Court Opinion

ID: 9958023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-06 06:14:57.474843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:41.406342
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed April 4, 2024

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   ___________

                              No. 11-24-00039-CV
                                   ___________

            IN RE COMMITMENT OF RICARDO ISLAND

                      On Appeal from the 441st District Court
                             Midland County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. CR54554

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Appellant has filed a pro se “Consolidated Notice of Appeal and Informal
Appeal Brief” that alleges three issues, one of which relates to the trial court’s
pretrial commitment of Appellant for the restoration of his competency to stand trial.
Appellant’s counsel has submitted a letter informing this court that Appellant’s
competency was restored, that he pleaded guilty to the charged offense in the
underlying case, and requesting that we dismiss this matter as moot.
       This court is prohibited from deciding moot controversies. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). When an appeal becomes
moot, we must dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.,
369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012).
      To the extent the “consolidated” notice of appeal relates to pretrial issues in
his then-pending criminal case, we lack jurisdiction to address the appeal because
Appellant has pleaded guilty to the charged offense pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement and has waived his right to appeal. Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a
plea bargain case in which the punishment imposed does not exceed the punishment
agreed to by the parties, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were
raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial
court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized
by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
      Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here, and Appellant’s notice
of appeal does not appear to relate to matters that were raised by a filed written
motion and ruled on before trial. Nevertheless, with regard to subsection (A), a
defendant may waive, as here, his right to appeal a trial court’s rulings on pretrial
motions, as long as the waiver is “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” made.
Marsh v. State, 444 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14 (West 2005)); Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A waiver of this right “will prevent a defendant from
appealing without the consent of the trial court.” Broadway, 301 S.W.3d at 697
(citing Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The trial
court has not granted permission for Appellant to appeal, and the trial court’s
certification states that Appellant does not have the right of appeal and that Appellant
has waived his right to appeal. Rule 25.2 provides that, in the absence of the trial
court’s certification showing that the defendant has a right of appeal, the appeal
“must be dismissed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

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      Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(d); 42.3(a).

                                          W. STACY TROTTER
                                          JUSTICE

April 4, 2024
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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