Court Opinion

ID: 9946447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 19:01:30.021115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.484388
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30297         Document: 101-1           Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/29/2024

         United States Court of Appeals
              for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                                FILED
                                                                      February 29, 2024
                                   No. 23-30297
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________
                                                                             Clerk

Michael Braggs,

                                                                Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                        versus

BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP
America Production Company; BP, P.L.C.; Transocean
Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater,
Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services,
Incorporated,

                                          Defendants—Appellees.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                  USDC Nos. 2:10-MD-2179, 2:17-CV-3887
                 ______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Graves and Wilson, Circuit
Judges.
Per Curiam:*

     _____________________
     *
         This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30297           Document: 101-1          Page: 2       Date Filed: 02/29/2024

                                       No. 23-30297

        This case involves a toxic tort action arising from Michael Braggs’s
exposure to crude oil and chemical dispersants while assisting with the
cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The district court granted
summary judgment because Braggs was unable to provide evidence of
medical causation through admissible expert testimony. We affirm.
                                             I
        In 2010, Michael Braggs joined the cleanup effort following the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For approximately ten months, Braggs worked in
many capacities along the Alabama coast. He cleaned various vessels that
navigated oil-contaminated waters. He deployed and removed contaminated
booms, which served as floating barriers to contain the oil in the Gulf of
Mexico. He picked up oil, tar balls, and oil-covered debris from various
beaches along Alabama’s shoreline. In these capacities, Braggs was exposed
to crude oil and chemical dispersants in the water and air.
        In 2017, Braggs filed this action against BP Exploration & Production,
Inc. (BP) and affiliated companies to recover for the alleged injuries he
sustained during the Deepwater Horizon cleanup.1 According to Braggs, his
exposure to crude oil and chemical dispersants caused him to develop several
medical conditions. Those included, inter alia, rashes, headaches, dizziness,
coughing, wheezing, gastroesophageal pain, and vision loss.
        To support his claim that toxic exposure caused these medical
conditions, Braggs offered the report and testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook, a
retired Navy physician with expertise in occupational medicine and

        _____________________
        1
           Braggs originally filed a “Short Form Joinder” in 2011 to join the multidistrict
litigation arising from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. In 2017, the presiding judge ordered
the plaintiffs who had not settled to file individual lawsuits. After consolidated discovery,
the presiding judge severed the cases, and Braggs’s case was assigned to Judge Zainey.

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                                       No. 23-30297

environmental toxicology.2 Cook’s report addressed the likelihood that toxic
exposure during the Deepwater Horizon cleanup caused certain medical
conditions among the cleanup workers. After providing a “general causation
analysis,” Cook concluded that a variety of respiratory, dermal, and ocular
conditions “can occur in individuals exposed to crude oil, including
weathered crude oil, during oil spill response and cleanup work.”
        BP moved to exclude Cook’s testimony in accordance with Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 because it failed to offer evidence of general causation.
BP then moved for summary judgment because Braggs failed to raise a fact
question as to an essential element of the case. The district court granted
both motions. The court concluded the general causation report did not
provide relevant and reliable expert testimony,3 and therefore, BP was
entitled to summary judgment. Braggs timely appealed.4

        _____________________
        2
            Multiple versions of Cook’s general causation report have been offered by
plaintiffs in similar cases. Here, BP included the May 31, 2022 version of Cook’s report
with its motion in limine and the June 21, 2022 version of Cook’s report with its motion for
summary judgment. Braggs offered the June report to establish general causation. The
district court noted the discrepancy between the versions “has no effect on the disposition
of the motion[] for summary judgment in the captioned case[].”
        3
           Judge Zainey adopted the reasoning provided by other sections of the court,
specifically Judges Vance, Barbier, Morgan, Milazzo, and Ashe. Other sections of the court
excluded Cook’s report because it failed “to identify the level of exposure to a relevant
chemical that can cause the conditions asserted in plaintiff’s complaint render[ing] his
opinion unreliable, unhelpful, and incapable of establishing general causation.” Harris v.
BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 17-4342, 2022 WL 2789037, at *7 (E.D. La. July 15, 2022)
(Vance, J.). In other words, “Cook fail[ed] to identify the harmful dose of any chemical to
which [plaintiff] was exposed that would cause the development in the general population
of the adverse health conditions or symptoms [plaintiff] alleges.” Johns v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. 17-3304, 2022 WL 1811088, at *4 (E.D. La. June 2, 2022) (Ashe, J.), aff’d on other
grounds, sub nom. Street v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 85 F.4th 266 (5th Cir. 2023).
        4
            Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

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                                         No. 23-30297

                                               II
        In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court
provided the analytical framework for determining whether expert testimony
is admissible under Rule 702. Courts must assess “whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”6
More pointedly, the critical inquiry is “whether the expert testimony is both
reliable and relevant.”7 The party offering the expert’s testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance of the
evidence.8
        Braggs challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
asserts Cook’s expert testimony satisfies Daubert. He maintains Cook’s
general causation report was based on “state-of-the-art, peer-reviewed
science” and faithfully followed the scientific method. He further contends
the report establishes general causation in accordance with Daubert because
“it includes numerous empirical studies that show health hazards to the
general population from exposure to crude oil.”
        We “review the admission or exclusion of expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion,”9 affording the district court “[w]ide latitude”10 in its

        _____________________
        5
            509 U.S. 579 (1993).
        6
            Id. at 592-93.
        7
         Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
        8
            See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Co., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
        9
         Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing St. Martin v. Mobil Expl.
& Producing U.S. Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2000)).
        10
             Roman v. W. Mfg., Inc., 691 F.3d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 2012).

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                                          No. 23-30297

determination. We “will not find error unless the ruling is manifestly
erroneous.”11 “Manifest error is one that is plain and indisputable, and that
amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.” 12 We review
challenges to summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards
as the district court.13 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 We construe all facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 15
                                               A
       Plaintiffs alleging injury due to toxic exposure must prove both general
and specific causation.16 General causation exists if “a substance is capable
of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population.”17
Specific causation exists if the “substance caused a particular individual’s
injury.”18 “Evidence concerning specific causation in toxic tort cases is
admissible only as a follow-up to admissible general-causation evidence.”19
       Our court has frequently addressed what general causation experts,
such as Cook, must show when a plaintiff alleges injury from toxic exposure.
       _____________________
       11
            Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
       12
           Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux
Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir. 2004)).
       13
            Smith v. Chrysler Grp., L.L.C., 909 F.3d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 2018).
       14
            Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
       15
            See Smith, 909 F.3d at 749.
       16
            See, e.g., Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2007).
       17
          Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 468-69 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Knight,
482 F.3d at 351).
       18
            Id. (quoting Knight, 482 F.3d at 351).
       19
            Knight, 482 F.3d at 351.

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                                         No. 23-30297

“[T]he expert must first demonstrate that the chemical at issue is actually
capable of harming individuals in the general population . . . .”20 In doing so,
the expert must identify “the harmful level of exposure to a chemical” at
which physical symptoms manifest.21 Put differently, they must determine
not only whether a chemical can cause certain health effects, but also at what
level of exposure those health effects appear.22 Our court has described this
to be a “minimal fact[] necessary to sustain the plaintiffs’ burden in a toxic
tort case.”23
        Braggs concedes Cook’s report fails to identify the harmful level of
exposure capable of causing his alleged medical conditions. Nevertheless,
Braggs contends any deficiency in the report regarding the absence of this
information is a result of BP’s failure to collect exposure data for the
Deepwater Horizon cleanup workers. He argues we “should not penalize
plaintiffs for the absence of data that BP should have collected.” He further
asserts the “unique circumstances” of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill require
a different standard for establishing general causation. These arguments fail
for two reasons.

        _____________________
        20
             Johnson, 685 F.3d at 469.
        21
          See Allen v. Pa. Eng’r Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Barrington
v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 23-30343, 2024 WL 400191, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2024) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (noting the expert report failed to identify the “necessary dose of
exposure to crude oil or oil dispersant for any of [the plaintiff’s] complained-of symptoms
to manifest in the general population.”).
        22
          See McGill v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 830 F. App’x 430, 433 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (expert testimony did not “provide conclusive findings on what
exposure level of Corexit is hazardous to humans”); Seaman v. Seacor Marine L.L.C., 326
F. App’x 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (expert failed to establish
general causation because “she provides no clue regarding what would be a harmful level
of Ferox exposure”).
        23
             Allen, 102 F.3d at 199.

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                                       No. 23-30297

        First, the supposed implausibility of “pinpoint[ing] the exact levels of
[Braggs’s] exposure to the toxic substances unleashed during the spill” has
no bearing on the general causation inquiry. General causation does not
depend upon particular sampling taken from the incident in question. 24
Instead, a general causation expert must assess whether the type of injury at
issue can be caused by a particular toxin in the general population.25 Cook’s
failure to identify the level of exposure capable of causing the alleged injuries
renders his opinion unreliable.26 His expert testimony does not establish
general causation in accordance with Daubert.
        Second, the district court correctly applied our toxic tort
jurisprudence regarding general causation, and therefore, did not abuse its
discretion.27     Braggs cites no case in which we have abrogated the
requirement that a general causation expert identify the harmful level of toxic
exposure in the general population. While the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was
a unique environmental catastrophe, the district court would have erred by
disregarding our toxic tort precedent and creating a new general causation
standard. Braggs’s assertion that the district court “requir[ed] Dr. Cook to
meet a requirement in his opinions that top-tier scientists . . . have not be able
to do” ignores Daubert and its progeny.                  Our court has consistently
        _____________________
        24
           See Byrd v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 22-30654, 2023 WL 4046280, at *2 (5th
Cir. June 16, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Exposure data collected (or not) from the
incident almost always bears on specific causation.”).
        25
           See Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 468-69 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Knight
v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2007)).
        26
           See Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“Where an expert’s opinion is based on insufficient information, the analysis is
unreliable.”).
        27
             Kim v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 86 F.4th 150, 162 (5th Cir. 2023) (noting a
district court did not abuse its discretion when it properly “analyzed the relevancy,
reliability, and potential helpfulness” of the expert’s testimony).

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                                           No. 23-30297

recognized “the law cannot wait for future scientific investigation and
research.”28        Courts “must resolve cases . . . on the basis of scientific
knowledge that is currently available.”29 Accordingly, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by applying our current toxic tort jurisprudence and
excluding Cook’s general causation testimony.
        To the extent Braggs argues his “temporary symptoms” require the
application of a different general causation standard, we consider the
argument forfeited as he cites no authority to support such a contention.30
Without Cook’s expert testimony, Braggs fails to provide reliable and
relevant expert testimony as required by Daubert and Rule 702 regarding
general causation. He has not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material
fact pertaining to his toxic exposure claim. The district court, therefore, did
not err in granting summary judgment.31
                                       *        *         *
        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

        _____________________
        28
             Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
        29
             Id.
        30
           See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits
an argument by failing to raise it in the first instance in the district court—thus raising it for
the first time on appeal—or by failing to adequately brief the argument on appeal.”
(citations omitted)); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring appellant’s argument to
contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities
and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”).
        31
            See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (“[A] complete failure
of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.”).

                                                8