Court Opinion

ID: 9403948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 21:00:40.044876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:10.077878
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4549

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        ZACHARY O’NEAL BOWE,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:21-cr-00334-WO-1)

        Submitted: June 15, 2023                                          Decided: June 20, 2023

        Before DIAZ, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J.
        Hairston, United States Attorney, Margaret M. Reece, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Zachary O’Neal Bowe pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court calculated Bowe’s

        advisory imprisonment range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2021) at 84

        to 105 months and sentenced him to 90 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Bowe argues

        that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines range by declining to reduce his

        offense level under USSG § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.

               We review Bowe’s sentence for reasonableness under a deferential abuse of

        discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). In doing so, we

        examine the sentence for procedural error, which includes “failing to calculate (or

        improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” Id. at 51. “We review a district court’s

        decision concerning an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment for clear error.” United

        States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007). “Under the clear error standard, we

        will only reverse if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

        committed.” United States v. Doctor, 958 F.3d 226, 234 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

        marks omitted).

               Under the Guidelines, a defendant is eligible for a two-level reduction to his offense

        level if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” USSG

        § 3E1.1(a). If the defendant qualifies for a reduction under subsection (a) and his offense

        level is 16 or greater, he is eligible for an additional 1-level reduction upon the motion of

        the Government. USSG § 3E1.1(b). “To earn the reduction, a defendant must prove to the

        court by a preponderance of the evidence that he has clearly recognized and affirmatively

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        accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” United States v. Bolton,

        858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A guilty plea may

        be evidence of acceptance, but it does not, standing alone, entitle a defendant to a reduction

        as a matter of right.” Dugger, 485 F.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted);

        see USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3.

               “To determine whether a defendant has accepted responsibility, the sentencing

        judge must weigh the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480,

        488 (4th Cir. 2018). The commentary to USSG § 3E1.1 provides a nonexclusive list of

        considerations relevant to this inquiry, which includes, as pertinent here, “voluntary

        termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations,” “post-offense

        rehabilitative efforts,” and “the timeliness of the defendant’s conduct in manifesting the

        acceptance of responsibility.” USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1; see Dugger, 485 F.3d at 240 (“The

        decision to grant an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction often depends on the actions of

        the defendant following his or her arrest or plea.”). Because “[t]he sentencing judge is in

        a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” the determination

        of the sentencing judge “is entitled to great deference on review.” USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5;

        see Harris, 890 F.3d at 488.

               The district court’s choice to decline to afford Bowe a reduction under USSG

        § 3E1.1 is supported by information in the presentence report the court adopted and

        sentencing testimony and evidence the court credited establishing that Bowe did not

        terminate or withdraw from criminal conduct after pleading guilty. Instead, five days after

        his guilty plea, he participated in a violent fight while incarcerated in a jail. Because Bowe

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        did not terminate or withdraw from criminal conduct following his guilty plea, the district

        court did not commit procedural sentencing error in determining that he did not deserve a

        reduction to his offense level under USSG § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility.

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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