Court Opinion

ID: 9407329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 16:01:21.595327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.036822
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13636     Document: 19-1      Date Filed: 07/06/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 22-13636
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        CRANDALL POSTELL,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        CITY OF CORDELE GEORGIA,
        a Georgia Municipal Corporation,
        CITY COMMISSION,
        of the City of Cordele,
        CHAIRMAN JOHN WIGGINS,
        VICE CHAIR JEANIE BARTEE,
        ROYCE REEVES, SR., et al.,
        as members in their oﬃcial and individual capacities,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13636

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00148-LAG
                            ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Crandall Postell, proceeding pro se, appeals following the
        district court’s dismissal of his third amended complaint for failure
        to state a claim. On appeal, Postell argues the district court
        (1) erred in denying his motion for recusal and (2) failed to
        demonstrate why amending his complaint for a fourth time would
        be futile. After careful review of the record, we affirm.
                             I.     BACKGROUND
               On August 30, 2019, Postell filed a pro se complaint with 130
        allegations against 16 defendants. In December 2019, all
        defendants except one moved to dismiss Postell’s complaint for
        failure to state a claim. In January 2020, Postell filed his first
        amended complaint and moved for leave to file that first amended
        complaint.
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        22-13636                Opinion of the Court                          3

        A.     Dismissal without Prejudice and Leave to Amend
               On September 29, 2020, the district court granted the
        defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed without prejudice
        Postell’s initial complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading.
        The district court explained that Postell’s initial complaint (1) failed
        to separate causes of action into different counts, (2) made
        “conclusory factual allegations,” and (3) “use[d] unnecessary legal
        conclusions.”
                Further, the district court found that Postell’s proposed first
        amended complaint was also an impermissible shotgun pleading
        because (1) it was “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial
        facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
        action,” (2) it “fail[ed] to specify which counts [were] against which
        [d]efendant,” and (3) each count incorporated and realleged all the
        allegations preceding it. (Quotation marks omitted). For this
        reason, the district court denied Postell’s motion for leave to file
        his first amended complaint.
                But the district court allowed Postell to file a motion for
        leave to file a second amended complaint within 30 days. The
        district court gave Postell the following instructions: (1) the second
        amended complaint must “set forth separate, discrete causes of
        action, pleaded in separate counts, which clearly identify the set of
        circumstances or allegations supporting each claim against each
        [d]efendant”; (2) he “must identify what precise conduct is
        attributable to each individual [d]efendant”; and (3) he must “not
        make conclusory legal statements or incorporate by reference all
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     22-13636

        preceding paragraphs into each count.” The district court warned
        Postell that “[f]ailure to comply may result in the dismissal with
        prejudice and/or the imposition of sanctions.”
        B.     Postell’s Motions for Leave to Amend
              On October 27, 2020, Postell moved for leave to amend his
        complaint and attached his proposed second amended complaint.
        But then, on December 9, 2020, Postell again moved for leave to
        amend and attached his proposed third amended complaint.
        C.     Postell’s Motion for Recusal
                On August 5, 2021, Postell moved to recuse the district court
        judge—Judge Leslie Gardner—based on her alleged “ongoing daily
        Illegal and Discriminatory Acts.” Postell noted that Judge Gardner
        oversaw another case, Whitest v. Crisp County Georgia Board of
        Education, et al., 1:17-cv-00109-LAG (M.D. Ga.), in which he was a
        plaintiff.1 Postell asserted that Judge Gardner discriminated against
        him as a non-attorney, prevented him from conducting discovery,
        and delayed his two cases for over a year. Postell also claimed that
        in Whitest, Judge Gardner “teamed up with all [the] parties” and
        initiated ex parte communications with the defendants, in violation
        of his constitutional rights.

        1 Relevant to this appeal, in Whitest, Postell moved for sanctions against the
        American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and some of its attorneys who were
        representing the plaintiffs.
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        22-13636               Opinion of the Court                        5

        D.    Postell’s Third Amended Complaint
              On August 9, 2021, the district court granted Postell’s
        motion for leave to file a third amended complaint that Postell filed
        back on December 9, 2020.
               Postell’s third amended complaint contained 23 counts and
        320 allegations against the following defendants: (1) the City of
        Cordele, Georgia (“City”); (2) the Cordele Police Department;
        (3) the Cordele City Commission; (4) City Commissioners John
        Wiggins, Jeanie Bartee, Royce Reeves Sr., Vesta Beal Shepard, and
        Wesley Rainey; (5) Former City Commissioner Zack H. Wade;
        (6) Sergeant Louis New; (7) Judge G. Russell Wright; (8) Cotton
        Law Firm; (9) Edwin T. Cotton; (10) Billy Cannon; and (11) Mike
        Fraser’s Auto Repair & Wrecker Service, Inc. (“Mike Fraser’s Auto
        Repair”).
               Counts 1 to 15, 17 to 18, and 20 to 23 raised federal claims
        under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conspiracy to violate his constitutional
        rights and for violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
        Amendment rights. Counts 16 and 19 asserted claims for
        negligence and conversion, respectively, under Georgia law.
        Postell sought (1) declaratory and injunctive relief, (2) attorneys’
        fees, and (3) compensatory and punitive damages.
             On August 30, 2021, all defendants—except Billy Cannon
        and Mike Fraser’s Auto Repair—moved to dismiss Postell’s third
        amended complaint.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13636

        E.    Denial of Recusal and Postell’s Motion for Leave to
              Amend a Fourth Time
               On March 14, 2022, the district court denied Postell’s motion
        for recusal. The district court (1) explained that grievances against
        a judge’s rulings and routine case administration efforts were not
        valid grounds for recusal and (2) concluded that Postell pointed to
        no evidence that the court harbored a personal bias against him or
        in favor of another party.
               On April 29, 2022, Postell moved for leave to file a fourth
        amended complaint in order to add two newly elected members of
        the City Commission and Regions Bank as defendants.
        F.    Dismissal Order
               On September 30, 2022, the district court (1) dismissed the
        claims against Billy Cannon and Mike Fraser’s Auto Repair for
        failure to serve, (2) granted the remaining defendants’ motion to
        dismiss Postell’s third amended complaint, and (3) denied Postell’s
        motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint.
                To begin with, the district court explained that, although it
        was dismissing Postell’s third amended complaint for failure to
        state a claim, it could have dismissed the third amended complaint
        as an impermissible shotgun pleading because it was “replete with
        conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected
        to any particular cause of action.” The district court also explained
        that the City Commission and the Cordele Police Department are
        not entities that can be sued.
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        22-13636                 Opinion of the Court                          7

               Then, the district court turned to the federal claims (Counts
        1 to 15, 16 to 18, and 20 to 23) and explained why each one failed
        to state a claim. As for Postell’s state law claims (Counts 16 and
        19), the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
        over them because it had dismissed all his federal claims and found
        that he could still prosecute the state law claims in state court.
                Lastly, regarding the denial of Postell’s motion for leave to
        file a fourth amended complaint, the district court concluded that
        nothing suggested another amended complaint would produce
        sufficient claims because (1) Postell had received multiple
        opportunities to amend his pleadings, (2) he failed to comply with
        the court’s specific instructions on how to cure the deficiencies in
        his pleadings, and (3) he filed a cursory response to the motion to
        dismiss.
               Following entry of final judgment, Postell timely appealed.
                           II.    MOTION TO RECUSE
               On appeal, Postell challenges the district court’s denial of his
        motion to recuse. Below, we set forth our standards of review and
        the statutes governing recusal, and then we explain why Postell’s
        challenge fails.
        A.     Standards of Review
               Typically, we review a denial of a motion for recusal for
        abuse of discretion. In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.
        2008). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect
        legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13636

        manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination,
        or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Diveroli v.
        United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks
        omitted).
                However, if a party fails to make a recusal argument to the
        district court, we review for plain error. Hamm v. Members of Bd. of
        Regents, 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). Under plain error
        review, the party raising the issue has the burden to show that
        (1) there is error (2) that is plain (3) that affects a
        defendant’s substantial rights and (4) that “not correcting the error
        would seriously affect the fairness of the judicial proceeding.”
        Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir.
        1999).
        B.    Recusal Generally
                Recusal is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. United
        States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). Under § 144, a
        judge must recuse herself when a party to a district court
        proceeding ﬁles a timely and suﬃcient aﬃdavit that the judge
        before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice
        either against him or in favor of any adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
        To warrant recusal under § 144, the moving party must, among
        other things, allege facts that would convince a reasonable person
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        22-13636                  Opinion of the Court                                9

        that bias actually exists. United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1150
        (5th Cir. 1979). 2
                Section 455 designates two primary reasons that a judge
        must recuse herself. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th
        Cir. 2003). First, under § 455(a), a judge “shall disqualify h[er]self
        in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be
        questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard of review for
        whether a judge should have recused herself under § 455(a) “is
        whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of
        the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
        would entertain a signiﬁcant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
        Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321 (quotation marks omitted).
               Second, under § 455(b)(1), a judge shall also disqualify
        herself if “[s]he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
        or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
        proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). The Supreme Court, however,
        has stated that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a
        valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States,
        510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994). Indeed, bias “must
        stem from extrajudicial sources, unless the judge’s acts
        demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it unfairly

        2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
        this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
        Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-13636

        prejudices one of the parties.” Berger, 375 F.3d at 1227 (quotation
        marks omitted).
        C.     Application to Postell
               Here, Postell challenges Judge Gardner’s impartiality on
        three grounds. We address each in turn.
               First, Postell contends that Judge Gardner is biased because
        she intentionally delayed this case for over a year and “prevented”
        him from discovery.3 These complaints amount to nothing more
        than disagreements with Judge Gardner’s docket administration,
        timeliness, and judicial rulings and are thus not valid bases for
        recusal. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556, 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (explaining
        that “[a] judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration” are
        not grounds for recusal); In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257,
        1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Challenges to adverse rulings are generally
        grounds for appeal, not recusal.”); Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776,
        780–81 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a district court’s delay does
        not require recusal). Judge Gardner did not abuse her discretion in
        denying Postell’s motion for recusal on this basis.
              Second, Postell argues that Judge Gardner is biased because
        she engaged in ex parte communications with opposing parties

        3 The defendants moved to stay discovery pending a ruling on their motions
        to dismiss Postell’s initial and third amended complaints. Postell did not
        respond to those motions to stay. Exercising her broad discretion to stay
        discovery and pretrial deadlines, see Panola Land Buyers Association v. Shuman,
        762 F.2d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985), Judge Gardner granted both motions to
        stay discovery.
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        22-13636                Opinion of the Court                          11

        regarding a potential consent order in Whitest. In support, Postell’s
        brief on appeal purports to quote or paraphrase excerpts from a
        telephonic hearing in Whitest.
                But the transcript of that hearing is not in the record in this
        case, and Postell thus lacks evidence to support the statements in
        his brief. In any event, the portions of the transcript that Postell
        purports to quote or paraphrase do not reveal any pervasive bias
        or prejudice warranting recusal. Rather, the excerpts indicate that
        (1) Judge Gardner asked whether Postell and other pro se plaintiffs
        had consented to the proposed settlement and explained that she
        did not believe she could enter a consent order without the consent
        of all parties; (2) counsel for the other plaintiffs disagreed; (3) Judge
        Gardner and counsel discussed her legal authority to enter the
        proposed consent order without the agreement of all parties; and
        (4) eventually, Judge Gardner ordered the parties to brief the issue
        and stated that she would not get into the “substantive issues”
        without everyone present. This exchange between a judge and a
        lawyer from an unrelated case does not provide a basis for Judge
        Gardner’s recusal in this separate case. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d
        1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[E]xcept where pervasive bias is
        shown, a judge’s rulings in the same or a related case are not a
        sufficient basis for recusal.”). Judge Gardner did not abuse her
        discretion in denying Postell’s motion for recusal on this basis.
               Third, Postell contends that Judge Gardner’s impartiality
        might reasonably be questioned because (1) he filed a motion for
        sanctions against the ACLU in Whitest and (2) were Judge Gardner
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13636

        to grant his motion for sanctions, “the ACLU would lose [a]
        substantial amount of money and so would Judge Gardner’s sister,
        Stacey Abrams,” who participated in multiple “highly-publicized
        efforts with the ACLU.”
               As an initial matter, Postell did not make this argument in
        the district court. Accordingly, we review this contention for plain
        error. See Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651; see also Curves, LLC v. Spalding
        Cnty., 685 F.3d 1284, 1287 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012).
               We readily conclude that there is no error—let alone plain
        error—in Judge Gardner’s failure to recuse herself because of the
        alleged connections between her sister and the ACLU. Postell does
        not explain how the alleged favoritism of another party (the ACLU)
        in a different case (Whitest) would result in an objective observer
        questioning Judge Gardner’s impartiality in this case—where
        neither her sister nor the ACLU is a party.
             In sum, we affirm the district court’s denial of Postell’s
        motion for recusal.
              III.   MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FOURTH
                         AMENDED COMPLAINT
               On appeal, Postell also argues that the district court failed to
        explain why amending his complaint a fourth time would be futile.
               We generally review the denial of a motion to amend a
        complaint for an abuse of discretion. Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty,
        605 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2010). Leave to amend “should be
        freely given” if the “underlying facts or circumstances relied upon
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        22-13636               Opinion of the Court                        13

        by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief.” Hall v. United Ins.
        Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks
        omitted). However, a court may deny leave to amend the
        complaint “when such amendment would be futile.” Id. at 1263.
        An amendment is futile when the complaint as amended would
        still be subject to dismissal. Id.
                Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        denying Postell’s motion for leave to ﬁle a fourth amended
        complaint. The district court had already given Postell multiple
        opportunities to amend his complaint to state a valid claim for
        relief. In fact, Postell ﬁled an initial complaint followed by three
        amended complaints. Despite these opportunities and explicit
        instructions from the district court on how to avoid dismissal of his
        complaint, Postell’s third amended complaint still failed to properly
        plead any federal claim for relief and was “replete with conclusory,
        vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any
        particular cause of action.”
              Moreover, nothing in the proposed fourth amended
        complaint ameliorated the deﬁciencies in the third amended
        complaint. Rather, Postell merely sought to add two additional
        defendants, while the remainder of the proposed fourth amended
        complaint was largely identical to the third amended complaint.
              Because granting Postell’s motion for leave to ﬁle a fourth
        amended complaint would have been futile, the district court did
        not abuse its discretion in denying the same. See Hall, 367 F.3d at
        1262–63.
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                      22-13636

                                 IV.     CONCLUSION
               For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of
        Postell’s motion for recusal and motion for leave to file a fourth
        amended complaint.4
               AFFIRMED.

        4 Although Postell titles a portion of his opening brief “MOTION TO
        DISMISS,” he does not appear to challenge the district court’s reasons for
        dismissal. Thus, Postell abandoned any challenge on appeal, beyond those
        already discussed supra, to the district court’s dismissal of his third amended
        complaint. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th
        Cir. 2004).