Court Opinion

ID: 9768703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:45:29.509622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:43.562815
License: Public Domain

FENNER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence support Nicholson’s (the defendant) conviction for felonious escape from custody.
As stated in the majority opinion, Section 575.200 defines the offense for which defendant was convicted as follows: “A person commits the crime of escape from custody ... if, while being held in custody after arrest for any crime, he escapes ... from custody.” “[A] person is in custody when he has been arrested but has not been delivered to a place of confine-ment_” Section 556.061(7), RSMo Supp. 1991. An arrest is made by either the “actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of the officer_” Section 544.180, RSMo 1986. However, “the arrest of a person can occur without actual physical restraint that is without the application of force or the handcuffing of the suspect.” Day v. Wells Fargo Guard Service Co., 711 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Mo. banc 1986). Even though police officers do not physically or actively restrain a defendant, other circumstances can be tantamount to an arrest. See, State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902 (Mo.App.1985). An arrest occurs when an officer takes control of the movements of an arrestee. City of Sedalia v. Russell, 623 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Mo.App.1981).
The actual restraint requirement of § 544.180, does not, as the majority interprets it, require actual physical restraint, especially where, as here, an officer exercises control over the movements of an arrestee. In the case at bar, the record reflects that Officer Dodd limited the defendant’s freedom and took control of his movements by impairing his ability to absent himself from the officer’s custody.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and disregarding all contrary evidence, the record reflects that while the defendant was seated in the public waiting area of the Columbia, Missouri Police Station, the arresting officer, a uniformed officer, walked up to the defendant and stood in front of him. Officer Dodd then showed the defendant some evidence implicating him in a crime and advised him that he was under arrest for a felony offense.1 The defendant became agitated and argumentative disputing the charge for which he was arrested. The officer again told the defendant that he was under arrest. Clearly, under our standard of review, a reasonable interpretation of Officer Dodd’s behavior would be that in walking up to the defendant and standing in front of him, she was controlling the defendant’s freedom of movement.
There was also evidence presented to prove that the defendant submitted to Officer Dodd’s authority. In this regard, the record reflects that the defendant argued the merits of his arrest with Officer Dodd for at least eight to ten minutes before he ran from the police station, thus evidencing an appreciation by defendant of the authority vested in Officer Dodd and the control that Officer Dodd had exerted over him.
Furthermore, the record reflects that after the second time defendant was told he was under arrest, he continued to dispute the charge against him and he was told a third time that he was under arrest for the *599felony offense. At this point, the defendant stood from where he was seated as if to follow Officer Dodd toward the door into the secured area of the police station, where he had been asked to proceed, thus manifesting assent to Officer Dodd’s request, authority and control. Defendant then ran in the opposite direction out of the police station with the arresting officer in pursuit.2
When considered in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence shows that the arresting officer took control of defendant’s movements by standing in front of him as he was seated in the police station and advising him that he was under arrest. The majority’s analysis of cases addressing the circumstance of a fleeing suspect are not in point. The defendant was not fleeing when he was informed that he was under arrest. He was restrained by the officer’s presence in front of him as he was seated in the police station. Furthermore, the defendant submitted to the custody of the arresting officer by arguing the merits of his arrest denying culpability for some eight to ten minutes, and by his action of standing as if to follow Officer Dodd toward the door of the secured area of the station, where he had been asked to go, before he fled.
The majority’s position does not consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Furthermore, in my opinion, the majority encourages the use of physical force or contact to restrain a person placed under arrest regardless of the surrounding circumstances. I believe these decisions are best left to the discretion of the arresting officer and that physical force or contact need not be encouraged in a circumstance where it does not appear warranted.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction for felonious escape from custody.

. Officer Dodd testified, "I finally walked up and stood in front of him and showed him the lab results, and I told him I was arresting him for a felony.”

. Officer Dodd testified that after her discussion of the charge with the defendant, “I assumed when he stood up he was coming, cooperative with me." Officer Dodd was then asked by the prosecutor: “Had you actually started to turn towards the door when he stood up?” To which Officer Dodd replied, “Yes.” The prosecutor asked: “The door back into the police department?” Officer Dodd replied, “Yes.”