Court Opinion

ID: 9636271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:22:17.072337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:43.693704
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
First, my perception of the factual situation presented by this case is quite different from that of the majority. Plaintiff/appellant was represented by counsel at various stages in this proceeding. Appellant’s father had contacted present counsel and was instructed by him to file a praecipe for a writ of summons in trespass due to the impending running of the statute of limitations. Counsel’s name was entered on the writ. Subsequently, appellant’s father met with counsel and formally engaged him to handle the case.
Thus, appellant’s father was not merely an unversed layman wandering through confusing courthouse corridors. He had received advice of counsel and entered counsel’s name on the writ. That appellant’s father erred in not *541following the correct service procedures is not properly laid to his status as a layman but is due to counsel’s failure to meet his obligations to his client.
Even though the relationship between a potential client and counsel may be transitory and tentative, certain obligations are created by even such a relationship. Among these obligations are informing the potential client of impending statute of limitations difficulties. This was done here—but that alone was not sufficient to discharge his duty. Directing appellant’s father to file a writ of praecipe, rather than doing it himself, or at least checking to see that it had been done correctly, was in dereliction of counsel’s duty.
Counsel doesn’t enter into merely a business relationship with his client, or even with his potential client. Their relationship is freighted with the obligations owed by a professional to his client. Appellant’s counsel did not meet those obligations here.
Second, the majority opinion establishes a test by which procedural rule enforcement is dependent upon the bad faith of the violator. As I read it, the language in Lamp about bad faith is dicta, merely part of the reasoning of the court, and should not be elevated to the status of a holding. It is an unworkable standard. It would create an additional and complex claim to be litigated with every procedural violation of this type. Further, the logic of the majority decision could create the same kind of difficulty when applied to other procedural rules.
I am mindful of the tragic disability appellant has incurred. In addition, I recognize that the enormity of that tragedy is compounded should appellant not be able to have his day in court to attempt to financially recover for his damages. However, our sympathy with the appellant’s position should not lead this court to create an impractical rule that would then have general application.
I would therefore affirm.