Court Opinion

ID: 9692940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:13:06.610616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:38.230504
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I join the majority Opinion with respect to the burden of proof required to determine a marital asset, and the issue summarily disposed of in footnote no. 1, I must dissent from that part of the majority Opinion regarding the valuation date of the marital property.
Under Section 403(b) of the Divorce Code, both parties must submit a detailed inventory and appraisal of all property owned at the time the action is commenced. Likewise, under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.33, we require each party who seeks distribution of property to file a detailed inventory, listing the marital property valued as of the date of the complaint, within sixty days after service of a pleading containing a claim for distribution of property. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.33(a)(4). *389Therefore, it is clear to me that the appropriate date for valuing marital property is the date the action was commenced. It would seem somewhat of an anomaly to require the parties to set values as of a certain date, yet ignore that valuation at the time of distribution. Nowhere else in the Divorce Code are the parties required to set forth the values of the property at a different time. Furthermore, using the date that the action was commenced as the time for valuation not only provides certainty, but is also consistent with the Divorce Code’s attempt to expedite an otherwise emotional or explosive period.
I disagree with the majority’s reasoning that using the date of filing the complaint will result in severe injustices. Either party can file a complaint at any time. Therefore, each party has the equal opportunity of setting the time for which the property will be valued. Once a complaint is filed, both parties can mutually agree to terminate the marriage and expedite property dissolution. Using the time requirements set forth in our Rules will result in an orderly procedure and timely distribution of property. The fluctuations in values that the majority is trying to avoid will not occur.
I admit that in a case such as the one now before this Court, using values as of the filing date of the complaint when the property is distributed more than three years later may result in stale values. This does not appear to me to be the fault of the Rule or the Court, but of the parties themselves. To prevent this occurrence, both parties could have agreed to a divorce under Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code and expedited property distribution in accordance with the Rules. However, from the number of appeals that have been filed by these parties (see Sutliff v. Sutliff, 361 Pa.Super. 194, 522 A.2d 80 (1987); Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 528 A.2d 1318 (1987); Sutliff v. Sutliff, 326 Pa.Super. 496, 474 A.2d 599 (1984)), it is clear that a swift resolve was not their highest priority.
Accordingly, I am hardpressed to concoct a scheme to protect the parties. Bad facts make bad law. We should *390not view the present litigation as the norm, but instead adopt a rule of law that ultimately results in equity to both sides. I would therefore remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County with instructions to evaluate the properties as of the date the action was commenced and expedite the distribution of the marital property-
LARSEN, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.