Court Opinion

ID: 9567533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:55:01.543961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:39.341033
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice,
(concurring in the result):
The Court’s determination that “lewdness” is a lesser included offense of “forcible sexual abuse” reaches a far better result, and thus alleviates part of the mischief of the holding in State in the Interest of J. L. S.1 However, I deem it unnecessary to reach so far. Rather, I take the view that J. L. S. does not stand as precedent in the instant case because the two cases are distinguishable factually.
In J. L. S., the Court concluded that the defendant's conduct was “simple offensive touching,” which the legislature had failed to proscribe, reasoning that:
The momentary touching or grabbing of the clothed breasts of an adolescent girl by a seventeen year old boy does not come within the phrase “otherwise takes indecent liberties with another.” This phrase cannot be interpreted under the present statutory scheme as subsuming a mere offensive touching where the circumstances do not indicate conduct of sufficient gravity to be equated with the specific descriptions set forth in the statute. Though the conduct of the defendant is not to be condoned, much less approved or admired, there was in fact no touching in anger, no actual violence or injury, and he desisted immediately upon her request. This, coupled with the fact no complaint was made about the matter for a week, leads us to the conclusion his misconduct should not reasonably be regarded as of the seriousness proscribed by the statute. [Emphasis added.]
The facts in the instant case are in sharp contrast with those in J. L. S. The victim was not assaulted in a relatively secure environment at her place of employment by an acquaintance who promptly ceased his offensive conduct upon request, as was the case in J. L. S. Rather, the victim was jogging alone, in an isolated canyon area, where she was assaulted by a stranger riding a motorcycle who refused to abandon his offensive conduct, causing the victim to seek the assistance of a passing motorist. Moreover, the defendant’s conduct consisted of two crude solicitations of an oral sex act, coupled with the rubbing of the victim’s buttocks. Such conduct cannot reasonably be regarded as only a “simple offensive touching.” On the contrary, such conduct reasonably supports the conclusion of the juvenile court that defendant did indeed take “indecent liberties .. . with intent .. . to arouse or gratify the sexual desire.”2
I would affirm the judgment of the juvenile court without modification.

. Utah, 610 P.2d 1294 (1980).

. The conduct proscribed by U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-404.