Court Opinion

ID: 9719133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:43:11.364754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:30.693768
License: Public Domain

Fahrnbruch, J.,
dissenting in part, and in part concurring.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that gives the appellant credit on child support for the moneys paid by his parents to the appellee.
At the trial court level, it is obvious that in crediting the appellant with the $7,500 paid by his parents to appellee, the trial judge erroneously relied upon an affidavit of the appellant’s parents. The affidavit was apparently admitted pursuant to the hearsay exception defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-803(22) (Reissue 1989), which provides in part:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions [§ 27-803(1) to (21)] but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (c) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
The proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing each of the conditions established by § 27-803(22). See In re Estate of Schoch, 209 Neb. 812, 311 N.W.2d 903 (1981). At the trial in this case, there was no showing that the affidavit of appellant’s parents had any of the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
*426The critical issue to be addressed when considering the admission of evidence under the residual hearsay exception, § 27-803(22), is whether the circumstances surrounding the making of the hearsay statements provide guarantees of trustworthiness comparable to the other specific hearsay exceptions. In re Estate of Severns, 217 Neb. 803, 352 N.W.2d 865 (1984); State v. Beam, 206 Neb. 248, 292 N.W.2d 302 (1980). It is the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness of the speaker of the words at the time the affidavit was made which control. In re Estate of Schoch, supra (citing Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979)). See, also, Polonsky v. CNA Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 626 (1st Cir. 1988). Here, the affidavit was made only after the commencement of these proceedings and not at the time the appellant’s parents paid any of the $7,500. The trustworthiness of the affidavit is suspect.
Moreover, the affidavit of appellant’s parents was not more probative on the point for which it was offered than any other evidence which the proponent could procure through reasonable efforts. The evidence from appellant’s parents could have been produced by deposition or by their testimony at the trial. There was no showing at the trial that the parents were unable to submit to a deposition or appear at the trial. The appellee had no opportunity to cross-examine appellant’s parents as to the truth of the statements made in the affidavit.
Foundation for the affidavit’s admission into evidence was lacking, and, in my opinion, the affidavit should never have been admitted into evidence.
In giving the appellant credit for the $7,500 paid by his parents to the appellee, the majority of this court bypasses the question of the admissibility of the affidavit of appellant’s parents. The majority concludes that since the “ [r]elator admits in her own testimony that she received $7,500 in monthly payments made directly to her by respondent’s parents, which she used for support of the children,” the appellant should receive credit for those payments.
It is submitted that the mere fact that the appellee acknowledged that she received, over a period of time, $7,500 from her ex-husband’s parents and used it to support her children does not prove that such money, when given, was either *427intended to be or should be credited to the ex-husband’s obligation to pay child support.
At no time during the 14 years that she received money from appellant’s parents was appellee ever told that those payments were to be considered as child support. During that same period, appellee was never asked nor did she ever agree to accept the money from appellant’s parents as payment upon appellant’s obligation to pay child support.
I would not allow the appellant credit for the $7,500 paid by his parents to the appellee, but I agree in all other respects with the majority opinion.
Caporale and Shanahan, JJ., join in this dissent and concurrence.