Court Opinion

ID: 9526403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:16:56.030303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:42.132084
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissented in Petersen I and dissent herein for the same reasons; see my dissent therein for my rationale. Petersen I, 486 N.W.2d at 521. In my opinion, the majority in this case has adopted a rule so liberal every employer in South Dakota is likely to be sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In Petersen I, my dissent makes clear that according to Petersen’s own testimony, the defendant’s conduct would not satisfy either the intent standard of Groseth and Mackintosh or the reckless standard set forth by Wangen. Groseth I, 410 N.W.2d at 169; Mackintosh, 451 N.W.2d at 281; Wangen, 428 N.W.2d at 248. The conduct of the defendants in Wangen was far more grievous than the defendant’s conduct in Petersen I. Wangen was suffering from, and receiving medical treatment for, severe depression. The defendants were aware of the illness and medical treatment. There is nothing in this record showing Petersen was mentally ill or suffering from severe depression. There is nothing indicating Petersen was receiving any medical treatment for depression. Wangen’s severe depression was the means by which the majority distinguished that case from Northrup and Hubbard. Northrup v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193 (Ia.1985); Hubbard v. United Press, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). Therefore, in my opinion, Petersen I and Wangen are clearly distinguishable.
In Tibke, written four years after Wan-gen, this court tried to establish consistency in our decisions on intentional infliction of emotional distress. Tibke, 479 N.W.2d at 907. Writing for the court, Judge Bradshaw analyzed the inconsistencies in our previous decisions1 and straightened them *470out. Before the ink on Tibke was dry, the majority in Petersen I, without citing Tibke, followed the previous rule stated in Wangen.2 When the inconsistency of the majority opinions in Petersen I and Tibke was pointed out in a petition for rehearing, the court granted this rehearing. Now, the majority tries to reconcile the inconsistency by claiming both rules are applicable. In Tibke, this court declared “[w]e have vacillated in our prior opinions setting forth the elements of this tort. The bench and bar of this state are entitled to a definitive delineation of the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Tibke, 479 N.W.2d at 907. I concurred in that opinion and feel it is even more applicable in light of the latest equivocation concerning the elements of this tort. In my opinion, the majority should abide by Tibke, which is the better rule, admit a mistake was made in Petersen I and affirm the grant of summary judgment by the trial court.

. I dissented in Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hosp Ass’n, 486 N.W.2d 516 (S.D.1992), French v. Dell Rapids Community Hosp., 432 N.W.2d 285 (S.D.1988) and Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1987) (Groseth I).

. In Petersen I, the majority notes Wangen modified the holding of Groseth I. I was disqualified from the Wangen case, but would probably have dissented to changing the standard set forth in our previous decisions.