Court Opinion

ID: 9378267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 21:00:35.270747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:19.889098
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0120n.06

                                         Case No. 22-3214

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                  FILED
                                                                                     Mar 09, 2023
                                                 )                               DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                 )
        Plaintiff - Appellee,                    )
                                                            ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
                                                 )
 v.                                                         STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                                                 )
                                                            THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
                                                 )
 KENNETH SHARP,                                             OHIO
                                                 )
        Defendant - Appellant.                   )
                                                                                        OPINION
                                                 )

Before: GIBBONS, BUSH, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

       JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Officers stopped Kenneth Sharp, a felon, while

he was driving a vehicle that had been reported stolen. During the stop, other passengers showed

the officers an open bottle of liquor, and the officers saw marijuana paraphernalia. The officers

searched the vehicle and found a handgun. While on bond awaiting trial for unlawful possession

of a firearm as a felon, Sharp was arrested for possessing another handgun. A jury later convicted

Sharp of possessing both handguns. Sharp’s Sentencing Guidelines range was 21-27 months, but

the district court varied upward to sentence Sharp to 36 months because of Sharp’s criminal

history, which was not entirely accounted for in the Sentencing Guidelines. Sharp appealed,

challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and the reasonableness of his

sentence. Because the district court did not err in either respect, we affirm.
No. 22-3214, United States v. Sharp

                                                  I.

          In September 2020, law enforcement officers patrolling in Cleveland, Ohio, noticed a Ford

Excursion driving erratically. A search of the vehicle’s license plate number revealed that it had

been reported stolen. The officers stopped the vehicle, which Sharp drove with several passengers.

          During the stop, Sharp told the officers that the vehicle was in his girlfriend’s name but

was effectively his. Sharp also said that his girlfriend had reported the vehicle stolen when she

was angry with him and had failed to withdraw the report. The officers attempted to contact

Sharp’s girlfriend but did not immediately reach her. The officers handcuffed Sharp and removed

him from the vehicle while they investigated.

          One of the officers then asked the other passengers whether there was anything in the

vehicle that should not be there. The passenger who was sitting in the front seat held up an open,

partially full bottle of tequila. The officer also saw a bright orange tray with visible flecks of

marijuana on it and three small glass containers that contained suspected marijuana residue. When

the officer asked what the tray was for, the front-seat passenger said that it was used to “roll your

weed.” DE 50, Mot. to Suppress Hr’g Tr., Page ID 241. The officer also smelled marijuana in the

vehicle.

          Officers searched the vehicle and found two loaded handgun magazines and an unloaded

Glock handgun. The officers arrested Sharp for possessing the handgun. The officers also

conducted a full inventory search of the vehicle because they planned to have it towed.1 While on

bond, Sharp was arrested again for possession of a firearm.

          A grand jury indicted Sharp for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Sharp moved to

suppress the evidence from the vehicle search. The grand jury later returned a superseding

1
    The officers released the SUV to Sharp’s girlfriend when she arrived at the scene.
                                                 -2-
No. 22-3214, United States v. Sharp

indictment adding a second felon-in-possession count based on Sharp’s second arrest. After two

evidentiary hearings, the district court denied Sharp’s motion. A federal jury found Sharp guilty

on both felon-in-possession counts.

       At sentencing, the district court calculated Sharp’s Sentencing Guidelines range as 21-27

months based on an offense level of 14 and criminal history category of III.2 Sharp’s criminal

history score accounted for three state convictions: one each for possessing marijuana, attempted

receiving of stolen property, and driving under suspension or license restriction. Sharp also had

approximately two dozen convictions for driving-related misdemeanors and another dozen traffic

infractions. Two other gun offenses did not count toward Sharp’s criminal history score because

they were too old, one involving domestic violence and the other in connection with a shooting.

For mitigation, Sharp relied on evidence that he grew up in a dangerous neighborhood where drug

and gang activity were frequent. The district court varied upward from the Sentencing Guidelines

range, reasoning that, because Sharp had multiple convictions that did not factor into his criminal

history score, including a couple of gun offenses, a 27-month sentence was insufficient. It

sentenced Sharp to 36 months’ imprisonment. Sharp timely appealed the denial of his motion to

suppress and his sentence.3

2
  The Presentence Investigation Report had erroneously assigned Sharp a lower criminal history
category of II because it failed to add a point to account for the fact that Sharp was on probation
in state court when he committed the counts at issue in this case.
3
 In his principal brief on appeal, Sharp once states that he is also appealing the district court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment based on an alleged Speedy Trial Act
violation, and elsewhere notes that this issue was included in his original notice of appeal in the
district court. However, Sharp did not include the speedy trial issue in his statement of the issues
presented on appeal, and he presents no argument that his speedy trial rights were violated. Sharp
has therefore abandoned this issue. See Doe v. Mich. State Univ., 989 F.3d 418, 425 (6th Cir.
2021) (“Generally, an appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on
appeal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                               -3-
No. 22-3214, United States v. Sharp

                                                 II.

          When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the district

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Trice,

966 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Hines, 885 F.3d 919, 924 (6th Cir.

2018)).

          We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Lanning, 633 F.3d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 2011).

                                                 III.

          We begin with Sharp’s motion to suppress evidence. The Fourth Amendment permits law

enforcement officers to search a vehicle without obtaining a search warrant if they have probable

cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.4 Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465,

466-67 (1999) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)). Probable cause

“requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of

such activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983)). The existence of probable cause depends on the

“totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).

          Here, probable cause supported the officers’ search of the vehicle Sharp was driving for

three reasons. First, the vehicle had been reported stolen. See Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070,

1075 (6th Cir. 1998) (officers who “had probable cause to believe the [vehicle] may have been a

stolen vehicle” also had probable cause to “enter the vehicle to determine whether it had been

tampered with or to determine the identity of the owner”). While Sharp insists that his explanation

4
 Although the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,
coupled with the inevitable discovery doctrine, also arguably justifies the officers’ search here, the
government has expressly waived reliance on the inventory search exception.
                                                -4-
No. 22-3214, United States v. Sharp

about his girlfriend’s stolen vehicle report should have assuaged the officers’ concerns, “probable

cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.”

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588.

       Second, the vehicle contained evidence of marijuana activity including the smell of

marijuana and visible paraphernalia used for marijuana. See United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638,

659 (6th Cir. 2002) (“This court has held that an officer’s detection of the smell of marijuana in an

automobile can by itself establish probable cause for a search.”) (citing United States v. Garza,

10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Michael Johnson, 707 F.3d 655, 658

(6th Cir. 2013) (same). Sharp argues that one officer was not familiar with the tray’s use for

marijuana and did not note the smell of marijuana in the police report. But the officer testified that

he did recognize the tray as one commonly used for marijuana, and, in any event, it is undisputed

that the front-seat passenger told him as much. The officer also testified that he smelled marijuana

and explained that police reports do not contain every detail of a search. Viewing this evidence in

the light most favorable to the government, see United States v. Gilbert, 952 F.3d 759, 762 (6th

Cir. 2020), the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle based on evidence of marijuana.

       Third, the open container of alcohol in the vehicle also contributed to the existence of

probable cause. In Cleveland, such a violation is punishable by up to thirty days in jail. See

Cleveland Mun. Code § 617.07(b)(5), (d); see also United States v. Howton, 260 F. App’x 813,

816-17 (6th Cir. 2008) (open container established probable cause in jurisdiction where open-

container violation was punishable by jail time); United States v. Latham, 763 F. App’x 428, 431

(6th Cir. 2019) (same).5 We need not decide whether the open container would have sufficed on

5
  Sharp argues that the open-container violation did not contribute to the officers’ actual
motivations for conducting the search. But the officers’ motivation is irrelevant given their
undisputed knowledge that the open container was in the vehicle. See Whren v. United States,
                                                -5-
No. 22-3214, United States v. Sharp

its own to establish probable cause because the stolen-vehicle report and marijuana evidence also

supported the existence of probable cause. We affirm the district court’s denial of Sharp’s motion

to suppress.

                                                IV.

       Because Sharp does not argue that the district court incorrectly calculated his Sentencing

Guidelines range or otherwise erred procedurally in imposing his sentence, we construe his

sentencing argument as a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. “A sentence

may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily,

bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives

an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d

508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2005)). A

sentence outside the Guidelines range “is not per se or even presumptively unreasonable.” United

States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2019). But a district court must “consider the extent

of the deviation to ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of

variance.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). An upward variance based largely on

criminal history, like the one the district court imposed here, is more likely to be reasonable in a

case that falls outside the “‘heartland’ of average cases” than in a “‘mine-run case.’” Boucher,

937 F.3d at708 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)).

       Here, we need not decide whether this is a “mine-run” case or one that falls outside the

“heartland,” because either way, two separate grounds support the district court’s nine-month

upward variance to account for Sharp’s criminal history. First, Sharp had prior gun crimes

517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”)
                                                -6-
No. 22-3214, United States v. Sharp

comparable to the instant offenses, a permissible basis for some upward variance even if, unlike

here, the Sentencing Guidelines already account for the past offenses in question. See United

States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 881 (6th Cir. 2020) (21-month upward variance based on two

previous violent firearms offenses reasonable); United States v. Philroy Johnson, 934 F.3d 498,

499-500 (6th Cir. 2020) (14-month upward variance based on numerous previous firearms offenses

reasonable). So this is not a case in which the defendant’s prior offenses on which the district

court relied for an upward variance bore no “meaningful relationship” to the instant offense. See

United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670, 677 (6th Cir. 2020).

       Second, Sharp’s record included many other offenses that were too minor to count toward

his criminal history score; these offenses further support the district court’s upward variance. See

e.g., United States v. Martinez-Rendon, 454 F. App’x 503, 506 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming 32-month

upward variance based in part on uncounted misdemeanors); United States v. Williams, 807 F.

App’x 505, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirming 20-month upward variance based in part on the

same); United States v. Hoff, 767 F. App’x 614, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming 10-month

upward variance based in part on the same).

       Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 36-month sentence.

                                                V.

       We affirm.

                                               -7-