Court Opinion

ID: 9377011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 17:07:17.243791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:11.201663
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Santiago, 2023-Ohio-561.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               DEFIANCE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                           CASE NO. 4-22-11
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

MANUEL SANTIAGO,                                           OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                           CASE NO. 4-22-12
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

MANUEL SANTIAGO,                                           OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                Appeals from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
                  Trial Court Nos. 19 CR 13725 and 21 CR 14242

                                      Judgments Affirmed

                           Date of Decision: February 27, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Henry Schaefer for Appellant

        Russell R. Herman for Appellee
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

        {¶1} Defendant-appellant Manuel Santiago (“Santiago”) appeals the

judgments of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the State

failed to comply with the terms of a plea agreement at sentencing. For the reasons

set forth below, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

                                Facts and Procedural History

        {¶2} On October 10, 2019, Santiago was indicted on one count of robbery in

violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), a felony of the second degree; one count of

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree;

and one count of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first

degree. Doc. 2A.1 These charges became the basis of Case No. 19-CR-13725. Doc.

2A. Subsequently, on January 2, 2020, a bill of information was issued in this case

that charged Santiago with one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C.

2919.25(A), a felony of the fourth degree. Doc. 29A.

        {¶3} On January 2, 2020, Santiago pled guilty to one count of robbery in

violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), a felony of the second degree and one count of

domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the fourth degree.

Doc. 34A. The prosecution indicated that, as part of plea negotiations, the State and

Santiago had reached a joint sentencing recommendation. Doc. 34A, 43A. The trial

1
  This appeal arises from two cases. The docket numbers from Case No. 19-CR-13725 will be followed by
the letter “A.” The docket numbers from Case No. 21-CR-14242 will be followed by the letter “B.”

                                                -2-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

court informed Santiago that it was not bound by the sentencing recommendation

given by the State before he entered his guilty pleas on January 2, 2020. Jan. 2 Tr.

12. The trial court then accepted Santiago’s pleas of guilty and ordered the

preparation of a presentence investigation. Doc. 34A.

       {¶4} On February 24, 2020, Santiago appeared at his sentencing hearing.

Doc. 43A. On motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the two remaining

charges to which Santiago had not entered pleas of guilty. Doc. 43A. At this

hearing, the trial judge stated the following:

       At the time of the plea the Court was advised there was a joint
       sentence recommendation. That he’d be admitted * * * directly
       to a period of community control, with an indefinite term of not
       less than five no more than seven and a half years reserved on the
       Robbery, a con-current [sic] seventeen-month term reserved on
       the Domestic Violence.

Id. at 2. On request by the trial court, the State then confirmed the basic terms of

the jointly recommended sentence. Id. at 3.

       {¶5} After examining Santiago’s criminal history as recorded in the

presentence investigation, the trial court concluded that a reserved sentence of “five

to seven and a half years isn’t near enough based on your history and these crimes.”

Feb. 24 Tr. 9.    The trial court then ordered Santiago to serve five years on

community control, reserving an indeterminate prison sentence of seven to ten-and

one-half years for the charge of robbery and a basic prison sentence of twelve

months for the charge of domestic violence. Doc. 43A. The trial court told Santiago

                                          -3-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

that the prison terms from these two cases could be run consecutively to each other.

Doc. 43A.

       {¶6} On February 25, 2021, Santiago was indicted on one count of vandalism

in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(a), a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of

breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), a felony of the fifth

degree. Doc. 1B. These charges became the basis of Case No. 21-CR-14242. Doc.

1B. On February 25, 2021, the State also filed a motion to revoke Santiago’s

community control in Case No. 19-CR-13725. Doc. 44A. The motion cited the

charges in Case No. 21-CR-14242 as one of the alleged violations of the terms of

his community control sanction. Doc. 44A.

       {¶7} On June 9, 2021, Santiago appeared for a plea hearing in Case No. 21-

CR-14242. Doc. 19B. The trial court informed Santiago “that his guilty plea in this

matter would also constitute a violation of terms of Community Control in Case No.

19 CR 13725 * * *.” Doc. 19B. The State set forth its sentencing recommendation:

       The State would recommend that the Defendant be allowed to be
       placed on community control. Our promises would be contingent
       on no new offenses between now and the date of sentencing and
       also that he continues to participate * * * in Racing for Recovery
       program. And then after sentencing we’d ask that that be
       condition of community control, if the Court does grant the
       community control, and if all that works out that way we would
       recommend that his community control not be revoked in Case
       Number 13725, but that he’d be allowed to continue on
       supervision. Again, subject to the condition that he successfully
       complete the Racing for Recovery program.

                                         -4-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

June 9 Tr. 3. The trial court informed Santiago that it was not bound by the

sentencing recommendation that had been presented by the State. Id. at 6. The trial

court then accepted Santiago’s pleas of guilty for the two charges against him in

Case No. 21-CR-14242 and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation.

Doc. 19B. The trial court also held a final adjudicatory hearing on the motion to

revoke Santiago’s community control and found that he had violated the terms of

his community control. Doc. 49A.

      {¶8} On October 5, 2021, Santiago appeared for his sentencing hearing.

Doc. 32B. In its judgment entry for Case No. 19-CR-13725, the trial court stated:

      Upon review of the Defendant’s extensive juvenile and adult
      criminal history, the Court finds that the Defendant is no longer
      amenable to any available community control sanctions.

      Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
      that the Defendant’s Community Control is REVOKED and the
      balance of the seven (7) years to ten and one half (10 ½) years of
      imprisonment is imposed for the offense of Robbery * * * and the
      CONSECUTIVE balance of the twelve (12) months of
      imprisonment for the offense of Domestic Violence * * *.

Doc. 57A. In its judgment entry for Case No. 21-CR-14242, the trial court stated:

      The Court made reference to the information contained in the
      Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, to the Defendant’s extensive
      criminal history and to the history of this cause as known to the
      Court.

      Based upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that
      the Defendant is no longer amenable to any available community
      control sanction and that a prison term is necessary and
      appropriate.

                                        -5-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

Doc. 32B. The trial court then imposed eleven-month prison terms for each of the

charges against Santiago to be served concurrently to the prison terms imposed in

Case No. 19-CR-13725. Doc. 32B. This left Santiago with an aggregate sentence

of eight to eleven-and-one-half years of imprisonment. Doc. 57A, 32B.

       {¶9} On October 14, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry of

sentencing in each of these cases. Doc. 57A, 32B. Santiago filed his notices of

appeal on November 10, 2021. Doc. 62A, 37B. However, there was an equipment

failure that prevented the recording of the sentencing hearing on October 14, 2021

from being transcribed. Doc. 80A. As a result, the appeals were withdrawn to give

the trial court an opportunity to resentence Santiago. Doc. 84A, 50B. June 13 Tr.

3.

       {¶10} On June 13, 2022, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. June 13

Tr. 2. The prosecutor stated that he “s[aw] no reason for the Court to impose

something different [from what was ordered at the October 5, 2021 hearing] at this

point in time.” June 13 Tr. 7. At this hearing, the parties discussed a letter that had

been received from the Director of Operations at Racing for Recovery. Id. at 11.

This letter read as follows:

       ‘This letter is written to inform you that Manuel Santiago has
       completed recommended number of IOP groups for court
       requirements. Due to this we can successfully complete him from
       SUD services. However, it is my recommendation that he seek a
       higher level of care for mental health support.             The
       recommendation is made because client’s emotional and
       behavioral problems that left untreated will lead to further

                                         -6-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

       destructive behaviors and likely a return to use. Examples of this
       include consistent pattern of challenging or disrespectful
       treatment of authority figures using verbally abusive language,
       overreaction, or hostility to insignificant irritants, and dishonesty
       in terms of engagement with peers in harmful situations.

       After reports from numerous participants at Racing for Recovery
       that Manuel was seen at a bar drinking with individuals in
       treatment, it was decided that he would no longer be able to
       engage in treatment or other services at Racing for Recovery. If
       you have any additional questions, please feel free to contact me.’

Id. at 11. The Defense argued that others who had been involved with Santiago

through Racing for Recovery would contest this assessment. Id. at 13. The trial

judge stated:

       I still don’t know that that’s the reason he should be continued on
       community control because he already had a substantial
       opportunity being placed on community control for two very
       serious offenses and then he goes out and commits two more
       felonies while on community control.

Id. Nonetheless, the trial court continued this matter to give the Defense the

opportunity to seek out an assessment from others at Racing for Recovery. Id.

       {¶11} On July 5, 2022, Santiago appeared for the continued resentencing

hearing in Case No. 19-CR-13725 and Case No. 21-CR-14242. July 5 Tr. 2. The

State recommended the following sentence:

       We were here June 14th and one of the issues that was discussed
       was issues and problems that had occurred at a facility called
       Racing for Recovery, and the Defendant’s connection to some
       problems that had occurred there. A letter that had been received
       from a managing person; I don’t know what his title officially was
       from Racing for Recovering regarding the Defendant’s behavior
       there. Those things were discussed at the time of the last hearing.

                                        -7-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

       The State had initially at the time of the original sentencing had
       made a recommendation for a five-to-seven-and-a-half-year term,
       aggregate for both cases given the Defendant’s extensive criminal
       history and multiple efforts to allow him to be, have alternative
       sentencing options. But upon looking at his criminal history it’s
       certainly one of the most extensive lengthy that we see in this court
       and including many offensives [sic] that are indicative of volatile
       behavior. Regardless of what the cause of those things are it’s our
       concern that he cannot be supervised and has demonstrated that.
       The State would recommend that a five-to-seven-and-a-half-year
       term be imposed in the aggregate of the two cases.

Id. at 4. In its judgment entry for Case No. 19-CR-13725, the trial court stated:

       Upon review of the Defendant’s extensive juvenile and adult
       criminal history, also considering that new offenses were
       committed while the Defendant was under Community Control
       Supervision, the Court finds that the Defendant is no longer
       amenable to any available community control sanctions.

Doc. July 25, 2022 Judgment Entry. The trial court then revoked Santiago’s

community control. Id.

       {¶12} However, the trial court did not impose the same “eight to eleven and

a half” year aggregate sentence that it had imposed at the October 5, 2021 sentencing

hearing. July 5 Tr. 20. In recognition of some of the progress that Santiago had

made, the trial court imposed “the term of not less than five no more than seven and

a half” years in prison. Id. In Case No. 21-CR-14242, the trial court imposed an

eleven-month prison term for each of the charges against Santiago. Doc. 50B.

These prison terms were to be served concurrently to the sentence imposed in Case

                                         -8-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

No. 19-CR-13725. Doc. 50B. The trial court issued a judgment entry of sentencing

in each of these two cases on July 25, 2022. Doc. 84A.

                                Assignment of Error

       {¶13} Santiago filed his notices of appeal on August 23, 2022. Doc. 87A,

53B. On appeal, he raises the following assignment of error:

       It was improper for the State to not recommend community
       control at sentencing.

He argues that the State breached the plea agreement by failing to recommend that

he remain on community control at the July 5, 2022 sentencing hearing.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶14} “Regarding the joint sentencing recommendation, Ohio law is clear

that a plea bargain is a contract between the state and the defendant.” State v.

Woodrey, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2010-01-008, 2010-Ohio-4079, ¶ 10. Thus,

“a plea agreement is * * * subject to contract-law standards.” State v. Vari, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 07-MA-142, 2010-Ohio-1300, ¶ 25. “[I]f one side violates a term of

the plea agreement, the other party has a right to pursue appropriate remedies * *

*.” State v. Liskany, 196 Ohio App.3d 609, 2011-Ohio-4456, 964 N.E.2d 1073, ¶

190 (2d Dist.).

       {¶15} In general, if the State “breach[es] * * * the agreement, the defendant

is entitled to either rescission (i.e., withdrawal of their plea) or specific

                                         -9-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

performance.” Vari at ¶ 27, citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263, 92

S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, (1971); State v. Walker, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1207,

2006-Ohio-2929, ¶ 13; Ritchie v. State, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-07-073,

2009-Ohio-1841, ¶ 9. “Since a plea agreement is a contract, to be construed strictly

against the state, the prosecutor is required to fulfill any promise or agreement of

the state.” State v. Zamora, 3d Dist. Paulding Nos. 11-07-04, 11-07-05, 2007-Ohio-

6973, ¶ 12. See State v. Soto, 158 Ohio St.3d 44, 2019-Ohio-4430, 139 N.E.3d 889,

(“When a plea rests on a promise made by the prosecutor, that promise must be

fulfilled.”).

        {¶16} “When an allegation is made that a plea agreement has been broken,

the defendant must merely show that the agreement was not fulfilled.” Zamora at ¶

quoting State v. Legree, 61 Ohio App.3d 568, 571, 573 N.E.2d 687 (6th Dist. 1988).

In such a circumstance, “[t]he court must examine the nature of the state’s promise

and the language used by the state in the plea agreement in order to determine

whether the state actually breached the plea agreement.” State v. Bembry, 7th Dist.

Columbiana No. 13 CO 33, 2014-Ohio-5498, ¶ 22.

        {¶17} However, “a breach of the contract by the defendant relieves the

prosecution of any obligations under the agreement.” State v. Payton, 6th Dist. Erie

No. E-09-070, E-09-071, 2010-Ohio-5178, ¶ 11.

        ‘Where a defendant enters a plea of guilty in exchange for the
        prosecutor’s promise to recommend probation, an implied
        condition exists that circumstances surrounding the bargain will

                                       -10-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

       remain substantially the same, and a subsequent change is
       sufficient to relieve the state of its obligation.’ State v. Hill, 10th
       Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-463, 2013-Ohio-674, ¶ 20, quoting State
       v. Pascall, 49 Ohio App.2d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1368, (9th Dist. 1972) at
       the syllabus.

“Additional misconduct during incarceration represents a substantial change in

circumstances from when the plea agreement was executed.” State v. Dowler, 4th

Dist. Athens No. 15CA7, 2015-Ohio-5027, ¶ 26.

       {¶18} Notably, “trial courts generally are not a party to the plea negotiations

and the contract itself.” State v. Kocak, 2016-Ohio-8483, 79 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 20 (7th

Dist.). For this reason, “[t]t is well-established law that a trial court is not bound to

accept a sentence recommendation proffered by the prosecution.” State v. Kitzler,

3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-02-06, 2002-Ohio-5253, ¶ 9. Thus,

       ‘[a] trial court does not err by imposing a sentence greater than
       that forming the inducement for the defendant to plead guilty
       when the trial court forewarns the defendant of the applicable
       penalties, including the possibility of imposing a greater sentence
       than that recommended by the prosecutor.’

State v. Oakley, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-06, 2019-Ohio-2487, ¶ 12, quoting State

ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6.

       {¶19} “Whether a party to a plea agreement breached the terms and

obligations of the agreement is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial

court, which will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”              State v.

Harrington, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-37, 2021-Ohio-343, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Tite,

6th Dist. Huron No. H-12-017, 2013-Ohio-1361, ¶ 10. See also State v. Flowers,

                                          -11-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22751, 2009-Ohio-1945, ¶ 6; State v. Adams, 2014-Ohio-

724, 8 N.E.3d 984, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.); State v. Perez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111296,

2023-Ohio-83, ¶ 23; State v. Cortes, 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2022-A-0019, 2022-

A-0020, 2022-Ohio-3973, ¶ 26. But see State v. Blair, 4th Dist. Scioto No.

11CA3429, 2012-Ohio-769, ¶ 16 (applying a de novo standard to this

determination).

                                  Legal Analysis

       {¶20} In this case, Santiago argues that the State violated the terms of the

negotiated plea agreement. He asserts that the State was obligated to recommend

that he remain on community control at his resentencing hearings.               This

recommendation was subject to an express condition that he “successfully complete

the Racing for Recovery program.” June 3 Tr. 3. At the resentencing hearing, a

letter from the director of operations at Racing for Recovery was presented. June

13 Tr. 10-11. This letter indicated that Santiago had a number of behavioral issues

in this program; that he needs further mental health support; but that he would not

be allowed to receive that support at Racing for Recovery. Id. at 11.

       {¶21} On appeal, Santiago argues that this letter should not be taken as an

indication that he did not successfully complete the Racing for Recovery program.

For this reason, he would have this Court find that he did not violate the State’s

express condition; that the prosecution was still obligated to recommend community

control at his resentencing hearings; and that the State breached the plea agreement.

                                        -12-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

However, to decide this appeal, we ultimately do not need to reach the question of

whether Santiago technically violated or complied with the State’s express

condition that he successfully complete the Racing for Recovery program.

       {¶22} As an initial matter, the Defense did not formally object over the issue

of whether the State was in compliance with the plea agreement and did not,

therefore, prompt a ruling from the trial court on this matter. The determination as

to whether a party has breached a plea agreement is a matter that lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Harrington, supra, at ¶ 10. In this appeal, we do

not have a ruling on this matter to review. For this reason, we will examine this

issue for plain error only. See State v. Montgomery, 2008-Ohio-4753, 970 N.E.2d

999, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.); State v. Watkins, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1213, 2016-Ohio-

5756, ¶ 9; State v. Hansen, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 11 MA 63, 2012-Ohio-4574, ¶

15; State v. Dudas, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2006-L-267, 2006-L-268, 2007-Ohio-

6739, ¶ 93; State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92037, 2009-Ohio-2138, ¶ 11.

       {¶23} “Under the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, ‘[p]lain errors or

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought

to the attention of the court.’” State v. Elliott, 2022-Ohio-3778, 199 N.E.3d 944, ¶

75 (3d Dist.), quoting Crim.R. 52(B).

       “In order to find plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), there must be
       an error, the error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial
       proceedings, and the error must have affected ‘substantial
       rights.’” State v. Bowsher, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-07-32, 2009-
       Ohio-6524, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759

                                        -13-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

      N.E.2d 1240 (2002). ‘The standard for plain error is whether, but
      for the error, the outcome of the proceeding clearly would have
      been otherwise.’ State v. Hornbeck, 155 Ohio App.3d 571, 2003-
      Ohio-6897, 802 N.E.2d 184, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Long, 53
      Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). Notice of plain error is
      taken “only to ‘prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State
      v. Davis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio-2916, ¶ 23,
      quoting Long, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus.

State v. Eitzman, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-21-03, 2022-Ohio-574, ¶ 42, quoting State

v. Taflinger, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-20, 2018-Ohio-456, ¶ 17. Under Crim.R.

52(B), “the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plain error affected

his substantial rights.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-

Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14.

      {¶24} In this case, the trial court expressed concern about Santiago’s

extensive criminal history at the very first sentencing hearing in Case No. 19-CR-

13735 on February 24, 2020 when discussing the terms of the joint

recommendation. Feb. 24 Tr. 9. After Santiago committed two offenses while on

community control, the State again recommended that he receive only community

control at the plea hearing and initial sentencing hearing in Case No. 21-CR-14242.

June 9 Tr. 3. Despite this recommendation, the trial court found that Santiago was

“no longer amenable to any community control sanction” in Case No. 19-CR-13725

and in Case No. 21-CR-14242. Doc. 32B. See Doc. 57A.

      {¶25} Subsequently, a resentencing hearing was held on June 13, 2022 only

because an equipment failure prevented a record of the prior sentencing hearing

                                       -14-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

from being created. June 13 Tr. 3. During this initial resentencing hearing, the

Defense requested a continuance to obtain some recommendation letters for

Santiago. Id. at 13. The trial court granted the continuance but stated the following:

       I still don’t know that that’s the reason he should be continued on
       community control because he already had a substantial
       opportunity being placed on community control for two very
       serious offenses and then he goes out and commits two more
       felonies while on community control.

Id. This statement came after the trial court had already found that Santiago was

not amenable to community control in its judgment entries in both cases from the

prior sentencing hearing. Doc. 57A, 32B. Given these facts, there is no indication

that the trial court would not have imposed a prison sentence had the State again

recommended community control at the resentencing hearing. Thus, Santiago has

not established that but for his complained of error, the outcome of the proceeding

clearly would have been otherwise. Accordingly, there is no plain error. See State

v. Hartley, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-14-04, 2014-Ohio-4536, ¶ 9, 13.

       {¶26} In conclusion, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[n]otice of

plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under

exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”

Long, supra, at 532. The facts of this case do not present a manifest miscarriage of

justice as Santiago has not even raised an argument that would indicate that he

suffered any prejudice in this case. His sole assignment of error is overruled.

                                        -15-
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12

                                   Conclusion

       {¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgments of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas

are affirmed.

                                                             Judgments Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.

/hls

                                       -16-