Court Opinion

ID: 9948000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 07:13:09.48845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:53.733847
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed March 1, 2024.

                                        In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00361-CR

                    MONTEZ ANTONIO ASHBY, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
                             Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. F-20-75720-V

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Justice Pedersen, III, Justice Garcia, and Justice Kennedy
                             Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III

      Montez Ashby appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of murder.

A jury found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at forty years’

imprisonment. Appellant raises three issues on appeal arguing (1) the evidence is

insufficient to disprove self-defense, (2) the evidence is insufficient to disprove the

justification of using deadly force, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct

the jury that the State has the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable

doubt. As to appellant’s sufficiency issues, we conclude the jury rationally could

have found each element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
rationally could have rejected appellant’s self-defense claims. Thus, we overrule

appellant’s first and second points of error. As to appellant’s third issue, we note the

trial court delivered a charge that properly instructed the jury to acquit appellant if it

believed he acted in self-defense to protect his life and property or if it had a

reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense. Thus, the trial court did not

err by submitting the jury charge without including an instruction that the State was

required to disprove the issue of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, we also overrule appellant’s third issue and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I.    BACKGROUND

      On the night of April 10, 2022, Travis Crowder picked up his friend Teresa

Hall, and the two spent the evening at his residence smoking Phencyclidine [PCP].

At around 2:00 a.m., the PCP ran out, and Hall asked Crowder to take her home. As

Crowder drove Hall home, the two encountered appellant driving in his vehicle in

the opposite direction. Appellant and Crowder had been childhood friends.

Appellant invited Crowder over to his residence to smoke more PCP.

      After Hall and Crowder arrived at appellant’s house, they sat in appellant’s

living room and smoked PCP with him. Hall did not hear much of the discussion

between Crowder and appellant because she had “earbuds” in her ears and spent

most of her time on Facebook listening to music. At some point in the evening,

appellant and Crowder walked to a back room in the house. While they were in the

                                          –2–
back room, Hall thought she heard some “play fighting” but no “scuffling” or anyone

“fearing for their life.”

       After Crowder failed to return from the back room, Hall saw appellant pacing

back and forth and then noticed that Crowder was dead. Crowder had been shot six

times. Hall observed that appellant was holding a gun. She was in fear for her life

and believed that appellant would also kill her. Hall called 911 to report the shooting.

       Hall later told police that she did not observe Crowder acting angry or

aggressive    towards       appellant.   She   told   police   that   neither   she   nor

Crowder intended to rob appellant of his drugs and that neither of them had a gun.

       Officer Corey Wheeler with the Dallas Police Department was the first officer

on the scene. Appellant approached Wheeler with his hands up and stated that

somebody had “tried to jack him.” Wheeler entered the residence and found Crowder

lying in a chair unresponsive and not breathing. Dallas Fire Rescue pronounced

Crowder dead at the scene. Wheeler briefly checked Crowder’s pockets and did not

locate any drugs or weapons on his person or near him.

       Madison Gaytan, a crime scene investigator formerly with the Dallas Police

Department, located four spent 380 caliber cartridge casings in the kitchen. The

spent cartridge casings were confirmed to belong to the handgun recovered from

appellant’s back pocket.

       Detective Frank Serra with the Dallas Police Department interviewed

appellant. During the interview, appellant alleged that at some point in the evening,

                                           –3–
while all three individuals were smoking PCP, he discovered that his glove that

contained the rest of the PCP went missing from his bag. Appellant suspected

Crowder had taken it and demanded it back. Appellant claimed that at that point,

Crowder struck him on his jaw causing appellant to push him back. Appellant stated

that the punch did not “faze” or hurt him because he was “ready to fight.” Appellant

demonstrated for Serra that after being punched, he pushed Crowder back, pulled

out his handgun, and “unloaded the clip.” Appellant admitted to shooting Crowder.

      Multiple times during the interview, Serra asked appellant if he had seen any

weapons in Crowder’s hands, but appellant refused to answer his question. And

when Serra asked appellant if Crowder verbally threatened him, appellant stated only

that Crowder “growled” at him. At no time during the interview did appellant tell

Serra he shot Crowder to defend himself, instead, he repeatedly stated, “you come

off getting in my business, you fuck with me,” followed by “he got what’s coming.”

Further, appellant never told Serra he had been in fear for his life during his

encounter with Crowder. Appellant, did however, repeatedly state that he felt no

remorse for killing Crowder because “no one fucks with [him] point blank.”

      Serra’s investigation demonstrated that appellant wielded a deadly weapon

during his encounter with Crowder, but that Crowder did not. Serra believed that

based upon the bullet holes in appellant’s kitchen wall, appellant had Crowder

cornered when he shot him five times. Additionally, according to Serra, the evidence

showed that Crowder stumbled to a chair where appellant fired a sixth shot into

                                        –4–
Crowder at close range. The medical examiner confirmed Serra’s conclusion and

testified that one of the gunshot wounds was consistent with someone being seated

in a chair with his head leaned back.

            Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with murdering Crowder.

During a jail call, appellant told the caller that he should have killed Hall as well.

            At trial, Serra testified that based on the totality of the circumstances, the use

of force by Crowder during the physical altercation did not rise to the level justifying

deadly force.

            A jury found appellant guilty of murdering Crowder and after finding the two

punishment enhancement paragraphs true, assessed his punishment at forty years’

incarceration.

II.         SUFFICIENCY POINTS1

            A.      Standard of review and applicable law

            To prevail on a claim of self-defense with the use of deadly force, a defendant

must prove: (1) he would have been justified in using force against the other person;

and (2) it was reasonable to believe that “deadly force [was] immediately necessary

[for protection] against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.”

TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 9.32(a). A person is justified in using force against another

when and to the degree that person reasonably believes the force is immediately

      1
          We will address appellant’s self-defense sufficiency points together.
                                                    –5–
necessary to protect himself from another’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.

Id. § 9.31(a). The use of deadly force may be justified when a person reasonably

believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id. at § 9.32 (a)(2)(A).

Additionally, the use of deadly force may be justified when a person reasonably

believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the other’s imminent

commission of robbery. Id. § 9.32 (a)(2)(B). Deadly force is “force that is intended

or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable

of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 9.01(3).

      In a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce some

evidence that supports his claim of self-defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589,

594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Once a defendant produces some evidence raising the

issue of self-defense, the State bears the burden of persuasion to show beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions were not justified. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d

at 594; Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). To meet its

burden of persuasion, the State is not required to produce additional evidence.

Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. The burden of persuasion requires only that the State

prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If the jury finds the defendant guilty,

it has made an implicit finding against any defensive theory raised by the defendant.

Id. at 914; see also Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 202

                                         –6–
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding that a jury verdict of guilty is an

implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s self-defense theory).

      Accordingly, when a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the

evidence to support the jury’s implicit rejection of his self-defense claim, “we look

not to whether the State presented evidence which refuted appellant’s self-defense

testimony, but rather we determine whether after viewing all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the

essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have

found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979).

In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we defer to the jury’s assessment of the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks v.

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

      B.     Discussion

      Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

jury’s finding of the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Instead, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s

rejection of his self-defense claims. This is consistent with his requesting a self-

defense instruction at trial since “a defensive instruction is only appropriate when

the defendant’s defensive evidence essentially admits to every element of the offense

including the culpable mental state, but interposes [a] justification to excuse the

                                         –7–
otherwise criminal conduct.” Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007).

        With that in mind, we note that with regard to the essential elements of the

offense, the jury was charged that it must find appellant committed the offense of

murder if, if it found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about

April 11, 2020, in Dallas County, Texas, the Defendant, did unlawfully then and

there intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Travis Crowder, an individual,

by shooting deceased with a firearm, a deadly weapon. The jury was also charged

that they must find appellant guilty of murder if they found from the evidence

beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about April 11, 2020, in Dallas County, Texas,

the Defendant, did unlawfully then and there intend to cause serious bodily injury to

Travis Crowder, an individual, and did then and there commit an act clearly

dangerous to human life, to-wit: by shooting Travis Crowder with a firearm, a deadly

weapon, and did thereby cause the death of Travis Crowder.

        The evidence is undisputed that appellant shot Crowder—an act clearly

dangerous to human life and—Crowder died as a result. Accordingly consistent with

appellant’s request for the self-defense instruction, the evidence establishes every

essential element of the offense of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.2 See Saxton,

    2
     A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an
individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 190.02 (b)(1). Alternatively, a person commits murder when he
intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of an individual. Id. § 19.02 (b)(2).
                                                  –8–
804 S.W.2d at 914. Therefore, we examine whether the evidence is insufficient to

support the jury’s rejection of appellant’s claim that he acted in self-defense.

      Initially, we note that Officer Cory Wheeler, the first officer on the scene,

testified that appellant said to him, “I really messed up this time, haven’t I?” We also

point out that during appellant’s video-recorded interview, which was played for the

jury, appellant admitted he shot and killed Crowder. At one point during the

interview, conducted by Serra, appellant demonstrated how he pulled out his

handgun and unloaded the clip after Crowder punched him. Additionally, appellant

stated that when he confronted Crowder about his alleged missing PCP, Crowder

“walked up” on him, and the two began to fight. Appellant told Serra that Crowder

struck him once on his jaw, but the strike did not “faze” him because he was “ready

to fight.” In fact, appellant repeatedly stated that he was not “fazed” by Crowder’s

punch and that he shot Crowder because he “was not playing no games.”

      Multiple times during the interview, Serra asked appellant if he had seen any

weapons in Crowder’s hands, but appellant refused to answer his question. And

when Serra asked appellant if Crowder verbally threatened him, appellant stated only

that Crowder “growled” at him. At no time during the interview did appellant tell

Serra he shot Crowder to defend himself, instead, he repeatedly stated, “you come

off getting in my business, you fuck with me,” followed by “he got what’s coming.”

Further, appellant never told Serra he had been in fear for his life during his

                                          –9–
encounter with Crowder. Appellant, did however, repeatedly state that he felt no

remorse for killing Crowder because “no one fucks with [him] point blank.”

      Serra testified that his investigation demonstrated that appellant wielded a

deadly weapon during his encounter with Crowder, but that Crowder had never

utilized a deadly weapon. Serra further testified that in his twelve years of experience

as a police officer, the individuals that he encountered who had recently participated

in fistfights exhibited “scrapes, bruising, swelling, blood, and discoloration to or cuts

on the face, knuckles, [or] hands.” But according to Serra, appellant did not exhibit

any injuries consistent with someone who had been in a fistfight. The jury was shown

images of appellant’s face and hands on the day of the shooting—images devoid of

any visible cuts, scrapes, or bruises.

      Finally, Serra testified that based upon the bullet holes in the kitchen wall, it

appeared that appellant had Crowder cornered when he shot him five times.

Additionally, according to Serra, the evidence showed that Crowder stumbled to a

chair where appellant fired a sixth shot into Crowder at close range. The medical

examiner confirmed Serra’s conclusion and testified that one of the gunshot wounds

was consistent with someone being seated in a chair with his head leaned back.

      In sum, Serra testified that he believed the use of force by Crowder during the

physical alteration did not rise to the level justifying deadly force. The evidence

supports the jury’s rejection of appellant’s claim that he was forced to immediately

                                         –10–
use deadly force against Crowder to protect himself from Crowder’s use of deadly

force. See TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 9.31(a).

      As it relates to appellant’s self-defense robbery claim, the evidence also

supports the jury’s rejection of appellant’s claim that he was forced to immediately

use deadly conduct to protect Crowder’s imminent commission of the robbery of his

property; namely his PCP. See id. § 9.32 (a)(2)(B). During his interview, Appellant

alleged that at some point in the evening, he went to his bathroom and discovered

that his stash of PCP was missing. Appellant suspected Crowder stole it. But several

witnesses testified there was no PCP found on Crowder’s person. Moreover, Hall

testified that neither she nor Crowder intended to rob appellant and that neither she

nor Crowder possessed a weapon that night.

      In our review, we defer to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the

witnesses, and the jury in this case could have found and in fact did find the elements

of the charged offense of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and disbelieved

appellant’s claim as it relates to his claim of self-defense of his person as well as to

his claim that deadly force was immediately necessary to prevent Crowder’s

imminent commission of robbery. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 910 (holding that as

the fact finder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the jury was free

disbelieve the testimony tending to show that the victim had been the aggressor,

thereby rationally determining that the appellant’s use of deadly force was not

immediately necessary); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston

                                         –11–
[1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (noting defendant’s testimony does not conclusively

prove a claim of self-defense because the jury could reject the testimony). Based on

these facts, we hold that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt

against appellant on the self-defense issues. We overrule appellant’s first and second

points of error.

III.   JURY CHARGE ISSUE

       In his third point, appellant claims the trial court erred by refusing to include

additional language in the trial court’s self-defense instruction in the jury charge.

Specifically, appellant claims the jury should have been instructed that the State has

the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. But here, the trial

court delivered a charge that properly instructed the jury to acquit appellant if it

believed he acted in self-defense or if it had a reasonable doubt as to whether he

acted in self-defense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to include

appellant’s requested language in the self-defense charge.

       A.    Standard of review and applicable law

       In analyzing a jury-charge issue a reviewing court should first determine

whether error exists. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

If error exists, the court must next determine whether the error caused sufficient

harm to warrant reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005). When, as in this case, the error was objected to, reversal is warranted only if

                                         –12–
the reviewing court finds any actual harm to the defendant. Barrios v. State, 283

S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

      The purpose of the jury charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law and

guide the jurors in applying it to the facts of the case. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d

244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, the trial court shall deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting

forth the law applicable to the case[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ann. art. 36.14;

Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This duty exists even

when defense counsel fails to object to inclusions or exclusions in the charge and

thus may require the trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on the law applicable

to the case. Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 486.

      When a defense is raised by the evidence at trial, the trial court is required to

instruct the jury it must acquit the defendant if it has reasonable doubt on the

existence of a defensive issue. TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 2.03(d).

      As discussed above, the defendant has the initial burden to produce evidence

supporting self-defense. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. Once

the defendant produces some evidence, the State bears the ultimate burden of

persuasion to disprove the raised defense. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14. This

burden does not require the State to produce evidence refuting the self-defense

claim; rather, the burden requires the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. The Penal Code places the burden on the State to prove each element of

                                          –13–
the offense charged; it does not require the State to “negate the existence of a

defense.” TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 2.03(b).

      B.     The trial court’s self-defense charges

      The jury was instructed on two theories of self-defense—defense of a person

and defense of a person—prevention of robbery. After setting out the applicable

definitions for each theory, the jury charge’s application paragraphs were set out as

follows:

       Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
       that the Defendant, did intentionally and knowingly cause the death of
       Travis Crowder, by shooting him with a firearm, a deadly weapon, as
       alleged in the indictment, but you further find from the evidence, as
       viewed from the standpoint of the Defendant at the time, that from the
       words or conduct, or both, of Travis Crowder, that it reasonably
       appeared to the Defendant that his life or person was in danger, and
       there was created in his mind a reasonable expectation of fear of death
       or serious bodily injury, from the use of unlawful deadly force at the
       hands of Travis Crowder, and that acting under such apprehension and
       reasonably believing that the use of deadly force on his part was
       immediately necessary to protect himself against Travis Crowder’s use
       or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, he did shoot Travis
       Crowder, then you should acquit the defendant on the grounds of self-
       defense; or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
       Defendant was acting in self-defense, then you will give the Defendant
       the benefit of that doubt and say by your verdict, not guilty.

      If you unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
      that at the time and place in question the Defendant did not reasonably
      believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury at the
      hands of Travis Crowder, or that the Defendant, under the
      circumstances as viewed by him from his standpoint at the time, did not
      reasonably believe that the degree of force actually used by him was
      immediately necessary to protect himself against Travis Crowder’s use
      or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, then you will find against
      the Defendant on the issue of self-defense.

                                        –14–
      And as it relates to deadly force in defense of a person: robbery, the trial court

set out the application as follows:

      Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
      the Defendant, did intentionally and knowingly cause the death of
      Travis Crowder, by shooting him with a firearm, a deadly weapon, as
      alleged in the indictment, but you further find from the evidence, as
      viewed from the standpoint of the Defendant at the time, that from the
      words or conduct, or both, of Travis Crowder, that it reasonably
      appeared to the Defendant that it was necessary to prevent Travis
      Crowder’s imminent commission of robbery, and that acting under such
      apprehension and reasonably believing that the use of deadly force on
      his part was immediately necessary to protect himself against Travis
      Crowder’s imminent commission of robbery, he did shoot Travis
      Crowder, then you should acquit -the defendant on the grounds of self-
      defense; or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
      defendant was acting in self-defense, then you will give the defendant
      the benefit of that doubt and say by your verdict, not guilty.

      If you unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
      that at the time and place in question the Defendant did not reasonably
      believe that the commission of robbery by Travis Crowder was
      imminent, or that the Defendant, under the circumstances as viewed by
      him from his standpoint at the time, did not reasonably believe that
      deadly force actually was immediately necessary to protect himself
      against Travis Crowder’s imminent commission of robbery, then you
      will find against the defendant on the issue of self-defense.

      The trial court also instructed the jury that the burden of proof of beyond a

reasonable doubt was on the State and that the presumption of innocence was

sufficient to acquit the defendant.

      Here, the charge adequately instructed the jury on the State’s burden and the

jury’s consideration of appellant’s claim of self-defense and deadly conduct in

defense of person: robbery. See id.; Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex. Crim.

                                        –15–
App. 1979) (op. on reh’g); Brotherton v. State, 666 S.W.2d 126, 127–28 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, the trial court did not err

by submitting the jury charge without including an instruction that the State was

required to disprove the issue of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We

overrule appellant’s third point of error.

IV.   CONCLUSION

      Having overruled appellant’s three points of error, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

220361f.u05                                  /Bill Pedersen, III/
                                             BILL PEDERSEN, III
Do Not Publish                               JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47

                                         –16–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

MONTEZ ANTONIO ASHBY,                         On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F-20-75720-V.
No. 05-22-00361-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Pedersen, III. Justices Kennedy and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Garcia participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 1st day of March, 2024.

                                       –17–