Court Opinion

ID: 9387135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 21:01:11.19622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.443258
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-7225      Doc: 16         Filed: 04/13/2023    Pg: 1 of 3

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-7225

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        ANTHOINE PLUNKETT, a/k/a Antoine Plunkett,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Danville. Pamela Meade Sargent, Magistrate Judge. (4:04-cr-70083-MFU-PMS-2)

        Submitted: January 30, 2023                                       Decided: April 13, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        Anthoine Plunkett, Appellant Pro Se.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Anthoine Plunkett appeals the magistrate judge’s order denying his appointed

        counsel’s motion to withdraw and his pro se motions for appointment of substitute counsel.

        While we grant his motion to supplement, we must dismiss his appeal.

               With few exceptions, our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district

        courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In general, an order is final only if “nothing

        remains for the district court to do except execute the judgment.” United States ex rel. Lutz

        v. United States, 853 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2017). Because the magistrate judge’s order

        did not finally resolve Plunkett’s § 2255 motion, we only have jurisdiction if it is one of

        the “very few types of interlocutory orders [that] qualify as immediately appealable

        collateral orders.” S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436, 441 (4th Cir. 2006).

               To be a final decision for the purposes of the collateral order doctrine, the order

        must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue

        separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from

        a final judgment.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006). The doctrine can “never be

        allowed to swallow the general rule . . . that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be

        deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct,

        Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994).

               Plunkett’s appeal does not satisfy the second or third prongs of the collateral order

        doctrine. To begin, Plunkett and his counsel base their motions on their disagreement about

        the claims Plunkett is authorized to raise in his successive § 2255 motion. Determining

        whether that disagreement justified appointing new counsel — and, if so, whether the

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        magistrate judge’s failure to do so prejudiced Plunkett — would require us to consider the

        merits of his § 2255 motion. Accordingly, the issue resolved by the magistrate judge’s

        order is not “separate from the merits of the action.” Will, 546 U.S. at 349; see also

        Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 (1985).

               Moreover, any harm to Plunkett from the magistrate judge’s order can be redressed

        “on appeal from a final judgment.” Will, 546 U.S. at 349. If the magistrate judge’s ruling

        is erroneous and the error is found not to be harmless, it can be corrected later. See United

        States v. Blackledge, 751 F.3d 188, 193, 197 (4th Cir. 2014). Because the type of claim

        Plunkett advances “can be adequately vindicated by other means,” we must dismiss his

        appeal for lack of jurisdiction. * Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107

        (2009).

               We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                           DISMISSED

               *
                 It is significant that it is Plunkett, and not his attorney, who appeals the magistrate
        judge’s order. “In delineating the boundaries of the collateral order doctrine, ‘the
        importance of the right asserted [on appeal] has always been a significant part’ of the
        analysis.” Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82,
        87 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 352). While several circuits have concluded
        that an attorney may immediately appeal the denial of a motion to withdraw because of the
        irreparable harm that befalls an attorney “forced to continue representing a client against
        his or her wishes,” United States v. Bellille, 962 F.3d 731, 736 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
        Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1999)), the Supreme Court has explained
        that orders that allegedly violate a litigant’s right to the counsel of his or her choice are not
        immediately appealable, see Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 438–39; id. at 442 (Brennan,
        J., concurring).

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