Court Opinion

ID: 9959064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:11:31.502148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:25.494088
License: Public Domain

J-A28007-23

                                   2024 PA Super 69

  HOLLY FISHER, EXECUTRIX OF THE  :             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  ESTATE OF SANDRA REICHART       :                  PENNSYLVANIA
                                  :
                                  :
            v.                    :
                                  :
                                  :
  AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL          :
  INDUSTRIES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS :             No. 106 EDA 2023
  SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST FOR THE   :
  CLUBMAN BRAND, AND TO THE       :
  NESLEMUR COMPANY AND PINAUD     :
  COMPANY, ART OF BUSINESS, INC.  :
  F/K/A RAYLON COR, WHITTAKER     :
  CLARK AND DANIELS, INC.,        :
  COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY,      :
  REVLON CONSUMER PRODUCTS        :
  CORPORATION, REVLON, INC.,      :
  BRENNTAG NORTH AMERICA,         :
  BRENNTAG SPECIALTIES INC.,      :
  BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, :
  CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY, :
  CYPRUS MINES CORPORATION,       :
  KOLMAR LABORATORIES, INC.       :
                                  :
                                  :
  APPEAL OF: AMERICAN             :
  INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES        :

             Appeal from the Order Entered December 2, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 190700877

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 10, 2024

       Appellant, American International Industries (“AII”), appeals from the

judgment entered December 2, 2022, awarding damages to Appellee, Holly

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A28007-23

Fisher (“Fisher”), Executrix of the Estate of Sandra Reichart (“Decedent”),

following a jury trial in this asbestos litigation. We affirm, in part, vacate, in

part, and remand with instructions.

      The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Decedent

owned a beauty salon, known as “Sandy’s Beauty Shop,” and worked as a

hairdresser from approximately 1960 through 1985.         In her work, Decedent

used the following talcum powders: Clubman Talc, Jeris Talc, Jean Nate Talc

and Cashmere Bouquet Talc. In January 2019, Decedent was diagnosed with

malignant pleural mesothelioma. On February 8, 2019, Decedent died.

      On July 8, 2019, Decedent’s daughter, Fisher, as the Executrix of

Decedent’s estate, commenced the present litigation asserting that the

aforementioned talcum powders contained asbestos and/or asbestiform

materials.   In particular, Fisher claimed that, from 1960 through 1985,

Clubman Talc, Jeris Talc, Cashmere Bouquet Talc, and Jean Nate Talc, were

comprised of asbestos-containing talc from Italy. Fisher further alleged that

Decedent’s exposure to the asbestos-containing talcum powders caused her

to develop mesothelioma, which led to her subsequent death. Fisher brought

this action against multiple defendants, including Neslemur Company

(“Neslemur”), owner of the Clubman Talc brand until 1987; AII, a product-line

successor to Clubman Talc following its acquisition of the brand from Neslemur

in 1987 and a product-line successor to Jeris Talc following its acquisition of

the brand from Ar. Winarick in 1991; Colgate-Palmolive Company (“Colgate”),

the owner and distributer of Cashmere Bouquet Talc; and Whittaker Clark and

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Daniels, Inc. (“WCD”), the supplier of the asbestos-containing talc products.

At the time of trial, only AII and WCD remained.1

       The matter proceeded to a jury trial on October 11, 2022. On October

19, 2022, AII filed a motion for nonsuit arguing that Fisher failed to establish

that Decedent’s use of Clubman Talc caused her mesothelioma. The trial court

denied AII’s motion. On October 21, 2022, AII moved for a directed verdict

on the same grounds, i.e., Fisher failed to establish causation with respect to

Clubman Talc. Again, the trial court denied AII’s motion.

       The jury returned a verdict for Fisher on October 21, 2022. In particular,

the jury found that Decedent had mesothelioma (Verdict Question 1);

Decedent inhaled asbestos contained in Clubman Talc, as well as asbestos

contained in talcum powder distributed by WCD, with “sufficient frequency,

regularity, and proximity to be a substantial factor in causing her disease”

(Verdict Question 2); AII, on August 17, 1987, acquired “all or substantially

all” of Neslemur’s manufacturing assets and “continued essentially the same

manufacturing operation for the production and distribution” of Clubman Talc

(Verdict Question 3); Decedent inhaled asbestos contained in Colgate’s

Cashmere Bouquet Talc with “sufficient frequency, regularity, and proximity

to be a substantial factor in causing her disease” (Verdict Question 9); and

Decedent inhaled asbestos contained in Neslemur’s products with “sufficient

____________________________________________

1 As will be discussed infra, Neslemur did not participate in the litigation.
Colgate was released prior to trial but ultimately included on the verdict form
pursuant to Pennsylvania’s FAIR Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.2).

                                           -3-
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frequency, regularity, and proximity to be a substantial factor in causing her

disease” (Verdict Question 11). The jury determined that Jeris Talc was not

one of the talcum powder’s that contributed to Decedent’s development of

mesothelioma (Verdict Question 1).      As such, the jury did not determine

whether AII, on April 26, 1991, acquired “all or substantially all” of Ar.

Winarick’s manufacturing assets and “continued essentially the same

manufacturing operation for the production and distribution of Jeris [Talc]”

(Question 4).    Ultimately, the jury awarded $400,000.00 in monetary

damages.

      AII filed a motion for post-trial relief on October 31, 2022, seeking

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). That same day, Fisher filed

a motion for delay damages, asking the trial court to mold the verdict to add

delay damages totaling $38,710.22, allocating it on a pro rata basis.        In

addition, Fisher filed a motion for post-trial relief, asking the trial court to

enter judgment in “conform[ity] . . . to the jury’s findings” and allocate the

$400,000.00 award to only AII and WCD in equal shares. Fisher’s Post-Trial

Motion, 10/31/22, at *6.

      The trial court denied AII’s motion on November 3, 2022. On December

2, 2022, the trial court granted Fisher’s motion for delay damages, stating

that “the verdict shall be molded to reflect the addition of delay damages in

the amount of $38,710.22, apportioned on a pro rata basis.”         Trial Court

Order, 12/2/22, at *1 (unpaginated). That same day, the trial court entered

another order, stating:

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       The jury rendered a $400,000.00 verdict and assessed liability
       against four defendants: [AII, WCD, Neslemur and Colgate].
       Each [of the] Defendant’s pro rata share of the verdict is
       one-forth (1/4), or $100,000.00, while each [of the]
       Defendant’s pro rata share of the delay of damages is likewise
       one[-]fourth[,] or $9,677.55. Each [of the] Defendant’s pro
       rata share of the verdict plus delay damages is $109,677.55[.]

       Defendant[, AII], as successor to Defendant Neslemur, is
       responsible for Defendant Neslemur’s portion of the damages.
       Defendant [AII’s] total portion of the verdict plus delay
       damages is, therefore, $219,355.10[.] Defendant [WCD’s]
       portion of the verdict plus delay damages is $109,677.55.
       Defendant [Colgate’s] portion of the verdict plus delay damages
       is $109,677.55.

Trial Court Order, 12/2/22, at *1-*2 (unpaginated) (emphasis added). On

December 6, 2022, Fisher filed a praecipe for entry of judgment, asking the

court to enter judgment in conformity with its December 2, 2022 order. This

timely appeal followed.

      AII raises the following issues on appeal:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [AII’s] motion for
          nonsuit, motion for directed verdict, and motion for [JNOV]
          when [Fisher] presented no evidence to the jury, in an
          asbestos case, that the product for which [AII] was alleged
          to be liable actually contained asbestos throughout the
          period of Decedent’s alleged use[?]

       2. Whether the trial court erred in granting [Fisher’s] motion
          for post-trial relief when [she] had not previously filed a
          motion for directed verdict, and where the result was to
          retroactively remove a defendant from the verdict form and
          assign that defendant’s share to [AII], thereby doubling
          [AII’s] share of the verdict?

AII’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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       In its first issue, AII argues that the trial court erred in denying its

motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, and JNOV.2 AII premises its claims of

error on its contention that Fisher presented “no evidence” that Clubman Talc

“actually contained asbestos during the period of Decedent’s use.” AII’s Brief

at 24. AII notes that Fisher’s “entire causation theory” was based upon her

allegation that Clubman Talc was “made from asbestos-[containing] Italian

talc” but argues that she failed to prove that Clubman Talc was blended with

Italian talc. Id. Hence, AII claims Fisher failed to establish the “critical first

step” in proving causation, i.e., that Clubman Talc contained asbestos. Id. at

27. We disagree.

       “In reviewing a trial court’s decision whether or not to grant a motion

for [nonsuit]/directed verdict[/JNOV] in favor of one of the parties, an

appellate court must consider the evidence, together with all favorable

inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict winner.”

Moore v. Ericsson, Inc., 7 A.3d 820, 824 (Pa. Super. 2010). We will reverse

a trial court’s order granting or denying such motions if we discern an abuse

of discretion or an error of law.              See Munoz v. Children’s Hosp. of

Philadelphia, 265 A.3d 805, 806 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining that the

“appellate court must review the evidence” presented during trial and
____________________________________________

2  We note that, in prior cases, this Court has held that “[o]nce [a] case
proceed[s] to trial and [the a]ppellant present[s] a defense, [a] trial court’s
refusal to grant . . . a compulsory nonsuit becomes moot.” Whitaker v.
Frankford Hosp. of City of Philadelphia, 984 A.2d 512, 517 (Pa. Super.
2009) (citations omitted). We will, therefore, consider AII’s claim that the
trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and JNOV.

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determine “whether the trial court abused its discretion or made an error of

law” in its disposition of a motion for nonsuit); Hoffa v. Bimes, 954 A.2d

1241, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that the standard of review of an order

granting or denying a motion for nonsuit is identical); see also Reott v. Asia

Trend, Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that an appellate

court’s standard of review for considering motions for a directed verdict and

JNOV are identical: the appellate court will reverse a trial court’s ruling if it

abused its discretion or committed an error of law).

        “To establish causation in an asbestos case[,] the plaintiff must prove

the exposure to asbestos caused the injury and that it was the defendant’s

asbestos-containing product that caused the injury. To satisfy this burden a

plaintiff must meet the ‘regularity, frequency and proximity’ test as articulated

by our Supreme Court in Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts Co., 943 A.2d 216 ([Pa.]

2007).” Moore, 7 A.3d at 824 (parallel citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff

“must      adduce    evidence    that     exposure     to   [the]   defendant’s

asbestos-containing product was sufficiently ‘frequent, regular and proximate’

to support a jury’s finding that [the] defendant’s product was substantially

causative of the disease.” Rost v. Ford Motor Co., 151 A.3d 1032, 1044

(Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).    Importantly, however, if a plaintiff fails to

establish that the defendant’s product actually contains asbestos, “the

‘frequency, regularity, and proximity’ analysis is not triggered” and causation

is not established. Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 576 (Pa. Super.

2014) (upholding the trial court’s decision to enter summary judgment

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because the plaintiff “failed to establish that [General Electric (GE)] products

containing asbestos were present at the worksite” and, as such, the appellant

“failed to create an issue of material fact establishing that [the d]ecedent was

exposed to asbestos-containing GE products”); see also Sterling v. P & H

Mining Equipment, Inc., 113 A.3d 1277, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding

that the plaintiff “failed to adduce evidence sufficient to support an inference

that [the plaintiff] inhaled asbestos from component parts of P & H cranes”

rendering summary judgment appropriate).

      In pursuing her claim against AII, Fisher did not allege that Clubman

Talc, itself, contained asbestos.   Instead, Fisher alleged that, during the

relevant period (1960 through 1985), Clubman Talc was blended with

asbestos-containing talc from Italy. To support this claim, Fisher presented

the expert testimony of Mark Krekeler, Ph.D., a geologist that specialized in

polysorical minerals. In particular, Dr. Krekeler opined that the talc mined

from Val Chisone, Italy, “contained detectable levels of asbestos.” N.T. Trial,

10/17/22, at 40. Dr. Krekeler based his opinion on, inter alia, documentation

from various companies indicating that asbestos was present in the talc mined

from Val Chisone, Italy.   Id. at 34; see also id. (citing a document from

Johnson & Johnson, Inc. indicating that, in the 1950s through the late 1970s,

it commonly found tremolite, actinolite, and chrysotile asbestos in the talc

mined from Val Chisone, Italy); (citing a document from Johns Manville

indicating that, in 1973, it found 1900 chrysotile fibers per milligram in the

                                     -8-
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talc mined from Val Chisone, Italy); (citing a document from WCD indicating

that, in 1972, it found asbestos in the talc mined from Val Chisone, Italy).

       Then, Fisher presented, via videotaped deposition, the testimony of

Donald Ferry. Initially, Ferry testified that he worked as a sales agent for

Charles Mathieu, Inc., an entity that purchased Italian talc from the Val

Chisone region.      Ferry stated that, from “roughly the 1950s through the

1960s,” he sold the Italian talc from the Val Chisone region to Neslemur.

Donald Ferry Deposition, 6/8/15, at 8.           Ferry further testified that, at an

unspecified time, Charles Mathieu began using WCD as an agent to sell the

Italian talc from the Val Chisone region to “smaller users,” including

Neslemur.3      Id. at 5.       This testimony was later corroborated by the

introduction of certain sales records from WCD. In particular, by stipulation,

Fisher introduced      records reflecting sales in 1981 and 1982 of Italian talc

____________________________________________

3 Donald Ferry testified that Neslemur    produced Jeris Talc. Other evidence
and testimony, however, was that Ar. Winarick owned and distributed Jeris
Talc until the brand was purchased by AII in 1991. Donald Ferry, however,
clearly testified that, starting in the 1950s, he worked as a sales agent that
exclusively sold Italian talc from the Val Chisone region to Neslemur. Hence,
the jury was free to disregard his testimony indicating which product Neslemur
owned and credit his testimony that he sold Italian talc from the Val Chisone
region to Neslemur during the relevant time period. See Mader v. Duquesne
Light Company, 241 A.3d 600, 617 (Pa. 2020) (“[T]he jury is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence, and resolving conflicts in testimony are
within the exclusive province of the jury.”).

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from the Val Chisone region from WCD to Neslemur.4            See N.T. Trial,

10/19/22, at 60-62.

       Importantly, and in contrast to AII’s claims on appeal, there was

evidence presented during trial which demonstrated that the Italian talc from

the Val Chisone region was, in fact, blended with Clubman Talc. In particular,

AII’s corporate representative, Charles Loveless, testified that, after AII

purchased the Clubman Talc brand from Neslemur in 1987, it received certain

documents from Neslemur, including formula cards. One such formula card

from January 1973 specified “Italian talc.” Id. at 15. Even though Loveless

testified that the aforementioned formula card included the “last reference” to

Neslemur’s use of Italian talc, other evidence showed detectable asbestos

fibers in Clubman Talc following January 1973. Id. In particular, Loveless

admitted that, in 1976, the Division of Cosmetics Technology of the Food and

Drug Administration (“FDA”) tested various products, including Clubman Talc,

and detected 9,000 tremolite fibers per milligram therein.     See N.T. Trial,

10/18/22, at 86.

       A review of the foregoing demonstrates AII’s claim that Fisher failed to

introduce sufficient evidence to prove that Clubman Talc contained asbestos

____________________________________________

4 On appeal, AII contends that WCD’s sales records were introduced against

WCD only, not AII. AII’s Brief at 9-10. A review of the trial transcripts,
however, reveals that Fisher introduced the sales records at the close of her
case-in-chief and did so via a stipulation. See N.T. Trial, 10/19/22, at 60-62.
The trial court was neither requested nor did it provide a limiting instruction
to ensure that the jury considered the sales records against WCD only. Id.
Hence, AII’s contention is belied by the record.

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lacks merit. Indeed, Dr. Krekeler’s expert testimony clearly established that

the talc mined from Val Chisone, Italy, contained asbestos.           In addition,

Donald Ferry’s testimony demonstrated that, starting in the 1950s, Charles

Mathieu sold asbestos-containing Italian talc from the Val Chisone region to

Neslemur and that, eventually, Charles Mathieu turned such sales over to

WCD, who continued selling asbestos-containing Italian talc from the Val

Chisone region to Neslemur until 1982.          Finally, the evidence introduced

during Loveless’s testimony demonstrated that, Neslemur’s formula cards,

until at least January 1973, referred to asbestos-containing Italian talc from

the Val Chisone region and that, in 1976, testing of Clubman Talc by the FDA

detected traces of asbestos. Thus, when we consider the evidence in a light

most favorable to Fisher, as the verdict winner, together with all favorable

inferences, we conclude that Fisher presented sufficient evidence that, from

at   least   1960   through    1976,     Clubman     Talc   was    blended    with

asbestos-containing Italian talc from the Val Chisone region.

      In its second issue, AII challenges the trial court’s disposition of Fisher’s

post-trial motion filed pursuant to Pa.C.R.P. 227.1. We will reverse a trial

court’s order granting or denying a party’s post-trial motion if we determine

an abuse of discretion or an error of law. United Env't Grp., Inc. v. GKK

McKnight, LP, 176 A.3d 946, 965 (Pa. Super. 2017)

      In her post-trial motion, Fisher asked the trial court to “enter an order

confirming the judgment [entered] to the jury’s findings in this case.” Fisher’s

Post-trial Motion, 10/31/22, at *1 (unpaginated). In particular, Fisher asked

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the trial court to enter judgment in “conform[ity] . . . to the jury’s findings”

and allocate the $400,000.00 award to only AII and WCD in equal shares. Id.

at *6. In support of her request, Fisher pointed to the fact that the jury was

asked and, ultimately, determined that AII “was the successor to Neslemur

for liabilities associated with [] Clubman [Talc],” and, in so doing, determined

that “AII’s acquisition of the brand brought about the virtual destruction of

[Fisher’s] remedies against Neslemur.” Id. at *1. Because Clubman Talc was

the only product for which Neslemur could be held liable, Fisher claimed that

the jury’s subsequent determination that a “Neslemur talc product contributed

to [Decedent’s] mesothelioma” was superfluous and, therefore, no judgment

should be entered against Neslemur. Id. at *2. In addition, Fisher asked the

trial court not to enter judgment against Colgate, claiming that “the jury did

not make a legally sufficient finding as to liability on the part of Colgate for its

Cashmere Bouquet [Talc].” Id. Ultimately, the trial court granted Fisher’s

motion, in part, concluding that AII, “as a successor to [] Neslemur,” was

“responsible for [its] portion of the damages.” Trial Court Order, 12/2/22, at

*2 (unpaginated). The trial court, therefore, apportioned one-half (1/2) of

Fisher’s damages to AII, one-fourth (1/4) to WCD, and one-fourth (1/4) to

Colgate. Id.

      On appeal, AII contends that the trial court erred in granting Fisher’s

post-trial motion, thereby “giving [AII] a [one-half] share of the verdict.” AII’s

Brief at 31. First, AII argues that Fisher’s post-trial motion was “procedurally

barred” because she failed to “move for a directed verdict at the close of

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evidence.” Id. at 25. Second, AII claims the trial court’s modification was

erroneous because the jury found four entities, AII, WCD, Neslemur and

Colgate, responsible for Decedent’s disease and subsequent death. Thus, AII

contends that “[e]ach joint tortfeasor is responsible for an equal share of the

verdict,” i.e., one-fourth of the verdict Id. at 34. Finally, AII argues that,

even “if Neslemur is taken out of the equation, post-verdict, then dividing the

award pro rata” means splitting the verdict against the remaining three

tortfeasors – AII, WCD and Colgate – resulting in the allocation of one-third

of the verdict share to AII. Id. at 34-35. We will address each of AII’s claims

in turn.

      AII’s first claim of error revolves around its belief that Fisher was

procedurally barred from seeking post-trial relief. In support of this assertion,

AII relies on Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 which, in relevant part, states:

       (a) After trial and upon the written Motion for Post-Trial Relief
       filed by any party, the court may

            (1) order a new trial as to all or any of the issues; or

            (2) direct the entry of judgment in favor of any party; or

            (3) remove a nonsuit; or

            (4) affirm, modify or change the decision; or

            (5) enter any other appropriate order.

       (b) Except as otherwise provided by Pa.R.E. 103(a), post-trial
       relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,

            (1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial proceedings
            or by motion, objection, point for charge, request for
            findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer of proof or other
            appropriate method at trial; and

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               (2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state how
               the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings or at
               trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless
               leave is granted upon cause shown to specify additional
               grounds.

Id. Because Neslemur was a defendant in this matter and included on the

verdict sheet, AII claims that Fisher waived her claim for relief because she

failed to move for a directed verdict “before the jury was discharged.” AII’s

Brief at 33.

      A review of the certified record reveals that, in contrast to AII’s claims,

Fisher’s counsel objected to the inclusion of a question regarding Neslemur’s

liability during the charge conference at trial, which included a discussion of

what was to be included on the verdict slip. The relevant transcripts provide:

       The [c]ourt: The question is out. Let’s move on to 13, 14, and
       15. 13 and 14 were questions that the plaintiff wanted out on
       your verdict sheet. 13 and 14 regarding Neslemur and Jean
       Nate [Talc]. I can see the relevance of those questions on the
       jury’s verdict.

                                        ***

       [Fisher’s counsel]: Just note our objection regarding the
       Neslemur question, Your Honor.

       The [c]ourt: That [is] question number 14?

       [Fisher’s counsel]: Right.

       The [c]ourt: Yes, you have an objection to 14. Defense, you
       want it in, correct? You submitted it. Certainly, Neslemur was
       a huge part of this case. And I understand – I think that the
       question is relevant to – I mean, plaintiff, if you want to try to
       explain to me why it should [not] be in there?

       [Fisher’s counsel]: Because the theory is, if the jury already
       answers that AII is the successor to Neslemur, there [is] no
       need to confuse them with any sort of exposure to Neslemur,

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       holding Neslemur liable. They [have] already determined that
       they are the product line successor and therefore liable for
       Neslemur. So to then subsequently ask questions about liability
       with regard to Neslemur, it contradicts the finding of the
       product line –

       The [c]ourt: But you remember, I wanted to put successor
       liability right after that. That [is] what I [am] saying. They had
       successor liability early on the verdict sheet. I though successor
       liability should go right after those questions.

       [Fisher’s counsel]: I understand.

N.T Trial, 10/20/22, at 131-132. Importantly, Rule 227.1(b) explicitly states

that a party may preserve a claim for post-trial relief by raising a claim, if

available, via “motion, objection . . . or other appropriate method at trial.”

Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1) (emphasis added). We therefore conclude that AII’s

claim that Fisher’s post-trial request for relief was procedurally barred is belied

by the record.

      Next, AII argues that Neslemur, as a defendant, should be responsible

for one-fourth of the share of the verdict. In support of this claim, AII argues

that, during trial, there was testimony indicating that Neslemur owned Jeris

Talc, as well as Clubman Talc. As such, AII claims that the trial court erred in

presuming that “the jury’s finding against Neslemur was related to Clubman

Talc.” AII’s Brief at 34.

      AII correctly points out that, during Donald Ferry’s testimony, he stated

that Neslemur produced Jeris Talc, even though other evidence and testimony

demonstrated that Jeris Talc was a product originally produced by Ar. Winarick

and purchased by AII in 1991. Despite this testimony, the jury found that

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Decedent was not exposed to asbestos contained in Jeris Talc. Importantly,

the jury was free to reject Ferry’s testimony that Neslemur made Jeris Talc

and, furthermore, conclude that Jeris Talc did not cause Decedent’s illness.

See Mader, supra at 617 (explaining that the jury was “free to believe all,

part, or none of the evidence, and resolv[e] conflicts in testimony are within

the exclusive province of the jury”). Hence, AII is essentially asking this Court

to reweigh the jury’s findings, which we are unable to do. Commonwealth

v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011) (reiterating it is not position

of this Court to “reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that

of the factfinder”). Moreover, a fair reading of the jury verdict demonstrates

that the jury could not have found Neslemur liable based upon a finding that

it produced Jeris Talc because they explicitly determined that Jeris Talc was

not a talc or talcum powder from which Decedent inhaled asbestos with

sufficient regularity, frequency, and proximity to be a substantial factor in

causing her disease. See Verdict Sheet, 10/26/22, at 1. Thus, AII’s claim

fails.

         Finally, AII argues that, even if Neslemur were permissibly removed

from the verdict form, the trial court erred in assigning AII one-half of the

total verdict, as opposed to one-third. We agree.

         Our Supreme Court recently explained how liability is to be apportioned

in a strict liability asbestos case. See Roverano v. John Crane, 226 A.3d

526 (Pa. 2020). The Roverano Court stated that, in accordance with the

plain language of the Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102, liability is to be

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apportioned on a per capita basis. Id. at 527-528. The Court reasoned that,

in strict liability asbestos matters, the alleged injury is “inherently a single,

indivisible injury that is incapable of being apportioned in a rational manner”

and, as such, “it is impossible to determine which actor caused the harm,

[and] it follows that it is impossible to apportion the amount of each

defendant’s liability on a percentage basis.” Id. at 510.

      Upon review, we hold that, while the trial court correctly determined

that judgment should not be entered against Neslemur, it erroneously

assigned AII one-half of the total verdict.     As discussed above, Neslemur

originally sold and produced Clubman Talc. In 1987, however, AII purchased

the Clubman brand from Neslemur, which was after Decedent’s relevant

exposure period (1960-1985).      Thus, the sole basis for AII’s liability was

Fisher’s claim that it constituted a product-line successor to Neslemur for

Clubman Talc, which the jury ultimately found. This finding, therefore, also

implicitly recognized that AII’s acquisition of the Clubman Talc virtually

destroyed Fisher’s remedies against Neslemur. See Keselyak v. Reach All,

Inc., 660 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Pa. Super. 1995) (holding that, because the

plaintiff’s claim against the original manufacturer was not destroyed by the

successor corporation’s acquisition of the product, the product-line exception

did not apply to impose liability on the successor corporation).           Upon

recognition of this fact, the trial court decided to “add” Neslemur’s purported

liability to AII. This was error. Instead, pursuant to Roverano, supra, the

trial court should have simply removed Neslemur’s portion of liability and, in

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turn, apportioned liability on a per capita basis to the remaining three

tortfeasors, AII, WCD and Colgate. Thus, we are constrained to vacate the

trial court’s December 2, 2022 judgment order.

      We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying AII’s motion for

non-suit, directed verdict and JNOV. We vacate the trial court’s December 2,

2022 order entering judgment against AII, WCD and Colgate and assigning

AII a one-half share, WCD a one-fourth share and Colgate a one-fourth share

of the verdict. We order the trial court to enter judgment on a per capita basis

against AII, WCD and Colgate consistent with this opinion.

      Affirmed in part.      Vacated in part. Remanded with instructions.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/10/2024

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