Court Opinion

ID: 9658491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:02:03.083335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:55.857249
License: Public Domain

*281Black, J.
(concurring). I agree with the construe-' tion given by the Court to these municipal charter provisions. But we part company on approach to the Court’s redeclared conception of equal protection — that a challenged enactment is good “so long as the law operates equally upon those within the particular class.”
That which I continue to oppose ■ (see separate opinion, Verberg v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 357 Mich 636, 645, 646) traces lineage back to the loose use of words found on page 339 of the report of In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich 313. On that occasion* Michigan’s regularly cited decision of pertinence (Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich 138 [LRA1918D, 233]) was assigned as supporting Brewster’s declaration that legislation is:' valid as against appeal to the right of equal protection provided it is found that those ydthin “the particular class” are treated equally; whereas Haynes-(p 14) holds — properly and more accurately — that legislation so challenged satisfies the test when it is made uniform “upon all persons of the class to which it naturally applies.”
The trouble with Breivster and its progeny is not hard to find. Manifestly reading Haynes in somewhat of a hurry, the Court- — in Brewster — eliminated the key word “natural” from Haynes’ announcement of principle and substituted the word “particular” in the place thereof. Note that Haynes’ rule was written from the uniformly accepted test of Ruling Case Law, quoted on page 142 of Haynes’ report (also quoted below).* Note also that American Jurisprudence, the modern successor to Ruling Case Law, carries the identical test and cites Haynes, with nu*282merous other authorities, in support (12 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, § 482, pp 156, 157).
Brewster’s unfortunate phrasing was repeated in In re Phillips, 305 Mich 636, 641; Rohan v. Detroit Racing Association, 314 Mich 326, 350 (166 ALR 1246); Fitzpatrick v. Liquor Control Commission, 316 Mich 83, 96 (172 ALR 608); and Lake Shore Coach Lines v. Secretary of State, 327 Mich 146, 153. Now it appears in this case of Burgess. What “particular class” is meant? All I can gather from iterated Brewster is that such class is the one claiming invidious discrimination. Is equal protection provided when all members of such “particular class” are treated alike? If so, the way to calculated evasion of this supposedly protected constitutional right is open for all who tend the fires of malignant discrimination.
When an appeal is made to the right of equal protection, the ultimately decisive question is whether the challenged classification is palpably or provably arbitrary. Here the plaintiffs’ challenge is ineffective, it appearing that the substantial and nonarbitrary differences between the pre-1941 class of widowhood and the post-1941 class, such differences being' manifest on the face of the scrutinized charter provisions, fairly justify favoring of the latter over the former in terms of increased benefits. The 2 classes were not carved out of “a natural class” the members of which, under germane provisions of the charter, are entitled to uniformity of benefits.
I concur in affirmance.
Smith, J., concurred with Black, J..
Souris, J.', took no part in the decision of this case.

 “ ‘The legislature cannot talce what might be termed a natural class of persons, split the same in two and then arbitrarily designate the dissevered factions of the original unit as 2 classes, and thereupon euact different rules for the government of each.’ 6 RCL. Constitutional Law, § 375, p 383.’'