Court Opinion

ID: 9853148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:43:26.248467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:41.404201
License: Public Domain

Sears-Collins, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, not because I am a nude dancing enthusiast, I am not, but because I strongly believe that the rights protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are essential to freedom and democracy, and that those rights have been tread upon in this case without good cause having been shown.
Neither the majority nor the appellee disputes that nude dancing is deemed a form of expression protected by the First Amendment, (majority p. 205). Also, this court has held that prohibiting the sale of alcohol at establishments which offer nude dancing “infringes upon protected expression.” Harris v. Entertainment Systems, 259 Ga. 701, 703 (386 SE2d 140) (1989).
In upholding the prohibition against the sale of alcohol at an es*209tablishment offering nude dancing in this case, the majority uses the test applicable to content-neutral legislation, which is set forth in Paramount Pictures v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 256 (297 SE2d 250) (1982) (majority p. 205). The majority holds that the ordinance is justified when limited to the establishments specified in Smyrna Code section 14-165 (i), which, according to the majority, “studies have shown produce undesirable secondary effects” (majority p. 206). However, nowhere in the majority opinion, the appellee’s brief, the appellee’s affidavit, or the record is it made clear just what “studies” are being relied upon, what the results of those “studies” were, where those “studies” were conducted, or why the results of those “studies” should reasonably be expected to apply to the specific situation being addressed by the city of Smyrna. “We should not investigate facts by the light of arguments, but arguments by the light of facts.” Myson, of Chen, one of the Seven Sages, c. 600 B.C.
I recognize that this Court has in the past assumed the viability of the governmental interest allegedly sought to be protected. See, e.g., Harris, 259 Ga. at 703. However, I believe that such deference without inspection can be dangerous, particularly when addressing suppressed expression. It seems to me that for a restriction on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments to survive First Amendment scrutiny based on an interest in preventing “undesirable secondary effects,” some very specific causal nexus must be established between the undesired effects and the combination of nude dancing and alcohol. Such a causal nexus simply has not been proved in this case. The majority’s reliance for this nexus on unnamed, unexplained and unrelated “studies” just does not seem appropriate when the right being infringed has First Amendment protection. Furthermore, while the majority states that unspecified “studies” have shown that some adult entertainment establishments have been shown to produce undesirable secondary effects, the majority does not even purport to rely on studies which have connected any undesirable effects with the combination of nude dancing and alcohol.
With no findings required as to the applicability of studies or experience by other cities to the situation being addressed, any community could rely on “studies” to enact a similar ordinance. I do not believe that unidentified “studies” constitute sufficient justification for diminishing rights protected by the First Amendment,6 or that that was the intention of the United States Supreme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U. S. 41 (106 SC 925, 89 LE2d 29) (1986), cited by the majority as authority for relying on “studies,” *210(majority at p. 206, n. 4). Even the city of Renton’s ordinance (which did not relate to the combination of alcohol and adult entertainment) was based on specific studies done by a specific city in the same area. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U. S. 41, 50-52.
Decided May 20, 1993
Reconsideration denied June 18, 1993.
Steven M. Youngelson, David L. Miller, Franklin H. Thornton, for appellants.
Cochran, Camp & Snipes, Scott A. Cochran, D. Michael Williams, for appellees.
Moreover, I believe that the failure of the city of Smyrna to produce anything more than conclusory, speculative and preconceived presumptions regarding the “secondary effects” of adult entertainment establishments at which alcohol is served strongly suggests that the city’s motive for regulating the establishments is in reality based upon a dislike for the subject matter of the expression. As a content-based regulation, section 14-166 (g) would not be subject to the Paramount Pictures balancing test applied by the majority. Rather, where protected expression is restricted precisely because of the content of that expression, the restriction is subject to much more stringent examination. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre 501 U. S. _ (111 SC 2456, 2466, 115 LE2d 504) (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U. S. at 58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As stated above, however, even under the less stringent test applied by the majority, there is insufficient proof in this case to justify the restriction on First Amendment protected expression.

 Nor do I agree, based upon a review of the record and the appellant’s brief, that the appellant concedes the existence of the purported secondary effects.