Court Opinion

ID: 9720777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:41:12.261505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.226236
License: Public Domain

RATTIGAN, J.
I dissent. While I do not question the relevant Fourth Amendment principles as expressed by the majority, I do not agree that Officer Shaffer’s search of the automobile was justified under any of them.
Prior to the pursuit and search of the vehicle, the City of Berkeley had unquestionably experienced civil disturbances in its streets. Although the evidence does not disclose the full nature and extent of these disturbances, it reasonably appears that a curfew had been imposed and that fire bombs had been thrown, at unmentioned times and places within the city, during the preceding three days. In addition, Sergeant Glenn and his squad had witnessed a riotous, rock-throwing incident before pursuing and searching respondents’ vehicle. These circumstances in general, however, would not have justified the police in stopping and searching every vehicle in the area; the question thus presented is whether any additional facts distinguished respondents and their vehicle from the myriad of persons and automobiles on the Berkeley streets that night.
The only such facts appeared in the visual observation by Sergeant Glenn—and by him alone—of some persons running to and from a school building. It is apparently true that the driver of respondents’ vehicle thereafter committed at least two traffic offenses (crossing a double line and speeding), and did not immediately stop the car when the police officers *456turned on their red light. But, absent evidence that respondents knew of the officers’ presence and were acting contrarily in response thereto, such actions do not—as the Attorney General and majority suggest— constitute “furtive conduct” from which the officers could reasonably have inferred attempted flight or possession of illegal weapons. (See People v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 807, 819-822 [91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449].) It also bears mentioning that the vehicle search was not justified as incident to a traffic arrest; an arrest for a traffic violation does not, in itself, authorize a search of the vehicle involved. (People v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 812-815; People v. Blodgett (1956) 46 Cal.2d 114, 116 [293 P.2d 57]; People v. Weitzer (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 274, 290 [75 Cal.Rptr. 318].) Furthermore, respondents were not arrested for traffic violations and the officers testified that they did not stop the vehicle on account thereof.
I believe, as the trial court found, that Sergeant Glenn’s observation of men running from a parked car to a building, and back, was insufficient to justify a search of respondents’ vehicle for fire bombs. There are many gestures or movements which a person might make, conceivably consistent with his possession of a fire bomb; but, if respondents were subject to a vehicle search upon the evidence presented here, any person who goes to or behind a building, or who carries a package, or walks on a street at night in an area in which there have been disturbances, would likewise be subject to apprehension and search. I do not accept this conclusion.
The more significant fact, however, is that Officer Shaffer, who made the actual search, was not informed of what Sergeant Glenn had seen at the school. Shaffer candidly testified that he knew only that Sergeant Glenn had mentioned having seen some “monkey business” at the school; with this information and no more, Shaffer decided, on his own and without direction from Sergeant Glenn, to search the vehicle when it stopped. The question of reasonable cause to search must be tested by facts known to the searching officer, regardless of information known to others (including other officers). (Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co. (1968) 391 U.S. 216, 221-222 [20 L.Ed.2d 538, 543-544, 88 S.Ct. 1472].)
The majority decision validates this search, in part, upon a suspect’s having purportedly engaged in “monkey business.” (The term imports nothing to me; I doubt, contrary to the majority’s interpretation of the term as communicated to Officer Shaffer, that it reasonably imported anything more significant to him.) The thrust of this conclusion, in my opinion, is to sanction an exploratory search “prompted by a general curiosity to ascertain what, if anything, was within the defendant’s ve*457hide.” (People v. Cruz (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 437, 441 [70 Cal.Rptr. 249].) A search cannot be justified by what it turns up (People v. Brown (1955) 45 Cal.2d 640, 643-644 [290 P.2d 528]; People v. Fein (1971) 4 Cal.3d 747, 756 [94 Cal.Rptr. 607, 484 P.2d 583]), and “probable cause cannot be based on a belated interpretation of the suspect’s conduct which appears reasonable only in the light of evidence uncovered in that very search.” (People v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 807 at p. 821.) In my view, therefore, the fact that the officers actually found the makings of fire bombs in respondents’ automobile cannot retroactively supply the probable cause that was lacking when Officer Shaffer first entered the vehicle.
The majority validates the search as a “relatively slight intrusion in reaching into the car ... in light of the disastrous consequences which might have ensued if respondents had been allowed to drive on and look for an inviting target elsewhere in the city.” The first reference, in my opinion, improperly considers the degree of an “intrusion” which was constitutionally invalid in substance,' the second reference is a hindsight evaluation which justifies the search upon the basis of what it turned up. As the latter reasoning is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment (People v. Brown, supra, 45 Cal. 2d 640 at pp. 643-644; People v. Fein, supra, 4 Cal.3d 747 at p. 756), I would not indulge in it upon the present evidence.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of dismissal.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 23, 1971. Rattigan, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 18, 1971.