Court Opinion

ID: 9917106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 17:02:16.373552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.256449
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                  SUMMARY
                                                            January 11, 2024

                                 2024COA4

No. 22CA0925, People in Interest of CMWR — Juvenile Court —
Delinquency — Adjudicatory Proceedings; Criminal Law —
Rights of Defendant — Speedy Trial — Exceptions —
Continuance Granted Without Defendant’s Consent —
Unavailability of Evidence Material to State’s Case

     A division of the court of appeals considers what statutes a

juvenile court must apply when determining whether to continue an

adjudicatory action against a juvenile past the speedy trial deadline,

over the juvenile’s objection. The division decides, as a matter of

first impression, that a court must consider the factors set forth in

section 18-1-405(6)(g), C.R.S. 2023 — a statute that addresses

continuances in trials of adult defendants — when deciding whether

continuance of the trial in a juvenile adjudicatory action would

violate the juvenile’s speedy trial rights. Under the facts of the case,

the division holds that the juvenile court erred by continuing the
juvenile’s trial past the speedy trial deadline because the prosecutor

failed to meet her burden of establishing, and the court did not find,

that the requirements of section 18-1-405(6)(g) were satisfied.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                          2024COA4

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0925
Mesa County District Court No. 21JD132
Honorable Lance P. Timbreza, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of C.M.W.R.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

                       JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE
                        REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

                                  Division VI
                         Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
                        Welling and Gomez, JJ., concur

                         Announced January 11, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tara Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for
Juvenile-Appellant
¶1    Juveniles charged with offenses in adjudicatory actions, like

 adults charged with criminal offenses, have statutory and

 constitutional rights to a speedy trial. But those rights are not

 absolute. In this opinion, we consider the statutes that a juvenile

 court must consider when determining whether a juvenile’s speedy

 trial rights would be violated by granting a continuance at the

 request of the prosecutor, without the juvenile’s consent. We

 decide, as a matter of first impression, that a court must consider

 the factors set forth in section 18-1-405(6)(g), C.R.S. 2023, which

 addresses continuances in trials of adult defendants, when ruling

 on a prosecutor’s request to continue the trial in a juvenile

 adjudicatory action past the speedy trial deadline, without the

 juvenile’s consent.

¶2    C.M.W.R., a/k/a L.M.R. (the juvenile), contends that (1) their

 statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights were violated, and

 (2) the court erred by not merging their first degree arson and

 criminal mischief convictions. We agree that the juvenile’s

 statutory speedy trial rights were violated, vacate the juvenile’s

 adjudication of delinquency, and remand to the district court with

 instructions to dismiss the charges filed in this case. In light of our

                                    1
 disposition, we need not reach the juvenile’s constitutional speedy

 trial or merger arguments.

           I.    Background Facts and Procedural History

¶3    In April 2021, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

 Meetinghouse in Fruita caught fire, resulting in more than one

 million dollars in damage. Law enforcement officers arrested the

 juvenile in connection with the fire. Two months later, the

 prosecutor charged the juvenile with one count of criminal mischief

 in violation of section 18-4-501(1), C.R.S. 2023; one count of first

 degree arson in violation of section 18-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2023; and

 one count of second degree burglary in violation of section

 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2023.

¶4    At a hearing conducted on September 27, 2021, the juvenile

 entered a not guilty plea and requested that the court set a bench

 trial within sixty days, pursuant to section 19-2.5-902(1), C.R.S.

 2023. The court determined that the speedy trial deadline was

 November 26, 2021 (sixty days from September 27).

¶5    The prosecutor and defense counsel announced that they were

 available for a five-day trial starting on November 22, 2021 — the

 Monday of Thanksgiving week. After the court set the trial for that

                                   2
 date, the prosecutor said she “[had] a feeling that [she] may have an

 issue with witnesses . . . because it is Thanksgiving [week].” The

 court asked the prosecutor to check with her witnesses and said

 “that way we’re not going through herculean efforts to set over a

 holiday and it’s going to cause us a problem anyway. And then we

 can figure out” the setting.

¶6    At a hearing conducted three days later, the prosecutor

 advised the court that “at least a couple [of witnesses] as of right

 now” would be unavailable Thanksgiving week. Defense counsel

 objected to setting the trial more than sixty days from the date of

 the juvenile’s not guilty plea.

¶7    At a further hearing conducted on November 3, 2021, the

 prosecutor formally requested a continuance of the November 22

 trial date due to witness unavailability. The prosecutor’s entire

 argument in support of her request for the continuance was:

            So the People have reached out to multiple
            witnesses, and they’re unavailable that
            weekend [sic]. And we have spoken to those.
            Some of whom are essential to the case in
            proving the People’s case, and we can’t proceed
            without them. So given the holiday conflict —
            the DA’s personally ready. It’s just a witness
            conflict and unavailability and some of whom

                                    3
           are flying or will be flying from across the
           country.

¶8    The juvenile objected to the prosecutor’s request for a

 continuance and asserted their right to a speedy trial. In its ruling

 from the bench granting the prosecutor’s motion to continue, the

 court said as follows:

          “[S]peedy trial runs on November 26, 2021.”

          “The prosecutor indicates [she] ha[s] witness

           unavailability [but she] made diligent efforts in terms of

           attempting to arrange witnesses but would require flights

           and travel and individuals who are unavailable due to the

           holiday.”

          “Given that and given the nature of the allegations in this

           case, the amount of discovery, the investigation on the

           part of all of the parties, the Court finds that there is

           good cause to set beyond the speedy trial setting of

           November 26th.”

 The court then reset the trial for January 10, 2022, which was the

 next date when both attorneys said they were available. Defense

 counsel later filed a motion to dismiss the charges against the

                                   4
  juvenile on the grounds that the juvenile’s right to a speedy trial

  had been violated.

¶9     The juvenile’s initial trial began on January 10, 2022 — 105

  days following the juvenile’s entry of a not guilty plea. But on the

  second day of trial, the prosecutor announced that several of her

  out-of-state witnesses had been exposed to, or had contracted,

  COVID-19 and were unable to travel. She requested a mistrial. The

  defense objected, arguing that “the benefit that [the witnesses] do

  add to the Prosecution does not outweigh [the juvenile’s] right to

  have a speedy trial.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request for

  a mistrial over defense counsel’s objection and continued the trial

  to February 14, 2022. (The propriety of the court’s decision to grant

  the mistrial is not at issue in this appeal.)

¶ 10   Defense counsel subsequently renewed her motion to dismiss

  the case “because holding the trial past November 26, 2021 violated

  [the juvenile’s] speedy trial rights.”

¶ 11   The juvenile’s bench trial began on February 14, 2022 — 141

  days following the juvenile’s entry of a not guilty plea. At the

  conclusion of the trial, the court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent

  on all counts.

                                       5
                              II.   Analysis

¶ 12   The juvenile raises two contentions on appeal. First, they

  contend that their statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights

  were violated when the court set their trial past the sixty-day

  speedy trial deadline because the prosecutor’s argument for a

  continuance lacked the necessary specificity regarding the

  materiality of the unavailable witnesses’ anticipated testimony.

  Second, they contend that the court erred by not merging the first

  degree arson and criminal mischief convictions because those

  offenses arose from the same conduct.

¶ 13   We agree with the juvenile that their statutory speedy trial

  rights were violated. For this reason, we do not reach their other

  contentions.

                        A.    Standard of Review

¶ 14   The interpretation and application of speedy trial statutes are

  questions of law subject to de novo review. See People v. Sherwood,

  2021 COA 61, ¶ 19, 489 P.3d 1233, 1238. (After the division

  decided Sherwood, the General Assembly recodified and

  renumbered title 19, which governs adjudicatory actions against

                                    6
  juveniles. See Ch. 136, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 557-773. Like the

  parties, we cite the speedy trial statutes as currently numbered.)

¶ 15     In addition, we review the district court’s factual findings for

  clear error; “we will not disturb those findings if they are supported

  by the record.” People v. Nelson, 2014 COA 165, ¶ 25, 360 P.3d

  175, 181. A trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only

  if they have “no support in the record.” Id. at ¶ 17, 360 P.3d at

  180.

                            B.    Applicable Law

¶ 16     Section 19-2.5-904(2), C.R.S. 2023, specifies the deadlines for

  the various phases of an adjudicatory action against a juvenile. As

  applicable here, section 19-2.5-904(2)(d) states that, “[i]n bringing

  an adjudicatory action against a juvenile . . . , the district attorney

  and the court shall comply with the deadlines for . . . [h]olding the

  adjudicatory trial, as specified in” section 19-2.5-902(1). Section

  19-2.5-902(1), in turn, provides that the speedy trial deadline in

  juvenile adjudicatory actions is sixty days from the entry of the

  juvenile’s plea of not guilty, “[e]xcept as set forth in section

  19-2.5-610, [C.R.S. 2023].” That exception — which applies when a

                                       7
  juvenile requests a jury trial — is of no consequence here because

  the juvenile did not request a jury. See § 19-2.5-610(4).

¶ 17   Next, section 19-2.5-904(3) says that “[t]he court may grant a

  continuance with regard to any of the deadlines specified in

  subsection (2) of this section upon making a finding of good cause.”

  But section 19-2.5-904(3) does not contain a definition of “good

  cause.” In addition, section 19-2.5-904(1) states that a “juvenile’s

  right to a speedy trial is governed by section 18-1-405 and [Crim.

  P.] 48(b).”

¶ 18   Section 18-1-405(6) specifies the time periods that are

  excluded from the computation of the speedy trial deadline

  pursuant to section 18-1-405(1). Section 18-1-405(6)(g) provides

  that, in adult criminal cases, the calculation of the speedy trial

  deadline does not include a “delay not exceeding six months”

  resulting from a continuance granted at the prosecutor’s request,

  without the defendant’s consent. That subsection applies in two

  situations: (1) when evidence material to the state’s case is

  unavailable, “the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence

  to obtain such evidence,” and “there are reasonable grounds to

  believe that this evidence will be available at the later date,”

                                      8
  § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I); and (2) when “the prosecuting attorney [requires]

  additional time in [a] felony case[] to prepare the state’s case and

  additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of

  the case,” § 18-1-405(6)(g)(II).

¶ 19    “The burden of compliance with the speedy trial statute is on

  the district attorney and the trial court.” People v. Roberts, 146

  P.3d 589, 593 (Colo. 2006) (analyzing a prior version of section

  18-1-405(6)(g)(I) that contained substantially similar language to

  the current version). “Meeting this burden requires that the People

  provide to a trial court, with some specificity, enough information

  on the record to show that they met their statutory burdens,

  including how the unavailable evidence is material to the state’s

  case.” Id. at 594.

¶ 20    The remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the

  charges with prejudice. People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 18, 467

  P.3d 1272, 1275.

       C.   We Review the Court’s Order Granting the Continuance
                     by Analyzing Section 18-1-405(6)(g)

¶ 21    On appeal, the parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the

  speedy trial deadline was November 26, 2021 (sixty days from the

                                     9
  date of the juvenile’s not guilty plea). See §§ 19-2.5-904(2),

  19-2.5-902(1). But the parties disagree as to which statutes apply

  to the determination of whether the juvenile’s speedy trial rights

  were violated. The juvenile argues that their statutory speedy trial

  rights were violated because the court failed to apply section

  18-1-405(6)(g), while the People contend there was no speedy trial

  violation because the court satisfied the general good cause

  standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3).

¶ 22   We hold that the standard for continuing a trial without the

  defendant’s consent set forth in section 18-1-405(6)(g) applies to

  requests for continuances in adjudicatory actions against juveniles.

¶ 23   “Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and

  give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Each provision of

  a statute must be construed in harmony with the overall statutory

  scheme to accomplish the purpose for which the statute was

  enacted.” People in Interest of J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Colo.

  App. 2001); see also Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. 2001)

  (discussing the principle of statutory construction that specific

  provisions prevail over general provisions).

                                    10
¶ 24   The People assert that the speedy trial analysis requires only a

  determination of whether the trial court correctly applied the open-

  ended good cause standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3). They

  point to the description of good cause in People v. Hines, 2021 COA

  45, 491 P.3d 578, as “an amorphous term, difficult of precise

  delineation.” Id. at ¶ 21, 491 P.3d at 584 (quoting People v. Roberts,

  2013 COA 50, ¶ 29, 321 P.3d 581, 587). The Hines division

  explained that, “[f]or that reason, whether the good cause standard

  has been satisfied depends on the facts of each case and is an

  inquiry left to the district court’s discretion.” Id.

¶ 25   But the Hines division did not hold that the court’s discretion

  is unbounded. Rather, the division applied “speedy trial case law”

  to determine whether “good cause” existed for purposes of the

  Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (the Act) in the

  absence of a definition of “good cause” in the Act. Id. at ¶ 22, 491

  P.3d at 584. Specifically, the division looked to the law governing

  speedy trial in analyzing whether the prosecution had exercised due

  diligence to obtain certain evidence — and, thus, whether the trial

  court had erred by finding good cause for a continuance under the

  Act. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23-24, 491 P.3d at 584.

                                      11
¶ 26   Consistent with the reasoning of Hines, in our view, it makes

  little sense to grant trial courts nearly unbridled discretion to grant

  a prosecutor’s request for a continuance in a juvenile adjudication

  trial, without the juvenile’s consent, when trial courts lack the same

  degree of discretion when considering similar requests for

  continuances in cases involving adult defendants. The General

  Assembly’s determination that the speedy trial deadline applicable

  to juvenile adjudications should be shorter than the speedy trial

  deadline in criminal cases involving adults reflects a policy decision

  that juveniles accused of delinquency should be brought to trial

  more quickly than adult defendants. Compare § 19-2.5-902(1)

  (providing a sixty-day speedy trial deadline in juvenile

  adjudications), with § 18-1-405(1) (providing a six-month speedy

  trial deadline in criminal cases involving adult defendants). For this

  reason, it would run counter to the General Assembly’s policy

  decisions to conclude that a continuance resulting in a violation of

  an adult’s speedy trial rights would not, under similar

  circumstances, result in a violation of a juvenile’s speedy trial

  rights.

                                    12
¶ 27   Further, the reference to section 18-1-405 found in section

  19-2.5-904(1) means that the provisions of the former section apply

  to juvenile adjudications, to the extent they are not inconsistent

  with the provisions of the Children’s Code. See J.M.N., 39 P.3d at

  1263 (holding that, “to give effect to all relevant statutory

  provisions,” a court must read section 19-2.5-904(1) to incorporate

  the tolling and enforcement provisions of section 18-1-405, “at least

  to the extent that these provisions are not inconsistent with the

  more specific sixty-day and ‘good cause’ continuance provisions” of

  sections 19-2.5-902(1) and 19-2.5-904(3)). In other words, section

  19-2.5-904(1) engrafts onto juvenile cases the speedy trial

  provisions found in section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48(b), to the

  extent those provisions fill in gaps in the Children’s Code.

¶ 28   Following the logic of J.M.N., we hold there is no inconsistency

  between the general good cause language in section 19-2.5-904(3)

  and the factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g) that address when a

  continuance entered without the defendant’s consent stops the

  running of the speedy trial clock. The People’s argument that the

  section 18-1-405(6)(g) factors do not apply to adjudicatory actions

  against juveniles cannot be squared with the language of section

                                     13
  19-2.5-904(1), which, as noted above, explicitly incorporates the

  requirements of section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48(b) into section

  19-2.5-904. See People v. Griego, 2018 CO 5, ¶ 25, 409 P.3d 338,

  342 (“When the statutory language is clear, . . . we give consistent,

  harmonious, and sensible effect to each part of the statute, and we

  interpret every word, rendering no words or phrases superfluous

  and construing undefined words and phrases according to their

  common usage.”).

¶ 29    For these reasons, a court must consider the section

  18-1-405(6)(g) factors when determining whether a prosecutor’s

  request for a continuance of the trial in a juvenile adjudicatory

  action past the speedy trial deadline, without the juvenile’s consent,

  would violate the juvenile’s speedy trial rights.

       D.   The Prosecutor Did Not Make a Sufficient Showing that
                the Requested Continuance Would Not Violate
                      the Juvenile’s Speedy Trial Rights

¶ 30    The record supports the juvenile’s contention that the

  prosecutor did not proffer, let alone establish, and the court did not

  find, that the first section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor — evidence

  material to the prosecutor’s case was unavailable — was satisfied.

  See § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I); Roberts, 146 P.3d at 592.

                                     14
¶ 31    To satisfy the prosecutor’s burden under the first factor, the

  prosecutor must “provide to [the] trial court, with some specificity,

  enough information on the record to show that . . . the unavailable

  evidence is material to the state’s case.” Roberts, 146 P.3d at 594

  (emphasis added). The reference to “material” in the first section

  18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor means more than “merely probative or

  relevant evidence in the context of continuing a trial beyond the

  speedy trial deadline.” Id. at 593. “A motion containing

  unsupported allegations that a witness is material and unavailable

  for trial is insufficient.” Id.

¶ 32    In this case, the prosecutor attempted to bolster her request

  for a continuance with the very type of unsupported allegations that

  the Roberts court indicated would be insufficient to continue a trial

  past the speedy trial deadline. See id. The prosecutor did not

  reveal the identity of the unavailable witnesses, provide a proffer of

  their anticipated testimony, or explain why such testimony was

  material to the prosecutor’s case. Rather, the prosecutor merely

  represented that she had “reached out to multiple witnesses, and

  they’re unavailable . . . . Some of [the witnesses] are essential to

  the case . . . .”

                                    15
¶ 33   Furthermore, this is not the type of case where the context

  makes clear that, because of the limited number of potential

  witnesses, most, if not all, of the prosecution’s witnesses are

  necessarily material, if not essential. As of November 2, 2021, the

  People had endorsed more than 170 lay witnesses and 24 expert

  witnesses, including two “TBD” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

  Firearms (ATF) agents. The prosecutor called only a modest

  fraction of these endorsed witnesses at trial.

¶ 34   In any event, “a trial court must exercise its independent

  judgment and may not accept the mere conclusions of a prosecutor”

  in deciding whether to continue a trial past the speedy trial

  deadline, over the defendant’s objection. Id. at 595. Beyond

  initially requesting that the prosecutor make a record explaining

  why a trial date of November 22, 2021, “doesn’t work . . . and what

  efforts [she had] made to secure witnesses” — with the latter

  inquiry going unaddressed — the court did not exercise

  independent judgment regarding the prosecutor’s request for a

  continuance past the speedy trial deadline. It did not ask the

  prosecutor to explain her vague, generalized statement regarding

  the materiality of the testimony of those witnesses who had

                                    16
  indicated their unavailability the week of November 22. The court’s

  unquestioning acceptance of the prosecutor’s inadequate argument

  for a continuance is akin to “[a] minute entry made by the court

  indicating that the People’s chief witness is missing,” which “is also

  insufficient absent a showing of materiality.” Id. at 594.

¶ 35   Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor failed to establish —

  and the court failed to adequately find — that, under the first

  section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor, the juvenile’s speedy trial rights

  would not be violated if the trial was continued past the speedy trial

  deadline. In light of this determination, we need not consider the

  second and third factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I). See Roberts,

  146 P.3d at 593-94 (noting that the prosecutor’s and the court’s

  burden of complying with the speedy trial statute “includes making

  a sufficient record that all three elements of section

  18-1-405(6)(g)(I), have been met”). The use of “and” in the list of

  factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) means that a prosecutor is

  entitled to an order continuing a criminal trial past the speedy trial

  deadline, without the defendant’s consent, only if the prosecutor

  has met all three of the factors. See United States v.

  Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 326 (2021) (noting that, when

                                     17
  three statutory requirements “are connected by the conjunctive

  ‘and,’” all three requirements must be met).

¶ 36   The People contend that we can affirm on the alternative basis

  that the continuance was justified under section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II),

  which permits a court to grant a continuance past the speedy trial

  deadline, without the defendant’s consent, when the continuance is

  necessary “to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time . . . to

  prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of

  exceptional circumstances of the case.” In support of this

  argument, the People point to two of the prosecutor’s

  representations to the court: (1) on November 2, 2021 — the day

  before requesting the continuance and twenty days before trial —

  the prosecutor said she was still waiting on DNA and fingerprint

  testing results from the state laboratory; and (2) on December 21,

  2021 — nearly a month after the speedy trial deadline had run —

  the prosecutor said her office had “just received long-awaited

  litigation packets” from the ATF. But this was not the basis on

  which the prosecutor sought the challenged continuance. Indeed,

  when the prosecutor requested the continuance, she specifically

  said that “the DA’s personally ready. It’s just a witness

                                    18
  conflict . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Because the prosecutor

  requested, and the court granted, the continuance exclusively on

  the basis of witness unavailability, we do not consider whether the

  prosecutor could have established grounds for a continuance under

  section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II). The prosecutor did not present that

  argument to the court, and the court did not refer to section

  18-1-405(6)(g)(II) when continuing the trial.

¶ 37   Moreover, at the same December 21, 2021, status conference

  at which the prosecutor discussed the recently received evidence

  from the ATF, she told the court “there is DNA outstanding” —

  presumably the same DNA test results she referenced during the

  November 2, 2021, hearing. But she also told the court at the same

  December hearing, “[w]e’re ready to proceed without [the DNA

  evidence],” illustrating why it would be inappropriate for us to

  consider grounds not identified to the court.

¶ 38   For these reasons, we hold that the court erred by continuing

  the juvenile’s trial past the sixty-day speedy trial deadline, without

  the juvenile’s consent, because the prosecutor failed to meet her

  burden of establishing, and the court did not find, that the

  requirements of section 18-1-405(6)(g) were satisfied.

                                    19
                            III.   Disposition

¶ 39   The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the

  district court with instructions to dismiss the charges in this case.

       JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

                                    20