Court Opinion

ID: 9628911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:33:59.582184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:22.622603
License: Public Domain

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I join in my dissenting colleagues’ discussions of the as-applied challenge, and conclude, as do they, that under intermediate scrutiny the identification/record-keeping requirements of § 2257 impose an unconstitutional burden on plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.
*370I share the majority’s reluctance to invalidate § 2257 in its entirety based on the hypothetical couple who create sexually-explicit depictions in private for their own use, as well as its preference for a resolution that permits § 2257 to operate within its constitutionally permissible reach. I have considered the alternative of simply agreeing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied and finding it unnecessary to address the facial challenge. But, notwithstanding my reluctance to reach the facial challenge, I agree with Judge Kennedy that § 2257’s sweep is so broad — even when the substantiality of its overbreadth is assessed relative to its plainly legitimate sweep — and its burdens so potentially chilling of protected speech, that requiring case-by-case challenges to its overbreadth is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
I do not agree with the majority that “[t]he record and the plaintiffs’ concessions establish that the overwhelming majority of applications of § 2257 do not offend the free-speeeh guarantees of the Constitution.” Maj. Op. at 339-40. Nor do I agree that plaintiffs’ challenge amounts to “leveraging a few alleged unconstitutional applications of the statute into a ruling invalidating the law in all of its applications.” Id. No doubt these differences stem at least in part from our divergent conclusions regarding the merits of plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge.
My joining in Judge Kennedy’s conclusion that the facial challenge should be upheld is based not only upon the application of § 2257 to the private couple, but also upon its application to plaintiffs and those like them, and to all adults who desire in any fashion to create, share, or disseminate non-obscene, sexually-explicit depictions of themselves, or other adults, without relinquishing their anonymity. While the majority correctly observes that we have no proof regarding the number of individuals who would be adversely affected by the application of § 2257, we do know that millions of adults exchange or share personally-produced sexually-explicit depictions. See J.A. at 1007-11 (stipulation of the parties noting the existence of, and incorporating an exhibit listing, over 13 million personal ads containing sexually-explicit text and images on a single website for sex and swinger personal ads, of which those examined showed that over 94% involved adults over 21).
While Williams and other cases cited by the majority do, indeed, as the majority stresses, require that a statute’s “overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” the majority cites no case where the application of this admonition resulted in the Court’s rejecting a facial challenge under circumstances such as those involved here. United States v. Williams, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1838, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). In Williams, the Court repeatedly rejected the defendant’s proffered unconstitutional applications as either not within the reach of the statute or not involving protected speech. Id. at 1842-44. Only the amici’s hypothetical movie distributor advertising a movie as containing footage of actual children engaging in actual or simulated sex, and the hypothetical documentary showing footage of child rape, arguably fell within both the statute’s sweep and the protections of the First Amendment. Id. at 1843-44. The Court viewed the movie-distributor hypothetical as “implausible” and the documentary hypothetical as adequately protected by an as-applied challenge. Id. The Court’s observation that “[i]n the vast majority of its applications, this statute raises no constitutional problems whatever,” id. at 1844, was not made in the context of millions of adults *371engaging in speech falling both within the statute’s sweep and the First Amendment’s protection. Such is the case here.
In Hicks, the Court found the substan-tiality requirement unsatisfied where the challenged regulation applied not just to those seeking to exercise First Amendment rights but also to strollers, loiterers, drug-dealers, roller skaters, and others not engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003). The court observed that “[rjarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech.” Id. at 124, 123 S.Ct. 2191. Here, the statute is addressed to conduct that is necessarily associated with speech; all the depictions that are the subject of § 2257 are speech, although those involving minors and those that are obscene are not protected by the First Amendment.
The instant case is, in this respect as in others, similar to Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002). In Watchtower, because the regulation affected a substantial amount of political and religious speech in addition to the targeted commercial speech, the Court found it necessary to look to whether the regulation struck an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the government’s interest in the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residents’ privacy. Id. at 164-69, 122 S.Ct. 2080. In evaluating this balance, the Court did not require statistics comparing the number of commercial canvassers affected to the number of non-commercial canvassers, or empirical data regarding the extent to which the regulation would deter protected speech. See id. at 168, 122 S.Ct. 2080. The Court was satisfied that the over-breadth was substantial based upon the inclusion of “ ‘Camp Fire Girls,’ ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses,’ ‘Political Candidates,’ ‘Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season,’ and ‘Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church,’ ” in the list of canvassers to which the ordinance applied. Id. at 165, 122 S.Ct. 2080. I would similarly conclude that whatever the ratio of sexually-explicit depictions involving persons who appear to be or are minors is to all sexually-explicit depictions, a substantial amount of sexually-explicit depictions involve persons who appear to be and are adults, and a substantial number of adults, like the Doe plaintiffs, will be deterred from sharing sexually-explicit pictures by the identification/record keeping requirements of § 2257.
Broadrick does, indeed, give me pause, particularly the Court’s admonition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine,” and its statement that “[a]lthough such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect — -at best a prediction— cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). However, in Broadrick, the statute’s proscriptions were clearly stated and included “a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass.” Id. at 616, 93 S.Ct. 2908. After observing that the statute was constitutional as applied to appellants’ conduct, and a long list of other conduct, the Court rejected the argument that because the statute had been interpreted as applying to “such allegedly protected activities as the wearing of political buttons or the use of bumper stickers,” id. *372at 618, 93 S.Ct. 2908, it should be struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court explained “as presently construed, we do not believe that § 818 must be discarded in toto because some persons’ arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.” Id. Here, the argument in favor of overbreadth does not rest upon “arguably protected conduct that may or not be caught or chilled.” It rests upon clearly protected conduct that, given its nature and the intrusiveness of the identification/record keeping requirement, is likely to be chilled.
As to the remedy, it appears all agree that the statute does not provide guidance as to how Congress would limit its reach. Maj. Op. at 337-39, 341-42; Dis. Op. at 359-61 (Kennedy, J.). Thus, it is not susceptible to a limiting construction without entering into Congress’ policy-making domain. The possibility of enjoining the unconstitutional applications of the law while preserving the other valid applications of the law is identified as a theoretical option by the majority, but is not the path chosen by it. Maj. Op. at 341-^42. It seems, then, that all agree that this too is not a viable option. Dis. Op. at 359-61. The majority opts to “assume for the sake of argument that certain applications of the law would be unconstitutional but still reject a facial challenge.” Maj. Op. at 341-42. The cases cited in support of this path are substantial overbreadth cases. Hicks, supra, 539 U.S. 113, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148; N.Y. Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 14, 108 S.Ct. 2225 (1988) (“[W]e cannot conclude that the Law threatens to undermine the associational or expressive purposes of any club, let alone a substantial number of them.”); N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (“[W]e seriously doubt, and it has not been suggested, that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute’s reach.”); Broadrick, supra, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830. For the reasons stated, these cases do not support the majority’s path.
Lastly, I do not regard the majority opinion as foreclosing the litigation posited by Judge Kennedy.