Court Opinion

ID: 5155633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-02 02:17:37.62642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:19.157055
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
specially concurring.
I join in the opinion of my colleague Daniel M. Taubman. I write separately to express concern as to the structure and application of CRM. 7. This rule, in conjunction with C.R.M. 6 and the applicable statutes concerning the role of magistrates, has confused and confounded appellants, particularly pro se appellants.
The rule provides for two routes of review or appeal: (1) review by a district judge if the matter is entered without consent upon application made within fifteen days, C.R.M. T(a),; and (2) appeal to the Court of Appeals if the matter is heard by consent, C.R.M. 7T(b). Both C.R.M. 6 and section 19-1-~108, C.R.S.2009, identify those matters that require consent and those that do not.
Without going into detail, some domestic relations matters require consent, and some do not, C.R.M. 6(b), the same is true of probate and mental health cases, C.R.M. 6(e); the same is true of juvenile matters, C.R.M. 6(d), and so on with respect to erimi-nal and civil matters. I will briefly discuss juvenile and domestic relations proceedings, which are frequently heard by magistrates.
Dependency and neglect proceedings, which frequently address fundamental rights, are governed by title 19, article 8, C.R.S. 2009. Section 19-1-108 both authorizes and governs the judicial functions of juvenile magistrates. At the outset of juvenile proceedings, the magistrate must advise the parties that they have a right to a hearing before a judge or they can consent to hearings before the magistrate. There is no requirement that they also be advised as to the appellate or review implications of that decision at that time. If the party consents to the magistrate, the manner of review is set forth in section 19-1-108(5), C.R.S.2009, which specifies review by the district court upon request made within fifteen days of the magistrate's order for matters under articles 2, 4, and 6 of title 19, and upon request made within five days notice for matters under article 3 of title 19. Adoption proceedings, including kinship adoptions, are under article 5 of title 19, and, for no immediately apparent reason, review is in the Court of Appeals. If review is in the Court of Appeals, that review is governed by the Colorado Rules of Appellate Procedure.
With respect to domestic relations cases, the magistrate may, without consent, hear all matters except permanent orders involving property division, maintenance, child support, or allocation of parental responsibilities, which require consent. CRM. 6(b)(1)(A), (2). In addition, the magistrate may hear, without consent, motions to modify permanent orders concerning property division, maintenance, child support, or allocation of parental responsibilities. C.RM. 6(b)(B). Therefore, magistrates are permitted to amend orders without consent; they are not empowered to enter orders in the first place without consent.
C.R.M. 7 was recently amended to require the magistrate to note on his or her written order whether review must be sought under C.R.M. 7(a) or 7(b). Though this amendment has undoubtedly reduced the confusion, it has not eliminated it.
C.R.M. 5(a) contributes to untimely appeals of matters heard by a magistrate without consent, in that, while a magistrate may consider a motion to correct clerical errors under C.R.C.P. 60(2), the magistrate is denied the authority to consider a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59(2). C.R.C.P. 59 motions, though not required, are frequently filed in the trial court prior to the initiation of an appeal to the Court of Appeals, and the period for initiating that appeal is tolled while the motion is pending, not to exceed sixty days. C.R.C.P. 59(b), (j), (k).
Though statistics are not available, I do not think I would be wide of the mark in stating that a significant, and perhaps unac*444ceptable, number of juvenile and domestic relations cases are dismissed on appeal to this court because: (1) district court review was required but not sought; (2) district court review was sought but not authorized; or (8) a post-trial motion under C.R.C.P. 59(a) was improvidently filed with the magistrate. Undoubtedly, as here, some of the dismissed appeals had merit.
In my view, this labyrinth unnecessarily sets traps for the unwary. Pro se litigants are most at risk. However, many of the dismissed cases involved counsel.
This case involves mother's fundamental rights. The doctrine of unique cireum-stances, as the dissent points out, has all but been abandoned in the federal system and may have a questionable future in state courts. Its use to expand the time within which to file an appeal is discretionary and may be subject to question. When, as here, fundamental rights are implicated, a litigant should not be subjected to a confusing appellate labyrinth and ultimately have to rely on a tenuous and discretionary doctrine in order to vindicate and protect his or her fundamental rights.