Court Opinion

ID: 9901422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:02:17.671444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.571177
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/21/23 P. v. Novela CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085118
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. MCR046874)
                    v.

 SERGIO NOVELA,                                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Ernest J.
LiCalsi, Judge.
         Sharon G. Wrubel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and
Christina Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

         * Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Snauffer, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       Following consolidation of five separate cases arising out of events on five
different dates, a jury convicted defendant Sergio Novela as follows:
       “Count 1: First degree murder, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang,
during the commission of which a principal personally used and discharged a firearm,
proximately causing great bodily injury or death. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5),
187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1).)
       “Count 2: Discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person,
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B), 26100,
subd. (c).)
       “Count 3: Premeditated attempted murder, committed for the benefit of a criminal
street gang, during the commission of which a principal personally used and discharged a
firearm. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (e)(1).)
       “Count 4: Assault with a firearm, committed for the benefit of a criminal street
gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B), 245, subd. (a)(2).)
       “Count 5: Active participation in a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).)
       “Counts 6 through 9: Unlawful possession of a firearm, committed for the benefit
of a criminal street gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A), 29800, subd. (a)(1).)
       “Counts 10 through 13: Unlawful possession of ammunition, committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A), 30305, subd. (a)(1).)
       “Count 14: Active participation in a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).)
       “Count 15: Assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury,
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A), 245,
subd. (a)(4).)

       1 “All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. . . .”

                                                2.
       “Count 16: Active participation in a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).)
       “Counts 17 through 19: Resisting and attempting to deter an executive officer in
the performance of his duty. (§ 69.)
       “Following a bifurcated court trial, defendant was found to have been released
from custody on bail or own recognizance when he committed counts 6 through 14
(§ 12022.1), and he was found to have suffered two prior convictions for serious felonies
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) that were also strikes (id., subds. (b)-(i)). He was sentenced to a
lengthy prison term and ordered to pay various fees, fines, and assessments.” (People v.
Novela (May 18, 2022, F073275) [nonpub. opn.], fn. omitted (Novela).)
       On appeal, we reversed the convictions on counts 3, 5, 14, and 16; the true
findings as to the gang enhancements on counts 1 through 4, 6 through 13, and 15; and
the true findings as to the gang-related firearm enhancements on counts 1 and 3. We
vacated the sentence in its entirety and remanded the matter for further proceedings
and/or resentencing. In all other respects, we affirmed. (Novela, supra, F073275.)
       On remand, the prosecutor elected not to retry the charges reversed on appeal. On
the prosecutor’s motion, the court dismissed counts 3, 5, 14, and 16; the gang
enhancements on counts 1 through 4, 6 through 13, and 15; and the gang-related firearm
enhancements on counts 1 and 3.2 The court resentenced defendant, declining
defendant’s request to strike his prior serious felony enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
       The court once again sentenced defendant to a lengthy prison term. Relevant here,
the sentence included two five-year terms for prior serious felony enhancements to each
of counts 1, 2, and 4,3 and a two-year term for the on-bail enhancement to count 6. The

       2 The court’s minute order regarding the dismissals does not reflect dismissal of
the gang-related firearm enhancements, although these enhancements clearly were
dismissed.
       3 The prior serious felony enhancement terms were stayed on counts 2 and 4
pursuant to section 654.

                                              3.
sentence also included $640 in court operations assessments (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)), and
$480 in criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373).
       Defendant now argues the court abused its discretion in declining to strike the
prior serious felony enhancements and the on-bail enhancement pursuant to section 1385.
He also argues the court erred in its calculation of assessments, an issue which the People
concede.
       We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike the
enhancements. We accept the People’s concession with regard to the assessments and
order the judgment corrected. In all other respects, we affirm.
                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       As the issues presented in this appeal relate only to resentencing, we summarize
the facts, as presented in our opinion in defendant’s prior appeal, only briefly.4 (Novela,
supra, F073275.) We omit facts pertaining only to the dismissed counts and allegations.
                           Evidence Related to Counts 1 and 2
       On March 21, 2013, Robert Moreno was shot and killed during a drive-by
shooting. During the incident, a bottle also was thrown from the car at Moreno and his
companions. Law enforcement subsequently found a beer bottle in the area of the
shooting. It bore defendant’s fingerprint. Evidence found in defendant’s cell after his
arrest suggested he took credit for the murder.
                               Evidence Related to Count 4
       At approximately 3:14 a.m. on March 29, 2013, Jairo I. and G.A., both of whom
had no gang affiliation, drove around in G.A.’s car to look for K., who had left Jairo’s
house on foot after she and G.A. got into an argument. When Jairo and G.A. found K.,
G.A. got out of the car to talk to her. Jairo noticed a car pass by them, then come back

       4 We grant defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the record on
appeal in Novela, supra, F073275.

                                             4.
toward them and park behind them, blocking G.A.’s car. A person wearing a blue flannel
shirt jumped out of the driver’s side backseat, pointed a gun at G.A., and asked, “Do you
bang?” When G.A. said no, the person got back into the car behind the driver and the car
left.
        Jairo told G.A. and K. to get in G.A.’s car. They drove around the corner to
Jairo’s home, parked the car, and started walking toward the house. As they were
crossing the street, the other car came around. Jairo, G.A., and K. ran for the house. The
car passed them, then the person wearing the flannel shirt got out of the driver’s side
backseat and fired a shot. The bullet shattered the windshield and back window of the
pickup truck behind which Jairo had taken cover. It then lodged in K.’s car.
        A vehicle matching the description of the suspect vehicle was stopped by law
enforcement shortly thereafter, about a mile and a half from the scene of the shooting,
with three occupants. Defendant was the driver. Jairo identified one of the other
occupants of the vehicle as the shooter.
                         Evidence Related to Counts 6 through 13
        On the morning of July 9, 2013, a search warrant was executed at a duplex in the
100 block of East 12th Street, Madera. As police approached the house, Sergeant Foss
heard a door in the back of the house open and slam shut, then what sounded like fences
being jumped. Two blocks away and approximately 15 to 25 minutes later, Foss
observed defendant walking down the street. Defendant was very sweaty and, despite the
fact it was cold, was wearing shorts and a tank top and no shoes. When Detective
Cederquist, who was driving, pulled up next to defendant, Foss asked where he was
coming from. Defendant turned as if to head in the opposite direction and said something
about coming from a friend’s house. When Foss began to open the car door, defendant
fled. After a short pursuit, defendant was taken into custody. There was a large splinter
on his shirt that looked like it was from a wooden fence.

                                             5.
       Meanwhile, law enforcement personnel forced entry into the home. Detective
Keiser, heard a door slam toward the back of the residence and footsteps, as if someone
was running from the residence. Upon entry, Keiser saw the back kitchen door was
partially open. Loaded firearms and methamphetamine packaged for sale were found in
two of the bedrooms. Evidence collected at the scene indicated defendant had been
living in one of the two bedrooms or staying there for days at a time.
                               Evidence Related to Count 15
       On the morning of July 28, 2013, a fight broke out in Module H of the jail.
Multiple inmates, including defendant, assaulted another inmate.
                        Evidence Related to Counts 17 through 19
       On August 2, 2013, correctional officers explained to defendant that he was being
reclassified and rehoused due to an incident earlier that morning. Correctional Corporal
Humbert, Correctional Officer Hensel, and Corporal Lawrence unshackled defendant so
that he could change into the clothing designated for his new housing unit. Defendant
became very upset and told the officers to “get the fuck out of the cell” so he could
change. Lawrence stepped out, then Humbert followed. As Hensel was stepping out,
defendant punched him with a fist on the left side of the head. Hensel grayed out a bit
and fell back into the sink, then he and defendant started having a fist fight. Defendant
continued to fight and resist the officers’ attempts to take him to the ground. It took the
efforts of several additional officers, and Humbert striking defendant in the thigh with his
baton, before defendant could be restrained. Defendant was placed in an intake cell,
where he yelled through the door, “I’m going to ‘F’ you up, Humbert. You’re next,” or,
“Humbert, you’re a bitch and you’re next.”
       Defendant’s conduct deterred and delayed Humbert, Hensel, and Lawrence in the
performance of their duties.

                                             6.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS TO THE ENHANCEMENTS
       Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in declining to strike his two
prior serious felony enhancements and the on-bail enhancement.5 We disagree.
       A.     Additional Factual Background
       When the parties appeared for resentencing, defense counsel asked the court to
consider striking the prior serious felony enhancements “based on the new cha[n]ges to
[section] 1385 and the mitigating circumstances that were passed this year. Specifically,
that [defendant] has multiple enhancements that . . . will be imposed in this case, if the
[c]ourt imposes both [prior serious felony enhancements], as well as the fact that both of
the [prior serious felonies] were over five years old . . . .”
       The People explained that the first prior serious felony involved violation of
section 69 with great bodily injury. That offense occurred in 2010, while the murder in
the instant case occurred in 2013. In that prior case, defendant “had contact with law
enforcement, he ended up punching the officer on the side of this arm causing him to fire.
The officer was off work for a year. During his apprehension, he threatened to kill that
officer when he got out of jail. He called the officer ‘fucking pigs, fucking putos’ and
yelled ‘southside for life.’ I think it is important to note that in our case that he is being
resentenced on today, he had another set of [section] 69 charges, where he assaulted
officers in the Madera County Jail.”
       The People pointed out that the second prior serious felony occurred in 2012 and
involved defendant “riding around with other gang members, pulled up to some young

       5 Defendant acknowledges defense counsel did not argue for dismissal of the on-
bail enhancement. To the extent this failure forfeited the issue, he argues ineffective
assistance of counsel. We address and reject this claim on the merits. (See People v.
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 150 [Even where an issue has been forfeited, if defendant
“asserts his counsel thereby rendered ineffective assistance . . . we turn to the merits of
the claim”].)

                                               7.
men wearing red soccer jerseys, asked them if they banged, and pointed a firearm at
them.” The People again emphasized the proximity in time between this offense and the
murder in the instant case and argued, “His conduct is extremely dangerous to this
community, and I don’t think the [c]ourt should strike it.”
       The court declined to strike the prior serious felony enhancements, stating, “[T]he
[c]ourt will note that it is using its discretion not to strike those . . . prior serious felonies,
given the fact that they were close in time to the commission of [c]ount 1, and they show
a pattern of extreme violence, where the defendant reign[ed] terror upon the streets of –
in particular Madera, and for those reasons, the [c]ourt is not going to strike them.”
       The court then sentenced defendant to an aggregate indeterminate term of 100
years to life, plus 10 years, and an aggregate determinate term of 13 years, 4 months6 as
follows:
       Count 1: A term of 75 years to life, plus two additional five-year terms for the two
prior serious felony enhancements.
       Count 2: A term of 25 years to life, stayed pursuant to section 654, plus two
additional five-year terms for the two prior serious felony enhancements, also stayed
pursuant to section 654.
       Count 4: An unstayed term of 25 years to life, plus two additional five-year terms
for the two prior serious felony enhancements, stayed pursuant to section 654.

       6 The court, orally and in its minute order and abstract of judgment, incorrectly
stated that defendant’s total sentence was an indeterminate term of 100 years, plus a
determinate term of 21 years, 4 months. Although the abstract of judgment correctly
notes the sentences on counts 17, 18, and 19 are consecutive, it then lists the terms for
those counts in parenthesis, a designation commonly used for concurrent terms.
Conversely, the abstract of judgment correctly notes the sentences on counts 7, 8, and 9
are concurrent, but lists the terms for those counts without parenthesis, a designation
commonly used for consecutive terms. This appears to be the source of the
miscalculation. On remand, the court shall correct the sentencing minute order and
abstract of judgment to reflect a total, unstayed determinate term of 13 years, 4 months.

                                                 8.
       Count 15: A middle-term sentence of six years, deemed the principal term.
       Count 6: A consecutive 16-month term (one-third of the middle term), plus an
additional two-year term for the on-bail enhancement.
       Counts 7-9: A concurrent middle-term sentence of four years on each count.
       Counts 10-13: A concurrent middle-term sentence of four years on each count,
stayed pursuant to section 654.
       Counts 17-19: A consecutive 16-month term (one-third of the middle term) on
each count.
       B.     Applicable Law
       At the time of defendant’s original sentencing, the court was prohibited from
striking the prior serious felony enhancements. (People v. Cepeda (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
456, 461; People v. Reneaux (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 852, 875.) However, by the time of
defendant’s recent resentencing, Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) had
removed this prohibition. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2.) In addition, Senate Bill No. 81
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) and Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) respectively
added, and later amended, section 1385, subdivision (c), which at the time of
resentencing provided, as it does now, in relevant part as follows:

       “(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
       enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
       dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

       “(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall
       consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
       prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I)
       are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
       weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
       finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
       ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
       the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
       others.”

                                             9.
       The mitigating circumstances identified in the cited subparagraphs include
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed”; “(F) The current offense
is not a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5”7; and “(H) The
enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).)
       A split of authority has emerged among the Courts of Appeal regarding the
application of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (Compare People v. Walker (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 386, 395, rev. granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309 (Walker), with People v.
Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1090, rev. granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894 (Ortiz).)
In Walker, the court held that the term “great weight,” as used in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) “places a thumb on the scale that balances the mitigating circumstances
favoring dismissal against whether dismissal would endanger public safety, and tips that
balance in favor of dismissal unless rebutted by the court’s finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety.” (Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 399–400, rev. granted.)
Thus, under the holding in Walker, “trial courts are to rebuttably presume that dismissal
of an enhancement is in the furtherance of justice (and that its dismissal is required)
unless the court makes a finding that the resultingly shorter sentence due to dismissal
‘would endanger public safety.’ ” (Id. at p. 398.)
       However, in Ortiz, the court declined to follow Walker’s “formalistic reading” of
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098, rev. granted.)
The Ortiz court explained:

       “In our view, the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it
       is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement. To be sure, the
       Legislature has invested the enumerated mitigating circumstances with

       7 As defendant points out, this mitigating circumstance would apply only to the
on-bail enhancement to count 6.

                                             10.
       great weight, both in the trial court’s evaluation of the defendant’s evidence
       in the first instance and in the trial court’s consideration of the mitigating
       circumstance once established. But this does not preclude a trial court from
       determining that countervailing factors—other than the likelihood of
       physical or other serious danger to others—may nonetheless neutralize
       even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of
       the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice. Interpreting the statute, as
       the Walker court does [citation], to require the trial court to dismiss an
       enhancement absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety
       would divest the trial court of its ultimate discretion under the statute to
       determine what is in furtherance of justice, considering all relevant factors.”
       (Ibid.)
       The question of how courts should construe and apply section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) is currently pending before our Supreme Court. In granting review of the Walker
decision, our high court defined the issue as follows: “Does the amendment to . . .
section 1385, subdivision (c) that requires trial courts to ‘afford great weight’ to
enumerated mitigating circumstances (Stats. 2021, ch. 721) create a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement unless the trial court finds dismissal
would endanger public safety?” (Walker, supra, S278309.)
       We review the trial court’s decision declining to dismiss a sentencing
enhancement for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287,
298.) A court abuses its discretion where it acts without being aware of the scope of its
discretion, considers impermissible factors, or fails to consider relevant factors. (People
v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029; People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
1134, 1141.)
       C.      Analysis
       Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss the
enhancements because (1) the court did not give “great weight” to the mitigating
circumstances; (2) the court did not find that dismissal of the enhancements would
endanger public safety, and instead relied on defendant’s past dangerousness; and (3) in

                                             11.
light of defendant’s otherwise lengthy sentence, dismissal of the enhancements could not
endanger public safety.
                i.      Great weight to mitigating factors
         Defendant contends there is no indication the trial court afforded great weight to
the mitigating circumstances that multiple enhancements were alleged, count 6 was not a
violent felony, and his prior convictions were over five years old.8 (See § 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(B), (F), (H).)
         Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the trial court knew and applied the
current law. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) We therefore presume the court was aware of and applied the
amendments to section 1385, which had taken effect more than nine months prior.
Indeed, in our prior opinion, we expressly noted these amendments would apply at any
resentencing. (Novela, supra, F073275.) We additionally note that the facts bearing on
the mitigating circumstances – the number of enhancements, the age of prior convictions,
and the nature of the substantive offenses – would have been readily apparent to the trial
court.
         The presumption that a court is aware of and applies current law may be rebutted
where the record affirmatively demonstrates the trial court was unaware of or
misunderstood its sentencing discretion. (People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003,
1026.) In such cases, remand is required “unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the
trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had
such discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) Here, nothing in
the record indicates the trial court was unaware of its discretion under section 1385 or the
weight to be given to mitigating circumstances. We are unable to infer from the present

         8 The People do not contend any of these mitigating circumstances were
inapplicable, but rather assume arguendo, that these mitigating circumstances applied.
We do the same.

                                              12.
record that the trial court failed to give great weight to the mitigating circumstances.
Regardless, the record clearly indicates the court would have imposed the same sentence
because, as we explain below, the court determined dismissal of the enhancements would
endanger public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
              ii.     Reliance on past dangerousness
       Defendant contends the trial court did not find that dismissal of the enhancements
would endanger public safety, but rather determined only that defendant’s past conduct
was dangerous, which finding he contends is insufficient to countervail the mitigating
circumstances favoring dismissal of the enhancements. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2).) We
disagree.
       Nothing in the present record suggests the court resolved the public safety issue in
defendant’s favor. The People argued defendant’s prior offenses showed that his
“conduct is extremely dangerous to this community.” (Italics added.) In declining to
strike the prior serious felony enhancements, the court noted the offenses were committed
close in time to the commission of count 1 and “they show a pattern of extreme violence,
where the defendant reign[ed] terror upon the streets of – in particular Madera.”
Although not expressly stated, the court’s comments reasonably may be interpreted as a
finding that dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety due to
defendant committing numerous violent crimes in close proximity to one another.
Meanwhile, no evidence was presented to suggest defendant was no longer inclined
toward such conduct. Regardless of whether danger to public safety is merely one factor
the court must consider in evaluating whether dismissal is in the furtherance of justice
(Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098, rev. granted), or whether such finding is
required to rebut a presumption in favor of dismissal (Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
p. 398, rev. granted), the court did not abuse its discretion.

                                              13.
              iii.    Length of sentence
       Defendant also argues the court abused its discretion in determining dismissal of
the enhancements endangered public safety, given the overall length of defendant’s
sentence. In other words, because defendant has been sentenced to a term greater than
100 years to life, the court could not rationally conclude that removing 12 years from his
sentence would endanger public safety. We disagree.
       Nothing in section 1385 suggests that any particular term is either necessary or
excessive to prevent danger to public safety. Rather, it is the trial court that is tasked
with determining whether dismissal of an enhancement term will endanger public safety
in a given context. Under the discretionary process established by section 1385,
subdivision (c), a court may rationally conclude that a lengthy sentence, including a
sentence that would appear to extend past a defendant’s natural life, is necessary to
protect public safety. Significantly, we note that defendant’s sentence already was
reduced by more than 100 years when several counts and enhancements were dismissed
due to retroactive, ameliorative changes in law. Declining to dismiss the remaining
enhancements in the instant case preserves the court’s ability to impose a sentence that it
believes will best protect public safety.
       In sum, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss
the enhancements.
II.    THE COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING ASSESSMENTS
       Defendant argues, and the People concede, the court erred in calculating certain
assessments imposed at sentencing. We agree.
       Defendant initially was convicted of 19 offenses. (Novela, supra, F073275.)
However, four counts were reversed and eventually dismissed, leaving defendant with 15
counts of conviction. At the resentencing hearing, the court orally pronounced that it was
imposing $1,850 in fines and assessments as indicated in the probation report, and as
would be listed in the court’s minute order and the abstract of judgment. The probation

                                              14.
report, sentencing minute order, and abstract of judgment all reflect that the fines and
assessments included $640 in court operations assessments (§ 1465.8) and $480 in
criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373).
       Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that a court
operations assessment of $40 “shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal
offense.” Defendant was convicted on 15 counts and should have been assessed $600
pursuant to section 1465.8.9 Instead, however, the sentencing minute order and the
abstract of judgment state the court imposed a $640 court operations assessment under
section 1465.8, subdivision (a). This amount is incorrect and the sentencing minute order
and abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect a court operations assessment of
$600 pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a).
       Government Code section 70373 provides, in relevant part, that a $30 assessment
“shall be imposed on every conviction” for a misdemeanor or felony. As stated,
defendant was convicted on 15 counts and should have been assessed $450 pursuant to
Government Code section 70373. Instead, the sentencing minute order and the abstract
of judgment state the court imposed $480 in criminal conviction assessments. This
amount is incorrect and the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment must be
corrected to reflect a criminal conviction assessment of $450 pursuant to Government
Code section 70373.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The matter is remanded for the court to correct the abstract of judgment and
sentencing minute order to reflect a total unstayed determinate term of 13 years, 4
months, $600 in court operations assessments (§ 1465.8) and $450 in criminal
convictions assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373), and to forward a copy of the corrected

       9 It is undisputed that dismissal of a charge prohibits imposition of assessments for
that charge under both section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373. (See People
v. Superior Court (Sanchez-Flores) (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 692, 707.)

                                            15.
abstract of judgment to the appropriate authorities. The judgment, as corrected, is
affirmed.

                                           16.