Court Opinion

ID: 9897392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:00.214507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.905544
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       May 18 2023, 8:52 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas C. Buchanan                                        Theodore E. Rokita
Buchanan & Bruggenschmidt, P.C.                           Attorney General
Zionsville, Indiana                                       Courtney Staton
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Elijah Mills,                                             May 18, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-1392
        v.                                                Appeal from the
                                                          Hamilton Circuit Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Paul A. Felix, Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          29C01-1911-F1-9633

                                 Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                              Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023                                 Page 1 of 25
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   In 2020, our Supreme Court issued Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020),

      and Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), overhauling Indiana double-

      jeopardy law and eliminating the constitutional and common-law analyses

      through which we previously determined substantive double jeopardy. In place

      of these analyses, the Court articulated new tests focused on statutory intent. In

      Wadle, the court addressed cases when a defendant’s single act or transaction

      implicates multiple criminal statutes. The Wadle test requires courts to first

      determine whether the statutes allow multiple punishments for the charged

      offenses. If so, there is no double jeopardy, but if not, the courts then look to

      our included-offense statutes to determine whether one of the offenses is

      included—either inherently or as charged—in another. If not, there is no double

      jeopardy. Neither of these steps allows us to look at the evidence presented at

      trial. Only if the court has determined that an offense is included in another—

      inherently or as charged—should the court go on to look at the evidence

      presented to determine whether the defendant’s actions constitute a single

      transaction or separate and distinct crimes.

[2]   Here, after the death of his son L.M., Elijah Mills was found guilty of Level 1

      felony neglect of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury or death and Level

      3 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The statutes of these offenses

      do not expressly permit multiple punishments, but Mills does not assert the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023           Page 2 of 25
      offenses are included inherently or as charged. Instead, he argues the offenses

      are included because the facts established at trial show the State used the same

      act—his battery of L.M.—to prove both offenses. But Wadle does not permit us

      to look to the evidence presented at trial to determine whether an offense is

      included in another for purposes of substantive double jeopardy. As such, we

      find no double-jeopardy violation here and affirm on this and all other issues.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   L.M., born in January 2015, was the biological son of Mills and Brittany

      Pearson. In 2018, L.M. lived with Mills and his girlfriend, Taylor Abrams, with

      Pearson exercising parenting time. In March of that year, Pearson noticed

      bruises on L.M.’s back, buttocks, and thighs and took him to the hospital. The

      Department of Child Services (DCS) was notified, and Ne’Cole Whyde, a DCS

      case manager, investigated. Whyde spoke with Mills, who admitted he

      “whooped” L.M. with a belt for saying “damn.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Whyde

      concluded Mills caused the bruising, substantiated the claim of physical abuse,

      and removed L.M. from the home. A few days later, Mills retracted his

      statements and told Whyde that the bruising was caused by a “fall down the

      stairs.” Tr. Vol. III p. 149. L.M. was returned to Mills’s care in April.

[4]   In September, Pearson noticed bruises on L.M.’s lower abdomen and thighs.

      The next month, DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Thomas Brown

      investigated, but Mills initially refused to speak with him without an attorney.

      Based on the timing of the injuries, Brown determined L.M. received them

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023            Page 3 of 25
      while in Mills’s care. Mills later suggested to Brown that this bruising may have

      occurred when L.M. was playing with another child. Nonetheless, Brown had

      “severe concerns with [L.M.’s] safety in the care of [Mills] and [Abrams]” and

      made a formal report raising claims of physical abuse against them. Id. at 173.

      However, the claims were never substantiated, and the matter was closed a few

      weeks later.

[5]   In the summer and fall of 2019, Pearson again began noticing bruises on L.M.

      and that he was getting “skinnier.” Id. at 113. Around this time, several other

      people expressed concern about L.M. Rumer Beck, Mills’s friend, was asked to

      babysit L.M., and when she arrived Abrams said that L.M. was being punished

      and had to stand in the corner with his arms raised. When Beck expressed

      concern about the punishment, she was told “that was what they wanted for

      their child.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 127. Later that night, Mills returned home “angry”

      and “[f]rustrated” and took L.M. into a bedroom, where Beck heard

      “swat[ting]” and “smacking” sounds and L.M. “crying out for his mother” for

      about “25 minutes.” Id. at 115-16, 213.

[6]   In August, law enforcement conducted a welfare check at Mills’s apartment

      after Austin Murrell, who lived in the apartment below Mills, reported hearing

      “a kid screaming for help” from Mills’s apartment and a male voice “yelling

      [L.M.’s] name” several times. Id. at 168, 169. Officers noted nothing of concern

      during the check. In October, Tamara Hodgkin, another friend of Mills, became

      so concerned about L.M. that she made a report to DCS. She reported that

      Mills and Abrams withheld food and water from L.M. as punishment and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023        Page 4 of 25
      would taunt him with food and that L.M. had bruises on his face and was

      limping. DCS attempted to investigate these claims, but Mills was

      uncooperative and would not allow photographs or for L.M. to talk to DCS.

[7]   Around 7:00 a.m. on November 12, the Noblesville Police Department received

      a call regarding a child who was in cardiac arrest at Mills’s home. Officers

      arrived to find Mills performing chest compressions on L.M., who was

      unresponsive and lying on his back on the living-room floor. Abrams was also

      in the home and had called 911. When medical personnel arrived, they noted

      L.M. had bruising across his face, torso, and inner thighs, all at various stages

      of healing, as well as abrasions to his knees and scarring “all over his body.” Tr.

      Vol. III p. 73. L.M., who was nearly five years old, appeared severely

      malnourished and weighed only twenty-nine pounds, approximately the size of

      a two-year-old.

[8]   L.M. was taken to Riverview Hospital, where he was placed on a breathing

      tube and then quickly transferred to Riley Hospital for Children due to the

      severity of his injuries. After “extensive” testing, doctors determined he suffered

      “subdural hematomas overlying both hemispheres of his brain,” bleeding

      outside the spinal cord, retinal hemorrhages, heterotopic ossification on his

      thighs and back,1 and a “healing injury” of the left forearm. Id. at 236-37.

      Doctors determined he was “critically ill,” his likelihood of “meaningful

      1
       Heterotopic ossification refers to “bone growth or bone development . . . in areas of the body it shouldn’t
      be” such as in soft tissue or muscle. Tr. Vol. III p. 237.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023                                  Page 5 of 25
      neurological and developmental recovery was very low,” and it was “unlikely

      that he would survive.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 4-5.

[9]   Mills gave various explanations for L.M.’s injuries. He told medical personnel

      who first responded to the home that L.M. had not experienced any trauma or

      accidents that could explain his injuries. He told FCM Holly McCombs, who

      went to Riley Hospital after a report was filed with DCS, that he had spanked

      L.M. that morning for wetting himself and that—as forms of discipline—he

      “pinch[ed]” L.M. on the thigh and forced him to exercise. Id. at 230. When

      interviewed by police at the hospital, he claimed L.M. had been experiencing

      headaches and had recently fallen in the home and at the park. The next day,

      Mills called Detective Michael Haskett of the Noblesville Police Department

      and gave more information about the time leading up to the 911 call. He stated

      that morning he forced L.M. to run as a punishment, that L.M. fell while

      running and hit his head, that this happened several times, and that Mills made

      L.M. continue to run even after the falls. He also stated he “popped” L.M. on

      the head when he refused to run anymore. Ex. 86, 2:38. Later in the call, the

      two discussed what could have caused the injuries, and Detective Haskett told

      Mills to let him know if he could think of anything else. Mills then reiterated

      that L.M. fell “on his face” while running. Id. at 8:09.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023         Page 6 of 25
[10]   The State charged Mills with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in

       catastrophic injury or death and Level 3 felony battery resulting in serious

       bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years old.2

[11]   L.M. spent almost two months at Riley Hospital, and his condition improved

       enough that he could breathe on his own. In January 2020, he was released

       from the hospital and placed in foster care. However, he never regained the

       ability to walk, talk, or eat, his neurological function did not improve, and he

       suffered from seizures and often struggled to breathe on his own. In November,

       L.M. contracted pneumonia and was placed on a ventilator. He continued to

       deteriorate, and doctors at Riley Hospital determined aggressive medical care

       would not be in L.M.’s best interests, given his poor quality of life and limited

       life span. L.M.’s breathing tube was removed on December 13, 2020, and soon

       after he died. L.M.’s cause of death was listed as respiratory failure with

       traumatic brain injury as an underlying condition. Thereafter, the State

       amended the charging information to add a count of Level 2 felony battery

       resulting in death to a person less than fourteen years old.

[12]   In September 2021, the State filed notice of its intention to present evidence of

       the 2018 DCS investigations. Mills objected under Indiana Evidence Rule

       404(b). Both parties submitted briefs on the issue, and a hearing was held. In

       2
         The State charged Abrams with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury or
       death and Class B misdemeanor failure to make a report. These charges were still pending at the time of
       Mills’s trial. Abrams later pled guilty to Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily
       injury and received a nine-year sentence.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023                                    Page 7 of 25
       part, the State argued that the evidence was relevant to show that L.M.’s

       injuries were not the result of an accident. The trial court then issued an order

       permitting the introduction of the evidence to disprove Mills’s contentions that

       L.M. “accidentally was injured.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 158.

[13]   A jury trial was held in April 2022. Over Mills’s objections, multiple witnesses

       testified about the March and October 2018 DCS investigations. Dr. Ralph

       Hicks, a pediatrician specializing in child abuse at Riley Hospital, testified that

       he was asked by DCS in March 2018 to opine on the cause of the bruising on

       L.M.’s buttocks, thighs, and lower back. Dr. Hicks testified that Mills’s

       explanation for the bruising—that L.M. had fallen down the stairs—was not

       consistent with the injuries and that the bruising appeared to have been caused

       by trauma with an object and was consistent with “inflicted injury.” Tr. Vol. III

       p. 222. He also testified that in October 2018 he was asked to consult on L.M.’s

       case and again opined that the amount of bruising and its location did not

       match Mills’s explanation.

[14]   Finally, Dr. Hicks testified about the injuries sustained by L.M. in November

       2019. He noted the injuries to L.M.’s thighs and back were caused by

       “significant or repeated trauma” and that these injuries and the forearm injury

       were likely older as they had partially healed. Tr. Vol. IV p. 3. As for the

       bleeding in L.M.’s brain, spine, and eyes, Dr. Hicks stated these injuries were

       caused by “forceful” blunt trauma and could not be explained by L.M. falling.

       Tr. Vol. III p. 247. Dr. Hicks also testified that when admitted to Riley Hospital

       L.M. had “chronic, ongoing malnutrition.” Id. at 238. Ultimately, Dr. Hicks

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023            Page 8 of 25
       opined that L.M.’s injuries “were characteristic of nonaccidental inflicted

       trauma.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 7.

[15]   Several witnesses also testified about their interactions with Mills on November

       11 and 12. Beck testified that Mills, Abrams, and L.M. ate at the restaurant

       where she worked on the evening of November 11 and that L.M. seemed fine.

       She further testified that she called Mills around 2:00 a.m. the next morning, he

       said he was punishing L.M. for “soil[ing] himself,” and she could hear L.M.

       “running” and “whimper[ing]” in the background. Id. at 120. Murrell, Mills’s

       downstairs neighbor, testified that around 2:00 a.m. that morning he heard “a

       kid running back and forth” while “crying and screaming” in Mills’s apartment.

       Id. at 173. He then heard a male voice telling the child to “shut the f*ck up.” Id.

       at 174.

[16]   The State also presented the phone call between Mills and Detective Haskett in

       which Mills admitted that he punished L.M. in the early morning of November

       12 by making him run laps in his soiled clothing and that he hit L.M. on the

       head. Finally, the State played a jail call between Mills and a friend in which

       Mills talked about the case and stated, “I’m not totally innocent here.” Ex. 78,

       0:32-0:34.

[17]   The jury found Mills guilty of all three counts. At sentencing, Mills asked the

       court to enter judgment only on Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting

       in catastrophic injury or death, arguing that double jeopardy precluded

       convictions for all three offenses because Level 2 felony battery resulting in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023          Page 9 of 25
       death and Level 3 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury are “lesser

       included[s]” of the Level 1 felony. Tr. Vol. V p. 136. The State agreed that the

       Level 2 felony battery should merge into the Level 1 felony neglect but

       contended that both the Level 1 felony neglect and Level 3 felony battery could

       stand. The court agreed and entered judgment only as to Level 1 felony neglect

       of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury or death and Level 3 felony

       battery resulting in serious bodily injury.

[18]   In his statement of allocution, Mills denied abusing L.M., contended he was

       being unfairly prosecuted “as a black male,” and said L.M. was “murdered” by

       DCS. Id. at 149. The trial court found as mitigating circumstances that Mills

       “lived thirty-two years of [his] life as seemingly a good person” and “seemingly

       cared for [L.M.].” Id. at 154, 155. The trial court also found two aggravating

       factors: L.M.’s “tender age” and that Mills violated a protective order by

       contacting L.M. while he was hospitalized. Id. at 157.

[19]   A key issue at sentencing was whether Mills’s sentences should be run

       concurrently or consecutively. The probation department recommended Mills

       receive enhanced sentences—thirty-five years for the Level 1 felony and twelve

       years for the Level 3 felony—but that they run concurrently. Mills asked for

       minimum sentences (twenty years and three years) and that any sentences be

       served concurrently, arguing consecutive sentences were inappropriate because

       the neglect and battery convictions stemmed from one “episode of criminal

       conduct.” Id. at 151. The State asked for maximum sentences on both

       convictions (forty years and sixteen years) and that they be served

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023        Page 10 of 25
       consecutively, for a total sentence of fifty-six years. The State acknowledged

       “the battery itself that resulted in the serious bodily injury and catastrophic

       injury, the death, was that instance when [L.M.] received the brain injury” but

       argued that because the neglect conviction was based on other actions besides

       the battery (the partially healed injuries and the malnutrition), the sentences

       should run consecutively. Id. at 140.

[20]   The court stated it “wouldn’t be fair to sentence someone for . . . an exact same

       offense.” Id. at 153. However, the court found the neglect “occurred over

       multiple months” and that this plus the aggravating factors warranted

       consecutive sentences. Id. at 155. The court sentenced Mills to thirty years for

       the Level 1 felony and nine years for the Level 3 felony, to be served

       consecutively, for a total sentence of thirty-nine years.

[21]   Mills now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
       I. Admission of Evidence
[22]   Mills contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence about the March and

       October 2018 DCS investigations in violation of Evidence Rule 404(b). A trial

       court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we

       will disturb its ruling only on a showing of abuse of discretion. Corbett v. State,

       179 N.E.3d 475, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. When reviewing a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023           Page 11 of 25
       decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard, we will affirm if there is any

       evidence supporting the decision. Id.

[23]   Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act “is

       not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a

       particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” but it

       “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,

       intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of

       accident.” The law governing the admissibility of other-acts evidence for “other

       purposes” requires a trial court to make three findings. D.R.C. v. State, 908

       N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009). First, the court must “determine that the evidence

       of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the

       defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act.” Id. (citation omitted).

       Second, the court must determine that the proponent has sufficient proof that

       the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act. Id. And

       third, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its

       prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. Id. Mills challenges all three of

       these findings.

[24]   Mills first argues evidence of the 2018 DCS investigations should not have been

       admitted to show “lack of accident” because he claimed L.M.’s injuries were

       caused by an accident resulting from “L.M.’s conduct, not Mills’ conduct.”

       Appellant’s Br. p. 26. In other words, Mills argues that Rule 404(b) evidence

       can be admitted only to show lack of accident when the defendant is alleging

       the charged harm was an accident caused by his own conduct (such as swinging

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023         Page 12 of 25
       his arm and accidentally striking the victim), rather than by some other source

       (such as the victim falling). But the State argues Rule 404(b) evidence may be

       admitted to show lack of accident whenever a defendant asserts that the

       charged harm was caused accidentally, regardless of who caused the accident.

       We need not determine that issue here, because the record sufficiently shows

       that Mills made statements giving the State reliable assurance that he would

       place accident at issue, and that the alleged accident occurred at least in part

       due to his actions.

[25]   The State may admit evidence to prove lack of accident under Rule 404(b) only

       where (1) the State has “reliable assurance that an accident defense will be

       raised” or (2) after the defendant places accident at issue at trial. Fairbanks v.

       State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019). Here, a day after L.M. was taken to

       Riley Hospital, Mills called Detective Haskett, and the two discussed Mills’s

       actions on November 12 and possible causes of L.M.’s injuries. In this call,

       Mills admits he “popped” L.M. on the head shortly before L.M. collapsed and

       medical personnel were called. He also stated that on the morning of November

       12 he forced L.M. to run laps and that L.M. fell several times while running

       and hit his head, but each time Mills forced him to get up and continue

       running. Each of these actions—hitting L.M. in the head and forcing him to run

       even after he had fallen and hit his head—was performed by Mills. And given

       these statements and the context of the conversation, the State had reliable

       assurance that Mills would place accident at issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023           Page 13 of 25
[26]   Mills also argues there is insufficient proof he caused the injuries described in

       the 2018 DCS investigations. There must be sufficient proof from which a

       reasonable jury could find the uncharged conduct proven by a preponderance of

       the evidence. Caldwell v. State, 43 N.E.3d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.

       denied. Direct evidence that the defendant perpetrated the uncharged act is not

       required; rather, substantial circumstantial evidence of probative value is

       sufficient. Id. The injuries noted in the March 2018 investigation were bruises

       down L.M.’s back, buttocks, and legs. During that time, Mills was L.M.’s

       primary caretaker and admitted to a DCS employee that he spanked L.M. with

       a belt. Later, however, he claimed the injuries resulted from a fall. Dr. Hicks

       testified the pattern of the bruises suggested non-accidental injuries, and DCS

       substantiated abuse against Mills. The October 2018 investigation involved

       bruises to L.M.’s abdomen. Based on the timeline, these injuries were sustained

       while L.M. was in Mills’s care. Mills explained these injuries, but Dr. Hicks

       testified these explanations were not consistent with the bruising. FCM Brown

       testified that, after investigating the issue, he felt compelled to make a formal

       report of child abuse. This is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a

       jury could find Mills committed these acts by a preponderance of the evidence.

[27]   Finally, Mills argues the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence

       Rule 403, which permits the trial court to exclude relevant evidence “if its

       probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the

       following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue

       delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” The trial court is afforded

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023          Page 14 of 25
       wide latitude in weighing probative value against prejudice under Rule 403.

       Freed v. State, 954 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We will reverse the

       court’s decision to admit only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id.

       Trial courts may consider a broad range of factors in balancing probative value

       against the risk of unfair prejudice, including the similarity between the past

       crime and the charged crime. Id.

[28]   Mills argues this evidence has low probative value because the injuries occurred

       over a year before the charged incident and were relatively minor. We disagree.

       The key issue in the case was whether L.M.’s injuries were caused by Mills or

       by some other source. Therefore, evidence that Mills had previously injured

       L.M. and claimed the injuries were caused by accidents is highly probative. He

       also argues that evidence of the prior uncharged conduct may have misled or

       confused the jury, and that such evidence “inflamed the jurors’ passions.”

       Appellant’s Br. p. 28. Again, we cannot agree. As Mills points out, the injuries

       involved in the 2018 investigations were relatively minor compared to those

       sustained in November 2019; thus, any chance of confusing the issues or unfair

       prejudice is low. We cannot say the trial court erred in determining the

       probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the dangers

       enumerated in Rule 403. See Ceaser v. State, 964 N.E.2d 911, 917-18 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2012) (court did not err in admitting evidence of prior abuse against child

       where it was highly probative, given the defendant was being accused of

       battering the same child in a similar way within a year timespan and was not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023         Page 15 of 25
       substantially outweighed by the threat of unfair prejudice associated with

       violence against a child), trans. denied.

[29]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 2018

       DCS investigations.

       II. Sufficiency of Evidence
[30]   Mills next argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. When

       reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence

       nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind.

       2015). We only consider the evidence supporting the verdict and any reasonable

       inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. A conviction will be

       affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each

       element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the

       defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[31]   To convict Mills of Level 1 felony neglect, the State had to prove beyond a

       reasonable doubt that Mills, being at least eighteen years old and having the

       care of L.M., a dependent less than fourteen, knowingly placed L.M. in a

       situation that endangered his life or health, and which resulted in catastrophic

       injury or death. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4; Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 24. To

       convict Mills of Level 3 felony battery, the State had to prove beyond a

       reasonable doubt that Mills, a person at least eighteen, knowingly or

       intentionally touched L.M., a person under fourteen, in a rude, insolent, or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023         Page 16 of 25
       angry manner, resulting in serious bodily injury. I.C. § 35-42-2-1; Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II p. 24.

[32]   Mills argues the State did not prove that he placed L.M. in a dangerous

       situation or touched him in a rude, insolent, or angry manner because “[n]o

       witness observed Mills inflict such trauma.” Appellant’s Br. p. 30. But such

       direct evidence is not required, as “a conviction may be sustained based on

       circumstantial evidence alone.” Lindhorst v. State, 90 N.E.3d 695, 701 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2017). And here, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence that Mills

       endangered and battered L.M. L.M. sustained serious injuries, including

       bilateral subdural hematomas, which Dr. Hicks testified were caused by blunt

       force trauma and were intentionally inflicted. L.M. received these injuries while

       in the sole care of Mills and his girlfriend, and two witnesses—Beck and

       Murrell—heard Mills punishing L.M. in the early morning of November 12.

       Mills gave inconsistent statements about how L.M. received these injuries,

       including falling at their home and at the park, but according to Dr. Hicks these

       explanations would not account for the severity of L.M.’s injuries. Mills later

       admitted to punishing L.M. in various ways on the morning of November 12,

       including “popping” L.M. on the head, and acknowledged in a jail call that he

       was “not totally innocent.” This is sufficient circumstantial evidence linking

       him to L.M.’s injuries. See Rohr v. State, 866 N.E.2d 242, 249 (Ind. 2007)

       (evidence sufficient to show father battered son where son was in father’s sole

       custody when the injuries occurred, the severity of the injuries did not match

       father’s explanation, and father made incriminating statements).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023        Page 17 of 25
[33]   The evidence is sufficient to support Mills’s convictions.

       III. Double Jeopardy
[34]   Mills also argues that his convictions constitute double jeopardy. Specifically,

       he contends his Level 3 felony battery offense is “factually included” in his

       Level 1 felony neglect-of-a-dependent offense because “the State presented the

       same evidence”—namely, that Mills battered L.M.—to prove both convictions.

       Appellant’s Reply Br. pp. 5, 6. The State responds that, pursuant to our

       Supreme Court’s overhaul of double-jeopardy law laid out in Wadle v. State, 151

       N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), courts do not look to the evidence presented at trial to

       determine whether an offense is included in another. We agree.

[35]   In Wadle, the Court set forth a new test for evaluating whether convictions

       under multiple statutes amount to double jeopardy. The first step is to

       determine whether “either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, whether

       expressly or by unmistakable implication.” Id. at 253. If so, there is no double

       jeopardy. Id. Here, the parties do not dispute that neither the neglect-of-a-

       dependent statute nor the battery statute clearly permits multiple punishment.

[36]   As such, we proceed to the next step, which requires that we “apply our

       included-offense statutes to determine whether the charged offenses are the

       same.” Id. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-6 provides: “Whenever: (1) a

       defendant is charged with an offense and an included offense in separate

       counts; and (2) the defendant is found guilty of both counts; judgment and

       sentence may not be entered against the defendant for the included offense.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023          Page 18 of 25
       Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-168 defines “included offense” as an offense

       that:

               (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
               than all the material elements required to establish the
               commission of the offense charged;

               (2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
               offense otherwise included therein; or

               (3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
               serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or
               public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
               establish its commission.

       “If neither offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged),

       there is no violation of double jeopardy.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253. “But if one

       offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), then the court

       must examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging

       instrument and as adduced at trial.” Id.

[37]   An offense is “inherently included” if it “may be established by proof of the

       same material elements or less than all the material elements defining the crime

       charged” or if “the only feature distinguishing the two offenses is that a lesser

       culpability is required to establish the commission of the lesser offense.” Id. at

       251 n.30 (citation omitted). Mills does not claim that Level 3 battery is an

       inherently included offense of Level 1 neglect of a dependent. Nor does he

       claim that it is an included offense “as charged,” that is, based on the way the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023            Page 19 of 25
       two offenses were set forth in the charging information. As such, there is no

       double-jeopardy violation, and our analysis ends here.

[38]   Mills urges us to look beyond the statutory elements and charging information

       and determine whether the offenses are included “as adduced at trial.”

       Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 8. Specifically, he contends that at trial the only

       evidence of both “serious bodily injury” (required for the Level 3 felony battery)

       and “catastrophic injury or death” (required for the Level 1 felony neglect) was

       “the battery to L.M. via blunt force trauma” and thus the State used evidence of

       the same act to secure both convictions. Appellant’s Br. p. 35.

[39]   This argument requires us to look at the evidence presented at trial to determine

       whether the same evidence was used to support two different convictions. But

       Wadle does not permit us to do so. Again, Wadle states,

               If neither offense is an included offense of the other (either
               inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double
               jeopardy. If, however, one offense is included in the other (either
               inherently or as charged), the court must then look at the facts of
               the two crimes to determine whether the offenses are the same.

       151 N.E.3d at 248 (emphasis added). Thus, once a court has determined an

       offense is not included inherently or “as charged” in another offense, there is no

       need to look at the evidence presented at trial. And here, because Mills does not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023         Page 20 of 25
       argue that based on the statutes or charging information the offenses are

       included, there is no double-jeopardy violation.3

[40]   We acknowledge that this analysis may produce harsh results.4 Had a defendant

       made Mills’s argument just a few years ago, we likely would have found these

       convictions constituted double jeopardy. See Bradley v. State, 113 N.E.3d 742,

       751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that the common-law “very same act test”

       prohibits “[c]onviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very

       same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and

       punished” (citation omitted)), trans. denied. But we note that, perhaps

       contemplating the Wadle analysis would produce such scenarios, our Supreme

       Court suggested other avenues by which a defendant like Mills may seek

       3
         Other panels of this Court have looked at the evidence presented at trial when determining whether an
       offense is “included” in another under Wadle. See Phillips v. State, 174 N.E.3d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans.
       not sought; Harris v. State, 186 N.E.3d 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. not sought; A.W. v. State, 192 N.E.3d 227
       (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. granted, opinion vacated, 205 N.E.3d 190 (Ind. 2023). For the reasons stated herein,
       we respectfully disagree. And, as noted, our Supreme Court has granted transfer in A.W.
       4
         One particularly troubling consequence of Wadle’s emphasis on the charging information is it can create a
       scenario where whether the defendant’s convictions constitute double jeopardy depends on the State’s factual
       inclusions or omissions in the charging information. For example, in Demby v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1035 (Ind.
       Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied, we found the defendant’s convictions for attempted murder and aggravated
       battery amounted to double jeopardy under Wadle because the offenses were included “as charged,”
       evidenced by the State’s factual allegations in the information that both offenses were committed by shooting
       the victim with a firearm. As we noted there, Demby benefited from the State’s inclusion of these facts in the
       information, and had the State not done so, there likely would have been no double-jeopardy violation under
       Wadle. See id. at 1045 n.12. One potential solution to this problem may be found, as our Supreme Court
       mentioned in Wadle, in Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees the defendant’s
       right, in “all criminal prosecutions,” to “demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him.”
       Currently, criminal defendants are not entitled to specific factual allegations in the charging information. See
       Gutenstein v. State, 59 N.E.3d 984, 995 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“The State is not required to include detailed
       factual allegations in a charging information.”), trans. denied. But perhaps, in light of Wadle, this case law
       should be revamped to increase protections against double jeopardy.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023                                    Page 21 of 25
       protection from multiple overlapping convictions, such as state constitutional

       protections against excessive sentences, as explained more fully below.

[41]   The trial court did not err in determining there is no double-jeopardy violation.

       IV. Sentence
[42]   Finally, Mills argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to reduce it under

       Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an appellate court “may

       revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial

       court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the

       nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The court’s role under

       Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers,” and “we reserve our 7(B) authority for

       exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019). “Whether a

       sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant,

       the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other

       factors that come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind.

       2008)). Because we generally defer to the judgment of trial courts in sentencing

       matters, defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate.

       Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[43]   The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is twenty to forty years, with an

       advisory sentence of thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4. The sentencing range for a

       Level 3 felony is three to sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years.

       I.C. § 35-50-2-5. Here, the trial court sentenced Mills to the advisory sentence

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023          Page 22 of 25
       for each conviction and ordered them to run consecutively, for a total sentence

       of thirty-nine years.

[44]   As to the nature of the offenses, Mills admits L.M.’s injuries were severe but

       claims that his actions on November 12 were simply discipline that got out of

       hand. The record does not support this contention and instead shows prolonged

       abuse starting as early as March 2018, when Mills beat three-year-old L.M.

       with a belt, leaving severe bruising. Numerous witnesses testified that such

       physical “discipline” continued throughout 2018 and 2019. Mills also withheld

       food and drink from L.M.—to the point that L.M. was severely malnourished

       and approximately the size of a two-year-old despite being almost five years

       old. This abuse culminated in Mills’s actions on November 12. When L.M.

       soiled himself, Mills forced him to run around the apartment in his soiled

       clothes in the middle of the night and “popped” him on the head. When L.M.

       was taken to Riley Hospital the next day, his injuries were severe, and many

       were in various stages of healing, suggesting ongoing abuse. This occurred

       despite two formal DCS investigations, a visit by law enforcement to do a

       welfare check on L.M., and voiced concern from friends—all of which surely

       alerted Mills that his actions were wrong. In short, the evidence doesn’t support

       Mills’s contention that his actions were a one-off and instead supports the

       State’s contention that L.M. was essentially tortured for months by Mills, the

       person who was charged with caring for him, eventually leading to his death.

[45]   As for his character, Mills argues that he has little criminal history. While his

       criminal history consists of just a few driving offenses, he did violate a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023             Page 23 of 25
       protective order by speaking to L.M. while he was hospitalized. Furthermore,

       Mills showed no remorse or responsibility for his actions, instead contending he

       was merely disciplining his four-year-old son, that DCS killed his son, and he

       was being unfairly prosecuted due to his race. None of this shows particularly

       good character.

[46]   Mills argues that the sentences should be run concurrently given that both

       convictions involved his battery of L.M. As our Supreme Court noted in Wadle,

       even if not double jeopardy, “multiple punishments in a single trial raise

       concerns over excessiveness.” 151 N.E.3d at 245. One way for trial courts to

       combat this “multiple punishment” issue is to take this into consideration

       during sentencing. See id. at 250-53 (noting Article 1, Section 16 and Article 7,

       Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution—all of which involve protections

       in sentencing—provide protection from “multiple punishments in a single

       prosecution”). Often, this will take the form of concurrent sentences. But it does

       not have to. Here, instead of enhanced sentences—which were requested by the

       State, recommended by the probation department, and certainly supported by

       the facts of the case—the court imposed advisory sentences and ran them

       consecutively. It is clear from the record that in doing so the trial court took

       into consideration that the two convictions stemmed from the same underlying

       battery. Mills faced a maximum sentence of fifty-six years but received only

       thirty-nine. This shows proper consideration of the multiple-punishment issue

       by the trial court.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023          Page 24 of 25
[47]   Mills has failed to show this is an exceptional case requiring us to use our Rule

       7(B) authority.

[48]   Affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1392 | May 18, 2023        Page 25 of 25