Court Opinion

ID: 9687445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:28:22.850087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:27.442378
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(concurring in reversal and remand for trial). I agree with Justice Black that this case should be remanded with instructions in order that the trial judge may have proper guidance as he proceeds with a trial.
I. The Motion for Summary Judgment.
Normally the time for a motion for summary judgment is before trial. In this case, a trial was begun. After seven days, it ended in a mistrial. The plaintiff’s last witness was on the stand at the time. The clear purpose of defendant’s motion was to test plaintiff’s entire case. This is disclosed in the first paragraph of the motion:
“Defendant * * * moves the court tó enter summary judgment for defendant * * * for the reasons that the pleadings heretofore filed in the above action, as well as the earlier and nearly completed trial of the cause on the merits before this court and a jury, disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant could not test plaintiff’s practically completed case by a motion for directed verdict. Under the circumstances, the motion' -for summary judgment could be utilized to determine whether plaintiff’s pleadings, exhibits, and witnesses had raised *506genuine issues of material fact for determination by the jury. Certainly the actual testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses should be as acceptable for this purpose as affidavits. GOB, 1963, 117. Since plaintiff’s case was incomplete, he could, in opposing the motion, have filed counter affidavits.1
While the motion for entry of summary judgment was properly made, in my view there were numerous questions of fact for determination by the jury and, consequently, it was error to grant same.
II. Did the Plaintiee Plead (1) Defamation by Libel and (2) Invasion oe Privacy?
Causes of action based upon a claim of libel and a claim of invasion of privacy were pled. The defendant was advised by letter from plaintiff’s attorneys immediately after the first showing of the film that plaintiff’s right of privacy had been invaded.2 The claim was reiterated in paragraph 13 of plaintiff’s “amended complaint and declaration.”3 The claim was stated by the pretrial judge in the pretrial statement.4 The claim is again made in sub-paragraph (h) of the plaintiff’s motion for new trial and rehearing on motion for summary judgment.5 Finally, since the case must go back, the *507plaintiff should he allowed to go to trial upon both theories even if it is necessary to amend the complaint. GCR, 1963, 118.1, 118.4. LaBar v. Cooper (1965), 376 Mich 401.
III. "Was the Film Nondeeamatory as a Matter of Law?
I agree with Justice Souris that it is not possible to determine as a matter of law that “A Bell for Okinawa” is nondefamatory. Plaintiff’s amended complaint and declaration alleged:
“10. The film as produced and telecast by defendant used plaintiff’s name and identified him with said Neukollin Eisenwerk and falsely characterized and portrayed him by name as an arrogant, unfeeling person, and as possessing a character universally associated with the Hitler Nazi party.
“11. The film as telecast further asserted that plaintiff was approached by Dr. von Scorebrand to donate a bell, but in a rude and violent manner refused to do so until compelled by his employees to do so, and then only without paying his employees for the work done, all of which was untrue.”
The film portrays a Franz Weeren6 in behavior toward Dr. von Scorebrand which a jury might conclude was rude, arrogant and unfeeling. It shows him refuse to donate the bell. While this behavior is redeemed through the intervention of the Eisenwerk workmen and the saintly character of Dr. von Scorebrand, the Franz Weeren of the film is not a wholly attractive character. The testimony of the agents of defendant who were charged with the *508responsibility for determining what films were to be telecast was that defendant at no time attempted to determine whether or not the film portrayed plaintiff falsely.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 US 130 (87 S Ct 1975, 18 L ed 2d 1094), decided June 12, 1967, Justice Harlan, in an opinion in which he was joined by Justices Clark, Stewart and Fortas, observed (pp 151, 152) :
“The law of libel has, of course, changed substantially since the early days of' the Republic, and this change is ‘the direct consequence of the friction between it * * * and the highly cherished right of free speech.’ State of New Jersey v. Browne, 86 NJ Super 217, 228, (206 A2d 591, 597). The emphasis has shifted from criminal to civil remedies, from the protection of absolute social values to the safeguarding of valid personal interests. Truth has become an absolute defense in almost all cases, and privileges designed to foster free communication are almost universally recognized. But the basic theory of libel has not changed, and words defamatory of another, are still placed ‘in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.’ Prosser, The Law of Torts (3d ed), § 108, at p 792. Thus some antithesis between freedom of speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy.”
In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Warren wrote (p 170):
“Freedom of the press under the First Amendment does not include absolute license to destroy lives or careers.”
There was testimony upon the trial from which the jury might conclude that, due to the publication *509of the TV film by defendant with knowledge that the film was false or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, the reputation of the plaintiff had been harmed so as to lower him in the esteem of the community and so as to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.
IV. Did the Defendant Enjoy a Qualified Privilege in Televising the Film?
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held the defendant enjoyed a qualified privilege in televising “A Bell for Okinawa.” The trial court found the film to be a matter of public interest and, so, held that the defendant was not required to determine the truthfulness of it, hut merely to believe it to be true and publish it in good faith. The availability of privilege in libel actions is tested by the occasion and is to be determined by the court, but each occasion must be viewed in the light of its own facts. The privilege to disseminate current, topical, immediate news of public interest, or about official or public figures, is one thing. The privilege in connection with past events of possible current interest but which do not have to be transmitted to the public in a matter of hours is quite another. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra. If the privilege is one of a limited or qualified nature, it may be lost through improper conduct. The test for a public figure, as stated by Justice Harlan, is (p 155):
“A ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”
*510Newspaper articles appeared in 1953 when the hell was cast and given. The event was described in an article by Bruce Bliven, Jr., in a German Lutheran publication called “Christ Und Welt,” in April, 1955, and the Reader’s Digest story in August of 1955. Consequently, the occasion of the giving of the bell for Okinawa and plaintiff’s connection therewith, if any, had entered the area of public interest. Photographs taken and published at the time remain extant. The newspaper and periodical articles describing the event can be procured from libraries or other record depositories. All of this material is in the public domain. To the extent that the film depiction of these matters was merely a reiteration by another medium of communication of what had already been published, it was privileged. Nevertheless, as Justice Talbot Smith pointed out in Lawrence v. Fox (1959), 357 Mich 134, 144, qualified privilege raises two questions:
“In short, at this point 2 questions are presented. The first is whether or not the occasion upon which the words were spoken was a privileged occasion. This determination is for the court and the burden of proof is upon the defendant asserting the privilege. If, however, the privilege is qualified, a further question remains, whether or not the privilege of the occasion was abused. Here the problem is one for the jury, under proper instructions, and with respect to it the plaintiff carries the burden of proof. ‘The question whether the occasion is such as to rebut the inference of malice if the communication be bona fide is one of law for the court; but whether bona fides exist is one of fact for the jury.’ Timmis v. Bennett, 352 Mich 355, 367, quoting Bacon v. Michigan Central R. Company, 66 Mich 166, 173.”
Plaintiff established notice to defendant after the first telecast. Plaintiff claims the film deviates falsely from previous accounts. The actor who *511depicts the Franz Weeren of the film may'or may not faithfully and truly depict the character,' features and behavior of plaintiff. Consequently, even though the defendant enjoyed a qualified privilege, there were still many questions to be considered by the jury.
“The fact, then, that it is determined that the occasion is conditionally privileged does not mean-that the publisher (whether newspaper or other) has carte blanche to deal recklessly with the most jealously guarded possession of a public official, or, indeed, of any citizen, his good reputation. Yet the conditional privilege does afford the publisher a degree of protection. He is not liable for absolute truth, it being required only, as we held in Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich 297, 305, quoting McAllister v. Detroit Free Press, 76 Mich 338, 356 (15 Am St Rep 318), that the statement made be ‘honestly believed to be true, and published in good faith.’ See, also, Howard v. Dickie, 120 Mich 238, 241; 15 MLP, Libel and Slander, § 21.” Lawrence v. Fox, supra, pp 142, 143.
Since none of the material was “hot” news that needed to be reported immediately, and since it claimed the previously published material had been falsified in the film version so as to be defamatory of the plaintiff, I would apply the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Curtis Publishing Co., supra, and leave the matter for determination by a jury.
V. Was There an Invasion of Right of Privacy?
Plaintiff’s claimed right of privacy poses the most difficult question but, once again, it is a question of fact for determination by a jury. The right of privacy does exist in Michigan. Pallas v. Crowley, *512Milner & Company (1948), 322 Mich. 411. It was examined by the Michigan Supreme Court in Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co. (1899), 121 Mich 372 (46 LRA 219, 80 Am St Rep 507). In that case it was held that a widow could not assert a suit for an injunction to prevent the use of the name of her deceased husband and a purported picture of him for a cigar and cigar label. It was concluded that the right, if it did exist, did not survive to the widow.
The right can be inferred in the early Michigan case of Demay v. Roberts (1881), 46 Mich 160 (41 Am Rep 154). In Pallas, this Court refused to follow the reservations as to the right expressed in Atkinson. Pallas involved a claimed unauthorized use by defendant of plaintiff’s photograph. The Court said (pp 416, 417):
“The general rule (to which, of course, there are exceptions) is stated thus in the American Law Institute’s 4 Restatement, Torts, § 867, p 398:
“ ‘A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.’
“Doubtless the question whether the unauthorized publication of a person’s photographic likeness 'unreasonably and seriously’ interferes with such person’s right of privacy involves an issue of fact which cannot be determined on hearing a motion to dismiss, as was done in the case at bar. We conclude that there are circumstances under which one may have a right of privacy in a photographic likeness, which may give rise to an action for damages for the unauthorized publication thereof. In so holding, we do not overlook Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372 (46 LRA 219, 80 Am St Rep 507), but decline to follow the same to the extent that it is inconsistent with the conclusion reached herein.”
*513Prosser, Interstate Publication, • 51 Mich L Rev 959, 990, describes the right of privacy as follows:
“Notwithstanding all this, the boundaries of the tort are still anything but well defined. It appears in reality to be a complex of four more or less related wrongs. One, which has the clearest recognition, is the appropriation of the values of a name, picture or personality. A second consists of intrusion upon the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion, as by invading his room, or tapping his telephone wires. The third consists of giving unjustifiable and embarrassing publicity to present or past facts out of the plaintiff’s life, and is apparently closely related to the intentional infliction of mental suffering. The fourth, which has made a rather amorphous appearance in half a dozen cases, involves putting the plaintiff in a false but not necessarily defamatory position in the public eye, as by attributing to him views that he does not hold, or conduct with which he cannot fairly be charged.”
Here the claimed invasions of privacy consist of “the appropriation * * * of a name, picture or personality * * * giving unjustifiable and embarrassing publicity to * * * past facts out of the plaintiff’s life, and * * * attributing to him * * * conduct with which he cannot fairly be charged.” Prosser, supra.
These are questions for a jury to determine. The proofs upon trial will of necessity include a viewing of the telecast. The language of an actor, it should be noted, is much more than words: See Gadde v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 377 Mich 117, 127, text and footnote 4 re nonverbal communication. It is the way in which he speaks, the way in which he moves about, the manner in which he smiles or frowns, that tells the story. If plaintiff has been portrayed as a villain, or whatever the portrayal, *514a jury is the proper fact-finder to consider and assess'that portrayal in its entirety.
VI. In Summary
Whether plaintiff’s claims have merit, they are entitled to be tested under the existing law as to libel and as to the right of privacy. I agree that the partially completed trial should be considered in connection with the motion for summary judgment. I disagree that the film is nondefamatory as a matter of law. I would treat the complaint as a two-count complaint, (1) in libel and (2) invasion of privacy. I would remand for a trial without costs, costs to abide the final result.
T. M. Kavanagh, J., concurred with Adams, J.

 “The characterization of Mr. Weeren and representation of his actions and conduct are regarded as false, defamatory and an invasion of his right of privacy.” — From letter by plaintiff's attorneys to defendant.

 “13. Plaintiff immediately, through attorneys, caused a letter to be sent to the defendant requesting that defendant cease and desist from further distribution and telecast of said film and advising the defendant that said film was false and dafamatory and an invasion of his right of privacy.”

 “This is the ease of the Bell for Okinawa. It is a libel and slander, invasion of privacy aetion by television.”

 “(h) that this Court erred in holding as a matter of law that *507plaintiff liad not established an invasion of plaintiff’s right of privacy.”

 It should be noted that one of the prime issues in this ease is whether or not the Franz Weeren of the TV film and plaintiff are one and the same or whether persons viewing the film would be likely to think they were.