Court Opinion

ID: 9498342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:14:58.34304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:46.452334
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except with respect to its discussion and resolution of Harris’ claim that he was maliciously prosecuted for resisting arrest, con*338tained in Part IIA. The district court’s determination that probable cause existed to charge Harris with resisting arrest was supported only by the court’s subjective conclusions, and not by its factual findings, which should have compelled the opposite determination. Presumably because the court erroneously determined that there was probable cause to charge Harris with resisting arrest, it failed to consider whether malice could be inferred from the absence of probable cause. I would vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to Harris’ claim of malicious prosecution for resisting arrest, and remand that issue for the district court to consider whether malice should be inferred and relief granted.
As the majority notes, in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim in Ohio, a plaintiff must establish three elements: 1) malice in instituting or continuing the prosecution, 2) lack of probable cause, and 3) termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused. Trussell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St.3d 142, 559 N.E.2d 732, 736 (N.E.2d) (1990). I will begin with the second element — requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate an absence of probable cause — because, in my view, this is where the district court went wrong, at least with respect to the resisting arrest charge.
Probable cause “exists when the facts and circumstances are such that a cautious individual would be warranted in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he or she is charged.” Norwell v. Cincinnati, 133 Ohio App.3d 790, 729 N.E.2d 1223, 1236 (1999) (citing McFinley v. Bethesda Oak Hosp., 79 Ohio App.3d 613, 607 N.E.2d 936, 939 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.1992)). Ohio Revised Code 2921.33 prohibits a person from resisting arrest “recklessly or by force.” State v. Hendren, 110 Ohio App.3d 496, 674 N.E.2d 774, 775 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.1996) (citing omo Rev. Code 2921.33). Ohio courts have interpreted this statute to prohibit “physical activity which prevents or delays an arrest.” State v. Keegan, 67 Ohio App.3d 824, 588 N.E.2d 928, 930 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. 1990). Thus, for example, while “going limp” does not involve the use of force, it can constitute resisting arrest. Id. Importantly, the district court’s opinion includes no discussion of what constitutes resisting arrest. It is unclear how the district court could have appropriately determined that there was probable cause to support a charge of resisting arrest without ever considering what constitutes resisting arrest under Ohio law.
Indeed, the district court’s factual findings do not support its conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that Harris resisted arrest. The majority insists that the district court found that the officers could “feel” Harris resisting and trying to pull away as they arrested him. However, this was not the finding of the court. Rather, the court simply noted that the officers testified that they could “feel” Harris resisting, but did not find that Harris had actually done so. J.A. at 131. The court also noted that “there is nothing in Caprez’s notes from that night to indicate Plaintiff was attempting to resist arrest.” Id.
The court’s actual finding with respect to this issue was that “[although there was no actual struggle, Plaintiff did not cooperate with the officers or willingly accompany them to the task force office.” Id. (emphasis added). The finding that there was no actual struggle is inconsistent with both the officers’ testimony that they could feel Harris pulling away, and with the majority’s assertion that there was evidence of physical activity which prevented or delayed arrest.
*339The district court found that Plaintiff was less than cooperative with the arresting officers:
While he may not have attempted to flea [sic], there is ample evidence to demonstrate that he did not accompany the officers to the task force willingly. Moreover, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that he did not cooperate with the officers when he was being asked the routine questions. In addition, there is evidence that Plaintiff bladed his body in a confrontational manner and that he made confrontational statements to the officers while in the task force office.
J.A. at 138.
Examining each of the actions complained of by the district court, none involves force or a “physical activity which prevents or delays arrest,” to use the language of Keegan. None involves interfering with or resisting an arrest “recklessly or by force,” to use the language of the statute.
The district court’s conclusory assertion that Harris did not accompany the officers to the task force “willingly” cannot support a finding of probable cause that he resisted arrest. Harris was undoubtedly unhappy at having been targeted, followed, and detained by the DEA when he was entirely innocent of any drug-related activity, and it appears from the district court’s findings that he communicated that unhappiness to the agents, but his conduct did not rise to the level of resistance required for a charge of resisting arrest under Ohio law. As the district court found, there was no actual struggle. The fact that Harris did not want to be arrested merely puts him in the company of most other arrestees, and does not constitute resisting arrest.
Similarly, the district court’s conclusion that Harris “did not cooperate with the officers when he was being asked the routine questions” is supported only by its finding that “Plaintiff was reluctant to cooperate and give O’Bryant the information for which he asked.” The court also found, however, that O’Bryant did obtain all of the requested information and that Harris never raised his voice. Furthermore, Harris’ failure to fully cooperate occurred after he was in the task force office, when, according to the findings of the district court, he had already been arrested. Even if an uncooperative attitude in answering questions could rise to the level of resisting arrest under Ohio law, Harris could not have resisted an arrest that had already been effectuated.
Finally, the district court’s reliance on Harris’ “blading” of his body is also unavailing. As with Harris’ failure to fully cooperate in answering questions, this action occurred after he had already been arrested and was in the task force office, and thus could not have supported a charge of resisting arrest. Moreover, according to the district court’s own description, “[w]hen a person blades their body, they turn away from the person they are blading their body against. This is done because a person with a bladed body presents less of a target to hit.” J.A. at 133. The fact that Harris adopted a defensive posture, perhaps out of fear that he would be struck by one of the agents, cannot be said to have delayed his arrest recklessly or by force.
I would emphasize that the facts of this case are very different from those cited by the majority in support of its view that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Harris resisted arrest. As the majority notes, in Hansen, the plaintiff pulled away from the officers and struggled with them. Hansen, 1994 WL 622153 at *6, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 31576 at *15. Again, in contrast, the district court in this case specifically found that no struggle took *340place. In Palshook, the plaintiff flung the handcuffs out of the arresting officer’s hands and kicked at other officers. 120 F.Supp.2d at 651.
The majority cites Keegan as well, but this case is of no help to its position, for, as noted above, Keegan interprets Ohio law to prohibit “physical activity which prevents or delays an arrest.” 588 N.E.2d at 930. Several other cases cited by the majority involve similar evidence. However, no evidence of physical activity which prevents or delays arrest is present in the instant case.
In my view, a cautious individual could not have believed that Harris was guilty of resisting arrest based on this conduct, and there was no probable cause to charge Harris with that crime, satisfying the second requirement of a showing of malicious prosecution. The parties stipulated that Harris was not convicted of resisting arrest — in other words, that he met the final requirement for a malicious prosecution claim, which is that the prosecution was terminated in his favor. I turn, then, to the first requirement: that Harris demonstrate malice in the bringing of the charge against him.
Despite the majority’s skepticism regarding Harris’ “invitation to presume malice,” Ohio courts have long and repeatedly held that malice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause. In other words, absence of probable cause is evidence of malice, under Ohio law. See, e.g., Melanowski v. Judy, 102 Ohio St. 153, 131 N.E. 360, Syllabus ¶ 1 (Ohio 1921) (“In an action for malicious prosecution, the want of probable cause is the gist of the action. If such be proven, the legal inference may be drawn that the proceedings were actuated by malice.”); Sikora v. Gibbs, 132 Ohio App.3d 770, 726 N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.1999) (“Importantly, the lack of probable cause generally becomes the essence of a claim for malicious prosecution for the reason that malice may be inferred if probable cause was not present.”); Garza v. Clarion Hotel, Inc., 119 Ohio App.3d 478, 695 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.1997) (in a claim for malicious prosecution, “[mjalice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause”); Canton Provision Co. v. St. John, 52 Ohio App. 507, 3 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ohio App. 5 Dist.1936) (“If want of probable cause is proven, the legal inference may be drawn that the proceedings were actuated by malice.”) I would remand this case so that the district court could consider whether, given Harris’ demonstration that there was no probable cause to charge him with resisting arrest, an inference of malice is warranted in this case. Based on the record before us, Harris would appear to be a law-abiding citizen who was improperly denied relief at trial, at least as to the claim of malicious prosecution for resisting arrest.