Court Opinion

ID: 9719768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:03:02.482272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:09.914272
License: Public Domain

BIEGELMEIER, Judge
(dissenting).
While I am in general agreement with Judge HANSON’S opinion. I cannot reach the same result and will endeavor to explain ithis divergence.
At common law and in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, parties to the action and interested persons, although not parties, were incompetent as witnesses, 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 159, 170; 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 120; nor was a man bound to furnish his adversary with evidence to be used against himself and discovery by a bill in equity supplied the means to remedy this defect. 17 Am. Jur., Discovery and Inspection, §§ 2 and 3. The general background may be found in 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 169 and § 172 and is referred to in McKay v. Brink, 65 S.D. 472, 275 N.W. 72.
Some of the statutory history of Dakota Territory and this state appear in Dunlap v. Thiele, 64 S.D. 150, 265 N.W. 593 and see comments in Langford v. Issenhuth, 28 S.D. 451, 134 N.W. 889. The general disqualifications of interest or being a party, etc., have been abolished with few exceptions. SDC 36.01. Not only may such persons testify but they *54may be “compelled to give evidence,” at any time before trial (SDC 36.0503) and a party “may call an adverse party and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by an opposing party. Any other opposing party may contradict and impeach any such witness.” SDC 36.0208. Greater latitude °is allowed in cross-examination under the statute than in ordinary cross-examination. First State Bank of Wood v. Anderson, 46 S.D. 104, 191 N.W. 339. As started in Langford v. Issenhuth, supra [28 S.D. 451, 134 N.W. 892], the Minnesota court has said “that the object of the statute was to permit a party to call his> adversary at the trial without making him his own witness, * * that the widest and freest scope is to be given the examination * * *” and “The whole case may be fully and minutely investigated.”
The Minnesota court has held “Where a party is in ‘default as to any issue, the essential element of adversity between the parties as a requisite for cross-examination has disappeared as to that issue.” Pearson v. Bertelson, 1955, 244 Minn. 224, 69 N.W.2d 621, 626; Alsleben v. Oliver Carp., 1959, 254 Minn. 197, 94 N.W.2d 354 and cases cited. Despite consistent holdings on this point that it is error to permit cross-examination under its statute of a defendant in default, it may not be prejudicial error to permit it. Alsleben v. Oliver Corp., supra. Other courts have come to varied conclusions on the subject and their decisions may be located in the West Digest, Witnesses, [key] 276. See Schwartz Supply Co. v. Breen, La.App., 184 So. 228, where evidence of one Co. v. Breen, La.App., 184 So. 228, where evidence of one defendant on cross-examination was held inadmissible against a codefendanit perhaps because of decisions under the Louisiana statute that a codefendant may not cross-examine such witness. In South Dakota, however, codefendants are entitled to such cross-examination. Dunlap v. Thiele, 64 S.D. 150, 265 N.W. 593. See also W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Cook Tex. Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 625, where cross-examination of a defendant was permitted even where the cddefendant claimed the other defendant occupied the position of a plaintiff.
*55In Peterson v. Peterson, 74 Cal.App.2d 312, 168 P.2d 474, the court held in an action ¡to quiet title where a defendant had disclaimed his interest in real property, he ■could not be called for cross-examination on that cause of action but could be called for cross-examination in the same action on a separate cause of action for damages. In Johnson v. St. Sure, 50 Cal.App. 735, 195 P. 947, it was held that evidence of one defendant on cross-examination was admissible against a codefendant. In Butler v. Parrocha, 186 Va. 426, 43 S.E.2d 1, 4, the statutes read:
“Sec. 3. ‘If any party required by another to testify on his behalf, refused testify, it shall be lawful for the court, * * * to dismiss the action
“Sec. 4. ‘A party called to testify for another, having an adverse interest, may be examined by such other party according to the rules applicable to cross-examination.’ ”
That statute apparently had its origin in 1865. The court said:
“It is clear that the intent of the legislature was, first, to compel a litigant, if called by another party to the cause, to testify in behalf of such other party; and, second, to permit any litigant to call and cross-examine any person ‘having an adverse interest’ in the outcome of the litigation, whether or not a party. * * *
“Sections 3350 and 3351 were construed in Ferguson v. Daughtrey, 94 Va. 308, 315, 26 S.E. 822, 825, where it was held that ‘where a party seeking to impeach a transaction for fraud calls as witnesses the parties to the transaction, which, owing to the exigencies of the case, he is obliged to do, and proves by them facts from which the law infers fraud, or which are inconsistent with good faith, and outweigh and overcome their denial of ¡the fraud, effect must be given to the facts so proved, and the transaction annulled.’
*56“The substance of this holding is that an admission of a party to the cause against his interest is substantive evidence and in the proper case may overcome positive testimony of the same party.”
In a case reported by headnote only in 42 N.E.2d 853, it is stated that in a garnishment proceeding, interests of a judgment debtor continued to be adverse to the judgment creditor, and trial court should have permitted judgment creditor to call the judgment debtor as a witness for cross-examination. Nudelman v. Stern, 315 Ill.App. 215, 42 N.E.2d 853. In Adams v. Farmers’ State Bank, 1928, 176 Minn. 108, 222 N.W. 576, referred to in the Alsleben opinion, supra, the court held cross-examination of a defaulted defendant in an action for fraud was proper for the reason that judgment could not be entered against the defaulted defendant without proving the cause of action alleged. In Sturgeon v. Hanson, 1932, 62 N.D. 720, 245 N.W. 481, 482, the court held cross-examination of a defendant was admissible even though he was in default stating: “It is a matter of no consequence, so far as the exercise of the statutory right (of cross-examination) is c'oncerned, that this defendant was in default, or that during his examination it appeared he was not as reluctant to impart information and disclose the truth as he might have been if he had been disposed to resist the plaintiff’s claim.”
In justice to the trial judge in the case at bar, it appears his rulings followed Dunlap v. Thiele, supra. I agree that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s request to call the defendant as an adverse witness. See Morrell Livestock Co. v. Stockman’s Commission Co., 1957, 77 S.D. 114, 86 N.W.2d 533.
It being error, was the error prejudicial? In my opinion, it was prejudicial. In Larson v. Nelson, 54 S.D. 184, 223 N.W. 41 44, as to the refusal of the trial court to permit cross-examination in a will contest, this court said:
“It is clear that a will contest is a proceeding, and respondent, being a party to the record, was subject to be called and examined as an adverse witness, and it was error to sustain the objection made.”
*57In Bates v. Flath, 1947, 81 Ohio App. 188, 78 N.E.2d 56, 57, the court under similar statute said: “Thus the plaintiff was given a positive -right, and if the admissions of the defendant in any degree contributed to prove plaintiff’s case, she was entitled to such examination and its denial to her was prejudicial error.” Sturgeon v. Hanson, supra. This right to call an adverse party for cross-examination and thoroughly question him was recognized in Clements v. Keith, 53 S.D. 588, 221 N.W. 675.
A party calling another party for cross-examination is in a much different position from the calling of a witness as his own as to the manner and result of such examination. Langford v. Issenhuth, supra. While Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed. § 897 considers the origin and present status of this difference, one phase of it is briefly stated in McCormick on Evidence, § 38, page 70, as
“The common law rule forbidding a party to impeach his own witness is of obscure origin * * * among the reasons * * * found for the rule are, first, that the party by calling the witness to testify vouches for his trustworthiness * *
A party is not bound by the evidence given by a witness on cross-examination and may impeach or otherwise discredit him. See SDC 36.0208; Barker v. Coats, 41 S.D. 45, 168 N.W. 797; In re Houda’s Estate, 76 S.D. 388, 79 N.W.2d 289.
Here, where plaintiff had this “right,” it wag denied by the -trial court, and he was thus required to call defendant Gill as his own witness; the prejudice was al-1 the more apparent when Gill was asked on his cross-examination by the garnishee if he had any intent to defraud plaintiff and he answered that he did not. How could plaintiff expect to convince the jury when the garnishee and plaintiff’s own witness testified there was no intent to defraud? When, as the Supreme Court of our sister state of North Dakota has pointed out in Wellens v. Beck, N.D.1957, 84 N.W.2d 345, at page 360, the generally accepted rule is that a chattel mortgage such as is involved in this action is not prasump*58tively fraudulent as we here affirm, but is void as to creditors, this court should not erect another shield in the hands of the parties to this claimed fraud. For these reasons I am unable to concur in the opinion and respectfully dissent. The error was prejudicial and the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.