Court Opinion

ID: 9743762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:42:25.174516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.376233
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
On the day the Prosecutor and defense counsel appeared before the court with appellant, each fully expected that the plea of guilty would be routinely accepted and that the prosecutor’s recommendation of probation would be favorably viewed by the Judge. Neither side expected to engage in a trial that day. But, when the trial judge heard the accused’s denial of any knowledge of certain aspects of the alleged offense and refused to accept a plea of guilty, and stated: “This cause now stands for trial. . . .”, things changed radically. The State was to be put to its burden of proving the accused guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. If it failed to do so the accused would go free. The defense was put to its task of probing, testing and challenging the State’s case and presenting its evidence. If it failed, an innocent man might go to jail. There is no room for doubt about what occurred following the refusal of the judge to accept *128the plea of guilty. The accused was put to trial. The record shows a waiver of jury trial by the defendant. It shows a waiver of opening statement and closing argument by defense counsel. Witnesses were called and examined by the State.
In this trial, no cross-examination of the State’s witnesses was had. No defense witness was called to testify. No theory of defense was offered. No opening statement or closing argument was made. Surely this is the kind of representation considered perfunctory and condemned in Castro v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 385, 147 N. E. 321; Wilson v. State (1925), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N. E. 2d 848; Shack v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 67, 231 N. E. 2d 36.
I would grant a new trial in this case.
Note. — Reported in 300 N. E. 2d 656.