Court Opinion

ID: 9380223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 17:08:36.179549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.493193
License: Public Domain

J-A28033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: V.C.-L., A MINOR                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: V.C.-L.                         :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2332 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 8, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Juvenile Division
                       at No(s): CP-46-DP-0000092-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                             FILED MARCH 17, 2023

        V.C.-L. (“Child”), via her guardian ad litem (“GAL”), appeals from the

trial court’s order adjudicating her dependent, insofar as the order does not

include a finding of child abuse, perpetrated by her parents, K.L.-C. (“Mother”)

and A.C.-V (“Father”), pursuant to the Child Protective Services Law

(“CPSL”).1      Following our careful review, we vacate and remand with

instructions.

        The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

              This case was initiated via a [d]ependency [p]etition filed by
        the Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth (“OCY”) on
        June 14, 2022, seeking that [Child] be adjudicated dependent. An
        [a]mended [d]ependency [p]etition was filed by OCY on July 20,
        2022, which added an allegation of child abuse against both
        [Mother and Father]. A hearing was held before the [trial court]

____________________________________________

1   See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6387.
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     on August 1, 2022, with th[e] court’s [o]rder of [a]djudication
     following on August 8, 2022.

            On February 8, 2022, Mother and Father . . . brought the
     then 5-month-old [C]hild to the Children’s Hospital of
     Pennsylvania [(“CHOP”)], King of Prussia Campus. [Child] was
     brought in seeking medical care for fussiness and issues related
     to her legs. A medical evaluation was performed and [Child]
     received a full-body x-ray, also known as a skeletal survey. At
     the time of this initial evaluation, the medical professionals were
     unable to determine the cause of the original complaint. On
     February 11, 2022, [Child] received an MRI to further investigate
     the cause of her fussiness and pain.             The MRI showed
     abnormalities in [Child’s] legs, and she was started on antibiotics
     for what was believed to be a bone infection. A second MRI was
     done on February 16, 2022, which noted abnormalities in the right
     femur, thigh bone, left tibia, and shin bone, ruling out the bone
     infection. Additional x-rays of [Child’s] legs were taken on
     February 18, 2022. These images showed healing fractures in the
     right femur and left tibia.

             . . . Kristin Fortin, [M.D.], a physician at [CHOP] . . . testified
     at the August 1, 2022, hearing as an expert on behalf of OCY. The
     doctor was consulted on the case after the February 18, 2022[] x-
     ray images were taken. [Dr.] Fortin indicated in her testimony
     that the x-rays revealed an oblique fracture in the right femur and
     left tibia. Although not initially visible, Dr. Fortin noted that once
     the doctors saw evidence of the fractures on the MRI taken
     February 18, 2022, signs of these fractures were also found visible
     when looking back at the February 8, 2022, x-ray images. On
     February 18, 2022, a referral was made to OCY regarding [Child],
     which triggered the eventual filing of the original [d]ependency
     [p]etition on June 4, 2022.

           [Dr. Fortin’s testimony established the following: Child
     suffered a broken right femur (thigh bone) and a broken left tibia
     (shin bone). See N.T., 8/1/22, at 6, 12. The fractures were
     oblique (i.e., at an angle, as opposed to transverse, which would
     be straight across the bone). See id. at 16. An oblique fracture
     can occur if there is “torsion or twisting around the long access of
     the bone,” or if there is a fall that involves twisting. See id. at
     17. While an older child, capable of walking, could suffer a
     “non[-]displaced fracture[] from [an] accident that they would
     cause themselves,” Child was too young to be walking, thus, it
     was unlikely that she sustained oblique fractures resulting from a

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     fall on her own. See id. at 17-19. Child’s injuries similarly could
     not be explained by a fall off a bed, because, with “an infant[,]
     most commonly[,] they hit their head[,] and we see like a skull
     fracture with that type of mechanism. It would need to be a
     mechanism where it was landing on the leg and turning over[,]
     but [that] wouldn’t explain fractures to both legs.” Id. at 19.]

            [Father had previously reported that the night before he and
     Mother brought Child to CHOP, he had been sitting with Child on
     a bed while Mother was in the shower; Child was sitting up on the
     bed with her legs crossed, and then she fell all the way forward,
     and Father purported to hear a “crack,” after which Child began
     abnormally crying. See id. at 14. Dr. Fortin opined that, even
     given Father’s explanation for how the injuries occurred, there
     was no “definite accident that could explain everything,” which
     was why she suspected physical abuse had occurred. See id. at
     31. Mother and Father also indicated Child had participated in
     physical therapy—for torticollis, i.e., difficulty moving her neck—
     the day before they brought her to CHOP. See id. at 14, 36, 82;
     still, Dr. Fortin opined, generally there was no “accidental
     explanation” for Child’s injuries, and, more specifically, she would
     not expect Child’s physical therapy to result in these fractures.
     See id. at 39, 48. Child did not have a bone infection, vitamin D
     deficiency, or any genetic issues known to result in weak bones.
     See id. at 10, 22, 23. Child does have a genetic variant of
     “unknown significance”; however, it does not play a role in bone
     development or bone health, but relates to an issue with the
     immune system which makes infections more likely. See N.T.,
     8/1/22, at 23-24. The hospital’s rheumatology team tested
     Child’s blood because, if her genetic variant were causing
     problems with her immune system, certain blood tests would
     reflect an abnormality; however, Child’s blood tests came back
     normal. See id. at 24.]

            Upon conclusion of the one-day hearing before the [trial
     court], an [o]rder . . . was entered adjudicating [Child] dependent,
     with Mother and Father retaining legal and physical custody. [The
     trial court premised its dependency adjudication on “the fact that
     the evidence that was presented[,] regarding the physical
     injuries[, was they] would not ordinarily be sustained but for the
     action or inaction of the parents[,] and [there was] really no
     plausible explanation on how those injuries occurred.” N.T.,
     8/8/22, at 3.] Th[e] court made the additional finding that [Child]
     would benefit from the services associated with an adjudication of

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        dependency. Th[e] court did not find [Child] to be a victim of child
        abuse.

              [Child], through her [GAL], filed the instant appeal . . .. As
        required, [Child] filed the 1925(b) concise statement
        contemporaneous with the appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/22, at 2-4 (internal citations to the record omitted).2

The trial court likewise complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        Child raises the following issues for our review:

        1. Did the lower court err in failing to make a finding of child abuse
           against [M]other and [F]ather[,] where the expert medical
           testimony presented at the dependency hearing ruled out any
           underlying medical condition as the cause of . . . [C]hild’s
           injuries, no accident was reported, and [M]other and [F]ather
           presented no evidence to rebut the presumption against them
           of child abuse under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6381(d)?

        2. Was the lower court’s failure to make a finding of child abuse
           against [M]other and [F]ather against the weight of the
           evidence[,] where the expert medical testimony presented at
           the dependency hearing ruled out any underlying medical
           condition as the cause of the child’s injuries, no accident was
           reported, and [M]other and [F]ather presented no evidence to
           rebut the presumption against them of child abuse under 23
           Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6381(d)?

Child’s Brief at 4.3

        Our standard of review is as follows:

              The standard of review in dependency cases requires an
        appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
____________________________________________

2 The trial court held the hearing on August 1, 2022, and a subsequent hearing
on August 8, 2022, whereat it issued its ruling. However, the notes of
testimony from the August 1, 2022 hearing are erroneously dated August 8,
2022. For clarity, citations to the notes of testimony will reference the correct
dates.

3   OCY joins in Child’s brief. See OCY Letter, 11/14/22.

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      determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
      record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
      lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
      review for an abuse of discretion.

Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d 553, 557 (Pa. Super. 2020) (internal citations

omitted).

      In her first issue, Child does not contest her dependency adjudication,

but rather asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to make

a finding of child abuse against Mother and Father pursuant to the CPSL. We

initially note that,

      [although] dependency proceedings are governed by the Juvenile
      Act[, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6475, the CPSL] controls
      determinations regarding findings of child abuse, which the
      juvenile courts must find by clear and convincing evidence. . . .
      [T]he [Juvenile] Act and the [CPSL] must be applied together in
      the resolution of child abuse complaints under the [CPSL, and]
      reference must be made to the definition sections of both the [Act]
      and the [CPSL] to determine how that finding [of child abuse] is
      interrelated.

            As part of [a] dependency adjudication, a court may find a
      parent [or caregiver] to be the perpetrator of child abuse[ ] as
      defined by the . . . CPSL. . . ..

Interest of G.R., 282 A.3d 376, 380–81 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations,

quotations, and indentation omitted; some brackets in original).

      The CPSL defines “child abuse,” in relevant part, as “intentionally,

knowingly or recklessly doing any of the following: (1) Causing bodily injury

to a child through any recent act or failure to act. . . ..”        23 Pa.C.S.A.

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§ 6303(b.1)(1).4 As noted above, the standard of proof for a finding of child

abuse pursuant to section 6303(b.1)(1) is clear and convincing evidence,

which is “evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable

the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth

of the precise facts in issue.” Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d at 558 (internal

citation and quotations omitted). Clear and convincing evidence of abuse is

established where there are injuries that are “non-accidental, not self-

sustained, and not the result of any bone abnormalities or genetic disorders.”

Interest of G.R., 282 A.3d at 382. When a parent contests an allegation of

child abuse, and the sufficiency of the evidence thereof, and offers an

explanation for the injury, “the proper issue that must be addressed . . . is

whether the injuries are entirely consistent with common types of child abuse

and inconsistent with [the proffered] explanation.”     Interest of A.C., 237

A.3d at 561 (internal citation omitted).

       Child argues the trial court abused its discretion in declining to enter a

finding of child abuse against Mother and Father, given Dr. Fortin’s testimony

that the fractures required “some mechanism involving twisting”; Child was,

at five months old, not old enough to walk; nor would a fall explain both

fractures; nor would Father’s explanation that Child had, while sitting on the

____________________________________________

4 For the purposes of the CPSL, the terms “intentionally,” “knowingly,” and
“recklessly” have the same meaning as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302. See
Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d at 558 (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(a)).

                                           -6-
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bed, fallen forward onto the mattress account for the fractures. See Child’s

Brief at 20. Child further highlights Dr. Fortin’s testimony that indicated her

concern for abuse based on the lack of a medical or accidental cause for the

injuries. See id. Given Child’s “serious injuries that could not be attributed

to an accident or an underlying medical condition,” and that her parents gave

explanations which “could not plausibly have caused the injuries,” Child

maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find abuse.

Id. at 22.

      The trial court considered Child’s issue and determined it merited no

relief. As the court explained:

            Doctor Fortin, the expert witness, indicated that the
      fractures seen in [Child’s] legs are more commonly found in
      children who are walking, as they can be caused by simple
      accidents that occur when in motion. (N.T., August 1, 2022, p.
      19). The [doctor] stated that “we don’t expect” that type of
      fracture to occur in a non-walker without a caregiver being aware,
      but she also indicated that they could not look at the x-ray and
      know exactly what happened or when the injury occurred. ([Id.
      at] 16, 18, 19). Doctor Fortin testified that Mother and Father
      were cooperative with the medical professionals, and consistent
      in their recounting of events. ([Id. at] 39-40).

             The court heard testimony that there was an incident when
      Father sat [Child] up, and, while supported, [Child’s] body fell
      forward so that her head was on the mattress of the bed, at which
      time Father heard a crack. ([Id. at] 14). Doctor Fortin testified
      that it would be “unexpected” for the aforementioned incident to
      have caused the injuries. ([Id. at] 21). It was also testified to
      that in the month leading up to February 8, 2022, [Child] was
      receiving physical therapy for an unrelated neck issue but that the
      therapy would not be expected to lead to the fractures suffered
      by [Child]. ([Id. at] 35, 48).

            The Court in In the Matter of Kaitlyn Read stated that “it
      is an unwarranted conclusion to find abuse simply because the

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      parents did not introduce any explanations for the injuries. The
      evidence must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
      children were abused. [In]nuendo and suspicion alone are not
      enough to compel a finding of child abuse.” 693 A.2d 607, 611
      (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing In the Interest of J.M., 652 A.2d 877,
      880 (Pa. Super. 1995)).

             Similar to the facts in J.M., the testimony presented before
      the undersigned was only innuendo and suspicion. The record is
      absent of testimony that would provide a possible incident causing
      or explanation for the fractures. [OCY] failed to provide any
      evidence or theory as to how they could have occurred. Instead,
      OCY presented evidence to support the fact that the doctors were
      unable to explain the injuries. As opposed to using concrete
      information and fact, OCY used the lack of explanation as support
      for a finding of abuse.

            It is significant to this court, as stated on the record, that
      both the OCY caseworker and the [GAL] for [Child] agreed that
      she should remain with Mother and Father. (N.T., August 1, 2022,
      p. 102). The OCY caseworker, Carol Robinson, testified that in
      her opinion; 24-hour supervision was unnecessary and the safety
      plan could be lifted. Ms. Robinson indicated that Mother and
      Father were receiving in-home services and willing to voluntarily
      continue with such services. ([Id. at] 64-65).

            After careful review of the evidence and testimony
      presented, it is clear to this court that OCY did not meet its burden
      in proving that [Child] was abused by Mother and/or Father.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/22, at 6-8.

      Following our review, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in

declining to make a finding of child abuse. Our review of Dr. Fortin’s testimony

reveals the following about Child’s injuries: Child suffered a right broken femur

(thigh bone) and a left broken tibia (shin bone). See N.T., 8/1/22, at 6, 12.

The fractures were oblique (i.e., at an angle, as opposed to transverse, which

would be straight across the bone). See id. at 16. An oblique fracture can

occur if there is “torsion or twisting around the long access of the bone,” or if

                                      -8-
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there is a fall that involves twisting. See id. at 17. While an older child,

capable of walking, could suffer a “non[-]displaced fracture[] from [an]

accident that they would cause themselves,” Child was too young to be

walking, thus, it was unlikely that she sustained oblique fractures because she

fell on her own.      See id. at 17-19.        Child’s injuries similarly could not be

explained by a fall off the bed, because, with “an infant[,] most commonly[,]

they hit their head[,] and we see like a skull fracture with that type of

mechanism. It would need to be a mechanism where it was landing on the

leg and turning over[,] but [that] wouldn’t explain fractures to both

legs.” Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Father had previously reported that the

night before he and Mother brought Child to CHOP,

       [M]other was in the shower. And he was with [Child] on the
       parent’s bed, and [Child] was—had her legs crossed. And he
       helped her to sit up. So[,] when he helped her to sit up, she fell
       all the way forward so that her head was onto the mattress. He
       said at that time[,] he heard a crack and [Child] was crying, and
       it was abnormal crying.

N.T., 8/1/22, at 14; accord id. at 50 (OCY caseworker explaining that parents

had related to her the same story). Dr. Fortin opined that, even given Father’s

explanation for how the injuries occurred, there was no “definite accident that

could explain everything,” which was why she suspected physical abuse had

occurred. See id. at 31.5         Child did not have a bone infection, vitamin D

____________________________________________

5 Mother and Father also indicated Child had participated in physical therapy
the day before, see N.T., 8/1/22, at 14, 82; still, Dr. Fortin opined generally
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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deficiency, or any genetic issues known to result in these fractures. See id.

at 10, 22, 23.6 Dr. Fortin’s testimony established that Child suffered non-

accidental, non-self-sustained injuries, that did not result from bone

abnormalities or genetic disorders. Thus, OCY carried its burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that Child suffered from abuse. See, e.g.,

Interest of G.R., 282 A.3d at 379, 382 (holding the agency met its

evidentiary burden where the medical expert testified that, even though she

could not “opine as to how or exactly when the injuries occurred,” the child’s

“three acute oblique and buckle leg fractures were non-accidental, not self-

sustained, and not the result of any bone abnormalities or genetic disorders”);

see also Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d at 561-62 (affirming a finding of child

abuse where the injuries were “likely the result of non-accidental trauma and

prove[n] . . . to be inconsistent with [the parent’s] explanation”).

       The trial court cited this Court’s 1997 decision in Matter of Read in

support of its finding that Child was not subjected to abuse. See Trial Court

Opinion, 9/19/22, at 7. That case, however, is distinguishable. There, an

____________________________________________

that there was no “accidental explanation” for Child’s injuries, and, more
specifically, she would not expect Child’s physical therapy to result in these
fractures. See id. at 39, 48. We also observe that Child’s physical therapy
was for “torticollis,” that is, she had difficulty moving her neck. See id. at 36.

6 Child does have a genetic variant of “unknown significance,” however, it does
not play a role in bone development or bone health, but instead relates to an
issue with the immune system which makes infections more likely. See N.T.,
8/1/22, at 23-24.

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expert witness’s testimony about injuries to two five-month-old children

“clearly indicated that all of these injuries were not representative of the

classic type of abuse injuries and could have been caused in a number

of accidental ways.           These injuries could have been caused by other

children, or adults at any time and under any circumstances.” See Matter of

Read, 693 A.2d at 611 (emphasis added).            Here, by contrast, Dr. Fortin

opined that there were no accidental explanations for Child’s injuries. See,

e.g., N.T., 8/1/22, at 39 (Dr. Fortin explaining that “we were concerned that

there wasn’t a medical or accidental explanation, and there were two fractures

in an infant, which made us concerned for physical abuse”). The trial court’s

reliance on our 1995 decision in J.M. is also inapt, as the holding there was

that proof of abuse of one child did not support allegations of neglect or abuse

against that child’s siblings. See J.M., 652 A.2d at 881. Rather, this case is

similar to the recently decided decisions in A.C., where a child suffered a likely

non-accidental injury that was inconsistent with explanations offered by the

parent, and G.R., where a five-month-old child (as is the case here) suffered

leg injuries including, as here, oblique fractures.7 Lastly, we note that the trial

court explained “[i]t is significant to this court . . . that both the OCY

caseworker and the [GAL] agreed that she should remain with Mother and

____________________________________________

7 In G.R., the evidence established that the oblique fracture “most likely
occurred from a compression or twisting or torsional force or bending force to
the leg.” 282 A.3d at 379 (internal citation and quotations omitted).

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Father.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/22, at 7. The trial court’s conclusion that

this agreement was significant was an abuse of discretion, however, because

the parties’ agreement that Child should remain with Mother and Father is not

germane to a finding of abuse on February 7, 2022.8 In sum, OCY proved

abuse by clear and convincing evidence, and we conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion in declining to make a finding of abuse.

       In her second issue, Child argues the trial court committed a legal error

in declining to apply the rebuttable presumption under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d)

that Mother and Father were the perpetrators of Child’s abuse.        The CPSL

provides:

             Evidence that a child has suffered child abuse of such a
       nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by
       reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other person
       responsible for the welfare of the child shall be prima facie
       evidence of child abuse by the parent or other person responsible
       for the welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d). This Court has explained the interaction between

section 6303(b.1)(1), which governs a finding of child abuse, and section

6381(d), which provides for the rebuttable presumption of the identity of the

perpetrator of abuse, as follows:

             Prima facie evidence is not the standard that establishes the
       child has been abused, which must be established by clear and
       convincing evidence; it is the standard by which the court
       determines whom the abuser would be in a given case. . . . The
       Legislature has determined that the likelihood clearly established
____________________________________________

8We observe that in G.R., notwithstanding the trial court’s finding of child
abuse against the parents, the abused child was permitted, following the
abuse hearing, to resume living with the parents. See 282 A.3d at 380 n.9.

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      abuse has occurred, other than at the hands of the custodian, is
      so small that prima facie evidence the custodian has caused the
      injury, either by acts or omissions, is all that is required. . . . Such
      a standard provides maximum protection for the child victim. . . .
      Thus, the Legislature has balanced the needs of society and
      children for protection against the abuser’s possible patterned
      behavior and his/her right to freedom unless found guilty beyond
      a reasonable doubt.

            Our Supreme Court reiterated our observation that the
      Legislature deemed it wise and necessary to establish a different
      evidentiary standard by enacting Section 6381(d)’s presumption,
      to avoid the evidentiary conundrum where the existence of abuse
      is rather easily proven but the court is unable to assign
      responsibility for the heinous act among the responsible adults,
      and to protect children from future abuse.

Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d at 558–59 (internal citations, quotations,

brackets, and indentation omitted; some ellipses in original); accord

Interest of C.B., 264 A.3d 761, 771 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, 270

A.3d 1098 (Pa. 2022) (emphasizing that the “likelihood clearly established

abuse has occurred, other than at the hands of the custodian, is so small that

prima facie evidence the custodian has caused the injury, either by acts or

omissions, is all that is required”).

      Section 6381(d)’s presumption is rebuttable: “The parent or responsible

person may present evidence demonstrating that they did not inflict the

abuse, potentially by testifying that they gave responsibility for the child to

another person about whom they had no reason to fear or perhaps that the

injuries were accidental rather than abusive.” In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164,

1185 (Pa. 2015). Where such rebuttal evidence is offered, the trial court must

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evaluate the validity of the presumption through evaluation of the prima facie

evidence presented as well as the rebuttal evidence. See id.

      Child argues that the trial court adjudicated her dependent based on its

finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that her injuries ordinarily would

not exist except for the acts or omissions of the parents—and this finding

activated the rebuttable presumption pursuant to section 6381(d) that Child’s

parents had perpetrated the abuse.         See Child’s Brief at 24-25.        Child

maintains that “the trial court’s legal conclusions were not supported by its

own finding of fact, [and, therefore, its] ruling . . . is so contrary to the

evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added).

      The trial court explained its ruling as follows:

      As this court did not make a finding of abuse pursuant 23
      Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6303(b.1)(1), 23 Pa.C.S[.A.] § 6381(d) does not
      apply. . . . The court did not find that abuse occurred in this case,
      and thus no further determination needed to be made.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/22, at 8.

      Following our review, we conclude the trial court committed an error of

law by declining to apply the rebuttable presumption under section 6381(d).

As this Court has explained, section 6381(d) provides that “[p]rima facie

evidence is . . . the standard by which the court determines whom the abuser

would be in a given case.” Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d at 558–59 (emphasis

added). Hence, section 6381(d)’s rebuttable presumption about the identity

of Child’s abuser(s) is only applicable following a finding of abuse by clear and

convincing evidence pursuant to section 6303(b.1). Here, as discussed above,

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the evidence was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that

Child was the victim of abuse. We further observe that the trial court premised

its dependency adjudication—that is, its finding by clear and convincing

evidence grounds for dependency9—on “the fact that the evidence that was

presented[,] regarding the physical injuries[,was they] would not ordinarily

be sustained but for the action or inaction of the parents . . ..” N.T., 8/8/22,

at 3. The trial court thus made, on the record, the factual finding required to

trigger section 6381(d)’s rebuttable presumption that parents are the ones

who abused Child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d). At the hearing, Mother and

Father both offered evidence and briefly testified.      See generally N.T.,

8/1/22, at 74-95. Mother and Father were thus afforded the opportunity to

offer evidence rebutting the section 6381(d) presumption. Notwithstanding

Mother and Father’s evidence, the trial court found that Mother and Father

had offered no plausible explanation for Child’s injuries. See N.T., 8/8/22, at

3 (trial court adjudicating Child dependent and further finding that there was

“really no plausible explanation [for] how those injuries occurred”). Thus, the

trial court has already found that Mother and Father failed to rebut section

6381(d)’s presumption. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law

by failing to identify parents as the perpetrators of Child’s abuse pursuant to

____________________________________________

9See  In re G.T., 845 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2004) (nothing the burden
of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the petitioner to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that a child meets that statutory definition of
dependency).

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J-A28033-22

section 6381(d). Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s August 8, 2022 order

and remand for the trial court to re-enter the order and include a finding that

Child is the victim of abuse and that Mother and Father are the perpetrators.

See In re L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1185; see also Interest of G.R., 282 A.3d at

385.

       Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/2023

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