Court Opinion

ID: 9617642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:59:05.285279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:14.037237
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. I dissent from the ruling of the majority for the reason that the petition (1) fails to attack or otherwise show wherein the governing authorities have violated the law and the Constitution in the zoning of this property and in failing to rezone it to the particular use of commercial enterprises as requested by the petitioners under the broad discretion to adopt legislation as given to them, and as stated in Vulcan Materials Co. v. Griffith, 215 Ga. 811, 815 (114 SE2d 29), that the county authorities may create the number, size and shape of such zones and districts and regulate the use for which they may be set apart as they “may deem best suited to attain the purpose of the zoning regulations,” and “they are to be the judges,” and (2) it otherwise fails to allege the zoning is arbitrary or capricious but consists of mere conclusions of the pleader without any basis in fact that it (the zoning) “prohibits the use of the Tuggle property for the only use for which the *35property is reasonably and economically suited” and “is the equivalent to a complete destruction of plaintiffs’ property,” nor is it shown that the property “cannot economically and practically be used for the purposes permitted by the existing zoning described.” The pleadings point out the conditional uses as well as the residential and agricultural uses to which the property may be put which include churches, schools, clubs and kindergartens, but nowhere allege or show that these are not permitted by any request for same to the governing authority. Rather the pleadings show an unadulterated state of facts that the pleaders conclude “the highest, best and most desirable use” of the property is commercial — which may very well be true — but if they are unable to convince the governing authority, they are at the mercy of the Constitution which gives to the governing authority this broad power without any criteria or standards by which the courts may review the judgments of the authority adopting the zoning resolution or ordinance in its legislative capacity.
This mandamus action seeks to force the officials of DeKalb County to grant them building permits which the law and the ordinance of that county do not authorize or permit them to do so long as they are valid. The majority has not declared the zoning regulations as applied to this property unconstitutional or that the petition so alleges, and specifically states that no decision is made thereon. I am of the opinion that the petition merely states legal conclusions without any basis in fact sufficient to allege grounds for the relief sought. . It fails to substantiate the pleaders’ conclusions that as to them the zoning regulations are violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. The ruling that it is void as being arbitrary and capricious is an unsupported court conclusion and in defiance of the plain constitutional authorization therefor. Judges are incapable, for want of information and facilities, of properly zoning property, and they have no constitutional power to do so. I submit that these duly constituted county officials and governing authority cannot perform arbitrarily and capriciously here without a ruling that their actions are unconstitutional.
While this suit was filed before the effective date of the new practice act, and it is not completely clear whether or not it is *36being considered by the lower court under the old or new procedure since the demurrers are being considered, nevertheless, under either procedure, no claim or cause of action for relief is shown, and I would so hold. For these reasons I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Grice concurs with this dissent.