Court Opinion

ID: 9488032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:34:15.418352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:38.687941
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting to Part IV of the court’s opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s conclusion in Part IV that the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) to the facts of the instant case. I conclude the court defines the scope of § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) too narrowly. Specifically, I do not agree that § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) applies only to eases where the defendant misrepresents he is acting “as a representative of’ an agency or organization. Instead, I believe § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) applies as well to a defendant who misrepresents he is acting “in the interest of’ an agency or organization. Thus, I would affirm the district court’s enhancement of Defendant’s sentence under § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A).
We interpret the sentencing guidelines as if they were statutes. United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir.1995). Therefore, we “must follow the ‘clear, unambiguous language [of the guidelines] if there is no manifestation of contrary intent.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir.1989)). Moreover, we must follow the commentary and policy statements that “interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied.” Stinson v. United States, — U.S.-,-, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1917-18, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7).
The plain language of § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) provides a two-level sentence enhancement where “the offense involved ... a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious, or political organization, or a government agency.” U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Webster’s Dictionary defines the phrase “on behalf of’ alternatively “as a representative of’ or “in the interest of.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 141 (1984). Thus, § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) applies, by its plain terms, when the defendant misrepresents either that he is acting “as a representative of’ or “in the interest of’ one of the specified agencies or organizations.
A defendant misrepresents that he is acting “as a representative of’ an agency or organization when he misrepresents his capacity as an employee, agent, of someone with authority to act for the agency or organization. For example, the Second Circuit applied § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) where a defendant misrepresented he was a “ ‘state doctor’ able to approve applications for Benefits.” United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175, 179-80 (2d Cir.1994). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit applied § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) where a defendant falsely implied that he worked for the Internal Revenue Service so that he could collect gift taxes. United States v. Hall, 996 F.2d 284, 286-87 (11th Cir.1993).
Additionally, a defendant misrepresents that he is acting in the interest of an agency or organization when he: (1) actually is an employee, agent, or someone with authority to act for the agency or organization, and (2) misrepresents he is acting in the interest of that agency or organization. Thus, the Fourth Circuit applied § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) where a defendant, who was president of a charitable organization that conducted bingo games, misrepresented to the public he was acting in the interest of the charitable organization by collecting the public’s monies for the bingo organization. In fact, the defendant skimmed a percentage of the collected money for himself and his cohorts. United States v. Marcum, 16 F.3d 599, 603 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 137, 130 L.Ed.2d 79 (1994). In addition, the Seventh Circuit applied § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) to enhance the sentence of a defendant who misrepresented that he was acting in the interest of his church. In United States v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 1222, 1224 (7th Cir.1994), Mr. *1117Lilly, pastor at Faith Baptist Church ■ in Avon, Indiana, persuaded investors to purchase over $1.6 million in certificates of deposit from Faith Baptist with the promise that the money would be used to help the church expand its facilities. Pastor Lilly deposited the money in various bank accounts of the church, but withdrew funds for his own use and purchased four airplanes, a house, and made a down payment on a second house. Ultimately, the church went bankrupt owing over $1.3 million on the certificates of deposit. The Seventh Circuit summarily concluded § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) applied to enhance Pastor Lilly’s sentence because Lilly misrepresented “to all the investors that he was acting on behalf of .[ie., in the interest óf] a charitable or religious organization.” Id. at 1228.
Thus, courts have applied § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) in accord with the plain meaning of the guideline’s terms “on behalf of’ to both “as a representative of’ and “in the interest of’type fraud cases. However, in the instant case, the court restricts the scope of the plain language of § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A). The court concludes that the guideline should apply only to “as a representative of’ eases. See Majority op. at 1112. The court reasons that the examples listed in § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) application note 4 and the commentary background statements express an intent to narrow the application of the plain terms of § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A). I disagree.
Neither the examples set forth in application note 4 nor the background statements to § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) manifest an intent by the Sentencing Commission to narrow the scope of the plain language of § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A). Far from expressing any intent to narrow the scope of the plain language of § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A), application note 4 states that the three listed examples represent merely a few of many that would fall within the scope of the guideline: “[ejxamples of conduct to which this factor applies would include....” U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) application note 4 (emphasis added). Moreover, simply because each of the three examples portrays an “as a representative of’type case1 does not, in the absence of definite, clear language, indicate that the Sentencing Commission intended that the guide-fine apply to only “as a representative of’ cases. See United States v. Gandy, 36 F.3d 912, 914-15 (10th Cir.1994) (concluding examples fisted in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 application note 2 after words “would include” did not constitute exclusive fist prohibiting guideline from applying to other, unlisted situations). Moreover, the background commentary does not express an intent to restrict the scope of the plain language of § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) to “as a representative of’ cases. Contrary to the court’s restrictive interpretation, the background commentary indicates that “[t]his guideline is designed to apply to a wide variety of fraud cases.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 commentary, background.
Thus, neither the examples set forth in application note 4 nor the commentary background statements support the court’s restrictive reading of § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A).2 I therefore believe § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A), in accord with its plain language, background commen*1118tary, and interpretations by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, applies where a defendant misrepresents he is acting “in the interest of’ one of the specified agencies or organizations.
Applying these principles to the instant case, Defendant misrepresented he was acting in the interest of an educational agency, the UTSC. As the president of the UTSC, Defendant prepared or had prepared false documentation that certified he would use $10,000 grant money provided by the DOL for computer training services for UTSC clients. Instead of acting in the UTSC’s interest, however, Defendant acted in his and Ms. David’s interest by: (1) using $8,206.64 of the grant money to fund an unauthorized computer purchase of his own design, and (2) giving the remaining $1,793.36 to Ms. David.3 Thus, because Defendant made a representation that he was acting in the interest of an educational agency, when in fact he was not, I conclude the district court correctly applied § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) to enhance Defendant’s sentence. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Application note 4 to § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) states:
Examples of conduct to which this factor applies would include a group of defendants who solicit contributions to a non-existent famine relief organization by mail, a defendant who diverts donations for a religiously affiliated school by telephone solicitations to church members in which the defendant falsely claims to be a fund-raiser for the school, or a defendant who poses as a federal collection agent in order to collect a delinquent student loan.
Each of these examples portrays an "as a representative of"-type case because in each the defendant misrepresents his capacity as an employee, agent, or someone with authority to act for the agency or organization (which can be either fictitious or real).

. The majority's restrictive interpretation would thwart the purpose behind § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) in some fraud cases. The guideline’s purpose is to punish those who “take advantage of victims' trust in government or law enforcement agencies or their generosity and charitable motives." U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) commentary, background. However, the majority would not apply the guideline in accord with its plain language to each case where its purpose was served. To illustrate, under the majority's reasoning, § 2F 1.1 (b)(3)(A) would not apply to the defendant in Lilly because the defendant was actually the pastor of Faith Baptist Church — i.e., the defendant could not misrepresent he was acting as a representative of the church because he was a representative of the church. However, had the defendant been posing as the pastor (and not actually the pastor), the result would change and the guideline would apply. The Sentencing Commission did not intend to draw this illusory distinction. Rather, the Sentencing Commission *1118intended that the guideline apply to a wide variety of fraud cases to punish those who "take advantage of victims’ trust in government or law enforcement agencies or their generosity and charitable motives.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) commentary, background.

. The court suggests that Defendant would have had to benefit personally from his misapplication of the funds in order for the guideline to apply. Majority Op. at 1112. However, neither the plain language of § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) nor its commentary specifies that the defendant must personally gain from his misrepresentation in order for the guideline to apply.