Court Opinion

ID: 9386809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 18:00:33.434496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:08.647826
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10415     Document: 00516710785          Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/13/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                         April 13, 2023
                                   No. 22-10415
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk
   Travis Heckman,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Raynols Gonzalez-Caballero; Cuba Transport, L.L.C.,

                                                          Defendants—Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:21-CV-161

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          A trucker collided with Travis Heckman on I-20. A jury found the
   trucker liable for the accident; while Heckman sought damages in the
   millions, citing medical bills, impact on earnings, and pain and suffering, the
   jury awarded $37,500. Heckman moved for a new trial or remittitur, citing
   defense counsel’s remarks at summation and a Batson violation. The trial
   court denied the motion. We AFFIRM.
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                                       No. 22-10415

                                            I.
          On March 7, 2019, Heckman’s car collided with an 18-wheeler,
   causing Heckman “to spin out into the center median striking the guardrail
   cables.” Raynols Gonzalez-Caballero was driving the 18-wheeler for Cuba
   Transport, LLC (collectively “Caballero”). 1 Several months after the
   collision, Heckman underwent a cervical fusion surgery on his neck and an
   ulnar nerve transposition surgery. On February 19, 2021, Heckman sued
   Caballero in the Northern District of Texas. By the Parties’ consent, District
   Judge Reed O’Connor reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Hal Ray, and
   the case was set for jury trial. Three episodes of the trial give rise to
   Heckman’s claims: an in limine motion, voir dire, and defense counsel’s
   closing argument.
          Prior to trial, the trial court granted Heckman’s in limine motion,
   which prohibited:
          Any of the following or similar comments or references or
          inferences to same because such claims are irrelevant and
          prejudicial to Plaintiff: (1) reference that Plaintiff will or might
          be made “rich” because of this lawsuit; (2) reference that this
          lawsuit is a “lottery” ticket that Plaintiff is holding; (3)
          reference that Plaintiff has or might “benefit financially” from
          this lawsuit.

          Two issues arose in voir dire. First, when defense counsel struck the
   only two Black members of venire, Heckman challenged the peremptory

          1
             The Parties jointly refer to Defendants-Appellees—the driver as well as the
   transportation company by which he is employed—as “Caballero.” For clarity, we adopt
   this convention as well.

                                            2
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                                         No. 22-10415

   strikes as a Batson violation. 2 Pursuant to Batson’s tripartite framework, the
   trial court first found that the strikes created a prima facie case of
   discrimination. The trial court then recounted defense counsel’s proffered
   reasons for the strikes, concluding that defense counsel had met their burden.
   Finally, the trial court undertook “a sensitive inquiry into the circumstantial
   and the direct evidence” of discrimination to determine the veracity of those
   reasons, which included a review of counsel’s notes and hearing additional
   argument. Ultimately, the trial court rejected the Batson challenge.
           Second, defense counsel asked the venire panel: “How many people
   think there’s way too many personal injury lawsuits filed today?” Several
   venirepersons agreed. When asked why, Venireperson No. 13 responded:
   “Texas Hammer.” Defense counsel responded: “I was waiting for someone
   to bring him up.” Venireperson No. 13 continued: “It just seems like we’re
   just too much trying to get free money, easy money,” a statement with which
   several jurors agreed. But Venireperson No. 10 mentioned seeing
   commercials for Mr. Adler and felt that “he’s going to do everything he can
   to make sure that I come out, you know, with lots of money,” and
   Venireperson No. 9 agreed with this positive association with “the Texas
   Hammer.” Aside from the comment regarding waiting for someone to bring
   him up, defense counsel never explicitly referenced Adler or “the Hammer,”
   nor did plaintiff’s counsel ever object to any of the questioning.
           Finally, during closing argument, defense counsel placed an emphasis
   on the word “hammer,” purportedly harkening back to the discussion
   undertaken during voir dire. In one example, defense counsel asked the jury
   whether it was “odd that [plaintiff’s counsel] kept hammering questions at

           2
             See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the use of
   peremptory challenges to remove a juror from the jury pool based on race violates the Equal
   Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

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   [an expert physician testifying] but not letting him provide an answer?” In
   the other spoken example, defense counsel argued that “irregardless [sic] of
   the issue of negligence, Plaintiff is contending that you should hammer the
   Defendant for $2,198,000 for this severe accident[.]” Defense counsel also
   created slides to be shown during closing arguments that displayed the word
   “hammer” in a similar context—e.g., “HAMMER-up litigation damages”
   or “HAMMER UP $$$$.” Notably, defense counsel—distinct from
   Caballero’s appellate counsel—attests that technical issues (a severed
   connection) and time limitations prevented counsel from showing many of
   the slides to the jury and he cannot “determine with certainty which slides
   were omitted during closing [arguments].” Ultimately, the jury found
   Caballero solely liable for the accident and awarded Heckman $37,500.
          Heckman moved for a new trial, arguing that defense counsel’s
   improper summation was prejudicial and that the trial court erred in rejecting
   the Batson challenge. The district court ruled that it “d[id] not view the
   comments as attempts to insert Mr. Adler and his marketing efforts into the
   trial of Heckman’s case, and there is no evidence to show that the arguments
   of defense counsel were false or baseless.” Regarding the Batson challenge,
   the trial court reviewed the steps it undertook to arrive at its decision and
   concluded “that defense counsel’s peremptory strikes of venireperson 1 and
   2 did not result from intentional discrimination based on race.”
                                          II.
          A trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial “will be affirmed
   unless there is a clear showing of an absolute absence of evidence to support
   the jury’s verdict, thus indicating that the trial court had abused its discretion

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   in refusing to find the jury’s verdict contrary to the great weight of the
   evidence.” 3 This standard of review is “burdensome for an appellant.” 4
                                                III.
                                                A.
           With respect to statements made in closing argument, “a ‘district
   court may order a new trial if improper closing argument irreparably
   prejudices a jury verdict or if a jury fails to follow instructions.’” 5 “In
   determining the effect of statements made during closing argument, we
   consider the record as a whole and not merely isolated remarks.” 6
           The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial rests in
           the sound discretion of the trial judge; that discretion can be
           set aside only upon a clear showing of abuse, which evinces an
           error of law in a ruling below. Where, as here, the trial judge
           has denied the motion and left the decision of the jury in tact
           [sic], this circuit has shown even greater deference to the trial
           judge’s discretion. However, this deference cannot exceed a
           due regard for what is right and the interests of justice. 7

           3
            Vital v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 685 F. App’x 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (unpublished) (per curiam) (quoting Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr., Inc., 241 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.
   2001)).
           4
               Id.
           5
              Wallner v. Ziegler, 470 F. App’x 230, 232 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (per
   curiam) (quoting Nissho–Iwai Co., Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 619
   (5th Cir. 1988)).
           6
             In re Isbell Recs., Inc., 774 F.3d 859, 872 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Daniel v. Ergon,
   Inc., 892 F.2d 403, 411 (5th Cir. 1990)).
           7
            Westbrook v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1241 (5th Cir. 1985) (per
   curiam) (citations omitted).

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   In sum, “[j]ury verdicts on damages may be overturned only upon a clear
   showing of excessiveness or upon a showing that they were influenced by
   passion or prejudice,” 8 and “[w]hen a jury verdict results from passion or
   prejudice, a new trial is the proper remedy rather than remittitur.” 9
            The heart of Heckman’s argument on appeal is that defense counsel
   prejudiced the jury by his allusions to a prominent local attorney, Jim Adler,
   who advertises on television and refers to himself as “the Hammer” because
   he “hammers” insurance companies. Heckman accents this point,
   referencing external materials highlighting the perils of attorney advertising
   vis-à-vis the “honor and dignity of the legal profession.” Finally, Heckman
   argues that the statements violated the trial court’s order to comply with
   relevant standards of professionalism and violated the trial court’s in limine
   order.
            While defense counsel’s references—in statements or slides—may
   have been inappropriate, they do not warrant a new trial. We lack the trial
   judge’s advantage of courtroom context in determining the extent of the
   jury’s perceived connection between the comments and Adler, and the able
   trial judge concluded that defense counsel’s statements did not constitute an
   “attempt[] to insert Mr. Adler and his marketing efforts into the trial.”
   Moreover, though some members of the venire spoke of Adler in a negative
   or disparaging way, others spoke positively of him and his commercials,
   mitigating the prejudicial impact of such a connection if it did indeed exist.
   And as the trial court observed: “the fact that Heckman’s counsel did not
   object to the use of ‘hammer’ in [Caballero’s] closing argument is a telling
   indication that they did not think at the time the references were so

            8
                Id. (citations omitted).
            9
                Id. (collecting cases).

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                                            No. 22-10415

   prejudicial that they warranted an objection or request for a limiting
   instruction.”
          Reversal or remittitur is appropriate only when, in closing arguments,
   “counsel’s assertions are ‘either false or without basis in the record.’” 10 For
   example, when a new trial was requested because counsel in summation
   referred to a party as “a thief,” this Court affirmed the denial of a new trial
   because there was evidence that the individual in question stole copyright.11
   By contrast, this Court ordered a new trial when counsel made multiple
   inappropriate remarks, including referring to the victim “as a woman who
   had flouted respect for marriage vows, who had used illegal drugs, and who
   was trying to take advantage of the good people of rural northern
   Mississippi.” 12 But even amidst such remarks, we made clear that we “would
   not reverse the district court . . . on the basis of these remarks alone, absent a
   timely objection.” 13 Rather, we instructed that the inappropriate comments
   made by counsel must be considered in conjunction with a particularly low
   award and an overwhelming amount of evidence: “[g]iven the strength of the
   plaintiff’s evidence on causation and the uncontradicted testimony that she
   is totally disabled and will incur enormous expenses over her lifetime as a
   result of her disability, we think the jury verdict of $55,000 strongly indicates
   that the jury’s deliberation in this case was not impartial.” 14
          Here, the record falls far short of indisputable evidence of injury and
   disability that would compel a conclusion that the jury would have otherwise

          10
               In re Isbell, 774 F.3d at 872 (quoting Wallner, 470 F. App’x at 233).
          11
               Id.
          12
               Hall v. Freese, 735 F.2d 956, 960 (5th Cir. 1984).
          13
               Id. at 962.
          14
               Id. at 959–60.

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                                          No. 22-10415

   awarded a higher verdict but for the statements at issue. Indeed, the evidence
   shows: the original police report was that neither driver was injured;
   Heckman had a preexisting spinal condition; Heckman was released from
   physical therapy with no restrictions, an ability to perform the work required
   at his job, and no loss of earning capacity; medical bills, which informed the
   damages calculation, were substantially inflated—even considered “grossly
   excessive” by one expert; and contrary medical evidence regarding the
   necessity of the surgery or the causation. In other words, the damages award
   was likely based on record evidence rather than defense counsel’s lamentable
   references. And as the trial court observed, the evidence regarding excessive,
   inflated billing suggests that the word “hammer,” as used colloquially
   meaning to “drive” or “build,” 15 has a basis in the record. 16
           Any prejudice was also undermined by the usual instructions. In
   analogous cases, we have found comfort in the trial court’s limiting
   instructions as minimizing any prejudicial effect. 17 So do we. Here, the trial
   court gave the pattern instructions: (i) “[t]he testimony of the witnesses and
   other exhibits introduced by the parties constitute the evidence”; (ii) that
   “statements of counsel are not evidence; they are only arguments”; (iii) “to
   decide the case in a fair, impartial, and unbiased manner, based entirely on
   the law and on the evidence presented to you in the courtroom”; and (iv) that
   jurors “may not be influenced by passion, prejudice, or sympathy that [they]
   might have for the plaintiff or the defendant in arriving at [their] verdict.” As

           15
               See Hammer, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/hammer
   (last visited Mar. 6, 2023).
           16
            See In re Isbell, 774 F.3d at 872 (declining to order a new trial where potentially
   inflammatory closing statements “were not without basis in the record”).
           17
                See, e.g., id.

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   “[j]uries are presumed to follow the instructions of the court,” 18 we conclude
   that the trial court’s instructions “effectively minimized any prejudice
   flowing from [the] improper remarks.” 19
           Heckman’s argument that counsel’s references violated in limine
   orders and instructions is similarly unpersuasive. The in limine order at issue
   is Heckman’s motion to bar defense counsel from any “comments or
   references or inferences” that he would get “rich,” e.g., winning the
   “lottery.” Reasonable minds can differ as to whether referencing
   “hammering up” damages is akin to making Heckman rich or to benefitting
   the medical professionals who inflated their bills, but Heckman’s
   interpretation is far from singularly correct, and “legal error must be clear or
   obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” 20 And once again,
   “[t]ellingly, an objection was not made when the statements were made.” 21
           In sum, any impropriety of counsel’s statements notwithstanding, the
   strong bar to remittitur or a grant of a new trial, the evidence justifying a low
   damages calculation, the lack of concern in the moment, and the jury
   instructions neuter Heckman’s claim to a new trial on the basis of defense
   counsel’s closing arguments.

           18
                Hollis v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 259 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 2001).
           19
             Wallner, 470 F. App’x at 233 (citation omitted); see also Learmonth v. Sears,
   Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 732–33 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that any prejudice flowing
   from improper comments “was effectively cured by the court’s sustainment of Sears’
   objections to each of the statements at trial, as well as by the court’s jury charge” (emphasis
   added)).
           20
                Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
           21
                Vital, 685 F. App’x at 358.

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                                                    B.
           “Batson claims are evaluated under a three-step process: (1) [a party]
   makes a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was based on
   race; (2) the [opposing party] provides a race-neutral basis for the strike; (3)
   the trial court determines whether the [striking party] purposefully
   discriminated against the juror.” 22 The trial court’s determination must be
   supported by the challenging party, which effectively “ha[s] the burden to
   show that the reason given was pretextual or otherwise inadequate.” 23 When
   a Batson challenge is raised at trial and then again on appeal, “[w]e pay great
   deference to the trial judge’s decision.” 24 It follows that “we will affirm the
   district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous, that
   is unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
   committed.” 25
           The Parties agree that defense counsel used two peremptory strikes
   against the only two Black persons on the venire panel. The trial court
   concluded that these strikes made a prima facie case of discrimination. The
   trial court found that Caballero articulated a sufficient non-discriminatory
   explanation: Venireperson No. 1, Golden, was struck in light of “questions

           22
             Broadnax v. Lumpkin, 987 F.3d 400, 409 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Foster v.
   Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 (2016)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 859 (2022).
            Batson challenges typically arise in criminal or habeas contexts, but Batson’s
   framework squarely applies to traditional civil suits. See, e.g., Great Plains Equip., Inc. v.
   Koch Gathering Sys., Inc., 45 F.3d 962, 964 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A party to a civil suit can
   challenge another party’s use of a peremptory strike that excludes a prospective juror on
   the basis of that juror’s race.” (citations omitted)).
           23
                Great Plains, 45 F.3d at 965.
           24
              Palmer v. Lares, 42 F.3d 975, 979 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
   Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 1992)).
           25
                Great Plains, 45 F.3d at 964 (citation omitted).

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   about his ability to follow the Court’s instructions and . . . holding
   [Caballero] to a higher standard than an ordinary person,” while
   Venireperson No. 2, Garnett, was struck because she was a social worker and
   thus, according to defense counsel, may be more sympathetic to an injured
   plaintiff. The trial court then reviewed the annotations and marks regarding
   the jurors stricken peremptorily and compared the two peremptorily stricken
   jurors to other jurors. After undertaking “a sensitive inquiry into the
   circumstantial and the direct evidence” of discrimination, the trial court
   found “no direct evidence” of inappropriate bias and concluded that the
   “circumstantial evidence that was suggested . . . [wa]s not persuasive enough
   to convince [the court] that intentional discrimination has been proven on
   these facts.”
           On appeal, Heckman argues that Magistrate Judge Ray “was reluctant
   to make a finding that [] Caballero’s striking of all the black jurors was race
   discrimination,” and that such discrimination was present, evidenced by a
   side-by-side comparison of jurors and implicit bias. We disagree.
           First, “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed that, when analyzing
   Batson challenges, ‘bare statistics’ are not the be-all end-all”; 26 instead, for
   “statistical evidence to be relevant, data concerning the entire jury pool is
   necessary. The number of strikes used to excuse minority . . . jury pool
   members is irrelevant on its own.” 27 Thus, that Caballero used peremptory

           26
              Chamberlin v. Fisher, 885 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Miller-
   El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)).
           27
             Sheppard v. Davis, 967 F.3d 458, 472 n.14 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Medellin v.
   Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 278–79 (5th Cir. 2004)).

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   strikes to “remove 100% of the nonwhite veniremembers” does not, in itself,
   establish discrimination. 28
          Second, scrutiny into the two strikes at issue—both in isolation and in
   the context of the other strikes—undermines Heckman’s argument.
   Consider Ms. Garnett. Defense counsel stated that “our basis for striking her
   is the fact that she’s a social worker. In my experience, people that work in
   the social work industry are generally more sympathetic, and that’s the
   reason that we struck her.” Thereafter, Heckman’s counsel argued that
   social workers are less sympathetic as they “have become very skeptical of
   individuals because . . . they’re always dealing with people who aren’t telling
   the truth.” Subsequently, Heckman’s counsel suggested that a “children’s
   programming librarian” and a “patient coordinator” are equally sympathetic
   but were not stricken, suggesting racial bias. Differing views counsel have as
   to social workers’ sympathy—or lack thereof—offers not only a clearer
   explanation, but a plausible non-pretextual reason. Caballero statistically
   reframes the argument persuasively: defense counsel struck 100% of social
   workers among the entire venire panel who may be especially sympathetic
   jurors. Absent any additional indicia of discrimination in counsel’s notes or
   statements, this strike does not give rise to strong evidence of discrimination.
          Now consider Mr. Golden. Defense counsel’s peremptory strike was
   used based on a conversation defense counsel undertook focusing on the
   standards of care owed by commercial truck drivers. In this open discussion,
   several venirepersons voiced—to varying degrees—some concern that they
   may hold truck drivers’ driving “to a higher standard of care . . . just by virtue
   of the fact they’re driving a truck.” After defense counsel probed multiple
   venirepersons’ beliefs on this issue, defense moved to strike two for cause.

          28
               Broadnax, 987 F.3d at 412.

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   The trial court denied the strike as to Venireperson No. 1, Mr. Golden, who
   is Black, but granted the strike as to Venireperson No. 4, Mr. Mitchell, who
   is not; the trial court distinguished the two challenges based on the different
   degrees of reluctance the respective venirepersons evinced with respect to
   the standard of care they believed truck drivers owed as well as their
   willingness or ability to disregard that instinct and follow the court’s
   instructions on this topic. Subsequently, defense counsel used a peremptory
   strike on Mr. Golden.
           Heckman argues that other venirepersons expressed similar concerns
   regarding 18-wheel truck drivers’ duties but were not peremptorily struck,
   giving rise to an inference of discrimination. There is more to the story,
   though: of the multiple members of the venire who expressed such concerns,
   defense counsel only challenged two for cause, meaning defense counsel’s
   concerns on this issue about other venirepersons were assuaged by the
   entirety of the discussion. Of the two challenged for cause, Mitchell—who is
   not Black—was removed, but Golden—who is Black—was not, prompting
   defense counsel to use a peremptory strike based on the same concern.
   Where a party has successfully challenged another juror on the same grounds
   for cause and attempted to do so again, it could be said that the “challenge
   for cause might have been justified,” thereby providing a sufficient non-
   pretextual reason for the challenge and diminishing the inference of
   discrimination—particularly where the striking party’s explanation for a
   peremptory strike “need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge
   for cause.” 29 Moreover, Caballero’s reframing of relevant statistics of the

           29
               United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
   district court’s observation that “‘a challenge for cause might have been justified’ as to this
   juror” was “more than sufficient under Batson, which emphasized that ‘the prosecutor’s
   explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause’” (quoting
   Batson, 476 U.S. at 97)).

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   challenge process is again persuasive: defense counsel struck 100% “of the
   venire members who were challenged but not removed for cause.”
           Finally, Heckman finds no refuge in arguments sounding in implicit
   bias. “Batson is not designed to root out implicit bias, as Justices Breyer and
   Marshall . . . have discussed in some depth.” 30
           Given no direct evidence of discrimination for the challenges, nominal
   circumstantial evidence (the treatment of minimally comparable jurors), and
   the deference this Court gives to a trial court with respect to Batson rulings,
   Heckman’s Batson claim does not warrant a new trial.
                                             *****
           We AFFIRM.

           30
              Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1110 n.26 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended (Mar. 21,
   2016); see Miller–El, 545 U.S. at 267–68 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at
   106 (Marshall, J., concurring)).

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