Court Opinion

ID: 9613837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:20:19.536738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:32.324862
License: Public Domain

*496OPINION
By the Court,
Thompson, J.:
At issue is the power of the probate court to annul its order directing a private sale of the Redfield cqin collection, and to direct instead, a public sale thereof.
The Estate of LaVere Redfield possessed 351,259 United States uncirculated silver dollars and 56,337 United States circulated silver dollars, a hoard having an appraised value of some $5,000,000. On November 4, 1975, the probate court authorized the Executrices of the estate to sell the coin collection to one or more buyers without the requirement of full disclosure, publication of notice and confirmation of sale. It was the court’s belief, shared by those interested in the estate, that a private sale pursuant to NRS 148.170 would produce the best price, whereas a public sale would depress the coin market and significantly reduce the sale price of the collection.1
The Executrices, pursuant to such authorization, made an agreement with A-Mark Coin Company, Inc., to sell the collection for $5,910,142. The sale was to occur January 19, 1976. That sale did not take place. Ten days before it was to happen, Rare Coin Galleries and Bowers & Ruddy Galleries, as coad-venturers, submitted an unconditional offer in court to purchase the hoard for $6,501,156 and tendered a cashier’s check in that amount.
This occurrence prompted the court to reconsider its November 4 order authorizing a private sale. The sale had not been consummated. It was evident that a better price could be obtained if public bidding was allowed.2 Accordingly, the *497court, on January 14, 1976, found that: the order of November 4, 1975, was erroneously entered, and that a sale pursuant to NRS 148.170 was not appropriate and would not yield the best price; that the court was obliged to obtain the best price for the estate; that the collection should be sold pursuant to NRS 148.190.3 Consequently, the court annulled the order of November 4, accepted the unconditional bid of Rare Coin Galleries and Bowers & Ruddy Galleries subject to further bidding at a public sale to be held January 27, 1976.
On January 27, 1976, public bidding occurred. A-Mark Coin Company, Inc., submitted the highest bid, $7,300,000. The court confirmed a sale of the coin collection to that company.
Notwithstanding its status as the successful bidder, A-Mark Coin Company, Inc., has appealed from two orders: the order directing a public sale, and the order confirming sale of the coin collection to it for $7,300,000. It claims an enforceable contract with the Executrices to purchase the coin collection for $5,910,142, and that the court lacked power to interfere with that contract at the insistence of Rare Coin Galleries and Bowers & Ruddy Galleries who allegedly were without standing to intrude. We turn to consider these contentions.
*4981. It is irrelevant whether Rare Coin Galleries and Bowers & Ruddy Galleries had standing to object to the private sale and themselves submit a bid. Their bid, whether properly submitted or not, caused the probate court to realize that the best interests of the estate would be served by a public sale rather than a private sale.4 Therefore, on its own initiative, the court annulled its order authorizing a private sale, and directed a public sale.
A probate court has jurisdiction to vacate a prior order upon learning that it was entered through mistake. Abel v. Lowry, 68 Nev. 284, 231 P.2d 191 (1951). .Our remedial rule, NRCP 60(b), contemplates such action.5 The court may initiate relief from such an order on its own motion. Martin v. Leonard Motor El-Paso, 402 P.2d 954 (N.M. 1965); McDowell v. Cele-brezze, 310 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1962). The court below was sensitive to its obligation. Its candor and wisdom in correcting an apparent mistake benefited the estate by $1,389,858. Its power to act as it did is established and, in our view, beyond question.
2. Since the probate court acted within its authority in nullifying prior authorization for a private sale and directing a public sale, we need not consider several other issues tendered by this appeal.
Affirmed.
Mowbray and Manoukian, JJ., concur.

 NRS 148.170: “Perishable property and other personal property which will depreciate in value if not disposed of promptly, or which will incur loss or expense by being kept, and so much other personal property as may be necessary to provide the family allowance pending the receipt of other sufficient funds, may be sold without notice, and title shall pass without confirmation; but the executor, administrator or special administrator is responsible for the actual value of the property unless, after making a sworn return, and on a proper showing, the court shall approve the sale.” The court treated the coin collection as similar to perishable property which would depreciate in value.

 The court stated: “However, the events which have transpired in this court this morning have demonstrated as an actual fact that this court’s November 4, 1975 order was made and entered upon an apparently erroneous assumption, and all the fears upon which the order was based have now been effectively eliminated by the Bowers and Ruddy Galleries’ unconditional bid, as stated. No one could have anticipated this, neither the court nor the estate counsel.
*497“The Court has concluded as a result that the question of standing has now become moot, and since that has now become moot, there is no question but that the court is duty bound to accept the bid which is for the best interest and greatest benefit to the estate, and that is to accept the highest price in the scope of the law. This court has certain statutory duties with respect to probate of estates which it is duty bound to follow, separate and apart from the desires of the heirs or persons involved.
“This will not be the first time that this court has vacated and set aside an order when convinced it was erroneously entered for whatever reason. Therefore, the November 4, 1975 order is vacated and set aside, and Nell Redfield and Dorothy BesChamps and all the three executrices of the estate are each and all relieved from any and all liability to the Markoff firm for any and all damages for breach of contract in regard to the December 17, 1975 contract for the purchase of the coins, since it was made pursuant to this court’s order, based upon, as it now turns out at least, an honest mistake of fact and/or other matters which the court will not attempt to hear or not attempt to define or indicate.”

 NRS 148.190:
“1. Except as provided by NRS 148.080, 148.170 and 148.180 and in summary administration under chapter 145 of NRS, the executor or administrator may sell personal property of the estate only after he has caused notice to be published at least 10 days before the sale in one or more issues of a newspaper published in the county where the proceedings are pending, if there is such a newspaper; if not, then in one having general circulation in the county. The notice shall include the time and place of sale, and a brief description of the property to be sold.
“2. Public sales must be made at the courthouse door, at some other public place, at the residence of the decedent or at a place designated by the executor or administrator; but no sale may be made of any personal property which is not present at the time of sale, unless the court shall otherwise order.”

 In line with authority elsewhere, Balaban v. Bank of Nevada, 86 Nev. 862, 477 P.2d 860 (1972), held that an unsuccessful bidder is not “a person interested in the estate” entitled to object to court confirmation of a sale. Whatever relevancy that decision may have to the question of standing, it does not bear upon the power of a probate court, sua sponte, to annul a prior order to protect the best interests of the estate.

NRCP 60(b): “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party which would have theretofore justified a court in sustaining a collateral attack upon the judgment; (3) the judgment is void; or, (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that an injunction should have prospective application. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1) and (2) not more than six months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.”