Court Opinion

ID: 9940558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:01:08.043506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:03.125486
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13901    Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 02/14/2024   Page: 1 of 17

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13901
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        EBONIE CARLISLE,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        RHODES & RHODES FAMILY DENTISTRY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                      D.C. Docket No. 7:20-cv-01895-LSC
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13901        Document: 29-1        Date Filed: 02/14/2024     Page: 2 of 17

        2                        Opinion of the Court                    22-13901

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               Rhodes & Rhodes Family Dentistry (“R&R”) fired Ebonie
        Carlisle, a dental hygienist. R&R says it fired Carlisle because she
        refused to help with patients, was insubordinate, and behaved
        combatively. Carlisle sued R&R, claiming, among other things,
        race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
        Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3, and
        42 U.S.C. § 1981. R&R then moved for summary judgment, which
        the district court granted. Carlisle appeals, arguing that the district
        court erred in granting summary judgment on her claims of race
        discrimination and retaliation. After review, we affirm the district
        court’s decision.
                                    I.      Background
              R&R, a dental practice owned by sisters Dr. Melinda Rhodes
        King and Dr. Belinda Rhodes King,1 employed Carlisle as a dental
        hygienist. All three women are black. Along with Carlisle, R&R
        employed Tracy Robinson, Deena Ross, and Heather Tinker as
        dental hygienists. Robinson is black, while Ross and Tinker are
        white. Anna Marie Smith and Larrin Durrett, both white, also
        worked at R&R. And Lindsey Herd, who is white, supervised all
        employees as the office manager.

        1 Because Dr. Melinda and Dr. Belinda share the same last name, we refer to

        them by their first names throughout this opinion.
USCA11 Case: 22-13901      Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 02/14/2024     Page: 3 of 17

        22-13901               Opinion of the Court                         3

               According to the R&R Employee Handbook, all R&R
        employees are employed on an at-will basis. The Handbook
        explains that “[i]f at any time it is determined that [an employee’s]
        continued employment is not beneficial to the group,
        Management, in its sole discretion, has the right to dismiss [the
        employee].” The Handbook also provides that disciplinary action
        “may take the form of a verbal warning, written warning,
        suspension without pay, or discharge,” and the discipline for an
        employee’s failure to abide by its procedures could “range from
        oral correction to termination.”
               Generally, R&R dental hygienists control their patient
        volume. For example, Carlisle treated 6 to 8 patients a day because
        she used an hour-long appointment block to treat each patient.
        Tinker treated 12 to 16 patients a day because she treated a patient
        every 30 minutes. Ross treated patients every 15 to 20 minutes.
        Because Tinker and Ross treated more patients, they were assigned
        an assistant to help them.
               While employed at R&R, Carlisle received three employee
        evaluations. In 2013, Carlisle scored 13’s and 14’s (out of 15) across
        the board on her feedback. The comments section reads, “Work[s]
        well with others and interact[s] with patients in a professional &
        friendly manner. Always willing to learn new things.”
               In 2017, in her second evaluation, she scored mostly 13’s,
        14’s, and 15’s. While technically exceeding expectations, she
        scored a 12/15 on Statement 15, which evaluates whether an
        employee “[i]nteracts with co-workers and patients in a courteous,
USCA11 Case: 22-13901     Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 02/14/2024    Page: 4 of 17

        4                     Opinion of the Court                22-13901

        tactful and professional manner.” The comments section reads,
        “Continue to treat team members in a professional manner and
        display exceptional teamwork and unity.”
               In her third and final employee evaluation, in April 2019,
        Carlisle again scored lowest (12/15) on Statement 15, which was
        circled. Under the comments section, the evaluation reads: “It’s a
        joy to have you on our team! We all love your joyful personality,
        just try to be less playful, more courteous to Lindsey [Herd]
        because temps/patients might not understand your two’s
        relationship.” Carlisle says she understood that R&R was
        concerned about her conduct toward Herd.
               Dr. Melinda explained in her deposition testimony that
        Carlisle and Herd would speak to each other in an “unprofessional”
        manner. According to Carlisle, she and Herd “played.” For
        example, they would “pinch” each other on the “bottom” or touch
        each other’s breasts in the hallways. Robinson testified during her
        deposition that “everybody” but her behaved like that at work.
              In her deposition testimony, Dr. Melinda also explained that
        they “[were not] hard on [employee] evaluations” because
        employees are “like . . . family.” Dr. Melinda added that Carlisle
        “has been talked to on occasions,” even though there are no
        written records of these talks or warnings.
               For example, in May 2018, Carlisle was part of an incident
        with Durrett. According to Carlisle, Durrett hit Carlisle’s knee
        while opening a drawer. Carlisle responded by bending down and
        telling Durrett that she “would punch her in the face” next time
USCA11 Case: 22-13901      Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 02/14/2024     Page: 5 of 17

        22-13901               Opinion of the Court                        5

        she did that without saying “[e]xcuse me.” Durrett, Carlisle, and
        Herd met to discuss the incident. Carlisle admitted that she does
        not have any evidence that the way Herd managed the situation
        was due to race. But Carlisle felt like she was discriminated against
        because she did not think R&R handled the situation properly.
               Then, in June 2019, an incident arose in which Carlisle
        refused to help a coworker. At 11:50 a.m., Smith asked Carlisle to
        help with Ross’s patient, and Carlisle declined because she had not
        finished treating her own patient. Carlisle finished with her patient
        at 11:55 a.m. and spent “around five minutes” cleaning her room
        and setting up for her 1:00 p.m. patient. At noon, Carlisle took her
        lunch break. Meanwhile, Ross worked through lunch.
              Toward the end of July 2019, Carlisle received an
        appreciation card from R&R. The card was filled with kind
        comments from everyone in the office.
                On July 31, 2019, Herd called a team meeting to address a
        lack of teamwork among the hygienists. During the meeting, Herd
        criticized Carlisle for not helping other employees. Carlisle turned
        to Tinker and Ross, confronting them about whether they said she
        never helped them. Both denied saying so. Carlisle says the
        incident was racially motivated because she was “pulled . . . into a
        conversation that didn’t have anything to do with [her]” and she
        perceived that she was being picked on.
              On August 1, 2019, the day Carlisle was terminated, she met
        with Dr. Melinda. Carlisle explained that she did not help her
        coworkers because they did not help her. She complained that the
USCA11 Case: 22-13901       Document: 29-1       Date Filed: 02/14/2024      Page: 6 of 17

        6                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13901

        two white dental hygienists, Ross and Tinker, received the help of
        an assistant while the two black dental hygienists, she and
        Robinson, did not. Dr. Melinda stated in her deposition that she
        understood that Carlisle’s complaint was based on a race issue.2
               Later that day, Carlisle, Dr. Melinda, and Herd met in Herd’s
        office. Carlisle brought up the team meeting from the day before,
        saying she asked four more coworkers whether they thought she
        would not help out at work. According to Carlisle, the four
        coworkers never said she did not help. Herd responded that
        employees are scared to admit it because they feared Carlisle
        would “beat them up.”
               During the meeting, Dr. Melinda, Herd, and Carlisle also
        discussed the May 2018 incident with Durrett.               Carlisle
        demonstrated what unfolded between her and Durrett. Dr.
        Melinda explained during her deposition testimony that Carlisle’s
        “tone and . . . body language [were] very hostile.” Dr. Melinda
        says Carlisle was “heated,” “invad[ed] [Herd’s] personal space,” and
        was “very, very expressive and belligerent.” Dr. Melinda told
        Carlisle that she was acting disrespectfully toward Heard. Carlisle
        concedes that she and Herd raised their voices.
             Herd told Carlisle that she “could have fired [her]” after the
        May 2018 incident with Durrett and “should fire [her] now[.]”

        2 Prior to August 1, 2019, Carlisle did not complain to Dr. Melinda or Dr.

        Belinda about race discrimination at work. And she does not recall
        complaining to Herd about race discrimination, either.
USCA11 Case: 22-13901        Document: 29-1        Date Filed: 02/14/2024       Page: 7 of 17

        22-13901                 Opinion of the Court                              7

        Dr. Melinda said she had to agree with Herd’s decision. Dr.
        Belinda arrived and said they “need[ed] to discuss [it] first.” Dr.
        Melinda sent Carlisle home for the rest of the day.
               Around 5:30 p.m., Dr. Melinda, Dr. Belinda, and Herd called
        Carlisle to tell her she was fired. Carlisle was told that she was
        terminated “because she failed to assist with patients, was
        insubordinate, and displayed hostile behavior.”
               Carlisle, in her deposition, testified she has no evidence that
        Dr. Melinda and Dr. Belinda were motivated by race when they
        fired her. But Carlisle felt that she was discriminated against
        because, in her view, R&R handled the situation improperly.
               Carlisle sued R&R alleging race discrimination based on
        disparate treatment, race discrimination based on discriminatory
        discharge, and retaliation in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
        § 1981. R&R moved for summary judgment.
                The district court granted R&R’s motion for summary
        judgment. As to Carlisle’s claims under Title VII, the court found
        that Carlisle failed to demonstrate that R&R employed 15 or more
        employees, and thus did not prove Title VII applied. 3 But the court
        still analyzed the merits of all Carlisle’s claims.

        3 Title VII’s proscriptions against unlawful employment practices apply only

        to entities that have “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
        of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”
        42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
USCA11 Case: 22-13901         Document: 29-1         Date Filed: 02/14/2024         Page: 8 of 17

        8                          Opinion of the Court                       22-13901

                The court concluded that Carlisle failed to establish a prima
        facie case for disparate treatment but that she met her initial burden
        of establishing a prima facie case for the discriminatory discharge
        and retaliation claims. The court then acknowledged, as Carlisle
        conceded,         that    R&R      “satisﬁed     its   burden       to
        articulate . . . legitimate non-discriminatory reason[s]” for ﬁring
        Carlisle. But, the court explained, Carlisle did not satisfy her
        burden of establishing that the proﬀered reasons were pretextual
        and that the real reason was unlawful discrimination. As a result,
        the court concluded that Carlisle “failed to provide ‘suﬃcient
        evidence of racial discrimination to create a triable factual
        dispute.’” (quoting Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d
        1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015)). The district court thus granted R&R’s
        motion for summary judgment. 4
                Carlisle timely appealed.

        4 In its pretext discussion, the district court also noted that “by showing other

        employees outside the protected class engaged in similar acts and were not
        similarly treated, Plaintiﬀ has indirectly shown that [R&R’s] proﬀered reason
        is possibly unworthy of credence.” Pointing to this line, Carlisle moved to
        alter, amend, or vacate the judgment under Rule 59. She asserted that the
        court’s acknowledgment to this point suggested that “a reasonable juror could
        possibly ﬁnd the reasons unworthy of credence,” thereby establishing a
        genuine issue of material fact. (emphasis in original).
        The district court denied Carlisle’s motion, explaining that the statement “was
        mistakenly included in the Court’s discussion of pretext and should be
        stricken.” It concluded that it found “no manifest errors of law or fact that
        would justify vacating its previous decision.” Because the statement was
        stricken from the record, any reliance on it by Carlisle lacks merit.
USCA11 Case: 22-13901         Document: 29-1         Date Filed: 02/14/2024         Page: 9 of 17

        22-13901                   Opinion of the Court                                9

                                       II.     Discussion
               Carlisle argues that the district court erred in granting
        summary judgment on her claims for several reasons. The sole
        issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting
        summary judgment to R&R as to Carlisle’s retaliation and
        discriminatory discharge claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by finding
        that Carlisle failed to demonstrate pretext. 5
              After review, we agree that Carlisle has failed to show
        pretext. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment for R&R.
               We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment. Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th
        Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
        shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
        the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 56(a). “Although all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in

        5 Carlisle has abandoned any challenge to the denial of her claims under Title

        VII because she failed to challenge the district court’s conclusion that she did
        not establish Title VII’s numerosity requirement. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
        Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (“To obtain reversal of a
        district court judgment that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an
        appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the judgment against
        him is incorrect. When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one
        of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, [s]he is deemed
        to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the
        judgment is due to be affirmed.”). Similarly, she has abandoned any challenge
        to the denial of her disparate treatment claim under § 1981 by failing to address
        it in her brief. Id. at 681.
USCA11 Case: 22-13901        Document: 29-1         Date Filed: 02/14/2024     Page: 10 of 17

        10                         Opinion of the Court                  22-13901

        favor of the nonmoving party, inferences based upon speculation
        are not reasonable.” Kernel Records Oy, 694 F.3d at 1301 (quotations
        omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
        of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence
        on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”
        Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Before
        granting summary judgment to a party, “[a] court must decide
        whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
        submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
        must prevail as a matter of law.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co.,
        357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted).
               Section 1981 prohibits intentional race discrimination in the
        enforcement of public and private contracts, including
        employment contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Johnson v. Ry. Express
        Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975). Such race discrimination
        includes retaliation. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 451
        (2008). It also includes discriminatory discharge. Civil Rights Act
        of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071.
              Section 1981 discrimination claims that rely on
        circumstantial evidence are evaluated under the McDonnell
        Douglas6 burden-shifting framework. Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate
        Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 2012). 7 Under

        6 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

        7 Claims of   race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are
        evaluated using the same analytical framework. See Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft.
        Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 843 (11th Cir. 2000)
USCA11 Case: 22-13901     Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 02/14/2024     Page: 11 of 17

        22-13901               Opinion of the Court                        11

        McDonnell Douglas, the employee bears the initial burden to
        establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.
        McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If an
        employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
        employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
        reason” for its actions. Id. The employee then bears the burden to
        show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for unlawful
        discrimination. Id. at 802–04.
               Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, we need not
        address whether Carlisle established prima facie cases of retaliation
        and discriminatory discharge. Although R&R disputes whether
        Carlisle met her prima facie burden for the retaliation claim,
        assuming arguendo that she did, the district court correctly
        concluded that both of Carlisle’s claims failed at step three for lack
        of pretext. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515
        (1993). The parties agree that R&R proffered a legitimate,
        nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Thus, this opinion
        focuses solely on whether Carlisle proved pretext.
                A plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that the
        defendant’s proffered reason is so weak, implausible, inconsistent,
        incoherent, or contradictory “that a reasonable factfinder could
        find [the reason] unworthy of credence.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs.,
        Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). A
        plaintiff can also prove pretext by showing “both that the
        [proffered] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real
        reason” for the adverse action. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at
USCA11 Case: 22-13901      Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 02/14/2024      Page: 12 of 17

        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13901

        515. The plaintiff cannot merely make conclusory allegations and
        assertions. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009).
                “[W]e have repeatedly and emphatically held” that
        employers may fire an employee for “a good reason, a bad reason,
        a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as
        its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Flowers, 803 F.3d at
        1338 (quotations omitted). Therefore, even if a plaintiff’s evidence
        supports an inference that the proffered reason is “pretext of
        something,” summary judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff does
        not produce evidence that the reason was pretext for unlawful
        discrimination. Id. at 1337–38. Finally, an employer’s honest belief
        that the employee violated its policies can constitute a legitimate
        reason for termination, even if such a belief may have been
        mistaken or wrong. See Smith v. PAPP Clinic, P.A., 808 F.2d 1449,
        1452–53 (11th Cir. 1987).
               In addition, to prevail on § 1981 claims, a plaintiff is required
        to show “that, but for race, [she] would not have suffered the loss of
        a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-
        Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014, 1019 (2020) (emphasis added);
        Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2021).
               Carlisle claims that she demonstrated pretext by suﬃciently
        rebutting the accusations that she engaged in combative,
USCA11 Case: 22-13901         Document: 29-1          Date Filed: 02/14/2024          Page: 13 of 17

        22-13901                    Opinion of the Court                                 13

        insubordinate behavior and that she refused to help her
        coworkers.8
               We agree with R&R for three reasons. First, Carlisle failed
        to show pretext because she cannot prove (1) that the proffered
        reasons for termination were false, and (2) “that discrimination was
        the real reason” for Carlisle’s termination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr,

        8 Carlisle asserts that she proved pretext for two more reasons that are easily

        discarded. First, she says she proved pretext by arguing that R&R did not
        follow its own disciplinary policies. She is correct that a plaintiﬀ can prove
        pretext by “establishing that the employer has failed to clearly articulate and
        follow its formal policies.” Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1186. But her conclusory
        allegation alone is not enough to survive summary judgment. Bryant, 575 F.3d
        at 1308.
        Second, Carlisle argues that she presented evidence of pretext by
        demonstrating the suspicious timing of her termination following her
        complaint of racial discrimination on August 1. But to the extent that Carlisle
        made this argument before the district court, she only raised it in terms of
        establishing a prima facie case for retaliation—not in terms of establishing
        pretext. Because Carlisle did not raise a temporal proximity theory to support
        her argument for pretext before the district court, we need not consider it now.
        Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004); see also
        Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Inst. of London Underwriters, 267 F.3d 1303, 1308 n.1
        (11th Cir. 2001). And even if we were to address the merits, we have held that
        “[w]hile close temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the
        adverse employment action can establish pretext when coupled with other
        evidence, temporal proximity alone is insufficient.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of
        Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1138 n.15 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). In addition, “the
        intervening discovery of employee misconduct can sever the causal inference
        created by close temporal proximity.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84
        F.4th 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2023). Carlisle’s temporal proximity argument
        therefore fails because she has not provided any other evidence of pretext, and
        evidence of her combative and hostile misconduct severs any causal inference.
USCA11 Case: 22-13901      Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 02/14/2024     Page: 14 of 17

        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13901

        509 U.S. at 515. While Carlisle disputes being combative or
        insubordinate, her assertions do not refute that R&R held an
        honest belief that she engaged in insubordinate and hostile
        behavior. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1471
        (11th Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiff’s pretext argument failed because
        he “offered no probative evidence to challenge” defendant’s
        asserted belief in allegations); see Smith, 808 F.2d at 1452–53. As the
        district court noted, the record reflects that R&R was concerned
        about Carlisle’s behavior “in the year and three months” before her
        termination. In May 2018, Carlisle threatened to punch Durrett in
        the face. Then, in April 2019, her performance evaluation
        instructed her to be more courteous to Herd, and Carlisle
        acknowledged that, as of this date, she knew that R&R was
        concerned about her behavior toward Herd. On August 1, 2019,
        Carlisle got into a heated argument with Herd in which they
        “scream[ed] at one another.” Although Carlisle asserts that she
        “felt” that the decision to terminate her was racially motivated, she
        readily admitted throughout her deposition that she had no
        evidence to support her claim that her termination was racially
        motivated. Carlisle’s conclusory allegations that R&R’s decision to
        terminate her was based on her race are not enough to survive
        summary judgment. Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1308. Thus, she failed to
        prove that R&R’s stated reasons for her termination were false and
        that the real reason was unlawful racial discrimination. Second, for
        the same reasons, Carlisle has failed to show that R&R’s proffered
        justifications for firing her—that she was insubordinate and
        hostile—were “so weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or
USCA11 Case: 22-13901        Document: 29-1        Date Filed: 02/14/2024         Page: 15 of 17

        22-13901                  Opinion of the Court                              15

        contradictory that a reasonable factfinder could find the reason
        unworthy of credence.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265. Third and finally,
        Carlisle failed to show that race was a “but-for” cause of her
        termination. Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014, 1019; Ziyadat, 3 F.4th
        at 1297. She also failed to show that “but-for” her statutorily
        protected conduct—complaining to Dr. Melinda on August 1—she
        would not have been fired. Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014, 1019;
        Ziyadat, 3 F.4th at 1297. Thus, Carlisle cannot prevail on her § 1981
        claims.9
               Carlisle resists this conclusion for three reasons. First, she
        argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether
        she refused to help with patients—one of the stated reasons for her
        termination. But, as R&R points out, the district court did not rest
        its opinion on whether Carlisle refused to see patients. Rather, the
        court addressed her insubordination and hostile behavior—
        behaviors suﬃcient to justify her termination.
              Second, Carlisle argues that her firing was pretextual
        because it conflicted with outdated performance evaluations and
        an appreciation card. But her three reviews occurred before her

        9 Also on appeal, Carlisle argues that she established a “convincing mosaic” of

        circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory conduct. The convincing-
        mosaic framework is an evidentiary approach in which “an employe may
        prove [discrimination] with any circumstantial evidence that creates a
        reasonable inference of [discriminatory] intent.” Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310;
        Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1335. For the reasons explained above, Carlisle’s
        circumstantial evidence does not raise a reasonable inference of
        discriminatory discharge or retaliation.
USCA11 Case: 22-13901        Document: 29-1         Date Filed: 02/14/2024         Page: 16 of 17

        16                         Opinion of the Court                       22-13901

        final altercations with Herd and therefore do not reflect R&R’s
        opinion of her in the final days of her employment. Still, her
        performance evaluations and the appreciation card are not
        inconsistent with her firing. In her April 2019 evaluation—the only
        evaluation that occurred after the 2018 incident with Durrett—
        Carlisle was explicitly instructed to be more courteous to Herd. As
        already mentioned, Carlisle acknowledged that she knew that R&R
        was concerned about her behavior toward Herd. On her 2017 and
        2019 evaluations, she scored lowest on Statement 15: “Interacts
        with co-workers and patients in a courteous, tactful and
        professional manner.” And although the appreciation card does
        not indicate any combative or insubordinate behavior on Carlisle’s
        part, it makes sense that fellow employees would not criticize
        Carlisle in an appreciation card.
               Third, Carlisle argues that other coworkers got into
        disagreements with Herd and were not fired. 10 But the evidence
        does not reflect that any other employee threatened a coworker
        with physical violence, nor does it reflect that any other employee

        10 Carlisle also argues that she and Durrett were treated differently, evidencing

        racism. But the record refutes her argument. First, the record shows that
        Herd treated Carlisle and Durrett equally when she conferenced with them
        after the May 2018 incident. Carlisle admits she does not have any evidence
        that the way Herd managed the situation was due to race. Second, there is no
        record evidence that Durrett engaged in combative or hostile behavior like
        Carlisle did.
USCA11 Case: 22-13901        Document: 29-1        Date Filed: 02/14/2024        Page: 17 of 17

        22-13901                  Opinion of the Court                              17

        screamed at Herd and invaded her personal space. 11                     Thus,
        Carlisle’s counterarguments fall short.
                                      III.    Conclusion
                Accordingly, for the above reasons, the district court did not
        err in granting summary judgment to R&R on Carlisle’s retaliation
        and discriminatory discharge claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
               AFFIRMED.

        11 Carlisle says she was provoked into bringing up the 2018 incident with

        Durrett during the August 1 meeting in Herd’s oﬃce, during which she
        screamed at Herd and invaded her personal space. But even if Carlisle was
        “provoked,” that fact is irrelevant because it does not aid Carlisle in meeting
        her burden to establish that R&R’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
        her termination were a pretext for unlawful racial discrimination.