Court Opinion

ID: 9418247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:16:05.314372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:58.806328
License: Public Domain

Mi. Justice Pitney,
dissenting in this case and also in Morrisdale Coal Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, post, p. 304.
Since the result reached by the court in these cases has the effect of virtually eliminating the option conferred by § 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act upon shippers aggrieved by unjust discriminations practiced by common carriers in violation of §§ 2 and 3 — the option to “either make complaint to the Commission” or to “bring suit for the recovery of the damages” — and of conferring upon . the carrier, in some cases at least, the choice of two lines of procedure, by selecting the character of the defense to be interposed; and since in this and in other respects aggrieved shippers are to be deprived, in very large measure,. of the right of redress by private action at law conferred ' by §§ 8 and 9 for violations of §§ 2 and 3, I deem it my duty to express, somewhat at length, the grounds of my dissent..
The case of the Mitchell Coal and Coke Company (No. *268674) presents the question whether an action for a violation of § 2 of the Act, based upon the ground of a discrimination accomplished by iñeans of secret rebates to competitors of the plaintiff, where the defense is that the rebates were paid (under the name of “trackage or lateral allowances”), as compensation for services rendered by the shipper in aid of the carrier, can be maintained without a prior application to the Interstate Commerce Commission and a-determination by that body as to whether the alleged “trackage or lateral allowances” were reasonable and proper. This case arose in the years 1897 to 1901. The action was commenced in 1905.
The case of the Morrisdale Coal Company (No. 207) raises the question whether an action can be maintained for a violation of § 3 of the Act* in respect of unfair discrimination in car distribution, without previous action by the Commission upon the question of the reasonableness of the treatment accorded by the carrier to the complaining shipper, or the propriety of the method of car distribution that was pursued. The cause of action accrued during the years 1902 to 1905, inclusive. Suit was commenced in 1908.
- These questions are answered in the negative, upon the authority of Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Balt. & Ohio R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481, 495; and Robinson v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 222 U. S. 506. I do not at all question the authority of these cases, or the propriety of the grounds upon which they were decided. But it seems, to me that the Pitcairn Case, as well as. the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, has no direct bearing'upon the questions now presented; and that the authority of the Abilene Cotton Oil Co. Case and the case of Robinson v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., and the reasoning of the court therein, are directly opposed to the result reached in the present cases.
*269The Abilene Case held that a carrier who observed the established and published schedules of rates without preference or discrimination could not be held liable to an action at law to recover for alleged excessive charges when the freights charged were those prescribed by the schedule; and that although § 22 of the Act declared that “nothing in this act contained shall in any w“af abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies,” this saving clause must necessarily be limited so as to exclude an action based upon common-law principles, when such action would run counter to the very means prescribed by § 6 of the same Act for producing uniformity and preventing discriminations.
And in the Robinson Case it was held, upon like reasoning, that a differential in rate between coal loaded into cars from wagons and coal loaded from a tipple, embodied in the filed and published schedules, could not be deemed unjustly discriminatory in an action at law, because the Act forbade any deviation from such published schedules while they remained in effect;
In both those cases the carriers had strictly observed the filed and published tariffs, and were for this reason held exempt from action upon what would have been their common-law liability if an unqualified meaning had been attributed to the language of § 22.
The present case is the very opposite of these, and the like reasoning should, I think, lead to the opposite result. For in the Mitchell Company Case the carrier, instead of observing the published schedules, itself departed from them. And "'the' alleged “trackage and lateral allowances” had no sanction .of filing or publishing, nor of any order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission. And in the Morrisdale Company Case, the car distribution scheme,pursued by the defendant had not been sanctioned by the Commission,
*270Moreover, both of the present cases relate to past transactions exclusively. And for this reason are not at all within the doctrine of the Pitcairn Case, which related, wholly to matters in futuro.
If the discriminations attributed to “trackage and lateral allowances” in the Mitchell Case, had received any previous sanction such as by § 6 of the Act is given to the filed and published schedules of rates, or if in the Morris-. dale Case the method of car distribution had been established or approved by an order of the Commission made in the exercise of its administrative powers conferred by the Act, I should'agree that the reasoning and authority of the Abilene and Robinson and Illinois Central Cases would control. If either of the cases at bar had to do with the control of rates or of practices in the future, it would seem to me that the authority and reasoning of the Pitcairn Case would control.
But to my mind, it seems a misapplication of the Abilene, Robinson and Pitcairn Cases, as well as a complete perversion of the act of Congress, to say that, respecting transactions in the past, which are by lapse of time put beyond the cognizance of an administrative body that normally deals only with matters in futuro, and respecting which the Commission has not acted, there shall be no right of action in the courts without previous application to such administrative body.
With great respect, it seems to me that the opinions in both the present cases err in confusing legislative and administrative functions, on the one hand, with judicial functions, on the other. Thus, in the Mitchell Case, after reciting the insistence of the plaintiff that the alleged “trackage and lateral allowances” were arbitrarily fixed, and .constituted a mere cover for rebating, and the contention of the defendant, on the other hand, that the allowances were made bona fide for services actually performed by the shipper in aid of the carrier, and that they were *271prima facie reasonable, and must be so treated by the courts until the Commission had determined otherwise, the opinion proceeds as follows: “These claims of the parties emphasize the fact that there are two classes of. acts which may form the basis of a suit- for damages. In one the legal quality of the practice complained of may not be definitely fixed by the statute, so that an allowance, otherwise permissible, is lawful or unlawful, according as it is reasonable or unreasonable. But to determine that question involves a consideration and comparison of many and various facts, and calls for the exercise of the discretion of the rate-regulating tribunal. The courts have not been given jurisdiction to fix rates or practices in direct proceedings, nor can they do so collaterally during the progress of a lawsuit when the action Is based on the claim that unreasonable allowances have been paid. If the decision of such questions were committed to different courts, with different juries, the results would not only vary in degree, but might often be opposite in character— to the destruction of the uniformity in rate and practice which was the cardinal object of the statute.”
This is the theory upon which both opinions proceed, the language employed in the Mitchell Company Case being: “The courts have no primary jurisdiction to fix rates.” — “In considering the administrative question as to reasonableness, the elements of the problem are the same, whether they involve the validity of obsolete allowances, discarded tariffs, or current rates and practices.”— “As to past and present practices or allowances,.the Commission has the same power, and there is the same necessity'to take preliminary action.”
And in the opinion in the Morrisdale Company Case (No. 207), referring to the different views that have been expressed upon the question of car distribution, the. opinion proceeds: “These rulings as to the validity of a particular practice, and the facts that would warrant a de*272parture from a proper rule actually enforced, are sufficient to show that the question as to the reasonableness of- a rule of car distribution is administrative in its character, and calls for the exercise of the powers and discretion conferred by Congress upon the Commission,” — citing the Pitcairn Case, 215 U. S. 481, and the Illinois Central Case, 215 U. S. 452.
. It is of course sufficiently obvious that where a legislative or administrative body is called upon to inquire with respect to the reasonableness of existing rates and practices and the propriety of sanctioning these or establishing others for the future, it is called upon to make somewhat the same kind of investigation of facts, conditions, and circumstances that a court and a jury, or a referee must make -when adjudicating upon the lawfulness and. reasonableness of practices in the past respecting which redress is sought by a suitor. Nevertheless, the function performed in the one case is legislative or administrative, as the case may be, and in the other case judicial.
Courts and juries, and referees, time out of mind, have been called upon to investigate the reasonableness of the past practices of common carriers. They did it long before commissions and other administrative boards were devised, and when legislation for the future rested wholly in Parliament, and Congress, and state legislatures.
It seems to me erroneous to conclude that, because the things that a court must do in order to pass judgment upon a past transaction respecting the rates or practices of a carrier are like the things that a commission or a committee, or other administrative or legislative body must do in order to perform their proper functions respecting present management and future regulation, therefore all. investigations into the past practices or rates of a carrier are administrative or legislative.
Legislation, consists in laying down laws or rules for *273the future. Administration has to do with the carrying of those laws into effect — their practical application to current affairs by way of management and oversight,, including investigation, regulation and control, in accordance with, and in execution of, the principles prescribed by the law maker. The judicial function is confined to injunctions, etc., preventing wrongs for the future, and judgments giving redress for those of the past..
The Interstate Commerce Act, as I look upon it, clearly recognizes these distinctions.
In the Act as originally passed and under which these cases arose (February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, c. 104) the duties of the company and the prohibitions of discrimination in rates and otherwise are prescribed, and the Commission is established for the purpose, I submit, primarily of seeing that those duties are observed in the future. See the proviso of § 4, permitting the Commission to relieve the carrier from the operation of the long and short haul clause; and the requirement in § '6 that copies of the schedules of rates, fares and charges established and published in Compliance with the same section shall be filed with the Commission, and notice given to it of all changes made in the .same; that, all traffic agreements or arrangements with other common carriers shall be likewise filed; that joint tariffs on through rates shall be filed, and these ‘1 shall be made public by such common carriers when directed by said Commission in so far as may, in the judgment of the Commission, be deemed practicable; and said Commission shall from time to time prescribe the measure of publicity winch shall be given to such rates,” etc. And for a refusal by the carrier to file or publish schedules the carrier shall be subject to a writ of mandamus at the relation of the Commissioners, and the Commissioners as complainant may apply for an injunction.
But then comes § 8, declaring the common carrier to be liable to the person injured for the full amount of damages *274sustained in consequence of any violation of the Act, with a counsel fee to be 'fixed by the court.
The next section has been so completely overlooked that it may be well to quote it:
“Sec. 9. That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions, of this act may. either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for. the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act, in any district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person or persons shall not have the right to pursue both of said remedies, and must in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure hereinafter provided for he or they will adopt. In any such action brought for the recovery of damages the court before which the same.shall be pending may compel any director, etc., to attend, appear, give testimony, etc., and may compel the production of the books and papers of such corporation,” etc. No similar compulsory powers are given to the Commission.
Sec. 11 authorizes the' appointment of the Interstate Commerce Commission and prescribes the qualifications.
Sec. 12 prescribes the general duties of the Commission, and remains for the most part unaltered by subsequent amendments. Unimportant amendments were made by the act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 855, c. 382, and a somewhat more important one respecting the production of evidence, and the use of testimony taken under depositions elsewhere, was made by the act of February 10, 1891, 26 Stat. 743, c. 128. • But an examination of § 12 is convincing .of the purpose of Congress to establish the Commission as an administrative body, the language being that it “shall have authority to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this Act, and shall keep itself informed as *275to the manner and method1 in which the same is conducted, and shall have the right to obtain from such common carriers full and complete information necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was created;” and (amendment of 1899), “ike Commission is hereby authorized and required to execute and enforce the provisions of this Act,” etc. The remaining provisions of this section relate entirely to the machinery by which these duties are to be performed.
Sec. 13 provides for complaints or charges to be made by any person, association, municipal organization, etc., respecting anything done or omitted to be done, by a common carrier in contravention of the provisions of' the Act; that a statement of the charges “shall bo forwarded by the Commission to such common carrier, who shall be called upon to satisfy the complaint or to answer the same in writing within a reasonable time, to be specified by the Commission. If such common carrier, within the time specified, shall make reparation for the injury alleged to have been done, said carrier shall be relieved of liability to the complainant only for the particular violation of, law thus complained .of. -If such carrier shall not satisfy the complaint within the- time specified, or there shall appear to be any reasonable ground for investigating said complaint, it shall be the duty of the Commission to -investigate the mailers complained of in such manner and by such means as it shall deem proper,” etc.
By § 14, “Whenever an investigation shall be made by said Commission, it shall .be its duty to make a report in writing in respect thereto, which shall include the findings of fact upon which the conclusions of the Commission are■ based, .together with its recommendation as to what reparation, if any, should be made by the common carrier to any party or parties who may be found to have been injured; and such findings so madé-shall thereafter, in all *276judicial proceedings, be deemed prima facie evidence as to each and every fact found.”
By § 15 it is made the duty of the Commission to deliver a copy of its report to the common carrier, with a notice to cease and desist from the violation of the law, or to make reparation for the injury found to have been done, or both, within a reasonable time; and if the carrier does so, "a statement to that effect shall be entered of record by the Commission, and the said common carrier shall'thereupon be relieved from further liability or penalty for such particular violation of the law.”
By § 16, if the carrier violates or refuses to obey a lawful order or requirement of the Commission, the latter is to apply in a summary way by petition to the United Slates Circuit Court for an injunction, mandatory or otherwise. The amendment- of this section made by act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 855, 860, e. 382, expressly saves the right of trial by jury in controversies requiring such a trial under the Seventh Amendment. In any such'proceeding the findings of the Commission are made prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated.
The remaining provisions of the Act are, as it seems to me, all in accord with the general policy indicated by those .above cited. The Commission is not. primarily, or in any proper sense, a judicial tribunal. It can render no judgment binding upon the parties,-can hold no trial by jury, cannot enforce its awards by process against the person or against property; its awards arc merely prima facie evidence, without any conclusive effeef, and must be enforced through the" .aid of the courts of law. It is an administrative body; a branch of the Executive Department, charged with the duty of aiding in the enforcement of the duties imposed upon the carrier by the Act; and with incidental — and only incidental — authority to award reparation, or, rather, to recommend reparation where it happens, In the course of its investigations, *277to learn that some improper practice of the carrier has produced an injury to the shipper that calls for such redress.
The Mitchell Case arose in the years 1897 to 1901; the Morrisdale Case during the period from March, 1902, to December, 1905, both inclusive. Both actions arose, therefore, prior to the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591, and the acts of April 13, 1908, 35 Stat. 60, c. 143, and June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, c. 309.
I do not see, however, that any of the amendments makes any material change in the duties of the carriers, or the remedies for breach of them, or in the functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the mode in which they are to be performed, so far as the question now under consideration is concerned- By those amendments, and by the Elkins Act of February 19, 1903, 32 Stat. 847, c. 708, the original scheme of the Interstate Commerce Act has been elaborated and the powers of the Commission extended, inclúding a grant of the rate-making power, the power to prevent advances in rates, etc. But this only emphasizes that the Commission was established as a body having executive and legislative rather than judicial powers. For the rate-making power is a branch of the legislative.
There is another important distinction, very clearly recognized in the opinion of the court in the Abilene Cotton Oil Co. Case, and pretty nearly lost sight of, as it seems to me, in the present decisions; and that is, the distinction between the general rules of conduct prescribed by the Act, and the standards by which obedience to those rules is to be tested. Thus, by § 1, the rates shall not be unreasonable; and by § 2 they shall not be discriminatory. These' are the general rules; but the method of enforcing them in the practical operations of the carrier is by the rate sheets prescribed by § 6 and the function committed to the Commission to revise them. *278Where the rate sheet lias been filed, etc., it of course becomes binding as the particular expression of the general, principle. Again, in-§4, thereds the general prohibition known as the “long and short haul clause”; but for a particular expression of it, as applicable to the management of a given railroad system, the Commission may act, as the proviso to that section declares. Clearly, until the Commission acts, the general prohibition is unqualified; and, when the Commission has acted, its .modification is as much law as the general prohibition was before. And this reasoning, I think, applies to the respective causes of action, now under consideration. Section 2 says— “No unjust discrimination.” If and when the rates are duly published, or the Commission has lawfully acted, the schedule or the; order furnishes for the time the measure of determining what is an unjust discrimination. But, until the rates are filed or the Commission has acted, it is, like every other case of .violation of law, a question for the courts, to be determined according to the terms of the law. And so with § 3, prohibiting undue and unreasonable preferences and advantages to particular shippers, of which, of course, discrimination in car distribution is an instance. When the Commission has lawfully taken action in accordance with its administrative duties, prescribed by the Act, its order or requirement becomes applicable; but until such order or requirement is made, the duty prescribed by § 3 remains unqualified. And if; under either section, the question of reasonableness arises in the course of an action in the courts, it must be determined according to the facts and the law, just as courts determine any and every other question of reasonableness in eases within their cognizance.
In the Abilene Case the court recognized that something must be taken from the force and effect of §§ 9 and 22 in order to' give full effect to the context and the. general scheme of the Act; and therefore it- naturally (and, as *279I concede, necessarily) held that the right of action conferred by § 9 “must be confined to redress of such wrongs as can, consistently with the context of the Act, be redressed by courts without previous action by the Commission, and therefore does not imply the power in a court to. primarily hear • complaints concerning wrongs of the character of the one here complained of.”
That is to say, complaints against a carrier who had observed the established schedule that was made by the Act the conclusive evidence (until modified by the Commission) of what rates should be deemed reasonable in law, could not be entertained by the courts (prior to action by the Commission) upon, the' theory that although reasonable in law the rates were excessive in fact.
This, however, in plain terms left open the doors of the courts to the suitor seeking pecuniary redress for other violations of the Act, not sanctioned by public schedules or by any other regulation declared obligatory by the Act. Arid within that category, as I think, are these present actions, brought against a carrier that (as we must assume in order to determine the jurisdictional question) violated the Act, instead of observing it; that so far from adhering to published regulations, or mandate of the Commission, or other order rendered obligatory by the Act, set up its own standard of practices and discriminations, and maintained them in defiance of the right of these plaintiffs to fair and equal treatment.
But the effect of the present decisions, if I apprehend them correctly, is to leave no force whatever remaining to § 9. The Abilene Case excluded from its wrongs of the character of the one there complained of; the present decisions excluded from its wrongs of the opposite character. That case exempted from action, the carrier who had consistently observed the published schedules; the present (Mitchell) case shields the carrier who systematically departs from the published schedules; and, bj' a parity *280of reasoning, the decision in the Morrisdale Case exempts from primary liability at law the carrier who systematically violates the rule of equality with respect to car distribution.
In the numerous amendments that have been enacted by Congress during the 25 years that the Interstate Commerce Act has been in force, in no instance has any change been made in either of the sections (§§ 2, 3, 8 and 9) that are here important. Nor has any of the changes made in the duties of the Commission operated to deprive the aggrieved shipper of his private action at law. Indeed, in the third section of the Elkins Act of February 19, 1903, 32 Stat. 847, 848, c. 708, Congress, — while authorizing the Commission to apply to the Federal court for an enforcement of the published tariffs, or a discontinuance of discrimination, and authorizing the district attorneys, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute and prosecute such proceedings, — was careful to declare that — “The proceedings provided for by this Act shall not preclude the bringing of suit' for the recovery of damages by any party injured, or any other action provided by said Act -approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, entitled,” etc".
But, according to the construction now for the first time adopted, in the majority of instances the right of the aggrieved shipper to resort to the ordinary courts of law for the recovery of his damages is subjected to an onerous condition precedent; or at least it may be so subjected at the option of the carrier; for, in No. 674 (the Mitchell Coal Co. Case), the shipper is driven to the Interstate Commerce Commission in respect of part of his claim because of the defense that the carrier interposed; while with respect to the residue of his claim, because the character of the. defense was different, the action must proceed at law. - '
In short, without any legislative repeal of § 9, the op*281tion there conferred upon the shipper has been transferred to the carrier.
How serious is the difference becomes apparent upon a little reflection. The shipper must go first to the Commission. But when he gets before the Commission h may or may not succeed; and if he succeeds he gets no adjudication that is binding upon the carrier, for by the terms of the Act such findings are only prima facie correct in so far as they determine the fact and amount of damage. In order to recover them he must still resort to the courts. Thus, the shipper has a chance to lose his case before the Commission, but no chance to win it there. The ruling of the Commission may conclude the case against him, but cannot conclude it in his favor.
Now, let us suppose the normal case of a bona fide claim, where there is no more probability that the complaining party will succeed than that he will fail. The probability of success before the Commission is represented by the fraction Y- If successful, he must then go to the court, and the finding of the Commission being no more than evidence, and not even shifting the burden of proof, the shipper’s probability of success is again represented by the fraction Y- Since he must receive two concurring awards, his probability of ultimate success in both tribunals is represented by Y x M- In short, instead of having the, option that Congress gave him, he is confined to a single line of procedure, contrary to the tenor of the Act, and his probability of success is reduced from “equal chances” down to “one chance out,of four.”
It is said that the questions that arise- about these practices of rebating and car distribution are complicated and difficult. Certainly that objection is not pertinent to the present cases. I see nothing beyond the grasp of a court of law in the Mitchell Case. The question that, as this court now holds, must await the determination of the Commission, concerns the allowances *282to the Altoona, Milwood, and Glen White Mines; and it is in substance a mere question of fact as to whether anything, and if so how much, ought to be allowed for certain hauling services, and the like; if too much was allowed, the allowance was a cover for rebating; otherwise, not. And the Morrisdale Case reduces itself, according to the opinion, to a narrow question of law upon admitted facts. It is the old question whether, during periods of car shortage, when the carrier is unable to furnish all the cars necessary to meet the demands for transporta-' tion, shippers having cars privately owned by themselves, or railroads having cars of their own- used to transport their fuel, shall, by reason of these “private cars ” or “fuel-cars,” have a greater share in the distribution of the gross facilities for transportation than would be the case if the carrier undertook to supply cars of its own for all shippers. It is a familiar question, that has been several times before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and decided by them as a question of law upon the authority ancl reasoning of the decisions of the courts of law. R. R. Com. of Ohio v. Hocking Valley R. R. Co. 12 I. C. C. 398; Traer v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 13 I. C. C. 451; Hillsdale Coal Co. & Pa. R. R. Co., 19 I. C. C. 356. The order of the Commission in the Hocking Valley Case, 12 I. C. C. 398, is the same that was sustained by this court in the Illinois Central Case, 215 U. S. 452.
-But, conceding everything that may be claimed respecting the inherent difficulty of properly passing upon such cases, they are no more difficult than many others with, which courts of law and of equity have to grapple.' The Interstate Commerce Commission, so far as it passes any quasi judicial judgment upon such' matters, does so by the pursuing methods that are modeled upon those of the courts, and which this court has recently held cannot be departed from without rendering the proceedings void. Int. Com. Com. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 227 U. S. 88.
*283But if all the Federal judges, in all the Federal courts, and the masters and referees who are at their command, are unable as a practical matter to grapple with these questions, what shall be said of the probability that the Interstate Commerce Commission, a single body, with headquarters at Washington, with limited powers, and with enormous labors in the line of its legitimate .administrative functions, will he able to properly dispose of the mass of judicial work that is now to be imposed upon it?
It is said that it is necessary to have these matters of rate discriminations and other preferential practices settled by a single tribunal. But is not this a question for Congress? And did not Congress in plain terms'confer upon the aggrieved shipper the option of going to the courts rather than to the Commission? And has Congress manifested any intent to repeal the second, third, eighth, and ninth sections of the Act?
The opinion in the Mitchell Case recognizes that the orders of the Commission are only “quasi-judicial and only prima facie correct in so far as they determine the fact and amount of damage — as to which, since it involves the payment of money and taking of property, the carrier is by § 16 of the Act, given its day in court and the right to a judicial hearing (25 Stat. 859).” But is the shipper not entitled to his day in court and to a judicial hearing? Has the Constitution any greater regard for the right of a carrier to trial by jury than it has for the right of a shipper? Conceding, as I do, that Congress could not, because of the Fifth Amendment, make the finding of an administrative body, acting without jury trial, final as against the carrier, I submit, -with great respect, that it gives an unconstitutional meaning to the Act if we construe it as depriving the shipper of his remedy without trial by jury.
It is said that if actions were to be brought in the courts — “to permit separate suits and separate findings would, not only destroy the equality which the statute *284intended should be permanent, but would bring about direct conflict in the administration of the law.” I confess myself unable to understand how giving redress by a private action for the consequences of past maladministration can conflict in any way with the proper administration of the law, which, if I understand the term, applies to the execution of it in the present and for the future.' It is unfortunately true that, since courts and juries are human, the result in one case doeá not always seem to accord with the result in another, This is theoretically true of all suits at law; practically, the successful administration of justice in the courts belies the theory.
The court sees in the Act a purpose to have all matters affecting rates and the regulation of practices that have to do with equality of service on the part of the carrier towards the shippers “settled by a single tribunal.” I have no difficulty in finding in the Act a purpose to confer the administrative power, the regulating power, upon a single tribunal, to wit, the Commission. But I find nothing, and the opinions refer to nothing, indicating a purpose that past transgressions of the Act and the cognizance of suits brought- for the redress of injuries consequent upon such transgressions shall be determined by a single tribunal. It would seem more probable that Congress considered precise uniformity with respect to administering, justice for past offences to be an unattainable dream. I repeat; administration, management, regulation, concern themselves with the present and' the future. The awarding of relief for past offences is properly a judicial function. And, as.I. read the Act, Congress conferred jurisdiction over such offences upon the courts; giving at the same time' an option to the shipper to resort if he would to the Commission in the first instance; doubtless on the theory that the simple cases, and those involving small amounts, would go (as experience demonstrates that they have gone) to the Commission, and that thereby that body, *285while enabled to accomplish (by its recommendations and warnings) much in the way of remedying past grievances, would at the same time be put in possession of information from sources that" otherwise would hardly be accessible, so that on the basis of that information it could proceed to establish regulations for the future.
Be this as it may, it seems to me highly illogical to say that damages shall not be awarded to a shipper for violations of the law committed by the common carrier in the pa§t, because the shipper would thereby “secure a belated but undue preference.” The-argument overlooks the fact that, upon the hypothesis that a cause of action exists, it is the carrier who has given a preference to the plaintiff’s competitor; it is for the damages resulting from that preference that the action is brought; and, if the action be justly determined, it gives to the aggrieved shipper a belated, but presumably a due, recompense.
That I have not misunderstood the real questions at issue in the Abilene, the Robinson, the Illinois Central, and the Pitcairn Cases will, I think, appear from a critical examination of those cases, in aid of which the following' extracts and comments are submitted (the italics, in most instances, being my own).
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907), 204 U. S. 426, was a review under § 709, Rev. Stat., of a judgment of a Texas state court. The Abilene Cotton Oil Co. sued on common-law principles to recover moneys alleged to have been exacted for freight on cotton seed over and above a just and reasonable charge. There were averments (p. 430) “That the rate exacted was discriminatory, constituted an undue preference, and amounted to charging more for a shorter than for a longer haul.” But (p. 432) these averments were eliminated in the course of the trial. The findings, as condensed by the court below, were (p. 432) that it was an interstate shipment, and the rates charged by the railroad company were those *286established under the Interstate Commerce Act, and had been duly filed and published; but that they were in fact unreasonable and excessive. This court (by the present Chief Justice, then Mr. Justice White) said (p. 436) that the question presented was:
"The scope and effect of the Act to Regulate Commerce upon the right of a shipper to maintain an action at law against a common carrier to recover damages because of the exaction of an alleged unreasonable rate, although the rate collected and complained of was the rate stated in the schedule filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and published according to the requirements of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and which it was the duty of the carrier under the law to enforce as against shippers.”
After pointing but.that the right of recovery sustained 'by the court below was clearly within the common-law principles stated, and was not in so many words abrogated by the Commerce Act, the court proceeded to inquire whether this common-law right had heen impliedly taken away by the Act, and to what extent. The general scope of the Act was then reviewed as follows:
"Let us, without going into detail, give an-outline of the general scope of that Act with the object of fixing the rights which it was intended to conserve or create, the wrongs which it proposed to redress, and the remedies which the Act established to accomplish the purposes which the lawmakers had in view.
"The Act -made it the duty of carriers subject to its provisions to charge only just and reasonable rates. To that end the duty was imposed of establishing and publishing schedules of such rates. It forbade all unjust preferences and discriminations, made it unlawful to depart from the rates in the established schedules until the same were changed as authorized by the Act, and such departure was made an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, and the prohibitions of the Act and the punishments *287which it imposed were directed not only against carriers but against shippers, or any person who, directly or indirectly, by any machination or device in any manner whatsoever, accomplished the result of producing the wrongful discriminations or preferences which the Act forbade. It was made 'the duty of carriers subject to the Act to file with the Interstate Commerce Commission created by that Act copies of established schedules, and power was conferred upon that body to provide as to the form of the schedules and penalties were imposed for not establishing and filing the required schedules. The Commission was endowed with plenary administrative power to supervise the conduct of carriers, to investigate their affairs, their accounts and their methods of dealing, and generally to enforce the provisions of the Act. To that end it was made the duty of the District Attorneys of the United States, under the direction of the Attorney General, to prosecute proceedings commenced by the Commission to'enforce compliance with the Act. The Act specially provided that whenever any common carrier subject to its provisions 1 shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter or thing in this Act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this Act required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this Act. . . .’ Power was conferred upon the Commission to hear complaints concerning violations of the Act, to investigate the same, and, if the complaints were well founded, to direct not only the making of reparation to the injured persons, but to order the carrier to desist from such violation in the future. In the event of the failure of a carrier to obey the order of the Commission that body, or the party in whose favor an award of reparation was made, was empowered to compel compliance by invoking the authority of the courts of the *288United States in the' manner pointed out in the statute, prima facie effect in such courts being given to the findings of fact made by the Commission. By the ninth section of the Act. it was.provided as follows:
‘1 That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act may either make complaint to the Commission, as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this Act, in any District or Circuit Court-of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such, person or persons shall not have' the right to. pursue both of said remedies, and must in each ease elect which one of the two methods of procedure herein provided for he or they will adopt. . . .’
“And by section 22, which we shall hereafter fully consider, .existing appropriate common-law and statutory remedies were saved. .
“When the Act to Regulate Commerce was enacted there was contrariety of opinion whether, when a rate charged by a carrier was in and of itself reasonable, the person from whom such a charge was. exacted had at common-law an action against the carrier because .of damage asserted to have- been suffered. by a discrimination against such person or- a preference given by the carrier to another. (Parsons v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 167 U. S. 447, 455; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 145 U. S. 263, 275.) That thé Act to Regulate Commerce was intended to afford an effective means for redressing the wrongs resulting from unjust discrimination' and undue preference is undoubted. Indeed, it is not open to controversy that to provide for these subjects was among the principal purposes of the Act. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 494.) And it is apparent that the means by which these great purposes *289were to be accomplished was the placing upon all carriers the positive duty to establish schedules of reasonable rates which should have a uniform application to all and which should not be departed from so long as the established schedule remained unaltered in the manner provided by law. (Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 167 Ib. 479.)
“When the general scope of the Act is enlightened by the considerations just stated it becomes manifest that there is not only a relation, but an indissoluble unity between the provision for" the establishment and maintenance of rates until corrected in accordance, with the statute and the prohibitions against preferences and discrimination. This follows, because unless the requirement of a uniform standard of. rates be complied with it would result that violations of the statute as to preferences and discrimination would inevitably follow. This is clearly so, for if it be that the standard of rates fixed in the mode provided by the statute could be treated on the complaint of a shipper by a court and jury as unreasonable, without, reference to prior action by the Commission, finding the established rate to be unreasonable and ordering the carrier to desist in the future from violating the Act, it would come to pass that a shipper might obtain relief upon the basis that the established rate was unreasonable, in the opinion of a court and jury, and thus such shipper would receive a preference or discrimination not enjoyed by those against whom the schedule of rates was continued to be enforced. This can only be met by the suggestion that the judgment of a court, when based upon a complaint made by a shipper without previous action by the- Commission, would give rise to a change of the schedule rate and thus cause the new rate resulting from the action of the court to be applicable in future as to all. This suggestion, however, *290is manifestly without merit, and only serves to illustrate the absolute destruction of the Act and the remedial provisions which it created which would arise from a recognition of the right asserted. For if, without previous action by the Commission, power might be exerted by courts and juries generally to determine the reasonableness of an established rate, it would follow that unless all courts reached an identical conclusion a uniform standard of rates in the future would be impossible, as the standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions reached as to reasonableness by the various courts called upon to consider the subject as an original question. Indeed the recognition of such a right is wholly inconsistent with the administrative power conferred upon the Commission and with the duty, which the statute casts upon that body, of seeing to it that .the statutory requirement as to uniformity and equality of rates is observed. Equally obvious is it that the existence of such a power in thé courts, independent of prior action by the Commission, would lead to favoritism, to the enforcement of one rate in one jurisdiction and a different one in another, would destroy the prohibitions against preferences and discrimination, and afford, moreover, a ready means by which, through collusive proceedings, the wrongs which the statute was intended to remedy could be successfully inflicted. ' Indeed no reason can be perceived for the enactment of the provision endowing the administrative tribunal, which the Act created, with power, on due proof, not only to award reparation to a particular shipper, but to command the carrier to desist from violation of the Act in the future, thus compelling the alteration of the old or the filing of a new schedule, conformably to the action of the Commission, if the power was left in courts to grant relief on complaint of any shipper, upon the theory that the established rate could be disregarded and be treated as unreasonable, without reference to previous action by the *291Commission in the premises. This must be, because, if the power- existed in both courts and the Commission to originally hear complaints on this subject, there might' be a divergence between the action of the Commission and the decision of a court. In other words, the established schedule anight be found reasonable by the Commission' in the first instance and unreasonable by a court acting originally, and thus a conflict would arise which would render the enforcement of the Act impossible.
"Nor is there merit in.the contention that section 9 of the Act compels to the conclusion that it was the purpose of Congress to confer power upon courts primarily to relieve from the duty of enforcing the established rate by finding that the same as to a particular person or corporation was so unreasonable as to justify an award of damages. True it is that the general terms of the section when takon alone might sanction such a conclusion, but when the provision of that section is read in connection with the context of the Act and in the light of the considerations which we have enumerated, we think the broad construction contended for-is not admissible. And this becomes particularly cogent when it is observed that the power of the courts to award damages to those claiming to have been injured, as provided in the section, contemplates only a decree in favor of the.individual complainant, redressing the particular wrong asserted to have been doné, and does not embrace the power to direct the carrier to abstain in the future from similar violations of the Act; in other words, to command a correction of the established schedules, which power, as we have shown, is conferred by the Act upon the Commission in express terms. In other words, we think that it inevitably follows from the context of the Act that the independent right of an individual originally to maintain actions in courts to obtain pecuniary redress for violations of the Act conferred by the ninth section must be confined to redress of such wrongs as can, con*292sistently with the context of the Act, be redressed by courts without previous action by the Commission, and, therefore, does not imply the power in a court to primarily hear complaints concerning wrongs of the character of the one here complained of. Although an established schedule of rates may have been altered by a carrier voluntarily or as the result of the enforcement of an order of the Commission to desist from violating the law, rendered in accordance with the provisions of the statute, it may not be doubted that the power of the Commission would nevertheless extend to hearing legal. complaints of and awarding reparation to individuals for wrongs unlawfully suffered from the application of the unreasonable schedule during the period when such schedule was in force.”
After citing two decisions in the lower Federal courts, and distinguishing several previous decisions of this court, and relying upon the Hefley Case, 158 U. S. 98, and the Mugg Case, 202 U. S. 242, as showing that the established rates were binding, the opinion proceeds (p. 445):
“In view of the binding effect of the established rates upon both the carrier and the shipper, as expounded in the two decisions of this court just referred to, the con- . tention now made if adopted would-necessitate the holding that a cause of action in favor of a shipper arose from the failure of the carrier to make an agreement, when, if the agreement had been made, both the carrier and the shipper would have been guilty of a criminal offense and the agreement would have been so absolutely void as to be impossible of enforcement. Nor is there forte in the suggestion that a like dilemma arises from the recognition of power in the Commission to award reparation in favor of an individual because of a finding by that body that a rate in an established schedule was unreasonable. As we have shown, there is a wide distinction between the two cases. When the Commission is called upon on the complaint of an individual to consider the reasonableness of an established *293rate, its power is invoked ‘not merely to authorize a departure from such rate in favor of the complainant alone, but to exert the authority conferred upon it by the Act, if the complaint is found to be just, to compel the establishment of a new schedule of rates applicable to all. And like reasoning would be applicable to the granting of reparation to an individual after the establishment of a new schedule because of a wrong endured during the period when the unreasonable schedule was enforced by the carrier and before its change and the establishment of a new one. In other words, the difference between the two is that which on the one hand would arise from destroying the uniformity of rates which it was the object of the statute to secure and on the other from enforcing that equality which the statute commands.
“But it is insisted that, however cogent may be the views previously stated, they should not control, because of the following provision' contained in section 22 of the Act to Regulate Commerce viz: £. . . Nothing, in.triis Act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common-law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.’ This clause, however, cannot in reason be construed as continuing in,shippers a common-law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. In other words the Act cannot be held to destroy itself. The clause is concerned alone with rights recognized in or duties imposed by the Act and the manifest purpose of the provision in question was to make plain the intention that any specific remedy given by the Act should be regarded as cumulative, when other appropriate common-law or statutory remedies existed for the redress of the particular grievance or wrong dealt with in the Act.
“The proposition that if the statute be construed as depriving courts generally, at the instance of shippers, of the power to grant redress upon the basis that an estab *294lished rate was unreasonable without previous action by the commission great harm will result, is only an argument of inconvenience which assails the wisdom of the legislation or its efficiency and affords no .j ustifieation for so interpreting the statute as to destroj7' it. Even, however, if in any case we were at liberty to depart from the obvious and necessary intent of a statute upon considerations of expediency, we are admonished that the suggestions of expediency here advanced are not shown on this record to be j ustified. As we have seen, although the Act to Regulate Commerce has been in force for many years, it appears that by judicial exposition and in practical execution it has been interpreted and applied in accordance with the construction which we give it. That the result of such long-continued, uniform construction has not been considered as harmful to the public interests is persuasively demonstrated by the fact that the amendments which have been made to the Act have not only not tended to repudiate such construction, but, on the contrary, have had the direct effect of strengthening and making, if possible, more imperative the provisions of the Act requiring Ihe establishment of rates and the adhesion by both carriers and shippers to the rates as established until set aside in pursuance to the provisions of ihe Act. Thus, by section 1 of the act approved February 19, 1903, commonly known as the Elkins Act, which, although enacted since the shipments in question, is yet illustrative, the willful failure upon the part of any carrier to file and publish ‘the tariffs or rates and charges,’ as required by the Act to Regulate Commerce and the acts amendatory thereof, ‘or strictly to observe such tariffs until changed according to law,’ was made a misdemeanor, and it was also made a misdemeanor to offer, grant, give, solicit, accept, or receive any rebate from published rates of other concession or discrimination. And in the closing sentence' of section 14t was provided as follows:
*295“‘Whenever any carrier files with the Interstate Commerce Commission or publishes a particular rate under the provisions of the Act to. Regulate Commerce or acts amendatory thereof, or participates in any rates so filed or published, that rate as against such carrier, its officers, or agents in any prosecution begun under this Act, shall be conclusively deemed to be the legal rate, and any departure from such rate or any offer to depart therefrom shall be deemed to be an offense under this section of this Act.’
“And, by section 3, power was conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to invoke the equitable powers of a Circuit Court of the United States to enforce, an observance of the published tariffs.
“ Concluding, as we do, that a shipper seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the established rate must, under the Act to Regulate Commerce, primarily invoke redress through the Interstate Commerce Commission, which body alone is vested with power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedulé'because the rates fixed therein aré unreasonable, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the court below would have had jurisdiction to afford relief if the right asserted had not been repugnant to the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce. It follows from what we have said, that the court below erred in the construction which it gave to the Act to Regulate'Commerce.”
In short, what the Abilene Cotton Oft Case decides is, that- with respect to interstate commerce the Act by its own language prescribed how it should be determined what rates should be charged by carriers, and how such rates should be made manifest; and that while § 1 of the Act prohibited - any charge beyond just and reasonable rates, it imposed the duty of establishing and publishing schedules, to the very end of enforcing'that provision, and in the effort to prevent unjust preferences and discriminations it rendered it unlawful to depart from the established schedules *296until they were changed by the administrative- Commission; wherefore the rate thus established and published must be deemed in law a reasonable rate for all purposes affecting the rights of the carrier and shipper between themselves until it had. been altered by the commission, which might be done if they found it unreasonable in fact. The entire reasoning of the opinion is quite consistent and logical, as well as most cogent and convincing, if confined to that subject-matter.
But to so apply that reasoning as to make it support the contention that discriminations by the carrier in the past, amounting to a departure by the carrier from the established, schedule, and effectuated by the giving of secret rebates to competitors in violation of § 2, or by other discriminatory practices violative of § 3, and where the conduct of the carrier has no prima facie sanction under the law by reason of the filing and publishing of a schedule, or otherwise, shall not be actionable in the ordinary course of law without a previous investigation or determination by the-commission upon the subject, is not only to ignore the essential differences between the facts in this case and those in the Abilene Case,.but is to virtually eliminate § 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which Congress in all its amendments has been scrupulously careful to leave untouched; and to make of the Interstate Commerce Commission, instead of an administrative and, quasi-legislative body, with duties to perform respecting the laying down of rules for the future and seeing that the carriers mnia’nue to conform to their duties under the Act, a judicial body but without, judicial powers, proceeding not by the ordinary process, of law, but by written notices,- sent here and there and everywhere to the persons concerned; not in actions inter partes, but in omnibus investigations conducted with associations of shippers and municipal corporations and other organizations, as parties of the one part, and groups of railroads, as parties of the other part; holding iiieir sessions in Washington or wherever *297it pleases them; without ample power to enforce the production of evidence; and .without any power to enforce their findings.
Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (1912), 222 U. S. 506, is in principle exactly .like the Abilene Case, and was decided upon its authority. There, the schedule published and filed conformably to the Act made a differential between coal loaded into the car from wagons and coal loaded from a tipple. Robinson’s shipments- having come under the higher rate, he sued to recover from the company $150 which was the excess paid by him over what would have been required if his coal had been loaded from .a tipple. There was an agreed statement of facts, but in it was no suggestion that the schedule had been the subject of complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission or had- been found by that Commission to be unjustly discriminatory, or that any order had been made about it. Naturally and properly this court held that there was no right of action. The pith of the reasoning is lucidly expressed in the opinion of the court (by Mr. Justice Van Devanter) as follows (pp. 508, 509):
“The Act, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379; c. 382, 25 Stat. 855; c. 61, 28 Stat. 643; c. 708, 32 Stat. 847, whilst prohibiting unreasonable charges, unjust discriminations and undue preferences by carriers subject to its. provisions, ,also prescribed, the manner in which that prohibition should be. enforced; that is to say, the Act laid upon' every such carrier the duty of publishing and filing in a prescribed mode, schedules of the rates to be charged for the transportation of property over its road, declared that the rates named in schedules so established should be conclusively deemed to be the legal rates until changed, as provided in the Act, forbade any deviation from them while they remained in effect, invested the Interstate Commerce Commission with authority to receive complaints against rates so established, and to inquire and find whether they were in any : wise violative *298of the provisions of the Act, and, if so, what, if any, injury had been done thereby to the person complaining or to others, and further authorized■ the Commission to direct the carrier .to desist from any violation found to exist, and to ‘make reparation for any injury found to have been done. Provision was also made for the enforcement of the order for reparation, by an action in the Circuit Court of the United States, if the carrier failed to comply with it.
“Thus, for the purpose of preventing unreasonable charges, unjust discriminations and undue preferences, a system of establishing, maintaining and altering rate schedules and of redressing injuries resulting from their enforcement was adopted whereby publicity would be given to the rates, their application would be obligatory and uniform while they remained in effect, and the matter of their conformity to prescribed standards would be committed primarily to a single tribunal clothed with authority to investigate complaints and to order the correction of any non-conformity to those standards by an appropriate change in schedules and by due reparation to injured persons.
“When the purpose of the Act añd the means selected for the accomplishment of that purpose are- understood, it is altogether plain that the Act contemplated that such an investigation and order by the designated -tribunal, the Interstate Commerce Commission, should be a prerequisite to the right to seek reparation in the courts because of exactions under an established schedule alleged to be violative of the prescribed standards.”
The Abilene and Robinson Cases maintain the binding force of published rates and differentials established pursuant to the Act, until modified by the Commission in the manner provided by the Act.
The present decisions give the same force to discriminatory practices established by the carrier without leave of the Commission, not included in the published rates *299and differentials, the practices being in direct violation-of the Act.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1909), 215 U. S. 452, was a suit brought by the Railroad Company in the United States Circuit Court to restrain the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission respecting car distribution. The issues were recited in the opinion of the court (by the present Chief Justice, then Mr. Justice White) as follows (p. 465):
“Being unwilling to comply with the order of the commission, the Illinois Central Railroad Company commenced the suit which is now before us to enjoin in all respects, the enforcement of the order of the commission. It was averred that although the company was adequately, equipped with coal cars and with sufficient motive power and operative forces, yet at times an inadequate supply of coal cars to meet the demand arose from the circumstances which we have previously stated. It was alleged that the regulations adopted by the company for ascertaining the capacity of the mines and for the distribution of cars were in all respects just and reasonable, and it was charged that the order of the commission, directing the taking into account of private cars in the distribution of cars, was unjust, unreasonable, oppressive and unlawful, because it deprived the owner's of such cars of the right to the use of their own property. It was further alleged that, as to the foreign railway fuel cars, the order was also unjust, unreasonable, oppressive and unlawful, because such cars constituted no part of the equipment of the road, and, failing to count them, could not constitute an unlawful discrimination or the giving of an unjust preference within the intendment of the act to regulate commerce. Besides charging that the'order to count the company fuel cars was unjust, unreasonable, etc., it was averred that the attempt of the commission to deal with such cars was *300beyond its power, and was but an effort to deprive the com* pany of its lawful right to freely contrdct for the purchase of the fuel necessary for the operation of its road. In addition; the proceedings in the suit brought by the Majestic Coal Company were set out, the granting of a temporary injunction therein as to counting foreign railway fuel cars and private cars was alleged, and it was charged' that in any event, as to those two classes of cars, the order of the Commission was not lawful since it compelled the company to violate the injunction which was yet in force. The Commission answered by asserting the validity in all respects of the order by it made, substantially upon the grounds which had been set out in its report and opinion announced when the order was made. All the averments in the complaint as to want of power were traversed and it was expressly charged that the subject of the distribution of coal cars as dealt with by the order was within the administrative power delegated to the commission by the terms of the Act to Regulate Commerce.” _ '
The Circuit Court enjoined the Commission from enforcing its order “in so far as it directed the taking into account the company fuel cars in the distribution of coal cars in times of car shortage, and in so far as it directed the future taking such cars into account.” The Interstate Commerce-Commission appealed to this court, and the decree was reversed on the ground that so far as it related to the company fuel cars the order of the Commission was within its administrative power.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co. (1910), 215 U. S. 481, arose on a petition of the Coal Company for a mandamus upon the Railroad Company to restrain discrimination in the distribution of cars in the “ Fairmont region” of West Virginia, alleged to be in violation of § 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The petition was filed January 16, 1907, in the United States Circuit Court, under § 1Ó of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stht. *301855, 862, cb. 382), sometimes called § 23 of the Interstate Commerce Act, because printed under that number in the pamphlet compilation of Interstate Commerce Laws. This section provided that for a violation of any"of the. provisions of the act of 1887 and amendments, preventing the relator from having interstate traffic: moved at. the same rates as are charged, or upon terms or conditions as favorable as those given by said common carrier for like traffic under similar circumstances, to any other shipper, “a mandamus might be issued commanding such common carrier to move and transport the traffic, or to furnish cars or other facilities for transportation for the party applying for the writ.” There were numerous grounds of complaint, some of which were abandoned at the hearing, and of the others the United States Circuit Court' (154 Fed. Rep. 108, 120) overruled all except one, and with respect to that awarded a writ of mandamus. There were cross writs of error from the Circuit Court *of Appeals,' which court affirmed the judgment so far as questioned by the defendant’s writ, of error, and reversed it in part so far as questioned by the relator’s writ of error (165 Fed. Rep. 113, 132). Upon-review in this court it was pointed out in the opinion (by the. present Chief Justice) at p. 492, that the question was, whether the court could, grant the relief prayed consistently with the provisions of the Aet to Regulate Commerce; and (p. 493): “ That a prohibition, by way of mandamus, against the act is sought and an order, by way of mandamus, was invoked, and was allowed luhich must operate, by judicial decree, ■upon dll the numerous parties and various interests as a rule or regulation as to the matters complained of for the condpct of interstate commerce in the future. When the situation is thus defined we see no escape from the conclusion that the grievances complained of were primarily within the administrative competency of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and not subject to be judieally enforced, at least *302until that body, clothed by the statute with authority on the subject, had been afforded by a complaint made to it the opportunity to exert its administrative functions.”
And, after referring to the decision in the Abilene Case, which dealt with the-provisions of the. Act as they existed prior to the amendment of 1906, the opinion pointed out (p. 494) that the amendment adopted in 1906 to § 15 of the Act (34 Stat. 584, 589, c. 3591), had the effect of partially repealing (what was called § 23 of the Act of 1887, but was really) § 10 of the Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 855, 862, c. 382, already referred to, which permitted the courts to award mandamus in certain cases. The opinion discusses at length the effect of the 1906 amendment of § 15 upon the remedy by mandamus conferred by the previous Act, with the result of holding that there was an implied repeal so far as the adjustment of the car-shortage regulations in the case under consideration was concerned.
But it will be observed that the aid of the courts was there invoked with respect to future regulations, and it was denied because by the terms of the act of 1906 it was placed within the administrative functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the mode in which their orders were to be carried into effect was by the same amendment prescribed.
I confess myself unable to find in the Illinois Central and Pitcairn Cases, or in the reasoning of the opinions therein, any ground for holding that the general right of action conferred by § 8 of thé original Interstate Commerce Act for a violation of §§ 2 or 3, or the option conferred upon the party injured, by § 9 of the same Act, has been repealed as’to "past transactions where the conduct of the carrier has not the sanction of an order of the commission, or (what is in essence the same thing) has not the sanction of a formal■ compliance with the Act, which the Act itself declares shall he prima facie lawful, as was the case with *303the published tariffs that were under consideration in the Abilene and Robinson Cases.
To declare, as was declared in the Abilene Case, that a carrier shall not be held actionable as for extortion in ¡the past where it has merely, charged the rates that were fixed in the schedule established in accordance with the Act, is to my mind as far as possible from declaring that past' practices of the carrier that are not sanctioned by any finding or schedule, or otherwise protected from attack by the provisions of the Act, are exempt from court inquiry; or that the carrier is exempt from an ordinary action at law for violations of the Act, when §§ 8 and 9 in plain terms ■ declare that the carrier shall for such violations be subject to an ordinary action at law, and declare also that the aggrieved shipper shall have the option whether he will make complaint to the Commission or bring his action in court.
In answer' to the suggestion that the result reached in these cases virtually nullifies § 9 of the Act, it is said that the contrary is shown by the decision just announced in Pennsylvania Railroad v. International Coal Co., No. 14, ante, p. 184. As I have endeavored to point out in the dissenting opinion in that case, the court there concedes the right of action, but in effect denies the right of recovery; for it excludes from consideration the only measure of damages that has ever been, or can be, generally applied in actions of that character.
The result of the decisions in these three cases, taken together, is, as it seems to me, to so greatly restrict and hamper the private right of action that Congress intended to confer by §§ 8 and 9 of the Act, that it is difficult to conceive of a case where the injured shipper can, by the simple and direct mode of an action at law, recover any substantial compensation for the discriminations practiced upon him by the carrier.