Court Opinion

ID: 9957268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 21:05:58.141794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.342718
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 220168-U

                                   Order filed April 3, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )       of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )       Kankakee County, Illinois
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )       Appeal No. 3-22-0168
             v.                                        )       Circuit No. 19-CF-693
                                                       )
      THOMAS A. REBMANN JR.,                           )       Honorable
                                                       )       William S. Dickenson,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.
            Presiding Justice McDade specially concurred.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance at trial.

¶2          Defendant, Thomas A. Rebmann Jr., appeals from his convictions for aggravated

     discharge of a firearm, arguing that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance where he

     abandoned a potentially meritorious claim of self-defense and failed to object to a key witness’s

     prior statements. We affirm.
¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4          On October 4, 2019, the State indicted defendant on two counts of aggravated discharge

     of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2018)) stemming from a September 16, 2019,

     shooting near a school bus preparing to unload children. When defense counsel entered the case

     on February 22, 2021, all previously tendered discovery was given to him, including the

     disclosure of a potential witness, Tolina Shannon, along with a transcript of her testimony in a

     separate but related matter. Defendant filed a statement disclosing a claim of self-defense.

¶5          The case proceeded to a jury trial on January 24, 2022. Relevant to this appeal, Cameron

     Curtis testified that he worked for the United States Postal Service. On the afternoon of

     September 16, 2019, he was delivering mail on the 400 block of South Lincoln Avenue in

     Kankakee. At that time, he observed “a silver Grand Prix, Grand Am style car” speeding

     northbound down the street. Curtis observed a school bus driving southbound toward two

     daycares. He indicated that the car was unable to pass due to the narrow roadway and stopped 15

     to 20 feet in front of the school bus.

¶6          After the car and bus were stopped, a 5-foot-10 inch to 5-foot-11 inch tall Caucasian male

     with blond hair that was buzzed on the side and short on the top exited the driver’s side and

     walked around the front of the car. Curtis heard the man yelling, “I told you mother fuckers to

     get out of the way.” Curtis observed the man pull out a handgun and fire “what [he] thought was

     four rounds.” The man was approximately 50 to 60 feet away from the bus when he began firing.

     He fired in a southeastern direction, away from both the school bus and Curtis. Curtis testified

     that the man appeared to be shooting in the direction of a residence which he knew to be

     occupied by the Carmona family. The man “didn’t appear to be” shooting at any person. Curtis

     indicated that he was aware that the Carmona family was affiliated with the Latin Kings gang.

                                                      2
¶7          When the shooting began, Curtis had already passed the Carmona residence and was

     standing several houses north of that location. Curtis explained that he had not observed anyone

     outside the Carmona residence when he had walked past it. Curtis reiterated that the man had

     “definitely not” shot at the school bus. Curtis testified that children had been preparing to exit the

     bus when the shooting began, and he heard a daycare employee yell for the bus driver to exit the

     area. Curtis indicated that the children returned to the school bus which then drove south. Once

     the school bus passed the street, the man returned to his car and drove northbound.

¶8          Latonya Hill testified that she had been employed as a school bus driver for

     approximately 20 years. In September 2019, Hill drove morning and afternoon routes. When

     asked whether her afternoon route included South Lincoln Avenue in September 2019, Hill

     replied that she could not remember that date. She could recall recent events but did not

     remember anything regarding September 2019.

¶9          Hill did not recall writing on an incident report after her afternoon shift on September 16,

     2019, that she had been dropping children off in the 400 block of South Lincoln Avenue. Neither

     did she recall giving a recorded interview to Kankakee Detective Kris Lombardi on September

     17, 2019. Hill testified that she did not remember: (1) which street she turned from, (2) what she

     noticed as she attempted to drop off the children on South Lincoln Avenue, (3) that the bus was

     in the middle of the roadway dropping off children and a gray silver car approached her, (4) that

     the driver of the silver car was in a hurry but was blocked in by the school bus and could not

     have gotten around it, (5) that she noticed the driver was fidgety and agitated, (6) the closeness

     of the silver car to the school bus, (7) writing in her September 16 written statement that she

     observed seven males come from the side of a residence, (8) describing that residence, (9) that

     the men came from the left/east side of the street or what the driver of the silver car did when

                                                       3
       they appeared, (10) yelling “no, no, no” at the driver of the car or that he responded with “move

       the fucking bus move the fucking bus,” (11) that she observed the driver holding a gun or that he

       again told her to move the bus, (12) hearing a gunshot from the group of men near the residence

       after the driver told her to move the bus a second time, (13) the driver of the silver car shooting

       back at the group of men, (14) that the driver and the group were firing back and forth,

       (15) anything about how she drove out of the area, (16) describing the driver as a Caucasian male

       wearing shorts and a white tank top, (17) explaining that she kept her attention on the driver

       because he appeared “too fidgety,” or (18) telling Lombardi all of these facts. She denied telling

       Lombardi that “about seven guys came from the side of the building and by that time the driver

       of the car that’s by the bus *** gets out.” On cross-examination, Hill testified that she did not

       remember police responding to the area. She also stated that during her employment as a bus

       driver, including the day of the incident, she had never found a bullet hole in her school bus.

¶ 10          The next day, defense counsel moved to strike Hill’s testimony because she was not a

       competent witness. The State argued that she was a recanting witness. The court denied the

       motion to strike and found that Hill could be impeached with her prior inconsistent statements.

¶ 11          Officer Jack Klasey of the Kankakee Police Department testified that at approximately

       3:30 p.m. on September 16, 2019, he responded to reports of a shooting in the 400 block of

       South Lincoln Avenue. He met with Hill and checked the occupants of the bus for injuries.

       Klasey spoke with Ruben and Martin Carmona outside of their residence and was directed to an

       area of the street north of the residence where he located six spent .45-caliber shell casings.

       Klasey was informed by anonymous witnesses that the car involved in the shooting was a silver

       sedan. Through the investigation, defendant became a person of interest. Klasey became aware

       that defendant’s girlfriend, Veronica Ayala, owned a silver Grand Prix. On cross-examination,

                                                         4
       Klasey testified that he was unsure whether Ruben was currently being prosecuted for the same

       event in another courtroom but indicated that could be the case.

¶ 12          The State played a previously admitted video recording from the school bus for the jury.

       The video depicted Hill driving the school bus. Two adults and several children were on the bus.

       The bus stopped, and a light-colored vehicle can be seen stopping abruptly. Hill shouted “No”

       several times and drove forward. A Caucasian male can be seen emerging from his car. Hill

       drove forward a short distance, stopped, and ducked down. Six gunshots can be heard. Hill drove

       forward again and contacted dispatch. She again yelled “No” toward the driver’s side of the

       school bus. Hill informed dispatch that she had been involved in a crossfire.

¶ 13          Lombardi testified that he investigated the September 16, 2019, shooting on South

       Lincoln Avenue. He photographed the six shell casings that had been discovered on the street.

       Lombardi interviewed Hill on September 17, 2019. The interview was video recorded, which

       was admitted and published to the jury. The video depicted Hill telling Lombardi everything that

       she could not remember telling him when she had testified the day before. On cross-examination,

       Lombardi testified that he concluded that defendant was the man who could be seen exiting the

       silver car and raising his arm when shots were heard on the video. Lombardi also opined that the

       six bullet casings near that area belonged to defendant. He explained that bullet casings only

       travel approximately 10 to 20 feet. Any casings from shots fired by individuals near the

       residence could not have travelled 700 feet to the street.

¶ 14          Sergeant Timothy Klopp of the Kankakee Police Department testified that he provided

       Hill with a photographic array on September 20, 2019. The identification was video recorded and

       was played for the jury. In the video, Hill was shown six photographs. She took approximately

       2½ minutes to study the photographs. She informed Klopp that she recognized numerous

                                                        5
       features in one photograph but was not completely sure. Hill explained that “the hair, the beard,

       nose, eyes and neck [made her] believe that that was the driver but [she thought] he [was] thinner

       now.” Hill identified the photograph of defendant as the man who fired the gun near the school

       bus on September 16, 2019.

¶ 15           Hill was recalled as a witness during defendant’s case-in-chief. Defense counsel showed

       her a previously admitted written incident report from the Illinois Central School Bus company.

       The account recorded in the report was consistent with the oral account of events that she gave to

       Lombardi. Hill indicated that she began yelling “no” as she “looked ahead and seen around seven

       males come from the side of the house.” The driver yelled for her to move the bus. Gunshots

       were fired. As she drove away slowly, she explained that “the Kings (as known as) from the

       house were still firing the guns.” Hill acknowledged that the signature on the report appeared to

       be hers; however, she did not remember writing it. She denied that the report was in her

       handwriting, then admitted that it could be her handwriting, but she had no recollection of

       writing it.

¶ 16           Hill testified that she had no recollection of being shown an initial photographic array by

       Lombardi on September 17, 2019. Defense counsel showed her a copy of a lineup questionnaire

       from that day. Hill denied that the witness signature was hers and testified that she did not recall

       viewing any of those photographs previously. The array contained defendant’s juvenile

       photograph. Hill did not identify defendant in the September 17 lineup.

¶ 17           Hill was shown the previously admitted bus video recording from September 16, 2019.

       She acknowledged that she appeared on the video but could not recall the incident. Hill was

       shown the videos of the September 20, 2019, photographic identification with Klopp and her

       September 17, 2019, interview with Lombardi. She again acknowledged that she appeared on the

                                                        6
       video but did not recall participating in those events. Hill indicated that she did not recognize

       defendant from the day of the shooting, stating: “I never seen that face around town.”

¶ 18          Lombardi was recalled as a witness. He testified that he administered the initial

       photographic lineup to Hill on September 17, 2019. She did not identify defendant’s photograph

       on that date. When asked by defense counsel why Hill was called back for another photographic

       lineup several days later, Lombardi explained that the photograph of defendant in the September

       17 lineup was from 2011 when defendant was a juvenile. The photograph included in the

       September 20 lineup depicted defendant as an adult.

¶ 19          Ayala testified that she was defendant’s fiancée. At the time of the shooting, she and

       defendant lived together with their two children in the neighboring town of Chebanse,

       approximately 10 to 15 minutes from South Lincoln Avenue. She was working in Grant Park on

       the afternoon of September 16, while defendant was at home. Ayala testified that defendant did

       not have a driver’s license. She admitted that she had owned a 2013 Grand Prix but testified that

       defendant did not drive that car.

¶ 20          During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel did not ask for the prepared

       instruction for self-defense to be given. The instruction was subsequently withdrawn. In closing,

       defense counsel argued that the State had not met its burden in proving that defendant had been

       the shooter, highlighting the lack of identification of defendant by the witnesses. Counsel

       highlighted Hill’s failure to identify defendant in the initial photographic lineup and her

       hesitancy and uncertainty in identifying defendant in the second photographic lineup four days

       later. Further, defense counsel argued that no DNA or fingerprints from the shell casings had

       been presented, no registration number from the involved vehicle had been obtained, and the

                                                         7
       admitted video recordings did not show defendant as the shooter that day. The jury found

       defendant guilty on both counts.

¶ 21          Defense counsel filed a motion for new trial, arguing in relevant part that the State had

       committed a discovery violation by failing to tender discovery related to the prosecution of

       Ruben Carmona for the same September 16, 2019, shooting. At a hearing, counsel argued:

                               “They failed to provide us with the 412 and they’re—yeah, and they’re

                      across the hall prosecuting Ruben Carmona, and I don’t know who else in a case

                      known as 2020-CF-813. I mean I have no idea how they think they can do that. I

                      mean I really I don’t. They—you know, that’s a very material fact. They owed us

                      a 412.

                               You know, if you look at my 413—if you look at my 413, I said we might

                      use self defense as an affirmative defense, but we don’t even have the information

                      to do that thanks to the State.”

       In response, the State explained that the only difference between the discovery in Ruben’s case

       and the instant case was a transcript of testimony provided by Shannon in a separate but related

       nuisance hearing. In that testimony, Shannon indicated that she had observed Ruben shooting in

       the direction of the school bus. The State tendered this transcript along with Shannon’s address

       and the identity of the court reporter who recorded the testimony on February 22, 2021, when

       defense counsel entered the case. Counsel acknowledged that he had received the transcript in

       question and “the transcript didn’t hurt [them] in any way.”

¶ 22          The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. At a sentencing hearing, the counts

       merged, and defendant was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals.

¶ 23                                             II. ANALYSIS

                                                         8
¶ 24          On appeal, defendant argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel

       where trial counsel abandoned a meritorious claim of self-defense and failed to object to the

       introduction of Hill’s prior statements.

¶ 25                                  A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 26          “Every defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under

       the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Illinois.” People v.

       Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

       defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

       reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. People v.

       Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30. In order to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that

       there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

       proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A

       reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

¶ 27          To establish deficiency, “a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the

       challenged action or inaction *** was the product of sound trial strategy and not of

       incompetence.” People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317 (2010). Actions that are considered

       matters of trial strategy are afforded great deference by the court and “are generally immune

       from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432 (1999)

       “[A] reviewing court will *** mak[e] every effort to evaluate counsel’s performance from his

       perspective at the time, rather than through the lens of hindsight.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d

       312, 344 (2007).

¶ 28                              1. Failure to Pursue a Claim of Self-defense

                                                         9
¶ 29          Defendant first contends that Hill’s statements, admitted as substantive evidence,

       provided strong evidence supporting his claim of self-defense which counsel unreasonably

       abandoned in favor of a theory that the State failed to prove defendant was the shooter in the face

       of strong identification evidence. Additionally, defendant asserts that, had the jury considered

       self-defense, a reasonable possibility exists that they may have acquitted defendant.

¶ 30          To raise a claim of self-defense, the record must contain some evidence, however slight,

       which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support the claim. People v. French, 2020 IL App

       (3d) 170220, ¶ 20.

                      “The elements of self-defense are: (1) that unlawful force was threatened against a

                      person; (2) that the person threatened was not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of

                      harm was imminent; (4) that the use of force was necessary; (5) that the person

                      threatened actually and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the

                      use of the force applied; and (6) the beliefs of the person threatened were

                      objectively reasonable.” People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225 (2004).

       “Self-defense is an affirmative defense, meaning that unless the State’s evidence raises the issue

       involving the alleged defense, the defendant bears the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to

       raise the issue.” People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 157 (1990). If the State negates any of the

       enumerated elements, a defendant’s claim of self-defense fails. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225.

¶ 31          “Generally, counsel’s decision to argue one theory of defense to the exclusion of another

       is considered trial strategy.” People v. Gill, 264 Ill. App. 3d 451, 462 (1992). Here, defense

       counsel disclosed an intention to raise a claim of self-defense. At trial, counsel presented no

       argument or evidence to further that claim, opting instead to put forth the theory that the State

       had failed to prove defendant was the shooter. He specifically informed the court that he was not

                                                        10
       asking the jury to be given the self-defense instruction that had been prepared by the State.

       Instead, counsel chose to attack the State’s identification evidence. He relied heavily on the

       failure of the witnesses to identify defendant as the shooter outside of the second photographic

       lineup presented to Hill. Defense counsel argued that the length of time spent studying the

       photographs and Hill’s lack of certainty rendered the only presented identification evidence

       insufficient, beyond a reasonable doubt, to prove defendant was the shooter. He further

       highlighted the lack of physical evidence, matching vehicle evidence, and video evidence to

       prove defendant was the shooter.

¶ 32          Assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s claim of self-defense is viable, it remains

       reasonable trial strategy to avoid raising the claim as admitting to shooting in self-defense would

       be incompatible with counsel’s theory that the State failed to prove defendant was the shooter.

       See People v. White, 2011 IL App (1st) 092852, ¶ 70. The fact that counsel’s strategic decision

       to argue that the State failed to prove its case was ultimately unsuccessful does not render that

       decision unreasonable or his representation deficient. Id. Consequently, defendant’s claim of

       ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a claim of self-defense fails.

¶ 33          In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s argument that the record shows that

       defense counsel did not make a strategic decision to abandon his claim of self-defense but did so

       due to his mistaken belief that he did not possess all the discovery. Defense counsel does briefly

       indicate that he may have presented a self-defense claim but he did not possess all the

       information; however, the record clearly demonstrates that counsel reviewed all the tendered

       discovery, including the transcript of Shannon’s testimony, and then disclosed his potential claim

       of self-defense. The record also reflects that counsel was not aware that Hill would testify

       inconsistently with her recorded statements. It is reasonable to presume that counsel opted to

                                                         11
       change theories after observing the newly discovered weakness in the State’s case. Accordingly,

       that single statement from defense counsel during argument on his posttrial motion is insufficient

       to overcome the presumption of sound trial strategy.

¶ 34                                    2. Unavailability of the Witness

¶ 35          Defendant argues that Hill’s video recorded statements to police, as well as her written

       statements to the bus company, were testimonial in nature and required Hill be subject to cross-

       examination to be admissible. Defendant contends that due to Hill’s complete memory loss

       regarding the incident, she was not sufficiently available for cross-examination to satisfy the

       confrontation clause. Therefore, defendant states that defense counsel should have objected to

       the admission of Hill’s prior statements.

¶ 36          Relevant to this appeal, section 115-10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

       allows prior statements of a witness to be admitted as substantive evidence if (1) the statement is

       inconsistent with their trial testimony, (2) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning

       the statement, (3) the statement narrates an event of which the witness has personal knowledge,

       and (4) the witness either acknowledges under oath that he or she made the statement or it is

       established that the statement was accurately recorded by videotape recording or similar device.

       725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2018). Additionally, for the statements to be admissible, they must

       also satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause. People v. Dabney, 2017 IL App (3d)

       140915, ¶ 18.

¶ 37          The confrontation clause requires that criminal defendants have the right to confront the

       witnesses against them. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The confrontation

       clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is

       effective in whatever way and to whatever extent defense counsel desires. People v. Leonard,

                                                       12
       391 Ill. App. 3d 926, 934 (2009). “[A] gap in the witness’ recollection concerning the content of

       a prior statement does not necessarily preclude an opportunity for effective cross-examination.”

       People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 88 (1989). “The confrontation clause is not violated when a

       witness appears, answers questions, and is cross-examined but is unable to remember previous

       events.” People v. Martin, 408 Ill. App. 3d 891, 896 (2011).

¶ 38          Here, Hill appeared on multiple days to testify at trial. During the State’s case-in-chief,

       Hill answered preliminary questions regarding her age and employment. When the questioning

       turned toward the events of September 16, 2019, Hill largely responded that she did not know or

       could not recall. At one point, she denied making a certain statement to Lombardi regarding

       seven individuals near the house. During cross-examination, she testified that she had never, at

       any point in her employment, found a bullet hole in her bus. The next day, defense counsel

       recalled Hill to testify in defendant’s case-in-chief. When asked about her written statement to

       the bus company, Hill acknowledged her signature on the statement even though she had no

       recollection of writing it. She also acknowledged providing video recorded statements to the

       police even though she did not recall making the statements. Further, defense counsel was able to

       obtain a complete denial of Hill’s identification of defendant as the shooter on September 16,

       2019. When asked if she recognized defendant from that event, Hill unequivocally said she had

       “never seen that face” before.

¶ 39          Defendant argues that Hill answering a few preliminary questions and then failing to

       answer even the most rudimentary questions about the incident and her statements rendered her

       unavailable for cross-examination. In support of this contention, defendant relies on In re

       Brandon P., 2014 IL 116653, ¶¶ 46-47, and In re Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d 776, 778 (2004).

       We find these cases to be inapposite. Both cases involved a victim who, after answering a few

                                                       13
       preliminary questions, refused to continue testifying or answer any further questions. Here, Hill

       answered every question asked from both the State and defense counsel over multiple days.

       While a significant portion of her testimony was that she did not know or could not remember

       the answers, defense counsel was able to elicit substantive information from her. We find Hill’s

       appearance at trial and her willingness to answer any question asked of her provided defense

       counsel with an effective opportunity to cross-examine her. See Leonard, 391 Ill. App. 3d at

       935-36 (“That [defendant] was not able to cross-examine [the witness] to the extent he would

       have liked does not rise to a violation of his right to confront [the witness]. [The witness]’s

       supposed gaps in memory, while making cross-examination of him challenging, did not preclude

       the opportunity for cross-examination.”). Thus, any objection counsel may have made to the

       admission of Hill’s statements on these grounds would not have been successful and defendant’s

       claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue fails.

¶ 40                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41          The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

¶ 42          Affirmed.

¶ 43          PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:

¶ 44          I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s judgment, only because

       the case law appears to require it. I write separately to note the disingenuousness of precedents

       that facilitate a finding that defendant had an opportunity to effectively cross-examine Hill, despite

       the fact that her substantive testimony was that she did not know or could not remember any of the

       facts of the relevant incident. This is especially true where, as here, evidence which reasonably

       appears to lean toward being exculpatory cannot be explored or developed by the examination of

       an eyewitness.

                                                         14
¶ 45           I am aware that, as the majority points out, relevant case law provides that a witness’s lack

       of recollection does not necessarily preclude an opportunity for effective cross-examination, (see

       Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 88), and that a witness is subject to cross-examination “when he is placed on

       the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions.” United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554,

       561 (1988). However, I disagree with this case law to the extent it finds it is possible for a defendant

       to effectively cross-examine a witness whose testimony consists almost exclusively of reiterating

       that she has no recollection of any of the events relevant to the charged offense. It does, however,

       so conclude, and so I concur.

                                                         15