Court Opinion

ID: 9661624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:45:11.154497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:31.447630
License: Public Domain

GALBREATH, Judge
(dissenting).
*109I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority because I find that the record sustains plaintiff in error’s allegation that his confession, admitted over objection, should have been excluded from evidence because it was obtained under circumstances denying him his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. I find the position of the State that the defendant waived these rights untenable in view of the proof.
The defendant was questioned a number of times prior to his final acknowledgement of guilt and was, according to the officers who conducted the interrogations, advised of his constitutional rights as set out in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, every time he was interviewed after he became a suspect.
On one of the occasions the defendant told the investigating officers some matters that later were found to have been untrue and on the last period of questioning the defendant was confronted with the inconsistencies of his prior statements. He continued to deny any knowledge of this crime for more than an hour while undergoing interrogation from two officers in an isolated room in an atmosphere totally adverse to him in the State Penitentiary in Nashville, where he had been sent following his involvement in this case. He had been previously convicted of burglary and was free at the time this crime was committed while the judge had under advisement an application for a suspended sentence. A few days after the commission of this crime the trial judge denied the application for suspended sentence and it was for this reason the defendant was in the Penitentiary.
*110Two agents of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, William E. Coleman and Kenneth Shelton, went to the Penitentiary on the 24th day of January, 1967, to confront the defendant with information that had recently come into their possession which convinced them the defendant had lied on the said prior occasion. After testifying on the trial of this cause that he was aware of the fact that the nineteen year old defendant had a low I.Q. and was not of a “high mentality” and other factors in the background of the defendant, including confinement at Central State Hospital for the mentally ill, Agent Coleman was asked and replied as follows:
“Q. In spite of all this, you had no necessity to go beyond reading the card — the Miranda card that you carry, to him? Is that right?
A That’s correct.
Q And you felt no necessity to require any affirmative waiver from him, any knowledgeable waiver from him, other than the simple nodding of the head? Is that right? (Emphasis added)
A Well, that’s substantially correct. The subject had recently been in Court, and had had the services of an attorney, and I’m sure was advised by his able attorney what his rights were in that particular case.
Q It has nothing to do with this case, has it, Agent Coleman?
A It has nothing to do with this case. That’s right.
Q I believe he was presented by the Honorable Richard Nance?
*111A Yes, sir.
Q And you have no way of knowing, of course, if the Honorable Richard Nance had any idea of this offense or any further?
A No, sir.
Q And you are not suggesting anything that might have been advised him on his prior representation, had any bearing at all on this case? Are you?
A On this case — no, sir.”
Does the above testimony from the State’s witness establish a valid waiver in light of Miranda?
The nod of the head was apparently interpreted by the interrogator as signifying only an understanding by the defendant of his rights. Indeed the nod was in response to the direct question, “Do you understand what all your rights are?” Even if the nod is construed to mean, “Yes, I do understand what all my rights are,” what interpretation should be placed on the continued protestations of innocence and denials of guilt? Do not these actions say just as eloquently as the nod signified an understanding of his rights, “Even though I understand my rights I do not want to tell you what you want to know”? The communication from the defendant we must find in substance in the record before the confession meets the test of admissibility is, “Yes, I do understand what my rights are and I waive these rights.” Understanding and waiver are not the same. Perhaps most of the victims of the type of coercion and mistreatment used to obtain confessions condemned by recent decisions of the United States *112Supreme Court understood their rights and never waived them, but simply broke down after repeated physical and psychological pressures became too great for further resistance. The defendant here explained on cross-examination the effect the prolonged questioning had on him.
“Q Eddie, one other question: Tell the Court, in your own words, exactly why you confessed?
A Just like I done told you, I was scared into all of it.
Q Scared? Of what?
A Of a beating or something like that.
Q Of a beating, or something like that?
A Yes.
Q Any other reasons?
A No.
Q And you say that Agent Coleman, the only thing he ever said, was, 'Come on, son, it would be better for you in the Hereafter if you would make a clean breast of it?’
A Yes, sir.
Q And didn’t you agree with him that it would be better?
A After I had done broke down.”
At no point in the record, which I have carefully examined page by page and line by line, does it appear that the defendant ever told anyone he did not want a lawyer. The State’s proof is that the defendant did not *113say whether or not he wanted an attorney. Thus, except for the nod, we have a completely silent record on this vital point.
“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
Here we do not have the unequivocal waiver of the type our Supreme Court recently discussed in its unreported decision of January 24, 1969, in the case of Hazel Jackson v. State, in which the defendant stated after being given the necessary advice and warnings, “Yes, I will tell you what happened.” Here we have only a nod of the defendant’s head followed by more than an hour of continued denial of guilt in the face of what must have seemed to him to be overwhelming evidence in the hands of his interrogators that they knew he was lying.
Knowledge concerning not only the mental attitude of the defendant but that of the interrogators is important to present the totality of circumstances involved to shed light on whether or not the defendant freely and voluntarily waived his privileges. The attitude of the officers is apparent from the following testimony of Agent Coleman:
“Q So the first thing you did, when you got in there and started the interrogation, you say you advised the subject of his Rights, you showed him this lie detector test, and you told him, this polygraph *114examination proved you were lying to us — something to that effect — is that correct?
A We also discussed from him here the lab tests that came back from the F.B.I.
Q You told him about the results of the lab tests and you told him that that indicated that he had been lying, too, didn’t you?
A Of course, we told him that it indicated that he had been untruthful, that certain transfers of things indicated that he had.
Q In other words, Agent Coleman, the crux — the thrust of your examination, interrogation, of this subject on this occasion was: We know you did it. Here’s why we know you did it, because this polygraph test and inconsistencies we have developed from other witnesses, these laboratory tests, now you might as well go ahead and confess —wasn’t that the thrust of your examination?
A Well, it was our — when we went out there, certainly, it was our purpose to gain the truth about the matter.
Q I understand, sir. But I’m talking about the thrust of your interrogation, and the manner in which— the psychology of your interrogation, if that’s a proper word — was to make the subject believe that you had the goods on him, he might as well go ahead and confess — isn’t that correct?
A I would think that is substantially correct — yes sir.
*115Q In other words, the whole thrust of your examination was: We have got the goods on you, we know you did it, and you might as well confess— isn’t that right?
A That would be substantially correct.
The method described above is almost a textbook example of the, “Look, Joe, we know you did it, why not make it easy on everybody, including yourself?” method well known to every law enforcement officer.
Such tactics on the part of the interrogating officers in view of the totally oppressive surroundings in which the defendant found himself, coupled with his continued refusal to admit the truth, raises a strong suggestion that his final, reluctant admission was something less than a product of free will:
“Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
If the State’s contention that the waiver was free and voluntary is correct, it would not have taken seventy minutes of dual interrogating to have elicited from him the statement, “All right, I killed them.” To reiterate Miranda, such prolonged denial by the defendant is in*116consistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of privilege.
Being bound by the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, I would hold as a matter of law that the State has not carried the “heavy burden” resting on it to show the defendant was afforded the constitutional rights to which he was entitled.