Court Opinion

ID: 9836823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:10.122408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.001595
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
RCM 1003(c)(1)(C), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998 ed.), sought to adopt the “same evidence” rule as set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Under RCM 1003(c)(1)(C), “offenses are not separate if each does not require proof of an element not required to prove the other.” Clearly under the “same evidence” rule, the “proof’ as to each conspiracy specification in this case is different. Accordingly, they are not multiplicious. The crimes sought to be committed, murder, robbery, and kidnapping, as well as the overt acts, are different.
Relying on Blockburger, the Court stated in Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942):
Since the single continuing agreement, which is the conspiracy here, thus embraces its criminal objects,' it differs from successive acts which violate a single penal statute and from a single act which violates two statutes.
In United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570-71, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989), the Supreme Court said:
We held in Braverman ... that “[t]he gist of the crime of conspiracy as defined by the statute is the agreement ... to commit one or more unlawful acts,” from which it follows that “the precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects.” A single agreement to commit several crimes constitutes one conspiracy. By the same reasoning, multiple agreements to commit separate crimes constitute multiple conspiracies. When respondents pleaded guilty to two charges of conspiracy on the explicit premise of two agreements which started at different times and embraced separate objectives, they conceded guilt to two separate offenses.
As did the respondents in Broce, appellant had the opportunity to plead not guilty to any and all of the four different specifications of conspiracy. He had the liberty to challenge the proof and show but one conspiracy. However, he chose to plead guilty, eliminating the need for the Government to produce detailed evidence. Consequently, appellant has forfeited this issue. See United States v. Lloyd, 46 MJ 19 (1997).
The challenged specifications are not facially duplicative. They do not necessarily constitute an unreasonable piling on of *186charges under the facts of this case. RCM 307(c)(4); see United States v. Foster, 40 MJ 140, 144 n. 4 (CMA 1994). The three conspiracies of which appellant remains convicted after review at the Court of Criminal Appeals (conspiracies to commit murder, robbery, and kidnapping), require proof of different elements. Even if the conspiracies to kidnap and rob were somehow the means by which the conspirators decided to murder the victim, appellant would be entitled to no relief. See United States v. Oatney, 45 MJ 185 (1996); United States v. Teters, 37 MJ 370 (CMA 1993); United States v. Neblock, 45 MJ 191, 202 (1996) (Crawford, J., concurring in the result).
Additionally, in Braverman, the Government conceded that there was but one conspiracy agreement. 317 U.S. at 52, 63 S.Ct. 99.* The Government also conceded that there was only one conspiracy in United States v. Reliford, 27 MJ 176-77 (1988) (summary disposition). There has been no such concession by appellee in this case. To the contrary, the Government asserts, and I agree, that the limited evidence in this case shows three separate agreements to commit three different felonies, each punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as separate and distinct offenses. As appellant has foreclosed the Government from the opportunity to present evidence by virtue of his guilty plea to separate conspiracies, he cannot now be heard to complain that he was improperly convicted. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 572,109 S.Ct. 757.
I would affirm the lower court’s decision.

 Braverman has been routinely distinguished by courts for the last 45 years. See e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 339-40, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1040 n. 10 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1025-26 (D.C.Cir.1974).