Court Opinion

ID: 9897306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:56.582847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:05.325234
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Aug 23 2023, 9:09 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Tomas M. Thompson                                          Curtis T. Jones
Thompson Legal LLC                                         James P. Moloy
Morocco, Indiana                                           Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeffrey L. Foster, Kathie J.                               August 23, 2023
Foster, and The Earl Goodwine                              Court of Appeals Case No.
Trust,                                                     23A-PL-473
Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                     Appeal from the Benton Circuit
                                                           Court
        v.                                                 The Honorable John D. Potter,
                                                           Special Judge
First Merchants Bank, N.A.,                                Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Defendant.                                        04C01-1101-PL-10

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Riley and Weissmann concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023                             Page 1 of 16
      Case Summary
[1]   This appeal involves a civil action that the trial court described below as having

      “lain dormant for longer times than many Pacific Rim volcanoes.” The action,

      which was filed on January 31, 2011, centers around a 2010 real-estate

      transaction. On December 19, 2022, the trial court entered summary judgment

      in favor of First Merchant’s Bank, N.A. (“the Bank”), finding that dismissal

      was appropriate due to Jeffrey and Kathie Foster’s and The Earl Goodwine

      Trust’s (collectively, “the Appellants”) failure to prosecute the action. While it

      is undisputed that the numerous periods of inaction, totaling approximately ten

      years, had occurred since the case was filed in 2011, the record demonstrates

      that the Appellants had resumed their prosecution of the case prior to the Bank

      filing its request for a dismissal of the action. As such, pursuant to the Indiana

      Supreme Court’s decision in State v. McClaine, 261 Ind. 60, 300 N.E.2d 342

      (1973), the Bank’s request for a dismissal for failure to prosecute was untimely.

      However, because we conclude that the designated evidence demonstrates that

      the Appellants should be barred from continuing the pursuit of their claims

      against the Bank pursuant to the doctrine of laches, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In a related underlying action, the Bank sought to enforce a promissory note

      against Treslong Dairy, LLC (“Treslong Dairy”), which had been secured by a

      security agreement that had granted the Bank, among other things, a security

      interest in all of Treslong Dairy’s haylage and silage (“the Collateral”). On

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023        Page 2 of 16
      May 27, 2010, the Benton Circuit Court ordered the Bank to sell the Collateral.

      In August of 2010, the Bank sold the Collateral for an amount less than the full

      judgment owed to the Bank. The Appellants, who were junior lienholders,

      received nothing from the sale.

[3]   On January 31, 2011, the Appellants filed a complaint against the Bank

      concerning its sale of the Collateral. The Bank filed its answer on May 3, 2011.

      The case then proceeded as follows:

              From January of 2011 through October of 2011 there was a
              complaint, [an] intervention and answer, an enlargement of time
              and a withdrawal of an appearance followed by a new
              appearance. Nothing happened from October 13, 2011 until
              October 15, 2012 when a motion to withdraw appearance was
              filed. The case remained dormant until February of 2014 when
              there was a new appearance and a request for enlargement of
              time to answer. That motion for enlargement of time triggered a
              flurry of additional motions for enlargement of time from other
              counsel which culminated with [the trial court] granting the final
              enlargement of time to [the Bank] on July 2, 2014. No other
              pleadings were ever filed—just requests for enlargements of time.

              Then, nothing happened until June 20, 2018 when an attorney for
              [the Bank] withdrew. One more year passed before another
              withdrawal motion was filed on April 30, 2019. Three more years
              passed until May 17, 2022 when a new counsel entered his
              appearance for [the Appellants] and asked for a case
              management conference.… The case management request
              initiated a new round of attorney withdrawals until finally, [the
              Bank] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 12, 2022

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023       Page 3 of 16
              seeking dismissal of the case for Trial Rule 41E issues and/or
              because of laches.[1]

      Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 13–14 (emphases in original). Following a

      hearing, the trial court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. The

      Appellants then filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied on

      February 2, 2023.

      Discussion and Decision
[4]   The Appellants appeal the trial court’s order granting the Bank’s motion for

      summary judgment following the denial of their motion to correct error. “We

      review denial of a motion to correct error for abuse of discretion.” In re

      Paternity of V.A., 10 N.E.3d 65, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “An abuse of

      discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the

      facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable inferences [drawn]

      therefrom.” Id.

[5]           When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, our standard of
              review is the same as that of the trial court. FLM, LLC v.
              Cincinnati Ins. Co., 973 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
              (citing Wilcox Mfg. Grp., Inc. v. Mktg. Servs. of Ind., Inc., 832
              N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. We stand in
              the shoes of the trial court and apply a de novo standard of
              review. Id. (citing Cox v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 848 N.E.2d 690,

      1
        The Bank asserts that it “elected to seek summary judgment, as opposed to filing a motion to dismiss, due
      to its desire to include other relevant material concerning the prejudice that the [Appellants] delay had
      caused.” Appellee’s Br. p. 8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023                              Page 4 of 16
              695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Our review of a summary judgment
              motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court.
              Ind. Trial Rule 56(H); Robson v. Tex. E. Corp., 833 N.E.2d 461,
              466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Summary judgment is
              appropriate only where the designated evidence shows there are
              no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
              to judgment as a matter of law. T.R. 56(C). For summary
              judgment purposes, a fact is “material” if it bears on the ultimate
              resolution of relevant issues. FLM, 973 N.E.2d at 1173. We
              view the pleadings and designated materials in the light most
              favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Additionally, all facts
              and reasonable inferences from those facts are construed in favor
              of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Troxel Equip. Co. v. Limberlost
              Bancshares, 833 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

              A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is clothed with a
              presumption of validity, and the party who lost in the trial court
              has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary
              judgment was erroneous. Henderson v. Reid Hosp. and Healthcare
              Servs., 17 N.E.3d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
              Where a trial court enters specific findings and conclusions, they
              offer insight into the rationale for the trial court’s judgment and
              facilitate appellate review, but are not binding upon this court.
              Id. We will affirm upon any theory or basis supported by the
              designated materials. Id. When a trial court grants summary
              judgment, we carefully scrutinize that determination to ensure
              that a party was not improperly prevented from having his or her
              day in court. Id.

      Webb v. City of Carmel, 101 N.E.3d 850, 860–61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

      I.      Trial Rule 41(E)
[6]   In its motion for summary judgment, the Bank argued that dismissal of the

      action was appropriate pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E) because the Appellants had

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023        Page 5 of 16
      failed to diligently pursue their claims. Trial Rule 41(E) provides for the

      dismissal of an action following a period of inaction, stating that

              [W]hen no action has been taken in a civil case for a period of
              sixty [60] days, the court, on motion of a party or on its own
              motion shall order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing such
              case. The court shall enter an order of dismissal at plaintiff’s
              costs if the plaintiff shall not show sufficient cause at or before
              such hearing. Dismissal may be withheld or reinstatement of
              dismissal may be made subject to the condition that the plaintiff
              comply with these rules and diligently prosecute the action and
              upon such terms that the court in its discretion determines to be
              necessary to assure such diligent prosecution.

      However, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[a] motion to dismiss for

      want of prosecution should not be granted if the plaintiff resumes diligent

      prosecution of his claim, even though, at some prior period of time, he has been

      guilty of gross negligence.” McClaine, 261 Ind. at 63, 300 N.E.2d at 344. “The

      burden is clearly on the defendant to timely file a motion to dismiss pursuant to

      [Trial Rule] 41(E). That is to say, the defendant must file his motion after the

      sixty-day period has expired and before the plaintiff resumes prosecution. Id.

      (emphases added).

[7]   More recently, in Babchuk v. Indiana University Health Tipton Hospital, Inc., 30

      N.E.3d 1252, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), we concluded that dismissal was

      inappropriate because it had not been requested prior to the plaintiff’s

      resumption of the case. In Babchuk, on May 29, 2014, after an approximately

      eighteen-month period of inactivity, Babchuk filed his motion to stay or, in the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023            Page 6 of 16
      alternative, for setting of a scheduling conference and the Hospital filed its

      motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The trial court granted the Hospital’s

      motion to dismiss. 30 N.E.3d at 1255. On appeal, we concluded that trial

      court had abused its discretion in granting the Hospital’s motion because the

      motion was untimely as it had not been “filed before Babchuk resumed

      prosecution of his case.” Id. (emphasis in original).

[8]   The Bank asserts that it elevates “form over substance” to base a ruling on

      dismissal under Trial Rule 41(E) on the chronological order in which motions

      are filed. Appellee’s Br. p. 12. However, McClaine and Babchuk make it clear

      that the chronological order in which the motions are filed is the determining

      factor as to the timeliness of a Trial Rule 41(E) motion to dismiss.

[9]   The Bank further asserts that Indiana jurisprudence has begun to move away

      from the so-called bright-line rule set forth in McClaine. In support, the Bank

      cites to our decision in Belcaster v. Miller, 785 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),

      trans. denied. In Belcaster, we noted that

              Courts of review generally balance several factors when
              determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in
              dismissing a case for failure to prosecute. These factors include:
              (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
              degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff; (4)
              the degree to which the plaintiff will be charged for the acts of his
              attorney; (5) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by
              the delay; (6) the presence or absence of a lengthy history of
              having deliberately proceeded in a dilatory fashion; (7) the
              existence and effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal
              which fulfill the purposes of the rules and the desire to avoid

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023          Page 7 of 16
               court congestion; (8) the desirability of deciding the case on the
               merits; and (9) the extent to which the plaintiff has been stirred
               into action by a threat of dismissal as opposed to diligence on the
               plaintiff’s part. Lee v. Friedman, 637 N.E.2d 1318, 1320 (Ind. Ct.
               App. 1994). “The weight any particular factor has in a particular
               case appears to depend upon the facts of that case.” Id.
               However, a lengthy period of inactivity may be enough to justify
               dismissal under the circumstances of a particular case, especially
               if the plaintiff has no excuse for the delay. Id.

       785 N.E.2d at 1167. The Bank asserts that our recognition of the above-quoted

       factors indicates a shift away from McClaine’s straight-line timeliness rule and a

       move towards giving trial court’s more discretion to consider whether dismissal

       is appropriate. We cannot agree with the Bank’s assertion, however, that our

       decision in Belcaster represents a move away from the Indiana Supreme Court’s

       decision in McClaine.

[10]   In Belcaster, there were four defendants, Fred Dempsey (“Dempsey”), Fairfield

       Realty (“Fairfield”), Becky Miller (“Miller”), and Matthew Miller

       (“Matthew”). Id. at 1166. After an approximate ten-month period of delay,

       Dempsey and Fairfield filed Trial Rule 41(E) motions to dismiss. Id. The

       motions prompted the Belcasters to file a “motion to set trial.” Id. Miller and

       Matthew subsequently filed Trial Rule 41(E) motions to dismiss. Id. Following

       a hearing, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss. Id. On appeal, the

       Belcasters argued that “the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint

       against Miller and Matthew because they filed their motion to set trial before

       Miller and Matthew filed their Trial Rule 41(E) motion to dismiss for failure to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023        Page 8 of 16
       prosecute.” Id. at 1168 (emphasis omitted). Considering the timeliness issue,

       we concluded as follows:

               [b]ecause the purpose of Trial Rule 41(E) is to ensure that
               plaintiffs diligently pursue their claims, this purpose is fulfilled if
               one defendant files a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
               before a plaintiff resumes prosecution. Therefore, in lawsuits
               involving more than one defendant, trial courts do not need to
               separate the various defendants when determining whether the
               plaintiff resumed prosecution before the filing of a Trial Rule
               41(E) motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.

       Id. at 1169. We do not read Belcaster as a move away from the Indiana

       Supreme Court’s decision regarding timeliness in McClaine, but rather a

       clarification that motions should be considered timely so long as at least one

       defendant files a motion to dismiss prior to resumption of prosecution. Further,

       the facts and circumstances at issue in Belcaster differ from those at issue in this

       case as Dempsey and Fairfield filed their motions to dismiss before the

       Belcasters took any action to resume prosecution of their case. No request for

       dismissal was made prior to resumption of prosecution in this case.

[11]   It is undisputed that there have been multiple, lengthy periods of inaction in this

       case. Following the most recent period of inaction, the Appellants resumed

       their prosecution of the case on May 17, 2022, by filing a motion for a case-

       management conference.2 The trial court granted the motion and the case-

       2
         The Bank does not assert that the Appellants’ request for a case-management conference was insufficient to
       constitute resumption of their prosecution of their case. Regardless, we concluded in Babchuk, we concluded

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023                              Page 9 of 16
       management conference was ultimately scheduled for August 22, 2022. The

       Bank did not file its motion for summary judgment, requesting a dismissal of

       the action, until August 12, 2022. In so far as the Bank’s motion sought

       dismissal for a failure to prosecute, the motion was untimely as it was not filed

       until after the Appellants had resumed their prosecution of the case. See

       McClaine, 261 Ind. at 63, 300 N.E.2d at 344; Babchuk, 30 N.E.3d at 1255; see

       also Baker Mach., Inc. v. Superior Canopy Corp., 883 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2008) (concluding that dismissal is appropriate only when the Trial Rule

       41(E) prompt is filed before resumption of the prosecution of the case), trans.

       denied. As such, we must agree with the Appellants that dismissal pursuant to

       Trial Rule 41(E) was inappropriate.

       II. Laches
[12]   The Bank alternatively argued below and contends on appeal that dismissal was

       warranted under the equitable doctrine of laches.

                Laches is an equitable defense that may be raised to stop a person
                from asserting a claim she would normally be entitled to assert.
                Indiana Real Estate Comm’n v. Ackman, 766 N.E.2d 1269, 1273
                (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Laches is neglect for an unreasonable
                length of time, under circumstances permitting diligence, to do
                what in law should have been done.” Gabriel v. Gabriel, 947
                N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “The general doctrine
                is well established and long recognized: ‘Independently of any

       that a request for a scheduling hearing, which is similar in nature to a case-management conference,
       “indicates a party’s intent to move forward with litigation” and “is sufficient to constitute resumption of
       prosecution for purposes of Trial Rule 41(E).” 30 N.E.3d at 1255.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023                                 Page 10 of 16
               statute of limitation, courts of equity uniformly decline to assist a
               person who has slept upon his rights and shows no excuse for his
               laches in asserting them.’” [SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen
               Cnty. Airport Auth., 831 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ind. 2005)] (quoting
               Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 698, 18 S.Ct.
               223, 42 L.Ed. 626 (1898)).

       Angel v. Powelson, 977 N.E.2d 434, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Stated differently,

       laches “‘is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and

       an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction

       with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing

       prejudice to the other party and thus acting as a bar in a court of equity.’”

       Thompson v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1002, 1005–06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting

       Douglas v. State, 634 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied.

[13]           The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff’s claim if a defendant
               establishes the following three elements of laches: (1)
               inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied
               waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions;
               and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the
               adverse party. SMDfund, 831 N.E.2d at 729. A mere lapse of
               time is not sufficient to establish laches; it is also necessary to
               show an unreasonable delay that causes prejudice or injury. Id.
               at 731. Prejudice may be created if a party, with knowledge of
               the relevant facts, permits the passing of time to work a change of
               circumstances by the other party. Id.

       Angel, 977 N.E.2d at 445.

[14]   Although the doctrine of laches is most commonly applied to cases in which a

       plaintiff has slept on their rights before initiating legal proceedings, it has also

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023          Page 11 of 16
       been applied to cases in which a plaintiff has slept on their rights after initiating

       legal proceedings. In Thompson, Thompson filed a petition for post-conviction

       relief (“PCR petition”) on August 17, 1992. 31 N.E.3d at 1004. He then

       “neglected to prosecute the petition until February 11, 2005 when he requested

       to proceed pro se by affidavit.” Id. In its March 8, 2005 response, the State

       argued that Thompson’s continued prosecution of his claim should be barred by

       the doctrine of laches, asserting that it had been prejudiced by Thompson’s

       delay in prosecuting his PCR petition. Id. Thompson then filed four separate

       amendments to his petition on various dates between May of 2005 and

       November of 2006. Id.

               Thompson took no further action to prosecute the PCR petition
               until July of 2012 when a new attorney appeared for Thompson.
               On December, 26, 2013, Thompson filed a fifth amendment to
               his PCR petition which raised several new claims of error as well
               as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

       Id. at 1005. The State again raised the defense of laches in response. Id.

       Following a hearing on laches, the post-conviction court granted the State’s

       motion to dismiss. Id.

[15]   In affirming the judgment of the post-conviction court, we noted the State’s

       argument that

               Thompson’s failure to prosecute his petition constituted an
               unreasonable delay in seeking relief. At the July 2, 2014 PCR
               hearing regarding laches, the State argued, “if you were to apply
               [Thompson’s] reasoning, then if a person is convicted today and
               files a PCR tomorrow[,] he can sit on his hands for twenty years
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023         Page 12 of 16
               later, wait for witnesses to die, wait for the case to go to crap and
               then say, [‘]no laches[’].” Tr. p. 48.

       Id. at 1007 (brackets in original). Finding the State’s laches argument to be

       persuasive, we concluded that “[a]lthough the particular facts of some cases

       may present a distinction between a delay in filing and a delay in prosecuting a

       PCR petition, we see no reason to draw such a distinction here as the prejudice

       to the State would be the same in either case.” Id. We further concluded that

       “[t]here was sufficient probative evidence to support the finding of laches.” Id.

       We find our opinion in Thompson to be instructive given that in this case, the

       Appellants filed their complaint and then did little to nothing for the next

       decade plus.

[16]   Turning our attention back to this case, we note that the trial court

       acknowledged the Bank’s laches argument but found that it “simply need not

       address the issue of laches having dismissed the case under Trial Rule 41.”

       Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 16. In dismissing the case under Trial Rule 41,

       however, the trial court made findings that also relate to the question of laches.

       First, the trial court found that the Appellants had allowed for a lengthy delay

       in proceedings with a total length of delay being “over 10 years.” Appellants’

       App. Vol. II p. 15. Specifically, the trial court found that

               Filing of a request for a case management conference for the first
               [time] after 11 years of the case pending should not save the
               [Appellants] from a decade of dilatory behavior. The delay in
               this case is egregious. It is true that [the Bank] did not do
               anything during those ten years, but it does not have to. The

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023         Page 13 of 16
        [Appellants] must prosecute the action and [they] did not, despite
        numerous opportunities to do so and numerous reminders
        triggered by withdrawals and appearances of counsel over the
        ten-year period.… The delay of over 10 years is not justifiable
        nor excusable, the length of that delay is egregious and the
        prejudice to the [Bank] is real.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 15. Regarding prejudice to the Bank, the trial court

found that

        [The Appellants have not] shown nor attempted to show, any
        just reason or excuse for the delay in this case other than prior
        counsel received a lot of documents to sort through. The
        collateral equipment in question has now been used for another
        twelve years, if it still exists, and any type of discovery to
        determine its fair market sale value back in 2009 or 2010 would
        be nearly impossible. The [Bank] points out that it no longer has
        contact or connections with nine of the ten former witnesses
        identified in 2014 and are prejudiced.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 15. The trial court also found that “the extreme

length of time of the delay in this case sands out” and the “prejudice to the

[Bank] is also multiplied by so much time.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 15.

The trial court further found that “there is a degree of personal responsibility on

the part of” the Appellants, they “are part of the cause of delay in not diligently

pursuing new counsel,” and their arguments that they had not engaged in any

deliberate dilatory behaviors “stretches the borders of credibility.” Appellants’

App. Vol. II p. 15.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023       Page 14 of 16
[17]   “A defendant relying on laches must show a lack of diligence by the plaintiff

       and prejudice to the defendant” and “the plaintiff has the burden of explaining

       its delay.” Simon v. City of Auburn, Ind., Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 519 N.E.2d 205,

       215 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). The trial court’s above-quoted findings

       demonstrate that the Bank had shown both prejudice and a lack of diligence by

       the Appellants and that the Appellants had failed to provide justifiable reasons

       for their lengthy delay. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court’s findings

       are supported by the designated evidence. As such, we further conclude that

       the Appellants should be barred by the doctrine of laches from continuing to

       pursue their claims against the Bank. The Appellants engaged in long periods

       of delay, which resulted in prejudice to the Bank. The length of the delay, at

       approximately ten years, was so long that we have no trouble equating the

       length of the delay to a waiver or an abandonment by the Appellants of their

       claims against the Bank.3 Thus, the trial court did not err in granting the Bank’s

       motion for summary judgment. See Morgan v. Dickelman Ins. Agency, Inc., 202

       N.E.3d 454, 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (providing that we may affirm the entry

       of summary judgment on any grounds supported by the designated evidentiary

       materials), trans. denied.

       3
         We are unconvinced by the Appellants’ assertion that, after ten years of delay by the Appellants, the Bank
       cannot assert laches merely because it did not include it as an affirmative defense in its answer to the
       Appellants’ complaint more than a decade ago. See Thompson, 31 N.E.3d at 1005 (allowing the State to raise
       the defense of laches almost twenty years after the initial PCR petition had been filed rather than requiring
       the State to have claimed laches in its original answer to the PCR petition).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023                              Page 15 of 16
[18]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-473 | August 23, 2023   Page 16 of 16