Court Opinion

ID: 9604319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:19:50.081898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:21.142612
License: Public Domain

Winborne, C. J.
Defendant appellant renews in this Court his demurrer ore tenus to the complaint of the plaintiff. It, like the demurrers filed in Superior Court, was upon the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant for actionable negligence.
For this purpose the truth of the allegations contained in the complaint is admitted, and “ordinarily relevant inferences of fact necessarily deducible therefrom are also admitted. But the principle does not extend to admissions of conclusions or inferences of law.” Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N.C. 517, 142 S.E. 761. See among many other cases Hollifield v. Everhart, 237 N.C. 313, 74 S.E. 2d 706; McLaney v. Motor Freight, Inc., 236 N.C. 714, 74 S.E. 2d 36, and cases cited.
*71Also it is provided by statute, G.S. 1-151, that “in the construction of a pleading for the purpose of determining its effect its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” And the decisions of this Court interpreting and applying the provisions of this statute require that every reasonable intendment must be in favor of the pleader. The pleading must be fatally defective before it will be rejected as insufficient. See Ins. Co. v. McCraw, 215 N.C. 105, 1 S.E. 2d 369, and cases there cited.
In the light of the provisions of the statute, as so interpreted and applied, admitting the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, this Court is constrained to conclude as a matter of law that the allegations in respect to defendant are fatally defective upon the ground on which the demurrers are predicated, that is, it affirmatively appears upon the face of the complaint that the injury of which plaintiff complains was, as stated by Stacy, C. J., in Smith v. Sink, 211 N.C. 725, 192 S.E. 108, “independently and proximately produced by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of an outside agency or responsible third person,” to wit, Dock Richardson. See McLaney v. Motor Freight Inc., supra, and cases cited.
The facts alleged show that defendant was traveling at a speed of 35 miles per hour, when the car driven by Dock Richardson suddenly appeared in front of defendant on defendant’s right side of the road. Under such circumstances, as contended by appellant in brief filed in this Court, defendant was “confronted with the choice of meeting the Richardson car head-on or turning to his left in the hope of avoiding a head-on collision.” Compare Henderson v. Henderson, 239 N.C. 487, 80 S.E. 2d 383. Indeed the allegations present a factual ■ situation similar to that in Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E. 2d 337, where Barnhill, C. J., writing for the Court declared: “That the bus driver, when he saw the automobile enter the highway just ahead of him, cut his bus to the left and crossed the center line cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be held an act of negligence. It is a human instinct when a collision is impending between two vehicles to turn or cut away from the other vehicle. The evidence here discloses that it was done in an effort to avoid the collision. There is no circumstance tending to show that it was other than what a man of reasonable prudence would have done.”
While it is true that it is set forth in the complaint that the defendant was in the act of turning in his driveway at the time of the collision, and had carelessly, negligently and without proper lookout and due caution driven over on the wrong side of the road causing and bringing about the collision and damages of which complaint is made, this is no more than a conclusion of the pleader and is negatived by the facts alleged immediately prior thereto in the same paragraph. *72The two allegations cannot be reconciled. This brings the case within the principle set forth in Lindley v. Yeatman, 242 N.C. 145, 87 S.E. 2d 5, that is, that “Where in stating a single cause of action the complaint alleges two repugnant statements of fact, the repugnant allegations destroy and neutralize each other, and where, with the repugnant allegations thus eliminated, the remaining averments are insufficient to state a cause of action, demurrer will lie.” See McIntosh, N. C. Practice & Procedure, Section 353; 21 Am. Jur., Pleading, Section 221.
Hence for error in overruling demurrers ore tenue the judgment from which appeal is taken is
Reversed.