Court Opinion

ID: 9897473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:38.542341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.985443
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion   3S
                              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                        THE STATE OF NEVADA,                      No. 85399
                        Appellant,                                                  FIL
                        vs.
                        DANIEL ADRIAN GONZALEZ,                                     SEP 1 4 2023
                        Respondent.

                        THE STATE OF NEVADA,                      No. 85400
                        Appellant,
                        vs.
                        DANIEL ADRIAN GONZALEZ,
                        Respondent.

                                  Consolidated appeals from a district court order granting
                       respondent's motion to dismiss a criminal complaint.       Second Judicial
                       District Court, Washoe County; Egan K. Walker, Judge.
                                  Reversed and remanded.

                       Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
                       District Attorney, Jennifer P. Noble, Chief Appellate Deputy District
                       Attorney. and Marilee Cate and Kevin P. Naughton, Appellate Deputy
                       I.Kstrict Attorneys, Washoe County,
                       for Appellant.

                       Evelyn Grosenick, Public Defender, and Kathryn E. Reynolds, Chief Deputy
                       Public Defender, Washoe County,
                       for Respondent.

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                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT .EN BANC.

                                                  OPINION

                By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:
                            In this opinion, we consider whether the dismissal of a criminal
                complaint against respondent Daniel Adrian Gonzalez was an appropriate
                remedy for the violation of his due process rights arising from a delay in
                competency restoration treatment pending trial. After the State charged
                Gonzalez with sexual assault, the district court found him to be incompetent
                to stand trial and ordered him remanded to a psychiatric hospital for
                competency restoration treatment. Gonzalez remained in jail for 160 days
                before being transferred to the hospital. After being transferred to the
                hospital, Gonzalez moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that his
                continued detention in jail after the district court's order and before being
                transferred to the hospital violated his due process rights. The district court
                agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.
                            The State appeals.     The State concedes that Gonzalez's due

                process rights were violated but argues that the district court abused its
                discretion in granting the extreme remedy of dismissal under the facts of
                this case. We agree. Although we acknowledge the gravity of Gonzalez's
                situation, this court's precedent does not support the district court's
                conclusion that aggravated circumstances warranted disrnissing the
                complaint against Gonzalez with prejudice. Furthermore, the district court
                neglected to balance the deterrent objectives of dismissal against society's
                interest in prosecuting criminal acts.      We conclude the district court

                therefore abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice,
                and we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
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                                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            The State charged Gonzalez by way of complaint with one count
                of sexual assault, a category A felony. During the proceedings, Gonzalez
                was assessed for competency and received two psychiatric evaluations, each
                of which concluded that Gonzalez was not competent to proceed with
                adjudication and recommended that he receive inpatient competency
                restoration treatment. After a hearing on the matter, the district court
                found Gonzalez to. be incompetent, that he may pose a danger to himself and
                to society, and•that commitment was necessary•to determine his ability to
                attain competency. To that end, the court ordered Gonzalez remanded to
                Lake's Crossing Center, a psychiatric hospital, for restorative treatment.
                            Gonzalez remained in custody at the Washoe County jail for 160
                days before being transported to Lake's Crossing. Lake's Crossing reported
                that staffing shortages, a lack of available beds, and COVID-19 protocols
                contributed to the delay. Because of the delay, the Division of Mental
                Health and Developmental Services of the Department of Human Resources
                (the Division) notified the district court that its initial competency reports,
                mandated by NRS 178.450(2), would not be timely submitted.
                            Gonzalez moved to dismiss the criminal complaint, arguing that
                his continued detention in jail prior to being transferred to Lake's Crossing
                constituted a violation of his due process rights. The district court granted
                Gonzalez's motion to dismiss. The court relied on Jackson u. Indiana, 406
                U.S. 715 (1972), and its progeny to conclude that Gonzalez's detention
                before being transferred to Lake's Crossing was not reasonably related to
                his receiving competency restoration treatment and therefore violated his
                due process rights.
                 •          On appeal, the State concedes that the district court's

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                conclusion as to the due process violation was correct. The legal basis
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                   justifying dismissal, however, is somewhat less evident from the district
                   court's order. The district court concluded that "it is obvious that the 160-
                   day delay and the Division's failure to comply with its mandatory reporting
                   requirements is 'shocking and outrageous' and warrants dismissal." The
                   district court invoked State v. Babayan, 106 Nev. 155, 787 P.2d 805 (1990),
                                                 •

                   acknowledging that dismissal is an extreme remedy.           After balancing

                   deterrent interests against the violation of Gonzalez's due process rights,
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                   the district court found that the' aggravated circumstances" warranted
                   dismissal.' The State appeals.
                                                     DISCUSSION
                               The State argues that the district court a.bused its discretio.n in
                   grajn.ting Gonzalez's rnotion to dismiss the. criminal complaint based on
                   circumstances outside a prosecutor's control--a lack of space at Lake's
                   Crossing. The State argues that the penalty for a due process violation
                   must. match the nature of the.violation and that the district court failed to
                   consider the effect dismissal would have on society's interest in prosecuting
                   crimes. We agree.

                     • . 'The parties dispute whether the district court ordered dismissal with.
                   prejudice or without. Where a district court does not. specify -whether
                   dismissal is with or without prejudice, *e would generally presume that
                   dismissal is without prejudice. See, e.g., District of ColUrnbia v. Whitley,
                   934 A.2d. 387, 388 n.1 (D.C. 2007) (noting that where dismissal of criminal
                   charges is not on the merits "and the trial court does not specify whether
                   dismissal is with prejudice, dismissal is presumed to be without prejudice");
                   State v. Hunter, 968 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ohic Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that
                   disniissal of a criminal complaint is presumed to be without prejudice unless
                   the trial court specifies otherwise). However, here, the district court
                   referred to the dismissal it was ordering as "an extreme measure," and it
                   applied the test for dismissal with prejudice as laid out in Babayan, 1.06
                   Nev. at 173, 787 P.2d at 818. Therefore, upon the facts• before. us, we infer
                   that the district court intended to dismiss the charge with prejudice: .
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                Standard of review
                           We review a district court's order dismissing a charging
                document for an abuse of discretion. Morgan v. State, 134 Nev. 200, 205,
                416 P.3d 212, 220 (2018). A district court abuses its discretion if its
                "decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or
                reason." Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).
                The district court abused its discretion in ruling that dismissal with.
                prejudice was warranted
                            "Dismissal is an extreme sanction . . . ." Morgan, 134 Nev. at
                205, 416 P.3d at 220. Dismissing a criminal complaint with prejudice "is
                most appropriate upon a finding of aggravated circumstances and only after
                a balancing of its deterrent objectives with the interest of society in
                prosecuting those who violate its laws." Babayan, 106 Nev. at 173, 787 P.2d
                at 81.8. For the reasons articulated below, we conclude that the district
                court abused its discretion both in finding aggravated circumstances and i.n
                neglecting to apply this balancing test.
                      The district court failed to apply the appropriate standard in finding
                      aggravated circumstances
                           In Babayan, we considered the dismissal of criminal charges
                with prejudice for due process violations. There, the district court dismissed
                multiple indictments against Ruben Babayan with prejudice for
                prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury. 106 Nev. at 163-65, 787
                P.2d at 812.    This court reversed the district court's dismissal of the
                indictments with prejudice. Id. at 176, 787 P.2d at 819-20. In so doing, we
                explained that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate "to eliminate
                prejudice to a defendant and to curb the prosecUtorial excesses of a District
                Attorney or [their] staff." Id. at 173, 787 P.2d at 818. Conversely, dismissal
                with prejudice is an extreme remedy warranted when the eviden.ce against
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                a defendant is irrevocably tainted or the defendant's case on the merits is
                prejudiced to the extent that notions of due process and fundamental
                fairness would preclude reindictment."       Id. (internal quotation marks
                omitted); cf. Langford v. State, 95 Nev. 631, 635-36, 600 P.2d 231, 234-35
                (1979) (concluding that, absent a showing of bad faith by the State or
                unalleviated prejudice to the defendant, the trial court properly denied the
                motion for a mistrial). Accordingly, this court held that dismissal with
                prejudice was not warranted, despite the due process violation. Babayan,
                106 Nev. at 173-74, 787 P.2d at 818.
                            In Morgan, as similar here, the district court ordered John
                Demon Morgan to be transferred to Lake's Crossing. 134 Nev. at 202, 416
                P.3d at 217. After a delay of over 100 days, Morgan filed a motion to
                dismiss. Id. Although the time frame for transferring Morgan to Lake's
                Crossing had not been met, the district court denied Morgan's motion. Id.
                at 202, 416 P.3d at 217-18. Instead, the district court ordered that Morgan
                be transferred to Lake's Crossing within seven days. Id. at 205, 416 P.3d
                at 220. In considering the direct appeal of Morgan's eventual conviction,
                this court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
                Morgan's motion to dismiss. Id. at 205-06, 41.6 P.3d at 220. We noted that
                dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction and that after balancing
                dismissal's deterrent objectives with society's interest in prosecuting
                crimes, the facts of the case did not amount to aggravated circumstances
                warranting dismissal. Id. at 205, 416 P.3d at 220.
                            Babayan and Morgan comport with this court's precedent
                related to the dismissal of charging documents in other situations where a
                d.efendant's due process rights may not specifically be at issue.          For
                dismissal to be an appropriate remedy, these cases require some misconduct

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                   on the part of the prosecution or some exten.ded prejudice to the defendant.
                   For example, in State v. Tapia, the State charged Peter Tapia with
                   embezzlement. 108 Nev. 494, 495, 835 P.2d 22, 23 (1992). After the State
                   failed to immediately provide Tapia with a document it intended to use at
                   trial, the district court found that the State had violated a discovery order
                   permitting Tapia to examine everything in the State's file and excluded the
                   document. Id. at 495-96, 835 P.2d at 23. Without the document, the district
                   court belieYed the State's case Was too weak and dismissed the case.. Id.. On
                   appeal, this court reversed. Id. at 498, 835 P.2d at 24. We held that the
                   district court acted within its discretion in 'determining that the- State had
                   violated the court's discovery order.     Id. at 497, 835 P.2d at 24.     We

                   nevertheless   concluded    that   "dismissal    was   an   extreme   remedy

                   unwarranted under the circumstances."           Id. at 498, 835 P.2d at 24.

                   Specifically, we held that "where the State's non-compliance with a
                   diScovery order is inadvertent and the court takes appropriate action to
                   protect the defendant against prejudice, there is no error justifying
                   dismissal of the case." Id. at 497, 83'5 P.2d at 24.
                               Relatedly, this court has addressed the circumstances under
                   which the prosecution may recharge a defendant if a case is dismissed for
                   the prosecution's failure to comply with procedural rules. Explaining "that
                   criminal accusations should proceed or terminate on principles compatible
                   with judicial economy, fair play[i and reason," McNair v. Sheriff, 89 Nev.
                   434, 438, 514 P.2d 1175, 1177 (1973), this court has held thatreprosecution
                   is barred o:nly where "the prosecution ha.s wilfully disregarded or displayed
                   a con.scious indifference to procedural rules," State v. Lamb, 97 Nev. 609,
                   610-11, 637 P.2d 1201, 1202 (1981). Conscious indifference does not require
                   a showing of "intentional acts or calculated bad faith by the prosecution."

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                          Id. at 611, 637 P.2d at 1202 (internal quotation marks omitted). It does,
                          however, require something more than mishandling the case or exercising
                          poor judgment. Id. at 611, 637 P.2d at 1202-03.
                                     In light of the foregoing authority, we now clarify that
                          "aggravated circumstances" may take the form of misconduct on the State's
                          part, cf. Babayan, 106 Nev. at 173, 787 P.2d at 818, or unalleviated
                          prejudice to the defendant, cf. Langford, 95 Nev. at 635-36, 600 P.2d at 234-
                          35. Here, without apportioning blame to the State or pointing to any
                          prejudice Gonzalez suffered as to his ability to receive a fair adjudication,
                          the district court summarily ruled that the due process violation in and of
                          itself constituted aggravated circumstances warranting dismissal. The
                          district court thus neglected to apply the standards demanded by our
                          precedent. Given that the district court did not address these highly fact-
                          bound inquiries in the first instance, however, we express no opinion as to
                          whether the situation here amounted to aggravated circumstances. We
                          conclude that its ruling exceeded the bounds of the law and therefore
                          constituted an abuse of discretion.
                                The district court failed to balance dismissal's deterrent objectiue with
                                society's interest in prosecuting criminal acts
                                       Even where aggravated circumstances favor dismissal with
                          prejudice, a district court's inquiry is not complete. Rather, the district
                          court may dismiss a charging document with prejudice only after balancing
                          the deterrent objectives of that sanction against society's interest in
                          prosecuting criminal acts. Babayan, 106 Nev. at 173, 787 P.2d at 818.
                                      In United States u. Lawson, the United States District Court for
                          the District of Maryland balanced the deterrent objectives of dismissing an
                          indictment with prejudice against society's interest in prosecuting
                          defendants charged with distributing controlled substances. 502 F. Supp.
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                158, 161, 172-73 (D. Md. 1980).        The court found that a prosecutor
                deliberately misled the grand jury in obtaining an indictment against the
                defendants. ld. at 163. As for the remedy for such misconduct, however,
                the court concluded that dismissal without prejudice was more appropriate.
                Id. at 172-73.    Specifically, the court noted that the misconduct was
                committed by a single prosecutor, who was no longer associated with the
                case, and that there was not a pattern of widespread or conti.nuous
                prosecutorial misconduct in the district.     Id.   The court explained th.at

                "[w]hile [the] defendants [were] entitled to the remedy of dismissal for
                violations of their constitutionally protected rights, they [were] not entitled
                to the reward of permanent immunity respecting their alleged criminal
                conduct." Id. at 173. Rather, on balance, the court concluded that the costs
                to society of dismissing the indictments with prejudice were "simply too
                high." Id.
                             Here, the deterrent objective of dismissal with prejudice is not
                evidenced in the record. Indeed, the district court did not articulate any
                behavior on the prosecutor's part that it intended to deter with dismissal or
                how dismissal would accomplish such deterrence. Instead, the district court
                balanced the State's interest in prosecuting Gonzalez against Gonzalez's
                due process rights.     As explained, this is not the inquiry used for
                determining whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted.
                             As to society's interest in proSecuting Gonzalez, although
                presumed innocent, Gonzalez is charged with sexual assault—a crime so
                serious the Legislature has approved of life with the possibility of parole as
                a punishment for it. See NRS 200.366(2)(b). On balance, society's interest
                in prosecuting sexual assault outweighs any deterrent effect dismissal with

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                   prejudice may have had under -the facts of this case. And we conclude that
                   the district court abused its discretion in ruling otherwise.2
                               We acknowledge that dismissal with prejudice was the only
                   remedy that Gonzalez sought for the due process violation. Gonzalez
                   languished in jail for five months before being transferred to Lake's
                   Crossing fbr court-ordered competency restoration treatment. This is a
                   troubling situation that, as the State concedes, violated Gonzalez's due
                   process rights. We stress that difficulties involving the availability-of beds,
                   staffing shortages, or other logistical challenges cannot justify detaining an
                   individual in jail for month after Month without recourse.          It is well
                   established that district courts enjoy inherent powers to control proceedings
                   before them, see Young v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 642, 646-47,
                   818 P.2d 844, 846-47 (1991), and a lesser sanction may have been more
                   appropriate to ensure Gonzalez's prompt transfer to Lake's Crossing, see,
                   e.g., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Div. of Pub. & Behavioral Health' v.
                   Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Aliano), 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 28,         P.3d
                       (2023) (concluding that the district court did not err in holding Division
                   of Public and Behavioral Health in contempt for failing to comply with court
                   orders requiring that criminal defendants found to be incompetent be
                   admitted for psychiatric care and imposing monetary sanctions); Morgan,

                         2Gonzalez avérs that dismissal was consistent with NRS 178A25(5).
                   However. the district court did not. dismiss t.he criminal complaint pursuant
                   to NRS 178.425(5), nor did it make the required finding that there was no
                   substantial probability that Gonzalez would attain competency in the
                   foreseeable future under the statute. Indeed, the district court specifically
                   stated at a hearing on the motion that it could not make such a finding
                   because Lake's Crossing had not yet submitted a report as to Gonzalez's
                   status. Accordingly, NRS 178.425(5) does not provide a basis for affirming
                   the district court's order.
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                  134 Nev. at 204-06, 416 P.3d at 219-20 (holding that a district court did not
                  abuse its discretion in denying a defendant's motion to dismiss and instead
                  ordering that the defend.ant be transferred to a psychiatric hospital within
                  seven days). Regardless, the fact that dismissal was the only remedy sought
                  does not justify the district court in dismissing with prejudice.3
                                               CONCLUSION
                                We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
                  finding aggravated circumstances without articulating some misconduct by
                  the State or prejudice to Gonzalez's case and without balancing the relevant
                  interests discussed above. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in
                  granting the extreme remedy of dismissal with prejudice under the facts of
                  this case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for further
                  proceedings in light of this opinion.

                                                                                   , C.J.
                                                      Stiglich

                  We concur:

                  Cadish                                        Pickerin

                                              J.                                        , j
                                                                Lee

                  Parraguirre                                   Bell

                        31tilight of our disposition, we decline to reach the State's argument
                  that the district court lacked inherent authority to enter an. order of
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                  dismissal.
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