Court Opinion

ID: 9751508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:32:31.707177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:49.436724
License: Public Domain

DONALD D. ALSOP, District Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) allows Minnesota taxpayers to claim deductions from their gross incomes for amounts which they have expended in connection with educating their dependents at qualified elementary and secondary schools located in Minnesota or in the states which surround Minnesota.1 As to the deductions which are available for amounts paid as tuition to sectarian institutions and for transportation and instructional materials which the state may not constitutionally provide directly,2 my *1323opinion differs from that of the majority. Because Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) provides for a tax deduction for tuition paid to sectarian schools and amounts paid for such transportation and instructional materials, I would hold that it has the primary effect of advancing religion and is therefore violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
This analysis is premised on the proposition that the Establishment Clause is intended not only to prohibit governmental endorsement of any religious view or practice but also to ban the government’s lending of any financial aid to a religious institution. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). No one contends that Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) constitutes governmental endorsement of any religious view or practice. Indeed, it does not require nor encourage anyone to adopt any sectarian conviction or to observe any religious practice. However, it does aid religious institutions by providing an economic benefit to religious schools; in doing so, it runs counter to the Establishment Clause.
It is well recognized that statutes are not rendered constitutionally invalid merely because they confer an indirect benefit to religious schools by relieving some of their financial burden or by making it easier for students to attend. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 44 L.Ed.2d 217 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1970). However, the benefit conferred by Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) is a direct one.
In Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973), the Supreme Court held that N.Y.Tax Law § 612 (Supp.1972-73) violated the Establishment Clause because the inevitable effect of a statute that provides tax benefits which aid parents who send their children to sectarian schools is to aid and advance those religious institutions. Id. at 793, 93 S.Ct. 2955. I would hold that Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) is constitutionally indistinguishable from N.Y.Tax Law § 612 (Supp.1972-73).
Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) is unlike N.Y.Tax Law § 612 (Supp.1972-73) in three respects. First, § 290.09(22) applies to taxpayers whose dependents attend public as well as non-public schools. Secondly, the deduction provided by § 290.09(22) is related to the taxpayer’s actual expenditures for his dependents’ education. Finally, the Minnesota statute which provides a deduction for such educational expenses has gone unchallenged since the time of its original enactment in 1955 and has thereby achieved a modicum of historical acceptability.
However, despite those distinguishing features, I deem Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) to be no less constitutionally objectionable than N.Y.Tax Law § 612 (Supp. 1972-73). The fact that § 290.09(22) applies to taxpayers whose dependents attend public schools is without practical significance. Although a taxpayer may be obligated to pay tuition for a dependent who attends a public school in a school district other than the district in which the student resides, Minn.Stat. § 123.39(5) (1978), the number of taxpayers actually affected by the obligation to pay such tuition is so limited that application of the deduction to such persons broadens the scope of Minn.Stat. § 290.-09(22) (1976) only imperceptibly beyond the scope of N.Y.Tax Law § 612 (Supp.1972-73). Obviously, the tax reductions authorized by § 290.09(22) flow primarily to taxpáyers whose dependents attend sectarian, nonpublic schools. See Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra at 794, 93 S.Ct. 2955. Because the benefits of the statute flow primarily to such taxpayers, the § 290.09(22) deduction’s inclusion of public school tuition payments does not transform Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) into a broadly based program of tax relief benefitting a large class within which religious institutions are naturally included. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696, *132490 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) (concurring opinion). Likewise, the fact that the deduction provided by § 290.09(22) is related to the taxpayer’s actual expenditures is without constitutional significance. Although Nyquist did leave open the question of a genuine tax deduction, the statute now before the court provides no less of a subsidy to the sectarian activities of the schools involved than did the statute declared unconstitutional in Nyquist because of the statute’s subsidization of sectarian activity. Similarly, the fact that Minn.Stat. § 290.-09(22) (1976) and its predecessor have gone unchallenged from 1955 until now does not cloak the present statute with the sort of historical acceptability attained by the property tax exemption challenged in Walz. The exemption of churches from the payment of real property taxes has a history which goes back to the colonial era and to the time that the Bill of Rights was drafted. That exemption has attained virtually universal acceptance; every state did and does permit some form of tax exemption for real property owned by religious and other charitable institutions. On the other hand, the tax deduction for tuition has been available in Minnesota for less than twenty-five years. In addition, I am aware of only two other states which have attempted to provide similar deductions; in both states, the statutes were declared unconstitutional shortly after their enactment. See Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra (N.Y.Tax Law § 612 (Supp.1972-73) unconstitutional); Public Funds for Public Schools v. Byrne, 444 F.Supp. 1228 (D.N.J.1978) (N.J.S.A. 54A:3-1(b)(2) unconstitutional).
Because I consider Minn.Stat. § 290.-09(22) (1976) to be constitutionally indistinguishable from the statute declared unconstitutional in Nyquist, I would hold that § 290.09(22) has the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion. Therefore, I would declare Minn.Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and would enjoin the statute’s continued operation.

. The deduction may not exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 or $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to 12.

. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 57 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (transportation to *1323and from school and textbooks and textbook substitutes constitutional; other instructional materials and transportation in connection with field trips unconstitutional).