Court Opinion

ID: 2965126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:48.158897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:59.926094
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-2254

                              JOSE RAFAEL BENITEZ-PONS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                       THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                   ____________________

                         and DiClerico, Jr.,* District Judge.
                                              ______________

                                _____________________

               William Ram rez-Hern ndez, with  whom Nora Vargas-Acosta and
               _________________________             __________________
          Vargas & Ram rez Law Office were on brief for appellant.
          ___________________________
               Roberto Ruiz-Comas  and  Edgardo  Col n-Arrar s,  with  whom
               __________________       ______________________
          Gaztambide  & Plaza, Goldman  Antonetti &  C rdova and  Cherie K.
          ___________________  _____________________________      _________
          Durand were on brief for appellees.
          ______

                                 ____________________

                                  February 12, 1998
                                 ____________________
                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                    DICLERICO,  District   Judge.     After  administrative
                    DICLERICO,  District   Judge.
                                ________________

          proceedings  resulted   in  the  revocation  of   his  securities

          brokerage license,  plaintiff-appellant Jos   Rafael Ben tez-Pons

          filed  a  motion  for  reconsideration  with  the Office  of  the

          Commissioner  of Financial Institutions  (OCFI), which  issued an

          interlocutory order tolling the  period for judicial review.   No

          resolution of the motion for reconsideration was issued, although

          the  agency  and the  plaintiff  engaged  in negotiations.    The

          plaintiff  then filed  a  complaint  in  federal  court  alleging

          violations of the Federal and State Constitutions and statutes in

          connection with  the revocation of  his securities license.   The

          district court granted  summary judgment to the defendants on the

          grounds   that  the  claims   were  barred  by   the  statute  of

          limitations.  We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

                                     Background1
                                     Background
                                     __________

                    The   plaintiff,  Jos    Rafael  Ben tez-Pons,   was  a

          practicing licensed securities broker  and licensed supervisor of

          other  securities  brokers.   In  April 1988,  he  co-founded and

          became   president  and  majority   owner  of  First  Continental

          Corporation  (FCC),  a  now  defunct  securities  brokerage firm.

          After suspecting improper  securities transactions by two  of the

          brokers  at  FCC,  the  plaintiff filed  a  complaint  with OCFI.

          OCFI's investigation eventually included the plaintiff himself.

                              
          ____________________

          1   The  facts recited herein  are either  not in dispute  or are
          alleged by the plaintiff.

                                         -2-

                    On January  27, 1992,  OCFI issued  a cease  and desist

          order to FCC, and ordered the plaintiff to show cause why further

          action should not be taken against him.  On January 30, 1992, the

          plaintiff entered into  a consent decree with OCFI.   The consent

          decree provided, inter alia, that  the plaintiff was to cease all
                           __________

          supervisory and  administrative functions  at FCC  for one  year,

          that FCC  would  name another  person  to supervise  and  perform

          administrative  functions  at  FCC, that  FCC  would  comply with

          certain filing requirements, that the plaintiff and FCC would pay

          certain fines,  and that the plaintiff  would supply a copy  of a

          resolution of the FCC Board of Directors ratifying such measures.

                    The plaintiff and FCC failed to comply with the consent

          decree.   On March 13,  1992, Peter Smith and  other governmental

          employees  or agents  of  OCFI  entered  FCC's  premises.    They

          conducted a warrantless search of the premises which included, in

          part,  downloading  computer  information  and  seizing  computer

          programs  and disks,  accounting books,  a registry,  shareholder

          contracts, and security boxes.  

                    On  March 19, 1992,  OCFI issued another  order against

          the  plaintiff and  FCC  finding, inter  alia,  that the  consent
                                            ___________

          decree  had not  been complied  with and  that the  plaintiff had

          engaged in  other  misconduct.   In  the order,  OCFI  ultimately

          concluded that  the situation  at FCC  placed  investors and  the

          securities  industry  in  Puerto  Rico  at risk.    It  summarily

          suspended  the plaintiff's license, ordered him to show cause why

          further actions should not be taken against him, and informed him

                                         -3-

          of his right  to seek an administrative hearing.2   The plaintiff

          exercised his right to an administrative hearing.

                    On  September 28, 1992,  the plaintiff was  afforded an

          administrative hearing  on  the issue  of the  revocation of  his

          license.   There  is no  evidence that  the plaintiff  raised any

          search and seizure  claims, privacy claims, or  illegal detention

          claims  during the administrative hearing.  On December 28, 1992,

          OCFI  issued a  resolution and  ordered  the plaintiff's  license

          permanently revoked.  On January  19, 1993, the plaintiff filed a

          timely motion  for reconsideration  with OCFI.   This step  was a

          procedural  prerequisite  to  seeking judicial  review.    In the

          plaintiff's motion  for reconsideration,  the plaintiff  asserted

          that the proceedings had violated his constitutional rights.3 
                              
          ____________________

          2   The record does not make clear  whether the plaintiff in fact
          held multiple licenses,  or one license authorizing  both broking
          securities and supervising other securities brokers.   

          3   The motion for reconsideration asserted constitutional claims
          as follows:

                      The proceedings carried in this case led to
                    a violation  of the due process of law and of
                    the  constitutional and  civil rights  of the
                    Defendant.  This is so because all or some of
                    the  charges made to  the Defendant are  of a
                    penal   character  that   entail  fines,   as
                    expressed in the Order  and Resolution, which
                    clearly reveals that the burden of proof fell
                    on the Office of the Commissioner.

                      For   this  reason   the   Office  of   the
                    Commissioner  was  obliged   to  present  its
                    evidence first  and convince  the judge  that
                    the   Defendant  had   committed  tha   [sic]
                    violations   he  was   being  charged   with.
                    Nevertheless, despite  the opposition  of the
                    Defendant,  in this case  the burden of proof
                    was inverted and the Defendant was obliged to

                                         -4-

                    OCFI responded to the  motion for reconsideration  with

          an  interlocutory  order  issued January  28,  1992,  pursuant to

          section 3.15  of Puerto Rico's Uniform  Administrative Procedures

          Act (codified at 3 L.P.R.A.   2165).  See P.R. Laws Ann.  tit. 3,
                                                ___

            2165  (1994)  (hereinafter  section  2165).4   The  plaintiff's
                              
          ____________________

                    prove  that he  is  innocent  of the  alleged
                    charges.   This is clearly a violation of the
                    rights  recognized  to  an  "accused" by  the
                    Constitution  of  the Commonwealth  of  P.R.,
                    which adulterates  with absolute  nullity the
                    whole proceeding and  converts the Order  and
                    Resolution into a  nullity.  Much more  so in
                    this case, by which the Defendant is deprived
                    of   his   right   to   his   agent   license
                    permanently.   The license already  issued or
                    granted  is an  acquired  right,  and  not  a
                    privilege as is erroneously  indicated in the
                    Resolution and Order.  (See Article 402(d) of
                    the Securities Law about the burden of proof,
                    which clearly shows that  the burden of proof
                    fell  in this  case  on  the  Office  of  the
                    Commissioner.)
                      . . . .
                      . . .  Due  process  of  law  has not  been
                    followed  in the  proceedings  carried on  to
                    deprive him permanently of his agent license,
                    which is an  acquired right and not  merely a
                    privilege.

          4  Section 2165 was amended  in 1994.  See Uniform Administrative
                                                 ___
          Procedures Act --  Judicature Act of 1994, 1995  Puerto Rico Laws
          Act No. 247 (H.B. No. 1684)   4.   The amendments do not directly
          affect our analysis as they are not applicable to the plaintiffs'
          case.  All references to section 2165 are therefore references to
          section 2165 as  it existed prior to the Judicature  Act of 1994,
          unless otherwise noted. 

          Section 2165 provided that:

                      The   party   adversely   affected   by   a
                    resolution  or  partial or  final  order may,
                    within  twenty (20) days of the filing of the
                    resolution  or  order,  present a  motion  to
                    reconsider  the  resolution  or  order.   The
                                                              ___
                    agency  shall  consider   the  motion  within
                    _____________________________________________
                    fifteen  (15)  days  of its  filing.    If it
                    _____________________________________________

                                         -5-

          translation of OCFI's interlocutory order states:

                      That  upon   review  of   the  Motion   for
                    Reconsideration of January 19, 1993, filed by
                    the Respondant [sic], the Commissioner orders
                    that it be considered and resolved.

                      Pursuant to  section 3.15 of Law Number 170
                    of   August   12,    1988   (Uniforme   [sic]
                    Administrative  Procedures  Act)  supra,  the
                    thirty  (30)  day  period  in  which  to seek
                    review  is tolled and will begin to run again
                    from   the  date  in  which  a  copy  of  the
                    Resolution   resolving    the   Motion    for
                    Reconsideration is filed and notified.

                      Docket and Notify.

                      In San  Juan, Puerto  Rico, on  January 28,
                    1993.

          On February 10, 1993, OCFI filed its opposition to the motion for
                              
          ____________________

                    rejects  the motion or  fails to act  upon it
                    _____________________________________________
                    within said  fifteen (15)  days, the  term to
                    _____________________________________________
                    petition  for review  shall  commence to  run
                    _____________________________________________
                    anew as of the notification of said denial or
                    _____________________________________________
                    as  of the expiration of the fifteen (15) day
                    _____________________________________________
                    term,  whichever may  be  the  case.    If  a
                    ____________________________________
                    determination  is made  upon the  motion, the
                    term to  petition for review  shall begin  to
                    run as  of the date  of filing a copy  of the
                    notification of the  resolution of the agency
                    resolving  the  motion   definitively,  which
                    resolution should be issued and filed  within
                    ninety (90) days after the motion  was filed.
                    If the  agency fails  to take  action on  the
                    _____________________________________________
                    motion for reconsideration  within the ninety
                    _____________________________________________
                    (90)  days of  the filing  of  the motion  it
                    _____________________________________________
                    shall lose jurisdiction over the same and the
                    _____________________________________________
                    term in which to petition for judicial review
                    _____________________________________________
                    shall  commence upon  the expiration  of said
                    _____________________________________________
                    ninety  (90) day term  unless the  court, for
                    _____________________________________________
                    good  cause  shown,  grants  the  agency   an
                    _____________________________________________
                    extension of time.
                    __________________

                      The   motion   to   reconsider   shall   be
                    jurisdictional in  order to  request judicial
                    review.

          See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,   2165 (1994) (emphasis added).
          ___

                                         -6-

          reconsideration.     OCFI  never   issued  a   decision  by   the

          Commissioner  on the motion for reconsideration within the ninety

          day period as required by section 2165.  

                    Following  OCFI's interlocutory  order  of January  28,

          1993, attorneys for OCFI and the plaintiff  met to try to resolve

          the issue.  The plaintiff asserts that during the months of March

          and April  1993, letters  and telephone calls  were exchanged  to

          this end.   The record  indicates that the  plaintiff's attorneys

          sent  OCFI settlement  proposals which  were evidently  rejected.

          The plaintiff's intention  in the negotiations was  to relinquish

          his  constitutional claims in  exchange for reinstatement  of his

          license.   The plaintiff  asserts that representations  were made

          that the statute of limitations  was tolled, although there is no

          evidence  in the record that substantiates this allegation beyond

          the interlocutory order.   During these interactions,  OCFI never

          indicated   that  it   was  not   considering   the  motion   for

          reconsideration.   In September  1993, the  Commissioner and  the

          plaintiff accidentally met, and in  response to an inquiry by the

          plaintiff, the Commissioner  indicated that he would  "follow up"

          on the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.  In June 1994, the

          attorney for  the  plaintiff  filed a  motion  to  "resign"  from

          representing him.  OCFI never responded to the motion.

                    In March and  April 1995, the plaintiff  contacted OCFI

          to inquire about the status of his case and request a copy of the

          examiner's findings.  The plaintiff was told that no one  at OCFI

          had any knowledge  regarding his case, and that no one could help

                                         -7-

          him with his inquiry.   

                    On May 2, 1995, the  plaintiff filed a complaint in the

          federal  district court of  Puerto Rico against  the defendants.5

          The plaintiff sought  declaratory relief, injunctive relief,  and

          damages pursuant  to 42  U.S.C.    1983 and  1988, and  28 U.S.C.

            2201.  The plaintiff asserted that  the defendants violated his

          right to  be free  from unreasonable searches  and seizures,  his

          right to  be free from  illegal detention, his right  to privacy,

          his property interest in his license, his liberty interest in his

          career, and  his liberty  interest in his  right to  contract for

          employment.   He  also  asserted  claims under  the  Puerto  Rico

          Constitution, Article  II, sections  7, 8,  and 10, and  Articles

          1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.  

                    On  July 31,  1995, the  defendants filed a  motion for

          summary judgment.  The  defendants argued that the  complaint was

          not filed within one year of the constitutional deprivations, and

          was therefore time  barred.  Furthermore, they  asserted that the

          plaintiff failed  to toll the statute of  limitations because (1)

                              
          ____________________

          5   Defendants are  the Office of  the Commissioner  of Financial
          Institutions  of the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico;  Jos   Sosa
          Llor ns, in his  official and personal capacity, and his conjugal
          partnership;  Asdr bal  Aponte,  in  his  official  and  personal
          capacity,  and  his  conjugal partnership;  Peter  Smith,  in his
          official and  personal  capacity, and  his conjugal  partnership;
          Rafael Rosario,  in his official  and personal capacity,  and his
          conjugal  partnership; John  Doe, in  his  official and  personal
          capacity,  and  his  conjugal partnership;  Richard  Doe,  in his
          official and personal capacity, and his conjugal partnership; and
          Virgilio Vega,  in his  official and personal  capacity, and  his
          conjugal partnership.   In light  of our conclusion, we  need not
          distinguish between the defendants in addressing  the plaintiff's
          claims and arguments. 

                                         -8-

          the  plaintiff failed  to  satisfy  the  applicable  Puerto  Rico

          tolling statute, which requires that there be identity  of relief

          requested,  and (2) equitable tolling was unavailable because the

          plaintiff could establish  neither excusable  ignorance nor  that

          the defendant  actively misled  or prevented  the plaintiff  from

          asserting his rights.  Finally, the defendants argued that OCFI's

          determination was final  and unappealable because the  statute of

          limitations had expired.

                    The district  court granted the defendants'  motion for

          summary judgment.   The  court first determined  that a  one year

          statute of  limitations controlled  the plaintiff's  claims.   It

          then  determined  that  the last  alleged  violation  occurred on

          September 28, 1992.   The complaint therefore had to  be filed by

          September 29,  1993.   The court agreed  with the  defendants and

          found  that  the  plaintiff   had  not  tolled  the   statute  of

          limitations on either  of two bases: (1) the  plaintiff failed to

          seek the same remedies in the district court as it had before the

          agency, and  therefore failed to satisfy the  requirements of the

          Puerto  Rico statute  governing  the tolling  of  the statute  of

          limitations through  extrajudicial claims, and  (2) the plaintiff

          failed to establish that the statute of limitations was equitably

          tolled.    The  court  implicitly found  that  the  plaintiff was

          neither  excusably ignorant  of the  statute  of limitations  nor

          actively  misled  by  OCFI.     The  court  concluded   that  the

          administrative order was final and unappealable.

                    The  plaintiff argues  on appeal  that  the ninety  day

                                         -9-

          review period  under section 2165 is  waivable and was  tolled by

          OCFI.    The  plaintiff  also  asserts  that  the defendants  are

          equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a

          defense  in  this  case.   Finally,  the  plaintiff  asserts that

          summary judgment  is  generally inapplicable  in actions  raising

          equitable  tolling or estoppel arguments, and that genuine issues

          of  material fact  in this  case precluded  the grant  of summary

          judgment.6  

                    We review motions  for summary judgment  de novo.   See
                                                                        ___

          Associated Fisheries of  Maine, Inc. v. Daley,  No. 97-1327, 1997
          ____________________________________    _____

          WL 563584, at *3 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 1997).

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                    State  law  statutes  of  limitations  govern  suits in

          federal courts  arising under    1983.  See  Board of  Regents v.
                                                  ___  _________________

          Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).   In Wilson v. Garc a, the  Supreme
          _______                            ______    ______

          Court determined that the state statute of limitations applicable

          in tort actions for personal injuries governs   1983 claims.  See
                                                                        ___

          471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985).  

                    The plaintiff  does not  dispute that  Puerto Rico  law

          establishes a one year prescription period for the claims in this

          case.   See  P.R. Laws  Ann.  tit. 31,    5298 (1994);  Rodr guez
                  ___                                             _________

          Narv ez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1990).   The one
          _______    _______
                              
          ____________________

          6   At  oral  argument, the  plaintiff's  attorney asserted  that
          summary  judgment was also inappropriate because discovery was at
          an  early  stage  and  sufficient  facts  could  not be  adduced.
          However,  this  argument  was not  asserted  before  the district
          court, nor in the  briefs submitted, and is deemed  waived.  See,
                                                                       ___
          e.g.,  Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea,  959 F.2d 349,  354 (1st
          ____   _______________    _____________
          Cir. 1992).

                                         -10-

          year period  begins running  one day after  the date  of accrual,

          which is  the date plaintiff  knew or had  reason to know  of the

          injury.  See Carreras-Rosa v.  Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172 (1st Cir.
                   ___ _____________     __________

          1997).  

                    The  tolling  of  the statute  of  limitations  is also

          governed by  state law.   See, e.g., Torres v.  Superintendent of
                                    ___  ____  ______     _________________

          Police, 893  F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1990).   Article 1873 of the
          ______

          Civil Code of Puerto Rico provides that extrajudicial claims will

          toll the one-year statute of limitations:

                    Prescription  of  actions is  interrupted  by
                    their institution before the  courts, [or] by
                    extrajudicial claims of the creditor . . . .

          P.R.  Laws  Ann. tit.  31,    5303  (1994).   "[T]he  tolling  is

          effective with  regard only to  identical causes of action.   The

          statute of limitations  is not tolled for all  claims arising out

          of the  same facts  . . . ."  Rodr guez  Narv ez, 895 F.2d  at 43
                                        __________________

          (citations  omitted).    Moreover, the  relief  requested  in the

          extrajudicial  claim  must  be  the same  relief  that  is  later

          requested in court.  See Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina, Co., 959
                               ___ ____________    ___________________

          F.2d 1149, 1154  (1st Cir. 1992); Rodr guez Narv ez,  895 F.2d at
                                            _________________

          44; Torres, 893 F.2d at 407; Hern ndez del Valle v. Santa Aponte,
              ______                   ___________________    ____________

          575 F.2d 321, 323-24  (1st Cir. 1978).  In other  words, "to toll

          the statute the action must be the  case at bar, and not merely a

          somewhat related action arising from the same facts,"  Ram rez de
                                                                 __________

          Arellano  v. Alvarez  de Choudens,  575 F.2d  315, 320  (1st Cir.
          ________     ____________________

          1978), and  if the remedies in both the  claims are not the same,

          the earlier  claim will fail  to toll the statute  of limitations

                                         -11-

          for  the later  claim, see  Torres,  893 F.2d  at 407.    For the
                                 ___  ______

          reasons enumerated  below, we find  the plaintiff's claims  to be

          barred by the statute of limitations.

                                         -12-

              I.  Fourth Amendment, Illegal Detention and Privacy Claims
              I.  Fourth Amendment, Illegal Detention and Privacy Claims
              __________________________________________________________

                    The  plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to illegal

          searches  and seizures, illegal detentions, and violations of his

          right to privacy between March 13, 1992, and March 19, 1992.  The

          plaintiff had  until March 1993  to file his  complaint asserting

          these  causes  of  action,  unless  he   tolled  the  statute  of

          limitations.   As indicated above, the plaintiff waited until May

          1995 to file his federal complaint asserting these claims.  There

          is  no evidence  in the  record that  the plaintiff  raised these

          claims  during the  administrative hearing.   He  did not  assert

          these  claims in his motion for  reconsideration filed with OCFI.

          Nor is  there evidence in  the record that these  specific claims

          were  asserted during the  negotiations that transpired  in March

          and April 1993.7   In fact, from  the record it appears  that the

          plaintiff  raised these  specific constitutional  claims  for the

          first time when  he filed his federal complaint.   Therefore, the

          district  court   properly  concluded  that  these   claims  were

          untimely, and  that the plaintiff  had not tolled the  statute of

          limitations under the Puerto Rico tolling statute.

                      II.  Federal and State Due Process Claims
                      II.  Federal and State Due Process Claims
                      _________________________________________

                    The plaintiff  asserts that  his  property and  liberty

          interests  were violated when  he was  allegedly deprived  of his

                              
          ____________________

          7   In  his sworn  statement and  in his  statement of  contested
          facts,   the  plaintiff   stated  that   he   "asserted  in   the
          administrative   proceedings   that   Defendants   violated   his
          constitutional and  civil rights  complained of"  in the  federal
          complaint.   This general statement  is supported by  evidence in
          the record, but only as to the due process claims.  

                                         -13-

          license without due  process.  We assume arguendo  that his claim
                                                   ________

          accrued at the latest possible date, December 28th, 1992, the day

          the  plaintiff's  license  was   permanently  revoked,  allegedly

          without  due process.   Because  the plaintiff  did not  file his

          complaint in  federal court until  May 2, 1995, these  claims are

          also time barred by the statute of limitations unless the statute

          was tolled under Puerto Rico law.  Unlike the search and seizure,

          illegal  detention,  and  privacy  claims  discussed  above,  the

          plaintiff  asserted  in  his   motion  for  reconsideration,  and

          allegedly  in his negotiations with OCFI, that the administrative

          proceedings  failed to afford him due  process.  In his motion he

          argued that his license was a right and not a privilege, and that

          he  was not  accorded due  process of  law in  the administrative

          proceedings because  the  burden  of  proof  was  inappropriately

          shifted to him.  The plaintiff's argument can, if read liberally,

          be understood  to assert that  the plaintiff was deprived  of his

          property  and liberty  interests  without  due  process  of  law.

          However, despite the plaintiff's assertion of these claims in the

          administrative proceeding, they  are not preserved by  the Puerto

          Rico tolling statute.

                    As we held in  Torres, if a party seeks a  remedy in an
                                   ______

          extrajudicial  claim  that  is different  from  the  remedy later

          sought in  a judicial proceeding,  the statute of  limitations is

          not tolled.   In Torres, the plaintiffs had  been discharged from
                           ______

          their positions  as police officers.  See 893  F.2d at 406.  They
                                                ___

          filed  an administrative action within the statute of limitations

                                         -14-

          seeking reinstatement.  After  their administrative claim  proved

          unsuccessful,  they filed  a   1983  action  in federal  district

          court  seeking  damages,  reinstatement,  and  the  expunging  of

          photographs and  fingerprints  filed with  the police.   By  this

          time, the  statute of  limitations for  their  federal claim  had

          expired.

                    In Torres, we found that because the remedies sought by
                       ______

          the  plaintiffs in the  district court were not  the same as they

          were in the  administrative proceeding, there  was no tolling  of

          the  statute of limitations  by their extrajudicial  assertion in

          the  administrative action.  In concluding  that the   1983 claim

          was time barred, we stated in Torres: 
                                        ______

                    [T]he district court  correctly held that the
                    extrajudicial  claim  must   claim  the  same
                    relief later  requested in the  federal suit.
                    The statute  of limitations for  Section 1983
                    claim  [sic] is  not  tolled  if  the  remedy
                    requested in  both suits  is different. . . .
                    The  record  supports  the  district  court's
                    finding  that  the  plaintiff  requested  two
                    distinct  remedies. . . .   Given that  these
                    remedies  were not  identical,  there was  no
                    tolling and  the prescription  period expired
                    . . . .

          Id. at 407.  The case at  hand presents similar facts.  Here, the
          ___

          plaintiff    asserted    constitutional   claims    before    the

          administrative  agency,  which   could  have  functioned  as   an

          extrajudicial claim under Puerto Rico law, tolling the statute of

          limitations.   However,  the plaintiff  failed to  seek the  same

          remedies  in  the  district  court   as  he  had  sought  in  the

          administrative proceedings.  In the administrative proceedings he

          sought  only  the  reinstatement  of his  license,  while  in the

                                         -15-

          district court he sought declaratory and monetary relief, as well

          as the reinstatement of his license.8

                         III.  Equitable Estoppel and Tolling
                         III.  Equitable Estoppel and Tolling
                         ____________________________________

                    The  plaintiff  also  argues  that the  defendants  are

          equitably  estopped  from  raising the  time  bar  defense.   The

          plaintiff's argument muddles the doctrines of equitable  estoppel

          and equitable tolling.  Because the plaintiff asserts elements of

          both doctrines,  we will  analyze the  equitable arguments  under

          both estoppel and tolling theories.

                    The first issue to be determined in analyzing equitable

          tolling is  its applicability to  the case  at hand.   In  Torres
                                                                     ______

          Ram rez  v. Berm dez Garc a, we  noted without resolution that it
          _______     _______________

          was   unclear  whether   the   federal  doctrine   of  fraudulent

          concealment  (equitable  tolling) continues  to  apply to    1983

          actions,  or  whether state  law governs  the issue  of equitable

          tolling.   See Torres Ram rez  v. Berm dez Garc a, 898  F.2d 224,
                     ___ ______________     _______________

          229 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1990).  We need not decide the issue here, as

          we find that under  either the federal or the state doctrine, the

          plaintiff has failed to establish that the statute of limitations

          should be equitably tolled.  

                    We have  previously addressed  equitable tolling  under

          Puerto  Rico law in   1983 cases.   "Puerto Rico law provides for

          equitable tolling in a  case of 'damage willfully and  wrongfully

          (dolosamente) concealed by  the author  of the  same.'"   Ram rez
           ___________                                              _______

                              
          ____________________

          8  For the same  reasons, the plaintiff's claims asserting Puerto
          Rico causes of action are time barred. 

                                         -16-

          Morales  v. Rosa  Viera, 815 F.2d  2, 4 (1st  Cir. 1987) (quoting
          _______     ___________

          Rivera  Encarnaci n v.  E.L.A.,  113  D.P.R.  383,  386  (1982)).
          ___________________     ______

          Similarly,  under federal law, the plaintiff must show "excusable

          ignorance of the statute of limitations caused by some misconduct

          of  the defendant."   Torres,  893  F.2d at  407 (quotations  and
                                ______

          citations omitted).   Equitable  tolling is  unavailable where  a

          party fails to exercise reasonable diligence.  Moreover, "[i]t is

          axiomatic that 'the  grounds for tolling statutes  of limitations

          are  more limited  in  suits  against  the  government  . . . .'"

          Kelley  v. NLRB,  79 F.3d  1238,  1248 (1st  Cir. 1996)  (quoting
          ______     ____

          Swietlik v. United States, 779  F.2d 1306, 1311 (7th Cir. 1985)).
          ________    _____________

          Courts  weigh five  factors  in  assessing  claims  of  equitable

          tolling:    (1)   the  lack  of  actual  notice   of  the  filing

          requirement; (2)  the lack of  constructive notice of  the filing

          requirement; (3) the diligence in pursuing  one's rights; (4) the

          absence  of prejudice to  the defendant; and  (5) the plaintiff's

          reasonableness in  remaining ignorant of the  filing requirement.

          See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of  America, 861 F.2d 746, 752 (1st
          ___ ____    _____________________________

          Cir. 1988).

                    Here, the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants

          concealed material  facts  regarding  the  plaintiff's  cause  of

          action or the damages incurred.  See Ram rez Morales, 815 F.2d at
                                           ___ _______________

          4 (finding equitable  tolling inappropriate in   1983  case under

          either federal or Puerto Rico doctrines  where defendants did not

          prevent  or  discourage  plaintiff  from viewing  agency  records

          regarding  unlawful police shooting, and there was no concealment

                                         -17-

          of material facts) overruled on other grounds by Carreras-Rosa v.
                             _____________________________ _____________

          Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 1997).  Instead, the plaintiff
          __________

          argues  that equitable tolling is appropriate because OCFI misled

          him regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations under the

          Puerto Rico Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.  

                    The facts and  arguments in  this case  are similar  to

          those presented by Kelley.  See 79 F.3d at 1242-43, 1247-50.   In
                             ______   ___

          Kelley, the  plaintiff failed to  serve process on  the defendant
          ______

          within  the time  period  mandated  by a  federal  statute.   The

          plaintiff  relied  on  a National  Labor  Relations  Board (NLRB)

          employee  who informed  the plaintiff's  attorney  that the  NLRB

          would serve  the defendant and  that the plaintiff should  not do

          so.  The employee neglected  to inform the plaintiff, however, of

          an NLRB regulation  stating that the ultimate  responsibility for

          serving notice  was on  the charging party.   The service  by the

          NLRB was  one day late.   In rejecting the  plaintiff's equitable

          tolling   argument,  we   held  that   although  the   employee's

          information was "incomplete and perhaps misleading," the delay in

          service could not "be wholly  attributed to an error on the  part

          of the [NLRB]."  See Kelley, 79 F.3d at 1249.   We found that the
                           ___ ______

          plaintiff  had  constructive  notice of  the  regulation  and its

          requirements because the plaintiff was represented by counsel for

          a long  duration, and counsel had access to the regulations.  See
                                                                        ___

          id. at 1249  ("Courts generally impute constructive  knowledge to
          ___

          plaintiffs  who, like appellant, consult with an attorney.").  We

          also determined that it was plain that the attorney's reliance on

                                         -18-

          the  employee's representations  was unreasonable.    See id.  at
                                                                ___ ___

          1249. The  information "almost by  definition, is  not nearly  as

          reliable as simply looking up the text  of a regulation."  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          1250.   

                    Here, the interlocutory order issued by  OCFI indicated

          that the statute of limitations was tolled until a copy of OCFI's

          resolution addressing the  motion for reconsideration  was "filed

          and notified."   In this  regard it was incomplete  and therefore

          inaccurate.   However, the  order  expressly stated  that it  was

          issued  pursuant  to section  3.15  of  the Puerto  Rico  Uniform

          Administrative Procedure Act,  which clarifies  the ambiguity  of

          the interlocutory  order.   Pursuant to  section 3.15, "[i]f  the

          agency  fails to take  action on  the motion  for reconsideration

          within the ninety  (90) days of the filing of the motion it shall

          lose jurisdiction over the same and the term in which to petition

          for  judicial review shall  commence upon the  expiration of said

          ninety  (90) day  term unless  the court,  for good  cause shown,

          grants the agency an extension of time."   P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,

            2165 (1994).  In short, the statute was tolled either until the

          OCFI's  resolution of  the motion  was issued  or until  the time

          period in which to issue the resolution expired. 

                    The plaintiff had  notice of the statute  governing the

          time limitations but relied on the agency's summation of the law.

          "The general rule is that 'those who deal with the Government are

          expected to  know the  law and  may not  rely on  the conduct  of

          Government agents  contrary to  law.'"  Kelley,  79 F.3d  at 1249
                                                  ______

                                         -19-

          (quoting  Heckler v.  Community Health  Servs., 467  U.S. 51,  63
                    _______     ________________________

          (1984)).  Moreover, the plaintiff had constructive notice  of the

          filing  requirement; he was represented by counsel throughout his

          dealings with OCFI;  and he had access to the Puerto Rico Uniform

          Administrative Procedure Act.  See Kelley, 79  F.3d at 1249.  Nor
                                         ___ ______

          can  we say  that  the  plaintiff was  diligent  in pursuing  his

          rights.   Between June 21, 1993, and  March 1995, the only action

          the plaintiff  took to pursue  his rights was when  he approached

          the  Commissioner at an unidentified meeting and the Commissioner

          indicated he would "follow up"  on the plaintiff's petition.  The

          plaintiff's  counsel acknowledged in oral argument that even this

          meeting  was entirely  accidental.   The  plaintiff initiated  no

          other contact with the agency  to resolve his dispute  throughout

          this  period.     Given  the  fact  that  the   plaintiff  was  a

          sophisticated businessman  represented by  counsel, and that  the

          plaintiff was directed to the specific section of the Puerto Rico

          Uniform  Administrative  Procedure  Act that  governed  the  time

          limitations for his  motion, we cannot  say that the  plaintiff's

          failure to  ascertain the timeliness  of his cause of  action was

          reasonable.

                    The  plaintiff has referred to the OCFI Regulation Rule

          19, see Commonwealth of Puerto  Rico, Office of the  Commissioner
              ___

          of Financial Institutions, Regulation # 3920, Rule 19 (1989), and

          Rule 3.16  of the  Puerto Rico  Uniform Administrative  Procedure

          Act,  see P.R.  Laws Ann. tit.  3,   2166  (1994), both  of which
                ___

          require that  notice be  sent when  an adjudicative  procedure is

                                         -20-

          terminated.   However,  the  plaintiff has  also  cited the  OCFI

          Regulation Rule 18.1, see Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,  Office of
                                ___

          the Commissioner  of Financial  Institutions, Regulation  # 3920,

          Rule  18.1 (1989),  and  Rule  3.15 of  the  Puerto Rico  Uniform

          Administrative Procedure Act, see  P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,    2165
                                        ___

          (1994), which provide that OCFI's  failure to decide a motion for

          reconsideration  within a  designated time period  either renders

          the motion and case dismissed by the agency, or strips the agency

          of its  jurisdiction over  the case.    In such  a situation,  we

          cannot agree that  the plaintiff's reliance on  selected portions

          of  the regulations (i.e. OCFI's failure  to notify the plaintiff

          as to  the termination of his  case) and his  disregard for other

          portions  of  the   regulations  that  indicated  his   case  was

          dismissed, was  reasonable.   The regulations must  be read  as a

          whole, and cannot be read selectively.  See O'Connell v. Shalala,
                                                  ___ _________    _______

          79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A] court engaged in  the task

          of statutory interpretation must examine  the statute as a whole,

          giving due weight to design, structure, and purpose as well as to

          aggregate language.").  Furthermore, the plaintiff's ignorance of

          the  time limitations was  unreasonable particularly in  light of

          the fact that these tolling provisions are uniform for all of the

          Puerto Rico agencies.  Because lack of prejudice alone  is not an

          adequate  basis for invoking equitable tolling, and the plaintiff

          has not met  the other requirements of the doctrine,  we find the

          equitable tolling  doctrine to  be inapplicable  on these  facts.

          See Kelley, 79  F.3d at 1250.  The plaintiff fails in his attempt
          ___ ______

                                         -21-

          to  distinguish this  case from  Kelley on  the grounds  that the
                                           ______

          Commissioner  issued  the  interlocutory  order.    Reliance  was

          unreasonable  in  light of  the  order's clear  reference  to the

          statute under  which  it was  authorized, the  uniformity of  the

          provisions for  all Puerto Rico  agencies, and the notice  in the

          regulations and statute indicating the pending time  limitations,

          among other factors. 

                    Equitable estoppel has  a similar origin and  effect as

          equitable tolling, although it is a distinct doctrine.  See Kale,
                                                                  ___ ____

          861  F.2d at  752.   Equitable  estoppel is  available in    1983

          actions.  See Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 839
                    ___ _____    _______________________

          (7th  Cir. 1992).   Even when  a federal court  borrows a state's

          statute  of  limitations,  the  court  applies  federal equitable

          estoppel principles.   See  id. at  841.   "(1) The  party to  be
                                 ___  ___

          estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct

          shall  be acted on  or must so  act that the  party asserting the

          estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter

          must be  ignorant of the true facts; and  (4) he must rely on the

          former's conduct to his injury."  Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660,
                                            _______    _____

          661  (1st Cir. 1987).  The "reliance must have been reasonable in

          that the party  claiming the estoppel did not know  nor should it

          have  known  that  its   adversary's  conduct  was   misleading."

          Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59.   "'If, at the time when he acted,  such
          _______

          party  had  knowledge  of the  truth,  or  . . . with  reasonable

          diligence he could acquire the knowledge . . . he cannot claim to

          have  been  misled  by  relying  upon  the  misrepresentation  or

                                         -22-

          concealment.'"  Id.  (quoting 3 J. Pomeroy,  Equity Jurisprudence
                          ___                          ____________________

            810, at 219  (S. Symons ed. 1941).  Indeed, "the conduct of the

          defendant  must  be so  misleading  as to  cause  the plaintiff's

          failure to file suit."  S nchez v. Loffland Bros., 626 F.2d 1228,
                                  _______    ______________

          1231 (5th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).

                                         -23-

                    The  flaw  in  the plaintiff's  argument,  as discussed

          above, is that the plaintiff's  reliance was not reasonable.  The

          interlocutory  order explicitly  cited  the  statute pursuant  to

          which  it was  issued.   The statute  in turn indicated  the time

          period after  which OCFI lost jurisdiction.  The OCFI regulations

          also  indicated  that  the motion  for  reconsideration  would be

          considered  "WITHOUT   CAUSE/CASE  DISMISSED"  without   an  OCFI

          resolution in 30  days.  See Commonwealth of  Puerto Rico, Office
                                   ___

          of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Regulation # 3920,

          Rule  18.1  (1989).   In  the  face  of  a conflict  between  the

          interlocutory order and the statute it expressly referred to, and

          another  conflict between regulations that indicated the case was

          dismissed but  that also indicated  notice would be given  in the

          event of  termination, it was  unreasonable for the  plaintiff to

          choose  to rely  upon the  interlocutory  order.   In this  case,

          OCFI's conduct was not so  misleading as to cause the plaintiff's

          failure  to  file  on  time   without  the  plaintiff's  lack  of

          diligence.   Nor  are  the  plaintiff's  negotiations  with  OCFI

          adequate to equitably toll the statute of limitations.  See Bomba
                                                                  ___ _____

          v.  W.L. Belvidere,  Inc., 579  F.2d 1067,  1071 (7th  Cir. 1978)
              _____________________

          ("[I]t  is  widely  held  that  mere  negotiations  concerning  a

          disputed  claim, without more,  is [sic] insufficient  to warrant

          the application of equitable estoppel . . . .").  The plaintiff's

          equitable estoppel argument must therefore fail.

                    The plaintiff also argues that the Commissioner had the

          authority to waive  the time periods at issue, and because he did

                                         -24-

          in  fact waive  them, the  statute of  limitations was  tolled by

          OCFI.    At the  time  of  this  case,  the Commissioner  had  no

          authority to waive the time periods of section 2165.  

                    The plaintiff's reference to language  in sections 2163

          and  2164 is  without  merit.9   Section  2163  provides that  an

          adjudicatory procedure before an agency shall  be resolved in six

          months, absent  exceptional circumstances.   See  P.R. Laws  Ann.
                                                       ___

          tit. 3,   2163 (1994).  Section 2164 provides  that a final order

          or  resolution shall  be  issued  within  ninety days  after  the

          conclusion of a hearing, unless waived in writing by the parties,

          or for just cause.  See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,   2164 (1994).    
                              ___

                    The  Uniform Administrative Procedure  Act is,  for the

          most part, arranged chronologically.   Section 2163 deals in  its

          entirety with the procedure of  the actual hearing.  Section 2164

          addresses  only issues pertaining to final orders or resolutions,

          including their timing,  content, or notice.  It  is not relevant

          to  motions for  reconsideration.    In  contrast,  section  2165

          governs  reconsideration and the applicable timing issues in this

          case.  Section   2165  provides   that  an   agency  shall   lose

          jurisdiction if  it  fails  to  take action  within  ninety  days

          "unless the  court, for  good cause shown,  grants the  agency an

          extension of time."  The  agency therefore lacks the authority to

          waive this requirement.   The requirement is not  affected by the

          discretion afforded the agency in other sections, nor by reliance
                              
          ____________________

          9  We also reject plaintiff's arguments premised on public policy
          favoring economical, fair,  and rapid proceedings, and  on OCFI's
          conduct.

                                         -25-

          on OCFI's representations  or conduct by the plaintiff.   We find

          the  statute to  be unambiguous  and decline  to read  into it  a

          meaning   that  directly  conflicts   with  the  intent   of  the

          legislature.10   See Pag n  Ramos v. State  Ins. Fund, 92  JTS 13
                           ___ ____________    ________________

          (1992)  (stating in dicta  "[o]nly through judicial authorization

          and 'for just cause  can that term  be extended for a  reasonable
               ____________________________________________________________

          period of  time.'")  (quoting  P.R.  Laws  Ann.  tit.  3,    2165
          _______________

          (1994)); Rivera  Rivera v.  Municipality of  Carolina, 96  JTS 28
                   ______________     _________________________

          (1996)  (stating in  dicta  that  there is  no  ambiguity in  the

          statute).  OCFI's administrative order is therefore final, and as

          timely review was not sought, unappealable.

                    The  plaintiff finally argues  that summary judgment is

          inappropriate in this case because it involves equitable estoppel

          or  equitable  tolling  issues, and  because  there  were genuine

          issues of material fact unresolved.   The mere fact that a  party

          asserts  such  equitable  claims does  not  foreclose  granting a

          motion for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Bell v. Fowler, 99  F.3d
                                        ___  ____  ____    ______

          262   (8th  Cir.  1996)  (equitable  estoppel);  Cada  v.  Baxter
                                                           ____      ______

          Healthcare  Corp.,  920  F.2d  446  (7th  Cir.  1990)  (equitable
          _________________

          tolling);  Jensen  v.  Frank,  912  F.2d  517  (1st   Cir.  1990)
                     ______      _____

          (equitable  tolling); Dillman v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 784 F.2d
                                _______    ______________________

                              
          ____________________

          10  We note that  the legislature has since amended  section 2165
          to provide for the agency discretion that the plaintiff argues we
          should  read into  the statute.    Pursuant to  section 2165,  as
          amended,  the agency loses jurisdiction after ninety days "unless
          the agency, for just cause  and within those ninety days, extends
          the term"  for at most another thirty days.  Act No. 27, H.B. No.
          1684,  Uniform Administrative Procedures Act -- Judicature Act of
          1994 (West 1997).

                                         -26-

          57 (2d  Cir. 1986)  (equitable estoppel  and equitable  tolling).

          Moreover, we  find that  the facts alleged  by the  plaintiff, as

          they  are  discussed throughout  this  opinion, fail  to  raise a

          genuine issue of  material fact requiring a trial.   The district

          court's grant of summary judgment is therefore appropriate.

                    Affirmed.  Parties shall bear their own costs.  
                    Affirmed
                    ________

                                         -27-