Court Opinion

ID: 9777952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:28:50.718438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.719712
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In its Motion for Rehearing, the State reasserts that appellant’s objection was insufficient to preserve error and, further, that even if the objection were sufficient, it was not error to overrule the objection. For the reasons stated in our original opinion, and the additional reasons expressed herein, we disagree. We hold that the substance of the objection was sufficient to preserve error, and that the trial court erred in overruling the objection.
Apparently the State bases its position that, even if the objection were proper and timely, it was not error to overrule the objection, on its premise that Jenkins testified to his opinion of Smith’s character pursuant to rule 405(a).1 In its brief, the State asserts:
Even if the trial court had understood appellant’s objection to be on the proper *845grounds, it was not error to overrule it. Clearly, defense counsel in the present case was surprised by his witness’ answer and was not responsible for the witness’ opinion being placed before the jury. Just as clearly, however, the witness made the statement because he wanted to help out the appellant and thought a statement of his opinion would do so. Because the witness deliberately placed appellant’s character in issue, the State should have been allowed to challenge his opinion with “have-you-heard” questions about appellant’s prior arrests.
[Emphasis added].
The State next challenges the applicability of Rutledge v. State, 749 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). We do not disagree with the State that ostensibly2 rule 405(a) changes prior law; however, we disagree that any change effected by rule 405(a) renders the rationale of Rutledge inapplicable to the specific facts of this case.3
We recognize that Rutledge involved a 1984 conviction and applies pre-rule 405(a) law. However, we disagree with the State’s apparent position that the applicability of a case is to be determined by a specific calendar date as opposed to the logic of its rationale as applied to the specific facts at bar. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the rationale of Rutledge is applicable to the facts here.
The factual record before us reflects: (1) that Jenkins was a fact witness called at the guilt-innocence stage, not a character or reputation witness called at the punishment stage; (2) that Jenkins testified based on his personal knowledge, not based on his opinion of Smith’s character or reputation, as the State seems to assert; and (3) that there was no predicate establishing substantial familiarity with Smith’s reputation either before the date of the offense, as required by rule 405(a), or, for that matter, after the date of the offense. Our application of Rutledge here, however, should not be read to mean that Rutledge would necessarily apply to a case where personal opinion, properly predicated on a substantial familiarity with the reputation of the accused prior to the date of the offense, as required by rule 405(a), is expressed by a witness under circumstances which otherwise would open up rebuttal evidence by the State. We emphasize that our application of Rutledge is limited to the specific facts of this case.
For all the above reasons, we overrule the State’s motion for rehearing, and reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial.

. TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 405(a) (effective September 1, 1986). Unless otherwise indicated, all further rule references are to the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.

. It is noted, however, that rule 405(a)’s “substantial familiarity" requirement provides that a character witness is only competent to express a personal opinion concerning the accused’s character when it is based upon reputation.

. We do not contend here that Rutledge would be applicable to all factual records, but limit its application to the specific facts of this case.