Court Opinion

ID: 9394729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:12:39.047626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.252232
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Huff and Lorish
              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              MICHAEL EARL JONES
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0806-21-1                                       JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
                                                                                   MAY 16, 2023
              CITY OF SUFFOLK

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
                                               W. Richard Savage, III, Judge

                              James L. Grandfield, Public Defender, for appellant.

                              Heather Emmert, Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney, for appellee.

                     The Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk (the “trial court”) convicted Michael Earl Jones

              (“appellant”) of reckless driving. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to

              support his conviction. Finding no error, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Poole v. Commonwealth,

              73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). In

              doing so, this Court discards any of appellant’s conflicting evidence, and regards as true all credible

              evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from

              that evidence. Gerald, 295 Va. at 473.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
        On May 9, 2020, appellant was driving “an 18-wheel truck carrying hogs in its trailer”

northbound along Carolina Road in the city of Suffolk. As the road curved to the left, appellant

failed to negotiate the turn safely and the truck flipped over onto its right passenger side. Paul

Watson, a front seat passenger in a van traveling southbound on Carolina Road, saw the accident

occur.1 He testified that the van in which he was riding was traveling the posted speed limit and that

appellant’s truck looked to be “travelling kinda fast” immediately before it overturned. Another

witness, Lisa Ambrose, also testified that the truck “was going fast” before it flipped over. She had

been stopped on a side street waiting to turn right (northbound) onto Carolina Road when she saw

appellant drive by and crash.

        Suffolk Police Department Officer Ben DeLugo arrived at the scene of the accident and

began investigating. He noted that the posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. Officer DeLugo

saw tire marks on the road leading to the place where the truck came to rest. Based on the tire

marks, Officer DeLugo opined that appellant had not used his brakes before crashing.

        In his motion to strike, appellant argued that “the mere happening of an accident does not

indicate recklessness, nor did any witness testify as to the speed of the truck, other than in the

qualitative fashion of witnesses Watson and Ambrose.” Relying on the witnesses’ testimony, the

trial court concluded that appellant was traveling fast and that his actions were reckless.

Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant and fined him $250. This appeal followed.

                                      STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

        1
         Watson directed the van driver to stop and then called 911 before attempting to aid
appellant.
                                                -2-
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is, upon

review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). So long as “there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the

reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ

from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69

Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).2

Under this standard of review, this Court defers to “decisions regarding the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight of the evidence [which] are matters left solely to the fact finder below.”

Blevins v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 628, 634 (2014). And all “reasonable inferences” the

fact finder draws from the evidence “cannot be upended on appeal unless [this Court] deem[s]

them ‘so attenuated that they push into the realm of non sequitur.’” Perkins, 295 Va. at 332

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 500 (2015)).

                                             ANALYSIS

        Appellant was convicted of violating the Suffolk City Code, which substantially mirrors

Code § 46.2-852 in defining “reckless driving: “any person who drives a vehicle on any street or

highway recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of

any person shall be guilty of reckless driving.” “The term ‘recklessly . . . imparts a disregard by

the driver . . . for the consequences of his act and an indifference to the safety of life, limb, or

        2
         “The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a
jury verdict.” Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 165, 174 (2003) (quoting Reynolds v.
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 163 (1999)).
                                                -3-
property.’” Blevins, 63 Va. App. at 635 (quoting Spencer v. City of Norfolk, 271 Va. 460, 463

(2006)). “The essence of the offence of reckless driving lies not in the act of operating a vehicle,

but in the manner and circumstances of its operation.” Id. (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth,

211 Va. 386, 388 (1970)).

       Multiple factors may indicate recklessness, “includ[ing] erratic driving, ‘the likelihood of

injury to other users of the highways,’ lack of control of the vehicle, driving in excess of the

speed limit, ‘dangerous driving behavior,’ intoxication, and noncompliance with traffic

markers.” Id. (citing examples).3 Thus, although the “[t]he mere happening of an accident does

not give rise to an inference of reckless driving,” the specific facts and circumstances that lead to

and cause the accident often will. Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 165, 174 (2003)

(quoting Powers, 211 Va. at 388). Here, the evidence was sufficient, “without resort to

speculation and conjecture,” for the trial court to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 469, 470 (1986).

       Two witnesses, with two different vantage points, saw appellant driving fast immediately

before overturning, indicating that appellant was speeding. Officer DeLugo testified that the tire

marks left on the road from appellant’s truck indicated that appellant did not use his brakes prior

to the crash. Based on these facts, and the accident itself, a rational trier of fact could reasonably

infer that the crash was a result of appellant’s recklessness.

       3
          This Court has recognized that “[f]ast driving alone, without the element of endangering
life, limb, or property, is not sufficient to support a conviction for reckless driving.” Blevins, 63
Va. App. at 636 (alteration in original) (quoting Spencer, 271 Va. at 464). Therefore, “[w]hat
distinguishes a speeding violation from the misdemeanor of reckless driving . . . is the likelihood
of injury to other users of the highways.” Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 328-29 (2021)
(quoting Mayo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 644, 648 (1977)). “Determining ‘the degree of the
hazard posed’ by the defendant’s driving, therefore, heavily ‘depends upon the circumstances in
each case.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 218 Va. at 648).
                                                  -4-
       And even if appellant did not exceed the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour, the

evidence supports the conclusion that he was certainly travelling too fast for the highway

conditions. Both Watson and Ambrose, who were travelling in significantly smaller cars,

perceived appellant to be driving fast as he approached the bend in the road. Appellant did not

use his brakes to reduce his speed before attempting to navigate that curve. As a result, he could

not maintain control of his 18-wheel transport truck, filled with heavy cargo, thus veering off the

right-hand side of the road and overturning. The totality of these circumstances evinced

appellant’s “disregard . . . for the consequences of his act[ions]” and provided a sufficient basis

for the trial court to conclude he drove at a speed or in a manner that endangered the life, limb, or

property of any person. Blevins, 63 Va. App. at 635 (quoting Spencer, 21 Va. App. at 463); see

also Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329-30 (2021). Therefore, viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that appellant

drove recklessly.

                                              CONCLUSION

       Finding the evidence sufficient to prove appellant guilty of reckless driving, this Court

affirms his conviction.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

                                                -5-