Court Opinion

ID: 9628065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:06:36.180775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:57.142005
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting, with whom RAPER, Justice joins.
I would hold that the trial court did err as a matter of law by applying § 1-12-102, W.S.19771 (hereinafter referred to as “the statute”), to the facts of this case. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
This action was instituted on a partnership claim against appellant. The judgment was in favor of a partnership on a quantum meruit count. Appellant’s counterclaim was against a partnership and was based on an alleged contract with a partnership.
If the word “person” in the statute does not include a partnership, the statute should not be applied to this case inasmuch as the action then would not be “by or against a person” as required by such statute.
But the section should not be applied to the facts of this case, even if the word “person” in the statute does include a partnership, inasmuch as the partnership entity is not “incapable of testifying” as the statute conditions its applicability.
The majority opinion agrees with the analysis of the trial court which results in the determination that the word “person” as utilized in the statute is defined with reference to § 8-l-102(a)(vi), W.S.19772 and includes a partnership. If so, the partnership had Frank Smith and Barbara Smith as partners, and either one of them could legally testify for and on behalf of the partnership. Since Frank Smith is dead, he could not actually so testify, but Barbara is alive and can do so.
“Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner or then present to his mind, and the knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could and should have communicated it to the acting partner, operate as notice to or knowledge of the partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership committed by or with the consent of that partner.” Section 17 — 13— 304, W.S.1977.
“An admission or representation made by any partner concerning partnership af*908fairs within the scope of his authority as conferred by this act [§§ 17-13-101 to 17-13-615] is evidence against the partnership.” Section 17-13-303, W.S.1977.
The partnership entity was in existence for the purposes of this case although the partnership was dissolved by the death of Frank Smith. Section 17-13-603(a)(iv), W.S.1977.
“On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.” Section 17-13-602, W.S.1977.
Whether or not Frank Smith actually communicated to Barbara Smith the details of the partnership’s arrangement with appellant is not pertinent insofar as the applicability of the statute to this case is concerned. He “reasonably could and should have” done so. Section 17-13-304, W.S. 1977, supra. Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s officer relative to the alleged oral contract is sufficiently corroborated by the fact of partial performance by the partnership under some arrangement and by timely performance and payment for similar work in the past is likewise not pertinent if the statute is not applicable to this case. We should not underestimate the ability of a jury or of the court acting as a fact finder to determine the true circumstances of the matter with proper allowances for the missing testimony of one of the partners of appellee. In allowing the testimony of appellant’s officer and of Barbara Smith and of others having information material to the issues, there will no longer be an inconsistency between allowing a recovery against appellant on a quantum meruit claim resulting from work performed under some sort of an understanding while denying consideration of appellant’s counterclaim arising out of the same understanding.

. Section 1-12-102, W.S.1977 provides:
“In any action or suit by or against a person who from any cause is incapable of testifying, or by or against a trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative of the person incapable of testifying, no judgment or decree founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in favor of a party whose interests are adverse to the person incapable of testifying or his trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative. In any such action or suit, if the adverse party testifies, all entries, memorandum and declarations by the party incapable of testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received in evidence.”

. Section 8-l-102(a)(vi), W.S.1977 provides:
“(a) As used in the statutes unless the legislature clearly specifies a different meaning or interpretation or the context clearly requires a different meaning:
* * * * * *
“(vi) ‘Person’ includes an individual, partnership, corporation, joint stock company or any other association or entity, public or private.”