Court Opinion

ID: 9618810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:17:31.063454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:42.659988
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Justice,
with whom BOO-CHEVER, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Calder was not convicted and sentenced twice for the same crime. My reading of the record convinces me that the entire sequence of reckless conduct may have been considered by the jury in reaching its verdict. From this I conclude that the dual conviction and sentencing placed Calder in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.1
The evidence presented at trial covered the entire attempt by Calder to flee from Trooper Feichtinger, and the defense emphasized that the unifying motive of Calder’s behavior was flight. Every eyewitness began testimony from the time Calder’s car was first seen by the trooper, and there was nothing to indicate clearly to the jury that the testimony was merely foundational.
The majority determines that Calder’s closing argument focused the attention of the jury on the second act, the striking of Feichtinger. In my opinion, the excerpt from argument cited by the majority is inadequate to put the jury on notice that it should not consider the testimony regarding Calder’s initial sharp turn and his careening through the parking lot in deciding whether striking the officer with his car was assault with a deadly weapon or reckless driving. An inference made from argument of counsel is too tenuous to provide an adequate basis for deprivation of an important constitutional right.2
Given the broad scope of the evidence presented, the lack of a limiting instruction,3 the necessity for the jury to make inferences to determine what conduct could be considered, and the fact that both convictions arose under the same statute, I conclude that it is likely that Calder was *1031indeed convicted and sentenced twice for the same conduct.
Since multiple convictions or sentences imposed for the same offense violate Alaska’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, Larson v. State, 569 P.2d 783, 786 (Alaska 1977); Thessen v. State, 508 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Alaska 1973); Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 310 (Alaska 1970), I would vacate Calder’s second sentence for reckless driving.

. Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution provides:
“No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.... ”

. The majority concludes that since the jury closely examined the incident in the parking lot to determine the issue of specific intent, they restricted their inquiry on recklessness to the same incident. There is no evidence that the jury did so, and I do not think the inference is justified.

.The jury instruction on reckless driving, far from being a limiting instruction, was extremely broad. It read, in part:
“In order for the accused to be found guilty of reckless driving, evidence presented in this case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) That on or about March 20th:
(2) At or near Anchorage, Alaska;
(3) Lance Calder operated a motor vehicle in a reckless manner....”
In light of my conclusion that Calder’s right to protection from double jeopardy was violated, it is unnecessary to consider whether the failure to give a limiting instruction constituted plain error.