Court Opinion

ID: 9960090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 12:02:08.037424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:10.375578
License: Public Domain

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                                     Cardoza v. Waterbury

             PAULA M. CARDOZA v. CITY OF WATERBURY
                           (AC 46460)
                              Alvord, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         The plaintiff motorist sought to recover damages from the defendant city for
            personal injuries she sustained and for damage to her vehicle allegedly
            resulting from a defective condition in a roadway that was owned and
            maintained by the defendant city. Pursuant to the applicable statute
            (§ 13a-149), the plaintiff sent a notice of claim to the defendant that
            stated the date, time and location of the incident, described her injuries
            and the losses she incurred, and provided that the cause of such injuries
            and losses was a ‘‘defect in the roadway . . . .’’ The defendant filed a
            motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the trial court
            lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to comply
            with the notice requirements of § 13a-149, as her notice did not identify
            the alleged defect in the road that caused her injuries and damages.
            The trial court granted the motion, concluding that it lacked subject
            matter jurisdiction over the action, and rendered judgment dismissing
            the complaint. On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held that the trial
            court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
            subject matter jurisdiction: the language of the plaintiff’s notice did not
            provide the level of specificity necessary to meet the requirements of
            § 13a-149 because it failed to describe the cause of the injury in any
            way beyond the assertion that there was a ‘‘defect in the roadway,’’ and,
            contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the use of the word ‘‘defect’’ did
            not provide any information as to the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries
            nor did the fact that the notice provided that the defect was ‘‘in’’ the
            road rule out a long list of potential defects; moreover, the plaintiff’s
            argument that the notice was sufficient in light of the complaints she
            had filed with the city’s police department and public works department
            following the incident, which provided additional information, was
            unavailing because § 13a-149 provides that the notice must be given to
            a selectman or the clerk of a city and does not allow the court to
            consider additional notices filed with departments within the city; fur-
            thermore, the savings clause of § 13a-149, even if construed liberally,
            was inapplicable because it applied only in cases in which information
            in the notice concerning one of the statute’s required elements was
            inaccurate or vague, not where the information was entirely absent,
            and, in the present case, the cause of the plaintiff’s injury was completely,
            totally and unmistakenly omitted from the plaintiff’s notice.

                    Argued January 30—officially released April 16, 2024
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                                  Cardoza v. Waterbury

                                    Procedural History

          Action to recover damages for, inter alia, personal
       injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an alleg-
       edly defective municipal highway, and for other relief,
       brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
       Waterbury, where the court, Massicotte, J., granted the
       defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment
       thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
       Affirmed.
          Prerna Rao, for the appellant (plaintiff).
         Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appel-
       lee (defendant).
                                         Opinion

          SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Paula M. Cardoza, appeals
       from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion
       to dismiss filed by the defendant, the city of Waterbury,
       for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
       complaint on the basis that she failed to comply with the
       requirements of the notice provision of the municipal
       defective highway statute, General Statutes § 13a-149.1
       On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in
       granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the
          1
            General Statutes § 13a-149 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person injured
       in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge may recover
       damages from the party bound to keep it in repair. No action for any such
       injury sustained on or after October 1, 1982, shall be brought except within
       two years from the date of such injury. No action for any such injury shall
       be maintained against any town, city, corporation or borough, unless written
       notice of such injury and a general description of the same, and of the cause
       thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence, shall, within ninety
       days thereafter be given to a selectman or the clerk of such town, or to the
       clerk of such city or borough, or to the secretary or treasurer of such
       corporation. . . . No notice given under the provisions of this section shall
       be held invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in describing the
       injury or in stating the time, place or cause of its occurrence, if it appears
       that there was no intention to mislead or that such town, city, corporation
       or borough was not in fact misled thereby.’’
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                              Cardoza v. Waterbury

         written notice that she submitted to the defendant con-
         tained sufficient information in compliance with the
         notice requirements of § 13a-149, or, in the alternative,
         the savings clause of § 13a-149 grants her relief under
         the statute. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
         judgment of the court.
             The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiff’s com-
         plaint, and procedural history are relevant to our resolu-
         tion of this appeal. On May 14, 2019, the plaintiff sent
         to the defendant via certified mail a written ‘‘Notice of
         Claim’’ (notice) pursuant to § 13a-149. The notice,
         which was received by the defendant on May 16, 2019,
         stated the plaintiff’s name; the date and time of the
         incident as April 12, 2019, approximately between the
         hours of 4 and 10 p.m.; and the location of the incident
         as ‘‘Gordon Street, between Cooke Street and Oakland
         Avenue.’’ The notice described the plaintiff’s injuries
         and losses as ‘‘pain and injury to her cervical and lumbar
         spine, and other injuries which are yet unknown. Prop-
         erty damages include loss and replacement of two tires
         and other damage to the vehicle.’’ With respect to the
         cause of the injuries and losses, the notice stated that
         ‘‘[t]he above injuries and losses were caused by the
         defect in the roadway described above.’’
            On April 5, 2021, the plaintiff commenced the present
         action by filing a one count complaint against the defen-
         dant alleging liability pursuant to § 13a-149. Specifically,
         the complaint alleges that, on or about April 12, 2019,
         the plaintiff was operating her motor vehicle in an east-
         ward direction on Gordon Street, which is owned and
         maintained by the defendant, near the intersection with
         Cooke Street, in Waterbury. When the plaintiff reached
         a portion of Gordon Street that ‘‘was heavily eroded
         and unsafe for public travel,’’ the defective condition
         of the roadway ‘‘caused [her] vehicle to suddenly experi-
         ence two flat tires,’’ which, in turn, caused ‘‘the plaintiff
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                                   Cardoza v. Waterbury

       to suffer personal injuries2 and losses3 . . . .’’ (Foot-
       notes added.)
          On December 14, 2022, the defendant, pursuant to
       Practice Book § 10-30, filed a motion to dismiss the
       plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the court lacked sub-
       ject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s failure to
       comply with the notice requirements of § 13a-149. Spe-
       cifically, in its memorandum of law in support of its
       motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the notice
       provided by the plaintiff was inadequate, as it ‘‘entirely
       failed to identify the alleged defect in the road that
       caused the plaintiff’s injuries and damages.’’ On January
       23, 2023, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition
       to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, with an attached
       affidavit and exhibits. The defendant filed a reply on
       January 30, 2023.
          On April 10, 2023, the court, Massicotte, J., held a
       hearing regarding the defendant’s motion to dismiss
       and, that same day, issued an order granting the defen-
       dant’s motion on the grounds that ‘‘the cause of the
       injury is completely missing [from the notice] and the
       savings clause does not apply.’’ The court noted the
       plaintiff’s argument that the language in the
       notice—‘‘the defect in the roadway described above’’—
       constituted a description of the defect but found, to
       the contrary, that the plaintiff had ‘‘failed to describe
       [the defect]’’ and, therefore, ‘‘completely and unmistak-
       ably omitted the cause’’ of her injuries. Accordingly,
          2
            Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the defendant’s
       carelessness and negligence in failing to maintain Gordon Street, she ‘‘suf-
       fered neck spasms, stiffness, and pain and tingling in her left arm . . . [and]
       pain [in] her low back . . . some or all of which require future treatment
       and possibly future medical procedures . . . .’’ She also alleged that she
       requires injections for pain and now has limited range of movement and
       that her ‘‘injuries will be permanent in nature and/or permanently disabling.’’
          3
            The plaintiff further alleged that, in addition to the expenses incurred
       ‘‘for medical care and attention,’’ she sustained ‘‘substantial damages and
       losses to [her] personal property, including . . . [the loss of use of her]
       vehicle,’’ and that her ‘‘ability to enjoy life’s activities has been impaired.’’
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                             Cardoza v. Waterbury

         the court concluded that it lacked subject matter juris-
         diction over the plaintiff’s action and rendered judg-
         ment dismissing the complaint. This appeal followed.

            We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles
         concerning actions pursuant to § 13a-149. ‘‘Under the
         common law, municipalities enjoyed immunity for
         injuries caused by defective highways. . . . This immu-
         nity has been legislatively abrogated by § 13a-149, which
         allows a person to recover damages against a municipal-
         ity for injuries caused by a defective highway. . . . Sec-
         tion 13a-149 provides the exclusive remedy for a person
         seeking redress against a municipality for such injuries.
         . . . Under § 13a-149, the plaintiff must provide statu-
         tory notice within ninety days of the accident in order
         for an action to lie for damages caused by a defective
         highway that the town must maintain. [T]he notice
         which the statute prescribes comprehends five essential
         elements: (a) written notice of the injury; (b) a general
         description of that injury; (c) the cause; (d) the time
         [and date], and (e) the place thereof. . . . The purpose
         of the notice requirement is not to set a trap for the
         unwary or to place an impediment in the way of an
         injured party who has an otherwise meritorious claim.
         Rather, the purpose of notice is to allow the municipal-
         ity to make a proper investigation into the circum-
         stances surrounding the claim in order to protect its
         financial interests. . . . More specifically . . . the
         statutory notice assists a town in settling claims
         promptly in order to avoid the expenses of litigation
         and encourages prompt investigation of conditions that
         may endanger public safety, as well as giving the town
         an early start in assembling evidence for its defense
         against meritless claims. . . . A notice that patently
         fails to meet this test in describing the place or cause
         of the injury is defective as a matter of law.’’ (Citation
         omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
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                                   Cardoza v. Waterbury

       omitted.) Murphy v. Clinton, 217 Conn. App. 182, 186–
       87, 287 A.3d 1150 (2023).
          ‘‘The failure to comply with [the requirements of
       § 13a-149] deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction
       over a plaintiff’s action. . . . It is well established that
       a determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter
       jurisdiction is a question of law over which our review
       is plenary. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the
       authority of the court to adjudicate the type of contro-
       versy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court
       lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over
       which it is without jurisdiction . . . . Under our rules
       of practice, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
       matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Id., 187–88. In the present
       case, the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss was
       premised on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
       notice requirements of § 13a-149. Therefore, the ques-
       tion before us is whether the trial court properly deter-
       mined, as a matter of law, that the description in the
       notice of the defect in the roadway that caused the
       plaintiff’s injuries was insufficient to satisfy § 13a-149.
       See Dobie v. New Haven, 204 Conn. App. 583, 595,
       254 A.3d 321 (2021), aff’d, 346 Conn. 487, 291 A.3d
       1014 (2023).
         On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the notice
       given to the defendant is sufficient to meet the require-
       ments of § 13a-149, and (2) even if it is not sufficient,
       the savings clause in the statute cures any deficiencies
       in the notice.4 We conclude, as a matter of law, that
         4
           We note that the plaintiff did not brief her claims separately, nor did
       she include any subheadings for her arguments, leaving us to attempt to
       differentiate her arguments in support of each of the two claims. See Practice
       Book § 67-4 (‘‘[t]he appellant’s brief shall contain the following . . . (e)
       The argument, divided under appropriate headings into as many parts as
       there are points to be presented, with appropriate references to the statement
       of facts or to the page or pages of the transcript or to the relevant document’’).
       For ease of discussion, we address the plaintiff’s claims in an order different
       from the order presented in her brief.
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                              Cardoza v. Waterbury

         the language of the notice is insufficient under the
         requirements of § 13a-149, and, furthermore, because
         it fails to describe the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries
         in any way, the savings clause is inapplicable.

            The notice provided by the plaintiff listed the cause
         of the plaintiff’s injuries as ‘‘the defect in the roadway
         described above,’’ which refers to the description of
         the location of the incident, namely, ‘‘Gordon Street,
         between Cooke Street and Oakland Avenue.’’ In con-
         text, therefore, the description of the cause is limited
         to ‘‘the defect in’’ the area of Gordon Street that is
         located between Cooke Street and Oakland Avenue.
         The entirety of the description of the cause of her injur-
         ies is that there is a ‘‘defect in’’ some portion of the
         roadway. Notably, the notice in the present case does
         not contain the more detailed description of the cause
         of the injury that appears in the plaintiff’s complaint,
         which alleges that the road was ‘‘heavily eroded and
         unsafe for public travel . . . caus[ing] the plaintiff’s
         vehicle to suddenly experience two flat tires and caus-
         ing the plaintiff to suffer personal injuries and losses
         . . . .’’

            Our appellate courts previously have addressed the
         level of specificity required to meet the five statutory
         elements under § 13a-149. In Marino v. East Haven,
         120 Conn. 577, 182 A. 225 (1935), for example, our
         Supreme Court addressed the sufficiency of the descrip-
         tion of the injury in the plaintiff’s notice and held that
         the notice stating that the plaintiff ‘‘ ‘fell and was
         injured’ ’’ was insufficient as a matter of law, as it failed
         to provide a description of the injury itself. Id., 578,
         580. Similarly, in Martin v. Plainville, 240 Conn. 105,
         689 A.2d 1125 (1997), our Supreme Court held that the
         notice given to the town under § 13a-149, which merely
         stated that the plaintiff ‘‘ ‘was injured after she
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                                  Cardoza v. Waterbury

       tripped,’ ’’ was insufficient as a description of the injur-
       ies suffered. Id., 107, 109. In Martin, the plaintiff chal-
       lenged the validity of Marino, arguing that it was ‘‘an
       outdated precedent that produces harsh results.’’ Id.,
       110. Our Supreme Court upheld Marino, noting that
       the ‘‘legislative history manifests an intent to require
       more rather than less notice to the town. The legislative
       history of the statute does not support the plaintiff’s
       argument that a mere statement of injury, without any
       description of such injury, should suffice under § 13a-
       149.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 111.5
          Our courts also specifically have addressed what con-
       stitutes sufficient notice as to the cause of the injury.
       In Ross v. New London, 3 Conn. Cir. 644, 222 A.2d 816,
       cert. denied, 154 Conn. 717, 221 A.2d 272 (1966), the
       notice provided by the plaintiff stated in relevant part:
       ‘‘The claim is that the fall was caused by the neglect
       of the city in the maintenance and repair of the sidewalk
       at said site.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
       645. The court held that it was ‘‘immediately apparent
       that [the notice] fails to specify the defect in the highway
       which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The cause of
       the injury required to be stated must be interpreted to
       mean the defect or defective condition of the highway
       which brought about the injury. . . . What exactly was
          5
            We note that Martin was decided before the enactment of General
       Statutes § 1-2z, which provides that ‘‘[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the
       first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its
       relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
       such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
       does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
       meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’ Our Supreme Court has
       ‘‘addressed the issue of whether the passage of § 1-2z require[s] us to aban-
       don prior interpretations of statutes in order to comply with § 1-2z’’ and
       ‘‘determined that we do not abandon prior interpretations of statutory lan-
       guage. Rather, even after the passage of § 1-2z, it is customary for us to
       begin with this court’s prior interpretations of statutes in previous cases.’’
       Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 342 Conn. 103, 124, 269 A.3d 24
       (2022).
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                                     Cardoza v. Waterbury

         the neglect of the city in the maintenance and repair
         of the sidewalk in front of the premises . . . which
         brought about the injuries claimed by the plaintiff? Was
         it a large, small or medium hole, a ditch, a gully, a
         rut, a depression, or the elevation of a portion of the
         sidewalk, or perhaps the failure of the city effectively
         to remove snow or ice accumulated thereon? . . . Cer-
         tainly, the use of the words neglect, maintenance and
         repair gives no clue whatsoever as to the direct cause
         of the fall in question, nor do the words give any indica-
         tion of that which occasioned or produced the fall. . . .
         It is sufficient and customary in defective highway cases
         to state that the cause was a specified defective condi-
         tion, without further statement that it in turn was due
         to negligence in failing to keep the highway in repair
         or otherwise.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
         marks omitted.) Id., 646–47.6
             6
               Although ‘‘[w]e are not bound by the precedent of the statutory Appellate
         Division of the Circuit Court . . . we may find it persuasive.’’ (Citation
         omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hackett, 72 Conn. App.
         127, 135, 804 A.2d 225, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 904, 810 A.2d 270 (2002). We
         find the court’s reasoning in Ross to be persuasive to our analysis in the
         present case. See also Beisiegel v. Seymour, 58 Conn. 43, 52, 19 A. 372
         (1889) (statement that highway was ‘‘defective, and out of repair is clearly
         insufficient’’ as to cause of plaintiff’s injuries (internal quotation marks
         omitted)). We also note that many Superior Court decisions similarly have
         determined that a bare bones assertion of a defect is insufficient under
         § 13a-149. See, e.g., Troisi v. Watertown, Superior Court, judicial district of
         Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (November 20, 2023) (‘‘description
         in the notice of claim [that plaintiff] . . . ‘was caused to fall due to a defect
         in the sidewalk’ ’’ was insufficient because it ‘‘fails to describe the exact
         nature of the defect’’); Castillo-Blain v. Wethersfield, Superior Court, judicial
         district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (November 5, 2019) (69
         Conn. L. Rptr. 417, 417–18) (notice stating cause as ‘‘ ‘relating to a defective
         sidewalk’ ’’ and that plaintiff was injured ‘‘ ‘[d]ue to a defect in the roadway
         in the crosswalk’ ’’ and ‘‘ ‘[a]s a result of the defect,’ ’’ was insufficient
         because it ‘‘provide[d] the defendant with nothing more from which to
         identify the exact nature of the defect’’); Sherard v. New Haven, Superior
         Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January
         7, 2019) (67 Conn. L. Rptr. 607, 610–11) (description of cause of injury as
         ‘‘ ‘a defect in the sidewalk due to its state of disrepair’ ’’ was insufficient
         under § 13a-149); Bencivengo v. Madison, Superior Court, judicial district
         of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 1, 2013) (notice describing
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                                  Cardoza v. Waterbury

          In Murphy v. Clinton, supra, 217 Conn. App. 184, this
       court determined that the description of the cause of
       injury in the notice provided was sufficient under § 13a-
       149. In Murphy, the notice ‘‘stated that while ‘walking
       across the intersection of Grove Street and West Grove
       Street . . . [the plaintiff] stepped into a defective
       water main hole cover causing serious personal injuries
       to her right leg.’ The plaintiff included three color photo-
       graphs with the notice, in which the water main hole
       cover is visible from three different distances within
       the intersection. Additionally, in the notice, the plaintiff
       referenced the three photographs; the notice indicate[d]
       that the water main hole cover ‘[was] more fully shown
       [i]n the photos attached hereto’ . . . .’’ Id., 185. In
       reviewing the notice, this court observed that ‘‘[t]he
       notice states that the plaintiff ‘stepped into a defective
       water main hole cover’ . . . . The plaintiff also
       included three color photographs with the notice, in
       support of the assertion that the water main hole cover
       located at the intersection . . . was the cause of her
       injury. Each photograph makes unmistakable that the
       cover is depressed, that is, markedly lower than the
       grade of the surrounding pavement. The language of the
       notice and the appended photographs go well beyond
       merely asserting a ‘defect’; rather, they paint a picture
       that gave notice to the defendant that the plaintiff’s
       injury was caused by a water main hole cover, in a
       particular location, that was not sufficiently flush with
       the surrounding pavement.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.,
       189. In sum, this court concluded that the description
       cause of injuries as ‘‘ ‘a defective condition upon a walkway and/or bridge’ ’’
       was defective in that it omitted required description of cause of injuries);
       Platt v. Naugatuck, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket
       No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January 17, 2012) (notice stating plaintiff fell due to
       ‘‘negligent maintenance of pedestrian sidewalks’’ was insufficient because
       it completely omitted cause of injury (emphasis omitted; internal quotation
       marks omitted)).
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                               Cardoza v. Waterbury

          was specific and detailed enough to give the town ade-
          quate notice as to what brought about the injuries suf-
          fered by the plaintiff. See id.

             In contrast, in the present case, the notice given fails
          to describe the cause of the injury beyond the assertion
          that it was a ‘‘defect in the roadway . . . .’’ Despite the
          plaintiff’s argument that such a description ‘‘excludes
          many different claims, including those involving (1)
          materials or other substances merely on the roadway,
          such as a pile of wet leaves . . . (2) sidewalks . . .
          (3) bridges . . . (4) malfunctioning traffic lights . . .
          [5] ice, snow or other weather conditions . . . or [6]
          parking lots’’; (citations omitted; emphasis omitted); we
          conclude that it fails to meet the requirements of the
          statute. Construing the notice requirements of § 13a-
          149 liberally, as we are required to do; see Murphy v.
          Clinton, supra, 217 Conn. App. 187; the use of the word
          ‘‘defect’’ fails to provide any information as to the cause
          of the plaintiff’s injuries. Nor does the fact that the
          notice provided that the ‘‘defect’’ was ‘‘in’’ the road, as
          the plaintiff argues, rule out a long list of potential
          defects. Unlike in Murphy, in which the plaintiff’s notice
          stated that the plaintiff stepped ‘‘ ‘into’ ’’ the water main
          hole cover; (emphasis added) Murphy v. Clinton, supra,
          185; the description in the plaintiff’s notice in the pres-
          ent case does not indicate whether the alleged defect
          was protruding from the surface, or underneath it,
          which would be important to the defendant’s efforts to
          identify the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Moreover,
          as Martino, Marino, and Ross make clear, the notice
          requirement is intended to provide the municipality
          with sufficiently specific information so that it can rem-
          edy the defect. We conclude that the language of the
          plaintiff’s notice fails to sufficiently describe the cause
          of her injury, and, therefore, it patently does not meet
          the requirements of § 13a-149 as a matter of law.
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          The plaintiff argues that the defendant was already
       familiar with the defect from complaints that she had
       filed with the defendant’s police department and public
       works department in the aftermath of the incident,
       which provided additional information, and that, there-
       fore, the notice was sufficient. This argument is unavail-
       ing. We note first that § 13a-149 provides that the notice
       must ‘‘be given to a selectman or . . . the clerk of such
       city or borough . . . .’’ The statute does not allow the
       court to consider the filing of additional notices with
       departments within the municipality. See General Stat-
       utes § 13a-149. Furthermore, the only support offered
       by the plaintiff in furtherance of this argument is that
       our Supreme Court stated that, ‘‘[i]n testing the suffi-
       ciency of a notice, it should be remembered also that
       a general description of the location of a large, or well
       known or long continued obstruction, or one with
       which the defendants are already familiar, may be quite
       sufficient to meet the test, where it would not be if
       these were not the facts.’’ Sizer v. Waterbury, 113 Conn.
       145, 158, 154 A. 639 (1931). The plaintiff’s reliance on
       Sizer is misplaced, however, because the notice given
       in Sizer to the city described ‘‘ ‘personal injuries sus-
       tained by reason of falling in a hole on Huntington
       Avenue’ ’’; id., 154; and, therefore, the description of
       the cause of the injuries—a hole—was provided as part
       of the notice, unlike in the present case in which a
       description of the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries was
       entirely absent from the notice.7
          7
            The plaintiff’s final argument in support of this claim is that the trial
       court ‘‘relied heavily’’ on this court’s decision in Frandy v. Commissioner
       of Transportation, 132 Conn. App. 750, 34 A.3d 418 (2011), cert. denied,
       303 Conn. 937, 36 A.3d 696 (2012), and that ‘‘[t]his reliance was erroneous, as
       unlike the state, municipalities are not sovereign and do not enjoy sovereign
       immunity.’’ The plaintiff is correct that there are important distinctions
       between Frandy and the present case: the claim in Frandy was brought
       under General Statutes § 13a-144, which permits a civil action to recover
       damages for injuries sustained on state highways or sidewalks, as opposed
       to roads owned by a municipality. See Frandy v. Commissioner of Transpor-
       tation, supra, 751. Nevertheless, the plaintiff overstates the trial court’s
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             We next turn to the plaintiff’s claim that the savings
          clause of § 13a-1498 applies in the present case and
          cures any deficiencies in the notice. We begin with the
          relevant legal principles. ‘‘Section 13a-149 . . . con-
          tains a saving[s] clause that provides that notice given
          under the statute will not be invalidated because of
          inaccuracies in its content as long as there was no intent
          to mislead the municipality or the municipality is not in
          fact misled. . . . While the saving[s] clause will excuse
          inaccuracies in the content of the notice, however, it
          will not excuse a complete absence of notice.’’ (Citation
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bassin v.
          Stamford, 26 Conn. App. 534, 538, 602 A.2d 1044 (1992).
          ‘‘When a notice fails to provide information respecting
          each of the required elements, it is deficient as a matter
          of law.’’ Pajor v. Wallingford, 47 Conn. App. 365, 378,
          704 A.2d 247 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 917, 714
          A.2d 7 (1998); see also Martin v. Plainville, supra, 240
          Conn. 113 (‘‘[t]he savings clause applies only where the
          information provided in the notice is inaccurate, not
          where information is entirely absent’’ (emphasis omit-
          ted)).
            The plaintiff correctly points out in her brief that the
          inclusion of a savings clause means that § 13a-149 is to
          be construed liberally. See Murphy v. Clinton, supra,
          217 Conn. App. 187. Nevertheless, as we previously
          reliance on Frandy. The trial court cited Frandy once in its decision, and
          the portion that it cited was a quotation within that decision from Ross v.
          New London, supra, 3 Conn. Cir. 646, in which the court discussed what
          constituted a sufficient description of the cause of injuries sustained by a
          plaintiff under § 13a-149. See Frandy v. Commissioner of Transportation,
          supra, 754–55. There is thus no merit to the plaintiff’s argument that the
          court’s use of Frandy in its decision was erroneous.
            8
              The savings clause of General Statutes § 13a-149 provides: ‘‘No notice
          given under the provisions of this section shall be held invalid or insufficient
          by reason of an inaccuracy in describing the injury or in stating the time,
          place or cause of its occurrence, if it appears that there was no intention
          to mislead or that such town, city, corporation or borough was not in fact
          misled thereby.’’
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                            Cardoza v. Waterbury

       stated in this opinion, the savings clause applies only
       in cases in which information in the notice concerning
       one of the required elements is inaccurate or vague,
       ‘‘not where information is entirely absent.’’ (Emphasis
       in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Salemme
       v. Seymour, 262 Conn. 787, 794, 817 A.2d 636 (2003);
       see also Bassin v. Stamford, supra, 26 Conn. App. 538.
       Our Supreme Court has ‘‘emphasize[d] that ‘entirely
       absent’ means exactly that; one of the ‘five essential
       elements’ articulated in Martin v. Plainville, supra, [240
       Conn. 109], must be completely, totally and unmistak-
       ably omitted from the plaintiff’s notice.’’ Salemme v.
       Seymour, supra, 794.

           In the present case, the notice given by the plaintiff
       to the defendant failed to include any description of
       the cause of the plaintiff’s injury; therefore, it did not
       fulfill one of the requirements for notice under § 13a-
       149. See id. (discussing Martin v. Plainville, supra, 240
       Conn. 113, and noting that court in Martin ‘‘declined
       to afford the plaintiff the ‘relief of the savings clause
       because the notice she provided failed to give any
       description of the injury whatsoever and, thus, did not
       comport with one of the five fundamental requirements
       for perfected notice’ ’’ (emphasis in original)); see also
       Nicholaus v. Bridgeport, 117 Conn. 398, 401, 167 A. 826
       (1933) (‘‘[t]he provision that no notice shall be held
       invalid or insufficient because of an ‘inaccuracy’ in stat-
       ing the cause of the injury, if the conditions stated in
       the statute appear, cannot avail to make valid a notice
       which fails entirely to state that cause’’ (emphasis
       added)); Ross v. New London, supra, 3 Conn. Cir. 645,
       647 (savings clause could not be applied when only
       description given in notice of cause of injury was
       ‘‘ ‘neglect of the city’ ’’). Accordingly, the savings clause
       cannot be applied to the notice given by the plaintiff
       to the defendant in the present case.
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            In summary, we conclude, as a matter of law, that
          the plaintiff’s notice fails to meet one of the statutory
          requirements of § 13a-149. Moreover, because the cause
          of injury was ‘‘completely, totally and unmistakenly
          omitted from the plaintiff’s notice’’; Salemme v. Sey-
          mour, supra, 262 Conn. 794; the savings clause does
          not apply. Accordingly, given the plaintiff’s failure to
          comply with a condition precedent to maintaining an
          action under § 13a-149, the court properly granted the
          defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
          jurisdiction.
            The judgment is affirmed.
            In this opinion the other judges concurred.