Court Opinion

ID: 9741716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:01:01.205892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.639815
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). It was claimed by the defense at trial in each of these consolidated cases that the prosecution had failed to produce a res gestae witness.
We agree, in each case, with the Court of Appeals: in Pearson the prosecution was not obliged to produce the witness, and in Wynn and Schwartz it was so obliged and did not exert sufficient efforts to produce him.
In Pearson there are other issues which we address in Part VII, infra. We affirm the Pearsons’ convictions.
The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Wynn and Schwartz and remanded for new trials. *728The principal issue presented is whether there must be a post-trial hearing, such as was required in People v Robinson, 390 Mich 629; 213 NW2d 106 (1973), in cases such as Wynn and Schwartz where, in the course of the trial, there was á hearing regarding the prosecution’s failure to produce the witness and a finding, at trial or on appeal, that the efforts to produce him were insufficient.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that where there has been such a hearing and finding a defendant may appeal without first seeking a Robinson hearing. We would hold, however, that if the Court of Appeals concludes that a witness should have been produced and the prosecutor’s efforts were insufficient, the order for a new trial shall be deemed conditioned by a right of the prosecutor to seek, within 30 days, a hearing to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced at trial by non-production of the witness. If the prosecutor establishes at such a post-remand hearing that the defendant was not so prejudiced because the witness could not possibly have been produced or because his testimony would have been of no possible assistance to the defendant, upon the trial judge’s entry of an order so finding the defendant’s conviction shall be deemed affirmed. Otherwise, upon expiration of the 30 days without the prosecutor seeking such a hearing or upon entry of an order following such a hearing that the defendant was prejudiced, the conviction shall be deemed vacated and the prosecutor may proceed with a new trial. The Court of Appeals should be deemed to have retained jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing a post-remand hearing record, which shall include a statement by the judge of his findings and reasons for his decision, upon applica*729tion by the prosecutor or defendant within 30 days of the entry of the judge’s order.
We do not address the question, suggested in our consideration of Wynn and Schwartz but not briefed or argued, of whether a prosecutor’s failure to produce a witness may, in some circumstances, require or justify dismissal of the prosecution.
I
The prosecution contends that "[t]he res gestae rule, couched in modern due process, compulsory process, discovery and pre-trial motions and depositions, has merged and no reason calls for its continuance and expensive redundancy”.
It appears from an early Michigan case that the rule is derived from the English practice.1 The rule took legislative form in 1859;2 the statute now provides: *730The relevant language has remained unchanged since first enacted.3 The statute has been consistently construed by this Court to require the prosecutor to indorse on the information, produce in court and call all known res gestae witnesses.4
*729"All informations shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction of the offense specified therein, after the proper return is filed by the examining magistrate, by the prosecuting attorney of the county as informant; he shall indorse thereon the names of the witnesses known to him at the time of Sling the same. The information shall be subscribed by the prosecuting attorney or in his name by an assistant prosecuting attorney. Names of additional witnesses may be indorsed before or during the trial by leave of the court and upon such conditions as the court shall determine.” MCL 767.40; MSA 28.980 (emphasis supplied).
*730The underlying rationale is that the prosecutor’s obligation is to present the "whole transaction”:
"But the prosecution can never, in a criminal case, properly claim a conviction upon evidence which, expressly or by implication, shows but a part of the res gestae, or whole transaction, if it appear that the evidence of the rest of the transaction is attainable. This would be to deprive the defendant of the benefit of the presumption of innocence, and to throw upon him the burden of proving his innocence. It is the res gestae, or whole transaction, the burden of proving which rests upon the prosecution (so far at least as the evidence is attainable). It is that which constitutes the prosecutor’s case, and as to which, the defendant has the right of cross-examination; it is that, which the jury are entitled to have before them, and, 'until this is shown, it is difficult to see how any legitimate inference of guilt, or of the degree of the offense, can be drawn.’ ” Hurd v People, 25 Mich 405, 415 (1872).5
*731"Its roots are in this Court’s historic concern that when the full investigative and prosecutorial power of the state is arrayed against an accused in a criminal case, the people’s duty is not met where only such evidence as points toward guilt is produced when there exists other evidence which may suggest innocence. It is a product of judicial policy that the prosecutor may not pick and choose which witnesses will fairly present the whole picture, but requires the production of all witnesses to an alleged crime, leaving it to the trier of fact to decide whether in the totality guilt is proven.” State Bar Grievance Administrator v Jaques, 401 Mich 516, 533-534; 258 NW2d 443 (1977).
The list of witnesses indorsed on the information is the only discovery available to the defendant as a matter of right. While the people argue that "[m]odern practice in Michigan is one of wide discovery”, discovery is discretionary* *6 and discovery orders are the exception, not the rule.
The people are in a better position than a defendant to identify and secure the production of witnesses. Few defendants have a staff of investigators to assist them. The police generally receive cooperation from citizens and also have the sup*732port of other law enforcement agencies in identifying and locating witnesses. A police investigation may continue to the time of trial. A thorough investigation may develop the identity of witnesses otherwise unknown to the defendant.
Police officers serve and enforce process for the prosecutor.7 A witness who might not respond to a subpoena delivered by a private process server may appear when a uniformed officer serves the process; service by an officer is a reminder of the authority of the law and strongly conveys to the witness the obligation to appear and that there may be adverse consequences if he does not.
If the prosecution were relieved of the obligation to produce res gestae witnesses, defendants would call upon the court for assistance. They would, if indigent, and most defendants are, seek investigators and other assistance to identify and locate witnesses and to serve and enforce process. Adjournments of trials would be sought because of real and fancied difficulties in obtaining the attendance of witnesses. Trials and justice would be delayed and additional costs would be incurred in providing indigent defendants with alternative and duplicative assistance in investigating the crime, and in identifying and locating witnesses and securing their attendance. Post-conviction claims that the prosecution withheld evidence, relatively rare in Michigan, would surely multiply, as would post-conviction Robinson hearings to determine what the undisclosed witness might have said had he been produced.
Allocation to the prosecution of the burden of investigation and production of witnesses has
*733served the people of this state well for more than a century.8 The efficient and fair administration of the criminal justice system is advanced by requiring the prosecution to present all the witnesses, those whose evidence tends to support the theory of the prosecution, and, as well, those who may give evidence tending to exculpate the defendant or raise a reasonable doubt.9
*734II
Willie Pearson and Lindsay Pearson were convicted of first-degree murder.10
Willie Pearson and James Kidd, the victim, lived in the same motel. Kidd was shot in the lobby of the motel. There was testimony that shortly before he was shot the Pearsons and a third man confronted him in his room. Lindsay took jewelry and Willie took money from him. The three men, all armed, then marched Kidd and his girlfriend down the stairs into the lobby. Kidd attempted to have the desk clerk call the police and was shot.
The defense claimed that the killing was not in the perpetration of a robbery. The articles taken from Kidd had previously been stolen from Willie Pearson; they were merely retrieving his property. Kidd gave them the money and said that the remaining property was at another location. The group started for that location. While they were crossing the lobby of the motel, another man ran in from the street, tussled with Kidd and shot him.
Raymond Collins, allegedly the third man in *735Kidd’s room, was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. At Collins’ preliminary examination, Kidd’s girlfriend identified him as the third man and he was bound over. The charge was subsequently dismissed because further investigation convinced the authorities that Collins could not have been at the scene of the crime.
At the trial, the Pearsons moved that Collins be indorsed as a res gestae witness and the prosecution required to produce him. An officer responded that three other persons who were also in Kidd’s room said that Collins was not present, and that further investigation had confirmed that he was at Selfridge Air Force Base. The judge ruled that Collins was not a res gestae witness.
The Pearsons contend that the prosecution was obliged to produce Collins because one of the prosecution’s principal witnesses said he was there. The prosecution responds that the judge correctly determined the disputed question of whether Collins was the third man and, moreover, the third man was an accomplice and, for that reason, not required to be produced.11 The Pearsons reply that the "accomplice exception” cannot be invoked because the prosecutor, in effect, determined that Collins was not an accomplice when he dismissed the charge.
We agree with the Pearsons that the judge erred in resolving the question whether the arrested *736Raymond Collins12 was at the scene on the hearsay assertions of the officer.
It appears, however, that whether the third man was the arrested Raymond Collins, another man named Raymond Collins, or a man with a different name, he was there as an accomplice. The testimony was that the third man in Kidd’s motel room was holding a gun and had participated in the offenses claimed to have been there committed. There was no affirmative evidence that the third man was a mere observer or bystander.
There being no affirmative evidence that Collins, if there at all, was there other than as the third man who participated in the commission of the offenses, the only conclusion justified by the record is that if he was there he was an accomplice.
Accordingly, the judge’s conclusion that the prosecutor was not obliged to produce Collins is sustained.
Ill
In the case of Willie Wynn, Earl Berry (complainant’s brother) had, it appears, beaten his former girlfriend, Jeanette Riley. Wynn, James Moore (Riley’s brother), and another person went to the Berry home. Moore entered first. A short time later Wynn entered with a rifle which discharged.
Wynn was charged with assault with intent to commit murder13 and convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.14
*737At Wynn’s trial, the judge ordered the prosecutor to produce Moore, but he was not produced.
Earl Berry had lived with Riley for five years. She had complained that Earl had beaten her and, earlier in the day the alleged assault by Wynn occurred, there was a court hearing regarding the alleged beating.
Wynn testified that he had been friends with Riley for ten years preceding the incident and had been seeing her after Earl Berry moved out of her home, but they did not have a romantic relationship. Earl Berry, who learned that Wynn was seeing Riley, told her he was going "to get” Wynn. The purpose of the visit to the Berry home was to inform Earl that Wynn and Riley were not romantically involved.
The prosecutor produced five eyewitnesses: the complainant, other members of his family, and his girlfriend. The tendency of their testimony was that Moore entered the Berry home and asked to speak to one of the Berrys. Earl Barry was not at home.15 Two of the Berrys and Moore talked in a bedroom. Wynn ran into the home and, as the three were leaving the bedroom, ordered the complainant to halt, then aimed and fired at him.
Wynn testified that it was Moore who suggested that he go to the Berry home to "straighten things out” and take a rifle with him. He agreed to go but asked that Moore enter first. Moore and Earl Berry were friends and it was decided that it would be better if Moore spoke first to Earl. When they reached the Berry home, Wynn and the third man remained in the car and Moore entered. A few minutes later, Wynn heard screams and the third man said "they are jumping” Moore. Wynn *738grabbed the rifle and ran into the home. He saw the two Berrys and Moore. He ran toward them, raising the gun, and told them to halt. In the process the gun accidentally discharged. The third man subsequently entered the home.
When the judge granted the motion of Wynn’s counsel during the trial to indorse Moore and ordered the prosecutor to produce him, the police located him and asked him to appear; the prosecutor said that the officers said that Moore said he would appear. A subpoena was not served and the prosecutor made no further efforts to produce him.16 The judge found that the prosecutor had failed to show due diligence to produce Moore and other witnesses, including the third man, whose production the judge had also ordered.17 He adjourned the case until the next morning so that the prosecutor could produce them or show due diligence. The prosecutor did not make any further effort to produce Moore and rested his case. He argued, nevertheless, in closing that Moore had conspired with Wynn to kill Earl Berry:
"Now James Moore went to that house to create a diversion, ladies and gentlemen. He went there to point out Earl or to get the family involved so that the defendant could go into the house and kill Earl. They were together.”
The judge instructed the jury that it was "at liberty” to draw the inference that if Moore had *739been produced his testimony would have been "unfavorable” to the people.
Manifestly, Moore and the third man were res gestae witnesses and the prosecutor was obliged to exert due diligence to produce them.
There was no substantial difference between the testimony of the people’s witnesses and Wynn. The only issue was whether the shot was intentional or accidental. The people’s witnesses were four Berrys and an intimate of one of them. There was "bad blood” between the Berrys and Wynn because of Jeanette Riley.
Moore and the third man who accompanied Wynn to the Berry home could have provided evidence regarding the purpose of the visit and Wynn’s expressed intent.18 Moore was standing about two feet in front of and to the side of the complainant when the shot was fired, and may have been the only person who had an unblocked view of the incident.
The failure to produce Moore cannot be justified on the ground that he was an accomplice if for no other reason than because when the issue of his non-production was raised the prosecutor did not claim that he was an accomplice. The prosecutor’s failure to advance that claim is consistent with Wynn’s testimony and the actions of the officers called to the scene who arrested Wynn and released Moore upon statements from the Berrys that he was not involved.19
*740Moore could have been produced and the trial judge correctly found that there was no justification for the failure to do so.
It was not open to the prosecutor, in lieu of complying with the rule requiring production of res gestae witnesses, to accept an instruction that the jury may infer that the missing witness would testify unfavorably to the people. A jury instruction on a permissible inference is not an adequate substitute for a live witness. Indeed, the instruction is intended for the case where, despite due diligence, the witness cannot be produced.20 A prosecutor does not have the option of calling a res gestae witness or of accepting an adverse jury instruction regarding a permissible inference.
In the instant case the prosecution had presented a strong case through the testimony of members of the complainant’s family. Wynn alone had testified in support of his theory of accidental discharge of the gun. The prosecutor had nothing to gain by producing Moore. This, coupled with his willful refusal to produce him and his jury argument, renders his position in this case suspect.
The order of the Court of Appeals reversing Wynn’s conviction and remanding for a new trial is sustained. We would hold that because there is reason to believe that the prosecution’s lack of due *741diligence was purposeful, before a post-remand hearing or a new trial, Wynn should have an opportunity to depose all officers and prosecutors who may have questioned Moore, and there shall be produced any statements made by Moore and the records of such interviews. The prosecutor should exert his best efforts to produce Moore; Wynn should be afforded an opportunity to depose him.
IV
John J. Schwartz was convicted of delivery of heroin.21
A Michigan State Police officer testified that he purchased heroin from Schwartz, to whom he had been introduced by an informant, Don "Igor” Cager. Cager was present throughout the transaction. Schwartz claimed entrapment.
Cager was indorsed on the information but not produced at trial. The trooper said that he had last seen Cager about six months before trial.22 On the day before trial, he began looking for him for the instant case. On the day he testified he made a second trip to Cager’s last known address in Algonac, Michigan. No one was at home. He spoke to a police officer and several young people on the street. He went to two restaurants, two bars, a pool hall and a fire station. The judge ruled that a "good faith” effort had been made to locate Cager.
The Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the record "fails to show that the prosecution seriously sought to discover the witness’s present
*742whereabouts”.23 A dissenting judge would have affirmed because, under the circumstances, the judge had not abused "his discretion” in excusing the failure to produce Cager.24
The people contend that while the officer "could have done more”, because he had no specific leads and the sources he checked provided no leads "his efforts were diligent”.
It is "the duty of the prosecutor to have subpoenas issued” for indorsed witnesses and "use such other means at hand to have them present at trial”.25 "[T]he positive burden to produce all res gestae witnesses is imposed upon the people to protect the defendant from false accusations and preserve his presumption of innocence. [People v] Eugene Harris, [43 Mich App 531; 204 NW2d 549 (1972)]; People v Kayne, 268 Mich 186; 255 NW 758 (1934). In essence, the obligation of res gestae witness production is derivative of a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and his right to demand prosecutorial proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons 'diligence’ means literally what Webster’s dictionary says it means: devoted and painstaking application to accomplish an undertaking.”26 Similarly, see Hurd v People, supra.
The officer was thus obliged to inquire of persons who might know Cager’s whereabouts. He did not do so; he did not attempt to locate him by inquiring of his parents, other family members, neighbors, male or female friends, former employers or governmental authorities.
*743Although the officer had last seen Cager about six months before the scheduled trial date and the last known address was at least 50 miles from the place of trial, he waited until the day before trial to begin efforts to produce him. He went to that address, apparently the home of Cager’s parents. No one was at home. He said he thought Cager’s parents worked, but made no effort to locate them or attempt to telephone later. He did not check with neighbors. Inquiry of Cager’s parents or neighbors was far more likely to produce information regarding his whereabouts than inquiry at two restaurants, two bars, a pool hall, or a fire station. The reasons are limitless why Cager was not at particular establishments on the day and time the officer entered and leads did not develop from inquiry at such establishments,27 and why a police officer casually encountered on a street28 or a few random youths would have no knowledge of his whereabouts. Although Cager was a narcotics informant, the officer did not check drug centers, hospitals, jails or courts.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the judge erred in focusing on the officer’s good faith. The question is whether the prosecution exerted due diligence. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that this was not a doubtful case that was resolved by the trial judge’s exercise of discretion. The failure to make timely inquiry, and any inquiry of other persons living at the address, Cager’s parents, neighbors, or friends and of authorities who might have information about his whereabouts, supports its conclusion that the prosecution’s efforts were inadequate.
*744V
We turn to the question whether there must be a post-trial hearing, such as was required in People v Robinson, supra, in cases such as Wynn and Schwartz where, in the course of the trial, there was a hearing regarding the prosecution’s failure to produce the witness and a finding, at trial or on appeal, that the efforts were insufficient.
In Robinson, supra, p 634, this Court declared:
"In appeals filed after this opinion is published, a defendant desiring reversal or a new trial because of a failure to produce an unindorsed or an indorsed witness shall, before filing his brief on appeal, move the trial court for a new trial. The prosecutor shall produce or explain why he cannot produce the witness or, as the case may be, why he did not indorse and produce him at the trial. If the witness is produced at the hearing, he shall be examined regarding his knowledge of the crime. If a new trial be denied, the judge shall state his reasons.”
The Court of Appeals in both Wynn and Schwartz declared Robinson inapplicable because, in contrast with that case, there had been a hearing during trial in the instant cases:
"[S]ince the trial court has already heard the prosecution’s explanations and found them wanting, a remand for an evidentiary hearing would serve no useful purpose.” People v Wynn, 60 Mich App 636, 641; 231 NW2d 269 (1975).
"Since an evidentiary hearing would be futile and would engender needless delay, it is not ordered.” People v Schwartz, 62 Mich App 188, 194; 233 NW2d 517 (1975).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that where *745the issue of due diligence has been explored at the trial, Robinson does not require a motion for a new trial and a hearing as a condition precedent to raising the issue on appeal. It would unduly burden and delay the appellate process to require such a post-trial hearing in cases where the trial judge has, after a hearing on the question of due diligence, already ruled, a ruling which more often than not will be affirmed on appeal.
The purpose of a Robinson hearing, however, is two-fold. It is not only to determine the reason for a failure to indorse or a failure to produce but also to determine whether the defendant has been prejudiced by non-production of the witness.
Heretofore, reversal and remand for a new trial was automatic whenever an appellate court found that the prosecution did not exert due diligence in discharge of its obligation to produce a res gestae witness.29 The prosecutor was not given the opportunity of showing that the missing witness’s testimony would, for example, have been inculpatory, or that he could not possibly have been produced because, for example, he was dead.
In Robinson, the issue concerning the alleged failure to produce a res gestae witness had not been preserved at the trial and appeared to have been an afterthought, the proverbial appellate parachute. To separate substantial post-conviction res gestae claims from those which are mere appellate stalking horses we required that thereafter *746a post-trial motion be filed in such a case before the issue may be assigned on appeal.
While we are persuaded that the prosecutor should have an opportunity, even in a case where the issue was preserved by objection at the trial, to show that the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to produce, the witness, there is a significant difference, in terms of securing prosecutorial compliance with the res gestae rule, between a case where the issue is duly preserved at the trial level and one where it is raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, to avoid undermining the long-established rule requiring indorsement and due diligence in the production of res gestae witnesses, we would carefully circumscribe the nature of the inquiry in such a post-remand hearing.
Where the issue of non-production is raised at the trial and it is determined at trial or on appeal that the prosecution did not exert due diligence, the question at a post-remand hearing should be whether the defendant suffered prejudice at the trial, not whether the missing witness’s testimony may at a subsequent trial bring about a different result. To frame the question in terms of whether there may be a different verdict or finding at a new trial would mean that if the witness could not be produced there would be no new trial, and would thus reward the prosecution for its lack of diligence, and would create a positive incentive not to locate and produce the witness for a post-remand hearing or new trial. If the question was whether there may be a different result at a new trial, a prosecutor might seek a post-remand hearing with a view to prevailing simply on an officer’s recital of his unsuccessful efforts to locate and produce the witness. Prosecutorial authorities who do not exert due diligence before the trial are not *747likely to exert greater efforts on remand unless there is some advantage to them — avoiding a new trial — in doing so.
If the prosecutor establishes that the witness could not possibly have been produced at the trial or his testimony would have been of no possible assistance to the defendant, then the defendant was not prejudiced at the trial and a new trial is not required.30
In assessing whether the witness’s testimony might possibly have assisted the defendant, it should be borne in mind that the defendant was entitled to jury appraisal, not a judge’s appraisal, of the worthiness of the witness’s testimony. It is again pertinent that the witness’s non-appearance at the trial is attributable to the prosecution’s failure to discharge its obligation to produce the witness.
The question whether the evidence adduced by the witness at the post-remand hearing might possibly have assisted the defendant at the trial will generally depend on an appraisal of whether his evidence might possibly have contributed to a result more favorable to the defendant. The witness’s testimony must consequently be considered in light of the other evidence adduced at the trial by the prosecution and defense. The focus of the inquiry, however, should be primarily on the pertinency of the witness’s testimony adduced at the post-remand hearing. To avoid invading the jury’s province of determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, the consideration of the other evidence adduced by the prose*748cution or defense at trial should be limited to the nature of such other evidence and should not extend to consideration of its quality or weight in relation or comparison to the witness’s testimony.
If the witness cannot be produced for a post-remand hearing (unless the prosecutor establishes further that the witness could not possibly have been produced at the trial), the conviction must be reversed because there is no way of knowing whether at the trial he might possibly have given testimony of assistance to the defendant. Requiring a new trial in such a case will encourage prosecutors to locate witnesses like Moore (Wynn) and Cager (Schwartz) and to produce them at a post-remand hearing which may avoid a new trial.
While the argument can be made that there is no point to a new trial where the witness cannot be produced — the testimony at the second trial will duplicate the first31 — we are persuaded that there is no other satisfactory means of securing compliance by the prosecution with its obligation to produce all res gestae witnesses. Retrial of the relatively few cases where an appellate court reverses because of a failure to exert due diligence is the price of securing compliance by the prosecution with the res gestae rule in the thousands of other cases where the fair and speedy administration of justice depends on compliance with that rule.
We add nothing to the burden of the prosecution by our dispositions and rulings in these cases; it is worth repeating that reversal and remand for a *749new trial has been the automatic remedy in the past for failure to produce the witness without opportunity for a post-remand hearing to show that the defendant was not prejudiced at the trial.
VI
In Robinson, supra, p 634, the Court also declared:
"The final disposition of this cause is held in abeyance. If the trial judge finds that a new trial is required, this Court will enter an order consistent with that determination. If not, the transcript, findings of the trial court and the supplemental briefs of the parties will be considered by this Court and a final disposition of the entire matter thereafter will be made.”
A similar procedure shall be followed, in effect, whenever an appellate court reverses a defendant’s conviction and orders a new trial on the ground that the prosecution failed to discharge its obligation to produce a witness. If the prosecutor seeks a post-remand hearing, either party is entitled to appellate review of an adverse determination. Within 30 days of the trial court’s order, the aggrieved party may seek such review by filing a statement to that effect with the appellate court. The transcript, judge’s statement of findings and reasons, order of the trial court, and supplemental briefs shall be forwarded promptly, within the time directed by the appellate court, to that court for its review and disposition of the matter.
We concur in the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals in Wynn and Schwartz, and remand for a new trial, subject to the prosecutor’s right to seek, within 30 days, a hearing on *750whether the defendant was prejudiced by the failure to produce the witness.
VII
We address the remaining issues in Pearson.
The Pearsons contend that the judge should have granted a motion for a mistrial because of the prosecutor’s actions in charging Willie Pearson’s girlfriend with perjury and subpoenaing two persons who were in Kidd’s room and placing them under bond to appear as witnesses at her trial on that charge. We conclude that it does not appear that the Pearsons were thereby deprived of a fair trial. The girlfriend adhered at the trial to her preliminary examination testimony corroborating Lindsay Pearson’s testimony that a stranger burst into the lobby and shot Kidd; she did not change her exculpatory testimony. Since the two witnesses were not subpoenaed or placed under bond until after they had testified at the Pearsons’ trial, there is no reason to believe that their testimony was influenced by the prosecutor’s decisions to charge the girlfriend or to subpoena or place them under bond. Nor is there any reason to believe that but for those decisions Kidd’s girlfriend would have changed her damaging preliminary examination testimony.
The Pearsons further contend that the innuendo of the prosecutor’s questioning of Pearson’s girlfriend was that she had earlier given inconsistent testimony which he improperly reinforced by suggestively flipping through sheets of paper as he propounded questions. While the judge might have earlier stopped the prosecutor from pursuing this form of inquiry, the questions and answers dealt with a subsidiary issue and the Pearsons were not thereby prejudiced.
*751Nor do we find merit in the contention that the prosecutor departed from the record in his summation. Defense counsel had stated in closing argument that Raymond Collins was bound over for trial and that the officer in charge of the case had then moved to dismiss those charges. He argued that since Kidd’s girlfriend had testified under oath that Collins was the third man the jury could infer that the prosecution did not believe her and that, by its verdict, it should say to the prosecution "why do you expect us to?” In those circumstances, the prosecutor was within the bounds of permissible argumentative response in asking the jury to infer, rather, that "the police and the prosecution know that he wasn’t the man”. We hasten to add that if the same argument had been advanced in terms of a defendant’s guilt, i.e., "you may infer that the police and the prosecutor know that the defendant is guilty”, a different question would be presented.32
The judge instructed the jury on the defense’s theory. It was not until after he completed his instructions that he was asked to instruct that if the jurors concluded that the killing in the lobby was not a "continuation” of a robbery in Kidd’s room they could not convict the Pearsons of first-degree murder. When this instruction was requested, the judge said that if it were to be given it would be necessary to instruct on lesser degrees of murder, which would be inconsistent with de*752fense counsel’s request that the jury be instructed to convict of first-degree murder or acquit. There was no error.
The jury was instructed that the presumption of innocence attaches until "each and every one of you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each defendant’s guilt”. After the jury brought in its verdicts of guilty, experienced and able defense counsel responded in the negative when asked whether there was anything further, and thus the jury was not polled. The Pearsons were not deprived of a fair trial by the judge’s failure to instruct that the verdict must be unanimous.
Finally, while People v Jenkins, 395 Mich 440; 236 NW2d 503 (1975), requires an instruction on second-degree murder in a first-degree murder case without regard to whether the instruction is requested or declined, by its terms the rule of that case applies only to cases tried after January 1, 1976. The trial in the instant case concluded February 25, 1974.
The convictions of the Pearsons are affirmed.
The cases of Wynn and Schwartz are remanded for new trials.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed in all three cases.
Kavanagh, C.J., and Williams, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Hurd v People, 25 Mich 405, 416 (1872).

 1859 PA 138, § 2; 1871 CL 7938; How Stat 9549; 1897 CL 11934; 1915 CL 15761.
1859 PA 138 authorizes criminal prosecution upon an information the same as upon indictment.
The indictment statute has a similar requirement of indorsement. MCL 767.25; MSA 28.965. See, also, Hill v People, 26 Mich 496 (1873).

 Other portions of the statute have been amended. 1927 PA 175, ch VII, § 40; 1929 PA 24, ch VII, § 40; 1955 PA 184, § 1; 1961 PA 11, § 1.

 See, e.g., Maher v People, 10 Mich 212, 225-226 (1862); Hurd v People, 25 Mich 405 (1872); Wellar v People, 30 Mich 16, 22-24 (1874); People v Price, 74 Mich 37, 41; 41 NW 853 (1889); People v Swetland, 77 Mich 53, 57-59; 43 NW 779 (1889); People v Howes, 81 Mich 396, 400-401; 45 NW 961 (1890); People v Deitz, 86 Mich 419, 427-432; 49 NW 296 (1891); People v Germaine, 101 Mich 485, 486-488; 60 NW 44 (1894); People v Vick, 235 Mich 475, 480; 209 NW 584 (1926); People v Raider, 256 Mich 131, 134-137; 239 NW 387 (1931); People v Kayne, 268 Mich 186, 189-195; 255 NW 758 (1934); People v Zabijak, 285 Mich 164, 169-173; 280 NW 149 (1938); People v Connor, 295 Mich 1, 5; 294 NW 74 (1940); People v Serra, 301 Mich 124, 129-131; 3 NW2d 35 (1942); People v Bartlett, 312 Mich 648, 654-655; 20 NW2d 758 (1945); People v Tann, 326 Mich 361, 366-367; 40 NW2d 184 (1949).
Only res gestae witnesses are required to be indorsed, produced and called. If a non-res gestae witness is indorsed, the prosecutor is obliged to have him in court, but there is no duty to call him. See People v Grant, 111 Mich 346; 69 NW 647 (1896); People v Lummis, 260 Mich 170; 244 NW 438 (1932); People v Zabijak, supra.

 See, also, Maher v People, supra; Patten v People, 18 Mich 314 *731(1869); Wellar v People, supra; People v Deitz, supra; People v Raider, supra; People v Tann, supra.

 Discovery is discretionary with the trial judge. See People v Johnson, 356 Mich 619; 97 NW2d 739 (1959); People v McIntosh, 400 Mich 1; 252 NW2d 779 (1977); see, also, RCR 2Í. Changing the res gestae rule would leave defendants who draw a judge who does not generally grant discovery with virtually no discovery.
The prosecutor states: "Under Recorder’s Court Rule 21.2 a defendant may discover virtually anything material to the defense.” The rule states:
"Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the information and upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable, the court may order the prosecution to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated papers, documents, transcriptions, recordings or tangible objects in the possession of the prosecution or the police and not intended to be introduced or used by the prosecution at the trial.” RCR 21, § 2 (emphasis supplied).

RCR 22 provides that "service of witness subpoenas” shall be "made by the Detroit Police Department on behalf of indigent defendants.” (Emphasis supplied.) There is no comparable general court rule.

 The people point out that the rule has been criticized and abrogated in other jurisdictions. See 7 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev), §§ 2079-2080, p 536 et seq. The criticism is not recent:
"The rule that the prosecution must indorse and call all the eyewitnesses to a crime of violence who are available, * * * although rejected or materially modified in most or all other American jurisdictions (16 Ann Cas 918, note; 16 CJ, p 846; 2 Michie on Homicide, p 1362), is too well established in this State to need the citation of authorities.” People v Raider, supra, pp 134-135 (1931).
Perhaps in response to the criticism, the Legislature enacted 1941 PA 336; MCL 767.40a; MSA 28.980(1), which provides:
"Witnesses whom the people are obliged by law to call as res gestae witnesses may be impeached the same as though such witnesses had been called by the respondent.”
Compare Wellar v People, supra, pp 23-24, where the Court said:
"The fact that he is compelled to call these witnesses, when he may not always find them disposed to frankness, entitles him, when it appears necessary, to press them with searching questions: Regina v Ball, 8 C & P 745 [1839]; Regina v Chapman, 8 C & P 558 [1838], By this means, and by laying all the facts before the jury, they are quite as likely to get at the truth as if he were allowed to impeach the witnesses who disappoint him. Any intelligent jury will readily discover whether a witness whom the prosecutor has been compelled to call is fair or adverse, and can make all proper allowance for bias, or any other influence which may affect his credit. If there is but a single eyewitness, he could not be impeached, and yet the danger of falsehood is quite as great, and the chances of its correction much less than where there are two, and both are called. And if such a witness need not be called by the prosecution, the defense cannot impeach him, and must either call him, and run the risk of finding him against them, or, if they fail to call him, be prejudiced by the argument that they have omitted to prove what was in their power, and must have done so because they dared not call out the facts. There is no fairness in such a practice, and a prosecutor should not be permitted to resort to it. He is not responsible for the shortcomings of his witnesses, and he is responsible for any obstacle thrown in the way of eliciting all the facts.”
Similarly, see People v Deitz, supra; cf. People v Connor, supra.

 The Court declared in People v Blazenzitz, 212 Mich 675, 678-679; 180 NW 370 (1920):
"The important question of fact on the trial was the identity of the *734murderers. By the failure of the prosecution to indorse the names of Eugene Vincent and Operhall as witnesses and to produce them at the trial, this being a case of homicide, a serious question is presented, for upon this record the fact remains that Eugene Vincent and Operhall saw men leaving the bank following the shooting. These men were the only known persons who saw the alleged murderers leave the bank building, they were the first to see them after the shooting, they observed them at a different time and place than did the witness Bert R. Vincent. And Eugene Vincent had an opportunity to observe one of the alleged murders at arm’s length. The failure to indorse and produce these witnesses is not a mere irregularity. It is a positive invasion of a substantial right of the defendant under the law. Such invasions might not be very harmful in cases where defendants have the means to employ counsel to discover the facts, and to prepare a defense, but it would be otherwise with the unfortunate and the helpless poor accused of crime, if subjected to the whim of officers, to the suppression of evidence, to conviction on less than the truth.” (Citations omitted.)

 MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548.

 The well-established rule is that the people are not required to indorse or produce res gestae witnesses who are accomplices. See People v McCullough, 81 Mich 25, 34; 45 NW 515 (1890); People v Resh, 107 Mich 251; 65 NW 99 (1895); People v Baker, 112 Mich 211; 70 NW 431 (1897); People v Raider, supra; People v Knoll, 258 Mich 89; 242 NW 222 (1932); People v Kennan, 275 Mich 452; 266 NW 468 (1936); People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540, 553; 256 NW2d 31 (1977); People v White, 401 Mich 482, 508-509; 257 NW2d 912 (1977).

 It appears that there may have been more than one Raymond Collins. A Raymond Collins may have been in the room and the police may have arrested the wrong Raymond Collins. Be that as it may, the testimony that placed Collins at the scene placed him there as the third armed man.

 MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278.

 MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279.

 Wynn was not acquainted with the Berrys, and would not have known Earl Berry at sight.

 The duty to produce a res gestae witness is imposed on the prosecution, not the judge. It therefore is of no importance whether the judge issued a bench warrant as the prosecutor suggested he might in an apparently heated exchange.

 The Court of Appeals concluded that a new trial was not justified on account of the failure to produce the other witnesses. No issue in that regard is presented on the appeal to this Court.

 "The circumstances which, in fact, led to the assault were a part of the res gestae, which the jury were entitled to have before them, to show what was the real nature of the act, the quo animo, state of mind and intention, with which it was done.” Maher v People, supra, p 225 (emphasis in original).

 The prosecutor also asserts that Wynn did not cooperate in the production of Moore. Under the circumstance that the police had located him, the asserted non-cooperation and following argumentative exchange between counsel is not germane.

 A note to the proposed standard criminal jury instruction, "Failure to Produce Res Gestae Witnesses” (CJI 5:2:14), states:
“If the evidence is insufficient to establish due diligence, then this instruction will not cure the error. The issue should be submitted to the jury only when there are sufficient facts establishing due diligence to warrant the jury’s being able to establish due diligence, as an alternative to the judge’s making the decision.” 1 Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions (Ann Arbor: Institute of Continuing Legal Education), p 5-67.
See People v Gibson, 253 Mich 476; 235 NW 225 (1931), and People v Serra, supra, where the Court found that the people had exercised due diligence and found no error in giving a similar jury instruction in that situation.

 MCL 335.341(l)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(a).

 The officer was asked whether he had done "anything” in the five weeks after Cager was indorsed as a witness. He said "yes”, that he "saw” "people I dealing dope with [sic]”. The prosecutor, on appeal, infers that he spoke to other informants in an effort to locate Cager.

 People v Schwartz, 62 Mich App 188, 193; 233 NW2d 517 (1975).

 Id., p 195.

 See People v Van Vorce, 240 Mich 75, 78-79; 215 NW 5 (1927); see, also, People v Zabijak, supra; People v McIntosh, 389 Mich 82; 204 NW2d 135 (1973).

 People v Johnson, 51 Mich App 224, 230-231; 214 NW2d 713 (1974).

 The record does not indicate the nature or scope of inquiry at the establishments.

 The record indicates that the officer so encountered was asked only whether Cager was in jail.

 See, e.g., People v Germaine, supra; People v Van Vorce, supra; People v Zabijak, supra; People v O’Dell, 10 Mich App 87; 158 NW2d 805 (1968).
In Maher v People, supra; Hurd v People, supra; People v Kayne, supra and People v Tann, supra, the issue was whether the omitted testimony was part of the res gestae. This Court found that it was, and reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In Wellar v People, supra, and People v Deitz, supra, the issue was whether the prosecutor was obliged to call the witness. This Court found that he was, and reversed and remanded for a new trial.

 This test is to be applied only at a post-remand hearing after there has been a finding by a trial or appellate court that the prosecutor failed to exercise due diligence. Whether the prosecutor has exerted adequate efforts to produce a res gestae witness at trial shall continue to be determined under the due diligence standard.

 Where a new trial is granted on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence, the testimony at a second trial may duplicate the testimony at the first. That has never been' thought to negate the judge’s power to grant a new trial on that ground, nor is he authorized on that account to, in effect, direct a verdict. Cf. People v Johnson, 397 Mich 686; 246 NW2d 836 (1976).

 The prosecution’s theory was not buttressed, the defense was not deprecated by the argumentative response that the police and prosecutor knew that Collins was not the third man in Kidd’s room. If the Pearsons had named the third man who allegedly entered the lobby and shot Kidd and a similar argument had been made, e.g., you may infer that the police and prosecution know that the man named by the Pearsons did not enter the lobby and shoot Kidd, a different question would also be presented. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function (Approved Draft, 1971), § 5.8(b); Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(0(3).