Court Opinion

ID: 9751960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:20:32.879374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:25.698693
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
dissenting.
In 1984, defendant Marko Bey was tried and convicted of the capital murder of Carol Peniston and other related offenses. The jury sentenced him to death. The Court affirmed defendant’s convictions but reversed his death sentence. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 548 A.2d 887 (1988) (Bey II). A new penalty trial was held in 1990 and defendant was again sentenced to death. This Court affirmed defendant’s death sentence. State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 610 A.2d 814 (1992) (Bey III), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995). The Court subsequently found that defendant’s death sentence was not disproportionate. State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. *297denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995). Thereafter, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant now appeals the denial of that PCR petition.
The denial of effective assistance of counsel is the thread that runs through virtually all of defendant’s claims for PCR. Almost all of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims pertain to the alleged inadequacy of R. Diane Aifer, Esq., lead counsel at defendant’s retrial. Defendant claims that he was denied certain important constitutional rights and due process protections, and that the ineffectiveness of counsel contributed to those denials. The most prominent of defendant’s circumvented rights was that of allocution. Counsel’s ineffective assistance led to defendant’s inability to exercise that right in spite of clear indications that he wanted to do so. Defendant was denied his right to testify in a similar manner. Counsel failed to advise defendant regarding the benefits and drawbacks of testifying, and unilaterally decided on defendant’s behalf that defendant would not testify. Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective because she failed to undertake necessary and adequate investigation in preparation for defendant’s trial, and that this deficiency contributed to counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence that would have substantially affected jury deliberations in his penalty trial. Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the period of parole ineligibility attendant to the alternative sentence to a death verdict, and that the PCR court subsequently erred in denying defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
Those errors, individually and in aggregate, require that defendant’s sentence be vacated.
I
Trial counsel’s ineffectiveness influenced nearly all of defendant’s PCR claims. The standards by which we evaluate the performance of defense counsel in a capital-murder prosecution, therefore, are all-important. A criminal defendant has a eonstitu-*298tional right to receive the effective assistance of competent counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A.2d 336 (1987). In ordinary criminal proceedings, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698; Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 58, 519 A.2d 336. This Court has redefined the second Strickland prong in the context of capital sentencing. Recognizing “the profound distinction between our circumscribed appellate-review function and the capital jury’s significantly less-restricted role in deciding between life and death,” the Court has held that the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel must be adapted “to the realistic limitations on appellate review of jury penalty-phase deliberations.” State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 250, 690 A.2d 1 (Marshall III), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 140, 139 L.Ed.2d 88 (1997). Prejudice is thus established at the penalty phase if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially.” Id. at 250, 690 A.2d 1 (emphasis added); see State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 431, 715 A.2d 228 (1998). In other words, “if a reasonable juror would have considered the material in his or her deliberative process, then vacation of the death sentence is required.” Morton, supra, 155 N.J. at 481, 715 A.2d 228 (Handler, J., dissenting); Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 310-11, 690 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting).1
*299Insofar as the Court finds that counsel’s performance was deficient, I agree. I disagree, however, with the Court’s application of the heightened prejudice standard. The Court distorts our well-established standard for determining when a defendant has been prejudiced by the performance of counsel in capital cases. Purporting to apply the enhanced standard, the Court in fact demands evidence of much more, concluding definitively, as if present in the jury room at trial, that none of the alleged deficiencies would have affected — or altered — the conversation regarding whether defendant should live or die. I give juries more credit, and contend that much of the evidence defendant now argues counsel should have presented or helped him to present in his penalty-phase trial would have substantially affected the jury’s discussions — particularly defendant’s allocution statement.
Reflecting our commitment to heightened standards in capital cases, I conclude that defendant’s sentence must be reversed.
II
Impairment of defendant’s right to allocution is the most compelling evidence of counsel’s ineffective assistance. Counsel’s deficient performance in this regard had the power to seriously diminish the value and content of the jury’s sentencing deliberations. The Court’s failure to reverse defendant’s sentence on this claim compromises our long-held belief that the right of allocution is paramount and may not be diminished.
A.
The right to make a statement in allocution inheres in this State’s common-law. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 362, 680 A.2d *300677 (1996) (Loftin I); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 429-30, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L.Ed.2d 205 (1989). Defendant’s right to allocution, “like the right to testify, is a personal right that defendants themselves decide whether to exercise.” Ante at 277, 736 A.2d at 492. Further, the trial court must address defendant, not counsel, in determining whether the right to allocution has been knowingly and voluntarily waived, and counsel “should consult with their clients so the clients can make their own informed decisions.” Ibid. The unique right of allocution, the chance for a defendant to address the jury directly and personally about why his life should be spared, can be the most compelling and crucial protection available to a defendant condemned in a capital prosecution. See Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 429-30, 548 A.2d 1022. It is a right that grows in importance proportionately to the strength and weight of the evidence of a defendant’s guilt and blameworthiness. The opportunity to address the penalty-phase jury when life hangs in the balance is unique and critical, a right both delicate and powerful.
The purpose of an allocution statement is to give the jury a chance to determine whether a defendant is sorry, whether he has suffered because of what he has done, and whether he has hope for the future. The right of allocution provides a “precious opportunity for rebuttal,” Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 622 A.2d 727, 733 (1993), and “reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant the opportunity to ask for mercy[,]” State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 478, 645 A.2d 734 (1994) (DiFrisco II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996). “The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.” Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670, 673 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion).
Defendant drafted, at the request of counsel, the following allocution statement:
*301I know that you may want to hear from me on why my Life should be spared by you. As you know from the Various Doctors that testified in this proceeding I’m not to good at explaining myself vocally. So instead I am writing this letter to you and speak to you on this matter. I do not know if Judge Arnone will allow you to read this or let this be read to you but I’m trusting that he will.
The crime’s that have me before you in this matter there is no excuse that I can give and what I write is not to be taken as one, this is only to let you know some of my feeling’s.
At the time of this crime, I was 18 yr’s old and am now 25 yr’s old, and I will live with this pain for the rest of my LIFE knowing this. I cannot tell you why someone was murdered that night nor can anyone else in this court room. I say this because I have not been able to answer this question to myself. But over these 7 yr’s I have thought about why a murder took place that night and even tho I have not still understood it, I do know that I could not and would not ever intentionally take someone’s life away for any reason. That I know for sure. People say that I don’t show any emotion’s but that is not true. When I think about what happened I do cry and ask forgiveness from the Alston and Peniston Families when I am in my cell at night or think about what happened. But how can I ask them for forgiveness or let them know that when I cry at night I cry for them also. I have told them that I am sorry and meant it, when I say these thing’s to them tho, someone say’s that I don’t mean it or when I don’t say anything they say that I don’t have any remorse but the people who make these statements have not sat down with me to see what I am feeling. Before this crime took place, I had not cried for a long time, but now in these 7 yr’s I have cried a lot, and within myself I know that my sorrow is knowing that what happened was wrong and for the Peniston Family, and to say to them again I am sorry.
Ladies and Gentleman Thank You for this chance to speak to You.
Defendant was never given the opportunity to deliver his statement to the jury.
B.
The Court correctly holds that counsel’s failure to fulfill her responsibility to fully inform defendant of his right to allocution, and failure to discuss with defendant the pros and cons of exercising the right as well as the particular purpose and limits of an allocution statement, was deficient. See ante at 278, 736 A.2d at 493. The Court’s conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced as a result, however, is founded on several crucial analytical errors.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the Court vacillates between holding that defendant’s allocution would not have “sub*302stantially affected” and would not have “substantially altered” the jury deliberations. Compare ibid, (holding that “a statement of remorse by defendant would not have substantially affected the jury’s deliberations”) with id. at 279, 736 A.2d at 494 (holding that “the record demonstrates that the plea would not have had a substantial propensity to alter the jury’s deliberations”). As a matter of clarification, those are not identical statements, and the former, not the latter, is the operative legal standard. To demonstrate prejudice, defendant must simply show that there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s deliberations would have been substantially affected. See Morton, supra, 155 N.J. at 431, 715 A.2d 228; Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 250, 690 A.2d 1. “Propensity to alter” jury deliberations, see ante at 279, 736 A.2d at 494, is not, precisely, the issue.
The Court’s analysis contravenes ineffective assistance of counsel principles in many respects. The Court reaches its conclusion by comparing defendant’s written allocution statement to the allocution statement that defendant read to the jury in his original 1984 trial, at which he was sentenced to death. The Court reasons that if a jury sentenced defendant to death in 1984, despite defendant’s personal plea, then a similar statement in this trial would similarly have had no effect. See id. at 280-81, 736 A.2d at 494-95. The fact that a previous jury, presented with a different allocution statement by the same defendant, sentenced defendant to death is irrelevant. The proper question is whether a reasonable jury is likely to have discussed and considered defendant’s allocution in its deliberations. Any conscientious juror, in my mind, would certainly have done so. See infra at 305-10, 736 A.2d at 509-11.
That error is compounded by the fact that the Court relies on defense counsel’s ássessment of the value of the allocution. The Court describes Aifer as “best positioned to determine how defendant’s allocution would affect the jury,” contending that because defense counsel knew the jury her assessment that defendant’s allocution statement would not have made a difference is the best *303evidence we have that her deficient performance was not prejudicial. See ante at 281, 736 A.2d at 495. It is inherently contradictory to assess the adequacy of counsel’s performance according to counsel’s own description of that performance. The Court’s attempt to buttress Aifer’s assessment of the jury with co-counsel McCauley’s evaluation is even more attenuated. The Court notes that “at the time of trial [McCauley] dismissed the effectiveness of an allocution, even without having read the statement.” Id. at 281, 736 A.2d at 495. Again, that only serves to reveal co-counsel’s deficient performance — -not only did McCauley fail to consult with defendant about the right of allocution, he decided not to read defendant’s proposed statement before assessing its impact. In any case, to rely primarily on the counsel whose performance we are reviewing to assess the effect of the deficient performance warps the analysis.
The Court finds that the testimony from experts who described defendant’s remorse as he spoke with them would likely have accomplished the same goal as an allocution statement by defendant. Indeed, the Court goes so far as to note that in this case “defendant’s remorse, as related by the expert witnesses, may have been more effective.” Id. at 282, 736 A.2d at 496. The Court offers no evidence to support that contention. The conclusion seems, rather, to be based on the notion that witnesses with credentials who testify eloquently are likely to carry more weight with a jury than potentially inarticulate defendants. In fact, the opposite may be true in this context. Although experts may lend credibility to issues at trial regarding technical matters by applying their expertise to reach professional diagnoses and conclusions, an expert’s testimony that a defendant is sorry for what he did or that he displays remorse cannot possibly carry with it the same force as a defendant’s own expression of that regret. The inarticulateness of a defendant may serve to confirm mitigating evidence of immaturity or diminished capacity. In the same regard, the Court’s contention that Aifer’s statement to the jury served the same purpose as an allocution statement is plainly wrong. Aifer told the jury: “[0]f course [defendant] feels guilty *304about [the murder]. He is guilty of it ... This is not someone who as I may have said on my opening glorified in his killing or enjoyed the shedding of blood or is proud of his work or feels that he was justified or anything like that.” Ibid. Apart from the fact that Aifer’s comments are unapologetic and fail to convey contrition, they cannot compare with the remorse expressed by defendant’s written statement, even as composed without the guidance of counsel.
Further, the Court’s attempt to deconstruct defendant’s allocution statement, which was unilaterally rejected by Aifer after she “glanced” at it, as a means of determining whether the allocution would have made a difference to the jury that heard defendant’s case, is unfair. That statement was written without advice of counsel, a deficiency that the Court acknowledges is responsible for the “problematic” portions of defendant’s statement. See id. at 279-80, 736 A.2d at 494. Only with advice from counsel can a defendant fully understand what an allocution statement is meant to accomplish, how to most effectively convey feelings of remorse, and prevent rebuttal. See Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 630-31, 577 A.2d 455. The Court must assess whether a reasonable juror’s deliberations would have been affected by a statement constructed by defendant with the benefit of counsel’s advice, and not simply by a written statement defendant wrote without advice from counsel.
Finally, the issue of “whether defendant would have delivered the allocution, even if properly advised,” which the Court discounts as “pure speculation,” see ante at 282, 736 A.2d at 496, is irrelevant to the analysis. We need not decide if defendant would have exercised his right to allocution — he has a right to be advised of it. If we determine that had he chosen to exercise the right, a jury’s deliberations would have been substantially affected, we must find counsel’s performance ineffective. Speculation about whether defendant would have exercised his right is especially pointless in light of the fact that defendant was never informed of *305the potential advantages and disadvantages of allocuting in this retrial.
Even if an assessment of the likelihood that defendant would have exercised his right to allocution were relevant, the Court’s finding that he likely would not have exercised the right is not supported by the record. The Court contends that defendant’s failure to object when Aifer told the trial court that defendant would not offer a statement of allocution, and the fact that defendant testified in his PCR proceeding that he “ ‘wasn’t hoping anything’ in particular would happen with the statement,” indicates that defendant most likely would not have exercised his right to allocution. See id. at 283, 736 A.2d at 496. That assessment, however, is made against the backdrop of counsel’s failure to advise defendant about the allocution right. With proper advice from counsel, defendant’s sentiment regarding his written statement may well have been different. He may have decided to make sure the jury heard it from him. After all, defendant took the trouble to write out a statement, which included the words: “I do not know if Judge Arnone will allow you to read this or let this be read to you but I’m trusting that he will.” Defendant claims that he would have chosen to allocute — indeed, he did in his 1984 trial after he was properly informed of and counseled regarding his right to do so. Defendant clearly wanted the statement presented to the jury in one form or another, and it was not.
C.
Contrary to the Court, I regard defendant’s allocution statement, see supra at 301, 736 A.2d at 506-07, as a powerful expression of defendant’s feelings of remorse that would have substantially affected jury deliberations.
We base our deferential standard of review of lower court decisions regarding the impartiality of jurors on the theory that “this [Cjourt is ‘perhaps too far removed’ from the realities of the voir dire to appreciate the nuances concealed by a ‘bloodless record....’” State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 87, 586 A.2d 85 (1991) *306(Marshall I), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993). That contention is based on the notion that only a trial court can adequately interpret the sincerity of jurors’ responses to questions. By the same token, we must not assume that a statement from an expert or from defense counsel attesting to a defendant’s remorse could possibly have the same impact on the jury as a statement from the defendant. When the defendant speaks, it gives jurors the opportunity to assess the defendant’s sincerity and level of remorse, and forces the jurors to look closely at the person whose fate they are being asked to decide. When a defendant has not testified, as here, the need for this assessment becomes all the more important. Given the powerful effect defendant’s remorse seems to have had on the two testifying experts, see ante at 281-83, 736 A.2d at 495-96, we can assume defendant’s allocution might have had the same powerful effect on the jury. To speculate otherwise goes against what little evidence we have.
Because of its emotional forcefulness, and perhaps because the community cries out for some indication from the criminal that he understands and regrets what he has done, a defendant’s allocution statement has a unique capacity to move a jury. See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 1599, 1619 (1998) (“[Jjurors are more likely to think a defendant is remorseful if he speaks on his behalf than if he says nothing.”). “[I]f jurors do think the defendant is remorseful, they are more apt to sentence him to life imprisonment than to death.” Id. at 1633. Further, “black-defendant status correlates with stronger findings of remorse than white-defendant status.” Id. at 1626-27. The importance of Bey’s right to allocution thus becomes all the more pressing if race truly impacts the extent to which a jury might be moved by his statement. See, e.g., infra at 308-09 n. 2, 736 A.2d at 510-11 n. 2 (indicating that in highly aggravated capital cases allocutions of black defendants influenced imposition of life sentence).
*307The importance of allocution, as recognized by this Court, also comes into sharp relief when analyzed in the context of the Court’s finding that victim-impact statements may be submitted to a jury in the penalty-phase proceeding. See State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A.2d 164 (1996) (holding victim-impact statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6), constitutional under federal and State constitutions). In Muhammad, supra, the Court held that victim-impact statements were admissible in accordance with the Legislature’s desire “to increase the participation of crime victims in the criminal justice system.” Id. at 33, 678 A.2d 164. In doing so, the Court recognized that “the prosecution has a legitimate interest in using victim impact evidence to show each ‘victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being.’ ” Id. at 38, 678 A.2d 164 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2607, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 734 (1991)). The Court referred to Payne, supra, in which the Supreme Court held that refusing to allow the victim to relay the impact of the murder “deprive[s] the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having before it all the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree murder.” 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735. Victim-impact evidence is used to add “moral force” to the evidence against the defendant, although it provides no actual measure of the defendant’s guilt or blameworthiness. See Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 86, 678 A.2d 164 (Handler, J., dissenting) (“Not only does victim-impact evidence have little or no relevance to the defendant’s blameworthiness, victim-impact evidence turns the focus from the defendant’s blameworthiness to the victim’s worthiness.”); id. at 65, 678 A.2d 164 (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (“Does an abused childhood become less so because the child become man has killed a Nobel Prize Winner? Or, put the other way, would an abused childhood be any more of a mitigating factor because the defendant had killed a prostitute or a homeless vagrant? The illogic of the proposition is obvious.”). Victim-impact evidence is permitted “to remind the jury that the defendant did not kill an abstract victim, but a real, *308unique human being whose loss is felt by the victim’s survivors.” Id. at 40, 678 A.2d 164.
The Court in Muhammad found a strong parallel between victim-impact evidence and a defendant’s allocution statement, and justified its acceptance of victim-impact evidence as admissible evidence on that ground. See id. at 45-46, 678 A.2d 164 (“[Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also____ We are to keep the balance true.”) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122, 54 S.Ct. 330, 338, 78 L.Ed. 674, 687 (1934)). That confirms and highlights the true nature and purpose, and underscores the necessity, of the allocution right. If victim-impact evidence has “moral force,” so does a defendant’s allocution. If a victim’s testimony regarding the impact of a defendant’s crime is allowed in the defendant’s penalty-phrase trial, during which the jury seeks only to determine whether defendant deserves to die based on his moral blameworthiness, then surely the right of a defendant through allocution to communicate and personalize his own sense of blameworthiness is all the more indispensable. Although the defendant has the opportunity to demonstrate his lack of moral blameworthiness through mitigation evidence in the penalty trial, we cannot convincingly contend that without a sincere self-expression from a defendant that the jury is likely to believe second-hand characterizations of defendant’s remorse. The accused is entitled to dispel whatever preconceived biases the jury may have against a “voiceless” defendant. The power of a defendant’s appeal can clearly dictate his own fate.2
*309Defendant’s draft allocution statement, see swpra at 301, 736 A.2d at 506-07, contained an expression of remorse that jurors could have found sincere. His appeal was eminently important in light of the press accounts of the crime that, as defendant acknowledged in his allocution, see ibid., dehumanized him. “The entire system of capital punishment depends on the belief that a jury representing the conscience of the community will responsibly exercise its guided discretion in deciding who shall live and who shall die.” Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 311, 524 A.2d 188.
The question for us is not what the Constitution commands, but what our civilization commends. Under our system of capital punishment, a jury of men and women forms the essential link between society and the defendant before the Court. Each capital jury expresses the collective voice of society in making the *310individualized determination that a defendant shall live or die. Whatever the Constitution permits, it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury, “which never heard the sound of his voice.”
[Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 429-30, 548 A.2d 1022 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1474, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, 733 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 765 (1972)).]
Consistent with that notion, I conclude that there is more than a reasonable probability that Aifer’s deficiency in respect of discussing with defendant his right of allocution substantially affected the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations in this case. The Court should, therefore, vacate defendant’s death sentence.
Ill
Defendant claims that Aifer was ineffective because she unilaterally usurped his right to testify. The PCR court rejected this claim, reasoning that because defendant became familiar with the right to testify during his prior murder trials in 1983 and 1984, he was, therefore, aware of the right to testify in his retrial. According to the court, the fact that defendant did not express an “affirmative, positive interest in testifying,” in light of his prior understanding, confirmed that he waived the right.
This Court correctly perceives that counsel’s failure to “inform defendant properly that the decision whether to testify was his [and] sufficiently consult with defendant” was deficient. See ante at 271, 736 A.2d at 489. The Court’s conclusion that “[defendant’s] testimony would not have altered substantially the penalty phase deliberations,” id. at 272, 736 A.2d at 489, however, is deeply misguided. That conclusion is founded on the same misapplication of our ineffectiveness of counsel standard in capital cases that plagues the Court’s analysis of defendant’s right to allocution.
A.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify on his own behalf. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708-10, 97 L.Ed.2d 37, 46-47 (1987); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 626-28, 577 A.2d 455 (1990). That right is “ ‘essential to due-*311process of law in a fair adversarial process.’ ” See Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 626, 577 A.2d 455 (quoting Rock, supra, 483 U.S. at 51, 107 S.Ct. at 2709, 97 L.Ed.2d at 46 (citation omitted)). “[T]he right to testify is a fundamental right that can be waived only by an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment____’” State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 36, 583 A.2d 747 (1991) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). Defendant is ultimately responsible for exercising that right. See ibid.; Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 631, 577 A.2d 455; State v. Bogus, 223 N.J.Super. 409, 423, 538 A.2d 1278 (App.Div.1988). The right of a defendant to testify is so important in the context of a criminal trial that it imposes a singular duty on defense counsel to render assistance that will effectively enable the defendant to understand that right and whether to exercise it. See Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 630-31, 577 A.2d 455.
In order for counsel’s assistance to be considered effective, defendant must be given the tools he needs to assess his testimonial right in the context of the specific trial in which the right is being contemplated. Because “‘[i]t is the responsibility of a defendant’s counsel ... to advise defendant on whether to testify and to explain the tactical advantages or disadvantages of doing so or not doing so[,]’ ” Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 630, 577 A.2d 455 (quoting Bogus, supra, 223 N.J.Super. at 423, 538 A.2d 1278), a defendant’s complete understanding of his right to testify can be confirmed only when we have assurances that he has been advised of the particular consequences in the trial at hand. Trials undoubtedly play out in different ways, even those involving the same crime and the same witnesses. The jury composition changes, the witness’s answers to questions may change, the lawyers’ strategies are undoubtedly adjusted, the evidence presented might be slightly different. Indeed, Aifer acknowledged the extent to which her own calculations rely, from ease to case, on an individual assessment of the context and, most specifically, of the jury and its reactions along the way. See ante at 281-82, 736 A.2d at 495-96.
*312The record demonstrates that counsel did not help defendant to understand the nature of his right to testify. Defense counsel’s failure to inform defendant of his right to testify must be deemed deficient performance. Accord id. at 272, 736 A.2d at 489.
The Court’s assessment of prejudice relies solely on evidence that defendant’s right to testify had been exercised to little avail in previous trials. In addition, the Court should be concerned with whether there exists a reasonable probability that the jury’s deliberations would have been substantially affected, not with whether the outcome of those deliberations would have been substantially altered by defendant’s testimony. Cf. ante at 273-74, 736 A.2d at 490.
A defendant’s testimony is perhaps the most important piece of evidence a jury might consider. A sentence founded on a jury’s deliberations that did not explore the testimony of the defendant himself, if he decided to exercise his right to present such testimony, would surely yield an empty sentence. The prejudice to defendant from counsel’s deficient performance is plain.
In sum, counsel “did not properly inform” or “sufficiently consult with defendant,” id. at 271, 736 A.2d at 489, and unilaterally made the decision whether or not defendant would testify without his consent. Had defendant testified, his testimony would have substantially affected the jury’s deliberations. Therefore, counsel was ineffective in this regard. The Court’s failure to recognize this trouncing of one of defendant’s most fundamental constitutional rights is unjust.
B.
In the context of a capital prosecution, the right to testify is similar to the right of allocution. Both allow the accused to appeal to the jury and to lend a personal and potentially forceful voice to his defense. The denial of these important rights in the present case demonstrates the necessity of heightened procedural protections to ensure that capital defendants voluntarily and knowingly waive their rights to allocute and testify. In much the same way *313that we require greater assurance when a capital defendant is accepting a plea agreement, a heightened standard is required here because of the extreme nature of the punishment sought by the State. See State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 374, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989) (reversing death sentence and guilty plea where defendant was inadequately informed regarding his eligibility for death penalty); id. at 383-90, 561 A.2d 1082 (Handler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (explaining necessity of heightened standard for accepting guilty pleas to capital murder).
Trial judges should be required to obtain an on-the-record waiver of the right to allocute and to testify from capital defendants, not counsel. The inquiry ought to include questions regarding whether the defendant’s counsel explained to defendant the meaning of the rights as well as the benefits and drawbacks of deciding to waive them. Finally, the court must simply ask the defendant if he has decided not to allocute and/or testify and if he has done so voluntarily.3 Had these procedures been followed in this case, defendant might not be before us today.
IV
Defendant also claims that counsel was ineffective at the penalty trial because she failed to present several witnesses who could *314have attested to defendant’s abusive upbringing, as well as his penchant for substance abuse and the fact that he was intoxicated on the night of the murder. Most compelling of the alleged omissions are counsel’s failure to interview several key witnesses, and her decision to meet for only one hour with defendant’s mother, Patricia Bey, the person who was perhaps most important to defendant’s mitigation case. The Court concludes that counsel was not ineffective and defendant was not prejudiced by these shortcomings. See ante at 252-69, 736 A.2d at 479-88. I disagree.
A.
“The failure to investigate, assemble, and present mitigating evidence is the most basic form of ineffectiveness of capital counsel.” Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 322, 690 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting). Counsel cannot be found deficient for making a reasonable strategic decision, even if the tactic was ultimately unsuccessful: “Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695; see Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 617, 577 A.2d 455. Nevertheless, “an inadequate investigation of law or fact robs a strategic choice of any presumption of competence.” Davis, supra, 116 N.J. at 357, 561 A.2d 1082. At least, “counsel has a duty to make ‘reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’” Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 618, 577 A.2d 455 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695).
Defense counsel failed to conduct a timely and adequate investigation of witnesses and evidence necessary to establish a mitigation defense. Investigating a defendant’s background in preparation for the presentation of mitigating evidence is a gargantuan task. Aifer did not begin her factual investigation in this case until June 1990, almost two years after she was assigned the case *315and two months before the commencement of defendant’s retrial. Simply put, two months of investigation is insufficient. Aifer was able to interview only seven potential lay witnesses in person. She evaluated the demeanor of three potential witnesses, including Ri El, pursuant to phone conversations. She failed to interview several potential witnesses regarding Patricia Bey’s alcoholism, abuse, and neglect — Mac El, Kim Oilstone, James Sullivan Evans, Theopolis Stewart, and Armand Veltre. And she interviewed six other witnesses whom she chose not to call at trial. Due to Aifer’s delayed investigation, this Court cannot endow her decisions to forgo calling witnesses whom she had not interviewed and her cursory approach to interviewing those whom she did call to testify with any presumption of competence. The Court correctly finds that counsel’s performance was deficient with regard to trial preparation and the presentation of witnesses. See ante at 254 - 55, 736 A.2d at 480.
B.
The Court concludes, however, that the numerous investigatory deficiencies that characterized Aifer’s preparation of defendant’s mitigation defense can not be said to have prejudiced defendant in such a way as to require that defendant’s sentence be vacated. See id. at 255, 736 A.2d at 480. Although much of the evidence presented by witnesses at defendant’s PCR hearing added little to the overall picture of the abuse defendant suffered at the hands of his mother, many of the witnesses presented by defendant at the PCR hearing offered important, noncumulative evidence that had not been presented at the retrial. The testimony of Carl MeGloun, Ri El, Mac El, and Bernadine Phillips Jackson regarding Patricia Bey would have focused on defendant’s drunkenness, belligerence, abuse and neglect. Theopolis Stewart and Armand Veltre could have testified to defendant’s inappropriate dress and lack of personal hygiene. Cora Patterson, Kim Oilstone, and James Sullivan Evans could have testified to defendant’s father’s neglect of defendant. Macko MeGloun’s proffered testimony re*316garding his own violent behavior and failure to care for defendant would have been strong corroboration of evidence presented at the retrial. Such testimony cannot be dismissed as simply cumulative or duplicative — it would have strengthened and added to the quantum of evidence adduced at the 1990 retrial. Aifer’s failure even to interview many of these witnesses undermines the argument that the choice not to call them was strategic.
I further question the Court’s conclusion with regard to Patricia Bey’s testimony. The Court asserts that defendant was not prejudiced by Aifer’s failure to prepare more extensively with Ms. Bey. See id. at 261, 736 A.2d at 483 (“Even if Ms. Bey testified more fully at the penalty-phase trial, her testimony would not have affected the jury’s deliberations. The additional testimony was largely cumulative of evidence revealed by other penalty-phase witnesses.”). That conclusion is questionable, largely for the same reason that deprivation of defendant’s right to testify and to alloeute is problematic — that is, a personal appeal from the person who committed the wrong is testimony unlike any other that might be offered to convey the same information. See supra at 252-53, 736 A.2d at 479-80 (stating that doctors’ testimony and counsel’s comments that defendant was remorseful were insufficient substitutes for defendant’s own plea for mercy). Patricia Bey’s testimony was significantly diminished by counsel’s failure to meet with her more often before trial. The fact that social worker Lois Nardone, who met with Ms. Bey more than ten times over a year’s time, was able to coax Ms. Bey into revealing much regarding defendant’s abuse suggests that Aifer not only should have put more time into preparing Ms. Bey as a witness, but that she likely would have been successful in doing so. The amount of damning information that Ms. Bey related at the PCR hearing painted a bleak and contoured picture of defendant’s upbringing that was seemingly unmatched by any of the other witnesses and would have had a powerful impact on any jury. The fact that Ms. Bey was the only witness who was directly implicated by her rendition of defendant’s early life makes her account of the abuse *317uniquely reliable and poignant in light of the embarrassment and self-condemnation engendered by her admissions.
I also disagree with the Court’s holding that Aifer’s limited presentation of evidence of defendant’s drug and alcohol abuse “would not have altered substantially the penalty-phase deliberations.” See ante at 259-60, 736 A.2d at 483. At the 1990 retrial, defense experts testified about defendant’s longstanding abuse of alcohol and drugs. In addition, Patricia Bey, Wendolyn El, and Clarence Horton testified that defendant had abused alcohol since he was approximately ten years old. Bey and El recalled that defendant had been found unconscious, due to a drug and alcohol overdose, on Route 35. At the PCR evidentiary hearing, defendant produced additional evidence of his drug and alcohol addiction. In the weeks preceding the crimes, Jackson and defendant often got drunk together. At the same time, Stewart observed defendant abuse alcohol and use marijuana and cocaine. Every time Mac El saw defendant in the few months before the murders, defendant was intoxicated. Three years earlier, Evans and Kim Oilstone recalled that defendant was intoxicated on a daily basis. Kenneth McGloun suspected that defendant was drinking. Three defense experts further testified that defendant’s drug and alcohol abuse prevented him from controlling his violent impulses. In addition, evidence of substance abuse was introduced through the testimony of defense expert Young.
Aifer’s failure to call Stewart, Evans, Mac El, and Kim Oilstone, whom she had not interviewed, as witnesses was not merely deficient representation — it was prejudicial because the testimony of these four witnesses would have augmented the evidence of defendant’s alcoholism that was presented at trial. Although the expert witnesses informed the jury that defendant had abused alcohol and drugs throughout his adolescence, testimony from witnesses who actually observed defendant’s alcohol or drug use or intoxication would perhaps have had a greater impact.
The Court also takes the position that Aifer’s deficient presentation of defendant’s lack of treatment for substance abuse was not *318prejudicial. Id, at 269-70, 736 A.2d at 488. Again, I disagree. Patricia Bey testified at the PCR proceeding that she did not seek help for defendant although she knew he was addicted to drugs and alcohol. Given the direct relevance of this type of evidence to a defendant’s blameworthiness, i.e., the level of responsibility that should be attributed to him for his crime, Ms. Bey’s testimony would have played an important role in defendant’s penalty phase presentation.
The combined impact of these failures by counsel, undoubtedly caused by her attempt to squeeze into' two months what any competent capital defense attorney would have taken much more time to complete, had grave potential to prejudice defendant by sapping the strength with which the jurors viewed defendant’s mitigating evidence, thereby affecting the nature of their deliberations substantially. This Court rightly provides few barriers to defendant’s ability to present mitigating evidence in the penalty trial based on the Court’s undeniable understanding that such evidence is relevant to “this most delicate kind of determination.” Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at 622, 477 A.2d 308. Our low threshold for admissibility of mitigating evidence derives from our recognition that
[b]ecause of th[e] fundamental distinction between the death penalty and all other punishments, there is a “corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Wood-son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976). Further, “it is natural that counsel for the condemned in a capital case should lay hold of every ground which, in their judgment, might tend to the advantage of their client____” Lambert v. United States [Barrett], 159 U.S. 660, 662, 16 S.Ct. 135 [135], 40 L.Ed. 296 [297] (1895).

[Ibid]

That belief in the central importance of mitigating evidence to a capital sentencing trial should impel us to reverse defendant’s sentence in this case due to counsel’s failure to “lay hold of every ground” from which defendant might have benefitted.
V
At his PCR proceeding, defendant requested an evidentiary hearing to reexplore the possibility of prejudice resulting from the *319trial court’s failure to assure that the jury fully understood the sentencing alternatives to death. Defendant argued that some of the jurors might have been satisfied to sentence defendant to life had they known he would never be released. The PCR court denied defendant’s request. This Court now upholds that denial. Ante at 294-95, 736 A.2d at 502-03.
I believe defendant’s claim is valid and requires post-conviction relief. The problem must be traced back to the trial proceedings. While in deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking: “Is Mr. Bey ever eligible for parole in the next seventy years?” Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 599, 610 A.2d 814. Before the trial court answered the question, a court officer informed the court that the jury had reached a verdict. Id. at 599-600, 610 A.2d 814. On direct appeal, this Court recognized that the trial court erred by failing to inform the jurors that if they did not sentence defendant to death he would serve an aggregate life sentence with a seventy-year period of parole ineligibility. Id. at 603, 610 A.2d 814. Despite the potentially overwhelming impact of that error, the Court held it was harmless. Id. at 606, 610 A.2d 814. I believe that determination was mistaken. Accord id. at 660-61, 610 A2d 814 (Handler, J., dissenting) (concluding that lack of clear instruction from court on when defendant would be eligible for parole was prejudicial error). The PCR court’s denial of defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and the Court’s affirmance on the matter, now join that stream of inequity.
The errors complained of were anything but harmless. N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3f provides:
Prior to the jury’s sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if defendant is not sentenced to death.
In order to properly conduct the balancing process in which capital sentencing jurors must engage, “penalty-phase jurors ... must be told the sentencing options and understand the consequences of their decision prior to deliberation.” State v. Timmen-dequas, 161 N.J. 515, 635, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (citing Bey II, supra, *320112 N.J. at 162-65, 548 A.2d 887; State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 502-03, 715 A.2d 281 (1998)).
To hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options, thus permitting its decision to be based on uninformed and possibly inaccurate speculation, is to mock the goals of rationality and consistency required by modem death penalty jurisprudence.
[Ramsewr, supra, 106 N.J. at 311, 524 A.2d 188.]
“[W]hen the jury is choosing between life and death, it should not be prevented from considering the likelihood that a defendant would spend his remaining life in prison.” Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 636, 737 A.2d 55 (citing Nelson, supra, 155 N.J. at 505, 715 A.2d 281).) ‘When the trial court is confused about the nature of a jury’s request during deliberations, the normal procedure is to ‘bring the jury into the courtroom in order to resolve [the] uncertainty.’ ” Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 715, 737 A.2d 55) (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Brown, 275 N.J.Super. 329, 646 A.2d 440 (App.Div.1994) (other citation omitted)). The trial judge may not assume a jury’s meaning. State v. Graham, 285 N.J.Super. 337, 342, 666 A.2d 1372 (App.Div.1995).
The jury’s request for clarification from the court suggests that defendant was prejudiced by the court’s failure to instruct the jury on defendant’s aggregate parole disqualifier. See Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 660, 610 A.2d 814 (Handler, J., dissenting). The court compounded the error by failing to question the jury before accepting the jury verdict as to the nature of their confusion with regard to defendant’s sentence. The trial court’s failure to resolve the ambiguity created by the jury’s note, even after the jurors subsequently indicated that they had answered the question, was a serious error given the deficient instruction administered to the jury regarding defendant’s parole disqualifier. The Court is unable to offer a definitive answer regarding the source of the jury’s confusion on defendant’s parole ineligibility. The mere fact that the Court found two plausible readings, and that it was reduced to speculation in attempting to resolve the ambiguity, see ante at 293, 736 A.2d at 502 (quoting Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 606, 610 A.2d 814), reveals the deficiency in the Court’s conclusion. *321Moreover, even if the Court fortuitously resolved the ambiguity correctly, the jury still would have engaged in the kind of speculation that our decisions on jury instructions have continuously sought to avoid.
Despite our efforts to prevent jurors from improperly inserting into their balancing process the alternatives to death, see Nelson, supra, 155 N.J. at 505, 715 A.2d 281 (holding that juries should be informed of non-capital sentences, but that they should base sentencing decision solely on aggravating and mitigating factors), it is incontrovertible that whether or not a defendant will one day go free often plays a role in capital sentencing decisions. See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex. L.Rev. 605 (1999). For example, one juror who deliberated on the capital murder trial of New Jersey defendant Scott Johnson, who was spared the death penalty, see supra at 308-09 n. 2, 736 A.2d at 510-11 n. 2, told a newspaper afterwards that “most, if not all [of the nine jurors] who favored the death penalty, feared that Johnson would one day be released to walk the streets and prey upon others if he was sentenced to life by possibly getting parole [in thirty years]. While never expecting Johnson to actually be executed, the death sentence would have guaranteed no hope of parole, they said.” O’Neill, supra, Star Ledger, Mar. 5, 1995.
Whether a defendant will go free in thirty years or sometime within seventy years if he is not sentenced to death may similarly be a potent factor that the jury considers. Insofar as the death sentence in this case may have been based on the jury’s fear that defendant would one day be released, the difference between a thirty-year parole disqualifier and a seventy-year parole disqualifier is significant when the defendant is twenty-five years of age. The Court severely minimizes the difference by asserting that, like the mistakenly-proffered thirty-year parole disqualifier, “defendant’s [actual] alternative sentence allowed for the possibility, as slight as it may be, of parole.” See ante at 292, 736 A.2d at 502. *322The court is grasping by implying that the impact on the jury of the two alternative sentences would have been the same given that the possibility existed that defendant could have been released at age ninety-five to commit another murder. The trial court’s misinstruetion, followed by the court’s acceptance of the jury’s verdict without clarification of its question, conjures a likelihood of extreme prejudice to defendant. In light of our concern that juries not be left to speculate on what might happen to a defendant who is not sentenced to death, the very real possibility that the jury in this case was doing just that, renders the Court’s holding unsupportable.
What, then, is the remedy? At a minimum défendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing should have been granted by the PCR court in an effort to make up for the trial court’s failure to clear up any ambiguity in the jury’s understanding of its sentencing options. The Court rejects defendant’s request to engage in the “ ‘extraordinary procedure’ ” of calling back jurors to interrogate them after they have been discharged because “the record does not support a finding of ‘good cause’ ” to permit the procedure. Id. at 291, 736 A.2d at 501. I am, however, hard-pressed to determine what, in the context of the “extraordinary” sentence imposed upon defendant, would constitute “good cause” if not a jury’s possible confusion with regard to the consequences of its verdict.
More fundamentally, defendant may have been irrevocably deprived of the opportunity to have secured a life sentence. The question posed by the jury implied that some jurors may have believed that if defendant could not be paroled in his lifetime, he should not be sentenced to death.
We recognize that any reversible error in a capital case may be said in some sense to have deprived defendant of the opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment, and that nevertheless the usual and proper remedy for such errors is reversal of the death sentence and retrial of the sentencing proceeding in which the defendant may again face the death penalty.
[Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 313, 524 A.2d 188.]
*323Here, because we cannot be sure on what basis the jury rendered its verdict, defendant can be said to have lost “the opportunity to receive a jury verdict” other than death. In such a case, we must avail ourselves of all possible remedies to avert grave injustice. If the record on the jury’s question at trial cannot be constructed reliably in an evidentiary hearing, our only option is to vacate defendant’s death sentence and impose a term of life.
VI
Because this is a capital prosecution, the Court must apply the standards governing post-conviction relief in a manner that maximizes constitutional protections. Paramount among defendant’s circumvented rights was the denial of his right of allocution. The record in my view supports defendant’s claim that due to counsel’s ineffective assistance he was denied the unique and critical opportunity in his penalty trial to make a personal appeal to the jury for mercy. Similar denial, without an effective waiver, of defendant’s right to testify compounded that deprivation. Defendant has also established that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in his effort to present mitigating evidence at his penalty trial. That claim inheres in counsel’s inadequate investigation, resulting in the serious omissions of possible mitigating testimony discussed herein. Finally, the jury was not clearly and directly informed by the court that defendant could be made to serve a prison term of no less than seventy-years with no possibility of parole as an alternative to death.
Under the enhanced standards that apply in capital cases, those serious errors constitute ample and compelling grounds to award defendant post-conviction relief. I, therefore, dissent.
Justices O’HERN and STEIN join in Part II of this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 4.
For reversal — Justices HANDLER, O’HERN, and STEIN — 3.

 I maintain that deficiency of counsel’ performance should be measured by an enhanced standard as well:
We must recognize that counsel representing a defendant in a capital-murder prosecution must demonstrate the competence of a specialist and expert, not simply the skills of an average practitioner. Most particularly, counsel should exhibit this level of competence in the sentencing phase of a capital murder prosecution. *299[State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989) (Handler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).]
See Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 311, 690 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 644, 577 A.2d 455 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 544-45, 585 A.2d 916 (1991) (Handler, J., concurring). Capital defendants require, without a doubt, a different level of representation than non-capital defendants.

 Anecdotal evidence supports that conclusion. In several New Jersey murder trials, defendants who read passionate allocution statements to the jury were sentenced to life imprisonment despite the horrific aspects of their crimes. Newspaper reports highlighted the defendants' personal pleas, indicating that such pleas played a central role in the community's assessment of the defendants' blameworthiness.
For example, at the trial of Steven Beverly, a prison inmate convicted for the capital murder of a prison guard, it was widely reported that
*309Beverly did not testify ... but read an allocution. — a prepared statement not subject to cross-examination. He was only allowed to express remorse or regret.
“I did not want or mean for Officer Baker to die, God knows," Beverly said choking back tears. “That will be with me for the rest of my life. Now I ask the members of the jury, please have mercy upon my soul." [Jury Mulls Fate of Jail Guard’s Murderer, Trenton Times, Nov. 11, 1998, at A6.]
Another story noted that "Beverly, 39, of Atlantic City tearfully apologized in court Tuesday and pleaded with the jury, saying he never intended to kill Baker. He asked jurors to 'have mercy upon my soul.’ ” Inmate Gets life for Killing Guard, Star Ledger, Nov. 13, 1998, at 40. Beverly was sentenced to life imprisonment.
In another capital murder prosecution, involving the carjacking, abduction, rape, and stabbing murder of a young mother in front of her child, defendant Scott Johnson, publicly reviled throughout the State, also exercised his right of allocution. He addressed the jury:
I’m sorry for what I did. And I know if I could change back the clock of time I would but I know I can’t. I will live with this for the rest of my life. I’m really sorry for what happened. Thank you.
Numerous newspaper articles reported the defendant’s plea, and remarked on the personal appeal made to the jury by defendant’s six-year-old daughter, who asked the jury to spare her father’s life. Articles allotted more space to the allocution statement than to extensive testimonial mitigating evidence regarding the defendant’s abusive childhood offered in the defendant’s penalty trial. See, e.g., Jim O’Neill, Shollar Killer Apologies and Pleads for His Life, Star Ledger, Mar. 3, 1995. The allocution, “[Johnson’s] first public acknowledgment of wrongdoing since his arrest,” ibid., seems to have been a substantial reason for his life sentence.

 I acknowledge the Court’s concern, expressed in Savage, supra, that to require the trial court to follow a special procedure, explicitly telling defendant about, and securing an explicit waiver of, a privilege to testify ... could inappropriately influence the defendant to waive his constitutional right not to testify____
[120 NJ. at 630, 577 A.2d 455 (quoting Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 30 (1st. Cir.1987)).]
I agree that the trial court should not in any way take on an advisory role in obtaining a waiver directly from a capital defendant, which would contravene the decision in Savage. Trial courts are certainly able to ask a defendant objective questions in order to secure assurances that the defendant has voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to testify or allocute. We allow such questioning in plea proceedings and when a defendant is waiving the right to counsel. We should also do so when a capital defendant has decided not to personally appeal to the jury.