Court Opinion

ID: 9597226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:56:46.731705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:02.660938
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice ROACH.
Because I do not think we have jurisdiction over the dead, I dissent. The majority opinion tips its “virtual” hand in its first sentence. It states that a dead person has moved for discretionary review. How is this possible? Clearly, it is not. The fact Wilford Harris is dead and no revivor has ever taken place disposes of this case.
After the trial court dismissed Appel-lees’ claims, they took an appeal against Wilford Harris, a dead person. A court cannot have jurisdiction over a decedent, and action against a decedent is a nullity. See Gailor v. Alsabi, 990 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Ky.1999) (“[T]he only defendant named in the complaint was deceased. Since the complaint did not name a party defendant over whom the circuit court could acquire jurisdiction, the complaint was a nullity.”). This should be the end of the inquiry, period, because it means there was no appellee before the Court of Appeals and there is no appellant before this Court. Appellees were not without recourse. If Appellees wished to toll the limitation period in KRS 395.278, they could have applied to be named the personal representatives of Harris’s estate pursuant to KRS 395.040(2) or for the appointment of a public administrator under KRS 395.400. But this was not done. Thus, the Court of Appeals opinion must be vacated because the Court of Appeals never had jurisdiction to hear this case.
I am baffled by the majority’s choice of cases to support its opinion since those cases directly demonstrate that the holding as to jurisdiction is wrong. For example, Turner v. Seale, 298 Ky. 403, 182 S.W.2d 953 (1944), holds:
Only the name of the deceased, W.C. Seale, appears in the statement of appeal filed in pursuance of § 739 to the Civil Code of Practice and the name of his real representative, Mary Burns Seale, against whom the action was revived, nowhere appears in the statement of appeal. No appellee being before this court, there is no one to be bound by any decision we might make on the questions sought to be raised. Therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.
Id. at 953. Dismissal is necessary for the simple fact that “there is no one bound by any decision we might make” on the matter. Id. An earlier case, Combs v. Eversole, 292 Ky. 135, 166 S.W.2d 280 (1942), stands for the same enduring principle: “Only the name of the dead man appears as the appellee. Hence, it would be idle to express an opinion on any of the questions sought to be raised, since no one would be *309bound thereby.” Id. at 281. The majority attempts to distinguish Turner and Combs from the present matter by arguing that in those cases, the action had previously been revived but the appeal had been pursued only in the name of the dead person. This distinction makes no sense, for surely if we would dismiss a case where a personal representative existed but was not named in the notice of appeal, we must also dismiss a case where a personal representative has never even been appointed. This “distinction” actually makes the current matter riper for dismissal since not only was a dead person the named party, there currently exists no party who could have been named.
The majority does cite one case where our predecessor court, when none of the parties raised the issue, chose to “overlook ... the fact that the appeal is prosecuted in the name of ... the decedent, who no longer exists.... ” Daniel v. Fourth and Market, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Ky.1968). The majority fails to note, however, that the Court in Daniel nonetheless affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the matter on the ground that the action had not properly been revived. In other words, the decedent (or rather, his estate), still lost the case. In this light, Daniel further supports dismissal of this case, and shows why the majority’s attempt to distinguish Turner and Combs — to further wear an already well-worn phrase — makes a distinction without a difference.
Until today, the required procedure, as aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, was crystal clear:
When read together KRS 395.278 and CR 25.01 require that when a litigant dies, any action pending with respect to him must be revived against that decedent’s administration and the administrator must be substituted as the real party in interest before the action can proceed.
Snyder v. Snyder, 769 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Ky.App.1989). Failure to comply with this procedure allows only one result: dismissal.
These holdings are consistent with one of the foundations of our law. Courts do not have jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions. As the Chief Justice recently explained in a unanimous decision:
It is fundamental that a court must have jurisdiction before it has authority to decide a case. Jurisdiction is the ubiquitous procedural threshold through which all cases and controversies must pass prior to having their substance examined. So fundamental is jurisdiction that it is the concept on which first-year law students cut their teeth.
Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky.2005). If no case or controversy exists, we have no jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Maricle, 15 S.W.3d 376, 380-81 (Ky.2000) (“Thus, the issue is not an actual case or controversy before this Court; the issue is not ripe for review. To grant the Commonwealth’s petition for a mandamus would require the rendition of an advisory opinion, which is beyond the constitutional powers of this Court. In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222., 262 Ky. 437, 90 S.W.2d 692, 693 (1936).”); Justice v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Ky.1998) (“First, it is a settled principle that this Court adjudicates only ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ ”). Because a dead man cannot be a party, there is no case for us to decide.
The majority opinion does not attempt to distinguish these cases. It simply concludes, in what amounts to an admission that the majority opinion is primarily intended to be advisory, that the question presented on appeal affects “our entire Kentucky bar.” Ante at 302; see also ante *310at 304 (declining to “act ‘sua sponte’ ” to dismiss since the issue addressed in the parties’ briefs (whether counsel must give notification of client’s death) “seems to us to be at this time a matter of great import to the counsel of this Commonwealth”). With all due respect, the importance of a matter is irrelevant to the question of jurisdiction. We have held:
This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the proposition that it has no jurisdiction to decide issues which do not derive from an actual ease or controversy. 30 Ky. Const. § 110, In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 262 Ky. 437, 90 S.W.2d 692 (1936) (“Power to render advisory opinions conflicts with Kentucky Constitution Section 110 and thus cannot be exercised by the Court”). Recently, in Philpot v. Patton, Ky., 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (1992), we reiterated that “[o]ur courts do not function to give advisory opinions, even on important public issues, unless there is an actual case or controversy.”
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (Ky.1994).
The majority opinion further attempts to evade this reasoning by offering as alternative grounds the absurd theory that Harris’s insurance carrier, State Auto, is a real party in interest. The majority further reasons — presumably so, since this notion is not explicitly stated in the opinion — that because State Auto has abided by its contractual duty to provide a defense, is a presently existing entity, and is a real party in interest, it has provided “virtual representation” of Harris’s estate. This proposition is not supported by the law or the facts of the case. To begin with, State Auto, as the liability insurer, is not a real party in interest. “The generally accepted modern view is that the real party in interest is the party (person) who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.” 6 Kurt A. Phillips, Jr., et al., Kentucky Practice: Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, Rule 17.01 cmt. 2, at 435 (6th ed.2005). This is why our predecessor court held that the liability insurance company of a defendant tort-feasor is not a real party in interest to a lawsuit over the tortfeasor’s liability, just as in this case. See Mayer v. Dickerson, 321 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Ky.1959) (“Plaintiffs insist that as their insurance carrier was forced to become a party plaintiff to the action, justice demands their motion to make defendants’ insurance carrier a party defendant should have been sustained. Plaintiffs overlook the fact that their policy is what is generally known as ‘collision’ insurance, while defendants’ policy covers what is known as ‘liability’ insurance. Plaintiffs’ insurance carrier had incurred liability and paid same, while defendants’ insurance carrier would incur no liability until a judgment was rendered against them; therefore, it was not a real party in interest.”).
Even assuming the validity of the majority’s theory that a liability insurance carrier is a real party in interest, such representation still requires that the real party in interest who provides the virtual representation be a named party. Yet, as even the majority admits, State Auto has never been named as a party. The majority’s reliance on Mason v. Anderson, 242 S.W.2d 1011 (Ky.1951), and Carroll v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 312 Ky. 380, 227 S.W.2d 410 (1950), demonstrate its own faulty reasoning in this regard. In both cases, the Court was faced with named parties that survived and were in a position to protect the rights of the deceased. The majority even quotes, then ignores, language demonstrating this requirement. Ante at 303 (quoting Mason, which noted that “there are other appellees surviving,” 242 S.W.2d *311at 1011, and Carroll, which noted “a party joined in a law suit may effectively represent another not so joined,” 227 S.W.2d at 410, and that “the contingent rights of the absent party will be protected by the person joined in the suit,” id. at 411).
Ultimately, the majority holds that a deceased person may pursue an appeal and that he may do so by being virtually represented by a “party” — his liability insurance carrier — that neither has been named nor can even be a party (i.e., by being a real party in interest). No amount of virtual reality can make this holding fit within the law. Given the majority’s refusal to recognize this leads me to believe that it is only concerned with achieving what it sees as a desirable result — allowing the Appellees to pursue their claim at trial — a result that shall not yield even to Civil Rules, the laws of nature, or our long-standing precedent. I cannot subscribe to such an opinion. Therefore, I dissent.
COOPER and JOHNSTONE, JJ„ join this dissenting opinion.