Court Opinion

ID: 9726049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:28:56.598438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.139544
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the decision of the circuit court and reinstate the decision of the Commission. The majority holds that the age of the purchaser is an essential element of the violation which must be proved by "competent evidence,” i.e., evidence that is not "inadmissible hearsay evidence.” 285 Ill. App. 3d at 30. It is difficult to prove a person’s age without relying on hearsay evidence. A birth certificate is hearsay — an out-of-court statement offered to show the truth of the matter asserted therein. Only those present at the time of birth have firsthand knowledge of the event. The child, of course, has no independent recollection of his birth. The father may not be able to testify because he may not have been in the delivery room. Doctors and nurses would not be expected to remember the date after several weeks had passed. That leaves only the mother, and if she is unable to testify it may be impossible to prove a person’s date of birth without using hearsay evidence. The hearsay rule is noted for its flexibility, its exceptions, and proof of age requires more flexibility than do most areas of proof. There is an exception to the hearsay rule that allows age to be proved by a birth certificate. 410 ILCS 535/25(2), (6) (West 1994). There is another exception that allows a person to testify to his own age. People v. Pennell, 315 Ill. 124, 127, 145 N.E. 606, 607 (1924). There is no reason flexibility must end with those two exceptions. In cases like the present, there should be no problem with proving age from a valid driver’s license. A bartender is entitled to rely on the birth date shown on a driver’s license. 235 ILCS 5/6 — 16a (West 1994) ("[a]dequate written evidence of age and identity of the person is a document issued by [any branch of government], including, but not limited to, a motor vehicle operator’s license”). The majority properly concludes that the identity of the informants does not have to be disclosed. The majority would apparently allow the informants’ ages to be proved by a birth certificate or by the informants’ own testimony. Secrecy could be preserved by redacting the informants’ identity on the birth certificate, or by the court reviewing the birth certificate or questioning the informant in camera, or by the court designating a third party to review the birth certificate or interview the informant. The last alternative may be preferable because then there would be a witness who could testify how the review or interview was accomplished. None of these alternatives would have been acceptable to defendants. Defendants insisted on learning the identity of the informants, an insistence that would have a chilling effect on future prosecutions using informants. Allowing the deputy chief to testify to the birth dates shown on valid driver’s licenses was a reasonable accommodation between the need to obtain accurate information of the informants’ dates of birth and the need to prevent disclosure of the informants’ identities. Additional steps could have been taken to verify the ages of the informants if that had been a real concern in this case. The majority improperly decides this case by labelling the evidence incompetent and inadmissible (285 Ill. App. 3d at 34) without considering whether the evidence should be incompetent and inadmissible. The majority decision is overly rigid in an area where flexibility is appropriate.