Court Opinion

ID: 9563783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:46:58.997311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.612222
License: Public Domain

BROOKS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that “package-deal” plea agreements must be rejected as being contrary to both law and public policy. I respectfully disagree.
It requires no citation of authority to state that such agreements are far from unique, and not a single case has been cited wherein such an agreement has been declared to be illegal per se. To the contrary, “package-deals” have long been a valuable and accepted tool to prosecutors who often have a need for all defendants, or none, to plead guilty. Prosecutors have a legitimate interest in avoiding the time, delay and expense of multiple trials or of a single trial of multiple defendants. More importantly, without the availability of a “package-deal”, a prosecutor is placed in a difficult position should one defendant plead and another go to trial since the defendant who pleads may thereafter become an adverse witness on behalf of his co-defendant, free of jeopardy.
Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, the prosecutor in the instant case did not “[p]rohibit the court’s independent consideration and determination of each defendant’s case.” To place the “blame” on the prosecutor is to ignore the fact that the agreements are bilateral in nature and presumably contain provisions which are of benefit to all parties as well as promoting judicial economy. In this regard, in the absence of the plea agreements, appellants faced prison terms in excess of 14 years.
If the “package-deal” was offensive to the trial judge in this case, it was within his *428power to reject it. His “hands were tied” only in the sense that he was not free to renegotiate the agreements for the parties. Right or wrong, this is one of the foundations of the plea bargaining process.
The record fully supports the unchallenged findings of the trial court that appellants entered into the plea agreements knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently and with a full appreciation of the constitutional rights which were waived thereby. The record also supports the trial court’s findings of a factual basis for the crimes charged, and these findings also stand unchallenged on appeal.
It simply appears that once appellants had the opportunity to review the presentence report, wherein the probation officer recommended a lighter sentence than that provided for in the plea agreements, they understandably suffered from an attack of “buyer’s remorse” and sought to enforce those provisions which were to their benefit but attempted to avoid those conditions which were to their disadvantage. This is the untenable position which appellants have continued to maintain on appeal. In fact, the final result reached by the majority is contrary to that sought by appellants. They have not requested that the plea agreements be set aside, as has now been done, but only seek to be sentenced without the undesirable conditions. The majority properly concedes that this court is without authority to mandate the requested relief, but then responds by voiding the agreements in their entirety, a result which appellants have neither requested nor apparently desire. Indeed, it is conceivable that they may ultimately regret having filed this appeal in the first instance.
With regard to the majority’s disenchantment with the prosecutorial discretion in this case, and its concern with certain aspects of plea bargaining in general, I readily recognize that prosecutors possess almost unlimited discretion and that they have emerged as the most powerful figures in the criminal justice system. The advisability of this state of affairs may well be subject to question, but it does not permit the result reached by the majority in this appeal.
I would affirm the judgments and sentences of the trial court.