Court Opinion

ID: 9929159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 21:02:19.212937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:17:42.340724
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/1/24 P. v. Downs CA2/3
Opinion following transfer from the Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B315593

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. TA150279)
           v.

  DAVID DOWNS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Connie R. Quiñones, Judge. Affirmed.
      Teresa Biagini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
       The trial court found that David Downs violated his
probation by assaulting his girlfriend. In making that finding,
the trial court partly relied on the victim’s and another witness’s
out-of-court statements admitted via the testimony of police
officers and their bodycam video. Downs appealed, contending
that admitting the statements violated his due process right to
confront and to cross-examine witnesses, and, in any event, there
was insufficient evidence he violated the terms of his probation.
We affirmed the judgment, but our California Supreme Court
granted review. The court then issued People v. Gray (2023) 15
Cal.5th 152, 169 (Gray), which held that hearsay qualifying as a
spontaneous statement is not categorically admissible at a
probation revocation hearing, and the trial court instead must
weigh, among other things, the government’s showing of good
cause against the defendant’s confrontation rights. The court has
transferred the matter to us with the direction to reconsider it in
light of Gray. Doing so, we conclude that any error in admitting
the out-of-court statements was not prejudicial, so we affirm the
order.
                        BACKGROUND
I.    Downs’s plea and suspended sentence
       In 2019, Downs was charged with battery with serious
bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 243, subd. (d); count 1) and assault
with a dangerous or deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2).
As to count 2, the information alleged that Downs personally
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The information further

1
     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                 2
alleged that Downs had two prior convictions within the meaning
of the Three Strikes law and two prior prison terms under section
667.5, subdivision (b).
       On June 17, 2020, Downs pled no contest to count 2 and
admitted the great bodily injury allegation.2 That same day, the
trial court sentenced Downs to seven years in prison, execution of
sentence suspended, and placed him on three years’ formal
probation on various terms and conditions, including that he obey
all laws. When Downs later failed to report to probation and to
comply with his financial obligations, probation was revoked and
reinstated on the same terms and conditions in March 2021.
II.   The probation revocation hearing
       Downs was thereafter arrested for domestic violence with
injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and a contested probation revocation
hearing was held. At the outset of the hearing, the prosecutor
represented that the victim, Nicole M., had been subpoenaed but
would not come to court because she had to work. And the
prosecutor could not ask for a body attachment due to a District
Attorney policy. Defense counsel objected to going forward and to
any evidence as hearsay and lacking foundation. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss, overruled the objections, and
transferred the matter for a probation hearing to be held later
that afternoon.
       At the hearing, neither Nicole nor her adult daughter
Jasmine, who had witnessed some of the relevant events,
testified. Officer Timothy Wolleck testified that he had spoken to
Nicole that morning of the hearing, and she had confirmed

2
      The trial court dismissed the remaining count and
allegations.

                                3
receiving the subpoena. But she would not be able to come to
court because she had to work. Her and Jasmine’s statements
were then admitted via the police officers’ testimony and
bodycam video.
       Officers Zachary Ikeda and Cesar Castaneda testified.
Officer Ikeda testified that just after midnight on July 12, 2021,
they responded to a domestic battery report. The victim’s
daughter, Jasmine, had called 911 and was the first person the
officer met when he arrived at the entrance to an apartment
complex. Officer Ikeda described Jasmine, who was pregnant, as
“a bit frantic” because she was “telling us that her mother and
[mother’s] boyfriend were in an altercation” and “needed us to go
up to their apartment.” Jasmine said that her mother (Nicole)
and Downs (mother’s boyfriend) had been and were “still arguing
at that moment while we were speaking” and there were “hands
on the other party.” Officer Ikeda testified that they could hear
throughout the courtyard loud arguing, which Jasmine said was
her mother and Downs. Jasmine said that her mother had a
“busted lip.” She also demonstrated how Downs had his hands
around her mother’s neck.
       Although Jasmine wanted the officers to go upstairs
immediately, protocol required them to wait for another police
unit to arrive. After that second unit arrived, the officers went to
the victim’s apartment, and she answered the door. The victim
said that earlier that day Downs had taken her car keys, phone,
and identification.3 Initially, Nicole was calm, but then she
started crying and shaking. She was concerned about getting her
property back.

3
      When Downs was booked, the keys were found on him.

                                 4
       Officer Castaneda also talked to Downs, who was still in
the apartment. Downs initially said Nicole was his girlfriend and
then later said she was just a friend with whom he stayed from
time to time. He admitted that he had grabbed Nicole in a bear
hug.
       Officer Castaneda said that Nicole had a cut on her lip and
bruising on her arm from where Downs had grabbed her. The
officer photographed Nicole’s arm but described the bruise on her
arm as more “vibrant” in person than in the photograph. The
officer also took a photograph of Nicole’s inner lip.
       Based on this evidence, the trial court found that Downs
violated the terms of his probation and executed the previously
suspended sentence of seven years.
III.   Downs’s appeal
      Downs appealed the order, contending, among other things,
that admitting Nicole’s and Jasmine’s statements violated his
due process rights. We affirmed the order, finding that Nicole’s
and Jasmine’s statements were spontaneous statements under
Evidence Code section 1240 and admitting them under that
hearsay exception did not violate Downs’s due process rights.
(People v. Downs (Oct. 24, 2022, B315593) [nonpub. opn.].)
      Downs petitioned the California Supreme Court for review,
it granted the petition on the issue of whether admitting the
statements violated Downs’s due process and confrontation
rights, and deferred consideration pending disposition of a
related issue in the lead case. The court issued Gray, supra, 15
Cal.5th 152 and transferred the matter to us with directions to
vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of Gray.

                                5
                         DISCUSSION
I.    Admissibility of statements under the due process clause
       In his supplemental brief, Downs contends that admitting
the victim’s statements violated his due process rights, as
clarified by Gray, supra, 15 Cal.5th 152. As we now explain, we
conclude there was no error in admitting Jasmine’s testimony
and that any error in admitting the victim’s statements was
harmless.
       Gray addressed whether hearsay qualifying as a
spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240 is
always admissible at a probation revocation hearing without
considering the balance of relevant interests.4 The court first
reiterated the general principle that a defendant’s right to
confront witnesses at a probation revocation hearing is grounded
in due process principles, and that right cannot be obviated
except on a finding of good cause not to allow confrontation.
(Gray, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 163–164.) No categorial exception
to the good cause finding for spontaneous statements exists.
Instead, trial courts must engage in a case-by-case,
“comprehensive, holistic approach.” (Id. at p. 169.)
       Gray then approved the holistic approach it had previously
articulated in People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144. Arreola, at
pages 1159 to 1160, held that good cause is met “(1) when the
declarant is ‘unavailable’ under the traditional hearsay standard
[citation], (2) when the declarant, although not legally

4
      In overruling Downs’s objections, the trial court here did
not state that it was basing its ruling on Evidence Code section
1240, but the parties on appeal do not dispute that statements
were admitted under this theory.

                                 6
unavailable, can be brought to the hearing only through great
difficulty or expense, or (3) when the declarant’s presence would
pose a risk of harm (including, in appropriate circumstances,
mental or emotional harm) to the declarant.” Arreola further
explained that the showing of good cause for dispensing with the
live testimony requirement must be considered with “other
circumstances relevant to the issue, including the purpose for
which the evidence is offered (e.g., as substantive evidence of an
alleged probation violation, rather than, for example, simply a
reference to the defendant’s character); the significance of the
particular evidence to a factual determination relevant to a
finding of violation of probation; and whether other admissible
evidence, including, for example, any admissions made by the
probationer, corroborates the former testimony, or whether
instead the former testimony constitutes the sole evidence
establishing a violation of probation.” (Id. at p. 1160.)
       When the trial court here found Nicole’s and Jasmine’s
statements admissible, Gray had not been decided, and therefore
the trial court had no occasion to apply Arreola’s balancing test to
determine whether the People had established good cause to
present their statements via the bodycam video. Because that is
a fact-driven inquiry that the parties did not develop, we would
normally remand the matter for the trial court to reconsider the
matter.
       However, remand is unnecessary because any error in
admitting Nicole’s statements and bodycam video was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally People v. Aranda
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 [federal constitutional errors subject to
review under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18].)

                                 7
      That is, Jasmine’s statements established that Downs
violated the terms of his probation, and admitting her statements
did not violate Downs’s due process rights. The confrontation
clause prohibits admission of testimonial out-of-court statements
against a defendant and not nontestimonial ones. (Crawford v.
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.) Statements are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
ongoing emergency, and the interrogation’s primary purpose is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution. (Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. 237, 244.)
But statements made in the course of a police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the interrogation’s
primary purpose is to enable police to meet an ongoing
emergency are not testimonial. (Ibid.) We independently review
whether a statement is testimonial. (People v. Ramirez Ruiz
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 809, 825.)
      Here, when officers arrived at the apartment complex,
Jasmine met them at the lobby and told them that she had just
returned from the market and her mother showed Jasmine her
injury.5 Jasmine said that Downs had assaulted her mother, and
Jasmine demonstrated with her hands how it happened.
Therefore, there was evidence that Jasmine witnessed some part
of an altercation between her mother and Downs because
Jasmine was able to demonstrate how it happened. And
although it appears that Jasmine did not see Downs hit Nicole’s
mouth, Jasmine did see the injury the assault caused.
      Jasmine made these statements while the emergency was
ongoing. When the police officers arrived, Nicole was still in the

5
      The officer initially reported a lip injury but during trial
corrected the record to reflect the cut was to her tongue.

                                  8
apartment with Downs, and the officers themselves could hear
loud arguing, which Jasmine confirmed was Nicole and Downs.
Because the officers thought there was a risk, they called for a
second unit to come before going to Nicole’s apartment.
Accordingly, Jasmine’s statements were not testimonial and
would have been admissible at a criminal trial. Because Gray,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 171, acknowledged that its rule did not
give probationers greater rights than criminal defendants,
Jasmine’s statements were admissible at the probation
revocation hearing, and their admission did not violate due
process.
II.   Sufficiency of the evidence
       Next, Downs argues that reversal is required because there
was insufficient evidence Nicole suffered a traumatic condition to
her body. We disagree.
       After finding that a defendant has violated probation, a
trial court has discretion either to reinstate probation on the
same or modified terms or to terminate probation and commit the
defendant to prison “if the interests of justice so require.”
(§ 1203.2, subd. (b).) We review the trial court’s order for abuse
of discretion and review factual findings for substantial evidence.
(People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318.) The facts
supporting a probation revocation must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Gray, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 162.)
       A person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition on a victim with whom the person has or had
a dating relationship is guilty of a felony. (§ 273.5, subds. (a),
(b).) A “traumatic condition” is a bodily condition, “such as a
wound, or external or internal injury, including, but not limited

                                  9
to, injury as a result of strangulation or suffocation, whether of a
minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force.” (Id.,
subd. (d).) Even minor injuries may give rise to a violation of
section 273.5, subdivision (a). (People v. Abrego (1993) 21
Cal.App.4th 133, 137–138.)
       There was sufficient evidence Nicole suffered a traumatic
injury to her body. Jasmine saw Downs put his hands on her
mother. And although Jasmine did not see him hit her mother’s
mouth, Jasmine saw an injury to her mother’s mouth area.
Indeed, Downs’s counsel concedes in a supplemental brief that
Jasmine heard her mother and Downs arguing, saw Downs “put
his hands around her mother’s neck,” and saw her mother’s
injury. Also, Downs admitted he had grabbed Nicole in a bear
hug. Officer Castaneda testified that he saw a cut on Nicole’s lip
and bruising on her arm from where Downs had grabbed her.
Such bruising and a small cut are traumatic conditions. (See,
e.g., People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085
[bruising is sufficient evidence of traumatic condition]; People v.
Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 771 [redness on victim’s face
and soreness to face and neck sufficient evidence of traumatic
condition].) And although these injuries are not apparent in the
photographs the officer took, this does not negate the other
evidence of traumatic condition. Rather, the lighting may not
have been adequate, and Officer Castaneda said that Nicole’s
injury was more vibrant than what the photograph reflected.
III.   The trial court did not fail to exercise its sentencing
       discretion
      Downs’s final argument is that the trial court erroneously
thought it lacked discretion to reinstate probation. (See, e.g.,
People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912 [remand proper

                                  10
where sentencing choice was based on misunderstanding of law].)
He bases this argument on the trial court’s following statement:
“So based on the evidence that was presented here—primarily
through Castaneda, and the video, the body cam, the court—you
know, the court has no choice. Seven years suspended is what
you bargained for after your case was bargained down from a
third strike, serious felony, down to a 245 plus G.B.I. in this
matter and that’s why you got the seven years.” (Italics added.)
       By this, the trial court was not saying it lacked discretion
to impose anything but the suspended sentence. In context, the
trial court was saying that the evidence, which the trial court
referred to, showed that Downs had violated the terms of
probation. Based on the evidence, the trial court felt compelled to
exercise its discretion to revoke probation and impose the
suspended sentence. We therefore decline to find, based on a
narrow reading of a single, terse comment, that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                      EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                       LAVIN, J.

                       EGERTON, J.

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