Court Opinion

ID: 9892717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 18:01:51.172302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:46.799102
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30756        Document: 00516941947             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/24/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                 October 24, 2023
                                       No. 22-30756
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Stephen J. Katz,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Christine Wormuth, Secretary, United States Department of the Army,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:21-CV-132
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Elrod, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge: *
         A septuagenarian civilian doctor employed by the U.S. Army was
   removed from his position as Chief of Surgery and replaced by a military
   officer half his age. When he complained, the doctor was suspended pending
   an investigation into alleged misconduct, which stretched on until five
   months later, when the doctor resigned. The doctor sued for age
   discrimination and retaliation, but the district court granted summary

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                          No. 22-30756

   judgment to the Army. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM as to the age
   discrimination claim but REVERSE and REMAND on the retaliation
   claim.
                                                I.
                                               A.
            In April 2016, the Army hired Dr. Stephen Katz as a civilian surgeon
   at Bayne-Jones Army Community Hospital in Fort Polk, Louisiana. He was
   73 years old. In October 2016, he was appointed Chief of Surgery. Katz
   competed for the Chief of Surgery position against two other general
   surgeons, including Dr. Isaac Isaiah. The relationship between Katz and
   Isaiah ultimately deteriorated to the point where the two did not speak to
   each other. 1
            Katz remained Chief of Surgery until August 1, 2018, when he was
   replaced by Major Caton Simoni, a 37-year-old active-duty Army Medical
   Corps Officer. The decision to replace Katz (a civilian) with Major Simoni
   (an officer) was part of a hospital-wide policy change implemented by the
   new Deputy Commander for Clinical Services, Lieutenant Colonel Brian
   Adams, M.D., which was designed “to put uniformed personnel in the
   department leadership roles as career development opportunities for young
   Officers.” Upon learning that he had been replaced as Chief of Surgery, Katz
   submitted a Memorandum for Record entitled “Hostile work environment”
   in which he asserted that being replaced as Chief of Surgery without any

            _____________________
            1
             Katz, who is Jewish, claimed that Isaiah, who is Christian, was given preferential
   treatment due to the “pro-Christian” ideology that permeated the hospital’s culture.
   Katz’s religious discrimination claim is not before this court on appeal. Nonetheless,
   Katz’s belief that Isaiah was given preferential treatment by, and was in cahoots with,
   hospital leadership is still relevant to the claims that are on appeal.

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   notice “represented a total lack of respect and an extension of the hostile
   environment in which [he] functioned.”
          On August 17, 2018—approximately two weeks after he had been
   replaced as Chief of Surgery and nine days after his internal complaint—the
   hospital’s Credentials Committee convened an ad hoc meeting and voted to
   place Katz’s clinical privileges in abeyance “due to allegations and reported
   concerns regarding [his] approach to surgical procedures, unprofessional
   conduct with staff, as well as concerns regarding patient safety and
   professional integrity.” The Committee also placed Isaiah’s clinical
   privileges in abeyance the same day “due to allegations and reported
   concerns regarding [his] surgical skill and practices, [his] performance within
   Department of Surgery, and concerns [his] surgical practices are outdated
   and potentially unsafe to patients.” Adams was the Chairperson of the
   Credentials Committee.
          The Notices of Abeyance sent to Katz and Isaiah stated that the
   abeyance was valid for 15 days, with an option to extend it to 30 days, while
   an investigation was conducted into the allegations, and that if the
   investigation was still ongoing after 30 days, the abeyance would
   automatically convert into a summary suspension. The Notices also
   explained that if the investigation found “substantial cause to proceed,” the
   hospital’s Credentials Committee would send the case to a more thorough
   “peer review.” In response to the abeyance, on August 21, 2018, Katz
   submitted another Memorandum for Record, this one entitled “Summary of
   Inappropriate [B]ehavior from the Bayne-Jones Army Community Hospital
   Command Group,” which, according to Katz, outlined the “overwhelming
   evidence that [he] was treated unfairly, and in a consistently hostile manner
   by Dr. Adams and the [hospital] command group.”

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           An investigator was assigned to Isaiah’s case on September 4, 2018,
   but an investigator was not assigned to Katz’s case until September 17, 2018.
   Because the investigation into Isaiah was still ongoing—and the investigation
   into Katz had not even begun—when the 30-day window expired, their
   abeyances converted to summary suspensions on September 16, 2018. The
   investigations into Katz’s and Isaiah’s conduct were completed on October
   3 and October 5, 2018, respectively. Both investigators recommended that
   the doctors’ clinical privileges be reinstated. The Credentials Committee
   reviewed the investigators’ reports during its October 10, 2018 meeting. As
   to Isaiah, the Committee voted to adopt the investigator’s recommendation,
   and Isaiah’s clinical privileges were reinstated the next day. But as to Katz,
   the Committee raised an additional concern—“potential fraudulent
   documentation on a postoperative patient”—that the investigator had not
   addressed. This concern about potentially fraudulent documentation dated
   back to a June 30, 2018 complaint that Isaiah had filed against Katz (Adams
   was CC’d on the complaint). The Committee therefore deferred voting on
   Katz’s reinstatement until an investigation could be conducted into the
   potential fraudulent documentation. On October 16, 2018, shortly after
   learning about the Committee’s decision, Katz contacted an Equal
   Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor to initiate an informal
   complaint. 2

           _____________________
           2
              Under the established process, Katz had 45 days from each allegedly
   discriminatory event to initiate an informal complaint with an EEO Counselor. If, after 30
   days, the EEO Counselor was not able to informally resolve the complaint, Katz would be
   permitted to file a formal EEO complaint. The Army would then investigate the allegations
   in the complaint and produce a report, after which Katz could either request a hearing by
   an EEOC administrative judge or a decision on the record from the Army. See EEO
   Complaint Procedures, U.S. ARMY, https://home.army.mil/benelux/index.php/about/G
   arrison/equal-employment-opportunity/eeo-program (last visited Oct. 11, 2023); see also
   29 C.F.R. § 1614.

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          On November 7, 2018—with the investigation into the potential
   fraudulent documentation completed—the Committee met again to discuss
   Katz’s suspension. The meeting minutes do not state whether the
   investigator substantiated the fraudulent documentation claim. Instead, the
   minutes note that the investigator “stated in his report that other complaints
   regarding Katz were leveled during the [investigator’s] interviews” and that
   “[d]uring the committee discussion it came to light from a few members of
   the Credentials Committee that Dr. Katz has previously left patients without
   completing a handoff or report on a patient to the other surgeon on staff,”
   i.e., Isaiah. The Committee therefore voted to send Katz to peer review.
          Katz’s peer review was conducted on December 12, 2018. The review
   panel found “no significant concerns for patient care or patient safety” and
   noted that the “poor professional environment” between Katz and Isaiah
   was “likely the reason for the identification of the [potentially fraudulent
   documentation] in question.” The panel therefore recommended that Katz’s
   clinical privileges be reinstated. However, the Credentials Committee did
   not convene to discuss the review panel’s recommendation until January 25,
   2019—more than a month later. In the interim, Katz filed a formal EEO
   complaint on December 28, 2018—alleging a hostile work environment and
   discrimination based on race, age (76), national origin (Jewish), and religion
   (Jewish)—and resigned effective January 2, 2019. He then amended his EEO
   complaint on January 3, 2019.
          Katz alleges that, prior to tendering his resignation, Colonel Marla
   Ferguson, the hospital’s commanding officer, threatened that if Katz did not
   resign, she would “end [his] career.” On January 25, 2019—three weeks
   after Katz’s resignation—the Credentials Committee voted to reinstate
   Katz’s clinical privileges. Katz was informed of his reinstatement on January
   31, 2019.

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                                    No. 22-30756

                                        B.
          Following the EEO office’s investigation of his complaint, Katz
   requested a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
   (EEOC) administrative judge. On August 4, 2020, the administrative judge
   ruled against Katz’s claims on the merits, and the Army’s EEO office
   adopted that decision on October 20, 2020.
          On January 18, 2021, Katz filed suit in federal court asserting four
   causes of action: (1) age discrimination; (2) hostile work environment; (3)
   retaliation; and (4) religious discrimination. At summary judgment, however,
   Katz proceeded only upon his claims that the Army had: (1) removed him
   from his position as Chief of Surgery because of his age, in violation of the
   Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); and (2) retaliated against
   him, in violation of the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
   by placing his clinical privileges in abeyance, converting his abeyance to a
   summary suspension, and delaying resolution of the investigation into his
   conduct, which culminated in his constructive discharge.
          The district court dismissed Katz’s claims concerning his removal as
   Chief of Surgery and the abeyance of his clinical privileges as time-barred by
   29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1), which requires federal employees to “initiate
   contact with [an EEO] Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter
   alleged to be discriminatory.” The court rejected Katz’s arguments that the
   Army had waived any timeliness objection by adjudicating his EEO
   complaint on the merits and that his claims concerning the abeyance were
   timely under the continuing violation doctrine because it was connected to
   his subsequent automatic suspension and further investigations. The court
   then dismissed Katz’s retaliation claim for failure to exhaust his
   administrative remedies because he did not “check the box for reprisal in his
   EEO complaint.”

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          Despite dismissing Katz’s claims on timeliness and exhaustion
   grounds, the district court proceeded to analyze the merits of Katz’s age
   discrimination and retaliation claims and, applying the familiar McDonnell
   Douglas burden-shifting framework, dismissed them once again. The court
   determined that Katz failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and
   found that, while Katz had presented a prima facie case of age discrimination,
   the Army had come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
   removing Katz as Chief of Surgery and Katz had not shown that this reason
   was pretextual. Katz timely appealed.
                                         II.
          We review de novo the district court’s determination of whether Katz
   exhausted his administrative remedies. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F. 3d 783, 788
   (5th Cir. 2006). The district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
   merits of Katz’s claims is also reviewed de novo, with all factual inferences
   viewed in the light most favorable to Katz. Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850 F.3d
   237, 241 (5th Cir. 2017). We may affirm the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment on any adequate ground supported by the record, even if it is
   different than the one on which the district court actually relied. Montgomery
   v. Brookshire, 34 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). The court “should grant
   summary judgment when ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
   and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Davidson v.
   Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R.
   Civ. P. 56(a)). In the employment discrimination context, the purpose of
   summary judgment is to weed out “patently meritless cases.” Caldwell, 850
   F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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                                          No. 22-30756

                                                III.
           We begin with Katz’s age-discrimination claim. 3 Under the federal-
   sector provision of the ADEA, all federal personnel actions must be “free
   from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (emphasis
   added). Accordingly, Katz establishes a triable ADEA claim against the
   Army if he shows a genuine dispute as to whether age played “any part” in
   the Army’s decision to remove him from the Chief of Surgery position. 4 See
   Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1174 (2020). 5 He can make this showing
   through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both. Jackson v. Cal-W.
   Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2010).
           As he did before the district court, Katz contends on appeal that the
   Army’s investigative report, which found that hospital leadership removed
   Katz from his position as Chief of Surgery as part of a hospital-wide decision
   “to put uniformed personnel in the department leadership roles as career
   development opportunities for young Officers,” was direct evidence of age
   discrimination. We agree. 6 “A statement or document which shows ‘on its
           _____________________
           3
              Because we find that Katz’s age-discrimination claim failed on the merits, we do
   not address whether it was also time-barred under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).
            4
              This is in direct contrast to ADEA claims against private-sector employers,
   which, given the statutory language prohibiting personnel actions taken “because of [an]
   individual’s age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added), require “but-for” causation.
   Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).
            5
              Even if Katz’s age-discrimination claim could survive summary judgment under
   the lower causation standard for federal-sector employees, because he cannot establish but-
   for causation, he is limited to “injunctive or other forward-looking relief” and “cannot
   obtain reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related to
   the end result of an employment decision.” Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1177–78. But we need not
   reach such remedy-related issues because Katz’s age-discrimination claim fails.
            6
              Disregarding Katz’s contrary contentions, the district court adopted the Army’s
   argument that the use of the word “young” in “young Officers” “refers to how much
   professional experience the officer has,” not the officer’s age, and therefore found that this
   was not evidence of age-based discrimination. But it was error for the district court to make

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                                         No. 22-30756

   face that an improper criterion served as a basis—not necessarily the sole
   basis, but a basis—for the adverse employment action is direct evidence of
   discrimination.’” Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 579 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (alteration adopted) (quoting Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.
   State Univ., 887 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2018)). The investigative report,
   which Adams confirmed at his deposition was accurate, shows on its face that
   age—an improper criterion—served as a basis (although not the sole basis)
   for removing Katz from his position as Chief of Surgery.
           But our inquiry does not end there. Because Katz has direct evidence
   of age-based discrimination, “the burden shifts to [the Army] to ‘prove by a
   preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made
   regardless of the discriminatory animus.’” Wallace v. Perform. Contractors,
   Inc., 57 F.4th 209, 218 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp.,
   L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005)). The Army has carried this burden.
   It is clear from the record that hospital leadership made a hospital-wide
   decision to replace civilian department heads with military officers. To be
   sure, there was an impermissible preference for “young” officers, and if Katz
   were an older military officer who had been replaced by a young military
   officer, this could be a very different case. But Katz is not a military officer.
   Thus, regardless of his age, Katz would have been replaced as Chief of
   Surgery because he is a civilian.
           For this same reason, Katz cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas
   pretext requirement, either. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

           _____________________
   this determination at the summary judgment stage; the court was required to draw all
   factual inferences in favor of Katz. See Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373, 1379 (5th Cir.
   1994) (“Credibility determinations have no place in summary judgment proceedings. The
   district court chose to believe the defendants’ evidence over the plaintiffs’ and that was
   error.” (citations omitted)).

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   792, 804 (1973). After determining that Katz had established a prima facie
   case, the district court correctly identified the Army’s proffered justification
   for removing Katz from his position as Chief of Surgery—that department
   leadership roles were being converted from civilian positions to military
   positions—as legitimate and nondiscriminatory. The ultimate burden thus
   shifted back to Katz to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
   this justification was pretext for age discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson
   Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). To show pretext, Katz needed
   to demonstrate either “disparate treatment” or that the Army’s proffered
   explanation was “false” or otherwise “unworthy of credence.” Moss v. BMC
   Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The
   district court correctly determined that Katz failed to carry this burden.
   There is no evidence to suggest disparate treatment (i.e., that other civilian
   department heads were allowed to remain in their positions while Katz was
   not). Nor has Katz shown that the Army’s proffered explanation was false.
                                        * * *
          Because the Army demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory,
   non-pretextual reason for removing Katz from his position as Chief of
   Surgery, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment with respect to Katz’s
   age discrimination claim.
                                          IV.
          Next, we turn to Katz’s retaliation claim. Before addressing the
   merits, we must consider two threshold issues: whether                     Katz
   administratively exhausted this claim, and whether the abeyance of Katz’s
   clinical privileges can be considered as a basis for this claim.

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                                     No. 22-30756

                                          A.
          The district court held that “Katz did not timely exhaust his
   administrative remedies” with respect to his retaliation claim “because of his
   failure to check the box for reprisal in his EEO complaint.” This was error.
   Our court’s caselaw is clear: “we do not require that a Title-VII plaintiff
   check a certain box . . . to exhaust his or her administrative remedies.”
   Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 792. Rather, “the plaintiff’s administrative charge will
   be read somewhat broadly, in a fact-specific inquiry into what EEO[]
   investigations it can reasonably be expected to trigger.” Id. Thus, if a
   retaliation investigation could “reasonably have been expected to grow out
   of” Katz’s EEO complaint, then he has sufficiently exhausted his
   administrative remedies with respect to that claim. See id.
          Katz filed his EEO complaint on December 28, 2018, and then
   amended it on January 3, 2019 to add additional factual allegations
   concerning his January 2, 2019 resignation. Although neither the original nor
   resubmitted EEO complaint checked the box for “reprisal” or used the word
   “retaliation,” the resubmitted complaint set forth the same factual
   allegations that form the basis of Katz’s retaliation claim in federal court: the
   “inappropriate” abeyance; the “endless and baseless” investigation that
   followed the abeyance; the additional investigation that was ordered despite
   the investigator’s “recommend[ation] that [Katz] be reinstated with no
   clinical change”; and “[five] months of forced inactivity” (i.e., suspension)
   “with no basis,” all of which, Katz alleged, made it “clear that the intention
   was to dismiss [him] or force [him] to resign,” which he did on January 2,
   2019. An investigation into potential retaliation would be “reasonably
   expected” to “grow out of” these allegations. See Williams v. Tarrant Cnty.
   Coll. Dist., 717 F. App’x 440, 445–46 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Despite
   [the plaintiff’s] failure to check the retaliation box, or otherwise include the
   word ‘retaliation’ in her charge, it was sufficient to exhaust her retaliation

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   claim” because “[t]he administrative investigation which can reasonably be
   expected to grow out of [her] charge would examine whether she was
   engaged in a protected activity . . . and whether she was terminated as a
   result.”(quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration adopted)). 7
                                                   B.
           Having determined that Katz administratively exhausted his
   retaliation claim, we must decide whether he can rely on the abeyance of his
   clinical privileges as a basis for this claim. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1),
   Katz was required to “initiate contact with [an EEO] Counselor within 45
   days of the date of the matter alleged to be” retaliatory. Katz concedes that
   he “contacted an EEO counselor on October 16, 2018”—more than 45 days
   after “the placement of his clinical privileges in abeyance on August 17,
   2018”—but contends that the Army waived its untimeliness defense and, in
   any event, the continuing violation doctrine applies. 8 We disagree with both
   assertions.

           _____________________
           7
               Katz argues that, even if he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies for his
   retaliation claim concerning conduct that occurred before he filed his EEO complaint—
   i.e., prior to December 28, 2018—under Gupta v. East Texas State University, 654 F.2d 411,
   413–14 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981), he was not required to exhaust his administrative
   remedies to assert a retaliation claim concerning post-December 28 activity, including the
   alleged threat Colonel Ferguson made that she would ruin Katz’s career if he did not resign.
   However, because Katz amended his EEO complaint on January 3, 2019 to include
   allegations concerning this post-December 28 conduct, the Gupta exception would not
   apply. See Eberle v. Gonzales, 240 F. App’x 622, 628 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding
   that the Gupta exception does not apply where the alleged retaliatory conduct occurred
   before the filing of the EEO charge).
             8
               In his reply brief, Katz asserts for the first time that the district court should have
   equitably tolled the 45-day requirement because Katz “was not aware of the timelines for
   filing, despite his due diligence.” But it is well established that arguments raised for the
   first time in a reply brief are forfeited, Dixon v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 794 F.3d 507, 508
   (5th Cir. 2015), and therefore this argument need not be addressed.

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          Beginning with waiver, our court has established a bright-line rule that
   “[i]n order to waive a timeliness objection, the agency must make a specific
   finding that the claimant’s submission was timely.” Rowe v. Sullivan, 967
   F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Munoz v. Aldridge, 894 F.2d 1489, 1494–
   95 (5th Cir. 1990)). Here, the Army made no specific finding of timeliness
   during the administrative adjudicatory process. Therefore, the district court
   correctly held that the Army did not waive its timeliness defense.
          Katz argues that Rowe’s specific-finding requirement does not apply
   here because “Rowe involved actions of the [Equal Employment
   Opportunity] Commission, as opposed to the actions of the federal-
   employer.” But our court has repeatedly and consistently applied this rule to
   the actions of the federal employer as well. See, e.g., Werner v. Dep’t of
   Homeland Sec., 441 F. App’x 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Here,
   the [Transportation Security Administration] made no such finding . . . .”);
   Ulanoff v. Henderson, No. 99-51025, 2000 WL 1835081, at *4 (5th Cir. Nov.
   20, 2000) (per curiam) (“[T]he Post Office made no such finding
   here . . . .”); Henderson v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 436, 440–41 (5th
   Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Veterans Administration made a specific finding of
   timeliness . . . .”). And Katz’s request that we “revisit [the] Rowe holding”
   can only be granted by the en banc court, not this panel. See In re Henry, 944
   F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Under the rule of orderliness, one panel of
   this circuit may not overturn another panel absent an intervening decision to
   the contrary by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” (quotation marks
   and citation omitted)).
          As for the continuing violation doctrine, the Supreme Court has
   explained that it only applies to hostile work environment claims, not
   discrimination or retaliation claims. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
   U.S. 101, 114–15 (2002); accord Hamic v. Harris Cnty. W.C. & I.D. No. 36,
   184 F. App’x 442, 447 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[P]ost-Morgan, a

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   plaintiff can only recover for retaliation to the extent that it occurred within
   the limitations period, that is, the continuing violations doctrine does not
   apply to retaliation.”). So, even if, as Katz asserts, the time-barred abeyance
   was related to other retaliatory acts that occurred within the 45-day
   limitations period, the abeyance cannot be considered as a basis for his
   retaliation claim. 9
                                                C.
           Finally, we turn to the merits of Katz’s retaliation claim, considering
   only those allegedly retaliatory acts that occurred within the limitations
   period. To establish a retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence,
   Katz has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that:
   (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment
   action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity
   and the adverse employment action. Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth.
   Bd. of Comm’rs, 810 F.3d 940, 945 (5th Cir. 2015). If Katz establishes a prima
   facie case, the burden shifts to the Army to show a legitimate, non-retaliatory
   reason for its decision, and, upon such a showing, the ultimate burden rests
   on Katz to demonstrate that the Army’s reason is pretext for retaliation. Id.
   at 948. The district court concluded that Katz had not established a prima
   facie case because he could not show that he suffered an adverse employment
   action. We disagree.

           _____________________
           9
             Although Morgan is a Title VII case, not an ADEA case, the circuits that have
   had the opportunity to consider the issue have uniformly applied the Morgan rule to ADEA
   claims. See, e.g., Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2003); Kassner v.
   2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 239–240 (2d Cir. 2007); Sherman v. Chrysler Corp.,
   47 F. App’x 716, 721 (6th Cir. 2002); Law v. Cont’l Airlines Corp., 399 F.3d 330, 333–34
   (D.C. Cir. 2005).

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          Beginning with the first element of Katz’s prima facie case, the district
   court correctly identified that by contacting an EEO counselor on October
   16, 2018, Katz engaged in protected activity. But as Katz points out, he also
   “engaged in various forms of protected opposition activity before resorting
   to his EEO contact beginning in October 2018”—namely, his August 8 and
   August 21 Memorandum for Record. See Foster v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 834 F.
   App’x 88, 91 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Title VII protects informal complaints so long
   as the plaintiff ‘reasonably believed’ the challenged employment practice
   violated Title VII.” (citation omitted)). This part of Katz’s prima facie case
   is therefore satisfied.
          As for the “adverse employment action” element, Katz was required
   to “show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
   materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded
   a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
   Welsh v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 941 F.3d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting
   Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)), abrogated
   on other grounds by Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023).
   “[W]hen determining whether an allegedly retaliatory action is materially
   adverse, courts look to indicia such as whether the action affected job title,
   grade, hours, salary, or benefits or caused a diminution in prestige or change
   in standing among . . . coworkers.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
          Katz points to three actions which he claims, standing alone and
   viewed together, constituted materially adverse events: (1) his August 17,
   2018 abeyance; (2) the prolonged investigation into his alleged misconduct,
   which extended his abeyance for more than five months; and (3) his forced
   resignation. The abeyance cannot be considered as part of this determination
   because, as explained above, it is time-barred. And even if we were to
   consider it, the abeyance, standing alone, is not a materially adverse event

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   because Katz continued to be paid during his suspension period. See Davis v.
   Legal Servs. Ala., Inc., 19 F.4th 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2021) (“No Circuit has
   held that a simple paid suspension, in and of itself, constitutes an adverse
   employment action.”) (collecting cases). However, Katz has presented a
   triable question of whether, by prolonging Katz’s suspension by repeatedly
   adding new grounds for investigation, the Army crossed the line into an
   adverse employment action.
           For five long months, Katz was unable to continue work as a general
   surgeon and was prohibited from seeing or operating on patients—a
   consequence that well might have dissuaded a reasonable doctor from making
   or supporting a charge of discrimination. Indeed, this court recognized as
   much in McCoy v. City of Shreveport, noting that when individuals are placed
   on leave pending an investigation into potential wrongdoing, those people are
   “indefinitely relieved of all duties and have little, if any, control over their
   reinstatement. Consequently, placement on administrative leave may carry
   with it both the stigma of the suspicion of wrongdoing and possibly significant
   emotional distress.” 492 F.3d 551, 560–61 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam),
   abrogated on other grounds by Hamilton, 79 F.4th 494. 10 What is more, Katz
   spent this time worried that he would be permanently barred from practicing
   at the hospital as the investigations into his alleged conduct were ongoing—
   increasing anxiety, emotional distress, and the overall deterrent effect. Thus,
   Katz has raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was subject
   to an adverse employment action by virtue of the Army’s prolonged
   investigation into his alleged misconduct.
           _____________________
           10
             McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559, is also relevant for its abrogation of this court’s holding
   in Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 2000)—that a four-month paid
   administrative leave was not an adverse employment action—in light of the Supreme
   Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53
   (2006), which lowered the standard applicable to Title VII retaliation cases.

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          As for Katz’s claim that he suffered the adverse employment action of
   forced resignation—i.e., constructive discharge—the district court declined
   to consider it due to a failure to exhaust. But, as explained above, Katz did
   exhaust this claim, and we therefore consider its substance.
          “In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation based on
   constructive discharge, [a plaintiff] ‘must prove that working conditions
   would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [his]
   shoes would have felt compelled to resign.’” Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns,
   L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film
   Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 429–30 (5th Cir. 1992)). To determine whether a
   “reasonable employee” would feel “compelled to resign,” we consider
   whether the plaintiff suffered:
          (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job
          responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work;
          (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6)
          badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer
          calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7)
          offers of early retirement or continued employment on terms
          less favorable than the employee’s former status.
   Id. at 440 (quoting Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir.
   2001) (alteration adopted)). Here, Katz alleges that he was removed from his
   position as Chief of Surgery (a demotion), had his clinical privileges placed
   in abeyance (a reduction in job responsibilities), was reassigned to report to
   Major Simoni (a younger supervisor), and had his career threatened if he
   refused to resign (harassment calculated to encourage resignation). Thus,
   Katz has raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was subject
   to a constructive discharge adverse action.
          With adverse action established for the purpose of summary
   judgment, the remaining element of Katz’s prima facie case is causation,

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   which the district court did not reach. On appeal, as before the district court,
   the Army’s argument on this issue is that “[t]here is no probative evidence
   whatsoever to support a retaliatory motive on the part of Dr. Adams.” But a
   causal connection can also “be established simply by showing close enough
   timing between the two events.” Garcia v. Pro. Cont. Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d
   236, 241 (5th Cir. 2019). This court has repeatedly held periods of a few
   months between protected activity and adverse action sufficient to satisfy
   causation in a prima facie case. See, e.g., Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840
   F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding two months sufficient to show causal
   connection); Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001) (four
   months). As Katz explained to the district court, Katz’s protected activities
   and the adverse actions against him occurred in close succession. On August
   21, 2018, following the abeyance, Katz submitted a Memorandum for Record
   concerning alleged unfair treatment. Within the next two months, Katz’s
   abeyance was allowed to lapse into a suspension (September 16) and his
   reinstatement was delayed pending an investigation into new allegations
   (October 10). Then, within a month of Katz contacting an EEO counselor to
   initiate an informal complaint on October 16, Katz’s suspension was further
   extended, and he was sent to peer review (November 7). Finally, within days
   of Katz submitting his formal EEO complaint on December 28, Katz claims
   that he was threatened with ruination if he did not resign. The close timing
   between these protected activities and adverse events is sufficient to establish
   causation and complete Katz’s prima facie case.
                                       * * *
          Because Katz established a prima facie case of retaliation, the district
   court erred in granting the Army summary judgment on this basis. We
   therefore REVERSE the district court’s judgment with respect to Katz’s
   retaliation claim and REMAND for the district court to consider whether

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   the Army has put forward a legitimate, non-retaliatory, non-pretextual reason
   for its adverse employment actions and, if not, to proceed to trial.

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