Court Opinion

ID: 9946145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 15:17:17.998058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.938795
License: Public Domain

STATE OF VERMONT PER &3

WASHINGTON COUNTY, SS. Hg
M2 DEC 28 AO fo

Robert LeFevre ) ey penine

) Washington Superior Courty:fejin 200204
Vv. ) Docket No. 612-10-97 Wnev

)
Leon G. Thompson, Jr., and )
Melody R. Thompson )

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

This matter is before the court on the Motion of the Defendants to enforce the terms of an
alleged agreement to settle the case. Plaintiff is represented by Jeffrey E. Tobin, Esq... The
Defendant is represented by Oreste V. Valsangiacomo, Jr., Esq. An evidentiary hearing was held
on the Motion on September 15, 1999. The attorneys subsequently submitted memoranda of law.

Findings of Fact

Based on the evidence admitted, the court makes the following findings of fact:

1. As of late August 1997, the Thompsons (defendants) had lived at their residence on
Route 14 in South Barre for approximately 15 years. During the time they had lived there, they
had used a driveway in common with the neighboring residence to the east, as well as an area of
open lawn between that driveway and their own house. On August 26, 1997, Robert LeFevre
moved into the residence next door, which he had just purchased. His girlfriend Tracy Brown

also moved in with him on that day.

2. A boundary dispute and problem over use of the driveway quickly developed, as Mr.
LeFevre claimed title to the driveway and yard area by virtue of his deed. The Thompsons
claimed rights by adverse possession. Mr. LeFevre placed a “No Trespass” order on the
Thompsons, and the Thompsons placed one on him. The complaint in this case. was filed on
October 22, 1997.

3. On May 22, 1998, Mr. LeFevre’s attorney, Mr. Tobin, wrote to the Thompsons’
attorney, Mr. Valsangiacomo, with a proposal described in general terms for resolution of the
competing claims. The general outline was that the Thompsons would receive record title to the
yard area, and Mr. LeFevre would have exclusive right to the driveway area. A week or two
later, all parties met at the Barre Police Department and removed to the property. They discussed
possible resolutions and problems. Tracy Brown raised with Chief Stevens the issue of Mr.
LeFevre’s liability if the Thompsons used the property. No resolution was reached. There was
an agreement that the Thompsons could use the yard for the birthday party of their
granddaughter, whose birthday was coming up on June 13, 1998.

4. A further meeting took place at the property on September 1, 1998. Chief Stevens was
not present. A surveyor was there, as well as an official from an agency of the State. An
agreement was reached with the following terms: Mr. LeFevre would have exclusive rights to the
driveway area, and the Thompsons would give up any claim to it; the Thompsons would acquire
exclusive ownership of the yard area they were claiming by adverse possession; a survey would
be done and permits obtained, and the parties would share the necessary costs but otherwise there
would be no exchange of money; Mr. LeFevre would be responsible for obtaining necessary
permits, as he had a desire to complete the process before the end of December, 1998; Mr.

LeFevre would continue to mow the yard; the Thompsons would no longer use the driveway; and
the only event that would release the parties from the agreement was the failure of the necessary
permits to be obtainable. Mr. LeFevre testified at the hearing that he thought it was mutually
understood that the Thompsons would not use the yard area, but no such term was stated by him
or anyone else, and was therefore not included in the agreement. There was certainly no
agreement that if the Thompsons used the yard area before the implementing paperwork was
complete, the agreement could be rescinded.

5. Pursuant to the agreement, a survey of the new boundary line was obtained. Mr.
LeFevre continued to mow the yard during the fall. The Thompsons began to make plans to sell
their property. The parties worked cooperatively through their attorneys to follow through on the
agreement.

6. On November 9, 1998, Mr. LeFevre signed the application for a deferral permit to
obtain permission for the transfer of title pursuant to the new boundary line agreed upon. Mr.
Tobin, Mr. LeFevre’s attorney, sent it to the Thompsons with a request that they pay their share
of fees. The Thompsons also signed the application and paid their share of the survey cost on
November 10, 1998, and on November 12, 1998, the deferral permit application was submitted
by Mr. Tobin,.

7. On February 16, 1999, the court was informed that the case had been settled. No
judgment order or order of dismissal has ever been submitted or issued by the court.

8. On March 12, 1999, the application and check were returned to Mr. LeFevre’s attorney
with information that additional requirements needed to be met. The Thompsons were not

informed of this. In April they inquired about the status of the permit application, and received

no response.
9. As the grass grew in the spring, it was not initially mowed by Mr. LeFevre. Relations
were friendly between the neighbors, however. On May 2, 1999, the Thompsons bought a new
sit-down lawn mower, and Mr. LeFevre, who was outside putting down staymat-near the new
boundary line, offered the use of his ramps to unload it. Mrs. Thompson asked if he had heard
any news about the permit, and he said he had not.

10. On May 12, 1999, the Thompsons inquired again about the status of the permit
application, and received no response. In May, Mr. Tobin was in contact with Barre Town
officials concerning the requirements for the permit. No information was ever given to the
Thompsons about the prospect of problems or delays in the permit process. As the spring
progressed, the Thompsons began mowing the lawn. . They also placed their motorboat on its
trailer in the area. Mr. LeFevre raised no objection to either of these activities.

11. The cooperative effort to carry out the agreement changed in early June. Mr.
Thompson drove his motorcycle across the yard area. This upset Mr. LeFevre, who nonetheless
said nothing to the Thompsons. The court held a status conference in the case on June 14, 1999,
and at that conference, Mr. Tobin gave notice for the first time that Mr. LeFevre did not wish to
go through with the settlement agreement that had been reached. There was no indication that
the permitting process had been exhausted without success, rather, the information was that the
plaintiff wished to proceed with the case.

12. On July 14, 1999, the Thompsons’ attorney filed the Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement that is presently before the court.

13. In an affidavit filed with the court on July 23, 1999, Mr. LeFevre agreed that there

had been an oral agreement to settle the case reached in the fall of 1998, but he claimed that an
additional term of the agreement was that no one would use the disputed land area. He claimed
that the Thompsons breached the agreement by storing their boat and trailer on it, mowing it, and
driving a motorcycle across it. He claimed that such breach excused his further-performance
under the settlement agreement.

14. After learning of Mr. LeFevre’s position, the Thompsons moved their boat and trailer

and stopped mowing the yard, and have made no further use of the property.

Conclusions of Law

The question is whether the Thompsons are entitled to enforcement of the settlement
agreement, or whether Mr. LeFevre is entitled to proceed with a hearing on the merits of the case.
Mr. LeFevre relies on the successor to the Statute of Frauds, 12 V.S.A. § 181, which provides
that: “A contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of an interest in or
concerning them... .” must be in writing. He argues that there is no signed settlement
agreement setting forth the terms on which property interests are to be transferred, and hence he
is not bound. The Thompsons argue that Mr. LeFevre’s admission, in his response to the Motion
to Enforce, that there was an oral contract is sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute, and
further that his failure to raise the Statute as a defense constitutes a waiver of any right to rely on
the Statute. The Thompsons further argue that even if a writing is required, that requirement is
satisfied by the written application for a deferral permit submitted by Mr. LeFevre, in which the
transaction is specifically described, and an attached survey is incorporated by reference.

It is clear that there was an oral settlement agreement, as acknowledged by Mr. LeFevre.

Its terms were also clear and comprehensive, as set forth in the findings. The court concludes
that the Thompsons are entitled to enforcement of the oral settlement agreement on several
grounds.

First, Mr. Lefevre was required to raise the Statute for the Prevention of-Hrauds and
Perjuries as an affirmative defense in a pleading responsive to the Motion for Enforcement. See
V.R.C.P. 8(c). He did not include it in his response, which was filed. The Statute was not raised
as a defense until the day of hearing, which was too late to put the Thompsons on notice.
Therefore, it was waived as a defense.

Even absent a waiver, the Statute was satisfied, in that there was a writing setting forth
specifically the terms of the land transaction, signed by Mr. LeFevre, the person to be charged.
The writing was the November 9, 1998 deferral permit application, which was submitted on
November 12, 1998. Ina similar case, the Court has held such a writing sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the predecessor to the current statute. “Not only does it
appear from the exhibits that there was a written offer by the defendant, the party here charged,
but the offer was accepted orally, if not in writing, before it was withdrawn by the defendant.
Thus this offer was a sufficient memorandum of the contract to satisfy the statute.” First Nat’!

Bank of St. Johnsbury v. Laperle, 117 Vt. 144, 148 (1952) (citations omitted).

In addition, part performance is sufficient to take a contract out of the requirements of the
Statute, even if the deferral permit application were not a sufficient writing. In this case, the
Thompsons accepted the offer and changed their position in reliance on it. Their actions in
reliance included: paying their share of the survey costs, cooperating promptly to complete the
permit application process, making plans to sell their property in reliance on the litigation being

settled, assuming responsibility for mowing the yard for which they were to become responsible,
and using it for their boat and motorcycle. All of this was done by the Thompsons in the
expectation that the implementation of the agreement would be forthcoming, thereby rendering

moot the “No Trespass” order. See Contractor’s Crane Serv.. Inc. v. Vermont Whey Abatement

Auth., 147 Vt. 441, 449 (1986) (“if party relies on an oral promise, fully performing its end of
the bargain, then a written promise is not required if it would be fraud to allow the promisor to

deny the contract.”’) (citing Nichols v. Nichols, 139 Vt. 273, 277 (1981)).

ORDER

Based on the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

is GRANTED. Defendants’ attorney shall prepare an Order.

Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this 7H, day of Dretnnles 1999.

Wye Wes eaclnt”
Hon. Méry Miles Teachout
Superior Judge, presiding