Court Opinion

ID: 9409661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 00:00:36.763612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.437199
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30147         Document: 00516825227             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/18/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                      July 18, 2023
                                        No. 22-30147                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   Jeremiah Womack,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Dometic Corporation; Skeeter Products, Incorporated,
   doing business as Skeeter Performance Fishing Boats,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:20-CV-76
                      ______________________________

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
                                               I.
          Jeremiah Womack bought a Skeeter bass boat with a Dometic
   hydraulic steering system. To break the boat in after the purchase, Womack
   took it out for five hours on a small, inland lake in Louisiana. During that first
   use of the boat, Womack noticed a bit of a skip to the left.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30147      Document: 00516825227           Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/18/2023

                                     No. 22-30147

          A few days later, Womack took the boat out on the lake again,
   intending to continue breaking it in. Before this second use of the boat,
   Womack familiarized himself with the user manual and its various warnings.
   The water on the lake was calm, apart from a slight chop.
          Womack was only on the lake for about ten minutes, when he began
   making a gradual turn to the right. As he made this gradual turn, the boat
   suddenly turned sharply and hooked around. This threw Womack from his
   seat, injuring him.
          Three days later, Womack took the boat to a local dealer in Louisiana
   to inspect the steering system. The local dealer thought there was a problem,
   so it sent the boat to Skeeter, the boat manufacturer, for further testing.
   Skeeter was unable to identify a problem with the steering system, but it still
   replaced the entire steering system. Skeeter then sent the old steering system
   to Dometic, the steering system manufacturer, which claimed it found no
   problem with the system.
          Womack brought this suit against Skeeter, the boat manufacturer, and
   Dometic, the steering system manufacturer, seeking damages for his injuries
   from the boat accident. Womack raises two claims under the Louisiana
   Products Liability Act: (1) for dangerous construction and (2) for failure to
   warn. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on both
   claims. We affirm.
                                         II.
          We “review[] a grant of summary judgment de novo and appl[y] the
   same standard as the district court.” Lyles v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA,
   Inc., 871 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators
   Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010)). For us to grant them summary
   judgment, Defendants must “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to

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   any material fact,” such that they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                         A.
          Womack argues that Defendants are liable under a theory of
   unreasonably dangerous construction. The Louisiana Products Liability Act
   defines unreasonably dangerous construction as follows: “A product is
   unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition if, at the time the
   product left its manufacturer’s control, the product deviated in a material
   way from the manufacturer’s specifications or performance standards for the
   product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same
   manufacturer.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.55. The “plaintiff must prove that
   a product is unreasonably dangerous in order to prevail in a products liability
   action.” Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 938 So. 2d 35, 47
   (La. 2006).
          Louisiana has adopted the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a way for the
   plaintiff to prove unreasonably dangerous construction even in the absence
   of direct evidence. See id. at 49 (Plaintiff can “use circumstantial evidence
   in order to make the inference that a product was unreasonably dangerous
   when that product left a manufacturer’s control.”). See also Lyles, 871 F.3d
   at 312 (“The Louisiana Supreme Court has specifically held that res ipsa
   loquitur can be applied in products liability actions . . . .”). “[T]he
   circumstantial evidence presented must exclude other reasonable hypotheses
   with a fair amount of certainty.” Lawson, 938 So. 2d at 48 (cleaned up).
          Invoking res ipsa loquitur, Womack references the testimony of expert
   witness Ken Smith, a trained naval engineer who works as a consultant on
   mechanical systems. As Womack interprets it, Smith’s testimony shows that
   there are only three reasonable hypotheses to explain the accident: (1) “a
   passing wave,” (2) “user input,” or (3) “a failure in the system.” Womack

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   cites his own sworn testimony that there were no waves on the water that
   day. This rules out a passing wave as the cause of the accident. And Womack
   also cites his own testimony that he was turning the boat slowly when he was
   thrown off his feet. This rules out user input, leaving only system failure.
   Thus, Womack concludes, “Smith’s theory that th[e] most likely cause of
   the end-swap was a failure of the steering system creates a material issue of
   fact that should go before a jury.”
          If this were an accurate characterization of Smith’s statements, then
   Womack might be right about res ipsa loquitur, entitling a jury to hear this
   case. But Smith’s statements make clear that no reasonable jury could
   conclude that res ipsa loquitur applies. That’s because Womack has failed to
   exclude all the reasonable possibilities that Smith’s report identifies as
   potentially causing the accident. If you read Smith’s report, you’ll see that
   he identifies four potential causes rather than three: (1) a wave, (2) user input,
   (3) “air entrained in the hydraulic system,” (4) “a mechanical problem with
   the system components.” Like Womack, Smith rules out the first two
   explanations—a wave and user input—based on Womack’s “experience and
   the reported water conditions.” This means the cause of the accident was
   that “the boat suddenly and abruptly changed course.”
          Nevertheless, Smith is unable to pin the accident on a product defect,
   as Womack would need to go before a jury on res ipsa loquitur. Smith explains
   that the accident could have happened due to a “mechanical problem with
   the system components.” Such a mechanical problem would likely amount
   to a construction defect. But Smith also notes that “air entrained in the
   system” could have caused the accident. “[E]ither of the most likely causes
   (air or mechanical failure) are possible and neither can be ruled out,” Smith
   concludes. Furthermore, Smith explains, air in the system “is a consequence
   of either insufficient hydraulic fluid in the system, or of air [sic] is not properly
   purged from the steering system hydraulics.”

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            So insufficient hydraulic fluid could have caused the accident.
   Although insufficient hydraulic fluid could certainly count as a product
   defect in some other case, we conclude that Womack’s claim must fail here.
   That’s because the plaintiff must “demonstrate not only what a
   manufacturer’s specifications or performance standards are for a particular
   product, but how the product in question materially deviated from those
   standards so as to render it ‘unreasonably dangerous.’” Morris v. United
   Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 756 So. 2d 549, 558 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 2000) (citations
   omitted). See also Lyles, 871 F.3d at 311 (same).
            Womack has failed to show that a lack of hydraulic fluid counts a
   deviation from the manufacturer’s standards, rather than a routine
   maintenance issue for which Womack himself was responsible. In other
   words, Womack has failed to show that insufficient hydraulic fluid is a
   product defect at all. Nor has Womack ruled out insufficient hydraulic fluid
   as a reasonable explanation for the accident.                 When any reasonable
   explanation apart from a product defect remains, res ipsa loquitur cannot
   apply.
            Womack “has not met his burden to ‘exclude all other reasonable
   explanations for his injuries.’” Id. at 313 (quoting Lawson, 938 So.2d at 49).
   Womack’s invocation of res ipsa loquitur therefore fails. And Womack has no
   other way to prove that the unreasonably dangerous construction of the boat
   caused his injuries. 1 So we affirm the grant of summary judgment to
   Defendants on Womack’s unreasonably dangerous construction claim.

            _____________________
            1
            A jury could not find that “sticky valves” caused the accident. As Dr. Wendy
   Sanders, a mechanical engineer, explains in her uncontradicted expert testimony, “a sticky
   valve would . . . not manifest in the same fashion as the incident described by Mr.
   Womack.” That’s because a sticky valve would “result in a locked steering wheel,
   feedback in the steering wheel, or the wheel would turn in one direction,” as Dometic

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                                                B.
           Womack also seeks to establish liability under a theory of failure to
   warn. The Louisiana Products Liability Act defines inadequate warning as
   follows: “A product is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning
   about the product has not been provided if, at the time the product left its
   manufacturer’s control, the product possessed a characteristic that may
   cause damage and the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide
   an adequate warning of such characteristic and its danger to users and
   handlers of the product.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.57(A). An “adequate
   warning” is one that “would lead an ordinary reasonable user . . . to
   contemplate the danger in using . . . the product and either to decline to use
   . . . the product or, if possible, to use . . . the product in such a manner as to
   avoid the damage . . . .” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.53(9).
           To survive summary judgment under a failure-to-warn theory in a
   Louisiana case, the plaintiff must show “that the product in question has a
   potentially damage-causing characteristic” and “that the manufacturer
   failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning about this
   characteristic.” Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir.
   2002). “To [satisfy] this test, . . . a plaintiff must provide evidence about the
   cause, frequency, severity, or consequences of the dangerous characteristic
   in question.” Id. (quotation omitted). See also Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So.
   3d 607, 614 (La. 2015) (Plaintiff must “specify what warning was
   inadequate,” must “provide a proposed adequate warning,” and must
   “provide . . . evidence to support this claim.”).

           _____________________
   argues, citing Sanders. Yet, according to Womack’s testimony, the steering was normal
   until the accident happened, and it also worked after the accident, though it had some slack.

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          In Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2000), the
   plaintiff sued a boat manufacturer under a Louisiana-law duty-to-warn
   theory. The plaintiff won in district court, yet we reversed. The plaintiff had
   failed to “provide evidence regarding the frequency of the accidents.” Id. at
   552. Without evidence of the “severity of the risk,” the plaintiff could not
   show that the defendant had “failed to use reasonable care.” Id. Similarly,
   Womack provides no evidence that the risk of the type of accident he
   experienced was great enough to merit warnings more extensive or more
   prominent than the warnings that Defendants already provided.
          Womack’s citation to Smith’s expert report does not help him.
   Womack’s opening brief argues “[t]here was an inherent danger in the
   normal use of the Dometic steering system that if too much air entered the
   steering system, then the steering system could fail which can result in
   injuries.” Smith’s report does contain conclusory complaints about the way
   Defendants warned users to check the fluid. For example, the font of the
   warning was not as large as the boat’s brand name. But Smith’s report
   nowhere provides evidence that the warnings were disproportionate to the
   risk of accident. Thus, Womack’s failure-to-warn claim fails as a matter of
   law.
          Consider also the statutory text at issue.          Under the Louisiana
   Products Liability Act, “[a] manufacturer is not required to provide an
   adequate warning about his product when . . . [t]he user or handler of the
   product already knows or reasonably should be expected to know of the
   characteristic of the product that may cause damage and the danger of such
   characteristic.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.57(B)(2).
          In Morgan v. Gaylord Container Corp., 30 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994), we
   invoked this statutory provision to grant a defendant summary judgment on
   a failure-to-warn claim. See id. at 591–92. In that case, the plaintiff was aware

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   that a pump would cause leaking, so the pump manufacturer “was not
   required to provide [plaintiff] an adequate warning concerning its pump.”
   Id. at 591. Similarly here, Womack was aware that operating the boat without
   checking the steering system could result in an accident. After all, Womack
   testified that, prior to taking the boat out, he “s[aw]” and “review[ed]” the
   manual’s various warnings to that effect. Because Womack knew that the
   steering system could cause the accident, Defendants were not required to
   warn him further.
                                       ***
          We affirm the grant of summary judgment to Defendants.

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