Court Opinion

ID: 9546191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:26:00.716997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:07.295344
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
dissenting.
The principal argument in this appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury verdict finding appellant guilty of obtaining possession of a controlled substance by fraud, in violation of § 35 — 7—1033(a)(iii), W.S.1977. Contrary to the holding of the majority, I would conclude that the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, is insufficient to support appellant's conviction. I wquld, therefore, have reversed the judgment entered in this case by the district court.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
As the majority observe, appellant Edwin Earl Broom was charged with obtaining possession of a controlled substance, “Pre-ludin 75,” by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge, in violation of § 35 — 7—1033(a)(iii), W.S.1977. That statute provides:
“(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally:
⅜ * * !⅜ * *
“(iii) To acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge.”
In the trial of the matter, the court instructed the jury concerning the elements of the charged offense and the definition of a fraudulent act:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 2
“The defendant is charged with the crime of acquiring or obtaining possession of a controlled substance by fraud. The defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:
“1. That the defendant, Edwin Earl Broom, knowingly or intentionally acquired or obtained possession of Preludin #75.
“2. That the Preludin #75 was obtained by fraud.
“3. That the incident occurred on the 20th day of January, 1983, in Weston County, Wyoming.”
*645“INSTRUCTION NO. 7
“To act fraudulently or with intent to defraud means to act willfully and deliberately and with the specific intent to deceive or cheat.”
At the close of the State’s case in chief, and again following the presentation of all of the evidence, counsel for appellant moved for judgment of acquittal, on the ground that the State had failed to establish any misrepresentation or fraudulent conduct. The trial court denied these motions and submitted the case to the jury. Appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to two to five years in the state penitentiary, fined $3,000, and ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution to the County of Weston and the State of Wyoming for attorneys’ fees. The court suspended all but five months of the sentence of incarceration and placed appellant on probation for four and one-half years.
Appellant perfected his appeal to this court and frames the issue as follows:
“1. Whether there exists insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of obtaining possession of a controlled substance by fraud.”
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
We recently repeated the standard under which we examine the evidence for sufficiency to support a verdict in Young v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 880, 882 (1984):
“ ‘The oft-repeated rule by which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is that we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, and we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way — it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412 (1976); Brown v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 189 (1978); Nisonger v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1094 (1978).’ ” Quoting from Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1979).
See also Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690 (1978). With this standard in mind, I examine the record to determine whether the evidence supports an inference of wrongful procurement of Preludin, 75 milligrams, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State presented five witnesses in establishing its case against appellant. The inspector for the Wyoming State Board of Pharmacy testified that Preludin is a controlled substance under state statutes, that it is a stimulant primarily prescribed to curb the appetite, and that Prelu-din tablets exist in strengths of 25, 50, and 75 milligrams.
Dr. Henry Stephenson identified State’s Exhibit No. 1 as the prescription for Prelu-din which he had written for appellant using the name “Eddie Opendack.” He testified that he had obtained that name from appellant’s chart prepared by his office staff. He further testified that appellant’s wife, Georgia Opendack, had contacted him previously and had supplied the family medical record which his staff may have used in preparing appellant’s chart.
State’s Exhibit No. 1 bears the notation “75 mg,” but Dr. Stephenson testified on direct examination that he failed to specify a strength when prescribing Preludin for appellant:
“Q Did you give that prescription to a person you thought was Eddie Open-dack?
“A I did.
“Q At the time you give [sic] it to the patient was there a strength, 75, written on the prescription?
“A There was not.
“Q Why wasn’t there a strength on the prescription?
“A I hadn’t put one on there.
*646“Q Why didn’t you put one on there? Is there a reason?
“A I suppose I neglected to.”
On cross-examination, Dr. Stephenson said that he had no recollection of having been contacted to amend appellant’s prescription to reflect the dosage of 75 milligrams. When asked about the possibility of such a change, the witness replied, “I suppose it’s always a possibility.” Dr. Stephenson subsequently stated, however, that it was his opinion that he had not written “75 milligrams” on the prescription.
The State next called two pharmacists whom appellant had contacted on January 20, 1983, to fill his prescription for Prelu-din. The first witness testified that appellant had presented the prescription, which failed to specify a dosage, around 2:45 p.m. Because the witness had not wished to delay his coffee break by telephoning Dr. Stephenson to obtain the correct strength, he told appellant that he did not carry the drug. The second pharmacist called by the State testified that he had filled appellant’s prescription for Preludin, 75 milligrams. On rebuttal, he established that the prescription specified the strength of 75 milligrams when first presented by appellant. The witness did not testify as to the time of day that this transaction with appellant occurred.
The State called as its final witness the correctional officer for the county jail. He established that appellant had signed his name as “Eddie Broom” on a fingerprint card and a telephone memorandum.
We recently discussed, in two related cases, the type of conduct necessary for a defendant to “knowingly or intentionally” obtain “a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge.” Section 35 — 7—1033(a)(iii). Robinson v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 374 (1984); Cronin v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 370 (1984). We cited extensive authority for the proposition that criminal statutes such as ours proscribe the procurement of drugs through untruthfulness or nondisclosure, regardless of whether the defendant commits a fraud in the technical sense. We found this concept compatible with the statute’s purpose of preventing the distribution of controlled substances for other than valid medical reasons. Therefore, to sustain the conviction in the instant case, the evidence must support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly or intentionally obtained Preludin, 75 milligrams, through untruthfulness or other deceitful conduct, as contemplated by § 35-7-1033(a)(iii) and the court’s instructions to the jury.
On appeal, the State does not rely on the theory, important at trial, that appellant obtained Preludin illegally through the use of a false name. Rather, the State contends that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant altered the prescription so as to read “75 mg.” I cannot agree.
The evidence establishes that Dr. Stephenson prescribed Preludin for appellant but neglected to specify the dosage on the prescription form. The doctor examined the prescription and conceded the possibility that he had changed the form. Nothing in the record indicates that the doctor intended to prescribe a dosage other than 75 milligrams. If the prescribing physician could not state definitely that he had not amended the prescription, how could the jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on this point?
In Chavez v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 166, 172 (1979), we examined the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal. The only inference which logically could be drawn from the facts of that case was the possibility that the defendant had possessed the requisite mental state for conviction. We concluded that the State had not carried its burden of establishing criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 601 P.2d at 172. Similarly, in the instant case, the only inference that can be drawn from the record, given the testimony of the prescribing physician, is the possibility that appellant amended the prescription. Such inference fails to satisfy the State’s burden of estab*647lishing the fraudulent procurement of Pre-ludin beyond a reasonable doubt.
Neither does the record support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant furnished a false name to the doctor in order to obtain the drug. The only testimony in this regard indicates that the name “Eddie Opendack” may have come from the family medical records, filed under the surname “Opendack” and supplied by appellant’s wife.
Since the evidence favorable to the State is insufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt, I would have reversed appellant’s conviction and would have remanded the case to the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant having petitioned the Court for a rehearing of his appeal, the Court, being fully advised, finds that it gave full recognition to the holding of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and based its decision thereon; wherefore, it is
ORDERED that appellant’s Petition for Rehearing be, and it hereby is, denied.