Court Opinion

ID: 9684241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:51:44.881159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:54.224637
License: Public Domain

CADY, J.,
concurs in part and dissents in part.
CADY, Judge.
I respectfully dissent in part. I would hold the verdicts are not inconsistent and do not establish grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, it is unnecessary to preserve the claim for further consideration.
*243The majority holds the dangerous weapon element of the crime of going armed becomes a specific intent element when the dangerous weapon is derived from the catch-all portion of the statutory definition of any device or instrument “which is actually used in such a manner as to indicate that the defendant intends to inflict death or serious injury upon the other and which, when so used, is capable of inflicting death upon a human being.” See Iowa Code § 702.7 (1993). I do not believe this language establishes a specific intent element.
Under the statute, any device or instrument can be transformed into a dangerous weapon when “used” in a manner to “indicate” an intent to inflict death or serious injury. The word “indicate” means to suggest to the ordinary person. See Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2nd Cir.1991). Thus, the statute adopts an objective test, using the eyes of a reasonable observer, not the mind of the user. The legislature sought to establish a broad, flexible definition of dangerous weapon, not create a second specific intent element for specific intent crimes involving a dangerous weapon. Moreover, a defendant can use an instrument or device so as to place the other in fear that it has become an instrument of death or serious injury, but have no specific intent to inflict death or serious injury. The verdicts in this case, therefore, were not inconsistent.