Court Opinion

ID: 9672369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:53:39.962601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.631094
License: Public Domain

M. S. Coleman, J.
(dissent). Leave to appeal was granted to explore the right of a defendant to represent himself under the circumstances at bar.
After all persons necessary to the trial, including defendant’s attorney, were present and prepared to go forward, defendant asked the court first for another attorney and next asked to represent himself.
The circuit judge, who had previously observed *338defendant’s behavior, had in hand a relevant psychiatric report and had spoken with defendant on the trial date, followed prevailing law and American Bar Association standards in reaching his conclusion that defendant could not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to counsel.
My colleagues rely upon Faretta v California, 422 US 806; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), and applying their interpretation retroactively would reverse the conviction. I would find that the trial judge, with admirable foresight, complied with the Faretta rationale. In any event, I would not apply the interpretation retroactively.
I.
The law as to self-representation was well settled when the American Bar Association published suggested guidelines in 1971. The trial judge followed both. First, we look to case law important to the state of the law in 1971.
In speaking of waiver of counsel, the United States Supreme Court stated in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938):
"The determination of whether, there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”
Defendant replied negatively to the court’s inquiry as to whether he wished counsel in Moore v Michigan, 355 US 155; 78 S Ct 191; 2 L Ed 2d 167 (1957). He wanted to "get it over with”. The Court found that because of defendant’s youth and lack of education, intervention of counsel was not intelligently waived. The Court also found the convic*339tion invalid because the "circumstances show that his rights could not have been fairly protected without counsel”.
In vacating a 1963 Arizona conviction1 in which a defendant chose to represent himself, the United States Supreme Court spoke approvingly of the Johnson, supra language with respect to the duty of the trial judge:
"This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.”
In addition to following the prevailing common law, the trial judge used the American Bar Association standards relating to the election of a defendant to represent himself at trial (May, 1971):
"A defendant should be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the court makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that he
"(a) possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of his decision; and
"(b) comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case.

"Commentary

"Although Federal statutes (28 UCS § 1654) and many state constitutions, e.g., Art 1, § 9, Constitution of Pennsylvania, authorize defendants in criminal cases to represent themselves, the right is not absolute. The defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel cannot be abrogated unless knowingly and intelligently waived, however strongly the defendant may desire to proceed alone. See Von Moltke v Gillies, 332 *340US 708 [68 S Ct 316; 92 L Ed 309] (1948); ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, §§ 7.1-7.3. (Approved Draft, 1968). Particularly when a trial is involved, the interest of the public in an orderly, rational trial is entitled to consideration in determining the defendant’s right to appear pro se. See United States v Bentvena, 319 F2d 916, 937 (CA 2, 1963); Butler v United States, 317 F2d 249, 258 (CA 8, 1963).
"Most defendants who seek to appear pro se do so in ignorance of the value of counsel and of their own inadequacies, or out of paranoid distrust of appointed counsel. More sophisticated motives may include the hope that the absence of counsel may afford a basis for reversal of a conviction regarded as inevitable, or a desire to ventilate societal hostility through the dramatic vehicle of a disorderly trial. See generally, Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 Duquesne L Rev 245 (1964). None of these sources of the desire to dispense with counsel outweigh the rights of codefendants, or the interest of the public in a just and orderly trial. Nor do they require the court to disregard the long-term interest of the accused in having guilt or lack of guilt fairly determined. ” ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to the Judge’s Role in Dealing with Trial Disruptions, Standard C.2 and commentary, pp 10, 11 (Tentative Draft, May 1971). (Emphasis added.)
In reaching his decision that defendant was not competent to waive counsel, the circuit judge here relied upon "the forensic report, psychiatric evidence, and defendant’s demonstrative behavior, including prior disruptive conduct before [the judge]”. After carefully following the existent law and the ABA standards, the trial judge concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. As to self-representation, the judge said:
"/ do not, however, ñnd that the defendant possesses *341the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of his decision to represent himself in the case and proceed to trial without the assistance of counsel, even advisory counsel, nor do I find that he comprehends all of the facts essential to a broad understanding of the case which would be necessary for him to properly represent himself, and it is for these reasons that I have felt that the protection of the defendant’s rights requires that he have counsel, notwithstanding his desire to proceed without counsel.” (Emphasis added.)
In this careful manner, the judge exercised the necessary discretion.
II.
Shortly after this decision the Court of Appeals decided the matter of People v Kirkland, 40 Mich App 22; 198 NW2d 811 (1972), wherein it underscored the basic concept that
"The right of the accused to represent himself at trial is not absolute when it conflicts with the interest of the public in ensuring a fair trial. * * * While the right to counsel may be waived, it is always the duty of the trial court to determine whether the waiver is voluntarily and intelligently made.”
Such has been the Michigan precedent.
III.
Then in 1975 came Faretta. The majority reach the conclusion that Faretta demanded defendant’s right to represent himself. I can find nothing in the Federal opinion or the facts of this case to support that finding.
First, the Faretta concepts are those employed by the court in this matter. That Court said:
*342"When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently’ forego those relinquished benefits. Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461; 146 ALR 357 [1938], Cf. Von Moltke v Gillies, 332 US 708, 723-724; 68 S Ct 316, 323; 92 L Ed 309 [1948] (plurality opinion of Black, J.)”
The record reveals a man unable to represent himself in any but a self-defeating manner. For instance, defendant asked that his appointed counsel be dismissed. He explained his reasons as:
"He ain’t handling my case right, by (sic) grandmother died, I tried to get out on — she died since I have been in jail, she died two days ago, my people have been trying to get me out on bond and I would like to defense this my own self * * * .”
Defendant’s attorney said he had visited his client at least four times in jail and the court noted his attempts to have bond lowered and the court’s refusal.
The court noted defendant’s prior disruptive behavior (which was personally observed) and also the Forensic Center report
"that the defendant exhibited confusion, rambling speech and occasionally incoherent mutterings and exhibited * * * personality features suggesting of an explosive and impulsive personality.”
The report stated that defendant
"could become expansive one time and then very quickly change his mood showing angry and threaten*343ing behavior. * * * however when any attempt was made to discuss the charge with him the patient became belligerent and sullen and refused to consider making a defense for himself.”
Defendant’s attorney also noted his client’s lack of interest in the details of his case other than bond.
Faretta requires that
" 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ Adams v United States ex rel McCann, 317 US 269, 279; 63 S Ct 236; 87 L Ed 268 [143 ALR 435 (1942)].”
Although this case was decided four years prior to Faretta, the judge fulfilled its basic requirements. He also adhered to the standards of 1971 and those upon which subsequent development of the concept has been built.
For reasons which I do not find apparent in the record, my colleagues find that the court failed to determine whether defendant was "literate, competent, and understanding”. They cite Faretta as retroactive precedent.
IV.
Although I would find that the requirements of Faretta have been met, the argument of retroactive applicability of the opinion deserves analysis.
In Johnson v New Jersey, 384 US 719; 86 S Ct 1772; 16 L Ed 2d 882 (1966), the United States Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the subject of retroactive treatment. The Court held that Escobedo v Illinois, 378 US 478; 84 S Ct 1758; 12 L Ed 2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), affected only *344those cases in which the trial began after the date of the respective decisions.
The Court noted three general rules governing retroactivity: (1) "[T]he choice between retroactivity and nonretroactivity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved.”2 (2) The retroactivity question must be determined " 'in each case’ by looking to the peculiar traits of the specific 'rule in question’ ”. The reason for this is that "[e]ach constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice * * * ”.3 (3) Protection of "the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial” is a crucial factor to consider.4
Further, the Court stated that "We must look to the purpose [of the newly adopted constitutional rule], the reliance which may have been placed upon prior decisions on the subject, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application * * * ”.5
For example, in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), the Court denied retroactive application of Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961). The Court reasoned that Mapp affected evidence "the reliability and relevancy of which is not questioned”. In Tehan v Shott, 382 US 406; 86 S Ct 459; 15 L Ed 2d 453 (1966), the Court denied retroactive application to Griffin v California, 380 US 609; 85 S Ct 1229; 14 L Ed 2d 106 (1965).
On retroactive application of Miranda and Escobedo, the Johnson Court stated that "the prime *345purpose of these rulings is to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination * * *
The Court explained its decision not to invoke retroactivity. One factor was the disruptive effect of retroactivity:
"[Retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda would seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws. It would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards.”
Not only did the Court deny retroactivity to final convictions, but also cases pending on appeal:
"All of the reasons set forth above for making Escobedo and Miranda nonretroactive suggest that these decisions should apply only to trials begun after the decisions were announced.”
Applying the Johnson analysis, Faretta should in any event be applied only to trials commencing after its decision date. Because the instant case long preceded Faretta, defendant should not be allowed to assert its holding.
However, even Faretta does not require a judge to permit self-representation under the facts of this case. The judge had a sound basis for his decision based upon his personal observations and discussions in court as well as upon the Forensic Center report. No formal format was required in 1971, nor do I believe it a requirement under Faretta. Indeed, if defendant had been allowed to proceed in propria persona, there would have been good grounds for reversal. The judge steered a precise course between Scylla and Charybdis.
*346Retroactivity of judicial decisions has long been a matter of concern primarily because of its effect upon bench and bar who proceeded as required by the law of a given date only to find years later that they should have been omniscent. Orderly development of law and social progress usually can be achieved without throwing into confusion the public and all of those upon whom decisions may fall.
Generally speaking, retroactivity of Faretta as interpreted would cause disruption of the administration of criminal law. "It would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty * * * in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards.”
The majority interpretation of Faretta should only apply to trials started after the date of that decision. Similar to Johnson, future defendants may benefit from the new rule of self-representation, while past defendants máy still utilize the previously existing Michigan case law.
There is no merit in the other challenges by defendant. No objection was made to the jury instruction, and no miscarriage of justice appears. Neither was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel.
I would affirm.

 Westbrook v Arizona, 384 US 150; 86 S Ct 1320; 16 L Ed 2d 429 (1966).

 Johnson, supra, at 728.

 Johnson, supra, at 728.

 Johnson, supra, at 729.

 Johnson, supra, at 727.