Court Opinion

ID: 9905199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 21:10:39.096515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:34.749896
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Sessley v. Grinston, 2023-Ohio-4281.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Tyler Sessley,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,              :              No. 23AP-238
                                                                (C.P.C. No. 18CV-5596)
v.                                                 :
                                                              (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Larry Grinston et al.,                             :

                 Defendants-Appellees.             :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on November 21, 2023

                 On brief: Tyler Sessley, pro se.

                 On brief: Baxter & Borowicz Co., LPA, Erik Brunkhorst, and
                 Louis M. Borowicz. Argued: Erik Brunkhorst.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Tyler Sessley, appeals from the September 15, 2020 order
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying her motion for default judgment
against defendant-appellee, Larry Grinston. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} This case has a complicated procedural history that is relevant to the
disposition of this appeal. Accordingly, a brief discussion of the case’s procedural posture
is required insofar as it relates to the assignments of error. On July 2, 2018, Ms. Sessley
and Tyrone “Bruce” Wen filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, abuse of access,
No. 23AP-238                                                                                                       2

trespass, and unlawful eviction against Thelma Black and her son Hugh Black.1 (July 2,
2018 Compl.) At the time of filing, Ms. Sessley and Mr. Wen requested the Franklin County
Clerk of Courts serve two copies of the complaint and summons on Ms. Black and her son
by certified mail at the same address: 1275 East 15th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43221.
(July 2, 2018 Request for Certified Mail Service.) The clerk’s office issued service on July 3,
2018, with copies of the two certified mail receipts filed on July 5, 2018. (July 5, 2018
Proofs of Service Issued.)
         {¶ 3} The receipt for the certified mail addressed to Ms. Black was returned with a
signature to the clerk of courts, which docketed a copy of the return receipt with the
notation that service was completed successfully on July 6, 2018.2 (July 11, 2018 Signed
Certified Mail Return Receipt.) Later that same month, the plaintiffs requested personal
service by the Sheriff’s Office and also service by ordinary mail on both Ms. Black and her
son at the same East 15th Avenue address. (July 23, 2018 Request for Personal Service;
July 23, 2018 Request for Service by Ordinary Mail.) Thereafter, the Sheriff’s Office filed
two notices to the docket, stating that service was successfully completed on Ms. Black’s
son at the listed address but was unsuccessful on Ms. Black, listing the reason as
“Deceased.” (Aug. 1, 2018 Writs of Service.)
         {¶ 4} The case progressed with Mr. Black participating as the sole active defendant.
On September 12, 2018, Ms. Sessley filed a document titled “Notice of Suggestion of Death
and Substitution of Party Under Civil Rule 25(A),” indicating Ms. Black had died on
June 24, 2018, Larry Grinston was appointed executor of her estate on July 18, 2018, and
the “Estate of Thelma Black should be substituted as the defendant for Thelma Black
pursuant to the Ohio Civil Rule 25(A).”                   (Sept. 12, 2018 Notice at 1.)              Ms. Sessley
subsequently requested service of the complaint and summons by certified mail on Mr.
Grinston, in his capacity as the estate executor, at 1254 North Fourth Street, Columbus,
Ohio. (Sept. 22, 2018 Request for Certified Mail Service.) She also requested that the clerk

1 The claims arose out of a 2016 rental agreement between the parties that is not relevant to the narrow

issue in this appeal. (July 2, 2018 Compl. at ¶ 7.)

2 The trial court uses the date of delivery as the date of service in its entries. (See, e.g., Oct. 29, 2020 Decision

and Entry at 1.) We use the date on which the return of service was filed to the docket as the date of service.
This discrepancy does not bear on the legal analysis, but we note it here for clarity.
No. 23AP-238                                                                               3

serve Ms. Black by certified mail again at 1275 East 15th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio.
(Sept. 22, 2018 Request for Certified Mail Service.)
       {¶ 5} On October 1, 2018, Mr. Wen, acting pro se, filed a notice under Civ.R. 41(A)
voluntarily dismissing his claims. (Oct. 1, 2018 Notice of Partial Dismissal.) At that time,
the trial court erroneously terminated the entire case, noting on the attached disposition
sheet that the case had been voluntarily dismissed. (Id.) Two days later, Ms. Sessley moved
to reactivate the case, informing the court that the partial dismissal only applied to Mr.
Wen’s claims. (Oct. 3, 2018 Mot.) On November 15, 2018, a copy of the certified mail
receipt addressed to Mr. Grinston was returned as undelivered, with a notation stating
“Unable to Forward.” (Nov. 15, 2018 Unclaimed Certified Mail Receipt.)
       {¶ 6} Ms. Sessley’s motion to reinstate the case remained pending for the next year
and a half, during which time the original trial court judge retired and was replaced by his
successor. On March 2, 2020, the trial court granted Ms. Sessley’s motion and reactivated
the case. (Mar. 2, 2020 Decision and Entry.) The court’s order also granted Ms. Sessley’s
motion to substitute Ms. Black’s estate for Ms. Black as a party-defendant. (Id.) Thereafter,
on March 30, 2020, Ms. Sessley made additional requests for personal and certified mail
service on Mr. Grinston as executor of the estate at the same North Fourth Street address
as her previous attempts. (Mar. 30, 2020 Request for Certified Mail Service.) Finally, on
April 15, 2020, personal service was obtained on Mr. Grinston. (Apr. 15, 2020 Writ of
Service.) And on May 16, 2020, Ms. Sessley filed a motion for default judgment against the
estate. (May 16, 2020 Mot.)
       {¶ 7} Mr. Grinston filed his answer and a memorandum opposing the motion for
default judgment on May 27, 2020, requesting that the trial court grant him leave to file his
answer instanter due to excusable neglect. (May 27, 2020 Mot.) In an entry filed
September 15, 2020, the court denied Ms. Sessley’s motion for default judgment and
granted Mr. Grinston’s motion for leave to file his answer out of rule pursuant to
Civ.R. 6(B). (Sept. 15, 2020 Decision and Entry.)      Ms. Sessley subsequently moved for
reconsideration of this order, which was denied on October 29, 2020. (Sept. 22, 2020 Mot.;
Oct. 29, 2020 Decision and Entry.) After the trial court denied several substantive motions,
a jury trial was eventually set for May 23, 2022. (Oct. 5, 2021 Entry Granting Continuation
of Trial Date.)
No. 23AP-238                                                                                                 4

        {¶ 8} Following a week-long trial, a jury returned verdicts in favor of Mr. Grinston,
as executor of the estate, on all of Ms. Sessley’s claims.3 Nearly a year later, the trial court
entered a final judgment in accordance with the jury verdicts. (Mar. 21, 2023 Jgmt. Entry.)4
        {¶ 9} On April 14, 2023, Ms. Sessley filed her notice of appeal from the trial court’s
October 29, 2020 journal entry denying her motion to reconsider the court’s earlier denial
of a default judgment against Ms. Black’s estate.
II. Assignments of Error
        {¶ 10} Ms. Sessley assigns the following assignments of error for our review:
                 [I.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and abused its
                 discretion by denying appellants motion for default judgment
                 when the evidence in the court record show the criteria for
                 granting a default judgment had been met and appellee failed
                 to adhere to the Ohio Civil Rules of Procedures to timely file an
                 answer to the complaint and failed to meet the criteria for
                 excusable neglect.

                 [II.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and abused its
                 discretion by not limiting its review of its initial order to the
                 sole issue of excusable neglect when it denied appellants
                 default motion.

                 [III.] The trial court erred as a matter of law, abused its
                 discretion, and committed obvious error when it held that
                 Appellant was required to serve Grinston’s attorney in order to
                 complete the substitution of Grinston under Civ Rule 25(A),
                 Civ Rule 25€, Civ. Rule 4 and Civ Rule 5 in violation of Civil
                 Rules of Procedures.

                 [IV.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
                 discretion by raising waivable affirmative defense arguments
                 for lack of personal jurisdiction and ineffective service on its
                 own after Grinston voluntarily submitted to the court’s
                 jurisdiction and waived his rights to the defenses. The Court’s
                 failure to hold a hearing on the issues was prejudicial to the
                 appellant.

3 Copies of the verdict forms were filed to the docket on May 27, 2022, and the case was administratively

terminated. Ms. Sessley filed a notice of appeal to this court on June 27, 2022. This court issued an order
sua sponte dismissing Ms. Sessley’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final judgment
entry. (Mar. 22, 2023 Jgmt. Entry.)

4 In the March 21, 2023 judgment entry, the trial court also noted that it granted Mr. Black a directed verdict

at the close of Ms. Sessley’s case during trial.
No. 23AP-238                                                                             5

                [V.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
                discretion by finding that appellant had not perfected service of
                process on Grinston on July 6 2018, July 24, 2018 or
                October 16, 2018 to trigger the start of the twenty-eight day
                deadline to file an answer under Civ Rule 12(A)(1).
(Sic passim.)

III. Discussion
       A. First, Second, and Fifth Assignments of Error
       {¶ 11} Because they are interrelated and dispositive of this appeal, we address Ms.
Sessley’s first, second, and fifth assignments of error together. We review a trial court’s
decision to deny a motion for default judgment for an abuse of discretion. Iqbal v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-31, 2014-Ohio-3156, ¶ 17. And we first consider
whether Mr. Grinston’s answer was timely filed.
       {¶ 12} Believing service was not perfected until 2020, Mr. Grinston argues on appeal
that his answer was timely filed, and even if it were not, the trial court properly granted
leave to file an answer out of rule. On the other hand, Ms. Sessley assumes service was
accomplished on Mr. Grinston in 2018, and therefore argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it accepted an answer filed several years late. In order to address the
assignments of error, it is helpful to set the relevant portions of this case’s procedural
history chronologically.
                   •   June 24, 2018: Ms. Black dies.
                   •   July 2, 2018: Complaint filed.
                   •   July 11, 2018: Service by certified mail on Ms. Black
                       returned signed and filed.
                   •   July 18, 2018: Mr. Grinston appointed executor of Ms.
                       Black’s estate.
                   •   August 1, 2018: Personal service completed on Mr.
                       Black.
                   •   August 1, 2018: Personal service unsuccessful on Ms.
                       Black, marked “deceased.”
                   •   September 12, 2018: Notice of Suggestion of Death
                       filed by Ms. Sessley.
                   •   September 22, 2018: Service by certified mail
                       requested on Mr. Grinston.
No. 23AP-238                                                                                6

                  •   October 1, 2018: Case terminated by trial court.
                  •   October 3, 2018: Motion to Reinstate Case filed by Ms.
                      Sessley.
                  •   November 15, 2018: Certified mail service on Mr.
                      Grinston returned “unclaimed.”
                  •   March 2, 2020: Order to reinstate case and substitute
                      estate for Ms. Black issued.
                  •   March 9, 2020: Beginning of administrative tolling
                      period ordered by March 27, 2020 Tolling Order.
                  •   April 15, 2020: Personal service completed on Mr.
                      Grinston.
                  •   May 16, 2020: Motion for Default Judgment filed by
                      Ms. Sessley.
                  •   May 27, 2020: Answer filed by Mr. Grinston.
                  •   July 30, 2020: End of administrative tolling period.

       {¶ 13} Because Ms. Black died before the complaint was filed, Ms. Sessley was
required to prosecute her claims against the estate as the real party in interest. See Civ.R.
17(A); Civ. R. 25(A). See Dolin v. Lupo, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-562, 2023-Ohio-3074, ¶ 20,
quoting Smith v. Bond, 7th Dist. No. 13 BE 27, 2015-Ohio-2585, ¶ 8. The estate was not
made a party until the trial court’s March 2, 2020 order reinstated the case and substituted
the estate for Ms. Black.
       {¶ 14} It is undisputed that the substitution of the estate for Ms. Black did not occur
until March 2, 2020. Until that substitution occurred, debate about whether service was
completed on Mr. Grinston or Ms. Black in 2018 is irrelevant. Ms. Black died prior to the
filing of the complaint and the first attempt at service. Service of process, whether signed
for by someone at the residence or marked completed in a docket notation by the clerk’s
office, cannot be perfected on a decedent as a matter of law because “a decedent may not
be a party to an action.” Wells v. Michael, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1353, 2006-Ohio-5871, ¶ 9.
       {¶ 15} Only once the case was reactivated and the estate was substituted for Ms.
Black as the proper party could service be attempted on Mr. Grinston as the executor of her
estate. And, on April 15, 2020, Ms. Sessley finally did perfect service on Mr. Grinston.
No. 23AP-238                                                                              7

Therefore, Mr. Grinston’s answer would have been due on or before May 13, 2020. See
Civ.R. 12(A)(1).
       {¶ 16} However, the COVID-19 pandemic began amid the reinstatement of the case
and completion of service on Mr. Grinston. In response to the pandemic, the Ohio General
Assembly and the Supreme Court of Ohio tolled all time limitations established in statute
or by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively, from March 9, 2020 to either July 30,
2020 or the end of the Governor’s declared state of emergency, whichever occurred first.
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197; In re Tolling of Time Requirements Imposed by Rules Promulgated
by the Supreme Court & Use of Technology, 158 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2020-Ohio-1166.
Because the state of emergency remained in effect past the identified end date, the tolling
orders expired on July 30, 2020. See Chapman Enterprises, Inc. v. McClain, 165 Ohio
St.3d 428, 2021-Ohio-2386, ¶ 11. In other words, “the tolling legislation tolled deadlines
between March 9 and July 30, 2020.” Johnson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist.
No. 22AP-61, 2022-Ohio-2155, ¶ 10. The Supreme Court’s website provides a number of
examples to illustrate the effect of the order. One example is especially helpful here:

              Q: WHAT DOES “TOLL” MEAN?
              A: Tolling serves to effectively freeze time from the date the
              tolling begins, which is March 9, 2020, until the expiration of
              the order.
              ***
              Q: HOW DOES TOLLING APPLY?
              A: How tolling applies is fact dependent. The following
              examples of a defendant’s answer are demonstrative:
              ***
              Example 2 – Defendant is served on March 23, 2020:
              Normally the defendant’s answer would be due 28 days
              thereafter, on April 20, 2020. However, because this deadline
              falls within the emergency period, it is tolled. * * * Because the
              emergency period was in effect when the defendant was
              served, the entirety of the 28 days is tolled, meaning th[at]
              once the emergency period ends, the defendant will have 28
              days left to file an answer.
No. 23AP-238                                                                               8

(Emphasis deleted.)        Supreme Court of Ohio, Tolling Legislation and Court
Orders/Frequently     Asked     Questions,    https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/tolling/
(accessed November 20, 2023).
       {¶ 17} Service on Mr. Grinston, as executor of the estate, could not have been
attempted until he was made a party to the case on March 2, 2020. Nothing in the record
indicates substitution was ordered at any point prior, despite Ms. Sessley’s assertion that
service was completed on Mr. Grinston in 2018. (Appellant’s Brief at 11.) Therefore, service
was not completed on Mr. Grinston until April 15, 2020—well into the emergency period.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s tolling order, Mr. Grinston had until August 27, 2020—
28 days after the conclusion of the tolling period—to file his answer. See Civ.R. 12(A);
Kemba Fin. Credit Union v. Covington, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-487, 2021-Ohio-2120, ¶ 4, fn.
1 (“As a result, the 28-day period to respond to the motion did not begin to run until July
31, 2020. Thus, appellant had until August 27, 2020 to file her response to the motion for
summary judgment.”).
       {¶ 18} Ms. Sessley moved for default judgment on May 16, 2020. Because the tolling
order was still in effect when Mr. Grinston filed his answer on May 27, 2020, his pleading
was well within the requisite time limitation. Although this case was plagued by a series of
unusual events, such as the erroneous termination, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a late-
filed judgment entry, further complicating a system already difficult to navigate without
representation, the estate’s answer filed by Mr. Grinston was unmistakably timely under
Civ.R. 12(A) and the tolling orders. (See Oct. 29, 2020 Decision and Entry at 5.) For that
reason alone, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion
for default judgment and denying Ms. Sessley’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
       {¶ 19} And because we have determined that Mr. Grinston’s answer was timely filed,
we do not need to consider whether the trial court correctly found Mr. Grinston
demonstrated excusable neglect to file his answer out of rule. Ms. Sessley’s first, second,
and fifth assignments of error are therefore overruled.
        B. Third Assignment of Error
       {¶ 20} In Ms. Sessley’s third assignment of error, she asserts the trial court erred
when it required service on Mr. Grinston’s counsel in order to complete the substitution of
parties under Civ.R. 25.
No. 23AP-238                                                                                                   9

        {¶ 21} In its decision on Ms. Sessley’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court
stated the following:

            Sessley, in order to accomplish the substitution of Grinston and the
            Estate of Thelma Black, was required to serve Grinston’s attorney. If
            Sessley was unable to serve Grinston’s attorney within ninety days
            under Civ. R. 25(E), an extension of time could have been requested
            under Civ.R. 25(A). Perry [v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 52 Ohio St.3d 168,
            171-72 (1990)]. However, Sessley served Grinston on July 6, 2018,
            instead of Grinston’s counsel. Though Grinston was served several
            times thereafter, it does not appear that Sessley ever served Gri[n]ston’s
            counsel, thus depriving the Court of personal jurisdiction over Grinston
            and the Estate.

(Oct. 29, 2020 Decision and Entry at 4.) The trial court further stated, “Therefore, the Court
lacked personal jurisdiction to grant Sessley’s motion for default judgment based on
Grinston’s failure to timely answer after the July 6, 2018 service was made.” (Oct. 29, 2020
Decision and Entry at 5.)

        {¶ 22} As acknowledged by the trial court, it is axiomatic that a default judgment
cannot be entered against a party who has not yet been served. “A trial court lacks personal
jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against a defendant where effective service of
process has not been made upon the defendant and the defendant has not appeared in the
case or otherwise waived service.” Iqbal, 2014-Ohio-3156 at ¶ 18. The trial court thus found
that a default judgment was not proper for two reasons: because service had not been
properly effectuated on Mr. Grinston’s counsel on July 6, 2018, and because the estate was
not formally made a party until substitution was ordered on March 2, 2020. Because we
agree with the trial court’s second conclusion and that was an independent ground on which
to find Mr. Grinston’s answer timely, we need not consider the propriety of the first. In his
role as executor of Ms. Black’s estate, Mr. Grinston was not made a party to the case until
the trial court’s March 2, 2020 court order. See Civ.R. 25(A). While the trial court and Ms.
Sessley both conclusively (and erroneously5) state that service by certified mail was

5 Service by certified mail was not, in fact, completed on Mr. Grinston during the first attempt at service on

July 6, 2018. While the language on the online docket suggests Mr. Grinston was served on that date, the
image of the certified mail receipt scanned and filed by the clerk’s office for the certified mail signed on July
6, 2018 is addressed to Ms. Black at 1275 East 15th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43221. It appears that the clerk
of courts replaced the name of the original party with the name of the substituted party on the online docket
No. 23AP-238                                                                                            10

completed on Mr. Grinston during the first attempt at service on July 6, 2018, it is irrelevant
because the estate was not yet a party to the case.
        {¶ 23} Therefore, our resolution of the first, second, and fifth assignments of error
renders Ms. Sessley’s third assignment of error moot.
         C. Fourth Assignment of Error
        {¶ 24} In her fourth assignment of error, Ms. Sessley challenges the trial court’s
decision to sua sponte raise the issue of personal jurisdiction. (Appellant’s Brief at 28.)
First, this argument assumes that service on Mr. Grinston was accomplished on July 6,
2018. As we have already noted, Mr. Grinston was not successfully served until 2020. But
second, and most importantly, Ohio trial courts have both the authority and responsibility
to determine jurisdiction, including the existence of personal jurisdiction over a party. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Connor v. McGough, 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 190 (1989). Therefore, it was not
error for the trial court to sua sponte raise the issue of personal jurisdiction, and Ms.
Sessley’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Disposition
        {¶ 25} Having overruled Ms. Sessley’s first, second, fourth, and fifth assignments of
error, and rendered her third assignment of error moot, we affirm the judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                                  Judgment affirmed.

                                MENTEL and BOGGS, JJ., concur.

when the trial court ordered the substitution on March 2, 2020. But, this notation on the docket does not
retroactively change the original recipient of service, nor equate to service on the substituted party as a
matter of law.