Court Opinion

ID: 9568768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:19.010158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:06:07.933333
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
concurring specially.
It is apparent from the record of this case that the recall campaign, the particular political process which was the beginning point for this litigation, has been completed. Appellee has suggested that this appeal is, therefore, moot and must be dismissed. I agree that it should be, but I concur because I believe this court has reached the correct conclusion.
Under the Appellate Practice Act, the dismissal of an appeal is mandatory for the three specific instances contained in subsection (b) of OCGA § 5-6-48, [cit.], one of which is “(3) Where the questions presented have become moot.” “A moot case is one which seeks to determine an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights.” [Cit.] *247. . ‘This court will upon its own motion dismiss an appeal where it affirmatively appears that a decision would be of no benefit to the complaining party. [Cit.] The fact that the appellants might possibly derive some future benefit from a favorable adjudication on an abstract question will not require this court to retain and decide the case. [Cit.]’ ” [Cits.] Of course, a case may be moot, but, because the error is capable of repetition and yet evades review, the appeal will be considered. [Cits.] [Chastain v. Baker, 255 Ga. 432, 433 (339 SE2d 241) (1986).]
Decided June 8, 1990.
Clark & McLaughlin, Michael C. Clark, for appellant.
Kitchens, Kelley, Gaynes, Huprich & Shmerling, David P. Kitchens, Mark A. Kelley, for appellee.
Altman, Kritzer & Levick, Mark J. Levick, Edward J. Sack, Julie Edelson, amici curiae.
The alleged error in the present case, refusing an injunction against appellee’s policy of prohibiting political activity and solicitation on its commercial property, is clearly capable of repetition. I do not believe, however, that it is such an error as will necessarily evade review. In order to justify reaching the merits of the constitutional claims involved, we have narrowed the issue to the right to use private commercial property to solicit signatures specifically for recall campaigns and do not address the right of politically active citizens, to insist on using the private commercial property of others for political purposes other than recall campaigns. This narrow approach invites piecemeal litigation, requiring that we address separately every political purpose for which anyone wishes to use the private commercial property of another. The issue is much broader and should be considered in a broader context than this single recall campaign. While I agree that the trial court was correct in denying appellant an injunction, and I agree with the rationale employed by this court in affirming the judgment below, I believe that the better and more prudent approach would be to wait for a proper case in which to decide the broader issue of the right to use private commercial property for political purposes generally.