Court Opinion

ID: 88265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:35+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:29.039915
License: Public Domain

77 U.S. 334 (1870)
10 Wall. 334
THE FARRAGUT.
Supreme Court of United States.

*335 Mr. Laurence Proudfoot, for the appellant.
Mr. Trumbull, contra.
*337 Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
The District and Circuit Courts were both satisfied that the evidence in the case fully supported the defence, and this court concurs in that conclusion, unless the position strenuously insisted on here by the appellants' counsel can be maintained, to wit, that the absence of a special look-out is evidence of negligence, which renders the owners of the steamer primâ facie liable.
It is undoubtedly true that the absence of a special look-out would, in many cases, perhaps in most cases, be regarded as evidence of great negligence. The last rule prescribed *338 by Congress by the act of April 29, 1864,[*] declares that "nothing in these rules shall exonerate any ship, or the owner, or master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper look-out," &c.; thus intimating that "a proper look-out" is one of the ordinary precautions which a careful navigation involves. But it would be against all reason to contend that the master or owners of a vessel should be made liable for the consequences of an accident by reason of not having a special look-out where the collision or loss could not have been guarded against by a look-out, or where it is clear that the absence of a look-out had nothing to do in causing it. Suppose that a sunken rock, dropped from a cargo of quarried stone, and unknown to the navigators of the channel, were the cause of the accident, could the presence of a look-out have the least tendency to guard against it? A hundred such instances might be suggested where the presence or absence of a look-out would have no influence whatever on the happening of the catastrophe. We are not to shut our eyes and to accept blindly an artificial rule which is to determine, in all cases, whether the navigator is liable to the charge of negligence in causing any loss or damage that may happen. A look-out is only one of the many precautions which a prudent navigator ought to provide; but it is not indispensable where, from the circumstances of the case, a look-out could not possibly be of any service. The object of a look-out is to discover dangers that are unknown, the advance of an approaching vessel, the appearance of a light on the coast, the discovery of a dangerous object, and many other things, the existence and presence of which could not be so easily and quickly known to the pilot as to a person whose sole business it was to make and communicate such discoveries. The cases referred to, taken in connection with the particular circumstances of each, cannot receive a different interpretation.
In the case before us no look-out could have been of any *339 possible advantage. No look-out would have ventured, or presumed, to interfere with the captain, who had the helm at the time. It would probably have been rather an interference and a hindrance to the safe management of the boat for any third person in such an exigency to have diverted his attention. The obstacle was there in plain sight. Its position was better known to the captain than to any other person. No look-out could have aided him in the emergency. But, if a look-out were needed, we have the evidence of the mate that he was on the hurricane-deck watching the course of the steamer at the time; and, had it been possible for any look-out to have been of any service, he would have rendered it. Clark, the captain of the canal-boat, was also on the watch as well as Nolte, the ship's carpenter, and one of the owners of the steamer. It is perfectly evident that the absence of a special look-out had nothing at all to do with the happening of the accident, and therefore it can have nothing to do with fixing the liability of the parties.
It is also evident that the loss was occasioned by the violence of the cross-current, which was due to the great height of water prevailing at the time, and was therefore the result of one of the ordinary dangers of river navigation.
DECREE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.
NOTES
[*]  13 Stat. at Large, 61.