Court Opinion

ID: 9669517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:58:01.157248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:57.572432
License: Public Domain

GARDEBRING, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent as to the admission of the Spreigl evidence. Society may be better off with appellant behind bars. He *20is a thief, a fence and a drug dealer who carried a gun, had a nasty temper, often threatened his perceived enemies and associated with a group of tough people. The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant would not make a great next-door neighbor. What the state did not prove so clearly was whether he was involved in the murder of Cindi Ann Schram. In effect, appellant has been sentenced to life in prison for being a scary man.
By affirming appellant’s conviction, the majority is allowing the already expansive Spreigl doctrine to balloon completely out of control. The result is the precise evil this court has vowed to avoid since Spreigl became the law of the state, to wit:
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal — whether judge or jury — is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (1965) (quoting 1 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 193, 194 (3d ed. 1939)). Furthermore, we have said that:
Evidence of other crimes or bad acts by a defendant is inadmissible to show that the defendant acted in conformity with them or had a propensity to commit violent crimes, but it is admissible for other purposes, such as to show intent, or absence of mistake or accident.
State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Minn.1987) (discussing Minn.R.Evid.Rule 404(b)); see also State v. Diamond, 308 Minn. 444, 448, 241 N.W.2d 95, 99 (1976) (evidence admitted to show defendant’s relationship to victim). Moreover, evidence of other bad acts “should be excluded where it is merely cumulative and a subterfuge for impugning defendant’s character or for indicating to the jury that he is a proper candidate for punishment.” State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 179, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (1967).
The Spreigl doctrine is a gloss on Minn.R.Evid. 404(b). That rule provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not be admitted unless the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, the trial court, after a detailed analysis, concluded that appellant’s prior acts were relevant to show appellant’s modus operandi. However, I would reverse that conclusion as an abuse of discretion. If appellant’s prior bad acts truly are relevant to his modus operandi, then we have stretched the concept of modus operandi so far that any history of threats or violence becomes proof that a defendant was merely committing a crime in his or her usual manner. The result is that we are effectively repealing Minn.R.Evid. 404(b) and permitting the state to prove guilt by conformance with bad character.
An examination of the Spreigl evidence admitted in the present case proves the point:
(1) Appellant went to Johnson’s house to beat him up for being a snitch. When he got there, Johnson wasn’t home, and appellant broke items inside the house and apparently fired a gun.
This incident shows that appellant was hot-tempered and acted impulsively on his anger. It does not show that when appellant decided to injure someone he did whatever was necessary to accomplish that goal. He did not go back a second time when Johnson was home. He did not solicit any friends to beat up Johnson. If he had done those things, the majority might be correct. We would have a modus oper-andi of intractable vengeance. Instead, we have evidence of a person talking tough, damaging property, and that’s all.
(2) Appellant apparently threatened to beat Ms. Krocak because she had *21snitched on him and break her neck if she ever lied to him again. ■
Ms. Krocak was never injured in anyway by appellant. Again, this incident shows appellant has a hair-trigger temper, makes vocal threats about inflicting serious harm, but does not follow through on those threats.
(3) Appellant allegedly grabbed Judkins and intimidated him with a gun for fear that Judkins had brought unwanted attention from county social service officials.
Again, no shots were fired and no punches were thrown. Appellant’s temper flared, he talked tough, and he intimidated someone. There is nothing more.
Yet, the trial court and the majority have concluded that those incidents are similar in time, location or modus operandi to the killing of Ms. Schram. I frankly fail to see the connection. Taken together, the Spreigl incidents show that appellant was hot tempered, impulsive and intimidating. Interestingly, the prosecution’s theory of the case was that appellant coolly and methodically arranged for someone else to kill Ms. Schram and that he did not confront her himself. If anything, the Spreigl evidence shows that the Schram murder was carried out in a manner diametrically contrary to appellant’s modus operandi.
There are cases where Spreigl evidence is appropriate. See State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.1991) (past violence toward objects of defendant’s affection relevant in trial for murder of woman who spurned advances); State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500 (Minn.1991) (violent murders occurred during similar residential break-ins three weeks apart); and State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1964) (past holdup used to show identity). In all of those cases, there is a tight nexus in time, location or modus operandi between the prior bad acts and the charged crimes. In the present case there is no nexus at all. The incidents used as evidence in appellant’s trial are nothing more than an effort to salvage the state’s weak case1 by proving that appellant had a bad character and acted in conformance with it. That violated Rule 404(b) and poisoned appellant’s chance for a fair trial. If such a result is truly the purpose of the Spreigl doctrine, the doctrine is in need of a major overhaul.
I dissent.

. I also am bothered by the aspect of the Spreigl rule that allows the use of prior bad acts only when the state has a weak case. The strength of the state’s case should be irrelevant. Evidence of prior bad acts is either relevant and helpful to the fact finder or it is not. This court should not be in the position of trying to help the state to gain convictions when it cannot do so solely on the evidence. If the state has a weak case, the correct response is an acquittal.