Court Opinion

ID: 9713966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:27:49.447107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.442822
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SIMPSON.
Section 306(f.1)(8) of the Workers’ Compensation Act,1 provides (with emphasis added):
*473Accordingly, a claimant who refuses reasonable medical or surgical procedures that would improve his condition and lessen his disability should not be permitted to continue to collect benefits for a permanent loss. Alltel, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Baum), 829 A.2d 739 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003); Litak v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Comcast Cablevision), 155 Pa. Cmwlth. 147, 624 A.2d 773 (1993). The Act does not permit employees to choose between compensation and cure. Alltel. See also Muse v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (W. Elec. Co.), 514 Pa. 1, 522 A.2d 533 (1987) (the purpose of the forfeiture statute is to provide a cure where it can reasonably be done; who can be cured and refuses soon dries sympathy).
*472If the employe shall refuse reasonable services of health care providers, surgical, medical and hospital services, treatment, medicines and supplies, he shall forfeit all rights to compensation for any injury or increase in his incapacity shown to have resulted from such refusal.
*473Because the majority opinion fails to apply the statutory directive to the undisputed and prolonged refusal of reasonable surgical services by Claimant here, I respectfully dissent.
Like the thoughtful dissent authored by Commissioner Susan McDermott of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), I would allow a credit against any future benefits for Claimant, although I would calculate the credit from the date of the petition rather than the earlier date of a physical examination or physician’s report. My conclusion gives effect to the statutory directive, which is rendered meaningless by the majority opinion. I interpret the statutory directive to specify the result to be achieved without restricting the reasonable method by which it is achieved under a given set of facts.
There are two reasons why I would calculate the credit from the date of the petition here. First, calculating the credit from the date of the petition dispels concern that Claimant lacks notice of the potential results of his conduct. Second, calculating the credit from the date of the petition allocates to the employer any delay in filing a petition, thereby avoiding concerns about delay that troubled the Board majority. Delay after filing the petition will be controlled by rules of procedure and the informed discretion of the compensation authorities.
For these reasons, I would reverse the Board majority and reinstate, as modified, the credit awarded by the Workers’ Compensation Judge.
President Judge LEADBETTER joins in this dissent.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 531(8).