Court Opinion

ID: 9604913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:28:14.548749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:25.287431
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice.
Appellant was a 19 year old member of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma when his former girlfriend, an unmarried 17 year old non-Indian, gave birth to Baby Boy D. With her consent the infant was adopted by the appellees, a married couple. After learning of the adoption without notice to him and without his consent, he filed a petition in the District Court, claiming to be the father and seeking to vacate the adoption.
Appellant’s Petition to Vacate requested that the Decree of Adoption be set aside on the grounds that (1) Baby Boy D was an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act1 (ICWA), and that the adoption proceedings are subject to invalidation thereby2 (2) that the appellant was denied due process, that is to say, notice and the opportunity to be heard, and (3) the Decree was subject to being vacated on the grounds of fraud practiced on the court by the natural mother. He also sought custody of the child.
The trial court found (1) that the appellant lacked standing to urge the vacation of the Decree of Adoption, (2) that the ICWA was not applicable, and (3) that no relationship existed between the appellant and Baby Boy D which would give rise to standing predicated on constitutional principles, citing Lehr v. Robertson,3 Caban v. Mohammed,4 and Quilloin v. Walcott.5 The trial court sustained the special appearance, objection to the jurisdiction of *1061the court and motion to quash of the appel-lee adoptive parents and the Petition to Vacate Decree of Adoption was dismissed.
Prior to dismissal of the Petition to Vacate, the trial court also denied the appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion to compel the natural mother to answer forty-nine (49) questions certified to the court by appellant’s attorney.
FACTS
The appellant and the natural mother met in January, 1982 in Shawnee where they both lived. They continued to date for seven months until August 15, 1982. Appellant then left Shawnee to go to an Indian school at Eufaula. [Tr. p. 122-123]. Although appellant knew when he left Shawnee for Eufaula that the mother was pregnant, he gave no thought to his future with the baby and did nothing as far as a commitment to the mother or baby. [Tr. p. 98, 121, 130] While at Eufaula Indian School from August 15, 1982 to December 22, 1982 he telephoned the mother in September [Tr. p. 91] and, although he made five or six trips to Indian “stomp dances” at Seminole approximately 17 or 18 miles from Shawnee and came to Shawnee at Thanksgiving [Tr. p. 100 and 126], he made no attempt to contact the mother. [Tr. p. 99, 127] After three months at the Indian school (around November, 1982) the appellant again “just lost interest in school” [Tr. p. 131] and on December 22, 1982 came back to Shawnee. He did not, however, tell the natural mother about his return. [Tr. p. 131] He remained in Shawnee from December 22, 1982 until March 1,1983 during which time he neither called the mother nor wrote her a letter. [Tr. p. 133, 134] Appellant had two contacts with the mother during that time, neither initiated by him. On December 24, 1982, he “bumped into” the natural mother at a record store in Shawnee but he did not discuss the baby’s future. [Tr. p. 101] The other contact occurred February 2, 1983 when the natural mother came to his home to tell him she was going to put the baby up for adoption and that she did not want any interference from him. He made no objection or response. He did not want to have anything to do with the mother or the child. [Tr. p. 135-137]
Approximately on March 1, 1983 appellant went to Muskogee to live with his brother and go to school there. [Tr. p. 103, 104] Again, he did not tell the natural mother, whose baby he knew was due the end of March or first of April, that he was going. [Tr. p. 154] During the entire time, appellant never suggested to his family that the natural mother was pregnant with his child. They learned accidentally when a member of the family heard about it and told the appellant’s father’s mother. At that point on March 30, 1983 four days before the birth of the child, appellant still had no interest. [Tr. p. 138]
Throughout the mother’s pregnancy, appellant did not make an effort to assist the natural mother in any way. He did not offer financial support nor did he offer to marry her. [Tr. p. 124, 132, 141] The baby was born on April 4, 1983. Appellant first contacted the natural mother by telephone on the 22nd or 27th of April, 1983. [Tr. 140] He never told the natural mother he wanted the child until after May 25, 1983 when his suit was filed. [Tr. p. 144]
ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal:
(1) Whether an unwed father of a newborn child has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Oklahoma adoption statutes that allowed the adoption of his newborn child without his consent, and did not require he be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(2) Whether an unwed Indian father of a newborn child has standing under the Federal and Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Acts to challenge the adoption of his child.
(3) Whether the Oklahoma Adoption statutes allowing the adoption of a child bom out of wedlock without the consent of the natural father and without requiring notice and the opportunity to be heard to the unwed father are constitutional.
*1062(4) Whether under the facts of this case, the denial of forma pauperis status was contrary to law and a denial of due process.
(5) Whether the trial court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion to compel wherein the appellant requested the trial court to compel the natural mother to answer forty-nine (49) questions certified to the court by appellant.
I.
DOES APPELLANT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE OKLAHOMA ADOPTION STATUTES?
“Standing” is the legal right of a person to challenge the conduct of another in a judicial forum.6 The United States Supreme Court has stated:
“When standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged, is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.”7
As this court has stated:
“ ‘Standing’ is the right to commence litigation, to take the initial step that frames legal issues for ultimate adjudication by a court or jury.”8
When standing of a party is brought into issue, the focus is on the party seeking to get his complaint before the court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.9 On review of the trial court’s ruling on the appellant’s standing, it is not necessary to decide whether appellant will ultimately be entitled to any relief but whether he has the legal right to seek judicial redress for his grievance. The proper inquiry concerning standing is whether the defendant has in fact suffered injury to a legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory or constitutional provisions.10
In his amended petition, appellant alleged inter alia, that he is the natural father of Baby Boy D, that a final decree of adoption has been entered for Baby Boy D, and that the relinquishment and adoption of the child by maternal consent alone as authorized by 10 O.S. §§ 60.5(2) and 10 O.S. § 29(2)(g) violated his rights of due process guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.
As a matter of law, his legal rights and interest in his newborn child were terminated by the adoption proceeding if the adoption is allowed to stand. He alleges that this liberty interest has been denied without due process of law. Focusing our consideration on the appellant and the allegations in his petition, we find that he has standing to challenge the adoption statutes of this state on the basis of his allegations that he was denied his liberty interest in his son.
II.
DOES APPELLANT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THIS ADOPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL AND OKLAHOMA INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACTS?
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)11 is structured around the concern “that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies” and placed in non-Indian homes and institutions.12 Congress has declared the policy of this Nation in passing the ICWA as follows:
*1063[T]o protect the best interest of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture....”13
The central thrust and concern of the ICWA is, therefore, “the establishment of minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families”.
Numerous provisions of the act support this conclusion.
Section 1901(4) states:
“[A]n alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them....”
Section 1911(a) provides exclusive jurisdiction in the Indian tribe:
“Over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation....”
Section 1912 addresses pending court proceedings. Subsection (d) requires:
“Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful, (emphasis added).
Subsection (e) declares:
“No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” (emphasis added). Subsection (f) states:
“No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, (emphasis added).
The Indian Child Welfare Act is applicable, therefore, when we are confronted with the removal of Indian children from their families. The purpose of the act is to promote the best interest of Indian children through promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families. The act is applicable when you have Indian children being removed from their existing Indian environment.
Oklahoma also has an Indian Child Welfare Act (OICWA).14 The stated purpose of the act is the “clarification of state policies and procedures regarding the implementation by the State of Oklahoma of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act” and to “cooperate fully with Indian tribes in Oklahoma in order to insure that the intent and provisions of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act are enforced”.15 The Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act applies when the ICWA is applicable.16
The appellant claims that he has standing under the Indian Child Welfare Act to challenge the validity of the adoption of his newborn son based upon violations of Sections 1911, 1912 and 1913 of the ICWA. Section 1911 gives Indian tribes jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of the tribe. Section 1912 addresses pending court proceedings concerning any involuntary proceeding in a state court where the *1064court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved. This section requires notice to the parents and to the Indian child’s tribe. Section 1913 deals with an Indian parent or custodian giving voluntary consent to a foster care placement or termination of parental rights.
The appellant alleges that these three sections were violated in different specific instances and, therefore, the appellant has standing under Section 1914 which allows:
“[A]ny parent ... from whose custody such [Indian] child was removed ... may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provisions of Sections 1911, 1912, and 1913....”
The ICWA defines parent as follows:
“ ‘[Pjarentf means any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.” 17
The ICWA definition of parent does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established. Further, Section 1914 grants standing to invalidate an action only to the parent from whose custody such child was removed.
The appellant made no attempt to acknowledge or establish paternity until he filed his petition to vacate the decree of adoption in the District Court of Stephens County. Until such time as a father has acknowledged or established paternity, the ICWA is not applicable. Congress has by this language evidenced its intent not to extend the ICWA to the child bom out of wedlock as in the instant case, whose father has never had custody and has not acknowledged or established paternity. We take this to mean acknowledged or established through the procedures available through the tribal courts, consistent with tribal customs, or through procedures established by state law.18 Until paternity is acknowledged or established, an unwed Indian father has failed to lay legal claim to the child and the ICWA is not applicable.19
This construction of the ICWA is in accord with the stated purpose of the act to protect Indian children from the destruction of Indian family units by child welfare agencies and courts. The ICWA emphasizes that the Congress seeks to protect the Indian child by setting minimum federal standards for the removal of that Indian child from an existing Indian family unit.20 Here we have a child who hás never resided in an Indian family, and who has a non-Indian mother. For the foregoing reasons we conclude appellant lacks standing to invoke the ICWA in this case.
III.
ARE THE OKLAHOMA ADOPTION STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS TO THIS UNWED FATHER?
The appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Oklahoma adoption statutes21 on two fronts. We have held that he has standing to do so. He claims that these statutes violated his Fifth and Fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Although there was notice by publication, he contends that this notice was not sufficient to meet due process requirements under the circumstances of this case. He argues, therefore, his interest in his newborn child was denied him without due process because he did not receive notice and the opportunity to be heard on the adoption of his newborn child.22 He con*1065tends that his right to equal protection was violated by the Oklahoma adoption statutes because they require the consent of, and thereby afford notice and an opportunity to be heard to, fathers and mothers of legitimate children, and to mothers of illegitimate children but not to fathers of illegitimate children.23 In our consideration of these challenges to the constitutionality to the Oklahoma adoption statutes, we will address first the due process argument, then the one concerning equal protection.
A. DUE PROCESS
The appellant contends that he was denied his interest in his newborn child without due process of law by the Oklahoma adoption statutes. In addressing this allegation this Court must answer the following question:
Was the interest of the appellant-unwed father of such constitutional stature that due process required he be given notice and the opportunity to be heard on the adoption of his newborn child?
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.24 When that clause is invoked in that context, this Court must make a determination of the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the state.25 Only after that interest has been identified can a proper evaluation of the adequacy of the state’s process be made.26 We, therefore, first consider the nature of the interest in liberty for which appellant claims constitutional protection, and then turn to the discussion of the adequacy of the procedure that Oklahoma has provided for such protection.
In legal problems arising from the parent-child relationship, the United States Supreme Court has held in some cases that the Federal Constitution supercedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relationships. In those cases the Court has emphasized that the paramount interest is the welfare of the child and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.
The Supreme Court, in its development of the constitutional theory of parental rights, has given attention to the protection to be given to biological parents who have developed emotional bonds with their children. Those emotional bonds are a critical factor in the determination of the constitutional right of biological parents to maintain their relation with their children. A biological relationship is of constitutional significance because it offers biological parents a unique opportunity to develop these emotional bonds with their children.27
The Court has examined the extent to which a natural, unwed father’s biological relationship with his child receives protection under the due process clause in precisely four cases: Stanley v. Illinois,28 Quilloin v. Walcott,29 Caban v. Mohammed30 and Lehr v. Robertson,31 These cases are important in the instant case because only when the Court has determined the unwed father to be one whose relationship with his child has amounted to a custodial relationship, has the Court re*1066sponded favorably to the unwed father. In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court described Peter Stanley as a man who had “sired and raised”32 his children. A man who had lived with and supported them all their lives.33 In the Court’s opinion, there was no question that Stanley was the natural father. The Court equated the interest of a custodial unwed father with that of any other custodial parent and gave it equal constitutional stature.
Illinois depended on the conclusive presumption that all unwed fathers are unqualified to have custody of their children. The Court, however, concluded that if Stanley was a fit parent, removal of his children would do nothing to further the state’s interest in the welfare and safety of his children. Thus, there was a necessity to disprove Stanley’s fitness. As a custodial unwed father, Stanley had a constitutional interest in his relationship with his children equal to the interest of other custodial parents. His interest entitled him to a hearing on his fitness because fitness was the standard applied to state removal of children from other custodial parents. It was his custody of his children, and not his biological connection alone, that gave him an interest of the same stature as that of any other custodial parent.34
In Caban v. Mohammed,35 Caban unlike Stanley, could claim protection only for the emotional ties created by a past custodial relationship and not for a current custodial relationship. However, the Court recognized that the relationship established by Caban’s former care and support of his children was potentially of equal weight with the relationship they currently had with their custodial mother. At least that weight was equal as against a state statute that gave mothers the power to withhold consent to the adoption of their children, while denying the same power to such fathers. For such purposes, a once-custodial father’s relationship is similar to that of a presently custodial mother.
Caban36 is limited to fathers like Caban who have had substantial relationships with their children. Fathers of newborn children are excluded because of the potentially greater difficulties in locating them. Because of a real difference in the availability of the father of newborns, differential treatment of them directed to their unavailability can be justified because of its substantial relationship to the state’s interest in promoting adoption, regardless of the similarity of the father’s interest to the mother’s.37 The court noted that the argument posed by the general unavailability of unwed fathers did not apply to Caban because fathers like Caban with substantial relationships with their children are clearly not unavailable. But if a father had not established such a relationship with his children, he cannot complain about differential treatment.38
In Quilloin v. Walcott,39 Quilloin’s relationship with his child was quite different from Stanley’s or Caban’s. Specifically, he had never consistently supported the child, and had never had nor sought actual or legal custody of the child.40 Unlike Stanley, the adoption did not terminate a current custodial relationship between a father and his son, and unlike Caban, the adoption did not terminate a current emotional relationship that had been created during a former custodial relationship. Nevertheless, Quilloin claimed that his interest in retaining his relationship with his son was of the same constitutional significance of Stanley’s and could not be terminated by the state without the same substantive justification, i.e. proof of his unfitness as a father. Justice Marshall, for a unanimous court, focused on the fact that Quilloin did not have, had never had, and had never *1067even sought actual or legal custody of his child,41 and permitted the adoption of his child to stand. The Court emphasized the distinction between a custodial father and a noncustodial father and indicated that the interest of noncustodial parents have less constitutional significance than the interest of custodial parents. More recently, the court has distinguished Stanley and Caban from Quilloin by calling the relationships in Stanley and Caban “developed” and the relationship in Quilloin merely “potential”.42 In essence, the distinction relates to the special kind of relationship that is developed by the exercise of custodial responsibilities.
The appellant, who does not presently have and has never had custody of his child, can make no absolute claim that he must be empowered to veto the adoption of his child. Under Stanley, Caban and Quilloin,43 custody, the shouldering of significant responsibility with respect to daily supervision, education, and protection, is the sine qua non for substantial protection.
In Lehr v. Robertson,44 the natural father, complained that the state’s failure to provide for his participation in the proceedings leading to the adoption of his daughter cut off his opportunity to establish a protected relationship with the child. The Court declared that the State of New York was not required to notify Lehr of, nor allow him to participate in, the proceedings leading to the adoption of his child. The state need not always give the father power to veto his child’s adoption, nor must the state even consider the father’s actual or potential relationship with the child as a factor in determining whether adoption is in the best interest of the child.45 After Lehr,46 it is clear that in some circumstances the state may constitutionally omit to notify or allow participation by unwed fathers who have never been established officially as being without an interest, and the state may even deny them participation in the preliminary stage determining that they are without an interest. In the instant case, this court must determine what right, if any, appellant, who has shown no interest in his child or in the care of the mother and the child prior to birth, has with respect to notice and the opportunity to be heard concerning the adoption of his newborn child. From the four Supreme Court cases, we know that his right is certainly less than a father’s who has or has had custody and has fulfilled the custodial responsibilities that go with custody.
The Constitution protects only parent-child relationships of biological parents who have actually committed themselves to their children and have exercised responsibility for rearing their children. This principal has its basis in the theory that the process of defining which relationships are constitutionally significant includes a consideration of how the competing interests are served by protection. Parents who commit themselves to their children and take responsibility for rearing their children share the state’s interest in assuming proper care for their children.
However, the paramount interest to be considered is the child’s best interest. Children are not static objects. They grow and develop, and their growth and development require more than day-to-day satisfaction of their physical needs. Their growth and development also require day-to-day satisfaction of their emotional needs, and a primary emotional need is for permanence and stability. Only when their emotional needs are satisfied can children develop the emotional attachments that have independent constitutional significance.47
This court recognizes that a child’s need for permanence and stability, like his or her other needs, cannot be postponed. It must be provided early. The need for early as*1068surance of permanence and stability is an essential factor in a constitutional determination in the instant case of whether or not to protect the appellant’s potential relationship with his child. The basis for constitutional protection is missing if the parent seeking it has not taken on those parental responsibilities which provide such permanence and stability.
In this case, we are concerned with the rights an unwed father of a newborn child has, when his interests and those of the mother are in conflict, and the best interest of the child is served by adoption and legitimation. After consideration of all the interests involved, the legislative goal of the statute and compelling state interest in requiring only the consent of one parent, the mother, is to facilitate adoptions that are in the best interest of the child born out of wedlock. To do otherwise would in many instances deny the child — and the state— the benefits of adoption and legitimation.
Here the appellant made no attempt to provide for the mother during pregnancy. Nor did he attempt to learn when and where the child was to be bom. Appellant did not pay, nor attempt to make any arrangements for the payment of the expenses related to the birth and care of the child or mother. He in effect abandoned the support and care of the mother and child during pregnancy and at birth. He did not assume any parental responsibilities.
The Oklahoma statutory scheme for adoption of a child born out of wedlock did not require the consent of the appellant and, thereby, did not require that he have notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning the adoption of his child. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the statutory scheme for the adoption of children bom out of wedlock is constitutionally sound, and that it was constitutionally permissible to omit notice and the opportunity for the appellant to be heard in the adoption proceedings.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
Although gender-based statutory classifications deserve careful constitutional examination,48 they are not invariably invalid. When men and women are not in fact similarly situated in the area covered by the legislation questioned, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated.49 Appellant urges on appeal that the Oklahoma statutory scheme allowing adoptions of illegitimate children without the consent of the natural father constitutes a gender-based distinction which is violative of equal protection under the law.
Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether there are differences between the members of the two classes that provide justification for treating them differently. Men and women are different, and the differences are relevant to the question whether the mother may be given the exclusive right to consent to the adoption of a child bom out of wedlock. Because the adoption in this case, as in most adoptions, involves a newborn infant, it is appropriate to focus on the significance of the differences in such cases. From the point of conception on, the law recognizes the very real differences between the father and mother concerning the child’s destiny. Only the mother has the constitutional right to decide whether to have the child or not have the child.50 The mother has the right to marry another male before the child is bom and affect the “rights” of the natural father who does not even have standing to dispute that the child is the child of the natural mother and her husband.51 At birth the mother is given custody of the child bom out of wedlock.52 The *1069mother may choose to marry the natural father and positively affect his “rights”.53
From conception through infancy the unwed mother will constantly be faced with decisions about how to best care for the child. It is much less certain that the unwed father will be faced with such problems. At the time and immediately after a child is born out of wedlock, the natural and real differences between the mother and father continue to justify some differential treatment of the mother and father in the adoption process. These differences justify a rule that gives the mother in whose sole charge the infant is often placed the maximum flexibility in deciding how to best care for the child. This is the rationale for a rule that gives the mother of the newborn child bom out of wedlock the exclusive right to consent to its adoption.
Also, adequacy of notice to absent fathers could invade the mother’s privacy, cause the adopting parents to doubt the reliability of the new relationship, and add to the expense and time required to conclude what is now usually a simple and certain process. Although in Caban54 the Court struck down the New York statute based on an equal protection argument, Caban, as Stanley, had in the past had custody and had exercised the burden of the custodial responsibilities given such importance in the Court’s opinion. The Court took special care to distinguish Caban’s claim from that of a father of a newborn. Caban had assumed full custodial responsibility for his children and thereby established a relationship equal in every way with that of any other single custodial parent. The Court said, however,:
“In those cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.”55
It must be remembered that there are not two, but three interests at stake: those of the mother’s, the father’s and child’s. Concerns humane, as well as practical, abundantly support our statutory scheme that only one parent need to consent to the adoption of the illegitimate child, although it requires both parents to consent to the adoption of one already legitimate. If the consent of both unwed parents were required, and one withheld that consent, the illegitimate child would remain illegitimate. We know from QuiUoin56 that requiring the consent of only one parent is not in itself constitutionally defective.
In QuiUoin, the Court found a Georgia Statute which always required a mother’s consent to the adoption of a child bom out of wedlock, but required the father’s consent only if he had legitimated the child, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The most relevant consideration by the Court in evaluating both the rights of the parents and the best interest of the child is the existence or non-existence of a substantial relationship between parent and child. In the instant case, that same consideration is sufficiently profound to overcome appellant’s claim that he has been invidiously discriminated against because he is a male.
In the adoption proceeding the competing interests at stake must be balanced. Granting unwed fathers the same rights as all other parents, but with no guarantee that they would assume the responsibilities that other parents assume, would be giving the unwed father an unqualified right to block an adoption, absent unfitness, even though the adoption might be in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court has been unwilling to allow unwed fathers to have the rights of parenthood without also assuming the responsibilities of parenthood. This reasoning represents a careful balancing of the competing interests at stake. We concur in that reasoning and its result. Requiring the consent to adoption of the natural mother, but not the consent of the natural father, of the child bom out of wedlock in the instance case does not deny appellant equal protection of the law.
*1070IV.
SHOULD THE APPELLANT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS?
Appellant used a litigation fund of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma to pay initial costs of his action when he filed his Petition to Vacate on May 25, 1983. On October 6, 1983, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
In support of his motion, appellant filed an affidavit of poverty. In his affidavit he stated, “that he is indigent, wholly without funds, property or other resources whatsoever to pay for transcripts and other services necessary as might normally be expected in order to properly prepare' for trial....”
The motion was denied at a hearing on November 28, 1983. At that hearing, Appellant testified that he was nineteen years old and his only job skills were working as a short order cook and “a little bit of carpentry work”. (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 36) He testified that he finished his high school education on August 25, 1983, and was unemployed for a month thereafter. Then he began working for his brother-in-law’s construction company. (Transcript, p. 35) From the time he began that employment the first of October until the November 28 hearing, he had worked only thirty-six hours at a pay rate of $4.00, receiving a gross salary of $146.00. (Rec. at 119, Tr. 34-35)
Appellant further testified that he lived with his mother and paid no rent or utilities, (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 38), but he had helped his family pay for some groceries. (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 59) He was drawing no unemployment compensation (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 51), and had no other work outside of the construction company. (Rec. at 119, p. 53) He did not own a car, did not have any insurance (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 38), and had no bank account or trust account. (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 45) He testified that his parents were “in no condition to help me that much,” (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 48), and he had no financial resources to pay for Human Leukocyte Antigen blood tests for the determination of paternity, (Rec. at 119, Tr. p. 36-37) No witnesses testified on behalf of Appellees.
Oklahoma law provides that no fees or costs shall be required “upon satisfactory showing to the court” that a litigant requesting to proceed in forma pauperis “has no means and is, therefore, unable to pay the applicable fees and costs and to employ counsel”.57 There are no Oklahoma civil cases containing further elaboration on the requirements of the statute governing for-ma pauperis status.
Although the appellant has not been denied any fundamental rights nor been prevented from prosecuting his lawsuit in the trial court or on appeal, we find that the trial court erred in overruling the appellant’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The appellant established through his affidavit and oral testimony that he was an indigent party who had no means to pay fees and costs. We remand this matter to the trial court to determine who shall be reimbursed for fees and the costs of this action including filing fees, the Human Leukocyte Antigen blood test58 and any other costs authorized by law for reimbursement by reason of poverty.
V.
WAS THERE ERROR IN REFUSAL TO COMPEL THE MOTHER TO ANSWER THE CERTIFIED QUESTIONS?
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in not compelling the natural mother to answer forty-nine (49) questions certified to the court. We find that the arguments of the appellant are not persuasive in light of the prevailing law. We further find this question to be moot as a result of our holdings in parts II and III of this opinion.
*1071CONCLUSION
We hold that the appellant does not have standing under the Indian Child Welfare Act and Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act to vacate the Decree of Adoption. We hold that he does have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Oklahoma adoption statutes but that his interest in his newborn child was not of such constitutional stature that required he be given the right to veto the adoption by requiring his consent. In this regard notice and the opportunity to be heard on the adoption of his child were not, therefore, required under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor was the appellant denied equal protection under the law because his consent was not required whereas the consent of the natural mother was.
We hold that the trial court erred in overruling the appellant’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and we remand this matter to the trial court as per our instructions. We hold the issue of the court’s overruling the appellant’s motion to compel to be moot in light of our holdings above.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.
SIMMS, C.J., DOOLIN, V.C.J., and HARGRAVE and WILSON, JJ., concur.
LAVENDER, J., concurs in Part 1, and dissents to Parts 2, 3 and 5.
KAUGER, J., concurs in Parts 1 and 4, and dissents to Parts 2, 3 and 5.
HODGES and OPALA, JJ., dissent.

. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, 1914.

. 25 U.S.C. § 1914.

. 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983).

. 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979).

. 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978).

. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Oklahoma Tax Com’n., 653 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Okl. 1982).

. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).

. Supra note 6.

. Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep, 652 P.2d 271, 274 (Okl.1982); Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 646 P.2d 605, 609 (Okl.1982).

. • Independent School Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa County v. Glass, 639 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Okl.1982).

. Supra note 1.

. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).

. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.

. 10 O.S.Supp.1984 §§ 40-40.9.

. 10 O.S.Supp.1984 § 40.1.

. 10 O.S.Supp.1984 § 40.3.

. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9).

. 10 O.S.1981 §§ 55, 60.3(4).

. See Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. 528, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz.App.1983).

. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.

. Oklahoma Uniform Adoption Act, 10 O.S. 1981 §§ 60.1-60.23.

. 10 O.S.1981 § 60.5 states "An adoption of a child may be decreed when there has been filed a written consent to adoption executed by: (2) If the child is born out of wedlock, its mother, if sixteen (16) years of age or older, shall be *1065deemed capable of giving consent." Because the consent of the unwed father of the child born out of wedlock is not required, there is no provision for notice or the opportunity to be heard to the father.

. 10 O.S.1981 § 60.6 states, "A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents, if living, nor a child born out of wedlock without the consent of its mother, if living — ”

. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-896, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-1749, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961).

. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-83, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600-2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983).

. 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

. 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978).

. 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979).

. Lehr supra note 27.

. Supra note 28, at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212-13.

. Id., at 650, 92 S.Ct. at 1212.

. Id., at 647-50, 92 S.Ct. at 1210-12.

. Supra note 30.

. Id.

. Id., 441 U.S. at 392-93, 99 S.Ct. at 1768-69.

. Id., at 392, 99 S.Ct. at 1768.

. Supra note 29.

. Id., at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 554-55.

. Id. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 554-55.

. Lehr, supra note 27, 103 S.Ct. at 2993.

. Supra notes 28, 29 and 30.

. Supra note 27 at 2993-5.

. Id.

. Id.

. See Lehr supra note 27, at 2993.

. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).

. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 95 S.Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975).

. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2840-2844, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976).

. 10 O.S.1981 § 3.

. 10 O.S.1981 § 6.

. 10 O.S.1981 § 2.

. Supra at note 30.

. Id at 391, 99 S.Ct. at 1767.

. Supra at note 29.

. 28 O.S.Supp.1984 § 152.

. See 10 O.S.1984 Supp. §§ 502, 503.