Court Opinion

ID: 9490102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:32:38.543663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:53.708989
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concedes that Brandt established a prima facie case of sex discrimination and that she presented sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered reason for hiring Frentzel was a pretext for its true reason. Yet the majority speculates as to the employer’s actual motivation and concludes that Brandt’s discrimination claim should, not have even survived a motion for JAML. Our court should not engage in such conjecture, which are essentially independent credibility determinations. Rather, because Brandt presented more than adequate evidence of sex discrimination to go to a factfin-der, I would affirm the jury verdict and judgment of the district court in favor of Brandt.
Brandt established the elements of a prima facie case of sex discrimination. First, as a woman, Brandt is a member of a protected class. Second, she applied for and was qualified for the position of an apprentice meat cutter. In August 1990, Brandt submitted an application to Shop ‘n Save for the position and her four-year experience as a meat clerk prepared her for nearly all of the necessary duties of a meat cutter and certainly of an apprentice. Third, despite Brandt’s qualifications, she was rejected in favor of a male applicant under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. At the time she submitted her application, she interviewed for the position and was told that although the company could not hire her at the time, her application would remain in the active file for one year. Less than a year after Brandt’s interview, Shop ‘n Save hired Frentzel, who had not even filled out an employment application and who had absolutely no meat-cutting experience. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Brandt’s establishment of a prima facie case created a legal presumption of sex discrimination that, if unrebutted, would have entitled her to judgment as a matter of law. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, *940506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746-47, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
To prevent entry of such judgment, Shop ‘n Save had the burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The company stated that it hired Frentzel rather than promote Brandt because Frentzel had management experience and some college education and because the decisionmakers were not even aware that Brandt was an applicant for the position when Frentzel was hired. At this point, the legal presumption of discrimination from Brandt’s prima facie case disappeared; yet, as our court recently clarified en banc, the elements of the prima facie case remain as evidence from which the factfinder may infer discrimination. Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 835-36 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749). As Justice Powell has explained:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiffs initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiffs initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant’s explanation.
Texas v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095 n. 10, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir.1996) (en bane).
In addition to her prima facie case, Brandt presented an arsenal of evidence to discredit Shop ‘n Save’s articulated reasons for hiring Frentzel. She alleged that Shop ‘n Save preselected Frentzel for the position and tailored the job qualifications to fit him. Frent-zel was the only person Shop ‘n Save ever hired for the apprentice position with the “special” job qualifications. Further, it is questionable whether Frentzel even possessed the qualifications for which he was allegedly hired or, as the majority notes, that the decisionmakers actually had any interest in his education or management experience. Evidence of pre-selection and the creation of a position tailored to Frentzel’s qualifications reasonably and effectively could have discredited Shop n’ Save’s explanation. See Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 729 (8th Cir.1982). Moreover, Shop ‘n Save’s decision cannot be defended on the basis of the relative qualifications of the applicants if those qualifications were not even considered. See Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 625 (11th Cir.1983). Further calling into question the veracity of Shop ‘n Save’s proffered reason, three and a half years after the company hired Frentzel it had yet to promote him to a management position. Brandt also introduced evidence that the majority of Shop' ‘n Save’s meat clerks were female and, at the time of trial, Shop ‘n Save had only hired one female meat cutter. The evidence that Shop ‘n Save has consistently maintained a workforce segregated by gender further buttressed Brandt’s discrimination claim. See Lams v. General Waterworks Corp., 766 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1985).
Brandt’s strong challenges to the defendant’s proffered reasons provided additional evidence from which the factfinder could have inferred that Shop ‘n Save’s decision was actually motivated by discrimination. As our court en banc just restated:
“[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reasons, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as [sex].”
Ryther, at 836 (quoting Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). Or, as Judge Posner put it in his decision for the Seventh Circuit en banc, “If the employer offers a pretext — a phony reason — for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact is permitted, although not compelled, to infer that the *941real reason was [sex].” Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assoc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.1991) (en bane).
I recognize that evidence of pretext may not support a reasonable inference of discrimination in some eases. “[EJvidence of pretext will not by itself be enough to make a submissible case if it is, standing alone, inconsistent with a reasonable inference of age discrimination.” Ryther, at 837. For example, in Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir.1996), where the employee discredited the employer’s reason for his discharge by acknowledging that he was fired for confronting his employer about alleged SEC violations, clearly no inference of discrimination remained. Id. at 1335. But this is not a Rothmeier-type case. Brandt’s pretext evidence does not point to a nondiseriminatory reason for passing her over nor has she offered or acknowledged such a justification. Rather, Brandt vigorously maintains that Shop ‘n Save’s decision was actually gender-motivated.
Shop ‘n Save has consistently argued that it hired Frentzel because he was more qualified and because the decisionmakers did not know Brandt was an applicant, asserting this position to the district court before, during, and after the trial, and continuing to do so before this court. Neither the jury, in considering the MHRA claim, nor the district court for the Title VII claim accepted this explanation. Nor does the majority, explicitly finding that the defendant’s articulated reasons for hiring Frentzel were fabricated. Yet, after discrediting Shop ‘n Save’s given reason, the majority creates its own, nondiscriminatory explanation for the defendant’s employment decision. The majority reaches out and speculates that Frentzel was actually hired because of Dougherty’s loyalty to an old friend. If Shop ‘n Save’s reason for hiring Frentzel was as the majority determined, Shop ‘n Save could have and should have advanced this reason before the trial court, where it could have been subjected to a legitimate inquiry. Shop ‘n Save should not benefit from failing to assert the “true” reason for its decision to the district court. As the Third Circuit stated:
We routinely expect that a party give honest testimony in a court of law; there is no reason to expect less of an employer charged with unlawful discrimination. If the employer fails to come forth with the true and credible explanation and instead keeps a hidden agenda, it does so at its own peril. Under those circumstances, there is no policy to be served by refusing to permit the jury to infer that the real motivation is the one that the plaintiff has charged.
Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1069. There is no basis in the record for the majority’s speculation. Even if there were, however, it would be for the factfinder — not this court — to consider in determining the employer’s motive. We need not decide whether a nonbusiness-related reason for rejecting a qualified woman in favor of a less-qualified, personal friend of a supervisor may ever be the basis for a summary judgment against such a claimant. Suffice it to say that Shop ‘n Save’s articulated reason smacked of pretext, and it was proper for the factfinder to infer that its real motivation was as Brandt charged.
The properly instructed jury determined that Shop ‘n Save discriminated against Brandt on the basis of her sex in violation of the MHRA. The district court then made specific findings of fact and independently determined that Shop ‘n Save similarly violated Title VII. We should not reverse the verdicts for insufficient evidence unless, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts, no reasonable factfinder could have returned a verdict for the non-moving party. Ryther, at 835. The district court properly denied Shop ‘n Save’s motion for JAML. I would affirm the court in all respects and award Brandt the damages to which she is entitled.