Court Opinion

ID: 9954151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:12:50.552161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.460206
License: Public Domain

J-A04035-24

                                   2024 PA Super 57

  RICHMOND WATERFRONT                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1172 EDA 2023
  PHILADELPHIA BELT LINE RAILROAD              :
  COMPANY                                      :

             Appeal from the Order Entered December 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                        No(s): 02872 March 2022

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:                                  FILED MARCH 25, 2024

       Appellant, Richmond Waterfront Industrial Park, LLC (Plaintiff) appeals

from of an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial

court) dismissing its quiet title action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on

the ground that the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act

of 1995 (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-16106, vests the federal Surface

Transportation Board (STB) with exclusive jurisdiction to decide issues

involving the abandonment of the railroad right of way and railroad tracks on

its property. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

       Plaintiff is the owner of a more than 50-acre property at 2950 Kirkbride

Street, Philadelphia (the Property), which it acquired from Rohm & Haas Co.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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in 1998. There are railroad tracks on the Property on a 33-foot wide right of

way of Philadelphia Belt Line Railroad Co. (Defendant) that runs across the

Property. Amended Complaint ¶¶9, 14-15, 17, 19-24, 26 & Ex. A at 3-4;

Richmond Waterfront Industrial Park, LLC Petition for Declaratory Order, STB

Docket No. FD 36710 (STB Petition), Plaintiff’s Verified Statement in Support

of STB Petition at 1-2.1

       On March 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a quiet title action against Defendant

seeking an order barring Defendant from asserting any right, easement, or

other interest in the Property. Defendant filed preliminary objections, and

Plaintiff, on July 7, 2022, filed an amended complaint alleging that Defendant’s

easement was barred by adverse possession, abandonment, and prescription.

Amended Complaint ¶¶45-68. Defendant filed preliminary objections to this

amended complaint asserting that the tracks on the Property were constructed

pursuant to an 1890 Philadelphia ordinance that granted Defendant the right

to build railroad tracks from Allegheny Avenue north along the Delaware River

and seeking, inter alia, dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction on the ground that the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over

abandonment of its railroad tracks and right of way on the Property.

Preliminary Objections to Amended Complaint ¶¶4, 8-9, 28-46. In response,

____________________________________________

1 Plaintiff submitted the STB Petition and all of its attachments to this Court

for its consideration in this appeal in conjunction with an application that it
filed to stay this appeal.

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Plaintiff argued that the action should not be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction on the ground that Defendant is not a rail carrier and that

the tracks and right of way were therefore not within the STB’s jurisdiction.

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Preliminary Objections ¶¶ 24-46, 50-51.

      On December 6, 2022, the trial court sustained Defendant’s preliminary

objection to jurisdiction and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction on the ground that abandonment of railroad tracks was within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the STB and that Section 10501(b) of the ICCTA, 49

U.S.C. § 10501(b), preempted state courts from determining property rights

involving alleged abandonment of railroad tracks. Trial Court Order, 12/6/22;

Trial Court Opinion at 4-7. Plaintiff timely appealed to the Commonwealth

Court, and the appeal was subsequently transferred to this Court on the joint

application of the parties.

      On July 28, 2023, prior to briefing in this appeal, Plaintiff filed the STB

Petition, a petition for a declaratory order from the STB that Defendant’s

railroad tracks and right of way on the Property are not within the STB’s

jurisdiction. STB Petition at 2, 15-21. Plaintiff filed an application to stay this

appeal pending the STB’s ruling on whether it has jurisdiction over Defendant’s

railroad tracks and right of way on the Property.         This Court denied the

application for stay by per curiam order on September 13, 2023. Defendant

on August 17, 2023 filed a response to the STB Petition in the STB proceeding

requesting dismissal of the STB Petition.       Joint Response to Court Order

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Directing Parties to File Status Report on STB Proceeding ¶2.        The STB has

neither rendered a decision on whether to accept the STB Petition nor ruled

on Defendant’s request to dismiss the petition. Id. ¶4.

      Plaintiff raises two issues in this appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred

in holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether the

trial court erroneously characterized the nature of the tracks at issue and the

requirements for their abandonment.       Because the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary and de novo. Mazur v.

Trinity Area School District, 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008); Strasburg

Scooters, LLC v. Strasburg Rail Road, Inc., 210 A.3d 1064, 1068 (Pa.

Super. 2019).

      Section 10501(b) of the ICCTA provides:

      (b) The jurisdiction of the [STB] over--

      (1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided
      in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including
      car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices,
      routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and

      (2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment,
      or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or
      side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or
      intended to be located, entirely in one State,

      is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the
      remedies provided under this part with respect to
      regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt
      the remedies provided under Federal or State law.

49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). The only exceptions to the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction

that Section 10501 sets forth are for public transportation provided by local

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governments and their contractors and solid waste transfer facilities.         49

U.S.C. § 10501(c).

      Section 10501(b) of the ICCTA preempts actions brought under state

law, including quiet title actions, that concern operation or abandonment of

railroad tracks.   Strasburg Scooters, LLC, 210 A.3d at 1068-69; B&S

Holdings, LLC v. BNSF Railway Co., 889 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1258-60

(E.D.Wash. 2012); Cedarapids, Inc. v. Chicago, Central & Pacific

Railroad Co., 265 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1012-16 (N.D.Iowa 2003); Burgoyne,

LLC v. Chicago Terminal Railroad Co., 169 N.E.3d 815, 823-28 (Ill. App.

2020); Ouachita Railroad, Inc. v. Circuit Court of Union County, 206

S.W.3d 811, 815-17 (Ark. 2005). Although Section 10501(b)(2) references

only “spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities,” 49 U.S.C.

§ 10501(b)(2), preemption and exclusive STB jurisdiction are not limited to

those items and encompass all railroad tracks of a rail carrier.          Section

10501(b)(1) of the ICCTA gives the STB exclusive jurisdiction over

“transportation by rail carriers.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1). The ICCTA defines

“transportation” as including any “property, … instrumentality, or equipment

of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by

rail,” which necessarily includes railroad tracks. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9).

      Because the STB’s jurisdiction over claims concerning operation or

abandonment of railroad tracks is exclusive, Pennsylvania courts lack subject

matter jurisdiction over such claims. Strasburg Scooters, LLC, 210 A.3d at

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1069. Plaintiff’s quiet title action is predicated on the claim that Defendant

abandoned the railroad tracks that are on the Property. Amended Complaint

¶¶17-34, 45-68.2

         Plaintiff argues that the railroad tracks on the Property are not subject

to the STB’s jurisdiction because Defendant is allegedly not a rail carrier. The

STB, however, has held that Defendant is a rail carrier with respect to its

tracks running from north of the Property to south of the Property and that

those tracks connected to Conrail tracks and were used to transport

“approximately      2,894    carloads     annually,   of   predominantly   chemicals,

intermodal containers, and import-export freight.” Philadelphia Belt Line

Railroad Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., STB Docket No. FD 32802, 1996

WL 362996, at *1-*2 (STB July 2, 1996).                Although the STB dismissed

Defendant’s complaint in that case, it did so on the ground that Defendant

was not entitled to relief and not because the STB lacked jurisdiction. Id.,

1996 WL 362996, at *5-*6.

____________________________________________

2 While Plaintiff also alleged a claim that Defendant does not have a valid right

of way because Plaintiff’s deed did not state that the Property was subject to
Defendant’s right of way, Amended Complaint ¶¶10-13, 39-44, Plaintiff has
subsequently admitted that its ownership of the Property is subject to
Defendant’s right of way. Plaintiff’s Verified Statement in Support of STB
Petition at 1-2 (stating under penalty of perjury that Plaintiff “purchased the
Property subject to an existing railroad right-of-way easement in favor of the
Philadelphia Belt Line Railroad Company (“PBL”) which is 33 feet wide and
runs the length of two parcels of the Property in a north-south direction for
2,719 feet”).

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      Philadelphia Belt Line Rail Road Co. - Petition for Declaratory

Order, STB Docket No. FD 35345 (Aug. 3, 2010), does not support Plaintiff’s

claim that the STB lacks jurisdiction over the tracks on the Property. In that

case, the STB held that it did not have jurisdiction over Defendant’s right of

way in a different part of Philadelphia because no railroad tracks had been

constructed on that portion of Defendant’s right of way and Defendant was

therefore not a rail carrier with respect to its right of way at the location. Id.,

slip op at 3-6. Here, in contrast, Plaintiff admits that there are railroad tracks

on Defendant’s right of way on the Property. Plaintiff’s Verified Statement in

Support of STB Petition at 1-2.

      Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in ruling on the

jurisdictional issue without discovery. Plaintiff, however, did not request any

discovery on the issue of jurisdiction before the trial court ruled on the

preliminary objections. Rather, it argued that the trial court should overrule

the preliminary objections without discovery.           Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Preliminary Objections ¶¶ 28-46; Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to

Preliminary Objections at 8-9, 17-20. The only reference that Plaintiff made

to discovery in its response to Defendant’s preliminary objections was in

response to a different preliminary objection, a demurrer to one count of the

complaint, and concerned merits discovery.           Plaintiff’s Memorandum in

Opposition to Preliminary Objections at 14.

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      Moreover, given the STB’s ruling that Defendant is a rail carrier with

respect to its railroad tracks in the part of Philadelphia that includes the

Property, Philadelphia Belt Line Railroad Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,

1996 WL 362996, at *1-*2, and the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction over rail

carriers’ railroad tracks, we believe that remand for jurisdictional discovery

would be inappropriate because any determination that there are facts that

remove these tracks from the STB’s jurisdiction must be made by the STB,

not by our courts. Indeed, Plaintiff recognizes that deferring to the STB is an

appropriate way of resolving this jurisdictional issue. Not only has Plaintiff

sought both a ruling from the STB that the STB lacks jurisdiction over the

tracks at issue here and discovery on the jurisdictional issue in that STB

proceeding, STB Petition at 2, 5 n.13, 15-17, 21-22, but Plaintiff has

represented to this Court that the jurisdictional question here “presents critical

and complex factual and legal issues that are within the STB’s expertise.”

Appellant’s Application for Stay at 5.

      Because the STB has held that Defendant is a rail carrier, Defendant’s

railroad tracks on the Property are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB

unless and until the STB, in its expertise, concludes that there are particular

facts concerning these tracks that remove them from its jurisdiction. To date,

the STB has made no determination that it lacks jurisdiction over Defendant’s

tracks on the Property. The trial court therefore properly concluded that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action seeking an adjudication that

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Defendant’s railroad tracks on the Property have been abandoned, and its

dismissal of this action without prejudice must be affirmed.

      In its second issue, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in

allegedly determining that the tracks on the Property are “side tracks” and in

ruling on the substance of the federal requirements for abandonment. We

conclude that the first of these claims fails because it is an inaccurate

characterization of the trial court’s rulings and that the second contention has

merit, but is not grounds for reversal of the trial court’s order.

      Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the trial court did not make any finding

that Defendant’s railroad tracks on the Property are “side tracks.” The only

references to “side tracks” in the trial court’s order are quotes from two cases

and are not a characterization of the tracks at issue here. Trial Court Order at

1-2. Rather, the trial court stated in its order that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because the ICCTA “completely preempts state action when it

comes to determining if a railroad has abandoned it[s] tracks,” not that only

determinations concerning “side tracks” are preempted. Id. at 1. The only

reference to “side tracks” in the trial court’s opinion is in a description of

Section 10501(b) setting forth the broad range of types of railroad tracks that

are subject to STB jurisdiction. Trial Court Opinion at 4. Moreover, the opinion

makes clear that the trial court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction was based

on its conclusion that the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over abandonment of

“railroad tracks.” Id. at 1-4, 7.

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      In contrast, Plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court made statements in

its opinion concerning the federal requirements for abandonment is supported

by the record.     Trial Court Opinion at 4-5.        Whatever the accuracy or

inaccuracy of the trial court’s statements, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

reach the issue of which federal abandonment procedures and requirements

apply to these tracks because that is a matter within the STB’s exclusive

jurisdiction. Those statements are thus without legal effect and the issue of

what requirements for abandonment apply to these railroad tracks is for the

STB to decide. Nothing in the trial court’s order, however, made any ruling

concerning the procedures or requirements for abandonment that apply to

these tracks under the ICCTA.          This argument is therefore not a basis for

reversal of the trial court’s order.

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly held

that the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims concerning the

railroad tracks at issue in this action and affirm its order dismissing this action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 3/25/2024

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