Court Opinion

ID: 9408407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 17:09:00.866972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.634694
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dwayne A. Peifer and D&K Living                 :
Trust                                           :
                                                :
                  v.                            :   No. 31 C.D. 2023
                                                :   ARGUED: June 5, 2023
Colerain Township Zoning Hearing                :
Board                                           :
                                                :
                  v.                            :
                                                :
Colerain Township                               :
                                                :
Appeal of: Chester Water Authority              :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER                                               FILED: July 12, 2023

               Chester Water Authority (CWA) appeals from an order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lancaster County denying CWA’s application for leave to
intervene in a land use appeal filed by Dwayne A. Peifer and D&K Living Trust1
(collectively, Peifer).2 Also before the Court is Peifer’s application to quash the

    1
     D&K Living Trust owns the subject property. (Sept. 16, 2021 Zoning Hearing Board “ZHB”
Decision, Finding of Fact “F.F.” No. 2.)
    In the order, the trial court also granted Peifer’s motion to quash and strike from the record
    2

CWA’s reply brief and amended reply brief.
instant appeal as interlocutory.3 We deny Peifer’s application to quash the instant
appeal and reverse the trial court’s order denying CWA’s application for leave to
intervene.
                                        I. Background
                In 2021, Peifer filed an application for a special exception to operate a
concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO), specifically an industrial duck farm,
in Colerain Township’s agricultural zoning district. Comprising approximately
sixty acres, the subject property is located at 510 Mt. Eden Road, Kirkwood,
Pennsylvania. The property is enrolled in the Township’s agricultural security area
and is permanently preserved as a farm through a conservation easement.
                The proposed duck barn would measure 63 feet in width by 640 feet in
length, would be located at least 75 feet from any property line, and would house
approximately 40,000 ducks at its maximum capacity.4 (Sept. 16, 2021 Zoning
Hearing Board “ZHB” Decision, Finding of Fact “F.F.” Nos. 5, 7, and 17.) The
ducks’ daily average water consumption would be approximately 3500 gallons,
which equates to a well producing 2.43 gallons per minute and is comparable to
approximately 9 single-family homes. (F.F. No. 31.) Every month, one truck would
deliver baby ducks. (F.F. No. 30.) Every four weeks, there would be four tractor-
trailer trucks that would load ducks and transport them to Harrisburg for processing.
There also would be feed trucks entering and exiting the property. (Id.) “Mortalities
[would] be handled using an industry standard incinerator system.” (F.F. No. 32.)

    3
      On April 4, 2023, this Court granted CWA’s application for expedited relief requesting an
expedited schedule for briefing and argument and listed Peifer’s application to quash with the
merits of the appeal. On May 3, 2023, the ZHB filed a notice of non-participation in the above-
captioned appeal.
    4
        Five thousand ducks necessitate a CAFO permit. (F.F. No. 28.)

                                                2
             The duck manure would be scraped to a point where it would be
conveyed underground to an outside concrete manure storage structure, measuring
105 feet in diameter and 16 feet deep, that would be located at least 200 feet from
any property line. (F.F. Nos. 8, 10, 15, and 17.) Although the capacity for the
manure structure would be approximately 971,600 gallons, the annual manure
generated would be approximately only 483,000 gallons. (F.F. Nos. 10 and 11.) The
structure would be pumped out in the spring and fall, with the wet manure applied
two times per year as a natural fertilizer to the surface of the land in accordance with
Peifer’s nutrient management plan. (F.F. Nos. 13, 20, and 21.) The manure would
be applied at approximately 4000 gallons per acre and would not be spread within
100 feet of any well or stream. (F.F. Nos. 18 and 19.) “In order to help mitigate
odors associated with the storage and land application of manure, a natural enzyme
called ‘pit king’ [would] be added to the manure in the manure storage structure.”
(F.F. No. 14.)
             As for CWA’s interest, the proposed duck farm is in close proximity to
CWA’s Octoraro Reservoir providing drinking water to the City of Chester,
Southern Chester County, and Western Delaware County. (F.F. No. 38.) CWA also
owns property across from the subject property. (Dec. 8, 2022, Trial Ct. Op. at 8.)
Appearing before the ZHB, a representative for CWA submitted a lengthy letter
from CWA’s chief operations officer and facilities supervisor copiously outlining
why CWA believed that the ZHB should deny Peifer’s application for a special
exception and stating that “CWA is a person affected by the application . . . and
requests recognition as a party in this proceeding.” (Aug. 11, 2021 Hr’g, CWA Ex.
J; Reproduced Record “R.R.” at 369a.) The representative offered to read the letter
into the record but the ZHB’s counsel stated that the ZHB had the letter and

                                           3
requested that it be marked and made part of the record. He further stated that the
representative could pass it out to community members present at the hearing. (Id.,
Notes of Testimony “N.T.” at 77; R.R. at 298a.) It does not appear that the ZHB
acted on CWA’s request to be accorded party status.
             In a September 2021 written decision denying Peifer’s application, the
ZHB concluded that the subject property was not an appropriate location for the
proposed use. The ZHB found that the proposed duck barn would be located in close
vicinity to a number of neighboring residences and on land sloping to nearby Gables
Run, which flows to Octoraro Reservoir. (F.F. Nos. 33 and 37.) In addition, the
ZHB determined that the proposed use would adversely affect the zoning district
because the odor associated with manure and the spreading thereof would adversely
affect the neighboring property owners as well as substantially injure or detract from
the use of neighboring properties and from the character of the neighborhood. (F.F.
Nos. 34 and 35.) Finally, the ZHB concluded that Peifer failed to prove that the
proposed use would be safely operated and that the neighboring properties would be
safeguarded from stormwater runoff and pollution. (F.F. No. 39.)
             Peifer appealed and the Township filed a praecipe for intervention as
of right to represent the ZHB. In November 2021, CWA filed an application for
leave to intervene in Peifer’s land use appeal. Ultimately, the trial court denied
CWA’s application and ruled that the Township and the ZHB could adequately
represent CWA’s interests. In January 2023, CWA appealed from the trial court’s
order denying CWA’s application for leave to intervene. In March 2023, Peifer filed
an application to quash CWA’s appeal as interlocutory. At this time, we consider
both the merits of the appeal and Peifer’s application to quash.

                                          4
          II. Peifer’s Application to Quash CWA’s Appeal as Interlocutory
              An order denying the right to intervene is no longer deemed a final
order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341. Fayette Cnty. Off. of
Plan., Zoning & Cmty. Dev. v. Fayette Cnty. Zoning Hearing Bd., 981 A.2d 336,
340 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). However, an appeal may be taken as of right from a trial
court’s collateral order. Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). A collateral order is defined as “an order
separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is
too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review
is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). All three criteria must be satisfied in order for the doctrine to
apply and the doctrine must be narrowly construed in order to avoid piecemeal
determinations and protracted litigation. Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306,
312 (Pa. 2015). Peifer concedes that the first criterion for application of the
collateral order doctrine is satisfied but argues that CWA cannot meet the second
and third criteria.
              The second criterion requires that the right involved be too important
to be denied review. CWA is both an adjacent landowner and the owner of the
directly affected Octoraro Reservoir. As the trial court concluded, CWA established
a “legally enforceable interest” under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2327(4)
setting forth who may intervene. Pennsylvania courts have long recognized that
property owners in the immediate vicinity of property involved in zoning litigation
have the requisite interest to become intervenors. Wexford Sci. and Tech., LLC v.
City of Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 260 A.3d 316, 325-26 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021); Twp. of Radnor v. Radnor Recreational, LLC., 859 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004); Larock v. Sugarloaf Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 740 A.2d 308 (Pa. Cmwlth.

                                          5
1999); Summit Twp. Taxpayers Ass’n v. Summit Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 411 A.2d
1263, 1265 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980); Schatz v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Dublin
Twp., 343 A.2d 90, 91-92 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975). In this respect, we reject Peifer’s
argument that CWA, as an adjacent property owner, had to articulate a legally
enforceable interest for intervention that may be affected by Peifer’s land use appeal.
The law provides that a property owner’s proximity to the subject property is
sufficient to afford it standing to appeal without any necessity for that owner to
declare any plans for its adjacent property.
             In addition, CWA’s appeal also implicates rights under the
Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) providing that all Pennsylvanians have

             a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
             the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
             environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are
             the common property of all the people, including
             generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
             Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
             benefit of all the people.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 27 (emphasis added). The ERA imposes fiduciary duties on the
Commonwealth and all state, county and local agencies, including CWA, “to prevent
and remedy the degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public natural
resources.” Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa. 2017).
             However, Peifer asserts that CWA’s purported interest in protecting its
water supply is not too important to be denied review because it is obviated by the
Commonwealth’s comprehensive regulation of the proposed use for the specific
purpose of protecting ground and surface water as well as other environmental
resources. Peifer cites regulation by the State Conservation Commission under the

                                          6
Nutrient Management Act5 and by the Department of Environmental Protection
under The Clean Streams Law.6
                Peifer’s position is without merit. The fact that other agencies may also
have a duty to protect the environment does not negate CWA’s duty, let alone
obviate its very specific interest in protecting the quality of drinking water in its own
reservoir. As the trial court concluded, CWA has a legally enforceable interest as a
property owner in the immediate vicinity of the proposed use. In addition, in
ascertaining whether the property interests of landowners seeking to intervene were
too important to be denied review, this Court observed:

                Every person has the right to the natural, proper, and
                profitable use of his or her own land. Implicit then is the
                right to protect one’s property from harm, whether it be in
                the form of decreased valuation, insufficient water supply,
                excessive dust, noise, pollution, or some other cause.
                [Emphasis in original.]

Wexford, 260 A.3d at 321 (quoting Larock, 740 A.2d at 312). Accordingly, CWA
satisfied the second criterion.
                The third criterion requires that the question presented is such that if
review is postponed until final judgment, the claim will be irreparably lost. CWA’s
failure to secure intervenor status would not only prevent it from asserting its
interests in the land use appeal in the trial court, but it would also cause it to lose its
ability to file an appeal from that court’s final order. In re Barnes Found., 871 A.2d
792, 794-95 (Pa. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 501 (authorizing appeals by “any party who is
aggrieved by an appealable order”). The underlying purpose behind the general
prohibition of interlocutory appeals is to require that all issues be decided following

    5
        3 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-22.
    6
        Act of June 22, 1987, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 691.1-691.1001.

                                                7
the final order rather than having issues be appealed in piecemeal fashion. Here,
however, CWA would never be able to appeal the denial of its intervention if the
instant appeal is quashed because, absent party status, it would be unable to appeal
from the trial court’s final order.
             In addition, CWA’s claim would be irreparably lost because it would
not have the same remedy available, prohibition of the proposed use, and would be
relegated to post-contamination damages and clean-up remedies. In support, CWA
cites Robinson Township, Washington County v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 962-
63 (Pa. 2013) (plurality), holding that the ERA “permit[s] not only reactive but also
anticipatory protection of the environment” before natural resources are degraded,
diminished, or depleted. In other words, CWA asserts that its appeal does not
involve a situation where it could obtain the same remedy in a separate action or
pursue other avenues by which it could obtain a remedy and/or protect its interests.
Compare Watson v. City of Phila., 665 A.2d 1315, 1318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995)
(unappealable interlocutory order because if attorney were not permitted to appeal
the denial of his petition to intervene in his former client’s whistleblower case,
attorney could recover his attorney’s fees through a direct action against his former
client). The third criterion has been satisfied.
             All three criteria necessary for application of the collateral order
doctrine having been satisfied, Peifer’s application to quash the instant appeal is
denied.
    III. Trial Court’s Denial of CWA’s Application for Leave to Intervene
             Having determined that the trial court’s order denying CWA’s
application for leave to intervene constitutes a collateral order, we now address the
merits of the trial court’s denial of CWA’s application for leave to intervene. The

                                           8
grant or denial of intervention is committed to the trial court’s discretion and will
not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of such discretion. Wexford, 260 A.3d at
325.
             Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2327 provides as follows as to
who may intervene:

                    At any time during the pendency of an action, a
             person not a party thereto shall be permitted to intervene
             therein, subject to these rules if
                    (1) the entry of a judgment in such action or the
             satisfaction of such judgment will impose any liability
             upon such person to indemnify in whole or in part the party
             against whom judgment may be entered; or
                    (2) such person is so situated as to be adversely
             affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
             in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof; or
                    (3) such person could have been named as an
             original party in the action or could have been joined
             therein; or

                    (4) the determination of such action may affect any
             legally enforceable interest of such person whether or not
             such person may be bound by a judgment in the action.

Pa. R.Civ.P. 2327 (emphasis added).
             Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2329, the corollary rule on
intervention, sets forth the reasons for denying intervention. Rule 2329 provides:

                    Upon the filing of the petition and after hearing, of
             which due notice shall be given to all parties, the court, if
             the allegations of the petition have been established and
             are found to be sufficient, shall enter an order allowing
             intervention; but an application for intervention may be
             refused, if

                                          9
                    (1) the claim or defense of the petitioner is not in
             subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the
             action; or
                    (2) the interest of the petitioner is already
             adequately represented; or
                    (3) the petitioner has unduly delayed in making
             application for intervention or the intervention will unduly
             delay, embarrass or prejudice the trial or the adjudication
             of the rights of the parties.

Pa. R.Civ.P. 2329 (emphasis added).
             “[A] grant of intervention is mandatory where the intervenor satisfies
one of the four bases set forth in Rule [ ] 2327 unless there exists a basis for refusal
under Rule [ ] 2329.” Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pa. Dep’t Hum. Servs., 225
A.3d 902, 908 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). Here, the trial court found that Rule 2327 was
satisfied because CWA had a legally enforceable and sufficient interest but denied
intervention on the basis that its interest was adequately represented by the ZHB and
the Township.
             As an initial matter, CWA asserts that the trial court did not state
unambiguously that CWA’s interest is already adequately represented by the
Township and the ZHB. However, this is implicit in the trial court’s analysis:

             The ZHB’s decision specifically states that [Peifer’s]
             proposed duck farm is located in close vicinity to Liberty
             Lane and acknowledged concern regarding [Peifer’s] land
             sloping into Gables Run which flows into CWA’s
             Octoraro Reservoir. Further, the ZHB found that [Peifer]
             failed to prove that: the proposed duck farm would be
             safely operated; the neighboring properties would be
             adequately safeguarded from the stormwater runoff and
             pollution and the proposed duck farm would not
             substantially injure or detract from the use of neighboring
             properties or from the character of the neighborhood.
             Thus, the ZHB found that [Peifer] did not comply with the

                                          10
             requirements of § 15.03.01 of the [Colerain Township
             Zoning] Ordinance and denied [the] request for a special
             exception. Instantly, the Township and the ZHB, which
             apply and enforce the Ordinance and are both parties to
             the instant land use appeal, have thus provided for the
             protection of the interests advanced by CWA; thus, CWA’s
             [application for leave to intervene] will be denied.

(Dec. 8, 2022 Trial Ct. Op. at 12) (emphasis added).
             Rule 2329(2) requires not just that the intervenor’s interest be shared
by an existing party, but that the existing party adequately and effectively represent
that interest throughout the entire course of the litigation. See Wexford, 260 A.3d at
325. CWA’s interests are distinct from, much broader than, and not fully aligned
with the interests of the Township and the ZHB. CWA provides water service in 33
municipalities across 3 counties, whereas the Township and the ZHB represent only
1 municipality. In addition, any runoff from the proposed duck farm would go into
Octoraro Reservoir, which CWA owns and uses to provide water service. Although
the Township and the ZHB were concerned about the water, they also considered
the odor from the proposed duck farm and character of the neighborhood. In
addition, CWA has greater expertise and resources regarding water quality issues
than do the Township and the ZHB, putting CWA in a more effective position to
litigate the critical safety issues at stake here. In other words, CWA is not the
average proposed intervenor.
             Furthermore, it is not clear that the Township and the ZHB can
adequately represent CWA’s interests in the land use appeal. CWA is affirmatively
asserting an interest in the land use appeal premised on the ERA whereas the
Township and the ZHB are not. While it is true that a municipality in passing a
zoning ordinance is bound by the ERA and must consider all of the attendant

                                         11
protected rights,7 CWA’s primary purpose is to ensure the quality of the water in the
Octoraro Reservoir and provide adequate and safe drinking water. Consequently,
even though all three entities must abide by the ERA, their respective decisions as
to how to do so may take different forms and not manifest in the same way. In
addition, CWA’s goal is to prevent the development of a duck farm altogether to
protect the water supply whereas the others’ interests are focused on defending the
ZHB’s assessment and application of the criteria for a special exception to Peifer’s
current proposal. Their goals are not necessarily to prevent the use under all
circumstances. This difference between the players’ respective interests may be
analogous to Wexford, 260 A.3d at 325, where “the interests of homeowners and the
local government [vis-à-vis a proposed thirteen-story building] do not necessarily
align,” and Larock, 740 A.2d at 314, where the residents were entitled to intervene
because their goal was to prohibit the quarry whereas the goals of the zoning hearing
board and the township were to protect the interests of the township, which at some
point could include settlement thereby allowing the quarry.
               Finally, we address CWA’s argument that the trial court erred in
determining that the Township and the ZHB could adequately represent CWA’s
interest without holding a hearing. The trial court determined that a hearing was not
necessary because the record provided it with an adequate basis upon which to
exercise its discretion. As noted, Rule 2329 generally requires a hearing. See Pa.
R.Civ.P. 2329 (providing that “[u]pon the filing of the petition and after hearing, . .
. the court, if the allegations of the petition have been established and are found to

    7
       Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677, 695 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
In addition, a municipality must balance “the interest of landowners in the use and enjoyment of
their property with the public health, safety and welfare of the community when it enacts land use
regulation.” Id. at 700 [citing In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assoc., 838 A.2d 718, 727-28
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)].

                                               12
be sufficient, shall enter an order allowing intervention”). However, there are
instances where a hearing may not be required, such as: 1) where it is apparent on
the face of the petition that the criteria for intervention have been met;8 and 2) where
the record provides an adequate basis upon which a trial court may exercise
discretion without a hearing, e.g., the record is sufficient to decide the petition.9
Nonetheless, case law generally provides that a hearing is preferable. E.g., Sunny
Farms Ltd. v. N. Codorus Twp., 474 A.2d 56, 62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (although the
record provided a sufficient basis upon which the trial court could exercise its
discretion to permit intervention, a hearing would have been preferable).
             Here, it is clear that the Township and the ZHB cannot adequately and
effectively support CWA’s interest in the land use appeal. Consequently, we decline
in the interest of judicial economy to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a
hearing. However, we do not condone the trial court’s decision not to hold a hearing
on intervention and encourage hearings in virtually all situations. Otherwise, it will
be virtually impossible to ascertain whether the proposed intervenor has satisfied the
allegations of the application for leave to intervene and whether those allegations are
sufficient to permit intervention.
                                     IV. Conclusion
             Accordingly, we deny Peifer’s application to quash CWA’s appeal as
interlocutory because CWA met the criteria for application of the collateral order
doctrine. In addition, we reverse the trial court’s order denying CWA’s application

    8
      Chairge v. Exeter Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 616 A.2d 1057 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992);
Santangelo Hauling, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 479 A.2d 88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).
    9
     SBA Towers, IX, LLC v. Unity Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 179 A.3d 652, 664 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018); Sunny Farms Ltd. v. N. Codorus Twp., 474 A.2d 56, 81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).

                                           13
for leave to intervene because the Township and ZHB cannot adequately and
effectively represent CWA’s interest in the land use appeal.

                                      _____________________________________
                                      BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                      President Judge Emerita

                                        14
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dwayne A. Peifer and D&K Living          :
Trust                                    :
                                         :
               v.                        :   No. 31 C.D. 2023
                                         :
Colerain Township Zoning Hearing         :
Board                                    :
                                         :
               v.                        :
                                         :
Colerain Township                        :
                                         :
Appeal of: Chester Water Authority       :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 12th day of July, 2023, Dwayne A. Peifer and D&K
Living Trust’s application to quash the above-captioned appeal is hereby DENIED.
            Further, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
denying Chester Water Authority’s application for leave to intervene in the land use
appeal is hereby REVERSED.

                                      _____________________________________
                                      BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                      President Judge Emerita