Court Opinion

ID: 9561142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:04:20.026734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:39.005944
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice,
with whom BURKE, Justice joins, dissenting.
I dissent.
The power of initiative and referendum is the basic recognition that under our republican form of government the ultimate political power exists with the people and not in some legislative body.1 These provisions permit the people to enact laws when the legislature refuses to act, or repeal acts of the legislature which are unpopular or unfair. Moreover, it is an additional check and balance on the governmental process because it acts upon the legislative awareness that such power exists with the people2
One set of critics at the constitutional convention claimed, however, that its limitations make it less than effective as a popular tool of government. They argued that the requirement of obtaining a large number of signatures from residents in order to put the issue before the voters significantly limited the use of the initiative process in all but a few cases.3
Now the majority opinion further restricts this process by countenancing substantial legislative limitation of the initiative procedure. When this court determines that the legislature may decide how much of the legislation supported by the people they want, the basic political right of initiative disappears, for it is not the will of the people that is paramount, it is the will of the legislature.
I find that the minutes of the Alaska constitutional convention and the commentary thereon are not as limited as the majority opinion indicates.
The initial proposal filed by the Committee on Direct Legislation contained the following language:
. Laws proposed by the initiative shall be submitted to the voters by ballot title at an election not later than 180 days after the adjournment of the legislative session following the filing of the petition, unless the legislature enacts the measure initiated during the session. 4
In the accompanying commentary the committee explained the content of the legislative enactment in the following terms:
If the legislature adopts a measure that is the subject of the initiative, the measure does not have to be submitted to the people, [emphasis added]5
The discussion and amendment of this initiative proposal was perhaps the most extensive and hotly contested6 of the entire constitution, covering 7½ days of proposals and counter proposals.7 This discussion included an extensive debate on the power to amend as being the power to amend and not the power to destroy.8
*741Subsequently the convention changed the proposal to provide as follows:
A referendum petition may be filed at any time. The secretary of state shall prepare a ballot title and proposition summarizing the proposed law, and shall place them on the ballot for the first statewide election held more than one hundred twenty days after adjournment of the legislative session following the filing. If, before the election, substantially the same measure has been enacted, the petition is void.9 [emphasis added]
The majority opinion finds this constitutional history inclusive and suggests that it may be supportive of the conclusion that the convention intended to give wide latitude to the legislature to change the initiative. I find it supports the exact opposite conclusion because of the extensive debate on the convention floor concerning the need for the initiative process, which was the subject of public hearings during the Christmas recess of the constitutional convention.
Further, the political climate of Alaska preceding, during and after the constitutional convention does not support a theory of distrust of the popular electorate or the legislation it would sponsor. Alaska’s history is replete with instances of frustration to get an absentee government in Washington to deal with pressing problems.10 In fact, such inaction was the greatest single boost to statehood. The members of the Alaska constitutional convention understood, more than most, the necessity of the initiative process for unpopular acts — for without it, the long years of struggle to achieve local control over our political destiny would have been cheapened.
In this case the legislature took the initiative title and enacted a measure which clearly was more politically palatable to them, but which is definitely not “substantially the same” as the initiative sponsored by the people.
In reviewing the referendum and the statute, I find that of the 19 separate sections of the initiative, only six are the same as the statute, and as part of the six I am including the section dealing with the powers and duties of the watchdog committee and the reporting system, which is only 50% of that stated in the initiative.
Seven sections have been eliminated entirely by the statute. This includes:
1. All references to United States senators and congressmen.11
2. Coverage of local elections is changed to local option.12
3. The requirement that out-of-state contributors submit themselves to Alaska jurisdiction.13
4. Almost all individual penalties for enforcement of the provisions of the act.14
5. All subpoena or investigatory power of the watchdog committee.15
6. All limitations on media spending.16
7. All requirements for equal charges by media and for equal time to candidates.17
8. Almost all reporting requirements by media, as well as all requirements that permits be obtained before media advertising is undertaken by a candidate.18
9. All requirements for the reporting and disposition of surplus funds collected.19
*74210. Most definitions and the statement of purpose.20
In addition, the dollar amount of expenditures has been changed in every instance to a higher figure.
Governor/Lt.
Governor $125,000 to $130,000
House 6,000 to 7,500
Senate 8,000 to 15,00021
Whereas the initiative required the disclosure of persons who contributed in excess of $50 to a candidate, the measure passed by the legislature requires only contributors of $100 or more need to be identified and reported.22 Moreover, every section dealing with failure to report, false reports, or perjury in reporting has been deleted, together with those provisions which provide for substantial fines for all people who refuse access to the records of a candidate.23 In addition, all sections permitting citizens to sue to enforce the provisions of the initiative have been eliminated.24
All power of the watchdog committee to delay certification of candidates or to bring charges requiring a delay of certification has been eliminated,25 as has the power of the court to declare the second highest vote-getter elected where expenditure violations were found.26
Additionally, the legislature removed most enforcement teeth by requiring that any violation found by the commission must be referred to the Attorney General for a decision of whether or not the violator would be prosecuted.27 The discretion to prosecute is an area of intense controversy, but such clearly depends upon factors outside the issue of whether or not a violation has occurred.28 Such things as the manpower of the office, the priority of work, and the seriousness of other problems29 can combine to make enforcement of this area somewhat improbable. To these practical problems is added a political reality which casts shadows over the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute. The Attorney General is appointed by the Governor; thus there is an unknown political factor which can effect the decision where the candidate or issue is one approved by the political party in power.
While the act does not explain how the watchdog committee will obtain evidence of violations without investigative or subpoena power, the statute is clear that there is no method of delaying certification or removing a candidate who is in violation without a court proceeding.30 Further, any case for voiding the election filed by the Attorney General must then be heard by the Supreme Court of Alaska as an original proceeding,31 rather than in the normal way of all other cases in the District or Superior Court. Since the Supreme Court must sit as five judges, it is a cumbersome body to hear fact disputes, particularly in view of its divided geographic situs and other work load. This process becomes even more cumbersome and somewhat questionable if constitutional rights of jury trial in certain cases32 and *743statutory rights33 to appeal all cases to the Supreme Court are considered.
The initiative recognized these problems by permitting the commission and private parties to bring suit to enforce its provisions and gave to the committee investigative and subpoena power to insure compliance. The elimination of these provisions goes to the heart of the enforcement provision and leaves, to a large extent, an illusory remedy. The initiative and the measure passed by the legislature have the same title and some similar reporting requirements, but by no stretch of the imagination are they substantially the same.34
The majority attempts to excuse the need for a number of the deleted sections by noting that certain federal reporting requirements or court decisions make them unnecessary. While disregarding the proposition that federal laws can provide effective regulation for Alaska elections when all complaints must be filed in Washington, D.C., I submit that this argument misses the point. The question is not whether the provisions are wise, but whether the legislative act is substantially the same as the initiative. It is for the people to provide the decision in situations such as this because the legislature failed to act until prodded by the electorate. By their inaction the legislators simply lost their ability to challenge the utility of the provisions. Their only power was to nearly duplicate the initiative, for that is just what the words “substantially the same” mean.
The majority’s final suggestion that the powers and duties referred to in several of the eliminated sections can be implied from other provisions of AS 15.13 flies in the face of two canons of construction which have been adopted in almost every jurisdiction: (1) criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, and (2) where there has been a material change in language of an act, it is presumed that the legislature intended to indicate a change in legal rights and obligations thereunder.35
I agree with the implication of the majority opinion that the sections eliminated affect the workings of the commission and various other provisions throughout the statute. However, I am unable as a matter of logic to find the flexibility in the act passed by the legislature to cover the gaps left by those sections deleted from the original initiative.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case with instructions to place the initiative on the ballot of the next general election.

. 2 Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, 981-975. See particularly the statements of Delegates Marston and Taylor, 959-961, before defeat of the motion to delete all reference to referendum in the article on 973.

. Fischer, Alaska Constitutional Convention, 79-81 (University of Alaska Press, 1975).

. Id. at 79.

. 6 Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, 19.

. Id. at 23; 2 Alaska Constitutioual Convention Proceedings, 929.

. Fischer, supra note 2, at 79-81.

. 2 Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, 928-1200 ; 3 Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, 2960-2993.

. 2 Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, 1173-1177.

. Section 4, Article XI, Alaska Constitution.

. Gruening, Many Battles, pp. 281-396 (Liveright 1973); Gruening, The State of Alaska, Chapter 28: “Self Government: The Quest for Statehood,” p. 460 (Kandom House 1954).

. Section 2 of Initiative.

. Section 18 of Initiative.

. Section 13 of Initiative.

. Sections 7 and 19 of Initiative.

. Section 4 of Initiative.

. Section 2 of Initiative.

. Section 16 of Initiative.

. Sections 5, 6 and 15 of Initiative.

. Section 10 of Initiative.

. Sections 1 and 20 of Initiative.

. Section 2 of Initiative. The majority refers to the last decennial census of 1970 to suggest $120,000 as the figure for Governor. However, constantly new census figures are validated to show changes for federal-state revenue-sharing purposes. The latest figures for 1975 make the $130,000 figure conservative.

. Section 9 of Initiative.

. Section 7 of Initiative.

. Section 19 of Initiative.

. Section 3 of Initiative.

. Section 19 of Initiative.

. AS 15.13.120(d).

. See Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court of Third Judicial District, 534 P.2d 947, 949-951 (Alaska 1974), for a discussion of the Attorney General’s discretion to decline prosecution in child support cases.

. Fischer, supra note 3, at 949.

. AS 15.13.120(b).

. AS 15.13.120(b).

. See Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-402 (Alaska 1970), for a discussion of cases where jury trial is required.

. AS 22.05.010.

. The only similar sections found in AS 15.-13.010-110 provide for
(1) a monitoring committee (.020 to .080) ;
(2) the reporting of contributions over $100.00 (.040) ;
(3) the registration of groups and the appointment of a treasurer (.050 and .060) ;
(4) limitations of spending by candidates in various races (.070) ;
(5) certain reporting requirements of contributors and a schedule for candidates (.080 to .110).
Additionally, the legislature added a tax credit of $50.00 from state income tax for political contributions. Also, publication of an election pamphlet containing background information on the candidates, costing each House candidate $25.00 and each Senate candidate $50.00.

. See Horack, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, § 1930, p. 412-414 (3rd Ed.1943).