Court Opinion

ID: 9370837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 19:00:57.417492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.991870
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14443    Document: 30-1     Date Filed: 02/14/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-14443
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RACQUEL LAVETTE BIJOU,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20535-AHS-2
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-14443      Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 02/14/2023     Page: 2 of 6

       2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-14443

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Racquel Lavette Bijou appeals her 168-month sentence for
       sex trafficking of a minor. On appeal, Bijou argues that: (1) the dis-
       trict court erred in applying a two-level increase to her offense level
       under the Guidelines for unduly influencing a minor to engage in
       prohibited sexual conduct; (2) the district court erred in applying a
       two-level increase to the offense level based on its finding that Bi-
       jou knew or should have known that the victim was a vulnerable
       victim; and (3) her sentence was substantively unreasonable. In re-
       sponse, the government argues that the appeal should be dismissed
       pursuant to the valid and enforceable appeal waiver in Bijou’s plea
       agreement. After careful review, we dismiss the appeal.
              We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.
       United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). We
       also review de novo whether a defendant knowingly and voluntar-
       ily waived her right to appeal her sentence. United States v. Beni-
       tez-Zapata, 131 F.3d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997).
              Plea agreements “are like contracts and should be inter-
       preted in accord with what the parties intended.” United States v.
       Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005). A sentence appeal
       waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily.
       United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). To
       establish that a sentence appeal waiver was made knowingly and
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       21-14443               Opinion of the Court                         3

       voluntarily, the government must show either that: (1) the district
       court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver dur-
       ing the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defend-
       ant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. Id.;
       see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (requiring that the district
       court inform the defendant of the terms of an appeal waiver). The
       touchstone for assessing this question is whether it was clearly con-
       veyed to the defendant that she was giving up her right to appeal
       under most circumstances. United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185,
       1192 (11th Cir. 2020). We’ve concluded that an appeal waiver was
       enforceable when the waiver was referenced during the plea collo-
       quy and the defendant confirmed that she understood the provi-
       sion and had entered into it freely and voluntarily. United States v.
       Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1323–24, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001). “There is a
       strong presumption that the statements made during [a plea] col-
       loquy are true.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th
       Cir. 1994).
               We’ve never adopted a general “miscarriage of justice” ex-
       ception to the rule that valid appeal waivers must be enforced ac-
       cording to their terms. United States v. King, 41 F.4th 1363, 1368
       n.3 (11th Cir. 2022). Moreover, we’ve said that appeal waivers ap-
       ply “not only to frivolous claims, but also to difficult and debatable
       legal issues.” United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th
       Cir. 2016). However, a defendant who has agreed to a sentence
       appeal waiver does not subject herself to being sentenced entirely
       at the whim of the district court. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14443

       Some sentences, including those imposed above the statutory max-
       imum or based on a constitutionally impermissible factor like race,
       may never be waived. Id. at 1350 n.18; see also Johnson, 541 F.3d
       at 1068 (observing that a sentence that implicated serious due pro-
       cess concerns, “for instance . . . a public flogging,” may trigger re-
       view notwithstanding a valid waiver (quotations omitted)). But,
       notably, the recognized exceptions to the enforceability of appeal
       waivers are “few and sharply defined.” King, 41 F.4th at 1367.
              Here, Bijou’s substantive arguments challenging the en-
       hancements and reasonableness of her sentence are barred by the
       appeal waiver in her plea agreement. Because Bijou’s appeal
       waiver broadly waived her right to appeal her sentence or the man-
       ner in which it was imposed, her challenges on appeal to the “un-
       due influence” and “vulnerable victim” enhancements to her
       guideline calculations and to the substantive reasonableness of her
       168-month sentence all fall within the scope of the waiver.
              As the record reflects, Bijou’s plea agreement allowed only
       three narrow exceptions to the waiver, where: (1) her sentence ex-
       ceeded the maximum permitted by statute; (2) the sentence was
       the result of an upward departure or an upward variance from the
       advisory guideline range established at sentencing; or (3) the gov-
       ernment appealed the sentence. However, her sentence was at the
       low end of the guideline range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment
       and below the statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment,
       and the government did not appeal her sentence. As a result, none
       of the exceptions to the waiver apply.
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       21-14443               Opinion of the Court                       5

               Because the appeal waiver bars Bijou’s arguments, she can
       prevail only if it is unenforceable. On appeal, Bijou says that the
       waiver was unenforceable because she did not “fully understand”
       its significance. But the record shows that the district court fully
       complied with the requirements of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) when it en-
       gaged in a thorough discussion of the appeal waiver contained in
       Bijou’s plea agreement. At the plea colloquy, Bijou affirmed that
       she read the entirety of the plea agreement and understood “every
       word.” In addition, the court engaged in an extensive discussion
       about the appeal waiver “to make sure” that Bijou understood the
       rights she was surrendering. And when Bijou said at one point that
       she did not understand the exceptions to the appeal waiver, the
       court provided a further explanation and Bijou ultimately con-
       firmed her understanding. She also indicated that she “fully dis-
       cussed the waiver” with her counsel and that her counsel answered
       all of her questions. We presume that Bijou’s statements under
       oath at the plea colloquy were true. Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187. Thus,
       on this record, we conclude that Bijou entered her plea knowingly
       and voluntarily. See Boyd, 975 F.3d at 1192;Weaver, 275 F.3d at
       1323–24, 1333.
              As for Bijou’s argument that she did not receive the benefit
       of the bargain by pleading guilty because she only received a sen-
       tence that was one year below the mandatory minimum for the
       charge she pled down from, we are unpersuaded. The plea agree-
       ment, which she said she understood, provided that the district
       court was not bound by any recommendations or the guideline
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       6                      Opinion of the Court               21-14443

       range and could sentence her up to the statutory maximum of life
       imprisonment. Moreover, the agreement indicated that any esti-
       mation or recommendation was merely a prediction, not a prom-
       ise, and Bijou would not be allowed to withdraw her plea if she
       received a higher sentence than what she expected. The fact that
       Bijou did not receive the sentence that she had hoped for does not
       affect the validity of her appeal waiver or her guilty plea.
               Bijou adds that we should not enforce the appeal waiver to
       avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” However, we’ve recognized only
       a “few and sharply defined” exceptions to the enforcement of an
       appeal waiver, none of which apply here, and we’ve never recog-
       nized a “miscarriage of justice” exception. See King, 41 F.4th at
       1367–68 n.3. In any event, it is unlikely that any “miscarriage of
       justice” exception would apply here. Bijou received a sentence at
       the low end of the guideline range and well below the statutory
       maximum of life imprisonment. As for her discussion of her diffi-
       cult life circumstances, this argument goes to the reasonableness of
       her sentence, and our case law directs us to apply appeal waivers
       even “to difficult and debatable issues.” DiFalco, 837 F.3d at 1215.
       Accordingly, Bijou’s appeal is barred by the appeal waiver in her
       plea agreement, and we dismiss the appeal.
             DISMISSED.