Court Opinion

ID: 9841190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 16:08:16.596191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:31.315653
License: Public Domain

J-A12030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 RALPH J. REISH, JR., EXECUTOR OF             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH M.                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
 REISH, DECEASED AND RALPH J.                 :
 REISH, JR., EXECUTOR OF THE                  :
 ESTATE OF RALPH J. REISH, SR.,               :
 DECEASED                                     :
                                              :
                      Appellant               :
                                              :   No. 2429 EDA 2022
                                              :
               v.                             :
                                              :
                                              :
 VISITING ANGELS                              :

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 26, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
                          No(s): 2021-19136

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2023

        Appellant Ralph J. Reish, Jr., Executor of the Estates of Elizabeth M.

Reish and Ralph J. Reish, Sr. (collectively, “Decedents”), appeals from the

order    sustaining   Appellee    Visiting   Angels’    preliminary objections and

dismissing Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice. Appellant contends

that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellee did not owe a duty of care

to Decedents and that Appellant failed to plead sufficient facts in support of

his claims. We affirm.

        The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case

as follows:

        [Appellant] commenced this wrongful death and survival action
        against [Appellee] by writ [of summons] on September 22, 2021.
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       [Appellant] filed a complaint on January 6, 2022, to which
       [Appellee] preliminarily objected. [Appellant] responded by filing
       an amended complaint.         [Appellee] again filed preliminary
       objections, which this time were followed by an answer from
       [Appellant] and a reply from [Appellee].

       [Appellant] alleged in the amended complaint that [Appellee]
       provided non-medical home and personal care services to
       Decedents in their residence in Pottstown, Montgomery County,
       between October and December 2020. Ralph J. Reish, Sr., died
       at the age of 89 on December 20, 2020. Elizabeth M. Reish died
       on January 2, 2021, at the age of 88. [Appellant] alleged both
       died from COVID-19[1] because [Appellee] and/or its staff did not
       take proper COVID-19 precautions, despite being aware of the
       risks posed to Decedents and the safety protocols necessary to
       avoid transmission of the disease. The amended complaint
       demanded compensatory and punitive damages.

Trial Ct. Op., 11/15/22, at 1-2 (citations and footnote omitted).

       In his amended complaint, Appellant alleged that Appellee owed

Decedents a “duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care which a

reasonably prudent person would exercise” to avoid infecting Decedents with

____________________________________________

1 COVID-19 refers to:

       A novel coronavirus [that] began infecting humans in China in
       December 2019. As of March 11, 2020, the World Health
       Organization (“WHO”) announced that the coronavirus, which had
       spread into at least 144 countries including the United States, had
       infected at least 118,000 people, and had killed more than 4,000
       people, was officially a pandemic.

Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 877 (Pa. 2020) (citation
omitted); see also Ungarean v. CNA, 286 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(stating that “COVID-19 is a novel contagious virus that can cause severe
acute respiratory illness. In the first three months of the pandemic, it killed
thousands of Pennsylvanians, and over 100,000 people nationwide”), appeal
granted, --- A.3d ---, 313 WAL 2022, 2023 WL 4530116 (Pa. filed July 13,
2023).

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COVID-19.      Am. Compl., 2/10/22, at 8-9, R.R. at 12a-13a.2           Appellant

asserted that Appellee and its employees breached that duty because Appellee

and its employees failed to take measures such as wearing masks when in

Decedents’ home, promptly and/or routinely testing employees for COVID-19,

monitoring employees’ body temperature and checking for other symptoms of

COVID-19, or following the COVID-19 protocols set forth by the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Pennsylvania Department of

Health.     R.R. at 8a-12a.         Appellant specifically claims that Appellee’s

employees infected Decedents with COVID-19. R.R. at 9a-10a. Appellant also

alleged that as “a direct and proximate result of” the alleged breaches,

Appellee “increased the risk of harm to Decedents, who thus became infected

with COVID-19 and died as a result thereof.” R.R. at 13a.

       After Appellant filed the amended complaint, the trial court explained:

       [Appellee filed] preliminary objections to the amended complaint
       [asserting] that [Appellant] failed to plead the breach [of] a legal
       duty. Alternatively, [Appellee] argued [that] the gist of the action
       doctrine barred [Appellant’s] tort claims because the relationship
       [Appellee] had with Decedents was contractual[,] and [that] the
       allegations in the amended complaint did not support a demand
       for punitive damages.

Trial Ct. Op. at 2 (some formatting altered).

       On August 26, 2022, the trial court sustained Appellee’s preliminary

objections and dismissed Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice.

Appellant filed a timely appeal.        The trial court did not order Appellant to
____________________________________________

2 We may cite to the reproduced record for the parties’ convenience.

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comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion

concluding that Appellant’s issues were meritless. See Trial Ct. Op. at 2-6.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
         concluding that [Appellee], a non-medical in-home personal
         care agency, did not owe a duty of care to take reasonable
         steps to prevent transmission of COVID-19 to its customers,
         the Decedents, and granting [Appellee’s] preliminary
         objections to [Appellant’s] amended complaint with prejudice?

      2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
         concluding that the [Appellant’s] amended complaint lacked
         specificity as to when and how [Appellee] infected the
         Decedents with COVID-19, and relied on speculation and
         coincidence in alleging that [Appellee’s] conduct caused
         Decedents to contract the disease?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).

      In his first issue, Appellant presents two alternative theories in support

of his claim that Appellee owed a duty of care to Decedents. Id. at 13-30.

We address these theories separately.

 Whether Pennsylvania Already Recognizes a Duty of Care to Avoid
              Transmitting a Contagious Disease

      In his first theory regarding Appellee’s duty of care, Appellant argues

that because Appellee had taken affirmative steps to perform services for

Decedents, Appellee had a duty to exercise reasonable care when performing

those services. Id. at 13-15 (citing, inter alia, Restatement (Second) of Torts

§§ 302, 323 (1965)). Appellant contends that Pennsylvania law recognizes a

duty of care to avoid the transmission of a communicable disease. Id. at 16-

19 (citing Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 195 A. 110, 111-14 (Pa. 1937);

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Smith v. Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C. 4th 663, 663-65 (C.C.P. Cumberland 1991)).

Therefore, Appellant concludes that Appellee’s duty to exercise reasonable

care when performing services on behalf of Decedents included a duty to

employ reasonable precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and that

Appellant has pled a cause of action in negligence for Appellee’s breach of that

duty. Appellant’s Brief at 16, 19.

      Our standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling or
      granting preliminary objections is to determine whether the trial
      court committed an error of law.          When considering the
      appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the
      appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.

      Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal
      sufficiency of the complaint.       When considering preliminary
      objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings
      are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably
      deducible therefrom.       Preliminary objections which seek the
      dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in
      which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable
      to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If
      any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it
      should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary
      objections.

Am. Interior Const. & Blinds Inc. v. Benjamin’s Desk, LLC, 206 A.3d

509, 512 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “To be clear and free from

doubt that dismissal is appropriate, it must appear with certainty that the law

would not permit recovery by the plaintiff upon the facts averred.” McGuire

v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1090 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citation omitted).

      It is well-established:

      Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably
      prudent person would exercise in the same or similar

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        circumstances. . . . To establish a prima facie case of negligence,
        a plaintiff must plead that the defendant owed a duty of care to
        the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, the breach
        resulted in injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff suffered an
        actual loss or damage.

Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 187 A.3d 214, 221 (Pa. 2018)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

        “Whether a duty exists under a particular set of facts is a question of

law.”    Herczeg v. Hampton Twp. Mun. Auth., 766 A.2d 866, 871 (Pa.

Super. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “In scenarios involving

an actor’s affirmative conduct, he is generally under a duty to others to

exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an

unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act.” Seebold v. Prison

Health Servs., Inc., 57 A.3d 1232, 1246 (Pa. 2012) (citing, inter alia,

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302, cmt. a (1965)) (quotation marks

omitted). However, “Section 302 [of the Restatement] does not in itself create

a duty. Rather, it defines what acts may constitute negligence, assuming that

a duty is independently established.” Moore v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of

Justice, 538 A.2d 111, 118 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (citation omitted).3

        Further, our Supreme Court has accepted the Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 323 as an accurate statement of Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Gradel

v. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674, 677-78 (Pa. 1980).

____________________________________________

3 Although decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court,

they may provide persuasive authority. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Odyssey
Contracting Corp., 894 A.2d 750, 756 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006).

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      Section 323 states:

      One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
      services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
      the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability
      to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
      reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if

         (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
         harm, or

         (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon
         the undertaking.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). However, Section 323 does not

“change the burden of a plaintiff to establish the underlying elements of an

action in negligence nor can it be invoked to create a duty where one

does not exist.” Gardner by Gardner v. Consol. Rail Corp., 573 A.2d

1016, 1020 (Pa. 1990) (citations omitted and emphasis in original).

      In Billo, our Supreme Court addressed whether the Workmen’s

Compensation Act of 1915 barred the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the

defendant-employer. Billo, 195 A. at 112. In that case, the plaintiff alleged

in his complaint that he had “contracted the occupational disease of silicosis

as a result of inhaling” various kinds of toxic dust while working in the

defendant’s steel mill and the defendant had been negligent in failing to

provide sufficient exhaust fans and ventilation to remove the dust. Id. at

111-12. The Billo Court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was not within

the scope of the Workmen’s Compensation Act because that act applied “to all

accidents occurring within this Commonwealth” and the plaintiff’s claim did

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not arise from an “accident.” Id. at 114. The Court also observed that if “a

man contracted smallpox through another’s negligence, he would have a right

of action against the tort-feasor.    To be stricken with disease through

another’s negligence is in legal contemplation as it often is in the seriousness

of consequences, no different from being struck with an automobile

through another’s negligence.” Id. (emphases in original).

      In Smith, the plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence, fraud and

deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and battery, alleging that

she and the defendant had been in a romantic relationship, the defendant

represented that he did not have any sexually transmissible diseases, and that

the plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with a sexually transmissible disease.

Smith, 11 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 663. The defendant filed preliminary objections

in the form of a demurrer arguing, among others, that the plaintiff had not

established that he breached a legal duty. Id. at 663-64 The trial court in

Smith observed that the Billo Court’s pronouncement regarding a cause of

action in negligence for spreading smallpox to be dicta. Id. at 664-65 (citing

Billo, 195 A. at 114). Instead, the trial court relied on the decisions of courts

of other states, explaining that “[m]any jurisdictions recognize a cause of

action for negligence involving the transmission of a sexual disease.” Id. at

664 (citing, inter alia, B.N. v. K.E., 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1989)). Therefore,

the trial court dismissed the defendant’s preliminary objections. Id. at 665-

66.

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      In DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester Cnty., Inc., 583 A.2d 422 (Pa.

1990), our Supreme Court examined “whether a physician owes a duty of care

to a third party where the physician fails to properly advise a patient who has

been exposed to a communicable disease, and the patient, relying upon the

advice, spreads the disease to the third party.” DiMarco, 583 A.2d at 423.

      The DiMarco Court explained that

      [the plaintiff] averred in his complaint that he contracted hepatitis
      after he had intimate relations with a woman who had been
      exposed to hepatitis eight weeks prior to the sexual relations; that
      this woman had been told by her doctors, [the defendants], that
      if she remained symptom free for six weeks, she would not have
      been infected by the hepatitis virus; that in reliance upon that
      advice, the woman abstained from sexual relations for eight
      weeks; and that the advice of the [defendants] was wrong in that
      the waiting period should have been twenty-six weeks.

                                  *    *    *

      When a physician treats a patient who has been exposed to or
      who has contracted a communicable and/or contagious disease, it
      is imperative that the physician give his or her patient the proper
      advice about preventing the spread of the disease. Communicable
      diseases are so named because they are readily spread from
      person to person. Physicians are the first line of defense against
      the spread of communicable diseases, because physicians know
      what measures must be taken to prevent the infection of others.
      The patient must be advised to take certain sanitary measures, or
      to remain quarantined for a period of time, or to practice sexual
      abstinence or what is commonly referred to as “safe sex.”

      Such precautions are taken not to protect the health of the
      patient, whose well-being has already been compromised, rather
      such precautions are taken to safeguard the health of
      others. Thus, the duty of a physician in such circumstances
      extends to those “within the foreseeable orbit of risk of harm.” If
      a third person is in that class of persons whose health is likely to
      be threatened by the patient, and if erroneous advice is given to
      that patient to the ultimate detriment of the third person, the third
      person has a cause of action against the physician, because the

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      physician should recognize that the services rendered to the
      patient are necessary for the protection of the third person.

Id. at 424-25 (citation and footnote omitted and emphases in original). The

DiMarco Court further held that “the class of persons whose health is likely

to be threatened by the patient includes any one who is physically intimate

with the patient[,]” and concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause

of action in negligence against the defendants.       Id. at 425 (emphasis in

original).

      It is well-established that “decisions are to be read against their facts,”

and that this axiom “prevents the wooden application of abstract principles to

circumstances in which different considerations may pertain.”       Maloney v.

Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 984 A.2d 478, 485-86 (Pa. 2009) (citation

omitted). Further, “dicta is an opinion by a court on a question that is directly

involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court,

but that is not essential to the decision. Dicta has no precedential value.”

Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 124 A.3d 1229, 1243 n.11 (Pa. 2015)

(citation and quotation marks omitted)).

      Additionally, this Court has explained that “decisions of the Court of

Common Pleas are not binding precedent; however, they may be considered

for their persuasive authority.” Hirsch v. EPL Techs., Inc., 910 A.2d 84, 89

n.6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Similarly, the decisions of federal

district courts and of courts in other states are not binding on this Court, but

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we may rely on them for their persuasive value. See Umbelina v. Adams,

34 A.3d 151, 159-60 nn.2-3 (Pa. Super. 2011).

     Here, the trial court explained:

     Pennsylvania does not impose “a general, all encompassing
     common law duty not to transmit a ubiquitous, communicable
     virus to another person.” Preliminary Objections to Amended
     Complaint, ¶ 24[, R.R. at 26a]. Indeed, the cases relied upon by
     [Appellant] — Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 195 A. 110 (Pa.
     1937); and Smith v. Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C. 4th 663 (Cumberland
     Cty. 1991) — only confirm [Appellee’s] argument.

     Billo is an occupational exposure case where our Supreme Court
     considered:

        Where there is nothing in the pleadings or in the evidence
        to remove either party from the provisions of the Workmen’s
        Compensation Act of 1915 . . . , is not the action barred by
        the employee’s voluntary and contractual surrender of his
        right to any form or amount of compensation or damages
        for any injury or death occurring in the course of his
        employment other than as provided by article 3 of said act
        ...?

     Billo, 195 A. at 112. In addressing that larger question, then-
     Justice George W. Maxey posited that a person who contracts
     smallpox from another would have a right of action in negligence.
     Id. at 114. That passage, which [Appellant] seizes upon to
     support his duty analysis, is dicta and not binding precedent on
     the issue before this court.

     Smith is readily distinguishable because that case involved an
     alleged knowing transmission of a sexual disease by an identifiable
     defendant who misrepresented to the plaintiff prior to a sexual
     encounter that he did not have the disease. Id., 11 Pa. D. & C.
     4th at 664. Notably, while the trial court in Smith overruled the
     defendant’s preliminary objections, it expressly characterized the
     above-referenced passage from Billo as dicta but noted that many
     jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for transmitting a
     sexual disease. Id. (emphasis added). In any event, the trial
     court decision from Cumberland County is not binding precedent
     and does not compel a finding that [Appellant] has asserted a
     recognized theory of liability here. Thus, this court properly

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       concluded that a recognized duty of care does not exist under the
       circumstances alleged in the amended complaint and leave to
       amend further would have been futile.

Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5 (some citations and some footnotes omitted).

       Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s

analysis that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action in

negligence for the transmission of a communicable disease.

       First, Billo did not address whether the plaintiff had a cause of action

for negligence against his employer for contracting an occupational disease;

rather, the issue before our Supreme Court was whether the Workmen’s

Compensation Act of 1915 precluded the plaintiff’s suit. See Billo, 195 A. at

111-14. Although the Billo Court remarked that a person would have a cause

of action against a tortfeasor who negligently caused a person to contract the

disease, that statement is dicta because that question was not before the Billo

Court. See Castellani, 124 A.3d at 1243 n.11; Maloney, 984 A.2d at 485-

86. Further, the facts of Billo are readily distinguishable from those of this

case because this case involves COVID-19, a viral disease, while the plaintiff

in Billo claimed that his health condition was caused by the toxic dust that he

inhaled while working at the defendant’s steel mill. See Billo, 195 A. at 111-

12.

       We do not find Smith to be controlling here. First, Smith is a Court of

Common Pleas decision, therefore, it is not binding on this Court. See Hirsch,

910 A.2d at 89 n.6. Further, the Smith decision did not apply Pennsylvania

law.    Instead, the Smith Court acknowledged that the Billo Court’s

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pronouncement regarding a cause of action for contracting a disease was

dicta, and relied on out-of-state decisions to conclude that the plaintiff could

maintain a cause of action for negligence involving the transmission of a

sexual disease. See Smith, 11 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 664. While the courts of

this Commonwealth may rely on the decisions of the courts of other states for

their persuasive value, they are not binding on our courts. See Umbelina,

34 A.3d at 160 n.3.              Additionally, Smith is factually dissimilar and

distinguishable from the instant case which involves allegations of the

negligent transmission of COVID-19, a respiratory illness from a caregiver to

a customer, in contrast to Smith which deals with a sexually transmitted

disease in a romantic relationship. For these reasons, we conclude that Smith

is neither controlling nor persuasive authority.

       In the instant case, Appellant alleged in the amended complaint that

Appellee provided “non-medical, home[,] and personal care services and

assistance to Decedents[.]” R.R. at 6a. Based on the foregoing, we conclude

that although Pennsylvania recognizes that a physician owes a duty of care

to certain third parties to advise a patient to take precautions against the

spread of a communicable disease, no Pennsylvania appellate court has held

that a layperson has a duty of care to take such precautions.4 See DiMarco,

____________________________________________

4 We note that in his reply brief, Appellant argues, for the first time, that
Appellee owed Decedents a duty of care because Appellee had a special
relationship to Decedents pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314
(1965). Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-3. First, our Supreme Court has
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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583 A.2d at 424-25.           Further, although Appellee’s employees provided

services to Decedents, neither Section 302 nor Section 323 of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts can be used to create a duty where one does not exist. See

Gardner, 573 A.2d at 1020; Moore, 538 A.2d at 118. For these reasons,

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

      Whether the Courts Should Impose a Duty of Care to Avoid
                 Transmitting a Contagious Disease

       Appellant alternatively argues that even if Pennsylvania does not

currently recognize a duty to avoid transmitting a contagious disease, this

Court should conclude that Appellee owed such a duty to Decedents based on

the five-factor test set forth in Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000).

Appellant’s Brief at 19-30.

       “The determination whether to impose affirmative common-law duties

as a predicate to civil liability is a matter of law; accordingly, our review is

plenary.” Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1243 (citation omitted). Further, because this

is an appeal from an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of

a demurrer, we take the averments of Appellant’s complaint as true and view

them in the light most favorable to Appellant. Id.

____________________________________________

explained that “an appellant is prohibited from raising new issues in a reply
brief.” Reginelli v. Boggs, 181 A.3d 293, 307 n.15 (Pa. 2018) (citation
omitted)). Additionally, this issue is waived because Appellant did not raise
this issue before the trial court. See PCS Chadaga v. Torres, 252 A.3d
1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “[a] new and different theory of
relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal” (citations
omitted)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

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      In Walters, our Supreme Court stated:

      We have characterized the duty inquiry as the “primary” inquiry
      in negligence.      To assist us in identifying a previously
      unrecognized duty, we rely upon five factors: “(1) the relationship
      between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct;
      (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm
      incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor;
      and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.”
      Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169.

Walters, 187 A.3d at 222 (footnote and some citations omitted).

      Additionally,   our   Supreme   Court    has   emphasized   that     “neither

foreseeability nor any other single consideration of policy is ‘alone

determinative of the duty question.’ Rather, we must afford such weight to

each factor as is warranted by ‘the particularized nature of the asserted duty

at hand and context.’” Id. at 229-30 (citation omitted); cf. Atcovitz v. Gulph

Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1223 (Pa. 2002) (explaining that

the Supreme Court’s conclusion in that case rested on its analysis of the fifth

Althaus factor).

      Finally, our Supreme Court has cautioned:

      Although our Althaus analysis applies principles well-rooted in
      the common law, we long have recognized that determining
      whether to impose a duty of care in novel circumstances can prove
      difficult, requiring policy judgments generally reserved for
      legislative action. In Althaus, and in several other cases, we have
      quoted Dean William Prosser’s influential comments:

         These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a
         duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the
         Constitution, is what we make of it. Duty is only a word
         with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to
         be liability; it necessarily begs the essential question. . . .
         The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to

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         the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather
         than the causal sequence of events; beyond that it serves
         none. In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many
         factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of morals
         and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule,
         and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall. In the
         end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis
         of the mores of the community, always keeping in mind the
         fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will
         be practical and in keeping with the general understanding
         of mankind.

      William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 15
      (1953). Thus, determining whether to impose a duty often
      requires us to weigh amorphous public policy considerations,
      which may include our perception of history, morals, justice and
      society.

      Our concern for the hazards of judicial policy-making has
      prompted our continuing restraint.

      The adjudicatory process does not translate readily into the field
      of broad-scale policymaking. For this reason, and because the
      Legislature possesses superior policymaking tools and resources
      and serves as the political branch, we took the position . . . that
      we would not direct the substantive common law away from well-
      established general norms in the absence of some clear
      predominance of policy justifications.

Walters, 187 A.3d at 222-23 (footnotes and some citations omitted and

formatting altered); see also id. at 229 (explaining that regarding the

Althaus factors our “default position that, unless the justifications for and

consequences of judicial policy-making are reasonably clear with the balance

of factors favorably predominating, we will not impose new affirmative duties”

(citation omitted and formatting altered)); Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1245 & n.19

(noting that “it is the Legislature’s chief function to set public policy and the

courts’ role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations” and

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“before a change in the law is made, a court, if it is to act responsibly must

be able to see with reasonable clarity the results of its decision and to say with

reasonable certainty that the change will serve the best interests of society”

(citations omitted and formatting altered)).

      Lastly, we note that “[i]t is not the prerogative of an intermediate

appellate court to enunciate new precepts of law or to expand existing legal

doctrines. Such is a province reserved to the Supreme Court.” Bell v. Willis,

80 A.3d 476, 479 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

      Here, the trial court explained:

      Addressing th[e Althaus] factors seriatim, this court first
      concluded that the relationship between Decedents and
      [Appellee], which involved the provision of non-medical personal
      care services, does not weigh in favor of creating the duty of care
      advanced by [Appellant]. Rather, and in conjunction with factors
      two and four,[FN6] to impose such a duty would diminish the care
      and services available to the elderly and infirm, permit recovery
      on the basis of mere speculation and lead to an explosion of
      litigation against individuals and businesses. Finally, this court
      concluded that the overall public interest would not be served by
      endorsing the broad duty of care [Appellant] has attempted to
      plead.
         [FN6][Appellee] conceded for purposes of its preliminary
         objections that factor three - the nature of the risk imposed
         and foreseeability of the harm incurred - weighed in
         [Appellant’s] favor.

Trial Ct. Op. at 6.

                      The Relationship Between the Parties

      Appellant claims that Appellant contends that the first Althaus factor,

the relationship between the parties, weighs in favor of recognizing that

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Appellee had a duty because Appellee was providing “in-home personal care

services” to Decedents and the purpose of Appellee’s business is to “provide

care and services for” elderly and at-risk customers, such as Decedents.

Appellant’s Brief at 22-26 (citing, inter alia, Walters, 187 A.3d at 232).

      Regarding the first factor, it is well established that

      Duty, in any given situation, is predicated upon the relationship
      existing between the parties at the relevant time. Where the
      parties are strangers to each other, such a relationship may be
      inferred from the general duty imposed on all persons not to place
      others at risk of harm through their actions.

      The relationship between the parties, therefore, does not have to
      be a specific, legally defined relationship, e.g., bailor-bailee,
      licensor-licensee, or business invitee.

Charlie v. Erie Ins. Exch., 100 A.3d 244, 252 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

      On this record, it is clear that Appellee had a contractual relationship

with Decedents to provide in-home personal care services, but Appellee is not

a medical provider. See R.R. at 6a. As discussed above, a medical provider

has a duty of care to advise an infected patient about how to prevent the

spread of their disease. See DiMarco, 583 A.2d at 424-25. Our research

has not uncovered legal authority under current Pennsylvania law for this

Court to impose the higher duty of care that medical providers owe to their

patients upon parties that do not provide medical services. Therefore, we

conclude that this factor does not weigh in favor of imposing a duty on

Appellee, who is not a medical provider.

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                    The Social Utility of the Actor’s Conduct

       Appellant argues that the second factor, the social utility of Appellee’s

conduct, weighs in his favor because of the risk of serious illness and death

that elderly and at-risk individuals face if they become infected with COVID-

19. Appellant’s Brief at 25-27.

       In Walters, the plaintiffs sued the University of Pittsburgh Medical

Center (UPMC) and several others, alleging that UPMC had been negligent in

failing to report a former radiology technician to law enforcement after UPMC

terminated his employment for stealing fentanyl. Walters, 187 A.3d at 221.

The plaintiffs alleged that the radiology technician had been fired from UPMC

for stealing intravenous fentanyl, injecting himself with the fentanyl, and

returning the used syringes to where the syringes could be used by others to

inject patients. Id. at 219-20. The plaintiffs argued that UPMC was negligent

because the radiology technician was subsequently hired by another hospital

where he continued stealing fentanyl and the syringes he contaminated were

later used on the plaintiffs, who contracted hepatitis C. Id. Our Supreme

Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether UPMC had a duty of

care to its patients to report the technician’s theft of the fentanyl. Id. at 221

n.8.

       In applying the Althaus factors, the Walters Court explained that there

was social utility in defendant UPMC providing health care, but that its failure

to report the technician’s theft of the fentanyl to law enforcement and take

additional steps to ensure that the technician “did not repeat his dangerous

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and criminal conduct while employed with other health care providers . . .

lacks all social utility.” Walters, 187 A.3d at 234-35; see also Breslin v.

Mountain View Nursing Home, Inc., 171 A.3d 818, 825 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(explaining that with respect to the social utility factor “[t]he need for

prevention     of   nursing   home   mismanagement      and   understaffing   is

unquestionable, as is the importance of proper care and treatment of nursing

home patients[,]” and concluding that this factor favored imposing a duty of

care on the defendant nursing home towards its patients because the

defendant “was in the best position to ensure the non-negligent care of its

patients, and thus, it possessed the ability to limit its liability by acting

reasonably with respect to its patients”).

         Here, Appellee’s conduct consisted of providing personal care services

to Decedents in their residence. See R.R. at 6a, 12a-13a. The social utility

of Appellee’s conduct weighs in favor of imposing a duty because their services

assist those who need personal care while residing in their homes. Further,

allowing Appellee’s employees to spread communicable illnesses to their

clients does not serve that purpose. Accord Walters, 187 A.3d at 234-35;

Breslin, 171 A.3d at 825. Therefore, we conclude that the social utility factor

weighs in favor of imposing a duty on Appellee.

          The Nature of the Risk Imposed and Foreseeability of the Harm

         Appellant and Appellee agree that the third factor weighs in favor of

imposing a duty. Appellant’s Brief at 27 (citing R.R. at 49a); Appellee’s Brief

at 24.

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      “Regarding the third factor, duty arises only when one engages in

conduct which foreseeably creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”

R.W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740, 747 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).            Our

Supreme Court has described this factor as the “most elusive Althaus factor,

both in its definition and in determining the weight it should be afforded.”

Walters, 187 A.3d at 236.

      Both government health authorities and the courts have recognized that

older individuals have a higher risk of developing severe symptoms and dying

from COVID-19. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 482 F.Supp.3d 1218,

1224-25 (M.D. Fla. 2020); Thakker v. Doll, 451 F.Supp.3d 358, 365 (M.D.

Pa. 2020); CDC, “Factors That Affect Your Risk of Getting Very Sick from

COVID-19,” https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/risks-

getting-very-sick.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2023).

      Both Decedents were in their eighties, and consequently COVID-19

posed a higher risk to their health than to younger individuals.         Appellee

provided personal care services to Decedents in their home. Therefore, we

agree with the parties that the foreseeability factor weighs in favor of imposing

a duty on Appellee. Accord Walters, 187 A.3d at 236-37 (concluding that

the nature of the risk and foreseeability of harm factor weighed in favor of

imposing a duty where the theft of injectable medication both deprived

patients of their prescribed medication and placed them at risk of contracting

a disease via the previously used syringes, in that case hepatitis C).

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            The Consequences of Imposing a Duty Upon the Actor

      Appellant asserts that the fourth factor, the consequences of imposing

a duty upon Appellee, weighs in favor of finding a duty exists because the

additional burden of taking reasonable precautions to avoid spreading COVID-

19 is not prohibitively expensive. Appellant’s Brief at 27-29 (citing, inter alia,

Estate of Madden v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 2021 WL 2580119, at *6 (D.

Md. filed June 23, 2021) (unpublished mem.)). In support, Appellant notes

that the District Court in Estate of Madden explained that the consequences

of imposing a duty would require employers to follow best practices to protect

their employees from COVID-19 but ultimately found against imposing a new

duty because the plaintiff was a third party to the employer-employee

relationship. Id. at 28.

      The plaintiffs in Estate of Madden were a Southwest Airlines flight

attendant and the estate of her late husband. Estate of Madden, 2021 WL

2580119, at *1. The complaint alleged that the flight attendant participated

in Southwest’s mandatory training, during which she was exposed to COVID-

19.   Id.   Within two weeks of the training both plaintiffs experienced

symptoms of COVID-19, the husband-decedent tested positive for COVID-19,

and he subsequently died due to complications from COVID-19.            Id.   The

plaintiffs alleged that defendant Southwest allegedly failed to implement

reasonable safety and health protocols to prevent its employees who were

participating in mandatory training from contracting or spreading COVID-19.

Id.   The District Court applied the Maryland courts’ seven-factor test to

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determine if Southwest owed a duty of care to the husband of its employee.

Id. at *4 (citing Kiriakos v. Phillips, 139 A.3d 1006, 1033-34 (Md. 2016)).

Among the factors that the District Court considered was the burden on

Southwest and the consequences of imposing a duty. Id. at *6. The Court

concluded that

      insofar as Southwest specifically is concerned, there appears little
      “additional” burden that imposition of a duty here would create.
      Employers like Southwest would be required to take reasonable
      steps to ensure the safety of foreseeable third parties like Mr.
      Madden from contracting COVID-19 as a result of Southwest’s
      activities. To do so, employers would simply be required to follow
      best practices like social distancing, contact tracing, and regular
      sanitation protocols to protect their own employees, so that those
      employees do not become conduits to their cohabitants.
      Southwest already embraced such practices with regard to its
      customers—in fact, one might reasonably expect that ensuring
      flight attendants’ safety would be a natural corollary of
      Southwest’s promise to protect its customers.

Id. (citation omitted). However, the District Court found that “the broader

societal consequences of the imposition of that duty” weighed against the

finding of a duty, particularly with respect to the expansion of potential liability

for employers to claims by third parties alleging that employees had exposed

the third parties to COVID-19. Id. Therefore, the District Court concluded

that “[t]he ‘floodgates’ consequence of imposing a duty here therefore weighs

against such an imposition[]” and that Southwest did not owe a duty to the

husband as a third party. Id. at *7-8.

      In Seebold, a corrections officer alleged that she became infected with

methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) after conducting searches

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of twelve inmates infected with MRSA.        Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1234.    The

plaintiff argued that the prison’s medical staff were negligent because they

owed a duty of care to prison staff and inmates “to warn them of and protect

them from acquiring an MRSA infection from those inmates known to be

carrying the bacteria in a communicable state.” Id. (citation and quotation

marks omitted). Our Supreme Court observed that the assessment of whether

a duty exists is “a matter for the courts, not juries.   Consistent with this

allocation of responsibility, we will not impose on physicians some non-

specified affirmative obligation to third-party non-patients relative to

communicable diseases, with juries deciding in each individual case just what

the duty might be.” Id. at 1247.

      The Seebold Court further explained that “the default duties are

administered in a fashion in which the duty is couched in general terms (e.g.,

to use reasonable care in affirmative conduct which creates risk of harm to

others), and juries frequently determine when such obligation is breached

relative to particularized circumstances presented in each case.”         Id.

However, the Court explained that “affirmative obligations above and beyond

the default duties are most often considered and determined on a more

specific basis, particularly where they are superimposed onto highly regulated

professional undertakings.” Id. at 1247-48.

      Here, in his amended complaint, Appellant identifies forty-one acts or

omissions by Appellee and its employees which Appellant claims were a breach

of Appellee’s duty to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 to Decedents.

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See R.R. at 8a-12a.         Although some of these alleged acts or omissions

overlap, they cover a broad range of activity including wearing masks, regular

COVID-19 testing, social distancing, and quarantining. See id. 8a-11a.

       We conclude that Estate of Madden is not applicable to the facts of the

instant case, as Estate of Madden involved an employer’s duty of care to the

husband of one its employees, while this case concerns whether Appellee

owed a duty of care to take precautions against spreading COVID-19 to

customers receiving in-home personal care services.      Further, the District

Court in Estate of Madden applied Maryland law, which is not binding on this

Court. See Umbelina, 34 A.3d at 160 n.3.

       As stated above, Appellant has alleged numerous omissions on the part

of Appellee that Appellant claims are part of the proposed duty not to spread

COVID-19 to customers. See R.R. at 8a-12a. Applying Maryland law, the

District Court in Estate of Madden concluded that requiring businesses to

“follow best practices like social distancing, contact tracing, and regular

sanitation protocols to protect their own employees” from COVID-19 weighed

in favor of imposing a duty of care, but declined to impose such a duty on

Southwest for other reasons.5 See Estate of Madden, 2021 WL 2580119,

at *6-7.

____________________________________________

5 Additionally, the District Court noted that Southwest had already adopted

such practices regarding its customers. Estate of Madden, 2021 WL
2580119, at *6. Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Appellee
had adopted some or all of the measures Appellant raised in his amended
complaint.

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      Although harsh, this factor as applied to the instant case, weighs against

imposing the duty to take precautions against spreading COVID-19 to

customers receiving personal care services upon Appellee, a non-medical

provider, because of the myriad of precautions that Appellee might have had

to take without clear guidance because no such affirmative common-law duty

in tort currently exists under Pennsylvania law. Although the Seebold Court

did not expressly discuss this factor, its admonitions that a court must be able

to see with reasonable clarity the results of its decision and that it should have

an adequately specific basis before imposing new law that creates an

affirmative duty, applies here. Accord Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1245, 1247-48.

Instantly, the lack of a clearly defined common-law duty under current

Pennsylvania law mandating non-medical providers of personal care services

to implement precautions not to spread COVID-19 to those in their care

weighs against our imposition of such a requirement.

               Overall Public Interest in the Proposed Solution

      Lastly, Appellant argues that the fifth factor, the overall public interest,

favors imposing a duty because it would preserve and protect the health of

elderly and vulnerable citizens. Appellant’s Brief at 30.

      In Atcovitz, one of the plaintiffs suffered a non-fatal heart attack and

stroke while at the defendant tennis club. Atcovitz, 812 A.2d at 1220. The

plaintiffs sued the defendant club for negligence, arguing that the defendant

owed its members a duty of care to acquire and maintain an automated

external defibrillator (AED) on its premises for medical emergencies. Id. After

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examining legislation and regulations pertaining to emergency medical

services and AEDs, our Supreme Court held that the overall public interest in

the proposed solution did not support imposing a duty on the defendant to

acquire, maintain, and use an AED in emergencies. Id. at 1223-24.

      In Seebold, our Supreme Court acknowledged that corrections officers

“are exposed to occupational risks in the institutional environment, not the

least of which is the potential for contracting certain communicable diseases

such as MRSA. Certainly, it is vital that their safety be maintained as a high

priority in institutional management.” Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1249. However,

the Court declined to recognize a new duty of care for prison medical

providers, explaining that the plaintiff’s “request for the imposition of a new,

affirmative, common-law duty in tort on the part of physicians to undertake

third-party interventions in a prison setting required a broader policy

assessment.” Id. at 1250; see also id. at 1251 (stating that “the present

appeal does not afford an adequate foundation to make an informed social

policy assessment which would support the imposition of a new affirmative

duty on physicians to make third-party interventions”).

      On March 6, 2020, then-Governor Tom Wolf issued a proclamation

declaring a state of disaster emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

DeVito, 227 A.3d at 877. To prevent the spread of COVID-19 via person-to-

person interactions, Governor Wolf subsequently issued an executive order

directing all businesses that the Governor deemed to be non-life-sustaining to

close. Id. at 878-80. Additionally, Governor Wolf authorized “then-Secretary

                                     - 27 -
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of Health Rachel L. Levine, in her sole discretion, to suspend or waive any

provision of law or regulation which the Pennsylvania Department of Health is

authorized by law to administer or enforce, for such length of time as may be

necessary to respond to this emergency.”        Corman v. Acting Sec’y of

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Health, 266 A.3d 452, 456 (Pa. 2021) (footnote and

quotation marks omitted). Secretary Levine directed those businesses which

had not been closed pursuant Governor Wolf’s executive order to implement

“stringent COVID-19 mitigation protocols, including a requirement that

employees and patrons alike wear face coverings while on business premises.”

Id. (footnote omitted). On or about July 1, 2020, Secretary Levine expanded

this mandate “to require all individuals to wear masks while outdoors and

unable to consistently maintain a distance of six feet from individuals who are

not members of their household” and in a variety of indoor settings open to

the public. Id. at 456-57, 457 n.7 (quotation marks omitted).

      The   General    Assembly    terminated    Governor     Wolf’s   disaster

proclamation on June 10, 2021, and the Department of Health lifted its

masking order on June 28, 2021.        Id. at 457 n.7, 458.     Subsequently,

Secretary Levine’s successor, Acting Secretary of Health Alison Beam, issued

an order directing that teachers, students, staff, and other persons entering a

school to wear face coverings while inside any school. Id. at 458-59. Our

Supreme Court held that the Acting Secretary’s order was void ab initio

because the Acting Secretary lacked the authority to issue that order without

following the rulemaking procedures of the Regulatory Review Act.       Id. at

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486-87. However, our Supreme Court explained that it was not “question[ing]

the efficacy of masking as a means by which to curb the incidence and spread

of aerosolized communicable diseases like COVID-19.” Id. at 487. The Court

further explained that

      it is not our prerogative to substitute our views for those of the
      policy-making branches of our Commonwealth’s government,
      especially on an issue as fraught with uncertainty as how best to
      respond to an evolving public health emergency. We leave that
      solemn duty to the people’s elected representatives and their
      lawful designees.

Id.

      In this case, similar to Atcovitz, it would be improper for this Court to

treat COVID-19-related mask mandates as establishing personal liability. See

Atcovitz, 812 at 1223-24. Further, as stated above, policy determinations in

this context are generally not within the purview of the judiciary and are best

determined by other branches of government.       See Corman, 266 A.3d at

487. Indeed, our Supreme Court has stated that changes in legal standards

involving the applicable duties of care should originate from the Legislature,

which “possesses superior policymaking tools and resources and serves as the

political branch[]” of government. See Walters, 187 A.3d at 223; see also

Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1245 n.19. To the extent that the judicial branch can

recognize a new duty of care at common law, such a pronouncement must

come from our Supreme Court, not this Court. See Bell, 80 A.3d at 479. For

these reasons, we conclude that that the overall public interest factor weighs

against recognizing a new duty of care.

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      After considering and weighing all of the Althaus factors, we conclude

that the balance of factors does not weigh in favor of recognizing a new duty

of care at common law for personal care providers to take precautions against

spreading COVID-19 to customers.           See Walters, 187 A.3d at 229.

Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

                                  Conclusion

      We certainly empathize with the family of Decedents in this tragic case.

We share the sentiments expressed by Justice Wecht, “for far too many, the

pain and loss wrought by this dreadful virus is incalculable. We do not intend

to diminish the weight of that anguish.” Corman, 266 A.3d at 487. However,

on this record and based on current legal authority, we are constrained to

conclude that Appellee did not owe a duty of care to take precautions against

spreading COVID-19 to Decedents, its customers. Because Appellant cannot

establish a duty of care, his second issue regarding whether his complaint pled

facts with sufficient specificity is moot. For these reasons we affirm the trial

court’s order sustaining Appellee’s preliminary objections and dismissing

Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2023

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