Court Opinion

ID: 9572490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:10.126264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:14.071411
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
specially concurring.
I write separately to invite renewed scholarly attention to an old but important issue underlying this case. The issue is whether the concept of mens rea is broader than the mere intent to do a particular act.
Such a distinction was recognized at common law. “The basic premise^] that for *906criminal liability some mens rea is required[,] is expressed by the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty).” 1 W. LaFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 297 (1986) (hereinafter LaFAVE). With respect to crimes consisting of proscribed acts,1 mens rea traditionally has been thought to mean a criminal intent — that is, culpability grounded in a wrongful purpose. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). Criminal intent is more than the mere “intent” which denotes that an act is not accidental.
Despite its antiquity, mens rea is a seminal concept in modern criminal law. To illustrate, I.C. § 18-903(c) prohibits the “[a]ctual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person against the will of the other____” If a person suddenly pushes another away from an oncoming motor vehicle, the act is without contemporaneous consent and it is far from accidental. But there is no crime because the act is unaccompanied by a criminal intent. Similarly, if a person genuinely entertains the delusion that a motor vehicle is about to strike another, and he pushes the other out of the way, his act is intentional but he has committed no crime because, again, his intent was not criminal.
This integration of criminal responsibility with criminal intent is so firmly rooted in our jurisprudence that in 1982, the Idaho Legislature expressly retained the concept of mens rea while generally abolishing “mental condition” as a “defense” to any charge of criminal conduct. See I.C. § 18-207(c).2 Indeed, our Supreme Court has said that I.C. § 18-207(c) “continues to recognize the basic common law premise that only responsible defendants may be convicted.” State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 621, 710 P.2d 526, 531 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct. 2260, 90 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986).
The Supreme Court’s statement in Beam is consistent with the view that mens rea is broader than mere intent to do a particular act. It also is consistent with descriptions of mens rea by courts in other states. E.g., Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1969); Tift v. State, 133 Ga.App. 455, 211 S.E.2d 409 (1974); In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180 (R.I.1981). However, I must concede that many earlier Idaho decisions are to the contrary. Shortly after the turn of the century, our Supreme Court stated that where a crime is defined by statute, the requisite state of mind consists only of intent to do the proscribed act. State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 P. 1051 (1902). Although the Court noted a possible distinction between statutes defining acts mala prohibita and those defining acts mala in se, this distinction has not been carried forward in later cases. In State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 767-68, 554 P.2d 944, 945-46 (1976), the Supreme Court reiterated its narrow view of mens rea, declaring that unless a statute specifically refers to a different intent, the “general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts____” Today’s lead opinion cites other Idaho cases to the same effect.3
These Idaho cases seemingly depart from the general practice of incorporating the traditional concept of mens rea into such statutory terms as “intentionally,” “know*907ingly,” “purposely,” “feloniously” or “unlawfully.” See LaFAVE at 298. However, our Legislature may have assumed that this practice was extant in Idaho when it specifically mentioned the concept of mens rea in I.C. § 18-207(c), despite presumably knowing that virtually all crimes in Idaho are defined by statute. If the Legislature had perceived mens rea as nothing more than the intent to do a particular act, it is unlikely that this common law term, with its rich historical meaning, would have received express recognition in I.C. § 18-207(c).4
Consequently, I question the cramped view of mens rea espoused by my colleagues today. But even if mens rea were accorded its broader meaning in this case, I would be constrained to join in affirming the judgment on appeal. The jury reasonably could have inferred that McDougall’s conduct (shooting one person and threatening others) was accompanied by a wrongful purpose and, therefore, a criminal intent. I realize that Dr. Lathrop testified, as noted in the lead opinion, that he did not believe McDougall harbored any criminal, wrongful or malicious intent. However, the jury was not bound by Dr. Lathrop’s opinion. McDougall himself admitted knowing that he was firing upon human beings. The jury was entitled to infer a culpable state of mind from McDougall’s own testimony and from other evidence of the circumstances surrounding his conduct. Accordingly, I concur in the result.

. The common law concept of mens rea has diminished application to statutory crimes which consist of negligence or of failure to perform affirmative duties. My focus here is on crimes consisting of proscribed acts.

. Idaho Code § 18-207(c) provides as follows: "Nothing herein is intended to prevent the admission of expert evidence on the issues of mens rea or any state of mind which is an element of the offense____”

. Some Idaho cases may confuse the distinction between mens rea and intent to do a particular act with the distinction between general criminal intent and specific intent. Mens rea and intent to do a particular act are components of the general criminal intent. This general intent applies to all crimes consisting of proscribed acts. In contrast, specific intent is an additional element of proof required by certain statutes defining particular crimes. For example, I.C. § 18-4501(4), a kidnapping statute, requires the wilful seizure or detention of a person — a proscribed act committed with general criminal intent — and it further requires proof of a specific intent to extort money or property.

. Idaho’s Solicitor General, one of the most knowledgeable commentators on I.C. § 18-207, has argued cogently that the reference to mens rea did not inadvertently reinstate the abolished insanity defense. However, he acknowledges that the concept of mens rea precludes the imposition of criminal liability upon one who acts under a genuine delusion of fact. Thus, he expresses an understanding that although mens rea is not as broad as the insanity defense which existed in 1982, neither is it as narrow as the mere intent to do a particular act. L. Thomas, Breaking the Stone Tablet: Criminal Law Without the Insanity Defense, 19 IDAHO L.REV. 239, 251-54 (1983).