Court Opinion

ID: 9854589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:09:32.157276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:10.084098
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Since our Supreme Court decided the case of Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 654, 656 (3) (341 SE2d 5) (1986), it has consistently followed the procedure of remanding a case for a hearing by the trial court on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, when appellate counsel is different than the trial defense counsel, and such a claim has been raised by appellate counsel, even when such appellate counsel did not raise the issue in a motion or amended motion for new trial. Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 148, 151 (5) (344 SE2d 639) (1986); Gilstrap v. State, 256 Ga. 20, 23 (7) (342 SE2d 667) (1986); Lloyd v. State, 257 Ga. 108 (3) (355 SE2d 423) (1987); Wadley v. State, 257 Ga. 280, 281 (4) (357 SE2d 588) (1987); Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 386, 388 (2) (359 SE2d 664) (1987). This court has also followed the procedure set forth in Smith, supra. Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. 523, 524 (3) (359 SE2d 416) (1987). Although Thompson, supra, held that after the date of publication of the opinion the issue is waived if not raised by the new attorney in an amended motion for new trial, that holding is not applicable here.
This court is bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Const, of the State of Ga., 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI. Although Smith, supra, might not specifically require that the case be *723remanded when a claim of ineffective counsel is made at the trial level and no evidentiary hearing is held on that issue, it is clear from the number of cases following that procedure in accordance with Smith that it is the procedure adopted by the Supreme Court to be followed in such cases. Therefore, I feel bound to remand the case for a hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, so that trial defense counsel can be heard on the issue. By not doing so, we are leaving this case open to a possible miscarriage of justice by reversal of the case in a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court based on a denial of procedural due process.
Decided March 18, 1988
Rehearing denied April 1, 1988
Wayne W. Gammon, for appellant.
Darrell E. Wilson, District Attorney, Mickey R. Thacker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Birdsong and Presiding Judge McMurray join in this dissent.