Court Opinion

ID: 9706043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:30:15.789336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:18.567278
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
We, too, would affirm the trial court’s order denying judgment n.o.v.; however, we cannot join the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order granting a new trial in favor of the United States Steel Corporation (USX) on any grounds.
The Carters assert that we should reverse the trial court granting new trial on grounds of prejudicial publicity. We believe that the prejudicial publicity did not constitute an *293extra-evidentiary prejudicial influence sufficient to justify a new trial; accordingly, we would reverse.
Initially, we note that the learned trial judge, apparently in accordance with standard practice in Allegheny County, recessed the jurors for the evening promptly at 5 p.m., even though they had not yet reached a verdict. We believe that the better practice in such cases is to keep the jurors at the courthouse later, allowing a break for dinner if necessary, until it becomes apparent that the jurors cannot reach a verdict by a reasonable hour. Naturally, jurors should not be coerced into reaching a quick verdict by the threat of a late night at the courthouse; however, trial courts should try to avoid giving jurors any opportunity to be exposed to information not presented in the evidence. When there is a risk that the jury will be exposed to information not in evidence, the trial judge should consider sequestering the jury. If such a practice had been followed in the present case, we might not be faced with this difficult decision. We now turn to the merits of this appeal.
I. New Trial on Grounds of Prejudicial Publicity
The majority treats the media accounts in this case as if they had been offered into evidence without proper instructions. Opinion at 650-651. We do not agree with their means of analysis, nor with the result it achieves. We emphasize that these accounts were not evidence. The second incident at Carrie Furnace Works was never offered into evidence nor admitted. No testimony regarding the second event was ever elicited at trial. The majority uses an inapposite analysis in order to look into the deliberations of the jury.
As the majority points out, jurors may not impeach their own verdicts. Opinion at 650. The well-settled policy of this Commonwealth protects the inviolability of jury deliberations. Commonwealth v. Williams, 514 Pa. 62, 76, 522 A.2d 1058, 1065 (1987), quoting Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binney 150 (1811).
*294[T]he verdict as uttered is the sole embodiment of the jury's act and must stand as such without regard to the motives or beliefs which have led up to its act. The policy which requires this is the same which forbids a consideration of the negotiations of parties to a contract leading up to the final terms as deliberately embodied in their deed, namely, the loss of all certainty in the verdict, the impracticability of seeking for definiteness in the preliminary views, the risk of misrepresentation after disclosure of the verdict, and the impossibility of expecting any end to trials if the grounds for the verdict were allowed to effect its overthrow.
8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2349, rule (a).
To this end, as a general rule, once the jury is polled and the verdict is recorded, the process by which the verdict is reached is not subject to impeachment by the jurors. Commonwealth v. Carr (1987), 370 Pa.Super. 1, 13, 535 A.2d 1120, 1126 (1987), citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 362 Pa.Super. 81, 523 A.2d 784 (1987); see also Commonwealth v. Stark, 363 Pa.Super. 356, 526 A.2d 383 (1986). A juror is, therefore, incompetent to testify as to what occurred during deliberations in the jury room. Fink v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 290, 293, 482 A.2d 281, 284 (1984), citing Pittsburgh National Bank v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 493 Pa. 96, 425 A.2d 383 (1981); see also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 453 Pa. 319, 322, 309 A.2d 371, 372 (1973), quoting Friedman v. Ralph Brothers, Inc., 314 Pa. 247, 249, 171 A. 900, 901 (1934).
A narrow exception to this general rule permits a juror to testify post-trial as to the existence of outside influences that may have prejudiced the deliberations. Williams, supra, 514 Pa. at 79, 522 A.2d at 1066, citing Commonwealth v. Sero, 478 Pa. 440, 445, 387 A.2d 63, 67 (1978); Commonwealth v. Zlatovich, 440 Pa. 388, 269 A.2d 469 (1970); Welshire v. Bruaw et al., 331 Pa. 392, 200 A. 67 (1938); see also Commonwealth v. Fuller, 336 Pa.Super. 507, 508, 485 A.2d 1197, 1198 (1984). This exception developed upon the recognition by our Supreme Court that “we can maintain *295the viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body only by guaranteeing that a verdict is reached by evidence and argument in open court, not by outside influences that might strip the jury of the impartiality we demand.” Sero, supra, 478 Pa. at 445, 387 A.2d at 67.
To effectuate this exception to the rule, a juror may testify as to the nature of the outside influence but is incompetent to testify as to the effect that this influence may have had in reaching a decision.
The ABA Standards pertaining to Trial by Jury, at § 5.7(a), direct that “[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror or concerning the mental processes by which the verdict was determined.” This is consistent with the well-settled principle of public policy in this Commonwealth that “post-trial affidavits and evidence of jurors elicited by the examination of counsel or by a litigant for the purpose of ... impeaching the verdict are improper, and such practice is to be discouraged.” 38 P.L.E. Trial § 397. See: Commonwealth v. Pierce, 453 Pa. 319, 309 A.2d 371 (1973). “Little will be gained and much lost by such inquiries.” [Zlatovich, supra, 440 Pa. at 396, 269 A.2d 473].
Fowler, supra, 362 Pa.Super. at 85, 523 A.2d at 786-787.
This exception to the virtual inviolability of jury verdicts is applied only in very limited and compelling circumstances. Williams, supra (death sentence cannot stand where jurors were informed that appellant was wanted in two other states on murder charges); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 456 Pa. 265, 268, 318 A.2d 737 (1974) (a new trial warranted where alternate juror informed that defendant had killed others in addition to the victim in the case); Welshire v. Bruaw, 331 Pa. 392, 200 A. 67 (1938) (inherently coercive effect of tipstaffs conduct in pressuring jurors to reach a prompt decision on jury’s deliberations warranted a new trial); but cf. Commonwealth v. Syre, 513 Pa. 1, 518 A.2d 535 (1986), overruling 348 Pa.Super. 110, 501 A.2d 671 *296(1985) (alternate juror’s testimony that court crier had advised one juror that every person who asks for jury trial is guilty not prejudicial given juror’s denial of such conversation); Fowler, supra (jurors viewing television program dealing with rape between days of deliberating not prejudicial even though one juror testified that “he could not be certain” that program had not affected his deliberations); Sero, supra (information conveyed to jurors that defendant had begun to read Bible after wife’s death does not create potential for prejudice).
Instantly, the trial court determined that extraneous information had come to the jury’s attention and that, as a consequence, "... it became necessary to determine whether that information itself was prejudicial.” Opinion at 13. In making this determination, however, the learned trial judge improperly questioned the jurors as to the effect of the television broadcast on their deliberations. The trial court determined that the extra-evidentiary information was prejudicial because it “raises an immediate adverse inference as to defendant’s contempt for the lives of trespassing children____” Opinion at 14.
The learned trial judge erred when he invaded the privacy of the jury room and questioned the jurors as to the effect of the extra-evidentiary influences. “It [is] improper for the trial court ... to interrogate an individual juror regarding the mental processes by which he had reasoned and then permit the juror to be cross-examined by defense counsel.” Fowler, supra, 362 Pa.Super. at 85, 523 A.2d at 787.
In any event, we believe that the prejudicial effect of the article and news broadcast was not of such a magnitude as to permit the impeachment of the jury’s verdict. We do not find any of the compelling circumstances present in the instant case nor do we believe we should carve such an exception to the rule prohibiting impeachment of a jury verdict. We do not find the newscast to be an extra-evidentiary prejudicial influence as contemplated by the law of this Commonwealth. It is a well-established principle of public policy that post-trial testimony by jurors for the *297purpose of “impeaching the verdict is improper, and such practice is to be discouraged.” Fowler, supra, at 85, 523 A.2d at 787, quoting 38 P.L.E. Trial § 397.
Furthermore, we do not believe that a new trial should be granted because we believe USX was partially responsible for the situation it complains of. On the morning of February 13, 1987, USX’s counsel asked the court to poll the jury to learn whether anyone had seen the media accounts of the second incident at Carrie Furnace Works.1 The trial court chose not to poll the jury at that time, and opined, “Maybe no one read [the media accounts] at all. Maybe you will get a defense verdict, then it becomes moot.” At that time, USX’s counsel withdrew its motion. Transcript, 2/13/87, at 15. USX acquiesced to the court’s decision not to poll the jury until after the verdict was received. “A party may not sit by silent, taking his chances on a verdict, and, if it is adverse then complain of matters which, if error, could have been eradicated during the trial if brought to the court’s attention properly and timely.” Krywucki v. Trommer, 199 Pa.Super. 145, 155, 184 A.2d 389, 394 (1962), citing Segriff v. Johnston, 402 Pa. 109, 166 A.2d 496 (1960).
In the present case, the issue was brought to the court’s attention; however, USX withdrew its motion and took the chance that, as the court suggested, the jury might come back with a defense verdict. Having taken that chance, the defense cannot now complain.
II. USX’s Alternative Grounds For Granting A New Trial
USX presented two alternative grounds for granting a new trial. These alternative grounds were not addressed *298by the majority or by the trial court because they would grant new trial on grounds of prejudicial publicity. We do not believe either of these alternative grounds justify a new trial.
First, USX asserts that the trial judge improperly exercised his discretion in permitting the jury to view the involved premises. The record reflects that, on February 6, 1987, the jury was taken to view the Carrie Furnace Works. Our Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may apply for a jury view of any premises involved in the litigation. Pa.R.C.P. 219. “[T]he allowance of the application shall be within the discretion of the court....” Id. The purpose of a view is to better enable the jurors to understand the testimony and to assist them in weighing conflicting testimony. Lobozzo v. Adam Eidemiller, 437 Pa. 360, 366, 263 A.2d 432, 435 (1970) (citations omitted). A trial court should not grant a view if the condition of the premises has changed substantially between the date of the accident and the time of trial. Garris v. McClain, 399 Pa. 261, 160 A.2d 398 (1960); Frasso v. City of Reading, 244 Pa. 525, 90 A. 800 (1914). A trial court might also deny a request for a jury view because the season of the year might not adequately portray the premises at the time of the accident. Diehm v. New Holland, 126 Pa.Super. 315, 191 A. 393 (1937).
USX urges that Carrie Works had substantially changed since the date of the accident. In support of this contention, USX cites testimony establishing that the railroad tracks and cars had been removed, the electrical wires running to tower 13D had been cut by vandals, the view occurred in February when there was no vegetation on the path, and the jury had to pass by a Duquesne Light substation, surrounded by fences and barbed wire, on the way to the view. USX’s brief at 29-30. While these facts demonstrate that, on the date of the accident, some conditions were slightly different from conditions on the date of the *299jury view, the facts are not sufficient to establish substantially changed conditions at the Carrie Works.
The purpose of the view was three-fold: (1) to enable the jury to depict the proximity of the playing field and playground to the Carrie Works; (2) to show the route taken by Carter to gain access to the Carrie Works; and (3) to show the height and structure of the tower. Andrew Carter testified that the conditions at Carrie Works had actually improved since June 1,1984. The boy indicated that several holes in the fence around the perimeter of the facility had been patched, the wires atop the tower had been removed, and the general condition of the buildings was cleaner. Carter further testified that the property, including the tower, was substantially unchanged since the accident.
As a safeguard against the jury placing too much emphasis upon the view, the trial judge stated to the jury, in pertinent part:
I omitted one instruction completely and that would be this: The purpose of your trip to a view of the Carrie Furnace Works and Tower 13-D was to enable you to understand the testimony which was or would be introduced.
Conditions which you observed there in 1987 are not substantive evidence of the way the facilities appeared on June 1, 1984, the day of this accident.
You should consider the testimony and the other evidence, such as pictures, on the conditions as they did exist on June 1, 1984.
There are some and were some differences. Of course, the tower never changed, and the buildings didn’t change, but there were some tracks that weren’t there. Perhaps other .things you might have notices.
Notes of Testimony, pages 718-719. The instruction was very helpful in limiting any prejudice which could result from the view. Accordingly, after consideration of the condition of the premises, the instruction to the jury, and the purpose of the view, we would find that the trial court *300did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury to view the scene of the accident.
USX’s next allegation not adjudicated by the trial court is that the trial court erred when it failed to grant a continuance of the trial. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in the determination of whether to grant a continuance, and, an appellate court should not disturb the decision absent an abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Penman, 357 Pa.Super. 225, 230, 515 A.2d 948, 950 (1986), alloc. dn., 515 Pa. 608, 529 A.2d 1082 (1987). “We must carefully scrutinize with extra care the lower court’s action in denying a continuance when such action operates to deprive a litigant of his chosen counsel.” Walasavage v. Marinelli, 334 Pa.Super. 396, 413, 483 A.2d 509, 518 (1984). USX claims that it was prejudiced when a member of its in-house counsel staff was hospitalized prior to trial, and rendered unable to participate in the trial.2 We believe the claim has no merit.
Rule 216 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial court to grant a continuance to “counsel of record” in case of illness. The attorney who was hospitalized handled a great portion of the pre-trial litigation, but she was not counsel of record nor did she handle the case to the exclusion of all other in-house counsel. Further, the attorney was hospitalized on January 5, 1987, and was unable to return to work, on doctor’s orders, for another six weeks. A continuance was granted until February of 1987. Counsel for USX had approximately one month to complete the preparations for trial.3 USX had the option to try the *301case with other in-house counsel, or retain outside counsel. On the very same day that the continuance was granted, the well-prepared files were delivered to the offices of the retained counsel. They had adequate time to familiarize themselves thoroughly with the case and present an effective, competent defense. As a result, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the continuance until February 2, 1987.4
USX'alleges, as its final basis for the granting of a new trial, that the trial court erred in permitting Karen Roche, M.D., to speculate as to Andrew Carter’s future physical condition. In her report filed with plaintiff’s pre-trial statement, Dr. Roche opined that Andrew could develop cataracts and/or neurological degeneration in the future. USX provides us with three cases purportedly in support of its position. None of the cases is dispositive of this issue.
In Martin v. Johns-Manville Corporation, 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985), the trial court permitted a medical expert to testify that plaintiff’s one blood-spitting episode coupled with his exposure to asbestos, demonstrated a greatly increased risk of contracting cancer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred when it admitted the testimony for the purpose of demonstrating a greatly increased risk of cancer. In Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952), the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. The medical expert witness testified that it was “possible,” not reasonably probable, for another illness to develop as a result of his injuries. Once again, the Supreme Court reversed because the evidence was too speculative. In Baccare v. Mennella, 246 Pa.Super. 53, 369 A.2d 806 (1976), the plaintiff had experienced lower back pain as a result of injuries sustained *302in an automobile collision. An expert medical witness testified that he was unable to give any prognosis concerning future back pain, or to estimate future medical expenses. This Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that it could not instruct the jury on future medical expenses when the testimony was so speculative.
A plaintiff in a personal injury suit may introduce expert testimony to support a claim that he may suffer certain future harm as a result of a past injury. Martin v. Johns-Manville, supra 508 Pa. at 164, 494 A.2d 1093; Boyle v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 403 Pa. 614, 618, 170 A.2d 865, 867 (1961); Walsh v. Brody, 220 Pa.Super. 293, 296, 286 A.2d 666, 668 (1971). When making prognosis, a medical expert cannot be expected to express his or her opinion with the same medical certainty required in a causation question. Boyle v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra, citing Stevenson v. Pennsylvania Sports Enterprises, Inc., 372 Pa. 157, 165, 93 A.2d 236, 240 (1952); see Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674 (1980). Unlike the plaintiffs in Martin and Lorch, whose medical experts testified that the illness from which the plaintiffs suffered might possible lead to other separate illness, Carter was already diagnosed as suffering from neurological degeneration. Dr. Roche stated with reasonable medical probability that neurological degeneration was secondary to severe electrical burns. USX did not pursue this issue on cross-examination, or present expert testimony to rebut the opinion of Dr. Roche. Therefore, we would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the testimony.
We would affirm the portion of the order of the trial court denying USX’s motion for judgment n.o.v. and reverse the portion of the order of the trial court granting a new trial to USX.
McEWEN and JOHNSON, JJ., join.

. We believe the course of action suggested by USX’s counsel is the better practice. In cases like this one, where prejudicial matter is published while the jury is deliberating, a trial court should poll the jury to see if any of them have been exposed to the publicity. If they have, the judge and counsel for both sides should see the affected jurors in chambers, to establish whether those jurors can remain fair and impartial and base their verdict solely on evidence presented in court. If the affected jurors cannot do so, then a mistrial should be declared. If they can be fair and impartial, then the court should instruct them not to discuss the publicity with their fellow jurors.

. USX cites the rationale expressed in Budget Laundry Company v. Munter, 450 Pa. 13, 298 A.2d 55 (1972), as authority for the proposition that a continuance should have been granted. The case is inapposite to the instant matter. In Budget Laundry Company, the defendant was unrepresented by counsel at trial, due to counsel appearing in Federal Court at the same time as Munter’s trial. Here, USX was represented by distinguished counsel at all stages of the Carter lawsuit.

. As of January 5, 1987, discovery was virtually complete and USX’s pre-trial statement had already been filed with the trial court.

. The trial court would have encountered scheduling difficulties if a longer continuance had been granted. The trial court had the option to insert the case into the March schedule, possible bumping the adjudication of another case into the fall term, or scheduling the trial for the fall.