Court Opinion

ID: 9942139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 16:02:40.22547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:43.027931
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-4081     Document: 010111002488      Date Filed: 02/20/2024   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                          Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 20, 2024
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _______________________________________

  JOSEPH M. HOSKINS,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 22-4081

  JARED WITHERS; JESS L.
  ANDERSON,

         Defendants - Appellees.

                     ___________________________________________

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
                   (D.C. No. 2:20-CV-00749-HCN)
                 _________________________________________

 Karra J. Porter, Christensen & Jensen (Anna P. Christiansen, Christensen
 & Jensen, P.C., with her on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-
 Appellant.

 J. Clifford Petersen, Assistant Utah Solicitor General, Utah Attorney
 General’s Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellees.
                     __________________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
               ___________________________________________

 BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
              ___________________________________________

       This appeal grew out of a traffic stop during Mr. Joseph Hoskins’s

 drive through Utah in November 2018. Mr. Hoskins’s car had an Illinois
Appellate Case: 22-4081   Document: 010111002488   Date Filed: 02/20/2024   Page: 2

 license plate, but the lettering was partially obstructed. Though the stop

 began uneventfully, it quickly escalated when the trooper (Jared Withers)

 directed a trained narcotics dog to sniff the car. Tempers flared; and

 Trooper Withers took Mr. Hoskins’s cell phone, pointed a gun at him,

 applied handcuffs, patted him down, and searched his car. The trooper

 found a large amount of cash and arrested Mr. Hoskins.

       The traffic stop, dog sniff, search, and arrest led Mr. Hoskins to sue

 Trooper Withers for violating the First and Fourth Amendments. 1 These

 claims trigger seven issues:

       1.     The traffic stop. The trooper could conduct a traffic stop only
              if he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Hoskins had
              violated Utah law. A Utah law required maintenance of license
              plates to keep the lettering legible. But did the Utah law apply
              to license plates issued in other states? We answer yes.

       2.     Prolonging of the traffic stop. After stopping the car, the
              trooper could ask the driver for proof of insurance. But the
              trooper couldn’t prolong the traffic stop to investigate the
              possibility of a crime. But what happens if the driver couldn’t
              find the proof of insurance? The trooper could ask the driver to
              look. While the driver was looking could the trooper conduct a
              dog sniff outside the car? We answer yes.

       3.     Reasonableness of protective measures during an
              investigative detention. After the stop became confrontational,
              the trooper decided to search the car and detain the driver. At
              some point, the restraint could elevate the detention into an
              arrest. But when the driver reacted angrily and positioned his
              hands in or near his pockets, could the trooper reasonably
              believe that he wasn’t elevating the stop into an arrest when he

 1
       Mr. Hoskins also claimed violation of the state constitution, but
 these claims aren’t at issue.

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              pointed a gun, handcuffed the driver, conducted a patdown, and
              put the driver in the patrol car? We answer yes.

       4.     Arguable probable cause to search the car. A trained
              narcotics dog’s reaction to the presence of drugs can establish
              probable cause to justify a search of a car. When a trained dog
              tries to leap into a car, does that reaction create at least
              arguable probable cause to conduct a search? We answer yes.

       5.     Arguable probable cause to arrest the driver. The search led
              to the discovery of a large amount of cash hidden in the car.
              Did the trooper obtain arguable probable cause to arrest the
              driver based on the dog’s reaction and the presence of the cash?
              We answer yes.

       6.     Lack of a clearly established violation for retaliatory use of
              force. We’ve never held that the Constitution prohibits an
              officer from pointing a gun at suspects when there’s probable
              cause to believe that they’re committing a felony. Given the
              absence of such a holding, did the trooper violate a clearly
              established constitutional right by pointing a gun at the driver
              to retaliate for protected speech? We answer no.

       7.     Lack of a clearly established violation involving excessive
              force. When a serious crime is suspected, we’ve held that the
              Fourth Amendment doesn’t prohibit a law-enforcement officer
              from pointing a gun at the suspect. Given that holding, did the
              trooper violate a clearly established constitutional right by
              pointing a gun at the driver when he reacted angrily and
              positioned his hands in or near his pockets? We answer no.

       Mr. Hoskins also sued Mr. Jess Anderson, Commissioner of the Utah

 Department of Public Safety, claiming a violation of the Fourteenth

 Amendment’s due process clause. This claim arose after the confrontation

 between Mr. Hoskins and Trooper Withers. That confrontation resulted in

 the arrest of Mr. Hoskins, which in turn led to the taking of a DNA sample.

 Despite the arrest, authorities never charged Mr. Hoskins; so Utah law

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 required destruction of the DNA sample. But Mr. Hoskins allegedly had no

 way to learn whether authorities had destroyed the DNA sample. Would the

 alleged inability to verify compliance with state law constitute a denial of

 due process? We answer no.

                                  Background

 1.    Mr. Hoskins is stopped with a large amount of cash hidden inside
       his car.

       When Trooper Withers conducted the traffic stop, he and

 Mr. Hoskins looked at the license plate. As they looked, Trooper Withers

 requested Mr. Hoskins’s proof of insurance. Mr. Hoskins said that his

 insurance information “should be in an email” on his phone, and Trooper

 Withers asked Mr. Hoskins to sit in the patrol vehicle to answer questions

 while he looked for the proof of insurance.

       In the patrol vehicle, Trooper Withers put Mr. Hoskins’s information

 into a computer. While Mr. Hoskins continued looking for his proof of

 insurance, Trooper Withers called dispatch and asked for someone to check

 on the status of the driver’s license and the existence of outstanding

 warrants.

       While waiting for dispatch to respond, Trooper Withers took a

 trained narcotics dog to sniff the outside of Mr. Hoskins’s car. During the

 sniff, the dog leaped and clawed at the front passenger door and tried twice

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 to enter Mr. Hoskins’s car through an open window. Trooper Withers

 commented that the dog was trying to follow the smell of drugs.

       Based on the dog’s reaction, Trooper Withers decided to search

 Mr. Hoskins’s car. At Trooper Withers’s instructions, Mr. Hoskins got out

 of the patrol vehicle and put his cell phone on the vehicle’s hood.

       Trooper Withers said that he was going to search the car and told

 Mr. Hoskins where to stand. After Mr. Hoskins went to the designated

 spot, Trooper Withers learned that the driver’s license was valid and no

 outstanding warrants existed.

       Trooper Withers walked toward the designated spot. As he

 approached, he noticed that Mr. Hoskins was holding a second cell phone.

 Trooper Withers took the cell phone from Mr. Hoskins and turned away. In

 response, Mr. Hoskins repeatedly cursed at Trooper Withers and positioned

 his hands in or near his pockets. Trooper Withers quickly turned around,

 pointed his gun at Mr. Hoskins, and ordered him to keep his hands out of

 his pockets. The trooper kept the gun pointed for roughly eight seconds as

 Mr. Hoskins raised his arms.

       Trooper Withers then put his gun away, handcuffed Mr. Hoskins,

 conducted a patdown, and returned him to the patrol vehicle. Trooper

 Withers and another officer then searched Mr. Hoskins’s car. The officers

 found roughly $89,000 in cash, which was doubled-wrapped in plastic,

 vacuum sealed, and hidden in the lining between the trunk and a rear seat.

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       Trooper Withers arrested Mr. Hoskins, and jail personnel collected

 Mr. Hoskins’s DNA. But no one pressed charges, and authorities released

 Mr. Hoskins.

 2.    Mr. Hoskins sues, and the district court dismisses the action.

       Mr. Hoskins sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the defendants

 successfully moved to dismiss. The court ruled that

       •      Trooper Withers hadn’t violated the Constitution by making the
              traffic stop, conducting a dog sniff, pointing a gun, conducting
              a patdown, applying handcuffs, searching Mr. Hoskins’s car, or
              arresting Mr. Hoskins, and

       •      Mr. Anderson hadn’t violated the Constitution by failing to
              provide a way to ensure destruction of the DNA sample.

 3.    Our de novo review includes consideration of the video.

       We conduct de novo review over the dismissal. SEC v. Shields,

 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014). In conducting this review, we credit

 “all well-pleaded factual allegations in the . . . complaint” and view the

 allegations in a light favorable to Mr. Hoskins. Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d

 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf &

 Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999)). The parties agree, however,

 that we can also consider the video from Trooper Withers’s body camera.

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                          Issues Involving Trooper Withers

 1.    We decide whether Trooper Withers is entitled to qualified
       immunity based on a two-part test.

       Because Trooper Withers had asserted qualified immunity,

 Mr. Hoskins needed to show that (1) the trooper violated a federal

 statutory or constitutional right and (2) the unlawfulness of the conduct

 was “clearly established at the time.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,

 664 (2012).

       When we consider qualified immunity through a motion to dismiss,

 we apply the plausibility standard set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

 Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2011). Under Iqbal

 and Twombly, the complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to

 state a facially plausible claim. Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins,

 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).

 2.    The Fourth Amendment wasn’t violated by the traffic stop or dog
       sniff.

       For the claims involving the traffic stop and dog sniff, the district

 court reasoned that

       •       the video from Trooper Withers’s body camera had shown
               reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and

       •       the dog sniff had not prolonged the traffic stop.

 We agree with these rulings.

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       A.     The initial traffic stop was justified.

       Mr. Hoskins challenges the traffic stop, arguing that he didn’t violate

 Utah law. But Utah law requires individuals to maintain their license plates

 in a legible manner, and Mr. Hoskins’s license plate was partially

 obstructed. 2 That obstruction led Trooper Withers to suspect a violation of

 Utah law. Trooper Withers could conduct a traffic stop if his suspicion had

 been reasonable. Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, Colo., 577 F.3d

 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009). The reasonableness of the suspicion entails an

 objective inquiry. Id.

       In conducting that objective inquiry, we regard Trooper Withers’s

 suspicion as reasonable. Utah law requires maintenance of license plates to

 keep the lettering legible. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-404(3)(b)(ii)

 (“[Every] license plate shall at all times be . . . maintained . . . in a

 condition to be clearly legible.”). A trooper could reasonably suspect a

 violation because the frame of the license plate was covering part of the

 lettering of the state (Illinois). Because the state’s lettering was partially

 covered, Trooper Withers had a reasonable basis to suspect a violation of

 Utah’s legibility requirements.

 2
       In the complaint, Mr. Hoskins admitted that the lettering on the
 license plate was partially obscured. Appellant’s App’x at 70.

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       Mr. Hoskins argues that Utah’s legibility requirement applies only to

 license plates issued in Utah. We rejected this argument in United States v.

 Echkart, concluding that a driver had violated Utah law when his

 California license plate wasn’t “clearly visible or legible.” 569 F.3d 1263,

 1271–72 (10th Cir. 2009).

       In Eckhart, the defendant hadn’t questioned the applicability of the

 Utah law on drivers from other states. But the Court decided the issue

 anyway, and we’re bound by that decision. See Wankier v. Crown Equip.

 Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that we’re bound by a

 panel’s interpretation of state law unless the state’s highest court later

 resolved the issue). Mr. Hoskins’s arguments do not allow us to skirt

 Eckhart’s interpretation of Utah law. Thompson v. Weyeshaeuser Co.,

 582 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Baker,

 49 F.4th 1348, 1358 (10th Cir. 2022) (concluding that the presentation of a

 new argument doesn’t allow us to deviate from a prior panel opinion). 3

 3
       Some other circuits also consider panel precedents as binding even
 when a party presents arguments not made to the prior panel. See Tippitt v.
 Reliance Standard Life Ins., 457 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating
 that the court of appeals was bound by panel precedent even when the
 appellant makes arguments not considered by the prior panel); Harris v.
 Epoch Grp., 357 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that “precedents do
 not cease to be authoritative merely because counsel in a later case
 advance a new argument” (quoting United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232
 (7th Cir. 1995))); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 553 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir.
 1977) (stating that a precedent controls even when an appellant makes an
 argument not considered by the prior panel).

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        We would follow Eckhart even if we were free to consider

  Mr. Hoskins’s argument for limiting the scope of the Utah law. The Utah

  law does not say anything to restrict the legibility requirement to license

  plates issued in Utah. To the contrary, the law uses the passive voice,

  requiring license plates to “be maintained” in a legible condition. Utah

  Code Ann. § 41-1a-404(3)(b)(ii). The passive voice reflects a statutory

  focus on how the license plate is maintained—not where it had been issued.

  See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (stating that a use of

  passive voice reflects a focus on the existence of an event rather than a

  specific actor’s culpability).

        We addressed similar statutory language in United States v. DeGasso,

  369 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2004). There we considered whether Oklahoma’s

  legibility requirement applies when the driver’s license plate had been

  issued in another state. Id. at 1145. We concluded that

        •     the first paragraph of the Oklahoma statute (directed to the
              Oklahoma Tax Commission) applied only to vehicles registered
              in Oklahoma and

        •     the second paragraph (mandating that the license plate be
              “clearly visible at all times”) applied regardless of where the
              license plate had been issued.

  Id. at 1147. For the second conclusion, we reasoned in part that police

  officers must identify vehicles regardless of where the license plate had

  been issued. Id.; accord United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1313

  (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a similar Kansas statute requires legibility of
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  license plates for vehicles driven in Kansas even when licensed in another

  state); cf. United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2008)

  (concluding that Tennessee’s statutory requirement on legibility applies to

  out-of-state license plates, in part because the legislative purpose “would

  surely be frustrated” if drivers from other states could avoid ready

  identification when driving on Tennessee highways).

        Our reasoning in DeGasso applies here. Like the Oklahoma statute in

  DeGasso, some subsections of the Utah statute arguably apply only when

  the license plate is displayed where it was issued. See, e.g., Utah Code

  Ann. § 41-1a-401(3) (governing the physical characteristics of license

  plates, such as the reflective material on the plate face, issued to Utah

  registrants); Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-402 (regulating the design of Utah-

  issued license plates). But the provision here bears no such limitation. This

  provision expressly applies to the maintenance of all license plates on

  vehicles using Utah roads. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-404(3).

        Mr. Hoskins argues that even if the license plate had violated Utah

  law, authorities rarely stopped anyone for a violation. But if Mr. Hoskins

  had been violating Utah law, it wouldn’t matter whether a law-enforcement

  officer would generally stop someone for a violation. United States v.

  Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 4

  4
      There we said that “[i]t is irrelevant, for purposes of Fourth
  Amendment review, ‘whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary
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        Mr. Hoskins bases his argument on case law involving retaliatory

  arrests. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019). Under this case

  law, officers don’t incur liability for retaliatory arrest if they had probable

  cause for the arrest. Id. at 1722, 1724. An exception exists when officers

  wouldn’t typically make an arrest even with probable cause. Id. at 1727.

  But Mr. Hoskins doesn’t claim retaliatory arrest.

        Granted, Mr. Hoskins elsewhere alleges protected speech and denies

  the existence of probable cause. But these allegations don’t bear on a

  trooper’s right to stop a driver for violating Utah’s equipment law. See

  United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 512 (10th Cir. 2000)

  (stating that an officer can stop a driver for reasonable suspicion involving

  violation of a state’s equipment law). So Trooper Withers could stop

  Mr. Hoskins even if Utah drivers had frequently driven with obstructed

  license plates.

        B.    The dog sniff didn’t prolong the traffic stop.

        Reasonable suspicion would thus allow Trooper Withers to stop

  Mr. Hoskins. To carry out the stop, the trooper could check Mr. Hoskins’s

  driver’s license, determine whether outstanding warrants existed, and

  inspect the proof of insurance. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,

  or routine according to the general practice of the police department or the
  particular officer making the stop.’” Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787
  (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993)).

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  355 (2015). But Trooper Withers couldn’t prolong the traffic stop to

  investigate the possibility of a crime. Id. at 353–55.

        Mr. Hoskins argues that Trooper Withers prolonged the traffic stop

  by conducting the dog sniff. We disagree. Trooper Withers didn’t begin the

  dog sniff until he had already asked dispatch to check on warrants for

  Mr. Hoskins and the status of his driver’s license. And when Trooper

  Withers finished the dog sniff, Mr. Hoskins was still looking for his proof

  of insurance and dispatch had not yet reported on the existence of

  outstanding warrants or the status of the driver’s license. 5 So the dog sniff

  did not extend the time of the traffic stop.

        We addressed similar circumstances in United States v. Cates,

  73 F.4th 795 (10th Cir. 2023), cert. pet. filed, No. 23-5903 (U.S. Oct. 27,

  2023). There a state trooper had stopped a motorist for speeding in a rental

  car. Id. at 799–800. The trooper asked for the rental contract, and the

  driver looked for it. While he looked, the trooper told another officer to

  conduct a dog sniff. The second officer finished the dog sniff before the

  driver could find his rental contract. Id. at 807. We thus concluded that the

  dog sniff hadn’t prolonged the traffic stop. Id. at 804.

  5
        In the complaint, Mr. Hoskins alleged that the dog sniff had taken
  about a minute. Appellant’s App’x at 83 ¶ 51.

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        Under Cates, Trooper Withers’s dog sniff did not prolong

  Mr. Hoskins’s traffic stop. In Cates, the driver was still looking for the

  rental contract when the dog sniff ended. And here, the trooper finished the

  dog sniff while Mr. Hoskins was still looking for his proof of insurance. In

  both Cates and our case, the traffic stop would have taken the same amount

  of time with or without the dog sniff. See United States v. Mayville,

  955 F.3d 825, 833 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Because the dog sniff and alert were

  contemporaneous with the troopers’ reasonably diligent pursuit of the

  stop’s mission, the subsequent search . . . did not violate [the defendant’s]

  Fourth Amendment rights.”).

        Mr. Hoskins questions the applicability of Cates, arguing that

  Trooper Withers waited too long to contact dispatch. But even if Trooper

  Withers had contacted dispatch earlier, the traffic stop would have taken

  just as long because Mr. Hoskins would still have been looking for his

  proof of insurance. So even if the trooper had contacted dispatch earlier,

  the dog sniff wouldn’t have prolonged the traffic stop. 6

  6
        Mr. Hoskins also alleges that the trooper delayed the stop by asking
  questions unrelated to the equipment violation. “But an officer’s mission
  during a traffic stop is not limited to determining whether to issue a
  ticket.” United States v. Cone, 868 F.3d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 2017). And
  Mr. Hoskins doesn’t say which questions were problematic or why those
  questions exceeded the scope of the trooper’s mission. We thus lack a
  meaningful argument to consider.

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  3.    Asking Mr. Hoskins to sit in the patrol car did not turn the
        detention into an arrest.

        Mr. Hoskins argues that when he was forced to sit in the patrol car,

  the stop escalated into an arrest. We disagree. A stop doesn’t escalate into

  an arrest if the detention is reasonably related to the circumstances

  justifying the stop. United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1335–36

  (10th Cir. 1994).

        The video shows that

        •     Mr. Hoskins needed to look on his cell phone for his proof of
              insurance and

        •     Trooper Withers ultimately called dispatch from the patrol car.

  In these circumstances, Trooper Withers could reasonably maintain safety

  by asking Mr. Hoskins to sit in the patrol car.

        Many other circuits have concluded that an order to sit in a police car

  doesn’t automatically turn a detention into an arrest. See United States v.

  Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 211 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Detention in a police car

  does not automatically constitute an arrest.”); United States v. Rodriguez,

  831 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that detention in a patrol car

  did not turn the seizure into an arrest); United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d

  903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that placement of the driver in a

  patrol car did not turn a traffic stop into an arrest); United States v. Parr,

  843 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Certainly, there is no per se rule

  that detention in a patrol car constitutes an arrest.”). These cases make
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  sense here. Trooper Withers asked Mr. Hoskins to sit in the patrol car, and

  Mr. Hoskins complied with the request. By asking Mr. Hoskins to join him

  in the patrol car, Trooper Withers was continuing to carry out the mission

  of the traffic stop. We thus conclude that the trooper didn’t turn the traffic

  stop into an arrest by asking Mr. Hoskins to sit in the patrol car.

  4.    The dog’s reaction created arguable probable cause to search the
        car.

        Trooper Withers and another officer searched Mr. Hoskins’s car. For

  that search, the officers needed probable cause to believe that the car

  contained contraband. United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 1210

  (10th Cir. 2012). But even if the officers had lacked probable cause, they

  would incur personal liability only if they had violated a clearly

  established right. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011); see p. 7,

  above.

        Though the district court didn’t rely on the absence of a clearly

  established right, we can affirm on any ground adequately supported by the

  record. Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). In

  deciding whether to consider affirmance on a different ground, we address

        •        whether the issue was briefed in district court and on appeal,

        •        whether the issue is legal or factual, and

        •        whether the record is adequately developed.

  Id. at 1162.

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        The issue was fully briefed in district court and on appeal, and the

  clearly established nature of a right entails a question of law. Garrett v.

  Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 2001). On that legal question, the

  district court was bound by the allegations in the complaint and the video

  from Trooper Withers’s body camera. See p. 6, above. So the record was

  fully developed. We thus exercise our discretion to consider Trooper

  Withers’s argument that any constitutional violation wouldn’t have been

  clearly established.

        We ordinarily consider a right clearly established only “when it’s

  apparent from a precedent or the clear weight of authority from other

  courts.” Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2021). But even

  without an applicable precedent or consensus of case law, a right can be

  clearly established when it is obvious. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–

  54 (2020) (per curiam).

        We determine whether Trooper Withers violated a clearly established

  right by considering whether probable cause was at least arguable.

  Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1142 (10th Cir. 2014). Probable

  cause was arguable if Trooper Withers had an objectively reasonable belief

  that probable cause existed (even if that belief was mistaken). Id. In our

  view, Trooper Withers could reasonably believe that the dog sniff had

  created probable cause.

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        A trained narcotics dog can react to drugs through either an alert or

  an indication. An alert takes place when the dog reacts to a known odor by

  changing body posture and increasing respiration. United States v. Forbes,

  528 F.3d 1273, 1275 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008). An indication involves other

  behavioral changes that show the precise location of the drugs. Id. For

  example, a dog might signal the location of the drugs by staring, sitting,

  scratching, biting, or barking. Id.

        A trained narcotics dog’s alert or an indication is enough to create

  probable cause for a search. See United States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275,

  1281 (10th Cir. 2009). So we must assess the objective reasonableness of

  Trooper Withers’s belief that the dog had alerted or indicated. For that

  determination, we credit the allegations in the complaint. See p. 6, above.

  But the parties agree that we can supplement those allegations with the

  video of the dog sniff. See p. 6, above.

        The video shows that the dog tried twice to leap into an open

  window. After the first effort, Trooper Withers commented that the dog

  was “following an odor right into the car.” Bodycam 2:37:45, 2:37:55.

  After the dog tried again to leap into the car, the trooper said that he

  regarded the dog’s behavior as an indication. Bodycam 2:38:00. Even if the

  trooper had been wrong, however, his characterization was at least

  reasonable because the dog had tried to leap into the car’s open window.

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        When the dog sniff took place, we had characterized similar reactions

  from trained narcotics dogs as enough for probable cause. See United

  States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding the

  district court’s finding that a dog had alerted when it stiffened, breathed

  heavily, and tried to jump into the window on the driver’s side); United

  States v. Woods, 351 F. App’x 259, 263 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)

  (stating that a dog had alerted when it stopped twice to smell a particular

  spot and stuck its head into the window on the passenger side); United

  States v. Gavilanas-Medrano, 479 F. App’x 166, 171 (10th Cir. 2012)

  (unpublished) (upholding the finding of an alert when a dog had stood on

  its hind legs and sniffed along the seam of the windshield and hood). 7

        Mr. Hoskins questions the significance of the dog’s second effort to

  leap into the car, downplaying the significance of the reaction and arguing

  that Trooper Withers had given an audible command for the dog to react. 8

  The video does show that the trooper made a sound before the dog tried to

  leap into the car for a second time. But before the trooper made this sound,

  7
        Though two of these cases aren’t precedential, they show that a
  trooper could reasonably infer probable cause from the dog’s reaction. See
  Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n
  unpublished opinion can be quite relevant in showing that the law was not
  clearly established.” (emphasis in original)).
  8
      Mr. Hoskins doesn’t allege in the complaint that the trooper gave a
  command for the dog to react.

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  the dog had already tried to leap into the car’s open window. So probable

  cause was at least arguable even if we disregard the dog’s second effort to

  leap into the car.

  5.    Trooper Withers didn’t violate a clearly-established right by
        conducting protective measures prior to the search.

        Though Trooper Withers had arguable probable cause to search the

  car, he doesn’t suggest that he had enough information to make an arrest

  until he searched the car. So the timing of the arrest matters. Mr. Hoskins

  alleges that he had been arrested prior to the search of his car; Trooper

  Withers argues that he didn’t make the arrest until after he had conducted

  the search.

        The required probable cause differs for search of a car and for an

  arrest. For an arrest, probable cause exists when reasonably trustworthy

  sources alert an officer to facts and circumstances that would warrant a

  person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed

  or is being committed. Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir.

  1995). For a car search, probable cause exists if the totality of the

  circumstances create a fair probability that the car contains contraband or

  evidence of a crime. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1489–90

  (10th Cir. 1993).

        We can assume, for the sake of argument, that Mr. Hoskins is correct

  in alleging an arrest prior to the search of his car. Even with this

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  assumption, Trooper Withers asserts qualified immunity, arguing that the

  case law wouldn’t have clearly established the escalation of his

  investigative detention into an arrest.

        Though the district court didn’t address this argument, it was fully

  briefed here and in district court. And the issue is legal, rather than

  factual, without the need for any further development of the record. So we

  can address Trooper Withers’s argument to affirm based on the lack of a

  clearly established right. See p. 17, above.

        We assess the clarity of the right based on the line between an

  investigative detention and arrest. Drawing that line is fact-intensive

  without the benefit of bright-line rules. See Hemry v. Ross, 62 F.4th 1248,

  1254 (10th Cir. 2023) (“We conduct a fact-intensive inquiry to distinguish

  between arrests and Terry stops.”); United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217,

  1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The allowable scope of an investigative detention

  cannot be determined by reference to a bright-line rule[.]”). Instead of a

  bright-line rule, we ask whether a reasonable officer could consider the

  restraints to fall within the scope of detention. Manzanares v. Higdon,

  575 F.3d 1135, 1150 (10th Cir. 2009).

        On this question, Mr. Hoskins needed to show clear establishment of

  “an unconstitutional arrest as opposed to a lawful investigative detention.”

  Soza v. Demsich, 13 F.4th 1094, 1100–01 (10th Cir. 2021). To satisfy this

  burden, Mr. Hoskins alleges escalation of the restraint by taking his second

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  cell phone, pointing a gun, applying handcuffs, conducting a patdown, and

  putting him in the patrol car. 9

        Mr. Hoskins points out that without the cell phone, he couldn’t

  record the encounter. But he doesn’t otherwise suggest that confiscation of

  the cell phone would have elevated the encounter into an arrest. And he

  didn’t suggest in district court that the confiscation of his cell phone would

  have elevated the detention into an arrest.

        After Trooper Withers took the second cell phone, Mr. Hoskins

  reacted angrily and cursed. Trooper Withers turned around and saw

  Mr. Hoskins with his hands in or near his pockets. At this point, Trooper

  Withers could reasonably fear that Mr. Hoskins was going to pull out a

  handgun.

        Until then, the encounter had proceeded without incident: The two

  men had looked at the license plate, discussed the legal requirement for

  unobstructed license plates, and sat together in the patrol car. But the

  encounter escalated with the dog sniff, as Mr. Hoskins snapped at the

  9
        Trooper Withers told Mr. Hoskins that he was being detained, not
  arrested. But the trooper’s statement isn’t dispositive. See Cortez v.
  McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1117 n.8 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating that
  the law-enforcement officers’ subjective beliefs were irrelevant when they
  told a suspect that he was not being arrested); accord United States v.
  Jackson, 377 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a similar
  statement by a police officer doesn’t matter because the inquiry under the
  Fourth Amendment is objective).
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  trooper. At this point, Mr. Hoskins had not been patted down. 10 Trooper

  Withers could thus believe that he needed to act quickly, pointing a gun at

  Mr. Hoskins in case he was reaching for his own gun.

        As Trooper Withers pointed his gun, he told Mr. Hoskins to remove

  his hands from his pockets. Mr. Hoskins complied, raising his hands;

  Trooper Withers put his gun away and applied handcuffs. Mr. Hoskins

  alleges that even if pointing the gun hadn’t elevated the detention into an

  arrest, the handcuffing would have done so.

        For this allegation, our case law wouldn’t have provided clear

  guidance to Trooper Withers. Many of our opinions stated that handcuffing

  a suspect hadn’t elevated a detention into an arrest. United States v.

  Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Neff,

  300 F.3d 1217, 1218–21 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d

  1188, 1191, 1193–95 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Salas-Garcia,

  698 F.3d 1242, 1249–52 (10th Cir. 2012). Of course, we had also held the

  opposite many times. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046,

  10
        In the complaint, Mr. Hoskins pointed out that he had lifted his shirt
  to reveal his waistband. Appellant’s App’x at 88 ¶ 96(a). Though he didn’t
  have a weapon in his waistband, he could have had a weapon in his pockets
  or socks. So a reasonable officer could have believed that a patdown was
  necessary to prevent the possibility that Mr. Hoskins was carrying a
  weapon in his pockets or socks. See United States v. Belin, 868 F.3d 43,
  50–51 (1st Cir. 2017) (concluding that a frisk was permissible because the
  suspect’s clothing prevented the officer from visually determining whether
  the suspect had a firearm).

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  1051–53 (10th Cir. 1994); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148–49

  (10th Cir. 2009); Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1122–23 (10th Cir.

  2010).

        From our cases, “any reasonable officer would understand that it

  [was] unconstitutional to handcuff someone absent probable cause or an

  articulable basis to suspect a threat to officer safety combined with

  reasonable suspicion.” Manzanares, 575 F.3d at 1150. But our case law

  wouldn’t have provided Trooper Withers with an easy benchmark to assess

  the seriousness of the threat. See Merkley, 988 F.2d at 1064 (stating that

  our case law has “eschewed” “bright-line standards” on when handcuffing

  would elevate a detention into an arrest). So even if the handcuffing had

  elevated the detention into an arrest, the violation wouldn’t have been

  clearly established.

        After Mr. Hoskins was handcuffed, he was patted down. Trooper

  Withers could view the patdown as a necessary safeguard during the search

  of the car. To conduct the patdown, Trooper Withers needed only a

  “minimum level of objective justification,” which could fall below the

  threshold for probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence. United

  States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1083 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States

  v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006), and United

  States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). Before Trooper Withers

  conducted the patdown, he had seen Mr. Hoskins reacting angrily with his

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  hands positioned near or in his pockets. In these circumstances, a trooper

  could reasonably view the patdown as a necessary safeguard to ensure that

  Mr. Hoskins wasn’t carrying a weapon while the officers searched the car.

        After conducting the patdown, Trooper Withers needed to participate

  in the search, diverting his focus from Mr. Hoskins. So Trooper Withers

  put Mr. Hoskins in the patrol car. As noted earlier, courts had often held

  that placement in a patrol car wouldn’t automatically turn a detention into

  an arrest. See pp. 15–16. So any violation at this step wouldn’t have been

  clearly established.

        We may assume for the sake of argument that the combination of

  measures turned the detention into an arrest. But a reasonable trooper

  could easily have found such a conclusion far from obvious based on our

  case law. In analogous circumstances, we upheld qualified immunity for

  the officer in Soza v. Demsich, 13 F.4th 1094, 1099–1104 (10th Cir. 2021).

  There the officer had pointed a gun at the suspect, patted him down, and

  applied handcuffs. Id. at 1098, 1100 n.2. Though we had elsewhere held

  that the measures turned the detention into an arrest, we upheld qualified

  immunity for the officers because the facts cut both ways on the likelihood

  of a danger to the officers, the plaintiff hadn’t identified a “sufficiently

  on-point case” to render a constitutional violation clearly established, and

  the district court and prior Tenth Circuit panel had differed on the

  reasonableness of the protective measures. Id. at 1101–1104.

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        The facts cut both ways here, too, and Mr. Hoskins hasn’t identified

  a prior case recognizing a constitutional violation in similar circumstances.

  He has cited cases recognizing that unreasonable force ordinarily turns an

  investigative detention into an arrest. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 40 n.191.

  But he does not suggest that the facts in those cases resemble the facts

  here. And Trooper Withers pointed a gun, applied handcuffs, and

  conducted a patdown only after he had seen Mr. Hoskins reacting angrily

  with his hands positioned in or near his pockets. In these circumstances, a

  trooper could reasonably regard the protective measures as necessary to

  ensure safety. We thus affirm the dismissal of this claim based on the

  absence of a clearly established right.

  6.    In pointing a gun, Trooper Withers didn’t violate a clearly
        established right against retaliation or excessive force.

        Mr. Hoskins claims that the trooper violated the First and Fourth

  Amendments by pointing the gun. For the First Amendment claim,

  Mr. Hoskins alleges that the trooper was retaliating for protected speech

  (cursing at the trooper and complaining that he had allowed the dog to

  scratch the car). For the Fourth Amendment claim, Mr. Hoskins alleges

  that pointing the gun constituted excessive force. 11 The district court ruled

  11
        Mr. Hoskins also alleged that he had been shoved. But he doesn’t
  argue on appeal that the shoving constituted excessive force.

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  that the trooper hadn’t violated either constitutional amendment by

  pointing the gun at Mr. Hoskins.

        Mr. Hoskins challenges these rulings, and Trooper Withers defends

  the rulings and argues in the alternative that any constitutional violation

  wouldn’t have been clearly established. We address Trooper Wither’s

  alternative argument because it is fully briefed, legal, and adequately

  developed. See p. 17, above.

        A.     A violation of the First Amendment wouldn’t have been
               clearly established.

        To determine whether the right was clearly established, we consider

  the allegations in the complaint and what we can see from the video. See

  p. 6, above. The video shows that Trooper Withers pointed his gun at

  Mr. Hoskins for roughly eight seconds, and Mr. Hoskins attributes the

  pointing of the gun to the trooper’s anger for the cursing and complaints

  about the dog sniff. We can assume for the sake of argument that the

  cursing and complaints constituted protected speech. Even with this

  assumption, however, we had no precedents finding a First Amendment

  violation when an officer points a gun at a suspect to retaliate for protected

  speech. 12

  12
        When the incident took place, one circuit had held that a retaliatory
  use of force can violate the First Amendment. See Coady v. Steil, 187 F.3d
  727, 733–34 (7th Cir. 1999).

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        Even if Trooper Withers had scoured the case law, he might

  reasonably have concluded that the First Amendment wouldn’t prevent him

  from pointing his gun at Mr. Hoskins in the face of his cursing and

  complaints. We addressed a similar issue in Frey v. Town of Jackson, Wyo.,

  41 F.4th 1223 (10th Cir. 2022). There the plaintiff alleged that a law-

  enforcement officer had unnecessarily applied a wristlock in the Spring of

  2018 to retaliate for protected speech. Id. at 1230, 1235. We concluded

  that the officer had qualified immunity based on the absence of any case

  law that would clearly establish a First Amendment violation from the

  retaliatory use of force. Id. at 1235–36. 13

        We decided Frey in 2022, years after the encounter between Trooper

  Withers and Mr. Hoskins. But Frey analyzed the clarity of our case law as

  of the Spring of 2018, which preceded Trooper Withers’s traffic stop by

  only a few months. Though Trooper Withers didn’t have the benefit of

  Frey when he made the traffic stop, our opinion shows that only a few

  months before Mr. Hoskins was stopped, a retaliatory use of force hadn’t

  been clearly established as a First Amendment violation. We thus affirm

  13
        Trooper Withers doesn’t cite Frey, but we must consider “all relevant
  case law.” Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2021); see
  Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).

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  the dismissal of this claim based on the absence of a clearly established

  protection against a retaliatory use of force. 14

        B.    A violation of the Fourth Amendment wouldn’t have been
              clearly established.

        We also uphold the dismissal of Mr. Hoskins’s claim under the

  Fourth Amendment. This claim involves the use of excessive force when

  the trooper pointed a gun at Mr. Hoskins for roughly eight seconds. Of

  course, we’ve found excessive force when officers shoot unarmed and

  unthreatening suspects. E.g., Finch v. Rapp, 38 F.4th 1234, 1243 (10th Cir.

  2022). But not when an officer points a gun at a suspect. To the contrary,

  we’ve held that the force isn’t excessive under the Fourth Amendment

  when an officer points a gun at an adult suspected of a serious crime.

  Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1239–41 (10th Cir. 2011).

        If Trooper Withers had scoured the case law, he might reasonably

  have concluded that pointing the gun wouldn’t be excessive. We had no

  14
         Mr. Hoskins relies on a Supreme Court opinion post-dating the traffic
  stop: Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019). In Nieves, the Supreme
  Court held that a retaliatory arrest doesn’t trigger liability when probable
  cause existed. Id. at 1723. Following Nieves, two circuits have held that a
  law-enforcement officer enjoys qualified immunity for retaliatory arrest
  when probable cause is at least arguable. Novak v. City of Parma, Ohio, 33
  F.4th 296, 305 (6th Cir. 2022); Nieters v. Holtan, 83 F.4th 1099, 1109–10
  (8th Cir. 2023). And we conclude below that probable cause was at least
  arguable. See pp. 31–34, below. But we need not determine whether
  arguable probable cause would trigger qualified immunity on the
  retaliation claim because there was no clearly established protection
  against a retaliatory use of force.

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  precedents finding excessive force when a law-enforcement officer points a

  gun at a suspect for a matter of seconds, and a trained dog had already

  alerted to the odor of illegal drugs in the car. And before the trooper drew

  his gun, the suspect was cursing with his hands near or in his pockets. 15

  Given these circumstances, reasonable law-enforcement officers could

  reasonably believe that the Fourth Amendment would allow them to point a

  gun at the suspect for roughly eight seconds.

        Mr. Hoskins also contends that the situation became volatile only

  because Trooper Withers had escalated the conflict by shoving Mr. Hoskins

  and pointing the gun. But in district court and on appeal, Mr. Hoskins

  doesn’t cite any pertinent case law or explain how a reasonable officer

  should have recognized a constitutional violation from the shove or display

  of a gun. We thus uphold the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim

  based on the absence of a clearly established violation. See Cummings v.

  Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1243 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the plaintiff’s

  failure to identify a factually similar precedent is fatal in qualified

  immunity).

  15
       The trooper had seen Mr. Hoskins’s waistband, but had not done a
  patdown. See note 10, above.

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  7.    The search yielded arguable probable cause for an arrest.

        With Mr. Hoskins secured, Trooper Withers and another officer

  searched the lining between the trunk and back seat and found $89,000 in

  cash, double-wrapped in plastic and vacuum sealed. Trooper Withers then

  arrested Mr. Hoskins.

        Mr. Hoskins challenges the lawfulness of the arrest. The arrest would

  have been lawful only if probable cause existed. United States v. Traxler,

  477 F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2007). Probable cause for an arrest would

  exist if Trooper Withers had reasonably trustworthy information that would

  lead a prudent person to believe that Mr. Hoskins was committing a crime

  or had already committed one. See p. 20, above. For the sake of argument,

  we can assume that probable cause didn’t exist when Mr. Hoskins was

  arrested. Even with this assumption, Trooper Withers urges us to affirm on

  the ground that any constitutional violation would not have been clearly

  established. We consider this argument because it’s fully briefed, legal,

  and adequately developed. See p. 17, above.

        A violation wouldn’t be clearly established if probable cause had

  been at least arguable. Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141

  (10th Cir. 2014). Probable cause would have been arguable if reasonable

  troopers could have believed that probable cause existed. Id.

        Based on the video, reasonable troopers could believe that they had

  probable cause to arrest Mr. Hoskins based on
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        •     the presence of roughly $89,000 in cash that had been double-
              wrapped, vacuum sealed, and hidden in the car’s lining and

        •     the dog’s leaps when sniffing the car.

        Mr. Hoskins argues that a large amount of cash wouldn’t be enough,

  in itself, for probable cause. But even if a lot of cash weren’t enough in

  itself, the amount did provide strong evidence of a connection to the drug

  trade. See United States v. One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Four

  Hundred Forty-Two & 43/100 Dollars ($149,442.43/100), 965 F.2d 868,

  876–77 (10th Cir. 1992); 16 accord United States v. Thirty-Nine Thousand

  Eight Hundred Seventy-Three and No/100 Dollars ($39,873.00), 80 F.3d

  317, 319 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing “that possession of a large amount of

  cash (here, nearly $40,000) is strong evidence that the cash is connected

  with drug trafficking”); United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 495 (6th

  Cir. 2010) (“Courts have readily acknowledged that large sums of cash are

  indicative of the drug trade[.]”). There wasn’t just a lot of money; it was

  double-wrapped, vacuum sealed, and hidden in the car’s lining.

  16
        In district court and on appeal, Mr. Hoskins relies solely on this
  opinion for the point that a large amount of currency isn’t alone sufficient
  for probable cause. The opinion does state that “a large amount of hidden
  currency in itself is not enough to establish that the money was furnished
  or was intended to be furnished in return for drugs[.]” 965 F.2d at 877. But
  the Court went on to conclude that the large amount of hidden currency “is
  strong evidence of . . . an illicit connection to drug trafficking.” Id. The
  Court thus included the “unusually large amount of hidden currency” as a
  factor contributing to “probable cause.” Id.
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        It’s possible, of course, that Mr. Hoskins was hiding the cash to

  protect against theft. But given the way that the cash was packed and

  hidden, Trooper Withers could doubt an innocent explanation. See United

  States v. Orozco, 41 F.4th 403, 407–09 (4th Cir. 2022) (stating that

  “innocent explanations seem unlikely” when $111,252 had been wrapped in

  grocery bags and stashed in a hidden compartment). After all, “[i]t is

  common for [currency related to illegal drug transactions] to be wrapped in

  cellophane so as to minimize the ability for a drug-sniffing dog to detect

  the drug residue often found on such currency, and to secrete it in a hidden

  area of a vehicle to escape detection.” United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600,

  604 (7th Cir. 2006).

        A reasonable officer could thus consider the vacuum sealed double-

  wrapping as an effort to conceal the odor of narcotics. This possibility

  could appear more likely when the dog jumped while sniffing the car. See

  United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir. 1994)

  (recognizing probable cause for an arrest when a dog alerted to the outside

  of a car); United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1998)

  (same).

        Mr. Hoskins explains that he hid the money to prevent theft. But an

  officer wasn’t compelled to credit this explanation for concealment of the

  money in the car’s lining. See United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 604

  (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that concealment of a large amount of cash

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  contributed to probable cause for an arrest even though the cash might

  have been hidden to prevent theft).

        Mr. Hoskins also points out that after the dog alerted, there were no

  drugs found in the car. But a trooper could reasonably infer from the dog’s

  reaction that the currency had been near illegal drugs. See United States v.

  Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 778 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Ordinary experience

  suggests that currency used to purchase narcotics is more likely than other

  currency to have come into contact with drugs.”).

        Based on the large amount of cash, its wrapping and concealment,

  and the dog’s leaps, Trooper Withers had at least arguable probable cause,

  triggering qualified immunity on the claim of an unlawful arrest.

                          Issues Involving the DNA Sample

        After Mr. Hoskins was arrested, he gave a DNA sample. But

  authorities never charged Mr. Hoskins with a crime. Under Utah law,

  authorities had an obligation to destroy the DNA sample. Utah Code Ann.

  § 53-10-406(1)(i) (2011). 17 But Mr. Hoskins allegedly lacks any way of

  knowing whether authorities destroyed the sample. So he sued for denial of

  due process.

        For this claim, Mr. Hoskins alleges the right to a procedure that

  ensures the destruction of his DNA sample. Granted, the Fourteenth

  17
        This section has been renumbered § 53-10-406(1)(h) (2022).

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  Amendment’s due process clause limits a state’s ability to take away

  entitlements. Dist. Att’y’s Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S.

  52, 67 (2009). These entitlements can come from either the Due Process

  Clause itself or state law. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

  454, 460 (1989). But neither the Due Process Clause nor state law creates

  such an entitlement.

        Mr. Hoskins relies on the constitutional right of privacy. But the Due

  Process Clause does not provide individuals with a freestanding right to

  their DNA evidence. See Dist. Att’y’s Off. for Third Jud. Dist., 557 U.S.

  at 72 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause

  doesn’t entitle defendants to evidence of their own DNA to prove factual

  innocence); see also Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir.

  1996) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute conditioning

  discretionary parole on collection of DNA).

        In the absence of an underlying substantive right, the Fourteenth

  Amendment’s due process clause doesn’t create a protected interest in

  procedure alone. Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1081 (10th Cir. 2007).

  We addressed a similar issue in Stein v. Disciplinary Board of Supreme

  Court of New Mexico, 520 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2008). There the plaintiffs

  claimed “a vested interest and confidence that the rules of procedure would

  be followed.” Id. at 1192. We rejected this claim based on the lack of a

  constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Id. We reasoned that

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  due process protects a substantive interest rather than serve as an end in

  itself. Id. Likewise, Mr. Hoskins’s desire for procedural safeguards does

  not trigger a liberty or property interest.

        Mr. Hoskins disagrees, asserting a substantive interest under state

  law. But he hasn’t identified a state law that creates an entitlement.

  Instead, Mr. Hoskins argues that state law should provide a procedure to

  ensure the destruction of his DNA. This argument for a change in state law

  reflects the absence of a protected interest. See Elliot v. Martinez, 675 F.3d

  1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012). The district court thus didn’t err in

  dismissing the due process claim.

                                    Conclusion

        The district court acted correctly in dismissing the action.

        With the gloss of the video, Trooper Withers was entitled to stop

  Mr. Hoskins and conduct a dog sniff. The dog sniff created at least

  arguable probable cause to search the car. The car’s license plate was

  partially obstructed, and the video shows that a trooper could reasonably

  believe that the dog had reacted to the odor of drugs. The resulting search

  yielded roughly $89,000 that was double-wrapped, vacuum packed, and

  hidden in the lining of the car. These circumstances created at least

  arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Hoskins.

        The trooper also pointed a gun at Mr. Hoskins for roughly eight

  seconds. We don’t need to decide whether this action involved retaliation

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Appellate Case: 22-4081   Document: 010111002488   Date Filed: 02/20/2024   Page: 37

  or excessive force. Even if the conduct had been retaliatory or excessive,

  the violation wouldn’t have been clearly established.

        After pointing a gun, the trooper applied handcuffs, conducted a

  patdown, and placed Mr. Hoskins in the patrol car. But Mr. Hoskins had

  been acting angrily with his hands near or in his pockets. So the trooper

  didn’t violate a clearly established right by taking protective measures

  before searching the car.

        Finally, Mr. Hoskins lacked a protected interest in a procedure that

  would ensure the destruction of his DNA sample.

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