Court Opinion

ID: 9643293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:24:43.431249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:59.086866
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
Defendant James Clopton and two other men physically wrenched one Billy Lee Riner from his home in the early hours of the morning, announced they were *13going to kill Mm, placed Mm in a car while holding a shotgun and pistol to Ms head, and drove off, presumably to complete their mission.1 Only miraculously did Riner manage to subdue his attackers and escape his intended doom. The majority concedes, as it must, that the above acts constituted a classic case of common law attempted murder;2 but nevertheless concludes that this defendant and indeed no defendant can be guilty of attempted murder unless the trigger of his gun has actually been pulled. With such a holding I am in firm disagreement.
In reaching its result the majority proceeds on the theory that the Legislature intended to pre-empt common law attempted murder when it passed two statutes in 1939.3 The statutes in question codify two well recog*14nized types of conduct which fall within the common law definition of attempted murder—where, for example, the assailant actually pulls the trigger of his loaded gun and either (a) misses the intended victim (Section 4711) or (b) inflicts bodily harm but does not ldll the intended victim (Section 4710). The majority concludes that by enacting these two statutes and remaining silent as to the other types of common law attempted murder, the Legislature meant to “pre-empt”, and thus narrow the scope of common law attempted murder.4 Thus under the majority’s holding conduct which formerly would have been proMbited under the common law definition of attempted murder is no longer proscribed.
The majority in my view falls into error when it concludes that the Legislature remained silent as to the *15areas of common law attempted murder not covered by Sections 4710 and 4711. Quite to tbe contrary tbe Legislature at the same lime it enacted the above statutes also enacted Section 5101 which provides that: “[e]very offense now punishable either by the statute or common law of this Commonwealth and not specifically provided for by this act, shall continue to be an offense punishable as heretofore."5 Surely the Legislature, merely by highlighting two recognized categories of common law attempted murder, did not “specifically provide” or preempt the entire offense of common law attempted murder. Sections 4710 and 4711 read in pari materia with Section 5101, conclusively establish that the Legislature did not intend to exonerate from punishment any conduct prohibited by common law attempted murder.
Sections 4710, 4711 and 5101 indicate a logical and rational scheme by which the Legislature intended to highlight certain types of common law attempted murder. The two statutes codified areas of common law attempted murder that had been made certain through case by case interpretation and analysis. Other areas of common law attempted murder, however, do not lend themselves to such neat caterogization. Bather than attempt the herculean and perhaps impossible task of codifying the complete area of attempted murder, the Legislature, as it did in many other areas, quite sensibly left it to the further refinement of the courts.
The majority’s interpretation leads it to an absurdity that it quite candidly acknowledges. Sections 4710 and 4711 deal specifically with attempted murder through such means as firearms and knives, and thus under the majority’s analysis all other means not specifically mentioned are still governed by common law concepts of *16attempted murder.6 Thus, if defendant James Clopton and his companions in this case had told the intended victim that they were going to kill him with, for example, a blackjack, the majority would in that instance sustain a conviction of common law attempted murder.7 If the assailant instead of a blackjack chooses a firearm, the most lethal of all weapons, the majority holds that the offense of attempted murder is not committed until the trigger is actually pulled. I cannot believe that the Legislature intended such an anamolous result. Moreover, such an interpretation does violence to the statutory canon of construction which mandates that in construing a statute we must be mindful that “[t]he Legislature does not intend a result that is absurd.”8
*17X dissent and would affirm the judgment of sentence.
Mr. Chief Justice Jones joins in this dissent.

 Tlie trial court found as a fact that the defendant had come from Oklahoma to kill Billy Lee Riner and collect $1,000.

 This Commonwealth has consistently followed the following test for determining whether an attempt has occurred: “An attempt, in general, is an overt act done in pursuance of an intent to do a specific thing, tending to the end but falling short of complete accomplishment of it. In law, the definition must have this further qualification, that the overt act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to form one of the natural series of acts which the intent requires for its full execution. So long as the acts are confined to preparation only, and can be abandoned before any transgression of the law or of others’ rights, they are within the sphere of intent and do not amount to attempts.” Commonweath v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 21-22, 42 Atl. 374, 377 (1899). See also Commonwealth v. Ellis, 349 Pa. 402, 404, 37 A. 2d 504, 505-06 (1944); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 148, 167 Atl. 344, 346-47 (1933); Commonwealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91, 98, 154 Atl. 283, 285-86 (1931).

 The Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §710, 18 P.S. §4710 defines “assaults with intent to kill” as: “Whoever administers, or causes to be administered by another, any poison or other destructive thing or stabs, cuts or wounds any person, or by any means causes any person bodily injury, dangerous to life, with intention to commit murder, is guilty of felony. . . .”
*14The Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §711, 18 P.S. §4711, defines “attempts with intent to kill” as: “Whoever attempts to administer any poison or other destructive thing, or attempts to cut or stab or wound, or shoots at any person, or, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner, attempts to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, or attempts to drown, suffocate or strangle any person, with intent to commit the crime of murder, although no bodily injury is effected, is guilty of felony. . . .”

 I am at a loss to understand the majority’s extended discussion of the British experience with common law attempted murder. Nowhere in the Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, Art. IV, §51, 46 P.S. §551, which establishes the guidelines for determining legislative intent, do I find justification for what the majority has done. The statute reads in pertinent part: “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. . . . When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the Legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters—(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to be attained; (5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) legislative and administrative interpretations of such law.”

 The Act of June 24, 1939, P. D. 872, §1101, 18 P.S. §5101. (Emphasis added.)

 It should be noted that the majority’s conclusion that attempts with weapons other than guns, knives and poison are still controlled by common law principles of attempted murder is inconsistent with the majority’s analysis of Sections 4710 and 4711. The majority reads Section 4711’s reference to guns, knives, and poison as a legislative determination that attempts with these weapons would no longer be within the common law definition of attempted murder. To be consisent with its analysis the majority should also read Section 4710’s reference to “by any means” as a specific statutory pre-emption of common law attempted murder when “any means” are used and the victim does not suffer bodily injury. Thus the majority would be required to hold that where a defendant attempted to kill a person by running him over with a car, but fortuitously the victim did not sustain bodily injury, the defendant committed no offense under Section 4710 (the victim did not incur bodily injury), nor under Section 4711 (that statute refers only to guns, knives, and poison), nor would he be guilty of common law attempted murder—because the majority would be required to conclude by its own reasoning that Section 4710 specifically preempted the offense of common law attempted murder.

 Even under the majority’s analysis of Sections 4710 and 4711 its conclusion that defendant Clopton was not guilty of common law attempted murder is based on the unwarranted assumption that since defendant held a gun to the intended victim’s head no other means might actually have been employed to complete the offense.

 Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, Art. IV, §52, 46 P.S. §552.