Court Opinion

ID: 9667153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:36:48.24894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.394330
License: Public Domain

*27JOHNSON, Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion of the court except insofar as it relies on chapter 609 of the Minnesota Statutes to reason that portions of the forfeiture provisions of chapter 169A should be “liberally construed.” That language derives from chapter 609, in which the legislature stated that the forfeiture provisions in sections 609.531 to 609.5318 “must be liberally construed” to carry out certain remedial purposes. Minn.Stat. § 609.531, subd. la (2006). Sections 609.531 to 609.5318, however, have no application to this case because they relate only to forfeitures based on certain enumerated offenses, but driving while impaired in violation of section 169A.20 is not among them. Minn.Stat. § 609.531, subd. 1(f) (2006). Rather, the county seeks forfeiture based on section 169A.63.
In my view, this case should be decided by relying on the caselaw stating that forfeiture statutes are “disfavored generally” and, accordingly, that we must “strictly construe [the statutory] language and resolve any doubt in favor of the party challenging” the application of such a statute. Riley v.1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn.2002); see also Torgelson v. Real Prop. Known as 17138 880th Ave., 749 N.W.2d 24, 26-27 (Minn.2008). It also is appropriate, as the court’s opinion reflects, to follow the analytical approach taken in Genin v.1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117-18, 119 (Minn.2001) (noting that contrary interpretation of statute that was “silent as to who bears responsibility for any accrued storage fees when the owner prevails at a forfeiture proceeding” would “encroach upon the legislature’s domain”). Consistent with this caselaw, the court properly interprets section 169A.63 to not permit forfeiture of the Laases’ jointly owned vehicle. In light of the language in subdivision 6, subdivision 7(d), and the third sentence of subdivision 1(h), there is no textual basis for a conclusion that the legislature intended either to permit or to prohibit forfeiture in this situation.
For these reasons, I concur in the opinion of the court.