Court Opinion

ID: 9665821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:57:47.412222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.210367
License: Public Domain

MORRISON, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur to the affirmance of this case, but dissent to the manner of its disposition.
The validity of the defense of accommodation agent is not raised by the parties, nor is its determination necessary to the disposition of the case. Appellant objected to the failure of the court to charge the jury on accommodation agent. The record, however, reflects that the court did charge on entrapment. This Court has held that a charge on accommodation agent is not required where, as here, the court’s charge on entrapment fully protects the appellant’s rights. Sosa v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 494 S.W.2d 849; Brooks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 499 S.W.2d 99; and Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 267.
Further, I am not persuaded that the statute, by definition, eliminates the concept of accommodation agent. The doctrine of accommodation agent, in narcotics cases, is well established in this jurisdiction. Durham v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 25, 280 S.W.2d 370; Alexander v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 288, 325 S.W.2d 139; Huerta v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 390 S.W.2d 770; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 396 S.W.2d 876; Reed v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 421 S.W.2d 116; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 427 S.W.2d 616; Garcia v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 486; Robbins v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 419; Senn v. State, 494 S.W.2d 836; Brooks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 499 S.W.2d 99; and as recently as Kemp v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 502 S.W.2d 726. A majority of the circuits in the Federal system recognize the concept of accommodation agent. Adams v. United States, 220 F.2d 297 (5th Cir., 1955); Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145, 337 F.2d 541 (1964, Circuit Judge Warren Burger writing for the majority); United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1970).
At this late date the majority has reached out to joust with a statute which ceased to be the law on August 27, 1973. Were we dealing with a new statute and writing on a clean slate, another situation would exist. This will certainly be one of the last cases raising this question to come to us under the old statute.
The disposition of this cause could rest on established precedent. The majority’s effort represents a needless exercise which defies the concept of judicial economy.
I would affirm this conviction under the authority of Sosa, supra, and the other cases cited.
ONION, P. J., joins in this opinion insofar as it dissents.