Court Opinion

ID: 9943871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:05:59.189451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:49:12.980358
License: Public Domain

Because we firmly believe that our statutory law does not bar the doors of the Family Court to Rhode Island citizens desiring a judicial determination of their marital status, we respectfully dissent.
We are in complete agreement with the majority on one critical point, however. The legal recognition that ought to be afforded same-sex marriages for any particular purpose is fundamentally a question of public policy, more appropriately determined by the General Assembly after full and robust public debate. If the courts are called upon to resolve any issue involving the validity of such a marriage, they must, of course, do so, but only when presented with an actual controversy by parties having adverse interests. See Devane v. Devane,581 A.2d 264, 265 (R.I. 1990) ("courts exist for the purpose of deciding live disputes involving `flesh and blood' legal problems with data `relevant and adequate to an informed judgment'") (quoting People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910,915 (Colo. 1985)). Such is not the situation with the case at bar. Neither one of the parties is contesting the legal validity of the marriage performed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Both plaintiff and defendant have filed a complaint and counterclaim, respectively, seeking to terminate that relationship in the Rhode Island Family Court. Both parties have satisfied the applicable domicile and residence requirements,19 and they have filed a certified marriage certificate from a sister sovereign state attesting to the existence of their marriage. We believe that is sufficient to invoke the authority of the Family Court to entertain their divorce petitions.
At the outset we think it essential to note that the certified question presented to this Court is extremely narrow in *Page 968 
scope.20 It requires only that this Court consider whether the Family Court may recognize a same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of entertaining a divorce petition. Thus, the question of whether such a marriage is entitled to recognition in Rhode Island for any other purpose is one this Court need not and should not answer. Clearly, the certified question does not implicate the eligibility vel non of same-sex couples to marry under Rhode Island marriage licensing laws.
The issue presented to this Court by the certified question is by its very terms limited to the divorce context. To answer the question, the dissenting justices perceive no need to consult forty-six-year-old editions of standard dictionaries. A brief survey of current dictionaries reveals that the same definition of the word "marriage" predominates today as it did when the Family Court Act21 was enacted in 1961.22 Nevertheless, the majority, in our opinion, overlooks the one central and unassailable fact upon which the certified question is predicated. On May 26, 2004, Ms. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston (the parties) were lawfully married under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
As we discuss below, the Family Court has been granted authority to hear and decide their complaint and counterclaim for divorce whether or not their marriage is determined to be legally valid in Rhode Island. We would answer the certified question in the affirmative, therefore, based on the plain language of the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Family Court. In addition, we believe such jurisdiction to be consistent with Rhode Island's domestic relations jurisprudence in 1961, when the Family Court Act was enacted, as it is today.
 The Parties' Marriage
The parties, both of whom were domiciled inhabitants of Rhode Island, were married in a ceremony that took place on May 26, 2004, in Fall River, Massachusetts. Civil marriages between two persons of the same sex were authorized in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of PublicHealth, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). In June 2004, thirteen municipal clerks and eight nonresident same-sex couples from several states, including Rhode Island, challenged the application and enforcement of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207, §§ 11 and 12.23 Cote-Whitacre *Page 969 v. Department of Public Health, 446 Mass. 350,844 N.E.2d 623, 631 (2006) (Spina, J., concurring). Before issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in accordance withGoodridge, the Department of Public Health and the Registry of Vital Records and Statistics had issued forms and guidance that effectively interpreted Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207, § 11 to bar municipal clerks from issuing marriage licenses to nonresident, same-sex couples. SeeCote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health, 18 Mass.L.Rptr. 190, 2004 WL 2075557, at *4 (Mass.Super.Aug. 18, 2004). As a result, the petitioning couples either had been denied marriage licenses or they had been prevented from having their marriages registered in the Commonwealth.Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health,2006 WL 3208758, at *1, 2006 Lexis 670, at *2 (Mass.Super.Sept.29, 2006). The Massachusetts Superior Court denied petitioners' motion to enjoin enforcement of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207, § 11 for failing to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Cote-Whitacre, 2004 WL 2075557, at *6. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court, by plurality opinion, ruled that same-sex residents of certain states could not marry in Massachusetts but remanded concerning couples residing in New York and Rhode Island "for a determination whether same-sex marriage is prohibited in those States."Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d at 631.
On remand, a justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court applied the test pronounced by Chief Justice Marshall in her concurring opinion in Cote-Whitacre because, he said, it "articulates the narrowest grounds for the judgment of the court." Cote-Whitacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *3, 2006 Lexis 670, at *8. Under that test, Rhode Island same-sex couples would be permitted to marry in Massachusetts unless the Massachusetts Superior Court determined that same-sex marriage is explicitly deemed void or otherwise expressly forbidden by a Rhode Island "constitutional amendment, statute, or controlling appellate decision." Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d at 653
(Marshall, C.J., concurring). Employing that construction of Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 207, §§ 11 and 12, and finding no "prohibitory positive law" in Rhode Island, the trial justice ordered "that a declaratory judgment enter that same-sex marriage * * * is not prohibited in Rhode Island."Cote-Whitacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *5, 2006 Lexis 670, at *15. The judgment was not appealed.
Whether the Massachusetts courts have correctly interpreted Rhode Island law is irrelevant to our analysis. What is germane is the fact the parties are married validly under Massachusetts law, as declared and applied by the Massachusetts courts.See Cote-Whitacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *5, 2006 Lexis 670, at *15. That fact alone should end this Court's inquiry.
 Family Court Jurisdiction
The Family Court is a statutory court and is vested with jurisdiction "to hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board." G.L. 1956 § 8-10-3(a). Without question, Ms. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston are in, subject to, and/or entitled to the benefits of the bond of marriage, at least in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as well as any other jurisdiction that recognizes their marriage. They now wish to *Page 970 
dissolve that bond and return to the status of single persons. Unless one or both of them establish the domicile and residency requirements of another jurisdiction, however, the Rhode Island Family Court is the only forum available to them to terminate their marriage. Moreover, because the parties are citizens of Rhode Island it is solely within the sovereign authority of Rhode Island to determine and/or alter their marital status by granting or denying their divorce complaint and counterclaim. That, in our opinion, is precisely the relief available to them under the plain and ordinary language of § 8-10-3.
This Court has long recognized that marriage is a contractual relationship between the parties to it, profoundly affecting their status, i.e., their legal and social condition, and that the state has the sovereign authority to fix or alter the status of its domiciled citizens. In 1856, this Court said:
 "[I]t is obvious, that marriage, as a domestic relation, emerged from the contract which created it, is known and recognized as such throughout the civilized world; that it gives rights, and imposes duties and restrictions upon the parties to it, affecting their social and moral condition, of the measure of which every civilized state, and certainly every state of this Union, is the sole judge so far as its own citizens or subjects are concerned, and should be so deemed by other civilized, and especially sister, states; that a state cannot be deprived, directly or indirectly, of its sovereign power to regulate the status of its own
domiciled subjects and citizens, by the fact that the subjects and citizens, of other states, as related to them, are interested in that status, and in such a matter has a right, under the general law, judicially to deal with and modify or dissolve this relation, binding both parties to it by the decree, by virtue of its inherent power over its own citizens and subjects, and to enable it to answer their obligatory demands for justice * * *." Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87, 105-06. (1856).
In 1904, this Court pronounced, "It is a matter of duty which the courts owe to the public to declare the situation of the parties. * * * It may be necessary, for the convenience and happiness of families, and of the public, likewise, that the real character of these domestic connections should be ascertained and made known." Leckney v. Leckney,26 R.I. 441, 445, 59 A. 311, 312 (1904) (quoting Lea v.Lea, 104 N.C. 603, 10 S.E. 488, 489 (1889)).
If a statute is unambiguous, "there is no room for statutory construction and [the Court] must apply the statute as written." State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 1045 (R.I. 2006) (quoting State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253
(R.I. 1998)). "If the [statutory] language is clear on its face, then the plain meaning of the statute must be given effect and this Court should not look elsewhere to discern the legislative intent." Henderson v. Henderson, 818 A.2d 669, 673
(R.I. 2003) (quoting Fleet National Bank v. Clark,714 A.2d 1172, 1177 (R.I. 1998)). In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that the parties are married for all legal purposes under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. We, the dissenting justices, discern no impediment in the language of § 8-10-3 that precludes the Family Court from entertaining their petition for divorce from the bond of their Massachusetts marriage. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Family Court does not turn on the gender of the parties; rather it turns on their status as a married couple.
 The Family Court Act
Although we are satisfied that the plain meaning of §8-10-3(a) is sufficient to determine *Page 971 
that appropriate authority resides in the Family Court to entertain the parties' complaint and counterclaim, we also find support for such authority outside the statutory language. The fact that the commonly accepted meaning of the word "marriage" in 1961, the year the Family Court Act was enacted, referred to a union between a man and a woman does not alter the analysis.24 It would have been quite extraordinary indeed if the original drafters of the act had anticipated or even contemplated same-sex marriages. Such a concept would have been as foreign to the General Assembly in 1961 as would have been the advent of the Internet to the drafters of the "commerce clause" in the United States Constitution.25 SeeSimmons v. State, 944 So.2d 317, 331 (Fla. 2006) ("the Internet `represents an instrument of interstate commerce, albeit an innovative one'") (quoting American LibrariesAssociation v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 173
(S.D.N.Y.1997)). Nevertheless, "[i]n attempting to apply a statute to a situation that was not intended by its drafters, the interpreting court should not rely on literalisms, technical constructions, or so-called formal rules of interpretation, but rather should rely on the breadth of objectives of the legislation and the common sense of the situation."26 A brief examination of the context of §8-10-3 clearly demonstrates that the Family Court possesses the authority to hear the parties' divorce.
The General Assembly created the Family Court in 1961 and infused it with broad and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of domestic relations. Opinion to theGovernor, 93 R.I. 211, 213, 172 A.2d 596, 597 (1961) ("the [L]egislature intended to divest the [S]uperior [C]ourt of all existing jurisdiction over divorces and all matters of domestic relations generally and to vest that jurisdiction exclusively in the [F]amily [C]ourt on and after September 1, 1961"). We first observe that § 8-10-2 expressly provides that the Family Court Act "shall be liberally construed to the end that families whose unity or well-being is threatened shall be assisted and protected, and restored, if possible, as secure units of law-abiding members * * *." Surely that language encompasses a family whose well-being is best served by severing its legal relationship. See Von Schack v. VonSchack, 893 A.2d 1004, 1011 (Me. 2006) ("Maine has a unique interest in assuring that its citizens are not compelled to remain in such personal relationships against their wills * * *.").
 Void or Voidable Marriages
More significant, however, is the well-recognized principle of statutory construction that the Legislature is presumed to *Page 972 
know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute. State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 916-17
(R.I. 2007); Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 898
(R.I. 2006); Shelter Harbor Fire District v. Vacca,835 A.2d 446, 449 (R.I. 2003). Two important aspects of the law as it existed in 1961 are persuasive evidence that the reach of § 8-10-3's grant of jurisdiction to the Family Court includes the power to adjudicate divorces from same-sex marriages.
First, when § 8-10-3 was enacted in 1961, the divorce laws contained a curious catchall provision: "Divorces from the bond of marriage shall be decreed in case of any marriage originally void or voidable by law * * *." G.L. 1956 § 15-5-1. That section, unamended, remains vital today. Thus, the Family Court's authority to entertain a divorce petition does not depend on the validity of the marriage itself. A void marriage is a nullity, one that is invalid from its inception.See Black's Law Dictionary 994-95, 1098 (8th ed. 2004). It is evident, therefore, that the General Assembly has provided a means of relief in the Family Court to parties who have entered a marriage that could neither be performed in Rhode Island nor granted legal effect in the state. It is incongruous to hold that a Rhode Island resident who lawfully has entered into a same-sex marriage is afforded no means to dissolve the union in Rhode Island, whereas a Rhode Island resident who may have entered into an incestuous or bigamous marriage, both of which are statutorily void, is entitled to divorce under § 15-5-1.
The scope of the certified question under review does not permit this Court to consider the underlying validity of the parties' marriage. It is sufficient for our inquiry to acknowledge the authority of the Family Court to grant (or deny) a divorce complaint on the grounds, when properly pled, of voidness or voidability under § 15-5-1, as it might grant a complaint on one of the other enumerated grounds such as irreconcilable differences,27 living separate and apart for at least three years,28 or extreme cruelty.29
 Principles of Comity
Secondly, the well-settled rule of law in 1961 was, and still remains, that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place where celebrated. Ex parte Chace,26 R.I. 351, 354, 58 A. 978, 979 (1904). The United States Supreme Court has said "[m]arriages not polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the State where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction." Loughran v. Loughran,292 U.S. 216, 223, 54 S.Ct. 684, 78 L.Ed. 1219 (1934). This rule of common law, lex loci celebrationis, is based upon the general principle "that the capacity or incapacity to marry depends on the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, and not on that of the domicile of the parties."Ex parte Chace, 26 R.I. at 354, 58 A. at 979. "`[A]ll nations have consented, or must be presumed to consent, for the common benefit and advantage, that * * * marriages should be good, or not according to the laws of the country where they are made. * * * By observing this law no inconvenience can arise, but infinite mischief will ensue if it is not.'"Id. at 355, 58 A. at 980 (quoting Scrimshire v.Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Cons. 395, 417). This doctrine reflects the principle of comity, or "[t]he recognition and respect that a court of one state * * * shows to *Page 973 
another state * * * in giving effect to the other's laws and political decisions." Black's Law Dictionary 863 (8th ed. 2004). "Comity is not a positive rule of law but one of practicality based on a proper regard for the law of a foreign state." O'Brien v. Costello, 100 R.I. 422, 430,216 A.2d 694, 699 (1966). Because the doctrine was settled law in 1961, the General Assembly that originally enacted § 8-10-3
conferring jurisdiction on the Family Court "to hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage" is charged with the knowledge that the capacity of Rhode Island citizens to marry might well be determined by some other jurisdiction.
The Chace Court also noted the well-recognized exception to this general rule, viz., when "a marriage is odious by the common consent of nations, or if its influence is thought dangerous to the fabric of society, so that it is strongly against the public policy of the jurisdiction * * *."Ex parte Chace, 26 R.I. at 356, 58 A. at 980. As we previously have noted, however, even if the presumption of validity of a Massachusetts same-sex marriage were rebutted by a showing that it was "strongly against the public policy" of Rhode Island, or if the General Assembly declared it as such, the Family Court would not be deprived of authority to entertain a petition seeking to dissolve the marriage.See § 15-5-1.
When construing a statute, this Court's "ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 711
(R.I. 2003) (quoting Oliveira v. Lombardi,794 A.2d 453, 457 (R.I. 2002)). We believe that, with respect to the certified question, the legislative intent underlying §8-10-3 is self-evident from its language vesting the Family Court with jurisdiction "to hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage." We also believe that the purpose of the statute's grant of jurisdiction to the Family Court is clear when it is viewed in the larger context of Rhode Island's domestic relations jurisprudence at the time the Family Court Act was enacted. That purpose is to give all Rhode Island citizens a means of determining their marital status and dissolving their marriage.
Finally, we observe that "we are bound to construe a statute in the most beneficial way which its language will permit, in order to prevent inconsistency or injustice." State v.Drowne, 20 R.I. 302, 306, 38 A. 978, 979 (1897). The result of the majority's opinion, in our view, places the parties, and all those similarly situated, in an untenable position. They are denied access to the Family Court and thus are left in a virtual legal limbo, unable to extricate themselves from a legal relationship they no longer find congenial without establishing the domicile and residency requirements of some other jurisdiction. Such a result runs afoul of the "`matter of duty which the courts owe to the public to declare the situation of the parties,'"Leckney, 26 R.I. at 445, 59 A. at 312, and, in our opinion, is not required by the language of § 8-10-3. By leaving same-sex marriage outside the purview of the Family Court, indeed outside the definition of the word "marriage" itself, the parties have no means of dissolving the marriage they entered into in Massachusetts, and thereby no means of altering their marital status in their domiciliary state.
We also are mindful that same-sex relationships are gradually gaining legal recognition, and domestic partners are afforded many of the same protections heretofore available only to opposite-sex couples. This Court has held that "it is not illegal for two men to live together, much less to contract and to enter into *Page 974 
partnerships with each other while doing so." Doe v.Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1094 (R.I. 2002). In Rubano v.DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000), we declared jurisdiction in the Family Court, under the Uniform Law on Paternity no less, to determine the existence vel non of a de facto parent-child relationship between a woman and the biological child of her former same-sex domestic partner. Moreover, the General Assembly has extended various benefits to same-sex couples. For instance, the term "dependents" is defined to include "domestic partners" in a statute extending certain insurance benefits to dependents of state employees. G.L. 1956 § 36-12-1(3). In 2006, the General Assembly enacted legislation providing that for the purposes of fulfilling an employer's obligations under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), a domestic partner is a dependent of an employee. Section 36-12-2.4, as enacted by P.L. 2006, ch. 189, § 2. Also in 2006, the General Assembly extended the state Parental and Family Medical Leave Act to domestic partners. G.L. 1956 § 45-19-4.3.
In summary, we believe § 8-10-3 confers authority on the Family Court to entertain a petition seeking to dissolve a same-sex marriage. In our view, the filing of a complaint and a certified marriage certificate is sufficient to invoke such authority; it is enough to get one in the door of the Family Court, which, we believe, the General Assembly intended to be a comprehensive forum for resolving issues concerning marital relations.
We would answer the certified question therefore in the affirmative. Such an answer in our opinion not only is compelled by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, but also is consistent with the policies and purposes of the Family Court Act by providing Rhode Island citizens a means of dissolving their marriage and judicially determining their marital status. In addition, we believe it to be consistent with the expectations of those Rhode Island residents who have in good faith entered into same-sex marriages in Massachusetts. We do not mean to suggest, however, that the Family Court is precluded from adjudicating the validity of the marriage if one of the parties alleges the marriage is void or voidable. We agree rather with the Governor, the Attorney General and several other amici curiae30 that this Court should answer the certified question in the affirmative without determining the legal validity of the underlying marriage. The parties in this case have not challenged the marriage, and therefore the issue of voidness is not properly before the Court. Moreover, we do not think it proper for the Court, on the state of this record, to attempt to determine whether same-sex marriage is "strongly against the public policy of this jurisdiction." See Exparte Chace, 26 R.I. at 356, 58 A. at 980. The resolution of that issue resides in the State House and not the courthouse. In the case at bar, therefore, we would remand to the Family Court for further proceedings on the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim.
19 General Laws 1956 § 15-5-12(a) requires that at least one party "has been a domiciled inhabitant of this state and has resided in this state for a period of one year next before the filing of the complaint."
20 The certified question asks: "May the Family Court properly recognize, for the purpose of entertaining a divorce petition, the marriage of two persons of the same sex who were purportedly married in another state?"
21 General Laws 1956 chapter 10 of title 8.
22 The New Oxford American Dictionary 1039 (2d ed. 2005) ("the formal union of a man and a woman, typically recognized by law, by which they become husband and wife"); Black's Law Dictionary 992 (8th ed. 2004) ("The legal union of a couple as husband and wife."); Random House Webster's College Dictionary 757 (2d rev. ed. 2001) ("the social institution under which a man and woman live as husband and wife by legal or religious commitments"); Funk Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary 829 (1963) ("a legal contract, entered into by a man and a woman, to live together as husband and wife"); The American College Dictionary 746 (1955) ("the legal union of a man with a woman for life").
23 Massachusetts General Laws Annotated ch. 207, §§ 11
and 12 lay out the procedure to be used when the applicants for marriage licenses are nonresidents. Section 11 provides that "[n]o marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction, and every marriage contracted in this commonwealth in violation hereof shall be null and void." Section 12 continues that [b]efore issuing a license to marry a person who resides and intends to continue to reside in another state, the officer having authority to issue the license shall satisfy himself, by requiring affidavits or otherwise, that such person is not prohibited from intermarrying by the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she resides.
24 The majority opinion rests on the definition of the word "marriage" as gleaned from dictionaries circa 1961. The Court states, "there is absolutely no reason to believe that when the Act creating the Family Court became law in 1961, the legislators understood the word marriage to refer to any state other than `the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex,'" and cites several dictionaries signifying that marriage is a contract or union between a man and a woman. Yet G.L. 1956 § 15-1-5, originally enacted in 1896 (G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 5), declares bigamous marriages void. Arguably the General Assembly in 1961 understood a marriage, albeit a void marriage, to encompass something other than the strict dictionary definition of one man, one woman. It is perhaps also interesting to note that since Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, in 1996, thirty-eight states, not including Rhode Island, have deemed it desirable to statutorily define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, or otherwise expressly prohibit same-sex marriages.
25 United States Constitution Art. I, § 8.
26 2A Norman J. Singer J.D. Shambie Singer,Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:2 at 161-62 (7th ed. 2007).
27 G.L. 1956 § 15-5-3.1(a).
28 Section 15-5-3(a).
29 Section 15-5-2(3).
30 We join the majority in expressing our appreciation to amici curiae for their thorough, sometimes creative, and very helpful briefs.
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