Court Opinion

ID: 9736698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:02:56.723123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:08.142704
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
¶ 1 I join the Majority in so far as it permits the enforcement of Taylor’s subpoena to obtain factual information contained in PennDOT’s investigative files. However, I disagree that opinion information in these same files is discoverable in this case.
¶ 2 The Majority concludes that the restrictions imposed by the trial court on disclosure of information met the purpose of § 3754 and consequently, there is “no violation of its terms.” Majority Opinion at 631. While I readily agree that the trial court imposed restraints on dissemination of materials during pre-trial preparation, the Majority does not address the potential effect of disclosure during trial. One can easily foresee a defense expert during direct or cross-examination, keeping in mind that PennDOT is not a party in this criminal case, disclosing information the Majority believes is protected by the trial court order. Therefore, I conclude that the application of § 3754 must be considered.
¶ 3 Initially, accepting PennDOT’s argument that § 3754 is designed to provide for uninhibited discourse among PennDOT employees and its experts, disclosure of factual information does not impact on this purpose. As a result, I do not find § 3754 applies to factual information in Penn-DOT’s possession even if it first appeared in an “in depth” study.
¶4 Given my conclusion that § 3754 is designed to protect opinions contained in such a study, I would remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of and exclusion of opinions. Appellee does not suggest, nor can I discern, the relevancy of PennDOT’s in-house opinions to the charge of vehicular homicide. Since it is Appellee who seeks the information, he must establish relevancy. Absent a showing of relevancy, I would prohibit disclosure of opinions and save for another day the question of applicability of § 3754.
¶ 5 By permitting disclosure of factual evidence, Appellee’s expert will be able to provide an informed opinion. Therefore, before beginning a constitutional analysis involving the application of § 3754 to criminal proceedings, I would require an initial showing of relevancy between the charges filed and the information sought. There being none in this case, I would vacate the trial court order and remand for that court to conduct an in camera review and exclude all non-factual materials.
¶ 6 ORIE MELVIN, J., joins.