Court Opinion

ID: 9634066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:20:08.694248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:39.249569
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I concur in Parts II, III, and TV of the court’s opinion, I cannot concur in Part I’s holding that there was a prima facie case of discrimination. Because I believe the panel majority applies the wrong standard of review and therefore reaches the wrong conclusion under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), I respectfully dissent from Part I of the court’s opinion.
I
Batson created a three-part burden shifting test which we must apply to ascertain if a juror was stricken for discriminatory reasons. See id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Generally, we review a district court’s determinations at stage one of this test — whether a defendant has established a prima facie case of discrimination — for clear error. See Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 681-85 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). The panel majority, however, adopts a de novo standard of review, asserting that the district court applied the improper legal standard. See Maj. Op. at 919-20 (citing Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.2004)).
I am not so persuaded. Clear error review is appropriate here. Collins’ attorney objected to the government’s peremptory challenge of the remaining African-American juror, Juror No. 9, in open court.1 The district court overruled the objection. According to the panel majority, the district court’s response suggests it believed a “pattern” of discrimination had to be shown. See Maj. Op. at 919-20. The majority rightly notes that under our precedent, such a showing is not required (and indeed would be impossible in situations where there is only one African-American juror on the panel). See United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir.1994). Rather, the Supreme Court has held that when assessing a stage-one Batson claim, the district court must determine whether the defendant has produced “evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (emphasis added).
While the district court’s initial statement was perhaps inartfully worded, the court later clarified its language when responding to defendant’s motion for a new trial. The majority is correct to this extent: when rejecting Collins’ argument that he had established a prima facie Bat-son claim, the district court stated that it had “no reason to reverse the original ruling.” Maj. Op. at 919-20. But Judge Klausner — unlike the majority — did not stop there. The district court went on to say that “[tjhere is no indication ... that any of the facts or relevant circumstances have raised any inference that the challenge was racially motivated.” The point was reiterated: “There is nothing in this case that [suggests] any inference that the challenge was racially motivated.” Thus, regardless of what the statement at trial *929might suggest, the district court clearly indicated that the “inference of discrimination” standard enshrined in Johnson was applied. At the very least, any potential legal error was cured.2 Accordingly, we should review the district court’s findings for clear error.
II
The panel majority correctly notes that only the third element of a prima facie case of discrimination is at issue: namely, does “the totality of the circumstances raise[] an inference that the strike was motivated by race.” Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2006). The fact that the juror stricken was “the one [bjlack member of the venire does not, in itself, raise an inference of discrimination,”3 as the majority also appropriately emphasizes. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902 (“[I]t is not per se unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more [bjlacks from the jury.” (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 101, 106 S.Ct. 1712)); see also Maj. Op. at 920-21. Thus, to determine whether an “inference” of racial discrimination exists, the panel majority has only the nebulous “totality of the relevant facts” and circumstances to assess. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1146. After such assessment, including the use of comparative juror analysis,4 the panel majority concludes that the prosecutor’s actions “raise[] an inference of impermissible discrimination.” Maj. Op. at 922-23.
I disagree. Considering the totality of circumstances, it is significant that Collins’ attorney struck the first African-American juror (Juror No. 2). Indeed, the prosecution had the opportunity to strike Juror No. 2 before Collins’ attorney did and declined to do so. While a pattern is not necessary for a finding of discrimination, the record nonetheless undermines any inference of discrimination. For similar reasons, it is relevant that Juror No. 9 was struck on the government’s third peremptory strike. Cf. United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (finding an inference of discrimination where the government used its first peremptory strike against a minority juror).
Using comparative juror analysis, the panel majority and Collins claim that Juror No. 9 was situated similarly to Juror Nos. 5, 6, and 10.5 They assert that be*930cause the government struck Juror No. 9 but permitted the latter group to remain on the jury, a prima facie case of discrimination exists. However, an analysis of the voir dire transcript suggests entirely innocuous reasons for the government to dismiss Juror No. 9, but keep Nos. 5, 6, and 10. According to the transcript, Juror No. 9 was a female with no relationship to anyone in law enforcement, no negative experiences with law enforcement, and no prior jury experience. Her familial status was unclear, but she stated that she did not live with any working adults. Juror Nos. 5, 6, and 10 are similar in some respects, but there are significant differences. Most notably, Juror No. 6 had prior civil jury experience,6 while Juror No. 5 and Juror No. 10 both indicated that they lived with another adult who worked outside the home. In fact, both Juror No. 5 and Juror No. 10 stated that they were married with children.
Reasonable minds could differ as to the impact such disparities could have on a juror’s service. However, there is no doubt that as the government asserts, these are “race-neutral, non-trivial” distinctions which cut against Collins’ claims that similarly situated jurors were treated differently. Given the deferential standard under which we review such determinations, see Tolbert, 182 F.3d at 681-85, on these facts, I cannot conclude that the district court committed clear error in ruling that no prima facie Batson claim was established.
Ill
Because the majority employs the wrong standard of review and accordingly reaches what I believe to be an erroneous conclusion, I am unable to join the court’s decision to remand for further proceedings on the Batson claim. I respectfully dissent.

. Collins’ attorney had previously struck an African-American member of the venire. The district court, with the concurrence of both parties, also excused an African-American prospective alternate juror for cause.

. At oral argument and in his reply brief, Collins asserts that the district court's statement in response to the motion for a new trial should be considered a "post-hoc” justification, “entitled to little weight.” Collins cites United States v. Mannino, 212 F.3d 835, 846 (3d Cir.2000), in support of this claim. However, Mannino is inapposite, because in that case, the district court was hypothesizing about how it would have ruled in an alternative scenario. In this case, the district court was not hypothesizing, but rather specifically stating the grounds for its decision.

. While the statement is true, of course, it is again worth noting that Juror No. 9 was not the only African-American member of the ve-nire in this case.

. As the panel majority states, comparative juror analysis is a tool by which a court seeks out inferences of discrimination through a side-by-side comparison of the stricken juror and other potential jurors who were allowed to serve. See Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1147-48; Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 362 (9th Cir.2006); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) ("If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination ....”).

.Collins also argues in his briefs that Juror No. 3 was similarly situated. However, unlike Juror No. 9, Juror No. 3 was dating a police officer and had previously served on a criminal jury.

. The panel majority and Collins argue that "prior jury experience” is not a sufficient basis upon which to distinguish Jurors No. 6 and No. 9 because the prosecutor accepted another juror (Juror No. 14) who, like Juror No. 9, had not previously served on a jury. At a minimum, the two are not similarly sitú-ated because Juror No. 14 indicated that he lived with people who worked outside the home, said he had a relative whose partner worked in law enforcement, and stated that he could identify certain tattoos which "indicate to [him] ... things that [potential witnesses] have done.”