Court Opinion

ID: 9955752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:14:54.438883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:20.208246
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                Court of Appeals
                                   NO. 2022-CA-1187-MR

KENNETH MALONE                                                     APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                    HONORABLE OLU A. STEVENS, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 08-CR-003680

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND JONES, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, Kenneth Malone, appeals the Jefferson Circuit

Court’s August 8, 2022 order denying him the relief he requested pursuant to CR1

60.02. Finding no error, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
                                      BACKGROUND

                The Commonwealth brought charges against Appellant for the

November 22, 2008 murder of Montez Stewart. A jury found Appellant guilty and

recommended a sentence of 32 years, which Appellant is currently serving. On

direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Appellant challenged his conviction

on all merit-based grounds, including whether he had proper notice to prepare a

defense and whether the jury instructions infringed on his constitutionally

protected rights. A summary of the facts and the evidence the Commonwealth

presented against Appellant can be found in Malone v. Commonwealth, 364

S.W.3d 121, 125-26 (Ky. 2008). The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his

conviction, including on the aforementioned alleged errors, concluding: “Malone

received a fundamentally fair trial . . . .” Id. at 134.

                Sometime thereafter, Appellant filed an RCr2 11.42 motion

challenging his attorney’s conduct at trial. The circuit court rejected each of

Appellant’s arguments, and we affirmed the denial of this motion in Malone v.

Commonwealth, No. 2014-CR-00463, 2015 WL 5896557, at *1 (Ky. App. Oct. 9,

2015).

2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -2-
             On July 29, 2022, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a CR 60.02 motion

for post-conviction relief – the subject of this appeal. The circuit court denied that

motion. This appeal now follows.

                                    ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Appellant alleges several errors, each of which we address

in turn. We are not persuaded by any of Appellant’s arguments.

CR 60.02(e).

             First, Appellant alleges the circuit court erred in denying his CR 60.02

motion because the judgment against him is void. In denying this motion,

Appellant claims the circuit court violated his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and § 11 of the Constitution of Kentucky.

             Pursuant to CR 60.02(e):

             On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve
             a party or his legal representative from its final judgment,
             order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: . . . (e)
             the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or
             discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
             been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
             equitable that the judgment should have prospective
             application; . . . The motion shall be made within a
             reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more
             than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
             entered or taken.

CR 60.02(e). In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

states:

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             No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
             abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
             United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
             life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
             deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
             protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Finally, § 11 of the Constitution of Kentucky reads:

“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from

unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall issue to search any place, or

seize any person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may be, nor

without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” KY. CONST. § 11.

             The Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s CR 60.02 motion is

untimely because it was filed nearly fourteen years after a jury convicted him.

Additionally, the Commonwealth contends that, even if the motion had been

timely, it would have been denied because the judgment is not void. We agree.

             Appellant does correctly point out that “[w]hile trial courts are

afforded discretion to address what constitutes a reasonable time under CR

60.02 . . . , the law is clear that void judgments are ‘not entitled to any respect or

deference by the courts.’” Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 306-07 (Ky.

2018) (quoting Soileau v. Bowman, 382 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Ky. App. 2012)). This

is because, “[a] void judgment is a legal nullity, and a court has no discretion in

determining whether it should be set aside.” Soileau, 382 S.W.3d at 890 (citing

Foremost Ins. v. Whitaker, 892 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. App. 1995)).

                                           -4-
               The judgment of conviction against Appellant is in no way void. His

challenge that he did not have proper notice of the charge brought against him,

and, as such, the Jefferson Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction against him is entirely

unsustainable. The record reveals Appellant had adequate notice that the

Commonwealth charged him with the murder of Montez Stewart. Moreover, the

Kentucky Supreme Court already addressed this very issue, indicating Appellant

had the ability to prepare a defense. See Malone, 364 S.W.3d at 126-29.

               Accordingly, the circuit court did not commit error when it denied

Appellant relief on this ground.

CR 60.02(f).

               Next, Appellant requests relief pursuant to CR 60.02(f). CR 60.02(f)

is a catchall provision for requested relief after a final judgment.

               Under this rule, “a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a

party or his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon

the following grounds: . . . (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature

justifying relief.” CR 60.02(f). A court cannot grant relief from a final

judgment except in “aggravated cases where there are strong equities.” Reed v.

Reed, 484 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Ky. 1972). Additionally, under the analogous federal

rule, “district courts may only grant relief in the face of an ‘extraordinary

circumstance.’” See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199, 202, 71 S. Ct.

                                           -5-
209, 212-13, 95 L. Ed. 207 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.

Ct. 384, 93 L. Ed. 266 (1949).

             In Klapprott, the federal government stripped Klapprott, a U.S.

citizen, of his citizenship by default judgment. See Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 602-03,

69 S. Ct. at 384-85. In doing so, “Klapprott never had the mere opportunity to

defend the claims against him . . . .” Andrew P. Lopiano, Comment, Dumplings

Instead of Flowers: The Need for a Case-By-Case Approach to FRCP 60(b)(6)

Motions Predicated on a Change in Habeas Corpus Law, 15 LIBERTY U. L. REV.

111, 122 (Fall 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 615, 69

S. Ct. at 390 (“The undenied allegations already set out show that a citizen was

stripped of his citizenship by his Government, without evidence, a hearing, or the

benefit of counsel, at a time when his Government was then holding the citizen in

jail with no reasonable opportunity for him effectively to defend his right to

citizenship.” Id., 69 S. Ct. at 390)).

             Here, Appellant had every opportunity to defend himself against the

charges brought. There is no allusion or indication that Appellant suffered from an

extraordinary circumstance. To the contrary, we note again that the Kentucky

Supreme Court remarked: “Malone received a fundamentally fair trial . . . .”

Malone, 364 S.W.3d at 134. Accordingly, there are no equities favoring

Appellant, and his brief fails to indicate anything to the contrary. Again assuming

                                         -6-
this motion was timely, Appellant cannot meet the requirements of CR 60.02(f) to

prevail on his motion.

             For these reasons, the circuit court did not commit error when it

denied Appellant relief under CR 60.02(f).

Other Miscellaneous Arguments.

             Finally, Appellant raises several arguments, all of which were either

addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in his direct appeal, addressed by this

court in the appeal of the denial of his RCr 11.42, or are arguments Appellant

should have brought in his direct appeal but failed to do so and, therefore, waived

them. In sum, Appellant claims: (1) his jury instructions contained instructions on

both intentional murder and wanton murder, which he claims is error in several

ways; and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel

failed to object to the jury instructions presenting both intentional and wanton

murder, which he claims is error.

             As already indicated, the Kentucky Supreme Court address all merit-

based issues involving the jury instructions in Appellant’s direct appeal. Malone,

364 S.W.3d at 130-32. The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded no error occurred

when the circuit court included instructions for both intentional and wanton

murder. Id. We cannot second guess their decision. Any merit-based challenges

to the jury instruction not brought in his direct appeal were waived. “[A] party

                                         -7-
may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal[.]” Koteras v. Commonwealth,

589 S.W.3d 534, 540 (Ky. App. 2018) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

Thus, the circuit court did not commit error in denying his CR 60.02 motion on

these grounds.

             Additionally, Appellant filed a RCr 11.42 motion challenging his

counsel’s performance. See Malone v. Commonwealth, No. 2014-CR-00463, 2015

WL 5896557, at *1 (Ky. App. Oct. 9, 2015). RCr 11.42 is the proper vehicle to

challenge his counsel’s performance; CR 60.02 is not. Additionally, Appellant did

not argue that his counsel’s failure to object to the jury instructions constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel in his RCr 11.42 motion. Thus, we treat that

argument as waived and cannot be brought here. Despite this, there appears to be

little merit to this argument as the jury instructions contained no error as, again,

indicated by the Kentucky Supreme Court its opinion. See Malone, 364 S.W.3d at

130-32. Thus, the circuit court did not err when it denied Appellant relief on this

ground.

                                   CONCLUSION

             The Jefferson Circuit Court committed no error; we affirm.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -8-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kenneth Malone, pro se    Daniel Cameron
La Grange, Kentucky       Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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