Court Opinion

ID: 9684039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:24.322076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.498692
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION . FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery. Punishment, enhanced by allegations and proof of two pri- or convictions, was fixed at life.
On original submission the conviction was reversed because of improper admonishment of the punishment range upon entry of appellant’s guilty plea. Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P. This is the extent of the admonishment given appellant as to the range of punishment:
“JUDGE: You plead guilty knowing that the penalty could be up to life imprisonment?
“MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir.
“JUDGE: And the lowest you could get, would be what, five years?
“MR. DIETZE [Prosecutor]: Assuming he is found guilty, habitual, assuming he is the same person, two previous convictions, it would be automatic life.
“JUDGE: You understand all about • that, and you still want to plead guilty?
“MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir.
“JUDGE: The Court will accept your plea.”
Article 26.13, supra, provides in part:
“(a) Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of:
“(1) the range of the punishment attached to the offense; .

“(c) In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.”
*830On original submission the Court held that the statement made by the prosecutor regarding automatic life punishment for an habitual offender could not satisfy the requirement of Art. 26.13, supra, that the court admonish the accused, citing Whitten v. State, 587 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Cr.App.), and Murray v. State, 561 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.Cr.App.). Murray, quoted in Whitten, held:
“The statute provides that it is the trial court which must admonish the accused of the range of punishment attached to the offense. The statute is mandatory: It does not allow the defense attorney, or the prosecutor, or the clerk of the court, or anyone but the judge himself, to admonish the accused of the range of punishment.”
In Whitten on rehearing, this theme was developed:
“Substantial compliance will also be found where a required admonishment is given, but is given in a different form than that prescribed by the statute yet which effectively satisfied the statutory requirements, [citations omitted.] . [T]here are two essential elements in these tolerated admonishments that are present in every case. First, the trial court gives the admonishment and, second, it is given directly to the defendant.
“In Art. 26.13, the legislature mandated that the trial court be responsible for giving the admonishment . . . The trial court, not the prosecutor, must satisfy itself as to the propriety of guilty pleas and defendants should properly look to the trial court, not the prosecutor, for admonishments on the law. The necessary participation of the trial court is a consistent requirement.
“The defendant must also be the object of the admonishment. To comply with both Texas law and federal due process, the defendant , must hear and understand the admonishments.”
On reconsideration we conclude that in this case the basic essentials of substantial compliance were present in the admonishment on the range of punishment set out above. Although the prosecutor spoke the words used to inform appellant of the automatic life sentence that could be imposed, it was the trial judge who first elicited that information from the prosecutor while addressing appellant, when he asked, “And the lowest you could get, would be what, five years?”, and it was the trial judge who then immediately adopted the prosecutor’s statement when he asked appellant, “You understand all about that, and you still want to plead guilty?”
The fact that the words actually stating the possible automatic life punishment were not spoken by the trial judge does not preclude a finding that the trial court was responsible for giving the admonishment. The facts here strike us as analogous to the use of a translator by the court to admonish a defendant who cannot understand English. The fact that in such a situation the actual communication to the accused is not spoken by the trial judge would not preclude a finding of compliance with Art. 26.13, supra. The words spoken by the translator would no doubt be found to be adopted by the court as its own. Similarly, the prosecutor’s words in this case appear to have been adopted by the trial court as its own.
While the style used is no model form to be condoned or copied, we nevertheless find the trial court was being responsible for giving the admonishment and was satisfying itself as to the propriety of appellant’s plea. We also conclude that the response made by appellant demonstrates his participation as the object and recipient of the admonishment. The two essentials of substantial compliance explained in Whitten on rehearing were present.
Both of the grounds of error raised in this appeal rest on the argument that the punishment admonishment was inadequate. No attempt was made to show appellant was not aware of the consequences of his plea or that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment actually given. Having found substantial compliance with Art. 26.-13, supra, the grounds of error are overruled.
*831The State’s motion for rehearing is granted, the prior reversal is set aside, and the judgment is affirmed.
ROBERTS, J., concurs in the result.