Court Opinion

ID: 9402753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 18:07:25.059444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.376330
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Garrison, 2023-Ohio-2002.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                       :
                                                     :
       Appellee                                      :   C.A. No. 29673
                                                     :
 v.                                                  :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 00927
                                                     :
 JUSTIN L. GARRISON                                  :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                     :   Court)
       Appellant                                     :
                                                     :

                                                ...........

                                                OPINION

                                        Rendered on June 16, 2023

                                                ...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by RICKY L. MURRAY, Attorney for Appellee

JOHNNA M. SHIA, Attorney for Appellant

                                               .............

EPLEY, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Justin L. Garrison appeals from his conviction in the

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of failure

to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and was sentenced to 18 months in

prison. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
                                                                                           -2-

       I.     Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} On May 23, 2022, Garrison was charged with a single count of failure to

comply with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony

of the third degree. A few months later at the plea hearing, the State offered an agreed

sentence of two years in prison. Garrison did not accept the State’s offer and instead

countered with a nine-month option. Ultimately, the parties agreed that Garrison would

plead to the indictment and defer to the trial court for the length of his sentence. The court

engaged in a detailed colloquy with Garrison, determined that he was voluntarily entering

into the plea agreement, accepted the guilty plea, and ordered a presentence

investigation (PSI).

       {¶ 3} On August 31, 2022, the parties gathered for the disposition where Garrison

argued for a nine-month sentence and the State reminded the court that there was no

agreement as to sentence length. Citing the PSI and his extensive criminal record, the

court sentenced Garrison to 18 months in prison, which by operation of law would run

consecutively to a sentence he was serving out of Butler County.

       {¶ 4} Garrison has filed a timely appeal which raises a single assignment of error.

       II.    Plea

       {¶ 5} In his assignment of error, Garrison claims that the trial court should not have

accepted his plea because it was not made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

manner. We disagree.

       {¶ 6} To satisfy the requirements of due process, a guilty plea must be made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate as
                                                                                         -3-

much. State v. Harris, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-29, 2021-Ohio-1431, ¶ 15. For a plea

to be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the trial court must follow the

mandates of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520, 24705,

2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13. “[T]he rule ‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the

trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his

plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’ ” State v. Dangler,

162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio

St.2d 163, 168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975).

       {¶ 7} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) mandates that the trial court inform the defendant of the

constitutional rights he is waiving, like the right to a jury trial, the right to confront

witnesses, the right to compulsory process, the right against self-incrimination, and the

right to require the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perdue,

2022-Ohio-722, 185 N.E.3d 683, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). Strict compliance with this Rule is

required. A failure to do so invalidates the plea. Id.

       {¶ 8} “A trial court must substantially comply with the notification of non-

constitutional rights contained in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), and a defendant must show

prejudice before a plea will be vacated for failure to substantially comply with these

notifications.” State v. Easter, 2016-Ohio-7798, 74 N.E.3d 760, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). “Substantial

compliance” means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant

understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is giving up. State v. Thomas,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26907, 2017-Ohio-5501, ¶ 37; State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106,

108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). A defendant challenging a guilty plea on non-constitutional
                                                                                       -4-

grounds “must show a prejudicial effect” – in other words, “that the plea would otherwise

not have been entered.” Thomas at ¶ 38.

      {¶ 9} In this case, there is no argument that the trial court did not fully advise

Garrison of the constitutional or non-constitutional rights he was giving up by pleading

guilty. Instead, he focuses on allegedly being promised a certain sentence that was not

imposed. While there may have been some off the record, in-chambers discussion that

the court was “leaning towards” giving Garrison a nine-month sentence, the record is clear

that result was far from guaranteed. The trial court informed Garrison at the plea hearing

that he could receive a 9, 12, 18, 24, 30, or 36 month prison term on the third-degree

felony failure to comply charge and that, by law, it would have to be served consecutively

to the prison sentence he was serving out of Butler County. He was also instructed that

there would be a license suspension imposed.

      {¶ 10} Later in the colloquy, when the court asked Garrison if anyone had promised

him anything to plead guilty – other than what was put on the record – Garrison stated,

“Just nine months.” The State quickly replied that nine months was not the offer. “I just

want to make sure that the defendant knows that is not promised.” Hearing Tr. at 7. The

court then clarified: “Yeah, let me back up a little bit. There was some discussion with

your counsel that the Court is leaning toward giving you a nine-month sentence. But that

is not the offer from the State and is not guaranteed from the Court.” Hearing Tr. at 7.

Garrison stated that he understood. The court further stated: “So there’s no promises that

are being made to you other than I’m going to decide what sentence I should impose.

That could be anywhere from community control sanctions up to three years [in prison].
                                                                                           -5-

Do you understand that?” Hearing Tr. at 8. Again, Garrison affirmed that he did. Finally,

at the end of the colloquy, Garrison indicated that he was entering into his plea voluntarily.

       {¶ 11} Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred by

finding Garrison’s plea to be voluntary. He was informed by both the State and the court

that there was no promise or guarantee of a nine-month sentence and, on at least two

occasions, he stated on the record that he understood the situation. Finally, even if

Garrison claims that he was relying on the court’s telling his counsel in chambers that it

was “leaning towards” sentencing him to nine months, that would not be enough to

overcome the evidence presented on the record that nine months was in fact not the offer.

See State v. Foster, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-20-17, 2021-Ohio-3408, ¶ 29 (holding that

“leaning toward” a sentence is not the same as a “promised” sentence, especially when

advised on the record that the court could sentence up to the maximum and before the

court knew the defendant’s entire criminal history). The assignment of error is overruled.

       III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 12} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

                                      .............

LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.