Court Opinion

ID: 9955506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:12:29.126591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:02.099811
License: Public Domain

[Cite as SoFi Lending Corp. v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-1166.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

SOFI LENDING CORP. AS                                 :
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR BLUE
RIDGE BANK, N.A.,                                     :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
                                                            No. 113153
                v.                                    :

TYRONE WILLIAMS,                                      :

                Defendant-Appellant.                  :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 28, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-22-970998

                                           Appearances:

                Zwicker & Associates, P.C., Brittany R. Fitzgibbon,
                Michelle L. Baker, and Daniel D. Copfer, for appellee.

                Tyrone Williams, pro se.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

                Tyrone Williams (“Williams”) brings the instant appeal challenging the

trial court’s judgment entering a default judgment against Williams for the breach
of a loan agreement complaint, brought by SoFi Lending Corp. as attorney-in-fact

for Blue Ridge Bank, N.A.1 (“SoFi”). For the reasons that follow, this court affirms.

              On November 7, 2022, SoFi filed a complaint against Williams alleging

that Williams breached a loan agreement that he entered into with SoFi, seeking

$80,280.43 in damages. SoFi alleged that Williams breached the loan agreement

by defaulting on payments. A copy of the agreement was attached to the complaint

and demonstrated that Williams borrowed a personal loan from SoFi on February

12, 2019, in the amount of $100,000 and had agreed to pay $1,783.99 monthly until

the balance of the loan and the 12.315 percent interest were paid off.

             Williams did not answer the complaint, and SoFi moved for default

judgment in the amount of $80,280.43 plus the costs of the action, for a total of

$80,539.38. The trial court set the default hearing for February 14, 2023.

             On February 6, 2023, an entity named “Tam Trust TTEE Subrogee and

Surety for defendant/primary debtor” (hereinafter “Tam Trust”) filed a purported

answer, captioned “answer to summons response to complaint writ of mandamus

tender special deposit demand for reimbursement of beneficial interest.” In that

document, Tam Trust provided that it would like to “settle the account” and

“conditionally agree[d] with the plaintiff/adversary and their claims[.]”

             Tam Trust argued that it is “the subrogee and surety standing as a living

private American man and only real party in this matter.” The substance of Tam

      1 Williams’s loan was sold to Blue Ridge Bank, N.A. in portfolio sale. SoFi filed the

instant action as the attorney-in-fact for Blue Ridge Bank, N.A.
Trust’s filing indicated that it, “under legal compulsion to do so,” made all of the

payments for and on behalf of Williams and thus was “subrogated to the rights of

the creditor in this [sic] (all) transactions.” The filing cited to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), for the proposition that there is no

right to contract under common law and included a purported writ of mandamus,

asking the court to “certify [Tam Trust’s] right to subrogation,” as well as a request

to “tender special deposit,” and a “demand for reimbursement of beneficial interest,”

demanding “full reimbursement for all funds paid, funds claimed to be not paid,

interest paid and unpaid, interest earned, future earnings, all values and late fees in

the amount of $150,000[].”

             SoFi filed a motion to strike the answer, arguing that Tam Trust is not

an attorney and is not a party to this case and cannot answer on behalf of Williams.

Tam Trust and/or Williams followed with four filings.

             In the first filing, “Tyrone Williams Trustee as the subrogee and surety

standing as a living private American man” filed a separate “tender special deposit”

that included an exhibit labeled a “promissory note” and “negotiable security

instrument” promising to pay Blue Ridge Bank, N.A. a sum of $80,280.43. The

“promissory note” provided that payment would be due on the 5th of every month.

A handwritten sum is written next to the proposed amount of the monthly

payments, but it is illegible. The document included space for a notarized signature,

but noted that it would not be notarized unless it was accepted by Blue Ridge Bank,

N.A.
             The second filing, made by “Tyrone Williams (LLC) Trustee Tam

Trust,” filed a motion titled “demand for recoupment and reimbursement of

beneficial interest,” alleging that (1) all payments were made by Tam Trust, (2) Tam

Trust “has sustentative legal rights,” (3) as subrogee, Tam Trust is the “true

creditor,” (4) an irrevocable trust was created for “the contract in the matter,” and

(5) that SoFi had already claimed the credit when the note was securitized. The

motion demanded “full equitable recoupment and reimbursement for all funds

borrowed in Exhibit C, all funds paid by [surety], all funds claimed to be not paid,

all interest gained, all profits made, and any late fees accessed or an amount of

$150,000.00 (whichever is less).” Exhibit C was a copy of the document titled “SoFi

Personal Loan Truth in Lending Act Disclosure” and Exhibit B was a document

entitled “Bill of Sale” demonstrating that SoFi Lending Corp. sold a portfolio of loans

to Blue Ridge Bank, N.A.

             “Tyrone Williams (LLC) Trustee Tam Trust” also filed an answer to the

complaint, alleging nearly identical sentiments to those in Tam Trust’s answer. The

final filing responded to SoFi’s motion to strike, and provided:

      Though I stand as a private living American civilian in my capacity as
      Trustee of TAM Trust the subrogee for the defendant, I am in fact the
      only living party in the matter. I have not presented myself as an
      attorney nor do I practice or take part in any form of necromancy.

      ***

      As a living private American civilian and trustee of this private trust
      (TAM TRUST) these documents must be accepted and tried by this
      court as an Article 3 Court under the doctrine of Equity/Chancery from
      the original Constitution; for this response and all submission
      henceforth. For it is my goal as surety and only real living private party
      in this matter to settle this debt with tender [of] special deposit. Please
      let it be known that I AM the heir, beneficiary, and subrogee of this
      account. I AM a living soul and implied surety for this matter and I AM
      standing in for and on behalf of the fictitious TYRONE WILLIAMS the
      defendant/primary debtor as Tyrone Williams Trustee, subrogee.

              Three days later, “Tyrone Williams (LLC) Trustee Tam Trust” filed a

“notice of abatement,” asking the court to “abate” the case and alleged the following

facts in support thereof:

      1. The defendant and plaintiff in this matter are fictitious non-living,
      soul-less personalities.

      2. I am a living private American civilian, Trustee of a private trust, and
      implied surety.

      3. The 1983 case of [Erie R.R. v. Thompkins] concluded that “there is
      no right to contract under common law[.]”

      4. This and all contracts require full disclosure. The plaintiff did not
      fully disclose its intentions with this security.

      5. Both partie[s] in a contract must provide something of equal
      worth/value or consideration. The plaintiff provide [sic] consideration
      of anything of intrinsic value.

      6. A contract must be signed by both parties with a wet signature. The
      plaintiff which is a soul-less entity did not sign nor can it have a 3rd
      party sign on its behalf.

      7. I am the true creditor in this matter, and I am owed chattels from the
      creation, sale, and profits of the securities [that] could not be created
      without me, the creditor.

      8. The 1913 Federal reserve Act along with the Gold Reserve act of 1934
      eliminated gold backed currency leaving the fiat dollar with no intrinsic
      value and no legal money. I, as the subrogee do not deal in illegal fiat
      currency therefore I tendered special deposit to settle this debt.
      9. There is no dispute, I tendered a special deposit with the creation of
      a new promissory note/security that zero [sic] out the balance and can
      be financially trader for additional value for the plaintiff.

      10. An irrevocable trust was formed in this matter, making the debtor
      and the beneficiary one. If the debtor and the beneficiary become one
      over the same matter the debt/duty to perform no longer exist.

             About three months later, the trial court granted SoFi’s motion to

strike, finding that “Tam Trust” and/or “Tam Trust Ttee” are not named defendants

and allowed Williams another 14 days to file an answer and cautioned that failure to

do so would result in a default judgment against Williams. The trial court allowed

SoFi additional time to respond to the numerous motions, continued the trial date,

and set a status conference via telephone for September 7, 2023.

             On August 1, 2023, Williams filed eight separate motions, this time

signed “Tyrone Williams Twilliams ex Relatione, authorized user, subrogee and

surety for and on behalf of Defendant/Primary Debtor.” These motions, which

included an answer to SoFi’s motion to strike (that had already been ruled upon), an

answer to the complaint, a “tender special deposit,” a “demand for reimbursement

of beneficial interest,” a writ of mandamus, a “writ of discovery,” and a “notice of

abatement.” Accompanying the new answer to SoFi’s motion to strike, Williams

provided:

      As a living private American civilian and trustee of this private trust
      (TAM TRUST) these documents must be accepted and tried by this
      court as an Article 3 Court under the doctrine of Equity from the
      original Constitution; for this response and all submission henceforth.
      For it is my goal as surety and only real living private party in this
      matter to settle this debt with tender of special deposit. Please let it be
      known that I AM the heir, beneficiary, and subrogee of this account. I
      AM Surety, a living soul and implied surety for this matter. I AM Surety
      for and on behalf of the fictitious TYRONE WILLIAMS the
      defendant/primary debtor. I state for the record to this most honorable
      court that I wish to subrogate the chattels and have this account settled
      and discharge[d].

              Nearly all of the other motions echoed the arguments made in prior

filings, and all indicated that the filing party was “sui jurist” rather than “pro se.”

              On August 30, 2023, the trial court found Williams in default,

reasoning that “Tyrone Williams, Twilliams ex Relatione, authorized user, subrogee,

and surety for and on behalf of defendant/primary debtor” filed the responses, not

Williams. The court struck the filings and ordered that pursuant to Civ.R. 55, SoFi

was entitled to default judgment against Williams in the amount of $80,539.38 plus

costs. Hereinafter, we will refer to all “parties” that made filings as or on behalf of

Williams as “Williams” for convenience.

              Williams appealed, and the parties were directed to this court’s

mediation department.       The mediator met with the parties on two separate

occasions, and the parties were unable to reach a settlement. The instant appeal

commenced, and Williams assigns a single error for our review, which provides,

verbatim:

      Lower court errored in stating Appellant’s filings/writs/answers were
      filed Pro Se, when Appellant clearly filed Sui Jurist [sic]. Making a
      special appearance in Proper Person.

              We recognize that while Williams appears to contest the distinction

between “pro se” and “sui juris,” his reason for doing so is an overarching argument
that the trial court erred in finding Williams in default because “Williams” had

appeared “sui juris” rather than “pro se.”

             We also find that this “pro se” and “sui juris” argument, and all caselaw

pertaining thereto, was not raised at the trial-court level, so we may not consider

those arguments because they have been waived. It is well settled that a party cannot

raise new arguments and legal issues for the first time on appeal and that failure to

raise an issue before the trial court waives that issue for appellate purposes. Miller

v. Cardinal Care Mgt., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107730, 2019-Ohio-2826, ¶ 23, citing

Cleveland Town Ctr., L.L.C. v. Fin. Exchange Co. of Ohio, Inc., 2017-Ohio-384, 83

N.E.3d 383 (8th Dist.).

              A trial court’s ruling on a motion for default judgment is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Active Time L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 108561, 2019-Ohio-4069, ¶ 7; Melling v. Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103007,

2016-Ohio-112, ¶ 28. A court abuses its discretion when it exercises its judgment in

an unwarranted way with respect to a matter over which it has discretionary

authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d

463, ¶ 35.

              Williams, by attempting to hide behind various “entities” and labels

such as “trustee,” “surety,” and “subrogee,” has done all but answer as Williams,

which would have been all that was necessary to avoid a default judgment in this

matter. However, Williams and the various labels under which he had filed,

purports to be a “living private American civilian” and has referred to “Tyrone
Williams” as fictitious. Williams insists that he is not subject to the “right to

contract” because there is no “common law right to contract.” These arguments are

consistent with “sovereign citizen” arguments.

              While Williams does not explicitly describe himself as a “sovereign

citizen,” he describes himself as a “Moorish American National,” which has been

grouped with “meritless rhetoric frequently espoused by tax protestors, sovereign

citizens, and self-proclaimed Moorish-Americans.” United States v. Coleman, 871

F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir.2017) (collecting cases).

              Sovereign citizen and other adjacent arguments, as the one in the case

at bar, have been repeatedly dismissed as “frivolous” and undeserving of significant

discussion by numerous Ohio and federal courts. See, e.g., State v. Thigpen, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99841, 2014-Ohio-207, ¶ 39 (“Thigpen’s arguments are frivolous

and have been held to be delay tactics.”); State v. Few, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

25969, 2015-Ohio-2292, ¶ 6 (finding a “sovereign citizen” argument “wholly

frivolous”); People of the Republic United States ex rel. Goldsmith v. Schreier,

D.S.D., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131987, 10 (Sept. 17, 2012) (citations omitted) (“Other

courts have noted the sovereign citizen theory has been consistently rejected and in

addition to meritless and patently frivolous, the theory has been referred to as

nonsensical, gibberish, and having no conceivable validity in American Law.”).

              “Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of descent, be it as a

‘sovereign citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’

that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be
rejected summarily, however they are presented.” United States v. Benabe, 654

F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir.2011). In accordance with numerous state and federal

precedents, we agree and summarily reject Williams’s arguments, overruling his

assignment of error.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

___________________________________
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR