Court Opinion

ID: 9586367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:09:55.907737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:48.119016
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole issue before us is whether, in an appeal of a civil case from a general district court to a circuit court, payment of the writ tax within the provided period is jurisdictional.
Robert E. Ballard and others* (collectively, Ballard) obtained a judgment against Ruth Hurst and J. H. Sarver (collectively, Hurst) in the General District Court of Giles County. After noting an appeal, Hurst gave the required appeal bond but did not pay the clerk of the district court the writ tax until after the prescribed 30-day period. Nevertheless, the record was transmitted from the district court to the circuit court where the case was docketed. The circuit court ruled that the writ tax requirement is jurisdictional and dismissed the appeal. We granted an appeal to the circuit court’s judgment.
Prior to legislative changes made in 1972, Acts 1972, ch. 585, the writ tax requirement was set forth in Code § 16.1-112, which provided in pertinent part:
If within thirty days from the date of the judgment the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken the amount of the writ tax as fixed by law and costs as required by [statute], the case shall be docketed; but if the writ tax and costs be not so paid within thirty days from the date of the judgment, the appeal shall thereupon stand dismissed and the judgment shall become final, ....
*367Hurst concedes that the writ tax requirement under former Code § 16.1-112 was jurisdictional, but contends that the replacement legislation, Code § 16.1-107, changes the requirement’s jurisdictional effect. We do not agree.
Code § 16.1-107 provides in pertinent part:
No such appeal shall be allowed unless and until the party applying for the same or someone for him shall give bond ... to abide by such judgment as may be rendered on appeal if such appeal be perfected, or if not so perfected, then to satisfy the judgment of the court in which it was rendered;
In addition to the foregoing, the party applying for appeal shall, within thirty days from the date of the judgment, pay to the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken the amount of the writ tax of the court to which the appeal is taken and costs as required by [statute].
When drafting the second paragraph of Code § 16.1-107 in 1972, the General Assembly was aware of the jurisdictional effect of the prior legislation. The General Assembly had the opportunity to repeal this jurisdictional requirement, but no such intention is manifested. The provisions of the second paragraph of Code § 16.1-107 are mandatory, not merely directory. Unless the writ tax is paid to the district court clerk within 30 days from the judgment date, the district court has no authority to transmit the case to the circuit court. See Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092, 1096, 277 S.E.2d 213, 216 (1981). Thus, the intended appeal is not perfected and the circuit court does not obtain jurisdiction. Indeed, we consistently have held that the failure to comply with rules governing appeals precludes “the exercise of the jurisdiction of the circuit court over the proceedings.” The Covington Virginian v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 548, 29 S.E.2d 406, 411 (1944).
Moreover, the curative provisions of Code § 16.1-114 are not available to Hurst, as these provisions cannot be used to correct jurisdictional defects. See Rudiger & Sons, Inc. v. Hanckel-Smith Sales Co., 230 Va. 255, 335 S.E.2d 257 (1985). In Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322, 200 S.E.2d 521 (1973), relied upon by Hurst, an appellant deposited cash in lieu of a $100 appeal bond set by the lower court. After the case was transmitted to the circuit court, the clerk of that court, on his own initiative, *368allocated $30.00 to the writ tax and other costs, leaving only $70.00 for the required appeal bond. The circuit court dismissed the appeal because “the bond of $100 [was] insufficient by the amount of $30.00.”
We reversed, concluding that the appeal bond was merely deficient, not void, and that “a deficient appeal bond does not require dismissal of the appeal.” Id. at 323, 200 S.E.2d at 522 (emphasis in original). We observed that Code § 16.1-114 empowers a trial court to correct “ ‘a mere defect, irregularity or omission in the proceedings’ ” in the court from which the appeal is taken. Id. (We also noted that Code § 16.1-109 provides procedures by which the circuit court may require new or additional security.)
In the present case, however, we do not have a mere defect, irregularity or omission in the proceedings which can be cured by Code § 16.1-114. Instead, we have a total failure to comply with a statute’s mandatory provision, which requires dismissal of the appeal. The Covington Virginian v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 29 S.E.2d 406; Forrest v. Hawkins, 169 Va. 470, 194 S.E. 721 (1938); Clinch Valley Lbr. Corp. v. Hagan Estates, 167 Va. 1, 187 S.E. 440 (1936); Brooks v. Epperson, 164 Va. 37, 178 S.E. 787 (1935).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

 The other appellees are Lea Sue Corell, Roy I. Ballard, and Ruth B. Corbett.