Court Opinion

ID: 9778659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:15:18.446377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.405632
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The judgment underlying this appeal adjudicates title to land, confirms an accounting made by certain of the parties and validates a gas purchase contract, settles a receivership and its claims, distributes the entire money proceeds of prior mineral production, awards a recovery as for damages, etc. All such adjudications are the product of the abortive agreement compromising and settling the parties’ differences. The judgment is divided into sections dealing with specific matters and in form appears to be severable but the recitation of compromise and settlement therein, the pleadings and the record as a whole show that the adjudications in each section were conditioned one on the other, that is, an adjudication was agreed to on one phase of the litigation because of the adjudication to be made in another phase; compromise and settlement implies a quid pro quo arrangement. The result is that the record does not clearly show, one exception aside, the numerous adjudications are definitely separable parts of the judgment, and, therefore, severable. In other words, this court cannot with assurance determine, which adjudication, if any, is independent and unconnected with the others. The rule of Bradford v. Taylor, 64 Tex. 169 (1885) is applicable; there it is said:
“We deem it proper, however, to say that there is nothing in the pleadings, nor in the former judgment which can withdraw that judgment from the operation of the general rule under which it has been steadily held, in this state, that the reversal of a judgment against two or more defendants on the appeal of one defendant only will operate as a reversal as to all, if the judgment be entire, operating to the prejudice of all the defendants, and not upon distinct and independent matters in which the several defendants are shown to be separately interested. Burleson v. Henderson, 4 Tex., [49] 59; Wood v. Smith, 11 Tex. 367; Willie v. Thomas, 22 Tex., [175] 176; Dickson v. Burke, 28 Tex., 118; Mc-Ilhenny [and Hutchins] v. [M. C.] Lee [and Co.], 43 Tex., [205] 210.”
See also 2 Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 167, p. 2418; 4 T.J.2d, Appeal in Error in Civil, Sec. 850 (1959). The adjudication respecting the San Jacinto Gas Processing Corporation is the exception mentioned.
The motion for new trial argues that San Jacinto Gas Processing Corporation’s position is identical to the position of Tennessee Gas - Transmission Company, another of the parties, and consistent disposition should be made of both parties. The gas processing corporation made a tender and entered into a stipulation agreeable to all parties and was discharged. The judgment pertaining to it appears to be sev-erable and the disposition originally made proper. On the other hand, an existing gas purchase contract between Tennessee Gas Transmission Company and the trustee well operator was validated, confirmed and continued in existence by a specific adjudication. This circumstance, in addition to the *592absence of a stipulation agreeable to all parties and a failure of the transmission company to ask for similar relief or to appear in this court by a brief, or otherwise, distinguishes the gas transmission company’s position from that of San Jacinto. These differences in the relative positions of these two parties accounts for the different dispositions originally made by this court.
The only motion for rehearing filed herein is that of appellees Curtis Hickey, R. H. Lee, Fred Whitaker and Lawrence L. Mc-Crary. The argument in their motion has attracted attention to a problem that has not heretofore been directly considered by counsel for the parties, or the court; that is the scope of Fulton and McClain’s appeal. Fulton and McClain’s notice of appeal was directed to the entire judgment, but, the appeal bond filed by these parties, in the part pertaining to this question, is as follows, to-wit:
“WHEREAS, in the above entitled and numbered cause pending in the District Court of Panola County, Texas, and at a regular term of said court, to wit, on the 18th day of October, 1966, the said Charles Spangler, et al., recovered a judgment against the said Hollie G. McClain, et al., for sum of $59,000.-00, from which judgment the said Hollie G. McClain and Belle Fulton, individually and as independent executrix of the Estate of Edwin M. Fulton, deceased, desire to take an appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals for the 6th Supreme Judicial District, sitting at Texarkana, Texas
Relevant to the $59,000.00 award, the judgment does not show its basis, whether in tort or contract, it merely shows Edward B. Lothrop, Robert F. Rosborough, Mrs. J. E. Powers, a widow, Mrs. Charles Spangler, Roy Nesbitt, W. M. Plaster, Travis Pugh, H. L. Padgitt, Lewis Chevallier, A. T. Farr, Jr., H. C. Havron, Robert E. Clark, Dan Littlejohn, Don E. Durham, A. D. Durham, and A. A. Morgan were awarded a recovery of $59,000.00 against Fulton and McClain; Charles Spangler is not named in the portion of the judgment pertaining to the award or elsewhere as a party to the award. The intent of the instrument is not clearly reflected by its language. If the scope of the Fulton and McClain appeal is limited to the adjudication made with respect to the $59,000.00 recovery, Curtis Hickey, R. H. Lee, Fred Whitaker and Lawrence L. Mc-Crary are not parties to the appeal, as they are not parties to the recovery adjudication.
Having concluded that the judgment was entire and not made up of severable parts, with the exception previously mentioned, and that the appeal bond’s language does not clearly limit the appeal, it is further concluded that the Fulton and McClain notice of appeal and appeal bond brought the entire judgment to this court for review. It has been authoritatively held that an appealing party desiring to limit an appeal to a part only of the underlying judgment must clearly and distinctly show an intention to do so. Barnsdall Oil Company v. Hubbard, 130 Tex. 476, 109 S.W.2d 960 (Tex.Com.App., op. adp. 1937); Con-nell Construction Company v. Phil Dor Plaza Corporation, 158 Tex. 262, 310 S.W.2d 311 (1958) ; Dallas Electric Supply Co. v.
Branum Co., 143 Tex. 366, 185 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Com.App., op. adp. 1945). This construction seems to agree with that made by the parties. The appellants Fulton and McClain have not suggested in their brief that they intended to limit the appeal, and the parties appearing in this court by brief and on motion for new trial proceed as though its scope encompasses them.
Should it develop in a new trial that some or all of the parties agree that disposition of the issues in the litigation can be made in harmony with the present judgment, the trial judge will be free to act upon agreements that are then made, but this court, in the present state of the record, cannot, with assurance determine that the adjudications made by the present judg*593ment are not dependent one upon the other, with the exception named. To render a take nothing judgment in favor of Fulton and McClain, or remand with instructions to the trial court to do so, as the motion for new trial urges would result in a judgment being entered disposing Fulton and McClain’s rights without a trial and without them having an opportunity to be heard in the trial court. This court cannot proceed as urged. Orderly procedure requires that the original opinion be adhered to. The motion for new trial is overruled.