Court Opinion

ID: 2963861
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:22.470224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:42.433070
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1730

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                RAFAEL ANTONIO CUEVAS,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                     [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Rosenn, Senior Circuit Judge,*
                                    ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

               Louis B. Abilheira for appellant.
               __________________

               Margaret E. Curran,  Assistant United States Attorney,  with
               __________________
          whom  Sheldon Whitehouse,  United States  Attorney, and  Edwin J.
                __________________                                 ________
          Gale,  Assistant United States  Attorney, were on  brief, for the
          ____
          United States.

                                 ____________________

                                   February 2, 1996
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

                 LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  Before he was convicted for being
                        _____________

            illegally  present in  the United  States  in violation  of 8

            U.S.C.    1326,  Rafael  Antonio  Cuevas, a  citizen  of  the

            Dominican  Republic, had  three separate encounters  with the

            Rhode Island  criminal justice system.   The primary question

            in this  sentencing appeal is  whether the disposition  of at

            least one of Cuevas' state offenses was a "conviction" for an

            "aggravated felony" under  the prior  offense enhancement  of

            U.S.S.G.    2L1.2(b)(2) (Nov.  1994).   Cuevas says  that the

            enhancement  does not apply to  him, arguing that  one of the

            offenses was not a "conviction" under state law, and that the

            others were not "aggravated felonies."  We hold otherwise, on

            the grounds  that the definition of "conviction"  is a matter

            of  federal, not state, law  and that Cuevas'  reading of the

            term "aggravated  felony" is foreclosed by  a recent decision

            of  this court.   Cuevas  falls within  the group as  to whom

            Congress and the Sentencing Commission intended longer prison

            terms   illegal  aliens previously deported  after aggravated

            felony convictions   and so we affirm his sentence.

                                        Facts
                                        _____

                 Each of the three times that  Cuevas faced charges under

            the criminal law in Rhode Island, he submitted a plea of nolo
                                                                     ____

            contendere, his plea  was accepted, he  was judged guilty  of
            __________

            the crime charged, and he was sentenced.  In 1983 he received

            three  years  probation  for  breaking and  entering  into  a

                                         -2-
                                          2

            building in the nighttime  with intent to commit  larceny; in

            1984 he  was sentenced to a year in prison plus probation for

            possession  of cocaine; and in  1986 he was  sentenced to two

            years probation for possession of cocaine.

                 Cuevas was deported  in 1989.  He  returned illegally in

            1990, then was arrested again in 1994 on another Rhode Island

            charge of cocaine  possession.  Once  again, he pleaded  nolo
                                                                     ____

            and was sentenced to  probation.  While serving that  term of

            probation,  he was  found  in the  United  States by  federal

            authorities.   He was subsequently indicted  in federal court

            on a charge of having been found in the United States without

            obtaining the  consent of the Attorney  General, in violation

            of  8 U.S.C.   1326.  He  pleaded guilty and was sentenced to

            fifty-seven  months in  prison under  U.S.S.G.   2L1.2.   His

            appeal raises two challenges to his sentence.

                         The "Aggravated Felony" Enhancement
                         ___________________________________

                 As in many sentencing  appeals, the consequences of this

            appeal to  the defendant  are not  negligible.   The district

            court  imposed a  sentence  of fifty-seven  months.1   Cuevas

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Section   2L1.2   of   the  Guidelines,   which   governs
            defendant's offense of conviction,  sets a base offense level
            of 8.   The district  court then added  sixteen levels  under
            subsection (b)(2) and subtracted three  levels for acceptance
            of responsibility  under   3E1.1,  producing a total  offense
            level  of 21.  Charted against a criminal history category of
            IV, that  offense level yielded  a sentencing range  of 57-71
            months;  the district court imposed sentence at the bottom of
            the range.

                                         -3-
                                          3

            says that he  should serve no  more than twenty-one  months.2

            He argues that  the 16-level enhancement he received  under  

            2L1.2(b)(2)  of the  Guidelines3  for having  previously been

            "deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony" cannot

            stand, because neither of the two cocaine possession offenses

            he  committed prior to his deportation  was a "conviction for

            an  aggravated   felony."4    He  contends   that  his  first

                                
            ____________________

            2.  While Cuevas asserts that   2L1.2(b)(2) does not apply to
            him, he concedes  that his BOL of 8 was subject at least to a
            4-level increase under   2L1.2(b)(1).  Subtracting two levels
            for  acceptance of responsibility  under   3E1.1(a), he would
            calculate his total offense level to  be 10, corresponding to
            a sentencing range of 15-21 months, given a  criminal history
            category of IV.

            3.  Under that guideline, defendants convicted under 8 U.S.C.
              1326 who previously have  been "deported after a conviction
            for  an  aggravated  felony"  are subject  to  a  substantial
            increase in their sentences:

                If  the defendant  previously  was deported  after  a
                conviction for an aggravated  felony, increase by  16
                levels.

            U.S.S.G.   2L1.2(b)(2)  (Nov. 1994).   Application note  7 to
              2L1.2 provides in relevant part:

                "Aggravated felony,"  as used  in subsection  (b)(2),
                means   . . .   any   illicit   trafficking  in   any
                controlled  substance  (as  defined   in  21   U.S.C.
                  802),  including  any  drug  trafficking  crime  as
                defined  in  18 U.S.C.     924(c)(2);  . . .  or  any
                attempt or conspiracy to  commit any such  act.   The
                term   "aggravated   felony"  applies   to   offenses
                described  in   the  previous   sentence  whether  in
                violation of federal or state law . . . .

            U.S.S.G.   2L1.2, comment. (n.7) (Nov. 1994).

            4.  Defendant also asserts that  his 1983 offense of breaking
            and  entering  cannot  be  characterized  as  an  "aggravated
            felony."  As the  government does not contest this  point, we

                                         -4-
                                          4

            violation was not itself an "aggravated felony," and that the

            disposition of his  second drug offense, to which  he pleaded

            nolo and for which  he received a sentence of  probation, was
            ____

            not  a "conviction" under Rhode  Island law.   We reject both

            prongs of Cuevas' challenge.

            A.   Whether the 1986 Disposition Was a "Conviction"
            __   _______________________________________________

                 Cuevas assumes  that whether the disposition  in 1986 of

            his second  cocaine possession offense is to  be considered a

            "conviction" for  purposes of the  Guidelines is a  matter of

            Rhode Island law.  He posits  that he was not "convicted"  of

            that offense under  Rhode Island law  and so  it cannot be  a

            conviction  for  purposes  of  Guidelines    2L1.2.5     This

            assumption is  unfounded.  In this Circuit and others, courts

            have  consistently held that whether a particular disposition

                                
            ____________________

            treat it as conceded.

            5.  He relies  on R.I.  Gen. Laws   12-18-3(a)  (1994), which
            provides:

                Whenever  any person  shall be  arraigned before  the
                district court  or superior  court,  and shall  plead
                nolo contendere, and  the court places the person  on
                probation  . . .,  then upon  the  completion  of the
                probationary period,  and absent  a violation of  the
                terms of the probation, the plea and probation  shall
                not  constitute   a  conviction   for  any   purpose.
                Evidence of  a plea of  nolo contendere followed by a
                period of probation, completed  without violation  of
                the terms  of said probation,  may not be  introduced
                in any court  proceeding, except that records may  be
                furnished  to  a  sentencing   court  following   the
                conviction  of an  individual for  a crime  committed
                subsequent to  the successful completion of probation
                on the prior offense.

                                         -5-
                                          5

            counts  as a "conviction" in the context of a federal statute

            is  a matter  of  federal determination.6   Under  applicable

            federal  standards,  Cuevas   was  clearly  "convicted"  with

            respect to  his 1986  cocaine  possession offense.   As  that

            offense was an "aggravated  felony," his 1989 deportation was

            "after a conviction" for at least one aggravated  felony, and

            the enhancement of   2L1.2(b)(2) was properly applied.

                 In  Molina v.  INS, 981  F.2d 14  (1st Cir.  1992), this
                     ______     ___

            court  addressed  the  meaning  of  a  statute  limiting  the

            availability of  amnesty from deportation  to illegal  aliens

            who  have "not  been convicted  of any  felony" while  in the

            United States.  8 U.S.C.   1255a(a)(4)(B).  The petitioner in

            that  case,  an illegal  alien,  admitted that  he  had twice

            pleaded nolo  contendere and  been sentenced to  probation on
                    ____  __________

            felony  drug charges under Rhode Island law.  Citing the same

            provision of Rhode  Island law upon which Cuevas relies here,

            see  R.I. Gen. Laws    12-18-3, the petitioner  argued that a
            ___

            nolo plea to a drug charge followed by a sentence of straight
            ____

            probation was not treated  as a "conviction" under  state law

            and, therefore, should  not be considered so for  purposes of

                                
            ____________________

            6.  The   particular  guideline   at  issue   here,    2L1.2,
            implements a statutory penalty  enhancement found  within the
            immigration laws.  See  8 U.S.C.   1326(b); United States  v.
                               ___                      _____________
            Restrepo-Aguilar, __ F.3d ___, ___,  No. 95-1660, slip op. at
            ________________
            3 n.2 (1st Cir. Jan.  30, 1996).  Thus, our understanding  of
            the  term "conviction" is informed both  by the law governing
            immigration  offenses as well as the law under the Guidelines
            governing the federal sentencing of those offenses.

                                         -6-
                                          6

            federal  law.  Molina, 981 F.2d at  19.  For the court, Judge
                           ______

            (now  Justice)  Breyer rejected  this  argument.   The  court

            specifically held that  the term "conviction" is  a matter of

            federal, not  state, definition.  Molina, 981  F.2d at 19-20;
                                              ______

            see also  White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 1994) ("As
            ________  _____    ___

            we   have  held   before,  federal   law  defines   the  term

            'conviction'  as  it is  used  in  the immigration  context."

            (citing Molina, 981 F.2d  at 19)).  The court noted that this
                    ______

            Circuit, forty years earlier,  had held that "the meaning  of

            the  word  'convicted' in  the federal  immigration law  is a

            federal  question."  Id.  at 19-20 (quoting  Pino v. Nicolls,
                                 ___                     ____    _______

            215 F.2d  237, 243 (1st  Cir. 1954) (Magruder,  J.) (internal

            quotation marks  omitted), rev'd  on other grounds,  349 U.S.
                                       _______________________

            901 (1955) (per curiam)).7

                 We follow Molina and  Pino and hold that the  meaning of
                           ______      ____

            the word  "conviction"  in   2L1.2(b)(2)  of  the  Sentencing

            Guidelines, which implements 8 U.S.C.   1326(b), a  provision

            found  within the  immigration laws,  is to be  determined in

            accordance with federal law.  See also White, 17 F.3d at 479;
                                          ________ _____

            Chong v. INS,  890 F.2d  284 (11th Cir.  1989) (per  curiam);
            _____    ___

            accord  Wilson v.  INS,  43 F.3d  211,  215 (5th  Cir.)  (per
            ______  ______     ___

                                
            ____________________

            7.  The  Supreme  Court in  its  Pino  decision expressed  no
                                             ____
            disagreement with Judge Magruder's statement that the meaning
            of "conviction"  is a  federal question,  but found  that the
            conviction at issue had  not attained "finality."   See Pino,
                                                                ___ ____
            349 U.S. at  901; Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d  211, 215 (5th Cir.)
                              ______    ___
            (per curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 59 (1995); Molina, 981
                          ____________                        ______
            F.2d at 20.

                                         -7-
                                          7

            curiam), cert. denied,  116 S. Ct.  59 (1995); Ruis-Rubio  v.
                     ____________                          __________

            INS, 380 F.2d 29  (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.  denied, 389
            ___                                        _____________

            U.S. 944 (1967).

                 Support  for this  conclusion  comes  from  outside  the

            context of  immigration statutes as  well.  For  example, the

            Seventh Circuit  has recently  held, in applying  the penalty

            enhancement provisions  of the Controlled Substances  Act, 21

            U.S.C.   841(b)(1)(B),  that  a plea  of  guilty to  a  state

            felony   offense  followed  by   a  sentence   of  probation8

            constitutes   a  "prior   conviction,"   even   though   that

            disposition  would  not be  so deemed  under  the law  of the

            convicting state.   See United States v.  McAllister, 29 F.3d
                                ___ _____________     __________

            1180, 1184 (7th Cir.  1994).9  Similarly, in 1983  this court

            held  that a defendant who had entered a nolo contendere plea
                                                     ____ __________

            and was  sentenced to probation  under Rhode  Island law  had

            been  "convicted"  of a  crime  for purposes  of  the federal

                                
            ____________________

            8.  For purposes  of determining whether a  state disposition
            is a  "conviction" as a  matter of  federal law, there  is no
            meaningful distinction  between a plea of  guilty followed by
            probation  and   a  plea  of  nolo   contendere  followed  by
                                          ____   __________
            probation.  United States v. Bustamante, 706 F.2d 13, 15 (1st
                        _____________    __________
            Cir.), cert.  denied, 464 U.S.  856 (1983);  cf. Sokoloff  v.
                   _____  ______                         ___ ________
            Saxbe, 501 F.2d 571, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating principle
            _____
            in context of 21 U.S.C.   824(a)(2) license revocation case).

            9.  Other  Circuits are  in  agreement  with McAllister  that
                                                         __________
            federal  law  governs  the  meaning of  "conviction"  in  the
            federal drug laws.  See United States v. Mejias, 47 F.3d 401,
                                ___ _____________    ______
            403-04  (11th Cir. 1995) (plea  of nolo in  state court, even
                                               ____
            with  adjudication  withheld,   is  conviction  for   federal
            purposes); United States v. Meraz, 998 F.2d 182, 183 (3d Cir.
                       _____________    _____
            1993);  United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 250 n.6 (4th
                    _____________    ________
            Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2446 (1993).
                        _____ ______

                                         -8-
                                          8

            felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm    statute,    18     U.S.C.

              922(h)(1),  even  though the  event  did  not  amount to  a

            "conviction" under  state law.  United  States v. Bustamante,
                                            ______________    __________

            706 F.2d 13, 14-15 (1st Cir.) (Breyer, J.), cert. denied, 464
                                                        _____ ______

            U.S. 856 (1983).

                 The decisions in Bustamante and, to a  lesser degree, in
                                  __________

            McAllister both  were based  in part  on the Supreme  Court's
            __________

            decision in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S.
                        _________    __________________________

            103 (1983).  In Dickerson, a defendant who had pleaded guilty
                            _________

            to  a state offense, served a term of probation, and received

            an  expungement of  his record  argued that  he had  not been

            "convicted"  of  that offense.    The  Court did  not  agree.

            Observing that a defendant "cannot be placed on probation  if

            the court does not deem him to be guilty of  a crime," id. at
                                                                   ___

            113-14,  the Court held that the  meaning of "conviction" for

            purposes of  the federal  gun control  statutes is a  federal

            matter:

                 Whether one has been "convicted within the language
                 of [a  federal] statute[]  is necessarily  . . .  a
                 question of  federal, not  state, law, despite  the
                 fact that the predicate offense  and its punishment
                 are defined by the law of the State.

            Id. at 111-12.
            ___

                 It  is  true, of  course,  that  the particular  outcome

            reached in Dickerson  under the federal gun  control laws was
                       _________

            effectively  abrogated  by  Congress  in May  1986,  when  it

            amended 18 U.S.C.    921(a)(20) to read as it currently does.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            That   congressional  action,   however,   reflects   not   a

            disagreement with  the  Court's reasoning,  but  merely  that

            Congress determined that its legislative objectives would  be

            better served by defining  "conviction" by reference to state

            law.     See  McAllister,   29  F.3d  at   1184-85  ("[W]hile
                     ___  __________

            interpreting federal  statutes is a question  of federal law,

            Congress can make the meaning of a statute dependent on state

            law.").   The  decisions  in Dickerson  and Bustamante  still
                                         _________      __________

            stand for the proposition that, absent legislative indication

            to the contrary, the meaning of  "conviction" for purposes of

            a  federal  statutory  scheme   is  to  be  determined  under

            prevailing federal law.   See   Yanez-Popp v.  INS, 998  F.2d
                                      ___   __________     ___

            231, 236  (4th Cir. 1993) ("[Dickerson] still  stands for the
                                         _________

            general proposition that federal  law governs the application

            of Congressional statutes in the absence of a  plain language

            to the contrary."); cf. McAllister, 29 F.3d at 1185 (treating
                                ___ __________

            Dickerson  as still  authoritative,  outside context  of  gun
            _________

            laws, for  principle that  guilty plea plus  probation equals

            conviction  under   federal  law).    Congress'  decision  to

            overrule the  particular result  reached in  Dickerson simply
                                                         _________

            reflects a  deliberate choice to define  "conviction" as used

            in a federal gun statute by reference to state law.

                 Congress has  not made the  same choice with  respect to

            the immigration laws.   See  Wilson, 43 F.3d  at 215;  Yanez-
                                    ___  ______                    ______

            Popp,  998 F.2d at 235; see also  Molina, 981 F.2d at 22 ("Of
            ____                    ________  ______

                                         -10-
                                          10

            course, federal  gun control  law is not  federal immigration

            law.").    Since the  May  1986  enactment  of the  statutory

            amendment to the gun  control laws that effectively abrogated

            Dickerson,  the courts    including this  one, see  White, 17
            _________                                      ___  _____

            F.3d at  479; Molina,  981 F.2d  at 19     have continued  to
                          ______

            define  "conviction" according  to uniform  federal standards

            for purposes of  the laws governing immigration offenses.  If

            Congress had disapproved of these cases, it surely could have

            amended the immigration laws  in the same fashion it  did the

            firearms  statute.   That Congress  has chosen  not to  do so

            reinforces our conclusion that "conviction" in the context of

            the  laws governing  immigration offenses,  including federal

            sentencing for  those offenses,  remains a matter  of federal

            definition.

                 The disposition of Cuevas' 1986 state cocaine possession

            offense  clearly   falls  within   the  scope  of   the  term

            "conviction," federally understood.  This  is true both as  a

            matter  of Guidelines interpretation and, more broadly, under

            the  law   governing  immigration  offenses.    Although  the

            particular guideline at issue  here (  2L1.2) does not define

            "conviction,"  the   guideline  that  contains   the  general

            instructions  for  assessing a  defendant's  criminal history

            does provide  clear guidance.   See  U.S.S.G.   4A1.2.   That
                                            ___

            guideline specifically provides that the phrase "'[c]onvicted

            of an offense'  . . . means that the  guilt of the  defendant

                                         -11-
                                          11

            has been established, whether by guilty  plea, trial, or plea

            of nolo contendere."  U.S.S.G.   4A1.2(a)(4) (Nov. 1994).10
               ____ __________

                 Relying in  part on   4A1.2,  this court held  in United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Pierce, 60  F.3d 886 (1st Cir. 1995),  petition for
            ______    ______                                 ________ ___

            cert. filed (Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-6474), that a prior state
            _____ _____

            "conviction"  is established  for Guidelines  purposes by  "a

            guilt-establishing event  (such as  a plea where  a defendant

            states  that he does not wish to  contest the charges)."  Id.
                                                                      ___

            at  892 (plea  of  nolo,  even  if  followed  by  a  withheld
                               ____

            adjudication,   constitutes   a   "conviction"  for   federal

            sentencing purposes);  see also  United States v.  Jones, 910
                                   ___ ____  _____________     _____

            F.2d  760, 761 (11th Cir.  1990) (per curiam)  (same).  Here,

            there  is no  dispute  that  whether  or not  Cuevas'  second

            cocaine  offense could  be  considered  a "conviction"  under

            Rhode Island law, he was indeed adjudged guilty of that crime

            following his nolo  plea and was sentenced to probation based
                          ____

            on  that plea.   Cf.  Dickerson, 460  U.S. at  113-14 ("[O]ne
                             ___  _________

            cannot be placed on probation if the court does not deem  him

            to  be  guilty  of a  crime.").    It seems  clear  under the

                                
            ____________________

            10.  Although the direct applicability  of this definition is
            limited to  the "purposes of [  4A1.2]"  itself, the purposes
                                                                 ________
            underlying  the  Guidelines'  criminal   history  computation
            provisions  are the  same  as the  purpose  behind the  prior
            offense enhancement  contained  in   2L1.2(b)(2)    i.e.,  to
                                                                ____
            provide   increased  sentences   for   defendants  who   have
            demonstrated recidivist  tendencies.  The  guidance given  in
              4A1.2 is instructive, if not dispositive.

                                         -12-
                                          12

            Guidelines,  then, that  Cuevas was  "convicted" of  the 1986

            cocaine offense.

                 Furthermore, even  outside the specific  context of  the

            Guidelines, the law is  plain that a state's acceptance  of a

            defendant's plea of nolo contendere on a drug charge followed
                                ____ __________

            by  imposition  of  a   probationary  sentence  counts  as  a

            "conviction"  for  purposes  of   the  statutes  relating  to

            immigration offenses.  White, 17  F.3d at 479;11 Molina,  981
                                   _____                     ______

            F.2d at 18; Ruis-Rubio, 380 F.2d at 29-30.   We conclude that
                        __________

            Cuevas was "convicted" in 1986 of his second cocaine offense,

            both  within the  meaning of  the  Guidelines and  within the

            broader context of the laws governing immigration offenses.

                                
            ____________________

            11.  In White, we said  that a disposition meets the  federal
                    _____
            definition of "conviction" for purposes of the laws governing
            immigration offenses if:

                (1) a judge  or jury has found the alien guilty or he
                [or  she] has  entered  a  plea  of  guilty  or  nolo
                contendere  or  has  admitted  sufficient  facts   to
                warrant a finding of guilty;
                (2) the  judge has  ordered some  form of punishment,
                penalty, or restraint  on the person's liberty to  be
                imposed . . .; and
                (3)  a  judgment of  adjudication  of  guilt  may  be
                entered if the  person violates the  terms of his [or
                her]  probation   or   fails  to   comply  with   the
                requirements    of   the   court's   order,   without
                availability  of  further proceedings  regarding  the
                person's guilt or innocence of the original charge.

            White,  17 F.3d  at  479 (quoting  Matter  of Ozkok,  Interim
            _____                              ________________
            Decision  3044, 19 I. &  N. Dec. 546,  551-52 (B.I.A. 1988));
            see also Wilson, 43 F.3d at  213-14 (adopting Ozkok); Molina,
            ________ ______                               _____   ______
            981 F.2d at  18 (quoting Ozkok).   All of  these factors  are
                                     _____
            satisfied  by   the  disposition  of   Cuevas'  1986  cocaine
            possession offense.

                                         -13-
                                          13

                 Once the disposition  of Cuevas' second  cocaine offense

            is recognized to  be a conviction, it clearly  constitutes an

            "aggravated  felony"   under  U.S.S.G.    2L1.2(b)(2).     An

            "aggravated  felony"  includes any  "drug  trafficking crime"

            within  the  meaning  of  18 U.S.C.    924(c)(2).    U.S.S.G.

              2L1.2, comment. (n.7).  A "drug trafficking crime"  in turn

            encompasses,  inter  alia, any  offense  that is  both  (1) a
                          _____  ____

            felony and (2) punishable under the Controlled Substances Act

            (21 U.S.C.   801 et seq.).  See 18 U.S.C.   924(c)(2); United
                             __ ____    ___                        ______

            States v.  Restrepo-Aguilar, __  F.3d ___, ___,  No. 95-1660,
            ______     ________________

            slip op.  at 7  (1st Cir.  Jan. 30,  1996); United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            Forbes,  16 F.3d  1294,  1301 (1st  Cir.  1994).   Here,  the
            ______

            defendant's second  offense of  simple possession  of cocaine

            undoubtedly  qualifies as  a felony  in the  requisite sense.

            Forbes, 16  F.3d  at  1301  (explaining that  a  second  drug
            ______

            possession offense  is punishable  as a felony  under federal

            law).12   And  cocaine possession  is, of  course, punishable

            under the Controlled Substances Act.  See 21 U.S.C.   844(a).
                                                  ___

            Thus,  the  offense  falls  within the  definition  of  "drug

                                
            ____________________

            12.  The possession offense, which was punishable under Rhode
            Island law by a maximum of three years imprisonment, see R.I.
                                                                 ___
            Gen. Laws   21-28-4.01(C)(1)(a), is also a felony under state
            law,  see R.I.  Gen. Laws   11-1-2  (defining "felony"  as an
                  ___
            offense punishable  by a  term of imprisonment  exceeding one
            year).  Thus, regardless whether  the offense would have been
            punishable  as  a  felony  under  federal  law,  the  offense
            qualifies as a felony for purposes of the definition of "drug
            trafficking crime."   See  Restrepo-Aguilar, __ F.3d  at ___,
                                  ___  ________________
            slip op. at 9.

                                         -14-
                                          14

            trafficking  crime" under  18 U.S.C.    924(c)(2), and  is an

            "aggravated   felony"   within   the   meaning   of  U.S.S.G.

              2L1.2(b)(2) and  application note  7.  The  district court,

            therefore,  properly increased  the defendant's  base offense

            level by 16 levels.

            B.   Whether the 1984 Offense Was a "Felony"
            __   _______________________________________

                 Even were one to  assume that the disposition of Cuevas'

            1986 cocaine offense was not a "conviction," his challenge to

            the application of   2L1.2(b)(2) would fail, because his 1984

            conviction  for   cocaine  possession   was  itself   for  an

            "aggravated felony."   As to his 1984 cocaine offense, Cuevas

            does  not dispute that he was "convicted."  Rather, he argues

            that,  while the offense was a felony under Rhode Island law,

            it  would  have  been punishable  only  as  a misdemeanor  if

            prosecuted  under federal law,  and therefore could  not be a

            "felony," nor a "drug  trafficking crime," nor an "aggravated

            felony" for purposes of    2L1.2(b)(2).  We recently rejected

            precisely  this  argument,  however,  in   United  States  v.
                                                       ______________

            Restrepo-Aguilar, __ F.3d ___, No. 95-1660 (1st Cir. Jan. 30,
            ________________

            1996).  Thus, even apart from Cuevas' 1986 cocaine possession

            offense, the  district  court properly  enhanced  defendant's

            sentence by 16 levels in view of  his 1984 offense, which was

            itself an "aggravated felony" under   2L1.2(b)(2).

                        Criminal History Category Computation
                        _____________________________________

                                         -15-
                                          15

                 Cuevas argues that the district  court erroneously added

            two points  to  his Guidelines  criminal history  computation

            based on a  finding that defendant had  committed his federal

            offense  of conviction  while under  a sentence  of probation

            imposed by the Rhode Island state court for a 1994 state drug

            offense.  See U.S.S.G.   4A1.1(d) (Nov. 1994) ("Add  2 points
                      ___

            if the  defendant committed  the instant offense  while under

            any criminal justice sentence, including probation . . . .").

            Defendant  contends that because  he illegally  reentered the

            United  States  in 1990,  he  could not  have  committed that

            offense while  under his  1994  state probationary  sentence.

            This argument has no more than superficial appeal.

                 The unambiguous terms of  the statute under which Cuevas

            was convicted  establish that a deported  alien who illegally

            reenters and  remains in the  United States  can violate  the

            statute at three  different points in time: when he "enters,"

            "attempts to enter,"  or when he  "is at  any time found  in"

            this  country.  8  U.S.C.   1326(a).   As was said  in United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Rodriguez, 26  F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 1994), "we think it
            ______    _________

            plain  that 'enters,' 'attempts to enter' and 'is at any time

            found  in'  describe  three  distinct occasions  on  which  a

            deported alien can violate Section 1326."  Id. at 8.
                                                       ___

                 Cuevas was  indicted  specifically for  the  offense  of

            being "found" in the United States in violation of   1326(a).

            That was the  charge to which he pleaded guilty.   Thus, even

                                         -16-
                                          16

            though  defendant  illegally reentered  the United  States in

            1990, he committed his   1326(a) offense in 1995, when he was

            "found."  Rodriguez,  26 F.3d  at 8.   He was  unquestionably
                      _________

            serving a  criminal probationary sentence for  his 1994 state

            drug  conviction at  that time.   There  was no error  in the

            district court's application of U.S.S.G.   4A1.1(d).

                 Affirmed.
                 _________

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                                          17