Court Opinion

ID: 9558395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:08:50.331036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:07.627165
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REGNIER
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the District Court’s decision essentially eliminates the requirement that an entity begin mining, making the “shall terminate” provision in § 82-4-221(1), MCA, surplusage. Under the District Court’s rationale, if an operator requests renewal, it will receive that renewal, along with an automatic three-year extension of its mining deadline, thus effectively eliminating the mandate that a permit terminate unless the operator obtains an extension. In my view, the statutory mandate is not, however, as the majority concludes, that a permit terminate at the conclusion of the five-year permit term if mining has not begun, but rather that the permit will terminate if mining has not begem and an extension of the mining deadline has not been secured.
In examining the provisions of § 82-4-221(1), MCA, the majority concludes that if a permittee does not commence mining within three years from the date its permit was issued, “the time to commence mining can be reasonably extended for up to two years if the permit-*290tee” meets certain statutory criteria. Thus, the majority reasons, “[u]nder the clear and unambiguous provisions of the statute, if mining is not commenced within the extended two-year period, then the permit terminates.” Although the majority acknowledges that the mining deadline may be extended “for up to two years,” the statute itself places no such restriction upon the duration of permissible extensions. Rather, with respect to mining deadline extensions, § 82-4-221(1), MCA, provides specifically that:
[T]he department may grant reasonable extensions of time upon a showing that the extensions are necessary by reason of litigation precluding the commencement or threatening substantial economic loss to the permittee or by reason of conditions beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the permittee.
This provision in § 82-4-221(1), MCA, specifically authorizes the department to grant more than one extension of time so long as the applicant meets certain criteria. Nowhere does the statute limit extensions to the original five-year permit term.
The majority observes that the “mining condition is embodied in the renewal sentence of § 82-4-221(1), MCA, and meeting the condition of mining is a precondition to renewal.” Although the statute provides that the permit “shall terminate” if mining has not commenced within three years of issuance of the permit, the subsequent sentence explicitly permits the department to extend that deadline. Assuming an entity obtains just such an extension, it is in compliance with the requirements of § 82-4-221(1), MCA. Nowhere does the statute state that mining is a precondition to renewal.
Accordingly, I believe the correct interpretation of § 82-4-221(1), MCA, is not to imply the requirement that mining begin within the initial five-year permit period, but to require, as does the statute, that an operator obtain an extension in the event it has not begun to mine within that period. Therefore, an operator who seeks a renewal must also apply for and obtain a second extension of the mining deadline. I would thus reverse the District Court to the extent that it held a renewal carries with it an automatic extension of the mining deadline.
Based on the foregoing, I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the District Court, but I would do so on the alternative basis that the court erred in concluding that a renewal obtained pursuant to § 82-4-221(1), MCA, carries with it an automatic extension of the mining deadline. Monteo was indeed entitled to renew its permit, but it failed to successfully obtain another extension of the mining dead*291line as required. When Monteo failed to successfully obtain an extension of its mining deadline, its renewed permit became meaningless.
Because the District Court held Monteo was not required to obtain an extension of its mining deadline, it thus did not review the DSL’s decision denying Montco’s application for an extension. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the District Court for a determination as to whether the DSL erred in denying Montco’s application for an extension of its mining deadline.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICE GRAY join in the foregoing concurring opinion.