Court Opinion

ID: 9689163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:22:37.788881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:45.650512
License: Public Domain

GARDEBRING, Justice
(dissenting).
Although it is my normal approach to defer to the decisions of trial courts in reviewing matters under the abuse of discretion standard, on these unusual facts, I must disagree with the majority that there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
What was the manifest necessity here? The tape contained only two statements that did not appear in Sgt. Freichels’ written report: first, that Long said her husband had been drinking at the time of the stabbing, and second, that Long said she had gone to the bathroom before getting the knife from the kitchen. The first statement was not the subject of any testimony by Long, so it was irrelevant. The second statement was contradicted by her testimony and could, therefore, have been used for impeachment purposes. However, neither statement was critical to the state or to the defense. Indeed the most damaging discrepancy between Long’s trial testimony and the tape — whether her husband had been standing up or sitting down at the time of the assault — was present in the written report as well and so, was available for impeachment, irrespective of the trial court’s ruling on the tape. Thus, I can only conclude that the potential impact of the tape — whether it was admitted or excluded — was marginal.
Weighed against the marginal importance of this evidence was the articulated wishes of the defendant to proceed, that is, in the words of the Supreme Court, “to conclude [her] confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal [she] might believe to be favorably disposed to [her] fate.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514, 98 S.Ct. 824, 835, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 558, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)). Here the right of the defendant, in consultation with her counsel, to determine the course of her defense strategy and to make her own assessment of what was best for her, should have been accorded the highest respect. As thorough and cautious as the trial court was in determining how to deal with the surprise disclosure of the interview tape, it should not have pre-empted the defendant and her counsel’s determination of what was in her best interests in defending the charges against her. There may indeed have been some prejudice to her case in admitting the tape in evidence, but, presumably for sound reasons known to her and her counsel — perhaps that she had established a positive rapport with this jury and the risk of prejudice was small compared with the loss of this particular jury as determiner of her guilt or innocence — she was willing to take that risk.
Because of the right afforded to the defendant to proceed once jeopardy has attached, the Supreme Court has established a high standard that must be met before the trial court may properly order a mistrial contrary to the wishes of the defendant. The trial court’s power, under these circumstances, “ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.” United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. *299165 (1824). The Supreme Court has also said that the judge’s decision to declare a mistrial is a proper exercise of discretion where a jury cannot reach an impartial verdict or where a verdict could be reached, but would face certain reversal on appeal because of an “obvious procedural error.” Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1070, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973). This court has said, similarly, that a defendant is “entitled to have the trial proceed to a finish by verdict, unless an intervening necessity prevents.” State v. McDonald, 298 Minn. 449, 454, 215 N.W.2d 607, 610 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Sommers, 60 Minn. 90, 91, 61 N.W. 907, 907 (1895)).
I cannot conclude that the jury’s ability to reach an impartial verdict would have been jeopardized had the trial court chosen any of the alternatives available or that the choice of any of them would constitute an “obvious procedural error.” Neither does this seem to be the kind of “plain and obvious cause” required by the Perez standard, nor can I identify the “urgent circumstances” which required the grant of a mistrial in the case of this defendant who, having been informed of her rights, earnestly wished to proceed. I see no “intervening necessity” here that was sufficient to deprive this defendant of her right to have the trial proceed to a finish by verdict.
Further, while none of the alternatives available was a perfect solution, given that such alternatives were acceptable to both the defense and the state and that the differences between the tape and the written statement were so inconsequential, any of them would have been preferable to the drastic measure of declaring a mistrial.
As a reviewing court, we are directed by the Supreme Court to satisfy ourselves that the trial judge exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 834. In spite of my general reluctance to overturn a trial court’s discretionary decision, I conclude that, on these facts, the sua sponte decision to declare a mistrial was improper and a subsequent trial of Long would be a violation of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy.