Court Opinion

ID: 9579595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:38.124964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:37.143051
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting).
i
A
The majority willingly overrules a significant line of cases, in which this Court has concluded that a disabled person’s right to worker’s compensation is governed by the law in eifect on the date of injury.1 It is imperative, however, that we instead distinguish that line of cases involving the disabled person’s right to compensation from the present cases in which we are presented with a third-party caregiver’s right to compensation that *151does not necessarily accrue on the date the employee is injured.2 The present cases should be distinguished on this basis.
In Grogan v Manistique Papers, Inc, 154 Mich App 454; 397 NW2d 825 (1986), the Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether the Second Injury Fund could be reimbursed for benefits paid to an injured worker as the result of a third-party tort action. The fund based its claim on an amendment of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act that had come into effect on May 8, 1984. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
The pertinent inquiry that must be made in the present case is what event or circumstances triggers the application of MCL 418.531(3); MSA 17.237(531)(3). Plaintiff contends that the date of the injury is the crucial event, while the fund asserts recovery from the third party triggers the application of the statute. After considering the arguments made by parties to this case, we find the argument made by the Second Injury Fund to be persuasive.
Although the Legislature made the statute effective immediately on May 8,1984, it did not clearly express what event was required to occur after the effective date in order to trigger application. . . . While it is true that it is the injury which allows an injured worker to recover workers’ compensation benefits, under § 827(5) it is not until recovery is obtained from a third party that the Second Injury Fund has a right to reimbursement. [Id. at 460.]
Similarly, in this case, the transaction or event that most naturally triggers application of the amendments at issue is not the injury, but the actual rendering of services._
*152A caregiver is a third party whose expectation and right to compensation does not arise on the date the employee is injured because the third party has no right or expectation of recovery for services that have not yet been rendered. Logic dictates that the caregiver is not entitled to compensation unless or until service is rendered. Attendant care services may be provided at any time following the injury, e.g., one day after the injury or, in some circumstances, not until years following the injury. As a result, I believe that the caregiver’s right to compensation accrues as services are rendered and that the law in effect on the date that service is provided governs the caregiver’s right to compensation, subject to a determination of whether any subsequent amendments are procedural/remedial or substantive in nature.3
B
Application of this rule in Mullins and Riza4 would dictate that plaintiffs be awarded compensation without regard to the fifty-six-hour limitation5 until the effective date of the statute.6 After the effective date, plaintiffs’ rights would be subject to the fifty-six-hour limitation because the rights accrue as service is provided. Similarly, in Sokolek, plaintiff would not be limited by the one-year-back *153rule because service was provided during the time before the amendment became effective.7
c
After concluding that a caregiver’s right accrues as services are rendered, it is necessary to determine whether any pertinent amendments should be applied retroactively. Despite the majority’s total failure to do so, I believe that deciding whether an amendment is procedural/remedial or substantive in nature is necessary and must be continued.8 Worker’s compensation should harmonize with the well-established and broadly applied rule that a procedural/remedial statute applies retroactively.9
The term "retroactive legislation” describes acts that operate on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations that existed before passage of the act. 2 Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 41.01, p 337. Provisions added by amendment that affect substantive rights will not be construed to apply retroactively unless the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent to that effect. Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 535; 377 NW2d 300 (1985).
The majority readily and without explanation *154overrules "sub silentio” a significant line of cases of this Court. Ante at 142. The well-established rule is that the law in effect at the time of the injury (in cases affecting the rights of the disabled person) or the law in effect at the time the right to compensation accrues (in cases such as the present one affecting third parties) governs the rights and duties of the parties unless the Legislature intended otherwise.10 Tarnow v Railway Express Agency, 331 Mich 558; 50 NW2d 318 (1951); Thomas v Continental Motors Corp, 315 Mich 27; 23 NW2d 191 (1946). It is axiomatic that a statute operates prospectively unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested. Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 9; 345 NW2d 184 (1984). However, in Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), this Court recognized an exception for statutes that were remedial/ procedural in nature.11
Although the distinction between procedural/ remedial and substantive is not always easy to discern, it is clear from the lead opinion in White v General Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387, 395; 429 NW2d 576 (1988), that an amendment affecting the right to receive any payment is substantive, while an amendment that merely affects the right to receive a fixed amount of compensation is procedural:
Unlike the provision in Selk, § 373 involves the question whether a retired employee has a substantive right to compensation under § 373, thus directly affecting the essence of his right, and not merely calculating the amount of compensation which he may eventually receive._
*155The central purpose of the fifty-six-hour amendment appears to have been to limit the amount of recovery in certain instances. In the present cases of Mullins and Riza, I believe that the statutory fifty-six-hour limitation on attendant care services, as amended by 1985 PA 103, is procedural in nature because it only affects the amount of compensation to which claimants are entitled. White, supra at 394-395. Therefore, the statute should apply retroactively.12
n
A
I do not believe that it is necessary to remand the Mullins case to the magistrate13 to determine "what . . . compensation is reasonable.”14 Ante at 145. Review of the decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board in this case indicates that this issue has been resolved. Although member Willard of the wcab stated that plaintiff was entitled to the prevailing wage of $3.75 an hour on the basis of testimony elicited from a health care expert, he apparently ordered payment at the rate *156of $7.25 an hour.15 The conclusion of the home health care expert should have been controlling. Findings of fact of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission are conclusive upon appellate review and may not be set aside by this Court if they are supported by any competent evidence. Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 263; 484 NW2d 227 (1992). I do not believe that there is any competent evidence, analysis, or otherwise to support the order of the wcab. In fact, the testimony, which was found as fact by two members of the panel, was wholly inconsistent with the order. Therefore, I believe that the rate payable to the attendant caregivers should be the rate consistent with the testimony of the home health care expert.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the wcab stating that plaintiff’s wife and daughter should be compensated at the rate payable to an individual because they do not incur the same expenses as an agency. Therefore, it is unnecessary to remand this case for further fact finding. This determination is inherent in the wcab’s finding that $3.75 an hour was the then usual and customary rate of a nurse’s aide._
*157B
Finally, I address the propriety of a cost-of-living increase. In Kosiel v Arrow Liquors Corp, 446 Mich 374, 390-391; 521 NW2d 531 (1994), I stated:
[Modification of the benefits award was inappropriate to the extent that its basis lay with the desires of plaintiff’s husband and not with changes in her condition. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to validate the notion that plaintiff, defendant, and the bureau were unable to conceive of the concept of inflation at the time the award was made. Thus, the failure to account for possible inflation constitutes a factual error that does not supersede an application of the res judicata doctrine.
However, in Mullins, the hearing referee held that attendant care was owed according to a schedule that stated that after September 10, 1985, the yearly rate was subject to cost-of-living increases. The hearing referee specifically anticipated inflation by setting up a schedule, while ordering that the award was subject to cost-of-living increases. However, I believe that cost-of-living increases are properly considered when determining the prevailing wage for an attendant caregiver. In this manner, caregivers are entitled to the prevailing wage when services are rendered.
hi
A caregiver’s right to compensation accrues as services are rendered and the law in effect on that date, subject to a determination whether any amendments are procedural in nature, should govern the caregiver’s claim. However, in Sokolek, § 381(3) provides that payments "shall not be *158made,” indicating a legislative intent to limit the hearing referee and the wcab’s authority to award benefits. The fifty-six-hour limitation of §315 . in Mullins and Riza properly should be considered procedural in nature. Therefore, the statute applies retroactively to limit plaintiffs’ compensation to fifty-six hours a week. Additionally, it is unnecessary to remand Mullins to determine whether the hourly wage is appropriate. A health care expert testified with regard to the prevailing wage. The prevailing wage includes considerations that the majority would remand to redetermine.
For these reasons, I would reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Sokolek and Mullins and affirm in Riza.
Weaver, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 "It has long been the rule in Michigan that in worker’s compensation cases the law in effect at the time of the relevant injury must be applied unless the Legislature clearly indicates a contrary intention.” Nicholson v Lansing Bd of Ed, 423 Mich 89, 93; 377 NW2d 292 (1985). See Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985); Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531; 377 NW2d 300 (1985); White v General Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387; 429 NW2d 576 (1988).

 The law in effect at the time the right to compensation accrues governs the rights and duties of the parties. Tarnow v Railway Express Agency, 331 Mich 558; 50 NW2d 318 (1951); Thomas v Continental Motors Corp, 315 Mich 27; 23 NW2d 191 (1946).

 See part i(c).

 I apply the rule for purposes of illustration only because I believe that further analysis indicates that the amendment was procedural in nature and applies retroactively. See discussion below.

 MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315)(1).

 We note that the fifty-six-hour limitation is but the maximum number of hours a week for which a caregiver is entitled to compensation for attendant care services. It is not the number of hours to which a caregiver is automatically entitled. Plaintiffs must submit sufficient proofs to convince the factfinder of the number of hours of attendant care that they have provided.

 Again, I apply the rule for purposes of illustration only because I believe that this case is properly resolved by reviewing the language of MCL 418.381(3); MSA 17.237(381)(3), which directs the hearing referee and the wcab that payments "shall not be made.” This indicates legislative intent to limit the authority of the hearing referee and the wcab in awarding the payment of benefits. See Franks, n 1 supra, p 684 (Riley, J., concurring); Kleinschrodt v General Motors Corp, 402 Mich 381, 384; 263 NW2d 246 (1978) (Coleman, J., dissenting). Therefore, I believe that plaintiffs are limited by the one-year-back rule, making it unnecessary to reach the procedural/remedial versus substantive analysis.

 See, generally, Hurd, n 1 supra.

 See Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682; 520 NW2d 135 (1994); Stott v Stott Realty Co, 288 Mich 35; 284 NW 635 (1939).

 See n 1.

 See Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corp, 371 Mich 480; 124 NW2d 286 (1963); White, supra.

 I agree with n 2 of Justice Boyle’s concurrence to the extent that it states that she does not believe these opinions are meant to be a vehicle through which employers or insurers may recoup payments already made to attendant caregivers.

 The majority remands the case to the magistrate to determine "whether it would be appropriate to award at least part of the extra expense required to hire a home companion from a nursing agency.” Ante at 145.

 The statute provides:
The employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines, or other attendance or treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal, when they are needed. [MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315)(1).]

 The order of the wcab stated that attendant care services were'to be paid at the rate of $7.25 an hour. A dissenting member of the three-member panel agreed with member Willard’s following statement:
Home health care expert Hoffner testified that the prevailing wage actually received by an attendant caregiver in 1984 and 1985 was the same whether the caregiver was obtained through an agency or not. Therefore, we find as fact that $3.75 per hour was' the usual and customary wage for attendant care in 1984 and 1985. Defendant is not required to pay an administrative fee (that rendered an agency rate of $7.00 and $7.25 per hour in 1984 and 1985 respectively) to plaintiff’s wife and daughter. [Mullins v Frank H Wilson Co, 1991 WCABO 331, 335 (emphasis added).]
Incredibly, this same member apparently ordered compensation to be paid at the rate of $7.25 an hour in direct contradiction of his finding of fact.