Court Opinion

ID: 9715401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:04:26.357262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:34.668249
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur.
Assisting (harboring) a criminal falls into the class of crimes that define accessory or *230accomplice liability, One assisting a criminal was formerly punished as an accessory after the fact. § 9-108, Burns (1956 Repl.)1 Criminal liability was predicated upon the fact of a commission of a crime independent of the legal status of the principal. The following elements of the crime were set out in. Tessely v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 445, 452, 370 N.E.2d 907, 911:
"*...(1) A felony committed. (2) Appellant did harbor, conceal, or assist the principal, with intent that he should escape detection, arrest, capture, or punishment. (8) Appellant had knowledge of the crime at the time of giving aid or assistance. (4) Appellant is not related to the person committing the ... [felo-nyJ Smith v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 546, 99 N.E.2d 417."
This theory of accessory liability is consistent with our presently effective statute IND.CODE 835-41-2-4 which reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person:
(1) has not been prosecuted for the offense;
(2) has not been convicted of the offense; or
(8) has been acquitted of the offense."
Oklahoma has addressed the question of whether the noneriminal delinquency status of a minor principal serves as a shield against criminal liability for his accessories. In Shockley v. State (1986), Okl.Cr., 724 P.2d 256, a father was convicted of harboring a criminal2 because he concealed his son, who had committed murder, from the county sheriff. The court in upholding the conviction stated:
"Where the principal is a minor, the conviction of the accessory depends upon whether there is sufficient evidence presented to show that there was a principal guilty of the crime charged, and whether or not that principal was ever charged with that offense. State v. Truesdell, 620 P.2d 427 (Okl.CR.1980). The fact that our Juvenile Code (Title 10) classifies a particular principal as a delinquent instead of a felon will not allow the accessory to avoid the illegality of his own act." Id. at 724 P.2d 258.
In State v. Truesdell (1980), Okl.Or., 620 P.2d 427, a mother was charged with being an accessory after the fact3 Her twelve-year-old son, the principal, shot her ex-husband ten times. The court vacated her successful motion to quash holding
"... that an accessory is not connected with the original crime, but is connected with the offender after the original offense has been committed. Wilson v. State, Okl.Cr., 552 P.2d 1404 (1976), Vann v. State, 21 Okl.Cr. 298, 207 P. 102 (1922). Thus, the crime of accessory after the fact is a separate and distinct crime, standing on its own particular elements. Murray v. State, Okl.Cr., 562 P.2d 1157 (1977), Wilson v. State, supra. *231And because accessory after the fact is a separate and distinct crime, a conviction of the principal is not a condition precedent to the conviction of an accessory after the fact. See People v. Jones, 184 Colo. 96, 518 P.2d 819 (1974), Britto v. People, 178 Colo. 216, 497 P.2d 325 (1972).
Accordingly, the fact that the principal, the Truesdell child, was not charged with the assault has no bearing on whether Ms. Truesdell has committed the crime of accessory after the fact. The fact that the principal is a minor goes to his legal status, not his factual status, and it is immaterial as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the charge of accessory after the fact. A conviction of accessory after the fact depends on whether there is sufficient evidence presented to show that there was a principal who was guilty of the crime charged, regardless of whether or not the principal was ever charged with the criminal offense." Id. at 620 P.2d 428, 429. (emphasis added)
The rationale of the Oklahoma cases is most persuasive. Considering this rationale and the history of accomplice liability, I believe that the appropriate basis for imposing eriminal liability upon accessories is the factual and not the legal status of the principal.
However, an examination of our legislative history has compelled me to concur with the majority. At one time the following statute would have applied to the case at bar:
"Whoever, not being husband or wife, parent or child of any person guilty of a felony, knowing him to be such, harbors or conceals such felon or whoever harbors or conceals a boy or girl, under eighteen (18) years of age knowing the boy or girl to be fleeing from incarceration or to avoid appearance in court or apprehension on a charge of delinguen-cy, shall, on conviction, be imprisoned ..." IND.CODE 35-1-92-1 as cited in Acts 1976, P.L. 129, See. 9 (Repealed by Acts 1977, P.L. 26, See. 25) (Emphasis added)
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the repeal of a law obliterates its effect. Payne v. Buchanan (1958), 238 Ind. 231, 150 N.E.2d 250. The wording of the above statute reveals that the legislature did not consider juveniles in flight to be fleeing felons. The statute's repeal raises the presumption that the legislature no longer intends that criminal liability attach to the concealing of fugitives under the age of eighteen, and, after all, our primary function in this situation is to determine the legislative intent.

. § 9-103 Burns (1956 Repl.) read in pertinent part:
"9-103. Accessory after the fact. Every person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or child, to any person guilty of any felony, who shall, after the commission of such crime, harbor, conceal or assist such offender, with intent that he shall escape from detection, capture, arrest or punishment, shall be deemed an accessory after the fact, and may be charged, indicted, tried, convicted and punished, tough the principal be neither charged, indicted, tried nor convicted; and, on such conviction, he shall suffer the same punishment. ..." (emphasis added)

. The statute Shockley was convicted under eads as follows:
"Any person who shall knowingly feed, lodge, clothe, arm, equip in whole or in part, harbor, aid, assist or conceal in any manner any person guilty of any felony, or outlaw, or fugitive from justice, or any person seeking to escape arrest for any felony committed within this state or any other state or territory, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary for a period not exceeding ten (10) years." 21 O.S. 1981, § 440.

. As applied in Truesdell, accessories are defined as:
"All persons who, after the commission of any felony, conceal or aid the offender, with knowledge that he has committed a felony and with intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, are accessories." 21 O.S. 1971, § 173.