Court Opinion

ID: 9812644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:44:04.608138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:43.666935
License: Public Domain

Devin, J.,
concurring: I concur in the decision that the statute under which the defendant was tried is inoperative and insufficient to sustain his conviction of a criminal offense. The statute transgresses constitutional limits in some respects and the rights of the appellant are thereby injuriously affected. This invokes the judicial power to declare the act void.
In our representative democracy the Legislature peculiarly represents the popular will. Its power is limited only by the restrictions placed upon it by the people themselves in the Constitution, and by the powers grapted to the Federal Government in the Constitution of the United States. It is only when it is made to appear clearly that the Legislature has exceeded the limitations upon its powers that the courts will interpose to protect constitutional rights which have been invaded or threatened. The power of the Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions generally upon the conduct of persons or businesses in the public interest, and for the promotion of the general welfare, may not be questioned. If the dry cleaning business, considering the proportions to which it has grown in the life of today, is affected with a public interest, the courts may not deny the power of the Legislature to impose regulations upon it. The decision that it is affected with a public interest is primarily for the Legislature, though always open to judicial inquiry.
While this business may not be regarded as one requiring a high degree of learning or scientific knowledge, it is conceivable that there may be sound reason for promulgating general regulations about it to safeguard the public against injury from ruined clothing or from infection by the germs of disease. The courts should not attempt to set up arbitrary distinctions between what are denominated the ordinary callings of life and the learned professions in respect to the constitutional *766limits upon legislative power. Tbe courts may not undertake to say tbat a particular business is not affected witb a public interest, contrary to legislative declaration, in tbe absence of a proper basis for determination. Nor should tbe proponents of legislation be required to sbow affirmatively tbat tbe particular expression of tbe legislative will is supported by facts and social and economic conditions sufficient to satisfy tbe courts. Does not tbe presumption tbat tbe Legislature acted witbin tbe limits of tbe Constitution lead to tbe conclusion tbat its declaration of policy should be followed by tbe courts, unless clearly shown to be unwarranted, arbitrary, or discriminatory? In tbe proper effort to protect individual freedom of conduct and tbe right to engage in a particular business free from regulation, tbe power of tbe Legislature to prescribe regulations in tbe public interest should not be unduly restricted, nor should there be imposed upon those seeking to uphold legislative regulation tbe burden of showing affirmatively tbat tbe lawmaking body has not thereby exceeded tbe limits upon its power fixed by tbe Constitution.
In the consideration of the questions raised by this appeal, as well as those of like nature which may hereafter arise, the judicial philosophy expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S., at page 446, seems appropriate: “I think the proper course is to recognize tbat a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the state, and tbat courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy tbat the particular court may happen to entertain.”