Court Opinion

ID: 9850483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:58:03.579865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.953140
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Judge,
dissenting. I join in the dissent for the following reasons:
On the first appeal of this case this court reversed the judgment of the trial court. In our original opinion (Williams v. Rentz Banking Co., 112 Ga. App. 384, supra), we held that the plea of duress was good as against the demurrer urged. In its motion jor a rehearing the bank contended that even if the note was procured by duress it had been waived and the signatures ratified by reason of the fact payments had been made by the makers on the note after the duress had been removed. This court made a ruling on the contention made in the bank’s motion for a rehearing and said on motion for rehearing, as follows:
“It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff bank on motion for rehearing that this court has overlooked the cases of Augusta Motor Sales Co. v. King, 36 Ga. App. 541 (137 SE 102) and Monk v. Holden, 186 Ga. 549 (2) (198 SE 697). These *783cases, which are authority for the proposition that a note executed under duress may be ratified after the removal of the duress by renewing the note or making payment on it or by recognizing its validity in some other manner such as asking for an extension of time to make payment, have no application here since no facts are set forth in the defendants’ answer which show that they ratified the note used upon after the removal of the alleged duress.
“The defendants in Paragraph 6 of the first amendment to their answer did allege that two payments had been made to the plaintiff bank on October 15, 1963, but it was not alleged that these payments were made on the note sued upon which was executed on June 22, 1963. To the contrary, it is clear from the allegations of Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the first amendment and from Paragraph 1 of the second amendment to the defendants’ answer that these payments were made on a prior note executed on April 21, 1961; and this fact was twice recognized by counsel for the plaintiff bank in his original brief.”
The holding in that case is to the effect that the defendants’ answer properly alleged the defense of duress and that the defendants’ allegations did not show that the two payments made to the bank on October 15, 1963, were made upon the note ■sued upon which was executed on June 22, 1963. We thus rejected the bank’s contention that even if the note was procured by duress such had been waived because the defendant’s answer showed that payments were made on the note sued upon. This holding, whether right or wrong, became the law of the case that duress was properly plead as a defense as alleged in the defendant’s answer.
In the instant case, the bank contends that the duress, if any, was waived because the deposition by one of the defendants on the motion for summary judgment showed that the payments were made on the note sued upon. This deposition of one of the parties, being in opposition to the motion, must be construed in favor of the deponent. Giving it that construction, and in view of the pleadings which we have already construed as alleging that the payments were not made upon the note sued upon, we can only conclude that such deposition does *784not, as a matter of law, show that the payments were made on the note sued upon so as to amount to a ratification.
We have previously held that duress was properly pleaded. The gist of the entire matter, it seems to me, now lies in whether we can say as a matter of law that a ratification such as would amount to a waiver of this defense is shown by one of the defendant’s depositions. In my opinion the pleadings and depositions show a genuine issue of fact on this question and under such circumstances the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Felton, C. J., and Pannell, J., concur in the foregoing dissent.