Court Opinion

ID: 9521261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:01:39.567299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:51.990566
License: Public Domain

White, J.
(concurring). I concur in the conclusion that case law establishes that plaintiff is not bound by the prior litigation involving her mother and defendant.
I also agree that under Spada v Pauley, 149 Mich App 196; 385 NW2d 746 (1986), plaintiff has a common-law equitable action to enforce her right to support coextensive with the rights of a legitimate child as set forth in MCL 722.3; MSA 25.244(3), subject to the general disability tolling provision, MCL 600.5851(1); MSA 27A.5851(1).
With regard to the question of retroactivity, I agree that the trial court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, support is restricted to the period commencing with the filing of the complaint. I would reach this conclusion on the basis that MCL 722.3; MSA 25.244(3) is silent with regard to the question of retroactive support and the Spada Court concluded that the general disability tolling provisions apply. Further, in Dep’t of Social Services v Brewer, 180 Mich App 82; 446 NW2d 593 (1989), this Court held that the Family Support Act, MCL 552.451 et seq.; MSA 25.222(1) et seq., the provisions of which closely parallel MCL 722.3; MSA 25.244(3), authorizes the award of retroactive support commencing before the filing of the complaint.