Court Opinion

ID: 9660088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:03:32.261138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:14.533109
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, Judge,
dissenting.
The principal opinion, although recognizing that a question of juror misconduct is reserved to the discretion of the trial court, nevertheless reverses the trial court’s ruling on its own finding that Juror Marshall was guilty of misconduct.
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for new trial due to juror misconduct dur*40ing voir dire in that four members of the jury panel intentionally concealed their involvement as parties to prior litigation.1
The trial court received testimony from four jurors and overruled the motion for new trial, thus finding there was no intentional concealment by any of those four jurors. The only juror in question here is Juror Marshall.
The trial count’s finding on intentional concealment was nothing more than a finding of fact on a question peculiarly within the province of the trial court. It is not to be disturbed on appeal if it rests “upon a reasonable foundation in fact and upon competent evidence in the record or within the knowledge of the trial court.” Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Company, 272 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo.1954).
The voir dire was extensive and comprehensive. It subjected the jurors individually and collectively to questions including whether any jurors had been involved in prior litigation. Juror Marshall’s unmentioned claim was for a personal injury sustained while operating a forklift. The claim was filed in 1981; it was settled for $1500 in 1982. At the post-trial hearing, he stated he did not think about this claim during the voir dire. The trial judge chose to believe him and the record provides reasonable support for that belief.
Although Juror Marshall did remember some details of his injury, the incident was vague in his memory; he thought it had been settled in “’74 or ’75,” not in 1982. He stated he “didn’t think about the [claim]” during voir dire. This was consistent with his vague and inaccurate recollection of the settlement date. Neither response is indicative of a sophisticated liar or dissembler. Both responses were considered reasonable by the trial judge who, in his capacity as trier of the facts, observed both the voir dire and post-trial interrogations of the venire and Juror Marshall and thus sat in the superior position to weigh the evidence and adjudge credibility.
As recognized by the Eastern District en banc, both parties have marshalled a number of Missouri cases to support their respective positions. Many Missouri cases are collected and analyzed in the ALR annotation to Anderson v. Burlington Northern R.R., 651 S.W.2d 176 (Mo.App. 1983). 38 ALR 4th 255-332 (1983), Effect of Juror’s False or Erroneous Answer on Voir Dire in Personal Injury or Death Action as to Previous Claims or Actions for Damages by Himself or His Family. Some of the same cases are cited by the parties to reach opposite conclusions. This seeming incongruity is only facial and is explained by each of these cases being decided upon its own facts and by reasonable persons differing about just what inferences from a given set of facts are reasonable. On the present record, the trial court’s finding of no intentional concealment was a reasonable inference, and this Court should defer to that finding.
This Court most recently in Yoon v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. banc 1987), agreed unanimously that the trial court’s discretion to grant a new trial was reasonably supported by its observations that several jurors were dozing during the trial. This Court should give no less deference to this trial court’s reasonably supported discretion to deny a new trial.
In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion as charged and the judgment for plaintiff should be affirmed.

. Defendant’s presentation to the trial court was that ”[d]efendant was denied its constitutional rights to an impartial panel of twelve jurors because one or more of the jurors failed to truthfully respond to questions asked during voir dire concerning prior claims, litigation and involvement with Barnes Hospital.”
This allegation is vague and lacks the specificity required by Rule 78.07 to preserve it for review. Relief should be denied for that reason.