Court Opinion

ID: 9788941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:23:01.877021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:17.891439
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
¶ 13 I agree with the result the court reaches but write separately because I disagree with the court’s criticism and eventual disapproval of the analysis adopted and applied in State v. Magner, 191 Ariz. 392, 956 P.2d 519 (App.1998).
¶ 14 As the majority opinion acknowledges, the validity of the stop was not raised and is not in question. Ante at ¶ 7. Nor have we granted review of any question pertaining to the length of the detention after the stop. There is a difference, of course, between the reasonable suspicion that will justify a brief investigative stop and the circumstances necessary to justify continued detention. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 3.8(B), 231-32 (2d ed.1999); Florida v. Royer, 460 *297U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326-27, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The sole question in the present case is whether the circumstances justified O’Meara’s continued detention. Ante at ¶ 7. The test for this, as the majority acknowledges, is to look at the “whole picture” or “totality of the circumstances.” Id.
¶ 15 I also agree that the totality of the circumstances here created sufficient suspicion of criminal conduct that detention for a reasonable length of time was permissible under both the fourth amendment and article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution. Given the officer’s knowledge of methods employed in the drug trade, the trade-off of cars, drivers, and passengers on two separate occasions at two different market parking lots raised at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. After the initial stop, this suspicion was strengthened by the smell of fabric softener emanating from the trunk of the car. While there are possibly innocent explanations for each of these facts, the totality of the picture they present makes it impossible to conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to suppress.
¶ 16 My disagreement is with the majority’s disapproval of Magner. What else are we to do but first look at the facts and then look at the overall picture they paint? The majority recommends that we look at the totality and ignore the individual circumstances. Indeed, it says that there “is a gestalt to the totality of the circumstances test.” The definition of “gestalt” is a “structure ... so integrated as to constitute a functional unit with properties not derivable from its parts.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 952 (1971).
¶ 17 But the final picture presented to the trial judge and to this court is different from, for example, an impressionist painting. When we view the waterlilies in Monet’s garden at Giverny, the artist’s talent enables us to first see only the finished product; we cannot see the individual strokes that make up the whole without close examination. In contrast, when determining whether the totality of the circumstances creates reasonable suspicion, we cannot evaluate the totality without first ascertaining and examining the facts that create the final picture.
¶ 18 This, indeed, was all the court did in Magner. In its analysis it first considered “The Individual Factors.” Magner, 191 Ariz. at 397-400, 956 P.2d at 524-27. The court then looked at the “Totality of the Circumstances.” Id. at 400, 956 P.2d at 527. This, we are now told by the majority, is just what should not be done. Ante at ¶ 9 (disapproving of the Magner approach). Instead, we look “at the whole picture to evaluate the totality of the circumstances.” But we cannot look at the whole picture until we have first painted it.
¶ 19 If the court means by its disapproval of Magner to invite affirmance of investigative stops and detention, disregarding any consideration of the innocent probabilities of the individual facts relied on by the police officer, then we should all fear the “gestalt” that will be created.
¶20 But of course the majority has no intention of approving such methods. Hence, my puzzlement is with the disapproval of Magner. As the majority in Magner stated, its “analysis clearly [showed that it had] performed a de novo review of the same circumstances as were before the trial court, and reviewed them as a whole. [They] simply disagree[d] ... that these circumstances, taken together, comprisefd] reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 401, 956 P.2d at 528 (emphasis added). The majority disapproves of this method but fails to tell us how else to conduct a review. How can we look at the result without first looking at the facts?
¶ 21 Unable to understand the majority’s approach, I simply concur in the result.
CONCURRING: THOMAS A. ZLAKET, Chief Justice.