Court Opinion

ID: 9962078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 17:00:41.921422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:48.970769
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                               _______________________

                                     No. 22-2620
                               _______________________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                  ALBERT MCCALL,
                                             Appellant
                               _______________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                         District Court No. 2-17-cr-00341-001
                      District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
                             __________________________

                      Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                    April 19, 2024

               Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

                                  (Filed: April 22, 2024)

                             __________________________

                                      OPINION*
                             __________________________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
SMITH, Circuit Judge.

       Albert McCall pleaded guilty to crimes relating to identity theft. He now appeals

five components of his sentence. The Government appropriately concedes that the District

Court plainly erred in its computation of the loss amount resulting from McCall’s crimes

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). We perceive no other error. We will therefore vacate

McCall’s sentence and remand with instructions as set forth below.

                                            ***

       McCall participated in an identity-theft conspiracy. He obtained credit reports and

other personal information of individuals from a co-conspirator, seeking out the identities

of particularly wealthy victims. McCall then used the personal identifying information of

these wealthy victims to create counterfeit driver’s licenses and credit cards which were

used to apply for credit, make fraudulent purchases, and cash counterfeit checks. McCall

“amassed a network of operatives” who “helped him execute the scheme” across multiple

states, including his home state of Ohio. JA104.

       McCall entered an open guilty plea to six counts of criminal activity relating to the

scheme.1 Before McCall’s sentencing hearing, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence

Report (“PSR”), which calculated a total advisory Sentencing Guideline Range. As

relevant here, the PSR recommended a 12-level enhancement for a loss amount between

1
  The six counts were: (1) conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) transfer of false
identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2); (3) mail fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; (4) wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (two counts); and (5)
aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). McCall entered his open
plea after a jury had been empaneled and both sides had presented opening statements.

                                             2
$250,000 and $550,000; a 4-level enhancement for being a leader or organizer of extensive

criminal activity; and a 2-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means. The PSR

also recommended a 2-level decrease in offense level due to McCall’s purported

acceptance of responsibility.

       McCall filed objections, arguing, inter alia, that he was responsible for a loss of less

than $95,000 and that the enhancements for being a leader or organizer of extensive

criminal activity and for the use of sophisticated means were improperly applied. However,

McCall did not object to any of the facts in the PSR’s statement of the offense. The

Government, in turn, raised three objections: first, that the correct loss amount was between

$550,000 and $1,500,000; second, that McCall should have received an enhancement for

obstruction of justice; and third, that McCall should not have received an offense-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

       As relevant here, the District Court denied McCall’s objections and granted the

Government’s objections. This appeal followed.2

       1. Loss amount under § 2B1.1(b)(1)

       McCall first challenges the District Court’s application of a 14-level enhancement

pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(h) based on actual and intended losses totaling more than

2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. McCall timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review
factual findings as to sentencing enhancements for clear error, and we conduct plenary
review of legal rulings, including the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.
United States v. Caraballo, 88 F.4th 239, 243 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2023). We review forfeited
arguments for plain error. United States v. Grant, 9 F.4th 186, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2021) (en
banc).

                                              3
$550,000 and $1,500,000 or less. Several months after McCall was sentenced, this Court

decided United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022), which held that § 2B1.1

reaches only actual loss and does not apply to intended loss. Id. at 257.

       The Government notes that McCall preserved this issue but forfeited the argument

he employs on appeal. Nonetheless, the Government commendably concedes that the

District Court plainly erred in including intended loss in the § 2B1.1(b) calculation. We

agree and will therefore vacate McCall’s sentence in light of Banks and remand for

resentencing.3

       2. Leader/organizer enhancement under § 3B1.1(a)

       McCall further contends that the District Court erred in applying a 4-level organizer

enhancement pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). McCall asserts that he was neither an organizer nor a

leader of the scheme, but instead was merely a participant in the conspiracy who utilized

organizational skills. “As used in § 3B1.1, an ‘organizer’ is a person who generates a

coherent functional structure for coordinated criminal activity. Similarly, in § 3B1.1, a

‘leader’ is a person with high-level directive power or influence over criminal activity.”

United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 354 (3d Cir. 2022).

3
 The Government contends that we should instruct the District Court to impose a 12-level
enhancement for a loss amount more than $250,000 and up to $550,000. Though the
Government rightly points out that the District Court determined that McCall was
“responsible for purposes of § 2B1.1 for each and every actual or intended loss” presented
by the Government, JA100, we are unable to determine from the face of the record and
with the requisite degree of certitude which of those losses were intended and which were
actual. Thus, we direct the District Court to make findings of fact, setting forth with
particularity the losses that may be considered post-Banks.
                                             4
       We perceive no error in the District Court’s finding that McCall was an organizer

and leader of the conspiracy. He not only described himself as “the main” conspirator,

SA180, but inter alia, selected individuals to target for identity theft on the basis of their

perceived wealth, directed a co-conspirator to obtain credit reports and other victim

information, and described “sen[ding] [his] people out”—his “operatives”—to make

fraudulent purchases. SA208, JA104.

       3. Sophisticated means enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)

       McCall     also   challenges    the   sophisticated    means     enhancement     under

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), arguing that his conduct did not involve the use of sophisticated means.

The text of the Guideline directs that “[i]f . . . the offense otherwise involved sophisticated

means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting

sophisticated means, increase [the base offense level] by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). “[A] sophisticated means enhancement is appropriate where a

defendant’s conduct ‘shows a greater level of planning or concealment than a typical fraud

of its kind.’” United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting United

States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 315 (3d Cir. 2011)).

       The District Court did not err in applying the sophisticated means enhancement.

The District Court found that McCall not only purchased credit card and personal

information from the dark web, but he also accessed individual victims’ credit reports,

applied for credit in victims’ names and then purchased merchandise with said credit. In

addition, McCall also manufactured and used credit cards and counterfeit driver’s licenses.

                                              5
McCall does not dispute these factual findings, and the District Court did not err in

concluding that they constitute sophisticated means.4

       4. Obstruction of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1

       McCall further challenges the District Court’s application of a 2-level enhancement

for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1. Pursuant to § 3C1.1, a 2-level enhancement is

required if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or

impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or

sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.”

       The District Court applied the § 3C1.1 enhancement based upon recorded

conversations between McCall and a coconspirator in which—on the Government and

District Court’s reading of the record—McCall “provided instructions to coconspirators

regarding what to do in the event that they [were] arrested and questioned about [McCall’s]

activities.” JA 109. McCall argues that, in such conversations, he was merely exercising

his constitutional rights and that a § 3C1.1 enhancement cannot be based on such actions.

4
  In one line of his brief, McCall argues that the enhancement is inappropriate because the
District Court did not find that his conduct involved sophisticated means in the
concealment of the offense. Nothing in the text of § 2B1.1(b)(10) requires that the
sophisticated means must be employed in the concealment of the crime for the
enhancement to apply. And our precedent makes clear that, to qualify for the enhancement,
the offense need only involve “a greater level of planning or concealment than a typical
fraud of its kind.” Fountain, 792 F.3d at 319 (cleaned up) (emphasis added) (quoting Fumo,
655 F.3d at 319). We therefore reject McCall’s contention that the District Court erred by
applying the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) enhancement without explicitly finding that sophisticated
means were used to conceal the offense.

                                             6
       We need not decide whether McCall’s argument has merit because we can affirm

the District Court’s application of the enhancement on any basis supported by the record.

TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 276 n.9 (3d Cir. 2019). The record includes transcripts

of recorded phone conversations in which McCall described his efforts to conceal evidence

in his home in anticipation of a search. It does not appear that McCall disputes this

characterization of the calls. Attempting to conceal evidence in anticipation of a search

relating to the crime of conviction supports an enhancement under § 3C1.1. See, e.g.,

United States v. Mikulski, 35 F.4th 1074, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (asking

another individual to hide a firearm related to the offense of conviction out of fear that

authorities would search his residence supports § 3C1.1 enhancement); United States v.

Alexander, 602 F.3d 639, 641-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (same). The District Court therefore did

not err in applying a 2-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

       5. Acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a)

       Finally, McCall argues that the District Court erred in denying him a 2-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Under § 3E1.1(a), a defendant is entitled to a

two-level reduction if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his

offense.” The defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the

evidence, his entitlement to such a reduction. United States v. Muhammad, 146 F.3d 161,

167 (3d Cir. 1998). In United States v. Mercado, we held that the consideration of post-

                                            7
plea conduct was appropriate in determining whether a § 3E1.1(a) reduction was

warranted.5 See 81 F.4th 352, 354 (3d Cir. 2023).

       The District Court based its denial of the § 3E1.1(a) reduction on the fact that

McCall had filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, despite having record

counsel at the time.6 McCall’s pro se motion alleged that trial counsel never presented him

with a plea offer from the Government which would have allowed him to plead guilty on

some counts and go to trial on others. At a hearing on the motion, McCall chose not to

testify. He did, however, waive attorney-client privilege, thereby allowing his initial trial

counsel to testify that the lawyer had indeed presented each of the plea offers he received

from the Government to McCall. The District Court denied McCall’s motion, finding that

trial counsel “testified credibly” regarding his communication of the plea offers to McCall

and that McCall’s contrary claim was a “fabrication.” SA91.

       It is not clear whether McCall disputes the District Court’s factual finding that, in

essence, McCall lied to the District Court in attempting to withdraw his guilty plea. In any

5
  Specifically, applying the three-step framework set forth in United States v. Nasir, 17
F.4th 459 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc), we held that the text of § 3E1.1(a) was “genuinely
ambiguous,” the Commentary directing courts to consider post-plea conduct was
reasonable, and that the Commentary invokes the Sentencing Commission’s substantive
expertise. Mercado, 81 F.4th at 356-61. We therefore held that the District Court did not
err in following the Guidelines Commentary and considering certain post-plea conduct to
determine whether a reduction in sentence pursuant to § 3E1.1(a) was warranted. Id. at
361.
6
  McCall’s initial trial counsel was still representing him at the time that he submitted his
pro se motion, though counsel subsequently withdrew from the case. McCall was
represented by new trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing that was held on his pro se
motion.
                                             8
event, the District Court’s finding in that regard was not clear error. We have no reason to

question it. McCall tries to cast his plea withdrawal motion as an attempt “to question

‘process’ as it relates to equity jurisdiction.” McCall Br. at 31. But falsely representing the

events surrounding the entry of one’s guilty plea goes far beyond raising legitimate

questions concerning process and is inconsistent with McCall’s acceptance of

responsibility for the offense conduct. The District Court therefore did not err in denying

McCall a 2-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).

                                             ***

       For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate McCall’s sentence and remand to the

District Court. The District Court shall make findings of fact as to the amount of actual

losses attributable to McCall’s conduct and impose the appropriate enhancement

accounting for such losses under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).

                                              9