Court Opinion

ID: 9396482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 18:04:27.419894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.382083
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MATTHEW WILLIAMS,                          )
                                           )
               Appellant,                  )
                                           )
                    v.                     )         C.A. No. N22A-05-002 JRJ
                                           )
DELAWARE                                   )
THOROUGHBRED RACING                        )
COMMISSION,                                ) )
                                           )
               Appellee.                   )

                            Date Submitted: April 13, 2023
                             Date Decided: May 18, 2023

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
Upon Claimant’s Appeal from the Decision of the Delaware Thoroughbred Racing
                         Commission: AFFIRMED.

Michael L. Vild, Esq., Cross & Simon, LLC, 1105 North Market Street, Suite 901,
Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorney for Appellant.
Bradford J. Beilly, Esq., Beilly & Strohsahl, P.A., 1144 S.E. 3rd Avenue, Fort
Lauderdale, FL 33316. Attorney for Appellant.
Adria B. Martinelli, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of
Justice, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorney for Appellee.

Jurden, P.J.
                                 I.    INTRODUCTION

     This is an appeal from a decision of the Delaware Thoroughbred Racing

Commission (“DTRC” or “Commission”) to uphold the penalties imposed by the

Board of Stewards (“Stewards”) against Appellant Matthew Williams (“Williams”).

After considering the parties’ briefs, the record below, and the determinations of the

Commission, the Court concludes that the Commission’s decision must be

AFFIRMED.

                                 II.   BACKGROUND

A.     Facts

       On June 9, 2021, the Delaware Park Racetrack hosted the annual Obeah

Stakes race.1 Williams, a horse trainer and Florida resident, entered thoroughbred

racehorse “Dream Marie” into the 8th race of the day.2 Dream Marie placed first,

earning the first-place purse prize of $60,000.3 Following the race, a blood sample

was taken from Dream Marie and sent to Industrial Laboratories for testing.4 The

sample returned results showing the presence of the drug aminocaproic acid

(“Amicar”).5 Williams requested a split sample, which was retested, confirming the

1
  Williams’ Opening Br. 3, Trans. ID 68212501.
2
  DTRC Hr’g Tr. 5:14-18.
3
  Stewards’ Ruling, R 31.
4
  DTRC Hr’g Tr. 5:18-20.
5
  Id. 3-8; see also Stewards’ Exs. 2, 3.

                                             2
positive result.6 Under the DTRC Rules and the ARCI’s Uniform Classification

Guidelines for Foreign Substances,7 Amicar is a prohibited substance at any level.8

B.     Procedural History

       1. Stewards’ Ruling

       On August 21, 2021, based on the presence of Amicar in Dream Marie’s post-

race blood sample, the Stewards issued a Ruling finding Williams in violation of

DTRC Rules 15.1.1, 15.1.3, 15.3.1, and 15.18.9 In accordance with their decision,

the Stewards assigned Williams 0.5 penalty points, disqualified Dream Marie from

her first-place win, and required Williams to forfeit the $60,000 purse. 10 Williams

appealed the Stewards’ Ruling to the Commission.

       2. Commission Hearing

       The Executive Director of the Racing Commission (“Crane”) received notice

of Williams’ appeal on August 24, 2021.11 Rather than schedule the hearing for

September, Crane scheduled the hearing before the Commission for October 13,

6
  DTRC Hr’g Tr. 6:13-19.
7
   Association of Racing Commissioners International (“ARCI”). The DRTC has adopted the
ARCI Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances. 3 Del. Admin. C. § 1001-15.18.
8
  3 Del. Admin. C. § 1001-15.1.1. See also Stewards’ Ex. 8, at 22, 29.
9
   Transcript R.135, 4:1-7. The Stewards also cited rules 7.3.1, 7.3.6, 15.3.2, and 15.19 in their
Ruling.
10
   DTRC Hr’g Tr. 4:8-13.
11
   Id. at 51:14-15.

                                                3
2021.12 Williams subsequently requested a continuance on October 5, 2021, to

obtain a quantification of the amount of Amicar in Dream Marie’s blood sample.13

Crane granted it, rescheduling the hearing for November 17, 2021.14 Williams

subsequently asked for a second continuance, requesting that the hearing be

scheduled in January after a meeting of the Racing Medication & Testing

Consortium (“RMTC”).15 Crane denied the request for a second continuance.

       On November 17, 2021, the Commission conducted a public hearing.16 Ms.

Kembra S. Lydia-Moore, Esq. (“Ms. Lydia-Moore”), appearing on behalf of the

Stewards, testified to the facts as stipulated by the parties and offered Exhibits 1-10

into evidence.17 Ms. Lydia-Moore testified that Dream Marie’s blood, as tested,

contained Amicar on the day of the race; that Amicar is a prohibited substance under

the DTRC rules; and that Williams, as her trainer, was responsible for that

12
   Id. at 51:15-16. Crane testified that the Stewards’ attorney and counsel for the Commission in
this appeal scheduled the hearing later than usual as a courtesy, due to her full schedule. Id. at
51:16-19,52:18-24.
13
   Id. at 5. Williams submitted the sample for retesting by Texas A&M Laboratory to have the
amount of Amicar quantified. The lab determined that “the amount of Amicar [was] 26.7
nanograms per milliliter of blood serum.” Williams’ Opening Br. 6.
14
   DTRC Hr’g Tr. 51:20-22.
15
   Id. at 54:10-18.
16
   In addition to offering testimony on the merits of the appeal, Williams’ counsel again moved for
a continuance of the hearing until January. Id. at 66:22-23. Williams’ counsel argued that the
Commission should not rule until after the RMTC issues new recommendations on Amicar. Id. at
67:17-18. Williams’ counsel argued that updated guidelines would provide a basis for the
Commission to overturn the penalty imposed by the Stewards. The Commission ruled
unanimously to deny Williams’ motion for a continuance.
17
   See generally Stewards’ Exs. 1-10.

                                                4
violation.18 In closing, Ms. Lydia-Moore asked the Commission to uphold the

Stewards’ Ruling, including all penalties as assigned.19

      Counsel for Williams argued in favor of reducing or eliminating the penalty

imposed by the Stewards on the basis that (1) Williams did nothing wrong in

following the advice of his veterinarian to treat Dream Marie with Amicar seven

days before the race, and (2) the amount of Amicar in Dream Marie’s blood was so

low, it does not justify the penalty.20

      The Commissioners responded to Williams’ first argument by citing the

Trainer Responsibility Rule 7.3.1, stating that “the trainer is ultimately [] responsible

for the condition of the horse on race day.”21 And because Williams assumed that

role on June 9, 2021, he was solely responsible for the presence of prohibited

medications.22 Thus, given the presence of Amicar, the Stewards were bound by the

rules of the DTRC rule the way they did.23

                         III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

      The right to appeal a decision of the DTRC is created by statute. Under

Delaware Law, “[a]ny person fined or otherwise disciplined by the Commission

18
   DTRC Hr’g Tr. 61:15—63:18.
19
   Id. at 63:17-18.
20
   Id. at 14:18-16:22.
21
   Id. at 26:21-27:1.
22
   Id. at 27:2-17.
23
   Id. at 27:18-21.

                                           5
shall have a right of appeal to the Superior Court of the State.”24 When reviewing a

decision on appeal from an administrative agency, the Court plays a limited role.

The Court “does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make

its own factual findings . . . [i]t merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate

to support the agency’s factual findings.”25 Factual findings, “if supported by

evidence . . . shall be conclusive, and the Court shall be confined to questions of

law.”26 Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.27 The Court will review the

Commission’s discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion.28

                                   IV.     DISCUSSION

           On appeal, Williams argues that (1) the Commission abused its discretion

in refusing to hear testimony from his proffered expert witness, and (2) the

Chairman’s statements to Commissioner Killeen during the final vote constitute

legal error.29

24
   3 Del. C. § 10128(m)(2)(d).
25
   Sewell v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 796 A.2d 655, 659 (Del. Super. 2000) (internal citations
omitted).
26
   19 Del. C. § 3323(a).
27
   LeVan v. Indep. Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 2007).
28
   Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).
29
   Williams’ Opening Br. 9.

                                               6
A.    The Commission’s Decision to Not Hear the Testimony of Appellant’s
      Expert Witness Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

      In his opening brief, Williams argues that the Commission abused its

discretion when it agreed not to hear the testimony of his proffered expert witness.30

Under 3 Del. Admin. C. § 1001-19.5.10, at a hearing before the Commission, it “may

exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious.”31

      Though not citing any authority supporting his argument, Williams argues that

the Commission abused its discretion, pointing to the language used in its Decision,

where the Commission held Dr. Cole’s testimony would be “immaterial and unduly

repetitious.”32 Williams also claims that “the Commission never expressly stated at

the hearing the reason why Dr. Cole was not permitted to testify.”33

      Contrary to his claims, the record reflects that the Commission did consider

whether it would hear Dr. Cole’s testimony, and it was only after a lengthy argument

from counsel and a detailed proffer that it exercised its discretion to exclude her

testimony. In reaching this decision, all five Commissioners made statements on the

record expressing their view that Dr. Cole’s testimony was not germane to the issue

at hand. Specifically, Commissioner Killen opined that, while Dr. Cole’s testimony

would be “interesting,” nothing she presented would change the outcome of the

30
   Id.
31
   3 Del. Admin. Code § 1001-19.5.10.
32
   DTRC Decision 2, Trans. ID 67581374.
33
   Williams’ Opening Br. 13.

                                          7
Commission’s decision.34 Commissioner Stegemeier commented, “I don’t think we

can look at it in terms of what the [RMTC’s] decision may be or what the ruling may

be in January or February. It’s what it was at the time the race took place.”35 And

Chairman Patterson stated,

       As much as I want to hear from her, I have to agree with my fellow
       commissioners that it’s not relevant regarding this medication. There
       was a positive found. Regardless of the – whether it’s performance-
       enhanced or not, the medication was found. And, therefore, our rules
       that – state that there would be a disqualification on any positive.36

The Commission has broad discretion to determine what evidence it will or will not

hear.37 Accordingly, the Court finds the Commission did not abuse its discretion.

B.     The Chairman’s Statements to Commissioner Killeen Do Not Constitute
       an Error of Law

       Williams also argues that Chairman Patterson’s “statements to Commissioner

Killeen to secure the deciding vote to uphold the Stewards’ Ruling constitute legal

error.” Specifically, Williams takes issue with the Chairman’s statement: “Okay.

Debbie, I’m going to kill you.”38 Williams alleges that by making this statement just

before the deciding vote was cast, Commissioner Patterson “wrongfully

‘strongarmed’ Commissioner Killeen into agreeing with him.”39 He further argues

34
   See generally DTRC Hr’g Tr.
35
   Id. at 75:17-20.
36
   Id. at 78:15-22.
37
   3 Del. Admin. C. § 1001-19.5.10.
38
   Williams’ Opening Br. 15-16
39
   Id.

                                         8
that the Chairman’s statement is part of a broader pattern of behavior, indicating a

predisposition to denying Williams’ appeal.40

       Though Williams’ argument suggests that Chairman Patterson’s behavior at

the hearing constitutes legal error, the Court finds that his claim implies that the

Commission’s decision to uphold the Stewards’ Ruling was not based on substantial

evidence. Thus, the Court will address both points in turn below.

        1. The Commission’s decision to uphold the Stewards’ Ruling is supported
           by substantial evidence.

       In their Ruling, the Stewards found Williams in violation of DTRC Rules

15.1.1.1,41 15.1.3,42 15.3.1,43 and 15.18.44 The Stewards found a violation because

a post-race blood sample indicated the presence of Amicar, which “is not an

allowable medication in Delaware, not to exceed the level of detection in blood.”45

In accordance with DTRC Rule 15.18 and ARCI Uniform Classification Guide, the

40
   Id. at 1.
41
   “No horse participating in a race shall carry in its body any substance foreign to the natural
horse, except as hereinafter provided.” 3 Del. Admin. C. § 1001-15.1.1.1.
42
   Id. § 1001-15.1.3 (relating to “Foreign Substances”). With one limited exception not relevant
here, “[n]o horse participating in a race shall carry in its body any foreign substance . . .” Id. §
1001-15.1.3.1.
43
   Id. § 1001-15.3.1 “Any person found to have administered or authorized a medication, drug or
substance which caused or could have caused a violation of Rules 15.1 or 15.2, or caused,
participated or attempted to participate in any way in such administration, shall be subject to
disciplinary action.”
44
   “The Commission hereby adopts by reference the ARCI Uniform Classification Guidelines for
Foreign Substances, Version 14.4, December 2020. If there is any inconsistency between the
Commission's regulations and the ARCI Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign
Substances, the provisions of the Commission's regulations shall prevail.” Id. § 1001-15.18.
45
   Stewards’ Ex. 6. As classified by the ARCI Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign
Substances, Amicar is a “class 4 drug with a C penalty.” Id. See also Stewards’ Ex. 8, at 1, 29.

                                                 9
Stewards’ imposed a penalty requiring that Dream Marie be disqualified from first

place for the purpose of receiving purse money, and requiring Williams to return the

purse money earned by Dream Marie for redistribution.46           Williams was also

assigned 0.5 penalty points for the violation.47         At the hearing before the

Commission, Williams stipulated to the presence of Amicar in Dream Marie’s post-

race blood sample, thereby establishing a prima facia case for the violation.48 And,

after a lengthy hearing, the Commissioners voted to uphold the Stewards’ Ruling,

stating “the rules are the rules,”49 and “I think we should uphold the [S]tewards . . .

you did what we asked you to do. . . . And if the rules change, they change.”50 Thus,

the Court finds that the Commission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

        2. There is no evidence to suggest Chairman Patterson unduly influenced
           the Commission’s decision.

      Williams argues that the Commission, through Chairman Patterson,

committed legal error. In support of his argument, Williams cites Quaker Hill Place

v. Saville51 for the proposition that “administrative officials must conduct

proceedings with impartiality and proper decorum[, and] . . . that any tribunal

46
   Stewards’ Ex. 6.
47
    Id. The Stewards did, however, waive the recommended $1000 fine due to mitigating
circumstances.
48
   DTRC Hr’g Tr. 85:18.
49
   Id. at 99:9.
50
   Id. at 103:2-5.
51
   523 A.2d 947 (Del. Super.).

                                          10
permitted by law to hear and decide cases must not only be unbiased[] but also avoid

any appearance of bias.”52

          As the Commission correctly notes, Williams’ reliance on this single case is

strained. In Quaker Hill, the Chairman of the State Human Resources Commission

made baseless allegations that the appellant and the Attorney General colluded, sent

inflammatory and accusatory letters to the Attorney General after issuing its ruling,

and awarded relief not provided for under the law. The Court found that the

Commission had “ignored the mandates of due process and fairness, did not

correctly allocate the burden of proof of discrimination, and [] its findings of fact,

inferences, deductions and conclusions [were] not supported by substantial

evidence, nor [were] they the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”53

          The facts of Quaker Hill lie in stark contrast to the facts of this case. The

Commissioner in Quaker Hill acted egregiously and exhibited a personal interest in

the outcome of the subsequent appeal. Here, the Record reflects a lengthy hearing,

an in-depth discussion between the Commissioners, and an overall adherence to

rules and procedure. Williams has presented no evidence to suggest that the

Commission’s decision was not based on substantial evidence, nor has he presented

evidence suggesting that Chairman Patterson’s statements had any effect on the

52
     Quaker Hill Place v. Saville, 523 A.2d 947, 966 (Del. Super.).
53
     Id. at 967.

                                                 11
outcome of the vote. There is nothing in the transcript that reflects improper

deliberations or undue influence. Both before and after Commissioner Killeen cast

the deciding vote, she made several statements indicating agreement with the

Stewards’ Ruling.54

                                    V.    CONCLUSION

         After careful review, the Court finds that the Commission did not abuse its

discretion, there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision, and

the Commission’s decision is free from legal error.                  Consequently, the

Commission’s decision is AFFIRMED.

         IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                         /s/ Jan R. Jurden
                                                   Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

cc: Prothonotary

54
     DTRC Hr’g Tr. 74:13-21; 95:12-19; 101:3-6.

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