Court Opinion

ID: 9742323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:10:46.875103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:31.029039
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I cannot agree however with the abandonment of the common enemy rule in favor of the reasonable use rule.
The Indiana version of the common enemy rule is summarized in the recent case of Argyelan v. Haviland (1981), Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 569, at 571 (transfer pending) as follows:
“ ‘[A] lower property owner may dam against such water to prevent it from entering onto his land and . . . cannot be held liable for damages resulting from the accumulation of water above the obstruction or because such obstruction causes the water to flow onto the land of another. Watts v. Evansville, Mt. Carmel and Northern Railway Co. (1921), 191 Ind. 27, 129 N.E. 315; Gwinn v. Myers (1955), 234 Ind. 560, 129 N.E.2d 225; Capes v. Barger (1953), 123 Ind.App. 212, 109 N.E.2d 725; Thompson v. Dyar (1955), 126 Ind.App. 70, 130 N.E.2d 52; Lowe v. Loge Realty Co., Inc. (1966), 138 Ind.App. 434, 214 N.E.2d 400. The only limitation outlined in the above cases is that a landowner may not collect surface water into a body and then discharge it on to another’s land.’ ” Citing Cloverleaf Farms, Inc. v. Surratt (1976), 169 Ind. App. 554, at 555, 349 N.E.2d 731, at 732 (original emphasis). Accord, Gene B. Glick Co., Inc. v. Marion Constructon Corp. (1975), 165 Ind.App. 72, 331 N.E.2d 26, reh. denied 333 N.E.2d 140.
The common enemy rule applies in cases where a lower property owner creates an obstruction on his land to prevent surface water from flowing onto his property. The common enemy rule does not apply in cases where a natural watercourse is obstructed, or interfered with, to the damage of another. See Lowe v. Loge Realty Co., Inc. (1966), 138 Ind.App. 434, 214 N.E.2d 400; Thompson et al. v. Dyar (1955), 126 Ind. App. 70, 130 N.E.2d 52. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Indiana has not followed both the civil law rule and common enemy rule with respect to surface waters. In all such cases the common enemy rule has been applied.
According to the majority’s definition of the civil law rule, the lower landowner has no right to obstruct the natural flow of water from an upper parcel of land. Although the majority declares that this rule has been followed in Indiana, it fails to cite a single case in which an Indiana court has held that a lower landowner may not obstruct the flow of surface water from the property of an upper landowner.
In Templeton v. Voshloe (1880), 72 Ind. 134, the majority finds the first enunciation of the civil law rule in Indiana. The issue in Templeton was whether Voshloe could lawfully cut openings in a ridge in order to allow surface water to flow across Temple-ton’s property. The Court referred to a legal treatise in deciding the issue.
“In referring to the subject under discussion, Washburn on Easements, marginal page 353, says: *1317‘Before proceeding to consider the law as to water percolating through the earth, beneath its surface, it is necessary to refer to a few principles which seem now to be pretty well settled as to the respective rights of adjacent land-owners, in respect to waters which fall in rain, or are in any way found upon the surface, but not embraced under the head of streams or watercourses, nor constituting permanent bodies of water, like ponds, lakes, and the like. It may be stated as a general principle, that, by civil law, where the situation of two adjoining fields is such that the water falling or collected by melting snows, and the like, upon one, naturally descends upon the other, it must be suffered by the lower one to be discharged upon his land if desired by the owner of the upper field. But the latter can not, by artificial trenches, or otherwise, cause the natural mode of its being discharged, to be changed to the injury of the lower field, as by conducting it by new channels in unusual quantities on to particular parts of the lower field.’ ”
72 Ind. at 136.
The narrow holding of the Court is as follows:
“The principle recognized by the text thus quoted from is well illustrated and sustained by several leading eases referred to, and commented upon, by the learned author.
“From these and other decided cases, we deduce the doctrine that the owner of the upper field may not construct drains or excavations so as to form new channels on to the lower field, nor can he collect the water of several channels and discharge it on the lower field so as to increase the wash upon the same. The right of the owner of the upper field to make drains on his own land is restricted to such as are required by good husbandry and the proper improvement of the surface of the ground, and as may be discharged into natural channels, without inflicting palpable and unnecessary injury on the lower field.” (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 136-137.
The right of the lower landowner to obstruct the flow of surface water was not at issue. The Court specifically held:
“As to where, and under what circumstances, the owner of the lower field may obstruct or direct the flow of surface water which naturally descends upon his land, we need not now inquire, as that question is in no way involved in the proper decision of this cause.”
Id. at 137.
The common enemy rule was not applicable to this case. It is therefore clear that the Court in Templeton did not choose to apply the civil law rule instead of the common enemy rule.
The issue in Smith et ux. v. Atkinson et al. (1962), 133 Ind.App. 430, 180 N.E.2d 542 was whether an upper landowner had changed the nature of his land so as to collect a substantial amount of water and expel it into a watercourse which ran across the lower land. Water from the upper parcel was being discharged into a ditch which eventually ran across the lower parcel. Once the water entered the ditch, it was no longer surface water. See Capes v. Barger (1953), 123 Ind.App. 212, 109 N.E.2d 725. The case did not involve the lower landowner obstructing the flow of surface water. The common enemy rule was not applicable.
Finally, a review of Gumz v. Bejes et al. (1975), 163 Ind.App. 55, 321 N.E.2d 851 reveals that it was concerned with both the intentional altering of the course and flow of waters and the impoundment and later release of waters. The case apparently did not concern surface waters, but rather water that was channeled through ditches. Again the common enemy rule did not apply-
The present case involves a landowner who raises his property in order to obstruct the flow of surface water. The effect was to force the surface water onto the land of another. Indiana courts have consistently stated that where surface water is involved, the lower landowner may obstruct the flow of surface water without incurring liability *1318for damage that the water does to the land of another.
See, e. g., Gwinn v. Myers et al. (1955), 234 Ind. 560, 129 N.E.2d 225; Watts v. Evansville, etc., R. Co. (1921), 191 Ind. 27, 129 N.E. 315; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (1912), 177 Ind. 524, 97 N.E. 164; New Jersey, etc., R. Co. v. Tutt (1907), 168 Ind. 205, 80 N.E. 420; Clay v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. (1905), 164 Ind. 439, 73 N.E. 904; The Cairo and Vincennes Railroad Company v. Houry (1881), 77 Ind. 364; Benthall v. Seifert (1881), 77 Ind. 302; Taylor, Administrator v. Fickas (1878), 64 Ind. 167; Argyelan v. Haviland (1981), Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 569 (transfer pending); Cloverleaf Farms, Inc. v. Surratt (1976), 169 Ind.App. 554, 349 N.E.2d 731; Lowe v. Loge Realty Co., Inc. (1966), 138 Ind.App. 434, 214 N.E.2d 400; Thompson et al. v. Dyar (1955), 126 Ind.App. 70, 130 N.E.2d 52; Dunn v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. (1917), 63 Ind.App. 553, 114 N.E. 888; Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Scott (1916), 67 Ind.App. 121, 114 N.E. 649; Vandalia R. Co. v. Yeager (1915), 60 Ind. App. 118, 110 N.E. 230; Gaskill v. Barnett (1913), 52 Ind.App. 654, 101 N.E. 40; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Atkinson (1912), 51 Ind.App. 315, 97 N.E. 353; Hart v. Sigman (1903), 32 Ind.App. 227, 69 N.E. 262; New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Speelman et al. (1895), 12 Ind.App. 372, 40 N.E. 541; Jean v. The Pennsylvania Company (1894), 9 Ind.App. 56, 36 N.E. 159.
The majority apparently ignores stare de-cisis and the rule of precedent. While I would agree that the Court of Appeals must be conservatively responsive to accepted legal trends, I cannot agree that this Court should in any respect presume to be a barometer of public opinion or the weather-vane of social change. It is for the Legislature to establish the procedures for such change. The function of the Court of Appeals is to interpret the law and lay down general guidelines by which the lawyers and the trial courts of the State may make determinations upon which they can depend. This function cannot be fulfilled by summarily abandoning the common enemy rule and replacing it with a rule of reasonableness. No longer will lawyers be able to advise their clients with any degree of certainty. What may be reasonable to one person in the use of his property may be unreasonable to an adjacent landowner. Neither of these opinions may comport with what a trial judge might declare is reasonable. The majority opinion does nothing more than muddy the waters in this area of the law.