Court Opinion

ID: 9459384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:19:09.635784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:08.640324
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant Bush must be presumed to have stated a prima facie case of conscientious objection when he reasserted his 1-0 claim before his board in 1969. This requires reversal of his conviction under United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d 619 (7th Cir., 1970), unless he failed inexcusably to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons set out below, I do not think Bush may be charged with a failure to exhaust.
As the majority correctly recognizes, Bush failed to appeal from his board’s 1966 denial of 1-0 status until December, 1968, when he wrote:
I would now like to open an appeal on the basis of my beliefs (As explained in a C.O. Form on record with your office since 1965); this is an appeal for classification into the C.O. class.
This in effect was a request for a reopening of his classification, since the period for a proper appeal had expired long prior to the date of the letter. United States v. Vincilli, 215 F.2d 210 (2d Cir., 1954); United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir., 1953); 32 CFR § 1626.2(c). The board responded by scheduling Bush for a personal appearance on February 25, 1969. Bush never appeared. By letter dated February 5, 1969, he informed the board that he would be unable physically to appear as scheduled and requested in lieu thereof that the board consider a *1098lengthy written explication of his moral beliefs. Bush’s next communication from the board was a notice of classification as I-A (SSS Form 110) and a classification advice (SSS Form 111).
The mailing of these forms takes on importance when viewed in conjunction with the regulations in effect at the time. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (revised Dec. 9, 1971) dealt with the criteria governing reopening and the procedure to be followed by a local board upon a determination not to reopen:
When a registrant, any person who claims to be a dependent of a registrant, any person who has on file a written request for the current deferment of the registrant in a case involving occupational deferment, or the government appeal agent files with the local board a written request to reopen and consider anew the registrant’s classification and the local board is of the opinion that the information accompanying such request fails to present any facts in addition to those considered when the registrant was classified or, even if new facts are presented, the local board is of the opinion that such facts, if true, would not justify a change in such registrant’s classification, it shall not reopen the registrant’s classification. In such a case the local board, by letter, shall advise the person filing the request that the information submitted does not warrant the reopening of the registrants’s classification and shall place a copy of the letter in the registrant’s file. No other record of the receipt of such a request and the action taken thereon is required, (emphasis added)
When a board reopened a registrant’s classification, it was required to reclassify him, 32 C.F.R. § 1625.11, and notify him as follows under 32 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (revised Dec. 9, 1971):
When the local board reopens the registrant’s classification, it shall, as soon as practicable after it has again classified the registrant, mail notice thereof on Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110) to the registrant and on Classification Advice (SSS Form No. Ill) to the persons entitled to receive such notice or advice on an original classification under the provisions of § 1623.4 of this chapter.
The fact that Bush was mailed Forms 110 and 111 by his board is thus highly significant; under the applicable regulations — which we must presume were adhered to by the board — the mailing signifies that Bush’s classification was reopened.1 This the board could not have done without making a twofold determination: (1) that Bush had presented new matter in support of his 1-0 claim, and (2) that his file, new matter included, contained sufficient information to state a prima facie case of conscientious objection. These determinations by the board are not subject to reexamination on appeal. See generally, Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 1274, 31 L.Ed.2d 473 (1972); Lenhard v. United States, 405 U.S. 1013, 92 S.Ct. 1296, 31 L.Ed.2d 477 (1972); United States v. Dziemiela, No. 72-1465 (7th Cir., Sept. 28, 1972); United States v. Nelson, No. 71-1812 (7th Cir., July 12, 1972); United States v. Hulsey, 463 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir., 1972); Memorandum for the United States in Joseph v. United States, 18-22; c. f. United *1099States v. Hershey, 451 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir., 1971).2
That the board found a prima facie case of conscientious objection and failed to state reasons for its denial of a 1-0 exemption calls Lemmens immediately into play. And the board’s finding that Bush had presented it with new matter by his letter of February 5 is relevant to refute the Government’s assertion that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The majority implies that Bush’s failure to exhaust remedies on his 1-0 claim in 1966 precludes his effective exhaustion in 1969, when he admittedly took an appeal from the board’s denial of that claim. As I see it, this view is persuasive only if the board rejected the 1-0 claim in 1969 for failure to state “any facts in addition to those considered when the registrant was classified.” 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4.3 But the board found the opposite, for it reopened Bush’s classification. It follows that the 1969 prosecution by Bush of his conscientious objection claim must be assessed apart from his 1966 prosecution of that claim and that his 1966 failure to exhaust Selective Service remedies cannot be carried over to taint his full attempt to exhaust those remedies in 1969.
Since I also reject the Government’s argument that Bush’s Selective Service file displays enough objective indicia of insincerity regarding his 1-0 claim to eliminate his defense under Lemmens, I would reverse.

. This would not be the case if Bush had appeared in person before the board. He would then have received Forms 110 and 111 even if the board had decided not to reopen his ease. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(d) states:
After the registrant has appeared before the member or members of the local board designated for the purpose, the local board, as soon as practicable after it again classifies the registrant, or determines not to reopen the registrant’s classification, shall mail notice thereof on Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110) to the registrant and on Classification Advice (SSS Form No. Ill) to the persons entitled to receive such notice or advice on an original classification under the provisions of § 1623.4 of this chapter, (emphasis added)
Bush did not appear, however, and this section raises no ambiguity as to the import of the board’s action.

. In the cited cases, it was inferred from the fact of reopening only that a local board had found a registrant’s file to state a prima facie case for statutory exemption. This is attributable, I think, to the fact that new matter unquestionably was involved in each case, and not to any judicial (or prosecutorial) reluctance to extend Joseph to its logical limit. Given the fact that an offering of new matter and presentation of a prima facie case are parallel requirements of a reopening under 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4, I can see no reason to read Joseph as inferring only a prima facie case from the fact of reopening.

. This would have been possible, even in light of the board’s mailing of Forms 110 and .111, if Bush had shown up for his personal appearance. See note 1, supra. We might then have to embark on a careful analysis of Bush’s Selective Service file to determine if the board’s decision to retain Bush as I-A could have been based on his failure to present new matter or a prima facie case for exemption. Here, however, Joseph forecloses this inquiry.