Court Opinion

ID: 9863069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:03:05.567723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:48.569663
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court and agree this cause should be remanded to the court of appeals to conduct another harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2). I write separately to reexamine our holding in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), in which this Court provided guidance as to how such harm anal-yses should be conducted.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2), the harmless error rule, is the Texas statutory equivalent of the harmless error rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), for addressing constitutional errors. Rule 81(b)(2) requires the reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction where the record below reveals error in the proceedings “unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.”
“As noted, Rule 81(b)2) mandates that the appellate court focus upon the error and determine whether it contributed to the conviction or the punishment. Irrespective of the focus of the inquiry, it is impossible to gauge the significance of the error apart from the remaining properly admitted evidence. This approach obviously implicates a review of the evidence, but the concern is solely to trace the impact of the error.” Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 585-586.
Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has established a coherent and consistent standard to determine whether or not an error is harmless. Logically, the best standard is the overwhelming evidence standard. That is, if the record shows overwhelming evidence of guilt (disregarding erroneously admitted evidence, if any) then any error is, by definition, harmless. The Supreme Court utilized the overwhelming evidence standard in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972). Yet, as pointed out by the majority in Harris, supra, at 586, the Supreme Court did not follow the overwhelming evidence standard in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). The Supreme Court, in effect, held that harmless error had to be measured on a case-by-case basis, rather than by reference to a formula or precise rule, and reiterated its holding in Chapman that “the question, however, is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the State has proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 258-59, 108 S.Ct. at 1798, citing Chapman, *314386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828.1
In my opinion, an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the record shows there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the finding of guilt or the assessment of punishment. If the record shows the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that no rational trier of fact would have voted for a verdict other than one of guilty, or, in the case of error affecting punishment, would have answered the punishment issues differently, then the no reasonable possibility standard is met. This standard assures that a criminal conviction in Texas will not be reversed for minor procedural trial errors where there is absolutely no question as to the defendant’s guilt. At the same time, this strict standard will assure that any criminal trial in Texas will be an essentially fair trial.2 After all, the purpose of the harmless error rule is to avoid setting aside convictions for errors that have little, if any, likelihood of having affected the result of the trial, because the reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-23, 87 S.Ct. at 827.
I disagree with the Harris majority’s assertion that “a reviewing court, in applying the harmless error rule should not focus upon the propriety of the outcome of the trial. Instead, an appellate court should be concerned with the integrity of the process leading to the conviction.” Harris, supra, at 587. It is my opinion that both are equally important. A procedurally perfect trial resulting in an unjust conviction is just as constitutionally disturbing as a trial with substantive procedural errors, regardless of its outcome. Rule 81(b)(2) was formulated to strike a balance between those who strive for “procedural perfection” and those who strive for the “right result” regardless of the procedural rights of the accused.3
Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court to conduct a second harmless error analysis employing the standard delineated above.
With these comments I join the opinion of the Court.

. A review of Satterwhite, which involved Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 error affecting punishment, shows that a reversal would have been mandated under the overwhelming evidence standard. " ‘Sufficient evidence' is not overwhelming evidence." See Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 259-60, 108 S.Ct. at 1799.

. So-called "structural errors” would still have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, with the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt being but one factor to be taken into account in determining if a structural error is harmless.

.In Harris, this Court, unwisely in my opinion, held that, in determining whether a particular error is harmless, a reviewing court should determine whether declaring that error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. Harris, supra, at 587. If the error is truly harmless, it makes little sense to punish the people of Texas by rewarding the appellant with a reversal of his conviction. Prosecutors who repeatedly and intentionally disregard the law are subject to discipline under the State Bar Rules, as well as by the courts under their powers of contempt.