Court Opinion

ID: 9865730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:48:35.192008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:51:30.281332
License: Public Domain

on rehearing.
This is a petition for a rehearing. The first contention is that the court erred in holding that the answer sets up a subsequent contract to the one sued on as a defense and counterclaim, and that the defendants should have been permitted to introduce all pertinent testimony tending to prove that issue. It is urged that said subsequent contract was unilateral, it being one in which Haskins made no express contract on his part. As a matter Of fact, that contention may be true, but the answer avers that Haskins did agree to said subsequent contract. Said averment is set forth in this case, and it is not necessary to set it out in full here.
*586It is substantially averred that Haskins promised to pay defendants $2,000 on November 19, 1891, and release them from all liability to him for money theretofore advanced for promoting the sale and development of the mines referred to, for their two-thirds interest in said partnership; and thereupon defendant Curran, on me nineteenth day of November, 1891, did transfer by deed, on the request of Haskins, said mining claims, and then and there delivered said deeds to said Haskins, which deeds were placed in the Coeur d’Alene Bank, with the deeds of the owners of said mining claims, which last-named deeds conveyed said claims to Martin Curran; also an escrow agreement authorizing the delivery of all of said deeds upon the payment to Martin Curran of the sum of $5,600 on or before December 5, 1891, and the further sum of $33,000 on or before June 1, 1892. It is also averred that, of said $5,600, Haskins was to receive $3,600, and Curran and Hussey $2,000, but said escrow agreement, on its face, fails to show that Haskins was to receive any part of said $5,600 in case it was paid to Curran. .Immediately following the averment last above stated is the following: ■“That said Haskins promised and agreed that upon such assignment being made, and such deeds placed in escrow, as aforesaid, to pay to these defendants the sum of $2,000 therefor on December 5, 1891; but the said Haskins has failed, neglected and refused to pay the same, or any part thereof,” etc. This allegation clearly avers that the $2,000 therein referred to was to have been paid as a consideration for the making of such assignment and such deeds placed in escrow as aforesaid, and not upon Haskins or his friend Boyle taking up said option. This averment is taken in connection with the averment that “Has-kins, being desirous of owning and purchasing from the defendants all of said bond, and thereby handling the said property himself, and of procuring the interest of these defendants therein, purchased of and from these defendants their two-thirds interest in said bond,” etc., for which he agreed to pay them $2,000; not in case that he concluded to exercise his option under said escrow agreement, but on condition that Curran and Hussey assign to him all of their interest in said original contract with the owners of said mines, and deliver possession to Haskins. It appears from the pleading that by the alleged *587agreement of November 9, 1895, said $2,000 was due and payable on November 19, 1891; and the last averment in regard to said $2,000 would indicate that the time of its payment had been extended to December 5,1891.
I think said allegations are sufficient to put in issue the making of said subsequent agreement, and any relevant proof thereof offered on trial should be admitted. The allegation, in effect, is that Haskins would pay to the defendants $2,000 for the performance of certain conditions and acts on their part; that they fully performed those conditions and acts as agreed; and that said $2,000 was due and not paid. I do not think that said averments refer to said escrow agreement. If the proof shows that they do refer to said escrow agreement, and to no ■other, that would be an end to that matter. The escrow agreement is in regard to the payment of money and the delivery of deeds. The contract averred and set forth as a counterclaim ■and defense was for a very different purpose. I do not hold ■that a subsequent contract was entered into (that is a fact for the jury), but do hold that a subsequent contract is pleaded as a defense and counterclaim in this suit. The payment of the $5,600 mentioned in the escrow agreement was optional; the payment of the $2,000 mentioned in appellants’ exhibit No. 9 was not optional, if the averments of the answer are true.
The counsel for petitioner criticise the following statement ■contained in the opinion in this case, to wit: “The trial court held that the subsequent agreement referred to was only an option, which option was waived by appellant” — and insist that the statement is incorrect, in that appellants had nothing to do with waiving said option. Through some oversight, the word “appellant” was used in the quotation referred to> instead of “respondent.” That error has been corrected. The last word of said quotation, to wit, “appellant,” has been changed to “respondent”; so that criticism, which was a just one, will not apply to the opinion as corrected.
We find no reason for changing our views as expressed in the opinion heretofore given in this case. The petition for a rehearing is denied.
Morgan, C. J., and Huston, J., concur.