Court Opinion

ID: 9959761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:03:10.439949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:52.734610
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-0201
                   LT Case No. 2019-CA-0446
                 _____________________________

FREDERICK JOHNSON,

    Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

    v.

WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP, A
FOREIGN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
                _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.
Eric C. Roberson, Judge.

Jessie L. Harrell, of The Harrell Firm, Jacksonville, for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, and Bethany J.M.
Pandher, of Greenberg, Traurig, P.A., Miami, for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.

                          April 12, 2024

EISNAUGLE, J.

    Frederick Johnson appeals a final summary judgment
entered in favor of Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (“Wal-Mart”) on his
complaint for negligence. In his complaint, Mr. Johnson alleged
that Wal-Mart employees were negligent when they confronted
and pursued shoplifters, causing the shoplifters to flee and injure
Mr. Johnson.

     Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment arguing that it had
no duty to protect patrons from fleeing shoplifters because its
conduct had not created a reasonably foreseeable “zone of risk,”
relying on Kmart Corp. v. Lentini, 650 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA
1995), and Graham v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 240 So.
2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Mr. Johnson opposed the motion,
arguing that Wal-Mart foreseeably increased the zone of risk
when it improperly confronted and pursued the shoplifters. Mr.
Johnson relied on Wal-Mart’s policies and procedures for dealing
with shoplifters as evidence that the risk of harm was reasonably
foreseeable.

     The trial court concluded, based on the undisputed summary
judgment evidence, that Wal-Mart did not create a reasonably
foreseeable zone of risk by its employees’ actions, and Mr.
Johnson could not rely on Wal-Mart’s policies and procedures as
evidence to establish reasonable foreseeability. Mr. Johnson
timely appeals. We affirm the summary final judgment and do
not reach Wal-Mart’s cross-appeal.

                                Facts

    The summary judgment evidence, as argued in Mr.
Johnson’s initial brief, is as follows.1 On February 1, 2019,

    1  While we recognize that our substantial record contains
other evidence, we consider only those facts and arguments
clearly raised below and in Mr. Johnson’s initial brief. “[C]ourts
are essentially passive instruments of government.” United
States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold,
J., concurring). It is not a court’s role to scour the record for facts
or arguments that a party could have raised in the trial court or
on appeal. See Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 (Fla. 1997)
(“In a footnote in his brief, Coolen notes two other statements
that he contends should have been deleted from the tape.
However, Coolen’s failure to fully brief and argue these points
constitutes a waiver of these claims.”); Mech v. Brazilian Waxing
By Sisters, Inc., 349 So. 3d 453, 454, n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (“It

                                  2
Shawnell Pitts and Erica Felder visited the Wal-Mart in
Fernandina Beach, Florida, with the intent to shoplift. Wal-Mart
employees observed the two shoplifters placing expensive
electronic merchandise in old Wal-Mart shopping bags and then
putting the bagged merchandise in plastic totes in their cart. A
loss prevention employee monitored the two and notified the self-
checkout associate.

     While Pitts continued his efforts, Felder left the store,
covered her license plate with a trash bag, and pulled her car up
near the store exit. Pitts then took his shopping cart through the
self-checkout area. As he approached, the self-checkout associate
placed her hand on the cart and asked him for a receipt. When
Pitts gave her a receipt reflecting a transaction for 98 cents, the
clerk asked Pitts if he had another receipt and picked up an item
in the cart.

     At that point, Pitts spun the cart, colliding with other
shoppers, exited the store, and jumped in Felder’s car, telling her
to “go, go, go.” During this time, Wal-Mart employees either
shouted for someone to call the police or indicated that the police
had already been called. After Pitts exited the store, Wal-Mart
employees walked out of the store and onto the sidewalk, with
the hope of capturing a picture of the getaway car’s license tag.
There is no summary judgment evidence indicating that any Wal-
Mart employee attempted to apprehend or otherwise chase Pitts
after he fled.

is not the responsibility of the Court to dig through the record to
locate the basis for a party’s argument.” (citation omitted)); see,
e.g., Jackmore v. Est. of Jackmore, 145 So. 3d 170, 171 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014) (declining to consider an argument only raised in the
summary of the argument section of the initial brief).

    Further, we do not consider the facts as they are
characterized by the parties but instead how they objectively
appear in the summary judgment evidence itself.

                                3
     As this all transpired, Mr. Johnson entered the store. He
noticed the commotion, and as a result, exited the store behind
both Pitts and the Wal-Mart employees. Upon leaving the store,
Mr. Johnson walked into the parking lot, where it is undisputed
that Felder struck him with her car.

     The summary judgment evidence also included: (1) Wal-
Mart’s policies and procedures for interacting with shoplifters, (2)
the testimony of Wal-Mart employees, based on their training on
Wal-Mart’s policies, indicating that escalating an encounter with
a shoplifter can create a “zone of risk,” and (3) the testimony of
an expert witness who opined that Wal-Mart escalated the
encounter by calling for police and following the shoplifter out to
the sidewalk.

     The policies and procedures relating to shoplifters set
internal rules for Wal-Mart employees aimed, in part, to limit
danger that could result from a fleeing shoplifter. For instance,
Wal-Mart’s policy prohibits employees from restraining a suspect
or pursuing a fleeing suspect more than ten feet from where they
began to run. The policies also instruct employees to stay on the
sidewalk and not enter the parking lot to avoid hazards from
motor vehicles.

    Wal-Mart     employees   testified,  based     upon    their
understanding of Wal-Mart’s policies and procedures, that
escalating an encounter with a fleeing shoplifter can present a
danger to customers. For example, Wal-Mart’s loss prevention
employee testified that a shoplifter could use a vehicle as a
weapon.

     Mr. Johnson’s expert witness testified that calling out for
police can “increase their fear of being apprehended and increase
the likelihood that they would try to flee.” Although the expert
conceded that Pitts was already fleeing before the clerk called out
for police, and that he could not say whether calling for police
“accelerated [Pitts’] departure or not,” he would advise against
“hollering call the police . . . because . . . that’s fuel on the fire.”

                                   4
                      Standard of Review

     We review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment and its
determination on the duty element of negligence both de novo.
McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992) (“For
these same reasons, duty exists as a matter of law and is not a
factual question for the jury to decide . . . .”); TPC Overtown Block
45, LLC v. Downtown Retail Assocs., LLC, 369 So. 3d 350, 353
(Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Our standard of review for an order
granting summary judgment is de novo.”).

               Legal Duty: A Fleeing Shoplifter

     When considering whether the general facts of a case
establish a duty, our focus is on “whether the defendant’s conduct
foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general
threat of harm to others.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502 (citation
omitted).2 “This requirement of reasonable, general foresight is
the core of the duty element.” Id. at 503. Importantly, to
establish a duty, the zone of risk created by a defendant’s conduct
“must have been reasonably foreseeable, not just possible.”
Graham v. Langley, 683 So. 2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

     While the causation element of negligence also considers a
type of foreseeability, foreseeability relates to duty and causation
“in different ways and to different ends.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at
502. The duty element is concerned with conduct that creates a
“generalized and foreseeable risk of harming others,” whereas the
causation element is more specific to the case and considers
whether “prudent human foresight would lead one to expect that
similar harm is likely to be substantially caused by the specific
act or omission in question.” Id. at 503.

    2  Our supreme court has recognized that there are other
potential sources of a legal duty, but these other sources are not
at issue in this case. Dorsey v. Reider, 139 So. 3d 860, 863 (Fla.
2014).

                                 5
     We are only aware of two Florida decisions considering
whether a shopkeeper has a duty to protect patrons from a
fleeing shoplifter—Lentini and Graham. Given the case specific
nature of our duty element analysis, neither case is exactly on
point, but both are instructive.

     In Lentini, a Kmart loss prevention employee confronted a
shoplifter and escorted him to a conference room. 650 So. 2d at
1032. Up to that point, the shoplifter was calm, but when the
employee went to call police, the shoplifter “left his chair and
ran . . . through the store,” and collided with the plaintiff. Id. A
jury found Kmart liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1031.

     On appeal, the second district reversed, concluding that
Kmart had no duty to the plaintiff. Id. at 1031–32. Specifically,
the appellate court reasoned that there was no evidence that
“Kmart’s conduct foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that
pose[d] a general threat of harm to others.” Id. at 1032
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).

     In Graham, the plaintiff alleged that employees of a food
market identified a “burly” individual, accompanied by members
of his family, who was attempting to take merchandise without
paying. 240 So. 2d at 157–58. The employees waited until the
family was outside by their car and then confronted them in the
parking lot. Id. at 158. The employees allowed the family to
leave without recording their license plate number after the
suspect agreed to go back inside the store. Id. As they did so, the
store manager told the suspect he intended to call the sheriff, and
the suspect “broke and ran, knocking down and injuring the
plaintiff.” Id. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

     On appeal, the district court identified the dispositive
question as “foreseeability,” and affirmed the dismissal. In so
doing, the court reasoned that based on the plaintiff’s allegations,
there was no reason to assume the shoplifter would become
violent. Id. at 159. According to the court, “[a]bsent some
foreknowledge of danger against which the store might have had
time to prepare itself, . . . the defendant did not breach its duty of
reasonable care . . . .” Id. Putting a finer point on it, the court
explained, “a storeowner is not negligent, absent special

                                  6
circumstances, in attempting to detain suspected shoplifters, and
does not create any foreseeable risk of harm . . . by doing so.” Id.

     When read together, Lentini and Graham establish that a
store has no duty to protect customers from a fleeing shoplifter,
at least without some special circumstances indicating danger
before the shoplifter flees.    Based on our supreme court’s
explanation of the duty element of negligence in McCain, we find
the analysis in Lentini and Graham persuasive.

    With these principles of the law in mind, we now turn to
whether Wal-Mart’s conduct created a legal duty in this case.

          Wal-Mart’s Conduct Before the Shoplifter Fled

     We reject Mr. Johnson’s argument that the employee’s action
of placing her hand on the cart as Pitts initially approached,
asking for a correct receipt, or picking up an item inside the cart
created a reasonably foreseeable zone of risk. First, given this
employee’s job duties, we find this conduct rather unremarkable.
Second, all of this occurred before Pitts displayed any aggression
or indication that he would flee. In sum, we think the employees
in Lentini and Graham, where there was no duty, did
substantially more right before the shoplifters fled in those cases.
Consistent with Lentini and Graham, we conclude that Wal-Mart
had no duty based on these facts prior to Pitts fleeing.

          Wal-Mart’s Conduct After the Shoplifter Fled

     That leaves us with the conduct of Wal-Mart’s employees
after Pitts first became violent by spinning his cart, striking
other customers, and fleeing the store. At that point, Mr.
Johnson argues that Wal-Mart had a duty because it created a
reasonably foreseeable zone of risk when an employee called for
police and when other employees walked onto the sidewalk to
record Felder’s license plate number.

     We conclude that Wal-Mart’s conduct after Pitts fled did not
create a reasonably foreseeable zone of risk. First, there is no
indication in this case that calling for the police, after Pitts
became violent, enlarged any zone of risk. By the time Wal-

                                 7
Mart’s employee called out for police, Pitts had not only fled, but
also hit other customers with his cart. Even Mr. Johnson’s expert
could not say that calling out for police at that point “accelerated
his departure.” In short, based on the facts of this case, we
conclude that calling out for police after the shoplifter has not
only fled, but done so violently, does not create a reasonably
foreseeable zone of risk. In such a case, the zone of risk is
already present, and at least on our record, calling for police did
not foreseeably enlarge the zone of risk.

     Second, we reject Mr. Johnson’s argument that employees
exiting the store to stand on the sidewalk also created a
reasonably foreseeable zone of risk. Given our record, we do not
agree that simply exiting the store and standing on the sidewalk
foreseeably enlarged the zone of risk.

               Wal-Mart’s Policies and Procedures

     Mr. Johnson argues, quite strenuously, that Wal-Mart’s
policies and procedures are evidence that “escalating an
encounter with a shoplifter” creates a foreseeable zone of risk.
We are not persuaded by this argument for two reasons.

     First, this argument is premised on the notion that Wal-
Mart’s conduct “escalated” the encounter with Pitts to begin
with—a proposition we reject. As we explained above, based on
the facts and argument relied upon by Mr. Johnson on appeal,
Wal-Mart did nothing that enlarged the zone of risk.

     Second, we are not convinced that internal policies and
procedures are all that important to our analysis of Wal-Mart’s
legal duty. Mr. Johnson relies on Florida decisions recognizing
that internal policies are sometimes admissible at trial, although
not dispositive, when they are relevant to the standard of care.
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wittke, 202 So. 3d 929, 930–31
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016); Mayo v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 686 So. 2d
801, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see also Disc. Tire Co. v. Bradford,
373 So. 3d 399, 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (explaining the narrow
role that internal policies play in the context of the standard of

                                 8
care).3 On the other hand, Wal-Mart argues that internal policies
are entirely irrelevant to the issue of duty because internal
policies will often go above and beyond what is merely reasonably
foreseeable.

     As we see it, given their nature, as well as the potential time
and resources available for their formulation, an internal policy
can indeed go far beyond what is merely reasonably foreseeable.
See, e.g., Disc. Tire, 373 So. 3d at 402 (“Discount Tire’s internal
policy went above and beyond and was one step higher than other
tire retailers.”); Steinberg By & Through Steinberg v. Lomenick,
531 So. 2d 199, 200–01 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“Therefore, to
instruct the jury, as the plaintiffs requested, that a violation of a
defendant’s internal rule is evidence of negligence is to give far
more weight to the evidence than it deserves; evidence that the
rule was violated is not evidence of negligence unless and until
the jury finds—which according to the caveat it is free not to do—
that the internal rule represents the standard of care.”).
Therefore, even if internal policies might sometimes be relevant
(and therefore admissible) when a jury decides compliance with
the proper standard of care in a negligence case, we fail to see
how a single party’s internal policies are themselves evidence
that an alleged tortfeasor’s conduct creates a reasonably
foreseeable zone of risk.

    3 We are aware that the legal duty element of negligence is

decided as a matter of law by the court, but that the standard of
care is a question of fact for the jury. See Torres v. Sullivan, 903
So. 2d 1064, 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Nichols v. Home Depot,
Inc., 541 So. 2d 639, 641–42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“The general
principle is thoroughly settled.       What is and what is not
reasonable care under the circumstances is, as a general rule,
simply undeterminable as a matter of law.             Rather, it is
peculiarly a jury function to determine what precautions are
reasonably required in the exercise of a particular duty of due
care.” (citation omitted)).

                                 9
     Importantly, in most cases, whether a legal duty exists will
not be in dispute. Generally, however, where the duty element is
genuinely at issue, and evidence is needed, a party’s internal
policies alone will not establish that the conduct in question
creates a reasonably foreseeable zone of risk. In other words,
absent some evidence to establish that the internal policies
themselves, or some specific portion thereof, represent only what
is reasonably foreseeable and not what is merely possible, a
party’s internal rule seems to be of little value to our legal duty
analysis.

     All that said, however, even if we were to consider the
internal policies, as Mr. Johnson invites us to do, the question of
duty remains one of law for the court. Thus, at a minimum, an
internal rule is in no way controlling in a court’s analysis of
whether a legal duty exists. See generally Dominguez v. Publix
Super Mkts., Inc., 187 So. 3d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
(stating, in the context of the standard of care, “[i]f what [the
Publix assistant grocery manager] did, under the circumstances
and within the five seconds he was allotted by fate, was
reasonable and demonstrated ordinary care, then the fact he
allegedly did not abide by Publix’s internal operating procedure
of blocking off the aisle does not create a heightened duty of care
in favor of Dominguez”).

     As such, informed by our analysis of Wal-Mart’s conduct
above, we conclude that Wal-Mart’s policies would not change our
disposition. Instead, we read the internal policies to go above
and beyond what is merely reasonably foreseeable, and do not
themselves evidence a legal duty to protect Mr. Johnson from
fleeing shoplifters.

                Testimony of Wal-Mart Employees

    Finally, Mr. Johnson argues that the testimony of Wal-
Mart’s employees recognized the risk of harm. It is true that
some of Wal-Mart’s employees testified that there is a risk of
harm when employees escalate an encounter with a shoplifter.
However, this testimony was in the context of questions about
Wal-Mart’s policies and procedures. As we have explained, Wal-
Mart’s policies and procedures do not establish a legal duty.

                                10
Therefore, Wal-Mart’s employees’ testimony based on those
policies does not establish a legal duty either.4

                           Conclusion

     We affirm the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment
because Wal-Mart’s conduct did not create a reasonably
foreseeable zone of risk. Therefore, Wal-Mart had no legal duty
to protect Mr. Johnson from fleeing shoplifters.

    AFFIRMED.

BOATWRIGHT, J., concurs.
MAKAR, J., dissents with opinion.

    4 Notably, Mr. Johnson includes a discussion of his expert’s

testimony in the facts section of his initial brief, but then
inexplicably fails to make any argument based on the expert’s
testimony in the argument section of the brief. Of course, a legal
argument is inseparably tied to the facts upon which it is based,
and it is not our function to rebrief an appeal. See D.H. v. Adept
Cmty. Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 870, 888 (Fla. 2018) (Canady, J.,
dissenting) (“This requirement of specific argument and briefing
is one of the most important concepts of the appellate process.
Indeed, it is not the role of the appellate court to act as standby
counsel for the parties.”); see also Flores v. State, 211 So. 3d 68,
70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[I]t is not the function of the Court to
rebrief an appeal.” (alteration in original)). Therefore, we have
no authority to search the record or briefs for new facts and
reformulate a party’s argument on their behalf. As a result, we
do not consider whether the expert’s testimony might have
turned the tide in our duty analysis in this case.

                                11
          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
           _____________________________

                       12
                                              Case No. 5D23-0201
                                        LT Case No. 2019-CA-0446

MAKAR, J., dissenting.

     On a Friday evening in February 2019, local bait and tackle
shop owner and frequent Walmart shopper, Frederick Johnson,
fled the retail chain’s Fernandina Beach store in fear due to a
fracas inside between a shoplifter and store employees, but was
run over and seriously injured in the storefront crosswalk by the
getaway car moments later. The employees, rather than defuse the
situation inside the store, escalated the risk to customers and
other employees, triggering the shoplifter’s dash to the parking lot
and patrons, like Johnson, to hastily exit the store. Employees
incited the shoplifter via a checkout counter confrontation that
involved attempts to snatch items from the shoplifter’s cart, a
physical altercation, a store employee yelling for the police, and
others pursuing the shoplifter out of the entrance.

     Johnson sued Walmart claiming it acted negligently under the
circumstances by creating a foreseeable risk of harm arising from
the encounter with the shoplifter. The trial court ruled, however,
that Walmart had no legal duty to protect customers from fleeing
shoplifters, even if Walmart employees improperly skirmished
with the shoplifter and escalated the encounter, thereby
increasing the risk of flight and harm to others. It granted final
summary judgment on that basis, after multiple rounds of legal
briefing1 just prior to trial. Because the factual record establishes
that Walmart created a foreseeable risk that customers or

    1  The trial judge requested supplemental briefing prior to
ruling on the motion for summary judgment and did so again after
Johnson filed a motion for rehearing that included additional
information including an expert report. At no point did the trial
court strike or otherwise disallow any of the legal filings of either
party; instead, he actively requested and relied upon all of the
filings, including the expert report, which he explicitly considered
and discussed.

                                 13
employees could be injured by the admittedly ill-advised escalation
of the potentially dangerous situation, a legal duty exists. As such,
Johnson is entitled to prove that Walmart was negligent by
escalating the situation; the foreseeability of the actual injury
Johnson sustained, i.e., being run over by the getaway car, is a
question of proximate cause for the jury to decide.

                                 I.

     The central issue in this negligence case is a purely legal one:
whether Walmart owes a legal duty to protect its customers and
employees from potential harm based on the facts presented,
which involve employees escalating a confrontation with a
suspected in-store shoplifter. Our review is de novo, meaning no
deference is given to the trial court’s legal conclusion; moreover,
the facts are construed most favorably to Johnson, the non-moving
party. Maronda Homes, Inc. of Fla. v. Lakeview Rsrv. Homeowners
Ass’n, Inc., 127 So. 3d 1258, 1268 (Fla. 2013) (“We view the facts
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party[,]” while the
determination of duty is “a pure question of law subject to de novo
review.”).

    A.      Source of Duty: Facts of the Case.

     Our supreme court recognizes at least four sources of a legal
duty: “(1) legislative enactments or administration regulations; (2)
judicial interpretations of such enactments or regulations; (3)
other judicial precedent; and (4) a duty arising from the general
facts of the case.” McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503
n.2 (Fla. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 (1965))
(emphasis added). As in McCain, this case predominantly deals
with “the last category—i.e., that class of cases in which the duty
arises because of a foreseeable zone of risk arising from the acts of
the defendant.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2 (emphasis added).
The italics emphasize that the judicial analysis of whether a duty
exists focuses on whether a defendant’s acts—here, those of
Walmart’s employees escalating the shoplifting incident into a
scuffle and melee—created a “foreseeable zone of risk” for which a

                                 14
legal duty exists to protect others from harm.2 Every defendant
“who creates a risk is required to exercise prudent foresight
whenever others may be injured as a result. This requirement of
reasonable, general foresight is the core of the duty element.” Id. at
503 (emphasis added).

     The judicial inquiry in this case is whether the “general facts
of the case” create a foreseeable zone of risk to customers or others.
See Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2007) (citing
McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503) (“[T]he determination of the existence
of a common law duty flowing from the general facts of the case
under our negligence law depends upon an evaluation of the
concept of foreseeability of harm.”). To make this legal
determination, a “court must make some inquiry into the factual
allegations. The objective . . . [is] to determine whether a
foreseeable, general zone of risk was created by the defendant’s
conduct.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502 n.1. If the facts—construed in
Johnson’s favor—demonstrate that Walmart’s conduct created a
foreseeable risk of harm, a legal duty exists, and he is entitled to
sue for negligence. “As a corollary, the trial and appellate courts
cannot find a lack of duty if a foreseeable zone of risk more likely
than not was created by the defendant.” Id. at 503.

     The existence of a legal duty, of course, is only a starting point
and a yardstick by which to measure a defendant’s conduct. As
McCain points out, a “duty exists as a matter of law and is not a
factual question for the jury to decide: Duty is the standard of
conduct given to the jury for gauging the defendant’s factual
conduct.” Id. The existence of a legal duty does not mean a plaintiff
automatically wins; to the contrary, a plaintiff must prove via
evidence and persuasion that a breach of a duty occurred. We next
turn to the question of whether a duty to protect customers exists
on the facts presented.

    2 Because Johnson relies predominantly on the general facts

of the case, he need not rely on a statute or prior caselaw to
demonstrate the existence of a legal duty in tort. McCain, 593 So.
2d at 503 (“The statute books and case law . . . are not required to
catalog and expressly proscribe every conceivable risk in order for
it to give rise to a duty of care.”).

                                  15
    B.      General Duty of Safety to Protect Customers.

     The supreme court in McCain said, “Florida, like other
jurisdictions, recognizes that a legal duty will arise whenever a
human endeavor creates a generalized and foreseeable risk of
harming others.” 593 So. 2d at 503. In this regard, Florida law has
long recognized the general duty of a business to make its premises
safe and to protect its customers from foreseeable harm. Hall v.
Billy Jack’s, Inc., 458 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1984) (A business owes
its “visitors a duty of reasonable care for their safety” but “is not
required to protect the patron from every conceivable risk; he owes
only a duty to protect against those risks which are reasonably
foreseeable.”); see also Budet v. K-Mart Corp., 491 So. 2d 1248,
1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (K-Mart owed an invitee “a duty to
exercise reasonable care for her safety” by exercising “ordinary
care to keep its aisles and passageways in a reasonably safe
condition” and “eliminating dangerous conditions of which it has
actual or constructive notice.”); Walker v. Feltman, 111 So. 2d 76,
78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959) (“A proprietor is not an insurer of the safety
of his customers but is charged with the duty of maintaining his
premises in a reasonably safe condition and guarding against
subjecting a customer to dangers of which the proprietor is
cognizant or might reasonably foresee.”). This general duty applies
to any retailer, including Walmart, who makes their premises open
to the public; if a foreseeable risk of harm to customers exists, a
duty exists on the retailer to act reasonably in protecting against
its breach by reducing or eliminating the risk. See generally,
Tammy E. Hinshaw & Thomas Muskus, 38 Fla. Jur. 2d,
Negligence § 30 (2023) (“Where a defendant’s conduct creates a
foreseeable zone of risk, the law generally will recognize a duty
placed upon the defendant, either to lessen the risk or see that
sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the harm
that the risk poses.” (footnote omitted)).

     This general duty applies to businesses like Walmart in a
multitude of factually diverse situations. For example, it applies to
a store’s responsibility to make sure that patrons are not injured
by children running amok in its aisleways. Kolosky v. Winn Dixie
Stores, Inc., 472 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (noting that
“three children were observed running unsupervised through the

                                 16
store aisles several times over the course of approximately thirty
to forty-five minutes”). It also applies to a store ensuring that
customers are not injured by unwieldy oversized carts (aka floats).
Budet, 491 So. 2d at 1250 (A department store owed a business
invitee “a duty to exercise reasonable care for her safety.”). It
applies to harm caused by foreseeable criminal conduct, such as a
bar that “was a ‘rough’ place with a history of fights and gunplay”
that “terminated all security service,” causing disorder. Stevens v.
Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1983); Allen v. Babrab, Inc., 438
So. 2d 356, 357−58 (Fla. 1983) (Evidence that showed that a
business had “a history of fighting and other disturbances” and
had a previous security policy that was no longer in place was
sufficient to reasonably find that the business owner “should have
known of the likelihood of injury to patrons caused by disorderly
conduct on the part of third parties in general[.]”). In these and
many other situations, a business has a duty to act reasonably to
lessen the risk or protect its customers from foreseeable harm.

     It bears emphasis that foreseeability has a two-fold role in tort
law, each role playing distinctively different functions that are
often confused. First, as just discussed, the foreseeability of a risk
determines whether a legal duty exists, which is the central focus
in this appeal. Second, foreseeability plays a related but different
role in determining whether a breach of a legal duty resulted in
the actual harm that was caused—so-called proximate causation.
As the supreme court in McCain said,

         foreseeability relates to duty and proximate
         causation in different ways and to different
         ends. The duty element of negligence focuses on
         whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably
         created a broader “zone of risk” that poses a
         general threat of harm to others. The proximate
         causation element, on the other hand, is
         concerned with whether and to what extent the
         defendant’s     conduct     foreseeably     and
         substantially caused the specific injury that
         actually occurred.

593 So. 2d at 502 (internal citation omitted). Relevant to this case,
the supreme court made clear that the duty element of negligence

                                 17
“is a minimal threshold legal requirement for opening the
courthouse doors, whereas the latter is part of the much more
specific factual requirement that must be proved to win the case
once the courthouse doors are open.” Id. (bold added; footnote
omitted). It is this minimal legal threshold that’s at issue in this
case.

    C.    Specific Duty to Not Escalate Potentially Dangerous
          Shoplifting Situations.

     It is well-established that Walmart and other retailers have a
general duty to make their premises safe and to protect their
customers from foreseeable risks of harm, such as criminal conduct
occurring within their stores and on their properties. See, e.g.,
Stevens, 436 So. 2d at 34; Levitz v. Burger King Corp., 526 So. 2d
1048, 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Thomas v. Circle K Stores,
Inc., No. 8:19-cv-2817-JSS, 2021 WL 3134781, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May
26, 2021). When foreseeable criminal conduct occurs, such as
shoplifting, it is self-evident that these potentially dangerous
situations should not be escalated unreasonably because they can
result in foreseeable harm to customers or employees. This
principle is a matter of common sense and consistent with the legal
requirement that defendants must lessen rather than escalate
risks where their conduct foreseeably could cause harm. Kaisner v.
Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989) (“Where a defendant’s conduct
creates a foreseeable zone of risk, the law generally will recognize
a duty placed upon defendant either to lessen the risk or see that
sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the harm
that the risk poses.”).

     This non-escalation principle was repeatedly mentioned in the
testimony of Walmart’s employees, as well as Johnson’s expert
report3 and testimony; it was also a basis for the shoplifter to

    3  The report was submitted with Johnson’s motion for
rehearing, which the trial court allowed. The trial court explicitly
considered it in his analysis over the objection of Walmart, who
claimed foreseeability was a question of law and not a proper
subject of expert testimony. After considering the matter on
rehearing, the trial court ordered a final, supplemental round of

                                18
skedaddle from the store, the getaway driver to panic and hasten
her exit from the parking lot, and for Johnson to flee the store in
fear. It is well-established that a legal duty exists to use due care
in a manner that protects customers when shoplifting occurs on
the premises and flight results. See, e.g., 62A Am. Jur. 2d Premises
Liability § 540 (2023) (“Consistent with the rule that once a
robbery is in progress, a store owner must use reasonable or due
care to protect his or her customers from foreseeable harm” and “a
customer who is injured while a shoplifter is being pursued by the
store owner or his or her employees may be entitled to recover from
the owner where, under the circumstances, the store owner
breached a duty of care to the customer because of the manner in
which the shoplifter was pursued.”); Louis A. Lehr, Jr., 3 Premises
Liability 3d, Shoplifting pursuits § 45:5 (2022) (surveying
numerous cases involving fleeing shoplifters injuring customers,
most imposing a duty where the harm was foreseeable).

     Consistent with McCain, the facts—construed in Johnson’s
favor—demonstrate the basis for a duty to protect customers (and
employees) by not escalating these types of situations. The
testimony of Walmart employees, Johnson’s testimony, the expert
report and testimony, and the evidence of what occurred (including
the video showing the shoplifter’s flight, the pursuit by Walmart
employees, and Johnson being run over while fleeing the store)
establish why a legal duty exists under the factual circumstances
presented.

     Walmart was aware that a shoplifting event was in progress.
The store’s asset protection manager had surveilled the shoplifting
suspects, Pitts and Felder, and concluded that Pitts should be
intercepted, and a receipt sought (Felder had left the store and was
in the parking lot covering up the getaway car’s license plate). The
manager recognized that confrontation of a shoplifter could
present a danger to customers and employees, including serious
injuries, if handled improperly. She nonetheless contacted a self-

memoranda on internal training. As such, the expert report is part
of the record upon which the trial court relied and is properly
considered on appeal.

                                 19
checkout host—who lacked authority to stop or make accusations
toward suspects—to be on the lookout for Pitts as he approached
the front of the store.

     Rather than de-escalate the situation, the opposite occurred.
By her own testimony, the self-checkout host—who was not
authorized to surveil or detain shoplifting suspects—had no
training and had never been involved in a shoplifting event before.
Nonetheless, after Pitts had already gone beyond the checkout
registers, she engaged him with “aggressive hospitality,” a phrase
she coined for how she personally deals with these types of
situations. She asked for a receipt but when Pitts failed to produce
one reflecting the items in his cart, she started “pulling stuff out of
his bags” and then pushed the cart forward aggressively. Because
she was holding the cart, the self-checkout host’s hand was twisted
and injured (“All my fingers was bruised.”). She yelled out “Call
the police” and then followed Pitts out the exit, stopping at the
sidewalk for safety reasons and the potential to be hit by a vehicle
(“Because we could get hurt or someone else get hurt. . . . you’re
walking into traffic, more or less.”).

     The asset protection manager noted that pursuit into the
traffic or parking area is disallowed because it is potentially more
likely that the getaway car is going to flee and injure someone.
Indeed, in addition to Johnson’s injury, one witness indicated that
the getaway car was “floored,” leading her to believe the driver was
intentionally trying to hit Johnson; the car exited the parking lot
going in the wrong direction, nearly hitting another car.

      Other testimony established that the self-checkout host
caused a scene by grabbing at Pitts’s arm and yanking it. (“Now,
it’s starting to be a scene because the [Walmart] lady and him are
tugging for the bags that’s in his arm,” resulting in “a crowd
starting to form” with people coming “out of the Walmart
watching” the struggle). People were “running outside” as Pitts
was “fighting with the lady,” while many gathered outside the
doorway, “probably in the 20-30 range.” A mom shopping with her
son said that Pitts “suddenly pushed [the mom] out of the way to
run to the door, almost knocking her down.” The “Walmart lady”
was “screaming” to others that “it’s them, it’s them,” leading

                                  20
Felder, at the wheel of the getaway vehicle, to believe that police
would soon arrive. Pitts “literally walked out like nothing was the
problem until the lady said, that’s him, that’s her,” when his pace
quickened, and he ordered Felder to flee the scene.

       Even Felder, who was waiting for Pitts and drove the getaway
car, understood the risk of foreseeable harm from escalating the
situation. Several Walmart employees followed Pitts out of the
building, some with walkie-talkies in hand, some in plain clothes.
All this commotion caused Felder to panic, wondering why her
accomplice, Pitts, was not hastening his exit fast enough. He
arrived, telling her to “go, go, go” because “they done already called
the police.” According to Felder, there “was just too much going on
. . . I didn’t know what to do, so I just took – I just went. I didn’t
want to get caught . . . but it was just kind of like too much going
on.”

     Johnson’s security expert reviewed all the employee
depositions, industry safety literature, Walmart’s policy, and
Johnson’s testimony. Based upon his review of this factual
background, he opined that Walmart engaged in “significant
deficiencies” that “reflect a lack of conformity with Wal-Mart’s
voluntary standards as established in their policy and training
manuals, standards that are consistent with widely-accepted
industry practices and published guidelines, as noted [in the expert
report].” (Emphasis added). The emphasized language reflects that
Walmart’s policies were not sui generis or unique; they were
merely like those prevailing in the retail community and were
“generally consistent with published guidance regarding responses
to suspected shoplifting” for which three books from the literature
on loss prevention and shoplifting management was cited.

     The security expert concluded that Walmart “was aware that
situations involving confrontation of shoplifting suspects, and
situations involving a suspect fleeing in a vehicle, created a risk of
injury to associates, customers, and suspects. In addition, the self-
checkout host “failed to adequately prioritize safety, and failed to
act appropriately to reduce the risk of harm arising from the
encounter with shoplifting suspect Mr. Pitts.” She lacked
authorization to engage Pitts, was untrained in dealing with

                                 21
shoplifting situations, and was inappropriately confrontational.
Her misconduct was the only evidence of what “provoked Mr. Pitts
to become aggressive and flee. Only after she impeded his
departure by grabbing the cart and pulling items out did his
demeanor shift toward violence.” It was also the only evidence that
“prompted Mr. Johnson to leave the subject store in fear
immediately after he arrived.” He concluded that Johnson’s injury
was “exactly the type of incident” that was preventable and could
be avoided had accepted industry standards been followed.

    D.     Judicial Precedent Supports a Duty Under the Facts
           Presented.

     Judicial opinions in a multitude of Florida business liability
cases over the past sixty-five years reflect the ever-evolving nature
of what constitutes a foreseeable risk of harm in the factual context
of each case. The central question in each case is whether a
foreseeable risk of harm was shown at the time each case was
decided under the specific facts presented.

     For example, it was held almost sixty-five years ago that a
shopkeeper has the legal duty to not create a situation that creates
a risk of harm arising from announcing “Go!” to a large group of
restive and unruly shoppers who rushed into the store to get
limited merchandise on sale. Walker, 111 So. 2d at 77. In
concluding that an injured patron could sue the shopkeeper in tort,
the court stated that “[o]ne does not have to indulge in speculation
to foresee the results of such action.” Id. at 78. The court noted that
“instead of controlling the crowd, the defendants’ employee further
incited it by shouting a signal usually associated with a foot race.”
Id. at 79.

     Likewise, one does not have to indulge in speculation to
foresee the results of confronting and pursuing a shoplifter out of
the store while yelling, “Call the Police!” A foreseeable risk of harm
to consumers and employees is the natural commonsense result.
The risk arises not just from the foreseeability of the shoplifter’s
and getaway driver’s flight, but also from the foreseeability of the
confluence of patrons fleeing the building in alarm. All too often
images of people fleeing businesses or venues are recorded where

                                  22
someone has yelled out or an alarming sound is heard. Which is
why no right exists to falsely yell “Fire!” in a crowded movie
theatre; to do so is to create a foreseeable risk of harm. Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”).

     From the legions of cases, the trial court relied exclusively on
just two, both involving shoplifters, one from 1995 and one from
1970. Both are factually distinguishable and neither account for
the development over the past fifty years of contemporary
protocols for dealing with retail shoplifting scenarios; indeed, the
actions of the shopkeepers in both cases are inconsistent with
current practices in handling suspected shoplifters. Moreover,
even if factually similar, neither case is binding precedent on this
court because each was decided by another district court of appeal.
See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1992). Most
importantly, both cases demonstrate that as long ago as 1970 a
foreseeable risk of harm exists from pursuing or attempting to
detain suspected shoplifters. Mishandling active situations
involving shoplifting poses safety and security concerns that tip
decidedly in favor of de-escalation and the involvement of
adequately trained personnel and law enforcement versus what
occurred in this case.

     The trial court relied on a case decided over a half-century ago,
Graham v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 240 So. 2d 157,
157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), which addressed whether a food market
had a legal duty, under the circumstances and law then prevailing,
to shield invitees from a shoplifter who broke free and ran, injuring
a patron. The manager suspected shoplifting and detained a
“burly” man and his family near their car. Id. at 157−58. He
permitted the wife and child to leave “after the suspect voluntarily
agreed to accompany the manager back inside the store. As they
were walking in, the manager apparently told the suspect that he
intended to call the sheriff, and the suspect broke and ran,
knocking down and injuring the plaintiff, who was still completing
her business.” Id. at 159. The appellate court, deciding the case
twenty-two years prior to the supreme court’s decision in McCain,
held that unless the food market “should reasonably have

                                 23
anticipated violence on the part of the suspected shoplifter, then
clearly it had no duty to take the extraordinary safety measures
alleged by plaintiff to have been negligently omitted.” Id.
(emphasis added).

     Unlike this case, no employee in Graham shouted out “Call
the Police” or the like; and no employee followed the fleeing
shoplifter outside the store. Notably, the court in Graham
indicated that a duty would exist if “some foreknowledge of danger
[existed] against which the store might have had time to prepare
itself.” 240 So. 2d at 159. Since Graham, decided fifty-three years
ago, the retail industry has had such “foreknowledge” for decades.
The industry knows that a foreseeable risk of harm exists in active
shoplifting scenarios, that this risk increases due to escalation
rather than de-escalation, that adopting detailed safety protocols
are necessary to protect customers and employees. A duty thereby
exits under McCain because a retailer’s escalation in such
circumstances “foreseeably create[s] a broader ‘zone of risk’ that
poses a general threat of harm to others.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at
502. In short, Graham is factually distinguishable and outmoded
under modern retail safety protocols, as the facts in this case
demonstrate.

     Next, the trial court relied on the Second District’s one-page
decision in Kmart Corp. v. Lentini, 650 So. 2d 1031, 1031 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1995), which cited Graham. In Lentini, a “suspected
shoplifter was spotted by one of Kmart’s department managers,”
resulting in the loss prevention manager confronting and
detaining him in a conference room; a department manager and an
assistant manager remained outside the conference room door. Id.
at 1032. When the loss prevention manager went to call the police,
the shoplifter—who had been cooperative—“suddenly left his chair
and ran out of the conference room and through the store, colliding
with the plaintiff” who “suffered a knee injury.” Id. The jury’s
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor was reversed because the Second
District concluded that the “record does not show that, in
apprehending and detaining the shoplifting suspect, Kmart’s
‘conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that pose[d] a
general threat of harm to others.’” Id. (citing McCain). As such,

                                24
there “was no breach of any duty owed to the plaintiff by Kmart.”
Id.

     Unlike the present case, however, Lentini involved the
apprehension and detention of a shoplifting suspect by store
personnel and is thereby factually distinguishable; there was no
indication that the shoplifter in Lentini was pursued by a store
employee who yelled out for law enforcement. Walmart did not
seek to apprehend or detain Pitts because doing so was dangerous
and disallowed. The record evidence shows that attempts by store
personnel (versus trained law enforcement) to apprehend or detain
suspected shoplifters are impermissible and frowned upon
industry-wide due to the well-established risk of harm that doing
so entails. Indeed, Walmart’s own safety policy does not condone
what occurred in Lentini, which is simply an outdated precedent
inconsistent with contemporary security and safety protocols.

     Moreover, no Florida court has followed Lentini, while other
courts have distinguished it and found a legal duty exists on facts
substantially the same as this case. For example, in Walmart
Stores East, L.P. v. Ankrom, 854 S.E.2d 257, 264 (W. Va. 2020), the
plaintiff-customer was injured in an in-store collision with a
fleeing shoplifter who was pursued by store employees attempting
to apprehend him. The case involved the same Walmart safety
policy (AP-09) at issue in this case. The West Virginia Supreme
Court held that “a reasonable juror could have concluded that in
this case Wal-Mart employees exposed [the plaintiff] to a
foreseeable high risk of harm in the course of apprehending [the
shoplifter] and, therefore, that Wal-Mart owed a duty to [the
plaintiff] to protect her from his criminal conduct.” Id. at 270. The
court distinguished and did not follow Lentini, noting that the case
involved a shoplifter who “submitted to store employees’ initial
requests to follow them to a security office or other location inside
the store,” which was not what happened in Ankrom. Instead, what
happened—like here—the store employees’ conduct resulted in a
“struggle” and a “scuffle” that created a foreseeable risk of harm.
Id. at 272.

    Likewise, in Fischer v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-
00226-SLG, 2019 WL 4131699, at *1 (D. Alaska Aug. 30, 2019), a

                                 25
case with similarities to this case, the federal court distinguished
Lentini. A Home Depot employee notified the store’s supervisor of
a potential shoplifter. As the suspect moved toward the store’s
entry vestibule, the supervisor asked twice for a receipt, but the
shoplifter continued moving to the exit, setting off the store’s
alarm system. The supervisor asked for a third time to see a receipt
upon which the “shoplifter then ran out the store’s entrance. At the
threshold of the exterior doors, the shoplifter collided with [the
plaintiff], who fell to the ground and broke her fingers.” Id. The
plaintiff said she heard someone yelling to “stop, bring it — that
back” just before the collision. Id.

     The federal court’s task was to determine if the facts of the
case supported a legal duty under Alaska negligence law. In
concluding that one existed, the court noted that “it is foreseeable
that a shoplifter would attempt to flee when pursued or when
pursuit appears imminent, and that the shoplifter’s attempt to
avoid apprehension could result in injury to bystanders.” Id. at *5.
Moreover, Home Depot’s shoplifting policies “suggest that Home
Depot already recognized the risks that such pursuit poses to
bystanders and attempted to minimize those risks.” Id. It
determined that “a reasonable jury could conclude that [the
supervisor’s] actions caused the shoplifter to bolt and collide into
[the plaintiff], and that this constituted a breach of Home Depot’s
duty of care to [the plaintiff].” Id. at *6. The court specifically
rejected Lentini because—unlike in the present case—there “was
no indication that the shoplifter [in that case] was pursued by any
store employee.” Id.4

    In summary, the facts in this case establish a legal duty to not
unreasonably escalate the risk of harm in shoplifting situations.
Escalation increases the risk of harm to customers/employees;

    4 This same distinction was made in the only other case to cite

Lentini. See Gantt v. K-Mart Corp., No. 02A01-9801-CV-00009,
1999 WL 33900761, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1999) (“There is
no evidence in the record that security personnel were pursuing
the shoplifter in the store, or that apprehension was attempted
before the shoplifter began to go through the outside doorway.”).

                                26
indeed, a Walmart employee was slightly injured, and Johnson
was severely injured as a result. The testimony of Walmart
employees, expert testimony including an expert report citing
industry literature, and the videos of what occurred fully support
the existence of a legal duty, which is not based exclusively on
Walmart’s policy, as the next section discusses.

    E.      The Role of Walmart’s Safety Policy

     The trial court characterized Johnson’s tort claim as premised
entirely on a breach of Walmart’s safety policy, AP-09,5 which was
inaccurate. The record contains plentiful evidence establishing the
basis for a legal duty to protect customers and to deescalate
shoplifting situations without reference to Walmart’s safety policy.

     That said, the trial court was not required to ignore Walmart’s
policy entirely; instead, it could consider it as relevant evidence in
making a judicial judgment about the existence of a legal duty. The
policy does not set the legal duty; but it is relevant in making the
judicial determination of what legal duty, if any, exists when
conduct foreseeably creates a zone of risk that may harm
customers and others.

      To start, judicial precedents hold that a legal duty may not be
based solely upon the existence and terms of a company’s own
policy; to do so creates a disincentive for companies to undertake
greater levels of care than are legally required. See Steinberg ex
rel. Steinberg v. Lomenick, 531 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
(Baskin, J., concurring) (“[A] contrary result would discourage the
voluntary setting of standards higher than those customarily

    5  Numerous reported decisions discuss Walmart’s safety
standards in AP-09, which is referred to by employees as a holy
book. Dillon v. Wal-Mart 2720, No. 3:18-CV-481-CWR-FKB, 2020
WL 5514153, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 14, 2020) (“Wal-Mart has
a policy and procedure manual, called AP-09, which employees
refer to as ‘the Bible.’ It identifies the steps asset protection
associates must follow when dealing with a customer suspected of
shoplifting.”).

                                 27
employed in the community.”). Just as the law doesn’t punish a
company for taking subsequent remedial measures after an
accident, see § 90.407, Fla. Stat. (2023), it likewise doesn’t impose
a legal duty in tort based solely on a company’s safety policy, see
K-Mart Corp. v. Kitchen, 662 So. 2d 977, 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
(“Imposition of a legal duty on a retailer on the basis of its internal
policies is actually contrary to public policy. Such a rule would
encourage retailers to abandon all policies enacted for the
protection of others in an effort to avoid future liability.” (citation
omitted)), decision quashed on other grounds, 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.
1997).6

     Although a legal duty cannot be based exclusively on a
company’s safety policy, a court can consider relevant portions of a
safety policy in determining the contours of a negligence claim. It
is uniformly held that a company’s policy setting standards for
employees to follow is relevant evidence of the standard of care.
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wittke, 202 So. 3d 929, 930–31
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“Internal policies and procedures may be
admissible if they are relevant to the standard of care[.]”); Mayo v.
Publix Super Markets, Inc., 686 So. 2d 801, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997) (recognizing that “safety rules and procedures established
by a party to govern the conduct of its employees are relevant
evidence of the standard of care”); Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Zapata,
601 So. 2d 239, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“Rules made by a
defendant to govern the conduct of employees are relevant
evidence of the standard of care.”); Steinberg, 531 So. 2d at 200

    6 A corollary is that an employer is not liable for breach of its

policy if what the employee did, though contrary to the policy, was
reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Publix
Super Mkts., Inc., 187 So. 3d 892, 894–95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
(noting that while Publix’s procedure for blocking an aisle to clean
spilled product is relevant to an employee’s conduct, if “what [the
employee] did, under the circumstances and within the five
seconds he was allotted by fate, was reasonable and demonstrated
ordinary care, then the fact he allegedly did not abide by Publix’s
internal operating procedure of blocking off the aisle does not
create a heightened duty of care in favor of [plaintiff]”).

                                  28
(“Concededly, rules made by a defendant to govern the conduct of
employees are relevant evidence of the standard of care. Indeed,
this court has held that a party’s internal policies and procedure
are admissible as some evidence of the appropriate standard of
care.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Disc. Tire Co., 2023 WL
7228186, at *3 (noting that internal policy is relevant to standard
of care but does not by itself create the standard).

     A standard of care is the degree of care a reasonable person
should exercise to avoid harm to others; it does not establish a legal
duty, but it is relevant in deciding if a legal duty exists. For
example, if a company is aware of a foreseeable risk of harm to
others arising from its conduct, its safety policy—while not an
exclusive basis for a legal duty—may be relevant in the judicial
calculus of whether a legal duty exists under the circumstances. A
common misnomer is that a company immunizes itself from
negligence claims simply by adopting a safety policy and arguing
that its standards cannot be the basis for a legal duty in tort. That
is incorrect. If a policy’s standards are the same or consistent with
those justified by regulations, industry norms, or the facts of a
case, McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503, a claimant can assert a breach of
those standards notwithstanding they are contained in a
company’s policy. Stated differently, a company’s adoption of
safety standards doesn’t shield the company from tort liability if
those standards independently prevail in the community or are
justified by the facts in a specific case; universal tort immunity
would result if the law was otherwise.

     Here, many portions of Walmart’s safety policy directly
address the risk of escalating situations involving shoplifting and
thereby establish the foreseeability of such risks. The policy clearly
established that Walmart understood that confronting shoplifting
suspects elevates the risk of harm to customers and employees.
Employees must disengage and withdraw from potentially
dangerous situations and avoid confrontations; attempting to
recover property is secondary to the safety of customers. The policy
reflects Walmart knew of and established protocols because of the
foreseeability of harm that would otherwise result from non-
compliance. These portions of the policy are relevant, not to impose
them as substantive legal standards (though they could be if

                                 29
prevailing in the industry), but to demonstrate that a known risk
of foreseeable harm existed in these types of shoplifting situations
for which a duty to protect customers and employees exists.
Johnson presented testimony and evidence establishing that a
legal duty exists in this type of case and was entitled to present
Walmart’s safety policy as relevant in the trial court’s
determination of whether a legal duty exists and the standard of
care.

                                 II.

     In conclusion, the record evidence establishes that Walmart
has a legal duty to protect customers and employees from the
foreseeable risks of escalating encounters with shoplifters, which
increases the risks of flight and harm. Under supreme court
precedent, if a defendant’s conduct foreseeably creates a zone of
risk posing a threat of harm, a legal duty exists in a negligence
action. The supreme court made clear over thirty years ago that
the question of duty “is a minimal threshold legal requirement for
opening the courthouse doors,” placing the burden on plaintiffs to
prove facts that “win the case once the courthouse doors are open.”
McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502–03 (underscore added; emphasis in
original). It was error to enter judgment against Johnson, who has
the right for a jury to hear his negligence claim. I dissent.

                                ***

                              Epilogue:

    The foregoing opinion, other than its ending (“I dissent”), is
verbatim what I proposed to decide this case and to which the
majority opinion responds. I offer the following comments.

     First, appellate courts have an obligation under the de novo
standard of review to consider the entire record in deciding a legal
question, such as whether a duty exists for businesses to protect
their customers from foreseeable harm. See Baxter v. Northrup,
128 So. 3d 908, 909 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); see also McCain, 593 So.
2d at 502 (noting that duty is a question of law subject to de novo
review). In doing so, appellate judges do not act like porcine truffle
scavengers rummaging for issues buried in the crevices of a

                                 30
skeletal unreasoned brief. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d
955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for
truffles buried in briefs.”). To the contrary, it is our responsibility
to do so. It’s one thing to say that a “single unreasoned paragraph”
in an appellate brief is “skeletal” and not deserving of appellate
review, id.; it’s quite another to disregard the full appellate record,
particularly where the appellant devotes his entire initial brief to
one legal issue—here, whether a legal duty exists.

      In this same vein, the majority grouses that it shouldn’t have
to “scour the record in search of facts or arguments that a party
could have raised in the trial court or on appeal” and says further
it is not their “responsibility . . . to dig through the record to locate
the basis for a party’s argument.” No digging or scouring required.
This is not a case involving a “single-sentence, non-supported, and
non-elaborated ‘argument.’” See Jackmore v. Est. of Jackmore, 145
So. 3d 170, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (refusing to review such an
“argument” tucked away in an initial brief’s summary of the
argument). Instead, the 53-page initial brief in this case provides
(a) a highly detailed factual recitation of the appellate record
(including the testimony of Johnson and Walmart employees,
Walmart’s policy, Johnson’s expert report and testimony,7 and
video evidence of the incident), and (b) legal argument in support
of the singular legal issue presented. Judges must fairly review
and characterize the parties’ legal submissions and consider the
entire record; wearing blinders defeats the purpose of de novo
review. Better to be a judicial truffle pig than a judicial ostrich.

     Second, the majority says, “we do not consider the facts as
they are characterized by the parties, but instead how they
objectively appear in the summary judgment evidence itself.” In
doing so, the majority disregards (indeed, doesn’t even mention)

     7 Notably, the initial brief’s statement of the case and facts

included a subsection, labeled “Mr. Johnson’s Expert Testimony,”
which described the expert as “opin[ing] that Walmart associates
dangerously escalated the encounter with the shoplifter by
removing items from the cart, confronting the shoplifter over his
fraudulent receipt, calling out for police, and following him out of
the store.”

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our appellate responsibility which is to construe the record
evidence in this appeal in a light most favorable to Johnson, the
non-moving party. See Baxter, 128 So. 3d at 909 (“An appellate
court must consider the evidence contained in the record, including
any supporting affidavits, in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.”); see also Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277,
1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (same). Doing so means viewing all
record evidence—and all reasonable inferences flowing from it—in
favor of Johnson’s position, which the majority fails to do.

     For example, the majority entirely rejects that any of
Walmart’s actions escalated the situation, when even employees
recognized what is glaringly obvious, i.e., that ill-advised and
foolhardy escalation occurred. The majority claims that the
Walmart self-checkout host grabbing the cart and attempting to
pick out items was “consistent with the employee’s job duties”
when employees were specifically forbidden from doing so to
prevent increasing the risk of harm in these situations. Indeed, the
untrained self-checkout host engaged in impermissible conduct
that triggered and escalated the encounter; her so-called
“aggressive hospitality”—rather than put shoppers at ease like
front door Walmart greeters of days gone by—did quite the
opposite. And the majority makes the astounding claim that the
Walmart employee shouting “Call the Police” is totally irrelevant
because Pitts, the shoplifter, had already started to flee. But he
was fleeing because the Walmart employee escalated the situation
by grabbing the cart and snatching an item, which the majority
entirely discounts. Nothing in the record says that shouting for
police in the checkout area was other than an appalling and
dangerous gaffe; a jury could easily conclude that it caused alarm
among customers, panicked the getaway driver who drove more
recklessly, and resulted in Johnson fleeing the store and being run
over.

     Rather than accepting the factual record and construing it in
Johnson’s favor, as is required, the majority does the opposite by
ignoring it or misconstruing it to Johnson’s disfavor. An appellate
panel cannot give greater weight to the movant’s evidence, disfavor
the non-movant’s evidence, or decide fact questions in this manner.
The reason is that appellate panels are not juries. The task at this

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juncture is not to decide whose version of events seems more
persuasive, convincing, or plausible; it is to construe all record
evidence and its reasonable inferences in favor of Johnson in
deciding whether a legal duty exists. Suker v. White Fam. Ltd.
P’ship, 193 So. 3d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (internal citation
omitted) (noting that summary judgment review requires a court
to “consider all record evidence in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party”). If done in this manner, the appellate record
establishes why a legal duty to avoid escalating the risks of harm
to customers and employees exists in the shoplifting scenario
presented. Let’s not forget that Walmart’s escalation of the risks
caused injuries to both protected categories.

     Plus, nothing in the record indicates that Walmart’s policy for
handling shoplifting situations was other than a basic
industrywide standard under the facts presented; no heightened
or super-duper policy protections were in place, only basic
commonsense ones. The reason that Walmart and other retailers
have policies that preclude escalation is because shoplifting is all
too commonplace and presents unique perils to customers and
employees. On this point, the majority entirely contradicts itself,
saying—with no legal authority or evidence—that such polices are
of “little value” unless they “represent what is reasonably
foreseeable.” But everyone—including Walmart—agrees that
retail shoplifting is not just reasonably foreseeable: it is pervasive
and dangerous, such that businesses have a duty to protect
customers and employees by not escalating the risks in these all-
too-common situations.

     Stated differently, the general and well-established duty to
protect customers from harm includes protecting against the
known risks arising from active shoplifter situations. The
evidentiary record demonstrates what is obvious: it is foreseeable
that harm to customers and employees will result when active
shoplifting situations are escalated rather than defused. Nothing
in the record points in the other direction. The majority, however,
is content to rely on a couple of outmoded and distinguishable
cases from other districts to conclude that retailers must know in
advance that a particular shoplifter has a propensity for violence
yet escalated the situation anyway. We need not and should not

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follow such dubious and inapplicable cases, particularly when no
evidence suggests the industry takes precautions only when a
patron is known to be violent; to the contrary, they take uniform
non-escalation precautions because they know the serious risks
that active shoplifting situations present.

     In this regard, the majority—contrary to the appellate
record—seems to think that grabbing shopping carts, shouting for
police, causing fear and flight by customers, and even aggressively
detaining suspected shoplifters versus calling law enforcement are
prevailing and acceptable industry standards, when they are not;
nothing in the record condones these practices. It ill-advisedly
gives the legal thumbs up to an untrained employee grabbing and
plucking items out of the cart of a potentially dangerous suspected
shoplifter, shouting “Call the police” as the suspect hazardously
hastens his escape causing commotion and customer concern, and
doing nothing to prevent the type of serious injuries that Johnson
suffered as he fled the storefront in fear. Remember that the
Walmart employees who followed the shoplifter out of the store
weren’t allowed to go into the crosswalk due to safety concerns, yet
they watched and did nothing as one of their frequent customers
fled and was run over there by the panicked getaway driver.

     In conclusion, the factual record in this case demonstrates
unequivocally that retailers have a duty to protect customers on
their premises from potential harm in active shoplifting scenarios
and that escalating these situations increases risks and produces
negative outcomes. It is common sense bolstered by a solid
appellate record, which shows that escalating dangerous
shoplifting situations intensifies the existing zone of risks to
customers and employees, thereby meeting the standards of
McCain, which recognizes “a duty arising from the general facts of
the case.” 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2 (emphasis added). Johnson ought
to have his day in court and have a jury—not an appellate court—
resolve whether Walmart breached its duty of care and caused him
harm. See United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir.
1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) (“Common sense and good practical
judgment of human conduct are essential in this regard, and that
is what juries are for.”).

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