Court Opinion

ID: 9463743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:15:00.211292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:15.817861
License: Public Domain

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the judgment of the Court which remands the case to the district court for further proceedings, including appropriate summary judgment proceedings.
Since I do not agree, however, with certain aspects of Judge Oakes’ opinion, I wish to so indicate in this special concurrence.
First, with deference to the author of the majority opinion, I find the characterization of the district court’s action here as revolving door justice, resulting in propelling appellant out on the street, to be both unnecessary and inaccurate. Indeed, there is much to be said for according swift revolv*793ing door treatment to many removed diversity eases. Here I have no doubt that the experienced district judge, who is thoroughly knowledgeable with respect to New York law, upon remand will carry out our mandate with his usual conscientious determination to see that justice is done.
Second, while I agree that appellant here was not given an adequate opportunity to prepare to meet the district court’s sua sponte order granting summary judgment, I do not think it is necessary to incorporate the ten day notice provision of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) into every such sua sponte summary judgment order. The rare case in which sua sponte summary judgment is appropriate may arise in such a manner that an accelerated determination can be made without unfairness to the parties. See Healy v. James, 319 F.Supp. 113 (D.Conn.1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 1122, 1129 (2 Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). I would continue to adhere to the practice in this Circuit of leaving the details of the timetable to the discretion of the district court in accordance with Professor Moore’s flexible formulation: “[I]f the court contemplates entering summary judgment sua sponte the parties should at least be given the opportunity to prepare and submit materials on the question of summary judgment.” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.12, at 56-339 (2 ed. 1976); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) and 12(c).