Court Opinion

ID: 9581185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:12:24.741279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:45.922058
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The taxpayer erred in filing its petition with the Rock county circuit court rather than with the Dane county circuit court. I agree with the majority opinion that there is sufficient leeway in the statutes to enable the court to save the taxpayer from *237its procedural error without doing harm to the public interest. I therefore agree with the majority opinion that the circuit court action should not be dismissed.
I do not join the majority opinion because I have difficulty following its discussion of “subject matter jurisdiction”, “competency of the court,” and “venue.”
The terms subject matter jurisdiction and competency are not self-defined. Although the majority opinion offers no clarification as to the meanings of both terms, the majority opinion apparently distinguishes between subject matter jurisdiction and competency. This distinction is traced to Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982), in which the court relied on sec. 7 of the First Restatement of Judgments (1942). A careful reading of sec. 7 and the comments shows, however, that the Restatement uses the terms subject matter jurisdiction and competency “more or less interchangeably”. Field and Kaplan, Civil Procedure 603 (2d ed. 1968). The Second Restatement of Judgments (vol. 1, p. 28) (1982) explains that it uses the term subject matter jurisdiction, rather than competency and rather than the two terms interchangeably, “simply because it [subject matter jurisdiction] is much more commonly used in American legal parlance than ‘competence’ or ‘competency.’ ”1
I recognize that there appears to be a difference of opinion among the scholars as to the use of the terms competency, subject matter jurisdiction, and to add further to the confusion, territorial jurisdiction and state power.2 It is generally agreed, however, that it does *238not matter what terminology is used as long as the court defines its terms, uses the terms in a consistent fashion and explains the consequences of the classifications it establishes. I do not think this opinion meets this objective.
The majority opinion defines subject matter jurisdiction as relating “to the power of the court to entertain a particular type of action.” Supra, p. 230. Yet in Mueller, supra 105 Wis. 2d at 177, the court, adopting the terminology of the First Restatement of Judgments, says that if the state has not given a court the power to entertain the action, the court has no competency to render a valid judgment. Thus the majority opinion defines subject matter jurisdiction in the same way Mueller defined competency.
The majority opinion does not expressly define competency but appears to use the term competency interchangeably with venue. Supra, pp. 230, 233. The majority defines venue as relating “to which court of those having the power to entertain the action should render judgment in the matter”, supra, p. 230, and to “the [court’s] competency to render a valid judgment.” Supra, p. 231.
Confusion arises because the First Restatement of Judgments, upon which Mueller and thus the majority opinion rely, does not generally classify a venue requirement as an issue of competency or subject matter jurisdiction.3 The First Restatement treats venue, ex*239cept where the state statute requires another interpretation, as a procedural defect which does not ordinarily go to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction or competence. Restatement of Judgments, sec. 7, Comment b, pp. 42-44. See also 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments sec. 4, Comment h, pp. 62-63. For an explanation of why the “place of trial” requirement in this case should be treated as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, not venue, see Shopper Advertiser v. Department of Revenue, 112 Wis. 2d 354, 360, 332 N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1983).
The definitions of the terms competency, subject matter jurisdiction and venue are less important than a consideration of the differences in consequences that flow from the classification of the error. The black-letter Restatement law is that “a judgment is void if it is not rendered by a court with competency to render it.” Restatement of Judgments, sec. 7. See also 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments, p. 28, and Mueller, supra 105 Wis. 2d at 177. A companion black-letter Restatement rule is that if venue is improper, the judgment is not void, but is invalid or erroneous and subject to reversal only on direct attack. Restatement of Judgments, sec. 7, Comment b, p. 43.
The majority opinion concludes that since venue is improper in this case, any judgment would be “invalid” {supra, p. 230) and the court lacks “the competency to render a valid judgment.” Supra, p. 231. Traditionally *240the terms valid, invalid (also sometimes referred to as erroneous), and void are terms of art in this field of law and must be defined. Different consequences are attached to these classifications, such as waiver, necessity for direct attack of the judgment, and ability to attack the judgment collaterally. See, e.g., 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments, sec. 1.
I am also perplexed that the majority, after labeling the error one of venue, not jurisdiction, then turns to sec. 807.07(2), Stats. 1981-82, and defines the word jurisdiction in that section to include venue to enable the Rock county circuit court to transfer the matter to the Dane county circuit court. I would have thought that the majority would have turned to sec. 801.53, 1981-82, which authorizes a change of place of trial where the county designated in the complaint is not the proper place of trial.
In summary, although I find the analysis in the opinion of the court of appeals thoughtful and edifying, I agree with the result reached by the majority: The error in selecting the court in this case should be classified in such a way that the action need not be dismissed. But I believe that the discussion in the majority opinion relating to competency, subject matter jurisdiction and venue instead of clarifying the law adds further confusion to an already confusing area of the law.
I dissent from that part of the mandate that remands the remaining issues to the court of appeals for decision. As I have explained before, I believe that this court has the power to remand issues to the court of appeals, but in the interest of judicial economy, speedy resolution of appeals, reduced costs to the litigants, and finality of decisions, I would have this court decide the entire case on review. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis. 2d 26, 45-46, 330 N.W.2d 209 (1983).

 See also sec. 11, Comment b p. 109, 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments.

 See, e.g., 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments, ch. 2, pp. 27-29, sec. 11 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Introductory Note, pp 100-102, sec. 24, Comment f, p. 108, sec. 92, Comment i, p. 275, sec. 105 (1969); Restatement of Judg*238ments sec. 7, Comments, pp. 41-44 (1942); Ehrenzweig and Louisell, Jurisdiction: Federal and State, p. 10-12, 162-64 (Nutshell Series 1973); Smit, The Terms Jurisdiction and Competence in Comparative Law, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 164, 167 (1961).

 It is possible to define venue as a subcategory of competency. See, e.g., Professor Smit, supra note 1, who defines competence as the power of the court to adjudicate a particular controversy and classifies rules of competency into rules of general competency and rules of specific competency. He views venue as a rule of *239specific competency. Indeed parts of Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 177-178, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982), upon which the majority relies, appear to treat venue as a subcategory of competency, while recognizing that different consequences are accorded the different subcategories of competency. In Mueller the court apparently recognized that some defects — which it labels as issues of competency — would have the same consequences as those defects which others label as issues of subject matter jurisdiction.