Court Opinion

ID: 9940849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 16:07:05.395443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:54.096834
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        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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                                              RENDERED: FEBRUARY 15, 2024
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0215-MR

ANTONIO MARSONEL WILSON                                              APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
V.                  HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
                          NO. 19-CR-00461-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                   AFFIRMING

      A jury of the Warren Circuit Court found Appellant Antonio Marsonel

Wilson guilty of murder by complicity. The Commonwealth and Wilson then

agreed to a sentence of 35 years. The trial court sentenced Wilson in

accordance with that agreement. Wilson now appeals to this Court as a matter

of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). After careful review, we affirm.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Appellant Wilson was in a romantic relationship with Selma Maropija.

Selma lived with her father Smajo Miropija, who did not like Wilson. On

February 3, 2019, Smajo and a friend returned to Smajo’s home where they

found Wilson. An altercation ensued during which Smajo and his friend

pushed Wilson, tried to drag him out of the house, and almost pulled his shirt
off. After the altercation, Wilson paced the street outside the home and

commented to Selma’s friend Brittany Apple that he was not done with Smajo.

Wilson also later told Selma he would get back at Smajo.

      The Commonwealth’s theory at trial was that Wilson hired an associate

named Jeffrey Lee Smith to kill Smajo for him. The proof established Wilson

drove a black Camry which ultimately was found to have accelerant in the

passenger seat, and that his fingerprints were found in a red Ford F-150 Smajo

had for sale on nearby Louisville Road. Smith testified to being taken to

Smajo’s workplace in the Camry and later driving the F-150.

      On February 8, 2019, Smajo was murdered and his body burned at his

business, Mega Transport. There were numerous witnesses interviewed and a

complicated trail of evidence investigated by the police. Police collected video

surveillance footage from a number of locations that revealed the movements of

vehicles of interest that day, including the F-150 that Smajo had for sale on

Louisville Road. Wilson had keys to Mega Transport, where the key to the F-

150 was kept on a wall.

      The surveillance footage showed that Smajo arrived at work at 9:28 a.m.

Around 10:15 a.m., a dark-colored passenger car parked near the F-150 Smajo

had for sale on Louisville Road. The two vehicles then drove off the parking lot.

At 10:18 a.m., a red Ford F-150 arrived at Mega Transport and one individual

entered the building. A black car followed behind the F-150, then passed by

Mega Transport several times while the F-150 was parked there. At 10:54

                                        2
a.m., one person exited Mega Transport, got into the F-150, and departed

heading toward Louisville Road.

      Around 10:57 a.m. the F-150 and black car returned to their previous

location on Louisville Road, where they stayed until 11:11 a.m. The black car

then departed, stopping momentarily near the F-150 before continuing on to

Louisville Road. At 11:32 a.m. the black car returned. The F-150 then pulled

onto Louisville Road.

      The F-150 returned to Mega Transport at 11:38 a.m., and left again at

11:41 a.m. headed away from Louisville Road. Smoke was then visible coming

from the building. The F-150 returned to its previous location on Louisville

Road at 11:46 a.m. At 11:47 a.m., the black car stopped and picked someone

up from the F-150.

      Around noon, Esnaf Ajanovic went to Mega Transport looking for Smajo

because he could not reach him by phone. Esnaf found the door locked and

left. Around 1:06 p.m., Smajo’s brother Arif Miropija went to Mega Transport

and found Smajo’s burnt body lying on the floor. The head was completely

blackened and fire was still present on the neck. An extension cord was later

discovered wrapped around Smajo’s neck. Subsequent medical examination

revealed that Smajo’s hyoid bone was fractured, his ribs were fractured, he had

a hemorrhage on the back of his skull possibly caused by blunt force trauma,

and the cause of his death was asphyxia via ligature strangulation.

      On the day of the murder, Selma’s friend Apple asked Wilson to go with

her to check on Selma. Wilson had Apple pick him up at the Sonic on

                                       3
Louisville Road. From there they drove to Mega Transport and saw police.

Wilson asked Apple to go back to Sonic so he could get some food. They then

parked in the parking lot of Apple’s apartment while Wilson ate. They then

returned to Mega Transport, where Apple got out and hugged Selma. Wilson

stayed in the car and spoke with Selma only on the phone.

      Selma testified that the morning of the murder, she tried to call Wilson

several times but he did not pick up. Eventually Wilson told Selma he was at

his mom’s house, and that he was sick, had taken medication, and fallen

asleep. Selma went to Wilson’s house. While there, she received a call from a

relative letting her know something had happened to her father. Selma left

Wilson and drove herself to Mega Transport, where she learned her father had

died. She texted Wilson with the news, left the scene, and went to Apple’s

apartment. Selma then went home.

      Around 5:00 a.m. the following day, Bowling Green police made a traffic

stop on Wilson. Police told Wilson detectives wanted to talk to him, but Wilson

declined to do so. Around 6:00 a.m., Wilson went to Selma’s house and stayed

for approximately an hour. Selma later texted Wilson to ask if he had anything

to do with her father’s death. Wilson said no, asked if Selma was serious, and

asked her if she thought he would do that or have something to do with it.

Wilson asked Selma to see him the evening of February 9, and she said no.

Selma and Wilson never talked again.

      The morning after the murder, police observed a black Camry in the

driveway at the home of Wilson’s mother. They saw the vehicle at Wilson’s

                                       4
house later that day. Around 7:00 p.m. that evening, police conducted a stop

of the black Camry while Wilson’s mother was driving it. During the stop,

Wilson’s mother repeatedly received calls from a phone number with a 270-

area code. Police called the number back and spoke to Wilson, who asked if

there was a warrant.

      Selma and Wilson were scheduled to take a Valentine’s Day trip to San

Francisco from February 13 to February 17, 2019. However, around 9:51 p.m.

on February 9 Wilson began attempting to book a flight to the Philippines. He

successfully booked the flight the next morning at 4:32 a.m. and was on the

flight when it departed Chicago at 9:50 a.m. on February 10. Wilson traveled

under his own name, had a return ticket scheduled, and contends he took the

trip to visit a relative because he was upset by Selma’s doubts in him. He took

the trip with awareness police wished to speak with him, but also with

awareness no warrant had been issued. Evidence at trial showed the

Philippines has an extradition treaty with the United States. Selma learned of

Wilson’s trip to the Philippines from one of Wilson’s family members.

      While Wilson was in the Philippines, the Bowling Green Police

Department arranged for cancellation of his passport and extradition back to

the United States. Before trial, Wilson filed a motion to exclude evidence of his

trip as consciousness of guilt, which the trial court denied.

      Again, Wilson’s associate Smith was the person allegedly paid by Wilson

to kill Smajo. In an interview with police, Smith acknowledged beating Smajo

at Mega Transport on the day of the murder. Smith’s DNA was also found

                                        5
under Smajo’s fingernails. Smith told police Wilson hired him to kill Smajo.

Wilson’s son Antonio Jr. also testified he told Selma after the murder that his

father had hired someone out of Memphis to kill Smajo. However, Antonio Jr.

also testified that his statement to Selma was false, and that he made it

because he had been mad at his father. Antonio Jr. also later told police he

thought Selma had set Wilson up.

      Jessica McKinney knew Smith from working in a laundromat next door

to a liquor store where Smith worked, and had seen Smith talking to Wilson

there. In February 2019, she asked to speak with police after she was arrested

on a child support warrant. McKinney told police that on February 8, Wilson

asked her for Smith’s phone number. She further testified that she had sex

with Wilson, and that he had a 513-area code phone number. McKinney also

said she saw Smith on February 9, the day after the murder, and that he was

not acting normal, that he had a newly chipped tooth and was missing some

hair, that he made her feel uneasy, and that his breathing turned funny when

she read him a news article about Smajo’s murder.

      Smith’s girlfriend Angel Cook testified at trial that Wilson’s phone

number changed from month to month. She further testified that Wilson did

business with Smith, and that a week before the murder she overheard a

conversation between Wilson and Smith regarding Smith being used as

“muscle, somewhere along the lines of a bouncer.” According to Cook, Smith

came home the day of the murder with his tooth knocked out and no shirt on,

                                        6
only shaking his head when she asked what happened. Cook also admitted

she lied in her initial statement to police in order to protect Smith.

      In late February police executed a search warrant at Wilson’s residence.

There they located a key and key fob for the black Camry. When police

searched the Camry, an accelerant-detecting dog alerted on the front passenger

seat. Gasoline was ultimately found to be present. Law enforcement also

pulled fingerprints from inside the door at Mega Transport and from the F-150

that were consistent with Wilson’s fingerprints.

      Law enforcement also obtained cell phone records from two phones. The

first was the 270-area code phone registered to Wilson, while the second was a

513-area code prepaid phone connected to him by other witnesses. Use of the

513-area code ceased on February 8, 2019, while use of the 270-area code

phone ceased the following day at 8:21 p.m.

      Before trial, Wilson moved to exclude as unreliable all evidence of cell

tower location data. The Commonwealth then identified F.B.I. Special Agent

Kevin Horan, a member of that agency’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team, as an

expert to offer an opinion that the historical cell tower data relating to Wilson’s

phones showed him in the general area at the time of the murder. Following a

Daubert hearing 1, the trial court denied Wilson’s motion, concluding that the

methodology was reliable and that Horan could testify so long as he referred

only to general areas and acknowledged the limitations of the technology.

      1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

                                          7
      At trial, Smith admitted he had beaten Smajo on the day of the murder. 2

He testified that he first met Wilson a couple of years earlier, and that they did

business together. According to Smith, killing Smajo was Wilson’s idea

because Wilson was angry Smajo laid hands on him during the attack at

Smajo’s home. Smith testified Wilson offered him $10,000 and a new truck to

commit the murder.

      Smith further testified he told Wilson he would have to think about his

offer. Smith stated Wilson took him to Mega Transport a couple of nights

before the murder to see the place. According to Smith, Wilson picked him up

on the day of the murder in a black Camry and took Smith to a truck. Smith

testified he fought with Smajo for a long time and did not want to kill him.

However, when Smith realized Smajo would see that Smith was driving the F-

150, he decided to knock him out. He testified that he struck Smajo with a tire

thumper three or four times in the chin and neck area.

      Smith also testified that Wilson picked him up after he returned the Ford

F-150 to Louisville Road. Smith said Wilson stated at that time they had to be

sure Smajo was dead, so they went to get a container of gasoline, returned to

the F-150, and went back to Mega Transport. Smith testified that Wilson went

into the building and started the fire. According to Smith, they then went back

to get the black Camry and return the F-150 to Louisville Road. Smith got into

the Camry with Wilson, who took him back home. Smith acknowledged he did

      2 At the time of Wilson’s trial, Smith had not received any offer for his testimony

and was still facing a life sentence. Court records indicate Smith ultimately plead
guilty and was sentenced to twenty years on September 7, 2023.
                                           8
not come forward until he was arrested, and admitted he did not tell the truth

in his initial interview with police.

         Special Agent Horan also testified at trial. He testified that the cell tower

data indicated it would be logical to assume the 270 and 513 area code phones

were together on the day of the murder, but he did not know whether it meant

they were actually together. He said the data also showed that the phones

moved west together between 9:15 and 9:21 a.m. Special Agent Horan

acknowledged the maps he showed the jury were not meant to illustrate where

the phone was at particular times, but rather were a best estimate of the

general area where the phone could have been. He further acknowledged the

data was not highly accurate as to where the phones were, that he could offer

only general estimates, and that the phones could have been more than a mile

from the murder scene. He also testified that he purposefully ignored certain

outlying data points as “fliers,” considering those not particularly reliable. One

such example was a data point showing one of the phones in a field across the

river.

         Wilson also presented expert testimony at trial on the issue of cell tower

location data from Prof. Adrian Lauf, a professor of computer science and

engineering at the University of Louisville who conducts research with wireless

communications. Dr. Lauf testified that Special Agent Horan’s report did not

support the idea that either phone was near the crime scene. He testified that

there are fewer cell phone towers in the area at issue, and thus the data suffers

from a higher error rate. He further stated that if any data points are

                                           9
disregarded as unreliable “fliers,” it undermines the entire accuracy of every

location estimate given. Dr. Lauf also testified that two phones in the same

place will not necessarily create the same footprint, as one might appear to be

in Smith’s Grove to the north of Bowling Green with the other appearing to be

south of Bowling Green in Richpond.

      Wilson moved to strike Special Agent Horan’s testimony, arguing his

analysis was unreliable given his admission that he disregarded “flier” data

points. The trial court denied the motion because Special Agent Horan had

provided only general locations, acknowledged the limitations of his analysis,

and Wilson had an opportunity to attack that analysis with his own expert.

      The trial court instructed the jury on murder by complicity and

facilitation and first-degree manslaughter by complicity and facilitation, but

denied Wilson’s request for instructions on second-degree manslaughter by

complicity and facilitation. The jury found Wilson guilty of murder by

complicity. He was found not guilty of tampering with physical evidence and

abuse of a corpse. The Commonwealth and Wilson then agreed to a sentence

of 35 years, and the trial court sentenced in accordance with that agreement.

Wilson now appeals.

                                   ANALYSIS

      Wilson raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred

in allowing evidence of Wilson’s trip to the Philippines after the murder;

(2) whether the trial court erred in admitting and refusing to strike Special

Agent Horan’s expert testimony regarding historical cell tower location data;

                                       10
and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the

lesser-included offenses of manslaughter in the second degree by complicity

and by facilitation. We review each issue in turn, providing additional facts as

necessary.

   I.      Evidence of Wilson’s Trip to the Philippines Was Relevant and
           Not Unduly Prejudicial.

        Wilson first argues the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth

to present Wilson’s trip to the Philippines as evidence of flight with

consciousness of guilt. Wilson’s allegation of error is preserved by his pre-trial

motion in limine which the trial court denied. KRE 103(d).

        The trial court found that evidence of Wilson’s trip was admissible given

that Wilson traveled on a ticket purchased on the spot only a couple of days

after the murder. The trial court noted that Wilson of course could present the

jury with his innocent explanation for the trip. In its opening, the

Commonwealth argued Wilson had fled to the Philippines. The Commonwealth

asked various witnesses about Wilson’s trip and introduced as an exhibit the

booking details for his flight. For its final witnesses, the Commonwealth

elicited testimony regarding the process of Wilson’s return trip back to the

United States with law enforcement. The Commonwealth again referred to

Wilson’s trip to the Philippines in its closing argument.

        We review an allegation of nonconstitutional evidentiary error for abuse

of discretion. Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Ky. 2018). That

is, we ask whether the trial court’s ruling was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. (quoting Lopez v.
                                        11
Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 867, 872-73 (Ky. 2015)). Wilson acknowledges

that evidence of his trip to the Philippines was likely relevant, but argues

admission of that evidence was nonetheless error because the evidence was

unduly prejudicial. We disagree.

      Kentucky law has long held that evidence of “flight to elude capture or to

prevent discovery is admissible because ‘flight is always some evidence of a

sense of guilt.’” Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Ky. 2003)

(quoting Hord v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 439, 13 S.W.2d 244, 246 (1928)).

Such evidence is relevant because “it has a tendency to make the existence of

the defendant’s guilt more probable: a guilty person probably would act like a

guilty person.” Id. at 219.

      Here, Wilson booked his travel to the Philippines on the morning of

February 10, 2019, two days after the murder. He booked the trip despite

having a separate trip already planned with Selma for the same timeframe, and

on the same day police asked him to come in for an interview. Also—and

unusually—he bought the ticket for same-day international travel to the

Philippines. These circumstances were sufficient to support a reasonable

inference that Wilson’s conduct was in furtherance of an effort to elude capture

or prevent discovery. As such, proof of his trip was highly probative of his

consciousness of guilt, and thus relevant.

      Nonetheless, even where flight evidence is relevant, its admissibility

remains subject to the balancing test of KRE 403. Id. That is, evidence of

flight, even if relevant, is inadmissible if “its probative value is substantially

                                         12
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” KRE 403.

      Here, Wilson contends admission of evidence regarding his trip to the

Philippines resulted in undue prejudice. As the plain language of KRE 403

makes clear, only where otherwise relevant evidence presents a risk of undue

prejudice, i.e., prejudice that is unnecessary and unreasonable, should it be

excluded. See Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Ky. 2000). And

then, only if that risk substantially outweighs the probative value of the

evidence. As noted above, evidence of Wilson’s trip was highly probative of the

ultimate issue of guilt, given that he booked his trip for same-day international

travel two days after the murder, on the same day police sought to interview

him, and despite having an existing trip already planned with Selma. While

Wilson undoubtedly faced prejudice from admission of this evidence, he was

permitted to present his innocent explanation for the travel to the jury and

thus ameliorate that prejudice. Given the highly probative nature of the

evidence and Wilson’s ability to offer a competing innocent explanation for his

trip, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that any

prejudice to Wilson did not substantially outweigh the probative value of

evidence of his flight. We thus perceive no error in the admission of that

evidence.

                                        13
   II.      The Trial Court Did Not Err in Allowing the Commonwealth’s
            Expert to Testify Regarding Historical Cell Tower Location Data.

         Wilson next argues the trial court erred in allowing Commonwealth

expert Special Agent Kevin Horan to testify regarding the location of Wilson’s

cell phones on the day of the murder based upon cell phone tower data.

Wilson filed a pre-trial motion to exclude Special Agent Horan’s proposed

testimony as unreliable, which the trial court denied after holding a Daubert

hearing. After Special Agent Horan testified at trial, Wilson again moved to

strike his testimony as unreliable. Wilson’s allegation of error is thus

preserved. Meskimen v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 526, 534 n.8 (Ky. 2013);

KRE 103(a)(1).

         KRE 702 governs the admission of expert testimony, providing that

         [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
         the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
         in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
         experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
         of an opinion or otherwise, if:

               (1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;

               (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
               methods; and

               (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods
               reliably to the facts of the case.

In applying this Rule, “the trial court functions as a ‘gatekeeper’ charged with

keeping out unreliable, pseudoscientific evidence.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146

S.W.3d 909, 913 (Ky. 2004). The trial court “must first assess the reliability of

the expert testimony . . . and then evaluate its relevance.” Id. at 914. “[T]he

consideration of reliability entails an ‘assessment into the validity of the

                                           14
reasoning and methodology upon which the expert testimony is based.’”

Toyota Mot. Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2000)). A trial court’s

determination regarding the reliability of expert testimony is a finding of fact

that we review for clear error. Miller, 146 S.W.3d at 915. In contrast, a trial

court’s determination of “whether the evidence will assist [the] trier of fact and

the ultimate decision as to admissibility” is a discretionary decision that we

review for abuse of that discretion. Id.

      Here, we perceive no clear error in the trial court’s determination after

the Daubert hearing that the historical cell tower data methodology relied upon

by Special Agent Horan was reliable. We previously explained that

methodology in Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 525 S.W.3d 73, 80 (Ky. 2017):

      [C]ell phones are essentially radios, as they use radio signals to
      contact cell towers. Each tower is unique and has identifiers that
      allow cell providers to determine what specific tower a phone
      communicated with during the logged activity. Most cell towers are
      engineered to cover a 360-degree radius which is typically broken
      down into three sectors. When a user makes a phone call, the cell
      phone connects to the tower and sector with the strongest signal,
      which is often, but not always, the closest tower to the caller.
      Through reviewing cell phone records, which reflect which tower a
      phone connects to at a specific date and time, Special Agent Horan
      could determine the general location of a phone at a particular
      time. By determining the cell phone tower and sector, Special
      Agent Horan can identify a general area or “footprint” within which
      the phone was located at a given time.

Significantly, however, such data “does not identify a cell phone user’s location

with pinpoint precision—it identifies the cell tower that routed the user’s call.”

Id. at 79 (quoting United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 515 (11th Cir. 2015)).

                                           15
      In Holbrook, we concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s conclusion that this methodology was sufficiently reliable to support

expert testimony, provided the expert acknowledges in his testimony the

limitations of the technology and its inability to identify a cell phone’s location

with pinpoint precision. Id. at 81. In the present case, the trial court found

that Special Agent Horan employed the same methodology at issue in Holbrook.

The trial court further—and appropriately—considered nonetheless whether

the methodology continues to enjoy scientific acceptance. See Meskimen, 435

S.W.3d at 535-36 (noting that while trial courts may take judicial notice of a

methodology’s reliability once accepted by an appropriate appellate court, “it is

the trial court’s duty to ensure that method is supported by scientific findings,

or at least not seriously questioned by recent reputable scientific findings,

before taking judicial notice of its acceptability”). The trial court’s conclusion

that the methodology remains reliable was supported by Special Agent Horan’s

testimony that the methodology is the gold standard worldwide, and that an

independent academic study within the last several years found the

methodology reliable. Moreover, the trial court further noted the methodology

also enjoys acceptance in the law enforcement and business communities. As

such, we find no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion following the Daubert

hearing that Special Agent Horan’s methodology was sufficiently reliable to

allow him to testify as an expert.

      Wilson also argues the trial court should have stricken Special Agent

Horan’s testimony at trial because in his testimony he admitted to disregarding

                                         16
outlying data points termed “fliers.” Horan testified the “fliers” were unreliable

because they were isolated and inconsistent with other groupings data points.

However, we do not conclude Special Agent Horan’s exclusion of data points he

deems unreliable rendered his testimony wholly inadmissible.

      Special Agent Horan acknowledged to the jury that he had excluded the

unreliable data points. Wilson presented his own expert regarding the

historical cell tower location data, and also vigorously cross-examined Special

Agent Horan regarding his exclusion of the unreliable data points. Moreover,

Special Agent Horan specifically informed the jury that he could provide only

general estimates rather than pinpoint-precise proof of the cell phone locations.

Under these circumstances, Special Agent Horan’s admitted exclusion of

certain data points he deemed in his expertise to be unreliable went to the

weight rather than the admissibility of his testimony. Wilson was certainly free

to—and did—seek to undermine Special Agent Horan’s conclusions on that

basis. And the jury was properly left to weigh the competing expert testimony

and determine what it believed. As such, we perceive no error in the trial

court’s refusal to strike Special Agent Horan’s testimony.

   III.   Wilson Was Not Entitled to Jury Instructions on Manslaughter in
          the Second Degree by Complicity or Facilitation.

      Finally, Wilson argues the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the

jury on the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter in the second degree by

complicity and by facilitation. Wilson requested such instructions and his

allegation of error is therefore preserved. RCr 9.54(2). When a defendant

contends the trial court erred either in failing to provide a requested jury
                                        17
instruction or in providing an unwarranted jury instruction, we review the

decision for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d 364,

367 (Ky. 2018).

      The trial court in a criminal case must instruct the jury on the whole law

of the case. RCr 9.54(1). Thus, the trial court must give “instructions

applicable to every state of the case deducible from or supported to any extent

by the testimony.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2005).

A defendant “is entitled to an instruction on any lawful defense that he has,

including the defense that he is guilty of a lesser included offense of the crime

charged.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d

845, 856 (Ky.1997); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 550

(Ky.1988)). “An instruction on a lesser included offense is required if the

evidence would permit the jury to rationally find the defendant not guilty of the

primary offense, but guilty of the lesser offense.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v.

Wolford, 4 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky.1999); Smith v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d

683, 687 (Ky.1987)). In considering on appellate review whether a requested

instruction was warranted, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable

to the requesting party, id. at 347, asking “whether a reasonable juror could

acquit of the greater charge but convict of the lesser.” Allen v. Commonwealth,

338 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Ky. 2011).

      As relevant here, a murder conviction requires proof the defendant

intended to and did cause the victim’s death. KRS 507.020(1)(a).

Manslaughter in the first degree requires proof the defendant intended to cause

                                        18
serious physical injury and in fact caused the victim’s death. KRS

507.030(1)(a). The trial court provided the jury with murder and first-degree

manslaughter instructions on both complicity and facilitation theories, and the

jury found Wilson guilty of murder by complicity.

      However, the trial court declined to instruct the jury as to second-degree

manslaughter by complicity or facilitation. A conviction for second-degree

manslaughter may be obtained by proving, as relevant here, that the defendant

wantonly caused the victim’s death. KRS 507.040(1). For purposes of our

criminal statutes, “[a] person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a

circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of

and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result

will occur or that the circumstance exists.” KRS 501.020(3). Our statute

governing complicity criminal liability provides:

      A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when,
      with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of
      the offense, he

            (a) solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such
            other person to commit the offense; or

            (b) aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in
            planning or committing the offense; or

            (c) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the
            offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so.

KRS 502.020(1).

      Wilson first contends he was entitled to an instruction on second-degree

manslaughter by complicity because Smith testified that when he beat Smajo

he did not intend to kill him but rather only to render him unconscious so

                                        19
Smith could escape. In other words, Wilson asserts that because the evidence

could support a finding Smith did not have the requisite state of mind for

murder (intent to kill) or first-degree manslaughter (intent to seriously injure),

the jury should have been allowed to consider whether Smith wantonly killed

Smajo. Wilson contends that such a finding would amount to a conclusion

that Smith committed only second-degree manslaughter, in which case the jury

could have found Wilson guilty of complicity to second-degree manslaughter.

      Not so. Long-standing Kentucky law holds that a principal’s state of

mind is irrelevant to determining the criminal complicity liability of his

accomplice: 3

      The principal actor’s mental state with respect to his own conduct,
      or the degree of his criminal liability, is largely immaterial to the
      criminal liability of an accomplice or the degree thereof. . . . [E]ven
      in the pre-penal code era, the degree of an accomplice’s liability
      was determined by his or her own mens rea and not that of the
      principal . . . That proposition was codified in KRS 502.030(1)
      [which provides that in] any prosecution for an offense in which
      the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of
      another person pursuant to KRS 502.010 and KRS 502.020, it is
      no defense that . . . such other person has not been prosecuted for
      or convicted of any offense based on the conduct in question, or
      has previously been acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a
      different offense. . . . [I]f an accomplice can be convicted despite
      the acquittal of the principal, it follows that the degree of the

      3 In the context of criminal complicity liability, the “principal” is the person who

commits the crime and the “accomplice” is the person who solicits, commands,
conspires, aids, counsels, or attempts to aid the commission of the offense, or who
fails to perform a legal duty to prevent the offense. See Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40
S.W.3d 356, 365 (Ky. 2000). Here, describing Wilson as Smith’s “accomplice” is
somewhat counter-intuitive given that it was Wilson’s idea to kill Smajo, his apparent
motivation for the killing was to avenge Smajo’s attack on him, and he solicited Smith
(who had never met the victim) for that purpose. Nonetheless, because Smith killed
Smajo following Wilson’s solicitation, Smith is the principal and Wilson the accomplice
for purposes of assessing criminal complicity liability.
                                           20
      offense of which an accomplice is convicted does not depend upon
      the degree of which the principal is convicted.

Tharp, 40 S.W.3d at 365. Thus, any change-of-heart Smith may have had

during his attack on Smajo is irrelevant to determining Wilson’s criminal

complicity liability. It is Wilson’s state of mind rather than Smith’s that

determines the level of Wilson’s criminal complicity liability. There was no

evidence Wilson enjoyed a similar change-of-heart. Indeed, the evidence was

simply that Wilson solicited Smith to murder Smajo, and that Smith alone

decided during the course of the attack that he did not want to kill Smajo. As

such, Smith’s change-of-heart did not entitle Wilson to a second-degree

manslaughter by complicity instruction.

      Wilson also argues he was entitled to a second-degree manslaughter by

complicity instruction because Smith’s girlfriend Angel Cook overheard a

conversation between Wilson and Smith regarding Smith being used as

“muscle, somewhere along the lines of a bouncer.” Wilson contends that based

upon this statement, a reasonable juror could conclude Wilson did not ask

Smith to kill or seriously injure Smajo, but rather only to engage in some other

conduct that resulted in Smith wantonly killing Smajo.

      However, in considering the evidence presented at trial as a whole, no

reasonable juror could infer that the comment overheard by Cook referred only

to Smith injuring rather than killing Smajo. The evidence at trial was that

Wilson asked Smith to kill Smajo, not do something else to him. Smith

testified Wilson asked him to kill Smajo. Wilson’s son also testified he told

Selma Wilson had hired someone to kill Smajo. In stark contrast, Wilson
                                        21
points us to no evidence presented at trial that he solicited Smith to do

something other than killing Smajo. Given this context, no jury could draw a

reasonable inference that the statement overheard by Cook was a reference to

Smith doing something other than killing Smajo. Thus, even considering this

evidence in the light most favorable to Wilson, it does not support a reasonable

inference that Wilson asked only that Smith injure Smajo rather than kill him. 4

As such, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury as to

second-degree manslaughter by complicity.

      Finally, we also find no error in the trial court’s refusal to provide an

instruction as to second-degree manslaughter by facilitation. Criminal

facilitation liability arises when the defendant, “acting with knowledge that

another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, . . . engages in

conduct which knowingly provides such person with means or opportunity for

the commission of the crime and which in fact aids such person to commit the

crime.” KRS 506.080(1). “Facilitation reflects the mental state of one who is

‘wholly indifferent’ to the actual completion of the crime.” Baker v.

Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 267, 280 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Perdue v.

Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148, 160 (Ky. 1995)). Thus, where there is no

evidence of such indifference, a facilitation instruction is not warranted. Id.

      As noted above, the trial court provided murder and first-degree

manslaughter facilitation instructions. A second-degree manslaughter

      4 As noted above, the trial court provided the jury with a first-degree

manslaughter by complicity instruction. Thus, the jury was allowed to consider
whether Wilson only intended for Smith to seriously injure rather than kill Smajo.
                                          22
facilitation instruction was warranted only if the jury could reasonably believe

1) that Smith did not intend either to kill or seriously injure Smajo, 2) that

Smith acted only wantonly, meaning he was aware of and disregarded a

substantial risk that he would kill Smajo, and 3) that Wilson, being wholly

indifferent to Smith’s commission of the crime, knowingly provided him with

means or opportunity to commit the crime and in fact aided Smith in the

commission of the crime. The evidence at trial could not support such

findings.

      First, even crediting Smith’s testimony that he did not intend to kill

Smajo as true, no reasonable jury could find that he did not, at a minimum,

intend to seriously injure Smajo. Serious physical injury includes an injury

which creates a substantial risk of death. KRS 500.080(18). Smith testified

that he intentionally struck Smajo several times in the chin and neck area with

a tire thumper with the hope of knocking him unconscious. Such conduct

plainly was an intentional infliction of physical injury that created a

substantial risk of death. Thus, no reasonable juror could find that Smith

acted only wantonly, rather than with an intention either to kill or to inflict

serious physical injury. 5

        5 Wilson also argues because Smith testified he was high on methamphetamine

at the time of the killing, the jury could have found he acted only wantonly by reason
of voluntary intoxication. However, to be relevant to criminal liability, there must be
evidence not only that the defendant was intoxicated, “but that he was so [intoxicated]
that he did not know what he was doing.” Lickliter v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 65,
68 (Ky. 2004) (citing Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (1999)). Here, Smith
testified in great detail regarding his recollection of the attack on Smajo, and there was
nothing in his testimony to support a reasonable finding he was so intoxicated he did
                                           23
      Likewise, no reasonable jury could find that Wilson was wholly

indifferent to Smith’s commission of the crime as required to warrant a

facilitation instruction. There evidence was that Wilson solicited Smith to

commit the crime as revenge for Smajo’s attack on Wilson. Wilson points us to

no competing evidence that Smith committed the crime of his own volition with

Wilson’s participation limited to that of a dispassionate and uninterested

accomplice. As such, because no reasonable jury could find that Wilson was

wholly indifferent to Smith’s commission of the crime, the trial court did not err

in refusing to provide a second-degree manslaughter by facilitation instruction.

                                  CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Warren Circuit Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Molly Mattingly
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Kristin L. Conder
Assistant Attorney General

not know what he was doing at that time. As such, Smith’s voluntary intoxication is
wholly irrelevant to his or Smith’s criminal liability.
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