Court Opinion

ID: 9689323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:27:55.138736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:47.010134
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that in certain respects the prosecutor’s argument was improper. I specifically disagree, however, with the majority’s assertion that on 11 occasions the prosecutor went beyond the scope of fair comment upon the evidence. Moreover, I disagree that any prosecutorial improprieties which occurred in this case compel reversal. In considering improper prosecutorial statements, said comments must be evaluated in light of their relationship to the evidence adduced at trial. An improper argument harmless in one case might require reversal in another. See People v Cowell, 44 Mich App 623, 627-628; 205 NW2d 600 (1973).
I agree with the majority that its opinion catalogs the most serious prosecutorial errors. However, as will be detailed below, I believe that none of these errors, alone or in combination, requires reversal.
The first area of impropriety concerns the prosecutor’s alleged vouching for the credibility of two of his witnesses. He stated:
"You saw the first two that testified. If they look very assaultive or aggressive, I am sorry. They are two of the meekest, mildest people I have seen in this line of *234business. I don’t know how they could have instilled any fear in somebody.”
In my opinion, this statement is far removed from the argument condemned in People v Erb, 48 Mich App 622, 631; 211 NW2d 51 (1973), upon which the majority relies, where the prosecutor stated that it was his duty to present the truth and that he would never call a witness on behalf of the people whom he thought might come into court and testify to a falsity under oath. Here, the prosecutor’s statement is more closely akin to a statement of personal opinion which does not place the prestige of the prosecutor’s office behind the remark. The prosecutor stated that two of his witnesses were meek and mild compared to others he had seen in this "line of business”. We do not know what the prosecutor in People v Yearrell, 101 Mich App 164; 300 NW2d 483 (1980), said from the opinion in that case. We do know, however, that Yearrell specifically held that arguments using such words as "I believe” or "I want you to convict” are not improper. Had the prosecutor said something like, "I would not have brought this case on behalf of the people if these two witnesses weren’t the meekest, mildest people I have seen in this line of business”, this case would have been more like Erb. As the argument was made, however, I believe it is more like Yearrell and, to the extent that the comment may be improper, it had precious little, if any, likelihood of improperly influencing the jury.
The second comment referred to by the majority concerns the prosecutor’s ruminations that defendant would have tried to kill others if they had said anything to him at the time of the crime. I agree that this remark was improper. However, the trial court sustained defendant’s objections to *235the same, stating, "I don’t want you to speculate on what might have happened with somebody else”. If this prosecutorial comment had been particularly influential on the jury, I would have expected defendant to have been found guilty of the charged offense of assault with intent to commit murder or, at least, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, one of the charged lesser offenses.
I agree with the majority that the following statement by the prosecutor was improper because it injected the personalities and credibility of the attorneys into the case:
"Listen carefully to what Mr. Decocq tells you and what he promised to show you when he started this trial. Because when an attorney argues to you he tries to bridge a gap between you and he [sic] for credibility. If you are going to buy my argument, you have to believe that I am a credible person. I am saying that in order to be credible you have to do and show what you feel you can show.”
I disagree, however, that the comment implied defendant was obligated to prove his innocence or that the comment was prejudicial to the defense.
The majority also finds the following comment improper:
"Mr. Decocq has also talked lesser included offenses. Yes, the judge does have to give lesser included offenses. He could give you some, like, seven or eight or nine of them. You have seven or eight possible verdicts.
"I am asking you, based upon the evidence and the necessary elements for assault with intent to murder, to find him guilty of that charge, because I think the elements have been established by the evidence presented. It is just like somebody being shot and murdered and lying on the floor in front of you. And you *236can ask to find him guilty of the lesser offenses of attempted murder, he is dead.
"The law says you have to give the lesser instruction of attempt murder. But he is dead, how can you say it is not murder?”
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion in regard to this comment. While it is true that defendant was not on trial for murder, the prosecutor was merely making an analogy to lesser included offenses in a murder trial. The prosecutor was in effect arguing that the evidence he had introduced so overwhelmingly proved defendant’s guilt that a guilty verdict on any lesser charge would be like finding a defendant guilty of only attempted murder when his victim was stone cold dead. The majority’s excerpting of this comment excises critical language which supports my position. The remark was a fair comment on the evidence.
As to the prosecutor’s comments concerning what happened in Viet Nam and the absence of powder burns, the trial court instructed the jury not to credit these remarks since they were not based on any evidence in the case. Given defense counsel’s numerous successful objections during the prosecutor’s argument, I believe it likely that the jury gave his entire argument little weight. Certainly the verdict rendered suggests that the jury gave little heed to the prosecutor’s comments.
Insofar as the alleged improprieties not discussed in the majority opinion are concerned, I find each instance, with two exceptions, entirely proper. One of these exceptions concerns an isolated question asked of Sharleen Dettling during direct examination. Defense counsel’s objection to the question was sustained. The other exception concerns questions put to Mr. and Mrs. Michael *237Flynn which were irrelevant. The questions concerned the fact that the Flynns’ son had just undergone heart surgery. I do not regard the questions as an impermissible attempt to bolster the Flynns’ credibility by appealing to the jurors’ sympathies. Indeed, the Flynns’ testimony was hardly supportive of the prosecution’s case. Both testified that defendant had not pointed the gun directly at the victim when it went off.
The prosecutor in this case did occasionally transgress the line between the proper and improper. However, he was called down on the most serious improprieties when the trial court sustained defense objections. It is sometimes difficult for me to understand why a prosecutor will risk a facially good case and probably good conviction by untempered closing comments. However, I think what improprieties occurred here were innocuous and did not affect the verdict. The jury refused to convict defendant of either assault with intent to commit murder or assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and ultimately convicted him of the least serious completed offense which the court’s charge would permit. In any case, it is my opinion that jurors give far less credence to prosecutorial arguments in general than the majority apparently believes. See People v Leverette, 112 Mich App 142; 315 NW2d 876 (1982).
I agree with the majority that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense of careless, reckless, or negligent use of a firearm. MCL 752.861; MSA 28.436(21). My analysis of this issue is somewhat different from the majority’s, however.
As the majority notes, defense counsel misinformed the trial court concerning the maximum *238possible sentence for reckless discharge of a firearm. Furthermore, if, as represented by counsel, MCL 752.861; MSA 28.436(21) carried only a one-year maximum penalty, the trial court’s conclusion that People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975), would preclude instructions on the offense would be correct. Thus, I conclude that counsel’s erroneous request puts this case into a factual posture in which relief should be forthcoming only to prevent a possible manifest injustice. I also conclude, however, that, in this case, failure to give defendant some relief very likely would work such a manifest injustice. The jury found defendant guilty of the least serious completed substantive offense it could. There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that no felonious assault had occurred and that the discharge of the firearm was due to mere carelessness or recklessness. Consequently, there is good reason to believe that a verdict of guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm might have resulted had the jury been so charged.
I also agree with the majority that the jury could not have found defendant guilty of a felony-firearm violation if it convicted him of the two-year misdemeanor of reckless discharge of a firearm. I further note, however, that this proposition is not as self-evident as the majority opinion would seem to imply. See People v Reuther, 107 Mich App 349; 309 NW2d 256 (1981), in particular my partial concurrence, noting that this Court is split on whether those crimes designated as two-year misdemeanors are to be treated as felonies in all respects except name.
Rather than outright reversing and remanding this matter for a new trial, however, I believe the proper remedy is to vacate the two convictions and *239to remand this matter to the trial court for entry of a verdict of guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm and for sentencing thereon. I would further allow the prosecution, at its option, to retry defendant for felonious assault and felony-firearm if it notifies the trial court before resentencing that it desires to proceed in this manner. People v Jenkins, 395 Mich 440, 443; 236 NW2d 503 (1975), People v Bryan, 92 Mich App 208, 225-226; 284 NW2d 765 (1979), lv den 408 Mich 914 (1980).
As to defendant’s final claim of error, I am completely satisfied with the majority’s resolution of this issue.
I would vacate defendant’s convictions and remand for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.