Court Opinion

ID: 9640358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:04:17.091096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.322388
License: Public Domain

DROWOTA, Justice,
concurring.
I would affirm but apply the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Specifically, I agree with that Court that “there is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect’s initial incul-patory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary.” Id. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1297-98.
In Elstad, the United States Supreme Court held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive *922questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Id. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298. Under Elstad, the factfinder is directed to “examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct” and thereby reach a determination as to whether the defendant’s post-Miranda statement was voluntarily made, see id.; because the trial court properly conducted this inquiry, I would affirm.
While the majority purports to adopt a presumption, apparently gleaned from Justice Brennan’s dissent in Elstad, that an illegally obtained initial confession taints any subsequent confession, I submit that the majority does nothing more than examine the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether Smith’s post-Miranda statement was voluntarily made.
Further, the “psychological stress” component of the majority’s presumption, see supra at-(“the State ... must establish that the subsequent confession was given freely and voluntarily and that the constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination was not waived due solely to the psychological pressures resulting from giving the previous statement”), gives reason for pause: Were the majority to actually apply Justice Brennan’s “cat out of the bag” presumption, it is difficult to imagine that Smith’s post-Miranda statement would be found free of taint. Smith waived his Miranda rights a mere three hours after his initial statement, and at a time when he was burdened by the “psychological stress” of knowing the police found 10,000 grams (22 pounds) of 94 percent pure cocaine in his car.
Finally, because Defendant’s subsequent confession is clearly admissible, I decline the opportunity to circumscribe the boundaries of Article I, Section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution.
I am authorized to state that Justice O’BRIEN concurs in this concurring opinion.