Court Opinion

ID: 9651081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:05:16.18727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:29.758170
License: Public Domain

SAUFLEY, C.J.,
dissenting.
[¶ 32] I concur in all parts of the court’s well reasoned opinion except its conclusion regarding the best interests of Michaela. Because I would conclude, on these unusual facts, that the record does not yet support a finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in Michaela’s best interests, I must respectfully dissent. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a) (1992). I also write separately from Justice Dana’s dissent, because I agree with the majority’s holding today that any evidentiary error that did occur was harmless. Ultimately, I would conclude that it was not the evidentiary issues upon which the court’s decision turned, but a question of judicial authority to prevent further disruptions in the child’s current beneficial placement that appears to have unnecessarily limited the court’s options.
[¶ 33] This case presents several unique circumstances that reflect policy and legal changes in this important area of law. First, the child was placed with her paternal grandmother, consistent with the Legislature’s ever-increasing directives to the State agency and the courts to encourage kinship placements where appropriate.8 Second, the child’s mother, while not able to be a custodian for her child, can be a positive force in her life, as demonstrated by the trial judge’s finding that there is “love, affection, and an emotional bond” between Michaela and her mother. And finally, other people in the child’s and mother’s lives have had a negative effect *1255on the mother’s ability to be a nondisrup-tive presence in her daughter’s life.
[¶ 34] In the end, because of the previous disruptions that Michaela had suffered, as well as appropriate concern for Michaela’s need for stability, the court concluded that a final severance of Michaela’s legal relationship to her mother was necessary. I find no fault with the trial court’s conclusion that the mother is not capable of being Michaela’s primary caretaker, and I agree with the trial court that the issue here came down to this: could the child’s best interests be served in a long-term foster care placement with her paternal grandmother, thus avoiding the final severance of Michaela’s legal relationship with her mother? See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a) (1992).9
[¶ 35] While the trial court answered that question in the negative, I would conclude that a judicial order short of termination would have best served Michaela’s needs. With the exercise of authority granted to it through the Act, the court could fashion an order that reduces or eliminates the legal disruptions in Michae-la’s life and that minimizes any remaining personal disruptions. Such an order, if complied with by the mother and her own mother, would have allowed Michaela to continue to thrive in the loving, competent care of her paternal grandmother, while at the same time allowing continued contact between Michaela and her noncustodial mother. Such a result would, in this unique case, be better for Michaela than the finality or certainty of adoption.
[¶ 36] There can be no question that children need stability in their family relationships, and that termination of parental rights and adoption are appropriate vehicles for assuring that stability in many instances where the child’s parents cannot be caretakers. It is time, however, to more thoroughly consider other options when the child has family members who are willing and able to provide a home. The purposes and benefits of kinship care are at the heart of this matter, and Mi-chaela’s current placement provides a compelling example of the benefits of kinship care. When she could not be cared for by her parents, she was placed in a safe, loving, stable relative’s home. The result is exactly as the Legislature has envisioned it. This physically fragile child receives the benefits of a grandmother who “has the capacity and willingness to nurture the child and provide her with a safe, predictable and comfortable home.”
[¶ 37] The reasons for pressing for finality are not necessarily as urgent when the child is cared for in a kinship placement. As is the case here, the child knows and has had contact with her mother. The paternal grandmother agrees that continued nurturing, nondisruptive contact would benefit the child. The court could address the disruption problems through the entry of an order that alleviates the problem of the maternal grandmother’s disruption by, if necessary, prohibiting the maternal grandmother from visiting Michaela, restricting her ability to file multiple motions with the court, and restricting her ability to take other actions that would disrupt Michaela’s life. Our zeal for permitting every person access to the courts must be tempered to prevent harm to children as a result of unfettered abusive access. Although prohibitions on the filing of docu*1256ments with the court are not expressly discussed in the child protection statutory scheme, 22 M.R.S.A. § 4036 (1992 & Supp. 2001) grants the court broad power to fashion individual child protection orders suited to the particular circumstances in each case.10
[¶ 38] If the court entered an order limiting the opportunities for disruption of Michaela’s home life and legal status, but leaving her mother’s parental rights intact, the mother would be given the opportunity to demonstrate that she could be a healthy, noncustodial part of the child’s life without causing or allowing disruptions that would harm Michaela. The benefits to Michaela of such a structured order would far outweigh the limitations on the mother’s and maternal grandmother’s access to frequent litigation. If, in such an arrangement, the mother fails to show that she is capable of being a healthy part of Michaela’s lile without creating such disruptions, termination would then be appropriate.
[¶ 39] I would also conclude that a recognition of the court’s authority to restrict the actions of noncustodial relatives is entirely consistent with the Legislature’s recent clarification that a kinship placement may result in a cessation of DHS involvement without requiring a termination of parental rights. See Implementation of Committee Recommendations, P.L.2001, ch. 696, § 34. The court is charged by law with considering numerous principles in fashioning such a protection order, including to “[p]rotect the child from jeopardy to his health or welfare,” and “[m]ake disposition in the best interests of the child.” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4036(2)(A) & (C) (1992). We have recognized this broad judicial authority numerous times. See, e.g., In re David W., Jr., 568 A.2d 513, 515 (Me.1990) (“22 M.R.S.A. § 4036 grants wide discretion to the court in child protection proceedings concerning custody of the child .... ”). Thus, the authority for the court to put into place an order restricting disruptions, but leaving parental rights intact, albeit circumscribed, exists in the statute.
[¶ 40] In this unusual case, I would vacate the judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights and return the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment denying the petition for termination of parental rights, and for the entry of further orders consistent with Michaela’s best interests.

. For an example of the new statutory provisions regarding kinship care taking effect after the entry of judgment in this case, see P.L.2001, ch. 559, § CC-5 (effective March 25, 2002) (to be codified at 22 M.R.S.A § 4041(l-A)(A)(l)(c)(vi)), which states that a rehabilitation and reunification plan must include "[a]ny use of kinship support, including, but not limited to, placement, supervision of visitation, in-home support or respite care." In addition, An Act to Implement the Recommendations of the Committee to Review the Child Protective Services, P.L.2001, ch. 696, § 34 (effective July 25, 2002) (to be codified at 22 M.R.S.A § 4041 (2)(A-2)(2)(b)) [hereinafter Implementation of Committee Recommendations] states: "If the permanency plan provides for a relative or other person to have custody of the child and the court has ordered custody of the child to that relative or other person, the court shall make a finding that continuation of reunification efforts is inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child and order the department to cease reunification unless the parent demonstrates that reunification should be continued and the court determines reunification efforts to be in the best interests of the child.”

. Michaela’s paternal grandmother has no legal responsibility upon termination of the mother’s rights to continue to permit visits between Michaela and Michaela’s mother, despite her indications at trial that she would, and thus there can be no assurance that such visits will continue. See, e.g., In re Melanie S., 1998 ME 132, ¶ 7, 712 A.2d 1036, 1038 ("[A]n order terminating parental rights deprives the court of any authority to impose a condition that preserves contact between the parent and the child.”)

. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
1. Disposition. In a protection order, the court may order one or more of the following:
A. No change in custody;
B. Departmental supervision of the child and family in the child’s home;
C. That the child, the custodians, the parents and other appropriate family members accept treatment or services to ameliorate the circumstances related to the jeopardy;
D. Necessary emergency medical treatment for the child when the custodians are unwilling or unable to consent;
E. Emancipation of the child ...;
F. Removal of the child from his custodian and granting custody to a noncustodial parent, other person or the department;
F-l. Removal of the perpetrator from the child's home, prohibiting direct or indirect contact with the child by the perpetrator and prohibiting other specific acts by the perpetrator which the court finds may threaten the child;
G. Payment by the parents of a reasonable amount of support for the child ...;
H. Other specific conditions governing custody;
22 M.R.S.A. § 4036(1) (1992 & Supp.2001).