Court Opinion

ID: 9928789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:36.363859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:42.015077
License: Public Domain

J-A25013-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.W., A          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: D.L.W., FATHER            :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 605 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
                     No(s): CP-02-AP-0000100-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: N.W., A          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: D.L.W., FATHER            :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 606 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
                     No(s): CP-02-AP-0000099-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: D.W., FATHER              :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 607 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): CP-02-AP-98-2022
J-A25013-23

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED: January 31, 2024

       D.L.W. a/k/a D.W. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered on May

1, 2023, which involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his biological

sons, J.B., born in December 2015, N.W., born in January 2017, and T.W.,

born in June 2019.1, 2 We affirm.

       We glean the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter from

the certified record.     The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and

Families (“CYF”) first began providing in-home services to the family in June

2019, shortly after Mother and T.W. tested positive for opiates at the time of

T.W.’s birth.    Father and Mother, who were never married, cohabited for

approximately five years and separated roughly at the time of T.W.’s birth in

June 2019. All three children initially resided with Mother but began living

with Father in February 2021.

       In March 2021, Mother was enrolled in an in-patient drug rehabilitation

program for her opioid addiction.              She was contacted by Father, who

requested that she leave the program in order to take over caring for the

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 As discussed further infra, no termination petition was filed with respect to
J.M.B., the children’s mother (“Mother”), due to her untimely death.

2 The record reflects that Father has two additional children with two separate
women. Neither those children nor their mothers was involved in these
proceedings.

                                           -2-
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children.    To prevent the children from continuing to be left alone and

unsupervised by Father, Mother left her rehabilitation program against

medical advice and attempted to care for them while under the influence of

narcotics. See N.T., 4/28/23, at 64, 94, 255. After receiving reports of these

circumstances, CYF obtained an emergency custody authorization and

removed all three children from the care of Mother and Father on April 6,

2021.

        On April 7, 2021, the court held a shelter care hearing and placed the

children in kinship care with their maternal aunt, J.B. (“Maternal Aunt”), with

whom they have remained throughout these proceedings. Maternal Aunt is

also an adoptive resource for all three children. See id. at 142. We note that

during the course of these proceedings, Maternal Aunt was appointed as a

secondary educational and medical decision maker for the children due to

Father’s chronic lack of availability and Mother’s demise. See id. at 85-86.

        The children were respectively adjudicated dependent on June 23, 2021,

with the court establishing an initial placement goal of reunification. Father

was ordered to complete a sexual assault recidivism risk assessment due to

his prior conviction for statutory sexual assault in September 2011, which

rendered him subject to registration as a sexual offender under Pennsylvania

law. See id. at 66. Dr. Beth Bliss completed the psychological evaluation

component of Father’s court-ordered risk assessment in October 2021. See

id. at 163. Dr. Bliss determined that Father presented a low risk of recidivism

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with respect to his history of sexual assault, but her observations led her to

diagnose him with major depressive disorder and antisocial personality

disorder. See id. at 165-66. In November 2021, Dr. Bliss authored a report

recommending that Father receive “individual outpatient counseling.”        See

CYF Exhibit 6 at 7 (unpaginated).

          Meanwhile, Father was offered and directed to participate in weekly

supervised visits with the children through the organizations A Second Chance

and Auberle.      See N.T., 4/28/23, at 65-66.    Ultimately, Father’s visitation

schedule was reduced to a bi-monthly schedule due to Father’s inconsistent

participation. See id. at 65-66. Father never progressed to unsupervised

visits.

          Mother passed away on September 13, 2021, under circumstances that

are not entirely clear from the record before us. We gather from the testimony

presented at the April 2023 hearing, however, that her death was a result of

her addiction. See id. at 154, 184. Separately, Father was charged with

several criminal offenses, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,

in connection with allegations that he had discharged a firearm into an

occupied house on September 19, 2021.

          Also in September 2021, Father was first referred to the Pennsylvania

Organization for Women in Early Recovery (“POWER”) for a telephonic

assessment of his potential need for substance abuse treatment. Id. at 5-7.

POWER determined that Father required additional assessment and referred

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to him to a secondary organization, Pathway to Care and Recovery

(“Pathways”). Id. at 6. Father failed to follow-up on this referral. Id. at 206.

Father was referred to POWER a second time in February 2022 and was re-

referred to Pathways for a supplemental assessment. Id. at 6-7. Father again

failed to follow through. Id. at 205-06.

      In January 2022, Dr. Bliss conducted a follow-up evaluation of Father,

along with assessments of his and Maternal Aunt’s respective interactions with

the children. She authored a supplemental report in February 2022, which

confirmed her earlier diagnoses and advanced a number of recommendations

related to reunification.    Based largely upon Dr. Bliss’s findings, the

dependency court made a number of additions to Father’s permanency goals

in an order filed on April 25, 2022, which directed Father to, inter alia: (1)

engage with mental health and substance abuse treatment; (2) resolve his

pending criminal charges; (3) visit with the children on a more consistent

basis; (4) obtain independent housing; and (5) submit to drug screens. In

permanency review orders filed between September 2022 and March 2023,

Father’s compliance with these directives was rated as minimal.

      On August 8, 2022, CYF filed petitions seeking to involuntarily terminate

Father’s parental rights to all three children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

                                     -5-
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§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).3          The orphans’ court held a termination

hearing on April 28, 2023, at which point in time J.B. was seven years old,

N.W. was five years old, and T.W. was three years old. Therein, CYF adduced

testimony from, inter alia, Dr. Bliss, CYF caseworker Stephanie Schmidt, A

Second Chance representative William Pipkins, Auberle representative Verlin

Jenkins, and adoption home study caseworker Ciera James.                    CYF also

introduced into evidence the permanency records concerning the children and

various other forms of pertinent documentation. Father testified on his own

behalf.

       On May 1, 2023, the orphans’ court filed orders involuntarily terminating

Father’s rights to the children pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On

May 24, 2023, Father filed timely notices of appeal to this Court at each of the

above-captioned cases along with concise statements of error pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).               Thereafter, the orphans’ court filed a

responsive opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) collectively addressing

Father’s arguments in each case. This Court consolidated these cases sua

sponte pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513.

       Father raises the following issues for our consideration:

____________________________________________

3  On October 12, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed KidsVoice to serve as
legal interest counsel for each child in conformity with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).
Although KidsVoice also served as the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for each child,
the trial court determined that no conflict existed between their respective
best and legal interests that would preclude such dual representation.

                                           -6-
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      1.    Did the orphans’ court abuse is discretion and/or err as a
      matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate
      Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5),
      and (8)?

      2.    Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter
      of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear
      and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental
      rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the [children]
      pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

Father’s brief at 7.

      Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
      an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
      unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
      court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
      decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
      child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
      protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
      significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
      child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
      party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
      evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and

                                      -7-
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      convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
      without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of

the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon

the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant

termination. Id. at 830 (cleaned up); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11).

If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for

termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and convincing

evidence,” the court then assesses the petition pursuant to § 2511(b), which

focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “To affirm a termination

decree, we must agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of

[§] 2511(a) in addition to [§] 2511(b).”      Int. of S.S., 252 A.3d 681, 686

(Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

      Consistent with this case law, our analysis in the instant case will focus

upon § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         ....

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and

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         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

         ....

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      In order to satisfy § 2511(a)(2), the petitioning party must establish:

“(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re

Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

Grounds for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), however, “are not limited

to affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that cannot be

remedied.” Id. (citing In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010)).

On this point, we emphasize that “[p]arents are required to make diligent

efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” Id.

(cleaned up).

                                     -9-
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      If a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination pursuant to

§ 2511(a), we then turn to § 2511(b), which requires that the court “give

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Of note, we “should consider

the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.”            In the

Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). Moreover,

this determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must be made

on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each child’s

specific needs.” Id. at 1105-06 (cleaned up). Thus, there is no “exhaustive

list” of factors that must be considered. Id. at 1113 n.28. While the particular

facts of each case determine the factors to be considered, our precedent

indicates that relevant points of inquiry include “intangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 267 (cleaned up).

      Our Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an evaluation

pursuant to § 2511(b) should consider the child’s bond with his or her parent.

See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, we must render

“a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the

child[.]” K.T., supra at 1113. This evaluation involves consideration of the

effect of severing the child’s bond with their parent.          Id. at 1109.    In

termination matters, “severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is

the   kind   of   loss   that   would   predictably   cause   ‘extreme   emotional

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consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.”     Id. at 1109-10 (quoting

E.M., supra at 484).      Our Supreme Court has distinguished, however,

“extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse or detrimental

impact” in the termination context. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the High Court

has cautioned that Pennsylvania courts “must not truncate [their] analysis and

preclude severance based solely on evidence of an adverse or detrimental

impact to the child.” Id. at 1114 (cleaned up).

      Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the

biological parent, but also examine the intangibles such as the love, comfort,

security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.” Id. at

1111 (emphasis in original; cleaned up). Thus, we consider factors that arise

from the facts of each case, such as the child’s need for permanency and

length of time in foster care, whether the child is bonded with the foster

parents, and whether the foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at 1113.

Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all intangible factors may

contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of primary

importance in the [§] 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109 (cleaned up).

      With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Father’s first

claim for relief challenging the orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to

§ 2511(a)(2).   See Father’s brief at 14-17.      Although Father purports to

challenge the orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), we note that

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his argument is largely constrained in addressing only the elements of proof

pertaining to § 2511(a)(5) and (8), i.e., discussing solely whether Father had

remedied the “conditions” that caused the removal of the children, without

discussing whether he suffers from unremedied incapacities that precluded

him from providing essential care to the children, as is paramount under

§ 2511(a)(2). See id. Nonetheless, we discern that Father is arguing that

the trial court’s findings pertaining to § 2511(a) were not supported by clear

and convincing evidence.

       The orphans’ court opined that “CYF has demonstrated by clear and

convincing evidence that Father is unable to parent” the children and that this

parental incapacity “will not be remedied within a reasonable period of time

based on Father’s lack of effort and non-compliance with the established

goals.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/5/23, at 10. We find ample support in the

certified record for these findings.

       There seems to be little dispute that Father suffers from significant

personal incapacities that directly impact his ability to provide essential

parental care to the children. As noted above, Dr. Bliss diagnosed Father with

depression and a personality disorder. The certified record similarly indicates

that he has not sought appropriate treatment for those conditions.4

____________________________________________

4  Father testified that he was briefly in therapy at some point in 2021 and
stopped at the beginning of 2022. See N.T., 4/28/23, at 219. Since then, he
has not enrolled in any new therapeutic treatment. Id. at 130, 219.

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Specifically, Dr. Bliss testified that Father’s untreated mental conditions

negatively impacted his ability to be a stable parent to the children, as follows:

      [T]he mental health symptoms and maladaptive personality traits
      are impacting his stability and impacting his parenting. That’s
      where you have the instability, the history of irresponsibility, the
      breaking rules and laws, difficulty trusting others, unstable
      relationships with others.

      So all of that falls into his mental health and maladaptive
      personality traits, and all of that needs to be fixed in order to help
      him to be a better or more stable parent for the kids.

N.T., 4/28/23, at 195. She also explained:

      There are multiple risks with that diagnosis being untreated, one
      with instability, children need stability.     So essentially [the
      children,] who have gone through so much and have some pretty
      significant needs, that stability is crucial for them and so that
      instability is concerning.

            ....

      And then the history and continued pattern of breaking rules and
      laws, there’s two issues. One would be if there were concerns of
      violence or safety risk for the children but, you know, potentially
      more so just the risk of having a parent that was the primary
      caregiver being incarcerated or going to jail and then the
      instability that would come with that at that point.

Id. at 175-76.

      The children individually have a number of specialized medical and

educational needs. Specifically, Ms. James testified that N.W. and J.B. have

each been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”),

depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), for which they

receive medication. See id. at 159. While T.W., who was three years old at

the time of the hearing, had not been formally diagnosed, the record reflected

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that he had been displaying issues with cursing and acting out with physical

violence. See id. at 31, 40, 190-91. All three children are also enrolled in

individualized trauma therapy. See id. at 159-61. Both N.W. and J.B. have

engaged in self-harming behavior. See id. at 88. Finally, we note that J.B.

has an individualized educational plan. See id. at 85.

      The certified record indicates that Father’s lack of mental wellness and

personal stability have caused N.W., J.B., and T.W. to be without essential

parental care that is necessary for their physical and mental well-being. See

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). Specifically, Ms. Schmidt testified that Maternal Aunt

was   ultimately   designated   as   a   secondary   medical   and   educational

decisionmaker for the children due to Father being chronically unavailable to

render critical consent on the children’s behalf at medical appointments and

educational meetings. See N.T., 4/28/23, at 84-85 (explaining “it was very

difficult to get ahold of [Father] for him to consent even though he was made

aware of every single appointment”).

      Father’s unavailability and lack of stability is also evident in his lack of

participation in supervised visitations with the children.     Mr. Pipkins, who

helped to supervise Father’s visits through A Second Chance, reported that

Father was offered a total of thirty-five supervised visits with the children

between July 2021 and January 2023. See id. at 9-10. Ultimately, Father

participated in twelve of the visits offered, and he unilaterally canceled or

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failed to confirm at least fifteen of the scheduled appointments. See id. at

10-22.

       Beginning in February 2023, Ms. Jenkins began supervising Father’s

visits with the children through Auberle. See id. at 28. He was offered a total

of five supervised visitations and he participated in two such appointments.

See id. In other words, Father participated in less than half of his scheduled

appointments to visit with the children.           He also never progressed beyond

supervised visitations.

       Similarly, Father’s lack of stability and availability is reflected in his drug

screening records. Ms. Schmidt testified that Father began random screenings

in April 2022, and was called to submit to random urine screens on fifty-three

occasions. Id. at 73-75. Of those requests, Father ultimately appeared for

only three such tests.5 Id. Similarly, Father has flatly failed to complete a

substance abuse treatment assessment. See id. at 206.

       We also find the testimony of Dr. Bliss to be clearly indicative of Father’s

inability to ameliorate these incapacities. She reported that Father was unable

____________________________________________

5   Father appeared for testing on December 12, 2022, December 21, 2022,
and February 1, 2023. See CYF Exhibit 1. While all three screens revealed a
positive result for having used marijuana, it appears that, at the time, Father
was in possession of a medical marijuana card. See id.; N.T., 4/28/23, at
131. Our analysis here is focused solely upon this evidence to the extent that
it is demonstrative of Father’s incapacity and his inability to take the steps
necessary to address that incapacity.

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to take any responsibility for his former parental shortcomings or make

meaningful progress towards improving:

      My concern with him is that he does take no accountability and
      that he wouldn’t change things about himself that would need to
      be changed because he doesn’t see them as they need to be
      changed. He doesn’t see that anything was his fault or a problem
      on his end.

      And so because of that, that doesn’t really make any meaningful
      changes, and that’s kind of seen through the time periods between
      my different evaluations . . . . that he wasn’t really taking any
      steps to change anything because again he didn’t think he needed
      to change anything.

Id. at 170. In sum, she opined that “he’s not in a position now and I don’t

believe that he would be in a position in the near future to meet their needs.”

Id. at 180. Furthermore, she emphasized that Father needed to engage in

therapy to address these instability concerns. See id. at 169 (“[T]he other

concerns I had in terms of maladaptive personality functioning, decision-

making skills, instability in his life, . . . those things cannot be addressed by

medication, and it really is something that requires therapy.”).

      Based upon the foregoing review of testimony, we observe no abuse of

discretion or error of law in the orphans’ court’s conclusion that involuntary

termination   of   Father’s   parental   rights   was   warranted   pursuant   to

§ 2511(a)(2). Overall, our review of the evidence of record finds sufficient

supports for the orphans’ court’s findings that Father’s lack of mental stability

and availability constituted an incapacity that caused the children to be

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without essential parental care or control, and Father would not remedy this

incapacity. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

      Accordingly, we now turn to Father’s arguments pursuant to § 2511(b),

wherein he asserts that his purported bond with the children should essentially

preclude the termination of his parental rights. See Father’s brief at 19 (“The

children have the right to permanency, but also have the right to have their

relationship with Father preserved.”).    Respectfully, we find that Father’s

arguments misrepresent the evidence adduced at the hearing.

      The orphans’ court “evaluated the primary bond of each child,

individually, and determined that the primary bond resides between [Maternal

Aunt] and each [c]hild, respectively.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/5/23, at 29.

Considering the bond and the evidence adduced at the termination hearing,

the court found that “termination will serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of [the c]hildren.” Id. We agree.

      With respect to the bond analysis mandated by our Supreme Court, the

testimony of Dr. Bliss is highly instructive, as she had the opportunity to

conduct direct, interactional observations of Father and the children.     She

testified that T.W. has an intense but “insecure attachment” to Father, which

caused him significant anxiety whenever Father’s attention was not solely

focused upon T.W.    See N.T., 4/28/23, at 172-73.      In contrast, Dr. Bliss

opined that N.W. and J.B. each manifested an “ambivalent attachment” to

Father. Id. at 176-77.

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      While Dr. Bliss recognized that the children each share some form of a

bond with Father, she concomitantly testified that Maternal Aunt serves as the

“psychological parent” for all three children, i.e., “the person that they view

as being able to meet their needs, who they would turn to if they needed

comforting or reassurance, who they see as . . . their primary attachment and

the person that they would turn to if they need someone.” Id. at 178-79.

Thus, she testified that termination of Father’s parental rights would not

constitute a significant detriment to any of the children. See id. at 180. She

also averred that each child’s connection with Maternal Aunt would “mitigate

or ameliorate any negative effects of severing” their relationship with Father.

Id.; see also id. at 90 (Ms. Schmidt explaining that the children see Maternal

Aunt “as a mother figure”).

      Dr. Bliss’s observations dovetail with Ms. Jenkins’ testimony concerning

her observations. Ms. Jenkins reported that although Father tried his “best”

to supervise the children during supervised visitations, he was largely

unsuccessful at responding to their outbursts and behavior. Id. at 33 (“[I]t

was just one kid set off the other, and they just all three at one point would

just run around.”). By contrast, Ms. Jenkins also observed the children in their

kinship placement and testified that Maternal Aunt was comparatively capable

of managing the children’s energy and behavior. Id. at 33 (“When I had first

visited the [foster] home, I actually thought they were different kids . . . . I

have not witnessed any disruptive behavior. They seem to respond and care

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for [Maternal Aunt] when she ask[s] them to do something as opposed to my

observation with [Father].”).    Furthermore, the testimony detailed above

speaks definitively that Maternal Aunt is better suited to address the children’s

specialized medical and educational needs. See id. at 84-85.

      Based upon the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the trial court’s conclusion that involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights would best serve the children’s developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Thus, we affirm the

orders terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children.

      Orders affirmed.

 1/31/2024

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