Court Opinion

ID: 9395183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 14:09:07.688215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.086846
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Chester Upland School District and  :
Chichester School District,         :
                  Appellants        :
                                    :
            v.                      :
                                    :
Delaware County Board of Assessment :          No. 171 C.D. 2022
Appeals and City of Chester         :          Argued: March 7, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                             FILED: May 17, 2023

             The Chester Upland School District and Chichester School District
(collectively, School Districts) appeal from the Delaware County Common Pleas
Court’s (trial court) January 12, 2022 order (January 12, 2022 Order) sustaining the
Delaware County (County) Board of Assessment Appeals’ (Board) preliminary
objections (Preliminary Objections) and dismissing the School Districts’ complaint
seeking declaratory relief (Declaratory Complaint) to revoke real estate tax
exemptions for several properties in their districts (Declaratory Case). There are
three issues for this Court’s review: whether the trial court erred or committed legal
error by ruling that the Declaratory Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice
(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) due to the principles of res judicata
and/or collateral estoppel; and (3) for failure to conform to law and/or failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. After review, this Court affirms.
               On January 21, 2021, the School Districts, which are two County school
districts, filed the Declaratory Complaint in the trial court, averring therein that they
had appealed to the Board seeking to revoke the real estate tax exemptions granted
for several properties in their respective districts (Exemption Appeals) following a
countywide assessment revision conducted pursuant to the Consolidated County
Assessment Law (Assessment Law).1 Therein, the School Districts alleged that in
each Exemption Appeal, the Board provided written notice by First Class Mail to
the respective property owner(s) and to the respective School Districts that a hearing
would be held. The School Districts further averred that the Board conducted
separate hearings on each of their respective Exemption Appeals at which their
counsel appeared, but neither the property owner(s) nor their representatives
attended to demonstrate that the subject properties were entitled to the exemptions,
and at each hearing, the School Districts’ counsel requested that, in the absence of
property owner challenges, the tax exemptions for the subject properties should be
revoked. The School Districts declared that the Board ultimately denied the School
Districts’ requests and declined to revoke the real estate tax exemptions for the 127
properties listed in Declaratory Complaint Exhibit A.
               The School Districts’ Declaratory Complaint consisted of two counts.
In Count I, the School Districts sought to obtain a judicial determination pursuant to
the Declaratory Judgments Act2 that the Board employed the incorrect legal standard
in declining to revoke the subject properties’ exemptions and, therefore, the trial
court should direct the Board to revoke those exemptions. In Count II, the School
Districts attempted to initiate a class action against the Board and the City of Chester
(City) in the City’s capacity individually and as a representative of the class of all
referenced property owners.

      1
          53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8801-8868.
      2
          42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541.
                                           2
               On March 1, 2021, the Board filed the Preliminary Objections to the
Declaratory Complaint. Therein, the Board averred that on December 9, 2020, under
a separate trial court number, the School Districts filed a complaint in mandamus
(Mandamus Complaint) and an emergency motion for peremptory judgment in
mandamus (Emergency Motion) (collectively, Mandamus Case), wherein the
School Districts sought a ruling that the Board impermissibly refused to revoke the
real estate tax exemptions when the property owners did not appear at the hearing
and, thus, failed to prove entitlement to the real estate tax exemption. The Board
further stated that on December 15, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the
Emergency Motion, during which the School Districts and the Board reached an
agreement in open court; the trial court entered an order on December 18, 2020,
affording the School Districts until January 31, 2021, to appeal to the trial court from
the Board’s determinations in the Exemption Appeals;3 and, on January 5, 2021, the
trial court dismissed the School Districts’ Emergency Motion (January 5, 2021
Order).
               In its Preliminary Objections, the Board asserted: (1) the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the School Districts’ claims are barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel; and (3) the Declaratory Complaint failed to conform
to law/failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court
sustained the Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Declaratory Complaint with
prejudice.
               On March 16, 2022, the trial court issued its opinion pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion).
Regarding the Board’s first Preliminary Objection - that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the School Districts failed to exhaust their administrative

      3
          See Reproduced Record at 45a.
                                           3
remedies - the trial court stated: “The School[] Districts’ active appeals [regarding]
the purported 127 properties where the Board refused to revoke the real estate tax
exemption necessitate[] the dismissal of the instant [Declaratory] Complaint . . . .
The School Districts are attempting to bypass the individual appeals process.” Rule
1925(a) Op. at 12.     The trial court sustained the Board’s second Preliminary
Objection - the School Districts’ action was barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel - because the trial court previously decided the matters at issue in its
Mandamus Case disposition.
             Finally, the trial court sustained the Board’s third Preliminary
Objection - that the Declaratory Complaint failed to conform to law/failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted - reasoning:

             Here[,] the Assessment Law provides that the School
             Districts[,] as taxing districts[,] have the right to appeal
             any assessment within their jurisdiction in the same
             manner, subject to the same procedure and with like effect
             as if the appeal were [sic] taken by a taxable person with
             respect to the assessment. See [Section 8855 of the
             Assessment Law,] 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855 (emphasis added).
             Because the Assessment Law provides a process for the
             School Districts to adequately obtain the relief they seek,
             the proposed class action lawsuit is improper.
             Additionally, the School Districts named the [City] as a
             [d]efendant in conjunction with their request that the [t]rial
             [c]ourt certify [the Declaratory Case] as a class action and
             appoint the [City] as class representative to represent the
             class of [p]roperty [o]wners listed in Exhibit A to the
             [Declaratory] Compliant [sic]. However, the [City] is also
             a taxing district and[,] as a taxing district[,] the City has a
             vested pecuniary interest in the assessment of every
             property located within its geographic boundaries. See
             generally [Sections 8844, 8846, 8848 and 8855 of the
             Assessment Law,] 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8844, 8846, 8848[, and]
             8855. The inherent conflict between the City and the
             interests of the [p]roperty [o]wners within its boundaries
             prohibits class certification.

                                           4
Rule 1925(a) Op. at 16-17. The School Districts appealed to this Court.4
               The School Districts first argue that the trial court erred by sustaining
the Board’s first Preliminary Objection that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction    because       the    School      Districts     had     not     exhausted   their
administrative/statutory remedies. The School Districts contend that they exhausted
their administrative remedies, and further claim, that the relief they requested is
permissible under the Declaratory Judgments Act.
               This Court has declared:

               A party may not seek judicial resolution of a dispute until
               he or she has exhausted available statutory or
               administrative remedies. [See Section 1504 of the
               Statutory Construction Act of 1972,] 1 Pa.C.S. § 1504;
               City of Phila[.] v. Lerner, . . . 151 A.3d 1020, 1024 ([Pa.]
               2016) (citing Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health,
               . . . 422 A.2d 141, 144 ([Pa.] 1980)). The doctrine “reflects
               a recognition of the general assembly’s directive of strict
               compliance with statutorily prescribed remedies” and it
               also acknowledges that “an unjustified failure to follow
               the administrative scheme undercuts the foundation upon
               which the administrative process was founded.” Jordan v.
               Fayette C[n]ty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 782 A.2d 642,
               646 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (quoting Shenango Valley
               Osteopathic Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health, . . . 451 A.2d 434
               ([Pa.] 1982)). If a party fails to pursue a statutory remedy,
               the court is without power to act until the statutory
               remedies have been exhausted, even in cases where a

       4
               When reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary
               objections in the nature of a demurrer, our standard of review is de
               novo and our scope of review is plenary. Preliminary objections
               may be sustained when, based on the facts pled, it is clear that the
               plaintiff will be unable to establish a right to relief. All well-pled
               material facts alleged in the complaint, and the inferences fairly
               deducible therefrom, must be accepted as true. However,
               conclusions of law, argumentative allegations, expressions of
               opinion and unwarranted inferences need not be accepted.
Young v. Est. of Young, 138 A.3d 78, 84-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citations omitted).
                                                 5
               constitutional question is presented. Muir v. Alexander,
               858 A.2d 653, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

Martel v. Allegheny Cnty., 216 A.3d 1165, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (emphasis
added). “It is well[ ]settled that when an adequate statutory remedy exists, [a c]ourt
lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit in either law or equity.” Chambers Dev. Co.,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 532 A.2d 928, 930 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (emphasis added).

               [A] “court’s equity powers are limited by the existence of
               an adequate statutory remedy.” [Lundy v. City of
               Williamsport, 548 A.2d 1339,] 1341 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)]
               (citing Arsenal Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Env[’]t Res., . . . 477
               A.2d 1333 ([Pa.] 1984)).            Further, “[i]n local
               governmental agency appeals[,] jurisdiction and remedy is
               conferred by statute. A court has no equity powers if it has
               no jurisdiction.” Lundy, 548 A.2d at 1341.

In re Est. of Pancari, 176 A.3d 404, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017); see also E. Coast
Vapor, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue, 189 A.3d 504 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Thus, “[t]he
courts must refrain from exercising equity jurisdiction when there exists an adequate
statutory remedy.” Keystone ReLeaf LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 186 A.3d 505, 513
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); see also Zarwin v. Montgomery Cnty., 842 A.2d 1018, 1021
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that a court should not exercise equitable
jurisdiction where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.”); Klein v. Shadyside
Health Educ. & Rsch. Corp., 643 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (“The use of
equity jurisdiction is particularly inappropriate when . . . a statutory . . . appeal is
already being pursued.”).5

       5
          The School Districts contend that “an alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies
. . . would not deprive the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction.” School Districts’ Br. at 5.
However, this Court has held:
               “It is well settled that when an adequate administrative remedy
               exists, [a] Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit in either law
               or equity.” Grand Cent[.] Sanitary Landfill, Inc. [v. Dep’t of Env’t
               Res.], 554 A.2d [182,] 184 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1989)]. “The doctrine of
               exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a party to exhaust all
                                                 6
             The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
             intended to prevent the premature interruption of the
             administrative process, which would restrict the agency’s
             opportunity to develop an adequate factual record, limit
             the agency in the exercise of its expertise, and impede the
             development of a cohesive body of law in that area.[6]

             adequate and available administrative remedies before the right of
             judicial review arises.” Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. [v. Dep’t of
             Env’t Res.], 684 A.2d [1047,] 1053 [(Pa. 1996)]. It is a court-made
             doctrine “intended to prevent premature judicial intervention into
             the administrative process” and “operates as a restraint on the
             exercise of a court’s equitable powers and a recognition of the
             legislature’s direction to comply with statutorily-prescribed
             remedies.” Id.
Pa. Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 135 A.3d 1118, 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)
(emphasis added).
       6
         Notwithstanding,
             [t]here are narrow circumstances where exhaustion of remedies is
             not required. See Commonwealth ex rel. Nicholas v. P[a.] Lab[.]
             Rel[s.] B[d.], . . . 681 A.2d 157 . . . ([Pa.] 1996). Indeed, our
             Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the exhaustion of
             administrative remedies for constitutional attacks:
                    The first exception is where the jurisdiction of an
                    agency is challenged. The second exception is where
                    the constitutionality of a statutory scheme or its
                    validity is challenged. The third exception is where
                    the legal or equitable remedies are unavailable or
                    inadequate, or the administrative agency is unable to
                    provide the requested relief.
             Empire Sanitary, 684 A.2d at 1054 (internal citations omitted). . . .
             ....
             A party seeking to avoid exhaustion must demonstrate a “substantial
             question of constitutionality (and not a mere allegation) and the
             absence of an adequate statutory remedy.” Kowenhoven v. C[nty.]
             of Allegheny, . . . 901 A.2d 1003, 1012 n.8 ([Pa.] 2006) (quoting
             Borough of Green Tree v. B[d.] of Prop[.] Assessments, Appeals &
             Rev[.] of Allegheny C[nty.], . . . 328 A.2d 819, 822 ([Pa.] 1974)
             (plurality)) (emphasis added) . . . . The exception applies to facial
             challenges “made to the constitutionality of the statute or regulation
             as a whole, and not merely to the application of the statute or
             regulation in a particular case.” Lehman v. P[a.] State Police, . . .
                                               7
Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 513. Accordingly,

              equity jurisdiction is precluded unless a two-part test is
              satisfied: the taxpayers must (1) raise a substantial
              constitutional issue, and (2) lack an adequate remedy
              through the administrative appeal process. See Borough
              of Green Tree [v. Bd. of Prop. Assessments, Appeals &
              Rev.], . . . 328 A.2d [819,] 822 [(Pa. 1974)] (“[W]hat is
              required to confer jurisdiction on an equity court is the
              existence of a substantial question of constitutionality (and
              not a mere allegation) and the absence of an adequate
              statutory remedy.” ([E]mphasis in original[.]) (quoting
              Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Indiana C[nty.] Bd. of
              Assessment & Revision of Taxes, . . . 266 A.2d 78, 79 ([Pa.]
              1970))[]; Kowenhoven [v. Cnty. of Allegheny], . . . 901
              A.2d [1003,] 1012 n.8 [(Pa. 2006)].

Beattie v. Allegheny Cnty., 907 A.2d 519, 524-25 (Pa. 2006) (bold emphasis added).

              A substantial question of constitutionality is one that
              challenges “the validity of the statute as a whole and
              not simply a challenge to the application of the statute
              to a particular party.” Cherry [v. City of Phila.,] 692
              A.2d [1082,] 1084 [(Pa. 1997)]. In other words, there must
              be a facial or direct challenge to the statute, as opposed to
              an as-applied challenge.

E. Coast Vapor, 189 A.3d at 511 (emphasis added).
              The School Districts contend that they exhausted their administrative
remedies by filing the Exemption Appeals to the Board and appealing from the
Board’s decisions to the trial court before asserting the instant claim in the trial court.
Citing Martel, the School Districts insist that “[this] Court has made clear that[,] so
long as the aggrieved party commenced the appeals process under the Assessment
Law and appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court, the aggrieved party may
also seek declaratory relief.” School Districts’ Br. at 6.

              839 A.2d 265, 275 ([Pa.] 2003) (emphasis added); accord Funk [v.
              Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,] 71 A.3d [1097,] 1102 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)].
Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 513-14.
                                             8
                In Martel, the property owners filed a class action complaint in equity
against the county board of assessment appeals and review (county board) pursuant
to the law known as the Second Class County Assessment Law,7 challenging
property reassessments that the county board had ordered in assessment appeals
brought by the school district, the county and the city (collectively, taxing
authorities). The county board and taxing authorities filed preliminary objections
that the property owners failed to exhaust their statutory remedies at law. Relying
on Beattie’s two-part test, the trial court overruled the preliminary objections. On
appeal, this Court, en banc, concluded that the trial court erred in applying the
Beattie test.
                With respect to an adequate remedy, the Martel Court explained:

                The [Second Class County] Assessment Law specifically
                grants the [county b]oard the “power” and “duty” “[t]o
                hear all cases of appeals from assessments, and all
                complaints as to assessments, errors, exonerations and
                refunds.” Section 4 of the [Second Class County]
                Assessment Law, 72 P.S. § 5452.4(c) (emphasis added).
                “[A]ny taxable person may apply to the [county] board for
                the reassessment of any subject of taxation which he
                considers incorrectly assessed or as to which he considers
                himself entitled to a change in valuation . . . .” Section 14
                of the [Second Class County] Assessment Law, 72 P.S. §
                5452.14. If a taxpayer prevails on his or her appeal and
                the [county b]oard or trial court lowers the assessed value
                of his or her real estate, the taxpayer will be entitled to a
                refund for the tax years at issue and interest. Section 17(a)
                of the [Second Class County] Assessment Law, 72 P.S. §
                5452.17(a). However, if the [county b]oard renders a
                decision regarding the reassessments and refunds that the
                taxpayer disagrees with, the aggrieved taxpayer may file
                an appeal to the trial court. Section 11 of the [Second
                Class County] Assessment Law, 72 P.S. § 5452.11;
                Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment,
                Appeals & Rev[.], . . . 622 A.2d 420, 427 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]

       7
           Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 626, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5452.1-5452.20.
                                                9
         1993) (explaining that the trial court conducts a de novo
         hearing on assessment appeals referenced in 72 P.S. §
         5452.11).
         As for [the] [p]roperty [o]wners’ request for injunctive and
         declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees and costs, if they are
         unsuccessful before the [county b]oard on their claims
         for reassessments and refunds, they can seek this
         additional relief from the trial court in their appeal as
         provided by [Section 11 of the Second Class County
         Assessment Law,] 72 P.S. § 5452.11. [The] [p]roperty
         [o]wners may seek an injunction pursuant to
         Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531[,
         Pa.R.Civ.P. 1531,] and may seek a declaration
         regarding the [Allegheny County] Administrative
         Code[8] and [county b]oard [r]ule as provided in
         Section 7532 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42
         Pa.C.S. § 7532. Similarly, [p]roperty [o]wners may
         request attorneys’ fees and costs from the trial court due to
         the [county b]oard’s failure to provide them with the
         requested assessment and refund relief pursuant to Section
         2503 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S § 2503.
         [The] [p]roperty [o]wners, here, acknowledged that one of
         their complainants, the Martels, commenced the appeals
         process under the [Second Class County] Assessment
         Law. The Martels filed an appeal with the [county b]oard
         with respect to their property assessment but the [county
         b]oard did not provide the relief they sought[,] so they
         filed a timely appeal of the [county b]oard’s decision with
         the “Court of Common Pleas Board of Viewers and
         docketed at No. BV-001316.” [Martel] Complaint ¶ 37.
         Because the Martels appealed the [county b]oard’s
         decision to the trial court as provided by the [Second
         Class County] Assessment Law, they may seek
         injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to
         attorneys’ fees, costs, and any other relief to which they
         contend they are entitled as a result of the [county
         b]oard’s failure to properly grant them relief on the
         assessments and refunds. The legislature provided an
         appeals process per the [Second Class County]
         Assessment Law to obtain the relief sought in the
         complaint, and the process must be followed

8
    Allegheny County, Pa., Administrative Code.
                                        10
             exclusively. Lilian v. Commonwealth, . . . 354 A.2d 250,
             252-53 ([Pa.] 1976) (explaining that where the legislature
             provides a statutory form of relief, it must be followed
             exclusively).

Martel, 216 A.3d at 1173-74 (bold and underline emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).
             Because the Second Class County Assessment Law provided an
adequate process for the individual property owners to obtain the relief sought, the
Martel Court found that the class action lawsuit was improper. Further, the Martel
Court held that the trial court erred in applying the Beattie test when it concluded
that the property owners had raised a substantial constitutional question to provide
the basis for equity jurisdiction, because “the exercise of equity jurisdiction is
appropriate when a ‘substantial frontal attack’ to the statute is brought[,] but it is not
appropriate when the challenge pertains to the application of the statute.” Martel,
216 A.3d at 1176.
             Contrary to the School Districts’ contention, Martel does not stand for
the proposition that because the School Districts commenced the appeals process
under the Assessment Law and appealed from the Board’s decision to the trial court,
they may also file an action in the trial court’s equitable jurisdiction seeking
declaratory relief. Rather, the School Districts may seek equitable relief in their
statutory appeals to the trial court from the Exemption Appeals. In the Exemption
Appeals, the Assessment Law permitted the School Districts to appeal from each
Board determination to the trial court, and the School Districts did so. The statutory
remedy includes an appeal from the Board to the trial court, see 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855,

                                           11
and is not exhausted until it is complete.9 The School Districts must pursue that
statutorily authorized process unless they can satisfy both parts of the Beattie test.10
               The School Districts filed the instant Declaratory Case in the trial court
seeking equity jurisdiction, contending, inter alia, that the Board’s misapplication
of the relevant burden violates their due process rights. 11 As in Martel, the School
Districts’ constitutional challenge applies to the Board’s application of the
Assessment Law and, thus, it does not meet the requisite Beattie standard by raising
a “substantial question of constitutionality.” E. Coast Vapor, 189 A.3d at 511.

       9
          The School Districts also assert that the trial court erroneously relied “solely on case law
governing declaratory actions filed in the [trial court] as a court of original jurisdiction where the
plaintiffs completely bypassed a board of assessment appeals.” School Districts’ Br. at 7.
Notwithstanding, this Court has described the use of declaratory judgment actions as
“inappropriate” where a statutory appeal to a trial court was pending. Klein, 643 A.2d at 1125.
        10
           As described in Martel, parties appealing from tax assessment decisions may seek, inter
alia, equitable relief in individual trial court appeals, but they may not implement a separate
declaratory judgment action outside of the process set forth in the Assessment Law.
        11
           The School Districts complain that the Board erroneously placed the burden on the
School Districts to prove the subject properties were not exempt. The Board retorts:
               Despite [the] School Districts’ argument that the law places the
               burden of proof on a property owner to demonstrate that they
               continue to qualify for an exemption before a [b]oard of
               [a]ssessment, [the] School Districts have not cited one case decided
               since the Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act[, Act of
               November 26, 1997, P.L. 508, 10 P.S. §§ 371-385 (IPPCA),] was
               enacted in 1997 for this proposition. Every case cited by School
               Districts that was decided since 1997 arose in the context of a
               property owner initially seeking an exemption where they
               clearly have the burden of proof. This is a critical distinction
               because the burden of proof is shifted by the [IPPCA] for institutions
               that have less than $10 million in revenue. [See Section 6 of the
               IPPCA, 10 P.S. § 376]. In those cases, the burden of proof is on a
               taxing authority seeking to challenge exempt status.
Board Br. at 17 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
                                                 12
Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the Board’s first Preliminary
Objection for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.12, 13
               For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

                                               _________________________________
                                               ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this matter.

       12
         With respect to the second Beattie element, that the party lacks an adequate remedy, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:
               “[I]n order to determine whether equity jurisdiction is proper in the
               face of an existing legal or statutory remedy, we must determine if
               the legal remedy available to the plaintiff is adequate and
               complete. . . . Where . . . a legal remedy would result in a
               multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits and, in contrast, an action in
               equity would provide a tidy global resolution, this Court has
               found the legal remedy to be inadequate.”
Kowenhoven, 901 A.2d at 1011 (emphasis added) (quoting Pentlong Corp. v. GLS Cap., Inc., 820
A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (Pa. 2003) (superseded by statute)). The trial court in the instant matter
recognized that there are appeals pending in the trial court with respect to the 127 properties where
the Board refused to revoke the real estate tax exemption. In each such Exemption Appeal, the
property owners failed to offer evidence to establish their right to a tax exemption; nonetheless,
the Board granted each an exemption. Thus, although it appears that the School Districts would
satisfy the second Beattie element, the Beattie test requires both elements to be met to secure equity
jurisdiction.
         13
            Having concluded that the trial court properly sustained the Board’s first Preliminary
Objection, this Court does not reach the remaining issues.
                                                 13
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Chester Upland School District and  :
Chichester School District,         :
                  Appellants        :
                                    :
            v.                      :
                                    :
Delaware County Board of Assessment :       No. 171 C.D. 2022
Appeals and City of Chester         :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2023, the Delaware County Common
Pleas Court’s January 12, 2022 order is affirmed.

                                      _________________________________
                                      ANNE E. COVEY, Judge