Court Opinion

ID: 9963871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:06:52.023485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.432111
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1661-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALFRED D. HOLLAWAY,
a/k/a ALFRED HOLLAWAY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                    Submitted April 9, 2024 – Decided April 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown, Haas and Bergman.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 21-01-
                   0031.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General for the State of
                   New Jersey, attorney for respondent (Deborah Cronin
                   Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and
                   on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Alfred Hollaway appeals from an order denying his motion to

suppress an out-of-court identification made by an undercover police officer

after an evidentiary hearing.

      Following the denial of his motion, defendant entered a conditional guilty

plea to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(i), transporting a firearm to unlawfully dispose of it to

another person, and to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j), unlawful possession of a firearm

with a prior armed robbery conviction. As part of the plea agreement, all other

charges against defendant in the indictment were dismissed. Thereafter, the

court heard and denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This

appeal followed.

      Defendant raises the following singular point on appeal:

            POINT I

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
            DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
            UNDER COVER OFFICER'S OUT-OF-COURT
            IDENTIFICATION

      Having considered this argument in light of the record and applicable legal

principles, we affirm.

                                     I.

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      The record developed at the Wade/Henderson hearing1 held by the trial

court in this matter reflects the following.

      On June 11, 2020, an undercover officer ("UCO") was working as part of

the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office Narcotics Task Force Unit. ("Task

Force"). At approximately 4:44 p.m., the UCO was in the parking lot of a South

Plainfield shopping mall to engage in a narcotics transaction with Tyrell Coffey.

When Coffey arrived, the UCO talked with him about the drug transaction and

they also spoke about purchasing a firearm. Coffey informed the UCO that he

had an AK-47 with three magazines for sale and that the UCO would need to

"get the money right away" if he wanted to purchase the gun. After negotiating

a price, the two reached an agreement for the UCO to purchase the gun and

magazines for $1300. They agreed that the UCO would obtain the money

immediately and Coffey would return with the gun. Although the UCO had been

part of hundreds of undercover narcotics operations, this was his first gun

purchase.

      Once Coffey left, the UCO went to the post-purchase location to obtain

the funds and discuss the transaction with other detectives. At around 5:37 p.m.,

1
 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208
(2011).
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                                         3
the UCO returned to the parking lot to purchase the gun. He parked his car and

waited while a surveillance unit monitored the exchange. Approximately fifteen

minutes later, Coffey arrived with a female passenger in the same silver Cadillac

he was driving earlier. A red Hyundai was trailing him. Coffey parked his car

in front of the UCO’s car and the red Hyundai parked next to the UCO. The

UCO could see that a Black male was driving the Hyundai, whom he later

identified as defendant. He relayed a description of the driver and the car to his

surveillance unit.

      All three men exited their vehicles and met at the back of the Hyundai.

Defendant asked the UCO, "where's the money", and he replied by asking,

"where's the weapon". All three men were standing close together at the back

of the Hyundai. There was still daylight at the time.

      Defendant opened the trunk and popped the vehicle liner to show the UCO

a blue bag with a black trash bag inside. Defendant opened the bags to show the

gun inside the trash bag and then gave the gun to Coffey, who put the gun in the

UCO's car. The UCO gave the money to Coffey. Thereafter, the three men

talked about future gun purchases and they told the UCO that selling guns is

"what [they] do . . . [They]'ll take care of it."

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       After the exchange, the UCO returned to his car and provided descriptions

of the gun seller to the surveillance unit, describing defendant as "Black male,

gray beard, black t-shirt, kind of tall" and the red Hyundai as having a Tennessee

tag.

       The UCO left the parking lot and went to the post-purchase location to

meet with additional detectives to secure the weapon. He told detectives to stay

with the Hyundai to attempt to identify defendant because at that time he did not

know the name of the driver.        Thereafter, the UCO went to Task Force

headquarters. Defendant remained in the parking lot and appeared to be sleeping

in the red Hyundai.

       At headquarters, other detectives were attempting to identify the driver,

and although at the hearing the UCO testified he did not recall assisting them,

Detective Anthony Pacillo testified that the UCO was "assisting in the lookups".

Detective Pacillo was also working for the Task Force and participated in the

undercover operation. He was part of the surveillance unit acting as lead

investigator. Detective Pacillo observed the drug and gun transactions made by

the UCO and could see Coffey and defendant from a distance but could not make

out any distinguishing characteristics.

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      Detective Pacillo obtained the red Hyundai's license plate number from

another detective and ran the license plate. The car was registered as a rental

from Enterprise. Detectives contacted Enterprise and found that the renter was

Shermaine Green. Defendant, Alfred Hollaway was listed as an additional

driver on the rental car agreement. A criminal history search revealed a recent

arrest of Hollaway in Pennsylvania. Detectives obtained a booking photo from

the Pennsylvania agency at 9:00 p.m. on June 11, 2020.

      Detective Pacillo testified he showed the photograph to the UCO within

three to five minutes after receiving it, without saying anything "specific other

than . . . is this him or whatever." The UCO said "yeah, that's the guy. . . that's

him" referring to the man he had just purchased the gun from approximately

three hours earlier. The UCO signed and dated the back of the photo to record

the positive identification.

      The UCO testified that there was "no doubt in [his] mind" that the man in

the photo was the seller. Detective Pacillo testified that he is familiar with

photographic arrays, but he did not use that type of procedure because it "doesn't

. . . pertain to [a] law enforcement [identification]". The UCO prepared a report

dated July 2, 2020, concerning the operation and stated that his normal practice

was to write his reports within a day or two of the operation and upload it later.

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There was no official record made of the identification procedure other than the

UCO's report. The time between the UCO's interaction with defendant and

Detective Pacillo showing him the photograph was slightly more than three

hours.

      The hearing record indicates the UCO's training included attending and

instructing several undercover trainings including the Attorney General Top

Gun case agent training, the Unit School and the FBI/State Police School. At

these trainings, he was taught how to focus on suspects during transactions

involving anywhere from one to ten people and to recount the event in a report

the day of an event or the following day to preserve his recollection of the

interaction.   As part of his duties as an instructor at the Unit School and

FBI/State Police School, he taught undercover officers-in-training. He trained

them what to look for when meeting people during an undercover investigation,

how to pay attention, how to stay in the moment and how to be alert.         In his

time as a UCO, he took part in wiretap investigations, met with targets to observe

transactions, bought drugs, guns, and fake licenses, and participated in

surveillance operations. He was the primary undercover officer in a recent case

where the Task Force dismantled a higher network drug organization.

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      Additionally, the UCO observed and spoke to defendant for several

minutes during the interaction even before the gun was visible. Also, the UCO

knew that he would be responsible for identifying the suspect at a later point and

knew to make direct observations of him.

                                      II.

      In support of his motion, defendant asserted that the identification was

insufficiently recorded in the UCO's July 2, 2020 report.          Defendant also

criticized the UCO's ability to recall the interaction because he originally

thought the red Hyundai was a Sonata rather than an Elantra and because he was

under additional stress as this was his first undercover firearm purchase and he

did not have sufficient time to observe the seller. Defendant also claimed that

some of Detective Pacillo's reported observations were given to him by other

detectives so they were not reliable. Defendant argued that the identification

was unreliable based on the totality of the circumstances and it should be

suppressed. Defendant further argues that the trial court failed to properly

consider the variables determining the reliability of an identification set forth in

Henderson.

      The State argues that the motion was properly denied because defendant

did not show that the procedure created a sufficient likelihood of irreparable

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misidentification. In support of its argument the identification was reliable, the

State posited the UCO was not a civilian witness but was a trained undercover

officer and an instructor to other officers concerning appropriate procedures in

an undercover operation.

                                      III.

      In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we "must uphold

the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Lamb, 218

N.J. 300, 313 (2014). Factual findings are accorded deference because they "are

substantially influenced by [the trial court's] opportunity to hear and see the

witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot

enjoy." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42

N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Therefore, the trial court's findings on the admissibility

of identification evidence are "entitled to very considerable weight." State v.

Farrow, 61 N.J. 434, 451 (1972). A finding that the identification procedures

were reliable should not be disturbed unless they fail the sufficient credible

evidence standard of review. State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 203 (2008).

      The purpose of a Wade/Henderson hearing is for the trial court to

determine whether an identification procedure created a substantial likelihood

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of irreparable misidentification, such that the identification was unreliable and

should be suppressed at trial. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229-230. New Jersey adopted

this principle in Henderson, 208 N.J. at 289.

       To obtain a pretrial Wade/Henderson hearing, "a defendant has the initial

burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a

mistaken identification." Henderson, 208 N.J. at 288. The evidence must be

tied to some system variable – usually law enforcement conduct – and not an

estimator variable. Id. at 288-89. Next, the State must offer proof that the

eyewitness identification was reliable. Id. at 189. Finally, the ultimate burden

is "on the defendant to prove a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification." Ibid. The third part of the test is taken from New Jersey's

previous test articulated in State v. Madison, and the court considers the relevant

system and estimator variables when determining whether a defendant has met

their burden. 109 N.J. 223, 239 (1988); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 291.

       System variables are variables within the control of the legal system, and

estimator variables are out of the legal system's control. Henderson, 208 N.J. at

247.    In Henderson, the Court listed system variables for eyewitness

identifications as: blind administration, pre-identification instructions, lineup

construction, feedback, recording confidence, multiple viewings, show up

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timeline, private actors, and other identifications made.               Id. 289-91.

Additionally, the Court listed estimator variables as: stress, weapon focus,

duration,   distance    and   lighting,    witness   characteristics,    perpetrator

characteristics, memory decay, race-bias, opportunity to view the criminal,

degree of attention, accuracy of prior descriptions, level of certainty

demonstrated at identification before feedback, and time between the crime and

confrontation. Id. at 291-93.

      Although a show-up identification process typically is "inherently

suggestive," the display of a single suspect in a photographic identification is

not impermissibly suggestive when it occurs "on or near the scene . . . 'before

memory has faded.'" State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 504 (2006) (citing State v.

Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452, 461 (1972)). On or near-the-scene identifications

"facilitate and enhance fast and effective police action[,]" because they are likely

to be accurate and to avoid inconvenience for witnesses. Ibid.

      The risk of misidentification is not heightened when the identification

occurs "within two hours of an event." State v. Pressley, 232 N.J. 587, 592

(2018). The court in Pressley declined to answer whether an identification made

by a law enforcement officer should be evaluated under the same standards as a

civilian eyewitness. Id. at 591. However, in State v. Little, a case with similar

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                                          11
facts to Pressley, we observed that "[t]here can be no dispute that a trained

undercover police officer has heightened awareness of the need for proper

identification of persons who engage in drug purveyance." 296 N.J. Super. 573,

580 (App. Div. 1997).

                                     IV.

      Having carefully considered the entire record and applicable law, we

determine that the trial judge's findings were based on sufficient, credible

evidence in the hearing record and his denial of defendant's motion to suppress

the UCO's identification was appropriate.

      In his written decision denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the judge

cited to the Manson/Madison 2 factors. Although our Court supplemented the

standards of Manson/ Madison in Henderson, we are convinced the evidence

and factual findings the trial judge relied upon adequately addressed the factors

as required by Henderson. 208 N.J. 208 (2011).

      Initially, the court held an evidentiary hearing concerning the

identification, implicitly determining the "show-up" identification showed some

2
 See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); State v. Madison, 109 N.J.
223 (1988).
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                                      12
evidence of suggestiveness under the first prong of Henderson. At the hearing,

testimony was taken which was relevant to the system and estimator variables.

      The trial judge found the identification was reliable based upon the

following findings. The judge found that the identification procedure in the

undercover operation "was not so inherently suggestive that it fail[ed] to pass

the preliminary inquiry of non-suggestiveness." The judge found that based on

the registration information for the red Hyundai defendant was observed driving,

detectives worked to "piece together his identity starting with the vehicle ['s]

rental information". This led them to conduct an NCIC search which produced

a booking photograph from an arrest of defendant in Pennsylvania. The trial

judge determined when the photo was shown to the UCO a "mere three hours

after the controlled purchase," the conditions under which the UCO observed

defendant make clear that presenting the UCO with the photograph to identify

defendant was a "reasonable substitution for an in person show-up, a line up, or

a photo array."

      The judge found the UCO was operating as part of a Task Force along

with other surveillance personnel, whose duties included the identification of

the driver of the red Hyundai.      The judge also determined the show-up

methodology employed by the Task Force officers "was not so suggestive as to

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fail the first inquiry of admissibility."   The findings by the trial judge cited

Detective Pacillo's testimony as credible as he did not say anything to the UCO

other than "is this him?" The judge also found Detective Pacillo did not disclose

to the UCO that the photo depicted the additional driver listed on the Hyundai's

rental agreement.

      The judge stated that the UCO was "an experienced officer, trained as an

illicit-drug-activity investigator with hundreds of controlled purchases

involving a number of different forms of contraband."         In addition to his

training, the judge noted that the UCO had a strong incentive to be observant.

Also, the judge found the conditions were ideal for the UCO to observe

defendant, making findings that it was sunny and bright outside and the UCO

was already familiar with Coffey due to their previous interactions. The judge

added the transaction took several minutes to complete during which time the

UCO had an unhindered line of sight and multiple opportunities to view

defendant.

      Recognizing the show-up identification procedure may create the

likelihood of misidentification, the trial judge determined that the UCO was also

working with the investigation team to identify the driver as compared to a

civilian witness. The judge determined the UCO knew who and what he was

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looking for while the search was pending because he had just directly observed

defendant approximately three hours prior to his identification.

      After a thorough review of the record, we determine the judge's findings

which applied the system and estimator variables were based on sufficient

credible evidence in the record and support the judge’s denial of defendant’s

motion.

      The UCO was an experienced undercover officer who had participated in

hundreds of undercover operations in his career. While this was his first gun

sale and his stress level may have been moderately heightened, this was not his

first undercover operation as he had participated in hundreds of undercover

operations. He attended several trainings to become an undercover officer and

was an instructor to other officers-in-training on how to focus on and identify

individuals involved in undercover operations. His training prepared him for

undercover situations involving identifying up to ten individuals. He knew

going into the operation that he would need to later identify the seller of the gun,

and even told his surveillance unit while he was completing the sale to

investigate the red Hyundai's tags to obtain an identification.

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      We have determined that an undercover officer has heightened awareness

of the importance of a proper identification, as compared to a civilian

eyewitness. Little, 296 N.J. Super at 580.

      In this instance, the gun purchase transaction took place over a sufficient

period of time where the UCO was able to clearly observe defendant. The UCO

had ideal viewing conditions during the firearm sale. Both Detective Pacillo

and the UCO testified it was still light out when the transaction occurred at

around 6:00 p.m. The interaction lasted several minutes, during many of which

defendant was standing close to the UCO and speaking to him. He had ample

opportunity to note defendant's face and appearance and commit it to memory.

      Although a gun was present, there was no evidence in the record that the

gun was being used to threaten the UCO or anyone else.          The gun was the

subject matter of the sale and was contained in a bag and unloaded at the time

of the exchange. The evidence presented at the hearing showed the UCO had

three distinct opportunities to view defendant without the distraction of the

firearm being visible. The first, when defendant pulled the red Hyundai into the

parking spot next to his car. The second, when all three men exited their vehicles

to begin the transaction and exchanged words. The third, after the gun was

secured in his vehicle and the men talked about future gun purchases.

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      Additionally, the UCO had already met with Coffey earlier in the day,

therefore it was less likely he would have been distracted in trying to remember

features and descriptions of both men.        His primary concerns during the

transaction were to purchase the gun and observe defendant for later

identification.

      We note there was a negative factor concerning the reliability of the

UCO's identification which was the additional one-hour time difference

exceeding the two-hour window articulated as guidance in Henderson and

Pressley. Nonetheless, when considering the other evidence supporting the

reliability of the identification, we conclude the excess time was insignificant

when weighed against the other cumulative evidence supporting the overall

reliability of the identification. The UCO was still actively working to assist the

investigation unit in identifying defendant during the three-hour period. There

was no gap where he began working on another case or through his shift ending,

which could have caused a lapse of memory or his focus to move elsewhere.

      The UCO testified "without a doubt" the photograph depicted the seller of

the firearm. He immediately signed and dated the photograph to record the

positive identification, indicating that he was certain this was the man from

which he purchased the gun.

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      While the trial judge did not directly cite Henderson in his written

decision, the record shows his rulings clearly considered the factors required

under the case including the relevant system and estimator variables. When

applying the standards required by Henderson to the trial judge’s findings, we

conclude his determination the UCO's identification was reliable, is based on

sufficient, credible evidence in the hearing record.

      In addition, after our in-depth review of the record including the trial

judge's factual findings addressed previously, we also determine based on those

same reasons, there was not sufficient, credible evidence proffered by defendant

that the identification procedure created a sufficient likelihood of irreparable

misidentification as required by Henderson.

      To the extent we have not otherwise addressed defendant's arguments,

they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. Rule

R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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