Court Opinion

ID: 9788401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:49:32.066602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:10.478143
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (FAA)) evinces a supreme and preemptive federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce. In Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 988 P.2d 67] (Broughton), this court articulated the principle that, notwithstanding the FAA, California may act in contravention of that policy by requiring a judicial forum for public injunction requests that parties contracting in interstate commerce have agreed to resolve by arbitration. There we held that claims by one party against another for public injunctive relief under our state’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) were inarbitrable despite the parties’ agreement to arbitrate all their disputes.
I joined the majority opinion in Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1066. But as Justice Chin cogently and compellingly explains in his concurring and dissenting opinion herein, Broughton’s reasoning has been undermined by three subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court: EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279 [122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755]; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105 [121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234]; and Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79 [121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373]. Accordingly, while I concur fully in the majority’s conclusion here that plaintiff Jose E. Cruz’s claims for restitution, disgorgement, and unjust enrichment are arbitrable pursuant to the parties’ agreement, I cannot join in its determination to follow and extend Broughton to bar arbitration of plaintiffs requests for injunctive *322relief under the CLRA, the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and Business and Professions Code section 17500.
Not only do the recent Supreme Court authorities cast grave doubt on Broughton's legal analysis and conclusion, but as Justice Chin also points out, claims under the UCL are easily alleged in the context of business activities. (Cone. & dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 339.) Therefore, extending Broughton to UCL injunctive relief requests will surely frustrate the legitimate contract expectations of a great many who seek to secure the benefits of a nonjudicial forum for resolving their disputes. Indeed, virtually every lawsuit involving a business entity will be subject to compounded costs and delayed resolution of claims when bifurcated litigation of the suit proceeds one part after the other in dual fora: first, an arbitration proceeding in which any UCL-based restitution, disgorgement, and unjust enrichment claims and any non-UCL damages claims are resolved; and second, a judicial action in which the UCL claims seeking public injunctive relief are litigated. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 320.) This additional consideration is a paramount one that further contributed to my reevaluation of Broughton.
For all the foregoing reasons, I hereby dissent from the majority’s decision that plaintiffs requests for injunctive relief are inarbitrable.