Court Opinion

ID: 9717815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:10:39.859277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.358758
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. There is no basis in statutory or case law for the transfer of this cause to Sangamon County, the circuit court was without authority to order it, and clearly mandamus should issue. In reaching its conclusion the majority fails to consider the difference between jurisdiction and venue. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is grounded on the concept that courts may decline jurisdiction where, under the applicable general venue statute, jurisdiction could appropriately be exercised. Venue, however, deals with the matter of where within a jurisdiction the cause is to be heard. This court has consistently held that the determination of venue is for the legislature. Chappells v. Sorenson (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 472; Mapes v. Hulcher (1936), 363 Ill. 227. Illustrative of the difference between jurisdiction and venue are the sources of the authority of the Federal courts to decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and to transfer venue in causes of action. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947), 330 U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839, the Supreme Court approved the dismissal of a cause of action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The authority, however, for interdistrict transfers stems from title 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a) (1976), enacted subsequent to the adoption of the opinion in Gulf Oil, and recognizing that transfer to a more convenient venue may be effected only pursuant to statutory authority. See Sohns v. Dahl (W.D. Va. 1975), 392 F. Supp. 1208; C. Wright, Federal Courts sec. 44, at 164 — 65 (2d ed. 1970). The order entered by the circuit court in this case further demonstrates the confusion which this opinion will cause. The order provides: “2. The Court further finds that all defendants have agreed to waive service if, this action is refiled in Sangamon County, Illinois. 3. That it is hereby ordered that plaintiffs’ cause of action and the same hereby is, transferred to Sangamon County, Illinois.” Obviously, these provisions are inconsistent. If the cause is transferred it proceeds without the requirement that any additional summonses be served. If, in fact, it purports to be a dismissal, requiring refiling and service of summons, it is clearly violative of the venue statute for the reason that transfer, rather than dismissal, is available even where wrong venue has been invoked. The circuit court and the majority are in agreement that under section 2 — 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 — 102) venue is properly in Cook County. Citing English authorities dating from 1705, the majority concludes that the circuit court was vested under the common law with the authority to transfer the cause to another county. The majority overlooks the fact that our statute adopted the common law of England as it existed prior to March 24, 1606. Decisions of the courts of England in 1705 and thereafter are not authority for the position which the majority takes. The majority cites a number of jurisdictions which have, by statute, authorized what the circuit court did here. This further demonstrates that, absent statutory authority, the order was improper. Of the jurisdictions which have considered the question whether courts possess the authority, without statutory enactment, to effect intrastate transfer of causes, only two have found an inherent or common law power to do so. An examination of the opinions (see Gonzales v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1962), 189 Kan. 689, 371 P.2d 193; Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson (Okla. 1972), 505 P.2d 484) shows that the authority is allegedly found in the acceptance of the common law in that jurisdiction, but it cannot be determined from either opinion the date at which the state of the common law is to be determined. Obviously it was not 1606 or the result would have been different. I need not lengthen this dissent by pointing out the confusion which the utter disregard of the venue statutes evidenced by this opinion will cause in the administration of justice in this jurisdiction. To destroy in one stroke the stability created by a long history of deference to legislative governance of venue is an unfortunate mistake which should be immediately corrected.