Court Opinion

ID: 9765350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:00:51.512718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.181973
License: Public Domain

*672Justice SAYLOR
dissenting.
I Join Mr. Justice Eakin’s dissenting opinion and additionally note that core functions of legal representation were not implicated by Appellant’s ancillary activity regarding the handling of the settlement proceeds. As this conduct does not involve the exercise of legal judgment, see generally Dauphin County Bar Ass’n v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545, 553, 351 A.2d 229, 233 (1976) (discussing the boundaries of the “practice of law” in terms of understanding and applying legal principles and judgment), it falls more comfortably within the business aspects of the activities of a law firm, a distinction recognized by other courts. See, e.g., Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash.2d 52, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (1984) (ruling that the Washington consumer protection statute applied to “certain entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law,” including “how the price of legal services is determined, billed, and collected”); Daniels v. Baritz, 2003 WL 21027238, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 30, 2003) (distinguishing between a lawyer’s actions “arising out of the actual practice of law” and his debt-collection practices, and holding that a claim that the latter activities violated the UTPCPL survived preliminary objections); cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2013-14, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975) (observing that the exchange of an attorney’s services in examining a land title for money constitutes “commerce” for purposes of the Sherman Act and, as such, is a “business aspect” of the legal profession). But cf. Cripe v. Leiter, 184 Ill.2d 185, 234 Ill.Dec. 488, 703 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1998) (holding that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to a plaintiffs claim that her attorney charged excessive fees).