Court Opinion

ID: 9883669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:09:09.132244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:28.663640
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that appellant was not denied his right to speedy trial. From that holding, I respectfully dissent.
Addressing the assertion of the right factor of the Barker v. Wingo1 test, the majority acknowledges that appellant asserted his right to a speedy trial in a timely fashion, indeed, within a few days of his arrest. Without, however, crediting him for the timely assertion, the majority proceeds to find fault, if not explicitly, then implicitly, with his having failed to “immediately complain after the first two postponements of his trial, [although] he did object when his trial date was postponed the third time.” The unkindest cut of all, however, is the majority’s holding that appellant’s prayer for a jury trial was a delaying factor “that we cannot ignore”, and its assumption that “the appellant did not really desire trial by jury” since he proceeded non-jury in the circuit court.
The majority approach to the prejudice factor is similar. Although it recognizes the interests protected by the speedy trial right, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, it refuses to recognize that appellant suffered prejudice as a result of the State’s prosecutorial neglect. See discussion infra. The majority reasons that this is appropriate because the pendency of two other cases, and their resolution, gave rise to the same elements of prejudice as did the instant case.
As one might expect, these analyses played a dispositive role in the balance of the factors. In the majority’s view, appellant’s prayer for jury trial was the critical factor for its conclusion that his right to speedy trial had not been infringed. It held:
The length of time between arrest and trial could fairly be said to be on the low end of the “constitutional *472dimension” scale. While we find it relevant that much of the delay was occasioned by the prosecutorial indifference exhibited by the State, we cannot and shall not ignore the fact that the appellant further delayed this trial in March, 1988, apparently for tactical reasons to which we are not privy____ On balance we are not prepared to say that the six month trial delay attributable to the State violated appellant’s right to a speedy trial. This holding makes obvious that the delay attributed to
appellant's jury prayer was not only weighed against appellant, but it was weighed heavily against him. What is less obvious, but nevertheless implicit in the holding, is that appellant was not prejudiced by the delay attributable to the State’s indifference.
I am in full accord with the majority’s conclusion that six months of the delay was due to “prosecutorial indifference”. I also wish to emphasize that, prior to the postponement of appellant’s third trial date, appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was heard and denied. Appellant's argument on the motion raised the issue of the propriety of the first two postponments; hence, even though he was not present to object at the time that they were granted, appellant did not acquiesce in, or accept, the postponements as justified. The case was postponed a third time, this time over appellant’s explicit objection. It was only after appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial had been denied by the District Court that, on the next trial date, appellant sought the jury trial to which he was constitutionally entitled. The record of the proceedings contains no indication that, when he requested it, appellant did not wish to have a jury trial. That he ultimately did not choose to proceed via that route is not and, indeed, cannot be dispositive since such a conclusion is supported only by sheer speculation.
I believe the majority is in error on several bases. First, it fails to credit to appellant the heavy evidentiary weight to which the assertion of the right to speedy trial is entitled. Second, it penalizes appellant’s assertion of his constitution*473al right to a jury trial. Third, the majority seems to suggest that, even though he was not present at the first two postponements through no fault of his own, appellant had an obligation to object prior to the hearing on his motion to dismiss. Finally, the majority erroneously concludes that appellant was not prejudiced by the delay attributable to the State.
“[T]he assertion or failure to assert [the right to speedy trial is] a significant factor in the overall [speedy trial] analysis.” Wilson v. State, 281 Md. 640, 656, 382 A.2d 1053, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839, 99 S.Ct. 126, 58 L.Ed.2d 136 (1978), citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. When an accused asserts the right, particularly, as here, early in the proceedings, it is “entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether [he was] being deprived of the right [to speedy trial]”. Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 118, 345 A.2d 62 (1975), quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. In this case, appellant not only asserted the right, but he reasserted it at the first available opportunity, i.e., at the third trial date, when he was brought to court for the first time and moved to dismiss the charges for want of a speedy trial. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why appellant was not entitled to be given the benefit of the strong evidentiary weight to which his assertion of the right was entitled.
A criminal defendant, charged with certain offenses, has a constitutional right, at his election, to a jury trial. When, therefore, in an appropriate case, he prays a jury trial, even though his trial is thereby delayed, he does no more than legitimately exercise his constitutional right. I reject the notion espoused by the majority that the resultant delay is chargeable against the defendant for purposes of a speedy trial analysis; the majority has provided no authority, not to mention Maryland authority, that supports that holding.2 *474Indeed, I believe Maryland law to be to the contrary. See, for example, Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 107 n. 7, 442 A.2d 550 (1982), in which the Court of Appeals made clear that, in the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-271(a), the successor to former Maryland Rule 746, the delay occasioned by a defendant’s request for a medical examination in support of his insanity plea was not attributable to the defendant.
In addition to the foregoing, there is another reason I believe that the delay cannot be charged against appellant. Recently, in Legal Aid v. Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. 214, 540 A.2d 1175 (1988), we made clear that a sanction, authorized by the Maryland Rules, aimed at dilatory conduct on the part of a party, see Maryland Rule 1-341, does not apply to such conduct when it is based on justifiable grounds and involves the assertion of a fundamental right. Id., at 221, 540 A.2d 1175. In that case, the trial judge assessed counsel fees and costs against the Legal Aid Bureau after the jury trial it prayed resulted in a verdict, reached after only brief deliberations, in favor of Bishop’s Garth. Rationalizing his decision, the trial judge concluded that, notwithstanding that it was for the purpose of obtaining “additional discovery” and of obtaining a decision on factual issues, the jury trial prayer was made in order to delay the trial and to intimidate Bishops Garth into dismissing its suit. We reversed, pointing out that “to the extent, if any, that the trial judge relied upon the jury trial request as indicating an improper delay, his finding was clearly erroneous.” 75 Md.App. at 222, 540 A.2d 1175.
*475In my view, the point we made was that permitting the imposition of sanctions on a party in a civil case who legitimately prays a jury trial places an improper and unacceptable burden on that party’s exercise of a fundamental right and, indeed, has a chilling effect. This point has at least equal applicability in the criminal context. Charging the delay occasioned by a defendant’s jury trial demand against that defendant for purposes of speedy trial analysis has the same effect as the imposition of sanctions in Bishop’s Garth would have had on Legal Aid’s exercise of a fundamental right; it places an undue and unreasonable burden upon the exercise of the jury trial right. The period should be considered neutral, neither charged against appellant nor affecting the weight to be given appellant’s assertion of the right.
That there were other bases for the prejudice which appellant alleges he suffered does not mean that he was not prejudiced as a result of the delay in the present case. The detainer attributable to this case prevented appellant’s release on work release and that, in turn, is, at least in part, attributable to the State’s indifference. Similarly, the fact that appellant’s bail was increased because of his failure to appear, a failure which was not his fault, by the way, is also directly attributable to the State’s prosecutorial indifference. Finally, an accused may suffer anxiety and concern as a result of more than one case. Thus, that there was anxiety and concern attributable to the sentences he received in other cases does not prove that he did not, at the same time, experience some anxiety and concern directly attributable to the case sub judice.
With these observations firmly in mind, it is patent that the balance of the factors mandates a result completely opposite that reached by the majority. Approximately six months of the delay was the result of prosecutorial indifference, which is more heavily assessed against the State, and *476in favor of the accused, than would be mere negligence.3 As indicated, appellant asserted his right early in the proceedings and reasserted them at the next available opportunity, when he was brought to court. Thus, he is entitled to receive the benefit of the strong evidentiary weight to which the assertion of the right is entitled. The delay occasioned by appellant’s jury trial prayer is neutral. On balance, appellant did suffer some actual prejudice. Appellant was incarcerated throughout this period, both as a result of this case and as a result of other charges, and he was prevented from being placed on work release, by virtue of the State’s delay in bringing him to trial on these charges. He also experienced some anxiety and concern.
Since none of the delay is attributable to appellant, the delay attributable to the State weighs in appellant’s favor, appellant early on asserted his right to a speedy trial, and appellant suffered some actual prejudice, I would hold that appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial.4

. 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

. The cases cited by the majority in support of its position are not applicable. In United States v. Kozerski, 518 F.Supp. 1082 (D.N.H.1981), the accused’s course of conduct supports the finding that the *474accused was intent upon delaying his trial. At issue in People v. Puyear, 48 Ill.App.3d 183, 6 Ill.Dec. 291, 362 N.E.2d 1113 (1977) was the accused’s waiver, late in the statutorily mandated speedy trial period, of the jury trial he had previously prayed. A case not cited by the majority, University Heights v. Dachman, 20 Ohio App.3d 26, 484 N.E.2d 199 (1984), actually holds that an accused’s jury trial prayer tolled the speedy trial time; however, that holding was in the context of a prayer that was not a matter of right. The opinion suggests, in other words, that the accused in that case had no absolute right to a jury trial of the charges against him.

. Of course, the length of the delay is also weighed against the State for purposes of the balance test. Lewis v. State, 71 Md.App. 402, 417-18, 526 A.2d 66 (1987).

. Even if the majority is correct that the delay occasioned by appellant’s jury trial demand was chargeable to appellant, I would reach the same result. Since the weight to be accorded that period of delay would, at best, be slight and the delay itself was short, placing it into the equation would have no appreciable effect on the balance.