Court Opinion

ID: 9730326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:08:36.466954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:05.829980
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I regret I am unable to agree with the majority opinion.
The statute which formed the basis of the action taken in this case had as its purpose
to promote maximum safety, comfort and well-being of the highway, to protect the public investment in highways, to preserve and enhance the natural scenic beauty or aesthetic features of highways and to prevent unreasonable distraction.
Under the terms of the Federal Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (as it was at the time of the action taken in this case) a federal contribution was available to the State for the payment of “just compensation” upon the removal of outdoor signs which were (1) lawfully in existence on the date of enactment of this sub-section, (2) those lawfully on any highway made a part of the interstate or primary system on or after the date of enactment of this system on or after the date of enactment of this subsection and before January 1, 1968, and (3) those lawfully erected on or after January 1, 1968.
A “hiatus” was created. No federal contribution was provided for payment of compensation for signs erected between October 22, 1965 and January 1, 1968.1
*752In order for the State to avoid having to shoulder the entire cost of removal of those signs erected in the “hiatus” period it was administratively determined that those signs erected in that period should be ineligible for “just compensation”.
All signs in controversy are similar and in most instances virtually identical to those classified as compensable.
There was no substantial difference in the location of the compensable and the non-compensable signs. As the referee pointed out
Since at the time of taking of the com-pensable signs all of them had been in existence longer than the non-compensa-ble signs, the classification obviously did not rest on any decision as to which signs had been truly amortized and which had not.
The majority opinion concludes that a classification based wholly on the fact that no federal subsidy was available for the payment of “just compensation” for the removal of those signs erected in the “hiatus” period is a reasonable and proper classification.
I disagree.
In Re Milo Water Company, 128 Me. 531, 537, 149 A. 299, 302 (1930), it is said
In determining the legality of classifications, the subject to be regulated, the character, extent, and purpose of the regulation, the classes of persons or corporations affected by the regulation may all be considered. One of the essential requirements, in order that the classification may not violate the constitutional guaranty as to equal protection of the law, is that it must be natural and not capricious and arbitrary. The law requires something more than a mere designation of characteristics which will serve to divide into groups. Arbitrary selection or mere identification can not be justified by calling it classification. The characteristics which can serve as a basis of a valid classification must be such as to show an inherent difference in the subject placed in separate classes which peculiarly requires and necessitates different or exclusive legislation with respect to them. A proper classification must embrace all who naturally belong to the class, or will possess a common disability, attribute, or qualification, and there must be some natural and substantial difference germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation between those within the class included and those whom it leaves untouched, (emphasis supplied)
I see no inherent difference in the signs classified as compensable and those classified as non-compensable.
I see no natural and substantial difference germane to the subject and purpose of the legislation.
The size of the signs is the same.
Their location relative to the highway is the same.
All have the same eye appeal and tendency to distract the driver on the highway.
I am satisfied the referee correctly labeled the administratively made classification “arbitrary”. I agree with him entirely when he said
An arbitrary classification which in effect affords to one group of sign owners full monetary compensation on top of full amortization while denying to owners of virtually identical signs anything more than a more limited opportunity to amortize their signs cannot be justified where its obvious sole purpose is to protect the “public purse” and it bears no “substantial relation to the public purpose sought to be accomplished.”
I would deny the appeal.
DUFRESNE, A. R. J., sat at oral argument as Chief Justice but retired prior to the preparation of the opinion. He has joined the dissenting opinion as Active Retired Justice.

. A recent amendment to a federal act has eliminated the hiatus and made ail the non-conforming signs here in controversy eligible for federal sharing of “just compensation".