Court Opinion

ID: 9558553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:12:11.954478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:23.705801
License: Public Domain

DUNFORD, District Judge
(dissenting).
I must dissent from that portion of the prevailing opinion which sustains the trial court’s determination of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
The rule that in a law case the appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s judgment unless the latter has mani*502festly disregarded determinative evidence, or that its conclusion in respect to such evidence is clearly against law» is unquestionably sound. But I think that the converse of the rule is equally sound, viz., that when the trial court’s judgment does disregard determinative evidence, or when its conclusions in respect to the evidence is clearly against law, the appellate court not only can, but should, make correction.
This case is somewhat unique in the respect that the defendants presented a theory based upon opinion evidence to the effect of the finding of the trial court and quoted in the prevailing opinion, while the plaintiff presented the theory of damages applied by this court to cases of trespass to growing crops. My disagreement with the prevailing opinion is fundamentally upon the applicable theory of damages when there is some evidence in the record to support each.
It is conceded in the prevailing opinion, as indeed it must be, that the finding
“that during the time the turkeys were off their normal feeding habits, they would have gained 2,050 pounds of weight necessarily was arrived at in a somewhat vague manner.”
The law requires a claimant to present in the trial of his cause the best evidence which the nature of the cause permits him to obtain and to present. Dubie v. Batani, 97 Mont. 468, 37 P. 2d 662; Landon v. Morehead, 34 Okl. 701, 126 P. 1027; Cushman Motor Works Co. v. Kelley, 70 Okl. 208, 173 P. 1042; School District No. 17, Rogers County v. Eaton, 97 Okl. 177, 223 P. 857; Shikany v. Salt Creek Tramp. Co., 48 Wyo. 190, 45 P. 2d 645. If the law requires presentation of the best and most convincing evidence of a fact, it seems to go without saying that the court should consider and apply that evidence which, in view of the whole record, is the most certain and convincing. Nor can I believe the rule of support of law judgments by the appellate court, excuses this court from applying the best *503evidence contained within the record, even though by doing so, it may reverse a cause and order a new trial, or the entry of judgment according to its conclusions upon the evidence, as the case may require.
To my mind, the court in this case was bound under Naylor v. Floor, 51 Utah 382, 170 P. 971, and Spencer V. J. W. Summerhays & Sons, 74 Utah 473, 280 P. 720, and upon the record made upon trial, to apply the rule of comparison between similar crops, similarly produced, upon similar lands and similarly marketed, less the cost saved by the tort of the defendants, because, in my judgment, the best evidence in the record supports that theory, and establishes the fallacy of the opinions of the experts that plaintiff’s turkeys should have, and thus did, recover their lost weight and lost condition (except for 2,050 pounds of weight), prior to marketing.
The court has before it, duly presented and received, all of the “manifest sheets” upon turkeys processed at the Nephi processing plant during the season in which plaintiff’s turkeys were marketed. It has before it in numerous instances, also, the description of the kind of turkeys, the ages of the turkeys, the kind of environment in which they were raised, the kind and amount of feed supplied, and the description of the manner of supplying water and care. These records contain the history of enough flocks without material variation from plaintiff’s flock in any of these particulars, which marketed higher in both weight and classification, to convince my mind that the results of defendants’ tort did in fact continue through, and affect the marketing, both as to weight and classification, and that acceptance of the testimony of experts against the facts so demonstrated, deprives the plaintiff of full restitution for the damage he suffered.
It would serve no proper public purpose for me to detail and apply the formulae which I used in following through the complications of a comparative analysis of the plain*504tiff’s flock with other similar flocks. It is sufficient, in order to indicate that the question is of enough financial importance to the parties to warrant this special dissent (if quantum is a consideration), to state that in applying the comparative formulae, it appears to me that plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $4,650.34 instead of the $550.00 awarded by the trial court and approved in the prevailing opinion.
CROCKETT, J., being disqualified, did not participate therein.
HENRIOD, J., did not participate.