Court Opinion

ID: 9882533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:17.408306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:11.951775
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Myers, 2023-Ohio-3413.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  ATHENS COUNTY

State of Ohio,                 :
                               :
     Plaintiff-Appellee,       :    Case No. 22CA15
                               :
     v.                        :
                               :    DECISION AND
Derek J. Myers,                :    JUDGMENT ENTRY
                               :
     Defendant-Appellant.      :    RELEASED 9/22/2023
_____________________________________________________________
                          APPEARANCES:

Emmett E. Robinson, Robinson Law Firm LLC, Wakeman, Ohio, for Appellant.

Lisa Eliason, Athens Law Director, and Jessica Branner Hittle, Assistant Law
Director, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________

Smith, P.J.

        {¶1} Appellant, Derek Myers, appeals the judgment of the Athens County

Municipal Court convicting him of failure to maintain an assured clear distance

ahead, a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A). On appeal, Myers

raises one assignment of error contending that the trial court wrongly denied his

motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, or R.C. 2945.71 et seq.,

and Traf.R. 18. Because we find merit to Myers’s sole assignment of error, it is

sustained and the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Further, the case is

remanded to the trial court for discharge pursuant to R.C. 2945.73.
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                               2

                                      FACTS

      {¶2} Derek Myers was cited for failure to maintain an assured clear distance

ahead on July 6, 2022, in connection with a vehicle accident that occurred in

Athens County, Ohio. His citation contained a service of summons ordering him

to appear in the Athens County Municipal Court on July 19, 2022. Myers

appeared at the hearing remotely and entered a written not guilty plea on that date.

A journal entry was filed on that same date ordering that a pretrial hearing be

scheduled on August 3, 2022, and stating that speedy trial time was tolled for the

period of the continuance.

      {¶3} Myers appeared in person for the August 3, 2022, pretrial hearing. The

trial court issued a “continuance entry” that same date continuing the case until

August 17, 2022, for the scheduling of a second pretrial hearing and for the

“prosecution to receive crash report and insurance information.” The entry stated

that speedy trial limits “are hereby waived for the length of this continuance.”

Myers appeared remotely for the next hearing on August 17, 2022. The hearing

transcript from that hearing indicates that the State refused to amend the charge

and Myers maintained his not guilty plea. The judge cleared a date of August 31,

2022, with the prosecutor for a bench trial and confirmed that the date worked with

Myers’s “schedule.” Another “continuance entry” was filed that day, again stating

that speedy trial limits were waived for the period the continuance.
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                3

      {¶4} Then, on August 24, 2022, Myers filed a motion to dismiss based upon

speedy trial grounds. His motion asserted that he had not waived his right to a

speedy trial, that speedy trial time had not been “legally tolled,” and that speedy

trial time had expired. The trial court orally denied the motion on the morning of

the August 31, 2022, bench trial and also issued a journal entry denying the motion

that same day. The bench trial proceeded as scheduled and Myers was found

guilty as charged. Myers now appeals from the final order that was issued on

September 2, 2022, setting forth one assignment of error for our review.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

      I.     THE TRIAL        COURT       WRONGLY     DENIED
             APPELLANT DEREK J. MYERS’S MOTION TO
             DISMISS FOR VIOLATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL
             ACT, R.C. 2945.71 et seq., AND TRAFFIC RULE 18.

      {¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Myers contends that the trial court

wrongly denied his motion to dismiss based upon speedy trial grounds. As set

forth above, Myers contends that the denial of his motion to dismiss was in

violation of R.C. 2945.71 et seq. and Traf.R. 18. In support of his assignment of

error, he argues that 56 days passed from the time he received service of summons

and when he was brought to trial. He also argues that the continuances that were

granted were in violation of Traf.R. 18 and that they did not effectively toll speedy

trial time. He further brings to our attention the fact that he never waived his right

to a speedy trial. The State responds by arguing that the trial court correctly denied
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                  4

Myers’s motion to dismiss, claiming that speedy trial time was tolled either upon

the trial court’s own motion or the agreed motions of the parties.

                                 Standard of Review

      {¶6} Generally, appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a motion

to dismiss based on statutory speedy trial grounds presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Spencer, 2017-Ohio-456, 84 N.E.3d 106, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.); State v.

Brooks, 2018-Ohio-2210, 114 N.E.3d 220, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.). An appellate court will

accept a trial court's findings of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence,

but the appellate court will independently review a trial court's application of the

law to the facts. Spencer at ¶ 16.

                               Speedy Trial Principles

      {¶7} A defendant's right to a speedy trial arises from the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10

of the Ohio Constitution. See State v. Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-

2904, 971 N.E.2d 937, ¶ 14; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33

L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). R.C. 2945.71 incorporates this guarantee, which provides

specific statutory time limits within which a person must be brought to trial. See

State v. Blackburn, 118 Ohio St.3d 163, 2008-Ohio-1823, 887 N.E.2d 319, ¶ 10.

The prosecution and trial courts have a mandatory duty to try an accused within the

statute's prescribed time frame. See State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 105, 362
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                  5

N.E.2d 1216 (1977). See also State v. Cutcher, 56 Ohio St.2d 383, 384, 384

N.E.2d 275 (1978).

      {¶8} Ohio's speedy trial statutes provide that if a defendant's trial is not held

within the time specified in R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.72, a court must discharge the

defendant upon motion made at, or before, the start of trial. R.C. 2945.73(B).

Additionally, speedy trial statutes must be strictly construed against the state. See

Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996).

      {¶9} When a defendant requests discharge on speedy trial grounds and

demonstrates that a trial did not occur within the speedy trial time limits, the

defendant has made a prima facie case for discharge. See State v. Camelin, 4th

Dist. Ross No. 18CA3642, 2019-Ohio-1055, ¶ 11; State v. Smith, 4th Dist.

Lawrence No. 16CA10, 2017-Ohio-7864, ¶ 21; State v. Cottrell, 4th Dist. Ross

Nos. 11CA3241, 2012-Ohio-4583, ¶ 10; State v. Kist, 173 Ohio App.3d 158, 2007-

Ohio-4773, 877 N.E.2d 747, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.). The prosecution then bears the

burden to show that actions or events chargeable to the accused under R.C.

2945.72 sufficiently extended the time to bring the defendant to trial. Smith at ¶

21, citing State v. Anderson, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 15CA3696, 2016-Ohio-7252, ¶

19.
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                   6

                                    Legal Analysis

      {¶10} Here, Myers’s traffic accident occurred on July 6, 2022, and his

traffic ticket that was issued that day served as his service of summons. Myers was

charged with failure to maintain an assured clear distance ahead, a minor

misdemeanor traffic offense in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A). R.C. 2945.71(A)

provides that “* * * a person * * * against whom a charge of minor misdemeanor

is pending in a court of record [ ] shall be brought to trial within thirty days after

the person’s arrest or service of summons.” Thirty days from Myers’s receipt of

his service of summons would have been on August 5, 2022. Thus, at the time

Myers filed his motion to dismiss based upon speedy trial grounds on August 24,

2022, 49 days had passed. Therefore, Myers made a prima facie showing that the

State failed to bring him to trial with the allotted 30 days. See State v. Howerton,

2021-Ohio-913, 168 N.E.3d 861, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). As explained in Howerton, at

the time a prima facie case for discharge was demonstrated, “[t]he burden then

shifted to the state to demonstrate that either a tolling event or other extension of

the statutory time limit occurred.” Id., citing State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28,

500 N.E.2d 1368 (1986) and State v. Smith, supra, at ¶ 21.

      {¶11} R.C. 2945.72 provides, in pertinent part, that the time to bring an

accused to trial may be extended by “(H) [t]he period of any continuance granted

on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                  7

other than upon the accused’s own motion[.]” As stated, the prosecution bears the

burden to show that actions or events chargeable to the defendant have tolled

sufficient time so that the defendant is tried within the speedy-trial period. State v.

Howerton, supra, citing State v. Camelin, supra, at ¶ 13, State v. Staffin, 4th Dist.

Ross No. 07CA2967, 2008-Ohio-338, ¶ 8 and State v. Whitt, 4th Dist. Scioto No.

04CA2962, 2005-Ohio-5154, ¶ 16. Here, although the State contends that speedy

trial time was tolled either upon the trial court’s own motion or the agreed motions

of the parties, we conclude the record before us does not support the State’s

contention.

                 July 6, 2022 - July 19, 2022 (13 speedy trial days)

      {¶12} Myers was cited and was provided a service of summons on July 6,

2022, ordering that he appear in court on July 19, 2022. The State concedes that

the 13 days between July 6th and July 19th were chargeable to the State for

purposes of speedy trial. Thus, as of July 19, 2022, 13 days had elapsed for

purposes of speedy trial.

               July 19, 2022 - August 3, 2022 (15 speedy trial days)

      {¶13} There is no hearing transcript in the record from the July 19, 2022,

hearing; however, the record included a written not guilty plea filed by Myers that

day. There was also a journal entry filed on July 19, 2022, stating that the “cause

came on for consideration upon the motion of the defendant” and that “for good
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                  8

cause shown, it is hereby ordered that: a pretrial be set.” The journal entry form

stated that a pretrial hearing was scheduled for August 3, 2022, and the form

contained a line that stated “Check if Speedy Trial time is tolled pursuant to law.”

The box was checked. The journal entry was only signed by the assignment

commissioner, was not signed by either party, and contained no signature line for

the judge.

      {¶14} There is simply nothing in the record to indicate that Myers requested

a pretrial hearing or that he requested a continuance. As stated, there is no hearing

transcript in the record related to this particular hearing and importantly, there is no

written motion for a continuance by Myers in the record. In his brief, Myers notes

that Traf.R. 18 requires that in traffic cases “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only

upon a written motion which states the grounds for the requested continuance.”

Myers directs our attention to this Court’s prior holding “that a trial court may not

grant an oral motion for a continuance in a traffic case.” State v. Osborne, 4th

Dist. Jackson No. 05CA2, 2005-Ohio-6610, ¶ 21. Therefore, even if Myers had

orally requested a continuance of the matter for purposes of holding a pretrial

hearing, because there was no written motion filed, the granting of a continuance

violated Traf.R. 18. Id. See also State v. Jacobucci, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

82813, 2003-Ohio-6177, ¶ 6; Oakwood v. Frailey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85973,
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                  9

2005-Ohio-5856, ¶ 22 (where the appellate court observed its prior holding “that

compliance with Traf.R. 18 is mandatory for each party”).

      {¶15} The State contends on appeal that the July 19, 2022 entry erroneously

stated that the matter was being continued until August 3, 2022, for the holding of

a pretrial hearing upon the defendant’s motion, but that it should have instead

stated that the matter was being continued for a pretrial hearing upon the court’s

own motion. In support of its contention, the State argues that such a continuance

would not run afoul of this Court’s prior holding in State v. Osborne or Traf.R. 18

because “the court’s journal entry served as both the written motion and stated the

reason for the continuance[,]” and therefore “the journal entry effectively satisfies

Traffic Rule 18 – that it be in writing and that a reason be given.” Thus, the State

essentially urges this Court to find that the July 19, 2022 journal entry was, in

reality, a sua sponte continuance issued by the court on its own motion and further,

that the entry not only constituted both a written motion and entry that complied

with both Traf.R. 18 and our prior reasoning in Osborne, but also that it effectively

tolled speedy trial time until the August 3, 2022 pretrial hearing. However, the

State cites no authority for these propositions and we are not persuaded by these

arguments.

      {¶16} Further, we conclude that the State’s argument that the trial court

meant to sua sponte continue the matter for the purposes of setting a pretrial
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                  10

hearing is merely conjecture, or speculation. Of importance, the journal entry at

issue was not even signed by the court. The entry seems to have been a standard

fill-in-the-blank form issued by the assignment commissioner. Moreover, we are

aware of no authority that grants an assignment commissioner the power to issue

orders that purport to toll speedy trial time, especially in the absence of a written

motion as required by Traf.R. 18. Thus, we find no merit to the State’s argument

that the trial court actually intended to order a sua sponte continuance.

       {¶17} In City of Greenfield v. Mallow, 4th Dist. Highland No. 454, 1982

WL 3585, this Court discussed the problems that result from permitting oral

motions. After observing that Traf.R. 18 provided that “[c]ontinuances shall only

be granted upon written motion which states the grounds for the requested

continuance[,]” we stated as follows:

       It is axiomatic that a court speaks through its journal and oral
       assertions of counsel at trial, at least when not concurred in by
       opposing counsel, [are] insufficient to meet the burden placed
       upon the trial court and the prosecution. To allow such oral
       assertions to obviate the speedy trial limitations “is to foreclose
       effective appellate review and, of necessity, to undercut a
       meaningful judicial implementation of R.C. 2945.71 through
       2945.73.” State v Wentworth (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 171, 175.

Id. at *2-3.

       {¶18} In light of the foregoing, we cannot agree with the State that the

journal entry filed on July 19, 2022 tolled speedy trial time until the next pretrial
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                               11

hearing that was held on August. 3, 2022. Accordingly, as of August 3, 2022, 28

days had elapsed for purposes of speedy trial.

             August 3, 2022 – August 17, 2022 (14 speedy trial days)

      {¶19} When the parties reconvened at the second pretrial hearing on August

3, 2022, a short hearing transcript was generated. The transcript is only 12 lines in

length and consists of the trial court informing Myers that it had “an entry to

continue this for two weeks to August 17th” and explaining that “[t]he prosecution

still needs to receive the crash report and insurance information.” Further, the

court stated “[s]o I’m going to go ahead and approve this continuance and set it out

for two weeks so they can finalize that information.” A “Continuance Entry”

signed by the judge was filed on August 3, 2022, continuing the case until August

17, 2022, “[u]pon motion of the Parties” in order for the “prosecution to receive

crash report and insurance information.” The continuance entry also stated that

“[s]peedy trial limits, as provided in R.C. 2945.71 et seq., are hereby waived for

the length of this continuance.” (Emphasis added). The State argues that Myers

appeared at the hearing and spoke with the prosecutor off the record and that the

parties agreed to continue the matter until August 17, 2022.

      {¶20} First, the hearing transcript does not contain an oral motion by either

party for a continuance and no written motion for a continuance was filed by either

party. The concerns expressed by our prior decision in State ex rel. Greenfield v.
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                               12

Mallow apply to this very scenario and even more so here where there is not even

an oral motion evident in open court upon the record. An off-the-record agreement

allegedly reached between the parties regarding a continuance in a traffic case fails

to comply with Traf.R. 18, which is a mandatory rule. Second, although the entry

cites the State’s need to obtain crash report and insurance information, no

discovery requests were filed by either party and therefore speedy trial time was

not tolled under any other section of R.C. 2945.72 for purposes of making and

complying with discovery. Third, and of utmost importance, contrary to the

statement in the entry that speedy trial time had been waived, there is no indication

in the record that Myers waived his right to a speedy trial either orally on the

record or in writing at any point during the proceedings below.

      {¶21} We previously explained as follows in Howerton, supra, regarding the

waiver of a defendant’s speedy trial rights:

      Generally, a criminal defendant may waive his or her speedy trial
      rights. See, e.g., State v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158, 637 N.E.2d
      903 (1994), syllabus; State v. O'Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 9, 516
      N.E.2d 218 (1987), citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529,
      92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. However, “[t]o be effective, an
      accused's waiver of his or her constitutional and statutory rights
      to a speedy trial must be expressed in writing or made in open
      court on the record.” King, syllabus.

Howerton at ¶ 19.

      {¶22} As in Howerton, we find no explicit waiver of Myers’s speedy trial

rights nor any request by Myers thus far that would have tolled speedy trial time.
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                               13

      {¶23} Moreover, a review of the record gives the impression that the State

and trial court at times used the terms toll and waiver, with respect to speedy trial,

interchangeably; however, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that a “speedy

trial waiver” and “the tolling provisions in R.C. 2945.72” are “separate and distinct

concepts that affect speedy trial calculations in different ways.” State v.

Blackburn, supra, at ¶ 16. The Court explained in Blackburn as follows:

      A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. State
      v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224,
      ¶ 18; State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845
      N.E.2d 470, ¶ 31. “As with other fundamental rights, a defendant
      can waive the right to a speedy trial.” State v. Adams, 43 Ohio
      St.3d at 69, 538 N.E.2d 1025. “To be effective, an accused's
      waiver of his or her constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy
      trial must be expressed in writing or made in open court on the
      record.” State v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158, 637 N.E.2d 903,
      syllabus.     On the other hand, R.C. 2945.72 provides
      circumstances that extend or toll the time within which an
      accused must be brought to trial but do not involve an intentional
      relinquishment of the fundamental right. R.C. 2945.72(H)
      extends the speedy-trial time for “[t]he period of any continuance
      granted on the accused's own motion.”

Blackburn at ¶ 17.

      {¶24} Contrary to the express representation in the August 3, 2022

continuance entry stating that the speedy trial limits were waived for the length of

the continuance from August 3, 2022, to August 17, 2022, the record contains no

waiver of speedy trial by Myers, either orally on the record in open court, or in

writing. Thus, Myers had not waived his right to a speedy trial at the time the case
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                14

was continued to August 17, 2002, at which time 42 days had elapsed for purposes

of speedy trial, and which clearly exceeded the 30 day limit for bringing him to

trial under R.C. 2945.71(A).

                August 17, 2022 – August 31, 2022 (14 speedy trial days)

      {¶25} Myers appeared in person at the August 17, 2022, hearing, at which

time the trial court set the matter for a bench trial on August 31, 2022. The trial

court selected a date for trial in coordination with the State based upon the officer’s

work schedule and asked Myers if the date worked with his schedule. Myers

appears to have answered in the affirmative, although a portion of the hearing

transcript is denoted as “inaudible.” The “Continuance Entry” filed after the

hearing stated that “[u]pon motion of the State/Defense, this case set for August

17, 2022 is hereby continued because additional time is required for preparation

and negotiation and/or: ________________.” Neither “State” or “Defense” is

circled on the form and the space after “and/or” was left blank. The form once

again stated that “[s]peedy trial limits * * * are hereby waived for the length of this

continuance[,]” despite there being no affirmative waiver of Myers’s right to

speedy trial.

      {¶26} Although speedy trial limits had already expired at the time the

August 17, 2022, hearing was convened, we will briefly address the State’s

arguments that Myers either acquiesced in the trial date or failed to object to the
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                 15

trial date being set beyond speedy trial limits. First, and importantly, at the time

the August 17, 2022 hearing was held, 42 speedy trial days had already elapsed,

which was well beyond the 30-day limit. Second, the State argues in its brief that

Myers’ argument that he did not agree to a continuance from August 17, 2022, to

August 31, 2022, “might be a little more believable if [he] had demanded a bench

trial on August 17 when the prosecutor stated she wouldn’t amend the charge. But

[Myers] neither demanded a bench trial nor objected to the continuance.”

However, aside from the fact that speedy trial time had already expired as of

August 17, 2022, in State v. Ramey the Supreme Court of Ohio held that where the

defense “merely acquiesces in a trial date but does not affirmatively lodge a motion

for continuance, the continuance is entered ‘other than upon the accused’s own

motion’ and, under the second clause of R.C. 2945.72(H), must be reasonable.”

State v. Ramey, supra, at ¶ 30, quoting R.C. 2945.72(H).

      {¶27} In Ramey, the Court questioned whether the continuance at issue that

was issued by the trial court was unreasonable, in part, because the trial court

“acted on the mistaken belief that the time for trial was automatically extended by

* * * Ramey’s counsel’s acquiescence in the trial date[]” and “[i]n doing so * * * it

failed to recognize that the extension was properly granted only under the second

clause of R.C. 2945.72(H).” Id. at ¶ 32. The entry at issue in the present case fails

to state whether it was the State or Defense who requested a continuance and
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                              16

contains nothing to suggest the continuance was being granted sua sponte.

Moreover, as with all of the prior continuances in this matter, there was no written

motion filed.

      {¶28} Third, this Court has previously acknowledged that “[t]he law is clear

that criminal defendants have no duty to object to trial dates set outside the limits

of the speedy trial statute.” State v. Davis, 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2610, 2002-

Ohio-2554, ¶ 33, citing State v. Tope, 53 Ohio St.2d 250, 251, 374 N.E.2d 152

(1978) and State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 362 N.E.2d 1216, syllabus (1977).

Thus, the State’s arguments are not well taken.

                August 24, 2022, Motion to Dismiss Based Upon Speedy
                       Trial Grounds (49 total speedy trial days)

      {¶29} In the intervening time between the August 17, 2022 pretrial hearing

and the scheduled August 31, 2022 bench trial, Myers filed a motion to dismiss

based upon speedy trial grounds on August 24, 2022. The motion was denied by

the trial court on the morning of the scheduled bench trial on August 31, 2022.

However, because our foregoing reasoning leads to the conclusion that 49 speedy

trial days had elapsed between the service of summons on July 6, 2022, and the

date the motion to dismiss was filed on August 24, 2022, the motion to dismiss

should have been granted and the trial court erred by denying it. Accordingly,

based upon the above reasoning, Myers’s sole assignment of error is sustained, the
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                                             17

judgment of the trial court reversed, and the case is remanded for discharge

pursuant to R.C. 2945.73.1

                                                                       JUDGMENT REVERSED.

1
 R.C. 2945.73 provides is (B)(1) that “Upon motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person
charged with a misdemeanor shall be discharged if the person is not brought to trial within the time required by
sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code. Such a discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings
against the person based on the same conduct.”
Athens App. No. 22CA15                                                                18

                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED and costs be assessed to
Appellee.
      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Court to carry this judgment into execution.
        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON
BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant
to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the
pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the
Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J., & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
                                 For the Court,

                                 _____________________________
                                 Jason P. Smith
                                 Presiding Judge
                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.