Court Opinion

ID: 9492787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:50:35.174447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:29.732193
License: Public Domain

WHYTE, District Judge,
dissenting in part:
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the arbitration award must be vacated (Part H.B.). I can understand why the majority believes the award is wrong and should be vacated, but I believe it has over-stepped our deferential review role in doing so.
A district court’s review of arbitration awards is “both limited and highly deferential.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Local 859 v. Madison Industries, Inc., 84 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, “an award must be confirmed if the arbitrators even arguably construed or applied the contract and acted within the scope of their authority.” Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820, 821 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 623 U.S. 1059, 118 S.Ct. 1385, 140 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998). “The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.” United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). A reviewing court is generally bound to defer to the decision of the arbitrator, even if that decision makes erroneous factual findings. See Sheet Metal Workers v. Arizona Mechanical & Stainless, Inc., 863 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir.1988); SFIC Prop., Inc. v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge 91, 103 F.3d 923, 924-25 (9th Cir.1996). The Third Circuit has- summarized the extremely deferential standard of review as follows: “Our review of the arbitrator’s factual findings is not whether those findings were supported by the weight of the evidence or even whether they are clearly erroneous. All that is required is some support in the record. When the court finds some support, the inquiry is over.” Tanoma Min. Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, UMWA 896 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir.1990).
Courts have recognized exceptions to the general rule of deference to the arbitrator’s decision, such as where the arbitrator “dispense[d] his own brand of industrial justice,” as opposed to making an award that draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358. It seems to me that the majority here quarrels with the arbitrator’s fact finding rather than finding the award does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.1 In any event, the majority assumes that the arbitrator based his decision on Ballard Smith’s 1986 testimony. However, the arbitrator stated that “[t]he shadow cast over the credibility of the Smith testimony coupled with the absence of any other corroboration of the claim submitted by Garvey compels a finding that the Padres declined to extend his contract not because of the constraints of the collusion effort of the *595clubs.... ” (Emphasis added). In other words, it appears the arbitrator felt that Smith’s prior inconsistent testimony negated the credibility of his current testimony and, therefore, the probative value of it was outweighed by the conclusion that could be drawn from the lack of any corroboration that a specific extension offer had been made.
Significantly, no evidence other than Smith’s arbitration statement corroborated Garvey’s testimony that he had received a specific extension offer. Garvey submitted no documentation whatsoever evidencing a specific offer. The Association submitted to the arbitrator, after the 21-day recess, Garvey’s responses to claims questionnaires which contain no mention of a specific offer. The 1988 questionnaire response states that “it would have been reasonable for the Club to pursue a contract extension.” The 1991 questionnaire response states that Garvey and the Padres engaged in “contract extension negotiations” beginning toward the end of the 1986 season, at which point Smith told Garvey that “he would talk to him later because there was interest in Steve remaining with the Padres beyond 1987,” and describes further talks with Smith in September, 1987 when, “[a]gain; Steve was told they would talk later.” Although the questionnaire responses discuss circumstances surrounding failed contract extension negotiations, they never state that a specific extension offer was actually made. Garvey never told his agent that he had received a specific offer from the Padres. Admittedly, Garvey, rather than his agent, was dealing with Smith at the time of the alleged offer. However, when the negotiations “stalled” and Garvey brought in his agent, Garvey apparently said nothing to his agent about having received a specific offer.
The majority says that “the arbitrator could not properly have relied on the claims questionnaires, because the arbitrator himself had previously established a procedure governing the hearings under which the questionnaires could not be considered.” Op. at 589 n. 6. The arbitrator did state at Garvey’s hearing that he would not consider “conflicting positions which might have been taken earlier, -such as in the claims questionnaires.” I believe the statement is reasonably read as confirming what the arbitrator had said in his February 14, 1994 award, specifically, that he would regard the “claims of the objecting players advanced in writing and/or oral argument as definitive of their position rather than potentially conflicting claims that may have been advanced earlier in this entire procedure.” That is, a player’s current claim, would define his position and the player would not be prejudiced by a previous conflicting claim. I do not read the arbitrator’s statement as suggesting that he would not consider the lack of evidence corroborating a current claim or earlier conflicting factual evidence. Nor does the arbitrator’s earlier statement preclude the use of conflicting factual statements to make credibility determinations.
I acknowledge that the evidence presented by Garvey at the arbitration supporting his claim that a specific extension offer was made to him is persuasive. However, our review must be highly deferential, and we should not vacate an award because we believe the arbitrator’s factual findings are erroneous. Therefore, I believe the district court properly denied the motion to vacate the award and that its judgment should be affirmed.

. The award draws its essence from the Framework developed from the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement resolved the grievances arising from the owners’ violations of the CBA.