Court Opinion

ID: 9680763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:38:16.321524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.364549
License: Public Domain

*237VOLLERS, Judge,
concurring.
While I certainly agree with the Presiding Judge that the procedural presumption of regularity is applicable to a situation like this in order to uphold the validity of the sentence which was pronounced, I feel that the Court has not gone far enough in solving the problem which is presented in cases such as this. It appears that the present opinion leaves open the question that the appellant could come back at some point, many days past the time in which to file a motion for new trial, and establish a record showing that there was in fact no waiver, other than by silence, of the ten day period in which to file a motion for new trial. I find such a position lacking.
Article 40.05 V.A.C.C.P. provides that: “A motion for new trial shall be filed within ten days after conviction as evidenced by the verdict of the jury .
It thus appears that the legislature has given every convicted defendant the right to file such a motion in order to develop such facts as may be necessary to convince a trial court that he should be granted a new trial, or to make a record for appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. It has long been recognized by this Court that such a motion is not a prerequisite to an appeal but is necessary in order to preserve certain matters for review by the Court of Criminal Appeals when they involve facts which are not reflected by the record. The timetable makes it imperative that the defendant, or his attorney, make a decision within ten days as to whether or not he needs or wants to file a motion for new trial. Failure to file such a motion ends the matter, unless the trial judge authorizes, for good cause shown, the filing of a late motion for new trial.
To implement the defendant’s right to file a motion for new trial and develop such matters the legislature further provided in Article 42.03 C.C.P. that:
“If a new trial is not granted, nor judgment arrested in felony and misdemeanor cases, the sentence shall be pronounced in the presence of the defendant at any time after the expiration of the time allowed for making the motion for new trial or the motion in arrest of judgment . .”
Thus it is clear that in the proper order of procedure provided for by the legislature a careful trial judge would wait ten days before pronouncing sentence to see whether or not the defendant wished to file a motion for new trial, which he has a right to do, or determine whether the defendant waives such period of time. But we are not dealing with the ideal situation; we are dealing with one in which sentence was pronounced within the ten day period of time after verdict. We are further presented with a situation where it has never been suggested, either to the trial court or this Court, that the defendant wished to present a motion for new trial or that he had any grounds to review on appeal which must be preserved by the presentation of evidence at a motion for new trial.
The right which has been granted to the defendant by the act of the legislature to file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment within ten days from the date of conviction is certainly no more significant or fundamental than rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States or Constitution of the State of Texas. Cases are legion which hold that constitutional rights can be waived by failure to assert them. Therefore, it would be perfectly logical that unless there is a specific waiver by the appellant or his attorney there would be a right to file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment within ten days after conviction, whether the sentence was pronounced or not; but this right would be waived by failure to assert it. That is exactly what we have in this case.
It would appear that the sentence which was pronounced was “voidable” upon the option of the appellant by attempting to file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment within ten days after verdict. If such a right was urged then the sentence should be set aside at appellant’s option. This record clearly reflects that he *238did not choose to do this and made no attempt to assert such a right.
I therefore concur in the result that the sentence pronounced before expiration of the ten day period after assessment of punishment is not void and this Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal.