Court Opinion

ID: 9761483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:43:52.526521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:23.946110
License: Public Domain

LIPEZ, Judge,
dissenting:
It is my interpretation of the record in this case that the evidence adduced at trial and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom are insufficient to establish negligence on the part of SEPTA. At trial, the appellee, Canery, was obviously unable to show how the accident happened, and so took alternate approaches. Canery’s medical witness testified, on cross-examination, that he did not know how the accident happened, and that Canery could have been injured while on the platform or in the track area.
It is axiomatic that the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence; and that the plaintiff must produce evidence from which there arises a reasonable inference that the defendant was negligent; and that such negligence was the proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff. Zilka v. Sanctis Construction, Inc., 409 Pa. 396, 186 A.2d 897 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 850, 83 S.Ct. 1915, 10 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1963). In the instant case, Canery adduced no evidence upon which the jury’s conclusion that SEPTA’s employee had been negligent could logically have been based; the verdict was thus the result of speculation and conjecture, and this cannot be permitted. See Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 397 Pa. 134, 138, 153 A.2d 477, 479 (1959).
The theory that Canery was run over in the track area is so bizarre, and the chance of his escaping electrocution or injuries far more serious than those actually sustained so remote, as to exclude any reasonable likelihood that the accident occurred in that fashion. I agree with the majority, therefore, that Canery must have been injured while on the station platform.
*397“A court will enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if, and only if, viewing all the evidence (including inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom) most favorably to the verdict winner, the elements of the cause of action or defense asserted have not, as a matter of law, been established.” Community College of Beaver County v. Soc’y of Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 589, 375 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1977). The evidence adduced at trial does not establish negligence on the part of SEPTA’s employee. The majority declare that Joseph Boscia, SEPTA’s Manager of Operational Training and Safety, “testified that all motormen are to sound a warning signal and slow down as they pass through a stationf,]” and that Pressley’s actions were “in direct contradiction to these instructions” and thus negligent. Boscia’s actual testimony was that motormen “must go into the station at a slow rate of speed, which normally is series speed on a controller.” Boscia also testified that “if they are coming into a station where they are not scheduled to stop, they must reduce speed to a slow speed, normal series, and . be alert for anyone who may go near the end of the platform mistaking them for a train that’s in normal passenger service.” The obvious import of this testimony, and of the inferences to be reasonably drawn from it, is that all trains must enter and pass through stations at a speed no greater that that designated “normal series,” and that, if any train is moving faster than this speed, it must slow down to this speed before entering or passing through a station. Boscia then stated, on cross-examination, that “normal series” speed is eighteen to twenty miles per hour. Pressley testified, on direct examination by plaintiffs counsel, that the train which he had been operating had proceeded through North Philadelphia station at “[approximately twenty miles an hour.” Since this evidence was offered in plaintiff’s case and no other evidence of speed was offered, we must conclude that Pressley was not negligent in operating his train at the time in question at that speed.
Boscia never testified that “all motormen are to sound a warning signal ... as they pass through a station.” *398His testimony on direct examination concerning use of a train’s horn was as follows:
They’re trained to use the horn at certain designated spots which have a W on the wall, mostly curves. They’re also trained that that horn is to be used as a warning device if there is anything that’s an emergency.
So, if they saw someone, for example, go toward the edge of the platform, he is trained to use the horn .
(N.T. 338.) Further, even if Pressley had sounded the horn as he neared the station, it would not have mattered. Canery testified that he had seen the train’s headlight at a distance of 400 to 500 feet, and that he knew that the train was coming. Sounding the horn would have done nothing additional to alert Canery to the approach of the train. Therefore, a failure by Pressley to sound the horn 1) was not negligent because it was actually not contrary to required operating procedure by reason of Pressley’s lack of awareness of any emergency situation, as discussed infra and 2) could not, in any event, have been a legal cause of Canery’s injuries.
On direct examination, Boscia testified that, if a motorman sees a person in a position of danger vis-a-vis the train,
[h]is immediate reaction that’s taught is to brake the train, and he may not grab for the whistle handle at the same time, simply because with one hand he’s throwing power off and with the other hand he’s taking the brake. So, he actually has no hand to grab the whistle.
Q. [by counsel for plaintiff] Are the utility motormen in their training told that occasionally at passenger’s platforms that a passenger might involuntarily place himself on the tracks?
A. Well, all people who are trained to operate in the subway are told that they may find someone in the track area some time.
Q. And, in connection with that advice during their training period, what are they instructed to do because of that eventuality which might occur?
*399A. To first put the train into emergency, and second, to sound their horn.
(N.T. 338-39). This testimony poses the question: Was SEPTA’s motorman negligent in failing to bring his train to an emergency stop? I believe that he was not.
Having failed to attempt to stop in time to avoid injuring Canery, which action would be required not only by SEPTA instructions, but by common sense as well, Pressley would have been negligent only if, in the exercise of reasonable care, he saw or should have seen Canery in a position of danger. Since Pressley’s testimony as plaintiff’s witness that he maintained a vigilant watch and saw no one is uncontradicted, the pivotal issue is whether Pressley should have seen Canery. On this question, Canery has presented no evidence, either directly or by inference.
Canery testified that, as he was standing on the platform, he saw the headlight of the approaching train at a distance of between four hundred and five hundred feet, and that he remembers nothing occurring after that until he awakened in a hospital. He was found on the platform, in an injured condition, after the passage through the station of a train operated by Pressley. It does not follow from this that, merely because Canery could see the lights of an oncoming train, a motorman operating that train could have seen him on the platform. While there was also testimony that the platform was well-lit, and that Pressley “had a clear view of everything that was within his vision to see as [he] went through the station,” what actually was within his vision to see is another matter. (Emphasis added).
It must be remembered that the photographs introduced in evidence by both Canery and SEPTA show that, along the entire length of the platform, there are large pillars and staircases placed at regular and relatively short intervals. Whether Canery could be seen depended on a number of factors: his position, i. e., whether he was near the edge of the platform; if he was, was he in such a position of danger that he was or should have been seen by Pressley; if Pressley saw or should have seen Canery, did he have *400enough warning to be able to stop; was Canery obscured by the pillars or staircases on the platform. These are some of the unanswered questions which make it impossible to draw the reasonable inferences necessary to a finding of negligence on the part of SEPTA.
Both Canery and the court below cite certain cases in support of the proposition that, given the circumstantial evidence adduced in the instant case and briefly stated above, Pressley must have been negligent for failing to see Canery and take steps to avoid injuring him. These cases, however, are distinguishable on the grounds that, in each of them, the circumstances are such that the defendant (or the defendant’s employee) saw or should have seen the plaintiff in time to avoid injury.1 Judgments n. o. v. in a defendant’s favor have been sustained where the plaintiff offered no evidence, nor could any inferences be drawn from the evidence that was admitted, showing where the plaintiff was when struck by defendant’s train. See Anderson v. Reading Co., 306 Pa. 246, 159 A. 450 (1932); Dangelo v. Pa. R. Co., 301 Pa. 579, 152 A. 743 (1930). Generally, judgment n. o. v. *401has been sustained where plaintiff failed to show, directly or by circumstantial evidence, exactly how the accident, which he claimed was caused by defendant’s negligence, happened. See Warden v. Lyons Trans. Line, Inc., 482 Pa. 495, 248 A.2d 313 (1968); Flaherty v. Pa. R. Co., 426 Pa. 83, 231 A.2d 179 (1967); Hillelson v. Renner, 183 Pa.Super. 148, 130 A.2d 212 (1957).
In my opinion, the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and judgment non obstante veredicto should be entered in favor of the appellant, SEPTA.

. See Kmetz v. Lochiatto, 421 Pa. 363, 219 A.2d 588 (1966) (defendant’s automobile struck plaintiff head-on in a well-lighted street where there was nothing to obstruct defendant’s vision); Evans v. Phila. Trans. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965) (motorman of train moving at speed of 10 m. p. h. admitted seeing “an object” between the rails at a distance of 88 feet or 168 feet, and stopping distance of train at that speed was 24 to 38 feet); Frisina v. Dailey, 395 Pa. 280, 150 A.2d 348 (1959) (defendant, driving his automobile, struck plaintiff, a pedestrian, head-on at well-lighted intersection; no evidence of any obstruction to defendant’s vision); Peden v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 324 Pa. 444, 188 A. 586 (1936) (evidence, including photographs, clearly showed that defendant’s engineer should have seen accident victims walking directly ahead along unobscured railroad track in daylight); Williams v. Phila. Trans. Co., 219 Pa.Super. 134, 280 A.2d 612 (1971) (plaintiffs testimony, corroborated by that of an eyewitness, was that, when her car stalled in an intersection, she blew her horn, shouted and waved at defendant’s bus which was then about 160 feet away and approaching at a speed of between 25 and 35 miles per hour; that the driver saw plaintiffs car and blew his own horn; and that the driver did not slow down although he had sufficient time to stop.)
In these cases, it may be said, there was evidence of an affirmative nature from which the inference of “should have seen” can reasonably and logically be drawn.