Court Opinion

ID: 9947272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 15:08:00.111718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.075487
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1836-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.A.M.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________

                   Submitted January 23, 2024 – Decided March 4, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-11-0950.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
                   for respondent (Milton Samuel Leibowitz, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

          Defendant J.A.M. appeals from a February 9, 2022 order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We

affirm.

      The circumstances leading to defendant's convictions for sexually

assaulting his daughters, D.M. and E.M., are set forth in our unpublished opinion

from defendant's direct appeal, State v. J.A.M., No. A-0928-16 (App. Div. Sept.

26, 2018) (slip op. at 1), and in the PCR judge's February 9 opinion. Thus, we

need only summarize the salient facts.

      In November 2013, defendant was indicted on the following charges: two

counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2) (counts

one and five); two counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2(c)(l) (counts two and six); two counts of second-degree-sexual assault,

N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4) (counts three and seven); and two counts of second-

degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (counts four and

nine). He also was indicted for the additional offense of second-degree sexual

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), against E.M. (count eight).

      Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the statement he gave to the

police after his wife—the victims' mother—reported defendant was sexually

abusing D.M. and E.M. The trial court denied the suppression motion.

      During his 2015 jury trial, both victims, as well as defendant's wife,

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testified against him. D.M. testified defendant began touching her breasts when

she was thirteen years old and that he started touching her vagina on a weekly

basis when she was fourteen. E.M. testified defendant began touching her

breasts and thighs when she was eleven years old, and he started putting his

fingers in her vagina once she turned thirteen. The girls also stated that when

these incidents occurred, defendant told them he was checking for diseases and

making sure they were virgins. Additionally, they testified they tried to fight

back and told defendant to stop, but he ignored their pleas and at times, slapped

them in the face.

      After the State rested its case and defense counsel confirmed he did not

want to call any witnesses, the judge inquired if defense counsel needed time to

speak with defendant about testifying. Counsel responded, "I think we are ready

to deal with that on the record right now." Thus, defendant was sworn and asked

if he signed a waiver form entitled "Waiver Not To Testify."          Defendant

answered, "[t]hat is correct," but then stated he had "one question for [his]

attorney." The judge took a brief recess to permit defendant to consult with

counsel. When the hearing resumed, the judge questioned whether defendant

"had enough time to speak to [his] attorney." Defendant answered, "[c]orrect."

      Next, the judge asked if defendant was "choosing not to be a witness."

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Defendant replied, "[t]hat is correct," prompting the following exchange:

            []COURT:       And you understand that it's your
            constitutional right to remain silent, and that's what
            you're invoking at this point[,] is that correct?

            []DEFENDANT: That's correct.

            []COURT: And you're telling me when I give the
            charge that I will tell the jury that they are not to
            consider for any purpose or in any manner in arriving
            at their verdict the fact that you did not testify, nor
            should that fact enter into their deliberations . . . in any
            manner . . . . And that you are entitled to have the
            jury . . . consider all of the evidence and that you . . .
            are entitled to the presumption of innocence even if you
            do not testify as a witness.

                  . . . [Y]ou're giving me consent to give this charge
            to the jury and . . . this has been explained to you by
            your attorney. Is that all correct?

            []DEFENDANT: That is correct.

            []COURT: Is there anything that I've said here that you
            have a question [about] or you do not understand?

            []DEFENDANT: No, nothing.

            []COURT: So you understand everything?

            []DEFENDANT: Correct.

            []COURT: And you have no questions?

            []DEFENDANT: No.

      In response to further questioning by the judge, defendant testified he

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understood that when the jury returned, he could not "get up and testify."

Accordingly, the judge admitted defendant's signed waiver into the record and

"accept[ed] it as [defendant]'s knowing and voluntary decision not to testify. "

      Defendant's waiver included a proposed jury charge that read as follows:

                  [J.A.M.] chose not to be a witness.

                 It is the constitutional right of a defendant to
            remain silent.

                   I charge you that you are not to consider for any
            purpose or in any manner in arriving at your verdict the
            fact that the defendant did not testify, nor should th[at]
            fact enter into your deliberations or discussions in any
            manner or at any time.

                  The defendant is entitled to have the jury
            consider all of the evidence and he is entitled to the
            presumption of innocence even if he does not testify as
            a witness.

                  I hereby consent to [the trial judge] giving the
            above charge to the jury, the significance of this
            statement having been explained to me by my attorney.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      Defendant was found guilty on all counts but the eighth count (second-

degree assault against E.M). He was sentenced in January 2016 to an aggregate

thirty-year term, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

7.2 on counts one, two, five, and six. In September 2018, we affirmed the trial

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                                        5
court's decision on his suppression motion and defendant's convictions but

remanded for resentencing on limited issues. J.A.M., slip op. at 8-9.

      Defendant was resentenced in February 2019, to an aggregate twenty-six-

year term, subject to NERA on counts one, two, five, and six. In April 2019,

the New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification.

State v. J.A.M., 237 N.J. 418 (2019).

      In December 2020, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR, alleging trial

counsel was ineffective for "waiv[ing defendant's] right to be present during a

crucial stage of trial without [defendant's] consent." Defendant also argued trial

counsel was ineffective for "fail[ing] to ensure . . . the jury was properly

instructed," and failing to object to the State's "damning" summation, which

"border[ed on] official misconduct."

      In November 2021, assigned counsel submitted a letter brief, as well as a

supplemental letter brief, and a supplemental unsigned certification from

defendant in support of the PCR petition. In PCR counsel's submissions, he

contended "[t]rial counsel failed to fully investigate the case and communicate

with [d]efendant, as well as represent [d]efendant at trial by raising objections."

PCR counsel further argued "[t]rial counsel's cumulative errors denied

[d]efendant his right to effective assistance of counsel."

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                                        6
      PCR counsel also contended in the supplemental brief—without a

corresponding certification from defendant—that "trial counsel was ineffective

because [he] failed to object to the removal of a Latino juror at trial ."1

Additionally, PCR counsel newly argued—without a supporting certification

from defendant—that "[d]efendant wanted to testify at trial[,] but trial counsel

advised [d]efendant not to testify," and "[d]efendant would have credib[ly]

testified that he never sexually assaulted his daughters and that their testimony

was coerced and coached." In defendant's unsigned supplemental certification,

he argued trial counsel's cumulative errors included counsel's failure to:

interview witnesses; sufficiently communicate with defendant; and seek

removal of a courtroom spectator who "stare[d] and glared at [defendant]

throughout the trial."

      During argument on the PCR petition in January 2022, the judge

confirmed he reviewed PCR counsel's submissions, as well as defendant's

unsigned certification.   PCR counsel represented he would file a signed

certification from defendant, identical to defendant's unsigned certification, at

the conclusion of the hearing.

1
  The record reflects the trial judge initiated the removal of this juror, without
objection from the State or defense counsel, after the judge concluded the juror
was sleeping during the trial.
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                                        7
      On February 9, 2022, the PCR judge entered an order denying defendant's

petition without an evidentiary hearing.         In a twenty-seven-page opinion

accompanying the order, the judge addressed defendant's multiple arguments

and also set forth defendant's colloquy with the trial court wherein defendant

confirmed his "[d]ecision to [n]ot [t]estify."

      Regarding defendant's assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to make timely objections at trial and object to "inflammatory

statements" made during summations, the judge found "defendant d[id] not

reference any specific statements made during the trial or during closing, which

he claim[ed] w[ere] objectionable," nor did PCR counsel "direct the court to any

[such] statements." Thus, the judge determined "[t]here was nothing specific

raised . . . to support this [ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)] claim."

      The judge also concluded defendant provided no factual basis for his

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview defendant's two

daughters. The judge noted that although "defendant elected to not testify,"

"defendant admitted to the police that he would frequently visit the two girls at

night in their bedroom and . . . would use his fingers to inspect their vaginas to

ensure . . . they were still virgins," a statement which "the jury clearly

rejected . . . as justification for defendant's conduct." Additionally, the judge

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                                         8
found "neither . . . defendant nor [PCR counsel] provided the court with a

certification from . . . [defendant's] wife or either daughter which supported

[defendant's] assertion that any or all of the three would have testified

differently . . . had [they] been interviewed by . . . defense counsel prior to trial."

The judge observed that "[t]he two girls gave statements [about] the sexual

assault to their mother, to the police, to the person who examined them[,] and at

trial." Thus, he found "[t]here [wa]s no reason to believe that [had] defense

counsel interviewed them . . . their testimony would have changed."

      Next, the judge rejected defendant's claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to communicate with defendant, finding "[n]either . . .

defendant nor [PCR] counsel suggest[ed] how more frequent conversations

would have changed the trial defense or the outcome of the trial."

      Turning to defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to seek the removal of a spectator at trial who "stared and glared" at defendant

in the presence of the jury, the judge found PCR "counsel simply state[d] . . .

defendant . . . raised this point" but "[n]o further argument was made to support

this assertion." The judge stated that to baldly "assert that any spectator had an

impact upon a jury without any facts to support such an assertion falls far below

the standard needed" to establish a prima case of IAC.

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                                          9
      The PCR judge also found no merit to defendant's contention that a Latino

juror "should not have been removed [during the trial merely] because she . . .

briefly closed her eyes." The judge found "the record . . . confirm[ed] . . . [the]

juror was excused because she fell asleep during the trial" and "defendant [wa]s

unable to show how the removal prejudiced his case when the remaining

[twelve] juror[s] who deliberated unanimously found him guilty of the majority

of the charges."

      Based on these findings, the judge concluded "[t]he defense . . . failed to

establish either prong of the" two-prong test under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984).       Regarding the first prong—whether trial counsel's

performance was deficient—the judge found "[t]here [w]as . . . no showing

whatsoever that [defendant's] trial counsel was in any way even remotely

deficient in his representation." The judge also concluded "[t]here [wa]s nothing

more that defense counsel could have done to prevent a guilty verdict in light of

defendant's own admission" to the police that he touched his daughters' vaginas.

      Next, the judge determined defendant failed to meet the second Strickland

prong, finding defendant did not "articulate[] how defense counsel's conduct

prejudiced" him. The judge stated defendant did "not come close to showing . . .

there [wa]s a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's conduct, the result

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                                        10
of the trial would have been d[ifferent]." In finding no evidentiary hearing was

warranted, the judge reasoned there were "no tactical decisions that trial counsel

would have [had] to justify." Further, the judge rejected defendant's argument

that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to explore trial counsel's failure to

interview the victims. The judge explained:

            to get to the point where an evidentiary hearing would
            be necessary[,] . . . there would need to be some
            evidence that the girls would have testified
            differently . . . [had] trial counsel interviewed them.
            There is no such evidence. The suggestion is purely
            speculative and does not justify an evidentiary hearing.

                  Likewise, the argument[s] regarding the
            handicapped juror, the allegedly (unspecified)
            inflammatory comment, and the [removal of the] Latino
            juror provide an insufficient factual basis . . . to
            conclude that an evidentiary hearing is required in this
            matter.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

            POINT I

            THE PCR COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS
            DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS
            DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
            DUE TO THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO
            CALL HIM AS A WITNESS TO TESTIFY IN HIS
            OWN DEFENSE DESPITE EXPRESSING A DESIRE
            TO TESTIFY.

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                                        11
            POINT II

            DEFENDANT     WAS   ENTITLED   TO   AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING BASED UPON HIS
            PRIMA FACIE SHOWING THAT HE WAS DENIED
            EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
            TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE
            AND INTERVIEW DEFENDANT'S CHILDREN.

            POINT III

            THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE REMAINING
            ARGUMENTS DESERVE EX[]PLORATION AT AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo, but generally

defer to its factual findings when those findings are "supported by adequate,

substantial and credible evidence." State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004)

(quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)).

When an evidentiary hearing has not already been held, we may conduct a "de

novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court."

Id. at 421. However, we review a trial court's decision to deny a PCR petition

without an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. State v. Preciose, 129

N.J. 451, 462 (1992).

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                                      12
       To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong test

enunciated in Strickland 2 by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gaitan,

209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012). Under the first Strickland prong, a defendant must

show    counsel's   performance    "fell    below   an   objective   standard    of

reasonableness" and "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Because a reviewing court "must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance," "the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel]

'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation

omitted). "The quality of counsel's performance cannot be fairly assessed by

focusing on a handful of issues while ignoring the totality of counsel's

performance in the context of the State's evidence of defendant's guilt." State v.

Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 165

(1991)).

2
  The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Strickland test in State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
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                                       13
      To satisfy the second Strickland prong, a defendant must show counsel's

alleged "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 466 U.S. at 687. This

means "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,

a trial whose result is reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show

the errors "had some conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. "An error

by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside

the judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the judgment." Id.

at 691. Importantly, failure to satisfy either Strickland prong requires the denial

of a PCR petition. Id. at 700.

      Trial counsel may be ineffective if counsel fails to conduct an adequate

pre-trial investigation. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 464; State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J.

Super. 14, 22-23 (App. Div. 2002). "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary."      State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013)

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004)).

Counsel's failure to do so will "render the lawyer's performance deficient."

Chew, 179 N.J. at 217 (quoting State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 618 (1990)).

"[W]hen a petitioner claims [a] trial attorney inadequately investigated [the]

case, [the petitioner] must assert the facts that an investigation would have

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                                        14
revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal

knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." Porter, 216

N.J. at 353 (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.

Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999)).

      The cumulative effect of trial errors may warrant reversal when it "casts

doubt on the propriety of the jury verdict that was the product of that trial." State

v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 474 (2008). Reversal may be justified when the

cumulative effect of a series of errors is harmful, even if each error itself is

harmless. Ibid. "[T]he predicate for relief for cumulative error must be that the

probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the underlying trial unfair."

State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007).

      A defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by

simply raising a PCR claim. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. To obtain an

evidentiary hearing, a defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the

evidence, a prima facie case for relief, material issues of disputed fact, and show

that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims. R. 3:22-10(b).

      "A 'prima facie case' requires that a defendant 'demonstrate a reasonable

likelihood that [their] claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable

to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits[,]' . . . and must be

                                                                              A-1836-21
                                        15
supported by 'specific facts and evidence supporting [their] allegations.'" State

v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 2016) (second alteration in

original) (quoting Porter, 216 N.J. at 355). "If the [PCR] court perceives that

holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the

defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be

granted."   State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013)

(omission in original) (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997)).

Also, if a defendant's "allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative," the

defendant is "not entitled to an evidentiary hearing." Porter, 216 N.J. at 355

(first quoting Marshall, 148 N.J. at 158). A defendant "must do more than make

bald assertions that [the defendant] was denied the effective assistance of

counsel. [A defendant] must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's

alleged substandard performance." Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

      Guided by these standards, we have no reason to disturb the February 9,

2022 order, and affirm the order substantially for the reasons stated by the PCR

judge. Moreover, we specifically reject defendant's argument that reversal of

the February 9 order is warranted due to the PCR judge's purported failure to

address trial counsel's failure to call defendant as a witness. That is because

defendant's contention that he wished to testify at trial is not only belied by the

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record, but unsupported by any certification he submitted with his PCR petition.

      In fact, the PCR judge recounted at length the colloquy between the trial

judge and defendant, confirming defendant understood he had a right to testify

and chose not to do so. Defendant's election to not testify also was memorialized

in a signed waiver, which the trial judge admitted as evidence of defendant's

"knowing and voluntary decision not to testify." Therefore, we decline to

disturb the PCR judge's specific finding that "defendant elected to not testify."

      We also have no reason to question the judge's findings that: (1) "[t]here

[wa]s nothing more . . . defense counsel could have done to prevent a guilty

verdict in light of defendant's own admission"; (2) "there was nothing . . . trial

counsel did or did not do which could have changed the trial outcome"; and (3)

"[a]ll of the arguments raised by . . . defendant in []his PCR application [we]re,

at best, speculative." These findings are amply supported on the record. Thus,

the PCR judge correctly concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie

case of IAC under Strickland, and that any alleged errors by trial counsel,

individually or cumulatively, did not establish a basis for PCR relief. Therefore,

defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

      Any remaining arguments advanced by defendant lack sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

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Affirmed.

                 A-1836-21
            18