Court Opinion

ID: 9770626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:13:36.488669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:19.158910
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
Applicant contends she is illegally restrained by an order of contempt in the 220th District Court of Bosque County. Specifical*838ly, she contends: 1) her restraint violates Tex. Const. art. I, § 18, and various statutes, because she is being imprisoned for the failure to pay a debt; and, 2) she was deprived of counsel at the contempt hearing.
I agree with the majority that applicant had a right to be represented by counsel at the contempt proceeding. Ante, at 836. Additionally, I agree with the majority that the trial judge failed to inform applicant of this right. Ante, at 837. Therefore, I join part II of the majority opinion. However, for the following reasons I dissent to part I of the majority opinion because I do not believe the trial judge is presently authorized to order recoupment
Tex.Code Crim.ProcAnn. art. 26.05(e) which provides:
If the court determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided, including any expenses and costs, the court shall order the defendant to pay the amount that it finds the defendant is able to pay.1
In Curry v. Wilson, 853 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Cr.App.1993), we considered whether a trial judge may seek recoupment of monies expended for the legal representation of an indigent. Curry was charged with involuntary manslaughter, and received appointed counsel. Following his acquittal, Curry was ordered to pay for his representation and a payment plan was established for recoupment. Id., 853 S.W.2d at 42-43. We granted review to determine whether a trial judge could order recoupment of monies expended on behalf of a defendant who had been acquitted. Id., 853 S.W.2d at 44. We held article 26.05(e) authorized the trial judge “to order repayment of the county funds expended for applicant’s appointed legal defense by virtue of [the judge’s] determination that applicant was financially able to offset those costs.” Curry, 853 S.W.2d at 45.
Even though the trial judge had issued a capias pro finum, the warrant was withdrawn and we did not address whether Curly was illegally restrained for failure to make payments as per the recoupment order. Id., 853 S.W.2d at 43. Therefore, the question we did not reach in Curry is expressly presented in the instant case: Is applicant illegally restrained?
Under the plain language of the art. 26.05(e), recoupment is authorized only for “legal services provided.” The costs of the legal services provided are not known until the criminal matter becomes final. In eases such as Curry v. Wilson, the matter is final when the defendant is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated. However, when the trial level prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence, the matter may be far from over. In such cases the defendant may file a motion for new trial. In such an event, the matter will not be final until the motion was granted, denied or overruled by operation of law. And, in the latter instances, the defendant may pursue an appeal. These legal services will normally include preparation of a statement of facts, a brief on behalf of the appellant and perhaps a motion for rehearing. Additional legal services may be required if either the State or the appellant seeks discretionary review. And, if such review if granted, the parties will again be required to file briefs and perhaps travel to Austin to present oral argument. Finally, upon our decision, legal services may be required to either file or respond to a motion for rehearing.
Because, the costs of the legal services provided in a criminal matter are subject to any number of variables, they are undeter-minable until the criminal matter becomes final. Therefore, I would use this case to establish the following bright-line rule regarding recoupment:
1. If the trial level prosecution ends with an acquittal or is otherwise terminated, recoupment is authorized and may begin immediately;
2. If the trial level prosecution ends with a conviction and sentence, and the defendant opts not to appeal, recoupment is authorized and may begin at the time the time for the filing of a motion for new trial or giving notice of appeal has expired;
*8393. If the trial level prosecution ends with a conviction and sentence, and the defendant opts to appeal, recoupment is authorized but may not begin until the mandate of affirmance has issued; or,
4. If the trial level prosecution ends with a conviction and sentence and the trial judge grants a new trial, or the case is appealed and the appeal results in an acquittal or reversal of some phase of the trial level prosecution, recoupment is not authorized until the occurrence of either 1,2, or 3.2
The instant criminal matter is not final because none of these events have occurred. Therefore, the trial judge is not authorized to order recoupment. Consequently, applicant is illegally restrained.
With these comments, I respectfully dissent to part I of the majority opinion.
OVERSTREET, MANSFIELD and PRICE, JJ., join this opinion.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Additionally, I would hold that in cases under 2 or 3 the better method of obtaining recoupment is either Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, § 11(a)(8) or 43.03.