Court Opinion

ID: 9492468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:41:54.104108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:19.209629
License: Public Domain

POLITZ, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Persuaded that Congress and the Sentencing Commission did not intend for mere transportation of aliens without a corresponding act of smuggling to be considered an aggravated felony, I respectfully must dissent.
As the majority has noted, Juventino Monjaras-Castaneda pled guilty to being found in the United States after previously having been deported, resulting in a base offense level of eight under the Guidelines. With an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, the sentencing range would have been 10-16 months.1 The district court, however, applied a 16-level enhancement under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A), which, with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, resulted in a Guideline range of 46-57 months. Monjaras was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment.
USSG § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) requires the 16-level increase in the base offense level if the defendant previously was deported or removed after a criminal conviction provided the conviction was for an “aggravated felony.” Application note one to § 2L1.2 observes that an aggravated felony “is defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) without regard to the date of conviction of the aggravated felony.” Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), an “aggravated felony” includes “an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling).”
Monjaras previously had been deported because he was convicted of transportation of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). In that offense, Monjaras met six undocumented aliens in Smiley, Texas, near San Antonio, and began driving them to Waco. Because the transportation offense of which he was convicted did not involve bringing aliens across the border, Monjar-as contends that the crime is not one “relating to alien smuggling” and cannot be used for the § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) sentencing enhancement.
Although the majority correctly frames the issue, I must disagree with its resolution. By concluding that the parenthetical phrase “relating to alien smuggling” is merely a description of the crimes in § 1324(a), the majority necessarily ignores both the plain language of the statute and the structure of other immigration provisions.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts give effect to every word in a statute.2 “Smuggling” is defined as the “fraudulent taking into a *332country, or out of it, merchandise which is lawfully prohibited.”3 Consequently, because “alien” is defined as a non-citizen or non-national of the United States,4 “alien smuggling” would be the illegal taking of a noncitizen into the country, an action which, to me, entails a crossing of the border. Further, there are several crimes listed in § 1324(a)(1) & (2) that do not involve the bringing of aliens into the United States, such as encouraging aliens to enter the country,5 and concealing, harboring, or shielding them from detection.6 I am of the belief that if Congress had intended to include any crime listed in § 1324(a)(1) or (2) as an aggravated felony, it simply would have said so. That it chose not to do so but, rather, used the “relating to alien smuggling” language is not properly weighed by the majority in my view.7
My resolution is buttressed by the construction of other immigration provisions. For example, § 1324 sets more serious penalties for offenses which involve the bringing of aliens into the United States as compared to the harboring, transporting, and concealing offenses, in which the alien already is in the country.8 Additionally, elsewhere in the Immigration and Nationality Act “smuggling” is defined as having “encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law.”9 Likewise, the disjunctive division of Guideline provision titles such as “Smuggling, Transporting, or Harboring an Unlawful Alien”10 indicates a distinction between smuggling and transporting offenses.11
Further, the majority ignores the rule of lenity, which requires that ambiguities in federal statutes or sentencing enhancements are to be considered in the defendant’s favor and are not to be construed in a way that maximizes the penalty.12 Because Congress and the Sentencing Commission did not define “alien smuggling” and the crimes that relate to the smuggling, it would appear that there exists an ambiguity in the statute that should have resulted in an interpretation favorable to Monjaras.
Finally, the very seriousness of the 16-level enhancement cannot go unnoticed. Using the bottom of the Guideline range, the aggravated felony enhancement caused & four-fold increase in Monjaras’ sentence. *333In my opinion the majority’s holding relies on far too slender a reed to warrant this dramatic increase. Convinced that Congress meant to require a border-crossing element when it authorized an aggravated felony enchantment for crimes “relating to alien smuggling,” I must dissent.

. The 10-16 month range would have resulted from a four-level enhancement for a previous non-aggravating felony and a two-level acceptance of responsibility adjustment.

. Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Crist v. Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1233 n. 11 (5th Cir.1980) (stating that courts must "give effect, whenever possible to all parts of a statute and avoid an interpretation which malees a part redundant or superfluous”)).

. Black's Law Dictionary 1389 (6th ed.1990). Black’s Law Dictionary also notes that "smuggling” and “smuggle” have "well-understood meaning[s] at common law.” Id.

. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).

. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iv).

. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iii).

. The majority places great emphasis on grammatical rules and sentence structure in concluding that the parenthetical is descriptive rather than restrictive. The majority recognizes, however, that reliance on grammar and construction does not eliminate a restrictive interpretation of the parenthetical. See ante slip op. at 11-12 (noting the two possible interpretations remaining after grammatical analysis).

. Compare the ten-year penalty for offenses in which a person "brings to” the United States an alien, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(B)(i), with the five-year penalty for transporting, concealing, and harboring offenses, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(B)(ii).

. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)© (emphasis added). See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 110 S.Ct. 2499, 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990) (holding that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning); Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 653 (5th Cir.1999).

. See USSG § 2L1.1 (emphasis added).

. Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 517 U.S. 392, 116 S.Ct. 1396, 134 L.Ed.2d 593 (1996) (holding that terms connected by a disjunctive are to be given separate meanings) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979)); Crist, 632 F.2d at 1233 n. 11.

. United States v. Brito, 136 F.3d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1817, 140 L.Ed.2d 954 (1998).