Court Opinion

ID: 9942959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:07:36.630428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:26.312399
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3310-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN L. WILLIAMS, a/k/a
HASSAN WILLIAMS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

                   Argued February 12, 2024 – Decided February 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk, and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 21-07-0852.

                   Susan Lee Romeo, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti,
                   Public Defender, attorney; Susan Lee Romeo, of
                   counsel and on the brief).

                   Cheryl L. Hammel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel J. Marzarella,
                   Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Cheryl L.
                   Hammel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant John L. Williams appeals from a March 21, 2022 conviction

for: third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one);

second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5(a)(1) and -5(b)(2) (count two); third-degree possession of heroin and fentanyl,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count three); and third-degree possession of heroin

with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(3) (count four). He

also challenges his sentence. We affirm.

      On November 10, 2020, Lakewood Police Detective Matthew Richardson,

Detective Sergeant Nathan Reyes, and Detective Kevin Donnelly were in an

unmarked police vehicle on assignment with the street crimes unit near Second

Street and Clifton Avenue. Around 8:30 p.m., Detective Richardson observed

defendant, who was wearing a traffic vest and sunglasses, walking on the north

side of Second Street. The detectives then saw Christopher Kiraly walk ing

toward defendant.

      Defendant and Kiraly met on the south side of Second Street and began to

walk northbound together as if engaged in a conversation. The two walked to a

municipal parking lot between Second Street and Third Street and walked in

between parked cars.     Detective Richardson testified defendant and Kiraly

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"stayed behind the vehicle for . . . at least thirty seconds, during which [Kiraly]

continued to poke his head out numerous times." The detectives then watched

Kiraly leave, "scanning the area and . . . walking away in a quick manner, and

he had his left hand within his left pants pocket." Defendant had a "trash picker"

in his hand. Detective Richardson did not observe defendant picking up any

trash with the device.

      Detective Richardson approached defendant, who was still in the parking

lot, and smelled the odor of raw marijuana.        When the detective informed

defendant he was going to search him, defendant stated: "[Y]ou got me. You

got me dirty." Detective Richardson testified the search of defendant's fanny

pack and clothing yielded

            a Ziploc bag that contained approximately sixteen
            grams of . . . an off-white rock-like substance, another
            plastic bag that contained approximately one gram of
            a[n] off-white rock-like substance, a plastic bag that
            had . . . approximately one gram of a white powder
            substance, a yellow vial that [] contain[ed] a white
            powder substance, a knotted plastic bag containing a
            green vegetative substance. There was a .01 digital
            scale or one cent, . . . three bricks of wax folds that
            contained a beige powder. There was a bundle . . . of
            wax folds that had a red stamp on it that also had beige
            powder within [it]. There w[ere] five loose wax folds
            that had a red stamp and had beige powder within it.
            There were several clear plastic gloves . . . [and] about
            eight clear plastic bags. And, there was $1,259[] in
            assorted U.S. currency . . . .

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                                        3
The detective also found a folded one-dollar bill with a white powder substance

inside it. Defendant was arrested following the search.

      Detective Richardson testified he was patrolling the area because it is

"plagued with a lot of quality[-]of[-]life issues, including open-air drug dealing,

open-air drug possession." At a later sidebar, and while the jury was on break,

defense counsel stated she "did not object [to this comment] at the time, because

it was kind of already out before [she] could object and [she] didn't want to draw

attention to it . . . ." When the jury returned, the trial judge instructed them as

follows:

            During the trial this morning there was some testimony
            about the area in downtown Lakewood where this
            incident . . . occurred. I instruct you that the area of the
            incident is not evidence of guilt in this case. Further,
            the mere presence of anyone, including the defendant
            or anyone else, in a particular area in downtown . . .
            Lakewood is likewise not evidence of guilt or
            innocence and you should not consider it as such.

      The State called Ocean County Prosecutor's Office Detective Olga

Brylevskaya "as an expert in the field of narcotics, including the practices,

methods, and techniques of those that are involved in the sale, distribution, or

possession with intent to distribute narcotics." Her expertise was based on her

interview of over one hundred people involved in narcotics distribution,

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specifically heroin and cocaine, over one hundred people who are drug users,

and approximately fifty people who were confidential sources regarding drug

distribution.

      She testified a typical drug sale interaction involved "a quick interaction,"

which is "hand to hand," and there is an "exchange [of] money for . . . drugs."

She explained interactions between drug dealers and buyers are "very brief and

quick, because the conversation . . . happened before they met," including

agreement on price and quantity.

      Detective Brylevskaya testified a drug dealer would have bags to package

the drugs, glassine paper folds, a scale to weigh quantities of drugs, and gloves.

They would also have "large quantities of money" in different increments to

quickly make change for buyers.

      She explained heroin users typically carry needles, spoons, cotton balls to

filter the heroin, "bottle caps to mix the water and the heroin so they can shoot

it up with the syringe," tourniquets, or straws for inhalation. A user "would

typically have between a bundle up to a brick," or "one wax fold" of heroin on

them, "but not more." This is because

                users know how addictive heroin is. They would be
                afraid if they had a greater quantity they would use it at
                once[,] . . . which would many times lead to an
                overdose. Another reason is that . . . a smaller amount

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                                            5
            of drugs . . . would be easier to dispose of it. If they
            were approached by law enforcement they can swallow
            it or throw it to the ground, so that it wouldn't be
            noticed. Another reason is a lot of users don't have the
            economic[] means, don't have the money to buy a lot of
            the drugs. A lot of the users [are] addicted to the
            opioids, which is the heroin. They . . . don't want to be
            going through withdrawals. So, they don't want to get
            dope sick, so they would only use it and then — to
            prevent the withdrawals, but they don't want to be
            exposed to a lot of it.

      According to Detective Brylevskaya, crack and cocaine users would

usually have "a half a gram to a gram, the most is 3.5 grams, which is called an

eight ball" of drugs on their person. She gave a similar explanation as the one

about heroin regarding why a user would have a small quantity of crack and

cocaine on their person and what dealers would carry on their person.

      Defendant testified he struggled with drug addiction since his youth and

participated in rehabilitation programs intermittently. At the time of his arrest,

he was living at a Lakewood motel and picked up trash, changed trash can liners,

and did other jobs in exchange for a reduction in rent. He worked "around the

clock," always wore a yellow reflective vest, and carried around gloves, bags,

and the trash stick. He relapsed because he thought he was going to have a baby

but found out he was not the father.

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                                        6
      Defendant testified that on the day of his arrest he had cocaine and heroin,

which he bought for personal use from a dealer in Asbury Park. He bought a

scale at a convenience store to verify the amount of drugs he was buying. He

bought a pipe and a "choy"1 to smoke crack.          He sniffed powder cocaine

throughout the day, went back to the motel, and began changing trash bin liners.

      Defendant went to the liquor store to play lottery tickets and took his drugs

and paraphernalia with him so his boss would not find anything in his motel

room. He also took the cash with him, which he said was from a stimulus check

he received during the COVID-19 pandemic. He put the pipe into a bag that had

food in it because the pipe was hot from use and put the rest of the contraband

in the crotch area of his underpants. Defendant testified he always kept his

contraband in his underpants. He told the jury: "I wear two pair of underwear,

the same underwear I got on now . . . ."

      Defendant encountered a friend on his way to the liquor store and ate some

shrimp with her. He kept walking, but then decided to return to the motel

because he forgot his wallet. He testified he then encountered Kiraly, who m he

recognized from a group of laborers that waited in the mornings in that area for

1
  Detective Brylevskaya explained choy is a type of metal filter used to smoke
crack through a pipe.
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                                        7
day jobs. Defendant claimed he saw the unmarked police vehicle and knew it

was police.    Kiraly followed defendant and asked to speak with him, but

defendant said he was trying to get back to the motel as quickly as possible to

get his wallet and use the bathroom.

      Defendant walked through the parking lot between Second Street and

Third Street. He urinated between two cars in the lot and told Kiraly "I can't

talk to you right now," and Kiraly "kept moving." When Kiraly walked away,

defendant said he vomited and fell to his knees. He testified he became sick due

to a combination of cocaine, alcohol, and the shrimp he ate. The police then

arrived.

      On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned defendant about the day

of his arrest and the following exchange took place:

              [PROSECUTOR: Y]ou were wearing two pairs of
              underwear; is that correct?

              [DEFENDANT:] Yes.

              [PROSECUTOR:] And you usually wear two pairs of
              underwear so there's nothing odd about that; right?

              [DEFENDANT:] No, I only wear them when I'm
              concealing drugs.

              [PROSECUTOR:]      Okay.     Drugs in this type of
              quantity?

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                                       8
            [DEFENDANT:] Yes, they're stretchy. I have them on
            today.

            [PROSECUTOR:] Right. You have them on today?

            [DEFENDANT:]          The same exact ones I got
            arrested . . . .

            [PROSECUTOR:] So, are you concealing . . . this
            amount of drugs on you right now?

                  ....

            [Y]ou only wear two pairs of underwear when you're
            concealing drugs you said; correct?

            [DEFENDANT:] Correct.

            [PROSECUTOR:] So do you have drugs on you right
            now?

Defense counsel objected, and the record reflects a sidebar occurred and the jury

took a break, but the judge's ruling on the objection was not transcribed.

However, when cross-examination resumed, the State did not continue with this

line of questioning.

      The intake nurse at Ocean County Jail the night of defendant's arrest

testified she conducted his medical intake at 2:50 a.m. She explained defendant

tested positive for marijuana and cocaine.

      Following the guilty verdict, the State moved for the imposition of an

extended term of imprisonment, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). The trial judge

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                                       9
found aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(1)(3), the risk of re-offense;

six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(1)(6), the nature and extent of defendant's prior record

and the seriousness of those offenses; and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(1)(9), the need

to deter defendant and others from violating the law. The judge also found

mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), the imprisonment of

defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents.

      The trial judge placed "heavy weight" on aggravating factors three, six,

and nine. He merged count one into count two and count three into count four.

He sentenced defendant on count two to an extended term of imprisonment of

seventeen years with eight and one-half years of parole ineligibility.        He

sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of five years flat on count four .

Defendant received 561 days of jail credit against his sentence, and the judge

assessed various fee, fines, and penalties.

      Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

            POINT I DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST
            BE REVERSED BASED ON PROSECUTORIAL
            MISCONDUCT:    1) IN VIOLATION OF THE
            COURT'S    PRIOR    INSTRUCTION,    THE
            PROSECUTOR ELICITED TESTIMONY FROM THE
            ARRESTING OFFICER DESCRIBING THE AREA
            AS ONE WITH "OPEN-AIR DRUG DEALING" AND
            "OPEN-AIR DRUG POSSESSION," AND 2) THE
            PROSECUTOR'S         CROSS-EXAMINATION
            DENIGRATED DEFENDANT AND IMPROPERLY

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                                       10
DISPARAGED THE DEFENSE BY REPEATEDLY
ASKING HIM WHETHER HE WAS CONCEALING
DRUGS IN HIS UNDERWEAR WHILE HE WAS
TESTIFYING (partially raised below).

    1.    The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
    When She Elicited Testimony From The
    Arresting Officer On The Area's Criminal
    Characteristics, Despite The Court's Warning To
    Avoid Any Testimony That It Was "A High-
    Crime Area" And The Officer's Opinion
    Regarding His Observations.

    2.   The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
    When She Denigrated Defendant And
    Disparaged The Defense By Asking Him
    Repeatedly If He Had Drugs In His Underwear
    While Testifying.

POINT II IT WAS PLAIN ERROR TO ALLOW
THE EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY REGARDING
THE USUAL CONDUCT AND STATE OF MIND OF
DRUG USERS AND ADDICTS, WHEN SHE WAS
NOT QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS IN
THAT AREA, SHE ADMITTED HER LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS    TO    ANSWER         SUCH
QUESTIONS, AND SHE PROVIDED NO BASIS TO
SUPPORT HER NET OPINIONS (not raised below).

POINT III DEFENDANT'S          MANDATORY
MINIMUM PERIOD OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY
ON COUNT TWO MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE
THE STATE REQUESTED, AND THE COURT
IMPOSED, A MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM ON
COUNT TWO, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) AND (b), IN
VIOLATION     OF      ATTORNEY   GENERAL
DIRECTIVE     2021-4,    WHICH   REQUIRES
PROSECUTORS TO WAIVE MANDATORY

                                                      A-3310-21
                      11
            MINIMUM TERMS FOR CONVICTIONS OF NON-
            VIOLENT DRUG OFFENSES, INCLUDING N.J.S.A.
            2C:35-5.

                                       I.

      In Point I, defendant contends there was prosecutorial misconduct because

the State improperly elicited testimony he was in a high crime area known for

drugs. He argues the testimony prejudiced the outcome of his case because the

State had no actual evidence of a drug transaction or that defendant intended to

engage in a drug transaction.     Defendant notes he moved to exclude the

testimony about the "high crime area" and the judge ruled Detective Richardson

could only testify about his observation of Kiraly but could not opine on his

observations or state that he knew Kiraly from prior interactions with law

enforcement.    Despite the judge's ruling, the prosecutor asked Detective

Richardson why he was patrolling the area and the detective responded it was

because the area had "quality of life" issues including "open-air drug dealing"

and possession.   Defendant argues this testimony improperly bolstered the

State's case and unduly prejudiced the defense's explanation why defendant was

in the area and had drugs in his possession.

      Defendant asserts the prosecutor also committed misconduct when she

questioned him about having drugs on his person during trial. He argues the

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                                      12
prosecutor knew her questions had no basis in fact and were neither a fair

comment on the evidence nor a reasonable avenue of cross-examination.

Further, "the prosecutor's questions improperly mocked defendant's efforts to

explain his actions to the jury and denigrated his defense on a critical factual

issue that also related to his and [Detective] Richardson's credibility." Indeed,

defendant's testimony that he carried drugs in his underpants contradicted

Detective Richardson's claim he found the drugs in defendant's pockets. The

prosecutor's questions prevented the jury from crediting defendant's testimony

that the drugs were not accessible for distribution on the street because they

were in his underpants.

      Prosecutorial misconduct justifies reversal where the misconduct was "so

egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Smith, 167 N.J.

158, 181 (2001) (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)). "In deciding

whether prosecutorial conduct deprived a defendant of a fair trial, 'an appellate

court must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of

responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when they

occurred.'" State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 608 (2021) (quoting Frost, 158 N.J.

at 83). "Factors to be considered in making that decision include, '(1) whether

defense counsel made timely and proper objections to the improper remarks; (2)

                                                                           A-3310-21
                                      13
whether the remarks were withdrawn promptly; and (3) whether the court

ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard

them.'" Ibid. (quoting Frost, 158 N.J. at 83).

      Detective Richardson's testimony about the crime in the area was to

explain why police were present the day of defendant's arrest, not why defendant

was stopped. Defendant does not challenge the reasons for the stop on this

appeal. The testimony did not contravene the judge's pre-trial ruling because

the ruling barred the detective from telling the jury he knew Kiraly, which the

detective never discussed. Moreover, the trial judge promptly instructed the jury

the area of the incident was not evidence of defendant's guilt. "One of the

foundations of our jury system is that the jury is presumed to follow the trial

court's instructions." State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007) (citing State v.

Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 526 (1998)). The record does not establish the jury

ignored the judge's curative instruction in this case.

      The   prosecutor's    questions   during   defendant's   cross-examination

regarding his underpants were beyond the scope of the State's case. However,

defendant opened the door when he volunteered that he only wears two pairs of

underwear "when [he's] concealing drugs," and then said he was wearing the

same underwear he uses to conceal drugs in court. Regardless, defense counsel

                                                                           A-3310-21
                                        14
promptly objected, and the record reflects the State abandoned this line of

questioning.

      Having reviewed the record and considered the tenor of the case, we are

unconvinced these instances were sufficiently egregious such that they deprived

defendant of a fair trial.     Both Detective Richardson's testimony and the

objectionable portion of the State's cross-examination were limited and not

repeated once the defense objected. We discern no reversible error.

                                         II.

      In Point II, defendant contends it was plain error to allow Detective

Brylevskaya to testify about the state of mind of drug users because the

testimony exceeded her scope of expertise. Moreover, the detective could not

opine whether defendant intended to distribute the drugs in his possession.

Defendant claims the detective's testimony that addicts do not buy large amounts

of drugs for fear of overdose lacked a basis and was a net opinion. Additionally,

the trial judge compounded the error by issuing a final jury instruction, which

stated the detective "was called by the State as an expert in the field of narcotics"

including "personal use" because the detective admitted she was not an expert

in the personal use of narcotics.

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                                        15
      We defer to a trial judge's evidentiary rulings "absent a showing of an

abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error in judgment." State v.

Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 12-13 (2021) (quoting State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402

(2015)). On appeal, we do not substitute our judgment "for that of the trial court,

unless the trial court's ruling was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of

justice resulted." Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)).

      "When a defendant fails to object to an error . . . at trial, we review for

plain error. Under that standard, we disregard any alleged error 'unless it is of

such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'"

State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting R. 2:10-2). Reversal is

warranted only where there is a "reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error

led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." Ibid. (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)). "The mere

possibility of an unjust result is not enough." Ibid.

      Expert testimony must be grounded in "facts or data derived from (1) the

expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data

relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but

which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts." Polzo v. Cnty. of

                                                                             A-3310-21
                                       16
Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008) (quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494

(2006)). "The net opinion rule . . . 'forbids the admission into evidence of an

expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. '"

Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53-54 (2015) (quoting Polzo, 196 N.J. at 583).

"To avoid a net opinion, the expert must 'give the why and wherefore' that

supports the opinion.'" Ehrlich v. Sorokin, 451 N.J. Super. 119, 134 (App. Div.

2017) (quoting Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54).

      At the outset, we note defendant did not object to Detective Brylevskaya's

testimony. Regardless, the admission of her testimony was neither an abuse of

discretion nor clearly capable of producing an unjust result. Her opinion was

grounded in her personal observations and vocational experience. She explained

why drug dealers carry certain amounts of contraband and equipment and why

the drugs and paraphernalia carried by users was different. She did not opine

on defendant's state of mind. Furthermore, the State's case included other

evidence pointing to the fact defendant was distributing rather than only

consuming drugs on the day in question. As we noted, a search of defendant's

person produced a large sum of money, drugs, empty baggies, and a scale.

Defendant's remaining arguments under this point lack sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

                                                                           A-3310-21
                                      17
                                      III.

      Finally, in Point III, defendant challenges his sentence on count two on

grounds the State violated an Attorney General Directive that prosecutors must

waive mandatory minimum terms for all non-violent drug crimes pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.2 He argues the State ignored the Directive, which has the

force of law, when it sought an extended term of twenty years imprisonment

with a mandatory ten years on count two.

      We review a sentence "in accordance with a deferential standard." State

v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). Under this standard, we do "not substitute

[our] judgment for that of the sentencing court."     Ibid. "[T]he deferential

standard of review applies only if the trial judge follows the [Criminal] Code

and the basic precepts that channel sentencing discretion." State v. Case, 220

N.J. 49, 65 (2014).

      Directive 2021-4 explains there are eighty crimes for which State law

requires judges to impose a longer period of parole ineligibility than for other

crimes, including N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing

of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS). Law Enf't Directive No. 2021-4, at

2
   Off. of the Att'y Gen. Law Enf't Directive No. 2021-04, Directive Revising
Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences
in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (Apr. 19, 2021).
                                                                          A-3310-21
                                      18
2. The Directive explains N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, among other offenses, differs from

other drug crimes because

            the period of mandatory parole ineligibility can be
            waived pursuant to a "negotiated agreement" between
            the defendant and the State. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12
            ("Section 12"), the parties can enter into an
            agreement—before or after conviction—that provides
            for a shorter period of parole ineligibility, among other
            possible sentence modifications. In addition, Section
            12 prohibits the sentencing judge from imposing a
            lesser sentence or shorter parole disqualifier than is
            provided for under the terms of the agreement.

            [Id. at 2-3.]

      Therefore, the Directive requires prosecutors to offer defendants

convicted after trial "the opportunity to enter into an agreement prior to

sentencing" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, that imposes ordinary parole

eligibility, including application of "commutation, minimum custody, and work

credits earned while in custody." Id. at 7. Notwithstanding this instruction, the

Directive states a prosecutor can still seek an extended term under N.J.S.A.

2C:35-12, and the sentencing court retains authority to impose a discretionary

period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b). Id. at 7-8.

      N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 provides:

            Whenever an offense defined in this chapter specifies a
            mandatory sentence of imprisonment which includes a
            minimum term during which the defendant shall be

                                                                              A-3310-21
                                       19
            ineligible for parole, a mandatory extended term which
            includes a period of parole ineligibility . . . , the court
            upon conviction shall impose the mandatory
            sentence . . . unless . . . in cases resulting in trial, the
            defendant and the prosecution have entered into a post-
            conviction agreement, which provides for a lesser
            sentence, period of parole ineligibility or anti-drug
            profiteering penalty. The negotiated plea or post-
            conviction agreement may provide for a specified term
            of imprisonment within the range of ordinary or
            extended sentences authorized by law, a specified
            period of parole ineligibility, a specified fine, a
            specified anti-drug profiteering penalty, or other
            disposition.

      Parole ineligibility is further addressed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b), which

provides, in pertinent part:

            As part of a sentence for any crime, where the court is
            clearly convinced that the aggravating factors
            substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, as set
            forth in [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b)] . . . the court may
            fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of the term
            set pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)] . . . during which
            the defendant shall not be eligible for parole . . . .

      N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) states:      "A person convicted of manufacturing,

distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute any dangerous

substance or controlled substance . . . shall upon application of the prosecuting

attorney be sentenced by the court to an extended term . . . ." Further, "[t]he

term of imprisonment shall, except as may be provided in N.J.S.[A.] 2C:35-12,

include the imposition of a minimum term." Ibid.

                                                                           A-3310-21
                                       20
      The Directive does not mandate a waiver of mandatory minimum

sentences or prohibit the State from seeking an extended term under N.J.S.A.

2C:35-12. The State and the defense did not enter an agreement. Moreover, the

Directive does not dictate a trial judge's discretion to impose a period of parole

ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b), because it is not applicable to the

judiciary.

      Defendant had an extensive criminal history, including eight prior

convictions for possession of CDS with intent to distribute, CDS distribution in

a school zone, and possession of CDS with intent to distribute while in or within

500 feet of public housing. At sentencing, the trial judge recounted defendant

had many more convictions for various offenses beyond the eight CDS

convictions.   As we noted, the trial judge found the aggravating factors

substantially outweighed the mitigating factors, justifying the imposition of

parole ineligibility. Under these circumstances, defendant's sentence does not

"shock the judicial conscience." Case, 220 N.J. at 65 (quoting State v. Roth, 95

N.J. 334, 365 (1984)).

      Affirmed.

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                                       21