Court Opinion

ID: 9898859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 15:08:49.984516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:34.529627
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Morris, 2023-Ohio-4105.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                              :   APPEAL NO. C-230108
                                                 TRIAL NO. B-2202366
           Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                             :
     vs.
                                             :
 ISAIAH MORRIS,                                        O P I N I O N.

           Defendant-Appellee.               :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 15, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W.
Springman, Jr., Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista Gieske, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}   Under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, a person accused

of a crime in Ohio is guaranteed the right to counsel. This appeal concerns that state

constitutional right and the admissibility of a defendant’s uncounseled statements

made in a police-initiated interrogation, where the defendant had been arrested,

arraigned, and appointed counsel, and after the defendant signed a “Notification of

Rights” form without counsel present. We hold that, in these circumstances, the

defendant’s purported waiver is invalid and therefore, we affirm the trial court’s

suppression of defendant-appellee Isaiah Morris’s statements.

                             I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   In May 2023, Morris was arrested and jailed for multiple counts of

felonious assault and other offenses unrelated to this appeal. The following morning,

Morris was brought to “Room A” at the Hamilton County Justice Center for an

arraignment. At his arraignment, the judge reviewed the complaint, determined

probable cause, set bond, and appointed counsel to represent Morris.

       {¶3}   That afternoon, and before Morris had an opportunity to speak with his

attorney, Detectives Glecker and Bender of the Cincinnati Police Department

interrogated Morris in the Justice Center. The interrogation began with Detective

Glecker’s word-for-word reading of a “Notification of Rights” form, which provided,

in relevant part:

       You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any

       questions and to have him with you during the questioning.

       If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any

       questioning, if you wish.

       If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will
                                          2
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right

       to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.

                                          ***

       I understand my rights.

       Signed_________________

       {¶4}   Morris signed the form. The interrogation lasted roughly two hours.

       {¶5}   Morris moved to suppress the statements made during the

interrogation as a violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I, Section

10 of the Ohio Constitution. In his motion and at the suppression hearing, Morris

argued that the right to counsel under the Ohio Constitution affords greater

protections than the right under the United States Constitution.

       {¶6}   At the suppression hearing, Detective Glecker recalled advising Morris

of his Miranda rights before Morris signed the “Notification of Rights” form. Glecker

acknowledged that the form omits any mention of a “waiver.” The state entered into

evidence Detective Glecker’s bodycam footage from the interrogation and the

“Notification of Rights” form. His testimony covered his experience as an officer, his

familiarity with the arraignment process, and the interrogation.

       {¶7}   At the close of the hearing, Morris argued that the signed “Notification

of Rights” form did not constitute a waiver of his rights, and reiterated his stance that

the state constitutional right to counsel provides more robust protections than the

federal right. In response, the state contended that Morris had waived his rights under

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Subsequently, both

parties submitted supplemental memoranda reiterating these very arguments.

                                           3
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶8}   The trial court suppressed Morris’s statements. The trial court

explained that it offered the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefing and

that the state “did not address the Ohio Constitutional issues.” The trial court found

that the designation-of-counsel form was docketed the morning of Morris’s

interrogation, Morris’s counsel was not notified of the interrogation, the detectives

“did not ask Mr. Morris to sign a waiver or acknowledge orally that he was waiving his

Miranda rights,” and the detectives asked Morris about the offense for which Morris

was arrested and appointed counsel hours before the interrogation.

       {¶9}   Additionally, the trial court found that Morris asked, “I can’t see a

lawyer?” roughly 45 minutes into the interrogation. Detective Glecker replied,

“[A]nybody can talk to a lawyer.” And Morris responded, “[Y]eah, cause that’s, we goin’

to do that cause I don’t know what you are talking about.” Detective Glecker continued

the interrogation.

       {¶10} The trial court found that Morris’s right to counsel had attached at the

arraignment. It acknowledged the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Montejo

v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009), which held that

the state does not violate an accused’s right to counsel under the United States

Constitution when law enforcement initiates an interrogation after a defendant

secures counsel at arraignment.

       {¶11} The trial court, however, relied on the right to counsel under the Ohio

Constitution as the basis for suppressing Morris’s statements. The trial court

conducted an extensive inquiry into the right to counsel under the Ohio Constitution

and identified persuasive reasons to find that the Ohio Constitution offers broader

right-to-counsel protections than the United States Constitution. It cited the

constitutional text, state precedent, the centrality of the right to counsel in Ohio’s
                                           4
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

criminal legal system, and Kentucky, West Virginia, and Kansas Supreme Court cases,

which rejected Montejo. Because it found that Ohio’s Constitution prohibits the state

from initiating uncounseled interrogations after an accused has secured counsel, the

trial court suppressed all uncounseled statements made by Morris during the

interrogation.

       {¶12} Alternatively, the trial court found that Morris’s remarks to the

detective, “can’t I talk to a lawyer?” and “yeah cause that’s – we goin’ to do that because

I don’t know what you’re talking about,” constituted an unequivocal request for an

attorney during the interrogation. Therefore, the trial court also found that all

statements following that request must be suppressed under the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.

       {¶13} The state appeals the trial court’s suppression of Morris’s statements.

                                II. Law and Analysis

       {¶14} The state’s sole assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred as

a matter of law by granting Morris’s motion to suppress. It offers four issues for review.

First, the state argues that Morris’s right to counsel had not attached because he had

not been formally indicted. Next, the state contends that Montejo v. Louisiana governs

Morris’s right to counsel. Third, the state asserts that the Ohio Constitution does not

guarantee a broader right to counsel than the federal Constitution. Finally, the state

maintains that Morris did not unambiguously request counsel at the 45-minute mark

of the interrogation.

       {¶15} The state’s appeal of the trial court’s decision to grant Morris’s motion

to suppress “presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Hampton, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-210423, 2022-Ohio-1380, ¶ 5, citing State v. Winfrey, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-070490, 2008-Ohio-3160, ¶ 19. We “must accept the trial court’s
                                    5
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

findings of fact if they are supported by competent and credible evidence.” Id., quoting

Winfrey at ¶ 19. But we “must independently determine, without deference to the trial

court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” State v. Bell, 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-050537 and C-050539, 2007-Ohio-310, ¶ 50.

             A. The Right to Counsel Attached at Morris’s Arraignment

       {¶16} The state first asserts that the trial court mistakenly analyzed Morris’s

right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Instead, the state insists, Morris’s interrogation and confession must be analyzed

under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

       {¶17} Both Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee to individuals a right against

compulsory self-incrimination during police interrogations. See New York v. Quarles,

467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); see also State v. Goff, 128

Ohio St.3d 169, 2010-Ohio-6317, 942 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 43. To protect that right, the

United States Supreme Court “established a set of specific protective guidelines, now

commonly known as the Miranda rules.” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443, 94

S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). These protective guidelines, or prophylactic rules,

require law enforcement to warn an individual in custody “that he has a right to remain

silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that

he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. at 443-

444, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694

(1966).

       {¶18} Absent these warnings, “statements obtained during a custodial

interrogation are inadmissible.” State v. Montgomery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

220063, 2022-Ohio-4030, ¶ 17, citing State v. Hill, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170507,
                                        6
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2018-Ohio-3130, ¶ 45. Miranda warnings are not required unless the individual is in

custody and subjected to an interrogation. See State v. Strozier, 172 Ohio App.3d 780,

2007-Ohio-4575, 876 N.E.2d 1304, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.); see also Hill at ¶ 46.

       {¶19} Beyond Miranda’s prophylactic protection of the right to counsel, under

Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, a person accused of a crime is guaranteed the right to counsel.

This right “is a necessary and cherished aspect of our adversarial system of justice.”

State v. Chinn, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 11835, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6497, 42-43

(Dec. 27, 1991). This right is both broader and narrower than the right under Miranda.

It is broader as it applies outside of custodial interrogations—it applies to all “critical

stages of criminal proceedings.” State v. Wright, 4th Dist. Highland No. 19CA14,

2020-Ohio-275, ¶ 6; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18

L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

       {¶20} The right is narrower because it “does not attach until a prosecution is

commenced.” State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996,

¶ 64. This is because it is an accused’s right to counsel. In other words, the right

“becomes applicable only when the government’s role shifts from investigation to

accusation.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410

(1986). So what matters is the initiation of “adversarial judicial proceedings * * *

‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or

arraignment.’ ” State v. Norman, 137 Ohio App.3d 184, 198, 738 N.E.2d 403 (1st

Dist.1999), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-690, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d

411 (1972). Adversarial criminal proceedings may commence at “a criminal

defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge

against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, [which] marks the start of
                                        7
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right

to counsel.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 208, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed.2d

366 (2008).

       {¶21} Ohio courts have recognized that the right “attaches at ‘the initiation of

adversary judicial criminal proceedings’ such as a preliminary examination.” State v.

Yoder, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011-CA-00027, 2011-Ohio-4975, ¶ 64 (right to counsel

attached when defendant “was arraigned and appointed counsel”), quoting Moore v.

Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); see State v. Dell, 2022-

Ohio-2483, 192 N.E.3d 1288, ¶ 41 (5th Dist.) (“A preliminary hearing is a critical stage

of the criminal process during which a defendant’s fundamental right to counsel is

protected.”).

       {¶22} The state acknowledges that, hours before the interrogation, Morris was

brought before a judicial officer for his arraignment. See Hamilton County Municipal

Court Loc.R. 9.11(b)(1). During his arraignment, the judge established bond, apprised

Morris of the nature of the charge, determined probable cause, and appointed counsel.

See Crim.R. 5(A).

       {¶23} But the state invokes our opinion in Bell to argue that Morris’s right did

not attach without a formal indictment. In Bell, we held that the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel had not attached before an interrogation because

attachment requires the initiation of formal charges and “the state had not indicted

Bell at the time of the January 15 interview.” Bell, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-050537

and C-050539, 2007-Ohio-310, at ¶ 54. Unlike Morris, Bell had not been brought

before a judge for his arraignment before police interviewed him. Instead, that

interview occurred after officers arrested Bell, “took him to the Springfield Township

Police Department, where he was advised of his Miranda rights and placed in an
                                      8
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

interview room with Detective Kemper.” Id. at ¶ 27. Therefore, Bell is properly

understood to stand for the principle that a defendant’s right to counsel does not

attach at arrest. See State v. McBride, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 8914, 1985 Ohio App.

LEXIS 5936, 25 (Feb. 27, 1985) (“Formal charging, filing a complaint, a court

appearance, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment will

activate the right, however, an arrest warrant alone is probably insufficient.”).

       {¶24} Because Morris’s arraignment marked the start of adversarial judicial

proceedings, his right to counsel attached.

                              B. Right to Counsel in Ohio

       {¶25} The state challenges the trial court’s decision to suppress Morris’s

statements as a violation of his right to counsel under the Ohio Constitution.

                                        1. Waiver

       {¶26} As an initial matter, Morris argues that the state forfeited its state

constitutional argument. Morris raised the state constitutional violation in his motion

and at the suppression hearing, but the state failed to argue why Montejo controls the

right to counsel under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. In fact, the trial

court requested supplemental briefing and the state failed to reference the Ohio

Constitution. The trial court recognized this fact in its decision. Now, for the first time,

the state argues that the right to counsel under the Ohio Constitution is no greater

than the right under the United States Constitution.

       {¶27} We recognize the well-established principle “that a party ordinarily may

not present an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer,

158 Ohio St.3d 513, 2019-Ohio-5156, 145 N.E.3d 278, ¶ 10. This contemporaneous-

objection rule is a principle of “fair administration of justice” and relates to “the true

relation between court and counsel which enjoins upon counsel the duty to exercise
                                        9
                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

diligence and to aid the court, [] not by silence to mislead the court into the

commission of error.” State v. Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249, 257-258, 95 N.E.2d 385 (1950).

This principle, of course, applies to the state’s appeal of a decision granting a motion

to suppress. See Wintermeyer at ¶ 25 (“when the state does not assert in the trial court

that a defendant lacks Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a contested search or

seizure, the state may not assert that argument in its own appeal from a judgment

granting a motion to suppress.”). Nevertheless, Morris raised the state constitutional

issue in his motion to suppress and the state insisted that the United States Supreme

Court’s interpretation of the federal constitutional right controls. Therefore, we will

address the merits of the parties’ arguments.

                           2. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

        {¶28} The parties agree that a criminal defendant may waive the right to

counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution at an

interrogation. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 787, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955. The issue

here is whether the right to counsel under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution

is bound by Montejo’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.

        {¶29} The state argues that the signed “Notification of Rights” form

constitutes a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Montejo.1

The trial court recognized that in Montejo, the United States Supreme Court expressly

overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986).

In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court held that “if police initiate interrogation

1 While the state recognizes that the trial court “did not rule on whether Morris, before questioning

had begun, voluntarily waived his Miranda rights,” the state contends that “the trial court implicitly
ruled that Morris voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before police questioning. Otherwise, it
would not have maintained that the Montejo decision was on point.” But the trial court’s decision
makes clear that the Ohio Constitution prohibited the detectives “from initiating an interrogation.”
Thus, there was no need for the trial court to analyze the validity of the “Notification of Rights”
form as a Miranda waiver.
                                                 10
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to

counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated

interrogation is invalid.” Jackson at 636. In Montejo, a divided United States Supreme

Court reversed course, finding Jackson “unworkable” and that its benefits are limited

to “preclud[ing] the state from badgering defendants into waiving their previously

asserted right.” Montejo at 793. Plus, the Montejo court weighed “the marginal

benefits of the Jackson rule * * * against its substantial costs to the truth-seeking

process and the justice system” and concluded that Jackson “does not ‘pay its way.’ ”

Montejo at 795. Accordingly, the Montejo court held that its Fifth Amendment

prophylactic rules adequately protect the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment

and ensure the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver. Id. at 793.

       {¶30} The trial court recognized that under Montejo, police may approach

represented defendants for interrogation. The trial court then turned to whether

Morris’s uncounseled statements during the interrogation must be suppressed under

the Ohio Constitution.

                             3. Issue of first impression

       {¶31} We must determine, as a matter of first impression in this state, whether

Montejo is consistent with the right to counsel under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

Constitution. The state argues that the Fifth District considered this issue in Yoder and

held that Montejo’s interpretation of the federal right to counsel conforms to the right

under the Ohio Constitution. We note that decisions of our sister state appellate courts

are not controlling authority, though “we afford those decisions due consideration and

respect.” Phillips v. Phillips, 2014-Ohio-5439, 25 N.E.3d 371, ¶ 32 (5th Dist.). And

without question, “the reasoning of other districts is persuasive.” State v. Thompson,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120516, 2013-Ohio-1981, ¶ 10.
                                        11
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶32} In Yoder, the court recognized that Montejo expressly overruled

Jackson and “eliminated the per se invalidation of Miranda waiver once counsel was

requested.” Yoder, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011-CA-00027, 2011-Ohio-4975, at ¶ 65. Like

Morris, Yoder argued that the Ohio Constitution required the suppression of any

uncounseled statements made to law enforcement after his arraignment. Id. at ¶ 67.

While Yoder recited the Ohio Supreme Court’s admonition for caution when

interpreting rights under our state Constitution, a closer reading of Yoder reveals that

the court did not address the state constitutional issue. See id. at ¶ 68, quoting State

v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 76. The court

provided no analysis of Yoder’s state constitutional claim. Instead, in affirming the

trial court’s decision denying his motion to suppress, the court relied on the fact that

Yoder had stipulated that he “validly waive[d] his Miranda rights” before his

interrogation. Id. at ¶ 69. As such, the court addressed the assignment of error in a

manner that avoided the constitutional question. And Yoder is distinguishable as

Morris has never stipulated that he validly waived his rights.

                             4. State Constitutionalism

       {¶33} We begin with the principle that Ohio, and other states, are “free to

construe their state constitutions as providing different or even broader individual

liberties than those provided under the federal Constitution.” Arnold v. City of

Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 41, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). Indeed, “state constitutions

are a vital and independent source of law.” Gardner at ¶ 76, citing William J. Brennan,

Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians

of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 535 (1986). This principle is well recognized in

this state: “it is well to remember that Ohio is a sovereign state and that the

fundamental guaranties of the Ohio Bill of Rights have undiminished vitality.” Direct
                                         12
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 545, 38 N.E.2d 70 (1941).

Therefore, courts may interpret the Ohio Constitution as affording greater rights if

“such an interpretation is both prudent and not inconsistent with the intent of the

framers.” That is not to say that our state Constitution is wholly incongruous with its

federal counterpart; rather, “[w]e can and should borrow from well-reasoned and

persuasive precedent from other states and the federal courts.” State v. Mole, 149 Ohio

St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 22, citing Davenport v. Garcia, 834

S.W.2d 4, 20-21 (Tex.1992); see Arnold at 42.

       {¶34} Our interpretation of the right to counsel under Article I, Section 10 of

the Ohio Constitution “should not be driven simply by disagreement with the result

reached by the federal courts’ interpretation.” Gardner at ¶ 20. When the language of

the Ohio and United States Constitutions are coextensive, there should be “compelling

reasons why Ohio constitutional law should differ from the federal law.” State v.

Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 363, 662 N.E.2d 311 (1996). But coextensive

provisions under the Ohio and United States Constitutions do not foreclose the

possibility that “[i]n some circumstances, rights afforded to people under the Ohio

Constitution are greater than those afforded under the United States Constitution.”

State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 26 (Fisher, J.,

concurring).

                   5. Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution

       {¶35} Beginning with the constitutional text, Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

Constitution provides, in relevant part:

       In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear

       and defend in person and with counsel; to demand the nature and cause

       of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the
                                         13
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to procure the

       attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an

       impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been

       committed; but provision may be made by law for the taking of the

       deposition by the accused or by the state, to be used for or against the

       accused, of any witness whose attendance can not be had at the trial,

       always securing to the accused means and the opportunity to be present

       in person and with counsel at the taking of such deposition, and to

       examine the witness face to face as fully and in the same manner as if in

       court.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court has found this guaranty “comparable to[,] but

independent of similar guarantees provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.” State v. Milligan, 40 Ohio St.3d 341, 533 N.E.2d 724 (1988),

paragraph one of the syllabus. Nevertheless, the right to counsel under Article I,

Section 10 has been construed more broadly than its federal counterpart. See State v.

Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155, 2015-Ohio-1519, 41 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 23-27.

       {¶37} Ohio’s constitutional text plainly guarantees a criminal defendant the

right to present a defense with counsel. And when read as a whole, Article I, Section

10 of the Ohio Constitution safeguards the integrity and fairness of a criminal trial. See

State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 79, 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976) (defendant must receive

a fair trial and substantial justice); see also State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 473, 486, 76

N.E.2d 355 (1947) (right to demand the nature and cause of accusation ensures a fair

trial); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 264, 79 N.E. 462 (1906) (right to a public trial

ensures fairness and justice); State v. Lane, 60 Ohio St.2d 112, 118-119, 397 N.E.2d
                                          14
                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

1338 (1979) (integrity of the trial process requires a neutral setting). Indeed, “careful

has been the constitution to secure the pure and impartial administration of criminal

justice, and to guard the accused from the possibility of oppression and wrong, under

the forms of a criminal prosecution.” Kirk v. State, 14 Ohio 511, 512 (1846).

                               6. Ohio’s Long-Standing History

        {¶38} Consistent with the purposes stated above, the attorney-client

relationship is central to Ohio’s criminal legal system. As early as 1816, indigent

Ohioans were appointed counsel without cost. See Conlan v. Haskins, 177 Ohio St. 65,

68, 202 N.E.2d 419 (1964). In fact, the first General Assembly guaranteed that counsel

would “have access to the accused at all reasonable hours.” Dille v. State, 34 Ohio St.

617, 620 (1878). And a defendant in Ohio has long been afforded “a right to a

reasonable opportunity to consult privately with his counsel without having other

persons present.” Ford v. State, 121 Ohio St. 292, 297, 168 N.E. 139 (1929), citing

Thomas v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 121, 157 N.E. 488 (1927); see Milligan at 343.

        {¶39} For the past 70 years, criminal defendants in Ohio have enjoyed

“statutory rights to contact and consult with counsel beyond comparable rights which

the federal and Ohio Constitutions guarantee.” Varnacini v. Registrar, 59 Ohio

App.3d 28, 30, 570 N.E.2d 296 (10th Dist.1989). Under R.C. 2935.20, after an arrest,

an individual must be provided opportunities to communicate and consult with an

attorney. The statute further provides that “[n]o officer or any other agent of this state

shall prevent, attempt to prevent, or advise such person against the communication,

visit, or consultation” with an attorney. R.C. 2935.20.2 Likewise, any “person arrest[ed

2 Violations of R.C. 2935.20 or 2935.14 result in a financial penalty for the officer or state agent and

are not grounds for suppressing evidence. See State v. Griffith, 74 Ohio St.3d 554, 555, 660 N.E.2d
710 (1996). Nevertheless, these statutes may inform our analysis.
                                                  15
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

who] is unable to offer sufficient bail or, if the offense charged be a felony, he shall,

prior to being confined or removed from the county of arrest, as the case may be, be

speedily permitted facilities to communicate with an attorney at law.” R.C. 2935.14.

That statute specifically prohibits confinement or removal of that person “until such

attorney has had reasonable opportunity to confer with him privately, or other person

to arrange bail.”

       {¶40} These policy choices are consistent with the guarantee that a defendant

“ ‘need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or

informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s

right to a fair trial.’ ” State v. Schleiger, 141 Ohio St.3d 67, 2014-Ohio-3970, 21 N.E.3d

1033, ¶ 13, quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

Counsel is needed at any stage requiring “legal advice-giving or truth-testing function

that only a lawyer can perform.” State v. Childs, 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 59, 236 N.E.2d 545

(1968). And counsel is necessary where the defendant has a “right to rely on counsel

as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” State v. Fite, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25318,

2011-Ohio-2500, ¶ 15, quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88

L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Counsel is necessary at these critical pretrial stages because

“depriv[ing] a person of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging

than denial of counsel during the trial itself.” Moulton at 170.

       {¶41} For more than a century, the right to counsel in Ohio has meant the right

to effective counsel. Absent effective counsel, a defendant is deprived of a fair trial and

substantial justice. Cornwell v. State, 106 Ohio St. 626, 628, 140 N.E. 363 (1922); see

State v. Cutcher, 17 Ohio App.2d 107, 115, 244 N.E.2d 767 (8th Dist.1969); see also

State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 80, 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976). Following these state

constitutional decisions, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth
                                          16
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Amendment right to counsel “is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

And the right to counsel “is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary

system of criminal justice.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51

L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).

                               7. Counsel’s Obligations

       {¶42} For Morris’s counsel to provide effective assistance, she must fulfill

certain duties to ensure that Morris receives a fair trial. Strickland at 689. She must

pursue her client’s defense with “reasonable diligence and promptness.” Prof.Cond.R.

1.3. In doing so, she must “consult with [her] client as to the means by which” her

client’s objectives are pursued. Prof.Cond.R. 1.2. She must establish reasonable

communication with her client. Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a). She must “explain a matter to the

extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions.”

Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(b). She must “conduct a reasonable pre-trial investigation sufficient

to develop appropriate defense strategies.” State v. Hartman, 2016-Ohio-2883, 64

N.E.3d 519, ¶ 54 (2d Dist.) (collecting cases).

       {¶43} These obligations reflect the crucial role that attorneys play in

presenting a defense and ensuring a fair trial. Attorneys “act as a spokes[person] for,

or advisor to, the accused.” United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37

L.Ed.2d 619 (1973). Their presence “ ‘protect[s] the unaided layman at critical

confrontations’ with his ‘expert adversary,’ the government, after ‘the adverse

positions of government and defendants have solidified’ with respect to a particular

alleged crime.” (Emphasis in McNeil.) McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct.

2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189,

104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). This is why, “once adversary proceedings have
                                         17
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the

government interrogates him.” Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424.

Therefore, the right precludes “governmental conduct [that] has rendered counsel’s

assistance to the defendant ineffective.” United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364,

101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) (collecting cases).

                                8. Jackson Reflects Ohio Law

       {¶44} To promote the protections guaranteed by the right to counsel, Jackson

crafted a bright line rule–after “the right to counsel attaches and is invoked, any

statements obtained from the accused during subsequent police-initiated custodial

questioning regarding the charge at issue (even if the accused purports to waive his

rights) are inadmissible.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 179, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115

L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), citing Jackson, 475 U.S. at 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631.

       {¶45} When Montejo overruled Jackson, it rejected the notion that all state

agents, rather than just attorneys, must respect the attorney-client relationship once

a defendant has secured an attorney. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 783, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173

L.Ed.2d 955. But in Ohio, a lawyer “shall not communicate about the subject of

representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented.” Prof.Cond.R. 4.2.

Ohio also imputes professional obligations onto certain nonlawyer government

agents. Prof.Cond.R. 5.3(c)(2). Further, all state agents, not merely state attorneys, are

prohibited from interfering with a defendant’s ability to consult or communicate with

his attorney. See R.C. 2935.20 and 2935.14. As such, the attachment of the right to

counsel triggers a series of obligations applicable to most state agents.

       {¶46} Montejo also rejected the view that Jackson is necessary to safeguard

the right to rely on the assistance of counsel. Montejo at 787. Instead, it tethered

Jackson to a right to be free from police pressure, or in the court’s words, an
                                      18
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

“antibadgering rationale.” Id. Assessing what it described as Jackson’s prophylactic

rule, the court weighed the benefit of eliminating badgering-induced confessions

against the “truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system.” Id. at 793, quoting

Moran, 475 U.S. at 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410. The Court concluded that

Jackson prevented few, if any, badgering-induced confessions from being admitted at

trial. Id. Thus, according to Montejo, Jackson was unnecessary because Fifth

Amendment safeguards already protected a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id.

       {¶47} But in Ohio, Jackson’s bright-line rule safeguards more than a

defendant’s right to be free from police pressure. One of the primary purposes of

excluding evidence to remedy a constitutional violation is to “ ‘ “deter future unlawful

police conduct.” ’ ” State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 82,

89, 661 N.E.2d 728 (1996), quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446, 96 S.Ct.

3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347,

94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). When the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio

Constitution requires the suppression of “physical evidence seized as a result of [a

suspect’s] unwarned statements,” it reasoned:

       We believe that to hold otherwise would encourage law-enforcement

       officers to withhold Miranda warnings and would thus weaken Section

       10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. In cases like this one, where

       possession is the basis for the crime and physical evidence is the

       keystone of the case, warning suspects of their rights can hinder the

       gathering of evidence. When physical evidence is central to a conviction

       and testimonial evidence is not, there can arise a virtual incentive to

       flout Miranda. We believe that the overall administration of justice in

                                          19
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       Ohio requires a law-enforcement environment in which evidence is

       gathered in conjunction with Miranda, not in defiance of it.

State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 49.

       {¶48} Evidence gathering equally incentivizes disregard of a defendant’s right

to counsel. But the right to counsel “includes the State’s affirmative obligation not to

act in a manner that circumvents the protections accorded the accused by invoking

this right.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

To this end, the Jackson rule encourages adherence to Ohio law and respect for the

right to counsel. See R.C. 2935.20; see also R.C. 2935.14.

       {¶49} Jackson’s bright-line rule is consistent with Ohio’s policies protecting

the attorney-client relationship and discouraging unlawful police conduct.

              9. Kentucky, West Virginia, and Kansas Reject Montejo

       {¶50} In Keysor v. Commonwealth, 486 S.W.3d 273 (Ky.2016), the Kentucky

Supreme Court rejected Montejo and found a broader right to counsel under its state

constitution. Discussing Montejo’s cost-benefit analysis, Keysor recognized additional

purposes for the Jackson rule. The rule ensures that the defendant’s waiver of the right

to counsel is valid and reinforces the attorney-client relationship. Keysor at 279-280.

The Keysor court noted,

       by discounting the social value of the attorney-client relationship in a

       cost-benefit    analysis,   [Montejo]   completely     disregarded    the

       unavoidable deterioration of the right to counsel that results when

       prosecuting authorities are permitted to send police interrogators to

       conduct custodial interviews with accused persons about the pending

       charges without the knowledge of their attorneys.

Id. at 280.
                                          20
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶51} Plus, Keysor reasoned, Montejo ignored the fact that the “ ‘substantial

costs’ ” are “by design,” and “[c]onstitutional protections were put in place by the

framers of the state and federal constitutions to hinder oppressive impulses by

retarding the government’s ability to incarcerate suspected offenders.” Id. Likewise,

the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that maintaining the “plain and valuable right

vested in everyone accused of a crime” * * * “should not be weakened, invaded or

destroyed” except for the best of reasons. State v. Wing, 66 Ohio St. 407, 425, 64 N.E.

514 (1902).

       {¶52} Kentucky is not the only state to hold that Montejo is contrary to the

right to counsel under state law. See State v. Bevel, 231 W.Va. 346, 745 S.E.2d 237

(W.Va.2013); see also State v. Lawson, 296 Kan. 1084, 297 P.3d 1164 (Kan.2013)

(finding that Jackson’s protections comport with state statutory protections for the

right to counsel).

       {¶53} Thus, in Kentucky, Kansas, and West Virginia, “if police initiate

interrogation after a defendant asserts his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar

proceeding, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated

interrogation is invalid as being taken in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.”

Bevel at 356; Keysor at 282.

              11. The Ohio Constitution Affords a Broader Right to Counsel

       {¶54} Considering Ohio’s longstanding history of strongly protecting an

accused’s right to counsel, Ohio’s jurisprudence finding more robust rights for

criminal defendants under the Ohio Constitution than the United States Constitution,

and state agencies’ obligations under the Ohio Revised Code and the Rules of

Professional Conduct, we hold that Montejo’s reasoning does not align with the nature

of the right to counsel in Ohio. As a result, we hold that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio
                                             21
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Constitution provides greater protection of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel

than the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

       {¶55} We follow the bright-line rule announced in Jackson, that when an

accused’s right to counsel has attached and an attorney has been secured, any

uncounseled waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel in a state-initiated

interrogation is deemed invalid. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89

L.Ed.2d 631.

                                    III. Conclusion

       {¶56} We note that the state’s fourth issue for review disputes whether Morris

requested an attorney around the 45-minute mark of the interrogation. Because we

affirm the suppression of Morris’s statements throughout the entire interrogation, we

decline to address this argument.

       {¶57} We overrule the state’s assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s

suppression of all statements made during the interrogation.

                                                                 Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., concurs separately.
WINKLER, J., dissents.

CROUSE, P.J., concurring separately.

       {¶58} I wholeheartedly concur in the foregoing opinion, but I write separately

to encourage litigants to continue to develop constitutional arguments under the Ohio

Constitution. Typically, the Ohio Constitution is mentioned only in passing, and

constitutional arguments are made under the federal Constitution and in lock-step

with United States Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., State v. Searight, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-230060, 2023-Ohio-3584, ¶ 12 (“However, because he fails to explain

how or why Section 10 [of the Ohio Constitution] would provide due process

                                          22
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

protections beyond those afforded to him by the federal Due Process Clause or by

Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause, we decline to ponder these questions.”); State v.

Thompson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200388, 2021-Ohio-3184, ¶ 14, fn. 1 (“In his reply

brief, Mr. Thompson makes a passing argument regarding the Ohio Constitution. It is

too late in the day to advance that argument on reply, and thus we have no occasion to

explore any potential distinctions between the inquiry under the Ohio and federal

Constitutions.”).

       {¶59} To my knowledge, this is one of the very few times a separate argument

under the Ohio Constitution has been developed and decided below and argued in this

court. Notably, the state did not address the Ohio constitutional issues when it was

invited to do so by the trial court, and it continued to argue to this court that we must

follow United States Supreme Court precedent when interpreting our state

Constitution.

       {¶60} In his book, 51 Imperfect Solutions, States and the Making of American

Constitutional Law, Judge Jeffrey Sutton cautions against a lock-step approach to

interpretating a state constitutional counterpart to the federal Constitution. He wrote:

       Why borrow in particular from the larger, far larger, jurisdiction?

       Federalism considerations may lead the U.S. Supreme Court to

       underenforce (or at least not to overenforce) constitutional guarantees

       in view of the number of people affected and the range of jurisdictions

       implicated. No state supreme court by contrast has any reason to apply

       a “federalism discount” to its decisions, making it odd for state courts to

       lean so heavily on the meaning of the Federal Constitution in construing

       their own.

                                           23
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American

Constitutional Law, 175 (2018).

       {¶61} In the case of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel, the Supreme Court

in Montejo certainly underenforced the right to counsel guarantee when it chose to

overrule Jackson. In noting that there was not a uniform rule among the states for the

appointment of counsel, the Court stated, “Nothing in our Jackson opinion indicates

whether we were then aware that not all States require that a defendant affirmatively

request counsel before one is appointed; and of course we had no occasion there to

decide how the rule we announced would apply to these other States.” Montejo, 556

U.S. at 787, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955. In fact, the Montejo majority recognized

that its holding may not apply to individual state constitutional rights when it

declared, “If a State wishes to abstain from requesting interviews with represented

defendants when counsel is not present, it obviously may continue to do so.”

(Emphasis deleted.) Montejo at 793.

       {¶62} It makes sense that when considering a right of such importance as a

criminal defendant’s right to counsel, the United States Supreme Court would be

concerned about enunciating a single national rule to be applicable to 50 states that

have different rules, systems, and traditions. Thus, when the United States Supreme

Court mentions leaving certain issues to the states, litigants should listen.

       {¶63} Litigants should also listen to the numerous invitations that the Ohio

Supreme Court itself has extended for the development of state constitutional

arguments. In his article “A Tipping Point in Ohio: The Primacy Model as a Path to a

Consistent Application of Judicial Federalism,” Judge Pierre Bergeron observed:

       The Ohio Supreme Court has recently suggested an openness to some

       state constitutional claims—especially in the equal protection context.
                                        24
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       Justice Fischer’s assertions that the Ohio Supreme Court should

       “reexamine the Ohio and federal Equal Protection Clauses” and that

       “[p]arties should not presume that rights afforded to a person under the

       United States Constitution . . . are the same rights as those afforded to a

       person under the Ohio Constitution” are practically a flashing neon sign,

       saying: “Lawyers, bring your state equal protection claims here!” And

       it's not just Justice Fischer. Where the parties fail to properly raise an

       issue under the Ohio Constitution, it has become commonplace for the

       Ohio Supreme Court to explicitly “leave[] open the question whether the

       Ohio Constitution might offer greater rights and protections to our

       citizenry under these circumstances.” Language of this nature may hint

       that the Ohio Supreme Court is interested in re-evaluating the

       protections provided by the Ohio Constitution and, perhaps,

       interpreting them with independent force. It is time for practitioners to

       respond to these hints and advance theories under state constitutional

       principles. Since courts generally do not address issues that the parties

       did not raise, courts need practitioners to develop these arguments in

       order to force courts to explore the protections provided by the state

       constitution.

Pierre H. Bergeron, A Tipping Point in Ohio: The Primacy Model as a Path to a

Consistent Application of Judicial Federalism, 90 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1061, 1082-1083

(2022) (string citing numerous Ohio Supreme Court cases inviting arguments under

the Ohio Constitution); see also State v. Brunson, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4299,

¶ 67 (“And because Brunson has failed to develop his argument under the Ohio

Constitution, we focus our analysis on whether the trial court violated Brunson's Fifth
                                           25
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Amendment right to remain silent.”); State v. Jackson, Slip Opinion No.

2022-Ohio-4365, ¶ 11 (“In the text of his propositions of law, Jackson also refers to

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides an independent

protection against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’ In the proceedings below,

however, Jackson did not argue that the Ohio Constitution provides him any greater

protection than the Fourth Amendment. And Jackson has not presented any such

argument to this court. Indeed, Jackson has not developed any argument under the

Ohio Constitution. As a consequence, we are constrained to evaluate Jackson’s claim

under only the Fourth Amendment.”).

       {¶64} The Montejo decision has been relentlessly criticized by legal scholars

since its release. In the article “Montejo and The New Judicial Federalism,” Professor

Laurent Sacharoff wrote:

       [T]he [Montejo] Court blurred the lines between [the Fifth and Sixth

       Amendment] right to counsel, at least when it comes to police

       interrogation. It essentially applied the weaker Fifth Amendment right

       to counsel protections to the Sixth Amendment right, eroding what had

       previously been an important distinction between the two rights.

       Numerous scholars and judges have criticized Montejo. The decision

       affords too little protection for criminal defendants, they argue, and it

       ignores the basic premises of the adversarial system.

Laurent Sacharoff, Montejo and The New Judicial Federalism, 50 Tex.Tech L.Rev.

599, 599-600 (2018); see also Eda Katharine Tinto, Wavering on Waiver: Montejo v.

Louisiana and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 48 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 1335, 1369-

1370 (2011) (“The Court erroneously focused on principles underlying Fifth

Amendment jurisprudence and ignored the fundamental Sixth Amendment notions of
                                      26
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the importance of the assistance of counsel and fairness in the adversarial process.”);

Geoffrey M. Sweeney, If You Want It, You Had Better Ask for It: How Montejo v.

Louisiana Permits Law Enforcement to Sidestep the Sixth Amendment, 55 Loy.L.Rev.

619, 643 (2009) (“The Court failed to elucidate how these two distinct rights vary, if at

all, in such a circumstance. As a result, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel's

participation at all critical stages is stripped of both force and function.”); Emily Bretz,

Don't Answer the Door: Montejo v. Louisiana Relaxes Police Restrictions for

Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, 109 Mich.L.Rev. 221, 230 (2010) (“The

rationale behind the Sixth Amendment, that which drove the Jackson rule and was

disregarded in Montejo, is to protect the integrity of the attorney-client relationship

throughout all pretrial critical stages when the state might take advantage of the

accused or where the defendant requires advice on how best to confront his

adversary.”); Michael C. Mims, A Trap for the Unwary: The Sixth Amendment Right

to Counsel After Montejo v. Louisiana, 71 La.L.Rev. 345, 369 (2010) (“The most

unsettling element of the Court’s ruling in Montejo is its complete disregard for the

traditional rationale behind the Sixth Amendment.”); Keysor v. Commonwealth, 486

S.W.3d 273, 281 (Ky.2016) (“While we respect the Supreme Court’s authority for the

interpretation of federal law, we cannot tether the Kentucky Constitution to the

Supreme Court’s evolving standards of Sixth Amendment protections.”).

       {¶65} Thus, I applaud Morris for raising this extremely important issue of a

criminal defendant’s right to counsel under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

Constitution. And I hope to see litigants continue to develop their constitutional

arguments under our state Constitution. “Lawyers and courts, working together, can

restore the independent force of the Ohio Constitution that our founders intended.”

Bergeron, 90 U.Cin.L.Rev. at 1087.
                                            27
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

WINKLER, J., dissenting.

       {¶66} A court’s analysis of similar provisions in the Ohio Constitution and the

United States Constitution “should not be driven simply by disagreement with the

result reached by the federal courts’ interpretation.” Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420,

2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, at ¶ 76. I respectfully dissent because I believe that

the trial court did just that.

       {¶67} Article I, Section 10 “is comparable to but independent of similar

guarantees provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

Milligan, 40 Ohio St.3d 341, 533 N.E.2d 724, at paragraph one of the syllabus. As the

Ohio Supreme Court instructs, “[w]e must be cautious and conservative when we are

asked to expand constitutional rights under the Ohio Constitution, particularly when

the provision in the Ohio Constitution is akin to a provision in the U.S. Constitution

that has been reasonably interpreted by the [United States] Supreme Court.” Gardner

at ¶ 76, citing State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175,

¶ 28-29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (where the language used by the federal and Ohio

Constitutions is “virtually identical,” it is “illogical” to suggest that the provisions

should be interpreted differently). When the language of the Ohio and United States

Constitutions are coextensive, there should be “compelling reasons why Ohio

constitutional law should differ from the federal law.” Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d at

363, 662 N.E.2d 311.

       {¶68} The United States Constitution, as interpreted by Montejo, clearly

permits the questioning here. The majority finds a compelling reason to disagree with

the United States Supreme Court based in the history of the right, reflected in

                                          28
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

jurisprudence, sections of the Ohio Revised Code and the Rules of Professional

Conduct.

       {¶69} I find it hard to reconcile the view that Article I, Section 10 has a history

and tradition of being more expansive than the Sixth Amendment with the actual text

of the two provisions. Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides, in

relevant part, “[i]n any trial in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear

and defend in person and with counsel.” (Emphasis added.) The Sixth Amendment

provides, in relevant part, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right to * * * have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defense.” (Emphasis added.) In

my view, the words of the Sixth Amendment are broader, applying to “all criminal

prosecutions” while Article 1, Section 10 requires not only a “trial” but a “trial in any

court.” This difference in the Ohio Constitution is particularly notable because the

inaugural Ohio Constitution of 1802 used the phrase “in all criminal prosecutions”

found in the federal Constitution. Article VIII, Section 11, Ohio Constitution (1802).

This change to narrower language cuts against the view that Article 1, Section 10 is

supposedly broader.

       {¶70} The references to the statutory right-to-counsel in R.C. 2935.20 are

misplaced. This case concerns only Morris’s constitutional right to counsel. Morris

chose to raise the constitutional grounds to ask the court to invoke the Exclusionary

Rule as a desired remedy. This is because Morris’s statutory rights would not result in

the suppression of his statements. State v. Griffith, 74 Ohio St.3d 554, 555, 660 N.E.2d

710 (1996). At most, R.C. 2935.20 would see Detective Glecker fined $25 to $100 and

imprisoned for not more than 30 days, and Morris’s statements admitted as evidence.

Insofar as R.C. 2935.20 informs our reading of Article 1, Section 10, the presence of

                                           29
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

additional statutory protections implies that the General Assembly thought the

available constitutional rights, and their applicable remedies, were narrow, not broad.

       {¶71} Ohio’s Rules of Professional Conduct would suggest applying Montejo,

not rejecting it. The United States Supreme Court rejected in Montejo a similar

invocation of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct

(“Model Rules”) as a basis to uphold the rule in Jackson advanced today. Montejo, 556

U.S. at 790, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955. In the same way the Sixth Amendment

does not codify the Model Rules, Ohio’s Constitution does not codify the Rules of

Professional Conduct, nor does it make investigating officers into lawyers. Model Rule

4.2, rejected as inapplicable in Montejo, and Ohio’s Prof.Cond.R. 4.2 are identical.

Prof.Cond.R. 4.2, Commentary (“Rule 4.2 is identical to Model Rule 4.2”). Model

Rule 5.3(c)(2) and Ohio’s Prof.Cond.R. 5.3(c)(2) are also similar. Prof.Cond.R. 5.3,

Commentary (“Rule 5.3 is similar to the Model Rule”). While Ohio’s rule expressly

covers lawyers in government agencies and the Model Rule only covers “law firms,”

the Model Rules make clear that “law firms” include government legal departments.

Model Rule 1, Comment 3 (“With respect to the law department of an organization,

including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the

department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional

Conduct.”). Thus, both rules impute a prosecutor’s professional obligations onto her

nonlawyer government agents, so long as she has managerial or direct supervisory

authority over the agent. Compare Prof.Cond.R. 5.3(c)(2) with Model Rule 5.3(c)(2).

       {¶72} Because the two rules are the same, Montejo’s criticism of relying on

Model Rule 4.2 applies here: the rule in Jackson advanced here is both narrower and

broader than Ohio’s Rules of Professional Conduct. Jackson is broader because Article

                                          30
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

1, Section 10 would apply to all government agents, while Ohio’s Rules of Professional

Conduct encompass lawyers and the government agents under the managerial or

direct supervisory authority of a lawyer. The rule in Jackson is also narrower because

if a represented party initiates contact with government agents, they may both talk

freely, whereas a prosecutor could be sanctioned for interviewing a represented party

even if that party initiates the communication and consents to the interview.

Prof.Cond. R. 4.2, Comment 3. Ohio’s use of similar language is not a compelling

reason to reach a contrary outcome to Montejo.

       {¶73} Accordingly, I would apply the United States Supreme Court’s reasoned

opinion in Montejo interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the

coextensive right to counsel in Article 1, Section 10 as written. To me, there is no

compelling reason to dispense with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation

except disagreement with the result. Consequently, I would have this court address the

argument that Morris did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. But because

the majority declines to address this argument, I will also decline to address it here.

       {¶74} I respectfully dissent.

Please note:

               The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

                                             31