Court Opinion

ID: 9831194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:54:05.875196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:32.348750
License: Public Domain

LEVY, J.
(after stating the facts as above). [1] The appellant objected to the following portion of the court’s charge:
“You are instructed that it is the duty of railway companies, engaged as common carriers in commerce, to provide sufficient and secure grabirons and handholds on their cars for the use of their employees to climb thereon or therefrom.” .
The objections to the charge are that (1) it does not say whether the “commerce” is interstate or intrastate; (2) it does not authorize the jury to find whether or not the car was in fact one “requiring” the railway company *323to equip it with, a secure ladder and handhold; and (3) it imposes absolute duty on the railway company to provide sufficient and secure grabirons and handholds on cars. The federal and the state statutes both impose absolute liability for the failure on the part of railway companies to provide sufficient and secure grabirons or handholds on cars requiring same. Section 8618, U. S. Comp. Stat. (the act in force at the time of injury); article 6713, Rev. Stat. of Texas. And a box ear, as shown here is evidently within contemplation of the law a car “requiring” a ladder and handhold on the roof for the proper and safe use of employees in operating the car. It was shown without dispute that the car from which appellee claims to have fallen was a high box car.
[2] Appellee on cross-examination proved, over the objection of appellant, by Dr. Kos-minsky and Dr. Smith, the medical regulations of the army in 1918, and the method and care used in their enforcement as applied, especially to cooks and details to the kitchen. If the evidence was incompetent it cannot, as viewed in this record, be held as reversible error, because Dr. Read testified to the same point and effect without any objection thereto.
[3] Over the objection of appellant several witnesses were permitted to state that they knew the general reputation of appellee in the community where he lives “for honesty and fair dealing,” and “that reputation was go.od.” It is the settled rule in this state that, in a civil action, evidence of the general reputation of a party to a suit “for honesty” is not admissible unless the suit, the cause of action, or defense, is such as to put the character of the party for honesty directly in issue. Kennedy v. Upshaw, 66 Tex. 442, 1 S. W. 308; Roach v. Crume (Tex. Civ. App.) 41 S. W. 86. Por instance, honesty is relevant and an issue in suits involving conversion, embezzlement of money, and the like. Cudlipp v. Export Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 149 S. W. 444; Mullinax v. Pyron, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 253, 123 S. W. 1139. In such character of cases tlie party is charged with doing an act involving moral turpitude which is endeavored to be fastened upon him by circumstantial evidence or by testimony of witnesses, and he may introduce proof of his former good character for honesty and integrity to rebut the presumption of guilt arising from such evidence. But where the proceedings pertain solely to credibility, as to whether or not the testimony of a party to the suit has been fabricated or recourse had to falsehood, then the party may introduce and would be confined to his general reputation for truth. As stated in Boon v. Weathered’s Adm’r, 23 Tex. 675:
“When a man’s honesty, * * * hjs correctness in business transactions, is in question, his veracity is not in question. When his veracity is in question, one cares not to know whether he be of a peaceable, or of a quarrelsome disposition. If the question is concerning honesty, the inquiry should be concerning honesty. If the question be one of veracity, the inquiry should be directed to the point at issue.”
It has been held that where there is evidence offered tending to show that the plaintiff was malingering, or feigning, injury for the sole purpose of securing damages, such evidence contains such an implication of fraud as to admit evidence of general reputation for truth and veracity. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Benjamin (Tex. Civ. App.) 165 S. W. 120; Id., 107 Tex. 331, 179 S. W. 513. But that case does not hold that general reputation for “honesty” was admissible on the ground of feigning injury or malingering. The decided weight of authority is that general reputation for “honesty” is inadmissible unless the suit or the defense charges a specific fraud amounting to a gross fraud or depravity. In the instant case the plaintiff was suing for personal injuries. The evidence offered by the defense was to the point and extent that the physical condition of the plaintiff cannot be fairly ascribed to the fall from the box car because for some time before the fall from the car he was suffering from a severe venereal disease; that his present condition was due partially, if not entirely, to the ravages of the disease. Plaintiff himself admitted ,that in “August, 1917” he had an affection described as “a chareroid.” There is relevancy and materiality in all the evidence, if true. There is no attack on the character with respect to “honesty and fair dealing.” Upon the denial by the plaintiff of such facts being true, there is involved only the issue of credible evidence. And testimony of the ear inspector could not be reasonably construed as, in effect, attacking the reputation of the plaintiff for “honesty.” The inspector was testifying to such physical facts as he claimed he found existing the next morning after the alleged injury. If the physical facts the inspector claims to have found on the car differ from the facts the plaintiff claimed to have existed, there exists merely a difference of evidence, which is a question solely of credibility for the jury.
The appellee insists that the case of Railway Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 S. W. 406, determines the question. In that case, we think, the one question was decided that under the facts of the case proof of general reputation was admissible and not inadmissible. The case did not conflict with nor change the ruling in the case of Kennedy v. Upshaw, supra.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for another trial.

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