Court Opinion

ID: 9444726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:10:09.970797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:58.730217
License: Public Domain

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge
(concurring).
I agree with all that is said in the opinion about the public policy of Florida with respect to so-called fair trade contracts and the effect of that public policy upon this suit. I am of the opinion, however, that wholly apart from those considerations, the suit fails because nothing is alleged to have been done by defendant which under settled law the defendant did not have the absolute right to do. Simply stated, it is my view that the matter is ruled by the principle stated by us in Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Texas Electric Service Co., 5 Cir., 63 F.2d 702, at pages 705-706:
“ * * * The whole doctrine of interference with the business and contracts of another springs from, its foundation rests in, public policy. The true balancing of public interests has always been the recognized *199criterion which determines in each particular case whether the conduct is actionable. One having no business interests to serve may not induce a breach of business relations. Such inducement is in law regarded as wanton and malicious. One having business interests to serve may by every fair means, such as lowering prices, offering better service, showing better salesmanship, freely induce those not under fixed contract to become his customers. Here the interest of the public in preserving free competition overbalances the public interest in protecting the individual in the business relations he has built up. This same principle of justification, though in narrower limits when business relations are cast in contract form, operates within those limits as strongly to make conduct nonactionable as it does in business relations not fixed by contract. It would be difficult to imagine a plainer case of justification for interference than the case made out here.”
Padgitt v. Lone Star Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 213 S.W.2d 133, at page 138 thus speaks to the same effect:
“Lastly and in final analysis, the claim of unfair competition is based on sales by defendant of butane at a price less than appellants are able or willing to sell it to their customers. Legitimate price-cutting is of the essence of a free competition; being an all too infrequent phase of present day economics, under which commodity prices appear to have no direction except ‘up.’ ‘ * * * One having business interests to serve may by every fair means, such as lowering prices, offering better service, showing better salesmanship, freely induce those not under fixed contract to become his customers. * * * ’ Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Texas Electric Service Co., supra. ‘If, for instance, the appel-lees, in the transaction of the business of lending in competition with appellants, had offered money for loan at a rate below that which the appellants could furnish it, and thereby induced the customers of the appellants to borrow from the defendant company, and by reason thereof Brown Bros, were unable to maintain their business, and were broken up and compelled to quit, then no cause of action would exist in favor of the appellants against the defendants, because, however malicious the motive, the means used would be lawful. * * * ’ Brown v. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co., etc. 97 Tex. 599, 80 S.W. 985, 987, 67 L.R.A. 195.”
Upon the authority of these cases, the principles they announce and apply, I am of the clear opinion that no cause of action is alleged against defendant and that the judgment should be affirmed.