Court Opinion

ID: 9477949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:35:39.502775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:08.465282
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Events subsequent to the District Court’s decision1 lead me to conclude that this case is moot. On that basis, resolution of the issue of jurisdiction to review that decision on the merits is inappropriate. I would vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the case to that court for dismissal of Athridge’s action.
While the motion to transfer this appeal to the Federal Circuit was pending, the Commissioner informed us that he had directed placement of Athridge’s name on the register without endorsement as “inactive.” 2 The Commissioner also announced his intention to eliminate from Section 10.-6(d) of the rules of practice before the Patent and Trademark Office the requirement that a registered attorney who is a federal employee be designated as “inactive” during his or her period of service with the Government.3 Additionally, a notice of proposed rulemaking to abolish completely Section 10.6(d) has been published,4 and the changes anticipated would be radical. Federal employees otherwise qualified would be registered, whether or not their official duties extend to preparation and prosecution of patent applications, and designations of inactive status would be discontinued.5
It seems clear that Athridge has obtained all the relief he is entitled to demand, and accordingly that his case is now moot. Just four years ago, in Doe v. Harris,6 we delineated the principles applicable:
First, the court must conclude “with assurance that ‘there is no reasonable expectation’ ... that the alleged violation will recur.”7 ... [I]n non-class actions ... the chance of recurrence must be evaluated with reference to the expectation that “the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” 8 Second, under the Davis formulation, it must be plain that “interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” 9
Each of these requirements, I think, has been met.
Athridge asked the agency to list his name on the register with an “inactive” designation.10 When, however, he came into the District Court, he sought more — invalidation of Section 10.6(d).11 The court held that Athridge’s name should be placed on the register, but with a designation of “inactive” status.12 Althridge then object*625ed to that endorsement, and the Commissioner removed it. Indeed, the Commissioner is moving toward total abolition of the questioned rule, not only for Athridge, but for all federally employed attorneys. There is no foundation for any claim that the Commissioner will deviate from this course or will attempt to alter Athridge’s registration as it now stands.13 I am constrained to “believe that this aspect of the case has ‘lost it character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if [the Court is] to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.’ ” 14
The second condition of mootness is equally met; the Commissioner’s decision has “completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the violation.”15 Athridge’s bid for injunctive relief on his own behalf is plainly foreclosed by the action of the District Court in combination with that later taken by the Commissioner. To the extent that his claims appear to survive in the form of requests for injunctive relief on behalf of all federal attorneys, Athridge is barred because he did not institute his suit as a class action or seek class certification.16 Similarly, Athridge’s request for declaratory relief must fail for lack of a continuing governmental practice threatening injury to any interest he properly may litigate.17 All circumstances considered, I would forego a determination of the jurisdictional question, and dispose of this appeal on grounds of mootness.18

. Athridge v. Quigg, 655 F.Supp. 779 (D.D.C.1987).

. Suggestion of Mootness, Athridge v. Quigg, No. 87-5164 (D.C.Cir.) (filed Oct. 27, 1987) at 2-3.

. Id. at 3.

. 53 Fed.Reg. 20,871 (1988).

. Id.

. 225 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 696 F.2d 109 (1982).

. Id. at 29, 696 F.2d at 111 (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1384, 59 L.Ed.2d 642, 649 (1979), in turn quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303, 1309 (1953)).

. Id., 696 F.2d at 111 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350, 353 (1975)).

. Id., 696 F.2d at 111 (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, supra note 7, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. at 1384, 59 L.Ed.2d at 649 (citations omitted)).

. Athridge v. Quigg, supra note 1, 655 F.Supp. at 780.

. Id. Were this done, Athridge would have been registered without notation of an "inactive" status.

. Id. at 780-782. The court concluded that § 10.6(d) was arbitrary and thus invalid, to the extent that it barred registration of an otherwise qualified attorney in federal employment solely on the basis of that employment, but further ruled that the attorney could be registered and designated as "inactive.” Id.

. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, supra note 7, 440 U.S. at 632-633, 99 S.Ct. at 1384, 59 L.Ed.2d at 650; see also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-317, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1706, 40 L.Ed.2d 164, 169 (1979) (accepting representation of law school officials that they would not seek to abrogate student’s registration for final year, whatever the outcome of litigation).

. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, supra note 7, 440 U.S. at 633, 99 S.Ct. at 1384, 59 L.Ed.2d at 650 (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 201-202, 24 L.Ed.2d 214, 218 (1969)).

. See text supra at note 9.

. Sannon v. United States, 631 F.2d 1247, 1251-1252 (5th Cir.1980).

. See Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 121-122, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 1698, 40 L.Ed. 2d 1, 17-18 (1974); Better Gov't Ass’n v. Department of State, 250 U.S.App.D.C. 424, 429-430, 780 F.2d 86, 91-92 (1986).

. Though I would not reach the jurisdictional question, I must voice my uneasiness about the uncritical manner in which the court has affixed the "patent" label to this case. I have serious reservations as to whether a claim that turns on an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (1982), which are conflict-of-interests provisions, is based in whole or in part upon 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which concerns federal jurisdiction over patent cases. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). Unlike the situations presented in Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 256 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 802 F.2d 532 (1986), and Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934 (Fed.Cir.1986), which clearly depended in part upon reading of substantive patent provisions, the right asserted in the case before us does not appear to be so readily capable of being “defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of [the patent] laws.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., supra, — U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2173, 100 L.Ed.2d at 824. Delineation of the precise boundaries of § 1338 and the corresponding boundaries of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (jurisdiction of the federal circuit), is a complex and delicate endeavor that is ill-served by cursory treatment.