Court Opinion

ID: 9569256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:11:58.877657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:37.844875
License: Public Domain

Justice KOURLIS
specially concurring:
I join the Majority opinion; however I write separately to emphasize certain matters of fact and law.
I.
First, on the substantive issue before the court, it is my view that the Denver District Court (Denver Court) had no jurisdiction or authority to change or affect the Adams County District Court (Adams Court) sentence and did not, in fact, affect that sentence. The Denver Court’s authority was limited to making findings regarding the defendant’s status for its own sentencing purposes. See Outler v. Norton, 934 P.2d 922, 926-27 (Colo.App.1997).
The Denver Court was directed by the court of appeals to determine whether Meredith’s first sentence had been discharged. See People v. Meredith, No. 93CA10832 (Colo.App.l994)(not selected for publication). In fact, some of the confusion in this case might have been avoided if the Adams Court had been the one to make that determination.
However, the Denver Court did ultimately hold a hearing on the issue of the status of the defendant, to determine whether the pre-sentence confinement time that Meredith had served should be applied against the Denver sentence. The Denver Court was within its jurisdiction to entertain that question because it related directly to the Denver sentence. For example, a sentencing court may make findings regarding a defendant’s previous parole status in order to decide whether to impose a sentence in the aggravated range. See § 18-l-105(9)(a), 6 C.R.S. (1997) *605(requiring a minimum sentence of midpoint in the presumptive range if defendant was on parole for another felony at the time of commission of the offense).
However, in my view, any findings that the Denver Court made regarding the status of the Adams County sentence are not binding upon either the Adams Court or the Department of Corrections (DOC), except insofar as the Denver order directed the DOC to apply presentence confinement credit to the Denver sentence.1 If the DOC has already applied presentenee confinement credit to the Adams County sentence, it must reallocate that credit to the Denver sentence pursuant to court order.
II.
Second, our holding today does not reallocate responsibility for the application of pre-sentence confinement credit. It is clear in the statutes that the DOC has primary statutory responsibility for determining how to apply presentence confinement credit and I do not believe that this opinion questions that authority.
The statute addressing presentence confinement credit provides:
A person who is confined for an offense prior to the imposition of sentence for said offense is entitled to credit against the term of his sentence for the entire period of such confinement. At the time of sentencing, the court shall make a finding of the amount of presentenee confinement to which the offender is entitled and shall include such finding in the mittimus. Such period of confinement shall be deducted from the sentence by the department of corrections. If a defendant is serving a sentence or is on parole for a previous offense when he commits a new offense and he continues to serve the sentence for the previous offense while charges on the new offense are pending, the credit given for presentenee confinement under this section shall be granted against the sentence the defendant is currently serving for the previous offense and shall not be granted against the sentence for the new offense.
§ 16-11-306, 6 C.R.S. (1997).
The prior version of this statute provided for significant court discretion in the imposition of presentence confinement credit (PCC). In 1979 the statute was repealed and reenacted to remove that discretion. See Godbold v. District Court, 623 P.2d 862, 864 (Colo.1981); People v. Dempsey, 624 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo.App.1981). In Dempsey, the court of appeals held that:
[Section 16-11-306) removes from the trial court the discretion whether to grant or deny a defendant credit against his sentence for presentence confinement time, and imposes upon the Department of Corrections a duty to assure that credit is given in every case. Under the [statute as amended], the only judicial function is to make a finding of fact concerning the number of days spent by a defendant in pre-sentenee confinement.
Dempsey, 624 P.2d at 375. See also People v. Patrick, 683 P.2d 801, 803 (Colo.App.1983); People v. Hardman, 653 P.2d 763, 764 (Colo.App.1982).
In 1988 the statute was again amended to add the last sentence regarding the allocation of PCC days between sentences. Under the new language, if a defendant reoffends while on parole, any time served awaiting disposition of the second charge must be applied to the first sentence. The purpose of this language is to ensure that inmates do not receive double credit (against both the first and second sentences) for presentence incarceration. See Outler v. Norton, 934 P.2d 922, 927 (Colo.App.1997).
All cases decided prior to the addition of the most recent amendment to the statute indicate that the sole judicial function in connection with presentence confinement credit against a DOC sentence is to include on the mittimus the number of PCC days to which the defendant is entitled. See Patrick, 683 P.2d at 803; Hardman, 653 P.2d at 764; Dempsey, 624 P.2d at 375. The DOC then *606has the statutory duty to credit the defendant with those PCC days. See Dempsey, 624 P.2d at 375. The amendment does not, in my view, change that allocation of responsibility. Hence, ministerial computation of days would remain the sole judicial function, and the DOC would be charged with applying the days to determine discharge date or parole eligibility date.
The court of appeals’ opinion in Outler supports this interpretation of the statute and presents a remarkably similar factual setting to the case now before us. In Outler, the defendant was on parole when he committed a second offense. At a reconsideration hearing on the second sentence, the second sentencing court made a finding that the defendant had completed the first sentence and therefore had not been on parole at the time of the second offense. The People did not appeal that ruling. The difference between the present case and Outler is that the second sentencing court in Outler apparently did not actually order the DOC to apply PCC days to the second sentence. When the DOC applied the PCC days to the first sentence as was compelled by statute, the defendant filed a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) action naming the DOC as a party. In the Rule 106 proceeding, the trial court ruled that the DOC was required to apply the PCC days to the second sentence because of the second sentencing court’s finding that the defendant had not been on parole at the time of the second offense. The Outler opinion does not state the purpose for which the second sentencing court made a finding regarding parole status. There is also no mention of the second sentencing court actually ordering the DOC to apply PCC days to its sentence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the second sentencing court’s finding would not bind the DOC regarding whether or not the first sentence had been completed. The procedural posture of Out-ler presented different issues to the court than those raised in this case, however, both eases reaffirm the principal responsibility of the DOC to apply presentence confinement credit. Both cases also support the notion that one sentencing court may not bind another sentencing court.
III.
I turn now to the procedural posture of the case. We have before us an original proceeding brought by Meredith to seek enforcement of the Denver Court order. That order was directed to the DOC, and the DOC has ignored it.
In Outler, the only order that was directed to the DOC regarding PCC days came from the district court in the Rule 106 proceeding. The DOC did, in fact, appeal that order, and the Outler case was the result of that timely appeal. The Outler court held that the DOC was entitled to notice and a hearing regarding defendant’s parole status for purposes of applying PCC days. See Outler, 934 P.2d at 927.
Both logically and by operation of precedent, the proper way to raise a PCC issue that involves parole determination would be a proceeding of which the DOC had notice. If the DOC has the statutory responsibility for assigning PCC days as reflected on the mitti-mus, and if the defendant disagrees with that assignment, the proper method would be to do as the defendant in Outler and file a Rule 106 action asking the court to review the DOC’s finding regarding parole status.
Here, the DOC likely had no knowledge that any court had made a determination regarding the application of PCC days until the Denver Court entered its August 11,1997 Order commanding the DOC to apply the credits against the second sentence.2 Because this is a criminal case between the People and the defendant, the DOC had no standing to intervene and make its arguments. See People v. Ham, 734 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Colo.1987).
However, in order to function, the courts must necessarily presume that the People represent the position of the DOC whenever necessary. The People have the duty to obtain such information from the DOC as is necessary and to present that information to the courts in a timely manner.
*607Here, once the People obtained the DOC information, they filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the DOC’s synopsis.3 In this synopsis, as well as in its briefs to this court, the DOC argues that the first sentencing court, not the second, had jurisdiction to determine whether its sentence had been discharged. Again, I emphasize that I agree that the Denver Court’s order could not force the DOC to discharge Meredith on the Adams County sentence. The Denver Court had no jurisdiction to enter such an order. I agree with the Majority that under Bullard v. Department of Corrections, 949 P.2d 999 (Colo.1997), “a district court lacks authority to address the circumstances around a plea bargain, judgment of conviction, or court sentence entered in another district court.” Maj. op. at 602. However, I also agree with the distinction drawn by the Majority that this does not divest the second sentencing court of its authority to make factual determinations relating to its own sentence.
The Denver Court’s second order dated September 18, 1997 then denied the People’s motion and again ordered the DOC to comply with its order regarding the allocation of PCC days. At this point, the DOC filed a C.A.R. 21 petition with this court asking for relief. The Rule 21 petition seeking intervention was filed on October 3,1997. In this petition, the DOC noted that the People had advised that they would not appeal the September 18, 1997 Order. The petition was denied.
Once the DOC had exhausted its remedies, it continued to ignore the Denver Court order. I cannot sanction the DOC’s continued refusal to comply with an unappealable court order. Certainly in general, the DOC must comply with whatever court orders are issued, or assure that the appropriateness of those orders is raised and resolved in a timely manner.
The People erred. The District Attorney conceded the discharge of the first sentence, thereby conceding not only a factual issue, but also a jurisdictional issue. That concession misled the trial court and disadvantaged the DOC. Nonetheless, it resulted in a final order directing that presentence confinement credit be applied to the Denver sentence. That order binds the DOC, and the DOC must credit Meredith with 210 days of pre-sentence confinement credit on the Denver sentence. In order to serve the statutory goal of assuring that credit is not twice applied, the DOC must also subtract that same credit from the Adams County sentence, to the extent it was previously applied.
The only grounds upon which the DOC could ignore the Denver Court order would have been if Denver had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter such an order. There are, for example, certain issues that fall outside of the court’s discretion, such as assignment of a defendant to a particular placement. Cf. McDonnell v. Juvenile Court, 864 P.2d 565, 569 (Colo.1993) (finding, in a C.A.R. 21 proceeding, that the juvenile court could not order the Department of Institutions not to place a juvenile in a specific institution); People v. Young, 894 P.2d 19, 20 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that “a sentencing court has no authority to assign a defendant to [Regimented Inmate Training because] such authority has been delegated to the executive director of the Department of Corrections”).
In this case, although the application of presentence confinement credit is an area left to DOC execution, the courts have a role in calculating it and including it on the mitti-mus for a given sentence. The Denver Court had subject matter jurisdiction sufficient to support the order it entered.
Hence, I agree that the DOC is bound by the Denver Court order and must apply 210 days of credit to Meredith’s Denver sentence.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice VOLLACK joins in this special concurrence.

. For example, the Denver court would have had no jurisdiction to determine that the Adams County sentence was discharged and order the DOC not to hold Meredith any longer on the Adams County sentence.

. The DOC's brief and accompanying documentation reflect that this determination resulted in erroneously accelerating Meredith’s discharge date.

. As noted by the Majority, the People had conceded the point at the earlier hearing. It is not surprising then that the district attorney apparently did not zealously press the DOC's position, and later refused to appeal the order.