Court Opinion

ID: 9418114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:09:13.741811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.855085
License: Public Domain

Mb. Justice Brewer
dissenting: I dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case, and, without noticing other objections, I rest that dissent upon this single ground: On June 17, 1905, the Burlington Railway Company made a contract with the petitioner, the Armour Packing Company, for the transportation of certain products from Kansas City, Kansas, to New York, this contract to remain in force until December 31, 1905. No objection is made to the reasonableness of .this contract or the rates named. The time during which it was to run was brief, less than seven months, and but for the legislation of Congress there would be no question of its validity, or that it could be enforced without subjecting either party thereto to any liability, civil or criminal. On August 6 the Burlington Company and its connecting carriers filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission an amendment to their tariffs, which was duly posted and published, and by which the rate from Kansas City, Kansas, to New York was increased.
On August 17,1905, the Armour Packing Company delivered *87to the Burlington Company, under its contract, sixty-seven tierces of oleo oil for transportation to New York. The railway-company accepted the shipment, issued á through bill of lading and received pay upon the basis of the rates fixed by the contract of June 17. Now, because the packing company insisted upon compliance by the railway company with its contract of transportation — andHhe railway company (recognizing the binding force of the contract) accepted the transportation and received payment at the rates named therein — the packing company is adjudged a criminal and fined the sum of $15,000.
I want to emphasize this matter. The railway company and the packing company entered into a fair and reasonable contract for transportation. Independently of the statute, it was valid in all respects, and could have been enforced by. the packing company against the railway company, but according to the ruling of the court the railway company was authorized arbitrarily to break the contract, raise the amount to be paid for transportation — thus unsettling the business of the shipper, even-it may be to the extent of wholly destroying it. Sustaining under those circumstances the power of' the carrier and punishing the shipper shocks my sense of justice, and I cannot impute to Congress an intent by its legislation to make possible such a result.
It has been one of the boasts of our jurisprudence that it upholds the sacredness of contracts. By constitutional provision a State is estopped from passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract, and again and again has this court stricken down legislation having such effect. While there is no such restriction upon the power of Congress, yet Congress has in this case broken no contract. It has simply, as held by the court, given permission to a carrier, arbitrarily and without inquiry or decision by any tribunal, to repudiate its contract.
Again, we have held that in “enacting the statutes establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission the purpose of Congress was to facilitate and promote commerce.” Texas & Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. *88197, 198. But to deny to parties the power of agreeing upon rates of transportation for a reasonable time tends to destroy and not promote commerce. One of the conditions of successful business — one of the things which induces new industries— is the ability to provide in advance for certainty of expenditures, including among them the cost of transportation. Who will engage in any new enterprise or invest money in a manufacturing industry when he knows that he cannot make a definite contract for rates of transportation to and from his factory, but is advised that whatever contract he makes may, at the whim of the carrier, upon ten days’ notice, be set aside and a higher rate imposed?
Further, it seems to be implied that Congress has given express authority to the carrier to raise, its rates, but this is not so. The single provision is that it shall not raise'its rates without giving ten days’ notice. It is a limitation upon power instead of a grant of authority.'
It may be said that the remedy of the shipper is to pay the increased rates and then sue the carrier for the excess, ‘But upon what ground can such an action be maintained? If the contract is no longer valid, if it has been destroyed by the mere action of the carrier in publishing a new tariff, and the rates of the latter are in themselves reasonable, although in excess of the contract provisions, how can a shipper recover damages? The contract is gone, has ceased to be valid, the new rates are reasonable, and thé shipper must abide by the consequences of the arbitrary act of the carrier.
But, it may be said, thtft prescribing the limitation of ten days’ notice of an increase in rates is an implied authority to the carrier to make such a raise, providing the new rates are reasonable. To my mind it seems more in accordance with the spirit and purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act to hold that, there being no express authority given to raise rates, the fact that the railway company has made a contract to operate for a reasonable time should be construed as an inhibition upon its right to make such a raise, and that the rates as fixed by its *89contract should continue for all shippers until the termination of. the period named therein.
Obviously, from the tone of the opinion of the court the wrong done to the shipper is recognized, and the. argument is only that the responsibility for the wrong rests upon Congress. In other words, the court has unloaded upon Congress the injustice which the construction placed by it upon the statute accomplishes. To my mind a better way would be to enforce the contract and thus secure justice in this case, leaving to Congress the enactment of additional legislation, if deemed necessary, to prevent the possibilities of secret arrangements between carrier and shipper..
I am authorized to say that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Peckham concur in this dissent. They are also of the opinion that the trial court, the District Court of the Western District of Missouri, had no jurisdiction of the alleged offense, but that such jurisdiction was vested in the District Court of Kansas, holding that when goods are delivered to the carrier, and the shipper has solicited', accepted or received any rebate, concession or discrimination from such' carrier, “in respect to the transportation” of the goods, the crime is then complete, at least so far as regards the shipper, and it cannot be made a continuing crime in each district through which the goods pass in their transportation. The Constitution has made provision for the venue of criminal actions or prosecutions, and their nature cannot he altered by legislative enactment, so as to embrace the whole country in one vast district. A provision in a statute of this nature by which it is possible to find an indictment and to have a trial at the most remote point from the actual commission of the offense, ought not to be approved as a compliance with the Constitution.