Court Opinion

ID: 9554266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 15:14:35.417338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:36.803952
License: Public Domain

THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 77

                                                                   APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                            August 8, 2023

 JESSICA GATES,

 Appellant
 (Plaintiff),

 v.

 “MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF CONVERSE
                                                                   S-22-0286
 COUNTY - ADVANCED MEDICINE.
 HOMETOWN CARE”, by and through the
 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
 MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF CONVERSE
 COUNTY,

 Appellee
 (Defendant).

                      Appeal from the District Court of Converse County
                           The Honorable F. Scott Peasley, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      C. John Cotton, Cotton Law Office, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:
      Billie LM Addleman, Christine L. Jordan, and Tyson R. Woodford of Hirst
      Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Woodford.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FENN, Justice.

[¶1] Jessica Gates appeals from the district court’s summary judgment order which
required Memorial Hospital of Converse County (MHCC) to produce certain records she
requested under the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA or the Act), but which also
imposed a protective order on those documents. Ms. Gates also appeals the district court’s
denial of her summary judgment motion related to the production of documents involving
a settlement between MHCC and a patient (MB settlement). We reverse and remand.

                                                  ISSUES

[¶2]      Ms. Gates raises two issues, which we rephrase as follows:

                I.         Did the district court err by denying Ms. Gates’s request to
                           order MHCC to produce documents relating to the MB
                           settlement?

               II.         Does the WPRA allow a district court to order public
                           records to be produced subject to a protective order?

                                                   FACTS

[¶3] In a separate action, Ms. Gates and her husband, acting as guardians and next friends
for their minor child, L.G., filed a malpractice action against MHCC. Instead of requesting
the information through discovery in that case, Ms. Gates sent MHCC’s counsel a letter
containing a “FOIA1/Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA) Request” in July 2021.
Among other things, this letter requested the inspection and production of the following
documents:

                     IV.      Governmental Claims for Medical Malpractice –
                              “all claims filed against a governmental entity”:

                           A. All Governmental Claims for Medical Malpractice filed
                              against Memorial Hospital of Converse County (or any
                              of its officers, agents, representatives or employees)
                              during the time period from January 1, 2014 to date.

                           B. All Governmental Claims for Medical Malpractice
                              pertaining to Jonathan Grosdidier, M.D., FACS,
                              regardless of time period.

1
    FOIA refers to the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).

                                                      1
                  C. All Governmental Claims for Medical Malpractice
                     pertaining to Dennis Yutani, M.D. and/or the radiology
                     department, regardless of the time period.

                  D. All Governmental Claims for Medical Malpractice
                     pertaining to the conduct of MHCC nursing staff,
                     regardless of the time period.

             V.      Settlement/Payment Of/On Claims for Medical
                     Malpractice – “all . . . documents . . . relating to the
                     receipt, use, and disposition of all public property
                     and public income.”

                  A. All documents related to the settlement/payment of/on
                     claims for medical malpractice against Memorial
                     Hospital of Converse County (or any of its officers,
                     agents, representatives or employees) during the time
                     period from January 1, 2014 to date.

                  B. All documents related to the settlement/payment of/on
                     claims for medical malpractice pertaining to Jonathan
                     Grosdidier, M.D., FACS, regardless of the time period.

                  C. All documents related to the settlement/payment of/on
                     claims for medical malpractice pertaining to Dennis
                     Yutani, M.D. and/or the radiology department
                     regardless of the time period.

                  D. All documents related to the settlement/payment of/on
                     claims for medical malpractice pertaining to the conduct
                     of MHCC nursing staff, regardless of the time period.

In response to her request to produce Governmental Claims for medical malpractice,
MHCC provided documents relating to two claims, one dated July 21, 2015, and another
dated February 8, 2021. In response to her request for documents relating to the settlement
or payment of claims for medical malpractice involving the receipt, use, and dispositions
of public property and public income, MHCC informed Ms. Gates it would not be
producing any other settlement agreements between MHCC and any other person or party
for “several reasons.” MHCC claimed: “First, most of the agreements were entered into
by an insurance carrier not qualifying as a document that needs to be produced under the
Act. Second, the settlement agreements included a confidentiality provision.” The letter
did not indicate how many other settlement agreements MHCC was withholding.

                                             2
[¶4] In September 2021, Ms. Gates’s counsel sent MHCC’s counsel a letter stating he
was aware of another claim filed by a patient, MB, which had not been provided by the
hospital, that purportedly involved the use of public funds. MHCC’s counsel had
previously informed Ms. Gates’s counsel the hospital was not going to produce documents
relating to the MB settlement because it had not been filed as a formal Governmental
Claim. Ms. Gates asked MHCC to reconsider its position and produce the MB settlement
because it was a claim filed against a public entity or it was an agreement or contract to
which a governmental entity was a party.

[¶5] When the parties still could not resolve their disagreement about whether these
documents were subject to production under the WPRA, Ms. Gates filed a request under
Wyoming Statutes §§ 16-4-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2021) asking the district court to
compel MHCC to produce these records. In its answer, MHCC asserted the requested
documents either did not fall under the WPRA or were subject to confidentiality
agreements.

[¶6] Ms. Gates filed for summary judgment on the application of the WPRA. She argued
the MB settlement fell within the definition of a public record under the WPRA because it
related to the receipt, use, and disposition of public property or income, or it was a contract
or agreement to which a governmental entity was a party. She also argued the WPRA did
not contain a provision that permits a governmental entity to selectively limit production
of all agreements and contracts to which it was a party by identifying some as confidential.
Furthermore, she argued she was entitled to the settlement agreements MHCC’s insurance
carrier entered into on its behalf because the hospital was a party to those agreements.

[¶7] MHCC argued the confidentiality provisions in the documents rendered them
“privileged” communications that were excluded from the definition of public records
under Wyoming Statute § 16-4-201(a)(v). MHCC alleged the requested records were
exempt from disclosure under Wyoming Statute § 16-4-203(d)(v)2 or Wyoming Statute §
16-4-203(d)(vii) (LexisNexis 2021).3 MHCC also argued it did not have to produce the
settlements entered into by its insurance carrier for two reasons: 1) MHCC was not a party
to those settlement agreements, and 2) no public funds were contributed to those
settlements. MHCC claimed it did not have to produce the MB settlement because the
“claim” had been settled before the filing of a notice of claim under the Wyoming
Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyoming Statutes §§ 1-39-101 et seq., and the
WPRA only required the hospital to produce claims “filed” in compliance with the WGCA.
MHCC attached the affidavit of its CEO, Matt Dammeyer, to its summary judgment
response in support of its argument. He averred three Governmental Claims had been filed
2
  This subsection exempts “Trade secrets, privileged information and confidential commercial, financial,
geological or geophysical data furnished by or obtained from any person[.]”
3
  This subsection exempts “Hospital records relating to medical administration, medical staff, personnel,
medical care and other medical information, whether on individual persons or groups, or whether of a
general or specific classification[.]”

                                                   3
against the hospital since 2014: the Gates’s claim, and the July 21, 2015, and February 8,
2021, claims that had been provided to Ms. Gates before this action was filed. He also
averred he was aware of two other settlement agreements MHCC’s insurance carrier had
reached with two separate claimants (insurance carrier settlements). He opined MHCC
was not a party to the insurance carrier settlements, and he stated no public funds were
expended to settle those claims. Although he did not use MB’s name, Mr. Dammeyer
stated MHCC had settled one claim which involved the use of MHCC’s funds. Mr.
Dammeyer did not opine the insurance carrier settlements or the MB settlement were
exempt from production under Wyoming Statute § 16-4-203(d) or that production of either
the MB settlement or the insurance carrier settlements would do substantial injury to the
public interest.

[¶8] In reply, Ms. Gates argued the MB settlement was subject to production under the
WPRA because it involved the use of public funds to settle a claim against a governmental
entity. Ms. Gates also argued the insurance carrier settlements were subject to the WPRA
because MHCC used public funds when it purchased the insurance policy, and the hospital
was a party to the insurance carrier settlement agreements. Ms. Gates asserted Wyoming
Statute § 16-4-203(d)(v) was inapplicable because MHCC made no showing the documents
contained any trade secrets or other privileged information that would preclude disclosure.
Ms. Gates further argued the settlement agreements were not protected from disclosure as
medical records under Wyoming Statute § 16-4-203(d)(vii) but were instead like the
physician recruitment contracts this Court ruled were subject to disclosure under the
WPRA in Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶9] The district court held a hearing on the summary judgment motion in September
2022. Shortly before the hearing, MHCC submitted copies of the MB settlement and the
two insurance carrier settlements to the district court for in camera review. At the hearing,
MHCC did not argue the exceptions under Wyoming Statute § 16-4-203(d)(v) or (vii)
applied. MHCC conceded the MB settlement was a contract between the hospital and an
individual that involved the use of public funds, and Ms. Gates had “a good argument for
the production of that agreement []” under the WPRA. However, it renewed its argument
the WPRA only applied to filed claims, and the hospital had produced all filed claims.
MHCC admitted the two insurance carrier settlements released the hospital from liability,
but it again asserted those documents were not subject to release under the WPRA because
no public funds were used to resolve those claims. MHCC argued the parties to those
settlement agreements “had a bonafide [sic] interest in the confidentiality of the amounts
paid to individual claimants[,]” and it would not violate public policy to allow the “amounts
and conditions of settlements with individual consumers” to remain confidential. If the
district court found the settlement agreements were public records, MHCC asked the
district court to enter a protective order “so that the interests of the parties involved could
have their confidentiality protected.”

                                              4
[¶10] At the end of the hearing, the district court asked Ms. Gates’s counsel if he had “any
objection to defense counsel’s request for a protective order for any documents that the
[c]ourt believes should be disclosed?” Ms. Gates’s counsel replied: “I don’t have a concern
about that. And if something comes up where we think we need to use them, we would
reserve the right to apply to the [c]ourt for a change in the protective order.” The district
court then stated it would review the records in camera to determine whether the records
were privileged or confidential by law or whether the release of those records would impair
or impede the hospital’s ability to discharge its duties.

[¶11] The district court issued an order in October 2022. The district court determined
Wyoming Statute § 16-4-201 referred only to filed claims. Because MB’s case was
resolved prior to the filing of a notice of claim, the district court determined the MB
settlement was not subject to production under the WPRA. The district court determined
the two insurance carrier settlements were subject to disclosure because the hospital was a
party to those agreements. The district court specifically found the WPRA “does not
contain an exception for settlements involving or including a government entity’s insurance
carrier.” The district court also found “[a]greements and contracts subject to the provisions
of a bargained for confidentiality clause are not considered ‘privileged or confidential by
law.’” It further found it could “order the disclosure of information protected by a
confidentiality clause when necessary and appropriate.”

[¶12] The district court recognized the public had a vital interest in information relating
to malpractice claims against MHCC and its employees. However, the district court also
found “at a minimum, by making the settlement agreements confidential, the release of
details of the confidential settlements may ‘impair or impede the governmental entity’s
ability to discharge its other duties.’” It found releasing the settlements for public
inspection would infringe on MHCC’s ability to reconcile claims efficiently and effectively
and would invoke a chilling effect on doctors, nurses, and hospital staff. It also found
litigants preferring to keep the terms of a settlement agreement private could not do so.
The district court found the confidentiality clauses in the settlements did not render them
per se exempt from disclosure. However, it found “restricting disclosure to [Ms. Gates],
subject to the provisions of a protective order prohibiting further disclosure, is both
necessary and in the public interest.” The district court ordered MHCC to produce the two
insurance carrier settlements to Ms. Gates subject to a protective order that went beyond
shielding the identities of the individuals and the amounts of the settlements. Among other
things, the protective order limited Ms. Gates’s use of the documents to the underlying
medical malpractice case, restricted the individuals to whom the documents could be
disclosed, and required the documents to be returned to MHCC or destroyed at the
conclusion of the litigation.

[¶13] Ms. Gates did not apply to the district court for any changes to the protective order,
but she timely appealed the district court’s order to this Court.

                                             5
                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶14] Determination of the first issue requires us to determine whether the district court
properly granted summary judgment. We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Matter of Phyllis V. McDill Revocable Trust, 2022 WY 40, ¶ 16, 506
P.3d 753, 759 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Bear Peak Res., LLC v. Peak Powder River Res., LLC,
2017 WY 124, ¶ 10, 403 P.3d 1033, 1040 (Wyo. 2017)).

             We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district
             court, using the same materials and following the same
             standards. We examine the record from the vantage point most
             favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that
             party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be
             drawn from the record. A material fact is one which, if proved,
             would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential
             element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the
             parties.

Id., 506 P.3d at 759–60 (citing Bear Peak Res., LLC, ¶ 10, 403 P.3d at 1040) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).

[¶15] This case also requires us to interpret the WPRA. “Statutory interpretation is a
question of law subject to de novo review.” Solvay Chemicals, Inc. v. Wyo. Dep’t of
Revenue, 2022 WY 124, ¶ 7, 517 P.3d 1146, 1149 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Camacho v. State
ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., Workers’ Comp. Div., 2019 WY 92, ¶ 17, 448 P.3d 834,
840–41 (Wyo. 2019)). Our rules of statutory interpretation are well established:

             Our goal in interpreting statutes “is to give effect to the intent
             of the legislature, and we ‘attempt to determine the
             legislature’s intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary
             meaning of the words used in the statute.’” Fugle v. Sublette
             Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 9, 2015 WY 98, ¶ 8, 353 P.3d 732, 734
             (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Stroth v. N. Lincoln Cnty. Hosp. Dist.,
             2014 WY 81, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 121, 125 (Wyo. 2014)). “The
             paramount consideration is to determine the legislature’s
             intent, which must be ascertained initially and primarily from
             the words used in the statute.” RME Petroleum Co. v. Wyo[.]
             Dep’t of Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶ 25, 150 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo.
             2007) (citing State ex. rel. Wyo[.] Dep’t of Revenue v. Union
             Pac. R. Co., 2003 WY 54, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Wyo.
             2003)). “Where legislative intent is discernible a court should
             give effect to the ‘most likely, most reasonable, interpretation
             of the statute, given its design and purpose.’” Adekale v. State,

                                             6
              2015 WY 30, ¶ 12, 344 P.3d 761, 765 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting
              Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 20, 50 P.3d 323, 329
              (Wyo. 2002)). “We therefore construe each statutory provision
              in pari materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and
              sentence according to their arrangement and connection.”
              PacifiCorp, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, State, 2017 WY 106,
              ¶ 10, 401 P.3d 905, 908 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Nicodemus v.
              Lampert, 2014 WY 135, ¶ 13, 336 P.3d 671, 674 (Wyo. 2014)
              (“To ascertain the meaning of a given law, we also consider all
              statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general
              purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously.”).

Solvay Chemicals, Inc., ¶ 8, 517 P.3d at 1149. “We do not interpret a statute ‘in a way that
renders a portion of it meaningless . . . .’” Conrad v. Uinta Cnty. Republican Party, 2023
WY 46, ¶ 20, 529 P.3d 482, 491 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Miller v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am.,
Inc., 2020 WY 155, ¶ 26, 478 P.3d 164, 171–72 (Wyo. 2020)).

                                      DISCUSSION

[¶16] The WPRA defines public records as:

              “Public records” when not otherwise specified includes any
              information in a physical form created, accepted, or obtained
              by a governmental entity in furtherance of its official function
              and transaction of public business which is not privileged or
              confidential by law. Without limiting the foregoing, the term
              “public records” includes any written communication or other
              information, whether in paper, electronic, or other physical
              form, received by a governmental entity in furtherance of the
              transaction of public business of the governmental entity,
              whether at a meeting or outside a meeting. Electronic
              communications solely between students attending a school in
              Wyoming and electronic communications solely between
              students attending a school in Wyoming and a sender or
              recipient using a nonschool user address are not a public record
              of that school. As used in this paragraph, a “school in
              Wyoming” means the University of Wyoming, any community
              college and any public school within a school district in the
              state;

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201(a)(v).       The WPRA classifies public records into two
categories:

                                             7
              (A) “Official public records” includes all original vouchers,
              receipts and other documents necessary to isolate and prove the
              validity of every transaction relating to the receipt, use and
              disposition of all public property and public income from all
              sources whatsoever; all agreements and contracts to which a
              governmental entity is a party; all fidelity, surety and
              performance bonds; all claims filed against a governmental
              entity; all records or documents required by law to be filed with
              or kept by a governmental entity of Wyoming; and all other
              documents or records determined by the records committee to
              be official public records;

              (B) “Office files and memoranda” includes all records,
              correspondence, exhibits, books, booklets, drawings, maps,
              blank forms, or documents not defined and classified in
              subparagraph (A) of this subsection as official public records;
              all duplicate copies of official public records filed with any
              governmental entity; all documents and reports made for the
              internal administration of the office to which they pertain but
              not required by law to be filed or kept with the office; and all
              other documents or records, determined by the records
              committee to be office files and memoranda.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201(a)(vi). Under the WPRA, once “any person” asks to review
or inspect a public record, the custodian of that record “shall” allow inspection unless:

               (i) The inspection would be contrary to any state statute;

                (ii) The inspection would be contrary to any federal statute
              or regulation issued thereunder having the force and effect of
              law; or

               (iii) The inspection is prohibited by the rules promulgated by
              the supreme court or by the order of any court of record.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(a). “Striking a delicate balance between the public’s right of
access to government records and the protection of proprietary information, the WPRA
contains several exemptions from disclosure, which are set forth in [Wyoming Statute] §§
16-4-203(b) & (d).” Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm’n, 2014 WY 37, ¶ 35, 320 P.3d 222, 231 (Wyo. 2014).

[¶17] If the custodian of the public record does not disclose the requested record, “a person
aggrieved” by that failure may “[a]pply to the district court of the district wherein the

                                             8
record is found for an order to direct the custodian of the record to show cause why he
should not permit the inspection of the record and to compel production of the record if
applicable.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(f)(i). The WPRA also sets forth the procedure
for the custodian to follow to obtain authorization to withhold the record from disclosure:

              If, in the opinion of the official custodian of any public record,
              disclosure of the contents of the record would do substantial
              injury to the public interest, notwithstanding the fact that the
              record might otherwise be available to public inspection, he
              may apply to the district court of the district in which the record
              is located for an order permitting him to restrict disclosure.
              After hearing, the court may issue an order upon a finding that
              disclosure would cause substantial injury to the public interest.
              The person seeking permission to examine the record shall
              have notice of the hearing served upon him in the manner
              provided for service of process by the Wyoming Rules of Civil
              Procedure and has the right to appear and be heard.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(g).

[¶18] The WPRA “creates a presumption that the denial of inspection of a public record
is contrary to public policy.” Laramie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Cheyenne Newspapers,
Inc., 2011 WY 55, 250 P.3d 522, 525 (Wyo. 2011) (citing Houghton, 870 P.2d at 1053).
The WPRA “places ‘the burden of proof upon the custodian to show that the exercise of
his discretion does not run afoul of statutory limitations in any particular instance where
custodial withdrawal is effected.’” Aland v. Mead, 2014 WY 83, ¶ 45, 327 P.3d 752, 767
(Wyo. 2014) (quoting Powder River Basin Res. Council, 2014 WY 37, ¶ 34, 320 P.3d at
231).

[¶19] We have recognized:

              In crafting the WPRA, the legislature anticipated that
              disagreements would arise between members of the public and
              the various custodians of public records as to whether
              particular documents or pieces of information are subject to
              disclosure and inspection under the Act. It therefore specified
              that those conflicts could be resolved in the district court by
              applying for an order directing the custodian to show cause
              why inspection of a denied record should not be permitted. In
              short, the custodian must explain why she denied access to
              specified records, and/or explain why the court should not
              grant the requesting party some relief from the custodian’s
              decision. That procedure is the exclusive means of challenging

                                              9
              a State governmental entity’s denial of access to the records it
              maintains.

Guy v. Lampert, 2016 WY 77, ¶ 14, 376 P.3d 499, 503 (Wyo. 2016) (internal citations
omitted). “The role of the district court is to examine the disputed information, all of the
other materials in the record and the applicable law, and then make a judgment as to
whether the custodian was correct in his conclusion.” Powder River Basin Res. Council,
2014 WY 37, ¶ 24, 320 P.3d at 230 (quoting Allsop v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 2002
WY 22, ¶ 29, 39 P.3d 1092, 1101 (Wyo. 2002)). The district court must “employ logic and
reason in that process.” Id. (quoting Allsop, ¶ 29, 39 P.3d at 1101). “If the custodian bears
his burden of showing that an exemption applies to the record sought, that is the end of the
judicial inquiry. If the custodian fails to prove that the record is exempt from inspection
by the public, the court must order the custodian to allow inspection.” Id. at ¶ 25, 320
P.3d at 230 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

   I. Did the district court err by denying Ms. Gates’s request to order MHCC to
      produce documents relating to the MB settlement?

[¶20] Ms. Gates contends the district court erred when it found the MB settlement was not
subject to production under the WPRA. She claims the district court misapplied the rules
of statutory construction when it found the WPRA only applies to “filed claims.” She also
claims the district court ignored portions of the statutory definition, including those
requiring the production of “documents . . . relating to the receipt, use and disposition of
all public property and public income[,]” and contracts to which a governmental entity is a
party. In its brief, MHCC stated:

              In light of the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s summary judgment decision
              and stipulated protective order, and in consideration of other
              factors, Memorial Hospital of Converse County (MHCC) no
              longer objects to the production of the settlement agreement at
              issue. Consequently, the Wyoming Public Records Act
              (“WPRA”) issue regarding the production of the M.B.
              settlement agreement is now moot.

Later in its brief, MHCC stated it would produce the MB settlement “pursuant to the terms
of the Protective Order entered by the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” At oral argument, both parties
represented there was now only one issue before the Court: whether the district court
properly entered the protective order. However, after reviewing the record, MHCC’s
concession appears to be contingent upon this Court upholding the protective order. Given

                                             10
our decision on the protective order below, we find this issue is not moot and needs to be
addressed.4

[¶21] In its summary judgment order, without analysis or explanation, the district court
summarily concluded: “The plain and ordinary meaning of ‘all claims filed against a
governmental entity’ under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-4-201 refers only to filed claims.” The
district court ended its analysis there and did not consider Ms. Gates’s argument that the
MB settlement fell under another section of the statutory definition. As set forth above,
“claims filed against a governmental entity” is only one type of “official public record”
subject to production under the Act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201(a)(iv)(A). The WPRA
also covers “all agreements and contracts to which a governmental entity is a party[,]” and
all documents relating to the “use and disposition of all public property and public income
. . . .” Id. The district court erred when it failed to consider the other sections of the statutory
definition before determining the MB settlement agreement was not subject to the Act. By
doing so, the district court rendered portions of the WPRA meaningless, in violation of our
rules of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Conrad, 2023 WY 46, ¶ 20, 529 P.3d at 491
(quoting Miller, 2020 WY 155, ¶ 26, 478 P.3d at 171–72).

[¶22] As MHCC conceded, the MB settlement is a contract to which the hospital is a party
that involves the use of public funds. The MB settlement falls under the definition of an
official public record, and it is subject to production under the WPRA. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
16-4-201(a)(iv)(A). Therefore, the district court erred when it found the MB settlement
was not subject to disclosure under the WPRA, and it should have ordered MHCC to
produce it. Because the district court found the MB settlement was not subject to
production under the WPRA, it never considered whether any sensitive information should
be redacted from the document. On remand, the district court may consider whether certain
information should be redacted from the MB settlement prior to production to Ms. Gates.

    II. Does the WPRA allow a district court to order public records to be produced
        subject to a protective order?

[¶23] Ms. Gates contends the district court’s entry of a protective order was contrary to
the WPRA and without evidentiary support. Ms. Gates claims imposing a protective order
on documents produced under the WPRA effectively turns the WPRA “on its head,” and
is contrary to the statute’s intention of placing the burden on the custodian to show the
record is exempt from disclosure. She asserts MHCC failed to comply with the mandatory
procedure set forth in Wyoming Statute § 16-4-203(g) for withholding a public record, and

4
  We have recognized that once the documents requested under the WPRA have been produced, the
requestor is not entitled to another remedy, and the issue becomes moot. See, e.g., Williams v. Matheny,
2017 WY 85, ¶ 23, 398 P.3d 521, 528 (Wyo. 2017) (finding the case was rendered moot when the custodian
provided the requested records). We note that although MHCC indicated it had agreed to produce the MB
settlement, it has not yet produced those documents. Because the hospital’s concession was contingent
upon the protective order and the documents have not yet been produced, the issue is not truly moot.

                                                  11
the hospital did not “present a shred of evidence or argument . . . that ‘disclosure would
cause substantial injury to the public interest.’” She contends MHCC’s concerns about
privacy could have been addressed through a simple redaction.

[¶24] MHCC admits it did not follow the procedure set forth in Wyoming Statute § 16-4-
203(g) to obtain authorization from the district court to withhold the settlement agreements.
However, it contends nothing in the statute required it to follow this process to obtain a
protective order, and the parties stipulated to entry of a protective order. MHCC focuses
on the use of the word “may” in the statute and claims “[t]he language is blatantly
permissive and does not exclude the option for parties to stipulate to the entry of a
protective order.” MHCC asserts the protective order in this case “is the result of unique,
case-specific circumstances.” Ms. Gates contends the parties did not stipulate to the entry
of a protective order in this case because there was not a “‘definite and certain agreement’
with specific terms.” While MHCC concedes Ms. Gates did not stipulate to the specific
terms of the protective order, it asserts, “Counsel’s representation on behalf of Appellant .
. . recognized that the [d]istrict [c]ourt may enter a protective order, in its discretion.”

[¶25] Even assuming the parties’ statements at the summary judgment hearing amounted
to a stipulation, as characterized by MHCC, that stipulation amounted to a legal conclusion,
i.e., that the WPRA authorizes district courts to enter protective orders.

              Parties to an action may not stipulate to legal conclusions to be
              reached by the court. It has generally been stated that the
              resolution of questions of law rests upon the court,
              uninfluenced by stipulations of the parties, and accordingly, it
              has been recognized that stipulations as to the law are invalid
              and ineffective.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations § 4 (June 2023 Update); see also L.U. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Cnty. of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 674 (Wyo. 1990) (“[A] stipulation between
the parties as to the correct law of the case is not binding upon the court.”); Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Langdon, 624 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 1981) (holding the Court was not bound by
the “litigants’ erroneous agreement” concerning the interpretation of a regulation).

[¶26] We have not yet addressed whether the WPRA authorizes a district court to enter a
protective order. However, we have recognized a district court may use other tools, such
as redaction, to facilitate the production of public records:

              We feel safe in concluding that the legislature intended for the
              courts to use those traditional judicial remedies that are
              available, as well as to fashion new ones that suit the
              circumstances which the statute was intended to remediate.
              Redaction is one such remedy. We tacitly approved of its use

                                             12
                in Sheridan Newspapers, though the precise issue raised here
                was not raised in that case. We take this opportunity to hold
                that a district court may use redaction as one of the remedies to
                vindicate the public’s interests in access to public records.
                That redaction is an appropriate tool to be used in
                circumstances such as these is well established in case law, as
                well as in statutes.

Allsop, 2002 WY 22, ¶ 30, 39 P.3d at 1101 (internal citations omitted).5

[¶27] A protective order under Rule 26 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure
(W.R.C.P.) is designed to forbid the disclosure or discovery of information, preclude
inquiry into certain matters, require documents to be sealed and opened only by court order,
or designate to whom the information can be disclosed after it is obtained. See W.R.C.P.
26(c). This type of secrecy and control is directly contrary to the object of the WPRA. See
Houghton, 870 P.2d at 1052 (“The object of the public records act is disclosure, not
secrecy . . . .”). Requiring public records to be subject to a protective order and limiting
the manner in which those documents can be used does not “vindicate the public’s interest
in access to public records.” Allsop, ¶ 30, 39 P.3d at 1101.

[¶28] “This Court has consistently considered federal precedent interpreting the [Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA)] in determining issues under the WPRA.” Powder River Basin
Res. Council, 2014 WY 37, ¶ 37, 320 P.3d at 232 (citing Sublette County Rural Health
Care Dist. v. Miley, 942 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Wyo. 1997)). In National Archives & Records
Administration v. Favish, a member of the public sought death-scene photographs of a
government official who died of an apparent suicide. 541 U.S. 157, 161, 124 S. Ct. 1570,
1574, 158 L. Ed. 2d 319 (2004). The Supreme Court of the United States explained:

                FOIA is often explained as a means for citizens to know “what
                their Government is up to.” [U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reps.
                Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,] 773, 109 S. Ct.
                [1468,] 14[81,] [103 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1989)]. This phrase should
                not be dismissed as a convenient formalism. It defines a
                structural necessity in a real democracy. The statement
                confirms that, as a general rule, when documents are within
                FOIA’s disclosure provisions, citizens should not be required
                to explain why they seek the information. A person requesting
                the information needs no preconceived idea of the uses the data

5
 The legislature subsequently approved the use of redaction to facilitate public records requests. In 2019,
Wyoming Statute § 16-4-202(c)(v) was amended to allow the district court to review records in camera to
determine whether privileged or confidential information should be redacted to permit review of the record.
2019 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 174 § 1.

                                                    13
              might serve. The information belongs to citizens to do with as
              they choose. Furthermore, as we have noted, the disclosure
              does not depend on the identity of the requester. As a general
              rule, if the information is subject to disclosure, it belongs to all.

541 U.S. at 171–72, 124 S. Ct. at 1580. The Supreme Court went on to say: “It must be
remembered that once there is disclosure, the information belongs to the general public.
There is no mechanism under FOIA for a protective order allowing only the requester to
see whether the information bears out his theory, or for proscribing its general
dissemination.” Id. at 174, 124 S. Ct. at 1581.

[¶29] Other federal courts have reached similar conclusions. See Gonzalez v. United States
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 475 F. Supp. 3d 334, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (holding the court
could not order a partial disclosure of the documents or disclosure pursuant to a protective
order because there was no basis for such a request under FOIA); Chiquita Brands Int’l
Inc. v. S.E.C., 805 F.3d 289, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Stonehill v. I.R.S., 558 F.3d 534,
538–39 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“While information disclosed during discovery is limited to the
parties and can be subject to protective orders against further disclosure, when a document
must be disclosed under FOIA, it must be disclosed to the general public and the identity
of the requester is irrelevant to whether disclosure is required.”); Maricopa Audubon Soc’y
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We conclude that a district
court lacks inherent power, equitable or otherwise, to exempt materials that FOIA itself
does not exempt.”). One federal court recognized “the idea that FOIA would require the
release of certain information, but only to the first person who requests it, is obviously
quite preposterous.” Greenpeace, Inc. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 311 F. Supp. 3d 110, 129
(D.D.C. 2018).

[¶30] Similarly, other states have held trial courts do not have authority to enter protective
orders in public records act cases. In Burroughs v. Thomas, a surviving spouse sought a
copy of the coroner’s investigative records relating to his wife’s death. 937 P.2d 12, 14
(Kan. Ct. App. 1997). When he was informed he needed to obtain a subpoena, Mr.
Burroughs filed suit against the coroner seeking the records under the Kansas Open
Records Act. Id. The district court found the records were subject to disclosure and not
subject to any statutory exemptions. Id. at 15. However, the district court also entered a
protective order allowing only Mr. Burroughs to access the records. Id. The appellate court
found the district court could only “apply and enforce” the Open Records Act. Id. (citing
Kan. Human Rights Comm’n v. Topeka Golf Ass’n, 856 P.2d 515, 523 (1993)). The
appellate court held, after concluding none of the statutory exceptions applied, “[t]he
district court did not have the authority to close public records which were not statutorily
exempt from public disclosure.” Id.

[¶31] In Lawson v. City of Jackson, a district court entered a protective order prohibiting
Ms. Lawson from seeking information under the Mississippi Public Records Act or using

                                               14
that information as evidence at trial as a sanction for discovery violations in the underlying
litigation. 349 So.3d 724, 725 (Miss. 2022). The Mississippi Supreme Court found “[t]he
Mississippi Public Records Act guarantees the right of any person to access public records,
subject to a limited number of exceptions.” Id. at 727 (citing Miss. Code. Ann. § 25-61-2
(Rev. 2018)). It found Ms. Lawson had a statutory right to access public records, and none
of the statutory exceptions applied to the records sought by Ms. Lawson. Id. at 728. The
Mississippi Supreme Court found “the trial court abused its discretion by restricting [Ms.]
Lawson’s access to public records from the City of Jackson.” Id. The appellate court also
found the district court abused its discretion by issuing a protective order preventing Ms.
Lawson from offering any public records she may obtain from the city as evidence at trial.
Id.

[¶32] In Mitchell v. City of Cedar Rapids, an injured motorist and his wife sued the city
and a police officer after the officer fired gunshots at the motorist during a traffic stop,
rendering the motorist a quadriplegic. 926 N.W.2d 222 (Iowa 2019). The plaintiff sought
discovery of certain police records in the personal injury action, rather than through a
separate public records suit. Id. at 224–25. After discussing the interplay between the civil
discovery rules and Iowa’s Open Records Act, the Iowa Supreme Court found the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the city’s request for a protective order.
Id. at 228–35. The Iowa Supreme Court noted “[a] protective order limiting disclosure to
third parties would be pointless here when any member of the public could obtain the same
reports through an Iowa Code chapter 22 open records request.” Id. at 236.

[¶33] We agree with the reasoning of these cases. Disclosure under the WPRA is distinct
from discovery under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. The information contained
in public records subject to production under the WPRA belongs to the citizens of
Wyoming to do with as they choose. See Nat’l Archives, 541 U.S. at 171–72, 124 S. Ct. at
1580. Although Ms. Gates is a litigant in an underlying malpractice case, the identity of
the person making a public records request is irrelevant. Id. Any member of the public
may ask to inspect a public record. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(a). Using a protective
order to limit Ms. Gates’s use of the public records obtained under the WPRA is contrary
to the law. “[I]f the information is subject to disclosure, it belongs to all.” Nat’l Archives,
541 U.S. at 171–72, 124 S. Ct. at 1580. The district court can only “apply and enforce”
the WPRA, and it does not have the authority “to close public records which [a]re not
statutorily exempt from public disclosure.” Burroughs, 937 P.2d at 15; see also Powder
River Basin Res. Council, 2014 WY 37, ¶ 25, 320 P.3d at 230 (holding the court must order
the custodian to produce the record if it is not statutorily exempt). Entering a protective
order in a public records case is pointless because any member of the public can receive
the same information by filing a request under the WPRA. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-
203(a); Mitchell, 926 N.W.2d at 236. We conclude a district court lacks inherent power,
equitable or otherwise, to issue a protective order to close public records the WPRA itself
does not exempt.

                                              15
[¶34] The district court should have ordered MHCC to allow Ms. Gates to inspect the
insurance carrier settlements, without imposing the protective order or placing any limits
on how those records could be used.

[¶35] Due to the entry of the protective order, the district court never considered whether
portions of the insurance carrier settlements should be redacted to protect personal
information like the names of the parties or the amounts of the settlements. On remand,
the district court may consider whether certain information should be redacted from the
insurance carrier settlements prior to production to Ms. Gates.

                                     CONCLUSION

[¶36] The district court erred when it determined the MB settlement agreement was not
subject to production under the WPRA. The MB settlement is a contract to which a
governmental entity is a party, and it is a document pertaining to the use and disposition of
public funds. It falls under the definition of a public record and is subject to production
under the Act. A district court lacks inherent power, equitable or otherwise, to issue a
protective order to close public records the WPRA itself does not exempt. The district
court erred when it ordered the insurance carrier settlements to be turned over subject to a
protective order. On remand the district court may consider whether sensitive information
should be redacted from the MB settlement and the insurance carrier settlements prior to
production. We reverse and remand.

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