Court Opinion

ID: 9384167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 00:00:36.269583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.077809
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40455         Document: 00516697223             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                               FILED
                                                                           March 31, 2023
                                       No. 22-40455
                                                                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                               Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Fransi Danilo Lainez Garcia,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 2:22-CR-161-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Fransi Danilo Lainez Garcia challenges his sentence for the crime of
   unlawfully re-entering the United States after deportation. He failed to raise
   the alleged sentencing error in district court, so we review only for plain
   error. See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904 (2018).
   Finding that the alleged error is neither clear nor obvious, we affirm.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40455     Document: 00516697223           Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                    No. 22-40455

                                         I.
          After his arrest in 2015, Lainez Garcia was deported in 2017. Between
   his arrest and deportation, Lainez Garcia committed a series of sex crimes
   involving minors. He pleaded guilty to corruption of minors and unlawful
   contact with a minor, both felonies, as well as to the misdemeanor of indecent
   assault. On October 7, 2016, he was sentenced on all three offenses in state
   court and given six years’ probation as punishment for the offense of unlawful
   contact.
          In 2022, Lainez Garcia was arrested in Texas and charged with illegal
   re-entry. He pleaded guilty to the illegal re-entry charge, and the sentencing
   report assigned him a sentencing level of twelve. Of the twelve points, two
   points were allotted because, at the time of his latest arrest, Lainez Garcia
   was still under a six-year probation sentence for the crime of unlawful
   contact. This appeal centers on these two criminal history points, which
   Lainez Garcia failed to contest in district court. With these two points, the
   Guidelines range was between fifteen and twenty-one months. Without
   these two points, the Guidelines range would have been twelve to eighteen
   months.
                                        II.
                                        A.
          Lainez Garcia argues that the district court erred by adding two
   criminal history points under Section 4A1.1(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines.
   That provision adds two points “if the defendant committed the instant
   offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation.”
   U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (emphasis added). The Guidelines commentary, in
   turn, defines a “criminal justice sentence” as “a sentence countable under
   §4A1.2.” Id. § 4A1.1, cmt. n.4 (emphasis omitted).

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                                     No. 22-40455

          So only “a sentence countable under §4A1.2” triggers the additional
   two points at issue.
          Lainez Garcia contends that his sentence was not “countable.” That
   is because he takes “countable” to mean “counted separately.” Id. §
   4A1.2(a)(2). And his sentence for unlawful contact was not “counted
   separately.” It was imposed on the same day as the sentences for corruption
   of minors and indecent assault, so all three sentences were “treated as a
   single sentence.” Id.
          The Government counters that Lainez Garcia’s sentence for unlawful
   contact was in fact “countable.” That is because it was “counted” together
   with the sentences for corruption of minors and indecent assault. On the
   Government’s view, the “countable” doesn’t mean “counted separately”:
   it just means “counted.” See id. § 4A1.2(c) (“Sentences for all felony
   offenses are counted. Sentences for misdemeanor and petty offenses are
   counted . . . .”).
                                          B.
          We need not decide which interpretation is correct. As Lainez Garcia
   concedes, he failed to object to the two-point enhancement in district court,
   so our review is only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain
   error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
   brought to the court’s attention.”).
          For a criminal defendant to qualify for relief under this standard, he
   “must show (1) that the district court committed an error (2) that is plain and
   (3) affects his substantial rights and (4) that failure to correct the error would
   ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.’” United States v. Sanchez-Hernandez, 931 F.3d 408, 410 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)). See
   also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (citing United States v.

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                                    No. 22-40455

   Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)) (“[T]he legal error must be clear or obvious,
   rather than subject to reasonable dispute.”).
          Assuming arguendo that the district court erred by adding the two
   points, we hold that the error was neither clear nor obvious. There is no on-
   point circuit precedent addressing the meaning of the provisions at issue in
   this case. And without on-point, binding precedent, the defendant normally
   cannot show that an error was plain. See United States v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323,
   330 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Absent any precedent directly supporting [the criminal
   defendant’s] contention, it cannot be said that the alleged error was ‘plain’
   for purposes of our review.”).
          There are exceptions to the rule that plain error requires controlling
   precedent. In rare cases, “a straightforward application of the guidelines”—
   an “uncomplicated resort to the language” at issue—leads us to conclude
   that the district court’s error was clear. United States v. Torres, 856 F.3d
   1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 2017). This is not such a case. The relationship between
   the relevant provisions is complicated—even confusing. And even assuming
   that Lainez Garcia’s interpretation of the Guidelines is right, we conclude
   that the Government’s position is reasonable. Given this reasonable dispute,
   any error cannot be plain.
                                        ***
          Because Lainez Garcia fails to show that the district court’s alleged
   error was plain, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.

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