Court Opinion

ID: 9608484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:13:42.108242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:14.674506
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds as a matter of law that Albert Kienke, a landlord, owed no duty of care to Robert English, a tenant, who performed remodeling services for rent. I dissent.
The majority opinion represents an unfortunate departure from this Court’s prior willingness, in light of contemporary legal developments, to undertake a realistic reappraisal of old common law concepts of tort liability of possessors of land. See, e.g., Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991); P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1991); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).
Williams modified the common law duty of care that landlords owe to tenants with respect to hazardous conditions on leased premises.1 We reviewed the development of landlord-tenant law in Williams, beginning with the early common law rule that a landlord was not liable to a tenant for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition existing on the land when the tenant took possession. Over time, the general rule was modified to make landlords liable under certain circumstances for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on leased premises. Prior to Williams, there *159were four instances in which landlords could be held liable for hazardous conditions.2 Williams expanded the scope of a landlord’s duty by holding that landlords have “a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their tenants in all circumstances” and that “[l]andlord liability is no longer limited by the artificial categories developed by the common law.” 699 P.2d at 726. The Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of a landlord, even though the tenant knew of the hazard created by a dangerously designed apartment window through which she fell, because a trier of fact could have reasonably inferred that both the landlord and the tenant were negligent.
The legal relationship between English and Kienke was more than a simple landlord-tenant relationship. Although the labor English performed constituted rent, his remodeling activities differed from the ordinary and usual activities of a tenant. English, however, was not an independent contractor in the usual or typical sense of that term: he was not licensed as an independent contractor; he was not experienced in construction; and he did not remodel for anyone but Kienke and only re-modelled for the purpose of paying rent. In any event, whether or not English was technically an independent contractor, Kienke still owed English a duty of due care under the circumstances. See Haberer v. Village of Sauget, 158 Ill.App.3d 813, 110 Ill.Dec. 628, 511 N.E.2d 805 (1987).
The majority acknowledges the change in the law made by Williams, but asserts that the old common law principle that “tenants are liable for any dangerous condition on the premises which they create” governs this case. Accordingly, the majority holds that English was an invitee and that Kienke owed him no duty of care because English created the hazard that caused his death. The majority states:
English was an invitee (business visitor) who was engaged to make extensive repairs on the house. In so doing, he created the hazard which led to his death. There is no basis to impose on Kienke under section 343 or 343A [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ] the duty to protect English from the hazard English created when Kienke did not live on the property, had not been there for two weeks, and did not supervise or exercise control over English’s work.
I submit that the majority misapplies §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Section 343 states the general rule as to a landowner’s liability:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
(Emphasis added.) Kienke obviously knew of the risk of harm to English and should— and did — expect that English would not realize the danger. Whether Kienke failed to exercise “reasonable care to protect” English, specifically, whether the warning Kienke gave English was legally sufficient to discharge his duty of due care under the circumstances, raises a material issue of fact that a jury should decide.
Certainly a landowner’s warning of the hazards an invitee may encounter may be sufficient to discharge the landowner’s duty of due care. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. d, at 217. See *160generally § 343A cmt. e., at 219. A warning may not be sufficient, however, if the landowner has reason to expect that the invitee may suffer physical harm despite his general awareness of the hazardous condition or its obviousness. In that event, a landowner must take other reasonable steps to provide for the safety of the invitee. See § 343A cmt. f(c), at 220. On facts similar to the instant case, the court in Shaffer v. Mays, 140 Ill.App.3d 779, 95 Ill.Dec. 83, 489 N.E.2d 35 (1986), applying §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement, held that a homeowner owed a duty of care to an invitee who, in remodeling a home, created the hazard that caused his injuries. See also Haberer v. Village of Sauget, 158 Ill.App.3d 313, 110 Ill.Dec. 628, 511 N.E.2d 805 (1987).
In this state, persons hired to perform work for a landowner are business invitees. In re Wimmer’s Estate, 111 Utah 444, 449-51, 182 P.2d 119, 121-23 (1947). We have also held that although a landowner may not have a duty of care to an invitee with respect to a dangerous condition that is known or obvious to the invitee, this rule does not preclude liability if the landowner should have anticipated harm to the invitee. Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1), at 218. Indeed, we have long recognized a landowner’s duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees from dangerous conditions on the premises. Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 208, 282 P.2d 304, 307 (1955); In re Wimmer’s Estate, 111 Utah at 452, 182 P.2d at 123. That duty runs to all workers, irrespective of their status as employee, independent contractor, or otherwise. See Robertson v. Sixpense Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 789 P.2d 1040, 1045 (1990) (en banc).
Under the principle stated in § 343 of the Restatement, a jury should determine the adequacy of Kienke’s warning. I submit that the majority’s mechanical and rigid application of the rule that a landowner is not liable for an injury caused by a hazard created by an invitee does not comply with the Restatement and is bad policy under comparative negligence law.
A jury could reasonably conclude that Kienke was negligent to some degree and that English was not solely responsible for his death. It is undisputed that Kienke told English he should support the porch roof with “plenty of 2 x 4’s.” Whether that warning was sufficient, given the nature of the risk, the relative experience and knowledge of English and Kienke, and other circumstances, raises factual issues that cannot legitimately be resolved on summary judgment. There is no evidence in the record as to how many two-by-fours should have been placed under the roof to provide adequate support or how many were in fact put in place as temporary supports. Nor does the evidence indicate how apparent the risk would have been to a layperson such as English or how great the risk was that the roof would collapse without proper support. There is, however, evidence that Kienke had superior knowledge as to the nature and strength of the internal structure of the porch roof. Certainly, Kienke was far more knowledgeable than English as to the nature of the risk and what steps were necessary to avoid the hazard. Clearly, there are a number of factual issues that need to be explored to determine the adequacy of Kienke’s warning. In any event, Kienke failed to meet his burden on his motion for summary judgment of showing that there were no material issues of fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We have consistently held that summary judgment should be granted in negligence cases only in the “most clear instances.” Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); see also Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Because Utah is a comparative negligence state, that rule has special force when a party asserts, as a matter of law, that the other party was solely negligent and that that party’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury. Where there are legitimate inferences that both parties were negligent, it is not for a court to decide as a matter of law that one party’s degree of negligence was of suffi-*161dent magnitude when compared with that of the other party to warrant summary judgment. The task of measuring the relative degree of negligence is for the trier of fact, unless the absence of negligence of one party is clear on any reasonable view of the evidence. As we stated in Williams:
Even though plaintiff may have been negligent, summary judgment is an altogether inappropriate procedure for assessing her degree of negligence against the negligence of the defendants. In the days when contributory negligence was an absolute defense in a negligence action, summary judgment could be used to dispose of negligence actions without depriving a plaintiff of his right to a trial on the merits. Now, however, contributory negligence is not an absolute defense, and summary judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for resolving negligence actions.
699 P.2d at 728.
I would reverse and remand for a trial.

. Williams explained the reason for that modification as follows:
The expanded liability of landlords under modern law has evolved from recognition of the fact that a residential lessee does not realistically receive an estate in land. Rather, the lessee’s rights, liabilities and expectations are more appropriately viewed as governed by contract and general principles of tort law. 699 P.2d at 727; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 63, at 434-35 (5th ed.1984) (discussing social policies supporting a modification of the traditional common law duty owed tenants by landlords).

. Williams stated that a lessor could be liable for negligence if
(1) he had contracted to repair the premises;
(2) there was a hidden or latently dangerous condition which was known to the lessor and caused an injury; (3) the premises were leased for purposes of admitting the public and a member of the public was injured; or (4) part of the premises was retained under the lessor’s control, but was open to the use of the lessee.
699 P.2d at 726 (citations omitted).