Court Opinion

ID: 9676770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:32:37.528843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:51.078832
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
A study of Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing has led us to believe we were in error in holding that the $1,500 recovery for five months remaining on the contract for personal services was within the category for which appellee was entitled to a claim for attorneys’ fees for personal services rendered under Article 2226 V.A.T.S. in bringing suit upon the claim for $1,500.
*798Statutes authorizing recovery of attorneys’ fees are penal in character and are to be strictly construed. Van Zandt et ux. v. Fort Worth Press et al., Tex., 359 S.W.2d 893.
When the above named article is construed strictly, the $1,500 constituted a recovery for personal services not rendered rather than personal services rendered. The statute says for “personal services rendered” (emphases ours).
The Supreme Court through Chief Justice Calvert in the case last above cited said:
“Perhaps every successful litigant should be permitted to recover his attorney fees from the opposite party. But whether that policy would be wise is for the Legislature, not the courts, to decide. Apparently the Legislature has not thought it wise. But however that may be, the Legislature has not authorized a recovery of-attorney fees in suits on claims such as that involved in this case.”
Under a strict construction of the statute here involved we believe we have to say that the Legislature has not authorized recovery of attorney fees in a suit on a claim such as the $1,500 item here under consideration. We still believe we are correct in holding that the $452.82 item would come within the statute. The personal services rendered was that of a commercial manager. The commissions, regardless of the individual who sold the advertising that made possible the commissions, constituted income from appellee’s personal services rendered as commercial manager. Appellants’ pleading denied they owed appellee anything, so the suit had to be filed and prosecuted in order to recover. Because of the aggressive manner in which it was contested and all the cross actions appellee had to overcome in order to recover, we believe an attorneys’ fee of half that recovery was reasonable.
Therefore, the case is reversed and remanded unless within seven days from the date of this announcement Ralph D. Cercy files a remittitur of $273.59 in addition to the remittitur heretofore filed. In the event such remittitur is filed, the judgment of the trial court will be reformed to conform with the above conclusion and as reformed, affirmed.