Court Opinion

ID: 9930685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 16:02:34.999026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:05.940316
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11958    Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11958
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       NELSON CINTRON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 0:07-cr-60049-WPD-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11958     Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 02/07/2024    Page: 2 of 7

       2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11958

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Nelson Hurricane Cintron appeals the district court’s order
       denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) motion for early termination of
       supervised release. On appeal, Cintron argues that the district
       court abused its discretion by failing to consider properly the
       relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. After review, we find no abuse
       of discretion and affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
              Between July 2006 and early 2007, Cintron engaged in
       sexually explicit online communications with undercover law
       enforcement officers who were posing as 14-year-old girls. During
       some of these conversations, Cintron sent images of child
       pornography to an undercover officer.
              A search of Cintron’s personal computer and laptops
       revealed more images and videos of child pornography, some
       depicting adults engaged in sexual activity with prepubescent
       children. Cintron admitted his conduct. But Cintron explained
       that at approximately age 18 he had a traumatic incident in which
       he was chased by 20 men and feared for his life and afterwards he
       developed an anxiety disorder and retreated into the virtual world
       of the computer.
             In 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, Cintron pled guilty
       to one count of distribution of child pornography, in violation of
USCA11 Case: 23-11958     Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 02/07/2024    Page: 3 of 7

       23-11958              Opinion of the Court                        3

       18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1). The district court sentenced
       Cintron to 180 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of
       supervised release. On July 24, 2020, Cintron was released from
       prison and began serving his supervised release term. Cintron was
       subject to numerous special conditions of supervised release for sex
       offenders, including restrictions on his use of a computer and
       access to the Internet.
             In November 2020, after Cintron was offered employment
       with Evexia Enterprises, the district court granted Cintron’s
       request to modify his conditions of supervised release to permit
       Cintron to use a computer “only as to employment at Evexia
       Enterprises” and “subject to probation’s installing, at Defendant’s
       expense, computer monitoring software.”
              In May 2023, Cintron filed a pro se § 3583(e)(1) motion for
       early termination of supervised release. Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1)
       motion argued that he had exhibited “exceptional” conduct while
       in prison, completed all requirements for psychotherapy
       treatment, obtained employment after his release, was law-
       abiding, and fully complied with his supervised release terms for
       the last approximately three years.
             Cintron’s motion stated that his employer at Evexia
       Enterprises had offered him a partnership in the business, which
       would require him to travel frequently and to have access at all
       times to a smartphone, tablets, and other computer-related
       equipment to interact with potential customers and hold virtual
USCA11 Case: 23-11958      Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 02/07/2024     Page: 4 of 7

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11958

       meetings. Cintron asked the district court to grant his motion to
       terminate supervised release so he could further his career.
             The government filed a brief response opposing the motion
       and noting that Cintron’s probation officer also objected to early
       termination.
               The district court denied Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The
       district court stated it had considered the government’s response
       and reviewed Cintron’s court file and presentence investigation
       report. The court acknowledged that Cintron had “completed
       much of his court ordered supervised release.” The court stated,
       “Other than that, there are no reasons, certainly not exceptional
       reasons, given for early termination.”
               The district court acknowledged it could terminate
       supervised release if warranted by the defendant’s conduct or in the
       interests of justice. However, the district court declined to exercise
       its discretion and do so in Cintron’s case, stating it had considered
       the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Cintron filed this appeal.
                                II. DISCUSSION
       A.    General Principles
               We review the district court’s denial of a motion for early
       termination of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United
       States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017). A court abuses
       its discretion when it fails to explain its sentencing decisions
       adequately enough for meaningful appellate review. Id.
USCA11 Case: 23-11958       Document: 20-1        Date Filed: 02/07/2024       Page: 5 of 7

       23-11958                 Opinion of the Court                             5

              Under § 3583(e)(1), and after the expiration of one year of
       supervised release, the district court may terminate a defendant’s
       supervised release term if, “after considering the factors set forth in
       section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6),
       and (a)(7)” the court “is satisﬁed that such action is warranted by
       the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”
       18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); see Johnson, 877 F.3d at 996.
              The relevant § 3553(a) factors referenced in § 3583(e)(1)
       include: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the oﬀense and the
       history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the need for the
       sentence imposed “to aﬀord adequate deterrence to criminal
       conduct,” “to protect the public from further crimes of the
       defendant,” and “to provide the defendant with needed educational
       or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
       treatment in the most eﬀective manner”; (3) “the need to avoid
       unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
       records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”; and
       (4) “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the oﬀense.”
       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7).
              A district court ruling on a § 3583(e)(1) motion “must
       demonstrate that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors,” but it
       “need not explain each factor’s applicability, nor always explicitly
       articulate that it considered the factors.” Johnson, 877 F.3d at
       997-98. Even so, the district court “must explain its sentencing
       decisions adequately enough to allow for meaningful appellate
       review.” Id. at 997. Meaningful appellate review “requires the
USCA11 Case: 23-11958      Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 02/07/2024     Page: 6 of 7

       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11958

       reasons for the district court’s decision to be suﬃciently apparent,”
       and thus, apart from the district court’s order, the record can also
       provide a suﬃcient basis for meaningful appellate review. Id. at 998.
       B.     Denial of Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) Motion
             Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
       denying Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. Although the district court
       did not explain each § 3553(a) factor’s applicability, it was not
       required to do so. See id. at 997-98.
               The district court’s explanation for its ruling indicates that
       the court considered the pertinent § 3553(a) factors, Cintron’s
       § 3583(e)(1) motion, the government’s response, and the criminal
       court ﬁle, including the presentence investigation report. The
       district court further explained that Cintron’s justiﬁcation—that he
       had successfully completed a substantial portion of his ﬁve-year
       supervised release term—was not suﬃcient to warrant early
       termination of supervised release. In light of the seriousness of
       Cintron’s child pornography oﬀense, which involved online
       distribution, and the need to protect the public while Cintron
       works with computers as part of his employment, we cannot say
       the district court abused its discretion.
               We also ﬁnd no merit to Cintron’s contention that the
       district court required him to show “unusual or extraordinary
       circumstances” rather than considering the § 3553(a) factors as
       mandated by § 3583(e)(1). The district court merely noted that
       Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion oﬀered no other reasons apart from
       the one the district court determined was insuﬃcient. The district
USCA11 Case: 23-11958         Document: 20-1         Date Filed: 02/07/2024          Page: 7 of 7

       23-11958                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

       court explicitly stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors,
       and Cintron has oﬀered no reason why we should not take the
       district court at its word.
               Cintron also argues the district court committed legal error
       because it “declined” to exercise its discretion. But Cintron
       misreads the district court’s order. The district court understood
       that it had the discretion to grant Cintron’s § 3583(e)(1) motion and
       concluded, after considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors, that an
       exercise of discretion in Cintron’s favor was not warranted under
       the circumstances. Such a determination is reviewed for an abuse
       of discretion, and we ﬁnd none here. See id. at 997. 1
               AFFIRMED.

       1 To the extent Cintron’s reply brief raises new arguments attacking his

       underlying criminal proceedings, including at sentencing, we decline to
       address them. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871-73 (11th Cir.) (en
       banc), cert. denied, ----U.S.----, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022) (explaining that generally
       arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited and deemed
       abandoned).