Court Opinion

ID: 2964941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:14.859228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:55.624030
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2039

                                RICHARD RILEY, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                   LARRY E. DUBOIS,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            Christopher Masonoff,  Sr., John Tarrant  and Charles  Mitchell on
            __________________________  ____________      _________________
        brief pro se.
            Nancy  Ankers  White,  Special  Assistant  Attorney  General,  and
            ____________________
        William D. Saltzman, Department of Correction, on brief for appellee.
        ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                    October 14, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 Per  Curiam.  In 1994, the Massachusetts Commissioner of
                 ___________

            Correction  promulgated a  "sex  offender treatment"  program

            ("the  program"),  see 103  DOC    446,  designed  to provide
                               ___

            treatment for  those inmates  "with a  present indication  or

            prior  history  of  involvement  in  the  commission  of  sex

            offenses,"  id.    446.07.    With  a  sequential  series  of
                        ___

            treatment phases, first at the medium-security level and then

            in minimum-security and pre-release  settings, the program is

            intended to  offer "a continuum  of service from the  time an

            inmate with such  a background is committed, until  he/she is

            released to the community, and hopefully beyond."  Id.  While
                                                               ___

            the   program  is  voluntary,  any  inmate  who  declines  to

            participate (or who  has not completed the  initial treatment

            stages)  is barred from moving beyond  minimum security.  See
                                                                      ___

            Dominique v.  Weld, 73  F.3d 1156, 1161  n.8 (1st  Cir. 1996)
            _________     ____

            (discussing program).

                 The plaintiffs here  are four inmates who  have declined

            to  participate  in the  program,  allegedly out  of  fear of

            retribution  from other  prisoners should  their sex-offender

            status become known.  They  have accordingly been confined to

            medium  security  with  a   consequent  loss  of  privileges.

            Plaintiff Tarrant further  complains that he has  been denied

            parole  as a result,  while plaintiff Masonoff  protests that

            his  parole reserve  date has  been  rescinded.   All of  the

            plaintiffs committed  their offenses before  the program  was

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            introduced.   Three  of  them  were  allegedly  screened  and

            "cleared"  under an earlier regime calling for the indefinite

            civil  commitment of "sexually dangerous persons."  See Mass.
                                                                ___

            G. L. c. 123A.  

                 In this pro se action under 42 U.S.C.   1983, plaintiffs

            insist that applying  the program to them is impermissible on

            a variety of  constitutional and other grounds.   Declaratory

            and   injunctive  relief   and   damages   are  sought;   the

            Commissioner of Correction is the sole named defendant.  From

            an  adverse award of summary judgment, plaintiffs now appeal.

            We affirm.

                 Extended   discussion  is   unnecessary.     Plaintiffs'

            principal contention, which underlies  many of their  claims,

            is that it is improper  to subject them to the program  after

            they had  been cleared under  the c. 123A  regime.  In  their

            view,  the program  is simply  a  "mirror image"--a  revamped

            version--of the c. 123A system, which could not be applied to

            them absent some  intervening sexual misconduct.   They argue

            that   doing  so  violates  notions  of  due  process,  equal

            protection,  ex post facto  law, res judicata  and collateral

            estoppel.  We  disagree.  The two regimes  share nothing more

            than a common purpose of  treating sex offenders.  Whereas c.

            123A involves involuntary and indeterminate civil  commitment

            based  upon a judicial  finding of sexual  dangerousness, the

            program involves a voluntary treatment scheme that can affect

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            a  prisoner's classification  level but  does  not alter  his

            underlying criminal sentence.   That one has  previously been

            determined not  to be a "sexually dangerous  person" under c.

            123A thus does not preclude subjecting him to the program. 

                 Applying  the program  to plaintiffs does  not otherwise

            violate  due process.   Imposing limitations on  a prisoner's

            access  to   minimum  security   entails  no   "atypical  and

            significant hardship" under  Sandin v. Conner, 515  U.S. 472,
                                         ______    ______

            484  (1995).    See,  e.g.,  Dominique, 73  F.3d  at  1158-61
                            ___   ____   _________

            (finding prisoner's removal from work release and restriction

            to medium security  to be permissible under Sandin).   Nor is
                                                        ______

            due process implicated  by the denial  of parole, see,  e.g.,
                                                              ___   ____

            Greenholtz v. Nebraska  Penal Inmates, 442 U.S.  1, 7 (1979),
            __________    _______________________

            or by  the rescission  of a parole  reserve date,  see, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (per curiam); Lanier v.
            ____    _________                                   ______

            Massachusetts Parole Bd.,  396 Mass. 1018 (1986)  (rescript).
            ________________________

            Plaintiffs' equal  protection  claim is  also misplaced;  sex

            offenders are not a  suspect class, see, e.g.,  Lustgarden v.
                                                ___  ____   __________

            Gunter, 966 F.2d  552, 555 (10th Cir. 1992),  and a treatment
            ______

            program such as this is  rationally related to the legitimate

            state interest in  protecting public safety, see,  e.g., Neal
                                                         ___   ____  ____

            v. Shimoda, 905  F. Supp. 813, 819  (D. Haw. 1995); see  also
               _______                                          _________

            Martel  v. Feidovich,  14 F.3d  1, 2-3  (1st Cir.  1994) (per
            ______     _________

            curiam).    Nor   does  the  program  constitute  a  bill  of

                                         -4-

            attainder.  See, e.g., Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45  (8th
                        ___  ____  _______    _____

            Cir. 1995).

                 As to whether  the program might  constitute an ex  post

            facto violation  by resulting  in the  deferral or  denial of

            parole (or of  a parole hearing), we need  express no general

            view.1   At  least  one court  has  held,  albeit in  a  case
                 1

            predating  California Dep't  of Corrections  v. Morales,  514
                       ________________________________     _______

            U.S.  499 (1995),  that conditioning  parole  on an  inmate's

            participation in a sex offender treatment program can violate

            the Ex Post Facto Clause.  See Parton v. Armontrout, 895 F.2d
                                       ___ ______    __________

            1214, 1215-16  (8th Cir.  1990); cf. Knox  v. Lanham,  895 F.
                                             ___ ____     ______

            Supp. 750, 756-58 (D. Md. 1995) (invalidating restrictions on

            parole eligibility for  "lifers").  Contra Russell  v. Eaves,
                                                ______ _______     _____

            722 F. Supp. 558, 560  (E.D. Mo. 1989), appeal dismissed, 902
                                                    ________________

            F.2d 1574 (8th Cir. 1990).   Yet plaintiffs have presented no

            direct  claim that this  is what  happened here;  indeed, the

            interplay  between the  program  and  the  parole  system  is

            unexplained on  the present  record.  Nor,  in the  course of

            their  ex post facto discussion, have they referred to parole

            in anything  more than  oblique fashion--either  below or  on

            appeal.   Plaintiffs  bore the burden  of establishing  an ex

            post facto violation.  See Morales, 514 U.S. at 510 n.6.   It
                                   ___ _______

                                
            ____________________

               1   Contrary  to  defendant's  suggestion,  our  Dominique
               1                                                _________
            decision does  not appear  to address this  issue, much  less
            "foreclose" it.   There is no  indication that any  complaint
            was there  voiced regarding  the program's  effect on  parole
            eligibility.

                                         -5-

            suffices  here to conclude  that the minimal  facts they have

            adduced and the perfunctory arguments they have advanced fall

            short of doing so. 

                 Plaintiffs'  remaining  claims   are  rejected  for  the

            reasons  recited by  the  district  court  (or  because  they

            require no separate comment). 

                 Affirmed.
                 _________

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