Court Opinion

ID: 9664867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:32:03.283332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.887486
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. The majority court, in my opinion, has made a grave mistake by its failure to recognize the appellant waived or concurred in the delay of his trial. The pertinent dates and narrated events are as follows: 10/18/82 Appellant was charged with first degree murder. 4/18/84 On this date, the appellant’s eighteen-month speedy trial period expired. During this period, neither the state nor appellant had moved for any continuances; nor did appellant file a motion to dismiss for a delay. 7/19/84 Instead, appellant, on this date, moved for a continuance, stating he had a witness who would be unavailable at the trial which had been set for 8/13/84. The trial court granted appellant’s motion, resetting the trial on 11 / 12/84. 10/29/84 Appellant again asked for a continuance and received it on the grounds that he obtained a new attorney who needed time to prepare for trial. The trial court reset the trial once again on appellant’s motion, this time to be heard on 4/8/85. 11/19/84 On this date, appellant filed a motion for dismissal, alleging for the first time that the state denied him a speedy trial. In Breedlove v. State, 225 Ark. 170, 280 S.W.2d 224 (1955), this court, in construing our prior speedy trial law, held that such law is not applicable where the delay was due to the application of the accused or where the accused concurred in the delay. See also Williams v. State, 210 Ark. 402, 196 S.W.2d 751 (1946) (wherein the court upheld the trial court’s overruling the defendant’s motion to discharge because she neither demanded a trial nor resisted its postponement). Here, for whatever reasons best known to appellant, he clearly acquiesced in the state’s delay in trying his case before the eighteen-month limitation expired on April 18,1984. Based upon his July 19,1984 motion to continue the first trial set on August 13,1984, he most likely was not ready to go to trial. In fact, appellant was not ready for trial at the second trial setting on November 12,1984. In my mind, appellant concurred throughout the delay until he moved for dismissal on November 19,1984. If he had been serious about a speedy trial, appellant should have raised his dismissal motion at the first opportunity after the eighteen-month limitation period ended on April 18, 1984, and before the trial date, August 13, 1984. In conclusion, I believe the majority’s reliance upon the court of appeals’ case of Garrison v. State, 270 Ark. 426, 605 S.W.2d 467 (Ark. App. 1980), is wrong. That court, and now this court, adopts a 1959 California court of appeals’ decision that, in effect, states that if a defendant can waive his speedy trial right, he must do so prior to when the limitation period ends. The California court reasoned that if such were not the rule, there would be no limitation of time in which one charged with a crime could be brought to trial, although the statutory time limit had long since expired. How that court’s rationale applies here, I fail to understand. Here, appellant’s case would have come to trial — even ended perhaps — if he had presented a meritorious motion to dismiss after the eighteen-month period had expired. Instead of asserting his right to a speedy trial, he requested and received two continuances after the eighteen-month period ended. I am unwilling to reward his lack of diligence by giving him the benefit of our speedy trial laws. Therefore, I dissent. Hickman and Hays, JJ., join in this dissent.