Court Opinion

ID: 9915587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 20:01:55.790937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:40.410226
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/24 House v. Skanska USA Civil West California District CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 ROSA HOUSE,

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E079363

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1204063)

 SKANSKA USA CIVIL WEST                                                  OPINION
 CALIFORNIA DISTRICT, INC. et al.,

          Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gilbert G. Ochoa,

Judge. Appeal dismissed.

         Rosa House, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

         Martenson, Hasbrouck & Simon, David L. Lewis and Houston A. Hatfield for

Defendants and Respondents.

                                                             1
       Rosa House appeals from an order granting defendants’ motion to enforce and to

modify a settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (unlabeled

statutory references are to this code). We conclude that the order is not appealable, and

we accordingly dismiss the appeal.

                                     BACKGROUND

       In August 2014, House filed an amended complaint against Skanska USA Civil

West California District, Inc. and Skanska-Rados (defendants), alleging causes of action

for trespass, negligence, and private nuisance. In December 2021, the parties attended a

mandatory settlement conference and reached an agreement.

       At a hearing on the matter, defendants’ counsel stated that the parties had reached

the following agreement: “The parties have agreed to settle for a total of $50,000.

Payment to be made within 45 days of the execution of the long-form agreement. The

long-form agreement will be sent to plaintiff’s counsel within two days. [¶] Upon

execution of the long-form agreement, plaintiff will file a request for dismissal within

five days and each side is to bear its own cost and attorneys’ fees.”

       The court asked House if she heard and accepted the terms of the agreement, and

she answered both questions, “Yes.” Defendants’ principal and counsel also indicated

that they agreed to the settlement as read. The court set an order to show cause

concerning dismissal in March 2022, which the court would take off calendar if the

“closing documents” were filed. House began representing herself a few weeks after the

hearing.

                                             2
       In April 2022, defendants filed a motion under section 664.6 to modify terms of

the settlement agreement and to enforce the agreement. Defendants sought to remove the

condition requiring House to sign the long-form settlement agreement before defendants

paid House the agreed amount and the case was dismissed. In support of the motion,

defendants’ counsel detailed the efforts he had undertaken to effectuate the agreement

and outlined the communications he had with House concerning settlement after the

agreement had been reached. House refused to execute the written settlement agreement,

even after defendants modified it to address some of her concerns.

       House opposed the motion. House argued, among other things, that (1) because

each party had agreed to pay their own costs and fees, defendants should pay House $752

plus interest for a deposition that defendants took, and (2) the court should enter

judgment in her favor in the amount of $471,000 or set the matter for trial because

defendants had violated the court’s order.

       The court held a hearing on defendants’ motion on May 19, 2022. Before the

hearing, the court issued a tentative ruling, which was given to the parties. The tentative

ruling indicated that the court was inclined to grant defendants’ motion and deny House’s

request for $752 in deposition costs and for entry of judgment in her favor of over

$400,000, and it further stated that the matter would be “dismissed upon payment of the

funds by defendant.”

       At the hearing, defendants’ counsel asked the court about how the matter would be

dismissed after payment, given that the parties’ agreement required House to request

dismissal within five days of receiving payment. The court replied: “When that doesn’t

                                             3
happen, the Court can dismiss it because you have agreed under [section] 664.6. Once

you made that check and you’ve given it to them, at that point in time, the case is

dismissed. So you need to come in on an ex parte, or whatever motion you want to file,

saying that you, you know, paid the check and that the matter should be dismissed.” The

court further reasoned, “I haven’t looked at the case law. It may be dismissed by

operation of law, but I don’t know. If I was the attorney on it, I would want to make sure

it was dismissed on the record.”

       The court adopted its tentative ruling as the final ruling. The minute order from

the hearing states: “The matter is dismissed upon payment of the funds by defendant.”

       House filed a notice of appeal in July 2022. She stated that she was appealing

from a “Judgment after court trial” entered on May 19, 2022, and also that she was

appealing from a “Motion to modify and enforce defendants’ long form settlement

agreement pursuant to” section 664.6.

                                      DISCUSSION

       The existence of an appealable order or “judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite

to an appeal.” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) We are independently

obligated “‘in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists.’” (Kirk v.

Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060.) If an “order is not appealable, we must

dismiss the appeal.” (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275, 277.)

       “The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v.

Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 (Dana Point).) Section 904.1 “lists appealable

judgments and orders” in civil cases. (Dana Point, supra, at p. 5.) Section 904.1 codifies

                                             4
“the one final judgment rule,” which provides that an appeal is generally only allowable

from a final judgment. (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756).

Interlocutory orders generally “‘are not appealable, but are only “reviewable on appeal”

from the final judgment.’” (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292-1293

(Doran).) Section 904.1 sets forth exceptions to the one final judgment rule and

identifies interlocutory orders that are appealable. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012)

206 Cal.App.4th 751, 780.) An order granting a motion under section 664.6 is not

included among the appealable interlocutory orders listed in section 904.1. (§ 904.1.,

subd. (a)(1)-(14).)

       Defendants argue that the appeal should be dismissed because the statement of

appealability in House’s opening brief does not comply with the rules of court, because

she fails to explain why the May 19, 2022, order is appealable. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

8.204(a)(2)(B).) In her opening brief, House contends that the appeal was taken under

section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1), from the trial court’s May 19, 2022, ruling, in which the

court entered “a final judgment.”1 We disagree.

       No judgment has been entered in this case. Nevertheless, in determining whether

an “order is interlocutory and nonappealable, or final and appealable,” we analyze “the

substance and effect of the adjudication, and not the form.” (Doran, supra, 76

1      In her reply brief, House contends that the order granting defendants’ section
664.6 motion “is appealable as a final order under [section] 904.1(a)(13) because it
constitutes a final disposition of the case.” That provision is inapplicable because it
makes appealable “an order granting or denying a special motion to strike under Section
425.16.” (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(13).)

                                             5
Cal.App.4th at p. 1293; Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5.) “If no issues in the action

remain for further consideration, the decree is final and appealable. But if further judicial

action is required for a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is

interlocutory” and not appealable unless it is otherwise statutorily appealable. (Doran, at

p. 1293.)

       The court ordered that it would not dismiss the case unless and until defendants

paid House the agreed amount. Thus, if defendants do not pay House $50,000, then the

case will not be dismissed. From the register of actions included in the record on appeal,

defendants did move for dismissal between the hearing on May 19, 2022, and July 2022,

when House filed her notice of appeal. But the record also reflects that the court has not

yet dismissed the action. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that defendants

paid House $50,000. The issues of both payment and dismissal thus remain unresolved.

Consequently, this is not a case in which the trial court merely failed to enter a formal

judgment but at the same time left no issues for future consideration, allowing us to

“amend [the] order to include a judgment.” (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th

1242, 1252; Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183.) Rather, the May 19,

2022, order granting defendants’ motion under section 664.6 did not finally dispose of

the case and consequently is not appealable.

                                               6
                                   DISPOSITION

     The appeal is dismissed. Defendants shall recover their costs of appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                            MENETREZ
                                                                                J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
          Acting P. J.

FIELDS
                        J.

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