Court Opinion

ID: 9961245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:06:04.586339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:29.969812
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. 63
                SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                       No. CR-23-646

                              Opinion Delivered: April 18, 2024
 DUANE JEFFERSON GONDER
                   APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE DREW
                              COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT;
                              MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
 V.
                              OF ADJUDICATED FACTS; MOTION
                              FOR PERMISSION TO FILE A
 STATE OF ARKANSAS            SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
                     APPELLEE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
                              ADJUDICATED FACTS; MOTION
                              FOR RULE ON CLERK
                              [NO. 22CR-10-53]

                                                 HONORABLE ROBERT BYNUM
                                                 GIBSON III, JUDGE

                                                 AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED.

                       COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice

       Appellant Duane Jefferson Gonder appeals from the circuit court’s denial of his

motion for permission to file a petition for writ of mandamus. For reversal, Gonder argues

that he has no other adequate remedy except for a writ of mandamus and that the circuit

court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. The circuit court

did not abuse its discretion; therefore, we affirm.

       In his underlying petition for the writ, Gonder asked the circuit court to compel the

prosecuting attorney, Franklin Spain, to withdraw Gonder’s guilty plea to the charge of

attempting to furnish a prohibited article into a correctional facility in violation of Arkansas

Code Annotated section 5-54-119 (Supp. 2009). The circuit court denied the motion for

permission to file a mandamus petition and found the petition to be meritless. Gonder also
has pending motions before this court. He requests that we take judicial notice that, during

the plea hearing, Spain misrepresented the facts underlying the charge of attempting to

furnish a prohibited article and therefore has a ministerial duty to correct the

misrepresentation, and that Gonder has a right to withdraw his guilty plea. Gonder has also

filed a motion for rule on clerk with an attached tendered reply brief. Gonder’s motion for

rule on clerk filed on January 22, 2024, is treated as a motion to file a belated reply brief.

For the same reasons set out below, the motions for judicial notice are denied. The motion

for rule on clerk is also denied. Gonder’s reply brief was due on January 2, 2024, 1 and

Gonder failed to demonstrate good cause for his failure to conform to procedural rules.

Jackson v. State, 2016 Ark. 95.

       Gonder was charged with capital murder, aggravated assault, aggravated residential

burglary, kidnapping, and attempting to furnish a prohibited article. Gonder v. State, 2022

Ark. 67, 641 S.W.3d 626 (affirming the denial of Gonder’s petition to unseal record). As

part of a negotiated plea agreement, the capital-murder charge was reduced to first-degree

murder, and the kidnapping and burglary charges were dismissed. Id. As a result, Gonder

pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and the

separate charge of attempting to furnish a prohibited article. Id. The record reflects that the

separate charge arose while Gonder was awaiting trial in the Drew County Detention

Center, where he attempted to introduce a cell-phone battery into his jail cell. The charges

       1
        Appellee’s responsive brief was filed on December 20, 2023, and Gonder’s reply
brief was due on January 4, 2024. Gonder filed a second motion for judicial notice on
January 9, 2024, and he did not file his motion for rule on clerk to file a belated brief until
January 22, 2024.

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were consolidated, and Gonder was sentenced to an aggregate term of 552 months’

imprisonment. Id.

       Gonder subsequently filed a petition pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal

Procedure 37.1 (2011), arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective because the murder

victim was armed with a gun and, had trial counsel informed the trial court of this fact

during Gonder’s plea hearing, a lesser sentence would have been imposed. Gonder v. State,

2011 Ark. 248, 382 S.W.3d 674 (per curiam). We affirmed the denial of Gonder’s Rule

37.1 petition, noting that a successful challenge to a plea agreement would not have resulted

in a reduction of the sentence but would have resulted in the nullification of the entire

agreement, necessitating a trial on the original charges. Id.

       After his Rule 37.1 petition was denied, Gonder filed a civil complaint against Spain

alleging that he was entitled to injunctive relief in the form of modifying the plea agreement

and setting aside his sentence for furnishing a prohibited item due to Spain’s

misrepresentation of the facts of the crime. Gonder v. Spain, 2016 Ark. 141, 489 S.W.3d 133

(per curiam). We affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because Gonder’s allegations

represented a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction and was therefore governed

by the time limitations set forth in Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c) (2016). Id.

       Now we turn to the writ of mandamus. The standard of review on a denial of a writ

of mandamus is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Andrews v. Payne, 2023 Ark.

129, 674 S.W.3d 450. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court has acted

improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id. The purpose of a writ of

mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Waller

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v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 252, 493 S.W.3d 757. A writ of mandamus is issued by this court only

to compel an official or a judge to take some action, and when requesting the writ, a

petitioner must show a clear and certain right to the relief sought and the absence of any

other remedy. Id. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a public officer is called upon

to perform a plain and specific duty that is required by law and that requires no exercise of

discretion or official judgment. Burgie v. State, 2021 Ark. 157, 628 S.W.3d 372. A writ of

mandamus is a discretionary remedy that will be issued only when the petitioner has shown

a clear and certain legal right to the relief sought and there is no other adequate remedy

available. Id. Moreover, a mandamus action enforces the performance of a legal right after

it has been established; it is not intended to establish a right. Id.

       Gonder argued that he is entitled to issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel Spain

to correct his misleading statements, amend the plea agreement, and return the parties to

the positions they were in before Gonder entered his guilty plea. Gonder alleges that Spain

has a ministerial duty to follow Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (2023)

prohibiting attorneys from knowingly presenting false information to a tribunal and

requiring an attorney to correct any misrepresentation of a material fact made to a tribunal.

Specifically, Gonder contends that Spain incorrectly informed the trial court that Gonder

was seen by a correctional officer removing a cell-phone battery that had been taped under

a table in the county jail’s visiting area. In support of his allegation, Gonder attached to his

petition the incident report related to the charge reflecting that a guard had seen Gonder go

into the visiting area and reach under a table where Gonder and his visitor had been sitting

during visitation hours on the previous day. Consequently, the guard searched the table

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where Gonder was sitting and had been sitting the previous day and found a battery taped

under the table. It further reflects that after the officer discovered the hidden battery,

Gonder’s jail cell was searched, and a cell phone was found. Gonder was charged with

attempting to introduce the battery into the county jail, to which he pleaded guilty. 2

       Gonder’s allegation that counsel violated Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct

3.3(a)(1) fails for two reasons. First, Gonder failed to present evidence that the

misrepresentation alleged by counsel was knowingly made. Arkansas Rule of Professional

Conduct 1.0 defines “knowingly” as denoting “actual knowledge” of the fact in question.

See Smith v. State, 2018 Ark. 37 (petitioner had burden of demonstrating that State

knowingly offered false testimony in support of conviction). Second, commentary to

Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) indicates that the obligation to correct any

erroneous statements made to a tribunal terminates at the conclusion of the proceedings.

See Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.3 cmt. 13 (2023).

       Moreover, Gonder’s mandamus claim asking that his conviction and sentence be set

aside is a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction arising from his guilty plea. A

pleading that mounts a collateral attack on a judgment is governed by the provisions of

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 and is subject to its procedural requirements.

Cullen v. State, 2023 Ark. 172, 678 S.W.3d 20; see also Gonder, 2016 Ark. 141, 489 S.W.3d

       2
         The prosecutor’s alleged misrepresentation was not material to Gonder’s plea and
conviction for attempting to introduce a prohibited article because whether Gonder
removed the battery or attempted to remove the battery was not material or relevant to his
conviction for “attempting” to introduce contraband. See Martin v. State, 354 Ark. 289, 119
S.W.3d 504 (2003) (relevant evidence must be of consequence to the determination of the
action).

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133 (Gonder’s claim for injunctive relief against Spain for alleged misstatements was an

untimely Rule 37.1 petition). Gonder is attempting to substitute a mandamus action for an

untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.2. In sum,

Gonder has failed to demonstrate that he has a clear and certain right to the relief sought

and has otherwise failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor has a ministerial obligation to

correct any misrepresentations made at the plea hearing that concluded ten years ago. Ark.

R. Prof’l Conduct 3.3 cmt. 13; Burgie, 2021 Ark. 157, 628 S.W.3d 372.

       Gonder alleges that he is entitled to mandamus relief because he has no other available

remedy. He is mistaken. There is no evidence in the record that either Gonder or his counsel

filed a motion to withdraw the plea before judgment was entered and executed. See Dillon

v. State, 2023 Ark. 78, 665 S.W.3d 235. After a judgment of conviction based on a guilty

plea is entered, the conviction and sentence cannot be modified. See Ark. R. Crim. P.

26.1(a) (2010); see also Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. 166, at 1, 546 S.W.3d 472, 473 (A trial

court loses jurisdiction to modify or amend an original sentence once the sentence is put

into execution.). Gonder, who was represented by counsel, could have filed a petition to

withdraw his plea before the judgment was entered but failed to do so. Moreover, Gonder

failed to allege in his Rule 37.1 petition that his guilty plea to furnishing contraband was

not knowingly or intelligently made due to Spain’s misrepresentations. Gonder, 2011 Ark.

248, 382 S.W.3d 674. Therefore, the lack of a remedy is due to Gonder’s failure to timely

file either a petition to withdraw his plea or a petition for Rule 37 postconviction relief.

       Affirmed; motions denied.
       Duane Jefferson Gonder, pro se appellant.
       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Rebecca Kane, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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