Court Opinion

ID: 9471636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:37:29.834882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:30.528705
License: Public Domain

WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree that we should affirm the district court’s denial of Barham’s habeas petition, but I have some reservations about the rationale and the language of the court’s opinion. I cannot agree that attorney Edwards’s simultaneous representation of Bar-ham, a criminal defendant, and Wayman, a prosecution witness, did not create an “actual conflict”. Both the magistrate and the district judge correctly found that such a conflict did exist. The majority, desiring to uphold a conviction that clearly ought to be upheld, appears to hold that simultaneous representation of a defendant and an adverse witness will not vitiate a conviction unless the defendant can adduce on-the-record evidence that his counsel acted in a way that harmed him. The majority opinion’s reliance on the “extraordinary circumstances” test of Baty v. Balkcom, 11 Cir.1981, 661 F.2d 391, cert. denied, 1982, 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2307, 73 L.Ed.2d 1308, indicates that such a broad holding is not intended. I would avoid the risk of misunderstanding by basing our affirmance squarely on the truly “extraordinary” facts of this case: that Wayman was not a key government witness, that the only actions of counsel that might have prejudiced Barham are in the record and are therefore subject to scrutiny by this court, and that we have two previous trials with which we can compare Edwards’s cross-examination of Way-man during the third trial. This “extraordinary” opportunity for comparison allows us to find that although attorney Edwards did have conflicting duties, this actual conflict did not prejudice Barham.
I.
The majority relies on United States v. Mers, 11 Cir.1983, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 482, 78 L.Ed.2d 679 (1983), in which this Court stated that actual conflict is demonstrated when a habeas petitioner “make[s] a factual showing of inconsistent interests and . .. demonstrate^] that the attorney ‘made a ehoice between possible alternative courses of action....’” The majority concedes that attorney Edwards had conflicting duties when he decided how thoroughly or lightly to cross-examine Wayman. But the majority then holds that, because Way-man’s testimony was “inconsequential”, this conflict “hardly rises to the actual conflict standards” of Mers.
*1534The majority’s approach improperly conflates two inquiries into one: in effect, the majority says there was no “actual conflict” because the effects of the conflict were harmless. This approach is at odds with the prophylactic nature of the rules against conflicts of interest. The right to effective counsel is basic to our adversary system of justice, and essential if that system is to yield just results and a belief among the participants, and the citizenry at large, that justice has been done. See Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan.L.Rev. 1133 (1982). If we are to preserve that belief in the essential justice of the system, we must protect against not only the fact but the appearance of injustice. In the usual case of conflicting interests, the fact of prejudice “may be subtle, even unconscious. It may elude detection on review. A reviewing court deals with a cold record, capable, perhaps, of exposing gross instances of incompetence but often giving no clue to the erosion of zeal which may ensue from divided loyalty.” Castillo v. Estelle, 5 Cir.1974, 504 F.2d 1243, 1245. A conflict of interest may affect the actions of an attorney in many ways, but the greatest “evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing. ...” Holloway v. Arkansas, 1978, 435 U.S. 475, 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 438. In such circumstances a reviewing court cannot be certain that the conflict did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, it is settled that once an actual conflict is shown, prejudice is presumed. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 1980, 446 U.S. 338, 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 347; Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91, 98 S.Ct. at 1181-82, 55 L.Ed.2d at 438; Glasser v. United States, 1941, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467-78, 86 L.Ed. 680, 702; Baty, 661 F.2d at 396. The majority does not directly contest this principle. Instead, it states that because the effects of the conflict in this case were insignificant, there was no “actual conflict”. This is a demand for proof of prejudice in another guise, and it is no less inconsistent with the law of effective assistance of counsel than would be a direct demand for proof of prejudice.
I respectfully suggest that the majority applies too stringent a standard for finding “actual conflict” in part because it relies entirely on cases involving the joint representation of co-defendants by a single attorney. Such joint representation has never been considered a per se denial of effective assistance. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S.Ct. at 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d at 433. In some cases, multiple representation may be advantageous to the co-defendants notwithstanding some potential conflicts. “Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense system gives strength against a common attack”. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 92, 62 S.Ct. at 475, 86 L.Ed. at 710-11 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). A per se rule against joint representation would deprive defendants of this strategy even in cases where the strategy would be beneficial to their defense. The courts are therefore willing to tolerate potential conflicts so long as those conflicts remain only hypothetical and not actual. There is no comparable reason to facilitate a single attorney’s concurrent representation of a defendant and an adverse party or witness. Such concurrent representation is inherently adverse to the defendant’s interests.
The majority finds “that the only decision Mr. Edwards made that potentially affected both of his clients was whether to cross-examine Mr. Wayman in a friendly or hostile manner”, and concludes that because Way-man’s testimony was “inconsequential” the conflict “remained hypothetical”. But in this habeas proceeding the magistrate found that Wayman’s testimony, while brief, was “certainly a significant chain of events in the prosecution’s case”. ■ The record supports this assessment. Each of Bar-ham’s three trials has turned on issues of credibility.1 Indeed, this Court reversed Barham’s first conviction because the *1535government used perjured testimony, and we emphasized that “credibility was especially important in this case in which two sets of witnesses ... presented irreconcilable stories.” United States v. Barham, 5 Cir.1979, 595 F.2d 231, 242-43. Wayman testified that Barham had used an alias, a false address, and a false explanation for his interest in buying a printing camera. Wayman was one of the few witnesses in this case who was not involved in the alleged conspiracy. His testimony was likely to have a significant impact on the jury’s assessment of Barham’s credibility. Even more apparent is the adverse effect a successful cross-examination could have had on the government’s case. If attorney Edwards were able to convince the jury that Wayman’s identification of Barham was mistaken, it might affect the jury’s perception of the credibility of the prosecution’s entire case. Therefore, it was in Barham’s interest for his attorney to probe deeply into the possibility that Wayman’s identification was mistaken, that his memory had been “refreshed” by government coaching, and the like. Edwards, on the other hand, would not want to alienate his client Way-man by engaging in an annoyingly persistent cross-examination on behalf of his client Barham.
“If a defense attorney owes duties to a party whose interests are adverse to those of the defendant, then an actual conflict exists. The interests of the other client and the defendant are sufficiently adverse if it is shown that the attorney owes a duty to the defendant to take some action that could be detrimental to his other client.” Zuck v. State of Alabama, 5 Cir.1979, 588 F.2d 436, 439, cert. denied, 1979, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed.2d 42. In Zuck, the defense attorney also represented the prosecutor in an unrelated civil matter. While there was no showing that the defense attorneys actually did anything or refrained from doing anything because of this dual representation, the Court held that the attorneys’ conflicting duties to their clients were sufficient to create an actual conflict. Id. at 439-40. Similarly, in Castillo, the defense attorney also represented the victim of the charged crime, who was one of the two principal witnesses for the prosecution. Again, the Court found it unnecessary to inquire into alleged instances of prejudice; the fact of conflicting duties was enough to create a “real” conflict. 504 F.2d at 1245. In the present case attorney Edwards’s decision to cross-examine “in a friendly manner” may have had little impact on the outcome of the case. But all the same, Edwards had conflicting duties to his two clients and this conflict became actual when he was required to cross-examine Wayman.
II.
In the usual case the existence of an actual conflict would require us to grant the habeas petition. This Court and its predecessor have several times stated that an actual conflict cannot be harmless “except under the most extraordinary circumstances”. Baty, 661 F.2d at 395; Turnquest v. Wainwright, 5 Cir.1981, 651 F.2d 331, 334; Johnson v. Hopper, 5 Cir.1981, 639 F.2d 236, 239, cert. denied, 1981, 454 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 548, 70 L.Ed.2d 412. These cases have not discussed what circumstances would rise to the level of “extraordinary”, and the Court has never before actually invoked this exception, but I believe that “extraordinary circumstances” are presented here. The reasons that underlie the rule proscribing the application of “harmless error” doctrine are inapplicable here.
First, the conflict, although real, could affect only Edwards’s cross-examination of Wayman. Unlike Holloway, therefore, there is no concern that the conflict may have affected off-the-record conduct before or after trial. See 435 U.S. at 490-91, 98 S.Ct. at 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d at 438. Any effects of Edwards’s conflicting interests could be identified in a record preserved for appellate and collateral review.
Second, unlike Zuck and Castillo, the conflict here was not one that could infect the entire trial. Wayman was not the prosecutor or the victim of the crime, and he had no interest in the outcome of the trial. Although Wayman’s testimony was not “in*1536consequential”, Wayman was only a minor witness.
Most importantly, we can assess the risk of prejudice in this case because there have been two previous trials and Edwards has twice before cross-examined Wayman. The magistrate and the district court compared the cross-examinations and found that, if anything, Edwards’s cross-examination of Wayman improved after Wayman became Edwards’s client. Inquiry into the effects of an error is difficult and undesirable in any context, because it is difficult to determine with absolute certainty what “would have happened” in the absence of the error. Conflicts of interest present especially subtle risks of prejudice, which make the inquiry even more difficult and less desirable. In this case, however, we know what “would have happened” because the same cross-examination was conducted both before and after the conflict of interest arose. This rare opportunity for comparison allows us to say with certainty that, despite the actual conflict of interest, Barham was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel.
The majority also invokes the “extraordinary circumstances” exception of Baty, and even though it finds no actual conflict the majority is careful to consider whether Bar-ham incurred prejudice. Whether the theory of this ease is that there was no actual conflict, as the majority holds, or that prejudice need not be presumed here, as I would hold, the holding of the case is limited to its very special circumstances: where the prosecution witness is a minor one, the conflict affects only on-the-record conduct that can be completely reviewed, and there is a previous cross-examination that provides a basis for comparing counsel’s conduct before and after the conflict arises.

. While the government’s evidence appears overwhelming, it is instructive to remember that Barham’s first trial ended in a hung jury.