Court Opinion

ID: 9955808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 15:16:15.915687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:24.084837
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                     2024 WY 36

                                                    OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                             March 29, 2024

  EMILY FAIRBANKS,

  Appellant
  (Plaintiff),

  v.

  HOLLY GALBRAITH,

  Appellee
  (Defendant).
                                                       S-23-0218, S-23-0219
  HOLLY GALBRAITH,

  Appellant
  (Defendant),

  v.

  EMILY FAIRBANKS,

  Appellee
  (Plaintiff).

                     Appeal from the District Court of Teton County
                       The Honorable Melissa M. Owens, Judge

Representing Emily Fairbanks:
      Bret F. King and Spencer B. King, King & King, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.
      Argument by Mr. Bret King.

Representing Holly Galbraith:
      Sean W. Scoggin and Blaine F. Burgess, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C.,
      Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Scoggin.
Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ,* BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

* Justice Kautz retired from judicial office effective March 26, 2024, and, pursuant to Article 5, § 5 of the
Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (LexisNexis 2023), he was reassigned to act on
this matter on March 27, 2024.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] These appeals stem from an automobile accident that occurred in Idaho. Holly
Galbraith was driving her vehicle when it crashed, injuring Emily Fairbanks, who was a
passenger in the vehicle. Ms. Fairbanks sued Mrs. Galbraith in Wyoming, alleging Mrs.
Galbraith was negligent. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion to dismiss, contending the statute
of limitations had run before the lawsuit was filed. The district court allowed limited
discovery on the issue, converted the motion to summary judgment, and denied it. The
district court later granted Mrs. Galbraith’s next motion for summary judgment in which
she argued that collateral estoppel prevented the relitigation of issues of negligence and
damages established in a companion case in Idaho. In appeal No. S-23-0219, Mrs.
Galbraith appeals the ruling on the statute of limitations; in appeal No. S-23-0218, Ms.
Fairbanks appeals the ruling on collateral estoppel.

[¶2] We conclude that the statute of limitations had run before Ms. Fairbanks filed her
complaint and accordingly reverse the district court’s ruling in appeal No. S-23-0219. We
do not reach the merits of appeal No. S-23-0218.

                                         ISSUES

[¶3]   Mrs. Galbraith raises a single issue, which we rephrase:

              1. Did the district court properly conclude that Idaho’s statute
                 of limitations was tolled, such that Ms. Fairbanks’ lawsuit
                 was timely?

Ms. Fairbanks raises the following issues, which we also rephrase:

              1. Did the district court err when it allowed Mrs. Galbraith to
                 assert collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense?

              2. Does Idaho’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages apply
                 to this matter?

Because Mrs. Galbraith’s issue is dispositive, we do not reach the issues raised by Ms.
Fairbanks.

                                         FACTS

[¶4] Ms. Fairbanks, a passenger in Mrs. Galbraith’s vehicle, sustained severe injuries in
a single car accident that occurred in Idaho when Mrs. Galbraith lost control of the vehicle
on a snow-packed road. The vehicle fishtailed, collided with a guardrail, and when the

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guardrail failed, careened down a 200-foot embankment. Ms. Fairbanks was 13 years old
when the accident occurred.

[¶5] Ms. Fairbanks filed two lawsuits. She sued the Idaho Transportation Department in
Idaho, and she sued Mrs. Galbraith in Wyoming. Both Ms. Fairbanks and Mrs. Galbraith
are residents of Teton County, Wyoming.

A.     The Idaho Case

[¶6] In Idaho, Ms. Fairbanks alleged that the Idaho Transportation Department had
negligently failed to maintain the guardrail. In June 2022, an Idaho jury awarded Ms.
Fairbanks damages in the amount of $1,018,409.78—$860,000 in noneconomic damages,
and $158,409.78 in economic damages. The jury apportioned negligence 60% to the State
of Idaho and 40% to Mrs. Galbraith, who was not a party to that case.

B.     The Wyoming Case

[¶7] In Wyoming, Ms. Fairbanks claimed Mrs. Galbraith was negligent. Mrs. Galbraith
initially filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the Idaho
statute of limitations barred Ms. Fairbanks’ lawsuit. The district court converted the
motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and after limited discovery, denied the
motion. Mrs. Galbraith filed a Petition for Writ of Review, which this Court denied.

[¶8] On July 22, 2019, Mrs. Galbraith filed an answer, listing her affirmative defenses.
After several COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 related delays, trial was set for February 27,
2023. On February 8, 2023, Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion to vacate the trial date and on
February 13, 2023, a motion for summary judgment. She argued that Ms. Fairbanks was
collaterally estopped from relitigating issues of negligence and damages and that Idaho’s
statutory noneconomic damage cap applied. After a hearing, the trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Galbraith.

[¶9] Both parties appeal. Ms. Fairbanks argues that collateral estoppel does not apply,
the district court erred in allowing Mrs. Galbraith to assert collateral estoppel late in the
case, and the Idaho damage cap does not apply. In cross-appeal, Mrs. Galbraith contends
that the district court erred when it concluded that the statute of limitations did not apply.
Additional facts relevant to the analysis are discussed below.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶10] Both parties are appealing the district court’s summary judgment rulings.

              “We review a district court’s ruling on summary judgment de
              novo.” Wilcox v. Sec. State Bank, 2023 WY 2, ¶ 26, 523 P.3d

                                              2
             277, 284 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Statzer v. Statzer, 2022 WY
             117, ¶ 10, 517 P.3d 574, 578–79 (Wyo. 2022)). We give no
             deference to the district court’s ruling, evaluate the same
             materials, and apply the same standards as the district court.
             Id.

                    “The record is assessed from the vantage point most
             favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give a party
             opposing summary judgment the benefit of all favorable
             inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record.” Id.
             (quoting Statzer, ¶ 10, 517 P.3d at 579). A material fact is one
             that would establish or refute an essential element of the cause
             of action or defense asserted by the parties. Id. The burdens
             of the respective parties in supporting or opposing summary
             judgment are well established:

                    The party moving for summary judgment bears the
                    burden of establishing a prima facie case and showing
                    there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
                    the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
                    Once that burden is met, the opposing party is obligated
                    to respond with materials beyond the pleadings to show
                    a genuine issue of material fact. When the moving party
                    does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion, it
                    establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment by
                    showing a lack of evidence on an essential element of
                    the opposing party’s claim.

             Id. (quoting Statzer, ¶ 11, 517 P.3d at 579).

Falkenburg v. Laramie Inv. Co., Inc., 2023 WY 78, ¶¶ 5–6, 533 P.3d 511, 514–15 (Wyo.
2023). “Whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo.” Boutelle v. Boutelle, 2014 WY 147, ¶ 7, 337 P.3d 1148, 1151,
(Wyo. 2014) (quoting Inman v. Boykin, 2014 WY 94, ¶ 21, 330 P.3d 275, 281 (Wyo.
2014)).

                                     DISCUSSION

Did the district court properly conclude that Idaho’s statute of limitations was tolled,
such that Ms. Fairbanks’ lawsuit was timely?

[¶11] The accident occurred in Idaho and we apply the Idaho statute of limitations. See
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-117 (LexisNexis 2023) (“If by the laws of the state . . . where the

                                            3
cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this state.”); Boutelle, ¶ 12,
337 P.3d at 1152–53 (When an accident and injuries occur in another state, the cause of
action accrues in that state and pursuant to Wyoming’s borrowing statute, the statute of
limitations to be applied is that of the state where the cause of action accrued.).

[¶12] Idaho has a two-year statute of limitations for “action[s] to recover damages . . . for
an injury to the person[.]” Idaho Code § 5-219 (2024). Idaho tolls the statute when the
complainant is a minor at the time of the occurrence giving rise to the complaint. Idaho
Code § 5-230 (tolling statute of limitations for a “period of [not] more than six (6) years
on account of minority . . .”). Additionally, Idaho tolls the statute for periods of time when
a defendant is absent from the state. Idaho Code § 5-229 provides:

                If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out
                of the state, the action may be commenced within the term
                herein limited, after his return to the state, and if, after the
                cause of action accrues, he departs from the state, the time
                of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
                commencement of the action.

Idaho Code § 5-229 (2024) (emphasis added). 1

[¶13] It is undisputed that the two-year statute of limitations was tolled during Ms.
Fairbanks’ minority and began to run on her eighteenth birthday, August 14, 2016. See
Idaho Code § 32-101 (defining the age of majority to be eighteen years of age). It is also
undisputed that Mrs. Galbraith was absent from the State of Wyoming for a total of 86 days
between August 14, 2016, and August 14, 2018. Ms. Fairbanks filed this lawsuit on August
22, 2018.

[¶14] Based on its interpretation of Idaho caselaw addressing the tolling of the statute of
limitations, the district court ruled that under Idaho Code § 5-229, time was tolled for the
days that Mrs. Galbraith was absent from Wyoming. The district court found:

                22. This Court is obligated under Tetzlaff[2] to agree with
                Plaintiff. Plaintiff has shown that Defendant was out of Idaho
                [Wyoming] for 86 days during the limitations period and some
                of those days included international travel. Those facts are not
                contested. Plaintiff has also provided the competent affidavit
                of her process server who explains the difficulties of using
1
  In our application of this statute here we consider days absent from Wyoming, as we are applying Idaho
law to this lawsuit brought in Wyoming.
2
  Tetzlaff v. Brooks, 950 P.2d 1242, 1243 (Idaho 1997) (“We reaffirm that this statute tolls the running of a
statute of limitations only when the party against whom the claim is made was out of the state and during
that time could not have been located for service of process with reasonably diligent efforts.”).

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              long-arm jurisdiction to serve a party while travelling out of
              state or out of the country, due to the lack of information
              regarding travel plans and lodging details that would be needed
              for services of process.

[¶15] On appeal, Mrs. Galbraith argues that the district court improperly determined that
the statute of limitations was tolled for the time she was out of the state because she was
present when the cause of action accrued, and Ms. Fairbanks failed to establish that she
exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and serve Mrs. Galbraith. Ms.
Fairbanks contends the district court properly applied Idaho Code § 5-229 and that her
lawsuit was timely.

[¶16] The Idaho courts have examined the application of § 5-229 on several occasions.
We note that their interpretation of § 5-229 has evolved and over time the Idaho courts
have been more reluctant to toll a statute of limitations when a defendant could be served
using Idaho’s long-arm statute. Compare Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 536 P.2d 291, 294
(Idaho 1975) (“the purpose of I.C. § 5-229 was to prevent the running of the statute of
limitations during the time the defendant was unavailable for service of process because he
was absent from the state”), with Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 963 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Idaho
1998) (“Where jurisdiction over a defendant may be had under the ‘long-arm statute,’ the
defendant is not absent from the state within the meaning of I.C. § 5-229.”), and Butterfield
v. MacKenzie, 966 P.2d 658 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (holding that sending two letters and
inquiring about the defendant’s whereabouts did not constitute reasonable efforts sufficient
to toll the statute of limitations under I.C. § 5-229).

[¶17] In Tetzlaff, two Idaho residents were involved in an automobile accident. The
plaintiff filed suit two years and seven days after the accident occurred. Tetzlaff v. Brooks,
950 P.2d 1242, 1243 (Idaho 1997). The defendant moved to dismiss claiming the statute
of limitations had run. Id. The plaintiff contended that “the absent from the state
exception” in Idaho Code § 5-229 applied, and because the defendant was out of the state
for a total of at least eleven days during the two years following the accident, the lawsuit
was timely filed. Id. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the claim. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that § 5-229 of the Idaho Code “tolls the running of a statute of
limitations only when the party against whom the claim is made was out of the state and
during that time could not have been located for service of process with reasonably diligent
efforts.” Id. Because the plaintiff “made no effort to demonstrate that while [the
defendant] was outside the state he could not have been located for service of process with
reasonably diligent efforts,” the court found the statute had not been tolled and affirmed
the dismissal. Id. at 1244.

[¶18] Following Tetzlaff, the Idaho Court of Appeals considered Idaho Code § 5-229 in
Butterfield. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Butterfield loaned money to Ms. MacKenzie.
Butterfield, 966 P.2d at 659. The promissory note stated that the loan was “due and payable

                                              5
April 15, 1990.” Id. In the fall of 1990, Ms. MacKenzie moved to Ventura, California,
and never returned to Idaho. Id. In May 1991, Mrs. Butterfield wrote to Ms. MacKenzie
asking for repayment of the loan. This letter was returned as undelivered. Id. A month
later, the Butterfields received a letter from Ms. MacKenzie postmarked June 25, 1991,
assuring them the loan would be repaid. Id. In March 1996, the Butterfields learned that
Ms. MacKenzie had moved to Jackson, Wyoming. They, then, sent her two certified letters
to two different Jackson mailing addresses. Both letters were returned, for different
reasons, one as “unclaimed” and the other as “delivery ‘attempted.’” Id. at 659–60. On
April 25, 1997, the Butterfields sued Ms. MacKenzie seeking recovery of the loan and
interest. Id. at 660. Ms. MacKenzie filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Idaho’s five-year
statute of limitations had run. Id. The district court converted the motion to one for
summary judgment and granted it. Id.

[¶19] The appellate court recognized that “during the relevant time period [from April 16,
1990, to April 16, 1995, but certainly no later than June 25, 1996, five years from the date
of Ms. MacKenzie’s last letter acknowledging the debt,] the Butterfields sent two letters
and talked to people around their home town.” Butterfield, 966 P.2d at 661. The court
concluded that “[t]his does not establish the reasonable diligence required to toll the statute
of limitations” under I.C. § 5-229. Id. The court reasoned:

                     The vast majority of cases hold that a statutory
              provision tolling the statute of limitations during the time
              a defendant is absent from the state has a direct reference
              to the inability of the plaintiff to secure service of process
              on such defendant. Thus, as long as service of process by
              some method can be had, the statute is not tolled,
              notwithstanding a defendant’s absence. See State ex rel.
              McGhee v. District Ct., 162 Mont. 31, 508 P.2d 130, 132
              (1973); Summerrise v. Stephens, 75 Wash. 2d 808, 454 P.2d
              224, 227–28 (1969). This principle “works to encourage
              potential plaintiffs to diligently utilize long-arm provisions,
              and prevents claims from becoming more stale than necessary
              by penalizing plaintiffs who do not invoke long-arm
              procedures.” Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 609, 570 P.2d
              284, 287 (1977).

                      In her affidavit, MacKenzie asserted that after leaving
              Ventura, California in July of 1992, she resided continuously
              in Jackson, Wyoming with a given mailing post office box; that
              she always left a forwarding address when leaving one location
              or residence and that she had never tried to conceal her identity
              or whereabouts. The Butterfields undertook no attempt to
              make contact with MacKenzie from May of 1991 to June 25,

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              1996. There is nothing in the record to suggest that MacKenzie
              could not have been located for service of process, under the
              Idaho long-arm statute (I.C. § 5-514), with reasonably diligent
              efforts.

Butterfield, 966 P.2d at 662 (emphasis added).

[¶20] To toll the statute of limitations, Tetzlaff and Butterfield require more than absence
from the state. A plaintiff must also prove that reasonable efforts were made to locate a
defendant and that service of process could not have been accomplished.

[¶21] The record here establishes that Ms. Fairbanks made no effort to locate Mrs.
Galbraith during the relevant time period. In her answer to interrogatories, Mrs. Galbraith
indicated she was absent from the State of Wyoming for a total of 86 days during the
limitations period. Approximately 16 of those days included international travel to Turkey,
Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. In his affidavit, Mr. Bontecou, a private investigator and process
server, testified as follows:

              Based on my experience trying to effect service of process on
              an individual who travels as extensively as the Defendant and
              her family does can be at best logistically difficult and often
              prohibitively expensive.

                      Trying to effect service of process on a Defendant who
              is traveling is simply not practical. As process servers we do
              not have legal access to travel information such as plane
              reservations, car rental or hotel reservations. Trying to serve
              the Defendant during their trips out of state would have been
              impossible.

                      Trying to effect service during their overseas travel of
              course would have been equaly [sic] impossible. In addition
              to not having access to travel information such as plane
              reservations, car rental or hotel reservations we do not have
              access to passport and State Department records that may
              provide certain travel information. Even if we did have
              specific travel information, trying to effect service on a U.S.
              citizen in a foreign country is time consuming and could not be
              accomplished during the short time that the Defendant was in
              Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Jordan.

Our review of Idaho law leads us to conclude that general evidence of potential difficulties
of service, absent any effort to locate the defendant, is insufficient to toll the statute of

                                             7
limitations. Mr. Bontecou’s affidavit falls short. It is an after-the-fact look at Mrs.
Galbraith’s absences and addresses only generalized difficulties of serving a party absent
from the state. It does not reflect any actual effort to locate or serve Mrs. Galbraith.
Accordingly, under Idaho law, the statute of limitations was not tolled while Mrs. Galbraith
was absent from Wyoming. It ran on August 14, 2018, two years after Ms. Fairbanks’
eighteenth birthday. The Complaint, filed on August 22, 2018, was not timely.

                                     CONCLUSION

[¶22] Because Ms. Fairbanks made no effort to locate Mrs. Galbraith during the time Mrs.
Galbraith was out of the state, the statute of limitations was not tolled. Ms. Fairbanks’
lawsuit was time-barred. We reverse the district court’s decision denying Mrs. Galbraith’s
motion for summary judgment.

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