Court Opinion

ID: 9894047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 16:01:16.971834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:03.343991
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13419    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 10/31/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13419
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       SONNY AUSTIN RAMDEO,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-81452-KAM
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13419         Document: 29-1         Date Filed: 10/31/2023          Page: 2 of 4

       2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-13419

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Sonny Austin Ramdeo, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
       court’s dismissal of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 motion as an impermissi-
       ble successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. After review, 1 we affirm.
               Rule 60(b)(6) provides a party may obtain relief from a final
       judgment for any reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P.
       60(b)(6). A court may entertain an independent action to “set aside
       a judgment for fraud on the court” in limited circumstances. See
       Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1), (3); see also Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281,
       282 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1987) (interpreting the former “savings clause”
       of Rule 60(b), which is now located in Rule 60(d)). When a pro se
       plaintiff brings a motion under Rule 60, the district court may con-
       strue it as a § 2255 motion, and if applicable, treat it as an unauthor-
       ized second or successive motion. Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d
       1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). However, a Rule 60(b) motion is not
       impermissibly successive when it “attacks, not the substance of the
       federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect
       in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Gonzalez v.
       Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005). “Fraud on the federal habeas court
       is one example of such a defect.” Id. at 532 n.5.

       1 While we typically review the denial of a Rule 60 motion for an abuse of

       discretion, we review the district court’s legal conclusions in a § 2255 proceed-
       ing de novo and the underlying facts for clear error. Farris v. United States, 333
       F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
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       22-13419                  Opinion of the Court                                3

               The district court did not err in construing Ramdeo’s Rule
       60(b) motion as a successive § 2255 motion and dismissing it as a
       successive motion outside of the district court’s jurisdiction. Alt-
       hough Ramdeo couched his motion in terms of a fraud upon the
       court claim, he essentially argued that, when evaluating the merits
       of his § 2255 motion, the magistrate judge and district court erred
       by failing to consider his evidence. This, in essence, asked the dis-
       trict court to reevaluate the previous resolution of his claim on the
       merits, which is tantamount to a successive § 2255 motion. See
       Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32 (stating Rule 60(b) motions are imper-
       missibly successive § 2255 motions if the prisoner either (1) raises a
       new ground for relief, even if “couched in the language of a true
       Rule 60(b) motion,” or (2) attacks a federal court’s previous resolu-
       tion of a claim on the merits, which is “effectively indistinguisha-
       ble” from asserting a direct claim of entitlement to substantive
       post-conviction relief). Notably, the magistrate judge’s and district
       court’s failure to explicitly mention—or give more weight to—cer-
       tain evidence is far from the kind of “egregious conduct” that
       would prevent the judiciary from impartially resolving Ramdeo’s
       case. See Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir.
       1978) 2 (demonstrating fraud upon the court requires a showing of
       “an unconscionable plan or scheme,” thus, “only the most egre-
       gious misconduct, such as bribery of a judge . . . , or the fabrication

       2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13419

       of evidence” will qualify (quotation marks omitted)); see also Trav-
       elers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating
       when committed by a judicial officer, fraud upon the court “de-
       file[s] the court itself,” or results in the court being incapable of re-
       solving cases in its usual, impartial manner (quotation marks omit-
       ted)). Therefore, the district court did not err in construing
       Ramdeo’s Rule 60 motion as a § 2255 motion.
               Moreover, the district court did not err in dismissing
       Ramdeo’s Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive § 2255
       motion. Ramdeo already filed a § 2255 motion. That motion was
       denied by the district court, and this Court affirmed the district
       court’s determination. Ramdeo did not obtain permission from
       this Court to file a successive motion to vacate, as required by stat-
       ute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (providing before a prisoner may
       file a second or successive § 2255 motion in a district court, he first
       must obtain an order from the court of appeals authorizing the dis-
       trict court to consider the motion). Thus, the district court did not
       err in finding that Ramdeo’s Rule 60 motion, construed as a § 2255
       motion, was an unauthorized successive motion that the district
       court lacked jurisdiction to consider. See Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216
       (explaining without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdic-
       tion to consider a second or successive § 2255 motion).
              AFFIRMED.