Court Opinion

ID: 9375534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 00:02:38.778385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.550701
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 P. v. Morro CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G060703

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 20HF1170)

 VINCENT MICHAEL MORRO,                                                OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Scott A.
Steiner, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Arthur Martin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and
Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                              *              *              *
                 Vincent Michael Morro appeals from the judgment convicting him of
making a criminal threat to a neighbor. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).) Morro was
acquitted of a second charge alleging assault with a deadly weapon, i.e., his car. (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) Morro argues his conviction must be reversed because the
court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of a prior incident in which he was
alleged to have also used his car as a means of assaulting a different neighbor.
                 We disagree and affirm the judgment.
                 Morro’s current contention, that the evidence was substantially more
prejudicial than probative, and the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
otherwise, was not made at trial and is consequently waived. In any event, we find the
argument unpersuasive.
                 The prosecution’s theory was that Morro made the threat he was convicted
of making—as well as the charged assault he was acquitted of—because he was angry at
the victim whom he believed had reported an earlier incident to police. Indeed, there was
significant evidence that Morro’s statements to the victim in connection with the charged
crimes were laced with accusations that the victim had “call[ed] the cops” on him and
“put [him] in jail.” As such, evidence related to the prior incident Morro was referring to
was relevant to establish Morro’s motive and intent related to the charged crimes. We
find no error.

                                             FACTS
                 This case arises out of an incident on a residential street in late June 2020.
Morro was on his driveway (Morro lived, “off and on” at his mother’s home, and the
victim had just arrived at his nearby home with his wife and children. Morro initiated a
confrontation by yelling ‘“[t]here’s that faggot. There’s that nigger that fucking put me
in jail.”’ The victim and his family worked to unload their car as quickly as possible
while Morro threatened and disparaged him—including by saying ‘“I’m going to fucking

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kill you for calling the cops on me and putting me in jail.”’ The victim did not respond to
Morro’s statements.
              Shortly thereafter, the victim met with a teenager in his courtyard for a
pre-arranged job interview. During the interview, Morro continued yelling, and
approached the victim’s property in an agitated manner. He then repeated things he had
said previously, including “I’m gonna kill you.”
              After concluding the interview, the victim walked the interviewee to his
car, out of concern for his safety. At that time, according to the victim, Morro was back
in his driveway, sitting in his car and revving the engine. He continued to scream slurs
and threats at the victim. The victim claimed Morro then abruptly “gunned his car” and
accelerated rapidly out of the driveway coming straight toward him, causing the victim to
move onto the grass sidewalk.
              As a consequence of that incident, Morro was charged with one count of
assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of making a criminal threat.
              When the trial commenced, the prosecutor moved, in limine, for permission
to admit evidence of a prior incident that occurred on June 9, 2020—approximately two
and one-half weeks before the confrontation between Morro and the victim—which had
prompted the victim to call the police and led to Morro’s arrest. In that earlier incident,
Morro allegedly became angry at other neighbors who had asked him to move his car so
they could get into their driveway. After yelling profanities at them, Morro allegedly got
into his car, drove it to the end of the cul-de-sac, turned around, and then sped down the
block, veering toward the neighbors before finally slamming on his brakes. The current
victim, who had witnessed the incident, called the police anonymously; Morro was
arrested as a consequence.
              During the motion in limine hearing, the prosecutor explained he was
seeking to admit the evidence to establish motive because Morro’s statements in
connection with the charged incident referenced his belief that the victim here had called

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the police, and because that incident established Morro’s intent as he was making the
alleged criminal threats.
              Morro objected to admitting the evidence; his counsel argued it was
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352 because it “will create an undue
consumption of time for the court.” Counsel pointed out the prosecutor would likely
want the two neighbors involved in that earlier incident—described by Morro’s counsel
as him driving “erratically and nearly hit[ting] the two of them, their kids, and a
mailman”—to testify about what happened. When the court clarified that those two
neighbors were already expected to testify, and thus it would not seem to require much
additional time to have them describe the prior incident, Morro’s counsel responded that
if they testified “it’s going to require me to call the mailman and have the mailman testify
as to what happened and what he saw.”
              The court was not persuaded; the trial judge observed the prosecution’s
“position is that the defendant’s conduct on a contemporaneous prior date that is shortly
before the date of violation in question helps explain his conduct on the date of violation
for the case in question. That’s classic [Evidence Code section] 1101 (b).” The court
then granted the motion in limine.
              The victim’s wife testified at trial. She described how Morro had also
confronted her when she went outside to get the mail, testifying that Morro came within
five to six feet of her, and said ‘“I’m going to fucking beat up and kill your husband”’
reiterating ‘“he put me in jail.”’
              Morro’s brother also testified. He stated he had witnessed the incident and
there had been five or six brief “verbal transactions” between Morro and the victim
before he “finally told [his] brother to shut up.” Morro’s brother claimed he said the
same thing to the victim, lamenting ‘“Can’t you see I’m trying to get him out of here?”’
He testified he did not hear his brother say “I’m going to kill you” or anything similar.

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              Morro’s brother explained by the time he told the victim to stop, Morro
“had everything in the car, he did his preliminary checks, we went through the garage,
locked the door, he got in the car, and we drove away.” The two men departed
simultaneously: “I followed him out of the driveway, out of the complex. He turned
right, I turned left.” Morro’s brother testified that departure was the only time Morro
drove his car out of the garage, and although the brother watched in his mirror as Morro
continued down the street, he never saw Morro drive his car toward the victim. Morro’s
brother testified he was not trying to minimize Morro’s conduct that day, and said he
understood why the victim and his wife were upset. He also acknowledged he would not
want Morro to be his neighbor.
              After the victim reported the incident, an officer responded to the scene; the
officer located Morro at a nearby pizza restaurant about three hours later. After the
officer informed Morro of his right to remain silent, Morro agreed to talk about the
incident. He acknowledged he had tried to provoke the victim into a fight by yelling at
him, using racial slurs, and flipping him off several times. But Morro repeatedly denied
saying he wanted to kill the victim, denied trying to hit the victim with his car, and
claimed no one had been in the street when he left in his car. Morro also admitted to the
officer that he had spoken to the victim’s wife and had told her he wanted to fight her
husband, but he denied telling her he wanted to kill him.
              The jury convicted Morro of making a criminal threat, while acquitting him
of assault with a deadly weapon. Morro admitted to having a prior strike conviction and
the court sentenced him to a total of nine years, comprised of the middle term, doubled
pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), plus five years for the
prior.

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                                        DISCUSSION
              Morro contends that because he was charged with making a criminal threat,
the trial in this case “should have been a trial on whether the evidence proved Morro said
he wanted to kill [the victim] rather than just beat him up.” He claims that when the
evidence is limited to the incident at issue “this [is] a close case,” while the added
evidence detailing the earlier incident made it “a trial on how Morro was a nightmarish
neighbor who traumatized the cul de sac with his angry, menacing, curses, slurs, and
scary driving.” He asserts the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to hear
testimony about the details of that prior incident.
              Preliminarily, we are not persuaded by Morro’s implied assertion that if the
jury believed he had threatened only to “beat up” his victim—rather than kill him—that
would not have qualified as a criminal threat under Penal Code section 422. The
statutory prohibition is not limited to death threats; it also applies to threats of great
bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).) Morro cites no authority for the notion that
a threat to beat someone up would not qualify as a threat to inflict great bodily injury, and
we know of none. Consequently, Morro’s suggestion that the jury might have wavered
on whether he threatened to kill his victim, as opposed to beat him, does not convince us
this was a “close case” on the charge of making a criminal threat.
              Next, while evidence of a defendant’s prior misconduct is generally
inadmissible to prove his or her propensity to commit the charged offense, such evidence
is admissible if it is relevant to prove some fact other than propensity, such as motive or
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intent. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subds. (a), (b).) Admissible evidence is that which
“‘(a) “tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference” to prove the issue upon
which it is offered; (b) is offered upon an issue which will ultimately prove to be material
to the People’s case; and (c) is not merely cumulative with respect to other evidence

       1
              All subsequent statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

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which the People may use to prove the same issue.’” (People v. Guerrero (1976)
16 Cal.3d 719, 724.)
              Even evidence which is admissible under section 1101 may be excluded
pursuant to section 352, which requires the trial court to weigh the probative value of the
challenged evidence ‘“against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and undue time
consumption. Unless these dangers “substantially outweigh” probative value, the
objection must be overruled.’” (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 606.) For
purposes of applying section 352, prejudicial evidence is not synonymous with
inculpatory evidence; rather, it refers to evidence that “uniquely tends to evoke an
emotional bias against the defendant” and has limited relevance to the issues presented in
the trial. (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)
              We review the trial court’s decision to admit such evidence, over the
defendant’s objection using the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v.
Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328-1329.) Under that standard, a reversal is not
required should we disagree with the trial court’s decision. We reverse only if we also
conclude the court acted in “‘“an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (Ibid.)
              In this case, the victim’s contention—and the prosecution’s theory of the
case—was that Morro’s aggression during the incident was motivated by his belief that
the victim had reported him to police in connection with the prior incident in which he
used his car as a weapon of assault. Evidence related to that incident was therefore
potentially admissible to prove Morro’s motive and intent under section 1101. Morro
does not contend otherwise.
              He argues the court nonetheless erred because, while the fact the prior
incident occurred may have been relevant and admissible, the details of it were
unnecessary. He contends those details were unduly prejudicial under section 352.
Specifically, Morro argues it was this additional evidence that had “the serious

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prejudicial effect of making Morro’s character as a menace to the neighborhood a
potentially dispositive issue in the trial.” This contention differs from the “undue
consumption of time” objection Morro made at trial.
              “On appeal, defendant may argue that the court erred in its ruling. But he
may not argue that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason different
from his trial objection.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 (Partida).) “A
party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to
conduct.” (Id. at p. 438, fn. 5.)
              As our Supreme Court explained in Partida, “[t]he objection requirement is
necessary in criminal cases because a ‘contrary rule would deprive the People of the
opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would “permit the defendant to gamble on an
acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on
appeal.”’ [Citation] ‘The reason for the requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded
objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It allows the trial judge
to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice.
It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer
of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.’” (Partida,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 434.)
              Morro’s current argument illustrates this problem. He now asserts that
instead of allowing witnesses to testify about the prior incident, the evidence “should
have been limited to [the current victim’s] testimony that he called the police after an
earlier neighborhood incident.” The law requires that the court and the prosecutor be
given the opportunity to address the alleged problem at trial before the conviction can be
overturned on that basis. Morro made no such argument in the trial court.
              But even if he had, we would not agree this evidence should have been
excluded. The unchallenged evidence which was admitted demonstrated Morro’s
behavior in connection with the charged crimes was menacing. It was Morro’s own

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statements that established he had been previously arrested and the current victim had
been the one who called the police. Morro also admitted to the police officer who
interviewed him that he had used slurs and profanity toward the victim because he was
trying to provoke the victim into a physical fight. Morro’s own brother, while testifying
for the defense, acknowledged he “understood why [the victim] would be upset” with
Morro, and then agreed he would not want Morro to be his neighbor.
              Based on that unchallenged evidence, Morro’s status as a neighborhood
menace was essentially undisputed. Viewed in that context, the details of an additional
similar incident posed little danger of prejudicing the jury on that point. Moreover, the
fact the jury convicted Morro of making the criminal threat, while acquitting him of the
more serious charge of assault with a deadly weapon—the alleged crime which bore a
striking resemblance to the prior incident—seems to confirm the jury was not prejudiced
by the evidence.

                                     DISPOSITION
              The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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