Court Opinion

ID: 9627035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:31:32.651807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:38.493897
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in affirming the judgment adverse to the contentions of the plaintiffs. In doing so I call attention to the fact that these plaintiffs signed a “Request For Driveway” which contained, inter alia, a request that the County Commissioners, acting for the Special Improvement District, include their property; and further, that they agree to pay the amount of the special assessment and waive any right to protest against it. This, I think, deprives plaintiffs of any standing to raise due process of law questions as to them in regard to notice and opportunity to be heard.
About the pertinent statutes, I desire to make the following observations: The provision for notice, hearing and opportunity to protest may be entirely meaningless unless the protest could prove effective under proper circumstances. How this *399could be accomplished is not spelled out. The protest seems to be limited to the questions whether the owner’s property will be benefited and whether the assessment constitutes more than his proper share of the total cost. The act only authorizes the Commission to eliminate property not properly included, or to decrease an assessment, and then provides that the Commission, “shall direct that proceedings for the making of the improvement and levy of the assessments be continued.”1 But there is no express provision for the discontinuance of the project, no matter how many or how valid the objections that may be voiced. It therefore appears to me that under the literal wording of the statute, it would be possible for the County Commissioners to arbitrarily create districts to make improvements, imposing the expense thereof upon taxpayers and their property, even though the same might be entirely impractical and might be opposed by the great majority of taxpayers in the district. Thus the right to protest would be an empty privilege if the project is to go forward in any event.
It may be argued that the Commission’s duty to discontinue the project is fairly implied from the language in Section 14 that, “the board of county commissioners shall * * * hear all objections to the creation of the proposed district.” But this is not stated, nor is there any indication as to what proportion of the taxpayers would have to object. To give these taxpayers an opportunity to effectively voice their will and protect their rights, the statute should provide for an election, or at least that in the event a majority of the taxpayers objected, the project should not go forward.2 Further, the purported limitations as to when suits may be brought are unreasonable and undoubtedly would be held invalid. These matters' are pointed out because I have qualms as to the propriety of proceedings which could be taken under a literal application of these statutes and apprehension that the court’s opinion might be construed as giving approval thereto. However, in view of the waivers signed and filed in the instant case, I think it is not necessary to adjudicate the point here. As to other points raised by the plaintiff, I am in accord with their treatment in the main opinion.

. Sec. 17-7-14, U.C.A.1953 — Supplement.

. Cf. Bigler v. Greenwood, 123 Utah 60, 254 P.2d 843.