Court Opinion

ID: 9457074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:11:29.730877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:12.474344
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Judge Decker conducted an extensive hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the Dichiarinte home on March 9, 1960. Eight witnesses, including four agents, three members of the Dichiarinte family and defendant’s lawyer, testified at the hearing. The principal factual issue raised by the motion concerned the voluntariness of the consent to search, but Judge Decker also considered the scope of the consent. After hearing the evidence, he expressly stated that he credited the testimony of the agents and did not credit the conflicting testimony of the defendant and his wife.1
In support of his order denying the motion to suppress, Judge Decker entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. After describing the circumstances of the arrest, he found that' the agents conducted a search of the entire house which lasted for 45 minutes to an hour; that no narcotics were found, but that the “agents seized a number of receipts and documents bearing aliases and variations of the defendant’s name which had come to the agents’ attention in the course of the conspiracy investigation culminating in the defendant’s indictment.”2
The court further found that during the course of the search, “Rosenthal reminded defendant that he did not have to allow the agents to search, but defendant replied that he had told them they could search all they wanted and that they wouldn’t find anything.”2
3
Finally, the court found that although defendant sought to call off the search 10 or 15 minutes before the agents actually left, they did not seize any evidence after that point in time. The court concluded that the evidence establishing defendant’s consent was “clear and positive” and that the “* * * attempted revocation of consent does not affect the materials sought to be suppressed because nothing was seized subsequent to it.” The district court’s findings of fact are supported by the record.4
After further pretrial proceedings, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the order denying the motion to suppress. The principal contention made in the motion to reconsider was that the items seized were beyond the scope of defendant’s consent, which was limited to a search for narcotics and, therefore, did not encompass evidence of income tax evasion. Judge Decker granted the motion to reconsider, took additional evidence, and then denied the motion to suppress for a second time. He reentered his original findings of fact and conclusions of law and, in addition, filed a memorandum opinion directed specifically to the question whether the seizure was beyond the scope of the search to which defendant had consented. He stated in part:
“Upon the instant motion for reconsideration, defendant stresses that Dichiarinte’s consent extended only to *134a search for narcotics, not also to evidence of tax evasion.”
The opinion then briefly reviewed the facts and applicable legal principles and stated:
“A consensual search may, however, be restricted by the accused; specifically, Dichiarinte might have limited this search to narcotics. But he did not do so. Instead, he gave the agents full permission to search the entire house. Thus, whether related to the narcotics arrest or otherwise, any evidence so obtained is admissible, at least until the defendant revoked his consent.”
I find nothing in Judge Decker’s analysis of the law which differs from the majority opinion of this court.
If we had heard the evidence de novo, we might well have formed a different impression with respect to the credibility of the witnesses and have interpreted the scope of defendant’s consent more narrowly than did Judge Decker. However, his findings of fact are supported by the testimony of the agents whom he credited. Since the findings are not clearly erroneous, I respectfully dissent.

. Appellant’s version of the events was dramatically belied by his signature on a receipt for the items taken during the -consent search. He signed the receipt in the presence of his counsel, who had specifically asked whether he had consented to the search.

. Finding No. 11 entered on February 5, 1965.

. Finding No. 12.

. For example, at p. 165 of the transcript, Agent Olivanti testified:
“We were talking about basket ball and horse racing and then Mr. Rosenthal had said to Mr. Dichiarinte, ‘If I were you, I wouldn’t let them search any more.’
“Mr. Dichiarinte said, T told them they could search all they want. They are not going to find nothing.’ ”