Court Opinion

ID: 9771675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:51:04.673586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:35.353521
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in results only. I respectfully disagree with some of the reasoning in the Majority Opinion, and, therefore, write separately to express my views on these matters.
I. INFORMED CONSENT
“Lack of informed consent” is not, per se, a tort. It is only a term useful in analyzing medical malpractice claims involving two different torts: (a) the type of assault and battery which occurs when a physician performs an unauthorized procedure, i.e., “where a patient has not consented to the particular medical treatment which was given"; and (b) the type of negligence which occurs when a physician *863has not made a “proper disclosure of the risks inherent in a treatment.” Louisell and Williams, Medical Malpractice, Yol. 2, Sec. 22.04. (Emphasis original.)
In this case the issue is one of “proper disclosure.” This then is a negligence case subject to the usual rules pertaining to medical negligence eases, which means the claimant needs an expert to prove failure to exercise reasonable care, i.e., lack of a “proper disclosure,” unless the risk is so substantial a lay jury could conclude from the circumstances presented that reasonable care required disclosure, or unless the medical testimony gives rise to such an inference; then it is a res ipsa loquitur case. See Perkins v. Hausladen, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 652 (1992).
This case was decided prematurely, on summary judgment, before it was clear that the claimant needed no expert because he had a res ipsa case. The claimant alleges he was given no information whatsoever about the risk of complications and the danger of thrombophlebitis from the procedure. It may well be that questions to the defendant or other doctors in the case will show a risk of harm so substantial that a lay jury could reasonably infer negligence from failure to warn even though the claimant employs no expert to testify the defendant was negligent.
Therefore, I agree that the case should be reversed.
II. STATUTORY INFORMED CONSENT
KRS 304.40-320 should have no bearing whatever on this case because it is a plainly unconstitutional legislative intrusion into liability for common law wrongs (negligence and assault and battery) protected from such intrusion by our Kentucky Constitution, Secs. 14, 54 and 241. Constitutionally, the statute cannot define the duty.
Our Opinion should not give aid and comfort to an unconstitutional statute by deigning to discuss its application.
Therefore, I concur in results only.