Court Opinion

ID: 9941590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 16:10:01.628924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:47.542683
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                         No. 123,687

                                     STATE OF KANSAS,
                                         Appellee,

                                              v.

                                    JOSHUA F. SINNARD,
                                        Appellant.

                               SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
       Appellate courts review a district court's decision to grant a continuance under the
speedy trial exceptions in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e) for an abuse of discretion. A
district court abuses its discretion if its decision (1) is based on an error of law—if the
discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; (2) is based on an error of fact—if
substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite
conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based; or (3) is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable—if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial
court. The party claiming error bears the burden to show the district court abused its
discretion.

2.
       K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4) imposes several conditions on the use of the
crowded-docket exception to Kansas' speedy trial statute. First, the district court may
order only one continuance based on a crowded docket. Second, the district court must
order the continuance within the original speedy trial deadline. Third, the new trial date
must be not more than 30 days after the limit otherwise applicable. And fourth, the record

                                               1
must show that other pending cases, rather than secondary matters such as witness
availability, prevented the court from setting the trial within the speedy trial deadline.

3.
       When a defendant argues the district court abused its discretion by making an
error of fact because the record does not support the district court's crowded-docket
finding, we review that finding for substantial competent evidence. Substantial competent
evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might regard as
sufficient to support a conclusion. An appellate court does not reweigh conflicting
evidence, evaluate witness credibility, or determine questions of fact, and the court
presumes the district court found all facts necessary to support its judgment.

4.
       K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-456 provides guidelines for the admissibility of lay and
expert opinion testimony. The distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is
that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while
expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by
specialists in the field.

5.
       K.S.A. 60-404 directs that a verdict shall not be set aside, or a judgment reversed,
based on the erroneous admission of evidence without a timely and specific objection. In
other words, the statute is a legislative mandate limiting the authority of Kansas appellate
courts to address evidentiary challenges. Thus, much like jurisdictional issues, appellate
courts may consider a party's compliance with K.S.A. 60-404 on their own initiative.

6.
       Like many evidentiary determinations considered on appeal, an appellate court
reviews a trial court's admission or exclusion of hearsay statements for an abuse of

                                              2
discretion. Hearsay is defined as evidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.
Out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated are not
hearsay under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-460. The theory behind the hearsay rule is that when
a statement is offered as evidence of the truth of the matter stated, the credibility of the
declarant is the basis for its reliability, and the declarant must therefore be subject to
cross-examination.

7.
        A jury instruction that omits an essential element of the crime charged is legally
erroneous.

        Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 7, 2022.
Appeal from Douglas District Court; JAMES R. MCCABRIA, judge. Oral argument held September 13,
2023. Opinion filed February 16, 2024. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is
affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

        Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the
briefs for appellant.

        Jon Simpson, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Suzanne Valdez, district attorney,
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

        WALL, J.: In July 2017, Joshua F. Sinnard arranged to have sex with a 17-year-old
in exchange for money. The State charged Sinnard with commercial sexual exploitation
of a child. Sinnard's trial began after the speedy trial deadline in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-
3402(a). But before that deadline had lapsed, the district court invoked the crowded-
docket exception. That exception authorizes the district court to grant a one-time

                                                        3
continuance for up to 30 days if the court's docket cannot accommodate another trial
setting within the original speedy trial deadline. Sinnard's trial began within 30 days of
his original speedy trial deadline.

       At trial, the investigating detective testified as a lay witness about the contents of
Sinnard's phone records from the day of the incident and explained in general terms how
cell phones connect to cell towers. The detective also testified to the contents of Sinnard's
phone records during a two-week period before and after the incident, even though those
records had not been admitted into evidence. A jury convicted Sinnard as charged. And a
panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Sinnard, No. 123,687, 2022 WL 5287901
(Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion).

       Sinnard now challenges the Court of Appeals' judgment on four grounds. First, he
argues the district court erred by invoking the crowded-docket exception. But the district
court's continuance satisfied the statutory conditions for invoking the exception.
Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's crowded-docket finding. And
the district court's decision to continue Sinnard's trial was not objectively unreasonable.
Thus, Sinnard has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion or that the
panel erred by affirming that decision.

       Second, Sinnard continues to argue that the detective's lay testimony about how to
interpret Sinnard's cell phone call records from the day of the incident and his general
explanation about how cell phones connect to cell towers was inadmissible expert
opinion testimony. But Sinnard has failed to preserve his challenge to the detective's
testimony about the contents of Sinnard's cell phone records. And the detective's
comments about cell phone connectivity were not so specialized as to bring them within
the realm of expert opinion testimony.

                                              4
       Sinnard also contends that the detective's testimony about the contents of Sinnard's
unadmitted phone records before and after the incident was inadmissible hearsay that
affected the verdict. Granted, the district court erred by admitting this hearsay testimony,
but we agree with the panel's conclusion that this error was harmless given the abundance
of other evidence corroborating the victim's account of the incident.

       Third, Sinnard claims that the jury instruction on commercial sexual exploitation
of a child was clearly erroneous. But the elements instruction given to the jury was
legally appropriate and included the culpable mental state for that crime. While Sinnard's
proposed instruction was also legally appropriate, the instructions given accurately stated
the law and were not reasonably likely to confuse the jury.

       Finally, Sinnard argues the panel erred by holding that cumulative error did not
deprive him of a fair trial. But having found only one harmless error, Sinnard is not
entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.

       Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm Sinnard's
conviction.

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On July 25, 2017, 17-year-old P.F. went to the Tonganoxie Public Library around
noon. While there, she decided that she wanted to go meet a friend at the Legends Outlet
Mall in Kansas City. She asked her mom, M.F., if she could go, but M.F. said no. P.F.
then started looking for other ways to get there.

       P.F. saw a Snapchat from a user named "Wamma Jamma" asking if anyone
wanted to make $200. P.F. understood this to mean having sex with someone in exchange
for money. P.F. responded to Wamma Jamma's message. P.F. then received a message on

                                              5
Snapchat from another user named "Blu." Blu told P.F. his name was Josh, and he would
pick her up at the Tonganoxie Public Library. Police later determined that the Snapchat
account using the name "Blu" was associated with Sinnard's phone number and e-mail
address. And at trial, P.F. identified Sinnard as the man who picked her up at the library.

       When P.F. got into Sinnard's car, they had a short conversation. They agreed
Sinnard would take P.F. to his apartment in Lawrence to have sex and then he would
drive her to the Legends and pay her on the way there. They left the library around 12:30
p.m. P.F. testified they took the "back way" to Lawrence "on [highways] 24 40" though
she could not remember the exact route. During the drive, Sinnard told P.F. he worked at
a car dealership.

       P.F. was not familiar with Lawrence, so she could not exactly recall the location of
Sinnard's apartment. But she remembered going down an "older" one-way street with a
lot of stoplights and a lot of trees on both sides. When they arrived at Sinnard's
apartment, they again discussed what would happen before going in—they would have
sex, and then Sinnard would drive P.F. to the Legends and pay her on the way there.

       Sinnard and P.F. spent no more than 30 minutes at Sinnard's apartment. They had
sex in Sinnard's bedroom. He then drove P.F. to the Legends, traveling on I-70. On the
way, he gave P.F. $200 in $20 bills.

       At the Legends, P.F. met up with her friend and they spent the afternoon and
evening there. Using the $200 she had just received, P.F. bought some items from
Victoria's Secret and some food. A friend of her friend then gave her a ride back to
Tonganoxie in exchange for the rest of P.F.'s cash.

       When P.F. arrived home, she was carrying a Victoria's Secret bag and a Chipotle
bag. Upon seeing the bags, M.F. became suspicious because she knew P.F. had no job

                                              6
and no money. M.F. questioned P.F. about the day's events. Over the next couple days,
P.F. explained to her mother that she had spoken with a Snapchat user named Wamma
Jamma about getting money and a ride to the Legends. A man named Josh had then
picked P.F. up at the Tonganoxie Public Library and driven her to Lawrence where they
had sex. Afterward, the man gave her $200 and drove her to the Legends.

       At first, P.F. did not want to report the incident to police. But after her father
found out what happened, she spoke with Detective Scott Slifer with the Lawrence Police
Department. P.F. provided some screenshots of conversations she had with Wamma
Jamma both before and after meeting with Sinnard. P.F. also provided Slifer with an
image from her phone's Google Maps application, which she believed showed a location
near Sinnard's apartment. The screenshot shows the location of the University of Kansas
campus with the address for Strong Hall and a pin drop "[s]hortly behind Allen
Fieldhouse," and asks, "Were you here?" from "1:04 PM to 1:28 PM" on "July 25, 2017."
P.F. did not recall ever being on the University of Kansas campus, but she believed
Google Maps simply identified "the nearest most popular [location] that you passed."

       P.F. also described Sinnard's apartment to Slifer. She said both Sinnard's bedroom
and the rest of the apartment were cluttered, with items like clothes and cups strewn
about. She drew a diagram of the layout of the apartment. She also described a sex toy
that Sinnard owned. And she said she had made it clear to Sinnard that she was only 17
years old.

       Slifer found Sinnard at the car dealership where Sinnard worked. Sinnard provided
the address for his apartment on Tennessee Street. His address was "about five blocks
east" of Strong Hall. And Tennessee Street happened to be one of the two one-way streets
Slifer had thought of when P.F. described the route Sinnard had taken to get to his
apartment.

                                               7
       Police searched Sinnard's apartment. Photographs of the apartment showed the
living room and one of the bedrooms were cluttered. Police found business cards and
mail with Sinnard's name in the cluttered bedroom. Police also found a sex toy in that
bedroom matching P.F.'s description. And a police diagram of the layout of the apartment
matched the diagram P.F. had drawn for Slifer.

       During his investigation, Slifer also obtained records for Sinnard's cell phone to
determine whether they tracked with P.F.'s version of events. Those records showed the
times that particular cell towers serviced Sinnard's phone for incoming and outgoing calls
on July 25, 2017. All calls before 12:34 p.m. were serviced by a single cell tower in
Baldwin City. An incoming call at 12:34 p.m. (routed to voicemail at 12:35 p.m.) and an
outgoing call at 12:36 p.m. were serviced by a cell tower in Tonganoxie. Slifer testified
the Tonganoxie tower was about 3.86 miles from the Tonganoxie Public Library "as the
crow flies." He also believed the tower was close to I-70.

       Sinnard's phone then neither placed nor received any calls until 2:02 p.m. At 2:02
p.m., 2:04 p.m., and 2:27 p.m., calls to and from Sinnard's phone were serviced by a cell
tower in Kansas City, Kansas. Slifer, relying on Google, determined that the tower was
"about 200 feet south" of the Kansas Speedway "very near the Legends Shopping
Center." Calls at 2:36 p.m. and 2:38 p.m. were again serviced by the cell tower in
Tonganoxie. All incoming and outgoing calls after 3:51 p.m. were serviced by cell towers
in Lawrence.

       At trial, the parties stipulated to the admission of the phone records from July 25,
2017. Slifer had also obtained records for the two weeks before July 25 and the two
weeks following July 25, but those records were not offered into evidence at trial. Even
so, Slifer testified, over Sinnard's hearsay objection, that the only time in that four-week
period that Sinnard's phone connected with the Tonganoxie tower was on July 25.

                                              8
       A jury convicted Sinnard of commercial sexual exploitation of a child. The district
court sentenced Sinnard to 38 months' imprisonment. Sinnard appealed, raising multiple
claims of error. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Sinnard, 2022 WL
5287901.

       Sinnard petitioned for review, and we granted all issues raised in his petition. We
heard oral argument from the parties on September 13, 2023. Jurisdiction is proper. See
K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petition for review of Court of Appeals decision);
K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (providing Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases subject to review
under K.S.A. 20-3018).

                                          ANALYSIS

I.   The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Granting a Continuance of
     Sinnard's Trial Under the Crowded-Docket Exception

       Sinnard first claims a violation of his statutory speedy trial right. Kansas statute
requires the State to bring a criminal defendant to trial within 150 days (if the defendant
is in custody) or 180 days (if the defendant makes bond). K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(a)
and (b). But the statute provides for an extension of that deadline in several
circumstances. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e). Relevant here, a district court may
grant one continuance of not more than 30 days if "because of other cases pending for
trial, the court does not have sufficient time to commence the trial of the case within the
time fixed for trial by this section." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4). This is commonly
known as the crowded-docket exception.

       Here, the district court invoked the crowded-docket exception to move Sinnard's
trial outside his original speedy trial deadline. Sinnard argues the district court abused its
discretion by invoking the exception. But the panel found that the district court judge

                                              9
balanced all the competing interests in setting its docket and that the court's
"discretionary decision . . . should be free from appellate interference." 2022 WL
5287901, at *3.

       On review, Sinnard continues to assert his claim of error. To resolve the issue we
first highlight additional facts relevant to the analysis. Then, we identify the applicable
standard of review and legal framework before analyzing the merits of Sinnard's claim.

       A. Additional Facts Relevant to the Speedy Trial Claim

       On April 22, 2019, Sinnard waived arraignment. Because Sinnard had posted
bond, the State was statutorily required to bring Sinnard to trial within 180 days—in this
case, by October 19, 2019. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(b). When setting their
dockets, district courts commonly stack several cases for trial on the same date. This
practice increases the chances that at least one case will proceed to trial on a given date
because cases are often continued or resolved. Here, Sinnard's case was the second
setting on July 29, 2019, behind State v. Ross, a rape case.

       At a motions hearing on July 23, 2019, the State informed the district court judge
that Sinnard's trial needed to be moved because State v. Ross would likely proceed to trial
on July 29. The judge suggested that Sinnard's trial could be set on October 28,
November 4, or November 12, though it would have to be another second setting because
there were already trials scheduled on each of those dates. The State then informed the
judge that Sinnard's speedy trial deadline was October 19. Sinnard offered to waive his
speedy trial rights through October 28. To ensure that Sinnard's waiver was made
knowingly, the judge offered to look for trial dates available before October 19, if any.
But after conferring with defense counsel, Sinnard stood by his original offer and waived
his speedy trial rights for 10 days, until October 28. Sinnard's case was the second setting
for that day because another case, State v. Potts, already occupied the first setting.

                                             10
       On July 29, 2019—the day State v. Ross was set to go to trial—the district court
held a hearing in State v. Ross to address the defense's motion for a continuance due to
defense counsel's illness. The district court judge suggested October 28, 2019, as a
possible trial date. The parties confirmed that October 28 was the only date in 2019 when
both counsel and witnesses would be available. The judge scheduled State v. Ross as the
first setting for October 28. The State later moved for a continuance in Sinnard's case,
which was the second setting on that date. It is unclear from the record what happened to
State v. Potts, which had originally been the first setting on October 28.

       At a motions hearing on August 5, 2019, the district court addressed the State's
motion to continue Sinnard's trial. The State argued that State v. Ross had justifiably been
set as the first case on October 28 because that case had been pending longer than
Sinnard's case. Rather than continuing Sinnard's trial, the State suggested the court leave
Sinnard's case in the second setting on October 28 and look for a backup trial date.
Sinnard objected to any continuance of his trial beyond October 28. In exploring backup
trial dates, the judge first offered November 4, but the State noted that there was already a
trial set for that week. The judge then suggested November 12, and both the State and
defense counsel confirmed they were available. The judge also reluctantly offered to
move some civil matters scheduled the week of September 30, but neither defense
counsel nor the prosecutor were available that week. So the district court reserved
November 12 as the backup date.

       At a status conference on October 16, 2019, the State informed the court that State
v. Ross would likely proceed to trial on October 28 and had scheduling priority over
Sinnard's case. The district court made a crowded-docket finding and continued Sinnard's
trial to November 12. Sinnard asserted his speedy trial rights and objected to the
crowded-docket finding.

                                             11
       On November 7, 2019, Sinnard requested a continuance of his trial because
defense counsel needed additional time to prepare due to counsel's involvement with a
federal jury trial. Sinnard's trial was set for January 21, 2020, and Sinnard waived his
speedy trial rights from November 12 until the new trial date. Sinnard's trial began on
January 21 as scheduled.

       B. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework

       "A claimed violation of the statutory right to speedy trial presents an issue of law
over which [this court] ha[s] unlimited review." State v. Brown, 283 Kan. 658, 661, 157
P.3d 624 (2007). And to the extent this issue requires the court to engage in statutory
interpretation, that also presents a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v.
Eckert, 317 Kan. 21, 27, 522 P.3d 796 (2023).

       But a district court's decision to grant a continuance under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-
3402(e) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Robinson, 306 Kan. 1012, 1017-
18, 399 P.3d 194 (2017). A district court abuses its discretion if its decision (1) is based
on an error of law—if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; (2) is
based on an error of fact—if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual
finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based;
or (3) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable—if no reasonable person would have taken
the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Green, 315 Kan. 178, 179-80, 505 P.3d 377
(2022). As the party claiming error, Sinnard bears the burden to show the district court
abused its discretion. Robinson, 306 Kan. at 1018.

       Kansas' speedy trial statute requires that a defendant held to answer on an
appearance bond must be brought to trial within 180 days after arraignment, and if not,
the defendant must be discharged from any further liability for the crime charged. K.S.A.
2019 Supp. 22-3402(b). But recognizing the realities of litigation, the statute provides

                                             12
for an extension of that deadline in several circumstances. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-
3402(e). Relevant here, the crowded-docket exception permits a district court to grant one
continuance of not more than 30 days if "because of other cases pending for trial, the
court does not have sufficient time to commence the trial of the case within the time fixed
for trial by this section." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4).

       Sinnard waived his speedy trial rights from October 19, 2019, to October 28,
2019, and again from November 12, 2019, until January 21, 2020. So Sinnard's issue
focuses on the 16 days, between October 28 and November 12—the period in which he
did not waive his speedy trial rights. We must determine whether an exception applies to
those 16 days. If not, the statute compels us to release Sinnard from prison and dismiss
his charges. See State v. Queen, 313 Kan. 12, 29, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021) (dismissal of
charges is only possible remedy for violating defendant's speedy trial right).

       C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Invoking the Crowded-
          Docket Exception

       Sinnard contends that the district court abused its discretion on five different
grounds. First, he argues the court made an error of law by invoking the crowded-docket
exception because the exception should not apply to the circumstances of his case.
Second, he argues the court made an error of law by misinterpreting the relevant statutory
language. Third, he argues the court made an error of law by failing to make fact-findings
with sufficient particularity. Fourth, he argues the court made an error of fact because the
record does not support its crowded-docket finding. And fifth, he argues the court's
decision to invoke the crowded-docket exception and continue his case was unreasonable.
We address these arguments in turn.

                                             13
                 1. The District Court Did Not Err by Applying the Crowded-Docket
                    Exception to the Circumstances of This Case

       First, Sinnard argues the crowded-docket exception simply does not apply in
situations like his. Under Sinnard's view, the district court would have been authorized to
invoke the crowded-docket exception only if the case originally scheduled for the first
setting, State v. Potts, had proceeded to trial on October 28, 2019. If not, Sinnard argues
the district court could not rely on the crowded-docket exception to continue his trial and
schedule yet another matter, State v. Ross, for the first setting on October 28. In other
words, once his trial was scheduled for the second setting on October 28, 2019, Sinnard
believes he had a vested right to automatically move into the first setting when State v.
Potts did not proceed to trial that day.

       But the plain language of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4) does not support
Sinnard's argument. See Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 224, 514 P.3d 1007 (2022) (in
interpreting statutes, courts first look to statute's plain language). The statute provides, in
relevant part:

                 "(b) If any person charged with a crime and held to answer on an appearance
       bond shall not be brought to trial within 180 days after arraignment on the charge, such
       person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime
       charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the
       defendant, or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (e).

                 ....

                 "(e) For those situations not otherwise covered by subsection (a), (b) or (c), the
       time for trial may be extended for any of the following reasons:

                 ....

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                       (4) because of other cases pending for trial, the court does not have
               sufficient time to commence the trial of the case within the time fixed for trial by
               this section. Not more than one continuance of not more than 30 days may be
               ordered upon this ground." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(b), (e)(4).

The plain language of the statute places no limit on the district court's ability to prioritize
trial settings on a given day. See State v. Young, 313 Kan. 724, 728, 490 P.3d 1183
(2021) (when statute's language is unambiguous, courts do not add or ignore words). Nor
does the language grant the defendant a vested right to have his or her case move into the
first trial setting if the original first setting does not proceed to trial.

       Instead, we have observed that the statute creates four conditions or limitations on
the crowded-docket exception. First, the district court may order only one continuance
based on a crowded docket. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4); Queen, 313 Kan. at 15
(statute "allows for a one-time, 30-day continuance"). Second, the district court must
order the continuance within the original speedy trial deadline. State v. Cox, 215 Kan.
803, 805, 528 P.2d 1226 (1974). Third, the new trial date must not be "'more than thirty
days after the limit otherwise applicable.'" State v. Coburn, 220 Kan. 750, 753, 556 P.2d
382 (1976). And fourth, the record must show that other pending cases, rather than
secondary matters such as witness availability, prevented the court from setting the trial
within the speedy trial deadline. See Queen, 313 Kan. at 22 (record did not support
crowded-docket finding when trial set outside of speedy trial deadline because of
difficulty securing witnesses at an earlier date); see also State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532,
543, 243 P.3d 683 (2010) (noting State presented no evidence to show other pending
cases prevented district court from commencing defendant's trial within statutory speedy
trial deadline).

       The district court's continuance of Sinnard's trial satisfied all four statutory
conditions. On October 16, 2019, the district court ordered a single continuance. The

                                                   15
court ordered that continuance before both Sinnard's original speedy trial deadline of
October 19, 2019, and the date to which he waived his speedy trial rights, October 28,
2019. The new trial date was set within 30 days of both October 19 and October 28. And
the record shows the district court continued Sinnard's trial because of other pending
cases and not because of secondary concerns like the availability of counsel or witnesses.
Thus, the crowded-docket exception applied to the circumstances of Sinnard's case.

              2. The District Court Did Not Base Its Decision on an Erroneous Legal
                 Conclusion

       Sinnard next argues the district court erroneously interpreted K.S.A. 2019 Supp.
22-3204(e)(4). Sinnard bases his argument on comments the district court judge made at
the August 5 hearing. There, the judge explained he did not make a crowded-docket
finding at the July 23 hearing (during which Sinnard's trial was scheduled for October 28)
because Sinnard waived his speedy trial rights up to October 28. The judge added: "Had
he not waived speedy trial, I may have had to make a [crowded-docket] finding at that
time, and I'm not sure I read the—I think as long as I am within the 30 days, I can move
[the trial] as necessary."

       Sinnard argues the district court judge erred by concluding that K.S.A. 2019 Supp.
22-3402(e)(4) permitted the judge to move Sinnard's trial "as necessary" because the
statute permits only one continuance. But here, the judge ordered only one continuance
based on the crowded-docket exception. So, even assuming Sinnard's interpretation of the
judge's comments are accurate, the district court did not act on any erroneous legal
conclusion. See Green, 315 Kan. at 180 (district court abuses its discretion if discretion is
guided by erroneous legal conclusion). Thus, Sinnard has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion on this basis.

                                             16
               3. The District Court's Fact-Findings Were Not Legally Inadequate

       Sinnard also argues that the district court's crowded-docket finding lacked the
requisite specificity. He claims the court needed to explicitly find on the record that it
lacked sufficient time to commence Sinnard's trial before the statutory speedy trial
deadline and that the reason it did not have sufficient time was because of other cases
pending for trial.

       Sinnard cites K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4) for support of this proposition. But
the plain language of that subsection does not require the district court to make any
specific findings on the record when invoking the crowded-docket exception.

       And while the district court did not use the precise language Sinnard believes to be
required, the court did make findings sufficient to establish that it could not commence
Sinnard's trial within the speedy trial deadline due to other pending cases. At the July 23
hearing, the judge walked through the many trials scheduled in the weeks to come and
stated, "I think there's ample basis for the Court to make a crowded-docket finding if I
have to go out past October 28." At the August 5 hearing, the judge again stated, "[M]y
docket is very crowded." And on October 16, 2019, when the judge invoked the crowded-
docket exception, he stated, "I don't have any other options" than to continue the trial to
November 12.

       Kansas appellate courts have consistently affirmed similar findings. See State v.
Rodriguez-Garcia, 27 Kan. App. 2d 439, 441, 8 P.3d 3 (1999) (district court's statement
"'I don't have anything open until November 17, 1997'" sufficient without more to
establish court's docket would not accommodate trial before November 17); State v.
Bennett, No. 117,800, 2018 WL 1770447, at *3 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion)
(The district court's statement that "'there's just no possibility of scheduling the case
earlier. This is the first date I've got available for a first setting'" is sufficient finding for

                                                17
crowded-docket exception.); State v. Parrish, No. 110,568, 2015 WL 967546, at *6 (Kan.
App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (district court's statement "'I will make a 30-day
finding as well, if it's close to being within that time frame, because my calendar is a
mess trying to find dates'" established earlier trial date was unavailable).

       The district court made findings sufficient to establish that it could not commence
Sinnard's trial within the speedy trial deadline due to other pending cases. Sinnard's
argument fails to establish that the district court abused its discretion.

              4. The Record Supports the District Court's Crowded-Docket Finding

       Next, Sinnard argues the district court abused its discretion by making an error of
fact because the record does not support the district court's crowded-docket finding. In
assessing this type of challenge, we review a district court's crowded-docket finding for
substantial competent evidence. Queen, 313 Kan. at 20. Substantial competent evidence
is "'such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might regard as sufficient to
support a conclusion.'" State v. Shockley, 314 Kan. 46, 53, 494 P.3d 832 (2021). "An
appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence, evaluate witness credibility, or
determine questions of fact, and the court presumes the district court found all facts
necessary to support its judgment." 314 Kan. at 53.

       In making his argument, Sinnard focuses on the time between his original trial
setting (July 29, 2019) and the statutory speedy trial deadline (October 19, 2019). He
highlights that at the July 23 hearing, the district court indicated there might be
availability for Sinnard's trial the weeks of August 19 and September 3. Because the
district court might have been able to accommodate his trial before October 19, 2019,
Sinnard claims the record does not support the district court's crowded-docket finding.

                                              18
       But Sinnard's argument ignores the circumstances of his case. At the July 23
hearing, the parties agreed to set Sinnard's case as the second setting on October 28,
2019. The State then pointed out that Sinnard's statutory speedy trial deadline was
October 19. The district court offered to look for earlier dates, but Sinnard agreed to
waive his speedy trial rights until October 28. Only then did the district court state that it
was unlikely that it could accommodate Sinnard's trial before October 28 in any event:

               "Alright. I said I would look for other dates, but the record should reflect that
       starting next week, I have a week-long rape trial. I have jury trials stacked the next week.
       Potentially—no, I can't, because Mr. Rosebud is the next week after that. Potentially, I
       could suggest August 19th. Then I have trial the week after that. I have a week in
       between those trials and then what starts is a three-week jury trial. My point is, I think
       there's ample basis for the Court to make a crowded docket finding if I have to go out
       past October 28."

Sinnard claims that these comments suggest the court might have had possible
availability the weeks of August 19 and September 3. But rather than inquiring about a
trial setting on those dates, Sinnard agreed to a second setting on October 28 and waived
his speedy trial rights up to that date. In other words, Sinnard invited the district court not
to set his trial before October 28, 2019.

       The record also establishes that on the day the district court ordered the
continuance—October 16, 2019—the earliest available date after October 28 for
Sinnard's trial was November 12. Ross was set for trial the week of October 28, and
another case was set for trial the week of November 4. The district court also stated on
the record that it had no other option but to continue Sinnard's trial to November 12.
Based on this evidence, a reasonable person could infer that on the day the district court
ordered the continuance, the earliest available date to set Sinnard's trial was November
12. See Shockley, 314 Kan. at 53.

                                                    19
       Thus, the district court's crowded-docket finding is supported by substantial
competent evidence. And Sinnard has failed to show the district court abused its
discretion by making any error of fact.

              5. The District Court's Decision to Grant a Continuance Based on the
                 Crowded-Docket Exception Was Not Unreasonable

       Finally, Sinnard argues no reasonable person would have set State v. Ross as the
first setting on October 28, 2019, and continued Sinnard's case because Ross was willing
to waive his speedy trial rights for as long as needed to ensure his attorneys could be
present at his trial. But as the panel observed, "[t]his argument ignores the fact that there
are other people involved in a jury trial of that type—the victims, other witnesses, the
trial attorneys, and court personnel. A trial judge setting trials must take all of those
interests into account when setting the docket." Sinnard, 2022 WL 5287901, at *3.

       The crowded-docket exception "was designed to accommodate the conflicting
demands of speedy justice and crowded court calendars," Coburn, 220 Kan. at 753. Here,
the district court reasonably balanced those interests. The district court explained that
State v. Ross involved "a high-level felony" and had been continued twice. The record
also indicates that State v. Ross had been pending longer than Sinnard's case. The district
court also noted that continuing State v. Ross would be especially difficult on the victim
in that case. And given witness availability, the court explained that the first date after
October 28 on which State v. Ross could be set for trial was February 10, 2020.

       We also disagree with Sinnard's contention that the record shows no consideration
for his speedy trial rights. Although the continuance of Sinnard's case pushed his trial
past the date to which he had waived those rights (October 28), the district court
rescheduled his trial for November 12, within 30 days of his original speedy trial deadline
(October 19). While it is possible another district court judge may have balanced these

                                              20
interests differently, the record does not show that the judge's decision to move State v.
Ross to October 28 and invoke the crowded-docket exception to continue Sinnard's trial
was "arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable." Green, 315 Kan. at 180.

       In sum, Sinnard has not met his burden to show that the district court abused its
discretion by continuing his trial under the crowded-docket exception. The district court's
continuance satisfied the statutory conditions for invoking the exception. The court's
crowded-docket finding is supported by substantial competent evidence, and a reasonable
person could agree with the court's decision to continue Sinnard's trial.

II. The District Court Did Not Err by Allowing Detective Slifer to Testify as a Lay
    Witness and Any Error in Admitting Slifer's Testimony About the Contents of
    Phone Records Not Admitted into Evidence Was Harmless Error

       Sinnard next raises two types of evidentiary challenges to Detective Slifer's
testimony. First, Sinnard argues the district court erred by allowing Slifer to testify as a
lay witness regarding how to interpret call records from Sinnard's cellular provider and
how cell towers generally connect to cell phones. Sinnard asserts Slifer's testimony on
these subjects included specialized knowledge that could only have been provided by a
qualified expert. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-456(a). Second, Sinnard argues Slifer's
testimony about the four weeks of phone records not admitted into evidence was hearsay,
and the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the hearsay exception for business
records under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-460(m).

       As to Sinnard's expert opinion challenge, the panel rejected Sinnard's argument
that Slifer's testimony crossed into expert opinion territory. The panel reasoned that Slifer
gave a "nontechnical explanation of commonly understood cell phone technology" when
he testified that cell phones generally connect to the closest cell tower. Sinnard, 2022 WL

                                              21
5287901, at *5. The panel also explained that Slifer did not try to pinpoint the location of
Sinnard's phone, and "[a] lay person reading the [admitted] call detail report and the
accompanying guide" could do what Slifer did. 2022 WL 5287901, at *5.

       As to Sinnard's hearsay challenge, the panel agreed that Detective Slifer's
testimony about the contents of phone records not admitted into evidence was hearsay
and the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for admitting that testimony under the
business records exception in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-460(n). 2022 WL 5287901, at *6.
Still, the panel held that the admission of that evidence was harmless error. 2022 WL
5287901, at *7.

       On review, Sinnard argues the panel erred by characterizing Slifer's testimony as
lay opinion. And while Sinnard agrees with the panel's holding regarding the erroneous
admission of Slifer's hearsay testimony, he argues that the admission of this evidence
affected the verdict. We review the expert opinion and hearsay challenges in turn.

       A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Allowing Detective
          Slifer to Testify as a Lay Witness

       To assess Sinnard's claim that Slifer improperly offered expert opinion testimony,
we first identify the applicable legal framework. Then, we examine the content of
Detective Slifer's testimony and the contemporaneous objections the defense lodged
against it. This will confirm which evidentiary challenges to Slifer's opinion testimony
are properly before our court. Finally, we review the merits of those expert opinion
objections that Sinnard properly preserved for appellate review.

              1. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework

       Any witness who testifies on a "relevant or material matter" must show they
"ha[ve] personal knowledge thereof, or experience, training or education if such be

                                             22
required." K.S.A. 60-419. Kansas law also permits a witness to testify in the form of
opinions or inferences when certain conditions are met. Such testimony is generally
divided into two categories—lay and expert opinion testimony.

       K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-456(a) and (b) provide the guidelines for the admissibility
of lay and expert opinion testimony:

               "(a) If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony in the form of
       opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds:
       (1) Are rationally based on the perception of the witness; (2) are helpful to a clearer
       understanding of the testimony of the witness; and (3) are not based on scientific,
       technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of subsection (b).

               "(b) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
       fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness who is qualified
       as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in
       the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (1) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or
       data; (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the
       witness has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case."

"The distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony results
from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from
a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field." United
States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 684 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing and quoting Fed. R.
Evid. 701 advisory committee notes [2000 amend.]).

       "'Whether a witness, expert or layman, is qualified to testify as to his or her
opinion is to be determined by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion.'" State v.
Timley, 311 Kan. 944, 952, 469 P.3d 54 (2020).

                                                    23
              2. Sinnard Did Not Preserve All His Objections to Detective Slifer's
                 Purported Expert Opinion Testimony

       Before discussing the merits of Sinnard's challenge to Detective Slifer's purported
expert opinion testimony, we must confirm what opinion testimony drew a
contemporaneous objection from the defense in compliance with K.S.A. 60-404. Just
before Detective Slifer testified at trial, Sinnard moved for an order to exclude any
testimony about cell phone technology. Sinnard argued that any testimony about how cell
phones connect with cell towers or why cell phones would connect with certain towers
over others was expert testimony and the State had not designated Slifer as an expert
under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3212.

       In response to the motion, the prosecutor said that Slifer would not be offering any
expert testimony. Instead, she believed Slifer would testify about the contents of
Sinnard's phone records, specifically what cell towers serviced certain calls. The
prosecutor added that Slifer would offer no opinion on the exact location of Sinnard's
phone at the time calls were made or received, other than to say cell phones generally
connect to the nearest cell phone tower.

       The district court ruled that Slifer could testify as a lay witness, provided he
testified only that cell phones generally connect to the nearest cell tower because that
knowledge was not so specialized as to qualify as expert testimony. The court added that
Sinnard was free to renew his objection if Slifer's testimony crossed into expert territory.

       When he took the stand, Slifer first discussed his experience with law enforcement
working with electronic devices and phone records. Then, without objection from the
defense, Slifer testified that cell phone service providers keep records of the dates and
times of customers' calls and text messages as well as the location of the towers that

                                             24
serviced those calls and messages. He also explained that cell phones generally connect
to the cell tower with the strongest signal, and the closest tower usually has the strongest
signal unless there is interference or a high volume of cell phone usage in the area.

       Slifer then discussed three exhibits that he had obtained from Sinnard's cell phone
service provider. One exhibit was a spreadsheet listing the calls made from or received by
Sinnard's phone on July 25, 2017; the times of those calls; and the addresses of the cell
phone towers that serviced those calls. Another exhibit was a guide explaining how to
read the phone records. And the final exhibit showed account details for the phone and
identified Sinnard as the subscriber. The parties stipulated to the admission of all three
exhibits.

       Detective Slifer explained the type of information that was contained in the phone
records and how the records were created. He also described the contents of the call
records from July 25, 2017. And he compared the location of the cell towers that had
serviced Sinnard's calls with the locations P.F. said she and Sinnard had traveled to on the
day of the incident. Sinnard did not object that any of this testimony constituted improper
expert opinion.

       At one point while Detective Slifer was describing the contents of the records, the
prosecutor asked Slifer to revisit his earlier testimony about the factors that influence
connections to cell towers. The question drew an objection on grounds of improper expert
opinion from defense counsel. The district court overruled the objection. Slifer once
again testified that cell phones generally connect to the nearest cell tower:

       "[A]ll other things being equal, your cell phone will try to connect to the tower that it has
       the strongest signal from, and the biggest variable in that is almost always distance. It
       tries to connect to the closest tower. There would be obviously exceptions . . . but in
       general, in a flat place, it will connect to the closest tower."

                                                     25
       As noted, Sinnard argued to the Court of Appeals that Slifer offered improper
expert opinion testimony on two subject-matter categories: (1) how cell towers generally
connect to cell phones; and (2) how to interpret call records from Sinnard's cellular
provider. The State argued that Sinnard had contemporaneously objected to testimony
falling into only the first category—how cell towers connect to cell phones. And by
failing to lodge a timely and specific objection to any other opinion testimony, as
required under K.S.A. 60-404, the State believed Sinnard had failed to preserve his
objection to Slifer's opinion testimony on the second category—how to interpret call
records. The panel did not address the State's statutory preservation argument. Instead, it
reached the merits, concluding all Slifer's challenged testimony was proper lay opinion.

       In his petition for review, Sinnard again challenged both subject-matter categories
of Slifer's opinion testimony. But the State did not renew its preservation argument under
K.S.A. 60-404 in a cross-petition or conditional cross-petition. Generally, we do not
consider issues not presented or fairly included in a cross-petition or conditional cross-
petition, although we retain authority to address a plain error not presented. See Supreme
Court Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 56.) Thus, one might argue that the
State's failure to renew its K.S.A. 60-404 preservation argument in a cross-petition or
conditional cross-petition precludes our review of that argument.

       But a K.S.A. 60-404 preservation argument is a different animal. K.S.A. 60-404
"directs that a verdict 'shall not' be set aside, or a judgment reversed, based on the
erroneous admission of evidence without a contemporaneous trial objection." State v.
Scheetz, 318 Kan. ___, ___, 541 P.3d 79, 83 (2024). In other words, the statute is a
legislative mandate limiting the authority of Kansas appellate courts to address
evidentiary challenges. Thus, much like jurisdictional issues, appellate courts may
consider a party's compliance with K.S.A. 60-404 on their own initiative.

                                              26
       One might also assume that if an appellate court concludes an evidentiary
challenge loses on its merits, any question of whether the challenge was properly
preserved under K.S.A. 60-404 would be inconsequential. But K.S.A. 60-404 permits
only one outcome regarding unpreserved evidentiary challenges: that the challenge will
not be the basis for setting aside the verdict or reversing the judgment. Thus, for an
appellate court to go beyond this pronouncement and consider the merits of the
unpreserved challenge—even to conclude no error occurred—would be akin to an
advisory opinion. And "Kansas courts do not render advisory opinions." Sierra Club v.
Stanek, 317 Kan. 358, 361, 529 P.3d 1271 (2023).

       For these reasons, we must determine whether Sinnard complied with K.S.A. 60-
404 as to Slifer's opinions on both subject-matter categories: (1) how cell phones
generally connect to cell towers; and (2) how to interpret the call records. As for the first
category, Sinnard argues some of Detective Slifer's explanations regarding the contents
of the records—such as the meanings of certain acronyms—exceeded the permissible
scope of lay testimony. But Sinnard did not object on these grounds at trial. See K.S.A.
60-404; State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 488, 231 P.3d 558 (2010) ("The contemporaneous
objection rule requires each party to make a specific and timely objection at trial in order
to preserve evidentiary issues for appeal."). So, that evidentiary challenge is not
preserved for our review, and we do not reach the merits of that challenge.

       As for the second category, Sinnard argues Detective Slifer's testimony regarding
cell tower connectivity to cell phones required specialized training and experience, and
thus the district court erred in allowing Slifer to provide lay testimony on this topic. As
noted, Sinnard moved to exclude this testimony before Slifer took the stand and later
renewed his objection during Slifer's testimony on this topic. These actions complied
with K.S.A. 60-404, and we have authority to review this issue on the merits.

                                             27
              3. Detective Slifer Provided Appropriate Lay Opinion Testimony

       The relevant inquiry here is whether the district court abused its discretion by
concluding that Detective Slifer's testimony was not so specialized as to be beyond a lay
person's ken and was thus admissible under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-456(a).

       Sinnard claims the panel's holding that Detective Slifer need not have been
qualified as an expert to discuss how cell phones generally connect with cell towers
conflicts with our decision in Timley. There, we held the district court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing a detective to provide lay testimony regarding the contents of cell
phone records, including the time a call was placed and the location of the cell tower that
serviced the call. Timley, 311 Kan. at 953-54. But the detective in Timley did not testify
regarding cell phone connectivity with cell towers, so that issue was not before us then.
Nor did we express any opinion in Timley on whether a lay witness could provide only
the same type of testimony as the detective in that case.

       While we did not address the issue in Timley, other jurisdictions have found that
general testimony about how cell phone towers function—including the typical range of
cell towers, that cell phones typically connect to the nearest tower, and factors affecting
connectivity—does not rely on specialized knowledge falling only within the purview of
an expert witness. See, e.g., United States v. Batista, 558 Fed. Appx. 874, 876 (11th Cir.
2014) (unpublished opinion) (records custodians could testify as lay witness that cell
phones connect to cell towers and phones generally connect to the tower with the closest,
strongest signal, adding "[i]t is common knowledge that cell phones connect wirelessly to
a nearby cell phone tower"); United States v. Kale, 445 Fed. Appx. 482, 485 (3d Cir.
2011) (unpublished opinion) (witness' limited discussion of operation of cell phone
towers did not require any "'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge'" and
"[a] person of average intelligence would almost certainly understand that the strength of
one's cell phone reception depends largely on one's proximity to a cell phone tower"). But

                                             28
see United States v. Natal, 849 F.3d 530, 536-37 (2d Cir. 2017) (Sprint employee's
testimony regarding how cell phone towers operate was expert testimony). And because
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-456 is substantively identical to the federal rules of evidence
governing lay and expert opinion testimony, federal caselaw interpreting those provisions
is persuasive. State v. Lyman, 311 Kan. 1, 21, 455 P.3d 393 (2020); State v. Sasser, 305
Kan. 1231, 1244-45, 391 P.3d 698 (2017).

       Indeed, in a case involving testimony like Slifer's, the Fourth Circuit held that a
witness need not be qualified as an expert to testify about cell tower function. United
States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g 824 F.3d
421 (4th Cir. 2016). In Graham, a Sprint records custodian testified that cell phones
connect to the cell tower emitting the strongest signal, and that along with proximity,
factors such as line of sight and volume of call traffic may affect the ability of a phone to
connect to a certain cell tower. The Fourth Circuit held that the witness' testimony did not
"rise to the level of an expert opinion" because the witness "did not . . . engage in any
analysis comparing the factors or seek to determine how these factors resulted in any
particular connection, which would have required scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge." 796 F.3d at 365. Instead, the witness "merely presented the fact that these
factors exist, which prevented the jury from being misled into believing that signal
strength is a matter of proximity alone or that a cell phone will always connect to the
nearest tower." 796 F.3d at 365.

       On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has held that an agent's testimony
"concerning how cell phone towers operate constituted expert testimony because it
involved specialized knowledge not readily accessible to any ordinary person." Yeley-
Davis, 632 F.3d at 684. In Yeley-Davis, the agent made a chart of phone calls made
between the defendant and a coconspirator, but a third phone number was included in the

                                             29
chart. The agent explained the third number was the coconspirator's number because
when a person travels outside "[their] assigned area" the cell tower will assign a new
phone number for "switching purposes to get to [their] phone." 632 F.3d at 683-84.

       But a closer examination of Yeley-Davis reveals that it is distinguishable. In Yeley-
Davis, the agent applied his specialized knowledge about cell tower operation to the
evidence and drew a conclusion about a discrepancy in the phone records at issue in those
proceedings. See also State v. Patton, 419 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)
("analysis of the many variables that influence cell site signal strength," which was
probative of whether the defendant was closer to one of two towers with overlapping
coverage, amounts to expert opinion testimony). But here, Slifer provided only general
testimony about the factors that affect cell phone connectivity. He did not apply that
knowledge to the evidence in the case to provide an opinion on the location of Sinnard's
phone at the time certain calls were made or to explain how connectivity factors resulted
in a connection to a particular cell tower. See State v. Blurton, 484 S.W.3d 758, 772 (Mo.
2016) (lay witness testimony based on cell phone records did not cross line into expert
witness territory because witness did not "attempt[] to pinpoint the defendants' exact
location within a small geographic area"). In fact, the Tenth Circuit later distinguished
Yeley-Davis on similar grounds. See United States v. Henderson, 564 Fed. Appx. 352,
364 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (distinguishing Yeley-Davis because there
was no discrepancy in Henderson's phone records needing expert clarification and
opinion testimony focused on location of cell towers to which phone connected).

       We agree with those jurisdictions that have found that a lay witness may provide
general information about how cell towers function. Such lay testimony is proper so long
as the witness does not rely on such information to support a more technical opinion
regarding topics such as the location of a cell phone at a particular time, an explanation as
to why a cell phone connected to a specific cell tower over another, or an explanation of
apparent discrepancies in call records. Slifer's testimony fits comfortably within this rule.

                                             30
He identified proximity as the primary factor influencing a cell phone's connection to a
cell tower. He also acknowledged cell phone connectivity is subject to other variables.
But he did not explain the science behind cell phone connectivity in technical detail. Nor
did he try to pinpoint the location of Sinnard's cell phone at any given time. See Timley,
311 Kan. at 953-54 (finding detective's lay testimony properly admitted, in part, because
he "did not definitively represent that [the defendant] was present at any given point at
any given time").

       For these reasons, Sinnard has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing Slifer to testify as a lay witness. And we affirm the Court of
Appeals' judgment on this point.

       B. The District Court Erred by Admitting Detective Slifer's Testimony About
          the Contents of Phone Records Not Admitted into Evidence but the Error
          Is Harmless

       In addition to the opinion testimony discussed above, Detective Slifer also testified
that he had reviewed Sinnard's phone records for the two weeks before and the two weeks
after July 25, 2017. Slifer explained that he typically requests four weeks of cell phone
data so he can identify a pattern of usage for a particular subscriber and determine
whether any phone activity deviated from that pattern. The phone records for that four-
week period were not admitted into evidence. Even so, the State asked Slifer if he saw a
pattern of Sinnard's cell phone connecting with the cell tower in Tonganoxie during that
period.

       Sinnard objected to the question on hearsay grounds, satisfying the
contemporaneous objection rule in K.S.A. 60-404. But the district court overruled the
objection. Slifer then said: "The only time the cell phone used any towers in Tonganoxie,

                                             31
Kansas, were on July 25th, 2017. It did it five times, and those are the five times that you
see in Exhibit 5. It is the only time in that four-week period it used those towers in
Tonganoxie."

       On appeal, Sinnard argued that the district court erred by overruling his objection
and admitting Slifer's testimony. The panel agreed, reasoning that Slifer's testimony about
the unadmitted cell phone records was hearsay. Sinnard, 2022 WL 5287901, at *6. But it
concluded that this error was harmless.

       On review to our court, Sinnard agrees with the panel's admissibility analysis but
contends that the erroneous admission of Slifer's testimony impacted the verdict. The
State contends that the testimony was not hearsay at all.

               1. Standard of Review and Legal Framework

       "Like many evidentiary determinations considered on appeal, an appellate court
reviews a trial court's admission or exclusion of hearsay statements for an abuse of
discretion." State v. Race, 293 Kan. 69, 75, 259 P.3d 707 (2011).

       Hearsay is defined as "[e]vidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-460. "Out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated are not hearsay under K.S.A. 60-460." 293 Kan. at 76. "'The
theory behind the hearsay rule is that when a statement is offered as evidence of the truth
of the matter stated, the credibility of the declarant is the basis for its reliability, and the
declarant must therefore be subject to cross-examination.'" 293 Kan. at 76.

                                               32
              2. The Detective's Testimony Was Inadmissible but Not Prejudicial

       The four weeks of phone records constituted out-of-court statements because the
State did not admit those records into evidence. And Detective Slifer's testimony about
the content of those records was offered to prove that Sinnard's phone had not connected
with the Tonganoxie tower on any day other than July 25, 2017. Thus, Slifer's testimony
about the content of those records should not have been admitted at trial unless an
exception to the hearsay rule applied. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-460.

       Rather than argue that a hearsay exception applied, the State argues the testimony
was not hearsay at all. The State cites State v. Randle, 311 Kan. 468, 477, 462 P.3d 624
(2020), which held, "A statement is not hearsay if it is 'used circumstantially as giving
rise to an indirect inference but not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted.'" The
State argues Slifer's testimony was offered to support the inference that Sinnard's phone
did not connect to any towers other than the towers specified in those records. But that is
a direct inference from the unadmitted phone records (the out-of-court statements), and it
was clearly offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that Sinnard's phone did not
connect with the Tonganoxie tower on any day other than July 25, 2017. Thus, Randle is
inapposite.

       The State also argues the records were computer-generated and thus non-hearsay.
The State relies on State v. Everette, No. 115,645, 2018 WL 4517575 (Kan. App. 2018)
(unpublished opinion), where a panel of the Court of Appeals distinguished computer-
stored information from computer-generated information. The panel held the former is
hearsay while the latter is not. 2018 WL 4517575, at *7. But the State did not establish at
trial that the call records were entirely computer-generated. See 2018 WL 4517575, at *7
(defendant produced no evidence that call logs were entirely computer-generated, thus no

                                             33
foundation to admit call logs as nonhearsay-computer-generated records). So even if the
rule in Everette controlled, the State failed to establish a foundation for admission of the
challenged records under that rule.

       Further, as we noted, the purpose of the hearsay rule is to ensure the credibility of
declarants when their out-of-court statements are offered for the proof of the matter
asserted. State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 127, 262 P.3d 285 (2011). Courts have reasoned
that out-of-court statements that are auto-generated by a machine do not present the same
credibility concerns as statements made by a person because "'there is no possibility of a
conscious misrepresentation.'" State v. Schuette, 273 Kan. 593, 596, 44 P.3d 459 (2002)
(quoting State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837, 840 [La. 1983]), disapproved of on other
grounds by State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). But this rationale
applies to the computer-generated records themselves. Here, the State did not admit the
four weeks of call records. Instead, Slifer testified about the contents of those unadmitted
records. The rationale for admitting auto-generated records does not extend to a live
witness testifying to the contents of machine-generated records that are not in evidence.

       Thus, Detective Slifer's testimony about the contents of the unadmitted call
records was hearsay, and the district court erred by admitting it.

       Having found error, we must now consider whether it was harmless. The
erroneous admission of evidence is reviewed under the statutory harmless error test.
Under that test, the party benefitting from the error (in this case, the State) has the burden
to show there is no reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of
the trial in light of the entire record. State v. Gaona, 293 Kan. 930, 940, 270 P.3d 1165
(2012); see also K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-261 (erroneous admission of evidence is harmless
unless it affects the defendant's substantial rights).

                                               34
        We agree with the Court of Appeals that the evidentiary error was harmless. As
the panel pointed out, "[t]he incriminating part of Detective Slifer's testimony was that
Sinnard's phone connected to the Tonganoxie tower and then the Kansas City tower at the
times P.F. said they were in Tonganoxie and at Legends in Kansas City. The
unchallenged exhibits displaying Sinnard's cell phone records corroborated P.F.'s
testimony on those points." Sinnard, 2022 WL 5287901, at *7. Slifer's testimony about
Sinnard's phone activity during the weeks before and after July 25, 2017, suggested his
phone activity on the day of the incident was unusual. This information would have
added an additional level of corroboration to P.F.'s version of events but was insignificant
compared to the inculpatory records from July 25, which were admitted without
objection.

        And Sinnard is incorrect that P.F.'s testimony was otherwise uncorroborated.
Along with Sinnard's phone records from July 25, 2017, the State corroborated P.F.'s
account with the following evidence: (1) a screenshot from P.F.'s phone of the Google
Maps application showing P.F. was near the University of Kansas campus on the day and
time P.F. claimed to be at Sinnard's apartment near the campus; (2) testimony that
Sinnard's apartment was located on a one-way street like the one P.F. described;
(3) photographs and a diagram of Sinnard's apartment which matched P.F.'s description;
(4) photographs of a sex toy recovered from Sinnard's apartment which matched P.F.'s
description; (5) M.F.'s testimony about what P.F. told her, which was generally consistent
with P.F.'s testimony; and (6) Detective Slifer's testimony about information uncovered in
his investigation which matched details P.F. had provided him, such as Sinnard using a
Snapchat account with the user name "Blu" and working at a car dealership. Given P.F.'s
testimony and the other evidence corroborating it, the State has met its burden to show
there is no reasonable probability that Detective Slifer's hearsay affected the outcome of
the trial.

                                             35
III. The District Court's Elements Instruction Was Not Clearly Erroneous

       Next, Sinnard challenges the jury instruction on the elements of commercial
sexual exploitation of a child. At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court
instructed the jury:

               "The defendant is charged with commercial sexual exploitation of a child. The
       defendant pleads not guilty.

               "To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

               "1. The defendant hired [P.F.] by giving, offering, or agreeing to give, anything
                      of value to any person.

               "2. The defendant hired [P.F.] to engage in sexual intercourse.

               "3. At the time of the act, [P.F.] was less than 18 years old. The State need not
                      prove the defendant knew the child's age.

               "4. This act occurred on or about the 25th day of July, 2017, in Douglas County,
                      Kansas.

               ....

               "The State must prove that the defendant committed the crime knowingly. A
       defendant acts knowingly when the defendant is aware of the circumstances in which he
       was acting."

       Sinnard contends the culpable mental state of "knowingly" should have been
included in the first and second elements, rather than placed only in a separate paragraph
below the listed elements. And he asserts the failure to include the word "knowingly" in
the first and second elements is akin to omitting an essential element of the crime.

                                                    36
       A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework

       We follow a multi-step framework when addressing instructional error issues.
First, we consider whether the issue was properly preserved below. Second, we decide
whether the challenged instruction was legally and factually appropriate. In doing so, we
exercise unlimited review of the entire record and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the requesting party. Third, upon a finding of error, we determine whether
that error requires reversal. State v. Douglas, 313 Kan. 704, 709, 490 P.3d 34 (2021).

       The first step of this framework affects the last step because an unpreserved
instructional error will be considered for clear error—that is, the error may be considered
harmless unless the party claiming it can firmly convince us the jury would have reached
a different verdict without the error. State v. Harris, 310 Kan. 1026, 1034-35, 453 P.3d
1172 (2019); see also K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3414(3) ("No party may assign as error the
giving or failure to give an instruction . . . unless the party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict . . . unless the instruction or the failure to give an instruction
is clearly erroneous."). Because Sinnard raises his instructional challenge for the first
time on appeal, we apply the clear error standard for reversibility.

       B. The Challenged Instructions Accurately Stated the Law and Were Not
          Reasonably Likely to Confuse the Jury

       Sinnard's claim of error centers on the legal appropriateness of the challenged
instruction. A jury instruction is legally appropriate when it fairly and accurately states
the applicable law. State v. Broxton, 311 Kan. 357, 361, 461 P.3d 54 (2020).
Furthermore, the district court has the duty to inform the jury of every essential element
of the crime charged. State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176, 181, 224 P.3d 553 (2010). This
duty arises from a defendant's jury trial right as guaranteed by the state and federal

                                               37
Constitutions. State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 847, 416 P.3d 116 (2018); State v. Brown,
298 Kan. 1040, 1045, 318 P.3d 1005 (2014). Thus, if Sinnard is correct that the
challenged instruction omits an essential element of the crime charged, the instruction
would be legally erroneous.

       "[A] culpable mental state is an essential element of every crime defined by"
Kansas' criminal code, unless otherwise provided. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5202(a). And if
a statute prescribes a culpable mental state for a crime but does not distinguish between
the material elements of that crime, the culpable mental state applies to all the material
elements "unless a contrary purpose plainly appears." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5202(f).

       Here, Sinnard was charged with commercial sexual exploitation of a child under
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6422(a)(1), which provides,

       "Commercial sexual exploitation of a child is knowingly . . . Hiring a person younger
       than 18 years of age by giving, or offering or agreeing to give, anything of value to any
       person, to engage in a manual or other bodily contact stimulation of the genitals of any
       person with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of the offender or another,
       sexual intercourse, sodomy or any unlawful sexual act."

       K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6422(a)(1) prescribes a culpable mental state of
"knowingly" but does not distinguish between the material elements of the crime. Thus,
to be convicted of that crime, the State must show that the defendant knowingly hired the
victim by giving, or offering or agreeing to give, anything of value to any person; and
that the defendant knowingly engaged in certain sex acts with the victim. But the State
need not show the defendant knew the victim was under 18 years of age. K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 21-5204 provides that proof of a mental culpable state does not require the accused
to have knowledge of the age of a minor, even when the age is a material element of the
crime charged. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5204(b).

                                                    38
       Sinnard relies on State v. Jackson, 61 Kan. App. 2d 184, 188, 500 P.3d 1188
(2021), to argue the challenged instruction is erroneous. In Jackson, the Court of Appeals
addressed an instructional challenge to an elements instruction for commercial sexual
exploitation of a child under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6422(a)(1). The instruction in
Jackson did not include the word "knowingly" in the first and second elements of the
crime, nor did it later inform the jury that the State had to prove the defendant committed
the crime knowingly. The panel recognized the given instruction mirrored PIK Crim. 4th
64.091 (2017 Supp.) but held that both the given instruction and the pattern instruction
erroneously omitted the required culpable mental state. 61 Kan. App. 2d at 188.

       But Jackson is clearly distinguishable. Unlike the instruction in Jackson, the
instruction here informed the jury of the culpable mental state. The instruction stated:
"The State must prove that the defendant committed the crime knowingly." The
instruction also clarified that the State need not prove that Sinnard knew P.F. was under
18 years of age, so the jury could infer the State must prove Sinnard committed the other
two elements knowingly. Thus, the panel here correctly held the instruction was legally
appropriate because it "clearly instructed [the jury] that the defendant's actions had to
have been done knowingly." Sinnard, 2022 WL 5287901, at *9.

       Granted, the instruction Sinnard proposes on appeal would have also been legally
appropriate. He argues the instruction should have said, "The defendant knowingly hired
[P.F.] by giving, offering, or agreeing to give, anything of value to any person," and,
"The defendant knowingly hired [P.F.] to engage in sexual intercourse." (Emphases
added.) And in fact, after the Court of Appeals issued Jackson, PIK Crim. 4th 64.091 was
amended to include the word "knowingly" in the first two elements of commercial sexual
exploitation of a child under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6422(a)(1).

                                             39
        But the fact Sinnard's proposed instruction would have also been legally
appropriate does not establish error. A party is not entitled to any proposed instruction
merely because it is legally and factually appropriate. Thus, if a party's requested
instruction is legally and factually appropriate, "we must also determine whether the
instructions given by the district court, considered together as a whole, properly and
fairly stated the applicable law and were not reasonably likely to mislead the jury." State
v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 820, 511 P.3d 931 (2022), cert. denied 143 S. Ct. 616 (2023).
"If so, the district court's failure to give the requested instruction does not constitute
error." 315 Kan. at 820. For the reasons explained above, the instructions given properly
and fairly stated the elements of commercial sexual exploitation of a child under K.S.A.
2017 Supp. 21-6422(a)(1) and these instructions would not have reasonably misled the
jury.

        Thus, Sinnard has failed to establish any instructional error. And because there
was no instructional error, we need not proceed to the reversibility inquiry—the third step
of the instructional error framework.

IV. Did Cumulative Error Deprive Sinnard of a Fair Trial?

        Finally, Sinnard contends the cumulative effect of the alleged evidentiary errors
and instructional error deprived him of a fair trial. "The effect of separate trial errors may
require reversal of a defendant's conviction when the totality of the circumstances
establish that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the errors and denied a fair
trial." State v. Martinez, 317 Kan. 151, 172, 527 P.3d 531 (2023). But Sinnard has
established only one error—the admission of hearsay evidence—and that error was
harmless. "A single, nonreversible error does not establish reversible cumulative error."
State v. Ballou, 310 Kan. 591, 617, 448 P.3d 479 (2019). Thus, Sinnard is not entitled to
relief on these grounds.

                                               40
                                       CONCLUSION

       In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by invoking the crowded-
docket exception under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4) to continue Sinnard's trial
beyond the original speedy trial deadline. The district court's continuance satisfied the
statutory conditions to invoke the exception. Substantial competent evidence supports the
district court's crowded-docket finding. And the district court's decision was not
objectively unreasonable.

       Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Detective Slifer to testify
as a lay witness. Slifer's testimony about cell phone connectivity was not so specialized
as to bring it within the realm of expert testimony. And he did not analyze the factors
affecting connectivity and apply that knowledge to determine the location of Sinnard's
phone at any given time, to explain why Sinnard's phone connected to a particular tower,
or to otherwise explain inconsistencies in the call records.

       While the district court erred in admitting Detective Slifer's hearsay testimony
regarding the contents of the four weeks of phone records not admitted into evidence, we
agree with the panel's conclusion that this error was harmless.

       The jury instruction on the elements of commercial sexual exploitation of a child
was legally appropriate and did not omit an essential element of the offense. While
Sinnard's proposed instruction was also legally appropriate, the instructions given
accurately stated the law and were not reasonably likely to confuse the jury.

       Finally, because we have identified only one nonreversible error, the cumulative
error doctrine does not apply.

                                             41
       Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed.
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

       ROSEN, J., concurs in the result.

                                              42