Court Opinion

ID: 9399424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 22:03:59.564937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.474422
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/2/23 Peterson v. Harris CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                        CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

 SABRINA PETERSON,                                                               B315356

             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                           (Los Angeles County
                                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 21STCV07836)
             v.

 CLIFFORD HARRIS et al.,

             Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Reversed in part and
remanded with directions.
     Berk Brettler, Andrew B. Brettler, Jake A. Camara;
Lavely & Singer and Kelsey J. Leeker, for Defendants and
Appellants.
      Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell & Diggs, Rodney S. Diggs,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      In January 2021, plaintiff Sabrina Peterson posted a
video and messages to her Instagram account accusing
defendants Clifford and Tameka Harris (entertainers who
perform under the stage names “TI” and “Tiny”) of various
forms of sexual and physical abuse.1 Peterson also accused
Clifford of previously threatening her with a handgun.
Clifford, Tameka, and Tameka’s friend, codefendant
Shekinah Jones Anderson, responded to Peterson through
their social media accounts. These responses serve the basis
for Peterson’s lawsuit against Clifford, Tameka, and
Anderson. The Harrises filed a special motion to strike
every cause of action against them under the anti-SLAPP
statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).2 After finding their
conduct to be protected activity, the trial court found
Peterson had established a probability of prevailing on the
merits of all seven causes of action. In so finding, the court
accepted post-complaint evidence attributing Anderson’s
accusation against Peterson to the Harrises. The court
denied the motion.
      The Harrises appeal the trial court’s order and contend
Peterson was prohibited from amending her complaint with
post-complaint evidence attributing Anderson’s statements

1     Clifford and Tameka share the same last name. In the
interests of clarity, we refer to them by their first names.
2    Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                2
to the Harrises. They also challenge the court’s finding of
minimal merit on each cause of action.
      We conclude the trial court properly considered post-
complaint evidence to clarify the claims that Peterson
asserted against the Harrises and affirm the denial in part.
However, we reverse the court’s order with respect to
Peterson’s causes of action for trade libel, intentional and
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On remand,
the trial court shall determine an award of attorney fees in
favor of the Harrises for partially prevailing on their motion
to strike.

     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Peterson’s Complaint
      The complaint, filed March 1, 2021, set forth the
following allegations concerning an ongoing public dispute
between Peterson and the Harrises. Peterson has known the
Harrises personally for over a decade. Peterson is an award-
winning business coach, entrepreneur, and founder of Glam
University, a company designed to “coach women who are
interested in entrepreneurship.” The Harrises are well-
known musicians, producers, and television personalities.
Codefendant Anderson is a reality television personality who
has appeared on a television show covering the Harrises.
      At some point during the parties’ friendship, Peterson
got into an altercation with Clifford’s assistant. Responding
to the altercation, Clifford placed a gun to Peterson’s head

                              3
and said, “‘Bitch I’ll kill you.’” Peterson ceased
communicating with Clifford but maintained her friendship
with Tameka.
      In January 2021, Peterson was the victim of a
carjacking. To cope with this traumatic experience, on
January 26, 2021, Peterson “shared her traumatic
experience with [Clifford] to a group of her followers” on
Instagram. As established by the evidentiary submissions
discussed below, Peterson also posted messages she had
received from other women accusing Clifford and Tameka of
various forms of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse.
Clifford, Tameka, and Anderson issued various statements
responding to Peterson’s Instagram posts.
      In every cause of action, the complaint alleged that
Clifford, Tameka, and Anderson “posted certain statements
on the public internet site Instagram to their more than 23.6
million followers” and sought to hold all three liable for the
statements. The complaint identifies the posts or public
statements as follows:

     1.     The Posts on the Harrises’ Instagram
            Accounts
     On January 26, 2021 (the same day Peterson revealed
the prior incident involving Clifford), Tameka posted to her
Instagram account a photograph of Clifford standing
alongside Peterson’s eight-year-old son. Attached to the
photograph was the following message:

                              4
             “‘Hold up. . . So you want your abuser to
     train your sons? He was just uncle 2 years ago
     . . . now when did you say my husband assaulted
     you? Did you change your mind or change it
     back? What’s up wit you today Pooh? . . . You
     strange. Everybody know you been special. . . .”

Tameka’s Instagram account has 6.6 million followers.

      In a statement released to the public January 29, 2021,
the Harrises “‘emphatically den[ied] in the strongest way
possible the egregiously appalling allegations being made
against them by [ ] Peterson.” The same day, Clifford posted
a video to his Instagram account in which he stated:
            “‘Whatever we ever have done has been
      done with consensual adults . . . . [¶] We ain’t
      never forced nobody, we ain’t never drugged
      nobody against their will. We ain’t never held
      nobody against their will. We never made nobody
      do anything. We never [sexually] trafficked
      any[body]. . . . [¶] I also want you to know
      there’s evil at play. . . . We’ve had a history in
      dealing with the particular individual in
      question.’”

Clifford’s Instagram account has 13.5 million followers.

      2.    The Post on Anderson’s Instagram Account
      Also on January 29, 2021, Anderson posted a video to
her Instagram account. In the video, Anderson stated:

                              5
             “‘She’s looking for fucking attention. She
     wants [Tameka]. She has sex with [Tameka], she
     wants [Tameka] to be her girlfriend. Now listen,
     this is my thing, [s]he came out and [Clifford]
     pulled a gun on her. . . .
             “‘She has a problem. But she ain’t talking
     about how she fucked Tamika [sic] too. I said
     what I said. Why she ain’t talking about she
     done sucked his dick and fucked her in her pussy.
     . . . I’m trying to figure out why she ain’t tell ya’ll
     about how much pussy she ate? Why she didn’t
     tell ya’ll about she wanted the women who used
     to go recruit the bitches for him to fuck?
             “‘What’s up? . . . Go ask her why [she] ain’t
     tell you she didn’t get fucked and she went to the
     apartment? Why she didn’t tell ya’ll if she done
     had somebody that did too?’”

Anderson’s Instagram account has 3.5 million followers.

      3.    The Causes of Action
      Peterson’s complaint asserted seven causes of action,
all against Clifford, Tameka, and Anderson: (1) defamation;
(2) trade libel; (3) false light invasion of privacy;
(4) intentional and (5) negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage; and (6) intentional and
(7) negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint
incorporated all of the parties’ statements into each cause of
action.

                                6
B.    The Anti-SLAPP Proceedings3
      1.    The Harrises’ Special Motion to Strike
      The Harrises filed a motion to strike all seven causes of
action based on conduct in furtherance of their right to speak
on an ongoing public controversy created by Peterson. As to
the merits, the Harrises argued none of their statements
asserted a provably false statement of fact. To the extent
their statements implied Peterson had lied about Clifford
threatening her with a gun, the implication was truthful. In
support, they argued Peterson was a “proven liar” because
she pled guilty to lying in a prior criminal matter. In
addition, the Harrises argued Anderson’s statement could
not be attributed to them personally, as “there is no
allegation that the Harrises were responsible or in any way
connected to those statements allegedly made by her.”
      The Harrises filed a supporting declaration by their
attorney Andrew Brettler. Attached to Brettler’s declaration
were court records from a criminal matter involving
Peterson in 2011. Those records reflected a guilty plea in
which Peterson admitted she had “denied know[ing] an
individual named ‘P. Denis,’ when in fact she knew of and
had lived with [this] individual.”4 Also attached to Brettler’s

3     Anderson filed her own motion to strike, and the court
denied the motion. Anderson dismissed her appeal from the
denial of her motion.
4      Peterson pled guilty to Section 1011(a)(2) of title 18 of the
United States Code, which prohibits making “any materially
false, . . . statement or representation” within the branches of the
United States government.

                                 7
declaration were various news articles covering the parties’
dispute. One article reported that in mid-to-late January
2021, Peterson had “posted a series of [direct message]
screenshots from more than a dozen anonymous women who
accused [Clifford] and [Tameka] of sexual abuse and other
transgressions.” Peterson posted the screenshots with the
following superimposed captions: “Refer to Women as His
Cattle?”; “Kidnapping Story from Neighbor!”; “Kids Forced
into a Closet at Gunpoint”; and “Drugged into a [C]orpse
[S]tate?”

      2.    Peterson’s Opposition
      In opposition, Peterson acknowledged “the Harrises are
public figures and the allegations regarding their conduct”
implicated issues of public interest. She argued, however,
that the Harrises’ statements implied the provably false
assertion that Peterson had lied about Clifford threatening
her with a gun. In addition, Peterson argued the Harrises
had directed Anderson to make the salacious sexual
accusations on Instagram.
      Peterson filed supporting declarations from herself and
her attorney Rodney Diggs. In her declaration, Peterson
averred the Harrises “began an online campaign of
harassment” and “enlisted” Anderson to harass, defame, and
discredit Peterson on Instagram. Around May 2, 2021
(several months after Peterson filed the complaint),
Anderson admitted in a video posted to her Instagram
account that she had been “instructed” by Tameka to make

                             8
the salacious sexual accusations against Peterson. As a
result of the defendants’ statements, Peterson declared she
had lost “over 30% of [her] personal clients and clients of
Glam U,” and was unable to attract investors to another
business venture in cannabis. In addition, Peterson averred
she suffered symptoms of emotional distress.
      In his declaration, Diggs stated it had “always been”
Peterson’s intent to pursue every cause of action against the
defendants together. But because the complaint had been
filed before Anderson admitted she had been directed to
make the salacious sexual accusations, Peterson did not
specifically allege this supporting fact in her complaint.
Diggs indicated that Peterson would file an amended
complaint conforming to the post-complaint evidence if
possible.

      3.   The Reply
      The Harrises argued Peterson could not “replead her
claims” against them based on post-complaint evidence
attributing Anderson’s accusations to them individually.

      4.   Hearing and Order
      The court held a hearing on the Harrises’ motion, after
which it took the matter under submission. By subsequent
written order, the trial court denied the motion. The court
found the Harrises had satisfied their burden of showing
each cause of action arose from protected activity within the
meaning of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4). In

                              9
so finding, the court found the parties’ controversy bore upon
matters of public interest, namely violence and sexual abuse
in the entertainment industry. However, the court
concluded Peterson had established a likelihood of prevailing
on each cause of action based on two statements attributable
to the Harrises: (1) their implied statement that Peterson
lied about the gun incident involving Clifford; and (2)
Anderson’s statement that Peterson engaged in salacious
sexual conduct.5
      The Harrises filed a timely notice of appeal.

                         DISCUSSION
      Section 425.16 “provides a procedure for the early
dismissal of what are commonly known as SLAPP suits
(strategic lawsuits against public participation)—litigation of
a harassing nature, brought to challenge the exercise of
protected free speech rights. The section is thus informally
labeled the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Fahlen v. Sutter Central
Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655, 665, fn. 3; Simpson
Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 21; see
§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

5     The court preliminarily noted that “the only defamatory
statements in contention [were] the comments surrounding the
accusation that Peterson was lying about the gun to the head
threat.” The court acknowledged the complaint “in its current
state does not attribute Andersons’s statements to the Harrises.”
Nevertheless, the court attributed Anderson’s statements to the
Harrises, as “the statements permit a reasonable inference [the
Harrises] approved or authorized” Anderson making them.

                               10
      Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion requires a familiar
two-prong approach. “First, the defendant must establish
that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by
section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the
required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a
probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th
376, 384 (Baral).) Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant or deny an anti-SLAPP motion is de novo. (Monster
Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.)

A.     Prong One: Protected Activity
       Under this prong, the court must determine whether
the moving parties made a prima facie showing that some or
all of the plaintiff’s claims arise from an act in furtherance of
their rights of petition or free speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
As we shall discuss, we agree with the Harrises that
Peterson’s claims arise from protected activity made in a
place open to the public or public fora in connection with
issues of public interest. (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(3) & (4).)
Courts employ a two-part test to determine whether speech
concerns a matter of public issue or public interest.
       First, courts must determine what public issue or issue
of public interest the speech implicates. (Geiser v. Kuhns
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1249 (Geiser); FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149 (FilmOn).)
Statements implicating public interest include (1) persons
“in the public eye”; (2) conduct that “could directly affect a

                               11
large number of people beyond the direct participants”; and
(3) “topic[s] of widespread, public interest.” (Rivero v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924.)
       Second, courts analyze the relationship between the
speech and the public conversation about the matter of
public interest, and whether the activity contributes to
public discussion on the issue. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1249; FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149-150.) Viewed
from the position “of a reasonable objective observer,” courts
must consider context (the identity of the speaker, the
audience sought, the timing and location of the speech, and
the apparent purpose of the conduct) to determine whether
there is “‘some degree of closeness’” between the speech and
the topic of public interest. (Geiser, supra, at pp. 1254-1256.)
       The statements made by Clifford, Tameka, and
Anderson in this case implicated issues of public interest.
Issues of “public interest” often include ongoing
controversies concerning “high profile individuals . . . subject
to extensive media scrutiny.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1254 (Jackson); accord, Hall v. Time
Warner, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1347; Seelig v.
Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798,
807-808 (Seelig).)
       Clifford and Tameka are accomplished musicians and
producers, and both have a television show covering their
lives. Peterson herself is a successful entrepreneur and
business coach who has been featured in well-known

                              12
publications. The controversy under which this case arose
directly concerns gun violence and sexual abuse by those in
the entertainment industry. The many articles covering this
controversy clearly establish the public’s interest in it.
(Accord, Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 226, 239-240 [reporting well-known political
consultant’s violence against former wives implicated public
interest].)
      Even assuming the statements did not implicate a
public issue or issue of public interest, they are still
protected as activity encouraging participation “in the
context of an ongoing controversy.” (D.C. v. R.R. (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 1190, 1215; Du Charme v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th
107, 119.) Peterson voluntarily thrust herself into the public
eye by accusing Clifford of gun violence and the Harrises of
various forms of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. All
of the statements appearing in the complaint were
responsive to Peterson’s own public revelations against the
Harrises. As such, Peterson has “subjected herself to
inevitable scrutiny . . . by the public and the media.” (Seelig,
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.)
      Finally, the activity of Clifford, Tameka, and Anderson
all occurred in a public forum for purposes of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3). With one exception,6 all of their

6    It is unclear if the Harrises’ joint statement denying the
accusations by Peterson was posted to their Instagram accounts.
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

                                       13
statements were published on Instagram and could be
readily accessed by 3.5 to 13.5 million followers. (Accord,
Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252; Briganti v. Chow
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 504, 508 (Briganti).) The Harrises
have met their initial burden, and we therefore proceed to
prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

B.    Prong Two: Probability of Prevailing on the
      Merits
      To demonstrate a probability of prevailing on all or
some of her claims, Peterson must “‘demonstrate that the
complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.’ [Citation.]” (Briganti, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at
p. 509.) However, because the anti-SLAPP statute permits
early intervention in lawsuits, “the plaintiff’s burden of
establishing a probability of prevailing is not high: We do
not weigh credibility, nor do we evaluate the weight of the
evidence. Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable
to the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff's submission as a matter
of law. [Citation.] Only a cause of action that lacks ‘even
minimal merit’ constitutes a SLAPP.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v.
Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 699–
700.)

Nevertheless, Peterson acknowledges this statement was
released to the public through various news outlets.

                             14
       1.    Identifying Peterson’s Claims
       Before we address each cause of action against the
Harrises, we must identify the “claims” on which those
causes of action are asserted against the Harrises. In other
words, we must identify the “basis of [ ] conduct” on which
“the various causes of action . . . sought to impose liability.”
(Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 713 (Taus); accord,
Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1012 [courts must identify the conduct “‘on which liability is
based’”].) That is particularly true where, as here, the
defendants seek “to strike particular claims supported by
allegations of protected activity that appear alongside other
claims within a single cause of action. . . .” (Baral, supra,
1 Cal.5th at pp. 391-392, italics added.)
       Here, the trial court found Peterson’s claims were
based on (1) the implied statement that Peterson lied about
Clifford threatening her with a gun; and (2) the accusations
that Peterson engaged in sexual contact with the Harrises
and recruited women for the same. Peterson concurs in the
trial court’s framing of her claims. The Harrises
acknowledge the former claim but dispute the latter.
       In this regard, the Harrises contend Peterson may not
attribute Anderson’s statement to them based on new
allegations and evidence presented during the SLAPP
proceedings. The Harrises argue that the evidence
presented by Peterson in opposition to the motion amends
the complaint, and they rely on Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co.
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 (Simmons) and its progeny

                              15
for the general rule prohibiting leave to amend once the first
prong of the anti-SLAPP statute is met. (Id. at p. 1074;
accord, Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1263 [the court
must “take the complaint as it is”].) Simmons crafted this
rule to avoid gamesmanship and the “procedural quagmire”
in which plaintiffs “disguise the vexatious nature of the[ir]
suit through more artful pleading.” (Simmons, supra, 92
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1073-1074.)7

7      Courts have applied the Simmons rule in two
circumstances not present here: (1) when the proposed
amendment seeks to overcome the defendant’s initial burden
under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis; and (2) when the
proposed amendment seeks to assert for the first time that a
defendant is liable for statements not found in the complaint.
(See Simmons, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073 [amendment
sought to “remove any allegations that might be . . . protected”];
Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 869, 900 [amendment provided new statements “not
identified or referred to in the [operative] complaint”]; Jackson,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1263, 1264, fn. 10 [same].)
       Further, Simmons did not “erect[] an absolute bar to
amendment.” (Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858,
869, 873 (Nguyen-Lam).) Rather, courts have permitted
amendments that purport “to meet [the plaintiff’s] burden on the
second prong [based on] timely submitted facts already before the
court. In such cases, . . . the trial court need only rule on the
[anti-SLAPP] motion and facts already under consideration.”
(Id. at p. 872.) “Where the evidence submitted for the motion
enables the plaintiff to demonstrate the requisite probability of
prevailing on the merits of her defamation claim, the policy
concerns against amendment in the anti-SLAPP context do not
apply because the plaintiff’s suit—shown to be likely
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

                                       16
      Here, Peterson’s complaint alleged that Clifford,
Tameka, and Anderson “posted certain statements on the
public internet site Instagram to their more than 23.6
million followers,” and Peterson sought to hold all three
defendants liable for every cause of action asserted. The
facts probative of the Harrises’ liability for Anderson’s
Instagram posts “emerged through the evidence the parties
submitted for the hearing on the strike motion.” (Nguyen-
Lam, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 868; see Slauson
Partnership v. Ochoa (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1021
[“nothing in the [anti-SLAPP] statute or case law suggests
that the factual analysis for ruling on the motion must be
frozen in time on the date the complaint is filed”].)8 After
Peterson initiated this action, Anderson admitted she had
been “enlisted” by the Harrises and directed by Tameka to
make the accusations against Peterson on Instagram. The
additional information provided in connection with the

meritorious—is not a strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Id. at p. 863.) Further, such an amendment does
not risk “thwart[ing] with delay” the procedure under section
425.16. (Id. at p. 872.) Thus, a court may deny an anti-SLAPP
motion where, after the first prong of the analysis is met, the
allegations of a cause of action can be amended conforming to
proof presented to state a cause of action upon which the plaintiff
has the requisite probability of success. (Id. at p. 874.)
8     The Harrises do not address Peterson’s duty of pleading a
claim against them for Anderson’s statement. (See Kinsella v.
Kinsella (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 442, 464 [the court “neither
consider[s] nor express[es] a view regarding” an issue that is not
supported by “argument or legal authority”].)

                                17
motion clarifies and supports Peterson’s pursuit of claims
against the Harrises which, as we shall discuss, serve as
valid bases for potentially meritorious causes of action. (See
Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co.
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 949 [“the SLAPP Act was ‘intended to
end meritless SLAPP suits early without great cost to the
target’ [citation], not to abort potentially meritorious claims
due to the lack of discovery”].)
      In sum, we find no error in the trial court’s attribution
of Anderson’s statement to the Harrises when considering
each cause of action. Peterson’s claims against the Harrises
are therefore based on (1) the implied statement Peterson
lied about the gun incident involving Clifford, and (2) the
express statement accusing Peterson of engaging in
salacious sexual conduct. To continue with these claims,
Peterson must establish minimal merit as to each claim to
meet her burden. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 391-392;
see Finato v. Keith A. Fink & Associates (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 136, 148-149 [prior appeal striking particular
allegations under section 425.16 barred repleading the same
or “analogous” allegations by amended complaint].)

      2.    Defamation
      “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a
publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged,
and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special
damage.” (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.)
“If the person defamed is a public figure, [he or she] cannot

                               18
recover unless he proves, by clear and convincing
evidence . . . the libelous statement was made with ‘“actual
malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” (Reader’s
Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 256
(Reader’s Digest), citation omitted.)
       When individuals voluntarily inject themselves or are
drawn into a particular public controversy, they become
public figures for a limited range of issues. (Gertz v. Robert
Welch (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 351, accord, Khawar v. Globe
Internat. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 263.) In this case, Peterson
voluntarily thrust herself into the public eye by initiating a
public controversy regarding gun violence and sexual abuse
in the entertainment industry. Thus, Peterson can be
considered, at a minimum, a limited public figure.
       Peterson marshaled evidence suggesting both
statements were provably false. As to the implied statement
Peterson had lied about the gun incident, Peterson averred
she had endured the “traumatic experience” involving
Clifford placing a gun to her head, and she stated the
Harrises’ denials were “false.” The Harrises offered no
evidence contradicting these averments. Viewed in context,
the Harrises’ statements implied a provably true or false
statement that Peterson had lied about the gun incident.
(See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 U.S. 1,
20-21; Carver v. Bonds (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328, 346
[“[c]alling someone a liar can convey a factual imputation of
specific dishonest conduct”].)

                             19
      The Harrises do not discuss any of this evidence and
instead argue that their statements that Peterson had lied
were in fact true. Citing Peterson’s prior criminal matter in
2011, the Harrises contend Peterson “is, in fact, a proven
liar.” But while Peterson’s criminal records may establish
Peterson lied about something in 2011, they do not
conclusively establish that she lied about Clifford
threatening her with a gun. (Accord, Dickinson v. Cosby
(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 691 [“Cosby would have us
conclude, as a matter of law, that the gist or sting of the
demand letter and press release was that Dickinson is a liar,
not that Dickinson lied about the rape. This is an inference
we cannot make”].)9
      Regarding the salacious sexual accusations, Peterson
declared she had “never engaged in sexual acts with either of
the Harrises nor have I ever recruited woman [sic] to engage
in sexual acts with the Harrises.” These allegations are also
capable of being proven true or false. (See Briganti, supra,
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 509 [plaintiff met her burden by
denying the defendant’s defamatory accusations].) The
Harrises do not challenge these statements as provably
false. Both statements are provable statements of fact.

9     The Harrises also appear to suggest their implied
statements were privileged under a “‘qualified privilege of reply.’”
The Harrises never raised this privilege below, and we do not
consider it. (Silk v. Feldman (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 547, 555;
Gallanis-Politis v. Medina (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 600, 615, fn.
10.)

                                20
      We also conclude that, contrary to the Harrises’
arguments, Peterson made the requisite showing of actual
malice as a limited public figure. “‘[Evidence] of negligence,
of motive and of intent may be adduced for the purpose of
establishing, by cumulation and by appropriate inferences,
the fact of a defendant’s recklessness or of his knowledge of
falsity.’ [Citations.] A failure to investigate [citation], anger
and hostility toward the plaintiff . . . may, in an appropriate
case, indicate that the publisher himself had serious doubts
regarding the truth of his publication.” (Reader’s Digest,
supra, 37 Cal. 3d at pp. 257–258, fn. omitted.)
      Here, the Harrises’ hostility toward Peterson is so clear
as to leave no substantial doubt. Their statements were
responsive to Peterson’s public revelation of controversial
issues involving the Harrises. From the parties’ dispute, a
reasonable factfinder could infer the Harrises were
“motivated by hostility and lacked regard for the truth of
[their] publications.” (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
652, 683 (Balla); see id. at pp. 683-684 [finding “vengeance
motive” behind the defendant’s conduct].) In addition,
Peterson averred the Harrises fabricated the salacious
sexual accusations and engaged in a campaign of
harassment aimed at discrediting her. The Harrises offered
no evidence to contradict this evidence. Thus, Peterson has
met her burden of establishing minimal merit for defamation
under both of her claims.

                               21
      3.     False Light Invasion of Privacy
      “‘False light is a species of invasion of privacy, based on
publicity that places a plaintiff before the public in a false
light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and where the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard
as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light
in which the plaintiff would be placed.’ [Citation.]”
(Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264.) “To establish a
false light claim based on a defamatory publication, a
plaintiff ‘must meet the same requirements’ as for a
defamation claim.” (Balla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 687.)
      Because Peterson’s cause of action for false light
invasion of privacy is based on the same claims for
defamation, the Harrises assert this cause of action should
be stricken as “superfluous.”
      We agree Peterson’s false light cause of action is
cumulative and will add nothing to her claims for relief.
(Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 1359, 1389, fn. 13 [“[w]hen a false light claim is
coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is
essentially superfluous, and stands or fails on whether it
meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of
action”]; see Civ. Code, § 3425.3.)
      But “a SLAPP motion is not the proper procedural
vehicle to address” cumulative or superfluous causes of
action. (M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
623, 637 (M.G.).) Peterson met her burden of establishing
minimal merit to her defamation cause of action.

                               22
Accordingly, “it cannot be said [her] lawsuit is meritless and
‘brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances.’” (Ibid.) For the reasons discussed
above, Peterson has met her burden on her cause of action
for false light invasion of privacy.10

      4.     Intentional and Negligent Infliction of
             Emotional Distress
       “A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress exists when there has been (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff has suffered severe or
extreme emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s
outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate causation
of the emotional distress.” (Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1265; accord, Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035,
1050 (Hughes).) “There is no independent tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] ‘The tort is
negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff
is an essential element. [Citations.] That duty may be

10     The authorities on which the Harrises rely do not purport
to strike superfluous causes of action under section 425.16. (See
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d
961, 964-965 [motion for summary judgment]; Selleck v. Globe
International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1129-1130, 1136
[demurrer].)

                               23
imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by
virtue of a special relationship.’” (Jackson, supra, at p. 1266,
fn. 11, quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993)
6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (Potter).)
      The Harrises contend (1) both causes of action are
cumulative of Peterson’s claim for defamation; (2) both are
based on conduct not amounting to extreme or outrageous
conduct; and (3) the Harrises owed no duty of care to
Peterson to sustain a negligent infliction cause of action.
      First, we have already held an anti-SLAPP motion is
not a vehicle for disposing superfluous causes of action. (See
M.G., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 637.)11
      Second, we agree with the Harrises that the implied
statement Peterson had lied about the gun incident, even if
insulting or unflattering, did not constitute extreme or
outrageous conduct. (See Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65
Cal.App.4th 488, 496 [“‘[t]here must still be freedom to
express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must
be left through which irascible tempers may blow off
relatively harmless steam’”].) However, the salacious sexual
accusations against Peterson, made in graphic detail, may
properly be considered extreme and outrageous by a
factfinder. (See Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th

11     Despite this conclusion, we agree Peterson is not entitled to
independent causes of action for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress in this case. (See Gilbert v. Sykes
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 34; Flynn v. Higham (1983) 149
Cal.App.3d 677, 681; Civ. Code, § 3425.3.)

                                24
471, 486-487 [accusing plaintiff of “vile and depraved
activities” may constitute outrageous behavior]; see also
Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138,
148 [“aggravated circumstances” in which a defendant utters
allegedly racist and insulting comments presents question of
fact sufficient to overcome demurrer]; Alcorn v. Anbro
Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 498 [same].)
      Third, we agree Peterson has failed to establish a duty
the Harrises owed to maintain her cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. “We all have the
duty to use due care to avoid injuring others” (Neighbarger v.
Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 536), but “there
is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to
another, . . .” (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 984.) “[U]nless
the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the
emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is
available only if the emotional distress arises out of the
defendant’s breach of some other legal duty and the
emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of
duty.” (Id. at p. 985.) Peterson has not identified “some
other legal duty” required to sustain this cause of action.
      Thus, Peterson has failed to meet her burden of
establishing minimal merit to her cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and her cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based
on the implied statement she had lied about the gun
incident.

                              25
      5.    Trade Libel
      Trade libel is defined as an intentional disparagement
of the quality of property with resultant pecuniary damage
to the plaintiff. (Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Court
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 905, 925 (Muddy Waters); Polygram
Records, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 543,
548.) “Despite its name, ‘“trade libel” is not true libel and is
not actionable as defamation.’ [Citation.]” (Muddy Waters,
supra, at p. 925.) “Whereas defamation concerns injury to
the reputation of a person or business, trade libel involves
false disparagement of the quality of goods or services.”
(Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 328, 340 (Mann); accord, Erlich v. Etner (1964)
224 Cal.App.2d 69, 73.)
      To prevail on this cause of action, the plaintiff must
prove “‘“the publication has played a material and
substantial part in inducing others not to deal with him, and
that as a result he has suffered special damages.”’
[Citation.]” (Muddy Waters, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 925.)
      Here, the Harrises contend (1) their statements injured
Peterson’s personal reputation and not the quality of goods
or services; and (2) there is no evidence Peterson’s
businesses suffered pecuniary damages. We agree.
      To begin with, we note Peterson has limited her cause
of action for trade libel to the salacious sexual accusations.
However, these accusations bear on Peterson’s reputation;
they say nothing about goods or services offered by her

                              26
consulting or cannabis businesses. (Mann, supra, 139
Cal.App.4th at p. 340.)
       Peterson has also failed to establish pecuniary
damages. “To establish this element, ‘“it is not enough to
show a general decline in [plaintiff’s] business resulting from
the falsehood, even where no other cause for it is apparent,
. . . This means, in the usual case, that the plaintiff must
identify the particular purchasers who have refrained from
dealing with him, and specify the transactions of which he
claims to have been deprived.”’ [Citations.]” (Muddy
Waters, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 925.) Peterson has not
identified any evidence in which a particular customer,
business entity, or specific contract or sale was lost as a
result of the salacious sexual accusations. That Peterson
lost “30% of her personal clients and clients of Glam U” due
to a tarnished reputation is not sufficient. (See Mann v.
Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
90, 109 [plaintiffs may not “rely on a general decline in
business arising from the [alleged] falsehood”], overruled on
another ground in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376.)

     6.    Interference with Prospective Economic
           Advantage
      A cause of action for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage requires (1) an economic
relationship between the plaintiff and a third party with the
probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) the

                               27
defendant’s intentional and wrongful conduct designed to
interfere with or disrupt this relationship; (4) actual
disruption or interference; and (5) economic harm to the
plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant’s wrongful
conduct. (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt
South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512.) The plaintiff must
also plead and prove “the interference was wrongful,
independent of its interfering character.” (Edwards v.
Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, 944; accord,
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. (1995) 11 Cal.4th
376, 393.) A cause of action for negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage shares these elements with
the exception of requiring only negligent conduct. (See
North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 764, 786.)
      The Harrises contend Peterson has failed to establish
(1) a wrongful act causing Peterson economic harm; and (2) a
relationship with a third party with a probability of future
economic benefit. We agree with the latter contention and
accordingly do not consider the former.
      Peterson did not demonstrate “‘the existence of an
economic relationship with some third party that contains
the probability of future economic benefit . . . .’ [Citations.]”
(Muddy Waters, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 926, italics
added.) Peterson’s evidence indicates that clients decreased,
but it does not establish a probability of future economic
benefit through these clients. (Accord, George v. eBay, Inc.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 620, 639 (George) [referring to

                               28
unidentified “‘repeat buyers’” insufficient when no facts show
those buyers would generate future business]; Muddy
Waters, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 914, 926.) Nor do
general averments of Peterson’s inability to “attract
investors” to her cannabis business suffice. (George, supra,
at p. 639 [“tortious interference is properly dismissed where
‘either the economic relationship with a third party is too
attenuated or the probability of economic benefit is too
speculative’”].) Peterson has failed to meet her burden on
both causes of action for interference with prospective
economic advantage.

C.    Attorney Fees
      Peterson and the Harrises request attorney fees on
appeal. We deny Peterson’s request. (§§ 128.5, 425.16, subd.
(c).)
      We grant the Harrises’ request for attorney fees based
on work performed in the trial court and on appeal as a
prevailing defendant under the anti-SLAPP statute. As
partially successful litigants in this appeal, they are
“entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in
moving to strike the claims on which they prevailed, but not
fees and costs incurred in moving to strike the remaining
claims.” (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

                             29
                        DISPOSITION
      The portion of the court’s order denying the Harrises’
motion to strike the second, fourth, fifth, and seventh cause
of action is reversed. The portion of the court’s order
denying the motion to strike the sixth cause of action based
on the Harrises’ implied statement Peterson had lied about
the gun incident involving Clifford is also reversed. In all
other respects, the order is affirmed. The Harrises are
entitled to fees and costs incurred both in the trial court and
on appeal in moving to strike the claims on which they
prevailed. On remand, the trial court is directed to
determine the amount.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                          MORI, J.

We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P.J.                                  ZUKIN, J. *

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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