Court Opinion

ID: 9573966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:00:59.445753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:50.023411
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — The majority correctly interprets the child support guidelines to allow trial courts the discretion to deviate from the schedule. However, the majority's conclusion that the trial judge actually exercised that discretion in this case is wrong. Rather than affirm, I would remand for the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of our opinion.
The entire record in this case consists of a 3-page transcript of oral argument and a 4-sentence Order Amending Decree (both attached in full as an appendix). At the hearing, the trial judge began by stating:
[A]s I read the statute and the guidelines, I don't have any jurisdiction or any authority to do anything but fix the support at guidelines.
Agreed Report of Proceedings, at 2.
The judge then engages in a short discussion as to why the lack of discretionary leeway is unfair to trial courts. Agreed Report of Proceedings, at 3-4. The following colloquy then ensues:
[counsel]: You're saying there is no discretion in this particular standard?
the court: ... I just don’t think I can exercise my discretion downward.
Agreed Report of Proceedings, at 4.
The trial court's written order is, if anything, even more clear. Paragraph (1) states:
*781Under the State Child Support guidelines effective July 1, 1988, this Court has no discretion to make a downward adjustment from scheduled support based upon the resources available to Petitioner by virtue of her second marriage, or any of the other circumstances outlined in Respondent's affidavit^]
(Italics mine.) Clerk's Papers, at 2-3.
The majority gives two reasons why we should ignore this information. First, the majority finds the statute "clear and specific", implying that the trial judge must have also. Majority, at 777. It is only fair, however, to note that we arrived at our conclusion after lengthy briefs from the parties, additional research from our staff, and discussion among ourselves. Here is what the trial judge thought about the clarity of the statute:
the court: I don't think anybody knows what the rule is. . . .
Agreed Report of Proceedings, at 2-3.
Second, the majority notes that the trial judge is experienced and:
given the clarity of the statute we have no doubt he understood his authority, under the proper circumstances, to deviate from the standard schedule even though he refused to do so in this instance.
Majority, at 777. I have not known many experienced tried judges — certainly none as able as Judge Day — who say one thing on the record when they "understand" the opposite to be true. What sort of precedent does this set? Are the plain-worded rulings of trial judges to be contorted, ignored, and psychoanalyzed to fit our results?
Given this record, I am at a loss to understand the majority's reluctance to remand. Although there are no Washington cases directly on point, the law appears to be clear. Failure to exercise discretion because of an erroneous view that the trial court does not have discretion requires the case to be remanded. Personalized Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. Stotler & Co., 447 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).1 *782It does not matter that the trial court's result could have been achieved upon the exercise of the withheld discretion. Sullivan v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 326 N.W.2d 320, 328 (Iowa 1982). In this case, the trial judge believed he had no discretion to deviate from the child support standards and ruled accordingly. Consequently, this case should be remanded for the trial judge to determine whether, exercising his discretion, a deviation from the child support standards is appropriate.
As to the other issues resolved in the majority opinion, I concur.
Brachtenbach, Andersen, and Guy, JJ., concur with Durham, J.
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See also Lemons v. Old Hickory Coun., Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 322 N.C. 271, 277, 367 S.E.2d 655 (1988) ("When a trial court has failed to exercise its discretion regarding a discretionary matter and has ruled on it trader the mistaken *782impression it is required to rule a particular way as a matter of law, its holding must be reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion.''); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 773 ("[W]here discretionary power existed in the court below to grant or deny a motion, which it denied on the erroneous assumption that it had no such power, its decision may be reversed and the case remanded to it in order that it may exercise its discretionary power.").