Court Opinion

ID: 9730492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:14:00.150852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.881329
License: Public Domain

LOUIS J. CECI, J.
(dissenting). Between January 1, 1972, and April 1, 1974, while earning $14,672.79, the defendant cheated the taxpayers of Milwaukee county out of $1,237.00. That felony is what the jury found she committed and, simply stated, that amount is what the trial court ordered her to pay. Yet the majority now lambasts the trial court for the defendant's failure to make full restitution.
When first placing her on probation, the trial judge specified that, as a condition of probation, she make restitution. She did not, and the court properly extended her probation. I agree with Justice Callow's concurrence to the extent that cause exists for extending probation whenever a probationer has the capacity to make full restitution, yet fails to do so. The record indicates that at the November 15, 1983, hearing, the defendant was earning $9.50 per hour, and her husband had a net earning income of $400.00 per month. They had two cars and budgeted $145.00 for church tithes and $50.00 for entertainment, among other things. Davis clearly had the capacity to make further restitution in this case. In addition, there is no substantial reason not to require further restitution payments from the defendant. Sec. 973.09(3)(b), Stats.1
*519Further, I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure to set a more detailed restitution plan. The majority opinion evidences a disappointing lack of appreciation and concern for the realities of the operations of the overworked criminal trial court system in Milwaukee county. Milwaukee county has 37 circuit court trial judges; the weighted caseload analysis of the director of state courts shows a need for 48.4 judges. The state has not seen fit to supply these courts with an adequate support staff of either secretaries, assistants, graduate law clerks, or interns. Yet the majority opinion now will require that the trial judge get involved in the analysis of what, when, where, how much, and how often shall the defendant make payments toward the satisfaction of the court-ordered restitution. The trial court's failure to personally draft a restitution repayment plan does not constitute abuse; more properly, the fact that the trial court left that duty to the probation department reflects the facts of a heavy trial caseload.
I must also comment about the majority's preclusive reading of the trial court's opening remark at the November 15, 1983, hearing. Majority opinion at pp. 491, 492. Obviously, the trial court had read the record and the probation report and had been apprised of the posture of the case before it. The majority's extrapolation that the trial court thus made known that it would not consider other circumstances is unfounded.
I dispute the majority's characterization of the defendant's restitution conduct as being an exhibit of good faith. The majority categorically states at p. 497 of the opinion, "We see no reason why the criminal justice system in these circumstances, where Dauis has repeatedly and continuously demonstrated good faith, should not relinquish its hold upon Davis." (Emphasis added.) This remarkable premise and piece of confabulation need not be directly controverted by me, other than to suggest that the probation agent's report filed with the court on November 17, *5201980, be reread. I quote in full the last paragraph of page 2 of that report:
"Miss Davis' payments during the first two years of supervision cannot be described as a good faith effort. However, there has been more of a good faith effort from that time up until the present. Even though Miss Davis does not have the ability to make substantial payments toward court obligations on a monthly basis in the future, it is felt that her probation should be extended mainly because there was not a good faith effort overall during the probation term. Since there is a substantial amount of restitution owing, it is also felt that Miss Davis should have the opportunity to show more convincingly a good faith effort to make restitution to the proper claimant in this case. For this reason, it is felt that a remittance is inappropriate. Also, since this agent began supervising her case in November of 1978 approximately there have been no serious adjustment problems on supervision. That is, Miss Davis maintains steady employment, a suitable place of residence, and provided for her family as best she could." [Emphasis added.]
Moreover, it is curious how the majority, after having read the emphasized portion of the passage, concludes that "[i]t was only . . . [an] apparent lack of effort during the first two years of supervision that impelled the probation agent to suggest that the court continue Davis on probation." Majority opinion at pp. 489, 490.
The majority opinion cites sec. 973.09(3)(b), Stats., and conveniently ignores sec. 973.09(3)(a), which reads as follows: "Prior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof." It is obvious that the trial court had this section in mind when it insisted that the defendant fulfill the original terms of probation and make full and complete restitution.
*521Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion and because the defendant certainly has the ability to make further restitution payments, I dissent.

 This subsection states in relevant part: "A probationer shall not be discharged from probation until payment of the ordered restitution . . . has been made or the court determines that there is substantial reason not to continue to require payment."