Court Opinion

ID: 9447823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:45:21.546113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:12.284714
License: Public Domain

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
At the final presentence conference on the afternoon of June 3, appellant’s trial counsel Mr. Madden asked permission to withdraw the plea of guilty. At a hearing on the postsentence motion to vacate sentence and withdraw the plea the judge said of the final presentence conference: “There’s no doubt about it, he was anxious to get me to agree that I would permit a change of plea, and I did not agree to that * Chief Probation Officer Garrett, a government witness, testified that when he arrived at the presentence conference the judge (1) “announced that Mr. Madden had come to him and asked him about withdrawing the plea of guilty”; (2) “stated * * * that Mr. Madden was asking that he be permitted to withdraw the plea of guilty, and the Judge had indicated that he didn’t think that that was appropriate under the circumstances”; and (3) “said in a somewhat surprised voice that Mr. Madden was there asking that the plea be withdrawn.” In response to a question whether the judge said he was denying a motion or request, or that he would not grant one if made, Mr. Garrett replied that he could not answer but he added “the Judge did say he was not going to let Mr. Madden change that plea to not guilty, that we were going ahead with the sentence.”
I think counsel’s request at the presentence conference was “an application to a court for an order” and should therefore have been considered a motion. Perry v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 188, 195 F.2d 37, 39.
Mr. Madden says in his affidavit that he “argued the motion on the ground that for the first time he had definite medical proof available which would constitute a defense to the indictment.” He testified that he repeatedly said at the presentence conference that the significance of the medical report was its indication that witnesses had become available who would testify about appellant’s condition at the time of the offense, whereas when he had advised a plea of guilty he was “faced with the prospect of having no decent medical evidence available to use”. Mr. Garrett was asked whether counsel referred to the medical report during the presentence conference. He replied: “I believe Mr Madden stated to the Judge that he felt there was information in the medical report which could now be used as a defense for the defendant.” The judge himself indicated at the postsentence hearing that he had understood, at the presentence conference, that the prospect of a jail sentence was not the only reason for wishing to change the plea. He said “ * * * it was after that [the medical examination] that Mr. Madden discussed with me that if he had known certain of the facts that he said was revealed by that examination, he would not have advised Mr. High to make the plea of guilty; and he made'inquiry of me how I thought it would be to withdraw the plea of guilty, and I told him I did not think it was a proper thing to do in the circumstances, after we had discussed the question of what the sentence would be, and the whole question was whether or not he should be incarcerated * * The judge also said: “It was more of a statement by Mr. Madden to the effect that had he known what had developed by this examination to be the case, he would not have advised Mr. High to plead guilty.”
I think it unimportant that the prospect of a jail sentence was one of the new developments and one of the reasons for *433the presentence request to withdraw the guilty plea. It is undisputed that another new development and another reason for the request was that a medical defense had newly become available. I think this made the request so plainly meritorious that the court abused its discretion in failing to grant it and let the defendant go to trial. Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 272 F.2d 499. Cf. Poole v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 250 F.2d 396.
I think the question is before us. The presentence request was one stated ground of the postsentence motion. As this court recognizes, “Much of the evidence presented on June 24, in the hearing on the postsentence motion, was directed to the question whether the appellant actually had made a pre-sentence motion, or had merely informally discussed with the judge what his attitude would be if such a motion were presented.” The trial judge must have determined that the presentence application was not a motion or that, if it was, he should deny it. In either case I think his disposition of the presentence request is presented on appeal from the only order he entered. I also think his failure to grant the presentence request was “manifest injustice”, to correct which the postsentence motion should have been granted under Rule 32(d), F.R. Crim.P.