Court Opinion

ID: 9583297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:37:17.63333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:55.975701
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree that pursuant to People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), a trial judge is required to state all reasons for departure from the sentencing guidelines on the record at the time of sentencing. Articulation will serve to aid in appellate review of sentencing and to avoid injustice on the basis of error at sentencing. As the majority points out, however, both the failure to articulate on the record the reasons for a sentence and a sentence based on inaccurate information will result in remand for resentencing only where the error prejudices the defendant.
1 also agree with the majority that a sentencing judge may not consider the possibility of a prisoner’s early release under the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act (oepa), MCL 800.71 et seq.; MSA 28.1437(1) et seq., as a factor in enhancing a sentence.1 The speculative nature of such a consideration introduces an element of inaccuracy into the sentence and results in unfair prejudice to the defendant. I write separately, however, because I disagree that early release because of disciplinary credits is an inappropriate consideration in determining a defendant’s sentence, and because I wish to disassociate myself from the implicit premise of the majority opinion that Administrative Order No. 1984-1 furnishes a substantive basis for reversal of a sentence based on accurate information.2
*430I
The question is not whether the Legislature may reduce reasonable prison sentences and provide for the implementation of corrections programs. It undoubtedly has that power. The question, rather, is whether a sentencing judge may consider the automatic crediting of good time in determining an appropriate term of incarceration.
By statute, a disciplinary credit of five days per month for each month served in prison is mandatory. MCL 800.33(5); MSA 28.1403(5). Additional "special” disciplinary credits of two days per month may be awarded for good institutional conduct upon the recommendation of the disciplinary credit committee. Id. Accumulated credits are automatically deducted ¿rom a prisoner’s minimum and maximum sentence in order to determine the prisoner’s presumptive parole eligibility and discharge dates. MCL 800.33(3); MSA 28.1403(3).3
Given their discretionary nature, "special” disciplinary credits are too speculative to be considered in a sentencing determination. However, the only speculative aspect of mandatory disciplinary credits which could work to a defendant’s detriment is that on a finding of major misconduct a defendant may lose credit for the month in which the misconduct was committed. MCL 800.33(6); MSA 28.1403(6).
I perceive no prejudice in assuming that a defendant will be eligible for parole on the date at *431which his automatically credited good-time credit makes parole available.
Time cuts under the oepa are speculative and not reasonably ascertainable by the trial judiciary. Parole under the "lifer” law is subject to the consent of the sentencing judge or successor judge. MCL 791.234(4)(b); MSA 28.2304(4)0). In neither event has the judiciary any ground to object if the sentence served is not the sentence intended. Early release pursuant to disciplinary credits presents a different situation. These credits are automatically awarded to reduce the sentence and are not subject to divestiture. The mandatory nature of disciplinary credits makes the potential for early release a virtual certainty, which is subject to reduction only at the defendant’s own hands.
Just as speculation injected into a sentencing creates an inaccuracy which may be inconsistent with due process of law, see Townsend v Burke, 334 US 736; 68 S Ct 1252; 92 L Ed 1690 (1948), judicial refusal to acknowledge the virtual certainty of early release creates a distortion of the sentencing process. As we have previously stated, the sentencing policy in Michigan requires that
the sentence should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender’s rehabilitative potential. [People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557, 574; 208 NW2d 504 (1973).]
Because it is indisputable that good-time credits will affect the amount of time that a defendant actually will serve, consideration of this factor is permissible in formulating a sentence which will meet society’s interest. In answering this precise question, the Illinois Appellate Court of the Second District recently held:
*432In the absence of any authority to the contrary, we see no reason why a sentencing judge may not consider, as one factor, the realities of the sentencing law in fashioning a sentence which is reflective of both the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s rehabilitative potential. A sentencing judge does not act in a vacuum, nor can he be expected to disregard the possibility of good-time credit which is inherent in every sentence of imprisonment. (See Abernathy v People [1970], 123 Ill App 2d 263, 271, 259 NE2d 363.) While we recognize that good-time credit and eligibility for good-time credit are not the same thing, we nevertheless believe that a sentencing court may properly determine the minimum amount of actual incarceration which is appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offense and the history and character of the defendant. [People v Torgeson, 132 Ill App 3d 384, 389; 477 NE2d 244 (1985). See also People v Smith, 148 Ill App 3d 655; 499 NE2d 1038 (1986).]
The determination of an appropriate sentence is one of the most difficult and agonizing decisions that a trial judge must make. If it appears that incarceration is a necessity, resolving the length of the term involves an individualized assessment of the defendant’s background, potential for rehabilitation, circumstances of the crime, and the protection of society. Under an indeterminate sentencing scheme, that is the trial court’s sentencing responsibility, a responsibility for which the judge alone is politically accountable.
The operation of good-time credit to reduce a reasonable sentence, if not taken into account, leads to diminished public confidence in the judiciary and a feeling that the trial judiciary has betrayed the citizenry. One of the aims of Congress in enacting new sentencing law is "honesty in sentencing” (emphasis in original):
*433[Congress] sought to avoid the confusion and implicit deception that arises out of the present sentencing system which requires a judge to impose an indeterminate sentence that is automatically reduced in most cases by "good time” credits. [41 Crim L Rptr 3087, 3089.]
Indeed, in recognition of the fact that the sentence imposed by a court is frequently not the sentence served, the Citizens’ Commission to Improve Michigan Courts recently made the following recommendation:
Too often, the judge or the victim is surprised to learn that the defendant has been released before completing the official minimum sentence. As we indicated earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court could do much to enhance public confidence in the integrity of the sentencing process if the Court would require each sentencing judge to inform the defendant of the earliest possible release date, as well as the official minimum and maximum sentence. The defendant, the victim, and the community would better understand the actual impact of the sentence, and the mystery surrounding early releases would be reduced. [Citizens’ Commission to Improve Michigan Courts, Final Report and Recommendations, p 13.]
A rule of this Court prohibiting the consideration of early release pursuant to the good-time statute can only perpetuate public frustration to the detriment of the criminal justice system. If the trial judge understands the realities of the correction system, as the public no doubt presumes, there cannot be a satisfactory answer to the question why that reality is not taken into account in sentencing. A sentence must look to the offender’s ultimate rehabilitation, but it must also bear a rational relationship to community values regarding the misconduct of the defendant.
*434II
There is no support in the record for the conclusion that disciplinary credits were factored into the sentencing guidelines so as to create a redundancy when that factor is used as a reason for departing from the guidelines.
In any event, it is my belief that a trial judge may consider the effect of disciplinary credits when fashioning a sentence pursuant to the factors in People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972).4 In such a situation, if the sentence falls outside of the guidelines, the reasons for departure are those related to the considerations in Snow, not merely the effect of disciplinary credits. Such a departure cannot be unwarranted unless it fails appellate review for some reason other than consideration of disciplinary credits.
The majority also contends that adding good time to a defendant’s sentence will result in disparity. However, in In re Southard, 298 Mich 75, 82; 298 NW 457 (1941), we observed that disparity has been built into the system by the people of this state. As this Court stated:
The policy expressed by the people, in providing by constitutional amendment for an indeterminate sentence law, directed the legislature to adopt a flexible law and the courts to fit the punishment in the exercise of their discretion to the needs of the particular case. In no other way could the will of the people be carried into effect. A discretion must be exercised in order to have indeterminate sentences.
To be sure, indeterminate sentencing creates a *435possibility of arbitrary sentences within the broad discretion granted the trial judiciary. That possibility was the motivation for the sentencing guidelines project. However, even the sentencing guidelines which prescribe recommended ranges for a crime result in a degree of disparity. Hence, it is not disparity in general which is the perceived evil, but unjustified disparity resulting from such impermissible considerations as the race or the economic status of a defendant or the personal bias and attitude of an individual judge. People v Coles, supra, p 546. It is the unjustified disparities which "promote disrespect for the criminal justice system and resentment among prisoners, thus impairing their morale and motivation for rehabilitation.” Id.
Where consideration of good-time credits is made in conjunction with other permissible considerations and pursuant to Snow, the disparity that results is justified as an effort to tailor the punishment to fit the offender and to permit optimum discretion in the parole authorities consistent with the defendant’s threat to the community as perceived by the trial judge. See People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 694; 199 NW2d 202 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The majority concludes that taking away good-time credits in advance will circumvent or nullify the act. In fact, the virtually automatic application of good-time credits has the effect of nullifying a part of the trial court’s sentence. If the purpose of the good-time statute is to reward a defendant for good conduct, that purpose will continue to be served, even if the trial court takes good-time credits into account in determining the actual length of time the judge believes the defendant ought to be incarcerated. By its very nature, indeterminate sentencing requires the trial court to *436exercise a degree of discretion in imposing a sentence. Consideration of good-time credits improves the accuracy of such an exercise of discretion and therefore does not constitute an invasion of the legislative prerogative to establish punishment for crimes. See People v Coles, supra, p 539.
Indeed, consideration of good time when fashioning a sentence will promote consistency between the Michigan Department of Corrections decision to release an offender and the trial court’s determination of a defendant’s dangerousness by insuring that a defendant will not be released before serving the minimum time thought to be necessary for the defendant’s rehabilitation. Concern that similar offenders committing similar offenses may receive dissimilar sentences depending on the judge’s decision to accurately factor good-time credits is met by observing that the "basic unfairness” in such a situation is not to the defendant who receives a sentence based on the reality of good-time credits, but to the people of the state who are deprived of a rational system of sentencing.5
hi
In the case at bar, the trial court stated:
In light of the age of the Defendant, the court is of the opinion that to protect society he should spend a minimum of 10 years in prison. Because of the uncertainty of the Emergency Powers Act and the slight uncertainty as to Defendant’s good time *437credits, the Court has resolved these differences in favor of the Defendant to result in a probable incarceration of 7 years.
I note that age is not a variable in the sentencing guidelines. However, the fact that age is not a variable surely does not mean it is not a permissible reason for departing from the guidelines in making the necessarily difficult determination of an appropriate sentence.61 agree that resentencing is necessary to the extent the sentences were based upon consideration of time-cuts pursuant to the oepa and discretionary disciplinary credits. I maintain, however, that consideration of mandatory disciplinary credits is proper in order to accurately tailor the punishment to the offender.
It is not the state’s failure to create and implement a successful corrections program that is distorting the judiciary’s sentencing responsibility, rather, it is this Court’s decision mandating that a judge cannot take into account the reality of the actual operation of the system. Nor is the judge who automatically takes credited good time into consideration "enhancing a defendant’s sentence on the basis of anticipated good-time reductions” as the majority claims. The sentence is not enhanced. Rather, the sentence is made more rational precisely to the extent that it accurately tailors the term on the basis of predictions regarding the defendant’s potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation. To be sure, the indeterminate *438sentencing model has its flaws and its critics. However, so long as that is the model the Legislature has adopted, there is no rational basis to require the trial judge to exclude truthful information from the calculation of a sentence which is not excessively severe nor motivated by impermissible factors. The motivating factor for this sentence was the judge’s determination of how much time he thought the defendant actually should serve for the protection of the community. Until today, I would have thought that was precisely what the law required and what the public demanded of the trial judiciary.
Brickley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.
Griffin, J., took no part in the decision of these cases.

 I note, however, that in n 24 of the majority opinion, the majority addresses the propriety of sentencing defendants to a term of years that exceeds life and precludes parole. Since this is not an issue in the present case, I find it inappropriate to address the issue at this time.

 Administrative Order No. 1984-1 imposes a responsibility on the trial judiciary authorized by this Court’s power of superintending control. Whether and to what extent this Court has the authority to *430establish guidelines as an independent basis for appellate review of a sentence which falls short of shocking the judicial conscience is an issue of considerable jurisprudential significance which was not briefed or argued here nor addressed in People v Walker, 428 Mich 261; 407 NW2d 367 (1987).

 Subsequent statutory amendments which would reduce good time may not be applied to a prisoner’s sentence before the effective date of the amendment in view of the restraints on ex post facto laws. OAG, 1933-34, p 394 (November 20, 1933).

 These factors are: (1) the disciplining of the wrongdoer, (2) the protection of society, (3) the potential for reformation of the offender, and (4) the deterring of others from committing like offenses. See also People v Coles, supra, p 550.

 Although this Court has thus far declined to pass upon the issue, the general jurisdictional grant which justified sentence review at the behest of a defendant, MCL 600.212-600.223, 600.308; MSA 27A.212-27A.223, 27A.308, is theoretically sufficiently broad to permit prosecutors’ appeals of sentences. In this connection, I note that although 81.6 percent of the judges sentence within the guidelines, six percent of the departures are below the suggested guidelines.

 While age is not a factor specifically set forth in the United States Sentence Guidelines Commission recommendations to Congress, the Commission notes that it is a factor "correlated highly with the likelihood of recidivism,” 41 Crim L Rptr 3129, which for policy reasons is not presently included. The reform of sentencing in the federal system contemplates periodic submission of recommendations to Congress, 28 USC 994(p). Under the federal scheme, resolution of policy questions thus remains in the policymaking body of government.