Court Opinion

ID: 9916279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 17:03:39.623248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:56.342969
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                             Jan 09 2024, 9:18 am

                                                                    CLERK
                                                                Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                   Court of Appeals
                                                                     and Tax Court

                             IN THE

     Indiana Supreme Court
                Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CT-182

   Jennifer Pennington and Joshua Pennington,
             Appellants/Cross-Appellees (Plaintiffs below)

                                 –v–

Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc., d/b/a Beacon
              Health and Fitness,
                  Cross-Appellant (Defendant below),

      Spear Corporation, and Panzica Building
                   Corporation,
                     Appellees (Defendants below).

          Argued: October 10, 2023 | Decided: January 9, 2024

              Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court
                        No. 71D04-1804-CT-160
                The Honorable Cristal C. Brisco, Judge

       On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                           No. 22A-CT-1573

                       Opinion by Justice Goff
  Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
Goff, Justice.

   Landowners have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection
of invitees on their premises. This duty generally requires the landowner
to protect invitees against foreseeable risks of harm. Our foreseeability
analysis varies, however, depending on whether a case involves a
dangerous condition on the premises or whether it involves a dangerous
activity. Today’s case, arising from an injury suffered by a swimmer who
collided with the corner of a swimming-pool wall, implicates the pool’s
allegedly dangerous condition. Finding some evidence that the risk of
harm was foreseeable, we deem summary judgment for the pool operator
unwarranted. However, we affirm summary judgment for the pool’s
architects.

Facts and Procedural History
   Memorial Hospital of South Bend, doing business as Beacon Health and
Fitness (or just Beacon), owns and operates a health and fitness center in
Granger, Indiana. The Panzica Building Corporation acted as the principal
architect and designer for the center. Panzica subcontracted with the Spear
Corporation to design the center’s swimming pool. This pool, rectangular
and seventy-five feet long, was built to serve multiple purposes, including
lap-swimming and aquatic fitness. We include the following image of the
pool, drawn from the record, for illustration.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024     Page 2 of 22
   Along one side of the pool, a long ramp descends into the water,
enabling disabled users to enter the pool. A concrete “wing-wall,” built
within the pool itself, sets off the ramp from the main swimming area. At
the bottom of the ramp, a gap twenty-two feet, six inches long opens in
the wing-wall. Continuing on past this gap, one reaches a second, shorter
stretch of wing-wall flanking a set of entry steps at the end of the pool.
The pool was designed so that the tops of the wing-walls would sit at the
water level, which was maintained by an automatic mechanism. When the
pool was opened, the wing-wall ends lacked padding and no floating
lane-divider was laid across the gap. Pennants were, however, strung
above and across the width of the pool approximately fifteen feet from
each end.

   During the first week of the pool’s operation in November 2016, Dr.
Jennifer Pennington visited and swam several laps of various strokes in
the lane adjacent to the wing-walls. After transitioning from freestyle to
backstroke, her head collided with the corner of the wing-wall by the
entry steps, causing her injury.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024      Page 3 of 22
    Dr. Pennington and her husband, Joshua Pennington, subsequently
filed suit against Beacon, Panzica, and Spear (collectively, the Defendants),
alleging numerous claims. Counts I and II charged all three Defendants
with defective design and failure to warn. Count III accused Beacon of
negligent maintenance and operation, including allegations of
inappropriate water levels, lack of guidance aids and safety features, and
failure to warn or instruct. Count IV, in turn, subjected Panzica and Spear
to allegations of negligent construction. Finally, Count V charged all three
Defendants with depriving Joshua Pennington of his wife’s services and
companionship due to the injury.

  Following discovery, the Defendants asked the trial court to bar the
opinion of the Penningtons’ expert, Dr. Thomas Sawyer; to strike other
items of evidence, including post-accident photographs of the pool and an
email sent by Panzica’s president; and to grant them summary judgment.
The trial court restricted Dr. Sawyer’s opinion in part—allowing his
testimony on matters related to swimming-pool management and
operations while excluding it insofar as it concerned design and
construction. The court then struck the email, photographs, and other
items of evidence and granted summary judgment to Panzica and Spear
on all counts and to Beacon on Counts I and II. (The Penningtons
conceded Count IV at the summary-judgment hearing.) On Count III,
negligent maintenance and operation, the trial court granted Beacon
partial summary judgment, finding no issues of fact related to the level of
the water or a duty to provide guidance aids and safety features.
However, the trial court partially denied summary judgment as to
Beacon’s failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions. Finally,
the court denied summary judgment to Beacon on Count V insofar as it
derived from the maintenance-and-operation claim.

   Spear moved the trial court to enter final judgment in its favor under
Indiana Trial Rule 54(B). After the court granted this motion, the
Penningtons appealed the summary judgments entered in favor of both
Spear and Panzica. Beacon also sought certification of a discretionary
interlocutory appeal under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B), which the trial
court granted and the Court of Appeals accepted. The Penningtons used
their brief in response to Beacon to raise cross-appeal issues of their own.
The Court of Appeals consolidated the two appeals and affirmed the trial

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024       Page 4 of 22
court in a published opinion. Pennington v. Mem’l Hosp. of South Bend, Inc.,
206 N.E.3d 473, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In affirming the partial denial of
summary judgment to Beacon on Count III, the panel analyzed the
foreseeability of harm by applying the test appropriate for activities
conducted on the premises. Id. at 487–88.

   Beacon sought transfer to this Court, which we granted, thus vacating
the Court of Appeals’ decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standards of Review
   Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary
matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial
Rule 56(C). The movant has the “initial burden” of demonstrating “the
absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue.” Hughley
v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). It is not enough for the movant to show that “the party
carrying the burden of proof lacks evidence on a necessary element.” Id.
Rather, they must “affirmatively negate” the opponent’s claim. Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only then must the non-
movant “come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the
trier of fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
review summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in
the non-movant’s favor. Id. (internal citation omitted). However, the trial
court’s decision to admit or strike evidence at the summary-judgment
stage is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d
756, 769 (Ind. 2009).

Discussion and Decision
    Our analysis begins in Part I by clarifying that all issues raised on
summary judgment are available for our review in this interlocutory
appeal. In Part II, we review the trial court’s exclusion of the Penningtons’
evidence and affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
architects Spear and Panzica as to their roles in the pool’s design. In Part
III, we first explain why the Penningtons’ claim of negligent maintenance

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024       Page 5 of 22
and operation against Beacon requires analysis of a condition—rather
than activities—on the premises. We then conclude that summary
judgment was unwarranted on the operational claim (except on one
specific issue within the claim). Finally, in Part IV, we address the design
claim against Beacon and reverse summary judgment.

I. All summary-judgment issues are available in this
   interlocutory appeal.
   The appeals in this case have become somewhat entangled, prompting
us to restate the proper appellate procedure under Trial Rule 54(B) and
Appellate Rule 14(B).

   Appellate jurisdiction “‘is generally limited to appeals from final
judgments.’” Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 2012) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fields, 842 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2006)). A judgment
typically becomes final when it “dispose[s] of all issues as to all parties,
ending the particular case and leaving nothing for future determination.”
Id.; App. R. 2(H)(1). But there are other ways in which a judgment may
become final. See App. R. 2(H)(2)–(5).

   An order is also a “final appealable judgment” when “‘the trial court in
writing expressly determines under Trial Rule 54(B) [that] there is no just
reason for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of judgment …
under Trial Rule 54(B) as to fewer than all the claims or parties.’” Ramsey,
959 N.E.2d at 253 (quoting App. R. 2(H)(2)). Trial Rule 54(B) thus allows
for the immediate perfection of an appeal without the need for final
judgment as to all claims or parties. To obtain an appeal under Trial Rule
54(B), the trial court must certify its order using “‘the magic language of
the rule.’” Id. (quoting Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ind. 2003)).
Depending on how the trial court frames its certification, the “magic
language” may apply to “only one portion of the order.” See id.

   Here, the trial court’s Trial Rule 54(B) certification order found “no just
reason for delay” and granted “Defendant Spear Corporation’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as a final and appealable Order.” App. Vol. II, p. 71.
The order thus applied the “magic language” to the judgment in favor of

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024        Page 6 of 22
Spear alone, permitting the Penningtons to immediately appeal the
judgment for Spear—but not the judgment entered for Panzica.

   That’s not all, however. This case also involves Beacon’s interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B). That rule allows for certification
of interlocutory orders (as opposed to judgments) for appeal. See App. R.
14(B). Appellate Rule 14(B), we’ve emphasized, “requires certification of
an interlocutory order,” not just “particular issues.” Harbour v. Arelco, Inc.,
678 N.E.2d 381, 386 (Ind. 1997). Thus, “[a]ny issues that were properly
raised in the trial court in ruling on the trial court’s summary-judgment
order are available on interlocutory appeal.” Id. 1

   Here, Beacon moved the trial court for “an order certifying for
interlocutory appeal that part” of its summary-judgment order “denying
Beacon’s motion for summary judgment.” Motion To Certify Order For
Interlocutory Appeal, Pennington v. Mem’l Hosp., No. 71D04-1804-CT-
000160 (St. Joseph Sup. Ct. July 8, 2022). The Penningtons then filed a
notice that they had no objection. The trial court granted Beacon’s motion,
stating that it was certifying only that part of its order partially denying
summary judgment to Beacon. Beacon then moved the Court of Appeals
to accept jurisdiction of the same limited issue and that motion was
granted.

   This manner of proceeding improperly purported to certify a specific
issue rather than the interlocutory order as a whole. The question arises,
then, whether the entire order is now subject to our review or only the one
issue. In Budden v. Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis,
this Court faced a similar issue. See 698 N.E.2d 1157, 1165–66 & n.14 (Ind.
1998). In that case, the trial court certified its interlocutory order and five
specific questions. Id. at 1165. We held that the “net effect” was simply to
“identify the issue that constitutes a ‘substantial question of law’

1 We implied in Coca-Cola Co. v. Babyback’s International, Inc. that only “the issues certified for

interlocutory appeal” are available for review. 841 N.E.2d 557, 561 n.2 (Ind. 2006). However,
we returned to the Harbour rule in Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Ind. 2011). See
William A. Ramsey, Appealing Orders Before A Case Ends: Dos, Don’ts And Modest Proposals, 56
Res Gestae 13, 22 n.30 (Dec. 2012) (discussing these inconsistencies). For clarity, we now
disapprove the approach taken in the Coca-Cola footnote.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024                           Page 7 of 22
presented by the order.” Id. at 1165–66 n.14 (quoting former App. R.
4(B)(6)). We reach the same result today and conclude that when a trial
court purports to certify an “issue,” it implicitly certifies the entire order
and merely identifies a “substantial question of law” that calls for “early
determination.” See App. R. 14(B)(1)(c)(ii). The error is “inconsequential”
so long as “it is clear what order is affected.” See Budden, 698 N.E.2d at
1166 n.14.

   Applying this rule, we will address all the issues stemming from the
trial court’s summary-judgment order and raised in these appeals: the
Penningtons’ appeal from summary judgment for the pool’s architects,
Spear and Panzica; Beacon’s appeal from partial denial of summary
judgment as to their operation of the pool; and the Penningtons’ cross-
appeal from partial summary judgment for Beacon as to its role in both
operating and designing the pool.

II. The Penningtons designated no admissible
    evidence that Spear or Panzica breached their
    professional duty of care.
   A plaintiff alleging negligence must prove (1) that the defendant owed
the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) that the defendant breached this duty by
allowing its conduct to “fall below the applicable standard of care,” and
(3) that the breach “proximately caused” a “compensable injury.” Goodwin
v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

   Here, the Penningtons alleged that Spear and Panzica were negligent in
designing the swimming pool. In seeking summary judgment, Spear and
Panzica designated the opinion of an expert swimming-pool designer and
engineer, Matthew Reynolds, that it had met the standard of care in
designing the pool. The Penningtons, in response, designated the opinion
of Dr. Sawyer, a “Risk and Safety Management Consultant” with
experience managing “aquatic facilities.” App. Vol. XII, p. 51. When
questioned during a deposition, Dr. Sawyer affirmed that he had no
experience, education, or training in “how to engineer the design of a
swimming pool” and was “not qualified to give an opinion” on the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024         Page 8 of 22
“standard of care applicable to any architect” who may sign or stamp a
design. App. Vol. III, p. 65. Based on this testimony, the trial court
excluded Dr. Sawyer’s evidence to the extent that it bore on swimming-
pool design.

   We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling as far as Spear and Panzica
are concerned. An architect or design professional has been negligent if
they “breached a duty to exercise the degree of competence ordinarily
exercised in like circumstances by reputable members of the profession.”
Smith v. Walsh Const. Co. II, LLC, 95 N.E.3d 78, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A witness must have
“familiarity with the standard of care” applicable to such trained
professionals, otherwise they cannot “testify to the requisite standard of
care” or any departure from that standard. Troutwine Estates Dev. Co. v.
Comsub Design & Eng'g, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 890, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(concerning engineers). Generally, this means the witness must be an
expert. Id. Here, Dr. Sawyer admitted being unqualified to speak about an
architect’s standard of care. The trial court reasonably concluded that he
thereby excluded himself from rendering any opinion on Spear and
Panzica’s conduct in designing the pool.

   The Penningtons also designated Exhibit 7, an email sent from the
president of Panzica to executives at Spear, stating that “a condition” of
the pool “expose[d]” all the Defendants to “liability for injury.” App. Vol.
IV, p. 217. The trial court excluded this evidence because it stated a “legal
conclusion” and discussed a “subsequent remedial measure.” App. Vol. II,
p. 65; see also Ind. Evidence Rules 407, 704(b). The portion of the email
discussing a remedial measure need not trouble us at this stage because it
can easily be separated from the liability statement and redacted. The
Penningtons argue that even if the Panzica president’s remark stated a
legal conclusion—which they do not contest—it was admissible under the
hearsay exception for an “opposing party’s statement.” Appellants’ Br. at
46. This exception concerns the admissibility against a party of a statement
“made by the party,” which here means Panzica (but not Spear). See Ind.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). However, while party-opponent statements are “not
hearsay,” Ind. R. Evid. 801(d), there are other reasons for which they may
not necessarily be admissible. We will not reverse the exclusion of the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024      Page 9 of 22
email because the Penningtons have not contested the trial court’s
conclusion that the statement was an inadmissible legal conclusion.

   Likewise, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of
Exhibit 12. This exhibit consisted of a set of photographs of the pool, taken
more than a year and a half after Dr. Pennington’s injury, showing a
subsequently installed floating lane-divider and padding on the exposed
end of the wing-wall. A factfinder could infer that this apparatus was
added to prevent further injuries—an action that could be interpreted as
an implicit admission that the pool was previously unsafe. It was proper
to exclude these photographs because evidence of subsequent remedial
measures cannot be used to prove negligence. Ind. R. Evid. 407. Among
the policies underlying this rule is a concern that admitting such evidence
would “deter a party from taking action that will prevent future injuries.”
WESCO Distribution, Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Indiana Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d
682, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

   Finally, we have examined the excluded Exhibit 6 (a binder of
miscellaneous design materials) and the admitted evidence cited by the
Penningtons in this appeal. The only item we identified that potentially
created an issue of fact is Exhibit 19, containing photographs purportedly
showing the pool, before it opened, with the waterline above the level of
the wing-walls. Spear’s vice-president, Sam Blake, admitted that the
submersion of walls within swimming pools would be unsafe. However,
we can find no deposition testimony or affidavit in the record on appeal
establishing a foundation for Exhibit 19—only a statement by counsel for
the Penningtons that the photographs were taken “prior to Opening Day”
and produced by Beacon in discovery. App. Vol. XII, p. 131. As Spear and
Panzica argue, this statement is not enough to establish whether the
photographs truly and accurately reflect the state of the pool on the day of
Dr. Pennington’s injury. See Troutwine, 854 N.E.2d at 903.

   The Penningtons’ evidence fails to create an issue of fact over whether
Spear or Panzica’s work fell below their professional standard of care. For
this reason, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Spear and Panzica.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024      Page 10 of 22
III. Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment
    on the maintenance-and-operation claim.
   We turn next to Beacon’s appeal from the partial denial of summary
judgment on Count III as to its failure to provide warnings or instructions
to swimmers. Resolution of this issue turns on whether undisputed
evidence showed that the harm Dr. Pennington suffered was
unforeseeable. To answer this question, we first clarify the distinction
between the two tests used in premises-liability cases for the foreseeability
of harm. Then, applying the test appropriate for analyzing conditions of
the premises, we affirm the trial court’s decision to partially deny
summary judgment. Furthermore, with the exception of one specific issue,
we deem Count III triable as a whole.

    A. Dr. Pennington’s injury implicates the condition of the
       swimming pool, not activities on the premises.
   A duty of care is an indispensable element of a negligence claim.
Absent a duty, there can be no breach and, hence, no liability. Goodwin, 62
N.E.3d at 386. Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care “is
a question of law for the court to decide.” Id. at 386–87. When
“foreseeability is an element of duty,” therefore, “the court must
determine the question of foreseeability as a matter of law.” Id. at 394. 2

   The parties agree that Dr. Pennington was an invitee on Beacon’s
premises. It is well settled in Indiana that a landowner has a duty to an
invitee to “exercise reasonable care for the invitee’s protection while the

2We acknowledged in Goodwin that the Restatement (Third) of Torts, along with a minority of
states, exclude foreseeability from the court’s duty analysis. 62 N.E.3d at 389–90 & n.4. One of
our own pre-Goodwin decisions had adopted this approach, holding that the court need only
make a “general determination” whether a duty of reasonable care applied in the
circumstances, leaving the foreseeability of harm for the jury. See Paragon Family Rest. v.
Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (Ind. 2003). We opined in Goodwin that this was a “much too
narrow” reading of the duty analysis. 62 N.E.3d at 388. And, in Rogers v. Martin, we explained
that “including foreseeability as an element of duty” for judicial determination promotes
consistency and prevents landowners becoming “the insurers of their invitees’ safety.” 63
N.E.3d 316, 324 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024                      Page 11 of 22
invitee is on the premises.” Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016).
To fix the parameters of this duty as it relates to “dangerous conditions on
the land,” we have adopted section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. See id. at 321–22, 323 (citing Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind.
1991)). The Restatement declares:

        A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
        caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only
        if, he

            (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
            discover the condition, and should realize that it
            involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
            invitees, and

            (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize
            the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against
            it, and

            (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
            against the danger.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (Am. L. Inst. 1965).

    Under this test, foreseeability is an element of duty. The duty to
exercise reasonable care extends to “an unreasonable risk of harm” that
the defendant “should realize” exists and “should expect” invitees to
overlook or fail to “protect themselves against.” Id.; see also Rogers, 63
N.E.3d at 324 (explaining that the “foreseeability component within the
landowner-invitee duty is already explicit” in Restatement section 343).

     In cases involving conditions on the land or premises, section 343’s
foreseeability analysis focuses specifically on “the condition” that
allegedly resulted in injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343. In
Griffin v. Menard, Inc., for example, the plaintiff was injured when a sink
fell onto him out of a cardboard box. 175 N.E.3d 811, 812 (Ind. 2021). We
focused on whether Menard had any “actual or constructive knowledge
that the box was defective.” Id. at 814 (emphasis added).

    A different test applies in cases stemming from “activities on a
landowner’s premises unrelated to the premises’ condition.” See Rogers, 63

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024          Page 12 of 22
N.E.3d at 323. In the companion cases of Rogers and Goodwin, we
explained that, “in the duty arena,” foreseeability “involves an evaluation
of (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm.” Id. at 325;
see Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 394 (restating the same). We consider the
“general class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member and
whether the harm suffered was of a kind normally to be expected—
without addressing the specific facts of the occurrence.” Rogers, 63
N.E.3d at 325 (citing Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 388–89) (emphasis added). In
Goodwin, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant bar should
have protected them against being shot by a patron. 62 N.E.3d at 385–86.
We asked the general question whether “bar owners routinely
contemplate that one bar patron might suddenly shoot another.” Id. at
393–94.

     A critical difference thus exists between the foreseeability tests for
conditions and activities. The Restatement test that we use for conditions
looks at whether the danger posed by the specific condition involved was
foreseeable. Whereas, the Rogers/Goodwin test that we use for activities
looks at whether it was foreseeable that a general class of persons to which
the plaintiff belonged might suffer the general type of harm involved. This
distinction makes sense in that a landowner can know the precise physical
condition of their premises, but only generally foresee what conduct or
behavior will occur. In today’s case, it potentially makes a significant
difference whether courts will consider the general foreseeability of a
swimmer hitting a wall or the specific risk of injury posed by the
particular wing-wall involved.

     The Court of Appeals indicated that it applied the activities standard
to the maintenance-and-operation claim here because “Beacon as
landowner made the decisions as to what activities could be conducted
within and in proximity to the gap and with what notifications,” such as
whether to allow backstroke in the lane with the wing-walls. Pennington,
206 N.E.3d at 488. We find the appellate court’s framing of the
Penningtons’ claims less convincing than the fact that Dr. Pennington
injured her head on a physical object, the wing-wall, while engaged in
what is ordinarily a reasonably safe activity. See Sturgis v. Silvers, 296 F.
Supp. 3d 981, 991 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (holding that, although the plaintiff was
attending a “social gathering” at the time she was injured, her injury

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024       Page 13 of 22
stemmed from a “condition,” namely the “latent instability” of a “balcony
railing” that collapsed).

    To distinguish between condition claims and activity claims, we focus
on the substance of the claims as reflected in the complaint, summary-
judgment briefs, and designated evidence. Here, Count III alleges that
Beacon failed to “remedy dangerous conditions” in the pool and
specifically mentions “water levels,” “guidance aids,” and “safety features
such as floating lines and adequate padding.” App. Vol. II, p. 194. The
Penningtons’ summary-judgment brief argues that Beacon “owed a duty
of care to protect a member of its fitness club from an injury resulting
from an exposed wall during normal use of its lap pool” and “failed to
take adequate measures to correct the dangerous condition.” App. Vol. III,
p. 111. Although we can imagine circumstances where it might be difficult
to disentangle conditions and activities on the land, 3 we have little trouble
identifying the Penningtons’ claim here as presupposing a duty to protect
invitees against a dangerous physical condition. The unreasonable danger
in which Dr. Pennington allegedly found herself was not merely
swimming backstroke, but swimming backstroke next to the unpadded
wing-wall. It was the placement and condition of this wing-wall that
formed the basis for alleging a duty to protect. As the substance of the
claim is that a condition of the premises caused an injury, the appropriate
foreseeability analysis follows Restatement section 343.

     We now apply the test for the foreseeability of dangerous conditions
in reviewing the trial court’s decision to partially deny summary
judgment to Beacon on Count III.

    B. Fact issues exist as to whether Beacon owed a duty to
       protect invitees from striking the wing-wall.
    Beacon offers two lines of argument that summary judgment on Count
III was proper under Restatement section 343. First, Beacon argues that it
had no actual or constructive knowledge of the wing-wall being

3For example, a person might be injured by slipping on liquid while fleeing a robbery on the
premises, or by dangerous driving at a defectively signposted cross-walk.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024                    Page 14 of 22
dangerous. Indeed, it contends that, as there was no design flaw, there
could be no duty to warn of a dangerous condition. Second, Beacon
argues that it could have anticipated Dr. Pennington herself realizing any
danger the wing-wall posed and protecting herself against it. For the
reasons explained below, neither argument persuades us.

      1. An issue of fact exists as to the foreseeability of the
         harm.
    Beacon argues that undisputed evidence showed it lacked any
knowledge, actual or constructive, that the wing-wall posed a danger to
its invitees. 4 It further asserts that, as there was no design defect, there was
no dangerous condition to warn Dr. Pennington about. We disagree.

   In moving for summary judgment, Beacon designated two expert
opinions. Engineer Matthew Reynolds opined that the pool was
“reasonably safe for its intended use,” and aquatics safety consultant
Michael Oostman opined that there was “no reason for Beacon to warn
against” swimming alongside the wing-walls. Cross-Appellant’s App.
Vol. II, pp. 121, 155. Beacon’s experts discovered no other example of a
person suffering an injury from swimming into a wing-wall, leading
Beacon to characterize the likelihood of the accident occurring as
“remote.” Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 30. Beacon also designated evidence
that it relied on its architects to design a safe pool and had no awareness
that the wing-walls posed a danger.

   This evidence met Beacon’s initial burden to show that Dr.
Pennington’s injury was unforeseeable. It then fell to the Penningtons to
designate evidence that Beacon either did or should have foreseen the
risk. In our opinion, the Penningtons carried their burden as non-movants
by offering the opinion of Dr. Sawyer.

  Dr. Sawyer established his credentials as an expert in the management
and operation of swimming pools, having (among other things) managed

4This argument bears on Restatement section 343(a), relieving the landowner of a duty unless
they “should realize that [the condition] involves an unreasonable risk of harm” to invitees.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024                    Page 15 of 22
“aquatic facilities” for over twenty-five years and taught college courses
on “risk and safety management” in aquatics. See App. Vol. XII, p. 51. In
Dr. Sawyer’s opinion, Beacon understood that swimmers “would be
swimming a variety of swimming strokes including the backstroke.” Id. at
56–57. Backstroke swimmers are commonly taught, Dr. Sawyer explained,
“to watch the side wall, lane lines and over-head flags to guide them to
the end wall.” Id. at 56. In his opinion, Beacon “knew or should have
known that a swimmer swimming the backstroke could easily run into”
the wing-wall “since there was no floating lane line divider” strung across
the gap in the wall. Id. According to Dr. Sawyer, this is what happened to
Dr. Pennington when she “got confused” by the absence of a wall on one
side of her. Id. at 58. Dr. Sawyer stated that Beacon could have made the
pool safer by providing signage warning against swimming backstroke
alongside the wing-walls, lifeguards to “enforce the rules and assist”
swimmers, and functioning surveillance cameras. Id. at 57–58. This
evidence creates an issue of fact over whether Beacon should, in the
exercise of reasonable care, have foreseen what happened as a matter of its
operational and managerial responsibility.

   Beacon attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that “the trial
court’s evidentiary ruling barring Sawyer from testifying about design
defects renders speculative and insubstantial his opinion as to what
Beacon could and should have done to address that condition.” Cross-
Appellants’ Br. at 35–36. In other words, if there were no design defect,
then Beacon had nothing to warn Dr. Pennington about.

   Even if we were to accept Beacon’s premise that there was no
admissible evidence of a design flaw (which Part IV of this opinion,
below, disagrees with), this argument does not persuade us.

   Commentary to the Restatement explains that invitees are “entitled to
expect reasonable care in the original construction of the premises,” in
their “present arrangement,” and in their “present use.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts app. § 343, reporter’s note to cmt. b. Even a safely
designed and constructed pool is not necessarily safe as actually set up to
operate in its “present arrangement” and “use.” It may, as Dr. Sawyer
believed, require warnings or instructions about how to use it safely. For
example, warnings against diving into shallow water are a familiar sight.
But we would not presume the necessity of such warnings only for

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024     Page 16 of 22
defectively constructed pools or swimming areas. See Benton v. City of
Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1999) (recognizing the common-
law duty “to warn where diving is dangerous”). Beacon’s success before
the trial court on the plaintiffs’ design claim did not automatically defeat
the maintenance-and-operation claim.

   We thus agree for the most part with the Penningtons that summary
judgment was unwarranted on Count III. However, we affirm the trial
court’s entry of partial summary judgment on one specific issue within
Count III. See T.R. 56(C) (authorizing trial courts to enter summary
judgment “upon less than all the issues” and to designate the issues
“upon which it finds no genuine issue as to any material facts”). The
designated evidence does not show that Dr. Sawyer found fault with the
level of water in the pool. Indeed, he stated in a deposition that he did not
“know what the level of the water was” at the time of Dr. Pennington’s
injury. App. Vol. X, pp. 88–89. The Penningtons’ evidence does not,
therefore, create a triable issue over whether the level of the water
contributed to the allegedly dangerous condition of the pool.

   In sum, issues of fact exist as to whether Beacon’s maintenance and
operation of the pool fell below the standard of reasonable care,
precluding summary judgment on Count III, except as to the issue of the
level of the water.

      2. An issue of fact exists as to whether the risk was
         known or obvious.
   Beacon also argues that it owed no duty to protect Dr. Pennington
because any danger the wing-wall posed was either known or obvious to
her. We think that Beacon failed to carry its initial burden of establishing
these facts.

   Restatement section 343 implicates the invitee’s own knowledge of the
risk, in that the landowner’s duty to protect does not arise unless they
“should expect that [invitees] will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves against it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §
343(b). The Restatement additionally “instructs that Section 343 should be
read together with Section 343A.” Roumbos v. Samuel G. Vazanellis & Thiros
and Stracci, PC, 95 N.E.3d 63, 66–67 (Ind. 2018) (citing Restatement

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024      Page 17 of 22
(Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. a). Section 343A(1) provides that a landowner
“is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any
activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(A)(1).

   In Roumbos, we explained the defendant’s burden in relying on Section
343A to divest themselves of any duty to protect. A landowner must
show, first, either that the plaintiff was “aware of the condition and
appreciate[d] its danger” or that “the condition and the risk [were]
apparent to, and would be recognized by, a reasonable person in the
position of the visitor exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and
judgment.” 95 N.E.3d at 67 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A
cmt. b). The landowner must then additionally prove that there was “no
reason to believe [the plaintiff] would fail to avoid” the danger despite it
being known or obvious. Id. at 66.

   Here, Beacon designated evidence that the wing-walls were visible both
from the side of the pool and to a person swimming “freestyle or
breaststroke” in the adjacent lane. Cross-Appellant’s App., p. 127. This
falls short of what section 343A requires. Even assuming that Dr.
Pennington saw the wing-walls while swimming freestyle or breaststroke,
Beacon’s evidence failed to show that she appreciated the danger the
wing-walls posed or that a reasonable person swimming in the pool
would recognize the risk. Beacon likewise failed to show that it had no
reason to anticipate a backstroke swimmer becoming disorientated and
colliding with the wing-wall even after recognizing the danger. For these
reasons, Beacon failed to affirmatively negate Dr. Pennington’s
maintenance-and-operation claim.

IV. Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment
   on the design claim.
   Finally, the Penningtons argued on cross-appeal that Dr. Sawyer’s
opinion created a fact issue as to whether Beacon should have foreseen a
risk while participating alongside Spear and Panzica in the design process
itself. We agree that there is a triable issue of fact here.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024      Page 18 of 22
    Unlike Spear and Panzica, Beacon is not an architectural or engineering
firm. So, the professional design standard of care discussed in Part II,
above, is inapplicable. Rather, Beacon, as the landowner, was obligated to
exercise reasonable care under Restatement section 343 in the “original
construction of the premises.” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt.
b. 5 A landowner’s duty of care applies during the design phase. See City of
Bloomington v. Kuruzovich, 517 N.E.2d 408, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that the city owed public-park invitees “a duty to design the park
safely”); Vazquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 504 F.3d 43, 50–
51 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (explaining that a premises-liability
claim based on negligent design arises when the defective property
“existed in the state intended by its owner,” e.g. “excessively steep
stairways,” “a balcony without a fence or guardrail,” or “a busy
intersection without stop signs or lights to direct traffic”).

   Dr. Sawyer was clearly qualified to give an expert opinion on Beacon’s
standard of care as an operator involved in designing the pool. Among
other things, he has managed aquatic facilities; taught college courses at
Indiana State University concerning the design and planning of sports
facilities, including aquatic facilities; and participated in the design
process for other pools, including one with wing-walls. He also
familiarized himself with national and state safety standards.

   Granted, Dr. Sawyer is not an architect or engineer. But Evidence Rule
702(a) doesn’t require him to be. The question is whether “the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Evid. R.
702(a). We have said that this standard “is a liberal one.” Escamilla v. Shiel
Sexton Co., Inc., 73 N.E.3d 663, 677 (Ind. 2017). Here, it is evident that Dr.
Sawyer’s specialized knowledge and experience will assist the factfinder’s
evaluation of whether Beacon met its standard of care during the pool’s
design process. His opinion should therefore have been admitted on the
design count against Beacon. Any remaining issue as to his credibility as

5The Penningtons frame Beacon’s duty in the design phase only with respect to its status as
landowner, without positing any independent duty arising from its alleged role as a co-
designer of the pool.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024                    Page 19 of 22
an expert “may properly be left to vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, argument of counsel, and resolution by
the trier of fact.” Tunstall v. Manning, 124 N.E.3d 1193, 1196–97 (Ind. 2019)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

   In Dr. Sawyer’s view, Beacon acted “carelessly and negligently” in
failing to appoint a “design committee/team” composed of professionals
such as “an aquatic consultant/specialist (with aquatic safety expertise)” to
liaise with Spear and Panzica during the design process. App. Vol. XII, pp.
54–55. An aquatic specialist, he says, would have recognized the
dangerous condition, and then “the design could have been modified.” Id.
at 54. Dr. Sawyer accepts that the pool satisfied Indiana and industry
standards, but in his opinion its design still constituted an unsafe “error.”
Id. at 59. This opinion creates an issue of fact concerning Beacon’s alleged
breach of its standard of care.

   Still, Beacon repeatedly states that it “relied” on Spear and Panzica to
design and build a safe pool. Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 9, 21. Generally, “a
principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor,”
including a contractor who designs a facility. See Vaughn v. Daniels Co.
(West Virginia), Inc., 841 N.E.2d 1133, 1143 (Ind. 2006). However, there is
evidence indicating that Beacon itself played a role in the design process.
See Steel v. Rust, 830 N.E.2d 62, 69–70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing a
principal’s vicarious liability for the negligence of an independent
contractor from liability for the principal’s “own negligence”). According
to the deposition of Sam Blake, Spear’s vice-president, it was Beacon who
“wanted the ramp and the steps.” App. Vol. III, p. 178. And Alan Loyd, a
Beacon representative, was “part of the discussions” about how the pool
would be designed, which included discussion of the wing-wall. Id.
Therefore, the evidence does not utterly foreclose the possibility that
Beacon, in the exercise of reasonable care, should itself have discovered
and remedied the allegedly dangerous condition during the design phase.

Conclusion
  The trial court correctly entered summary judgment for Spear and
Panzica. However, Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on any
count, except as to the single issue of the level of the water within Count

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024      Page 20 of 22
III. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial of
all the Penningtons’ claims against Beacon.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES JENNIFER
PENNINGTON AND JOSHUA PENNINGTON
James P. Barth
Daniel H. Pfeifer
Peter D. Hamann
Ryan G. Milligan
Jeffrey J. Stesiak
Pfeifer Morgan & Stesiak LLP
South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR CROSS-APPELLANT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF
SOUTH BEND
Louis W. Voelker
Kyle G. Grothoff
Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP
Hammond, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE SPEAR CORPORATION
Beverly J. Mack
Huelat & Mack, P.C.
LaPorte, Indiana

Lyle R. Hardman
Hunt Suedhoff Kearney LLP
South Bend, Indiana

Scott A. Ruksakiati
Tyson & Mendes
Chicago, Illinois

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE PANZICA BUILDING CORPORATION
Martin J. Gardner
Andria M. Oaks
Christopher J. Uyhelji

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024      Page 21 of 22
Gardner & Rans, P.C.
Granger, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CT-182 | January 9, 2024   Page 22 of 22