Court Opinion

ID: 9640814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:15:59.539445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.050495
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I disagree that either Williams v. State, 263 Ark. 401, 565 S.W.2d 415 (1978), or A.R.Cr.P. Rule 17.1(a)(ii), require a reversal of this case. Appellant was arrested on the morning of August 22,1986, for the aggravated robbery of W.L. Ferguson, which occurred at 11:45 a.m. the previous day. At police headquarters appellant was given the Miranda warnings and signed the appropriate forms indicating that he understood his rights and chose to waive them. He agreed to give a statement to be recorded on a cassette tape, provided his wife and daughter were present. That was agreed to and appellant gave a recorded statement to Detective David Hunt in the presence of his wife and daughter. Appellant’s statement consists of eight pages in question and answer form in which he stated that he and Ray Graves drove down Tyler Road in Russellville, that Ray got out of the car and appellant drove down and stopped in front of the Dairy Queen on Hwy. 64. When Ray came running back to the road appellant picked him up, drove him to the Confederate Inn at Morrilton and came home. He said Ray had a .22 pistol which appellant hid in his attic and got $1,000 in the robbery, that Ray gave him $400 which he flushed down the toilet when the police arrived at his house the next morning. He said they had decided to rob “Cowboy” Ferguson because appellant’s brother, Ricky Hamm, told them Ferguson had a lot of money and was old. Prior to trial appellant filed a request for discovery, asking for “a copy of any written or recorded statements, or the substance of any oral statements, made by the accused.” (Emphasis supplied). The state responded by furnishing a typed, verbatim copy of appellant’s statement. Appellant moved to suppress appellant’s confession as being coerced and because the original tape recording was not available. At the suppression hearing Detective Hunt testified that after the tape recording was transcribed by a secretary, he listened to it and determined that the typed transcription was accurate and for budgetary reasons the original tape was not preserved. The court denied the motion to suppress and appellant’s statement was admitted at trial. I do not find a breach of A.R.Cr.P. Rule 17.1 (a)(ii) in this instance. Appellant asked for a copy of a defendant’s statements and makes no contention that he did not receive just that. Moreover, Detective Hunt, whom appellant’s counsel characterized (in oral argument) as “a very honest officer” testified that the copy was an accurate, verbatim transcription of the tape and appellant makes no claim to the contrary. The only inaccuracy the appellant could point to in the suppression hearing was that Detective Hunt spoke of the robbery as occurring at 11:45 p.m., rather than 11:45 a.m. on August 21. Whether this discrepancy was his mistake or a typographical error was not resolved, but it is undisputed that the robbery occurred in the morning and the state never claimed otherwise. Nor does Williamson v. State, supra, govern this case. In Williamson, the prosecutor furnished a typed copy of a tape recorded statement of a witness to the defense, but refused to permit the defense to have access to the original tape even though he still had it in his possession. We held that it was error for the trial court to refuse to order the state to permit the defendant to have access to the original tape. In contrast, the tape no longer exists in this case and there is no contention that its absence is due to bad faith. Nor is this the statement of a third party, it is the statement of the defendant himself which he does not deny having given. Neither the appellant nor his wife testified to any inaccuracies between the taped statement and the typed copy and in the absence of any contention that the copy is materially flawed, the trial court’s ruling of admissibility ought not to be reversed. A.R.E. 1003 provides that a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original. Appellant not only made no showing of a lack of authenticity, he does not even allege it. I would affirm the trial court. Hickman, J., and Glaze, J., join this dissent.