Court Opinion

ID: 9789884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:43:30.570811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.919599
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the holding and with most of the reasoning in the lead opinion. My first reason for writing separately is to expand upon the opinion’s analysis of the relationship between this case, involving benefits payable by private employers and insurers,1 and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254, 90 S Ct 1011, 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970), and other cases involving “benefits * * * paid directly by the government.” 65 Or App at 118. I do not understand those cases to be the principal authority supporting our holding that due process protections attach to claimant’s interest in continued payment of his benefits. In my view, claimant’s due process rights arise because the procedure for terminating his privately-paid benefits is affected with state action, and cases such as Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 US 149, 98 S Ct 1729, 56 L Ed 2d 185 (1978), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67, 92 S Ct 1983, 32 L Ed 2d 556 (1972), are the authority for our decision.
I do not think the lead opinion says otherwise. However, some confusion arises from its reliance on Mathews, Goldberg and similar cases in its discussion of whether claimant has a constitutionally significant interest in the continuity of his benefits. Here, as in Goldberg and Kelly, the source of the interest is governmental, i.e., a statutory or regulatory requirement. But unlike Goldberg and Mathews, where a government was the obligor as well as the source of the mandate, the requirement here falls upon private employers and insurers. The relationship between insurers and claimants is no less “private” because it is statutorily-defined than it would be if it were contractual. In other words, *126Goldberg and Mathews may further the analysis of whether claimant has a constitutionally protectible interest, but they cease to be relevant after that question is answered. Thereafter, claimant’s interest is the equivalent of a private contract right or of an interest in tangible property. The question becomes whether the governmental involvement in terminating the interest is sufficient to constitute state action, and not whether the interest being terminated is in a governmental benefit. I agree with the answer in the lead opinion and, consistent with the foregoing, I also think that that opinion answers the right question.
My second reason for writing separately is that I question the need and the appropriateness of the specificity of the lead opinion’s answer to the question “what process is due.” The opinion’s detailed discussion of required procedures may invade the board’s authority to adopt its own procedures. See McPherson v. Employment Division, 285 Or 541, 591 P2d 1381 (1979). In any event, the detailed treatment is extraneous, because nothing is to take place on remand which involves the application of due process pre-termination requirements.2
Warden, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

 Although SAIF is the insurer involved in this case, I understand the majority’s holding to apply to all employers and insurers subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law. The vast majority are not governmental bodies. My use of terms such as “private” in this opinion should be understood as generic language referring to the typical employer or insurer, and should surely not be understood as a specific comment on SAIF’s status.

The lead opinion’s footnote 6, 65 Or App at 124 , does not satisfy my concern, although it does make it apparent that the majority does not share that concern.