Court Opinion

ID: 9520362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:37:51.045275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:02.539789
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part with opinion.
I concur with the majority's decision to reverse the trial court's order regarding college expenses. I also concur in the majority's decision to reverse the trial court's order that Harold reimburse Carol for her payment of the second mortgage and tax liability and that he pay her attorney fees, but respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to remand the case for a further evidentiary hearing on those matters.
Carol was the party seeking a determination of whether Harold's obligations were discharged in his bankruptcy. The "default" is that a debt is discharged in bankruptey unless it is specifically excepted from discharge by statute. See Howard, 580 N.E.2d at 1002. Therefore, a creditor objecting to the discharge of a debt bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt falls within the statutory exception. Id. "To determine whether an obligation to a former spouse is dischargeable in bankruptey, the court must determine whether the dissolution decree intended the obligation to be maintenance for the spouse or to effect a division of property and debts." Id. at 1008. The majority has set out the factors that are to be considered in making this determination. See op. at 260-61.
I note first that I disagree with the standard employed by the trial court in making its determination. The trial *267court's order indicates that in determining dischargeability:
courts look to various factors including the parties' imbalance in income, expenses and earning capacity and whether the failure of the debtor to pay would impair the nondebtor spouse's ability to maintain his or her expected standard of living or support the couple's children.
Appellant's Appendix at 33. Nowhere in the order does the trial court discuss the complete list of factors to be considered in determining dischargeability. Theoretically, every obligation-financial and otherwise-from one ex-spouse to another impacts the ability to maintain the former standard of living and support children, but that does not necessarily make the obligation in the nature of support. Rather, an obligation is only support if it meets specific criteria. See Cowart 711 NE2d at 528-29 (holding that trial court's reasoning that all obligations under the decree were in the nature of maintenance or support because debtor's failure to pay in turn affected ex-spouse's ability to pay child support was not a proper basis for concluding the obligations were nondischargeable: "[tlhe fact that the payment by the debtor may result in the former spouse's having funds available to pay child support is not sufficient to render the obligation one 'in the nature of maintenance or support.! ").
Further, I disagree with the majority that remand is appropriate. The trial court acknowledged in its order, as the majority does in its opinion, that no evidence was presented regarding several of the salient factors for determining dis-chargeability. See Appellant's App. at 35; Op. at 262. The factors for which there is evidence in Carol's favor are not sufficient to override the factors for which the evidence does not support her position and for which there is no evidence at all. Rather than being a case where the evidence was presented but the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings-in which case I would agree remand was proper-this is a case where the proponent of the motion failed to prove her case. Carol did not present an adequate basis upon which the trial court could evaluate all the relevant factors and determine whether the dissolution decree intended Harold's obligations to be maintenance or property division. Nor, as the majority acknowledges, did Carol present evidence to support an award of attorney fees. See op. at 266. Carol is not entitled to a "second bite of the apple" in order to prove her case. I would therefore hold that Harold's obligations are dischargeable and that Carol is to pay her own attorney fees and 1 would simply reverse the trial court's order."