Court Opinion

ID: 9918370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 19:00:31.656725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:42.882196
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50967         Document: 00517031467             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-50967
                                     Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                     ____________                               January 12, 2024
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                           Clerk

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Francisco Daniel Cobos,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:20-CR-1957-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Willett, Duncan, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Francisco Daniel Cobos pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
   agreement, to one count of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute
   five kilograms or more of cocaine, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
   (b)(1)(ii), 846. As part of the plea agreement, Cobos agreed to fully cooperate
   with the Government, including testifying if needed. In exchange, the

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50967      Document: 00517031467           Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/12/2024

                                     No. 22-50967

   Government agreed to consider filing a motion for a downward departure
   pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
          The Government filed the § 5K1.1 motion, and Cobos was sentenced
   within the guidelines range to 54 months of imprisonment. Subsequently,
   however, Cobos refused to testify against a codefendant. The Government
   filed a second superseding indictment charging Cobos with attempting to
   possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute and aiding and
   abetting. He filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the
   Government breached the plea agreement, which was denied by the district
   court. Cobos was convicted and sentenced to 94 months of imprisonment,
   to run concurrently with the previously-imposed term.
          Cobos now argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
   to dismiss the second superseding indictment, asserting the Government
   breached the plea agreement and that his refusal to testify was not a violation
   of his cooperation agreement. He also contends that the district court
   improperly considered parol evidence, that the second superseding
   indictment was barred by res judicata, and that the Government’s motion for
   a departure under § 5K1.1 should have applied to his second sentencing.
          A claim of breach of a plea agreement is reviewed de novo, and this
   court will accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
   erroneous. United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 387 (5th Cir. 2007). This
   court applies general principles of contract law to interpret the terms of a plea
   agreement. Id. at 387 (5th Cir.2007).
          Even with strict construction, the plea agreement clearly and
   unambiguously states that Cobos’s obligation to cooperate includes testifying
   and that it may extend after sentencing. Additionally, the plea agreement
   does not include any promise by the Government not to bring additional
   charges. The Government complied with its obligation to file a § 5K1.1

                                           2
Case: 22-50967      Document: 00517031467          Page: 3    Date Filed: 01/12/2024

                                    No. 22-50967

   motion.     Accordingly, the district court’s determination that the
   Government had not breached the plea agreement was not erroneous.
          Regarding Cobos’s parol evidence claim, “parol evidence is
   inadmissible to prove the meaning of an unambiguous plea agreement.”
   United States v. Ballis, 28 F.3d 1399, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, Cobos has
   not specified what evidence was improperly considered, and the district court
   stated that it did not consider parol evidence. Cobos has shown no error.
          With respect to Cobos’s jurisdictional claim, he has not provided any
   support for the proposition that a conviction on one count bars the
   Government from bringing another different count. “To confer subject
   matter jurisdiction upon a federal court, an indictment need only charge a
   defendant with an offense against the United States in language similar to
   that used by the relevant statute.” United States v. Jacquez-Beltran, 326 F.3d
   661, 662 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003). The second superseding indictment did so. His
   contention that the second prosecution was barred by res judicata, or claim
   preclusion, is without merit. See Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S.
   5, 9 (2016); United States v. Kalish, 734 F.2d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1984).
          Finally, regarding the district court’s decision not to apply the § 5K1.1
   downward departure to his second sentencing, “absent a government
   motion, a sentencing court does not have discretion to depart on the basis of
   the defendant’s cooperation under § 5K1.1.” United States v. Robinson, 741
   F.3d 588, 599 (5th Cir. 2014). Further, Cobos’s contention that the § 5K1.1
   motion in his initial prosecution should apply to the second prosecution is
   unsupported.
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

                                          3