Court Opinion

ID: 9514863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:52:12.826147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:21.913600
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 25.] The majority misapprehends the relevant inquiry and South Dakota’s settled law in Issue Two leading it to wrongly conclude that Myhre’s statements should be suppressed. I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 26.] The standard for review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is:
A trial court’s findings of fact from a suppression hearing must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.... This court’s function under the clearly erroneous standard is to determine whether the decision of the lower court lacks the support of substantial evidence, evolves from an erroneous view of the applicable law or whether, considering the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In making this determination, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s decision.
State v. Meyer, 1998 SD 122, ¶ 16, 587 N.W.2d 719, 722-23 (citations omitted).
[¶ 27.] In this case the trial court concluded that Nachtigall had a constitutional obligation to advise Myhre of Miranda prior to the commencement of the second interrogation because he was the primary suspect and the focus of the officer’s investigation. The trial court’s reliance on this one factor is contrary to settled South Dakota law and the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s ruling only serves to further the misapplication of South Dakota law to the undisputed facts of this case.
[¶ 28.] Miranda warnings must be given whenever a defendant is interrogated while in police custody. State v. Thompson, 1997 SD 15, ¶ 23, 560 N.W.2d 535, 540.
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of the law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warning to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda learnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody. ’
Id. (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977) (emphasis added).
[¶ 29.] In State v. Herting, this Court elaborated:
The test in determining whether Miranda warnings are required ‘is not whether the investigation has focused on any particular suspect, but rather, whether the person being questioned is in custody or deprived of his or her freedom to leave.’ The United States Supreme Court recently expanded on the Mathiason standard, holding ‘the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.’ Further, this Court has stated:
An officer’s knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned. Those beliefs are relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable *192person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘freedom of action.’ Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. The weight and pertinence of any communications regarding the officer’s degree of suspicion will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In sum, an officer’s views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officer’s views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.
2000 SD 12, ¶ 9, 604 N.W.2d 863, 865 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 30.] Our review of the objective circumstances surrounding Nachtigall’s interrogation of Vincent reveals that Vincent was not deprived of his freedom to leave, and he was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda.
[¶ 31.] As a conservation officer, Nachtigall has a duty to enforce every state statute dealing with game, fish, parks, forestry, or boating. SDCL 41-15-10.1. On the day of this incident, he was patrolling alone in a remote, rural area. He returned to the Myhre party a second time after hearing a different story from another group of hunters.
[¶ 32.] When Nachtigall questioned Vincent the second time he was attempting to gather facts about the shooting of the deer since accounts differed. Vincent was allowed to remain where he was seated in the Suburban during questioning. Nachti-gall took no verbal or physical action to restrain Vincent’s movement. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the facts and circumstances in this case indicate Vincent was free to leave if he chose. Vincent did not choose to leave, but, rather, he stayed and answered Nachtigall’s questions. Nachtigall’s questioning of Vincent constituted general on-the-scene questioning and fact gathering, “absolutely essential for law enforcement officers to perform their jobs well and to investigate possible crimes.” Herting, 2000 SD 12, ¶ 10, 604 N.W.2d at 865 (citation omitted). As this Court has previously noted:
When circumstances demand immediate investigation by the police, the most useful, the most available tool for such investigation is general on-the-scene questioning, designed to bring out the person’s explanation or lack of explanation of the circumstances which aroused the suspicion of the police, and enable the police to quickly determine whether they should allow the suspect to go about his business or hold him to answer charges.
Id. (citation omitted).
[¶ 33.] Vincent was not subjected to a custodial interrogation under the circumstances presented. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s holding in Issue Two.
[¶ 34.] GILBERTSON, Justice, joins this dissent.