Court Opinion

ID: 9790962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:02:04.533167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.852698
License: Public Domain

*250JOSEPH, C. J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion demonstrates that the line of cases culminating in Bock v. Zittenfield, 66 Or App 97, 672 P2d 1237 (1983), rev den 296 Or 486 (1984), can too easily be extended to reach too far. Even though I believe that Bock was wrongly decided, and that Judge Van Hoomissen’s dissent was correct in principle, I do not now propose to reconsider it— primarily because Bryant’s statements there were definitely about Bock and about his work performance. That is the point of departure for distinguishing the instant case. In each of the cases primarily relied on in Bock (9 Farnsworth v. Hyde, 266 Or 336, 512 P2d 1003 (1973); Newton v. Family Federal Savings & Loan, 48 Or App 373, 616 P2d 1213 (1980); Benassi v. Georgia-Pacific, 62 Or App 698, 662 P2d 760 (1983); Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or 347, 563 P2d 1205 (1977)), the allegedly defamatory statements were unambiguously about the plaintiffs. In all but Farnsworth (and even there, arguably) the statements reflected on the plaintiffs’ work performance.
That is not true in this case. As stated in the majority opinion, Sanders called a meeting of all claims department personnel the day when plaintiff had been discharged. “At that meeting he stated that (1) an unidentified employe was discharged that day because she had an unauthorized key, (2) several items of personal property had been missing before that date and (3) if any other employes had unauthorized keys, they should be turned in to the employer.” (Slip opinion at 2; emphasis supplied.) In other words, an employe had been discharged for violation of an express company policy, a meeting was called to remind employes of the company policy, the reason for the discharge was stated to be the violation of that policy and the reason for the policy was stated. Surely, no one could reasonably conclude that it was unreasonable or inappropriate for the meeting to be called, for the policy to be restated and for the basis of the policy to be stated. Of course, it would have been possible to do that without mentioning the discharge of any employe; but it is critical to note that the exact and proper reason for the employe’s discharge was stated and that plaintiff does not challenge the propriety of that discharge.
*251The only defamatory inference that could be drawn is that Sanders was not stating the true reason for the discharge but was “hinting” that the real reason was theft by plaintiff. Although, as the opinion says, “A statement that a person has committed theft is defamatory as a matter of law” (69 Or App at 244), there must be evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the statement was that the person had committed theft. We should hold, as a matter of law, that a clear and accurate statement of the reason for plaintiffs discharge prohibits submission to a finder of fact of the issue whether the statement of the reason for the unauthorized key policy in the given context was capable of a defamatory meaning.
That should be the end of the case. There is no need to pass on the question of qualified privilege; but if there were, there is also a need to be a lot more careful than the present majority opinion. There are four examples given in the Restatement comment relating to abuse of qualified privilege. 69 Or App at 245-46. I submit that none of those reasonably supports the majority’s application under the facts here. It is important to note the underlying theme of the exmples: Loss of a qualified privilege by abuse depends upon the unreasonableness of the conduct. The majority opinion will effectively weaken the concept of qualified privilege to the point of disappearance, for every employer in a similar situation would be at an extreme risk in trying to implement and reinforce work rules after a discharge.
I dissent.
Young, J., and Rossman, J., join in this dissent.