Court Opinion

ID: 9549629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:22:27.595647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:38.538513
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
*121OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Blume, Chief Justice.
A petition for rehearing has been filed in this case. We held that appellant’s right of way is assessable for the street improvements in question to be made in the city of Riverton, and that according to area and the percentage fixed in the fourth part of section 29-2019 Wyo. Comp. St. 1945. The decision must not be taken as representing the view of fairness on the part of the members of this court. We based the decision on our statute. We fully realize that nowadays trucks, busses and airlines take away a good deal of the business that would otherwise go to railways. If our decision had been based on a former decision of this court, without reference to any statute, it may well be that we should have overruled such former decision, or modified it in *122accordance with the rule often announced by this court that when the reason of a rule ceases, the rule itself should cease. And there is no doubt that the legislature, too, should in all justice follow that rule and should revise the statute in accordance with present day conditions. But it is a separate department of our government and it is fully recognized that the judicial department will not interfere with the legislative department except in cases in which the statute in question is clearly unconstitutional.
The petition for rehearing is accompanied by a brief of 60 pages. We have read it with care. We heretofore made an exhaustive examination of the subject before us setting forth our view in an opinion some thirty pages long. We should not be expected to write another long opinion, or specifically mention the various matters set forth in appellant’s present brief. Counsel for appellant admit that at least some of the cases cited in our original opinion sustain our decision in this case, but believe that these cases are not sustained by the weight of authority. We still think that the great weight of authority is that, generally speaking, a railroad right of way is subject to special assessments for street improvements the same as other property. We have not held — as counsel seem to think we did — that it is subject to all special assessments. Many situations might arise in which it would be palpably unjust and arbitrary to subject a right of way to such special assessments. An interesting case on this phase of the subject is Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. City of Winter Haven, 112 Fla. 807, 151 So. 321. We have limited and do limit our decision strictly to the facts existing in this case.
Whether or not the question of benefit, and the extent thereof, is a judicial question — in which case the owner may challenge an assessment on the ground of *123lack of benefit — or a legislative one, depends on the statute. It may be conceded for the purpose of this case that in most jurisdictions the question is a judicial one, as counsel claim. We think that in the present case it is a legislative one. Counsel say that the cases cited by us which involve the constitutionality of statutes on this subject are not in point, but that only the construction of our statute is in question. Strictly speaking that may be correct, but the cases involved statutes in which the legislature determined what property was benefited, and hence are at least illustrative of the subject before us. See also our comment below. Let us examine our statutory provisions somewhat more closely than we did in our original opinion.
Under the provisions of section 29-2002 Wyo. Comp. St. 1945, the city council is given the power to levy assessments upon lands specially benefited by an improvement, “and to determine what lots, parts of lots, and parcels of land are specially benefited by such improvements, * * The city council in this case made such determination by creating an improvement district and making the assessments in question herein. The case accordingly falls squarely within the decision in the case of Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159, and similar cases. However, our legislature was not content with leaving the matter solely in the hands of the council, but for some reason thought that it should itself put the matter beyond question of doubt, and provided by section 29-2019 Wyo. Comp. St. 1945: “All property included within said limits of such local improvement district shall be considered * * * the property specially benefited by such local improvement and shall be the property to be assessed to pay the cost and expense thereof * * * in proportion to area and distance back from the marginal line of the street * * Here all the property within the district shall be considered benefited. How can this court, without declar*124ing the statute unconstitutional, construe this statute to mean that the judiciary has the power, after testimony introduced, to determine the exact contrary and fly squarely in the face of the apparently mandatory provision of the statute? The fourth part of the same section provides for the extent of the benefit. We have not discovered any statute exactly like it. It is provided that the assessments shall extend to the distance of half a block, and that in the proportion of 60, 30 and 10 per cent according to the distance back from the street. The statute further provides as follows: “* * * provided that any fractional lots or irregular shaped tracts to which the above formula does not apply shall be assessed according to area.” The right of way of appellant comes within that proviso. Here are no qualifications whatever. The irregular tracts shall be assessed according to the area thereof, and evidently, according to the percentage mentioned previously, depending on the distance back from the marginal lines of the street. That seemingly was done. And the legislature was not even satisfied with these apparently mandatory provisions, and to leave as little loophole as possible to the property owner provided by section 29-2060 Wyo. Comp. St. 1945 as follows: “The action and decision of the council as to all matters passed upon by it in relation to any action, matter or thing provided in this Act * * * shall be final and conclusive in the absence of fraud.” We shall refrain from deciding the extent of the meaning of this apparently drastic provision of this statute. Suffice it to say that it would seem to be clear that we must either uphold the assessment herein against the right of way of appellant, or declare the statute unconstitutional. We see no other alternative, no matter what may be our view as to the justice of the assessment. We naturally hesitate to say, especially in view of the numerous authorities heretofore cited, that the proposed assessment is so arbitrary and palpably *125unjust so as to warrant us in holding that the legislature has gone beyond the limit of its power.
Counsel for appellant say that our holding is inconsistent with the provisions of section 29-2022 Wyo. Comp. St. 1945, authorizing the court to confirm, correct, modify or annul the assessment. But that we think relates to matters other than that of benefit or no benefit. There are a number of such matters pointed out in the case of Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. 674, 91 P. 244, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 121.
Counsel for appellants now for the first time call our attention to the case of In Re Shilshole Ave. (Bolcom Mills, Inc. et al v. City of Seattle) 94 Wash. 583, 162 P. 1010. That case seems to hold that the question of benefits is a judicial one under the statutes considered by the court. The line of argument was entirely different from that taken by the same court in Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. Seattle, supra. The court relied to a great extent upon the same case on a former appeal, involving condemnation proceedings, as shown in 85 Wash. 522, 148 P. 781, 787, which cites section 7790 Rem. & Bal. Code (1915) to the effect “That no property shall be assessed a greater amount than it will be actually benefited.” Just extent of the influence of that statutory provision in the second case we do not know. The case did not involve a railroad right of way. The Northern Pac. Ry. Co. case, supra, was not mentioned. So far as we have been able to find the last mentioned case has never been overruled. And it is far from clear that if the simple question were now presented to that court as to whether or not a railroad right of way is subject to special assessment for street improvements under evidence such as was before this court, it would now hold contrary to the decision in the Northern Pac. Ry Co. case, particularly, in view of the exhaustive consideration of the subject in the latter case.
*126Counsel for appellant argue that the case ought to be reheard because the “conclusive” effect of the statute was not argued on the question of benefits. Whether the statute has such conclusive effect or not depends entirely on whether or not the appellant was entitled to be heard on the question of benefits — whether in other words the question is judicial — or whether the legislature determined that question. In the latter case, as almost unanimously held by the courts, the legislative determination is conclusive, except in cases of fraud, arbitrariness or palpable injustice. So that the matter of conclusiveness or non-conclusiveness is in fact merely a matter of construction of our statute, round which the whole argument of counsel revolved. We might, however, add that counsel for appellant assigned as one of the errors that the trial court held the statute to be “conclusive.” And counsel for respondent argued (page 30 of their brief) as follows: “The statute being a reasonable exercise of the legislative power, the inquiry passed beyond the range of the judiciary. Further action, if necessary or desired, must come from the legislature.” That clearly is a statement claiming that the provision of our statute is conclusive on the question of benefits. That is substantially the position we took in the original opinion.
Counsel for respondent relied upon the case of Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. City of Seattle, supra. The case was discussed by counsel on both sides. It holds that a legislative determination as to what lands are benefited is conclusive. And that was the holding in at least several cases cited by the court. Again counsel for respondent cited section 29-2060, mentioned supra. True counsel for respondent were not entirely consistent, or, we may say, insistent upon the position taken as above mentioned, and attempted to meet the situation should this court hold that the matter of benefit is a judicial question. That, of course, is not surprising. We think that *127the question decided by this court was squarely before us. If some feature was overlooked by counsel for appellant, or was not deemed important, that could not limit this court in deciding the point. And we might say parenthetically that we have not infrequently found that were we to limit our decisions strictly and literally to the arguments advanced by counsel in a case, the law in this jurisdiction would be in a sorry state. We do not find any sound reason for departing from our former opinion, and the petition for rehearing must be and is denied.
That brings us to the distinct and alternative request in the petition for rehearing, namely that we should delete from our opinion everything relating to the point as to whether or not appellant’s right of way may be assessed for street improvements. We held in the original opinion, as a second question involved herein, that the property of the appellant was not sufficiently described, and for that reason set aside the assessment. So counsel for appellant now argue that the question of whether or not the right of way of appellant is assessable for the street improvements involved herein is a moot question, and should not be decided by this court at this time. It is true that this court will not pass upon moot questions, nor, generally, upon questions not necessary to be decided, and which are not likely to arise again in the further proceedings in the case. The point whether or not the right of way of appellant is assessable for the improvements in question was decided by the trial court. The major portion of the briefs and of the oral arguments was devoted to that point. If we should not now decide it, it is bound to arise again, and would, it would seem, require another appeal. In such a case it is our right, if it is not our duty, to decide the question. Babcock v. Rieger, 332 Mo. 528, 58 S.W. (2d) 722; Stocker v. Boston & M. *128R. R., 83 N. H. 401, 143 Atl. 68; Wight v. Rohlffs, 48 C.A. (2d) 696, 121 P. (2d) 76; Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co. 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W. (2d) 406, 147 A.L.R. 945, and cases cited, and see Welsh Mfg. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 61 R. I. 469, 5 C.J.S. 48, note 37; Decennial Digest, section 843 under “Appeal and Error.” A decision on a point under these circumstances cannot be regarded as obiter dictum. In Watson v. St. Louis L. M. & S. Ry Co., 169 Fed. 942, 944, the court stated: “A carefully prepared opinion on an important question of law expressly decided by the trial court * * * properly brought before the court by the assignment of errors and the pleadings in the case, and which was fully and ably argued by counsel for all the parties, cannot be considered as obiter even if the question could be, and in fact was, determined upon other issues'.”
From time immemorial up to the present time, complaints have been heard of the laws’ delays. Justinian in 530 A.D. found it necessary to enact a law to speed up the disposition of pending cases “lest lawsuits extend almost into infinite time and exceed the measure of the life of man.” Code Justinian 3, 1, 13. Whether Justinian succeeded in his aim or not we do not know. Several states appear to have enacted statutes in the spirit of Justinian’s law, requiring appellate courts, in case of reversal, to decide all questions arising in a case. That, of course, is for the purpose of obviating further appeals, if possible. See notes to C.J.S. under “Appeal and Error” section 1455. Counsels’ contention, if upheld, would, we think, mean an adding to the justifiable complaint against the laws’ delay. The policy attempted to be followed by this court for many years forbids that. The alternative request above mentioned is denied.
RlNER, J., and Ilsley, J. concur.