Court Opinion

ID: 9676401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:23:42.451127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.341736
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Although on original submission a practically unanimous Court found that applicant’s pleas of guilty were involuntary, now without explication a majority would have the Court deny his “request to withdraw his plea” and, contrary to first principles and sua sponte, utilize a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding to serve the office of an appeal, viz:
*650“Accordingly, we deny applicant’s request to withdraw his plea. We grant review of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. See Ex parte Hilliard, 687 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). We will treat the merits of applicant’s suppression claim on the basis of the record in his original appeal, our Cause Nos. 64,103 and 64,104.”
For several reasons I dissent.
First, assuming the opinion on original submission was correct in finding applicant’s pleas were involuntary when made, Morgan v. State, 688 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), does not serve to change the nature and character of his pleas. If involuntary they still remain involuntary.
Second, the historical facts of the matter are that on direct appeal the Court affirmed the judgment since the incourt judicial confession was sufficient to support the pleas independently from the statements made to officers, and that on original submission in this proceeding it was judicially determined that the pleas were involuntary and, accordingly, applicant was remanded to answer the indictment. Are we now saying that the plea was voluntary and, therefore, may not be withdrawn?
Finally, on what basis are we reviewing the merits of his suppression claim? I have seen Hilliard. He made a “conditional plea.” The issue there was whether the State had complied with the Texas Speedy Trial Act, an issue more jurisdictional in nature. The Court found it had not and, accordingly, vacated the judgment of conviction and ordered the prosecution dismissed. Here, however, the judgments are not void, only voidable — should it be found that the trial court erred in admitting the statements, for such “trial error” the remedy would be simply to remand applicant to local custody to answer the same indictment.
Again, I must protest misuse of The Great Writ. See Ex parte Aaron, 691 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), and Ex parte Collier, 614 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Clinton, J., concurring).