Court Opinion

ID: 9908187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 01:00:35.646391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:58.581826
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40582    Document: 00516994194      Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/07/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                                FILED
                                                                   December 7, 2023
                               No. 23-40582                          Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                                Clerk

   Honorable Terry Petteway; Honorable Derrick Rose;
   Honorable Penny Pope,

                                                       Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                   versus

   Galveston County, Texas; Mark Henry, in his official capacity as
   Galveston County Judge; Dwight D. Sullivan, in his official capacity as
   Galveston County Clerk,

                                                   Defendants—Appellants,

   ______________________________

   United States of America,

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                   versus

   Galveston         County, Texas; Galveston        County
   Commissioners Court; Mark Henry, in his official capacity as
   Galveston County Judge,

                                                   Defendants—Appellants,

   ______________________________

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   Dickinson Bay Area Branch NAACP; Galveston Branch
   NAACP; Mainland Branch NAACP; Galveston LULAC
   Council 151; Edna Courville; Joe A. Compian; Leon
   Phillips,

                                                          Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                      versus

   Galveston County, Texas; Mark Henry, in his official capacity as
   Galveston County Judge; Dwight D. Sullivan, in his official capacity as
   Galveston County Clerk,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                    USDC Nos. 3:22-CV-117, 3:22-CV-57,
                                  3:22-CV-93
                  ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, BARKSDALE,
   Stewart, Elrod, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson,
   Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, and
   Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:1
         IT IS ORDERED that Appellants’ opposed motion to stay the
   district court’s October 13, 2023 Order and its November 30, 2023 order and
   from any further action altering the boundaries of the Galveston County

         _____________________
         1
             Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Barksdale, Elrod,
   Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges,
   voted to grant a stay pending appeal. Stewart, Southwick, Haynes, Graves,
   Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges, voted to deny a stay pending appeal.

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   Commissioners Court precincts during the pendency of this appeal is
   GRANTED.

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   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, joined by Jones, Smith,
   Barksdale, Elrod, Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt, and
   Wilson, Circuit Judges, concurring:
          A federal court replaced the district map chosen by the people of
   Galveston County with a judicially created one. A panel of our court held that
   result was commanded by circuit precedent. Petteway v. Galveston County, 86
   F.4th 214, 216–18 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam). But all three panel members
   underscored their “agree[ment] that this court’s precedent permitting
   aggregation should be overturned. We therefore call for this case to be
   reheard en banc.” Id. at 218. A majority of judges in active service agreed and
   voted to rehear the case. 2023 WL 8223483 (5th Cir. Nov. 28, 2023).
          The next question is what rules should govern Galveston County’s
   district lines pending en banc rehearing. And the answer is clear: the Purcell
   principle requires a stay. See Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per
   curiam). Purcell requires courts to consider the effect of late-breaking judicial
   intervention on voter confusion and election participation. See id. at 4–5.
   Since Purcell, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized that lower
   federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an
   election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct.
   1205, 1207 (2020) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Democratic Nat’l
   Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28 (2020) (mem.) (Roberts,
   C.J., concurring) (staying judicial intervention “in the thick of election
   season”).
          Citing Purcell, the Supreme Court refused to bless judicial
   intervention in State elections 21 days before the general election date, see
   Veasey v. Perry, 574 U.S. 951 (2014) (mem.), 34 days before the general
   election date, see Merrill v. People First of Alabama, 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020)
   (mem.), 46 days before the general election date, see Andino v. Middleton, 141
   S. Ct. 9 (2020) (mem.), 48 days before the primary election date, see Raysor

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   v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020) (mem.), 92 days before the primary
   election date, Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089 (2022) (mem.), and 120 days
   before the primary election date. See Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879
   (2022) (mem.).
          In this case, Galveston officials originally selected the following map
   for county commissioner precincts (“Original Map”):

   ROA.24458–24459. If we allowed the district court’s injunction to go into
   effect, the Galveston voters would have this map (“Judicial Map”):

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   ROA.24458–24459.
          Absent a stay, Galveston County’s voters would be forced to vote
   under the new Judicial Map even before we could determine whether VRA
   § 2 or the Fourteenth Amendment allowed that result. On November 30,
   2023, the district court entered an order implementing the Judicial Map.
   That was less than two weeks before Texas’s filing deadline on December 11,
   2023. Moreover, our next en banc sitting is January 23–25, 2024. So even if
   we were to hear the case in January and release a decision on the lawfulness
   of the maps on the same day we heard argument, it would be only 42 days
   before the Texas primary election on March 5, 2024. Even that is far too late
   for a federal court to tinker with the machinery of a state election and to
   displace the Original Map. See e.g., Raysor, 140 S. Ct. at 2600; Middleton, 141
   S. Ct. at 9. These principles apply a fortiori to any en banc rehearing after
   March 5.
          If we did not stay this “extraordinary departure from the traditional
   course of relations between the States and the Federal Government,” Shelby
   County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 545 (2013) (citation omitted), the people of
   Galveston would have to endure an entire election cycle under a “federal

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   intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking,” ibid. (citation
   omitted). Moreover, we cannot change the shape of the four districts after
   county voters have already voted for their party candidates for those set
   districts. Cf. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 879–81 (Kavanaugh, J.,
   concurring). So our choice is either to enter a stay now or allow Galveston
   County voters to use the (potentially unlawful) Judicial Map until after the
   November 2024 general election. We properly chose now.
          Finally, a word on the merits. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
   we must “be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law
   overrides the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” Bond
   v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
   U.S. 452, 460 (1991)) (quotation omitted). That Congress must authorize
   encroachments upon state sovereignty through “unmistakably clear”
   statutory language suggests plaintiffs’ coalition claim must fail. Gregory, 501
   U.S. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
   (1985)). As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, such unambiguous language is
   lacking here because “[a] textual analysis of § 2 reveals no word or phrase
   which reasonably supports combining separately protected minorities.”
   Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Moreover,
   it is not at all clear that coalition claims are permissible under the anti-
   proportional-representation provision of VRA § 2. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b);
   see also Comment, Christopher E. Skinnell, Why Courts Should Forbid
   “Minority Coalition” Plaintiffs under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Absent
   Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 U. Chi. Legal F. 363, 377 (“Just
   because Congress clearly intended to interfere with state election systems by
   passing and amending the VRA, it does not inevitably follow that courts
   should infer an intention to interfere to such a degree as to encompass
   minority coalitions.”). Nor is it clear how much “scholarship supports [the
   district court’s] application of Section 2.” Post, at 19 n.2 (Higginson, J.,

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   dissenting) (principally citing Scotty Schenk, Why Bartlett is Not the End of
   Aggregated Minority Group Claims Under the Voting Rights Act, 70 Duke L.J.
   1883, 1889 n.29 (2021)). But see Schenk, 70 Duke L.J. at 1889 (“Scholarly
   views on aggregated claims under Section 2 are split.”).
          At the end of the day, plaintiffs would read § 2 to require race-based
   redistricting with no logical endpoint. The County has shown a likelihood of
   success in arguing that is unlawful. The County has also shown the other stay
   factors required by Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). Therefore, the en
   banc court was correct to stay implementation of the Judicial Map.

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   Priscilla Richman, Chief Judge, concurring:
          I concur in granting a stay of the district court’s October 13, 2023 and
   November 1, 2023 orders that adopted “Map 1” as the remedial plan for
   governing the 2024 election of members of the Galveston County
   Commissioners Court.            The filing deadline for candidates for that
   Commission, and other state and federal candidates for the 2024 election in
   Texas, is December 11, 2023, which is four days from today. For the reasons
   explained in Judge Oldham’s concurring opinion, a decision needs to be
   made at this juncture as to what map will be used to establish the districts
   from which the Commissioners will be elected. Even if we heard this case en
   banc in January, and the outcome of the appeal were that the map that is
   permitted to go into effect now, in December 2023, is not the map that should
   have governed, we cannot (or at least should not) consider unraveling what
   will have transpired in order to put into place a different map just before the
   March 2024 primary elections, or worse yet, after the March 2024 primary
   elections.
          I do not know how the en banc court will rule. I remain open on the
   underlying merits and await full briefing, argument, and deliberation before
   deciding the important issues presented in this appeal. But our court is
   confronted with deciding, now, which map is going to apply. We must do so
   based on neutral principles. The Supreme Court has provided guidance,
   which we must apply, and that guidance is found in Purcell v. Gonzalez,1 and
   decisions applying it.
          To me, a critical issue is whether Galveston County must establish
   that it is likely to succeed on the merits. Judge Higginson’s dissenting

          _____________________
          1
              549 U.S. 1 (2006).

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                                            No. 23-40582

   opinion in the present case looks to the Nken v. Holder2 factors that typically
   apply in determining whether a stay pending appeal should be granted. One
   of the most significant factors in Nken is likelihood of success on the merits.
   However, when a stay is requested that impacts elections, and the
   commencement of the election process is imminent, the Supreme Court has
   applied Purcell, and generally has not considered likelihood of success on the
   merits, though dissenting Justices have lamented the removal of that factor
   from the equation.3
           If likelihood of success on the merits is a factor, even in applying
   Purcell, the question is whether the law that existed when the district court
   ruled is the measure. Or, instead, may an appellate court with the power to
   abrogate existing case law consider what it thinks the law, correctly
   interpreted, will be once the appeal is finally decided. The procedural
   posture of this case is somewhat unusual and raises this question.
           A panel of this court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding
   that existing precedent in this Circuit “permits distinct minority groups to
   be aggregated under Section 2” of the Voting Rights Act.4 However, the
   panel disagreed with that precedent and called for en banc rehearing.5 This
           _____________________
           2
               556 U.S. 418, 437 (2009).
           3
             See Veasey v. Perry, 574 U.S. 951, 952 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
   (“Refusing to evaluate defendants’ likelihood of success on the merits and, instead, relying
   exclusively on the potential disruption of Texas’ electoral processes, the Fifth Circuit
   showed little respect for this Court’s established stay standards. See Nken v. Holder, 556
   U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (‘most critical’ factors in evaluating request for a stay are applicant’s
   likelihood of success on the merits and whether applicant would suffer irreparable injury
   absent a stay). Purcell held only that courts must take careful account of considerations
   specific to election cases . . . not that election cases are exempt from traditional stay
   standards.”).
           4
               Petteway v. Galveston Cnty., 86 F.4th 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2023).
           5
               See id. at 217-18.

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   court granted rehearing en banc in an order filed November 28, 2023.
   Galveston County and the other appellants requested a stay of the district
   court’s orders pending the outcome of this appeal.
          Judge Higginson’s dissenting opinion says we should apply
   existing Circuit precedent and hold that Galveston County has not shown
   likelihood of success on the merits. Judge Oldham’s concurring opinion,
   joined by a majority of the en banc court, indicates that Section 2 of the
   Voting Rights Act does not unambiguously support combining separately
   protected minorities. That portends, if not expresses, a disagreement with
   current Circuit precedent. Judge Oldham’s opinion therefore concludes
   that Galveston County has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
          If I were writing on a clean slate, I would conclude that the district
   court faithfully applied existing precedent from this Circuit, and therefore
   there was no error. I would deny the stay and proceed with en banc
   consideration. The outcome of the en banc court’s decision would apply
   going forward, but not to the 2024 election, assuming, of course, that the
   Supreme Court ultimately would not reverse us.
          But we are not writing on a clean slate. Though I have not found a
   Supreme Court decision squarely on point, and there are mostly separate
   opinions, consideration of the likelihood of success on the merits does not
   seem to have been embraced by a majority of the Supreme Court in the Purcell
   context.
          For example, in April 2020, the Supreme Court granted a stay of a
   district court order to the extent it required the State of Wisconsin to count
   absentee ballots postmarked after election day on Tuesday, April 7, 2020.6

          _____________________
          6
              Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020).

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   The Court’s rationale was based primarily on the fact that the plaintiffs did
   not ask the district court for this relief.7 As for legal precedent, the Supreme
   Court said, “[t]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal
   courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an
   election,”8 citing Purcell,9 Frank v. Walker,10 and Veasey v. Perry.11 There was
   no discussion in either the Supreme Court’s majority opinion or the
   dissenting opinion of likelihood of success on the merits. Similarly, there was
   no mention of likelihood of success on the merits in Purcell, Frank v. Walker,
   or the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Veasey.
          Later in 2020 (in October of that year), the Supreme Court denied an
   application to vacate a stay the Seventh Circuit had granted of a district court
   order enjoining enforcement of the State of Wisconsin’s laws governing an
   impending election.12 The very succinct majority opinion provided no
   reasoning. But there were separate opinions. Chief Justice Roberts
   said it was “improper” for the district court to have “intervened in the thick
   of election season to enjoin enforcement of a State’s laws” and expressed
   agreement with the Seventh Circuit’s decision to stay the injunction pending
   appeal.13 The Seventh Circuit had not addressed likelihood of success on the
   merits in staying the district court’s injunction.                  Nor did Justice
   Gorsuch’s nor Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinions in that

          _____________________
          7
              Id. at 1206.
          8
               Id. at 1207.
          9
               549 U.S. 1 (2006).
          10
               574 U.S. 929 (2014).
          11
               574 U.S. 951 (2014).
          12
               Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020).
          13
               Id. at 28.

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   case consider likelihood of success on the merits in agreeing that the Seventh
   Circuit’s stay should not be vacated in light of the district court’s
   interference with the state’s handling of the impending election. Justice
   Kagan’s dissenting opinion did not address likelihood of success on the
   merits either.
          Factually, the closest Supreme Court case to the one before us seems
   to be Merrill v. Milligan.14 Diverging views about the role of the likelihood of
   success on the merits were evident in separate opinions in that 2022
   Section 2 voting rights decision. Without providing its rationale, a majority
   of the Supreme Court issued a stay pending appeal of a three-judge district
   court’s injunctions.15 The district court had concluded that Alabama’s
   redrawing of congressional districts likely violated federal voting-rights laws
   and ordered that Alabama’s “congressional districts be completely redrawn
   within a few short weeks.”16 The district court “declined to stay the
   injunction for the 2022 elections even though the primary elections [were to]
   begin (via absentee voting) just seven weeks from [the Supreme Court’s
   decision], on March 30.”17 Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice
   Alito, opined that ordinarily, “a party asking this Court for a stay of a lower
   court's judgment pending appeal or certiorari ordinarily must show (i) a
   reasonable probability that this Court would eventually grant review and a
   fair prospect that the Court would reverse, and (ii) that the applicant would
   likely suffer irreparable harm absent the stay. In deciding whether to grant a
   stay pending appeal or certiorari, the Court also considers the equities

          _____________________
          14
               142 S.Ct. 879 (2022).
          15
               Id. at 879.
          16
               Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
          17
               Id.

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   (including the likely harm to both parties) and the public interest.”18 But,
   citing Purcell, they were of the view that there was an exception: “[a]s the
   Court has often indicated . . . that traditional test for a stay does not apply (at
   least not in the same way) in election cases when a lower court has issued an
   injunction of a state’s election law in the period close to an election.”19 These
   two concurring Justices did not, however, think that Purcell “could be
   read to imply that the principle is absolute and that a district court may never
   enjoin a State’s election laws in the period close to an election.”20 They
   explained that “[a]lthough the Court has not yet had occasion to fully spell
   out all of its contours,” they “[thought] that the Purcell principle thus might
   be overcome even with respect to an injunction issued close to an election if
   a plaintiff establishes at least the following: (i) the underlying merits are
   entirely clearcut in favor of the plaintiff; (ii) the plaintiff would suffer
   irreparable harm absent the injunction; (iii) the plaintiff has not unduly
   delayed bringing the complaint to court; and (iv) the changes in question are
   at least feasible before the election without significant cost, confusion, or
   hardship.”21
          The Chief Justice dissented in Merrill v. Milligan, “because,”
   he said, “in my view, the District Court properly applied existing law in an
   extensive opinion with no apparent errors for our correction.”22
   Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts recognized that “while the
   District Court cannot be faulted for its application of Gingles, it is fair to say

          _____________________
          18
               Id. at 880 (citations omitted).
          19
               Id.
          20
               Id. at 881.
          21
               Id.
          22
               Id. at 882.

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   that Gingles and its progeny have engendered considerable disagreement and
   uncertainty regarding the nature and contours of a vote dilution claim.”23 He
   explained what he would have done:
          In order to resolve the wide range of uncertainties arising under
          Gingles, I would note probable jurisdiction in Milligan and grant
          certiorari before judgment in Caster, setting the cases for
          argument next Term. But I would not grant a stay. As noted,
          the analysis below seems correct as Gingles is presently applied,
          and in my view the District Court's analysis should therefore
          control the upcoming election. The practical effect of this
          approach would be that the 2022 election would take place in
          accord with the judgment of the District Court, but subsequent
          elections would be governed by this Court's decision on
          review.24
          Though I would take a similar approach in the present case, Chief
   Justice Roberts’s position did not carry the day in Merrill. A stay was
   granted. Accordingly, it appears to me the best path forward in deciding
   whether to grant a stay today is to apply the framework set forth by Justice
   Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion in Merrill. I therefore conclude that the
   parties advocating that new districts should be put in place before the
   impending election have not shown that the underlying voting rights issue is
   “entirely clearcut” in their favor. There is a circuit split. Our court has taken
   the issue en banc to decide whether our existing precedent correctly
   construed Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Accordingly, I have voted to
   grant a stay pending appeal.
          Judge Higginson’s dissenting opinion is critical of our court for
   setting this case for argument in May. We did so because we have a very full
   January en banc docket. I and others are willing to add this case to the January
          _____________________
          23
               Id. at 882-83.
          24
               Id. at 883.

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   docket, but a majority of the court voted not to do so. With great respect to
   Judge Higginson, I think the only impact moving the oral argument to
   January could have is to get our decision to the Supreme Court at an earlier
   date for review, if indeed that Court is going to await an en banc decision from
   us. Given the cost and complexities of the election process, a “do over” of
   filing deadlines or the primary election process for the Galveston County
   Commissioner’s Court in January or February is not feasible or supported by
   case law. If we do not issue a stay now, the en banc court does reverse the
   district court, and we were to restart the election process, it is very probable
   that a different set of candidates would file. There would be little time for
   those candidates to campaign, and the time and resources expended by
   campaigns that commenced in December, or earlier, would be for naught.
   There is also a significant concern about public confusion.

          For all these reasons, I concur in granting a stay pending appeal.

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   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge, joined by Elrod, Circuit Judge, concurring:
           Our colleagues explain why “the Purcell principle requires a stay.”
   Ante, at 4 (Oldham, J., concurring). See also ante, at 9 (Richman, C.J.,
   concurring). Put simply, under Purcell, it is too late in the day for federal
   courts to interfere with the district lines that will govern the 2024 election
   cycle, given that we’re now on the eve of deadlines set forth under Texas law.
           But that does not answer one question raised by Judge Higginson in
   his dissent: Why are we waiting until May 2024 to begin our en banc
   deliberations in this matter? Post, at 20-21 (Higginson, J., dissenting).
           No one knows how long it will take for every member of our en banc
   court to decide this case on the merits—for comparison, look at the cases that
   remain pending on our 2023 en banc calendar. Nor does anyone know how
   long it will take for the Supreme Court to complete its review of whatever
   decision we issue. Perhaps this case will have run its course by sometime in
   2024. Perhaps it will not resolve until 2025. Perhaps it won’t resolve before
   two years from today—on the eve of deadlines for the 2026 cycle.
           I’m aware of no good reason why we cannot add this matter to our
   January 2024 en banc docket. On various occasions, our court has shown
   that we can act expeditiously when necessary. Given the importance of the
   issues presented, there’s every reason to do so here. See ante, at 16 (Richman,
   C.J., concurring) (supporting “moving the oral argument to January” and
   observing that that would “get our decision to the Supreme Court at an
   earlier date for review”).1

           _____________________
           1
             As an alternative to fulsome en banc deliberations, we also could’ve simply
   authorized a three-judge panel to decide these issues as an original matter. See, e.g.,
   Affholder, Inc. v. S. Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Mindful of the law of the
   circuit rule, which forbids one panel to overrule another save when a later statute or
   Supreme Court decision has changed the applicable law, this opinion has been considered

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           _____________________
   not only by all members of the panels in those two cases but also by all judges in active
   service who were not members of those two panels. . . . [T]he court has sua sponte
   reconsidered those two opinions, authorized their overruling, and chosen to adhere to this
   opinion.”). See also Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124 n.4 (1st Cir. 1992);
   United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80, 87 n.5 (2nd Cir. 2007); 7th Cir. R. 40(e); United
   States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 721 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Dep’t of Homeland
   Sec. Off. of Inspector Gen., 71 F.4th 51, 56 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2023); Policy Statement on En Banc
   Endorsement of Panel Decisions (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 1996).

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   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge, joined by Stewart, Graves
   and Douglas, Circuit Judges, dissenting:
           Appellant Galveston County filed its stay motion on Friday. We gave
   the Respondents the weekend to respond.1 I dissent because Galveston
   County’s stay request should fail at the first step of Nken review. See Nken v.
   Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
           First, it is settled law in our own circuit that nothing in the history or
   text of the Voting Rights Act prevents members of multiple-minority groups
   from filing a vote-dilution claim together. League of United Latin Am. Citizens
   v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 864 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see Campos v. City of
   Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit expressly came
   to the same conclusion in Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee
   County Board of Commissioners, 906 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1990). The
   Second and Ninth Circuits have implicitly allowed combined claims to go
   forward. See Pope v. County of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 572 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012);
   Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1992).2 Only a single,
   divided circuit has prevented Black and Latino citizens from bringing a
   unified vote-dilution claim. Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir.
   1996) (en banc).

           _____________________
           1
            To be clear, the current stay posture is that “the administrative stay imposed
   terminated when the court granted rehearing en banc.” Order, No. 23-40582, Petteway v.
   Galveston County (5th. Cir. Nov. 30, 2023)).
           2
              Considerable scholarship supports this application of Section 2. See Scotty
   Schenk, Why Bartlett is Not the End of Aggregated Minority Group Claims Under the Voting
   Rights Act, 70 Duke L.J. 1883, 1889 n.29 (2021); see also Sara Michalowski, A Tale of Two
   Minority Groups: Can Two Different Minority Groups Bring a Coalition Suit Under Section 2
   of the Voting Rights Act of 1965?, 63 Catholic U.L. Rev. 271, 274 (2013); Kevin Sette,
   Are Two Minorities Equal to One?: Minority Coalition Groups and Section 2 of the Voting Rights
   Act, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 2693, 2731 (2020).

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                                          No. 23-40582

           Significantly, the Supreme Court recently confirmed that under
   Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, judicial intervention is appropriate to
   remedy discriminatory gerrymandering in “instances of intensive racial
   politics where the excessive role of race in the electoral process denies
   minority voters equal opportunity to participate.” Allen v. Milligan, 143 S.
   Ct. 1487, 1510 (2023) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
   Significantly, the Court then denied two applications sought by Alabama to
   stay the district court’s decision to direct a special master to draw new state
   congressional maps. Allen v. Milligan, 216 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (2023); Allen v.
   Caster, 216 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (2023).
           The election at issue—which the district court comprehensively
   showed will deny minority voters of Galveston equal opportunity to
   participate—takes place in November 2024. The Supreme Court “has
   repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter
   the election rules on the eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
   Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (per curiam) (citing
   Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006)); see Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst.
   v. Hargett, 977 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2020). Yet our court’s stay,
   compounded by two interrelated decisions we also take—revisiting settled,
   thirty-five year old precedent3 yet calendaring that re-argument six months
   in the future4—creates the very problem the Supreme Court in Purcell told
           _____________________
           3
             United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“It is rarely
   appropriate to overrule circuit precedent just to move from one side of a conflict to another,
   [except] when this circuit can eliminate the conflict by overruling a decision that lacks
   support elsewhere.”). Cf. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1716 (2022) (Alito, J.
   dissenting) (“Members of this Court have argued that a determination regarding an
   applicant’s likelihood of success must be made under ‘existing law.’” (citing Merrill v.
   Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting))).
           4
           The court already is scheduled to convene to hear en banc matters in January, just
   two months away.

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                                          No. 23-40582

   courts to avoid: The stay imposed today will last through the May argument
   until we issue our decision, which may be months later, on the eve of the
   election or later.5
           Importantly also, the majority’s stay order offers no rebuttal—factual
   or legal—of the district court’s 150-page opinion entered with firsthand
   benefit of an evidentiary hearing that lasted 10 days.6 The veteran district
   judge included in his opinion 42 pages of factual findings detailing the “stark
   and jarring” and “mean-spirited” transformation of Precinct 3 from a
   majority-minority district to a district with almost no minority voters.7

           _____________________
           5
             Conclusively, we are not “on the eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm.,
   140 S. Ct. at 1207. Galveston is not “five days before the scheduled election,” id., nor
   obviously is voting already underway, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State
   Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (2020). The election is one year away and early voting in the
   primary would not begin, at the earliest, until nearly three months from now. Important
   Election       Dates         2023-2024,         Tex.         Sec’y         of         State,
   https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/important-election-dates.shtml. “[E]ve of
   an election” cannot be a year from an election. In fact, the Supreme Court recently has
   clearly instructed our court to advance litigation when an election is a year away. See, e.g.,
   Ardoin v. Robinson, 143 S. Ct. 2654, 2654 (June 26, 2023) (mem.) (“Stay heretofore entered
   by the Court . . . vacated. This will allow the matter to proceed before the Court of Appeals
   for the Fifth Circuit for review in the ordinary course and in advance of the 2024
   congressional elections in Louisiana.”). Even if this were “the eve of an election,” and even
   if a heightened version of stay factors were to apply, it is clearcut that plaintiffs would
   prevail under our circuit’s “existing precedent.” Petteway v. Galveston County, 86 F.4th
   214, 218 (5th Cir. 2023), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 23-40582, 2023 WL
   8223483 (5th Cir. Nov. 28, 2023). Our panel explicitly affirmed the district court’s
   application of existing precedent. Id. That precedent has been the stability for legislatures
   across our circuit for almost three decades.
           6
           The oppositions filed by the three Respondents, given a weekend to work, totaled
   72 pages—yet the majority rejects their arguments without explanation.
           7
             As all three Respondents to this motion emphasize, the district court rejected the
   race-neutral reasons proffered by the County to explain the 2021 dissolution of Precinct 3.
   Cf. Voting Determination Letter, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Mar. 5, 2012),
   https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-determination-letter-38 (Letter from the Department
   of Justice objecting to Galveston County 2012’s redistricting plan as a “retrogression in

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                                         No. 23-40582

           There should be no doubt that, in giving ourselves a half-year delay
   just to hear oral argument to reconsider law that has been ours for decades,
   and is the near-consensus application of Supreme Court law, we have
   ensured that the district court’s directive—that Galveston remedy its racially
   discriminatory redistricting project—will be stymied for an election that will
   take place approximately a year from now. That delay-and-default ruling has
   no precedent and stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s guarantee
   to all of an equal right to vote, which the Court reminded us almost a century
   and a half ago, is “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
   356, 370 (1886).

           _____________________
   minority voting strength in Precinct 3”). Galveston County’s decade-long effort to abolish
   the only majority-minority district in the County occurs in the context of a history of
   restrictions on the political power of non-white Texans. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
   649, 656-57 (1944) (holding that resolution restricting ability to vote in Democratic Party
   primaries to “all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under the
   Constitution and laws of the State” violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).

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