Court Opinion

ID: 9889291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-08 07:10:53.610054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:22.574799
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 3, 2023

                                      In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-22-00609-CR

                    JAMIE MICHAEL BROWN, Appellant
                                        V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 122nd District Court
                          Galveston County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 16-CR-2164

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Jamie Michael Brown appeals the revocation of his deferred-
adjudication community supervision. Following revocation, the trial court
adjudged appellant guilty of the first-degree felony of aggravated sexual assault of
a child and assessed punishment at imprisonment for eleven years. Tex. Pen. Code
Ann. 22.021(a)(2)(B). In two issues we construe as one, appellant contends that his
trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not object when a custodian of
records from the probation department testified from appellant’s probation file,
which was not in evidence, about violations of the terms of his deferred
community supervision. We affirm.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

      As part of his 2019 plea agreement with the State, appellant received
deferred-adjudication community supervision for ten years. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 42A.053(a)(1). Appellant’s community supervision was subject to
conditions, including reporting monthly to a supervision officer, attending sex
offender treatment until successfully discharged, performing 320 hours of
community service at a rate no fewer than sixteen hours a month, paying $60.00 a
month as a community supervision fee, paying $5.00 per month to the Sexual
Assault Program Fund, and paying $10 per substance abuse test to reimburse the
cost of drug/alcohol screening.

      In May 2020, the State filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt, alleging
that appellant had violated the conditions of his community supervision by failing
to (1) report to his supervision officer in April 2020; (2) complete sex offender
treatment, having been unsuccessfully discharged from it on April 21, 2020; (3)
perform community service at the specified rate; (4) pay his community
supervision fee, accruing an arrearage of $595.00; (5) pay the sexual assault
program fund; and (6) pay $10 of his drug/alcohol fee. Appellant pleaded not true
to the State’s allegations.

      The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt and
found the State’s allegations to be true. The trial court signed a judgment
adjudicating appellant guilty of the first-degree felony of aggravated sexual assault
of a child and sentenced appellant to eleven years imprisonment. This appeal
followed.

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                  II.       INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

      In two issues that we construe as one, appellant contends that his trial
counsel was ineffective because counsel did not object when a custodian of records
from the probation department testified from appellant’s probation file, which was
not in evidence, about violations of the terms of his deferred community
supervision. The State responds that appellant has not established that his counsel
acted deficiently or that appellant was prejudiced by admission of testimony from
the custodian of records.

      The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right
to reasonably effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). To prove a
claim of ineffective assistance an appellant must establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that (1) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
deficiency the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984); see Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808,
813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We analyze the prongs from Strickland in the order
best suited to review of appellant’s issue. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Ex parte
Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

      In considering an ineffective assistance claim, we indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional behavior and was motivated by sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994). To overcome this presumption, a claim of ineffective
assistance must be firmly demonstrated in the record. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814;
Pham v. State, 595 S.W.3d 769, (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019), aff’d,

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639 S.W.3d 708 (2022).

      A sound trial strategy may be imperfectly executed, but the right to effective
assistance of counsel does not entitle a defendant to errorless or perfect counsel.
Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “Isolated
instances in the record reflecting errors of omission or commission do not render
counsel’s performance ineffective, nor can ineffective assistance of counsel be
established by isolating one portion of trial counsel’s performance for
examination.” McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Counsel’s performance is judged by “the totality of the representation,” and
“judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” with every
effort made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. Robertson, 187 S.W.3d
at 483.

      At the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt, the State
called Benjamin Wilson, a court liaison officer with the Galveston County
Community Supervision and Corrections Department. Wilson was also the
custodian of records for the probation office. He testified that the department
maintains a file on each offender to document the facts of the case, the
probationer’s monthly meetings, treatments, drug testing, and “chronologicals,”
which are notes entered by probation officers about goals, probation requirements,
financial information, community service performed, and drug test results. The
documentation is extensive so that any probation officer assigned to the case can
supervise the probationer. Thus, although Wilson had not been one of the
appellant’s supervisors, he could check the conditions of appellant’s probation—
and whether appellant had met those conditions—from the file.

      The Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that probation department
records qualify as business records, provided that a proper predicate is laid. See

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Simmons v. State, 564 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Business records,
as records of regularly conducted activity, are exceptions to the hearsay rule if the
requisites of Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6) are met. Tex. R. Evid. 803(6). Once
this proper predicate is established, it is not error to allow a witness to testify from
the probation department records. See Simmons, 564 S.W.2d at 770; Canseco v.
State, 199 S.W.3d 437, 439–40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet ref’d).

      In this case, we need not determine whether the State established the proper
predicate for the probation records under Rule 803(6) or whether the performance
of appellant’s trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
relating to the witness’s use of the probation department records. Instead, we
address the second prong of the Strickland standard and conclude there is no
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s purported deficiency the result of the
proceeding would have been different. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

      In a hearing concerning revocation of deferred-adjudication community
supervision, proof of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation.
Anderson v. State, 621 S.W.2d 805, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). At the hearing on
the State’s motion to revoke, the State called a second witness, Norma Gamez-
Paquin, a licensed counselor who provided sex offender treatment to appellant. Ms.
Gamez-Paquin testified that sex offender treatment takes place once a week in a
structured, four-phase program, often over a period of years, until the sex offender
successfully completes the program. She first saw appellant on December 8, 2019,
in a group therapy session. However, appellant’s attendance at his sex offender
treatment was sporadic. Out of twenty group sessions, he missed eight. Generally,
he missed one session a month, but in March 2020, he missed two consecutive
sessions. Appellant’s last attendance was March 17, 2020, and he then stopped
attending. Ms. Gamez-Paquin also testified that appellant never progressed in his

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treatment, instead remaining in denial about his offense. A team that included Ms.
Gamez-Paquin decided to terminate appellant from the program for absences, lack
of progress, and his “complete denial.” On April 21, 2020, she co-signed a letter
addressed to appellant that he was “unsuccessfully discharged” from sex offender
treatment.

      The conditions of appellant’s deferred-adjudication community supervision
required him to attend sex offender treatment and comply with all program
guidelines “until successfully discharged.” Because Ms. Gamez-Paquin’s
testimony established a violation of the conditions of appellant’s community
supervision, her testimony alone provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to
grant the State’s motion to revoke. See Anderson, 621 S.W.2d at 805; cf. Shah v.
State, 414 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet ref’d.)
(stating it is well established that the testimony of a sole witness may constitute
legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction). Appellant has thus not met the
second prong of Strickland, that the result of the proceeding would have been
different but for his trial counsel’s purported errors regarding testimony from the
State’s first witness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

      We overrule appellant’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                        /s/       Margaret "Meg" Poissant
                                                  Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Poissant.
Do Not Publish—TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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