Court Opinion

ID: 9412463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 14:08:48.233552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:25.035294
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Peter Vega,                                    :
                                  Petitioner   :
                                               :
                   v.                          :   No. 39 M.D. 2022
                                               :   Submitted: February 17, 2023
John E. Wetzel, and George M. Little,          :
Secretary of Pennsylvania D.O.C.               :
Ms. B. Mason, Superintendent at                :
SCI-Mahanoy                                    :
Ms. L. White, Deputy Superintendent            :
at SCI-Mahanoy, Ms. Pamela Smith,              :
and Christina Houser, Health Care              :
Administrators at S.C.I. Mahanoy,              :
                          Respondents          :

BEFORE:            HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                   HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                   HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                    FILED: July     ,

                   John E. Wetzel, George M. Little, Bernadette Mason, Lori White,
Pamela Smith, and Christina Houser (collectively, DOC) filed a preliminary
objection to the pro se petition for review filed by inmate Peter Vega (Petitioner).
DOC essentially argues that because Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim,
this Court should sustain DOC’s preliminary objection and dismiss Petitioner’s
petition for review. We sustain in part and overrule in part DOC’s preliminary
objection.1 We order DOC to file an answer within           days. Petitioner may file an
amended petition for review conditioned upon Petitioner’s compliance with the
rules.

         1
             We detail our order infra.
                                       I. BACKGROUND2
                Petitioner requested copies of his medical records from Smith, one of
the prison health care administrators. Pet. for Review, / / , ¶¶ , . Smith denied
the request, stating that Petitioner was entitled to such records only if there was “a
legal case.” Id. ¶ . Petitioner filed an inmate grievance, which the “grievance
coordinator” denied, reasoning that Petitioner must be “representing himself in
actual litigation” before he could receive copies. Id. ¶ . Petitioner alleged that the
relevant DOC policy, DC-ADM                    , violates        Pa.C.S. §             of the Medical
Records Act (Records Act),               Pa.C.S. §§          -      . Id. ¶¶       ,     .3 Petitioner
exhausted his administrative appeals, including an appeal to Mason, who was the
prison superintendent. Id. ¶¶          - .
                Petitioner filed his petition for review in this Court.                     Petitioner
contended that under the Records Act, “he has an absolute right” to copies of his
medical records. Id. ¶            . In Petitioner’s view, DOC’s policy “should not be
interpreted or applied in such a manner as to abridge” Petitioner’s rights under

        2
          We “must . . . accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the
petition for review and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts. A preliminary
objection in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a
doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Where a trial court sustains preliminary
objections on their merits, it is generally an abuse of discretion to dismiss a petition for review
without leave to amend. If it is possible that the pleading can be cured by amendment, a court
must give the pleader an opportunity to file an amended petition for review.” Robinson v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No.          M.D.      , filed Sept. ,       ) (unpublished) (cleaned up),
      WL             , * n. , slip op. at n. . We also “construe pro se materials liberally.” Id. When
available, we rely on the postmarked dates. See generally Thomas v. Elash,             A. d     ,    (Pa.
Super.       ) (holding that “the prisoner mailbox rule applies to all pro se legal filings by” inmates).
We may cite to Superior Court or unreported decisions for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P
   (b)( );        Pa. Code § . (a); Pa. State Police v. Madden,                A. d       ,      n. (Pa.
Cmwlth.          ).
        3
          More precisely, Petitioner alleged that DOC’s original and revised DC-ADM                policy
violates     Pa.C.S. §        . Pet. for Rev. ¶ .

                                                   2
Pa.C.S. §          . Id. ¶    . Further, Petitioner averred that DOC has no penological
interest that justifies denial of his right to copies of his medical records. Id. ¶               .
Petitioner concisely requested mandamus and declaratory judgment as relief, but did
not otherwise elaborate. Id. ¶             . Petitioner did not attach the DOC policy to his
petition.
                DOC filed a single preliminary objection for a demurrer on several
grounds. DOC claimed Petitioner ( ) has no right to mandamus relief; ( ) failed to
alleged sufficient personal involvement by some of the individual DOC respondents;
( ) failed to sufficiently plead a violation of his rights to due process and equal
protection; and ( ) cannot recover as a matter of law under Sections                      and
of the Records Act,          Pa.C.S. §§         ,           , and Section      a of the Health Care
Facilities Act (Facilities Act), Act of July            ,        , P.L.     , as amended, added by
the Act of July       ,      , P.L.    ,     P.S. §          .   a. Prelim. Objs., / /     , at - .
Petitioner filed a response to DOC’s preliminary objection and a supporting brief.
                                             II. ISSUES
                In support of its preliminary objection, DOC raises three issues. First,
DOC argues that Petitioner fails to plead “sufficient personal involvement” by some
of the individual defendants. DOC’s Br. at . Second, DOC contends that Petitioner
fails to state claims for equal protection and due process. Id. Third, DOC claims
that Petitioner has no right to his medical records under the Records Act. Id.4
                                      III. DISCUSSION
            A. Personal Involvement of Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser
                Before summarizing DOC’s first argument, for context, we note that
Petitioner did not allege that Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser engaged in any

       4
           DOC implicitly argues that Petitioner has no right to mandamus relief. See DOC’s Br. at
 - .

                                                    3
actions purportedly aggrieving Petitioner. See generally Pet. for Rev.
               In support of its first issue, DOC argues that Petitioner failed to
sufficiently allege the personal involvement of Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser. In
DOC’s view, although Petitioner named the above individuals as respondents, he did
not “make any allegations whatsoever against” those individuals. DOC’s Br. at                       .
DOC reasons that because Petitioner failed to plead “actionable conduct” by those
individuals, they must be dismissed. Id. at            . DOC summarily concludes, without
argument, that Smith and Mason must also be dismissed from the action. Id. at                     .5
               In Bush v. Veach, A. d             (Pa. Cmwlth.           ), this Court addressed
a similar issue in an analogous procedural posture. In Bush, an inmate sued various
prison employees, claiming that ( ) the employees violated the inmate’s due process
rights; ( ) almost all of the employees retaliated against the inmate; and ( ) the prison
superintendent failed to properly supervise the actions of the employees. Bush,
A. d at      . The defendants filed preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer.
Id. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections, reasoning, inter alia, that
the inmate’s claim against the prison superintendent failed. Id. at                . Specifically,
the trial court explained that the prison superintendent could not be held liable solely
on the doctrine of respondeat superior6 for the employees’ alleged illegal retaliatory
actions against the inmate. Id. at           -   . The inmate appealed.
               The Bush Court rejected the inmate’s reasoning, primarily relying on
federal caselaw stating “that personal involvement can be shown through allegations

       5
           Petitioner does not directly counter DOC’s argument, other than broadly contending that
DOC wronged him. See generally Pet’r’s Br. at - .
         6
           “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior[,] recovery is sought on the basis of vicarious
liability. An employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of an employee if that act was
committed during the course of and within the scope of employment.” Brezenski v. World Truck
Transfer, Inc.,      A. d , (Pa. Super.           ).

                                                 4
of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence, but the allegations must
be made with appropriate particularity.” Id. at                   . The Bush Court therefore
affirmed the trial court, reasoning that the inmate failed to allege the superintendent’s
actual knowledge with specificity and particularity. Id.
               Instantly, upon review of Petitioner’s petition for review, we agree with
DOC that Petitioner failed to allege “actionable conduct” by Wetzel, Little, White,
and Houser. See generally Pet. for Rev. Like the inmate in Bush, Petitioner failed
to allege any “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and acquiescence” by the
above individuals. See Bush, A. d at                  . As in Bush, which sustained a demurrer
because the petitioner failed to allege an individual’s actual knowledge sufficiently,
we similarly sustain DOC’s preliminary objection regarding Wetzel, Little, White,
and Houser. See id. However, DOC’s skeletal argument regarding Smith and Mason
fails. See DOC’s Br. at         . Because DOC fails to argue why we should sustain its
preliminary objection as to Smith and Mason, we overrule DOC’s preliminary
objection as to those two individuals. See Bush, A. d at                   ; see also Pet. for Rev.
¶¶ - ,     . Regardless, Petitioner alleged their involvement with an appropriate level
of specificity. See Pet. for Rev. ¶¶ - ,           ; Bush, A. d at          .
                      B. Equal Protection and Due Process Claims
               DOC also argues that Petitioner failed to state claims for a violation of
his rights to equal protection and due process. DOC’s Br. at                .7 DOC tersely argues

       7
          Notably, DOC cited no legal authorities in support of its second argument. DOC’s Br. at
  - ; see Pa.R.A.P.       ,     (a); Chester Cmty. Charter Sch. v. Dep’t of Educ.,        A. d ,
(Pa. Cmwlth.        ) (stating “Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure function as the Court’s
‘local rules’ for matters within our original jurisdiction”). On that basis alone, we could deny relief
to DOC because we cannot advocate as DOC’s counsel. See Commonwealth v. B.D.G.,                   A. d
    ,     (Pa. Super.       ) (en banc) (stating the “Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly
equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of
advocate and neutral arbiter.” (cleaned up)).

                                                  5
that Petitioner failed to explain how DOC’s denial of Petitioner’s request for his
medical records violated his rights. See id. In DOC’s view, Petitioner inadequately
stated how he was “treated differently from similarly situated individuals” as to
trigger an equal protection claim. Id. at           . Further, DOC contends Petitioner did
not identify the particular due process he believes he was entitled to receive. Id.8
               “Pennsylvania is a fact pleading state.” Briggs v. SW Energy Prod. Co.,
     A. d      ,      (Pa.       ) (citation omitted). Accordingly, a petition for review
must include “material facts on which a cause of action . . . is based[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P.
     (a); Pa.R.A.P.          (e). Under Rule         (a), a complaint’s material facts must
“apprise the defendant of the claim being asserted” and “summarize the essential
facts to support the claim.” Steiner v. Markel,            A. d          ,          (Pa.    ). “The
[petition for review] need not identify specific legal theories . . . . Assertions of legal
rights and obligations in a [petition for review] may be construed as conclusions of
law, which have no place in a pleading.”                N. Front St. Assocs., LP v. Spector
Gaden & Rosen, P.C.,           A. d      ,      (Pa. Super.           ) (cleaned up).
               For example, in order to plead a cause of action for equal protection,
the petitioner must plead material facts “that he is receiving different treatment from
that received by other similarly situated individuals.” Myers v. Ridge,                    A. d   ,
    (Pa. Cmwlth.          ). Relatedly, a procedural due process claim requires pleading
at least one of the following: inadequate notice, no opportunity to be heard, or an
inability “to defend oneself before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction
over the case.” Commonwealth v. Turner,               A. d        ,          (Pa.      ). Those due
process elements “are implicated only by adjudications, not by state actions that are

       8
         In response, Petitioner does not counter DOC’s argument, for example, by identifying the
material facts supporting his due process and equal protection claims. See generally Pet’r’s Br. at
 - .

                                                6
legislative in character,” i.e., a procedural due process claim necessarily requires an
adjudicative agency action. Sutton v. Bickell,                A. d       ,        (Pa.       )
(affirming order “sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer” and
dismissing with prejudice the appellant’s due process claims).                In contrast, a
substantive due process claim requires facts establishing a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected property right or other interest. Khan v. State Bd. of
Auctioneer Exam’rs,               A. d       ,        (Pa.   ). In the prison context, the
challenged deprivation must be balanced against “legitimate penological interests.”
Sutton,       A. d at         (citation omitted). Thus, a petitioner must plead material
facts to support each element of the claims at issue. See Pa.R.Civ.P.                     (a);
Pa.R.A.P.       (e); Steiner,        A. d at          .
              Instantly, even after construing Petitioner’s pro se petition for review
liberally, he fails to plead material facts for his due process and equal protection
claims.     Specifically, Petitioner does not plead material facts regarding his
differential treatment, inadequate notice or an inability to defend himself, or a
constitutionally protected right. See Pa.R.Civ.P.            (a); Pa.R.A.P.      (e); Myers,
    A. d at      ; Turner,         A. d at       ; Sutton,   A. d at      - ; see generally
Pet. for Rev. Accordingly, we sustain DOC’s preliminary objection to the extent it
invoked a demurrer to Petitioner’s equal protection and due process claims. See
Sutton,       A. d at        .9
                                         C. Records Act
              Last, DOC contends that Petitioner has no right to his medical records
under the Records Act. DOC’s Br. at               . DOC reasons that the Records Act does
not apply to prison health care facilities and providers. Id. at       - . In support, DOC

       9
       Because Petitioner may file an amended petition for review, we trust DOC’s counsel will
comply with all applicable briefing rules in the future.

                                                  7
discusses DuBoise v. Rumcik,            A. d         (Pa. Cmwlth.           ), which denied the
inmate’s application for summary relief on his claim that he was entitled to his
mental health records under the Records Act. DOC’s Br. at                      -     (referencing
DuBoise,        A. d at        ). In DOC’s view, the DuBoise Court held that DOC had
a legitimate penological interest in preventing an inmate from accessing such
records. Id. at     . Per DOC, policy DC-ADM                was also at issue in DuBoise. Id.
at    .10
               We reiterate that in resolving preliminary objections, we accept as true
the petitioner’s “well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts” and all reasonable
inferences therefrom. Robinson, slip op. at n. ,                 WL             , * n. . We add
that we may consider exhibits and documents attached to the petition for review.
Witmer v. Exxon Corp.,             A. d         ,        (Pa. Super.         ) (resolving order
sustaining a demurrer). Finally, we need not extensively recap DuBoise, other than
to note that in DuBoise, the Court had previously overruled DOC’s preliminary
objection in the form of a demurrer to the inmate’s petition, which had requested
mandamus relief under the Records Act. DuBoise,                   A. d at          . The DuBoise
Court then ordered DOC to answer the inmate’s petition, and DOC filed an answer
and new matter, which attached, without apparent objection, policy DC-ADM                         .
Id.
               Instantly, this case differs from DuBoise for two reasons.                   First,
DuBoise resolved an application for summary relief, unlike the preliminary
objection at issue here. Cf. id. Second, unlike DuBoise, policy DC-ADM                      is not

        10
         Petitioner counters by construing the statutory language of the Records Act. Pet’r’s Br.
at - . In his view, the Records Act grants him the right to access his medical records. Id. at ;
accord Pet. for Review ¶¶ , . Petitioner reasons that under the Facilities Act, DOC is a state
agency operating a health care facility and, therefore, the Records Act applies. Pet’r’s Br. at - .

                                                8
of record. Cf. id. Under these circumstances, granting a demurrer based on DuBoise,
which resolved an application for summary relief, would be premature. See Witmer,
    A. d at      .
              Further, the instant procedural history is similar to DuBoise.    In
DuBoise, the Court recounted that it had previously overruled DOC’s demurrer to
the inmate’s petition for mandamus relief under the Records Act. See DuBoise,
A. d at       . Similarly, as in DuBoise, DOC requested a demurrer to Petitioner’s
petition for review requesting, inter alia, mandamus relief under the Records Act.
See id. Given the posture of this case, we overrule DOC’s preliminary objection to
the extent DOC sought to dismiss the Records Act claim.
                               IV. CONCLUSION
              For these reasons, we sustain in part and overrule in part DOC’s
preliminary objection. Specifically, we sustain DOC’s preliminary objection to the
extent DOC sought the dismissal of individuals Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser.
We overrule DOC’s preliminary objection to the extent DOC requested the dismissal
of Smith and Mason. We sustain DOC’s preliminary objection to the degree DOC
sought dismissal of Petitioner’s equal protection and due process claims. We
overrule DOC’s preliminary objection to the degree DOC sought dismissal of
Petitioner’s claim for mandamus relief regarding the Records Act. Petitioner may
file an amended petition for review conditioned upon Petitioner’s compliance with
the applicable rules. Finally, we order DOC to file an answer within   days unless
Petitioner files a compliant amended petition for review.

                                             LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

                                         9
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Peter Vega,                               :
                          Petitioner      :
                                          :
              v.                          :   No. 39 M.D. 2022
                                          :
John E. Wetzel, and George M. Little,     :
Secretary of Pennsylvania D.O.C.          :
Ms. B. Mason, Superintendent at           :
SCI-Mahanoy                               :
Ms. L. White, Deputy Superintendent       :
at SCI-Mahanoy, Ms. Pamela Smith,         :
and Christina Houser, Health Care         :
Administrators at S.C.I. Mahanoy,         :
                          Respondents     :

                                       ORDER
              AND NOW, this       st day of July,       , we SUSTAIN in part and
OVERRULE in part the preliminary objection filed by John E. Wetzel, George M.
Little, Bernadette Mason, Lori White, Pamela Smith, and Christina Houser
(collectively, DOC).    Specifically, we SUSTAIN in part DOC’s preliminary
objection to the extent that DOC requested the dismissal of ( ) Wetzel, Little, White,
and Houser; and ( ) Petitioner’s equal protection and due process claims. We
OVERRULE in part DOC’s preliminary objection to the degree DOC requested the
dismissal of ( ) Smith and Mason; and ( ) Petitioner’s mandamus claim under
Sections       and       of the Medical Records Act (Records Act),         Pa.C.S. §§
    ,      . Petitioner may file an amended petition for review conditioned upon
Petitioner’s compliance with the applicable rules. DOC must file an answer within
   days unless Petitioner files a compliant amended petition for review.

                                LORI A. DUMAS, Judge