Court Opinion

ID: 9940705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 01:00:34.955635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:37.097685
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-11099         Document: 00517064225             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/14/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                        No. 22-11099
                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                February 14, 2024
   Yoel Weisshaus,                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Steve Coy Teichelman; 100th Judicial District,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 2:22-CV-35
                      ______________________________

   Before Smith, Graves, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves Jr., Circuit Judge: *
          Appellant Yoel Weisshaus brought a § 1983 Fourth Amendment
   Claim against police officer Steve Teichelman and the 100th Judicial District
   (“the District”) alleging illegal search and seizure incident to a prolonged
   traffic stop. The district court granted the District’s motion to dismiss for
   failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment based on qualified im-
   munity to Teichelman. We AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-11099      Document: 00517064225          Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/14/2024

                                    No. 22-11099

                                 Background
          On March 2, 2020, Appellant was traveling with a passenger, Ms. Lee,
   from Oklahoma to Scottsdale, Arizona when he was pulled over in Texas by
   Officer Teichelman for speeding and displaying an obscured license plate and
   registration insignia. Teichelman requested to see Appellant’s driver’s
   license and registration and asked Appellant to accompany him to his patrol
   car. Ms. Lee stayed in the vehicle. While running Appellant’s license and
   registration, Teichelman asked Appellant questions regarding his travel
   plans. Appellant was unable to provide details as to the length of his stay and
   hotel accommodations, and stated only that he was helping Ms. Lee move
   her belongings to New Jersey. Given that Appellant had a driver’s license
   from New Jersey, was unable to give specific answers as to length of stay and
   hotel accommodations, and was traveling on I-40, a highway that was a
   known “drug and human trafficking corridor” with a woman “who appeared
   to be considerably younger with no familial connection,” Officer Teichelman
   developed a suspicion of criminal activity. To dispel this suspicion,
   Teichelman decided to ask Ms. Lee the same questions he asked Appellant.
   Lee was unable to provide details and appeared “nervous, timid, and scared”
   and was avoiding eye contact and looking at the floorboard. Teichelman’s
   suspicion of criminal activity elevated, and he asked Appellant if he would
   consent to a search of his vehicle. Appellant declined. Teichelman then
   walked his canine partner, Kobra, around the vehicle to do an open-air sniff.
          Teichelman asserts that Kobra passively alerted to the scent of
   narcotics in the vehicle. Appellant argues that the dog did not alert because
   it did not sit, bark, or stop. Teichelman searched Appellant’s vehicle. Finding
   nothing, Teichelman permitted Appellant to leave.

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                            Procedural History
          On March 2, 2022, Appellant filed suit naming Teichelman and the
   District as Defendants. The District filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
   state a claim, which the district court granted. Teichelman filed a motion for
   summary judgment asserting qualified immunity, which the district court
   granted, holding Plaintiff could not establish that Teichelman violated clearly
   established law. Weisshaus appealed the grant of summary judgment.
                            Standard of Review
          “A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the
   same standard on appeal that is applied by the district court.” Cass v. City of
   Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016). “Typically, the movant bears the
   initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a material fact issue.” Orr v.
   Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
   Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)). But “[a] good-faith assertion of quali-
   fied immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it
   to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Id. (quoting Cass v.
   City of Abilene, 814 F.3d at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted)). To do
   so, a plaintiff must “identify specific evidence in the summary judgment rec-
   ord demonstrating that there is a material fact issue concerning the essential
   elements of its case for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id.
   (quoting Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994)).
                                   Discussion
                               I. Officer Teichelman
          Appellant argues that Teichelman violated his Fourth Amendment
   right to be free from unconstitutional searches and seizures. The Fourth
   Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
   Const. amend. IV. “The stopping of a vehicle and detention of its

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   occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.” United
   States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004). “We analyze the legality
   of traffic stops for Fourth Amendment purposes under the standard articu-
   lated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” United States
   v. Smith, 952 F.3d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Under Terry,
   “the legality of police investigatory stops is tested in two parts.” Brigham,
   382 F.3d at 506. “Courts first examine whether the officer's action was justi-
   fied at its inception, and then inquire whether the officer's subsequent actions
   were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.”
   Id.
          Appellant does not argue that the stop was not justified at its incep-
   tion. As to the second inquiry, we may assume that Appellant is correct that
   the initial justification for the stop ended when Teichelman issued the cita-
   tion and returned his driver’s license while Appellant was still in the patrol
   vehicle. Thus, there must have been some additional justification permitting
   Teichelman to prolong the stop.
          The Fourth Amendment “permits an officer to initiate a brief investi-
   gative traffic stop when he has ‘a particularized and objective basis for sus-
   pecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Kansas v. Glover,
   140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
   417–18 (1981)). The “level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably
   less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obvi-
   ously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. (quoting Prado Navarette
   v. Cal., 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)). “The standard depends on the factual and
   practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
   men, not legal technicians, act.” Id. at 1188 (internal quotations and citation
   omitted). The district court granted summary judgment to Teichelman based
   on qualified immunity, finding that Appellant had failed to show that any con-
   stitutional violation was clearly established.

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                                     No. 22-11099

          The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials
   from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been
   believed to be legal.” Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 599 (5th Cir. 2016).
   “This immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who know-
   ingly violate the law.’” Id. “Accordingly, we do not deny immunity unless
   ‘existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question be-
   yond debate.’” Id. at 599-600 (citation omitted). To defeat qualified immun-
   ity, Appellant must show: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or consti-
   tutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of
   the challenged conduct.” Id. at 600. “This court, like the district court, has
   ‘discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified-immunity anal-
   ysis to tackle first.’” Id. (citation omitted). We begin with the second prong.
                               A. Clearly Established
          “If the defendant's actions violated a clearly established constitutional
   right” courts examine “whether qualified immunity is still appropriate be-
   cause the defendant's actions were objectively reasonable in light of law
   which was clearly established at the time of the disputed action.” Brown v.
   Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
   The court focuses on the state of the law at the time of the incident and
   whether it provided fair warning to the defendant that his conduct was un-
   constitutional. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014). The caselaw must
   establish beyond debate that the officer’s conduct violated then-clearly es-
   tablished law. Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020). Appellant
   must “identify a case in which an officer acting under similar circumstances
   was held to [have committed a constitutional violation] and explain why the
   case clearly proscribed the conduct of the officer.” Joseph on behalf of Estate
   of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 345 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation amended). “It
   is the plaintiff's burden to find a case in his favor that does not define the law

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   at a high level of generality.” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (quotations and citation omitted).
                              i. Reasonable Suspicion
          Appellant first argues that it was clearly established that Teichelman
   did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and conduct a dog sniff.
   A “police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the
   stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable sei-
   zures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015). “A seizure jus-
   tified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] un-
   lawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
   th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id. “Once the purpose of
   a valid traffic stop has been completed and an officer's initial suspicions have
   been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional
   reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts.” United States v. Es-
   trada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Machuca–
   Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2001)). “If the officer develops reasona-
   ble suspicion of additional criminal activity during his investigation of the cir-
   cumstances that originally caused the stop, he may further detain [the] occu-
   pants [of the vehicle] for a reasonable time while appropriately attempting to
   dispel this reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 833
   (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir.
   2010)). Reasonable suspicion exists “when the detaining officer can point to
   specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational infer-
   ences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.” Id.
          Appellant has not shown that any constitutional violation was clearly
   established. It is undisputed that Teichelman questioned Appellant while he
   was seated in the car, still processing Appellant’s documents. In this ques-
   tioning, (1) Appellant was short with his responses to questions about his

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                                     No. 22-11099

   travel plans, (2) Appellant had a New Jersey driver’s license and was travel-
   ing on I-40, a known drug corridor, (3) with a female that appeared to be con-
   siderably younger than him, and (4) had no familial relation to him. Appellant
   has not shown that it was clearly established that under similar facts an officer
   was held to have committed a constitutional violation. In fact, we have previ-
   ously found reasonable suspicion where the driver was unable to answer
   questions as to travel plans and where his story diverged from that of other
   occupants while traveling on a known drug corridor. (See United States v.
   Smith, 952 F.3d at 649 “we have consistently considered travel along known
   drug corridors as a relevant—even if not dispositive—piece of the reasonable
   suspicion puzzle.” Id.)
          For the same reasons, Appellant has failed to show that any continued
   detention to question Ms. Lee was clearly established as unconstitutional. Af-
   ter questioning Appellant, Teichelman questioned Lee with the same general
   questions on travel itinerary, and she (1) could not provide details as to the
   trip, (2) appeared nervous, timid, and scared, and (3) failed to make eye con-
   tact with him and looked at the floorboard. See Andres, 703 F.3d 828 at 833-
   34 (finding reasonable suspicion where the driver’s untruthful answers, nerv-
   ousness, and the anonymous tip about carrying drugs created additional rea-
   sonable suspicion justifying the continued detention). Furthermore, the rea-
   sonable suspicion determination “must be made based on the totality of the
   circumstances and the collective knowledge and experience of the officer or
   officers.” Estrada, 459 F.3d at 631-32. Courts “must allow law enforcement
   officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make in-
   ferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to
   them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507
   (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).
          Appellant cites United States v. Santiago, for the proposition that it
   was clearly established that Teichelman unconstitutionally extended the

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   stop. 310 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002). In that case the officer stopped Santiago
   for a flashing light hazard to oncoming traffic. The officer claimed he was
   suspicious because Santiago said they were traveling on vacation to Atlanta
   for one week before his kids started school, but his wife, who was in the car,
   said they were staying for 2-3 weeks. Further, the officer knew that school in
   Louisiana had already started. The officer also noted nervousness when he
   asked Santiago for his license, and the officer was suspicious because there
   was another woman’s name on Santiago’s car’s registration. To dispel this,
   Santiago explained that school started later where he lived, hence the late
   travel date, and he also explained that the other woman on the registration
   was his ex-wife, but the car was his. The officer ran criminal history checks,
   and despite them coming back negative, and the car not being reported as
   stolen, the officer extended the stop and ultimately conducted a canine drug
   sniff. The court found that the officer unreasonably extended the stop in
   violation of Santiago’s Fourth Amendment rights stating that the officer’s
   suspicion of child trafficking and stolen vehicle were dispelled, and the
   conflicting statements and nervousness were not enough. Id. at 342.
          Unlike in Santiago, Teichelman articulated that he was partly
   suspicious because Appellant was traveling on I-40, a known drug highway,
   with a woman who “appeared to be younger” and had no familial connection.
   Accordingly, pertinent facts present in this case, differ from those in
   Santiago. See Smith, 952 F.3d at 649 (finding that the totality of the
   circumstances supported reasonable suspicion where the stories of the driver
   and the non-relative passengers were inconsistent; the driver’s story seemed
   implausible; and that they were traveling on an interstate frequently used to
   transport contraband). Accordingly, this court cannot say it is “beyond
   debate” that Teichelman did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the
   stop. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656.

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          Furthermore, unlike in Santiago, Teichelman’s suspicions were not
   dispelled. “Once the purpose of a valid traffic stop has been completed and
   an officer's initial suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention
   must end[.]” Estrada, 459 F.3d at 631 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
   (“If the officer develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity
   during his investigation of the circumstances that originally caused the stop,
   he may further detain [the] occupants [of the vehicle] for a reasonable time
   while appropriately attempting to dispel this reasonable suspicion.”) Andres,
   703 F.3d at 833 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, neither Appellant
   nor Ms. Lee could give concrete travel details, they were traveling on a known
   drug highway with an out-of-state license, there was no familial relationship,
   and Ms. Lee was acting nervous, scared, and avoided eye contact. Only then
   did Teichelman conduct an open-air sniff. Accordingly, even if Teichelman
   did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to conduct the dog
   sniff, any violation was not clearly established.
                                 ii. Probable Cause
          Appellant next argues that it was clearly established that Teichelman
   did not have probable cause to search his vehicle. A police officer has
   probable cause to conduct a search when “the facts available to [him] would
   ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief’ that contraband or
   evidence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, U.S. 237, 243 (2013)
   (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion)). “The
   test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or
   quantification.’” Id. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).
   “All we have required is the kind of ‘fair probability’ on which ‘reasonable
   and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.’” Id. (citation omitted). “In
   evaluating [this standard], we have consistently looked to the totality of the
   circumstances.” Id. at 244. Our court “has repeatedly affirmed that an alert
   by a drug-detecting dog provides probable cause to search.” United States v.

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   Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 444 (5th Cir. 2003). “The question—similar to
   every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a
   dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a
   reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or
   evidence of a crime.” Harris, 568 U.S. at 248.
          Teichelman states that Kobra alerted. Appellant argues that the dog
   did not sit, bark, or stop, and thus did not alert and there was therefore no
   probable cause to search his vehicle. Even if Teichelman did not have
   probable cause to search the vehicle, any violation was not clearly established.
   “Evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training
   program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.” Harris, 568
   U.S. at 246. Kobra is registered and trained to give passive alerts. Further,
   “[o]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not require drug dogs to abide
   by a specific and consistent code in signaling their sniffing of drugs to their
   handlers.” United States v. Clayton, 374 F. App'x 497, 502 (5th Cir. 2010).
   Additionally, “[t]he question—similar to every inquiry into probable
   cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the
   lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a
   search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.” Harris, 568 U.S. at
   248. The totality of the circumstances shows that in addition to his
   questioning of both Appellant and Ms. Lee, the lack of familial connection,
   and the drug highway; Teichelman is trained in highway interdiction,
   Teichelman routinely patrols I-40 with Kobra, and Kobra is registered and
   trained to alert to narcotics. Under this set of facts, Appellant has not shown
   that the search of his vehicle was clearly established as unconstitutional.
   Appellant cites to Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348, to show that Teichelman violated

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   a clearly established constitutional right. Although Appellant references this
   case in the context of his Monell claim against the District, we discuss it here. 1
           In Rodriguez, Rodriguez was pulled over for driving on a highway
   shoulder. When the officer asked Rodriguez why he was driving on the
   shoulder, he answered that he swerved to avoid a pothole. The officer then
   asked Rodriguez if he would accompany him back to his patrol car, but he
   declined. The officer proceeded to run Rodriguez’s information while in his
   patrol car, and it came back with no issues. He then asked both people in the
   car questions about where they were going, which they answered, and the
   officer issued a warning and returned all documents. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
   351-52. At that point, the officer had fully completed everything related to
   the stop and “took care of all the business.” Id. at 352. Despite this, the
   officer held Rodriguez while he conducted an open-air sniff around the
   vehicle. The dog alerted to drugs in the vehicle and a search revealed a large
   bag of methamphetamine. Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence
   arguing that the officer prolonged the stop without reasonable suspicion.
           The magistrate judge found that the continued detention for the dog
   sniff was not supported by individualized suspicion and the district court
   adopted those findings, but nonetheless denied the motion to suppress under
   Eighth Circuit precedent because the extension of the stop by seven to eight
   minutes was only a “de minimis” intrusion on Rodriguez’s rights. The Eighth
   Circuit affirmed and did not address whether the officer had individualized
   suspicion. Id. at 352-53. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case
   for the Eighth Circuit to determine whether reasonable suspicion of criminal
   activity justified detaining the driver beyond the completion of the initial
           _____________________
           1
             Appellant mentions that the “dog was only a fabricated pretext . . . for probable
   cause,” and so it is probative to his argument that Teichelman did not have probable cause
   to search his vehicle.

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   traffic stop because an officer may not prolong the stop “absent reasonable
   suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 355;
   358.
          Here, similar to Santiago, pertinent facts of this case differ from the
   facts of our case. Unlike in Rodriguez, Teichelman specifically articulated his
   suspicion on why he suspected that criminal activity was afoot, and those
   reasons were not dispelled prior to extending the stop and conducting the
   search. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish that any constitutional
   violation was clearly established.
                                  II. The District
                                    Jurisdiction
          Appellee first argues that Appellant has waived his right to appeal the
   district court’s order dismissing the claims against the District because
   Appellant failed to “designate the judgment—or appealable order—from
   which the appeal is taken.” Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
   3(c)(1)(B), a “notice of appeal must ... designate the judgment, order, or part
   thereof being appealed.” Carraway v. U.S. ex rel. Fed. Emergency Mgmt.
   Agency, 471 F. App'x 267, 268 (5th Cir. 2012). “Rule 3's dictates are
   jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is a prerequisite to appellate
   review.” Id. However, “we construe a notice of appeal liberally to avoid
   technical barriers to review.” U.S. ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 816
   F.3d 315, 327 (5th Cir. 2016). Because Appellant identified the final order in
   this case in his Notice of Appeal, we may assert jurisdiction. “Reviewing a
   final judgment, [] ‘clearly encompasses the prior orders leading up to it.’”
   Id. at 328.

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                               Standard of Review
          The court conducts de novo review of a district court’s order to
   dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Walker v. Beaumont
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 734 (5th Cir. 2019). “To survive a Rule
   12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint ‘does not need detailed factual
   allegations,’ but it must provide the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to
   relief—including factual allegations that, when assumed to be true, ‘raise a
   right to relief above the speculative level.’” Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798
   F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “We may affirm a district
   court’s order dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘on any basis supported
   by the record.’” Id. (citation omitted).
                                  Monell Liability
          Appellant argues that the District has a custom or policy of exploiting
   Texas laws by converting ordinary traffic stops into an opportunity for civil
   forfeiture. He argues that the District created the 100th Judicial District
   Traffic Enforcement Division (“Traffic Division”) to use these traffic stops
   as an opportunity for civil forfeiture, to search, without probable cause, in
   hopes of finding large sums of cash or narcotics. Municipal liability under 42
   U.S.C. § 1983 “requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official
   policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the
   policy or custom.” Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.
   2001) (quoting Monell v. Dep't. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
   Monell does not encompass liability based on respondeat superior; accordingly,
   “the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the
   municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; [and]
   isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never
   trigger liability.” Id. There is no dispute that District Attorney Inman was

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   the District’s policy maker. Accordingly, we look to whether there is an
   official policy.
          “Although an official policy ‘usually exists in the form of written
   policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, ... it may also arise in the form
   of a widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute
   a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.’” Balle v. Nueces Cnty., 952
   F.3d 552, 559 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Appellant does not allege
   that there was a written policy, only that there was a “practice and custom”
   of unconstitutional seizures. “In order to find a municipality liable for a
   policy based on a pattern, that pattern ‘must have occurred for so long or so
   frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the
   governing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected,
   accepted practice.” Davidson v. City of Stafford, Tex., 848 F.3d 384, 396 (5th
   Cir. 2017). “A pattern requires similarity, specificity, and sufficiently
   numerous prior incidents.” Id. Here, Appellant does not provide sufficient
   factual detail for this court to find an unconstitutional official policy.
          At the district court, Appellant provided twenty-one instances where
   “the officer called a k-9 unit to prolong detentions after the purpose of the
   traffic stops had concluded pursuant to the District’s unconstitutional
   pattern and practice.” However, none of these examples provide the specific
   background necessary for a court to determine, for example, the purpose of
   the stop, whether the persons were guilty or not, any court rulings on the
   matter, any similarity between the occurrences, or number of total stops in
   context. See Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir.
   2009) (finding the district court did not err in holding that the plaintiff did
   not establish an unconstitutional official policy where the pattern evidence
   failed to provide context such as the size of the police department or number
   of arrests). Appellant only makes the conclusory assertion that these stops
   were prolonged due to an unconstitutional practice. That is not enough. To

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   survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s “description of a policy or custom
   and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation ... cannot be
   conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Balle, 952 F.3d at 559 (quoting
   Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)).
   Even if this court were to take at face value, Appellant’s contention that “he
   was not required to plead these factual allegations” the remainder of his
   complaint, is conclusory. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
   dismissing the complaint against the District.
                                  Conclusion
          We AFFIRM the district court.

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