Court Opinion

ID: 9460051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:38:56.618956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:26.487266
License: Public Domain

MULLIGAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The majority here holds that the New York State coram, nobis proceeding is not dispositive because the judge who *1016conducted the evidentiary hearing and wrote the opinion applied the wrong constitutional standard. The majority says that, in the fall of 1968, the state of the law in New York was such that “only a finding of official interference would restore lost appeal rights;” that Williams therefore “pinned his hopes” on his claim that prison officials interfered with his right to appeal; and that Williams’ “lack of knowledge [of his appeal rights] and the malfeasance of his attorney” were largely irrelevant. Hence, the majority concludes that Justice Marks did not focus on the factual questions now in issue since they only emerged as critical subsequently, with the issuance of our opinion in United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F. 2d 648 (2d Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 929, 25 L. Ed.2d 105 (1970). The argument runs that since the proper constitutional standard had not been articulated until after the state hearing and after the opinion of Justice Marks was filed, our state court brother could hardly have been able to apply it. If the majority is correct in this position, then I submit that the proper relief in this case is a dismissal of the petition rather than a remand to the district court for a further evidentiary hearing. This is so because if the majority is correct in its analysis, the state court did not have a “fair opportunity” to consider the constitutional defect, and petitioner has thus not exhausted his state remedies. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); United States ex rel. Nelson v. Zelker, 465 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1045, 93 S.Ct. 544, 34 L.Ed.2d 497 (1972).
In Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965), the basis of petitioner’s claim was, like that of petitioner Williams here, that his rights with respect to assigned counsel on appeal of his conviction in the state court had been denied. Blair had raised this claim in his state proceedings, but his contention had been rejected. In the federal habeas proceeding, Blair relied on Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), the seminal case which held that indigent defendants have a right to assigned counsel on appeal. Since Douglas was decided after the denial of his state claim, the circuit court held that his constitutional right to counsel had not been passed on by the state court, that he therefore had not exhausted his state remedies and that if he did not proceed within 90 days in the state court, his petition should be dismissed. This doctrine has been recognized in a number of other cases. See Donlavey v. Smith, 432 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); James v. Cop-inger, 428 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Sloan v. McMann, 415 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Walker v. Fogliani, 343 F. 2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965); Comment, Ha-beas Corpus — Effect of Supreme Court Change in Law on Exhaustion of State Remedies Requisite to Federal Habeas Corpus, 113 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1303 (1965). In Pennsylvania ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 339 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1964) (per curiam), the court stated the basis upon which this doctrine rests:
[A] decent regard for the position and responsibilities of the state courts requires that they be afforded an opportunity to consider and decide these questions before the federal district court is called upon to do so.
Id. at 599.
The circuit court there simply dismissed the petition without conditions. The same result is mandated here if the majority thesis is sound.
If, on the other hand, the issue of Williams’ knowledge or lack of knowledge of the thirty-day time limitation and the right to • free counsel was squarely placed before the state court, I do not think that my brothers have here accorded the state court decision the respect to which it is entitled.
In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that “the coequal responsibilities of state and federal judges *1017in the administration of federal constitutional law are such that we think the district judge may, in the ordinary case in which there has been no articulation [of the governing legal standard], properly assume that the state trier of fact applied correct standards of federal law to the facts, in the absence of evidence . . . that there is reason to suspect that an incorrect standard was in fact applied.” Id. at 314-315, 83 S.Ct. at 758 (footnote omitted). The Court’s recent reversal of this court in LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 35 L.Ed.2d 637 (1973) (per curiam) emphasizes our obligation to recognize the state courts as coequal and not inferior tribunals.
It is necessary to inquire as to what evidence my brothers in the majority find to overcome the presumption that the state court recognized the proper standard to be applied. The first claim is that the state court could not have known the proper standard because our opinion in Smith had not as yet been published. However, as we have pointed out, this mandates dismissal of the petition. Even if that were not so, I do not think that Smith is controlling here. The history of the right of the indigent to free counsel from Douglas to Smith is set forth in the majority opinion. It was not until Smith that a federal court held that, as a necessary corollary of Douglas, the State of New York had the obligation, even in 1965, to advise an indigent client of his right to assigned counsel. However, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130, 299 N.Y.S.2d 156, 247 N.E. 2d 130 (1969), in the words of the majority, put the burden of advising defendants of their appeal rights squarely on the state. This case was decided after the state coram nobis proceeding in this case but two months before Justice Marks rendered his opinion. Since it was a sharp departure from the prior practice of the state courts, which had placed the onus on trial counsel to advise convicted indigent defendants of their appellate rights, we must assume that the case did not escape the attention of an experienced state trial judge who was then bound to advise defendants of their rights to appeal as indigents. The majority, however, says that Montgomery “does not hold that, as part of their responsibility to an indigent with private counsel, a trial court must advise such a defendant of his right to different, appointed appellate counsel.” Since this precise proposition was not before the Court of Appeals, it was of course not “held,” but I cannot accept the conclusion that it was not necessarily implicit in the holding of the state court.
The Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department, in effect when Justice Marks rendered his decision and when he conducted the evidentiary hearing, specified that it was the obligation of trial counsel, retained or assigned to advise a defendant who was unable to pay the cost of an appeal of his rights to apply for leave to appeal as a poor person.1 Montgomery shifted that burden from counsel to the court. I cannot assume that the burden on the court was any less than that which had been on *1018counsel, and, therefore, the state court would have known that Williams was entitled to be advised of his right to free assigned counsel whether he had retained counsel on trial or not. The right of a defendant to be advised of his right to appeal as a poor person obviously does not depend upon some presumption that, since he could afford to retain trial counsel, he could afford appellate counsel and was stuck with him on appeal.2 The distinction here proffered is too precious, and I cannot accept that Montgomery can reasonably be interpreted so academically. Judge Friendly, in his dissenting opinion in Smith, observed :
Today’s ruling may not be of great practical importance with respect to New York prisoners in light of Judge Keating’s sweeping language in People v. Montgomery . . . which the majority applauds.
417 F.2d at 659.
In any event, the State here does not contend that Williams was ever advised by the court or by counsel of his right to appeal as an indigent. The claim is made that, either at the detention center in New York City or at Sing Sing Prison, he was so advised by jailhouse lawyers and that therefore he knew of his rights. Smith makes it abundantly clear that the critical question in cases such as this is “was [the defendant] informed or did he know prior to the expiration of his time to appeal that he could appeal without cost to himself and with counsel appointed by the state?” 417 F.2d at 655 (emphasis added). See also United States ex rel. Roldan v. Follette, 450 F. 2d 514, 516 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Witt v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc). Douglas held that the indigent defendant had the right to free counsel on appeal, and, while Montgomery and Smith held that the obligation to advise the indigent rests on the State, the position of the State here is that, if in fact Williams knew that he had the right to free counsel, the question of whether or not he was officially advised is irrelevant.
To establish that Justice Marks did not focus on Williams’ right to free counsel on appeal, the majority emphasizes the last sentence of the pertinent portion of his opinion. He held that Williams’ ignorance of his right to appeal as a poor person was cured when he arrived at Sing Sing Prison on May 12, 1965. The court stated: “Defendant testified to this at the hearing.” But, says the majority here, Williams denied at his state evidentiary hearing that he knew he could have any counsel on appeal other than his retained trial counsel. Reference is then made to the cor-am nobis hearing, in which Williams did testify: “I didn’t understand anything, to tell the truth.” Justice Marks, who not only had the opportunity to observe the defendant at the evidentiary hearing, but also was the judge at trial, during which Williams was independently identified as a rapist by four of his victims, obviously had the right to find this testimony incredible. Williams’ story that he was denied stamps to mail his notice of appeal was demonstrated to be a total fabrication, and this placed his credibility ‘ seriously in doubt. Moreover, the state judge was not required to articulate credibility findings in his opinion. LaVallee v. Delle Rose, supra, 410 U.S. at 692, 93 S.Ct. 1203.
Williams further testified that he did know from jailhouse lawyers that he could appeal “without paying any money.” The majority interprets this as an admission only that he knew he could appeal without paying court costs. He did know something of significance, therefore, even on the assumption of the majority. Since any prisoner knows that the major and primary cost of an appeal is counsel fees, I cannot agree that his answer is susceptible to the lim*1019ited interpretation of the majority. Justice Marks could well have found that his answer meant what it said, and that when Williams testified that he knew he could appeal without paying money, he meant free counsel as well as free costs. It certainly does not fulfill the petitioner’s burden “to establish in the District Court by convincing evidence that the state court’s determination was erroneous.” Lavallee v. Delle Rose, supra, 410 U.S. at 695, 93 S.Ct. at 1206 (emphasis added).
The majority’s only other evidence that Justice Marks did not address himself to Williams’ right to free counsel on appeal is the language of his opinion finding that Williams knew of his right to appeal as “a poor person.” This is found to be linguistically equivalent to “in forma pauperis,” and, it is said, since the broad right to free counsel on appeal was only enunciated in Smith, the state court’s use of the poor person terminology could not have been intended to indicate a finding that Williams knew his appeal rights had to be exercised within thirty days and included free counsel.3 This is pure petitio principii. Douglas had already enunciated the rights of an indigent on appeal and Montgomery was the precursor of Smith.
Aside from this, the majority must assume that Williams’ claim was that he did not know of the time limit or the free appeal (else we must dismiss for lack of state exhaustion of remedies). How can we assume that the coram nob-is judge did not address himself to those contentions? On the contrary, the following colloquy between Williams’ counsel and Justice Marks indicates that he did:
And it is claimed he was denied his constitutional rights to counsel.
And may I further submit that the fact that the defendant may have been informed about certain of his legal rights does not necessarily mean that he knew that he had a right to appeal, that he had a right to appeal as a poor person, and that he had 30 days in which to file a notice of appeal.
THE COURT: Those are the questions which the Court will have to try.
The majority properly insists that as a matter of law, logic and reality, an indigent needs three distinct pieces of information to effectuate his right to appeal:
1) that he could appeal in forma pau-peris,
2) that he could obtain appointed appellate counsel,
3) that he had to file his appeal in thirty days.4
*1020I totally agree. It is so clearly logical that it could not have escaped the attention of the state court.5
I respectfully dissent.

. The Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department provided as follows:
(b) Notification of right to appeal. (1) After conviction and sentence. Where there has been a conviction after trial or otherwise ... it shall be the duty of counsel, retained or assigned, and of the public defender, immediately after the pronouncement of sentence or the service of a copy of the order disposing of the application in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis or a writ of habeas corpus, to advise the defendant in writing of his right to appeal, the time limitations involved, the manner of instituting an appeal and of obtaining a transcript of the testimony, and of the right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal as a poor person. It shall also be the duty of such counsel to ascertain whether defendant wishes to appeal and, if so, to serve and file the necessary notice of appeal.
22 New York Codes, Rules & Regs. § 606.5 (1968) (emphasis added).

. As Judge Medina indicated in Smith, the only practical method of handling the problem is to require that notification of the right of a poor person on appeal be given to indigents and non-indigents alike. 417 F.2d at 654 n. 7.

. While the term “in forma pauperis” initially referred only to the right to sue “without liability for costs” (Black’s Law Dictionary 895 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968)), the term has assumed a much broader meaning since Douglas. Buie 32(a)(2) of our own Buies of Criminal Procedure provides that the court “shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and of the right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis." The rule does not mention free counsel. However, in Johnson v. Norton, 435 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1970), the court said: “the trial court did not inform [defendant] of his right of appeal from his conviction and, if indigent, to court-appointed counsel, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(2).” In Smith, Judge Medina stated that the New York and the federal rules “do no more than implement what we think was at all times implicit in the landmark case of Douglas v. California.” 417 F.2d at 655. Douglas held that the appointment of counsel on appeal for the indigent was constitutionally mandated. Montgomery and Smith simply put the onus on the state to so advise the indigent. As we have pointed out, that is not in contention here. The State only claims that Williams knew of this right.

. The majority position that Justice Marks made no finding that Williams knew of the ■ thirty-day time limit is not substantial, as footnote 15 suggests. If Justice Marks found, in the view of the majority, that Williams knew that he did have the right to appeal without costs, it must have been obvious that that information was totally worthless if he was unaware that he had to exercise this right in timely fashion. A specific finding to this effect is not necessary. *1020Townsend v. Sain, supra, 372 U.S. at 314, 83 S.Ct. 745. Further, in Montgomery Judge Keating had emphasized the importance of the time question:
The condition precedent to appellate review of a criminal prosecution is the filing of a notice of appeal. It is apparent that the 30-day period in which an appeal must be docketed is a critical time for the defendant. It cannot be successfully argued that an indigent defendant does not have the right to counsel at this stage of his proceedings (see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114).
24 N.Y.2d at 133, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 160, 247 N.E.2d at 132.

. With respect to the argument in footnote 18 of the majority opinion: I agree that Williams made largely the same contentions in the state court as he makes here in the federal courts, although they were of course all made prior to Smith. The holding of the majority, however, that the coram nobis court did not apply the proper federal constitutional criterion since it had not yet been articulated, prompted the counter-argument that the petition should therefore be dismissed for failure to exhaust. If the majority’s position is that the affirmance of the coram nobis decision by the Appellate Division and the denial of review by the Court of Appeals were post-Smith and therefore meaningful, then the argument that the state court could not have applied the proper constitutional criterion evanesces. It must be assumed on this theory that the New York appellate courts considered that the Smith criteria had been applied and were satisfied. The majority cannot have it both ways. Ilaec reputent, videbunt.