Court Opinion

ID: 9928278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 15:03:10.516401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:37.280257
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 31, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1399
                       Lower Tribunal No. 11-31255
                          ________________

                           Einath Bach Levy,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                        Samuel Salomon Levy,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-
Dade County, Ivonne Cuesta, Judge.

      Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Fort Lauderdale), for
appellant.

     Abramowitz and Associates, and Evan L. Abramowitz, for appellee.

Before HENDON, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

     HENDON, J.

     Einath Bach Levy (“Mother”) appeals from the “Order on Father’s
Motion for Reallocation of Responsibility for Guardian ad Litem Fees and

for Mother to Make Contribution to Same.”1 We reverse the order under

review and remand with instructions.

     The Mother and Samuel Salomon Levy (“Father”) divorced in Virginia

in 2011. The parties have two minor children, a son born in 2008 and a

daughter born in 2010 (collectively, “minor children”). In 2011, the trial

court entered an agreed order domesticating, among other things, the

parties’ final judgment of dissolution of marriage and their Consent Custody

and Visitation Agreement.

     In March 2020, the Mother, on behalf of the parties’ two minor

children, filed petitions for injunction for protection against domestic

violence with children (“DV Petitions”). The trial court appointed a guardian

ad litem for the minor children (“Guardian”) in the domestic violence cases.

The trial court’s order provides that the Father is required to pay 100% of

the Guardian’s fees, but reserved jurisdiction to reallocate the fees and

costs.

1
  The Mother also appealed the July 18, 2022 “Order on Father’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees and Costs Dated October 27, 2021.” This order reflects
that the Father sought attorney’s fees based on the trial court’s granting of
the “Father’s Emergency Motion to Adjudicate Mother in Contempt and to
Suspend Mother Timesharing with Minor Children,” in which the trial court
reserved jurisdiction to determine the Father’s request for attorney’s fees
and costs. The Mother has not raised any issues in this appeal regarding
the order entered on July 18, 2022.

                                       2
       Following a hearing conducted in June 2020, the trial court denied the

DV Petitions. Thereafter, on July 1, 2020, the trial court entered an order in

the underlying action, stating that, although the DV Petitions were denied,

based on the evidence presented, further intervention was needed for the

family, and appointed the Guardian to act as the guardian ad litem for the

minor children in the underlying post-dissolution case. The trial court noted

that the minor son was experiencing anxiety about visiting the Father, and

the minor son’s and Father’s relationship was deteriorating, and as a result,

the trial court temporarily altered the Father’s timesharing with the minor

son.

       Following the appointment of the Guardian in the underlying case, the

parties continued to engage in litigation. The Father filed several motions,

which were either granted or granted in part. In the orders, the trial court

significantly reduced the Mother’s timesharing with the minor children,

particularly with the minor son. In one of the orders, the trial court stated,

among other things, that the parties “remain engaged in bitter disputes and

are unable to co-parent in a manner that is in the best interest of the

children.”

       In October 2021, the Father filed “Father’s Motion for Reallocation of

Responsibility for Guardian Ad Litem Fees and for Mother to Make

                                      3
Contribution to Same” (“Motion for Reallocation of Fees”), which is at issue

in this appeal. In the motion, the Father sought to reallocate the Guardian’s

fees as permitted in the order appointing the Guardian.          The Father

asserted that, since the trial court’s appointment of the Guardian, the

Mother has hired a board certified family law attorney, indicating she has

means available to her to contribute to the cost of the Guardian’s fees. The

Father requested that the trial court reallocate the Guardian’s fees, and

order the Mother to contribute to the fees or, in the alternative, for the

Mother to pay the cost of the Guardian moving forward.

     The trial court conducted a hearing on the Father’s Motion for

Reallocation of Fees, during which the Father and Mother testified, and the

parties’ financial affidavits and the Guardian’s billing records were

introduced into evidence. The trial court did not rule at the conclusion of

the hearing.

     On July 15, 2022, the trial court entered its “Order on Father’s Motion

for Reallocation of Responsibility For Guardian ad Litem Fees and for

Mother to Make Contribution to Same.” In its order, the trial court noted

that the Father testified that he has paid in excess of $96,000 in fees to the

Guardian, and that “many” of the Guardian’s fees were incurred as a result

                                      4
of the Mother’s actions. 2 The trial court found that the Guardian’s billing

records corroborated the Father’s testimony.         The trial court’s order,

however, does not specify which of the Mother’s actions resulted in the

Guardian’s fees or the amount of fees incurred as a result of the Mother’s

actions.

      The trial court’s order also addressed the Father’s testimony as to his

finances. The trial court noted that the Father’s financial affidavit reflects

that his gross monthly income is $10,690.00, and that he testified that he

has taken additional funds from his corporation to pay for many of the

expenses in the case.          The   trial court also noted that the Father’s

testimony reflects he pays other expenses related to the minor children in

addition to child support. 3

      The trial court also addressed the Mother’s testimony and financial

affidavit. The trial court noted that the Mother’s testimony reflects she is a

self-employed designer, earning $1,000 per month, and she has “made no

real effort to find true gainful employment as she is being regularly

supported by her boyfriend and family member.” The trial court, however,

did not state that it was imputing income to the Mother for her lack of effort

2
  The trial court’s order also provides that the trial court agrees with the
Father’s “testimony that an overwhelming amount of work done by the
Guardian in this matter has been a result of the actions of the Mother.”
3
  The Father pays $1,250 per month in child support for the minor children.

                                        5
in finding other employment.

      As to the trial court’s statement that the Mother is “being regularly

supported by her boyfriend and family member,” the trial court addressed

(1) the Mother living in her brother’s condominium; (2) the Mother’s brother

and boyfriend providing funds to her former and current attorneys in the

lower tribunal; (3) the Mother having access to one of her boyfriend’s

vehicles, and (4) her boyfriend taking the Mother out to dinner and on

vacations. The trial court stated that the “relevant inquiry” when determining

whether to include as income any financial benefits received from others is

whether the benefit is regular and expected and whether the benefit

reduces living expenses.

      First, as to the Mother’s housing, the trial court stated that the

Mother’s testimony shows that she has lived in her brother’s condominium

for approximately ten years, she pays only the monthly maintenance fees,

and the condominium could be rented for approximately $2,500 to $3,000

per month. Despite paying the monthly maintenance fee and maintaining

the condominium, the trial court found that the Mother is living in the

property “rent free.” The trial court’s order provides that in court opinions

the value of “free housing has been imputed, where the benefit is

expected,” but the trial court did not specifically state in its order that it was

                                        6
imputing any income to the Mother based on her living in her brother’s

condominium, and if so, in what amount.

      Second, the trial court addressed the funds the Mother’s brother and

boyfriend provided to pay for the Mother’s attorneys’ fees. The trial court

stated that the Mother’s testimony reflects her boyfriend paid “tens of

thousands of dollars to her current attorney, Mr. Fox,” and her brother paid

“hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees for the attorneys the

Mother had prior to Mr. Fox.” Further, as stated in the order, the Mother

testified that although there are no loan documents, she believes she owes

her brother and boyfriend the monies she received from them to pay her

attorneys. The trial court’s order does not specifically make any findings as

to whether these payments to her attorneys were gifts, rather than loans,

and if “gifts,” whether these types of substantial “gifts” will continue in the

future.

      Third, the trial court also noted that the Mother’s testimony reflects

that her boyfriend allows her to use his vehicle whenever she needs it. The

trial court’s order states no further facts as to the use of vehicle. Further,

the order does not specifically state that the trial court is imputing income to

the Mother based on her access to her boyfriend’s vehicle and, if imputing

income, the amount of income it is imputing.

                                       7
     Finally, the trial court also noted that the Mother’s testimony indicates

that her boyfriend invites her out to dinner and pays for vacations. Once

again, the trial court’s order does not make any further findings such as

whether the trial court is actually imputing income to the Mother based on

these dinner invitations and vacations.

     The trial court granted the Father’s Motion for Reallocation of Fees.

The trial court found that, under the circumstances, it is equitable for the

Mother to be responsible for 50% of the Guardian’s fees, representing

$48,000 through June 1, 2022, and any fees incurred after that date. The

Mother’s appeal followed.

     The Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion and erred

by imputing income to the Mother, and by ordering her to pay 50% of the

Guardian’s fees, including 50% of past fees paid by the Father through

June 1, 2022 ($48,000), without making necessary findings as to the

Mother’s ability to pay. See Brennan v. Brennan, 184 So. 3d 583, 590 (Fla.

4th DCA 2016) (“The standard of review for a trial court’s findings regarding

imputation of income is whether the findings are supported by substantial

competent evidence.”); see also Iannuzzelli v. Lovett, 981 So. 2d 557, 559-

60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (stating that a trial court has discretion in

determining whether to award attorney’s fees and costs under section

                                     8
61.16). The trial court’s order directing the Mother to pay both the past and

future fees assessed by the Guardian was also based on the Mother’s

actions necessitating a portion of the Guardian’s fees. The assessments of

fees based on the Mother’s actions is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

See Rosaler v. Rosaler, 226 So. 3d 911, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (stating

that trial court’s consideration of the parties’ litigation conduct to limit

attorney’s fees and to order the payment of costs under section 61.16,

Florida Statutes, is reviewed for abuse of discretion, “even where the party

that benefits from the ruling occupies the superior financial position”).

      “[S]ection 61.16(1) of the Florida Statutes requires that the trial court

take into consideration the parties’ financial ability to pay when imposing

attorney’s fees and costs.” Troike v. Troike, 271 So. 3d 1069, 1073 (Fla.

3d DCA 2019); see also § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“The court may from

time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order

a party to pay a reasonable amount for . . . the cost to the other party of

maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter . . . .” The

appointment of the Guardian in the instant case is considered a “cost” of

the litigation. See Franklin & Criscuolo/Lienor v. Etter, 924 So. 2d 947, 950

(Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (noting that where a guardian ad litem is properly

appointed, the guardian ad litem’s fees are a cost of litigation).

                                       9
      The trial court’s order granting the Father’s Motion for Reallocation of

Fees and ordering the Mother to pay 50% of the Guardian’s past and future

fees was based on the Mother’ failure to seek out “true gainful

employment”; her receipt of financial benefits from her brother and

boyfriend; and/or the Mother’s actions necessitating the services of the

Guardian.    The trial court did not specifically state it was imputing income

to the Mother based on her failure to seek out “true gainful employment.”4

However, assuming the trial court’s statements in its order can be taken as

an imputing income to the Mother, the trial court failed to state how much

income it was imputing to the Mother.

      Next, in addressing the funds the Mother’s brother and boyfriend

provided to pay for her past and current lower tribunal counsels and other

financial benefits, the trial court’s order fails to contain sufficient findings.

This Court’s decision in Rogers v. Rogers, 824 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA

2002), is instructive. In the dissolution of marriage action, the trial court

granted the wife’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees and costs based on

her need and the husband’s ability to pay. The trial court relied, in part, on

loans that the husband’s parents made to the husband prior to the marriage

($24,500), during the marriage ($12,000 in October 2000, and $22,000 in

4
 At the hearing, the trial court stated that the Mother is earning less than
minimum wage.

                                       10
March 2001), and after the parties separated (a total of $72,000 within a

five month period). The loans were secured by promissory notes. Rogers,

824 So. 2d at 903. The husband appealed.

      On appeal from the order granting the wife temporary attorney’s fees,

this Court explained as follows:

      When determining a party's ability to pay and a party's need for
      attorney's fees and costs, the general rule is that the trial court
      may only consider the financial resources of the parties and not
      the financial assistance of family or friends. An exception to
      this general rule is that income can be imputed based on gifts if
      the gifts are continuing and ongoing, not sporadic, and where
      the evidence shows that the gifts will continue in the future.

Id. at 903 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).       This Court

found that the exception to the general rule was not applicable, stating as

follows:

      Contrary to the wife's argument, the exception is not applicable
      in the instant case. The evidence showed that the husband's
      parents made large, sporadic loans to the husband, which
      varied in amount and frequency. Further, there was no
      evidence that the husband's parents would continue to loan the
      husband money in the future. Moreover, unlike gifts, the
      husband continues to be legally indebted to his parents.

      Although the lower court also relied on the husband's assets in
      awarding fees and costs to the wife, we must nonetheless
      reverse and remand for reconsideration where the loans were a
      primary factor in the lower court's finding that the husband had
      the ability to pay. On remand, the lower court is directed to
      reconsider the wife's motion for attorney's fees and costs based
      upon the parties' financial resources, not the financial resources
      of family or friends.

                                      11
Id.; see also Troike, 271 So. 3d at 1072-73, 1073 n.4 (noting that the

husband paid the wife’s prior fees and costs (including guardian ad litem

fees) with funds he received from his parents, which funds were not

secured by a promissory note; reversing the order requiring the husband to

pay the wife’s temporary alimony, attorney’s fees, and costs, and

remanding for the trial court to consider the husband’s financial ability to

pay with instructions that the “loans should not be considered in

determining [the husband’s] financial ability”).

      The trial court’s order fails to make any findings as to whether the

exception to the general rule is applicable in the instant case, or findings as

to the parties’ financial ability to pay the Guardian’s fees. Without these

findings, we cannot determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Therefore, we reverse the order under review and remand with instructions

for the trial court to make the necessary factual findings and conclusions

based on those findings, and if the trial court deems necessary, to conduct

a further hearing. 5

      Finally, the trial court’s order requiring the Mother to pay 50% of the

Guardian’s past and ongoing fees was also based on the Mother’s actions,

5
 We take no position as to any factual findings, conclusions, or whether a
subsequent hearing is necessary.

                                      12
which resulted in necessitating the Guardian’s services. The trial court did

not specifically set forth what part of the Guardian’s work was as a result of

the Mother’s actions. The record demonstrates that both the Mother’s and

the Father’s actions resulted in the Guardian’s services. See Meloan v.

Coverdale, 525 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (reversing assessment

of guardian ad litem fees and attorney’s fees against former husband,

despite his superior financial position, where the former husband was

required to “resort to enforcement action in court” because the former wife

resisted former husband’s visitation rights; holding that remand was

required so that trial court could take into account not only the financial

positions of the parties but other equitable factors); Hahamovitch v.

Hahamovitch, 133 So. 3d 1020, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to the

husband, even though he has a greater financial ability to pay, where “the

trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was based upon an express finding of

bad faith conduct and was supported by detailed factual findings describing

the specific acts of bad faith conduct that resulted in the unnecessary

incurrence of attorney’s fees,” and where the “court’s findings were

supported by the record, and the fee award was limited to fees that were

unnecessarily incurred due to the wife’s untrue allegations”).      Thus, on

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remand, the trial court is also instructed to make detailed findings as to the

Mother’s action necessitating the Guardian’s services, and to make

conclusions based on those findings. 6

     Reversed and remanded with instructions.

6
  We also take no position as to any factual findings relating to the Mother’s
actions necessitating the Guardian’s services or conclusions based on
those facts. We also take no position as to ordering the Mother to pay 50%
of the Guardian’s fees.

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