Court Opinion

ID: 9903916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:09:45.534964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:49.299798
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

C.C., FATHER OF L.A., A CHILD,

            Appellant,

v.                                          Case No. 5D22-1476
                                            LT Case No. 2017-DP-000117-SH

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

            Appellee.

                                        /

Opinion filed November 14, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Osceola County,
Laura Shaffer, Judge.

Ryan Thomas Truskoski, of Ryan
Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Orlando,
for Appellant.

Kelley Schaeffer, of Children’s Legal
Services, Bradenton, for Appellee,
Department of Children and
Families.

Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide
Director of Appeals, and Desiree
Erin Fernandez, Senior Attorney, of
Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office,
Tallahassee, and Blake Lynne
Bruce, of Defending Best Interests
Project, Alexandria, VA, for
Appellee, Guardian ad Litem
Program.

COHEN, J.

      C.C. (“Father”) appeals the order terminating his parental rights to L.A. (“the

child”). 1 Father argues that there was not competent substantial evidence that

termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child. We agree.

      This case involves competing principles found in many termination of parental

rights cases: the constitutional right of a parent to raise his or her child and the right

of the child to permanence and stability. Courts have long recognized the

fundamental liberty interest of parents in determining the care and upbringing of their

children. Padgett v. Dep’t of HRS, 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991). This interest is

particularly strong under the Florida Constitution. S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. &

Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 777–78 (Fla. 2016) (“[T]his fundamental right is equally as

strong, if not stronger, under the Florida Constitution.”). However, that interest is not

absolute; the best interests of the child prevail. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570 (“[T]he

only limitation on this rule of parental privilege is that as between the parent and the

child the ultimate welfare of the child itself must be controlling.” (citation omitted)).

      Born in Osceola County in December of 2017, the child was sheltered after

      1
       The termination of the mother’s parental rights was affirmed by this Court in
a separate case.
                                        2
his mother was arrested for physical abuse of her eldest child. Father resided in

North Carolina at the time of the child’s birth. The mother consented to the child’s

dependency, while Father did not. Instead, Father requested that the child be placed

with him. The Department of Children and Family Services (“the Department”)

moved for an expedited placement with Father, dismissed the dependency petition

as to him without prejudice, and ordered a home study. Upon Father’s request, the

Department assigned several voluntary tasks to him, including completion of

individual counseling, parent coaching, and a psychological evaluation—which

Father completed.

      The home study, performed in North Carolina, was negative because of

Father’s criminal history. The Department was informed that there was nothing Father

could do to obtain a positive home study in North Carolina. Additional services were

not ordered for Father, although reunification remained the goal; instead, the

Department recommended that he secure an apartment in Florida to potentially

obtain a positive home study, and Father made some attempt towards that goal.

      At six months old, the child was placed with a non-relative, with whom the child

still resides; the child is now almost five. Between incarcerations, Father visited the

child through video calls two to three times per week, supervised by the caregiver,

and travelled to Florida on multiple occasions to visit the child.

      Father was unable to effectuate a move to Florida when he became

incarcerated. Father’s criminal history includes an arson and assault conviction that
                                          3
predated the birth of the child by twelve years. However, Father has been in and out

of jail during the pendency of this case. Father is currently incarcerated with an

anticipated release date of September 2023.

      Father was arrested in North Carolina for DWI in August 2018, and not long

after, the Department filed an amended petition for supplemental findings of

dependency relating to Father, alleging impending danger to the child, prospective

neglect, and prospective abuse, which Father denied. The Department noted the

recent arrest and Father’s criminal history preceding the child’s birth, as well as

reports of domestic violence involving Father. At that point in time, the child had not

been adjudicated dependent as to Father. The Department also moved to place the

child in a permanent guardianship with the caregiver, noting that adoption was not

appropriate given Father’s engagement in services as well as his provision of

money, clothing, diapers, and food for the child. The court responded by ordering a

goal of permanent guardianship concurrent with a goal of reunification, and also

ordered that the Department file an amended case plan within 30 days to include

proposed tasks for Father. That plan was never generated.

      During this time, Father had been sentenced to 18 months on the DWI

charge.2 After serving seven months, he was released into a voluntary substance

abuse treatment program. One week later, the Department filed an expedited petition

      2
          The offense predated the child’s birth; the sentence did not.
                                           4
for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights. The petition alleged: (1)

chronic substance abuse; (2) abandonment; and (3) continued involvement

threatens the child irrespective of services. In January 2020, after completing the

treatment program, Father resumed his virtual visits twice per week.

      The TPR trial was conducted piecemeal over a span of ten months. The trial

court initially denied the Department’s petition. However, after a motion for

rehearing filed by the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”), the trial court reversed itself and

ordered a new trial sua sponte, noting that, because the trial transpired over nearly

a year during the pandemic, the case should be tried again “in fairness to the

parties.”

      The court ordered Father to undergo an updated psychological evaluation.

Father requested that the evaluation be scheduled in North Carolina or,

alternatively, that the Department assist with his travel to Florida for an appointment

there. The Department did not respond, so Father offered to participate in the

evaluation in Florida during a trip in May 2021 to visit the child.

      Shortly before the trip, Father was again incarcerated and has not seen the

child since. Several months later, the Department filed an amended expedited TPR

petition, retaining the original grounds but adding a fourth ground, that the child was

in out-of-home care for 12 out of the past 22 months.

      At trial, the GAL testified that, prior to his incarceration, Father travelled to

Florida for in-person visits three to four times per year and had video visits with the
                                          5
child as well. He had provided clothing for the child around the holidays; would

check throughout the year on the child’s needs; provided diapers when asked;

signed parental consents for medical procedures; and paid a portion of the funds

for the child’s daycare. The GAL expressed concerns about the child’s safety with

Father given his “very long prior history of criminal involvement” and “ongoing issues

with substance abuse” but conceded that Father had never been provided a case

plan.

        Father testified remotely from prison in North Carolina. He acknowledged his

criminal history including his current incarceration for possession of a firearm by

a felon, communicating threats and assault by pointing a weapon, and violation of

probation by resisting a public officer. His plan following his release was to transfer

his parole to Florida and resume the relationship with his child.

        Father testified that in addition to completing the counseling services and

psychological evaluation after referrals were provided in 2018, he also took an

anger management class and followed other recommendations made by the

psychologist. He stated that he worked to better himself while incarcerated by

completing his GED, obtaining an HVAC diploma, and attending the substance

abuse program as well as associated 12-step meetings. He had not heard from his

case manager for almost one year, since his incarceration in May 2021.

        The case manager admitted that she had not made any referrals to overcome

concern about Father’s substance abuse after he completed the voluntary treatment
                                         6
program, such as drug testing. She also explained that the updated psychological

evaluation was ordered while the case was in a TPR posture so that the Department

could determine whether it wanted to move forward with the TPR trial or not; but there

was no follow-up to obtain the evaluation once Father missed the appointment in

Florida.

      The trial court entered final judgment terminating Father’s parental rights on

the basis of (1) abandonment, (2) continuing involvement threatens the child

irrespective of services, and (3) the child having been in care for 12 of the last 22

months, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), (1)(c), and (1)(e)3., Florida Statutes

(2021), respectively. The majority of the court’s findings addressed his criminal

history. After noting that Father did not have a case plan, the trial court added that

“he did participate in some services but it did not stop the criminal behavior and it

did not stop him from being repeatedly incarcerated.”

      As to the least restrictive means of protecting the child, the trial court found

that “[t]he child was sheltered four and a half years ago” and proceeded to find, in a

conclusory fashion, “The Department has made reasonable efforts. Neither parent

is able to be safely reunified with the child.”

      Father argues on appeal that the Department failed to prove that the termination

of his parental rights was the least restrictive alternative when he was never provided a

case plan and had never harmed the child. 3

      3
          We note the assertion in the Department’s brief that Father had been given
                                         7
      The least restrictive means test is a judicially imposed requirement that “is tied

directly to the due process rights that must be afforded to a parent before his or her

parental rights are terminated.” S.M., 202 So. 3d at 778. However, the test “is not

intended to preserve a parental bond at the cost of a child’s future. Rather . . . it simply

requires that measures short of termination should be utilized if such measures can

permit the safe re-establishment of the parent-child bond.” Id. at 778–79 (citation

omitted). The least restrictive means analysis focuses on the actions taken by the

Department to ensure that a parent is provided fair procedures before the

termination of parental rights. I d . at 778 (“This prong focuses specifically on what

actions were taken by the State before filing a petition to terminate the parent’s

rights.”). In order to meet the requirement, the Department must show that it has

made a good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent and to reunify the family. K.D. v.

Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 242 So. 3d 522, 523–24 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Generally,

this prong is satisfied by the Department offering the parent a case plan and

providing the parent with the help and services necessary to complete the case

plan. Id. However, a case plan is not necessarily a mandatory prerequisite to

termination. Id. at 524. Even so, a petitioner’s burden to prove that termination is

the least restrictive means of protecting a child from harm is not eliminated.

      Beginning with an analysis of the Department’s efforts to rehabilitate Father

a case plan. Both the testimony of the GAL and the findings made by the trial court
demonstrate the inaccuracy of that assertion.
                                        8
and reunify him with the child, for the four years from the shelter petition to the filing

of the amended TPR petition, little was done, despite the Department’s undisputed

awareness from the outset that Father had a criminal history and substance abuse

issues. The Department provided—at Father’s request—some initial voluntary

counseling, one psychological evaluation, and two home studies. The Department

did not provide: (1) a formal case plan and associated services that would provide

Father with an opportunity to prove his capability; (2) an updated psychological

evaluation; (3) substance abuse treatment or drug screening, despite diagnosed and

admitted alcoholism, and the Department’s allegation of chronic substance abuse; or

(4) any contact or services while incarcerated or between the two incarcerations. In

other words, the Department expended minimal efforts during the over-two years

that Father was not incarcerated and none while he was incarcerated. This lack of

effort does not suffice as having provided Father with “fundamentally fair

procedures” before terminating his parental rights. See S.M., 202 So. 3d at 778.

      In addition, the evidence presented did not demonstrate Father would not

benefit from services, for several reasons. See C.A.T. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,

10 So. 3d 682, 684–85 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (“[I]n order to establish that termination

is the least restrictive means, DCF must show that the parent will not benefit from

court ordered services.”); L.C.A. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 319 So. 3d 671, 678

(Fla. 3d DCA 2021); A.S. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 162 So. 3d 335, 340 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2015). First, the GAL testified that there are services for incarcerated parents
                                           9
that are intended to reduce recidivism, which the GAL simultaneously noted was

the State’s primary concern for Father. Second, no updated psychological

evaluation was conducted, despite Father’s willingness to submit to one. See In re

E.R., 49 So. 3d 846, 859–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that termination was

least restrictive means when court could not determine whether mother had mental

health problem that would prevent her from benefitting from court-ordered services,

because mother refused to discuss her other child’s mysterious death, rendering

psychological evaluation incomplete). And more significant, the GAL testified that

the results of the updated evaluation would inform the Department’s determination

whether to file the TPR at all; yet, the evaluation was never conducted. Third, there

was also no evidence that supervised visitation would be harmful to the child while

Father engaged in such services, as harm was never reported in their 100-plus visits

together. See C.A.T., 10 So. 3d at 685; cf. R.W. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 228 So.

3d 730 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (determining parent not amenable to court-ordered

services where there was “absolutely no reasonable basis to believe [the mother]

will improve”).

      Finally, Florida courts consider a parent’s efforts at rehabilitation when

determining if termination is the least restrictive means. See generally J.J. v. Dep’t of

Child. & Fams., 994 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (where termination not least

restrictive means when mother, who was previously convicted of aggravated child

abuse of another child, engaged in voluntary counseling, parenting classes, and
                                          10
regular visitation of subject twins but was not provided case plan); V.M. v. Dep’t of

Child. & Fams., 922 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (where Department did not

demonstrate reasonable efforts toward reunification for father who, for seven

months between incarcerations: regularly visited child, attended a court hearing, and

completed one voluntary task); cf. R.K. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 898 So. 2d 998

(Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (where termination was least restrictive means for mother with

15-year history of drug abuse and criminal activity, plus prior removal of another child,

who left substance abuse program prior to completion and refused Department’s

offer of voluntary services). Here, Father requested voluntary services, which

included counseling and a psychological evaluation, completed all of them as soon

as they were referred, and continued with individual counseling. Additionally, as part

of his sentence for DWI, he completed a substance abuse treatment program. After

his home study was negative and unlikely to change, he pursued relocation to

Florida, driving back and forth to secure an apartment, while also working toward

placement of the child with a friend in North Carolina. When the court ordered an

updated psychological evaluation and the Department would not arrange it in North

Carolina, he made arrangements to travel to Florida—without assistance from the

Department—to complete it. While incarcerated, he obtained his GED diploma and

HVAC certification, and he attended 12-step meetings for substance abuse. In

addition, it is undisputed that Father had video visits with the child two to four times

per week prior to his first incarceration, resumed that practice after incarceration,
                                          11
and also travelled to Florida to visit the child in person.

      Clearly the trial court was concerned with Father’s criminal history. Appellees

contend that additional services would not remedy the essential problem of Father’s

criminal propensities, a history that prohibits safe reunification, but Appellees

provide no authority connecting a parent’s criminal history with an inability to benefit

from court-ordered services. Instead, Appellees largely rely on S.M., 202 So. 3d

769, where the Florida Supreme Court found the least restrictive means test met,

concluding that “the material facts in the underlying termination of parental rights

trial . . . demonstrate the extensive efforts made by the Department to reunify the

mother with her children before it filed a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. at

773. The extensive efforts included three case plans plus four years of services. Id.

at 783. But the mother refused to comply, did not visit the children on a regular

basis, routinely missed court hearings, and conceded that reunification would be

harmful to the children. Id. at 772–74. The instant case does not reflect such efforts

by the Department or non-compliance by Father.

      That same history was utilized in the trial court’s analysis of whether the child

could be safely reunified with Father. At trial, the bulk of the State’s questions

concerned Father’s criminal history. The only exhibit entered by the State as to him

was Father’s judgment and sentence from the 2005 arson case, and Father’s

criminal history comprised the majority of the trial court’s findings. However, Father

has no history of harming children in general or this child in particular.
                                           12
      We recognize that time is of the essence in permanency cases and that, while

Father never harmed the child, the instability of impermanency itself can cause

harm. S.M., 202 So. 3d at 781 (“The Legislature has also made clear that ‘[t]ime is

of the essence’ in providing permanency for children requiring that, if possible,

children should be placed in a permanent living situation within one year of coming

into care.” (citation omitted)); see B.K. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 166 So. 3d 866,

876–77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (recognizing that harm can arise from continued

instability in child’s life).

      Here, the child has never been in Father’s custody and instead has been with

the same caregiver for the four years preceding the trial, a caregiver who has

expressed an interest in adopting him. However, much of the delay was outside of

Father’s control. Father pursued custody immediately and requested a home study,

then pursued two other options as soon as the home study was negative. He

completed his voluntary tasks promptly upon referral and resumed visitation as soon

as he was released from jail. As noted by the trial court, the first TPR trial was

protracted for close to one year due the pandemic—and then further delayed when,

after finding that the Department had not established grounds for termination of

parental rights, the trial court sua sponte granted a new trial that did not commence

until one year later. As such, this is not a case of a child enduring impermanency

while waiting for a slow-moving parent to demonstrate responsibility by completing

one—or multiple—case plans.
                                        13
      In sum, cases permitting termination of parental rights without the provision of

a case plan generally involve extraordinary circumstances. S.M., 202 So. 3d at 778

(“The determination of the least restrictive means must be evaluated in light of the

right being terminated: to be a parent to one’s child. Consideration of this prong is

all the more critical in the extraordinary case, where the Department does not offer

the parent the chance to comply with the requirements of a case plan and be

reunited with his or her child . . . .”). This Court has articulated specific examples of

such extraordinary cases:

      [O]ur supreme court has recognized, in certain “extraordinary
      circumstances,” termination of parental rights without the use of a case
      plan is the least restrictive means to protect a child. Those extraordinary
      circumstances include severe or continuing abuse through continuing
      involvement and egregious abuse as found in then section 39.464,
      paragraphs (3) and (4), now renumbered as section 39.806(1)(c) and
      (1)(f).

R.W., 228 So. 3d 730 at 733 (relying on In re T.M. & F.M., 641 So. 2d 410, 413

(Fla. 1994)) (emphasis added); see also In Int. of X.W., 255 So. 3d 882, 890 (Fla.

2d DCA 2018) (“We are confident that in cases like this one—involving the sexual

battery of an eleven-year-old resulting in the conception of a child—such

extraordinary circumstances exist.”).

      Under the facts of this case, and in the absence of other reasonable efforts at

reunification, a case plan should have been provided to Father, with the opportunity

to perform satisfactorily thereunder, before DCF pursued severance of his parental

rights. See S.M., 202 So. 3d at 777–78. Accordingly, there was not competent
                                          14
substantial evidence that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting

the child.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

SASSO and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.

                                       15