Court Opinion

ID: 9926710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 16:08:55.292598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.893896
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Williams v. Grayson, 2024-Ohio-247.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

DINITA WILLIAMS,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 112575
                v.                                :

KEVIN GRAYSON,                                    :

                Defendant-Appellant.              :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 25, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Domestic Relations Division
                                Case No. DR-22-388975

                                            Appearances:

                The Wiltshire Law Firm, LLC, and Cheryl M. Wiltshire, for
                appellee,

                Allen C. Hufford, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                  Kevin Grayson appeals the imposition of a monthly spousal support

of $3,000 in the final decree of divorce. Grayson claims that award inverted the

income disparity between himself and Dinita Williams. For the following reasons,
we reverse the decision of the domestic relations court and remand for a renewed

determination of the amount of spousal support necessary to equalize the parties’

income disparity for the 72-month duration of the award.

              Grayson and Williams were married in 2000 and were in their 50s at

the time of the divorce in 2023. As is relevant to the sole issue in this appeal, the

parties stipulated that Grayson earns approximately $110,000 annually through his

full-time work as a police officer for Cuyahoga County Community College and his

regular, part-time employment as security at Cleveland Heights and University

Heights library. Grayson also started lawn care and security businesses but had no

discernable income from either source as of the trial. Also according to their

stipulation, Williams earns approximately $78,000 as a social worker for Cuyahoga

County Children and Family Services. Although Williams worked part time in 2019,

she has not worked a second job since. Williams was awarded $3,000 per month in

spousal support for a term of 72 months. The sole reason provided for that award

and the term was the “Income of the parties and Duration of the Marriage.”

              The parties’ retirement assets were divided equally, and their

individual debts for rent and vehicles remained their respective obligations. The

only other asset was the marital home, which went into foreclosure. The domestic

relations court held Grayson responsible for any deficiency following the foreclosure

sale because he “had received a substantial sum as an inheritance from a former

coworker and while that money was available, he chose not to use said funds to pay

the mortgage at the marital home.” Grayson inherited approximately $94,000.
Those funds were deposited and remained in a separate account, but neither party

in this appeal elaborated as to what amount, if any, remained at the time of the

divorce.

              In this appeal, Grayson claims that the trial court abused its

discretion by imposing a monthly spousal support obligation of $3,000 because that

$36,000 annual obligation inverted the parties’ income disparity.       Before the

spousal support award, Williams annually earned approximately $78,000, as

contrasted to Grayson’s gross earnings of $110,000.         Williams would gross

$114,000, in consideration of the transfer of wealth through the support obligation,

and Grayson’s gross annual income after paying that support obligation will be

$74,000. The $3,000 monthly support obligation upends the income disparity the

spousal support award was meant to rectify.

              A trial court has broad discretion in awarding spousal support, but

that discretion is not absolute.     Williams v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 103975, 2016-Ohio-7487, ¶ 9, citing Gordon v. Gordon, 11th Dist. Trumbull

No. 2004-T-0153, 2006-Ohio-51, ¶ 13. “In determining whether to grant spousal

support and in determining the amount and duration of the payments, the trial court

must consider the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18.” Id., citing Deacon v. Deacon, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91609, 2009-Ohio-2491, ¶ 57.           R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n)

establishes the factors courts must consider in determining whether spousal support

should be awarded and, if so, the amount of the award. A.A.O. v. A.M.O., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 110338 and 110349, 2022-Ohio-2767, ¶ 18-19.              The parties’
respective incomes and the duration of the marriage are factors to be considered.

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a) and (e). Thus, the domestic relations court’s stated rationale

adhered to the statutory criteria.

               Notwithstanding, “[t]he goal of spousal support is to reach an

equitable result.” Hloska v. Hloska, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101690, 2015-Ohio-

2153, ¶ 11, citing Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988).

“[T]here is no set mathematical formula * * *.” Id., citing Kaechele. “If the record

reflects that the trial court considered the statutory factors, and if the judgment

contains details sufficient for a reviewing court to determine that the support award

is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law, the reviewing court will uphold the

award.” Chattree v. Chattree, 2014-Ohio-489, 8 N.E.3d 390, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.), citing

Daniels v. Daniels, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-709, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 772,

9 (Mar. 4, 2008), and Schoren v. Schoren, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-04-019, 2005-

Ohio-2102, ¶ 11.

               The parties’ assets were divided equally, except for each one’s

separate property.    The $3,000 monthly obligation is neither explained nor

supported by the parties’ respective incomes. Importantly, Grayson concedes that

an award of spousal support is generally justified in light of their income disparity

at the time of the divorce. And further, he does not contest the duration of the award,

which is generally based on the length of the marriage. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110214, 110245, and 110274, 2022-Ohio-299, ¶ 42; La Spisa v.

La Spisa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111810, 2023-Ohio-3467, ¶ 107. His sole argument
pertains to the monthly amount needed to equalize that disparity. According to

Grayson, $3,000 inverts the relative gross earnings as between the parties.

              On its face, we agree that the judgment does not contain sufficient

details to conclude that the support award is fair, equitable, and in accordance with

the law. The spousal support award in this case exceeds that which is necessary to

equalize the parties’ income disparity. In Momotaz v. Sattar, 2022-Ohio-2676, 193

N.E.3d 1144 (8th Dist.), for example, the parties produced evidence of an

approximate $110,000 disparity between their respective incomes. Id. at ¶ 39. The

court imposed a monthly spousal support obligation of $2,800 for 64 months on the

husband based on his income and the overall equal distribution of other assets. Id.

at ¶ 38-40. The panel affirmed that lesser obligation as being equitable despite the

larger disparity. Likewise, in Smith at ¶ 36-37, the panel concluded that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $1,500 per month in spousal support

for 108 months considering the husband’s “phantom income” of $768,ooo annually

as contrasted to the wife’s $57,000 yearly income. Id. Husband’s actual annual

income was closer to $155,000, demonstrating a $98,000 earned income disparity

between the husband and wife. Id. at ¶ 4.

              In this case, the $3,000 spousal support award based on the $32,000

annual income difference between the parties is facially inequitable. It does not

equalize the income as between both parties. It actually exacerbates it in favor of

Williams.
               Williams advances two arguments in support of the $3,000 monthly

obligation. She first contends that Grayson failed to timely provide his financial

information to the court for the purpose of considering the appropriate amount of

spousal support. The record demonstrates that the parties stipulated to their

respective incomes, so any delays in producing the information during the discovery

process was not prejudicial to Williams at trial. Further, discovery violations are not

included as a statutory basis to justify a spousal support award under

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).

               Williams also claims that Grayson failed to disclose his approximate

$94,000 inheritance that he had deposited and maintained in a separate account

during their marriage. The domestic relations court, however, expressly determined

that the spousal support award was based on the relative incomes of each party.

There is no evidence of any income being earned on the principal account balance

traced to the inheritance proceeds. Even assuming the disproportionate spousal

support award included consideration of the separate property, our conclusion

would be the same. A $3,000 monthly support obligation would deplete the entire

principal of the inheritance in a couple of years and would likewise be deemed

inequitable on its face. More to the point, however, the inheritance factored into the

decision to declare Grayson responsible for any deficiency judgments pertaining to

the foreclosure initiated on the marital home.       We therefore cannot consider

whether the principal balance of the account associated with the inheritance
proceeds would be an appropriate consideration to support the spousal support

award.1

               The spousal support award of $3,000 per month is vacated as being

inequitable on its face because it inverted the parties’ income disparity. The matter

is remanded solely for the purpose of calculating an equitable award that will

equalize the parties’ income disparity for the 72-month duration, which was not

challenged in this appeal.

               Reversed and remanded.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., CONCURS;
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY

      1 Williams’s final argument suggests that Grayson has not reached his full earning

potential because he only works two jobs and he could work three or four. Not only is that
argument not supported by case authority as required under App.R. 16(A)(7), but it cuts
both ways. Just as much as Grayson could always take on more jobs, so too could
Williams.