Court Opinion

ID: 9794171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:00:45.076647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:39.104216
License: Public Domain

Judge JONES
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The chickens merely mentioned by Judge Tursi in his special concurrence in People v. Seigler, 832 P.2d 980 (Colo.App.1991), have, it seems, come home to roost in this case.
Judge Tursi noted that because the culpable mental state of second degree murder, § 18-3-103, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), and of heat of passion manslaughter, § 18-3-104(l)(c), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), is the same, namely, “knowingly,” it would operate in the interests of fundamental fairness to inform the jury, whether by instruction or by special interrogatory, of the mitigating ña-tee of heat of passion manslaughter, vis-a-vis, second degree murder. He further noted that the applicable pattern jury instructions, COLJI-Crim. No. 9:05 and No. 9:08 (1983), and the general instructions given to the jury failed to address the mitigating nature of the lesser charge as to the greater.
Finally, he realistically predicted that once a jury has found the “knowingly” mens rea element, “there is little reason or incentive for it to consider whether the prosecution has proven the element of heat of passion necessary for a verdict of manslaughter.” People v. Seigler, supra, at 985.
Judge Tursi’s prescience has been rewarded, dubiously, in this case. Here, for the same reasons he mentioned in Seigler, not only did the jury have no reason or incentive to go beyond the mens rea element which applies to both the greater and the lesser charges, but the prosecution also proclaimed to the jury that it had not proven the heat of passion manslaughter charge. Thus, the jury had a double incentive to avoid searching the evidence for mitigation to the second degree murder in the form of heat of passion and, I believe, placed the defendant in the position of having had to carry the burden of proof as to the lesser charge.
Here, unlike the case in Seigler, the prosecution obviously hoped that, if it had not proven first degree murder, it had, at least, shown the culpable mental state of “knowingly” as to second degree murder. Thus, it did not wish to have the jury focus on the proof of that mental state as to the charge of heat of passion manslaughter. And, in stating affirmatively, under these circumstances, that heat of passion manslaughter charge had not been proven, while arguing that, indeed, the culpable mental state necessary for proof of that charge had been proven, I believe that the prosecution did transfer the burden of proof as to heat of passion manslaughter to the defendant.
Thus, I write to express my belief that it is now time, in the interests of justice and fundamental fairness, to instruct the jurors in these cases, in some appropriate form, that once they have found that the defendant acted in accordance with the requisite mens rea of “knowingly,” as to both second degree murder and heat of passion manslaughter, they must then examine the evidence to determine whether those actions mitigate the murder to manslaughter.
Our supreme court has recognized that, in promulgating § 18-3-104(l)(c), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), the General Assembly intended that “murder is mitigated to manslaughter,” if a defendant’s homicidal acts were a result of “sudden passion” caused by “a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim.” Coston v. People, 633 P.2d 470, 473 (Colo.1981) (emphasis in original). See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 66 (2d ed. 1969). I believe that this interpretation of § 18-3-104(l)(c) expresses the legal basis as to why juries should be informed, as the General Assembly established, of the mitigating nature of heat of passion manslaughter.
I would respectfully assert that in every case in which there is sufficient evidence to *158instruct on second degree murder and also to instruct as to heat of passion manslaughter, the jury should be presented with a special interrogatory on which it is directed to answer the question: Was the act, or series of acts, causing death knowingly committed? If the answer is “yes,” it would then answer the question: Was the act, or series of acts, causing the death performed upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the person who performed the killing sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person?
If the answer to the second question is “yes” it would then answer the question: Between the provocation and the killing was there an interval sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard?
The jurors would then be instructed that if they answer the first two questions “yes” and the third question “no,” they must find the defendant guilty of heat of passion manslaughter, unless they also find from the evidence that any defense to that charge is applicable.
An interrogatory, or instruction similarly structured, such as this, would simply and directly inform the jury that, under certain circumstances, murder may be mitigated to manslaughter. Additionally, the absence of reasons, or disincentives, to search the evidence for the mitigating nature of heat of passion manslaughter would be negated.
Here, given the unusual nature of the circumstances leading to the homicide, I believe that had the jury had the benefit of the statement of law such as in the proposed interrogatory and supporting instructions, it might have convicted the defendant of manslaughter and not of second degree murder.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.