Court Opinion

ID: 9571746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:50.418668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:53.998638
License: Public Domain

NEELY, Justice,
concurring:
I gladly concur in the result reached by the majority. I feel compelled to write a concurring opinion in this case, however, for a number of reasons. First, the economic considerations that inform my adoption of this result deserve to be made explicit. Second, the collateral problems presented by assets best characterized as “future interests”, such as insurance coverage, pension rights, and interests in developing properties, merit further discussion. Third, from both a legal and practical point of view, I have grave reservations about the adoption of a fault standard to govern the value of homemaking services. Fourth, I believe that today’s alteration of our divorce law has repercussions that should affect the rules under which alimony is currently awarded. Fifth, I do not believe that the presumption of gift should operate among divorcing parties with the same vigor that it operates between a husband or wife and others not party to that marital unit.
At the outset, I should explain that I find statutory authority for today’s ruling in the language of W.Va.Code, 48-2-21 [1969]. This provision in its entirety provides:
Upon decreeing the annulment of a marriage, or upon decreeing a divorce, the court shall have power to award to either of the parties whatever of his or her property, real or personal, may be in the possession, or under the control, or in the name, of the other, and to compel a transfer or conveyance thereof as in other cases of chancery.
The broad equitable powers conferred on our courts by this statute I believe allow room for a court to find that economic and homemaking contributions to a marriage give rise to a property interest subject to Code, 48-2-21 [1969].
A marriage is, as the majority has stated, to some degree an economic partnership. Both partners contribute services that have a recognizable value to the household. In most marriages a surplus is generated by the parties’ forbearance from immediate consumption of the marital income. This marital surplus is commonly invested in a dwelling, and in insurance and other investments to assure the protection of the partners from penury should sudden and unforeseen events, or the quiet onslaught of age, diminish the family earnings. It does no violence to this statute, I believe, to recognize that contributions of a party to his or her marriage give rise to a property right to a proportionate share of that marital surplus.
Admittedly, we have always assumed an extremely narrow authority under Code, 48-2-21 since the first statute on this subject was enacted in 1931. Nonetheless, the *174door has always been open to us to expand the equitable jurisdiction of courts in property awards, and as divorce has become a more prevalent occurrence, and its regulation a more social and less personal question, we have done so.1 Without qualifying my admiration for the redoubtable authority marshalled by the majority, I conclude that I would urge the step we have taken today regardless of the authority in other jurisdictions.
I further believe that the circuit courts, who shall have to implement this decision, are better served by an opinion that derives from a West Virginia statute and an explicit, coherent theory implementing it then they are by an opinion derived from foreign authority. In the inevitable unmapped areas that today’s innovating opinion will leave, our courts should have a statute and a theory to refer back to; from these twin polestars they can plot a course that will approximate our own. In the event that they encounter (God forbid) stupid authority, they will be able to resist its siren song and hold a true course.
I
My enthusiasm for today’s holding arises largely from my understanding of the economic plight of women in America. Simply put, women are poorer than men.2 The mean wage for women who work full time is 59 percent of the equivalent mean wage for men. Among single men and women who are not living with relatives, the poverty rate for men is 18.1 percent; the rate for women is 27.7 percent. Once a man and woman are married, if both are working full time, the woman’s wage on average amounts to only 34.7 percent of the family earnings. When a marriage has ended, the situation becomes bleaker; 10.3 percent of male single parents fall below the poverty line (a total of 205,000); 34.6 percent of single women with children, or a total of *1753.4 million such women, fall below the poverty line. In fact, divorced women with children now make up a new class of the poverty-stricken.3 By contrast, the poverty rate for families headed by a married couple is only 6.8 percent.
Among the factors leading to this result, two are prominent. The first is that court-ordered awards, which overwhelmingly go to the former wife, are frequently not paid. The second, that divorced women often do not have access to that part of the marital surplus invested in pensions or insurance, is discussed at length infra, in Section II.
Among divorced or currently separated women, 14.3 percent were entitled to alimony or maintenance as of the spring of 1979. The alimony or maintenance award amounted to over 25 percent of the mean income of those women who actually received it. However, of those women entitled to receive alimony or maintenance payments in 1978, 28.4 percent did not receive the full amount due them, and 30.5 percent received nothing at all. The equivalent statistics for child support payments are only a slight improvement: 22.7 percent of the women entitled to child support received less than the full amount due them, and 28.4 percent received no child support payments at all.4
Our growing experience with the financial position of divorced women leads me to the conclusion, confirmed by this statistical data, that West Virginia’s current scheme for allocating marital property acquired through joint efforts is inadequate to protect women5 and their dependent children from unfair results. Since the statute does not by its terms foreclose us from developing equitable doctrines — such as those adopted in Patterson v. Patterson, 167 W.Va. 1, 277 S.E.2d 709 (1981) — that will provide greater financial security upon divorce, it is incumbent upon us to do so. As a court supervising the exercise of equitable jurisdiction over these matters, we must repudiate rules that confer an unfair advantage on one party at the other’s expense.6 As the statistics illustrating the national epidemic of non-payment (supra) indicate, our reliance on alimony and child support as the means of distributing the marital surplus confers just such an unfair advantage.
The effects of this unfair advantage are manifest in the facts of this case. The LaRues had been married for thirty years, and had raised two sons, both now grown. At the time of the divorce, Mrs. LaRue was fifty-one years old. Mrs. LaRue had worked for a little over seven years during the marriage, and contributed total earnings of approximately $51,000 to the marriage over the course of her employment. The LaRues had enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle. Their gross income in the last year of the marriage, during which Mrs. LaRue was not working, was forty-three thousand dollars — a sum sufficient to assure the La-Rues’ financial security and allow them a number of luxuries.
*176Upon the divorce, Mrs. LaRue was awarded alimony of two hundred forty dollars per month, along with an allowance for hospitalization and medical insurance. The alimony has since been raised to four hundred and fifty dollars per month. Mrs. LaRue has also received two thousand dollars, which she herself withdrew from a joint account shortly after the separation, a 1977 Mercury Bobcat automobile, a share of the household goods, and stocks valued at approximately fourteen hundred dollars. Mrs. LaRue’s job prospects are limited by her age, her lack of recent work experience, and a debilitating arthritic condition from which she suffers.
Mr. LaRue retained the family home, a 1977 Mercury Cougar automobile, the lion’s share of the household goods, bank accounts with balances totalling approximately twenty-seven thousand dollars, corporate stock with a value of two thousand one hundred dollars, and his partnership share in his accounting firm. He also retained control of nine life insurance policies, the beneficiary designations of which have apparently been changed since the separation of the parties to remove Mrs. LaRue as a beneficiary.
The financial ruin of Mrs. LaRue was countenanced under our existing law because the LaRue marriage had been a traditional one in the sense that Mr. LaRue, a certified public accountant, exclusively handled the family’s financial affairs. Consequently, most family assets were titled in his name, and were therefore under our law considered his property upon divorce. A broader reading of Code, 48-2-21 [1969], embracing the concepts of the marital surplus and recognizing economic and homemaking contributions, closes this ghastly chasm in our legal landscape.
II
This Court’s holding today opens a wide field of opportunity to the circuit courts, whose options previously were by and large limited to alimony and child support. (Again, see note 1, supra). It is my hope that the circuit courts, who are after all primarily responsible for the administration of West Virginia’s family law, will creatively avail themselves of the opportunities that equitable distribution presents. Unfortunately, there are many problems which are beyond the capacity of courts to solve. Courts can only distribute wealth, they cannot create any. The economies of scale that prevail in joint households are irretrievably lost when a married couple separates. Pensions adequate to support two retired people living together may not be adequate to support the two retired people living separately. Similarly, when an active head of a household becomes disabled, he may still be able to support a joint household with insurance proceeds, but may no longer be able to meet his alimony or child support obligations.
However, there is a second problem which courts may successfully address, which comes to mind because of some of the peculiar forms the marital surplus is likely to assume. The “savings” of the average American family no longer take the form of cash on hand in a savings account in the local bank. Rather, the “savings” are invested in the family home, plowed back into ongoing business ventures, or used to buy institutional insurance and pension programs. These forms of “savings” are often tied to the family wage-earner personally, or held in the name of the partner who is responsible for taking care of the financial affairs of the family.
The advent of societal institutions selling financial protection in a pension/insurance package has transformed the nature of America’s wealth from present capital to future interest. These modern institutions serve the same need that traditional savings arrangements served — to wit, protection from the vagaries of fortune over time — but do so more efficiently because the good and bad fortunes of individuals are for these institutions merely statistical parameters. To the extent that these various forms of savings represent investments rather than assets — and some are investments under very strict terms — they present a new challenge to courts attempting to effect among divorcing parties a fair *177financial reconciliation. With a little effort and imagination courts can see that divorcing parties, who own an apple orchard for instance, leave the courthouse with apples for life rather than a truckload each of applewood kindling.
We must be aware, for instance, of the importance of the family home in terms both of its emotional and financial value. I am concerned that the dominant financial value of the family home will cause inequities, and even forced sale, as a result of our adoption of equitable distribution. My concern is particularly aroused when I contemplate minor children, who are the innocent victims of their parents’ inability to maintain the marriage. Our courts should bend over backward to maintain minor children with a custodial parent in the family home when appropriate. This can be accomplished under traditional child support (Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610, 236 S.E.2d 452 (1977)) and alimony (footnote one, Patterson v. Patterson, 167 W.Va. 1, 277 S.E.2d 709 (1981)) doctrines.
The sordid statistics about the impoverished state of women cited above should instruct us that in domestic relations a bird in the hand is worth several in the bush. Although the majority opinion does not express or imply a contrary conclusion, I should like to make the point explicitly and in no uncertain terms that, if either alimony or child support is to be part of the final order, trial courts should not force a sale of the marital house merely to split the proceeds unless the marital house substantially exceeds the reasonable needs of the wife and children. One convincing indication that the house substantially exceeds the reasonable needs of the wife and children would be that the value of the use of the house exceeds any reasonable support obligation. Because a husband must support his children, and often his former wife, it is far better to order that he continue to pay the mortgage on the family house and provide it for his children and former wife’s use than to leave these dependents waiting each month for alimony and child support checks whose delivery is so uncertain.
Similarly, where the marital surplus has been invested in an ongoing business that would be destroyed by withdrawal of the wife’s proportionate share, courts should be open to compromises that allow the wife an interest in the ongoing business. The doctrine of equitable distribution should neither license nor excuse the destruction of golden-egg-laying geese.
Pension rights and insurance plans present a particularly challenging opportunity for this kind of creative solution. Investment in pensions and insurance is probably the largest slice of the investment pie. Today social security taxes, for instance, are almost fourteen percent of wages (although the employer pays half) which means that fourteen percent of an average wage-earner’s salary is automatically “saved” for retirement, disability, and the protection of his survivors in the event of his death. In addition to social security are myriad company, union, and public employee pensions.
These programs are generally tied to the wage-earner in a family, and would therefore seem to be an asset ripe for redistribution under a court’s equitable powers.7 *178However, pension rights present one of the most complex problems in equitable distribution cases. In most states, a husband’s vested interest in a pension plan is considered marital property 8 but certain limitations exist.
The United States Supreme Court has decided that military retirement and railroad retirement are personal entitlements unavailable for distribution upon divorce. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981) (military retirement); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (railroad retirement). Additionally, a number of state courts have held that where the right is contingent or subject to divestment, the plan is non-contributory, or the present value of the pension unascertaina-ble, the pension rights are not subject to division.9
Furthermore, even where rights are vested because cash contributions have been paid into an actuarily sound plan, it may nonetheless be impossible to withdraw the money to make an equitable distribution because of the terms of the plan. More frequently than not, pension contributions are mandatory for the period during which a person is employed in a particular firm and can be withdrawn only on termination of employment or retirement. Even where money can be withdrawn, such withdrawal may destroy the value of the pension or have oppressive tax consequences, and often there is no other money available to compensate a spouse in lieu of the money locked away in the pension plan.
An examination of the West Virginia Public Employees Pension Plan may illustrate the dimensions of those problems. This plan provides a pension based on two percent of an average of the high three years of salary for every year of qualifying service, with a reduced percentage available to a surviving spouse. W.Va.Code, 5-10-22 [1971] and Code, 5-10-24 [1961], Public employees must be part of the plan and, while they work for the State, money cannot be withdrawn. W.Va.Code, 5-10-17 [1980], Employees can receive their total contributions, without interest, if they leave state service and their estate can receive their contributions if they die before receiving back all actual contributions. W.Va.Code, 5-10-30 [1974]. However, the value of the pension if collected at the time of retirement in any individual case will often far exceed the fair market value of the employee’s contributions in a private, actuarially sound, pension plan.
Consequently, courts may wish to avoid an immediate division of pension rights when making an equitable distribution of property if to do so would merely destroy for both parties a far greater future en*179titlement. Under such circumstances, a court should choose to provide equitable treatment for the wife through an award that will allow her to share in future benefits when they fully mature.
An analogue to the pension problem is found with respect to private insurance. Many middle income people have whole life insurance policies but their cash surrender values are negligible until people have reached comfortable middle age. A husband whose insurance policy is paid for with marital assets may on termination of the marriage eliminate the former wife’s beneficiary status, as was apparently done in Mrs. LaRue’s case. Where alimony is not a charge on a former husband’s estate 10 the wife may then be left with nothing upon his death. Although the present cash surrender value of the policy may be negligible, its value as insurance (particularly if the husband is in poor health) may be substantial.
Ill
The majority has elected to permit marital fault to affect a wife’s recovery for her contribution of homemaking services. I believe this to be incorrect both legally and practically.
I trace our power to initiate what, in all candor, we must admit to be a distinct departure from all our previous holdings, to the authority reserved to us by the broad language of W.Va.Code, 48-2-21 [1969]. It is a construction of this provision defining “property” to mean marital property (as opposed to inherited property, or property brought to the marriage) that forms the ground on which equitable jurisdiction may be built.11 Defining “property” as marital property (or, more specifically, the “marital surplus”) does not complete our task, however. We must further decide what activities should be considered as contributions to the marital surplus when the time comes for partition of the surplus. I agree with the majority’s decision that homemaking services merit such consideration, but I believe that once that decision is made, the statute leaves us no room to interfere with recovery.
The right to recover from the marital surplus the proportionate share of one’s contribution is a limited but unqualified right. It is limited, because Code, 48-2-21 [1969] authorizes only transfers based upon contribution or equitable ownership. We are not a community property state. A spouse is entitled under our statute to receive only the share of property acquired with the marital surplus to which his or her contribution to the marriage renders that spouse entitled. Once that entitlement has been established, however, the statute becomes directive. Because the statute mandates restoration, a spouse’s right to recover his or her share should not be qualified by considerations of fault in the break-up of the marriage, relative wealth, needs of the children, or any other matter.12 These are matters to be considered in the context of alimony or child support awards only, as provided in W.Va.Code, 48-2-16 [1969],
Apart from the fact that the fault rule does not follow from the statute that au*180thorizes our holding, the practical difficulties of applying a fault rule are manifold. To add the question of fault to the questions of quality of homemaking services and quantity of homemaking services that a court will already be called upon to decide will, I fear, muddy these waters hopelessly and render meaningful review impossible. More important, as I shall discuss at some length in the following section, it will blur and confuse the distinction between restoration and alimony at a time when this distinction most urgently needs clarification. To my mind, a “monetary award for homemaker services” based on fault and giving rise to no property rights is indistinguishable from alimony.
In syllabus point 2 of Patterson v. Patterson, supra, we concluded on the basis of our reading of Code, 48-2-21 [1969] that:
Since the authority of a circuit court in divorce matters is entirely statutory, the court does not have power in a divorce action to transfer title to real property from one spouse to another either in lieu of or as a supplement to alimony or child support; ...
Our holding today should not disturb the distinction between recoupment and alimony that we maintained in Patterson. Under the statute, courts do not have power in a divorce action to transfer title to property from one spouse to another either in lieu of or to supplement alimony or child custody awards. The majority opinion suggests that courts nonetheless do have power to refuse to transfer title to property from one spouse to another in lieu of refusing alimony. I disagree. Equitable distribution of the assets acquired with the marital surplus is an enterprise conceptually distinct from the award of alimony or child custody payments, and should remain so.
Although the division of the marital surplus is fairly mechanical, the determination of the spouse’ contribution is not. When the husband is a successful brain surgeon the wife’s contribution to the marriage may amount to less than half of his income. Conversely, when he is an indolent slob it may amount to substantially more than half. In this latter case, however, the question of the ratio of distribution is likely to be mooted by lack of assets. While most divisions will likely end up very near equal, there are certain factors which other jurisdictions consider13 and which we should commend to our courts to consider, in ascertaining a proper division. The proportionate share of a spouse should reflect:
(1) the length of the marriage;
(2) the occupation of the parties, whether each worked and for how long; and, where both parties worked, the respective contributions of each partner;
(3) the amount and sources of all income;
(4) the contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, or dissipation of marital property, including services as a homemaker;
(5) the loss of inheritance rights in property acquired during the course of the marriage and the loss of pension rights; and
(6) the income tax consequences, if any, of property division.
Obviously, since this is a case of first impression, it is not possible to anticipate all of the considerations that we will ultimately be called upon to analyze. None*181theless, in the inevitable hiatus between the initiation of litigation in the nisi prius courts and the ultimate, case-by-case development of rules through the appellate process, we should make some tenuous effort to anticipate the general contours of equitable distribution.
IV
Alimony and equitable distribution are distinct concepts, but together they command the entire field of financial settlement on divorce. Therefore, where one expands, the other must recede.
Our past, narrow reading of W.Va.Code, 48-2-21 [1969] required us, in order to prevent injustice, to adopt an expansive view of the circumstances in which alimony was appropriate. In Dyer v. Tsapis, 162 W.Va. 289, 249 S.E.2d 509 (1978) we relaxed the traditional requirement that a showing of specified categories of fault was a prerequisite to any award of alimony, in favor of a rule that a showing of “inequitable conduct” on the part of a spouse would suffice. Dyer, supra, concerned alimony in a divorce predicated on voluntary separation under W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) [1977]. In Haynes v. Haynes, 164 W.Va. 426, 264 S.E.2d 474 (1980), the rationale of Dyer, “that alimony is a way of avoiding unjust enrichment of either of the parties,” Haynes, 164 W.Va. at 426-427, 264 S.E.2d at 475, was extended to apply to alimony in a divorce based on irreconcilable differences under W.Va. Code, 48-2-4(a)(10) [1977]. Most recently, in syllabus point one of F.C. v. I.V.C., 171 W.Va. 458, 300 S.E.2d 99, (1982) we dropped all pretense of a fault requirement and concluded that “[a]limony may be awarded under W.Va. Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) against a faultless party if ‘principles of justice’ so require ...”
Clearly, now that economic and homemaking contributions are to be considered in the distribution of marital property, the likelihood of “unjust enrichment,” Haynes, supra, 164 W.Va. at 428, 264 S.E.2d at 475, and the corresponding necessity of applying “principles of justice” F.C. v. I.V.C., supra, syl. pt. 1, may recede. In situations where there is no inequitable conduct shown, and both parties are adequately provided for after the distribution of the marital assets, remedial alimony is no longer appropriate. This does not, of course, mean that alimony is extinct in West Virginia. Where the division of the marital property does not provide an adequate result — for instance, if the marital property is insufficient — courts must still have resort to alimony to redress apparent inequity. It does, however, mean that alimony can be reduced to manageable proportions, and to its two ancient elements, fault and need.
No-fault redistribution of the parties’ contributions, along with alimony and child support to address fault and need provide a clear and complete set of tools with which to address the financial aspect of divorce fairly, thoroughly, and comprehensibly. I admit that these are more rigid concepts than those of the majority, but it is only with rigid structural members that one can build — mush does not retain its shape.
V
My final concern is the majority’s relation of intra-marital gifts to the doctrine of equitable distribution. Although I am not violently opposed to a rule that considers gifts given by one spouse to the other during their marriage as set-offs against contributions to the marriage, such a rule is susceptible to abuse unless our doctrine of presumption of gift is clarified. To the extent that the majority wishes to consider only highly personal gifts, like a wife’s jewelry or mink coat, I have no quarrel. Other types of property, however, like stocks and bonds require something beyond a gift analysis.
Our narrow construction that forbade equitable distribution of property acquired by joint efforts included a somewhat perverse presumption that any transfer of property between married persons is a gift. That presumption, obviously, confounds all human experience; it is far more reasonable to presume that the titling of marital property in the name of one spouse is an expedience, and that mutual benefit is intended. The spouse in whose name the property is titled presumably holds the property as if a trustee for the other spouse. It follows, *182then, that upon the termination of a marriage the circumstances that justified titular ownership in the name of one spouse cease to exist, and the implicit expectations upon which the transfer was made are entirely confounded.
It is argued by Mr. LaRue in this very case that any transfers of money or property from Mrs. LaRue to himself were gifts and must be treated as such. We discussed the problem of presumed gifts in Patterson, supra, in the context of impressing a constructive trust on property titled in the husband’s name but acquired by both husband and wife through joint business efforts:
_ Transfers between related persons can be challenged not only by the persons involved, but by third parties as well. The presumption concerning gift has its most forceful effect when a transfer is challenged by a third party, particularly after the death of one of the related persons. The court cannot be blind to the obvious fact that most married persons do not contemplate divorce throughout the entire course of a marriage, and that transfers of property between spouses [are] usually intended for the joint benefit of both. While we must retain the presumption of gift in order to avoid difficult third party claims (since spouses usually do intend to confer the benefit of property on their spouse in the event of their death), the presumption of gift is probably best rebutted in a suit between spouses by a clear showing of unjust enrichment. Most people do not intend unjustly to enrich the other man.
167 W.Va. at 11-12, 277 S.E.2d, at 716.
I believe that we should respond to Mr. LaRue’s argument by raising the dictum of Patterson to a specific holding that the presumption of gift is eliminated, or at least qualified, as it applies at the time of divorce to intra-marital gifts of property of a non-personal nature. Of course, we should in no way weaken the continued vitality of the presumption of gift when the inter-spousal transactions are challenged by disgruntled children, greedy relatives, or creditors.
Human experience instructs us that married couples will not behave during the marriage as if divorce were imminent. Such a posture would enervate the cooperative spirit that is central to all successful marriages. We should presume that by entering into an arrangement such as that adopted by the LaRues a wife implicitly trusts her husband to acquire equity for their joint financial security — that her husband was intended not to be her donee, but her fiduciary. Consequently, it should require no torturing of the language of Code, 48-2-21 [1969] to conclude that where one spouse (usually the husband) has acted for the other in this presumed fiduciary capacity in the management of the family surplus the fiduciary must return his spouse’s interest in property titled in his name when, upon divorce, his trust ends.
Notwithstanding our previous narrow holdings, Code, 48-2-21 [1969] plainly authorizes courts of equity to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the titling of family property in the name of one spouse. Furthermore, the statute clearly implies that if the court finds that assets earned by one spouse have been converted into property titled in the name of the other spouse, the assets should be restored to the spouse who originally earned or contributed those assets.
Therefore, with the above qualifications and elaborations, I concur in the majority decision.

. The history of our law governing the financial resolution of a divorce shows our constant and increasing discontent with the failings of alimony and child support. Although we have always exercised the narrowest possible authority under Code, 48-2-21, we have also always been alert to grounds for equitable exceptions to our constricted view. Prominent among those grounds has been the unjust enrichment of a spouse upon dissolution of the marriage. As we recently stated in Patterson v. Patterson, 167 W.Va. 1, 277 S.E.2d 709 (1981):
It is apparent from the law of trusts that the purpose of a constructive trust is to redress unjust enrichment resulting from an equitable wrong. The extent of the property subject to the trust should be equal to the extent of unjust enrichment. That is, a wife should be entitled to a trust in property to the extent that the husband is unjustly enriched by her contribution.
167 W.Va. at 12-13, 277 S.E.2d, at 716.
The disabilities of alimony and child support as the exclusive means of effecting a fair distribution of marital assets were recognized long before Patterson, however. In Goff v. Goff, 60 W.Va. 9, 53 S.E. 769 (1907), we permitted a lien on a husband's land to assure the payment of alimony. Subsequently, in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 68 W.Va. 15, 69 S.E. 381 (1910), though we refused to award "the fee simple title of a husband in his lands,” id., at 24, 69 S.E. 381, to the wife, we acknowledged that “the better rule ... is to give the wife ... life estate in the realty." Id., at 23, 69 S.E. 381. Wood v. Wood, 126 W.Va. 189, 28 S.E.2d 423 (1943) found statutory authority allowing divorce courts “power to make any order or decree concerning the estate of the parties ... for the purpose of making effectual any order or decree ... relating to the maintenance of the parties or the custody and maintenance of their children. Id., syl. pt. 2.
In Kinsey v. Kinsey, 143 W.Va. 574, 103 S.E.2d 409 (1958) and Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610, 236 S.E.2d 452 (1977) we approved awards granting use of the family home to the parent with custody of the children. (This authority was enlarged by footnote one of Patterson, supra, which opined that a life estate in the home may be awarded regardless of custody of the children). In McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W.Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978) we approved the transfer of the title to the family automobile from the husband to the wife, once again to effectuate an order of custody concerning the children. Patterson, thus, is the last in a long series of cases in which we have stretched at our self-imposed bounds to avoid inequity in the financial settlement of a divorce.

. The statistics in this paragraph are taken from “Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1981”, Series P. 60 No. 134, Consumer Income, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1982) updating “Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1980”; Series P. 60 No. 132, Consumer Income, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1982) and “Characteristics of the Population Below the Poverty Level: 1980,” Series P. 60, No. 133, Consumer Income, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1982).

. The Bureau of Census has measured the incidence of poverty in families of different ethnic origins. In every ethnic group the incidence of poverty is more than twice as high among families headed by single women as it is among any other type of family. In the categories "all families" and “white families” the incidence of poverty among families headed by single women is over three times as great as that of any other family category. In fact, the median income of households headed by women ($10,960) is lower than the median income of black ($13,-267) or Hispanic ($16,402) households, and is less than half that of white households ($23,-517).

. These statistics are taken from “Child Support and Alimony: 1978,” Series P. 23, No. 112, Special Studies, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1981).

. Although our divorce law is sex-neutral, and alimony and support payments may be awarded to men as well as women, as a matter of practice alimony and child support are largely women’s remedies. A motivating concern in this case is the inferior financial position that women in West Virginia, as well as throughout America, enjoy relative to men. Although it is not our task to remedy affirmatively this position, neither need we countenance rules that aggravate women’s economic plight.

. Our adoption of the "primary caretaker” rule, Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981), which to a degree protects the primary caretaker (usually the mother) from having to bargain away her financial security as the price of avoiding a custody battle over the children, was a first step in this direction.

. Women, and particularly older women, often do not have any pension rights, because they either did not work, worked only intermittently, or did not work at jobs with pension plans. The following table illustrates this gap. The disparity is actually even starker than these figures would suggest, since women receiving the pensions of deceased husbands are counted as women "receiving pension.”
EMPLOYEE PENSIONS FOR PEOPLE AGE 65 AND OLDER, 1976
Percent Receiving Pension Median Annual Pension Benefit
WOMEN
All 18%
Public Employer 9 $ 2,750
Private Employer 9 1,340
EMPLOYEE PENSIONS FOR PEOPLE AGE 65 AND OLDER, 1976
Percent Receiving Pension Median Annual Pension Benefit
MEN
All 38%
Public Employer 13 4,830
Private Employer 25 2.060
Working Women, Marriage (working paper), President’s and Retirement, Commission on Pension Policy (1980), citing statistics from Social Security and the Changing Roles of Men and Women, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1979).
These statistics are unsurprising when viewed in light of the fact that, in 1981, half of the *17843,000,000 women in the paid labor force were employed in only 20 occupations: Secretary, bookkeeper, salesclerk retail worker, cashier, waitress, registered nurse, elementary school teacher, private household worker, typist, nursing aide, sewer and stitcher, cook, receptionist, secondary school teacher, assembler, bank teller, building interior cleaner, hairdresser, cleaner and servant, and childcare worker. Employment and Earnings U.S. Dept, of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, (1982). The majority of these occupations are not likely to be covered by pension plans.

. The majority of equitable distribution jurisdictions say that pension rights are to be considered in arriving at a financial settlement; however, there is no single formula for how such consideration is to be applied. See Monsma v. Monsma, 618 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1980) (Alaska); In re Marriage of Camarata, 43 Colo.App. 317, 602 P.2d 907 (1979) (Colorado); Husband B. v. Wife B., Del.Super., 396 A.2d 169 (1978) (Delaware); Green v. Green, Hawaii App., 599, 623 P.2d 890 (1981) (Hawaii); In re Marriage of Bodford, 94 Ill.App.3d 91, 49 Ill.Dec. 633, 418 N.E.2d 487 (1981) (Illinois); Wilson v. Wilson, Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1169 (1980) (Indiana); Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 586 S.W.2d 292 (Ky.Ct.1979) (Kentucky); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md.App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371 (1981) (Maryland); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 105 Mich.App. 400, 306 N.W.2d 528 (1981) (Michigan); Jensen v. Jensen, 276 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.1979) (Minnesota); Vert v. Vert, Mont., 613 P.2d 1020 (1980) (Montana); Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977) (New Jersey); Matter of Marriage of Franzke, 51 Or.App. 35, 624 P.2d 632 (1981), aff'd., 292 Or. 110, 637 P.2d 595 (Oregon); Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis.2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978) (Wisconsin). See also, Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).

. For instance: Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980); Delay v. Delay, 612 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.App.1981); Mueller v. Mueller, 166 N.J.Super. 557, 400 A.2d 136 (1979).

. Our position regarding alimony as a charge on a decedent’s estate is outlined in In re Estate of Hereford, 162 W.Va. 477, 250 S.E.2d 45 (1978) where (to summarize very briefly) we concluded that alimony could be a charge on a decedent’s estate where the terms of the property settlement permitted such a charge, and equity demanded it.

. For instance, our holding does not empower courts to transfer title to any property acquired by either spouse before the marriage or after the marriage by gift of a third party or inheritance. These types of property are unavailable for distribution in this State not merely because we say they are not, but because of the express language of Code, 48-2-21 [1969] that mandates restoration of property. Before property titled in the name of one spouse may be distributed to the other spouse, it must appear to the court that the property to be distributed is within the contemplation of Code, 48-2-21 [1969].

.The rule that considerations of marital fault should have no impact on property distribution has been expressed by the courts of Maine and Illinois. Boyd v. Boyd, Me., 421 A.2d 1356 (1980); In re Marriage of Cihak, 92 Ill.App.3d 1123, 48 Ill.Dec. 428, 416 N.E.2d 701 (1981). But see Smith v. Smith, 5 Kan.App.2d 117, 612 P.2d 1257 (1980); Murff v. Murff, Tex., 615 S.W.2d 696 (1981), decided under different statutes.

. The following cases include discussions of factors considered in arriving at an "equitable” distribution of marital property: Makar v. Makar, 398 So.2d 717 (Ala.Civ.App.1981); Neely v. Neely, 115 Ariz. 47, 563 P.2d 302 (1977) (no relation); Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 429 A.2d 964 (1980); Turpin v. Turpin, 403 A.2d 1144 (D.C.App.1979); Farias v. Farias, 58 Haw. 227, 566 P.2d 1104 (1977); Matter of Marriage of Thornton, 89 Ill.App.3d 1078, 45 Ill.Dec. 612, 412 N.E.2d 1336 (1980); Libunao v. Libunao, 388 N.E.2d 574, reh. denied, 390 N.E.2d 695 (Ind.App.1979); In re Marriage of Steenhoek, Iowa, 305 N.W.2d 448 (1981); Smith v. Smith, 5 Kan.App.2d 117, 612 P.2d 1257 (1980); McCallister v. McCallister, 101 Mich.App. 543, 300 N.W.2d 629 (1980); Viers v. Viers, 600 S.W.2d 214 (Mo.App.1980); In re Marriage of Owen, Mont., 609 P.2d 292 (1980); Kullbom v. Kullbom, 209 Neb. 145, 306 N.W.2d 844 (1981); Carr v. Carr, N.D., 300 N.W.2d 40 (1980); Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Civ.App.1979); Matter of Marriage of Rink, 18 Wash.App. 549, 571 P.2d 210 (1977).