Court Opinion

ID: 9403630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:07:42.035267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.363060
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0714
                               Filed June 21, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAZMOND DEANTRA TURNER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark Fowler (order

continuing trial and good-cause finding), Henry W. Latham II (pre-trial conference),

and Meghan Corbin (motion to dismiss and trial), Judges.

      JazMond Turner appeals his convictions on two counts of third-degree

sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.

      Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., Greer, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                          2

DOYLE, Senior Judge.

       JazMond Turner appeals his convictions on two counts of third-degree

sexual abuse, claiming his right to a speedy trial was violated. Turner challenges

both the finding of good cause to continue the trial past the ninety-day speedy-trial

deadline set out in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) (requiring trial within

ninety days of indictment) and the length of the delay. We review for an abuse of

discretion. See State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 327 (Iowa 2019).

       On September 8, 2021, the State filed trial information alleging that Turner

committed two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree. Under rule 2.33(2)(b),

the ninety-day deadline for a speedy trial was December 7. On November 29, the

district court continued the trial beyond the December 7 deadline. After a trial that

began on February 8, the court found Turner guilty on both counts and sentenced

him to consecutive five-year terms of incarceration.

       Turner first argues the court erred by finding good cause for delaying trial

beyond the speedy-trial deadline. We will reverse a trial court’s good-cause finding

if there is no reasonable basis in the record supporting the trial court’s finding.

State v. Albertsen, 228 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Iowa 1975).

       We begin by noting that our review is hampered by the state of the record.

The district court’s November 29th order says the State requested or moved to

continue, but there is no written motion in the record. The order says that Turner

resisted the motion. And although the November 29 hearing was reported, Turner

did not order a transcript of that hearing. Although it was the State’s burden to

show good cause to exceed the speedy-trial deadline, Turner must provide us with

a record disclosing the claimed error. See State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789, 791
                                         3

(Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (“[A] defendant claiming error has an obligation to provide the

court with a record that discloses the error claimed.”). When no record is made,

“we accept the trial court’s findings as being supported by the evidence.” See id.

       Even without a complete record, we discern that good cause existed to

delay trial beyond the December 7 speedy-trial deadline. On November 29, the

court entered an order continuing the pretrial conference and trial due to “death in

the family to key witness, death in the family to attorney, and evidentiary exchange

not completed.” The pretrial conference was scheduled for December 10th. At

that pretrial conference, trial was set for February 7, 2022. A December 27 order,

captioned “ORDER RE: GOOD CAUSE,” expands on the court’s previous good

cause reasons and finds good cause to surpass the speedy-trial deadline:

              On the 29th of November, a hearing was held to determine if
       good cause existed to extend the defendant’s one-year speedy trial
       deadline. The court finds that good cause has been shown. The
       one-year speedy trial deadline is extended for the following reasons.
              Prosecutor’s very close family member unfortunately passed
       a few days ago and the funeral and executor duties fell upon the
       prosecutor. Funeral to be held the week of trial next week.
              Moreover, a key witness was unavailable because of events
       outside of her control.
              In addition, Defense counsel needed additional time to review
       a video which was a key piece of evidence prior to trial.

Turner disputes that he requested more time and argues another prosecutor could

have been assigned to try the case before the deadline. Even so, the unavailability

of a key State witness provided good cause.1 See State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d

1We also note there are delays attributable to Turner. After arraignment, the court
scheduled a pretrial conference for September 24 with a tentative trial date of
October 4. The pretrial conference was then continued twice—first because
Turner’s court-appointed counsel withdrew based on a conflict of interest, and the
second time at Turner’s request. On October 8, the court scheduled trial to begin
on November 29. Turner changed counsel twice more based on breakdowns in
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697, 705 (Iowa 2017) (observing that a conflict with the schedule of at least one

material expert witness “[is] enough to justify a brief extension past the speedy trial

deadline”).

       Turner also argues his right to a speedy-trial was violated based on the

length of the delay between the speedy-trial deadline and the start of trial. Turner

raised the issue in a pro se motion to dismiss filed on January 25, 2022, arguing

the two-month delay “was caused due to chronic court congestion” and did not

constitute good cause. But as the district court noted, Iowa Code section 814.6A

(2021)2 prevents represented defendants from making and the court from ruling

on pro se filings. Although the court directed Turner’s attorney to confer with

Turner and “determine whether any motion should be filed and set for hearing,”

counsel did not raise the issue until the day trial was scheduled to start. In an oral

motion, counsel argued,

       Mr. Turner is requesting you to . . . reconsider the good cause finding
       and to dismiss this case because of the case being tried after the
       90 days required by Rule of Procedure.
               The good cause hearing was held on November 29th. At that
       good cause hearing, it was stated by the State that they were
       [un]able to conduct the trial on or before the running of the speedy
       trial date. It appears the grounds—and I’m sure there was a record
       made, so I’m not going to restate all the grounds. That additional
       time was needed by defense counsel to review discovery and
       evidence. Good cause was granted.
               Mr. Turner believes the seventy-day delay or resetting of his
       trial—or approximately seventy days—is unreasonable and is also
       grounds to dismiss. And the delay in the order from November 29th

the attorney-client relationship. The court appointed the last of the attorneys to
represent Turner on November 29—the date trial was scheduled to begin and the
date of the continuance hearing.
2 Section 814.6A(1) states, “A defendant who is currently represented by counsel

shall not file any pro se document, including a brief, reply brief, or motion, in any
Iowa court. The court shall not consider, and opposing counsel shall not respond
to, such pro se filings.”
                                          5

       to December 27th was an unreasonable delay and actually
       references the one-year speedy trial date.
              I’m sorry, there was an additional continuance from the start
       date from February 7th to February 8th, which he feels is
       unreasonable.

In denying the request, the court addressed only Turner’s argument about

reconsidering the good-cause ruling:

              I don’t know that the court necessarily has grounds to
       reconsider a good-cause hearing, especially given the fact that the
       good-cause hearing happened so long ago; however, I did review
       the terms of the original good-cause hearing and I make the same
       finding, that it appears that there were grounds on both sides—both
       the State and the defendant’s side to continue the hearing past the
       one-year deadline for good cause. And the most prominent of those
       reasons were that defense counsel needed additional time to be able
       to be fully prepared for the trial, which is obviously in the defendant’s
       best interests.
              So the motion to reconsider is denied.

The court never addressed Turner’s argument about the length of the delay

between the good-cause ruling and trial. As a result, error is not preserved for

appellate review. See State v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 434-35 (Iowa 2023) (“It is

a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both

raised and decided by the district court before we decide them on appeal.” (citation

omitted)), reh’g denied (Feb. 8, 2023); State v. Walker, 236 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa

1975) (holding defendants cannot assert error on appeal if they fail to raise a

speedy-trial claim below). Accordingly, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.