Court Opinion

ID: 9890613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 18:04:15.337389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:38.268993
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 Williams v. Hillcrest Manor CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

BRIAN WILLIAMS,                                                      B319608

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                          BC714309)

HILLCREST MANOR LLC et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
         Brian Williams, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
                        ____________________
       Brian Williams defaulted in two successive unlawful
detainer proceedings initiated by Hillcrest Manor, LLC, the
owner of the apartment complex in which he lived. Representing
himself, Williams in July 2018 filed a complaint and in March
2020 the operative first amended complaint for damages, naming
Hillcrest Manor and 16 other defendants and purporting to allege
50 causes of action arising from the unlawful detainer actions,
including for wrongful eviction, trespass, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and deprivation of civil rights in violation of
title 42 of the United States Code section 1983. His prayer for
relief requested, in part, $999 million in general economic
damages and $999 million in punitive damages.
       The trial court granted the special motion to strike filed
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16
(section 425.16) by three of the defendants—Vincent Real, a
lawyer who represented Hillcrest Manor in the unlawful detainer
proceedings; James McCone, a lawyer associated with Real who
wrote a letter regarding the proposed settlement of the first
unlawful detainer action; and Stephen Friend, a registered
process server who served the summons and complaints in the
two actions.1 We affirm.

1     Williams’s first amended complaint named as defendants
Law Offices of Vincent Real, aka Emil Vincent Real, Jr.,
individually; Emil Vincent Real, Jr. aka Vincent Real,
individually and in his official capacity as owner of Law Offices of
Vincent Real; James Gorden McCone, aka James G. McCone,
individually and in his official capacity as owner of Law Offices of
James G. McCone; Law Offices of James G. McCone, aka James
Gordon McCone, individually; and Stephen Friend aka
Stephen J. Friend, individually, aka Stephen Merrill Friend,
individually, and in his official capacity as a California registered

                                  2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. The Unlawful Detainer Proceedings
       As described in declarations and supporting documents
filed with the special motion to strike, Real represented Hillcrest
Manor in an unlawful detainer action in 2015 based on
Williams’s nonpayment of rent. After Friend was unable to
personally serve Williams, Real requested a court order
authorizing service through posting; and Friend posted copies of
the summons and complaint on the property and mailed copies to
Williams. Williams did not respond within the statutory time,
and Real obtained a default judgment on behalf of his client and
thereafter a writ of possession, which he delivered to the sheriff’s
office in Inglewood.
       According to Real, he was contacted at this point by Gary
Casselman, an attorney representing Williams, who presented an
abeyance agreement dated March 27, 2015 signed by Williams
and a representative of Hillcrest Manor. The abeyance
agreement provided Hillcrest Manor would request a dismissal
with prejudice of the unlawful detainer action if Williams paid
$2,500 on April 5, 2015 and $2,700 on April 20, 2015 as rent for
the period January through April 2015. On April 1, 2015
McCone, Real’s associate, wrote Casselman confirming their
conversation earlier that day in which McCone said, if both
payments were made, “[W]e will recall the writ, set aside the
judgment, dismiss the case and restore the tenancy.” The
payments were made by Williams; but, according to Real, the

process server and as owner of Amicus Attorney Service, Inc. The
special motion to strike was filed on behalf of all those named
defendants. For simplicity, we refer to these defendants only as
Real, McCone and Friend.

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case could not be dismissed because judgment had been entered.
Real explained, “I did, however, cancel all execution on the
judgment, which, in the case posture, was the closest I could
come to fulfilling my client’s part of the abeyance agreement.”
      A second unlawful detainer action was filed in 2016 for
nonpayment of rent. Hillcrest Manor was again represented by
Real. Friend personally served Williams on July 21, 2016.
Williams did not respond, and Real’s office obtained a default
judgment in favor of Hillcrest Manor. Williams filed an ex parte
application to set aside the judgment. Following a continuance
(with a stay of execution of the judgment) and prior to the matter
being called, Williams and Real agreed the application to set
aside the judgment would be denied, but the lock-out order would
be stayed, Williams’s security deposit would be returned and
Williams would move out. The court was notified of the
settlement, which was subsequently carried out by the parties.
      2. Williams’s First Amended Complaint
       In his first amended complaint Williams alleged—in what
might fairly be described as a nonlinear narrative—that the
owner of Hillcrest Manor forcibly broke into his apartment and
stole personal property, the decision to seek his eviction was in
retaliation for reporting the burglary to the police, Williams’s
bank records showed he had the money needed to pay any rent
due and the process server lied when averring Williams had been
properly served with the summons and complaint in the initial
unlawful detainer action.2 Because entry of the improperly

2     Williams failed to include the first amended complaint in
his designation of the record on appeal. We augment the record
on our own motion to include that document. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

                                4
obtained default judgment in the unlawful detainer action is a
public record, Williams further alleged, he “has and still is
suffering the loss of his reputation, shame, mortification, and
hurt feelings all to his general damage.”
       Specifically as to Real and McCone, Williams alleged the
two lawyers agreed to have the initial unlawful detainer case
dismissed with prejudice and have the file sealed if Williams
complied with the terms of the parties’ abeyance agreement.
Williams also alleged Casselman spoke to Real on March 16
and 17, 2015 but included no details of their conversation and
described a July 18, 2016 phone call from Real to Casselman
(relayed to Williams by Casselman) in which Real said Hillcrest
Manor’s owner would pay Williams $1,000 if he would move out
in a week (apparently a reference to the return of Williams’s
security deposit as part of the settlement of the second unlawful
detainer action). Finally, Williams alleged that Real and McCone
were hired “as either employees or independent contractors,
lawyers, to handle all aspects of any Unlawful Detainer Actions.”
       As to Friend, Williams alleged the proof of service of the
summons and complaint in the first unlawful detainer action,
which he reviewed at the Santa Monica courthouse, had been
signed by Friend and further alleged the proof of service falsely
stated Williams had been personally served on February 24, 2015
when he was conferring with his attorney while in custody at the
Twin Towers Correctional Facility. Other than being identified
as a defendant in several places in the pleading, no other
allegations concern Friend.
       Although the caption pages for the first amended complaint
list 50 causes of action, Williams failed to state the number and
nature of each cause of action in the body of the document and

                                5
failed to identify as to each separate cause of action the party or
parties to whom it was directed, as required by California Rules
of Court, rule 2.112. From our own review of the pleading, it is
not apparent which causes of action Williams contends apply to
Real, McCone or Friend.
      3. The Special Motion To Strike
       Real, McCone and Friend moved to strike the complaint as
it related to them, arguing attorneys filing an unlawful detainer
lawsuit and a registered process server serving the lawsuits
constituted protected petitioning activity within the meaning of
section 425.16 and all their conduct as alleged in the first
amended complaint was protected by the litigation privilege of
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(2).
       The motion was supported by declarations from Real,
McCone and Friend, which described the two unlawful detainer
actions between Williams and Hillcrest Manor. Attached as
exhibits were the superior court docket from the initial unlawful
detainer action; the complaint, proofs of service and default
judgment from the second unlawful detainer action; a conformed
copy of the application and order to serve summons by posting,
filed February 20, 2015 in the initial unlawful detainer action,
from Real’s office files; the March 27, 2015 abeyance agreement;
emails between Real and Casselman regarding the proposed
abeyance agreement; and McCone’s April 1, 2015 letter to
Casselman regarding the agreement.
       Williams filed an opposition, which included declarations
from him and Casselman. Williams argued his claims against
Real, McCone and Friend did not arise from their protected
activity because the underlying unlawful detainer actions did not
concern an issue of public interest (it was “personal” and

                                  6
“private”). Because Real, McCone and Friend could not satisfy
the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Williams contended, he
did not need to demonstrate a probability of prevailing in the
litigation. Although not discussed in Williams’s memorandum in
opposition to the motion (and not expressly alleged in the first
amended complaint), in their supporting declarations Williams
and Casselman asserted Hillcrest Manor and its attorneys had
breached the abeyance agreement because the 2015 unlawful
detainer action had not been dismissed and no satisfaction of
judgment had been entered.3 The opposition did not address the
applicability of the litigation privilege. Real, McCone and Friend
filed a reply in support of the motion.
       After hearing oral argument the trial court granted the
motion. The court found Williams’s claims arose from Real,
McCone and Friend’s litigation activities and, as such,
constituted protected activity within the meaning of
section 425.16. It also found all of the alleged misconduct was
protected by the litigation privilege: “[T]he litigation privilege
forecloses any showing of a probability of success on the merits by
Plaintiff because Moving Defendants’ alleged conduct was either
made in furtherance of the unlawful detainer actions, which are
judicial proceedings, in relation to, or done in good faith and
under serious consideration of litigation prior to the initiation of
the unlawful detainer actions as alleged in the [first amended
complaint]. [Citations.] The [first amended complaint] does not
allege that Moving Defendants engaged in any other conduct that

3     Neither declaration suggests a legal basis for asserting a
contract claim against Hillcrest Manor’s attorneys for breach of
the abeyance agreement between Williams and Hillcrest Manor.

                                 7
did not have some connection or logical relation to the unlawful
detainer actions.”
      Williams filed a timely notice of appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
       Section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP
statute, makes available a special motion to strike certain
meritless claims early in the litigation: “A cause of action against
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 619-620 [“[a] court may strike a cause of
action only if the cause of action (1) arises from an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech ‘in connection
with a public issue,’ and (2) the plaintiff has not established ‘a
probability’ of prevailing on the claims”].)
       Pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (e), an “‘act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing

                                 8
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.”
       In ruling on a motion under section 425.16, the trial court
engages in a now familiar two-step process. “First, the defendant
must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity
protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes
the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability
of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384; accord,
Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009
(Bonni).)
       “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity
underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1062-1063; accord, Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) Thus,
“[t]he defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each
challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim may be struck
only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong
complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading
to some different act for which liability is asserted.’” (Wilson v.
Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884; see Bonni, at
p. 1012; Park, at p. 1060.)
       “As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to
demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its
complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon
competent admissible evidence.’” (Sweetwater Union High School

                                  9
Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940; accord,
Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) “‘We
have described this second step as a “summary-judgment-like
procedure.” [Citation.] The court does not weigh evidence or
resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and
made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true,
and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it
defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’” (Monster
Energy, at p. 788; see Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714
[the court should grant the section 425.16 motion “‘if, as a matter
of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats
the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the
claim’”].)
       We review de novo an order granting or denying a special
motion to strike under section 425.16 (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1238, 1250; Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884), considering the parties’ pleadings and
affidavits describing the facts on which liability or defenses are
predicated. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)
      2. Any Claims Against Real, McCone and Friend Arise from
         Protected Petitioning Activity
       The litigation-related activities of an attorney and the
attorney’s agents, including, as pertinent here, the filing and
prosecution of a civil action on behalf of a client, generally
constitute acts in furtherance of a person’s constitutional right of
petition. (See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 [An
act in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech
“includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and

                                 10
prosecution of a civil action. [Citation.] This includes qualifying
acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in
litigation”]; Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer
& Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 113, 226 [“[i]t is well
established that the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute extends
to lawyers and law firms engaged in litigation-related activity”];
see also ValueRock TN Properties, LLC v. PK II Larwin
Square SC LP (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1046 [section 425.16
protection for petitioning activities “includes the filing of
lawsuits, and the statements and pleadings made in or in
preparation for civil litigation”].)
       In his brief in this court Williams does not dispute that,
whichever of his 50 causes of action he may have asserted against
Real, McCone or Friend, each arises from Real’s role as litigation
counsel for Hillcrest Manor in the two unlawful detainer actions,
McCone’s limited participation as Real’s associate in settlement
discussions resolving the initial unlawful detainer action or
Friend’s submission of a proof of service (allegedly false) in the
initial action. And he does not contend that litigation-related
conduct is not properly classified as constitutionally protected
petitioning activity. Rather, his sole challenge to the trial court’s
step-one analysis is his argument, based on a misunderstanding
of the general language in section 425.26, subdivision (b)(1), that
to come within the protection of section 425.16 petitioning
activity must be “in connection with a public issue.” Here,
Williams argues, the issue was purely private—a simple
landlord-tenant disagreement.
       As discussed, however, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1),
defines as a matter of public interest any written or oral
statement or writing made in a judicial proceeding and

                                 11
subdivision (e)(2) similarly defines as a matter of public interest
any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body. The
acts upon which Williams’s complaint is based (Real’s court
filings, McCone’s settlement letter during the pendency of the
first unlawful detainer case and Friend’s signed proof of service
filed with the court) all fall squarely within those definitions,
whether the unlawful detainer action was private and personal or
a matter of widespread public interest. (Feldman v. 1100 Park
Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1479 [“‘[t]he
prosecution of an unlawful detainer action indisputably is
protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16’”]; Birkner
v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281 [same]; see Kenne v.
Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 966 [attempt to serve process
constitutes protected petitioning activity within section 425.16].)
      3. Williams Failed To Demonstrate a Probability of
         Prevailing on Claims Against Real, McCone and Friend
       Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(2), creates an absolute
privilege for litigation-related communications:4 “‘Although
originally enacted with reference to defamation [citation], the
privilege is now held applicable to any communication, whether
or not it amounts to a publication [citations], and all torts except
malicious prosecution. [Citations.] Further, it applies to any
publication required or permitted by law in the course of a

4      Civil Code section 47 provides in part: “A privileged
publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) In any
(1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other
official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or
course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable
pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1
of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows . . . .”

                                 12
judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even
though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no
function of the court or its officers is involved. [Citations.] [¶]
The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;
(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some
connection or logical relation to the action. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] Thus, ‘communications with “some relation” to
judicial proceedings’ are ‘absolutely immune from tort liability’ by
the litigation privilege [citation]. It is not limited to statements
made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps
taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 1057; see Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of
Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 [“‘[t]he principal
purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and
witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts
without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort
actions’”]; Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor
Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1006.)
       Moreover, “‘communications made in connection with
litigation do not necessarily fall outside the privilege merely
because they are, or are alleged to be, fraudulent, perjurious,
unethical, or even illegal’ assuming they are logically related to
litigation.” (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
903, 921; accord, Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
892, 920; see Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948,
956 [“the privilege extends even to civil actions based on
perjury”]; Kenne v. Stennis, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 965

                                 13
[“‘[t]he litigation privilege has been applied in “numerous cases”
involving “fraudulent communications or perjured testimony”’”].)
       As the trial court ruled, all the conduct of Real, McCone
and Friend alleged by Williams falls well within the scope of the
litigation privilege: Real’s filing and Friend’s service of the
unlawful detainer actions (see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane
Associates, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1486, 1488 [“Park
Lane’s filing of the unlawful detainer action clearly fell within
the litigation privilege”; “the litigation privilege applied to the
service of the notice to quit in this case”]), and Real’s and
McCone’s settlement discussions with Casselman or Williams
himself (see Mancini & Associates v. Schwetz (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 656, 661 [litigation privilege “applies to
statements made during settlement negotiations”].) (See also
Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, supra,
41 Cal.4th at pp. 1249-1250 [litigation privilege preempted
provisions of a city’s tenant harassment ordinance that
authorized civil and criminal penalties for bringing an action to
recover possession of a rental unit without a reasonable factual or
legal basis]; Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057
[litigation privilege “is not limited to statements made during a
trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior
thereto, or afterwards”]; O’Keefe v. Kompa (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
130, 134 [litigation privilege applies to postjudgment enforcement
efforts].)
       In his briefing in this court, Williams asserts in conclusory
fashion that he established a probability of prevailing on the
various causes of action at issue in the special motion to strike—
an argument made without identifying the evidence purportedly
submitted in the trial court to support any of his allegations of

                                 14
tortious conduct. But Williams does not address (or even cite) the
litigation privilege, let alone explain why the privilege does not
constitute an absolute defense to his claims against Real, McCone
and Friend. On the record before us, it would be impossible for
Williams to avoid application of the litigation privilege.
      4. Williams Was Not Entitled to Leave To Amend
       Williams final argument that the trial court should have
granted him leave to amend his complaint if necessary to
establish the requisite probability of prevailing on the merits of
his claims against Real, McCone and Friend misreads governing
law. A plaintiff like Williams who unsuccessfully responded to a
special motion to strike may not be given leave to amend his or
her complaint. As stated more than two decades ago in Simmons
v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073, “Allowing a
SLAPP plaintiff leave to amend the complaint once the court
finds the [first step] showing has been met would completely
undermine the statute by providing the pleader a ready escape
from section 425.16’s quick dismissal remedy. Instead of having
to show a probability of success on the merits, the SLAPP
plaintiff would be able to go back to the drawing board with a
second opportunity to disguise the vexatious nature of the suit
through more artful pleading. This would trigger a second round
of pleadings, a fresh motion to strike, and inevitably another
request for leave to amend.” (Accord, Finato v. Keith A. Fink &
Associates (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 136, 149; Martin v. Inland
Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611, 626;
Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 992, 1005; see Dickinson v. Cosby (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 655, 676 [“[t]here is no such thing as granting an
anti-SLAPP motion with leave to amend”].)

                                15
       To be sure, the court of appeal in Nguyen-Lam v. Cao
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858, a case indirectly relied upon by
Williams,5 affirmed the trial court’s order allowing the plaintiff to
amend her complaint to allege actual malice when her
evidentiary showing in response to a special motion to strike
demonstrated the requisite probability of prevailing on the merits
of a defamation claim that required proof of actual malice. The
court reasoned that the policy concerns against amendment in
the anti-SLAPP context did not apply because the plaintiff’s
suit—shown to be likely meritorious—was not a strategic lawsuit
against public participation, albeit one that lacked a necessary
allegation. (Id. at p. 863.) Nonetheless, the court pointed out
that the trial court’s order granting plaintiff leave to amend
effectively denied the special motion to strike. (Id. at p. 874; see
Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th
at p. 629 [“an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion with leave to
amend is the functional equivalent of an order denying the
motion”].) That is a far cry from the case at bar, where Williams
made no showing in the trial court of a probability of prevailing
on the merits of his claims against Real, McCone and Friend. To
the contrary, as discussed, the litigation privilege absolutely
barred his claims against the three moving parties.

5    Williams quotes the court of appeal’s discussion of Nguyen-
Lam v. Cao, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 858 in Martin v. Inland
Empire Utilities Agency, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at page 627.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The order granting the special motion to strike is affirmed.
Real, McCone and Friend are to recover their costs on appeal.

                                      PERLUSS, P. J.
      We concur:

            FEUER, J.

            MARTINEZ, J.

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