Court Opinion

ID: 9473530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:32:10.832455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:34.888978
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Ineffective assistance of counsel may provide sufficient “cause” for a State procedural default. Clay v. Director, Juvenile Division, Department of Corrections, 749 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir.1984). Failure to perfect an appeal despite the client’s expressed desire to appeal amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 431.1 *254Despite Zellers’ plea that counsel keep him informed of the progress of his State post-conviction motion and to appeal if the motion were dismissed,2 Zellers’ attorney failed to inform him that his case was dismissed and failed to perfect an appeal. Such ineffective assistance constitutes sufficient cause to excuse Zellers’ failure to perfect a direct appeal from the dismissal of his postconviction motion.
The majority focuses on Zellers’ failure to perfect a “belated,” as opposed to a direct, appeal from the dismissal. But for his counsel’s ineffectiveness, Zellers would not have had to pursue a belated appeal. He was entitled to an appeal of right, and the sole reason for his failure to exercise that right was counsel’s incompetence. Whether Zellers’ failure to perfect a “belated” appeal was in some sense his own fault is therefore irrelevant: he should not have been forced to pursue the extraordinary “belated” procedure in the first place.
Even assuming that it is appropriate to focus on Zellers’ failure to perfect a belated appeal, I would hold that he has demonstrated sufficient cause for this failure. To be sure, by failing to contact his lawyer for approximately two-and-one-half years, Zellers personally failed to exercise the diligence necessary to perfect a belated appeal. See Zellers v. State, 271 Ind. 22, 389 N.E.2d 299 (1979). But the definition of “cause” is neither rigid nor wholly fault-based. The cause and prejudice standard can only be understood by reference to the underlying policy concerns governing federal habeas jurisdiction and the broad equitable inquiry that must inform the balancing of conflicting policies. See Reed v. Ross, — U.S. -, -, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2907, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (decision whether to exercise federal habeas jurisdiction is a matter of equitable discretion). On one side of the balance is Congress’ intent to “interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as the guardians of the people’s federal rights”; on the other side are principles of comity. Id. No principle of comity requires us to defer to the across-the-board failures of the Indiana criminal justice system to furnish Zellers essential due process rights.
Acting through a variety of agents in a variety of capacities, the State of Indiana consistently flouted the procedures required by both its own law and the federal Constitution. First, Indiana police secured a confession from Zellers after a lengthy interrogation that was not preceded by the necessary Miranda warnings.3 Then Indiana furnished Zellers counsel who, during two brief consultations, failed to explain the elements of the various homicide offenses under Indiana law and did not discuss any possible defenses. Counsel’s sole advice was for Zellers to throw himself on the mercy of the court, in the hope of avoiding the death sentence, by pleading guilty to first degree murder; there is no evidence that counsel ever even approached the prosecutor about a possible plea agreement. This failure to ensure Zellers’ understanding of the charges against him and his possible defenses rendered his plea *255ineffective as not “knowing and intelligent,” see United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.1984), and fell so short of the required reasonable standard of care as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as well as malpractice under State law, see Citizens’ Loan, Fund & Savings Ass’n of Bloomington v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890) (attorney warrants that he will exhibit ordinary diligence).
When, three years later, Zellers attempted to withdraw his guilty plea in a State collateral proceeding, Indiana furnished Zellers with a public defender who failed to inform Zellers of the progress of his case and failed to perfect a timely direct appeal, in violation of Indiana law. See Dixon v. State, 152 Ind.App. 430, 284 N.E.2d 102 (1972) (public defender has duty to take appeal, if requested to do so by the client, even if she believes case to be wholly frivolous). Finally, Indiana provided Zellers with a trial judge who, one and one-half years after hearing evidence, dismissed Zellers’ postconviction motion without issuing any findings of fact or conclusions of law. This summary disposition violated required Indiana practice, and was apparently intended as a default judgment in retaliation for both parties’ failure to submit proposed findings. See Zellers v. State, 266 Ind. 111, 361 N.E.2d 143 (1977).
Having consistently disregarded its own as well as federal procedures, Indiana is hardly in a position to urge this court to defer to the “integrity” of State procedural rules. Cf. Ross, — U.S. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2907 (federal habeas court must consider “State’s interest in the integrity of its rules and proceedings and the finality of its judgments”). Under these circumstances, the interest in acting as the “guardians of the people’s federal rights,” see id., seems to outweigh the need, in the interests of comity, to refrain from undermining State procedures that even the State does not take seriously. I would hold, therefore, that the State is estopped to contest Zellers’ assertion that he had cause for his failure to perfect a belated appeal.
Having concluded, under two alternative rationales, that Zellers had cause for his State procedural default, it is next necessary to determine whether he was prejudiced by the default. The courts have yet to define exactly what measure and quantum of “prejudice” is necessary to satisfy the cause and prejudice standard of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir.1983) (en banc) (finding no prejudice where asserted error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but not indicating whether such a showing is necessary as well as sufficient); Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 817 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (en banc) (prejudice means “actual prejudice,” but failing to define “actual prejudice”). In its most recent decision on the subject, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that the burden of showing prejudice is not onerous. In Ross, — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2907, the Court held that sufficient prejudice was shown where it could conclude that but for the asserted underlying error, the petitioner “might not have been convicted” of the crime charged.
In the case at bar, Zellers has introduced sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that his guilty plea was ineffective because he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to trial and because the plea was the product of incompetent counsel. Although Zellers has never contested the charge that he killed his aunt, it is unclear what degree of homicide he is guilty of. Even his confession to the police indicates no motive. The presentence report does indicate considerable ill-feeling between Zellers and the decedent. The decedent was Zellers’ stepmother. When Zellers’ father died, the decedent committed him to a foster home and married his father’s brother. Zellers may, then, have a heat-of-passion defense, which would serve to reduce *256his crime to voluntary manslaughter, and, in turn, would reduce his sentence from natural life to two to twenty-one years. See Burns’ Ind.Ann.Stat. § 10-3405 (subsequently repealed). Because, then, Zellers “might” not have been convicted of first-degree murder, but for the asserted error, he has shown sufficient prejudice to justify a hearing on the merits in federal habeas court.
Nearly twenty years after the crime and after sixteen years of litigation, Zellers has yet to receive a hearing and decision on the merits of his constitutional claims.4 Although two and one-half years of the delay may properly be attributed to his own transgressions, the rest may be attributed to the failure of Indiana to provide competent counsel, responsive trial judges, and speedy justice. Zellers is presently serving a term of natural life pursuant to a guilty plea that may well be defective. I believe Zellers has demonstrated sufficient cause and prejudice independent of his own escape and lack of diligence to merit at least a hearing and decision on the merits after all this time.
I would therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Zellers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus and would remand for further proceedings.

. On May I, 1972, four months after an evidentiary hearing and three months before his motion was dismissed, Zellers sent the following letter to his appointed public defender:
I was in hopes that I would not have to write and remind you that I’m still waiting for you to do something in my behalf after the last letter. But, it looks like you have forgotten me and the unfinished court proceedings in Knox Circuit Court____
I have had this action in the Knox Circuit Court since August 8, 1969, to which I am no further toward an appeal than I was even before I filed this action____
I do appreciate the help that you and your office has rendered in my behalf, but do not stop there, don’t take me out in the middle of the ocean and leave me swimming alone. I need help in this case.

. Because the Indiana trial judge failed to issue any findings of fact, this factual assertion and the others to follow must be based on my own independent review of the record.

. The Indiana trial court’s improper summary dismissal of Zellers’ postconviction action without issuing any findings can hardly be considered a decision on the merits.