Court Opinion

ID: 9426220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:08.915239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:59.628200
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring.
The Atomic Energy Commission, by general regulations, limited the location of nuclear power plants so as not to be nearer than a specified number of miles from population centers. After issuing a construction *16permit which the Court of Appeals held violated those regulations, that agency’s successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, amended the regulations so as to permit the deviation. 40 Fed. Reg. 26526 (1975). By its decision today, the Court holds that the Court of Appeals “erred in rejecting the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.” Ante, at 14. I read today’s decision as in no way relying on the agency’s post hoc amendment of its regulations to save in this Court its issuance of the construction permit. Ante, at 15 n. 5. I therefore concur in the Court’s decision. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s conduct in the course of this litigation, however, compels further comment.
A certain danger lurks in the ability of an agency to perfunctorily mold its regulations to conform to its instant needs. In the present case, regulations performed an important function of advising all interested parties of the factors that had to be satisfied before a license could be issued. If those conditions can be changed willy-nilly by the Commission after the hearing has been held and after adjudication has been made, the Commission is cut loose from its moorings, and no opponent of the licensing will be able to tender competent evidence bearing on the critical issues. Not just the Commission, but the entire federal bureaucracy is vested with a discretionary power, against the abuse of which the public needs protection. “ [A] dministrators must strive to do as much as they reasonably can do to develop and to make known the needed confinements of discretionary power through standards, principles, and rules.” K. Davis, Discretionary Justice 59 (1969). Confinement of discretionary power, however, cannot be obtained where rules can be changed and applied retroactively to affect a controversy.
For some years, the agency which was supposed to *17promote nuclear energy was also charged with the responsibility of protecting the public against its abuse. But a promoter is naturally shortsighted when it comes to the adverse effects of his project on the community. With the establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Congress undertook to rectify this weakness in the control system by separating the promotion function from the function of safeguarding the public.1 But the power to change the rules after the contest has been concluded would once more put the promotion of nuclear energy ahead of the public’s safety.
Eminent scientists have been steadfast in opposing the growth of nuclear power plants in this Nation. The number who think nuclear power should be abandoned has been growing.2 The future of nuclear power in this *18country is not a policy matter for courts to decide, but those who oppose the promotion of nuclear power should have at least a chance to know what the issues are when a case is set down for hearing and adjudication, and to argue meaningfully about those issues. If the rules can be changed by the Commission at any time — even after the hearing is over — the protection afforded by the opposition of scientific and environmental groups is greatly weakened. Ad hoc rulemaking in those areas touching the public safety is to be looked upon with disfavor.

 The separation of promotional and regulatory functions was accomplished under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U. S. C. § 5801 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The legislation transferred the research and development functions of the AEC to the new Energy Research and Development Administration. § 5814 (c). The AEC’s regulatory functions became the responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. §5841 (f). Also transferred to this new Commission were the responsibilities of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. § 5841 (g).
The legislative history of the Act indicates that this division of functions was “a response to growing criticism that there is a basic conflict between the AEC’s regulation of the nuclear power industry and its development and promotion of new technology for the industry.” S. Rep. No. 93-980, p. 2 (1974). “The [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] will have solely regulatory responsibilities, in keeping with a basic purpose of this act to separate the regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission from its developmental and promotional functions, which are transferred to [the Energy Research and Development Administration]Id., at 19.

J. Gofman & A. Tamplin, Poisoned Power: The Case Against Nuclear Power Plants (1971); see Eord & Kendall, What Price *18Nuclear Power?, 10 Trial 11 (1974); Tamplin, Reacting to Reactors, 10 Trial 15 (1974); Hearings on AEC Licensing Procedure and Related Legislation before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 294-302 (1971).