Court Opinion

ID: 9447025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:23:32.272035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:52.380849
License: Public Domain

BURGER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I must dissent because, without additional findings, this court does not have an adequate basis for appellate review of the questions presented. Those questions are: (1) Whether a written confession not offered by the prosecution in its case-in-chief may be used in rebuttal to impeach the defendant’s credibility, without a determination by the trial judge as to its admissibility under Mallory v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479, and (2) if the confession be found inadmissible as evidence-in-chief, whether, and under what circumstances or to what extent, such written confession may be utilized for impeachment purposes.
If the confession is admissible under Mallory, there would be no occasion to reach the problem of its use for impeachment; it would be admissible for all purposes. However, I am unable to see how this court can pass upon the threshold admissibility question without having before it some findings by the *919trial court as to whether the impeaching written confession was, or was not, admissible under Rule 5(a), Fed.R.Crim. P., 18 U.S.C. Such findings were never made by the District Court since the prosecution did not offer the written confession as direct evidence. The mere fact that it was not offered does not, in and of itself, demonstrate inadmissibility.
I would therefore retain jurisdiction and remand for specific findings by the District Judge on this issue. The trial judge on remand would, of course, be free to call for arguments or briefs, or both, precisely as he would have been able to do in the course of trial in resolving that issue out of the presence of the jury. If the written confession is found to be admissible and that determination is affirmed by us on review it would be dispositive of the case.
However, if the written confession is found by the trial court to be inadmissible, a new trial would be required, as I see it, subject to the procedures which I shall now discuss. A confession inadmissible under Rule 5(a) should be received for impeachment only under the most guarded conditions. These conditions have been suggested in part by the Supreme Court in Walder v. United States, 1954, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503. In that case, a narcotics prosecution, the defendant took the stand and “made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics.” Id., 347 U.S. at page 65, 74 S.Ct. at page 356. The prosecution was allowed to introduce for impeachment purposes evidence to the effect that na-cotics had been found in the defendant’s possession on a previous occasion, even though the discovery of possession on that occasion rested on an admittedly illegal search and seizure. By electing to take the stand and by making a “sweeping claim” on direct examination pertaining to an event not connected with the instant prosecution, the Supreme Court held the defendant could not thereafter use the illegality of that previous search as a shield for his current perjury. However, recognizing the dangers inherent in allowing use of “tainted” evidence for any purpose, the Court said:
“He [defendant] must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
From the Walder case I would conclude that before inadmissible evidence can be used for impeachment, three factors must be present: (1) the defendant must elect to take the stand, (2) his testimony which conflicts with the inadmissible statements must do more than merely deny the elements of the crime for which he is being tried, and (3) the inadmissible statements should be received only to the extent that they do not admit the very acts which are essential elements of the crime charged. Presence at the scene of the crime, or knowledge of where the place was located and how to find it, for example, are not matters which constitute criminal acts or, in and of themselves, elements of the crime; therefore the truth or falsity of appellant’s sweeping statements concerning them could well be the basis for impeachment.
The instant case is an excellent illustration of the effect of the use of an illegally obtained confession for impeachment. The record shows that shortly after his arrest the defendant allegedly made an oral statement to the arresting officer admitting he and an accomplice broke into a certain shed, and that the accomplice (but not defendant) stole certain property therein. Nearly five hours later, defendant then made a formal and more detailed confession, which was reduced to writing and signed, in which he admitted the larceny. It is the use of this entire written confession by the prosecution in its rebuttal for impeachment that is in issue in this case.
*920At the trial, defendant took the stand and on direct examination, testified as follows:
“Q. During the time you were inside [where the arrest took place], did you say anything or did he [the arresting officer] say anything about the housebreaking * * *
A. No, sir, he really didn’t.
******
“Q. Did you go with [accomplice * * * to the 1400 block of Rit-tenhouse Street, Northwest * * ?
A. No, sir, I never been to the place in my life.
“Q. Did you know anything about that? A. • No, sir, I don’t know where it is. I couldn’t go to it.” (Emphasis added.)
Upon cross-examination, the defendant testified:
“Q. Now, is it your testimony * * * that when you were arrest-. ed * * * you did not tell the detective * * * [t]hat you were with [accomplice] * * * when the place was broken into on July 13 or 14? A. No, sir, I did not.
“Q. And that you did not tell him that you were with him when the Drive-it Gun was taken ? A. I didn’t tell him that, no sir.
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“Q. Do you recall meeting [accomplice] * * * the other defendant in this case? A. No, sir.
“Q. Do you recall meeting him that day? A. No, sir.
“Q. Now, you don’t remember anything of that day? A. I didn’t see him that day, as I remember. I don’t [sic] see him that day. (Emphasis added.)
“Q: Well, do you recall what you did on July 13, 1956. You say you were at home. A. I think I was. If I wasn’t in the hospital, I was home.”
From this testimony, it is clear that the defendant in his testimony on trial, (1) denied making any statement to the arresting officer; (2) denied meeting and accompanying the co-defendant in the case to the scene of the crime, and denied having any knowledge of the activities of his accomplice; (3) denied knowing where the looted building was located; and (4) at first denied, though later admitted, signing a written c.onr fession five hours after arrest. It was to rebut these statements that the prosecution was permitted to introduce the allegedly inadmissible written statement for impeachment purposes. This..confession, which was read in its entirety to the" jury; undercareful instructions-from the trial judge that it was for impeachment only, contained a detailed and complete admission of the crime. The question is whether the defendant did nothing more than “deny all elements-of the case against him.” He did make a “sweeping claim” involving past occurrences that “I never been to the place in my life. * * * I don’t know where it is. I couldn’t go to it.” Yet, for ostensible impeachment purposes, a full and allegedly illegal confession was allowed to go to the jury. The prejudicial impact of the full confession on the jury cannot be eliminated by instruction from the bench, no matter how carefully, pointedly or precisely phrased.
It is my view that the proper procedure to be undertaken where a defendant testifies in direct contradiction to a written confession previously made but not offered in evidence is for the trial judge, when the confession is offered for impeachment purposes, to compare the defendant’s testimony with the alleged confession, and to receive in evidence only that part of the written statement 'which does not go to the admission of acts which constitute necessary elements !of the crime itself, but which at the same time constitute true impeachment of sworn testimony directly and precisely contradicted by the writing. For example, in the instant case the defendant’s denial that he had seen his co-defendant on the day of the crime could be contradicted by reading only that part of the written statement in which defend*921ant admitted spending time with the co-defendant; similarly he may be impeached on his statement “I have never been to the place in my life,” and “I couldn’t go to it.” Perhaps ho may also be impeached on his denial of signing a written statement by the fact of the statement and signature itself, though not its contents.
Admittedly, the process of allowing only part of the confession in evidence is not free from difficulties, but the ■difficulties are not greater than those under the so-called Jencks statute, 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958), for example, (and under the preJencks case practice) and certainly not greater than the hazards inherent in letting the full untested written confession in evidence, and then trying to limit the scope and weight which a jury should give to it.1
Courts seldom have available a course which is perfect in handling problems like this. The defendant should not be permitted to commit profitable perjury with impunity, but he must be permitted ; to deny the criminal act charged without; thereby giving leave to the government! to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence otherwise inadmissible. Walder v. United States, 1954, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503.2 Plainly, he is not¡ free to do this under threat of having} an entire written confession of the crime received against him by way of rebuttal w'hen he takes the stand and denies his guilt. We must tread carefully when utilizing proscribed evidence for any purpose. The charge given in this case was explicitly framed and, if it were possible to narrow the thrust and impact of the full confession in these circumstances, the trial judge did all in his power to accomplish that result. But once introduced for this “limited” purpose, the most skillful charge ever framed is hard put to accomplish the prophylactic properties essential to a fair result.

.J.A coerced confession is rejected because it is not a true statement but one exacted by duress or force and thus inhereWly unreliable. A confession rejected under Kule 5(a) for “unnecessary delay” is not discredited as inherently untrustworthy; it is rejected as a moans of enforcing Kule 5(a) — a prophylactic suppression. Í

. í Apy other course, it seems to me, would permit the use of proscribed confessions in rebuttal even in the case where the trial court had taken testimony and