Court Opinion

ID: 9962258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 14:06:38.293745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:10.946492
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13395

                  COMMONWEALTH   vs.   JOSEPH JAMES.

       Norfolk.       September 13, 2023. - April 23, 2024.

Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

Forfeiture Proceeding. Search and Seizure, Computer, Return.
     Constitutional Law, Taking of property, Burden of proof.
     Due Process of Law, Taking of property, Burden of proof.
     Practice, Civil, Presumptions and burden of proof. Waiver.
     Search and Seizure, Warrant. Statute, Construction.
     Words, "Public interest."

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on June 6, 2017, and February 20, 2018.

     A motion for return of property was heard by Robert C.
Cosgrove, J., and a second motion for return of property, filed
on April 21, 2022, was considered by him.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

     Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
the defendant.
     Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
                                                                    2

    GEORGES, J.    This case raises a question of statutory

interpretation:   whether a judge may issue a forfeiture decree

for property seized pursuant to a search warrant under G. L.

c. 276, § 3, based solely on the judge's determination

forfeiture would be in the "public interest," or whether the

judge must instead follow the procedural requirements set forth

in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, before any forfeiture decree may

issue.   For the reasons that follow, we conclude the latter

interpretation should apply.     Accordingly, we vacate the

Superior Court orders insofar as they denied the return of

certain property to the defendant, and we remand the case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

    1.    Background.   a.   Facts.1   Over the course of several

months in 2016, the defendant, a thirty-eight year old

professional photographer, sexually exploited a fifteen year old

girl.    The defendant initially contacted the victim through a

private message on a social networking website after the victim

"liked" one of his posts.     The defendant then began

communicating with the victim through telephone calls, text

messages, and cell phone and computer applications that support

    1  Our recitation of the facts relies in part on the
Commonwealth's "Statement of the Case," which was filed in the
Superior Court after the defendant was arraigned in two cases
stemming from his sexual exploitation of a minor. The defendant
does not dispute the facts contained within that statement for
purposes of his appeal.
                                                                     3

"video chat."   Through these communications, the defendant

solicited and received nude and partially nude images of the

victim.    The defendant eventually met the victim in person and

started sexually abusing her.

     After learning of their daughter's exploitation, the

victim's parents notified the Weymouth police department, which,

alongside State police, began investigating the defendant.     The

victim's parents provided investigators with the victim's two

cell phones.    Upon examining the cell phones, the State police

were able to confirm that sexual abuse occurred and that the

defendant and the victim were in frequent communication.      The

police also found dozens of photographs of the defendant and the

victim together, including photographs of the two kissing.

     Based on the evidence obtained from the victim's cell

phones, the police obtained a warrant for the defendant's

arrest.   While attempting to locate the defendant, a State

police trooper learned of an address where the defendant had

lived.    The trooper spoke with a tenant living at that address

who reported the defendant had left behind some personal

belongings, including a computer tower2 and an external hard

     2 "A computer tower is basically the shell of a computer,
without the internal hardware such as disk drives and circuit
boards installed." United States v. 10,510 Packaged Computer
Towers, More or Less, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1191 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
                                                                     4

drive.   The police then obtained and executed a search warrant

for the defendant's property at this location.   They seized a

computer battery with a power cord, a separate bag of additional

power cords, a computer mouse and speakers, a cell phone, the

external hard drive, and the computer tower, which contained

five internal hard drives.

     After the internal hard drives were extracted from the

computer tower, their contents, along with the contents of the

external hard drive, were reviewed by a forensic examiner.     The

examiner determined that one of the internal hard drives, a

Kingston HyperX internal drive (Kingston drive), was the "main

drive" in the computer tower and proceeded to "image" the

Kingston drive.3   The examiner only "previewed" the data stored

on the other internal hard drives, with the exception of one

internal hard drive that could not be examined due to damage.

     On the Kingston drive, the examiner uncovered nude images

of the victim in the form of "selfies," which appeared to have

been taken by the victim and sent to the defendant.   The

Kingston drive also contained images of the victim and the

defendant together, as well as communications between them

showing the defendant was aware the victim was only fifteen

     3 "A forensic image is an exact replica, bit for bit, of the
original storage device that allows investigation of past use
without altering the original evidence." New Hampshire Ball
Bearings, Inc. v. Jackson, 158 N.H. 421, 424 (2009).
                                                                      5

years old.     Additionally, the Kingston drive contained "hundreds

of images of girls, in various stages of undress," but also

"typical 'photographer' pictures of families, kids, and/or

couples."4

     The examiner did not uncover images of the victim or

communications between her and the defendant on any of the other

hard drives.    However, the examiner found images of nude and

partially nude unidentified women on some of these hard drives.

Specifically, in a folder titled "Photography" on the external

hard drive, the examiner found "'boudoir' style" photographs

that featured women clothed or "scantily dressed," and who

"systematically undressed" over the course of the photography

sessions.    As the women did so, the focus of the photographs

changed from the women generally, to specific nude body parts,

particularly their breasts and vaginas.

     On one of the internal hard drives, in a folder titled

"Photo concepts, models, artists," the examiner discovered "one

hundred forty-two (142) image files -- mostly of naked women."

On another internal hard drive, the examiner found adult

pornography.    On the last internal hard drive that the examiner

was able to access (Toshiba drive), the examiner mostly found

software applications, movie files, and music files.

     4   The report does not specify the ages of these "girls."
                                                                    6

     A State police trooper with experience and training related

to child pornography investigations examined the images of the

nude and partially nude unidentified female subjects on the hard

drives.     Although the trooper believed some of the images "may

constitute child pornography if the subjects [were] under

[eighteen] years old," the trooper was "not able to make a

determination of the age of the females in the images."      The

trooper also noted "[i]t would be nearly impossible to make a

determination on the age of the females in the images without

identification."

     The trooper further suggested, based on his training and

experience, the computer tower "should be looked at as one

interconnected system," comprised of all five internal hard

drives.     While the trooper asserted there could be "backups of

the drives" -- otherwise referred to as "volume shadow

copies" -- within any of the five internal hard drives, he

stated "it is unknown" whether any such backups actually

existed.5    The trooper further stated the Kingston drive

     5 The trooper defined "volume shadow copies" as a
"technology that allows for manual or automatic backups or
snapshot[s] o[f] computer volumes or files."
                                                                   7

contained ".lnk files," which "could show . . .

interconnectivity between the drives in the tower."6

     b.   Procedural history.   The defendant was indicted by a

Norfolk County grand jury on eight counts of aggravated rape of

a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23A, and three counts of enticement of

a minor, G. L. c. 265, § 26C (b).    He was then separately

indicted on one count of possession of child pornography, G. L.

c. 272, § 29C, based on the nude images of the victim discovered

on the Kingston drive.   No charges were brought relating to the

images of the nude and partially nude unidentified female

subjects found on the hard drives.   The defendant eventually

pleaded guilty to all charges, except for the eight counts of

aggravated rape of a child, where he instead pleaded guilty to

the lesser included offense of statutory rape under G. L.

c. 265, § 23.

     A Superior Court judge sentenced the defendant to a term of

from seven years to seven years and one day in State prison for

seven of the counts of statutory rape, and a term of from five

years to five years and one day for the one count of possession

of child pornography, all to be served concurrently.    For one of

the counts of statutory rape and for the three counts of

     6 As explained by the trooper, .lnk files "are shortcut
files that link an application or file commonly found on a
user's desktop, or throughout a system."
                                                                   8

enticement of a minor, the judge sentenced the defendant to

three years of probation, from and after his prison sentence.

    After being sentenced, the defendant filed a motion for

return of the property the Commonwealth seized from his former

residence, including the computer tower, the external hard

drive, four of the five internal hard drives (excluding the

Kingston drive), the video camera, the computer battery, the

power cords, the computer mouse, the speakers, and the cell

phone.   The defendant also filed a motion to "stay data erasure

or destruction of the [Kingston drive]."   In the latter motion,

the defendant asserted "[m]ost, if not all of [his] important

personal, business, or sentimental files are saved in the

desktop, documents and downloads folders" contained within the

Kingston drive.   He requested the Commonwealth preserve the

Kingston drive and send him "a list of those files in order to

determine whether or not a subsequent motion to preserve or copy

that data is appropriate."

    In response, the Commonwealth filed a "motion for leave to

destroy and dispose of certain computer equipment, digital media

and contraband seized from [the] defendant via search warrant."

Aside from the Toshiba drive -- which only contained

applications, movies, and music -- the Commonwealth sought to

destroy the hard drives and cell phone pursuant to G. L. c. 276,

§ 3, asserting a "public interest" in destroying the devices.
                                                                    9

However, the Commonwealth agreed to return the computer tower

(with the hard drives removed), along with the Toshiba drive,

the video camera, the computer battery, the power cords, the

computer mouse, and the speakers.

     After holding a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion judge

granted the defendant's motion for return of property with

respect to the uncontested property, but denied his request for

the remaining property, including three of the five internal

hard drives, as well as the external hard drive.   The motion

judge also granted the defendant's motion to stay destruction of

the Kingston drive and ordered the Commonwealth to provide a

list of files on the drive, but only to the extent that such a

list already existed.7   The judge took no action on the

Commonwealth's motion to destroy the hard drives and cell phone.8

     The defendant timely appealed from the motion judge's

rulings in November 2018.9   The Appeals Court subsequently

granted a stay of his appeal to allow the defendant to file a

renewed motion for return of property in the Superior Court,

which the defendant filed in March 2022.   In his renewed motion,

     7 The motions were considered by a different Superior Court
judge from the sentencing judge.

     8 Although it is unclear from the record, the cell phone may
have been returned to the defendant.

     9 The defendant's appeal only relates to the seized property
and not to his pleas, convictions, or sentences.
                                                                      10

the defendant principally raised, for the first time, the issue

of lack of process under G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8.    The same

motion judge denied the renewed motion in September 2022.     The

defendant appealed from the denial, which was consolidated with

his prior appeal, and we granted his application for direct

appellate review.

    2.   Discussion.    In reviewing the denial of a motion for

return of property pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 3, "[w]e begin by

acknowledging the strong constitutional protections against

governmental deprivations of private property."    Commonwealth v.

Salmons, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 65 (2019).    Among these

constitutional protections, "no part of the property of any

individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to

public uses, without his own consent, or that of the

representative body of the people."    Art. 10 of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.    Additionally, "no subject

shall be . . . deprived of his property . . . or estate, but by

the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."      Art. 12 of

the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

    a.   The search warrant statute.    Before proceeding with our

analysis, we summarize the various sections of the statutory

scheme at issue.    General Laws c. 276, §§ 1 et seq. (search

warrant statute), concerns the seizure, retention, and disposal

of property obtained pursuant to a search warrant.      See G. L.
                                                                       11

c. 276, §§ 1 (describing types of property that may be subject

of search warrant), 2-2C (describing requirements for issuing

valid search warrant).     Most notably, § 3 provides that, apart

from certain exceptions not relevant here, "all other property

seized in execution of a search warrant shall be disposed of as

the court or justice orders and may be forfeited and either sold

or destroyed, as the public interest requires, in the discretion

of the court or justice."     G. L. c. 276, § 3.

    Immediately following § 3, the statutory scheme sets forth

detailed procedures for issuing a decree of forfeiture regarding

property seized in execution of a search warrant.        See G. L.

c. 276, §§ 4-8.      Pursuant to § 4, the owner of the property, and

others with an interest in the property, are entitled to notice

"[b]efore a decree of forfeiture . . . is issued."        G. L.

c. 276, § 4.    Such notice must "set[] forth the substance of the

complaint" and provide a "time and place" for the owner to

appear to "show cause why the articles seized should not be

forfeited."    Id.   Section 5 describes service of process for the

notice, which must be served "not less than fourteen days before

the time appointed for trial."      G. L. c. 276, § 5.     Section 6

allows for the postponement of "the time appointed for the

trial" if notice has not been properly served, if the property

needs to be retained for use as evidence in a trial, or "if

other sufficient cause appears."      G. L. c. 276, § 6.    Section 7
                                                                       12

describes the procedure for forfeiture "[i]f upon trial the

property is adjudged forfeited."       G. L. c. 276, § 7.   Finally,

§ 8 describes the process for appealing from a forfeiture

decree, indicating, inter alia, that "[a]ll proceedings [on

appeal] . . . shall conform so far as may be to proceedings in

criminal cases."      G. L. c. 276, § 8.

       We now proceed to address the primary question in this

case:       whether there is any interplay between G. L. c. 276, § 3,

on the one hand, and §§ 4 to 8, on the other.       As with all

questions of statutory interpretation, we exercise de novo

review.       See Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 73 (2022).

       The Commonwealth asks us to construe the phrase "as the

public interest requires" in § 3 as a stand-alone provision

unrelated to the ensuing procedural requirements of §§ 4 to 8.

The defendant counters that the Commonwealth and the courts must

strictly adhere to the procedural requirements of §§ 4 to 8

before seized property can be lawfully forfeited pursuant to

§ 3.    We conclude the Legislature intended for the procedural

safeguards laid out in §§ 4 to 8 to apply whenever a decree of

forfeiture is issued under § 3.10

       Our opinion today is limited to the forfeiture of
       10

property under the search warrant statute not covered by another
forfeiture statute. See, e.g., G. L. c. 94C, § 47 (forfeiture
of controlled substances); G. L. c. 265, § 56 (forfeiture of
property used in human trafficking); G. L. c. 266, § 143H
                                                                    13

    "We interpret a statute according to the intent of the

Legislature, which we ascertain from all the statute's words,

construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language

. . ." (quotation and citation omitted).   Ciani v. MacGrath, 481

Mass. 174, 178 (2019).   "Ordinarily, where the language of a

statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to

legislative intent" (citation omitted).    Id.   "Ultimately, we

must avoid any construction of statutory language . . . that

. . . would frustrate the Legislature's intent" (citation

omitted), Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325,

332 (2021), or "render . . . any portion of it meaningless,"

Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 690

(2022).

    Interpreting § 3 in isolation would violate the well-

established rule of statutory construction that "[w]e do not

interpret . . . statutory language . . . so as to render it or

any portion of it meaningless."   Williams, 490 Mass. at 690.      If

we were to adopt the interpretation of § 3 advocated by the

Commonwealth and view § 3 in isolation, a court could forgo the

procedures set forth in §§ 4 to 8 to issue a decree of

(forfeiture of illegal sound recordings); G. L. c. 267A, § 4
(forfeiture of laundered money and property). Our opinion also
does not reach the enumerated exceptions under G. L. c. 276,
§ 3 (a)-(c), including the "dangerous weapons" exception under
§ 3 (b), which we recently construed in Commonwealth v. Fleury,
489 Mass. 421, 429-430 (2022).
                                                                  14

forfeiture, so long as the court concluded that "the public

interest requires" forfeiture.   The procedures in §§ 4 to 8,

therefore, would merely be superfluous suggestions.    In

contrast, reading G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, as prescribing the

procedures a court must follow to determine if "the public

interest requires" forfeiture under § 3 gives meaning and

harmony to all sections of the search warrant statute and thus

effectuates the Legislature's over-all intent.   See Marengi v. 6

Forest Rd. LLC, 491 Mass. 19, 25 (2022) (we "harmonize . . .

related provisions . . . of the same statutory scheme so as to

give full effect to the expressed intent of the Legislature"

[citation omitted]).

    To the extent there is any lingering ambiguity in the

statutory language, we turn to the legislative history.     See

Ciani, 481 Mass. at 178.   In 1870, the Legislature passed an

earlier version of G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, one year after this

court held the forfeiture provision of the search warrant

statute then in place was procedurally deficient.     See St. 1870,

c. 242, §§ 1-4; Attorney Gen. v. Justices of the Mun. Court of

Boston, 103 Mass. 456, 463-469 (1869).   Before the decision in

Attorney Gen., under the historic search warrant statute, courts

could issue a warrant for several types of contraband, including
                                                                     15

gambling apparatuses or implements.11    See R.S. (1836), c. 142,

§§ 1-5.   When seized property was no longer needed as evidence,

it was to be destroyed under the direction of the court.12     See

R.S. (1836), c. 142, § 5.    The statute did not require the court

to conduct any proceedings or issue any notice whatsoever before

ordering the destruction of the seized property.     See id.

     Subsequently, in 1869, the Legislature expanded the reach

of the search warrant statute beyond contraband to allow

"furniture, fixtures, and personal property" to be seized from

"gaming-houses."13   See St. 1869, c. 364 (amending historic

search warrant statute).     Because possession of this property

was not inherently unlawful, such property was to be sold rather

than destroyed if "upon [a] hearing" the court "adjudged" that

the property was seized from a gaming-house at a time when

gambling was taking place.    See St. 1869, c. 364, § 3.

     11Specifically, pursuant to R.S. (1836), c. 142, §§ 1 and
2, courts could issue a search warrant for (1) stolen or
embezzled property, (2) counterfeit money, (3) obscene
materials, (4) lottery tickets, and (5) gambling apparatuses or
implements.

     12Stolen property was returned to the owner rather than
destroyed. See R.S. (1836), c. 142, § 5.

     13As the name suggests, "gaming-houses" were buildings
where gambling took place. See Commonwealth v. Blankinship, 165
Mass. 40, 42-43 (1895).
                                                                       16

    The historic search warrant statute and the 1869 amendment

were considered by this court in Attorney Gen., 103 Mass. at

457, after an agent of the Commonwealth seized gambling

implements, furniture, and personal property from an alleged

gaming-house but did not arrest any persons in connection with

the alleged gambling.    As a result, the lower court was faced

with deciding whether to order the sale and destruction of

property belonging to unknown persons who had received no notice

of the proceedings.     Id. at 457, 463.

    On appeal, this court determined the lower court could not

order the sale and destruction of the property because proper

procedures had not been carried out.       Id. at 469.   We observed

that "[t]he terms of the statute, taken literally" did not

require "any formal[] . . . notice or trial," id. at 464, but we

nonetheless read these requirements into the statute on the

grounds that it would be "entirely contrary to the spirit of our

laws that property which may be valuable should be literally

destroyed without some attempt to notify the owner . . . or

[without] hav[ing] a hearing on the question whether the

property can be said to be of that class which the statute

intends to condemn," id. at 465.    Regarding the 1869 amendment,

the court concluded "to fall within the familiar provisions of

our Constitution . . . [t]he hearing and adjudication spoken of

in the [amendment] must be understood to mean a judicial
                                                                   17

hearing, with all its incidents, of notice, actual or

constructive[,] trial, and the right of appeal to a jury."      Id.

468.

       One year after this court's decision in Attorney Gen., the

Legislature passed St. 1870, c. 242, which required notice and a

trial prior to the issuance of a forfeiture decree and provided

the right to appeal from a forfeiture decree.    Specifically, the

statute required

       "written notice . . . setting forth the substance of the
       [forfeiture] complaint, [and] commanding the persons, if
       any, in whose possession the things were found, and the
       owner, if alleged, and all other persons claiming any
       interest therein, to appear before said court or magistrate
       at a time and place therein named, to show cause, if any
       they have, why the things seized should not be forfeited."

St. 1870, c. 242, § 2.    The statute also detailed how notice was

to be served and permitted the trial to be postponed if such

notice was not "duly served."   St. 1870, c. 242, §§ 3-4.

       It is no coincidence that St. 1870, c. 242, was passed

directly after this court's decision in Attorney Gen., and that

it codified the procedures this court read into the search

warrant statute.   The Legislature's intent in passing these

provisions was clearly to ensure that proper procedure was

followed for the issuance of a decree of forfeiture.

Considering this history, we conclude the legislative intent

behind G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, much like its precursor, is to

provide the necessary procedural process to ensure that
                                                                  18

forfeiture is not "contrary to the spirit of our laws" and

"fall[s] within the familiar provisions of our Constitution."

Attorney Gen., 103 Mass. at 465, 468.   It would therefore be

contrary to the Legislature's intent to read G. L. c. 276, § 3,

as a stand-alone provision, separated from the procedural

safeguards in §§ 4 to 8.

    The Commonwealth cites Beldotti v. Commonwealth, 41 Mass.

App. Ct. 185 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173 (1997), in

support of its argument that the "public interest" clause of

G. L. c. 276, § 3, is untethered to the procedural requirements

of §§ 4 to 8.   The defendant in Beldotti was convicted of murder

in the first degree for a "brutal sex crime" and sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of life without the possibility of parole.

Id. at 185.   The Appeals Court denied the defendant's motion for

the return of property seized from his house pursuant to a

search warrant, reasoning that "[a]lthough property may not be

forfeited simply because it is offensive or repugnant," there

was "a connection between the property . . . and the crime . . .

committed" that warranted forfeiture.   Id. at 189.

    In deciding Beldotti, the Appeals Court gave no

consideration as to whether the procedural requirements in §§ 4

to 8 had been followed, and it is unclear whether either party

raised the issue on appeal.   Accordingly, to the extent that

Beldotti may be read as allowing forfeiture to be accomplished
                                                                    19

outside of the parameters §§ 4 to 8, it is not correct and not

to be followed.   When the Commonwealth seizes property pursuant

to a search warrant, unless another statute governs forfeiture

or the property falls under one of the exceptions enumerated in

§ 3, the procedural requirements of the ensuing sections must be

complied with before a forfeiture decree may be entered.

    b.   Standard of proof at forfeiture proceedings.      Having

determined the procedural requirements of §§ 4 to 8 must be

followed prior to a determination whether forfeiture is in the

"public interest" under § 3, we take this opportunity to clarify

the standard of proof to be applied under the search warrant

statute, as the statute does not specify the applicable

standard.   We hold that a preponderance of the evidence

standard, as the general standard in civil cases, applies here

and the burden of proof falls upon the Commonwealth.    See Doe,

Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry

Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015) (Doe), and cases cited.     See also

Andrews, petitioner, 449 Mass. 587, 591 (2007) ("the baseline

rule [is] that the fact finder in a civil case usually employs a

fair preponderance of the evidence standard").   Therefore, in a

forfeiture action brought under the search warrant statute, the

Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that "the public interest requires" forfeiture.     G. L.

c. 276, § 3.   In arriving at this conclusion, we have balanced
                                                                    20

"the private interests affected, the risk of erroneous

deprivation, the probable value of additional or substitute

safeguards, and the governmental interests involved," and we are

satisfied that this standard of proof accords with due process

(citation omitted).     Doe, supra at 311.

    c.    Waiver.   It is undisputed that the procedures set forth

in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, were not followed here.    As a

threshold matter, the Commonwealth argues that the defendant's

claim of entitlement to such procedure is untimely and waived

because he raised the issue of procedural deficiencies for the

first time in his renewed motion for return of property, rather

than in his original motion.    We disagree.

    Rather than denying the defendant's renewed motion on

waiver grounds, the Superior Court judge instead reached the

merits of the defendant's claim.    Although Rule 61 of the Rules

of the Superior Court (2023), which governs motions for the

return of property, prescribes a particular time period for the

filing of such motions, it also confers discretion upon Superior

Court judges to entertain these motions "at such other time as

the court may allow."    Therefore, it was within the judge's

discretion to reach the merits of the defendant's renewed

motion.   See Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 792-793

(2003) (discussing judge's discretion to hear renewed pretrial
                                                                     21

motions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 [a] [5], 378 Mass. 871

[1979]).

     d.    Application of § 3.   Irrespective of any procedural

deficiencies, the Commonwealth argues forfeiture is in the

"public interest" and appropriate in this case because of the

odious nature of the crimes for which the defendant was

convicted, and because of the possibility the disputed hard

drives "may" contain child pornography.     We believe such a

determination is premature.

     The Commonwealth posits that returning any of the drives

would "result in a high likelihood" of returning child

pornography to the defendant because the drives "may" have been

interconnected with the Kingston drive.     In support of these

assertions, the Commonwealth relies entirely on the affidavit of

a State police trooper averring there are "hundreds of images of

unidentified nude or semi-nude females" of indeterminate ages on

the disputed drives that "may" constitute child pornography "if"

the subjects were under eighteen years of age.     Additionally,

the trooper asserted that the presence of .lnk files "could"

signify that the drives were "interconnected" to the Kingston

drive, which contains pictures of the victim.     The trooper does

not purport to know the likelihood of either possibility being

true.
                                                                       22

    The Commonwealth's arguments here are analogous to those

that it previously presented in Salmons, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at

65, where the Commonwealth objected to the return of the

defendant's seized property based only on speculation.      In

Salmons, the defendant was "arrested . . . for assault and

battery and related charges" stemming from an incident of

domestic violence.      Id. at 62.   As part of the investigation,

the police seized the defendant's three cell phones, two of

which "contain[ed] 'numerous and sexually explicit photographs

and videos of the defendant and [the victim].'"       Id. at 63.

    The Commonwealth in Salmons filed a motion to erase the

data on the defendant's cell phones based solely on the

possibility "the data on them could be used to harm the victim"

in the future (emphasis added).      Id. at 68.   To avoid this

purported risk, a judge granted the Commonwealth's motion

without any "finding of fact that such harm was in any sense

likely."   Id. at 69.    The Appeals Court reversed, reasoning that

mere speculation that "lawful property . . . might be used to

commit a crime or inflict other harm in the future" cannot

overcome "the strong constitutional protections against

governmental deprivations of private property."       Id. at 65, 68.

    Here, as in Salmons, the defendant's property may not be

forfeited based merely on the speculative concern that harm

could occur if the disputed property were to be returned.          There
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has been no showing (as of yet) to justify that concern.

Significantly, the trooper's supporting affidavit, the only

basis for the Commonwealth's concerns, does not establish that

future harm is likely to occur or that the property in question

constitutes illegal contraband.     Instead, the trooper only makes

vague assertions about potential illegality, in that the images

on the disputed drives "may" constitute child pornography "if"

the subjects were under eighteen years old.     Such assertions on

their own cannot justify forfeiture at this juncture.

     To balance all the competing interests, what is required

are appropriate proceedings in accordance with G. L. c. 276,

§§ 4 to 8, including notice and a trial, so a judge may

evaluate, on a full factual record, the merits of the competing

arguments to determine if a forfeiture decree is in the "public

interest" under § 3.     Indeed, this case hinges on numerous

factual disputes and thus requires a fact finder to resolve

them.     To be clear, we do not suggest it would be impossible or

even unlikely for the Commonwealth to demonstrate the hard

drives contain child pornography or forfeiture is not otherwise

in the public interest; we conclude only that proceedings

consistent with the requirements of §§ 4 to 8 are necessary for

a judge to make such a determination.

     3.    Conclusion.   The orders of the Superior Court denying

in part the defendant's motion for return of property and
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denying the defendant's renewed motion for return of property

are vacated and set aside insofar as they denied the return of

certain property.   The matter is remanded to the Superior Court

for forfeiture proceedings consistent with this opinion.14   We

express no view on the merits of the issues to be decided.

                                    So ordered.

     14We reject the defendant's argument that the only lawful
remedy in this case would be an order requiring the return of
his property. None of the cases the defendant cites requires
this remedy, and in fact, remand was ordered in the majority of
these cases. See, e.g., Lindell v. United States, 82 F.4th 614,
622 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 23-950
(Apr. 15, 2024) (remanding to determine whether continued
retention of plaintiff's cell phone was justified when "the
record ha[d] not been developed on this issue"). See also
Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 139 (2017) (remanding when
State had "zero claim of right" to property at issue).