Court Opinion

ID: 9545205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:08:18.871437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:19.207033
License: Public Domain

Hicks, J.
(concurring in part with the dissent)—I concur with the dissent of Stafford, J., except for his concurrence with the majority in its approval of the trial court granting petitioner's (plaintiff's) motion in limine. I am of the view the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion and that defendant is entitled to a new trial on that ground.
The majority says absent abuse of discretion, the admission of evidence lies largely within the discretion of the trial *498court and cites as authority Hill v. C. & E. Constr. Co., 59 Wn.2d 743, 370 P.2d 255 (1962). Hill is not apposite in this instance. Hill is concerned with opinion evidence and the hypothesis upon which that opinion was based. The trial court rejected the evidence for failure to base the hypothesis on all the relevant facts in the case.
The only reason for permitting opinion evidence of an expert in any event is to assist and advise the trier of fact in instances where the testimony is beyond the understanding of the ordinary person. Ewer v. Johnson, 44 Wn.2d 746, 270 P.2d -813 (1954). Of course, the trial court must have wide discretion in determining whether opinion evidence is necessary, just as it must have discretion in controlling the use of demonstrative evidence and many other matters. But, relevant admissions of a party-opponent are not among those matters with which the trial court has such broad discretion.
For more than 75 years this state has recognized and applied the rule that relevant unprivileged admissions of a party-opponent are admissible against him. Hart v. Pratt, 19 Wash. 560, 568, 53 P. 711 (1898). Such evidence is not confined to the purpose of impeachment, but it is also entitled to be admitted as substantive evidence. E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 262, at 629 (2d ed. 1972). Olson v. Hodges, 236 Iowa 612, 19 N.W.2d 676 (1945) (error to instruct the jury that an admission could be considered merely as discrediting the party's testimony. Evidence was admissible not only as discrediting testimony of plaintiff, but as substantive evidence against him); Greenwood v. Harris, 362 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1961) (admissions of defendant physician, though the only expert evidence in an action for malpractice, is sufficient to defeat defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's case).
Defendant's efforts to show by plaintiff's own statements when he was making claims under state industrial and private insurance carriers that he attributed his injuries to the *4991968 shock and that he made no mention of the 1970 incident, should have been allowed. Failure to mention a material circumstance presently being claimed which it would have been natural to mention in a former statement, is sufficient for admission of the former statement. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 34, at 64 (1954).
Further, the excluded evidence is admissible in this state under the circumstances of this case, despite the collateral source rule. Rich v. Campbell, 164 Wash. 393, 398, 2 P.2d 886 (1931). In Rich, a case involving the use of a prior insurance claim made by plaintiff, a limiting instruction was deemed sufficient to prevent misuse of the evidence by the jury.
As the Court of Appeals said in this case, Goodell v. ITT-Federal Support Servs., Inc., 15 Wn. App. 639, 642, 550 P.2d 1171 (1976):
Defendant's purpose was not to show that the plaintiff had been compensated, but to cast doubt upon his contention that a second shock had occurred.
If, as defendant contends, plaintiff had made no disclosure of or claim for the second shock until he filed a notice of trial amendment 2 years after its alleged occurrence and 9 months after commencing this action, admission of the proscribed evidence was vital to the defense of the case. Statements made by plaintiff after the date of the alleged second shock contained in his industrial insurance file should be admissible regardless of the laying of a foundation for impeachment. The statements when offered by defendant come in as admissions of a party-opponent. Their use is not confined to impeachment purposes, nor should their admission be constrained by impeachment rules. Raborn v. Hayton, 34 Wn.2d 105, 108, 208 P.2d 133 (1949).
The second reason offered by the majority to exclude the evidence is that:
[I]n evaluating the offered evidence, the trial court and this court need to evaluate the probative value of the *500offered evidence in the defendant's case versus the prejudicial effect upon the plaintiff's case. Rothman v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 7 Wn. App. 453, 500 P.2d 1288 (1972).
I do not so read Rothman v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 7 Wn. App. 453, 500 P.2d 1288 (1972). In that case the trial court excluded the evidence (a personalized check in the amount of $5 dated the day of the maker's death; the defense was suicide); the Court of Appeals reversed and found the check admissible, and said at page 456:
In the trial of a case, any circumstance is admissible which reasonably tends to establish the theory of the party offering it, or to explain, qualify, or disprove the testimony of his adversary. Robertson v. O'Neill, 67 Wash. 121, 120 P. 884 (1912); Bloomquist v. Buffelen Mfg. Co., 47 Wn.2d 828, 289 P.2d 1041 (1955). All facts which support a reasonable inference on a contested matter and any circumstances whereby an alleged fact may be proved or disproved are relevant. Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959). . . . Evidence which has some logical proof tendency may nevertheless be excluded if it also has a tendency to mislead, distract, waste time, confuse or impede the trial. See Diel v. Beekman, 7 Wn. App. 139, 499 P.2d 37 (1972). Coleman v. Dennis, 1 Wn. App. 299, 461 P.2d 552 (1969). None of these additional tendencies appear to be present in this case.
(Italics mine.) That is exactly the case here under consideration—in my view none of the additional tendencies appear to be present. From defendant's point of view, it was the granting of the motion in limine which would have a tendency to mislead, for the whole story would not be told. Rothman is supportive of the admission of defendant's proffered evidence, not its exclusion.
The majority goes on to say that in any event,
[T]he defense theory was presented to the jury. While it might have been more effective to present documentation of claims in connection with industrial insurance and private coverage, it was only cumulative and it cannot be said that the defense theory was not presented to the jury.
*501I cannot subscribe to such reasoning. The plaintiff is entitled to present his case to the trier of fact as effectively as he can within the rules. The defendant is entitled to no less. Because of the granting of the motion in limine, the defendant, in effect, was required to enter the trial of this case as handicapped as though it had one hand tied behind its back.
Defendant, as a matter of right, was entitled to have presented this evidence to the jury in as effective a manner as it could fairly devise. Further, defendant was entitled to have its theory of the case, based on that evidence, presented to the jury by proper instructions.
On the issue of the admissibility of evidence that qualifies as admissions of a party-opponent, the Court of Appeals is correct and should be affirmed. Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Therefore, I dissent.
Petition for rehearing denied July 12, 1978.