Court Opinion

ID: 9891271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 21:03:52.012889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:27.284097
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/17/23 P. v. McKandes CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B323020

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                                      A378904)

 BERNARD McKANDES,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shelly B. Torrealba, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
      Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Bernard McKandes (defendant)
appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6 (former Penal Code section 1170.95). The
trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show
cause, concluding on the basis of a probation report and
preliminary hearing testimony that defendant had not
established a prima facie case for relief. We consider whether
this was error.

                         I. BACKGROUND
       A.    The Underlying Offense
       In 1984, McKandes was charged in a two-count information
with murdering and robbing Carl Diggs (Diggs) and personally
using a shotgun in the commission of the crimes.
       The record reflects that, prior to the entry of judgment, the
trial court denied a motion to withdraw a plea. It also reflects
defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and admitted to
the charged personal use of a firearm enhancement. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 17 years to life in prison.

      B.     The Petition for Resentencing
             1.    The parties’ submissions
       In January 2019, defendant filed a form petition under
section 1172.6 asserting he was entitled to relief under the
statute. Defendant checked boxes asserting an information was
filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, he pled guilty or no contest to
first or second degree murder in lieu of going to trial because he

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believed he could have been convicted under one of those theories,
and he could not be convicted of the offense under current law.1
      The trial court initially denied defendant’s petition without
appointing counsel for him. In a prior opinion, we reversed that
order and remanded with directions for the trial court to appoint
counsel for defendant and thereafter proceed consistent with
section 1172.6.
      The trial court appointed counsel for defendant on remand
and the People responded to defendant’s petition, arguing he was
not entitled to relief because he was Diggs’ actual killer. The
People relied on defendant’s probation report and a portion of the
preliminary hearing transcript to establish the facts of the
offense.
      As pertinent here, the probation report recited the
following as the elements and relevant circumstances of the
present offense: “On March 2, 1982 at approximately 8:00 p.m.,
the defendant and a female companion accosted the victim as he
exited his car in front of 8319 South Hoover Street. After a brief
conversation, the female pushed the victim, causing him to fall to
the ground. As the victim attempted to regain his feet, the
defendant pulled a weapon from inside of his jacket and shot
him.”
      The portion of the preliminary hearing transcript that the
People submitted contained testimony from a single witness—a
“Miss Gabriel.” She testified she saw two people, a male and a
female walk up to Diggs and start talking to him. Miss Gabriel

1
      McKandes also checked other boxes to indicate he was
convicted at trial, and that his conviction was for first-degree
felony murder. Neither assertion is supported by the record.

                                 3
testified the female made a quick movement and Diggs fell down.
Diggs began to get up, and the male fired a gun at him. Miss
Gabriel did not make a positive identification of defendant when
initially presented with a lineup card because she was afraid for
her life. On a later date, she positively identified defendant as
the shooter. The record before us does not contain any other
portions of the preliminary hearing transcript.

             2.    The trial court’s decision
       The trial court held a hearing on the issue of whether
defendant had made a prima facie case for relief. When offered
the opportunity to be heard, defendant’s counsel submitted on the
petition. The trial court indicated it was going to deny the
petition and later read its ruling into the record at a subsequent
hearing.
       The court’s decision indicated the court had reviewed the
information, the probation report, the judgment, a portion of the
preliminary hearing transcript containing testimony from a
witness to the crime, and the opinion in the prior appeal. The
court stated defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and
admitted the allegation that he personally used a firearm to be
true. The court stated the record of conviction established
defendant was the victim’s actual killer, and thus, defendant
could be found guilty of second degree murder under current law.

                         II. DISCUSSION
      The trial court erred by denying defendant’s petition
without issuing an order to show cause. Defendant’s petition
asserted he was eligible for resentencing and the record of
conviction does not conclusively establish otherwise. The

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probation report was not part of the record of conviction and was
not a proper basis to establish ineligibility at the prima facie
stage. Defendant’s admission to personal use of a firearm did not
constitute an admission that he was the actual killer. And
reliance on a portion of the preliminary hearing transcript was
not permitted at the prima facie stage because there is no
evidence in the record demonstrating defendant stipulated to the
preliminary hearing testimony as the factual basis for his plea to
second degree murder.

       A.    Section 1172.6
       Under section 1172.6, “person[s] convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter,” may file a petition to have that conviction
vacated under certain circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “After
the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefing[ ], the
court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a
prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the
court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to
make an order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully
setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

      B.     The Trial Court Erred in Summarily Denying the
             Petition
       “A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no

                                  5
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,
that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer . . . .” (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) In determining whether a
petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief, the court may
review the record of conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 971-972 & fn. 6.)
       The record of conviction allows the court “to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless. This is consistent with the statute’s overall purpose: to
ensure that . . . culpability is commensurate with a person’s
actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless petitions can
be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima facie review
process.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 971.) The prima facie
inquiry under section 1172.6 is limited and the bar for the
showing was “‘intentionally and correctly set very low.’” (Id. at
972.)
       The trial court consulted the information against
defendant, his probation report, the judgment, the submitted
portion of the preliminary hearing transcript, and the opinion in
defendant’s prior appeal. Relying on these sources, the trial court
found defendant had not made a prima facie case for relief
because the record of conviction established he was the sole
participant in the crime and the actual killer. This was error.
       “A probation report ‘ordinarily is not part of the record of
conviction.’” (People v. Soto (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 813, 816, fn. 2;
see also People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 179.) There is
no reason to consider the probation report in this case as part of
the record of conviction that the trial court could properly rely on,
and the Attorney General does not contend otherwise (arguing

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only that any error in considering the probation report was
harmless).
       Defendant’s admission that he personally used a firearm
also did not establish his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law.
A “finding of personal use . . . [does] not in itself prove [a]
defendant was the actual killer” or perpetrator. (People v. Jones
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120, italics added; see generally People
v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1007 [“‘Although the use of a
firearm connotes something more than a bare potential for use,
there need not be conduct which actually produces harm but only
conduct which produces a fear of harm or force by means or
display of a firearm in aiding the commission of one of the
specified felonies’”].)
       Finally, there is no indication in the record that defendant
stipulated the preliminary hearing transcript was the factual
basis for his plea. Where no such stipulation is present, reliance
upon facts taken from the preliminary hearing transcript is
“‘impermissible factfinding’ at the prima facie stage . . . .” (People
v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481-482 [“We reject
Davenport’s argument that the preliminary hearing transcript is
never part of the record of conviction. [Citation.] We agree,
however, that the trial court erred in considering facts from the
preliminary hearing transcript here because Davenport did not
stipulate to the transcript as a factual basis for his plea”]; see
also § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [placing limits on consideration of
preliminary hearing testimony even at a section 1172.6 hearing
following issuance of an order to show cause—which is not the
procedural posture here].)
       The Attorney General, however, argues the law in this area
is “unsettled” and cites People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th

                                   7
1154 for the proposition that it can be appropriate for a trial
court to rely on a preliminary hearing transcript in deciding
whether section 1172.6 is warranted.2 The observation, though,
does not grapple with the key question. It is not general reliance
on preliminary hearing transcripts that defendant challenges,
but rather the trial court’s reliance on the transcript in his case
where the record does not establish defendant admitted the
preliminary hearing transcript was the factual basis for his plea.
Nguyen does not aid the People on this point, as the record in
that case showed Nguyen’s attorney did stipulate the preliminary
hearing transcript and police reports provided the factual basis
for the defendant’s plea.
      Because the record of conviction does not conclusively
establish defendant was either the sole participant in the crime
or the actual killer, the trial court needed to first issue an order
to show cause and hold a hearing before determining whether
defendant is precluded from obtaining section 1172.6 relief.3

2
       The California Supreme Court has granted review in a case
to decide whether a trial court engaged in impermissible judicial
factfinding by relying on a preliminary hearing transcript to deny
the defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
(People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, rev. granted June
28, 2023, S279670.) Subject to further guidance from our
Supreme Court, we conclude reliance on the preliminary hearing
transcript in this case was impermissible.
3
       In light of our holding, we need not address defendant’s
claim that his attorney provided constitutionally defective
assistance by submitting on the written petition without any
additional argument.

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                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court with
directions to issue an order to show cause and to thereafter
proceed as required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                      BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

      MOOR, J.

      KIM, J.

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