Court Opinion

ID: 9927049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 01:02:02.787028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.660756
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/24 P. v. Powell CA2/4

            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B327804

       Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. A079362
       v.

ERNEST LEE POWELL,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathryn A. Solorzano, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
      Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stefanie
Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       Defendant and appellant Ernest Lee Powell petitioned the
trial court under former Penal Code section 1170.95 to have his
1981 second degree murder conviction vacated.1 The trial court
granted the petition and vacated Powell’s murder conviction. The
court resentenced Powell to a five-year upper term for robbery, a
one-year firearm enhancement, and a concurrent three-year
upper term for burglary. On appeal, Powell argues the court
erred by imposing upper terms for robbery and burglary in light
of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 567). He also
argues the court erred by imposing the firearm enhancement.
       We conclude remand is warranted for resentencing in light
of SB 567 and order Powell’s sentence vacated. As discussed in
greater detail below, at Powell’s new sentencing hearing, the trial
court is directed to consider its full range of sentencing options,
including whether to reimpose the firearm enhancement.
Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, on remand the trial
court is directed to consider whether and how the question of
mootness impacts this case.

1      All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. We will refer
interchangeably to these two different section numbers
depending on the context. Section 1172.6 provides relief for
certain individuals convicted of murder under the felony murder
rule, natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other
theory of imputed-malice liability. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)

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               PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In 1979, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
information charging Powell with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)),
robbery (§ 211), and burglary (§ 459). With respect to all counts,
the information alleged Powell personally used a firearm.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)2 In 1981, Powell pled guilty to second
degree murder and admitted the firearm use allegation was true.
The trial court sentenced him to a seven-year term for the
murder, plus a two-year firearm enhancement, for a total term of
nine years in state prison.
      In 2021, Powell filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95.3 The prosecution conceded Powell had
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief because he
was charged and pled guilty under the felony murder rule.
      In 2022, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d). The prosecution indicated it could
not locate its witness, Gregory Locke, and had no other
admissible evidence proving Powell was the actual killer or that
Powell could otherwise be convicted of murder under current law.
      At a later hearing, the court noted Powell’s guilty plea
could not establish that he remained guilty of murder under
current law. The court vacated Powell’s murder conviction and
held a resentencing hearing. The prosecution asked the court to

2    The Attorney General’s request for judicial notice of
Powell’s information and the reporter’s transcript from his
change of plea hearing is granted.
3     While serving his murder sentence, Powell was convicted in
an unrelated drug case and sentenced to 25 years to life under
the Three Strikes law. He was still in custody serving that
sentence as his resentencing petition proceeded in the trial court.

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sentence Powell on the remaining charges of robbery and
burglary, and to impose a firearm enhancement on the robbery
count. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecution’s request
that the court impose the firearm enhancement.
       The court sentenced Powell to an upper term of five years
on the robbery, plus two years on the firearm enhancement, for a
total term of seven years in state prison.4 It imposed a three-year
upper term on the burglary count but stayed sentencing under
section 654. Defense counsel did not object to the court’s
imposition of upper term sentences.
       Powell timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      I.    The matter is remanded for resentencing in
            light of SB 567

     Powell first argues the trial court’s imposition of upper
terms on his robbery and burglary convictions violated the
ameliorative provisions of SB 567.5 In raising this argument,

4     Although the trial court orally imposed a one-year firearm
enhancement, the sentencing hearing minute order and abstract
of judgment reflect the court imposed a two-year term on the
firearm enhancement. The proper sentence was the punishment
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) when Powell was
sentenced in 1981 – namely two years imprisonment. (See People
v. Martinez (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 18, People v. Zamarron
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 865, 871 [prior to January 1, 1990, a
firearm use enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
was punishable by a two-year term].)
5     Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 “amended
section 1170, subdivision (b) to specify that, when a sentencing
court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall

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Powell notes the trial court did not state its reasons for imposing
the upper term sentences. The Attorney General counters Powell
forfeited his argument by not objecting in the trial court, but
contends that, assuming Powell’s argument is not forfeited, the
matter should be remanded for resentencing because it is not
clear what the court relied on in imposing the upper terms.
       Although it is true Powell’s attorney did not object in the
trial court, we are of the view that forfeiture principles should not
preclude Powell from receiving the benefits conferred by the
Legislature in enacting SB 567. (See, e.g., People v. Smith (2001)
24 Cal.4th 849, 852 [arguments that a sentence is unauthorized
are reviewable whether or not an objection was raised in the trial
court]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [reviewing
court may consider issues not raised in the trial court that
present pure questions of law on undisputed facts].)6 We
therefore order his sentence vacated and remand the matter for a
new sentencing hearing. (Cf. People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th
857, 893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on
remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing

not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the
aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the defendant’s
stipulation to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is
waived) beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior
convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. (Stats.
2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(1)—
(3), by amendment.)” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37,
44.)
6     We agree with Powell that SB 567 applies retroactively to
his nonfinal case. (People v. Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125,
1130-1131.)

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discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’”].) At the new
hearing, the trial court is directed to apply SB 567 in determining
Powell’s sentence.

      II.   Powell’s arguments regarding the firearm
            enhancement

      Powell next argues the trial court’s imposition of the
firearm enhancement was an unauthorized sentence and must be
stricken. The Attorney General contends Powell also forfeited
this argument by not objecting in the trial court, and assuming
Powell had not forfeited it, the imposition of the enhancement
was proper. Review is currently pending before our Supreme
Court in another case on whether enhancements may be imposed
by a trial court when resentencing under section 1172.6.7 And, as
the parties expound in their briefs, there is a split of authority in
the Courts of Appeal on this issue. (Compare Arellano, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at pp. 422, 432-437 [language of section 1172.6 does
not authorize trial courts to attach enhancements to redesignated
target or underlying convictions when resentencing petitioners on
those counts] with People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727,
741-742 (Howard) [section 1172.6 permits trial courts to impose
related enhancements when resentencing on redesignated
convictions so long as the new sentence is not greater than the
original sentence].)

7     The Supreme Court has granted review in People v.
Arellano (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 418 (Arellano), review granted
Mar. 15, 2023, S277962 on the following issue: “When a
defendant obtains resentencing for a conviction under Penal Code
section 1172.6, subdivision (e), is the trial court permitted to
impose not only the [sentence for the] target offense or
underlying felony, but also corresponding enhancements?”

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       Because (as discussed above) we are vacating Powell’s
entire sentence, including the firearm enhancement, and
remanding the matter for a full resentencing hearing, we need
not address Powell’s argument that the firearm enhancement
must be stricken. We note the trial court has discretion to strike
the firearm enhancement in light of Senate Bill No. 620 (SB 620)
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.).8

      III.   The court’s oral pronouncement of judgment on
             the firearm enhancement

      The Attorney General points out that although the trial
court apparently intended to impose a two-year term on the
firearm enhancement, which was the punishment under section
12022.5, subdivision (a) when Powell was sentenced in 1981, at
the resentencing hearing, the court instead orally imposed a one-
year term on the firearm enhancement. As noted above in
footnote four, the proper enhancement would have been two
years. The Attorney General requests that we order oral
pronouncement of judgment corrected. Because we are vacating
Powell’s sentence and remanding the matter for a resentencing
hearing, we need not address this issue.

      IV.    Mootness

      As mentioned above, at Powell’s resentencing hearing, the
court sentenced him to an upper term of five years on the
robbery, plus two years on the firearm enhancement. The trial
court then awarded Powell 18,803 days of custody credit. The

8     Effective January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 620 amended
section 12022.5, subdivision (c) to give trial courts discretion to
strike firearm enhancements imposed under section 12022.5.
(People v. Contreraz (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 965, 967-969.)

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parties’ briefing does not address whether the issues presented
on appeal are rendered moot by the fact that Powell has already
served significantly more prison time than the trial court may
lawfully impose on resentencing. (See People v. Rish (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380 [“‘[A] case becomes moot when a court
ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties
with effective relief.’”].) The issue of mootness, and how mootness
might impact this case as it proceeds through the appellate
process, is an issue the trial court should consider on remand.

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                        DISPOSITION

       Powell’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court for a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the
trial court is directed to consider its full range of lawful
sentencing options. As discussed above, that includes (but is not
limited to) applying SB 567 and SB 620. The court is also directed
to consider whether Powell’s credits for time served exceed any
possible sentence the court may re-impose, and whether the issue
of resentencing is moot.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                  CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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