Court Opinion

ID: 9494327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:35:42.163513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:21.651023
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the judgment and in all but part II of the majority opinion. In part II the majority holds that because Bellamy knew that the government was seeking an upward departure under § 2K2.5 of the Sentencing Guidelines for brandishing during his offense of possession of a firearm in a school zone, he had sufficient notice that the district court might depart under § 5K2.0 of the Guidelines for bran-dishing in connection with the separate felon-in-possession offense. The majority therefore concludes that the district court committed “no error, plain or otherwise, in Bellamy’s sentencing.” Ante at 455. I respectfully disagree. The district court’s departure pursuant to § 5K2.0 constitutes *457plain error because the court failed to provide notice of its intent to depart on that ground, as required by Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991). Although the court committed plain error, I concur in the judgment because Bellamy has not established that the plain error affected his substantial rights.
Bellamy was convicted of two separate offenses: (1) possession of a firearm in a school zone in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. '§ 922(g). After Bellamy was convicted, the government moved for, and the pre-sentence report recommended, a departure under Application Note 4 of § 2K2.5 because he had brandished his pistol while committing the offense of possession of a firearm in a school zone. Application Note 4 of § 2K2.5 provides, “Where the firearm was brandished, discharged, or otherwise used, in a ... school zone, and the cross reference from subsection (c)(1) [of § 2K2.5] does not apply, an upward departure may be warranted.” At sentencing the district court did not consider the motion and recommendation for an upward departure under § 2K2.5 for brandishing the firearm in a school zone. Instead, the court departed under § 5K2.0 for brandishing in connection with the separate felon-in-possession offense. Bellamy, however, did not receive prior notice that a § 5K2 .0 departure was being considered. Neither the presen-tence report nor the government had recommended a departure under § 5K2.0, and Bellamy did not learn of the court’s intention to depart under that section until sentencing, when the court departed on its own under § 5K2.0.
The district court’s failure to notify Bellamy of its intention to depart under § 5K2.0 for the felon-in-possession offense constitutes plain error. In Burns v. United States the Supreme Court held that:
before a district court can depart upward on a ground not identified as a ground for departure either in the pre-sentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government, Rule 32 requires that the district court give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a ruling. This notice must specifically identify the ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure.
501 U.S. 129, 138-39, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (emphasis added). Notice is essential because it allows the defendant a full and fair opportunity to challenge a proposed departure. See id. at 136, 111 S.Ct. 2182 (“ ‘Th[e]right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed’ that a decision is contemplated.”) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (alteration in original)). For notice to be effective, it must allow the opportunity “for focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues relevant to determining the appropriate Guidelines sentence.” Id. at 134, 70 S.Ct. 652. Here, neither the pre-sentence report nor the government’s motion suggested a departure under § 5K2.0 for the felon-in-possession offense. Bellamy only had notice of the recommendation to depart under § 2K2.5 for the separate crime of possession of a firearm in a school zone. The district court completely failed to provide notice that identified § 5K2.0 as the specific ground on which it intended to depart.
The majority contends that because Bellamy knew that the presentence report and the government recommended a departure under § 2K2.5 for the offense of possession of a firearm in a school zone, he had notice that the district court contemplated departure under § 5K2.0 for the separate felon-in-possession offense. The majority says that in every departure decision (whether it be under § 2K2.5, the *458general departure provision of § 5K2.0, or otherwise), a defendant must be prepared to argue that his case does not fall outside the heartland of situations encompassed within an applicable guideline. See ante at 455. Thus, the majority decides that Bellamy had notice of a potential § 5K2.0 departure because he “should have been prepared to argue not only the discrete defense [that Application Note 4 of § 2K2.5 did not apply], but also that-as a general matter and not-withstanding its treatment in other sections of the Guidelines — the brandishing in no way rendered his case exceptional.” Ante at 455. In other words, because Bellamy had to be prepared to argue that his case was not exceptional for a § 2K2.5 departure on one offense, he should have been prepared to argue that his case was not exceptional for a § 5K2.0 departure on the other offense.
Even if, as the majority suggests, Bellamy was in a position to argue that his case was not outside the heartland of felon-in-possession cases, this does not mean that the district court did not commit an error under Bums. The majority’s point, I believe, goes to the question of whether the court’s failure to provide notice affected Bellamy’s substantial rights. See United States v. Cedelle, 89 F.3d 181, 184 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that under plain error analysis, the “asserted defect in the trial proceedings must, in fact, be error; the error must be plain; and, it must affect the substantial rights of the defendant”). The district court failed to notify Bellamy of its intent to depart under § 5K2.0 for the felon-in-possession offense, and this constitutes plain error. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 138-39, 111 S.Ct. 2182 (holding that the notice of departure “must specifically identify the ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure” (emphasis added)). The majority’s assertion that Bellamy should have been prepared to argue, as a general matter, that his case was unexceptional only tends to show that the district court’s error did not prejudice Bellamy. Although Bellamy did not have notice of the court’s intent to depart, he is not prejudiced (1) because he should have been equipped to argue to the district court that his conduct was not outside the heartland of felon-in-possession cases and (2) because he has not been able to explain to us why his conduct was not outside this heartland.
Again, the Supreme Court made it clear in Bums that “before a district court can depart upward on a ground not identified ... either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government,” the court must give the parties reasonable notice that “specifically identifies]” the contemplated grounds for departure. Burns, 501 U.S. at 138-39, 111 S.Ct. 2182. Because no notice was given on the § 5K2.0 departure, I would hold that the district court committed a Bums error. Nevertheless, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Bellamy is not entitled to relief. To obtain relief under plain error analysis, Bellamy must prove that the district court’s error “affected his substantial rights, i.e., that it was prejudicial.” United States v. Hastings, 134 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir.1998). Here, Bellamy has failed to show that the district court’s Bums error affected his substantial rights. First, as the majority points out, Bellamy was in a position to argue that his case was not outside the heartland of felon-in-possession cases. This is because the argument he would have to make to avoid a departure under § 2K2.5 is substantially the same as the argument he would have to make to avoid a departure under § 5K2.0. In both instances, Bellamy would have to show that his acts of brandishing a firearm in a crowded school and pointing a firearm at a school teacher did not constitute exceptional conduct. See United States v. Barber, 119 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir.1997) (“[T]he sentencing court may depart only if it concludes that the factor is *459present to such an exceptional or extraordinary degree that it is outside the heartland of situations encompassed within the applicable guideline.”). Because the arguments under § 2K2.5 and § 5K2.0 are essentially the same and Bellamy had notice of a potential departure under § 2K2.5, he was in a position to argue that his case was not exceptional under § 5K2.0. Second, Bellamy has not offered any indication that his conduct was within the heartland of felon-in-possession cases. For these reasons, the district court’s error in failing to give the required notice did not prejudice Bellamy. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.