Court Opinion

ID: 9857264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:24:48.226302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:22.358813
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the Garden Road Bridge (“the Bridge”) did not constitute a dangerous condition at the time of Levin’s accident because the Bridge was not physically flawed. In reaching that result, the majority concludes that as a matter of law a dangerous condition cannot exist under N.J.S.A. 59:4-la unless a physical defect exists in the public property. That conclusion is not supported by the language or the legislative history of the statute. The majority’s limitation on public-entity liability under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A 59:1-1 to :12S (“the Act”), denies plaintiffs a jury trial to determine the possibility of compensation for injuries sustained ima tragic accident arising out of what plaintiffs assert was a reasonable and foreseeable use of the Bridge.
I.
According plaintiffs the favorable inferences to which they were entitled on the motion for summary judgment, I find that the record discloses the following factual context for the issue before the Court. The Garden Road Bridge spans the Maurice River. The eastern end of the Bridge is in Vineland in Cumberland County and the western end is in Pittsgrove in Salem County. For decades, local residents have used the area around the Bridge as a bathing beach and have dived from the Bridge parapet into the river seven feet below. The Bridge has a parapet that is twenty-seven inches high and twelve inches wide. The parapet was designed to protect the edge of the Bridge and runs parallel to the road. It is elevated slightly above a wide sidewalk that lies between the parapet and the road. In 1978, Mary Lou Quesenberry, a seventeen-year-old, broke her neck and became a quadriplegic after having dived into the Maurice River from the Bridge. *51She sued the Counties, and the parties ultimately settled the claim. In the course of the Quesenberry litigation, an engineering and safety report was prepared. The report detailed the hazard inherent in the placement of a low bridge wall over a body of water known to be used for recreation. The report offered recommendations to eliminate the hazard. It suggested erecting a protective fence to prevent access to the river from the Bridge. The report also suggested that the Counties supervise the site and post effective signs on the Bridge that would warn bathers of the hazard.
Salem County passed a resolution prohibiting swimming, fishing, or diving from any bridge. Cumberland County took no official action prohibiting the use of the Bridge for swimming and diving. Neither County implemented any of the suggested corrective measures.
As a child, plaintiff Richard Levin had enjoyed summer outings at this swimming hole with his family. He had been unaware of the Quesenberry incident. Having perceived no danger, he had dived from the Bridge on several occasions. Nearly five years ago, Richard and two friends had stopped at the Garden Road Bridge for an early evening swim. After watching several other bathers dive off the Bridge, Richard dived from the north side of the Bridge into the river. He hit his head on a sandbar below the water’s surface, broke his sixth cervical vertebra, and became a quadriplegic. Richard Levin and his wife filed an action against Cumberland and Salem Counties and the Cities of Vineland and Pittsgrove.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Salem County submitted several sworn statements asserting that “no swimming” and “no diving” signs had been posted at the Bridge. The County also relied on its ordinance prohibiting diving from the Bridge.
In opposition to defendant Salem County’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs’ expert certified that on several different days after Richard’s accident numerous families had used the Bridge site for recreational activities. They had swam in the river and *52jumped, dived, and performed stunts from the Bridge. Plaintiffs offered photographs of those activities. They also offered several certifications disputing the County’s assertion that “no diving” signs had been posted on the Bridge.
The trial court determined that “there is no genuine issue of material [ ] fact and as a matter of law, [the] Bridge cannot be deemed to be a dangerous condition of [] public property.” Accordingly,' the court held that the County was immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act. The Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons stated by the trial court.
II.
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 imposes liability on a public entity if
the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that * * *
b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition f * * a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
A public entity, however, is not liable unless the action it takes or fails to take is palpably unreasonable. N.J.S.A. 59:4-2b. A dangerous condition is defined as “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” N.J.S.A 59:4-la. There are two distinct prongs to the statutory definition of dangerous condition. First, the property must be “used with due care.” Second, the property also must be used in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. Each of these definitional prongs has distinct implications. However, the threshold inquiry is whether plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact in respect of the existence of a dangerous condition. Because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act was modeled after the California Tort Claims Act, an inquiry into California law is instructive. Chatman v. Hall, 128 N.J. 394, 411, *53608 A.2d 263 (1992); Rochinsky v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 110 N.J. 399, 407, 541 A.2d 1029 (1988).
The California Tort Claims Act, adopted in 1963, illustrates what I believe is the correct interpretation of the requirement that property be used in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. The majority equates reasonably-foreseeable use with intended use. The California Act, however, suggests a more expansive interpretation of the definition. Its definition of dangerous condition is virtually identical to that in N.J.S.A. 59:4-la. Section 830(a) of the California Government Code defines dangerous condition as “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” In its comment to that section, the California Law Revision Commission stated:
A “dangerous condition” is defined in terms of “foreseeable use.” This does not change the pre-existing law relating to cities, counties and school districts. These entities are liable under Government Code [former] Section 53051 for maintaining property in a condition that creates a hazard to foreseeable users even if those persons use the propeiiy for a purpose for which it is not designed to be used or for a purpose that is illegal Acosta v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 208, 14 Cal.Rptr. 433, 363 P.2d 473 (1961); Torkelson v. City of Redlands, 198 Cal.App.2d 354, 17 Cal.Rptr. 899.
[CalLaw Revision Comm’n cmt. to Gov.Code § 830 (emphasis supplied).]
In Torkelson v. City of Redlands, a child who had been playing in a drainage ditch drowned when she was swept into a water tunnel. 198 Cal.App.2d 354, 17 Cal.Rptr. 899 (1961). Finding that the defendant was not immune under the Public Liability Act, which preceded the Tort Claims Act, the California District Court of Appeal held that
in determining whether public property constitutes a dangerous condition the use factor to be considered in making such determination includes not only its designed or originally intended use, but every other reasonably anticipated use and also any use actually being made of it, conditioned always upon the fact that the owning agency has knowledge of its actual use, and conditioned further that such use is not a mere casual one but a customary use.
*54[Id. 198 Cal.App.2d at 361, 17 Cal.Rptr. at 903.]
Although the drainage ditch was fit for its intended use, the court nevertheless concluded that whether a dangerous condition was created by the City’s acquiescence in the children’s use of the ditch was a question for the jury to resolve.
The California Supreme Court also considered the scope of public-entity liability for dangerous conditions. In Acosta v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 208, 14 Cal.Rptr. 433, 363 P.2d 473 (1961), the court reversed the grant of a summary judgment motion in favor of the defendant county, concluding that the plaintiffs violation of an ordinance prohibiting bicycle riding on certain sidewalks did not bar his suit under the Public Liability Act for injuries sustained when he fell off his bicycle after hitting a bump in the sidewalk. Id. 56 Cal. 2d at 213, 14 Cal.Rptr. at 436, 363 P.2d at 476. That case established that a public entity may be liable for damages even though an injury arose out of a use of property for which it was not designed or intended. See Torkelson, supra, 198 Cal.App.2d at 359, 17 Cal.Rptr. at 902 (citing Acosta, supra, 56 Cal.2d 208, 14 Cal.Rptr. 433, 363 P.2d 473).
The question under California law is not, as the majority suggests, ante at 46, 626 A 2d at 1096, whether there is some defect in the property that caused the injury. Rather, the question is whether, when used in a foreseeable manner, public property or a condition thereof may pose a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable user. Torkelson, supra, 198 Cal.App. 2d 354, 17 Cal.Rptr. 899. The majority relies on Campbell v. City of Santa Monica, 51 Cal.App.2d 626, 125 P.2d 561 (1942), in support of its assertion that under California law a dangerous condition cannot exist absent a physical defect in the public property. That ease involved an unauthorized motor vehicle that negligently entered onto a pedestrian promenade and injured a pedestrian. The court found that “[t]he harm in this case was caused, not by the condition of the Promenade or the want of barriers or signs barring its use by vehicles without a permit, but by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” Id. 51 Cal.App.2d at 630, 125 P.2d *55at 563. Thus, the City’s immunity stemmed from the negligence of the third party and not from the lack of a physical defect in the property. Unlike the situation in Torkelson, the City’s failure to prevent or warn against the negligent use of the promenade by a motor vehicle was not tantamount to an approval of that use that would have rendered the event foreseeable within the dictates of section 830(a) of the California Government Code.
The majority cites two California Supreme Court decisions, Hayes v. California, 11 Cal.3d 469, 113 Cal.Rptr. 599, 521 P.2d 855 (1974), and Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal.3d 799, 205 Cal.Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193 (1984), for the proposition that California’s highest court has “tilted in both directions,” ante at 48, 626 A.2d at 1097, on the question whether the term “dangerous condition” requires a defect in the property itself. However, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of public-entity liability in Hayes was based on a claim for damages arising out of an assault on two college students who were using the university’s beach at night, and who contended that the prevalence of crime rendered the beach an unsafe area and, consequently, a dangerous condition of public property. The Hayes court rejected the contention that the university had a duty to warn about the well-known danger of violent crime, concluding that the susceptibility of users of the university’s beach to violent attacks by third parties did not create a dangerous condition of public property. 11 Cal.3d at 472, 113 Cal.Rptr. at 602, 521 P.2d at 858. In Peterson, however, its latest pronouncement on the question, the court was confronted with a claim for damages based on an assault of a student ascending a stairway in the school’s parking lot, no claim whatsoever having been asserted that the stairway was defective or unfit for its intended use. The Community College was aware that other assaults had occurred in that area and that the thick and untrimmed foliage and trees that adjoined the stairway created a condition conducive to attacks on students leaving the parking lot. Noting that the plaintiff had been attacked in broad daylight in an area of the campus where school officials had reason to anticipate students would be vulnera*56ble to attack, the California Supreme Court concluded that the thick and untrimmed foliage and trees around the parking lot and stairway, combined with the circumstance of prior attacks on students in the same area, were sufficient to create a “dangerous condition” of property within the meaning of the California Tort Claims Act. Peterson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at 812-13, 205 Cal.Rptr. at 850-51, 685 P.2d at 1201-02.
This Court previously has not considered- whether a dangerous condition exists for the purpose of liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 when a member of the public is injured while using public property in a foreseeable or tacitly-permitted manner. However, in Burroughs v. City of Atlantic City, 234 N.J.Super. 208, 560 A.2d 725, certif. denied, 117 N.J. 647, 569 A.2d 1345 (1989), the Appellate Division, considering a claim similar to the one before us, suggested that the foreseeability of a specific use of public property was material in determining whether the property constituted a dangerous condition. Burroughs involved a plaintiff who had dived off an ocean-beach boardwalk and struck his head on the ocean bottom. He had broken his neck and become a quadriplegic. Diving from the boardwalk was specifically prohibited and warning signs had been posted. Lifeguards regularly prevented visitors from diving off the boardwalk and on occasion had called on the local police to assist in that effort. A lifeguard, who had seen the Burroughs party drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana prior to the accident, had warned the group to stay out of the water for their own safety. The Burroughs court considered whether the proximity of the boardwalk to the ocean constituted a dangerous condition for purposes of liability under N.J.S.A 59:4-2. The court concluded that “whether a dangerous condition is present depends on a combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior.” Id. at 218-19, 560 A.2d 725. It found that although the boardwalk was intended for recreational uses, those uses did not include diving. The court found that a dangerous condition did not exist and that the legislature had not intended to expose Atlantic City to liability in a situation in which the boardwalk was *57safe for its intended use, diving was prohibited by a city ordinance, and Atlantic City had “posted signs to that effect and instructed its employees to stop the prohibited activity when it is observed.” Id. at 219-20, 560 A2d 725.
The Court apparently rejects the holding in Burroughs that a dangerous condition may arise from a “combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior.” Id. at 218-19, 560 A.2d 725. Instead, it concludes that a ‘“dangerous condition’ as defined in N.J.S.A. 59:4-la [ ] refer[s] to the ‘physical condition of the property itself and not to activities on the property.’ ” Ante at 44, 626 A.2d at 1095 (quoting Sharra v. City of Atlantic City, 199 N.J.Super. 535, 540, 489 A.2d 1252 (App.Div.1985)). The Court finds support for its conclusion in Sharra, supra, and several other Appellate Division decisions, ante at 44, 626 A.2d at 1095, but that reliance may be misplaced. Those cases hold that a public entity is not liable for injuries to the plaintiff caused by actions of a third party on public property when the third party’s actions were criminal, Rodriguez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 39, 44, 472 A.2d 146 (App.Div.1983) (finding that “liability cannot be visited upon the Authority under the Tort Claims Act by reason of the criminal assault and robbery of Rodriguez”), certif denied, 96 N.J. 291, 475 A.2d 586 (1984); Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J.Super. 329, 346 A.2d 102 (App.Div.1975) (holding' that criminal conduct of one student in attacking another did not constitute dangerous condition), created a nuisance, Cogsville v. Trenton, 159 N.J.Super. 71, 386 A.2d 1362 (App.Div.1978) (declining to hold City liable for injuries sustained by minor plaintiff when bitten by dog belonging to tenant of city property), or were otherwise unforeseeable, Sharra, supra, 199 N.J.Super. 535, 489 A.2d 1252 (holding that racing cyclist on boardwalk did not constitute dangerous condition). Casting doubt on the precedential value of those eases, the Appellate Division recently commented:
We note certain ambiguities in these decisions. These cases may be construed as barring public entity liability for negligent, reckless or criminal acts of a third *58party on publicly owned land. However, they may also be interpreted as simply holding that where public property is not defective public liability will not be imposed for injuries which result from the dangerous acts of third parties.
[Daniel v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 239 N.J.Super. 563, 588 n. 3, 571 A.2d 1329 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 325, 585 A.2d 343 (1990).]
Both interpretations focus on the activities of a third party. Although the cases referred to in Daniel and relied on by the majority may inform a discussion of public-entity liability in the context of third-party activity, they are limited to that context and are inapposite to the issue before us.
Daniel reaffirmed the court’s conclusion in Burroughs that “ ‘whether a dangerous condition is present depends on a combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior.’ ” 239 N.J.Super. at 585, 571 A.2d 1329 (quoting Burroughs, supra, 234 N.J.Super. at 218-19, 560 A.2d 725). That formulation is consistent with decisions of the California courts both before and after our Legislature’s enactment of our Tort Claims Act. This Court previously has acknowledged the particular significance of California decisions in the interpretation of the Tort Claims Act. See Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537 A.2d 652, cert. denied sub nom. University of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J. v. Fuchilla, 488 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed.2d 51 (1988). Burroughs, like Torkelson, concedes that a foreseeable use may constitute a dangerous condition.
In King by King v. Brown, 221 N.J.Super. 270, 274, 534 A.2d 413 (App.Div.1987), the plaintiff, who was hit by a car as he attempted to cross a street at a busy intersection, alleged that the high volume of vehicular and pedestrian traffic created a dangerous condition of public property within the meaning of N.J.S.A 59:4-la. The Appellate Division rejected the plaintiffs contention. However, it refused to embrace the view that a physical defect in public property is a prerequisite to recovery under the Act. Instead, the court adopted the view that
*59a condition of public property which is safe for one activity may become a dangerous condition when the property is converted to a different activity. For example, a bridge designed solely for pedestrian use may become dangerous when converted to use by vehicular traffic if its structure cannot support the additional load. In most cases, application of the dangerous condition standard requires consideration of both the physical characteristics of the public property as well as the nature of the activities permitted on that property. Indeed, the definition of dangerous condition in N.J.S.A. 59:4-la requires consideration of the reasonably foreseeable use of the property.
[Id. at 274-75, 534 A.2d 413.]
That King involved a permitted use of the public property does not diminish the persuasiveness of that court’s reading of N.J.S.A. 59:4-la.
The majority has focused almost exclusively on intended or permitted uses of property as they relate to dangerous conditions. However, by doing so, the Court strays from the actual definition of dangerous condition as provided by statute. As stated above, a dangerous condition, as defined by N.J.S.A. 59:4-la, arises when two factors are present. The property must be used in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. As articulated in Burroughs, Daniel, and King, supra, I am confident that use in a reasonably foreseeable manner encompasses activities that are tacitly permitted as well as objectively foreseeable. That, of course, implicates an unintended use of public property as well as the intended use.
In addition to the foreseeability requirement, a dangerous condition is one that poses a substantial risk of injury when the property is being used with due care. The majority seems to have avoided a closer scrutiny of this portion of the statutory definition. The phrase “use with due care” invites a jury to examine whether a given plaintiffs conduct while engaging in a foreseeable activity amounts to an objectively reasonable use of the property.
Our courts often have described “due care” with regard to dangerous conditions as a basic matter of “common sense.” See Hawes v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 232 N.J.Super. 160, 164, 556 A.2d 1224 (Law Div.1988); King, supra, 221 N.J.Super. at 276, 534 A.2d 413; Lytle v. City of Newark, 166 N.J.Super. 191, *60196, 399 A.2d 333 (Law Div.1979). Thus, once an activity is deemed foreseeable, it becomes important to focus on whether or not a person also acted reasonably while engaged in that activity. What constitutes a sensible use of property is a matter well within the ambit of the jury.
Whether a particular use of property constitutes use with due care “depends on the variable element of risk of harm inherent in any situation.” King, supra, 221 N.J.Super. at 276, 534 A.2d 413. In Daniel, supra, the Appellate Division focused on the issue of “due care.” The court decided that the phrase did not refer to the actual conduct of a given plaintiff. Rather, the court noted that “the infinite variety of situations that may arise ma[de] it impossible to fix the definite rules in advance of all conceivable conduct.” Consequently, the court concluded that “the reasonable user requirement does not refer to the actual activities of the plaintiff or others. Rather it constitutes a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior.” 239 N.J.Super. at 588, 571 A.2d 1329.
That court’s reference to a community ideal standard implies that a plaintiffs conduct must be reasonable, and in determining whether the conduct is reasonable, a consideration of standards or customs of the community would be relevant. Thus, it is important to ask not only whether it was foreseeable that Richard Levin and other persons had used the bridge as a diving platform with the knowledge of defendants, but also, whether diving off the bridge was a reasonable “use” of the property as measured by community standards. The term reasonable does not denote “intended” or “permitted,” but rather involves an assessment of whether persons similarly situated would tend to engage in certain conduct.
The definitional requirement of use with due care necessarily tempers the potential scope of a public entity’s liability. It is not sufficient that a public entity be cognizant that its property is being used in a foreseeable manner that creates a substantial risk of injury. The use of the property must itself be reasonable. *61Thus, if a few daredevils engaged in a foreseeable but highly dangerous use of public property, the governmental entity’s failure to take precautions would not be palpably unreasonable.
Conduct that is regularly engaged in by members of the public exercising due care and tacitly permitted by a public body may constitute a reasonably-foreseeable use and thereby establish a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A 59:4-la. Furthermore, a tacitly-permitted use that differs from the originally-intended use may convert “safe” public property into a dangerous condition if the property is not safe for the officially-permitted use. See Torkelson, supra, 198 Cal.App.2d at 359-60, 17 Cal.Rptr. at 902-03 (“[A]ny established actual use which, being known to and acquiesced in by the public agency owner, has converted or enlarged the designed or originally intended use.”).
Plaintiffs have presented material issues of fact with respect to their claims. The evidence proffered in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment is probative of plaintiffs’ claim that the diving accident was proximately caused by a dangerous condition of public property. The record before the trial court reasonably suggests that a jury could find that diving from the Garden Road Bridge was a foreseeable use of the Bridge; that defendants had knowledge of that use; and that a reasonable person exercising due care might dive from the Bridge. In addition, whether defendants’ acquiescence in the use of the Bridge as a diving platform created a substantial risk of injury to foreseeable users is for a jury to determine. Finally, plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to support a jury determination that defendants were palpably unreasonable in their failure to warn against or remedy the asserted dangerous condition of public property created by the Garden Road Bridge.
The Tort Claims Act was enacted “to reestablish a system in which immunity is the rule, and liability the exception.” Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 372, 593 A.2d 335 (1991). As this Court frequently has recognized, “ ‘immunity is the dominant consideration of the Act.’ ” Rochinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 408, 541 *62A.2d 1029 (quoting Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 498, 497 A.2d 183 (1985) (O’Hern, J., concurring). Under the Act, public entities are not liable for an injury unless liability is specifically provided for by statute. Chatman, supra, 128 N.J. at 402, 608 A.2d 263. Furthermore, liability can be imposed on a public entity only if that imposition is consistent with the entire Act. Kolitch, supra, 100 N.J. at 492, 497 A.2d 183. Nevertheless, when the Legislature has specifically provided for public-entity liability, this Court must give effect to its intention.
N.J.S.A 59:4-2 exposes governmental bodies to liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition if the conduct in respect of that condition was palpably unreasonable. That exception to the general rule of immunity can be traced to the justifiable public expectation that public entities will warn against or take action to prevent injury from known hazards. The failure to do so may suggest either that a particular activity, when engaged in with due care, poses no substantial risk of injury, or that the public entity’s conduct was negligent or even palpably unreasonable. In authorizing public-entity liability for dangerous conditions, N.J.S.A. 59:4-la, :4-2, the Legislature carefully balanced the competing interests of the public and the governmental units. See Report of New Jersey Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 220-21 (1972). That authorization reflects the Legislature’s intention to secure to the public protection from government’s palpably-unreasonable conduct. Notwithstanding that legislative directive, the majority ignores the plain statutory language and extends public-entity immunity to circumstances not within the intended scope of the Act. The majority’s restrictive construction of the term “dangerous condition” detracts from the protection of the public contemplated by the Legislature’s authorization of public-entity liability for dangerous conditions. It finds no justification in the policy, language, or history of the Tort Claims Act.
I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the Law Division for a jury trial on plaintiffs’ complaint.
*63Justice HANDLER joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 5.
For reversal and remandment — Justices HANDLER and STEIN — 2.