Court Opinion

ID: 9862521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:17:44.231166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:43.082849
License: Public Domain

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, Acting P. J., Concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. I agree that the mother in this case is not a proper party in a *66habeas corpus proceeding initiated by the father to determine whether he received effective representation of counsel. And I agree that the mother is not aggrieved, as that term is used in the law, by the outcome of the proceeding. I therefore agree with the majority’s conclusion that the mother does not have standing to pursue an appealfrom the trial court’s order in the habeas corpus proceeding, and that her appeal must accordingly be dismissed.
I write separately to expand upon the discussion of a. point made in the majority opinion, that the rules governing habeas corpus, because they were developed in the context of criminal law, “ ‘do not fit the dependency context well.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 53.) The use of habeas corpus in dependency cases to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is a relatively recent development in the law. (See In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 722].) However, such claims are being brought before us with increasing regularity. I therefore believe it is worthwhile, and perhaps would be helpful to practitioners in the dependency field, and to the family members they represent, to attempt to articulate some general guidelines for the use of the habeas corpus writ proceeding to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency case.
It is now well established that indigent parents whose children are the subject of dependency proceedings and may be placed out of the home have a statutory, and in some cases a due process, right to appointed counsel. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(h)(1)(B); In re Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1659 (Kristin H.).) A parent who has a right to appointed counsel is entitled to competent counsel; otherwise “ ‘it will be a hollow right.’ [Citations.]” (Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1659.) Indeed California law expressly provides that “[a]ll parties who are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent counsel.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317.5, subd. (a).)
In Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, we found that this statutory right to counsel “must include the right to seek review of claims of incompetence of counsel.” (Id. at p. 1662.) We further found in Kristin H. that review of claims of incompetence of counsel in dependency proceedings can be sought through a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at p. 1667.) As in the criminal context, a petitioner must meet a two-part test: petitioner must show that “counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys practicing in the field of juvenile dependency law” and must also “establish that the claimed error was prejudicial.” (Id. at pp. 1667-1668.) The test for prejudice is whether it is “ ‘reasonably probable’ ” that a more favorable result would have occurred in the absence of counsel’s alleged failings. (Ibid.; see People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
*67The circumstances of a habeas corpus petitioner in a dependency setting are somewhat different from those of a criminal defendant, who is generally seeking release from confinement. In the criminal context, the parties are well defined. The petition alleges that the petitioner is unlawfully “imprisoned or restrained” and names the person or entity who is the custodian of his or her confinement. (Pen. Code, § 1474.) The custodian of petitioner’s confinement files the written response, or “return,” setting forth the legal basis for the restraint. (Pen. Code, § 1480.) In a dependency proceeding, on the other hand, although the underlying dependency petition may contain allegations of criminal activity, the proceedings are civil in nature. (In re Charles T. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 869, 875 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 868].) There is no prosecution by the state, or resulting confinement or restraint on liberty similar to the criminal context. In addition, the dependency proceeding involves an entire family, whose interests are both diverse and intertwined.
As the majority points out, habeas corpus has been used historically in civil proceedings involving child custody disputes, such as those between parents in a divorce proceeding (In re Barr (1952) 39 Cal.2d 25 [243 P.2d 787]; In re Macedo (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 276 [257 P.2d 743]), between a parent and a guardian (In re Lukasik (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 438 [239 P.2d 492]), or between a birth parent and adoptive parents. (Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857 [245 Cal.Rptr. 1, 750 P.2d 778].) In those cases, which do not necessarily involve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts have found that “the writ will lie when a person entitled to custody of a minor child is denied possession thereof.” (In re Barr, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 27.) Thus, the party claiming custody is the petitioner, who alleges that he or she is wrongfully deprived of the .child, and the respondents in the proceeding are the party or parties who have custody of the child.
While these cases have some parallels to the dependency setting, they do not provide an ideal model for a habeas corpus proceeding raising ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency setting. Although the protection of the child or children is a central issue in dependency proceedings, the child’s custody is generally not the direct focus of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising ineffective assistance of counsel, and the person who has custody may not be a party to the habeas corpus proceedings. In the case before us, for instance, although the mother had custody of the three girls, she was not a proper party to the habeas corpus proceedings initiated by the father, as the majority opinion has concluded. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a dependency proceeding can be brought by any party entitled to counsel, and in a variety of circumstances. The child or children can be in out-of-home care under the custody of the social services agency, or can be, as was the case here with the petitioner’s daughters, in the custody of the other parent. Furthermore, unlike a criminal habeas corpus proceeding, which generally occurs after the underlying trial has concluded, in the dependency *68setting a challenge to counsel’s competence can arise at any stage of the proceedings, and the proceedings then continue along a. statutory timeline. The focus of a dependency ultimately shifts to the child’s interests in permanency; and any evaluation of the parent’s rights in the later stages of the proceedings must take into account that the purpose and objective of dependency law is to achieve a safe and permanent home for the child. (See, e.g., In re Arturo A. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 229,-242-246 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 131].)
Bearing these considerations in. mind, and acknowledging that some of the Penal Code rules governing habeas corpus (Pen. Code, §§ 1473-1508) are specific to the criminal setting, I offer the following suggestions to provide guidance to juvenile court judges and practitioners regarding the use of habeas corpus proceedings raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in dependency cases.
The proceeding “begins with the filing of a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388].) A habeas corpus petition can be filed in the superior court or in a Court of Appeal.1 A petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel filed in the Court of Appeal must be filed either concurrently with the appeal from the particular order, or during the pendency of the appeal from that order. “Habeas corpus may not be utilized to challenge antecedent final orders.” (In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 534 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 856].) A petition for habeas corpus is proper where the claims will require consideration of matters outside the appellate record.2 (In re Darlice C. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 459, 463 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 472].) The habeas corpus petitioner in a dependency proceeding- will generally not be “imprisoned or restrained” (Pen. Code, § 1474); however, the allegations should include facts describing the child’s custody, the petitioner’s interest in the child, and why the petitioner is claiming that the custody of the child is unlawful. It should state “fully and with particularity” the grounds for relief under the two-part test summarized above, namely that counsel’s representation fell below reasonable standards and that it is reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred in the absence of the error. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252]; see Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1667-1668.) “ ‘Conclusory allegations made without *69any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 474.) Since the dependency proceeding is an ongoing process, the petition should include allegations describing the child’s current situation. (See Abbott et al., Cal. Juvenile Dependency Practice, supra, Appeals and Writs, § 10.113, pp. 786-787.) The petition should “include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim,” including affidavits, declarations, and pertinent portions of the trial transcript. (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 474; see generally Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.490, 8.380, 8.384.) The petition should be served on all parties to the dependency proceeding, or on their attorneys if represented, and on the juvenile court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25.)
The habeas corpus petitioner bears a “heavy burden” to plead facts sufficient to warrant relief. {People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 474.) If a reviewing court finds that the petition does not state a prima facie case for relief, the court will summarily deny the petition. (See Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1233-1236 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 70].) In order to assist the court in determining whether the petition states a prima facie case, the court may request informal opposition. (People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 737; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.380(c).) If the court requests opposition, and opposition is filed, the petitioner then has the opportunity to file a reply. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.380(c)(3).) This informal response procedure is not a substitute for formal pleadings; rather, it “performs a screening function,” to assist the court in evaluating the sufficiency of the petition. (People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 742.)
If the reviewing court finds that the petitioner states a prima facie case for relief, the court will issue an order to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted. “[T]he order to show cause does not ‘establish a prima facie determination that petitioner is entitled to the relief requested. Rather, it signifies our “preliminary determination that the petitioner has made a prima facie statement of specific facts which, if established, entitle [petitioner] to habeas corpus relief under existing law.” ’ ” (Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234.) The reviewing court may determine that factual disputes regarding counsel’s performance and the question of prejudice are most appropriately addressed in the juvenile dependency court where the hearing was initially held. In such a case, the order to show cause will be returnable in the superior court, preferably before the same judge who presided over the hearing where the alleged error occurred. (Pen. Code, § 1508.) This effectively transfers the proceeding to the superior court, and that court will conduct any evidentiary hearing that may be required. (People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 740.)
*70The responding party in a habeas corpus proceeding in a dependency matter is generally the social services agency, which is the constructive custodian of the child or children. The order to show cause will direct the respondent to file a “return,” responding to the claims raised in the petition and the factual bases for those claims. (Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234.) The return may also provide documentary evidence in order to enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed. (Ibid.) The petitioner then files a reply, or “traverse,” controverting the issues raised in the return. “Facts set forth in the return that are not disputed in the traverse are deemed true.” (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 477.) In the alternative, the parties may stipulate to treat the petition as a traverse, or petitioner may reassert the factual allegations set forth in the petition. (Ibid.) Although the traverse may allege additional facts to support the claim on which the order to show cause has issued, the petitioner in a traverse may not expand the scope of the proceedings by introducing additional claims or different factual bases for those claims. (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 478.) “[A] habeas corpus petitioner may not raise additional issues in the traverse.” (Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.) The return and .traverse become the primary pleadings through which issues are joined in a habeas corpus proceeding. (People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 739.) Based upon those pleadings, the court decides whether an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve factual issues necessary to determine if the petitioner is entitled to relief. (Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1672-1673; People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 738-740.) “[T]he issues to be addressed may not extend beyond the claims alleged in the habeas corpus petition.” (Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.)
I believe the best practice is that all parties to the dependency proceeding, particularly the party who has custody of the child or children, should be served with notice of the writ proceedings and additional notice in the event that an evidentiary hearing is ,to be held on the merits of the petition.3 The juvenile court conducting the hearing may, in its discretion, entertain a motion to intervene by any party to the dependency (Code Civ. Proc., § 387), and may grant such a motion upon a showing that the circumstances, the interests of the child, and the interests of such party warrant intervention. Otherwise, the court may deny intervention, or, as the trial court did in this case, may deny intervention but allow the party or parties or their attorneys, as well as the attorney whose representation is at issue, to be present during *71the proceedings. If any party to the dependency is unrepresented and participates in the hearing, the court may appoint counsel.
At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner and respondent have the opportunity to produce witnesses and other evidence to support the allegations in their respective pleadings, and trial counsel has the opportunity to explain the reasons for acting or failing to act in the manner complained of. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859].) The petitioner has the burden of proving the factual contentions contained in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Merkle (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 46, 48 [5 Cal.Rptr. 745].) The petitioner must further show that he or she has “suffered essential unfairness and injustice” and this claim must be shown “not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.” (Id. at p. 49.) As noted in the majority opinion, petitioner’s task in effect is to demonstrate “what the trial would have been like, had [petitioner] been competently represented, so [the court] can compare that with the trial that actually occurred and determine whether it is reasonably probable that the result would have been different.” (In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1071 [275 Cal.Rptr. 384, 800 P.2d 862].)
As in criminal habeas corpus proceedings, the court conducting the hearing is to have broad discretion and full power and authority to order discovery and to issue all other orders “necessary to a full and fair hearing and determination of the case.” (Pen. Code, § 1484.) If the court determines that the petitioner has met the requisite burden, the court will grant the petition, which generally results in reversing or vacating the relevant order or judgment in the case. A reversal because of ineffective assistance of counsel “does not preclude further dependency proceedings in juvenile court; it simply requires that the proceedings be reconducted because the parents were not properly represented.” (In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1707, fn. 9 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 294].) Finally, as we have decided today, only the parties to the habeas corpus proceeding have standing to appeal the order granting the petition. (Pen. Code, §§ 1506, 1507.)
In closing, I note that the proceedings in this case were conducted with exemplary thoroughness, and in conformance with established rules governing habeas corpus. My comments are intended simply to provide guidelines to assist courts and practitioners in this developing area of the law. A timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is available to the parties in a dependency proceeding, who are entitled to competent counsel. As always in dependency proceedings, the *72child’s interest in having a safe and stable home is a paramount concern; however, this interest is always best served by ensuring that all parties to the proceeding have competent representation.

The California Constitution provides that the superior- court, Courts of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. all have original jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus relief. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) (See Abbott et al., Cal. Juvenile Dependency Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2007 supp.) Appeals and Writs, § 10.112, p. 783.)

In some appellate districts, appellate counsel’s appointment includes the authority to pursue a habeas corpus writ. In others, this authority must be obtained from the court that appointed counsel. (See Abbott et al., Cal. Juvenile Dependency Practice, supra, Appeals and Writs, § 10.110, p. 780.)

In the case before us, it appears that the mother was unrepresented at the time notice of the hearing was sent, and it was sent to her former attorney. It is unclear whether her former attorney communicated this to her, or whether formal notice was forwarded to her. In any case, she does not assert that she did not receive notice.