Court Opinion

ID: 9946657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 01:00:34.709989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:23.012896
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50574         Document: 183-1           Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/29/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                                        FILED
                                                                              February 29, 2024
                                   No. 21-50574
                                 ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
Charles E. Epley,

                                                                Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                        versus

Samuel B. Itie, Medical official at Lynaugh; Roxie Ingram, Medical
official at Lynaugh; M. Fuentes, Practice Manager at Lynaugh;
Michelle D. Sellers, Classification at Lynaugh; Paul M.
Robinson, Sergeant at Lynaugh; Heather M. Gonzales, Sergeant
at Lynaugh; Raul Melero, Captain at Lynaugh,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:18-CV-34
                 ______________________________

Before Stewart, Clement, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Charles Epley spent nearly thirty years incarcerated at various units
within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Epley alleges that he
suffered physical and mental distress over a three-week period, during which

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-50574          Document: 183-1           Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/29/2024

                                       No. 21-50574

he was transferred seven times between several units across the state,
including the Lynaugh and Montford units. He sued officials in the Lynaugh
Unit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged First and Eighth Amendment
violations related to the incidents he claims were the source of his injuries.
In a series of opinions, the district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants on all claims. Epley appeals; we now affirm.
        We find that Epley raised no genuine issue of material fact on his
Eighth Amendment claims. As to these claims, we summarily affirm the
district court.1
        Epley’s First Amendment claim, however, warrants our attention.
Epley practices a pre-Christian religion originating in Europe. As part of his
suit, Epley claims that Lynaugh supervisor Paul Robinson violated his
constitutional right to exercise this religion. TDCJ had previously cleared
Epley to acquire and wear a Celtic cross medallion. Epley wore the medallion
as a form of religious observance. He alleges that he arrived at Lynaugh with
the medallion, that it was taken alongside his other personal items when
Epley was sent to an infirmary for medical observation, and that he never saw
it again. He believes that Robinson intentionally confiscated the medallion
and caused its loss.

        _____________________
        1
            Epley’s suit against the Lynaugh officials, which comes to us from the Western
District of Texas, was originally part of a larger suit in the Northern District of Texas
against numerous officials in various TDCJ departments and the office of the Texas
Attorney General. The Northern District sua sponte severed the claims against the
Lynaugh officials and transferred the case to the Western District. In addition to appealing
the Western District’s summary judgment rulings, Epley attempts to challenge the
Northern District’s severance and transfer decision. Noting that Epley failed to seek
mandamus after the transfer occurred, we decline to consider his arguments. See, e.g., Def.
Distrib. v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 423, 426 n.13 (5th Cir. 2022).

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Case: 21-50574        Document: 183-1        Page: 3     Date Filed: 02/29/2024

                                   No. 21-50574

       The magistrate report adopted by the district court concluded that
confiscation could not violate the First Amendment.
       We disagree with this conclusion. The right to exercise religion does
not stop at the prison gate. See Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995).
To be sure, this right, as it pertains to inmates, “is subject to reasonable
restrictions and limitations necessitated by penological goals.” Id. It is also
true that prisons can sometimes limit the possession of religious items
without raising constitutional concerns. See, e.g., McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684
F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding TDCJ policy barring medallions worth
more than twenty-five dollars).
       But no decisionmaker may act based on religious animus. See, e.g.,
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533 (2021); see also Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 636 (2018). This is as
true for prison officials as it is for other civil servants. See Jackson v. Godwin,
400 F.2d 529, 533–35 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that “courts will not shrink from
scrutinizing administrative actions” “in the area of arbitrary official action in
the administration of prisons which involves the constitutional rights of
inmates to . . . enjoy the ‘preferred’ freedoms of the First Amendment,”
including “freedom of religion.”). When a prison official deprives an inmate
of a religious item because of hostility toward the inmate’s religion, the
deprivation is not reasonable.
       Epley forfeited his right to argue deprivation with religious hostility,
however. He does not accuse Robinson of religious hostility in either his pro
se or counseled opening briefs on appeal. Nor do his legal arguments
implicate the intent of policy enforcers. Not until Epley’s counseled reply
brief is it intimated that Robinson possessed animus toward Epley’s religious
exercise.

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Case: 21-50574        Document: 183-1       Page: 4     Date Filed: 02/29/2024

                                  No. 21-50574

       Parties cannot wait until the other side can no longer brief a response
to raise important issues. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.
1993) (“This Court will not consider a claim raised for the first time in a reply
brief.”). The failure to timely assert these issues results in them being
forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
       Because Epley forfeited his right to raise the important issue of
religious hostility, we affirm the decision of the district court.

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