Court Opinion

ID: 9914053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:04:43.866034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:56.707645
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 22, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0918-MR

PHILLIP TOWNES                                                         APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE ALISON C. WELLS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CR-00099

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                 REVERSING AND
                                  REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND EASTON,
JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Phillip Townes (“Townes”), challenges his

jury trial conviction for possession of a controlled substance in the first degree with

a sentence of three years to serve. We conclude the circuit court erred by allowing

a lab analyst witness to testify about the results of drug tests performed by another

analyst. The witness had no personal knowledge of any testing of the drugs at

issue. In these circumstances, Townes was denied his constitutional confrontation
right. The same witness’s testimony also contributed to an overall inadequate

chain of custody to authenticate the lab test results. We reverse the judgment of

the Perry Circuit Court and remand for a new trial.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             In December of 2019, Townes was a passenger in a vehicle stopped

by police in Hazard. The arresting officer, Sgt. Steven Everidge (“Everidge”),

knew Townes. Everidge checked Townes’ name for any outstanding warrants and

discovered a warrant for a failure to appear in court.

             While placing Townes under arrest, Everidge patted him down and

felt something in his right front pants pocket. Everidge told Townes that the items

did not feel “like candy.” On hearing this, Townes reached into this pocket and

attempted to throw the items he retrieved. He was prevented from doing this by

Everidge and another officer on the scene. After handcuffing Townes, Everidge

retrieved two baggies of white substances from Townes’ closed fist and recovered

another small baggie which had remained in Townes’ pocket. Townes was

charged with possession of a controlled substance in the first degree.

             Everidge saw a crystal-like substance in the bags Townes tried to get

rid of. The way it looked and how it was packaged (“dime bag”) was “spot on” for

what Everidge typically sees with methamphetamine. On cross-examination,

Townes’ attorney asked Everidge about his level of experience with drugs.

                                         -2-
Everidge testified he sees methamphetamine “a lot.” He was “pretty confident”

that what he saw was methamphetamine. Everidge’s testimony about his

experience and observations was admitted without objection. The context of the

questions by Townes’ attorney suggested drugs possessed for personal use rather

than for trafficking.

             After transporting Townes to the police station, Everidge processed

the three packages of suspected contraband as evidence. While handling the items,

Everidge wore rubber gloves. Everidge prepared documentation, which he

explained during his testimony. The contents of these documents would later be

corroborated by the lab analyst witness. Everidge attached the documentation to

the items and then dropped the evidence in a locked box. The police department

used a bank-like night deposit box to secure evidence.

             Everidge testified about the limited access to this evidence he and

others would have after the deposit. He identified by name the evidence custodian

with the police. Everidge explained that a police custodian officer later retrieved

the evidence and transported it to the Kentucky State Police lab in London for

analysis to determine the contents of the baggies. The documents with the lab

confirm the name of the evidence custodian who took the evidence to the lab. This

was the same name identified by Everidge.

                                         -3-
             Jamie Hibbard (“Hibbard”), a forensic scientist at the state police

crime laboratory in London, testified that former employee Erin Thorne (“Thorne”)

conducted the testing on the three packets. Hibbard conducted both administrative

and technical peer reviews of Thorne’s work. The review ensured that the bar code

numbers on the police agency submission matched those on the report. Hibbard

examined the evidence to confirm the weights and descriptions of the baggies

listed. This confirmed the items were consistent with those listed on the report of

what was sent to Thorne and what Thorne’s report described as having been tested.

But Hibbard himself did not perform any chemical analysis during his reviews.

             The defense argued Hibbard did not possess sufficient personal

knowledge to testify about the test results. Over defense objection, Hibbard was

allowed to read from the report which Thorne prepared. Hibbard informed the jury

that Thorne’s analysis revealed the three packets contained methamphetamine,

cocaine, and a mix of fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine.

             The defense also objected to the admission of the report as well as

testimony gleaned from it, because the prosecution failed to provide sufficient

evidence of the chain of custody of the evidence tested. The police custodian

officer who removed the submission from the secure box and transported it to the

lab did not testify at the trial. Other than the contents of the forms, there was no

direct testimony concerning how the submission arrived at the laboratory in

                                          -4-
London. Nonetheless the prosecution was allowed to enter the report into

evidence.

             After the prosecution rested its case at the end of the first trial day, the

defense made a motion for directed verdict. The defense argued the prosecution

failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. The trial court denied the motion.

             The next morning, the trial court, without explanation on the record,

reconsidered its ruling about the lab report. The trial court disallowed the report as

an exhibit for the jury to consider, but the testimony about it could still be

considered. Based on the arguments raised herein, Townes filed a motion for a

new trial or for acquittal, which was denied by the trial court. Townes now

appeals.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             “The standard of review of an evidentiary ruling is abuse of

discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Cox v.

Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Ky. 2018) (citations omitted).

                                          -5-
                                       ANALYSIS

                Townes objected to the introduction of the laboratory report and to

Hibbard’s testimony as it was dependent upon the report. One basis of the

objection was the lack of a sufficient chain of custody for the tested materials.

         KRE1 901 provides as follows:

                (a)    General provision. The requirement of
                       authentication or identification as a condition
                       precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
                       sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
                       question is what its proponent claims.

                Chain of custody is part of a method used to identify and authenticate

an item of evidence. “Establishing chain of custody is particularly important

where the object is in the form of a sample of material that is collected by an agent

associated with one of the parties and transmitted to a laboratory for scientific

analysis.” 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL

EVIDENCE § 9:10 (2023). The chain of custody serves to “insur[e] that the object

offered at trial is the very one connected to the party, transaction, or events

. . . .” Id.

                The Kentucky Supreme Court held in Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25

S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky. 2000):

                       If the offered item possesses characteristics which
                are fairly unique and readily identifiable and if the

1
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                            -6-
             substance of which the item is composed is relatively
             impervious to change, the trial court is viewed as having
             broad discretion to admit merely on the basis of
             testimony that the item is the one in question and is in a
             substantially unchanged condition. On the other hand, if
             the offered evidence is of such a nature as not to be
             readily identifiable, or to be susceptible to alteration by
             tampering or contamination, sound exercise of the trial
             court's discretion may require a substantially more
             elaborate foundation. A foundation of the latter sort will
             commonly entail testimonially tracing the “chain of
             custody” of the item with sufficient completeness to
             render it improbable that the original item has either been
             exchanged with another or been contaminated or
             tampered with.

             Thus, blood samples require a different amount of chain of custody

evidence than a gun. This case involved drugs, many of which may look alike.

Illegal drugs are not necessarily “fairly unique and readily identifiable.” United

States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir. 1989). “For drugs and drug

paraphernalia – items which are fungible and not readily identifiable or

distinguishable – a stronger foundational showing is required than for non-fungible

or readily identifiable evidence, but a perfect chain of custody is not required.”

Saxton v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Ky. 2022).

             While it may not be necessary to establish an infallible chain of

custody for the admission of drug or blood evidence, there must be some attempt to

do so.

                    Even with respect to substances which are not
             clearly identifiable or distinguishable, it is unnecessary to

                                          -7-
establish a perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all
possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as
there is persuasive evidence that “the reasonable
probability is that the evidence has not been altered in
any material respect.” United States v. Cardenas, 864
F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
909, 109 S. Ct. 3197, 105 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1989). See also
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 738, 740
(1969). Gaps in the chain normally go to the weight of
the evidence rather than to its admissibility. United
States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988). Here,
however, there was no attempt at all to establish the chain
of custody of these blood samples, even though the
samples apparently were transferred and stored internally
within the hospital, then transferred and stored outside
the hospital, first at a laboratory in Louisville, then,
presumably, at another laboratory in Nashville. As
Justice Palmore aptly put it in Henderson v.
Commonwealth, supra:

                     Hence the integrity of the evidence
              from the time it was relinquished by the
              investigative officers until it reached the
              laboratory analyst was not proved. We think
              that surely it is unnecessary to delve into the
              literature of the law in order to document the
              point that this type of carelessness in the
              development of important evidence during
              the course of a trial simply will not do. We
              know it is tedious and time-consuming to
              trace the integrity of an exhibit; in fact, it is
              tedious and time-consuming to have a trial
              at all when we think we know the defendant
              is guilty anyway, but it is not half as bad a
              nuisance to do it right the first time as it is to
              go through the whole process a second time
              two years later.

Id. at 461.

                              -8-
Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 8-9 (Ky. 1998).

             The Commonwealth’s overall approach to this case illustrates the

danger of assumptions. The numerous bench conferences reveal how assumptions

led to this reversal. The Commonwealth assumed there would be no issue with the

chain of custody for the drug evidence. Although the police evidence custodian

was available, the Commonwealth failed to properly list him as a witness. The

trial court might have permitted that testimony anyway with proper

accommodation to the defense because of the limited and probably uncontroverted

nature of this chain of custody evidence, but the trial court was certainly within its

discretion to prohibit the testimony.

             Another apparent assumption was that, because the lab analyst who

performed the tests was now a schoolteacher in another Kentucky county, then it

would be acceptable to have another lab analyst testify about the tests performed.

As the Commonwealth noted, defendants often stipulate to some chain of custody

or lab result issues. This could be a tactical decision of not emphasizing the drugs

by having a jury see how much trouble it took to prove that the drugs were drugs.

             The fact that an item is a controlled substance is sometimes not what

the defense wants to argue about. Even so, no assumption should be made, and

without a confirmed stipulation prior to the beginning of a trial, the prosecution

should be prepared to present its evidence to show the links in the chain of custody

                                          -9-
and to provide for the right of a defendant to confront those who provide

testimonial evidence against him, such as the lab technician who personally

confirmed the presence of a controlled substance. See Peters v. Commonwealth,

345 S.W.3d 838 (Ky. 2011) (because lab testing and conclusions are testimonial in

nature providing evidence on an element of a drug possession charge, the right to

confrontation typically requires the testimony of the analyst, although an error in

this regard may not rise to the level of palpable error).

             Having addressed the chain of custody issue, we now turn to a more

detailed discussion of the separate issue, the lack of Hibbard’s personal knowledge

of the testing and its results and the Confrontation Clause. Townes contends his

rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the trial court allowed

Hibbard to testify using the report generated by Thorne, even though Hibbard

conducted only peer reviews of the report. Again, the peer reviews did not include

a personal retesting of the materials.

             The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates this right to state

proceedings in addition to federal prosecutions. This right is further protected in

Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. Despite textual differences, Kentucky’s

                                         -10-
appellate courts have not yet held that Section 11 is to be construed differently

from its Sixth Amendment counterpart.

                        In recent history, the United States Supreme
                 Court’s construction of the Confrontation Clause has
                 undergone a dramatic makeover. The old rule, as
                 exemplified by Ohio v. Roberts,[2] allowed third-party
                 admission of out-of-court testimony if the evidence bore
                 “adequate indicia of reliability.” When a witness against
                 the accused is unavailable for live testimony, the Court
                 ruled that the Constitution allowed the testimony through
                 either a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” in the rules of
                 evidence, or if the testimony contained “particularized
                 guarantees of trustworthiness.” The old rule thus
                 construed basic evidentiary practices as satisfactory for
                 Confrontation Clause purposes.

                        But in Crawford v. Washington,[3] the Court
                 rejected the Ohio v. Roberts position. Under the
                 Crawford rule, “the inquiry is not whether hearsay falls
                 under a deeply rooted exception or has particularized
                 guarantees of trustworthiness; rather, the inquiry is
                 whether the out-of-court statement is ‘testimonial’ and
                 whether the defendant had an opportunity to cross-
                 examine the statement when it was made.” So Crawford
                 introduced a more searching inquiry than the traditional
                 standard – non-testimonial statements may still be
                 examined for reliability, but testimonial out-of-court
                 statements from unavailable witnesses are categorically
                 barred from admission under the Constitution unless the
                 defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination.

Manery v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.3d 140, 144-45 (Ky. 2016) (citations omitted).

2
    448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980).
3
    541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).

                                                -11-
              Thorne did not testify about her lab testing. Townes was denied an

opportunity to cross-examine Thorne about her findings. Townes’ Confrontation

Clause rights were violated when Hibbard was allowed to testify as to Thorne’s

scientific findings by reciting her findings contained in the report she generated

and about which Hibbard possessed no personal knowledge. Peters, supra.

              The trial court did not provide a reason for the ruling allowing

Hibbard to testify from the lab report, the same report it later excluded from

evidence, again with no reason stated on the record. The reason often given for

allowing one member of an organization to testify concerning a document created

by another person or persons within the same organization is the document is made

and kept in the regular course of business, which suggests suitable neutrality and

reliability. After the still recent change in Confrontation Clause law, admission of

business4 or official5 records cannot deprive a defendant of his confrontation rights.

              As part of a business record, mundane aspects of chain of custody

entries may be admissible without confrontation. Some records entries simply

establish facts for admission of evidence such as who took the drugs to the lab.

Such entries in the chain of custody are not necessarily testimonial as would be

4
 KRE 803(6) addresses “records of regularly conducted activity” and is often referred to as the
business records rule.
5
 KRE 803(8) addresses “public records and reports” which has specific limitations for records of
police related investigation.

                                              -12-
testing and the results of testing to prove the presence of a controlled substance, an

element of the crime being tried. See, e.g., United States v. Tearman, 72 M.J. 54

(Armed Forces App. 2013).

             But any attempt to justify admission of a lab report of testing

conclusions as a business record fails when the document is clearly prepared for

testimonial use to prove an element of a criminal charge, as held in Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).

                    The trial court ruled, and the Commonwealth now
             argues, that the testimony was admissible because it was
             a record the Commonwealth kept in the normal course of
             business. We hold that this ruling was in error. Building
             on its ruling in Crawford, the Supreme Court later held:

                            Documents kept in the regular course of
                    business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite
                    their hearsay status. See Fed. Rule Evid. 803(6).
                    But that is not the case if the regularly conducted
                    business activity is the production of evidence for
                    use at trial. Our decision in Palmer v. Hoffman,
                    318 U.S. 109, 63 S. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645 (1943),
                    made that distinction clear. There we held that an
                    accident report provided by an employee of a
                    railroad company did not qualify as a business
                    record because, although kept in the regular course
                    of the railroad’s operations, it was “calculated for
                    use essentially in the court, not in the business.”
                    Id., at 114, 63 S.Ct. 477.

                   Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
             321, 129 S .Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009).
             Furthermore, the Court went on to specify in Bullcoming
             v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 180
             L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011), that “the analysts who write reports

                                         -13-
               that the prosecution introduces must be made available
               for confrontation.”

                      We are bound by these holdings of the Supreme
               Court of the United States when it comes to this federal
               constitutional issue. Therefore, we hold that the trial
               court erred in allowing the admission of the statement at
               issue. Having found error, we must now determine if it
               was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v.
               California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d
               705 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can
               be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a
               belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

Bowling v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 231, 241 (Ky. 2018).

               It was error to allow Hibbard to testify as his knowledge about the

evidence tested and the results came from the report authored by Thorne.6 Now we

must determine whether the error was harmless. It was not.

               Harmless error analysis applied to a constitutional error,
               such as the Confrontation Clause violation addressed in
               Crawford, involves considering the improper evidence in
               the context of the entire trial and asking whether there is
               a “‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
               of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Talbott v.
               Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky.1998) (quoting

6
  Both the prosecution below and the Commonwealth on appeal describe Erin Thorne as being
“unavailable.” However, there was never any showing of an attempt to serve her with a
subpoena. Hibbard testified Thorne left the Kentucky State Police Lab to be a teacher in the
Lincoln County School System. If we take judicial notice of any Kentucky map, we can see that
the drive time from Lincoln County where the witness now teaches and Perry County where this
trial took place is right at two hours. It does not matter for our analysis for this appeal, but the
word “unavailable” has meaning in the law. KRE 804(a)(5) deems a declarant unavailable as a
witness if he “[i]s absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been unable to
procure the declarant’s attendance by process or other reasonable means.” Reasonable means are
not satisfied when a party makes no effort to show it attempted to produce the witness. Justice v.
Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Ky. 1998).

                                               -14-
             from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S. Ct.
             824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)). A properly preserved
             constitutional error is reversible, in other words, unless it
             was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (again
             citing Chapman). The question is not simply whether
             there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction
             aside from the improper evidence. The question, rather,
             is whether the improper evidence was of a weight, was of
             a striking enough nature, or played a prominent enough
             role in the Commonwealth’s case to raise a reasonable
             possibility that it contributed to the conviction.

Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803, 826-27 (Ky. 2014).

             In the present matter, there is more than a “reasonable possibility”

Hibbard’s improper testimony contributed to Townes’ conviction. Without his

testimony, the Commonwealth proffered no other scientific evidence of the illegal

nature of the white powder contained in the baggies retrieved from Townes. While

it may be the Commonwealth could still argue the surrounding facts and

circumstances indicated the contents were contraband, this does not alter the likely

impact of the scientific test results heard by the jury.

             The Commonwealth points out that convictions involving controlled

substances can be obtained and upheld without scientific analysis citing Miller v.

Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1974). But in Miller, a nonexpert witness

provided testimony concerning the identity of a white powder she witnessed the

defendant shoot into the arm of another.

             Testimony is competent if given by a witness who has
             special knowledge of drugs or because of extensive use

                                          -15-
                of drugs is qualified as an expert witness on drug culture.
                To hold otherwise and demand laboratory analysis would
                defeat the purpose of the statute and allow traffic or
                transfer of controlled substances to flourish in the secret
                confines of society. Therefore, the trial court was correct
                in submitting the case to the jury upon the substance
                identification by a nonexpert observer.
Miller, supra, at 943. There was no such evidence in this case.

                The Commonwealth was required to prove each element of the crime

of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree beyond a reasonable

doubt. The Commonwealth must prove the possession of a controlled substance.

See KRS7 218A.1415.8 Because of the evidentiary errors we have discussed,

reversal is required.

7
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

8
 (1) A person is guilty of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree when he or she
knowingly and unlawfully possesses:

                (a) A controlled substance that is classified in Schedules I or II and
                is a narcotic drug;
                (b) A controlled substance analogue;
                (c) Methamphetamine;
                (d) Lysergic acid diethylamide;
                (e) Phencyclidine;
                (f) Gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), including its salts,
                isomers, salts of isomers, and analogues; or
                (g) Flunitrazepam, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.

(2) Possession of a controlled substance in the first degree is a Class D felony subject to the
following provisions:

                (a) The maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than
                three (3) years, notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532[.]

                                                -16-
             The question becomes whether the case should be remanded for

dismissal or retrial. When a defendant files an appeal, he challenges the validity of

the prior proceeding. If error is found, the prior proceedings did not necessarily

place the defendant in jeopardy as the concept is applied constitutionally. But

there may be circumstances where a total lack of evidence results in a Double

Jeopardy bar to a retrial.

             In deciding whether to remand for retrial or dismissal, there is an

important distinction between insufficient evidence and incompetent evidence

considered by the jury. Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 99 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Ky.

2003). If the evidence presented, including the evidence erroneously admitted,

was enough to sustain the verdict, then the remedy is retrial not dismissal. See

Hobbs v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1983). We must consider all the

evidence which the jury in this case found sufficient to convince them beyond a

reasonable doubt that Townes possessed a controlled substance.

             Everidge felt the packages of drugs and commented that they did not

feel “like candy.” Townes tried to tamper with this evidence by throwing it away,

only to be prevented from doing so by the forceful actions of two officers.

Townes’ actions are circumstantial evidence that what Townes possessed was a

controlled substance, and he knew it. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d

360 (Ky. 1986).

                                        -17-
             We must also keep in mind that the Commonwealth only had to prove

one controlled substance, not the four as indicated on the lab report. If we focus on

methamphetamine alone, other competent evidence proved Townes’ knowing

possession of it. For example, Everidge had experience identifying

methamphetamine and how it is packaged. Everidge said he saw a crystal-like

substance in the bags Townes tried to get rid of. The way it looked and how it was

packaged (“dime bags”) was “spot on” for what he usually sees with

methamphetamine.

             On cross-examination, Townes’ attorney asked Everidge about his

level of experience with drugs. He sees methamphetamine “a lot.” Everidge was

“pretty confident” that what he saw was methamphetamine. If for the moment we

leave aside the errors in the chain of custody and denial of confrontation, the

detailed testimony of the lab analyst left no doubt that the substances tested

included methamphetamine as well as three other dangerous substances. The

situation here is not insufficient evidence; it is a problem with improperly admitted

evidence, including gaps in the chain of custody.

             As we have previously explained, a chain of custody need not be

perfect. All that is needed is proof that the substances tested were what they are

claimed to be, and it is probable that there has been no tampering with the

substances since they were seized. In Helphenstine v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d

                                         -18-
708 (Ky. 2014), a conviction was upheld despite chain of custody concerns, but the

court suggested in dicta that a retrial could be prohibited if the Commonwealth

“completely abdicated” its job to prove a chain of custody. Id. at 717. But this is

not such a case.

             Everidge had testified in detail how he processed the drugs and put

them in a bank-like deposit box. He explained the forms used to send items to the

state lab and his part in filling out those forms. Everidge further explained the

limited access others would have to this evidence. He identified by name the

evidence custodian with the police.

             As the lab analyst witness, Hibbard could not testify about things

about which he had no personal knowledge, or which otherwise met no hearsay

exception. But Hibbard personally conducted two peer reviews for this case. In

doing so, he examined documents which are part of the chain of custody, including

the one discussed by Everidge. Hibbard checked these same forms which

documented the name of the arresting officer and the evidence custodian who

brought the items to the lab. Hibbard also looked at the items himself to make sure

they were consistent with size and descriptions given for them. Hibbard’s

explanation of the review process was without objection.

             Ultimately, we must carefully consider Rabovsky, supra. In that case,

the Court noted “there was no attempt at all to establish the chain of custody[.]”

                                         -19-
Id. at 8. Yet the report of blood analysis was admitted into evidence. The Court

reversed the case for a new trial. It did not dismiss the charges. Id. at 10. The

issue in that case was also not insufficient evidence but rather improperly admitted

evidence due to a chain of custody failure.

             When we compare Rabovsky to the present case, the similarity is that

evidence was improperly admitted, in part because of a faulty chain of custody. In

this case, even though the printed report was admitted and then unadmitted,

everything Hibbard had said about the results was still in evidence. When we

consider all the evidence admitted, properly or not, there was not such a total lack

of any effort to establish the chain of custody or to introduce the lab analysis

results as to permit dismissal rather than retrial.

                                   CONCLUSION

             For the reason indicated, the Judgment of the Perry Circuit Court is

REVERSED with direction for a new trial of the charge of possession of a

controlled substance in the first degree.

             THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.

             CALDWELL, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.

CALDWELL, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. Although I agree

with the majority that the chain of custody was incomplete and the trial court erred

in allowing Hibbard to testify, I believe remand for a new trial in this instance

                                            -20-
would be unjust. Allowing the prosecution to engage in a trial run at a prosecution,

only for this Court to direct it where to cure its deficiencies of evidence, would

result in disparate fairness and injustice.

             The majority holds, and I agree, the trial court erred first in allowing

Hibbard to testify, after properly not allowing the laboratory report to be entered

into evidence. But this error was compounded when the trial court denied Townes

a directed verdict. The majority holds that the testimony of Everidge alone was

sufficient for a finding that the substance contained in the baggie was a controlled

substance. I disagree.

             While the report of the laboratory analysis of the substance was

inadmissible, it need not be ignored by us on appeal that the report indicated

Everidge was incorrect in his opinion of what the baggies contained:

methamphetamine. As it turned out, the baggies contained methamphetamine,

fentanyl, and cocaine. And while it may not matter for purposes of the statute

prohibiting possession of controlled substances which substances were contained

in the baggies as the charge would be the same, it does matter for purposes of what

can be considered competent evidence. The fact that Everidge’s opinion was at

least partially incorrect underscores why prosecutors do not rely solely upon the

opinions of law enforcement in determining the chemical makeup of substances

found on an accused. I therefore disagree with the majority that Everidge provided

                                          -21-
sufficient testimony concerning the identity of the substances seized from Townes

for the prosecution to have survived directed verdict.

             The only competent proof on an element of the offense was premised

upon the improper evidence adduced by Hibbard, which the majority found was

admitted by error of the trial court. If the trial court ruled properly, the

prosecution’s only competent evidence on an element of the offense would have

been excluded and directed verdict would have been entered.

             In Hobbs v. Commonwealth, the inquiry before the Court was whether

the prosecution adduced sufficient proof to support a finding of guilt on the charge

of being a persistent felony offender. 655 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Ky. 1983). This

Court reversed Hobbs’ conviction and remanded for a new proceeding on PFO.

Hobbs then sought discretionary review from the Kentucky Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court held when a trial court errs in admitting evidence, remand for a

new trial is proper and double jeopardy is not implicated. “We are not disposed to

hold that an error by a trial court in the admission of testimony in evidence

precludes a retrial when an appellate reversal is procured by a defendant on that

ground. In such a case, the defendant is entitled only to an opportunity to obtain a

fair readjudication of his guilt free from error.” Id.

             However, since the Hobbs decision, the Supreme Court has

recognized the fundamental unfairness of allowing the prosecution a second bite at

                                          -22-
the apple. “We recognize that the Commonwealth could have presented evidence

that Cohron had been charged with felonies at the time of the June 12 escape. But

the focus is upon the evidence that was presented and not upon the evidence that

could have been presented.” Cohron v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 489, 497-98

(Ky. 2010). In Cohron, the prosecution failed to prove an element which would

support a charge of escape in the second degree rather than escape in the third

degree. The element separating the two charges was whether Cohron was facing a

felony at the time of his escape, an essential element of second-degree escape. On

remand, the Court held it would be a violation of the prohibition against double

jeopardy to allow the prosecution a second bite at the apple and directed the trial

court to only allow retrial on the lesser charge of escape in the third degree, not

requiring evidence of a pending felony charge. In so doing, the Court cited Burks

v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2147, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) (“The

Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the

prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the

first proceeding.”).

             In the present case, I would hold there was a failure to provide

sufficient evidence. The Commonwealth wholly failed to provide evidence

sufficient to support the admission of the laboratory evidence. And in this case,

                                         -23-
like Cohron, the prosecution had every opportunity to present the evidence, but in

the words of the United States Supreme Court, “it failed to muster.” Burks, supra.

             The morning of trial, before voir dire, the prosecution was put on

notice Townes was questioning whether there would be evidence to support

finding a proper chain of custody. Yet, the prosecution made no effort whatsoever

to provide the evidence, nor any attempt to call the author of the laboratory report.

There is no excuse for the prosecution’s total failure to provide sufficient evidence

to support their case and it would be the height of injustice to allow it to do so on

remand, this Court providing a roadmap of trial preparation through its opinion.

             I would hold the Commonwealth “completely abdicated its

responsibility to prove a proper chain of custody in this case.” Helphenstine v.

Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Ky. 2014). As the Supreme Court

observed in Helphenstine, a trial court has adequate remedies available when a

chain of custody is fatally flawed. But in Townes’ case, the trial court erred in not

properly excluding the report and the testimony derived from it. Id. The trial court

realized the lab report was not admissible, but only after Hibbard used it as the

basis of his testimony of which he possessed no personal knowledge, precluding

Townes from confronting evidence against him. The trial court erred and failed to

protect Townes’ rights. I forward that the only just solution would be not to allow

the prosecution a second bite of the apple.

                                         -24-
             As the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized in Commonwealth v.

Davidson, “the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the

reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient.” 277 S.W.3d 232, 235

(Ky. 2009) (citing Burks, supra, at 18, 98 S. Ct. at 2150-51). But “double jeopardy

does not bar a retrial on the same offense when reversal is due to trial error because

it does not imply the government has failed to prove its case.” Id. (citing Burks,

supra, at 15, 98 S. Ct. at 2149).

             I would hold in the present case the admissible evidence presented by

the prosecution was legally insufficient. I would also find the trial court erred in

not granting a directed verdict as there was not sufficient admissible evidence to

support the prosecution’s case going to the jury. The trial court recognized the

laboratory report was not admissible, but too late, having already allowed the

prosecution’s witness to testify to contents of the inadmissible report. The only

option available to the trial court to ameliorate the error was to enter directed

verdict and I would hold it was error not to do so.

             In the absence of any case law directly on point a just determination

must be desired, as supported by the law and the decisions of our Supreme Court.

In this case, where the trial court recognized its error in allowing the report only

after that report was the sole basis of the testimony of the only proper proof on an

element (i.e., the identification of the controlled substances involved) the court

                                         -25-
further erred in not then entering a directed verdict. The basis for the exclusion of

the report and the testimony was a want of evidence, evidence the prosecution was

charged with providing. It would be unjust to allow the prosecution to benefit

from their failure to present sufficient evidence and receive a second opportunity to

do so. I would reverse with instructions to dismiss the charges.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Roy Alyette Durham, II                     Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Ken W. Riggs
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -26-