Court Opinion

ID: 9828599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:32:59.418574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:50.812969
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is urged on motion for rehearing that this court erred in overruling appellant’s eleventh,' fifteenth, and sixteenth assignments of error. These assignments relate to the charge of the court and the refusal of special charges as to the effect of the order of appellant authorizing employés to treat January 2d, the day the message was sent, as a legal holiday, the first falling on a Sunday, and to keep the office of appellant open only from 8 o’clock to 10 o’clock a. m., and from 4 o’clock to 6 o’clock p. m. on that day. It will be seen from the opinion that the message in question was received at 6:10 p. m., when it was delivered to the messenger, and that the office at Orange was then open and remained open until 7 o’clock p. m. It was further shown, which is however not stated in the opinion, that the messenger was engaged in delivering messages at least up to 7 o’clock. The point now urged in’ this motion for a rehearing is that any service performed by the agent after 6 o’clock p. m. was a gratuitous service on his part which appellant was not obligated to perform, and that it is therefore not liable for any negligence of its agents in the performance of this service. The following cases are cited in the motion in support of this contention: Telegraph Co. v. Rawls, 62 S. W. 136; Telegraph Co. v. Weeks, 128 S. W. 674; Telegraph Co. v. May, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 27 S. W. 760; Telegraph Co. v. Neel, 86 Tex. 368, 25 S. W. 15, 40 Am. St. Rep. 847. By referring to appellant’s brief, it will be seen that none of the propositions stated under the several assignments referred to even suggest the question here presented. They refer only to the duty of the appellant to keep its office open after 6 o’clock p. m., and none of the authorities cited in the motion for rehearing are cited in the brief, nor any authorities, in fact, bearing upon this question. Of the cases cited the strongest is Telegraph Co. v. Neel, supra, which arose upon a certified question. After reviewing the cases and referring to the conflict of authorities, the Supreme Court concludes its opinion as follows: “In the application of the principles of law to new cases, we should proceed with caution, and therefore we deem it proper to say that our ruling is restricted to the question submitted. Whether the rule we’ have announced should be applied to other regulations by telegraph companies we leave for decision when the question may arise.” The question submitted and answered can only be intelligently applied by reference to the state of facts upon which it was based, which were as follows, as correctly stated in the syllabus: "A telegram was sent from Yoakum to Cuero, Tex., July 29, 1891, at 4 o’clock a. m. The message reached Cuero at 4:59. The office hours at Cuero were from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m. *910The carrier hoy did not reach the office before 7 a. m., and the message was promptly delivered after the opening of the office.” In the present ease it appears from the undisputed evidence that the office at Orange was kept open until 7 o'clock. The message was not received until 6:10. The messenger boy was on hand, and, as stated by the agent, had other messages, some of which the agent telephoned to the addresses. In short, it appears that the office was open and the usual work of a telegraph office was being done until 7 o’clock. There is nothing to indicate that the order of the appellant with regard to office hours, differing from those on ordinary business days, on January 2d, was anything more than to authorize agents to observe these hours. The rule was for their benefit, and did not require the office to be closed, except between the hours named. In the Neel Case the messenger boy did not come to the office until the time for opening, when the message was promptly delivered. The telegraph company was without means of such delivery until the office actually opened in accordance with the established rule. The facts, we think, distinguish this case from the Neel Case and others cited, even conceding that appellee was bound by the rule authorizing employes to treat the 2d of January as a legal holiday. It is true that the evidence would have authorized a finding' of negligent delay in the transmission of the message from Cool-edge to Orange, but we do not think that it required such finding as a matter of law, and therefore we cannot say that the jury did not base their verdict on the negligent delay in delivering the message after it reached Orange. In such case, if this case falls under the rule laid down in the Neel Case, and is not distinguishable, some of the assignments of error referred to should have been sustained, if the question had been properly presented in the brief. But we doubt very much whether this question can be raised for the first time in a motion for a rehearing.
[15] The office of a proposition under an assignment is to specifically present the question of law intended to be embraced by the assignment, and where an assignment is not relied upon as in itself a proposition, but the pleader undertakes to state propositions thereunder, we think that this court is not authorized to consider any question not suggested by such propositions, nor is the appellee expected to make answer to them. Rule 30 (142 S. W. xiii). Any other rule would not be fair to appellee, who is only required to answer the question presented by such propositions.
We conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled, and it is so ordered.