Court Opinion

ID: 9897369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:43.390422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.655933
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    Jun 14 2023, 9:17 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Brian R. DeHem                                             Mark J. Crandley
DeHem Law, LLC                                             Barnes & Thornburg LLP
Noblesville, Indiana                                       Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR INDIANA SHERIFF’S
ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE
Tonya J. Bond
Josh S. Tatum
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

The Clinton County Sheriff’s                               June 14, 2023
Office and Sheriff Richard Kelly,                          Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants,                                                22A-PL-2640
                                                           Appeal from the Tippecanoe
        v.                                                 Circuit Court
                                                           The Honorable Sean M. Persin,
The Board of Commissioners of                              Judge
Clinton County and the County                              Trial Court Cause No.
Council of Clinton County,                                 79C01-2104-PL-35
Appellees.

                                 Opinion by Judge Brown
                            Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                            Page 1 of 23
      Brown, Judge.

[1]   The Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Richard Kelly (together,

      “Appellants”) appeal from the trial court’s declaratory judgement. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History

[2]   On January 1, 2019, Richard Kelly began his term as the Sheriff of Clinton

      County. Sheriff Kelly appointed his spouse, Ashley Kelly, as the jail matron

      and as the manager of the jail commissary for the Sheriff’s Office. 1 Sheriff

      Kelly also appointed a legal deputy to serve the Sheriff’s Office.

[3]   The Indiana State Board of Accounts (“SBOA”) and the Indiana State Police

      (“ISP”) investigated the use of the commissary fund. In March 2021, the Board

      of Commissioners of Clinton County (the “Board”) filed a complaint for

      emergency preliminary injunctive relief requesting an order prohibiting Sheriff

      Kelly from expending further money from the commissary fund. In April 2021,

      an amended complaint was filed adding, as plaintiff, the County Council of

      Clinton County (the “Council,” and the Board and Council, together,

      “Appellees”). The court issued an order on June 14, 2021, denying Appellees’

      request for a preliminary injunction. The order noted “there is an ongoing

      investigation by the [ISP] into the alleged unauthorized control over

      commissary funds at the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office,” “there is a pending

      1
        Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5 provides “[e]ach sheriff shall appoint a prison matron for the county” and “[t]he
      prison matron or the prison matron’s assistants shall receive, search, and care for all female prisoners and all
      boys under fourteen (14) years of age who are committed to or detained in the county jail, municipal lockup,
      or other detention center in the county.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                   Page 2 of 23
      investigation with the [ISBA],” and Appellants “appear to be cooperating with

      the pending investigations.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 130-131.

[4]   On June 25, 2021, Appellants filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment

      requesting that the trial court make the following determinations: (A) Ind. Code

      §§ 36-2-2-2, 36-1-3-5(a)(2), and 36-8-10-21 2 allow elected officers, including

      Sheriff Kelly, to execute their own contracts subject to their budgets; (B) Ind.

      Code § 36-8-10-10.6 provides that Sheriff Kelly is entitled to appoint a legal

      deputy, neither the Board nor the Council approve the contract for the legal

      deputy, and the Council must appropriate a reasonable amount to pay the legal

      deputy; (C) Ind. Code § 36-8-10-21 provides for the commissary fund and

      neither the Board nor the Council approve contracts for personnel regarding the

      commissary, including contracts for commissary manager; (D) Sheriff Kelly did

      not unlawfully pay legal fees from the commissary fund when there was a

      resolution in place for him to pay expenses for contracting with professional

      consultants; and (E) Sheriff Kelly was entitled to pay for legal fees from the

      commissary for the defense of this and other actions challenging the operation

      of the fund. The counterclaim alleged no contract needed approval by

      Appellees given that no public funds were used to pay the commissary

      2
        Ind. Code § 36-2-2-2 provides: “The three (3) member board of commissioners of a county elected under
      this chapter is the county executive. In the name of ‘The Board of Commissioners of the County of ____’ the
      executive shall transact the business of the county.” Ind. Code § 36-1-3-5(a) provides: “Except as provided in
      subsection (b), a unit may exercise any power it has to the extent that the power: (1) is not expressly denied
      by the Indiana Constitution or by statute; and (2) is not expressly granted to another entity.” Ind. Code § 36-
      8-10-21 relates to a jail commissary.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                 Page 3 of 23
      manager. In October 2021, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss their complaint,

      and the court granted the motion.

[5]   Appellants and Appellees filed motions for summary judgment. In their

      motion, Appellants stated they filed the declaratory judgment action to prevent

      the interference of the Board and Council in the operations of the Sheriff’s

      Office. In her affidavit, Ashley stated that she served as the jail matron as an

      employee of the Sheriff’s Office, she also provided services as the commissary

      manager which was a contractor position, and her compensation as

      commissary manager was based on sales. She stated “Sheriff Kelly provided a

      contract for my services as Commissary Manager to the County Attorney,” the

      Board never took any action on that contract, “[t]he financial terms of that

      agreement mirrored that of the previous Commissary Managers,” and, after the

      SBOA “found the lack of a written contract for the Commissary Manager

      improper, Sheriff Kelly and I executed a retroactive contract for commissary

      services.” 3 Id. at 191. She further stated the Council refused to appropriate

      3
          A “Commissary Services Contract” dated November 12, 2021, following Ashley’s affidavit provided:

                 THIS CONTRACT made and entered into between the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office . . .
                 and Leonne, LLC and/or Ashley Kelly . . . (Leonne, LLC and Ashley Kelly shall be
                 collectively referred to as “Contractor”).
                                                              *****
                 Leonne LLC is a company created on November 27, 2018 and originally owned by Sheriff
                 Kelly and Ashley Kelly. Sheriff Kelly has since relinquished any ownership in Leonne LLC.
                                                              *****
                 2. Compensation. Contractor and the Sheriff shall jointly approve prices for commissary
                 items, an up-to-date list of which shall be kept at all times in the Sheriff’s Office. Contractor
                 shall be paid one-half (1/2) of the profit margin of each commissary item sold as calculated by

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                     Page 4 of 23
      funds to pay the legal deputy in 2021, when Sheriff Kelly sought to have

      funding added to his budget to pay his legal deputy in 2022, the Council refused

      to do so, and as a result his 2022 budget contains no funds for the legal deputy’s

      compensation. Ashley also stated that, during a public meeting in December

      2021, members of the Board stated they were going to fire her as matron

      because of an alleged violation of a nepotism ordinance. Appellants designated

      Council Resolution 2017-05 dated May 9, 2017, which allowed commissary

      funds to be used for expenses for contracting with professional consultants and

      Council Resolution 2021-01 dated April 13, 2021, rescinding Council

      Resolution 2017-05.

[6]   The designated evidence also includes a report issued by the SBOA regarding

      the use of the commissary funds for the period between January 1, 2019, and

      September 30, 2021. The SBOA’s report states:

              Checks were issued from the CCSO [Clinton County Sheriff’s Office]
              jail commissary funds totaling $190,916.61 to Leonne[4] and
              $32,967.92 to Ashley Kelly from January 1, 2019 to September 30,
              2021, for 50 percent of commissary profit on merchandise sales, with
              the remaining 50 percent of the profit being retained in the jail

              the Sheriff after deducting supplier’s invoices. The other one-half (1/2) of the profit margin
              shall be deposited by the Sheriff in the Clinton County Jail commissary fund.
      Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 194-195.
      4
        The report states “Leonne is an Indiana based limited liability corporation established on November 27,
      2018, which was approximately two months prior to Sheriff Richard Kelly taking office” and “Leonne is
      owned and operated by its two members, Richard Kelly and Ashley Kelly.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume
      II at 205. It also states: “Richard Kelly and Ashley Kelly have a 49 percent and 51 percent ownership
      interest, respectively, in Leonne.” Id. at 206.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                 Page 5 of 23
        commissary fund for use by the Sheriff in accordance with Indiana
        Code 36-8-10-21(d). . . .

        Supporting documentation for the above checks were “invoices”
        printed by the CCSO Records Clerk that detailed commissary profit
        on merchandise sold, and contained handwritten notes made by the
        Records Clerk that calculated 50 percent of that profit amount. This
        calculated amount was paid to either Leonne or Ashley Kelly.

Id. at 205. The report further provided that, in order to substantiate the

payments, the SBOA requested Ashley to provide a contract for commissary

services; Ashley provided a copy of a contract between Nancy Ward and Sheriff

Jeffrey Ward, dated November 6, 2017, to which Ashley was not a party; on

March 2, 2021, an unsigned contract was presented to the Clinton County

attorney which referenced the Sheriff’s Office and Ashley as the parties; and as

of September 30, 2021, the proposed contract had not been signed. The report

stated Ashley served as the jail matron, she and Sheriff Kelly were paid from

the county general fund, “the associated compensation for the Sheriff and

Matron positions were included in the County’s salary ordinances, which were

approved by the County Council,” and “none of the compensation paid to

Ashley Kelly via Leonne, or to Ashley Kelly from the commissary fund, was

included in the County’s salary ordinance or in any labor contract authorized

by the County Council.” Id. The report stated “it is our audit position that any

payments for commissary manager services provided by Leonne or Ashley

Kelly should have been supported by signed written contracts.” Id. at 206.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023        Page 6 of 23
[7]   In their summary judgment motion, Appellees argued that the Board as the

      county executive is the only entity in county government allowed to enter into

      contracts and that there are financial limits to the sheriff’s ability to contract

      and pay for a legal deputy. In their amended brief in support of their motion,

      Appellees argued “all payments to Leonne LLC for commissary services should

      have been memorialized and supported by signed written contracts.”

      Appellants’ Appendix Volume III at 55. Appellees further stated that

      “[Appellants] assert that the Council must appropriate a ‘reasonable amount’ to

      pay for the Sheriff’s legal deputy,” “[Appellees] do not disagree with this

      assertion,” and “[t]he issue being, what amount is reasonable?” Id. at 58. They

      stated that, “[f]rom the dates of December 19, 2018 through December 7, 2021,

      [Appellants] have paid a total of $65,769.19 in legal fees for a legal deputy per

      the attached invoices . . . .” Id. at 58-59.

[8]   On March 31, 2022, the trial court held a hearing. On July 7, 2022, the court

      entered an order finding “[t]he Sheriff and Commissary Manager created

      Leonne LLC to receive profits from the sale of commissary items,” “[t]he

      Commissary Manager was a 51% member, and the Sheriff was a 49% member,

      in Leonne LLC,” “[t]he agreements to hire and pay the Commissary Manager

      and/or deposit profits into Leonne LLC were not submitted to the County for

      approval,” and “[c]onversely, the former Commissary Manager, Nancy Ward,

      wife of former Sheriff Jeff Ward, signed annual contracts with the County,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023           Page 7 of 23
along with conflict of interest disclosures.” 5 Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at

20. It also found “[m]any legal disputes have arisen between the Sheriff and the

County during Sheriff Kelly’s tenure” and, “[w]hen the Sheriff sought increased

funding from the County for legal deputy services in 2022, the Council denied

the request.” Id. at 21. The order also stated:

           1. The Court declines to enter declaratory relief regarding the
           Sheriff’s authority to appoint a Legal Deputy of his choosing or
           whether the Council must appropriate a reasonable amount to pay
           the Legal Deputy. The County has oversight over contracts with the
           Sheriffs’ Legal Deputy that might encumber the county general fund.

                                                   *****

           2. It was not unlawful for the Sheriff to appoint his wife as the Jail
           Matron because Indiana law specifically allows the wife of the Sheriff
           to serve as a Jail Matron, as an exception to the nepotism statutes.

                                                   *****

           3. The Court declines to enter declaratory relief on the broad
           question of whether elected officers can execute their own contracts
           subject to their budgets.

5
    The order also stated:

           [C]hecks issued to Leonne LLC and the Commissary Manager totaled $113,610.07 in 2020.
           This was a significant increase from prior years, primarily due to the Commissary Manager’s
           decision to sell electronic smoking devices to jail inmates. The County later enacted an
           ordinance banning the use of electronic smoking devices in all county buildings, including the
           jail. On October 8, 2021, the Montgomery Superior Court #l concluded that the County
           exceeded its authority by enacting the ordinance because the County cannot restrict the
           Sheriff’s authority to sell electronic smoking devices and nicotine pouches to jail inmates. See
           54D01-2103-PL-257. The County has appealed this decision to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 20. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. See Brewer v. Clinton
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 22A-CP-117, (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2023), trans. pending.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                    Page 8 of 23
                                                      *****

               4. Indiana Code § 36-8-10-21 provides for the Sheriff’s commissary
               fund, and the County must approve contracts regarding the
               distribution of profits from the commissary fund.

                                                      *****

               5. During the period of time when Council Resolution 2017-05 was
               in place, it was not unlawful for the Sheriff to pay legal fees from the
               commissary fund for legal work of the Sheriff’s Office, without
               approval of the County.

                                                      *****

               6. During the period of time when Council Resolution 2017-05 was
               NOT in place, the Sheriff was still entitled to pay for legal fees from
               the Sheriff’s commissary fund for all matters related to expenses of
               operating the commissary, without approval of the County.[6]

      Id. at 21-22, 24, 27.

[9]   Appellants filed a motion to correct error, and the court held a hearing at which

      it stated “what you were seeking in declaratory relief is that the sheriff has the

      authority to enter any contracts, as long as it’s within the confines of the budget

      we can contract for anything,” “I’m not prepared to say that,” “[s]o, what you

      [were] specifically requesting is too broad and so I just said you know what I’m

      not going to say that,” “I do not disagree with you that the sheriff certainly can

      6
       The court found that reasonable attorney fees related to operating the commissary included fees related to
      addressing “whether County has authority to ban e-cigarettes and nicotine pouches (regardless of the
      outcome of the appeal)” and “good faith legal disputes involving I.C. § 36-8-10-21 (even if the Court does not
      adopt the Sheriff’s position).” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 27.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                 Page 9 of 23
       enter some contracts,” and “I don’t think anyone would dispute that.”

       Transcript Volume II at 40. The court entered an order stating that it “made

       some references to ‘the County,’ instead of ‘the Board of Commissioners of

       Clinton County’ or ‘the County Council of Clinton County,’ when it was

       unnecessary to define the role of each department” and clarifying that its

       reference to “the County” in its “Decision No. 4” was a reference to “the

       county fiscal body” or the Council. Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 37.

       The order also stated the court made no determination regarding any criminal

       activity. 7

       Discussion

[10]   Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material

       fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mangold ex

       rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001).

       We may affirm on any grounds supported by the Trial Rule 56 materials. Catt

       v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 2002). A trial court’s grant

       of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity. Lowrey v. SCI

       Funeral Servs., Inc., 163 N.E.3d 857, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. The

       fact the parties make cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our

       standard of review. Sterling Commercial Credit-Mich., LLC v. Hammert’s Iron

       Works, Inc., 998 N.E.2d 752, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We review the court’s

       7
        Criminal charges were filed in March 2022 against Richard Kelly under cause number 12C01-2203-F6-253
       and Ashley Kelly under cause number 12C01-2203-F6-254.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                        Page 10 of 23
       ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Speedway

       SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied.

[11]   Indiana’s declaratory judgment statute provides that “[c]ourts of record within

       their respective jurisdictions have the power to declare rights, status, and other

       legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed,” “[t]he

       declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect,” and “[t]he

       declaration has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.” Ind. Code §

       34-14-1-1. “The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or

       decree where the judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not

       terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Ind.

       Code § 34-14-1-6. “The use of a declaratory judgment is discretionary with the

       court; therefore, a trial court’s decision to allow a declaratory judgment to

       proceed is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Est. of

       Morris ex rel. Morris, 966 N.E.2d 681, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citations

       omitted), trans. denied.

[12]   Appellants argue that Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10.6(e) “expressly and unequivocally

       authorizes Sheriff Kelly to appoint a legal deputy without the oversight or

       approval of the county executive or county fiscal body” and the Board “has no

       authority to determine the terms of that appointment.” Appellant’s Brief at 15.

       They argue Ind. Code § 36-8-10-21 establishes a commissary fund from which

       the sheriff may disburse funds without appropriation or approval by the county

       fiscal body. They argue the payments to Ashley and Leonne were

       compensation for services rendered, the payments were properly classified as

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023        Page 11 of 23
       expenses, “both during and prior to Sheriff Kelly’s term of office, the

       Commissary Manager’s compensation was based upon a 50/50 split of the Jail

       Commissary profit margin—similar to a commission-based wage,” “[t]he

       method of calculating an expense does not change an expense payment’s

       classification into a distribution of profits,” and even if the payments “could be

       classified as a disbursement of profits,” the legislature “did not categorize any

       such payments differently from any other disbursement of funds permitted by

       the statute.” Id. at 24-26. Appellants request this Court to remand with

       instructions to enter declarations that: Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10.6(e) grants the

       Clinton County Sheriff sole authority to appoint a legal deputy and to

       determine all terms and conditions of the legal deputy’s employment; the

       Clinton County Sheriff is authorized to execute contracts on behalf of the

       Clinton County Sheriff’s Office; the Clinton County Sheriff is authorized to

       negotiate and execute a contract to retain a commissary manager as a personnel

       expense related to operation of the commissary; and the funds disbursed to

       Ashley via Leonne for her services as commissary manager were “expenses of

       operating the commissary, including, but not limited to, facilities and

       personnel” as provided in Ind. Code § 36-8-10-21(d)(2). Id. at 27.

[13]   The Indiana Sheriffs’ Association, as amicus curiae, 8 argues the trial court erred

       in finding the Board has oversight over contracts with the legal deputy that

       might encumber the county general fund and in finding the Sheriff is not

       8
           Counsel Tonya Bond for the Indiana Sheriff’s Association was the legal deputy appointed by Sheriff Kelly.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                Page 12 of 23
       authorized to disburse profits from the commissary without county oversight.

       It argues “[t]he trial court’s rule would allow commissioners to control sheriffs’

       contractual decision-making” and “[a]llowing commissioners to interfere with

       sheriffs’ fulfilling their duties in this way—to hijack the decision-making

       process—effectively hands the keys to the jail over to the commissioners.”

       Indiana Sheriffs’ Association’s Brief of Amicus Curiae at 15. It argues sheriffs,

       not councils or commissioners, have authority to enter contracts with legal

       deputies. It asserts: “If the trial court is correct, commissioners would oversee

       selecting their sheriffs’ legal counsel. As this case illustrates, commissioners

       and sheriffs sometimes find themselves on the opposite sides of litigation,

       making that role inappropriate and unethical.” Id. at 20-21. It also argues

       sheriffs, not councils or commissioners, have authority to enter contracts with

       commissary vendors. It contends the court “relied heavily on its own

       distinction between ‘expenses’ and ‘profits’” and “nothing indicates that the

       expense of managing the commissary cannot be calculated as a commission of

       the revenues after subtracting all other expenses.” Id. at 22-24.

[14]   Appellees maintain “[t]he Sheriff and the Amicus treat this case as addressing

       the abstract question of whether Indiana sheriffs may unilaterally enter

       contracts that bind Indiana counties,” “this is not an issue for this appeal,” and

       “[t]he trial court expressly declined to enter a declaratory judgment deciding

       whether or not the Sheriff needed approval to enter contracts.” Appellees’ Brief

       at 19-20. They argue the Sheriff has the power to appoint its counsel but not to

       approve the contract for payment of that counsel through county funds. They

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023         Page 13 of 23
       assert the plain language of Ind. Code § 36-8-10-21 places limits on how a

       sheriff may use commissary funds, lists several ways a sheriff may use

       commissary funds, and provides the funds may be used for another purpose that

       is mutually agreed upon by the sheriff and the county fiscal body. They

       contend “[t]he Sheriff cannot fit the payments to Leonne into the category for

       ‘expenses’” and therefore needed the Council’s approval for those payments.

       Id. at 32. They argue Sheriff Kelly “claims these payments are akin to a

       contingency fee or an arms-length business contract that have a profit baked

       into them,” “[t]here is no arms-length contract that might support the Sheriff’s

       argument but only a deal between the Sheriff and a business . . . he owns with

       his wife,” “[i]n this context, the ‘contract’ does not accurately reflect actual

       ‘expenses’ of running the commissary but pays out ‘profits’ above the amounts

       amount [sic] of expenses,” and “[t]he statute’s ‘expenses’ limitation would have

       no meaning if it could be avoided by creating a new entity and treating

       payments to that entity as ‘expenses.’” Id. at 38-39.

[15]   When interpreting a statute, we begin by reading its words in their plain and

       ordinary meaning, taking into account the structure of the statute as a whole.

       Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023) (citation omitted).

       Mindful of what the statute says and what it does not say, we aim to avoid

       interpretations that depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to

       irrational and disharmonizing results. Id. (citation omitted). Rather, we

       presume the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a

       logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and goals. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023         Page 14 of 23
       (quotation and citation omitted). Ultimately, our goal is to determine and give

       effect to the legislature’s intent. Id.

[16]   With respect to the trial court’s findings regarding the distributions from the

       commissary fund, Ind. Code § 36-8-10-21 provides:

               (a) This section applies to any county that has a jail commissary that
               sells merchandise to inmates.

               (b) A jail commissary fund is established, referred to in this section
               as “the fund”. The fund is separate from the general fund, and
               money in the fund does not revert to the general fund.

               (c) The sheriff, or the sheriff’s designee, shall deposit all money from
               commissary sales into the fund, which the sheriff or the sheriff’s
               designee shall keep in a depository designated under IC 5-13-8.

               (d) The sheriff, or the sheriff’s designee, at the sheriff’s or the
               sheriff’s designee’s discretion and without appropriation by the
               county fiscal body, may disburse money from the fund for:

                        (1) merchandise for resale to inmates through the
                        commissary;

                        (2) expenses of operating the commissary, including, but not
                        limited to, facilities and personnel;

                        (3) special training in law enforcement for employees of the
                        sheriff’s department;

                        (4) equipment installed in the county jail;

                        (5) equipment, including vehicles and computers, computer
                        software, communication devices, office machinery and
                        furnishings, cameras and photographic equipment, animals,
                        animal training, holding and feeding equipment and supplies,
                        or attire used by an employee of the sheriff’s department in the
                        course of the employee’s official duties;
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023             Page 15 of 23
                        (6) an activity provided to maintain order and discipline
                        among the inmates of the county jail;

                        (7) an activity or program of the sheriff’s department intended
                        to reduce or prevent occurrences of criminal activity, including
                        the following:

                                 (A) Substance abuse.
                                 (B) Child abuse.
                                 (C) Domestic violence.
                                 (D) Drinking and driving.
                                 (E) Juvenile delinquency;

                        (8) expenses related to the establishment, operation, or
                        maintenance of the sex and violent offender registry web site
                        under IC 36-2-13-5.5; or

                        (9) any other purpose that benefits the sheriff’s department that
                        is mutually agreed upon by the county fiscal body and the
                        county sheriff.

               Money disbursed from the fund under this subsection must be
               supplemental or in addition to, rather than a replacement for, regular
               appropriations made to carry out the purposes listed in subdivisions
               (1) through (8).

               (e) The sheriff shall maintain a record of the fund’s receipts and
               disbursements. The state board of accounts shall prescribe the form
               for this record. The sheriff shall semiannually provide a copy of this
               record of receipts and disbursements to the county fiscal body. The
               semiannual reports are due on July 1 and December 31 of each year.

[17]   According to the statute, Sheriff Kelly was able to disburse money from the

       commissary fund for certain specified purposes which included “expenses of

       operating the commissary, including . . . personnel.” Ind. Code § 36-8-10-

       21(d)(2). He was also able to disburse money from the fund for “any other

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023            Page 16 of 23
       purpose that benefits the sheriff’s department,” but a disbursement for such

       “other purpose” was required to be “mutually agreed upon by the county fiscal

       body and the county sheriff.” Ind. Code § 36-8-10-21(d)(9).

[18]   The trial court found:

               There is at least some authority to support the Sheriff’s position that
               he can enter into some contracts regarding the disbursement of
               commissary funds without approval of the County. See Alexander v.
               Marion County Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“The
               parties do not dispute that . . . the Sheriff has the authority, and in
               fact, the duty, to enter into contracts” regarding telephone services
               for jail inmates.)[, reh’g denied, trans. denied.] It is undisputed that he
               has the authority to pay wages for services related to operating the
               commissary.

               However, it is a giant leap to contend that he may lawfully distribute
               over $100,000.00 per year to himself and his wife through a private
               entity, without County approval, because all of these funds are
               personnel “expenses” necessary to operate the commissary. I.C. §
               36-8-10-21(d)(2). . . .

               The powers of the Sheriff are established by statute. The Court
               declares that personnel expenses necessary to operate the commissary
               include wages or specific financial outlays necessary to procure
               certain services. Profits, by their very nature, are amounts exceeding
               expenses, and I.C. § 36-8-10-21(d)(2) does not provide authority to
               disburse profits without County oversight. Therefore, I.C. 36 § 26-8-
               10-21(d)(9) [sic] controls. The Sheriff may disburse profits of the
               commissary fund, but only as mutually agreed with the County,
               which is consistent with the practice of the prior Sheriff.

               Furthermore, it is important to note that the Sheriff is a 49% member
               of Leonne LLC, but he has delegated the work associated with the
               commissary fund to the Commissary Manager. The argument that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023             Page 17 of 23
               commissary funds are paid to him as an “expense of operating the
               commissary” is not persuasive.

       Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 26-27.

[19]   The designated SBOA’s report provided that checks were issued from the

       commissary “totaling $190,916.61 to Leonne and $32,967.92 to Ashley Kelly

       from January 1, 2019 to September 30, 2021, for 50 percent of commissary

       profit on merchandise sales,” that supporting documentation “detailed

       commissary profit on merchandise sold, and contained handwritten notes made

       by the Records Clerk that calculated 50 percent of that profit amount,” and

       “[t]his calculated amount was paid to either Leonne or Ashley Kelly.” Id. at

       205. The November 12, 2021 “Commissary Services Contract,” which referred

       to “Leonne, LLC and Ashley Kelly,” collectively, as “Contractor,” provided:

       “Compensation. . . . Contractor shall be paid one-half (1/2) of the profit

       margin of each commissary item sold as calculated by the Sheriff after

       deducting supplier’s invoices. The other one-half (1/2) of the profit margin

       shall be deposited by the Sheriff in the Clinton County Jail commissary fund.”

       Id. at 194-195. Moreover, the SBOA report provided that Richard Kelly had a

       forty-nine percent ownership interest in Leonne and Ashley Kelly had a fifty-

       one percent ownership interest, which supports the conclusion the

       disbursements were not for services rendered or operating expenses. Under the

       circumstances, we are not persuaded that the disbursements to Leonne and

       Ashley constituted “expenses of operating the commissary” under Ind. Code §

       36-8-10-21(d)(2). We find no error in this regard.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023        Page 18 of 23
[20]   To the extent Appellants requested the trial court to make the determination

       that elected officers including Sheriff Kelly are allowed to execute their own

       contracts subject to their budgets, the trial court stated that requests for

       declaratory relief “must be limited to specific cases and controversies to avoid

       unintended consequences and judicial overreach” and “decline[d] the invitation

       to answer this broad question of law.” Id. at 24. Appellees maintain “[t]he trial

       court opted . . . to construe and apply the statutes governing the particular

       matters at issue—the jail commissary and the appointment of a legal deputy”

       and the court’s decision complied with the principles that the courts will not

       address constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary and decide cases only

       on the facts of the particular case. Appellees’ Brief at 20-21 (citing Snyder v.

       King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011) (“First, it is a cardinal principle of the

       judicial function that we will pass upon the constitutionality of a coordinate

       branch’s action only when it is absolutely necessary to do so. . . . A second

       cardinal principle of the judicial function is that courts should not issue

       advisory opinions but instead should decide cases only on the specific facts of

       the particular case and not on hypothetical situations.”) (citations omitted)).

       We agree the trial court was not required to enter the broad declaratory

       judgment requested by Appellants. We find no error in this respect.

[21]   As for the appointment of a legal deputy, Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10.6(e) provides:

               The sheriff may also appoint one (1) legal deputy, who must be a
               member of the Indiana bar. The legal deputy does not have police
               powers. The legal deputy may continue to practice law. However,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023          Page 19 of 23
               neither the legal deputy nor any attorney in partnership with the legal
               deputy may represent a defendant in a criminal case.

       Additionally, Ind. Code § 36-2-3.5-3 provides: “The board of commissioners

       elected under IC 36-2-2 is the county executive. The county council elected

       under IC 36-2-3 is the county legislative body as well as the county fiscal body.”

       Ind. Code § 36-2-3.5-4(a) provides “[a]ll powers and duties of the county that

       are executive or administrative in nature shall be exercised or performed by its

       executive, except to the extent that these powers and duties are expressly

       assigned to other elected officers,” and Ind. Code § 36-2-3.5-4(b) provides the

       executive shall, among other things, submit an annual budget to the legislative

       body; supervise the collection of revenues and control all disbursements and

       expenditures, and prepare a complete account of all expenditures, to the extent

       these matters are not expressly assigned to other elected officers; and negotiate

       contracts for the county.

[22]   As for the legal deputy the trial court found:

               The County does not dispute that Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10.6
               expressly authorizes the Sheriff to “appoint” a Legal Deputy of his
               choosing. The County does not dispute that the Council must
               appropriate a reasonable amount to pay the Legal Deputy. Since
               there are no controversies on these issues, the Court does not grant
               declaratory relief.

                                                       *****

               The Court finds that agreeing upon a reasonable rate for attorney’s
               fees is an inherent part of the process of appointing a Legal
               Deputy. If this issue was left to the County, particularly during a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023        Page 20 of 23
               time of frequent intra-governmental disputes, it could significantly
               limit the Sheriff’s ability to freely appoint a Legal Deputy of his
               choosing.

               Having said that, the Legislature did not confer unrestrained
               authority for the Sheriff to otherwise “contract with” a Legal
               Deputy on all terms the Sheriff “considers appropriate.” This is
               language our Legislature has used in other areas of local
               government. For example, a Town Clerk-Treasurer has
               contracting authority for legal services under Ind. Code § 36-5-6-8,
               as follows:

                        A clerk-treasurer may hire or contract with competent
                        attorneys or legal research assistants on terms the clerk-
                        treasurer considers appropriate.

               Generally, when the Legislature uses particular language in one
               section, but omits it in another, we presume it is intentional. J.B.
               v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 61 N.E.3d 308, 312 (Ind. Ct. App.
               2016). We presume the Legislature authorized the Sheriff to select
               his Legal Deputy, but did not authorize the Sheriff to sign
               contracts with the Legal Deputy regarding retainers, promises to
               pay for services beyond any appropriated amount, or other terms
               that might encumber the county general fund.

               Meanwhile, the Commissioners have the power to “transact the
               business of the county.” I.C. 36-2-2-2. This includes executing
               contracts on behalf of the County. Local 1963 of the UAW v.
               Madison County, 999 N.E.2d 949, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)[, trans.
               denied]. Accordingly, the Court declares that the County, not the
               Sheriff, has oversight over contracts with the Legal Deputy that
               might encumber the county general fund.

       Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 21-22.

[23]   We agree that Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10.6 provides that the sheriff may appoint a

       legal deputy and that the Council and Board do not have the authority to reject
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023             Page 21 of 23
       the sheriff’s selected legal deputy. Also, we find the court’s determination that

       agreeing upon a reasonable rate for the legal deputy’s fees is an inherent part of

       the appointment is reasonable and consistent with effectuating the intent of Ind.

       Code § 36-8-10-10.6. The court’s limited determination seeks to avoid

       rendering superfluous the language in the foregoing statutes.9 We do not

       disturb the trial court’s limited determinations under these circumstances. 10

[24]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court. 11

[25]   Affirmed.

       9
         To the extent the trial court stated the Sheriff does not have unlimited authority to enter an agreement with
       the legal deputy where the contract might encumber the county general fund, we clarify that the Sheriff may
       enter an agreement with a legal deputy, and if the Council does not provide some allocation for the
       agreement, or the Sheriff does not believe the allocation is reasonable, the Sheriff may initiate a mandate
       action. See Brown v. State ex rel. Brune, 172 Ind. App. 31, 36, 359 N.E.2d 608, 611 (1977) (“The legislative
       intent appears to command the council to make some allocation, and therefore mandate would be
       appropriate if the council refused to allocate any funds. However, the necessity of the funds and the amount
       of allocation is within the discretion of [the] council and mandate will [lie only] for a clear abuse of the
       discretion.”), reh’g denied.
       10
          Appellants cite Loc. 1963 of United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Madison Cnty.,
       999 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, Alexander v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct.
       App. 2008), reh’g denied, trans. denied, and Lake Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners v. Martinez, 199 N.E.3d 366 (Ind. Ct.
       App. 2022), trans. denied. In UAW, this Court found the commissioners and council, by entering into a
       collective bargaining agreement, exceeded their authority and encumbered the right of the elected recorder
       and assessor to appoint and discharge their deputies and employees. 999 N.E.2d at 958-959. In Alexander,
       we noted the sheriff was charged with the care of prisoners in the county jail, that to carry out this function
       the Sheriff must provide a safe and secure manner for jail inmates to make phone calls, and that the parties
       did not dispute “that implicit in this charge is that the Sheriff has the authority, and in fact, the duty, to enter
       into contracts to carry out this function.” 891 N.E.2d at 93. In Martinez, we held that a sheriff had the
       authority to enter into a contract for the purpose of providing medical services to inmates so long as the funds
       were within the sheriff’s approved budget. 199 N.E.3d at 368-373. We cannot say that UAW, Alexander, or
       Martinez dictate that the trial court was required to enter the declaratory judgment requested by Appellants.
       11
         We express no opinion as to any criminal actions or Appellants’ ability to recover attorney fees in this or
       other actions involving the Council or Board.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023                                    Page 22 of 23
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2640 | June 14, 2023   Page 23 of 23