Court Opinion

ID: 9957357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:00:41.570015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:17.163889
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MARCOS A. MORALES,                              DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         CH-1221-21-0420-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 3, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Ibidun Roberts , Esquire, Columbia, Maryland, for the appellant.

      Dennis M. McGuire , Esquire, Akron, Ohio, for the agency.

      Grant T. Swinger , Esquire, Westchester, Illinois, for the agency.

      Timothy B. Morgan , Esquire, Hines, Illinois, for the agency.

      Rachel A. Davakis , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae, Office
        of Special Counsel.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

                                   REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,
REVERSE the initial decision, and REMAND this matter to the Central Regional
Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                   BACKGROUND
      On August 12, 2021, the appellant, a GS-11 Supervisory Diagnostic
Radiologic Technician, filed an appeal with the Board alleging that the agency
had   retaliated   against   him    for   “whistleblower   activity   and   perceived
whistleblower disclosures.” Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 4, Tab 9 at 31.
The appellant alleged the following: (1) on January 14-17, 2019, he participated
in an investigation conducted by the agency’s Office of Medical Inspector (OMI);
(2) on February 11-12, 2019, he participated in a Veterans Health Administration
(VHA) Radiology site visit; and (3) on April 8-12, 2019, he participated in an
investigation conducted by the agency’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
IAF, Tab 2 at 1.      The appellant averred that the agency was aware of his
participation in the three investigations. Id. at 2. He explained that, during each
of these investigations, he was questioned about purported wrongdoings of M.S.,
the agency’s Health Systems Specialist Director. Id.
      The appellant asserted that, as a result of his participation in the three
aforementioned investigations, the agency took the following actions:          (1) on
March 25, 2019, it cancelled a vacancy announcement for a position for which he
had applied; (2) on September 3, 2020, it cancelled a vacancy announcement for a
position for which he had applied; (3) on September 14, 2020, it failed to select
him for the MidCon Administrative Officers Academy; and (4) between
January 29, 2021, and February 5, 2021, it expanded the area of consideration for
a position for which he had applied, i.e., it posted the position externally, in order
                                                                                       3

to avoid hiring him.      Id. at 2-3.   The appellant averred that M.S. had been
involved in all of these actions. Id. at 4. The appellant explained that he had
filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) on March 10, 2021,
and that, on July 31, 2021, OSC had provided him with a 60-day status update
following a prior 90-day status update. Id. at 5, 88. He provided a copy of his
OSC complaint, IAF, Tab 1 at 8-20, and explained that, on April 12, 2021, he had
amended his complaint in response to OSC’s initial assessment of the same, IAF,
Tab 8 at 5, 9-14. The appellant’s amended complaint alleged that the agency also
perceived him as a whistleblower. Id. at 9. The appellant requested a hearing on
the matter. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. The agency argued that the appellant had failed to
show that the Board has jurisdiction over his appeal. IAF, Tab 10 at 7-13.
      Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
issued an initial decision dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdiction.         IAF,
Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 10.        In so doing, she concluded that the
appellant had exhausted his claims of protected activity with OSC. 2 ID at 3-5.
She also found that he had exhausted his claim that the agency perceived him as a
whistleblower. ID at 4. She found, however, that the appellant failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation that he had engaged in any protected activity under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). ID at 6-8. To this end, she reasoned that the appellant
had not gone to either OIG or any of the other agency investigatory components
to disclose wrongdoing; rather, the components had come to him at his worksite,
and he had “no choice but to cooperate.” ID at 7. She also reasoned that the
appellant had not provided any information to these entities that “constitute[d] a
2
  The administrative judge explained via footnote that the appellant had also indicated
that he had filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint on January 29,
2021, and that an EEO representative had thereafter contacted agency management
officials regarding the complaint. ID at 5-6 n.7. She also indicated that the appellant
had alleged that he had contacted the office of Senator Tammy Duckworth. Id. The
administrative judge explained, however, that the appellant did not allege that either of
these actions constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) or that any
adverse personnel actions had stemmed therefrom. Id. The appellant does not raise any
arguments concerning either of these actions on review.
                                                                                        4

disclosure under whistleblowing law”; indeed, the appellant “had nothing to
disclose to the investigators about the suspected wrongdoing.” ID at 7-8. For
these same reasons, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to
make a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency perceived him as a whistleblower.
ID at 8-9.      Although the administrative judge found that the appellant had
exhausted various alleged personnel actions with OSC, she did not make a finding
regarding whether the appellant had made nonfrivolous allegations of personnel
actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). ID at 4-5.
         The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a
response, and the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
Tabs 1, 3, 5. 3 Additionally, OSC has filed an amicus curiae brief. 4 PFR File,
Tab 6.

                  DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
         To establish jurisdiction in a typical IRA appeal, an appellant must show
by preponderant evidence 5 that he exhausted his administrative remedies before
OSC and make nonfrivolous allegations 6 of the following:               (1) he made a
disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected
3
  The agency’s response was due on or before December 3, 2021. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1.
The agency ostensibly filed its response at 12:45 a.m. on December 4, 2021. PFR File,
Tab 3, Tab 4 at 1. The agency, however, is located in Hines, Illinois; thus, its response
was timely filed. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(m) (2021) (explaining that the date of filing
for pleadings filed via e-Appeal Online are time stamped with Eastern Time, but the
timeliness of a pleading will be determined based on the time zone from which the
pleading was submitted).
4
  OSC contends in its brief that the administrative judge erred in finding that the
appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that his cooperation with, and disclosures to,
the agency’s investigative components constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(C). PFR File, Tab 6 at 1-10. As discussed herein, we agree with OSC’s
contention.
5
  Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
6
  A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
                                                                                    5

activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the
disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 11, 14. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has found that, in the context of an
IRA appeal, a nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Hessami v.
Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Any doubt or ambiguity as to whether the appellant made nonfrivolous
jurisdictional allegations should be resolved in favor of affording the appellant a
hearing. Grimes v. Department of the Navy, 96 M.S.P.R. 595, ¶ 12 (2004).
      For the following reasons, we disagree with the administrative judge’s
conclusion that the appellant failed to establish Board jurisdiction, and we
remand the matter for adjudication on the merits.

The appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that he engaged in protected
activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). 7
      The administrative judge concluded that the appellant failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation that he engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9) because (1) his participation in the three agency investigations was
compulsory and (2) he had not disclosed any wrongdoing to agency investigators,
much less made a protected disclosure.         ID at 7-8.    We disagree with this
conclusion.
      An appellant engages in protected activity when he cooperates with, or
discloses information to, “the Inspector General (or any other component

7
   We find that the appellant exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC
regarding the allegations discussed herein; indeed, the agency did not discernably
dispute that the appellant satisfied the exhaustion requirement. IAF, Tab 1 at 16-17,
Tab 8 at 9-11; see Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8
(2011) (explaining that an appellant may demonstrate exhaustion through, among other
things, his initial OSC complaint, evidence that he amended his initial complaint, and
his correspondence with OSC).
                                                                                       6

responsible for internal investigation or review) of an agency, or the
Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions of law.”             5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(C). Under the broadly worded provision of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)
(C), disclosures of information to an agency component responsible for internal
investigation or review are protected regardless of their content, as long as such
disclosures are made “in accordance with applicable provisions of law.”              See
Fisher v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8. Here, the appellant
asserted that he cooperated with investigations conducted by three separate
agency investigatory components, i.e., OMI, VHA Radiology, and OIG. 8 IAF,
Tab 2 at 1. He also asserted that, during each of these investigations, he provided
“the best information he had” concerning the alleged wrongdoings of M.S. Id.
at 2. Contrary to the administrative judge’s findings, neither the content of the
appellant’s disclosures to these components nor his lack of proactivity in making
the same are relevant for purposes of Board jurisdiction; indeed, the plain
language of the statute provides that an appellant need only “cooperat[e] with” or
“disclos[e] information to” such an entity. 9 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C); see
also Fisher, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8.          Thus, we find that the appellant made a

8
  As indicated, the statute provides that “cooperating with or disclosing information to”
OIG, OSC, or “any other component responsible for internal investigation or review”
constitutes protected activity. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). Thus, the appellant’s assertion
that he participated in an OIG investigation amounts to a nonfrivolous allegation of
protected activity. Insofar as the appellant provided documents showing that OMI has
the authority to conduct internal agency investigations, we find that the appellant’s
allegation that he participated in an OMI investigation also constitutes a nonfrivolous
allegation of protected activity. E.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 65-66. Although the appellant’s
assertions regarding the VHA Radiology site visit were less clear, he specifically
asserted that this component is responsible for internal reviews. IAF, Tab 2 at 1,
Tab 11 at 5-6. We find that such an allegation is sufficient at the jurisdictional stage.
See Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1364, 1369.
9
  The nature of an appellant’s cooperation/disclosures may be relevant at the merits
stage of an IRA appeal, when an appellant must prove the contributing factor element
by preponderant evidence, and the agency must defend itself by providing clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action absent the
protected activity. See Fisher, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8 n.1.
                                                                                      7

nonfrivolous allegation of three instances of protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9). 10

The appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency perceived him as a
whistleblower.
       The administrative judge concluded that the appellant failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation that the agency perceived him as a whistleblower because
he had merely cooperated with agency-initiated investigations and neither was
aware of any actual wrongdoing nor made any protected disclosures to agency
investigators. ID at 8-9. We disagree with this conclusion.
       The Board is authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) to consider a request for
corrective action when the appellant alleges that the agency violated 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(C) by taking or failing to take a personnel action based on its
perception that he engaged in activity protected under that statute.        Corthell v.
Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 12 (2016), overruled on
other grounds by Requena v. Department of Homeland Security , 2022 MSPB 39.
The analysis of whether an appellant was actually a whistleblower is different
than the analysis of whether an appellant was perceived as a whistleblower.
King v. Department of the Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 8 (2011). In cases falling
under the latter category, the Board will focus its analysis on the agency’s
perceptions, i.e., whether the agency officials involved in the personnel actions at
issue believed that the appellant engaged or intended to engage in protected
activity.   See id.   In these cases, the issue of whether the appellant actually
engaged in protected activity is immaterial; the issue of whether the agency

10
   In his petition for review, the appellant asserts that “he did make protected
disclosures” during the course of the three investigations. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. We
surmise that, through this assertion, the appellant is buttressing his argument that he
engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). To the extent he is
instead asserting that he also made protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),
we find his assertion unavailing. Indeed, the appellant did not allege before either OSC
or the administrative judge that his IRA appeal concerned protected disclosures under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). IAF, Tab 1 at 10, 16-17, Tab 2 at 1-2, Tab 8 at 9; see Banks v.
Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).
                                                                                    8

perceived him as a whistleblower will essentially stand in for that portion of the
Board’s analysis in the jurisdictional stage of the appeal. Id.
       Here, as discussed, the appellant alleged that agency management was
aware that he had participated in all three agency investigations, each of which
we have found constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).
IAF, Tab 2 at 1-2.     Implicit in this allegation was an allegation that agency
management believed that he had engaged in protected activity vis-à-vis the
investigations.   Thus, we find that the appellant also made a nonfrivolous
allegation that the agency perceived him to be a whistleblower. However, to the
extent the appellant proves at the merits stage of his appeal that he participated in
all three investigations and that the relevant agency management officials were
aware of his participation, the appellant’s “perceived as” claim will likely carry
little weight.

The appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that he was subjected to personnel
actions.
       Although the administrative judge found that the appellant had exhausted
his administrative remedy regarding his four alleged personnel actions, she did
not make a finding as to whether his allegations constituted nonfrivolous
allegations of personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).           As stated, the
appellant identified the following personnel actions:       (1) a March 25, 2019
cancellation of a vacancy announcement for a position for which he had applied;
(2) a September 3, 2020 cancellation of a vacancy announcement for a position
for which he had applied; (3) his September 14, 2020 nonselection for the
MidCon Administrative Officers Academy; and (4) the agency’s January 2021
expansion of the area of consideration for a position for which he had applied.
IAF, Tab 2 at 2-3.
       Regarding the March 25, 2019 and September 3, 2020 vacancy
announcement cancellations, the appellant asserted that, on the aforementioned
dates, the agency cancelled vacancy announcements for a Health Systems
                                                                                    9

Specialist Position. Id. at 2, 7, 9. He averred that he had interviewed for the first
vacancy announcement prior to the agency’s cancellation of the same and that the
agency cancelled the second vacancy announcement on the same day that he
applied for the position.     Id. at 2.      We find that these assertions constitute
nonfrivolous allegations of two nonselections, i.e., two personnel actions under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i).     See Ruggieri v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
454 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that a nonselection is a
cognizable personnel action even when the agency does not select another
candidate to fill the subject position).
      Regarding his September 14, 2020 nonselection for a training opportunity
at the MidCon Administrative Officers Academy, the appellant asserted that he
sought to participate in the Academy, which is “a comprehensive, hands-on and
intensive boot camp geared towards high-performing Administrative Officers []
who may serve as trainers and mentors at their home stations upon completion”;
however, he was not selected for this opportunity. IAF, Tab 2 at 3-4, 10-18. “[A]
decision concerning . . . training” is a personnel action if it “may reasonably be
expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation,
or other [personnel] action [as described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).]” 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix). Thus, the plain wording of the statute explicates that not all
denials of training opportunities are covered personnel actions. Id.; see Simone v.
Department of the Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 9 (2007); see also Shivaee v.
Department of the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 383, 387 (1997) (explaining that there must
be, at a minimum, a moderate probability that the training would have resulted in
some type of personnel action).            Here, we find that the appellant made a
nonfrivolous allegation of a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix).
Indeed, in addition to alleging that the subject training opportunity was geared
towards employees “who may serve as trainers and mentors at their home stations
upon completion,” IAF, Tab 2 at 4, the appellant also provided an email
indicating that this training opportunity facilitated “the establishment of an
                                                                                     10

informal ‘resource pool’ of trained” administrative officers, id. at 12. Thus, we
find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that he was denied a
training opportunity that may reasonably have been expected to lead to an
appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other personnel action. See
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix); see also Grimes, 96 M.S.P.R. 595, ¶ 12 (stating that
any doubt or ambiguity regarding jurisdictional allegations should be resolved in
favor of affording the appellant a hearing).
      Lastly, regarding the agency’s expansion of the area of consideration for a
position, the appellant asserted that, on January 11, 2021, the agency posted a
vacancy announcement for a Chief Technologist position. IAF, Tab 2 at 4. He
averred that M.S. “actively sought other employees to apply for the position,” and
thereafter opened the position to external candidates. 11 Id. The appellant alleged
that M.S. had taken these actions “to avoid hiring him.” Id. at 3. We find that
these assertions amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of an additional nonselection,
i.e., a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i). See Weed v. Social
Security Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶¶ 4, 13-17 (2010) (concluding that
an agency’s purported use of “a particular selection process as part of a scheme
that would deny a whistleblower an opportunity to seek [an] appointment”
constituted a nonfrivolous allegation of a nonselection).
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant made nonfrivolous allegations of
four separate personnel actions, i.e., three nonselections and the denial of a
training opportunity. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i), (ix).

11
   As discussed in the initial decision, the appellant alleged in his OSC complaint that
the agency failed to consider his veterans’ preference when evaluating him for the Chief
Technologist position; however, the appellant, who is represented by counsel, did not
discernably raise this claim before the Board. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1 at 17, Tab 2 at 2-3.
To the extent the appellant wishes to raise a claim under the Veterans Employment
Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), he may file a separate appeal in this regard. See
Haasz v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 108 M.S.P.R. 349, ¶ 6 (2008) (setting forth
the jurisdictional standard for VEOA claims).
                                                                                           11

The appellant has satisfied the contributing factor jurisdictional criterion.
      An appellant’s protected activity is a contributing factor if it in any way
affects an agency’s decision to take, or fail to take, a personnel action. See
Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012). One way to
satisfy the contributing factor criterion is the knowledge/timing test. Wadhwa v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 615, ¶ 12, aff’d, 353 F. App’x 435
(Fed. Cir. 2009). Under this test, an appellant can prove the contributing factor
element through evidence showing that the official taking the personnel action
knew of his protected activity and that the personnel action occurred within a
period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the activity
was a contributing factor in the personnel action.              See id.; see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e)(1).
      Here, the appellant alleged that the agency “was aware of everyone who
participated    in   the    investigations,”    which        occurred   in   January   2019,
February 2019, and April 2019. IAF, Tab 2 at 1-2, Tab 8 at 9. He also alleged
that M.S. was involved with all four personnel actions at issue, which occurred
between March 2019, and January 2021. IAF, Tab 2 at 4. Accordingly, we find
that the appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that, if proven, would satisfy the
contributing factor criterion via the knowledge/timing test. 12                See Wadhwa,
110 M.S.P.R.     615,      ¶ 12   (explaining   that,   if    an   appellant   satisfies   the
knowledge/timing test, the appellant has demonstrated that a protected disclosure
was a contributing factor in a personnel action); see also Mastrullo v. Department
of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21 (2015) (explaining that the Board has held that
a personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of a protected
disclosure satisfies the knowledge/timing test).
12
  However, the appellant’s March 25, 2019 nonselection predated the April 2019 OIG
investigation; thus, the appellant’s participation in the OIG investigation could not have
contributed to his initial nonselection. IAF, Tab 2 at 1-3; see El v. Department of
Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 10 (2015) (explaining that, because the subject
personnel action predated the appellant’s protected disclosure, the disclosure could not
have contributed to the personnel action), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
                                                                              12

      Accordingly, we find that the appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that
he engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) and that the agency
perceived him as a whistleblower.     We also find that he made nonfrivolous
allegations that his protected activity and the agency’s perception of him as a
whistleblower contributed to four personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2),
i.e., three nonselections and the denial of a training opportunity. Thus, we find
that he is entitled to his requested hearing and a decision on the merits of his
appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 2; see Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R.
230, ¶ 5 (2016). Prior to conducting a hearing, the administrative judge shall
afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to complete discovery and order the
parties to submit any other evidence that she deems necessary to adjudicate the
merits of this appeal. See Lewis v. Department of Defense, 123 M.S.P.R. 255,
¶ 14 (2016).

                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand the appellant’s IRA appeal to
the Central Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this
Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.