Court Opinion

ID: 9695664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:26:53.813308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.668211
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority concludes that for the purposes of Rule 1100, the 180-day period starts to run when a case is certified to adult court rather than when a delinquency petition is filed in Juvenile Court. Rule 1100(a)(2) states: “Trial in a court case in which a complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” To rationalize the majority opinion would require that certification to adult court be equated with the filing of a written complaint. Neither I, nor the majority itself, is willing to admit to such a strained interpretation in order to reach its result. Moreover, such an interpretation would also negate the intent of our Supreme Court as manifested in the following comment to Rule 1100: “For the purpose of this rule only, it is intended that ‘complaint’ also include special documents used in lieu of a complaint to initiate criminal proceedings in extraordinary circumstances.” Even if it is conceded that juvenile delinquency petitions are not “special documents used in lieu of a complaint to initiate criminal proceedings in extraordinary circumstances,” when read in context with the rule, the comment nevertheless clearly indicates that the word “complaint” was used to designate the point when criminal proceedings are initiated. In the instant case, proceedings were initiated by the filing of the delinquency petition in Juvenile Court, not by the certification of the case to adult court. While I agree with the majority that generally the intent *169of the Supreme Court was to exclude juvenile proceedings from the operation of the rules of criminal procedure, I cannot agree that such an application under the facts of this case, limiting Rule 1100, insures the accused of his right to a speedy trial. The juvenile exclusion was intended to protect juveniles from the full thrust of adult criminal proceedings, rather than to deny juveniles the benefit of a speedy trial. The request for certification should merely justify an extension of time for the Commonwealth under Rule 1100(c), if needed. Accordingly, in my view, since the Commonwealth did not raise the question of certification in its petition for an extension, the lower court was correct in computing the 180-day period from the date of the filing of delinquency petition and granting appellee’s motion to dismiss.