Court Opinion

ID: 9539417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:04:11.358755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:49.081569
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
The evidence contained in the record presents genuine issues of material fact for jury resolution in regard to whether defendant Bucher consumed excessive alcohol prior to driving home, was driving under the influence of alcohol, or otherwise negligent so as to cause the collision which injured plaintiffs. On appellate review of summary judgment all evidence and ambiguities created thereby must be construed most favorably towards the respondent and against the movant. North v. Toco Hills, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 116, 119 (286 SE2d 346); Blount v. Seckinger Realty Co., 167 Ga. App. 778, 779 (307 SE2d 683).
Construing the evidence in this manner for purposes of appellate review of the grant of summary judgments in favor of defendant Healthdyne, Inc. (and while acknowledging that the genuine issues of material fact presented by the evidence have yet to be resolved by a jury) it appears that a jury will be authorized to determine that: Defendant Bucher (a purchasing agent) was required by his employer to entertain prospective vendors after normal working hours on a regular basis. Such business entertainment was conducted within the scope and course of Bucher’s employment. During the course of such an evening defendant Bucher consumed a quantity of alcohol sufficient to result in his being under the influence of alcohol when he undertook to drive home. While driving home under the influence of alcohol Bucher was involved in the collision which injured plaintiffs. The proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of defendant Bucher.
In my view the collision in question could be determined by a jury to be no more than the natural and probable result of negligent actions (such as the imbibing of excessive quantities of alcohol with *187knowledge that he would be driving home later in the evening) taken by Bucher in the course of his employment and for the benefit of his employer. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The general rule that a servant going to and from his work acts only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer, should not be applied so as to obscure the foreseeable causal connection between defendant Bucher’s actions, in the course of his employment, and the injuries to the plaintiffs. If Bucher consumed excessive alcohol during the course of his employment, he did so with the knowledge that later in the evening he would be driving home. Thus, if Bucher started home with his driving ability impaired such may be viewed as an act of negligence; however, such may also be viewed as the natural and probable result of an earlier act of negligence, such as Bucher’s alleged excessive consumption of alcohol knowing he would have to drive home. A jury would be authorized to conclude that Bucher’s negligence in consuming excessive alcohol (in the course of his business entertaining) began an unbroken and foreseeable chain of events resulting in injury to plaintiffs. “Where a defendant’s negligence sets in operation other causal forces which are the direct, natural, and probable consequences of that negligence, he may be held liable for injuries caused by the other forces.” Reid v. Modern Roofing &c. Works, 89 Ga. App. 285, 286 (79 SE2d 31).
Similar reasoning is expressed in the decision of Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 452, 120 Cal. App3d 157, which I consider to be persuasive. In Harris, a wrongful death action, the plaintiff parents appealed the dismissal of their complaint against a company whose employee collided with the vehicle, in which deceased was a passenger. In Harris the employee was driving home in an intoxicated condition from the employer’s Christmas party. We note that the cases sub judice show even more clearly the business purpose associated with the circumstances under which the employee became intoxicated.
After acknowledging the exemption of employer liability under the “going and coming” rule also at issue in the cases sub judice, the court in Harris stated that “[t]he underlying philosophy which holds an employer liable for an employee’s negligent acts is the deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise should not be able to disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be the result of its activity . . . Thus, we think it can be fairly said that liability attaches where a nexus exists between the employment or the activity which results in an injury that is foreseeable.” Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 452, 455, supra. Based on this reasoning and the similar case of Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal. App. 2d' 777 (294 P2d 733) (involving an employee driving home intoxicated from a company banquet) the court in Harris held that the complaint *188stated a claim, “which, if proved, would support a jury’s determination that [the employee’s] intoxication occurred at the Christmas party and that his attendance at the party as well as his state of intoxication occurred within the scope of his employment. That he would attempt to drive home while still intoxicated and might have an accident was foreseeable . . .” Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 452, 457, supra.
As the jury would be authorized to determine that the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries was the negligence of Bucher during the course of his employment and for the benefit of his employer, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable to the cases sub judice. I would hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motions for summary judgment of defendant Healthdyne, Inc.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Judge Pope and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.