Court Opinion

ID: 9393274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 19:02:50.8952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:52.298257
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                             )
                                               )
       v.                                      )           I.D. No. 1112000553
                                               )
OMAR MITCHELL,                                 )
                                               )
                      Defendant.               )

                             Date Submitted: March 2, 2023
                              Date Decided: May 9, 2023

                                          ORDER

       Upon consideration of Defendant’s pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief1

(“Motion”), Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, statutory and decisional law, and the

record in this case, IT APPEARS THAT:

       (1)    On August 14, 2014, Defendant pled guilty to Murder Second Degree,

three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony

(“PFDCF”), two counts of Robbery First Degree, and Possession of a

Firearm/Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP/PABPP”).2

       (2)    By Order dated January 23, 2015, effective December 1, 2011,

Defendant was sentenced to a total of 47 years of unsuspended Level V time.3

1
  D.I. 120.
2
  D.I. 109.
3
  D.I. 113. Defendant’s sentence is as follows: for Murder Second Degree, 28 years at Level V,
suspended after 26 years at Level V for 2 years at Level IV DOC Discretion, followed by
decreasing levels of supervision; for each count of PFDCF, 3 years at Level V, for each count of
Robbery First Degree, 3 years at Level V, and for PFBPP/PABPP, 6 years at Level V. The Court
       (3)    On March 2, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for

postconviction relief.4 In his Motion, Defendant asserts a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, arguing that his trial attorneys violated the Delaware Rules of

Professional Conduct by allowing him to enter a plea that was neither knowingly nor

intelligently made.5

       (4)    Before addressing the merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the

Court must first determine whether any of the procedural bars under Rule 61 are

applicable.6 A motion under this Rule may be subject to summary dismissal if it is

untimely, repetitive, previously adjudicated, or procedurally defaulted.7 The issue

here is timeliness. Under Rule 61(i)(1), a motion must be filed no more than “one

year after the judgment of conviction is final . . .”8 “A judgment of conviction is

final . . . 30 days after the Superior Court imposes sentence.”9

       (5)    Here, the Court imposed its sentence on January 23, 2015,10 and it

became final thirty days later, on February 23, 2015. Defendant filed the instant

motion on March 2, 2023, more than five years later; accordingly, Defendant’s

Motion is procedurally barred as untimely.

also ordered Defendant to pay $5965.00 in restitution.
4
  D.I. 120.
5
  Id.
6
  Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
7
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
8
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
9
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m).
10
   D.I. 112.
                                                2
      NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s

Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

                                                /s/ Jan R. Jurden
                                          Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

cc:   Original to Prothonotary
      Abigail E. Rodgers, DAG
      Omar Mitchell (SBI# 00521134)

                                      3