Court Opinion

ID: 9381304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 17:03:25.495874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.543556
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                               D080018

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                (Super. Ct. No. RIF1801370)

 LATRAVIUS BRIAN GOBERT,

         Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Jacqueline Jackson, Judge. Affirmed.
       Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Latravius Brian Gobert strangled his girlfriend, Mariah M., to death in
front of their six-year-old daughter. After a jury convicted him of second
degree murder, the court imposed a 35 years-to-life prison sentence.
      On appeal, Gobert contends his conviction should be reversed because
the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay evidence of two prior domestic
violence incidents. He also seeks independent review of the materials

considered by the trial court during a Pitchess1 hearing. We affirm the
judgment, determining that although the hearsay was inadmissible, it was
harmless error. On the Pitchess claim, although the trial court did not follow
the correct procedure at the in camera hearing, we have independently
reviewed the materials and conclude there was no resulting prejudice to
Gobert.
      Gobert additionally contends that the portion of the minute order from
the sentencing hearing prohibiting him from owning, possessing, and
controlling deadly weapons and related paraphernalia should be stricken
because it was not part of the oral pronouncement of judgment. The Attorney
General concedes that the discrepancy requires us to strike the terms “deadly
weapon” and “related paraphernalia” from the minute order, and we agree.
At the same time, we reject Gobert’s related contention that a notation in the
minute order memorializing the court’s instruction that he not possess any
firearms and ammunition constitutes an unauthorized sentence.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Gobert and Mariah began dating in about 2010. A few years later they
began living together when their daughter, identified at trial as Jane Doe,
was born.

1     Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
                                       2
      The relationship was stormy. Mariah worked nights as a stripper and
after hours entertained clients she met at the club. As problems with money,
work, alcohol abuse, and family life increased over the ensuing years, their
arguments became progressively worse, or as Gobert’s mother, Teri, put it,
“[A] revolving door.”
      One early afternoon in March 2018, Gobert and Mariah were arguing
in their apartment. Mariah told him to “pack [his] stuff and leave.” Jane,
who was in her bedroom, came out when her dog starting barking at the
commotion. She saw her mother “on the ground naked,” her body “flopping
around” while Gobert’s was strangling her.
      Gobert left Mariah’s lifeless body in the bathroom, and instead of
calling paramedics drove with Jane to his mother’s house, just a few minutes
away. After he went upstairs to speak to Teri, Jane heard her scream.
      Gobert and Teri quickly drove back to his apartment. It had been
about 25 minutes since Mariah was strangled. Teri found her dead in the
bathroom. An autopsy showed that cartilage in Mariah’s neck was fractured,
and petechial hemorrhaging was present around her eyes, cheeks, forehead,
and lips—telltale signs of strangulation. According to the pathologist, death
by strangulation takes time—about four to five minutes.

      Police interrogated Gobert the same night.2 Initially, he claimed that
Mariah slipped in the bathroom. But later he described being frustrated with
Mariah’s “drinking and partying” while he stayed at home. Gobert explained
that Mariah told him to move out and was throwing things at him. He

2     The jury watched a video of the interview.
                                      3
admitted grabbing her neck and strangling her until she was “gasping” and

“started coughing up something.”3
      At trial, defense counsel conceded that Gobert killed Mariah, but urged
the jury to conclude it was voluntary manslaughter, the result of “passion
rather than judgment.” Apparently accepting that Gobert was subjectively
provoked, the jury acquitted him of first degree murder, instead convicting
him of murder in the second degree.

                                 DISCUSSION

A.   The Trial Court Erroneously Allowed Hearsay Evidence of Prior
     Domestic Violence Incidents, But the Errors Were Not Prejudicial

      1. Smothering with a pillow

      Generally, evidence of propensity or disposition is inadmissible to prove

a person’s conduct on a specific occasion. (Evid. Code,4 § 1101, subd. (a).)
There is, however, a statutory exception where domestic violence is involved.
“[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense
involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other
domestic violence is not made inadmissible by [s]ection 1101 . . . .” (§ 1109,
subd. (a)(1).) This exception applies even where, as here, the offense charged
is murder. (See People v. Mitchell (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 919, 929 [“courts
have unambiguously rejected the suggestion that [§ 1109] may only be
applied when a domestic violence offense is charged”]; People v. Brown (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1234–1237 [§ 1109 applied where defendant charged
with murder].)

3     According to the pathologist, that type of gasping, called agonal
breathing, indicates Mariah had “passed the point of no return.”
4     Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
                                       4
      Before trial, the prosecutor moved to admit testimony from Mariah’s
friend and coworker, D.S., that about a month before she was killed, Mariah
told her Gobert smothered her with a pillow until she lost consciousness and
awoke to being slapped by him. Defense counsel objected, asserting the
evidence was inadmissible hearsay and “we don’t know the specific hearsay
exception” the prosecutor “is even trying to offer for admission.” Without
asking the prosecutor to identify the applicable hearsay exception, the trial
court overruled the constitutional objections, said nothing about the hearsay
objection, and stated the evidence was admissible.
      When at trial the prosecutor asked D.S. about “a pillow incident,”
defense counsel again objected stating, “I’m going to object and ask for a
standing objection that this is hearsay.” The court replied, “Okay. So the
objection is overruled, but the standing objection will continue under [section]

1109.”5 (Italics added.) D.S. then testified:

         “That they were fighting and, like I said, at one point or
         another throughout the tussle, they fell on the floor. They
         were tussling on the floor, and he got—smothered her with
         the pillow.”

      On appeal, Gobert contends and the Attorney General appropriately
concedes that the trial court erroneously overruled the hearsay objection.
Section 1109, subdivision (a)(1) is not a hearsay exception. Nor does it
independently authorize the admission of hearsay. (See generally, People v.
Quintanilla (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1058–1059 [noting that the
Legislature did not create an exception to the hearsay rule for domestic
violence cases where the defendant kills the declarant].) Rather, it permits

5     From this comment, it appears the trial court mistakenly believed that
section 1109 creates a hearsay exception. It does not.
                                       5
the admission of prior domestic violence evidence notwithstanding section
1101, which otherwise excludes character evidence when offered to prove a
person’s conduct on a specified occasion.

      2. Moving out

      About a month before she was killed, Mariah left her Southern
California home and stayed with her sister, R.J., in Las Vegas after having
an argument with Gobert. She returned, fearful for her safety, about two
weeks later. In a pretrial motion and over defense counsel’s hearsay
objection, the court stated it would allow this evidence to be admitted under
section 1109.
      During trial but before this testimony was presented, the prosecutor
disclaimed any desire to elicit “any specific facts” about the argument, stating
“I don’t think there’s a hearsay exception for that.” Counsel explained that
he only wanted “to offer a little bit of information as to why” R.J. “would drive
four hours on a Saturday to go pick up her sister, bring her back to Las Vegas
and have her stay out there.” He maintained, “I’m not offering it for the
truth of the matter, just the effect on [R.J.] and what she did subsequent.”
      After some further discussion the following colloquy occurred:

         “[Prosecutor:] I will just ask, you know, [‘][T]hey had an
         argument and then she called you, said she wanted a ride
         to get out of town[?’] Is that [okay]?

         “[Defense counsel:] That’s perfect.[6]

         “[The court:] Okay.

6     In context, we understand counsel’s comment, “[t]hat’s perfect,” and a
moment later, “[o]kay,” as an attempt to make the best of a bad situation,
mitigating the prejudicial effect of the court’s pretrial ruling allowing this
evidence. The Attorney General’s brief does not contend otherwise.
                                       6
         “[Prosecutor:] We will do it that way so there’s no hearsay
         and doesn’t violate any kind of order.

         “[Defense counsel:] Okay.

         “[Prosecutor:] And it still allows me to get the [section] 1109
         in that the court has allowed me to.

         “[The Court:] Okay. So the objection is overruled but with
         the limitation that any details of the incident that may
         have been reported to [R.J.] would be hearsay and not
         admissible, and it appears the parties have agreed to at
         least a brief leading question . . . .” (Italics added.)

      Consistent with this discussion, R.J. testified that Mariah told her that
she and Gobert “had gotten into an argument.” R.J. further testified that
Mariah was “scared” and “felt that maybe it would be unsafe” for her to get
her belongings from the apartment while Gobert was there.
      On appeal, Gobert contends that the court erroneously overruled the
hearsay objections to Mariah’s out-of-court statements to R.J. We agree.
The prosecutor’s theory of admissibility was twofold. The first was that the
evidence was admissible under section 1109 to show Gobert’s propensity for
domestic violence. On that theory, the evidence was relevant only if offered
for the truth of the matter asserted—that is, Gobert abused Mariah in the
recent past and she feared future domestic violence. Absent any applicable
hearsay exception (and the Attorney General does not claim there is any), the
evidence was inadmissible, notwithstanding the character evidence exception
in section 1109.
      The prosecutor also sought to admit Mariah’s statements to R.J. for the
nonhearsay purpose of explaining R.J.’s conduct—so the jury would
understand why R.J. picked up Mariah and had her stay in Las Vegas for two
weeks. This is a nonhearsay use of the evidence. (See People v. Livingston
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1162 [“ ‘ “The statement is not hearsay, since it is the
                                       7
hearer’s reaction to the statement that is the relevant fact sought to be
proved, not the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” ’ ”].) But that
does not necessarily make it admissible. “No evidence is admissible except
relevant evidence.” (§ 350.) For Mariah’s statements to her sister to be
admissible for this nonhearsay purpose, R.J.’s motive, state of mind or intent,
must be independently relevant without regard to the truthfulness of those
statements.
      People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610 illustrates a paradigmatic
application of this principle. There, two witnesses at a murder trial testified
they heard rumors that a person who died a year before the murder was a
member of the defendant’s gang who had been killed by the victim’s gang.
The evidence was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that the
defendant had also heard the rumors, believed what he had heard, and thus
had a reason to kill the victim in retaliation for the prior killing. (Id. at
p. 656.) The evidence was relevant, regardless of whether it was true,
because it shed light on the defendant’s motive.
      The fundamental problem here is that R.J.’s motive or intent is not at
issue. Therefore, evidence that she rescued Mariah from Gobert’s past acts of
domestic violence is only relevant to show Gobert’s propensity to commit
future acts if the past abuse occurred—that is, only if the declarant’s
statements are true. Because the use of this evidence to show propensity
under section 1109 was inadmissible hearsay, and any nonhearsay use of the
evidence was not relevant, the trial court erred in allowing it.
      We turn now to whether the evidence was prejudicial. The parties

disagree on the appropriate standard. Gobert contends Chapman7 (harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt) applies “because the effect of the trial court’s

7     Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
                                         8
error was so egregious that the admission of the evidence violated [his] right
to due process” under the federal constitution. The Attorney General
maintains Watson is the correct standard because “ ‘generally, violations of
state evidentiary rules do not rise to the level of federal constitutional
error.’ ”
       The Attorney General is correct. “Error in admitting evidence of a
defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence under section[ ] 1109 . . . is subject
to the standard of prejudice set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818.” (People v. Megown (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 157, 167.) “Under
the Watson test, the trial court’s judgment may be overturned on appeal only
if the defendant shows ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable
to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ”
(Megown, at p. 167.)
       Here, the errors were not prejudicial. During his police interrogation,
Gobert admitted strangling Mariah. Jane, who was nine years old when she
testified, saw his hand(s) on her neck and her mother’s naked body “flopping”
on the floor. Against this backdrop, the propensity evidence added very little.
Without that evidence, it was abundantly clear that Gobert killed Mariah.
Even defense counsel in closing argument had to concede the killing was
unlawful. The best the evidence allowed her to urge was voluntary
manslaughter instead of murder.
       Moreover, in closing argument the prosecutor did not emphasize the
erroneously admitted testimony. Indeed, he underplayed it, mentioning the
pillow smothering just once—and even then, obliquely. Avoiding incendiary
words like “smother,” he merely stated, “We know that he’s grabbed her
before during arguments, and we got confirmation of that. . . . [R.J.] told us
about instances, and Ms. [D.S.] told us about instances.” (See People v. Lopez

                                        9
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1064–1065 [harmless error in part because the
challenged testimony was brief and the prosecutor did not emphasize it in
closing argument], abrogated in part on other grounds in People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1191, 1216.) Additionally, defense counsel deftly
deflected the evidence, stating in closing argument, “[I]t actually supports a
manslaughter conviction, shows that Mr. Gobert could be provoked but
certainly had no intention of killing Mariah.” In light of these factors, there
is no reasonable possibility that if D.S.’s statements were omitted the result
of the trial would have been different.
      Gobert, however, contends the evidence was prejudicial because there
was substantial evidence that Mariah’s death was “the culmination of many,
many weeks of escalating provocation.” Teri described Mariah as a
“hothead,” who wanted everything her way. In the moments leading up to
the strangulation, Gobert told police that Mariah was hitting him saying,
“I fucking hate you,” and was throwing “stuff” at him. Gobert claims that
because the “only evidence” suggesting he acted with malice was the
inadmissible hearsay, the error must be deemed to have been prejudicial.
      This argument is undercut by the record. The inadmissible hearsay
was not the “only” evidence negating malice. According to the medical
expert, a person being strangled will lose consciousness after about a minute
but not experience irreversible brain damage and imminent death until “the
four-to-five minute mark.” As the prosecutor succinctly stated in closing
argument, “[I]t was willful because he took his hand to her throat and
squeezed until she went unconscious and eventually died. [¶] . . . He could
have let go after 30 seconds. He could have let go after one minute. . . . [B]ut
he didn’t. He kept squeezing her neck. . . . She fought back, she went
unconscious, she stopped moving, she gasped for air, but he kept squeezing.”

                                          10
      Moreover, although there was ample evidence of subjective provocation
(which the jury apparently credited by convicting on second degree murder),
evidence of objectively adequate provocation that is necessary to reduce
murder to voluntary manslaughter was extremely thin. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Gobert, Mariah’s provocative conduct consisted
of sharp words and simple assault that cause no physical injury. Even
assuming this conduct actually did incite Gobert, “ ‘no defendant may set up
his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his
passions were aroused’ ” unless the provocation was “ ‘such as would
naturally tend to arouse the passion of the ordinarily reasonable man.’ ”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 950.) “ ‘ “A provocation of slight and
trifling character, such as words of reproach, however grievous they may be,
or gestures, or an assault, or even a blow, is not recognized as sufficient to
arouse, in a reasonable man, such passion as reduces an unlawful killing
with a deadly weapon to manslaughter.” ’ ” (People v. Wang (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1073.) Determining the killing was not voluntary

manslaughter was not a close call.8 The error in allowing hearsay evidence
of prior domestic violence incidents was not prejudicial.

B.   Pitchess

      Before trial, the Riverside County District Attorney’s office notified
defense counsel that one of the investigators on the case, Jennifer Higgins,
was recently placed on administrative leave pending an internal

8      The jury began deliberating at 1:43 p.m. on July 28, 2021 and returned
its verdict at about the same time the next day.

                                       11
investigation “into potential moral turpitude conduct.”9 Gobert filed a
motion seeking Pitchess discovery of police records and asked the trial court
to conduct an in camera review and disclose to counsel any discoverable
information. The trial court found good cause for an in camera hearing
regarding “conduct involving moral turpitude.”
      The custodian of records for the Riverside Sheriff’s department testified
under oath during the in camera proceeding and identified four files he
selected as potentially relevant. One of the files was designated
“[p]ersonnel,” and the custodian of records stated it contained “evaluations
and assignment type history.” The trial judge declined to examine its
contents, stating, “I will not need to take a look at that.” The next file was
designated “[m]edical.” Again, the trial judge declined to examine it. The
remaining two files were reviewed. The trial judge found that one of them
contained discoverable material on the issue of Higgins’s “moral turpitude,

dishonesty, fabrication.”10 The court ordered the prosecutor to disclose the
name and contact information of a witness identified in the document.
      On appeal, Gobert asks that we independently review the sealed
Pitchess materials and hearing transcript to determine whether the trial
court erred in ordering only this disclosure. The Attorney General does not
oppose this request.
      On our own motion in August 2022, we ordered the record augmented
with the confidential documents reviewed by the trial court. We also ordered
the Riverside superior court clerk to transmit to this court “the items
reviewed” by the trial judge. If they were not available, we directed the trial

9     At one point in the case, Higgins was the primary investigator,
interviewed witnesses, and participated in Gobert’s interrogation.
10    Higgins did not testify at trial.
                                          12
judge to hold a hearing within 30 days to settle the record by having the
custodian of records for the Riverside County Sheriff’s department provide
the trial judge copies of the documents reviewed in camera. The trial judge
was directed to “certify” that the items produced by the custodian of records
“are the same documents reviewed on March 6, 2020.” Finally, we ordered
the Riverside superior court clerk to transmit under seal to this court only a
copy of the settled record.
      Upon comparing the sealed record provided by the Riverside superior
court with the reporter’s transcript of the trial judge’s in camera review, we
determined that two of the files produced by the custodian of records for the
trial court’s review were not transmitted to this court (the missing
documents). We called this discrepancy to the attention of the superior court
clerk and informally asked that the missing documents be transmitted to us
under seal. When they still had not been produced by February 2023, we
issued an order directing the superior court clerk to transmit the missing
documents. We have now obtained and reviewed them.
      Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 created a mechanism for criminal
defendants to discover relevant evidence contained in confidential law
enforcement personnel records. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216,
1225−1226 (Mooc).) A defendant seeking discovery must file a motion
supported by an affidavit showing good cause for the disclosure sought. (Id.
at p. 1226.) “Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both
‘materiality’ to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a ‘reasonable
belief’ that the agency has the type of information sought.” (Warrick v.
Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1016.) This merely requires a
plausible showing that officer misconduct might or could have occurred.
(Id. at p. 1026; see Sisson v. Superior Court (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 24,

                                       13
34 (Sisson) [good cause threshold is relatively low].) If the defendant
establishes good cause, the trial court is required to conduct an in camera
hearing, where the custodian of records must bring to court all documents
that are potentially relevant to the motion. (Mooc, at pp. 1226, 1228−1229.)
At the in camera hearing, “the court must review the requested records in
camera to determine what information, if any, should be disclosed” (People v.
Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 (Gaines)), making a record of the
documents it examined to facilitate appellate review (Mooc, at p. 1229). The
court should thereafter disclose any responsive documents to the defendant.
(Gaines, at p. 179; Mooc, at p. 1226.)
      The decisionmaker is the court, not the custodian of records. (Mooc,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) Accordingly, “a trial court conducting an in
camera review of peace officer personnel records must examine the produced
records itself and may not rely on the custodian's assessment of the
discoverability of the information contained in the records.” (Sisson, supra,
216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 28–29.) Not only should it “examine all of the
potentially responsive documents the custodian[ ] produce[s],” it must also
“inquire into what types of documents the custodians opted not to produce,”
to adequately assess the completeness of the custodian’s review and the
legitimacy of his or her decision to withhold documents. (Id. at pp. 38–39,
italics added.)
      Here, although the custodian of records determined that four separate
files were potentially relevant, the trial judge did not personally review two
of them. Based solely on the custodian’s descriptions of one as “[p]ersonnel”
which “includes evaluations and assignments” and the other as “[m]edical,”
the court stated, “I will not need to take a look at that.” This was a mistake
because a general description like “evaluations” did not foreclose the

                                         14
possibility that the file might contain information relevant to Higgins’s
honesty and credibility. As a general rule, a trial court “must examine the
produced records itself and may not rely on the custodian’s assessment of the
discoverability of information contained in the records.” (Sisson, supra, 216
Cal.App.4th at pp. 28–29.)
      In the interest of judicial economy, we have independently reviewed all
four files that the Sheriff’s custodian of records testified he brought with him
to the in camera hearing. (See Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1232
[independently reviewing personnel file instead of remanding for further
proceedings].) Based on that review, we are satisfied that the files contain
nothing that bears on Higgins’s credibility or honesty beyond what Gobert
already received. Accordingly, the trial court’s error was harmless because
Gobert was not entitled to any additional discovery. (See, e.g., Gains, supra,
46 Cal.4th at p. 182 [prejudice must be shown even if Pitchess discovery was
erroneously denied].)

C.   The Order Prohibiting Possession of Deadly Weapons and Paraphernalia
     Is Improper

      The minute order from the sentencing hearing states in part:
         “Do not knowingly own, possess or have under your control
         any firearm, deadly weapon, ammunition, or related
         paraphernalia, for life. . . . .”

Gobert maintains this was not part of the trial judge’s oral pronouncement of
the sentence. The Attorney General concedes the order should be stricken,
and we agree. “In a criminal case, it is the oral pronouncement of
sentence that constitutes the judgment.” (People v. Scott (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324.) In the event of a discrepancy between the oral
pronouncement of judgment and a minute order or an abstract of judgment,
the oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Morales (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
                                       15
1587, 1594; People v. Zachery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) At Gobert’s
sentencing hearing, the trial judge did not utter these words or anything even
close to them. It follows that we must correct the discrepancy by ordering the
trial court to modify the minute order. (See, e.g., People v. Mitchell (2001) 26
Cal.4th 181, 185 [“Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and
appellate courts . . . that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have
ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the
oral judgments of sentencing courts”].)
      Moreover, trial courts generally do not enforce penal laws by
injunction, unless specifically authorized to do so by statute. (See Rincon
Band of Luiseño Mission Indians etc. v. Flynt (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1059,
1109.) If in the future Gobert should unlawfully possess a firearm, he can be
charged and tried for that offense, but the court may not preemptively
establish a lifetime injunction to enforce the criminal law. We will therefore
strike the term: “Do not knowingly own, possess or have under your control
any firearm, deadly weapon, ammunition, or related paraphernalia, for life”
from the clerk’s minute order of October 1, 2021.
      Parenthetically, we have discovered numerous unpublished appellate
opinions where defendants complained of the same error, and all of them

originate from the Riverside County Superior Court.11 In attempting to

11     People v. Williams (Oct. 22, 2021, E073445) [nonpub. opn.]; People v.
Fitzgerald (Feb. 14, 2020, E071541) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Lillard (June
12, 2018, D073720) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Granados (Jan. 16, 2018,
E065727) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Amaya (Dec. 8, 2017, E066055) [nonpub.
opn.]; People v. Amaya (Feb. 15, 2017, E065092) [nonpub. opn.]; People v.
Wilkerson (July 16, 2015, E060059) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Shaver (May 28,
2015, G049824) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Dunlap (Mar. 13, 2015, E059899)
[nonpub. opn.]; People v. Suruy (Nov. 6, 2014, E057934) [nonpub. opn.];
People v. Flores (Mar. 28, 2014, E057234) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Hutter
                                       16
understand why this is happening, we note that as supporting authority the
minute order here cites Penal Code section “1202,” which we assume is an
attempt to cite Penal Code section 12021, the former statute prohibiting a

felon from possessing a firearm.12 As best we can determine, however,
former Penal Code section 12021 never referred to “deadly weapons” or
“paraphernalia,” and in any event was repealed more than a decade ago
(Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.) Sen. Bill No. 1080) and
replaced by Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a). That statute clearly
applies only to firearms, and does not speak to other types of deadly weapons

or to weapons-related “paraphernalia.”13

D.   The Minute Order’s Instruction Regarding Firearms Is not Improper

      Under Penal Code section 29800, it is a crime for a person convicted of
a felony to own, purchase, receive, possess, or have in their custody or control
any firearm. Under Penal Code section 29810, subdivision (a)(2), the trial
court is required to “instruct” such a person that they are “prohibited from
owning, purchasing, receiving, possessing, or having under his . . . custody or
control, any firearms, ammunition, and ammunition feeding devices . . . .”
      Here, at sentencing the court did not give this instruction orally. But
the clerk’s minute order states:

(Jun. 11, 2013, E055202) [nonpub. opn.]; and People v. Cronk (May 4, 2010,
E046546) [nonpub. opn.].
12     The minute order also cites a federal statute, section 922(g)(1) of title
18 of the United States Code, which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to
“possess . . . any firearm or ammunition.”
13      Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “Any person who
has been convicted of a felony under the laws of . . . the State of California
. . . and who owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody
or control any firearm is guilty of a felony.”
                                       17
         “The court instructs the defendant that he or she is
         prohibited from owning, purchasing, receiving, possessing,
         or having under his or her custody or control any firearms,
         ammunition, and ammunition feeding devices, including,
         but not limited to magazines. Prohibited Persons
         Relinquishment forms were provided to defendant. . . .
         Defendant has completed a Prohibited Person
         Relinquishment Form.”

      On appeal, Gobert contends that because the court did not give this
instruction orally, it must be stricken from the minute order as an unlawfully
imposed sentence. We disagree. It is not an unauthorized criminal sentence
because it is not a sentence at all—it is an instruction.
      Moreover, a fair reading of the record is that Gobert received the
requisite instruction. At sentencing the trial court remarked, “Oh, I do have
the gun form. And so I’m also finding that Mr. Gobert has complied with the
firearms relinquishment law. Nothing further is due at this time. No
weapons are known.”
      The “gun form” is an apparent reference to a “Prohibited Persons
Relinquishment Form,” which the court is required to provide under Penal

Code section 29810, subdivision (a)(2).14 In the form, the first paragraph
advises the convicted person: “Pursuant to Penal Code section 29810, any
person who is convicted or any offense listed in [Penal Code] sections 29800
or 29805 is prohibited from owning, purchasing, receiving, possessing, or
having under his or her custody or control any firearms, ammunition, and
ammunition feeding devices, including but not limited to magazines.”
Because the record shows that Gobert completed this form, we can

14     On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the Prohibited Persons
Relinquishment Form as revised January 2018 and readily available on the
California Courts Judicial Branch Statutory Forms website. (§§ 452, subd. (c)
[official acts], 454, subd. (a)(1), 459.)
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confidently surmise he saw or should have seen the required instruction. In
any event, given his 35 years to life prison sentence, any failure to so instruct
at the time of sentencing would be harmless, since this opinion itself advises
Gobert of the relevant information long before he should be in any position to
need it.
                                DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed. The provision in the clerk’s minute order of
October 1, 2021—“Do not knowingly own, possess, or have under your control
any firearm, deadly weapon, ammunition, or related paraphernalia, for
life”—is ordered stricken. The clerk of the superior court is ordered to
prepare an amended minute order deleting that language.

                                                                       DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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