Court Opinion

ID: 9649891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:12:47.910239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.788241
License: Public Domain

Grimes, J.,
dissenting: In the court’s charge, the jury was told that if the plaintiffs had an “alternative access to his property”, they could not recover. There was no mention made as to the reasonableness of the alternative means of access.
I think the court is wrong in two respects. It seems clear *699to me that when land abuts upon that part of a highway which is discontinued, the owner is entitled to damages for loss of access to the public highway. But where the land does not abut upon that part of the highway which is discontinued, the owner may recover only if he has suffered “a peculiar and special damage not common to the public”. Candia v. Chandler, 58 N.H. 127 (1877). This distinction is recognized in Cram v. Laconia, 71 N.H. 41, 51 A. 635 (1901), relied on by the court. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs’ property abuts that part of the highway which was discontinued and they are entitled, therefore, to damages. In Cram, the plaintiff’s property did not abut any part of the highway which was discontinued and he could not recover because of the inability to show special damages. St. Regis Co. v. Board, 92 N.H. 164, 26 A.2d 832 (1942), also relied on by the court, was not a highway case but involved the building of a dam on a river which prevented plaintiff from floating logs downstream. Plaintiff’s access to the river from its property was in no way reduced but rather its damage was its inability to use the river for navigation, a loss which was common to the rest of the public. The case recognizes also the distinction between rivers and highways.
In addition Tilton v. Sharp, 85 N.H. 138, 155 A. 44 (1931), also cited by the court, was not a discontinuance-of-a-highway case. Rather, it was a case involving loss of access to a filling station from one of two adjacent streets. Nevertheless, that case states that the reasonableness of alternative means of access must be considered. In the case before us, the jury was not told to consider the reasonableness of the alternative means of access but were told that any other means of access would prevent the plaintiffs from recovering damages. See C. Antieau, 1A Municipal Corporation Law § 9.42, at 9-91 (1974). I think, therefore, that a new trial should be ordered.