Court Opinion

ID: 9639821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:49:14.752287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:22.136109
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree that a reversal of the order below is necessary, because defendant in its answer sufficiently alleged a good counterclaim to prevent dismissal of the. action by the plaintiff. But I think a like result should be reached by the application of the new federal rules of civil procedure. Under Rule 41 (a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, the plaintiff’s right to withdraw terminates upon the filing of an answer, and any order of. dismissal then made by the court shall be “upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” The court did not act under this rule. Had it done so it should clearly have limited or denied the right of dismissal upon the appearance of such substantial opposition as was disclosed here. Indeed, this is the course suggested in a similar case by District Judge Hincks. The Stanley Works and Andre Gueneau v. The C. S. Mersick &. Co.,* D.C.Conn., Feb. 15, 1939, Department of Justice, Decisions on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Bulletin No. 18, Feb. 27, 1939.1
In this case the district judge, wheri he made his order in October, 1938, might properly have decided the motion under the new rules, even though it was argued shortly before they became effective. The whole purpose and intent of Rule 86 is that the rules should be applied wherever possible and except where to do so “would not be feasible or would work injustice.” The application of this salutary rule of dismissal, similar to that in force for some time in the Southern District of New York (Bronx Brass Foundry v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U.S. 230, 56 S.Ct. 451, 80 L.Ed. 657), was certainly feasible and would work justice here, rather than injustice. The reference by the judge in his opinion to an “understanding” that decision would be under .the former practice does not seem adequate ground to justify a refusal to- apply the new rules. Courts well should be hesitant in approving of stipulations to apply earlier and more technical rules of procedure in place of the newer system. The construction and effect of such stipulations may well be reserved for future consideration, but it would seem that in any event nothing short of an express agreement by counsel approved by the court should be given effect and that a mere statement of the court’s intention or of some indefinite understanding to that effect should be held insufficient. Moreover, after the decision granting the motion to dismiss the counterclaim and well after the -new rules became effective, the defendant moved to vacate the order of dismissal and for leave to amend its counterclaim by making various additions to it, perfecting its ■ allegation of a valid claim. Decision of that motion should surely have been made pursuant to the new rules, with the result that the motion should have been granted.
Hence I prefer to rest my conclusion not only on the grounds stated by Judge *93PATTERSON, but also on the provisions of Rule 41 (a) (2) as applied to this case. A judgment of reversal, however supported, is adequate in any event to pave the way for a proper disposition of the controversy in the District Court.

 Ed. Note: No opinion for publication.

 Judge Hincks also held that “under this salutary rule a counterclaim which serves but to restate the controversy initiated by the complaint is wholly redundant and should be stricken.” In a case where the counterclaim is wholly redundant the course of striking it is not out of place, but it would seem often, if not usually, desirable to defer a ruling until the trial [see Rule 12 (b), (c), and (d)], when it can be more clearly seen whether affirmative relief is needed by a defendant.