Court Opinion

ID: 9731939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:02:16.594646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.072400
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court reversing the trial court’s order directing the parties to continue collective bargaining and scheduling negotiation sessions.
Section 1003 of the Public Employee Relations Act (“PERA”), 43 Pa.S. § 1101.1003, provides:
If a strike by public employes occurs after the collective bargaining processes set forth in sections 801 and 802 of Article VII of this act have been completely utilized and exhausted, it shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the *180health, safety or welfare of the public. In such cases the public employer shall initiate, in the court of common pleas of the jurisdiction where such strike occurs, an action for equitable relief including but not limited to appropriate injunctions and shall be entitled to such relief if the court finds that the strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. If the strike involves Commonwealth employes, the chief legal officer of the public employer or the Attorney General where required by law shall institute an action for equitable relief in the court of common pleas of the jurisdiction where the strike has occurred or the Commonwealth Court.
No common law equity jurisdiction exists in Pennsylvania. A court may exercise only those equitable powers which have been specifically conferred by the legislature. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 459 Pa. 148, 151, 327 A.2d 351, 354 (1974), citing Calabrese v. Collier Township Municipal Authority, 430 Pa. 289, 240 A.2d 544 (1968); Armstrong School District v. Armstrong Education Association, 5 Pa.Cmwlth. 387, 291 A.2d 125 (1972). Thus, the scope of a chancellor’s jurisdiction in matters involving strikes by public employees is defined by Section 1003 of PERA.
The majority holds that section 1003 “does not reduce any of the common law jurisdiction of a court of common pleas in equity.” Given its expansive view of the scope of authority of an equity court, the majority has shaped its response to the issue without deference to the detailed legislative scheme for collective bargaining. The response is visceral and invalid.
The Legislature has mandated that no strike by public employees be prohibited unless or until the strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety, or welfare of the public. In such cases, the Act gives the right to a public employer to initiate an action for equitable relief in the common pleas court. It is significant that § 1003 is structured as an authorization for the public employer to seek relief from a strike, including injunctive relief. The Act does not provide an unlimited grant of authority for the *181court to step in to resolve a dispute, and, notably, the public employees are given no right to approach the court for relief.
The majority seizes upon the phrase “an action for equitable relief including but not limited to appropriate injunctions” as authority for its broad interpretation of the court’s role in a strike by public employees. Argument can easily be made that the phrase was intended only to clarify that injunctive relief was permitted, and not to suggest that the court has unfettered discretion to act as a super-arbitrator. Much more is at stake than a disagreement as to the meaning of the phrase, however.
The majority has lost sight of the overall scheme developed by the Legislature. Scrutiny of the Act as a whole reveals a carefully crafted balance of the rights of the public employer, public employee, and the public at large. To achieve this delicate balance, the Legislature specifically defined the roles of the arbitrators, the courts, and the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board.
The balance is disrupted by the majority’s unsupported expansion of the court’s role. The majority concludes that the authority of the court must necessarily be far-reaching, fearing that any restriction on that authority would defeat it. I disagree. Section 1003 of the Act does not have to be interpreted so as to permit the court to wield power to compel attendance and to direct the hours of negotiation in order to preserve the court’s authority to grant equitable relief. Negotiations require finesse, not a judicial steamroller.
Forcing individuals to appear and negotiate at specific times by court order may prove undesirable. “A major purpose of the Act is to encourage the peaceful resolution of labor disputes between public employers and their employees through orderly procedures of collective bargaining.” Commonwealth v. Ryan, 459 Pa. at 158, 327 A.2d at 354 (footnote omitted). The court’s role is only to ensure that the public is not endangered or threatened by a delay in that peaceful resolution.
*182There is no reason to believe that a court-imposed negotiating session will achieve what the public employer and public employes have not. The common pleas court may act only to end a strike, not to impose a judicial settlement. Bristol Township Education Association v. School District of Bristol Township, 14 Pa.Cmwlth. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974). The Commonwealth Court correctly held that when the trial court attempted to supervise the bargaining agreement in the instant case, it impermissibly intruded into the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board’s jurisdictional province. I dissent.