Court Opinion

ID: 9589950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:26.522784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:52.928403
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in the majority opinion except for Division 5 concerning disqualification of a prospective juror.
The majority concludes that the trial court erred when it ruled that the State’s reasons for exercising a peremptory strike which removed Juror # 17, a black woman, from the venire were race-neutral, case-related, clear and reasonably specific. See Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439 (5) (469 SE2d 129) (1996). I would conclude that the trial court’s determination that appellant failed to establish purposeful discrimination was not clearly erroneous. Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 666 (437 SE2d 463) (1993).
The prosecutor gave multiple reasons for his exercise of challenges against Juror # 17: because her attorney-cousin had shared a legal practice with C. B. King (an attorney the prosecution character*721ized as notorious for injecting race as an issue in his cases); because when questioned by counsel for one of the defendants, Juror # 17 had expressed some reservations about a dual system of justice; and because Juror # 17’s lawyer-cousin had served as President of the Georgia Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
Although we must insure that peremptory strikes are not exercised for racially-motivated reasons, the presence of one potentially racially-motivated explanation does not tarnish jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986) in those situations where counsel gives multiple reasons justifying the exercise of a peremptory challenge against a particular venireperson and those reasons include a racially-neutral explanation for striking the juror which is not itself a pretext for removing the juror for the racially-discriminatory reason. Lingo v. State, supra at 668-669. In Lingo v. State, we examined the Court of Appeals’ holding in Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga. App. 85 (5) (424 SE2d 368) (1992) (holding that the jury selection process is invalidated under Batson when a racially-motivated explanation for striking a venireperson accompanies a racially-neutral explanation for removal of that venireperson) and concluded that where simultaneous reasons are given for removing a juror, the jury selection process is invalidated only “where it can be determined that the racially-neutral explanation is, in fact, pretextual since there is a racially motivated reason that can be independently determined . . . .” Lingo v. State, supra at 668, fn. 4. Accordingly, while the existence of competing explanations for the exercise of a peremptory challenge calls for greater scrutiny by the trial court to insure that Batson’s mandate to eliminate racial discrimination is upheld, mere injection of a racially-motivated explanation into the jury selection process does not so infect the procedure as to render unavoidable the reversal of the case.4
Applying the above analysis to the record in this case, I would find no reversible error in the dismissal of Juror # 17. One reason given by the prosecutor for striking Juror # 17 was her relationship with King. Standing alone, the juror’s connection to King would have been an inappropriate basis upon which to base jury selection. The goal of Batson and its progeny, to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection, is clearly not furthered by striking a prospective juror solely because of a tenuous association with any individual known for espousing controversial positions on racial issues. However, the prosecutor gave two other reasons for striking Juror # 17: that she believed there may exist a dual system of justice, and that her cousin *722had been president of a criminal defense bar organization. Applying Lingo v. State to these facts, the question is whether the racially-neutral explanations given by the prosecutor for striking the juror were a pretext for the independent racially-motivated rationale of a relationship with King. As to the dual system of justice reason, my review of the transcript reveals that the juror was responding to questioning by one of the defense attorneys (and not the prosecutor) who asked her whether she shared the same “concern” with another prospective juror “about a dual system of justice for minorities.” The juror responded that she had “seen or read about trials where I felt that was the case. That’s not how I feel all of the time. I just take it case by case.” The transcript also reveals that when the prosecutor was later called upon to explain his strikes,5 he stated he believed the juror had said she “thought there was a dual system of justice or there could have been a dual system.” Neither the defense nor the trial court indicated that the prosecutor’s impression of what Juror # 17 had said was mischaracterized. Had the facts been as the prosecutor believed them to be, the statement by Juror # 17 would have constituted a race-neutral reason for striking her, as
“the ultimate inquiry for the [trial court] is not whether counsel’s reason[s are] suspect, or weak, or irrational, but whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race-based.” [Cit.]
(Emphasis supplied.) Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 454 (448 SE2d 179) (1994). There is no showing in the record that the prosecutor deliberately misinterpreted Juror # 17’s response in order to make a racially-neutral reason pretextual. The fact that the prosecutor may have been less attentive while defense counsel were going forward with their voir dire is irrelevant to whether the prosecutor acted with racial animus. It is the subjective intent of the prosecutor which is at issue in reviewing a Batson challenge, not the accuracy of the prosecutor’s notes on voir dire.
The other reason articulated for the strike, that Juror # 17 was related to someone who had been president of a Georgia criminal defense association, was undoubtedly race-neutral. I acknowledge that the cousin’s relationship to the defense association was first raised by the trial judge; however, the prosecutor affirmatively stated that he recollected the relationship and actively endorsed to the trial court that the cousin’s affiliation to the defense group was a factor in his decision to exercise a strike against Juror # 17. Under *723these circumstances, we cannot presume that the prosecutor’s endorsement of the race-neutral reason was purely pretextual merely because it was first mentioned by the trial court.
Decided March 17, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 3, 1997.
William J. Mason, for appellant.
Douglas C. Pullen, District Attorney, Lori L. Canfield, Margaret E. Bagley, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
In reviewing the trial court’s disposition of a Batson motion, we must always bear in mind that the trial court’s decision whether a prosecutor’s strikes were the result of neutral selection procedures rests largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s state of mind, demeanor and credibility and as such lies peculiarly within the province of a trial judge whose findings we must accord great deference and disregard only if clearly erroneous. Lingo v. State, supra at 669; Smith v. State, supra at 454. Accordingly, we are not authorized to presume racial animus from an ambiguous record where the trial judge who oversaw the proceedings concluded otherwise. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, there exist racially-neutral explanations which served as the basis for the exercise of the State’s challenges. Because it was clearly permissible under these facts for the prosecutor to strike Juror # 17 on the basis of her relationship with her lawyer-cousin and on the basis of his impression of her belief in a dual system of justice, I would conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the reasons offered by the State for excluding this prospective juror were sufficiently race-neutral to withstand a Bat-son challenge. Finding no other reason for reversal of this case, I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent.

 Because it is inconsistent with Lingo v. State,'! would thus reject the position set forth in Strozier v. Clark that any racially-motivated explanation automatically vitiates the jury selection process.

 The transcript reveals that 16 more prospective jurors were questioned after Juror # 17.