Court Opinion

ID: 9862419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:10:02.169462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:29.410765
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KAPALA, specially concurring: While I agree with the majority on the reversal as to count I based on the common-law tort of retaliatory discharge and the affirmance as to count II, I respectfully disagree as to that part of the opinion in which we recognize an implied private right of action under the Act. My analysis is guided by two supreme court cases that I believe control the issue. In Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455 (1999), our supreme court reiterated the four factors to be considered when determining whether an implied private right of action under a statute is appropriate. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. These factors are: (1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted? (2) Is the plaintiffs injury one the statute was designed to prevent? (3) Is a private right of action consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute? and (4) Is implying a private right of action necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violation of the statute? Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. As to factor one, I believe it is clear that the Act’s intended purpose was to protect elder citizens from abuse. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate otherwise. Additionally, the legislative debates mention support by elder groups while there is no mention of any interest by employees of any organizations involved in addressing elder abuse issues. Further, in this court’s opinion in Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 301 Ill. App. 3d 547 (1998), we expressly recognized that the Act is “intended to safeguard the rights of vulnerable persons of our society (i.e., *** elderly persons ***).” Fisher, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 554. Thus, I do not believe the Act in general was intended to protect persons such as plaintiff in this case. Further, my reading of section 4.1 does not alter this conclusion as to the first factor. While section 4.1 does prohibit discrimination against employees who report elder abuse, I believe its intended purpose was, consistent with the overall purpose of the Act, to protect elders by encouraging reporting of abuse without fear of retaliation. In my opinion, any protection employees might receive under section 4.1 is merely ancillary to the purpose of the Act, which is the protection of our elderly from abuse. I also consider the second factor under Fisher to weigh in favor of not implying a private right of action. I believe the injury that the Act, including section 4.1, is designed to prevent is abuse of the elderly. Perhaps a stronger argument could be made in this case had a plaintiff who is an abused elder sought to pursue an implied private right of action. In our case, however, we have an employee whose injury, being terminated from her employment, in no way relates to the type of injury with which the Act is concerned, abuse of the elderly. Moving to factor four, I am particularly persuaded by the supreme court case of Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386 (1999). In that case, the court stated it was unnecessary to analyze in detail all four of the factors because there was no “clear need” to imply a private remedy to effectuate the purpose of the act at issue there. Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at 393. The Abbasi court further stated that an “application of the fourth factor to this case leads to the same conclusion.” Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at 393. The court in Abbasi went on to conclude that it was not appropriate to recognize an implied right of action because it was not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violation of the act. It so held because there was a common-law cause of action to provide such a remedy. Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at 393. Here, as in Abbasi, plaintiff has an adequate remedy, that being the tort of retaliatory discharge. Thus, to the extent one concludes that there is a need to provide an adequate remedy for a violation of section 4.1, there is no “clear need” to recognize an implied private right of action under the Act. Similarly, it is unnecessary to do so within the meaning of factor four. As for factor three, I concede that an implied private right of action would be consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act, as it would discourage employers from violating section 4.1, and thus promote the discovery and prevention of elder abuse. Nonetheless, I believe the other three factors outweigh factor three in assessing the propriety of whether to recognize an implied private right of action under the Act. Finally, I would point to the cautionary language in Fisher wherein the supreme court stated that it has “consistently sought to restrict the common law tort of retaliatory discharge.” Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 467. The court further stated that while the case before it did not involve the common-law tort of retaliatory discharge, it found such restrictive language “instructive on the question presented in this case.” Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 468. Thus, the court stated that it “must also hesitate to imply such actions under a statute without legislative authority.” Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 468. I read this language from Fisher as another reason not to recognize an implied private right of action under the Act. It is apparent the supreme court strongly disfavors doing so except in the most compelling situations. I do not consider the situation here, when viewed in light of Fisher and Abbassi, to be so compelling. For all of these reasons, I believe we should not take the additional step of recognizing an implied private right of action under the Act.