Court Opinion

ID: 9711480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:32:50.72106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.419350
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(dissenting). The court in its opinion disregards the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature to limit electronic surveillance to certain designated offenses involving the activities of “organized crime.” The court achieves this result by declaring the legislative definition of organized crime unworkable. This conclusion is without support in the record, and contrary to the clear legislative history of G. L. c. 272, § 99. I am comforted by the opinion in Commonwealth v. Jarabek, post 293 (1981), decided today, be*287cause it indicates, at least, some judicial restraint in rewriting G. L. c. 272, § 99. Nevertheless, the effect of the majority opinion in this case will be, I fear, to permit broad electronic surveillance in areas never intended by our Legislature in the enactment of G. L. c. 272, § 99. The consequence of the majority opinion will be to legitimize electronic intrusion on a broad range of individual activity solely on the basis of “reasonable suspicion” that organized activity by two or more persons may be involved.
It is significant to note that the language found in G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7, which precludes electronic surveillance except in regard to designated offenses involving organized crime, is not constitutionally mandated. The inclusion of such limiting language involved a deliberate legislative judgment that this was the appropriate method of balancing the interests of law enforcement against the interest of protecting individual privacy rights.
The determination precisely at which point the respective needs for privacy of communication and for effective law enforcement must mutually yield with regard to authorization of electronic surveillance is a function peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. By refusing to give effect to statutory language defining the term “organized crime,” the court today invades that province and usurps that function.
By 1967 the Congress of the United States recognized that scientific and technological developments had established the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques as a serious threat to privacy of communication in all walks of life.1 Sen. Rep. at 2154. Concluding that the status of wiretap and electronic surveillance law was intolerable and “serves neither the interests of privacy nor of law enforcement,” Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970), 82 Stat. 211 (1968). Sen. Rep. at 2154, *288quoting from Report of President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Title III serves the dual purpose of protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and delineating on a uniform basis, in conformity with the minimum constitutional standards as set forth in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. Sen. Rep. at 2153, 2156, 2163. “To assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers [investigating] . . . specified types of serious crimes, and only after authorization of a court order obtained after a showing ... of probable cause.” Sen. Rep. at 2153.
The Federal act is not self-executing in so far as State law enforcement authorities are concerned. In order to obtain a wiretap warrant from a State court, there must be a State wiretap statute in effect. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 247 (1975). Recognizing that the law enforcement needs of the different States vary, Congress left the States some latitude to individualize their wiretap statutes. While a State may not adopt standards for obtaining wiretap warrants that are less restrictive than those set forth in Title III, a State is free to adopt more stringent standards. Id. at 247.
Massachusetts has enacted a wiretap statute which in several significant respects is more restrictive than Title III.2 See Commonwealth v. Vitello, supra. In enacting G. L. c. 272, § 99, “the Legislature proceeded on the premise that electronic surveillance is anathema except within certain narrowly prescribed boundaries.” See the court’s opinion, supra at 279. Thus, § 99 establishes a particularly “broad *289statutory prohibition against warrantless [electronic] surveillance.”3 Id. “When the Legislature decided, after proposals to the contrary, to allow some warrantless surveillance by law enforcement officers, it also decided, consistent with its concern for the privacy rights of individuals, to limit the reach of the statute to interception of offenses in connection with organized crime.” Id. at 279-280.
Despite professing obeisance to these principles, the court today so broadly defines organized crime, and so loosely applies that definition, as to substantially strip the statute of its intended restrictive effect. Ignoring much of the statutory language, the court defines organized crime as “‘a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services.’” Id. at 277. Nevertheless, the court finds the requisite connection to organized crime in this case by inferring that a “certain amount” of discipline and organization would be required to acquire illicitly the examinations in issue. Id. at 281. Assuming such an inference is warranted, this quantum of organization falls far short of that required by the statute or even under the court formulation. One could as easily infer that a “certain amount” of discipline and organization would be required to achieve the objective of any conspiracy.
The highly descriptive language in the preamble of the statute, as well as the common understanding of the term “organized crime,” suggest a much higher order of criminal activity and organization than is revealed on the facts of this case. The term “organized crime” refers to those notorious and readily recognized highly “structured criminal syndicate^] composed of professional criminals who primarily rely on unlawful activity as a way of life,” Masiello v. Norton, *290364 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (D. Conn. 1973), and not to criminal conspiracies, generally.
Like § 99, the “major purpose of [the law enforcement component of] title III is to combat organized crime.” Sen. Rep. at 2157. The legislative history to Title III sets forth a lengthy description of organized crime which is in many respects strikingly similar to, but provides greater detail than, that set forth in the preamble to G. L. c. 272, § 99. The statutory definition of organized crime set forth in G. L. c. 272, § 99 A, provides: “The general court finds that organized crime exists within the commonwealth and that the increasing activities of organized crime constitute a grave danger to the public welfare and safety. Organized crime, as it exists in the commonwealth today, consists of a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services. In supplying these goods and services organized crime commits unlawful acts and employs brutal and violent tactics. Organized crime is infiltrating legitimate business activities and depriving honest businessmen of the right to make a living” (emphasis supplied).
The Legislature enacted this provision in full awareness of recent constitutional decisions and the legislative history of the Federal act (Title III). See Report of the Special Commission on Electronic Eavesdropping, 1968 Sen. Doc. No. 1132; Message of Governor John A. Volpe to the House and Senate, 1968 House Doc. No. 3797. Thus the enactment of G. L. c. 272, § 99, must be viewed in juxtaposition with the background of the enactment of the Federal statute. When the preamble is read in juxtaposition with this legislative history, which is excerpted at length in the margin,4 it *291becomes unmistakably clear that the Legislature did not intend its definition of organized crime to be so broad as the court suggests.
The court posits that effectuation of much of the descriptive language appearing in the preamble would render the statute unworkable. However, every word of a legislative enactment is to be given force and effect, if possible. Contrary to the court’s contention, it would not be necessary under the statute to prove in every case that “a grave danger to the public welfare and safety” and that “brutal and violent tactics” are involved in the commission of each designated offense. Rather, it is only necessary to show some *292“connection” between the designated offense and those criminal groups designated in the preamble as organized crime. G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7. The quantum of proof required to establish the organized crime connection is not so high as to render the statute unworkable. While the “wall of secrecy” surrounding organized crime renders it peculiarly difficult to gather evidence sufficient to obtain convictions of organized crime figures, G. L. c. 272, § 99 A, Sen. Rep. at 2159-2160, it is also common knowledge that organized crime connections are well-known to law enforcement agencies. Thus, a connection with organized crime may generally be susceptible of proof by “articulable facts” amounting to “reasonable suspicion.” See the court’s opinion, supra at 281.
In conclusion, I see no reason not to give full meaning to all the language of G. L. c. 272, § 99. Such an approach would fully effectuate the dual purposes of the statute of enabling law enforcement officers, upon a reasonable showing of a connection with organized crime, to more easily gather evidence through the use of electronic surveillance, while protecting “the privacy of all citizens of the commonwealth” from the “grave dangers” which would be attendant on the use of electronic surveillance as a general criminal investigative technique. G. L. c. 272, § 99 A. I dissent.

 See Senate Report on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Judiciary Committee), Sen. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2112-2309 (hereinafter cited as Sen. Rep. with appropriate pagination to the U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News).

 Many States have eschewed the use of electronic surveillance as a law enforcement technique. For listing of States which had not enacted an electronic surveillance statute or entirely prohibited such surveillance as of 1976, see Note, Electronic Surveillance — State Authorization of Wiretaps under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 600, 601 n.14 (1976).

Contrast, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(C) (permitting warrantless interceptions by law enforcement officers if such officer is party to the communication or on the basis of consent of one of the parties to the communication) with G. L. c. 272, §§ 99 B 4, 99 B 7 (permitting warrantless surveillance under similar circumstances only in the course of investigation of a designated offense in connection with organized crime).

In setting forth excerpts from the legislative history of Title III, I emphasize, by italicizing, those portions of the description of organized crime which most closely parallel the language of the preamble: “Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. . . . The major purpose of title III is to combat *291organized crime. . . . Ignored entirely in the development of our system of justice. . . was the possibility of the growth of a phenomenon such as modem organized crime with its attendant corruption or [sic] our political and law enforcement processes. We have always had forms of organized crime and corruption. But there has grown up in our society today highly organized, structured and formalized groups of criminal cartels, whose existence transcends the crime known yesterday, for which our criminal laws and procedures were primarily designed. . . . These hard-core groups have become more than just loose associations of criminals. They have developed into corporations of corruption, indeed, quasi-governments within our society, presenting a unique challenge to the administration of justice. . . . Today . . . [organized crime] is active in, and largely controls, professional gambling . . . [and] has an almost monopolistic control over the illegal importation, distribution and sale of narcotics .... Loan sharking, finally, is everywhere dominated by organized crime. . . . Organized crime has not limited itself to criminal endeavors. It has large spheres of legitimate business and union activity undermining our basic economic mores and institutions. . . . Organized crime flourishes best only in a climate of corruption. . . . Victims, complainants, or witnesses are unwilling to testify because of apathy, fear, or self-interest, and the top figures in the rackets are protected by layers of insulation and [sic] direct participation in criminal acts. Information received from paid informants is often unreliable, and a stem code of discipline inhibits the development of informants against organized criminals. In short, intercepting the communications of organized criminals is the only effective method of learning about their activities. . . . [U]nder ‘present procedures too few witnesses have been produced to prove the link between criminal group members and the illicit activities that they sponsor [sic]. Victims do not normally testify for they are already in bodily fear or they are compliant .... [T]he securing of an evidentiary substitute for live testimony, which is not subject to being eliminated or tampered with by fear or favor, is necessary.” (Emphasis supplied.) Sen Rep. 2153-2161.