Court Opinion

ID: 9529682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:53:21.276147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:53.442919
License: Public Domain

Cutter, J.
dissenting. Mr. Justice Spalding and I are of the view that Schedule A of the agreement expressly called for the note of Lee himself, defined in the agreement as the “buyer.” This is to us the import of the words, “The balance of the purchase price . . . ($26,000.00) ... is to be paid by the execution of a note and purchase money mortgage in said amount from the Buyer to the Seller.” We think that this language means what it says and that the defendants were entitled to the personal note or in-dorsement of Lee, secured also by a second mortgage upon the conveyed locus.
The record indicates that Schedule A was language specially prepared for this agreement. With minor excep-*747tians the balance of the agreement was on a printed form of the general type frequently sold by law stationers. If there is conflict between them, the specially inserted language is to be preferred to the printed language. See King Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Cape Cod Bdcst. Co. Inc. 317 Mass. 652, 654-655, and authorities cited; Restatement: Contracts, § 236 (e).
The sole references to a “nominee” in the agreement are (1) in art. 4 with respect to the quitclaim deed to be given, “running to the buyer, or to the nominee designated by the buyer by written notice to the seller at least seven days before the deed” was to be delivered, and (2) in art. 9, where it was said that the “acceptance of a deed by the buyer or such nominee as the buyer shall have designated . . . shall be ... a full performance” of all but any obligations specially excepted in the agreement. These two special references to a “nominee,” each made in addition to use of the word “buyer,” indicate to us that “buyer” was to mean only Lee (defined as the buyer), and that where any effect was to be given to acts of a nominee, or where benefits were to be conferred upon a nominee, that intention was expressed in specific terms.
There is some inconsistency between the provision (art. 4) that the buyer may designate a nominee to take title and the provision of Schedule A that the buyer is to give the note and mortgage. As the majority point out, if under art. 4 the buyer selects a nominee to take title as grantee, then only that grantee can execute the second mortgage which we think Schedule A requires Lee to give. Even if a nominee should take title as grantee, however, the note could still be given by Lee (as Schedule A provides), or be indorsed by him. That note could be secured by the mortgage given by the nominee. See Perry v. Miller, 330 Mass. 261, 263-264. The resolution of the inconsistency, which seems to us most consonant with our view of Schedule A, would be to recognize the purpose of the defendants to be paid by a note from the “Buyer,” Lee, and to provide by a mortgage from the nominee the security for which the agreement stipulated.
*748This case is unlike Central Trust Co. v. Rudnick, 310 Mass. 239, 241, where a purchaser “agreed to procure a conveyance of . . . property to himself ‘or a nominee acting for him’; [and] that he or his nominee would execute a note.” The agreement, as the original papers show, read, “He or such nominee shall . . . execute ... a note” (emphasis supplied). To he sure, in the Central Trust Co. case, this court said (at pp. 244-245) that “the transaction of business through one known to be a straw is persuasive evidence that the parties did not intend that any personal liability was to be assumed by the person for whom the straw was acting.” This principle, however, should not prevail in the face of the explicit provision of Schedule A.1 Our interpretation of this provision seems to us consistent with the natural desire of the defendants to obtain assurance of payment of the purchase price. See Corbin, Contracts, § 1199 at pp. 387-S88.2
The present controversy might easily have been avoided by an adequately definite provision in the agreement, either (a) that Lee himself must give, or become liable individually upon, the second mortgage note, or (b) that the note of a nominee would be acceptable. Obviously, in the light of the majority’s decision, vendors in the future should protect themselves by wholly clear language concerning the form of payment or by striking out or modifying references in printed forms to the use. of nominees.

 In re Childs Co. 163 F. 2d 379, 382 (2d Cir), relied upon by the majority, is also distinguishable. There language similar to that in the Central Trust Co. case appears, but the court had before it a sale during reorganization proceedings, in which the judge had expressly approved the execution of a purchase contract by a “dummy” rather than by the successful bidder at the judicial sale. Similarly in Barkhausen v. Continental Ill. Natl. Bank # Trust Co. 3 Ill. 2d 254, 266, there was no express agreement (like that in Schedule A) to “justify an imposition of . . . personal liability.”

 The situation of the assignee of a vendee is somewhat analogous to the situation before us. Where the original vendee’s personal obligation is required (as in Schedule A) by the purchase agreement, the vendor cannot be compelled to accept the obligation of an assignee. See Lojo Realty Co. Inc. v. Estate of Isaac G. Johnson, Inc. 227 App. Div. (N. Y.) 292, affd. 253 N. Y. 579, 580. Cf. Montgomery v. DePicot, 153 Cal. 509, 512-514, where it was held that the agreement before the court (which called only for “a promissory note” without specifying the maker) did not require the personal obligation of the vendee. See also statement on rehearing, at p. 516.