Court Opinion

ID: 9687849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:51:23.310542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:32.330744
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(dissenting). I cannot share my colleagues’ interpretation of this statute and the *344result reached. The facts giving rise to this prosecution represent, in my mind, the classic situation the statute was enacted to discourage.
Robert James traded in his 1970 Pontiac Fire-bird automobile to the defendant and purchased another vehicle. At that time all parties agree that the Pontiac had approximately 29,800 miles on the odometer. Little more than one to one and one-half weeks later Mr. James recognized his car on a local street and out of curiosity peeked through the window at the mileage. The odometer then read approximately 14,000 miles. Mr. James next contacted the new owner, Mrs. Mary Farrow.
Mrs. Farrow testified that she and her husband first saw the Pontiac on defendant’s lot (approximately four days after Mr. James had traded it in) and the car had 13,769 miles on the odometer at that time. Mrs. Farrow further testified that she and her husband relied on the low mileage as a major factor in their decision to purchase the Pontiac. They placed a deposit on the Pontiac that evening and picked up the car the next day, paying the balance. The Secretary of State’s records indicate that there were no owners other than the defendant after Mr. James traded in the car and before it was sold to the Farrows.
At trial, the sales manager, the salesman, and the mechanic handling the sale and delivery of the Pontiac declined to testify and asserted their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
When Mr. James traded in his automobile he filled out the "affidavit” reproduced in full in the majority opinion. It is claimed that possession of this "affidavit” accords a defense to the defendant by reason of the first sentence in MCLA 750.421e; MSA 28.658 (quoted by my colleagues). I disagree. First, the "affidavit” was not, in the strict sense, a *345true affidavit. On its face the jurat demonstrates that it was signed on a different day from the day the signature was affixed by the affiant. I would find this was not an affidavit within the meaning of the statute and affirm on that basis alone. However, I further believe that the first sentence of § 421e, supra, should be read to accord a defense only when the alteration of the odometer’s mileage occurred prior to the acquisition of the auto by the dealer or person charged under the statute. Any other construction makes avoidance of the clear intent and legislative purpose an easy matter for the unscrupulous.
The defendant was fined $100 and costs of $50. Because no specific penalty is provided in the statute, the maximum fine and sentence allowed by law is set by MCLA 750.504; MSA 28.772. The penalty allowed is $100 and/or 90 days in jail. It is obvious that the corporation cannot be put in jail. The only effective remedy against the corporation is the fine. In times where it is often commonplace for fines of $100 to be levied in more serious traffic violation cases, a $100 fine should not be commonplace for conviction under this statute. This is especially true where incarceration, as noted, is not available as a deterrent. If the Legislature adopts my colleagues’ recommendation and reexamines the statute, they might wish to give specific attention to a penalty provision providing more discouragement against future violation.
I would affirm the conviction.