Court Opinion

ID: 9471862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:42:55.7181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:36.446316
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring.
I agree that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest appellants at the time they stopped appellants’ car. From the police radio broadcasts the police officers knew that the branch bank had just been robbed by two white males armed with a pistol and a shotgun, the general description of the robbers and their clothing, and the descriptions of two cars that were possibly involved in the bank robbery: a 1971 or 1972 green Ford and a 1974 or 1975 full-sized, dark blue or black Thunderbird or Mercury. The police officers also knew that the green Ford had already been located in a parking lot and that the dark blue or black ear had green license plates. These facts establish reasonable suspicion; however, nothing more than suspicion connected either the green car or the dark blue or black car with the bank robbery. None of the bank employees could describe the getaway car. Witness Hofer, the man who had seen the cars in the motel parking lot before the bank robbery and later saw the green car driving away from the bank at a normal rate of speed immediately after the robbery, could not connect the cars with the robbery. Another person did provide a more definite connection between the robbery and the green car because he saw the green car speeding away from the bank at the time of the robbery. However, the police officers had already stopped the car when the information provided by Fisher was broadcast over the police radio.
The crucial question thus is whether the police officers’ actions can fairly be characterized as an investigatory stop which is permissible on the basis of reasonable suspicion only, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), or as an *1149arrest for which the police officers lacked probable cause. The proper characterization of the police officers’ actions in turn depends upon the significance we should attribute to the police officers’ approach with drawn weapons under the circumstances of this case. This is a difficult question. The cases involving police officers’ approaches to cars, with or without weapons, are not consistent and quite often contrary results have been reached in cases involving similar facts. See United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177, 181-84 (2d Cir. 1981) (reviewing cases). The present case certainly does not involve a brief and minimally intrusive encounter between the police and the subjects under investigation. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (airport investigatory stop). Here, the police officers stopped the car by flashing red lights, then approached the car with their weapons drawn and ordered appellants at gunpoint not to move. The officers did not ask appellants any questions. In my opinion this kind of action is almost indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Nonetheless, I agree that the police officers’ use of force (approaching the car with drawn weapons) was reasonably predicated upon the specific facts known to the police officers and which warranted such precautions: the occupants of the car were suspected armed bank robbers. See United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir.) (gun drawn when approaching armed bank robber), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed.2d 594 (1981); United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir.1977) (armed attempted bank robbers; shots had been fired); United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1314 (D.C.Cir.1975) (armed bank robbers), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852, 97 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed.2d 127 (1976). See also Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.-2(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1975) (officer may use such force as reasonably necessary, short of deadly force, to stop any person or vehicle); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(d), at 30-32 (1978 & Supp.1984) (suggesting that an otherwise valid stop is not inevitably rendered unreasonable merely because the suspect’s car is blockaded or when the police officers draw weapons). But see United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d at 252-55 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.1979) (police officers force taxi off the road and surround passengers without drawing guns; arrest); United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir.1974) (car surrounded by police officers; orders given at gunpoint; arrest).
Because I think that the police officers' actions, even though the use of drawn weapons was involved, can be fairly characterized as an investigatory stop which was based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, I concur.