Court Opinion

ID: 9836821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:09.823608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.998999
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result):
I concur with the majority opinion, except where it vainly attempts to square its opinion today with its opinion in United States v. Giles, 48 MJ 60 (1998). One looking at the facts of both cases can see that the majority’s attempt to reconcile these two very similar cases is flawed with the same semantics at issue in both cases — the phrasing of artful, ambiguous questions.*
In Giles, the majority held that a member had an inelastic attitude towards sentencing when,
[although he indicated that he could consider the evidence and the circumstances of the case, [he] repeatedly stated that he believed a bad-conduct discharge or a dishonorable discharge was necessary for any servicemember who distributed drugs, and he had not heard of or experienced any circumstances where a punitive discharge would not be appropriate.
Id. at 63. In my dissenting opinion in Giles, I preferred to defer to the judgment of the military judge on that question, as the majority of the court wisely does today. Id.
In the present case, during group voir dire, SFC Walder, along with all the other panel members, did not state that he felt an obligation to adjudge a punitive discharge, confinement, or grade reduction because of the nature of the offense. Moreover, he expressed an understanding that “with the *194judge’s instructions [he was] authorized to adjudge no punishment.” (R. at 50, 51). When asked the same question on individual voir dire, SPC Walder gave the same answer. (R. at 79). After twice repeating his position, SFC Walder succumbed to the increasingly artful questioning by defense counsel and stated that he would not give no punishment. (R. at 79-80, 80-81).
This is precisely the situation, i.e., inconsistent answers to repeated and increasingly complex questions by both trial and defense counsel, that lends itself best to the judgment of a trial judge who is present and observing the proceedings, rather than a distant appellate tribunal. At the end of the day, whether such artful questioning pertains to “real sentencing issues” (the majority’s term) or not, does not change the wisdom of deferring to the determination of the military judge. See United States v. Giles, 48 MJ 60, 63 (1998) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).

 More particularly, I do not agree with the majority's attempts to distinguish Giles on the basis that the artful questioning in that case concerned "real sentencing issues,” but not in appellant’s case. This unsupported view of the law was not adopted by a majority in United States v. McLaren, 38 MJ 112, 119 n. * (CMA 1993), and it suggests that a member’s answers to no-punishment questions are usually irrelevant. I disagree (see RCM 1002, "a court-martial may adjudge ... a sentence of no punishment”), and would note that a member’s intent to not follow the judge's instructions and the law on a permissible punishment is always a relevant concern. See United States v. McGowan, 7 MJ 205, 206 (CMA 1979).