Court Opinion

ID: 9624658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:12:50.31311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:01.077580
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sparks
specially concurring.
I concur in the conclusion announced, but I feel that an undue recitation of facts has obscured the legal arguments supporting the decision.' I might add that when *148viewed in the light of very recent federal decisions, this is the first time this Court has been called upon to resolve a conflict between the Colorado Labor Peace Act and the Federal Taft-Hartley Act.
This case concerns a “labor dispute” involving a Colo- • rado employer engaged in interstate commerce. The trial court held that no labor dispute existed under C.R.S. ’53, 80-5, denoted as the Labor Peace Act, and enjoined the únion from any type of picketing, peaceful or otherwise.
The fundamental issue presented in this case is the constantly recurring clash between federal and state jurisdictions in matters involving interstate commerce. By virtue of its superior right to regulate such commerce the federal government is the authority in that field. By process of trial and error Congress has enacted successive laws dealing with labor management relations, the controlling one in this case being the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. 141, et seq., commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. This act applies to those industries involved in interstate commerce. Since through the process of imagination even the smallest business can be placed on an “interstate” level, we resignedly concede that' more often than not states are sovereigns without subjects.
In the instant case the válidity of the injunction when considered solely under the Colorado Labor Peace Act is not presented. The union contends simply that Congress has pre-empted the field in those cases where the parties are subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board as in the instant case. Since federal law is controlling here a review of pertinent federal cases decided since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act convinces us that the contentions of the parties have already been answered. In Garner v. Teamsters, etc., 346 U.S. 484, 98 L. Ed. 228, 74 S. Ct. 161, an employer engaged in interstate commerce sought an injunction against the union under the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, No labor *149dispute or strike was in progress but picketing operations of the union caused a virtual cessation of the business. The picketing was orderly and peaceful. Applying state law the Pennsylvania trial court granted an injunction against the union. The injunction was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and on certiorari the United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as follows:
“The equity court held that respondents’ conduct violated the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act. The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth held, quite correctly, we think, that petitioners’ grievance fell within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices. It, therefore, inferred that state remedies were precluded.”
The principle that state courts cannot enjoin peaceful picketing which is subject to federal jurisdiction, even though in violation of state law, is apparently firmly established. We observe, however, that the United States Supreme Court carefully pointed out that the Garner case was not one which involved “mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes.” If such had been the facts, the court stated:
“We have held that the state may still exercise ‘its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways.’ ” citing Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740, 86 L. Ed. 1154, 62 S. Ct. 820.
The further federal case applicable here is the case United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266, 100 L. Ed. Adv., 76 S. Ct. 794. Parties in that case were subject to federal jurisdiction, but nevertheless the courts of Wisconsin granted an injunction against the union pursuant to state law for alleged “mass picketing and violent conduct.” In affirming the decision of the Wisconsin courts, the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
*150“The States are the natural guardians of the public against violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We would not interpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless to avert such emergencies without compelling directions to that effect.”
In the case before us we haye concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction of the controversy by virtue of the “mass picketing” principle above set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Since, however, the union had a primary right to picket peacefully subject only to federal jurisdiction, we must further determine whether or not an abuse of that right destroyed the right entirely as was the effect of the trial court’s injunction.
Historically this Court has upheld the right to peaceful picketing under the constitutional guaranty of free speech. Even more compelling has been a constant reiteration of this right through the medium of the federal courts and national Congress. In the Wisconsin case, supra, we find no language to indicate that the court denied the right of peaceful picketing. The point is resolved in a reading of this case as it appears in the Wisconsin reports where it is affirmatively shown that only the unlawful picketing was enjoined, and that the court set forth the terms under which peaceful picketing could be carried on. United Automobile Workers, et al. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, et al., 269 Wis. 578, 70 N.W. (2d) 191.
It follows, therefore, that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in enjoining all picketing, including such peaceful picketing as might lawfully be carried on under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, pursuant to such reasonable conditions as the court may impose.