Court Opinion

ID: 9561234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:38.889403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.713201
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice
(concurring in the result):
I concur on the ground that Lane was guilty only of an isolated error in judgment, made in good faith, as explained in the majority opinion. I believe that “just cause” requires a higher degree of culpability than present here. However, I do not agree that “just cause” requires culpability equal to conduct which is “deliberate, willful, or wanton.” When the legislature in 1983 added “just cause” to the statute, it was not engaging in a useless act. It intended “just cause” to be a separate and additional standard to that already in the statute of “deliberate, willful, or wanton.” We so held in Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985). While both standards require culpability on the part of the discharged employee, “just cause” includes conduct which does not rise to the degree of being “deliberate, willful, and wanton.” The latter words describe conduct which falls short of being intentional, but which is more culpable than negligent. “Just cause” for termination, however, might arise from the commission of a negligent act. For example, a repeated negligent act by an employee which endangers the safety of others at the work place might well constitute “just cause” for discharge but would not rise to the level of being “deliberate, willful, or wanton.”
I therefore do not believe that the statute now contains a unitary standard, although it would seldom seem necessary to resort to the higher standard since the lesser standard of “just cause” would be more easily met.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of HOWE, J.