Court Opinion

ID: 9529987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:06.077537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.188252
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the court: With his petition for rehearing, defendant filed what he termed to be a “supplemental record,”1 containing two short statements from court reporters which he suggests established that there were no trial court proceedings in this matter on the morning of October 30, 1974. Based solely on these statements, it is argued that reversal is mandated because defendant could not have been admonished at that time relative to his right to a jury trial. In one of the statements, Alpha Martin states: “I did not take the case of Sherman Brown before Judge White on the 30th day of October, 1974.1 was only present for a half hour because the reporter for that court was late. The case of Sherman Brown was not even called while I was there.” In the other, Ruth Sayre states: “[T]hat I was assigned to Judge DANIEL J. WHITE’S court on October 30th, A.D. 1974. I transcribed my shorthand notes pertaining to the case of People of the State of Illinois versus Sherman Brown, at a hearing commencing at 2:00 o’clock P.M. on said date. I hereby certify that on said date there was nothing relative to the Sherman Brown case heard in the morning.” Initially, it is noted that the statements are unverified and that neither court reporter stated she was present in the courtroom on the morning in question. Martin does not say whether her half-hour presence was in the morning or afternoon. She does state, however, that the reporter assigned to the courtroom in question was late in appearing that day. Sayre says that she was the assigned reporter and was present during the afternoon session. Although she makes no statement as to being in the courtroom during the morning session, she nevertheless concludes that nothing related to the instant case was heard in the morning. This conclusion is not supported by the record, in which there is a jury waiver signed by defendant on October 30, 1974, and a corroborating entry in the “memorandum of orders” on the same date. The trial commenced in the afternoon session of the court on October 30 and, because the transcript of proceedings contains no reference to the jury waiver, it appears that the admonitions took place either during the morning session or at some time not attended by either of the two court reporters. A morning session was indicated from the comment of defendant’s attorney when the case was called in the afternoon of October 30, that “We answered ready this morning.” In the light of the foregoing, we reject defendant’s contention that reversal is mandated by the content of the court' reporter statements. Moreover, even were we to assume that there was no such morning session, it remains our belief that defendant knowingly and understandingly waived a jury trial. We think that the following facts are more significant and are in themselves controlling of this issue. First, defendant did sign a jury waiver on October 30 while being represented by counsel; Second, the October 30 entry in the memorandum of orders clearly states that he was advised of his right to a jury trial and, after being so informed, that he signed the waiver; Third, no objection was made at the commencement of trial on October 30 to the case being heard without a jury; Fourth, defendant does not urge that he wanted or that he was deprived of a jury trial; and Fifth, he does not contend that he did not sign the waiver or that it was not voluntary or that he was in any way prejudiced by it. As stated in People v. Murrell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 287, 291, 326 N.E.2d 762, 765: “Neither of the defendants in these cases now before this court has urged that he wanted or that he was deprived of a jury trial. Also neither defendant urges that he was in any way prejudiced by his counsel’s waiver. There is no contention that the waiver was not voluntary. Under these circumstances we will not reverse the convictions. People v. Dudley, 58 Ill. 2d 57; People v. Morehead, 45 Ill. 2d 326.” In view thereof, we will not reverse the conviction here, and defendant’s petition for rehearing will be denied. Petition for rehearing denied. MEJDA and WILSON, JJ., concur.   This “supplemental record” was not in conformance with the rules but, in the absence of objection thereto, we allowed it to be filed.