Court Opinion

ID: 9951406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 23:03:41.485546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:01.420033
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 AROR-ARK ARK O’DIAH,

                 Plaintiff,
                                                            Civil Action No. 23-653 (RDM)
         v.

 JOHN G. ROBERTS, et al.,

                 Defendants.

                                              ORDER

       Plaintiff Aror-Ark Ark O’Diah filed this suit, pro se, on March 9, 2023. His 80-page

complaint asserted a bewildering assortment of common-law and constitutional claims against

more than 90 Defendants and sought $100,000,000 in damages from each Defendant. See

generally Dkt. 1. As described in this Court’s May 22, 2023 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s

complaint, Plaintiff’s filing made “reference to a racially motivated conspiracy of some kind”

that involved various healthcare providers, banks, and commercial businesses (such as T-Mobile

and Staples), as well as New York state agencies and federal and state judges. Dkt. 11 at 2

(citing Dkt. 1 at 13–14). Plaintiff further alleged that the judges he named as defendants had

taken “actions of some kind ‘without substantive due process’ and suspended the United States

Constitution and that various businesses . . . in some way enforced the assertedly

unconstitutional orders of the judges.” Id. (citing Dkt. 1 at 15–30). The Court was unable to

discern from this filing any “intelligible description of the factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims”

and thus dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to comply with the minimal pleading

standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Dkt. 11 at 2.
       Plaintiff then tried to file several amended complaints, Dkt. 20; Dkt. 21, all of which

substantially restated the original complaint and were not compliant with the Court’s Standing

Order. See Dkt. 10 at 3 (requiring “[a]ny amended or proposed amended pleading or other

filings . . . be accompanied by a redline comparison between the original and the amended filing

or proposed amended filing”). After the Court rejected those efforts, Plaintiff moved to

disqualify the undersigned judge from this case, Dkt. 22, and sought leave to file a third amended

complaint that, once again, restated the claims from the original complaint and added the

undersigned judge as a defendant. The Court denied both of Plaintiff’s motions and explained,

among things, that a plaintiff cannot disqualify the judge presiding over his case by amending the

complaint to challenge the judge’s prior decisions in the case. Min. Order (July 13, 2023); Dkt.

25.

       Plaintiff now appears to seek leave once more to file an amended complaint, Dkt. 28. 1

But that document just reasserts the same “conclusory and scattershot factual allegations” that

the Court has repeatedly found to fall short of Rule 8(a) pleading obligations. Dkt. 11 at 2.

Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which

the Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are held to less stringent standards, see

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), pro se litigants still must comply with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Plaintiff has

not met Rule 8(a)’s minimal standard in any complaint he has sought to file. Despite his

1
  Though stylized as an opposition to Defendant SSA’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 26, the document
Plaintiff filed contains no response to the arguments contained in the motion to dismiss and
instead appears to be a complaint.
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repeated attempts, the Court cannot discern precisely what Plaintiff alleges. Nor, for that matter,

can the Defendants, see Dkt. 26, which is the purpose of Rule 8’s pleading standard. See Coia v.

George Washington Hosp., No. 08-cv-1355, 2008 WL 3055862, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2008)

(“The purpose of the minimum standard of Rule 8 is to give fair notice to the defendants of the

claim being asserted, sufficient to prepare a responsive answer, to prepare an adequate defense

and to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies.” (citing Brown v. Califano, 75

F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977))). 2

       The Court has given Plaintiff many opportunities to file a pleading that conforms to the

Federal Rules and that states a plausible claim for relief. Not only has Plaintiff failed to do so,

Plaintiff appears to not even be trying to meet this low bar, as he continues to refile substantially

the same pleading. This process must come to an end. Plaintiff has provided the Court with no

reason to conclude that, if he were permitted to seek leave to file yet another amended complaint,

he would be able to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6).

See Abulhawa v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 239 F. Supp. 3d 24, 37 (D.D.C. 2017)

(“Courts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not

survive a motion to dismiss.”).

       Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Social Security Administration’s

motion to dismiss, Dkt. 23, its supplemental motion to dismiss, Dkt. 26, are GRANTED. It is

2
  To the extent the Court can discern any claims, those claims appear to seek damages from
dozens of judges for issuing or failing to issue decisions in their judicial capacities, which are
barred by judicial immunity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (describing a long line of
Supreme Court precedents that have found “judge[s] . . . immune from . . . suit for money
damages”). The Court noted this defect in its order dismissing Plaintiff’s original complaint; but
Plaintiff nevertheless continues to try to assert those same, barred claims that have already been
dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. 11.
                                                  3
further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED and the Clerk of the Court is

directed to terminate the case.

       SO ORDERED.

                                                /s/ Randolph D. Moss
                                                RANDOLPH D. MOSS
                                                United States District Judge

Date: March 15, 2024

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