Court Opinion

ID: 9558119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:03:07.674827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:20.565822
License: Public Domain

*843RICHARDSON, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the tolling effect of ORS 12.155 applies when advance payments are made by insurers to third party claimants, but does not apply when insurers make advance payments to their own insureds. In my opinion, the statute is applicable in both situations, and I therefore dissent.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority examines or touches on the following factors: (1) the language of ORS 12.155 and of other Oregon advance payment statutes; (2) the purposes of and the public policy considerations underlying the statutes; (3) a Supreme Court decision which interpreted ORS 12.155 in connection with a question unrelated to the one presented here; and (4) legislative history. I do not think it is necessary or permissible for us to look beyond the language of ORS 12.155 to resolve the issue before us, because I consider the language to be unambiguous with respect to that issue and to be inconsistent with the majority’s conclusion. However, I find nothing in the majority’s treatment of the other three factors *844which persuasively supports its position, and I find that some of those other factors, when correctly viewed, militate as strongly against the holding as the statutory language does. I will discuss the four factors in the order indicated above.
1. The Statutory Language.
ORS 12.155 provides generally that its tolling effect extends to “each person entitled to recover damages for the death, injury or destruction” if the person receives the prescribed notice from the payor. An “advance payment” is defined by ORS 41.950 as “compensation for the injury or death of a person or the injury or destruction of property prior to the determination of legal liability therefor.” The majority quotes the foregoing language, together with certain other language from the advance payment statutes, and states that “[a]ll of the terminology ‘sounds in tort.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 55 Or App at 841. The majority then concludes that the terminology does not relate to claims by insureds against insurers because the relationship between them is contractual.
In my view, the majority’s effort to fit the statutory language into a “tort” or “contract” cubbyhole causes it to miss the point of the language. It is correct, as the majority indicates, that words such as “death,” “injury” and “destruction” are often found in tort contexts; it is also correct that thosé words generally do not arise in contractual settings; however, it is decidedly not correct that those words are unusual in insurance contracts or in litigation over insurance contracts.
The reason for the enactment of the advance payment statutes was to regulate the consequences which follow when advance payments are made by insurers. Although the statutes would apparently also apply to advance payments by others, they were intended to be and operate principally as insurance statutes.1 The majority is *845not correct in characterizing the statutory language as tort terminology; the language is insurance terminology, and thé words “death,” “injury” and “destruction” as used in the statutes refer to losses which are covered by insurance, not to the tortious or other cause of those losses.
Nothing stated or implied in ORS 12.155 or the other advance payment statutes relates to why the payments are made, i.e., anticipated tort or contract liability; the statutes relate to what is being paid for, i.e., death, injury or destruction to persons or property; and the statutes do not say or suggest that their applicability depends on who suffers the death, injury or destruction, i.e., insured persons or third parties. People insured against death, injúry or destruction to their own persons or property as readily as they insure against liability for losses they cause to the persons or property of others. The advance payment statutes apply to both types of coverages.
In addition to its “tort terminology” theme, the majority seems to base one other point on the statutory language. Its opinion suggests that the presence of words such as “liability” and “damages” in the statutes bolsters the conclusion that the statutes distinguish between third party “tort claims” and insured “contract claims.” If the majority does intend that suggestion, it loses sight of the location of the advance payment statutes to have their effects of tolling the statute of limitations for the payee and of relieving the payor from any implied admission of responsibility by reason of the payment, litigation must be initiated after an advance payment is made. Statute of limitations and admission concepts have no operational relevance except in the context of litigation. Words such as “liability” and “damages” are also relevant in that context, *846whether the litigation is an action by an insured on a policy or a tort action by a third party against an insured.
In sum, I find nothing in the statutory language or the majority’s analysis of it which supports the conclusion that ORS 12.155 applies only to advance payments on third party claims and does not apply to advance payments to insureds. The language of the statutes is unambiguous and requires the opposite conclusion.
I now turn to the extrinsic areas where the majority seeks support for its conclusion.
2. The Statutory Purposes and Public Policy.
The majority states that
“* * * the public policy considerations for encouraging advance payments to persons injured by or suffering property damage from the actions of insureds are quite different' from the public policy considerations that might be involved in encouraging settlements of disputes between insurers and their insureds.” 55 Or App at 839.
The majority does not explain in what ways the policy considerations differ. While I recognize that there are differences in the appropriate emphasis society should place on the early resolution of injury cases versus the early disposition of commercial disputes, I fail to see how those differences are relevant here. The source of the insurer’s obligation is its contract with the insured, whether the claim is by a third party or the insured. More fundamentally, the policy preference for expediting the process of making injury victims whole applies with equal force to insured and third party injuries. That policy preference may explain why the advance payment statutes were written to reach only insurance coverage of personal and property damage, and were not extended by the legislature to other species of coverage. However, the policy preference does not provide a basis for distinguishing between the same kinds of losses if insured persons rather than third parties sustain them.
In any event, whatever policy considerations the majority has in mind, the only policy objective of ORS *84712.155 is to prevent recipients of advance payments from being lulled into resting on their rights by a payor’s apparent acknowledgment of responsibility. See Duncan v. Dubin, 276 Or 631, 637, 638, 556 P2d 105 (1976). There is no difference between advance payments to third parties and those to insureds for purposes of that statutory objective.2
3. Previous Case Law.
The majority quotes extensively from Duncan v. Dubin, supra, and then appears to use Duncan as authority or a point of departure for a number of propositions which support the conclusion that the advance payment statutes apply only to third party claims. See 55 Or App at 839-40. Duncan does not stand for those propositions. The Supreme Court’s opinion speaks only of the statutes’ application to third party claims because the case involved only a third party claim. To read Duncan as implying that the statutes do not also apply when advance payments are made to insureds is akin to reading a decision affirming a murder conviction as implying that robbery is not also illegal.
The majority’s reliance on or use of Duncan, which deals with an unrelated issue, is not the only perplexing use of authority in its opinion. As noted by the majority, the Supreme Court stated in Richards v. Smith, 260 Or 586, 589, n 2, 491 P2d 1167 (1971), that “[ORS 12.155] penalizes an insurer if it does not notify an insured party of the expiration of the limitation period.” (Emphasis added.) The majority states that the emphasized words are “an apparent typographical error and should read ‘injured party.’ ” 55 Or App at 837, n 6. I do not suggest that the dictum in Richards, which was also a case involving an unrelated issue, is controlling here. Nevertheless, I think that there is little to be said for the majority’s facile attribution to clerical error of a statement by the Supreme Court which directly contradicts the majority’s conclusion.
*8484. Legislative History.
The majority states that the language it quotes from Duncan “contains the substance of the legislative history that indicates the limited reach of the statutes.” 55 Or App at 839. Again, the majority attempts to abridge the scope of the advance payment statutes by reading the particular application of them which the court considered in Duncan (quoted by the majority at 55 Or App at 837-39) does not suggest that the proposed advance payment legislation was intended to apply exclusively to third party claims. The Supreme Court’s opinion contains a number of incidental references to the fact that the statutes do apply when advance payments are made to third parties. There is no suggestion in the opinion that the statutes do not apply when payments to insureds are involved, and Duncan’s references to the third party claimant context are attributable solely to the fact that that was the context of the case.
Consequently, if legislative history were relevant or appropriate to our inquiry, the history to which the majority points would offer scant support for its conclusion. However, it is axiomatic that we may not look to legislative history or other extrinsic sources if the statutory language we are applying is clear. In Duncan, the court concluded that ORS 12.155 was ambiguous or silent with respect to the question in that case, which was whether the statute of limitations was tolled as to both the plaintiffs personal injury and property damage claims when the insurer made an advance payment only for the property damage. But for reasons earlier stated, there is nothing unclear about the statutory language as it applies to the question in this case. The ambiguities here are of the majority’s making and not the legislature’s.
I respectfully dissent.
Thornton, Roberts and Van Hoomissen, JJ., join in this dissent.

 Note, for example, that ORS 12.155(1) provides that the notice a payor must furnish to avoid the tolling effect of an advance payment “shall be in such form as the Insurance Commissioner prescribes.” More fundamentally, if they are not unique to the settlement of insurance claims, advance payments are certainly far *845more common in the insurance settlement process than in the resolution of disputes where insurance is not involved. The discussions of the statutory history in the majority opinion and in the majority’s quotation from Duncan v. Dubin, 276 Or 631, 636-638, 556 P2d 105 (1976), demonstrate that the legislature’s concern was with advance payments in the insurance setting. The majority appears to agree that the statutes are directed at advance payments by insurers, although it of course does not agree with my view about which advance payments by insurers are subject to the statutes.

 By a parity of reasoning, insurers would presumably find no difference between advance payments to insureds and those to third parties for purposes of relying on the provisions in the advance payment statutes that the payment do not constitute an admission of liability.