Court Opinion

ID: 9640864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:17:13.888841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.429937
License: Public Domain

FULLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority holding that reverses the trial court judgment in favor of the consumer. The result is that an innocent purchaser for value has lost not only his just damages but also lost his car. I feel that the majority has unfortunately based its decision on the discovery rule when it should not have been reached. Instead the trial court judgment should be affirmed.
This is a case of continuing deception up to the moment of trial and a fact issue existed as to the date of commencement of the statute of limitations. Appellants did not overcome this burden because they did not submit and obtain a jury finding that supported the claim of limitation. Tex.R. Civ.P. 279.
FACTS
Fifty-nine year old Lynn Dickey was a thirty year employee of the railroad. He had only a fifth grade education, was married and had three daughters. He owned his home for which he had paid $8,500.00. During his fifty-nine years, he had purchased only two new cars, a 1971 Maverick and a 1977 Jeep Cherokee. He never had filed a lawsuit or appeared in court during his entire lifetime. With his limited education, it was quite natural that he had a strong desire that his daughter, Clara Lynn Dickey, attend college. He promised that daughter that if she would attend college, he would buy her a “dependable car.” This fatal promise unfortunately brought Mr. Dickey to the car dealership of Appellant Dick Poe Motors, resulting in the tragic event that followed. After driving a Chrysler New Yorker and asking the salesman if it was “American made,” he was assured by Appellant Dick Poe Motors that it was entirely a quality “American made” automobile. The car was sold on November 25, 1985, but was not actually delivered to the Dickeys until November 27, 1985. The car was financed through Appellee *748Lynn Dickey’s credit union and payments totalled $366.00 a month.
The amount of problems that developed with this $18,000.00 automobile is almost beyond comprehension, yet as to the Appel-lee consumers, it was never revealed that they had, in fact, purchased a “lemon.” Appellant dealer constantly maintained that the car was a quality ear. The dealer never disclosed to the Dickeys that the car had been damaged in transit. Neither was the fact that six months prior to the sale of the car, while the car had accumulated only forty-nine miles on the speedometer, it had already been repaired ten times in the dealer’s shop.
While it was apparent that the Dickeys were understandably “unhappy” with the car after the purchase because of various mechanical problems, the dealer was continuing to attempt to correct the problems. Problems with the car were characterized in trial as being brakes, electrical, engine and miscellaneous. The car was in the shop a total of thirty-six times from the time it arrived on the dealer’s lot until the purchaser finally gave up and filed suit. When the car was sold to the Dickeys on November 25, 1985 (but delivered on November 27), no mention was made to Mr. Dickey of the frequent prior troubles with the electrical system, the cooling system or the fact that the car had suffered damage in transit. As additional new problems occurred, the dealer worked on them but never advised them that the car they purchased had more problems than most. Instead, the dealer constantly maintained up to and including the time of trial that the Chrysler car was a quality product. Yet, the general manager and vice-president of the selling dealer admitted that the car sold to the Appellees “had more problems with it than the normal ’85 Chrysler New Yorker.”
Appellant Dick Poe Motors contended up until time of trial in its cross-claim against Chrysler Motors Corporation that the manufacturer produced a “defective product” (the car).
Appellant, Chrysler Motors Corporation cross-claimed against Dick Poe Motors asserting that the car was negligently and improperly repaired by Dick Poe Motors. These allegations were brought out before the jury.
The very basis of violations of the DTPA involves false, misleading and deceptive acts. The legislative intent was that the Act was to be liberally construed and applied to protect the consumer against false, misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions and breaches of warranty. Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987). Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.1977).
DID APPELLANTS ESTABLISH AS A MATTER LAW THAT APPELLEES’ SUIT WAS BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATION?
DISCUSSION
NO — I would hold that the evidence presented in this case raised a fact issue as to the date the statute of limitations started to run against the Appellees in their action for the alleged “false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice” committed by the Appellants. It was Appellants’ burden to obtain a jury finding that supported its claim of limitations. Tex.R.Civ.P. 279.
Appellants failed to seek and obtain a jury finding as to the date limitations commenced to run. Such failure operated as a waiver of the defense of limitations. Tex. R.Civ.P. 94. It also relieved the trial court of any duty to determine the application of the discovery rule. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Even assuming I am incorrect in overruling the points of error based on the failure of Appellants to secure a jury finding on the defense of bar of limitations, I see no relief for the Appellants. Appellants assert that during the first two months of ownership of the vehicle, it was returned to the dealer eight times for service or repair. Appellants say this should bar the Dickeys’ claim as a matter of law. Appellants cite Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.1988) and Woods v. William H. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.1988) for the existing authority supporting their position. *749Both of these cases are cited for the proposition that the party seeking the benefit of the discovery rule must plead, prove and secure findings that the discovery rule excused the failure to file within the appropriate limitation period.
The Willis case was a legal malpractice case which was resolved on appeal by a finding that there was an incorrect wording of the submitted issue on discovery. The negligence alleged in that case involved the single act of an improperly drawn settlement agreement in a divorce case.
The Woods case was a suit against an insurance agent and an insurance carrier for failure to provide the single act of insurance coverage. The agent and carrier pled limitations but the party seeking the benefit of the discovery rule failed to plead it or obtain findings on the issue of discovery.
Neither of the above cases involve a continuing course of conduct involving continued misrepresentation and deception and therefore should be distinguished from the instant case. In the alternative, however, I would find that the evidence in this case would also support a finding by the trial court as a matter of law that Appellees filed suit within “two years after the date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice occurred....” Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.565 (Vernon 1987).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Before OSBORN, C.J., and FULLER and KOEHLER, JJ.