Court Opinion

ID: 9940932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 17:14:31.656666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:05.748237
License: Public Domain

J-A27002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  Ch.D.V.                                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  C.D.V.                                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 678 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 12, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 2018-00760

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                     FILED: FEBRUARY 15, 2024

       C.D.V. (Father) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Cumberland County, granting Ch.D.V.’s (Mother) petition for

modification of custody. After our review, we affirm.

       Mother and Father married in 2015, separated in 2017, and are the

parents of Child (born May 2016). The parties are now divorced; Mother is

remarried, and Father lives with his fiancée, with whom he has a child, as well

as his fiancée’s two children.

       Mother initiated the instant custody action in 2017, and the parties, by

agreement, shared custody of Child, on a 50/50 schedule. In reality, however,

Mother testified that she was the primary caretaker. See N.T. Modification of

Custody Hearing, 4/11/23, at 13 (Mother testifying that although “in writing,

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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it was 50/50,” Father would typically have custody “two days out of the

week.”); id. at 7-10 (Mother testifying she schedules and takes Child to

medical appointments, pays for Child’s clothing, health insurance, and

activities (art club, science club, and ballet), helps Child with homework, and

attends parent-teacher conferences). Father disputed much of Mother’s

testimony regarding who pays for what.           See N.T. Hearing, supra at 36-38.

       When Child started kindergarten, Father wanted to exercise his 50/50

shared custody schedule, which the parties adhered to for the first half of

Child’s kindergarten year. Id. at 14. Mother testified that Father “absolutely”

loves Child, but that the schedule during the school year was not in Child’s

best interest.    Mother testified Child was arriving at school late, appeared

unkempt, and was having anxiety with the transitions. Id. at 15, 23.1 Mother

appealed to Child’s “de facto grandmother,” Staci Kirchhoff, to intercede on

Child’s behalf. The trial court described the parties’ and Child’s relationship

with Kirchoff as follows:

       Staci Kirchoff is a remarkable woman who took Father in shortly
       after both of his parents died in 2011. She became a surrogate
       mother to him, paying for his college and helping him buy his
       current home. She has also been a de facto grandmother to
       [Child]. In addition to being [] Child’s “Wabbie,”1 she pays the

____________________________________________

1 On cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that Child was late to school

only one time during Father’s custodial time, but stated that it was more
“about [Child] getting to school looking like she’s presentable and having a
structure and schedule throughout the week.” N.T. Modification of Custody
Hearing, supra at 23. Although Child’s school never contacted Mother
regarding Child’s appearance, Mother stated that “other parents from
Harrisburg Academy [had] reach]ed] out to [her.]” Id. at 26.

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         tuition to allow [Child] to attend Harrisburg Academy, a
         prestigious private school.
         [1]A term of endearment used by the Child toward Ms. Kirchhoff.     It
         signifies “grandmother” in Father’s native Brazil. (citation omitted).

Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/23, at 2 (footnote in original).

         Mother and Father, who reside only 25 minutes apart, met with

Kirchhoff2 in February 2022, and Father ultimately agreed that Child’s best

interests would be served by allowing Mother to have primary custody during

the school year. The parties adhered to this arrangement for the remainder

of Child’s kindergarten year. See N.T. Modification of Custody Hearing, supra

at 14.

         When Child was about to start first grade, Father wanted to return to

the parties’ original agreement of 50/50 shared custody. Father previously

worked in IT from home and is currently a stay-at-home dad. Father’s fiancée

works full time as a mental health/behavioral case manager for children and

youth. Id. at 32-33.

         On October 28, 2022, Mother filed a petition for modification of custody

and, following the April 11, 2023 hearing, President Judge Edward E. Guido

granted Mother’s petition.        The court reviewed the custody factors on the

____________________________________________

2 Kirchoff testified that she considers Father     her “son,” “the brother for my
four children,” and even though she and Father are somewhat estranged
currently, Kirchoff testified that “[Father] will always be my son, and I’ll always
try and keep in touch with him[.]” See N.T. Hearing, supra at 57, 63, 68.
Kirchoff is a former teacher, with a degree in early childhood and elementary
education. Id. at 61. She testified as to the importance of a consistent routine
during the school year for Child, whom she considers her “granddaughter.”
Id. at 61, 65-66.

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record, see id. at 73-75, and ordered that Mother have primary physical

custody during the school year, subject to Father’s partial custody every other

weekend, and that, during the summer, the parties share physical custody

50/50 on a week on/week off basis. See Order, 4/12/23.

      Father filed a timely appeal. Both Father and the trial court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Father raises the following issues for our

review:

          1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and misapply the law
             in granting [Mother] primary physical custody of [Child]
             when that decision was against the weight of the evidence
             and contrary to [Child’s] best interest?

          2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion and error
             of law in failing to recognize Father as more likely than
             Mother to encourage and permit [Child] to have frequent
             and continuing contact with the other party, pursuant to 23
             Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(1)?

          3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err in determining
             that Mother performed more parental duties on behalf of
             [Child] than Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(3)?

          4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err in determining
             that Mother was more likely than Father to provide more
             stability and continuity, in [Child’s] education, family life,
             and community pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(4)?

          5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err in determining
             that Mother was more likely than Father to maintain a
             loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with
             [Child] adequate for her emotional needs pursuant to 23
             Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(9)?

          6. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion and error
             of law in determining that Mother was more likely than
             Father to attend to [Child’s] daily physical, emotional,
             educational, developmental, and special needs pursuant to
             23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(10)?

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         7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that
            [Child] suffered from anxiety as a direct result of the
            number of exchanges between Mother and Father when
            considering “other” factors pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
            5328(a)(16)?

Appellant’s Brief, at 3-4.

      We address Father’s claims together as each challenges the court’s

application of the custody factors to the evidence presented. Father argues

that the court’s order “was against the weight of the evidence” and gave

“inappropriate weight to much of Mother’s testimony[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at

10.

      We review a trial court’s determination in a custody case for an abuse

of discretion, and our scope of review is broad. M.P. v. M.P., 54 A.3d 950,

953 (Pa. Super. 2012). Because we cannot make independent factual

determinations, we must accept the trial court’s findings that are supported

by the evidence. Id. The trial judge’s deductions or inferences from its factual

findings, however, do not bind this Court. Id. We may reject the trial court’s

conclusions, but only if they involve an error of law or are unreasonable in

light of its factual findings. Id. See also Smith v. Smith, 281 A.3d 304 (Pa.

Super. 2022).

      Although we are given a broad power of review, we are
      constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating
      the court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
      judgment, but if the court’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable
      as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused. An
      abuse of discretion is also made out where it appears from a
      review of the record that there is no evidence to support the
      court’s findings or that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence.

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M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 18-19 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (internal

citations omitted).

      Moreover, on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer

to the findings of the trial court, which has had the opportunity to observe the

proceedings and demeanor of the witnesses. R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d

1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2009). This Court is bound by the credibility

determinations of the trial judge, “who viewed and assessed the witnesses

first-hand.” R.L.P. v. R.F.M., 110 A.3d 201, 207-08 (Pa. Super. 2015).

      The discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters should
      be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature of the
      proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on the lives
      of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial
      court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot
      adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed record.

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Jackson

v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

      In any custody case decided under the Child Custody Act (Act), 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321 et seq., the paramount concern is the best interest of the

child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5328, 5338. Section 5338 of the Act provides

that, upon petition, a trial court may modify a custody order if it serves the

best interest of the child. Id. at § 5338; C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 909 (Pa.

2018). In ordering any form of custody, the court shall determine the best

interest of the child by considering the following factors, set forth in section

5328(a):

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     (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent
     and continuing contact between the child and another party.

     (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member
     of the party’s household, whether there is a continued risk of harm
     to the child or an abused party[,] and which party can better
     provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.

     (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the
     child.

     (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's education,
     family life and community life.

     (5) The availability of extended family.

     (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

     (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s
     maturity and judgment.

     (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other
     parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable
     safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.

     (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
     consistent[,] and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
     for the child’s emotional needs.

     (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
     emotional, developmental, educational[,] and special needs of the
     child.

     (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

     (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to make
     appropriate child-care arrangements.

     (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness
     and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party’s
     effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is not
     evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.

     (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of
     a party’s household.

     (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a
     party’s household.

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      (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(1-16).

      Here, the court heard testimony from Mother and Father, as well as

Kirchoff, who is, essentially, Child’s de facto paternal grandmother. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court considered the statutory custody

factors, provided a detailed analysis of those factors on the record, set forth

each of the custody factors and explained in detail which factor favored which

party, and concluded that it was in Child’s best interest for Mother to have

primary custody during the school year. See N.T. Modification of Custody

Hearing, supra at 73-77.

      The court specifically noted that many of the custody factors were

neutral, favoring neither party, and stated on the record that, “[f]ortunately

for this young lady, both parents want the other party to be fully involved in

her life.”   Id. at 73.   Further, the court found, under “any other relevant

factor,” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(16), that Child’s anxiety would be lessened

by fewer custody exchanges during the school year.         Id. at 75.   As Child

matures, she may be better adept at handling transitions, but in light of Child’s

youth, the court’s consideration here is reasonable, and the court found

Mother’s and Kirchoff’s testimony on this issue credible. See id. at 13, 61,

65. See also Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/23, at 42. The court resolved most

of the conflicts in testimony in favor of Mother. Id.

      Father would have us reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. “The

parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on the

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evidence. Rather, the paramount concern of the trial court is the best interest

of the child.”   R.M.G., 986 A.2d at 1237 (internal citations omitted).

“Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration of the

best interest of the child was careful and thorough, and we are unable to find

any abuse of discretion.” Id.

      President Judge Guido’s order reflects a meaningful consideration of the

custody factors, and we find no error or abuse of discretion in his

determination that this order is in Child’s best interest.   See M.P., supra.

Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/15/2024

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