Court Opinion

ID: 9755910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:59:25.405712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:12.910206
License: Public Domain

BATTAGLIA, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that, “Officer Moro did not have a reasonable basis for frisking petitioner and that the evidence recovered by him as a result of the frisk and subsequent extended search was inadmissible.” To reach that result, the majority parses away at and ignores all of the circumstances surrounding the stop and frisk. Having eliminated the context within which the stop and frisk occurred, the majority then determines that Officer Moro’s observation of the bulge in Ransome’s pocket, without more, was insufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to justify a frisk. In my opinion, this “divide and conquer” analysis is inappropriate.
Further, I believe that in the course of segmenting and discounting each of the factors surrounding the stop and frisk, the majority ignores the Supreme Court’s mandate that we pay due regard to the trial court’s factual findings and inferences, as well as the tenets of our well-established standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress. That standard requires us to consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most *118favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, which, in this case, was the State. For these reasons, and the reasons discussed herein, I am compelled to respectfully dissent.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nathan v. State, 370 Md. 648, 659, 805 A.2d 1086, 1093 (2002)(citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1875, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999)). “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 571, 774 A.2d 420, 430 (2001)(quoting, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977))(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Reasonableness depends “ ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” Id. (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09, 98 S.Ct. at 332, 54 L.Ed.2d at 336)(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,. 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). With respect to a frisk for weapons, an “officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909. “[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. A frisk for weapons is justified when “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. Since Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court has “said repeatedly” that courts “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case” in making “reasonable-suspicion determinations.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. at 750, 151 L.Ed.2d at 749 (2002)(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 *119L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)(stating that “the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account”) (citations omitted)); see also Nathan, 370 Md. at 660, 805 A.2d at 1093 (stating that “[t]he determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed is made by looking at the totality of the circumstances in each case to see whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting illegal activity”).
Because the totality of the circumstances is so crucial to a proper analysis of reasonable suspicion, and is what the majority seemingly fails to consider, I shall briefly discuss the suppression hearing evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the stop and frisk in the instant case.
Officer Moro was the only witness who testified at that hearing. He identified himself as a member of the Baltimore City Police Department’s “flex unit,” a specialized force that targets areas of the city with high rates of violent crime, narcotic sales, and handgun use. At approximately 11:20 p.m. on Friday, July 28, 2000, he and two other officers, all in plain clothes, were patrolling the 100 block of North Decker Street in an unmarked car. They were patrolling that area because of numerous citizen complaints regarding the discharging of guns, narcotics activity, and loitering.
Officer Moro’s patrol car turned from Fayette Street onto North Decker Street and headed south on that street. The night was dark, North Decker was dimly lit, and devoid of pedestrian traffic except for Ransome, who was about “10 to 12” feet from Officer Moro when the officer first noticed him, and one other individual next to whom Ransome was standing. As the patrol car approached and started slowing down, Ransome turned to his right to face the vehicle and gazed at Officer Moro for approximately 15 seconds. At that point, Officer Moro, seated in the rear passenger side of the vehicle, noticed a large bulge in Ransome’s left front pants pocket. He testified that what drew his attention to the bulge was “[t]he fact it was so visible in the pants.” He exclaimed to his fellow officers that he suspected it was a gun.
*120The officers then got out of the car and Officer Moro approached Ransome, and asked him, “hey man, you mind if I speak to you?” Ransome stared at Officer Moro, but gave no response. Officer Moro then asked Ransome his name and where he lived. Officer Moro testified that he did so in order to “feel out the situation.” He explained that “[fit’s a tactical approach.” Ransome answered both questions, and during the interaction, Officer Moro noted that Ransome avoided eye contact and that his voice indicated he was nervous.1
Officer Moro then told Ransome to place his hands on his head and proceeded to do a pat down search, starting at Ransome’s waistline. He explained that he started at the waistline, rather than going directly to the bulge in the pocket, because “it’s a systematic pat-down. I’m going off of what I was trained. I directly go to the waist area. [Ninety] percent of whatever is concealed, it’s concealed in the waist area. Then I move into the left pocket and conducted my outer garment pat-down throughout the whole course of the body.”
He felt a bulge in the waist area, which he suspected to be narcotics. Officer Moro continued his search for weapons, eventually coming to the bulge in the pants pocket, which felt hard. He then went back up to the bulge in the waist area, lifted Ransome’s shirt, and saw a plastic bag with what appeared to be marijuana. He recovered the drugs, arrested Ransome, and upon conducting a full search incident to the arrest, also recovered cocaine. The large bulge in the left front pants pocket turned out to be over $ 900 dollars in cash comprised of 37 bills wadded up into a ball.
The trial court judge explicitly found Officer Moro’s testimony to be credible and determined: “[W]e have a bulge, a nervousness in response, we have the environment, ... we have the flex unit purposes, [and] the citizen complaints ... of discharging of weapons and trafficking in drugs.” The court then concluded that in light of all the circumstances, Officer *121Moro had a “reasonable articulable suspicion” to stop and frisk Ransome. I agree.
The Supreme Court has declared that in analyzing whether there was reasonable suspicion, “a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996). Similarly, this Court has declared that in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we give “all favorable inferences to the State.” In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 529, 789 A.2d 607, 610 (2002); see also Wilkes, 364 Md. at 569, 774 A.2d at 429 (stating that “[w]e review the facts found by the trial court in the light most favorable to the prevailing party” which is the State when a motion to suppress is denied); Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 488, 701 A.2d 691, 693 (1997).
Despite the trial judge’s findings as to the circumstances conti-ibuting to Officer Moro’s reasonable suspicion — the bulge, nervousness, environment, flex unit purpose, and citizen complaints of weapons being discharged and drug activity— the majority questions “the extent to which they, or indeed any of them, were truly a factor in the decision to stop and frisk petitioner.” The majority refers to the following testimony from Officer Moro as the source of its speculation:
[Court]: You testified here to what you observed about his demeanor as being a relevant part of your thinking process as an officer, a professional. Why wouldn’t that be incorporated ... in your [probable cause] report?
[Moro]: That’s one part, your honor. The part I focused on in my report was that, based upon observing the bulge, that I became fearful at this point of the bulge and, based upon my training and experience, I know that weapons are concealed in the waistband, concealed in pockets and based upon just observing the bulge alone of being possi*122bly a hard object or weapon that that would give me enough reasonable suspicion as well as becoming [fearful] of my safety and my other officers, that I had enough to go do a stop and frisk on this gentleman.
The court continued to press the officer:
[Court]: Well, not to make a fine point of it ... [i]f you drove by him on north decker, you [wouldn’t] be fearful [that] he would pull out a gun and start shooting at you?
You must drive past people with guns unfortunately.
[Moro]: Would I be fearful?
Yes.-
[Court]: ... Fearful of what?
[Moro]: Of my safety. Fearful he might have a gun, would draw the gun and take my life. Based upon the bulge, I was going to conduct a stop and frisk. The reason I asked these questions were just to buy me time to feel him out, but I was — at that point, I was going to do a stop and frisk.
But that was not the only testimony from Officer Moro regarding his rationale for deciding to conduct a stop and frisk. The officer also testified:
[Moro]: I approached the defendant and asked if I could speak with him.
[Q:] What did he say at that point?
[Moro]: He was looking at me, made no comments, just made eye contact with me.'
[Q]: What happened next?
[Moro]: At which point I approached him I asked him a couple of questions as what is your name? And he gave his name as Deshawn Ransome.
Now, while he’s talking to me I’m noticing the defendant’s eyes are not really, not making any more contact with me *123and it appears his voice was getting real nervous at this point.
[Q]: And what did you do at that point, officer?
[Moro]: At that point, based on what I’m seeing with the bulge in his pocket and the way the defendant’s mannerism, the way he’s talking to me, at that point I advised him to place his hands on top of his head and conducted an outer garment pat down based upon all my observations and defendant’s mannerisms.
By focusing on the officer’s testimony while being questioned by the court about his probable cause report, and ignoring portions of his testimony where he describes his rationale for stopping and frisking Ransome, the majority fails to “review the facts found by the trial court in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,” Wilkes, 364 Md. at 569, 774 A.2d at 429, and fails to objectify that review in light of the totality of circumstances in which the officers found themselves.
The test is whether a reasonable officer, in light of all the circumstances known to him at the time, would have effectuated a stop and frisk. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently spoke of this in State v. McGill, 234 Wis.2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795 (2000). There, the court observed that “the record establishes a number of very specific facts that support [a reasonable suspicion], although not all were relied upon by the officer as a part of his subjective analysis of the situation.” Id. at 570, 609 N.W.2d at 801. “But ... this is an objective test,” the court declared, “and therefore certain factors, such as the time of night and the fact that the officer was alone, can and should be part of the equation.” Id. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained that Terry v. Ohio, supra, did not “restrict its reasonableness analysis to the factors the officer testifies to having subjectively weighed in his ultimate decision to conduct the frisk.” Id. at 571, 609 N.W.2d at 801-02. To the contrary, the court recognized that Terry establishes an objective test: “ ‘would the facts available to the officer at the *124moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?’” Id., 609 N.W.2d at 802 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the court concluded that it could “look to any fact in the record, as long as it was known to the officer at the time he conducted the frisk and is otherwise supported by his testimony at the suppression hearing.” Id. See also United States v. Roggeman, 279 F.3d 573, 580 n. 5 (8th Cir.2002) (stating that the objective, reasonable suspicion test is not based on “what the searching officer actually believed but what a hypothetical officer in exactly the same circumstances reasonably could have believed”). Unfortunately, the majority in this case fails to adhere to these tenets.
Equally as unpersuasive is the majority’s position that Officer Moro failed to adequately articulate why he found the circumstances surrounding the stop and frisk to be suspicious. Specifically, the majority complains that “Officer Moro never explained why he thought that petitioner’s stopping to look at his unmarked car as it slowed down was suspicious or why petitioner’s later nervousness or loss of eye contact, as two police officers accosted him on the street, was suspicious.” Additionally, the majority explains that it “understand[s] that conduct that would seem innocent to an average layperson may properly be regarded as suspicious by a trained or experienced officer.” But for an officer to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion based on such conduct, the Court concludes, the officer must “offer some explanation of why he or she regarded the conduct as suspicious; otherwise, there is no ability to review the officer’s action.” “Terry requires,” the majority continues, “the officer to point to ‘specific and articulable facts’ justifying his conduct.’ ”
. “Terry does not require,” however, “the law-enforcement officer performing the search to state the reasons justifying the search articulately, only that such reasons be articulable.”. Roggeman, 279 F.3d at 583-84. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Officer Moro needed to and did fail to point to “specific and articulable facts” justifying the stop and frisk. Moreover, I also disagree with the very premise of the majori*125ty’s statements, for it does not take a specially trained law enforcement officer to reasonably conclude that the factors here were suspicious. At almost midnight on a deserted and dimly lit street in an area of Baltimore City plagued with gun fire and narcotics activity, Officer Moro and his fellow officers, while traveling in their unmarked patrol car, came upon Ransome and his companion. Ransome did not just glance at Officer Moro, he gazed directly at Moro for fifteen seconds, physically turning his body to the right to face the officer’s unmarked car head on. And at that moment, still locked in Ransome’s gaze, Officer Moro noticed the large bulge in Ransome’s left front pants pocket. He immediately suspected that it was a weapon. These factors would appear suspicious to an objective reasonable person, even without any specialized law enforcement training or experience.
That is, unless you change the scene to that of an airport, as the majority has done by relying on the case of United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir.1982). In that case, Gooding arrived at Washington National Airport on a flight from New York City at about 3:00 p.m. Id. at 79. Gooding caught the attention of officers who were patrolling the airport for drug couriers because most of the passengers on his flight were wearing business suits, while he was dressed in slacks, a sweater, and a coat. Id. The officers followed Gooding and noted that he carried a briefcase and flight bag, but picked up no checked baggage. He also appeared “nervous” and “suspicious” to one of the officers. Id. Another described him as appearing “angry” and “ ‘distraught’ over someone’s not being there.” Id. Gooding made a telephone call, and “appeared to get no response.” Id. After making a second call, he went into a bar for one minute, left, entered a restaurant and ate for 25 minutes, and then made a third telephone call. Id. Thereafter, he departed the airport and started walking towards public transportation. Id.
At that point, two of the officers who were following Gooding approached him, identified themselves as police, and eventually asked to search his briefcase and flight bag. Id. at 79-80. After Gooding consented, the officers recovered cocaine *126and arrested him. Id. at 80. Gooding was later charged with possession and intent to distribute, and after Gooding’s pretrial motion to exclude that evidence was denied, he was convicted on those charges. Gooding appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which vacated the conviction and remanded because “his seizure was impermissible under the fourth amendment.” Id. at 84-85.
The Gooding court explained that in making reasonable suspicion determinations, courts should “take into account that trained law enforcement officers may be ‘able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.’ ” Id. at 82 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1882, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)(Powell, J., concurring)). The court cautioned, however, that “any such special meaning must be articulated to the courts and its reasonableness as a basis for seizure assessed independently of the police officers’ subjective assertions, if the courts rather than the police are to be the ultimate enforcers of the principle.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362 (1979)). Applying these principles to “objective criteria articulated by the police for the detention of [a] citizen,” the court concluded that the seizure was “impermissible under the fourth amendment.” Id. at 84. Those “objective criteria” were as follows:
1) [defendant] arrived from New York, a source city for drugs; 2) he was dressed casually on a 3:00 p.m. businessmen’s flight; 3) he made a telephone call immediately after arriving and subsequently made two other phone calls; 4) he scanned the concourse after deplaning; 5) he acknowledged the agent’s presence in an alleged cat-and-mouse game of mutual surveillance, and 6) to two of the agents his demeanor appeared distraught and nervous.
Id. at 83. The court noted that although many of these criteria appear in “ ‘drug courier profiles,’ ” it had “specifically held that a drug courier profile, without more, does not create a reasonable and articulable suspicion.” Id. at 83. Thus, it concluded that the seizure was unconstitutional.
*127If the facts in this case had taken place in an airport in the afternoon after a business flight, I would be more persuaded by the majority’s position that Officer Moro had to articulate how, in light of his specialized training and experience, he had found certain factors to be suspicious. Indeed, an average layperson would not find it suspicious, in my opinion, to see Ransome and his companion walking through an airport together. And the bulge in Ransome’s front pants pocket would not seem out of the ordinary or indicate anything suspicious, as most of us have experienced travel, if not on planes then on trains or buses, and understand that one carries more personal items when traveling than one would normally. Indeed, in hasty travel and wanting of baggage space, people often pack their pockets with bulky items.
But our facts did not take place in an airport. Quite to the contrary, Ransome was located on a poorly lit city street, close to midnight, in an area in which complaints about the discharging of weapons and narcotics trafficking had been received. Viewed within those circumstances, it does not take the expertise of a police officer to know that an unusually large bulge in the front pocket of pants, coupled with a fifteen second gaze and subsequent nervousness, is a suspicious set of circumstances.
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, two police officers on routine patrol observed Mimms driving an automobile with expired tags and stopped him because of that. 434 U.S. at 107, 98 S.Ct. at 331, 54 L.Ed.2d at 334. One of the officers asked Mimms to step out of the car and produce his license and title. Id. When Mimms exited the car, the officer noticed “a large bulge under [Mimms’s] sports jacket.” Id. “Fearing that the bulge might be a weapon, the officer frisked [Mimms] and discovered in his waistband a .38-caliber revolver loaded with five rounds of ammunition.” Id. Mimms was then arrested and indicted for carrying a concealed deadly weapon and for unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. Id., 434 U.S. at 107, 98 S.Ct. at 331, 54 L.Ed.2d at 335. Prior to trial, Mimms filed a motion to suppress, which was denied, and he was convicted for the above mentioned charges. Id.
*128The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on the basis that the officer’s ordering Mimms to get out of his car was an impermissible seizure. Id. With respect to the bulge, however, it “was willing to assume, arguendo, that the limited search for weapons was proper once the officer observed the bulge under [Mimms’s] coat.” Id., 434 U.S. at 107, 98 S.Ct. at 331-32, 54 L.Ed.2d at 335.
The Supreme Court not only assumed, but specifically ruled that the search was justified. The Court stated that “[u]nder the standard enunciated in [Terry v. Ohio ] whether ‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate’ — there is little question the officer was justified.” Id. at 112, 98 S.Ct. at 334, 54 L.Ed.2d at 337-38 (internal quotations omitted). The Court explained that “[t]he bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer.” Id. “In these circumstances,” the Court concluded, “any man of ‘reasonable caution’ would likely have conducted the ‘pat down.’ ” Id., 434 U.S. at 112, 98 S.Ct. at 334, 54 L.Ed.2d at 338.
The majority’s answer to Mimms is simply that each case must be judged upon its own facts, and that to apply Mimms “uncritically to any large bulge in any man’s pocket, would allow the police to stop and frisk virtually every man they encounter.” I do not suggest that the Mimms decision, or any other case, should be applied uncritically. What I do strongly suggest, however, is that the circumstances of the instant case are at least as compelling as those in Mimms. Mimms dealt with a traffic stop, which, by its nature, is particularly dangerous for officers. So also is a street encounter with a nervous citizen at night in an area specifically known for being infested with narcotics and having a problem with people discharging weapons. Thus, in my view, the combination of factors here was at least as compelling as those in Mimms.
*129Also, I am no more convinced by the majority’s attempt to distinguish the many other cases cited by the State. “[T]o be sure,” the majority concedes, “[tjhere have been ... many cases in which a bulge in a man’s clothing, along with other circumstances, has justified a frisk.” But “[e]ach of those cases,” according to the majority, “presents a combination of circumstances justifying a reasonable belief that the bulge noticed by the officer may be a weapon or that criminal activity may be afoot, a combination lacking here.” Unlike the defendants in those cases, the majority continues, “petitioner had done nothing to attract police attention other than being on the street with a bulge in his pocket at the same time Officer Moro drove by.”
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s sanitization of the facts. Ransome did not just happen to be strolling down the street with a companion when Officer Moro drove by. Ran-some was on a dimly lit street devoid of any pedestrian traffic except for himself and his companion, near midnight, in an area of the city known for narcotics dealing, gun fire, and loitering. Officer Moro did not just, as the majority characterizes it, “[drive] by.” As a member of a specialized police unit that deals with violent crime, Officer Moro and his fellow officers were patrolling North Decker Street in response to numerous citizen complaints regarding drugs, weapons, and loitering. It is within this context (which the majority inappropriately avoids) that Officer Moro noted Ransome’s gaze and identified the large bulge in Ransome’s left front pants pocket.
The majority asserts that Ransome “had not committed any obvious offense”; he was not “behind a residence2 or found on a day care center porch late at night.” He “was not without identification, was not a known criminal or in company with one, was not reaching for the bulge in his pocket or engaging *130in any other threatening conduct, did not take evasive action or attempt to flee, and the officer was not alone to face him.” That the circumstances here are riot exactly the same as those in the cases relied upon by the State is inconsequential. Essentially, the majority is taking a cookie cutter approach to Terry stops. The combination of factors here is just as compelling, if not more persuasive, than those distinguished in the State’s cases. For all of the reasons mentioned above, I respectfully dissent.
Judge CATHELL authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissent.

. Although the officer did not include that information in a probable cause report or a statement of charges, he testified that he does not always put all details in those reports.

. I take issue with the majorities recitation of the facts on this point. Indeed, Officer Moro testified at the suppression hearing that when he stopped and searched Ransome, Ransome was in front of "[a] dwelling.”