Court Opinion

ID: 9681602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:53:06.344363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.733466
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Believing trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the State’s manifestly improper closing argument at the punishment phase of trial, I respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
Appellant testified at the guilt/innocence phase and admitted assaulting the complainant, but contended she was justified in using force to protect herself or another against the complainant’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. See, Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.31 and 9.33. The jury rejected appellant’s self-defense/defense of third person defense and returned a verdict of guilty.
At the punishment phase, appellant again testified and on cross-examination by the State the following exchange occurred:
Q: Ms. Vaughn, do you accept the jury’s verdict?
A: Yes, I have to.
Q: During the trial, you denied what took place and what the jury found to be true. And do you now admit to the members of the jury that that took place?
A: No. What I told the jury was the absolute truth, what I believe was the truth, what happened was the absolute truth.
During its jury argument at the punishment phase of trial, the State argued:
You know, ladies and gentlemen, one of the first things a person has to do when they want to rehabilitate is to admit their crime. Admit what they did. Admit the injustice and the harm they caused to an*571other. But we didn’t hear that up here today. They have not admitted to anything. They are not admitting to what you found them guilty of. That’s the first step anybody has to take in rehabilitation. They haven’t done it. A possible reason could be for them to do it, they would have to get on the stand and admit to you that they lied to us. But the thing is they are not admitting it and that is the first step to rehabilitation.1
B.
On direct appeal, appellant contended the above questioning and argument were objectionable and that her trial attorney’s failure to object rose to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed:
In order for trial counsel’s failure to object to the State’s question and argument to have been ineffective assistance, appellant must demonstrate that if he had objected, the trial judge would have committed error in refusing to sustain his objection. Appellant cannot meet that burden. We believe that the questions themselves were proper and represent no more than the usual risk a defendant assumes when he or she takes the stand to testify. At most, any error would have been improper jury argument by the State.
We cannot say that the trial judge would have committed error had he overruled an objection to the State’s remarks on closing. There is no definitive precedent that controls; indeed the lack of precedent ... makes a ruling on appellant’s hypothetical objection extremely uncertain.
Vaughn v. State, 888 S.W.2d 62, 74 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994). Chief Justice Oliver-Parrott dissented, believing a defendant should not be punished for exercising the constitutional right to stand trial rather than plead guilty. Id., 888 S.W.2d at 77.
Today, a majority of this Court accepts the premise of Chief Justice Oliver-Parrott, but nevertheless holds:
... Though an admission of her guilt at punishment would amount to aggravated perjury, and a waiver of her appellate rights, it is unclear that there is anything unconstitutional about putting appellant to a choice between these consequences.
Ante at 567. For the following reasons, I disagree.
II.
The standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase of a non-capital trial was established in Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Under this standard the test for effectiveness of counsel is, first, whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance and, second, whether counsel reasonably rendered effective assistance. Craig v. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). In the instant case the threshold issue is whether the State’s argument was objectionable. If the argument was proper counsel was not ineffective for failing to lodge an objection and our inquiry is complete.
There are four categories of permissible jury argument: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3) answer to the argument of opposing counsel; or (4) a plea for law enforcement. Campbell v. State, 610 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The instant argument does not fit into any of the four areas of permissible argument. Wages v. State, 703 S.W.2d 736, 740-741 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985). Consequently, the argument was improper and was, therefore, objectionable.
The second issue is whether in failing to object, trial counsel reasonably rendered effective assistance. The Sixth Amendment guarantees to everyone many valuable rights including the right to a trial to determine the question of guilt. These rights are further enumerated and defined in our Code of Criminal Procedure which sets forth in great detail the manner in which a trial shall be conducted. All persons are presumed to be innocent. Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann. art. *57238.03. A plea of guilty is a denial of every material allegation in the indictment, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.17, and upon such a plea, the State bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); and, art. 38.03. During trial, a defendant may contend that the complained of conduct was justified. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.02. Conduct that is justified establishes a defense to the prosecution. When the evidence raises such a defense, the trial judge shall instruct the jury that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was not justified. See, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14. The right to contest one’s guilt is the most valuable right within our criminal justice system. There are no summary determinations of guilt; even in the face of a plea of guilty, the State must still offer evidence of guilt. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15.
Having said this, it necessarily follows that a defendant may not be punished for invoking the constitutional and statutory rights associated with trial. And, it is manifestly improper for the State to argue that any defendant should be punished for invoking those rights. See, Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1020 (11th Cir.1991) (Improper argument to suggest defendant was not entitled to rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.). Several cases are illustrative of this point. In Lopez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), this Court found reversible error was committed when the prosecutor argued the defendants had lied when they entered pleas of not guilty. See also, Anderson v. State, 525 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). In Perkins v. State, 630 S.W.2d 298, 302-303 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. ref d), the Court found reversible error when the prosecutor argued the defendant’s plea of “not true” to the enhancement paragraph was “a lie.” The plea was proper to require the State to meet its burden of proof to enhance the range of punishment. In Wages, 703 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985), the State argued the jury had been summoned to service because the defendant insisted on her right to a jury trial.2 The Court concluded the argument was improper. Id., 703 S.W.2d at 741.3 See also, Perdue v. Com., 916 S.W.2d 148, 163-64 (Ky.1995) (Improper in closing argument to refer to the “time and trouble” occasioned by a plea of not guilty and resulting trial.). Similarly, the State may not, in argument, comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. To allow such a comment would permit the jury to punish the defendant for invoking his constitutional and statutory right to remain silent. U.S. Const, amend. V; Tex. Const, art. I; § 10; and, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.08.
In the instant case, the State asked the jury to punish appellant for persisting in her belief in her defense which had been rejected by the jury. Appellant had every right to raise that defense and to continue to believe in it regardless of the jury’s verdict. In Overstreet v. State, 470 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), the defendant testified at the punishment phase of her trial and indicated that she did not agree with the jury’s verdict. The State later argued that the defendant could not be rehabilitated because she had not confessed her guilt. We condemned the argument, noting:
A defendant in a criminal ease under our laws has the right to enter a plea of not guilty and to file a motion for probation, and the fact that he has exercised those rights should not be utilized against him.
Id., 470 S.W.2d at 655.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held a defendant may not be placed in such a situa*573tion. In Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1966), the trial judge asked the defendant, who pled not guilty at trial, to recant his plea and admit his guilt before sentencing. The trial judge stated: “If you will come clean and make a clean breast of this thing for once and for all, the Court will take that into account in the length of sentence to be imposed.” Thomas, 368 F.2d at 944. The defendant continued to profess his innocence and the trial judge imposed the maximum sentence.4 The Fifth Circuit reversed:
Our part in the administration of federal justice requires that we reject the theory that a person may be punished because in good faith he defends himself when charged with a crime, even though his effort proves unsuccessful. It is evident that the punishment imposed by the district court on the defendant was in part for the fact that he had availed himself of his right to a trial, and only in part for the crime for which he was indicted.
Thomas, 368 F.2d at 944 (quoting, Wiley, 278 F.2d at 504). Additionally, the Court stated: Thomas, 368 F.2d at 945 (quoting, United States v. Toteo, 214 F.Supp. 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y.1963)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit held a trial judge may not induce a defendant, who has been found guilty following a trial by jury, to confess his or her guilt prior to the imposition of sentence. See also, United States v. Wright, 533 F.2d 214, 216 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. Laca, 499 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.1974); Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.1972). See also, United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.1960).
No matter how heinous the offense charged, how overwhelming the proof of guilt may appear, or how hopeless the defense, a defendant’s right to continue with his trial may not be violated. His constitutional right to require the Govémment to proceed to a conclusion of the trial and to establish guilt by independent evidence should not be exercised under the shadow of a penalty — that if he persists in the assertion of his right and is found guilty, he faces, in view of the Trial Court’s announced intention, a maximum sentence, and if he pleads guilty, there is the prospect of a substantially reduced term. To impose upon a defendant such alternative amounts to coercion as a matter of law.
In light of the decisional authority from this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Fifth Circuit, the State’s argument was manifestly improper. Accordingly, if trial counsel had objected, the trial judge would have committed error in overruling the objection. Therefore, trial counsel did not render reasonably effective assistance when he failed to object. Furthermore, appellant was prejudiced by the argument because the punishment assessed was toward the upper end of the punishment range.5 See, Moore v. State, 530 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. Because the majority fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.
OVERSTREET, J., joins this opinion.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. The State argued:
STATE: Ladies and gentlemen, what you’ve just heard from the defense lawyer amounts to a sympathy plea. Don’t let the defendant in this case or her attorney put the monkey on your back. You didn’t ask to spend four days down here at the courthouse this week. You didn't get a subpoena to come down and be a juror. I didn't ask to be here. The judge didn’t ask to be here. [The defendant] has brought us all here today and for the last four days.
Wages, 703 S.W.2d at 740-741.

. The Court of Appeals concluded the error was cured when the trial judge sustained the defendant’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the State’s closing argument. Ibid.

. The Fifth Circuit has held the sentence imposed did not have to he the maximum statutory term for a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights to be violated. Wright, 533 F.2d at 216. The Fifth Amendment was violated when the sentencing authority considered the defendant’s refusal to confess after a not guilty plea. See, e.g., Laca, 499 F.2d at 927; Thomas, 368 F.2d at 945; Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.1959). ”[T]he fact that the maximum statutory term was not imposed is not dispositive of the issue" of a Constitutional violation. Wright, 533 F.2d at 216. If the record suggests the possibility that the sentencing authority may actually have taken a defendant’s refusal to cooperate into account in sentencing, “then the sentence should be vacated and a new sentence imposed without consideration of this refusal.” Rogers, 504 F.2d at 1085.

. Appellant was sentenced to six years confinement, probated, and a fine of $5,000.00.