Court Opinion

ID: 9704067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:20:49.355932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:55.800726
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I disagree with the decision of the majority. As I view the facts and the applicable law, the trial court did not err in ruling that defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in admitting defendant’s confession into evidence. The determinative issue is whether defendant was illegally detained for custodial interrogation at the hotel before he was advised of his constitutional rights and before the police had probable cause to arrest him. The United States Supreme Court has defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612.) The application of this definition in particular' fact situations has provided must grist for the judicial mill. In People v. Savory (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 435 N.E.2d 226, the court comprehensively summarized post-Miranda decisions and detailed the criteria to be used by reviewing courts as follows: “In determining whether a statement was made in a custodial setting, the court must look to all of the circumstances surrounding the questioning, with no single factor deemed controlling, and then objectively evaluate whether a reasonable, innocent person would have believed he was free to leave or was expressly or impliedly bound to remain in the presence of police. [Citations.] Numerous factors are to be considered in this inquiry: the location [citation], time [citation], length [citation], mood and mode [citation] of the interrogation; the number of police officers present [citations] and the presence or absence of friends or family of the accused [citation]; any indicia of formal arrest of the subject including physical restraint, show of weapons or force, booking, fingerprinting or informing the person he is under arrest [citation]; the manner in which the person questioned got to the place of interrogation, i.e., voluntarily on his own, in response to a police request, or on a verbal command indicating compulsion [citation]; whether he voluntarily assists police in their investigation [citation]; whether the subject is allowed to walk within and from the location of the interrogation unaccompanied by police [citation]; and the age, intelligence and mental makeup of the accused [citation].” 105 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028, 435 N.E.2d 226, 230. Turning to the case at bar, I think it most significant that the interrogation of the defendant took place in a room at the hotel where defendant was employed and where the crime had occurred. Defendant was initially questioned at the scene of the fire at 5:30 a.m. and then allowed to go home. He returned to work in the late afternoon and was told by his employer, not by the police, to go to Room 3702 to be interviewed. I believe it significant to note that every single case relied upon by the majority involved an interrogation that took place at a police station. It is surely much more likely that a defendant is in police custody when the police put'him in a car and transport him to the police station for an interview. Although the majority expressly hold that this defendant was “illegally seized,” apparently at the point when the officers “focused their inquiry upon the defendant,” I believe such a holding is unsupportable under the circumstances of this case. Here defendant was interviewed in a hotel room; he entered that room on his own volition after being instructed to do so by his employer, not by police officials; and the point of the questioning was to obtain information concerning the discrepancies between defendant’s previous statements and those of other witnesses. The police officers testified that defendant was not the main suspect, that they could not tell who was lying and who was telling the truth, that defendant was at all times free to leave, that he was never threatened or given promises, and that he was offered food and drink several times. Any pressure or intimidation felt by defendant as a result of his employer’s conduct cannot be charged to the police. The fourth amendment protects citizens against police misconduct, not misconduct of private citizens. Contrary to the majority view, I believe there was no intrusion by the State upon defendant’s liberty when his employer told him to report to a hotel room for questioning. In the course of the questioning in the hotel room, the police asked defendant if he would be willing to take a polygraph examination to help clear up the discrepancies in the stories of the various employees. He was advised that the test was not mandatory but completely voluntary. Defendant admitted at the suppression hearing that he voluntarily agreed to go to the private office of the polygraph examiner to take the test. He was offered a ride by one of the officers. Again, defendant was not required to go with the officer, but he agreed to ride with him. The polygraph examination took place in a private office, not in a police station or other public building. An interval of about IV2 hours (from 7:30 p.m. to 9 p.m.) separated the conclusion of the questioning of defendant at the hotel room and his arrival at the examiner’s office. During that time defendant watched television in a hotel room. None of this activity constituted a custodial detention of defendant by police. In my view, the fact that he was in the presence of police officers in the hotel where he was employed did not amount to arrest or police detention. According to the evidence at the hearing, at the precise point when defendant became a prime suspect, after he had made some admissions to the examiner without any officers being present, the attending officer was then notified and entered the examining room and told defendant that he was under arrest, and advised him of his Miranda rights. The attending officer was then given an oral statement by defendant after defendant indicated that he did not want an attorney. The officer requested a written statement, and defendant agreed. Such conduct on the part of the police was appropriate. (See People v. Savory (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 435 N.E.2d 226.) In Savory, the court noted that after 2xk hours of interrogation, the defendant was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings when the officers began to doubt the defendant’s account and started to ask express questions that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Applying that test to the instant case, there is nothing to indicate that the police asked questions which were expected to elicit an incriminating response until after defendant was questioned by the examiner. That, of course, was the point where the Miranda warnings were given by the police, the point where the police interview ceased being investigatory and became a custodial interrogation. (See People v. Bradford (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 998, 423 N.E.2d 1179.) Considering the testimony which tended to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant was not illegally detained for custodial interrogation, I would rule that the decision of the trial court was not manifestly erroneous. Having found no illegal detention, I would hold that the defendant’s confession was admissible at his trial. As I see it, the holding of the majority poses unnecessarily grave problems for those charged with solving crimes. Certainly not every investigatory inquiry, merely because made by a police officer, is attended by the mischief which the fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments seek to avoid. Finally, the line must be drawn between voluntary, consensual confessions which are the product of “reasonable” police conduct and those confessions obtained by “unreasonable” police activity. That line is not a bright one. Each case must be carefully scrutinized in light of all surrounding circumstances (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041), and we should affirm the trial court’s determination of voluntariness unless it is clearly unreasonable. People v. Devine (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 914, 424 N.E.2d 823. With these thoughts in mind, I have searched the record before us and must conclude that no constitutional violation can be found. There is nothing in this case to indicate that the police treated defendant improperly. There was no light shining in his eyes, no deprivation of food or drink for long periods of time, no display of weapons, no threats or promises or bribes. The facts indicate nothing more than a questioning of defendant in the course of a police and fire investigation, asking for more details and additional information concerning matters he had previously told them and things they had discovered during the day. When the police could not determine who was telling the truth and who was not on the basis of the interview, they suggested a lie detector test. By my view the majority opinion stretches the reader’s credulity in finding that the defendant was illegally restrained while he watched TV in a hotel room, while he rode to the examiner’s office, and while he took the polygraph examination — in the face of defendant’s own testimony that he took the test voluntarily, knowing that he did not have to. The only reasonable implication from defendant’s testimony is that he knew he did not have to go with the police for the polygraph test. Since the defendant’s testimony amounted to an admission against his interest, it must be given considerable weight in support of the trial court’s ruling. In my judgment, the cases relied upon by the majority can all be distinguished from the case at bar and should not be considered controlling. Two important distinguishing elements of the case before us are (1) that the questioning occurred at the scene before defendant was a prime suspect and (2) that defendant himself stated that he voluntarily agreed to go to the polygraph tester’s office. In every one of the cases cited by the majority, the defendant was taken by the police to the police station and questioned at the station before the police had probable cause to arrest him, and in all those cases, the courts concluded that a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would have considered himself under restraint, not free to leave, and therefore that an illegal detention occurred. In People v. Townes (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 32, 435 N.E.2d 103, the defendant “willingly” accompanied the police to the station, in another town, but was questioned there over a 12-hour period without the police having probable cause for an arrest. In Townes, it was the length of time involved that was perhaps most critical. I believe the circumstances of the instant case, unlike those relied upon by the majority, are not consistent with a finding that defendant was illegally seized or detained prior to his confession. Defendant also contends that reversible error occurred when the prosecution introduced into evidence defendant’s typewritten statement of April 16, 1981, where, in addition to admitting that he started the fires in question, defendant stated that he receives sexual gratification or excitement from fires and that he had set other fires to bum leaves or weeds. Defendant sought to have the comments relating the sexual aspects of fires excised from the statement on the ground that they were irrelevant and prejudicial, but the court refused to do so. We think the statements were relevant to the question of defendant’s motive, even though defendant denied that sexual gratification was his motive here. The trial court must weigh the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect. (People v. Monroe (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 317, 362 N.E.2d 295.) We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in this case. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the circuit court of Peoria County in its denial of the motion to suppress defendant’s confession.