Court Opinion

ID: 9479777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:28:53.460401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:16.583416
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Although I am doubtful that the City can press its claims against Monsanto successfully, I certainly believe it has stated a cause of action. In my view, the district *618court erred when it dismissed the City’s nuisance and abnormally dangerous activity claims for failure to assert Monsanto’s “authority or actual physical control to direct the use or disposal of its product past the point of sale.” Appellant’s App. at 4. I do not agree that a defendant must have the “final say” over the disposition of the harmful agent in order to face liability under either a nuisance or an abnormally dangerous activity theory of recovery. This is not the law under the Restatement, nor the law of Indiana (which in large measure follows the Restatement).1 Instead, the operative concept (and the one generic to the law of tort) is that of “participation.” See MacMillan Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp., 495 F.Supp. 1134, 1146 (D.Vt.1980) (applying “the basic common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in, or furthers a tortious act, is jointly and severally liable with the prime tortfeasor.”); see generally S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. Gans, 1 The American Law of Torts § 3:4 (1983).2
It is clear from the language of section 834 of the Restatement that a plaintiff need show only that the defendant “participate[d] to a substantial extent” in carrying on the nuisance-causing activity. See Massachusetts v. Pace, 616 F.Supp. 815, 821 (D.Mass.1985) (following section 834); Page County Appliance Center v. Honeywell, 347 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 The majority evidently concedes this point, see majority op. at 614 & n. 5, yet nevertheless approves the district court’s application of non-Indiana precedent, created by federal district courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction, to support the proposition that the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s “authority or actual physical control” over the nuisance-causing agent. See id. at 614 n. 4. Those cases conflict with the Restatement and, I believe, with Indiana law.4
*619In Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), unfortunately the only Indiana case from which we can draw guidance on this issue, the Indiana Court of Appeals for the First District explicitly embraced and applied the Restatement’s test for abnormally dangerous activities.5 The court reiterated a pronouncement by the Indiana Supreme Court that sections 519 and 520 must be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 853 (emphasis added). The district court in this case did not even attempt to apply the section 520 test to Westinghouse’s PCB disposal practices, finding that Monsanto could not in any event be held liable because it lacked “authority or actual physical control” over the PCBs bought from it by Westinghouse. While a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must sometimes predict the course of state law where the law is unclear, it cannot be seriously disputed that a federal court must follow unambiguous state law. In the case before us, the district court eschewed clear Indiana precedent adopting section 520 and instead created its own criteria, without any basis in Indiana law, for assessing the adequacy of the City’s abnormally dangerous activity claim.
In response to the dissent, the majority seems to suggest that “participation” and “control” amount to the same thing. The important difference, it seems to me, is that a manufacturer almost by definition cannot “control” the product past the point of sale and is therefore automatically exculpated from liability for any event after the sale. With some possible exceptions, a manufacturer also does not “participate” in the creation of a nuisance or the carrying on of an abnormally dangerous activity merely by selling a product.6 A manufacturer may, however, otherwise “participate” extensively in events subsequent to the sale and could very well incur liability under that test. Here, indeed, there are extensive allegations of the manufacturer's efforts to affect the disposition of the product after sale. I think it is entirely possible that even under the appropriate test the City's allegations would not survive summary judgment, whether because Westinghouse’s disposal practices were not abnormally dangerous under section 520, or because Monsanto’s “participation” in those practices was insufficient to justify liability or because of other difficulties in showing causation. But surely the City is entitled to a determination of its claims under a proper application of Indiana tort law.
It seems to me that, on the basis of the majority opinion, sellers of toxic chemicals and other dangerous substances, simply by virtue of their commercial status, become insulated from any liability — except that cognizable under a negligence or a products liability theory — beyond the point of sale for any of their activities occurring either before or after the sale. Just because Monsanto’s activities here are arguably benign is not a good reason to insulate from liability all manufacturer activity, whether benign or not. This seems to me a potentially dangerous precedent, one incon*620sistent with Indiana law and one from which I must respectfully dissent.

. The Indiana nuisance statute states that "[wjhatever is injurious to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance, and the subject of an action.” Ind.Code Ann. § 34-1-52-1 (Burns 1986).
Indiana follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 519, in its definition of “abnormally dangerous activity." See Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). Section 519 provides:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.

. It also appears clear that a showing of participation is all that is needed to maintain a cause of action in trespass against a defendant. Sections 875 and 876 of the Restatement conclude that concert of action liability may be applied to any action in tort. The authors of the Restatement did withhold an opinion as to whether a concert of action theory would be available in tort claims not requiring a showing of intent or fault. Nevertheless, logic, together with the substantial development of tort law during the years since the Restatement was published, seems to validate recognition of concert of action theories in all types of tort actions.

. In its reply to the dissent, the majority observes that the New Hampshire nuisance law at issue in both City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., 637 F.Supp. 646 (D.R.I.1986), and Town of Hooksett School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F.Supp. 126 (D.N.H.1984), is quite similar to the language of the Indiana statute, cited purely for convenience supra, at note 1 of this dissent. Likewise, the Iowa nuisance statute virtually replicates the language of the Indiana law. See Iowa Code ch. 657.1 (West 1987). Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court adheres to Restatement section 834. See Page County Appliance Center, 347 N.W.2d at 176. Since these statutes merely define nuisance and do not speak in any way to the applicability of section 834, I do not perceive the relevance which the majority attaches to the similarity between the Indiana and New Hampshire nuisance provisions.

. The majority also errs in saying that the "uncontested record shows that when alerted to the risks associated with PCBs, Monsanto made every effort to have Westinghouse dispose of the chemicals safely.” Majority op. at 614. This point is not “uncontested" because the City hotly disagrees as to the “immediacy” with which Monsanto informed its customers of the hazards of PCBs and questions Monsanto's even longer delay in imparting its knowledge to the City. The City also disputes Monsanto’s claims of *619good faith in implementing its PCB disposal program.

. Section 520 of the Restatement sets out the factors which a court must consider in determining whether a particular activity is abnormally dangerous. Those factors are:
(a) Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of another;
(b) Likelihood that the harm that results from [the activity] will be great;
(c) Inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) Extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) Inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f)Extent to which its value to the community is out-weighed by its dangerous attributes.

. Of course, the sale of an inherently or unreasonably dangerous product may expose a manufacturer to strict liability on a theory of products liability. Given the reach of products liability law, most courts would doubtless resist the creation of an identical cause of action under the rubric of "abnormally dangerous activity." However, the City explicitly disclaims that it has ever sought recovery against Monsanto on a products liability theory. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 19. Rather, the City argues that ”[a]s an aggressive participant in disposal and discharge activities, Monsanto shares responsibility and liability for injury caused by those activities.” Id. (emphasis added).