Court Opinion

ID: 9742455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:14:09.615462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:32.746684
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring: While the majority correctly reverses the judgment of the appellate court, it omits any discussion of the appellate court’s reasoning and fails to explain why that reasoning was in error. I write separately to do so. The appellate court provided a straightforward analysis in support of its decision to affirm the circuit court’s granting of defendant’s motion to suppress. At the outset, the appellate court noted that there was no dispute in this case that the Chicago police officers who arrested defendant in Indiana were in fresh pursuit when they crossed the state line. The appellate court further noted that section 35 — 33—3—1 of Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute (Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—1 (Michie 1998)) provides the statutory authority for an out-of-state officer to effect an arrest in Indiana when the officer is in fresh pursuit. Section 35 — 33—3—1 states: “Any member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within [Indiana] in such fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.” Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—1 (Michie 1998). The appellate court then observed, however, that the Chicago officers, in violation of section 35 — 33—3—2 of the Indiana statute (Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—2 (Michie 1998)), failed to bring defendant before an Indiana judge before returning him to Illinois. Section 35 — 33—3—2 provides: “If an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of this state. If the judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall discharge the person arrested.” Ind. Code Ann. §35 — 33—3—2 (Michie 1998). The appellate court concluded, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the police officers’ failure to comply with the presentment requirements of section 35 — 33— 3 — 2 rendered defendant’s arrest statutorily invalid. The court explained: “Chicago police officers had no inherent authority to effect an arrest in Indiana; rather, the Chicago police officers’ authority to make an arrest in Indiana was derived from Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute and the authority provided by the Indiana statute is conditioned by the requirement that an accused shall be brought before an Indiana judge for a determination of the lawfulness of the arrest. Accordingly, under the rationale of People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447, which we endorse, defendant’s arrest was unlawful.” (Emphasis added.) 367 Ill. App. 3d at 881. According to the appellate court, the presentment requirement in section 35 — 33—3—2 was a condition precedent to the authority granted in section 35 — 33— 3 — 1. The failure to comply with the presentment requirement meant that the officers had no statutory authority to arrest defendant. The appellate court then pointed to this court’s decision in People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2002), which holds that a police officer’s right to arrest a person outside his jurisdiction is no greater than that of a private citizen and “that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.” See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Savage, 430 Mass. 341, 719 N.E.2d 473 (1999) (invoking the exclusionary rule when an out-of-state officer effected an extraterritorial arrest without statutory or common law authority). Because the appellate court had determined that defendant’s arrest was made without statutory authority, the court applied the rule of Carrera and affirmed the circuit court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress. In my view, the appellate court erred in its reading of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute and in its conclusion that defendant’s arrest was statutorily unauthorized. It is a well-settled rule that we may not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions. People v. Martinez, 184 Ill. 2d 547, 550 (1998). Nothing in the Indiana fresh-pursuit statute states that the presentment requirement of section 35 — 33—3—2 conditions the authority to arrest provided in section 35 — 33—3—1. Nor does the statute state that the failure to present a defendant before an Indiana judge negates the authority to arrest a defendant in fresh pursuit. The presentment requirement is a procedure to be followed after a statutorily authorized arrest has been made. See, e.g., State v. Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 356 N.W.2d 868 (1984); see also People v. Junco, 70 Misc. 2d 73, 333 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (describing the condition-precedent argument as an “exotic assertion” that would impose absolute liability on all inadvertent violations of the presentment requirement), aff’d, People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419, 321 N.E.2d 875, 363 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1974). Of course, having determined that the Chicago police officers were authorized to arrest defendant, there still remains the entirely separate question as to whether the exclusionary rule should be applied when police officers inadvertently fail to comply with the presentment requirement of section 35 — 33—3—2. For the reasons stated by the majority (see 229 Ill. 2d at 518-24), I agree that it should not. Accordingly, I join in the judgment of the majority.