Court Opinion

ID: 9683487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:29:42.928285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.654656
License: Public Domain

PHIL JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting from order on motion for rehearing.
I dissent from the Court’s denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of appellants.
In Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.1997), the supreme court reiterated its policy on interpreting the Appellate Rules1 in matters where the viability of an appeal is in question:
This Court has never wavered from the principle that appellate courts should not dismiss an appeal for a procedural defect whenever any arguable interpretation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure would preserve the appeal. We have repeatedly held that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over any appeal in which the appellant files an instrument in a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction.... Our decisions reflect the policy embodied in our appellate rules that disfavors disposing of appeals based upon harmless procedural defects, (emphasis added). Id. at 616.
We are to construe the Rules liberally and not impose requirements resulting in loss of the right of appeal unless absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of a Rule. Id. at 616-17. See also Jones v. City of Houston, 976 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.1998); Stangel v. Parker, 945 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.1997).
The filing of appellants’ Notice of Appeal resulted in the implied filing of a motion for extension of time for the perfecting of the appeal, and our appellate jurisdiction exists over the appeal if appellants’ Notice of Appeal was a bona fide attempt to invoke our appellate jurisdic*314tion. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 615-16. By addressing the merits of whether appellants offer a “reasonable explanation” for failing to timely file their Notice of Appeal, the majority apparently concludes that appellants made a bona fide attempt to invoke our jurisdiction. I agree with that conclusion. The record reflects no evidence that the filing of the notice was not a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court.
Our original dismissal of appellants’ appeal was because appellants did not “reasonably explain” their need for an extension of time to perfect their appeal. It is not absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of any Rule that we refuse to allow appellants to make their explanation for needing an extension of time via a Motion for Reconsideration. See Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616-17. Thus, it is appropriate that we consider the explanation which appellants offer in their Motion for Reconsideration for needing the extension. If their explanation indicates conduct short of intentional or deliberate noncompliance with the time period for perfecting their appeal without the granting of an extension, then appellants are entitled to have their appeal considered. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677; Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1989).
As noted by the majority, the supreme court has approved the description of an appellant’s “reasonable explanation” for needing an extension of time in which to perfect an appeal as being “[A]ny plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file ... was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance .... ” (emphasis added). Garcia, 774 S.W.2d at 670 (quoting Sloan v. Passman, 536 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ) (Guittard, C.J., dissenting at 538 S.W.2d 1).2 Garcia further emphasized that the proper focus in determining whether a “reasonable explanation” exists is whether a deliberate or intentional failure to comply with the appellate rules has occurred, and that “Any conduct short of deliberate or intentional noncompliance qualifies [as a reasonable explanation].” (emphasis added). Garcia, 774 S.W.2d at 670; see also Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex.1977).
I view the standard used by the majority to evaluate appellants’ explanation for their failure to perfect an appeal without the need for an extension of time as too strict in light of the guidance of Garcia, Verburgt and Jones. The majority tests appellants’ explanation for internal consistency, detailed factual support, and eviden-tiary support for a causal relationship between the failure to perfect an appeal without an extension of time being granted and the circumstances relied on as explanation. The supreme court appears to require only a statement of circumstances indicating that appellants’ failure to comply with the notice of appeal deadline was not intentional or deliberate. Garcia, 774 S.W.2d at 670. The supreme court has not mandated that an appellant’s explanation pass a factual sufficiency review or an evidentiary causal relationship review as to the need for an extension of time. On the contrary, the court has specifically stated that (1) appellate courts are not to impose requirements resulting in loss of the right of appeal unless absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of an appellate rule; and (2) the policy of the court and the appellate rules disfavors disposing of appeals on harmless procedural defects. Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616-17.
In the verified Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for appellants sets out circumstances indicating the need for an extension of time for perfecting the appeal. *315The circumstances included counsel’s being a sole practitioner, his misunderstanding of the law concerning the time for perfection of appeal and his crowded trial and hearing schedule. Logical inconsistencies in the explanation by counsel for appellants and gaps in the time periods covered by the explanation for needing an extension do not evidence a deliberate or intentional disregard of the rules for perfecting appeals. Once appellants offered an explanation which indicated that they did not show an intentional disregard for the time requirements for perfecting an appeal, they met the requirements of Rule 10.5(b)(1)(C) as interpreted by Meshwert and Garcia. Our guidance is clear: appellate courts should not dismiss an appeal for a procedural defect if any arguable interpretation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure would preserve the appeal. Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616. Evidence of failure to timely act by appellants (or their counsel) or a factual omission in appellants’ explanation for needing the extension of time, therefore, should not be held to deprive this court of jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal, given the facts in this case. See Garcia, 774 S.W.2d at 670.
Had appellants filed their Notice of Appeal fourteen days earlier, they would not have been required to offer any explanation whatsoever for the time they took to perfect their appeal. Appellee has not claimed harm from the extra fourteen days it took appellants to file their Notice of Appeal. We are to dispose of appeals on the merits and not on harmless procedural defects, unless disposition on the basis of the procedural defect is absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of a Rule. Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616-17. In light of existing supreme court precedent, no such necessity is demonstrated in this case.
I would not deny the Motion for Reconsideration at this time. As we are required to do by Rule 49.2, before granting a Motion for Reconsideration, I would request appellees to respond to the Motion for Reconsideration. I would then review the record for affirmative evidence that appellants or their counsel intentionally or deliberately violated the time limits prescribed for perfecting their appeal. We should then set aside our dismissal for want of jurisdiction and reinstate the appeal unless we determine from the record, based on affirmative evidence of such intent, that appellants or their counsel intended not to comply with the time limit specified for perfecting their appeal. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616-17; Garcia, 774 S.W.2d at 670.

. All references to a ‘Rule’ or to 'Rules’ will be to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless noted otherwise.

. Garcia addressed former TexR.App. P. 41(a)(1) and 41(a)(2), whereas we address the current appellate rules revised effective September 1, 1997. The revised rules require appellants to reasonably explain the need for an extension of time. Tex.R.App. P. 10.5(b)(1)(C).