Court Opinion

ID: 9882314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 18:03:54.83804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:59.966936
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/5/23 In re S.B. CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re S.B. et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
 OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,                                              E080777

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. SWJ2200100)

 v.                                                                      OPINION

 I.E.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michael J. Rushton,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Marisa L.D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Irene A.E. (Mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court finding that she

possessed several firearms in violation of a restraining order. She argues that (1) the

court erred by admitting certain evidence and (2) the finding that she had firearms in her

immediate possession or control is not supported by substantial evidence. (Fam. Code,

§ 6322.5, subd. (a).) We affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

I. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition

       Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) received referrals

in late 2021 and early 2022 alleging that 10-year-old K.B. and 13-year-old S.B. were at

risk of abuse or neglect. Israel B. (Father) and Mother had joint legal custody of the

children, but Father had sole physical custody of them, and they had occasional weekend

visits with Mother. According to the referrals, Father and his former partner, Kimberly

A., fought frequently, Father was an alcoholic and drove the children while under the

influence, and S.B. had recently hit her head on a window sill during a fight with Father.

Mother disclosed prior domestic violence incidents with Father, and she said that she had

used methamphetamine and alcohol in the past but was currently sober.

       DPSS filed a petition alleging that S.B. and K.B. were persons described by

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). At the detention hearing

in March 2022, the court detained both children from Father, detained K.B. from Mother,

and placed S.B. in Mother’s home. DPSS placed K.B. with paternal aunt.

       At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in May 2022, the court found true

allegations that both parents had a history of substance abuse, Father engaged in acts of

                                              2
violence in the presence of the children, and both parents had a history of substantiated

child welfare referrals and had failed to benefit from previous services. The court

removed the children from the custody of both parents and ordered reunification services

for both parents. DPSS placed S.B. with K.B. in paternal aunt’s home.

II. Six-Month Review and Father’s Request for a Restraining Order

       In October 2022, Mother was arrested and charged with first degree burglary,

contempt of court, and violating a protective order. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 166, subd.

(c)(1), 273.6, subd. (a).) According to Father, Mother broke into his home and stole his

security cameras. The court in Mother’s criminal case issued a protective order

protecting Father from Mother.

       DPSS reported that Father had successfully completed most of his services. He

had progressed to unsupervised overnight visits with the children, and they were eager to

return to his care. DPSS recommended an extended 30-day visit with Father before

transitioning to placement in his home with family maintenance services.

       At the six-month review hearing in December 2022, the court authorized the

30-day visit with Father and continued the hearing. That same day, Father filed a request

for a restraining order protecting him and the children from Mother, so the court

addressed that request as well. Father’s papers stated that the criminal protective order

already in place protected him but not the children, Mother had recently been released

from custody, and Father hoped the children would soon be in his care. The court issued

a temporary restraining order protecting Father and the children. The court questioned

both parents under oath regarding firearms. Father stated that to his knowledge, Mother

                                             3
did not own, possess, or have access to firearms. Mother likewise stated that she did not

own, possess, or have access to firearms. The court informed Mother that as a restrained

party, she could not own or possess any firearms.

       In preparation for the continued review hearing, DPSS reported that the extended

visit with Father had gone well. Mother supported returning the children to Father’s care.

       The court continued reunification services for both parents at the continued review

hearing. The court also authorized the extended visit with Father to continue for another

30 days and gave DPSS the authority to place the children in his home with family

maintenance services.

       At the same hearing, the court granted Father’s request for a permanent restraining

order. The court again questioned Father under oath about Mother’s access to firearms,

and he again said that to his knowledge, Mother did not own, possess, or have access to

firearms. Mother was not present at the hearing. The court then asked whether anyone in

the audience had information on the topic, and paternal aunt responded. According to

paternal aunt, roughly one year earlier, Mother posted photos of firearms on Facebook.

The court stated that it had run a search on CLETS (California Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System), and there were no firearms registered to Mother. But in

light of the information from paternal aunt, the court set a hearing to determine whether

Mother had firearms within her “immediate possession or control.” (Fam. Code,

§ 6322.5, subd. (a).)

                                             4
III. Firearms Hearing

       The court held the firearms hearing several days later in January 2023. Paternal

aunt, Father, and Mother’s friend, John R., testified.

       A. Evidence at the Hearing

       Mother had a business called A. Cleaning Services.1 The business name was also

the name of Mother’s Instagram account. Paternal aunt did not follow Mother on

Instagram, but Kimberly, Father’s former partner, followed Mother. Kimberly and

paternal aunt were friends.

       Paternal aunt gave Father’s counsel copies of three screenshots reflecting posts on

Instagram. Two of the screenshots depicted posts from an account named

“_blanket_girl4” (blanket girl). Paternal aunt did not know whether the blanket girl

account belonged to Mother. One of the blanket girl posts depicted a flyer for a gun

show in San Bernardino. The second blanket girl post depicted firearms in the back of

Mother’s car; paternal aunt and Father both identified the car as belonging to Mother.

       The third screenshot depicted a post from the A. Cleaning Services account. That

post was the same photo of firearms in the back of Mother’s car that the blanket girl

account had posted. The caption on the A. Cleaning Services’ post stated, “My toys.”

       Paternal aunt saw the actual Instagram posts reflected in the screenshots, and the

screenshots showed the posts. Kimberly showed paternal aunt the posts and took all of

the screenshots. Paternal aunt and Kimberly worked together to write notes on the

1      The business name includes Mother’s first surname. We use the initial “A.” in
place of the surname to protect the anonymity of the children.

                                              5
screenshot exhibits. Their notes on each exhibit documented the dates of the posts.

Above the screenshot of the A. Cleaning Services post, they noted: “December 8,

2020—[Mother] posted the picture again this time labeling the Guns as ‘My toys.’”

       Paternal aunt also gave Father’s counsel screenshots of text messages about selling

guns. She could not explain how the text messages were connected to Mother, but

Kimberly could explain that. Kimberly gave paternal aunt those screenshots. Paternal

aunt saw only the screenshots and not the text messages themselves.

       John had known Mother for five to six years. They were friends and did not

currently have a romantic relationship, but they had talked about getting married after

Mother obtained a divorce. John helped Mother financially. He had recently spent

$4,000 to bail her out of jail in November 2022. John recognized the photo of the gun

show flyer posted by the blanket girl account—the photo depicted a display at his

workplace. He was not familiar with the blanket girl account and had never known

Mother to go by that social media handle. But he knew that the A. Cleaning Services

account belonged to Mother.

       John also recognized the photo of the firearms in the back of a car. He took the

photo and texted it to Mother. The firearms belonged to him and were registered to him,

and the photo showed them in the back of Mother’s car. The photo showed three

firearms, but he had at least 12 of them in the car. He borrowed Mother’s car to relocate

the firearms. He had a pickup truck, but he did not have room for the firearms in the cab,

and he wanted to transport them in a covered vehicle. John took the photo because

Mother was curious about what firearms he had. He still owned them and had a third

                                             6
party storing them in a secure location. That third party was a police officer, but he was

not a federal firearms licensee, and the firearms were not stored at a law enforcement

facility. John did not want to say who had the firearms because he did not want to get

that person “involved in this.” Mother was not with him when he relocated the firearms,

and she did not know where they were located. Mother did not currently possess the

firearms, she never had access to his firearms, and as far as he knew, she did not have any

firearms. He would never allow Mother to borrow one of his firearms. He did not know

why Mother would have referred to the firearms as her toys.

       B. Court’s Ruling

       After the close of evidence, Mother objected on hearsay grounds “to the evidence

that was submitted by father’s counsel.” She also argued that statements by paternal aunt

were double hearsay in that they were “based on statements of others,” including

Kimberly. She further objected on due process grounds because “the other person

mentioned” by paternal aunt did not testify and was not made available for cross-

examination. And she argued that the screenshots lacked authentication because

Kimberly provided them, Kimberly did not testify, and paternal aunt lacked personal

knowledge.

       The court admitted both screenshots of the blanket girl posts (the photo of the gun

show flyer and the photo of the guns in the back of the car), but none of the notes on the

exhibits. The court explained that although the identity of blanket girl had not been

established, John’s testimony had sufficiently authenticated the photos in the posts. The

court admitted the screenshot of the A. Cleaning Services post, as well as the notes on the

                                             7
exhibit. The court described that post as the “most damning piece of evidence.” The

court declined to admit or consider the screenshots of the text messages.

       The court observed: “In this case, there is, frankly, compelling evidence that at

one point in time mother was in possession of a number of firearms based on the

photograph that she described as her toys, and I quote ‘My toys.’ [¶] The [A.] Cleaning

Services post is extremely compelling.” The court also noted that it did not find John “to

be a very compelling witness.” It explained: “So then I get [John] that comes in here

. . . . He seems like a guy, on the hope of this romantic relationship, that would do or say

anything for mother, including to his own detriment. I mean, the $4,000 that he bailed

her out is, let’s face it, more than a token gesture. [¶] Why he would take photos of guns

that he—what makes more sense to you, that mom took photos of guns that she was

transporting in her vehicle, or for some nonsensical reason [John] took photos of guns

that he was transporting in the back of mom’s vehicle and sent her photographs. [¶] So

the more logical and compelling outcome or answer to the Court is that she took the

pictures of the weapons in her car.”

       The court found that Mother had firearms in her possession, explaining: “Mom

describes them as ‘My toys.’ I don’t have any information that I find believable that she

is no longer in possession of her toys; therefore, I’m going to be making the firearms

finding against her.”

       The court amended the permanent restraining order to find that Mother had

prohibited items, namely, “numerous” firearms “purportedly registered to John [R.].”

The court also sent notice to the relevant law enforcement agencies and the Riverside

                                             8
County District Attorney’s Office that Mother had firearms in violation of a restraining

order. (Judicial Council Forms, form DV-830 [Noncompliance with Firearms and

Ammunition Order, or Warrant].) Mother filed a notice of appeal from the amended

restraining order.

                                      DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Challenges

       Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by admitting the screenshots of

the Instagram posts. (See People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266 (Goldsmith)

[trial court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion].) She

asserts that (1) paternal aunt lacked personal knowledge of the screenshots, (2) the

screenshots were not authenticated, (3) one of them constituted inadmissible hearsay, and

(4) their admission violated her right to due process. The arguments lack merit.

       1. Personal Knowledge

       The “testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless

he [or she] has personal knowledge of the matter.” (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) The

witness’s personal knowledge “may be shown by any otherwise admissible evidence,”

including the witness’s own testimony. (Id., § 702, subd. (b).) Personal knowledge

means “‘a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of the

[witness’s] own senses.’” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 356.)

       Mother argues that the screenshots lacked an adequate foundation because paternal

aunt lacked personal knowledge of the Instagram accounts, the account owners, and the

posts. But paternal aunt testified that she observed the posts themselves—not just the

                                             9
screenshots of the posts—when Kimberly showed her the posts.2 Paternal aunt therefore

had personal knowledge of the posts and whether the screenshots accurately represented

the posts. Paternal aunt also said that the A. Cleaning Services account belonged to

Mother. But even if paternal aunt had not so testified, John’s testimony established that

the A. Cleaning Services account belonged to Mother, and Mother does not challenge

John’s personal knowledge of that fact. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion

by overruling any personal knowledge objection to the A. Cleaning Services post.

       As for the two blanket girl posts, none of the witnesses knew who owned that

account. However, even if the court erred by admitting the blanket girl posts, Mother

fails to show that any error was prejudicial. One of those posts was merely the same

photo posted by the A. Cleaning Services account. Because that blanket girl post was

duplicative of other evidence, there is no reasonable probability that exclusion of the post

would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for Mother. (People v. Watson (1956)

46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1117 (Rodrigues)

[admission of cumulative evidence did not prejudice the defendant].) And Mother does

not explain how she was prejudiced by admission of the second blanket girl post

depicting the gun show flyer. The court admitted it for “whatever evidentiary value” it

had, but the court did not appear to assign any value to the post. The court did not rely on

2      Mother asserts that paternal aunt did not see the Instagram posts. That is an
incorrect description of paternal aunt’s testimony. The testimony that Mother cites
concerned the screenshot of a text message conversation. Paternal aunt said that she saw
only screenshots of the text messages. The court did not admit the exhibits depicting text
message conversations.

                                             10
the post in its oral ruling. In contrast, it described the A. Cleaning Services post as the

“most damning piece of evidence.” We see no reasonable probability that the court

would have changed its firearms finding if it had excluded the gun show flyer post.

       2. Authentication

       “Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to

sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b)

the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code,

§ 1400.) A photo qualifies as a writing. (Id., §§ 100, 250.)

       “A photograph or video recording is typically authenticated by showing it is a fair

and accurate representation of the scene depicted.” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at

p. 267.) “This foundation may, but need not be, supplied by the person taking the

photograph or by a person who witnessed the event being recorded. [Citations.] It may

be supplied by other witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, content and location.”

(Id. at p. 268.) All that is required for admissibility “is a prima facie case. ‘As long as

the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing is admissible. The fact

conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight

as evidence, not its admissibility.’” (Id. at p. 267.)

       Evidence Code section 1553 supplies a means to authenticate printed images in

part. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Under that section, a “printed

representation of images stored on a video or digital medium is presumed to be an

accurate representation of the images it purports to represent.” (Evid. Code, § 1553,

subd. (a).) The presumption operates “to establish, at least preliminarily, that errors in

                                              11
content have not been introduced in the course of printing the images and accompanying

data.” (Goldsmith, at p. 269.) If a party offers evidence that the printed image “is

inaccurate or unreliable,” then “the party introducing the printed representation into

evidence has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the printed

representation is an accurate representation of the existence and content of the images

that it purports to represent.” (Evid. Code, § 1553, subd. (a).) But in the absence of

contrary evidence, the presumption supports a finding that the printed versions of images

are accurate representations of the images and data stored on a device. (Goldsmith, at

p. 269.)

       First, under Evidence Code section 1553, the printouts of the screenshots were

presumptively accurate representations of the screenshots stored on Kimberly’s device.

Mother did not introduce any contrary evidence. Second, given that paternal aunt

observed the actual Instagram posts, her testimony was sufficient to sustain a finding that

the screenshots depicted the posts by the blanket girl and A. Cleaning Services accounts.

Third, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that two of the posts depicted

firearms in the back of Mother’s car. John claimed to have taken the photo and

recognized the firearms and Mother’s car, and paternal aunt and Father also recognized

Mother’s car in the photo. Fourth, John’s testimony was sufficient to sustain a finding

that the third post depicted a gun show flyer at his workplace. Sufficient evidence thus

supported a finding that the screenshots were accurate representations of the Instagram

posts, two of the posts were accurate representations of firearms in Mother’s car, and the

third post was an accurate representation of the gun show flyer.

                                            12
       Mother contends that the screenshots were not properly authenticated because

there was no evidence that she owned the blanket girl account, and while John testified

that the A. Cleaning Services account belonged to her, there was no evidence about who

had the authority to post to that account. To the extent that the blanket girl posts were not

properly authenticated, Mother has not shown that their admission prejudiced her, as

already explained. And to the extent that proper authentication required a showing that

Mother posted the photo to the A. Cleaning Services account, the evidence gave rise to

that reasonable inference. There was no dispute that she had a business called A.

Cleaning Services or that the Instagram account belonged to her. The post depicted

Mother’s car, and the caption of the post referred to “My toys.” (See Goldsmith, supra,

59 Cal.4th at pp. 268, 271 [contents of photos may be considered in determining whether

photos were authenticated].) Given that the post showed Mother’s car, the poster referred

to objects in Mother’s car as “My toys,” and the account belonged to Mother, the court

could reasonably infer that Mother posted the photo. The evidence was sufficient to

establish a “prima facie case” of authenticity supporting admission of the post. (Id. at

p. 267.)

       3. Hearsay

       Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while

testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid.

Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) The general rule that hearsay is inadmissible is subject to

numerous exceptions, including one for statements of a party. (Evid. Code, § 1220.)

“The hearsay rule does not bar statements when offered against the declarant in an action

                                              13
in which the declarant is a party.” (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898.)

Under that exception, the “only preliminary fact that is subject to dispute is the identity of

the declarant.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Evid. Code § 403, subd. (a).) The

hearsay statement “is admissible upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a

finding that the party made the statement.” (Ibid.) Although we review the juvenile

court’s ultimate ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion, we review the court’s

conclusion regarding preliminary facts for substantial evidence. (People v. DeHoyos

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 132.)

       Mother argues that the A. Cleaning Services post was not admissible under the

hearsay exception for statements of a party, because Father failed to establish that she

was the poster. But substantial evidence supports the finding that Mother posted the

photo. As just discussed, the evidence showed that the Instagram account belonged to

Mother, the post depicted Mother’s car, and the poster referred to objects in Mother’s car

as “My toys.” The court could reasonably infer from that evidence that Mother posted

the photo and therefore was the declarant for purposes of the hearsay exception.

       Mother also asserts that the A. Cleaning Services post was inadmissible hearsay

because the notes submitted with the post (“December 8, 2020—[Mother] posted the

picture again this time labeling the Guns as ‘My toys’”) were prepared by Kimberly after

the post had occurred. None of that explains why the post itself was inadmissible

hearsay.

       To the extent that Mother means the notes documenting the date of the post were

hearsay, she forfeited any such challenge. Mother did not object to any of the screenshot

                                             14
exhibits on hearsay grounds when the witnesses were testifying. After the close of

evidence, when the court asked for argument, Mother “object[ed] to the evidence that

was submitted by father’s counsel on evidentiary grounds.” She asserted a hearsay

objection as follows: “First, on evidentiary grounds, my objection[s] to the admissibility

include hearsay in that the statements were created out of court in order to prove the truth

of the matter asserted by [paternal aunt].” After the court gave the parties an indicated

ruling on the admissibility of the screenshot exhibits, including the admissibility of the

notes at issue, it stated that it would hear any additional arguments. Mother said that she

had nothing to add.

       We will not reverse a ruling for claimed evidentiary error unless the appellant

timely objected to the evidence and made “clear the specific ground of the objection.”

(Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) “The reason for the requirement is manifest: a

specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It

allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to

avoid possible prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional

foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the

prospect of reversal.” (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 187-188; Estate of

Silverstein (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 221, 225 [‘“Where inadmissible evidence is offered,

the party who desires to raise the point of erroneous admission on appeal must object at

the trial, specifically stating the grounds of his objection, and directing the objection to

the particular evidence which he seeks to exclude’”].)

                                              15
       Mother’s blanket objection to all of Father’s evidence (which included seven

exhibits) and her hearsay objection to some unspecified statements did not preserve her

hearsay challenge to the notes on the A. Cleaning Services post. She had to direct her

objection to the particular evidence that she wanted to exclude. Her generalized

objections did not allow Father to cure any defects in the evidence or permit the court to

make an informed ruling on the specific objection she now raises. (People v. Boyette

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.) She thus forfeited the hearsay challenge to the notes.

       Even if Mother had not forfeited the argument, we would conclude that it lacks

merit. Paternal aunt testified that she saw the Instagram posts, she and Kimberly wrote

the notes on the exhibits together, and their notes set forth the date of each post. Her

testimony established that the date in the notes was the date of the post. The portion of

the notes documenting the date thus was admissible for “the nonhearsay purpose of

giving context” to paternal aunt’s testimony about the dates. (People v. Maciel (2013) 57

Cal.4th 482, 524.) Moreover, other evidence established everything else in the notes:

Substantial evidence showed that Mother was the poster, and the caption of the post was

evident from the face of the post itself. The notes were cumulative of other evidence in

those respects, so their admission did not prejudice Mother. (Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th

at p. 1117.) Accordingly, either the notes were admissible for a nonhearsay purpose, or

any assumed error was harmless.

       4. Due Process

       “In a civil proceeding, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses derives

from the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.” (San Diego Police

                                             16
Depart. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 574 (Geoffrey S.); see also In re

Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1244 [“parties generally have a due process right to

cross-examine available hearsay declarants”].) Mother argues that the admission of the

screenshots violated her right to due process, because she was denied the right to cross-

examine Kimberly. Mother asserts that paternal aunt’s testimony “involved multiple

layers of hearsay,” and Kimberly was “the source of the information.” The argument

fails.

         Mother does not identify the specific testimony that conveyed a hearsay statement

by Kimberly or any other specific testimony that purportedly involved multiple layers of

hearsay. We have no duty to comb the record for testimony that might fit the description

and develop the argument for her. (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th

1178, 1190; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that the court admitted hearsay statements by

Kimberly, no one denied Mother the right to cross-examine Kimberly. The record

contains no indication that Mother tried to subpoena Kimberly or otherwise call her as a

witness but was prevented from doing so. There thus was no due process violation.

(Geoffrey S., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 575 [rejecting a due process claim because the

appellant never tried to call the hearsay declarants as witnesses].)

         In sum, we conclude that all of Mother’s evidentiary challenges are meritless.

B. Substantial Evidence Supporting the Firearms Finding

         Mother argues that the juvenile court’s firearms finding is not supported by

substantial evidence. We disagree.

                                              17
       After a dependency petition has been filed, the juvenile court has exclusive

jurisdiction to issue restraining orders protecting the children who are the subject of the

petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.620(b),

5.630(a).) The court may also issue a restraining order protecting the children’s parent.

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (a); In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199,

211.) Restraining orders issued by the juvenile court prohibit the restrained party from

owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition during the term of

the order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (g); Fam. Code, § 6389, subds. (a), (c)(1);

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(g).) When the court issues the restraining order, it must

determine “whether the restrained person is in possession or control of a firearm or

ammunition, as provided in Section 6322.5 of the Family Code.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 213.5, subd. (g).)

       Under Family Code section 6322.5, when the court receives information that a

restrained person has a firearm or ammunition, the court shall “determine, by a

preponderance of the evidence, whether the person subject to a protective order has a

firearm or ammunition in, or subject to, their immediate possession or control.”

(Fam. Code, § 6322.5, subd. (a).) The court may set a review hearing to make the

determination. (Id., subd. (c)(1).) If the court determines that the restrained party has

firearms in violation of the restraining order, then the court must report the violation to

the prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction. (Fam. Code, § 6389, subd. (c)(4).)

       We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (In re

Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) We view the evidence in the light most

                                             18
favorable to the prevailing party “and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to

uphold the juvenile court’s determination.” (In re Cassandra B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th

at p. 210.) “We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or

resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

       Substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that Mother had firearms

in or subject to her immediate possession or control. The evidence showed that the A.

Cleaning Services Instagram account belonged to Mother, she posted a photo of firearms

in her car in December 2020, and she referred to the firearms as “My toys.” John

claimed that he was merely using Mother’s car to move his firearms and took the photo

when Mother was not present, but the court found that John lacked credibility. The court

reasonably concluded that Mother had taken the photo herself. And on the basis of all of

that evidence, the court reasonably inferred that Mother had the firearms in her

immediate possession or control in December 2020. Moreover, the court reasonably

inferred that Mother still had them in her immediate possession or control at the time of

the hearing. John refused to specify who had the firearms currently or where they were

located. Mother had earlier testified that she did not have any firearms, but the court was

not required to credit Mother’s testimony. In the absence of any evidence that Mother

had sold or in some other way relinquished possession or control of the firearms since

December 2020, the evidence was sufficient for the court to find that Mother still had the

firearms in or subject to her immediate possession or control.

       Apart from her substantial evidence challenge, Mother argues that the juvenile

court applied an incorrect legal standard, namely, whether Mother had “past possession

                                            19
or future access” to firearms. She relies in large part on arguments of counsel and

comments by the court regarding Mother’s “access” to firearms. But the court “‘is

presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’” (People v. Stowell

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption. On the

contrary, the court’s ruling demonstrated that it applied the correct standard: It found that

Mother was “in possession of a number of firearms” on the basis of her Instagram post

and that there was no credible evidence she was “no longer in possession” of them. The

record thus shows that the court was aware that it had to find Mother currently possessed

firearms.

       For all of these reasons, substantial evidence supports the court’s firearms finding.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The amended restraining order is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                MENETREZ
                                                                                           J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                        P. J.
RAPHAEL
                           J.

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