Court Opinion

ID: 9702312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:06:25.414667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:28.906395
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring:
Although I concur in the judgment and join the court’s opinion, I think it appropriate to add a few observations.
First, the scope of a motion pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b) is “narrowly circumscribed,” Fleming v. District of Columbia, 633 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C.1993), and “extremely meagre.” Clement v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted). “[W]e do not review or determine the merits of the underlying action, but only decide whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” *336State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 593 A.2d 184, 185 (D.C.1991). To the extent, if any, that Ms. Brown may be challenging the merits of the original order (rather than the trial judge’s refusal to reconsider that order on grounds asserted in the Rule 60(b) motion), she cannot prevail. Fleming, 633 A.2d at 848-49.
Second, the judge has already indicated her probable disposition on remand of some of the issues presented. If, as she stated, she was “persuaded by defendant Kone’s arguments,” she is unlikely to credit Ms. Brown’s claim that she never received the Joint Motion, which was mailed to Ms. Brown’s address. Moreover, a finding by the judge that Ms. Brown acted in good faith would be difficult to reconcile with her earlier acceptance of Kone’s arguments.
Nevertheless, when a trial judge elects to leave intact the drastic remedy of dismissal of the action, without any explicit consideration of lesser sanctions, she should be required to make clear and unequivocal findings on the matters prescribed by our case law. Accordingly, I agree that this court should reverse the judgment and remand the case.