Court Opinion

ID: 9720016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:12:52.487013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:29.495514
License: Public Domain

TURNER, P. J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.— I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that reverses and dismisses defendant’s conviction for felony false imprisonment. I concur in the remainder of the opinion.
*1122Defendant’s contention that he may not be convicted of false imprisonment because it is a necessarily included offense of kidnapping and the Attorney General’s concession in that regard are without merit.1 The kidnapping and the felony false imprisonment were separate acts which, under the unique set of facts present in this case, constituted distinct crimes. The felony false imprisonment was not an offense included within the kidnapping. Penal Code section 20 states, “In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent . . . .” In the present case, there is no doubt defendant intended to falsely imprison Maria N.; he tied her to the tree. Rather, the issue is whether separate acts occurred so as to give rise to liability to false imprisonment.
Substantial evidence supports the implied finding of the jurors that defendant committed a felony false imprisonment separate and apart from the kidnapping. An act is essential for the existence of a crime. (Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) ch. 6, § 1, p. 605.) One commentator has noted, “The word ‘act’ might be defined ... in a narrow sense to mean only voluntary bodily movement.” (1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) § 3.2(c), p. 275.) In People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 53 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], the Supreme Court held, “Under [Penal Code] section 20, the defendant’s wrongful intent and his physical act must concur in the sense that the act must be motivated by the intent.” In the present case, when defendant concluded the lengthy asportation of Maria N., a fair inference from the evidence was that defendant formed a separate intent to degrade her by tying her to a tree. That intent manifested itself in conduct which was materially different from the kidnapping. During the kidnapping, *1123Maria N. was being moved. When defendant formed the separate intent to tie her to the tree and acted on that newly developed mental state, the movement, an essential element of the kidnapping (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 180 [217 P.2d 1]), came to a complete halt. The key point is that a separate intent was formed and conduct different from that which was essential to a kidnapping ceased. In other words, to paraphrase Justice Mosk in his opinion in People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 53, the act of felony false imprisonment was “motivated by the [separate] intent.” Therefore, substantial evidence supports the trier of fact’s implied conclusion that a false imprisonment, which was not necessarily included within the kidnapping, occurred in the present case.
This conclusion is supported by two additional considerations. First, the deputy district attorney squarely presented this issue to the jurors. During argument, she said: “Assault two, false imprisonment. This charge is related to the incident where the defendant tied her to the tree down by the waterline. She testified he had the rope tied around her neck and that he then wrapped it around the tree and tied her hands behind the tree and tried to do something to her. The act of tying her to the tree is false imprisonment. [H] Look at the elements: [fl] [1.] violate liberty of another by restraining, confining, or detaining the person. Clearly she was restrained and confined. Very definitely. [f¡ The second element, was this done by violence or menace[?] Now, the law describes menace as a threat of harm, express or implied, by word of [szc] act. All of that exists, [fl] Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, I would submit the People have proven false imprisonment beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clearly, the People’s theory was presented directly to the trier of fact. Second, although not entirely conclusive, our Supreme Court has made it clear that separate sexual acts which occur in close proximity to one another are distinct crimes. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 325-334 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078].) In tying Maria N. to the tree, defendant engaged in a crime which was separated in terms of the sexual acts and at the conclusion of the asportation. Given the totality of the circumstances, I would affirm the felony false imprisonment conviction.
In the alternative, defendant contends that it was violative of Penal Code section 654 to sentence him for both felony false imprisonment and the enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 667.8 for kidnapping in order to commit a sexual offense.2 In determining whether a sentence violates Penal Code section 654, an appellate court is “required to view the evidence *1124in a light most favorable to the judgment.” (People v. Williamson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 164, 172 [153 Cal.Rptr. 48].) In People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162 [255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32], our Supreme Court held, “ ‘The defendant’s intent and objective are factual questions for the trial court; [to permit multiple punishments,] there must be evidence to support a finding the defendant formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced. [Citation.]’ ” The false imprisonment and the kidnapping may be separately punished. When defendant untied Maria N., he had committed a completed felony false imprisonment, lying Maria N. to the tree in order to degrade her was not the same act as the kidnapping or the rapes and involved separate intents. Therefore, Penal Code section 654 is inapplicable to the present case. (People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 335-338.) The cases involving kidnapping or felony false imprisonment and rape relied upon by defendant do not involve the presence of an intentionally distinct act of degradation which also constituted a crime such as tying the victim to a tree. Under these circumstances, multiple sentencing for felony false imprisonment and sexual assault with a kidnapping enhancement was appropriate. (People v. Ratcliffe (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 808, 819 [177 Cal.Rptr. 627].) Since substantial evidence supports the sentencing court’s explicit determination that the felony false imprisonment was a “separate act of violence,” the sentence for felony false imprisonment must be affirmed.

I wish to emphasize that I do not believe this issue is properly before this court. No objection to the purported lesser included nature of the felony false imprisonment charge was raised in the trial court. Therefore, in my view, the issue has not been preserved for appellate purposes. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1138 [275 Cal.Rptr. 797, 800 P.2d 1227]; Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1 [151 Cal.Rptr. 837, 588 P.2d 1261].) The prior decisions of the California Supreme Court which have held that a defendant may not be convicted of a greater and lesser offense have not addressed the issue of waiver when no objection was interposed in the trial court to the conviction of both the greater and lesser included crimes. Therefore, in the absence of a specific Supreme Court directive that this issue can be raised on appeal despite the failure to object in the trial court, I believe the general waiver rule and policy enunciated in In re Marriage of Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 1138 and Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist., supra, 23 Cal.3d at pages 184-185, footnote 1, should apply.
In People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 973-975 [254 Cal.Rptr. 811, 766 P.2d 577], our Supreme Court held that a defendant could, by failure to object, waive the right to litigate on appeal the correctness of a conviction of a nonlesser included offense. In Toro, the waiver rule applied to a defendant’s due process rights to notice of the charges. (Id. at p. 973.) If the defendant in Toro waived, by failure to object in superior court, his right to raise an issue concerning his conviction of a nonlesser included offense on appeal, then defendant in this case waived his right to raise the issue on appeal that he was convicted of a purportedly lesser included offense.

Penal Code section 667.8, subdivision (a) provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person convicted of a felony violation of Section 261, 264.1, 286, 288a, or 289 who, *1124for the purpose of committing that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 207, shall be punished by an additional term of three years.”