Court Opinion

ID: 9808678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:46:50.843445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:11.354761
License: Public Domain

Eueches, O. J.,
concurring in the judgment: This action is in forma pauperis, and the counsel of plaintiff is the son of the Judge presiding at the trial. When the case was' called for trial, the defendant called the attention of the Court to this fact, and alleged that the plaintiff’s counsel was prosecuting the case under a contract for a part of the recovery as a contingent fee. The plaintiff’s counsel, in arguing this motion, called it extraordinary, but did not deny the facta alleged by the defendant. The Court refused the motion, giving his reasons therefor, as set out in the opinion of this Court.
The motion was not alone made upon the ground that the presiding Judge was the father of plaintiff’s counsel. If it had been made upon this ground alone, it would have been extraordinary, and contrary to the uniform practice in this Court and in the Superior Courts of the State.
The record states the mtoion as follows: “The defendant ihen moved to continue the case, for that, as was sufficiently shown by the petition of plaintiff to bring this suit in forma pauperis, his counsel, E. J. Justice, had taken the same for a contingent fee, and was therefore a partner in the suit, as much so as if his name had appeared in the summons and complaint.” This was the motion, and the Judge, in assigning his reasons for refusing it (among other things) said' “that he knew not, nor did he care, what arrangements coun*344sel bad made with bis client as to fees; tbat be bad no interest whatever in tbe matter, and tbat be was fully conscious of bis ability to try this case with absolute impartiality; * * * tbat out of twenty cases on tbe calendar, Justice & Pless appeared in eighteen of them, and this was tbe first case called for trial, and a continuance of this case on such grounds would set .a precedent to continue tbe calendar and adjourn the Court."'"
To malee a continuance of this case a precedent for continuing tbe other seventeen eases, would be to put them on tbe same footing as this case, tbat is, tbat they were all pauper cases brought for contingent fees. This, I am satisfied, was not tbe ease, and tbe reason assigned,, as I think, does bis son injustice. _ And it may be tbat it does bis other son injustice, as I am inclined to think; it does. If tbe motion bad been made to continue for tbe reason alone tbat tbe plaintiff’s counsel was tbe son of, the presiding Judge, then tbe grounds stated would have been correct.
Tbe law of this State, adopting tbe law of England as far back as Eleventh Henry VII did not allow an attorney “to take any fee or reward” for bis services in pauper suits. Revised Statutes, Chap. 31, sec. 153; Rev. Code, Chap. 31, sec. 43,which continued to be tbe law until tbe adoption of Tbe Code, as it was regarded as a species of champetery. But tbat is not tbe law now, and probably never will be again. But it is doubtful whether there should not be some legislation with regard to such fees.
Under tbe law, as contained in tbe Revised Statutes and tbe Revised Code, an administrator was not allowed to bring and prosecute a suit in forma pauperis. McKeil v. Cutler, 45 N. C., 139. This question, so far as I am advised, has not been presented to tbe Court since tbe act of 1868-9 (Code, secs. 210, 211). But no such motion was made in this case, *345and no sucb question is before tbe Court now ; and I know tbe practice bas been otherwise since tbe adoption of Tbe Code.
I shall take it, then, at least so far as this case is concerned, that Mr. Justice bad tbe right to bring this suit in forma pauperis, and to contract with bis client for a part of tbe recovery as a contingent fee, and this brings up tbe question of bis pecuniary interest in the recovery. And taking it that be bad a direct pecuniary interest in tbe recovery, or that be was to have all tbe recovery, or that it bad been bis own action, I know of no law in this State that would have prevented bis father from trying tbe case. This, I think, was altogether a matter of propriety with him, and for him to determine whether be would or not try tbe case; and I see no legal grounds upon which this exception can be sustained.