Court Opinion

ID: 9675327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:49:19.129528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.373242
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
While I agree with the majority opinion’s handling of appellant’s ground of review, I write to comment on the court of appeals analysis of his jeopardy issue.
*866In 1987 this court unanimously adopted as our own the decision of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in January v. State, 695 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.App.—13th District, 1985). See January v. State, 732 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.Cr.App., 1987). In that case, the court of appeals succinctly delineated the three separate guarantees afforded by the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution and also the three different tests for determining the meaning of the phrase “same offense” germane to each of the three tests. I quote extensively from that opinion:
At the outset, it is necessary for us to point out that the United States Supreme Court has specifically noted three separate guarantees arising from the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. It:
(1) protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,
(2) protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and
(3) protects against multiple punishments for the same offense [in the same trial],
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980).
Each of these guarantees affords an accused a separate constitutional protection, and each protection requires a court to focus on different factors in determining the extent of the constitutional protection. For example, the collateral es-toppel doctrine owes its existence to the first guarantee of double jeopardy protection (which protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal) and requires a reviewing court to determine what issues were resolved favorably to the accused in a former trial, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), while the third guarantee of double jeopardy protection (which protects against multiple punishments for the same offense requires a court to review the statutory elements of two offenses when they are alleged to be “the same. ” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The second guarantee of double jeopardy protection (which protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction) has proven quite difficult to effectuate and, as noted below, has confused courts trying to define the parameters of the constitutional protection. The present case involves this second guarantee of double jeopardy protection, (emphasis supplied)
January, supra at 220.
It should be apparent that in the present case1 the jeopardy issue concerns protections afforded under the first guarantee, not under the second or third. Therefore the “same offense” test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) would, to me, seem inapplicable to the case at bar.
With these comments, I join the majority opinion.

. And, should the State file a new complaint and information alleging the offense of criminally negligent homicide, in this new case also.