Court Opinion

ID: 9539231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 15:00:32.590886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:38.301956
License: Public Domain

20-1607
     Lin v. Garland
                                                                                    BIA
                                                                               Lurye, IJ
                                                                            A206 063 897

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of August, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                    DENNIS JACOBS,
 8                    RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 9                    EUNICE C. LEE,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   JUNSHENG LIN,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                    v.                                          20-1607
17                                                                NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                     Lewis G. Hu, Esq., New York, NY.
24
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant
 2                                      Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux,
 3                                      Assistant Director; Remi Da Rocha-Afodu,
 4                                      Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
 5                                      Litigation, Civil Division, United States
 6                                      Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

 7         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Junsheng Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

11   China, seeks review of a May 11, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming a May 16, 2018

12   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

13   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

14   (“CAT”). In re Junsheng Lin, No. A 206 063 897 (B.I.A. May 11, 2020), aff’g No. A

15   206 063 897 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 16, 2018).        We assume the parties’

16   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17         We have considered the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., without

18   the inconsistency finding that the BIA found to be clearly erroneous. See Xue

19   Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review

20   adverse credibility determinations “under the substantial evidence standard,”

21   Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative
                                             2
 1   findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

 2   compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 4   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

 5   the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal

 6   consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with

 7   other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,

 8   inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”         8 U.S.C.

9    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

10   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

11   make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

12   167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Here, substantial evidence

13   supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

14         The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies in the record as to when Lin

15   first attended church meetings.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   Lin testified

16   variously that he first attended church in August, September, and October 2004.

17   When asked to explain a letter asserting that he had first attended in October 2004,

18   Lin testified that he officially joined in October, and that the author of the letter

                                               3
 1   probably remembered incorrectly. The agency was not required to credit this

 2   explanation. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2018) (“A petitioner

 3   must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

 4   secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

 5   to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).       The variations in Lin’s

 6   testimony and supporting documents are significant because, regardless of

 7   whether he correctly remembered the date, his testimony was inconsistent about

 8   whether he began attending church during his mother’s approximately four-

 9   month hospitalization, or whether he began attending after she was discharged.

10         The agency also reasonably found that Lin’s testimony was internally

11   inconsistent and inconsistent with documentary evidence regarding his

12   communications with a church friend who wrote a letter in support of his

13   application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Although the letter was dated 2016,

14   Lin initially testified that he had not been able to reach the friend since 2013, and

15   that the friend had sent the letter to Lin’s mother in 2012 or 2013. The agency was

16   not required to credit Lin’s testimony that he was confused and that his mother

17   may have been in contact with the friend later. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. The

18   agency may consider the cumulative impact of even minor inconsistencies. Xiu

                                              4
 1   Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[E]ven where an IJ relies on discrepancies or lacunae that,

 2   if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the

 3   cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential by the fact-finder.”

 4   (quotation marks omitted)).

 5         The agency also reasonably relied on contradictions between Lin’s

 6   testimony, documentary evidence, and the testimony of Father Thi regarding Lin’s

 7   religious practice in the United States.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   Lin’s

 8   testimony was inconsistent with his confirmation certificate regarding which

 9   priest conducted his confirmation; Lin testified that he had seen Father Thi on

10   Monday two days before his hearing when he was one of eight people who

11   participated in a baby’s baptism, but Father Thi testified that he had last seen Lin

12   on Sunday and Lin did not participate in the baptism; and Father Thi initially

13   misidentified Lin as Joseph Wang or Wang Thai Shun and implausibly attempted

14   to explain that error by asserting that Lin and Wang sounded similar in Chinese.

15   Father Thi’s inconsistent testimony undermines Lin’s credibility because Lin

16   claimed that he spoke to Father Thi in his office in addition to regularly attending

17   weekly church services, and he chose to present Father Thi’s testimony to

18   corroborate his claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that factfinder

                                                5
 1   may rely on inconsistencies in a witness’s statements and between an applicant’s

 2   statements and other evidence). And such corroboration was necessary in the

 3   first place because Lin’s testimony had already been called into question by the

 4   other inconsistencies. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007)

 5   (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

 6   credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant

 7   unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”).

 8         Finally, the IJ reasonably concluded that the remaining evidence about Lin’s

9    particular circumstances in China—a letter from Lin’s mother—did not

10   rehabilitate his testimony because it was from an interested party not available for

11   cross-examination.     See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013)

12   (holding that “[w]e generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be

13   afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence” and upholding BIA’s decision to

14   afford little weight to letter from applicant’s spouse in China); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968

15   F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that “IJ acted within her discretion in

16   according . . . little weight” to letters from applicant’s wife and friend “because the

17   declarants (particularly [the applicant’s] wife) were interested parties and neither

18   was available for cross-examination”).

                                                6
 1         Taken together, the multiple inconsistencies provide substantial evidence

 2   for the adverse credibility determination.     See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8

 3   (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

 4   was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude

 5   even more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.      Because Lin’s asylum,

 6   withholding, and CAT claims all relied on the same factual predicate, that

 7   determination was dispositive of all forms of relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d

 8   148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

 9         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

10   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

11                                         FOR THE COURT:
12                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
13                                         Clerk of Court

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