Court Opinion

ID: 9943252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 22:02:01.33148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:44.041434
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 (unmodified opn. attached)

                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION FIVE

JASON RIDDICK et al.,                      B323731

     Plaintiffs, Cross-                    (Los Angeles County
Complainants, and                          Super. Ct. No.
Respondents,                               21SMCP00655)

       v.                                  ORDER MODIFYING
                                           OPINION AND DENYING
CITY OF MALIBU et al.,                     PETITION FOR
                                           REHEARING
     Defendants, Cross-
Defendants, and Appellants.                [NO CHANGE IN
                                            JUDGMENT]

      Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c), it is
ordered that the opinion filed on February 1, 2024, is modified as
follows:

      1.   On page 4, section B, in the first sentence of the
second paragraph, after “plaintiffs,” add the next chronological
footnote:
               Among other documents in support of their
application, plaintiffs submitted a December 7, 2020, letter that
attached a copy of an April 21, 2020, memorandum from the
executive director of the Coastal Commission regarding
implementation of the recent ADU law stating that “the
construction or conversion of an ADU . . . directly attached to an
existing single-family residence would qualify as an exempt
improvement to a single-family residence. (Cal. Code Regs, tit.
14, § 13250(a)(1).) Guest houses and ‘self-contained residential
units,’ i.e., detached residential units, do not qualify as part of a
single-family residential structure, and construction of or
improvements to them are therefore not exempt development.
(Cal. Code Regs, tit. 14, § 13250(a)(2).)” (Emphasis omitted.)

      2.    On page 6, the second line, at the end of the partial
sentence, after “application.”, add:

             Plaintiffs attached, among other exhibits, two
publications from the Coastal Commission: (1) an April 18, 2017,
memorandum stating that “[t]o qualify as an exempt
improvement to a single-family dwelling, an ADU must be
contained within or directly attached to the existing single-family
structure;” and (2) the April 21, 2020, memorandum referenced
above stating that an ADU “directly attached to an existing
single-family residence would qualify as an exempt improvement
to a single-family residence.”

                                  2
      3.   On page 6, at the end of the first full paragraph that
begins “On May 10, 2022, . . .”, add:

            Plaintiffs also acknowledged a January 2022 Coastal
Commission publication that reconsidered its position in favor of
exemptions for attached ADUs, but maintained that the
Commission’s new reasoning was flawed and that the
interpretation of the City’s LCP was a matter of law for the court
to determine.

      4.    On page 13, at the end of the first full paragraph that
begins “Finally, the wording . . .”, add the next chronological
footnote:

             The City also advocates deference to the Coastal
Commission’s January 2022 publication reconsidering its prior
position in favor of exemptions for attached ADUs. That
guidance, however, contradicted prior Commission publications
supporting plaintiffs’ application, including the April 21, 2020,
memorandum from its executive director. Despite plaintiff’s’
urging, the City ignored the Commission’s prior guidance on the
issue during the application process; it was not until this
litigation arose that it adopted a more deferential posture
towards such agency interpretations. Given the Commission’s
inconsistent positions on the issue within a relatively short
timeframe, we decline the invitation to afford judicial deference
to its most recent position on the issue. (See Henning v.
Industrial Welfare Com. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1262, 1278 [“[I]n the
abstract, a current administrative interpretation would
ordinarily be entitled to great weight. [Citation.] But when . . .

                                 3
the construction in question is not ‘a contemporaneous
interpretation’ of the relevant statute and in fact ‘flatly
contradicts the position which the agency had enunciated at an
earlier date, closer to the enactment of the . . . statute[,]’ it cannot
command significant deference”].)

      The petition for rehearing is denied. There is no change in
the judgment.

_________________________________________________________

RUBIN, P. J.                    MOOR, J.                   KIM, J.

                                   4
Filed 2/1/24 (unmodified opinion)
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION FIVE

JASON RIDDICK et al.,                    B323731

     Plaintiffs, Cross-                  (Los Angeles County
Complainants, and                        Super. Ct. No.
Respondents,                             21SMCP00655)

       v.

CITY OF MALIBU et al.,

     Defendants, Cross-
Defendants, and Appellants.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
      Best Best & Krieger, Trevor L. Rusin, Greg W. Kettles,
Patrick Donegan, and John Natalizio, for Defendants, Cross-
Defendants, and Appellants.
      Pacific Legal Foundation, David J. Deerson, for Plaintiffs,
Cross-Complainants, and Respondents.
                    I.    INTRODUCTION

      The City of Malibu (the City) denied plaintiffs’1 permit
application to add an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) to their
residence under state ADU standards.2 Plaintiffs petitioned the
trial court for relief and obtained an order directing the City to
process the proposed ADU as exempt from coastal development
permit (CDP) requirements.
       On appeal, defendants3 contend the trial court
misinterpreted the City ordinance governing exemptions from the
state’s CDP requirement. In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs argue
that, because they established a right to a permit under state
ADU standards as a matter of law, the court should have ordered
the permit to issue forthwith. We affirm the judgment in its
entirety.

1     Plaintiffs are Jason and Elizabeth Riddick, and Renee
Sperling, Elizabeth’s mother.

2     The Legislature found and declared that California has a
severe housing crisis and that ADUs provide “additional rental
housing stock” in single-family residential zones and are thus “an
essential component of California’s housing supply.” (Gov. Code,
§ 65852.150, subd. (a)(4), (5), (8).) Government Code section
65852.2 establishes state standards under which ADU permit
applications must receive ministerial approval, including
standards for parking, height, setback, landscape, architectural
review, and maximum unit size.

3    Defendants are the City, the Malibu City Council, and the
Malibu Planning Department.

                                 2
                     II.   BACKGROUND

A.    Coastal Development Regulatory Framework

      “The [California] Coastal Act [of 1976 (Coastal Act; Pub.
Resources Code, § 30000)4] is a comprehensive scheme governing
land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.
[Citation.] . . . With certain exceptions, ‘any person wishing to
perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone must
obtain a [CDP] “in addition to obtaining any other permit
required by law from any local government or from any state,
regional, or local agency . . . .”’ [Citations.] The Coastal Act
authorizes exemptions from the CDP requirement for certain
minor developments such as improvements to existing single
family residences and other structures. (§ 30610.)
       “The Coastal Act requires local governments to develop
local coastal programs [(LCPs)], which consist of a land use plan
and a local implementation plan. [Citation.] ‘Once the California
Coastal Commission certifies a local government’s [LCP], and all
implementing actions become effective, the commission delegates
authority over [CDPs] to the local government.’ [Citation.]”
(Venice Coalition to Preserve Unique Community Character v.
City of Los Angeles (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 42, 47–48.)
       All properties in the City are located within the coastal
zone as defined by the Coastal Act and are therefore subject to its
provisions, including the CDP requirement for proposed

4    All further statutory references are to the Public Resources
Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                 3
developments within that zone.5 The Coastal Commission
certified the City’s LCP in 2002. (City of Malibu v. Coastal
Commission (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 549, 554.) Chapter 13 of
that LCP established the process for the review of all
development within the City’s coastal zone to ensure that it is
consistent with the provisions of the Coastal Act. Section 13.4.1
of that chapter (section 13.4.1) exempts “[i]mprovements to
existing single-family residences” from the requirement of a CDP,
with certain exceptions. The interpretation of that section’s
exemption is at the core of the dispute between the parties.

B.    Plaintiffs’ Permit Application

      The Riddicks own and occupy, along with their children, a
single-family residence in the City. To accommodate Sperling’s
move into the residence, the family decided to construct “a small
[ADU] attached to [the] residence . . . .” On July 10, 2020, they
applied for a permit to build “a new 414 square foot [ADU and a]
157 square foot addition” to the existing residence that included a
new primary bathroom.
      On June 7, 2021, following communications between the
City and plaintiffs, the City’s planning commission adopted a
resolution denying plaintiffs’ request for an ADU permit. The
commission concluded that a CDP was required for the project
and refused to approve one, finding that the project did “not
conform to the LCP as it violates residential development
standards for required minimum rear and side yard setbacks and

5     The parties agree that the state’s ADU standards do not
“supersede or in any way alter or lessen the effect or the
application of the [Coastal Act].” (Gov. Code, § 65852.2, subd. (l).)

                                 4
maximum allowed [total development square footage] and [total
impervious lot coverage].”
       On June 28, 2021, plaintiffs appealed the commission’s
denial of their requests for an ADU permit. On August 19, 2021,
the City council held a noticed public hearing on the appeal and
made findings in support of a resolution to deny the appeal.
       On September 2, 2021, plaintiffs resubmitted plans to the
City, advising that the new plans contained a modification:
“[T]here will be no addition to the primary residence. Instead,
the proposed space originally put forth as an addition to the
primary residence is now designated as part of the ADU.”
(Emphasis omitted.)
       On October 8, 2021, plaintiffs’ counsel sent an e-mail to the
City, emphasizing that the revised project was exempt from the
CDP requirement and therefore entitled to ministerial review
and approval.
       On October 25, 2021, the City attorney responded that the
proposed project required a CDP, without specifically addressing
plaintiffs’ modified plans.

C.    Petition for Writ of Mandate

        On November 18, 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint against
defendants asserting causes of action for: Writ of administrative
mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5); traditional writ of mandate
(id., § 1085); declaratory relief (id., § 1060); and violation of the
Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, § 65589.5). The cause of
action for traditional mandate asserted that defendants had a
clear, present, and ministerial duty to review and approve
plaintiffs’ ADU permit application, and plaintiffs had a clear,

                                  5
present, and beneficial right to approval of their permit
application.
      On May 10, 2022, plaintiffs filed an opening brief in
support of their petition. On their claim for traditional mandate,
plaintiffs argued that, under section 13.4.1, their ADU project
was exempt from the CDP requirement and should therefore be
processed and approved ministerially under state ADU standards
(Gov. Code, § 65852.2).
      On June 10, 2022, defendants filed their opposition brief.
On the traditional mandate claim, defendants argued that their
interpretation of section 13.4.1 was entitled to deference and they
did not have a legal duty to process plaintiffs’ permit application
under Government Code section 65852.2 because that section
specified that it did not “alter or lessen” the Coastal Act’s CDP
requirements.
      In reply, plaintiffs argued that the City’s interpretation of
section 13.4.1 was not entitled to deference because: The
unambiguous language of that section exempted attached ADUs
from the CDP requirement; the City had no comparative
interpretive advantage over the trial court; and there was no
indication in the record that the City’s interpretation was
carefully considered or long-held and consistent.

D.    Ruling on Traditional Mandate Claim

      On July 25, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the
claims asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint and then took the matter
under submission. The next day, the court issued a “Final
Ruling” granting plaintiffs’ claim for traditional mandate.

                                 6
       On the issue of giving deference to the City’s interpretation
of section 13.4.1, the trial court explained that “the proper
interpretation of the [section] is a question of law for the [c]ourt’s
independent interpretation. The [c]ourt is certainly not bound by
the City’s (or Commission’s) interpretation. Furthermore, the
City’s interpretation is not a long-standing opinion on this issue.
In fact, the City (and Commission) ha[ve] admittedly reversed
course with this decision. These circumstances weigh against
finding deference.”
       On whether the language of section 13.4.1 unambiguously
exempted plaintiffs’ project from the CDP requirement, the trial
court concluded that “the plain language of the statute fits
[plaintiffs’] interpretation far better than the City’s
interpretation.” On the relief to be granted, the trial court stated,
“Plaintiffs requested . . . that the [c]ourt compel [defendants] to
‘ministerially approve’ the revised ADU under [Government
Code] section 65852.2. However, the court cannot grant the
requested relief to compel approval. The [r]ecord does not show
that the City improperly denied the application on a ministerial
basis. Instead, the City indicated [it] would not review the
application at all. . . . [Plaintiffs] only justify that the City must
decide the application within 60 days from the date it receives a
completed application pursuant to Government Code section
65852.2. The [c]ourt does not order the City to grant or approve
the application since the only prior determination was that the
application required a CDP.”
       On September 19, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment
granting plaintiffs’ cause of action for traditional mandate and
directing the City “to process [plaintiffs’] application in
compliance with the [c]ourt’s July 26, 2022, Final Ruling

                                  7
attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’” The judgment also denied each of
plaintiffs’ other causes of action.
      On September 22, 2022, defendants filed a notice of appeal
from the judgment and, on October 26, 2022, plaintiffs filed their
notice of cross-appeal.

                         III.   APPEAL

A.    Traditional Mandate6

       “Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a), . . .
empowers courts ‘to compel a public agency or officer to perform a
mandatory duty.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] [Traditional m]andamus is
appropriate to compel a ‘ministerial’ act, that is, ‘“an act that a
public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to
his [or her] own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s
propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists. . . .
[Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Put another way, a
ministerial act is one ‘“‘[w]here a statute or ordinance clearly
defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing
body must take,’”’ thus ‘“‘eliminat[ing] any element of

6      “‘To state a cause of action for a [traditional] writ of
mandate, one must plead facts showing (1) a clear duty to act by
the defendant; (2) a beneficial interest in the defendant’s
performance of that duty; (3) the defendant’s ability to perform
the duty; (4) the defendant’s failure to perform that duty or abuse
of discretion if acting; and (5) no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy exists.’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles Waterkeeper v. State
Water Resources Control Bd. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 230, 265
(Waterkeeper).)

                                 8
discretion.’”’ [Citation.]” (Waterkeeper, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 265–266, fn. omitted.)

B.    Standard of Review

      The interpretation of a local ordinance is a legal issue
subject to our de novo review. (Brookside Investments, Ltd. v.
City of El Monte (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 540, 548, fn. 4.)

C.    Statutory Interpretation

       The primary issue in this appeal involves the proper
interpretation of the language in subdivision (A) of section 13.4.1.
The City reads that section to exclude both attached and
detached ADUs from the CDP exemption for improvements to
existing single-family residences. Plaintiffs maintain that the
section exempts all improvements directly attached to existing
single-family residences, including attached ADUs, from the CDP
requirement and that only detached ADUs are excluded from the
CDP exemption.
       Section 13.4 of the City’s LCP—entitled “EXEMPTIONS
FROM AND DE MINIMUS WAIVERS OF [CDPs]”—states
that “[t]he projects described in [s]ections 13.4.1 through 13.4.9
are exempt from the requirement to obtain a [CDP] . . . .” Section
13.4.1 then provides: “13.4.1 Exemptions for Improvements
to Existing Single-Family Residences [¶] A. Improvements
to existing single-family residences except as noted below in
(B).[7] For purposes of this section, the terms ‘Improvements to

7     The parties agree that the proposed ADU does not fall
within any of the classes of development listed in subdivision (B).

                                 9
existing single-family residences’ includes all fixtures and
structures directly attached to the residence and those structures
normally associated with a single family residence, such as
garages, swimming pools, fences, storage sheds and landscaping
but specifically not including guest houses or accessory self-
contained residential units.”
       We review ordinances under the same rules of construction
that we review statutes. (Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of
Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 281, 290.) “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur
fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the
enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the
statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’
[Citation.]” (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157,
165–166.)

                               10
      1.    Deference to the City’s Interpretation

        Defendants maintain that we should give “great deference”
to their interpretation of section 13.4.1 and adopt it unless clearly
erroneous. Plaintiffs counter that because both the plain text
and legislative history support their view of the statute, the
City’s interpretation is entitled to “little-to-no deference . . . .”
        “To the extent we are engaging in statutory interpretation,
‘we must give deference to [an agency’s] interpretations, but not
to the exclusion of other tools of statutory construction.’” (ACCO
Engineered Systems, Inc. v. Contractors’ State License Bd. (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 80, 87.) As the court in Yamaha Corp. of America
v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 (Yamaha)
explained, “Where the meaning and legal effect of a statute is the
issue, an agency’s interpretation is one among several tools
available to the court. Depending on the context, it may be
helpful, enlightening, even convincing. It may sometimes be of
little worth. [Citation.] Considered alone and apart from the
context and circumstances that produce them, agency
interpretations are not binding or necessarily even authoritative.
. . . ‘The standard for judicial review of agency interpretation of
law is the independent judgment of the court, giving deference to
the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances
of the agency action.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p.7–8.)
        We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case,
defendants’ interpretation of section 13.4.1 is not entitled to
deference. As explained below, neither the language of section
13.4.1, subdivision (A) nor its legislative history are ambiguous;
thus there is no need to defer to defendants’ interpretation.
(Advanced Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 196

                                 11
Cal.App.4th 338, 350; Department of Industrial Relations v.
Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Board (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 93, 106.)
       Moreover, even if there was some ambiguity concerning the
meaning of the text, it is not composed of “‘technical, obscure,
complex, open-ended’” language “‘entwined with issues of fact,
policy, and discretion’” that would require resort to defendants’
specialized expertise. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.)
Defendants therefore “enjoy[] no comparative advantage over a
generalist court in interpreting the legal text at issue.”
(California Veterinary Medical Association v. City of West
Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 556.)
       Furthermore, the record does not reflect that defendants’
interpretation was the result of careful consideration by senior
agency officials or that defendants consistently maintained their
interpretation, especially over a long period of time. (See
Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 13.) Instead, defendants’
interpretation appears to be a matter of first impression, initially
made by planning department staff in response to plaintiffs’
attached ADU proposal. Indeed, there is no indication in the
record that City planning officials carefully deliberated and
weighed the decision to require a CDP in this case and nothing to
suggest that they had been confronted with the same or a similar
issue in the past and consistently determined that a CDP was
required. (See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of
Equalization (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 338, 352 [deference
appropriate if the agency determination is not “adopted ad hoc as
a litigating position in this case only,” but rather is one the
agency has maintained “consistently for at least 20 years”].)

                                 12
       Finally, the wording of the statute at issue was not crafted
by City planning officials in response to some unique local
conditions or considerations, such that they would be in the best
position to understand and explain its meaning. As discussed
below, that language was adopted in 2002 as part of the City’s
LCP as mandated under the Coastal Act (§§ 30500–30526; Pacific
Palisades Bowl Mobile Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012)
55 Cal.4th 783, 794).) And, it appears to be based, almost
verbatim, on an implementing regulation promulgated by the
Coastal Commission. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13250, subd. (a).)
Thus, City officials would be in no better position than a court of
this state when interpreting the Coastal Commission’s intent in
adopting that regulation.

      2.    Plain Meaning of Section 13.4.1

       We agree with the trial court that, under the plain meaning
rule, the language of section 13.4.1, subdivision (A) includes
attached ADUs in the class of improvements to existing single-
family residences that are exempt from the CDP requirement.
The title and first sentence of the subdivision establish that
improvements to existing single-family residences are exempt as
a class, “except those noted below in (B).” That language is broad
and subject only to the exceptions in subdivision (B), none of
which is implicated here.
       The next sentence defines “improvements” broadly, and
consists of two distinct categories of structures: (1) all structures
directly attached to the residence, and (2) other structures
normally associated with a single-family residence, such as
garages and swimming pools. The first category of

                                 13
improvements, all “directly attached” structures, is unqualified
and therefore evinces an intent to exempt any such attached
improvements. The second category, structures “normally
associated” with single-family residences, is qualified by a list of
four examples of detached structures that are included in the
definition and, in the final clause of the definition, a specification
of two types of detached structures that are deemed excluded.
       Under that bifurcated definition, the specification of
excluded structures in the final clause of subdivision (A) modifies
and applies only to “normally associated” structures, and not to
the first category of “structures directly attached . . . .” The
common sense reading of the two separate categories suggests
that the drafters of subdivision (A) intended to differentiate
between attached structures and normally associated detached
structures, with all of the former being exempt from the CDP
requirement and most of the latter also being exempt, unless
they specifically qualify as either a guest house or an accessory
self-contained residential unit. When, as here, “the language is
clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it
necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .”
(Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.)

      3.     Legislative History

      Even if the language of section 13.4.1, subdivision (A) was
susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the legislative
history in the record8 confirms our interpretation that ADUs

8     The City did not provide any historical documents
demonstrating its intent in enacting section 13.4.1. Nor did it
include such documents for the Coastal Commission regulation

                                   14
directly attached to existing residences are exempt from the CDP
requirement. “It is an established principle that where statutory
language is unambiguous, a court is precluded from considering
legislative history. (See, e.g., People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th
1106, 1111 [‘If the language contains no ambiguity, we presume
the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the
statute governs. [Citation.] If, however, the statutory language
is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we can
look to legislative history in aid of ascertaining legislative
intent[ ]’].) . . . [T]he plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court
from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute
comports with its purpose. [Citation.] Courts have therefore
considered legislative history even in cases where the text of a
statute is clear; but only to confirm the interpretation already
apparent from the plain language, not to advance an alternative
meaning. [Citations.]” (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA,
Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 755.)
       As noted, the language of section 13.4.1, subdivision (A)
was taken almost verbatim from the Coastal Commission
regulations9 implementing section 30610, subdivision (a). That

upon which section 13.4.1 is modeled, namely, California Code of
Regulations, title 14, section 13250, subdivision (a).

9     Defendants do not deny that section 13.4.1 was taken from,
and closely mirrors, the language of a Coastal Commission
regulation that defines improvements to existing single-family
residences; but they insist that certain variations in syntax,
paragraph structure, and language between the LCP section and
the state regulation demonstrate the City’s intent to exclude
attached ADUs from the category of attached structures excluded
from the exemption of the CDP requirement.

                                 15
section of the Coastal Act provides: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of this division, no [CDP] shall be required pursuant to
this chapter for the following types of development and in the
following areas: [¶] (a) Improvements to existing single-family
residences; provided, however, that the commission shall specify,
by regulation, those classes of development which involve a risk
of adverse environmental effect and shall require that a [CDP] be
obtained pursuant to this chapter.”
       The Coastal Commission’s definition of the term
“[i]mprovements to existing single-family residences,” as used in
section 30610, subdivision (a), is set forth in California Code of
Regulations, title 14, section 13250, subdivision (a) which
provides: “(a) For purposes of . . . section 30610[, subdivision]
(a), where there is an existing single-family residential building,
the following shall be considered a part of that structure: [¶]
(1) All fixtures and other structures directly attached to a
residence; [¶] (2) Structures on the property normally
associated with a single-family residence, such as garages,
swimming pools, fences, and storage sheds; but not including
guest houses or self-contained residential units; and [¶]
(3) Landscaping on the lot.”
       That definition makes clear that there are two distinct
categories of improvements that qualify as exempt by dividing
them into two separately numbered paragraphs. Paragraph (1)
states that “all” structures “directly attached” to existing
residences are among those exempt. Paragraph (2) then states
that other structures “on the property,” meaning those not
directly attached to the residence, are also exempt if they are
normally associated with single-family residences and similar to
the four types of detached structures listed as examples. But

                                16
paragraph (2) then expressly excludes from the second category of
detached structures only guest houses and self-contained
residential units.
       Under the Coastal Commission definition, directly attached
structures, including ADUs, are exempted from the types of
developments that require CDPs under the Coastal Act. We
therefore reject defendants’ contention that in enacting section
13.4.1 of the LCP—as mandated by the Coastal Act—the City
harbored an unexpressed intent to alter materially the meaning
and effect of the regulation upon which it is based. The minor
differences in language between the two provisions do not
support a reasonable inference that the City had any such intent.
And, as explained, the difference in the paragraph composition
shows that the original drafters of the regulation meant what
they said: Directly attached structures of all types are exempt.

     4.    Harmonizing Section 13.4.1

      Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ interpretation of
subdivision (A) of section 13.4.1 is internally inconsistent with
certain language in the subdivision itself and at odds with other
provisions of the statutory scheme of which it is part. According
to defendants, “[t]o adopt [that] interpretation would lead to
absurd results.”
      Defendants’ only example of internal inconsistency is based
on the second category of exempt structures, namely, those
normally associated with single-family residences. According to
defendants, the final clause of subdivision (A) cannot be read to
apply only to “normally associated” structures because guest
houses and accessory self-contained residential units are not

                               17
normally associated with single family residences; instead, they
are a “rare addition to a home . . . .” But their assertion is
contrary to the plain language of the long-standing Coastal
Commission definition, which expressly includes guest houses
and accessory self-contained residential units in the category of
structures normally associated with single-family residences.
(Cal. Code Regs, tit. 14, § 13250, subd. (a)(2).) Thus, reading
section 13.4.1 to include guest houses and accessory self-
contained residential units among the types of detached
structures normally associated with single-family residences
comports with the Coastal Commission’s understanding of those
types of structures and does not render section 13.4.1 internally
inconsistent.
       Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ interpretation of
section 13.4.1, “to exempt attached guest houses and accessory
self-contained residential units[,] also nullifies some of the
language of section 13.13.1 [of the City’s LCP].”10 According to

10     Section 13.13.1 provides: “A. The planning manager may
process consistent with the procedures in this chapter any [CDP]
application for the specific uses identified below, except a
proposed [CDP] that is appealable or is within the Commission’s
continuing jurisdiction as defined in Chapter 2 of the Malibu LIP
(Definitions). [¶] 1. Improvements to any existing structure; [¶]
2. Any single-family dwelling; [¶] 3. Lot mergers; [¶] 4. Any
development of four dwelling units or less that does not require
demolition, and any other developments not in excess of
[$100,000] other than any division of land; [¶] 5. Water wells.
[¶] 6. Driveways or access road improvements required by the
fire department . . . .
       “B. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the LCP,
attached or detached second dwelling units shall be processed as
administrative permits, except that the approval of such permits

                                18
defendants, under that section both “‘attached and detached
second dwelling units, i.e., guest houses and accessory self-
contained residential units’” require administrative CDPs. They
therefore conclude that, to “interpret section 13.4.1[, subdivision]
(A) to exempt attached second dwelling units . . . would
effectively delete the term ‘attached’ in section 13.13.1[,
subdivision (B)].”
       Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the language of section
13.4.1 can be reasonably construed to harmonize with section
13.13.1, which does not state that attached guest houses and
accessory self-contained residential units require CDPs. Instead,
subdivision (A) provides that the planning manager (as opposed
to the planning commission) “may” process any CDP permit
application for the types of projects listed in subparts 1 through
6, including “[i]mprovements to any existing structure.”
Subdivision (B) specifies that applications for “attached or
detached second dwelling units” “shall” be processed by the
planning manager as administrative CDPs. The section does not
define when a CDP is required for a particular type of
improvement. Instead, it provides the administrative process by
which a permit application will be processed—as between the
planning commission and the planning manager—in the event a
proposed improvement requires a CDP. By comparison, section
13.4.1 provides that some improvements to single-family
residences, as defined in subdivision (A), do not require a CDP,
while others, as listed in subdivision (B), must receive such
permits. Thus, section 13.13.1, dealing only with the latter types

shall be appealable to the Coastal Commission if the project is
located in the appealable zone. [Citations.]”

                                 19
of projects, does not conflict with section 13.4.1 as interpreted by
plaintiffs.
       Defendants further contend that plaintiffs’ interpretation
would “effectively delete the term ‘attached’ from the definitions
of ‘guest house’ and ‘second unit’” in section 2.111 of the City’s
LCP. But they do not adequately develop this one-sentence
contention or explain why the general definitions at the
beginning of the LCP, including the definition of “second unit,”
must be harmonized with a specific section defining those
improvements to single-family residences that are exempt from
the CDP requirement. (See People v. Rodriguez (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 637, 642 [although courts must attempt to
harmonize different statutory sections, that analysis is limited to
“statutory sections relating to the same subject” and only “to the
extent possible”].)
       Finally, defendants argue that it would be inconsistent
with the LCP statutory scheme to exempt attached accessory self-
contained residential units from the CDP requirement as the
LCP seeks generally to require “‘any development’” proposed in
the City to be reviewed pursuant to that process and most of the
exemptions from that process are for projects that “neither

11     Section 2.1 defines “guest house” as: “[A]ttached or
detached living quarters on the same premises as a single family
residence for the use of family members, guests or employees of
the occupants of such residence, containing no kitchen facilities
and not rented or otherwise used as a separate dwelling.” It
defines a “second unit” as: “an attached or detached residential
dwelling unit which provides complete independent living
facilities for one or more persons. It shall include permanent
provisions for living, sleeping, eating, cooking, and sanitation on
the same parcel as the single family dwelling is situated.”

                                 20
intensify use nor significantly expand development.” According
to defendants, because attached ADUs increase intensity of use,
“[i]t would make no sense for the [LCP] to exempt [them] from
the [CDP] requirement while requiring projects with equal or
smaller increases in intensity of use, including detached ADUs, to
obtain a [CDP].”
       Under subdivision (B) of section 13.4.1, certain classes of
development are not exempt from the CDP requirement if “they
involve a risk of adverse environmental impact” including
improvements (such as attached ADUs) to single-family
structures in locations, such as on a beach or in a wetland. That
provision, when read together with the plain language of
subdivision (A), reflects a policy choice to treat single-family
residences located in environmentally sensitive areas differently
from residences in other areas of the coastal zone.
       Although the wisdom of such policy choices is often subject
to debate, that is not a factor which we may consider in
interpreting section 13.4.1. Given the plain meaning of the
language used by the Legislature, we assume that it meant what
it said, without questioning the policy determinations reflected in
that language.

                     IV.   CROSS-APPEAL

      Plaintiffs contend that, under the trial court’s order
requiring the City to review and approve their permit application
under applicable state ADU standards, there is no dispute that
they are entitled to have the permit issued, without further
submissions on their part of any kind. According to plaintiffs, the
City has not adopted its own ADU ordinance and is therefore

                                21
bound to follow the state default standards in Government Code
section 65852.2.12 As plaintiffs view the record, their pending
application meets all of those required state standards.

A.    Procedural Background

      In their cause of action for traditional writ of mandate,
plaintiffs alleged that they had a “right to ministerial review and
approval of their revised ADU proposal” and were “entitled to an
order directing the City to accept the revised ADU proposal for
ministerial review and to approve the same within the time limit
mandated by [s]tate law.” In their prayer, they confirmed the
extent of the relief they sought on that cause of action: A “writ of
traditional mandate compelling [defendants] to ministerially
approve [their] revised ADU application . . . pursuant to
Government Code [s]ection 65852.2.”
      Following the hearing on plaintiffs’ traditional writ of
mandate claim, the trial court issued a July 26, 2022, final ruling
on that claim granting it and ruling that “[plaintiffs] only justify
that the City must decide the application within 60 days from the

12      Government Code section 65852.2, subdivision (b)(1)
provides, in pertinent part: “When a local agency that has not
adopted an ordinance governing accessory dwelling units in
accordance with subdivision (a) receives an application for a
permit to create or serve an accessory dwelling unit pursuant to
this subdivision, the local agency shall approve or disapprove the
application ministerially without discretionary review pursuant
to subdivision (a). The permitting agency shall either approve or
deny the application to create or serve an accessory dwelling unit
. . . within 60 days from the date the permitting agency receives a
completed application . . . .”

                                22
date it receives a completed application pursuant to Government
Code section 65852.2. The [c]ourt does not order the City to
grant or approve the application since the only prior
determination was that the application required a CDP.”
       On August 31, 2022, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce
judgment, seeking a determination that “their updated ADU
application [was now] complete and that the City must decide the
application within 60 days from August 17, 2022, the date of its
completion.” Based primarily on factual matters that occurred
after the trial court’s final ruling, plaintiffs urged the court to
construe and enforce its ruling by entering a subsequent order
finding that plaintiffs had submitted a completed application and
ordering the City to review it under appropriate standards by
October 16, 2022.
       On September 19, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment
on its final ruling that granted the request for traditional
mandate and directed defendants “to process [plaintiffs’]
application in compliance with the [c]ourt’s July 26, 2022, Final
Ruling attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’”
       On October 26, 2022, plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal
from this judgment only.
       On November 9, 2022, the trial court issued a minute order
denying plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the court’s final ruling.
Plaintiffs did not separately appeal that postjudgment order.

                                 23
B.    Analysis

       In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs argue that they were
entitled to a permit within 60 days of their completed application,
which they claim was October 16, 2022. Plaintiffs’ arguments in
their cross-appeal therefore appear to arise from matters that
occurred following the final ruling on which the judgment is
based, such as their efforts to submit the additional information
and payment they deemed necessary to complete their ADU
application.13 Because, however, their cross-appeal is limited to
the judgment, and not taken from any separate postjudgment
ruling on enforcement, the matters they urge us to adjudicate are
not properly before us on the cross-appeal. We therefore affirm
the judgment.

13    Ordinarily, a complaint speaks only as to matters which
occurred as of the date it was filed; matters occurring after filing
are raised by a supplemental complaint. (See Foster v. Sexton
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1032.)

                                 24
                        V.   DISPOSTION

      The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. The parties are to
bear their own costs on appeal.

                                          KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             MOOR, J.

                                25