Court Opinion

ID: 9767054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:07:26.383727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:27.877340
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, dissenting. The chancellor said “under the facts and circumstances presented” he was making other than equal division of the property. The only fact or circumstance mentioned by him is that the appellant was convicted of attempting to murder the appellee. At first blush of moral indignation that fact would seem surely enough to deny the appellant any marital property whatever. Upon palliative reflection, however, I believe the majority’s opinion is incorrect, and its credibility is immediately betrayed by the attempt to limit its effect to the “bizarre” facts of this case. This should be a court in which precedent is applied even-handedly. It is clear that we cling to fault as the main basis for dissolution of marriage. It is equally clear that a person convicted of attempted murder will be punished by the criminal law. However, I believe it was the intention of our General Assembly to remove the punitive aspect from division of property upon divorce. As the majority points out, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1985) permits the chancellor to divide property on other than a fifty-fifty basis when equal division would be inequitable. The statute says the court shall make its equitable decision “taking into consideration” the nine factors listed, none of which mentions fault. The statute concludes with the sentence beginning: “When property is divided according to the foregoing considerations the court must state its basis. . . .” To me that indicates legislative intent to limit the considerations to those enumerated. The provision for equitable distribution is no more than a general introduction to the specific “equities” enumerated in the act. It would be proper for us here to follow the principle of statutory construction that when there is inconsistency or doubt about the meaning of a statute the general terms will be controlled by the specific. Langford v. Brand, 274 Ark. 426, 626 S.W.2d 198 (1982); Scott v. Greer, 229 Ark. 1043, 320 S.W.2d 262 (1959). The substantially older cases cited by the majority on the limitations of this principle do no more than suggest that it is not iron-clad. I agree with them, but that does not lessen the principle’s usefulness in a case where the General Assembly has given an extensive list of considerations which is notable for its omission of “fault,” a matter which surely must have crossed the legislative mind when the statute was drafted. In addition, the majority misapplies the language of Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The “clearly erroneous” standard of review is invoked without citation of the rule. The rule, in part, says: Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous (cleiarly against the preponderance of the evidence), and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. There is no dispute in this case about the fact that the appellant was convicted of conspiring to kill her husband. The dispute here is about whether that fact should control the result reached by the chancellor in distribution of marital property. I agree with the majority that we try a case like this de novo. While Rule 52(a) precludes us from upsetting factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, we are free to alter the chancellor’s conclusions and the result the chancellor reached. Even if I could conclude that it was not error for the chancellor to go beyond the statutory considerations for marital property division, I would conclude the division here to have been inequitable. Although the misconduct of the appellant was extreme, the abstract of the record presented by the appellant and unchallenged by the appellee showed that the appellee was engaged in income tax evasion and hiding his assets from her and introducing drugs to her which caused her physical injury. The chancellor may or may not have believed any of that testimony. We do not know. He seized solely upon the criminal conviction of the appellant. That is the only fact or circumstance he recited. This case demonstrates the wisdom of the General Assembly’s decision to leave fault out of the considerations to be used in division of marital property. There is enough misery to go around in the disintegration of a marriage. There is enough inevitable punishment in the dissolution of a marriage. Surely when, as here, a criminal act is a part of the fault of one party it is enough that the criminal law has run its course. While we will always be able to hide behind the majority opinion’s disclaimer of its effect only on cases with the same facts as this one, it is wrong for us to do so. When, in the next case, we say it was wrong for the chancellor to consider some lessor fault, we will be delivering that well-known contradiction in terms, “unequal justice.” Dudley, J., joins in dissent.