Court Opinion

ID: 9944652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:10:03.135808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:08.753536
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Ponsart v. Arnold, 2024-Ohio-640.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 GEAUGA COUNTY

MICHAEL PONSART, et al.,                          CASE NO. 2023-G-0030

                 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                                  Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                    Court of Common Pleas

CHERYL ARNOLD, et al.,
                                                  Trial Court No. 2021 P 000668
                 Defendants-Appellees.

                                              OPINION

                                     Decided: February 20, 2024
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

Evan T. Byron, Kaufman, Drozdowski & Grendell, LLC, 29525 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite
250, Pepper Pike, OH 44122 (For Plaintiffs-Appellants).

Josephine L. Begin, Manning & Clair, Attorneys at Law, 38040 Euclid Avenue,
Willoughby, OH 44094 (For Defendants-Appellees).

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.

        {¶1}     Appellants, Michael and Sandra Ponsart (the Ponsarts) and Dave and

Sharon Hathy (the Hathys), appeal the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common

Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, Cheryl and Don Arnold and

three companies the two jointly own: Heritage Hills RV Park, LLC, Thompson/Grand River

Valley KOA, LLC, and Heritage Hills Campground, LLC. Appellants claimed that

appellees violated the terms of seasonal contracts for the use of recreational campsites

by disallowing the sale, transfer, or assignment of the rights to the remaining season’s

campsite as a package deal with campsite user’s recreational vehicles currently on site.
Appellants alleged breach of contract and tortious interference with a business

relationship.

         {¶2}   Appellants raise two assignments of error, arguing the trial court erred by

granting summary judgment on their breach of contract claim and tortious interference

with a business relationship claim.

         {¶3}   Having reviewed the record and the applicable caselaw, we find appellants’

assignments of error are without merit. First, the campsite transfer policy was a

nonassignable and unwritten revocable policy. Appellees did not commit a breach by

changing the policy midseason. Second, appellees did not tortiously interfere with a

business relationship because appellants failed to establish that any business relationship

existed. Further, as owners of the campsite, appellees were privileged to limit the transfer,

sale, or assignment of the rights to a campsite.

         {¶4}   Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common

Pleas.

                              Substantive and Procedural History

         {¶5}   Appellees owned a recreational campground in Geauga County. The

campsite had three types of campers: overnight, monthly, and seasonal. Seasonal camp

users paid for the entire camp season: May 1 through October 31. Seasonal camp users

signed a campsite use agreement. The agreement provided:

         This agreement is not a lease. It is a contract which is binding on both the
         campground and the camper. This agreement is not a lease of real estate.
         The camper is not a tenant. This agreement is, for legal purposes, a license
         to use the property of the campground on the conditions which are stated
         in this agreement.

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Seasonal camp users were given the opportunity to make a deposit and reserve the next

year’s site. Any lot not secured by a deposit could be opened to individuals on a waiting

list. Cheryl Arnold testified that the waiting list had approximately 500 people on it. The

Ponsarts and Hathys both became seasonal camp users in 2016. The Hathys began

camping by purchasing an existing recreational vehicle (RV) on site.

      {¶6}   In 2016, the campsite use agreement provided that RVs more than ten

years old would not be accepted unless they were already located on a campsite. The

campsite use agreement also provided that “If your Motorhome or Travel Trailer is

older than the requirement, it cannot be sold and left here at the park. Please

discuss any pending sale with Don if the plans are to leave it at the park. We will

need to meet the new owners and determine if they fit the neighborhood/park. We

have a great group of people and want to keep it that way.” (Bold in original.)

      {¶7}   However, this language was removed from the campsite use agreement for

the 2017 season onward. Additionally, in August 2018, appellees sent a letter to notify

camp users that certain camp sites would no longer be used as seasonal sites. The notice

stated:

      If you are planning to sell your camper in the future * * *. In the above
      sections, you will not be able to sell your lot and camper as a package deal.
      When you leave, your lot will no longer be a seasonal lot. Very important to
      keep in mind and if you have questions, please come ask. This DOES NOT
      affect current seasonals staying on these lots, just the selling of your lot and
      camper when you no longer want to be here.

After receiving this letter, the Hathys chose to move their campsite from one of the

affected sites. Cheryl testified the reason for this change was to afford easier in and out

access to day camp users and because seasonal camping is less profitable.

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       {¶8}   For the 2020 season, the pertinent year for this lawsuit, the RV age

limitation provision made no reference to leaving the RV at the site as a condition of the

sale. In September 2020, appellees sent a notice to formally end the policy of allowing

people to assume a seasonal site and priority for reserving their site in the following year

when a campsite user sold their RV. That notice read:

       Addendum to contract: Due to the high demand and extremely long wait list,
       we have decided to no longer allow the selling of your camper with the lot.
       We feel as though this is unfair to the people who we are placing on the list,
       who already have campers, and want a seasonal spot. If we have the
       information regarding selling your camper prior to the packets being sent
       out on 9/20/2020, you will be allowed to continue with the sale.

       {¶9}   Neither the Ponsarts nor the Hathys had placed their RVs on sale by this

point. However, appellants maintain that due to the long waitlist, “had they listed their

campers/sites for sale * * * it is a virtual certainty that * * * both would have had multiple

offers.” (Brief in Opp. to MSJ, pp. 17-18.).

       {¶10} On November 5, 2021, appellants filed a complaint with counts for breach

of contract, tortious interference with a business relationship, fraud, deceptive trade

practices, and unjust enrichment.

       {¶11} On May 2, 2023, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellants

responded in opposition, and appellees filed a reply. At this time, appellants dismissed

their fraud and deceptive trade practices claims.

       {¶12} On July 27, 2023, the trial court issued an order granting appellees’ motion

for summary judgment. The trial court’s order noted that the salient facts were not in

dispute and concluded appellees ended their “unwritten policy allowing some seasonal

sites to be sold by the respective licensees to applicants.” The court determined

appellants had not identified any “real or prospective buyers prior to the expiration of their
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2020 Contracts” but claimed they would have sold ahead of time had they known about

the policy change.

         {¶13} The trial court concluded the campsite use agreement was a license to use

the property and as such did not provide appellants “a right to sell or transfer their license

to use any campsite. [Appellants] do not identify any language in the Contract to prove

otherwise.” The trial court noted that under R.C. 1335.05, the statute of frauds requires

promises creating an interest in land to be in writing. However, the trial court determined

that regardless of the statute of frauds, the breach of contract claim failed because there

was “no need to perform (i.e., allow a transfer) in absence of a tentative sale during the

[2020] contract term.”

         {¶14} The trial court further concluded that appellees had not tortiously interfered

with a business relationship because appellants did “not even allege, much less prove, to

have had any contracts or relationships with prospective purchasers during the pendency

of any contract. [Appellants’] claim of a potential business relationship or contract is

insufficient to prove the necessary element in support of their claim in this regard.”

         {¶15} Finally, the trial court concluded appellants’ unjust enrichment claim could

not be sustained on the basis of appellants’ maintenance and beautification of their

campsites.

         {¶16} Appellants timely appealed raising two assignments of error. In this

appeal, appellants have not contested the trial court’s dismissal of their unjust enrichment

claim.

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                                        Standard of Review

       {¶17} We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Hapgood v.

Conrad, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2000-T-0058, 2002-Ohio-3363, ¶ 13, citing Cole v. Am.

Industries & Resources Corp., 128 Ohio App.3d 546, 715 N.E.2d 1179 (7th Dist.1998).

“We review the trial court's decision independently and without deference, pursuant to the

standards in Civ.R. 56(C).” Allen v. 5125 Peno, LLC, 2017-Ohio-8941, 101 N.E.3d 484

(11th Dist.), ¶ 6, citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711,

622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993).

       {¶18} Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) no genuine issue as to any

material fact exists; (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving

party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion and it is adverse to the nonmoving

party. Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Ohio St.3d 414, 415, 715 N.E.2d 532 (1999). “The

initial burden is on the moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that no issue

of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the movant meets

this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of

material fact exists for trial. Id.

                                 Assignments of Error and Analysis

       {¶19} Appellants’ assignments of error state:

       {¶20} “[1.] The trial court committed reversible error by granting Appellees’ motion

for summary judgment on Appellants’ breach of contract claim.”

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       {¶21} “[2.] The trial court committed reversible error by granting Appellees’ motion

for summary judgment on Appellants’ tortious interference claim.”

       Breach of Contract:

       {¶22} “To establish a breach of contract claim, a party must demonstrate (1) the

existence of a binding contract or agreement; (2) the non-breaching party performed its

contractual obligations; (3) the breaching party failed to fulfill its contractual obligations

without legal excuse; and (4) the non-breaching party suffered damages as a result of the

breach.” Cafaro-Peachcreek Joint Venture Partnership v. Spanggard, 11th Dist. Trumbull

No. 2022-T-0004, 2022-Ohio-4468, ¶ 28, citing Utz v. Stovall, 11th Dist. Portage No.

2012-P-0135, 2013-Ohio-4299, ¶ 28.

       {¶23} Appellants maintain that the threshold issue in this case is whether the

campsite use agreements are licenses, leases, or some other legal document. Appellants

contend that the campsite use agreement is a lease or, alternatively, an irrevocable hybrid

license. Appellees counter that the distinction between whether the campsite use

agreement was a license or a lease is immaterial because appellees terminated a policy

that was not part of the 2020 campsite use agreement. As the campsite sale policy was

not part of the written 2020 campsite use agreement, appellees contend that they could

not have breached the contract, regardless of whether the campsite use agreement

conferred a lease or a license.

       {¶24} As the contract in question deals with a recreational campsite, this matter is

governed by R.C. chapter 3729 concerning Recreational Vehicle Parks, Recreation

Camps, Combined and Temporary Park-camps. R.C. 3729.12 provides: “Every campsite

use agreement entered into between a camp operator and a campsite user shall be in

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writing, shall contain the name, address, and phone number of the campsite user, and

shall designate the campsite that is the subject of the agreement. The campsite use

agreement also shall contain a description of the procedure for removing property from

the campsite if the campsite user fails to remove all property from the campsite as

required by section 3729.13 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 3729.01(B) defines a “campsite

user” as “a person who enters into a campsite use agreement with a camp operator for

the use of a campsite at a recreational vehicle park, recreation camp, combined park-

camp, or temporary park-camp.”

       {¶25} A license is “‘a personal, revocable, and nonassignable privilege, conferred

either by writing or parol, to do one or more acts upon land without possessing any

interests in the land.’” Varjaski v. Pearch, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 04 MA 235, 2006-Ohio-

5268, ¶ 12, quoting DePugh v. Mead Corp., 79 Ohio App.3d 503, 511, 607 N.E.2d 867

(4th Dist. 1992). A license grants “‘an authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon

another's land, without possessing any estate therein.’” Mosher v. Cook United, Inc., 62

Ohio St.2d 316, 317, 405 N.E.2d 720 (1980), quoting Rodefer v. Pittsburg, O.V. & C.R.

Co., 72 Ohio St. 272, 281, 74 N.E. 183 (1905), citing Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sanford's Chancery

72.

       {¶26} “There are two types of licenses: revocable licenses which are mere

privileges to do an act on the land of another and licenses coupled with interest which are

generally irrevocable.” Varjaski, supra, at ¶ 12, citing Kamenar R.R. Salvage v. Ohio

Edison Co., 79 Ohio App.3d 685, 691, 607 N.E.2d 1108 (3d Dist.1992). “If the parties

intend the agreement to be permanent in nature, the license is said to be coupled with an

interest.” Cambridge Village Condominium Assn. v. Cambridge Condominium Assn., 139

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Ohio App.3d 328, 333, 743 N.E.2d 954 (11th Dist. 2000). “A license coupled with an

interest becomes irrevocable, meaning that it is no longer terminable at the will of the

licensor, and constitutes a right to do the act rather than a mere privilege to do it.” Id. at

333-334, citing Kamenar at 691.

       {¶27} First, the site transfer policy was not a term of the 2020 campsite use

agreement. The language of the campsite use agreement was an agreement to use the

land between May and October of a given year and each year the parties executed a new

campsite use agreement. Further, neither party was obligated to renew the agreement in

subsequent seasons.

       {¶28} The unwritten site transfer policy and the past practices allowing such

transfers do not bind appellees or create a contract right. The language of the agreement

explicitly set forth that the “agreement is not a lease of real estate. The camper is not a

tenant. This agreement is, for legal purposes, a license to use the property of the

campground on the conditions which are stated in this agreement.” Moreover, the

statutory language contained in R.C. Chapter 3729 also supports the conclusion that

campsite use agreements are licenses by referring to a person entering into a campsite

use agreement as a “user.” Thus, the campsite use agreements at issue here were

licenses.

       {¶29} Next, the licenses here were “nonassignable.” See Varjaski, supra, at ¶ 12.

R.C. 3729.12 mandates that a camp operator must maintain a written agreement

containing the name, address, and phone number of the campsite user with all campsite

users on a campsite. Appellants argue that they should have been entitled to sell their

RVs along with the rights to the campsite itself to a third party. However, by law, the seller

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of the RV cannot unilaterally sell the RV along with the rights to its site on a recreation

park. The campsite user wishing to sell an RV on a seasonal campsite cannot execute a

written agreement on behalf of the campsite operator, nor can the campsite user maintain

the new campsite user’s statutorily required contact information. In short, the campsite

user has no ability to sell, transfer, or assign rights to a campsite without the involvement

and participation of the campsite operator.

       {¶30} Appellees’ pre-2017 campsite use agreement reflected this when it

requested that any sales of RVs to remain on the park must be discussed with appellees

and given final approval. The sale of an RV along with the campsite was within the final

discretion of appellees under both the written campsite use agreement and the mandates

of R.C. 3729.12. From 2017 on, the campsite use agreement made no mention of the

policy allowing campsite users to sell their RVs with the rights to the campsite. It does

appear that the policy to allow campsite users to engage in such sales continued at the

discretion of appellees as recently as 2020 under the same seasonal campsite use

agreement at issue here. However, in 2018, appellees notified campsite users that this

policy would no longer apply to certain sections of the camp. This change occurred

midseason and appellees unilaterally implemented the change.

       {¶31} Finally, the unwritten campsite transfer policy was “revocable.” See

Varjaski, supra, at ¶ 12.

       “‘At common law a parol license to be exercised upon the land of another
       creates an interest in the land, is within the statute of frauds, and may be
       revoked by the licensor at any time, no matter whether or not the licensee
       has exercised acts under the license, or expended money in reliance
       thereon. * * * [A] parol license to do an act on the land of the licensor, while
       it justifies anything done by the licensee before revocation, is revocable, at
       the option of the licensor, and this although the intention was to confer a
       continuing right, and money has been expended by the licensee upon the
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         faith of the license. Such license cannot be changed into an equitable right
         on the ground of equitable estoppel.’” (Emphasis in Fling).

Fling v. Daniel, 2019-Ohio-1723, 130 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.), quoting Yeager v.

Tuning, 79 Ohio St. 121, 125-126, 86 N.E. 657 (1908), quoting 31 A.C.

Freeman, American State Reports 715 (1893) (annotation to Lawrence v. Springer, 49

N.J.Eq. 289, 24 A. 933 (1892)).

         {¶32} Here, the campsite sale policy was unwritten and left to the discretion of

appellees. Read in conjunction with the statutory requirements set forth in R.C. Chapter

3729 as discussed above, this policy cannot even be said to have constituted a parol

license to be exercised on the land. This is because any campsite user who wished to

exercise their “rights” under the unwritten campsite sale policy had to do so at appellees’

approval. Thus, although there may have been a policy to conditionally allow the sale of

an RV onsite, there never existed a license to sell, transfer, or assign the right to the

campsite along with the sale of an RV. As such, this policy was completely revocable at

appellees’ discretion. Notwithstanding this, had such a license existed, it would have been

a parol license and thus revocable at the discretion of appellees.

         {¶33} Because the campsite transfer policy was a nonassignable and unwritten

revocable policy, appellees did not breach the written campsite use agreement when they

unilaterally changed the campsite sale policy midseason to deny future RV/campsite

package deal sales. Therefore, appellants cannot establish a breach of the campsite use

agreement and appellees are entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract

claim.

         {¶34} Accordingly, appellants’ first assignment of error is without merit.

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       Tortious Interference:

       {¶35} “Tortious interference with a business relationship is similar to tortious

interference with a contract.” Gentile v. Turkoly, 2017-Ohio-1018, 86 N.E.3d 991, ¶ 24

(7th Dist.). “‘The elements of a tortious interference with a business relationship are (1)

a business relationship, (2) the tortfeasor's knowledge thereof, (3) an intentional

interference causing a breach or termination of the relationship, and, (4) damages

resulting therefrom.’” Redding v. United States Parachute Assn., Inc., 11th Dist. Geauga

No. 2022-G-0024, 2023-Ohio-884, ¶ 38, quoting Diamond Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Dayton

Heidelberg Distrib. Co., 148 Ohio App.3d 596, 2002-Ohio-3932, 774 N.E.2d 775, ¶ 24 (3d

Dist.) “Tortious interference with a business relationship does not require the breach of

contract, rather it is sufficient to prove that a third party does not enter into or continue a

business relationship with the plaintiff.” Gentile, supra, at ¶ 24.

       {¶36} Appellants acknowledge that they did not have any business relationship

with a prospective buyer but contend that this is not fatal to their tortious interference

claim because the campsite had a 500-person waiting list. Appellants also cite two prior

sales earlier in the 2020 camping season in support of their position. Thus, they argue

there was no reason to have a buyer lined up, because they had no reason to believe the

policy would be changed.

       {¶37} This argument fails for two reasons. First, there is no evidence regarding

any individual on the waitlist. While it is possible there were individuals on the waitlist who

did not already own an RV and were willing to purchase one to obtain a campsite, there

is a lack of evidence that any given individual was willing to purchase the Hathy’s or the

Ponsart’s specific RVs on those specific sites. Thus, appellants failed to establish any

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business relationship or appellees’ knowledge and subsequent intentional interference

with it.

           {¶38} Second, this argument fails because appellees were free to assert their own

property interests. “There is no liability for tortious interference with a potential sales

contract where the defendant acts to discourage the prospective contract which he

believes in good faith to impair his legally protected interests.” Carman v. Entner, 2nd

Dist. Montgomery No. 13978, 1994 WL 28633, *7 (Feb. 2, 1994.), citing Bell v. Le-Ge,

Inc., 20 Ohio App.3d 127, 132, 485 N.E.2d 282 (8th Dist.1985). “One is privileged

purposely to cause another not to perform a contract, or enter into, or continue a business

relationship with a third person by in good faith asserting or threatening to protect properly

a legally protected interest of his own which he believes may otherwise be impaired or

destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.” Id. quoting 4 Restatement

of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 773, at 20 (1979).

           {¶39} Appellees owned the campsite and had the privilege to limit the transfer,

sale, or assignment of seasonal campsite use agreements. Appellees’ stated reason for

the policy change was specifically because they felt it was unfair to the 500 people on the

waiting list to require a person wanting to become a seasonal camp user to buy an RV as

a de facto condition precedent to obtaining a seasonal campsite. The campsites

themselves did not belong to the appellants and appellants had no right to compel

appellees to accept an assignment of the seasonal campsite use agreement contract to

any third-party through appellants’ sale of their RVs.

           {¶40} Accordingly, appellants’ second assignment of error is without merit.

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      {¶41} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Geauga County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

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