Court Opinion

ID: 9682251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:27.014989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.442563
License: Public Domain

HECHT, Justice,
joined by OWEN, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the Court’s opinion and would add only that in several other states the judiciary has deferred to the legislature to determine social host liability. See, e.g., Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Fla.1987)(“[W]hen the legislature has actively en*609tered a particular field and has clearly indicated its ability to deal with such a policy question, the more prudent course is for this Court to defer to the legislative branch.”); Gariup Constr. Co., Inc. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (Ind.1988) (“Cognizant of our legislature’s active and ongoing interest and participation in the development of public policy in this area, this Court is unwilling to depart from the general rule followed in most jurisdictions, and we hold that common law liquor liability shall not be extended to the purely social host”, (footnote omitted)); Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash.2d 381, 755 P.2d 759, 762 (1988)(en banc)(observing that the legislature was disinclined to impose social host liability, and noting that its judicial deference to the legislature on the issue of social host liability “is fully supported by precedent both within and without th[e] state”); Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis.2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1979) (“The problem ... of controlling drinking and driving ... is a legislative problem ... and the issue [of whether or not to impose liability upon alcohol providers] is one best dealt with by the legislature.”).
This is true for some courts even in the absence of legislative pronouncements on issues related to social host liability. See, e.g., Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So.2d 526, 529 (Miss.1985)(“We are of the opinion that this question, which involves strong public policy and change of the law, should be studied comprehensively and addressed by the [legislature].”); D’Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4, 518 N.E.2d 896, 899 (1987) (“[I]f there is to be a change in [imposing liability on non-seller alcohol providers] it should come from the legislature.”); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973)(“[W]e feel that a decision of this monumental nature is best left to the legislature.”); Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I.1995) (“[T]he creation of new causes of action [regarding social host liability] should be left to the Legislature.” (citations omitted)).
Some courts have gone so far as to hold that a legislature’s activity in this area preempts a common-law cause of action. E.g., Charles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill.2d 482, 209 Ill.Dec. 226, 231, 651 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1995); Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn.1985); Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Minn.1982).
In circumstances similar to those in this case, other jurisdictions have refused to recognize a cause of action for negligence per se. The Nevada Supreme Court has reasoned:
In other contexts we have recognized that a violation of a penal statute is negligence per se. We decline to so rule in this ease since to do so would subvert the apparent legislative intention. The statute before us is but one of many in the statutory scheme regulating the sale of tobacco and intoxicating liquor to minors and drunkards. The section immediately preceding [the statute in question] does impose a limited civil liability upon the proprietor of a saloon who sells liquor to a minor. By providing for civil liability in one section and failing to do so in the section immediately following, the legislature has made its intention clear. Accordingly, we must conclude that a violation [of the statute in question] does not impose civil liability ..., nor is such a violation negligence per se.
Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358, 360 (1969) (citations omitted); see also Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976) (agreeing with the court’s conclusions in Hamm); cf. Kube v. Kube, 193 Neb. 559, 227 N.W.2d 860 (1975) (no cause of action for violation of a federal statute that provided no civil remedy).