Court Opinion

ID: 9666689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:25:32.125179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:32.252053
License: Public Domain

FARRIS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the record establishes appellant breached its contract to the appellees’ damage, but I would reverse and remand the case for new trial because the evidence is insufficient to sustain the amount of damages awarded appel-lees.
In their cross-action against appellant, appellees allege they mailed the insurance proceeds check to appellant with the understanding that appellant would disburse the funds to the contractor employed to repair appellees’ residence, as the repairs were completed. Appellees allege that appellant never paid the contractor, did not credit them with the insurance payment, and foreclosed on appellees' premises divesting them of their right, title and interest in both their home and their $15,700.00. Although in their prayer for relief against appellant, appellees pray for recovery of the $15,700.00 which appellant “converted to their own use and benefit,” appellees’ cause of action is in the nature of an action on a contract rather than a suit for conversion. Appellant’s only special exception was to appellees’ allegations of prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees.
Appellant requested no special issues, instructions, or definitions, and did not object to the court’s charge. The trial court submitted two issues to the jury:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant deposited the insurance proceeds check in question into a special account intended to be used to pay for repairs to Plaintiff’s home?
Answer: “We do” or “We do not.”
ANSWER: WE DO
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant converted the insurance funds to its own use and benefit?
Answer: “We do” or “We do not.”
ANSWER: WE DO
In the absence of any requests or objections, omitted issues will be deemed found by the trial court to support the judgment, if one or more issues necessary to sustain it are submitted. See Turner, Collie & Braden v. Brookhollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex.1982). The court’s charge is sufficient to submit the issue of appellants breach of its contract with appellees. As the majority opinion notes, the deed of trust provides that appellant may, at its option, either apply the insurance proceeds to the reduction of appellees’ debt or to the restoration or repair of the damaged property. Appellant neither pled nor proved an exercise of its option, and the evidence shows that in fact appellant did not exercise the option but rather mismanaged the entire affair, to the injury of appellees.
With regard to the deemed finding on the omitted issue of damages, I disagree with the majority’s finding that there is no evi*72dence of any actual damages. The applicable test is whether the evidence of damages creates more than a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 TEXAS L.REV. 361, 363 (1960).
I would sustain appellant’s sixth point of error and reverse and remand for new trial because there was insufficient evidence of actual damages.
An assertion that the evidence is “insufficient” to support a finding of fact can mean that the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). We are required to consider all of the evidence in the case in making this determination. See id.
The evidence is uncontroverted that the appellees received the insurance check following the fire damage to their residence, endorsed the check, and mailed it to the mortgage company. Mr. Poole testified of several telephone conversations with various employees of appellant who assured him that he would shortly receive a draft for approximately one-third of the insurance proceeds in order to begin repairs on his residence, with the remaining two-thirds to be forwarded in two supplemental payments. The appellant never forwarded any of the promised drafts to appellees. Appellees were unable to make the repairs to their home, and were unwilling and unable to continue payments on a residence which they could not occupy. As a consequence of appellees’ non-payment, appellant foreclosed on appellees’ residence, bidding the property in at $39,118.00, of which $30,396.74 represented the unpaid balance on the note held by appellant.
An injured party is not to be denied a recovery because the exact amount of his damages is undeterminable if he has produced the best evidence available to him and it is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for determining his loss. Vance v. My Apartment Steak House, Etc., 677 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex.1984); Hindman v. Texas Lime Company, 157 Tex. 592, 305 S.W.2d 947 (1957).
The outline of the appellees’ damage, outlined above, creates more than a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of damages; however, applying the Garza v. Alviar test, I would hold that the evidence does not afford a reasonable basis for determining appellee’s loss and is so weak that the finding of damages should be set aside and a new trial ordered.