Court Opinion

ID: 9588163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:31:04.612899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:24.023920
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. I concur in all of the rulings
of the majority except that in Division 6. I dissent from that ruling and from the judgment. The circumstantial evidence as to the identity of the party who injured the plaintiff is undisputed. It showed that the insurance company issued a policy of insurance to Robert Evans, a colored taxi driver living in Milledgeville, Baldwin County, Ga., and that Robert Evans, a colored man ran over the plaintiff in Milledgeville, Ga. It also appeared that the policy was upon a Plymouth automobile. These facts were sufficient at least to show prima facie that Robert Evans was the person to whom the policy of insurance was issued and that he was the person who injured the plaintiff. If the jury had rendered any other verdict under the above evidence I think it would have had to be reversed. Code § 38-304 provides: “Concordance of name alone is some evidence of identity. Residence, vocation, ownership of property and other like facts may be proved. Reasonable certainty is all that can be required. In civil suits parties are generally relieved from the onus of proving identity, as it is a fact generally more easily disproved than established.” I think that this Code section fits this case like a glove. The plaintiff proved every circumstance mentioned in it which goes to show identity. I think the plaintiff made out a prima facie case which demanded a verdict for the plaintiff in the absence of a counter showing by the defendant.
I am authorized to state that Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur in this dissent.