Court Opinion

ID: 9608818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:17:58.622567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:47.479377
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that voir dire begins when the attorneys read the jury questionnaires, and that a request for a jury shuffle after reading the questionnaires comes after voir dire has begun and therefore is untimely.
The Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have taken steps in the last several years to create consistency between the civil and criminal rules of evidence and of appellate procedure. Additionally, the court of criminal appeals has stated that the standard for reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case encompasses the same standards utilized in civil jurisprudence for reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence.1 Although there are significant differences between civil and criminal law and procedure, such as the burden of proof and burden of production of evidence, these differences are often rooted in constitutional mandate. Areas of difference not based on constitutional requirements are eroding. This trend is especially evident in discussions of criminal pretrial discovery.
I am disturbed, therefore, that the majority attempts to distinguish jury shuffles in civil cases from jury shuffles in criminal cases, when the civil and criminal provisions for jury shuffles are essentially the same. The procedure for shuffling a jury in a civil case is found in rule 223 of the *138rules of civil procedure, while article 35.11 of the code of criminal procedure governs jury shuffles in criminal cases.2 Both rule 223 and article 35.11 mandate a timely shuffle, specify how the shuffle will be carried out, and permit only a single shuffle.3
To be timely, a shuffle request in a civil case must be made “prior to voir dire examination by any party or attorney in the case.”4 Although article 35.11 does not specifically state when a shuffle request in a criminal case must be made in order to be timely, the court of criminal appeals has held that a shuffle request is timely if it is made prior to the commencement of voir dire.5 Thus, a request for a jury shuffle in either a civil or a criminal case must be made before the start of voir dire. The critical issue, therefore, is when does voir dire begin. While it appears that no Texas court has specifically decided when voir dire begins in a civil case, numerous Texas courts have addressed this issue in the context of a criminal case.
The traditional rule in Texas is that the parties to the lawsuit, not the trial judge, conduct the voir dire examination of the jury panel for the case, although the trial judge controls the voir dire and may participate in the voir dire.6 The Williams court noted that in revising the code of criminal procedure in 1965, “the Legislature, acting upon the recommendations of the State Bar Committee on the Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, perceived, in a new statute, ‘voir dire’ to be that examination of the jury panel conducted by the prosecution and defense.”7
Consequently, Texas courts have repeatedly held that, in a non-capital criminal trial, voir dire begins when the prosecutor actually begins to speak after being recognized by the trial judge and after the trial judge has made his or her preliminary remarks and has sworn and qualified the panel.8 “If it was held otherwise, then any judge, by interspersing voir dire type questions among introductory remarks to the jury panel for the cause, could sua sponte deny a defendant his absolute right to a jury shuffle upon timely motion and render a mandatory statute meaningless.” 9
Furthermore, the court of criminal appeals recently has addressed the effect of jury questionnaires on the shuffle process.10 In Garza, the jury panel members completed written questionnaires containing detailed questions beyond the type of questions found on the standard jury information cards. Even though the State had already viewed the questionnaires when it requested a shuffle, the court of criminal appeals held that the State’s request was timely.11 Specifically, the court stated that “written questionnaires, while often helpful tools in conducting voir dire, do not constitute a formal part of the voir dire proceedings” and that “voir dire does not com-*139menee simply because a party has read the answers to written jury questionnaires.”12
Additionally, it is important to note that rule 226 requires the trial court or its designee to swear the jury panel “fbjefore the parties or their attorneys begin the examination of the jurors.”13 Further, rule 226a requires the trial court to give the jury panel admonitory instructions as prescribed by the Texas Supreme Court.14 The Approved Instructions accompanying rule 226a contain oral instructions that must be given by the trial court “to the jurors after they have been sworn as provided in Rule 226 and before the voir dire examination.” 15 Thus, voir dire examination cannot begin until the jury panel has been sworn and instructed. The record in this case reflects that once the jury panel members were segregated in the central jury room, they were sworn. There is no evidence, however, that the trial court had instructed the jury panel members before the attorneys viewed the questionnaires and before the shuffle was requested, thus indicating that voir dire had not yet begun.
The conduct of voir dire rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge.16 The questions posed on jury questionnaires traditionally are attributed to the trial court. The purpose of jury questionnaires is to elicit basic information, possible biases, and other problems that would otherwise be brought out during voir dire, the time when the attorneys actually speak with the prospective jurors. Counsel may rely on these questionnaires to determine which questions to ask during voir dire and which jurors to strike, thus minimizing the length of voir dire. While the trial judge is not required to allow the parties or their attorneys to view jury questionnaires before requesting a shuffle, I have found no authority prohibiting the trial judge from doing so.
The majority places great emphasis on the fact that the questionnaire in the case now before us was thirteen pages long and contained sixty-three questions. I have found no authority, however, holding that the start of voir dire is determined by the length of the questionnaire or the number of questions on the questionnaire. What if there had only been one page of questions? What if the parties had asked only twenty questions? WTiat if the trial judge, rather than the parties, had drafted the questionnaires? What if the prospective jurors had answered the questionnaires, but the trial judge had withheld the completed questionnaires until after he had completed his required instructions? Would the trial judge then be required to add to the length and expense of the trial by dismissing the jury panel until the lawyers had been given time to copy and read the completed questionnaires?
The majority opinion holds that the questions in this case were too specific and too numerous and, thus, constituted the start of voir dire, but the majority fails to delineate any guidelines for what type of questionnaires, if any, could be used without cutting off a party’s right to a shuffle. The majority’s holding basically prohibits a trial judge from using any jury questionnaires because by doing so, the trial judge would cut off the parties’ right to request a shuffle. Prohibiting a trial judge from using or allowing parties to use jury questionnaires is an unwarranted intrusion into the discretion of a trial judge to conduct a trial as efficiently as possible while still protecting the rights of all concerned.
The issue in this case is whether the trial judge abused his discretion by shuffling the jury after allowing the parties and their attorneys to view the questionnaires but before bringing the jury panel into the courtroom and before instructing the jury panel. A civil trial judge has no *140less discretion in conducting voir dire than do his or her brethren on criminal benches. I would hold, as did the Garza court, that voir dire in civil cases, as in criminal cases, does not begin merely because the parties or their attorneys have viewed jury questionnaires, but begins after the trial court has seated the jury panel in order in the courtroom; has instructed, qualified, and sworn the jury panel; and has instructed the plaintiff to begin the voir dire examination. Thus, I would hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the request for a shuffle. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s thorough and scholarly opinion.

. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-1l (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.11 (Vernon Supp.2000); Tex.R. Civ. P. 223.

. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.11; Tex.R. Civ. P. 223; Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding that article 35.11 guarantees only a single shuffle).

. Tex.R. Civ. P. 223.

. See Ex parte Daigle, 848 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).

. See Williams v. State, 719 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

. Id.

. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 940, 110 S.Ct. 2193, 109 L.Ed.2d 520 (1990); Williams, 719 S.W.2d at 577; Richardson v. State, 981 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1998, pet. ref’d); Turner v. State, 828 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. refd), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1037, 113 S.Ct. 1865, 123 L.Ed.2d 485 (1993).

. Williams, 719 S.W.2d at 577.

. See Garza v. State, 7 S.W.3d 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

.Id. at 166.

. Id.

. Tex.R. Civ. P. 226.

. Id. 226a.

. Id. 226a Approved Instructions.

. See'Williams, 719 S.W.2d at 577.