Court Opinion

ID: 2964688
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:44.581469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:58.303877
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-2159

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                NELSON ROSALIO CORREA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                  [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                        Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                        _____________________

                              _________________________

               Elizabeth  A. Lunt,  with  whom Zalkind,  Rodriguez, Lunt  &
               __________________              ____________________________
          Duncan were on brief, for appellant.
          ______
               Donald L.  Cabell,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  with
               _________________
          whom Donald K. Stern,  United States Attorney, was on  brief, for
               _______________
          appellee.

                              _________________________

                                     May 29, 1997
                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.     Defendant-appellant  Nelson
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          Rosalio Correa challenges that part of his sentence which depends

          upon the district court's  allegedly erroneous computation of his

          criminal  history score.   We  first must  resolve an  issue that

          divides  the circuits.   Once  that is  behind us,  we detect  no

          miscalculation and therefore affirm the sentence.

                                          I
                                          I
                                          _

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                    We  cull the  largely  undisputed facts  from the  plea

          colloquy,   the   presentence  investigation   report,   and  the

          transcript  of the  sentencing  hearing.   See  United States  v.
                                                     ___  _____________

          Garcia, 954 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.  Dietz,
          ______                                   _____________     _____

          950 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1991).

                    A  native  of  the Dominican  Republic,  Correa resided

          legally in  the United States  for a short  spell.  That  sojourn

          ceased on January 5,  1994, when, after having been  convicted of

          various  crimes committed between 1989 and 1993, he was deported.

          We do not chronicle the  complete compendium of Correa's criminal

          capers,  but  confine  ourselves  to conveying  the  contours  of

          certain crimes  that possess  particular  pertinence for  present

          purposes.

                    1.   The  February Offenses.   On  March 13,  1991, the
                    1.   The  February Offenses.
                         ______________________

          Commonwealth of Massachusetts issued  a criminal complaint (later

          served  by summons) which charged  Correa, then 19  years of age,

          with  three  counts of  breaking and  entering  and one  count of

          larceny.  See  Mass. Gen. Laws ch.  266,    16A, 30  (1990).  The
                    ___

                                          2

          charges arose from a spree that occurred on February 19, 1991; on

          that  date, Correa  raided three  separate automobiles  parked in

          Danvers, Massachusetts, and  absconded with ill-gotten gain  from

          one.

                    2.   The  June Offenses.   Some  months later,  Correa,
                    2.   The  June Offenses.
                         __________________

          still  19, was  charged  with  falsifying  his  age  to  purchase

          alcoholic beverages, in violation  of Mass. Gen. Laws ch.  138,  

          34A  (1991), and contributing to  the delinquency of  a child for

          buying  and  serving  alcohol  to  two  boys,  ages  12  and  15,

          respectively,  in  violation of  Mass. Gen.  Laws  ch. 119,    63

          (1993).  The infractions were alleged to have occurred on June 8,

          1991, in Beverly, Massachusetts.

                    3.  The  State Court Disposition  Hearing.  On  October
                    3.  The  State Court Disposition  Hearing.
                        _____________________________________

          28,  1992, Correa pled  guilty in a  state district  court to all

          charges  arising from  both  incidents.    With  respect  to  the

          February offenses, the court imposed a nine-month sentence on the

          three   breaking-and-entering  counts   and  filed   the  larceny

          conviction.  With respect  to the June offenses, the  court filed

          all the convictions.1

                    In due course, the  government deported Correa.  Little
                              
          ____________________

               1In  Massachusetts, after  a plea  of  guilty in  a criminal
          case, "a judge, with the consent of  the defendant, may place the
          case on file rather than impose sentence immediately."  DuPont v.
                                                                  ______
          Superior  Court, 401  Mass. 122,  123 (1987).   Although  that is
          _______________
          usually the  end of the matter,  the case thereafter  "may at any
          time be called up [by the  court] and sentence may be imposed, or
          some  other final disposition made  of it."   Marks v. Wentworth,
                                                        _____    _________
          199 Mass. 44, 45 (1908).  Hence, the  defendant's right to appeal
          is  suspended for  the length of  time that  the case  remains on
          file.  See DuPont, 401 Mass. at 123; Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367
                 ___ ______                    ____________    _______
          Mass. 432, 438 (1975).

                                          3

          daunted, he reentered  the United States  unlawfully in 1995  and

          found his way to Lynn, Massachusetts.  The authorities eventually

          apprehended him  and pressed a  charge of  illegal reentry  after

          deportation.  See 8 U.S.C.   1326 (1994).  Correa  pled guilty to
                        ___

          this  accusation  in  federal  district court.    The  sentencing

          proceeding that followed comprises the cynosure of this appeal.2

                    We  set   the  stage.    In   applying  the  sentencing

          guidelines, a  nisi prius  court, among other  things, transposes

          the  defendant's criminal  past into  "criminal history  points,"

          thus  obtaining  a  "criminal   history  score"  which  yields  a

          "criminal history  category."   See United  States v.  Emery, 991
                                          ___ ______________     _____

          F.2d  907, 909-10  (1st  Cir. 1993)  (illustrating the  process).

          Since the guideline sentencing range (GSR) is derived from a grid

          and  is determined in a given case by correlating the defendant's

          criminal history  category with  his adjusted offense  level, see
                                                                        ___

          United States v.  Diaz-Villafane, 874  F.2d 43,  47-48 (1st  Cir.
          _____________     ______________

          1989), criminal  history points can profoundly  affect the length

          of a sentence.

                    This case typifies  the phenomenon.   In the course  of

          his sentencing calculations,  Judge O'Toole treated  the February

          offenses  as  comprising  one  crime  and  the  June offenses  as

          comprising another, unrelated crime.  Hence, he assigned criminal

                              
          ____________________

               2The  district  court apparently  applied the  November 1995
          edition  of the  sentencing  guidelines.   See  United States  v.
                                                     ___  _____________
          Harotunian,  920  F.2d  1040,  1041-42  &  n.2  (1st  Cir.  1990)
          __________
          (explaining  that  the  guidelines  in  effect  at  the  time  of
          sentencing control  unless ex post  facto considerations prohibit
          their use).  Thus, all references herein are to that edition.

                                          4

          history  points for  each.   On  that  basis, Correa  garnered  a

          criminal history score of 7, which placed him in criminal history

          category  IV.    Had the  judge  treated  the  February and  June

          offenses as related rather  than unrelated, or had he  deemed the

          June  offenses  unworthy  of  consideration,   Correa's  criminal

          history score would  have dropped  by one point,  placing him  in

          criminal  history category  III.   At  Correa's adjusted  offense

          level (19),  the single  criminal history point  accounted for  a

          substantial  increase in his GSR (which rose from 37-46 months to

          46-57 months).  See USSG ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table).
                          ___

                    Having  added the disputed  criminal history  point and

          fixed  the GSR  at  46-57 months,  the  judge then  accepted  the

          government's  recommendation, incorporated in the plea agreement,

          that  Correa be sentenced at  the nadir of  the applicable range.

          Consequently,   the  court   imposed  a   46-month  incarcerative

          sentence.  This  appeal ensued.   In it,  the appellant  contends

          that  the  district court  erred  in  adding  the extra  criminal

          history  point.    He makes  two  arguments  in  support of  this

          contention.  We treat these arguments sequentially.

                                          II
                                          II
                                          __

                                    Related Cases
                                    Related Cases
                                    _____________

                    The  guidelines  require  the  assessment  of  criminal

          history  points for  "each prior  sentence."   USSG  4A1.1.   But

          there are  exceptions.   One such exception  authorizes sentences

          imposed in  what the Sentencing Commission  calls "related cases"

          to  be  treated as  a single  sentence.   See  USSG  4A1.2(a)(2).
                                                    ___

                                          5

          Insofar as  pertinent here, sentences are  considered related "if

          they  resulted from  offenses that  . .  . were  consolidated for

          trial  or sentencing."    Id., comment.  (n.3).   At  sentencing,
                                    ___

          Correa argued unsuccessfully that  the February and June offenses

          fell  within this safe  harbor (and, therefore,  should be deemed

          related) because  the state court had in effect consolidated them

          for sentencing.   Judge O'Toole  rejected the  notion that  these

          disparate offenses constituted  a set of related cases.3   Correa

          now presses this argument on appeal.

                    The standard of review in sentencing appeals ordinarily

          is deferential.  See 18 U.S.C.    3742(e) (1994); see also Dietz,
                           ___                              ___ ____ _____

          950 F.2d  at 52.  Thus,  "where there is more  than one plausible

          view of  the circumstances,  the sentencing court's  choice among

          supportable  alternatives"  is  not   clearly  erroneous  and   a

          reviewing tribunal cannot disturb it.  United States v. Ruiz, 905
                                                 _____________    ____

          F.2d 499,  508 (1st Cir. 1990).   However, to the  extent that an

          alleged error  involves the district court's  interpretation of a

          sentencing guideline,  it presents  a question of  law warranting
                              
          ____________________

               3In so ruling, the lower court relied on an application note
          instructing that "[p]rior sentences are not considered related if
          they  were  for offenses  that were  separated by  an intervening
          arrest (i.e.,  the defendant is  arrested for  the first  offense
                  ____
          prior to committing the second offense)."  USSG   4A1.2, comment.
          (n.3).  The court repudiated United States v. Joseph, 50 F.3d 401
                                       _____________    ______
          (7th  Cir.), cert. denied, 116  S. Ct. 139  (1995), and impliedly
                       _____ ______
          found that the summons Correa received for the February offenses,
          which had  been served  before  he committed  the June  offenses,
          constituted the functional  equivalent of an intervening  arrest.
          While this  holding seems  problematic, we  need not  resolve the
          uncertainty.   Here, the  record plainly presents  an alternative
          ground for affirmance, and we are free to use that ground in lieu
          of the trial court's  rationale.  See Hachikian v.  FDIC, 96 F.3d
                                            ___ _________     ____
          502, 504 (1st Cir. 1996).

                                          6

          plenary review.  See  United States v.  Santiago, 83 F.3d 20,  26
                           ___  _____________     ________

          (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 701 (1st
                           _____________    _______

          Cir. 1992).  So it is here.

                    In United  States v.  Elwell, 984  F.2d 1289 (1st  Cir.
                       ______________     ______

          1993),  we intimated that  a mere coincidence  in timing, without

          more, is not enough  to justify treating convictions that  do not

          possess  common  antecedents  as  having  been  consolidated  for

          purposes of sentencing.   See  id. at 1296  n.7 (explaining  that
                                    ___  ___

          such convictions cannot  be "deemed `constructively' consolidated

          because  of .  . .  [a] plea  bargain and  concurrent sentences")

          (dictum).    We now  transform  the  Elwell adumbration  into  an
                                               ______

          express  holding:   at  least in  respect  to offenses  that  are

          temporally  and  factually  distinct  (that  is,  offenses  which

          occurred  on different dates  and which did not  arise out of the

          same course  of conduct),  charges based  thereon  should not  be

          regarded as having been  consolidated (and, therefore, "related")

          unless the original  sentencing court entered an actual  order of

          consolidation  or  there is  some  other  persuasive indicium  of

          formal  consolidation apparent on the face of the record which is

          sufficient to  indicate that the offenses  have some relationship

          to one  another  beyond  the  sheer fortuity  that  sentence  was

          imposed by the same judge at the same time.

                    In  so holding, we align ourselves with a number of our

          sister  circuits  which  have  reached  a  substantially  similar

          conclusion.  See, e.g., United States v. Patasnik, 89 F.3d 63, 74
                       ___  ____  _____________    ________

          (2d  Cir. 1996); Green v. United States, 65 F.3d 546, 548-49 (6th
                           _____    _____________

                                          7

          Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 826 (1996); United States v.
                      _____ ______                         _____________

          Allen,  50 F.3d 294, 298-99 (4th Cir.),  cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
          _____                                    _____ ______

          2630  (1995); United  States  v. Alberty,  40 F.3d  1132, 1134-35
                        ______________     _______

          (10th  Cir. 1994), cert. denied,  115 S. Ct.  1416 (1995); United
                             _____ ______                            ______

          States  v.  Klein, 13  F.3d 1182,  1185  (8th Cir.  1994); United
          ______      _____                                          ______

          States v. Garcia, 962 F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1992).  By the same
          ______    ______

          token, we reject the  minority view embodied in United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          Smith,  991 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) (envisioning "no need
          _____

          for  a formal consolidation order for cases to be `related' under

          section 4A1.2").

                    We  are cognizant  that some  may see  insistence on  a

          formal  indicium of consolidation, such  as an order  or a docket

          entry, as  arbitrary.   But judicial  inquiry into a  defendant's

          criminal  past  for  sentencing  purposes,   properly  conceived,

          requires  only a  snapshot of  the surface, not  an archeological

          dig.   Thus,  when  a  federal court  is  obliged  to tabulate  a

          defendant's  criminal  history  score  for  sentencing  purposes,

          limiting  the  requisite  inquiry  to the  formal  record     the

          indictment, the  docket entries, the judgment  of conviction, and

          the like   strikes the right balance.  Moreover, it does so  in a

          manner that  supplies needed  uniformity while husbanding  scarce

          judicial resources.

                    This  approach also is in keeping with the way in which

          we have treated  analogous matters.   After all,  when a  federal

          court  looks  to  a prior  state  conviction  in formulating  its

          sentencing  calculus,  the  court  most  often  characterizes the

                                          8

          previous conviction  by means  of a formal  categorical approach,

          restricting its  examination to  the legislature's  definition of

          the  crime.  See,  e.g., Taylor v.  United States,  495 U.S. 575,
                       ___   ____  ______     _____________

          600-02  (1990); United States v.  DeLuca, 17 F.3d  6, 8 (1st Cir.
                          _____________     ______

          1994);  United States  v. De  Jesus, 984  F.2d 21,  23 (1st  Cir.
                  _____________     _________

          1993).    If the  legislature's  definition  provides an  inexact

          construct, however, the court commonly bases its characterization

          of the previous conviction  on what is readily apparent  from the

          formal documents  in the case,  without delving more  deeply into

          the  actual circumstances of the offense.  See, e.g., Taylor, 495
                                                     ___  ____  ______

          U.S. at  602 (permitting a  sentencing court, when  a categorical

          approach  fails,  to  consider   the  charging  papers  and  jury

          instructions to  ascertain the  contours of the  particular prior

          offense); United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)
                    _____________    ______

          (similar); United  States v. Fiore,  983 F.2d 1,  3-4 & n.3  (1st
                     ______________    _____

          Cir. 1992) (similar).

                    We  are  not disposed  to  deviate  from this  salutary

          principle in  interpreting  the "related  case"  guideline,  USSG

           4A1.2(a)(2).    Were  we  to  do  so,  we  would  make  criminal

          sentencing   already  an operose  task under the  guidelines    a

          more   cumbersome  and   time-consuming   endeavor  with   little

          corresponding benefit.   Criminal  history, by  definition, deals

          with bygone events which  often happened in the distant  past, or

          in a remote jurisdiction,  or both.  Requiring a federal judge to

          go  behind the  formal record  and excavate  the details  of what

          transpired  in  each instance  would  impose  an onerous  burden,

                                          9

          freighted with unusual evidentiary difficulties.  We think that a

          categorical  rule, analogous  to  that sponsored  by the  Supreme

          Court in Taylor, better serves the interests of justice.
                   ______

                    In the instant  case, the record  is pellucid that  the

          state  court  judge  never  entered an  order  consolidating  the

          complaints, which  embodied the  February and June  offenses, for

          sentencing or  for any other purpose.  To the exact contrary, the

          complaints embodying these two sets of offenses were at all times

          handled under separate docket numbers, and there is no indication

          that  the state  court  judge ever  gave  a moment's  thought  to

          whether consolidation was (or was  not) desirable.  Moreover, the

          appellant concedes that the offenses occurred in different places

          at different  times  and  that they  arose  in  widely  divergent

          factual contexts.  Last, but  not least, this is not a  situation

          in which  the court  of original  jurisdiction  imposed a  single

          sentence spanning a  series of  discrete offenses.   Rather,  the

          court  imposed  a prison  sentence  on  the breaking-and-entering

          convictions (the main component of the February offenses) but did

          not include the  convictions on the June offenses as  part of the

          underpinning for that  sentence.  Instead, the  court filed those

          charges, in effect  reserving the right to  call up the  file and

          impose a sentence at a future date.  See supra note 1.
                                               ___ _____

                    We  will not  paint the  lily.   Because there  were no

          formal indicia  of consolidation, the February  offenses were not

          "related"  to the  June offenses  under a  proper reading  of the

          federal sentencing guidelines.  Hence, the appellant's  principal

                                          10

          assignment of error fails.

                                         III
                                         III
                                         ___

                               Juvenile Status Offenses
                               Juvenile Status Offenses
                               ________________________

                    The appellant's fallback position  is that, even if the

          June offenses are not  "related" to the February offenses  in the

          requisite  sense, they  nonetheless are juvenile  status offenses

          and thus not countable  in compiling his criminal  history score.

          See USSG   4A1.2(c) (ordaining  that the sentencing  court should
          ___

          "never count  . . .  [j]uvenile status offenses"  when tabulating

          criminal  history  points).   The  district  court rejected  this

          asseveration.  So do we.

                    The  sentencing  guidelines  do  not  define  the  term

          "juvenile status offense,"  although they offer  illustrations of

          crimes which,  like juvenile  status offenses, are  excludable in

          computing  a  defendant's  criminal  history  score.    See  USSG
                                                                  ___

           4A1.2(c)(2).   In determining  whether a prior  conviction falls

          within  the  ambit of  section 4A1.2(c)(2),  courts traditionally

          "look  to the substance of the underlying state offense."  United
                                                                     ______

          States v.  Unger, 915 F.2d 759,  763 (1st Cir. 1990).   Moreover,
          ______     _____

          courts  can derive some guidance from a mirror image provision in

          the  guidelines  which  encourages  the  assignment  of  criminal

          history points  for  a  crime committed  by  a  defendant  before

          reaching the  age of 18 if he or she perpetrated the crime within

          the five-year period immediately  preceding the occurrence of the

          offense of conviction.  See USSG   4A1.2(d)(2).  This provision's
                                  ___

          primary purpose is to promote points for past crimes that predict

                                          11

          criminal proclivity.

                    Considering   together  the  caselaw   and  the  actual

          guideline  provisions, we  conclude  that a  crime constitutes  a

          juvenile status offense only if three elements coalesce:  (1) the

          defendant  committed the crime  as a  juvenile, see  USSG  4A1.2,
                                                          ___

          comment. (n.7); (2) the conduct would have been lawful if engaged

          in by  an adult, see United  States v. Ward, 71  F.3d 262, 263-64
                           ___ ______________    ____

          (7th Cir. 1995);  and (3) the offense is not  serious, see United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v.  Hardeman, 933 F.2d 278, 281-83  (5th Cir. 1991).  When
          ______     ________

          all  is said and done, this third element, which necessitates the

          appraisal of  gravity for  a given  crime, is  quintessentially a

          judgment  call.   Still, the  illustrations of  exempted offenses

          supplied   by   the   Sentencing   Commission,   e.g.,   truancy,

          hitchhiking, loitering, vagrancy, and minor  traffic infractions,

          USSG  4A1.2(c)(2),  furnish a  valid point  of  comparison.   The

          enumerated offenses all  possess a  bland quality  that helps  to

          distinguish  them  from  more  substantial transgressions:    for

          example, one  common characteristic is that  they provide little,

          if  any, indication  of a person's  proclivity to  commit future,

          more serious crimes.

                    In applying this paradigm to the June offenses, we note

          first  that either of the two component crimes   falsifying one's

          age  to purchase alcohol and contributing to the delinquency of a

          child    is, if not an exempted offense, independently sufficient

          to warrant the bestowal of the challenged criminal history point.

          Since  contributing to the delinquency of a child is arguably the

                                          12

          more weighty of the crimes, we focus exclusively on it.

                    The  appellant flunks  the first  segment of  the test:

          the victims may have been juveniles, but in  ascertaining whether
              _______

          a  crime is  (or is  not) a  juvenile status  offense, it  is the

          perpetrator's age,  not  the victim's  age,  that matters     and

          Correa was 19 years old when he committed the  act.  Accordingly,

          he was not a juvenile.  See USSG  4A1.2, comment. (n.7) (defining
                                  ___

          a juvenile for this purpose as a person under the age of 18).  He

          also fails  to satisfy the  second requirement:   contributing to

          the  delinquency  of   a  child  is   conduct  which  state   law

          criminalizes regardless of the perpetrator's age.  See Mass. Gen.
                                         _____________       ___

          Laws ch. 119,  63.

                    Since the appellant's  argument depends on  his ability

          to establish three  factors, and  the first two  are lacking,  we

          need  go no further.4   It is abundantly  clear that the district

          court did  not err either in  declining to classify the  crime of

          contributing to the delinquency  of a child as a  juvenile status

          offense or in assessing an extra criminal history point for it.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               4Because the  appellant's argument  stalls at the  first two
          stages of the test, we need not decide  whether the offense might
          be  written off either as youthful folly or as lacking predictive
          value vis- -vis  future lawlessness (and,  therefore, pass muster
          at the third stage of the test).

                                          13