Court Opinion

ID: 9929250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 05:06:20.425221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:19.796494
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     February 1, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 365018
                                                                     Genesee Circuit Court
MARQUON LEON JACKSON,                                                LC No. 22-049711-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and REDFORD and MALDONADO, JJ.

MALDONADO, J. (concurring)

        I concur in the outcome, but I disagree with how the lead opinion reached it. In my opinion,
defense counsel’s question was inappropriate from its inception because defendant did not know
anything about Khogaly’s background. This case hinges entirely on defendant’s state of mind,
and information defendant did not know was wholly irrelevant to his state of mind. This case
revolves around whether defendant believed he was in danger, the reasonableness of this belief,
and whether his actions were a reasonable response to his perceived danger. This is a subjective
inquiry, so the focus must be on the information that was available to defendant at that time.
Because there is no indication that Khogaly committed an act of aggression, this case does not fall
into the category of cases in which evidence of a character trait of aggression is admissible.

       Finally, I also write separately to address what I view as a double standard regarding the
adequacy of jury instructions as a curative measure. Simply put, if curative instructions are
adequate to address circumstances unfair to defendants, they should also be viewed as adequate to
address circumstances unfair to prosecutors.

     HARRIS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A SUBJECTIVE CLAIM OF SELF-
              DEFENSE AND AN OBJECTIVE ACT OF AGGRESSION

       The general rule is that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]”
MRE 404(a). This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. Particularly relevant to this case
is MRE 404(a)(2), which, in pertinent part, provides: “When self-defense is an issue in a charge
of homicide, evidence of a trait of character for aggression of the alleged victim of the crime

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offered by an accused” is admissible. A separate rule, MRE 405, deals with permissible ways to
introduce evidence of a person’s character in those circumstances in which character evidence is
admissible. MRE 405(a) provides that “[i]n all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.” However, pursuant to MRE 405(b), evidence “of specific
instances of [a] person’s conduct” is only admissible when the “character or a trait of character of
[that] person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense[.]”

        In People v Harris, our Supreme Court provided an in-depth explanation regarding the
interplay of those rules of evidence in homicide cases involving claims of self-defense. Harris,
458 Mich at 315-316. In particular, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the defendant must have
known of the victim’s character for aggression in order for it to be admissible. Id. When
undertaking this analysis, the Court distinguished cases in which the defendant alleged that the
victim was the first aggressor from cases in which the defendant alleged self-defense:

               The actual violent character of the deceased, even though it is unknown to
       the defendant, is admissible as evidencing the deceased’s probable aggression
       toward the defendant. It is now widely accepted that a defendant may show a
       pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim that bears on whether the victim
       committed an act of aggression on the particular occasion in conformity with that
       trait. This is so because, when a controversy arises regarding whether the deceased
       was the aggressor, a jury’s persuasion may be affected by the character of the
       deceased because it will shed light on the probabilities of the deceased’s action.
       The sole purpose for which evidence of this type is admissible is, from the victim’s
       general turbulent or violent character, to render more probable the evidence that
       tends to show an act of violence at the time he was killed. This probability is
       evidently not affected in the slightest degree by the defendant’s previous
       knowledge. The light comes from the fact that the victim was the one who was apt
       or likely to do such an act as the one imputed to him, and not from the defendant’s
       knowledge of the fact.

               Because the question is what the victim probably did, not what the defendant
       probably thought the victim was doing, the additional element of communication to
       the defendant is unnecessary when using character evidence to prove the victim
       was the aggressor. The inquiry is one of objective occurrence, not of subjective
       belief.

               In contrast, where a defendant charged with murder asserts that he killed in
       self-defense, his state of mind at the time of the act is material because it is an
       important element in determining his justification for his belief in an impending
       attack by the deceased. The reputation of the deceased for a violent or turbulent
       disposition is a circumstance that would cause such a belief. However, unlike
       evidence tending to show that the victim was the aggressor, the deceased’s violent
       reputation must be known to the defendant if he is to use it to show that he acted in
       self-defense. . . . The purpose of this evidence is to show the defendant’s state of
       mind; therefore, it is obvious that the victim’s character, as affecting the
       defendant’s apprehensions, must have become known to him, otherwise it is

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       irrelevant. [Harris, 458 Mich 315-317 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations
       omitted; emphasis added).]

      In People v Edwards, 328 Mich App 29, 35-36; 935 NW2d 419 (2019), this Court
expanded on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Harris:

       [E]vidence of a victim’s aggressive character is admissible in the form of reputation
       evidence, even if the defendant does not have knowledge of the decedent’s
       character, to show that the decedent was the probable aggressor. With that said,
       evidence of the decedent’s reputation that is not known to the defendant is
       inadmissible to prove an essential element of self-defense, e.g., a reasonable
       apprehension of harm. [Id. at 36-37.]

        In sum, whether the defendant in a homicide case must have known about the alleged
victim’s character trait of aggression depends on the nature of the defense. If the defendant’s
stance at trial is that the defendant acted in response to an actual act of aggression taken by the
alleged victim and if there is a dispute regarding whether the alleged victim actually did make an
act of aggression, then the defendant need not have known about the character trait. This is because
the defendant’s state of mind is irrelevant to whether the alleged victim actually took an objective
action. For example, if a hypothetical defendant argues that he shot the victim because the victim
first shot at him and then introduces the character evidence for the purpose of proving that the
victim actually did shoot at the defendant, the defendant’s knowledge of the character trait is
irrelevant.

        In this case, defendant’s entire encounter with the alleged victim was captured by security
cameras. Thus, we know with absolute certainty that the alleged victim did not make an act of
aggression immediately before being shot. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that
defendant did not need to shoot the victim at all because the victim did not have a gun on his person
or in his vehicle. Accordingly, defendant’s case revolves entirely on defendant’s subjective state
of mind and whether he reasonably believed he was in mortal danger; there are no objective actions
taken by the alleged victim that are at issue. According to defendant, because the victim engaged
in disorderly behavior in the store, made comments possibly implying a desire to harm defendant,
and reached into his car in a manner consistent with grabbing a gun, defendant reasonably believed
that he was justified in shooting the alleged victim. Because defendant did not know that the
alleged victim was supposedly on some sort of a terrorist list, this evidence was not relevant for
assessing “his justification for his belief in an impending attack by the deceased.” Harris, 458
Mich at 316.

          The lead opinion articulated the above-quoted language from Harris, but it did not apply
it. In Harris, the Supreme Court made it clear that “[t]he sole purpose for which evidence” of the
alleged victim’s violent character may be admitted is “to show an act of violence.” Harris, 458
Mich at 316 (emphasis added). What is the “act of violence” that was “imputed to” Khogaly by
the defense? Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The lead opinion did not identify one.
Indeed, this is a rare case in which we know exactly what happened, and we therefore know that
Khogaly did not commit an act of violence. What we do not know, and the reason there will be a
trial, is whether defendant reasonably believed Khogaly was going to commit an act of violence if
defendant did not intervene. This is a case in which the evidence has been offered by defendant

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as “justification for his belief in an impending attack by the deceased,” so “it is obvious that
[Khogaly’s] character, as affecting the defendant’s apprehensions, must have become known to
him, otherwise it is irrelevant.” Id. at 317.

        Because the issue in this case is “defendant’s state of mind,” not the actions of the alleged
victim, evidence of Khogaly’s character was only admissible if defendant knew about it. Id. It is
undisputed that defendant did not know anything about any possible terrorist connections of the
alleged victim, and this evidence is therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. Id.

                                  CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

        In the world of appellate review, curative instructions reign supreme. Mistake after mistake
is brushed to the side with the familiar refrain, “Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.”
People v Horton, 341 Mich App 397, 405; 989 NW2d 885 (2022). Our appellate system affords
instructions so much weight that unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct only warrant
reversal if a curative instruction would have been insufficient to alleviate the harm caused by the
misconduct. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). However, when it
is the defense that makes a mistake, jury instructions suddenly carry less weight. In this case, as
the preceding analysis makes clear, I believe defense counsel’s question was inappropriate.
However, if the shoe was on the other foot, this fire would have been extinguished with a curative
instruction. Given the deference our caselaw demands be given to jury instructions, I do not
understand why defense counsel’s mistake warranted a mistrial instead of a curative instruction. I
do not believe that a mistrial should have been declared or that a new trial should be conducted.
However, I fully recognize that the law in this regard does not comport with my beliefs. Therefore,
I do agree with the lead opinion’s conclusions regarding the double jeopardy issue.

                                                              /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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