Court Opinion

ID: 9601765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:49:40.274988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:23.506929
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree that we should remand these cases back to the district court, I write separately because I believe that the majority unduly restricts the district court’s discretion on remand.
I. MANDATORY CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE
The majority concludes that the only way to vindicate Congress’s intent in specifying a mandatory seven-year sentence for brandishing a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii), is to require the district court to ignore the mandatory sentence, determine an appropriate sentence for the other convictions by means of the usual 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis, and then tack on seven additional years. I disagree. Absent the mandatory seven-year sentence, the district court would have discretion to determine a sentence anywhere between the statutory minimum and the statutory maximum — in this case, between zero and twenty years in prison for each defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The mandatory sentence pursuant to § 924(c) adds seven years to both the statutory minimum and the statutory maximum, giving the district court discretion to determine a sentence in this case anywhere between seven and twenty-seven years for each defendant. It would not repudiate Congressional intent to require simply that the district court apply the usual § 3553(a) analysis to sentence the defendants to between seven and twenty-seven years in prison; the district court could not sentence the defendants to less than the mandatory seven years in prison, and the district court would have the option of sentencing the defendants to up to seven more years in prison than it could otherwise. This is just as plausible a means of vindicating the intent behind § 924(c) as is requiring the district court to ignore the mandatory seven years in reaching its decision on the other counts of a conviction.
More importantly, not only is it plausible that the sentencing statutes permit the district court to consider the effect of a mandatory sentence in reaching its ultimate sentencing determination, it is the only sensible interpretation. The § 3553(a) factors require the district court to give at least some consideration to the total amount of time that a defendant will spend in prison. For example, § 3553(a) instructs the sentencing court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) — essentially, the need to “incapacitate]” the defendant, see Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2463, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). We have made clear that this consideration does not depend solely on the crimes for *588which the defendant is currently being sentenced, for which simply adding sentences together might be appropriate; it also depends in part on the history and characteristics of the defendant. See United States v. Wells, 473 F.3d 640, 644-45 (6th Cir.2007) (“Such egregious actions, coupled with the lengthy history of escalating violent behavior by the defendant in his relatively short life, highlight the need for the sentence of incarceration to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to protect the public from further crimes of this defendant.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). Setting all other factors aside for the moment, if a district court determines that the history and characteristics of a particular defendant require incapacitation for a specific number of years, the majority’s rule would require the district court to sentence the defendant to that number of years plus seven. The district court would thereby violate § 3553(a)’s instruction to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary ” to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and for no reason other than to vindicate a formalistic reading of § 924(c).1
Consideration of other § 3553(a) factors would yield similar nonsensical results under the majority’s rule. In United States v. Younger, No. 06-2159, — Fed.Appx. -, 2007 WL 2088679 (6th Cir. July 19, 2007) (unpublished opinion), for example, we affirmed the district court’s decision to vary upward from the Guidelines range based on the need to provide an appropriate rehabilitative sentence, a consideration required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Although the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range was six to twelve months in prison, the district court reasoned that the defendant would benefit from a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program and accordingly sentenced him to twenty-one months in prison, the minimum sentence that permitted participation in the program. Younger, — Fed.Appx. at -, 2007 WL 2088679, at * 1-*2. If the defendant in Younger also faced a mandatory seven-year sentence, however, the majority’s rule would instruct the district court to sentence the defendant to twenty-one months in prison plus seven years, even though the additional nine months above the Guidelines range would be completely unnecessary in light of the mandatory seven-year sentence.
Allowing the district court to apply the usual § 3553(a) analysis to sentence Franklin and Clarke to between seven and twenty-seven years in prison would not negate the imposition of the mandatory seven-year sentence, as the majority asserts. It simply would recognize the reality that, in light of the various purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a), a district court cannot determine an appropriate sentence for a defendant convicted on multiple counts simply by adding together what would be an appropriate sentence for each count.2 I see no congressional intent *589in § 924(c) to ignore that reality, and I would therefore conclude that the district court did not err by considering the mandatory seven-year sentence in determining appropriate ultimate sentences for Franklin and Clarke.
II. EFFECT OF THE PRIOR SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION
I am not as convinced as the majority that the district court “believed it was required to apply a sentence within the ranges suggested by this court’s prior opinion.” Maj. Op. at 586-87. In most respects, the district court’s sentencing determination was an ideal example of what a district court should do at sentencing. At the initial resentencing hearing, the district court expressed some confusion over whether, in light of our previous opinion in this case, it had the authority to include enhancements based on judge-found facts in the advisory Guidelines ranges for Franklin and Clarke. The district court adjourned the hearing, researched the law, and clarified for itself that “since the guidelines are not mandatory that the [cjourt may include any of the other factors by a preponderance, found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence.” J.A. at 289 (Franklin 10/26/05 Resentencing Hr’g at 3). In the subsequent resentencing hearings for each defendant, the district court accurately calculated the applicable Guidelines range, permitted the defendant to make a statement, and carefully explained its consideration of each of the § 3553(a) factors. The court indicated that it would sentence each defendant below the applicable Guidelines range based on the social purposes of sentencing, see J.A. at 306 (Franklin 10/26/05 Resentencing Hr’g at 20); J.A. at 327 (Clarke 10/31/05 Resen-tencing Hr’g at 17), and it is clear from context that the district court was referring to the purposes of sentencing outlined in § 3553(a). In all of these aspects, the district court’s sentencing determination was a model of proper sentencing procedure.
However, as detailed by the majority, scattered comments by the district court make it unclear whether the court felt unduly constrained by our previous opinion in this case. It might be that the district court independently decided to sentence Franklin and Clarke to terms that happened to coincide with the Guidelines ranges mentioned in our previous opinion. Because the district court’s scattered comments make this unclear, however, I would remand so that the district court could clarify its reasoning. Cf United States v. Wilms, 495 F.3d 277, 281 n. 1 (6th Cir.2007) (“[I]t is possible that the district court simply misspoke, stating that a re-buttable presumption applies but not actually applying a presumption that Wilms should be sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range. However, ... we cannot ignore the district court’s statements suggesting that it might have applied such a presumption.”). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment insofar as it vacates the sentences of Franklin and Clarke to permit the district court to clarify its rationale.

. The majority’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) is misplaced. All that § 3551(a) does is recognize that certain sentences — such as the mandatory seven-year sentence on the § 924(c) count — do not require consideration of the sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a). But § 3551(a)’s "[ejxcept as otherwise specifically provided” clause has no impact on the determination of the appropriate sentence for the other convictions. With respect to the other convictions involving bank robbery and bank larceny, the district court must follow § 3553(a)'s mandate "to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the specified sentencing purposes, such as protecting the public from the defendant's further crimes. The majority's invocation of § 3551(a) is in effect a red herring.

. Notably, the Sentencing Commission itself has concluded that a district court cannot determine an appropriate sentence for a defendant convicted on multiple counts simply *589by adding together what would be an appropriate sentence for each count. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 3, pt. D (setting forth the method for calculating the Guidelines range for a defendant convicted on multiple counts).