Court Opinion

ID: 9849874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:48:27.927621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:27.724017
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting).
*184I respectfully dissent and would affirm the order of the lower court.
The Industrial Commission takes the place of a jury and its findings of fact should be sustained by both the circuit court and this Court unless it can be said that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the evidence is contrary to the commission’s findings. The single commissioner’s findings were concurred in by the full commission (only one member dissenting). The facts found included the following:
“3. That it appears from the weight of the more credible testimony that the claimant was the aggressor in a fight from which he received his injury.
“4. That it appears from the weight of the more credible testimony that the claimant had a very serious drinking problem and was drinking on the day in question
“5. That it appears from the testimony of Mr. W. W. Champion that this employee had been dismissed of his responsibilities for the day and had been told to leave the place of employment prior to his injury.
“6. That it is our finding of fact that Toby Brown testified truthfully when he told the Commission that the Claimant called him “a long haired son-of-a-bitch” and then drew back a tire iron to strike him while they were standing within close proximity of one another near the cash register at Champion’s American Service Center. We are compelled to disbelieve the claimant’s version of how the fight began due to the many conflicts between his testimony and that of his employer, Mr. W. W. Champion, and, due to the claimant’s often repeated denials at the hearing that he was drinking on the day of his injury in spite of the contrary testimony of four witnesses, two of whom were trained medical personnel of the Veterans Administration Hospital.”
It is the law of this State that a claimant cannot be said to have suffered “an injury by accident”, as defined by § *18572-14 of the Act, if he is found to he the aggressor. Zeigler v. S. C. Law Enforcement Division, 250 S. C. 326, 157 S. E. (2d) 598 (1967).
There is evidence (obviously believed by the Commission) to the effect that the difficulty commenced when the claimant “reached under the counter and got the piece of iron and drew it back at me like he was gonna hit me.” In reversing the lower court, the proposed opinion adopts the argument of counsel for the claimant that the difficulty involved two separate fights and that the claimant was not the aggressor in the second fight. Both the Industrial Commission and the circuit judge rejected this version of the evidence, and I agree. While the time elements involved between the initial aggression of the claimant and the injuries sustained are not clearly spelled out, it is obvious that the Industrial Commission looked upon the difficulty as one conflict with, at most, a lull between two stages of the fight.
In my view, the order of Special Judge Joseph R. Moss properly disposed of this issue when he said:
“On appeal, counsel for the claimant ably argued that the only reasonable inference to be made from the testimony and evidence is that there were two separate altercations on the day in question, and that the co-employee, Mr. Toby Brown, was clearly the aggressor in the second fight during which the claimant received his injury. While such an inference is possible from the testimony of the employer, Mr. W. W. Champion, who recalled having made some effort to separate the combatants in the midst of their battle, it is certainly not the only possible inference that can be made from the testimony. The co-employee, Mr. Brown, made no mention of Mr. Champion’s efforts as a peacemaker, and the claimant testified that he never spoke with Mr. Champion until after he was injured. Also, it appears from Mr. Champion’s version of the incident that after the initial lead pipe, knife, and hammer throwing incidents, he asked the claimant to remain in the service station office or go home. What the *186claimant’s counsel characterizes as the ‘second fight’ occurred outside the service station office on the pavement where Mr. Brown had been working. Therefore, it is at least inferable that even if there were two fights instead of one, as claimant’s counsel insists, that it was the claimant, Mr. Kinsey, who renewed hostilities by seeking out Mr. Brown, rather than the opposite being true.”
I would affirm the lower court.