Court Opinion

ID: 9671057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:30:14.795688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.921737
License: Public Domain

*691Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s analysis regarding witness Pryor and its result. However, I write separately to address the claimed error regarding the nonappearance of witness Anderson. I would hold that “due diligence” is not the statutory standard, and that there was no abuse of discretion in proceeding without him.
In People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281; 537 NW2d 813 (1995), all seven members of this Court recognized that in enacting MCL 767.40a; MSA 28.980(1) the Legislature eliminated the court-created requirement, unique “in the country if not the world,”1 that the prosecuting attorney use “due diligence” to produce all res gestae witnesses. Id. at 287, 308. While the context of the case was the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor violated the statute by failing to exercise “due diligence” to earlier discover a witness who was endorsed during trial, the majority and the dissent both recognized that the amendment of the statute eliminated due diligence as a standard and provided that witnesses may be added or deleted upon leave of the court and for good cause shown or by stipulation of the parties. Justice Levin’s dissent, joined by Justices Cavanagh and Mallett, advocated adoption of the five-part standard for good cause of People v Travis, 443 Mich 668, 680-683; 505 NW2d 563 (1993), which would require some minimal level of diligence by the prosecutor. Burwick, supra at 309. However, the dissenters agreed that in adopting the good-cause standard, the Legislature did away with the “due dili*692gence” requirement. Id. at 308. As Justice Levin observed:
Using the majority’s metaphor, the fat lady has already sung and we have no thought of bringing her back for an encore. [Id.]
While it is true that Burwick involved only the issue whether due diligence or good cause was the standard applicable to the discovery and alleged late endorsement of a witness rather than, as in this case, an alleged due diligence obligation to produce an endorsed witness, the statute makes no distinction between these situations. Rather, it provides that the list of witnesses that will be called may be amended as follows:
The prosecuting attorney may add or delete from the list of witnesses he or she intends to call at trial at any time upon leave of the court and for good cause shown or by stipulation of the parties. [MCL 767.40a(4); MSA 28.980(1)(4) (emphasis added).]
It follows, and I would hold, that the “lady” is not off stage waiting to resume her due diligence role under the amended statute. The Legislature has eliminated her part in this morality play. People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698; 273 NW2d 856 (1979), mandating post-conviction evidentiary hearings regarding whether the prosecutor had exercised “due diligence” under the former statute, has been legislatively overruled.
As recognized by the entire Court in Burwick, the appropriate inquiry under the amended statute is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excus*693ing production of the witness.2 Applying that inquiry, under either the majority approach or that of the dissent in Burwick there was no error. Under either approach, prejudice must be shown. Id. at 294. In contrast with his position regarding Pryor’s absence, defendant made only a pro forma objection to Anderson’s failure to appear. No claim was made that defendant’s case was adversely affected by Anderson’s absence, nor did counsel request a continuance so that additional efforts could be made to locate him.3 Under the good-cause standard, unanimously endorsed in Burwick, the trial judge had the discretion to fashion a remedy to mitigate any potential unfairness from the failure to produce Anderson. However, with respect to Anderson, no unfairness or prejudice was alleged, and no remedy was requested.
The purpose of the statutory amendment was precisely to preclude use of allegations of lack of a statutory obligation of due diligence as a predicate for reversal on appeal. Failure to address the due diligence issue regarding Anderson despite our prior holding suggests lack of commitment to Burwick and will perpetuate confusion regarding a constantly recurring issue in trials and appeals of criminal cases. In my view, given these considerations, the Court has an obligation to the jurisprudence to reaffirm that the Legislature intended to eliminate use of due diligence as an appellate balloon and repose the question of the calling of witnesses to the discretion of the trial court, a decision that creates a reciprocal responsibil*694ity on the objecting party to establish a record basis for a claim of prejudicial error. I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing witness Anderson, and that to the extent that opinions from the Court of Appeals have resurrected “due diligence” as a statutory obligation, they are in error.

 Senate Analysis, SB 119 (1986 PA 46), March 26, 1986, p 1.

 The prosecutor did not formally move to strike the witness list as the statute contemplates. However, the court’s ruling effectuated that result.

 There is no suggestion of the prosecutor’s bad faith. Burwick at 308-309 (Levin, J., dissenting).