Court Opinion

ID: 9384031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 16:08:47.531238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.855114
License: Public Domain

March 31, 2023
                                                       Supreme Court
     Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of       :
               Jesmac, Inc.

                      v.                   :          No. 2022-10-Appeal.
                                                      (PM 19-10036)
      The Bailey Group LLC et al.          :

     Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of       :
       Commercial Painting, Inc.

                      v.                   :          No. 2022-11-Appeal.
                                                      (PM 19-7974)
      The Bailey Group LLC et al.          :

            Petrolex II LLC                :

                      v.                   :          No. 2022-12-Appeal.
                                                      (PC 20-5729)
      The Bailey Group LLC et al.          :

  Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of Gem :
       Mechanical Services, LLC

                      v.                   :          No. 2022-24-Appeal.
                                                      (PM 19-9211)
      The Bailey Group LLC et al.          :

                 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
                 before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
                 are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
                 Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
                 Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
                 Email:      opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov,     of     any
                 typographical or other formal errors in order that
                 corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
                                                  Supreme Court
    Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of    :
              Jesmac, Inc.

                  v.                   :          No. 2022-10-Appeal.
                                                  (PM 19-10036)
     The Bailey Group LLC et al.       :

    Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of    :
      Commercial Painting, Inc.

                  v.                   :          No. 2022-11-Appeal.
                                                  (PM 19-7974)
     The Bailey Group LLC et al.       :

           Petrolex II LLC             :

                  v.                   :           No. 2022-12-Appeal.
                                                   (PC 20-5729)
     The Bailey Group LLC et al.       :

 Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of Gem :
      Mechanical Services, LLC

                  v.                   :          No. 2022-24-Appeal.
                                                  (PM 19-9211)
     The Bailey Group LLC et al.       :

      Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

                                   OPINION

      Justice Goldberg, for the Court. These consolidated cases came before the

Supreme Court on November 30, 2022, pursuant to an order directing the parties to

                                           -1-
appear and show cause why the issues raised in these appeals should not be

summarily decided. The plaintiff, Petrolex II LLC (Petrolex), appeals from a

decision granting motions to stay the Superior Court proceedings in four cases and

refer them to arbitration in this construction dispute. After considering the parties’

written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has

not been shown and that these cases may be decided without further briefing or

argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the orders of the Superior

Court.

                                 Facts and Travel

         The party identified as the lead defendant, Lyman Lofts Developers LLC

(Lyman), was the owner of the Lyman Mill property (property) located at 184

Woonasquatucket Avenue, North Providence, Rhode Island.1 In April 2015, Lyman

entered into an agreement with The Bailey Group LLC (Bailey) to serve as general

contractor for renovations converting an old mill complex into residential apartment

units (the project). In April 2016, as a requirement by an additional investor brought

in to obtain tax credits, Lyman and Bailey entered into an American Institute of

Architects (AIA) standard agreement form between owner and contractor with

respect to the project. Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich), at the request

1
 The plaintiff and Lyman share a principal office location, with the manager of each
entity possessing an identical surname (Santoro); however, Lyman is no longer a
party to this case.
                                          -2-
of Bailey, furnished a payment bond in the amount of $11,952,275 for the project in

accordance with the project requirements. Bailey subsequently entered into separate

agreements (subcontracts) with each of the subcontractors retained for the project.2

         The record discloses that Lyman made timely payments on the first

twenty-one requisitions submitted by Bailey, including all change orders, amounting

to $17,261,600. Bailey claimed it was still owed $1,313,277 on the project for its

final submitted requisition and retainage. Lyman denied owing any money to Bailey

because mechanics’ liens filed by the subcontractors against the property totaling

$1,485,016.70, plus costs and attorneys’ fees, were outstanding. Lyman claimed

Bailey owed at least twelve of its subcontractors a total of $1,617,704.70 for labor,

material, and equipment furnished in connection with the project. Lyman further

asserted that it was owed a credit from Bailey under the construction contract, for

failing to perform as required, in the amount of $854,352, and that Lyman’s architect

on the project agreed a credit of $736,000 was owed to Lyman.

         In 2019 three subcontractors filed complaints against Bailey and Lyman to

enforce their mechanics’ liens for work done, but not paid for, on the project. The

plaintiff settled these outstanding balances by directly paying the subcontractors in

2
    Bailey is the principal defendant in the cases on appeal.

                                            -3-
return for assignment of the liens against defendants.3 As a condition of these

payments, plaintiff required the subcontractors to dismiss any claims they had

against Lyman, terminating Lyman’s involvement in these cases. The plaintiff then

filed amended complaints, substituting itself as the plaintiff and assignee of the three

subcontractors in the mechanics’ liens actions. On August 13, 2020, plaintiff filed

an additional complaint against Bailey as the assignee of nine further subcontractors.

In addition to the causes of action currently before us, Lyman filed a complaint

against defendants claiming it was owed $854,352 in credits for the project.

      The defendants filed motions to stay the Superior Court proceedings in all five

Superior Court cases and refer them to arbitration. On August 3, 2021, the trial

justice issued a bench decision, finding that plaintiff directly paid the subcontractors

their outstanding balances, in return requiring the subcontractors to dismiss their

claims against Lyman. The trial justice noted that the parties agreed that plaintiff

“stands squarely in the position and the shoes of each subcontractor * * *.”

      The trial justice found that the language of the subcontracts was clear and

unambiguous, requiring mandatory arbitration for disputes concerning both the

construction and application of the subcontracts. The trial justice further determined

that, even if the provision in the subcontracts or agreements providing that Bailey is

3
 The plaintiff paid less than the outstanding amounts due under the subcontracts for
assignment and transfer of all right, title, and interest in and to the subcontractors’
claims against defendants.
                                           -4-
obliged to pay only if it is paid by Lyman is deemed void, as plaintiff asserted, the

dispute between the parties was nonetheless subject to arbitration. The trial justice

granted defendants’ motions to stay the Superior Court proceedings in all of the

cases before the court and compelled the parties to participate in mandatory

mediation and arbitration. On August 16, 2021, plaintiff timely appealed, filing

separate notices of appeal in four of the Superior Court actions.4

      On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial justice erred in granting the motions

to stay and refer the matters to arbitration because there was no dispute between

defendants and the subcontractors regarding the construction and application of the

language as set forth in the subcontracts. The plaintiff further argues that a dispute

over the pay-if-paid provision contained in the respective contracts is not referrable

to arbitration as this clause, plaintiff contends, is void and unenforceable as being

against public policy.

                                Standard of Review

      “The issue of whether a dispute is arbitrable is a question of law that this Court

reviews de novo.” Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education v. Hellenic

Society Paideia – Rhode Island Chapter, 202 A.3d 931, 934 (R.I. 2019) (quoting

Town of Johnston v. Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, Local 1491, 159 A.3d 83,

4
 A notice of appeal was not filed in the fifth case, Lyman Lofts Developers LLC v.
The Bailey Group, No. PC 20-5839.
                                           -5-
85 (R.I. 2017)). “Arbitration is a creature of the agreement between the parties, and

a ‘duty to arbitrate a dispute arises only when a party agrees to arbitration in clear

and unequivocal language, and even then, the party is only obligated to arbitrate

issues that it explicitly agreed to arbitrate.’” Id. (quoting State Department of

Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 866 A.2d 1241,

1247 (R.I. 2005)). “Because arbitration is a matter of contract, ‘[g]eneral rules of

contract construction apply[,]’ and ‘whether the parties agreed to submit a particular

dispute to arbitration turns upon the parties’ intent when they entered into the

contract from which the dispute ultimately arose.’” Id. (quoting Radiation Oncology

Associates, Inc. v. Roger Williams Hospital, 899 A.2d 511, 514 (R.I. 2006)). “In

ascertaining what the intent is we must look at the instrument as a whole and not at

some detached portion thereof.” Id. (quoting Hill v. M. S. Alper & Son, Inc., 106 R.I.

38, 47, 256 A.2d 10, 15 (1969)). “Significantly, however, ‘[w]hen uncertainty exists

about whether a dispute is arbitrable, this Court, like the United States Supreme

Court, has enunciated a policy in favor of resolving any doubt in favor of

arbitration.’” Id. (quoting School Committee of Town of North Kingstown v. Crouch,

808 A.2d 1074, 1078 (R.I. 2002)).

                                      Analysis

      The plaintiff first argues that Section 5.2 of the subcontracts is very specific

and limited and applies only to disputes concerning the interpretation and application

                                          -6-
of the terms in the subcontracts. The plaintiff contends that the meaning of the term

“construction” must be strictly construed and should be interpreted as pertaining to

the arrangement of terms in the subcontracts. According to plaintiff, because this is

a legal dispute, and not a dispute concerning the construction or application of the

language in the subcontracts, the cases need not proceed to arbitration. We disagree.

The relevant language is as follows:

             “5. CLAIMS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

             “* * *

             “5.2 Any dispute, controversy, or claim concerning the
             construction or application of this Agreement that is not
             settled by the parties shall be decided in accordance with
             the dispute resolution procedures contained in the
             Owner-Contractor Agreement. If the Owner-Contractor
             Agreement does not provide a dispute resolution
             procedure, the dispute shall be arbitrated in accordance
             with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the
             American Arbitration Association. The decision of the
             arbitrator shall be binding and judgment upon the award
             rendered by the Arbitrator may be entered into any court
             having jurisdiction thereof.” (Emphasis added.)

The applicable section of the Owner-Contractor Agreement states:

             “ARTICLE 6 DISPUTE RESOLUTION

             “* * *

             “§ 6.2 BINDING DISPUTE RESOLUTION

             “For any Claim subject to, but not resolved by, mediation
             pursuant to Section 15.3 of AIA Document A201-2007,
                                          -7-
               the method of binding dispute resolution shall be as
               follows:
               “(Check the appropriate box. If the Owner and
               Contractor do not select a method of binding dispute
               resolution below, or do not subsequently agree in writing
               to a binding dispute resolution method other than
               litigation, Claims will be resolved by litigation in a court
               of competent jurisdiction.)

                   “[‹‹X››]5 Arbitration pursuant to Section 15.46 of AIA
                   Document A201-2007

                    “[‹‹ ››] Litigation in a court of competent jurisdiction

5
    The arbitration box was the only box checked with an “X.”
6
    The pertinent sections of § 15.4 are as follows:

               “§ 15.4.1 If the parties have selected arbitration as the
               method for binding dispute resolution in the Agreement,
               any Claim subject to, but not resolved by, mediation shall
               be subject to arbitration which, unless the parties mutually
               agree otherwise, shall be administered by the American
               Arbitration Association in accordance with its
               Construction Industry Arbitration Rules in effect on the
               date of the Agreement. * * *

               “* * *

               “§ 15.4.2 The award rendered by the arbitrator or
               arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered
               upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court
               having jurisdiction thereof.

               “§ 15.4.3 The foregoing agreement to arbitrate and other
               agreements to arbitrate with an additional person or entity
               duly consented to by parties to the Agreement shall be
               specifically enforceable under applicable law in any court
               having jurisdiction thereof.”
                                            -8-
                  “[‹‹ ››] Other (Specify)” (Footnotes added.)

      “When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the agreement is viewed

in its entirety and the words used in the contract are given their ordinary meaning.”

Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. Downing Seaport, Inc., 890 A.2d 58, 62-63 (R.I.

2005). “When ascertaining the usual and ordinary meaning of contractual language,

every word of the contract should be given meaning and effect; an interpretation that

reduces certain words to the status of surplusage should be rejected.” Andrukiewicz

v. Andrukiewicz, 860 A.2d 235, 239 (R.I. 2004).

      Section 5.2 of the subcontracts states “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim

concerning the construction or application of this Agreement that is not settled by

the parties shall be decided in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures

contained in the Owner-Contractor Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) The term

“application” means “[t]he act of applying,” while “applying” is defined as

“put[ting] into action.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language

86 (5th ed. 2011). Construing Section 5.2 as to pertain only to the interpretation of

language set forth in the subcontracts would reduce the phrase “application” to mere

surplusage and thus, irrelevance. We reject this contention. The language of Section

5.2 explicitly requires that any disputes regarding the construction or application of

the subcontracts be referred to arbitration. We therefore conclude that any dispute

                                          -9-
concerning the application of the subcontracts, including legal disputes arising from

the project, must be referred for arbitration.

      The plaintiff next argues that the pay-if-paid provision in the subcontracts is

void and unenforceable as being against public policy, and thus not referrable for

arbitration. The United States Supreme Court has opined that “a challenge to the

validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must

go to the arbitrator.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449

(2006). Simply put, a “challenge [to] the enforceability of the underlying contract

does not negate the enforceability of their agreement to arbitrate.” Montgomery Ford

Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Hall, 999 So. 2d 964, 968 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). “As a

matter of federal law, the arbitration clause is unaffected even if the substance of the

contract is otherwise void or voidable.” Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.3d 98,

103 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,

388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)).

      The plaintiff cites a recent Superior Court decision, Moura Interior Finishes

of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Tocci Building Corporation, PC 20-2585, when arguing

that the pay-if-paid provision of the subcontracts is void and unenforceable as

against public policy. In Moura, the trial justice stated that a “pay when” clause

“should be void against public policy and unenforceable” when granting a motion

                                           - 10 -
for summary judgment. That ruling has no bearing on our decision in the cases at

bar.

       Having concluded that “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim concerning the

construction or application of [the] Agreement” must be resolved through

arbitration, even if the pay-if-paid provision were to be declared void, the arbitration

provision of the subcontracts would not be nullified because “a challenge to the

validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must

go to the arbitrator.” Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 449. Accordingly, any disagreement over

the enforceability of the pay-if-paid provision should be decided by an arbitrator

pursuant to Section 5.2 of the subcontracts.

                                      Conclusion

       For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the orders of the Superior

Court. The papers in these cases may be returned to the Superior Court.

                                           - 11 -
                                              STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

                                         Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of Jesmac, Inc. v. The
                                         Bailey Group LLC et al.

                                         Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of Commercial Painting,
                                         Inc. v. The Bailey Group LLC et al.
Title of Case
                                         Petrolex II LLC v. The Bailey Group LLC et al.

                                         Petrolex II LLC, as assignee of Gem Mechanical
                                         Services, LLC v. The Bailey Group LLC et al.
                                         No. 2022-10-Appeal (PM 19-10036)
                                         No. 2022-11-Appeal (PM 19-7974)
Case Number
                                         No. 2022-12-Appeal (PC 20-5729)
                                         No. 2022-24-Appeal (PM 19-9211)

Date Opinion Filed                       March 31, 2023

                                          Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices                                  Long, JJ.

Written By                               Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal                         Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        Associate Justice Richard D. Raspallo

                                         For Plaintiff:

                                         Guido R. Salvadore, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                         For Defendant:

                                         Michael J. Lepizzera, Jr., Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)