Court Opinion

ID: 9726603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:59:45.811498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:28.815611
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 47. (dissenting). Today's decision extends immunity for recreational activity on one owner's property to the owner of adjacent property that the injured plaintiff walked across in order to get to his automobile after leaving the land upon which he engaged in recreational activity. Because I conclude that this extension of immunity is not justified under Wis. Stat. § 895.52, I dissent.
¶ 48. The facts of this case show that the plaintiff, Donald Urban, was injured while walking on the property of defendant David Grasser. The plaintiff walked across David Grasser's land to get back to the plaintiffs automobile after having worked on his boat. The plaintiff s boat activities, which occurred on property owned by Paul Grasser, are "recreational activities" on Paul Grasser's land within Wis. Stat. § 895.52(l)(g) and (2)(b).
*697¶ 49. Under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b), "no owner is liable for. . .any injury to.. .a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's property." Paul Grasser is immune from liability under the statute for injury to the plaintiff, who engaged in a recreational activity on Paul Grasser's property. Paul Grasser may also arguably be immune from liability under the statute for injury to the plaintiff for any recreational activity in which the plaintiff engaged on Paul Grasser's easement.
¶ 50. The statute does not, however, extend recreational immunity to David Grasser, the owner of the servient estate, the property subject to the easement.1 The statute grants an owner immunity from liability only for an injury to "a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's property." Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) (emphasis added). The plaintiff was not injured while engaging in a recreational activity on David Grasser's property. The majority opinion implicitly agrees with this position and therefore rewrites Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b).
¶ 51. The majority opinion has rewritten Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b), apparently adding the words shown in boldface to grant an owner of property immunity from liability for an injury to "a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's property and to a person engaging in a recreational activity on another person's property when the activity on the owner's property is inextricably connected to *698the recreational activity on the other person's property."
¶ 52. Applying the statute as rewritten, the majority opinion concludes that David Grasser is entitled to share Paul Grasser's recreational immunity because the plaintiffs walking on David Grasser's property is "inextricably connected" to the recreational activity of boating that had occurred on Paul Grasser's property. This nebulous concept of "inextricably connected" that extends recreational immunity to a second property owner as a result of a recreational activity that occurs on adjacent property has no basis in the recreational immunity statute.
¶ 53. In reading the statute the way it does, the majority opinion suggests that it is fulfilling the purpose of the statute to encourage property owners to open their property for recreational activity.2 I disagree.
¶ 54. First, whether the purpose of the recreation immunity statute is to open land for recreation is open to question. The "opening the land" purpose is no longer expressed in the statute. The 1983 amendments to the recreational immunity statute apply to the present case and contain no references to opening the land or giving or granting permission to enter the land as had earlier statutes. The purpose of the 1983 statute was to limit the liability of property owners toward others who use the property for recreational activities. The 1983 amended statute does not purport to grant *699immunity only to those owners who open their land for recreational activity.3
¶ 55. One of the purposes of the 1983 amendments as evidenced in the legislative history was to do away with the great uncertainty in the recreational immunity law produced in this court's decisions.4 Yet the majority opinion creates new uncertainty. Requiring an intensely fact-driven inquiry into whether a plaintiffs presence on one property is "inextricably connected" to recreational activity on a second property creates uncertainty.
¶ 56. This sort of intensive fact-driven inquiry fundamentally changes the "open the land" purpose of the recreational immunity statute that the majority opinion is striving to achieve: If property owners' immunity from suit depends on a court's fact-driven inquiry rather than on the plain language of the statute, property owners have less incentive to open their property for recreational activities. I do not think the legislature intended that Wis. Stat. § 895.52 operate as such an unpredictable tool for defendants in personal injury cases.
¶ 57. The new and nebulous judicially created concept of "inextricably connected" threatens to extend recreational immunity far beyond the plain language of the statute. For example, the plaintiff in this case was walking across David Grasser's property to get his automobile, which was parked on the street. Is the *700street or parking area on which the plaintiff parked his automobile, an activity that was necessary to get to the boat, also inextricably connected to the recreational activity that occurred on the property of a different owner? Is the owner of the street or the parking area entitled to recreational immunity for an injury that occurred while the plaintiff was going to or from his car? What if the plaintiff parked a mile away and had to walk over several different properties to reach his boat: would each property owner along the journey be entitled to recreational immunity under the majority opinion's theory of an inextricable connection? What about an injury that occurred at some point in the plaintiff s drive from home? The majority opinion provides no sense of how distant in time or space the nonrecreational activity must be in order to extricate it from its connection to the recreational activity. As a result, the potential applications of this new theory of recreational immunity seem boundless.
¶ 58. Because I see no logical stopping point for the majority's new theory, and because I do not think the legislature intended that the statute would provide such broad immunity for defendants in personal injury cases, I conclude that this case represents the stopping point for recreational immunity.
¶ 59. David Grasser is not the owner of property on which a recreational activity occurred. Accordingly, under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b), David Grasser is not immune from liability for injury to the plaintiff, who was engaged in a recreational activity on another's property.
¶ 60. This court should await clear guidance from the legislature before extending recreational immunity to adjacent property owners whose property the injured person walks across en route to or from a *701recreational activity on another's land. The nebulous concept of "inextricably connected to recreational activity" cannot be applied with any precision and expands recreational immunity far beyond the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 895.52.
¶ 61. Finally, I join the chorus of voices on this court expressing frustration with trying to apply the current version of the recreational immunity statute clearly and consistently in the myriad fact situations that have arisen.5 More cases are in the pipeline. I join the chorus requesting clarification from the legislature regarding the intended scope and application of the *702recreational immunity statute.6 I suggest the legislature might wish to reexamine the statute. See Wis. Stat. §§ 13.83(l)(c)l and 13.93(2)(d) (1999-2000).
¶ 62. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 63. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 The existence of an access easement between David and Paul Grasser provides no support for the majority opinion's conclusion that the two men share recreational immunity. The majority opinion cites no authority to support the idea that statutory immunity from tort liability of the owner of a dominant estate is shared by the owner of the servient estate.

 See majority op. at ¶ 12.
See also Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling Co., 2001 WI 64, ¶¶ 60-61, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).

 Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 632-33, 635, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996).
See also Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling Co., 2001 WI 64, ¶¶ 60-61, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).

 See Minnesota Fire, 2001 WI 64, ¶ 61 n.7 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).

 Another issue is the disparity in language between Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b), which grants an owner of property immunity under certain circumstances, and Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d), which restores liability for social guests.
Section 895.52(2)(b) grants immunity for any "injury to.. .a person engaging in recreational activity on the owner's property." In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d) creates a social guest exception. Subsection (6)(d) states that the liability of an owner (other than a government body or nonprofit organization) whose property is used for recreational activity is not limited under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) when the "injury occurs on property owned by a private property owner to a social guest."
Thus, for recreational immunity, apparently an owner need only show that the injured person engaged in recreational activity on the owner's property. It is arguable that whether the injury occurred on the owner's property is irrelevant. If the injured person seeks to hold the owner liable under the social guest exception to recreational immunity, the statute might be interpreted to require that the injury occurred on the owner's property. See Waters v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI62, ¶ 50, 243 Wis. 2d 703, 627 N.W.2d 497.

 See majority op. at ¶ 12. See also Minnesota Fire, 2001 WI 64, ¶¶ 37-44 (Bradley, J., concurring); id. at ¶ 72 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).