Court Opinion

ID: 9537972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:28:04.389746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:14.511427
License: Public Domain

Young, C. J.,
with whom Steffen, J., agrees, dissenting:
The district court classified the annuity as community property subject to disposition. It further found that awarding Laurence eighty percent and Gail twenty percent of the annuity was “just *662and equitable.” However, the district court gave no specific reasons for this distribution. Instead, the court simply stated that it would not be just and equitable to divide the annuity equally.
At the time of the divorce trial, the annuity had a present value of approximately $713,000. By the trial court’s distribution, Laurence would receive $570,000 and Gail $142,600 of the annuity’s value as of March 1986. We agree with Gail that this division constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion given the court’s failure to set forth its reasons for the selected distribution scheme.
Nevada law provides for a disposition of community property “as appears just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties and to the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, and to the party through whom the property was acquired. . . .” NRS 125.150(l)(b). Our case law for nearly 30 years has reflected that “[e]qual distribution of the community property appears to be the rule in most cases.” Weeks v. Weeks, 75 Nev. 411, 415, 345 P.2d 228, 230 (1959). We have consistently reaffirmed the general doctrine expressed in Weeks. Fox v. Fox, 81 Nev. 186, 197, 401 P.2d 53, 58 (1965); Stojanovich v. Stojanovich, 86 Nev. 789, 793, 476 P.2d 950, 952-953 (1970); Jolley v. Jolley, 92 Nev. 298, 299, 549 P.2d 1407 (1976); Schick v. Schick, 97 Nev. 352, 353, 630 P.2d 1220, 1221 (1981). We recently overturned a district court for ignoring the general principle announced by this court — equal division of community property as the rule — when neither the court nor the record provided a justification for disregarding appellant’s community property interest in respondent’s home. Sly v. Sly, 100 Nev. 236, 240, 679 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1984).
The majority opinion concludes that the general rule is “an innocuous statistical observation.” We disagree. Such a deprecatory label seems hardly appropriate when, in every decision in the last three decades we have held that under normal circumstances, equitable distribution requires an equal division of community assets. My brethren, who now undermine the Weeks rule, participated in many of these decisions. Heretofore, there has been no criticism of the holding in Weeks or its progeny. Moreover, although the majority opinion censures the initial presumption of an equal division, it offers no suggestions as to what guidelines the district courts should use when distributing community assets. There must be some starting point in the calculus of the trial judge. If a fifty-fifty figure is unsatisfactory to the majority, would a sixty-forty figure be preferable — or, should the ratio be determined on an ad hoc basis, after which the court could preclude rational review by merely uttering the mystical incantation that the division is “just and equitable.”
*663The community property system is based upon the premise that spouses contribute equally to marriage and thus deserve to share equally in the resulting gains of marriage. Marital Property Reform, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 761, 771 (1982). As the majority opinion correctly states, “[cjommunity property is, by definition, property owned in common by a husband and wife, each having an undivided one-half interest.”1 Accordingly, it is difficult to see how the starting place to determine a just and equitable distribution could be anything other than a fifty-fifty split. Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-1299 (Ohio 1981);2 see Hatch v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that in the absence of sound reason, each spouse must receive substantial equivalents in the division of community property).
Furthermore, after acknowledging that it is the husband who more frequently does the acquiring of community property, the majority states that it is legitimate to consider who acquired the property when equitable considerations are being weighed. While we may agree that it is appropriate to consider who acquired the property, it is precisely because wives less frequently do the acquiring that we believe anything other than an equal division starting point may well work an inequity for women.
In Stojanovich, this court noted that although the district court is vested with broad discretion in the division of community property, the trial court must support an unequal disposition by “a clearly expressed reason in what manner, for what purpose and for whose benefit that division is made.” 86 Nev. at 793, 476 P.2d at 953. Since Stojanovich, we have consistently affirmed the requirement that the district court provide its reasons for deviating from a presumptively just and equitable division: an equal disposition of community property. Sly v. Sly, 100 Nev. 236, 240, 679 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1984); Schick v. Schick, 97 Nev. 352, 354, 630 P.2d 1220, 1221 (1981).
The majority criticizes the Stojanovich decision, stating that the court reached this conclusion “without citation of authority, statement of reasons or other discussion.” However, logic dictates that if the appellate process is to provide a meaningful review of the district court’s decision, the trial court must state its rationale for any discrepancy in the property division. When the trial court fails to state its reasons for the selected distribution *664scheme, it prevents effective review. See Commercial Cabinet Co. v. Wallin, 103 Nev. 238, 737 P.2d 515 (1987) (remanding case when the district court’s failure to make specific findings prevented effective review of the propriety of the award). Stojanovich is consistent with Nevada law requiring that a district court make specific findings of fact sufficient to indicate the basis of its ultimate conclusion. NRCP 52(a); e.g., Wilford v. Wilford, 101 Nev. 212, 215, 699 P.2d 105, 107 (1985). Thus, we conclude that the district court cannot merely rely on the magic words that “a just and equitable division” requires the chosen disposition. Instead of this' amorphous phrase, the court must provide appropriate reasons for a disproportionate distribution of community property.
According to the majority opinion, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that an equal division of the annuity income was not equitable. It lists the following three factors to justify the trial court’s manifestly unequal eighty-twenty division: (1) the parties were married a relatively short period of time, approximately three years; (2) Gail can maintain the same standard of living and lifestyle that she had before and during marriage despite the unequal distribution of the annuity; and (3) the monthly annuity payments constitute a substantial portion of Laurence’s law practice income.
We conclude that the reasons stated by the majority opinion for the eighty-twenty division do not justify the trial court’s disposition of the annuity income. The factors listed by the majority are not persuasive in supporting a deviation from the general rule. Even though the parties were married only three years, Laurence clearly earned the annuity during his marriage to Gail. A relatively brief marriage does not alter the annuity’s community property status, so it should not affect the distribution of the community assets.
Likewise, the second and third factors are of questionable relevance in dividing the annuity. The record indicates that both Laurence and Gail came into their marriage with considerable separate property. The record fails to show that either party requires the income from the annuity to maintain the standard of living enjoyed before and during marriage. Consequently, the last two factors do not justify the district court’s deviation from an equal disposition of the annuity income. If the gossamer reasons expressed by the trial court are deemed adequate to validate giving Laurence $570,000 and Gail $142,600 of what was clearly community property, we will establish precedent which may engender prolonged litigation, the principal beneficiaries of which will most likely be the lawyers, not the litigants. We will *665turn back the clock to the days prior to no-fault divorce when inordinate amounts of time and money were consumed in trying to show which spouse was guilty of greater fault.

 NRS 123.225(1) defines the respective interests of the husband and wife in community property as “present, existing and equal interests.” (Emphasis added.)

 Although Ohio is a non-community property state, it utilizes equitable distribution, a concept similar to fair and equitable distribution under NRS 125.150.