Court Opinion

ID: 9914026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:08:55.898479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:56.913637
License: Public Domain

J-A19020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WILLIAM KAREEM MIKE                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2969 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 12, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
               Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0000646-1998

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant, William Kareem Mike, appeals from the order entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (PCRA court), denying his fifth

petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.

       The factual and procedural history of the case is undisputed. Briefly,

       [o]n November 2, 1997, there were approximately twenty to thirty
       people hanging around outside the Bristol Garden Apartments. At
       approximately 6 p.m. that evening, outside the N Building of those
       Apartments, the victim, Martino Cruz and [Appellant] began to
       argue over a woman. The argument escalated as [Appellant]
       began pushing the victim and culminated with [Appellant]
       revealing his gun and saying he was going to shoot Cruz.
       [Appellant] fired four shots at the victim’s feet. [Victim] turned
       to walk away from [Appellant] when [Appellant] pistol-whipped
       him in the head with the side of the gun and the victim fell to the
       ground and covered his face with his hands.             [Appellant]
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A19020-23

      proceeded to kick and stomp the victim as he lay on the ground.
      Then [Appellant] bent down to the victim, put the gun against his
      head and shot and killed [the victim]. [Appellant] fled the area.

Commonwealth v. Mike, 2260 EDA 2000, unpublished memorandum at *2

(Pa. Super. filed June 14, 2001) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/2000, at

1-2). See also PCRA Court Opinion, 1/5/2023, at 1.

      On July 17, 2000, Appellant waived a jury trial and entered a guilty plea

to a general charge of criminal homicide. The trial court then proceeded to

his degree of guilt hearing. On July 18, 2000, at the conclusion of the hearing,

the trial court found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him

to life in prison.

      On June        14, 2001, this   Court   affirmed his   conviction.   See

Commonwealth v. Mike, 2260 EDA 2000, unpublished memorandum (Pa.

Super. filed June 14, 2001).    On December 11, 2001, our Supreme Court

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v.

Mike, 779 A.2d 1220 (Pa. 2001).

      Subsequently, Appellant filed four PCRA petitions. None of them was

successful.

      On December 14, 2021, Appellant filed the underlying PCRA petition, his

fifth, claiming that he discovered a new witness, Aisha Randolph, who was

willing to testify that the murder was accidental. After holding a hearing on

July 17, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition on

October 12, 2022.

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      This appeal followed. Both the PCRA court and Appellant complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Appellant argues that the discovery of a witness willing to

testify that the murder was accidental qualifies as newly-discovered facts,

rendering the instant petition timely, and that, on the merits, the new facts

are after-discovered evidence that qualify him for relief under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(2)(vi). We disagree.

      On appeal,

      [w]e review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
      light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
      Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super.
      2010). This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
      the evidence of record. Id. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
      ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
      error. Id. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
      grounds if the record supports it. Id. Further, we grant great
      deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not
      disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record.
      Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011).
      However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
      Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011);
      Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007).
      Further, where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard
      of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
      Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012).

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       All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,” 1 unless an

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).2              “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520,

522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (overruled on

other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)). As

timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of Appellant’s underlying

claims,    we    first   determine     whether   this   PCRA   petition     is   timely

____________________________________________

1  It is undisputed that the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely.
Appellant was sentenced on July 18, 2000. On June 14, 2001, we affirmed
the judgment of sentence. On December 11, 2001, our Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. If no petition for writ of certiorari
is filed with the United States Supreme Court, as in the instant case, the
judgment of sentence becomes final at the expiration of the 90-day period
available to petition the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.1. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final for purposes of the PCRA on March 11, 2002. Appellant
had one year to file a timely PCRA petition (i.e., March 11, 2003). The
underlying petition was filed on December 14, 2021, which is more than 19
years after his judgment of sentence became final. Thus, the underlying PCRA
petition is facially untimely, and it is not reviewable unless an exception to the
time bar applies.

2 The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and

proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of
the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the
date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

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filed. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). If it is not

timely, we cannot address the substantive claims raised in the petition. Id.

      Appellant acknowledges that the underlying PCRA petition is facially

untimely. He argues, however, that the underlying petition is timely under

the newly-discovered facts exception, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)(ii).

Specifically, Appellant contends that the discovery of a witness, Ms. Randolph,

now willing to testify regarding the underlying facts, qualifies as a newly-

discovered fact.

      Appellant’s entire timeliness argument is summarized as follows:

      Ms. Randolph was a witness to the events that day.             Ms.
      Randolph’s account and proffered testimony of what she
      witnessed is her own unique recollection of the events which could
      not be discerned prior to communicating with her. And, as
      demonstrated by her intentional absence from the Commonwealth
      and her stated intent to avoid any involvement with this matter,
      [Appellant] could not have known that this witness would be
      willing to testify on his behalf. Under these circumstances,
      [Appellant] was unable to locate Ms. Randolph and, in any event,
      would not have been able to secure Ms. Randolph’s testimony
      absent her recent willingness to testify in this matter. Thus,
      Appellant has satisfied the newly discovered [facts] exception.

Appellant’s Brief at 10.

      The newly-discovered facts exception requires a petitioner to plead and

prove two elements: (1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated were

unknown, and (2) these unknown facts could not have been ascertained by

the exercise of due diligence.   See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d

618, 638 (Pa. 2017) (emphasis added). The focus of the exception is on the

facts upon which the claim is predicated (here, the accidental shooting

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defense), not the discovery of another conduit for known facts about his claim

(here, witness’s willingness to testify).        See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008).           Appellant’s discovery of a new

willing source to testify on the accidental shooting defense does not transform

the new source into an unknown fact for purposes of the newly-discovered

facts exception. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263,

1269 (Pa. 2008).

       Additionally, the content of Ms. Randolph’s statement (accidental

shooting defense) was known to Appellant several months before the trial,

when the Commonwealth disclosed Ms. Randolph’s interview report to

Appellant in pre-trial discovery (on or about June 19, 2000).3

____________________________________________

3 The interview report summarized Ms. Randolph’s statement as follows:

       [Appellant] pulled a gun from somewhere and fired three bullets
       at [victim]’s feet. [Victim] tried to walk away but [Appellant] hit
       him on the back of the head with the gun which knocked [victim]
       down to the ground. [Ms. Randolph] thinks that the gun went off
       as it struck the back of [victim]’s head. [Victim] was laying on his
       back covering his head with both hands as [Appellant] continued
       to hit [victim] with the gun. Every time that [Appellant] hit
       [victim] with the gun[,] the gun would fire in different locations.
       Everybody started running into the buildings because as
       [Appellant] was swinging the gun around it was pointing in many
       directions.

Commonwealth Exhibit PCRA C-1 (Addendum Report, Interview of Aisha
Randolph, 12/1/1997, at 7), 7/18/22.

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       Thus, the facts adduced by Appellant to support his timeliness claim do

not qualify as “facts,” as understood under the PCRA; nor do they qualify as

“unknown.”

       Because the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely and given that

Appellant failed to prove that he met the “newly-discovered facts” exception,

we conclude that the PCRA court properly dismissed the underlying petition

as untimely.4

       Order affirmed.

Date: 12/28/2023

____________________________________________

4 Due to our conclusions, we do not need to address whether the claim raised

here (accidental shooting defense) meets the after-discovered evidence
ground for PCRA relief. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171,
177 (Pa. Super. 2015) (appellant’s reliance on Section 9543 as a basis for
asserting an after-discovered evidence claim under the PCRA did not suspend
appellant’s initial obligation to establish jurisdiction by alleging and proving
(a) the existence of facts that were unknown to him and (b) his exercise of
due diligence in discovering those facts, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii));
see also Burton, 158 A.3d at 629 (and cases cited therein).

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