Court Opinion

ID: 9735307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:08:35.308973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:57.096745
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORRO-^ dissenting: The defendant in the case at bar filed a motion to reconsider his sentence in which he argued, in part, that his sentence was excessive when compared to the sentences imposed on other defendants in comparable cases. The trial court struck this argument from defendant’s motion, holding, as a matter of law, that in fashioning defendant’s sentence, it could give no consideration whatsoever to the sentences imposed on other defendants in comparable cases. The issue presented in this case is a narrow one: did the trial court err when it held, as a matter of law, that it was wholly prohibited from considering comparative sentencing information? I would hold that the court did err. There is no sound reason in law or policy why a trial court should not be permitted to consider comparative sentencing information along with all of the other factors it may consider when making sentencing decisions. I would hold that if a defendant presents case-specific information regarding sentences imposed on similarly situated offenders to the trial court, the court should be allowed, in the exercise of its discretion, to consider such information for the purpose of ensuring that the defendant’s sentence is not inexplicably and grossly disparate. In my opinion, the sentencing court should have the discretion, if it chooses, to consider potentially relevant and useful information in order to reach a measured and just sentence within the applicable statutory sentencing range. There is no reason to artificially limit the information which the sentencing court has before it, as the majority in the case at bar has done. Moreover, unlike the majority, I believe that section 5 — 5—4.3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—4.3 (West 1998)) supports the use of comparative sentencing analysis. As Justice Rathje correctly observes, section 5 — 5—4.3 shows that sentencing parity is an explicit goal of the legislature and that “the legislature intended for the courts to have statistics of sentences in other cases available to them ‘for their use in imposing . and reviewing sentences.’ ” 189 Ill. 2d at 71 (Rathje, J., dissenting). Hence, section 5 — 5—4.3 supports defendant’s argument that sentencing judges should be allowed, in the exercise of their discretion, to consider sentences imposed on other defendants in comparable cases. I emphasize that I would not hold that trial judges are compelled to consider all comparative sentencing information which is presented to them, or that comparative sentencing information may, by itself, control the sentencing judge’s decision. The question of whether to consider the comparative sentencing information should be left to the discretion of the trial judge, who may decide that, in some cases, the comparative sentencing information is inappropriate and should be given no weight, or, conversely, should be a factor in fashioning an appropriate sentence. Accordingly, I would remand the case at bar to the trial court so that it might decide, in the first instance, what weight, if any, should be given to defendant’s comparative sentencing argument. CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.