Court Opinion

ID: 9634298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:15.318466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:51.394193
License: Public Domain

FUENTES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the majority in its affirmance of the District Court’s finding that, in connection with this transaction, LEP Profit and LEP Japan acted as “indirect carriers” and not as “freight forwarders.” However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the District Court’s finding that FedEx was entitled to benefit from the limited liability provision of the Warsaw Convention was in error. The majority reversed the District Court’s decision on that issue because FedEx failed to specifically list Anchorage, Alaska and Newark, New Jersey as “agreed stopping places” on the air way bill for the relevant transaction.
As noted above, to be eligible for limited liability protection, Article 9 of the Warsaw Convention requires that a carrier comply with the Convention’s requirements for documenting a given shipment in an “air waybill.” A proper “air waybill” must contain certain particulars listed in Article 8 of the Warsaw Convention, including the following, which is the text of subpart (c) and the disputed provision in this case:
The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in cases of necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its international character.
The majority here adopts an interpretation of 8(c) articulated in a line of cases from the Second Circuit. These cases found that all interim stops are encompassed by the phrase “agreed stopping places,” so that failure to specifically list any such stop on the waybill of an international flight renders the carrier ineligible for limited liability protection. See, e.g., Intercargo Ins. Co. v. China Airlines, Ltd., 208 F.3d 64, 69-70 (2d Cir.2000); Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 94 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir.1996). The rationale for interpreting 8(c) in such a stringent fashion is that limited liability affords carriers a “significant benefit”; as such, “omission of any required item from the air waybill will result in the loss of limited liability regardless of the commercial significance of the omission.” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 429 (2d Cir.2001).
The “primary purpose of the contracting parties to the Convention,” however, was to “limit[] the liability of air carriers.” Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991). Our own jurisprudence suggests that in “order to further the goals of uniformity and liability limitation, the Convention’s provisions must be construed broadly. Indeed, the purposes of the Convention must be furthered to the greatest extent possible.” Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir.1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To read Article 8(c) as imposing the draconian requirement that a carrier anticipate and list all stopping places in order to qualify for limited liability protection is certainly not a “broad” interpretation that furthers the *685goal of limited liability for carriers to the “greatest extent possible.”
Instead, the majority’s interpretation embraces the narrowest possible understanding of Article 8(c) by failing to consider the significance of the latter portion of the provision. That portion states that “if [the carrier] exercises [the right to alter the stopping places] the alterations shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its international character.” This safety valve ensures that all parties to the contract understand and agree that the transportation in question qualifies for limited liability protection under the Warsaw Convention regardless of any alternate route that the carrier may select out of necessity. As the District Court explained, the inclusion of a safety valve demonstrates that the “driving force of 8(c) as a whole is. to ensure notice and acknowledgment, not as to every stop, but as to stops [that] pertain to and indicate the international character of the flight.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 22.
The majority contends that the “meaning the District Court gave to the language of 8(c) requires an additional caveat that simply does not appear in the text.” Part II, supra at [9]. To the contrary, it is the majority’s reading of Article 8(c) that imposes upon carriers a burden far heavier than the provision requires. To further the purpose of the Warsaw Convention to the “greatest extent possible,” as mandated by Onyeanusi, this Court should read Article 8(c) as imposing a requirement that carriers list only those “agreed stopping places” that might impact the international character of the flight and thus the availability of limited liability protection to the carrier.8
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Although the District Court did not reach its conclusion on the issue of limited liability via application of the Hague Protocol to the facts of this case, to do so, I believe, would have lent further support to the court's analysis. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that the “later change effectuated by the Hague Protocol could just as easily be viewed as changing and restricting, rather than clarifying, the exceptions for limited liability.” Part II, at [9]. The Hague Protocol did not furnish a different definition for the phrase "agreed stopping places,” but merely clarified that only an interim stop that affected the international character of the shipment qualified as such an “agreed stopping place.” Courts have recognized that if an "amendment clarifies prior law rather than changing it, no concerns about retroactive application arise and the amendment is applied to the present proceeding as an accurate restatement of prior law.” Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).