Court Opinion

ID: 9792420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:29:11.090501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.760187
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting:
Section 1130 A(5) is one of the few termination provisions which is clear and unambiguous.
In plain words it says that bringing an action for termination of parental rights for abuse is absolutely contingent upon a previous abuse adjudication or conviction. Under this section the first abuse incident will not be sufficient for termination.
The majority’s observation of the practical effect of the requirement of the statute is surely true. Few termination actions will ever be brought under the section because children will not be returned to the offending parent for further abuse, and will stay instead in the custody of third parties.
The majority is appalled that this section is dependent on a repetition of abuse. It therefore construes away the prior adjudication requisite and overrules Lyni P., Okl, 626 P.2d 864 (1981), which correctly held the section requires the prior adjudication as a condition.
I share the majority’s feelings of dismay about this statute but I do not share their belief that it is something that this Court can, or should, fix.
This section is not the least bit ambiguous. It is a clear expression of the legislature’s intention. It is basic that where language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction. Where the wording is clear and plain, the evident meaning of a statute must be accepted and there is no justification for the use of interpretive devices to fabricate a different meaning. See, e.g. In re Martin's Estate, 183 Okl. 177, 80 P.2d 561 (1938); State, ex rel., Ogden v. Hunt, Okl, 286 P.2d *13751088 (1955). I would let the responsibility for this section remain with the legislature.
This Court has spent considerable time and effort over the past years, writing a series of opinions which try to fashion some order and reasonableness into our statutory scheme governing termination of parental rights. See, e.g., Matter of Moore, Okl., 558 P.2d 371 (1976); J.V. v. State, Dept. Inst., Soc. & Rehab. Services, Okl., 572 P.2d 1283 (1978); Matter of Keyes, Okl., 574 P.2d 1035 (1978); Ilee M. v. State, Dept. of Inst., Soc. & Rehab. Services, Okl., 577 P.2d 908 (1978); Matter of J.F.C., Okl., 577 P.2d 1300 (1978); Matter of Earnest James C., Okl., 578 P.2d 352 (1978); Matter of Sherol S., Okl., 581 P.2d 884 (1978); Matter of Lyni P., supra; Matter of C.G., Okl., 637 P.2d 66 (1981).
The Court’s piecemeal efforts to “save” termination provisions are probably counter-productive, however. For while our termination provisions, both procedural and substantive, make little sense and have been in obvious need of major revision for years, there has been no appreciable legislative movement in the area.
This child is not going to be returned to these parents even if the termination is reversed. I would reverse the termination for failure to comply with § 1130 A(5), our sole statute authorizing termination for the specific ground of abuse.
I am authorized to state that IRWIN, HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ., join me in this dissent.