Court Opinion

ID: 9927764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 22:44:12.464265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:13.636946
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                   No. 82869-0-I
                      Appellant,
                                                   DIVISION ONE
       v.
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 VANESSA VALDIGLESIAS LAVALLE,

                      Respondent.

       COBURN, J. — Vanessa Valdiglesias LaValle appealed from a guilty verdict on

one count of solicitation of murder in the first degree, asserting multiple grounds on

appeal. In reviewing the only ground before it, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed

her conviction based on its interpretation of the criminal solicitation statute, RCW

9A.28.030(1), and remanded back to this court. After reviewing her only remaining

claim, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider

Valdiglesias LaValle’s expert’s report in determining whether to grant her request for an

exceptional sentence below the standard range. We vacate the sentence and remand

for resentencing.

                                          FACTS

       The underlying facts are set out in this court’s published opinion. See State v.

Valdiglesias LaValle, 23 Wn. App. 2d 934, 518 P.3d 658 (2022) (LaValle I), rev’d in part,

2 Wn.3d 310, 535 P.3d 856 (2023) (LaValle II).
No. 82869-0-I/2

       Valdiglesias LaValle was convicted of solicitation of murder in the first degree

following a jury trial. At trial, the State admitted video of her telling her son, S.G., that if

he poisoned his father, Valdiglesias LaValle’s former husband, Timothy Grady, she and

S.G. would be together forever.

       Valdiglesias LaValle appealed. This court reversed her conviction, holding that

what she offered did not meet the “other thing of value” requirement in the criminal

solicitation statute, RCW 9A.28.030(1). LaValle I, 23 Wn. App. 2d at 949-50. We also

affirmed the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress the recording of her

conversation with her son S.G. Id. at 943. Valdiglesias LaValle did not cross-appeal

our holding affirming the suppression ruling. Because we reversed Valdiglesias

LaValle’s conviction, we did not reach her additional claim that the trial court failed to

consider her expert’s report in determining whether to grant her request for an

exceptional sentence below the standard range. Id. at 936. Because the only issue

before the Supreme Court was the interpretation of RCW 9A.28.030(1), in which they

reversed this court, LaValle II, 535 P.3d at 863, on remand we now review Valdiglesias

LaValle’s remaining claim – whether the trial court erred in failing to consider an expert

report she submitted to support her request for an exceptional sentence below the

standard range based on mitigating factors outlined in RCW 9.94A.535(1)(h) and (j).

       At sentencing, Valdiglesias LaValle requested an exceptional sentence of 364

days of jail, below the minimum standard range of 180 months. She cited the following

examples under RCW 9.94A.535(1) as possible grounds for mitigation: 1

       1
           The defense sentencing memorandum also listed “(g) The operation of the multiple
offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in
light of the purpose of this chapter, as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.”
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No. 82869-0-I/3

              (h) The defendant or the defendant’s children suffered a continuing
       pattern of physical or sexual abuse by the victim of the offense and the
       offense is a response to that abuse.
              ....

              (j) The current offense involved domestic violence, as defined in
       RCW 10.99.020, and the defendant suffered a continuing pattern of
       coercion, control, or abuse by the victim of the offense and the offense is a
       response to that coercion, control, or abuse.

Valdiglesias LaValle reminded the court that “[t]his court may also impose a sentence

below the standard range based on findings of any other relevant mitigating factor.” To

support her request for mitigation, Valdiglesias LaValle summarized the domestic

violence she experienced while married to Grady, and she submitted a psychological

evaluation along with documentation relied upon by the expert that included police

reports and witness statements dating from 2009 to 2016, medical records, and social

service records relating to Valdiglesias LaValle and her children.

       Dr. Claudette S. Antuña described Valdiglesias LaValle as “a survivor of verbal,

emotional, psychological, physical abuse, sexual and financial abuse perpetrated by

husband on her,” and diagnosed her with Chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and

Victim of the Crime of Domestic Violence in the U.S, among other diagnoses. 2 The

evaluation was conducted at the request of her defense attorney. Antuña wrote:

              It is recommended that [Valdiglesias LaValle] receive culturally
       competent and linguistically sensitive psychotherapy to deal with the
       physical, verbal, emotional, psychological abuse she has sustained at the
       hands of her husband and needs to understand the long-term
       consequences of these events on her, and her children who also need
       individual counseling and with their mother would benefit from family
       counseling.

       Valdiglesias LaValle also submitted a letter from Skagit Domestic Violence &

       2
         Other diagnoses included histrionic personality disorder, personal history of verbal,
physical, emotional, psychological, financial abuse from spouse, and imprisonment.
                                                3
No. 82869-0-I/4

Sexual Assault Services (DVSAS), which helps victims of domestic violence and sexual

assault through shelter and counsel, among other things, to establish that she was

receiving services from DVSAS since July 2010.

      Defense counsel explained to the court that the psychological evaluation

included police reports from incidents going back to 2009 and included statements from

lay witnesses and not just Valdiglesias LaValle. He stated that throughout his time

working with Valdiglesias LaValle, she always worried about the safety and well-being

of her children. He told the court that Valdiglesias LaValle always complied with police

and came in voluntarily, never denying what she had said. He further contended that

proportionality was a clear basis for the court to consider an exceptional sentence below

the standard range because no one was physically hurt.

      The State submitted a letter from forensic psychiatrist Mark McClung. The State

had asked McClung to review the evidence related to the present case and to comment

on Antuña’s report. McClung did not evaluate Valdiglesias LaValle. McClung noted

some criticism of Antuña’s methodology and also wrote, “The report mentions no

discussion with the defendant regarding the defendant’s thoughts, emotions or decision-

making at the time of the crime; it provides no specific connection between the

psychological evaluation findings, and [Valdiglesias LaValle]’s mental state at the time

of her criminal acts.” McClung did not otherwise dispute Antuña’s diagnosis that

Valdiglesias LaValle was a victim of domestic violence.

      The State recommended the low-end of the standard range, 180 months, and

objected to an exceptional sentence below the standard range.

                                            4
No. 82869-0-I/5

      The court addressed Valdiglesias LaValle’s request for an exceptional sentence

below the standard range based on domestic violence, stating:

              She has raised issues of domestic violence that should be taken as
      a mitigating factor. That, from my recollection of not only testimony at the
      trial, but reviewing all the post-trial memorandums from the various
      psychiatric and psychological experts, that there is, in the court’s mind, a
      missing link between the diagnosis and the criminal act itself, that even if
      she was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of
      domestic violence from her marriage, there was nothing in this
      psychological report presented by the defendant, at least that I confirm is
      persuasive, it doesn’t provide that connection, that her mental state at the
      time of her criminal acts in this case of solicitation was because of that.
              So I don’t believe I could use that in this case, even though I’m
      quite empathetic to her descriptions of what happened in the marriage, but
      I don’t believe I can use that.

The court followed the State’s recommendation and imposed 180 months.

      Valdiglesias LaValle appeals.

                                      DISCUSSION

      Valdiglesias LaValle contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it

concluded it could not impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range. We

hold that the court applied the wrong legal standard in determining why it could not

consider the proffered evidence of the defense expert’s report.

      Under Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act, a party generally cannot appeal a

standard range sentence. RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Brown, 145 Wn. App. 62, 77,

184 P.3d 1284 (2008). The trial court cannot abuse its discretion as a matter of law as

to the sentence’s length if the trial court imposes a sentence within the standard range

as set by the legislature. Brown, 145 Wn. App. at 78. However, when this court

reviews the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request for an exceptional sentence

below the standard range, “review is limited to circumstances where the court has

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No. 82869-0-I/6

refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing

to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.” State v. Garcia-

Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997).

       The court may impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range if it

finds that mitigating circumstances are established by a preponderance of the evidence.

RCW 9.94A.535(1). We need not determine whether the evidence Valdiglesias LaValle

submitted sufficiently established a basis for mitigation under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(h) or

subsection (j) because they, like all the other subsections listed, “are illustrative only

and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences.” RCW

9.94A.535(1) (emphasis added). Valdiglesias LaValle correctly informed the court that it

“may also impose a sentence below the standard range based on findings of any other

relevant mitigating factor.” The issue here is that the trial court believed it could not use

Antuña’s report because of a “missing link.” Specifically, the court said it did not provide

what “her mental state [was] at the time of her criminal acts.” The court explained, “I

don’t believe I could use that in this case, even though I’m quite empathetic to her

descriptions of what happened in the marriage, but I don’t believe I can use that.”

       Notably, the parties dispute whether the court acknowledged the presence of

domestic violence in the marriage. The State argues that “the trial judge expressed that

information regarding abuse came from Valdiglesias [LaValle], but the judge did not

state at any point that he believed that the abuse existed.” The record establishes that

the information submitted regarding abuse did not come from just Valdiglesias LaValle,

but also eyewitnesses. 3

       3
        For example, the defense submitted a copy of an Anacortes Police Department report
regarding a June 2, 2010 incident in which a witness told police she saw a female being pushed
                                              6
No. 82869-0-I/7

       The State contends that “[e]ven if the court had found that a continuing pattern of

abuse existed, the court was not incorrect in determining that the language of the

statutory factor explicitly requires some connection between the prior abuse and the

current criminal act.” We need not address the merits of the State’s argument because

the State’s argument relates to the weight that the trial court might give Antuña’s report

rather than whether the trial court can and should consider the report in the first

instance. The court must first, in exercising its discretion, consider what was properly

submitted by defense before determining if it supported an exceptional sentence. See

State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 685-86, 358 P.3d 359 (2015) (remanding for

resentencing after trial court incorrectly believed it was prohibited from considering the

mitigating circumstance of whether youthfulness diminished the defendant’s capacity to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and supported an exceptional sentence

below the standard range).

       In the instant case, the trial court believed it could not “even use” Antuña’s report

in its consideration. We do not know of, nor does the State cite to, any authority that

requires defendants to submit a forensic determination of the mental state at the time of

the criminal offense in order for the trial court to consider a defendant’s submitted

out of a vehicle and then pulled back in and the witness could see the male striking at the
female and the female attempting to fend off the male while holding an infant child in her arms.
The witness wrote a statement under penalty of perjury saying she tried to intervene after she
saw the male pull the female and her child into the driver seat of the car, was swinging his arms
like he was hitting her and held his hand over her mouth while pulling her and the child into the
car. Police reported that the female, Valdiglesias LaValle, said her husband, Grady, called her
names in the store and when they left he pushed and pulled her while she held her child, and he
put his hand over her mouth to stop her from yelling for help. She also reported that he placed
his hand around her neck but she was not choked. Police noted that Valdiglesias LaValle had
minor marks on her neck and left side of her face which were consistent with her story. Police
took Grady into custody after speaking with him about the incident.
                                               7
No. 82869-0-I/8

psychological evaluation for the purposes of determining whether mitigating factors exist

to support an exceptional sentence. In fact, the State does not argue that the trial court

was prohibited from considering Antuña’s report.

      The court abused its discretion by denying Valdiglesias LaValle’s request for an

exceptional sentence without considering Antuña’s report under the mistaken belief that

it could not even consider the report without information of Valdiglesias LaValle’s mental

state at the time she committed the crime.

      We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this

opinion.

WE CONCUR:

                                             8