Court Opinion

ID: 9674582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:31:01.403222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.298808
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Chief Justice
(concurring).
It seems to me that when a Juvenile Court judge enters an order relinquishing jurisdiction to deal with a child under the Juvenile Code and exposing him to proceedings under the general criminal law, at least two questions arise:
(1) the procedural question: does the form of the order satisfy the requirements of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 ?
(2) the substantive question: did the Juvenile Court judge abuse his discretion in ruling, on the facts before him, that the child “is not a proper subject to be dealt with” under the Juvenile Code ?
In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. banc 1972), held that the order of the Juvenile Court relinquishing jurisdiction to deal with the child under the Juvenile Code was not a final appealable order and that neither question (procedural or substantive) would receive appellate review unless the child were convicted under the general criminal law and appealed. In re T.J.H., supra, did recognize a need for preliminary review of the procedural question, if desired, before putting the child to trial under the general criminal law and, therefore, suggested the Kent v. Reid device (Kent v. Reid, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 316 F.2d 331 (1963)) of permitting the child to raise the procedural question by filing a motion under Rule 25.06.
I understand the opinion adopted today to hold that the child may raise the procedural question in an appellate court by filing an application for writ of prohibition. I do not object. However, I would discontinue the use of the Kent v. Reid device in Missouri and would overrule In re T.J. H., supra, to that extent. The Kent v. Reid device is no longer needed to raise the procedural question. It was never intended that it be used in Missouri to raise the substantive question.