Court Opinion

ID: 9769359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:47:43.084122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:01.525959
License: Public Domain

STORCKMAN, Judge
(dissenting).
I regret that I am unable to concur in the majority opinion. I cannot do so because I believe there is such an accumulation of errors that the aggregate spells out a case of legal prejudice and a denial of a fair trial.
It is unnecessary to rehash the deficiencies found to exist in instruction No. 10 on self-defense and the assignments of error made as to instructions numbered 8 and 9. They are sufficiently disclosed by their discussion in the majority opinion. But the ruling of the court limiting the number of character witnesses and the instruction on previous good character in my opinion demonstrate decisively that the bounds of fair trial were exceeded.
As the majority opinion recognizes, there is a distinction between evidence relating to the character and reputation of an ordinary witness and that of the defendant in the case. The relevant character trait of an ordinary witness is his reputation for truth and veracity which is a collateral issue. The evidence of the defendant’s “good character” relates to the essential traits of character involved in the offense for which he is on trial. State v. Robinson, 344 Mo. 1094, 130 S.W.2d 530, 531 [2], Such evidence goes to “the improbability of his committing the offense charged” and is substantive proof of his innocence. State v. Nienaber, 347 Mo. 541, 148 S.W.2d 537; State v. Robinson, 344 Mo. 1094, 130 S.W.2d 530; State v. Taylor, 293 Mo. 210, 238 S.W. 489; 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 676, p. 699. An instruction on the defendant’s “good character” is specifically required. Section 546.-070(4). Thus, by statute the good character of the accused is one of the issues in the case on which it is mandatory that an instruction be given for the jury’s information in giving their verdict.
I doubt the validity of a court rule which arbitrarily limits the number of the defendant’s character witnesses to a specific number. In State ex rel. Plummer v. Gideon, 119 Mo. 94, 24 S.W. 748, it was held that a rule of court limiting to fifteen the number of subpoenaes for witnesses to which one accused of murder is entitled as of right is void as being in violation of what is now § 18a, Art. I, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S., providing that the accused shall have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
*508In the present case the trial court indicated reliance upon a court rule or custom in limiting the number of witnesses. In ruling, he stated: “Ordinarily we only permit three, and we have permitted four.” The general rule stated in 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1042, p. 1178 is: “Generally, in restricting the number of witnesses, care must be exercised to avoid an undue intrusion on the substantial right of accused to a fair trial. Accordingly, it has been held that this discretion of the court does not extend to limiting the number of witnesses at the commencement of the trial before the exigencies of the case are developed; that the court should not have a rule or make a rule in advance of the ad-duction of evidence limiting the number of witnesses; and that the number of witnesses that may be permitted to testify should be governed by the circumstances in each particular case.” See also 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 677(1), p. 709.
In State v. Mahan, Mo., 267 S.W. 866, the attack was upon the reputation of the prosecuting witness but the opinion points up that there is no statutory limitation of the number of witnesses stating, 267 S.W. 867-868[2]: “It is true the court has no right to limit the number of witnesses which the defendant may summon in his behalf. State ex rel. Plummer v. Gideon, 119 Mo. 94, 24 S.W. 748, 41 Am.St.Rep. 634. Section 4193, R.S. 1919 [now § 550.170, RSMo 1959, V.A. M.S.], does not limit the number of witnesses which may be produced in proof of any specific facts, but simply limits the assessment of costs in such case. However, the witnesses were not offered to testify to any fact directly affecting the alleged crime, but as to the collateral matter of the reputation of the prosecuting witness.” See also State v. Bowerman, 140 Mo.App. 410, 124 S.W. 41.
If the circumstances of a particular case justifies limiting the number of witnesses to the good reputation of the accused, then I think that after the particular situation has developed defendant’s counsel should be advised in sufficient time so that they may select the witnesses they desire to offer. It is common knowledge that lawyers sometimes choose to close the testimony in their case with what they consider to be their best witnesses. In the present case two police officers were among those excluded by the ruling.
The holding on this point in the majority opinion opens the door to further erosion of defendant’s rights in this regard. I consider this and the following crossroad points on which the court has taken the wrong way.
As to the instruction on good character, I consider the use of the phrase “if proven to your satisfaction” to be prejudicially erroneous. State v. Adams, Mo., 355 S.W. 2d 21 (No. 48,805, also decided March 12, 1962) held it was reversible error for an instruction to require the defense of insanity to be “established by the evidence to your reasonable satisfaction.” Good reputation is no more a collateral issue than insanity. Both of these issues bear directly upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant. I fully concur with the Adams decision and consider the error in this case to be much more grievous in that evidence of good character need only create a reasonable doubt in order to establish the defendant’s innocence whereas insanity is an affirmative defense which the defendant has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence. In this regard the majority opinion conflicts with the Adams case and is out of harmony with other decisions of this court.
The majority opinion in this case tends to destroy or at least impair the salutary effect of the Adams decision.
The two cases relied upon by the majority opinion for “somewhat similar language in good character instructions” are not controlling or persuasive. In State v. Nienaber, 347 Mo. 541, 148 S.W.2d 537, the words were “if established” as contrasted with “if proven to your satisfaction” in the instant case. The words “to your satisfaction” were not in the Nienaber *509instruction and the blow was not softened by reasonable satisfaction as in State v. Adams which was nevertheless reversed. In State v. Lasson, 292 Mo. 155, 238 S.W. 101, the term “you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” was not used in the same connection; it dealt with the guilt of the defendant on all of the evidence and not with proof of the defendant’s good reputation to the satisfaction of the jury. In fact the first part of the Lasson instruction has none of the objectionable language because it refers to “the testimony relating to his character” much as if the first part of the present instruction had said “the evidence relating to the previous good character of the defendant for being a peaceable and law-abiding citizen” which would harmonize it with the latter part of the instruction and remove the temptation to use the phrase “if proven to your satisfaction” or similar objectionable language.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.