Court Opinion

ID: 9493627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:13:39.472864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:56.377501
License: Public Domain

ROSENN, Circuit Judge,
Concurring in part and Dissenting in part:
I concur and join with the majority except with respect to Part E(2) pertaining to the Downward Departure for Community and Charitable Activities. For reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent from this aspect of the opinion.
The trial judge tried this hard fought case skillfully, patiently and without error. However, I believe that when it came to sentencing, the voluminous letters from the defendant’s political constituents, colleagues, and other friends misled the Court to depart downward from the Guidelines. The majority appropriately rejects the first two categories of these letters but concludes that the third category of letters provide “an adequate basis” for the District Court’s conclusion to depart downward. Maj. op. at 773. In reaching its conclusion, the majority gives “quite deferential” review to the District Court’s finding that Serafini’s civic and charitable contributions did exist to an exceptional degree, or in an extraordinary manner. Maj. op. at 772.
The general rule of “deference” is not without limitation; it has many restraints. It must be consistent with Congressional purpose and, in this case, the Sentencing Guidelines. Even in cases where administrative agencies enjoy much deference in
*779interpreting their own regulations, Justice Jackson has stated that the weight of deference “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, ..., and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Sunft & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), quoted affirmatively in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-142, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). Accord, Daughters of Miriam Ctr. for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1258 (3d Cir.1978).
Although I agree wholeheartedly that the District Court’s sentencing finding is entitled to deference, “this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history.” Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979) (quoted in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)). When invoked as a guide to the exercise of judicial action, discretion must be sound, and not exercised arbitrarily or without regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996).
Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31 (1977). Discretion, even the discretion resting with a sentencing trial judge, must be restricted by the applicable statutory meaning, purpose and history. The United Sates Sentencing Guidelines, which apply here, whether we empathize with them or find them frustrating, are binding upon the sentencing judge and the appellate courts. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (holding that the Guidelines are constitutional). Unless courts uphold the surrounding belt of restriction, discretion, even the little discretion that remains with a judge under the Sentencing Guidelines, will override the parameters of statutory limitation.
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984,18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 997-998 (the “Act”), the federal sentencing system had been “predominantly standardless and indeterminate.” Federal Sentencing Manual, G.T. McFadden, J.C. Clarke, J.L. Staniels, § 1.01[2], The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission and empowered it to promulgate guidelines and policy statements pertaining to sentencing decisions. “Those statutory changes and the guidelines have significantly altered the scope and nature of judicial discretion.” Id. at 1.01[3]. In enacting the SRA, Congress was concerned not only with equal punishment to offenders who commit crime, but also with the need to promote respect for the law and to limit judicial discretion in sentencing. Id. at 1.64.
The Sentencing Guidelines are clear that a defendant’s record of charitable work and community service are a discouraged justification for a sentencing departure. See United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1324 (1st Cir.1994). The historical note to the Civic and Charitable Amendment to the Guidelines (§ 5H1.11) “expresses the Commission’s intent that the factors set forth in this part are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range; but that, unless expressly stated, these policy statements do not mean that the Commission views such factors as necessarily inappropriate to the determination of the sentence within the applicable guideline range.”
Discouraged-feature factors are not usually relevant to a departure decision. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035. A court may depart only if a discouraged factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way that makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present. See id., at 96, 116 S.Ct. 2035. Therefore, a down*780ward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines on the ground of community and charitable activities is only appropriate if the defendant performed charitable acts to an exceptional degree. This appears to be a recognition that in our culture and society, every person is expected reasonably to contribute charity to the poor and to non-profit organizations dedicated to educational, health, and religious purposes.1
Thus, the critical question is whether the discouraged factor is present in this case to “an exceptional degree or in some other way that makes this case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.” The majority relying on United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998), concludes that the District Court had “an adequate basis,” maj. op at 776, for its departure. In Woods, the District Court allowed a one level departure to a woman who pleaded guilty to one count of bankruptcy fraud. The District Court found that the defendant’s money laundering offense fell outside the “heartland” of such cases and that taking two troubled young women into her own home and paying for them to attend a private high school warranted the departure. In affirming, in one paragraph of a five page opinion, the court did not even cite or discuss the Guideline under which it affirmed the departure, but merely stated “we have no basis for holding that [the efforts by the defendant] were not [exceptional].” Unlike the Woods case, we have a substantial record here from which to assess. It shows that Serafini’s charitable works were not exceptional or extraordinary by any reasonable standard.
In the ordinary course of events, a taxpayer, especially one with substantial annual income, will specifically list every available charitable contribution as a tax deduction in his federal income tax return. Serafini filed such returns and specifically claimed charitable deductions. These returns are the best evidence of his charitable contributions; they are not vague, indefinite opinions of friends and political constituents tendered to a sentencing judge in an effort to obtain a reduced sentence. The tax returns are concrete evidence of Serafini’s charitable giving, and are the most logical place to begin an analysis of whether his charitable acts were exceptional.
The defendant is not only “a wealthy individual,” maj. op at 775, but his federal income tax returns show substantial income from sources other than his salary as a state official. Included are substantial royalties from the Empire Landfill. A financial analysis of his pertinent income returns for the period 1991 through 1996 reveals the following undisputed evidence.
YEAR $ TOTAL $ CHARITABLE CHARITY AS % INCOME DEDUCTIONS OF INCOME ROUNDED
1991 724,019 13,407 1.8
1993 857,000 22,604 2.6
1994 855,000 16,620 1.9
1995 908,172 17,385 1.9
1996 1,101,276 20,310 1.8
Except for 1993, in which his contributions exceeded 2%, all of his contributions are less than 2% per annum. Donating less than 2% of one’s income to charity— even 2.6% — is lackluster and pedestrian by any measure; it is not exceptional. It is far below the average measure of giving in the United States by people in the defendant’s socioeconomic status.2
*781Serafini’s charitable contributions of his annual income is ordinary at best when compared to'national figures. It pales in comparison to tithing, the practice in many religious organizations of giving ten percent of one’s income to one’s religious institution. Serafini’s charitable contributions are extraordinarily low when considering that many religious institutions throughout history have encouraged charitable giving in addition to the tithe. See Carl Bakal, Chanty USA 21 (1979).
Serafini appears to have made many appearances at public events, but he did not contribute money or resources according to his means. He has helped some people with small debts, cost of indentures, and other acts of kindness, but he never paid out any exceptional, amount of money. The District Court was sensitive to this; it observed that the defendant had distinguished himself “not by the amount of money [he has] given, but by the amount of time that [he has] devoted.” Maj. Op. at 775.
As noted, the majority and the District Court were persuaded by Serafini’s non-financial charitable acts. But much of Ser-afini’s civic participation was either honorary or obligatory because of his job as a Representative. Numerous letters submitted on his behalf were written by constituents or other beneficiaries of his public position. The majority finds three letters noteworthy. Maj. Op. at 773. One comes from William Drazdowski, “a close personal friend,” which explains defendant’s role in providing a $300,000 guarantee to Dr. Edward. Zaloga to enable him to obtain new medical data from Tokyo physicians for the treatment of his brother’s brain tumor. The doctor testified that thirty minutes after a telephone call to Serafini at 1:30 a.m. for assistance, Serafini called back to tell him “that everything was in place.” Neither Drazdowski, an aecoun-tant, nor Dr. Zaloga claim that Serafini personally made the guarantee; nor does the defendant. There is no information how the guarantee was accomplished, to whom’ it was made, who made it, and the substance of the guarantee, or the relationship between Dr. Zaloga and the defendant. The majority believes this assistance “is hardly part of the normal duties of a local politician.” On the other hand, the entirely obscure and mysterious incident may very well have its genesis in defendant’s political agenda. In any. event, it hardly rises to the level of significant community service.
The Seig letter attests to Serafini’s offer to employ Seig, a young friend of the family, on the defendant’s legislative staff, a loan to him'of an unstated sum of money, and encouragement to Seig to attend college. The third letter reports a personal check of $750 from the defendant to a widow who was about to lose her home through foreclosure. The widow expressed doubt about her ability to repay and defendant insisted she need not do so unless able.
These three “noteworthy” letters do reflect commendable action by the defendant, but neither they, nor the other letters, show community service to an exceptional or extraordinary degree. A few acts of personal kindness to individual friends do not add up to community service; they do not fulfill the purpose of the Guidelines. The District Court relied considerably on the defendant’s gift “of time.” I can find no evidence of the amount of time given to community service, as distinguished from some personal favors to friends and political constituents.
The Guidelines do not suggest a sentence departure for time spent aiding friends or family, or time in performing *782acts of kindness — even unusual acts of kindness to individuals. Construing such personal acts to individuals as exceptional community service under the Guidelines opens up an area as vast and deep as the Seven Seas. The Guidelines speak in terms of community service and there is nothing in the record of this case that definitively shows Serafini gave community service, independent of his political activities. The 1999 Statistical Abstract of the United States reveals that in the year 1995, persons in the United States with income of $100,000 or more contributed an average of 4.4 hours per week to volunteer work without monetary pay. In this case, although Serafini earned many times more than $100,000 in 1994 and 1995, we have no record that he gave any amount of time to volunteer work, whether it was for one or more weeks during the year, or for fifty-two weeks.
The cases support the foregoing analysis. Courts may not leniently interpret the requirement of extraordinary circumstances to grant a downward departure. See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (Defendant was a highly-decorated Vietnam veteran, had saved an innocent civilian during the My Lai massacre, and had served with the Secret Service; these deeds did not warrant a departure); United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 247 (4th Cir.1990) (Defendant’s work history, family ties and responsibilities, and extensive contribution to the town’s economic well-being could not justify downward departure.)
United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628 (8th Cir.1998), contains factual similarities to this case, particularly with respect to the defendant’s socioeconomic status. In commenting upon the defendant’s commendable record as a neighbor and good friend who advised local business owners, hired young people, served on his church council and raised money for charity, the court there also noted that the defendant’s annual income exceeded $500,000. The court found that it was neither exceptional nor out of the ordinary for someone of the defendant’s income and preeminence in his small community to engage in charitable works and community services of this nature. See id. at 630. The majority here notes, maj. op. at 775, that the Morken court found that given Morken’s station in life, his contributions were not extraordinary. Here, Serafini’s annual income over the years was substantially higher than Morken’s, and for several years prior to his indictment, was almost double. Serafi-ni’s contributions, like Morken’s, were not exceptional or out of the ordinary. Serafi-ni’s contributions were even less exceptional, considering his much larger income and preeminence.
We have no information of record of time spent by Serafini in behalf of fund raising efforts or other services of the United Way or the colleges and other community service organizations in his county. In United States v. Crouse, 145 F.3d 786 (6th Cir.1998) the defendant, Crouse, served on the boards of various community organizations over many years. In commenting on his service in connection with his request for sentencing departure, the court of appeals observed:
Crouse’s community works, while found to be significant by the District Court, are not unusual for a prominent businessman. Examples of Crouse’s community involvement include church activities; service on the boards of various community organizations, including a local hospital, the United Way, and regional airport authority; and his mem- ' bership and active involvement with the Rotary Club. These examples of community involvement spanned over at least a 25-year period.
Crouse, 145 F.3d at 792.
Measured by any reasonable standard, whether it be tithing to his church and community, or other charitable contributions of money or community time, Serafi-ni’s charitable and community service was far from exceptional or extraordinary. It was quite ordinary for a man in his preem*783inent position and financial circumstances. Nor were his charitable contributions or' community services of the level or character exacting personal sacrifice, a deprivation of something of substance because of his contributions.3
I therefore conclude that it was impermissible under the Guidelines for the District Court to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines.

. According to a national survey by Independent Sector on "Giving and Volunteering in the United States,” approximately 69% of all households in the United States made voluntary contributions to charity in 1995. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 404 (1999).

. According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the average American household contributed 2.2% of its income to charity in 1991. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 404 (1999). In 1993, the average was 2.1%. See id. In 1995, the average was 2.2%. See id. In 1995, households with greater than $100,000 income contributed 3.4% of their household income to charity. See id. Accord*781ing to a 1999 report by the Independent Sector, of the American households that gave to charity, in 1998, they contributed 2.1% of their income; in 1995, 2.2% was contributed; in 1993, 2.1% was contributed; in 1991, 2.2% Was contributed; in 1989, 2.5% was contributed, and in 1987, 1.9% was contributed. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 391 (1997); < <http://www.independentsector.org/ GandV/sJceyf. htm>>.

. According to Laurie Nieb, Coordinator for the Archdiocese Office of Stewardship in Denver, Colorado, sacrificial giving means ‘‘a gift that impacts your life; give from your sustenance, not your abundance.” The Denver Post, October 21, 1999, Section A, pg. A-01.