Court Opinion

ID: 9616571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:47:47.409277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.897327
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
dissenting.
I joined the earlier opinion of the court in this case reported in 232 Ga. 430 (207 SE2d 66), but cannot agree that the present appeal has been correctly decided in the majority opinion.
The first appeal was from the grant of a summary judgment to defendants Blackwell and Poole and a denial of a summary judgment to plaintiffs Haynes. The order of the trial court, reviewed in that appeal, expressly provided that the trial judge did not consider the consequences of a subsequent transfer of the land in question from Blackwell and Poole to Perimeter Development Corporation or the later conveyance of the land by security deed from Perimeter to the Gwinnett County Bank. Neither Perimeter nor the bank had filed any motions for summary judgment at that time.
We reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Poole and Blackwell, holding that an issue of fact remained as to whether the first conveyance on April 3, 1972, from the Haynes (the plaintiffs) to Blackwell and Poole, was a sale or a loan. The rights of Perimeter and the bank were not in issue in the first appeal. However, there is some language in this court’s opinion in the first appeal which indicates that Perimeter and the bank took the *444land subject to any equity that the plaintiffs Haynes could present since the Haynes had remained in possession of the land after conveying it to Blackwell and Poole and no actual inquiry had been made of them as to any interest they might still claim in the land.
Upon the return of the case to the trial court following the first appeal, Perimeter and the bank moved for the first time for summary judgment and supported their motions by showing a complete absence of notice of any loan, real, or otherwise, between the plaintiffs (Haynes) and Blackwell and Poole, to whom the plaintiffs transferred the land on April 3, 1972, by warranty deed.
Nevertheless, the trial court denied the motions for summary judgment filed by Perimeter and the bank because of the dicta in this court’s opinion in the first appeal. I would reverse the judgment in the present appeal because I believe it is erroneous and the issue presented was not decided in the first appeal. In my opinion, the question presented is controlled by the principles stated in Malette v. Wright, 120 Ga. 735, 741 (48 SE 229), and an application of the provisions of Code § 37-111. The record in this appeal makes it quite clear to me that Perimeter and the bank are transferees for value without actual or constructive notice of any equitable interest which the plaintiffs Haynes now claim they retained when they conveyed this property by warranty deed to Blackwell and Poole on April 3,1972. Thus, under my view, the law requires that Perimeter and the bank be granted summary judgments in their favor.