Court Opinion

ID: 9383822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 14:04:50.288883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.497853
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0011-MR

RYAN MCCOY AND
SARAH MOYER                                                       APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE LUCY ANNE VANMETER, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CI-03242

THE TEN TEN GROUP, LLC, D/B/A
WILSON’S GROCERY; CORLAND
MAPLE; AND HANNAH MAPLE                                             APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: This is an appeal of a Fayette Circuit Court order dismissing

employees’ claims – before discovery – of wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy, and defamation.
                                        FACTS

             The circuit court dismissed the complaint of Appellants, Sarah Moyer

(“Sarah”) and Ryan McCoy (“Ryan”), pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil

Procedure (“CR”) 12.02(f) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. For purposes of this appeal, we must accept as true the employees’

factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Pike v.

George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Ky. 1968). Insomuch, we shall interpret the facts in

a fashion most favorable to Ryan and Sarah and accept the material facts in the

complaint as true. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010).

             Appellee Wilson’s Grocery is a small shop offering groceries and

food preparation services. At the relevant time period, there were only 10 non-

management employees. Appellees Corland Maple (“Corland”) and Hannah

Maple (“Hannah,” collectively, the “Maples”) were the principals in the business,

but did not handle the day-to-day operations. Ryan and Sarah started their

employment with Wilson’s Grocery in the summer of 2019 and remained in good

standing at the store until the days prior to their termination.

             During the COVID-19 pandemic, business increased at Wilson’s

Grocery, but pandemic-specific health and safety protocols for the employees were

either implemented slowly or not at all. Employees used personal funds to

purchase personal protective equipment and stayed after their paid, working hours

                                          -2-
to sanitize the store. Employees requested hazard pay and increased safety

protocols, but these were initially denied by the Maples.

             On March 30, 2020, Ryan organized a non-management staff meeting

to discuss requesting higher hourly pay and additional health and safety measures.

After the discussion, Ryan drafted a letter – which seven of the 10 non-

management staff signed – and Ryan and Sarah emailed the letter to the Maples.

Upon receipt, the Maples scheduled an all-employee meeting for April 2, 2020.

             On April 1, 2020, the Maples informed the staff, via email, of

possible, upcoming layoffs. The next day, at the April 2 meeting, Corland Maples

read the staff letter aloud, acknowledged the requests, and invited comments.

Ryan and Sarah voiced concern about the Maples’ perceived lack of concern for

workers’ safety and again requested hazard pay. Ryan and Sarah were the only

employees to speak at that meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Maples

again denied the request for hazard pay, and it is unclear what additional health and

safety methods were agreed upon.

             On April 3, 2020, Ryan filed a complaint with the National Labor

Relations Board, claiming that the Maples threatened layoffs in retaliation for

                                         -3-
requesting hazard pay.1 Also that day, Ryan began feeling ill and informed the

Maples he needed to take unpaid leave to monitor symptoms.

               On April 4, 2020, Ryan and Sarah received emails from the Maples

terminating their employment. The emails claimed the decision was an attempt to

“scale back” the pandemic workforce and was not due to their conduct.2 Wilson’s

Grocery also terminated two other employees around that time.

               On April 5, 2020, Wilson’s Grocery posted on their Instagram:

               We did not fire half our staff. We accommodated two staff
               members that were uncomfortable and at risk so that they
               could continue to receive compensation during this time
               of isolation. We did choose to eliminate a few who had
               bullied our team and made staff and customers alike feel
               uncomfortable.

               Elsewhere on the store’s Instagram page, a person who identified

herself as a parent of a Wilson’s Grocery employee wrote that there was a “petition

demanding a pay raise that would have bankrupted the business[.]” Additionally,

the Maples allegedly stated to at least one other unidentified person that Ryan and

Sarah had been “fired,” described them as “bitter,” and said they were to blame for

another employee’s discharge.

1
 It is not clear from the record what resulted from that complaint, nor whether that or other
administrative remedies were exhausted.
2
 However, according to the complaint, on April 7, Hannah called Sarah and told her she was laid
off so she could collect unemployment, and because “Ryan was experiencing COVID symptoms,
and you cohabitate with him, so we can’t have you in the store.”

                                               -4-
                Ryan and Sarah then filed a complaint alleging two counts of

wrongful termination in violation of public policy and one count of defamation.

Wilson’s Grocery filed a motion to dismiss. The Fayette Circuit Court granted the

motion, dismissing the complaint before discovery. Ryan and Sarah appealed.

                           I.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

                A motion to dismiss is a pure question of law; therefore, a reviewing

court owes no deference to the circuit court’s determination. Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7.

Instead, we review the issue de novo. Id. CR 12.02(f) is designed to test the

sufficiency of a complaint. Pike, 434 S.W.2d at 627. It is proper to grant a

CR 12.02(f) motion to dismiss if “it appears the pleading party would not be

entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his

claim. . . . Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the

complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?” James v.

Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

                                   II.   ANALYSIS

                On appeal, Ryan and Sarah assert the circuit court erred in dismissing

their two wrongful termination claims and one defamation claim. We will discuss

each in turn.

                                           -5-
A. Wrongful Termination

             Under Kentucky law, an employer may ordinarily “discharge his at-

will employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that some might view as

morally indefensible.” Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983) (citation omitted). However, a narrow

exception is applicable when the discharge was “contrary to a fundamental and

well-defined public policy as evidenced by [an] existing . . . constitutional or

statutory provision.” Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985) (citation

omitted); see also Marshall v. Montaplast of N. Am., Inc., 575 S.W.3d 650, 652

(Ky. 2019) (emphasis added).

             Only three circumstances exist in which a discharge will
             be actionable as contrary to public policy: (1) when there
             are “explicit legislative statements prohibiting the
             discharge,” (2) when “the alleged reason for the discharge
             . . . was the employee’s failure or refusal to violate a law
             in the course of employment,” or (3) when “the reason for
             the discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right
             conferred by well-established legislative enactment.” Hill
             v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412, 422 (Ky.
             2010) (quoting Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 402).

Id. Additionally, “the public policy involved must have an employment-related

nexus.” Id. (citing Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 402).

             Here, Ryan and Sarah do not contest the at-will nature of their

employment. They assert they were discharged because of their “exercise of a

right conferred by well-established legislative enactment,” which was in

                                          -6-
contravention of public policy. They contend (i) Kentucky Revised Statute

(“KRS”) Chapter 338 (“KOSHA”) provides the public policy of protecting

Kentucky employees’ right to “oppose unsafe workplaces”; and, (ii) KRS 39A

(“Governor’s Emergency Powers”) provides the public policy of protecting a

workers’ right to “try to secure [an employer’s] compliance with valid emergency

orders of the government in times of community danger.”

             i. KOSHA (KRS Chapter 338)

             Ryan and Sarah argue that KOSHA – Kentucky’s Occupational Safety

and Health Employees Act – protects employees from retaliation for opposing

unsafe workplaces. We agree, but those protections are not unlimited.

             KOSHA is a fundamental and well-defined public policy. KOSHA,

by its own words, was enacted to promote the safety, health, and general welfare of

working Kentuckians. KRS 338.011. The statute mandates employers to furnish a

place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing or are

likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees. KRS 338.031.

Further, the statute confers a right to employees to request the commissioner to

conduct an inspection of perceived unsafe or unhealthy work conditions. KRS

338.121(1). KOSHA explicitly prohibits an employee’s discharge for filing a

                                        -7-
complaint or instituting legal proceedings related to the statute. KRS

338.121(3)(a).3

               Here, the letter Ryan and Sarah sent to the Maples could qualify as a

“complaint” under KOSHA. In 2016, our Kentucky Supreme Court found that an

employee-to-employer letter complaining about unsafe work conditions could

reasonably be interpreted as a “complaint” under KOSHA. Ky. Occupational

Safety & Health Review Comm’n v. Estill Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 503 S.W.3d 924, 930

(Ky. 2016). However, that situation involved an employee seeking to utilize the

rights and remedies within KOSHA. Here, it is unclear from the record if Ryan

and Sarah initiated any KOSHA steps prior to pursuing their wrongful termination

claim. It is likely they did not, considering they are arguing that “[w]orkers who

face public health and safety violations in the workplace are not relegated to filing

complaints with [KOSHA] and hoping for the best.” Conversely, Wilson’s

Grocery argues that Ryan and Sarah are bound by the rights and remedies within

KOSHA, and that KOSHA cannot be the statutory underpinning for a wrongful

termination claim.4

3
  KRS 338.121(3)(a) states, “No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or herself
or others of any right afforded by this chapter[.]”
4
 Wilson’s Grocery relies on Benningfield v. Pettit Environmental, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 567 (Ky.
App. 2005), an opinion built upon Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d 399. However, we will focus our analysis

                                                 -8-
              In 1985, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Grzyb v. Evans, “explained

the circumstances in which the doctrine of preemption would block the creation of

a common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” Hill,

327 S.W.3d at 421. In Grzyb, a hospital employee filed suit against his hospital

employer alleging wrongful discharge because he fraternized with a female

hospital employee. Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 400. The employee asserted a claim for

(1) common law wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (2) violation

of his civil rights under KRS 344.040 – both based on sexual discrimination. Id.

Ultimately, our Supreme Court found that Evan’s common law wrongful discharge

claim was preempted by the statutory remedies afforded under KRS Chapter 344

for civil rights violations. Id. at 401. In so finding, the Court stated, “[w]here the

statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil [remedies] available to

the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the

statute.” Id. In 2010, our Supreme Court further explained this rule and Grzyb’s

application of the doctrine of preemption:

              Preemption [in Grzyb] was based on the fact that his sex
              discrimination claim was based on the same law as his
              wrongful discharge claim. Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401-402.
              The only “fundamental and well-defined public policy”
              that Evans could articulate to meet the requirement for a
              wrongful discharge claim was the very same public policy

on the root case (Grzyb v. Evans) and apply the Kentucky Supreme Court’s more recent
interpretation of Grzyb in Hill, 327 S.W.3d 412.

                                             -9-
             embodied in the civil rights statutes of KRS Chapter 344.

Hill, 327 S.W.3d at 421.

             The crux of the matter in Grzyb was the fact that both of his claims

depended upon the same statutory language (KRS Chapter 344, sexual

discrimination) and that statute proved a remedy for a specific unlawful act. In

Hill, the Court clarified that “[w]hen preemption is properly applied, the common

law claim is subsumed and eliminated by the overriding statutory scheme, and the

remedy, if there is to be one, may only be found under the statute.” 327 S.W.3d at

423 n.8. The statute that Ryan and Sarah’s wrongful discharge claim is built upon

(KOSHA) already has a remedy (to file a complaint with the commission, appeal

to the commissioner, etc.), so a common law wrongful termination claim on those

same grounds is preempted by the legislature’s development of the remedy in the

statute. Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed by the circuit court, and

we affirm.

             ii. Governor’s Emergency Powers (KRS Chapter 39A)

             Ryan and Sarah argue the Governor’s emergency orders permit

employees to “oppose flagrant violations of emergency orders designed to defend

health and safety.” They argue that although executive orders are not statutory or

constitutional provisions, the Governor’s emergency orders should be given the

full effect of the law, and we should treat the orders, for purposes of this review,

                                         -10-
the same as a statutory or constitutional provision. We agree, but still must affirm

the circuit court on this issue.

                 On March 6, 2020, the Governor of Kentucky signed Executive Order

2020-215, declaring a state of emergency in the Commonwealth due to the

COVID-19 global pandemic. Throughout the rest of 2020, additional executive

orders and emergency regulations were issued to address the public health and

safety issues created by the disease. KRS 39A.100 authorizes the Governor to

declare such a state of emergency, and “KRS 39A.180 mandates that all

emergency orders and administrative regulations issued by the Governor or any

state agency shall have the full force of law[.]” Beshear v. Acree, 615 S.W.3d 780,

787 (Ky. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                 Pursuant to the authority in Executive Order 2020-215, the

Department of Public Health issued an order on March 17, 2020, mandating

public-facing businesses that could not comply with CDC5 social distancing

guidelines to cease all in-person operations. Businesses that provided food,

grocery, and consumer goods could remain open, but needed to practice CDC

guidelines including, but not limited to, “ensuring employees practice appropriate

hygiene measures, including regular, thorough handwashing; ensuring that

5
    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

                                                  -11-
employees who are sick remain home; and regularly cleaning and disinfecting

frequently touched objects and surfaces.”

                 Executive Order 2020-246, signed on March 22, 2020, stated that the

Governor was empowered to exercise powers necessary to promote and secure the

safety and protection of Kentuckians. The Amicus Curiae brief filed by the

Kentucky Equal Justice Center6 argued that these Executive Orders provided

employees the “right to be protected, ‘to the fullest extent practicable,’ by

prescribed measures to slow the spread of COVID-19.”

                 We agree that the Governor’s orders had7 the “full force of the law.”

Beshear v. Acree, 615 S.W.3d at 787. However, Ryan and Sarah needed to (1)

point to an explicit statement in the Governor’s orders that prohibited their

discharge; (2) show that their discharge was for a failure or refusal to violate the

Governor’s orders in the course of employment; or (3) demonstrate that their

discharge was due to their exercise of a right conferred by the Governor’s

emergency orders. We can easily dismiss the first two possibilities: Ryan and

Sarah did not (1) point to any explicit statement in the Governor’s orders

prohibiting their discharge, nor (2) were they discharged for failing or refusing to

6
    The Kentucky Equal Justice Center filed an Amicus Curiae appellate brief on this issue alone.
7
 The legislature has since revoked some of the Governor’s powers; however, we apply the law
as it was written at the relevant time.

                                                -12-
violate the Governor’s orders. They admit that the Governor’s orders “need[] to

confer rights on employees or seek to protect the public in some way that relates to

employment,” but they needed to show more than just the existence of an

employment-related nexus. They needed to show that their discharge was due to

their exercise of a right conferred by the Governor’s emergency orders.

             Ryan and Sarah argue that the hygiene and transmission concerns that

they brought to the attention of Wilson’s Grocery were the same rights conferred

by the executive orders. They argue that because Wilson’s Grocery had not

implemented safe systems in the grocery store and food preparation setting, they

had a right to report those concerns to their employer. “The workplace was not

safe for [Ryan and Sarah] because of [those hygiene and safety failures], nor was it

safe for any of [Ryan and Sarah’s] co-workers or the customers they served.”

However, while we certainly disapprove of firing of employees merely for voicing

concerns about health and safety, we cannot find a right where none is conferred.

See Marshall, 575 S.W.3d at 655.

             In Marshall, an employee accurately informed some of her coworkers

that one of their supervisors was a registered sex offender. Id. at 651. Shortly

thereafter, the employee was discharged and subsequently filed a complaint

alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Id. The employee

claimed that the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act established a public

                                        -13-
policy that the sex offender registry should be open and accessible to everyone. Id.

However, the trial court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim; this Court affirmed the decision, as did our Supreme Court.

             In Marshall, our Supreme Court found that (a) the objective of the

Sex Offender Registration Act was to protect the public; (b) information from the

sex offender registry must be publicly available and publicly disseminated; and (c)

the Act provides immunity from criminal and civil liability for anyone who

disseminates information from the registry in good faith. Id. at 655. Yet despite

this, the Court concluded that the Act did not create a right to engage in an act. Id.

“The statute must make clear that it intends to protect employees in their

employment situation. As much as we may wish to, this Court cannot, by judicial

fiat, insert that right into the statutory scheme.” Id. at 656.

             Similarly, here, we cannot find an “explicit right” in the Governor’s

orders – for Ryan and Sarah to challenge Wilson’s Grocery’s handling of health

and safety regulations – sufficient to satisfy the narrow public policy exception of

the terminable-at-will doctrine. Ryan and Sarah were not fired for exercising a

right conferred by the Governor’s executive orders (or well-established legislative

enactment). Therefore, Ryan and Sarah cannot establish a wrongful termination

claim in violation of a public policy that created a specific right under KRS

                                          -14-
Chapter 39A. Thus, we need not discuss the existence of an employment nexus.

Again, we must affirm.

B. Defamation

              The requisite elements of defamation are: (1) false and defamatory

language,8 (2) about the plaintiff, (3) which is published to a third party, and (4)

which causes injury to reputation. Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, 627

S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. App. 1981). “Statements classified as defamatory per se

include those which attribute to someone a criminal offense, a loathsome disease,

serious sexual misconduct, or conduct which is incompatible with his business,

trade, profession, or office.” Gilliam v. Pikeville United Methodist Hosp. of Ky.,

Inc., 215 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Ky. App. 2006) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Such statements must tend to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, ridicule or

contempt or disgrace, or induce such an evil opinion of the plaintiff as to deprive

him of friendship. Id. at 61. Whether an alleged statement constitutes defamation

per se is a matter of law. Columbia Sussex, 627 S.W.2d at 274.

              Ryan and Sarah argue that the Appellees “engaged in . . . an extensive

propaganda campaign to discredit and harm” them. They asserted that the

8
  We use “defamation” throughout this Opinion to include slander (oral defamation) and libel
(written defamation). “Generally speaking, defamation is simply a claim for injury to one’s
reputation.” Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276, 281 n.7 (Ky. 2014).

                                             -15-
statements were (1) a written statement posted on Wilson’s Grocery’s Instagram

page; and (2) spoken statements by the Maples:9

              Statement 1 (written social media post): “We did not fire
              half our staff. We accommodated two staff members that
              were uncomfortable and at risk so that they could continue
              to receive compensation during this time of isolation. We
              did choose to eliminate a few who had bullied our team
              and made staff and customers alike feel uncomfortable.”

              Statement 2 (verbal statement): the Maples stated to at
              least one unidentified person that Ryan and Sarah had been
              “fired,” described them as “bitter,” and represented that
              they had caused another employee’s discharge.

              Here, Ryan and Sarah argued that these statements resulted in an

actionable claim for defamation per se, contending that the statements are false,

damage their reputation, and challenge their fitness to perform their job. They

admit that they were not specifically identified in the written statement, but they

contend the statement complained of (“We did choose to eliminate a few who had

bullied our team and made staff and customers alike feel uncomfortable.”) can be

reasonably understood to be about them. However, the complaint also asserted

that they were told by the Maples that they were not fired but were laid off so they

could collect unemployment, which was also part of the post above. The

complaint confirms that other employees were let go as well.

9
  Ryan and Sarah argue a third statement was allegedly defamatory, but they admit it was written
by a “parent of an unidentified employee” of Wilson’s Grocery, not a party to this appeal nor a
representative of Wilson’s Grocery, and therefore not relevant to our review.

                                             -16-
             Thus, we first question whether Ryan and Sarah were sufficiently

identified for purposes of establishing defamation per se. We recognize that

Wilson’s Grocery is a small local shop and that friends and acquaintances familiar

with the incident might have reasonably understood it to have been about Ryan and

Sarah (even before Sarah’s own social media explanation). However, it is not clear

to this Court that a reader would have known if they were the staff accommodated

or if they were among the “few” who “bullied” the team. Still, the circuit court did

consider the allegations in the light most favorable to them, and even “assuming

that the statement was understood to be about Ryan and Sarah”, did not find it to

be false and defamatory per se.

             “A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form

of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the

allegation of undisclosed defamatory fact as the basis for the opinion.” Yancey v.

Hamilton, 786 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Ky. 1989), citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 566 (1977)).

             The issue is whether the statements are false and tend to injure one in

his reputation or expose him to public hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy, or shame.

Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, 151 S. W.3d 781, 795 (Ky. 2004), overruled on other

grounds by Toler, 458 S.W.3d 276. Generally, “[f]alse allegations of unfitness to

perform a job are per se defamatory.” Estepp v. Johnson Cnty. Newspapers, Inc.,

                                         -17-
578 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Ky. App. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). However, it is not defamatory to simply state someone was “fired.” Id.

at 744-45 (citation omitted).10 Stating that someone was discharged for drinking or

for theft is far different than describing an employee as bitter or a bully as the case

law illustrates.

                  We agree with the circuit court that those comments are more in the

nature of opinion that does not rise to the level of defamation per se. In Desai v.

Charter Communications, LLC, 381 F. Supp. 3d 774, 784 (W.D. Ky. 2019), a

federal court applying Kentucky law was faced with an employer who attributed a

theft of printers to certain employees. The Court reviewed Kentucky case law and

noted that certain types of statements – including false accusations of theft – are

presumed to have damaged the plaintiffs’ reputations, and thus no proof of injury

resulting from such statements is required: they are “actionable per se.” Similarly,

10
     Estepp, 578 S.W.3d at 745, explains:

       [D]efamation has been found in our Kentucky cases in which a statement of discharge
       was combined with an imputation of unfitness. In Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
       Ingle, 229 Ky. 578, 17 S.W.2d 709, 710 (1929), “[t]he words written on the blackboard,
       ‘Ingle discharged for drinking,’ in their ordinary acceptance mean that he was unfit for
       his occupation by reason of his indulgence in drinking.” The Court clarified that
       publication of those words was libelous per se because “they impute unfitness to perform
       the duties of an office or employment, or . . . prejudice a person in his profession or trade”
       by “not only stat[ing] the fact of plaintiff’s discharge, but the reason for it.” Similarly, in
       McCauley v. Elrod, 16 Ky.L.Rptr. 291, 27 S.W. 867, 868 (Ky. 1894), the Court held that
       the statement “I discharged Elrod for stealing,” was actionable.

                                                   -18-
in Stringer v. 151 S.W.3d at 793, the terminated employees alleged that they were

falsely painted as thieves.

             In contrast, however, more ambiguous statements of opinion “require

evidence of pecuniary loss arising from the use thereof”; and affirmative proof of

injury that is actionable without any development of extrinsic facts or

circumstances. Desai, 381 F.Supp. 3d at 785. For example, we deemed

ambiguous and opinion language to be unactionable in Foster v. Jennie Stuart

Medical Center, Inc., 435 S.W.3d 629 (Ky. App. 2013), when two nurses were

terminated and a publication was made that their termination was in the “best

interests of the institution.” The allegations of someone bullying another, or being

bitter, even if proven, simply do not rise to the level required to impute unfitness

for their profession and are mere opinion statements requiring affirmative proof of

injury. There was no such evidence or claim contained within the complaint in this

case.

             In summary, the statements complained of are both true (they were

fired) and are opinion statements that are incapable of being proven objectively

incorrect, so they are not defamatory per se. Even if the facts alleged in the

complaint could be proved, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief. James v.

Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App. 2002). Thus, on this claim as well,

dismissal was not in error.

                                         -19-
                                  CONCLUSION

            The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is AFFIRMED as to all

counts.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                 BRIEF FOR APPELLEES THE TEN
                                       TEN GROUP, LLC, D/B/A
Robyn Smith                            WILSON’S GROCERY; CORLAND
Adam Johnson                           MAPLE; AND HANNAH MAPLE:
Louisville, Kentucky
                                       Robert L. Abell
                                       Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE FOR
KENTUCKY EQUAL JUSTICE
CENTER:

John S. Friend
McKenzie Cantrell
Louisville, Kentucky

                                     -20-