Court Opinion

ID: 9681148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:44:36.704104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:21.111133
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. It is not often that a justice has to defend a dissenting opinion, but that is what I am called upon to do. Three concurring opinions filed in this case are actually in response to a dissent three of us made in Asher v. State, 300 Ark. 57, 776 S.W.2d 816 (1989) (Hickman, J., dissenting). So the reader who is interested in this discourse should probably read that dissenting opinion first. It best states my views regarding the speedy trial rule. Before responding to my colleagues, it is necessary first to see what occurred in this case. The trial judge dismissed murder charges against Tipton when twelve months had elapsed without a trial. The state appeals that ruling and the majority dismisses the appeal as a matter not prejudicial to the state and the uniform administration of justice. Nothing could be more wrong as demonstrated by the sharp dispute we have over our so-called speedy trial rule, its application and its future. The facts of the case are unique. We do not know exactly why the trial judge dismissed the charge. No memorandum was entered in this case as there was in Key v. State, 300 Ark. 66, 776 S.W.2d 820 (1989), which would explain what happened. The record is simply silent on any argument made to the court or the. reason for the court’s decision. The state’s motion for a continuance was granted in November of 1988 evidently because a key prosecution witness could not attend the trial on the scheduled date. This was a valid reason for delay. The prosecution represented the motion for a continuance as a joint motion, which was not the case. In an October 27 letter to the deputy prosecutor, the defense counsel refused to join the motion, while admitting that it might be to Tipton’s advantage that the doctor not appear. Whether the prosecution’s misrepresentation was intentional or otherwise is irrelevant to the state’s right to a continuance and to an excludable period for the witness’ unavailability. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (“a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.”) Just prior to Tipton’s January, 1989, motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the state moved that the period from November 1988 to the March 1989 term of court be excluded from the speedy trial computation. The state’s motion also mentioned the illness of the presiding judge which had evidently caused some docket congestion. Perhaps the trial judge felt that since we have not recognized illness of the judge as a good reason for delay, it could not be considered in this case. See Novak v. State, 294 Ark. 120, 741 S.W.2d 243 (1987). Even so, the judge did not address those questions; he simply dismissed the charge without explanation. Since the record shows nothing to dispute the state’s claim that the witness was critical and unavailable, I find no basis for dismissal. If the deputy prosecutor misled the court, he should be disciplined. Regardless, the defendant should have to answer to the state for taking a life. He did not ask for a speedy trial, nor has he demonstrated any prejudice. The people are entitled to their day in court. My colleagues, in their concurring opinions, make a good deal of noise and smoke but miss the point. The question is not whether we should have a speedy trial rule, but whether it should make sense. They are content to continue upholding a rule and our decisions interpreting that rule which create a legal trick allowing criminal defendants to avoid trial. They walk free on a genuine legal technicality. Ironically, the rule is called the speedy trial rule, and a defendant can avoid trial by simply laying low for a year and then crying “speedy trial” all the time, of course, not wanting a speedy trial. That is the perversion of the law which I addressed in the dissent in the Asher case. The rule is defended because we have had it for some time, because the United States Supreme Court does not prohibit our rule, and because it makes trial judges and prosecutors pay attention to their business. That concedes it has little relation to the constitutional principle at issue. It is suggested that it would be too difficult to draft a rule to discipline prosecutors and trial judges who neglect their duties, and the best way to prompt them is to free criminals. Nonsense. This court loves to make rules. It makes criminal rules, civil rules, appellate rules, supreme court rules, trial court rules, ethical rules for lawyers and judges, rules for court reporters, rules for bar admission, legal specialization, legal education, and rules of evidence. Am I to believe that we cannot draft and enforce a rule to make judges and prosecutors move cases? The question is not whether we should have a rule, but whether it should have any sensible relation to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Should a defendant, if he wants a speedy trial, be made to ask at some time for a speedy trial in order to avail himself of that right? The concurring judges say no. Should a defendant merely have to show how he might be prejudiced and indeed denied any of his rights by the fact he has not been promptly brought to trial? The concurring justices say no. That is the part of the rule and our decisions that make no sense. In Barker v. Wingo, supra, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the matters of prejudice and a defendant’s obligation to assert his right: We think the better rule is that the defendant’s assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right. Regarding prejudice to the defendant, the court said: A fourth factor is prejudice . . . assessed in light of the interests of the defendant which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. The old saw that it might not be a good rule but it has been around for a long time, and we unanimously approved the change, is added to the arguments to defend the rule. The principle of stare decisis is no excuse for upholding a decision that is indefensible. Any time we find we have made a mistake we should correct it at the first opportunity. Who would be prejudiced if we closed this legal loophole and removed this legal trick? No person will be denied a speedy trial if he asks for it; no charges will remain if he is denied a fair trial because of delay. Isn’t that what the constitution means? This court has not been averse to overruling decisions that have stood for many years. Established precedent was rejected in Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Cowger, 295 Ark. 250, 748 S.W.2d 332 (1988); Midgett v. State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987); Walker v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 291 Ark. 43, 722 S.W.2d 558 (1987); and City of Hot Springs v. Creviston, 288 Ark. 286, 705 S.W.2d 415 (1986). It has never been adverse to changing rules; we do it all the time. See Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark. 55, 771 S.W.2d 266 (1989). The opportunity to overrule precedent was declined in Southwest Ark. Communications Inc. v. Arrington, 296 Ark. 141, 753 S.W.2d 267 (1988); Davis v. Cox, 268 Ark. 78, 593 S.W.2d 180 (1980). I can only suppose my fellow justices are sincere in defending a policy and a rule because they deem it right and just. I happen to disagree.