Court Opinion

ID: 9475043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:15:54.726012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:28.867478
License: Public Domain

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The issue before us — at least as I understand it — is whether the magistrate’s finding at the Section 301(k) hearing that Sand-erlin had “raised” insanity as a defense at his trial a year earlier is clearly erroneous. United States v. Henry, 600 F.2d 924, 925 (D.C.Cir.1979). Since I do not believe that that factual determination is erroneous, still less clearly erroneous, I am obliged to dissent.
In Henry we held that a defendant committed under Section 301(d) after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may collaterally attack his commitment in a Section 301(k) proceeding (apparently at any time he remains committed). If he can show that there is no evidence — either objective or subjective — that he chose to rely on that defense or was even aware that it was relied upon by his counsel, and that there are further indications that the defendant would have objected to interposing that defense, the defendant satisfies his burden of proof that he has been improperly committed.
Here, there is ample evidence, as the majority recognizes, that defendant’s competent and experienced counsel agreed with the prosecutor to a stipulated NGI verdict in return for a reduced charge (misdemean- or rather than felony) because at the time there was good reason to believe that the defendant would be better off if charged with a misdemeanor. That having been established, there remains only the question as to whether Sanderlin was “aware” that the insanity defense was raised. Sanderlin’s attorney, Mr. Christensen, testified that he had, indeed, explained the defense and its implications to Sanderlin before trial, which caused Sanderlin to “consider” authorizing the agreement in the weeks before trial, according to Dr. Polley. Christensen also testified that he would not have permitted an NGI acquittal against his client's wishes, and that Sanderlin, who, of course, was present during the proceedings, did not indicate any discomfort with the defense. In light of all this, it seems to me impossible to conclude that Sanderlin was not aware that the defense was in fact raised in his behalf.
In this case, however, the Government went further and proved that Sanderlin actually agreed to the interposition of the defense, even though the magistrate erroneously (though inconsequentially, as it turned out) prevented Christensen from testifying on this point when Sanderlin raised his attorney-client privilege. See Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 *737(8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125, 95 S.Ct. 811, 42 L.Ed.2d 826 (1975); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D.Wash.1975); Wender v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 434 A.2d 1372, 1374 (D.C.1981) (and cases cited therein). Polley testified that Sanderlin, four days after trial, told Polley that Sanderlin had specifically agreed to the stipulated NGI in expectation of a shorter period of hospitalization.
Under Henry the whole point of a Section 301(k) hearing (at least one in which defendant collaterally attacks his commitment) is to determine whether objective or subjective evidence shows that the defendant was aware or chose to rely upon an insanity defense. Yet the majority appears to hold that as a matter of law no evidence can be produced by the Government to meet the Henry test unless the trial judge or the prosecutor in the original proceeding specifically put defendant’s agreement to raise the insanity defense on the record.1
In truth, the majority opinion has little to do with what we are charged to do — determining whether the trial judge’s finding is clearly erroneous. Instead, the court adopts a new rule, de facto overruling Henry in the bargain, by refusing to recognize relevant evidence of Sanderlin’s agreement. The majority’s new rule may or may not be based on sound policy but it is certainly not predicated on either statutory or constitutional law.

. The majority refers to evidence presented on the record in a Section 301(k) proceeding but not in the original trial as "non-record evidence.” Perhaps it should be called non-evidence evidence, like a non-bank bank.