Court Opinion

ID: 9893763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:01:15.075691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:07.747724
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 30 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YUGA LABS, INC.,                                No.    22-56199

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:22-cv-04355-JFW-JEM
 v.

RYDER RIPPS; JEREMY CAHEN,                      MEMORANDUM*

                Defendants-Appellants,

and

DOES, 1-10,

                Defendant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted October 16, 2023
                           San Francisco, California

Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

      Yuga Labs, Inc. brought this suit against Ryder Ripps and Jeremy Cahen for

their alleged misuse of Yuga Labs’ trademarks under federal and state law. Ripps

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
and Cahen appeal the district court’s order denying their motion to strike Yuga

Labs’ state-law claims under California’s anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public

Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1).

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We

have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. See Planned Parenthood

Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 2018),

amended by 897 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2018). We review a district court’s denial of

an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. Gunn v. Drage, 65 F.4th 1109, 1118 (9th Cir.

2023). We affirm.

      California’s anti-SLAPP statute requires a court to strike “[a] cause of action

against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s”

free speech rights “in connection with a public issue . . . , unless the court

determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). The

statute requires a two-step analysis. First, the defendant must “make a prima facie

showing that the plaintiff’s suit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant’s

rights of petition or free speech.” Jordan-Benel v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 859

F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2017). As relevant here, an “act in furtherance” includes

“conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the

constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of

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public interest.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4). Second, if the defendant

makes this prima facie showing, “the plaintiff must then demonstrate a probability

of prevailing on the challenged claim.” Jordan-Benel, 859 F.3d at 1188.

        The district court correctly determined that the anti-SLAPP motion failed at

the first step of the analysis because Yuga Labs’ claims did not arise from acts

Ripps took in furtherance of his right of free speech. According to the complaint,

the alleged conduct underlying Yuga Labs’ state-law causes of action is Ripps’s

appropriation of Yuga Labs’ Bored Ape Yacht Club trademarks to sell Ripps’s

infringing non-fungible tokens. While Ripps’s broader artistic project may further

his rights of free speech, it “merely provide[s] context” for the alleged conduct

underlying Yuga Labs’ claims. Bonni v. St. Joseph Health Sys., 491 P.3d 1058,

1068 (Cal. 2021). Ripps’s free speech activity may be relevant to those claims, but

it is not the basis for them. See Jordan-Benel, 859 F.3d at 1190 (“[E]ven if a

defendant engages in free speech activity that is relevant to a claim, that does not

necessarily mean such activity is the basis for the claim.”).1

        AFFIRMED.

1
    We deny Ripps’s and Cahen’s motion for judicial notice.

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