Court Opinion

ID: 9950937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 06:05:54.996968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:30.358459
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

MATTHEW BURCHARD,                                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 14, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 364021
                                                                     Otsego Circuit Court
TREETOPS ACQUISITION COMPANY, LLC, a                                 LC No. 2021-018503-NO
Limited Liability Company d/b/a TREETOPS,
TREETOPS RESORT, and/or TREETOPS GOLF,

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff Matthew Burchard appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant
Treetops Acquisition Company, LLC’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7) (release) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). On appeal, plaintiff argues
that the release he signed was invalid and, alternatively, that his gross-negligence claim should be
allowed to proceed to trial. We affirm.

                                            I. FACTS

       On May 4, 2019, plaintiff was with about fifteen other golfers as part of a bachelor party.
That afternoon, plaintiff and the others were at the “Threetops” golf course, which is one of the
courses offered by defendant.1 Plaintiff had never played Threetops before and had not consumed
alcohol that day. Before being allowed on the course, plaintiff was required to sign a “Golf Cart

1
 Somewhat confusingly, “Treetops” is the name of the overall resort, which includes several golf
courses. One of those courses is named “Threetops,” as it is a Par-3 course.

                                                -1-
Rental Agreement,” which is a standardized form that defendant requires both drivers and
passengers of a golf cart to sign before golfing.2 The agreement includes the following release:

       I am aware of the dangers of golf and operating a golf cart, generally, including
       without limitation, the risks of being struck by a golf ball or golf cart, golf carts
       colliding, or the golf cart overturning (the “dangers”). I understand that the risk of
       the dangers may be increased due to the extreme terrain at Treetops Resort
       including the hills, slopes and grade changes. . . . I assume the inherent and
       extraordinary risks of the dangers. I hereby waive any claim I have or may hereafter
       have for injuries to my person or property arising out of the dangers and release
       [defendant] . . . from any and all liability in any way related to the dangers.

       In addition, a “starter” advised the group about the hills on the third and seventh holes and
generally informed the group “[t]hat you brake. Don’t lockup the brakes. If you lockup the brakes,
use your gas. That will release the brake.”

        Unfortunately, plaintiff lost control of his golf cart on the third hole while descending the
hill from the tee boxes to the green. He described the accident in his deposition as follows:

       We get on the cart path and we’re going down to the green. I remember going
       down the hill and the golf cart started going a little faster than I like. So I applied
       the brakes. The brakes didn’t slow the golf cart down. So I applied the brakes
       harder. Golf cart still didn’t slow down. Then I put all my body weight on the
       brake pedal and then the golf cart still did not slow down. And I remember a sharp
       left turn coming up. And I remember waking up in the hospital a few days later.

        Plaintiff added that he tried applying the parking brake as well, but doing so was unhelpful
because “it felt like one of the wheels were catching, but then would give way.” Plaintiff was
subsequently informed that he was thrown from the golf cart and that the golf cart flipped and
landed on him. He said that the weather conditions that day were “sunny” and that he had no
reason to believe that the cart path was wet.

       Plaintiff sued defendant in November 2021. In Count I, plaintiff sought relief for
negligence and premises liability, asserting, in relevant part, that the cart path was defectively
designed and unreasonably increased the chances of injury. In Count II, plaintiff sought relief for
gross negligence, essentially asserting that the circumstances were so egregious as to warrant that
claim.

       Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10).
Defendant argued that summary disposition of the ordinary-negligence and premises-liability
claims was warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because plaintiff signed a release that waived those
claims, and summary disposition of the gross-negligence claim was warranted under MCR
2.116(C)(10) because the facts of this case do not amount to gross negligence. In support of the

2
 Defendant generally prohibits golfers from walking or using a pull cart on the Threetops golf
course.

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latter argument, defendant introduced evidence indicating that there is a sign near or at the top of
the hill on the third hole that reads, “BRAKE” and “STEEP GRADE”; there is a speed bump on
top of the hill; the golf cart in question was inspected about a week before the accident and found
to have no mechanical issues; the golf cart was inspected shortly after the accident and again found
to have no mechanical issues; and the starter warned plaintiff and the rest of his group to brake on
the third hole while descending the hill.

       Plaintiff responded with two expert reports indicating that the hill was excessively steep
under both industry standards and the recommendations of the golf-cart manufacturer, and that
defendant was negligent in other respects. The report prepared by Kristopher Seluga of
Technology Associates, LLC, stated, in relevant part:

              The subject path, in the area leading to the sharp left curve, has a maximum
       grade of approximately [19 degrees] (34%) with a significant length exceeding [14
       degrees] (25%). . . .

                The design of the subject car path was deficient and violated numerous
       industry recommendations as well as the warnings in the E-Z-Go TXT golf car
       manual. For example, the National Golf Car Manufacturers Association (NGCMA)
       published the “Golf Course Safety Guidelines,” in 2006 which recommended that
       golf cars not be allowed to drive on paved surfaces steeper than 25% [14 degrees]
       . . . . The Owner’s Guide for the subject E-Z-Go TXT fleet gasoline golf car states:
       “Never drive vehicle up, down or across an incline that exceeds [14 degrees] (25%
       grade).” Therefore, the Tree Tops golf course was violating the E-Z-Go warnings
       in the manual for the subject car by instructing golfers to drive down the subject
       hill, which significantly exceeded a 25% grade in the area near the entrance to the
       left curve where drivers were likely to attempt to slow down in order to safely
       negotiate the curve. . . .

       The report prepared by Edward E. Wankel of Leisure Services Associates Inc., stated, in
relevant part:

                These defendants failed to install protective fencing or appropriate guard
       rails at the sharp left turn along the cart path; failed to make appropriate alterations
       to the golf car pathway to reduce the slope from beyond 25% /or 33.65% as it
       presently exists; failed to meet proper radiuses of the curve of this sharp turn; failed
       to erect appropriate warning signs that would have more efficiently warned of the
       very sharp turn ahead and the dangerous steep slope; failed to warn golf car
       operators to “Slow Down”; failed to establish a proper risk management program;
       failed to engage in proper maintenance procedures; and failed to engage in proper
       safety inspections on the golf courses grounds, specifically in and around the the
       [sic] cart path at issue herein at hole number three.

        The trial court heard the motion on November 8, 2022. Following arguments, it ruled in
favor of defendant on the record, reasoning as follows. First, the release that plaintiff signed before
golfing was valid, as it had the parties’ mutual assent and was not induced by fraud or mutual
mistake. As a result, defendant was entitled to summary disposition of the ordinary-negligence

                                                 -3-
and premises-liability claims under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Second, the trial court ruled that plaintiff
failed to establish a question of material fact regarding gross negligence:

       I’m compelled based upon the information that’s been supplied to find that an
       objective observer must and would conclude that Treetops exhibited not reckless
       conduct, but conduct that was appropriately tailored for many reasons in seeking to
       warn, and in seeking to advise patrons of the risks. Risks which it even explained
       where heightened due to the extreme terrain.

               For example, evidence offered by defendant demonstrates that one week
       prior to the accident at issue the golf cart in question underwent a full maintenance
       inspection. That included a full review of mechanics including brake shoes, brake
       cable and the parking brake, along with a performance test. According to that
       inspection no, no issues were identified.

               In addition to the pre-accident inspection the starter in this case, Joseph
       Tyre, testified during his deposition that he specifically warned all groups, but
       specifically plaintiffs group, to use the brakes and gas when going downhill to make
       sure that the brakes didn’t lock up, which is exactly what plaintiffs expert even
       suggested should have been done.

               He also testified that he told them to be careful on hole number three where
       the accident occurred, and provided each customer, including plaintiff with the golf
       cart agreement. Which as noted contains specific warnings regarding a variety of
       dangers, including the danger of the cart overturning, and that the risks are
       heightened due to the extreme terrain.

                In addition, defendant’s other employee, one in particular McKinley,
       testified as his deposition that the bag drop employees are trained to inspect all carts
       before their set up on the staging area for guests to use, and that no bag drop
       employee flagged plaintiffs cart, or noted anything wrong with it, or it would have
       never been put into that staging area for use.

                                                ***

              Even taking into account both of the proffered expert reports of Leisure,
       Leisure Services and the other report from Mr. Seluga, the court finds insufficient
       evidence of gross negligence in order to defeat the summary disposition motion.

              By way of example, much of the Leisure Services report alleges that
       defendant was aware of the prior accidents resulting from the steep grade. That
       defendant was aware, or should have been aware of the golf cart manufacturer’s
       recommendation, and that the defendant knew, or should have known of industry
       standards prohibiting elevation changes.

              But it’s correctly cited and noted by defendant in the motion and brief
       ignorance of industry standards and or recommendations, including manufacture

                                                 -4-
        recommendations, or failure to implement them does not amount to gross
        negligence under Xu versus Gay. . . .

       On November 23, 2022, the trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s ordinary-
negligence and premises-liability claims under MCR 2.116(C)(7), and dismissing his gross-
negligence claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10).3

        Plaintiff now appeals.

                                   II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118;
597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) for a “release.”
“A party may support a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or
other documentary evidence.” Maiden, 461 Mich at 119. Summary disposition is warranted under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” “In evaluating a
motion for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR
2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Maiden, 461 Mich at
120.

       “The interpretation of a release presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.”
Radu v Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc, 302 Mich App 363, 374; 838 NW2d720 (2013).

                                          III. DISCUSSION

        Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by ruling that his release was valid, so his ordinary-
negligence and premises-liability claims should proceed to trial. Plaintiff alternatively argues that
he established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant was grossly negligent, so
at a minimum, that claim should proceed to trial. We disagree with both of plaintiff’s contentions.

                                                Release

         “[I]t is not contrary to this state’s public policy for a party to contract against liability for
damages caused by ordinary negligence.” Paterek v 6600 Ltd, 186 Mich App 445, 448; 465 NW2d
342 (1990). This principle applies to premises liability as well. See Skotak v Vic Tanny Int’l, Inc,
203 Mich App 616, 618-619; 513 NW2d 428 (1994). “As with other contracts, the validity of a
contract of release turns on the intent of the parties.” Paterek, 186 Mich App at 449. “To be valid,
a release must be fairly and knowingly made.” Id. “A release is not fairly made and is invalid if
(1) the releasor was dazed, in shock, or under the influence of drugs, (2) the nature of the instrument
was misrepresented, or (3) there was other fraudulent or overreaching conduct.” Id.

3
 The trial court also dismissed plaintiff’s breach-of-contract and fraud claims, but plaintiff does
not challenge that aspect of the trial court’s ruling on appeal.

                                                   -5-
        Plaintiff does not dispute that the release, if valid, would amount to a waiver of his
ordinary-negligence and premises-liability claims. However, he argues that the release is invalid
because (1) there was no mutual assent on behalf of defendant, as a representative of defendant
did not sign it; (2) the release was not “knowingly” signed by plaintiff because he was not informed
about safe braking, the fact that the golf course did not comply with national safety standards, and
the fact that the terrain ahead was dangerous; and (3) it was not “fairly” signed by plaintiff because
he was not informed that he would be required to sign the release until after he paid for the golf
round, and defendant would not allow him to avoid the release by walking or using a pull cart.
None of these arguments have merit.

        With regard to the first argument, this Court has specifically rejected the contention that a
release “lacks mutuality of agreement” because it was not signed by the other party. Hall v Small,
267 Mich App 330, 333; 705 NW2d 741 (2005). “[A] release need not be signed by the party
being released if it shows on its face that it was not intended to be signed by the party obtaining
the release.” Id. at 333-334 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The release in this case clearly
shows on its face that it was not intended to be signed by a representative of defendant to be valid.

         With regard to the second argument, the starter informed plaintiff and the other golfers that
the golf course had steep hills and to brake while descending those hills. In addition, the release
itself referred to “extreme terrain at Treetops Resort including the hills, slopes and grade changes.”
Thus, defendant warned plaintiff both verbally and in writing about the general condition of the
golf course, so the release was “knowingly” provided. Even if plaintiff did not read the release
before signing it, his failure to do so would not warrant rescission of the release. See Dombrowski
v City of Omer, 199 Mich App 705, 710; 502 NW2d 707 (1993). “Failure to read a contract
document provides a ground for rescission only where the failure was not induced by carelessness
alone, but instead was induced by some stratagem, trick, or artifice by the parties seeking to enforce
the contract.” Id. (cleaned up).

        With regard to the third argument, that there was other fraudulent or overreaching conduct,
while it is true that plaintiff was not presented with the release until after he paid for the golf round,
and that he was not allowed to walk or use a pull cart, these facts do not compel the conclusion
that the release was “unfairly” provided. There is nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiff
would have been unable to obtain a refund if he refused to sign the release or that defendant
somehow pressured him into signing the release despite his unwillingness to do so. Nor has
plaintiff identified any other egregious facts. In short, the facts preceding the golf round do not
constitute “fraudulent or overreaching conduct.” See Paterek, 186 Mich App at 449.

       For these reasons, the release was valid and waived plaintiff’s ordinary-negligence and
premises-liability claims.

                                           Gross Negligence

        “It is well established in this jurisdiction that, although a party may contract against liability
for harm caused by his ordinary negligence, a party may not insulate himself against liability for
gross negligence . . . .” Lamp v Reynolds, 249 Mich App 591, 594; 645 NW2d 311 (2002). Gross
negligence is “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an
injury results.” Dougherty v City of Detroit, 340 Mich App 339, 346; 986 NW2d 467 (2021)

                                                   -6-
(quotation marks and citation omitted).4 “Gross negligence suggests almost a willful disregard of
precautions or measures to attend to safety and a singular disregard for substantial risks.” Id. at
350 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Evidence of ordinary negligence or simply alleging
that an actor could have done more is insufficient to meet the standard for gross negligence . . . .”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words,

       [s]imply alleging that an actor could have done more is insufficient under Michigan
       law, because, with the benefit of hindsight, a claim can always be made that extra
       precautions could have influenced the result. However, saying that a defendant
       could have taken additional precautions is insufficient to find ordinary negligence,
       much less recklessness. Even the most exacting standard of conduct, the negligence
       standard, does not require one to exhaust every conceivable precaution to be
       considered not negligent.

               The much less demanding standard of care—gross negligence—suggests,
       instead, almost a willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend to safety
       and a singular disregard for substantial risks. It is as though, if an objective
       observer watched the actor, he could conclude, reasonably, that the actor simply
       did not care about the safety or welfare of those in his charge. [Tarlea v Crabtree,
       263 Mich App 80, 90; 687 NW2d 333 (2004).]

        In Xu v Gay, 257 Mich App 263; 668 NW2d 166 (2003), the decedent was injured when
he fell backwards while using a treadmill at a fitness center. Id. at 265. His estate argued that the
fitness center was grossly negligent because the wall was only 2 ½ feet behind the treadmill,
whereas it should have been at least five feet behind the treadmill under industry standards. Id. at
270. This Court disagreed that the fitness center was grossly negligent, reasoning:

               Essentially, plaintiff argues that there were industry standards, that
       defendant should have known about these standards, and that defendant’s ignorance
       of and failure to implement these standards constituted gross negligence. However,
       this establishes a case of ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. Evidence of
       ordinary negligence does not create a question of fact regarding gross negligence.
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that
       reasonable minds could not differ; defendant’s mere ignorance does not constitute
       conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an
       injury resulted to Yan. [Id. at 271 (citations omitted).]

         In this case, the facts show that defendant displayed some level of concern for the safety
of its customers. The golf cart at issue, as with all other golf carts, was inspected for safety about
a week before the accident occurred and found to have no problems. The fact that the golf cart
was examined post-accident and found to have no operational defects seemingly confirms the

4
  This definition of “gross negligence” is set forth by MCL 691.1407(8)(a) of the Governmental
Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. However, in Xu v Gay, 257 Mich App 263,
269; 668 NW2d 166 (2003), this Court applied the GTLA definition to “[a] contractual waiver of
liability.”

                                                 -7-
earlier inspection. In addition, the starter warned golfers such as plaintiff to drive carefully on the
hills and apply the brakes, the liability waiver expressly includes such warnings, and the third hole
has a speed bump and a warning sign at the top of the hill. Given the high standard for establishing
gross negligence, “almost a willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend to safety and a
singular disregard for substantial risks,” Tarlea, 263 Mich App at 90, it is difficult to conclude that
defendant satisfied this standard in light of its multiple precautionary measures.

         Plaintiff does not dispute that defendant took steps showing a concern for golf cart safety,
but observes that the slope of the hill exceeded both industry standards and the guidelines set forth
in the golf cart operational manual. In addition, plaintiff argues, the record indicates that there
were at least a few incidents or accidents on the third hole before plaintiff’s mishap, which suggests
that defendant had knowledge that the third hole could be made safer. However, accepting
plaintiff’s contentions, “ignorance of and failure to implement” industry standards “establishes a
case of ordinary negligence, not gross negligence.” Xu, 257 Mich App at 271. Moreover, to the
extent that defendant also ignored or failed to implement the slope recommendation in the
operational manual, that fact is not so egregious as to outweigh all of the other precautionary
measures implemented by defendant to ensure the safety of its golfers. This perhaps is best
illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of golfers safely, including those participating in the
bachelor party of plaintiff, drove through the third hole without incident. While the record does
indicate that the third hole had some unspecified number of accidents, the record does not indicate
whether those accidents actually involved injury and, overall, the number is negligible in light of
the thousands of golfers that play the golf course each year. Simply put, the facts of this case are
consistent with ordinary negligence, not gross negligence.5

                                        IV. CONCLUSION

       The trial court did not err by concluding that the release is valid, nor did the trial court err
by granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s gross-negligence claim. We affirm.

                                                               /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Riordan

5
  Plaintiff directs our attention to Dippel v Treetops Resort, Otsego Circuit Court No. 19-17905-
NO. In that case, the plaintiff was injured while descending a hill on a different golf course
operated by defendant. The trial court, which was a different trial judge from the instant case,
ruled that the plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to gross negligence. We
acknowledge, that at first glance, our decision appears to be inconsistent with Dippel. However,
we note that the golf cart at issue in Dippel was apparently manufactured by a different company
than the golf cart at issue in this case. According to the trial court’s opinion in Dippel, “the manual
recommended partially pressing the accelerator on the cars when descending hills . . . .” Plaintiff
has not identified a similar warning in the operational manual in the case before us.

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