Court Opinion

ID: 9351581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-02 00:00:37.456888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:00:53.300330
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50240         Document: 00516594103              Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/30/2022

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                         December 30, 2022
                                        No. 22-50240
                                                                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk

   Alejandro Hernandez,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   El Pasoans Fighting Hunger; Jose "Abe" Gonzalez;
   Susan E. Goodall,

                                                                  Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 3:21-CV-55

   Before King, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.*
   Per Curiam:**
         Alejandro Hernandez, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
   the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we
   AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further
   proceedings.

         *
             Judge Haynes concurs in the judgment only.
         **
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50240      Document: 00516594103          Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/30/2022

                                    No. 22-50240

                                         I.
          In March 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant Alejandro Hernandez, proceeding
   pro se, filed a single-count complaint against Defendants-Appellees seeking
   injunctive relief for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
   (“ADA”). After Hernandez filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis,
   the district court referred the application to a magistrate judge. The district
   court also directed the magistrate judge to consider whether Hernandez’s
   action should be dismissed under the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C.
   § 1915. Hernandez subsequently amended his complaint (as amended, the
   “Complaint”) after his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted.
   In his Complaint, Hernandez alleges that he suffers from asthma exacerbated
   by breathing difficulties caused by a deviated septum in addition to severe
   PTSD, chronic anxiety, and “panic triggers” that “hinder breathing
   abruptly” and disrupt “other normal daily functions,” all of which
   “substantially limit most major life activities with distress.” Hernandez
   alleges that he is unable to wear a face covering for “medical reasons,” i.e.,
   due to his disabilities. Defendants-Appellees are a food bank, El Pasoans
   Fighting Hunger (“EPFH”), and two of its employees, Jose “Abe”
   Gonzalez and Susan E. Goodall (collectively, the “Defendants”).
          EPFH operates “walk-up locations” where it distributes food to those
   who are in need. During the COVID-19 pandemic, EPFH had a policy
   requiring all food recipients to wear a face covering while at a walk-up
   location. On January 13, 2021, Hernandez alleges that he went to one of
   EPFH’s walk-up locations in El Paso, Texas without wearing a mask.
   According to Hernandez, he was “pushed by an attendant working for the
   Defendants, experienced shaming in the form of name calling,” and was
   publicly “labeled with demeaning, humiliating and degrading language and
   treatment” while attempting to receive food at the El Paso walk-up location.
   Hernandez also alleges that he had been previously “physically pushed out

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   of the building by a male staff member” at the El Paso walk-up location on or
   about January 10, 2021. Accordingly, Hernandez asserts that Defendants
   have prevented him from accessing their food services by denying him entry
   to walk-up locations.
          The Complaint also describes Hernandez’s “good faith effort[s]” to
   resolve this dispute with Defendants. Hernandez spoke to numerous EPFH
   employees on multiple occasions, including Goodall and Gonzalez,
   explaining the nature of his disability; Gonzalez, however, denied any
   wrongdoing. Instead, Hernandez alleges            that Gonzalez “violated
   [Hernandez’s] privacy by making public searches about [him] to determine
   whether he was the property owner of the residence where he lives” and
   whether Hernandez owned a vehicle as well. Hernandez also alleges that
   EPFH’s website “provides no information on reasonable accommodations
   for persons who cannot wear face covering[s].” Hernandez, however, admits
   that he “was told that he could register for home delivery as a reasonable
   accommodation.” But he alleges that he only received food via home delivery
   once after registering for the service in November 2020. According to
   Hernandez, he brought this issue to Defendants’ attention and requested that
   he alternatively be allowed to receive “curb side service” beside a walk-up
   location but that Defendants refused, citing the current home delivery
   accommodation as good enough.
          Hernandez seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to allow him to
   benefit from their food services without wearing a face covering.
   Additionally, Hernandez requests that the court “provide clear protocols”
   to Defendants, if necessary, and direct Defendants to “train their staff about
   its legal obligations and to post and disseminate notice to . . . all pertinent
   staff regarding their legal obligations under the ADA.”

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          On March 10, 2021, the district court referred Hernandez’s
   Complaint to the magistrate judge to determine if the Complaint should be
   dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On April 23, 2021, the magistrate judge
   issued his report and recommendations, recommending that the Complaint
   be dismissed without prejudice as frivolous and for failing to state a claim.
   The magistrate judge reasoned that while Hernandez was able to sufficiently
   allege the first two prongs of his ADA claim—that he has a disability and that
   “food banks are places of public accommodation under the ADA”—the
   Complaint failed to demonstrate that Defendants took adverse action against
   him because of his disability. The magistrate judge explained that because the
   law does not require a business to “modify or alter the goods and services
   that it offers in order to avoid violating” the ADA, Defendants were under
   no obligation to alter their masking policy.
          On July 1, 2021, the district court issued an order, accepting in part
   and rejecting in part the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations.
   First, the court explained that the Complaint did not sufficiently allege how
   Defendants failed to provide Hernandez with a reasonable accommodation.
   Specifically, the court pointed to the paucity of facts surrounding
   Defendants’ response to Hernandez’s complaints that he had not been
   receiving food deliveries. Rather, the court determined that the Complaint
   merely stated in a conclusory manner that Defendants failed to provide a
   reasonable accommodation to Hernandez. The court also found that EPFH’s
   website showed that, in addition to home delivery, EPFH offered a “Mobile
   Pantry” service where “people can alternatively pick [food] up via a ‘drive
   thru’ without the need to enter [EPFH’s] facilities,” further refuting
   Hernandez’s contention that Defendants failed to provide reasonable
   accommodations. The court noted that although Hernandez is entitled to a
   reasonable accommodation, this is not necessarily commensurate with his
   preferred accommodation, i.e., curb side service. The court also ruled that

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   the magistrate judge was correct in that the law does not require Defendants
   to alter their masking policy for Hernandez.
          Second, and after already holding that the Complaint failed to state a
   claim, the court also determined that Hernandez failed to establish that he
   had Article III standing to bring his claim. The court held that Hernandez
   could not show that there was a threat of future discrimination, i.e., an injury-
   in-fact, relying on the same information from EPFH’s website—the Mobile
   Pantry service—that it had used to refute the Complaint’s allegations that
   Defendants failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. The court also
   ruled that the accommodations listed on EPFH’s website mooted
   Hernandez’s claim for injunctive relief. The court thus dismissed the
   Complaint as frivolous but deviated from the magistrate judge’s
   recommendation by ordering that the Complaint be dismissed with
   prejudice. The court reasoned that there is a presumption to dismiss
   frivolous cases with prejudice unless the court provides an explanation as to
   why an exception is warranted. The court declined to provide such an
   explanation, noting that the magistrate judge did not do so as well.
          On appeal, Hernandez asserts that his Complaint states a claim and is
   not frivolous, and that the district court erred when it took judicial notice of
   EPFH’s website to refute the Complaint’s allegations.
                                          II.
          A court may dismiss a complaint filed by a plaintiff proceeding in
   forma pauperis “at any time” if it determines, inter alia, that the action is
   frivolous or the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
   28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, a court may examine the frivolity of
   such a suit before service of process has been effectuated. Green v. McKaskle,
   788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986). This is one of those cases; here, the
   magistrate judge ordered that service of process should not issue until he

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   determined whether Hernandez’s Complaint had merit. In these cases,
   “[d]ismissal is ‘often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as
   to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering
   such complaints.’” Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1991)
   (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
          Under Title III of the ADA (“Title III”), “[n]o individual shall be
   discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
   of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
   of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
   leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C.
   § 12182(a). A successful claim under this provision must satisfy three
   elements: (1) the plaintiff has a disability; (2) the defendant owns, leases, or
   operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the defendant
   discriminates against the plaintiff in connection with that public
   accommodation based on the plaintiff’s disability. Accord Molski v. M.J.
   Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007); Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 442
   F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 2006); Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d
   1221, 1231 (11th Cir. 2021); see McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 186 (5th
   Cir. 2000). The district court held that Hernandez adequately pleaded the
   first and second elements of his claim. At issue on appeal is the court’s
   determination that the Complaint was deficient in pleading the third element.
   But the court’s analysis went beyond the sufficiency of the Complaint’s
   factual allegations; it also dismissed the Complaint for lack of subject matter
   jurisdiction.
          “[W]hen the issue of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits,
   district courts should deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits
   of the plaintiff’s case under . . . [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).”
   In re S. Recycling, L.L.C., 982 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal
   quotations omitted); Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th

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   1013, 1019 (5th Cir. 2022); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.
   1981). Here, the district court held that the Complaint failed to state a claim
   for the same reason that it held Article III standing was wanting—the factual
   allegations were insufficient to show that Defendants failed to provide a
   reasonable accommodation. Additionally, those holdings relied on the same
   facts—which the court found on EPFH’s website—to refute the
   Complaint’s allegations. The court did not address, however, whether the
   jurisdictional and merits issues should be dealt with simultaneously. Without
   explanation, the court began its analysis by addressing the Complaint’s
   failure to state a claim. Only after completing its 12(b)(6) analysis did the
   court turn to Hernandez’s standing. If these two issues are distinct, the court
   should have addressed them in reverse order: first, the court should have
   ruled on whether it had subject matter jurisdiction, and then, only if it had
   ruled in the affirmative, should it have assessed whether the Complaint failed
   to state a claim. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95
   (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold
   matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United
   States and is inflexible and without exception.” (internal quotations
   omitted)); see e.g., Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We
   must first consider the threshold question of jurisdiction.”).
          Yet, despite this apparent oversight, an accessible offramp is in reach.
   On a typical motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint’s
   factual allegations are taken as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
   (2009). At this stage of the proceedings, a court is confined to a limited
   factual universe: “(1) the facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents
   attached to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice may be
   taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch.
   Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). A court may also consider
   “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss,” which “are

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   considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s
   complaint and are central to her claim.” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet,
   Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Collins v. Morgan Stanley
   Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000)). Citing this last
   exception, the district court made findings of fact based on information it
   found on EPFH’s website, implying that it considered the website central to
   Hernandez’s claim. The entirety of the district court’s standing and
   mootness analyses is dependent on these factual findings. Likewise, much of
   the court’s analysis concerning whether the Complaint states a claim relies
   on these findings as well.
          Hernandez now argues that it was improper for the court to make
   these findings. If Hernandez is correct, then he would indeed have standing,
   his case would not be moot, and the remaining issue would be whether the
   Complaint states a claim. Accordingly, we will first consider whether the
   district court was permitted to rely on its factual findings. If not, we need not
   determine whether “the issue of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits”
   (nor whether this action is moot). S. Recycling, 982 F.3d at 379 (internal
   quotations omitted).
                                          A.
          Hernandez argues that EPFH’s website is not central to his
   Complaint, and therefore, the district court should not have incorporated it
   into its analysis. The Complaint states that “EPFH operates a website which
   provides no information on reasonable accommodations for persons who
   cannot wear face covering [sic].” This fact forms part of the basis for
   Hernandez’s argument that Defendants failed to provide him with a
   reasonable accommodation. If EPFH’s website contradicts the Complaint’s
   allegations, the remaining allegations supporting his claim cannot stand. The
   Complaint recounts Hernandez’s communications with EPFH’s staff.

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   According to the Complaint, Defendants told Hernandez that he could
   register for home delivery, but the Complaint alleges that this was not a
   reasonable accommodation. But Hernandez admits that he is familiar with
   EPFH’s website. And the Complaint alleges that Hernandez checked the
   website for reasonable accommodations. Therefore, if a reasonable
   accommodation was listed on the website, Hernandez would be expected to
   inquire as to its availability when communicating with EPFH staff. See
   Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997)
   (“The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a modification was requested
   and that the requested modification is reasonable.”). There can be no Title
   III claim if the Complaint cannot show that Hernandez met his burden.
   Accordingly, EPFH’s website is central to the Complaint because the
   veracity of the relevant factual allegations depends on Hernandez’s
   knowledge of the website.
          What is troubling, however, is that we cannot locate the information
   the district court cited on EPFH’s website. The court held that Defendants
   offered individuals like Hernandez reasonable accommodations because
   “their website indeed shows that due to COVID-19, Defendants do offer
   services such as . . . a ‘Mobile Pantry’ program in which people can
   alternatively pick [food] up via a ‘drive thru’ without the need to enter
   [Defendants’] facilities,” in addition to the home delivery program. 1
   Hernandez asserts that the link cited by the court does not mention the
   availability of the Mobile Pantry program. We agree. The article does not
   refer to the Mobile Pantry program by name, nor does it describe a similar

          1
            See EPFH, El Pasoans Fighting Hunger Food Bank’s Response to COVID-19
   (Coronavirus),   https://elpasoansfightinghunger.org/details/news/el-pasoans-fighting-
   hunger-food-banks-response-to-covid-19-coronavirus (last visited Nov. 21, 2022).

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   initiative. Therefore, the district court erred in considering these proffered
   facts.
            The entirety of the district court’s standing and mootness analyses
   relied on its factual findings from EPFH’s website. As we have determined
   that those factual findings were unsupported, we reverse the court’s order to
   the extent it depends on either analysis. We accordingly turn to the court’s
   decision to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim.
                                           B.
            We review a § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal for failure to state a claim de
   novo using the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. Butler v. S.
   Porter, 999 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Butler v. Porter,
   142 S. Ct. 766 (2022), reh’g denied, 142 S. Ct. 1224 (2022). To overcome a
   motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege enough facts, accepted as true,
   “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
   Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
   plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
   inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
   U.S. at 678. Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the
   complaint must include “factual allegations that when assumed to be true
   ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503
   F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Conclusory
   statements     or     “‘naked   assertion[s]’     devoid   of    ‘further   factual
   enhancement’” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original)
   (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “The plausibility standard . . . asks for
   more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A
   complaint pleading facts “that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
   liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
   entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Whether the

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   plausibility standard has been met is a “context-specific task that requires the
   reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
   679. Additionally, the pleadings of a pro se litigant such as Hernandez “are
   construed liberally.” Butler, 999 F.3d at 292 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404
   U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (per curiam)).
          The district court held that the Complaint contained insufficient
   factual allegations regarding the third prong of a Title III claim—the
   discrimination prong. Discrimination under Title III includes:
          a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
          practices, or procedures, when such modifications are
          necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
          advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities,
          unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
          modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such
          goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
          accommodations.
   42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Hernandez claims that because he was
   unable to comply with EPFH’s masking requirements on account of his
   disability, which precluded him from benefiting from EPFH’s services,
   Defendants were obligated to make reasonable modifications to
   accommodate him. The Complaint alleges that Defendants offered
   Hernandez a reasonable accommodation in the form of home delivery once
   he had initiated communication with EPFH staff. But Hernandez contends
   that the Complaint also alleges that the home delivery program was
   ineffective. The Complaint states that Hernandez “register[ed] for home
   delivery . . . in November [2020] and only received food once since that
   time.” The Complaint then states that when Hernandez “informed
   Defendants about this fact, . . . Defendants refused to provide a reasonable
   accommodation.” The Complaint provides only one additional detail
   concerning this interaction: Hernandez requested that Defendants

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   alternatively allow him to receive curb side service, but “once again the
   Defendants refused to provide this reasonable accommodation citing their
   practice as ‘good enough.’”
          These allegations are insufficient to show that Hernandez was denied
   a reasonable accommodation. Hernandez does not explain how Defendants
   responded to his complaint regarding the infrequency of home delivery, apart
   from the legal conclusion that they “refused to provide a reasonable
   accommodation.” There are no allegations describing Defendants’ actual
   response.     Hernandez’s       characterization      of   Defendants’       response
   necessitates an inferential leap beyond the bounds of a well-pleaded
   complaint. A court need not substitute legal conclusions for factual
   allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Tellingly, Hernandez provides a factual
   allegation in describing Defendants’ response to his suggested alternative,
   i.e., curb side service—that home delivery was “good enough.” This
   allegation also demonstrates that Defendants relied on home delivery as a
   reasonable modification to their masking policies that could not otherwise
   accommodate individuals with disabilities like Hernandez. Thus, the
   Complaint would likely be well pleaded had it alleged facts showing that
   Defendants refused to ensure that home delivery was an effective alternative.
   But this link in the logical chain is not supported by any factual allegations.
   Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a claim and we affirm the district
   court’s holding in this respect.2

          2
              Hernandez also challenges the district court’s determination that Defendants
   were not required to provide Hernandez with a reasonable accommodation, in part, because
   “exempting [Hernandez] from [EPFH’s] mask policy would pose a direct threat to the
   health and safety of others . . . due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” We need not reach this
   issue as there is a sufficient basis to dismiss the Complaint regardless.

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                                          C.
          The district court also dismissed Hernandez’s Complaint as frivolous.
   We review a § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissal for a complaint as frivolous for
   abuse of discretion. Butler, 999 F.3d at 292 (5th Cir. 2021). A complaint is
   frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke,
   490 U.S. at 325. “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on
   an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the
   violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Harper v. Showers,
   174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact
   if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts
   when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v. Gilley, 138
   F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). “[C]learly baseless” is a “category
   encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton
   v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (internal quotations and citations
   omitted). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts
   alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or
   not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. at
   33. But an in forma pauperis complaint “may not be dismissed . . . simply
   because the court finds the plaintiff’s allegations unlikely.” Id. The standard
   to dismiss a complaint as frivolous is more exacting than the standard for
   failure to state a claim; accordingly, a court may hold that a complaint fails to
   state a claim but does not rise to the level of frivolous. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
   328–29 (“That frivolousness in the § 1915(d) context refers to a more limited
   set of claims than does Rule 12(b)(6) accords, moreover, with the
   understanding articulated in other areas of law that not all unsuccessful
   claims are frivolous.”).
          At the conclusion of its analysis, the district court ruled that
   Hernandez’s claim was “factually frivolous because the facts alleged are
   ‘clearly baseless.’” The court, however, did not provide any reasoning for its

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   determination, nor did it identify which particular facts were “clearly
   baseless.” Because the court held that the Complaint sufficiently pleaded
   that Hernandez has a disability and that Defendants operate a place of public
   accommodation, we infer that the court deemed the allegations surrounding
   the alleged discrimination as frivolous. The Complaint alleges that EPFH
   makes no exceptions for its masking policy, effectively preventing Hernandez
   from accessing its services. It then recounts Hernandez’s attempt to access
   EPFH’s services at a walk-up location without wearing a face covering and
   the resulting backlash he experienced. The Complaint also alleges that
   Hernandez communicated with EPFH staff in an attempt to rectify his lack
   of access to EPFH’s services. We cannot reason that any of these facts (or
   the others alleged in the Complaint) are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or
   “delusional,” nor do these allegations read as “irrational” or “wholly
   incredible.” See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33.
          Although we have ruled that the Complaint is lacking in sufficient
   detail regarding Hernandez’s communications with EPFH staff, see supra
   II.B, this deficiency alone does not render the whole complaint frivolous.
   Indeed, the district court recognized that the Complaint easily satisfied the
   first two prongs of a Title III claim. And the Complaint does contain
   allegations (albeit incomplete) relating to the third prong as well. None of
   these facts can be described as frivolous. Therefore, we hold that the district
   court abused its discretion in dismissing the Complaint as frivolous.
          A complaint that is dismissed as frivolous is presumed to be dismissed
   with prejudice unless the district court “specifically dismisses without
   prejudice.” Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir. 1997). If a court
   dismisses a frivolous action without prejudice, it is expected to provide
   reasoning for its decision. Id. Here, the magistrate judge recommended that
   the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice. The district court rejected
   this recommendation and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice because

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   (1) it found no reason that warranted an exception and (2) the magistrate
   judge provided no reason for his recommendation on the issue. But now that
   we have ruled the Complaint is not frivolous, defaulting to a dismissal with
   prejudice may no longer be appropriate. “Generally a district court errs in
   dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
   without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.” Bazrowx v. Scott, 136
   F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). But “if a complaint alleges the plaintiff’s best
   case, there is no need to remand for a further factual statement from the
   plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, the
   record does not indicate that Hernandez was given an opportunity to amend
   his Complaint once it was screened by the magistrate judge and district court.
   It is also unclear to us that the Complaint alleges Hernandez’s best case
   considering that he may only be a few factual allegations away from stating a
   claim. Therefore, in light of our ruling that the Complaint should not have
   been dismissed as frivolous, we remand this action to the district court to
   reconsider whether Hernandez should be given leave to amend his
   Complaint.3
                                              III.
           For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the
   Complaint for failure to state a claim, but we REVERSE the district court’s
   holding that the Complaint is frivolous. We accordingly REMAND to the

           3
              Hernandez filed his initial complaint on March 8, 2021, nearly two years ago. In
   the intervening period since this filing, many health precautions, including masking
   requirements, have abated. Given these general developments, it is possible that
   Hernandez may be seeking to enjoin a policy that is no longer in place. Therefore, the
   district court should consider if Hernandez’s claim is moot on this basis when determining
   whether he should be provided with the opportunity to amend his Complaint.

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Case: 22-50240    Document: 00516594103           Page: 16   Date Filed: 12/30/2022

                                   No. 22-50240

   district court to reassess whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted and
   whether Hernandez should be afforded leave to amend his Complaint.

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