Court Opinion

ID: 9881068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:01:16.384675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:01.735752
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10566    Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 09/29/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10566
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        WILLIE M. BURKS, III,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00344-MHT-JTA-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10566

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Willie M. Burks, III, a former supervisory correctional of-
        ﬁcer, appeals his conviction and sentence of 108 months’ imprison-
        ment for his failure to intervene to protect an inmate against an-
        other oﬃcer’s excessive use of force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242.
        As to his conviction, he argues that he intervened to stop the assault
        and, alternatively, that there was insuﬃcient evidence for a jury to
        ﬁnd that he did not intervene. With respect to his sentence, he ar-
        gues that the district court procedurally erred when it applied the
        Sentencing Guideline provision for aggravated assault because (1)
        he was not the person who assaulted the inmate, and (2) the gov-
        ernment did not prove that he conspired with the oﬃcer who did.
        He also argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
        given the less severe sentences meted out to his co-defendants and
        because the district court did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C §
        3553(a) factors. After a review of the parties’ briefs and the record,
        we aﬃrm.
                                          I
              This case arises from a criminal civil rights prosecution in-
        volving a correctional oﬃcer’s assault of two inmates at Elmore
        Correctional Facility in Elmore, Alabama. The incident took place
        on February 16, 2019, after Oﬃcer Leon Williams escorted inmates
        Cortney Rolley and Chris Hampton to the shift oﬃce to report
        them for attempting to bring contraband into the facility. Inside
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        22-10566               Opinion of the Court                        3

        the shift oﬃce and on duty that day were Lieutenant Burks, Ser-
        geant Ulysses Oliver, and Correctional Oﬃcer Bryanna Mosley.
        Lieutenant Burks was the shift commander in charge and was re-
        sponsible for overseeing the oﬃcers and the inmates’ well-being.
        At Lieutenant Burks’ trial, video evidence and witness testimony
        described what happened.
               Once inside the shift oﬃce, Oﬃcer Williams explained to the
        other oﬃcers that he witnessed Mr. Rolley and Mr. Hampton jump-
        ing the gate in the visitor’s yard and attempting to bring in contra-
        band. Sergeant Oliver and Oﬃcer Williams then left the shift oﬃce
        to review the security footage while Lieutenant Burks stayed be-
        hind with the inmates. Lieutenant Burks handcuﬀed Mr. Rolley
        and Mr. Hampton with their hands behind their backs and placed
        them in a holding room directly across from the shift oﬃce.
               After a few minutes had passed, Sergeant Oliver and Oﬃcer
        Williams returned to the shift oﬃce. Sergeant Oliver, having con-
        ﬁrmed Oﬃcer Williams’ report, became enraged. Video evidence
        showed that he retrieved the keys for the holding room, entered the
        room, and grabbed Mr. Rolley and shoved him out into the hallway.
        While in view of Oﬃcers Williams and Mosley, Sergeant Oliver
        proceeded to strike Mr. Rolley multiple times with his ﬁsts and his
        baton. He then brought out Mr. Hampton and did the same thing
        to him. This time, Lieutenant Burks watched, just a few feet away,
        as he stood in the hallway.
               Video evidence also showed that after Sergeant Oliver as-
        saulted Mr. Hampton and Mr. Rolley, Lieutenant Burks followed
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10566

        the inmates back into the holding room. Sergeant Oliver then ag-
        gressively pushed his baton into Mr. Hampton’s face, while Lieu-
        tenant Burks again only watched and failed to intervene.
                In each incident, the inmates were compliant, did not resist,
        and posed no threat to Sergeant Oliver or others nearby. The as-
        saults left Mr. Rolley and Mr. Hampton with signiﬁcant injuries.
               The government subsequently brought criminal civil rights
        charges under 18 U.S.C. § 242 against Sergeant Oliver as the aggres-
        sor, and against the other oﬃcers for their failure to intervene. Ser-
        geant Oliver and Oﬃcers Williams and Mosley were separately
        charged with two counts of deprivation of rights under color of
        law for their roles in the assault, and Lieutenant Burks was charged
        with one count of deprivation of rights under color of law for his
        failure to intervene in the assault of Mr. Hampton. 1
               All of the oﬃcers, except Lieutenant Burks, pled guilty to
        the charges. The district court sentenced Sergeant Oliver to 30
        months in prison, and Oﬃcers Williams and Mosley each to one
        year of probation.
               After a ﬁve-day trial, the jury found Lieutenant Burks guilty.
        At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence investiga-
        tion report—which calculated an oﬀense level of 31 and a criminal

        1
         Lieutenant Burks was inside the shift office with the door open when Ser-
        geant Oliver assaulted Mr. Rolley in the adjacent hallway. The government,
        however, did not charge Lieutenant Burks for failing to intervene in the assault
        on Mr. Rolley.
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        22-10566                 Opinion of the Court                            5

        history category of I—and sentenced Lieutenant Burks to 108
        months in prison, at the bottom of the advisory guideline range of
        108 to 120 months.
                                            II
                We review Lieutenant Burks’ challenge to the suﬃciency of
        the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence, including all reasonable
        inferences, and resolving credibility determinations in the light
        most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See United States v. White, 663
        F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2011). We will not overturn a guilty ver-
        dict “if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have al-
        lowed the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
        doubt.” United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir.
        2013).
                                            A
                To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the govern-
        ment had to prove that Lieutenant Burks acted willfully and under
        color of law to deprive Mr. Hampton of rights protected by the
        Constitution or laws of the United States—here, his Eighth
        Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
        See United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1294 (11th Cir. 2019). Sev-
        eral cases have held that an oﬃcer who is in a position to intervene
        against another oﬃcer’s excessive use of force, but fails to do so, is
        liable under § 242. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 890 (9th
        Cir. 1993); United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 907 (10th Cir. 2005);
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                     22-10566

        United States v. Pagan-Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573, 593 (1st Cir. 2013). Lieu-
                                                                   2
        tenant Burks does not take issue with this proposition.
                Here the critical issue is whether the government presented
        sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lieu-
        tenant Burks willfully chose not to intervene to stop Sergeant Oli-
        ver’s unconstitutional assault on Mr. Hampton, despite being able
        to do so. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        jury’s verdict, we conclude that it did.
                At trial, the government presented video evidence that
        showed Lieutenant Burks standing just arms-length away while
        watching Sergeant Oliver strike Mr. Hampton several times with
        his baton. He is seen merely shuffling his feet, and at no point does
        he attempt to intervene in the assault. And though the video con-
        tained no audio, Sergeant Oliver and Officers Williams and Mosley
        testified that Lieutenant Burks never gave Sergeant Oliver a verbal
        command to stop. All three witnesses testified that Lieutenant
        Burks seemed to condone the attack by stating “it’s fair” as Ser-
        geant Oliver continued to assault Mr. Hampton in front of him.
        video evidence also showed that, after the two beatings in the hall-
        way had occurred, Lieutenant Burks looked on as Sergeant Oliver
        shoved his baton in Mr. Hampton’s face. He again did not inter-
        vene and again stated “it’s fair.”

        2
         Lieutenant Burks argues that he did not use a dangerous weapon or person-
        ally assault Mr. Hampton. But these arguments are unavailing because he was
        convicted under a failure-to-intervene theory. He does not argue against that
        theory on appeal, but instead challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
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        22-10566               Opinion of the Court                         7

                                          B
               Lieutenant Burks first asserts that he in fact intervened by
        telling Sergeant Oliver to stop. In support, he relies on his own
        testimony at trial, a written report by Sergeant Oliver stating that
        Lieutenant Burks told him to stop, and the testimony of Training
        Officer Lieutenant Reginald Amber that a command to stop con-
        stitutes a form of intervention. But contrary to Lieutenant Burks’
        suggestion, this evidence does not conclusively show that he inter-
        vened.
               The government at trial did not dispute that a command to
        stop would have been a form of intervention, but instead argued
        that Lieutenant Burks never gave such a command. On this record,
        whether or not Lieutenant Burks intervened by telling Sergeant Ol-
        iver to stop was a credibility determination within “the exclusive
        province of the jury.” United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1571
        (11th Cir. 1990). Although Lieutenant Burks testified at trial that
        he told Sergeant Oliver to stop and that, shortly thereafter, Ser-
        geant Oliver stopped assaulting Mr. Hampton, the jury was not re-
        quired to credit his testimony, as the eyewitness testimony of three
        officers contradicted his version of the events. Moreover, Sergeant
        Oliver testified at trial that the statement that he made in his writ-
        ten report—that Lieutenant Burks had commanded him to stop as-
        saulting Mr. Hampton—was false. He explained that he had writ-
        ten this statement only because Lieutenant Burks told him to do
        so, and not because he actually heard Lieutenant Burks tell him to
        stop.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-10566

               Of course, the jury could have believed Lieutenant Burks’
        testimony over that of the other officers. Or it could have credited
        Sergeant Oliver’s report. But it did not do so, and we cannot dis-
        turb its credibility choices.
               Lieutenant Burks next maintains that there was “an over-
        whelming amount of [r]easonable [d]oubt as to whether [he] inter-
        vened,” which should have resulted in a not guilty verdict. See Ap-
        pellant’s Br. at 20. But the evidence that Lieutenant Burks points
        to at best suggests that the jury could have decided the case another
        way.
                 First, Lieutenant Burks argues that, because the video evi-
        dence shows his jaw moving during the assault of Mr. Hampton,
        “it is likely he told [Sergeant] Oliver to stop.” See id. Again, alt-
        hough a jury could have drawn this inference, it was not required
        to do so—it was “free to choose between the . . . reasonable con-
        clusions drawn from the evidence.” Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1303.
        The government presented suﬃcient evidence for a jury to reason-
        ably conclude that Lieutenant Burks did not command Sergeant
        Oliver to stop and instead only stated “it’s fair.” As we have said
        many times, the government’s evidence did not need to “exclude
        every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” United States v. Iriele,
        977 F.3d 1155, 1168 (11th Cir. 2020).
               Second, Lieutenant Burks asserts that all three oﬃcers
        “changed” their testimony in the hopes of either getting a plea deal
        or enhancing their plea deals. In doing so, he impliedly charges that
        their testimony at trial was false. We will disturb credibility
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        22-10566                Opinion of the Court                          9

        determinations only where the testimony is “incredible as a matter
        of law.” United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009).
        Here the oﬃcers’ testimony was not incredible as a matter of law.
        See id. (providing that testimony is incredible as a matter of law if
        it relates to “facts that the witness could not have possibly observed
        or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature”).
        Moreover, the oﬃcers’ prior inconsistent statements and their sta-
        tus as cooperating witnesses were made known to the jury, which
        “was entitled to weigh their testimony accordingly.” Id. We there-
        fore defer any conﬂicts in the evidence “to the jury’s resolution of
        the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.”
        United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal
        quotation marks and citation omitted).
                Lieutenant Burks’ remaining arguments also lack merit. He
        claims that the evidence showed (1) that “there was no written pro-
        tocol” for how to respond to an officer assaulting another inmate;
        (2) that he had a “back condition” that prevented him from physi-
        cally intervening; (3) that the other officers had a separate duty to
        intervene; (4) that officers Williams and Mosley testified that if they
        had intervened, “none of the officers would have been in trouble;”
        (5) that if he had known about Sergeant Oliver’s anger issues, he
        would have reassigned his duties “to avoid inmate contact;” and (6)
        that he was “shocked” to see Sergeant Oliver’s reaction, which
        “may have delayed his intervention.” See Appellant’s Br. at 21–23.
        But none of this evidence negates the fact that he had the duty and
        opportunity to intervene and that the video evidence and
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10566

        corroborating witness testimony supported the government’s con-
        tention that he knew he had an obligation to intervene and chose
        not to.
              In sum, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient
        to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lieutenant Burks violated
        18 U.S.C. § 242 by willfully choosing not to intervene in Sergeant
        Oliver’s assault of Mr. Hampton.
                                          III
               Next, we address Lieutenant Burks’ sentencing arguments.
        We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the
        sentencing guidelines de novo, and review ﬁndings of fact for clear
        error. See United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017).
                We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of
        a sentence for abuse of discretion. In doing so, we consider the
        totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
        51 (2007); United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1264 (11th Cir.
        2023). “We ordinarily expect a sentence within the [advisory]
        Guidelines range to be reasonable,” so Lieutenant Burks bears the
        burden of showing that his sentence is unreasonable in light of the
        record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Gon-
        zalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court abuses
        its discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence
        when it “(1) fails to aﬀord consideration to relevant [§ 3553(a)] fac-
        tors that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to
        an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
        judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey,
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        22-10566               Opinion of the Court                        11

        612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation
        marks and citation omitted). We will vacate a defendant’s sentence
        as substantively unreasonable only if “left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm
        conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judg-
        ment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
        lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts
        of the case.” United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir.
        2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                          A
               Lieutenant Burks argues that the district court incorrectly
        applied the base oﬀense level of 14 for aggravated assault because
        he was not the one who assaulted Mr. Hampton and there was no
        ﬁnding that he conspired with Sergeant Oliver about the assault.
        His reading of the Sentencing Guidelines is mistaken.
                The provision applicable to oﬀenses involving individual
        rights, U.S.S.G § 2H1.1(a), requires a district court, when determin-
        ing a defendant’s base oﬀense level, to apply the greatest of: “(1)
        the oﬀense level from the oﬀense guideline applicable to any un-
        derlying oﬀense; (2) 12, if the oﬀense involved two or more partic-
        ipants; (3) 10, if the oﬀense involved (A) the use or threat of force
        against a person; or (B) property damage or the threat of property
        damage; or (4) 6, otherwise.” The base oﬀense level for aggravated
        assault is 14. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. The issue here, then, is whether
        the district court correctly considered the “underlying oﬀense” to
        be aggravated assault.
               The commentary to § 2H1.1 explains that the “oﬀense
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10566

        guideline applicable to any underlying oﬀense” means “the oﬀense
        guideline applicable to any conduct established by the oﬀense of
        conviction that constitutes an oﬀense under federal, state, or local
        law.” See § 2H1.1, cmt. n.1. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, rel-
        evant conduct includes “all acts and omission committed, aided,
        abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
        caused by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
                At sentencing, the district court independently found that,
        when failing to intervene in the assault of Mr. Hampton, Lieuten-
        ant Burks also “condon[ed]” and “encouraged” the assault by stat-
        ing “[i]t’s fair.” See D.E. 217 at 17. Lieutenant Burks’ inaction,
        moreover, did not constitute “passive watching” because he was “a
        supervisor who stood there, said it was ‘fair,’ did nothing, [and] en-
        courage[ed]” Sergeant Oliver “to beat” Mr. Hampton. See id. As a
        result, the district court found that “he should be held accountable
        [for the] assault.” Id.
               Given the district court’s ﬁndings—which we ﬁnd were not
        clearly erroneous in light of the video evidence and witness testi-
        mony presented at trial—we conclude that the district court ap-
        plied the correct underlying oﬀense—aggravated assault. Sergeant
        Oliver’s use of his baton to assault Mr. Hampton constituted an ag-
        gravated assault. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1. (deﬁning aggra-
        vated assault, in part, as “a felonious assault that involved . . . a dan-
        gerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury with that
        weapon”); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 n.1(E)(i) (deﬁning a “dangerous
        weapon,” in relevant part, to mean “an instrument capable of
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        22-10566                   Opinion of the Court                                 13

        inﬂicting death or serious bodily injury”).
                Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Lieutenant Burks was ac-
        countable for aiding and abetting the assault of Mr. Hampton. See
        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). The video evidence and witness testi-
        mony amply support the ﬁnding that he stood by and encouraged
        Sergeant Oliver to assault Mr. Hampton by stating “it’s fair,” in-
        stead of intervening to stop the assault. His failure to intervene
        and encouragement of Sergeant Oliver’s acts therefore helped fur-
        ther the underlying aggravated assault. See U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1, cmt.
        n.1. That Lieutenant Burks did not personally assault Mr. Hamp-
        ton, and that he was not charged with conspiring with Sergeant Ol-
        iver, are of no consequence for purposes of determining his base
        oﬀense level in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d
        886, 907 (10th Cir. 2005) (aﬃrming district court’s use of aggra-
        vated assault as underlying oﬀense in guidelines calculation in a §
                                        3
        242 failure-to-intervene case).
                                                B

        3 Relying on the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1, Lieutenant Burks argues

        that a district court may only substitute an underlying offense where a defend-
        ant “acted in conspiracy with the person who committed the underlying of-
        fense.” Appellant’s Br. at 24 (citing § 2H1.1, cmt. n.1). But that is not the case.
        The commentary simply provides that in cases where there is more than one
        underlying offense, the base offense level may be calculated by “deter-
        mine[ing] the underlying offenses encompassed within the count of convic-
        tion as if the defendant had been charged with a conspiracy to commit multi-
        ple offenses.” § 2H1.1, cmt. n.1 (emphasis added).
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10566

                Lieutenant Burks next argues that his sentence was substan-
        tively unreasonable because the district court subjected him to a
        “trial penalty.” See Appellant’s Br. at 24. In support, he points out
        that the district court was “harsh[er]” in imposing his sentence than
        it was with Sergeant Oliver (sentenced to 30 months in prison) and
        Oﬃcers Williams and Mosely (each sentenced to one year of pro-
        bation). See id. at 25. At the end of the day, we are unpersuaded.
               Generally, a disparity in sentencing among co-defendants is
        “not an appropriate basis for relief on appeal.” United States v.
        Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
        marks and citation omitted). This is especially true where, as here,
        the defendants are not similarly situated. See id.
                Unlike Lieutenant Burks, Sergeant Oliver and Oﬃcers Wil-
        liams and Mosley pled guilty and received acceptance of responsi-
        bility adjustments. They also cooperated with the government by
        testifying at trial. We have explained that a defendant who cooper-
        ates with the government and pleads guilty is not similarly situated
        to a defendant who provides no assistance to the government and
        proceeds to go to trial. See id. See also United States v. Docampo, 573
        F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Although the district court is re-
        quired to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
        ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
        conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), the other [cooperating] defendants
        who received less severe sentences were not similarly situated.”)
        (internal quotation marks omitted). The same is true even when
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        22-10566               Opinion of the Court                         15

        the cooperating defendants receive a “substantially shorter” sen-
        tence. See Cavallo, 790 F.3d at 1237; Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1101.
                Moreover, Lieutenant Burks’ argument that the district
        court penalized him for going to trial is unpersuasive. First, the
        district court imposed a two-level obstruction enhancement on
        Lieutenant Burks for testifying falsely at trial, and this enhance-
        ment—along with the lack of an acceptance of responsibility ad-
        justment—partly explain the diﬀerent sentences. Second, the dis-
        trict court sentenced him at the bottom of his advisory guideline
        range. A sentence at the bottom of the advisory guideline range is
        generally indicative of reasonableness. See United States v.
        Coglianese, 34 F.4th 1002, 1009 (11th Cir. 2022). Lieutenant Burks
        has not met his burden of showing otherwise.
               Lastly, Lieutenant Burk maintains that the district court im-
        properly considered the § 3553(a) factors. But in so arguing, he has
        not shown that the district court failed to consider relevant factors
        that were due signiﬁcant weight, gave signiﬁcant weight to im-
        proper factors, or otherwise committed a clear error of judgment
        in considering the proper factors. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Instead,
        he simply reviews the factors and notes that each should have mit-
        igated in his favor. Essentially, he asks us to re-weigh the § 3553(a)
        factors ourselves. We will not do so.
               The weight a district court chooses to give any given factor
        in determining a defendant’s sentence is generally within its discre-
        tion, and we will not substitute its judgment with our own. See
        United States v. Alvarado, 808 F.3d 474, 496 (11th Cir. 2015). We are
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10566

        satisﬁed here that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors
        when it fashioned Lieutenant Burks’ sentence.
               At sentencing, the district court stated that it had “consid-
        ered and consulted” the advisory guidelines and Lieutenant Burks’
        arguments, and that it had “evaluated the reasonableness of [the]
        sentence through the lens of [§] 3553[.]” See D.E. 217 at 61–62. It
        also noted that, in imposing Lieutenant Burks’ sentence, it found
        that the sentence was “suﬃcient but not greater than necessary to
        comply with the [§ 3553(a) factors].” Id. at 62. We have held that
        “[a]n acknowledgment [that] the district court has considered the
        defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suﬃce” to
        show that the district court did just that. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at
        1324. Lieutenant Burks has failed to convince us that we should
        not take the district court at its word.
                                         IV
               We affirm Lieutenant Burks’ conviction and sentence.

               AFFIRMED.