Court Opinion

ID: 9493853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:21:08.573154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:03.284304
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The issue in this case is the authority of the Internal Revenue Service to use the aggregate method of assessment for the employer’s share of Social Security taxes on unreported tip income. The separate issue of the accuracy of the assessment is not before us and the two concepts-authority and accuracy-should neither be confused nor mixed and matched. In affirming the district court’s rejection of the aggregate approach, the majority creates a circuit split on a tax issue of national importance. Unlike Quidditch or Fizzing Whizbees, there is nothing magical about the IRS’s assessment-the employer owes taxes on the unreported tip income and the IRS has simply devised a practical means of calculating the tip income. In view of our respect for the decisions of sister cir*853cuits in tax cases, our deference to the IRS in interpreting the tax code, and the logic and practicality of the aggregate method, I respectfully dissent.
A. Other Circuits.
The question of whether the IRS is authorized to assess the employer’s share of Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”) taxes, commonly known as Social Security taxes, based on the aggregate method without first determining the amount of under-reporting by individual employees is one of first impression in this circuit. Three other circuits, however, have already addressed this issue, and all three have held that the tax code (“Code”) authorizes the IRS to do so. See 330 West Hubbard Restaurant Corp. v. United States, 203 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir.2000); Bubble Room, Inc. v. United States, 159 F.3d 553, 568 (Fed.Cir.1998) (Bubble Room II); Morrison Restaurants, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir.1997); see also LIR Mgmt. Corp. v. United States, 86 F.Supp.2d 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Quietwater Entm’t, Inc. v. United States, 80 F.Supp.2d 1323 (N.D.Fla.1999), rev’d in part, vacated in part without op., 220 F.3d 592 (11th Cir.2000).
The majority’s position places the Ninth Circuit directly at odds with our sister circuits, which is of particular concern in this case, as “[ujniformity among Circuits is especially important ... to ensure equal and certain administration of the tax system.” Hill v. Comm’r, 204 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Until now, we have “hesitate[d] to reject the view of another circuit” in this area. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Three years ago the Eleventh Circuit was the first circuit to address the question before us. In Morrison Restaurants, the employer sought a refund and abatement of FICA taxes assessed on unreported employee tips. 118 F.3d at 1528. The employer argued that the IRS does not have the authority under 26 U.S.C. § 3121(q) to assess its share of FICA taxes on unreported tips on an aggregate basis without first determining the under-reporting by individual employees and crediting their wage history accounts. Id. at • 1529. This is precisely the position advocated by Fior D’ltalia. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that § 3121(q)
clearly states than an employer can be assessed for its share of FICA taxes on employee tips even if the employee fails to report all tips. It also suggests that the employer can be assessed its share of FICA taxes even when the individual employee’s share is not determined.
Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded:
[W]e are unconvinced that Congress’s silence can be construed to mean that an employer cannot be assessed its share of FICA taxes based on employees’ unreported tips in the aggregate without determining the underreporting by the individual employees and crediting the individual employees’ wage history accounts.
Id. at 1529-30. The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the IRS’s use of the aggregate method because its interpretation of the Code was reasonable. Id. at 1530.
The next year, in Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 554, the Federal Circuit similarly addressed whether the IRS has the authority to assess the employer’s share of FICA taxes on unreported tips on an aggregate basis “without first determining the under-reporting by the individual employees and then crediting their Social Security wage earnings records.” The court concluded that the statutes authorize the IRS to do so:
I.R.C. § 3121(q) expressly contemplates that the employer may be liable for its share of FICA taxes even if the records supplied by the employee are missing, inaccurate, or incomplete. Although not conclusive, § 3121(q) would thus seem to imply that an indirect method may be *854used to calculate the amount of employer FICA tax in the absence of any better evidence.
However, I.R.C. § 3121(q) does not fully address the question at issue here-whether the particular indirect formula used by the IRS to estimate the [employer’s] FICA tax liability was illegal. I.R.C. § 6201 speaks to this question. Under I.R.C. § 6201, the IRS is “authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments” necessary for all taxes imposed by the Code, “which have not been duly paid ... in the manner provided by law.” I.R.C. § 6201 implicitly authorizes the IRS to use an indirect formula in order to carry out the general power granted in I.R.C. § 6201. For example, the IRS would have to use an indirect formula to estimate the amount of FICA tax owed by an employer when there is no other way to “determine and assess” the wages deemed to have been paid by the employer.
Id. at 565. The Federal Circuit concluded that the statutes authorize the IRS to use the aggregate method without first determining the individual employees’ tip income. See id. at 566-68.
Most recently, in 330 West Hubbard Restaurant, 203 F.3d 990, 997, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue and similarly concluded that the statutes authorize the IRS to assess the employer’s share of FICA taxes based on the aggregate method without first determining the amount of under-reporting by individual employees. The Seventh Circuit was unequivocal:
We conclude that [the employer] has failed to demonstrate that the IRS’s aggregate method of collecting employer FICA taxes is an impermissible reading of the tax code. Accordingly, we uphold the IRS’s interpretation of its authority to use the aggregate method of collecting FICA taxes.
Id. at 997.
Every circuit court that has addressed the aggregate assessment issue has come to the opposite conclusion from the majority. The majority’s attempt to avoid the weight of circuit authority by suggesting that its position is somehow in line with that of 830 West Hubbard Restaurant and Morrison Restaurants is transparently unsuccessful. See Maj. Op. at 850 n. 9 (“our holding is entirely consistent with those of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits”). As noted above, both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held that the IRS has the authority to use the aggregate method with respect to unreported tip income without determining the under-reporting by individual employees and crediting their wage history accounts. See 330 West Hubbard Restaurant, 203 F.3d at 994, 997; Morrison Restaurants, 118 F.3d at 1529-30. Although the majority agrees that the IRS need not assess the employees in order to assess the employer, the majority concludes that the IRS may not rely on the aggregate method and must audit the employees. See Maj. Op. at 850 & n. 9. Requiring an audit is simply another way of saying that the IRS cannot estimate and that the only way the IRS can assess taxes on unreported or under-reported tips is to undertake an individual accounting of employees. This view can hardly be viewed as “entirely consistent” with that of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. The IRS’s authority to use the aggregate method was at the heart of the cases in those circuits. The majority’s recharacterization can only pretend consistency with these cases.
B. The IRS’s Interpretation Is Reasonable.
The Supreme Court has instructed that we must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its statutes and that our review is restricted to determining whether that interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is *855based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 730, 105 S.Ct. 2919, 86 L.Ed.2d 565 (1985) (“The IRS’s understanding of the terms of the Code is entitled to considerable deference.”); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (“this Court has long recognized the primary authority of the IRS ... in construing the Internal Revenue Code”). We have likewise limited our review of IRS interpretations of the Code. See Walthall v. United States, 131 F.3d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding that where the IRS’s interpretation is reasonable, “[w]e must ... show the IRS interpretation substantial deference”); Durando v. United States, 70 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir.1995) (“Courts give deference to IRS rulings and interpretations of the Code.”); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir.1994) (recognizing “the well-settled rule that an agency’s interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference unless it contradicts the statute’s plain meaning”).
In reviewing the IRS’s interpretation of the Code, we “need not find that the agency construction [is] the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading that [we] would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778; accord Walthall, 131 F.3d at 1297 (concluding that although “[t]he statute is not susceptible only to the [taxpayers’] interpretation ... the IRS’s interpretation ... is reasonable” and “[w]e must therefore show the IRS interpretation substantial deference”). Moreover, we owe deference to the IRS’s interpretation of the Code even absent a formal IRS rule. See Alexander v. Glickman, 139 F.3d 733, 736 (9th Cir.1998) (“We owe deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute even absent a formal agency rule interpreting the statute.”).
The IRS’s interpretation of the statutes at issue here-that is, its conclusion that the statutes permit it to use the aggregate method-is reasonable in light of the statutory language. Nothing in the statutes or regulations requires the IRS to determine the amount of unreported tips before assessing the employer’s FICA tax liability, and nothing in the statutes or regulations prohibits the IRS from using the aggregate method. Rather, the IRS’s use of the aggregate method is entirely consistent with the statutes and regulations and therefore is entitled to substantial deference. A brief review of the relevant Code sections reveals that the Code does not require or bar any method, but leaves selection of the method to the agency.
Section 3111 imposes a FICA tax on employers that is computed as a percentage of wages paid by the employer to its employees. 26 U.S.C. § 3111; 26 C.F.R. §§ 31.3111-1, 31.3111-4. “Wages” includes all tips received by employees except those that amount to less than $20 in any calendar month. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(12)(B), (q); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)(12)-l. Section 3121 (q) requires employers to pay the § 3111 taxes on the total amount of tips and other remuneration, up to the Social Security wage base. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1). As the Federal Circuit recognized,
[i]n the case of the employee FICA tax, the employer need only consider those tips that “are included in a written statement furnished by the employee to the employer pursuant to section 6053(a).” Unlike the employee FICA tax, however, there is no parallel provision which limits the employer’s FICA tax liability to tips that are included in the written statement furnished by the employee.
Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 556 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3102(c)) (emphasis added).
Although the statutes do not directly address whether the IRS has the authority to make aggregate assessments with respect to unreported tips, see Maj. Op. at 849-50, they are certainly broad enough to permit the IRS to do so. In fact, it is precisely the statutes’ silence that requires *856Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In particular, § 3121(q) provides that, even in cases where employees do not provide the employer with tip statements under 26 U.S.C. § 6053(a) or where the statements are inaccurate or incomplete, the IRS may issue a notice and demand for employer FICA taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(q). The statute does not suggest, let alone require, that the IRS must first audit the employees to determine the amount of unreported tips.
This statutory silence is buttressed by § 6201’s express delegation authorizing the IRS to determine and assess the amount of FICA taxes imposed by § 3111. See 26 U.S.C. § 6201. Specifically, § 6201(a) permits the IRS to “make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes ... imposed by this title.” 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a). It is up to the IRS to choose the method, so long as reasonable, and it is reasonable for the IRS to conclude that the authority to determine and assess taxes includes the authority to use the aggregate method to assess the employer’s taxes on unreported tips. Indeed, the IRS uses estimation methods in other contexts-specifically, to determine the amount of tips received by employees and assess a FICA tax against them under 26 U.S.C. § 446(b). Like § 6201(a), § 446(b) does not specifically authorize estimates, but § 446(b) has been interpreted to permit the IRS to use estimates to determine tax assessments. See Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 557-58. The majority posits that use of estimates with respect to employees is permissible but not so with employers. See Maj. Op. at 847-48. This dichotomy overlooks the fact that employers and employees have independent tax obligations with respect to tips. And, although employers arguably have a more difficult burden than employees in documenting the actual amount of tips, the implementation of estimates is a judgment best left to the IRS, not the court. The majority’s approach tramples the deference owed to the IRS.
The IRS’s interpretation of the statutes is also consistent with § 3111’s imposition of a single tax on the employer based on the aggregate tips and other wages received by its employees. See 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a)-(b); Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 566 (“[T]he employer FICA tax imposed by I.R.C. § 3111 is expressed in terms of the employees’ aggregate tip income.”). Similarly, the limitations period for the assessment of employer FICA taxes is consistent with the conclusion that the IRS need not audit employees before assessing the employer; the limitations period does not begin to run until after notice and demand by the IRS under § 3121(q), even if the limitations period for assessing employees has run. See Rev. Rul. 95-7, 1995-4 I.R.B. 44 (Q & A 11). In other words, because the IRS can assess the employer even after it may no longer audit the employees, the statute implicitly authorizes the use of estimates. Although, as the majority points out, other interpretations of the statute are possible, see Maj. Op. at 849-50, to be reasonable, the IRS’s interpretation need not rule out alternatives.
Congressional action in recent years suggests that Congress believes that the IRS has the authority to use the aggregate method as well. In 1998, Congress passed a law that prohibited the IRS from “threatening] to audit [a] taxpayer in an attempt to coerce the taxpayer into entering a Tip Reporting Alternative Commitment [TRAC] Agreement.” Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-206, § 3414, 112 Stat. 685, 755 (July 22, 1998). Under the TRAC program, the employer agrees to educate its employees about tax reporting, establish procedures to ensure accurate tip reporting, and fulfill various federal tax requirements; in return, the IRS agrees to base the employer FICA tax liability solely on reported tips and any unreported tips discovered during an IRS audit of an employee. See H.R. Conf. Rep. *857No. 105-599 at 274 (1998), U.S. Code & Cong. Admin. News at 297; S.Rep. No. 105-174 at 75 (1998); H.R.Rep. No. 105-364 (Pt. 1) at 73 (1997). The TRAC program is a special initiative that limits the employer’s liability to actual rather than estimated tips. But, in making sure that TRAC is not used as a cudgel, Congress acknowledged the IBS’s power to make aggregate calculations of employer tax obligations, before or without making determinations with respect to individual employees.
As the majority concedes, the IRS need not assess each employee before it can assess the employer. See Maj. Op. at 849. The majority stresses, rather, that the IRS need only audit each employee before assessing the employer. See Maj. Op. at 850 & n.9. But, as the majority recognizes, employer and employee tax obligations are completely separate. See Maj. Op. at 850. One has nothing to do with the other. Although the employer and employee may be bound together through an employment relationship, their tax obligations arise separately. See Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 565 (“We read §§ 3101 and 3111 as imposing a separate and distinct tax liability on employers.”).1 Where the wages fall within the wages band, the employer must pay taxes on them, regardless of whether the employees reported them. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(q).
The employer’s independent tax obligation resonates in the structure and text of the Code. The respective employer and employee tax obligations are set forth in different subchapters. The employer’s obligation is set forth in § 3111; the employees’ obligation is set forth in § 3101. As previously noted, the employer’s duty to collect and remit the employees’ share of FICA taxes applies only with respect to reported tips-the employer’s duty is not so limited. See 26 U.S.C. § 3102(c)(1), 3121(q). Finally, as discussed above, the limitations periods for the two tax obligations are different. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(q).
The majority makes much of the IRS’s lack of specific regulatory authority to use the aggregate method. But, as noted earlier, the IRS does not need to adopt a regulation in order to benefit from the deference owed to its interpretation of the Code. The majority also projects the image of a rogue IRS exercising its muscle to collect employer taxes on unreported tips, trampling on restaurants’ rights and ignoring basic process. This characterization obscures the congressional dictate to tax all wages, specifically including unreported tips, and ignores the fact that the IRS’s method is based on justifiable projections, not “thin air” estimates.
The majority also intimates that Congress tried to put the brakes on the IRS’s effort to collect employer taxes on tips. An examination of recent legislation dispels this notion. Code § 45B generally allows an income tax credit to an employer for employer FICA taxes paid with respect to employee tips. See 26 U.S.C. § 45B. In 1996, Congress amended § 45B to clarify that the tax credit is available for employer FICA taxes paid on all tips, regardless of whether the employees reported the tips. See 26 U.S.C. § 45B(b)(l)(A), as amended by Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-188, § 1112(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1759 (1996). The majority reads this amendment as “demonstrating] the difficulty the executive and the legislative branches have had in reaching common ground on the problem of collecting taxes on employee -tips.” See Maj. Op. at 852. But, rather than a *858rebuke of “the IRS’s recent efforts to enhance the collection of FICA taxes on cash tips,” as the majority suggests, Maj. Op. at 852, the amendment merely confirms that the employer’s tax obligation is completely separate from the employees’ obligation. And the amendment does more-it confirms that the IRS may impose taxes on all tips and that the employer may benefit from a tax credit on those tips, whether reported or not.
C. Practicality of Aggregate Method.
The majority’s policy arguments against the aggregate method are just that-the court making policy. Equally availing practical and policy considerations support the IRS’s approach and weigh against the majority’s position. For example, the majority’s approach effectively prohibits the IRS from assessing the employer’s share of FICA taxes with respect to unreported tips because the IRS cannot possibly audit all tipped employees to determine the degree of under-reporting. See Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 567 (“[A]s a practical matter, the IRS lacked the resources necessary to audit each of the [employer’s] tipped employees to determine the unreported tip income of each tipped employee.”). The majority’s approach thereby invites employers and employees alike to evade their statutory tax obligations. See id. (“[Requiring the IRS to make an assessment against each employee for employee FICA taxes on unreported tips before the IRS could make an assessment against the employer for employer FICA taxes on such tips might also provide an incentive to an employer to discourage accurate reporting or to ignore clearly inaccurate reporting by its employees.”); Morrison Restaurants, 118 F.3d at 1530 (“[Bjasing the employer’s share of FICA taxes exclusively on employees’ reported tips would provide incentive to the employer to discourage accurate reporting or ignore blatantly inaccurate reporting by the employees so that the employer could pay less FICA tax.”).
The IRS’s interpretation-the one to which we owe deference-requires only that employers comply with the law; it is neither unfair nor a punishment. See Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 566 (“[W]e reject the position that the McQuatters formula [i.e., the aggregate method] is punitive in nature and thus limited to situations where taxpayers fail to keep adequate records.”). Cf. Maj. Op. at 848. Employers are required, by statute, to pay their share of FICA taxes on reported and unreported tips. Use of the aggregate method is not an effort to tell restaurants how to run their businesses. It is simply an alternate means of assessing the tax when individual employees’ records are unavailable. Restaurants can continue to pool tips or not, to require certain reporting from their employees or not, and to create a specialized tip system or not. The choice lies with the restaurant, not the IRS. The consequence is that the tax is still owed and the IRS will impose a reasonable method to assess it. Because the IRS’s conclusion that it can assess the employer’s share of FICA taxes with respect to unreported tips based on the aggregate method is reasonable, we should defer to that interpretation, particularly here, in light of the need for uniformity in administering the national tax system and the views of our sister circuits.
D. Use of the Aggregate Method Does Not Preclude a Challenge as to Accuracy and Amount.
The majority confuses the IRS’s authority to use the aggregate method with the accuracy of that method. See Maj. Op. at 846-47, 848-49. “[Wjhether there are flaws in the indirect formula used to estimate the FICA tax is a separate matter from whether the IRS has the authority to assess an employer-only FICA tax based on an aggregate estimate of unreported tip income.” Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 568.
Adoption of the aggregate method does not preclude an employer from challenging *859the amount of the assessment by showing, for example, that some of the tips were received by employees who fell outside the wages band. See SSO West Hubbard Restaurant, 203 F.3d at 996 (“[The employer’s] argument [regarding the wages band] is misplaced because it fails to distinguish between the IRS’s authority to collect taxes and the correctness of the IRS’s calculation of the amount of those taxes.”); Bubble Room II, 159 F.3d at 567 (concluding that failure to take the wages band into account does not “make the assessment unlawful” but, rather, “merely suggests that the amount of FICA tax assessed against [the employer] may have been incorrect by some margin and that it may be entitled to a refund of some portion of the FICA tax assessed against it”). Here, however, the issue of accuracy is not before us, because Fior D’ltalia did not challenge the accuracy of the calculation-it challenged only the IRS’s authority to assess taxes under the aggregate method.
The IRS is not just plucking a number out of the air and shifting the burden to the taxpayer as the majority would have us believe. Use of the aggregate method does not shift the normal burdens in some topsy-turvy manner. Instead, the aggregate method is predicated on a reasonable estimate and that may be challenged by the taxpayer. There is nothing new or unusual in this scheme of tax assessment.
Our review of the IRS’s interpretation of the Code is limited. Because the IRS’s conclusion that it has the authority to use the aggregate method is reasonable, we must defer to it, as have three circuits before us. This approach preserves the right to challenge the accuracy.of the assessment resulting from the aggregate method. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. Many of Fior D'ltalia’s arguments against use of the aggregate method focus on employees; for example, incentives with respect to employee tip-reporting and crediting of employee Social Security accounts. But the employer and employee tax obligations are separate and not completely parallel. Whether employees report their tips and receive Social Security credit is not at issue here. If employees do not receive Social Security credit for all of their income, it is because they under-reported their income-not because of the aggregate method of assessing employer FICA taxes.