Court Opinion

ID: 9795761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:38:13.528668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:36:17.507387
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING'S DENIAL
OPALA, J.
T1 The Bank complains on rehearing that the court's certiorari pronouncement overlooked an issue that stands unresolved. We are urged to now reach for review an alleged error in nisi prius determination of the prejudgment interest's amount. Because, for the reasons to be stated, we Rold that the issue tendered for resolution on rehearing was not before the court and is hence barred from our consideration by the Bank's failure timely to press it by certiorari petition, rehearing is denied. The procedural tangle the case unfolds at this stage calls for a supplemental opinion that should provide valuable guidance for the bench and bar upon (a) the strictures of § 994 1 certification and (b) the extent of corrective relief that may be afforded the victorious party in the intermediate appellate court without a quest of its own for certiorari scrutiny of the issue desired to be examined.
I
THE PERTINENT ANATOMY OF CONTROVERSY NOW AT ISSUE
¶ 2 The appeal in this case2 was brought from a certified § 994 "judgment"3 that had been entered in a lawsuit by a physician against her bank to recover losses from wrongly honored checks.4 The physi*142cian won. The Bank appealed from an order certified under the provisions of 12 0.S.Supp. 1995 § 9945 -which was brought here by its first petition in error. - Some thirteen months later, the trial court ruled on the physician's quest6 for computation of the prejudgment interest's amount that was due.7 The Bank then brought its next (supplemental) petition in error for prosecution of what appears to be the second prong of the appeal. The latter was filed in the same cause.8 The second petition sought review of the nisi prius-determined quantum of prejudgment interest. - The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA], deciding only the issues tendered by the first petition in error, reversed the certified order by resolving the issues in the Bank's favor.9 Shortly thereafter COCA denied the Bank's motion 10 for leave to supplement the record by including additional materials (needed for prosecution of the issue tendered by the Bank's supplemental petition in error) and to brief the later-assigned issue of its prejudgment interest obligation 11 which was initially injected into the appeal by the supplemental petition in error. - Certio-rari, sought here by the physician alone, raised for review only those issues which stood resolved by COCA's opinion. The Bank did not press for certiorari relief from its own defeat (on its quest for prejudgment interest's review via COCA's post-opinion order denying the Bank's motion for leave to supplement the record and to brief the issue advanced by the second petition in error).
II
THE BANK INVITED THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ISSUE'S EXCLUSION FROM COCA'S OPINION BY PREMATURELY PROCURING A § 994 CERTIFICATION OF THE NISI PRIUS ORDER THAT WAS NOT YET FIT TO BE ADVANCED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
¶3 The procedural tangle unveiled on rehearing began when the law firm initially representing the Bank secured the trial judge's $ 994 certification for an order that had not yet advanced to judgment stage (upon the claim in contest).12 Although that order may at first glance have appeared to bear the earmarks of a judgment, it actually fell short of having the requisite legal attributes, owing to its failure to include the exact amount of prejudgment interest due the creditor. The judgment's memorial recites that the rate of interest and the date from which prejudgment interest is to run are "to be determined" at a later time.13 There can be no judgment suitable for § 994 certification when the court disposes of but a portion of the contest by leaving unresolved any issue on the merits of the partly-decided claim. The quantum of the obligor's entire hhiability must be determined.
¶4 In short, the certified order is mot a judgment. Its obligation is not adjudged in a sum certain.14 Prejudgment interest differs from postjudgment interest. The latter need not stand reduced to, and be expressed in, a lump sum. It is a continuing obligation that runs at the statutory rate *143from the date of judgment until paid. The former, on the other hand, constitutes an integral part of the total adjudged lability that is recovered and stands in law as an item of damages owed for delayed satisfaction of an obligation on which it accrues.15
T5 The Bank's error in prematurely securing a § 994 certification (in advance of the judgment on the physician's claim) was the culprit responsible for the presently unfolded procedural tangle. Neither the three affected courts nor the two litigants involved timely discovered the infirmity occasioned by the prematurely, and hence impermissibly, certified order.
II
THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ISSUE NOW PRESSED ON REHEARING WAS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT ON ITS CERTIORARI REVIEW OF THE COCA OPINION. THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE BANK HAD FAILED TO PRESERVE IT FOR CORRECTIVE RELIEF BY TIMELY BRINGING A PETITION FOR CERTIORA-RI TO REVERSE COCA'S DENIAL OF THE BANKS CRITICAL MOTION IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE SUPPLEMENTAL PRONG OF ITS APPEAL FROM BECOMING FINALLY TERMINATED.
16 COCA's denial of the Bank's motion (for leave to supplement the record and to brief the prejudgment interest issue) was the functional equivalent of the supplemental petition's dismissal. The motion's denial terminated all proceedings for prosecution of issues tendered by that (second) petition in error. It effectively barred the Bank from proceeding further on the second prong of its appeal.16
T7 The Bank contends on rehearing that the court should have reviewed the dismissal as one of the issues standing before it on certiorari. We disagree The teachings of Hough v. Leonard 17 cannot be invoked here to preserve the COCA dismissal (of the second petition in error) for our certiorari scrutiny.18 Hough saves for sua sponte review-one that may be conducted sans cer-tiorari quest-only those issues that, though preserved for corrective relief on appeal, were left unaddressed by COCA. The issue we deal with here was affirmatively dealt with by COCA's post-opimon dismissal. It does not hence qualify for sua sponte review under the teachings of Hough.
T8 The Bank's sole claim to review of the dismissal is its eryptic statement in the response to the physician's certiorari petition. The statement calls the court's attention to what it references as the pending prejudgment-interest issue. That issue was then no longer pending. It was dead, having been finally extinguished by COCA's dismissal of the supplemental petition in error and by the Bank's failure timely to bring certiorari for review of that error. The review the Bank seeks today should have been sought by *144pressing the COCA error (in the dismissal) through its own certiorari quest.
¶9 Generally no relief can be granted from a nisi prius judgment to an appellee who did not counterappeal. But no counterappeal is necessary to argue that, in spite of errors committed at nisi prius, the judgment is nonetheless impervious to reversal because it is correct in result.19 A party who does not petition for certiorari is in virtually the same position as the appellee who stands sams counterappeal. Without its own certiorari petition, that party can advance only those arguments which would demonstrate the correctness of COCA's disposition.20 In short, the Bank may not sue-ceed in having us treat today as unaddressed the alleged COCA error in its dismissal of the Bank's supplemental petition in error. The prejudgment interest's quantum stood addressed by COCA as a tendered issue and rejected from consideration at the second-prong stage of the Bank's appeal.
IV
SUMMARY
¶10 COCA's post-opinion denial order dismissed that prong of the Bank's appeal which was sought to be prosecuted by supplemental petition in error. Hough v. Leonard will not preserve that dismissal for this court's sua sponte review as part of the physician-initiated certiorari. - The Bank's own certiorari petition was a conditio sine qua mon21 for obtaining review of COCA dismissal's correctness and for securing relief from its adverse effect upon the continued viability of the Bank's second appeal prong.22
{11 In short, the Bank's rehearing petition addresses itself to an issue that was not before this court in the physician-triggered certiorari proceeding. REHEARING DENIED.
112 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER and OPALA, JJ., concur.
{13 SUMMERS, J., dissents.
14 KAUGER and WINCHESTER, JJ., not participating.
T15BOUDREAU, J., disqualified.

. See the provisions of 12 O.S.Supp.1995 § 994 that govern certification of decided nisi prius claims sought to be reviewed in advance of judgment that disposes of all the claims in litigation.

. The appeal was commenced by the Bank's 14 August 1997 petition in error.

. The decision was certified on 15 July 1997 as a § 994 "judgment" on jury verdict which is ripe for immediate appellate review, f.e., for review to be commenced in advance of nisi prius decision on the other (yet unresolved) claims in the district court action.

. In multi-party/multi-claim cases, when one complete claim (or more) has been decided, but other claims stand unresolved, the court may advance the decided claim(s) for immediate review. 12 0.$.Supp.1995 § 994. See in this connection Nestle Food Company v. Crews, 2000 OK 58, ¶ 2, n. 2, ¶ 6, n. 12, 11 P.3d 205, 206-207; LCR, Inc. v. Linwood Properties, 1996 OK 73, ¶ 12, 918 P.2d 1388, 1392.

. The 15 July 1997 § 994 "judgment" is more accurately to be described as a § 994 certified order.

. The physician's 27 April 1998 nisi prius motion to determine the time period for the accrued prejudgment interest and its rate.

. The nisi prius 29 September 1998 order determining interest and costs.

. The Bank's 29 October 1998 supplemental petition in error.

. The 15 December 1998 COCA opinion.

. The Bank's 29 October 1998 motion.

. COCA's 4 January 1999 post-opinion order.

. By statutory definition, a "judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action." 12 § 681.

. - The 15 July 997 judgment on jury verdict.

. King v. Finnell, 1979 OK 155, 603 P.2d 754. There, in a mortgage foreclosure suit, the order tendered for review was held unappealable because it fell short of a judgment. Nisi prius failure to determine (a) the amount of damages and (b) the attorney's fee was held fatal to the order's attainment of judgment status. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tidwell, 1991 OK 119, ¶¶ 1-2, 820 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Opala, C.J., concurring in result).

. Prejudgment interest, when statutorily authorized, is an item of recovery that constitutes a part of the adjudged obligation. It is an element of the total liability adjudged. Fleet v. Sanguine, Ltd., 1993 OK 76, 854 P.2d 892, 899; Huff v. State, 1988 OK 118, 764 P.2d 183, 188.

. - An order that precludes a party from proceeding further in the case (or precludes it from obtaining the relief sought) terminates the case in the court in which it was brought. National Diversified Business Services, Inc. v. Corporate Financial Opportunities, Inc., 1997 OK 36, 946 P.2d 662, 668; Gilliland v. Chronic Pain Associates, Inc., 1995 OK 94, 904 P.2d 73, 76; Mayhue v. Mayhue, 1985 OK 68, ¶ 3 n. 4, 706 P.2d 890, 893; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26, ¶ 4 n. 1, 646 P.2d 601, 603; Centorp Corporation v. Gulf Prod. Corporation, 1938 OK 473, 83 P.2d 181, 185 syl.1.

. 1993 OK 112, 115, 867 P.2d 438, 445 (Hough teaches that the party victorious before COCA is entitled to this court's sua sponte review of all issues which, though properly preserved and briefed on appeal, were not addressed by the appellate court ).

. This case does not fit into the range of protection extended by Hough, supra note 17. By its supplemental petition in error, the Bank sought to preserve for appellate review the prejudgment interest's quantum. - After the Bank was unsuccessful on this addressed issue before COCA, it did not seek corrective relief by timely bringing a certiorari petition for reversal of COCA's dismissal of its appeal's supplemental prong. The Bank's oblique reference to the prejudgment interest issue in ifs response to the physician's petition for certiorari (on issues in the first prong of the appeal ) was insufficient to keep its second prong alive. This is so because the latter prong's dismissal was not followed by certiorari quest.

. Woolfolk v. Semrod, 1960 OK 98, 351 P.2d 742, 745; Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1261.

. Handy v. City of Lawton, 1992 OK 111, ¶ 4, 835 P.2d 870, 876.

. The phrase conditio sine qua non means an indispensable condition, an absolute prerequisite. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 4th ed., p. 1556.

. Today's belated recognition that the first prong of the Bank's appeal was prematurely brought does not require this court to vacate-as coram non judice-its 18 January 2000 opinion on cer-tiorari and to dismiss the appeal. For the meaning of the Latin phrase see Collins v. Mid-Continent Pipeline Co., 1999 OK 56, 6 P.3d 1050, 1053 n. 8. At a minimum, the COCA opinion of 15 December 1998 was entered here in excess rather than in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction; this court's power of certiorari review is firmly attached to every form of COCA's appellate cognizance. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. City Vending of Muskogee, Inc., 1992 OK 110, 835 P.2d 97, 104 (Opala, J., concurring in judgment); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct 1099, 1105, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). More importantly, this court's certiorari pronouncement grants to the appealing Bank no corrective relief from the erroneously certified 15 July 1997 nisi prius order. The terms of the latter order are left entirely undisturbed.