Court Opinion

ID: 9604574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:23:39.767911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:22.665026
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
concurring specially.
I arrive at the same result by a different route. In this divorce and alimony case (divorce granted with alimony reserved), the husband sought to defend on several grounds, one of which was an alleged settlement agreement. The trial court found that the settlement agreement had not been signed and granted the wife’s motion for summary judgment as to it. The husband seeks to appeal the grant of that partial summary judgment under Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h).
Relying on Code § 6-701 (b),1 the husband contemporaneously seeks to appeal the denial of his motions seeking summary judgment as to the wife’s claims for equitable division of property and an interest in the husband’s business. (One other enumeration of error relates to the trial judge’s refusal to rule on another motion; rulings may be appealable, but refusals to rule generally are not.)
It is doubtful whether motions for summary judgment as to *782particular defenses and some of the elements of damages are appropriate as motions for summary judgment. None of these motions resulted in “judgments.” They resulted in orders governing the conduct of the case much as a pretrial order would. Code Ann. § 81A-116. Such a pretrial order is not appealable, at least not per se. A motion for summary judgment may be made as to a claim, a counterclaim or a cross claim, as to all (i.e., no liability) or part thereof (i.e., liability but not damages). Code Ann. § 81A-156 (a) (b). A motion to strike is the proper means by which to attack an insufficient defense (e.g., an alleged settlement agreement). Code Ann. § 81A-112 (f). Improper claims for damages should be eliminated from the case at a pretrial hearing or by some means other than a motion for summary judgment, which does not result in a “judgment.” See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice (Part 2) ¶ 56.20, discussing Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works, 154 F2d 214 (7th Cir. 1946).
However, assuming that “summary judgment” was granted in this case (where it appears the motion was actually to strike an insufficient defense), Code Ann. § 6-701.1 (a) (2) requires an application to appeal orders granting or refusing alimony. If an order granting or refusing alimony is appealable only by application, it follows that a reasonable interpretation of Code Ann. § 6-701.1 means that orders allowing or disallowing claims to alimony or defenses to alimony are likewise appealable only by application. See Citizens &c. Nat. Bank v. Rayle, 246 Ga. 727 (1980).
All of the orders in this appeal regarding the property settlement agreement, the equitable division of property and interest in the husband’s business, are orders relating to the granting or refusing of permanent alimony and hence can only be appealed by application under Code Ann. § 6-701.1 (a)(2). I therefore concur in the dismissal of this appeal.

See Southeast Ceramics v. Klem, 246 Ga. 294 (1) (271 SE2d 199) (1980).