Court Opinion

ID: 9730786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:23:55.562648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:09.289537
License: Public Domain

Schreiber, J.,
dissenting. In this case the public interest in having all relevant and material evidence presented to a jury in a-criminal proceeding has been subordinated to an unwarranted interpretation of the search and seizure clause of the federal constitution.1 The judicial sanction of suppression which the prevailing opinion imposes may cause the withholding of relevant and material evidence of a crime from a jury whose task it is to determine the truth.2 I cannot agree with the plurality’s claim that the evidence and inferences to be drawn could not, upon a proper formulation of the issues,- justify a finding of probable cause to search the car. For do I agree with its refusal-to consider, in addition to the reasons given at the scene, the facts known to the police at the time defendant was arrested and. the car was impounded as the determinative element-for deciding whether probable cause existed. I would remand this matter to the trial court to make factual findings, after giving the parties • the opportunity to supplement the record, on ■ the issue of whether there was probable cause to search defendant’s automobile at the time of the arrest and search of the defendant.
*55Only the State produced evidence at the hearings on the motions to suppress. One motion was directed to. the evidence obtained upon the arrest and search of the defendant and another to the evidence acquired on the subsequent search of the automobile he had been driving. The following picture emerges from the record.
In May 1976, the Organized Crime Unit of the Union County Prosecutor’s Office began conducting an investigation into bookmaking centered about Michael Verlingo whose operations were conducted in an apartment at 1381 North Avenue, Elizabeth. As part of that investigation the police had determined that Verlingo’s phone, which was being monitored pursuant to a court order, was being used for transmission and receipt of bets on sporting events.
One caller, whose voice was later identified as that of the defendant Anthony Ercolano, had engaged in five to seven such telephone conversations prior to June 30, 1976. Detective Lynch, a member of the Organized Crime Unit who had been listening to. these calls, recognized the same voice during a June 30, 1976 conversation. On that occasion the caller stated he would come the next day at 1:00 n.M. to collect money owed from previous bets. Detective Lynch reported this information to his superior, Sergeant Rowland, who, in turn, requested that members of the Elizabeth Police Department Confidential Squad be dispatched to 1381 North Avenue to determine the identity of the caller.
Detectives Malone and Brennan of the Elizabeth Police Department watched the premises the next day. They saw a white male, who was 5 feet 9, 180 pounds, age 45 to 50, with wavy black and gray hair and driving a new gray Lincoln Continental with license plate number 755 EUF, arrive at the appointed hour. He entered the apartment house and was seen leaving about five minutes later. A radio inquiry disclosed that the vehicle was registered in the name of Enrico Ercolano (the defendant’s brother) of Jersey City.
On July 7, Detective Lynch, while monitoring the same phone, heard another conversation with the same caller. This *56conversation indicated that the caller would be coming to the VerlingO' apartment that evening at 8:00 p.m. Sergeant Rowland obtained a search warrant for the apartment and arranged for members of the Elizabeth Police squad and the Union County Prosecutor’s Office to meet at the premises at 7:30 p.m. Upon arrival, they entered and searched the apartment.
Two detectives were dispatched to the front of the apartment house. About 8:00 p.m. the man who had appeared on July 1 drove up in the same Lincoln Continental. He was apprehended by the detectives as he entered the apartment house and, after refusing to give his name, was arrested for conspiracy to violate the gambling laws. A search conducted incident to his arrest produced several thousand dollars and disclosed that his name was Anthony Ercolano.
Ercolano was taken to Elizabeth Police Headquarters. The car, which was locked, was checked from the outside and 'taken to headquarters as well. An Assistant County Prosecutor who attended the raid instructed that the car be impounded for safetjr reasons since it was not known how long Ercolano would be detained. At police headquarters Ercolano refused to permit the car to be searched. Sergeant Rowland, according to his testimony, wanted to make certain nothing had happened to the vehicle en route to headquarters and inspected the car from the outside for the first time. On the armrest between the seats of the driver and passenger he saw some pieces of paper on which there were notations, which he thought might have something to do with gambling. He then opened the car door and found the papers wotc in fact gambling paraphernalia. Sergeant Rowland did not know why the car had not been searched initially outside the Verlingo apartment except for the Assistant Prosecutor’s instructions to impound the vehicle.
As indicated previously, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches of his person and of the vehicle. The trial court held that there was probable *57cause to arrest the defendant and therefore the personal search, being incidental to the arrest, was proper. The defendant has not appealed from that ruling.
The trial court also held that the police had a right to impound the vehicle and that “they had a right to get a search warrant as to this vehicle, but they did not do either one of those.” Einding, therefore, that there had been no impoundment and that the search was made without a warrant, it granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidentiary use of the gambling slips. The trial court made no specific factual findings. Its ruling implied that probable cause existed but that a warrant was necessary.
Whether the search of the Ercolano vehicle was reasonable or unreasonable within the Eourth Amendment context depends on resolution of three basic questions. Eirst, did the police have probable cause to search the vehicle at the scene ? Second, if so, could that be done without first obtaining a warrant? Einally, if the police could have conducted a warrantless search at the scene, is its validity vitiated because the ear was removed to police headquarters before the search ?
Although as previously noted, the trial court implied probable cause existed, it made no express finding on that issue. In examining the record we must keep in mind that reasonable or probable cause is not a technical concept but one which is drawn from “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life” as tested by reasonable persons. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949). It has been described as a “well grounded” suspicion. State v. Burnett, 42 N. J. 377, 387 (1964); State v. Waltz, 61 N. J. 83, 87 (1972).
Here, the police knew that an illegal gambling operation was being carried on at the Yerlingo apartment. The raid of the apartment verified it was being used for illicit purposes, several phone calls seeking to place bets on baseball games having been received while the search was underway. *58They were aware that the defendant participated in that illegal activity. This was evident from his telephone conversations with occupants of the Yerlingo apartment, his appearance on July 1, 1976 to collect gambling moneys, and his reappearance on July 7, 1976 to pick up additional funds. The probable cause to arrest the defendant as a co-conspirator in a gambling activity is not questioned. Having probable cause to believe that the defendant was engaged in' a gambling conspiracy, the police could reasonably conclude that the Lincoln Continental he was using to carry him to and from the Yerlingo apartment in connection with the gambling operation might contain gambling paraphernalia. Automobiles transporting criminals in .'the course of criminal activity are likely instrumentalities of crime or the repositories of the tools and fruits of crime. See, e: g., Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 304, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1975) (forged cheeks); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970) (robbery); State v. LaPorte, 62 N. J. 312 (1973) (robbery). Cf. State v. Naturile, 83 N. J. Super. 563, 581 (App. Div. 1964) (dissenting opinion of Justice (then Judge) Sullivan). Particularly is this so where the suspected crime involves organized gambling, which entails the continuing and constant movement of individuals transporting gambling slips, writings, moneys and other paraphernalia. Cf. State v. Snow, 77 N. J. 459 (1978). The use of automobiles in gambling is commonplace as is the presence of gambling contraband in the automobiles used by gamblers. Under all these circumstances, one could reasonably conclude that the police had probable cause to search the vehicle.
The plurality, in addition to asserting that the evidence could not justify a finding of probable cause, claims that since the Prosecutor has not contended on this appeal that probable cause did exist,3 this Court should ignore the appar*59ent existence of the factual and' legal basis justifying the search. This Court should not hesitate to consider a singularly material issue concerning the admissibility of evidence in a criminal proceeding where the facts generating that issue are patent in the record even though they may not have been crystallized by the parties or addressed by the court below. To contend that exclusion of such evidence will act as a deterrent to police action even though defendant’s constitutional rights have not been violated is incomprehensible.
The plurality would also preclude consideration of whether probable cause existed by restricting the Court’s assessment of the police activity to the subjective intent expressed by the Assistant County Prosecutor that the automobile had been impounded for safety reasons. This is a most unrealistic approach. The reasons expressed by the Assistant County Prosecutor ought not to be taken at face value. It seems evident that there would have been no reason whatsoever to impound the car, let alone that offered by the Assistant County Prosecutor, if the car had not itself been used in furtherance of the criminal activity of the defendant' and been a likely source of criminal materials. In no sense was the impoundment of the vehicle here comparable to that involving a motorist arrested for a non-criminal offense.' State v. Slockbower, 79 N. J. 1 (1978).
In the context of this ease it appears simply that, the police may very well have selected or voiced the wrong reason for seizure and search of the vehicle. The Court, in assessing the reasonableness of the search, should not be confined to the explanations made by the participating officers. What is crucial is whether the facts known to the police clearly and *60objectively disclosed probable cause for the police actions and whether the officers acted upon those facts. It is not germane to the validity of the search that the officers believed different reasons justified the search other than their knowledge before the search of obvious facts demonstrating probable cause.4
Substantial authority exists for the position advocated here. In Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F. 2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. den. 374 U. S. 807, 83 S. Ct. 1696, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1032 (1963), the court, though rejecting the government’s contention that a warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest, sustained the search as one within the automobile exception of Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925). Posing the question as “whether or not it is necessary to explore the agent’s intent,” 315 F. 2d at 701, the court ruled as follows:
Tiie legality of a search cannot be balanced against the good faith of the searcher or the extent or correctness of his legal knowledge. An unlawful search, though made in the honest belief of right, remains unlawful and its fruits remain forbidden. A lawful search, though not made under subjective claim or knowledge of right, remains lawful and evidence so obtained is admissible. Here, the agent took control of the car, searched it and seized contraband. He intended to do what he did and his actions constituted a continuous course of conduct. The conduct was justified because the agent had probable cause to .seize the vehicle and the legality of his actions are not affected by his subjective beliefs. [Id. at 702]
Accord, White v. United States, 448 F. 2d 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 405 U. S. 926, 92 S. Ct. 974, 30 L. Ed. *612d 798 (1972); Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F. 2d 532, 536 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vital-Padilla, 500 F. 2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding probable cause for arrest).
In United States v. Capra, 372 F. Supp. 600 (S. D. N. Y. 1973), the police searched an automobile for narcotics at a garage to which the car had been moved after the defendant’s arrest. The government attempted to justify the search either as incident to the arrest or as an inventory search, but Judge Erankel could find “little or no support” for these justifications. Nevertheless, noting that “their [the officers’] rationale for their right to seize and search the vehicle is not conclusive,” he sustained the search under the principle of probable cause. 372 F. Supp. at 602, 603 & n.2. The Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the automobile search although a new trial was ordered on other grounds. 501 F. 2d 267, 279-280 (2d Cir. 1974).
Justice Hall in State v. Romeo, 43 N. J. 188 (1966), cautioned that
[c]ourts ought not to insist that policemen act on necessary spurs of the moment with all the knowledge and acuity of constitutional lawyers. The fundamental requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Granting requisite adherence to the basic essentials of that concept assuring proper recognition of the individual liberties sought to be safeguarded thereby, the validity of law enforcement conduct should not be judicially tested by post faoto technicalities and formalisms of no vital importance. [Id. at 206]
To label the search as unreasonable and suppress relevant evidence, simply because the police who knew the facts supporting lawful seizure and search of the vehicle selected the wrong theory, serves no salutary purpose, constitutional or otherwise.
Once probable cause is found to exist, neither the failure to obtain a warrant before searching the Ercolano vehicle nor the delay in making the search until after its removal to police headquarters rendered the search unreasonable. This becomes apparent when recognition is given to an underlying thesis of the Fourth Amendment — one’s right to privacy. *62Consistent with this premise there has developed a special niche for automobile searches. Motor vehicle searches, generally, are not subject to the same warrant strictures applicable to houses or other buildings. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976), Chief Justice Burger, writing for a majority of the Court, .commented:
The reason for this well-settled distinction is twofold. First, the inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a. practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible. * * * But the Court has also upheld warrantless searches where no immediate danger was presented that the car would be removed from the jurisdiction. * * * Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office. [428 U. S. at 367, 96 S. Ct. at 3096, 49 L. Bd. 2d at 1004; citations and footnote omitted]
Modern rules governing automobile searches evolved because of the realistic appraisal of the more limited expectation of privacy of motor vehicles in public and quasi-public places as well as because of their mobility.5 These rules sane-*63tioning warrantless automobile searches are substantially more expansive than those enunciated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), the Supreme Court’s initial opinion on warrantless motor vehicle searches. In Carroll the Court enunciated the principle that warrantless searches of vehicles were proper if the officer undertaking the search had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained material properly subject to seizure. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Supreme Court, pointed out that:
[T]he true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The 4th Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens. [267 U. S. at 149, 45 S. Ct. at 283, 69 L. Ed. at 549]
In that connection
'the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the 4th Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. [267 U. S. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 283, 69 L. Ed. at 551]
Thus, the Chief Justice drew a sharp distinction between the need for a warrant before searching a house as distinguished from a motor vehicle. He also pictured probable cause not as a technical concept, but rather in terms of whether the searching officer reasonably believed such contraband existed in the vehicle. He concluded that:
*64The measure of legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. [267 U. S. at 155 — 156, 45 S. Ct. at 286, 69 L. Ed. at 552]
The Carroll rule was extended in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 .(1970), to cover searches for evidence relevant to the wrongdoing in addition to contraband. This extension comported with the primary purpose of searches, namely, to obtain relevant evidence to assist the fact-finder in ascertaining the truth. See State v. Bisaccia, 45 N. J. 504, 509 (1965). Furthermore, Chambers expanded the Carroll rule to provide that if the police were entitled to make a warrantless search at the scene of defendant's arrest, removal of the vehicle to police headquarters would not invalidate a warrantless search made there.
In Chambers the police stopped a station wagon which matched the description of one that had been involved in a gas station robbery. After arrest of the occupants, the car was taken to police headquarters and there searched. The search led to the discovery of two revolvers and other incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court, rejecting motions to suppress, held that:
Eor constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. *■ * * The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained. The same consequences may not follow where there is unforeseeable cause to search a house. * * * But as Carroll * * * held, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars. [399 U. S. at 52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 428-429; footnote omitted]
*65See also Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F. Supp. 33 (E. D. Ark. 1965), aff’d sub nom. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F. 2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. den. 386 U. S. 964, 87 S. Ct. 1040, 19 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1967); Annot., “Modern status of rule as to validity of noneonsensual search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by lapse of time between, or difference in places of, arrest and search,” 19 A. L. R. 3d 727, 746, 757 (1968).
That probable cause to search a vehicle on the scene is not lost or dissipated because the search is conducted at a later time at a more convenient place is further illustrated in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 ,(1914). The police, having obtained a warrant, arrested the defendant when he appeared at a police office. They towed the defendant’s car, which was in a commercial parking lot a half block away, to a police impoundment area. The next day an examination of the car’s exterior revealed that the tread of a tire matched an impression at the scene of the crime and paint on the fender was similar to that of the victim’s car. The Supreme Court, in upholding the warrantless search stated:
We do not think that, because the. police impounded the car prior to the examination, which they could have made on the spot, there is a constitutional barrier to the use of the evidence obtained thereby. [417 U. S. at 593, 94 S. Ct. at 2470, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 336]
Justice Sullivan in State v. LaPorte, 62 N. J. 312 (1973), discussed the same problem. After the defendant was arrested, his car was impounded and towed to police headquarters where it was searched. Items related to an armed robbery were uncovered. He wrote:
The police had the right to seize defendant’s automobile since it had been reported as an instrumentality used in the robbery. The search of it was clearly justified since the officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of the Roselle Park armed robbery (as it actually did). * *■ * Since the police had probable cause to search defendant’s automobile, and the circum*66stances were such that it was not practicable to secure a warrant, their actions in seizing the vehicle, bringing it to police headquarters and searching it there, were not unreasonable. [Id, at 316]
The Supreme Court has recently decided a case strikingly similar to that before us in Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 304, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1975). The police had there been advised that an individual had attempted to negotiate four checks on a nonexistent account at a bank. They had been given a description of the suspect and the automobile he was driving. Ten minutes later they were told that an individual fitting that description and driving an automobile matching the one described had attempted to pass fraudulent checks at a second bank. The police came to the scene and arrested the individual. He was driven to the police station and his car was brought there too.
Despite his refusal to consent to a search of his car, the officers went ahead and found four checks that corresponded with those that he had attempted to pass at the first bank. The Supreme Court reversed a finding by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that the seizure of the checks violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion stated:
In Chambers v. Maroney we held that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. There, as here, “[t]he probable-cause factor” that developed- on the scene “still obtained at the station house.” 399 U. S., at 52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419. The Court of Criminal Appeals erroneously excluded the evidence seized from the search at the station house in light of the trial judge’s finding, undisturbed by the appellate court, that there was probable cause to search respondent’s car. [423 U. S. at 68, 96 S. Ct. at 305, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 211-212]
These cases, beginning with Chambers v. Maroney, supra, clearly demonstrate that, when the police have reasonable cause to search a vehicle at the scene of the defendant’s arrest, they may subsequently search the automobile after its re*67moval to police headquarters without obtaining a warrant. See State v. McCarthy, 130 N. J. Super. 540, 544-545 (App. Div. 1974); State v. Hannah, 125 N. J. Super. 290, 295 (App. Div. 1973), certif. den. 64 N. J. 499 (1974). Consequently, if the knowledge possessed by the police at the time they arrested Ercolano was sufficient to generate probable cause to search the vehicle at that time, the subsequent warrantless search conducted at police headquarters satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The plurality would prohibit all warrantless automobile searches, even though probable cause existed, if when the police came upon the vehicles they were not readily movable at that moment (irrespective of whether they were located on public or private property). 79 N. J. at 45. In no case has the Supreme Court so reasoned or made such a holding. The plurality derives this odd doctrine substantially from its interpretation of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). At issue there was the propriety of a police search of defendant’s automobile in connection with an ongoing murder investigation that had been proceeding for several weeks. After having obtained warrants for the defendant’s arrest and search of his automobile, the police arrested the defendant in his home and took him to police headquarters. Some two and a ba.lf hours later, the police had the defendant’s car, which had been parked in his driveway, towed to headquarters. The car was searched on three occasions, initially two days after it was seized, again eleven months later, and finally three .months after that.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for five members of the Court, held the warrant was invalid because the official who had signed it was the chief investigator and prosecutor and not a magistrate. As the plurality correctly notes, Mr. Justice Stewart did observe that this was not a case in which “it is not practicable to secure a warrant * * What the plurality fails to mention is that Mr. Justice Stewart was reflecting the views of only four members of the Court in that part of his opinion. Furthermore, a fair *68reading of that opinion discloses that he was concerned with the mobility factor in an extremely limited sense. He emphasized that the automobile was on private property under the guard of two police officers, that the defendant Coolidge was in jail, and that his wife was miles away in the company of two plainclothesmen. He concluded that under those circumstances “[w]e attach no constitutional significance to this sort of mobility.”6 403 U. S. at 461 n. 18, 91 S. Ct. at 2035 n. 18, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 580 n. 18.
Moreover, the plurality in this case has seen fit to discard the prevailing opinion in Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, upholding a search of a vehicle at police headquarters following its removal after the defendant’s arrest, from a commercial parking lot. Other courts have undertaken a more searching attempt to reconcile Coolidge and Cardwell and have concluded, as Cardwell did, that the significant distinction between the two cases is not whether the ear was moving or readily movable, but whether it was located in a public or semi-public place or on private property at the time it was seized or searched. Compare United States v. Pruett, 551 F. 2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1977) (search of car invalidated where defendants were already arrested, car was parked “at the residence,” and agents had a warrant to search the house) with Haefeli v. Chernof, 526 F. 2d 1314 (1st Cir. 1975) (upholding search of car parked on public street after defendant arrested in office); United States v. Vento, 533 F. 2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976) (upholding search of car parked on public street after defendant arrested away from his car); United States v. Ramirez, 513 F. 2d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 423 U. S. 912, 96 S. Ct. 215, 46 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1975) (upholding search of truck at filling station after arrest of defendants at cafe); United States v. Pheaster, 544 *69F. 2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert den. 429 U. S. 1099, 97 S. Ct. 1118, 51 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1977) (search upheld where defendant arrested and car subsequently searched at EBI garage); United States v. McClain, 531 F. 2d 431 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 429 U. S. 835, 97 S. Ct. 102, 50 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1976) (search upheld where defendant arrested, and car searched thereafter in hotel parking lot); and United States v. Woods, 568 F. 2d 509 (6th Cir.), cert. den. 435 U. S. 972, 98 S. Ct 1614, 56 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1978) (search upheld where car was parked in motel parking lot and searched after arrest of defendant). But see United States v. Kelly, 547 F. 2d 82 (8th Cir. 1977) (search invalidated where car was parked in motel parking lot and searched after defendant’s arrest; alternative holding).
The reason for this distinction, as summarized by the Chief Justice in South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, is twofold. The first is the diminished expectation of privacy with respect to a ear parked in a public or quasi-public place as opposed to a purely private location. Secondly, when a car is parked in a public or quasi-public place, access to it can often not be restricted, and there is an increased danger that the vehicle will be moved or damaged and the evidence lost.
The plurality erroneously analyzes the need for a warrant in terms of mobility rather than accessibility, despite the fact that once a suspect is arrested, his car is only “mobile” under a tortured definition of mobility. See Texas v. White, supra. Compare United States v. Kelly, supra, with United States v. Helberg, 565 F. 2d 993 (8th Cir. 1977) (search upheld where ear seized in parking lot and searched at headquarters; defendant not present but not yet arrested) and Brewer v. Wolff, 529 F. 2d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 1976) (search upheld even though car’s mobility was “substantially diminished” once defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in back seat of police cruiser). The effect of a suspect’s arrest on his car’s mobility is the same irrespective *70of whether he was arrested in his car, near his car, or a substantial distance from his car.
Claiming that the police knew that the defendant had been visiting Yerlingo using the same automobile, the plurality contends a warrant to search the vehicle should have been obtained before the defendant’s arrival on July 7, 1976. But prior to that arrival, the police only knew that the unknown caller had used that Lincoln Continental owned by one Enrico Ercolano on July 1, 1976. They did not know that on July 7, 1976 the unknown caller, whose identity was ascertained after his arrest, would be driving the same vehicle and, although as the majority concedes the police ‘ffiad probable cause to believe that he [the defendant) was implicated in the conspiracy,” it does not follow that they would have been able to obtain a search warrant for the Lincoln Continental. Cf. United States v. Vento, 533 F. 2d 838, 865-866 (3d Cir. 1976) (not required to obtain warrant where police did not know whether suspect would arrive in his own car or in another). Moreover, merely because the police anticipated that the suspect would implicate himself in criminal activity by arriving at thé scene and entering the apartment, and that this would occur directly in their presence, did not impose upon them an obligation to obtain a search warrant in advance of the event. They were entitled to rely upon the predicated occurrence of a criminal act which they would witness as the basis for 'arresting the defendant and searching him and the automobile he was using.
To suppress evidence which has not in fact been obtained in violation of the Eourth Amendment unjustifiably rewards a defendant and penalizes society. In terms of the Eourth Amendment, a vehicular search on a public street cannot sensibly be held unreasonable when ample cause existed for that search and was known to the officer who made the search, nor is that cause dissipated by the removal of the automobile to police headquarters where the search is made. It could not even reasonably be contended that privacy *71interests were unjustifiably invaded where, as here, the seized evidence was in plain view.
I would reverse and remand to the trial court, with leave to the parties to supplement the record, for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine whether there was probable cause for the search of the automobile, whether facts indicating such probable cause were known to the police responsible for this investigation and whether the automobile was searched under circumstances related to such probable cause.
Chief Justice Hughes joins in this opinion.

The plurality has also relied upon Art. 1, par. 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, but its analysis is almost exclusively based upon the federal cases and it has advanced no reason why the New Jersey Constitution should be interpreted differently from the federal' constitution.

The United States Supreme Could; in Rakas v. Illinois, -- U. S. ——-, 99 S. Cf. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), articulated the countervailing policies by stating that:
Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights; Kelevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected, lid. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 427, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 397]

The Prosecutor’s brief asserts that once the defendant was arrested the exigencies of the situation dictated that the police act, that when *59the search was made at headquarters the papers were in plain view, and that the search was thus proper under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974). The plurality takes the curious position that the plain view doctrine cannot be applied when the police, while on the outside at a place where they may lawfully be, look into a car for investigative purposes. 79 N. J. at p. 35.

The plurality contends that the purported reasons of the Assistant Prosecutor and not the facts govern the reasonableness of a search. Its sole authority for this position is Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514 (1958). It is inapposite. There the police searched a house without a warrant when they were looking for the defendant. The search was invalidated because the facts did not justify the search of the house. Here, to the contrary, a court could reasonably find that the facts did justify the search of the car.

Tke United States Supreme Court has very recently reemphasized the difference between a search of an automobile and a home in Rakas v. Illinois, - U. S. -, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978). In its analysis of whether an automobile search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment the Court focused on the issue of whether a person who seeks “the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” ■ Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 430, 58 L. Bd. 2d at 401. The Court noted that “[w]e have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 433, 58 L. Ed. 2d. at 404. Mr. Justice Bowell, in a concurring opinion joined in by the Chief Justice, emphasized the distinction between an expectation of privacy in an automobile and elsewhere. He referred to their presence on public streets, their being serviced in public places, their being parked in public places, the high visibility of their interiors, and their extensive regulation and inspection. Id. at-& n. 2, 99 S. Ct. at 436 & n. 2, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 408 & n. 2.

It is significant that Mr. Justice Stewart joined the majority in Rakas v. Illinois, - U. S. -, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), which reiterated the reduced expectation of privacy with respect to an automobile in a public place.