Court Opinion

ID: 9626934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:28:21.314583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:36.512729
License: Public Domain

ORIE MELVIN, J.,
dissenting:
I believe appellant’s conduct clearly constituted a threat and therefore violated the trial court’s order. Furthermore, I believe the majority’s holding eviscerates the purpose and goals of the Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6118.
The issue in this case is whether appellant violated the PFA order by stating, “I’m going to kill this bitch.” The majority engages in a discussion of what constitutes a threat only to conclude, what is exceedingly obvious, that the instant statement “can be viewed as threatening in nature.” Despite this ac-knowledgement, the majority maintains that such a threat is permissible “as long as it did not occur in the plaintiff’s presence or place her in fear.” Based on the common and ordinary meaning of the word “threat” and the purposes the PFA Act was designed to advance, I believe it is clear that the presence of the victim or a communication to the victim is unnecessary.
The majority finds that appellant’s conviction for contempt cannot be sustained because the PFA order in question was not definite, clear, specific and left doubt in the mind of appellant as to the conduct prohibited. Specifically, the majority maintains the term “threatening” found in the order can be interpreted as prohibiting a threatening statement which merely referred to the plaintiff, Ms. Naeemah Banks, or where such a statement is made in her presence or in some manner subject her to fear. Therefore, because the majority believes the order did not clearly and specifically preclude the conduct exhibited by appellant, it vacates his contempt conviction.
The PFA order provided that appellant “shall refrain from abusing, harassing, threatening and stalking the Plaintiff or placing her in fear of abuse in any place where she may be found.” (emphasis added). The order does not require that appellant refrain from directly threatening Ms. Banks. In fact, because the above sentence is in the disjunctive, a reasonable interpretation of the phrase “in any place where she may be found” only refers to the prohibition against placing Ms. Banks in fear of abuse. Appellant was served with a PFA order which prohibited him from threatening Ms. Banks. Yet moments after he received the order, he felt it necessary to express his intention to kill her while still in the presence of the deputies. I believe it would be clear to any reasonable individual that such egregious conduct is prohibited by the court’s order. Further, such conduct is an affront to the court’s authority for which criminal contempt sanctions are appropriate. Therefore, I must disagree with the majority.
I find appellant’s statement, “I’m going to kill this bitch,” certainly falls within a reasonable person’s ordinary understanding of what was prohibited by the order. I read the instant order to mean that a threat occurs when one utters words which are intended to convey a desire to inflict physical or other harm to the person the order was intended to protect and these words are communicated to *724someone. See United States v. Baish, 460 A.2d 38 (D.C.1983) (adopting such a definition of “threat” in the context of the offense of making threats to do bodily harm.); State v. Alston, 75 Haw. 517, 865 P.2d 157 (Haw.1994) (rejecting defendant’s claim- that threatening cannot occur if the threat is never communicated to the intended victim and holding that an intention to inflict harm may be conveyed to a third party to constitute a threat). In this case, the threat was communicated to the deputies. Furthermore, the absence of a requirement that the expression be communicated to the victim is consistent with the purpose and intent of the PFA Act.
As noted by the majority, the PFA Act is a vanguard measure designed to deal with the problems of domestic abuse. Cipolla v. Cipolla, 264 Pa.Super. 53, 398 A.2d 1053, 1054 n. 1 (Pa.Super.1979). The primary goal of the Act is to advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse. Snyder v. Snyder, 427 Pa.Super. 494, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa.Super.1993). Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 340 Pa.Super. 552, 490 A.2d 918, 922 (Pa.Super.1985); see Lee v. Carney, 435 Pa.Super. 405, 645 A.2d 1363, 1364 (Pa.Super.1994) (purpose of Act is to protect victims of domestic violence from the perpetrators of such abuse); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (Pa.Super.1987) (goal of the Act is to provide immediate protection from the threat of physical violence). In Eichenlaub, our Court quoted with approval the trial court’s reflections as to the Act’s purpose as applied to contempt proceedings under the Act:
The emergency nature of the judicial process pursuant to the Protection from Abuse Act requires that this Court act swiftly to prevent continued abuse and deal with contempt situations in an expeditious manner lest the violation giving rise to the contempt become a criminal action for homicide. Faced with life and death situations, this Court must utilize its expertise in such matters to enforce its orders without the time delay in a jury trial.
Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d at 922, quoting slip op. of trial court at 11.
I believe it is necessary to interpret and define the term “threat” in light of the PFA Act’s purpose. The purpose of imposing contempt sanctions for a violation of a PFA order forbidding one from threatening another is to prevent the ultimate harm such threats foretell. Therefore, once an individual, who is subject to such an order and who is given notice of its contents, has announced his intention to kill, I believe it is clear and would be clear to any person a violation of the order has occurred.
In this case, immediately after he was served and while in the presence of law enforcement officers, appellant uttered an intention to kill a woman the PFA order explicitly intended to protect. Under the majority’s holding, law enforcement officers in similar circumstances would be restricted until a threat is communicated to the intended victim. Only then would it be sufficiently clear that threatening has occurred to constitute a violation of the order. To allow law enforcement officers to stand idly by while a person expresses his intent to kill because the intended victim is not present or has not yet been informed of his intent is absurd and in total contradiction of the Act’s purpose to prevent imminent harm. Under the majority’s rationale, if after hearing appellant’s statement the deputies immediately telephoned Ms. Banks and informed her of what they heard only then would appellant’s statement constitute a threat. Thus, law enforcement officials would be required to inform the intended victim before they could take any action. This is contrary to the Act’s purpose of reacting to early signs of abuse and preventing more serious abuse from occurring. The Act’s numerous provisions enable courts to respond quickly and flexibly to advance warnings of abuse. Snyder, 629 A.2d at 981. Requiring courts to fashion PFA orders so as to distinguish every conceivable type of conduct that is prohibited would not allow law enforcement officers to respond quickly to advance warnings of abuse and would eliminate a tool for combating domestic violence.
While it is true appellant in this case was incarcerated at the time he was served with the PFA order, this fact does not eliminate the existence of a threat because Ms. Banks was not in imminent danger. First, the rec*725ord does not indicate, nor have the attorneys provided any indication when appellant was to be released. He very well may have been able to carry out his threat against Ms. Banks shortly after he made the statement. Second, the expression of an intention to do harm is the violation of the order and does not require the present ability to carry out the threats. See Commonwealth v. Ashford, 268 Pa.Super. 225, 407 A.2d 1328 (Pa.Super.1979) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that violation of the terroristic threats statute was not established because he was handcuffed and unable to carry out his threats against police officers). The fact appellant could not immediately kill Ms. Banks after he expressed his intention to do so does not eliminate the fact he made a threat. Finally, even if appellant was to remain in the York County Prison for an extended period of time, his expression of intention to kill Ms. Banks was an early sign of abuse to which the deputies reacted. Consequently, his statement constituted a threat and was a violation of the PFA order.
While inroads have been made in the judicial arena through PFA orders to protect victims and punish batterers, the majority opinion defeats the efforts targeted by these legal solutions. Victims of domestic abuse inherently rely on indirect criminal contempt sanctions as a remedy for violations of the PFA Act. The contempt road empowers abused victims and helps them escape from the violence. Taking away the force of contempt powers as the majority has done strips away from victims of domestic abuse protection from their abusers. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.