Court Opinion

ID: 9653705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:52:13.766316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:53.023288
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Judge.
On original submission this Court unanimously reversed the case at bar apply*82ing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255. On the State’s motion for rehearing the majority, like Delilah, shaved Barber rendering it shorn like Samson of its natural strength. Such action limited the application of Barber to the reproduction of testimony from a preliminary hearing or examining trial and questioned its retroactivity. To such tonsorial approach this writer dissented pointing out his reasons for holding Barber retroactive. These opinions on the State’s motion for rehearing were handed down on December 18, 1968.
On January 13, 1969, the United States Supreme Court in Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 89 S.Ct. 540, 21 L.Ed.2d 508, held that Barber must be given retroactive application.
In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, the United States Supreme Court, only this month, held that the Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, error, there presented, was harmless constitutional error in light of the record before the court.
In view of Harrington and further consideration of the record in the case at bar, I am now convinced that while an error of constitutional dimension occurred that it was harmless constitutional error.
The case at bar was not based upon circumstantial evidence, the “unavailable” witness Porter was not the sole incriminating witness for the State, the fact that appellant shot the deceased was not disputed, and the appellant and his father subsequently testified and corroborated in essence the missing witness’ testimony.
The dissenting Justices in Harrington accused the majority of shifting the inquiry, in determining harmless error, from whether the constitutional error contributed to the conviction to whether the untainted evidence provided “overwhelming” support for the conviction. Under either inquiry I conclude that error here was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt given the setting of this particular case.
I therefore join Judge Morrison and Special Judge Griffin in their disposition of this cause.
I would caution, however, against any interpretation that merely because the tainted evidence is cumulative the error is harmless.
In Harrington the Court stated:
“We do not depart from Chapman; nor do we dilute it by inference. We reaifirm it. We do not suggest that, if evidence bearing on all the ingredients of the crime is ¡tendered, the use of cumulative evidence, though tainted, is harmless error. Our decision is based on the evidence in this record.” (Emphasis supplied)
For the reasons stated, I concur in overruling appellant’s motion for rehearing.
MORRISON, J., joins in this caution.