Court Opinion

ID: 9568510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:04:29.711055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:43:21.645656
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
While agreeing with the majority that the trial court erred in holding Wife in contempt for failing to pay more than $140 per week in child support, I would not characterize that error as an abuse of discretion. A trial court acts as the trier of fact in a contempt action, and is vested with broad discretionary power when the evidence is conflicting. Yancey v. Mills, 210 Ga. 684, 685 (1) (82 SE2d 505) (1954). Here, however, there was no conflicting evidence upon which the trial court could exercise its discretion. As recited by the majority on page 605 of its opinion, the undisputed evidence shows that “the March 1998 contempt order increasing Wife’s child support obligation to $140 was an improper modification of the final judgment[,]” rather than a clarification of her obligation under the decree. Notwithstanding a trial court’s discretionary authority in matters of contempt, the terms of the final judgment in a divorce case cannot be modified in a subsequent contempt proceeding, as a matter of law. Harper v. Smith, 261 Ga. 286 (404 SE2d 120) (1991).
However, Husband’s contempt action was not the only proceeding involving the divorce decree pending in 1998. Wife’s modification action was also before the trial court at that time, and in that proceeding she had sought to change the amount that she should pay for child support from a percentage of her income to a sum certain. There is no question that the increase in Wife’s child support obligation to the specific amount of $140 per week would be valid if it appeared in a separate order entered in her modification action or in a consolidated order entered in both cases. Olliff v. Olliff, 234 Ga. 892 (218 SE2d 622) (1975); OCGA § 9-11-42 (a).
Thus, the actual error that I perceive in this case consists of the trial court’s mistaken inclusion of the provision increasing the amount of child support in the context of the order styled in Husband’s contempt proceeding, rather than correctly including it as a *607provision in the order entered in Wife’s contemporaneous modification action. Under these circumstances, I do not agree with the majority that OCGA § 9-11-60 (f) precludes the correction of this error because three years have passed since entry of the contempt order. OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) provides that clerical mistakes in judgments and orders arising from oversight or omission may be corrected “at any time.” I believe that, pursuant to subsection (g), the trial court, acting either sua sponte or on Wife’s motion, would be authorized to eliminate the provision increasing child support to the sum certain of $140 per week from the contempt order and to add it to the modification order. See Smith v. Smith, 230 Ga. 238 (196 SE2d 437) (1973). Compare State of Ga. v. Harrell, 260 Ga. 202 (391 SE2d 641) (1990) (no modification action pending at time of entry of erroneous order in contempt proceeding).
Decided February 16, 2004.
Stern & Edlin, George S. Stern, David J. Beaudry, for appellant.
Head, Head & Head, James B. Head, for appellee.