Court Opinion

ID: 9852481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:31:11.071336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.463424
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting) — I do not agree with the reasoning of the majority, nor with the proposed dismissal of the case against appellant John Patrie. I would agree that the conviction cannot stand, and that a new trial should be granted. However, this is on the ground that the question of intent was not properly submitted for consideration by the jury.
The majority holds that, regardless of his intent, John Patrie committed no crime, because he signed a document which never became an “initiative petition,” as the latter is defined ad hoc, I think somewhat strangely and tortuously, by the majority. Presumably, the majority would find that a crime had been committed if Patric’s improper signature had escaped notice long enough and had actually been submitted to the Secretary of State by the League of Women Voters (the sponsoring group in this instance). Under this reasoning of the majority (which, as indicated, seems palpably fallacious to me), we would have a situation where the subsequent voluntary act of the League of Women Voters, completely beyond the control of the defendant, becomes the sole determining factor as to whether the previous act violated the statute. Among other things, this appears to me to violate or to be inconsistent with the accepted standard or operating legal principle that an act is either legal or illegal when done, and that if it is legal at the time it is committed it should not become illegal by the subsequent independent and unrelated acts of third parties. United States v. Fox (1877), 95 U. S. 670, *82624 L. Ed. 538. Conversely, neither should the intervening acts of a prosecutor legalize and make innocent an act which was illegal when it was committed.
Whether or not the petition involved herein is a “legal petition” for other purposes, it seems quite clear to me that the statute requiring the signing of the true name to the “petition” refers to the document actually available to the public for signature, and, moreover, refers to such document at the time it is signed by voters, or is available by their signatures. Essentially, it seems reasonably obvious and convincing to me that the statute is designed to deter persons from placing fraudulent signatures upon the sheet of paper or printed forms circulated for voter consideration and action. In other words, it just does not seem to me to make good common sense to say that the legislature was concerned only about violations of the prohibition involving those sheets which ultimately find their way to the Secretary of State. There would be no rational reason for such a limitation, as the act of signing is made illegal, not the consequence of it.
The state established every element of the crime required by the statute excepting only the element of intent. This was removed from the consideration of the jury by the following instruction, assigned as error by the defendant:
“It is not necessary for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or at all, that the defendant signed the initiative petition by the name of Hugo N. Frye with intent to defraud the State or any other person, if he did so sign his name, nor is it necessary that he knew such would be unlawful. It is sufficient in this regard that it be done purposely and wilfully and with knowledge that such was not his true name.”
The only issue then is whether the missing element in the state’s case — that of intent to defraud — is one necessary to the violation of RCW 29.79.440.
The distinctions between those criminal statutes which require the element of guilty intent and those which do not were developed in Seattle v. Gordon (1959), 54 Wn. (2d) 516, 342 P. (2d) 604, where we said:
*827“At common law, scienter was an element of every crime. When the common law was codified into the criminal statutes, there was a modification of the common-law rule relative to the element of intent, namely, in those criminal offenses regarded as acts mala prohibita scienter is not an element, while in those offenses designated as acts mala in se intent is an element.
“The distinction between those offenses which require scienter (acts mala in se) and those mala prohibita is that, in the latter group of cases, the legislature may properly say that (1) to require scienter to be proved would defeat the purpose of the act, and (2) the doing of the act itself imperils the public safety or welfare. . . .

it

“Whether the legislature intended scienter to be an element of a crime, when it is not specifically defined as an element, is a determination to be made by the courts.
The double requirement respecting an act malum pro-hibitum is merely a recognition of the necessity of balancing the requirements of the public interest against the individual injustice of punishing unintended violations of the law.
This statute does not meet the Gordon case requirements and must be interpreted as requiring the element of intent. The purpose of the act and the public interest thereby represented is two-fold. The ultimate goal is of course to insure that each qualified citizen is limited to one vote in the initiative process. The immediate purpose, however, is both to deter citizens from signing in an unlawful manner and to ease the burden ultimately placed upon the Secretary of State in checking the validity of signatures.
The major interests of the statute are not defeated by requiring the element of intent. The deterrence of citizens from making fraudulent signatures can only prevent wilful violations, and this is what the statute is designed to meet. The burden of the Secretary of State, while possibly lessened to some small degree by forcing the citizen to sign such a petition at his own risk, is not of such importance as to outweigh the interests of the individual who might, with no fraudulent intent, affix a signature not his “true *828name.” The statute fulfills its purpose when it reaches those citizens who sign the petition in an unlawful manner with the intent to perpetrate a voting fraud upon the people of Washington, either by being counted twice or by unduly hampering or confusing the initiative process.
While the conviction must be reversed upon this ground, I cannot concur with the majority in ordering dismissal of the case against Patrie. If he affixed the name of Hugo N. Frye to the petition with the intent to defraud or hamper the initiative process, this would constitute a violation of ROW 29.79.440. In my judgment a new trial should be ordered, and the case should be remanded for further proceedings in accord with the views expressed hereinbefore.
May 19, 1964. Petition for rehearing denied.