Court Opinion

ID: 9905848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:06:46.01669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:56.348335
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128366

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 128366)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
                          FRANK ROLAND, Appellee.

                             Opinion filed November 30, 2023.

        JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Holder White, Rochford, and
     O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justice Neville took no part in the decision.

                                         OPINION

¶1       The defendant, Frank Roland, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging he
     received ineffective assistance of counsel during his bench trial for attempted
     murder when his attorney failed to present evidence of his mental health history in
     support of his defense. After the petition was advanced to the second stage of
     proceedings, it was dismissed by the circuit court of Cook County.

¶2       On appeal, the appellate court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case
     for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. 2022 IL App (1st) 173013. For the following
     reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

¶3                                    BACKGROUND

¶4        On September 18, 2002, Roland was arrested in Chicago following a shooting
     incident involving police officers. Prior to trial, Roland’s retained counsel
     requested that Roland be evaluated for fitness to stand trial and for sanity at the
     time of the offense. The trial court granted the request and ordered that an
     evaluation be performed by Dr. Roni Seltzberg, a psychiatrist with Forensic
     Clinical Services (FCS). Dr. Seltzberg evaluated Roland and found him fit to stand
     trial with medication. Dr. Seltzberg also reported to the court that she performed a
     sanity evaluation on Roland and determined he was legally sane at the time of the
     offense but that he may have been experiencing symptoms of a depressive mood
     disorder that was likely exacerbated by alcohol and illegal substances. Based on Dr.
     Seltzberg’s evaluation, the trial court found Roland fit to stand trial. Soon
     thereafter, the trial court allowed Roland’s retained counsel to withdraw and
     appointed new counsel.

¶5       On January 27, 2005, a bench trial commenced. Chicago police officer Ronald
     Rewers testified that on September 18, 2002, he, Officer Catherine Figueroa, and a
     third officer were on patrol in plain clothes in an unmarked squad car when they
     received a call stating that a man was threatening a child with a gun. They searched
     the area until, at approximately 11 p.m., Officer Rewers saw Roland standing on
     the sidewalk having a conversation with a woman. Roland matched the description
     of the man who had been reported for threatening the child. Officer Rewers and the
     other officers exited the car, announced they were police, and ordered Roland to
     put his hands up. Officer Rewers testified that Roland looked at them and then
     started running. Officer Rewers began chasing Roland on foot, and “[a]fter about
     15 steps,” Roland reached into his waist and pulled out a gun. Officer Rewers
     ordered Roland to drop the gun and show his hands, but Roland did not comply.
     Instead, as he was “still running,” Roland “looked back over his left shoulder” and

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     “pointed the gun back towards [Officer Rewers] and fired one shot,” “all in one
     motion.” Officer Rewers testified that Roland pointed the gun “directly at [him]”
     and so he “dove to the ground.” He saw the muzzle flash and returned fire at Roland.
     Roland continued running, and Officer Rewers lost sight of him. Approximately
     half an hour later, Roland was found at a nearby residence and arrested.

¶6       On cross-examination, Officer Rewers testified that Roland fired under his left
     shoulder while looking back at him. Officer Rewers also stated that it was dark out
     during the shooting incident.

¶7       Officer Figueroa testified that she started chasing Roland behind Officer
     Rewers. She saw Roland turn to look back, and then she saw a muzzle flash. On
     cross-examination, she agreed that she would have seen the muzzle flash regardless
     of where Roland pointed the gun.

¶8       Roland testified that on September 18, 2002, he was “feeling bad about certain
     things” including the death of the mother of his child as well as his own mother,
     and so he was “drinking, smoking weed, [and] getting high.” Roland further
     testified that he was feeling suicidal but that he “didn’t have the courage to pull a
     gun on” himself. He explained that he purchased a gun and “tried to put it to [his]
     temple” and “in [his] mouth” but he “didn’t have the guts to pull the trigger.”

¶9       Roland stated that, when he saw a police car drive by that evening, he came up
     with a plan to get the police to shoot and kill him. At approximately 11 p.m., he
     was standing on the sidewalk talking with his friend, Threasa. Police officers
     parked in front of him and exited the car. 1 Roland started running. One of the police
     officers told him to freeze, but he kept running and “fired a shot in the air.” Roland
     testified that he was not trying to kill the police officer and that he shot at a slightly
     upward angle instead of at the police officer. He explained that he shot into the air
     because he thought that, once he did so, the police officer would shoot back at him
     and kill him. He testified that shooting at the police officer “would have defeated
     [his] whole plan.” However, the officer missed Roland when he shot back, and
     Roland did not have another plan, so he just ran. He fled to Threasa’s house nearby,
     where he was subsequently arrested.

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             Roland did not clarify whether it was the same police car he saw earlier or a different one.

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¶ 10       Roland testified that, a couple of days after his arrest, he tried to hang himself
       in his jail cell using a rope made of bed sheets. Other inmates discovered him
       unconscious, and he was taken to Cermak Hospital, where he received psychiatric
       treatment and was placed on medication. He further testified that he had tried to kill
       himself another time shortly before September 18, 2002, by cutting his throat. He
       was treated at Tinley Park Hospital, where the doctor said he was crying out for
       help.

¶ 11      On cross-examination, Roland confirmed that he began running as soon as he
       saw the police officers and did not shoot his gun until after he had started running.
       The State did not cross-examine Roland about his suicide attempts.

¶ 12       In closing argument, Roland’s trial counsel argued that the ultimate issue in the
       case was Roland’s state of mind. Counsel pointed to Roland’s testimony that he
       was depressed and wanted the police officers to shoot and kill him and that he did
       not point the gun at Officer Rewers but rather into the air. Counsel asserted this
       showed that Roland lacked the specific intent to kill.

¶ 13        The State told the court that the issue in this case “boil[ed] down to credibility”
       and whether Roland pointed his gun at Officer Rewers or into the air. The State
       asserted that Roland’s “excuse” that he was suicidal and was trying to draw police
       fire was “simply ridiculous based on the evidence.” The State argued that Roland’s
       actions were inconsistent with suicide by police, specifically that he ran away, shot
       directly at Officer Rewers, and then hid in a nearby house.

¶ 14      Following closing arguments, the trial court stated:

              “[T]here’s absolutely no doubt that [Roland] fired a gun at Officer Rewers.
          I don’t believe [Roland]. It quite frankly doesn’t make any sense to me. If he
          wanted to commit suicide by police, an unmarked car pulls up with three
          [tactical] officers. He wants to guarantee all three of them shooting at him, he
          wouldn’t be fleeing and running and ducking behind the archway. Just for a
          whole lot of reasons, [Roland’s] story is completely unbelievable to me.”

       The trial court therefore found Roland guilty of attempted murder.

¶ 15      At the sentencing hearing, the trial court told Roland:

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               “I understand that you may have some mental health problems.

               The doctor has prescribed medication. I do not know how sincere your
           suicide attempt was at the Cook County Jail, but I do know I will take your
           lawyer’s representation that you are taking psychotropic medication that a
           doctor has prescribed.”

       The trial court then sentenced Roland to 30 years’ imprisonment. Roland’s
       conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Roland, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1152
       (2007) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 16       On January 23, 2008, Roland filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging he
       received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Roland alleged his trial
       counsel “failed to fully investigate [Roland’s] claims of being hospitalized for
       psychiatric treatment to be able to present a proper defense at trial.” Roland
       attached several documents which he asserted corroborated his testimony that he
       was suicidal and shot into the air so that the police officers would shoot and kill
       him. The attached documents included a screening form from Cermak Health
       Services dated September 20, 2002, which noted that Roland reported he had been
       hospitalized for psychiatric treatment at Tinley Park in 2002 after he attempted to
       commit suicide via a “scratched throat” and also noted that Roland had attempted
       suicide while in the Cook County jail; a form from the Tinley Park Mental Health
       Center dated May 8, 2007, received in response to Roland’s March 27, 2007,
       release form, noting that the release form had lacked the necessary witness
       signature; and progress notes from Ingalls Hospital dated July 19, 2002, which
       noted that Roland was admitted with self-inflicted lacerations to his throat in a
       possible attempt “to kill himself” with a knife.

¶ 17       The trial court summarily dismissed Roland’s petition. Roland appealed, and
       the appellate court reversed and remanded for second-stage proceedings. People v.
       Roland, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1223 (2010) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois
       Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court found that, because the medical
       records attached to Roland’s petition “could only have served to corroborate his
       testimony at trial and support the defense theory, it is at least arguable that counsel’s
       failure to investigate [Roland’s] mental health history and to present evidence of
       his hospitalization and previous suicide attempt fell below an objective standard of
       reasonableness and prejudiced” Roland. Id.

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¶ 18       On remand, Roland, through appointed postconviction counsel, filed a
       supplemental petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel
       “failed to investigate and present readily available evidence indicating that
       [Roland] had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for mental-health issues
       in the weeks before his arrest.” Roland’s petition argued that, had his trial counsel
       sufficiently presented evidence of his mental health records, the trial court would
       have “heard the full history of [his] suicide attempts” and there was a reasonable
       probability his trial would have resulted in a different outcome.

¶ 19       The State moved to dismiss. On May 25, 2017, the trial court granted the State’s
       motion and dismissed Roland’s petition at the second stage of proceedings. In its
       written order, the trial court explained:

               “[Roland] acknowledges that the trial court was aware that his mental health
           was an issue in this case. [Citation.] Jail records showed that [Roland] attempted
           suicide while in jail soon after his arrest. His mental health was investigated by
           counsel and evidence as to his mental state was presented to the court, both
           through [Roland’s] testimony and these records. That trial counsel did not
           pursue every piece of documentation does not establish an ineffectiveness
           claim.”

       The trial court also noted that the documents attached to Roland’s petition did not
       show “that he was actually seen at Tinley Park.” Moreover, the trial court found
       that such documentation would not have changed the outcome at trial, as it “would
       not have established that [Roland] was suicidal on the day of the shooting” and
       would not have outweighed the State’s “consistent, credible testimony from
       officers on the pertinent details,” specifically that Roland fired a gun “at or near
       officers.”

¶ 20       Roland appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-
       stage evidentiary hearing. In so ruling, the appellate court found that Roland’s
       petition made a substantial showing that he received ineffective assistance of
       counsel because he satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test pursuant to
       Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 2022 IL App (1st) 173013, ¶ 28.
       Specifically, the appellate court held that “[t]rial counsel’s alleged failure to present
       evidence of Roland’s mental health history that would only serve to bolster his
       defense is objectively unreasonable.” Id. ¶ 27. The appellate court further held that

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       Roland showed prejudice because his allegations created a reasonable probability
       that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, in particular that
       his medical records “would create a credibility contest with Officer Rewers and
       directly contradict testimony.” Id.

¶ 21       Justice Coghlan dissented on the ground that allowing evidence of Roland’s
       mental health history would constitute raising a diminished capacity defense, which
       is unavailable as a defense in Illinois. Id. ¶ 37 (Coghlan, J., dissenting).

¶ 22       This court granted the State’s petition to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct.
       1, 2021).

¶ 23                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 24       At issue is whether Roland’s petition made a substantial showing that he
       received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not present the
       documents appended to his petition, such that a third-stage evidentiary hearing is
       warranted. The State does not take up the dissent’s point about Roland making a
       diminished capacity argument. Rather, the State argues that the trial court took into
       consideration Roland’s testimony that he was suicidal but did not believe it since
       he ran away from the police officers. Therefore, additional evidence of his suicide
       attempts that occurred at some other time would not have made a difference in
       Roland’s trial.

¶ 25       The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides an avenue for individuals
       convicted of criminal offenses to challenge their convictions on grounds of
       constitutional violations. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008). The Act sets forth
       three stages of review. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 32. If the circuit
       court does not dismiss the petition at the first stage, it advances to the second stage,
       where the State may file a motion to dismiss the petition. Id. ¶ 33; 725 ILCS 5/122-
       4, 122-5 (West 2008). At the second stage, the circuit court must determine whether
       the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a
       constitutional violation. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33. The petitioner bears the
       burden of making such a showing. Id. ¶ 35. “If the petitioner makes the requisite
       substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated, he is entitled to a
       third stage evidentiary hearing.” Id. ¶ 34.

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¶ 26        Roland’s petition alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
       when his trial counsel failed to present corroborating evidence of his mental health
       history, specifically the documents regarding his suicide attempts. Every defendant
       has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under both the United
       States Constitution and the Constitution of Illinois. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV;
       Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are
       governed by the standard set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. People v. Moore,
       2020 IL 124538, ¶ 28. Pursuant to that standard, in order to prevail on a claim of
       ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel’s
       performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
       defendant. Id. ¶ 29. More precisely, a defendant must show that counsel’s
       performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and
       that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance,
       the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. (citing Domagala, 2013
       IL 113688, ¶ 36). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
       confidence in the outcome. People v. Pingelton, 2022 IL 127680, ¶ 53.

¶ 27       We need not address Roland’s contention that his trial counsel’s failure to
       present the documents appended to his postconviction petition was objectively
       unreasonable because we conclude that Roland has failed to establish prejudice.
       See People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 53 (if it is easier to dispose of an
       ineffective-assistance claim on the ground that it lacks a showing of sufficient
       prejudice, a court may proceed directly to Strickland’s prejudice prong). Roland
       urges that his trial came down to a credibility contest between his testimony that he
       pointed the gun into the air and Officer Rewers’s testimony that Roland pointed the
       gun directly at him. He argues, as the appellate court found, evidence of his mental
       health would have corroborated his testimony and explained why he shot the gun
       into the air. Had this evidence been presented, therefore, there is a reasonable
       probability that his trial would have resulted in a different outcome.

¶ 28       We agree with Roland that the documents appended to his petition would have
       corroborated his uncontested testimony at trial regarding his mental health issues.
       Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that these documents, if admitted into
       evidence, would have changed the outcome of his trial. See id. ¶ 54 (an error by
       counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
       judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment).

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       Indeed, in assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether
       counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a
       reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently but,
       instead, whether it is reasonably likely that the result of the proceedings would have
       been different. People v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 46. We cannot say that in this
       case there would have been a different outcome.

¶ 29        In asking whether Roland’s trial likely would have had a different outcome if
       trial counsel had presented the documents appended to his postconviction petition,
       we take note of the trial court’s specific comments about Roland running away from
       the police officers. The court said: “If he wanted to commit suicide by police ***
       [if he] wants to guarantee all three of them shooting at him, he wouldn’t be fleeing
       and running and ducking behind the archway.” As Roland acknowledges, the trial
       court was fully aware of his mental health issues and suicide attempts, but it
       nevertheless found that his conduct on that day did not support the defense that he
       wanted to commit “suicide by police.” In finding Roland guilty, the trial court
       focused on his fleeing from the police and not the credibility regarding his suicide
       attempts. Accordingly, it is unlikely that corroborating evidence that Roland had
       struggled with suicide on other occasions would have changed the trial court’s
       focus from his conduct on that particular day, such that the court would have found
       him not guilty.

¶ 30       In other words, it is not reasonably likely that further evidence of Roland’s
       mental health history would have changed the trial court’s determination that
       Roland’s conduct during the shooting did not demonstrate that he wanted to commit
       “suicide by police.” Specifically, the court noted that he fled from the police and
       their gunfire, taking evasive measures to avoid being shot. Accordingly, we find
       that Roland’s postconviction petition failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of
       Strickland. See People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2002) (in order to establish
       prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
       for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
       different). Because Roland has failed to establish the prejudice prong required by
       Strickland, we need not address whether Roland’s petition satisfied the
       performance prong of Strickland. See People v. Gayden, 2020 IL 123505, ¶ 27 (the
       failure to establish either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of
       ineffective assistance of counsel).

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¶ 31      We therefore hold that Roland’s postconviction petition failed to make a
       substantial showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial
       court accordingly did not err in dismissing his petition at the second stage. Thus,
       we reverse the appellate court’s judgment, which reversed the trial court’s ruling.

¶ 32                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 33       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment holding
       that Roland’s postconviction petition made a substantial showing that he received
       ineffective assistance of trial counsel and remanding the matter for a third-stage
       evidentiary hearing in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court of
       Cook County’s dismissal of Roland’s petition.

¶ 34      Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 35      Circuit court judgment affirmed.

¶ 36      JUSTICE NEVILLE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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