Court Opinion

ID: 9570006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:19:17.588836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:36.146620
License: Public Domain

LANE, Presiding Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree with the majority in affirming the Appellant’s judgment and sentence. I write separately to address Appellant’s first, second and fourth assignment’s of error.
I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion that in light of Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) the closing of the courtroom to the public during the victims’ testimony was proper. In this case the state prosecutor sufficiently articulated the reasons for the closure. Although the trial judge made only a conelusory statement that the courtroom should be closed, we can infer that he adopted the prosecutor’s argument.
I propose a better practice would be for the trial judge to specifically set forth in writing the reasons for the closing of the courtroom to the public or in the alternative enunciate these findings and conclusions on the record. I foresee a reversal on this issue in a future case where the facts are weaker and the prosecutors argument is not as succinctly articulated.
In the second assignment of error, Appellant alleges the trial court improperly subjected him to trial on count five of the Amended Information which he alleges was dismissed at the preliminary hearing. I agree that it is clear the magistrate intended to bind Appellant over for trial for the lewd molestation of S.T. which occurred at Bob’s Boat Storage. The trial judge stated at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing that “evidence submitted shows there were three separate incident’s.... a second act which consisted of forced sodomy by the witness.” (Tr. 96). A review of the record reveals the second act of forced sodomy referred to by the Judge is the incident at Bob’s Boat Storage.
I agree with the majority that the inclusion of “Enchanted Oaks” in count five of the Amended Information did not amount to fundamental error. However, I adamantly disapprove of the use of Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317 (Okl.Cr.1991) and Moore v. State, 809 P.2d 63 (Okl.Cr.1991), to support the majority’s conclusion, nor do I believe it is necessary to utilize these cases to resolve the issue presented.
I disagree with the majority’s finding that the photograph (State’s Exhibit No. 1) was properly admitted as a legal warrant-less search authorized by the consent of Appellant’s ex-wife. The majority refers to Sullivan v. State, 716 P.2d 684, 686 (Okl Cr.1986), where we stated that when the prosecutor seeks to justify a warrantless search by proving consent, the State must show the consent was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over, or had a sufficient relationship to the premises or property to be searched.
In this case, the only evidence offered by the State was the testimony of Detective Majors. He stated the Appellant’s ex-wife had Appellant’s keys and that she was told by the Appellant to move the car. Appellant denies giving his ex-wife authority to move the vehicle and claims he did not give her the keys but placed them on the coun-tertop and left them when he was arrested. The evidence in support of the State’s contention that the ex-wife had common authority over the vehicle is weak at best. In light of our holding in Sullivan, the State did not meet its burden of proving the ex-wife had adequate authority to consent to the search. There was insufficient evidence presented to the trier of fact to support a finding that Appellant’s ex-wife had common authority over or any relationship to the vehicle.
I agree with the trial judge’s ruling that the search of the vehicle was proper under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Where there are exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause, an officer may legitimately make a search without a warrant. Blackburn v. State, 575 P.2d 638, 642 (Okl.Cr.1978).
*506Probable cause exists where the facts preceding the search are sufficient to warrant an officer to reasonably infer contraband is within the vehicle. Gonzales v. State, 525 P.2d 656, 658 (Okl.Cr.1974). The detective knew the Appellant had taken a nude photograph of one of the victims and had kept the photograph. The detective knew the appellant did not have a permanent residence. During the arrest Appellant informed the detective that all of his belongings were in the vehicle. From these facts the detective could reasonably conclude the photograph was in the vehicle along with Appellant’s other possessions.
Assuming there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained the photograph, a determination of whether exigent circumstances existed must still be made. Exigent circumstances exist where it is not practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 152, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1924). The existence of emergency, otherwise known as "exigent circumstances” permits a law enforcement officer to substitute his judgment for that of a neutral magistrate to the existence of probable cause to make a search. Hughes v. State, 552 P.2d 1154 (Okl.Cr.1976).
The detective reasonably concluded exigent circumstances existed requiring an immediate search of the vehicle. First, the detective knew the vehicle was about to be moved at the request of the Appellant. After the arrest Appellant contacted either his ex-wife or a friend to move the Blazer. Second, the detective knew there would be ample opportunity to move the property during his absence due to the delay in obtaining a search warrant after 5:00 p.m. in Los Angeles and the distance required to travel from the location of the vehicle to the District Attorney’s office and back. In light of the aforementioned facts, the search of Appellant’s vehicle was proper.