Court Opinion

ID: 9593594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:23:23.064044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:54.415812
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND PETITION FOR REHEARING
JOHNSON, Justice.
The Council has filed a motion for leave to produce additional evidence and a petition for rehearing.
THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
The motion requests leave to present the “new and additional testimony” of a witness “upon the grounds and for the reason that such testimony is critical to a proper determination of the issues in this action and was not known nor available to [the Council] until after this Court took testimony on April 14, 1992, regarding Judge Becker’s alcohol recovery progress.” The Council supports its motion with the affidavit of Gregory Shipman dated May 13, 1992. Shipman is the court reporter for District Judge James J. May of the Fifth Judicial District. Judge May is a member of the Council, but recused himself from the proceedings before the Council concerning Judge Becker. Judge Becker has objected to the introduction of this new evidence by the Council and has proposed to offer rebuttal evidence if the new evidence is permitted.
We first point out, as we did in our initial opinion, that the Court’s authority in this proceeding derives from the Court’s original supervisory control of judges vested in the Court by art. 5, § 2 of our state constitution. This is not an appeal from the Council. This Court has the ultimate authority and responsibility to decide what should be done in each case based on our weighing of the evidence presented to the Council and any additional evidence the Court permits.
As our initial opinion indicates, at the hearing before this Court, the Court permitted Judge Becker and his relapse prevention therapist to testify on the limited issue of Judge Becker’s progress in his alcohol recovery program since the Council’s hearing in November 1991. Although the Court invited the special examiner for the Council to present rebuttal evidence, the special examiner said he had none to offer.
This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that when a party seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, “it is essential ... that such evidence has been discovered since the trial and that it could not have been discovered before or during the progress of the trial by the exercise of due diligence.” Fredericksen v. Luthy, 72 Idaho 164, 168, 238 P.2d 430, 432 (1951); cf. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) (A new trial may be granted based on “[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which [the party] could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.”) The party seeking a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence bears the burden of establishing that the party could not have discovered the evidence before the trial by the exercise of due diligence. Grasser v. *296First Security Bank of Idaho, 96 Idaho 754, 757, 536 P.2d 749, 752 (1975).
Although neither the prior decisions of this Court nor the rules promulgated by the Court concerning new trial motions govern this proceeding, we believe the principles embodied in our decisions and rules are appropriate to apply in this situation. Here, there is no showing that by the exercise of due diligence prior to this Court’s hearing on April 14, 1992, the Special Examiner for the Council could not have discovered the new evidence the Council wishes to present. Therefore, we deny the motion for leave to produce additional evidence.
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING.
The Council filed its petition for rehearing pursuant to Rule 42 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. We first point out that because this is not an appeal, Rule 42 does not technically apply in this proceeding. We do, however, have inherent authority to consider the petition as a request for reconsideration of our decision.
Before issuing our initial opinion in this proceeding, we considered all of the issues the Council raises in the brief in support of its petition, except the request to present additional evidence, which we deny above. After reviewing the other issues presented in the Council’s brief, we are not convinced to reconsider our decision. Therefore, we deny the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BISTLINE and McDEVITT, JJ. and WALTERS and TROUT, JJ. Pro Tern., concur.