Court Opinion

ID: 9789893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:43:35.417319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.990808
License: Public Domain

BIVINS, Judge (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I concur with the majority except as to Point II. After correctly identifying the issue under Point II, the majority proceeds to decide that defenses to strict liability claims should no longer bar recovery, but instead should proportionately reduce recovery as in comparative negligence cases. While I agree with that approach, I do not believe we can reach the issue here. Plaintiff’s argument is simple and straight-forward: “The instruction [No. 2] informs the jury that conventional contributory negligence is a defense to products liability.” While contributory negligence, now applied comparatively, was a proper defense to plaintiff’s claims of negligence, clearly it was not a proper defense to the claim based on strict liability. Jasper v. Skyhook Corporation, 89 N.M. 98, 547 P.2d 1140 (Ct.App.1976). I read Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981), as limiting the defense of negligence with respect to strict liability cases to “the ‘negligence’ concept of voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger.” Id. at 688, 634 P.2d 1234. This type of “negligence” simply provides a restatement of the assumption of the risk defense. The factual bases for the comparative negligence defense in this case, as set forth in instruction No. 2 do not fall within this concept. The instruction fails to state that the comparative negligence defense could only apply to the plaintiff’s first claim based on negligence; as a result, the instruction is defective. The trial court should have informed the jury that they cannot consider plaintiff’s comparative negligence as a defense to the products liability claim. Plaintiff made a proper objection and tendered an instruction which might have cured the problem. It stated: “You are instructed that the defense of contributory negligence does not apply to the ‘products liability claim.’ ” The trial court refused that tendered instruction. NMSA 1978, UJI Civ. 14.1(1) (Repl.Pamp. 1980) provides in part: If you find that the plaintiff has proved what is required of him on any one of his claims [and that none of defendant’s defenses to that claim has been proved], then you will determine plaintiff’s damages and return a verdict for that amount. (Emphasis added). Contrary to that subparagraph Instruction No. 2 states: If you find that Plaintiffs have sustained damages and they have proven one or more of the claimed acts of negligence, products liability or breach of warranty was the proximate cause thereof and Defendants have failed to prove any of their affirmative defenses, then your verdict should be for Plaintiffs. If you find that Plaintiffs have not proved any of their claims, then your verdict should be for Defendants. If, on the other hand, you find that Plaintiffs have proved one or more of their required claims and Defendants have also proved one or more of their affirmative defenses, you will answer the Special Verdict form submitted to you with these instructions. (Emphasis added). Comparing the two provisions, it is easy to see that UJI 14.1 was not followed; there is no way to tie any of the defendants’ affirmative defenses to a particular claim. Plaintiffs allege three separate and distinct causes of action: negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty. Defendants asserted three separate and distinct affirmative defenses: comparative negligence, assumption of the risk and misuse of the product. These defenses should have been linked to the respective cause of actions to which they apply. Comparative negligence is a defense only to the negligence claim; assumption of the risk and misuse of the product are defenses only to the strict liability claim. The last paragraph of the instruction refers the jury to the Special Verdict form which provides: We, the jury, answer the following questions: Question No. 1: Did Luciano Márchese act negligently, misuse the car or track or assume the risk of the accident? Yes X No_ Question No. 2: If your answer to Question No. 1 is “yes,” was that conduct a proximate cause of the accident? Yes X No _ From the way the instruction is worded, the jury could have found for plaintiff on strict liability but reduced based on conventional comparative negligence. This would be contrary to law. In addition, the instruction would also have made it possible for the jury to find for plaintiff on the claim of breach of warranty but reduce based on conventional comparative negligence. The Directions For Use to UJI 14.1 state that it is to be given in lieu of UJI 3.2; nevertheless the following from UJI 3.2 is equally applicable to UJI 14.1: This is the most important single instruction in the lawsuit and the court and counsel should give particular attention to its finalization. * * sfc . :Js ‡ $ Since this instruction is the post to which all of the remaining instructions are tied, extreme care and caution must be exercised when any departure is made from it. While not relevant to any issue presented, it should be noted interstitially that under instruction No. 2, the strict liability claim includes alleged defects with regard to the race track. Strict products liability applies to chattels; not realty. The proper form for plaintiff’s action for these claims is in negligence. Because of the defect in instruction No. 2, I would reverse and remand for new trial.