Court Opinion

ID: 9949860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 19:06:49.08929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:20.286215
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/12/24 P. v. Kramer CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    2d Crim. No. B320203
                                                              (Super. Ct. No. BA435471)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County)

 v.

 ANDREW H. KRAMER,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      Andrew H. Kramer pleaded guilty in 2018 to arson, assault,
and other charges arising from a dispute with his former
business partner and landlord. He received a negotiated prison
term of 33 years and four months in state prison. The trial court
awarded him 974 days of presentence custody credits and an
equal number of conduct credits. Appellant disagreed with the
credit award and moved to correct his sentence. The trial court
denied the motion. We affirmed the denial order on appeal.
(People v. Kramer (July 27, 2021, B304830) [nonpub. opn.],
review denied Oct. 13, 2021, S270688 (Kramer I.).)
       Since Kramer I, appellant has filed many motions,
petitions, and related appeals seeking additional credits and
other remedies to hasten his release from prison. None has
succeeded. In this latest appeal, appellant challenges an order of
the trial court denying a “motion to correct sentence and award
statutory time credits.” We appointed counsel to represent him
on appeal. After an examination of the record, counsel filed an
opening brief raising no issues and requested we follow the
procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). Appellant filed a supplemental brief, in propria
persona, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing. He filed a habeas petition raising the same issues
while this appeal was pending.
       We conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify
appellant’s sentence. He is entitled to no presentence credits, of
any type, other than those awarded to him at sentencing on July
18, 2018. Reframing his contentions as ineffective assistance of
counsel on appeal does not achieve a different result. The order
denying his motion, it follows, was not an appealable order. We
will dismiss the appeal.
         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                    Plea Agreement and Sentence
       Appellant was arrested in 2013 for series of violent crimes
against a former business associate. Federal prosecutors charged
him with conspiracy to distribute marijuana in an unrelated case
in 2015. He was confined in county jail while the state and
federal cases were pending.
       Appellant pleaded guilty to the federal drug charges in
January of 2016 and received a 16-year sentence. He pleaded
guilty to certain state charges, including arson, stalking, and

                                 2
assault, in July of 2018.1 Prosecutors dismissed charges of
attempted murder and conspiracy in exchange for his plea.
Appellant received a negotiated sentence of 33 years and four
months in state prison to be served concurrently with his federal
sentence. The trial court awarded him 1,984 days of credit for
time served: 974 days of actual custody credit credits and the
same number of conduct credits. It denied custody credits for the
time appellant spent in county jail between his sentencing in the
federal and state cases, about two and a half years, citing In re
Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152 (Rojas). Appellant moved to
recalculate his credits and requested an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether denying credits for this period violated the
terms of his state plea agreement. The trial court denied the
motion in June of 2020.
                 Sentence Affirmed on Direct Appeal
                 and Related Habeas Petition Denied
      Appellant challenged the trial court’s application of Rojas
on direct appeal, contending he was entitled to full presentence
credit for his time in county jail between his federal and state
sentencings. We affirmed the ruling in Kramer I. We denied his
related petition for writ of habeas corpus. (In re Kramer (July 27,
2021, B306611) [denial order].)

      1 Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of stalking (Pen.

Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)), six counts of arson of a structure (Id.,
§ 451, subd. (c)), two counts of assault by means likely to produce
great bodily injury (Id., § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and one count of
attempted arson (Id., § 455).

                                 3
      June 2020 Motion for Correction of Presentence Credits
                  Denied and Appeal Dismissed
      Appellant again moved to correct his sentence in June of
2020. He requested additional presentence credits for milestone
completion, good conduct, and extraordinary conduct. The trial
court denied his motion. We dismissed his appeal, noting from
the record that appellant had made “at least three prior identical
and unsuccessful requests for the correction of presentence
custody credits.” We cautioned that “[n]o purpose is served by
the repeated efforts to litigate this single issue.” (People v.
Kramer (Aug. 3, 2020, B306589) [nonpub. opn.].)
        April 2022 “Motion to Correct Sentence and Award
          Statutory Time Credits” Denied (This Appeal)
      This appeal concerns a trial court order dated April 6, 2022
denying appellant’s “motion to correct sentence and award
statutory time credits.”2 A copy of the motion is not contained in
the record on appeal.3 The minute order is the only record of the
proceedings below. It states: “Motion to correct sentence and
award statutory time credits, filed April 6, 2022, read and
considered. Re: presentence credits, defendant attempts to

      2 The court received a second notice of appeal from the

same order and assigned it a separate case number (B320323).
We ordered the appeals consolidated for all purposes on June 29,
2022.

      3 We notified the superior court of this omission on July 21,

2022 and requested to prepare and transmit a supplemental
transcript. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.340(b).) The clerk of the
court filed a supplemental transcript dated November 2, 2022,
certifying it could not locate the document in its files.

                                 4
relitigate issues ruled upon by this court and the Court of Appeal
(B304830). That matter is final and will not be revisited.
Defendant[’]s request for education, etc. credits are to be
addressed to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. They are not subject to trial court order as they
do not consist of presentence credits. [¶] Motion denied.”
              July 2022 Habeas Petition in Trial Court
       In July of 2022, while this appeal was pending, appellant
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that defense
counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
object to the trial court’s presentence credits award. The trial
court denied the petition, finding that appellant was “merely
repeating old claims” and seeking the same relief “through a
different vehicle.” We dismissed his appeal. Our dismissal order
stated: “‘“[T]he rule is well established that an order made after
judgment is not appealable where the motion merely asks the
court to repeat or overrule the former ruling on the same facts.”’
(People v. Vaitonis (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 156, 159.) Kramer
sought the same relief for additional presentence credits in 2019
on two occasions, which was denied by the superior court. The
orders denying additional presentence credits were affirmed in
People v. Kramer (July 27, 2021, B304830) [nonpub. opn.]. The
August 9, 2022 order denying the petition for presentence credits
is therefore not an appealable order.” (People v. Kramer (Nov. 7,
2022, B323516) [nonpub. opn.], review denied Jan. 25, 2023,
S277816.) We denied appellant’s petition for rehearing.
         January 2023 Habeas Petition in Court of Appeal
       Appellant filed a habeas petition in this court in January of
2023. Like his July 2022 trial court petition, he framed his
grievances as ineffective assistance of counsel rather than plea

                                 5
agreement violations or legal error. He filed a supplement brief
in propria persona that is identical in substance to the one he
filed here. We deferred ruling on the petition pending disposition
of this appeal. (In re Kramer, B325979.) We deny the petition
effective this date by separate order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.387(b)(2)(B).)
                            DISCUSSION
       Appellant is not entitled to our independent review of the
record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, or its
federal constitutional counterpart, Anders v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 738, because he appeals an order denying postconviction
relief rather than his underlying criminal conviction. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 221-222, 230; see People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 119 [independent judicial review mandated by
Anders applies only to first appeal as of right]; People v. Serrano
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496, 503.) He is nevertheless entitled to
our consideration of the contentions raised in his supplemental
brief. (See Delgadillo, at p. 232; Serrano, at p. 503.)
       Appellant identifies four ways his defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance in connection with the 2018 guilty plea and
sentence. We address these in the order raised.
       He first contends counsel “failed to provide competent
representation during his sentencing by failing to object to the
sentencing court’s misapplication of state law and precedent
when it denied the [a]ppellant full-time credit for the time he
spent in pre-trial custody and properly argue for the [a]ppellant
to receive full time credit for all of the time that the [a]ppellant
spent in pre-trial custody.” Even if a valid objection existed at
the time, appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice. (See In re
Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1132 [defendant asserting

                                 6
ineffective assistance “‘“must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient”’” and that “‘“the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense”’”].) Counsel’s purported “failure” did not result in
waiver. Appellant challenged the trial court’s application of
Rojas on direct appeal in Kramer I. We affirmed the ruling on
the merits. He now attempts to circumvent Kramer I with a new
legal theory based on Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (b),
which states: “For the purposes of this section, credit shall be
given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to
proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant
has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single
period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a
consecutive sentence is imposed.” Appellant argues that we
“misquoted” subdivision (b) by quoting only the first sentence.
He interprets the second sentence as entitling him to the
additional credits he seeks. From here, he faults his defense
counsel for failing to press this point during sentencing. We
disagree. The argument is creative but wrong. We reject it now
and would have rejected it in Kramer I.
       Second, he contends counsel “failed to properly argue at
sentencing that . . . [a]ppellant was entitled to work and
education credits that he had earned in pre-trial detention.” This
fails for the same reason as the first. Appellant is not entitled to
these credits. The trial court resolved this question in June of
2020. We dismissed the appeal from that order in August of 2020
and now repeat our admonition that “[n]o purpose is served by
the repeated efforts to litigate this single issue.” (People v.
Kramer, supra, B306589)
       Third, appellant contends counsel performed deficiently by
“failing to inform [him] that pleading to his two different crimes

                                 7
at different times would result in uncredited ‘dead time.’” We
will not second guess the strategic considerations that informed
defense counsel’s advice to accept the plea bargains. Nor will we
speculate whether appellant could have reduced his “dead time”
by timing his plea bargains differently yet still achieved the same
negotiated terms—which included the dismissal of several counts
of attempted murder.
       Fourth and last, he contends counsel “was ineffective in
advising [him] to plead guilty to crimes that he did not commit,
failing to request additional discovery from the government.”
Appellant argues prosecutors could not have proven four of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty. He uses information gleaned
from law enforcement records, fire department reports, and even
the victim’s bankruptcy petition to scrutinize the wisdom of
defense counsel’s advice to enter a plea agreement on the state
charges. Identifying evidentiary anomalies and factual disputes
in such records does not and will not entitle appellant to unwind
his plea agreement, wholesale or piecemeal.
       As noted above, appellant’s supplemental brief is identical
in form and substance to the habeas petition he filed while this
appeal was pending. We cannot discern from the record,
however, whether appellant based the denied “motion to correct”
on these arguments. The April 6 minute order states only that he
“attempt[ed] to relitigate issues” raised in prior filings and
sought additional credits “for education, etc.” Nor can we discern
any other basis for the trial court to modify the final judgment of
conviction by way of a motion to “correct” appellant’s sentence.
As such, the order denying the motion could not, and does not,
affect his substantial rights. It is not appealable. (Pen. Code,

                                8
§ 1237, subd. (b); People v. Hodges (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 186,
190.)
                           DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    CODY, J.

We concur:

      YEGAN, Acting P. J.

      BALTODANO, J.

                                9
                    Ronald S. Coen, Judge
             Superior Court County of Los Angeles
               ______________________________

     Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                             10