Court Opinion

ID: 9405460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 17:00:50.80515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.304703
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 28 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD ODQUINA,                                   No.   22-16844

                Plaintiff-Appellant,              D.C. No.
                                                  1:22-cv-00407-DKW-WRP
 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, a                MEMORANDUM*
municipal corporation; HOLLY T.
SHIKADA, Esquire, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, in her Official Capacity as
the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Hawaii
              Derrick Kahala Watson, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                        Argued and Submitted June 8, 2023
                                Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: BADE, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Appellant Edward Odquina appeals an order from the district court denying

a motion for preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 and affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      We assume without deciding that license plates bearing customized

alphanumeric inscriptions—commonly known as vanity plates—fall outside the

government-speech doctrine as explained in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of

Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200 (2015), and are properly analyzed as

nonpublic forums. We conclude the district court’s denial was proper because the

relevant restrictions are not viewpoint based. See Mitchell v. Md. Motor Vehicle

Admin., 148 A.3d 319, 337 (Md. 2016).

      The government may restrict speech in nonpublic forums so long as such

restrictions are reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose and are viewpoint

neutral. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).

Odquina does not contest the district court’s conclusion that Hawaii’s prohibition

on the use of vulgar language on vanity plates is reasonable. It is also undisputed

that Odquina’s license plate was recalled solely for the use of an implied vulgarity

and not because of the plate’s overall message.

      Odquina contends that using profanity or vulgar language is a viewpoint that

may not be constitutionally abridged. The district court properly concluded that

Odquina’s challenge went to the content of his message, rather than its viewpoint,

and that such content-based restrictions are constitutionally permissible. And

Odquina’s arguments to the contrary here rely on a misreading of precedent. For

example, his invocation of a line of cases involving criminal statutes does not

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support the proposition that vulgarities are constitutionally protected in all

circumstances. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18–23 (1971)

(acknowledging that the First Amendment has “never been thought to give

absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases

or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses” but

overturning conviction of protestor for wearing a jacket containing an obscenity);

Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974) (per curiam) (“Th[e] single

isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any officer of the

court, cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt.”);

Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (remanding in light of Cohen).

      Moreover, Odquina’s reliance on authorities invalidating overly broad

statutes that would impermissibly restrict constitutionally protected speech is

misplaced; these authorities are inapposite given the relatively narrow scope of the

regulations here. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132–34 (1974)

(finding city’s prohibition on “obscene or opprobrious language toward or with

reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of . . .

duty” was overly broad because it impermissibly reached protected speech);

accord Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–08 (1973) (per curiam).

      Because the relevant regulations are reasonable and do not restrict messages

based on their viewpoint, they are constitutionally permissible, and we affirm the

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district court’s denial of Odquina’s request for a preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order.

      AFFIRMED.

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