Court Opinion

ID: 9689711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:43:43.933164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.588023
License: Public Domain

BARHAM, Justice
(dissenting).
Gilbert Lee Schoonover was charged with armed robbery, tried, and convicted. That crime is defined by LSA-R.S. 14:64 as follows :
“Armed robbery is the theft of anything of value from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.”
LSA-R.S. 14:67 defines theft thus:
“Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential.” (Emphasis here and elsewhere has been supplied.)
LSA-R.S. 14:10, “Criminal intent”, provides :
“Criminal intent may be specific or general:
“(1) Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.
“(2) General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.”
The defendant Schoonover requested written charges or instructions for the jury, and submitted to the court a special requested charge in the language of LSA-R.S. 14:10(1), which is a charge of specific criminal intent. The judge refused the requested charge, and the defendant x'eserved Bill of Exception No. 3. The judge’s per curiam to this bill of exception states that the general charge fully covered the proof of intent, and that the special charge requested was covered by his instruction to the jury that “ * * * an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property, was an essential ingredient to the crime of robbery * * * ”. I believe that the trial court has committed reversible error in refusing to give the requested charge.
LSA-R.S. 14:11, “Criminal intent; how expressed”, reads:
“The definitions of some crimes require a specific criminal intent, while in others no intent is required. Some crimes *331consist merely of criminal negligence that produces criminal consequences. However, in the absence of qualifying provisions, the terms ‘intent’ and ‘intentional’ have reference to ‘general criminal intent.’ ”
The reporter’s comment thereunder correctly states the meaning of this statute:
“ * * * However, in some crimes the production of certain consequences plus a specific intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequences is necessary (for example, ‘Forgery is the false making or altering, with intent to defraud, of any signature * * *’). Such an intent is a ‘specific intent.’ ”
Theft is an essential ingredient of armed robbery and must be charged in a trial for armed robbery. The use of force or intimidation while armed with a dangerous weapon is an entirely different offense in the absence of intent to commit theft. The definition of theft is qualified or modified by the clause: “An intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential." This intent is the “specific criminal intent” described in LSA-R.S. 14:10(1).
Our criminal statutes have defined the two grades of intent. A more onerous burden of proof is required of the State under specific intent. When specific intent is an essential ingredient or element of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury. In these instances, in order to constitute guilt in the mind of a jury there must be not only a wrongful act but a specific criminal intent. We have defined by statute what constitutes that intent. It is the trial court’s obligation to define specific intent for the jury when applicable, and it must include the charge when it is requested. Without the definition or instruction as to specific intent, the jury in the instant case determined guilt under a charge which used such general terms as “intent” and “intentional”. The jury could have determined that “the circumstances indicate/d/ that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act”. A verdict so predicated upon “general criminal intent” would be illegal, erroneous, and unjust. The defendant would have been adjudged guilty without the State being required to prove, and the jury to find, a specific criminal intent.
The defendant in his requested special charge submitted to the court a correct and complete statement of the law applicable to his case. That statement of the law is not contained in the charge given by the court. The requested charge is used throughout the State of Louisiana in the trial of criminal cases when specific intent is a necessary element of a crime. This court has *333said repeatedly that if the requested charge is a correct statement of the applicable law and is not covered by the general charge, it must be given by the court. The requested charge offered by the defendant meets all the requirements of our law and jurisprudence, and I must therefore dissent from the majority since the failure to give this charge is reversible error.
Although this conclusion would dispose of the matter if I were writing the majority opinion, I feel compelled to express an opinion upon Bills of Exception Nos. 1 and 2 in this dissent.
These bills of exception were reserved during the voir dire examination of the jury when defense counsel objected to questions by the assistant district attorney in regard to certain laws which he contended were applicable to the case. The question involved in Bill of Exception No. 1 is: “Do you understand the rule of law, the law of principals as explained ? * * * ” Prior to this question the court had instructed the jury on the law of principals, and in the per curiam there is a full legal-size page of instructions in regard to principals which were rendered by the court to the jury during their voir dire examination. The instructions are similar to a charge to the jury. Certainly the court may be required to correct an erroneous statement of law and inform the jury that they must take the law from the court. The jury may be informed that the court will instruct them at the conclusion of the trial as to the law; but it is grave error, if not reversible error, for a court to instruct a jury in regard to principles of law during the voir dire examination. The court cannot at this stage of the proceeding know what law is applicable or correct. To quote law which would be inapplicable to the evidence when produced on the trial would confuse and confound a jury.
The instructions given here are more objectionable and censurable in light of the court’s statement that:
“* * * I have instructed them in order that they [sic] might make the legal question understandable by lay persons, and in order to do this I must use a factual situation as that involved in the trial s{t % >>
It may be inferred that this is a comment upon the expected evidence. It is reprehensible that a court would inject itself into the province of the jury to this extent.
Bill of Exception No. 2 was reserved when the court allowed the assistant district attorney to ask: “ * * * Do you all understand the Judge’s instructions with regard to what a conspiracy could be?” I agree with the majority that State v. Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d 370 (on rehearing), holds that where the crime charged necessarily involves a conspiracy, it is proper for the judge to instruct the jury on the law of conspiracy even though conspiracy is not the crime charged. I disagree, *335however, with the majority statement here that:
“ * * * Evidence of a conspiracy would be relevant upon the trial, and the ability to understand the somewhat complex problems which might arise under the law of conspiracy was essential to the juror’s ability to act intelligently in the case; therefore, there was no error in the ruling of the trial judge on this bill.”
This court has held repeatedly that it is improper to inquire on voir dire examination whether the juror understands certain principles of law. State v. Perioux, 107 La. 601, 31 So. 1016; State v. Willie, 130 La. 454, 58 So. 147; State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338; State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85. It is often pertinent to know whether a juror will accept and apply certain principles of law if they are charged him by the court. However, jurors should not be examined as to their understanding and opinions on questions of law, as jurors are not supposed to know the law and are not incompetent if their understanding and opinion do not coincide with the views of lawyers, jurists, and legal writers. Questions in respect to a juror’s knowledge and understanding of the law should not be permitted on voir dire examination. Jurors are chosen for the very reason that they are lay people and, hopefully, form a peer group. They are not expected to be learned in the law, and their instruction in the law is to be delivered by the court at the end of the trial during the formal charge to the jury. Neither counsel nor the court should instruct in the law on voir dire examination.
Since I need not determine whether these two bills of exception constitute reversible error or merely error which is not prejudicial, I make no judgment in that respect.
I respectfully dissent.
BARHAM, J., is of the opinion a rehearing should be granted.