Court Opinion

ID: 9373877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:09:35.154218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:49.150652
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-9539     Document: 010110816181      Date Filed: 02/22/2023   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 22, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  GERARDO H. MUNOZ-MORALES,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                         No. 21-9539
                                                         (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

        Gerardo H. Muñoz-Morales1 petitions for review of a decision by the Board of

 Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ)

 denial of his application for cancellation of removal. We dismiss in part and deny in

 part his petition for review.

        *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        1
         Although the Petitioner’s second last name is sometimes spelled “Moralez” in
 the record, we use “Morales” in this order and judgment, consistent with the vast
 majority of his filings and other documents in the record.
Appellate Case: 21-9539    Document: 010110816181        Date Filed: 02/22/2023      Page: 2

 I.    Background

       Muñoz-Morales is a native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the

 United States as a lawful permanent resident in May 1989. In August 2020, the

 Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear alleging he was

 removable as an alien convicted of two or more offenses for which the aggregate

 sentences to confinement were five years or more. After admitting the allegations

 and conceding he was removable as charged, Muñoz-Morales filed an application for

 cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).

       A.      The IJ’s Decision

       After a hearing at which Muñoz-Morales testified, the IJ denied his application

 for cancellation of removal. The IJ found that he satisfied the statutory requirements

 under § 1229b(a)(1)-(3). But after reviewing the record as a whole and weighing

 Muñoz-Morales’s positive and negative factors, the IJ denied relief as a matter of

 discretion.

       The IJ noted the following positive factors in Muñoz-Morales’s case: his long

 residency in the United States; his family ties in the United States, including his three

 United-States-citizen adult children; his ownership of property in the United States;

 his employment history and his employer’s favorable comments about his work; his

 payment of income taxes; his religious practice; and his value and service to his

 community. The IJ took note of Muñoz-Morales’s and his daughter’s testimony, as

 well as letters from his daughter, one of his sons, and friends and neighbors.

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       On the negative side of the scale, the IJ described Muñoz-Morales’s criminal

 history, including five arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which

 resulted in four DUI convictions in 2006, 2009, 2010, and 2017.2 In addition,

 Muñoz-Morales had been apprehended by the Border Patrol in 2004 for transporting

 illegal aliens, although he was not charged with any crime. In 2005, he was

 convicted of criminal mischief related to an altercation with his then-wife. In

 response to a question from the IJ, Muñoz-Morales acknowledged that he had driven

 while intoxicated on more occasions than the five times that resulted in arrests. He

 estimated he had done so on thirty occasions while living in the United States.

 Pointing to that admission, his multiple DUI arrests during an eleven-year period, and

 the minimal evidence he provided regarding completion of rehabilitation programs,

 the IJ found that the evidence did not demonstrate that Muñoz-Morales had been

 genuinely rehabilitated.

       The IJ ultimately found that Muñoz-Morales’s positive equities were not so

 significant as to counterbalance his serious and dangerous criminal conduct, and

 therefore concluded he failed to show that he warranted a favorable exercise of

 discretion.

       B.      The BIA’s Decision

       The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Muñoz-Morales’s appeal. It

 expressly stated that it considered the totality of his positive equities and

       2
         Muñoz-Morales’s first DUI arrest in 2001 resulted in pretrial diversion rather
 than a conviction.
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 humanitarian factors present in the case. The BIA pointed to his long residence in

 this country, his three adult children in the United States, his employment history and

 filing of tax returns, and his religious participation. The BIA also “recognize[d] that,

 as a result of his disability,3 his age, and other factors, it will be particularly difficult

 for him to return to Mexico and re-establish himself in that country,” stating that

 “[t]here can be little dispute that his removal will result in a significant level of

 hardship to himself and his family.” R. at 3.

        But the BIA said it could not ignore his criminal history, including his multiple

 DUI convictions, which “are serious adverse factors.” Id. at 4 (citing the Attorney

 General’s decision in Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664, 670 (A.G. 2019)

 (stating that “an alien with multiple DUI convictions would likely be denied

 cancellation of removal as a purely discretionary matter” because “[m]ultiple DUI

 convictions are a serious blemish on a person’s record and reflect disregard for the

 safety of others and for the law”)). The BIA also noted Muñoz-Morales’s candid

 admission he had driven while intoxicated on approximately thirty occasions. While

 it recognized that rehabilitation is not a requirement for relief, the BIA was “not

 persuaded that he is rehabilitated.” Id. It acknowledged and considered

 Muñoz-Morales’s “claims that, since March 2017, he has abstained from driving

 under the influence of alcohol, completed court-ordered courses, and attended

        3
          Muñoz-Morales testified that he is disabled because he is missing two fingers
 on his left hand. See R. at 148. He further testified that he also has no right hand.
 See id. at 149.
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 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings,” and his presentation of letters of support attesting

 to his rehabilitation. Id. But the BIA determined that, “[w]hile his efforts to

 rehabilitate himself during the past few years are laudable, they do not overcome his

 extensive decade-long history of drunk driving.” Id.

       “[U]pon consideration of the totality of the record and a balancing of the

 appropriate factors present in [Muñoz-Morales’s] case,” the BIA held that the IJ

 “properly denied [his] application for cancellation of removal as a matter of

 discretion . . . based upon the evidence and testimony.” Id. It determined that,

 “[e]ven considering [his] recent rehabilitation efforts, the positive equities and

 humanitarian factors remain significantly offset by his serious criminal history.” Id.

 II.   Discussion

       The Attorney General may cancel the removal of a noncitizen permanent

 resident who establishes that he “(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for

 permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States

 continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not

 been convicted of any aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). In addition to these

 statutory requirements, the noncitizen must also demonstrate that he warrants a

 favorable exercise of discretion. See Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1619 (2022)

 (“Because relief from removal is always a matter of grace, even an eligible

 noncitizen must persuade the immigration judge that he merits a favorable exercise of

 discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of

 Muñoz-Morales’s application for cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion.

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       A.     Jurisdictional Limitations

       The government argues this court lacks jurisdiction over all of the issues raised

 in Muñoz-Morales’s petition for review. Our jurisdiction depends on whether he

 raises a constitutional claim or a question of law and whether he exhausted those

 issues before the BIA.

              1.     Cancellation of Removal

       Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction to review “any

 judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229b.” This provision

 denies us jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspects of a BIA decision

 concerning cancellation of removal, including any underlying factual determinations.

 See Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2020). But under

 another provision, we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions

 of law regarding cancellation of removal. See id. at 1182; see also § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

 (precluding judicial review “except as provided in subparagraph (D)”);

 § 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B) . . . which limits or eliminates

 judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or

 questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of

 appeals in accordance with this section.”). We therefore lack jurisdiction in this case

 unless Muñoz-Morales raises a constitutional claim or a question of law.

              2.     Failure to Exhaust

       We also lack jurisdiction to review issues that Muñoz-Morales did not exhaust

 before the BIA. We can review a final order of removal only if “the alien has

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 exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C.

 § 1252(d)(1). Available administrative remedies include motions to reconsider or

 reopen filed with the BIA. See Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1122

 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that challenges to “the BIA’s allegedly de novo

 [fact]finding” were unexhausted because they “should have been brought before the

 BIA in the first instance through a motion to reconsider or reopen”). The exhaustion

 requirement is jurisdictional. See Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir.

 1999).

          The exhaustion rule “give[s] the agency the opportunity to correct its own

 errors.” Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010).

 Therefore, “[i]t is not enough to go through the procedural motions of a BIA appeal,

 or to make general statements in the notice of appeal to the BIA, or to level broad

 assertions in a filing before the Board.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Rather, “[t]o satisfy § 1252(d)(1), an alien must present the same specific legal

 theory to the BIA before he or she may advance it in court.” Id. Thus,

 Muñoz-Morales “may not add new theories seriatim as the litigation progresses from

 the agency into the courts.” Id. at 1238.

          We will address our jurisdiction as to each of the issues Muñoz-Morales

 asserts in his petition for review.

          B.    Issues Raised in Petition for Review

          Muñoz-Morales characterizes all of the issues he raises as constitutional

 claims or questions of law. But “arguing that the evidence was incorrectly weighed,

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 insufficiently considered, or supports a different outcome” does not raise a

 constitutional claim or question of law. Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1084

 (10th Cir. 2007). And a contention that the agency failed to explicitly consider

 certain evidence is properly viewed as a substantial-evidence argument, rather than a

 constitutional claim. See Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 844, 851-52 (10th Cir. 2009).

 Consequently, however characterized, we lack jurisdiction to review

 Muñoz-Morelos’s challenges to the evidentiary support for the agency’s factual

 findings and the BIA’s weighing of the evidence, as well as his arguments that the

 BIA failed to consider certain evidence.

       Muñoz-Morales nonetheless purports to raise the following issues: the BIA

 erred by (1) reviewing the IJ’s factual findings de novo, (2) departing from its own

 precedential decisions in exercising its discretion, and (3) failing to provide adequate

 reasoning for its conclusion that the positive factors in his case did not outweigh his

 serious criminal history. He also argues his detention during removal proceedings

 deprived him of due process because he did not have a full and fair opportunity to

 gather evidence regarding his rehabilitation.

              1.     Incorrect Standard of Review

       Muñoz-Morales first argues that the BIA erred by reviewing the IJ’s factual

 findings de novo, in contravention of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Ordinarily,

 pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(D), “we have jurisdiction over a claim that the Board

 applied the incorrect standard of review to an IJ’s factual determinations.”

 Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1184. But we lack jurisdiction to review the issue in

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 this case because Muñoz-Morales did not exhaust it by raising it in a motion to

 reconsider or reopen filed with the BIA. See Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1122.

              2.     Misapplication of BIA Authority

       Muñoz-Morales argues the BIA departed from its own precedential decisions

 in exercising its discretion. We may review as a question of law whether the BIA

 departed from its own adopted legal standards. See Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at

 1184. We review such a contention de novo. See Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 851. But

 Muñoz-Morales exhausted only one of his contentions.

       Muñoz-Morales argued in his BIA appeal that the IJ erred by failing to

 properly apply the BIA’s balancing test in concluding that he did not merit a

 favorable exercise of discretion. R. at 18-19. This was so, he argued, because the

 positive factors in his case far outweighed the negatives. Id. at 20. Muñoz-Morales

 did not argue—as he does now—that BIA precedent precluded the agency’s reliance

 on his admission that he drove while intoxicated on 30 occasions, or that the

 evidence failed to demonstrate his lack of good moral character under the standards

 in Matter of Castillo-Perez. Because he did not raise these contentions in his BIA

 appeal or in a motion to reconsider or reopen, we lack jurisdiction to review them.

       Muñoz-Morales did argue in his BIA appeal that, under the BIA’s precedent,

 rehabilitation is not a prerequisite to a favorable exercise of discretion. See R. at 23

 (citing Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 196 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding

 rehabilitation is “a factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion” but is not “an

 absolute prerequisite to a favorable exercise of discretion in every case involving an

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  alien with a criminal record”)). But this claim fails because he does not demonstrate

  that the BIA departed from this standard. The BIA explicitly recognized that

  rehabilitation is not required. See R. at 4. It then found that “[e]ven considering

  [Muñoz-Morales’s] recent rehabilitation efforts, the positive equities and

  humanitarian factors remain significantly offset by his serious criminal history.” Id.

  We lack jurisdiction to review Muñoz-Morales’s ultimate contention that the BIA

  should have assigned more weight to his positive factors. See Kechkar, 500 F.3d

  at 1084.

               3.     Inadequate Reasoning

        Muñoz-Morales argues the BIA’s decision “failed to include sufficient

  [rationale] supporting the conclusion that adverse factors of the case outweighed the

  positive equities, or why the positive equities were not enough to outweigh any

  adverse factor on the record.” Pet’r’s Br. at 26. He contends the BIA’s decision is so

  lacking in analysis that it amounts to an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Maatougui v.

  Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding the BIA does not abuse its

  discretion if its decision is sufficient for meaningful appellate review). But

  Muñoz-Morales does not explain how this contention raises either a constitutional

  claim or a question of law subject to our jurisdiction. We need not decide that issue

  because we lack jurisdiction for a separate reason: Muñoz-Morales failed to exhaust

  this issue in a motion to reconsider or reopen filed with the BIA.

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                4.    Due Process

        Finally, Muñoz-Morales contends he was deprived of his right to due process

  because his detention prevented him from having a full and fair opportunity to gather

  evidence regarding his rehabilitation. Such a claim is reviewable under

  § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Abiodun v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006)

  (distinguishing the petitioner’s detention-based due process claim from a reviewable

  “claim that his detention prevented him from obtaining favorable evidence for the

  proceedings”).

        Muñoz-Morales asserts that he raised this due process claim in his BIA appeal,

  but the BIA failed to rule on it. He argued in his appeal that his testimony and a

  completion certificate from a rehabilitation program clearly established his

  rehabilitation. R. at 21-22. He then added:

        Respondent was detained through the proceedings; he relied on others to
        put his packet together. If he had been out of detention, he would have had
        more time and ability to gather more complete evidence. Given the realities
        of his detention, the Immigration Judge should not have been so quick to
        dismiss his Certificate of Completion as insufficient.
  Id. at 22. Muñoz-Morales did not explicitly assert a due process claim in his BIA

  appeal, nor does the BIA appear to have recognized that he did so. But giving him

  the benefit of the doubt as to exhaustion, we hold that his due process claim fails on

  the merits.

        A noncitizen “in removal proceedings is entitled only to . . . procedural due

  process, which provides the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

  meaningful manner.” Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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  “To prevail on a due process claim, an alien must establish not only error, but

  prejudice.” Id. We review due process claims de novo. See Witjaksono v. Holder,

  573 F.3d 968, 973-74 (10th Cir. 2009). Muñoz-Morales fails to demonstrate

  prejudice by showing a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his removal

  proceeding would have been different but for his detention. See Molina v. Holder,

  763 F.3d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 2014).

        The IJ gave Muñoz-Morales twenty-six days to submit all of his evidence

  supporting his application for cancellation of removal, including detailed affidavits

  from himself and all other witnesses. See R. at 173. Muñoz-Morales submitted

  seventy-five pages of evidence, including one completion certificate from a

  rehabilitation program, id. at 286. He also submitted letters from family members

  and others addressing their knowledge of his rehabilitation efforts. In his own

  affidavit, he stated that he had stopped drinking in 2017 but he did not mention any

  rehabilitation programming. Id. at 214. Muñoz-Morales’s counsel did not request a

  continuance from the IJ to collect more evidence regarding his rehabilitation—based

  upon his detention or otherwise. Nor did Muñoz-Morales testify that he had

  additional documentation to offer regarding his rehabilitation efforts. In sum,

  Muñoz-Morales has never indicated—before the IJ, the BIA, or this court—what

  additional evidence he could have submitted were he not detained. He therefore fails

  to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as a result of his detention.

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  III.   Conclusion

         We dismiss Muñoz-Morales’s petition for review to the extent we lack

  jurisdiction to consider the issues he raises. We otherwise deny his petition for

  review.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Gregory A. Phillips
                                             Circuit Judge

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