Court Opinion

ID: 9722664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:43:52.054429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:38.256702
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: When the instant criminal plaintiffs were sentenced for their crimes, section 3 — 6—3 of the Unified Code of Corrections provided that certain prisoners were eligible to earn credits toward early release through their participation in prison educational programs. (730 ILCS 5/3 — 6—3(a)(4) (West 1992).) Then, in 1993, Public Act 88 — 311 became effective, which modified the Unified Code of Corrections so that certain categories of prisoners were no longer eligible to earn any additional education credits. The plaintiffs’ resulting class action suit alleged, and the majority has found, that Public Act 88 — 311 constitutes an impermissible ex post facto law in that it makes more burdensome the punishment of their crimes. I dissent. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Youngblood (1990), 497 U.S. 37, 50, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30, 44, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2723, ex post facto jurisprudence in the United States had devolved into finding a violation wherever a law retroactively worked a disadvantage on a prisoner. Essentially, the majority employs this outdated, broader approach in finding that Public Act 88 — 311 is an ex post facto law unconstitutionally disadvantaging the instant plaintiffs. In Collins, however, the Supreme Court returned ex post facto jurisprudence to its rightful roots by reaffirming the definition delivered by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull. (Collins, 497 U.S. at 50, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 44, 110 S. Ct. at 2723, citing Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648.) Calder held, in pertinent part, that an ex post facto violation occurs only where a retroactive law "changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” (Emphasis added.) Calder, 3 U.S. at 390, 1 L. Ed. at 650. The majority errs in its application of the Calder definition by focusing solely on the meaning of the term "punishment.” It finds that Public Act 88 — 311 inflicts a greater punishment in that it curtails the possibility of reducing the plaintiffs’ actual prison time. What the majority ignores, however, is the threshold requirement that the law at issue constitutes a change in the punishment "annexed to the crime, when committed.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390, 1 L. Ed. at 650. The dangers inherent in ignoring this requirement become clear upon considering the absurd conclusions to which it logically leads. Consider section 3 — 6—3(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3 — 6— 3(a)(3) (West 1992)), which gives prison officials the discretion to grant an additional 180 days of good-conduct credit for meritorious conduct. Accepting the majority’s rationale, if, at the time of the crime, good-conduct credit could be earned by a prisoner for cleaning prison latrines, then the subsequent assignment of such services to an employed janitor might arguably be deemed a violation of the prisoner’s rights. More directly to the point, however, the majority’s approach improvidently raises both equal protection and ex post facto questions as to the thousands of prisoners who are currently on the waiting lists for educational programs. At the time Public Act 88 — 311 was enacted, there were in excess of 4,000 prisoners on waiting lists for educational programs. (See 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 16, 1993, at 1 (comments of Senator Hawkinson).) As of November 1, 1994, some 4,992 inmates remained on educational program waiting lists. Doubtless, many of these prisoners will have served their prison terms without ever being offered participation in educational programs. It should be recognized that the amendments contained in Public Act 88 — 311 can only constitute an ex post facto law if the pre-amendment provisions constituted a law annexed to the plaintiffs’ crimes when committed. In determining whether a law is annexed to a crime when committed, it is appropriate to note that, by including the ex post facto prohibition in the Constitution, the Framers sought to "assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.” (Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964.) In other words, the ex post facto clause ensures that a criminal knows in advance the consequences of his crime. These consequences, of course, include the sentence that a criminal can expect under the law. In Illinois, for example, criminals understand that, except for certain proscribed offenders, the sentence imposed by a trial judge will automatically be reduced by their good behavior while in prison. (730 ILCS 5/3 — 6—3(a)(2) (West 1992).) Such automatic credit for good behavior is a law annexed to the crime when committed because, inter alia, this guaranteed "eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 25, 101 S. Ct. at 966. This is not the case, however, regarding enhanced credit for participation in educational programs. Unlike automatic credit for good behavior, the possibility of earning educational credit in Illinois has always been uncertain. It depends upon the vagaries of State funding, the prison that an inmate is randomly assigned to, and even upon the innate abilities of a given prisoner. The arbitrary and uncertain availability of the educational programs precludes any suggestion that criminals anticipate that their sentences will be reduced if they choose to participate in educational programs. For, choose though they might, their desires are likely to be frustrated by the unavailability of such programs. Consequently, unlike automatic good-conduct credit, the law making these educational programs available does not constitute a law annexed to the crime when committed. Insofar as the availability of educational participation credits could not have been depended upon when the plaintiffs committed their crimes, Public Act 88— 311, which only modifies the availability of the educational classes, is not an ex post facto law. Any disadvantages caused by Public Act 88 — 311 are thus constitutionally irrelevant. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this dissent.