Court Opinion

ID: 9352135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 10:10:13.217522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:58:03.173249
License: Public Domain

In The
                              Court of Appeals
                     Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                    No. 07-22-00225-CV

                   IN RE NOBEL LEAF HOLDINGS, LLC, RELATOR

                                ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

                                     January 3, 2023
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       In this original proceeding, Relator, Nobel Leaf Holdings, LLC (“Nobel”), seeks a

writ of mandamus ordering Respondent, the Honorable Danah Zirpoli, judge of the 64th

District Court of Castro County, Texas, to vacate an order denying Nobel’s motion to

transfer venue and to render an order transferring the case to Lubbock County. At our

request, Real Party in Interest, First United Bank, filed a response. Nobel filed a reply.

       As an additional issue, the Bank argues we lack mandamus jurisdiction because

Nobel’s petition was not timely filed and because Respondent did not rule on Nobel’s

motion to transfer venue. We disagree with the Bank’s jurisdictional challenge. Because
we conclude the record does not establish a clear abuse of discretion by Respondent, we

deny Nobel’s petition.

                                              Background

        This case, pending in Castro County district court, involves the Bank’s efforts to

collect on notes claimed to be in default and to recover equipment said to be subject to a

perfected security interest made in favor of the Bank. On March 30, 2022, the Bank

amended its pleading to add Nobel as a party, although issuance of citation was not

requested at that time.1

        At some point not established in the record before us, the Bank had moved for

Respondent to issue a temporary injunction, consideration of which was set for hearing

on April 21, 2022. Two days before the hearing, Nobel filed an objection and motion to

transfer venue in a document that also included its original answer and counterclaim.

Nobel alleged that venue was mandatory in Lubbock County pursuant to Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code section 15.011 because some of the equipment claimed to

be collateral constituted fixtures.2 Nothing in the mandamus record indicates that Nobel

filed a motion to continue the injunction hearing.

        At the commencement of the temporary injunction hearing, Nobel’s counsel

announced his appearance and told Respondent he had a “preliminary matter.” For the

first time, counsel orally requested a setting on Nobel’s objection to venue and asked

         1 The Bank alleged its rights in the equipment are superior to Nobel’s and that Nobel intentionally

interfered with the Bank’s contracts with the borrower.
        2 Nobel also alleged the Bank’s lawsuit was between a landlord and tenant arising under a lease,
although that argument is not advanced in this proceeding.

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“that this matter be delayed or reset until we can make a determination on venue.” After

hearing argument about the due order of hearing the matters and whether Nobel’s “venue

motion” was supported by verification or proof, Respondent ruled:

           THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
           Okay. Counsel, I will deny that motion at this time. We will move forward
           for the hearing on the temporary injunction.

On May 11, 2022, Respondent signed an order granting temporary injunctive relief and

set the case for trial for September 22, 2022. The same day, Nobel filed a notice of

interlocutory appeal seeking review of the temporary injunction. The interlocutory appeal

was later voluntarily dismissed,3 but Nobel initiated the present original proceeding

petition in this Court in July 2022.

                                             Analysis

Jurisdiction

       We begin with the Bank’s argument that we lack jurisdiction because Nobel’s

petition for mandamus was not timely filed and because its complaint was not preserved

by a trial court ruling.

       Section 15.0642 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows a party to

challenge a mandatory venue determination by mandamus. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 15.0642. The petition must be filed before the later of “the 90th day before the

date the trial starts” or the tenth day after the date the party receives notice of the trial

       3  See Nobel Leaf Holdings, LLC v. First United Bank, No. 07-22-00145-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS
5317 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 27, 2022, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (granting Nobel’s motion for
voluntary dismissal of interlocutory appeal).

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setting. Id. The Bank interprets this section to mean that trial “starts” on the date included

in the trial setting order, meaning Nobel should have sought mandamus relief on or before

June 24, 2022 (90 days before September 22, 2022). We disagree with the Bank’s

position that the trial court’s setting order affixes a deadline for Nobel’s petition. Moreover,

even if the Bank’s position was correct, we have no indication that trial began on

September 22.

        The Bank also contends Respondent never ruled on Nobel’s motion to transfer

venue.4 However, the reporter’s record from the April 21, 2022 hearing indicates the trial

court expressly referred to the “venue motion” in its discussion with the attorneys and

before ruling it was denying “that motion at this time.” We find suitable support in the

record that Respondent knew what she was considering when denying “that motion at

this time,” and therefore reject the Bank’s jurisdictional arguments.

Nobel’s Petition

        Nobel asserts Respondent possessed no discretion to refuse to transfer the suit

from Castro County to Lubbock County pursuant to section 15.011 of the Civil Practice

and Remedies Code. A writ of mandamus generally issues only to (1) correct a clear

abuse of discretion (2) for which the relator has no adequate appellate remedy. See In

re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

However, when a party brings a mandamus petition to seek to enforce a mandatory venue

determination, it must only prove that the respondent abused its discretion. See TEX. CIV.

        4In the same section of its responsive brief, the Bank also contends Nobel failed to “preserve a
complaint for appellate review.” The Bank fails to present any authority showing how this alleged failure
somehow implicates this Court’s jurisdiction.

                                                   4
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642; In re Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216

(Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (“adequacy of an appellate remedy is not a requisite of a

mandatory venue mandamus under section 15.0642.”).

       Motions to transfer venue are governed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87.1. It

states in relevant part:

          The determination of a motion to transfer venue shall be made promptly
          by the court and such determination must be made in a reasonable time
          prior to commencement of the trial on the merits. The movant has the
          duty to request a setting on the motion to transfer. Except on leave of
          court each party is entitled to at least 45 days notice of a hearing on the
          motion to transfer.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 87.1.      When a court grants a motion to transfer without giving the

responding party sufficient notice under the rules, it abuses its discretion. Henderson v.

O’Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1990). The mandamus record plainly reflects, and Nobel

conceded in the trial court’s hearing, that less than forty-five days had passed before

Nobel sought to have the motion to transfer heard. We therefore disagree with Nobel’s

position that granting the motion to transfer was required by law.

       Nobel argues in its reply that any failure to comply with Rule 87.1’s notice

requirement should be excused due to the Bank’s delay in bringing Nobel into the case.

Although Rule 87.1 contemplates leave of court as an alternative to forty-five days of

notice, such relief was not requested from Respondent; we therefore do not consider it

here. In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per

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curiam). See also In re Bank of Am., N.A., No. 01-02-00867-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS

8722, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 9, 2003, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).5

                                                Conclusion

        Nobel’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

                                                                   Lawrence M. Doss
                                                                       Justice

         5 “Equity is generally not served by issuing an extraordinary writ against a trial court on a ground

that was never presented to the court and that the court thus had no opportunity to address. Moreover, the
standard of review on mandamus is whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion. It would be hard
to conclude, without circumstances that were highly unusual or that made a trial court’s ruling void, that a
trial court could abuse its discretion in making a ruling for a reason that was never presented to the court.”

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