Court Opinion

ID: 9623263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:30:39.717552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:13.937882
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the majority errs in focusing upon “the trial court’s ultimate disposition of the children,” (majority opinion, p. 270) rather than confining its analysis to the only reviewable order in this case. Moreover, even if the issue of “the trial court’s ultimate disposition of the children” were reviewable in this case, I nevertheless cannot agree with the majority’s resolution of that issue. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
In the final judgment and decree of divorce that was entered in this case, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that both parents were unfit and awarded custody to DFCS. That is the only order from which Ms. Watkins ever sought permission to file a discretionary appeal and it is the only order from which this Court ever authorized the filing of a notice of appeal. As the majority recognizes, a trial court has authority in a divorce case to award custody to a third party based upon a finding of parental unfitness, and the applicable statutes and case law are sufficient to put a litigant on notice that a superior court judge might exercise that authority. (Majority opinion, p. 272.) It follows that the judgment in this case should be affirmed.
However, the majority suggests that due process may require that a trial court give specific notice to the parents that it is considering an award of custody to a third party. Yet, the only impact of requiring such notice that is even suggested by the majority is the possibility that the parent would present evidence regarding the third party’s fitness to have custody. (Majority opinion, p. 273.) What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that the fitness of the third-party custodian is not even a factor in this case, since the third-party custodian is not a relative or other individual, but is DFCS. Here, it is only the fitness of the parents, not the fitness of the third-party custodian that is at issue. Furthermore, by presenting evidence that an award to him or her is in the child’s best interests, a parent necessarily presents evidence that any other party would not be the best possible custodian. Thus, the majority fails to show in what material way Ms. Watkins would have presented her case differently had she known that third-party custody was a possibility. Ms. Watkins’ concern was her own fitness to retain custody and, if she was shown to be unfit, she *275cannot retain custody by claiming that she is less unfit than a third-party custodian.
Therefore, Ms. Watkins’ due process rights were not violated when the trial court awarded custody to DFCS in the final divorce decree, which award was based upon a determination that both she and the father were unfit.
It was only after the notice of appeal from the final divorce decree had been filed by Ms. Watkins that the trial court entered its supplemental order addressing the issue of the children’s deprivation. Ms. Watkins did not seek and this Court did not grant a discretionary appeal from that supplemental order. Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s opening sentence, our grant of the application for discretionary appeal from the final divorce decree could not and did not mention the issue of deprivation, because neither the trial court nor the parties had raised the issue at the time.
In appealing from a final judgment, a complaining party may enumerate as error any other prior or contemporaneous rulings. Southeast Ceramics v. Klem, 246 Ga. 294, 295 (1) (271 SE2d 199) (1980). However, a party is not entitled to enumerate as error any and all other subsequent rulings in the case. Cates v. Cates, 225 Ga. 612, 613 (2) (170 SE2d 416) (1969); Hester v. Human, 211 Ga. App. 351, 352 (1) (439 SE2d 50) (1993); Costanzo v. Jones, 200 Ga. App. 806, 811 (3) (409 SE2d 686) (1991). This Court does not consider judgments if rendered subsequent to the only judgment appealed from. Lowe v. Watson, 228 Ga. 393 (1) (185 SE2d 774) (1971); Graham v. Haley, 224 Ga. 498 (4) (162 SE2d 346) (1968); Hester v. Human, supra; Costanzo v. Jones, supra. Issues which are not encompassed within the final order from which an appeal has been taken, but only in a subsequent order, may not be raised on that appeal, but may be raised only pursuant to a subsequently filed notice of appeal. Hester v. Human, supra; Costanzo v. Jones, supra. The proper filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court. Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995); McFarren v. State, 210 Ga. App. 889, 892 (4) (437 SE2d 869) (1993). Accordingly, in my opinion, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the trial court’s supplemental order or its finding therein of deprivation.
However, even assuming that this Court did have such jurisdiction, I believe that the court should vacate the supplemental order rather than reverse it for the reason set forth in the majority opinion. Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-46, a notice of appeal, with payment of costs, “serves as a supersedeas of the judgment (unless supersedeas bond be required), and ‘while on appeal, the trial court is without authority to modify such judgment.’ [Cits.]” Cohran v. Carlin, 249 Ga. 510, 512 (291 SE2d 538) (1982). Thus, in another case involving *276the issue of child custody, we held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to supplement a previously entered final judgment after a notice of appeal had been filed. Jackson v. Martin, 225 Ga. 170, 172 (2) (b) (167 SE2d 135) (1969). See also Allied Productions v. Peterson, 233 Ga. 266, 267 (211 SE2d 123) (1974); Deans v. Dain Mgmt., 201 Ga. App. 466, 468 (411 SE2d 354) (1991). These principles apply equally to this case. “The filing of an application for appeal shall act as a supersedeas to the extent that a notice of appeal acts as supersedeas.” OCGA § 5-6-35 (h); In the Interest of A. R. B., 209 Ga. App. 324 (1) (433 SE2d 411) (1993). Therefore, in my opinion, the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the supplemental order and, rather than reversing on the merits, I would vacate that order for this procedural error.
Decided February 19, 1996.
Bonnie L. Loffredo, Vicky O. Kimbrell, Lisa J. Krisher, Phyllis J. Holmen, Wendy J. Glasbrenner, for appellant.
James T. Irvin, for appellee.
In summary, it is my opinion that the final judgment and decree of divorce should be affirmed and the supplemental order and the issue of deprivation should not be addressed. Even if this Court had jurisdiction to address both the final divorce decree and the supplemental order, the former should be affirmed on the merits and the latter vacated because the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue it.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham joins in this dissent.