Court Opinion

ID: 9729976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:55:53.928897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:02.856350
License: Public Domain

NAJAM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that Bennett was subject to and violated the Little Hatch Act and, therefore, was ineligible to assume or be a candidate for the office of mayor of Terre Haute. See Ind.Code § 3 — 8—1—5(c)(6). Next, the majority concludes that, under our Supreme Court’s opinion in Oviatt v. Behme, 238 Ind. 69, 147 N.E.2d 897 (1958), Burke is not entitled to that office. But the majority then disregards Oviatt and holds that Burke is not required to establish a right to the office and is entitled to relief on his complaint in the form of a special election.
The Oviatt opinion is the culmination of a long line of Indiana cases on this issue, is still good law, and controls the outcome in this case. The majority opinion is incompatible with our well-established common law rule that a successful post-election challenge cannot be maintained on the grounds of the winning candidate’s ineligibility unless the voters knew of that ineligibility and wasted their votes accordingly. The majority’s analysis also ignores Indiana’s statutory scheme on posLelection challenges. Assuming, without deciding, that Bennett was ineligible, I would hold based on the undisputed evidence that Burke has failed to state a successful claim against Bennett and has no grounds to upset the election.
Burke’s action against Bennett is governed by Indiana Code Chapter 3-12-8, which describes the post-election contest procedures for elections to local offices. Most relevant here are Sections 1, 2, and 17 of that Chapter. Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-l(b) and Section 3-12-8-2(1) give Burke standing to challenge Bennett’s eligibility in a post-election setting. And Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-17(c) describes the remedy available to Burke upon a successful challenge: “After hearing and determining a petition alleging that a candidate is ineligible, the court shall declare as elected or nominated the qualified candidate who received the highest number of votes and render judgment accordingly.” However, after acknowledging that “Burke does not have a right to the office of mayor of Terre Haute under Ind.Code § 3-12-8-17 based upon *532the holding in Oviatt,” Op. at 530, the majority nonetheless nullifies the election and concludes that Burke is entitled to other relief.
The majority correctly discusses, but then disregards, our Supreme Court’s decision in Oviatt. There, the court held that the predecessor statute to current Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-17(c) “must be interpreted in light of the common law, as well as the constitution of this State.” 147 N.E.2d at 900. The court then stated “the principle here involved” as follows:
The existence of the fact which disqualifies, and of the law which makes that fact operate to disqualify, must be brought home so closely and so clearly to the knowledge or notice of the elector, as that to give his vote therewith indicates an intent to waste it. The knowledge must be such, or the notice brought so home, as to imply a wilfulness in acting, when action is in opposition to the natural impulse to save the vote and make it effectual. He must act so in defiance of both the law and the fact, and so in opposition to his own better knowledge, that he has no right to complain of the loss of his franchise, the exercise of which he has wantonly misapplied.
Id: (quoting State ex rel. Clawson v. Bell, 169 Ind. 61, 70, 82 N.E. 69, 73 (1907) (quoting People ex rel. v. Clute, 50 N.Y. 451 (1872))). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the General Assembly has acquiesced in the holding of Oviatt. See op. at 528. As explained below, under Oviatt Burke is not entitled to relief and there is no vacancy in the office of mayor of Terre Haute. Nevertheless, the majority declares a vacancy and grants relief to Burke by ordering a special election.
Again, Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-17(c) describes Burke’s exclusive remedy in this action, namely, removing Bennett from office and placing Burke in that position. See I.C. § 3-12-8-17(c). But in Oviatt, our Supreme Court expressly held that an action can be maintained under that statute only if the losing candidate can demonstrate that the voters knew of the winning candidate’s ineligibility at the time of the election. 147 N.E.2d at 900. Here, the trial court specially found that “neither Bennett, his employer, his opponent^] or the electorate knew of the Hatch Act violation.” Appellant’s App. at 21. That fact is not disputed by the parties and, as such, this court on review may determine only whether the trial court correctly applied the law in light of that fact. See, e.g., Lumbard v. Farmers State Bank, 812 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Accordingly, Burke’s action under Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-17(c) cannot stand, and the trial court correctly entered judgment in favor of Bennett.
The Common Law Before Oviatt
Since 1860, our Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, has recognized the common law principle identified in Oviatt. Most notably, in State ex rel. Clawson v. Bell, 169 Ind. 61, 65-71, 82 N.E. 69, 71-73 (1907), relied upon in Oviatt, the court thoroughly discussed Indiana law on that principle. The Bell court concluded:
The number of votes which the relator in the case at bar received is far below those received by appellee. To nullify the votes cast for the latter, in the absence of proof of the required knowledge of his ineligibility on the part of the persons who voted for him, and award to the relator the right to the office in question, would be antagonistic to the principles of popular government, and would, as is shown by the number of votes cast for appellee, be in opposition to the deliberate choice of a large majority of the voters of Henry county.... We find no warrant under the facts in *533this case for holding that the votes cast for appellee should be treated as nullities, and therefore rejected, and the right to the office be awarded to the relator. In a legal sense, he has no more interest therein or thereto than he would have had he not been a candidate at said election. If appellee, as claimed, is disqualified for holding the office, the proper prosecuting attorney, as provided by the statute, can institute an action in the name of the State on his own relation to oust him from the office.
(Emphases added.) In other words, the loser of an election has no legal right to maintain an action to remove an ineligible election winner “in the absence of proof of the required knowledge of [the winner’s] ineligibility on the part of the persons who voted for him.” Id. at 73, 82 N.E. 69.
Bell is notable for another reason, namely, the action our Supreme Court did not take. After conceding, without deciding, the election winner’s ineligibility, our Supreme Court did not order a special election.18 Nor did it order the election winner’s removal from office. Rather, because the election loser was unable to demonstrate the voters’ knowledge of the election winner’s ineligibility, the court dismissed his action and expressly refused to treat “the votes cast for [the ineligible election winner] ... as nullities.” Id.
To be sure, there is language in Bell and other cases to suggest that the election of an ineligible candidate results in a “void” election or that that election “is a failure.” *534See id. at 72, 82 N.E. 69. But that language was for the benefit of the State, which, at that time, had the authority to remove from office the ineligible winner of an election.19 See id. at 73, 82 N.E. 69 (“If appellee, as claimed, is disqualified for holding the office, the proper prosecuting attorney ... can institute an action in the name of the State ... to oust him from office”). That language did not confer a legal interest upon the loser of an election to the office in question. Id. (“In a legal sense, he has no more interest therein or thereto than he would have had he not been a candidate at said election.”).
Neither does our Supreme Court’s analysis in Bell stand in isolation. See, e.g., Fields v. Nicholson, 197 Ind. 161, 165-68, 150 N.E. 53, 55-56 (1926) (“in the absence of proof that the voters wilfully threw away their ballots on a candidate they knew could not lawfully be elected, the mere fact that the one who received the largest vote was ineligible to be elected to the office or to hold it, is not enough to give the candidate who received a less number the right to the office.”); State ex rel. Davis v. Johnston, 173 Ind. 14, 15, 89 N.E. 393, 393 (1909) (“the relator, having received neither a majority nor a plurality of the votes cast for candidates for county assessor, has no such interest in the office as entitles him to maintain this action. There was no averment in the complaint, and no evidence upon the trial, that the electors of the county, at the time they cast their votes for appellee, had either actual or constructive knowledge of his alleged ineligibility.”); State ex rel. Heston v. Ross, 170 Ind. 704, 706-07, 84 N.E. 150, 150-51 (1908) (“In the absence of such a showing the complaint herein is fatally defective and the relator thereunder does not establish any right to maintain this action to oust appellee from the office and be awarded possession thereof for himself.”).
In ordering a special election here, the majority finds a vacancy where there is none. In Bell, our Supreme Court assumed the election winner ineligible, yet did not remove him from office. 82 N.E. at 71-73. Neither did the court remove the ineligible, winning candidates in Ross or Johnston. Ross, 84 N.E. at 150-51; Johnston, 89 N.E. at 393. And in Fields, the court expressly held that the election winner was ineligible for office, but it refused to install the losing candidate to that office because the voters were unaware of that ineligibility. 150 N.E. at 55-56. Finally, despite Oviatt’s ineligibility for office under the constitutional amendment at issue in that case, our Supreme Court did not remove Oviatt or order a special election. Oviatt, 147 N.E.2d at 899-902. Instead, the court expressly held that, because Oviatt’s ineligibility was not clear to the voters that had re-elected him, Oviatt was “entitled to the office in controversy.” Id. at 902.
It is true, as the majority notes, that Bell, Ross, and Johnston were quo warran-to proceedings. But, for our purposes, that fact does not distinguish those cases. Rather, it emphasizes the significance of Oviatt, in which our Supreme Court, in interpreting the predecessor statute to Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-17(c), adopted from Bell the “principle” that voters cannot have their votes nullified by a court because of a candidate’s unknown ineligibility. See 147 N.E.2d at 900. In other words, Oviatt applied the quo war-ranto standard to statutory post-election challenges. The majority’s assessment, that “[ujnlike a quo warranto action, Ind. *535Code §§ 3-12-8 does not require that Burke establish his right to the office,” op. at 531, simply ignores the Oviatt holding. Oviatt is a bridge between the common law of quo warranto proceedings and our post-election contest statutes.
Oviatt is Controlling Precedent
This panel is unanimous in its conclusion that the General Assembly has acquiesced in the Oviatt holding, which requires voter knowledge to nullify an election. The operative, material facts in this case are the same as those in Oviatt, and the post-election contest statutes in question are essentially the same. In other words, Oviatt is controlling precedent. Thus, it does not render the post-election contest statutes “meaningless” to count all the votes in the Terre Haute mayor’s race. See op. at 528. Rather, we must follow the opinion of our Supreme Court, in which the Legislature has acquiesced for some fifty years. While Oviatt may have made some post-election challenges more difficult, we are an intermediate appellate court, and it is inappropriate for us to disregard that opinion. See Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
The majority relies on dicta in Oviatt to distinguish that case from this one. While the Oviatt court discussed a declaratory judgment action upon which the voters had relied, Oviatt was not decided on law of the case grounds. The prior declaratory judgment action was a separate action. See Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1038, 1048-49 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (noting that application of the law of the case doctrine requires the same case). Nor was Oviatt decided on the grounds of res judicata, since Behme, the post-election challenger to Oviatt’s seat, was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. See Oviatt, 147 N.E.2d at 901; Perry, 871 N.E.2d at 1048 (recognizing that application of the doctrine of res judicata requires identity of parties). Rather, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the court’s reference to the declaratory judgment is that the court sought to emphasize the fact that members of the public did not know that Oviatt was ineligible for office and, therefore, did not knowingly throw their votes away by voting for him.
The majority also attempts to distinguish Oviatt on two other grounds. First, the majority asserts that if all votes are nullified “equally at the same time,” id. at 69, 147 N.E.2d 897, and a special election is ordered, then there is no conflict with Article II, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. I need not address the majority’s constitutional analysis but must note, again, that the majority disregards Indiana’s well-established common law principle, which Oviatt incorporated into Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-17(c), that the voters must have knowingly wasted their vote on an ineligible candidate in order for the losing candidate to maintain an action under our post-election challenge statutes. See Oviatt, 147 N.E.2d at 900.
The majority also concludes that, although Burke “does not have a right to the office of mayor under Ind.Code § 3-12-8-17, ... a vacancy exists.” Op. at 529. The majority then orders a special election under Indiana Code Section 3-10-8-1(4). That section provides for a special election “[wjhenever a vacancy occurs in any local office[,] the filling of which is not otherwise provided by law.” I.C. § 3-10-8-1(4). Hence, the majority concludes that while Burke cannot replace Bennett, Bennett can be removed from office. But neither Burke nor Bennett alleges that a vacancy exists in the office of mayor of Terre Haute. And, again, under Oviatt there is no vacancy. Thus, Indiana Code Section 3-10-8-1(4) does not apply, and the major*536ity errs when it nullifies the votes of the Terre Haute electorate.
Special Election Statutes Do Not Apply
I must also note that the majority’s resort to a special election cannot be reconciled with our statutory scheme for post-election challenges. The General Assembly has divided Indiana Code Section 3-12-8-17 into multiple subsections. Subsection (c) describes the remedy available upon a successful post-election challenge to a winning candidate’s eligibility, and it is the grounds for Burke’s complaint. But another subsection, (d), describes when a court, in a post-election challenge, may order a special election to ascertain the results of a prior election.
Subsection (d) states as follows:
(d) If the court finds that:
(1) a mistake in the printing or distribution of the ballots used in the election;
(2) a mistake in the programming of an electronic voting system;
(3) a malfunction of an electronic voting system; or
(4) the occurrence of a deliberate act or series of actions;
makes it impossible to determine which candidate received the highest number of votes, the court shall order that a special election be conducted under IC 3-10-8.
None of the factors described under subsection (d) are present here, and, as such, this court may not order a special election under our post-election contest statutes.
The majority’s resort to a special election under Section 3-12-8-17(c), which contains no such remedy, violates the plain meaning of the statute. Neither subsection (c) nor subsection (d) provides for a special election under the circumstances of this case. Rather, to reach the remedy of a special election, the majority leaps from Indiana Code Chapter 3-12-8, which governs post-election contests and is the statutory basis for Burke’s complaint, to Indiana Code Chapter 3-10-8, which governs special elections. In sum, the majority finds a post-election, special election remedy where none applies.
Conclusion
The majority’s conclusion that Oviatt denies Burke his action but that this court may nevertheless declare a vacancy and nullify the election is incongruous. Burke has not demonstrated that the voters for the office of mayor of Terre Haute knowingly wasted their votes on Bennett, and Burke therefore cannot maintain his cause of action under Indiana Code Section 3-12—8—17(c). See Oviatt, 147 N.E.2d at 900. The analytical flaw in the majority opinion is that it relies on Bennett’s ineligibility rather than on the determination that, as a matter of law, Burke cannot prevail in his post-election contest. In our jurisprudence, Burke’s inability to maintain a successful cause of action is the end of the matter. And it pre-empts the question of Bennett’s ineligibility.
Indiana’s election laws are for the benefit of the voters and the protection of the franchise. The voters are entitled to transparency, and Bennett should have obtained an Advisory Opinion from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel regarding his status under the Little Hatch Act. But both candidates here are at fault for not addressing Bennett’s eligibility before the election. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the idea that Burke was unable to discover Bennett’s alleged Little Hatch Act violation until after the election results had been tallied is implausible.
The majority is correct in holding that, given Oviatt, it is incumbent upon candidates to have issues of eligibility brought to the voters’ attention prior to an election. *537See op. at 528. But that is precisely why I am obliged to dissent from the majority opinion. In its operation and effect, the rule in Oviatt is akin to a rule of estoppel. Oviatt means that candidates have a duty to discover and disclose eligibility issues before an election so that the voters can take those issues into account when casting their ballots. And, under Oviatt, a candidate with knowledge of a bona fide eligibility issue who fails to disclose that issue before the election is, in effect, es-topped from raising that issue in a post-election challenge. The majority opinion nullifies the operation and effect of Oviatt.
For almost 150 years, our Supreme Court has consistently held that a successful post-election challenge cannot be maintained on the grounds of the winning candidate’s ineligibility unless the voters knew of that ineligibility and wasted their votes accordingly. To permit otherwise encourages “gotcha” politics in which the loser of an election gets a second bite from the apple, claiming for the first time, after the fact, that the winner was ineligible. Like the majority, I disagree with the trial court’s reasoning and conclusion that Bennett is not subject to Indiana Code Section 3 — 8—1—5(c) because he was “mayor-elect” and “not a candidate.” But while I disagree with the trial court’s reasoning, I vote to affirm the trial court’s judgment that Bennett is entitled to remain in office. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 920, 923-24 (Ind.1998) (“we hold that where a trial court has made special findings pursuant to a party’s request under Trial Rule 52(A), the reviewing court may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.”).
I respectfully dissent.

. In Bell, our Supreme Court’s determination not to order the removal of the ineligible election winner and not to order a special election were considered by implication, if not expressly stated. Two of the decisions from foreign jurisdictions the Bell court discussed ordered, on similar facts, special elections. See People ex rel. Furman v. Clute, 50 N.Y. 451, 465 (1872) ("unless the votes for an ineligible person are expressly declared to be void, the effect of such person receiving a majority of the votes cast is, according to the weight of American authority ..., that a new election must be had....”); In re Corliss, 11 R.I. 638, 644 (1876) ("The only effect of the disqualification ... is to render void the election of the candidate who is disqualified, ... [which requires] the choice of electors to fill such vacancy, by an election in grand committee.”). But our Supreme Court did not follow the New York and Rhode Island cases and order a special election in Bell.
Another case cited in Bell did not order a special election. See Commonwealth ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270 (1867). Rather, in Cluley, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, as our Supreme Court held in Bell, the following:
The votes cast at an election for a person who is disqualified from holding an office are not nullities. They cannot be rejected by the inspectors, or thrown out of the count by the return judges. The disqualified person is a person still, and every vote thrown for him is formal. [I]t is said that if sufficient notice is given of a candidate's disqualification, and notice that votes given for him will be thrown away, votes subsequently cast for him are lost, and another candidate may be returned as elected if he has a majority of good votes after those so lost are deducted....
But the present relator suggests no such case. He does not even aver that, if the votes given for Cluley were thrown out, he received a majority, though doubtless such was the truth. He has therefore exhibited no such interest as entitled him to be heard.
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After what has been said, it will be seen that we are of opinion J.Y. McLaughlin has no such interest as entitles him to be heard in a writ of quo warranto. The question which he seeks to raise is a public one exclusively, and it can be raised only at the instance of the attorney-general.
56 Pa. at 273-75 (emphases added). Again, after reviewing those jurisdictions, our Supreme Court in Bell did not nullify the existing vote and order a special election. Rather, it held that the election loser did not have a cause of action because he had not shown that the voters knowingly threw their votes away on an ineligible candidate. Bell, 82 N.E. at 71-73.

. Standing to challenge the eligibility of an election’s winner has since been conferred, by statute, to the loser of that election. See I.C. §§ 3 — 12—8—1 (b), -2(1). However, the election loser's remedy is still constrained by Indiana Code Section 3 — 12—8—17(c) and Oviatt.