Court Opinion

ID: 9456243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:46:36.853485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:54.181002
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge
(concurring) :
I agree with the result set forth in the opinion by Judge Davis. To my view, however, it conveys a false impression to say that appellant did not have adequate representation by counsel to the extent that such statement carries any implication against the counsel involved. To the extent that the efforts of appellant’s counsel may have been frustrated it was caused by the rapidity with which appellant reversed his position and not by anything his counsel did or failed to do. Appellant had orally and in writing voluntarily confessed to certain housebreakings, had voluntarily requested removal from Texas to the District of Columbia for trial, had voluntarily waived a hearing on his removal from Texas to the District of Columbia and had then voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to two counts of a 12-count indictment. The next day he changed his mind and said he wanted to withdraw his plea and plead not guilty. That his counsel could not understand such a sudden reversal of position is not surprising, especially in the face of appellant’s voluntary confessions. Faced with such situation counsel made a clear statement of the factual situation to the court and stated that he did not feel he could represent appellant any longer. Counsel’s action was timely, commendable and proper and the situation that evolved is not in any way a discredit to him. Under such circumstances the court should have acceded to his request and appointed another counsel to represent appellant. This will be corrected on remand.
It appears on the very inadequate record before this court that there may be some doubt that appellant committed the Symington housebreaking but we do not decide that he did not commit that offense. That is appellant’s claim and it should be fully investigated. If he did not commit that crime, it goes without saying that on remand his plea to that count of the indictment should not stand.
The opinion by Judge Davis implies that the trial court on remand should consider appellant’s mental and psychological problems in relation to his guilty pleas. An inquiry of such nature, which essentially goes to the voluntariness of the plea, is, of course, always in order in a case where the facts present it; but since appellant, at the time of the entry of the plea, was found to be competent to stand trial, and the court by appropriate inquiries at that time determined that he voluntarily entered his plea of guilty, it seems to me that the validity of the plea from that standpoint had been adequately determined.