Court Opinion

ID: 9382520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 21:02:57.527971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.859937
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/23 (unmodified opinion attached)
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION EIGHT

 PACIFIC PALISADES                             B306658
 RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION,
 INC.,                                         Los Angeles County
                                               Super. Ct. No. BS174471
        Petitioner and Appellant,
                                                 ORDER MODIFYING
        v.                                           OPINION

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,                  [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

      Defendants and
 Respondents;

 RONY SHRAM et al.,

      Real Parties in Interest
 and Respondents.

       THE COURT:

     IT IS ORDERED that the opinion in the above-entitled
matter filed on March 8, 2023, be modified as follows:

       On page 11, line 2, the phrase "claim of exemption" shall be
replaced with "appealable action on a coastal development permit
or a claim of exemption."
     There is no change in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________
STRATTON, P. J.          WILEY, J.         VIRAMONTES, J.

                              2
Filed 3/8/23 (unmodified opinion)
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION EIGHT

 PACIFIC PALISADES                             B306658
 RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
                                               Los Angeles County
         Plaintiff and Appellant,              Super. Ct. No. BS174471

         v.

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents;

 RONY SHRAM et al.,

        Real Parties in Interest and
        Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, John A. Torribio, Judge. Affirmed.
     John B. Murdock; Law Offices of Thomas M. Donovan and
Thomas M. Donovan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
       Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Terry Kaufmann-Macias,
Senior Assistant City Attorney, Donna L. Wong and Oscar
Medellin, Deputy City Attorneys; Downey Brand, Kathryn L.
Oehlschlager and Hina Gupta for Defendant and Respondent
City of Los Angeles.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Andrew M. Vogel, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Justin J. Lee, Deputy Attorney
General, for Defendant and Respondent California Coastal
Commission.
       Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell and Matthew D. Hinks
for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
                        ____________________
       People who do not want an eldercare facility built near
them have been fighting the project since 2017. Others want the
facility, saying the project would fit the neighborhood and the
public needs it. The trial court rejected the opponents’ challenge,
which was based on Los Angeles zoning laws, the California
Environmental Quality Act, and the Coastal Act. These
neighbors appealed. The three respondents—the City of Los
Angeles, the California Coastal Commission, and the developer—
defend the trial court ruling. We affirm.
                                  I
       We summarize facts from the 10,425-page record.
                                  A
       The vacant one-acre lot was zoned for commercial use in
1978. The site was graded in the early 1970s; today it has no
trees and few plants. A photo shows bare flat dirt behind a chain
link fence.

                                 2
      The lot is at the corner of Palisades Drive and Vereda De
La Montura in Pacific Palisades, which is an oceanside part of
the City of Los Angeles with a 2008 population of some 25,000.
(L.A. Times, Mapping L.A., Pacific Palisades profile,
 (as of March 6, 2023), archived at
.) The lot is “located within a
densely developed 740-unit residential subdivision known as the
Headlands.” About half the homes in the immediate area are
multifamily units; the others are single family homes. There are
many large two- and three-story residential condominium units.
      The area immediately surrounding the lot includes a
restaurant, an office and business center, and residential
condominiums. To the north and east are multifamily
condominiums; to the south is commercial development.
      The lot is within Los Angeles city limits; all municipal
references are to that city. The parcel is within the coastal zone,
about two and a half miles from the coast. Large public parks
with hillside hiking trails are nearby.
      The respondent developer bought this lot in 2013 and, after
consultation with some neighborhood organizations, proposed a
four-story project. The developer explained his motivation in a
2017 letter to neighbors. “The decision to pursue senior living
was made with feedback we received from some members of the
Highlands community who expressed a lack of options for older
adults who wish to age in place. These sentiments were echoed
by two independent market studies showing that Los Angeles in
general and the Palisades in particular lack adequate housing for
seniors, trailing nearly every major metropolitan area in the
country.” The developer sought to “establish a communication

                                 3
channel” with neighbors to “make the process as smooth and
unobtrusive as possible.” He hoped to break ground in 2018.
      The record contains a detailed description of the eldercare
project with architectural plans, maps, and images. The
developer proposed 82 residential rooms in a 64,646 square foot
building with underground parking. The ground floor of the
building would have residential rooms, a public bistro, and other
features, with more residential rooms on the other three floors.
The building’s height would range from 25 to 45 feet, making it
one story higher than the tallest nearby structures. City zoning
allowed for a building of this height on this lot.
                                  B
      This dispute began in June 2017, when the developer
applied to the City’s planning department for permission to build
in accordance with the Los Angeles zoning code. He sought a
coastal development permit and a “Class 32 infill project
exemption” from the California Environmental Quality Act.
Later we return to Class 32 exemptions.
      Land use regulation in Los Angeles can be intricate. This
application proceeded through six layers of review:
         1. the City Zoning Administrator,
         2. the West Los Angeles Area Planning Commission,
         3. the Planning and Land Use Management Committee
             of the Los Angeles City Council,
         4. the Los Angeles City Council itself,
         5. the California Coastal Commission, and
         6. the Superior Court.
      We summarize these layers of scrutiny.
///
///

                                4
                                   1
       A Los Angeles zoning administrator conducted the first
review. The administrator announced a public hearing on the
project, which prompted community reactions.
       Some people favored the project. For instance, a 45-year
Palisades resident wrote as the chairman of the Palisades
Highlands Presidents Council, a group of some 20 individual
homeowners associations. The chairman related how the
developer contacted this Council in 2013 to discuss possible plans
before buying the site. The Council did not want another
shopping center or office building. The developer worked with
the Council from 2014 to 2017. The Council polled each
individual homeowners association in 2015. “The results
revealed that the majority of those who voted in the survey in the
Highlands preferred the 64,000-square foot residential structure
proposed by the developer.” The chairman reported the developer
had worked closely with member associations to address their
concerns.
       The chairman added that “[t]here is a substantial
population of older residents who have lived in the Palisades
Highlands or adjacent neighborhoods for decades and dread the
prospects of having to move away, particularly those in town
homes with many stairs. This project provides an option for them
to remain in the community . . . . It also allows some of the
younger crowd living here to bring their parents closer to them.
It is our responsibility as a society to house the elderly in the
very same neighborhoods in which they have lived for many
years, rather than callously pushing them out of the community
that they know and love.”

                                5
       Others were adamantly opposed to the proposal. This
opposition was substantial and ranged over many subjects.
       Opponents raised issues, for instance, about parking,
traffic, fire hazards, the lack of nearby medical resources for
seniors, the intrusion of the project upon the views and natural
beauty of the area, and disruption the construction would cause.
       On October 4, 2017, the zoning administrator held a public
hearing attended by the developer and some 40 community
members. Some people from the community spoke in favor of the
project; some spoke against it.
       On January 26, 2018, the administrator issued a 32-page
single-spaced decision approving the proposal and granting a
coastal development permit. The administrator found the project
had no significant effect on the environment and therefore, by
virtue of the Class 32 categorical exemption, was exempt from
the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act.
       The administrator found the project was consistent with
the area’s general plan and zoning; specifically, it was consistent
with the Brentwood-Pacific Palisades Community Plan. This
plan is a 60-page document the City’s planning department has
posted online. (https://planning.lacity.org/odocument/abf34149-
0480-4d2d-9506-26b8e06fe185/Brentwood Pacific%20Palisades%
20Community%20Plan.pdf (as of March 6, 2023), archived at
.) It is a part of the general plan
for Los Angeles, and was last updated in 1996. “The City of Los
Angeles has the responsibility to revise and implement the City's
General Plan.” (Id. p. II-3; see also L.A. Municipal Code, Art. 1.5,
 (as of March 6, 2023), archived at

                                 6
.) This plan thus has the stature
of municipal hopes and intentions for the City circa 1996.
       The administrator found the “site and surrounding area are
urbanized areas.” The proposal’s design theme would preserve
community character. There was ample landscaping throughout
and outside the building. The site had no threatened species, and
there would be no significant impact on traffic or parking. “The
project design is entirely consistent with current surrounding
development.”
                                   2
       Opponents and their counsel appealed this decision to the
West Los Angeles Area Planning Commission in February 2018.
Neighbors filed a 58-page brief citing a host of objections.
       Again, the opponents’ objections ranged widely, and
included the following:
       The project would be inconsistent with the parklike
neighborhood, which included features of natural beauty, rugged
rocks, and teeming wildlife. The area was a fire hazard zone and
vulnerable to flash floods, slides, and earthquakes. The eldercare
proposal lacked nearby supporting medical, rescue, and
emergency facilities. Neighbors were overwhelmingly opposed to
the project. The project was incompatible with the surrounding
wilderness and parklands, would ruin scenic values and views,
and would bring excessive density. The project would worsen
parking and traffic congestion and lacked supporting public
transportation. The added traffic would dramatically increase
the risk of speeding cars, accidents, injuries, and deaths. The
traffic nightmare would create a significant risk of death and
serious injury to pedestrians. The facility would create
intolerable noise. The proposal did not meet the criteria for a

                                7
Class 32 categorical exemption. The neighborhood is not highly
urbanized. The project would impair views from a scenic
highway and would contradict the area’s community plan. The
lack of proposed landscaping was appalling and would
permanently scar the surrounding wildlands.
       Other objections were that the project would threaten a list
of 65 species, including amphibians, reptiles, insects, and birds.
The zoning administrator ignored evidence the project site was
likely to contain or be near archaeological evidence of early
tribes, including the Tongva people. The developer low-balled the
amount of excavation that would be needed. Dirt hauling
operations would cause pollution. The project would
unacceptably increase greenhouse gas emissions and posed risks
to water quality. Permitting this development would violate the
Coastal Act and the zoning code. The modern and unattractive
architecture of the proposed building would be out of character
with the surrounding Mediterranean and rustic homes.
       There were many other individual protests. One person
wrote that “[w]e need this project like a hole in the head, period.”
The protests reiterated issues concerning traffic, parking, noise,
safety, and fire hazards. Further objections were to the project’s
architecture and appearance: it would be an eyesore, a “white
elephant,” and “large and unsightly.”
       On April 18, 2018, the West Los Angeles Area Planning
Commission held a public hearing on the matter. The 146-page
transcript of this hearing is in the record.
       This Commission rejected the neighbors’ objections and
approved the project with some 26 pages of reasons, findings, and
conditions of approval. In particular, the Commission found the

                                 8
project was consistent with the area’s general plan, followed its
design guidelines, and preserved community character.
                                  3
       Opponents again appealed this ruling, and now via
diverging proceedings. Neighbors simultaneously appealed to
City officials and to the California Coastal Commission. In this
section we describe the City process.
       On June 5, 2018, the Planning and Land Use Management
Committee of the Los Angeles City Council heard the neighbors’
appeal from the Commission’s decision. This public hearing
involved presentations by the City’s planning department and
interested members of the public.
       An experienced real estate attorney spoke for the objectors.
He noted over 1,500 people had signed statements opposing the
eldercare facility. He said the “biggest insult” was the
developer’s assertion that the facility site was substantially
surrounded by urban uses. He stressed the site’s proximity to
Santa Ynez City Park and Topanga Canyon State Park, and
concluded the surrounding area was parkland, not urban
development. He displayed an image he said showed “the
massive amount of open space that does actually surround it.”
The attorney argued the proposal was incompatible with the
neighborhood. “The developer will say there are projects that are
proximate that are the same height. Of course, they sit up on
hillsides, so they’re not comparable.” The attorney complained
about the amount of excavation that would be necessary.
       The developer’s lawyer rebutted some of these points.
“This project is located smack in the middle of the Highlands
community, which has been established in this area for decades.
[⁋] It’s bounded at the north by multifamily residential, at the

                                 9
east by multifamily residential, at the south by a commercial
development . . . .” The lawyer argued the appeal was “simply a
repeat of their earlier failed appeal to the West Los Angeles
Planning Commission,” the public hearing that set a record for
most highly attended meeting, signifying the project already had
been well vetted.
       An architect who was president of the Pacific Palisades
Civic Group told the committee the “size and massing” of the
project complied with the local code, and that the surrounding
area “is a highly developed area with many structures exceeding
the size of the proposed project.” This architect urged the
committee to approve the project.
       The planning deputy for Los Angeles City Councilmember
Mike Bonin told the committee the project “will provide a much-
needed community benefit with convenient local residential care
for seniors allowing them to stay in the community close to
family. The project has been thoughtfully designed in compliance
with the Brentwood Pacific Palisades Community Plan by
providing the transition between existing commercial and
adjacent residential that surround the property [on] three of four
sides . . . . Additionally, the Pacific Palisades Community Council
did find the proposed eldercare use to be appropriate . . . .”
       This Committee voted unanimously to recommend the City
Council deny the appeal and approve the project.
                                   4
       On June 19, 2018, the City Council held a public hearing
and unanimously approved the project.
                                   5
       Many opponents—individuals as well as the appellant
Association—protested the City’s decision to the California

                                10
Coastal Commission. Any aggrieved person may appeal a local
government’s claim of exemption to this Commission, which shall
hear the appeal unless the appeal presents “no substantial issue.”
(Pub. Resource Code, § 30625.)
                                  a
       The Commission’s staff prepared recommendations for the
Commission about whether the appeal raised a substantial issue
under the Coastal Act. The staff analyzed a detailed record that
included engineering, biological, fire hazard, traffic, parking and
other studies submitted by the neighbors. The staff also
reviewed the voluminous correspondence for and against the
project.
       On June 29, 2018, the staff issued a 17-page single-spaced
report recommending the Commission reject the appeal for want
of a substantial issue. A July 10, 2018 addendum responded to
critiques of the 17-page report.
       We recount the staff analysis, which concluded the appeal
raised no substantial issue under the Coastal Act.
       The neighbors’ main objections were about whether the
project’s design and character would have an adverse visual
impact, including whether it would block scenic views from
streets, from nearby homes, and from park trails. The project’s
height, mass, and design, these objections went, would be out of
character with the surrounding area.
       Commission staff concluded the following. Public views
from nearby trails would not be significantly affected due to the
design and site of the project, which would be located in a
developed and urbanized area. Concerns about fire protection,
protected species, traffic, and parking were insubstantial. The

                                11
project’s density, scale, and land use were compatible with the
surrounding area.
       The site was not an environmentally sensitive habitat. The
area had been disturbed by human activity—it had been part of a
large residential subdivision since the 1970s—and it contained no
threatened or endangered species. The project was within the
urban limit line and would not go beyond the boundaries. The
project would not significantly degrade parks or recreational
areas.
       The surrounding buildings were as tall as 36 feet and as
large as 27,590 square feet. There was a permitted nearby use of
up to 50 feet in height for a church and school. “[T]he nearby
residential condo complexes to the north and east do have far
larger footprints when you look at those clusters of the buildings
in terms of square footage. But they are lower, and they range
from two to three stories and 20 to 36 feet in height.” The
Calvary Christian School Facility, located on the same street
within the same subdivision, is more than 60,000 square feet in
size, and “it’s similar in that it is an institutional use. And the
maximum height for structures on that lot was 50 feet.”
       The staff compared these existing uses to the proposed
64,646 square foot project: “The proposed height ranges from 25
feet adjacent to the open space to 45 feet adjacent to Palisades
Drive. The structure will not be significantly visible from the
Santa Ynez Canyon trailhead located 600 feet from the site, along
Vereda de la Montura, due to the topography of the trail. The
surrounding trails at Topanga State Park, Trailer Canyon and
Temescal Ridge are at a significantly higher elevation than the
project site and thus, the project will not significantly impact
public views. Although the proposed project would be the tallest

                                12
structure in the area adjacent to a City park, the Headlands’
residential community was originally approved by the
Commission with the understanding that the subdivision would
permanently impact views in the once undeveloped area.”
       In other words, the neighbors’ homes and the existing
commercial uses already affected views of what a half century
ago had been a pristine undeveloped area, so the one new
building would not change the status quo significantly.
       The staff concluded the proposed project would not have
“any significant adverse impacts on coastal scenic resources”
because it was located in “an area highly developed with
residential and commercial uses. The proposed project
incorporates landscaping and design features to minimize the
visual mass of the structure adjacent to the City park.”
       The staff investigated and dismissed the arguments about
hazards including fires, landslides, and geological instability.
       The staff addressed effects on public recreation and the
mountain trails that began near the site. The project would not
compound parking problems. It had ample underground parking
for a population that would not drive much, if at all. “[T]he
project has been sited and designed to minimize impacts to public
recreation and access to the surrounding trails.”
       The staff concluded “[t]he proposed development is
compatible with the density, scale and character of the
surrounding area . . . .” The question of the City’s compliance
with the California Environmental Quality Act did “not raise a
substantial issue.” The City’s analysis found the project would be
consistent with the Los Angeles Municipal Code, the Brentwood-
Pacific Palisades Community Plan, and the Los Angeles County

                               13
Interpretive Guidelines. The staff concluded this decisionmaking
had “substantial legal and factual support.”
       The staff noted the Palisades area was short on housing for
seniors “who no longer need or can afford the single-family homes
that predominate in the area. . . . [T]he project provides
opportunities for seniors to live in an area otherwise only
accessible by those who are mobile and affluent.”
                                   b
       Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Bonin wrote in
support of the project. “The proposed project will provide a much-
needed community benefit with convenient, local residential care
for seniors, allowing them to stay in the neighborhood and close
to family. The project has been thoughtfully designed in
conformance with the California Coastal Act. Its density and
scale is comparable with the existing development in the
surrounding neighborhood and the Commission has consistently
determined that senior care facilities are an approved use on
commercially zoned land in the Coastal Zone. Additionally, the
project conforms with the Brentwood-Pacific Palisades
Community Plan by providing a transition between commercial
and adjacent residential uses that surround the property on three
of four sides. I concur with Coastal Commission staff’s
recommendation that ‘no substantial issue’ exists regarding the
proposed eldercare project.”
                                   c
       Some input to the Commission from neighbors favored the
project. One resident wrote, for instance, that the project “is
needed by the Pacific Palisades community. My 94 year old
mother is in an assisted living facility in Culver City because
there are no suitable accommodations available in the Palisades.

                               14
Other members of the community have aging parents in facilities
as far away as the West Valley and Ventura. This situation
necessitates separation causing distress and inconvenience. As
we all age it is imperative that residential facilities be available
to maintain seniors within our community. The fact that this
Project is located in an appropriately zoned area and fully
compliant with size and height ordinances makes this Project
especially appropriate. The community needs this facility.”
       Other supporters argued the project’s “height, mass and
design” would be “fully compliant with local regulations” and
would be “visually compatible with the character with the
surrounding area and will not further block views from public
trails or roadways.”
                                   d
       Opponents argued vociferously and at considerable length
against the staff report.
       For instance, one attorney contended the City’s decision
violated the Coastal Act by failing to minimize the risks to life
and property from geologic, fire, and flood hazards and by failing
to preserve scenic values. The project would dominate rather
than be subordinate to its setting, and it would not serve visitors.
It would violate density rules and would have an adverse and
degrading effect on environmentally sensitive habitats. The
City’s decision failed to protect the neighborhood, failed to
minimize the traffic impact, and failed to follow interpretative
guidelines. The project was inconsistent with the local plan for
the area. “Due to its aesthetics and overwhelming height and
bulk, the Project would be in complete disharmony with all
existing development.”

                                 15
       Another attorney in opposition submitted a 31-page
statement that included many complaints. For example, “The
Project’s Bloated Size and Towering Height Render It Manifestly
Incompatible with the Vast Wilderness Parklands and
Residences in the Surrounding Community.”
       There were many other submissions from opponents.
                                       e
       On July 11, 2018, nine members of the Coastal Commission
held a public hearing and, afterwards, unanimously ruled the
appeal presented no substantial issue.
       The staff started the hearing by responding to the assertion
by some neighbors that the approved development would degrade
an environmentally sensitive habitat area. “[A]lthough the
subdivision itself is surrounded by large, expansive areas of
environmentally sensitive habitat areas, characterized primarily
by chaparral and coastal sage scrub, and [r]iparian habitat areas,
the subject site itself is entirely on an existing graded pad. And
there is no native vegetation or sensitive habitat that would be
affected by the structure itself.” The staff likewise addressed and
dismissed concerns about parking, traffic, and geology.
       Lawyers for both sides then spoke.
       An attorney reiterated the opponents’ many objections: the
importance of preserving parklands in the coastal zone, the
project’s harm to views from public trails, the adverse effects on
traffic, the fire risk in this hazard zone, and the destruction of
natural habitat. This attorney emphasized trailheads into the
parkland were only 150 feet from the project, which would create
grave parking problems. “And no view analysis has been done
from any point on the trails . . . .” Counsel stressed the
inadequacy of the project’s parking analysis.

                                16
        On the pro-project side, the developer’s lawyer noted his
client’s extensive community outreach and the considerable local
support for the project, including from the Pacific Palisades
Chamber of Commerce and the Land Use Committee of the
Palisades Community Council. “There’s a demonstrated need for
this project. . . . [M]ost of the residents with elder parents have
to send them within an hour to two hours away, to other
available facilities.”
        The staff responded to the complaints about the project’s
effect on views.
        “The [view] analysis in the report focuses on where the
project would have been visible from, primarily, some of those
trails that are up to two miles away, the major trails in the area.
And our view analysis was, when you’re looking at it from those
trails where the site would be visible, and so far away, and you’re
looking at the whole 800-unit subdivision, this is not going to
present any sort of effect. ¶ The other trails that are in the City
Park, or in the park, are at a lower elevation and probably only
be visible from that one point near the trailhead. But [I would]
point out that any structure would be visible there, and we think
they’ve done a good job here of -- one, it’s set back, the structure
itself, from the edge. There’s a parking -- their surface parking
lot is located between the edge of the slope and the building. And
then, the building does have some step-up in the upper stories. ¶
I think any building there would be somewhat visible, but we
don’t think that’s going to be a significant impact, and it would
only be visible from that very focused point of that trail.”
        A Coastal Commissioner commented, “I know that these
projects are difficult, but I think this is an important project for
the reasons stated by the applicant because housing for seniors,

                                17
especially in higher-income ZIP codes . . . is very difficult to site,
even though it is an extremely needed service. . . . [W]hen
families are trying to take care of their elderly parents or their
elderly relatives, it really matters in terms of proximity, and
particularly in those cases where you have family members who
suffer from memory issues, who suffer from brain diseases such
as dementia and Alzheimer’s . . . . [This site] had been
categorized as a commercial area, and also that when you looked
at the surrounding neighborhood, that, in fact, it’s densely
developed, with tall structures. And I think, fortunately for the
people who live in that area, they have the proximity to all those
wonderful state parks and state trails. ¶ But that’s not a reason
. . . to deny elderly housing, which is something that is sorely
needed in a lot of neighborhoods.”
         The Coastal Commission unanimously rejected the appeal
as presenting no substantial issue.
                                    6
         On July 24, 2018, appellant Association sued the City of
Los Angeles and the Coastal Commission. The amended pleading
was filed December 12, 2018. This operative pleading challenges
the approval of the project by the City and the Coastal
Commission. The first count is “error and abuse -- unsupported
findings” under the Coastal Act. The second charges a violation
of the California Environmental Quality Act. The third count is
“error and abuse -- no fair hearing.”
         On April 21, 2020, the trial court denied the neighbors’ writ
petition in an 18-page statement of decision. It began by
rejecting the neighbors’ challenge to the City’s grant of Class 32
categorical exemption for the eldercare project. The court found
the project was zoned C-1, which allows for commercial uses and,

                                 18
specifically, eldercare facilities. The court found the project
combined residential and commercial components and was
consistent with the area’s community plan.
       The trial court examined and rejected each of the
neighbors’ complaints. The court found substantial evidence
supported the City’s findings that the project would not have an
adverse effect on traffic, noise, scenic views, aesthetics, or
threatened species. The City had properly considered relevant
guidelines. The court found the neighbors had enjoyed a full and
fair opportunity to present their evidence to the Coastal
Commission and rejected their claims about Coastal Act
violations. The court entered judgment against the Association
on June 2, 2020.
                                    II
       In three chapters, we affirm the trial court’s sound ruling.
The first chapter concerns the Los Angeles zoning code. This
discussion is an unfortunately intricate excursion through a
detailed statute. The second chapter is about the neighbors’
claim the City did not adequately evaluate the project’s
compatibility with the neighborhood. The third weighs the
attack on the Coastal Commission’s decision.
       Before embarking on these three chapters, we note the
respondents argue, citing Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 43, 58, [291 Cal.Rptr.3d 250], review granted on
issue of dismissal of untimely appeal June 15, 2022, S274147,
that they win without any need to reach the merits. Because our
Supreme Court granted review of Meinhardt and because our
analysis shows the respondents indeed do win on the merits, we
will assume without deciding that Meinhardt was wrongly
decided. Whether our assumption is right or wrong, the

                                19
respondents defeat this appeal and the trial court’s judgment
stands. This issue thus does not matter here and will detain us
no further.
                                    A
       The neighbors devote the bulk of their opening appellate
brief to one issue: whether the proposed building is bigger than
the Los Angeles zoning code allows. In this section, our summary
citations are to the Los Angeles Municipal Code ( (as of March 6, 2023), archived at .) This Code defines a lot’s “buildable area” partly
in terms of “yard” space, so much of this discussion refers to yard
requirements. (See id. at § 12.03.)
       This zoning controversy boils down to one sentence in the
law: section 12.22.A.18(c)(3). (That citation is forgettable, but
later it will pay to remember it, because it is central to our
discussion.) We quote that decisive sentence, omitting
superfluous words and adding italics and bracketed numbers:
       “No yard requirements shall apply to the residential
portions of buildings located on lots . . . [1] used for combined
commercial and residential uses, if [2] such portions are used
exclusively for residential uses, [3] abut a street, private street or
alley, and [4] the first floor of such buildings at ground level is
used for commercial uses or for access to the residential portions
of such buildings.” (§ 12.22.A.18(c)(3).)
       We shall refer back to this quoted sentence, so again we beg
the reader to keep it in mind.
       The trial court correctly ruled this provision means no yard
requirements applied to the residential portions of the eldercare
facility. That holding wins the day for the project.

                                 20
      The eldercare project satisfies each of the four bracketed
elements.
             1. The lot would be “used for combined commercial
                and residential uses.” A ground floor bistro would
                be open to the public. Because the public would be
                able to dine there, that operation would be
                commercial. The rooms where residents sleep
                would be private and residential. The building
                therefore combined commercial and residential
                uses.
             2. The building would have portions that are
                exclusively residential. The neighbors do not
                dispute the individual rooms where elders sleep
                would be exclusively residential.
             3. The residential portions of the building would
                abut streets: Palisades Drive to the east and
                Vereda De La Montura to the north. The
                neighbors do not contest this.
             4. The first floor would be used for commercial uses:
                the public bistro would be a commercial operation.
      The conclusion is simple: no yard requirements apply here.
This demolishes the opponents’ zoning argument.
      The neighbors dispute this plain English interpretation of
the zoning code for five reasons. These five arguments fail under
any standard of review.
                                    1
      First, the neighbors argue this provision has no application
to the eldercare facility because a different section of the zoning
code—namely section 12.13.A.2(a)(31)—specifically allows an
eldercare facility to be built at this locale.

                                21
       This argument is illogical because these two sections do not
conflict. A specific authorization of an eldercare facility is
consistent with a general yard exception for combined use
buildings. The two provisions have different functions: the latter
pertains to yard requirements; the former does not. A mention in
one place does not imply exclusion in another. To think
otherwise is a fallacy.
       Consider a parallel example. Suppose one law allows
fishing in mountain lakes. A separate law establishes the
minimum fish size for keepers. The laws are different and
consistent. That is the situation here. The inference the
neighbors press is spurious.
       We explain in more detail. The prolixity of the zoning
numbering scheme is daunting because six signifiers are a lot,
but keep in mind the two provisions are section 12.22.A.18(c)(3),
quoted above, and section 12.13.A.2(a)(31), which we quote here:
       SEC. 12.13. “C1” LIMITED COMMERCIAL ZONE.
       The following regulations shall apply to the “C1” Limited
Commercial Zone:
       A. Use – No . . . building or structure shall be erected, . . .
except for the following uses . . . : . . .
       2. . . . The following . . . businesses . . . :
       (a) Types of Uses: . . .
       (31) Eldercare Facility.
       Section 12.13.A.2(a)(31) thus authorizes eldercare facilities
in a particular zone.
       Section 12.13.A.2(a)(31) and 12.22.A.18(c)(3) are different
in purpose and are consistent. The former authorizes uses,
including eldercare facilities. The latter regulates yards. It is

                                 22
like the mountain lakes and the fish size. The suggestion that
one section constrains the other is unfounded.
       In sum, the neighbors’ first argument fails.
                                   2
       Second, the neighbors fasten on the word “lots” in section
12.22.A.18(c)(3), which we quoted above. Their argument
involves other subdivisions of this same section (subdivisions (a)
and (b)).
       We quote material words of those subdivisions, as well as
the now familiar subdivision (c)(3). (There are many pertinent
subdivisions; we mark this quotation with italics instead of
quotation marks.)
       18. Developments Combining Residential and Commercial
Uses. . . . [T]he following uses shall be permitted: . . .
       (a) Any use permitted in the R5 Zone on any lot in the CR,
C1, C1.5, C2, C4 or C5 Zones . . . . Any combination of R5 uses
and the uses permitted in the underlying commercial zone shall
also be permitted on such lot.
       (b) Any use permitted in the CR, C1, C1.5, C2, C4 or C5
Zones on any lot in the R5 Zone provided that the lot is located
within the Central City Community Plan Area. Any combination
of these commercial and residential uses shall also be permitted
on the lot. Commercial uses or any combination of commercial
and residential uses may be permitted on any lot in the R5 Zone
by conditional use pursuant to Section 12.24 W.15. outside the
Central City Community Plan Area.
       (c) Yards. Except as provided herein, the yard
requirements of the zone in which the lot is located shall
apply . . . .

                                23
       (3) No yard requirements shall apply to the residential
portions of buildings located on lots in the CR, C1, C1.5, C2, C4,
and C5 Zones used for combined commercial and residential uses,
if such portions are used exclusively for residential uses, abut a
street, private street or alley, and the first floor of such buildings
at ground level is used for commercial uses or for access to the
residential portions of such buildings. (SEC. 12.22.
EXCEPTIONS.)
       The neighbors argue the exception to yard requirements in
subdivision (c)(3) has no application to this lot, because the lot is
not in one of the exceptions allowed in subdivisions (a) or (b), and
because an eldercare facility is a use already allowed in the C1
zone.
       The statutory words show no inconsistency exists between
the language about lots in the various subdivisions. All three
subdivisions are permissive. The neighbors’ argument is
untenable.
                                    3
       Third, the neighbors argue the ground floor bistro will not
be open to the public and therefore the first floor of this building
would not, in the language of the statute, be “used for commercial
uses.” (§ 12.22.A.18(c)(3).) This open-to-the-public question is
one of fact.
       Where the dispute is factual in character, the law requires
the trial court to defer to the agency’s factfinding, which compels
upholding its decision even though an opposite conclusion would
have been equally or more reasonable. The court’s task in this
setting is neither to weigh conflicting evidence nor to determine
who has the better argument. (Vineyard Area Citizens for

                                 24
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40
Cal.4th 412, 435.)
       The developer and the City made offers of proof about this
fact in the trial court. The neighbors’ opening appellate papers
do not cite any pertinent objection they raised to this offer. This
omission forfeits appellate challenge to this proffered fact. In a
bench trial, the trial judge is entitled to take an unchallenged
proffer as something that does not require further trial time,
which is always scarce. If the neighbors wanted to take factual
issue with this point, the place to do it was at trial.
                                   4
       Fourth, the neighbors argue the ground floor is not
“exclusively” residential. The statute, however, does not require
that the first floor be “exclusively residential.” The statutory
words demonstrate this. With our emphasis, the statute creates
an exception that applies when the residential portions of the
building “are used exclusively for residential uses, abut a street,
private street or alley, and the first floor of such buildings at
ground level is used for commercial uses or for access to the
residential portions of such buildings.” (§ 12.22.A.18(c)(3).) The
word “exclusively” modifies “residential uses” only, not the rest of
the sentence. The residential uses indeed are exclusively
residential: the residential rooms are residential only. The first
floor is used for commercial uses: there is a public bistro there.
This argument thus founders by misreading the statute.
                                   5
       Fifth, the neighbors argue about evidence they did not
present to the trial court and that is not in the record. We deny
their motion for judicial notice. (See Western States Petroleum
Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 573, fn. 4 [“it would

                                 25
never be proper to take judicial notice of evidence that (1) is
absent from the administrative record, and (2) was not before the
agency at the time it made its decision.”]; Pulver v. Avco
Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622, 632 [“As a general
rule, documents not before the trial court cannot be included as
part of the record on appeal and thus must be disregarded as
beyond the scope of appellate review.”].)
        The neighbors make two different claims in their motion for
judicial notice.
                                   a
        The neighbors first say they did not present the extra-
record evidence to the trial court because the City “came up with
an interpretation at trial that referenced the dates of adoption of
amendments to subsections of that Code section that was
incorrect, and research was appropriate to aid in interpretation of
the entire section.”
        The City responds that this allegation about its supposedly
new interpretation is “simply false.”
        We need not resolve when the City proposed its
interpretation, for—whenever the City proposed it—the
neighbors’ time to research this trial issue was before or during
trial. In this bench trial, the neighbors did not ask the trial court
for a recess for research. Nor do the neighbors suggest it would
have been futile to make this request to the trial court. To show
it is futile to object, counsel must show it is costly to assert your
rights. (E.g., People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820–822.) The
neighbors do not attempt this endeavor. This argument
collapses.
///
///

                                 26
                                   b
       Based on different extra-record material, the neighbors
claim the City falsely told the trial court that, in the future, the
City would review the interior floor space issue on a robust
record. The neighbors maintain we therefore should rule on
matters about which they request judicial notice to avoid “judicial
waste and needless proceedings.” The neighbors contend that
forcing them to appeal the post-judgment matters in a separate
proceeding would be “a significant waste of judicial resources”
and would cost courts and the parties “untold tens of thousands
of dollars.”
       We decline this unprecedented invitation to attempt to
moot a future appeal in the name of judicial economy.
       As authority for their proposal, the neighbors cite Reserve
Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813 (Reserve).
But Reserve noted that “[i]t is an elementary rule of appellate
procedure that, when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s
judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which
were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.
[citation omitted] This rule preserves an orderly system of
appellate procedure by preventing litigants from circumventing
the normal sequence of litigation.” (Ibid.) It is true the Reserve
opinion departed from this usual rule—in a situation about which
there was no possibility of factual dispute. (Ibid.) That situation
hardly obtains here, where the neighbors are charging the
developer made false statements to the trial court and
manipulated City zoning officials to produce a mere “shadow-
play.” The developer and the City dispute these claims.
       The neighbors cite two other cases that are equally
inapplicable. In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413 rejected

                                27
appellate consideration of postjudgment evidence. And Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444,
footnote 3, denied a motion to take judicial notice of post-
judgment evidence.
       We thus apply Reserve’s “elementary rule of appellate
procedure” and deny the neighbors’ motion for judicial notice.
(Reserve, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 813.)
       In sum, the neighbors’ first appellate argument fails.
                                  B
       The neighbors’ second appellate attack is on the City’s
decision to grant the project a “Class 32 Categorical Exemption.”
The non-specialist may wonder what this means. We explain in
three steps. First, we review law familiar to land use experts but
less familiar to others. Second, we state the standard of review.
Third, we review and reject the neighbors’ two complaints: the
project will be architecturally incompatible with the
neighborhood, and the project will spoil the view.
                                  1
       We set the stage by summarizing some law.
       A “Class 32 Categorical Exemption” is a term of art under
the California Environmental Quality Act. We offer a brief
summary of that famous statute. Then we sketch portions of the
California Coastal Act. In this section of our opinion, statutory
citations are to the Public Resources Code.
                                  a
       The California Environmental Quality Act is often called
CEQA, a convention we reluctantly follow because it is
convenient in this case of many statutes. (§ 21000 et seq.)
       Our state enacted CEQA in 1970. That landmark year of
broadening environmental awareness saw the first Earth Day,

                                28
the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act, and the
advent of the federal Environmental Protection Agency.
       Since then, CEQA has embodied California’s central policy
of requiring governmental entities to give major consideration to
preventing environmental damage. (County of Butte v.
Department of Water Resources (2022) 13 Cal.5th 612, 626.)
       CEQA is a legislatively imposed directive specifying how
state and local agencies will exercise discretion over land use
decisions. (Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad
Authority (2017) 3 Cal.5th 677, 712.)
       CEQA review is undertaken by a lead agency, defined as
“the public agency which has the principal responsibility for
carrying out or approving a project which may have a significant
effect upon the environment.” (§ 21067.)
       CEQA aims to inform the public and government decision
makers about the potential environmental effects of proposed
activities. Its statutory scheme created a tiered system of
environmental analysis to match the likelihood and magnitude of
possible environmental damage. The most elaborate CEQA
analysis is the environmental impact report: the so-called EIR.
An environmental impact report must give decisionmakers what
they need to take appropriate account of environmental
consequences. The report is also a document of accountability. It
must arm those outside the approval process with an accessible
and empowering document. If people disagree with the proposed
project, the report is to help them respond accordingly. (Laurel
Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of Univ. of California
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392.)

                               29
       Environmental impact reports can be elaborate, as well as
very expensive and time-consuming, and are appropriate when
exacting environmental assessment is appropriate.
       Common sense, however, tells us “that the majority of
private projects for which a government permit or similar
entitlement is necessary are minor in scope—e.g., relating only to
the construction, improvement, or operation of an individual
dwelling or small business—and hence, in the absence of unusual
circumstances, have little or no effect on the public environment.”
(Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60
Cal.4th 1086, 1100 (Berkeley Hillside), quoting Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 272,
italics added.)
       When it is likely there will be little or no effect on the public
environment, the lead agency—here, the City of Los Angeles—
may conclude the project is exempt from CEQA if the project
passes five tests.
       These five tests comprise the aforementioned Class 32
categorical exemption.
       We italicize the five words at issue here:
          1. The project is consistent with the applicable general
             plan designation and all applicable general plan
             policies as well as with applicable zoning designation
             and regulations.
          2. The proposed development occurs within city limits
             on a project site of no more than five acres
             substantially surrounded by urban uses.
          3. The project site has no value as habitat for
             endangered, rare, or threatened species.

                                  30
          4. Approval of the project would not result in any
             significant effects relating to traffic, noise, air
             quality, or water quality.
          5. The site can be adequately served by all required
             utilities and public services. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,
             § 15332, italics added; see generally Berkeley
             Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1092–1102
             [explaining origin, authority, and stature of CEQA
             regulations and guidelines].)
       This CEQA exemption is sometimes called the in-fill
development projects exemption, the Class 32 categorical
exemption, or some similar combination of words. (See, e.g.,
Protect Tustin Ranch v. City of Tustin (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 951,
956–964.)
                                   b
       We now turn to the Coastal Act (§ 30000 et seq.), which
governs land use planning for California’s coastal zone. (Pacific
Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012)
55 Cal.4th 783, 793 (Palisades Bowl).)
       The Coastal Act promulgated policies governing
development in the coastal zone that are called “Chapter 3”
policies. (§§ 30200–30265.5.)
       Under the Coastal Act, local governments and the Coastal
Commission share responsibility for coastal planning. Local
governments may prepare local coastal programs within their
jurisdictions’ coastal zones. (§ 30500.) The City of Los Angeles
does not have a certified local coastal program and has instead
exercised its option to issue such permits under section 30600(b).
       In certain coastal areas of the City closest to or along the
sea known as dual permit jurisdictions, proposed development

                                  31
requires permits from both the City and the Commission.
(§ 30601; Palisades Bowl, supra, (2012) 55 Cal.4th at 794; Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13301, subd. (a).) For projects located
inland of the areas identified in section 30601, known as “single
permit jurisdiction” areas, proposed development requires a
coastal development permit only from the City. However, the
permits the City issues in single permit jurisdictions are
appealable to the Commission. (§ 30602.)
       This eldercare project is within a single permit jurisdiction
in the City.
       Appeals of City permit decisions to the Commission
initially require the Commission to determine whether the appeal
raises a “substantial issue” as to the project’s conformity with
Chapter 3 of the Coastal Act. (§ 30625, subd. (b)(1).)
       If the appeal fails in this regard, as here, that is the end of
the line. (§§ 30625, subd. (b)(1)), Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13115,
subd. (b).)
                                    2
       We review the City’s factual findings of consistency with
general and community plans under the substantial evidence
standard. (See Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
404, 410 (Holden).)
       The neighbors agree the substantial evidence standard
applies to this inquiry.
       This deferential standard means that, when a city approves
a proposed development as consistent with its general plan,
reviewing courts defer to that approval as an extension of the
entity’s unique competence to interpret its own policies. If the
city has followed proper procedures, courts must defer to the
city’s decision unless no reasonable person could have reached the

                                 32
same conclusion. (Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v.
Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 141, 154–155 (Orange Citizens).)
       This case aptly illustrates the wisdom of this deferential
standard. Opponents of the project see an eyesore threatening
their beautiful neighborhood by the park; the blight will detract
from splendid views. Supporters perceive a needed facility that
will mesh with their locale; for them, the proximity is an
advantage and not a curse.
       These heartfelt and honorable disagreements turn in
considerable measure on aesthetic judgments. That creates a
problem for courts.
       “Aesthetics are subjective.” (Georgetown Preservation
Society v. County of El Dorado (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 358, 363
(Georgetown).)
       The law tries hard to steer clear of subjectivity.
       How can a community resolve these disagreements that
involve clashes of aesthetic judgment?
       “Once a general plan is in place, it is the province of elected
city officials to examine the specifics of a proposed project to
determine whether it would be ‘in harmony’ with the policies
stated in the plan. [Citation.] It is, emphatically, not the role of
the courts to micro-manage these development decisions.”
(Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland (1993) 23
Cal.App.4th 704, 719 (Sequoyah).)
       The question is whether a reasonable person could agree
with the City’s conclusion that adding this urban building to this
urban area was compatible with the plan for Brentwood and
Pacific Palisades. (Orange Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 154–
155 [if the city has followed proper procedures, courts must defer

                                 33
to the city’s decision unless no reasonable person could have
reached the same conclusion].)
      The answer is yes: the City’s decision was eminently
reasonable, as the next section explains.
                                    3
      The neighbors fault the City’s decisionmaking on
architectural compatibility and views. We address each topic in
turn.
      Architectural compatibility is pertinent, the neighbors say,
according to this four-step analysis:
          1. The City granted the project a Class 32 categorical
              exemption from CEQA.
          2. This exemption has five requirements, one of which
              requires consistency between the project and all
              applicable general plan policies. (We previously
              quoted these requirements and italicized these
              words.)
          3. The Brentwood-Pacific Palisades Plan set forth the
              objective of protecting “the character and scale of
              existing residential neighborhoods.”
          4. There is no architectural compatibility because the
              “size, design, and mass of the building are completely
              divorced from the character of the community’s
              buildings and uses.”
      The neighbors conclude that “the Categorical Exemption
cannot be applied.” They use similar logic about views.
      This argument fails because substantial evidence supports
the City’s finding of compatibility between the project and the
neighborhood.

                                 34
       The City found the “site and surrounding area are
urbanized areas.”
       Up till now, in these proceedings the neighbors vigorously
contested the factual description of their subdivision as
“urbanized.” In this court they no longer press this
disagreement, and for good reason. The record shows this
neighborhood has been a subdivision of Los Angeles for many
decades. True, there are nearby public parks and open space,
which no doubt is a lovely aspect of the neighborhood. But
Pacific Palisades and Brentwood are not undeveloped seashores
or wildernesses far from roads and other marks of human
activity. They are subdivisions of the second largest city in
America.
       The urbanized character of this site and the surrounding
area thus are facts unchallenged in our court.
       The City had an ample basis for finding the architectural
character of this proposed building is compatible with an
urbanized area and with the community plan for Brentwood and
Pacific Palisades. The architectural drawings of the proposed
building alone are substantial evidence on this score. They
reveal a typical urban building.
       The neighbors urge closer scrutiny. Without saying so
explicitly, the neighbors effectively argue for mandatory
architectural uniformity. We illustrate how this is true.
       Opponents decried the “modern, unattractive, flat-roof
design of the Project, with an array of elevator shafts, staircases,
and HVAC equipment towering up an additional 10 to 12 feet
higher’ and called it “completely out of character with the
Mediterranean and rustic designs of the residential projects and
the small commercial project that are proximate to the Site --

                                 35
where all rooftop appurtenances are placed out of sight, beneath
sloping rooflines.”
      Elsewhere in the record neighbors called the proposed
building a “monstrous eyesore,” a “white elephant,” and “large
and unsightly.”
      Their opening appellate brief echoes these concerns by
posing this contrast.
      “The entire subdivision consists of one and two-story homes
and two and three-story townhomes no higher than 36 feet, the
vast majority of which are built in a Mediterranean or rustic style
with pitched roofs. In contrast, as can be seen from [the
developer’s] own filings, the planned eldercare building will be a
45 foot high (not including 10-12 foot stairway and elevator
extensions above the roof), four-story, flat-roofed, largely glass
and metal structure. . . . The size, design, and mass of the
building are completely divorced from the character of the
community’s buildings and uses.”
      This argument for mandatory architectural uniformity
misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review, where we
inquire whether evidence supports the agency’s decisionmaking.
We do not reweigh evidence. Elected officials have latitude to
weigh competing and subjective notions of beauty and blight.
Our judicial role in this setting is to defer to their judgment
when, as here, substantial evidence supports it.
      As for views from park trails and elsewhere, the record
again supplies substantial evidence for finding the project to be
exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act. The
neighbors anchor their argument to the community plan’s policy
of preserving and protecting views from hillsides, public lands,
and roadways.

                                36
       The record shows, however, that the major intrusions on
the views of nature from high trails in the public parks are the
hundreds of existing buildings in the neighbors’ subdivision. As
one approaches the proposed facility, it becomes more visible, as
do surrounding urban structures. The existing views are of an
urban neighborhood against a backdrop of open space. The City
was entitled to conclude that adding another urban building to
this urban setting was compatible with the Brentwood-Pacific
Palisades plan.
       Again, the neighbors implicitly argue for architectural
uniformity. They suggest that views of this building are uniquely
odious. But substantial evidence supported the City’s
determination that this typical urban building was compatible
with existing views in this urban neighborhood.
       The neighbors’ opening brief cited three decisions, but none
involved architectural incompatibility or preservation of views.
In Holden, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 411–420, the issue was
residential density. The Holden decision upheld a municipal
decision on a density issue. In Santa Monica Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Santa Monica (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 786,
788, the issue was parking. In San Lorenzo Valley Community
Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley USD
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1368, the issue was the decision to
close two elementary schools. These decisions are inapposite.
       The neighbors also cite Georgetown, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th
358 but that case applied a different standard of review than the
one governing this appeal. There a county issued a “mitigated
negative declaration.” (Id. at pp. 364, 366, 369.) This procedure
triggered what the Court of Appeal described as an “unusual” and
nondeferential “fair argument” standard of review. (Id. at p.

                                37
370.) The Georgetown decision distinguished situations where
“planning or zoning determinations are reviewed with greater
deference, both because the public entity is deemed best able to
interpret its own rules and because it is presumed to bring local
knowledge and experience to bear on such issues.” (Id. at p. 371.)
This latter standard, which the Georgetown opinion did not
apply, is the pertinent law for this case. Because the Georgetown
opinion is distinguishable, we engage it no further.
       We repeat that “[o]nce a general plan is in place, it is the
province of elected city officials to examine the specifics of a
proposed project to determine whether it would be ‘in harmony’
with the policies stated in the plan. [Citation.] It is,
emphatically, not the role of the courts to micro-manage these
development decisions.” (Sequoyah, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p.
719.)
       This standard defeats the neighbors’ second attack on the
trial court’s decision. A reasonable person could have reached the
same conclusion as the City: that this proposal for an urban
building is compatible with the plans for this urban area.
                                    C
       The neighbors’ third and final appellate attack is on the
Coastal Commission’s decision. The Coastal Commission decided
the neighbors’ appeal presented no substantial issue under the
Coastal Act.
       The same deferential standard of review governs this
analysis as well. It was for the Commission to weigh conflicting
evidence; we may reverse only if a reasonable person could not
have reached the same conclusion. (Lindstrom v. California
Coastal Com. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 73, 93.)

                                38
      The neighbors again misunderstand the standard of review.
They offered what they say is substantial evidence in support of
their many complaints about the eldercare proposal. But this
mistakes the question. The question is not whether the
neighbors presented evidence supporting their objections.
Rather, the question is whether the Commission had a
substantial basis for deciding as it did. The answer is yes.
Reasonable people could agree with the Commission’s findings
that the City’s substantive decision on the merits of the eldercare
project enjoyed “factual and legal support.” (Hines v. California
Coastal Com. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, 846, fn. 11, 849, 850.)
      Now using the Coastal Act as their fulcrum, the neighbors
repeat their complaints that the project would be visually
incompatible with their neighborhood. (See Pub. Resources Code
§ 30251 [development shall be sited and designed to protect views
to and along the ocean and scenic coastal areas and to be visually
compatible with the character of surrounding areas].)
      These arguments in substance are the same as the
objections about architecture and views that we just rejected. As
we explained, substantial evidence supports the City’s decision,
and it supports the Commission’s decision too.
      The neighbors cite Douda v. California Coastal Com. (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1200, which held the Coastal Commission
has authority to regulate scenic and visual resources within the
coastal zone, even when the site is four miles from the coast.
That authority is not in dispute here. The Commission ruled
against the neighbors because the content of the neighbors’
appeal did not raise a substantial issue. Douda is irrelevant.
      The neighbors raise traffic issues. The Coastal Commission
and the City relied on a traffic study estimating the eldercare

                                39
facility would “generate a nominal increase in trips,
approximately 260 daily trips or 14 AM peak-hour trips or 21 PM
peak-hour trips . . . .” This study concluded the project would not
have a significant effect on nearby intersections. The neighbors
criticize this study, which is a misguided request for us to
reweigh evidence.
       The neighbors raise the specter of a parking calamity, but
the Commission concluded the nominal increase in traffic would
not significantly displace street parking for hikers bound for the
trails. The eldercare facility would, after all, include
underground parking. This logic is sound. Substantial evidence
supports the Commission’s and the City’s decisions.
       The neighbors point to “Regional Interpretive Guidelines”
the Coastal Commission apparently adopted in 1980 for Los
Angeles County. On the first page, this Guidelines document
states the “guidelines should assist in applying various Coastal
Act policies to permit decisions; they in no case supersede the
provisions of the Coastal Act nor enlarge or diminish the powers
or authority of the Commissions or other public agencies.”
       These guidelines do not diminish the powers or authority of
the Coastal Commission. The neighbors cite no case for their
claim that these guidelines can be used to overturn a Commission
decision. The neighbors’ opening brief does not supply an
adequate legal analysis explaining this proposed result. We will
not overturn the Commission’s decision on this basis.
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                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the judgment and award costs to the
respondents. The motion to take judicial notice is denied.

                                          WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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