Court Opinion

ID: 9901412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:00:30.713043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.537256
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20611        Document: 00516975416             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/21/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                     ____________                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                      FILED
                                       No. 22-20611                           November 21, 2023
                                     ____________                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk
   Stephanie Zavala,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Harris County, Texas; N. Harmon, Jailer; Diaz, Jailer,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:19-CV-3341
                     ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         On September 12, 2017, Stephanie Zavala was arrested for
   misdemeanor criminal trespass and booked into the Harris County Jail. While
   confined, Zavala alleges that “one or more of the other inmates punched,
   kicked, and threw her on the floor where her head struck the concrete while
   two unidentified jailers looked on for several minutes.” Zavala also alleges
         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                         No. 22-20611

   that, on a prior occasion, she requested water from Jailer Napoleon Harmon.
   She says that, instead of giving her water, he placed her in a cell and used a
   hog-tie on her by shackling her wrists to her ankles because he was “annoyed
   with” her. In response, Zavala filed a complaint with the Harris County
   Sheriff’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG).1 Zavala contends that when
   she asked Harmon for water, he “pointed to the area where the disgusting
   toilet was and said [Zavala] could drink from there.” In her OIG complaint,
   Zavala stated that the combined toilet and sink area in the holding cell was
   unsanitary, but she did end up drinking water from the sink.
          Zavala filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint and two amended
   complaints naming as defendants Harris County, Texas, (County) and
   Harmon.2 The district court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings
   and dismissed all claims against the County on November 23, 2021. On
   October 19, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
   Harmon, dismissing with prejudice the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
   excessive force claims against him. The court also granted summary
   judgment in favor of Harmon for depriving Zavala of water when she was
   allegedly dehydrated in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Zavala
   timely appealed.
          Zavala does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her water-
   deprivation claim against Harmon or of her Fifth Amendment Due Process
   claim. Zavala does, however, challenge the district court’s judgment for the
          _____________________
          1
             There were two toilets in Zavala’s holding cell. Both toilets were
          connected to sinks. One of the toilets was clogged and had a sink on top of
          it. The other toilet appeared to be functioning.
          2
           Zavala also brought claims against a jailer identified only as “Jailer Diaz.”
          The district court dismissed the claims against Diaz without prejudice for
          failure to serve pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Zavala does not
          challenge the district court’s dismissal of Diaz in this appeal.

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   County on the pleadings (second amended complaint), which concluded that
   Zavala failed to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of
   Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
   12(c). She also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
   favor of Harmon on qualified immunity grounds for the excessive force claim.
   Both challenges fail.
                                           I
                                          A

          We review de novo the district court’s grant of the County’s motion
   for judgment on the pleadings. Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 82 F.4th
   427, 429 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam). For a motion for judgment on the
   pleadings, we review “whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
   the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” Id. (quoting Doe v. MySpace,
   Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)); Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 12 (c). A Monell claim is used to assert liability for municipal policy. Webb
   v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2019). We have
   identified three ways this liability can be established:

          First, a plaintiff can show written policy statements,
          ordinances, or regulations. Second, a plaintiff can show a
          widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to
          constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.
          Third, even a single decision may constitute municipal policy
          in rare circumstances when the official or entity possessing
          final policymaking authority for an action performs the specific
          act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim.

   Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
          Zavala alleges that the County has a widespread practice of allowing
   excessive use of force in the jail. She points to prior instances of an officer
   beating an inmate, an officer leaving an inmate in a squalid cell, and officers

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   shooting suspects outside the jail setting that she says show a pattern of
   conduct that fairly represents municipal policy. She contends that, as part of
   this policy, the County (1) failed to intervene when other inmates threw her
   on the floor, and (2) allowed Harmon to hog-tie her.
          “Where prior incidents are used to prove a pattern, they must have
   occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the
   attribution to the governing body of knowledge that the objectionable
   conduct is the expected, accepted practice of city employees.” Peterson v.
   City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). “A pattern requires similarity and specificity;
   prior indications . . . must point to the specific violation in question.” Id. at
   851 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
   incidents to which Zavala points do not have the requisite similarity to be
   deemed a custom, adopted as official policy, and are not analogous to the facts
   here. As the district court observed, she has not alleged instances where
   jailers failed to intervene or used hog-ties in circumstances like hers. She thus
   fails to show a “practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute
   a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” See Webb, 925 F.3d at 215
   (citation omitted).
          Zavala also cannot prevail on any other theory of municipal liability.
   She does not show that the County was “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to an
   obvious need” in training its employees with respect to those issues. See
   Peterson, 588 F.3d at 849. Nor has she alleged facts supporting liability under
   a ratification theory. Id. at 848 (citation omitted) (explaining that ratification
   may occur when “the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s
   decision and the basis for it,” but that only happens in “extreme factual
   situations.”) To the extent that Zavala argues these claims should be
   maintained because she has yet to obtain discovery, the district court
   determined correctly that she had ample prior opportunity to do so. Thus,

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   we agree with the district court that Zavala failed to state a Monell claim
   against the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 94.
                                           B

          We review the adverse summary judgment ruling granted by the
   district court on the excessive force claim against Harmon de novo. See Estate
   of Henson v. Wichita County, 795 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary
   judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
   to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Where, as here, Harmon asserts qualified
   immunity, the burden shifts to Zavala to overcome that defense. See Melton
   v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). “[T]he plaintiff must
   show that the official violated a [plaintiff’s] statutory or constitutional right”
   and “that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged
   conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Which prong
   of that analysis to address first is within our discretion. See Pearson v.
   Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
          Although Zavala asserts that Harmon used excessive force in violation
   of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, “[t]he constitutional rights
   of a pretrial detainee are found in the procedural and substantive due process
   guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 206
   (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2573 (2022); see Boyd
   v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662, 673 n.3 (2023) (the Fourteenth Amendment “is
   the locus of the right of a pretrial detainee to be free from excessive force and
   is therefore the source of the right at issue here.”) “Nevertheless, the
   standard for excessive force is the same under either provision: whether the
   force was objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of
   each particular case.” Boyd, 74 F.4th at 673 n.3 (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). Accordingly, we consider Zavala’s excessive force claim

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   under the Fourteenth Amendment, and we resolve this claim under qualified
   immunity’s second prong—whether the right was clearly established at the
   time of Harmon’s alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
          This court considered the use of hog-tie restraints in Pratt v. Harris
   County, 822 F.3d 174, 182–85 (5th Cir. 2016). There, in a divided opinion, we
   recognized that “hog-tying is a controversial restraint,” but that “we have
   never held that an officer’s use of a hog-tie restraint is, per se, an
   unconstitutional use of excessive force.” Id. at 182. To prevail on an
   excessive force claim, the plaintiff must still show “that the force purposely
   or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v.
   Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015).
          Zavala argues that Harmon’s conduct constituted excessive force
   under the factors outlined in Kingsley and that this “clearly establishes his
   violation.” Kingsley suggests that we consider, among other factors, “the
   relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force
   used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; . . . the threat reasonably perceived
   by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576
   U.S. at 397. And on the Kingsley factors, Harmon’s use of hog-ties was not
   clearly a use of excessive force.
          Here, Zavala’s medical intake screening form indicated that “she had
   a history of panic attacks, anxiety, and depression, she was exhibiting
   inappropriate behavior and was screaming, singing loudly, at times showed
   some signs of being incoherent, and possible self-injurious behavior.” It was
   also recorded that Zavala “was having suicidal ideations, had been watching
   Netflix about killings, and was hearing voices.” By her own admission,
   Harmon only placed Zavala in the hog-tie restraint after she was “yelling for
   help” and exhibiting behavior described as inappropriate, disorderly, and
   self-injurious. Zavala does not allege any severe injuries, nor does she

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   contend that she was at risk of death from the hog-tie restraint. Her main
   complaints are that she was denied water while restrained, suffered minor
   scrapes and bruises, and has mental health issues from the incident. 3 Thus,
   Zavala fails to show that Harmon’s conduct was unconstitutionally
   unreasonable or excessive under clearly established law. Further, this is not
   “an obvious case” where the constitutional violation would be clear “even
   without a body of relevant case law.” See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
   199 (2004). Therefore, Harmon is entitled to qualified immunity.
                                            II
           For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
   district court.

          _____________________
          3
           As noted above, Zavala admitted to having various mental health issues
          prior to her arrest.

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