Court Opinion

ID: 9918833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 18:01:19.48714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.586943
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-3208        Document: 010110984043   Date Filed: 01/16/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                         PUBLISH                             Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      January 16, 2024

                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  SAMUEL D. DRINKERT,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 22-3208

  COLONEL KEVIN PAYNE,

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Kansas
                           (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-03045-JWL)
                        _________________________________

 Submitted on the briefs: **

 Robert Feldmeier, The Law Offices of Robert Feldmeier, Raleigh, North Carolina for
 Petitioner - Appellant.

 Jared S. Maag, Assistant United States Attorney (Duston J. Slinkard and James A. Brown
 with him on the briefs), District of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas, for Respondent - Appellee.
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.

        
        Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Michael Johnston, is replaced by Kevin
 Payne as the Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth,
 Kansas. Appellee’s motion to substitute party is granted.
        **
          After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellate Case: 22-3208        Document: 010110984043      Date Filed: 01/16/2024      Page: 2

                            _________________________________

 HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
                            _________________________________

        Petitioner Samuel Drinkert appeals from the denial by the United States District

 Court for the District of Kansas of his application for a writ of habeas corpus filed under

 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He challenges his convictions by a court martial for violations of the

 Uniform Code of Military Justice, arguing that the military courts improperly admitted

 prior consistent statements by one of his alleged sexual-assault victims. We agree with

 the district court that he is not entitled to relief.

        I.      BACKGROUND

        We adopt the following summary of the relevant facts by the United States Navy-

 Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA):

        [Mr. Drinkert]’s convictions arise out of separate incidents involving two
        victims, his brother’s ex-girlfriend, [Ms. F.], and a co-worker, [Ms. W.].

        ...

        The incidents involving [Ms. W.] occurred . . . in March and April 2018 at
        [Mr. Drinkert’s] residence, where [Ms. W.], a co-worker and friend of [Mr.
        Drinkert], spent a significant amount of time due to her unstable housing
        situation. On 30 March 2018, [Mr. Drinkert], [Ms. W.], and a mutual friend
        were at the house consuming alcohol and socializing. [Ms. W.] became
        sleepy and woke up the next morning in [Mr. Drinkert]’s bed (when he
        brought her breakfast). On 3 April 2018, [Ms. W.] and [Mr. Drinkert] were
        again at [Mr. Drinkert]’s residence drinking and socializing. [Ms. W.]
        eventually became tired and went to bed. While her memory became hazy,
        she recalled being in [Mr. Drinkert]’s bedroom prior to falling asleep and
        awoke early the next morning with [Mr. Drinkert]’s penis inside her vagina.
        She feigned being asleep while [Mr. Drinkert] ejaculated inside of her,
        cleaned her with baby wipes, put her underwear on, and left for work. When
        [Ms. W.] confronted [Mr. Drinkert] about the incident a few days later over
        a messaging application, and told him she was avoiding him because “[y]ou

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        raped me,” [Mr. Drinkert] initially replied, “What?” and “You don’t
        remember do you?” She then told him she did remember, including that he
        had “baby wipe [sic] and put everything back how it was,” that he was
        “wrong,” and that she did not want to see him again, to which [Mr. Drinkert]
        responded, “I understand.”

        On 16 April 2018, after [Ms. W.] had provided a statement to the Naval
        Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS] alleging that [Mr. Drinkert] had
        sexually assaulted her on 30 March and 4 April, five Virginia Beach Police
        officers with the assistance of two NCIS agents executed a civilian search
        warrant at [Mr. Drinkert]’s residence. The warrant permitted law
        enforcement to search for and seize evidence to include “cellular phone /
        electronics which can take photographs an[d] any media storage devices, to
        include USB, disks, tablets, laptop and desktop computers.” The search
        warrant did not authorize searching [Mr. Drinkert]’s person.

        ...

        A forensic review of the phone revealed photographs taken on 3 April 2018,
        to include one depicting a finger penetrating [Ms. W.]’s vagina. There was
        another photo of [Ms. W.] while she appeared to be asleep, a photo of [Ms.
        W.] topless, and search terms related to [Ms. W.]. Pursuant to the search
        warrant, law enforcement also seized [Mr. Drinkert]’s laptop computer. The
        forensic review of the computer revealed the same photographs, as well as
        search terms related to [Ms. W.]. Evidence existing on the phone, but not the
        computer, included a specific search for “[Ms. W.] naked,” as well as
        searches related to whether one could get pregnant on birth control. All the
        other evidence from the laptop computer, to include the digital penetration
        photo, contained metadata which showed the time and location where the
        photos were taken, as well as the device used to take them.

 Supp. App., Vol. I at 102–05 (footnotes omitted). At trial the military judge admitted

 testimony of prior consistent statements made by Ms. W. As described by the NMCCA:

        After the sexual assault, [Ms. W.] petitioned the City of Virginia Beach for
        a civilian protective order against [Mr. Drinkert], where she was placed under
        oath and asked questions. At trial, after her testimony in the Government’s
        case-in-chief, [Mr. Drinkert]’s trial defense counsel cross-examined her
        about the addition of facts to her testimony at trial that were not included in
        her testimony at the protective order hearing, implying [Ms. W.] fabricated
        portions of her testimony at trial. After [Ms. W.]’s testimony, the
        Government called as a witness Construction Mechanic Third Class [CM3]

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        Juliet, a former co-worker and roommate of [Ms. W.]. Over trial defense
        counsel’s objection, CM3 Juliet was permitted to testify about [Ms. W.]’s
        statements to him about the sexual assaults approximately three weeks before
        the civilian protective order hearing that were consistent with her trial
        testimony. The military judge found that the testimony was permissible and
        could be admitted as a prior consistent statement to rebut the express or
        implied charge of recent fabrication, influence or motive under Mil. R. Evid.
        801(d)(l)(B)(i) and to rehabilitate [Ms. W.]’s credibility as a witness when
        attacked on another ground under Mil. R. Evid. 80l(d)(l)(B)(ii).2

 Id. at 115–16.

        Mr. Drinkert was convicted on three specifications of sexual assault and one

 specification of indecent video recording. He appealed his convictions to the NMCCA.

 Among the issues he raised was the one issue he pursues in his habeas proceeding—the

 propriety of the admission of prior consistent statements by Ms. W. Affirming his

 conviction, the military appellate court ruled that the prior statements were admissible

 under Military Rules of Evidence 801(d)(l)(B)(i) and (ii). Since satisfaction of either rule

        2
            Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) states:

        (d) Statements that Are Not Hearsay
               A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay:
               (1) A Declarant-Witness’ Prior Statement. The declarant testifies
               and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the
               statement:
                      (A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was
                      given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
                      proceeding or in a deposition;
                      (B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
                      offered:
                             (i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the
                             declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent
                             improper influence or motive in so testifying; or
                             (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a
                             witness when attacked on another ground . . . .
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 would suffice for affirmance, we need address only the court’s discussion of

 801(d)(l)(B)(i):

        [Mr. Drinkert] challenged [Ms. W.’s] recollection of events under a theory
        that [Ms. W.] was too intoxicated to remember what happened and therefore
        fabricated her statements and testimony during the investigation and that any
        testimony based on her recollection lacked credibility. Regarding the
        allegation of recent fabrication, the military judge took note that trial defense
        counsel’s cross-examination of [Ms. W.] focused on differences between her
        testimony at a civilian protective order hearing and her testimony at trial,
        which implied that she developed a motive to fabricate sometime after the
        civilian hearing. The prior consistent statements that were admitted by the
        military judge were made to CM3 Juliet approximately three weeks before
        the civilian hearing. The statements were thus offered to rebut an express or
        implied charge of recent fabrication or improper motive and preceded any
        motive to fabricate or improperly influence, thus satisfying the requirements
        of Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(B)(i) . . . .

 Id. at 116–17 (footnotes omitted).

        Mr. Drinkert unsuccessfully pursued habeas relief in federal district court. On

 appeal to this court, he argues only that he is entitled to reversal of his court-martial

 convictions because of the admission of the prior statements by Ms. W.

        II.    DISCUSSION

        Both in his military appeal and in this court, Mr. Drinkert has argued that the

 military judge misapplied the Military Rules of Evidence. He contends that during cross-

 examination of Ms. W. at trial the focus was on establishing that her purported

 recollection of events was false because she had suffered an alcohol-induced blackout,

 not that she fabricated her testimony or had an improper motive; that is, the “defense

 theme was of mis-recorded memory, not of motive to fabricate.” Aplt. Br. at 16. In the

 alternative he contends that Ms. W.’s statements were inadmissible because she made the

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 prior consistent statements several days after the blackout and an admissible prior

 consistent statement must be made before the motive to fabricate or improper influence

 arose. As we proceed to explain, however, Mr. Drinkert has failed to establish that he is

 entitled to have us review whether the NMCCA correctly interpreted the Military Rules

 of Evidence.

        When reviewing a military conviction on a habeas petition, “[t]he limited function

 of the civil court is to determine whether the military have given fair consideration to

 each of the petitioner’s claims.” Thomas v. U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 625 F.3d 667,

 670 (10th Cir. 2010). A merits review is warranted only if the petitioner shows that “the

 military tribunals failed to consider his claims fully and fairly.” Santucci v. Commandant,

 U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 66 F.4th 844, 852 (10th Cir. 2023); accord Roberts v.

 Callahan, 321 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here an allegation has been fully and

 fairly considered by the military courts, the federal civil courts may not review the

 merits.”).

        When we say that a military court has fully and fairly considered an issue, we are

 not saying that we agree with the court’s reasoning. Indeed, we ordinarily focus only on

 how the issue was presented to the military court, without considering that court’s

 reasoning, or even its conclusion. See, e.g., Thomas, 625 F.3d at 671 (“[W]hen an issue is

 briefed and argued before a military board of review, we have held that the military

 tribunal has given the claim fair consideration, even though its opinion summarily

 disposed of the issue with the mere statement that it did not consider the issue meritorious

 or requiring discussion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roberts, 321 F.3d at 997

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 (deciding, without any reference to the military court’s opinion, that petitioner’s grounds

 for relief were fully and fairly considered because the petitioner “made well-reasoned

 arguments, cited proper legal authority and identified proper legal standards” in arguing

 each ground before the military courts); King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732, 735 (10th Cir.

 1970) (“We must hold that the record shows that there was a fair consideration of this

 constitutional claim by the military upon full presentation of the facts and law . . . so that

 we cannot review the issue here. . . . The appellant asserts that the military courts and

 boards reached the wrong result. But again in view of the way in which the case reaches

 us, this is not for us to evaluate.”). But cf. Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th

 Cir. 1990) (military court’s summarily affirming without discussion was a factor in

 determining that habeas review was proper).

        In this case Mr. Drinkert received full and fair consideration in his military-court

 appeal on the question of the admissibility of Ms. W.’s prior consistent statements. He

 thoroughly briefed the issue, arguing that they were not admissible under either of two

 rules that treat certain prior consistent statements as nonhearsay. See Mil. R. Evid.

 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). And the NMCCA thoroughly responded in holding that Ms. W.’s

 prior consistent statements were properly admitted.

        Mr. Drinkert relies on the following four-part test (which we have called the

 Dodson test) that this circuit has adopted to assist in determining whether a claim was

 fully and fairly considered by the military and therefore is not entitled to habeas review in

 civil courts:

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        [O]ur review of a military conviction is appropriate only if the following four
        conditions are met: (1) the asserted error is of substantial constitutional
        dimension, (2) the issue is one of law rather than disputed fact, (3) no military
        considerations warrant a different treatment of constitutional claims, and (4)
        the military courts failed to give adequate consideration to the issues
        involved or failed to apply proper legal standards.

 Thomas, 625 F.3d at 670–71 (citing Dodson, 917 F.2d at 1252–53). We have said that

 this test “merely develops our understanding of full and fair consideration; it does not add

 an additional jurisdictional hurdle.” Roberts, 321 F.3d at 997.

        Application of the Dodson test, however, does not help Mr. Drinkert. As we said

 in Santucci, “[S]atisfaction of each factor is . . . critical to the invocation of our merits

 review.” 66 F.4th at 858. That is, we cannot grant such review even if just one of the

 Dodson factors is unfavorable to the petitioner. See Thomas, 625 F.3d at 670–71;

 Santucci, 66 F.4th at 858. Yet here, three of the four are not satisfied.

        First, although Mr. Drinkert contends that “[t]he improper admission of hearsay

 implicates his due process rights,” Aplt. Br. at 15, “the asserted error is [not] of

 substantial constitutional dimension,” Thomas, 625 F.3d at 670. In the court-martial

 proceedings he did not invoke any constitutional objection to the prior consistent

 statements; and, in any event, “evidentiary determinations ordinarily do not present

 federal constitutional issues” except where the challenged ruling “unfairly . . .

 prevent[ed] a defendant from presenting evidence . . . critical to his defense.” Romano v.

 Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d

 1064, 1101 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Absent a showing that the admission of the evidence

 violated a specific constitutional guarantee, a federal court on habeas review will not

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 disturb the state court’s evidentiary ruling unless it was so grossly prejudicial that it

 fatally infected the trial and denied the fundamental fairness that is the essence of due

 process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The admission of prior statements by a

 witness who testified at trial, even if not permitted under the rules of evidence, did not

 render the trial fundamentally unfair.

        Second, the admissibility issue was not one of pure law. Mr. Drinkert’s chief

 complaint about the NMCCA opinion is that it rests on misconstruing the implications of

 his cross-examination of the witness, an issue that is more factual than legal.

        Third, Mr. Drinkert has not shown that “the military courts failed to give adequate

 consideration to the issues involved or failed to apply proper legal standards.” Thomas,

 625 F.3d at 671. He wisely does not press an argument that the NMCCA failed to give

 adequate consideration to the admission of prior statements. The military appeals court

 fully confronted his arguments. Rather, he claims that the court did not apply proper legal

 standards. He does not dispute that the Military Rules of Evidence governed the

 admissibility of the prior statements. But he argues that those rules were improperly

 applied. He contends that “[a] civilian court cannot determine whether the military courts

 ‘failed to apply proper legal standards’ if it fails to determine whether the military courts’

 decisions were informed by an erroneous view of the law,” Aplt. Br. at 14 (quoting

 Dodson, 917 F.2d at 1252–53); and, in his view, the district court therefore erred in not

 considering “whether the [military appellate court’s] view of the law was correct,” id. at

 15. The government does not challenge Mr. Drinkert’s formulation of what is required to

 satisfy the fourth Dodson factor and focuses solely on whether the military courts

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  properly applied the Military Rules of Evidence. We take this opportunity to correct the

  parties’ threshold misunderstanding of the fourth Dodson factor.

         To begin with, it would be contrary to our precedents to interpret the “apply

  proper legal standards” language to require that we assess the merits of the habeas claim

  (that is, assess whether the governing law was properly applied in the court-martial

  proceedings) in determining whether we should review it. As discussed above, “where an

  allegation has been fully and fairly considered by the military courts, the federal civil

  courts may not review the merits,” Roberts, 321 F.3d at 996; and the Dodson test is

  simply a useful tool for determining whether an issue has been fully and fairly

  considered. It would make no sense to interpret Dodson to say that we need to assess the

  merits to determine whether to review the merits.

         This does not mean that the apply-proper-legal-standards language has no content.

  We just need to distinguish between failure to apply the proper standard and incorrectly

  applying that standard. Unfortunately, there has been no occasion for this court to make

  that point in our court-martial precedents. In particular, Dodson itself did not define apply

  proper legal standards; and it held only that the fourth factor was satisfied in that case

  because the military court affirmed the conviction summarily without discussion, which

  addresses the adequate-consideration component of the fourth test, rather than the apply-

  proper-legal-standards component. See Dodson, 917 F.2d at 1253.

         But we are not without cues to the meaning of this undefined term. Dodson’s four-

  part test was adopted from the Fifth Circuit opinion in the notorious case (not notorious

  opinion) of Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (1975). In support of the apply-proper-

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  legal-standards requirement, Calley cited (unfortunately without any parenthetical

  explanation) only one page of one opinion: SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94

  (1943). See 519 F.2d at 203. And on that page of its opinion the Supreme Court held that

  a court would act improperly if it upheld an agency’s action by determining that the

  action could have been justified on a ground that the agency did not state. (Chenery is

  generally cited for the proposition that a court can affirm an agency decision only on a

  ground expressly relied on by the agency.) Although the Supreme Court did not use the

  term legal standard, it was establishing a legal standard under which courts should

  review agency action. By citing that part of Chenery, the Calley court was indicating that

  failure to comply with the Chenery limitation on review of agency action would be an

  example of a failure to “apply proper legal standards.” The cited passage from Chenery

  would have been a peculiar example for Calley to use if the Fifth Circuit was trying to

  convey that “apply proper legal standards” meant “apply legal standards properly,” since

  almost any appellate opinion would exemplify review of whether the law was properly

  applied.

         The distinction between failing to apply the proper standard and applying the

  proper standard incorrectly is well established in the habeas context, where 28 U.S.C.

  § 2254(d)(1) distinguishes between a decision “that was contrary to” clearly established

  law and a decision that “involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established law.

  The Supreme Court has explained:

         [The] “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses have
         independent meaning. A federal habeas court may issue the writ under
         the “contrary to” clause if the state court applies a rule different from the

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        governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than
        we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court may
        grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court
        correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but
        unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.

  Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (emphasis added and citations omitted); see

  Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 914 (10th Cir. 2017) (“If the state court identifies

  and applies the correct legal rule, its decision will not be ‘contrary to’ federal law,

  but the state court’s application of the correct rule can still be evaluated under

  § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause.” (further internal quotation marks

  omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).

        Most pertinent to this case, it is not uncommon to speak in terms of “legal

  standard” when describing the “contrary to” clause. See, e.g., Price v. Vincent, 538

  U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (Habeas relief was not warranted under the “contrary to” clause

  of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because “[n]owhere did the Michigan Supreme Court apply a

  legal standard contrary to those set forth in our cases. Nor did that court confront a

  set of facts materially indistinguishable from those presented in any of this Court’s

  clearly established precedents.” (emphasis added)); Eizember v. Trammell, 803 F.3d

  1129, 1140 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized

  that a state court’s identification of the correct governing legal standard and the

  reasonableness of its application of that standard to the facts are two distinct statutory

  inquiries.” (emphasis added)). We think the “apply proper legal standards”

  component of the Dodson test is using that language in the same sense.

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        The NMCCA applied the proper legal standard—the Military Rules of

  Evidence—in resolving Mr. Drinkert’s appeal. His complaint is that it did not

  properly apply the standard. But that is irrelevant to the Dodson test.

        We conclude that habeas relief is inappropriate.

        III.   CONCLUSION

        We AFFIRM the judgment below.

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