Court Opinion

ID: 9948817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 23:02:33.808699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:54.469698
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/24; On remand
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION EIGHT

 MATTHEW BOERMEESTER,                             B290675

        Plaintiff and Appellant,                  (Los Angeles County
                                                  Super. Ct. No. BS170473)
        v.

 AINSLEY CARRY et al.,

        Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Amy D. Hogue, Judge. Affirmed.

     Hathaway Parker, Mark M. Hathaway and Jenna E.
Parker for Plaintiff and Appellant.

     Young & Zinn, Julie Arias Young, Karen J. Pazzani;
Horvitz & Levy, Mark A. Kressel, Scott P. Dixler, Beth J. Jay,
Jeremy B. Rosen; Pazzani & Sandhu and Karen J. Pazzani for
Defendants and Respondents.

                          _________________________
       Following his expulsion from the University of Southern
California (USC) for engaging in intimate partner violence,
Matthew Boermeester filed a petition for writ of administrative
mandate in the superior court pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5. The superior court denied the petition,
and Boermeester appealed. In a divided opinion, we held that
Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at
the live hearing at which USC adjudicated the allegation and we
reversed the trial court’s judgment. The California Supreme
Court granted USC’s petition for review (Boermeester v. Carry
(May 28, 2020, B290675), opn. ordered nonpub. Sept. 16, 2020),
reversed our opinion, and held that Boermeester did not have
such a right. (Boermeester v. Carry (2023) 15 Cal.5th 72
(Boermeester).) The Supreme Court then remanded this matter
to us with clear instructions “to determine in the first instance
the remaining claims Boermeester raised on appeal that the
Court of Appeal expressly declined to reach.” (Id. at p. 98.) We
are bound by these instructions. (See Griset v. Fair Political
Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.)
       Following remand, the parties filed supplemental briefs.
Boermeester contends USC’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence; USC’s use of a combined investigator-
adjudicator procedure denied him fair process; and USC’s appeal
process amplified the harm from the use of an investigator-
adjudicator. We find substantial evidence supports USC’s
decision and find no denial of fair process in USC’s use of an
investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process, either
structurally or as conducted in this case. We affirm the denial of
the writ.

                                2
                        BACKGROUND
      In 2016 and 2017, Boermeester was a member of the USC
football team and Jane Roe was a member of USC’s women’s
tennis team. Boermeester and Roe dated from March 2016 to
approximately October 2016. On January 21, 2017, after
midnight, three male USC students heard screaming in the alley
behind their residence. Two of them looked outside and observed
Boermeester put his hand on Roe’s neck and push her against a
wall. One of the men, MB2, went outside, which broke up the
encounter and resulted in Boermeester and Roe walking away.
The two other men, TS and DH, lived in the other half of Roe’s
duplex and spoke with her soon after the incident.
      One or more of the men reported this incident to the USC
men’s tennis coach, who reported it to USC’s Title IX
Coordinator, Gretchen Means. USC began an investigation into
the incident. Means and USC’s Title IX Investigator Lauren
Helsper met with Roe on January 23, 2017. We previously
summarized Roe’s statements as follows:
      Roe reported she spent the day with Boermeester on
Friday, January 20, 2017. He called to ask her to pick him up
from a party at approximately 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. on January 21,
2017. She did, and after getting food, they returned to her home.
Boermeester was the drunkest she had ever seen. He yelled in
the alley behind her house, trying to be funny.
      Roe had her dog Ziggy with her. Boermeester wanted her
to drop Ziggy’s leash to allow him to run in the alley. He grabbed
the back of Roe’s hair hard and said “drop the fucking leash.”
Roe refused. Boermeester responded by increasing his hold on
Roe’s hair, causing her to drop the leash because it “hurt.”

                                3
       Boermeester then grabbed Roe “tight” by the neck, causing
her to cough. He laughed and let go. He grabbed her by the neck
twice more and pushed her hard against a concrete wall that ran
along the alley behind her duplex. Roe’s head hurt after she hit
the wall.
       Three USC students, DH, TS, and MB2, exited their
apartments. Roe believed they were awakened by the loud
yelling. When they asked after Roe, Boermeester told them that
he and Roe were just “playing around.” DH and TS, who lived on
the other side of Roe in the duplex, took her into their apartment.
Boermeester was asleep when she returned to her place.
       The next day, Roe told Boermeester that he scared DH and
TS because “it looked really bad when you pushed me and it
looked really bad with your hand around my neck.” He replied,
“it was a joke, we were messing around, tell them to calm down”
and added, “tell them you’re into that,” implying that it was
foreplay. When Roe asked him, “what if you hurt me bad? Would
you feel bad? If you were playing around and it hurt?”
Boermeester told her, “no” because it would have been “brought
on by” her.
       The Title IX coordinator explained Roe had the option to
request an avoidance of contact order (AOC) prohibiting
Boermeester from contacting her. Roe indicated she wanted the
AOC as well as temporary emergency housing because
Boermeester had a key to her house. The investigator noted Roe
was crying throughout the meeting.
       Roe acknowledged she was in a “bad situation” but was
conflicted about what to do because she still cared for
Boermeester. Roe indicated she did not want to participate in an
investigation and did not want Boermeester to be charged with

                                4
anything other than the January 21, 2017 incident. She was
informed the Title IX office was obligated to investigate and could
proceed without her consent. Boermeester was charged with the
January 21, 2017 incident of intimate partner violence for which
there were eyewitnesses.
       On January 26, 2017, USC notified Boermeester of an
investigation into the events of January 21, 2017, and that he
may have violated USC’s sexual misconduct policy by committing
intimate partner violence. He was placed on interim suspension
and received an AOC letter.
       As we previously summarized, that same day Roe
exchanged a series of text messages with the investigator stating,
I am “pretty freaked out about today. I know I’ve said this a lot
but I really can’t emphasis [sic] enough that you guys please
please make it clear that I did not bring this forward that I want
nothing to do with it and I’m not pressing any charges.” She
further stated, “He can’t know I made a statement. Can you not
tell him I made a statement[?] Like he can’t know I met with you
guys.” The investigator assured her Boermeester would be
advised the investigation was initiated by the Title IX office and
he would not be made aware of her statement until the time of
the evidence review.
       On January 30, 2017, Roe and her advisor met with the
investigator. We summarized that meeting as follows:
       Roe indicated she had reservations about the investigation
because she felt as though her voice was not heard and that it
was more about “burning him” than her wellbeing. Roe explained
she thought she was in a supportive environment when she
initially met with the Title IX office and so she freely shared her
story. Although she understood the Title IX office was “trying to

                                5
do the right thing,” it has made things for her more “difficult.”
Roe felt bullied by the process and no longer “fully believe[d]”
many of the statements she initially made to the Title IX office.
       Roe also requested the AOC be lifted because she had
changed her mind. She requested the AOC during her first
meeting because she did not “trust” that it would be clearly
conveyed to Boermeester that the investigation was initiated by
the Title IX office, not her. She did not want Boermeester to be
“mad” at her. She remarked “at the end of the day, he is like my
best friend so it is like you are taking that away too.” She
explained, “you think this is to protect me. Feels like I lost
control on everything and I feel like you are controlling who I can
talk to.” Roe stated that she did not feel she was in danger. She
was upset they could not speak to each other. She believed that
the investigation was too harsh and that instead, Boermeester
should be mandated to go to counseling and be placed on
probation.1
       Boermeester was also interviewed by USC on January 30,
2017. We previously summarized his statement concerning the
incident as follows:
       Boermeester generally confirmed the events of January 21,
2017, as Roe had described them; however, he denied intending
to hurt her.

1      The next day, Roe texted the investigator, “Will I know
tomorrow if I can get rid of my statement because I really don’t
want it used and I don’t even think it is fair because I still
disagree with somethings I said so to use it wouldn’t be accurate
and I just have been stressing about if it’s being used or not so
will [the coordinator] have an answer for me tomorrow?”

                                 6
       He reported he and Roe ate at the Cheesecake Factory at
approximately 4:00 p.m. Later that night, he text messaged Roe
to pick him up from a party because he was unable to drive. He
had three glasses of wine at the restaurant and four to five beers
at the party. When they arrived at Roe’s home after picking up
food, they began playfully throwing french fries at one another.
       Boermeester wanted to watch Roe’s dog run around so he
asked her to let the dog go. They were standing by a wall when
he instructed her to release the dog. He acknowledged he put his
hand around her neck while she stood against the wall, but
denied they were arguing or that he was angry. He also denied
choking her or slamming her head against the wall. He believed
Roe felt safe with him. He asserted he did not have a tight grip
on her. Boermeester believed the eyewitnesses misinterpreted
what they saw. He explained he and Roe sometimes put their
hands on each other’s necks during sex.
       USC’s Title IX investigator interviewed 16 people in total,
including the eyewitnesses, Roe’s roommates and friends, and
Boermeester’s ex-girlfriend. We summarized the eyewitnesses’
statements as follows:
       MB2 is Roe’s neighbor. He initially reported he did not see
any physical contact between Roe and Boermeester. He
explained he heard an argument between a man and a woman
about a dog. When he walked outside to take out his trash and
see what was happening, “it kinda settled a little bit.” Roe
approached him a few days later to ensure he did not get the
wrong impression.
       One month later, MB2 called the investigator to admit he
had not been truthful in his initial statement because he was
trying to “protect” Roe’s wishes to “keep it on the down low” and

                                7
“downplay” the incident. He explained Boermeester’s attorney
attempted to speak with him at his home in March 2017. He told
the attorney what he initially told the Title IX investigator.
However, he decided, “the lawyer coming to speak to me, finding
my apartment, I don’t want to keep this any longer, perpetuating
this lie.”
       During a second interview, MB2 reported he heard
laughing and screaming sounds coming from the alley by his
home, which initially seemed playful. The noise then changed to
what sounded like a male trying to “assert his dominance” over a
female. MB2 looked into the alley and saw Boermeester standing
in front of Roe with both hands around her neck. He then pushed
her into the alley wall and she began to make “gagging” noises.
MB2 added, “once he put his arms around her the first time she
wasn’t saying anything.” MB2 believed, “this guy is violent. He
domestically was abusing her.” He stated, “truth is I really
wanted to beat the shit out of this guy.” Because of what he saw,
MB2 grabbed a trash bag and went outside. He asked them how
things were going, which “broke it up.” Afterwards, Boermeester
and Roe walked back to her apartment.
       DH is a member of the USC men’s tennis team and Roe’s
neighbor. He was reluctant to participate in the investigation
but described what he saw on the night of January 21, 2017. He
reported he heard screaming. He heard a male voice yelling
loudly and a female voice talking but could not make out what
they were saying. He looked outside and saw Roe and
Boermeester standing by the wall. He noticed Roe’s dog running
in the alley, which made him realize something was wrong
because Roe did not allow her dog to run freely. He saw Roe

                                8
pinned against the wall by Boermeester, who had his hand
around her chest/neck. DH did not see or hear Roe hit the wall.
       TS is also a member of the USC men’s tennis team and is
DH’s roommate. He reported DH woke him up, urgently stating,
“we gotta go downstairs, [Boermeester] is hitting [Roe].” When
they got downstairs, DH asked to speak to Roe. Boermeester
walked back to Roe’s house. DH tried to convince her to spend
the night at their apartment. DH observed Roe was “playing
casual at first” and tried to “downplay it.” When DH confronted
her about Boermeester’s arm around her throat, she rationalized
it by saying, “he’s just drunk.” About 15 to 20 minutes later, Roe
returned to her home, crying. She then texted that Boermeester
was asleep and stated, “I am safe. Thanks for looking out for
me.” TS and DH reported the incident the next day to the men’s
tennis coach.
       We also noted that “Roe’s roommates and friends uniformly
reported that Roe and Boermeester’s relationship was volatile,
but they did not personally witness any physical violence
between them.”
       In addition to interviewing witnesses, the investigator
obtained video of the incident from a camera located in the alley
about two buildings away from Roe’s duplex. The recording is
silent and grainy. There is no dispute that the video shows
Boermeester and Roe in the alley after midnight on January 21,
2017. We found that the video supported “the trial court’s
description of the events” as follows:
       “At 12:16:16 a.m., the video shows Petitioner shoving Roe
from the area adjacent to the house into the alleyway. At
12:16:50, Petitioner appears to be holding Roe’s neck or upper
body area. At 12:17:12, Petitioner grabs Roe by the neck and

                                9
pushes her toward the wall of the alley. At 12:17:13 and
12:17:14, Roe’s head and body arch backwards. Between 12:17:16
and 12:17:26, Petitioner and Roe are against the wall and barely
visible from the camera. At 12:17:26, Petitioner backs away from
the wall and re-enters the camera’s view. At 12:17:28, Roe re-
enters the camera’s view. Roe and Petitioner proceed to push
each other. At 12:17:38, Petitioner moves toward Roe and
appears to be pushing her against the wall. At 12:17:40, a dog
can be seen running across the alley. At 12:17:57, a third party
enters the camera’s view and walks in the direction of Petitioner
and Roe. At that moment, Petitioner and Roe walk away from
the wall and back towards the house. At 12:18:19, the third
party walks over to the dumpster, places a trash bag inside, and
walks back toward the house.”
       Under USC’s Misconduct Policy, Boermeester was entitled
to review the evidence collected, including witness statements,
physical and documentary evidence, and audio/visual material
before USC made any findings of fact. Also before findings of fact
were made, Boermeester was entitled to submit cross-
examination questions to be asked of the other party by the Title
IX Coordinator at an Evidence Hearing. Boermeester was also
entitled to appear at an Evidence Hearing himself. The Evidence
Hearing is each party’s separate opportunity to respond to the
evidence collected. At the Evidence Hearing, the Title IX
Coordinator will ask each party the questions submitted by the
other. The Title IX Coordinator has the responsibility to exclude
any questions that are inflammatory, argumentative, or relate to
character evidence or non-relevant sexual history. Boermeester
did not submit questions for cross-examination. He elected to

                               10
submit a written statement rather than participate in the
Evidentiary Hearing.
      USC’s investigation, called a Summary Administrative
Review (SAR), concluded on March 22, 2017. Helsper prepared a
78-page report of the review. On April 27, 2017, USC informed
Boermeester and Roe that it had determined that Boermeester
was responsible for the charged conduct. On May 2, 2017, the
Misconduct Sanctioning Panel recommended expulsion.
      Boermeester appealed to the Title IX Appeal Panel. The
Panel found, among other things, that the findings of fact in the
SAR were supported by substantial evidence. The Panel
recommended a two-year suspension because Boermeester’s
conduct could have been reckless rather than intentional. The
vice-president for student affairs, Ainsley Carry, rejected the
appellate panel’s recommendation and affirmed the decision to
expel Boermeester, reasoning the sanction was appropriate under
the sexual misconduct policy regardless of whether or not
Boermeester intended to harm Roe.
      Boermeester filed a petition for writ of administrative
mandate in the superior court. The petition was denied, and this
appeal followed.
      We briefly summarize the issues which we did reach in our
prior opinion, and which are not affected by the California
Supreme Court’s ruling in Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th 72. We
found meritless Boermeester’s claim that he did not receive
notice of the allegations against him. We also found meritless his
claim that an interim suspension was improperly imposed. We
noted: “To the extent Boermeester argues USC’s Title IX office
was biased against him, an argument that appears throughout
his appellate briefs, he has presented no legal or factual basis to

                                11
support this argument other than to say its decisions were not in
his favor. . . . Boermeester also complains Roe was not provided
proper notice she was a suspected victim and intended reporting
party in the proceedings. Boermeester lacks standing to assert
Roe’s rights in this matter.” (Boermeester v. Carry, supra,
B290675.) These decided issues are outside the scope of the
remand and we cannot and do not reconsider them.
      We expressly declined to reach only two issues: 1) whether
USC’s policy was unfair because the Title IX investigator held the
dual roles of investigator and adjudicator; and 2) whether
substantial evidence supported USC’s findings that Boermeester
violated its intimate partner violence policy. We mentioned that
there were “other claims of error,” which we declined to reach.
Based on a review of Boermeester’s original opening brief on
appeal, we find that there was at most one other claim of error
which we did not reach: Boermeester’s claim that USC’s limited
appellate review did not provide a check on the investigative
process.2 These are the only three claims we consider now.

2     Even without the Supreme Court’s instructions, we would
not consider any other claims without an explanation of why they
were not raised in the original briefing. (See Dahms v.
Downtown Pomona Property & Business Improvement Dist.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 708, 711, fn. 1 [“any arguments raised in
the supplemental briefs that could have been raised in the
parties’ original briefs will not be considered”]; accord, People v.
Vasquez (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1033, fn. 10 [disregarding
contention in supplemental brief that party could have raised
before the previous Court of Appeal decision].)

                                12
                         DISCUSSION
A.    The Standard of Review Was Decided in Our Prior Opinion.
       In his initial brief on appeal, Boermeester contended that
the disciplinary hearing involved vested fundamental rights,
which required the trial court to not only examine the
administrative record for errors of law but also exercise its
independent judgment based upon the evidence disclosed in a
limited trial de novo. Boermeester claimed that because the trial
court did not recognize this, remand was required to permit the
trial court to conduct the appropriate review. USC contended
that education is not a vested fundamental right, the trial court
correctly reviewed the evidence for substantial evidence, and we
should do the same.
       Although we did not expressly address the issue of whether
education is a vested fundamental right, we decided the issue
adversely to Boermeester when we held that we review USC’s
substantive decisions and factual findings for substantial
evidence. We cited Doe v. University of Southern California
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221 to support our holding. The
discussion of the standard of review in that case makes clear that
Doe is applying the standard of review applicable to cases not
involving a fundamental vested right.
       In his supplemental brief on remand, Boermeester again
argues that USC’s administrative decision substantially affected
his vested fundamental rights and so we should reverse the trial
court ruling and remand the matter to the trial court to review
the evidence independently. Because we decided this issue in our
prior opinion, it is outside the scope of the remand. Further,
Boermeester does not cite new authority issued after our initial
decision in this matter or after the Supreme Court’s decision, so

                               13
even if we had jurisdiction to reconsider this issue, Boermeester
has given us no reason to do so.
      Boermeester does point out that the Supreme Court
recognized the value and importance of a college education, and
the stigma of expulsion, but we note the Court simply ended the
discussion by stating: “For these reasons, we find that a student’s
interest in completing a postsecondary education at a private
university is analogous to an individual’s interest in continuing
membership in a private organization that impacts the
individual’s ability to practice his or her chosen profession. Our
common law doctrine of fair procedure therefore applies in
determining whether USC’s disciplinary procedures were fair.”
(Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 89.) We do not view this
discussion as an indirect indication that we should reconsider our
previous ruling on the standard of review, particularly given the
Court’s explicit directions that we should consider issues we
expressly declined to reach.3

3      Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Divisions
Three and Seven of this District Court of Appeal have expressly
held that college disciplinary decisions do not involve a vested
fundamental right. (Doe v. University of Southern California
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1212, 1231 [“A university disciplinary
proceeding concerning sexual misconduct does not involve a
fundamental vested right.”]; Doe v. Occidental College (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1018 [“California cases reviewing colleges’
disciplinary decisions concerning student sexual misconduct have
repeatedly applied the substantial evidence standard because the
decisions there ‘do not “ ‘involv[e] a fundamental vested
right.’ ” ’ ”].) Division One has indicated that it is not a
fundamental right by its selection of the standard of review. (See

                                14
B.    Substantial Evidence Supports USC’s Findings.
       Boermeester contends that USC’s finding of a violation is
not supported by substantial evidence because 1) there was no
physical evidence that Roe suffered physical harm from the
incident; and 2) the evidence that he grabbed her and pushed her
into a wall is uncorroborated hearsay.
       The substantial evidence standard of review is deferential.
“ ‘[W]e are not free to indulge in an independent reconstruction of
the events: our view of the record must be circumscribed by a
limited appellate review of University proceedings.’ We examine
all relevant evidence in the administrative record and view that
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, resolving all
conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences in support of
the judgment.” (Do v. Regents of University of California (2013)
216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1490.) “Only if no reasonable person could
reach the conclusion reached by the administrative agency, based
on the entire record before it, will a court conclude that the
agency’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence.”
(Ibid.)
       Boermeester points to evidence that Roe had no bruising,
scrapes, or similar markings when examined by USC two days
after the incident. We agree that it is undisputed that Roe had
“no bruises or anything else anywhere on [her] body” when
examined by USC. Boermeester, however, points to nothing in
USC’s definition of physical harm that requires visible physical
marks that last at least 48 hours.

Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055,
1065.)

                                15
       As for the affirmative evidence of physical harm, Roe stated
that it hurt when Boermeester grabbed her hair and when he hit
her head against the wall. He pushed on her neck hard enough
to make her cough.
       Pushing on a person’s neck hard enough to prompt
coughing is an act causing physical harm, whether or not it
leaves lasting visible marks on the skin. Similarly, head pain
which lasts after the moment of impact is physical harm, whether
or not it leaves lasting visible marks on the scalp.4
       Boermeester contends, however, that USC’s factual finding
that he grabbed Roe by the neck and pushed her head into a wall
is also not supported by substantial evidence because USC relied
on uncorroborated hearsay, specifically 1) “uncorroborated
hearsay summaries of what witnesses may have said during
private, unrecorded interviews with USC’s investigator and Title
IX Coordinator” and 2) the “uncorroborated hearsay summaries
[which] themselves contain various levels of uncorroborated

4      The Supreme Court has indicated that physical pain
qualifies as physical harm under USC’s policies. As relevant, the
Court wrote: “Shortly after the incident occurred, Roe told the
Title IX investigator that Boermeester had physically harmed
her. Specifically, Roe said that it ‘hurt’ when Boermeester
grabbed the back of her hair ‘hard’ and told her to drop her dog’s
leash; that it ‘hurt’ when Boermeester grabbed the front of her
throat and neck, causing her to cough; and that her ‘head hurt’
after Boermeester grabbed her by the neck again and pushed her
head ‘hard,’ causing her head to hit the alleyway wall. . . . USC
could have concluded that Boermeester ‘caus[ed] physical harm’
to Roe and, thus, violated its policy against intimate partner
violence.” (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 97.)

                                16
hearsay, including what witnesses supposedly said they heard
from [Roe] or other witnesses.”
       The legal term “hearsay” has no significance in this appeal.
Formal evidentiary rules applicable in court are not required in
administrative proceedings like USC’s. (Doe v. Regents of
University of California (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 44, 56 [formal
rules of evidence do not apply in university disciplinary
proceedings]; Floresta, Inc. v. City Council (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d
599, 608 [“rules of admissibility of evidence do not bind
administrative agencies”].) Indeed, Boermeester conceded in his
administrative appeal that “this is not a court of law and that the
rules of evidence do not apply.” Boermeester’s belated reliance on
In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227 in his briefing on remand
is misplaced. That case involves a dependency hearing in
juvenile court, a proceeding which provides far more procedural
protections than does an administrative hearing conducted by a
university.
      Boermeester’s first “hearsay” claim appears to be that the
investigator and coordinator could not rely on their own notes; he
implies that they were required to make audio or video
recordings of the witness interviews. Boermeester has cited no
case law holding that an administrative body must record
witness interviews. Written notes can provide an adequate
record. (See Andersen v. Regents of the University of California
(1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 763, 772–773 [four-page notes of
administrative proceeding acceptable for administrative record in
student discipline case].)
      It is not clear what Boermeester means by
“uncorroborated” summaries. If Boermeester means that Helsper
did not confirm with witnesses that her summaries were

                                17
accurate, we previously found that the “investigator made it a
general practice to reread the statement to the person after the
interview to confirm accuracy.” The record shows that Helsper
read the summaries of the three key witnesses from the night of
the incident to them and they confirmed the summaries were
accurate. A cursory review of other witness summaries indicates
this was Helsper’s common practice. Both Boermeester and Roe
were permitted to review and comment on the notes of their own
interviews.
      As for the contents of the interviewed witnesses’
statements, we are not aware of any requirement that a witness
statement be corroborated in order to be considered reliable
enough to constitute substantial evidence. (See Casella v.
SouthWest Dealer Services, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
1127, 1144 [“Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness may constitute substantial evidence.”].)
      Boermeester’s claim that the witnesses were repeating
“hearsay” statements by other witnesses is forfeited by
Boermeester’s failure to identify specific statements and to
provide an argument that the “hearsay” statement is not
reliable.5 (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)

5     To be clear, the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply and
there is no bar against hearsay. Generally, the bar against
statements is based on the premise that such statements can be
unreliable. Thus, read generously, Boermeester’s “hearsay” claim
can be understood as a claim that the statements are unreliable.
Boermeester’s claim could also be understood as a claim that the
witnesses lacked personal knowledge. These are the concerns
present in Doe v. University of Southern California, supra,
246 Cal.App.4th at page 253, not any technical violation of the
inapplicable hearsay rule. In this case however, any such claims

                               18
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 (United Grand).) Even under the formal
rules of evidence, there are many exceptions to the hearsay rule;
those exceptions exist because some out-of-court statements are
deemed reliable because of the circumstances under which they
were uttered.
       Boermeester’s fundamental claim appears to be that no oral
witness statements can “be deemed weightier or more reliable
than the written statements submitted personally by [Roe] and
[him]. In her written statements, [Roe] disputed that she ever
made statements indicating [he] hit her head against a wall, and
to this day, she denies that any alleged intimate partner violence
occurred.” He contends the “security video is inconclusive but is
consistent with” his and Roe’s statements “that no violence
occurred.” Boermeester further contends that the investigator’s
“speculation and opinion of [Roe] as a victim of domestic violence
who ‘recanted’ cannot possibly be deemed substantial evidence,
especially in light of [Roe’s] repeated assertions that she is not a
victim of domestic violence and would never stand for physical or
verbal abuse perpetrated by [him] or anyone.”
       As we have previously explained, there is nothing
questionable about choosing to find a victim’s initial statement
more credible than a later recantation of that statement,
particularly in domestic violence cases. This is a point repeated
by the Supreme Court in its analysis of this case. (Boermeester,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 98 [“it is not uncommon for victims of
intimate partner violence to recant. Roe’s post-incident

by Boermeester would be forfeited by the failure to identify
specific statements and provide supporting argument. (United
Grand, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)

                                19
communications with USC’s Title IX office and her friends
indicate that she feared retaliation and felt a sense of loyalty
towards Boermeester, either of which may have motivated her
later recantation.”].) There is likewise nothing questionable
about finding a victim more credible than the alleged attacker.
Relatedly, there is an exception to the hearsay rule for
spontaneous statements made “while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by” an event and so made at or
near the time of an exciting event (Evid. Code, § 1240) because
such statements are considered more reliable than those made
after time for reflection. This, too, supports USC’s decision to
treat Roe’s initial oral statement as the more credible of her two
accounts.
       Three courts have now viewed the security video and all
have found it consistent with the victim’s initial oral account.
(Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 97 [“The video of the
incident—though grainy and soundless—is consistent with Roe’s
initial account. (Boermeester v. Carry, supra, B290675.)”].)
       Finally, we note Roe’s initial oral statement is also
corroborated by Boermeester’s admission that he had his hands
on [her] neck and had her against the alleyway wall (see
Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 97–98) and the statements
of the two eyewitnesses. DH stated he heard screaming, looked
out the window and saw that Boermeester “had [Roe] pinned
against the wall with his hand on her chest/neck.” He saw
Boermeester “holding her against the wall.” MB2 similarly
stated he heard screaming, looked outside and saw “a guy
standing around [Roe] with both of his hands around her neck.
He was pushing [Roe] against the wall and [she] was ‘gagging.’ ”

                                20
     Substantial evidence supports USC’s finding that
Boermeester committed intimate partner violence.
C.    A Combined Investigator-Adjudicator Process, Without
      More, Does Not Deny Fair Process.
       In his original brief, Boermeester contended “it is simply
too perilous to allow a single individual to act in the overlapping
and conflicting capacities as investigator, victim advocate,
prosecutor, and tribunal, deciding credibility and relevancy of
evidence, making findings, and imposing discipline. [(Doe v. Allee
(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1068.)] Likewise, delegating a single
investigator/adjudicator to implement an accused student’s right
to cross-examination is ‘incompatible with adversarial
questioning designed to uncover the truth. It is simply an
extension of the investigation and prosecution itself.’ [(Ibid.)]”
Boermeester relied solely on Allee, and his claim of error
mirrored the argument in that case: an investigator-adjudicator
cannot properly perform adversarial cross-examination at a live
evidentiary hearing.
       In his supplemental brief on remand, Boermeester
continues to rely solely on Allee, now disapproved in part by
Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th 72. Boermeester contends: “In a
student disciplinary adjudication, the factfinder cannot be an
individual with the ‘divided and inconsistent roles,’ such as those
occupied by the Title IX investigator at USC, who exercises
‘unfettered discretion to chart the course and scope of the
investigation and to determine credibility in questionable ways.’
[(Doe v. Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1069–1070.)] [¶] In
Allee, all the administrative findings and decisions were made by
the investigator, USC’s Dr. [Kegan] Allee, whose determination
was based on ‘all evidence she deemed relevant, and taking into

                                21
account her determination as to the parties’ credibility.’ (Ibid.)
This process, the Allee [c]ourt ruled, was unfair.”
       In fact, the Allee court recognized that “an administrative
procedure in which a single individual or body investigates and
adjudicates does not, ‘without more,’ violate due process.” (Doe v.
Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067 (Allee).) The court found
“more” occurs primarily in situations where the accused had a
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The court
believed that “the performance of this key function is simply too
important to entrust to the [dual role] Title IX investigator in
USC’s procedure.” (Id. at p. 1068.) The court found the “notion
that a single individual, acting in these overlapping and
conflicting capacities, is capable of effectively implementing an
accused student’s right of cross-examination by posing prepared
questions to witnesses in the course of the investigation ignores
the fundamental nature of cross-examination: adversarial
questioning at an in-person hearing at which a neutral fact finder
can observe and assess the witness’ credibility. [Citations.] . . .
[A] right of ‘cross-examination’ implemented by a single
individual acting as investigator, prosecutor, fact finder and
sentencer, is incompatible with adversarial questioning designed
to uncover the truth.” (Ibid.)
       In Boermeester, however, the Supreme Court expressly
disapproved Allee’s holding concerning live cross-examination. If
we assume that Allee has any continuing vitality on the issue of
fair process after Boermeester, the Allee opinion, shorn of all
references to the right to live cross-examination, would consist
simply of a discussion concerning USC’s investigatory policy and
practices. It is not clear that the Allee court would have found a
lack of fair process based on investigatory policy alone.

                                22
       Before evaluating Boermeester’s argument, we add some
context missing from his discussion. The Allee court found that
the investigator did not conduct a thorough investigation due to
what it perceived as premature credibility determinations.
(Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.) For example, the
investigator seemed to have “rejected . . . almost immediately”
the accused’s initial statement that the victim had a strong
motive to frame him “despite investigative leads . . . that, if
pursued, would lend support to Doe’s theory, and weaken Roe’s
credibility. This was symptomatic of a larger problem with Dr.
Allee’s investigation. She did not follow up with presumably
identifiable and available witnesses . . . who might have filled in
holes in the investigation, thus providing a fuller picture from
which to make the all-important credibility determination.”
(Ibid.) The court then concluded that “[d]eficiencies such as these
are virtually unavoidable in USC’s system, which places in a
single individual the overlapping and inconsistent roles of
investigator, prosecutor, fact finder, and sentencer.” (Ibid.) That
system is no longer in place. The investigation in Allee was
conducted under a pre-2016 version of USC’s policy.6 The
investigation in this case was conducted pursuant to USC’s
Misconduct Policy adopted August 22, 2016.
       Under the August 2016 policy, USC provides the parties
with the procedural protection of a right to a “fair, thorough,
reliable, neutral and impartial investigation” by a trained

6       The misconduct in Allee occurred in 2015. (Allee, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1058.) Likewise, the policy in effect in 2013
when the misconduct occurred in Doe v. University of Southern
California, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 235, is no longer in
effect.

                                23
investigator. USC requires its Title IX Coordinator “to oversee
prohibited conduct reports and investigation to ensure timely
resolution and compliance with Title IX and [USC’s] policy.” To
be clear, the Title IX Coordinator is not the same individual as
the Title IX Investigator. Thus, while the investigator in this
case had discretion in her investigation, she had guidelines to
follow in conducting her investigation and was subject to
oversight. This is not the “unfettered discretion” to investigate
which the Allee court disapproved.
       Further, unlike the investigation in Allee, the investigation
in this case was thorough. Boermeester does not identify any
avenues left uninvestigated.
       While it is possible that a specific combined investigator-
adjudicator process could be structured in an unfair manner, a
holding that a combined investigator-adjudicator process can
never be fair would be inconsistent with current California law,
which has recognized that a combined investigatory and
adjudicative model does not, without more, deprive an accused
student of a fair hearing. (Doe v. Westmont College (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 622, 637 [combining investigative and
adjudicative functions does not, without more, deprive a student
accused of sexual misconduct of a fair hearing]; Doe v. University
of Southern California, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1235, fn. 29
[and cases cited therein] [although investigator held dual roles as
the investigator and adjudicator, the combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a
due process violation].) Indeed, the Allee opinion acknowledges
that this is the law.

                                24
       Federal courts are divided on this issue. As the First
Circuit explained, this system has been called “inquisitorial. See
Inquisitorial System, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
(defining ‘inquisitorial system’ as a ‘system of proof-taking used
in civil law, whereby the judge conducts the trial, determines
what questions to ask, and defines the scope and the extent of the
inquiry’). No doubt, this model of justice is not the one our
founders chose for criminal trials. [Citations.] But this is not to
say that the inquisitorial model is constitutionally inadequate in
all settings. In fact, we consider the inquisitorial model fair
enough for critical administrative decisions like whether to
award or terminate disability benefits. See Sims v. Apfel,
530 U.S. 103, 110–11, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000)
(explaining that Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial
rather than adversarial).” (Haidak v. University of
Massachusetts-Amherst (1st Cir. 2019) 933 F.3d 56, 68.) On the
other hand, some courts have condemned the inquisitorial
approach. (Doe v. Baum (6th Cir. 2018) 903 F.3d 575, 581–585.)
       As the California Supreme Court has noted, federal law in
this specific area is “still evolving.” (Boermeester, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 91.) Recent proposed amendments to 2020
regulations, which are not yet final, “provide that universities
may opt ‘to conduct live hearings with cross-examination or have
the parties meet separately with the decisionmaker and answer
questions submitted by the other party when a credibility
assessment is necessary.’ (87 Fed. Reg. 41390, 41397 (July 12,
2022).) After reexamining its position and evaluating relevant
case law, the [United States Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights (OCR)] determined that ‘neither Title IX nor due
process and fundamental fairness’ (87 Fed. Reg., supra, at

                                25
p. 41505) requires universities ‘to provide for a live hearing with
advisor-conducted cross-examination in all cases’ (id. at
p. 41507). The OCR further justified the proposed amendments
by stating that growing evidence calls into question ‘whether
adversarial cross-examination is the most effective tool for truth-
seeking in the context of sex-based harassment complaints
involving students at postsecondary institutions’ and shows that
‘information-gathering approaches such as questions asked in
individual meetings instead of during a live hearing (sometimes
described as inquisitorial procedures) are more likely to produce
the truth than adversarial methods like cross-examination.’
(Ibid.)” (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 92.)7

7     Specifically, “studies have found that
information-gathering approaches such as questions asked in
individual meetings instead of during a live hearing (sometimes
described as inquisitorial procedures) are more likely to produce
the truth than adversarial methods like cross-examination.
These studies ‘suggested that inquisitorial procedures may result
in the presentation of more accurate and less biased information.’
Mark R. Fodacaro et al., Reconceptualizing Due Process in
Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Science,
57 Hastings L.J. 955, 982, 982 n.165 (2006) (citing E. Allan Lind
& Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 25
(1988)); see also Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from
Inquisitorialism, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 699, 711 (2014). Because non-
adversarial information gathering approaches tend to reduce
opportunities for bias, researchers have found that such methods
are ‘most likely to produce truth.’ John Thibaut & Laurens
Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 541, 547 (1978).”
(Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, text and legal
analysis, 87 Fed.Reg. 41390, 41507 (July 12, 2022).)

                                26
      California law is also developing. The Legislature recently
enacted Senate Bill No. 493 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which “is
intended ‘to account for the significant individual civil
consequences faced by respondents alleged to have committed
sexual violence as well as the significant harm to individual
complainants and to education equity more generally if sexual
violence goes unaddressed.’ (Stats. 2020, ch. 303, § 1, subd. (n).)
As relevant here, it gives universities the discretion to decide
whether ‘a hearing is necessary to determine whether any sexual
violence more likely than not occurred.’ (Ed. Code, § 66281.8,
subd. (b)(4)(A)(8), added by Stats. 2020, ch. 303, § 3.)”
(Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 91.) Senate Bill No. 493 also
provides “the investigation and adjudication of alleged
misconduct under this section is not an adversarial process
between the complainant, the respondent, and the witnesses, but
rather a process for postsecondary institutions to comply with
their obligations under existing law.” (Ed. Code, § 66281.8,
subd. (b)(4)(A)(i).) Thus, nothing in Senate Bill No. 493 suggests
the California Legislature views the inquisitorial method as
insufficient to address the interests of the parties to a sexual
violence complaint, and the interests of the university
community.
      Senate Bill No. 493 is also consistent with the California
Supreme Court’s explanation that “[w]here it applies, the
common law doctrine of fair procedure requires private
organizations to provide adequate notice of the charges and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. [Citations.] We have never
held, however, that any specific or baseline procedures must be
followed to satisfy these requirements. . . . ‘It may be satisfied by
any one of a variety of procedures which afford a fair opportunity

                                 27
for an applicant to present his position.’ [Citation.] In fact, we
have observed that a formal hearing is not required in all
circumstances; at times, it may be sufficient for a private
organization to allow only a written response to the charges.
[Citation.]” (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 90.)
       The Supreme Court has made it clear that private
“ ‘associations themselves should retain the initial and primary
responsibility for devising a method which provides an applicant
adequate notice of the “charges” against him [or her] and a
reasonable opportunity to respond.’ ” (Boermeester, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 90.) The California Supreme Court concluded it
“is therefore appropriate to give private universities broad
discretion in formulating their disciplinary processes to ensure
that they not only provide the accused student a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, but also embolden victims to report
incidents of sexual misconduct or intimate partner violence,
encourage witnesses to participate in the disciplinary process,
and allow the private university to conserve its resources so that
it can remain focused on its primary mission of providing a
postsecondary education.” (Id. at p. 93.) Nothing in this
discussion calls into question the combined investigator-
adjudicator model or a private university’s determination that it
best meets all the competing needs of a student disciplinary
proceeding.
       Of course, it is possible that a university will select a
procedure which is inherently unfair, or that university personnel
will not act fairly. Here, Boermeester contends that investigator
and adjudicator Helsper did not act fairly. To show unfairness,
he repeats many of his claims made in connection with lack of
substantial evidence argument claim, all but one of which related

                               28
to the investigator’s credibility determinations.8 We reject these
claims for the reasons set forth in our discussion of substantial
evidence, above.9
       The only new and different claim of unfairness in this
section is Boermeester’s contention that several of the witnesses,
even critical witnesses like Peter Smith and MB2, were only
interviewed by the investigator by phone, not in person.
Boermeester contends this practice contravened USC’s policy,
which “requires the Investigator to personally see and hear all
parties and witnesses to the investigation, putting him/her in the
best position to make determinations as to credibility and
relevance.” He contends conducting interviews by phone
precludes accurate identification of witnesses and evaluation of
whether their accounts are credible. The record cite provided by
Boermeester is from the report of the Title IX Appeals Panel.
USC’s policy does not prohibit telephonic interviews.
Boermeester has forfeited any claim about identification by
failing to develop an argument supported by legal authorities or
cogent reasoning showing that telephonic interviews are more

8      To the extent we did not address the investigator’s response
to Boermeester’s statements concerning his “own thoughts [and]
feelings,” we find that the investigator simply and correctly found
that “intent was irrelevant under USC’s policy against intimate
partner violence.” (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 97.)
9      We note Boermeester also claims the investigator
“disregarded the parties’ own written submissions entirely,
except to bolster her own unsupported opinion that [Roe] is a
victim of domestic violence.” This is simply a claim that the
investigator was biased against him. We rejected that claim in
our first opinion.

                                29
susceptible to misidentification than in-person interviews.
(United Grand, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.) Boermeester
has likewise forfeited his claim that credibility determinations
cannot be made without viewing the person speaking. (Ibid.)
Further, Boermeester’s claim concerning the need to observe a
witness’s countenance is inconsistent with Boermeester’s
repeated claims that Roe’s written statements (which offer no
opportunity to see or hear Roe) should be treated as more credible
than her oral statements.
D.    Boermeester Received Considerable, Adequate Appellate
      Process.
       Again echoing Allee, Boermeester contends that USC offers
students only a limited appeal right, and the “ ‘harm to
fundamental fairness created by USC’s system is amplified by the
limited review of the investigator’s factual findings available in
the university’s appellate process.’ [(Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th
at 1069.)]” Boermeester describes USC’s appellate processes in
this case as identical to the process described in Allee.
       As the Court of Appeal which decided Allee has now made
clear: “We did not hold [in Allee] that the student had been
entitled to any particular administrative appellate procedure.
Rather, we merely relied on limitations of the [T]itle IX appellate
procedure to support our holding that on the record before us,
additional safeguards were required in the underlying factfinding
process.” (Alpha Nu Assn. of Theta XI v. University of Southern
California (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 383, 421–422.) One of those
limitations, the inability to cross-examine witnesses, is not
relevant to Boermeester. We have found that the investigative
procedure provides adequate safeguards in the form of
supervision by the Title IX coordinator. Thus, the relationship

                                30
between appellate procedure and the underlying factfinding
process is not the same as the one considered by the court in
Allee.
       In addition, as Justice Wiley pointed out in his dissent to
the prior opinion in this matter, the amount of process
Boermeester received was “considerable.” USC’s process involved
four layers of review, three of which were appellate. “First was
the investigation. Upon concluding the extensive investigation,
the investigator determined Boermeester was responsible for
intimate partner violence. [¶] The second layer was a separate
panel. The sanctions panel reviewed the record and decided to
expel Boermeester. [¶] The third layer was the Misconduct
Appellate Panel. Boermeester appealed to this separate panel.
Pages 494 and 495 of the Administrative Record spell out the
duties of this Misconduct Appellate Panel. These rules
empowered the Misconduct Appellate Panel to decide whether
substantial evidence supported the investigator’s fact finding.
The Misconduct Appellate Panel also was to determine whether
this fact finding supported the investigator’s conclusions about
policy violations. [¶] This Misconduct Appellate Panel exercised
independent judgment. It recommended a two-year suspension
rather than expulsion for Boermeester. [¶] The fourth layer was
USC’s Vice President for Student Affairs, who was USC’s final
decisionmaker on student discipline. This USC Vice President
overruled the Misconduct Appellate Panel’s recommendation and
determined the appropriate sanction was expulsion.”
       As the dissent also pointed out, Boermeester then “applied
for a fifth layer of review by filing in the superior court. He was
granted that review. Boermeester then sought and obtained a
sixth and seventh layer of review, in this court and the Supreme

                                31
Court. At the time of our prior opinion (and of Allee), it was not
settled law that writ review of USC’s disciplinary proceedings
would be available. The Supreme Court held, as a matter of first
impression, writ review pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5 is appropriate for a private university’s
disciplinary hearing. (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 86.)
We conclude the adjudicatory process was adequate.
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                          STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             WILEY, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

                                32