Court Opinion

ID: 9480086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:37:46.873504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:28.603096
License: Public Domain

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
It is clear that the sentencing judge did not comply with the command of Rule 32(c)(3)(D). Because factual inaccuracies in the presentence report (PSR) were alleged, the sentencing judge was under a duty to resolve that allegation or make a determination that the controverted matter will not be taken into account in the sentencing. She did not do so. In addition, the rule requires that a written record of the aforesaid findings and determinations be appended to, and accompany, any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau of Prisons or the Parole Commission. The sentencing judge neglected to follow this requirement of the rule as well.
We took this case en banc to consider what to do about such acknowledged errors. The panel decided that the case should be remanded to the sentencing judge to insure compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(D), that is to hold a hearing to resolve the disputed matter, or to determine that such matter was not considered in the sentencing decision and to append its findings and deliberations to the copy of the PSR transmitted to the Bureau of Prisons or the Parole Commission.
It must be emphasized that the en banc court was convened only to consider the proper procedure on remand if the sentencing court determines it did not consider the disputed matter at the time of the original sentence. No one denies that if the sentencing court finds the disputed matter was considered, or should be considered, in fixing the sentence, a formal resentencing hearing will be required. This appeal, then, is based upon the assumption that the sentencing court will determine that it did not consider the disputed matter when it fixed the original sentence of the defendant. Under such circumstances, the panel held that the sentencing court, on remand, may make a written determination at that time that it did not consider the disputed matter when it fixed the original sentence, and append a copy of such determination to the PSR made available to the prison parole officials. No formal resentencing of the defendant would be necessary; his presence would not be required.
The en banc opinion rejects the practical interpretation of the rule recommended by the panel. And it does so for reasons that I find to be singularly unconvincing.
The majority panel asserts that strict compliance with the Rule is required. I have no reluctance in accepting strict compliance with the rule. But I note that there is no explicit language foreclosing compliance after the sentencing hearing has occurred. The argument based upon the single word “will” as requiring contemporaneous compliance is, in my view, a strained reading that serves no purpose. As is clear from the assumptions that govern this appeal, the controverted matter will not, did not, and cannot be considered by the trial judge.
The majority also concedes that a failure to append a copy of the findings and declarations made by the sentencing judge for use by the prison officials is purely ministerial. Such ministerial errors are properly corrected by order of the sentencing judge without formal resentencing. I regard the subsequent declaration by a panel that it did not consider controverted matter as similarly ministerial.
At the bottom of the majority’s reasoning is the apparent belief that the court that makes a post-sentence finding that it did not consider disputed matter in the PSR is in fact resentencing the defendant. To resentence a defendant without his presence under such circumstances is to deny his right of allocution.
I simply cannot accept the premise of the majority’s argument. The defendant, by hypothesis, will receive the same sentence. It will be based upon the same factors considered by the sentencing court at the *1519time of the original sentence. The only-new action by the sentencing court upon remand will be to note what it did not consider and to record that fact for the prison officials. I do not regard this negative action as the equivalent of resentenc-ing.
The interest of the defendant in this case is clear. He wants a second chance to persuade the judge that his sentence is excessive. But the interest of the government is equally clear. It believes the original sentence was proper and that any procedural or ministerial errors can be corrected without incurring the “practical difficulties such as the cost of transportation and the risk of flight” in bringing the defendant back to court. I believe the government has the stronger case and should prevail, absent some showing of prejudice to the defendant. None is made here.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court and “remand in order to insure compliance with Rule 32” as interpreted by the panel.