Court Opinion

ID: 9795925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:42:39.527527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:41:11.327342
License: Public Domain

Caplinger, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Kansas follows the minority rule requiring a finding of acquiescence when a party takes any action inconsistent with the right of review. Instead, I would hold that Kansas cases require receipt of a tangible benefit before finding acquiescence to a judgment, and because Almack received no tangible benefit here, he did not acquiesce in the judgment.
The primary Kansas case cited by the majority in support of its conclusion that Kansas follows the minority rule is Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 200 P.3d 467 (2009). However, the issue in that case was not whether an action inconsistent with appeal results in acquiescence. Rather, in Harsch the appellants were proceeding simultaneously in two cases — one in state court appealing the damages they were awarded in an eminent domain proceeding and the other in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the eminent domain statute. The appellants attempted to stay the state court case pending resolution of the federal case, and the district court denied the motion. The issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the stay — not whether the appellants acquiesced in the judgment and were precluded from appealing. 288 Kan. at 281-82, 292.
The appellants argued the court abused its discretion because if they would have proceeded to trial after the denial of their motion to stay, it would have constituted acquiescence. Our Supreme Court disagreed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion to deny a stay in state court when a separate, but unique, action was proceeding in federal court. The court aptly reasoned that the Harsches were not voluntarily complying with the denial of the stay and thus could not have been held to acquiesce. 288 Kan. at 292. The court did not suggest, however, that any time a party takes any voluntary action inconsistent with its appeal rights, it has acquiesced in the judgment.
*777The majority also cites In re Marriage of Zimmerman, No. 96,466, unpublished opinion filed July 3, 2008, and suggests that in that case, the husband’s motion to compel his ex-wife to execute a quitclaim deed to properties awarded to the husband barred his subsequent appeal of the property division. However, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Zimmerman did not hold that the husband acquiesced to the judgment simply by filing a motion to compel. Instead, the district court granted the husband’s motion to compel and his wife was forced to execute a quitclaim deed to property awarded to the husband. Further, the husband even sold one of the properties. Again, in this case the appealing party actually received a benefit from his inconsistent actions. Thus, Zimmerman does not support the majority’s suggestion that a party acquiesces to a judgment simply by taking any action inconsistent with appeal rights.
The majority also relies upon McDaniel v. Jones, 235 Kan. 93, 95, 679 P.2d 682 (1984). In summarizing the holding of this case, the majority indicates the court there held that McDaniel, who had been awarded an equitable mortgage, acquiesced in the judgment “in pursuing the sale” of the property. 43 Kan. App. 2nd at 774-75. However, the majority’s summary of the holding omits important facts and misstates the court’s holding. McDaniel did not simply pursue the sale of the property, he successfully forced the sale. The court held: “In seeking and obtaining the execution of the judgment by causing the property to be foreclosed and sold, the plaintiffs have impliedly recognized the validity of the trial court’s judgment granting them an equitable mortgage on the premises and the right to foreclose to satisfy the mortgage.” (Emphasis added.) 235 Kan. at 102. As in the other cases cited by the majority, the party that acquiesced in the judgment received a tangible benefit. Thus, McDaniel also is inconsistent with the majority’s conclusion that a party acquiesces in a judgment when it takes any voluntary action inconsistent with its appeal rights.
Finally, the majority relies heavily upon the concept that “anything that savors of acquiescence in a judgment” cuts off the right to appellate review as stated in Tice v. Ebeling, 238 Kan. 704, 713, 715 P.2d 397 (1986). 43 Kan. App. 2d at 775. But Tice did not *778address the issue of whether a party waives the right to appeal by acquiescing in a judgment. Instead, the court used the phrase “savor of acquiescence” to support its determination that the appellant’s failure to object to an evidentiary ruling resulted in acquiescence to the ruling and waiver of the right to appeal that particular issue.
In conclusion, I would find that Kansas follows the majority approach and requires that a party must do more than simply take voluntary action inconsistent with appeal rights in order to acquiesce to a judgment. Rather, a party acquiesces in a judgment only if it received a tangible benefit as a result of its inconsistent actions. Thus, I would reach the merits of the issues raised by AJmack in this appeal.