Court Opinion

ID: 9407591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 16:09:20.66883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.060667
License: Public Domain

J-S17016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: C.D.A., A          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: D.C.B., FATHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 187 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered January 17, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                                 2022-00074

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                  FILED: JULY 7, 2023

       D.C.B. (“Father”) appeals from the decree dated January 13, 2023, and

entered January 17, 2023, in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas,

involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his son, C.D.A. (“Child”).1

Further, counsel for Father (“Counsel”), has filed a petition to withdraw and

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After review, we

grant the petition to withdraw and affirm the termination decree.

____________________________________________

1 By separate decree dated December 22, 2022, and entered December 27,
2022, the orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother,
C.A.A. (“Mother”). Mother did not file an appeal and did not participate in the
instant appeal.
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        The orphans’ court aptly summarized the factual and procedural history

as follows:

          [Child] was born [in December 2018]. … [Father] has been
          incarcerated since June 8, 2018 and was still in that status as
          of the date of the [involuntary termination] hearing on January
          13, 2023. [Child] (and a sibling)[2] were the subject of an
          Emergency Protective Order dated August 30, 2021. At a
          shelter care hearing on August 31, 2021, sufficient evidence
          was presented that return of [C]hild to the home of [Mother]
          was not in the best interest of [] Child, and that [] Child should
          remain in foster care[.]

          An adjudication hearing was held on September 9, 2021. []
          Mother was present and represented by counsel. [] Father was
          not present or represented by counsel. [Child] was adjudicated
          a dependent child at that hearing.        The grounds for the
          adjudication were the substance abuse concerns as to []
          Mother[,] who had tested positive for substances at the time of
          [sibling]’s birth and admitted to ongoing drug use.
          Additionally[,] there were concerns for untreated mental health
          and deplorable home conditions. [Father] was incarcerated and
          unable to care for [] Child.

          The juvenile court hearing officer proceeded to a dispositional
          hearing following the September 9, 2021 adjudication hearing.
          The following permanency plan for [Father] was recommended
          and ultimately endorsed by the court on September 15, 2021:

               1. Participate in any programs available to him while
               incarcerated, including parenting classes and anger
               management; and

               2. Contact [Erie County Office of Children and Youth] (“the
               Agency”) upon his release from prison to develop a
               treatment plan.

          The court ordered [] Child’s permanent placement goal to be
          return to parent or guardian and that [] Child remain in [his]
          foster home. A three [] month permanency review hearing was
          to be scheduled.
____________________________________________

2   Child’s sibling is not a subject of this appeal.

                                           -2-
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         On December 20, 2021, the initial permanency review hearing
         took place. At the time of the hearing, [] Father was not present
         or represented by counsel. The court found that there had been
         minimal compliance by the Father with the permanency plan.
         The court also found that there had been minimal progress
         toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
         placement. The court ordered [] Child’s permanent placement
         goal remain return to a parent or guardian and that [] Child
         remain in [his] foster home. A three [] month review hearing
         was to be scheduled.

         On March 14, 2022[,] the second permanency review hearing
         took place. At the time of the hearing, the Father was not
         present or represented by counsel. The court found that there
         had been no compliance by [] Father with the permanency plan
         and no progress towards alleviating the circumstances which
         brought the child into placement. The court ordered [] Child’s
         permanent placement goal was to return to parent or guardian
         concurrent with adoption and that [] Child’s placement continue
         in [his] foster home. A four [] month review hearing was to be
         scheduled.

         The third permanency [review] hearing took place on July 13,
         2022. [Father] was not present or represented by counsel.
         Following testimony, the [c]ourt determined that there had
         been no compliance by [] Father with the permanency plan and
         no progress in alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
         placement. The court changed the permanent placement plan
         to adoption.[3] The Agency was no longer to offer services,
         including visitation, to [] Father.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 1-3 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

        On October 13, 2022, the Agency filed a petition for the involuntary

termination of parental rights. Specifically, the Agency sought termination

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On October 20,

____________________________________________

3   No appeal was filed with respect to the goal change.

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2022, the court appointed Deanna L. Heasley, Esquire, as legal counsel.4 The

orphans’ court held a hearing on the petitions on January 13, 2023, wherein

Father, who remained incarcerated, appeared and was represented by

counsel.5 The Agency presented the testimony of ongoing case supervisor,

Stacie Pederson. Additionally, Father testified on his own behalf. Thereafter,

by decree dated January 13, 2023, and entered January 17, 2023, the court

involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

       On February 10, 2023, Father filed a timely notice of appeal. In lieu of

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Counsel submitted an

accompanying statement of intention to file an Anders brief pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).       See re J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(holding that the decision of counsel to follow Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) procedure

in a termination of parental rights case was proper). The orphans’ court filed

a Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 14, 2023.          Counsel filed a petition to

withdraw, as well as an Anders brief, on April 4, 2023.

____________________________________________

4A review of the certified record revealed that Attorney Heasley served as the
Child’s legal counsel and guardian ad litem (“GAL”). See N.T. Hearing,
1/12/23 at 1. During the hearing, Attorney Heasley represented that the
Child’s “legal and best interests merge.” Id. at 23; see also In re Adoption
of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. Super. 2020).

5  We are unable to discern from the record if Father participated virtually, or
if he were physically present.

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       When counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders and its progeny,6

this Court may not review the merits of the appeal without first addressing

counsel’s request to withdraw.         See In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d

1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d

590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010). To procedurally withdraw, counsel must:

        1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
        making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
        determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
        of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
        [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
        or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems
        worthy of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citation omitted).        Counsel must also “attach to their petition to

withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their

rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

       Additionally,     our   Supreme         Court   has   set   forth   the   following

requirements for Anders briefs:

        [W]e hold that in the Anders brief that accompanies
        court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must:
        (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
        citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
        counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
        counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
        counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
        Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
____________________________________________

6 This Court extended the Anders procedure to appeals from decrees
terminating parental rights involuntarily in In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275
(Pa. Super. 1992).

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        controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to
        the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

       Instantly,    Counsel    filed   a      petition   to   withdraw    certifying   her

conscientious review of the record and determination that Father’s appeal is

frivolous.   Counsel further attached a copy of a Millisock letter informing

Father of his rights with respect to her petition.7 Likewise, Counsel filed an

Anders brief that included a summary of the procedural history and facts but

does not cite to the record. Further, in concluding that the appeal is wholly

frivolous, Counsel failed to articulate fully the controlling caselaw for Section

2511(a)(5) and (8). Nevertheless, we remain cognizant that the framework

of Anders and Santiago requires “substantial[], if not perfect[],” compliance.

See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007).

We thus conclude that Counsel’s brief is substantially compliant with Anders

and Santiago.8

       Having    concluded      that    Counsel      complied     with    the   procedural

requirements of Anders/Santiago, we must next “conduct a review of the

record to ascertain if on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel,

____________________________________________

7 Father has not responded to Counsel’s petition to withdraw and Anders
brief.

8  Notwithstanding our ultimate determination that Counsel’s brief is
substantially compliant, we caution counsel regarding adherence to the
briefing requirements of Santiago.

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intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188

A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). Counsel raises challenges as

to the sufficiency of the evidence in the Anders brief and presents the

following issues for our review:

         A. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
            abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
            parental rights was supported by clear and convincing
            evidence pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
            and (8)]?

         B. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
            abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
            parental rights was supported by clear and convincing
            evidence pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(b)]?
Anders Brief at 3 (superfluous capitalization and suggested answers

omitted).9

        We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When

applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings

of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021).           “Where the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may

____________________________________________

9   Child’s counsel/GAL submitted a letter to this Court in support of the decree.

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not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or

abuse of discretion.”   In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa.

2021). An abuse of discretion in this context exists “only upon demonstration

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.    The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven

enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a).             Only if the court

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the

petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing

evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of

the truth of the precise facts in issue.”     C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (citation

omitted).

      In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).          As

indicated, we have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental

rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of

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Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).10 See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004). Instantly, we will analyze the court’s termination

decree pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:

        (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
        may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
        grounds:

              (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
              least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
              petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
              relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
              failed to perform parental duties.

                                          ...

        (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
        rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
        developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
        child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
        the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
        furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
        beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
        filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
        not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
        described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
        giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

____________________________________________

10 Significantly, we do not find subsections (a)(5) and (8) applicable to Father,
as he was incarcerated at the time of Child’s removal. See In re C.S., 761
A.2d 1197, 1200 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (stating that Section
2511(a)(5) and (8) did not provide a basis for terminating the father’s parental
rights when he was incarcerated at the time of the child’s removal from the
mother’s care); see also In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1123 n.2 (Pa. Super.
2010) (same).

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      In order to establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1) “[a] petitioner. . . must demonstrate by competent, clear and

convincing evidence, ‘[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has

refused or failed to perform parental duties.’” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-364

(citation omitted) (footnote omitted). While undefined,

       our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to
       the needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and
       support. Parental duties are carried out through affirmative
       actions that develop and maintain the parent-child relationship.
       The roster of such positive actions undoubtedly includes
       communication and association. The performance of parental
       duties requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain
       a place of importance in the child’s life.

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, “[f]ortitude is required, as a parent must act with ‘reasonable

firmness’ to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a

parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform

parental responsibilities.” Id. (citation omitted). It follows that incarceration

does not relieve a parent of the obligation to perform parental duties.           An

incarcerated   parent   must   “utilize   available   resources   to   continue    a

relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828

(Pa. 2012), discussing In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1975).

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      Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that Father failed to perform his

affirmative duties. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 7-8. The court

found as follows:

       [Father] was incarcerated the entirety of [C]hild’s life. The total
       sum of his contacts [with] his son were five letters. He never
       sent any cards or presents at Christmas or other holidays to his
       son. This lack of any reasonable attempt to have meaningful
       contact with his child is well below the standard of any parent
       to affirmatively make a good-faith interest and effort to
       maintain the parent child relationship even in difficult
       circumstances. In re D.J.S.[, 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super.
       1999)] (letters, some support and gifts insufficient to prevent
       termination of parental rights of an incarcerated parent).

       [] Father claimed to have completed court-ordered programs
       and that he had [c]ertificates of [c]ompletion for those
       programs.      However[,] the Agency never received any
       certificates or information as to what programs the Father
       supposedly had attended or completed. [Father]’s response
       when asked why he did not send the certificates to the Agency
       was that he didn’t know how to make copies. Stacie Pederson
       testified she personally faxed [F]ather applications for counsel
       for the [d]ependency proceedings. [Father] never requested
       counsel or communicated about the hearings, yet
       acknowledged receiving the “court stuff[.”] In cases involving
       an incarcerated parent “the focus is on whether the parent
       utilized resources available in prison to maintain a relationship
       with his or her child.” In re B., N.M.[, 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.
       Super. 2004)]. [] Father’s failure to attend programs, or if he
       did, inquire as to how to make copies of his certificates to send
       to the Agency is not indicative of a parent utilizing all available
       resources to maintain the parent-child relationship. The lack of
       interest shown by [] Father in the legal proceedings involving
       his child demonstrates his complete lack of effort to continue a
       relationship with his child.
Id.

      A review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding of grounds

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for termination under Section 2511(a)(1). Father was incarcerated since June

2018, prior to Child’s birth, and remained incarcerated at the time of the

termination hearing, over four years later, without contact with Child. See

N.T., 1/13/23, at 5, 22. There was no dispute that Father sent five letters to

the Agency during an unspecified time period. However, Father did not send

any cards or presents to Child. See id. at 5, 7, 13, 16. Father did not request

any visitation or telephone contact. See id. at 14, 17. Moreover, Father did

not participate in any of the dependency proceedings, despite notification from

the Agency.11 See id. at 7-8, 15.

       With respect to Father’s claim that he completed court-ordered

programs, specifically, anger management, drug and alcohol, parenting, and

batterer’s group, Father conceded that he failed to provide certificates of

completion to the Agency. See id. at 19-20. When questioned why he did

not provide these certificates to the Agency, Father responded that he did not

know how to make copies.           See id. at 20.   The court, however, rejected

Father’s excuse. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 9 (“The [c]ourt

attaches no credibility to [] Father’s excuse[] as to why he provided no

documentation to the Agency.”).

____________________________________________

11 Father testified that he submitted applications, as best we can discern, as
it relates to obtaining counsel. See N.T., 1/13/23, at 19. These assertions,
however, are unsubstantiated.

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       As indicated supra, incarceration does not relieve a parent of the

obligation to perform parental duties. An incarcerated parent must “utilize

available resources to continue a relationship” with his or her child. S.P., 47

A.3d at 828.      Thus, given Father’s lack of contact and commitment, the

orphans’ court’s termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) is supported by

competent evidence in the record, and we find no abuse of discretion. See

C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.

       Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 267.12    As outlined in T.S.M.,

____________________________________________

12 Our Supreme Court recently issued an opinion addressing the standard for
analyzing the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of a
child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), with a particular eye on the issue of
severing the parental-bond. See Interest of K.T., 2023 WL 4092986 (Pa.
June 21, 2023). Specifically, the Court held that, in making a Section 2511(b)
determination, a        trial  court must analyze         the   following four
factors: (1) whether the parental bond is “necessary and beneficial to the
child;” (2) “the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster care;”
(3) “whether the child is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster
parents;” and (4) “whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort,
security, safety and stability.” Id. Moreover, the Court explained that, when
reviewing the nature of the parental bond, a court must consider “whether
maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare.” Id. Importantly, the K.T. Court’s decision is
particularly relevant to an analysis of an existing parental-bond. As indicated
herein, however, Father was incarcerated since before Child’s birth, without

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         The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
         properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
         comfort, security, and stability.” [T]he determination of the
         child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
         emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
         attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
         permanently severing the parental bond. However, [. . .]
         evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

        “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular

case.”    In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted). When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

well.    Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

         Moreover,

         While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
         aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
         nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
         court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

              [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
              equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
____________________________________________

any visitation or contact. As such, the evidence of a parental bond between
Father and Child is virtually non-existent. Nonetheless, a review of the
orphans’ court’s reasoning demonstrates it considered the lack of parental
bond between Father and Child, Child’s need for permanency, Child’s bond
with his foster parents, and whether foster parents can meet Child’s
developmental, physical and emotional needs. Hence, we conclude that the
orphans’ court’s decision is consistent with K.T.

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            also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort,
            security, and stability the child might have with the foster
            parent.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted) (brackets in original) (ellipses added).

      In determining that termination of Father’s parental rights favors Child’s

needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court noted the lack

of a bond between Father and Child and emphasized the safety and stability

provided by Child’s foster parents. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at

8-9. The court stated:

       [Child] has many needs. … His needs are being met in his
       pre-adoptive foster home. The foster parents are actively
       participating in the services necessary to provide [Child] the
       ability to have a productive life. [] Child is receiving love and
       attention and positively responding to being in a stable family
       situation. He calls his foster parents Mom and Dad and lives
       with his sibling. [Child] deserves a safe and secure life. []
       Father has shown no desire to provide safety and security for
       his child. [Attorney Heasley] concurred with [Child]’s need for
       stability and the fact that the child only recognizes the foster
       parents as his support.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 8 (ellipses added) (citation to record

omitted). Upon review, we agree and discern no abuse of discretion.

      Herein, the record supports the finding that Child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare favor termination of parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Specifically, there

is no evidence of any bond between Father and Child, as Father has been

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incarcerated since prior to Child’s birth with no visitation or contact. See N.T.,

1/13/23, at 5, 14, 22. Further, Child is doing well in a pre-adoptive home

where he is placed with a younger half-sibling and with foster parents, who

are working to meet his behavioral and therapeutic needs.          See id. at 6,

10-11, 15-16. Ms. Pederson disclosed that Child has behavioral health needs

that he displayed upon placement in his foster home. See id. at 11. She

stated that Child “throws tantrums that involve screaming, there’s some

physical aggression, attention-seeking behaviors, biting, angry outbursts.”

Id. Ms. Pederson testified that the foster parents “have been working with

him, redirecting him. They have participated in several assessments for him

to receive services. They also participated in [. . .] therapy services [. . .] to

help address some of the behavioral health needs that he has [as well as] the

history of trauma that he’s experienced.” Id. at 11. Despite noting that “more

work is needed,” Ms. Pederson testified that Child’s behavior has improved.

Id. at 12, 15-16. As such, Ms. Pederson opined that it would be harmful to

Child if he were removed from his foster home. She explained:

       I think it would be more detrimental to his well[-]being to be
       removed from the foster home.           He is building healthy
       attachments to the foster parents. He calls them mom and dad.
       He is starting to learn the concept of family, and a family unit.
       [A]nd he is [. . .] viewing his foster parents as the parental
       figures in his life. They have been the most stable caregivers
       for him in his life.

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Id. at 12. She further expressed that it would be in Child’s best interest to

terminate Father’s parental rights and acknowledged no negative effects on

Child as a result. Id. at 12-13.

      Based on the foregoing independent analysis of the orphans’ court’s

termination of Father’s parental rights, we agree with Counsel that the appeal

from the decree terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1) and (b) is wholly frivolous and our review of the record does not

reveal any overlooked non-frivolous issues.

      Decree affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2023

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