Court Opinion

ID: 9494160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:30:55.34503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:15.309811
License: Public Domain

*209JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Unlike the majority, I believe that New York’s felony DWI statute, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 1192.3, 1193.1(c), creates a “crime of violence” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and therefore I believe that Dalton was convicted of an “aggravated felony” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) that properly renders him subject to deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
First, while I agree with the majority that § 16(b) directs our inquiry to the generic “nature” of the offense in question, and therefore that we must determine categorically whether the offense is a crime of violence without reference to the particulars of the appellant’s conviction, see ante at 204-05(collecting cases) [Draft at 7-9], I do not agree that such categorical analysis compels the conclusion that New York’s felony DWI offense is not a “crime of violence.” Although New York courts have interpreted the DWI statute to allow conviction of one who intends to operate a vehicle that is nonetheless unable to move, see, e.g., People v. David “W”, 83 A.D.2d 690, 442 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279-80 (1981), one may always conjure up examples of how a criminal statute can be applied to cases where the defendant’s conduct does not create a risk that force will be used. For instance, a defendant might be convicted of burglary notwithstanding that he entered through a wide-open door when no one was at home. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20 (“A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein. Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.”). Such an offense still carries some risk that “force will be used” as § 16(b) requires, as where the police use force in the course of apprehending the defendant, but the risk there is by no means “substantial.” Still, most would concede that burglary is a crime of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Guadardo, 40 F.3d 102, 103-05 (5th Cir.1994); S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 307, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486-87 (“The definition [in § 16(b) would include] offenses such as burglary in violation of a State law ... inasmuch as such an offense would involve the substantial risk of physical force against another person or against the property.”). Consequently, I believe the categorical analysis suggested by the majority requires a broader, common-sense view, one that contemplates the risks associated with the proscribed conduct in the mainstream of prosecutions brought under the statute. After all, it surely was the risk of injury from the use of force upon innocent victims by drunk drivers on the road that animated the legislation in the first place.
Second, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that driving while intoxicated does not involve “a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used .” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Even accepting arguendo that the word “use” implies intentional availment, as the majority contends, driving inevitably involves intentional use of force: the driver necessarily intends to use mechanized force to propel the vehicle to its destination. In an accident, that force does not stop being “used”; but for the driver’s use of force to propel the vehicle, the collision with another vehicle or a pedestrian would not have occurred. Accordingly, all driving involves some risk that “physical force may be used against *210the person or property of another.” Driving while intoxicated, however, makes that risk “substantial” and therefore triggers § 16(b)’s definition of a crime of violence.
Moreover, that the offense requires two prior drunk driving convictions increases the attendant risk. Although the prior convictions do not increase the chance that the defendant will cause injury in driving drunk for the third time (they are independent events), the risk that injury will occur on one of three occasions is greater than on any one occasion considered alone. Consequently, the more drunk driving incidents incorporated into a single offense, the greater the risk of harm associated with that offense. Because New York’s DWI statute requires multiple prior DWI convictions, the offense “by its nature” involves a substantial risk that harmful force will be used.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.