Court Opinion

ID: 9852384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:34.333457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.022856
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant, in its petition for rehearing, points out that it remitted to respondent the special service charge of $8.00 for the protective packing of respondent’s hi-fi set. *582It then contends that the Court is amiss in stating:
“[the] applicable tariffs and other regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission do not permit appellant the benefit of both the additional charge and the limitation on liability when there is failure to perform special accessorial services for which the parties have contracted.”
Appellant misconstrues the import of this statement.
The mere formality of refunding the charge for the protective accessorial service, after failing to perform the service is not material, since appellant admits that if it did not refund the charge, “it would have been liable to respondent for that amount as an overcharge.” When the parties first executed the contract for the transportation of respondent’s household goods, which included the covenant for performance by appellant of the accessorial service, appellant became entitled to the benefit of limitation of its liability upon performance of the covenant, had there not been a showing of the “carrier’s utter disregard of its covenant to perform.”
The parties, themselves, placed no importance on the fact that appellant remitted to respondent the $8.00 charge for the accessorial service. Mention thereof appears only in the stipulated facts and in appellant’s statement of the evidence. Except perhaps by inference, it was not incorporated into appellant’s assignments of error; nor was it argued by either party on appeal, nor were authorities cited in support of any legal significance attributable thereto. Such contention cannot be considered when raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. Supreme Court Rule 41; Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93, 369 P.2d 590 (1962).
Appellant further insists that the contract between the parties is indivisible and, as controlled by 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11), cannot be “vivisected” to provide for a limitation on liability as to one covenant and full liability as to another covenant within the same contract.
The contract contains independent covenants for which separate considerations were charged and paid. One covenant provided for transportation of respondent’s household goods; the other covenant for special protective packing of his hi-fi set. When there are several covenants for performance under one contract and money considerations are apportioned and paid for each, the covenants are sever-able and independent. Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, 75 Idaho 436, 273 P.2d 399 (1954) ; Warm River Lumber Co. v. Rightenour, 67 Idaho 187, 174 P.2d 940 *583(1946); Durant v. Snyder, 65 Idaho 678, 151 P.2d 776 (1944). As hereinbefore mentioned, appellant failed to perform the special covenant for protective packing of the hi-fi set. Appellant thereupon cannot contend that its liability under such special covenant became limited in the same manner as though it had been performed; nor as under the covenant providing for transportation of the household goods.
It is also argued that the decision of the New York Courts in Loeb v. Friedman’s Express, 187 Misc. 89, 65 N.Y.S.2d 450, aff’d, 271 App.Div. 873, 66 N.Y.S.2d 634, appeal dismissed, 271 App.Div. 916, 67 N.Y.S.2d 690, aff’d, 296 N.Y. 1029, 73 N.E.2d 906, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 851, 67 S.Ct. 1743, 91 L.Ed. 1859 (1946), is contra to that of the United States Supreme Court in American Ry. Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584, 43 S.Ct. 206, 67 L.Ed. 414 (1923) and cannot properly be used in support of the conclusions reached in the case at bar. See also the later case of Paramount Dress Co. v. Kirby & Kirby, 167 Pa.Super. 524, 76 A.2d 432 (1950), approving the Loeb decision. In view of the extensive history of the Loeb case in the courts of New York and the United States Supreme Court, we do not concur with that contention.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
KNUDSON, C. J., and McQUADE, Mc-FADDEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.