Court Opinion

ID: 9364201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 18:02:15.679557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.575227
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 P. v. Bonilla CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080020

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. RIF1902977)

JAVIER FRANCISCO BONILLA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Mark E. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
         Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Melissa Mandel and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
         A jury convicted Javier Francisco Bonilla of committing a lewd or

lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a); count 3)

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
and attempted lewd or lascivious acts on a child under age 14 (§§ 664/288,
subd. (a); counts 4 and 5). The jury deadlocked on a charge of aggravated
sexual assault of a child under age 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(4), count 1); therefore,
the court declared a mistrial on that count. The court granted the defense’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal on a charge of lewd or lascivious act by use
of force on a child under age 14. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1), count 2.)
      Following a second trial on the count 1 charge, a jury found Bonilla not
guilty. The court sentenced him to eight years in state prison for his
convictions.
      Bonilla unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on grounds of ineffective
assistance of his first counsel, and raises that issue as his sole contention on
appeal. We affirm.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
First Trial: Prosecution Case
      As Bonilla does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his convictions, we briefly summarize the facts to provide context for his
contention.
S.T.’s Testimony
      S.T., who was 19 years old at the time of trial, testified that when she
was four or five years old, she and her mother lived temporarily in Riverside
County with her grandmother, who is married to Bonilla. S.T. testified
Bonilla, who she called “Papa,” touched her inappropriately.
Count 1 (Oral Copulation Charge)
      S.T. testified Bonilla orally copulated her when she was about four
years old. It happened one evening in December, after her mother and
grandmother left the house to get pizza. She went to Bonilla’s bedroom,
where he was on his bed watching television. He pulled down her pajama

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pants and underwear. Although she kept telling him “no,” he would not stop
orally copulating her. She froze because she did not know what to do. When
her mother and grandmother returned and opened the bedroom door, Bonilla
threw S.T. off the bed, and warned her to keep quiet about what had
happened. S.T. put her underwear on backward, and went to the kitchen,
where her mother noticed her underwear and scolded her. S.T. did not tell
her mother and grandmother about Bonilla’s actions because she was afraid
Bonilla would hurt her.
Count 3 (Pinching Incidents)
      When S.T. was between four and seven years old, Bonilla frequently
pinched her nipples and her body, hurting her. He called the pinches
“mosquito bites” in a taunting tone, and would laugh about them. Bonilla
usually did not pinch her nipples when other people were present.
Count 4 (Penis Exposure Incident)
      S.T. testified that when she was about five years old, Bonilla exposed
his penis to her when she entered his bedroom to tell him dinner was ready.
While Bonilla lay on his back on the bed, he told her, “ ‘Do you want to see
it?’ ” He then pulled down his underwear and pants, pulled out his penis, and
laughed. S.T. told him, “No,” and ran out of the room.
Count 5 (French Kiss Incident)
      S.T. testified that when she was about 6 years old, Bonilla had a shed
in the backyard that he used as a “man cave.” Once, when S.T. went there,
he told her, “ ‘Let me teach you how to French kiss,’ ” and locked the door,
putting a sledgehammer against it. Bonilla puckered his lips and said, “ ‘You
go like this.’ ” S.T. pushed him away and said, “ ‘No, no.’ ” Bonilla cornered
her and got within two feet of her. She managed to open the door, and ran
into the house. S.T. told no one about these incidents until 2016.

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      On redirect examination of S.T., the prosecutor noted how emotionally
difficult it was for S.T. to testify, “And as you sit here this afternoon, you've
been pretty emotional. Would you agree?” S.T. replied, “Yeah.”
S.T.’s Mother’s Testimony
      S.T.’s mother testified about the December incident when S.T. was four
years old and she left her with Bonilla while she went to buy pizza. She
remembered that upon her return, she was surprised to see S.T. had on her
underwear backward, and she scolded S.T. However, S.T.’s mother did not
think much about the incident. Years later, her cousin admitted to her that
Bonilla had sexually molested her as a child. S.T.’s mother immediately
asked S.T., who was then 15 years old, whether Bonilla had molested her.
S.T. then told her mother and grandmother about the different incidents.
S.T.’s Grandmother’s Testimony
      S.T.’s grandmother testified about the pizza incident. She remembered
telling S.T.’s mother not to be so hard on S.T. for having her pajama pants
inside out.
      The grandmother also testified that when she and Bonilla were newly
married, he used the term “tickle spot” with her as a term of affection. She
described it as “[l]ike play talking when you’re going to get together.”
      She testified that after she talked to Bonilla about S.T.’s claims against
him, he said, “I can’t believe that she would betray me like this.” That
phrasing was striking to her because it implied S.T. “betrayed a secret.”
Another time, Bonilla said of S.T.: “She came to me. She put her thing on
my thing.”

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Defense Case
Defense Objections During S.T.’s Testimony
      During direct examination of S.T., defense counsel successfully
interposed several objections that the prosecutor was asking leading
questions. The court also sustained objections that certain questions were
asked and answered, or called for hearsay. Further, when the prosecutor
asked S.T., whether she harbored “any hard feelings” against Bonilla, the
court sustained defense counsel’s relevancy objection.
      On S.T.’s cross-examination, defense counsel asked several questions
aimed at probing her memory regarding the oral copulation charge: what
television show Bonilla was watching; whether the bedroom window was
open or closed; whether Bonilla was on top of the covers or under them; what
he was wearing; what colors were S.T.’s underwear and Bonilla’s pants;
whether Bonilla was circumcised or uncircumcised. S.T. answered most of
those questions with “I do not remember,” “I don’t really know,” or “I can’t
say for sure.” Defense counsel challenged S.T.’s recollection of her 2016
report to police, pointing out she did not mention that when Bonilla exposed
his penis to her, he asked if she wanted to touch or see it.
      Also during S.T.’s cross-examination, defense counsel prefaced one of
his questions with, “I know you hate talking about this, but I have to ask a
couple more questions about the [oral copulation incident].” Defense counsel
did not ask S.T. about the pinching incidents.
Bonilla’s Direct Testimony
      Bonilla testified at trial and denied all of the charged misconduct.
Regarding the oral copulation charge, he corroborated parts of S.T.’s account,
confirming that S.T. was four years old at the time, it was December, he was
left alone at home with S.T., and S.T. entered his bedroom while he watched

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television. However, he claimed she jumped on the bed, sat on her knees,
pointed to her vagina and said she had a “tickle spot,” and asked him if he
wanted to see and touch it. He told her no, and directed her to talk to her
mother about that. S.T. rolled off the bed. At that exact moment, her mother
entered the bedroom and asked where S.T. was. Bonilla replied that she was
on the floor. S.T. and her mother left the room. He never told S.T.’s mother
or grandmother about that incident.
      Bonilla testified that about two weeks later, he was asleep in his bed
and woke up to find that S.T. had taken his hand and was rubbing her vagina
with it. He did not tell his wife or stepdaughter about this incident until
after S.T. spoke to police.
Cross-Examination of Bonilla
      On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Bonilla, “Now, as you sit
here today, you’re not denying that there was any sexual inappropriate
contact between you and [S.T.], right? Bonilla replied, “I’m not denying it,
no.” The prosecutor continued, “But you’re saying that . . . you were not the
person who initiated it? It was all [S.T.?]” Bonilla replied, “That’s true.”
      The prosecutor confronted Bonilla with his wife’s testimony that
Bonilla had used the term “tickle spot” to refer to intimacy between them.
Bonilla stated he did not remember using that term with his wife. The
prosecutor also asked about Bonilla’s wife testimony that when they learned
about S.T.’s accusations against him, he offered to apologize to S.T. if he had
done anything wrong, even though he insisted S.T. had wronged him.
      In discussing what he considered S.T.’s “inappropriate” conduct as a
five-year-old, Bonilla admitted asking his wife why God would put S.T. here
to toy with him. He also believed S.T. came to them “with a Satan on her
shoulder.”

                                        6
      Bonilla claimed S.T., her mother and grandmother made up their
testimony against him. The prosecutor asked him, “they are lying on you for
no reason at all? Bonilla responded, “Well, they hate my guts.” When the
prosecutor asked Bonilla why they would lie, Bonilla replied, “I don’t know.
To persecute me, throw me in jail.”
      The jury viewed a video of Bonilla’s interview with police.
Defense Closing Arguments
      Defense counsel in closing arguments highlighted the contradictions
between S.T.’s recollection of the original incidents and what she reported to
police several years later, and implied she was lying: “So [S.T.] tells [the
sheriff’s deputy] that in the one incident when Mr. Bonilla exposed himself to
her, he’s lying in bed naked, he wiggles his penis at her, and she exits the
room. The People would have you believe that that’s a minor discrepancy.
Well, that’s a major discrepancy. If she’s lying about this, what else is she
lying about? [¶] Now, she said when she was talking about that incident,
[‘Bonilla] pulled down his pants, he pulled down his underwear, he pulled out
his penis.[’] Now, I asked her a question that obviously would be completely
inappropriate for a five-year-old, but I’m not asking a five-year-old. I’m
asking a woman who was almost 20. [‘]Was [Bonilla] circumcised?[’] She
said, ‘I don’t know. He had his penis,’ and she made a hand gesture, like a
claw almost, and she couldn’t see if he was circumcised or not. Okay. Fine. I
asked her, ‘Was he naked?’ [She said,] ‘No. He was wearing pants.’ I said,
‘What color were they?’ She said, ‘I don’t remember, but they were dark.’
That’s not what she told [the sheriff’s deputy] back in 2016, just four years
ago. But for whatever reason, she’s got an incredible memory as to what
happened to her when she was four and a half, five years old, down to the last

                                        7
detail, ladies and gentlemen. Including the fact that she was overly
traumatized by this act of being orally raped, as she put it.”
      Defense counsel added, “The other thing [S.T. told an officer] that was
different was that Mr. Bonilla grabbed her as she walked in the door that
night, and he put her on the bed and he had her take her clothes off. That’s
different. That’s not a minor change here. These are significant. If she’s
lying about one thing, what else is she lying about?”
      Defense counsel also sought to rehabilitate Bonilla with the jury:
“Now, you’ve heard Mr. Bonilla testify. He’s not a very sophisticated man.
He expresses himself in the way that he expresses himself. Some of the
things he said he clarified. Some of the things he said he basically said,
‘That’s not what I meant.’ You’re going to have to determine what weight you
give to that.”
Second Trial and New Trial Motion
      The trial court appointed a different attorney to represent Bonilla in
the second trial, where Bonilla did not testify. That jury found Bonilla not
guilty of count 1.
      Bonilla subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing the verdict in the
first trial was contrary to the evidence, and his first trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to adequately impeach the witnesses with
their prior inconsistent statements.
      The People countered that Bonilla had retained a private attorney with
over 19 years of experience. They further argued the two trials were
substantially different because Bonilla did not testify in the second trial, and
Bonilla’s second attorney benefited from being able to impeach the witnesses
with their testimony from the first trial.

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      The same judge who had presided over the first trial heard this motion
and denied it: “I don’t think this meets that standard [for an ineffective
assistance claim]. I honestly don’t think it’s even close. I think things
differently would have been done, but I do not believe the standard has been
met. Secondly, one of the other grounds [for the new trial motion] was the
verdict was contrary to the evidence. I mean, whether you want to believe
somebody or not, I had somebody up here testifying that these things
happened. I think it’s hard once you have that, if a jury decides to accept
that evidence in their sound judgment to accept it . . . . There was evidence
and testimony to support their findings.” The court stated that defense
counsel did a “pretty good job,” and “seemed to cover all the relevant areas
and the relevant areas of attack.” The court summarized it ruling: “And was
it the hallmark case of advocacy? No. But was it effective assistance? Yes.”
                                 DISCUSSION
      Bonilla contends we must reverse his convictions because his first trial
counsel was ineffective for “failing to adequately investigate readily
ascertainable facts and failing to properly impeach prosecution witnesses.”
(Capitalization omitted.) He specifically contends his counsel “failed to cover
count 3 and 4 in toto, asking no impeachment questions on those counts, and
no impeachment questions of [S.T.’s mother or grandmother] on counts 3, 4,
and 5.” He contrasts this with counsel at the second trial, who asked more
questions regarding the different incidents, and elicited contradictions

between S.T.’s testimony and her statements to police.2

2      Bonilla elaborates: “At cross-examination in the second trial, second
counsel confronted S.T. with her statement to [an investigator] that the shed
incident was the last incident, while she told [a sheriff’s deputy] it was the
first, and that she told [the sheriff’s deputy] that she was four years old at the
time. . . . Second counsel also confronted S.T. with the inconsistency
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A. Applicable Law
      Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “[u]sually . . .
‘more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding[,]’ . . . a defendant
may raise the issue of counsel’s effectiveness as a basis for a new trial, and, to
expedite justice, a trial court should rule ‘[i]f the court is able to determine
the effectiveness issue on such motion.’ [Citation.] To make out a claim that
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, ‘the defendant must
first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892,
958; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).)
      “[T]o what extent and how to cross-examine witnesses” are among “the
wide range of tactical decisions competent counsel must make.” (People v.
Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 746.) “ ‘As to whether certain witnesses
should have been more rigorously cross-examined, such matters are

between her testimony (that she was in the house and sent to the shed to get
[Bonilla] for dinner), and her statement to [an investigator] that she had been
playing in the garden; her testimony that [Bonilla] said ‘let me teach you how
to French kiss,’ [was] not included in her account to [an investigator]; her
testimony that she brushed past [Bonilla] and telling [a sheriff’s deputy] that
she pushed [Bonilla] away; her testimony that she moved the sledgehammer
and unlocked the door before running out and telling [an investigator] first
that she ran out while [Bonilla] was trying to lock the door, then adding the
hammer and unlocking later in the conversation; her testifying at the first
trial that she ran upstairs and stayed away from [her mother and
grandmother], whereas at the second trial she testified that she went to her
mother and grandmother. . . . [¶] Second counsel showed S.T. a June 14,
2006 Google photograph of the property that had no shed: the shed had not
yet been built. . . . S.T. then responded that she now thought the shed was
probably built in late 2006.”
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normally left to counsel’s discretion and rarely implicate inadequacy of
representation.’ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 217.) A “ ‘trial
counsel’s tactical decisions are accorded substantial deference’ ” and “ ‘[a]
reviewing court will not second-guess trial counsel’s reasonable tactical
decisions.’ ” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1185; Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at pp. 689-690.) “If the record on appeal ‘ “ ‘sheds no light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel
was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be
rejected.” ’ ” (People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 876, overruled on other
grounds by People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104; see also People v. Hoyt,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 958-960.)
      “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a
just result.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686.)
B. Analysis
      In evaluating Bonilla’s claim, we review the record for tactical reasons
defense counsel had for the scope of his cross-examination. In light of the fact
Bonilla admitted at trial that the sexually inappropriate conduct occurred but
that S.T. initiated it, defense counsel faced a near impossible task of
convincing the jury to believe Bonilla as opposed to S.T. Further, S.T. was
emotional when she testified about the sensitive topic of her being the victim
of child molestation; therefore, she was potentially a sympathetic witness.
By contrast, Bonilla in his police interview had blamed S.T. for initiating the
sexually inappropriate acts. Defense counsel could have reasonably decided
to limit his cross-examinations to avoid the appearance of being aggressive

                                       11
towards S.T. and her mother and grandmother, and turning the jury against
Bonilla. Further, as we pointed out, Bonilla’s first trial counsel instead
interposed numerous objections during the prosecutor’s direct examination of
S.T. In this way, counsel obtained the benefit of challenging S.T.’s account
and streamlining the scope of S.T.’s testimony, while minimizing the
prospects of appearing to attack the sympathetic victim. Under these
circumstances, as a tactical matter, defense counsel was well within the scope
of his responsibility to curtail cross-examination. We “keep in mind that
counsel’s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make
the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time,
[we] recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690.)
      As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, there is no reasonable
probability Bonilla would obtain a different first trial result but for counsel’s
failure to investigate further or more fully cross-examine S.T., her mother
and grandmother. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
As stated, the first trial counsel during S.T.’s cross-examination and in
closing argument challenged S.T.’s credibility; pointing to her recollection of
the incidents from when she was around four or five years old, and the
discrepancies in what she told police. Counsel twice argued to the jury that if
S.T. was lying about a minor detail, then she possibly was lying about other
more significant matters. We conclude defense counsel adequately
accomplished his goal of undermining S.T.’s credibility on cross-examination.
“We rarely second-guess counsel’s cross-examination tactics . . . . [Citation.]
Moreover, defendant does not . . . explain how counsel’s cross-examination . . .

                                       12
could have prejudiced him in light of the other substantial incriminating
evidence in the case.” (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 94.)
      In comparing the performance of counsel in the two trials, we point out
that Bonilla did not testify before the second jury, and that fact likely was the
significant difference resulting in his acquittal on the lone charge presented.
As the first counsel’s conduct did not so undermine “the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686), we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bonilla’s new
trial motion.
                                DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                 O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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