Court Opinion

ID: 9726566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:57:30.539213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:28.387186
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDS, J., dissenting. I am unable to agree with the majority opinion in this case. I respectfully dissent and will state my reasons therefor: Relief against a defendant who does not answer is limited to the cause of action stated and relief prayed in the plaintiff’s complaint. (C. P. A. Sec. 34; Glass v. Glass (1956), 9 Ill.App.2d 568, 133 N.E.2d 524; Sweglo v. Mikolon (1941), 310 Ill. App. 541, 34 N.E.2d 868; Kryl v. Zelezny (1937), 290 Ill. App. 599, 8 N.E.2d 223.) It is well settled that the amendment of a complaint in a matter of substance has the effect of setting aside a default for want of answer, and that the defaulted defendant must be given notice of the amended pleading and afforded an opportunity to appear and answer. (See above cases, and others collected in Smith-Hurd Anno. Stat., ch. 110, sec. 34, note 5.) The text of Section 34 recognizes this principle, as does new Rule 7-1 (ch. 110, sec. 101.7-1), which supplements Section 34. It will be noted that Section 34 provides that even in cases not involving defaults, if relief in addition to that prayed is sought, “. . . the court shall, by proper orders, and .upon terms that may be just, protect the adverse party against prejudice by reason of surprise.” In the comments in Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes (see Sec. 34, page 364), it is pointed out that this provision was to be construed broadly to protect against surprise arising out of change of theory or of type of relief. In other words, the concept of “change of substance” is flexible and all-inclusive. Obviously there is as much (and in my opinion, much more) need to be solicitous and protective of a defaulted defendant. The basic premise involved is due process (notice) and fair play (prevention of entrapment). It is essential that principles of broad construction of the statute be followed and liberal application of the spirit behind the statute be made. A default judgment based upon a substantial departure from the cause of action or theory of the case stated in the plaintiff’s complaint or the relief prayed necessarily prejudices a defendant who has not been notified of such a departure, operates as a surprise and defeats a primary function of pleading, the furnishing of notice to another party of the theory on which a case is prosecuted or defended. It violates our concepts of due process and fundamental sense of justice and fair play. The material allegation in the complaint concerning the instant defendants is in paragraph 4 of the complaint : “. . . or, in the alternative, plaintiff states that if the plaintiff is deprived of any right which he may have as a result of the fire loss hereinafter described asa result of the error of the said brokers or either of them, or of the said agent, in misdescribing the said premises, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover against the said broker or agent for the breach of his duties in so misdescribing the premises;” The material prayer is in paragraph (b) ■ of the prayer: “(b) That following the determination of the matter of reformation, that judgment be entered against the defendant Illini Mutual Insurance Company, in the total sum of Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) together with the penalties and attorneys’ fees provided by Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 73, § 767, or, in the alternative, that judgment be entered against the defendants Walter O’Neil, Andrew Hammond and Willie Prowell, or one or more of them, as shall be determined, in the amount of the total loss sustained by the plaintiff of Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00);” The plaintiff himself thus chose to condition the instant defendants’ liability on a finding of non-liability on the part of the defendant insurance company and sought relief against the individual brokers only in the event of a finding by the trial court that the insurance company was not liable to him. Served with a copy of this complaint, the individual brokers were entitled to rely on it and on the fact that judgment would not be entered against them absent a finding that the insurance company was not liable to the plaintiff. It is true that by failing to appear a defendant admits the material allegations of the complaint. But the application of that rule to this case means only that, in the words of the complaint, “if the plaintiff . . . was deprived of any right which he may have as a result of the fire loss” against the insurance company, the defendant brokers admitted liability to him. On such a complaint, the plaintiff could recover a default judgment from the defendant brokers only after the non-liability of the insurance company had been established. When the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the defendant insurer without prejudice, he in effect amended his complaint and completely changed his theory of his case and attempted to free himself of the self-imposed condition requiring a finding of non-liahility on the part of the insurer before judgment could be entered against the defendant brokers. Regardless of whether a default judgment could have been entered against the defendant brokers on a different statement in the complaint as originally filed, and regardless of whether the assertion in the complaint as originally filed of the condition precedent to recovery against the individual brokers was in law a prerequisite to recovery against them. It is clear that by dismissing the defendant insurer and thus necessarily substantially amending the theory of the complaint as originally stated, the plaintiff became precluded from taking a default judgment against the defendant brokers on the new theory in the absence of notice to them under Rule 7-1 (ch. 110, Sec. 101.7-1) and an opportunity to respond. I am of the opinion that there plaintiff’s counsel engaged in a course of deliberate entrapment. For these reasons, it is my opinion that the judgment below was erroneously entered. "What I have said must be sharply distinguished from a case in which the alternative liability of two or more defendants is carefully pleaded so that the alternatives are clearly stated independently of one another. That is, that the alternative liability of one defendant is not predicated upon the non-liability of another defendant. In such a case, a default judgment against a defendant after one or more other defendants have been voluntarily dismissed might well be supportable. But that is not this case. In this case, the plaintiff’s stated theory required a finding of non-liability on the part of the insurer before judgment could be entered against the appellants. A default judgment could not be entered upon a theory substantially at odds with the theory thus stated in the complaint. The default judgment is at odds with the letter and spirit of the statute and the rule and as well a violation of due process and fundamental justice upon which the principles inherent in the statute and rule are based. Under these circumstances, the entry of a default judgment against these appellants, after the dismissal of the defendant insurer was in error, and I feel that the cause should be reversed and remanded.