Court Opinion

ID: 9587357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:21:19.866932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:40.790703
License: Public Domain

Lewis, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
In my opinion, the activities approved by the majority constitute the practice of law in violation of Section 40-5-310 of the 1976 Code of Laws and Rule IV of the Rules of this Court concerning the South Carolina Bar; and I would so hold. I therefore dissent.
The facts are not in dispute. The South Carolina Highway Patrol makes each year many charges in magistrates’ courts for violations of the traffic laws. In the trial of many of these cases, the Highway Patrol assigns supervisory personnel to assist the prosecuting officer. The personnel assigned to prosecute these cases are not attorneys but have had training and experience in the prosecution of cases in magistrates’ courts. When so assigned to prosecute, they conduct trials on behalf of the State and, in so doing, make and resist motions, examine and cross-examine witnesses, make and resist objections to the admission of evidence, *700argue points of law to the court, and present arguments to the jury. This Court has previously held, unequivocally, that the foregoing activities constitute the practice of law and, when engaged in by one not licensed as an attorney, constitute a violation of Section 40-5-310, supra. State v. Wells, 191 S. C. 468, 5 S. E. (2d) 181.
The case of State v. Messervy, 258 S. C. 110, 187 S. E. (2d) 524 does not sustain the majority view. Regardless of the dicta in that decision, we only held that, under those facts, no prejudice resulted from allowing the patrolman, the prosecuting witness, to argue to the jury.
This Court, in the majority opinion, for the first time is authorizing State agencies, here the State Highway Patrol, to, in effect, authorize persons unlicensed to practice law to provide legal representation for the State in magistrates’ courts. With the creation of this new attorney many questions will, of necessity, arise in regard to his relationship with the public litigants. What degree of competency is required of these newly created" attorneys? By what Code of Ethics will their professional conduct be judged? What authority will discipline them? Will this Court have the authority to suspend or disbar them from further practice in the magistrates’ courts, if they are found guilty of misconduct; or will the State Highway Patrol have the sole right to judge the conduct of its employees and, therefore, the ethical standards of this new breed of lawyer that the majority opinion is now permitting to be created by edict of the Highway Department? What will be the accepted dress of this patrol-lawyer ? He is, or will be, we are told, a member of the State Highway Patrol? Will he be permitted to appear as attorney wearing his officer’s uniform, equipped with pistol, blackjack, and handcuffs? These might well be persuasive exhibits in the eyes of some jurors.
I suppose that this new position would best be characterized as that of a paralegal. If paralegals are to be permitted to practice law in the magistrates’ courts, it should be only *701after standards for their competence, conduct, and regulation are established, for, if the State can be represented by a paid paralegal, certainly the defendant can also. When we authorize paralegals to practice law, we should be prepared to meet the problems created by such action. Expediency is no justification for the action now taken by the majority.
I would reverse the judgment and hold that the actions here involved constitute the practice of law in violation of the foregoing statute and Rule.