Court Opinion

ID: 9395232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 16:01:09.149234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.374639
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14247   Document: 54-1    Date Filed: 05/17/2023   Page: 1 of 37

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 20-14247
                         ____________________

        WENDALL JERMAINE HALL,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        LIEUTENANT PETER MEROLA,

                                                  Defendant-Appellee,

        SERGEANT CHARLES WATSON, et al.,

                                                          Defendants.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 20-14247            Document: 54-1   Date Filed: 05/17/2023   Page: 2 of 37

        2                           Opinion of the Court             20-14247

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cv-01054-BJD-PDB
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
        ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
               This is one Heck of an appeal. That’s because resolution of
        the appeal turns in large part on the proper application of the Su-
        preme Court precedent known as Heck v. Humphrey.1 In a nutshell,
        Heck precludes a convicted person from pursuing a civil claim for
        damages under § 1983 if, because of what the elements of his civil
        claim require him to prove, a decision in his favor on that claim
        would necessarily call into question the validity of his criminal con-
        viction.
               Here, we must determine whether resolution of Plaintiff-
        Appellant Wendall Hall’s § 1983 lawsuit against correctional offic-
        ers would necessarily require a determination going to the validity
        of a prison disciplinary finding against Hall. If so, we must affirm
        the district court’s dismissal of Hall’s lawsuit. If not, we must va-
        cate and remand in part.
               Hall sued three Defendant-Appellee correctional officers un-
        der § 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment
        rights. While Hall was in his prison cell, two correctional officers

        1 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
USCA11 Case: 20-14247       Document: 54-1        Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 3 of 37

        20-14247                 Opinion of the Court                            3

        sprayed a chemical agent on him. The parties contest why the of-
        ficers did this: Hall says it was in retaliation for his protected
        speech; the correctional officers respond that it was to stop Hall
        from tampering with a sprinkler in his cell. Ultimately, Hall was
        found guilty of tampering with the sprinkler. Shortly after that,
        Hall alleges that a supervising officer instructed the prison staff not
        to feed him—again, in retaliation for Hall’s protected speech. Hall
        sued the two officers and the supervising officer for violating his
        First and Eighth Amendment rights.
                The district court dismissed Hall’s claims against the two
        correctional officers under Heck v. Humphrey because it concluded
        that the success of Hall’s claims required a showing that his prison-
        disciplinary conviction was invalid. But although the district court
        dismissed Hall’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages
        against the supervising officer, it allowed Hall’s demand for nomi-
        nal damages to go to trial. Over Hall’s objection, the district court
        instructed the jury that it could award Hall only nominal damages.
        The jury returned a verdict for the supervising officer.
               After a thorough review of the record and with the benefit
        of oral argument,2 we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Hall’s
        claims against the two correctional officers: Heck does not bar
        Hall’s Eighth Amendment claim, and even if Heck applies to Hall’s
        First Amendment claim, Hall is entitled to leave to amend. As for

        2 We appointed Patrick C. Valencia to represent Hall on appeal. We appreci-
        ate Mr. Valencia’s service to the Court.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247         Document: 54-1        Date Filed: 05/17/2023         Page: 4 of 37

        4                          Opinion of the Court                      20-14247

        Hall’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages, we agree
        with Hall that the district court erred in dismissing them. That’s
        so because the Prison Litigation Reform Act doesn’t apply to this
        removed action. And though we conclude that the district court’s
        jury instruction was erroneous, we find that error harmless. So we
        vacate and remand in part and affirm in part.
                                I. BACKGROUND
                                 A. Factual Background
               In 2014, Wendall Hall was incarcerated in Florida’s Colum-
        bia Correctional Institution.3 Doc. 9 at 1. On January 31, two cor-
        rectional guards, Oﬃcers Watson and Wright, went to the door of
        Hall’s cell. Id. at 14. According to the complaint, the oﬃcers told
        Hall that they were going to “gas” him because he was “a black
        n[*****], who ha[d] many past disciplinary reports for masturba-
        tion” and because Hall had “ﬁle[d] [l]awsuits and grievances against
        correctional oﬃcers and [was] testifying in trial against [another
        correctional oﬃcer,] Oﬃcer Bennett.” Id.
               True to their word, the oﬃcers returned to Hall’s cell,
        opened the food ﬂap, and sprayed Hall in his face and chest with
        chemical agents, causing Hall to suﬀer “severe physical pain in his
        face, chest, eyes” and to be “unable to see out of his eyes, [have]

        3 Because the district court dismissed Hall’s claims against the two correc-
        tional officers (Officers Watson and Wright) at the motion-to-dismiss stage,
        for purposes of our review, we must consider the allegations in Hall’s com-
        plaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The facts may or
        may not be as Hall’s complaint alleges.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1     Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 5 of 37

        20-14247               Opinion of the Court                        5

        blurry vision, [and suﬀer] diﬃculty and severe physical pain when
        breathing, severe burning and itching of skin, bleeding out of but-
        tocks and severe chest pain and long[-]lasting mental pain [and] se-
        vere mental injury.” Id.
              Hall denied tampering with the sprinkler in his cell, id.—the
        reason the oﬃcers later gave for spraying Hall.
               A week later, on February 7, another oﬃcer—Lieutenant Pe-
        ter Merola—went to Hall’s cell to say that he was “going to order
        his oﬃcers not to feed [Hall] any food” to “teach [Hall] a lesson
        about ﬁling so many grievances.” Id. at 15. Lieutenant Merola also
        made good on his word. Id. Correctional oﬃcers did not give Hall
        any food on February 8th and 9th and told Hall that they were not
        giving him food on Lieutenant Merola’s orders. Id.
                                  B. Procedural History
                Hall sued Oﬃcers Wright and Watson and Lieutenant Mer-
        ola in state court in July 2015. He asserted First and Eighth Amend-
        ment claims against Oﬃcers Watson and Wright for deploying
        chemical agents against him because he ﬁled grievances and gave
        testimony in a case against another prison guard. And Hall alleged
        that Lieutenant Merola had violated his First and Eighth Amend-
        ment rights by instructing oﬃcers not to feed Hall in retaliation for
        ﬁling grievances. Hall sought compensatory and punitive dam-
        ages.
               The defendants removed the case to federal court, invoking
        federal-question jurisdiction. After removal, at the defendants’ re-
        quest, the magistrate judge required Hall to ﬁle a new complaint
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 6 of 37

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14247

        on the Middle District of Florida’s standard prisoner civil-rights
        complaint form. Hall complied, ﬁling an “Amended Complaint.”
               The oﬃcers moved to dismiss the claims against them, as-
        serting three reasons. First, Oﬃcers Watson and Wright said the
        claims against them were barred by Heck. They attached a discipli-
        nary report that adjudicated Hall guilty of attempting to break the
        sprinkler in his cell. The report also explained that, when Hall re-
        fused to stop, the oﬃcers used force to compel Hall to stop. The
        report stripped Hall of 20 days of “gain time” and ordered 30 days
        of “disciplinary conﬁnement.” Because Hall had been found guilty
        of tampering, the oﬃcers said, Heck barred the claims against them
        based on their spraying of chemical agents on him. Second, all
        three oﬃcers (including Lieutenant Merola) said that Hall wasn’t
        entitled to compensatory or punitive damages because, under the
        Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), pris-
        oners could recover those damages only in cases with actual physi-
        cal injuries, which Hall hadn’t alleged. And third, they asserted
        Eleventh Amendment (but not qualiﬁed) immunity.
               Hall responded that Heck wasn’t applicable because he did
        “not request injunctive relief for restoring gaintime credits los[t]
        from disciplinary report and d[id] not seek injunctive relief for ear-
        lier or speedier release from prison so his monetary relief if
        granted will not cause a speedier or earlier release of plaintiﬀ from
        prison[.]”
               The district court granted the motion in part and denied it
        in part. The district court agreed with Oﬃcers Watson and Wright
USCA11 Case: 20-14247     Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023    Page: 7 of 37

        20-14247               Opinion of the Court                       7

        that Heck barred Hall’s claims against them because Hall contended
        that he “was subjected to chemical gassing for reasons other than
        he was tampering with a safety device and refusing to obey verbal
        orders to cease his actions—a claim that would necessarily imply
        the invalidity of the punishment imposed.” The district court
        noted in a footnote that this was “not a case in which Plaintiﬀ ad-
        mitted that yes, he tampered with the security device . . . but the
        oﬃcers used excessive force in subduing him. Instead, Plaintiﬀ al-
        leges in his [c]omplaint that he was not tampering with a safety de-
        vice in his cell and Defendants Watson and Wright chemically
        gassed him for various retaliatory or discriminatory reasons.” The
        district court accordingly dismissed Oﬃcers Watson and Wright
        from the case.
                As to the remaining defendant (Lieutenant Merola), the dis-
        trict court struck Hall’s claims for compensatory and punitive dam-
        ages because Hall’s claimed injuries—hunger pangs—didn’t consti-
        tute a physical injury as required under the PLRA. But the district
        court found that Hall had stated viable First and Eighth Amend-
        ment claims against Lieutenant Merola, so it denied the defend-
        ants’ motion as to those claims. The district court rejected the of-
        ﬁcers’ claims to Eleventh Amendment immunity because Hall sued
        the oﬃcers in their individual capacities, not their oﬃcial capaci-
        ties.
               Just a week later, Hall sought leave to ﬁle an amended com-
        plaint. He said that he would add dates that Lieutenant Merola
        ordered him not to be fed (adding February 7 and 18 to the list) and
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 8 of 37

        8                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14247

        more facts to show that he had suﬀered a physical injury. As to
        Oﬃcers Watson and Wright, Hall asked for leave to replead his
        claims to add a denial-of-medical-care claim. Hall also argued that
        his complaint wasn’t Heck-barred because Heck didn’t apply to all
        claims involving prison disciplinary actions, just those that would
        impact the time the prisoner would be incarcerated. Hall attached
        an aﬃdavit, sworn under penalty of perjury, that after using the
        gas, the oﬃcers ordered a nurse not to treat Hall’s injuries, prolong-
        ing Hall’s pain.
               The district court denied Hall’s motion. In the district
        court’s view, Hall sought to amend his complaint for reasons that
        appeared “dubious, ﬁnancially motivated, and not made in good
        faith.” “Realizing that no claims for compensatory and punitive
        damages remain,” the district court said, Hall was (1) seeking to
        “change the character of his complaint”—to add a new claim
        against Watson and Wright and (2) to enhance his allegations—to
        add details his allegations of physical injury allegedly caused by
        Lieutenant Merola—to circumvent the court’s ruling. The district
        court added that the defendants’ assertions—that Hall had unduly
        delayed amendment and that Hall was proceeding in bad faith—
        were “well founded” because Hall was an experienced pro se liti-
        gant and had solicited a ruling on the motion to dismiss without
        seeking leave to raise new claims.
              The case, now consisting solely of First and Eighth Amend-
        ment claims against Lieutenant Merola and seeking only nominal
        damages, continued past summary judgment and on to trial.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1     Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 9 of 37

        20-14247               Opinion of the Court                        9

               In June 2018, the district court appointed Hall counsel. In
        August 2018, Hall’s new counsel moved to ﬁle a Second Amended
        Complaint and to reopen discovery. He explained that he wanted
        to add allegations about physical injury—speciﬁcally, that Hall suf-
        fered from Gastroesophageal Reﬂux Disease (“Reﬂux”) and
        Crohn’s disease and had been prescribed a special diet for these con-
        ditions. When these conditions ﬂared up, he explained, Hall suf-
        fered the debilitating chest pain described in the complaint. Hall’s
        counsel asked to provide supporting medical records showing that
        Hall had suﬀered a physical injury. The proposed Second Amended
        Complaint also alleged that Hall hadn’t been fed from August 7,
        2014 until August 10, 2014.
               The district court denied the motion to ﬁle a Second
        Amended Complaint. Noting that the case had been pending for
        years, the court said that the proposed amended complaint at-
        tempted to relitigate old issues when it sought to add allegations of
        medical diseases and to inject new issues, like that Hall hadn’t been
        fed in August 2014. The court explained that the case was on the
        brink of trial, so, the court concluded, it would be prejudicial to
        Lieutenant Merola to allow Hall to amend his complaint.
               Hall proceeded to trial against Lieutenant Merola on his
        First and Eighth Amendment claims. At trial, Hall testiﬁed that he
        was denied food as retaliation for grievances that he ﬁled. He said
        that Lieutenant Merola’s theory—that Hall purposefully starved
        himself in February 2014—was implausible because Hall had med-
        ical conditions that would have made starvation dangerous. Plus,
USCA11 Case: 20-14247     Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 10 of 37

        10                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14247

        Hall said, he had a trial that month for which he needed to be pre-
        pared. Hall also called a fellow inmate who testiﬁed that he saw
        the oﬃcers refuse Hall food on the days in question. Hall submit-
        ted his medical records—documenting his Reﬂux—into evidence.
               At the end of the ﬁrst day of the trial, Hall moved to rein-
        state his claims for compensatory and punitive damages and, under
        Rule 15(b), to conform the pleadings to include the allegations
        about his Reﬂux. The district court denied the motion, concluding
        it would prejudice Lieutenant Merola because of the surprise.
               In his case, Lieutenant Merola called several jail oﬃcials and
        himself—all of whom testiﬁed that Lieutenant Merola never di-
        rected them to withhold food from Hall and that, even if Lieuten-
        ant Merola had, they would have fed Hall anyway. Lieutenant Mer-
        ola also called the warden of the jail, who testiﬁed that Lieutenant
        Merola wasn’t on duty on two of the dates Hall alleged he wasn’t
        fed (February 8 and 9).
               After the close of evidence, the district court instructed the
        jury as follows:

              If your verdict is in favor of Peter Merola with respect
              to each claim, you will go no further. But if your ver-
              dict on one or both claims is for Wendall Hall, you
              will consider the issue of damages. Where, as here,
              any physical injury an inmate suffers is minimal,
              the law allows an inmate to recover nominal dam-
              ages. This is because a person whose constitutional
              rights were violated is entitled to a recognition of that
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 11 of 37

        20-14247                Opinion of the Court                        11

               violation, even if he suffered only minimal injuries.
               Thus, if your verdict is for Wendall Hall on either
               claim, you should award Wendall Hall nominal dam-
               ages not to exceed one dollar.

        Doc. 261 at 180 (emphasis added). Hall objected to the reference
        that his injuries were minimal and asked for an “open-ended nom-
        inal damages jury instruction.” The district court overruled both
        requests without explanation.

                The district court also instructed the jurors (in Jury Instruc-
        tion 3) that they “should not assume from anything [the district
        court said] that [the district court] [had] any opinion about any fac-
        tual issue in this case. Except for [the district court’s] instructions
        to [the jury] on the law, [the jury] should disregard anything [the
        district court] may have said during the trial in arriving at [the
        jury’s] own decision about the facts.” Jury Instruction 4 directed
        the jurors to decide for themselves whether to believe each witness.
        Jury Instruction 5 told jurors to assess witnesses’ credibility and de-
        cide whether misstatements were unintentional or intentional.
        And Jury Instruction 10 directed that “the fact that [the district
        court] [gave] instructions concerning the issue of damages should
        not be interpreted in any way as an indication that [the district
        court] believe[s] that Wendall Hall should or should not prevail in
        this case.”

              During closing arguments, Hall’s counsel emphasized that
        Hall wasn’t fed and emphasized that an injury “[did] not have to be
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 12 of 37

        12                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14247

        a broken arm or a broken leg” to qualify as a legally cognizable in-
        jury. Hall’s counsel reminded the jury that Hall had stomach-re-
        lated conditions and “was at risk for being harmed as a result of not
        receiving food.” And Hall’s counsel concluded that, “even without
        those medical problems, going three days without food hurts. It’s
        not a pleasant experience. So even holding that aside, the hunger
        pains that Mr. Hall felt, not being able to stand up straight because
        he was so hungry, that’s an injury under the law, folks.”

              The jury returned a verdict on both counts for Lieutenant
        Merola. Hall timely appealed. While this case was on appeal, Hall
        was released from incarceration and was civilly committed.

                     II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
             We review de novo a motion to dismiss based on Heck v.
        Humphrey. Dixon v. Hodges, 887 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018).
               As for denial of leave to amend, we review that for an abuse
        of discretion. Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th
        Cir. 2001).
               On jury instructions, we will reverse “only if we are left with
        a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was
        properly guided in its deliberations.” Carter v. DecisionOne Corp.,
        122 F.3d 997, 1005 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
                              III. DISCUSSION
               We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we discuss
        Hall’s claims against Oﬃcers Watson and Wright. And second, we
        analyze Hall’s claim against Lieutenant Merola.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247     Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023    Page: 13 of 37

        20-14247               Opinion of the Court                       13

                   A.     Claims Against Oﬃcers Watson and Wright
                Hall contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
        First and Eighth Amendment claims as barred by Heck because,
        given that he isn’t in custody, Heck doesn’t apply. And even if Heck
        applies, Hall continues, it doesn’t bar his Eighth Amendment claim
        because prevailing on his excessive-force claim wouldn’t “neces-
        sarily” invalidate his underlying conviction. Finally, Hall concludes
        that he should receive leave to amend.
                Oﬃcers Watson and Wright respond that Heck applies even
        to claims brought after the plaintiﬀ leaves custody. Next, they con-
        tend that Hall presented his Eighth Amendment claim diﬀerently
        to the district court. In other words, they say, Hall claimed in the
        district court that the oﬃcers engaged in excessive force because
        they gassed him for no reason at all—and if that premise were ac-
        cepted, it would invalidate Hall’s conviction for tampering with the
        sprinkler in his cell. But on appeal, the defendants assert, Hall im-
        plicitly concedes that he was tampering with the sprinkler system
        but claims for the ﬁrst time that the oﬃcers’ use of gas to prevent
        him from doing so amounted to excessive force. Finally, even if we
        conceptualize Hall’s claim as one of excessive force in response to
        Hall’s tampering with the sprinkler system, the defendants say that
        they are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity because no clearly estab-
        lished law put them on notice that their conduct was unlawful.
              We proceed in four steps. First, we discuss the Supreme
        Court’s decision in Heck. Second, we explain why Hall’s Eighth
        Amendment claim survives Heck. Third, we turn to Hall’s First
        Amendment claim and show that whether that claim survives Heck
USCA11 Case: 20-14247     Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 14 of 37

        14                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14247

        depends, not on whether Heck applies to out-of-custody plaintiﬀs,
        but on how that claim is construed. Ultimately, we conclude that
        we need not decide how to construe Hall’s First Amendment claim
        because, fourth, we hold that Hall is entitled to leave to amend.
                                    1. Heck
               We begin with Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In
        Heck, the plaintiﬀ—who was imprisoned for manslaughter—sued
        prosecutors and a police investigator under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
        damages because of their alleged unreasonable investigation, pur-
        ported destruction of exculpatory evidence, and use of “an illegal
        and unlawful voice identiﬁcation procedure” at Heck’s trial. Id. at
        479. Heck did not seek to be released from custody in his § 1983
        action. Id.
               The Court determined that Heck’s action must be dis-
        missed. Id. at 490. In reaching this conclusion, the Court consid-
        ered the nature of Heck’s claim—that is, whether it properly
        sounded in habeas or as a § 1983 action. See id. at 480–87. To be
        sure, Heck characterized it as a § 1983 claim. But the Court de-
        scribed Heck’s claim as “l[ying] at the intersection” of habeas cor-
        pus and § 1983. Id. at 480.
                As the Court explained, “habeas corpus is the exclusive rem-
        edy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his
        conﬁnement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though
        such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Id. at
        481. Section 1983, in contrast, “creates a species of tort liability.”
        Id. at 483. The Court pointed out that, while Heck’s suit didn’t seek
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 15 of 37

        20-14247                Opinion of the Court                         15

        a speedier release, it did call into question the lawfulness of his con-
        viction. Id. at 482–83. So while the Court categorized Heck’s suit
        as falling under § 1983, it still found that the suit wasn’t cognizable.
        Id. at 483.
                That was so because the Court analogized Heck’s particular
        § 1983 claim to the common-law cause of action for malicious pros-
        ecution. Id. at 484. This characterization of Heck’s speciﬁc claim
        was critical to the rest of the Court’s analysis because the elements
        of a common-law malicious-prosecution claim required the plain-
        tiﬀ to show termination of the prior criminal proceeding in his fa-
        vor. Id. at 484. In other words, as an element of his malicious-
        prosecution-like claim, a successful plaintiﬀ must show that either
        he was not convicted or that his conviction has been invalidated or
        otherwise set aside. Id. Because Heck’s conviction was still valid,
        the Court reasoned, permitting Heck to proceed with his action
        under § 1983 would necessarily allow Heck to engage in an imper-
        missible “collateral attack on [his] conviction through the vehicle
        of a civil suit.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
               So the Court held that Heck could not proceed with his
        claim. Id. at 490. Rather, the Court explained, “to recover damages
        for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or
        for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would ren-
        der a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiﬀ must prove
        that the conviction or sentence has been [invalidated or otherwise
        set aside].” Id. at 486–87 (footnote omitted). And a district court
        must dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 suit seeking damages if “a
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 16 of 37

        16                      Opinion of the Court                  20-14247

        judgment in favor of the plaintiﬀ would necessarily imply the inva-
        lidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the conviction or sen-
        tence has already been invalidated. Id. at 487. As relevant here,
        the Supreme Court later extended the Heck rule to apply to prison
        disciplinary convictions. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645–48
        (1997).
                         2. Eighth Amendment Claim
              Hall ﬁrst says that Heck does not bar his excessive-force
        claim. We agree.
               “Heck bars a § 1983 claim only when it is a ‘logical necessity’
        that judgment for the plaintiﬀ in that suit would contradict the ex-
        isting punishment.” Dixon, 887 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Dyer v. Lee,
        488 F.3d 876, 879 (11th Cir. 2007)). Factual allegations bar claims
        under Heck in only narrow circumstances: “where the allegation in
        the § 1983 claim is a speciﬁc one that both necessarily implies the
        earlier decision is invalid and is necessary to the success of the §
        1983 suit itself.” Id. “When a plaintiﬀ alleges a fact that, if true,
        would conﬂict with the earlier punishment, but that fact is not nec-
        essary to the success of his § 1983 suit, the Heck bar does not apply.”
        Id.
                Applying that guidance here, we must conclude that the dis-
        trict court erred. If a factual allegation contradicts a guilty verdict,
        our case law requires district courts to consider whether the fact is
        “necessary” to the success of the § 1983 suit itself. Dixon, 887 F.3d
        at 1239. Here, Hall’s factual allegation—that he wasn’t tampering
        with the sprinkler system—could be false and Hall could still
USCA11 Case: 20-14247        Document: 54-1         Date Filed: 05/17/2023        Page: 17 of 37

        20-14247                   Opinion of the Court                              17

        succeed on his lawsuit if Oﬃcers Watson and Wright used more
        force than constitutionally permissible in stopping Hall from tam-
        pering with the sprinkler system. That is, Hall’s denial of tamper-
        ing with the sprinkler isn’t “necessary” to the success of his exces-
        sive-force claim. As Judge Easterbrook explained in Gilbert v. Cook,
        “[i]f [Hall] had been willing to concede” that he was guilty, “he
        would have had clear sailing” on his § 1983 claim. 512 F.3d 899, 901
        (7th Cir. 2008). But a Hall confession—“a confession that might
        facilitate a criminal prosecution on top of the prison discipline”—
        is not “a precondition to a civil remedy against public oﬃcials who
        respond with excessive force.” Id. 4

        4 Judge Newsom’s thoughtful concurrence on this point is, really, we think
        just a question of semantics. Here’s why: Hall sued for excessive force. The
        question is whether Hall’s factual allegation—that he didn’t tamper with the
        sprinkler—means that Heck bars his claim. Judge Newsom agrees that, if Hall
        admitted tampering, then there’d be no problem with Hall’s suit because an
        officer can use more force that constitutionally permissible—that is, excessive
        force—in effecting discipline that is otherwise warranted. Newsom Concur-
        rence at 2. But that agreement means Hall’s denial that he tampered with the
        sprinklers isn’t “necessary” to success in his suit. In other words, if we re-
        moved that factual allegation, or flipped it to an admission, Hall’s suit could
        succeed just the same. All Hall needs to do is show that the officers used ex-
        cessive force. So the denial isn’t logically necessary. Consider our prior prec-
        edent, Dixon, where the plaintiff was found guilty in prison disciplinary pro-
        ceedings of battery on a correctional officer but sued that same officer for ex-
        cessive force. 887 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2018). He—as Hall does
        here—denied committing an underlying infraction. Id. We said that the denial
        didn’t bar his claim because “[t]he success of this claim is not necessarily de-
        pendent on whether Dixon lunged at Pollock or not. His disciplinary punish-
        ment, of course, establishes that he did. But that factual finding is not
USCA11 Case: 20-14247         Document: 54-1         Date Filed: 05/17/2023          Page: 18 of 37

        18                          Opinion of the Court                        20-14247

               Oﬃcers Watson and Wright don’t dispute this analysis. In-
        stead, they raise two counterarguments.
                First, they say, Hall didn’t make this argument in the district
        court, so it isn’t properly before us. We disagree. In responding to
        the Oﬃcers’ motion to dismiss, Hall argued that he wasn’t seeking
        to overturn his disciplinary ﬁnding that he tampered with the safety
        device. He said that his suit, if successful, wouldn’t expunge his
        disciplinary conviction, overturn it, or restore lost “goodtime”
        credits; all he would get, he said, was money. His tampering
        charge, he concluded, was “incidental” to his claims of excessive
        force. The argument is properly preserved.
              Second, the Oﬃcers respond that they are entitled to quali-
        ﬁed immunity. But the Oﬃcers did not raise this issue in the district
        court. Instead, they raised only the issue of Eleventh Amendment

        determinative of whether Pollock used excessive force against Dixon.” Id. at
        1239–40 (footnote omitted). The point is this: a factual allegation that denies
        the truth of a disciplinary conviction doesn’t mean that Heck bars the suit if—
        as is the case here—the plaintiff could succeed if he or she admitted the truth
        of the disciplinary conviction. See id. at 1238 (“A prisoner may be punished for
        battery on a prison guard, and that prison guard may be held liable for exces-
        sive force on the prisoner in subduing him; both may be true.”). To the extent
        Judge Newsom contends that Hall couldn’t succeed on an “I didn’t do it” the-
        ory, we agree that Hall couldn’t use a § 1983 suit to overturn his disciplinary
        conviction. But that doesn’t mean his excessive-force claim is Heck-barred be-
        cause the validity or invalidity of Hall’s disciplinary conviction is irrelevant to
        whether the officers used excessive force against him. See id. at 1240 (“It is
        logically possible both that [the prisoner] lunged at [the guard] and that [the
        guard] used excessive force against him.”).
USCA11 Case: 20-14247         Document: 54-1          Date Filed: 05/17/2023          Page: 19 of 37

        20-14247                    Opinion of the Court                                 19

        immunity. Given this omission, they have forfeited this argument.
        See Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71 F.3d 837, 842 (11th Cir. 1996).
                              3. First Amendment
              We next turn to Hall’s First Amendment claim. Hall alleged
        that Oﬃcer Wright violated the First Amendment by “unlawfully
        gassing [Hall] with chemical agents because [Hall] ﬁle[d] lawsuits
        and grievances against correctional oﬃcers.”
              The parties disagree about whether Heck applies to Hall now
        that Hall is no longer in custody on his criminal convictions. 5 They
        spend much of their briefs on the topic—a question that has

        5 Hall completed his sentence in July 2019 and says that he is now civilly com-
        mitted. So Hall is “in custody” for habeas purposes. See Duncan v. Walker, 533
        U.S. 167, 176 (2005) (explaining that a state order of civil commitment satisfies
        the “in custody” requirement); United States v. Searcy, 880 F.3d 116, 120 (4th
        Cir. 2018) (“A person may also challenge his civil commitment collaterally
        through habeas corpus proceedings.”). But importantly, Hall isn’t “in cus-
        tody” for the conviction he is complaining about—the sprinkler tampering
        charge—so habeas for that claim isn’t available. That is because, to file a ha-
        beas petition, Hall must be “in custody” because of the conviction he attacks.
        See Stanbridge v. Scott, 791 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Stanbridge’s civil com-
        mitment is merely a collateral consequence of his criminal conviction, and
        thus insufficient to render Stanbridge in custody pursuant to that [criminal]
        conviction.”); cf. Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401–02
        (2001) (“Coss is no longer serving the sentences imposed pursuant to his 1986
        convictions, and therefore cannot bring a federal habeas petition directed
        solely at those convictions” while distinguishing that a prior conviction used
        to enhance a current sentence could be collaterally attacked). Because Hall has
        completed his state criminal sentence (for which he lost “gaintime” credits),
        he isn’t “in custody” because of that sentence.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 20 of 37

        20                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14247

        divided our sister circuits. But we can decide this appeal without
        resolving this thorny question.
               As we’ve mentioned, Hall alleged that Oﬃcers Wright and
        Watson violated the First Amendment by “unlawfully gassing
        [Hall] with chemical agents because [Hall] ﬁle[d] lawsuits and
        grievances against correctional oﬃcers.” Oﬃcers Wright and Wat-
        son argue that this claim is most similar to a malicious-prosecution
        claim, though they don’t say why. And Hall himself never explains
        which common-law tort he thinks is most analogous to his claim.
               As for us, we don’t think it’s clear that a malicious-prosecu-
        tion claim is the best ﬁt here. After all, when we look at Hall’s
        claim, Hall doesn’t seem to be complaining that he was aggrieved
        by the disciplinary report (and accompanying loss of “gaintime”)
        but rather by the use of the gas itself. To be sure, if Hall’s claim is
        that the guards fabricated a sprinkler-system charge to justify their
        use of gas on him, then his claim would seem to be most analogous
        to a malicious-prosecution claim because the wrong would be
        about the alleged misuse of the prison disciplinary system. We
        agree that that claim would be barred. See Williams v. Radford, 64
        F.4th 1185, 1195 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Under our precedent, if an in-
        mate is ‘found guilty of an actual disciplinary infraction after being
        aﬀorded due process,’ and ‘there was evidence to support the disci-
        plinary panel's fact ﬁnding,’ he cannot assert a retaliation claim.”)
        (quoting O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011)).
              But on the other hand, if Hall’s claim complains that the
        guards used chemical agents on him to retaliate against him for his
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1       Date Filed: 05/17/2023       Page: 21 of 37

        20-14247                 Opinion of the Court                          21

        First Amendment protected speech (in the form of ﬁling prison
        grievances), then the most analogous tort might be battery because
        the wrong in that case is about the use of force.
               And battery can be part of a First Amendment-retaliation
        claim. “To state a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a
        plaintiﬀ generally must show: (1) she engaged in constitutionally
        protected speech, such as her right to petition the government for
        redress; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely aﬀected that
        protected speech and right to petition; and (3) a causal connection exists
        between the defendant’s retaliatory conduct and the adverse eﬀect
        on the plaintiﬀ's speech and right to petition.” DeMartini v. Town of
        Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
        The analogous common-law tort, then, is the retaliatory conduct—
        the second prong.
               In the usual case, the retaliatory conduct is an arrest or a
        prosecution. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019). That is,
        the government arrests or prosecutes someone for their protected
        speech. Id. In those cases, we look to the common-law torts of
        false arrest or malicious prosecution. Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d
        1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining a warrantless arrest is anal-
        ogous to false arrest and an arrest with a warrant is analogous to
        malicious prosecution).
               But a First Amendment retaliation claim can use any sort of
        adverse action at its second element: a civil lawsuit, see DeMartini,
        942 F.3d at 1298–99, 1301, or the termination of employment, Lane
        v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 243 (2014), for instance. Or, as relevant here,
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1       Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 22 of 37

        22                      Opinion of the Court                   20-14247

        the use of force. We see no reason why Hall cannot rely on the use
        of force to satisfy the “adverse action” prong.
                 Other circuits agree. The Eighth Circuit, for instance, has
        recognized that excessive force could constitute an adverse action
        in a First Amendment claim. See Burbridge v. St. Louis, 2 F.4th 774,
        781 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The adverse action alleged here [in this First
        Amendment retaliation case] is the use of excessive force. On ap-
        peal, Oﬃcer Biggins argues only that he did not use excessive force
        and thus there was no adverse action. . . . Rather, as explained
        above, his sole argument for reversal is that if Drew’s excessive
        force claim fails, the First Amendment claim necessarily fails as
        well.”). So has the Seventh. See, e.g., Coady v. Steil, 187 F.3d 727, 733
        (7th Cir. 1999) (“The remaining question before us is whether it was
        ‘clearly established’ on March 18, 1995 that a government oﬃcial
        could not retaliate against a subordinate’s protected exercise of po-
        litical speech by hitting him.”).
               Indeed, the Seventh Circuit thought “it [was] clear that being
        punched in the face would deter anyone from exercising his or her
        First Amendment rights.” Id. We have no trouble reaching the
        same conclusion about being sprayed in the face with gas.
               So that raises the question of which claim Hall is advancing.
        Is Hall complaining that Oﬃcer Wright instigated a disciplinary ac-
        tion against him for his speech? Or is Hall instead saying that Of-
        ﬁcer Wright used gas against him to punish him for his speech? The
        former might be barred by Heck as analogous to a malicious-prose-
        cution claim without a favorable termination, but the latter would
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 23 of 37

        20-14247                Opinion of the Court                         23

        not. As it turns out, though, we don’t need to decide which claim
        Hall is bringing because we must give him leave to replead.
                                 4. Leave to Amend
               Hall also seeks leave to amend his complaint against Oﬃcers
        Watson and Wright. We agree that the district court abused its dis-
        cretion in denying Hall an opportunity to amend here. As a pro se
        litigant, Hall was entitled to at least one chance to amend his com-
        plaint under our precedent.
              Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend its pleading once
        as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it and, after that,
        with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave
        (which the court should freely give leave when justice so requires).
        FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
               Rule 15 “severely restrict[s]” the district court’s discretion to
        deny leave to amend. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d
        1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In particular, before
        dismissing a complaint, a district court “must” give a pro se party
        “at least” one chance to amend the complaint if a more carefully
        drafted complaint might state a claim. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108,
        1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy
        Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
               Hall’s ﬁrst motion for leave to amend sought to add a claim
        that Oﬃcers Watson and Wright were deliberately indiﬀerent to
        his serious medical needs—namely, that they had had ordered a
        nurse not to treat Hall’s wounds after they had deployed gas, pro-
        longing the pain the gas caused. The district court denied the
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1       Date Filed: 05/17/2023       Page: 24 of 37

        24                       Opinion of the Court                   20-14247

        motion because it found that Hall was seeking “to raise entirely
        new claims concerning the denial of medical care . . . that were not
        raised in his Amended Complaint.” The district court also stated
        that the defendants’ assertions “that there has been undue delay
        and bad faith in making this request” were “well founded.”
                We disagree for three reasons. First, this motion was Hall’s
        ﬁrst request for leave to amend. While the operative complaint was
        an “Amended Complaint,” it was “amended” only because the
        magistrate judge had struck Hall’s original complaint for not using
        the Middle District of Florida’s approved prisoner-civil-rights form
        complaint. But given that Hall had sued in state court (and the
        defendants had removed the action to federal court), that Hall’s
        complaint was not on the approved form wasn’t a shortcoming at-
        tributable to Hall. In other words, the Amended Complaint was
        Hall’s ﬁrst complaint. And absent a showing of futility or lack of
        desire to amend, Hall had to be given at least one chance to amend
        his claims. See Bank, 928 F.2d at 1112.
                Second, the district court erred in concluding that Hall had
        unduly delayed seeking leave to amend. 6 As we’ve noted, the dis-
        trict court ruled on the motion to dismiss on May 17, 2016. Hall
        moved for leave to amend just a week later. We cannot say that a
        week’s delay is “undue.” The delay between the ﬁling of the mo-
        tion to dismiss (in October 2015) and Hall’s motion for leave to

        6 We assume without deciding that bad faith and undue delay can be reasons
        to deny a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 25 of 37

        20-14247                Opinion of the Court                        25

        amend (in May 2016) just reﬂects the time the district court used to
        adjudicate the motion. Cf. In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1109
        (11th Cir. 2014) (“Although generally, the mere passage of time,
        without more, is an insuﬃcient reason to deny leave to amend a
        complaint, undue delay may clearly support such a denial.”) (cita-
        tion omitted).
               We also don’t think that Hall improperly delayed seeking
        amendment between ﬁling his complaint in state court in July 2015
        and moving for leave to amend in May 2016, because we are cogni-
        zant that “the original complaint was ﬁled by the plaintiﬀ pro se
        while a prisoner in the state prison system.” Stevens v. Gay, 792 F.2d
        1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). Nor had a court-ordered discovery
        deadline passed that would have barred discovery into Hall’s new
        allegations. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (aﬃrming denial of leave to amend after the end of discovery). No
        doubt the defendants would have preferred denial of leave to
        amend. But at bottom, “[t]he lengthy nature of litigation, without
        any other evidence of prejudice to the defendants or bad faith on
        the part of the plaintiﬀs, does not justify denying the plaintiﬀs the
        opportunity to amend their complaint.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d
        1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2001).
               Third, we are skeptical that the district court properly con-
        cluded that Hall sought leave to amend in bad faith. Bad faith can
        be shown where “an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a friv-
        olous argument[] or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of
        harassing an opponent. A party also demonstrates bad faith by
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1       Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 26 of 37

        26                      Opinion of the Court                   20-14247

        delaying or disrupting the litigation[.]” Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d
        1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998). We’ve aﬃrmed sanctions based on bad
        faith even against non-lawyer parties. Cf. Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf,
        Inc., 9 F.4th 1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 2021).
               Here, though, the record contains no indication that Hall
        sought to advance a frivolous legal theory: he wanted to add alle-
        gations that Oﬃcers Wright and Watson prevented a nurse from
        treating his injuries from the use of gas. That seems to us to be a
        perfectly legitimate Eighth Amendment claim—maybe meritori-
        ous, maybe not, but not frivolous. Nor does the record include any
        indication that Hall sought to harass Oﬃcers Wright and Watson
        in particular. As far as we can tell, this lawsuit is Hall’s ﬁrst against
        them. Finally, to the extent that the district court found Hall’s de-
        sire to amend to be “ﬁnancially-motivated”; we’d be remiss if we
        didn’t note that the majority of litigation has at least some ﬁnancial
        motivation. In other words, given the costs of litigation generally,
        that Hall wanted to proceed with his claims only if he could recover
        more than nominal damages does not strike us as showing bad
        faith.
               In sum, we think the district court abused its discretion in
        not giving Hall at least one chance to amend his claims against Of-
        ﬁcers Watson and Wright.
                         B. Claim Against Lieutenant Merola
                Hall argues the district court erred in four ways in its rulings
        on Hall’s claim against Lieutenant Merola. First, he says that the
        district court was wrong to dismiss his claims for punitive and
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 27 of 37

        20-14247                Opinion of the Court                        27

        compensatory damages. Second, he contends that the district court
        erred in denying his counseled motion for leave to amend. Third,
        he argues that the district court erred in denying his mid-trial Rule
        15(b) motion to conform his complaint to the evidence. And,
        fourth, he urges us to conclude that the district court erred in in-
        structing the jury that Hall was entitled to only nominal damages.
        We will take each in turn.
                       1. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
                As preliminary matter, Hall asserts that the district court
        erred in dismissing his claims for compensatory and punitive dam-
        ages under § 1997e(e) because that statute applies to only actions
        ﬁled in federal court. And his action, he points out, was ﬁled in
        state court and removed to federal court. We agree.
               Section 1997e(e) imposes a “limitation on recovery” and
        states that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
        conﬁned in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental
        or emotional injury suﬀered while in custody without a prior show-
        ing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C.
        § 1997e(e) (emphasis added).
               We’ve held that “bringing” an action means “commencing”
        it, not “maintaining” it. Maldonado v. Baker Cnty. Sheriﬀ’s Oﬀ., 23
        F.4th 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2022). Here, Hall ﬁled suit in state court,
        and the defendants removed the action to federal court. In other
        words, Hall didn’t bring his civil action in federal court, so §
        1997e(e) doesn’t apply. The district court therefore erred in dis-
        missing Hall’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages
USCA11 Case: 20-14247     Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 28 of 37

        28                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14247

        pursuant to § 1997e(e). But given that the jury found that Hall
        wasn’t entitled to even nominal damages, the error doesn’t warrant
        reversal. More on this below. See infra at 34.
                2. Counseled Pre-trial Motion for Leave to Amend
               Hall also argues that the district court erred in denying his
        second motion for leave to amend, the one ﬁled shortly after his
        appointed lawyer joined the case. Hall’s counsel’s proposed Second
        Amended Complaint sought to add new facts from Hall’s deposi-
        tion: that Hall had lost weight and that he had Crohn’s disease and
        acid reﬂux. Hall also wanted to add new dates to when he said that
        Lieutenant Merola ensured he wasn’t fed, adding August 7 to Au-
        gust 10 in addition to the dates in February. The district court de-
        nied the motion because Hall either wanted to add new dates
        (which would require more discovery) or sought to bolster his alle-
        gations to establish physical harm so he could seek compensatory
        and punitive damages. The district court found that Hall had un-
        duly delayed in seeking to add these new facts on the eve of trial
        and after three years of litigation.

                As we’ve said, leave to amend should be “freely given when
        justice so requires it.” But at the same time, it is “not an automatic
        right.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008). A dis-
        trict court may “in the exercise of its inherent power to manage the
        conduct of litigation before it, deny such leave where there is sub-
        stantial ground for doing so,” such as “undue prejudice to the
USCA11 Case: 20-14247       Document: 54-1        Date Filed: 05/17/2023        Page: 29 of 37

        20-14247                  Opinion of the Court                            29

        opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment.” Id.
        (quoting Faser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 674 F.2d 856, 860 (11th Cir.
        1982)). 7
                The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
        Hall’s second motion for leave to amend. Hall sought leave to
        amend in August 2018—over three years after he had originally
        ﬁled suit and less than two months before trial. The case was ready
        for trial on the claims that Hall had originally made. Cf. Burger King
        Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999) (aﬃrming denial
        of leave to amend forty months after the ﬁling of the counterclaim
        where the only explanation was the retention of a new attorney).
        Hall sought to add new dates when Lieutenant Merola allegedly
        did not feed him. And that would have necessitated deposing new
        witnesses or re-deposing old ones. Plus, Lieutenant Merola might
        have needed to retain an expert witness to explain or rebut Hall’s
        claims as to his medical conditions. On the eve of trial, denying
        leave to amend was well within the district court’s discretion.
                         3. Rule 15(b) Motion to Conform
               Hall also argues that the district court erred in denying his
        mid-trial Rule 16(b) motion to amend the complaint to conform to
        the evidence already admitted at trial.
              Rule 15(b) provides that, when a party objects to the admis-
        sion of evidence that wasn’t raised in the pleadings, the court

        7 These cases involve counseled plaintiffs, and at the time of these motions,
        Hall had counsel.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 30 of 37

        30                      Opinion of the Court                  20-14247

        “may” permit amendment when it “will aid in presenting the mer-
        its and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence
        would prejudice that party’s action or defense on the merits.”
        FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(1). To prevent prejudice, “[t]he court may
        grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet the evi-
        dence.” Id. Determining whether amendment will be prejudicial
        requires determining “whether [the defendant] had a fair oppor-
        tunity to defend and whether [the defendant] could offer any addi-
        tional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different theory.”
        Doe #6 v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 974 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2020).

               When the non-amending party does not object, the pro-
        posed amendment “must be treated in all respects as if raised in the
        pleadings. A party may move—at any time, even after judgment—
        to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to
        raise an unpleaded issue. But failure to amend does not affect the
        result of the trial of that issue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(2). We review
        the denial of a Rule 15(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Doe
        #6, 974 F.3d at 1337.

               We need not decide whether the district court erred in deny-
        ing amendment because it makes no difference to the outcome
        here. The jury heard all the evidence Hall sought to add about his
        medical conditions and medical records. And still, the jury found
        for Lieutenant Merola. So even if the district court erred in denying
        leave to amend, any error didn’t prejudice Hall.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 31 of 37

        20-14247                Opinion of the Court                        31

                                  4. Jury Instruction
               As we’ve explained, Hall’s claim that Lieutenant Merola in-
        structed other oﬃcers not to feed Hall went to trial, and the jury
        found Lieutenant Merola not liable. In support of his request for a
        new trial, Hall argues that Jury Instruction 9 was legally incorrect
        because it limited his damages to nominal damages. In Hall’s view,
        the instruction was prejudicial because it directed the jury that “any
        [of Hall’s] physical injur[ies]” were minimal, thus impugning Hall’s
        credibility given that Hall had testiﬁed to suﬀering physical injuries.
        The severity of Hall’s injuries was central to his case, Hall says, be-
        cause the entire case boiled down to whether the jury should have
        believed Hall or Lieutenant Merola. So telling the jury that the in-
        juries were minimal—and thus, in Hall’s view, not to believe Hall
        when he testiﬁed to severe injuries—placed a thumb on the scale
        of liability. We disagree.
               As a reminder, Jury Instruction 9 read,
               If your verdict is in favor of Peter Merola with respect
               to each claim, you will go no further. But if your ver-
               dict on one or both claims is for Wendall Hall, you
               will consider the issue of damages. When, as here,
               any physical injury an inmate suffers is minimal,
               the law allows an inmate to recover nominal dam-
               ages. This is because a person whose constitutional
               rights were violated is entitled to a recognition of that
               violation, even if he suffered only minimal injuries.
               Thus, if your verdict is for Wendall Hall on either
USCA11 Case: 20-14247       Document: 54-1        Date Filed: 05/17/2023        Page: 32 of 37

        32                        Opinion of the Court                    20-14247

               claim, you should award Wendall Hall nominal dam-
               ages not to exceed one dollar.

        Doc. 241 at 15 (emphasis added). The judge also directed jurors (1)
        to decide for themselves whether to believe each witness; (2) to as-
        sess each witness’s credibility; and (3) to not “in any way” construe
        “the fact that [the district court] [gave] instructions concerning the
        issue of damages” “as an indication that [the district court] be-
        lieve[d] that Wendall Hall should or should not prevail in this case.”
        Id. at 16
               “We will not disturb a jury’s verdict unless the charge, taken
        as a whole, is erroneous and prejudicial.” S.E.C. v. Yun, 327 F.3d
        1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003). “In some instances, even an inaccurate
        instruction may not mandate reversal. If the totality of the instruc-
        tions properly express the law applicable to the case, there is no
        error even though an isolated clause may be inaccurate, ambigu-
        ous, incomplete or otherwise subject to criticism.” Christopher v.
        Cutter Lab’ys, 53 F.3d 1184, 1194 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
                The charge was legally wrong: as we explained above, the
        district court erred in limiting Hall to nominal damages. Finding
        legal error, we turn to prejudice. 8

        8 Lieutenant Merola argues that Hall did not preserve his argument. We dis-
        agree. Hall objected to the nominal-damages instruction at the charge confer-
        ence, and the district court stated that the objections were “noted and over-
        ruled for the record and preserved for the record.”
USCA11 Case: 20-14247        Document: 54-1        Date Filed: 05/17/2023        Page: 33 of 37

        20-14247                  Opinion of the Court                              33

               Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, we conclude that
        Hall was not prejudiced. The jury had the chance to award Hall
        nominal damages but did not do so. In making this decision, the
        jury had to consider whether Lieutenant Merola instructed guards
        not to feed Hall in retaliation for Hall’s ﬁling of grievances, not how
        badly Hall may have suﬀered if Lieutenant Merola gave such an
        instruction. Even Hall’s counsel conceded during closing argu-
        ments that an injury “[did] not have to be a broken arm or a broken
        leg” to qualify as a legally cognizable injury. And Hall’s counsel
        concluded that “even without those medical problems, going three
        days without food hurts. It’s not a pleasant experience. So even
        holding that aside, the hunger pains that Mr. Hall felt, not being
        able to stand up straight because he was so hungry, that’s an injury
        under the law, folks.” 9 In other words, as Hall’s counsel argued the
        case, there was no clash between Hall’s testimony and the chal-
        lenged instruction. And because Hall’s case turned, not on the

        9 One more thing: Hall also argues—in his pro se brief only—that the magis-
        trate judge abused her discretion in denying Hall’s motion for sanctions when
        Merola did not appear for a settlement conference. We disagree. We review
        a district court’s sanctions order for an abuse of discretion. Amlong & Amlong,
        P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2007). While Lieutenant
        Merola disobeyed a court order to attend the settlement conference, the mag-
        istrate judge found Lieutenant Merola’s explanation—that he had overslept
        after working a night shift and had fallen asleep with his clothes on and his
        phone beside him—credible. Especially given that this was an isolated inci-
        dent, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying Hall’s
        motion for a default judgment.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247     Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023    Page: 34 of 37

        34                     Opinion of the Court                20-14247

        severity of his injury, but its existence, we conclude that the jury-
        instruction error doesn’t warrant a new trial.

                          IV. CONCLUSION
               We VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Hall’s claims
        against Oﬃcers Watson and Wright and REMAND for leave to re-
        plead and AFFIRM the jury’s verdict in favor of Lieutenant Merola.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247     Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 35 of 37

        21-12106              Newsom, J., Concurring                        1

        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the
        judgment:
               I agree with pretty much everything in the majority opinion.
        I write separately only to oﬀer one tiny clariﬁcation.
                The majority opinion correctly concludes that, in the partic-
        ular circumstances of this case, Hall’s Eighth Amendment claim
        isn’t barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and is progeny.
        See Maj. Op. at 17–19. For me, though, that conclusion turns on
        exactly what kind of “excessive force” claim Hall is pursuing. Has
        he raised only what I’ll call an “I didn’t do it” claim—i.e., a claim
        that he didn’t tamper with the sprinkler in his cell and, therefore,
        that any force that Oﬃcers Watson and Wright used to subdue him
        was, by deﬁnition, constitutionally excessive—or has he also raised
        an “I did it but the force used to subdue me was nonetheless con-
        stitutionally excessive” claim?
                As the majority opinion explains, the district court seemed
        to think that Hall had presented only an “I didn’t do it” claim: “The
        district court noted in a footnote that this was ‘not a case in which
        Plaintiﬀ admitted that yes, he tampered with the security device . .
        . but the oﬃcers used excessive force in subduing him. Instead,
        Plaintiﬀ alleges in his complaint that he was not tampering with a
        safety device in his cell and Defendants Watson and Wright chemi-
        cally gassed him for various retaliatory or discriminatory reasons.’”
        Maj. Op. at 7 (quoting Doc. 37 at 11 n.5). If that were indeed the
        only type of excessive-force claim that Hall had pleaded, Heck, in
        my view, would foreclose it. In that instance, Hall’s claim would
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1      Date Filed: 05/17/2023     Page: 36 of 37

        2                     Newsom, J., Concurring                 21-12106

        meet both of the Heck-bar prerequisites that we speciﬁed in Dixon
        v. Hodges: It would (1) “necessarily impl[y] the earlier decision is
        invalid,” because the prison’s disciplinary proceeding resulted in a
        decision that Hall did tamper with the sprinkler; and (2) it would
        be “necessary to the success of his § 1983 suit,” because, again, the
        very premise of “his” (i.e., Hall’s particular) claim would be that no
        tampering occurred. 887 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018).
               All of which is to say that if we were stuck with the premise
        that the lone excessive-force claim that Hall pleaded was of the “I
        didn’t do it” variety, I’d have to conclude that Heck barred it. But—
        and for me it’s a big but—I don’t think we’re stuck with that prem-
        ise. Rather, I think that Hall’s pro se complaint, liberally construed,
        is properly read to present an “I did it but the force used to subdue
        me was nonetheless constitutionally excessive” claim. He alleged
        there—with my enumeration added for clarity—that Oﬃcers Wat-
        son and Wright gassed him “[1] without any justiﬁcation or suﬃ-
        cient reason to wantonly cause him pain or injury or [2] to retaliate
        against [him] for ﬁling grievances, Lawsuits or for his past discipli-
        nary history or [3] using excessive force against him.” Doc. 9 at 9-
        12. Now, I’ll admit, that’s a little hard to make out, but I think that
        the ﬁnal phrase, which I’ve labeled No. 3, really makes only as an
        alternative to the “I didn’t do it” claim in No. 1. And notably, in his
        opposition to the oﬃcers’ motion to dismiss, Hall seemed—again,
        being charitable—to say something similar, calling the “charge of
        tampering with safety device . . . merely incidental or slight to his
        further claims of excessive force against Watson and
        Wright.” Doc. 13 at 8-11.
USCA11 Case: 20-14247      Document: 54-1       Date Filed: 05/17/2023      Page: 37 of 37

        21-12106               Newsom, J., Concurring                          3

                So, as I see it, Hall alleged an “I did it but . . .” claim. That
        claim—unlike any “I didn’t do it” claim that he might also have
        brought—is not Heck-barred because it doesn’t necessarily imply
        the invalidity of the prison disciplinary proceeding. To the con-
        trary, it acknowledges the result of that proceeding and insists that
        Oﬃcers Watson and Wright violated the Eighth Amendment for
        independent reasons.