Court Opinion

ID: 9891907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 19:00:56.352181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:01:14.638663
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12585    Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 10/19/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12585
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        STEVEN SHERWOOD,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00055-TES-CHW-1
                            ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                22-12585

        Before BRANCH, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              Steven Sherwood appeals his above-guidelines sentence of
        72 months’ imprisonment imposed after he pleaded guilty to
        possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues that the
        sentence is substantively unreasonable. After review, we affirm.
                                 I.     Background
               In August 2020, police pulled Sherwood over for failing to
        come to a complete stop at a stop sign. Sherwood did not have car
        insurance, and the police informed him that his car would be
        towed. During the inventory search of the vehicle, police
        discovered a marijuana grinder, a glass jar containing marijuana
        and methamphetamine powder, a perfume bottle, “a Swisher
        Sweet blunt pack,” 109 tablets (some of which later tested positive
        for being methamphetamine), digital scales, and “packaging
        materials.” When officers went to arrest Sherwood, he attempted
        to flee, and was apprehended after a brief physical struggle with
        officers. Officers discovered a loaded gun on Sherwood’s person.
        Sherwood later commented during booking that he was a
        convicted felon.
               A grand jury charged Sherwood with possession with intent
        to distribute methamphetamine (Count 1), possession of a firearm
        during a drug-trafficking crime (Count 2), and possession of a
        firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3). Sherwood pleaded guilty
        to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, pursuant to a
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        22-12585                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        written plea agreement, and the government agreed to dismiss the
        remaining counts.
               Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office
        prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which
        revealed that Sherwood, then age 39, had a criminal history dating
        back to the age of 17 involving drugs and firearms, and some of this
        history did not score criminal history points due to the age of the
        offenses. 1 Sherwood’s resulting guidelines range was 46 to 57
        months’ imprisonment, and he faced a statutory maximum of 10
        years’ imprisonment. Finally, the Probation Office noted that
        “factors [were] present that would [ordinarily] warrant an upward
        variance,” namely, that Sherwood “ha[d] demonstrated a pattern
        of similar/identical criminal conduct.” In particular, the probation
        officer highlighted Sherwood’s “prior federal conviction for Felon
        in Possession of a Firearm and Using and Carrying a Firearm
        During and In Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime” and explained
        that
               [h]ad Sherwood’s term of supervised release not been
               terminated early he would have been assessed two

        1 Sherwood had the following convictions:      (1) 1999—(age 17)—distribution
        of cocaine, which scored zero criminal history points; (2) 2000—(age 18)—
        possession of marijuana, which scored zero criminal history points; (3) 2002—
        (age 20)—possession of crack cocaine, which scored zero criminal history
        points; (4) 2004—age 22—felon in possession of a firearm and using and
        carrying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, which scored three
        criminal history points; and (4) 2018—(age 35)—possession of ecstasy, which
        scored one criminal history point.
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        4                       Opinion of the Court              22-12585

               additional criminal history points. It [was] further
               noted, [that] Sherwood ha[d] two previous felony
               convictions, Distribution of Cocaine and Possession
               [of ] Crack Cocaine. Both of these oﬀenses [were] not
               counted but related to similar oﬀense/conduct of the
               instant oﬀense.

        (sixth alteration in original).
               Sherwood objected to the probation officer’s assertion that
        an upward variance might be warranted, arguing that the
        guidelines range accurately represented his criminal history.
        Furthermore, he maintained that, even if he had been assessed the
        two additional criminal history points highlighted by the probation
        officer, his criminal history category would have remained the
        same (Category III). In response, the probation officer maintained
        her position that an upward variance might be warranted,
        reasoning as follows:
               Sherwood has demonstrated through habitual
               convictions that there has been no adequate
               deterrence for future criminal conduct. This is
               Sherwood’s second federal oﬀense, and the conduct
               of both convictions are similar. As noted in the
               instant oﬀense, Sherwood was found with a ﬁrearm
               in addition to a large quantity of methamphetamine
               and marijuana. When law enforcement attempted to
               arrest Sherwood, he failed to comply. His conduct
               resulted in one law enforcement oﬃcer being
               transported to the hospital for injuries. Although
               Sherwood’s Criminal History Category reﬂects prior
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        22-12585                Opinion of the Court                      5

               sentences, it does not reﬂect the nature of the
               oﬀenses, pattern of conduct, or other characteristics
               not otherwise captured in criminal history
               calculation(s). The Court, in United States v. Mathis,
               No. 20-14819, 2021 WL 4912459 (11th Cir. Oct. 21,
               2021) upheld an upward variance from the guideline
               sentencing range due to a defendant’s criminal
               history to include the fact the defendant had been
               previously convicted [federally] of a similar oﬀense.

        (alteration in original).
               At sentencing, Sherwood’s counsel reiterated that the
        guidelines range accounted adequately for Sherwood’s criminal
        history, and, therefore a within-guidelines sentence was
        appropriate.
               The government, in turn, argued that although the facts of
        the underlying offense were “relatively vanilla,” the district court
        should vary upward from the guidelines range because of
        Sherwood’s criminal history. The government pointed out that
        Sherwood was not on probation or supervised release at the time
        of the present offense only because the court had terminated his
        supervision early in large part because Sherwood had become a
        “problem for supervision” and had “refused to comply.” The
        government argued that, considering this fact in conjunction with
        Sherwood’s lengthy criminal history for the same variety of
        offenses, an upward variance was appropriate in light of the
        sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The government
        maintained that an above-guidelines sentence was necessary to
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12585

        achieve deterrence in this case and because Sherwood had
        demonstrated that he was “unable and unwilling to comply” with
        supervised release conditions and continued to engage in
        “unrepentant conduct.”
               Sherwood’s counsel then emphasized that two of
        Sherwood’s prior convictions from when he was younger involved
        very small amounts of drugs and his other prior convictions all
        centered around drug possession, which indicated that Sherwood
        had a drug addiction problem, not that he was a distributor of
        drugs. She acknowledged that the same could not be said for the
        amount of drugs found in Sherwood’s possession in the present
        case, but nevertheless maintained that a within-guidelines sentence
        was appropriate.
               Sherwood then made a statement to the court that he had
        “learned [his] lesson” and that he had “tr[ied] [his] best to stay out
        of trouble” and “just . . . got caught up in the unfortunate
        circumstance.” He stated that with “COVID-19 and everything
        going on at [that] time” he had “made some bad decisions,” and he
        asked the court for mercy. He noted that, since his release from
        prison, he had been employed in “several jobs” and he had “tried
        to stay on the right path.”
               The district court then noted that the last time Sherwood
        was on supervised release, it had terminated his supervision early
        because it seemed like Sherwood was “going to do what [he] felt
        like doing, and it was a waste of everybody’s time” to keep him on
        probation. So the court “turned [him] loose,” but now Sherwood
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        22-12585                   Opinion of the Court                                  7

        was back before the district court for the same thing—guns and
        drugs. The district court noted that, “[s]o, I gave you a break last
        time, and I will—I am man enough to say that was a horrible
        mistake. I missed it. But I will not miss it again. That I will not
        miss.” The district court stated that the advisory guidelines range
        was 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. The district court then
        explained that after considering the § 3553(a) factors—particularly,
        “the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence, reflect
        the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and
        provide just punishment” and the “nature of [Sherwood’s] prior
        arrests and convictions”—an upward variance was appropriate.
        Accordingly, the district court sentenced Sherwood to 72 months’
        imprisonment to be followed by three years supervised release. 2
        Sherwood objected to the reasonableness of the sentence. This
        appeal followed.
                                        II.     Discussion
               Sherwood argues that the district court erred by imposing a
        substantively unreasonable sentence and varied upward primarily
        because of its “regret” in terminating his prior term of supervised
        release early, which was an inappropriate consideration. He
        maintains that the applicable advisory guidelines range accounted

        2 Consistent with its statements at sentencing, the district court indicated in its

        statement of reasons that the upward variance was appropriate given the
        nature and circumstances of the offense, Sherwood’s history and
        characteristics, including his “prior federal conviction” and “pattern of
        criminal conduct,” and the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
        promote respect for the law, and provide adequate deterrence.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12585

        adequately for his criminal history and that a within-guidelines
        sentence is appropriate and supported by the § 3553(a) sentencing
        factors.
                We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a
        deferential abuse of discretion standard, asking whether the
        sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
        circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The
        district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
        greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of
        § 3553(a)(2), which include the need for a sentence to reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
        punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from
        future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must
        also consider the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the
        history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need to
        avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
        similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id.
        § 3553(a)(1), (6). When evaluating the history and characteristics
        of the defendant, a court may properly consider a defendant’s
        previous offenses, even where those offenses are already part of the
        calculation of his guidelines range. See United States v. Williams, 526
        F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
               Importantly, the weight given to a particular § 3353(a) factor
        “is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and it
        is not required to give “equal weight” to the § 3553(a) factors.
        United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015)
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        22-12585               Opinion of the Court                         9

        (quotation omitted). “We will not second guess the weight given
        to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable under the
        circumstances.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th
        Cir. 2022).
               A district court “imposes a substantively unreasonable
        sentence only when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
        factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight
        to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
        judgment in considering the proper factors.” Rosales-Bruno, 789
        F.3d at 1256 (quotations omitted). The burden rests on the party
        challenging the sentence to show “that the sentence is
        unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and
        the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” Id.
               No presumption of reasonableness or unreasonableness
        applies to a sentence that lies outside the advisory guidelines range.
        Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. “Upward variances are imposed based
        upon the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. The district court may “impose an
        upward variance if it concludes that the [g]uidelines range was
        insufficient in light of a defendant’s criminal history. When doing
        so, [the] district court[] [is] afforded broad leeway in deciding how
        much weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.”
        Id. at 1355–56 (quotations and internal citation omitted); see also
        United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Courts
        have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior
        crimes the defendant has committed, and [p]lacing substantial
        weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely consistent with
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12585

        § 3553(a) because five of the factors it requires a court to consider
        are related to criminal history.” (alteration in original) (quotations
        and internal citation omitted)). “[A] district judge must give
        serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the
        Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually
        lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular
        case with sufficient justifications.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
                In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the
        guidelines range, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but
        must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the
        § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.
        at 51. “The fact that [we] might reasonably have concluded that a
        different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal
        of the district court.” Id. at 51. Rather, we will “vacate the sentence
        if, but only if, we ‘are left with the definite and firm conviction that
        the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
        the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
        range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’”
        United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
        (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).
               Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in varying
        upward from the applicable guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’
        imprisonment and imposing a sentence of 72 months’
        imprisonment. Contrary to Sherwood’s argument, the district
        court did not impose an upward variance simply because it
        regretted terminating Sherwood’s supervised release early in a
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        22-12585               Opinion of the Court                       11

        prior case. Rather, the district court explained that an upward
        variance was appropriate because of Sherwood’s history and
        characteristics and his repeated recidivism (i.e., the fact that
        Sherwood’s instant offense was similar to his prior offenses,
        including the offense for which he had been on supervised release
        previously). “A court that weighs heavily a defendant’s criminal
        history has acted within its discretion,” and, when, as here, a
        defendant is a recidivist, “the court may correctly conclude that
        previous punishment for criminal conduct failed to deter him and
        that a harsher sentence is warranted.” Riley, 995 F.3d at 1280. The
        district court also stated that it had considered the remaining
        § 3553(a) factors and that those factors supported the upward
        variance, particularly, “the need for the sentence to afford adequate
        deterrence, reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect
        for the law, and provide just punishment.” “Under substantive
        reasonableness review, we have repeatedly affirmed sentences that
        included major upward variances from the guidelines for
        defendants with significant criminal histories that the sentencing
        courts weighed heavily.”          Id. at 1279 (collecting cases).
        Furthermore, “[w]e have affirmed a sentence in which recidivism
        was the single most important factor in the court’s decision to vary
        upward, and we have recognized the Supreme Court has
        consistently affirmed the imposition of longer sentences, even for
        non-violent offenses, based on an offender’s recidivism.” Id.
        (quotations and internal citation omitted).
              Although Sherwood argues that the guidelines range
        accounted adequately for his criminal history, the district court was
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12585

        entitled to consider Sherwood’s prior offenses even if they were
        already part of the guidelines calculation. Williams, 526 F.3d at
        1324. While Sherwood quarrels with the weight the district court
        gave to the § 3553(a) factors and the way in which the court applied
        them to his case, it was within the district court’s discretion to give
        more weight to one § 3553(a) factor—Sherwood’s history and
        characteristics—than it gave to the others. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
        at 1254. Moreover, Sherwood’s sentence is well-below the
        statutory maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment, which is an
        indicator of reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
        1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence that is below
        the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness).
                Accordingly, we are not “left with the definite and firm
        conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
        judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
        that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
        facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (en banc) (quotation
        omitted). Consequently, we conclude that Sherwood’s sentence is
        substantively reasonable, and we affirm the district court.
               AFFIRMED.