Court Opinion

ID: 9634579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:17:28.503608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:06.042416
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
concurring in result.
Neither the passage of time nor the changing composition of this Court has improved my chances of persuading the Court to recognize the error of its ways in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150 (1978). However, not even with a two-year respite since my pertinacious but unsuccessful effort in that case am I about to launch another full-scale assault on the majority’s perpetuation of one of the basic flaws in our products liability law, namely, the rejection of the widely-accepted definition of strict liability found in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965). Today’s effort is limited to an amiable protest against the majority’s continued distortion of the risk-utility ingredient of its strict-liability-in-tort analysis.
I would adhere to the Restatement Second standard that a manufacturer is subject to strict liability for personal injury caused by its product if plaintiff proves that the injury was caused by a defective condition in the product that rendered it unreasonably dangerous for use. The “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” language comprises an essential concept that must be incorporated into the proper risk/utility analysis in design defect cases, see Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’r Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 171-75 (1978).
For today’s purposes I simply point out that since the twenty-seven cases selected from the at least twenty-five jurisdictions that had adopted the Restatement Second, section 402A language as of the date Suter was handed down, see 81 N.J. at *249191-92 (concurring opinion), additional decisions have swelled the numbers. Although string citations are nobody’s favorite reading material, the following may profitably be consulted by those interested in keeping up with the modern, enlightened trend of the law on this subject: Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Illinois law); Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Service, 624 F.2d 1242, 1250 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Texas’ view of § 402A, held that “it is not enough to find a defect without also finding that the defect is unreasonably dangerous”); LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980) (under Louisiana law, maker of product may be held strictly liable for personal injury due to defect in product that renders product unreasonably dangerous); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F.Supp. 1093, 1094 (D.Mont.1981) (under Montana law, manufacturer of product is subject to strict liability where it can be shown that his product was defectively designed so that it was unreasonably dangerous to user or consumer; plaintiff must prove injury caused by “defect, unreasonably dangerous”); Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F.Supp. 165, 172 (D.Kan.1980) (under Kansas law, plaintiff must prove product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous); Kellar v. Inductotherm Corp., 498 F.Supp. 172, 176 (E.D.Tenn.1978), aff’d, 633 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1981) (under Tennessee law of strict liability, adopting § 402A, plaintiff must prove that product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous); Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F.Supp. 407, 411-12 (N.D.Okla.1979) (under Oklahoma law of strict liability, applying § 402A, questions whether manufacturer’s product was in a “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous” are two separate requirements of proof); Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267, 275 (Hawaii 1980) *250(applying Restatement Second definition of “defective condition unreasonably dangerous”); Dubin v. Michael Reese Hospital, 83 Ill.2d 277, 280, 47 Ill.Dec. 345, 346-48, 415 N.E.2d 350, 351-53 (Ill.1980) (seller or manufacturer of product is strictly liable for injury to consumer resulting from “defective condition which renders the product unreasonably dangerous,” treating “defective” and “unreasonably dangerous” as two separate proofs); Palmer v. Avco Distr. Corp., 82 Ill.2d 211, 215, 45 Ill.Dec. 377, 379-80, 412 N.E.2d 959, 961-62 (Ill.1980) (applying § 402A, held product to be in defective condition, unreasonably dangerous); Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill.2d 26, 35, 37 Ill.Dec. 304, 402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (Ill.1980) (same; treating “unreasonably dangerous” inquiry as whether the risk of danger posed by the defective condition outweighs any apparent usefulness of the product); Elgin Airport Inn v. Commonwealth, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 43 Ill.Dec. 620, 410 N.E.2d 620, 623 (App.Ct.1980) (plaintiff must establish that product “was in a defective condition making it unreasonably dangerous to the user”); Ryan v. Blakely, 71 Ill.App.3d 339, 348, 27 Ill.Dec. 540, 547, 389 N.E.2d 604, 611 (App.Ct.1979) (strict liability imposed on manufacturer of product that is unreasonably dangerous to user or consumer by virtue of a defective condition or design); Lukowski v. Vecta Educ. Corp., Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Ct.App.1980) (strict liability imposed when product is in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition); Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush, Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 48, 57 (Ct.App.1980) (question of strict liability under § 402A is whether product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous; product may be defective and not unreasonably dangerous); Kennedy v. Sawyer, 4 Kan.App. 545, 551, 608 P.2d 1379, 1384-85 (Ct.App.1980); Hancock v. Paccar Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 484, 283 N.W.2d 25, 37 (Neb.1979); Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 253 (Okl.1980); Smith v. Smith, S.D., 278 N.W.2d 155, 159 (S.D.1979) (under § 402A, burden on plaintiff to prove “a defect which is unreasonably dangerous”); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 *251(Utah 1979) (adopting § 402A in toto, nothing that plaintiff must prove that the defective product is unreasonably dangerous); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90 Wis.2d 672, 681, 280 N.W.2d 226, 230-31 (Wis.1979); Black v. General Elec. Co., 89 Wis.2d 195, 209, 278 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Ct.App.1979) (citing Cepeda, noted that § 402A language of “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” should remain in strict liability standard).
I agree with the Court that “in inadequate warning or design defect cases, a strict liability charge should be given,” ante at 240-241, and hence join in the judgment reversing and remanding. However, I would make the Restatement Second, section 402A language an integral part of such a charge.
Justice SULLIVAN joins in this opinion.
SULLIVAN and CLIFFORD, JJ., concurring in the result.
For REVERSAL and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justice SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER — 6.
For affirmance —None.