Court Opinion

ID: 9957286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 00:00:40.400856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.483384
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50183          Document: 130-1           Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/03/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit
                                    No. 22-50183
                                  ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                  April 3, 2024
United States of America,                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                  Clerk
                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Michael Medina,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:05-CR-39-1
                  ______________________________

Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      At issue is whether section 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 applies
to a defendant’s resentencing when his pre-enactment sentence was vacated
post-enactment. It does not. AFFIRMED.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50183        Document: 130-1         Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                   No. 22-50183

                                         I.
       Michael Medina pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of: conspiracy
to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; conspiracy to
use and carry a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(o); and two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during
a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
       At the time of his first sentencing, § 924(c) required a seven-year
mandatory minimum sentence if a firearm was brandished; and, “[i]n the
case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection”, a 25-year
mandatory minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (C) (2004). The
25-year mandatory minimum applied even to instances where the “second or
subsequent conviction” was obtained in the same proceeding. E.g., Deal v.
United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (construing “second or subsequent”).
Therefore, the district court in 2005 imposed, inter alia, a seven-year
sentence for Medina’s first § 924(c) conviction, and a consecutive 25-year
sentence for his second.
       In 2016, Medina moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(providing remedies for sentences imposed in violation of law). But, before
the court ruled on the motion, the First Step Act was enacted, amending,
inter alia, § 924(c)(1)(C). See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
§ 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The
Act replaced the “second or subsequent conviction” language so that the
statute now reads: “In the case of a violation of this subsection that occurs after
a prior conviction under this subsection has become final, the person shall . . . be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years”. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(C) (2023) (emphasis added). In other words, the amended
statute no longer requires the imposition of a 25-year mandatory minimum

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                                  No. 22-50183

sentence for a second § 924(c) conviction that, like Medina’s, was obtained
in the same proceeding. See id.
       Regarding scope, the First Step Act explained that the amended
§ 924(c) “appl[ied] to any offense that was committed before the date of
enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as
of such date of enactment”. First Step Act of 2018 § 403(b).
       After the amendment, the district court granted Medina’s motion in
part, vacating his § 924(o) conviction. Deciding full resentencing was
appropriate, the court also vacated Medina’s sentence. On resentencing,
however, and without mentioning the amended § 924(c), the court
reimposed the seven- and 25-year sentences for the two § 924(c) convictions.
                                       II.
       Medina contends the district court erred in not applying the amended
§ 924(c). Because he (as he also concedes) did not raise this issue in district
court, review is only for plain error. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d
537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Under that standard, he must show a forfeited plain
error (clear-or-obvious error, rather than one subject to reasonable dispute)
that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135
(2009). If he makes that showing, we have discretion to correct the reversible
plain error, but generally should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id. (citation
omitted).
       During the pendency of this appeal, our court held in United States v.
Duffey that section 403 of the First Step Act does not “appl[y] to post-
enactment resentencings of defendants whose pre-enactment sentences were
vacated after the law was enacted”. 92 F.4th 304, 307 (5th Cir. 2024),
petition for cert. docketed sub nom. Hewitt v. United States (U.S. 12 Mar. 2024)
(No. 23-1002). Needless to say, and pursuant to our limited plain-error

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                                 No. 22-50183

review, the requisite clear-or-obvious error is lacking. Because Medina’s pre-
enactment sentence was vacated after the First Step Act was enacted, section
403 does not apply to his post-enactment resentencing. See id.
                                     III.
       Accordingly, the sentence is AFFIRMED.

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