Court Opinion

ID: 9963868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:06:50.224492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.480671
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0995-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THOMAS NEVIUS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted April 8, 2024 – Decided April 26, 2024

                   Before Judges DeAlmeida and Jacobs.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 04-10-
                   0985.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
                   Counsel, on the brief).

                   Jennifer     Webb-McRae,       Cumberland       County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen
                   Christopher Sayer, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
                   on the brief).

                   Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Thomas Nevius appeals from the October 7, 2022 order of the

Law Division dismissing his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) as

content and time barred. We affirm.

                                       I.

      Following a jury trial in which he represented himself without assistance

of counsel, defendant was convicted of murder, felony murder, second-degree

burglary, and third-degree conspiracy to commit burglary. In April 2008, he was

sentenced to an aggregate prison term of sixty-five years, subject to the No Early

Release Act (NERA). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      In short, the jury found that defendant killed Ruth Walker, a fifty-two-

year-old woman who lived alone in an apartment in Vineland. When checking

on her, Ms. Walker’s relatives discovered her lifeless body in a bedroom of the

ransacked apartment. Police detectives determined Ms. Walker was stabbed

with a sharp object and strangled with a blood-stained XXXL T-shirt found near

the body, both injuries causing her death. From this evidence, detectives

discerned at least two individuals committed the homicide. They noticed the T-

shirt used to strangle the victim was distinct in size and that its sleeves were

scissored off. Together with DNA evidence and a matching palm print found in

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the victim’s bedroom, police linked the sleeveless XXXL T-shirt to another

identically sized and tailored T-shirt they retrieved from defendant’s home under

authority of a search warrant.

      As part of his defense, defendant claimed that another individual, William

Boston, provided a statement to police implicating himself in the homicide along

with a third party, Tyrone Beals. The trial judge excluded Boston’s statement,

finding it did not satisfy the strictures of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) as an admission

against penal interest.

      On direct appeal, we affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v.

Nevius, 426 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2012). Writing for our court, Judge

Parrillo held that Boston’s statement was not “truly self-inculpatory as to the

declarant.” Id. at 394. We further concluded that Boston’s written statement

was ultimately self-serving and allowed “too much opportunity for contrivance

to warrant admission.” Ibid. (quoting State v. Gomez, 246 N.J. Super. 209, 215-

216 (App. Div. 1991)). As such, we held that barring the statement under

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) “did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.” Id. at 397. The

Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Nevius, 213 N.J. 568 (2013).

      In 2013, defendant filed a petition for PCR. The PCR court denied the

petition without an evidentiary hearing and subsequently denied defendant’s

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motion for reconsideration. We affirmed. State v. Nevius, No. A-3982-14 (App.

Div. Feb. 14, 2017). The Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Nevius,

230 N.J. 367 (2017).

      In 2017, defendant filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254. The District Court denied the petition. Nevius v. Attorney General, No.

Civ. 17-4587 (NLH) (Dec. 11, 2019). The Third Circuit affirmed. Nevius v.

Attorney General, No. 20-1074 (June 16, 2020). The Supreme Court denied

certiorari. Nevius v. Grewal, 141 S. Ct. 1703 (2021).

      On December 21, 2021, nearly five years after our affirmance of the denial

of defendant’s first PCR petition, defendant filed a second PCR petition

advancing the following arguments.

            POINT I

            THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S RECENT
            DECISION IN STATE V. HANNAH MAKES IT
            CLEAR    THAT     [THE]      TRIAL     COURT
            MISINTERPRETED     N.J.R.E.    803(C)(25) IN
            VARIOUS WAYS[:] (1) THE COURT DID NOT
            HAVE THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO
            DETERMINE THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF CO-
            DEFENDANT WILLIAM BOSTON’S STATEMENT
            AGAINST   INTEREST[;]    (2)    THE    COURT
            ERRONEOUSLY REQUIRED THE DEFENDANT
            TO    PROVE    CO-DEFENDANT          TO   BE
            UNAVAILABLE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE
            ADMISSION OF HIS STATEMENT.

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            POINT II

            THE    COURT    VIOLATED       PETITIONER’S
            CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRESENT A
            COMPLETE DEFENSE WHEN IT WRONGLY
            INTERPRETED N.J.R.E. 803(C)(25) TO REQUIRE
            DEFENDANT TO SHOW THAT HIS CO-
            DEFENDANT     WILLIAM       BOSTON     WAS
            “UNAVAILABLE” AS A WITNESS AND HIS
            STATEMENT TO PASS A NON-EXISTENT
            “TRUSTWORTHINESS”        TEST      AS     A
            PREREQUISITE FOR THE ADMISSION OF HIS
            STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST[,] THEREBY
            EXCLUDED      CO-DEFENDANT         WILLIAM
            BOSTON’S STATEMENT (AGAINST INTEREST)
            [SIC] ADMITTING HIS OWN INVOLVEMENT IN
            THE CRIME AND NAMING TYRONE BEALS AS
            HIS ACCOMPLICE.

      Counsel was appointed to assist defendant and the PCR court directed

appointed counsel to brief whether defendant’s second PCR petition was time-

barred pursuant R. 3:22-4(b) and R. 3:22-12(a)(2).      Counsel for defendant

submitted a letter brief urging that “[a]ny procedural bars should be relaxed to

correct a fundamental injustice.” In opposition, the State maintained that

defendant’s second petition was time-barred.

      In a written opinion issued on October 7, 2022, Judge Smith denied

defendant's second PCR petition. The court held that the petition was barred by

the one-year limitation under R. 3:22-4(b) and R. 3:22-12(a)(2). He noted that

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even where our Rules provide for relaxation of time limitations, R. 1:3-4

prohibits the court from enlarging the time frames for PCR petitions governed

by R. 3:22-12 (a)(2). The judge found that the one-year time limitation started

to run on February 23, 2015, the date on which defendant's first PCR was

denied.1 He further found that there was no allegation of ineffective assistance

of counsel for the first PCR petition, no new constitutional right was asserted,

and no new evidence or factual predicate was claimed to be discovered.

Therefore, there was no basis for enlargement of the one-year time limitation. R.

3:22-12(a)(2); R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(A); R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(B); R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C).

      Finally, Judge Smith rejected defendant’s reliance on State v. Hannah, 248

N.J. 148 (2021), as ground to relax the one-year time limitation because the

Hannah Court did not establish a new constitutional right. He noted that this

court’s holding as to inadmissibility of evidence under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25)

amounted to a prior conclusive adjudication on the merits. R. 3:22-5. An

October 7, 2022 order memorializes the trial court's decision.

      This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following arguments.

1
 We observe that this date is a mistake. Defendant’s first PCR was denied on
February 2, 2015. This error is immaterial to the trial court's decision, as the
second petition was filed more than a year after February 2, 2015.
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            POINT I

            THE SECOND PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT
            DENIED DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO
            SUBMIT A MERITS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HIS
            SECOND PCR CLAIMS.

            POINT II

            AS DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF SECOND PCR COUNSEL, A
            REMAND IS REQUIRED WHERE DEFENDANT
            CAN BE ASSIGNED COMPETENT PCR COUNSEL.

            POINT III

            FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND FAIR PLAY
            REQUIRES RELAXATION OF ANY PROCEDURAL
            BARS AND REMAND FOR ASSIGNMENT OF
            COMPETENT PCR COUNSEL. (Not raised below)

In a supplemental self-represented brief, defendant raises an additional

argument.

            THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
            CONSIDER APPELLANT’S PRO SE FILINGS
            [AND] INSTEAD ACCEPTED COUNSEL’S EIGHT
            PAGE LETTER AS THE FILING THEN TIME
            BARRED AND DISMISSED APPELLANT’S
            SECOND POST CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION[,]
            WHICH MOST CERTAINLY SATISFIED R. 3:22-
            12(B) AS IT IS BASED ON A NEWLY DECIDED
            DECISION IN STATE V. HANNAH, 248 N.J. 148
            (2021) [AS WELL AS] LOWER COURT[']S
            MISINTERPRETING        N.J.R.E.  803(C)25
            STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST.

                                                                  A-0995-22
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                                        II.

      Because there was no evidentiary hearing, we review de novo the trial

court's legal conclusion that defendant's second PCR petition is barred by R.

3:22-4 and R. 3:22-12(a)(2). State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004); State v.

Lawrence, 463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020). A PCR court's decision

to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).

      We begin with the PCR court's legal conclusion that defendant's second

PCR petition was untimely filed. Rule 3:22-2 provides that a petition for post-

conviction relief is cognizable if based on the following grounds: (a) substantial

denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Federal or

State Constitution; (b) lack of jurisdiction to impose the judgment; (c) imposition

of sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence

authorized by law if raised together with other grounds cognizable under

paragraph (a), (b), or (d) of this rule; (d) any ground previously available as a

basis for collateral attack upon a conviction by habeas corpus or any other

common-law or statutory remedy; and (e) a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel based on trial counsel's failure to file a direct appeal of the judgment of

conviction and sentence upon defendant's timely request.

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      "A petitioner is generally barred from presenting a claim on PCR that

could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, R. 3:22-4(a), or that has been

previously litigated, R. 3:22-5." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 546 (2013). See

R. 3:22-4. "[P]ost-conviction relief is not a substitute for direct appeal; nor is it

an opportunity to relitigate a case on the merits." State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82,

97 (2021).

      A second or subsequent PCR petition must be filed within one year after

the latest of: "(A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New

Jersey, if that right has been newly recognized by either of those Courts and

made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases on collateral review; or (B)

the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered, if

that factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise

of reasonable diligence; or (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent

application for post-conviction relief where ineffective assistance of counsel that

represented the defendant on the first or subsequent application for post-

conviction relief is being alleged." R. 3-22:12(a)(2). The time limitations "shall

not be relaxed," except as provided in Rule 3-22:12(b). State v. Marolda, 471

N.J. Super. 49, 62 (App. Div. 2022).

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      Second PCR counsel did not argue that defendant is entitled to relief based

on any of the foregoing subsections. Rather, conceding defendant was otherwise

time barred but relying on Hannah, counsel argued that “any procedural bar

should be relaxed to correct a fundamental injustice.” Our review of Hannah

reveals that the Court did not establish a new constitutional rule or

right. Instead, the Court was faced with applying an evidentiary rule in a

scenario entirely unlike that presented here. In Hannah, the Court held that trial

counsel was ineffective in not seeking admission of compelling evidence

presented via the second PCR petition in the form of a statement made against

penal interest. The Court determined that this evidence would have buttressed

Hannah’s third-party-guilt defense to a degree that the outcome of the trial might

well have been different. In support, the Court favorably cited our 2012

opinion’s interpretation of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). State v. Hannah. 248 N.J. at

183-184 (quoting State v. Nevius, 426 N.J. Super. 379, 394 (App. Div.

2012)). It is equally apparent that no new factual predicate has been discovered.

      We also concur with Judge Smith’s observation that no claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel was raised in defendant’s second PCR. Thus,

strictures of R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(A), R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(B), R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C) have

not been met. Moreover, because in our rulings of 2012 and 2017                 we

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adjudicated the merits of the very rule of evidence that defendant now seeks to

raise again, the final potentional avenue of review is foreclosed pursuant to R.

3:22-5, which provides:

            A prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for
            relief is conclusive[,] whether made in the proceedings
            resulting in the conviction[,] or in any post-conviction
            proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or prior to the
            adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such
            proceedings.

      This leaves for our consideration appellate PCR’s counsel’s arguments.

The first point concerns the second PCR court’s purported error in denying

defendant the opportunity to submit a merits brief. We are satisfied that the

merits of defendant’s position were duly considered by the foregoing

analysis. Defendant points to nothing substantive in his pro se or counseled

submissions that this court has not considered. The same holds true for appellate

counsel’s third point, which calls for a relaxation of procedural bars in the

interest of “fundamental fairness” and “fair play,” seeking a remand for

appointment of a new PCR counsel. We have reviewed and reject the possibility

of any rule relaxation. Appellant counsel’s second and supplemental points

allege ineffectiveness of second PCR counsel. Those claims would by necessity

have to be raised in a third PCR petition.

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      To the extent we have not addressed any other arguments, we are satisfied

they are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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