Court Opinion

ID: 9399561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 18:01:12.276205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.751059
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11644    Document: 24     Date Filed: 06/05/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                 In the
               United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-11528
                         ____________________

      STATE OF FLORIDA,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellee
                                                      Cross Appellant,
      versus
      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
      ACTING COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
      PROTECTION,
      U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
      DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
      U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
      SECRETARY, et al.,
USCA11 Case: 23-11644   Document: 24     Date Filed: 06/05/2023     Page: 2 of 9

      2                     Order of the Court                 23-11528

                                                 Defendants-Appellants
                                                      Cross Appellees.

                        ____________________

                               No. 23-11644
                        ____________________

      STATE OF FLORIDA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
      versus
      SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
      CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL,
      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                 Defendants-Appellants.

                        ____________________

               Appeals from the United States District Court
                   for the Northern District of Florida
                D.C. Docket Nos. 3:21-cv-01066-TKW-ZCB,
                         3:23-cv-09962-TKW-ZCB
                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11644          Document: 24          Date Filed: 06/05/2023          Page: 3 of 9

      23-11528                      Order of the Court                                   3

      Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
      LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
              The Department of Homeland Security1 (“DHS”) has filed a
      motion to stay two orders pending its appeal in this case: (1) the
      March 8, 2023, order that vacated DHS’s Policy on the Use of Pa-
      role Plus Alternatives to Detention to Decompress Border Loca-
      tions (the “Parole+ATD policy”); and (2) the May 16, 2023, order
      enjoining DHS’s Parole with Conditions in Limited Circumstances
      Prior to the Issuance of a Charging Document memorandum (the
      “PWC policy”). After careful consideration, we deny DHS’s mo-
      tion. 2

                          I.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
             When reviewing a motion to stay pending appeal, we con-
      sider the “traditional” stay factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant
      has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the

      1 We refer to the Defendants in this case—the United States, U.S. Customs and

      Border Protection, DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS
      Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Ur M Jaddou, and Tae D John-
      son—collectively as DHS for ease of reference.
      2 In denying  this stay, we note that we write only for the parties’ benefit. “Be-
      cause an ‘order[ ] concerning [a] stay[ is] not a final adjudication of the merits
      of the appeal, the tentative and preliminary nature of a stay-panel opinion pre-
      cludes the opinion from having an effect outside that case.’” League of Women
      Voters of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 32 F.4th 1363, 1369 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022)
      (some alterations in original) (quoting New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, 976 F.3d
      1278, 1280 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020)).
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      4                        Order of the Court                   23-11528

      merits; (2) whether the stay applicant will be irreparably injured
      absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially in-
      jure the other persons interested in the proceeding; and (4) where
      the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26 (2009)
      (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).
              Among these four factors, the first and second “are the most
      critical.” Id. at 434. “To satisfy its burden as to those [two] factors,
      the party seeking the stay must show more than the mere possibil-
      ity of success on the merits or of irreparable injury.” Democratic
      Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019); accord
      Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35. Indeed, “[a] stay is not a matter of right”
      but rather “an exercise of judicial discretion,” Virginian Ry. Co. v.
      United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926), and so the “[t]he party re-
      questing a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances
      justify an exercise of that discretion,” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34.
      Where the balance of equities identified in the second, third, and
      fourth factors weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay, “we re-
      lax the likely-to-succeed-on-the-merits requirement” of the first fac-
      tor. League of Women Voters, 32 F.4th at 1370; accord Garcia-Mir v.
      Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986).
             Moreover, “[i]n considering whether to stay a preliminary
      injunction, we apply the usual standards of review governing our
      review of the merits of the preliminary injunction.” Democratic
      Exec. Comm., 915 F.3d at 1317. Thus, we review legal conclusions
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      23-11528                  Order of the Court                              5

      de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Id.; accord Swain v. Junior,
      958 F.3d 1081, 1088 (11th Cir. 2020).
                                 II.     ANALYSIS
             In its motion to stay, DHS argues that it has satisfied all four
      of the Nken stay factors as to both of the orders on appeal. We
      disagree and deny the motion because DHS has not met its burden
      to show that it will suffer an irreparable injury absent a stay. 3
              As to irreparable injury, DHS argues that, if left in effect, the
      district court’s orders will “undermine the Executive Branch’s con-
      stitutional and statutory authority to implement its immigration
      priorities and secure the border.” “The most immediate conse-
      quence of the orders,” according to DHS, “will likely be [the] over-
      crowding [of] CBP facilities during increases in border encounters,”
      which would threaten the “health, safety, and security” of USBP
      officers and aliens. DHS warns that the overcrowding of CBP fa-
      cilities could cause it to have to release some aliens without ade-
      quate monitoring measures and could, in the “worst-case sce-
      nario,” prevent it from apprehending some aliens entirely. Each of
      these potential consequences, DHS asserts, would have negative
      downstream effects on public safety and national security.

      3 Because we conclude that DHS has failed to meet its burden on establishing
      irreparable harm, we need not address the other Nken factors, including
      whether DHS has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the
      merits.
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      6                       Order of the Court                23-11528

      Overall, we do not find this argument persuasive for the following
      reasons.
              To start, DHS’s claims of irreparable injury ring somewhat
      hollow on this record, considering the department’s track record
      of overstating similar threats in the underlying proceedings. For
      instance, on January 12, 2023, DHS represented to the district court
      that any vacatur of the Parole+ATD policy would result in “disas-
      trous consequences” for the management of the border starting the
      very next day. DHS made the same representation again on Feb-
      ruary 16, 2023. But, in truth, CBP had stopped using the Pa-
      role+ATD practices as of January 2, 2023, and DHS now admits
      that it was able to “manage[] its detention capacity [since January]
      using many other tools at its disposal.” The department’s ability to
      ascertain future harm is uncertain at best. Given this record, we
      take DHS’s latest claims of impending disaster if it is not allowed
      to use either of the challenged policies with some skepticism.
             Recent data from the border casts further doubt on DHS’s
      irreparable-injury argument. Contrary to DHS’s catastrophic pre-
      dictions, the number of daily encounters with aliens did not surge
      in the days following the expiration of the Title 42 order on May
      11, 2023, but instead fell significantly. Compare Doc. 13-1 ¶ 11 in
      No. 23-cv-09962 (predicting a daily average of 12,000–14,000 en-
      counters), with Doc. 28 at 4 in No. 23-cv-09962 (showing that the
      number of encounters dropped from 9,649 on May 11, 2023, to
      4,193 on May 14). DHS has neither explained how that data is con-
      sistent with its representations nor provided any more recent data
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      23-11528                Order of the Court                          7

      demonstrating a surge in illegal crossings at the border. This Court
      will not find irreparable harm based on mere conjecture.
             Lastly, the timing of DHS’s appeals and motion for stay un-
      dermines the department’s assertions of irreparable injury. As dis-
      cussed, the district court entered its order vacating the Pa-
      role+ATD policy on March 8, 2023, but stayed the decision for
      seven days “to allow [DHS] to seek appellate review.” Further, as
      Florida points out, DHS has known since January 30, 2023, that the
      Title 42 order would terminate on May 11. DHS, however, chose
      not to initiate an appeal of the vacatur order until May 5, 2023—
      almost sixty days after entry of the order. And, to be clear, USBP
      did not issue the PWC memo—which the district court found to
      be “materially indistinguishable from the Parole+ATD policy”—
      until May 10, 2023, right before the Title 42 order expired. Given
      that DHS stopped using the Parole+ATD policy in early-January
      2023, DHS operated for approximately five months without either
      of the challenged policies before seeking relief from this Court. In
      this context, i.e., where DHS frames its concerns over its tools in
      detaining aliens at the border in terms of national security, that de-
      lay of several months greatly undermines the department’s posi-
      tion. Cf. Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th
      Cir. 2016) (discussing the similar factors for injunctive relief and
      noting that “[a] delay in seeking a preliminary injunction of even
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      8                        Order of the Court                   23-11528

      only a few months—though not necessarily fatal—militates against
      a finding of irreparable harm”).
             In sum, DHS has not carried its burden of showing that the
      second factor under the “traditional” stay framework, i.e., irrepa-
      rable injury, is met. Indeed, “simply showing some ‘possibility of
      irreparable injury,’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S.
      at 435 (citation omitted) (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514
      (9th Cir. 1998)). Because DHS therefore has failed to establish one
      of the two “most critical” factors, id. at 434, we do not find a stay
      pending appeal to be warranted as to either of the district court’s
      orders.
                             III.   CONCLUSION
             For these reasons, the motion to stay is DENIED.
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      23-11528 J. PRYOR, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part         1

      J. PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
            I would grant the motion with respect to the Parole With
      Conditions policy.