Court Opinion

ID: 9790548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:54:48.27433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.129295
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.,
dissenting.
I do not agree that, under the circumstances in this case, the action by the employe of the treatment facility which lead to discovery of the gun in defendant’s purse was state *402action comprehended by Article 1, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. However, because I disagree with the second conclusion of the majority that the “official action” constituted an unreasonable search, I need not further address the first error of the majority. Assuming then, for the purposes of discussion, that the action complained of was “state action,” I conclude it was not unreasonable, as that concept is used in State v. Newman, 292 Or 216, 637 P2d 143 (1981), cert den 457 US 1111 (1982).
The majority, after reciting the holdings and some of the reasoning of certain cases involving searches incident to “civil hold” detention of intoxicated persons, concludes that the search was unreasonable. See State v. Perry, 298 Or 21, 688 P2d 827 (1984); State v. Newman, supra; State v. Keyes, 61 Or App 434, 657 P2d 724 (1983); State v. Lawrence, 58 Or App 423, 648 P2d 1332, rev den 293 Or 801 (1982). The majority rationale, based on its assessment of the evidence, is reflected in this passage:
“* * * ‘[A] person is entitled to a greater expectation of privacy in a civil hold situation than he is in a criminal case.’ State v. Perry, supra, 298 Or at 28. Here, there was no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion before the search that defendant had committed any crime. A search of a civil hold detainee is reasonable only if it is necessary to effectuate the purpose of ORS 426.460 to protect the intoxicated person. State v. Lawrence, supra, 58 Or App at 430. Although the search of defendant’s purse was consonant with defendant’s civil hold status, that is, it was for treatment purposes, it was not necessary to accomplish that purpose. There was no emergency. Nothing in defendant’s symptoms suggested that she needed treatment beyond detention. Moreover, there was no evidence that defendant was unwilling or unable to answer questions concerning other drugs that she might have been using. Assuming that there may be circumstances in which it would be necessary to search a detainee’s purse for treatment purposes, the circumstances were not present here. A contrary result would be inconsistent with the greater expectation of privacy associated with the civil hold status. The search here was unnecessary and, therefore, unreasonable. * * *” 82 Or App at 401. (Brackets theirs.)
In analyzing the circumstances of the “official action” in this case to determine its reasonableness, a few salient facts must be recalled. The police officers who initially *403took defendant into protective custody had transported her to a treatment facility and had left her there by the time the search took place. There were no police officers involved in the search. The night supervisor of the treatment facility conducted the search. When a person is brought to a treatment facility by the police pursuant to ORS 426.460, the director of the treatment facility and the staff have certain responsibilities:
“The director of the treatment facility shall determine whether a person shall be admitted as a patient, or referred to another treatment facility or denied referral or admission. If the person is incapacitated or the health of the person appears to be in immediate danger, or if the director has reasonable cause to believe the person is dangerous to self or to any other person, the person must be admitted. The person shall be discharged within 48 hours unless the person has applied for voluntary admission to the treatment facility.” ORS 426.460(2).
Under that statute, the facility’s staff must make a number of medically related decisions. The first is whether the person should be admitted. That requires an assessment of the person’s condition to determine if the police officers’ initial conclusion is correct and if the person needs some type of treatment that the facility offers. Defendant was admitted to the facility by the night supervisor. As the trial court found:
“Intake supervisor at Hooper, observing defendant’s emotional behavior, testified that alcohol might explain that behavior and felt it advisable to observe the defendant and release her if no farther problems developed.”
The court held that the civil hold was not illegal, and defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
Second, the staff must decide if the person should be referred to another treatment facility. That requires a medical assessment of the person’s conditions and a preliminary diagnosis. The night intake supervisor testified that at the time of admission, there is a itemization of all the person’s possessions “in case any client should state that they came in with a considerable amount of money we want to verify that.” He also said he checked to see if the person had any drugs.
“* * * [T]hat is merely for the basis of we want to make sure that there is no health reason. Maybe alcohol and some *404pills mixed could be very fatal, and, if so, we want to send them to a hospital so they can be monitored closer.”
It is clear that the examination of the person’s possessions is for two reasonable purposes: one, the inventory function to protect the property of the person who is detained and, two, the necessity to have information to make a required medical diagnosis. It is also clear that the search was not a criminal investigation masquerading as an inventory or medical investigation. The officer who brought defendant to the treatment facility testified that he had left her there and was unaware that the facility would conduct any type of search.
The circumstances of this case are different vis-a-vis the reasonableness of the search in State v. Newman, supra, and State v. Lawrence, supra. In those cases the police officers took the defendants into custody under ORS 426.460 and conducted the searches before the persons were taken to a treatment facility. In each case the court held that the necessities of getting the person to a treatment facility did not reasonably justify the extensive search that produced the incriminating evidence. When a police officer is faced with the necessity of taking a person into custody pursuant to ORS 426.460, he has a limited function: to get the person to the treatment facility. He has no authority or obligation to make a determination of the person’s condition beyond that dictated by ORS 426.260(1). A search designed to assist in other types of determinations is simply not a relevant action by the police officer in the absence of some emergency which requires an immediate search.
The majority’s response to the state’s argument that the search was necessary to make a proper assessment of defendant’s condition and to make a determination of the appropriate course of action is:
«* * * There was no emergency. Nothing in defendant’s symptoms suggested that she needed treatment beyond detention. Moreover, there was no evidence that defendant was unwilling or unable to answer questions concerning other drugs that she might have been using. * * *” 82 Or App at 401.
The fact that there was no emergency, which I take to mean that the defendant was not convulsing in extremis on the floor, perhaps is relevant in analyzing a search by a police officer before he brings a person to the treatment facility. *405However, the staff of the facility is required to make a series of medical decisions and should not be limited in the search for relevant information by being able to respond only to an emergency.1 It also may be true that nothing in this record suggest to the majority that defendant needed treatment beyond detention. I, like the majority, may feel somewhat confident in making that assessment at this juncture in the proceedings. However, I, like the majority, do not have the training, experience or responsibility to make that decision under the circumstances that exist when a person is brought to the treatment facility. The facility staff is faced with the responsiblity for making a responsible decision as to what needs to be done. A responsible and competent approach would reasonably include acquiring all the relevant information available. As the supervisor testified, it was important to determine if the person might have ingested drugs with alcohol because some combinations could be “very fatal.” Faced with that ominous potential, a search of the places a person would ordinarily carry drugs is not unreasonable. The facility staff member was not searching for evidence of a crime but was carrying out an assigned responsibility. It would not have been responsible for the staff to perform its duties in the fashion that this court’s opinion dictates.
The majority notes, perhaps with tongue in cheek, that there is no evidence that defendant was unwilling or unable to answer questions about possible drug use. The evidence was that she was quite uncooperative with the police officers. Presumably, she was the same with the staff at the facility. The trial court included in its recitation of facts that defendant was exhibiting emotional behavior which the intake supervisor concluded could be attributed to alcohol. A patient who seeks medical advice from her physician may be candid about drug use and cooperative in disclosing such information; however, a person exhibiting signs of intoxication who is brought involuntarily to the facility by the police may not exhibit the same degree of cooperation. It is reasonable for the treatment facility staff not to depend on the intake interview as the sole means of getting relevant and *406important drug use information. That is so as a general proposition and in this particular situation.
The majority takes some refuge in a statement from State v. Perry, supra, that
“* * * a person is entitled to a greater expectation of privacy in a civil hold situation than he is in a criminal case. * * *” 298 Or at 28.
That statement, phrased in terms of degrees, offers little assistance in analyzing a search, other than to suggest that the reasons for an intrusion into a privacy enclave must be closely scrutinized in a civil hold situation. It also may indicate that the same reasons that justify a search in a criminal arrest situation are not readily transferrable to a noncriminal detention. Perry, however, does indicate that a limited inventory of the property of a person detained under ORS 426.460 is appropriate. In Perry, the police opened a closed suitcase taken into custody with the intoxicated defendant, who was detained on a civil hold. The court noted that, as it held in State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 510 P2d 568 (1973), the necessities of inventory do not allow opening a closed suitcase in a criminal arrest. It follows, the court concluded, that the closed suitcase could not be opened in the process of a civil hold inventory. The majority in this case does not suggest that defendant’s purse is a “closed container” in the same category as the suitcase involved in Perry. I do not read Perry as saying that the treatment facility, in compliance with the property caretaking function associated with a treatment related detention, could not look into defendant’s purse to determine the type of property that she had for safekeeping. A purse serves a function similar to the pockets in clothing for carrying valuables, currency and medications. The responsibilities of the facility to safeguard the property of a detainee and to collect information for the necessary medical decisions justified the incursion into defendant’s purse. The pistol which was the basis of the criminal charge was discovered during this necessary and reasonable search. The trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence of the search was correct and the conviction should be affirmed. The majority disagrees, which leaves me with a dissenting view.
Warden, Van Hoomissen and Rossman, JJ., join in this dissent.

 A person convulsing on the floor of the facility from drug and alcohol overdose may happily cry: “Give me liberty and give me death.”