Court Opinion

ID: 9596517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:50:48.894541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:35.188406
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge
dissenting.
For the reasons stated below, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Petitioner’s violations constituted nine, rather than one, violations of North Carolina General Statutes section 143-215.114A.
I concur, however, with the majority’s conclusion that Petitioner violated 15A North Carolina Administrative Code 2D. 1900 and reluc*183tantly agree that the agency’s use of the measuring wheel was acceptable, although I would caution regulatory agencies against the dangers of using another’s equipment as the basis for their enforcement actions as became apparent in the instant case.
The majority cites — and dismisses — Petitioner’s argument that the agency’s decision exceeded its statutory authority. The majority correctly notes that an argument that an agency action was in excess of statutory authority is subject to de novo review. North Carolina Department of Natural Resources v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 658, 599 S.E.2d 888, 894 (2004).
“ ‘[W]e must expect the Legislature to legislate only so far as is reasonable and practical to do and we must leave to [the agency] the authority to accomplish the legislative purpose, guided of course by proper standards.’ ” In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 381-82, 379 S.E.2d 30, 35 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (quoting, Com’r of Insurance v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 402, 267 S.E.2d 547, 563 (1980)). It is well-settled that state agencies must employ “adequate guiding standards” which ensure that the agency’s decision-making process is not arbitrary and that the agency is not called upon to make significant policy determinations appropriately left to other branches of government. Adams v. Dept. of N.E.R, 295 N.C. 683, 697-98, 249 S.E. 2d 402, 411 (1978); see In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 382, 379 S.E.2d 30, 35.
Petitioner was cited for nine violations of 15A North Carolina Administrative Code 2D. 1900, “Open Burning,” within 1,000 feet of occupied structures. North Carolina General Statutes section 215.114A specifically states that “[t]he Secretary may assess a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per day for a violation of the emissions limitations set out in G.S. 143-215.107D as provided in this subsection.”
The company’s previous history of compliance was as follows: on 16 September 1992 Notice of Violation was issued for open burning within 1,000 feet and a civil penalty of $1,247.44 was assessed and paid, on 21 March 1996 Notice of Violation was issued for open burning within 1,000 feet and a civil penalty of $1,341.56 was assessed and paid, and on 6 October 1997 Notice of Violation was issued for open burning within 1000 feet and a civil penalty of $2,842.00 was assessed and paid.
The initial notice of violation prepared by Tony L. McManus (McManus), an environmental specialist with the Mooresville *184Division of Air Quality in the North Carolina Department of Environment and. Natural Resources, on 5 November 1999 indicated that there was one, not nine, violations of 15A NCAC 2D. 1900 in accordance with the agency’s past practice of citing for multiple for violations.
In the “Enforcement Case Assessment Factors Report,” a recommendation prepared by McManus, the “alleged violation” is described as “[t]he open burning of land clearing debris within 1,000 feet of an occupied residence by MW Clearing & Grading, Inc. located off of Highway 74/Wilkinson Boulevard ....” No mention is made that there were nine debris piles burning in this description of the alleged violation. Moreover, McManus sent a memorandum on 29 December 1999 to Mike Aldridge, supervisor of the enforcement group, regarding petitioner’s violation. In the 29 December memorandum, with the subject of “Fast Track Enforcement,” McManus identified the type and number of violations as “One violation of 15A NCAC 2D.1900, ‘Open Burning.’ ” This citation of one violation of the administrative code was consistent with the agency’s past practices as both McManus and Keith Overcash (Overcash), Deputy Director for the Division, testified at the administrative hearing.
Deputy Director Overcash, however, elected unilaterally to throw out the agency’s past practices in assessing the penalty in this matter. Included in the evidence presented at the administrative hearing was a “Division of Air Quality — Civil Penalty Assessment” worksheet. The assessment factors were based upon provisions included in North Carolina General Statutes section 143B-282.1 and North Carolina Administrative Code 15A 2J.0006. These provisions are required considerations in each assessment according to Overcash. Accordingly, he completed a worksheet for every penalty the agency assessed for which he was responsible. For each factor, the alleged violation could be rated as not significant, moderately significant, significant, very significant, or extremely significant. Petitioner was rated as follows:
1) The degree and extent of harm to the natural resources of the State, to the public health, or to private property resulting from the violation;

significant

2) The duration and gravity of the violation;

significant

*1853) The effect on ground or surface water quantity or quality or on air quality;

significant

4) The cost of rectifying the damage;

not significant

5) The amount of money saved by noncompliance;

very significant

6) Whether the violation was committed willfully or intentionally [Cause];

significant

7) The prior record of the violator in complying of failing to comply with the programs over which the Environmental Management Commission has regulatory authority; and

extremely significant

8) Cost to the State of enforcement procedures.

not significant

9) The effectiveness of the action taken by the violator to cease the violation.

not significant

In addition to the assessment factors preprinted on the page, Overcash hand wrote in the following three items: “[previously assessed (3 times) for same violation;” “[n]ine piles [within] 1000 f[ee]t of residence;” and “[r]esponse from violator indicated savings of [$]31,000 by open-burn vs. hauling.” No credit was given to petitioner for the following “Remission Factors:”
Whether one or more of the civil penalty assessment factors were wrongly applied to the detriment of the petitioner;
Whether the violator promptly abated continuing environmental damage resulting from the violation;
Whether the violation was inadvertent or the result of an accident;
Whether the violator had been assessed civil penalties for any previous violations; and Whether payment of the civil penalty will prevent payment for the remaining necessary remedial actions.
*186Overcash also testified that there was no Division policy on treating multiple piles as a single violation. He further stated that because of the financial savings petitioner would realize by burning rather than hauling away its debris, he “felt that we could count them as separate violations.” Overcash also testified that the Division uses a “penalty tree” to ensure consistency between assessments from one to the next, but that basically it was for first and second time violators and after that, the decision to assess at a higher amount was solely in his discretion. There simply were no principled “adequate guiding standards” underlying Overcash’s decision to deviate from the agency’s historical practice of assessing one penalty for multiple piles, nor for failing to utilize the Division’s penalty tree that he specifically stated was intended to ensure consistency.
“It is a well-established principal that the long standing interpretation of a statute by the administering agency should be given deference.” 2002 N.C.A.G. 525, 2002 W.L. 431451 (N.C.A.G.) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). “Administrative interpretation of a statute, acquiesced in over a long period of time, is properly considered in the construction of the statute by the courts.” Petty v. Owen, 140 N.C. App. 494, 500, 537 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2000) (citing Duggins v. Board of Examiners, 25 N.C. App. 131, 137, 212 S.E.2d 657, 662, cert allowed, 287 N.C. 258, 214 S.E.2d 430 (1975) and affirmed, 294 N.C. 120, 240 S.E.2d 406 (1978)). Although not binding upon this Court, the advisory opinions of the Attorney General do merit “respectful consideration.” Williams v. Alexander County Board of Education, 128 N.C. App. 599, 602, 495 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1998).
The majority states, supra, that “[e]ven though the agency had previously counted multiple piles as a single violation where a single penalty was considered sufficient to effect future compliance, it is not irrational or illogical to count each pile as one violation.” The majority also correctly notes the deference properly given to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutes. However, given the agency’s longstanding prior history of interpreting violations of North Carolina General Statutes section 143-215.114A and 15A North Carolina Administrative Code 2D. 1900 with multiple bum piles as constituting one violation of the statute and the code, that is the proper interpretation which should receive deference, not an interpretation in which the Deputy Director essentially throws out the rule book in order to assess a civil penalty inconsistent with the agency’s previous actions.
*187Because I have determined that the agency acted in excess of its statutory authority by its actions in this instance in that it employed wholly new guidelines never utilized before that were not a part of its worksheet and it deviated from its penalty tree, it is unnecessary to determine at this time whether, after implementation of “adequate guiding standards,” imposition of such a penalty would be appropriate.