Court Opinion

ID: 9532709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:24:09.873661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:49.456553
License: Public Domain

Ethridge, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
A majority of the judges, namely, McGehee, Roberds, Kyle, Lotterhos, and the writer, are of the opinion that this case should be reversed for a new trial on the question of damages, and to that extent this opinion expresses the views of the judges on that issue. The basis of that position is the highly prejudicial effect of the injection into the case on plaintiff’s voir dire examination of jurors of the existence of liability insurance.
It is also my view of this case, concurred in by Judges Roberds and Lotterhos, that for the same reason the case should be reversed and remanded on liability as well as on damages, and this opinion registers a dissent to that extent.
The facts are covered substantially in the opinion of Judge Holmes, and I will not lengthen this opinion by recounting them; but some additional remarks on the factual issues are pertinent. This is a rather unusual but not a solitary type of case. Weyen v. Weyen, 165 Miss. 257, 139 So. 608 (1932); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 *55Miss. 536, 57 So. 2d 302 (1952). A mother is here suing her daughter for personal injuries received by her while riding as a guest in her daughter’s truck. The mother, appellee-plaintiff, lives with her daughter, appellant-defendant, and the defendant takes care of her mother. There were only two people in the truck at the time of the collision, appellant and appellee. Both of them testified that appellant was driving carefully and was not negligent. Yet the Court is affirming the judgment on liability, despite testimony and admissions of plaintiff.
Appellee-plaintiff, Mrs. Emma Shearron, testified concerning appellant in part as follows: “Q. Prior to the day of the accident, had you ridden with her on a good many occasions ? A. Indeed I had. She had had a truck for several years and I rode with her. Q. Is she a careful driver? A. Indeed, she is one of the most careful drivers I have ever rode with. Q. Is she a fast driver? A. No, sir. Q. Do you observe what she does when the weather changes and on crooked roads? A. Yes. Q. On this day, were you afraid of the manner in which she was driving the car? A. No, sir. Q. At the time of the accident, you had felt no fear from the way she was handling the truck? A. No, sir. . . . Q. At the time of this wreck you tell this jury that Miss Helen Burke Shearron was driving in a careful manner ? A. She certainly was driving in a careful manner. Q. Mrs. Shearron, I believe you answered that on this occasion Miss Helen was driving in a careful manner. Was she driving her truck in a careful manner? A. I told you she was. Q. Was she, or not, driving at an excessive rate of speed? A. She was not. Q. Was she driving in a negligent manner ? A. I wouldn’t think so. I wasn’t afraid to ride with her. Q. You had ridden with her a great number of times? A. Yes. Q. You didn’t think that she was driving in a negligent manner or a careless manner? A. I didn’t think so. Q. You do believe that she was using due care for her safety and yours? A. Yes. Q. You couldn’t say what caused the *56accident? A. I think it was because something was wrong with the mechanism of the car. Q. Do you and your daughter live together? A. Yes. Q. Have you lived together for sometime? A. Excepting her school years, we have always lived together. Q. You say, except for her school years you have always lived together? A. Yes. Q. You share the same home? A. We do. Q. She cares for you like a daughter would a mother? A. I consider her a very good daughter. She takes care of me.”
Both plaintiff and defendant agreed that the collision of the truck into the embankment was caused by something which happened to the mechanism of the car which took it out of appellant’s control. There was some testimony that appellant was driving between 45 to 50 miles per hour, although both appellant and appellee testified that she was not driving over 45 miles per hour. Two mechanics testified for appellant. In their opinions the collision was caused by the tie bolt breaking on the rear of the truck and the drive shaft dropping so as to cause the two right rear wheels to lock. It was said that a worn tie bolt could not be detected by the usual inspection of a truck. In rebuttal, a mechanic testified for appellee that from his examination of the truck the tie bolt was broken because of the impact of the truck into the bank. The testimony of both appellant and appellee, who were the only ones in the truck, supported appellant’s version that the tie bolt broke and then caused the truck to get out of control and run into the bank; and that that was the sole, proximate cause of the accident. The mechanic who testified for appellee in rebuttal gave his opinion that the tie bolt broke from the impact. He did not see the accident and was not in the truck at the time. His opinion-testimony is the only evidence which contradicts the testimony of both appellant and appellee that there was a sudden mechanical accident which caused the mechanism of the truck to get out of control and which then threw it into the embankment.
*57Appellant’s defense was that the accident was caused by a hidden or latent mechanical defect in the truck, which was not known to appellant and which by reasonable care she could not have ascertained; and that therefore the injuries to appellee were not caused by any negligence of appellant, but by such latent defects. Monsour v. Farris, 181 Miss. 803, 181 So. 326 (1938); Green v. Maddox, 168 Miss. 171, 149 So. 882, 151 So. 160 (1933); Anno. 138 A. L. R. 838 (1942); 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, Secs. 235, 251, 254. Whether there was a latent defect in the truck and whether it was the sole, proximate cause of the accident, or whether appellant was driving at an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances and such negligence contributed to the accident were questions for the jury.
However, I do not agree with the statement in the opinion of Justice Holmes that the “overwhelming weight of the evidence clearly establishes the negligence of the appellant.” On the contrary, I am of the opinion that on the facts the issue of negligence vel non was a close question to be properly submitted to the jury without the injection into the case of prejudicial matter such as whether appellant was insured. Here a 78 year old mother, who lives with and is cared for by her daughter is suing that daughter for negligence. Yet the mother in her own testimony admits that the cause of the accident was something happening to the mechanism of the truck, and that the defendant in her opinion was not negligent. Certainly under the peculiar circumstances of this case the issue of negligence vel non should have' gone to the jury unprejudiced by the wholly irrelevant question of whether appellant had liability insurance.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the trial on voir dire examination, the jury was clearly told by inescapable inference by the appellee’s attorney that the appellant was protected by liability insurance. Appellee’s attorney first stated to the jury, “I know most of your occu*58pations, but I want to specifically inquire concerning some.” Appellee’s attorney then, without any preliminary questions, asked the jury “Do any of you gentlemen now work for a casualty or insurance company?” James McLemore, a prospective juror, answered “I don’t now. I have in the past.” Appellant made proper objections to this line of interrogation which were overruled, and moved for a mistrial, which motion was overruled. Appellee’s attorney then continued his voir dire examination: “ Q. Mr. McLemore, you say you don’t now, but have in the past? A. Yes. Q. Do any of you other gentlemen work for a casualty company or insurance company? (None answer in the affirmative.) Q. Have any of you other gentlemen in the past worked for such company? (No one answers in the affirmative.)”
In the absence of the jury appellee’s attorney then stated into the record that he had knowledge that the defendant was covered by liability insurance. Appellant’s objections and motion for mistrial having been overruled, appellant’s attorney then interrogated McLemore, as follows: “Mr. McLemore, would it embarrass you to sit in the trial of this case? A. I don’t know what insurance company is involved, but it could be the same company I was associated with and it would put me in an embarrassing position to form any decision.” The significant aspect of this answer is that it shows clearly that McLemore, along with the other prospective jurors, had naturally inferred that some insurance company was involved as a defendant in this case. The court excused McLemore, and then instructed the jury that this was a lawsuit strictly between the plaintiff and defendant, and that they would decide the issues only between those two parties. After the verdict was rendered, the motion for a new trial set up the above errors in the voir dire examination. Appellee’s attorney then stated in the record that he had information that a certain insurance corporation was a liability insurer of the defendant, and that *59at least one agent of that company resided in the Ring-gold Community in the county; and that the voir dire questions to the jurors concerning insurance were for the purpose of ascertaining whether any member of the venire had worked for that or any other insurance company. The motion for a new trial was overruled.
 A majority of the judges, MoGehee, Roberds, Kyle, Lotterlios, and the writer, are of the opinion that the method of interrogating the jurors on voir dire, used by appellee, wholly failed to comply with the requirements of the Mississippi decisions, and necessitates a reversal and a new trial on the issue of damages alone; and that the size of the verdict, $17,500, in favor of a 78-year-old appellee with no proof of life expectancy, against her daughter, was very probably affected by the voir dire examination indicating defendant was covered by liability insurance. In Herrin, Lambert and Company v. Daly, 80 Miss. 340, 31 So. 790 (1902), plaintiff’s counsel asked a defendant if there was anyone back of his firm who would satisfy plaintiff’s judgment. An objection to this was overruled, and on appeal the case was reversed. Judge Calhoun said that the question “could not conceivably throw any light on the issue, and could have no other tendency than to seduce a verdict on the ground that an insurance company, and not the defendants, would be affected.” This Court up to the present time has consistently followed that principle, making exceptions only where the defendant was responsible for the injection of the insurance issue.
There are five Mississippi eases dealing with the limited circumstances under which prospective jurors can be interrogated on voir dire concerning their connections with a liability insurance company. In Yazoo City v. Loggins, 145 Miss. 793, 110 So. 833 (1926), counsel for plaintiff had asked jurors, ‘ ‘ especially an insurance agent who was a member of the panel,” on voir dire examination, whether they were interested in or represented any *60insurance company engaged in writing indemnity insurance. The Court held that this was not reversible error, and that such an examination was proper so long as it was conducted within reasonable limits and in good faith to discover the state of mind of the juror; and that the court should limit such an examination to one “conducted in good faith. ’ ’ But it then said: 4 4 Such an examination may usually be conducted in such a manner as not necessarily to disclose the existence of such insurance in the particular case, and the court should not allow questions tending to prejudice the minds of the jurors because of the existence of such insurance. ’ ’ Lee County Gin Company v. Middlebrook, 161 Miss. 422, 137 So. 108 (1931), cited Yazoo City v. Loggins. However, Middlebrook is distinguishable, because after the trial court had overruled defendant’s objection to the question, counsel for defendant then stated to the jury, “We don’t object to that, though: the insurance company we had our insurance in is busted, the Home Insurance Company. ’ ’ Hence under these circumstances the Court in effect observed that appellant could not argue error, where he waived his objection bjr such a statement.
Three years later, in Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695 (1934), the Court considerably limited the rule in Yazoo City v. Loggins. Appellee was administratrix of her son’s estate. He was thirteen years of age at the time appellant’s car collided with him on a public highway and killed him. The Court thought that the evidence as to negligence of appellant was clear. On voir dire plaintiff’s counsel asked whether any of the jury was engaged in the business of accident or indemnity insurance. Objection to this was overruled, and the court also refused to admonish the jury that the matter of insurance had nothing to do with the merits of the case. The Court observed that this type of voir dire examination was a 44maneuver” to evade the nde in Herrin v. Daly; and that in the Loggins case the Court *61had pointed out that ‘ ‘ such an examination may usually be conducted in such a manner as not necessarily to disclose the existence” of insurance. The Court then said: “Reaffirming that observation of the court, we would now add as a corollary thereto that the proper means of ascertaining the qualifications of a tendered juror in respect to his insurance connections is to ask him what business he is engaged in, and, if he answer, for instance, that he is a farmer, then the further precautionary question may be put to Mm whether he has any other business or business connections, and, if he answer that he has not, that usually ought to end the privilege so far as inquiry into his insurance connections are concerned. There may be cases, nevertheless, wherein it will happen that there will be no reasonable method at getting at the question of the juror’s qualification on the issue of his insurance connections except by interrogatories which will disclose that the defendant in the particular case is probably insured, but the trial judge should see to it that the necessity exists in the particular case, . . . ”
In fine, the Court stated “the proper means” to be followed, and then said that in certain rare cases there might not be any reasonable method of getting at the question of the juror’s qualification except by a direct question concerning insurance. The Avery decision to that extent overruled or modified the Log gins case, outlined a nonprejudicial procedure for a voir dire examination in this respect and held that a direct question concerning insurance would be available on voir dire only in rare cases.
In M. and A. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Villere, 190 Miss. 848, 1 So. 2d 788 (1941), on the trial in chief, plaintiff’s counsel while cross-examining a photographer testifying for defendant asked him who requested the photographer to take the pictures, to which he replied with the name of an insurance company. The court instructed the jury to pay no attention to the witness’ response. *62The Court, in holding this to be reversible error, reaffirmed Avery v. Collins and its limitations upon the Loggins case; stated again that the Loggins rule would be applicable only in “rare cases”; and held with approval that in Avery v. Collins ‘£ emphasis was appropriately placed upon the prejudicial effect of the disclosure rather than upon the motive for its adduction.” We agree with these statements in Avery and in Villere, and would observe that the good faith test is impractical. As indicated in Villere, the test should be whether the line of interrogation used here was necessary in order for plaintiff on the facts in the particular case to qualify the jury. Such necessity would exist only in rare cases. We wish to state at this point that nothing said herein should be construed as a reflection upon the able and honorable counsel for appellee.
In Kennedy v. Little, 191 Miss. 73, 1 So. 2d 163 (1941), the Court affirmed a verdict for plaintiff by a three to three vote. Counsel for plaintiff on voir dire had asked two prospective jurors if they were connected with any liability insurance company, but the trial court sustained an objection to those questions. Appellant did not argue this issue in his brief. The controlling opinion pointed out that the trial court sustained objections to the questions ; and held that under these circumstances there was no reversible error, citing Yazoo City v. Loggins.
Walley v. Williams, 201 Miss. 84, 28 So. 2d 579 (1947), reaffirmed what the Court had said in the Villere case. On the trial a juror had interposed a question as to whether the plaintiff was paying for insurance, to which the plaintiff had begun to answer “the company paid . . . ” The Court held that this was reversible error, as was an instruction granted plaintiff. Judge Griffith, who wrote the opinion in Avery v. Collins, said:
“But appellee makes the unique argument that we should now lay aside all our previous decisions about insurance in cases such as this, beginning with Herrin *63v. Daly, 80 Miss. 340, 31 So. 790, 92 Am. St. Rep. 605, because appellee says that at tbe present day most jurors know, as a matter of current information, that all enterprises employing more than a few workers carry liability insurance, and that when that issue is injected into the trial, the jurors are furnished no information beyond that which most of them already know.
“For the reasons stated in the quotation found in Odom v. Walker, 193 Miss. 862, 11 So. 2d 452, and turning also to what was said in M. & A. Motor Freight Lines v. Villere, 190 Miss. 848, at pages 857 to 859,1 So. 2d 788, we not only reaffirm what was held in those cases, but affirm that we have no intention to qualify or recede from them in the slightest. Moreover, we'must decline to consider that jurors are aware as a matter of current knowledge that all employers carry liability insurance; but if we should accept that proposition as true, we would be confronted with the deeper question whether trials before jurors of personal injury cases would be valid under the due process clause of the federal constitution, )>
 In the present case a majority of the judges, McGehee, Roberds, Kyle, Ethridge and Lotterhos, are of the opinion that the method followed here in interrogating the jurors on voir dire was not in accord with, and was a complete departure from, the procedure established in the foregoing cases, and particularly in Avery v. Collins, which considerably limited the doctrine of the Log gins case; and that this failure to comply with the rule of Avery v. Collins necessitates a reversal of this case for a new trial on the issue of damages alone. On voir dire appellee’s attorney should have followed the types of. questions suggested in Avery, or others of a similar nature. We do not think that this was one of those “rare cases” in which no other interrogatories would suffice except those disclosing that the defendant is probably insured.
*64In view of the peculiar nature of this case, and the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant, three of the judges, being Roberds, Lotterhos and the writer, are of the opinion that the case should be reversed and remanded as to both liability and damages; that the factual issue on liability is close, and that a new jury should pass on it, along with damages, without the case being obfuscated and prejudiced by the irrelevant issue of liability insurance. To that extent this opinion constitutes a dissent from the controlling decision.
ON SUGGESTIONS OF ERROR
Jan. 25, 1954
50 Adv. S. 62
69 So. 2d 801
Per Curiam.
On November 23, 1953, this Court, by a per curiam opinion, held by a^ majority vote that the above styled cause should be “Affirmed on the issue of liability and reversed on the question of damages. ’ ’ The opinion discloses the division of opinion among the eight Judges who participated in the decision, and what Judges concurred in the several views set forth therein. In addition to the per curiam opinion which set forth the names of the respective Judges who concurred in different views as to what should be done with the case, there was a written opinion by one of the Judges which set forth the views of the majority as to why the case should be affirmed on the question of liability, and also set forth the dissenting views of three of the Judges to the effect that the same should have been affirmed both as to liability and damages. Another was written by Judge Ethridge which set forth the views of a majority to the effect that the case should be affirmed on liability and reversed on the question of damages, and wherein there was expressed the views of three Judges dissenting as to that result, since they were of the opinion that the case *65should be reversed for a new trial both on the question of liability and the question of damages. The case is reported in Advance Sheet No. 44, p. 52, of the Mississippi Reports, and the Advance Sheet of the Southern Reporter to Yol. 68 So. 2d 71, neither of which are yet shown in the bound volumes of the said reports.
A Suggestion of Error was filed on behalf of the appellee on December 3, 1953, and on December 23, 1953, a Suggestion of Error was filed by the appellant; it being contended in the former that we should have affirmed the case both on liability and on the question of damages; whereas, in the latter, it is contended that the case should have been reversed both as to liability and on the question of damages.
 However, after a full and careful consideration of both Suggestions of Error and in conference, we have concluded that since a majority of the Judges are still of the opinion that the prejudicial error for which the case was reversed and remanded should be applied only to the question of the amount of the damages allowed by the verdict of the jury, and are of the opinion that any other verdict than that of liability on the issue of negligence would not have been justified, the case should remain affirmed on the question of liability in any event, and that the same should be reversed on the question of damages unless the plaintiff shall, within ten days from the rendition of the decision herein on these Suggestions of Error, enter a remittitur of $5,000 so as to reduce the amount of the judgment from $17,500 to the sum of $12,-500. The per curiam opinion heretofore rendered is therefore modified accordingly; and the Suggestion of Error filed on behalf of the appellee is sustained in part and overruled in part; and that filed on behalf of the appellant is overruled.
Affirmed on liability and damages with remittitur.
All Justices concur except Gillespie and Lee, JJ., who took no part.
*66ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
Mar. 15, 1954
57 Adv. S. 31
Per Curiam.
In a Per Curiam opinion rendered on November 23, 1953, this Court by a majority vote affirmed the judgment of $17,500 appealed from in the above styled cause, insofar as liability for damages to the plaintiff is concerned, but reversed the cause for a new trial on the question of the amount of damages. Advance Sheet No. 44, p. 52, to the Mississippi Reports, and Advance Sheet to Vol. 68 So. 2d 71.
On December 3, 1953, the appellee, who was the plaintiff in the trial court, filed a Suggestion of Error and urged in her brief in support thereof that the case should have been affirmed both as to liability and on the question of the amount of damages. It was further suggested in the brief that in the event the Court should adhere to its decision that prejudicial error had been committed upon the trial of the case, and that such error influenced the amount of the verdict, we should require a remittitur to be entered by the appellee instead of ordering a reversal of the case for a new trial as to the amount of damages, since the testimony in the record now before us fully discloses the nature and extent of her injuries, and as much so as could be done on another trial.
On December 23,1953, the appellant filed a Suggestion of Error in which it was contended that the case should have been reversed for a new trial both on the question» of liability and damages. In her brief in support of this Suggestion of Error, no response was made to the appellee’s suggestion that a remittitur be entered instead of requiring a new trial on the question of damages.
On January 25, 1954, in a second Per Curiam opinion, reported in Advance Sheet No. 50, p. 62, to the Mississippi Reports, and Advance Sheet to Vol. 69 So. 2d 801, *67we required that a remittitur of $5,000 be entered within ten days thereafter, which was accordingly done.
In other words, we overruled the appellant’s Suggestion of Error and then sustained the appellee’s Suggestion of Error in part and overruled it in part. The latter should not have been sustained either in whole or in part without first calling on the appellant for a reply thereto. Under Rule 14 (3) of this Court it is provided that “No reply to a suggestion of error shall be filed, unless the Court, by special rule or otherwise, shall call therefor.”
On February 10, 1954, the appellant filed a motion .for a stay of judgment and for permission to file a reply to the Suggestion of Error of the appellee. We thereafter considered this motion, stayed the judgment, and granted permission to the appellant to file a reply to the brief of the appellee, to the extent that such brief had urged the entry of a remittitur instead of a new trial on the question of damages, it having been called to our attention that the appellant had theretofore failed to make such reply in observance of the said Rule 14 (3) of this Court. The appellant’s brief in support of her own Suggestion of Error, filed on December 23, 1953, had otherwise covered her contentions in answer to the Court’s action on November 23,1953, as reported in Advance Sheet No. 44, p. 52, to the Mississippi Reports, and the Advance Sheet of the Southern Reporter to Yol. 68 So. 2d 71.
 We are now in receipt of, and have duly considered, the appellant’s reply to the suggestion made by the appellee for a remittitur to be entered in the event the Court should still be of the opinion that the case should not be affirmed both as to liability and damages, and have reached the following conclusion, to-wit: to adhere to our second per curiam opinion rendered on January 25, 1954, hereinbefore referred to, wherein we required that a remittitur of $5,000 be entered, which was done so as to reduce the judgment from $17,500 to the sum *68of $12,500. In view of all of the facts and circumstances set forth in our previous opinions in this case, .which are being reported in 219 Miss. 27, 68 So. 2d 71, we deem this to be the best solution of the present controversy, though not as a precedent to follow under different circumstances where the amount of the verdict is deemed to have been influenced by prejudicial error upon the trial. A final judgment is to be accordingly entered in the sum of $12,500, thereby reducing the original judgment from $17,500 to the extent of the $5,000 remittitur entered, the result being that the Suggestion of Error filed by the appellee is overruled in part and sustained in part.
Suggestion of Error overruled in part and sustained in part.
A quorum of the Judges including McGehee, G. J., and Hall, Kyle, Holmes and Ethridge, JJ., concur in this Per Curiam opinion. Gillespie and Lee, JJ., being disqualified, took no part.