Court Opinion

ID: 9452652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:47:50.021203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:18.473253
License: Public Domain

SPEARS, District Judge
(dissenting):
While I agree that the district court had jurisdiction of this Federal declaratory judgment suit, I am convinced, upon reflection, that since he was under no compulsion to exercise such jurisdiction, and there has been no showing that he abused his discretion in refusing to do so after having concluded that abstention was proper, his judgment should be affirmed. See Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942). As a consequence, I respectfully dissent.
In granting the motion to dismiss, the late lamented Judge Sheehy commented that “a Federal court should abstain from entertaining any Federal declaratory judgment action when the questions involved * * * can just as well be tried in the State court as they could in the Federal court”, and that “the declaratory judgment remedy should not be invoked to determine the validity of a defense in a pending case in a State court”, a proposition which, he added, “fits this case like a glove”. Under the circumstances of this case, I can see no reason to burden a new judge with a rehash of the same matter.
This is not a suit to enforce an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as authorized by Title 28 U.S.C. Sections 2321-2325. The United States is not a party, and the Commission’s order was permissive not mandatory.
The judgment sought to be enforced in the State court adjudicated rights under a contract based upon a valuable consideration. It was perpetuated by the Supreme Court of Texas, the highest court of the State in such matters, long before the lease agreement referred to was approved by the Commission.
The State court has the power to determine whether its final judgment was superseded by the order of the Commission, Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118, 68 S.Ct. 426, 92 L.Ed. 580 (1948), and it is the only court having jurisdiction to pass upon the question of contempt. Since its decision would involve a federal question, review by the Supreme Court of the United States is authorized. Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1257. Therefore, abstention would certainly be more desirable than a situation which could find the Federal court concluding that the Texas company has been relieved by the Commission’s order of any duty to maintain offices and shops at Tyler, and the state court holding to the contrary. In that event, unless the interpretation by the Federal court were to be coupled with an injunction stopping all State court proceedings, a serious conflict would develop. But such an injunction, even if allowed under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2283, would have the practical effect of enforcing the Commission’s order which the court cannot do in the absence of the United States as a party. Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2322.
Judge Sheehy undoubtedly felt, and I agree, that the initial determination of the question by the State courts, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States, will eliminate the possibility of conflict, and serve to promote and maintain the delicate balance between the State and Federal courts.