Court Opinion

ID: 9558030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:01:54.776852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:06.407744
License: Public Domain

*1113ROSE, Justice.
INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that the courts should not undertake to administer the school systems of Wyoming. We should not substitute our judgment in educational matters for those of school boards and administrators. We said as much in Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, Wyo., 544 P.2d 870, 874:
“. . . This court has consistently recognized the importance of administrative boards and their decisions. It has adhered to the rule that our courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the particular hoard or commission . . . ” (Citing cases) 1
We reaffirm and again embrace this rule. Still, in the school systems, there are some interrelated obligations which are sometimes overlooked, disregarded, or— perhaps — simply not understood by school administrators, teachers, lawyers, judges, and even the public at large. We need to contemplate these as we revisit the manner in which school administrators and teachers are legally obligated to conduct themselves with respect to each other and their professional duties.
First off, the general public — indeed, all of society, has a massive interest in maintaining good schools. “Good schools” means good teachers — and by “good teachers” we mean “good” in all important aspects of their professional lives.
Secondly, however, we must remember that teachers are mere humans with the same strengths, foibles and frailties common to all of us. It may, therefore, be assumed that an individual teacher may or may not — for one reason or the other — be able to fit into a given school system. Whether or not the teacher can adjust to the established order does not ’change the fact that he or she is still a human being. The heavy responsibility that the teacher agrees to and must discharge to the organized school structure is placed into apposition by the school board’s counterobligation not to play whimsical games with the lives of those whose service they have enlisted. If the teacher does not measure up, according to reasonable standards of professional requirement, the teacher may be removed, but in the process of removal, all the rights and interests of all of those concerned must be considered. This includes the rights of
(a) Society;
(b) The children;
(c) The parents;
(d) The other school teachers;
(e) The administrators; and
(f) The teacher himself.
In protecting all of these various rights, the court must see that the rules and the law with respect to removal and termination are followed. If they are not — and in the discharge of our duties of protecting all of the peoples’ interests — the court will not approve the actions of the board. School boards must follow the law in dismissing teachers. Where they do not — as here — the dismissal cannot receive our sanction.
BACKGROUND
When he was dismissed (or terminated) 2, the appellant Powell was, and had *1114been for eight years, a continuing contract teacher in the Moorcroft High School, Crook County, Wyoming, with some constitutionally-protected rights in his employment. Roush v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, Wyo., 497 P.2d 540.
Powell received a letter informing him that his superintendent was recommending his contract not be renewed for the school year 1974-1975, under and by authority of § 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., pertaining to suspension and dismissal of teachers. A hearing was demanded and had on an oral agreement, whereby the parties acknowledged that the only charges against which the teacher need defend are the following:
“1. Neglect of duty (leaving the classroom and students unattended).
“2. Failure to follow district policy as outlined under general regulations. (N) Page [sic] 31 and 32.
“3. The inability to establish rapport with students.
“4. Insubordination.”
Of the four charges, only “neglect of duty” and “insubordination” are specific statutory grounds for dismissal (§ 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.). “Failure' to follow district policy” and “inability to establish rapport with the students” are grounds for termination only if they may be included in the phrase, “other good or just cause,” as recited by § 21.1-160, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.3
After the hearing the Board convened to consider the question at hand, with the Minutes of the Board reflecting the following:
“Chairman Moline called the Board back into regular session and called for a vote on the following order: Order to terminate the contract of Thomas W. Powell at the conclusion of the 1973-74 school year on grounds of failure to establish rapport with students. The vote being 8 to 0, It was therefore ordered by the Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. One, that the contestant’s employment with Crook County School District No. One be, and is, hereby terminated at the conclusion of the 1973-74 school year.” [Emphasis supplied]
The only relevant purported “finding of fact” is:
A. “That the Contestant has been unable to control the conduct of his students as evidenced by the unusual amount of disciplinary problems that have developed in his classroom during the 1973-1974 school year, which in turn has caused a great amount of dissention [sic] between the Administration and the Contestant.” [Emphasis supplied]
The applicable purported “conclusion of law” made by the Board is:
B. “That the Contestant failed to establish rapport with his students during the 1973-1974 school year.” [Emphasis supplied]
Of course, “B” above is not a conclusion of law. However, in order to thoroughly inquire of the question, we are assuming that it was placed in “conclusions of law” by mistake; and, for purposes of this part of our opinion only, we treat it as though it were categorized as a “finding of fact.” 4
*1115In light of the charges lodged — the Board’s order, together with the “finding of fact,” which finding determined — only that the teacher
“has been unable to control the conduct of his students . . . ”
and our gratuitous assumption that he
“failed to establish rapport with his students ...”
is also a finding of fact for the limited purpose of this portion of the problem’s analysis, we, therefore must come to the following conclusions:
(1) He was found not guilty of the charge of “neglect of duty.”
(2) He was found not guilty of the charge of “insubordination.”
(3) He was found not guilty of a charge of “failure to follow district policy as outlined under general regulations. (N) Pages 31 and 32.”5
(4) He was found guilty of a professional deficiency which allegedly constituted statutory “good or just causes [s]” for termination, namely,
(a) inability to establish rapport and
(b) an inability to control the conduct of the students.
It must be remembered that, of these last two complaints, the order of the Board found him guilty of only one — inability to establish rapport. The teacher was only charged with one — failure to establish rapport. The other student-disciplinary accusation, consisting of an inability “to control the conduct of the students,” was not brought against him. We ask, rhetorically, if there is not a fatal, irreconcilable inconsistency between a finding of not guilty of the charge of failure to follow the Board’s student-discipline policy and a finding of fact that the contestant is “unable to control the conduct of the students,” a charge that was not made against him.6
THE ISSUE
We delineate the only issue for decision to be whether or not a failure to establish “rapport” with the students is ground for dismissal as ordered by the Board. Since we find that such ground does not exist, it is not necessary to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the order of failure to establish rapport.

Exclusion of Inability to Control Conduct as an Issue on Appeal

In defining the issue, we exclude the question of whether or not the appellant *1116was unable to control the conduct of his students. Inability to control conduct is a student-discipline matter and the ability or inability of the teacher to maintain discipline in the classroom is not in issue because, while he was charged with a failure to follow the District’s discipline policy, he stands, by reason of the Board’s silent response, not guilty of this. Mr. Powell was not charged with any other disciplinary shortcoming. The result of the operation of a presumption of innocence seems to us to say, with reference to the Board’s disciplinary policy 7, that:
(a) He was able to meaningfully motivate the students through preparation and planning;
(b) He stressed Board standards of conduct — not “rules and regulations”;
(c) He provided “necessary guidance for continuing student self actualization”; and
(d) Where the students were “continuously disruptive,” it is to be assumed that the teacher, according to Board policy, employed and called upon “the resources of the district; i.e., administrators, guidance counselors, etc.,” in an effort to “rehabilitate the student prior to taking action designed to remove the student from school.” It must be further assumed that the appellant employed and gave effect to the procedures established by the Board to be followed for student discipline, namely, informing student, principal and counselor and parents of unacceptable behavior — that he discharged his obligations with respect to arranging parental conferences and he adhered to the rules with respect to suspension.

Inability to Control Conduct

Should inability to control the conduct of the students be excluded from our consideration ? The only student-discipline shortcoming lodged against Powell was his failure to follow District policy, with respect to which he stands innocent. He is, nonetheless, being terminated for a disciplinary shortcoming with which he had not been charged — namely, his inability “to control the conduct of his students.” In other words, inability to maintain discipline.
Let it be conceded that a charge of inability to maintain discipline, supported by facts (i.e., “control the conduct of his students”), is “good or just cause” 8 for terminating or dismissing a contract teacher. The question remains- — can the appellant be terminated or dismissed for this reason when he is not charged with this professional deficiency, while, at the same time, he is presumed to have followed the Board’s detailed policy of enforcing student discipline — an alleged fault concerning which charges were lodged ?

Notice

As we have said, Mr. Powell was a continuing contract teacher with eight years of his life invested in the Moorcroft school system. The Wyoming Statutes, § 21.1-154, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., provide that such a teacher shall be employed
“ . . . on a continuing basis from year to year without annual contract renewal . . . ”
In Roush v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, Wyo., 497 P.2d 540, 542, and Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Sydney Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976), we quoted with approval from Endicott v. Van Petten, D.C.Kan., 330 F.Supp. 878, 883, the following:
“ ‘ * * * The very purpose of tenure and continuing contract laws is to give recognition to a constitutionally protecti-ble interest. This type of statute gives teachers a certain degree of security in their positions and guarantees freedom to teach by protecting them from removal on unfounded charges * * *.’ ” [Emphasis supplied]
*1117The notice sections of the Administrative Procedure Act, § 9-276.25 (a) and (b) (4), W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., provide :
“§ 9-276.25. Contested cases; procedure generally; subpoenas.—
“(a) Notice to be given. — In any contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice served personally or by mail
!‘(b) Statement in notice. — The notice shall include . . . :
⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ifc ⅝
“(4) A short and plain statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or other party is unable to state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved, and thereafter upon application a more definite and detailed statement shall be furnished.” [Emphasis supplied]
Likewise, written notice of dismissal is required by the Education Code, § 21.1-160 (a), W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., in the following words:
“(a) Written Notice: Suspension or dismissal proceedings shall be initiated by the superintendent or any member of the board delivering to the teacher a written notice thereof, together with written reasons therefor.” [Emphasis supplied]
The hearing will be conducted “on the reasons (as referred to in § 21.1-160(b), W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.), for such dismissal . . . ”9 [Emphasis supplied]
We hold that the only student-disciplinary issue of which the teacher was notified was a failure to follow the Board’s policy with respect to discipline and, having made no finding concerning this charge, thereby leaving him to be presumed innocent thereof, the appellant may not now be found quilty of a student-disciplinary deficiency (unable to control conduct), with which he had not been charged.
In order to satisfy the minimum rights of the appellant he must have had adequate, specific notice of those things with which he was being charged. This is a due-process guarantee which allows him to prepare for his hearing.
We said in Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, Sheridan County, Wyo., 440 P.2d 1, 4 (1968):
“. . . The important question is whether or not the parties had fair notice of the issues involved . . .”
Did Powell have fair notice that he could be found guilty of a student-discipline inadequacy (inability to control conduct), concerning which there had been no charges made, even though he were to successfully defend against the charge of failure to follow student-disciplinary policies of the Board? We hold that he did not.
What is “fair notice” under Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, as applied to this case? If Mr. Powell was going to be required to defend a student-disciplinary charge, it was necessary to specifically inform and notify him as contemplated by § 9-276.25 (a) and (b)(4) and § 21.1-160(b), supra. He had a right to believe that the only student-discipline complaint was embraced in the charge of not following the Board’s discipline policy. According to the manner in which the issues were framed, there is no reason to believe he should have guessed that there might be additional dissatisfaction with his student-disciplinary methods over and above and outside the charge that he had failed fo follow the District’s student-discipline policy.

*1118
Rapport

The teacher was charged with and found guilty of
“inability to establish rapport with students.”
There were, however, no specific findings of fact made with respect to this charge and it is, therefore, conclusionary and thus insufficient to support an order of discharge. Furthermore, for the reasons set out above, it is necessary to exclude all testimony and evidence of any kind bearing upon a purported inability to control the conduct of the students as proof of the teacher’s failure to establish rapport. Therefore, even though the order is deficient because it is unsupported by a proper finding of fact, the remaining naked question may be identified as follows:
Is a failure to establish rapport with the students, by and of itself, “good and just cause” to terminate Mr. Powell?
We hold that it is not “a good or just cause” as required by the statute as a matter of law.
What is rapport ?
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines the word as follows:
“relation marked by harmony, conformity, accord, or affinity.”
At the outset, it readily appears that "rapport” as employed in this context connotes a mental or emotional interrelationship between teacher and student, as compared to conduct control which imports an affirmative disciplinary technique. Is it a prerequisite of good teaching that the instructor maintain good “rapport” with the students in all conceivable circumstances ? Are judges supposed to know out of hand that the answer to this question is in the affirmative and therefore become obligated to take judicial knowledge of the fact that a teacher who does not have good rapport with the students should be fired ?
It is not invading the facts here too deeply, in order to establish a proposition of law, to ask indulgence with the following hypothetical inquiry:
Assume there were five boys who had been made to repeat the course — they were admittedly embittered by the requirement and had vowed to disrupt the class — at any cost whatever. Assume they embarked upon such a course of conduct which resulted in the teacher having almost no rapport with them, even though the instructor followed the Board’s prescribed disciplinary procedure to the letter.
Are we to condone the firing of the teacher for being unable to establish a rapport with these boys? We think not — it asks too much — perhaps no human could establish a “rapport” with them under such conditions.
Another question that comes to mind — is it rapport they need or is it discipline? If it was discipline — the record shows that the disciplinary procedures were presumptively followed. If it was rapport — it, perhaps, did not exist. But these assumptions and questions only emphasize the vagaries and uncertainties in which school boards and administrators, as well as lawyers, judges and contestants find themselves enmeshed when a definitive acceptable standard of professional conduct is not furnished — proven—and in the appellate process relied upon. We know of no case, nor has any been cited — where the teacher’s “failure to establish rapport with his students” has been held to be sufficient ground for discharge. In the absence of such citation, we must assume none were found. Nation v. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F., Wyo., 518 P.2d 931.
We make one final observation concerning the “good cause” facts necessary to support the discharge of a teacher. “Good cause” cannot be just any reason that the Board deems sufficient for the discharge of the teacher. We have held in Monahan v. Board of Trustees, etc., County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 237:
“It becomes clear then, from what we have said, that a hearing on termination of a continuing contract teacher in*1119volves the question of whether there is good cause for termination. There must not only be good cause but there must be substantial evidence before the board to show that there is good cause. Absent either, a decision on the part of the board to terminate will be arbitrary.”
Not only must there be “good cause” and substantial evidence in support of the charge, but in order for the facts to sustain such a charge they must bear reasonable relationship to the teacher’s fitness or capacity to perform his duties in that position. Where a teacher’s discharge was the concern of the court, it was said in Stiver v. State, 211 Ind. 380, 1 N.E.2d 1006, 1008: “. . . ‘other good and just cause’
would include any cause which bears a reasonable relation to the teacher’s ‘fitness or capacity to discharge the duties of his position . . .’”
Where a definition of cause was under consideration in a teacher contract-termination case the court said in Jepsen v. Board of Education, 19 Ill.App.2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417, 418-419:
“. . . In Murphy v. Houston, 1928, 250 Ill.App. 385, the court defined cause to mean ‘some substantial shortcoming which renders continuance in his office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and something which the law and a sound public opinion recognize as good cause for his not longer occupying the place.’ The rule as laid down is in harmony with Throop on Public Officers (Book III, Chapter XVI); City of Chicago v. Condell, 1905, 124 Ill.App. 64; Heaney v. City of Chicago, 1904, 117 Ill.App. 405; Joyce v. City of Chicago, 1905, 120 Ill.App. 398, affirmed 216 Ill. 466, 75 N.E. 184; City of Chicago v. Gillen, 1906, 124 Ill.App. 210; Joyce v. Board of Education of Chicago, 1945, 325 Ill.App. 543, 60 N.E.2d 431 ...”
We find the test of good cause with respect to public officers generally to be facts which are related to the office and affect the administration thereof. Guine v. Civil Service Commission, 149 W.Va. 461, 141 S.E.2d 364, 368-369 ; 63 Am.Jur. 2d, Public Officers, § 202, Note 57, page 752.
Therefore, it is the decision of this court that the “good cause” to which the statute refers when the term “any other good or just cause” is used in § 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., or when good cause is contemplated as discussed in Mon-ahan, supra, these terms assume facts which bear a relationnship to the teacher’s ability and fitness to teach and discharge the duties of his or her position.
For the reasons above stated, we hold that a general charge of “inability to establish rapport with his students,” unsupported by definition and specific facts going straight to the charge, is insufficient, standing alone, to constitute “other good or just cause” under the statute, or the good cause which is necessary to insulate the order of termination or dismissal against capriciousness and arbitrariness. We repeat —in coming to this conclusion we place heavy emphasis tipon the fact that the Board failed to find the contestant to have been deficient in his administration of the Board’s disciplinary policy and there was no specificity of the rapport charge as required by the notice statute so that the contestant could know that the rapport allegation was an additional student-discipline charge which he would be required to overcome. In any case — and within the four corners of this record — we cannot come to a conclusion that an “inability to establish. rapport with the students” is in all cases — and indeed in this case — an “other good and just cause” under the statute which provides grounds for dismissing teachers.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
We reverse for another reason.
The only finding of fact made by the Board is that
“. . . the contestant has been unable to control the conduct of his students
*1120This is a conclusion and not a finding! Findings of fact are required under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. § 9-276.28, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., provides :
“ § 9-276.28. Same; final decision; notification. — A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or dictated into the record. The final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of fact if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings . . . ”
We said in Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550, 555, that the Administrative Procedure Act
“. . . wisely requires an agency in a contested case to include in its final decision ‘findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated.’ Such requirement imposes upon an agency the duty to make findings of basic facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are based. Unless that is done there is no rational basis for judicial review. Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 626, 65 S.Ct. 850, 89 L.Ed. 1235; California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 59 Cal.2d 270, 28 Cal.Rptr. 868, 379 P.2d 324, 326, 327; Cities Service Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission, 201 Kan. 223, 440 P.2d 660, 671; 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 16.01, p. 436 (1958).”
We further said in Pan American, supra:
“To illustrate, one of the duties charged to courts, on review of agency action, is to ascertain whether or not such findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. To afford the court an opportunity informatively and intelligently to discharge that function it must first be known what underlying evidentiary, facts the agency relied upon for a finding or conclusion of ultimate facts. Findings of those basic facts will not be implied from ultimate findings. Fallon v. Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, Wyo., 441 P.2d 322, 327, rehearing denied 443 P.2d 135 .. . ”
The rule of Pan American, supra, was applied in Geraud v. Schrader, Wyo., 531 P.2d 872, 879, cert. den., 423 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 205, 46 L.Ed.2d 134, where we said:
“. . . The court has examined the plans of all those submitted by the county committee and discovers that all are deficient in their findings and conclusions, in that there is a failure to abide by the direction in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n, Wyo.1968, 446 P.2d 550, 555, and repeated in State Board of Equalization v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., Wyo. 1969, 457 P.2d 963. It is insufficient for an administrative agency to state only an ultimate fact or conclusion, but each ultimate fact or conclusion must be thoroughly explained in order for a court to determine upon what basis each ultimate fact or conclusion was reached. The court must know the why .
“It is not an obligation of a reviewing court to dig into all of the detailed information gathered in the comprehensive studies made by the county committee as well as the state committee and determine the basis for an ultimate fact. It is the duty of an administrative agency to point out in its decision how it arrived at its final facts and conclusions. There may or may not be formed, a valid syllogism.”
The rule of Pan American, supra, was cited in Monahan v. Board of Trustees, etc., County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235 (1971). Finally, in Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, Wyo., 544 P.2d 870, 872 (1976), Justice McClintock, *1121speaking for this court, addressed the question of the substitution of conclusions for findings of fact and said:
“The first finding of the Commission is that ‘Mary P. Shenefield has been discriminated against * * * ’ by the Board. In Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550 (1968) this court expressed strong disapproval of so-called findings which were merely statements of the ultimate facts or conclusions of the administrative agency. Notwithstanding this clear expression, administrative agencies continue to make purported findings that in no way comply with statutory mandates and directives of this court. The finding that complainant had been discriminated against is in no way a finding of fact but represents only the conclusion of the Commission upon the merits of the case. It is therefore necessary for us to determine if the other findings of the Commission are sufficient to sustain this conclusion and if so, whether they are supported by substantial evidence as that term has been defined by this court.” [Emphasis supplied]
In Shenefield there were “other findings of the Commission” to which the court could look to sustain the questioned conclusion. In the instant matter there are none. The only finding is that he was
“unable to control the conduct of his students . . . ,”
a rank conclusion that does not even purport to contain the factual aspects required by the statute and decisions of this court.
The order of the district court is reversed for all of the reasons set out herein and the appellant Powell is reinstated in the Moorcroft school system, with all attendant rights, benefits and privileges enjoyed by him prior to receiving the letter of intention to terminate his employment.

. Sweetwater County Planning Committee v. Hinkle, Wyo., 493 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1972) (review of action of County Planning Committee for Organization of School Districts) ; Gore v. John, 61 Wyo. 246, 276, 157 P.2d 552, 562 (1945) (review of action of the Public Service Commission) ; Rayburne v. Queen, 78 Wyo. 359, 370, 326 P.2d 1108, 1111 (1958) ; Howard v. Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 86, 214 P.2d 737, 739 (1949) (action of Board of Land Commissioners) ; and J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. v. Hudson, Wyo., 348 P.2d 73, 75 (1960) (action of State Board of Equalization).

. It is necessary to use the words “dismissed” and “terminated” interchangeably and synonymously in this opinion. Even though the statute makes a distinction in the two terms, which we recognized and discussed *1114in Monahan v. Board of Trustees, etc., County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235 (§ 21.1-152, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.—Definitions), the teacher in this case was given notice, which included grounds for dismissal under § 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. (entitled “Suspension or dismissal of teachers.”), while the stipulation of the parties speaks of the hearing being had under the entire Education Code, as well as the sections having to do with termination only. This fact makes no material difference in the law of this opinion.

. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
“The board may suspend or dismiss any teacher for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, insubordination, or any other good or just cause.” [Emphasis supplied.]
There must be “cause” whether we are speaking of “termination” or “dismissal.” Mona-han v. Board of Trustees, etc., County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, supra, Note 2.

. Both “finding” “A” and “conclusion” “B” are mere non-factual conclusions and therefore do not qualify as legitimate findings of *1115fact in any ease. Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, Wyo., 544 P.2d 870, supra. Also, see Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550 (1960). See this matter discussed, infra.

. In General Regulations “N” the subject of discipline is considered and provides as follows :
“2. Discipline — Meaningful classroom activity and motivation of students through preparation and planning should be the rule. Teachers should stress broad standards of conduct, not ‘rules and regulations.’ Students should be expected to fulfill their obligations to themselves in obtaining more than a ‘minimum standards’ type of education. Therefore, within a humanistic context, teachers will provide necessary guidance for continuing student self actualization. In those instances that students are continuously disruptive, the resources of the district; i. e., administrators, guidance counselors, etc., will be used to attempt to rehabilitate the student prior to taking action designed to remove the student from school.
“The following procedures will be followed in student discipline:
“a. The student will be informed of his unacceptable behavior by the teacher.
“b. The principal and/or counselor shall be informed of a student’s unacceptable behavior.
“c. Parents will be informed of a student’s unacceptable behavior.
“d. A parental conference will be arranged,
“e. If [the] behavior continues, a one day suspension.
“f. If the behavior continues, a three day suspension.
“g. If the behavior continues, a 10 day suspension as outlined in the Wyoming Code.
“h. Referral to the superintendent.”

. Since Powell was charged with failing to follow .the Board’s student-discipline policy and the Board entered no order with respect thereto, he stands presumptively innocent of this charge for all purposes of this appeal.

. See the Board’s disciplinary policy, Note 5, supra.

. Section 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum. Supp., supra.

. The exact language of subsection (b) is:
“ (b) Hearing: Every teacher who has dismissal or suspension proceedings instituted against him shall have a hearing before the board on the reasons for such dismissal or suspension, unless such hearing is waived in writing by the teacher.” [Emphasis supplied]