Court Opinion

ID: 9553677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:33:23.984636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:04.249825
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Presiding Judge,
specially concurring.
I specially concur, because, in my opinion, the lead opinion extends the duty arising out of a landlord/tenant relationship beyond legally recognized limits. The principles stated may well define the duties of a possessor of land. They do not express the duties recognized in the landlord/tenant situation.
*15To put this matter in proper legal context, it is necessary to revisit what the common law says happens when property is leased. This is well stated in the introductory statements to Topic 3, “Liability of Lessors of Land to Persons on the Land,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 comment a, at 240 (1965):
When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the lease as equivalent to a sale of the land for the term of the lease. The lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time being the owner and occupier, subject to all of the liabilities of one in possession, both to those who enter the land and to those outside of it. Therefore ... it is the general rule that the lessor is not liable to the lessee, or to others on the land, for injuries occurring after the lessee has taken possession, even though such injuries result from a dangerous condition existing at the time of the transfer.
Thus, the landlord was generally held immune from tort liability. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 63 at 434 (5th ed. 1984) (hereafter, “Prosser and Kee-ton”); Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property, § 202 (3rd ed. 1981). The tenant acquired an estate in the leasehold that conveyed not only possession but also control. Prosser and Keeton, supra. The general rule was that in the absence of an express contractual provision, a tenant took the premises as he found them. Id., see also Cummings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20, 386 P.2d 27 (1963). In Cummings, however, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that modern social policy considerations and Arizona precedent compelled the conclusion that certain exceptions should be carved out from the general rule. 95 Ariz. at 25, 386 P.2d at 30. The court therefore held that the landlord was under a duty to inspect the premises and “to take those precautions for the safety of the tenant as would be taken by a reasonably prudent man under similar circumstances.” 95 Ariz. at 26, 386 P.2d at 31. Arizona is also within the majority of jurisdictions that imposes a statutory duty on landlords to maintain fit premises in general and specifically on landlords of mobile home parks. See A.R.S. § 33-1434. This extension of liability, however, does not compel the conclusion that the landlord’s duty extends beyond the leased premises as a matter of law.
To support its contention that a landlord is liable to his tenant for off premises dangers, the lead opinion focuses on the foreseeability of the harm suffered in this case. It rejects the proposition that the landlord is under no duty to protect a tenant from off premises dangers claiming that neither Markowitz nor its predecessors “held that the geographic limits associated with a particular relationship necessarily delimit the scope of any duty of care imposed upon the parties to the relationship.” Maj. op. at 1059-60. My reading of the cases cited is to the contrary. In Markowitz, the injury occurred on state property in which the defendant/state had dominion and control over the site of the accident. Similarly, in both Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. 601, 667 P.2d 1316 (1983), and Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984), the defendant/city had the duty to keep its streets reasonably safe for travel. Lastly, in Tribe v. Shell Oil Co., 133 Ariz. 517, 652 P.2d 1040 (1982), the accident occurred on the proprietor’s property and the issue that made summary judgment inappropriate was whether the danger was open and obvious and not whether the proprietor had a duty in the first instance. I find no authority in these cases for the proposition that, as a general rule, a landlord’s duty to his tenant should be co-extensive with that of a possessor of land or extended to off-premises dangers.1 Foreseeability is not the *16issue. The issue is: even if the harm is foreseeable — that Georgie would be struck by a car in a busy street adjacent to his home — does the landlord have a duty to take measures to prevent that injury as a matter of law?
The lead opinion relies on the Montana case, Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491 (Mont.1985). In Limberhand, a small child wandered across a parking lot of an apartment complex that was adjacent to an open irrigation ditch. The child fell in the ditch and drowned. The owner/landlord of the apartment complex controlled the parking lot. The Montana court predicated its finding that the landlord had a duty to use reasonable care in protecting a social guest or tenant of the apartment complex from off-premise dangers, on the landlord’s retained control, of common areas in the apartment complex and not on any duties arising from the basic landlord/tenant relationship. Limberhand, 706 P.2d at 498 (“It is well-settled law in Montana that the social guest of a tenant in the common areas of an apartment complex is afforded a degree of protection from harm in relation to the duty of a landlord.”). A different analysis obtains when the landlord relinquishes control of the premises to the tenant. In my opinion, Limberhand does not support the reasoning the majority employed in this case.
While acknowledging the salutary effect of the growth of law in regard to the landlord/tenant relationship, I am constrained to conclude that the changes have not undermined the basic proposition that any duty imposed on the landlord must be defined by the original contractual agreement between the landlord and the tenant. I would therefore hold that the landlord/tenant relationship imposes on the landlord only a duly to prevent harm on the premises, unless the landlord controls the tenant’s ability to protect himself from off-premise dangers.
The parties have stipulated, for the purpose of this summary judgment, that the absence of a fence was the proximate cause of Georgie’s injuries. In the lease between the parties, the landlord reserved to himself the decision to allow or not allow fencing on the property. The record, at least for the purpose of summary judgment, shows that the tenants requested that they be allowed to erect fencing to protect against the precise danger that resulted in Georgie’s injuries. The landlord refused. When a party contractually places himself in a position to control a risk that can give rise to bodily harm, that party assumes the duty to exercise that control with reasonable care. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 357; Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 443 (majority of courts impose tort liability for injuries to person or property when landlord contractually agrees to keep premises in repair, finding a duty arising out of the contract relation); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 258 N.W.2d 30 (1977) (citing growing trend toward holding lessor liable in tort from injuries resulting from lessor’s failure to perform under a convenant to make repairs.).
This duty arises out of control, as defined by the contract, and cannot be generally extended to all aspects of the landlord/tenant relationship. Under the circumstances here, a jury question is raised as to whether the landlord exercised due care in the contractual control he reserved to himself.
I therefore concur that this case must be reversed.

. A possessor of land may be liable for off-premises liability. Prosser and Keeton, supra, at § 57. Such liability, however, is predicated on the ability the possessor has to control the manner in which he uses the premises. Id. Although the possessor has a right to make use of the land for his own benefit, that right is qualified by “principles of reasonableness, so as to cause no unreasonable risks of harm to others in the vicinity.” Id. at 386. A possessor’s duty in this situation arises as a matter of law so that even a tenant may be held liable if he controls *16the activities on the premises without the landlord’s consent. Id. at 437. This duty is not analogous to the duty imposed by the landlord/tenant relationship which is defined at its inception by a contractual agreement and which must be applied with the development of the common law exceptions to the principle of caveat emptor in mind.