Court Opinion

ID: 9848239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:15:11.29788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:09.248802
License: Public Domain

EASLEY, Chief Justice and FEDERICI, Justice (dissenting). We concur in part and dissent in part. We agree that this Court is reluctant to issue a writ of superintending control directed at a lower court. However, the majority of this Court has decided that it is appropriate to exercise our superintending control in a case of great public interest such as this one. The number of potential cases arising out of the penitentiary riot, the cost of litigation, the cumbersome and expensive trial and appellate process, all combine to compel this Court to exercise its superintending control in this matter. The majority applies this reasoning only to the civil cases arising out of the riot. The basis of the majority opinion is that the trial court has not ruled on the discovery issues in any criminal cases. However, the matters are now pending in the district court and no doubt will soon be back in this Court. The reasons for exercising our superintending control are just as strong in the criminal cases as they are in the civil cases. From a review of the statutes, rules and case law, there can be little doubt that any privileges which apply in civil matters extend to criminal proceedings as well. Cirale v. 80 Pine Street Corporation, 35 N.Y.2d 113, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1, 316 N.E.2d 301 (1974). Because this is true, it is inappropriate to exercise our superintending control in civil cases and not do so in the criminal cases, when the legal issues to be decided are identical. Our principles of judicial economy and prompt administration of justice are subverted by the majority’s decision to rule on civil proceedings but wait until later to decide applicability of privileges in the criminal proceedings. We agree with the majority that a claim of executive privilege is available in New Mexico, and we agree with the tests set down by them in determining applicability of the privilege in individual cases. In determining that an executive privilege exists in New Mexico, the majority begins with the New Mexico Constitution. This is a logical starting place, since our Constitution controls if any state statutes or judicial rules conflict with it. The majority points out that Article III of the New Mexico Constitution provides for the separation of powers among the three departments of government. Each department is independent within its own sphere and has expressed and implied powers vested in it by the State Constitution. Cf. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S.Ct. 448, 61 L.Ed. 881 (1917). Since the Attorney General is a member of the Executive Department, 'N.M.Const., Article V, § 1, he is entitled to all of the express and implied powers within the sphere of the Executive Department. Implied powers of a department are such powers as are necessary to enable it to perform its duties or to exercise the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution. Marshall v. Gordon, supra. The majority finds an implied power in the Executive Department to invoke the executive privilege because “it is necessary and appropriate to the powers of the executive that [it] be free from disclosure of confidential communications among its members.” We agree. However, if we are to give effect to the executive privilege, the same reasons apply for giving effect to a public interest privilege. Any analysis of the public interest privilege must begin with the New Mexico Constitution as was done by the majority here for the executive privilege. The public interest privilege applies to confidential communications to public officers, in the performance of their duties, where the public interest requires that the confidential communications or their sources not be divulged. See Cirale v. 80 Pine Street Corporation, supra; Fischer v. Citizens Committee, 72 Misc.2d 595, 339 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1977). A public officer is one whose position is created by law, who has certain definite duties imposed by law, which must involve the exercise of some portion of the government power. Pollack v. Montoya, 55 N.M. 390, 234 P.2d 336 (1951). The office of Attorney General is created by Article V, § 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. The Attorney General has certain definite duties imposed by law, and they involve the exercise of a portion of the executive power. The Attorney General is a public officer. As such, he must exercise such implied powers as are necessary for him to perform his duties. Just as it is necessary and appropriate that his intragovernmental confidential communications be free from disclosure (executive privilege), so it is necessary and appropriate that certain confidential communications from the public and the identity of other informants be free from disclosure (public interest privilege). Both privileges are necessary to enable the Attorney General to perform his duties as an executive officer under the New Mexico Constitution. The majority finds that an executive privilege for internal communications is necessary to the successful functioning of an independent executive and therefore is implied in the Constitution. But the majority’s analysis of a constitutional basis for a public interest privilege extends no further than a bare conclusion that the privilege inherent in the executive “does not encompass nor extend to communications or situations involving persons who are not of the executive.” In so concluding, the majority has closed its eyes to the possibility that there may exist, in rare and compelling circumstances, situations in which a privilege for communications between members of the Executive Department and the public is equally necessary to the successful functioning of an independent executive. At stake is the ability of the Executive Department to investigate the causes of the penitentiary riot. Such an investigation is of vital importance in order to enable the executive to identify and root out the causes and contributing factors of the riot in order to prevent similar catastrophes in the future. In these extraordinary circumstances, a limited privilege for communications between Executive Department investigators and members of the public is crucial to the ability of the Executive Department to effectively conduct such an investigation. Anything less is a denial of the ability of the Executive Department to perform its constitutional duties. An additional reason is available for upholding both the executive privilege and the public interest privilege. Like the federal courts which are governed by privileges available under the common law, so the courts of this State are governed by privileges available at common law when not otherwise covered in our Constitution or by the rules of this Court because New Mexico has adopted the common law. Section 38-1-3, N.M.S.A. 1978. That common law privileges exist in New Mexico is supported by State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (1977). The majority holds that Newsome was a case which merely involved a statutory interpretation. However, in that opinion, the Court quoted from MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961), with approval: The public’s right of inspection is not without qualification. There may be circumstances under which the information contained in a record can be justifiably withheld from the person seeking it. Obviously, if it is shown that the information is being sought for an unlawful purpose, the request for it may be denied. [Citations omitted.] Even where the request is made for a lawful purpose the public interest may require that the information be withheld. Thus where the information is received in confidence, it may be proper to refuse access to it. . . . And in City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156, 238 P.2d 581 (1952), confidential information furnished to a municipal corporation by some of its employees for the purpose of establishing rates of compensation was held to be non-accessible. Similarly, in Mathews v. Pyle, supra, 75 Ariz. [76] at page 81, 251 P.2d [893] at page 897, it was held that a report of a state Attorney-General to the Governor was subject to inspection unless “confidential and privileged” or if “disclosure would be detrimental to the best interests of the state.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 795, 568 P.2d at 1241. The Court in Newsome concluded: We hold that a citizen has a fundamental right to have access to public records. The citizen’s right to know is the rule and secrecy is the exception. Where there is no contrary statute or countervailing public policy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243. It is readily apparent that the opinion in Newsome involved more than statutory interpretation. There is precisely the sort of “countervailing public policy” expressed in Newsome when one applies either the executive or the public interest privilege. As was stated in Jones v. State, 58 A.D.2d 736, 395 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App.Div. 1977), the basic reason for recognition of a public interest privilege is to protect the “public interest in enabling the government effectively to conduct sensitive investigations involving matters of demonstrably important concern.” Id. 395 N.Y.S.2d at 863. Certainly an investigation into the causes of the New Mexico State Penitentiary riot with a purpose of taking appropriate steps to prevent a recurrence is the type of investigation covered under the common law. Respondents and real parties in interest argue that since neither the Governor nor the Legislature specifically granted the Attorney General the right to extend a promise of confidentiality to informants, the promise was of no effect. The Governor’s letter and the Attorney General’s authority under the letter are set forth in the majority opinion. Furthermore, the Legislature appropriated $100,000 to the Attorney General “for the purpose of conducting a study to determine the cause of the events at the state penitentiary on or about February 2 and 3, 1980, to investigate any claims the state may have against other persons and to recommend any necessary changes in the administration and facilities of the penitentiary.” N.M. Laws 1980, ch. 24, § 9. Neither of these directions to the Attorney General specifically allows him to grant confidentiality to sources of information. However, the common law public interest privilege does not rest upon a specific grant of privilege by the Governor, the Legislature, or our rules. It rests upon the common law. The majority reasons that this common law privilege was superseded by our Rules of Evidence. However, we do not believe that our Rules of Evidence contemplated the sort of extraordinary situation involved here, and we are convinced that they do not address the applicability of either the executive or the public interest privilege. See State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, supra. For the reasons set forth above, we are of the opinion that both an executive and a public interest privilege exist in New Mexico. We would apply the same tests for disclosure under the public interest privilege as the majority has set forth under the executive privilege. We would direct the district court to apply these privileges to discovery matters in both civil and criminal cases arising out of the New Mexico State prison riot. In all other respects, we concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.