Court Opinion

ID: 9940595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 20:03:32.785373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:04.137915
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2023-0724
                 _____________________________

THEODORE FAGAN, as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of LaShan Fagan,

    Appellant,

    v.

JACKSON COUNTY HOSPITAL
DISTRICT d/b/a JACKSON
HOSPITAL, a/k/a JACKSON
COUNTY HOSPITAL FOUNDATION,
INC.,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County.
Ana Maria Garcia, Judge.

                       February 14, 2024

KELSEY, J.

     The final judgment on appeal dismissed Appellant’s wrongful-
death lawsuit against Appellee, a hospital district protected by
sovereign immunity. See § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) (defining
“state agencies or subdivisions” as including “the independent
establishments of the state, including state university boards of
trustees; counties and municipalities; and corporations primarily
acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the state, counties, or
municipalities”). We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

     The trial court ruled that dismissal was required because—as
is undisputed—Appellant failed to comply with the statutory two-
year time limit for notifying the Florida Department of Financial
Services of the claim under section 768.28(6)(a)2. of the Florida
Statutes. This section provides as follows:

    [If] [s]uch action is for wrongful death, the claimant must
    present the claim in writing to the Department of
    Financial Services within 2 years after the claim accrues.

§ 768.28(6)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2017); see § 95.11(4)(d), Fla. Stat.
(establishing two-year statute of limitations following accrual of an
action for wrongful death).

     Although conceding he did not notify DFS within that time
limit, Appellant argues instead that, because chapter 766
establishes presuit investigation requirements that apply to
claims against both non-immune defendants and immune
defendants like Appellee, fairness and equity dictate that tolling
provisions in chapter 766 should apply equally in actions under
section 768.28. Appellant argues that if that were the case, the
strict two-year time limit for notifying DFS under section
768.28(6)(a)2. should be extended as well, making the notice to
DFS timely in this case.

     Dual dichotomies are critically important here: immune
versus non-immune defendants, and notices to defendants versus
notices to statutorily designated state agencies. It is true that
claimants and defendants alike (even immune defendants) are
subject to presuit investigation requirements. See § 766.203(2),
Fla. Stat. (applying requirements to claimants); § 766.106(3)
(applying them to defendants). And it is true that section
766.106(4) authorizes tolling of statutes of limitations for filing
suit during such presuit investigations:

        The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be
    served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11.
    However, during the 90-day period, the statute of

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    limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants. Upon
    stipulation by the parties, the 90-day period may be
    extended and the statute of limitations is tolled during
    any such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination
    of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall
    have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute
    of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file
    suit.

§ 766.106(4), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). As is facially
obvious, this section tolls deadlines for filing lawsuits, not for
giving statutory notice to state agencies. These parties agreed to
the extensions contemplated in section 766.106(4)—as to filing of
a lawsuit. The parties never agreed to an extension for notifying
DFS under section 768.28(6)(a)2.—nor could they have validly
done so.

    Chapter 766 addresses notice to state agencies separately. It
requires claimants to give notice of their claims to the state
agencies with potential regulatory authority over medical
malpractice. Such notices in cases subject to chapter 766 are not
due until after presuit investigations end and after a suit is filed:

         Following the initiation of a suit alleging medical
    negligence with a court of competent jurisdiction, and
    service of the complaint upon a defendant, the claimant
    shall provide a copy of the complaint to the Department
    of Health and, if the complaint involves a facility licensed
    under chapter 395, the Agency for Health Care
    Administration.

§ 766.106(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017).

     Unlike section 766.106, section 768.28 uniquely embodies and
restricts the state’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity in tort
actions. The Florida Legislature expressly and specifically made
these actions “subject to the limitations specified in this act.”
§ 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). In cases subject to section 768.28,
“the claimant must present the claim in writing to the Department
of Financial Services within 2 years after the claim accrues.”

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§ 768.28(6)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2017). Unlike chapter 766, section
768.28 does not allow for delayed notice to DFS.

     Appellant nevertheless argues that we should interpret
section 768.28 as allowing delayed notice to DFS after the tolling
contemplated in chapter 766, because that would more “fairly and
equitably” allow more time for presuit investigation in cases
involving immune defendants. Appellant argues that the strict
limitations in section 768.28(6) “conflict with the purpose of
Chapter 766 presuit provisions.”

     As a threshold matter, we observe that any statutory
interpretation argument based on what a litigant thinks the
Florida Legislature “should” have said but did not say, and asking
us to say it instead, stands on extremely unstable ground. Our
standard of review for statutory interpretation is de novo, but “[w]e
are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed
there by the Legislature.” Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.
1999). If a statute is “‘clear, unambiguous, and addresses the
matter in issue,’ then our task is at an end.” Advisory Op. to
Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Restoration
Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Graham v.
Haridopolos, 108 So. 3d 597, 603 (Fla. 2013)). Courts are “‘without
power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would
extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and
obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative
power.’” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (emphasis
removed) (quoting Am. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Williams.
212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). These limits apply with
greater force in the context of section 768.28, which, as a limited
waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity, must be “strictly
construed, with strict compliance being required.” Maynard v.
State Dep’t of Corr., 864 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

    Established precedent requires affirmance. In Menendez v.
North Broward Hospital District, 537 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1988), the
defendant in a malpractice action was a hospital district, as is the
defendant here. Significantly, the court expressly noted that its
analysis was governed by the requirement that the statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. Id. at 91.
The statutory agency-notice requirement of section 768.28 applied

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(though what is now DFS was then called the Department of
Insurance and the limit was three years). Id. at 90–91. The lawsuit
was filed and had been pending for four years before the defendant
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to
notify DOI timely. Id. at 90. The plaintiffs argued that the agency
had indirect notice of the claim and that the defendant was
estopped from raising timeliness because it had participated in the
litigation for years without raising the notice defect. Id. The
defendant prevailed before the trial court and on appeal, and the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed on a certified question. The
supreme court, in addition to honoring the requirement of strictly
construing section 768.28, emphasized that timely notice to the
agency is “an essential element of the cause of action,” making the
plaintiffs’ failure to comply “fatal to their complaint.” Id. at 91.

     The Menendez court relied on Levine v. Dade County School
Board, 442 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1983), which required strict
construction of the agency-notice deadline in section 768.28(6).
Menendez, 537 So. 2d at 91 (citing Levine, 442 So. 2d at 212–13).
In Levine, the plaintiff argued that the agency-notice requirement
was non-substantive, and that the failure to give such notice
should be excused because it did not create any prejudice. Levine,
442 So. 2d at 211. The plaintiff even got an affidavit from DOI
saying the agency had no financial interest or function in such
claims. Id. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s arguments. The court recognized that it was required to
give effect to the plain language of the statute, and held that as
part of the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, it must be
strictly construed. Id. at 212 (first citing Manatee Cnty. v. Town of
Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1978); and then citing Spangler
v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth., 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1958)). The court
summed up the statutory-interpretation restrictions as follows:

         In the face of such a clear legislative requirement, it
    would be inappropriate for this Court to give relief to the
    petitioner based on his or our own beliefs about the
    intended function of the Department of Insurance in the
    defense of suits against school districts. Our views about
    the wisdom or propriety of the notice requirement are
    irrelevant because the requirement is so clearly set forth
    in the statute. . . . Consideration of the efficacy of or need

                                  5
    for the notice requirement is a matter wholly within the
    legislative domain.

        . . . Where the time for such notice has expired so
    that it is apparent that the plaintiff cannot fulfill the
    requirement, the trial court has no alternative but to
    dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

Levine, 442 So. 2d at 212–13.

     Appellant attempts to distinguish Menendez and Levine on
the grounds that they did not address his equitable argument. This
bootstrapping is contrary to numerous additional cases. The same
presuit tolling argument was rejected on the same grounds in
Wright v. Polk County Public Health Unit, 601 So. 2d 1318 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1992). The court there held that the complaint was properly
dismissed for failure to allege timely notice to the agency, but could
not be dismissed with prejudice because the record did not
demonstrate whether timely compliance was still possible. Id. at
1319. There as here, the plaintiff argued that the statutory tolling
for presuit investigation requirements should apply to chapter 768
as well. Id. The court rejected the tolling argument, citing
Menendez and Levine. Id. at 1023. To similar effect is Goldberg v.
Belkins Moving and Storage Company, 423 So. 2d 491, 491 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982), where the tolling of the statute of limitations under
the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act was held not to toll time
for giving notice to DOI under section 768.28(6).

    Furthermore, the trial court judge originally assigned to this
case below thoroughly explained the problem with Appellant’s
argument, in an early order denying on procedural grounds the
hospital’s pre-answer motion to dismiss:

         Again and again, Florida courts have reiterated that
    the failure of a claimant to timely notify DFS can cripple
    an otherwise viable claim. See Maynard [v. State, Dept. of
    Corr.], 864 So. 2d [1232,] 1234 [(Fla. 1st DCA 2004)]
    (holding that appellant’s complete failure to timely notify
    the department was fatal to the claim); see also, Broward
    County School Board v. Joseph, 756 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th
    [DCA] 2000) (holding that plaintiff’s suit was due to be

                                  6
    dismissed because of his failure to satisfy conditions
    precedent by not notifying the department within the
    mandated time frame); Wall v. Palm Beach County, 743
    So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (affirming summary
    judgment in favor of county on the grounds of failure of
    the claimant to give notice of claim to the department);
    Wagatha v. City of Satellite Beach, 865 So. 2d 620 (Fla.
    5th DCA 2004) (affirming dismissal of complaint with
    prejudice because appellant did not provide timely notice
    of claim under § 768.28(6)(a)); Pirez v. Brescher, 584 So.
    2d 993, 995 (Fla. 1991) (“[Plaintiff] failed to give proper
    notice of his claim and thus failed to comply with a
    condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity.
    This necessarily results in the dismissal of his claim.”);
    Burkett v. Calhoun County, 441 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA
    1983) (affirming dismissal of complaint against the
    county where plaintiffs did not notify the department of
    insurance within three years as required by § 768.28(6)).
    A blind eye cannot be given to such case law.

     Despite this weight of authority and clear warning from the
trial court, Appellant pursued and continues to pursue his in pari
materia argument by citing Maggio v. Florida Department of Labor
& Employment Security, 899 So. 2d 1074, 1076–77 (Fla. 2005). He
claims Maggio is “controlling,” and argues that the supreme court
in Maggio “harmonized” the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) with
the sovereign immunity statute to excuse a claimant’s failure to
notify DFS within three years as then required by section
768.28(6).

     Maggio is inapposite. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the
court there clearly distinguished between the two statutory
schemes. In Maggio, the issue was whether, as the defendant state
agency argued, a state employee’s employment discrimination
claim should be treated as a tort claim and made subject to the
separate tort notice requirements of section 768.28(6). 899 So. 2d
at 1076. The legislature did not reference the tort immunity
provisions of section 768.28(6) anywhere in the FCRA. The
supreme court rejected the agency’s argument, holding that the
two statutory schemes—civil rights on the one hand and tort
claims against the state on the other hand—are independent. 899

                                7
So. 2d at 1080. The other cases Appellant cites for this argument
are likewise inapposite, as they do not involve the two statutes at
issue here or apply the strict limits for interpreting the state’s
limited waiver of sovereign immunity in section 768.28.

    We have carefully considered all of Appellant’s arguments and
authorities, and find them without merit. In light of the
overwhelming weight of controlling authority, we affirm the trial
court’s dismissal of Appellant’s lawsuit.

    AFFIRMED.

LEWIS and RAY, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Joseph D. Lane and John Givens of The Cochran Firm – Dothan,
P.C., Dothan, Alabama, for Appellant.

Jaken E. Roane of Guilday Law, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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