Court Opinion

ID: 9492392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:40:23.628412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:17.301462
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all of the majority opinion, except Part II.B. Because I cannot agree, however, that Johnson’s conduct amounted to “physical restraint” under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3, or that he has conceded the point,1 I respectfully dissent from Part II.B.
The restraining conduct here consisted of Johnson grabbing the keys to Kelly Johnson’s car as she sat in her car in the couple’s driveway. Kelly “escaped” this restraint by jumping out of her car. The Guidelines define “physically restrained” to mean “the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 Application Note Ki).
I submit that taking the keys to a car is not “physical restraint,” as that term is defined in the Guidelines. Kelly jumped out of the car and fled immediately after Johnson grabbed the keys. Given the Guidelines’ definition, which requires a “forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up,” some use of force resulting in the physical or bodily restraint of the person is required to qualify for the enhancement. No use of force (or even the threat of force) was present here. The cases which have upheld application of this enhancement confirm that some use of force and resulting physical, bodily restraint is required. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir.1990) ( victim held around neck at knife point); United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.1989) (victim physically prevented from leaving room in which defendant had placed a pipe bomb).
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that application of the § 3A1.3 victim restraint enhancement was error.

. The majority holds that Johnson has conceded that a "physical restraint” was involved. See Maj. op. at 1133 ("Johnson admitted in his reply brief that he restrained Kelly on March 20 when he held her in her car when she returned home from work.”). Because of this assumption, the majority does not reach the question of whether Johnson’s conduct amounted to "physically restraining” Kelly, within the meaning of U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1 and 3A1.3. I read appellant’s arguments differently and do not agree that Johnson has admitted that his conduct amounted to a "physical restraint,” within the meaning of the Guidelines. See, e.g., Appellant's Op. Br. at 31 (“Immediately afterward, she jumped out of the car and ran away; thus, she [Kelly] was not restrained.”). I thus reach the issue of whether a "physical restraint” was involved.