Court Opinion

ID: 6738369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:20:15.164884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:52.815873
License: Public Domain

Robinson, J.
(dissenting). This is an appeal from an order sustaining a general demurrer to the complaint. It avers that at different times between the 30th day of July, 1910, and the 1st day of June, 1915, the plaintiff received and transported coal by the carload for the defendant between points in North Dakota; that the defendant by reason thereof became obligated to pay to the plaintiff the lawful and reasonable rates for such transportation; that the defendant has at all times refused to pay such reasonable rates, and has paid only the rates prescribed by chapter 51 of the Laws of 1907. It avers that the plaintiff refused to comply with chapter 51, and the attorney general brought a suit to compel such compliance. The state supreme court sustained the same. State ex rel. McCue v. Northern P. R. Co. 19 N. D. 45, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1001, 120 N. W. 869. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision without prejudice because of defective proof. 216 U. S. 579, 54 L. ed. 624, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. That by reason of said decisions and by compulsion during part of the year 1910 and until June, 1915, the plaintiff put in force the rates prescribed by chapter 51. That in July, 1911, on due application the state supreme court made an order reopening its judgment and appointing a referee to take additional testimony, and on such testimony it was again adjudged that the plaintiff keep the rates prescribed by chapter 51. State ex rel. McCue v. Northern P. R. Co. 26 N. D. 438, 145 N. W. 135. That on June 11, 1915, the judgment of the state court was reversed and the action dismissed, with costs, $1,878.82. 236 U. S. 585, 59 L. ed. 735, L.R.A.1917F, 1148, P.U.R.1915C, 277, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1.
The complaint avers that § 142 of the state Constitution is the sole authority for the regulation of rates, and it provides that the rate fixed by the legislative assembly or Board of Railroad Commissioners shall remain in force pending the decision of the courts, and that during the time of said shipments until July, 1915, by reason of the wrongful mandates of the courts, the plaintiff was compelled to accept and trans*92port coal at the rates fixed by chapter 51, which rates were not reasonable, And that at reasonable rates for the services rendered for the defendant, at its request there is due to the plaintiff an additional sum in excess of $26,000.
Disregarding some errors and omissions which counsel agree to waive, the complaint fairly shows that the plaintiff performed services for the defendant at its request in the transportation of coal, and that by compulsion the plaintiff accepted for such services $26,000, less than the reasonable value of the same, and the defendant has refused to pay such reasonable amount. Now it is manifest that if one party may compel another to perform services at less than the reasonable value of the same, he may compel performance without any value at all. If a party may take the services or the property of another without just-compensation, he may take it withoiit any compensation, and that is simple robbery. Of course, if the plaintiff voluntarily performed the services for the compensation received — as contended by the defendant — then it cannot recover an additional sum. The defense contends that at the date of the first decree of the United States Supreme Court, the statutory rate was lawful because it was not adjudged unlawful on the testimony submitted, but in that there is a fallacy. If chapter 51 fixed the rate at half the reasonable value or less than the reasonable value, the rate never became lawful by reason of a failure to make proof or the necessity of an experiment to demonstrate the fact. It is quite possible that on a trial the evidence may show that the services were voluntary and made without protest at the compensation fixed by statute, but the averments of the complaint are otherwise.
Here is a fine specimen of specious reasoning. It must be conceded that at the date of the first decision of the United States Supreme Court the statutory rate was lawful. Therefore the decree declaring' the same lawful was not erroneous, and therefore said decree only compelled the plaintiff to obey a valid law. Can it be said that a decree of a court compelling the defendant to comply with the valid law is coercive ?
The question is, Was the law valid? If it was a valid law at the time of the first decree, it was valid at the time of the second decree and it has always been valid. If a statute was void at the time of the *93second decree, it was equally yoid at the time of the first decree though the evidence failed to show it. The first decree was expressly based on the failure of proof regarding the reasonable value of the services. Hence, on the question of the constitutionality of the law, the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to express an opinion. When the case was reopened and further testimony submitted, the court held that the maximum rates fixed by chapter 51 are unreasonable, requiring the carrier to transport the commodity at a loss, and that “tho state exceeded its authority in enacting the statute, which amounts to an attempt to take the property of the carrier without due process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment.” Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 586, 59 L. ed. 735, L.R.A.1917F, 1148, P.U.R.1915C, 277, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1.
The complaint shows, by force of this statute and the court decisions, the plaintiff has been compelled to carry loads of coal for defendant at a loss or without just compensation, and that such loss amounts to over $26,000. Hence, the complaint does state a good cause of action.
Order sustaining demurrer should be reversed.