Court Opinion

ID: 9487382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:15:06.467423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:14.159190
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Were we writing on a clean slate, I might wholeheartedly concur across the board with my colleagues. But we are not. Thus, although I concur in most of the majority’s opinion, I must respectfully dissent from Part III regarding the imposition of Rule 9011 sanctions. In my judgment, our en banc holding in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.1990) (en banc) precludes the approach to this issue taken by the majority.
The Townsend decision essentially reads out of Rule 11 plain language appearing to authorize an award of sanctions upon a showing only of improper purpose. As we said in that case, “with regard to complaints which initiate actions, ... such complaints are not filed for an improper purpose if they are non-frivolous.” Id. at 1362. In other words, a court may not impose Rule 11 sanctions for a “bad faith” filing unless it also finds that the petition was frivolous, i.e., “[A] determination of improper purpose must be supported by a determination of frivolousness when a complaint is at issue.” Id. (emphasis added).
The language of Rule 9011(a) tracks the language of Rule 11. That is why we have said, “Because the analysis of sanctions is essentially identical under Rules 9011(a) and Rule 11, we will use the terms interchangeably.” In re Grantham Bros., 922 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 94, 116 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991). I’m concerned that the majority ignores this guidance and writes around Townsend in a way that will confirm the views of some of our critics that we are just a series of independent and disconnected panels ignoring the need to create a stable law of the circuit. Moreover, the majority’s apostatic claim in justification of its departure from Townsend, i.e., that bankruptcy proceedings seldom involve broad policy implications, and that bankruptcy proceedings are subject to manipulation and abuse not typical of civil litigation, is surely not susceptible of reliable verification.
In my view, Townsend controls. We should follow its dictates and affirm the BAP’s reversal of the sanctions notwithstanding the purpose for which this action was filed, as I will now explain.
A complaint or petition is frivolous if, after reasonable inquiry, a debtor “could not form a reasonable belief that the petition is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification or reversal of existing law.” Rainbow Magazine, 136 B.R. 545, 551 (9th Cir. BAP 1992). Here, the bankruptcy court sanctioned the debtor because it concluded that case law in the Ninth Circuit clearly established that the debtor’s case was filed in “bad faith.”1 Although a number of bankruptcy *832courts had held that using bankruptcy law to appeal a judgment without posting an appeal bond constituted a “bad faith” filing, and although we now hold that the bankruptcy court’s assessment of the viability of the petition was correct, no court of appeals or BAP decision had yet addressed the issue at the time the petition was filed. Even the bankruptcy courts in this circuit did not all agree on the proper approach. Compare In re Karum Group, Inc., 66 B.R. 436, 437-38 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1986) with In re Corey, 46 B.R. 31, 33 (Bankr.D.Haw.1984). 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) doesn’t explicitly require that petitions be filed in good faith, much less address whether a petition may be filed in order to avoid posting an appeal bond. Under these circumstances, I agree with the experienced members of the BAP: the debtor could reasonably have believed that the petition was warranted by law or a good faith argument for the modification or reversal of existing law. Cf. Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir.1990) (even though BAP had already adversely decided the issue, the BAP decision’s “binding effect is so uncertain that it cannot be the basis for sanctioning a party for seeking a contrary result in a district where the underlying issue has never been resolved”). Thus, I am unable to conclude that at the time of filing debtor’s petition was frivolous, even though we now hold that it was filed for a purpose inconsistent with congressional intent. Therefore, I believe we are constrained to hold, as the BAP did, that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in sanctioning the debtor. Accordingly, I would affirm the BAP’s reversal of the sanctions.2
I do not mean to suggest that lack of authority on point always precludes sanctions. However, when courts are construing equitable limitations not explicitly delineated in the Bankruptcy Code, courts should be wary of imposing sanctions when the law is not well-developed.

. At one point, the bankruptcy court suggested that once it dismissed the case for “bad faith,” it must impose sanctions. The bankruptcy court relied on dicta in In re Chisum, 847 F.2d 597, *832599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892, 109 S.Ct. 228, 102 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988), which stated: "If the bankruptcy court determines as a factual matter that a debtor’s successive filings were not proposed in good faith, the court must impose sanctions under Bankr.R. 9011.” The BAP, however, correctly rejected this reasoning, observing that the term "bad faith” in Chisum "must be read as a shorthand expression for the failure to comply with the Rule 9011 standards and not as a reference to the test for the dismissal of bankruptcy petitions.” See also In re Villa Madrid, 110 B.R. 919, 922 (9th Cir. BAP 1990). In other words, a dismissal for "bad faith” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) does not automatically lead to Rule 9011 sanctions. In re Southern Cal. Sound Sys., Inc., 69 B.R. 893, 901 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987).

. Of course, in light of our opinion settling this issue, any future petitions similar to the petition in this case would be sanctionable as frivolous.