Court Opinion

ID: 9635636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:57:09.280872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:31.367402
License: Public Domain

LONG, J.
dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division that deferred to the credibility evaluation of the trial court.
The majority has essentially adopted Segars’s argument that the Municipal Court was not free to accept any of Officer Williams’s evidence once it found that he made a statement that was untrue. Although not denominated as such, that contention is obviously based on the “false-in-one, false-in-all” inference. State v. Fleckenstein, 60 N.J.Super. 399, 408, 159 A.2d 411 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 33 N.J. 109, 162 A.2d 338 (1960). However, it is well established that false-in-one, like other inferences, is permissive and not mandatory. Thus, a trier of fact who finds an inaccuracy in a witness’s testimony may, but need not, entertain the inference. Ibid. (citing State v. Guida, 118 N.J.L. 289, 297, 192 A. 445 (Sup.Ct.1937), aff'd, 119 N.J.L. 464, 196 A. 711 (E. & *500A.1938)); see also State v. Humphrey, 183 N.J.Super. 580, 584, 444 A.2d 1135 (Law Div.1982), aff'd, 209 N.J.Super. 152, 507 A.2d 241 (App.Div.1986) (contrasting permissive nature of inferences with compulsory nature of presumptions). If the false-in-one, false-in-all inference is not adopted, the trier of fact brings to bear the ordinary rules for judging credibility and may accept none, some, or all of a witness’s evidence. Indeed, that is what we empower jurors to do every day. The Model Jury Charge provides:
(Sample One)
If you believe that any witness deliberately lied to you, on any fact significant to your decision in this case, you have the right to reject all of that witness’s testimony. However, in your discretion you may believe some of the testimony and not believe other parts of the testimony.
(Sample Two)
If you believe that any witness or party willfully or knowingly testified to any facts significant to your decision in the case, with intent to deceive you, you may give such weight to his or her testimony as you deem it is entitled. You may believe some of it, or you may, in your discretion, disregard all of it.
[Model Jury Charges (Civil), § 1.12M False in One, False in All (Nov.1998).]
Here, the Municipal Court had an opportunity to observe the character and demeanor of Officer Williams when he took the stand. Those observations put that court in the best position to evaluate the officer’s credibility. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161, 199 A.2d 809 (1964) (stating that appellate courts “should give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his [or her] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy”). I note that the court did not simply accept Officer Williams’s testimony uncritically and indeed rejected a portion of it in favor of Segars’s version of the events. However, it did accept the remainder of Officer Williams’s testimony, much of which was supported by Segars.
It is a deeply rooted principle of our jurisprudence that “[appellate courts should defer to trial courts’ credibility findings that are influenced by matters such as observations of the character and *501demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474, 724 A.2d 234 (1999). Such deference is not limited to cases in which the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s assessment. Zahner v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 321 N.J.Super. 471, 476, 729 A.2d 478 (App.Div.1999). Indeed, the basic underpinning of deference in such circumstances is that the appellate court is ordinarily in no position to judge a witness’s credibility. On the contrary, it is the trial court in which we repose the ultimate responsibility for determining whether a witness is truthful. In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117, 693 A.2d 92 (1997).
To be sure, an appellate court may intervene if a trial court’s credibility evaluation is “undoubtedly mistaken.” Lautek Corp. v. Image Bus. Sys. Corp., 276 N.J.Super. 531, 541, 648 A.2d 488 (App.Div.1994). There is simply no basis for such a conclusion in this case. Officer Williams obviously was wrong in his testimony regarding the circumstances under which he encountered Segars. The Bank of New York records proved that. Certainly, it would have been preferable for the State to recall Officer Williams at that point and refresh his recollection with those records. However, it is obvious why the prosecutor saw no need to do so. Even before those records were produced, the Municipal Court had concluded that it was much more likely that Segars’s version was correct because his memory of the event would naturally be clearer than that of Officer Williams, to whom an MDT check was “business as usual.” Critically, the court believed Officer Williams when he said he did not racially target Segars, but conducted a random check of several license plates during the relevant period. The police records supported Officer Williams, showing that he, in fact, checked three plates within a four-minute period and that Segars’s was not the first one checked after their encounter. Segars further attested to the ticketing of the Caucasian driver and to Officer Williams’s polite and helpful demeanor. In short, there was objective evidence to undergird the Municipal Court’s assessment of Officer Williams’s credibility and its ultimate determination that Segars did not prove discriminatory targeting.
*502Although Segars established a prima facie ease based on Officer Williams’s misstatements and the inference that could be drawn therefrom, that did not require a verdict in his favor. Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2751, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 421 (1993) (“Quite obviously, however, what is required to establish the ... prima facie case is infinitely less than what a directed verdict demands”). Put another way, the Municipal Court was free to adopt the permissive inference of discriminatory targeting advanced on Segars’s case, but was not compelled to do so. In fact, although crediting Segars’s testimony, it rejected the inference of discriminatory targeting based on its favorable evaluation of the bulk of Officer Williams’s testimony as supported by other evidence in the case and as supported by the court’s assessment of the officer’s believability when he testified. On the total record, I am satisfied that the reviewing courts properly deferred to that judgment and that there is no warrant for our intervention.
I am also concerned about the effect of the majority opinion on our jurisprudence. It opens the door to wholesale rejection of police testimony based solely on the problem of fallible memory. In my experience, when police officers testify about criminal and quasi-criminal events, which they encounter many times every day, often under very similar circumstances, mistakes, even on important details, are not at all unusual. Police personnel testify from old reports while defendants, to whom the criminal charges are unique, testify from memories on which the facts are emblazoned. The likelihood that a truthful defendant is more accurate in detail is a high one. That should not automatically jettison a police officer’s testimony. The majority opinion alters what has classically been our approach in such circumstances — to leave to the trier of fact judgments regarding credibility, taking into account not only the story that is told, but also the demeanor of the teller. I would continue to adhere to that rule.
Justice LaVECCHIA joins in this opinion.
*503For reversing — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI — 5.
For affirming — Justices LONG and LaVECCHIA — 2.