Court Opinion

ID: 9353097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:04:37.876988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:34.482147
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                       COURT OF APPEAL

                                          FIRST CIRCUIT

                                         NO. 2022 CA 0530
l

                         KENNETH TRONCOSO AND GAIL TRONCOSO

                                              VERSUS

    IfPOINT                  CARR HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION ET AL

                                               Judgment Rendered.
                                                                       rJAN 10 2023

                                         Appealed from the
                                     22nd Judicial District Court

                                In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
                                          State of Louisiana
                                        Case No. 2011- 13315

                          The Honorable John A. Keller, Judge Presiding

        Wayne A. Collier                              Counsel for Plaintiffs/ Appellants
        Slidell, Louisiana                            Kenneth Troncoso and
                                                      Gail Troncoso

        Clint L. Pierson, Jr.                         Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
        Covington, Louisiana                          Point Carl Estates Subdivision
                and                                   Homeowners Association,
        Patricia R. Fox                               Patricia Childress, Michael
        Covington, Louisiana                          Bearden, Richard Capdebosq, Jr.,
                                                      Lesley Capdebosq, and William
                                                      Edgett

                         BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ-

     14P, s+ r-/, : Y•   C0nC+&r`]
THERIOT, J.

       This appeal arises from a trial court judgment denying plaintiffs' motion for

partial summary judgment, granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, and

dismissing plaintiffs' suit. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the portion of the

trial court judgment that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and

dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On March 15,     2002, Kenneth and Gail Troncoso purchased one of ten

individual numbered lots in Point Carr Estates Subdivision from the developer,

Waterfront Developers, LLC, for $ 1. 75, 000. 00.         The property purchased by the

Troncosos is identified as " Lot 9."

       In January 2008, Richard Capdeboscq,           Jr., owner of Lots 2 and 4, filed

Articles of Incorporation for the Point Carr Estates Subdivision Homeowners

Association (" HOA"),     a   Louisiana     non- profit   corporation.      The   Articles   of

Incorporation provided that the initial officers of the corporation would be Richard

Capdeboscq, Jr., President, and his wife, Lesley Capdeboscq, Secretary/ Treasurer,

and the initial Board of Directors of the corporation would be composed of Richard

and Lesley Capdeboscq. The Articles of incorporation further provided that "[ e] ach

person . . .    who   acquires,   through    purchase,     donation,     exchange,   or   other

conveyance, a residential lot in Point Carr Estates Subdivision shall be a member of

this corporation, and by virtue of such acquisition shall be deemed to have consented

to join the corporation and consent to be bound by all the terms, conditions and

provisions set forth herein and in the By -Laws as adopted by the Board of Directors."

       The Board of Directors ofthe HOA adopted By -Laws on September 24, 2008,

which purported to apply to "[ a] 11 present or future owners, lessees, invites, tenants,

or occupants of the Point Carr Estates Subdivision property as more fully set out in

the Restrictive Covenants of the Point Carr Estates Subdivision ...               or any other

                                              2
individual who may use the facilities or come upon the Point Carr Estates

Subdivision property in any manner." Also on September 24, 2008, seven individual

lot owners in Point Carr Estates Subdivision appeared before a notary and witnesses

and executed a document entitled " Dedication of Servitudes, Easements,                                         and

Restrictive Covenants of Point Carr Estates" (" Restrictive Covenants").'

         The property declared to be subject to the Restrictive Covenants (                                      the

 Property") was defined in the document as:

         ALL THAT CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND in Section 25 and 26,

         Township 9 South, Range 13 East, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana,
         more fully described as follows:

         Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 5 Northshore Beach
         Subdivision at the westerly right of way line of Carr Drive being the
         POINT OF BEGINNING,
         go South 60 degrees 32 minutes 27 seconds West — 239. 60 feet to a
         point;

         thence go North 30 degrees 16 minutes 37 seconds West —547. 76 feet
         to a point;
         thence go North 47 degrees 53 minutes 13 seconds East — 132. 27 feet
         to a point;
         thence go North 79 degrees 16 minutes 47 seconds East — 219. 06 feet
         to a point;

         thence go North 30 degrees 05 minutes 39 seconds East — 506. 36 feet
         to a point;
         thence go South 60 degrees 32 minutes 47 seconds West — 94. 69 feet
         to the POINT OF BEGINNING.                       Containing in all 4. 23 acres of land.

         The Property, as defined in the Restrictive Covenants, included all ten lots in

the Point Carr Estates Subdivision, including Lot 9.                           The Restrictive Covenants

declared that the Property " shall               be held, conveyed, hypothecated and encumbered,

sold,   used,     occupied,       and improved subject to the servitudes,                      privileges,      and

restrictions hereinafter set forth."                  They further provided that those servitudes,

privileges, and restrictions " shall be deemed to run with the land and shall be binding

upon the [ HOAJ, the [ HOA' s] successors, assigns and liquidators, and shall inure to

 The Restrictive Covenants were signed by Matthew McElveen ( Lot 1); Richard and Lesley Capdeboscq ( Lots 2 and
4); William Edgett ( Lot 3);   Darryl Tedesco ( Lot 6); Patricia F. Childress ( Lot 7); and Michael Bearden ( Lot 8)
collectively, the " individual defendants").   Although McElveen, Edgett, Tedesco, and Bearden each purchased their
respective lots with a spouse or former spouse, the spouses or former spouses did not sign the Restrictive Covenants.

                                                           3
the benefit of and be enforceable by the [       HOA], its successors,   assigns,   and

liquidators, and further shall be enforceable by the [ HOA] or any person acquiring

or owning any part or parcel of [ t] he Property."      Article IV of the Restrictive

Covenants, entitled HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, declared that "                 each    and

every Lot Owner, by accepting a deed and purchasing a Lot or entering into a

contract with regard to any Lot in the POINT CARR ESTATES SUBDIVISION

does hereby agree to and binds himself to be a Member of and be subject to the

obligations and duty [ sic] enacted By -Laws and rules, if any, of the [ HOA]."     The

By -Laws (Instrument #   1700255) and Restrictive Covenants (Instrument # 1700257)

were filed for registry in the conveyance records for St. Tammany Parish on

September 26, 2008.

      On December 31, 2010, the Troncosos executed a " Louisiana Residential

Agreement to Buy or Sell"      to sell Lot 9 to Richard and Yvette Warren for

 130, 000. 00 ( the " Warren purchase agreement").    Although the Warren purchase

agreement initially included a predication clause that conditioned the sale on HOA

approval of the Warrens' plans to build a 1, 900 square foot house on Lot 9, this

predication clause was removed by an amendment to the agreement dated January

4, 2011.   The Warren purchase agreement provided that the act of sale would be

executed on or before February 9, 2011, subject to a ten-day extension in the event

curative title work was necessary. The Warrens did not appear at the scheduled act

of sale.   The Troncosos allege that one of the reasons they were given for the

Warrens' refusal to complete the purchase of Lot 9 was the potential effect of the

By -Laws and Restrictive Covenants recorded against the property.

       On March 9, 2011, counsel. for the Troncosos sent an amicable demand letter

to the HOA and individual defendants regarding the "      Disturbance in Possession"

created by the recording of the By -Laws and Restrictive Covenants against Lot 9.

The letter stated that the Troncosos "   demand that their property be released,"   and

                                            4
further stated that "[ t] itle insurers have agreed that the attached Partial Release

executed and notarized by all of the individuals who signed and the [ HOA] will clear

title."   The letter requested that the recipients deliver the executed release to counsel

for the Troncosos by March 17, 2011, and stated that if the Partial Release was not

executed or if the Troncosos did not " receive a clear title policy,"       suit would be filed

and a preliminary injunction set for hearing.

          A " Partial Release of Dedications of Servitudes, Easements and Restrictive

Covenants by Point Carr Estates Subdivision Homeowners Association and By -

Laws" (" Partial Release")    was executed before a notary and witnesses on March 15,

2011 by Richard Capdeboscq, Jr., individually and as authorized agent for the HOA;

Lesley Capdeboscq; Childress; and Tedesco. The Partial Release states that "[ HOA]

and Individuals caused Instrument #      1700255 bearing Registry # 1864037 [ By- laws]

and #     1700257 bearing Registry #    1864040 [ Restrictive Covenants] to be recorded

in the public records for St. Tammany Parish on September 26, 2008,"              and "[   HOA]

and Individuals wish to release a portion of the Property," specifically Lot 9.            Three

of the individual defendants who signed the Restrictive Covenants did not sign the

Partial Release: McElveen, Edgett, and Bearden. The Partial Release was recorded

on June 9, 2011, with the missing signatures noted, as Instrument # 1814019 bearing

Registry # 2069759.

          On June 8, 2011, after negotiations with the Warrens were unsuccessful and

they refused to execute the act of sale, the Troncosos filed a " Petition for Damages

Arising from a Real Estate Contract" in the Twenty -Second Judicial District Court

against     the   Warrens   and   their realtor ( the " Warren    suit'),    seeking   specific

performance, damages, and attorney fees.          The Warren suit was assigned to Division

H.

          Also on June 8, 2011 ( the same date the Troncosos filed the Warren suit), the

Troncosos filed the instant suit (" HOA suit")      in the Twenty -Second Judicial District

                                              5
Court. The HOA suit, which was assigned to Division D, was styled as a possessory

action and suit for preliminary injunction against the HOA and the individual

defendants who signed the Restrictive Covenants, i. e.,                    Richard Capdeboscq, Jr.,

Matthew McElveen, Patricia F. Childress, William Edgett, Michael C. Bearden,

Daryl Tedesco, and Lesley Capdeboscq.'                    In the HOA suit, the Troncosos alleged

that the HOA and individual defendants caused a disturbance in law of their

possession of Lot 9 by executing and filing the Restrictive Covenants and By -Laws

for recordation, and further alleged that the recordation of these instruments against

Lot 9 caused them to lose the $ 130, 000. 00 cash sale to the Warrens. In addition to

a judgment of possession and damages for the disturbance of their possession, the

Troncosos sought an injunction to remove the Restrictive Covenants and By -Laws

from the public records against Lot 9.

          The parties to the HOA suit entered into a consent judgment on September 20,

2011, pursuant to which the Troncosos'                 request for a preliminary and permanent

injunction was granted, the defendants were enjoined from asserting any petitory

claims encumbering Lot 9, and the inscriptions bearing Instrument #                               1700257

Restrictive Covenants)           and #     1700255 (      By -Laws) against Lot 9 were forever

cancelled.         The defendants reserved all defenses and did not admit any liability to

the Troncosos.

          On December 30, 2013, the Troncosos' claims against the Warrens in the

Warren suit were dismissed on summary judgment. In written reasons for judgment,

the trial court found that the Warrens had pointed out an absence of factual support

for an essential element of the Troncosos'                    claim for breach of the purchase

agreement, i. e., that the Troncosos would be able to tender merchantable title within

the time period set forth in the purchase agreement. The trial court found that the

z The Troncosos also named as a defendant, " ABC [ 11nsurance who provides insurance to the defendants for the
liability to plaintiffs."

                                                      2
Warrens carried their burden on the motion through the expert opinion of Julian J.

Rodrigue, Jr.,       a real estate attorney and licensed title insurance agent, that the

Troncosos did not have merchantable title to Lot 9 on the date specified for closing

in the Warren purchase agreement,                    nor did they have merchantable title at the

termination of the ten- day curative period. Finding that the Troncosos failed to

present evidence in opposition to the motion to show that they would be able to

satisfy their burden of proving that they were able to tender merchantable title on the

prescribed dates, the trial court granted the Warrens' motion for summary judgment

and dismissed the Troncosos' claims against the Warrens.

        The Troncosos amended their petition in the HOA suit on June 24, 2411 to

specifically allege that the Warrens " refused to proceed to sale because the recorded

instruments asserted the property was subject to restrictions in                                     favor    of a

homeowners association," and the Warrens " would not purchase the property with

the recorded instruments of record." The Troncosos claimed that in addition to the

loss of the sale proceeds, they incurred costs and expenses as a result of the lost sale.

The Troncosos also alleged that " the               execution with the intent to file and the filing

of the instrument by the [ HOA] and individual defendants who signed as Owners is

a disturbance in law,"             and they sought damages resulting from the unlawful

recordation, including costs and attorney fees.'

        The Troncosos            amended        their    petition      again     on    September        8,   2015,

reasserting the allegations of their prior amended petition and adding additional

allegations, including allegations of fraud and misrepresentation.                              The Troncosos

alleged that the Restrictive Covenants constitute fraud and misrepresentation in that

they purport to apply to all lot owners and all lots in Point Carr Estates Subdivision,

including the lot owners who did not sign the Restrictive Covenants and the lots

3 On August 31, 2015, the trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action filed by McElveen as to the
Troncosos' claim for attorney fees and gave the Troncosos fifteen days to amend their petition to cure the exception.

                                                          7
owned by those non -signors. The Troncosos further alleged that the defendants

knew or should have known that the Restrictive Covenants were by their terms going

to be recorded against Lot 9.             The Troncosos also alleged that some or all of the

defendants were aware that the Troncosos had a potential buyer for Lot 9,'                                  who

planned to construct a home that was smaller in size than the defendants would

prefer, and that those defendants prepared and filed the Restrictive Covenants and

By -Lays for the purpose of interfering with that sale. The Troncosos further alleged

that the HOA and individual defendants were given an opportunity to avoid litigation

by assuring the potential buyer that their home would be approved if they proceeded

to sale, but the HOA and individual defendants instead stated that the restrictions

would be enforced and the home would not be approved.                             The Troncosos alleged

that as a result of the actions of the HOA and the individual defendants, they suffered

actual monetary damages, as well as consequential damages, and were required to

file litigation, incurring costs and attorney fees.

         Defendants McElveen and Tedesco filed a motion for summary judgment on

June 4, 2019, urging that the Troncosos lacked factual support for their assertions

that the recording of the Restrictive Covenants caused the loss of the sale to the

Warrens or that they suffered any damages at all as a result of the recording of the

Restrictive Covenants.            They also urged that the Troncosos' claims in the HOA suit

should be barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because the Troncosos

presented a contradictory argument in the Warren suit, which has been litigated to

its conclusion.         Specifically, McElveen and Tedesco argued that the Troncosos

should be bound by their assertion in the Warren suit that the Restrictive Covenants

were not binding on Lot 9.            In support of their motion, McElveen and Tedesco filed

 Although the Troncosos did not name the potential buyer referred to in this amended petition, these allegations do
not appear to refer to the Warrens.

                                                        8
a number of exhibits,'              including:        an excerpt from the Restrictive Covenants;                         a

February 17, 2011 "            Act of Servitude of Ingress and Egress," in which Waterfront

Developers, L. L.C., the developers of Point Carr Estates Subdivision, granted a non-

exclusive servitude of ingress and egress for residential purposes in favor of Lot 9

and the Warrens as owners of Lot 9; the Warren purchase agreement, including the

amendment removing the predication clause; the petition in the Warren suit; the

Troncosos' original and first supplemental and amending petitions in the HOA suit;

the December 30, 2013 partial summary judgment in the Warren suit, along with the

trial court' s written reasons for judgment; Rodrigue' s expert affidavit, prepared in

connection with the Warren suit, attesting to his opinion that the Troncosos did not

have merchantable title to Lot 9 on the necessary dates for three reasons, two of

which were unrelated to the Restrictive Covenants,6 and the third. being that the

    series of recorded instruments" ( the Restrictive Covenants and the Partial Release),

were "     suggestive of litigation;"' excerpts from Rodrigue' s deposition, in which he

opined that Lot 9 was not encumbered by the Restrictive Covenants because the

Troncosos did not sign the Restrictive Covenants;$ the October 10, 2011 Consent

5
    Many of the exhibits filed by McElveen and Tedesco in support of their motion are not included in the exclusive list
of documents that may be filed in support of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 4),
nor have they been properly authenticated by an affidavit or deposition to which they are attached. See La. C. C. P. art.
966, comments — 2015, comment ( c). However, it does not appear that the Troncosos objected to the filing of the
documents, so the trial court did not err in considering those documents in support of the motion. see La. C. C. P. art.
966( D)( 2) ( the court " shall consider any documents to which no objection is made").

G Rodrigue' s first two reasons for concluding that the Troncosos did not have merchantable title were: (    1) The 2002
act wherein the Troncosos purchased Lot 9 listed the owner/ seller as " Waterfront Development, LLC,"        when the

correct name was actually ` Waterfront Developers, LLC;" and ( 2) The developer of Point Carr Estates subdivision,
Waterfront Developers, LLC, had never transferred the streets to the HOA.

    Rodrigue' s third reason for concluding that the Troncosos did not have merchantable title was that the Restrictive
Covenants and Partial Release filed in the public records against Lot 9 were " suggestive of litigation."      Rodrigue' s

reasons for concluding that the recorded instruments were suggestive of litigation were that not all lot owners had
signed the Restrictive Covenants to impose the restrictions; some co- owners in indivision ( whose spouses signed the
Restrictive Covenants) did not sign, resulting in only a one- half interest in those lots being encumbered; and the Partial
Release was insufficient to release Lot 9 from the Restrictive Covenants because it was not signed by the owners of a
majority of the lots, as required by the Restrictive Covenants, nor even by all of the original signatories to the
Restrictive Covenants.

    During Rodrigue' s deposition, he discovered that he had made an error in preparing his affidavit. While reviewing
the recorded instruments, Rodrigue had mistaken Tedesco' s signature for that of Kenneth Troncoso, As a result,
Rodrigue' s affidavit assumed as fact that Kenneth Troncoso had signed the Restrictive Covenants as the owner of Lot
9, but noted that Gail Troncoso, who owned an undivided one- half interest in Lot 9, had not signed. Rodrigue
considered the fact that only one spouse signed the act to encumber the property to be suggestive of litigation. Once
he discovered the Kenneth Troncoso did not sign the Restrictive Covenants, Rodrigue testified that " Lot 9 was not
encumbered" by the Restrictive Covenants, but did not say whether this new information changed his opinion on the
merchantability of the title to Lot 9 vis- a- vis the recorded instruments.

                                                              M
Judgment in the HOA suit; McElveen' s affidavit, attesting that he only signed the

Restrictive Covenants as an individual for the purpose of encumbering his own

property and denying any responsibility for the drafting of the document or obtaining

other lot owners'         signatures on the document; the Warrens' motion for partial

summary judgment in the Warren suit, along with their statement of undisputed

material facts and their memorandum in support; Kenneth Troncoso' s affidavit

prepared in connection with the Warren suit, in which he attested that he and his

wife    tendered "      merchantable        insured title"        to   the   Warrens;       the    Troncosos'

memorandum in opposition to the Warrens' motion for partial summary judgment,

in which they argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the

title to Lot 9 was merchantable; certain exceptions filed by McElveen in the HOA

suit, as well as the August 31, 2015 judgment sustaining his exception of no cause

of action on attorney fees; the March 15, 2002 act of sale whereby the Troncosos

acquired Lot 9 from the developer; and Tedesco' s affidavit, attesting that she only

signed the Restrictive Covenants as an individual for the purpose of encumbering

her own property, that she signed the document before other signatures were

obtained and with the understanding that all other required signatures would be

obtained prior to filing in the public records by the attorney responsible for drafting

the document, and denying any responsibility for drafting the document, hiring the

attorney who drafted the document, obtaining other lot owners'                             signatures on the

document, or recording the document.

        The Troncosos opposed McElveen and Tedesco' s motion for summary

judgment and filed the following exhibits'                   with their opposition:           the Restrictive

Covenants; the HOA By -Laws; the Consent Judgment in the HOA suit; the March

9 Although the Troncosos' opposition to the motion for summary judgment lists Kenneth Troncosos' affidavit as
 Exhibit E," and the opposition memorandum refers to the affidavit in argument, this affidavit was not filed in the
record with the opposition.

                                                        10
9,   2011 amicable demand letter; excerpts from Yvette and Richard Warren' s

deposition testimony about their desire to purchase a lot that was not subject to

restrictive covenants and the role of the Restrictive Covenants in their decision not

to purchase Lot 9; and excerpts from McElveen' s deposition, in which he stated that

he did not recall being told what was going to be done with the Restrictive Covenants

after he signed them, although he " understood that it required some legal filing."

         After a hearing, McElveen and Tedesco' s motion for summary judgment was

granted, dismissing the Troncosos' claims against them. 10 The Troncosos initially

filed a motion for devolutive appeal of the September 25, 2019 judgment dismissing

their claims against McElveen and Tedesco, but that appeal was later dismissed as

abandoned.

         On August 16, 2021, the trial courts' continued and reset the trial on the merits

for November 23 and 24, 2021,                     and ordered the parties to file any motions and

exceptions in sufficient time to be heard on November 4, 2021.

         On September 17, 2021, the HOA and the remaining individual defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment, which was set to be heard on November 4,

2021.     The motion was a " me too"               motion, 12 in which the defendants stated in their

memorandum that they " adopt the Memorandum in Support of [ McElveen and

Tedesco' s] Motion for Summary Judgment, together with all exhibits, in exten,so."

The defendants argued that the September 25,                               2019 judgment dismissing the

Troncosos' claims against McElveen and Tedesco had become final, and the trial

115 Although the trial court issued written reasons for judgment at the Troncosos' request, these written reasons
consisted strictly of a statement that the trial court ` adopts the statement of the case prepared by plaintiffs [ sic} in
support of the motion for summary judgment," followed by a copy -and -paste of the " Statement of the Case" and
 Statement of Uncontested Facts" from McF,lveen and Tedesco' s memorandum and a statement that the trial court
finds that the supporting documents " show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law."

11 John A. Keller took office January 4, 2021 as the District Judge for Division " D" of the Twenty -Second Judicial,
District Court following Judge Peter J. Garcia' s death in March 2020.

12 See CamSoft Data Systems, Inc. v. Southern Electronics Supply, Inc., 2019- 0731, p. 5, n_ 2 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 712/ 19),
2019WL2865359, at * 2. n. 2 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2019- 01229 ( La. 11119119), 282 So.3d 1071 ( a " me too"
motion is a motion that attempts to adopt and incorporate the evidence, authorities, and arguments set forth in another
motion simply by reference thereto).
court' s reasons for judgment in that matter, including findings of fact, were the law
of the   case.
                 The defendants filed the affidavits of the remaining individual

defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment.          The affidavits of

Edgett, Bearden, Richard and Lesley Capdeboscq, and Childress each stated that

he/ she executed the Restrictive Covenants individually,      for the sole purpose of

encumbering his/ her own property, and denied any personal responsibility for the

drafting or recording of the Restrictive Covenants,

      The Troncosos opposed the defendants'         motion.   In their opposition, the

Troncosos objected to the defendants' adoption ofMcElveen and. Tedesco' s motion

for summary judgment and memorandum, arguing that there is no procedure found

in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure to satisfy the requirements of La. C. C. P.

art. 966 by adopting the pleadings of other parties.      The Troncosos argued that

adopted pleadings are not among the exclusive list of documents that may be filed

in support of a motion for summary judgment under La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4). They

also objected to the defendants' motion on the grounds that it does not comply with

Rule 9. 1O( a) of the Louisiana. District Court Rules because it does not contain a list

of material facts and essential legal elements or references to documents proving

such facts.   Further, the Troncosos filed the following exhibits in opposition to the

defendants'   motion for summary judgment:       the affidavit of Kenneth Troncoso,

stating that the Restrictive Covenants were the reason they were unable to cause the

Warrens to purchase Lot 9 and that the defendants refused his request to voluntarily

release Lot 9 from the Restrictive Covenants in order to allow the Warren sale to

proceed; an excerpt of the Restrictive Covenants; copies of the sales or transfers

whereby McElveen and his wife, Tedesco and her husband, Bearden and his wife,

                                           12
Edgett and his ex- wife, and Childress each acquired ownership in their individual

lots in Point Carr Estates Subdivision; and the Consent Judgment in the HOA suit."

           The Troncosos also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on

September 20, 2021, which was set for hearing along with the defendants' motion

on November 4, 2021.              The Troncosos' motion sought summary judgment solely on

the issue that the Restrictive Covenants constituted an unlawful encumbrance on Lot

9.    In support of their motion for partial summary judgment, the Troncosos filed the

Restrictive Covenants;              the HOA By -Laws; a copy of a Geoportal Map dated

September 14, 2021,              showing Point Carr Estates Subdivision, with lot numbers

handwritten on the individual lots; the Partial Release; the Consent Judgment in the

HOA suit; a July 27, 2020 Cash Sale whereby the Troncosos sold Lot 9 to Shannon

and Christopher Bell for $ 95, 000. 00, which states that the sale is subject to the

Restrictive Covenants filed in the public records in 2008; a subdivision plat of Point

Carr      Estates      Subdivision;        an   undated         document entitled "          Frequently Asked

Questions" on St. Tammany Parish Government letterhead, addressing enforcement

of restrictive        covenants,      along with an undated copy of what appears to be an

ordinance titled "         Sec. 40- 074. 01, Parish Enforced Subdivision Restrictions and/ or

Covenants,"           setting     forth     certain     required      restrictions        for    parish -approved

subdivisions that would be included on any final subdivision plat, run with the land,

and be enforced by the Parish Planning Commission; the March 15, 2002 act of sale,

including attachments, whereby the Troncosos acquired Lot 9; the HOA Articles of

Incorporation executed by Richard Capdeboscq, Jr. as incorporator; and the trial

court' s February 5, 2020 written reasons for judgment issued in connection with the

summary judgment in favor of McElveen and Tedesco."

13 Although most of the exhibits filed by the Troncosos with their opposition are not admissible summary judgment
evidence, the defendants did not file a reply memorandum raising an objection to the exhibits pursuant to La. C. C. P.
art. 966( D)( 2), so those exhibits must be considered by the court.

     Again, the defendants did not object to any of the Troncosos' exhibits filed in support of their motion, and those
exhibits must be considered by the court pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 2).   The Troncosos' motion for partial

                                                           13
           In opposition to the Troncosos'                motion for partial summary judgment, the

defendants argued that Judge Garcia' s written reasons for judgment issued in

connection with McElveen and Tedesco' s motion for summary judgment contained

findings of fact that are binding on the court as the law of the case and that preclude

summary judgment in favor of the Troncosos. The defendants did not file any

supporting documents in opposition to the Troncosos' motion for partial summary

judgment."

           The hearing on both motions for summary judgment was held on November

4, 2021.       Although the Troncosos had raised objections pursuant to La. C. C. P. art.

966( D)(2) to the defendants' motion for summary judgment and opposition to the

plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court did not rule on the

objections or specifically state in writing or on the record which documents, if any,

he held to be inadmissible or declined to consider.'

           After hearing arguments and reading the prior trial court decisions, the trial

court ruled in favor of the defendants.                          In ruling,      the court found, based on

Rodrigue' s expert legal opinion, that the recording of the Restrictive Covenants

without the Troncosos' signature did not create an encumbrance on Lot 9,                                             and

therefore the Troncosos failed to establish any damages. The trial court also found

summary judgment lists two exhibits purportedly filed in support of the motion that do not appear in the record along
with their motion; ( 1) "   EXHIBIT A —Sales of Lots and boar jsic] Slips in Point Carr Estates Subdivision;" and ( 2)
 EXHIBIT 12 — Affidavit of Kenneth Troncoso."          Although those listed exhibits appear to have been filed in the
record with the Troncosos' opposition to the defendants- motion for summary judgment, they cannot be considered in
support of their motion, since they were not actually filed with it. See Duran v. fioul' s Deli Juicy Juicy, L.L.C., 2021-
1600, p. 4 ( La.App. I Cir. 8/ 8/ 22), 348 So. 3d 735, 737 ( a court may consider only those documents specifically filed
in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, even if those documents appear elsewhere in the
record).

  The Troncosos filed a reply to the defendants' opposition, objecting to the defendants' failure to comply with La.
C. C. P. art. 966 and Rule 9. 10 of the Louisiana District Court Rules in their opposition. The Troncosos argue that the
opposition memorandum failed to include a list ofthe material facts that the defendants contend are genuinely disputed
and to reference documents proving each such fact.

Ib The provisions of La, C. C. P. art_ 966( 13)( 2) requiring that the trial court " shall consider all objections prior to
rendering judgment" and " shall specifically state on the record or in writing which documents, if any, it held to be
inadmissible or declined to consider" are mandatory. James as Co -Trustees ofAddison Family Trust v. Strobel, 2019-
0787, p. 10 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 6/24120), 2020WL3446635, at * 5; see also La. C. C. P. art. 5053 ( the word " shall" is
mandatory)_    Although it was error for the trial court to proceed with the motions without ruling on the Troncosos'
objections, given our disposition of this matter, this error is of no moment.

                                                            14
that there was no liability of the individual defendants, based on their affidavits

stating that they only signed the Restrictive Covenants and were not responsible for

drafting or recording the Restrictive Covenants. A judgment was signed granting

the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the Troncosos' suit, and
                                                                                             17
denying the Troncosos' motion for partial summary judgment.                                       The trial court

issued written reasons for judgment at the request of the Troncosos, in which he

found that the Troncosos failed to provide proof that any of the remaining individual

defendants was responsible for the drafting or recording of the Restrictive

Covenants, and further that the Troncosos failed to provide proof of an encumbrance

or damages resulting therefrom.                  The Troncosos filed a motion for new trial on a

number       of    grounds,      including the           defendants'        failure     to comply with the

requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 966 and District Court Rule 9. 10 and the trial court' s

misapplication of the law of the case doctrine, which was denied.                                     This appeal

followed.

         On appeal, the Troncosos argued that the trial court erred in considering the

defendants'       motion for summary judgment in spite of their objections to the

defendants'       failure to comply with the procedural requirements for motions for

summary judgment; in finding that the invalid restrictions did not affect the title to

Lot 9; in finding that no liability existed on the part of the individual defendants; and

in finding that the Troncosos offered no proof of damages in opposition to the

defendants' motion for summary judgment.

                                                 DISCUSSION

         Summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action.                      The procedure is favored and shall be

  The judgment signed by the trial court on December 14, 2021 lacked proper decretal language required for a final
judgment. In accordance with La. C. C. P. arts_ 1918( A), 1951, and 2088( A)( 12), this matter was remanded to the trial
court by an August 17, 2022 interim Order for the issuance of an amended judgment correcting deficiencies in the
December 14, 2021 judgment. The appellate record was thereafter supplemented with an amended judgment issued
by the trial court on August 29, 2022.

                                                           15
construed to accomplish these ends. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 2).     After an opportunity

for adequate discovery, summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P.

art. 966( A)(3).    However, a summary judgment may be rendered only as to those

issues set forth in the motion under consideration by the court at that time. La. C. G. P.

art. 966( F).

       Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria

that govern the trial court' s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate.    In re Succession of Beard, 2013- 1717, p. 10 ( La -App. 1 Cir. 616114),

147 So. 3d 753, 759- 60.

       In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court' s role is not to evaluate

the weight of the evidence or to make a credibility determination, but instead to

determine whether or not there is a genuine issue of material fact.            See Hines v.

Garrett, 2004- 0806, p. 1 ( La. 6/ 25/ 04), 876 So. 2d 764, 765 ( per curiam). A genuine

issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree. However, if reasonable

persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and

summary judgment is appropriate. Hines, 2004- 0806 at p. 1, 876 So.2d at 765- 66.

A fact is " material" when its existence or nonexistence is essential to the plaintiff' s

cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Smith v. Our Lady of the

Lake Hasp.,     Inc.,   93- 2512, p. 27 ( La. 7/ 5/ 94), 639 So. 2d 730, 751. Any doubt as to

a dispute regarding an issue of material fact must be resolved against granting the

motion and in favor of a trial on the merits. Id.

       The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the mover.

La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).   If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on

the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover' s

burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the

                                                f1ro.
adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. Rather, the mover must point out to the

court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse

party' s claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce

factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.         La. C. C. P. art.

966( D)( 1).   Although factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must

be construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, mere conclusory allegations,

improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation will not support a finding of a

genuine issue of material fact.   Guillory v. The Chimes, 2017- 0479, p. 4 ( La.App. 1

Cir. 12/ 21/ 17), 240 So. 3d 193, 195. Whether a particular fact in dispute is material

can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Larson v. XYZ

Insurance Company, 2016- 0745, p. 7 ( La. 5/ 3/ 17),   226 So. 3d 412, 417.

        The mover on a motion for summary judgment can meet its burden of proof

on the motion by filing supporting documentary evidence consisting of pleadings,

memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical

records, written stipulations, and admissions with its motion for summary judgment.

La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4). This list is exclusive, and documents not included in the

exclusive list may not be filed in support of or opposition to a motion for summary

judgment unless they are properly authenticated by an affidavit or deposition to

which they are attached. La. C. C. P. art. 966, comments —2015, comment (c). The

court may only consider those documents filed in support of or in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 2); see also Viering v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co.,   2017- 0204, p. 8 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 9127/ 17),   232 So. 3d 598, 603, writ

denied, 2017- 1821 ( La. 12115117), 231 So. 3d 637 (     observing that since the 2015

amendments to La. C. C. P. art. 966, parties must attach all documents in support of

or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment to their motion or opposition).

Oral testimony may not be allowed at the hearing, and the court cannot consider

                                            17
other materials in the record. La. C. C.P. art. 966, comments -- 2015, comment ( c)

and ( k);   James, 2019- 0787 at p. 8; 2020WL3446635, at * 4. The mover' s supporting

documents must prove the essential facts necessary to carry the mover' s burden.

Horrell v. Alltmont, 2019- 0945, p. 6 ( La -App. 1 Cir. 7/ 31/ 20),   309 So. 3d 754, 758.

       As noted above, the HOA and remaining individual defendants only filed the

affidavits of Edgett, Bearden, Richard and Lesley Capdeboscq, and Childress with

their motion for summary judgment. Although they attempted, by a statement in

their memorandum in support of their motion, to adopt in extenso the motion,

memorandum, and exhibits filed in this matter in 2019 by McElveen and Tedesco,

these materials elsewhere in the record cannot be considered on summary judgment.

See James, 2019- 0787 at pp, 7- 8, 2020WL3446635 at * 34 (where plaintiffs filed

no documents or evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment on their

cross- claim, but only a " Statement of Undisputed Facts" referencing documents filed

in the record as exhibits on their motion for summary judgment on the main demand,

the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden on the motion because only documents filed

in support of or in opposition to the motion may be considered);          see also Horrell,

2019- 0945 at pp. 8- 10, 309 So. 3d at 759- 761 ( request in movers' memorandum that

the court take judicial notice of court decisions in prior litigation between the parties

did not satisfy the requirements of La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4);   the judgments and suit

record from the prior litigation must be filed with the motion for summary judgment

in order for the court to consider them);   Forstall v. City ofNew Orleans, 2017- 0414,

pp, 8- 10 ( La.App. 4 Cir. 1/ 17/ 18), 238 So. 3d 465, 471- 472 ( where the mover failed

to attach any documents in support of its motion for summary judgment and merely

referenced evidence located elsewhere in the record, and La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 2)

precluded the trial court from considering other material in the record for purposes

of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the mover failed to meet its burden

of establishing a prima facie case that there were no genuine issues of material fact);

                                             18
and Davis v. Hixson Autoplex of Monroe, L.L.C., 51, 991, pp. 7- 9 ( La.App. 2 Cir.

5123118),   249 5o. 3d 177, 182- 183 ( reference to documents existing elsewhere in the

record is not sufficient -   the documents must specifically be filed in support of or in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment in order for the court to consider

them).    Because the exhibits filed by McElveen and Tedesco in 2019 were not filed

by the HOA and remaining individual defendants with their motion for summary

judgment as required by La. C. C. P. art. 966, those exhibits were not before the court

on this motion.   Only the affidavits actually filed with the defendants' motion may

be considered in determining whether the defendants satisfied their initial burden on

summary judgment.

         In their memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, the

defendants raised three grounds for the court to grant summary judgment. They

argued that the Troncosos would be unable to prove that the recording of the

Restrictive Covenants was the cause of their inability to sell their home; that the

Troncosos would be unable to prove any damages resulting from the recording of

the Restrictive Covenants; and that the Troncosos'         claims are barred by judicial

estoppel as a result of a contradictory argument in the Warren suit. The supporting

documents filed with the defendants'          motion (   the affidavits of the remaining

individual defendants) only contained attestations that the remaining individual

defendants executed the Restrictive Covenants individually, for the sole purpose of

encumbering his/her own property, and denied any personal responsibility for the

drafting or recording of the Restrictive Covenants.       These affidavits are insufficient

to satisfy the movers' initial burden on the motion for summary judgment, which

required them to point out an absence of factual support for the Troncosos' claims

that the recording of the Restrictive Covenants caused their inability to sell their

home or any other damages, or to prove that the Troncosos were judicially estopped

from raising their claims in the HOA suit based on their allegedly contradictory

                                             19
claims in the Warren suit.                Because the defendants failed to file any evidence in

support of their motion that would satisfy their initial burden with regard to the issues

actually raised in the motion, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of the defendants.

         The trial court' s oral and written reasons for judgment reveal that it also

granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on the issue of

liability; however, that issue was not raised in the defendants' motion for summary

judgment."         As previously noted, a summary judgment may gDly be rendered or

affirmed as to those issues set forth in the motion under consideration by the court

at that time.      La. C. C. P. art. 966( F).          A summary judgment decided on issues other

than those raised by the parties is legally erroneous and must be reversed.                                    See Leet

v. Hospital Service District No. I of East Baton Rouge Parish, 2015- 1148, p.                                           13

La.App. 1 Cir. 2/ 28/ 19), 274 So. 3d 583, 591.                    The purpose of the restriction codified

in La. C. C. P. art. 966( F) is to inform the opponent of the summary judgment motion

of the elements on which there allegedly is no genuine issue of material fact and to

avoid surprise. Cutrone, 201.9- 0896 at p. 9, 293 So. 3d at 1215- 16; see also Louisiana

District Court Rules Rule 9. 10 (                outlining the requirement for a memorandum in

support of a motion for summary judgment).                              Failure to enforce La. C. C. P. art.

966( F) results in a non -mover on a motion for summary judgment being required to

respond to the motion by submitting evidence that it will be able to carry its burden

of proof as to all essential elements of his claim, regardless of whether a particular

element of his claim was placed at issue by the motion or not.                                Cutrone, 2019- 0896

at p. 9, 293 So. 3d at 1216. Requiring a non -mover to essentially try his entire case

  Although appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment, and afford no deference to the trial court' s
underlying reasoning for its judgment when conducting de novo review of a summary judgment, those reasons may
be relevant when determining whether a trial court exceeded its authority by rendering summary judgment as to issues
not set forth in the motion under consideration by the court. See La. C_C.P. art. 966( F); Liberia's Tax Fund 1, LLC v.
Laiche, 2021- 0330, pp, 9- 10 n. 6 ( La.App. I Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340 So.3d 236, 242- 43 n. 6, writ denied, 2022- 00160 ( La.
4/ 12/ 22), 336 So.3d 82, citing Cutrone v. English Turn Property Owners Association, Inc., 2019- 0896, pp. 9- 10
 La. App. 4 Cir. 3/ 4/ 20), 293 So.3d 1209, 1215- 16.

                                                            20
to the court in response to a motion for summary judgment is contrary to the stated

purpose of the summary judgment procedure, i. e., to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 2).                                  Because

the issue of liability was not raised in the defendants' motion, summary judgment

may not be rendered or affirmed based on that issue, regardless of whether the

supporting documents filed with the motion would satisfy the individual defendants'

burden for summary judgment on that issue.' 9 Therefore, to the extent the trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants based on the issue

of liability, that summary judgment is also reversed.

         The trial court judgment on appeal also denies the Troncosos' motion for

partial summary judgment. The denial of a motion for summary judgment is an

interlocutory judgment and is appealable only when expressly provided by law.

However, where there are cross- motions for summary judgment raising the same

issues, this court can review the denial of a summary judgment in addressing the

appeal of the granting of the cross- motion for summary judgment.                                         Waterworks

District No.        1 of Desoto Parish v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety &

Corrections, 2016- 0744, p. 3, n. 1 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 2/ 17/ 17),                        214 So. 3d 1, 3, n. 1, wit

denied, 2017- 0470 ( La. 5/ 12/ 17), 219 So. 3d 1103. Nevertheless, in their motion for

appeal,
           the Troncosos specifically requested and were granted an appeal of the

portion of the judgment granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Their motion for appeal further stated that the portion of the judgment denying their

19 Although the trial court seemed to find that the affidavits of the remaining individual defendants were sufficient to
carry the defendants' burden on summary judgment as to the issue of their individual liability, consideration of this
issue on summary judgment is precluded by La. C. C. P. art, 966( F). Consistent with the purpose of that provision, it
would amount to an unfair surprise for the court to grant summary judgment on an issue that was not raised, without
giving any warning to the Troncosos as to the issues that needed to be opposed on summary judgment. For instance,
if the defendants in this matter had properly raised the issue of liability in their motion for summary judgment and
supported the motion with the affidavits of the individual defendants, in which they deny any responsibility for the
drafting or filing of the recorded instruments, then the' T' roncosos, having been informed that the issue of the individual
defendants' liability was before the court, could have opposed the motion by filing such supporting evidence as the
Partial Release, in which the HOA and some ( but not all) of the remaining individual defendants stated that they
 caused [ the By-laws] and [ Restrictive Covenants] to be recorded in the public records for St. Tammany Parish on
September 26, 2008." However, with the defendants raising only the issues of damages and judicial estoppel in their
motion, the Troncosos had no notice that they should oppose the motion by filing proof of the defendants'
responsibility for the recording of the Restrictive Covenants in the public records. The summary judgment by ambush
on the 'issue of liability in this matter is precisely what La. C. C. P. art. 966( F) is intended to preclude.

                                                            21
own motion for partial summary judgment " is interlocutory and not subject of direct

appeal."   Given the fact that the Troncosos did not request an appeal the denial of

their motion or assign error to the denial, as well as the fact that the two motions

before the court in this matter were not necessarily cross- motions for summary

judgment raising the same issues, we decline to review the denial of the Troncosos'

motion for partial summary judgment.

       Given     our   disposition   of this   matter, we pretermit   discussion   of the

Troncosos'     remaining assignments of error.       Our ruling in this matter does not

prevent either party from filing another motion for summary judgment,                with

appropriate documentary support. See Forstall, 2017- 0414 at p. 11, n. 12, 238 So. 3d

at 473, n. 12.

                                      CONCLUSION

       The August 29, 2022 judgment of the trial court is reversed insofar as it grants

the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismisses the plaintiffs'           case.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to defendants, Point Carr Estates Subdivision

Homeowners Association, Richard Capdeboscq, Jr., Lesley Capdeboscq, Patricia

Childress, William Edgett, and Michael Bearden.

       REVERSED.

                                               22