Court Opinion

ID: 9774521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:22:50.0353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:09.429848
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CASTILLE,
dissenting.
The Majority’s plain language construction of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716 (the “Act”), is reasonable. But I *488am less certain than the Majority that the construction outlined reflects the General Assembly’s intention in adopting the grandfathering exception found in Section 710.1(d) of the Act. Particularly given the disruption the construction will likely cause in Philadelphia, where City Council has engaged in its current approach to compliance with the Act for over half a century, I am persuaded that Council’s interpretation is also reasonable. Because I would affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court, I respectfully dissent.
I agree with Council that Section 710.1(d) authorizes Council to forego public comment at its regularly scheduled meetings because it has historically held “special meetings solely for the purpose of public comment in advance of advertised regular meetings.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 710.1(d). Appellants and others attended such a special meeting in this case and they testified regarding the bill under consideration. As a result, Council attempted to address some concerns in an amendment to the bill prior to its final passage. Alekseev v. City Council, 976 A.2d 1253, 1254 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009).1 I am persuaded that the Act’s goals are satisfied through continuation of Council’s longstanding process, which preceded the Act, and that the General Assembly did not intend a major disruption of the practice.
The Act expressly declares that it is “the public policy of this Commonwealth to insure the right of its citizens to have notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any agency business is discussed or acted upon.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). In furthering this policy, the Act sets forth certain requirements designed to promote open decisionmaking, including the public participation provisions of Section 710.1. See generally 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 704 (open meetings); 705 (recording of votes); 706 (minutes); 709 (public notice). The Act expressly authorizes an agency to adopt “rules and regulations necessary for the conduct of its meetings and the maintenance of order,” as long as those rules and regulations do not violate the intent of the Act. 65 Pa.C.S. § 710.
*489The Act also includes several relevant definitions. First, a “special meeting” is a “meeting scheduled by an agency after the agency’s regular schedule of meetings has been established.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 703. The definition of “special meeting” does not include a quorum requirement, although “meeting” is more generally defined as a “prearranged gathering of an agency which is attended or participated in by a quorum of the members of an agency held for the purpose of deliberating agency business or taking official action.” Id. The Majority applies the quorum language in the definition of “meeting” to the definition of “special meeting,” and holds that a Council committee meeting must include a quorum of Council members. Maj. Op. at 486, 8 A.3d at 315.
I recognize that the Majority’s interpretation of these provisions is a logical one and thus has substantial force. But, conversely, the failure to specifically include a quorum requirement in the definition of “special meeting,” I believe, reflects an intention to afford more play in the statutory construct. In my view, the statute may reasonably be read as intending to grant more flexibility to an entity such as Philadelphia’s City Council in its efforts to confront the practical ramifications of allowing public comment at every regularly scheduled meeting in a city the size of Philadelphia. Council’s procedure — apparently in effect since 1951 — aims to ensure that all citizens have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on proposed legislation, and thus furthers the salutary purposes of the Act.2 I do not view the Act as intending to preclude the governing bodies of political subdivisions, such as Council, from delegating certain aspects of its business to committees *490which may be tasked with receiving public comment in an efficient and organized manner.
In my view, the Act implicitly authorizes such delegation. The Act defines “agency” to include the “body, and all committees thereof authorized by the body to take official action or render advice on matters of agency business, of all the following: ... any board, council, authority or commission of the Commonwealth or of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 703 (emphasis added). I am persuaded by Council’s reading this definition together with the definitions of “meeting” and “special meeting” — as well as the obvious grandfathering clause in Section 710.1(d) — to allow Council to receive public comment at special meetings of its committees, without the requirement that a quorum of Council members be present. Instead, under this more generous reading, only a quorum of the committee is required, and Council’s practice does not violate the Act. As a matter of course, then, I respectfully cannot agree with the Majority’s position that this latter interpretation represents improper “bootstrapping.” Maj. Op. at 486, 8 A.3d at 314-15.
I have no doubt that in drafting Section 710.1(d), the General Assembly was aware of Philadelphia City Council’s longstanding, preexisting practice of receiving public comment in special meetings conducted by Council committees, and sought to preserve it. The practice serves the goals of the Act by providing an open forum for meaningful and orderly public participation in the legislative process while promoting the efficient operation of the legislative body of the Commonwealth’s largest city.3 As a practical matter, and as Council argues, its committee procedure may well be superior to a public comment period that might be offered at its regular meetings, where final votes would be taken. In this case, and consistently with the practice in effect in Philadelphia for over *491half a century, appellants were allowed to provide input to the committee in advance of the regular Council meeting at which the bill was passed, so it appears they actually had a more realistic opportunity to participate in shaping the legislation, rather than speaking at the very meeting where the vote was taken. In my judgment, Council’s committee practice satisfies the Act’s general requirement that the council of a political subdivision must provide a reasonable opportunity for public comment regarding matters under consideration. See 65 Pa. C.S. § 710.1(a). Council’s practice furthers the Commonwealth’s stated policy of public access, 65 Pa.C.S. § 702, and constitutes a permissible adoption of rules “necessary for the conduct of its meetings and the maintenance of order.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 710.
I would therefore affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court and uphold the grant of summary judgment.4
Justices TODD and McCAFFERY join the opinion.

. According to Council, these amendments addressed concerns raised by a different property management organization that also participated in the committee meeting. Appellee’s Brief at 9, 27.

. Section 2-201(2) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter provides:
Before a bill shall be considered by the Council it shall be referred to a committee, considered at a public hearing, reported by the committee, printed as reported, and distributed to the members of the Council and made available to the public.
According to Council, committee hearings are publicly advertised in advance and a transcript of the hearing is produced and kept available for public review at the Chief Clerk’s Office. See 65 Pa.C.S. § 706 (written minutes shall be kept of all open meetings of agencies). As the Majority notes, the committee hearings are also "broadcast internally to *490councilpersons who are not in attendance.’’ Maj. Op. at 483, 8 A.3d at 313.

. According to Council, "during the 2004 to 2007 session, Council held more than 120 public Committee hearings each on approximately 315 bills (almost 90% of the more than 350 bills introduced annually) — and at such hearings there is no limit on the number of persons who may testify, and, generally, no limitation as to time for such testimony.” Appellee's Brief at 25 (footnote omitted).

. A practical result of the Majority's holding is that action taken at the April 26, 2007 Council meeting, which was- challenged in a timely fashion, is now voidable. See 65 Pa.C.S. § 713 ("Should the court determine that the meeting did not meet the requirements of this chapter, it may in its discretion find that any or all official action taken at the meeting shall be invalid.”).