Court Opinion

ID: 9740210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:30:04.732949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.839555
License: Public Domain

G. E. Bowles, J.
(dissenting). Defendant had been the physician of Betty Jean Phillips, the chief prosecution witness, for four years. Since 1976 he had prescribed drugs for her and treated her during a hospitalization for a drug overdose. She testified that defendant was one of her drug sources and that she had received drugs from him in exchange for sexual favors.
Ms. Phillips contacted the vice squad, of the Grand Rapids Police Department on April 26, 1979, because she wanted to kick her addiction to *306Preludin and speed. The officers took Ms. Phillips to defendant’s office and told her to "go up there and to do what you would normally do” and "not to do anything out of the ordinary”. Defendant did not see her on April 27th, a Friday, but told her to return on Saturday, April 28th when his receptionist would not be working. Ms. Phillips returned to defendant’s office on April 28, 1979, equipped with a recording device. At the outset the two played what Ms. Phillips called their usual "silly game”, defendant asking her why she was there and telling her to leave because he was too busy to see her. She said she was there to pay her bill and offered to pay in money. After a suggestive gesture by Ms. Phillips, she participated in an act of fellatio with defendant and, at the conclusion, asked the defendant for another prescription for Preludin. Defendant wrote her a prescription for 30 pills. The prescription was written after Ms. Phillips told him that she could sell them all.
The majority relies in part on defendant’s notations on Ms. Phillips’ patient records in reaching its decision. However, these records are of dubious validity. Defendant’s record of Ms. Phillips’ April 28th visit contains a notation that defendant extracted a promise from her that she would never again return to his office. However, the truthfulness of this entry is not supported by Ms. Phillips or, more importantly, the transcript of the recording of the pair’s April 28th conversation.
As the majority notes, defendant did not see Ms. Phillips on April 27th. However, this should not be construed as evidencing resistance on the part of defendant to commit the illegal act. Defendant told her to return the following day, a Saturday. Defendant’s receptionist testified that his office hours were 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. Monday through *307Friday. Rather than indicating resistance, defendant’s refusal to see Ms. Phillips on April 27th may be viewed as indicative of his desire to see her alone when they could be free from interruptions.
Michigan recognizes the so-called objective test for entrapment. People v Turner, 390 Mich 7; 210 NW2d 336 (1973). The character or predisposition of the particular defendant is irrelevant to determining whether entrapment occurred. Central to the determination is whether the illegal conduct of the defendant was a product of police creativity. Turner, supra, 17. The mere fact that the actions of the police constitute the commission of a crime does not necessarily establish entrapment. There must be intolerable police conduct that institutes or instigates the crime. People v Moore, 73 Mich App 514, 517; 252 NW2d 507 (1977). The existence of a relationship between an informant and the defendant prior to police involvement is a factor to be weighed in determining whether the police conduct offends public policy. People v Irma Perry, 75 Mich App 121, 126; 254 NW2d 810 (1977).
The offense committed, delivery of a controlled substance by defendant, was not the product of the creativity of the police, nor did it result from any play on defendant’s sympathies. Ms. Phillips already had an appointment for Friday, April 27, 1979, with defendant to pay for a prescription she had received on April 24th before the contact with the police on April 26, 1979. The police gave instructions for her to "do what she normally did” and "not to do anything out of the ordinary”. That, in fact, is what happened; she did what she normally had done. Defendant gave her Preludin in exchange for sex.
Significantly, the tape recording of the April 28th conversation shows that defendant and Ms. *308Phillips played a game, defendant pretending that he wanted her to leave. Further, before the sexual act Ms. Phillips offered to pay her bill in money and defendant did not accept it. When he gave her the 30 Preludin pills he knew that she was going to sell "every one”.
Ms. Phillips did not play on defendant’s sympathy. The pills were not for her own use, but rather, were for resale. Under current case law, before an appeal to sympathy can constitute entrapment, it must be shown that the appeal was to human emotions and motivations which can be characterized as arising for man’s better nature. An offer to satisfy someone’s sexual desires is not an appeal to sympathy under the cases; it is hardly an appeal to man’s better nature. People v Duis, 81 Mich App 698; 265 NW2d 794 (1978), People v Rowan, 76 Mich App 124; 255 NW2d 791 (1977), People v Soper, 57 Mich App 677; 226 NW2d 691 (1975).
At most defendant was given an opportunity to commit the charged offense by the activity of Ms. Phillips and the police. This opportunity, one might add, had been seized by defendant on previous occasions. There was no inducement or incitement by the police within the contemplation of the law.
A trial court’s finding that no entrapment occurred is subject to appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard. People v D’Angelo, 401 Mich 167, 183; 257 NW2d 655 (1977). Furthermore, defendant has the burden of proving the entrapment defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In the instant case, the trial court’s finding that entrapment had not been proven was not clearly erroneous.
The entrapment defense is calculated to protect *309society in those situations where the police conduct is so reprehensible that the court as a matter of public policy will not permit such conduct to result in a conviction. See United States v Russell, 411 US 423; 93 S Ct 1637; 36 L Ed 2d 366 (1973) (Justice Stewart dissenting). Police should not be permitted to manufacture crime. However, this is not such a case.
I would affirm.