Court Opinion

ID: 9514831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:58.997414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:21.476585
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 45.] I concur with the majority opinion in affirming Issues 1, 2, 3 and 5. I concur in result on Issue 4. While I do not agree that Honomichl v. Leapley, 498 N.W.2d 636 (S.D.1993), necessarily controls the Batson issue here, I believe our examination of the question requires lesser scrutiny on habeas corpus review. See Flute v. Class, 1997 SD 10, ¶ 11, 559 N.W.2d 554, 557 (court exercises decreasing scrutiny as time passes). At the time Ms. Huapapi’s name was stricken, the defense made no objection. Now, more than a decade after the trial, we are called on to decide if the decision to strike her name was purposefully discriminatory. The prosecutor’s explanation for striking her name appears inadequate under Batson. If the matter had been challenged on direct appeal after the issue had been properly preserved, I would probably be compelled to hold that exclusion of Ms. Huapapi was improper, and not subject to harmless error analysis. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717, 123 L.Ed.2d 353, 367-68, reh’g denied, 508 U.S. 968, 113 S.Ct. 2951, 124 L.Ed.2d 698 (1993); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1725, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 90 (1986). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found in a habeas appeal that a prosecutor’s race-based peremptory challenges of jurors and alternates was a “structural defect” not susceptible to harmless error analysis. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 171 (8thCir.l995).
[¶ 46.] Nonetheless, no court has suggested that trial judges must sua sponte intervene to prevent discriminatory exclusion of jurors. On the contrary, Batson requires a timely objection. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 422, 111 S.Ct. 850, *285857, 112 L.Ed.2d 935, 948 (1991). A “requirement that any Batson claim be raised not only before trial, but in the period between the selection of the jurors and the administration of their oaths is a sensible rule.” Id.
[¶47.] As there was no objection, we review this matter not for harmless error, but plain error. “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of a court.” SDCL 23A-44-15 (Rule 52(b)). As we said in State v. Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 7, 587 N.W.2d 439, 443, “[ujnlike harmless error review under SDCL 23A-44-14 (Rule 52(a)), in which the State has the burden of proving the error was not prejudicial, with plain error analysis the defendant bears the burden of showing the error was prejudicial.” (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737-41, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779-81, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 62 F.3d 1180 (9thCir.l995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 931, 117 S.Ct. 303, 136 L.Ed.2d 221 (1996)). In Nelson, we also explained:
Plain error requires (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may we exercise our discretion to notice the error if (4) it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” We invoke our discretion under the .plain error rule cautiously and only in “exceptional circumstances.” Such circumstances may include cases in which “ ‘a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result,’ ” i.e., a defendant is actually innocent.
Id. ¶ 8 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 48.] Under plain error analysis, Weddell bears the burden of proving that this mistake must be corrected because “a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” Id. See United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9thCir.l996) (applying plain error analysis to defendant’s Batson claim raised for the first time on appeal). Furthermore, because this conviction is
under collateral attack, we are more at liberty to explore whether the exclusion of Ms. Huapapi was prejudicial to Weddell. Although the prosecutor’s explanation for striking her was unsustainable under Bat-son, there is nothing in his answer that suggests an inherent discriminatory intent. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 406 (1991); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839, reh’g denied, 515 U.S. 1170, 115 S.Ct. 2635, 132 L.Ed.2d 874, and on remand, 64 F.3d 1195 (8thCir.l995). In the habeas hearing, the circuit court believed the prosecutor’s explanation. The court had the opportunity to observe his demeanor and judge his credibility. Certainly the court’s fact findings are entitled to some deference. See Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d at 1105-06. After carefully considering the issue, I must state that Weddell has not met his burden of showing that a grievous injustice occurred. In fact, he makes no showing that had Ms. Huapapi remained on the jury the outcome would have been different.
[¶ 49.] Accordingly, I concur in affirming, but for reasons other than those stated by the majority.