Court Opinion

ID: 9753977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:36:52.856726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:45.944616
License: Public Domain

WICKERSHAM, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent:
The facts of this case are accurately stated by President Judge Dale F. Shughart of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County as follows:
On September 14, 1977, the defendant, Russell Melvin Shoats, and several other inmates took over a cell block of the Huntingdon State Correctional Institution as part of an attempt to escape, from prison. Several of the institution guards were injured during the episode. After the takeover was complete and the cell block secured, the defendant and three other, inmates attempted their escape from the prison as planned. Two of the inmates were captured almost immediately and a third was killed during the escape. The defendant, however, was able to avoid the authorities and remained at-large until his capture on October 10, 1977.
On September 26, 1977, while the defendant was a fugitive, he entered the home of Dale Rhone, a guard at the prison, and forced him and his wife, Marlene, and their five-year-old son, Eric to drive him in their car to a location outside of Cokesburg, Pennsylvania, where the defendant ordered Mrs. Rhone, who was driving the car, to pull over to the side of the road. At that point the car could not be restarted forcing the defendant to abandon it along the side of the road. The Rhones were then ordered into the woods, tied to a tree, and left by the defendant. *243They remained at that location for approximately three and one-half hours before they were able to free themselves and find help.
An application for change of venue was granted, and the above case was assigned to this county for trial by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On October 25, 1978, after a three day trial, the defendant was found guilty by a jury of escape, robbery, kidnapping, and simple assault as the result of his participation in the escape and subsequent events. The defendant was acqui[t]ted of the charge of aggravated assault by a life prisoner.
Lower court opinion en banc dated March 2, 1979 at 1-2.
The majority holds that trial counsel was ineffective for neglecting to object to the court’s failure to instruct the jurors that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving each and every element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority finds, however, as I do, that the court carefully instructed the jurors that in order to find appellant guilty they had to be satisfied that the Commonwealth established that guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I agree with appellee’s analysis of this aspect of President Judge Shughart’s charge to the jury.
. . . the charge of the trial judge by implication advised the jury of its duty vis a vis each element of each offense, and the jury by its verdict demonstrated that it understood its function.
Initially, President Judge Shug[h]art reviewed each of the elements of each of the charges with the jury defining for them the various terms, and making reference to the testimony as it related to the elements and definitions. He also defined for the jury the lesser included offense of simple assault and unlawful restraint. (Tr. pp. 292-296). Judge Shug[h]art defined reasonable doubt and explained the Commonwealth’s burden as to the charges in general. (Tr. pp. 299-300)
For the purposes of this argument, the significant portion of the charge appears on pages 304 through 306 of the Transcript. Again the Court below broke down each *244element of each offense and instructed the jury as to their function. Implicit in these instructions is the legal concept that in order to convict on a particular charge, guilt beyond a reasonable doubts [sic] must be established by the Commonwealth as to each element.
Finally, the jury in this case reduced the offense of assault by life prisoner (aggravated assault) to simple assault. Obviously, the jury concluded that the Commonwealth had failed to meet its burden as to some element of the crime of aggravated assault. The verdict reflected] an understanding by the jury of the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.
Appellee’s Brief at 8.
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 472 Pa. 485, 372 A.2d 794 (1977) cited by the majority is distinguishable on its facts. In Bishop defense counsel specifically requested an additional charge relating to “each and every element” of the offenses, and the trial judge refused.
Bishop also stands for the following:
It is beyond cavil that an accused in a criminal case is clothed with a presumption of innocence and that the burden of proof in establishing guilt rests with the Commonwealth. The quantum of proof necessary to satisfy this burden, which never shifts from the Commonwealth to the accused, is such that the fact-finder must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441 (1959) ....
In determining the adequacy of the instructions to the jury on the relevant legal principles the charge must be read as a whole. Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 459 Pa. 129, 327 A.2d 118 (1974); Commonwealth v. Fell, 453 Pa. 531, 309 A.2d 417 (1973); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970). In the instant case the court informed the jury several times of the presumption of innocence and burden of the Commonwealth to prove guilt *245beyond a reasonable doubt. These were accurate statements of the law. . . .
Id., 472 Pa. at 489-490, 372 A.2d at 796.
In Commonwealth v. Lesher, 473 Pa. 141 at 146, 373 A.2d 1088 at 1091 (1977), the supreme court said:
It is well-established, however, that in charging the jury the trial court is free to use its own form of expression; the only issue is whether the area is adequately, accurately and clearly presented to the jury. Commonwealth v. McComb, 462 Pa. 504, 341 A.2d 496 (1975). Also, in evaluating a challenge to the correctness of instructions to the jury, the charge must be read and considered in its entirety and it is the general effect of the charge that controls....
Instantly, the charge as given was correct and adequate. If defense trial counsel wanted more specifics he could have so requested—but he did not. Counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to object to a charge that was correct and adequate.