Court Opinion

ID: 9949043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 17:11:11.048125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:34.445570
License: Public Domain

J-S43014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARCUS GARVEY TRUST JR.                      :   No. 840 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-21-CR-0002265-2020

BEFORE:      McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                          FILED: MARCH 8, 2024

       The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Marcus Garvey

Trust Jr.’s motion to suppress. It maintains that the trial court erred by

entertaining the motion because it was untimely and claims the court erred in

granting the motion. We affirm.

       The instant case stems from an alleged rape in September 2019. See

Criminal Information, filed 11/3/20. The criminal complaint alleges that Trust

sexually assaulted the victim on September 21, 2019, at approximately 9:44

p.m. That same night, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Corporal Matthew

Johnston interviewed Trust at the Carlisle Regional Medical Center. See

Criminal Complaint, at 7. Trust was receiving medical treatment after allegedly

being assaulted by “an associate” of the victim. Id.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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       The Commonwealth filed charges against Trust for the alleged sexual

assault four months later. Trust moved for an extension of time to file an

omnibus pretrial motion, alleging outstanding discovery “material to the

defense’s preparation of their pretrial motion.” Motion to Extend Time to File

Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed 12/14/20, at 2, ¶ 10. The court granted the

motion and gave Trust an extension of 30 days “calculated from the date

the discovery is complete.” See Order Extending Time to File Omnibus

Pretrial Motion, filed 12/14/20 (emphasis added). The order also directed the

District Attorney to “notify [Trust] in writing that discovery is complete.” Id.

       On the day of trial, Trust filed a Motion in Limine for Exclusion of

Statement of Defendant. He sought the exclusion of his statements to Corporal

Johnston, claiming that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without

being given Miranda1 warnings. See Motion in Limine for Exclusion of

Statement of Defendant, filed 5/8/23, at 3, ¶ 15. At a hearing on the motion,

the Commonwealth stated, and the court confirmed, that the Commonwealth

had objected off the record that the motion was untimely and that the court

had overruled the objection.

       Corporal Johnston testified that he arrived at the hospital, in plain

clothes, to speak with Trust. N.T., Motion to Suppress Hearing, 5/24/23, at

23. When Corporal Johnston arrived, Trust was in a room in the emergency

department. Trust’s girlfriend and a member of the medical staff were in

____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

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Trust’s room. Id. at 24. Trust’s girlfriend had taken him to the hospital. Id. at

27. Corporal Johnston testified that he asked the medical staff if he could

speak with Trust privately, and they allowed him to do so. Id. at 24. Trust’s

girlfriend also left the room at the corporal’s request. Id. at 32. Trust was not

receiving treatment immediately before the interview but was holding gauze

to his face. Id. at 24, 32.

       Corporal Johnston testified that during the interview, the door to the

room was closed but not locked, two uniformed officers remained outside the

room, Trust “was sitting upright in the gurney,” and “was not handcuffed to

the chair rail.” Id. at 27, 31-32, 36, 37-38. Corporal Johnston conceded that

he did not at any point during the interview inform Trust of his Miranda rights.

Id. at 35.

       The Commonwealth played, during Corporal Johnston’s testimony, the

recording of his questioning of Trust. See id. at 25-26. The recording reflects

that Corporal Johnston informed Trust at the beginning of the interview that

he was not there to ask about the assault on Trust but rather about “some

things that happened with the female[.]” R.R. 186 (unpaginated).2 Trust

denied having attended a party or having “hook[ed] up” or having sexual

relations that night. Id. at 187-88 (unpaginated). When medical personnel

attempted to enter the room during the questioning, Corporal Johnston had

them leave because they needed more time. Trust replied that he did not
____________________________________________

2 A transcript of the interview is in the reproduced record. The parties do not

dispute its accuracy, and our review shows it to be materially accurate.

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“need any more time” or “need to answer any more questions,” and Corporal

Johnston ended the interview. Id. at 189-90 (unpaginated).

      One of the uniformed officers who remained outside of Trust’s room

during the interview, Trooper Corey James, testified that to get to the door to

Trust’s room, he had to go through a secured door that only medical personnel

with a key could access. Id. at 11-12. Trooper James did not go into Trust’s

room and was not blocking the door to his room. Id. at 6, 8.

      Trust testified in support of his motion. He said that during the interview,

Corporal Johnston stood at the end of his hospital bed, and he did not feel like

he could leave the room. Id. at 41. He did not indicate whether he knew or

saw the two uniformed officers outside of his room. Trust admitted that he

told Corporal Johnston he did not want to answer any more questions, stating

it was because he saw the doctor who was ready to assist him. Id. at 43-44.

      The court granted the motion to suppress. Id. at 48. This timely appeal

followed.

      The Commonwealth raises the following issues:

         I.    Did the trial court err in hearing [Trust’s] untimely
               pretrial motion to suppress evidence?

         II.   Did the trial court err in suppressing evidence when it
               erroneously concluded that [Trust] was “in custody”
               at the time of questioning and therefore his
               constitutional rights were violated?

Commonwealth’s Br. at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

      The Commonwealth’s first issue addresses whether the trial court erred

in hearing Trust’s motion to suppress. The Commonwealth likens this case to

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Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1246-48 (Pa.Super. 2011).

The Commonwealth maintains that Trust, like Borovichka, filed an untimely

motion to suppress and failed to give a reason for the untimely filing. The

Commonwealth also maintains that Trust “was aware of the grounds for the

motion” and “was clearly on notice about the content and circumstance of the

interview” with Corporal Johnston. Id. at 21, 22.

      The Commonwealth’s claim is meritless. It acknowledges that the court

granted Trust an extension but ignores the basis of that extension, i.e., the

completion of discovery. Id. 14 (“On December 14, 2020, [Trust] filed a

motion to extend to time to file an omnibus pretrial motion, which was granted

and the time to file was extended by 30 days”). Thus, it erroneously claims

that Trust’s motion was “877 days late.” Id. at 21. This calculation assumes

the deadline ran from the court’s order granting the extension. However, the

deadline ran from the completion of discovery. Therefore, we discern no error

by the court.

      Next, the Commonwealth alleges that the court erred in granting the

motion to suppress. It maintains that the court incorrectly concluded that

Trust was in custody at the time of his interview. It points to numerous factors

that would suggest that Trust was not in custody at the time including the

“short” duration of the interview, that Trust was not arrested before, during,

or after the interview, that the interview occurred in Trust’s hospital bed, and

that Corporal Johnston obtained permission from hospital staff to speak with

Trust. See id. at 31-32. It also notes that Trust agreed to be interviewed and

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went to the hospital on his own accord to be treated for his injuries. See id.

at 33. The Commonwealth further points out that Trooper James did not block

the door to Trust’s room, that Corporal Johnston asked, “general questions,”

and that “no uniformed troopers were present” during the interview. Id. at

34, 35.

      Our standard of review is settled for the grant of a motion to suppress:

          We consider only the evidence from the defendant’s
          witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution
          that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains
          uncontradicted. This Court must first determine whether the
          record supports the factual findings of the suppression court
          and then determine the reasonableness of the inferences
          and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In appeals
          where there is no meaningful dispute of fact, . . . our duty
          is to determine whether the suppression court properly
          applied the law to the facts of the case.

Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 427 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

      If a person is in custody or its functional equivalent, and is subject to

interrogation, police must give the familiar Miranda warnings. See

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887-88 (Pa.Super. 2009). A

person is in custody if they are “physically denied [their] freedom of action in

any significant way or . . . placed in a situation in which [they] reasonably

believe[] that [their] freedom of action or movement is restricted by the

interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 376 (Pa. 2015)

(citation omitted). “The standard for determining whether an encounter is

custodial is an objective one, focusing on the totality of the circumstances with

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due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the

individual being questioned.” Id. We consider such factors as: “the basis for

the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transferred

against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show,

threat or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or

dispel suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 71 A.3d 998, 1004 (Pa.Super.

2013) (citation omitted).

      The trial court determined that Trust was in custody at the time of

Corporal Johnston’s questioning. See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 7/5/23, at

4-5. That was a proper application of the law to the facts of this case.

Certainly, Trust’s freedom of action or movement was limited by the fact that

he was in the emergency room to receive treatment for his injuries. However,

that is not the issue. The question is whether he reasonably believed he could

leave the interview. Under the entirety of the facts here, he did not. Corporal

Johnston told Trust at the start of the interview that he was questioning him

because he was a suspect in a sexual assault. Corporal Johnston had medical

personnel and Trust’s girlfriend leave the room, closed the door, and had a

doctor that entered the room during the questioning, leave. Trust’s room was

accessible through a secured door that only hospital employees with a key

could open, and two uniformed troopers were outside of Trust’s room during

the interview.

      Trust’s telling Corporal Johnston he did not want to answer more

questions does not mandate a contrary outcome. He did so for the stated

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reason that he wanted medical attention, and his desire not to answer

questions does not demonstrate that he was not in custody. On balance, in

view of the totality of the circumstances, Trust “reasonably believe[d] that his

freedom of action or movement [was] restricted by the interrogation.”

Cooley, 118 A.3d at 376; cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 727 A.2d 1089,

1100-01 (Pa. 1999) (concluding appellant was not in custody during interview

with detective at a hospital where another patient was in the room; the door

to the room remained open; and appellant’s restraints were “due to his

physical condition”); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 955 (Pa.Super.

1997) (concluding appellant was not in custody during interview with detective

at a hospital where detective obtained permission from medical staff to speak

with appellant, appellant agreed to answer questions, appellant was not

restrained, and interview occurred in hospital lounge).

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2024

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