Court Opinion

ID: 9573264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:51:16.23063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:12.969126
License: Public Domain

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 93. {concurring). Todd Rongstad (Rongstad) seeks to assert First Amendment protections before this court in response to Julie Lassa's (Lassa) defamation claim. The action before us is not about Lassa's defamation claim or Rongstad's First Amendment defense, however. This case is about the power of the circuit court to enforce the orders that it lawfully enters during litigation that is pending before it. When viewed in the proper perspective, the resolution of this matter is relatively simple and straightforward.
¶ 94. The majority and the dissent are determined to reach and decide matters that were dismissed as part of a settlement agreement that was accepted by the circuit court. The majority chooses to reach Rongstad's assertions of privilege in determining whether discovery sanctions are appropriate for his refusal to comply with discovery orders. The dissent chooses to reach Rongstad's assertions of privilege as part of deciding the defamation claim. I am not so inclined. The defamation claim has been dismissed, a result sought by Rongstad. That dismissal includes the defenses to the claim, including any assertions of privilege by Rongstad. The dismissal of the defamation claim was part of the settlement agreement between the parties, approved by the court. It's over. The merits of the underlying defamation action are simply not before us. The assertions of privilege are not before us. To reach out and decide the merits of that dismissed claim and any defense Rongstad had to it would allow Rongstad to have his cake, and eat it too. We should not become so engaged.
*235¶ 95. The majority concludes that in defamation cases, circuit courts should ordinarily decide a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim before sanctioning a party for refusing to disclose information that would identify otherwise-anonymous members of an organization. Majority op., ¶¶ 5, 90. Because I agree that this approach should be followed by the circuit courts in the future, I concur with and join that portion of the opinion. Likewise, I concur with and join that portion of the decision in which we'decline to exercise our superintending authority to establish a right to interlocutory appeal as Rongstad suggests. Id., ¶¶ 6, 89, 91. I also concur with and join that portion of the opinion which holds that under the circumstances here, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in compelling discovery and imposing sanctions before deciding Rongstad's motion to dismiss. Id., ¶¶ 5, 90. I finally concur with and join that portion of the opinion that rejects Rongstad's challenge to the severity of the $65,000 in attorney's fees and forfeitures because the parties stipulated to that amount.1 Id.
¶ 96. Because the circuit court dismissed the underlying defamation claim with prejudice, however, I conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Lassa's defamation claim, and Rongstad's assertion of any privilege with respect to that claim, including whether the circuit court properly imposed sanctions for a violation of pretrial discovery orders.
¶ 97. It is axiomatic that in "all cases of appeal or error, there must have been a proceeding, in good faith, an adjudication in an inferior court. This inferior court *236must have passed upon the case ...Webster v. Stadden, 8 Wis. 83, *225, *228, 37 N.W. 316 (1859). "[P]arties cannot, either by failure to raise the question or by consent, confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court to review an order which is not appealable." Szuszka v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 112 N.W.2d 699 (1961); see also Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thoma, 45 Wis. 2d 580, 586-87, 173 N.W.2d 717 (1970). This court simply has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a nonappealable order. Gilbert v. Hoard, 201 Wis. 572, 573, 230 N.W. 720 (1930); see also Hargrove v. Peterson, 65 Wis. 2d 118, 122, 221 N.W.2d 875 (1974) ('When an order is not appealable, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and any attempted appeal must be dismissed.").
¶ 98. Prior to the reorganization of the court system in 1977, Wis. Stat. § 817.10 provided that any judgment or order was reviewable by a "party aggrieved." Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Koenigs, 110 Wis. 2d 522, 526, 329 N.W.2d 157 (1983). That provision was omitted from the 1977 revision of the rules and statutes because it was considered to merely state a fundamental and well-understood concept upon which standing to appeal was predicated:
"The elimination of the phrase in the revisions of the statutes and rules was not intended to change the concept that a person had to be aggrieved by a judgment or order before he could appeal." Martineau and Malmgren, Wisconsin Appellate Practice, sec. 601 (1978).
Id. A person is aggrieved if the judgment bears directly and injuriously upon his or her interests, and the person must be adversely affected in some appreciable manner. Weina v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d *237341, 345, 501 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mills, 142 Wis. 2d 215, 217-18, 418 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1987).
¶ 99. In this action, there is no question that Rongstad has been aggrieved by the sanctions imposed by the circuit court for contempt-related attorney's fees and contempt-related forfeitures.2 Those sanctions, along with the question of whether the circuit court should decide a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim before sanctioning a party for refusing to comply with the circuit court's discovery orders, are therefore properly before this court.
¶ 100. The underlying merits of Lassa's defamation claim and Rongstad's assertion of privilege with respect to both that claim, as well as to the validity of the discovery sanctions, are an altogether different matter. The parties entered into a settlement, approved by the circuit court, which dismissed the underlying defamation claim with prejudice. Majority op., ¶¶ 26-27. While Rongstad has been aggrieved by the contempt sanctions for refusing to comply wdth lawful court orders, he simply cannot assert that he has been aggrieved from a judgment in which he prevailed.3 *238Wisconsin Stat. § 809.10(4) does not provide Rongstad with a vehicle for appealing the judgment of dismissal entered in his favor.4
¶ 101. It matters not that Rongstad sought to preserve certain of his appellate rights by way of stipulation. See Coleman v. Percy, 96 Wis. 2d 578, 587, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980) ("It follows, therefore, that the [parties] lacked authority to create by contract a greater right of judicial review than what they enjoyed by statute."). Parties simply cannot confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court by consent, and an order or judgment must be appealable for an appellate court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. As such, his stipulation preserving certain appellate rights was invalid.
¶ 102. This matter should be decided on the same footing as this court's decisions in Lawrence v. MacIntyre, 48 Wis. 2d 550, 553, 180 N.W.2d 538 (1970), and *239Gallagher v. Schernecker, 60 Wis. 2d 143, 148-49, 208 N.W.2d 437 (1973). In Lawrence, 48 Wis. 2d at 553, the appellants appealed from an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint, an order in their favor. This court appropriately dismissed the appeal, ruling that the parties were not "aggrieved." Id. "We think it elementary that a party may not appeal from a judgment in his favor." Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 103. Similarly, in Gallagher, 60 Wis. 2d at 148-49, this court held that where an appellant seeks an order vacating an arbitration award and secures such an order, "[a]s the moving party who prevailed, he is not an aggrieved party with the right to appeal the order vacating the award."5 See also Edlin v. Soderstrom, 83 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 264 N.W.2d 275 (1978) (where the complainant had sought the relief granted by other portions of the judgment, and as to those parts of the judgment he was not an aggrieved party and could not appeal); Thoma, 45 Wis. 2d at 588 (a "defendant cannot appeal from the judgment which grants the nonsuit he sought and secured").
¶ 104. Rongstad sought and secured a dismissal with prejudice of Lassa's defamation claim. He is not an aggrieved party as to that judgment. This court is therefore deprived of jurisdiction to decide the merits of that action and any orders entered as part of that action, including any defenses to it. Consequently, I would not reach the questions of whether the circuit court incorrectly applied the constitutional balancing test under NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), or *240whether Rongstad made a "substantiated assertion of privilege" under Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 94, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999).6 I respectfully decline to join those portions of the majority opinion. If Rongstad wanted this court to reach these issues, he should have litigated them on the merits before the circuit court.
¶ 105. Rongstad was found in contempt by the circuit court for intentionally failing to comply with the court's orders to provide discovery to Lassa. "The court noted it appeared that Rongstad had lied under oath and that he had given evasive answers designed to avoid providing the information ordered." Majority op., ¶ 21. The circuit court found Rongstad's conduct to be "egregious and in bad faith." Majority op., ¶ 24. Sanctions, including attorney's fees, were ultimately imposed against Rongstad for his contempt of court.7 While the amount of the sanctions imposed is properly before this court, there is no doubt that Rongstad intentionally failed to comply with the circuit court's discovery orders. Majority op., ¶ 21. Rongstad simply has no right to willfully disobey a lawful court order just because he disagrees with it.
*241¶ 106. Rongstad had to abide by the terms of the discovery order, even if erroneously entered, until he either succeeded in reversing the order in the trial court or through the applicable review process. See State v. Orethun, 84 Wis. 2d 487, 490, 267 N.W.2d 318 (1978) ("Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the fact that an order or judgment is erroneously or improvidently rendered does not justify a person in failing to abide by its terms.") (citation omitted); Anderson v. Anderson, 82 Wis. 2d 115, 118-19, 261 N.W.2d 817 (1978); cf. Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 117, 128, 586 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A voidable judgment. .. has the same effect and force as a valid judgment until it has been set aside."). The only way he could refuse to follow the order was if that order was found to be void and therefore did not need to be obeyed. See State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, ¶¶ 42, 49, 294 Wis. 2d 100, 718 N.W.2d 649. Because the underlying matter was dismissed as part of the settlement agreement entered into by Rongstad, the discovery order was never held to be void. The circuit court was thus fully justified in enforcing its order.
¶ 107. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

 Three members of this court, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and I, all agree that sanctions in the amount of $65,000 are therefore proper in this matter.

 Once again, it must be noted that Rongstad agreed to be sanctioned, in part to secure a dismissal of the defamation claim against him. This matter is complicated by his attempt to preserve certain issues on appeal as part of the stipulation, notwithstanding the dismissal of the underlying defamation claim.

 The majority curiously asserts that Rongstad is "aggrieved" by the final judgment because he entered into a "settlement agreement" that required him to pay $65,000 in sanctions. Majority op., ¶ 28. He agreed to the judgment, which included dismissal of the defamation claim against him, and he agreed to be sanctioned in that amount.

 The case of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), did not involve the dismissal of the underlying claim such as occurred here. Instead, the NAACP chose to challenge the circuit court's final judgment of civil contempt against the organization in the context of opposing an action to enjoin the organization from conducting further activities in the state. Id. at 452-53, 466-67. Similarly, in Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), the underlying negligence action had not been dismissed when the issue of contempt arose and was appealed.
That is precisely what should have occurred here. Rongstad could have litigated the underlying defamation claim, any defenses to that claim, and the validity of the discovery orders had he chosen to do so. Instead, Rongstad abandoned, unintentionally perhaps, any opportunity to pursue that defamation claim and any First Amendment defenses to it, as well as the validity of the discovery orders related to the defamation claim, when he agreed to the dismissal of the defamation claim, and the judgment of dismissal was entered by the circuit court.

 Because respondent cross-appealed from the order vacating the award, which was appealable as to the respondent, the issues were before the court and resolved on the merits. Gallagher v. Schernecker, 60 Wis. 2d 143, 149, 208 N.W.2d 437 (1973).

 Both the majority opinion and the dissent have chosen to address some of the First Amendment concerns raised by Rongstad in this appeal. This would be entirely appropriate, had this matter been fully litigated at the circuit court level to conclusion. As the circuit court has dismissed the underlying claim with prejudice, any relevance regarding First Amendment concerns would he now limited to the question of whether the circuit court should assess attorneys' fees against Rongstad, as opposed to whether the circuit court should have ordered sanctions in the first instance. See Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(b).

 It is not clear whether those sanctions were imposed pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 785.04(1) and 804.12(2)(a)4., or whether they were imposed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(b).