Court Opinion

ID: 9819202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:07.995187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:22.319029
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court committed reversible error when it found that defendant’s violation of his fiduciary duty not to intentionally torch his employer’s property was an aggravating factor in pronouncing sentence for the crime of aggravated arson. The trial court considered defendant’s violation of his duty not to destroy his employer’s property to be within the meaning and intent of the statutory aggravating factor where "the defendant, by the duties of his office or by his position, was obligated to prevent the particular offense committed.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS Ann. 5/5 — 5—3.2(a)(4) (Michie 1994). I simply cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion the trial court was in error. While the majority may be correct in stating that "[t]he defendant’s obligation to prevent an offense based on his office or position inherently requires some substantive indicia of responsibility on his part,” I cannot agree with its conclusion that "[n]one exists here.” 292 Ill. App. 3d at 760. True, defendant had no managerial or supervisory authority, nor was he required to provide security. However, it is fundamental to the employer-employee relationship (i.e., defendant’s "position” vis-a-vis his employer) that an employee not spread gasoline around the employer’s store, light a fire and leave. An employee has an absolute duty to his employer to prevent his own misconduct. See People v. Warwick, 123 Ill. App. 3d 692, 697 (1984). Indeed, it is well settled that a special fiduciary relationship exists on the part of an employee toward his employer. There is no question that: "[w]hile acting as an agent or employee of another, one owes the duty of fidelity and loyalty; accordingly, a fiduciary cannot act inconsistently with his agency or trust; i.e., solicit his employer’s customers for himself, entice coworkers away from his employer, or appropriate his employer’s personal property.” ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 3d 671, 683 (1978). To that list of examples of breach of an employee’s fiduciary duty to his employer, I would add "burn down the employer’s place of business.” I also believe that People v. Bosley and People v. Zemke, cited by the majority for the proposition that a trial court cannot consider a defendant’s position as an employee as a factor in aggravation, are distinguishable from the case at bar. In both these cases the trial court considered the mere fact that the defendant in a criminal sexual abuse case was a fireman or a minister as coming within the gambit of the statutory section at issue. The reviewing court, in each of those cases, correctly noted that the defendants’ crimes had no relationship to their job duties. In the matter sub judice, however, there is a direct link between the defendant’s crime and his position as the arson victim’s employee. This link is sufficient, I believe, to permit the trial court to consider the defendant’s position as the victim’s employee as an aggravating factor when imposing sentence. Assuming, arguendo, that the majority was correct in finding that the defendant’s status as the arson victim’s employee was not an aggravating factor under section 5 — 3.2(a)(4) of the statute, the trial court still could consider the defendant’s breach of his duty to his employer as an aggravating factor when passing sentence. It is well settled that a trial court is not limited to considering only the statutory aggravating factors and may consider any fact which would tend to aggravate the offense. People v. Helm, 282 Ill. App. 3d 32, 34 (1996). Indeed, a trial court may consider nonstatutory factors as aggravating factors in determining whether to impose a more severe sentence. Even though the legislature has decided to enumerate certain factors that are to be given weight, that enumeration is not exclusive. People v. Irby, 237 Ill. App. 3d 38, 70 (1992). Therefore, even if the trial court’s consideration of the defendant’s position was not a factor contemplated by the legislature in enumerating certain aggravating factors, there has been no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in considering that fact in aggravation. For the reasons discussed, I would uphold the trial court’s sentence and I therefore, respectfully, dissent.