Court Opinion

ID: 9713713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:20:34.115709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.057184
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(concurring).
In my dissent from the majority opinion in CommonWealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d 784 (1973), I expressed the fear that the effect of that decision was to overrule, sub silentio, the rule enunciated in Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 271 A.2d 481 (1970).1 Because the Court today, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Jones, indicates that this apprehension was unfounded, I gladly concur in the judgment.
I am compelled to comment, however, upon the view expressed by Mr. Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion that rules of finality embodied in the Post Conviction Hearing Act 2 bar appellant’s attempt to litigate this issue. Section 3(c) (12) of the Act provides that a person is eligible for post-conviction relief if he can prove:
“(12) The abridgement ... of any right guaranteed by the constitution or the laws of this State or the constitution or laws of the United *259States, including a right that was not recognized as existing at the time of the trial if the constitution requires retrospective application of that right;” (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, appellant sought to establish that Commonwealth v. Wayman did effect a change in existing law; that it is a decision of constitutional dimension; and that it ought to be retrospectively applied. Although he failed to clear the first hurdle of the standard set forth in § 3(c) (12) of the statute, i. e. that the decision in Wayman wrought a change in the law as it existed when Marsh II was decided, he was, nevertheless, by the very terms of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act entitled to raise the argument. It is, therefore, this Court’s duty to decide it on the merits.

. See Commonwealth v. Wayman, supra (dissenting opinion of this writer).

. Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. 1580, 19 P.S. § 1180 et seq., (Supp.1974).