Court Opinion

ID: 9956995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:04:37.479415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:02.321388
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                      DONNIS TURNER FOSTER,

                               Appellant,

                                   v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-2966

                              April 3, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Michael S.
Williams, Judge.

Bryant A. Scriven of Scriven Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

     Donnis Foster appeals from an amended sentence.1 The circuit
court sua sponte entered an amended sentence imposing a

     1 Mr. Foster raises an additional argument on appeal concerning an

order denying his motion to withdraw plea. Because of our reversal of
the corrected judgment and sentence, we do not reach the errors urged
by Mr. Foster regarding the denial of his motion to withdraw plea.
nondiscretionary fine mandated by section 893.135(1)(c)1.b, Florida
Statutes (2010). On appeal, Mr. Foster argues that he had the right to be
present for the correction of his sentence. Mr. Foster is correct. See
Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d 901, 907 (Fla. 2012) ("[Mr.] Dunbar was
entitled to be present when his sentence was increased because a
sentencing proceeding in which a sentence is increased is a critical stage
of trial at which the defendant's presence 'would contribute to the
fairness of the procedure.' " (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,
745 (1987))); see also Thomas v. State, 286 So. 3d 884, 885-86 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2019) (applying Dunbar and concluding that due process required
Mr. Thomas to be present when the trial court imposed a mandatory
minimum term to Mr. Thomas' sentence after the sentencing hearing).
     Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Foster's amended sentence and remand
for a sentencing hearing for the circuit court to orally pronounce
imposition of the nondiscretionary fine it added to Mr. Foster's written
sentence outside of his presence.
     Reversed and remanded.

SLEET, C.J., and LUCAS, J., Concur.
LaROSE, J., Concurs with opinion.

LaROSE, Judge, Concurring.
     With hesitation, I join the court's opinion. Under Dunbar v. State,
89 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2012), Mr. Foster is entitled to be present at a new
sentencing hearing. Of course, we know how the story will end. The trial
court will impose a nondiscretionary fine under section 843.135(1)(c)1.b.

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This strikes me as "make-work."2 But, Dunbar seemingly compels this
result for due process reasons. We are bound by Dunbar.
     Perhaps, however, Dunbar sweeps too broadly. Nothing will be
gained by Mr. Foster's attendance at the hearing. The trial court's hands
are tied. Justice Canady's partial dissent in Dunbar, 89 So. 3d at 908, I
think, marks out a better path. The majority in Dunbar, 89 So. 3d at
907, held that Mr. Dunbar was entitled to be present when the trial court
increased his sentence to include a previously omitted mandatory
minimum term.
     Justice Canady challenged the necessity of that requirement.
Indeed, Justice Canady noted that Mr. Dunbar had not established that
a fundamental and harmful error occurred when the trial court imposed
the corrected sentence without him. Id. at 908. Because the trial court
lacked authority to impose a sentence without a mandatory minimum
term, Justice Canady saw no way that Mr. Dunbar's presence "would
contribute to the fairness of the procedure." Id. (quoting Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)). Justice Canady continued, "[I]n the
circumstances existing here, [Mr.] Dunbar's presence at a resentencing
would be a prime example of a situation 'when presence would be
useless, or the benefit but a shadow.' " Id. (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at
745)).
     The same is true for Mr. Foster. Nothing he can do or say at a
resentencing hearing will alter the outcome. Dunbar, in my view,

     2 See Make-Work, Merriam Webster Dictionary Online,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/make-work (last visited
February 13, 2024) (defining "make-work" as "work assigned or done
chiefly to keep one busy"). Because judicial resources are limited, make-
work is generally disfavored. See generally United States v. Jeffords, 647
F. Supp 906, 907 (D. Me. 1986).
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imposes unnecessary strain and expense on the trial court and the
Department of Corrections.
      We have previously said that "[a] defendant has a right to be
present at any sentencing proceeding except those that are purely
ministerial in nature." Darwin v. State, 259 So. 3d 260, 261 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2018) (quoting Rivers v. State, 980 So. 2d 599, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA
2008)). We explained that "a resentencing at which the trial judge has
judicial discretion is not a ministerial act." Id. at 262 (quoting Jordan v.
State, 143 So. 3d 335, 339 (Fla. 2014)). Consequently, we reversed Mr.
Darwin's sentence because he was not present at a resentencing hearing
where the trial court imposed a discretionary fine. Id. ("[T]he trial court
exercised discretion in orally pronouncing a discretionary fine at
resentencing, the resentencing was not merely a ministerial act, and Mr.
Darwin was entitled to be present."). Logically, it follows that a
resentencing hearing where the trial court will impose a nondiscretionary
term should not require a defendant's presence. The trial court's
action—anticipated by our decision today—is certainly akin to a
ministerial act.
      In an analogous situation, the supreme court held that the trial
court need not provide notice and a hearing to a defendant before
imposing the statutorily required $100 minimum fee for services
rendered by the public defender. See State v. J.A.R., 318 So. 3d 1256,
1258–59 (Fla. 2021). Perhaps Dunbar's vitality is weakened. Maybe the
supreme court should revisit its breadth.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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