Court Opinion

ID: 9448483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:37:01.17136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:22.563168
License: Public Domain

GANEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has ruled that in a capital case in a state court due process of law requires that the defendant have benefit of counsel at his sentencing. Ellis v. Ellisor, 239 F.2d 175 (1956). This ruling, in my opinion, means that the benefit is to be conferred upon the defendant at every important stage of the court sentencing procedure. Was George Lee Rivers denied this benefit in the State Court? It appears to me that he was.
Whether the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution requires a court imposing a death penalty to give its reasons, factual or otherwise, for doing so, need not be decided in this case. However, when such a recital is given,1 a defendant should be afforded an opportunity to object before the sentencing court to any part of the recital he deems erroneous or unjustified. Otherwise, it seems to me, a defendant in a capital case would be denied the effec*785tive assistance of counsel at an important stage of the sentencing procedure. This would be especially true where, as here, the sentencing court has broad discretion in imposing either a life sentence or the death penalty, and the latter, on appeal, will be vacated only for manifest abuse of that discretion, or changed to imprisonment for life in the most exceptional cases.2
Rivers maintained both before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the district court that the resentencing court, in its written opinion, either through a misinterpretation of the record or a misapplication of the facts, made prejudicial statements concerning him which were not only erroneous but without factual basis or legal warrant. The district court, upon its own review of the evidence submitted to the sentencing court, was of the view that “the record supports the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the sentence was in accordance with Pennsylvania law and justified by the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. (Cases omitted.)” It concluded that the case did not present a “ ‘foundation * * * extensively and materially false,’ as was true in Townsend v. Burke, [334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948)] * * and therefore denied the petition for habeas corpus. A majority of a panel of this Court agrees with that denial. Making the assumption that the district court’s view and conclusion, but not its ruling, are correct on those points, I do not think that they answer the due process problem here. Even though the alleged errors in the sentencing court’s statement are not the kind that require the vacating or setting aside of the sentence by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, if they were brought to the attention of the sentencing court, they might be of sufficient weight to persuade that court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment instead of the extreme penalty.2
3 A return trip to the sentencing court by Rivers might well be in vain, but until he has been given the opportunity to make the trip, I will not be satisfied that he has been afforded due process of law. That there is a basis in the record for the sentencing court’s findings and sentence, and his chance of success looks unfavorable from a review of the record, should not cause a federal court to overlook his right to challenge the alleged errors before the sentencing court. As long as it appears that a defendant has been prevented from presenting his objections, through his counsel, to the sentencing court and that those objections are not frivolous, a federal court, in my opinion, should not refuse to issue the writ.
Here Rivers has not been given the opportunity to reappear before the sentencing court. His objections are not frivolous — at least three of the seven justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania who heard the second appeal did not think so. As a matter of fact, the three dissenting justices in the second appeal in Commonwealth v. Cater, 402 Pa. 48, 57, 166 A.2d 44 (1960), would have vacated the sentences of death and remitted the record with instructions to sentence Cater and Rivers to imprisonment for life.
I would reverse the order of the district court and remand the cause with instructions to grant the writ providing for a reasonable time limitation in which to give Rivers an opportunity to present his objections to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.

. “Public duty” was given as the motivating factor for the sentencing court’s written opinion.

. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has reduced a sentence of death to life imprisonment in but three cases. See Commonwealth v. Cater, 402 Pa. 48, 57, 166 A.2d 44 (1960).

. In principle the situation is akin to one where a trial court has failed to rule on a party’s motion for a new trial involving a constitutional question and on appeal the appellate court treats the failure as though the trial court denied the motion, and, after reviewing the entire record, affirms the denial. Should not the appellate court have remanded the case to the trial court for its ruling on the motion for a new trial even though the party’s chances of getting a favorable ruling are slim?