Court Opinion

ID: 9527888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:35:22.539624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:15.906795
License: Public Domain

CATES, Judge
(dissenting).
The stipulation states that claimant-appellee is “entitled to unemployment compensation unless disqualified under Section 214-A.” The las* paragraph of the stipulation reads:
“It is further stipulated between the parties that the claimant Headon did *137not work from the termination of the second shift, working overtime through Friday night to Saturday morning, February 28, 1959, at 6:30 a. m., until the commencement of the second shift on Monday, March 9, 1959, anything in the Record to the contrary notwithstanding.”
The applicability of Code 1940, T. 26, § 192, has not been shown. This section reads as follows:
“ ‘Week’, as used in this chapter, means such period of seven consecutive days, as the director may by regulation prescribe. The director may by regulation prescribe that a week shall be deemed to be in, within, or during that benefit year which includes the greater part of such week, or that benefit year within which such week ends.”
This record fails to show that Headon had served the waiting period prescribed by Code 1940, T. 26, § 213, subsec. D.
However, from the regulations of the Director, which, under Broadway v. Ala. Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 246 Ala. 201, 20 So.2d 41(12), we must take by judicial notice, it was possible for the claimant to have had a prior waiting period served in the same benefit year or possibly enough unemployment between February 28 and March 9 to meet the test though this seems but remotely possible.
Subject to this qualification, I would vote to affirm the judgment below.
In Department of Industrial Relations v. Savage, 38 Ala.App. 277, 82 So.2d 435, no independent act of a customer was shown to have intervened; ceramic kilns need lead time to warm and cool, hence an ultimatum’s deadline actually for some branches of the work was practically effective sooner than in some later phases of work on down the line.
I cannot distinguish causation here from that in Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co. v. Bennett, 36 Ala.App. 33, 51 So.2d 544. The majority opinion here says vessels were moved from the yard. Is this use of the passive voice without saying by whom (other than the master, mates and men who, by law, are licensed to man, victual and navigate them) an artful or careless omission?
The shipowners feared a strike that never came. Our statute says “directly due” to a labor dispute. I have heard no voice raised against Bennett.
I must respectfully dissent.