Court Opinion

ID: 9919207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 18:03:14.211774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.486116
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2021-3588
                  _____________________________

RAYMOND PROFIT,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
James M. Colaw, Judge.

                         January 17, 2024

RAY, J.

     Raymond Profit was indicted for first-degree murder with a
firearm (count I) and robbery with a firearm or deadly weapon
(count II). After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged on count
I with special findings that he possessed and discharged a firearm
resulting in the victim’s death. On count II, he was convicted of the
lesser-included offense of petit theft. He was sentenced to life in
prison on count I and time served on count II.

     On appeal, he first argues that his first-degree murder
conviction should be vacated because it could have been based on
a legally inadequate theory. He next argues that his trial attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel due to his failure to move
for an arrest of judgment. We affirm.
                                  I

     To begin, Profit challenges his first-degree murder conviction
because the jury’s verdict could have rested on an inadequate legal
theory. He contends that the State presented two alternative
theories of first-degree murder: (1) premeditated murder and (2)
felony murder based on the commission of a robbery. The
underlying offense of robbery was separately charged in count II.
Yet the jury convicted him of the lesser offense of petit theft in
count II, which is only a misdemeanor. Because the general verdict
does not specify which theory of first-degree murder the jury relied
on, Profit argues that the jurors may have erroneously believed
that he could be convicted of felony murder based on the
commission of a theft.

     A true inconsistent verdict on legally interlocking charges can
be reversible error. Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 218, 220–21 (Fla.
2007) (citing State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732–33 (Fla. 1996)).
A true inconsistent verdict occurs when the acquittal of one charge
negates an element of another. Id. For example, “convictions for
lesser included misdemeanors of a separately charged underlying
felony negate the essential underlying felony element of felony
murder.” Id. at 221; see also Morris v. State, 349 So. 3d 491, 493
(Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (holding that the jury rendered a true
inconsistent verdict when it convicted the defendant of first-degree
felony murder while acquitting him of the underlying felony).

    Here, however, the error claimed by Profit was not preserved,
and he cannot show a fundamental error.

     Profit raised this issue in a motion to correct sentencing error
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). But a
rule 3.800(b)(2) motion is meant to correct “‘harmful errors in
orders entered as a result of the sentencing process.’” Jackson v.
State, 983 So. 2d 562, 572 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.800 court cmt.). “[S]uch a motion is not the correct procedural
vehicle for attacking the merits of an underlying criminal
conviction.” Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA
2007).

    Profit does not argue that his life sentence is illegal or
erroneous. Instead, he challenges the validity of his conviction and

                                 2
seeks to have it vacated for a new trial. This claim cannot be raised
in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. See Dorsett v. State, 873 So. 2d 424,
425–26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that an error does not become
a sentencing error simply because a successful challenge to
defendant’s conviction would also result in his sentence being
vacated). Consequently, to succeed on appeal, he must show a
fundamental error. See Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 574.

     Fundamental error imposes a difficult burden on a defendant.
Cf. Sims v. State, 135 So. 3d 1098, 1101–02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
(describing fundamental error as the shifting of the burden to the
defendant to prove a harmful error while the harmless error
analysis puts the burden on the State to prove that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). “Fundamental error has
been defined as one that goes to the essence of a fair and impartial
trial, error so fundamentally unfair as to amount to a denial of due
process.” Scoggins v. State, 691 So. 2d 1185, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997). A fundamental error must result in prejudice. See Calloway
v. State, 210 So. 3d 1160, 1191 (Fla. 2017) (“Fundamental error
must amount to a denial of due process, and consequently, should
be found to apply where prejudice follows.”); Jackson, 983 So. 2d
at 576 (Fla. 2008) (“By its very nature, fundamental error has to
be considered harmful. If the error was not harmful, it would not
meet our requirement for being fundamental . . . .” (quoting Reed
v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 369–70 (Fla. 2002))).

     Legally inconsistent verdicts can constitute fundamental
error. See Zelaya v. State, 257 So. 3d 493, 497 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
And while the existence of a valid alternative legal theory does not
save a true inconsistent verdict when the issue is preserved, it is a
key factor in a fundamental error analysis. For instance, in Zelaya,
Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a conviction for
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon when the jury’s finding
of guilt for that offense conflicted with the findings on the three
robbery counts and an attempted robbery count arising from the
same incident. 257 So. 3d at 496. In the robbery and attempted
robbery counts, the defendant was charged with committing the
offenses with a firearm or deadly weapon, but he was convicted of
the lesser offenses of robbery with a weapon and attempted
robbery with a weapon. Id. The Fourth District reasoned that by
acquitting the defendant of the greater robbery offenses, the jury

                                 3
found as a matter of law that he did not possess a firearm or deadly
weapon during the offenses. Id. No alternative theory of
aggravated battery had been alleged or proven. Id. Therefore,
despite the defendant’s failure to preserve the error, the Fourth
District reversed, concluding that the error was fundamental. Id.
at 497.

     Similarly, in Proctor v. State, 205 So. 3d 784 (Fla. 2d DCA
2016), the defendant was charged with committing two crimes
against the same victim: (1) aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon on a person over sixty-five and (2) aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon on a person over sixty-five. Id. at 785. He was
convicted of the aggravated assault charge with a finding that he
did not actually possess a firearm. Id. at 786. Yet no evidence or
argument was presented as to the defendant’s possession of a
different deadly weapon. Id. at 787. Nor was the jury instructed on
the alternative theory of aggravated assault with intent to commit
a felony. Id. The verdict refuted any suggestion that the jury
intended to pardon the defendant of the firearm possession. Id. at
789. Despite the evidence that the defendant used a firearm during
both offenses, the jury also found the defendant guilty of the lesser
offense of battery on a person over sixty-five instead of aggravated
battery with a deadly weapon on a person over sixty-five. Id. at
788. Thus, the jury’s findings indicated that it did not believe that
the defendant used the firearm during either offense. Id. Because
the jury’s finding on the aggravated assault charge negated an
element of the offense, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal
concluded that the jury had convicted the defendant based on a
theory not charged in the information and that this amounted to
fundamental error. Id. at 789.

     Here, unlike Proctor and Zelaya, the evidence supported two
valid alternative theories of first-degree murder: premeditated
murder and felony murder during the commission of an attempted
robbery.

     There is no question that the jury believed that Profit shot and
killed the victim. In connection with count I, the jury found that
Profit actually possessed and discharged a firearm, resulting in the
victim’s death.

                                 4
     The State’s theory was that the motive for the shooting was a
debt. While Profit testified that the victim did not owe him money,
that testimony was undermined by the evidence of the victim’s
large drug transactions—with some drugs purchased for his
personal use—at a time when he had money troubles. Profit
testified that after meeting the victim in mid-March, he sold the
victim $200 to $300 worth of crack cocaine on fifteen to twenty
occasions. Around that time, the victim was also buying drugs from
three other drug dealers. One dealer testified to selling the victim
$100 to $200 worth of crack cocaine four or five times. But the
victim’s fiancée testified that his construction business was in
financial trouble. His financial difficulties had caused him to sell
drugs to support his family. The medical examiner testified that
when the victim died on March 29, 2011, he had cocaine and
Oxycodone in his system in concentrations consistent with
substance abuse.

     Profit’s testimony that the victim did not owe him a debt is
also contrary to his own statements. One witness testified that
Profit told him that he shot the victim in the head because the
victim owed him between $1,600 and $1,800. In a recorded
conversation, Profit told a confidential informant that the victim
owed him money, so he lured the victim into a meeting by
pretending that he was not worried about the debt. When the
victim could not pay what he owed, Profit shot him. At trial, Profit
acknowledged the accuracy of the recorded conversation and
confirmed that he had made those statements.

     The circumstances of the victim’s death further support
premeditation. Profit called and texted the victim on March 29 to
set up a drug deal. The victim went to meet Profit at Profit’s
apartment complex inside an apartment the victim had been hired
to renovate. The victim was later discovered in the bathroom,
slumped against the wall and the bathtub. He had been shot four
times—twice in the head, once in the torso, and once through the
arm. Three of the four gunshot wounds were fatal. He had no
defensive wounds. The blood spatter on the wall suggested that he
was shot while he was sitting or kneeling on the bathroom floor.
Taken together, Profit’s actions in luring the victim to the
apartment, his intent to make the victim pay his debt or be
punished for it, and the way the victim was killed all show

                                 5
premeditation. See Barnes v. State, 218 So. 3d 500, 504 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2017) (“Premeditation can be inferred from facts that include:
the nature of the weapon used; the presence or absence of adequate
provocation; previous difficulties between the parties; the manner
in which the homicide was committed; and/or the nature and the
manner of the wounds inflicted.”).

     The evidence also supported the theory of felony murder
during the commission of an attempted robbery. At the time of his
death, the victim owed Profit money. When the victim was
discovered, his pockets were turned inside out. He had been using
his cellphone just before he died, but his cellphone was missing.
He did not have a wallet, identification, or money to buy drugs.
While this suggested that his possessions had been removed from
his person, it was unclear what was taken from him. Perhaps the
jury determined that Profit tried to rob the victim and was
thwarted. That finding would not conflict with Profit’s conviction
for theft. A theft can be accomplished by an attempt to take
property. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2011) (defining “theft” to
include endeavoring to obtain the property of another); State v.
Santo, 693 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“Because the
statute includes the phrase ‘or endeavors to obtain or to use,’ the
state proves a completed theft ‘when an attempt, along with the
requisite intent, is established.’” (quoting State v. Sykes, 434 So.
2d 325, 327 (Fla. 1983))). Nor is this conclusion undermined by the
jury’s failure to separately convict Profit of attempted robbery
because the jury was not instructed on that lesser-included offense
in connection with count II.

      Not only does the evidence support these two valid theories of
first-degree murder, but neither the State’s arguments nor the jury
instructions allowed the jury to convict Profit of felony murder
based on a theft. The State’s opening statement framed the
evidence as proving either premeditated murder or felony murder
during a robbery. In the State’s closing, it argued that the jury
could convict Profit of felony murder during a robbery because he
shot the victim while trying to forcibly take the victim’s wallet,
cash, and/or cellphone. And when the trial court instructed the
jury on the elements of felony murder, the jury was not merely
advised that felony murder required proof that Profit killed the
victim during the commission of a felony. The instructions

                                 6
required the State to show that Profit killed the victim during the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery. They defined
the elements of robbery and attempted robbery, as well as the term
“principals in the commission of robbery.” They did not mention
theft. Thus, it would be hard to conceive of the jurors interpreting
those instructions as allowing a conviction for felony murder based
on the underlying offense of theft. Cf. Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S.
313, 328 (2013) (“[A] jury is presumed to follow its instructions.”
(quoting Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599, 606 (2012))).

     While Profit stresses the possibility that the jury convicted
him based on an invalid felony murder theory, a conceivable
possibility of prejudice does not establish a fundamental error.
Especially in circumstances like these, where that possibility is so
remote. The jury instructions, findings, arguments, and evidence
supported two valid legal theories. And it is illogical to conclude
that despite the arguments and jury instructions defining felony
murder exclusively in terms of a robbery or attempted robbery, the
jurors mistakenly believed he could be convicted of felony murder
based on the underlying offense of theft. Thus, Profit failed to meet
his burden of showing fundamental error.

                                 II

     In Profit’s second issue, he argues that his trial attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record
by failing to move for arrest of judgment. He asserts that counsel
should have made the argument described in Issue I.

     An unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot support reversal on direct appeal unless the defendant
establishes that a fundamental error occurred. Steiger v. State, 328
So. 3d 926, 932 (Fla. 2021). But for the reasons already discussed
in connection with Issue I, Profit has failed to show a fundamental
error. As a result, his unpreserved ineffective assistance of counsel
claim also fails.

    AFFIRMED.

BILBREY and LONG, JJ., concur.

                                 7
               _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Richard M. Bracey,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Adam B. Wilson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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