Court Opinion

ID: 9897551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:02.927416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:54.103848
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                 APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                    APPELLATE DIVISION
                                    DOCKET NO. A-1540-21

NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,                            APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
                                                  October 25, 2023
        Plaintiff-Respondent,                  APPELLATE DIVISION

v.

D.A.,

        Defendant-Appellant/
        Cross-Respondent,

and

L.A.,

     Defendant.
_______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF I.E. and
H.E., minors,

     Cross-Appellants.
_______________________________

              Argued September 27, 2023 – Decided October 25, 2023

             Before Judges Rose, Smith1 and Perez Friscia.

1
  Judge Smith did not participate in oral argument but joins the opinion with
consent of the parties. R. 2:13-2(b).
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
            Docket No. FG-09-0134-20.

            Ryan T. Clark, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
            for appellant/cross-respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,
            Public Defender, attorney; Ryan T. Clark, on the
            briefs).

            Jessica Steinglass, Deputy Attorney General, argued
            the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
            General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
            Attorney General, of counsel; Christina Duclos, Deputy
            Attorney General, on the brief).

            Neha Gogate, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
            argued the cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
            Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis
            Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Neha
            Gogate, of counsel and on the brief).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSE, J.A.D.

      Defendant D.A. appeals from a January 7, 2022 judgment of guardianship

terminating her parental rights to her two biological children: I.E. (Isiah), born

in August 2016; and H.E. (Helen), born in November 2017.2 The judgment also

terminated the rights of the children's biological father, L.A. (Lou), who was

incarcerated at the time of trial and refused to appear. Lou does not appeal from

2
  Consistent with the parties' briefs, we use initials and pseudonyms to protect
the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
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                                        2
the judgment or otherwise participate in this appeal. Significantly, however,

Lou's violent assaults against his biological son, S.E. (Sean), born in September

2007, underpin the precipitating event that led to the guardianship complaint.

At that time, Sean, and Lou's biological daughter, H.E. (Hallie), born in July

2006, resided in Bayonne with defendant, Lou, Isiah, and Helen. 3

      Following a multi-day trial and written submissions of the parties, the

judge issued a lengthy written decision finding the Division of Child Protection

and Permanency satisfied all four prongs of the "best interests of the child" test,

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) to (4), by clear and convincing evidence.

Accordingly, the judge held termination was in the children's best interests. See

In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999).

      Defendant does not challenge the judge's conclusion that the Division

satisfied the first prong, i.e., the "child[ren]'s safety, health, or development has

been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship." N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(1). That determination was supported by "[t]he pervasive abuse

that went on in the family home while I[siah] and H[elen] were present."

Instead, defendant argues the judge erroneously determined the Division proved

3
 In March 2020, Sean and Hallie were returned to the custody of their biological
mother, M.H., none of whom are parties to this appeal.

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the remaining three prongs by clear and convincing evidence, N.J.S.A. 30:4C -

15.1(a)(2) to (4). Because Isiah has severe autism and special needs, defendant

claims it is highly unlikely the Division will find him a permanent home and she

is in the best position to care for both children.

      The children's law guardian cross-appeals, challenging the second, third,

and fourth prongs of the best interests test. The law guardian urges us to reverse

the judgment because there is no viable permanency plan for the children and

the judge relied on inadmissible hearsay testimony and lay opinion to find there

were no alternatives to termination under prong three.

      Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied the

evidence in favor of the guardianship petition supports the judge's finding that

the Division established the challenged second prong, i.e., "[t]he parent is

unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or

unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of

permanent placement will add to the harm," N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2); and the

first part of the third prong, i.e., "[t]he [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to

provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the

child's placement outside the home," N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). However, we

cannot discern on this record whether the Division satisfied its burden to explore

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                                         4
alternatives to termination under the second part of the third prong, which in

turn impacts the judge's finding on the fourth prong, whether "[t]ermination of

parental rights will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C -15.1(a)(4).

Accordingly, we affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

                                       I.

                      A. The Evidence Adduced at Trial

      The guardianship trial spanned six days during November and December

2021. The Division moved into evidence more than 100 exhibits and presented

the testimony of five witnesses, including three caseworkers and an expert in

psychology. Defendant did not testify but called her own psychology expert.

On behalf of the children, the law guardian presented the testimony of another

psychology expert. Defendant and the law guardian moved into evidence their

experts' reports; the law guardian submitted various reports on behalf of Isiah.

The voluminous evidence adduced at trial was discussed in the judge's opinion

and need not be repeated in the same level of detail. We recount the most

significant evidence to provide context to the issues raised on appeal.

      On March 21, 2019, eleven-year-old Sean was admitted to the Jersey City

Medical Center with life-threatening injuries, including "a subdural hematoma

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                                        5
with severe brain bleeding" that required emergency surgery. Sean's doctors

noted the child's injuries were in various stages of healing and were inconsistent

with Lou's account that Hallie had pushed Sean into the wall the evening prior

to his hospitalization.4

      Initially claiming Lou was not home when the incident occurred,

defendant said Hallie "beat[] S[ean] with the [phone] charger," then pushed him.

Defendant later changed her story, asserting: Lou was asleep at the time of the

incident; when Lou awoke, he fed Sean; and the couple then put Sean to bed.

The following morning, defendant remained home while Lou went to work.

Defendant said she attempted to wake Sean at 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., but both

times "he was unresponsive." Defendant called Lou, who picked up Hallie at

school before arriving home.5 Emergency services were not called to the home

4
   Following his admission, the hospital registered Sean on an organ donation
list. Although Sean survived, his treating physicians reported the child would
experience problems communicating, eating, walking, and breathing .
Accordingly, Sean would require multiple surgeries, hospitalization, and long-
term care.
5
  Although Hallie initially claimed she hit Sean, she ultimately acknowledged
Lou physically abused Sean on the night in question and had abused Sean in the
past. Hallie feared future abuse by Lou and defendant.

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                                        6
until nearly 3:00 p.m. Police observed "blood on the wall and many droplets of

blood on the floor and in the tub." 6

      The following day, defendant and Lou were arrested and charged with

child endangerment and related offenses. They were remanded to the county

jail, prompting the Division to conduct a Dodd removal 7 of Hallie, Isiah, and

Helen. Pertinent to this appeal, the court awarded the Division care, custody,

and supervision of Isiah and Helen. Diagnosed with autism, Isiah's behavior

made placement difficult. After a series of four brief placements, including

relatives, friends, and non-relatives, on July 8, 2019, Isiah and Helen were

placed with their current non-relative resource parent, who does not wish to

adopt or participate in kinship legal guardianship (KLG).

6
  Inexplicably, defendant and Lou recorded the abuse inflicted on Sean. During
the criminal investigation that followed, police extracted various videos and
photographs from defendant's and Lou's cell phones. The images depicted the
injuries to Sean's entire body, welts and swelling on his face, and blood on his
clothing. The other children are visible in the background of some of the videos.
The Division moved several images into evidence at trial.
7
   A Dodd removal is an emergent removal of a minor without a court order
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82, known as the Dodd Act. See N.J. Div.
of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011). Sean was
hospitalized at the time of the removal.

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                                        7
      Defendant and Lou were released from jail ten days after their arrest. The

Division's initial plan was reunification.      The Division offered defendant

psychological and parenting evaluations, but her attorney advised against

completing the evaluations in view of the pending criminal charges.8

Accordingly, the Division was unable to effectuate services based on defendant's

specific needs until the criminal matter was resolved.

      In the meantime, the Division explored placement of the children with

relatives in the United States if reunification did not occur, including reassessing

the relatives with whom the children briefly lived following their removal. All

relatives residing in this country were ruled out. Defendant also proposed her

parents in Dubai, an emirate within the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In August

2019, the Division made a referral to International Social Services (ISS) for an

in-home study; ISS thereafter approved the maternal grandparents' home.

Through ISS, the Division requested a child resource study and contacted an

autism center in Dubai to address Isiah's needs.

      The Division provided defendant liberal supervised visitation with the

children. Although defendant spoke English and was able to communicate with

8
   Lou similarly declined services. Because Lou does not appeal from the
judgment, we focus instead on the Division's efforts regarding defendant.
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                                         8
the caseworkers, the Division made available an Arabic interpreter for meetings

and defendant's ensuing psychological evaluations. Notably, defendant did not

need housing assistance or transportation services, but the Division transported

defendant to the hospital for one of Isiah's procedures.

      The Division also offered services for the children tailored to their needs,

including medical consultations and evaluations, play therapy, and daycare.

Although Helen was assessed by the early intervention program, she was

deemed ineligible for services.    Diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder,

expressive language delay, and adjustment disorder, Isiah had difficulty

sleeping, threw tantrums, hit his head on objects, and bit himself and others.

The Division therefore referred Isiah to early intervention, speech therapy, and

applied behavioral analysis (ABA) therapy.

      At trial, however, the adoption caseworker acknowledged the Division did

not provide ABA therapy until it was court ordered, and two years had transpired

before the therapy was implemented. The worker attributed the delay to the

Department of Developmental Disabilities, which was required to approve the

service prior to implementation by the Division. By the time of trial, all of

Isiah's court-ordered services were in place.

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                                        9
      Defendant attended most of Isiah's therapy appointments, was in regular

contact with Isiah's nurse, and attended his neurological evaluations.

Defendant's visits with the children were positive; there were no issues or

problems noted.    Defendant also maintained a good relationship with the

resource parent.

      Following a March 2, 2020 fact-finding hearing, the same judge who later

conducted the guardianship trial concluded defendant and Lou abused or

neglected the children. On March 13, 2020, defendant's mother arrived in the

United States from Dubai.

      As part of the Division's planning, on April 20, 2020, the adoption

caseworker, Mariam Attia, met virtually with unspecified attorneys in Dubai.

One week later, the judge approved the Division's plan of termination of parental

rights followed by adoption. A few months later, defendant told the worker she

had filed for divorce from Lou, blaming him for her loss of custody.

      On November 13, 2020, defendant pled guilty to second-degree

endangering the welfare of a child for her part in the abuse inflicted on Sean.

During her plea colloquy, defendant acknowledged she failed to call for medical

assistance after Lou severely injured Sean. A non-citizen of the United States,

defendant acknowledged her guilty plea could result in deportation. Sentencing

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                                      10
was scheduled for January 15, 2021; defendant was accepted into the pretrial

intervention program. 9

      Following disposition of defendant's criminal charges, the Division

scheduled her psychological evaluation at the Audrey Hepburn Children's House

(AHCH).     In March 2021, defendant was referred to Wafa House, an

organization that provides therapeutic services to mostly Arabic-speaking

families.   Defendant's referral included domestic violence and parenting

counseling. By the time of trial, defendant's services remained ongoing.

      At the time of trial, the Division's plan for the children was termination of

parental rights followed by placement with their maternal relatives in Dubai.

Concurrently, the Division was exploring select home adoption.

      Prior to the start of trial, the Division moved to "bifurcate" the

proceedings "in an effort to try to fully explore the possibility of transferring

custody to the[] relatives in Dubai." The Division sought findings on prongs

one and two only.         Defendant, Lou, and the law guardian opposed the

application. Noting defendants were unwilling to consent to the transfer of

custody, the judge denied the Division's novel application.

9
  On the same day, Lou pled guilty to two counts of endangering the welfare of
a child and was thereafter sentenced to an aggregate ten-year prison term.
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                                       11
      At trial, Attia testified that based on the Division's understanding "from

the various meetings with the consulate, as well as the attorneys in Dubai,"

adoption by the maternal relatives was not a viable option for the children. The

law guardian objected, asserting the "question asked for a legal expert opinion."

The judge sustained the objection on that ground and because the testimony

constituted hearsay. Nonetheless, the judge permitted the caseworker to testify

that Dubai law allowed "a custody arrangement." The judge overruled the law

guardian's renewed objection, concluding:         "Layperson[s] can know that

information also." Attia thus testified Dubai required a "report indicating that

mom cannot currently care for H[elen] and I[siah]," and defendant's consent "to

transfer custody to [L.A., (Laura), the maternal aunt]." 10

      By the time of trial, however, both parents had refused to give their

consent, and proposed return of the children to defendant. Attia acknowledged

that should the court terminate parental rights in this case – and the parents

continued to withhold consent – the Division would contact the Dubai attorney

"to figure out how to do a custody arrangement without [defendant's] consent."

10
   Around March 2021, the maternal grandmother became ill and Laura, who
resided with her parents, offered herself as an additional support for the children.
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                                        12
      In the alternative, the Division's plan for the children was select home

adoption. However, Attia acknowledged it would be difficult to place Isiah in

an adoptive home in view of his behavioral issues. The Division had not begun

searching for a select home because the Division "cannot work on the select

home goal" when placement with relatives has not been ruled out.

      Dr. Brett A. Biller, Psy.D., testified for the Division. As the mental health

director of AHCH, Dr. Biller supervised the clinicians who conducted

interviews, performed testing, and prepared reports for the Division. Dr. Biller

reviewed the recommendations and co-signed the reports. Defendant submitted

to two evaluations, by two different evaluators, each conducted over the course

of two non-consecutive days between January 2021 and October 2021.

      Dr. Biller explained the test results administered to defendant. He noted

defendant deliberately presented herself in an overly positive fashion, which

invalidated some of the testing including the child abuse potential inventory .

For example, defendant displayed rigid parenting beliefs and an expectation of

compliance with those beliefs.       Further, she "demonstrate[d] profound and

significant parental risk factors," i.e., "lack of insight and . . . lack of judgment"

concerning the harm she caused Sean. Defendant blamed the Division, Lou,

Sean, and Hallie, for the removal of Isiah and Helen. Yet defendant described

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                                         13
Lou as "good-hearted" and "giving." Notably, defendant denied she witnessed

any violence in the home. When shown the video of her laughing at Lou's abuse

of Sean, defendant claimed she was laughing "to protect her children" by

distracting them from the abuse.

      The second evaluation was conducted after defendant had engaged in

months-long therapy, yet she continued to minimize the situation that led to the

removal of the children and her role in Sean's injuries.         There was "no

indication" that defendant demonstrated any personal gain since the first

evaluation. Although she finally acknowledged she feared Lou and that he

caused Sean's injuries, she failed to take any responsibility for Sean's injuries

and continued to lack understanding about the impact of that abuse on Isiah and

Helen. Defendant claimed she would protect her children but could not expla in

how she would do so. Accordingly, AHCH was concerned about defendant's

ability to empathize with children and understand their experiences.

      Dr. Biller noted defendant cited her cultural differences to rationalize her

behavior, but he explained that the AHCH psychologists considered those

differences when conducting their analyses. He also acknowledged defendant:

participated in services; was employed; filed for divorce from Lou; expressed

concern that Isiah had not been receiving proper services since his removal; and

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                                      14
believed she could provide a higher level of care to Isiah if the children were

returned to her custody.

      Nonetheless, Dr. Biller opined that as of October 2021 – when the second

evaluation had been concluded – defendant "was not yet able to safely parent

her children unsupervised." AHCH further expressed concerns that defendant

would attempt to influence the children's recollection of their home life "to

enhance her best interests."

      AHCH recommended that the Division concurrently work toward

reunification and termination of parental rights. Dr. Biller explained AHCH

"always will advocate for reunification when it's . . . [in] the best interests of the

children." Citing concerns for stability and permanency, however, Dr. Biller

testified the need to consider "different permanency options." He further stated

defendant should continue to receive the recommended services to determine

whether she made therapeutic progress and to assist her if her parental rights

were terminated.

      Dr. Maha Younes, Ph.D., a psychologist and native Arabic speaker,

testified on behalf of the children. Dr. Younes conducted an evaluation of

defendant and bonding evaluations between her and the children in October and

December 2020, which were updated in October 2021.

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                                         15
      Dr. Younes opined that this matter must be evaluated through the lens of

cultural competency. She testified about defendant's history, noting she was

born in Palestine, lived in Dubai, her first marriage ended in divorce, and she

emigrated to the United States to marry her cousin, Lou. Further, from a cultural

standpoint, in Middle Eastern countries, the man is the head of the household

and his authority is undisputed. Any problems with defendant's second marriage

also would be considered a negative reflection on her. Defendant was expected

to respect Lou and refrain from interfering with his parenting of Sean and Hallie

because she is their stepparent. By contrast, defendant could express her opinion

about Lou's treatment of her biological children. Dr. Younes testified defendant

did nothing to help Sean from an "American perspective" because she did

nothing to intervene when Lou was abusing Sean.

      Citing the test results performed on defendant, Dr. Younes testified

defendant was less anxious and depressed after she distanced herself from Lou

and took more responsibility for her part in the harm that befell the children. In

addition, defendant's understanding of her role in the family had become more

in line with "the laws of the United States." Defendant's test results did not

indicate any tendencies toward abusing children.

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      During the first round of bonding evaluations, Isiah was unable to interact.

However, during the second round, Isiah was very attached to, and physically

affectionate with, defendant. Helen also engaged with defendant and even called

her, "mommy." Neither child wanted to separate from defendant at the end of

the evaluation. During the interactions, defendant was appropriate, positive, and

encouraging. Dr. Younes opined defendant and the children were "extremely

well-bonded," and defendant was "quite capable" of parenting both children.

      Dr. Gerard A. Figurelli, Ph.D., an expert in psychology testified for

defendant. Dr. Figurelli conducted evaluations of defendant in September 2020,

October 2020, and August 2021, and performed his bonding evaluation with the

children in October 2020.

      Dr. Figurelli diagnosed defendant with anxiety, depression, and dependent

personality traits. However, she was not dependent on any substances and did

not have any cognitive defects. Through therapy, defendant learned how to

defend herself and protect her children from abuse. She also learned how to

parent successfully. However, Dr. Figurelli recognized Isiah's autism was "quite

severe," which would create challenges and require defendant to undergo

additional parental training. Dr. Figurelli opined the bond between defendant

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                                      17
and Helen was "significant" and "intact," and the bond between defendant and

Isiah was emotional and worth preserving.

                         B. The Trial Judge's Decision

      In her written decision, the judge addressed the governing legal principles

in view of the evidence presented at trial, finding the Division satisfied all four

prongs of the "best interests of the child" test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) to (4)

by clear and convincing evidence. Assessing the credibility of the experts, the

judge "f[ound] Dr. Biller's testimony to be the most credible and persuasive of

all the expert witnesses." The judge elaborated:

            The other experts downplayed [defendant's] role in the
            abuse and lost credibility when they claimed not to have
            seen [defendant] strike S[ean] with a partially full
            gallon of milk despite claiming that they watched the
            video. Upon observing the video admitted into
            evidence, this [c]ourt has no doubt that she st[r]uck him
            with it to which he recoiled.

      The judge also found Dr. Younes "the least credible of all the experts ."

Noting the expert did not watch any of the videos, the judge discredited Dr.

Younes's opinion that defendant's involvement or lack of involvement in her

stepchildren's abuse had any bearing on defendant's "ability to parent her own

children." The judge further found the expert's opinion was based primarily on

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                                       18
the information defendant disclosed to her. The judge "observed the witness to

be defensive and evasive on cross-examination by the Division."

      The judge's credibility assessment of the experts informed her decision on

prong two. Referencing Dr. Biller's testimony, the judge was persuaded "the

same risk factors remained" even though defendant was afforded therapeutic

services between both AHCH evaluations. The judge further noted: "Even Dr.

Figurelli could not project[] when [defendant] would be ready for reunification."

      The judge found the Division proved it made reasonable efforts to reunify

the family under prong three. The judge detailed the Division's efforts "to

provide services to the family beginning with the [Title 9] litigation," but noted

defendant "refused to comply with psychological evaluations" while her

criminal charges were pending. Thereafter, the Division referred defendant to

Wafa House for therapeutic services. Although defendant had been attending

those services since March 2021, the judge noted she had not "demonstrate[d]

any progress as of her AHCH reevaluation in October 2021." The judge also

rejected the law guardian's argument that insufficient services were provided to

the children. Noting the Division's statutory obligation under prong three is "to

assist the defendants in remedying the circumstances that led to placement of

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the children," the judge nonetheless summarized the services the Division

provided to Isiah and Helen.

      The judge recognized "the Division's plan [was] to conduct a more

extensive search for a select home to adopt the children while continuing to work

with the relatives in Dubai." Regarding the second part of prong three, the judge

found the Division explored and ruled out placement with relatives in the United

States, but the maternal relatives residing in Dubai "have not been ruled out."

Nonetheless, the judge concluded, "There are no alternatives to termination of

parental rights." The judge explained:

            Dubai will not recognize adoption or KLG but will
            recognize placement if the parents[] consent, which
            they have refused to give[,] and . . . the [c]ourt finds the
            children were abused and it is not safe to return the
            children to them. The children cannot continue to
            languish in a foster home that does not wish to be a
            permanent placement for them.

                  ....

            While there is an alternative to termination of parental
            rights placement with the relatives in Dubai, that option
            is only feasible if there is consent by the parents.
            Absent consent, there is no alternative.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      Finally, the judge found the Division proved the fourth best interests

prong. Citing the testimony of the competing experts, the judge concluded:

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                  Both children have remained in foster care since
           March 2019. Neither parent has corrected the reasons
           for the removal as stated throughout this decision.
           Despite the fact that Dr. Younes found that during the
           second bonding evaluation, H[elen] called defendant
           "mommy" and was "more engaged with her mother"
           and comfortable than the initial bonding evaluation,
           this can hardly be called a secure bond which if severed
           would do more harm than good. Likewise, I[siah] was
           "so attached" to his mother that the expert was
           surprised. How much of this is merely a comfort level
           with her as a familiar figure is unknown. The expert
           concluded that [defendant] was "well bonded" with her
           children. The [c]ourt has no doubt that [defendant]
           loves her children and desperately wants to be reunified
           with them but as Dr. Biller testified [defendant] has a
           poor prognosis for any meaningful change now or in the
           foreseeable future. Furthermore, it is unknown if or
           when she will be able to safely parent her children.
           Thus, as explained by Dr. Biller and found persuasive
           by this court she continues to pose a risk to their safety
           due to her lack of insight and judgment. It is in their
           best interest that termination be granted so that they can
           achieve permanency.

           [(Emphasis added).]

                       C. Post-Judgment Applications

     Following the trial judge's decision, the matter was transferred to the Child

Placement Review docket (FC matter). This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

     In June 2022, we granted defendant's emergent application for leave to

appeal from the denial of her motion to intervene in the FC matter. We then

summarily reversed the FC judge's decision, noting defendant "has court-

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                                      21
ordered visitation nine hours per week," and the children "wish to continue

contact with their mother, but if the Division . . . prevails in its application, the

children would be placed outside the country." Accordingly, we held defendant

had standing to intervene in the FC matter.

      In July 2022, the law guardian moved to remand the present appeal to the

trial court so the children could move to vacate the January 7, 2022 judgment

under Rule 4:50-1.      The law guardian asserted:       "Three months after the

judgment of guardianship was issued, the Division represented to the [FC] court

new information that parental consent is not required to transfer custody to

L[aura] in Dubai, UAE, and sought an order granting legal and physical custody

of [the children] to her." The law guardian thus argued a remand would permit

the trial court "to consider the current information relevant to its determination

to terminate [defendant]'s parental rights and the decision of whether custody

should be transferred to the maternal aunt in the UAE in the children's best

interest." The law guardian noted just prior to commencement of trial, the

Division was willing to bifurcate the trial to obtain a finding on the first two

prongs to attempt to obtain a custody transfer to Dubai in lieu of termination of

defendant's parental rights, but the judge was unwilling to do so because

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                                        22
defendant did not consent to the transfer. As stated, however, both defendant

and the law guardian opposed the Division's pretrial application.

      Defendant opposed the law guardian's remand motion, seeking instead "a

full remand after reversal of the [j]udgment" by this court.            Defendant

maintained she opposed placement outside the United States, contending she

would never see her children again, thereby constituting a "de facto termination

of [her] parental rights because the UAE is not even a signatory to the [Hague

Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction]."

      The Division also opposed the law guardian's motion but cross-moved to

stay the appellate proceedings pending the FC court's hearing on its application

to transfer custody to the maternal aunt in Dubai. We denied both motions.

      Following a plenary hearing, the court in the FC matter denied the

Division's application to transfer custody. According to its October 3, 2022

order, the court concluded it was not in Isiah's best interests to be moved out of

the country "at this time pending appeal."11 (Emphasis added).

11
  The parties did not provide a transcript of the plenary hearing or the FC court's
decision.
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                                       23
                                         II.

      Our review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is limited.

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). We will

uphold the court's factual findings if they are "supported by adequate,

substantial, and credible evidence." Ibid. "Concomitantly, reviewing courts

should defer to the trial court's credibility determinations." Ibid. We do so

because the court "has the opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments

about the witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a 'feel of the case' that can

never be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 293 (2007)). Our Supreme Court has reiterated

"a trial court's factual findings [in a guardianship action] 'should not be disturbed

unless they are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" N.J.

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re

Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). However, we review the

trial court's legal interpretations de novo. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552-53.

                    A. Prong Two and Prong Three-Part One

      Having reviewed the record with these standards in mind, we find no merit

in the arguments raised by defendant or the law guardian concerning the second

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prong and the first part of the third prong of the best interests test. We are

satisfied that the trial judge's factual and credibility findings as to these prongs

are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, and her thorough

opinion amply addressed the issues. See R.G., 217 N.J. at 552. Defendant's

inability to eliminate the harm facing her children cannot reasonably be

attributed to any alleged deficiency on the part of the Division. The record

demonstrates the Division made reasonable efforts to provide services, facilitate

visitation, and address the children's needs. We therefore affirm the judge's

findings under these prongs for the reasons set forth in her written decision.

                   B. Prong Three-Part Two and Prong Four

      We part company, however, with the trial judge's findings on the second

part of the third prong and her conclusion that termination of defendant's

parental rights "will not do more harm than good" under the fourth prong. We

do so for procedural and substantive reasons.

      Initially, the judge's conclusion that there are no alternatives to

termination under the third prong was based on incompetent hearsay and lay

opinion adduced by the Division on direct examination of the adoption

caseworker. Over the objection of the law guardian, Attia testified about the

Division's understanding of UAE law, which was based on conversations with

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"the consulate" and "attorneys in Dubai." The judge correctly sustained the law

guardian's objection because the Division's question called for an expert legal

opinion and hearsay.    Nonetheless, the judge cited that same incompetent

testimony to conclude that "Dubai will not recognize adoption or KLG but will

recognize placement [only] if the parents[] consent."

      Although a trial court's evidentiary decisions are reviewed under the abuse

of discretion standard, N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J.

354, 366 (2017), and the danger of hearsay is mitigated in a bench trial, N.J.

Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.D., 447 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div.

2016), the admission of Attia's testimony constituted harmful error here. Indeed,

the feasibility of adoption or a KLG-type arrangement under UAE law is best

elicited through expert testimony pursuant to N.J.R.E. 702. Attia's testimony

was not based on her perception, see N.J.R.E. 701, and reiterated statements

made by out-of-court declarants, see N.J.R.E. 801(c). Accordingly, we conclude

the judge's prong three determination improperly relied on incompetent

evidence.

      Moreover, it appears the testimony elicited by the Division at trial may

not have been accurate.     Post-judgment, the Division has been exploring

placement with the maternal relatives in Dubai – in the absence of defendant's

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consent. Indeed, the FC court denied the Division's application while this appeal

was pending. As in N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.S., 417 N.J. Super.

228, 247 (App. Div. 2010), we recognize our review of the trial judge's decision

in this case has been "aided by the benefit of time." Similar to that matter, where

a culmination of events post-judgment caused us to question an otherwise sound

decision by the trial court terminating a parent's rights, see id. at 249, here the

criteria for placement in Dubai appears to be at odds with the evidence presented

at trial, i.e., that defendant's consent was necessary for the children's placement

with the maternal relatives in Dubai.

      Our jurisprudence recognizes two permanency options:              KLG and

adoption. P.P., 180 N.J. at 507-08 (citing N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1). Under the

second part of prong three, KLG is considered an alternative to termination of

parental rights that offers permanency and stability to a child residing with a

relative or kinship caregiver. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. L.L., 201

N.J. 210, 222-25 (2010) (discussing the KLG Act and its intent). In the present

matter, because the Division's plan appears to be a form of KLG, the Division

has not clearly and convincingly proven all alternatives to termination have been

ruled out.

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      Although we do not find the judge's finding on prong four "wide of the

mark" as of the time of the decision, in this unusual factual context, we must

reverse and remand as to prong four and the portion of prong three requiring the

court to consider alternatives to termination. The post-judgment developments

require a fresh inquiry. See T.S., 417 N.J. Super. at 249-50 (remanding for a

prong four inquiry based on post-trial developments). On remand, the judge

should consider whether adoption or a KLG-type custodial arrangement with the

maternal relatives in Dubai is feasible under UAE law after considering the

testimony from a qualified expert; and whether, under the current circumstances,

termination would not do more harm than good.

      In reevaluating the second part of prong three, and prong four, the trial

judge is not foreclosed from considering whether defendant has continued

therapeutic services and whether she could safely parent the children in the

foreseeable future. We also leave to the judge's sound discretion whether

updated psychological evaluations and fresh testimony is required to assess

defendant's present ability to parent, and whether the evaluations or testimony

warrant a reassessment of prong two. See K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348 (holding the

four prongs of the best interests test "are not discrete and separate; they relate

to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that

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identifies a child's best interests"). However, we do not suggest a preference

either regarding whether to adduce further evidence or in the ultimate result.

      In conclusion, we affirm the trial judge's decision as to prong two and the

first part of the third prong of the best interests test. Because the Division did

not present competent evidence regarding the second part of the third prong, we

cannot determine whether the Division has demonstrated there are no

alternatives to termination or that termination would not do more harm than

good under the fourth prong.

      Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court to reopen the FG

matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.         The remand

proceedings shall be conducted expeditiously.

      Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.         We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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