Court Opinion

ID: 9659803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:54:57.208116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.643794
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority sees the “error” [sic] as “whether appellant was required to object to the prosecutor’s opening statement at some point during his trial to preserve that alleged error for review.” Opinion at 459.1 That point, the majority says, came when the trial judge changed his ruling on admissibility of the confession; then “[i]t was incumbent upon appellant ... to notify the trial judge of the error, by objection or motion for mistrial, so that any harm resulting from the error could be cured,’’ citing Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Opinion at 459.
*460Before concluding that appellant “failed to preserve this error for review,” the majority mentions but a portion of the colloquies assaying the dilemma created by now excluding the confession (i.e., prosecutor’s expression of concern that reversible error was in the case), ibid. It overlooks crucial parts bearing on the issue discussed by both parties and the court of appeals.2
In its PDR the State says:
"... In an effort to be fair to the State, which had relied upon the trial court’s original ruling in mentioning the tape in opening statement, the judge told the appellant not to discuss, during closing argument, why the State failed to offer the tape it had earlier promised to bring the jury. (R. Ill — 302-303.)”
PDR at 4.
In his brief appellant points out that the trial court “expressly ordered defense counsel not to discuss the failure of the State to introduce the confession.” Brief at 12.
In its opinion the court of appeals said much the same and went so far as to quote the court, viz: “The court stated that if appellant ‘does slip and do it, then I’ll open it up.’ ” Peake v. State, 755 S.W.2d 541, at 543 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1988).
In these circumstances, to require appellant somehow “to notify the trial judge of the error ... so that any harm resulting from the error could be cured” ignores the reality that the judge was well aware of the situation presented by his own ruling, and he and parties were then and there grappling with that very “error” in order to find a way to cure it. Neither Zillender v. State, supra, nor Rule 52(a) demand a ritualistic cant precede efforts by a trial judge to find a solution to a problem the court and parties already recognize and acknowledge exists. Moreover, when the trial judge devised a “cure” for the error by directing counsel for appellant not to mention the fact that the State failed to introduce his taped confession to the jury, the court imposed a fait accompli, effectively foreclosing every avenue of contemporaneous protest available to appellant.
For those reasons as well as reasons given below for its decision, I would affirm the judgment of the Houston [1st] Court of Appeals. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins in this opinion.

. Emphasis in original; all other emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.

. The matter came up twice: immediately after the ruling and later just before the charge on guilt/innocence was read to the jury.
When the prosecutor asserted the ruling was incorrect and requested time to research the law because he was "afraid of what would happen on appeal if that cassette does not get in, after my opening statement," III SF 207, and counsel for appellant was interjecting remarks in support of the ruling, the court concluded the exchange, viz:
“We’ll leave it. We’ll take a chance on that. We’re going to move on. We'll move on. We're going to take a chance on that; and the Court’s not going to always be right, either, always be right. Not always going to be right, and I don’t think you would have any problem if there is a finding. I don’t know one way or the other. Leave it.”
In the presence of the jury the State rested. Id., at 208-210.
Later, after appellant and the State adduced additional evidence, the prosecutor broached the subject again, generating another colloquy, viz:
“ [STATE]: I beg the Court’s indulgence. I would like again to reurge the admissibility of the tape or allow the State to research the law even further. I’m confident I could bring the Court even more cases to show that tape is admissible. I’m worried about the consequences of this trial since I mentioned the tape in my opening argument, fully believing that it would be admissible.
* * * * * *
[COURT]: I’ll tell you what I'll do. I'll cure that. I’m not going to do that: but I’ll allow— I’ll require the defense to not make mention of the fact you didn't bring a tape so you won’t get into that situation, since it wasn’t brought. So we'll — that way — I know what you’re saying, It happens sometime. 'Well, they said we’re going to do this and that. Why didn't they? Must be hiding something.’
So I don’t want that happening. If the defense does slip and do it, then III open it up.
[DEFENSE]: Oh, no.
[COURT]: That should be strong enough for them not to get you into that trick bag.
Let’s bring the jury.”
Id., at 302-303