Court Opinion

ID: 9475649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:34:17.734101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:50.857999
License: Public Domain

LAY, Chief Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I fully recognize that the Supreme Court has held that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their prison cells, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), and that it has held that random searches of cells are an effective instrument against the proliferation of weapons, illicit drugs, and other contraband in the prison setting. Id. at 528, 104 S.Ct. at 3201. In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), the Court took judicial notice “that the unauthorized use of narcotics is a problem that plagues virtually every penal and detention center in the country.” Id. at 588-89, 104 S.Ct. at 3234. Moreover, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Court upheld the practice of body cavity searches of pretrial detainees performed by prison employees after contact visits with persons outside the institution. However, in Bell the Court took care to note that in that case inmate attempts to smuggle “money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband” into the prison facility “by concealing them in body cavities are documented in this record.” Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884. In upholding these searches the Court stated that in each case “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment * * requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Id. The Court continued:
We do not underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates. Nor do we doubt, as the District Court noted, that on occasion a security guard may conduct the search in an abusive fashion. * * * Such abuse cannot be condoned. The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
Id. at 560, 99 S.Ct. at 1885 (citations omitted).
There should be little doubt that randomly conducted urinalysis for the purposes of detecting illicit drug use by an inmate is a search that implicates the Fourth Amendment. Although prisoners are not completely divested of their constitutional rights while incarcerated, the unique constraints of the prison environment require that the inmates’ rights be curtailed in a reasonable manner. We acknowledge that in balancing the rights of the inmate against the state’s institutional interests, due deference must be given to prison administrators’ judgments. Unless substantial evidence exists in the record to indicate that the prison officials have exaggerated their response to considerations of institutional security, courts should ordinarily defer to the expert judgments of corrections officials in such matters. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). There is nothing in the present record to show that prisoners in the Iowa correctional facilities must be searched on a random basis, thus subjecting prisoners to possible harassment and abuse, rather than under a reasonable sus*758picion standard (which is, of course, less than probable cause). The record is devoid of any facts from which the administrators could conclude that random searches of all prisoners are necessary to maintain prison discipline. Under these circumstances, the procedures here are an exaggerated response to the circumstances by the prison administration. If the prison authorities can show that security problems can be traced to the use of the reasonable suspicion standard, then the competing Fourth Amendment interests may be reevaluated and properly balanced to remedy those demonstrated problems. Here, however, there is no evidence that the state has shown any facts at all that indicate a need to conduct at-random searches.
No one is in favor of the consequences which may flow from illegal drug abuse, whether in the prison context or elsewhere. However, the majority’s analysis relies on assumptions and generalizations, rather than on demonstrated facts, in affirming the district court’s determination that on balance the Iowa State Penitentiary’s asserted need to protect institutional security» hy conducting random searches of inmates’ urine, outweighs the individual inmate’s privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment. In its opinion granting summary judgment to the state penitentiary, the district court made no findings of fact that the prison officials had demonstrated actual past or present drug abuse by inmates which in fact threatened the security of the institution. Moreover, a review of the record yields little, if any, factual basis to support such findings. In its brief to this court, no facts were recited by the state penitentiary to support the institution’s asserted need to detect and deter the use of contraband drugs by inmates through such intrusive, random means.
I recognize that it is likely that illicit drug use by prisoners has the potential to create serious security problems in the prison setting. However, merely alleging the probability that drug abuse exists or that security problems may potentially arise from such abuse is an insufficient foundation on which to base any judicial action, especially in a case such as this which determines the scope of Fourth Amendment rights for a significant number of people. As an appellate court, we should demand from litigants and rely ourselves on facts, not dicta, even dicta drawn from Supreme Court opinions, especially when making judicial determinations with constitutional implications.