Court Opinion

ID: 9957391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:03:12.93693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:18.111645
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GULF AVIATION SERVICES                       )
GROUP WLL D/B/A UNITED                       )
AVIATION,                                    )
                                             )
         Plaintiff-Counterclaim              )
         Defendant,                          )
                                             )
         v.                                  )       C.A. No. N20C-05-128 AML CCLD
                                             )
WILMINGTON TRUST                             )
COMPANY,                                     )
                                             )
         Defendant-Counterclaim              )
         Plaintiff.                          )

                              Submitted: February 22, 2024
                              Decided:   April 3, 2024

                                          ORDER1

    1.   Pending before this Court is a Petition to Establish and Enforce a Charging

Lien filed by Lupkin PLLC (“Lupkin”). On December 29, 2023, the Court issued

its Post-Trial Memorandum Opinion resolving the parties’ claims.2 On February 2,

2024, the Court entered a final order and judgment in favor of Gulf Aviation in the

amount of $3,195,967.40 and post-judgment interest in the amount of $919.39/day.3

1
  Sitting as a Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware by special designation of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV § 13(2).
2
  Gulf Aviation Servs. Group WLL v. Wilmington Trust Co., 2023 WL 9118772 (Del. Super. Dec.
29, 2023).
3
  D.I. 173.
    2.   On February 13, 2024, Lupkin filed its Petition to Establish and Enforce a

Charging Lien (the “Petition”). The Petition seeks a lien in the amount of 10% of

Gulf Aviation’s recovery to satisfy unpaid contingency fees in connection with

Lupkin’s representation of Gulf Aviation between March 4, 2020 and June 2, 2021.4

Lupkin alleged that Gulf retained the firm to provide pre-litigation and litigation

services regarding Gulf’s dispute with Wilmington Trust. The Petition also averred

that Gulf entered into a hybrid fee agreement with Lupkin under which Gulf paid a

reduced hourly rate for Lupkin’s services and agreed to pay a 10% contingency fee

for any judgment obtained as a result of Lupkin’s services.5 After Gulf terminated

Lupkin on June 2, 2021, it paid the outstanding hourly fees but not the contingency

fee, which Lupkin contends is now due.6

    3.   On February 16, 2024, Gulf Aviation responded to the Petition, asserting

numerous defenses, including that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

decide the Petition because the dispute is subject to binding arbitration and because

Lupkin cannot recover contingency fees from a judgment that its representation did

not directly secure.7 Lupkin did not respond to any of these arguments.

4
  D.I. 175.
5
  Id.
6
  Id.
7
  D.I. 176.
                                          2
    4.   On February 22, 2024, Wilmington Trust Company responded to the Petition,

stating that it had transmitted the funds in satisfaction of the judgment and took no

position on the Petition. Wilmington Trust asked to be excused from any further

proceedings.8

    5.   Having considered the Parties’ submissions and the applicable authorities, it

is evident that the Petition must be refused for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

When the arbitrability of a claim is disputed, the court first must determine whether

the arbitration provision is broad or narrow, after which the court applies the relevant

provision to determine if the claim falls within the scope of the parties’ agreement

to arbitrate.9 Where the provision is narrow, the dispute must directly relate to the

contractual right that is subject to arbitration.10

    6.   Here, Lupkin’s engagement letter provided that “[i]f a fee dispute arises in the

future, it is agreed that [client] and the Firm have consented in advance to submit

any such dispute to binding fee arbitration under Part 137 of the Rules of the Chief

Administrator.”11

    7.   Because this arbitration provision only concerns fee disputes, and not any

dispute concerning Lupkin’s representation, it is a narrow provision. Lupkin’s

8
  D.I. 177.
9
  Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Internet, Inc. 817 A.2d 149, 155 (Del. 2002).
10
   Id.
11
   Pltf’s Opposition to Petition Ex. A at 2 (emphasis in original).
                                               3
Petition, however, directly relates to a fee dispute because the parties disagree as to

whether Lupkin is entitled to recover contingency fees from a judgment obtained

after Gulf Aviation terminated Lupkin’s representation.12 Because the parties agreed

to arbitrate any fee dispute, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition and the

matter must be submitted to arbitration.

                                                      IT IS SO ORDERED

                                                      /s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
                                                      Hon. Abigail M. LeGrow

12
  Even if this Court had jurisdiction over the Petition, a charging lien would be inappropriate to
secure unpaid contingency fees where the law firm’s representation did not directly secure the
judgment. Katten Muchin Roseman LLP v. Sutherland, 153 A.3d 722, 727 (Del. 2017) (“In the
case of hourly billing, unlike with a contingency fee, the total amount that the client is required to
pay her lawyer is not based on the client's recovery.”) (emphasis added).
                                                  4