Court Opinion

ID: 9471668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:38:16.963614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:31.562116
License: Public Domain

BONSAL, District Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
In granting Mariani’s motion for acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), the trial judge stated:
The Court has reviewed the evidence presented against Mariani as required, “in a light most favorable to the government and ‘not in isolation but in conjunction’ ”. United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 at 321 (2d Cir.1983) quoting, United States v. Geany [sic], 417 F.2d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028, 90 S.Ct. 1276, 25 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). I am nevertheless unable to say that a jury might reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mariani willfully became a member of the conspiracy.
The trial judge had properly instructed the jury that “In determining whether a defendant was a member of an alleged conspiracy ... the jury should consider only that evidence, if any, pertaining to his own acts and statements.” The jury did not follow this instruction, perhaps because of its findings with respect to the drug counts in which Mariani was not named, and the trial judge stated:
After reviewing the evidence in a light favorable to the government, the Court finds that the evidence of Mariani’s participation in an agreement to steal money from the federal government is simply too meager for a reasonable juror to find Mariani guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
I find nothing to indicate that the trial judge’s conclusion was erroneous. He had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to consider the evidence presented in the course of the trial. The effect of a *867reversal will mean only that Mariani may appeal his conviction. In the interest of judicial economy, I would prefer to see the proceeding ended now.
Accordingly, I would affirm.