Court Opinion

ID: 9671390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:35:35.281563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.681543
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
{dissenting). At about ten o’clock on an August evening, an armed robbery and killing took place in the city of Madison.
Later that evening, the Madison police placed in custody the defendant and two companions, suspected but not charged with having committed the robbery and homicide.
Also at the police headquarters were 18 persons who were witnesses to the holdup and homicide.
Around the midnight hour, the police set out to arrange a viewing of the suspects by the witnesses to determine *617whether any of the witnesses identified any of the suspects as involved in the robbery and homicide.
Both the difficulty of reassembling the 18 eyewitnesses at a future date and the importance of freshness of recollection made an undelayed opportunity to identify reasonable.
The Dane county district attorney contacted Legal Services and that agency agreed to provide an attorney for the other two suspects at a lineup-type identification.
The attorney, provided by Legal Services under a contractual relationship with the county, arrived, spoke to the defendant and it was agreed between them that the attorney would represent the defendant until other arrangements for trial counsel were made.
The police arranged for three prisoners in the county jail, all of them black as were the three suspects, to appear in a lineup with the three men suspected of committing the crimes.
To enable the defendant’s attorney and district attorney to preview the lineup, the police conducted a full dress rehearsal or “practice” lineup.
The defendant’s attorney objected to the six persons wearing suit coats, stating that the borrowed suit coats worn by the nonsuspects were ill-fitting. The suit coats were removed from the six for the first lineup.
The defendant’s attorney also objected to variances in height, weight and hair styles among the six persons in the lineup. He also objected to the ratio of suspects to nonsuspects — three each. There is no showing or claim that other nonsuspects of the race, height and weight demanded were available at the postmidnight hour.
With all of his demands not being met, the defendant’s attorney stated that he thought he should leave and not further participate in the lineup.
The district attorney stated, “Phil, you have made your position clear. You have stated your position. Your objections have been noted. I want you to stay. . .
*618His demands for additional changes in the lineup arrangements not being acceded to, the defendant’s attorney left.
At 1:20 a. m., the first lineup was conducted, exactly as it had been conducted at the rehearsal or “practice” run.
At the hearing on admissibility of the first lineup, the district attorney testified: “I think he left because he [defendant’s attorney] thought he could invalidate the lineup if he did.”
If defendant’s attorney so thought then, he has no reason to change his mind now, for the majority opinion holds that the walkout by defendant’s attorney prevented the holding of a constitutionally valid lineup identification.
The writer would hold that the deliberate defense stratagem or device of leaving the scene, after determining and observing the exact nature and composition of the lineup procedure to be followed, was an act or tactic binding upon his client, and constituted a waiver of counsel’s right to remain.
The role of a defendant’s counsel at a lineup identification is that of an observer.1
Here the defendant’s attorney went beyond the role of observer to do three things: (1) To demand that changes be made in the composition of the lineup, one of which was made; (2) to threaten that, if the remaining de*619mands were not acceded to, he would not remain as observer; (3) to, in fact, leave the scene when all of his demands were not met.
Whether “running out the bluff” or carrying out the threat is viewed as a tactic to secure further concessions or to prevent the holding of the lineup or to plant a time bomb to be exploded on appeal, the majority opinion makes clear that the defendant’s attorney ought not to have done what he did.
Regardless of “oughtness,” the writer would hold that, when the defendant’s attorney did what he did, he, on behalf of his client, made “. . . a deliberate choice of strategy [which] even if it backfires, amounts to a waiver binding upon the defendant and this court. ...” 2 Consultation of defense counsel with the defendant before embarking upon the stratagem or tactic is not a prerequisite to the strategic waiver rule.3 The writer would hold that the calculated and carefully considered walkout of defendant’s attorney constituted a *620waiver, on behalf of his client, binding upon such client, of the right to the continued presence of the attorney at the identification lineup.
This is particularly true where the deliberate choice of strategy was made by defendant’s attorney after he had observed and established, to his own satisfaction, the factual basis for future objection to the composition of the lineup. Since no objection is even suggested except as to the composition of the lineup, the defendant’s attorney had already served as the “eyes” of the defendant 4 observing all that he needed or wanted to observe to establish the basis for future objection to the lineup as composed and conducted.
Actually, the majority opinion does not dispute or dissent from the general rule that a deliberate choice of strategy by defense counsel constitutes a waiver binding upon a defendant. Rather, it seeks to take the present situation out from under the general rule. Two reasons are advanced for not applying the rule in this case:
The first reason given for exceptionalizing this case is that the walkout of defendant’s attorney was a “single act ‘on behalf’ of defendant,” and “not part of a deliberate trial strategy.” To qualify as a tactic, an act or choice of alternative strategies, the majority states, must be “made as part of an overall trial plan.” Neither precedent nor sound reasoning support such added requirement. What makes an act or choice between alternative actions a “tactic” is its being made deliberately, after evaluation of the consequences of making the particular choice. Many of the major decisions in criminal *621cases, each a strategic choice between alternatives, are tubs that stand on their own bottoms. For example: Whether to waive preliminary hearing, whether to enter a plea of guilty, whether to have the defendant take the witness stand, whether to offer additional testimony or to cross-examine a particular witness. Each such choice between alternatives, with the gains and risks it involves, surely is a; “tactic,” to which the rule of strategic waiver applies. Even if a “tactic” required an “overall plan,” both are clearly evident here. The tactic was to walk out; the plan was to challenge the admissibility of any identification made at the lineup. To what had been observed as to the composition of the lineup, the tactic served the planned objection by adding, successfully it would appear, the claim that the stroll taken by defense counsel rendered the’ lineup identification constitutionally infirm.
The second reason advanced for not applying the rule of strategic waiver to this case is the claim that there is here a “special relationship” between the defendant’s attorney and defendant. The reference is to the fact that the attorney representing the defendant at the time of the identification lineup was provided by Legal Services under its contractual arrangement with Dane county so to do. The majority opinion states that it is “doubtful” whether the relationship between defendant’s attorney and defendant “was sufficient to constitute an attorney-client relationship.” The record provides no basis for any such doubt. The record establishes that, when the attorney arranged for by Legal Services arrived at police headquarters, he spoke with the defendant and the other two suspects and it was agreed between them that the attorney would represent the defendant and the two others until other arrangements for trial counsel were made. Ordinarily, retaining an attorney involves and implies an obligation to pay for services performed. But it is the authorization to appear for the client that estab*622lishes a full attorney-client relationship. That the hill is to be sent to someone else, here the taxpayers of Dane county, does not dilute the authority to represent nor change the attorney-client relationship into something less.
The writer would hold that, when the defendant here agreed to have the Legal Services’ attorney represent him at the lineup, the attorney agreed to become his attorney and the relationship was that of attorney-client. If, as the majority opinion states, the attorney here was not “retained” by the defendant nor “appointed” by a court, a strange hybrid has been newly created. For the purpose of compliance with Wade, Gilbert5 and other cases cited in the majority opinion, an attorney-client relationship is created enough to meet the constitutional requirement of being represented by counsel. But not enough of an attorney-client relationship is present to warrant applying the doctrine of strategic waiver to acts and tactics taken by provided counsel. It follows, inescapably from the majority opinion logic, that, if the defendant here had been financially able to retain private counsel and did so, deliberate choices between alternative strategies made by such “retained” counsel would be binding upon the defendant who hired him. This result goes well beyond equalizing the differences between those who are able to provide their own legal counsel and those for whom counsel must be provided at public expense. It gives only to the indigent, for whom counsel is provided, the option not to be bound by strategic decisions and trial tactics of his attorney. The goal of providing legal counsel for the indigent accused should be to place them in the same position as defendants able to hire their own attorneys. Certainly it should not be to *623put them in a preferential position, with all of the pluses and none of the minuses.
Holding that the deliberate choice of tactics or strategy by defendant’s attorney was binding upon the defendant and constituted here a waiver of the right to continued presence of such attorney at the first lineup, requires consideration of the objections raised by defendant to the fairness of such first lineup. The writer agrees with the trial court that the objections raised were without merit, and that such lineup was fairly conducted. On the claim that having three suspects and four nonsus-pects in a lineup is an impermissible ratio, it is enough to note that in Wright,6 a lineup composed of two suspects and two police officers was upheld as fairly conducted. Here the ratio is three suspects to four non-suspects; there it was two-to-two. Actually, as to the defendant, the ratio is one-to-six for we are not entitled to lump the defendant and two other suspects into a single unit. That would be to assume an identification of any one of the three suspects as likely to be accompanied by an identification of the other two. To do so, would be to assume if not shared guilt, at least shared participation in a common criminal enterprise by the three.
The second and third objections to the composition of the first lineup deal, respectively, with variances in hair styles and disparities in height. Both relate to the matter of similarity in appearance, and both are answered by the holding in Wright that: “. . . The police are not required to conduct a search for identical twins in age, height, weight or facial features. ...” 7 The test is the test of reasonableness or, as it was stated in Wright: “What is required is the attempt to conduct a fair lineup, taking all steps reasonable under the ‘totality of circumstances’ *624. . . 8 Given the broad variety of hair stylings in the nation, it would be entirely unreasonable to require the police to seek to locate lineup participants, acceptable in other particulars, whose hair styling matched that of a particular suspect. Even bringing a barber or hair stylist to the police headquarters would not insure such result. The writer would not want to suggest the providing of wigs to produce a sameness of hair styles among the persons appearing in a lineup, not even if there were a wig shop with a large variety of hairpieces available for borrowing. As to differences in height, six of the seven participants in the lineup, including the defendant, ranged in height from five feet, eight inches, to six feet or thereabouts. One participant, the seventh, was five feet, five and one-half inches tall. In Wright, the two suspects were five feet, eleven inches, and six feet, one inch, in height. The two nonsuspects, both police officers, were six feet and six feet, two inches in height. However, in Wright, the two suspects were nineteen and twenty years of age; the two nonsuspects were twenty-nine and thirty-six years of age. Under the “totality of circumstances” test, this court upheld the trial court finding in Wright that the lineup had been fairly conducted, and the writer would agree with the trial court here that it was fairly conducted in the case now before us.
Upholding the trial court finding that the first lineup was fairly conducted and holding that the walkout of defendant’s attorney was a deliberate tactic or stratagem, binding upon the defendant, constituting a strategic waiver of the right to continued presence of such attorney at such lineup, the writer would affirm the trial court’s admitting of identifications made at the first lineup as properly admissible. While the question is closer, giving full weight to the trial court finding of *625fact that the second lineup, the one with suit coats on, did not meet the fairness test, the writer would affirm the trial court holding that identifications made at the second lineup were not admissible at trial. So holding and so upholding the trial court rulings, the writer would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.

 See: Wright v. State (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 75, 84, 85, 175 N. W. 2d 646, stating: “. . . The presence of counsel at the lineup is intended to make possible the reconstruction at the time of trial of any unfairness that may have occurred at the time of the lineup. The important purpose to be served is that of observer. . . . His [counsel’s] function, as observer, was to assist the court in reconstructing the circumstances of the lineup at the time of trial. That is what he did, and that is all that he was required to do. . . .”

 State v. McDonald (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 534, 537, 538, 184 N. W. 2d 886, this court also stating: “. . . If this was a strategic trial tactic of defense counsel, it was a conscious and intentional waiver of the constitutional questions involved.” Citing Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U. S. 443, 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. Ed. 2d 408; Fay v. Noia (1963), 372 U. S. 391, 83 Sup. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837.

 Id. at pages 538, 539, this court stating: “. . . Not every trial tactic can be or must he the result of consultation between counsel and client. ... In the conduct of a criminal case, the trial court cannot satisfy both the client who proceeds pro se and counsel who disagrees. While the defendant should he consulted concerning pleas of guilty and the general defense of his case, he need not be consulted in every detail. The accused has no more right to control his attorney and the conduct of the trial than he has to dictate to his surgeon how to perform the operation.” If this is the law as to midtrial strategies, it is more aptly applied to a prewarrant lineup “. . . when, as always would be the case, there was no judge or magistrate present to rule on the propriety of . . . objection. . . .” Wright v. State, supra, at page 84.

 See: Zamora v. Guam (9th Cir. 1968), 394 Fed. 2d 815, 816, the court stating: “We do not believe that Wade always requires the presence of a lawyer with certificate in hand in the given case. Underlying the Wade case is a philosophy that the lineup should not be exclusively a police function and that the defendant ought to have some protection at it and eyes there representing him. . . .” (quoted with approval in Wright v. State, supra, at page 85.)

 United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U. S. 218, 87 Sup. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U. S. 263, 87 Sup. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178.

 Wright v. State, supra, at pages 86, 87.

 Id. at page 86.

 Id. at page 86.