Court Opinion

ID: 9374048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:16:50.45197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:44.263337
License: Public Domain

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22-P-21                                             Appeals Court

           IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN P. URBAN.

                             No. 22-P-21.

        Plymouth.      November 1, 2022. – February 13, 2023.

            Present:   Wolohojian, Ditkoff, & Walsh, JJ.

Probate Court, Appeal. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment,
     Presumptions and burden of proof, Deposition. Undue
     Influence. Will, Undue influence, Testamentary capacity,
     Validity.

     Petitions for probate of a will filed in the Plymouth
County Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on
April 1 and July 29, 2019.

     The cases were heard by Edward F. Donnelly, Jr., J., on
motions for summary judgment.

     William F. Spallina for Michelle Finnegan.
     Robert F. Callahan, Jr., for The John P. Urban Scholarship
Fund.

     DITKOFF, J.    Michelle Finnegan appeals from decrees

allowing the petition of the attorney for the decedent, John P.

Urban, to probate Urban's May 3, 2016, will (2016 will), and

dismissing Finnegan's competing petition to probate as a will an
                                                                        2

agreement for payment of services dated September 24, 2016.        We

conclude that the burden of showing undue influence remains with

the objector where, as here, a fiduciary holding a power of

attorney does not intrude on the attorney-client relationship

with an estate attorney that yields the will.     With that

understanding, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of

material fact concerning whether the 2016 will, which was

produced by independent legal counsel, was the result of undue

influence.   We further conclude that there is no genuine issue

of material fact whether Urban possessed testamentary capacity

when he signed the 2016 will.

    Turning to the other issues, we conclude that the judge

correctly determined that the summary judgment record showed, as

a matter of law, that Finnegan's agreement for payment of

services (2016 agreement) (even if it constituted a will) was

the product of undue influence.     Finally, concluding that the

judge acted within his discretion in striking a transcript of

answers by a witness that was obtained outside a deposition with

notice to the other parties, we affirm.

    1.   Background.   a.   Urban's relationship with Finnegan.

"We recite the material facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party."   Docos v. John Moriarty & Assocs., 78 Mass.

App. Ct. 638, 639 (2011).   In the 1990s, Finnegan moved to

Naples, Florida with her parents.    Shortly thereafter, she was
                                                                     3

introduced to Urban, at the time in his mid-seventies.      For

nearly twenty years, Urban lived in a guest house behind

Finnegan's parents' home during the winter months and spent the

rest of the year in Massachusetts.

    For many years, Finnegan maintained a close relationship

with Urban, who would die without a surviving spouse,

descendants, siblings, or siblings' descendants.    Urban

frequently ate meals with the Finnegans and went to classical

music concerts with Finnegan's parents.    Urban regularly went to

church with the Finnegans and joined Finnegan's uncle for

Christmas dinner.

    b.   The wills.   Prior to the execution of the 2016 will,

Urban signed three similar wills.    Their manner of drafting and

execution is important to understanding the issues here.

    Urban, his close friend, Dr. Geoff Emerson,1 and Attorney

Daniel Singleton were all members of the Cohasset Golf Club.       In

2012, while Dr. Emerson was present, Urban expressed to Attorney

Singleton that he "needed to make a will."    Attorney Singleton

made an appointment to meet with Urban.

    1  Although Attorney Singleton and Dr. Emerson were
acquaintances, Attorney Singleton and his wife "never socialized
with Dr. and Mrs. Emerson." Attorney Singleton did not perform
any legal work for the Emersons until after Urban died.
                                                                   4

     At some point in 2012 or 2013, Dr. Emerson drove Urban to

Attorney Singleton's office, but Attorney Singleton and Urban

met alone, whereupon Urban "went through a whole list of people

who . . . he wanted to leave money to."   On June 19, 2013,2

Dr. Emerson drove Urban to Attorney Singleton's office, and then

Urban met privately with Attorney Singleton to review the will.

Urban executed the will; two people who worked in Attorney

Singleton's office building served as disinterested witnesses.

The will provided for sixteen beneficiaries, including Finnegan

and her parents and sister, Dr. Emerson and his wife, Middlebury

College, and the John P. Urban Scholarship Fund (scholarship

fund), to be created upon Urban's death for the purpose of

providing scholarships to local high school students for college

expenses.

     In 2014, Urban was diagnosed with dementia.   That same

year, Dr. Emerson called Attorney Singleton and indicated that

Urban wished to change his will.   Attorney Singleton called

Urban to discuss revisions and then drafted a new will.   The

2014 will was substantially similar to the 2013 will with the

following key changes:   Urban reduced Finnegan's bequest from

$375,000 to $225,000 while increasing the bequest to each of

Finnegan's parents from $180,000 to $325,000, increased

     2 By this point, Urban had appointed Dr. Emerson to serve as
his health care proxy.
                                                                    5

Dr. Emerson's bequest from $375,000 to $800,000, increased

Mrs. Emerson's bequest from $225,000 to $400,000, and added a

bequest to the Cohasset Golf Club.    On June 6, 2014, Dr. Emerson

drove Urban to Attorney Singleton's office.    Attorney Singleton

and Urban met privately to review the will.    Dr. Emerson was not

present when Urban signed the will.   Two disinterested persons

who worked in Attorney Singleton's office building witnessed

Urban execute his will.   Two months later, in August 2014, Urban

executed a durable power of attorney and appointed Dr. Emerson

to that role.

    In the spring of 2015, Attorney Singleton drafted a third

will in response to Urban's request to revise his will.    Given

that the scholarship fund had now been formed and Dr. Emerson

was a trustee, Urban removed Dr. Emerson as his personal

representative and appointed Attorney Singleton instead.

Finnegan's bequest was unchanged, her parents' bequests were

each reduced from $325,000 to $300,000, Dr. Emerson's bequest

was increased from $800,000 to $900,000, and Mrs. Emerson's

bequest was increased from $400,000 to $450,000.   On May 5,

2015, Dr. Emerson drove Urban to Attorney Singleton's office.

Urban met with Attorney Singleton privately in his office to
                                                                     6

review the will.   In the presence of two disinterested

witnesses,3 Urban executed this will.

     In the spring of 2016, Dr. Emerson called Attorney

Singleton and indicated that Urban wanted to double the bequest

to Middlebury College from $150,000 to $300,000.4    Based on this

information, but without first speaking with Urban, Attorney

Singleton drafted a new will for Urban.   On May 3, 2016, Urban's

caregiver drove Urban from the nursing home where he was living

at the time to Attorney Singleton's office.   Urban's caregiver

reported that "[a]ll morning long, and throughout the time [she]

was with him that day, Mr. Urban was clear headed and focused."

Because of Urban's limited mobility, Urban and Attorney

Singleton met privately in the parking lot behind Attorney

Singleton's office to discuss the revised will.     Attorney

Singleton observed that "Urban immediately recognized [him]."

In speaking with Urban, Attorney Singleton noticed that Urban

was "alert and focused."   Attorney Singleton discussed the

increased bequest to Middlebury College and Urban approved that

revision.   When Urban executed the 2016 will, Attorney Singleton

     3 One was Attorney Singleton's wife; the other worked in
Attorney Singleton's office building.

     4 Middlebury College attested that it "was not aware of the
$300,000 bequest that Mr. Urban made to Middlebury in the Will
until after Mr. Urban's death, when Middlebury received notice
that the Will had been offered for probate."
                                                                      7

"assessed Mr. Urban's testamentary capacity and concluded that

that Mr. Urban had testamentary capacity. . . .     Mr. Urban knew

what he owned, knew who the natural objects of his bounty were

and knew that he was making his will."     Two disinterested

individuals who worked in Attorney Singleton's office building

witnessed Urban execute his will.    Both witnesses signed an

"Affidavit to Due Execution of Will" attesting, among other

things, that Urban was "of sound mind and under no constraint or

undue influence."     Finnegan was not present when Urban executed

his 2016 will and had not seen him in over a year.

    c.   The 2016 agreement.    In April 2014, Finnegan contacted

her attorney to complain about Urban's friends, to express

concerns about "being taken advantage of," and to ask for advice

on "legally how to protect [her]self."    In response, her

attorney offered to "draft[] a legal document that allows

[Finnegan] to make decisions on [Urban's] behalf and also be

'reimbursed' for [her] time and care."

    In September 2016, Finnegan traveled from Florida to

Massachusetts to visit Urban at the nursing home.     She brought a

three-page document entitled "Agreement by Parties."     The

document stated that the parties "acknowledged that over the

course of the last approximately 20 years, [Urban] has not paid

[Finnegan] for the care giving she provided for him while he was

living in Florida."    The 2016 agreement provided:
                                                                   8

     "Finnegan shall be exclusive beneficiary and Personal
     Representative to the estate of John Urban upon his death
     and for [Finnegan] to distribute the appropriate amounts
     that [Urban] had previously instructed to Middlebury,
     Northfield Mount Hermon,[5] DKE,[6] Essential Art[7] . . .
     and to keep so she shall remain in the lifestyle she had
     become accustomed while [Urban] lived with her."

The agreement also provided that Urban's "house is to be

transferred into [Finnegan's] name for her to do as she wishes

and believes [Urban] would like."

     Finnegan presented the 2016 agreement to Urban.    She

admitted that this was the first time that Urban had seen it in

its entirety.   Finnegan testified that, when she presented the

agreement to Urban, he "at least looked at it, but [she]

d[id]n't know now if he was able to read it" or whether she read

it out loud to Urban at the time.   The 2016 agreement expressly

stated that Finnegan and Urban agreed that Finnegan would "be

[the] exclusive beneficiary and Personal Representative to the

estate of John Urban upon his death . . . [and that it]

revok[ed] all former wills by [Urban] at any time."    The

agreement was signed by Finnegan, Urban, and two witnesses.     One

     5 Northfield Mount Hermon is a private boarding school
attended by Urban, to which Urban left $150,000 in his will.

     6 Presumably, the acronym stands for the Delta Kappa Epsilon
fraternity. The record reflects that Urban was a fraternity
brother at Middlebury.

     7 The reference is to a nonprofit organization founded and
controlled by Finnegan.
                                                                    9

witness was Finnegan's father, who was deceased at the time of

these proceedings.   The other witness had also lived in a guest

house on the Finnegan estate and attested that she "only vaguely

remembered" the signing.   She did recall that Urban stated "he

trusted [Finnegan] to take care of everything."    Shortly after,

Finnegan left Massachusetts.

     d.   Procedural background.   In February 2019, Urban died

from Alzheimer's dementia at the age of ninety-seven.    On April

1, 2019, Attorney Singleton filed a petition in the Probate and

Family Court to probate Urban's 2016 will and to be appointed as

personal representative, in accordance with the 2016 will.     In

June 2019, Finnegan filed an affidavit objecting to Attorney

Singleton's petition8 as well as a notice of claim for five

million dollars against Urban's estate.9   A month later, Finnegan

filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court to probate the

2016 agreement.   In September 2019, eleven beneficiaries under

     8 Because the 2016 will contains an in terrorem clause,
Finnegan's litigation forfeits her bequest. See Savage v.
Oliszczak, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 145, 147 (2010).

     9 In January 2020, Finnegan filed a complaint in the
Superior Court against the estate, seeking five million dollars
in damages for services rendered to Urban. In April 2022, after
a hearing on the motion, a judge allowed the estate's motion for
summary judgment. The judge ruled that Finnegan "is not
entitled to quantum meruit based on the undisputed material
facts" and that Finnegan could not recover in equity because
"she has acted in bad faith." Moreover, the judge ruled that
Finnegan's "claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata."
No appeal was filed.
                                                                     10

the 2016 will, including the scholarship fund, objected to

Finnegan's petition.

    In July 2020, the scholarship fund filed a motion for

summary judgment regarding both the 2016 will and the 2016

agreement.   In February 2021, the judge allowed the scholarship

fund's motions for summary judgment.     Regarding the 2016

agreement, the judge found that there was no genuine dispute of

material fact that it was the product of undue influence and

dismissed with prejudice Finnegan's petition to probate it.

Regarding the 2016 will, the judge found that there was no

genuine dispute of material fact that Urban possessed

testamentary capacity when he executed the 2016 will and that it

was not procured by undue influence.     A decree entered admitting

the 2016 will to probate as "the Decedent's last will" and

appointing Attorney Singleton as personal representative.     This

appeal followed.

    2.   Standard of review.   In evaluating the allowance of a

motion for summary judgment, "we review de novo whether there

were genuine issues of material fact."    Cellco Partnership v.

Peabody, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 500 (2020).    We ask "whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Molina v. State Garden, Inc., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 173, 177 (2015),
                                                                     11

quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120

(1991).   "While we examine the record in its light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, . . . '[c]onclusory

statements, general denials, and factual allegations not based

on personal knowledge [are] insufficient to avoid summary

judgment.'"   O'Rourke v. Hunter, 446 Mass. 814, 821 (2006),

quoting Cullen Enters., Inc. v. Massachusetts Prop. Ins.

Underwriting Ass'n, 399 Mass. 886, 890 (1987).

    3.    The 2016 will.   a.   Undue influence.   "To prove undue

influence, a contestant must show 'that an (1) unnatural

disposition has been made (2) by a person susceptible to undue

influence to the advantage of someone (3) with an opportunity to

exercise undue influence and (4) who in fact has used that

opportunity to procure the contested disposition through

improper means.'"    Maimonides Sch. v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct.

240, 255-256 (2008), quoting O'Rourke, 446 Mass. at 828.      "In a

will contest involving allegations of undue influence, the

burden of proof ordinarily rests with the party contesting the

will."    Germain v. Girard, 72 Mass App. Ct. 409, 412 (2008),

quoting Matter of the Estate of Moretti, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 642,

651 (2007).   "However, in cases involving a fiduciary, 'the

fiduciary who benefits in a transaction with the person for whom

he is a fiduciary bears the burden of establishing that the

transaction did not violate his obligations.'"     Germain, supra
                                                                  12

at 412-413, quoting Cleary v. Cleary, 427 Mass. 286, 295 (1998).

"[T]he burden of proving the absence of undue influence shifts

to the fiduciary only where he has actually taken part in the

questioned transaction."   Rempelakis v. Russell, 65 Mass. App.

Ct. 557, 563 (2006).

     Finnegan does not challenge the probate judge's conclusion

that the summary judgment record demonstrates that she would be

unable to meet the burden of showing undue influence at trial.

Rather, she argues that she would not have borne that burden.

She contends that, because Dr. Emerson was Urban's power of

attorney and a beneficiary of the will, the Emersons and the

scholarship fund (of which the Emersons are trustees) would have

the burden at trial to show the absence of undue influence and

that, on summary judgment, the Emersons and the scholarship fund

failed to demonstrate an absence of genuine disputed fact on

that point.10   See Arcidi v. National Ass'n of Government

Employees, Inc., 447 Mass. 616, 619 (2006) ("The moving party

has the burden of demonstrating affirmatively the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue,

regardless of who would have the burden on that issue at

trial").   We disagree.

     10Where this would leave us as to the fourteen
beneficiaries of the will who are not Dr. Emerson, his wife, or
the scholarship fund, see Germain, 72 Mass. App. Ct. at 413, is
a quandary that, thankfully, we do not reach.
                                                                    13

    The burden-shifting rule "applies not just to the drafter

of estate planning documents," but also to "one who serves as a

fiduciary under a power of attorney; was fully involved in all

the undertakings relative to the revisions of the testator's

will and estate plan, yielding the beneficial inheritance; and

exercised unrestricted and expansive power over the testator's

finances."   Matter of the Estate of Moretti, 69 Mass. App. Ct.

at 643.   The burden to show the absence of undue influence "is

generally met if the fiduciary shows that his principal made the

bequest . . . with the advice of independent legal counsel."

Cleary, 427 Mass. at 291.   The advice of independent legal

counsel, however, is ineffective where the fiduciary "was an

intruder into the relationship between the attorneys and the

testator, and engaged in acts which, in effect, subverted the

independence of the legal representation."   Matter of the Estate

of Moretti, supra at 644.

    Here, there is no evidence that Dr. Emerson intruded on the

attorney-client relationship between Urban and Attorney

Singleton.   Although Dr. Emerson drove Urban to Attorney

Singleton's office in 2013, 2014, and 2015, he did not drive the

legal relationship between Urban and Attorney Singleton.      Cf.

Matter of the Estate of Sharis, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 839, 843

(2013) (decedent "lacked the advice of independent counsel

[where] . . . . Spinelli selected the attorney, communicated
                                                                     14

with the drafting attorney by e-mail, filled in certain terms,

and transported [decedent] to her husband's nursing home for the

execution of her will. . . .     No attorney reviewed the terms of

the will with [decedent].     Only Spinelli did so.   Significantly,

the decedent had no prior wills").    Unlike in Matter of the

Estate of Moretti, where the fiduciary "played a substantial

role in the drafting process," 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 654,

Dr. Emerson did not.   Attorney Singleton attested that, when he

discussed estate planning with Urban, "Dr. Emerson was never

present."   Likewise, each time Urban executed his will -- in

2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 -- Dr. Emerson was not present.

     Although Dr. Emerson called Attorney Singleton in 2016

regarding Urban's request to revise his will, doing so was not

to Dr. Emerson's advantage.    Increasing the bequest to

Middlebury College in the 2016 will had no effect on the

bequests to Dr. Emerson or his wife and in fact reduced the

bequest to the scholarship fund, which was to receive "the rest

and residue" of Urban's estate.11    Even though Dr. Emerson spoke

with Attorney Singleton first, Urban agreed to this revision

after meeting privately with Attorney Singleton.      Accordingly,

the summary judgment record did not raise a triable issue of

     11Although Attorney Singleton helped to create the
scholarship fund, which named the Emersons as trustees, "Urban
was either present or gave express approval for any course of
action while he was alive."
                                                                    15

fact either that Dr. Emerson actually took part in the

questioned transaction or that the 2016 will was the product of

undue influence.    See Rempelakis, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 563, 567

(burden of proof never shifted where "Russell took no meaningful

part in the decedent's decision to supersede her 1988 will in

favor of a new disposition that benefitted Russell and his

family").    Cf. Matter of the Estate of Sharis, 83 Mass App. Ct.

at 842 (decedent's fiduciary held "power of attorney . . .

[with] near complete control of [decedent's] finances, and

played an instrumental role in arranging for the will to be

drafted and executed.     It was therefore his burden to prove that

the will was not the product of his undue influence").

Similarly, the existence of truly independent legal counsel

would preclude a finding of undue influence in these

circumstances.

    b.      Testamentary capacity.   Testamentary capacity "requires

freedom from delusion which is the effect of disease or weakness

and which might influence the disposition of [the testator's]

property" and the "ability at the time of execution of the

alleged will to comprehend the nature of the act of making a

will."   Paine v. Sullivan, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 817 (2011),

quoting Palmer v. Palmer, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 245, 250 (1986).

"[T]o determine testamentary capacity, '[t]he critical question

is whether the testator was of sound mind at the time the will
                                                                   16

was executed.    It has been held that, 'a person . . . may

possess testamentary capacity at any given time and lack it at

all other times.'"     Matter of the Estate of Rosen, 86 Mass. App.

Ct. 793, 798 (2014), quoting O'Rourke, 446 Mass. at 827.

"Whether a testator had testamentary capacity is a question of

fact."   Matter of the Estate of Galatis, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 273,

278 (2015).     See Rempelakis, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 563 (will

proponent "has the burden of proving that the decedent had

testamentary capacity at the time of her execution of the

instrument").

    Here, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that

Urban possessed testamentary capacity when he executed the 2016

will.    See Haddad v. Haddad, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 59, 69 (2021)

("There was no direct evidence to rebut the presumption [of

testamentary capacity] with respect to July 12, 2011, the day

[testator] executed his new estate documents").     Urban's

caregiver attested that, on the day she drove Urban to Attorney

Singleton's office to execute the 2016 will, "Mr. Urban was

clear headed and focused. . . .     Mr. Urban immediately

recognized Attorney Singleton."    She further attested that

"Mr. Urban was neither delusional nor confused."     Likewise,

Attorney Singleton attested that, when Urban arrived at his

office to execute the will, "Urban immediately recognized [him]

. . . . [and] was alert and focused."    After assessing Urban's
                                                                   17

testamentary capacity, Attorney Singleton determined that Urban

possessed testamentary capacity.   Each disinterested witness

attested that, when Urban arrived at Attorney Singleton's office

to execute his will, he "remembered [the witness] from the

previous times when [the witness] served as a witness for him."

When Urban executed his 2016 will, both witnesses signed an

"Affidavit to Due Execution of Will" where they "declare[d] that

[they] believe[d] this Testator to be of sound mind and memory."

Similarly, both witnesses attested that "Mr. Urban was alert and

focused when [they] spoke on May 3, 2016 . . . . [and] appeared

to be of sound mind."

    In contrast, Finnegan was unable to testify to Urban's

testamentary capacity at the time he signed the 2016 will

prepared by Attorney Singleton because she had not seen him in

over a year.   To be sure, Urban suffered from dementia, and we

do not doubt that a person might be so far afflicted that

medical records could demonstrate that he could not have had

testamentary capacity at the relevant time.   Here, however, the

medical records do not reflect this stage of the disease.

Rather, records from April 1, 2016, reflect that, when Urban was

sent to the hospital with enzyme issues, he was "confused."

When assessed, apparently at the nursing home, three days after

the will signing, he had "self-feeding difficulty."   Given the

variable nature of dementia, these records do not overcome the
                                                                    18

specific testimony regarding Urban's condition on May 3, 2016,

and thus do not create a genuine issue of material fact.      See

Haddad, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 69-70 ("the presumption can be

rebutted by evidence that a testator was delusional,

incompetent, or confused in the days leading up to the making of

a will"); Matter of the Estate of Rosen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at

799 ("the contestant's evidence is insufficient to defeat the

presumption that the testator had the requisite testamentary

capacity to execute his [will]").   This was not a case where

"the cognitive deficits associated with Alzheimer's disease

manifest[ed] themselves in the loss of abilities that bear on

testamentary capacity."    Paine, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 818.

    c.   Urban signing the 2016 will.   Finnegan asserts that

Urban never signed the 2016 will.   The will is notarized, and

Attorney Singleton, both disinterested witnesses, and the

caregiver each attested or testified that Urban signed the will.

To counter this evidence, Finnegan cites to an affidavit of the

keeper of records at the nursing home where Urban was living

stating that the nursing home has no record that Urban left the

premises on May 3, 2016.   Finnegan, however, ignores the

keeper's second affidavit, which states the following:

    "[I]n May of 2016, visitors who took patients out of the
    building were supposed to voluntarily inform the nursing
    staff [that] the patient was leaving the home. No employee
    at the Nursing Home was assigned to enforce our policy
    . . . . The Nursing Home was dependent on the visitors to
                                                                     19

    report the patient's trip to the staff. It is possible
    that patient trips occurred without any evidence of the
    trip in the facility records."

Contrary to Finnegan's assertion, the affidavits indicate that

Urban could have left the nursing home to execute the 2016 will

without the nursing home's having any record of him doing so.

Finnegan did not present any evidence to suggest otherwise.

Accordingly, there was no genuine dispute of material fact

whether Urban signed the 2016 will.    See O'Rourke, 446 Mass. at

815-816.

    4.     The 2016 agreement.   In the absence of a fiduciary

relationship, "a party challenging a will or other document on

the ground that it was procured through fraud or undue influence

bears the burden of proving the allegation by a preponderance of

the evidence."   Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 588, 604

(2009).    As stated, undue influence requires a showing that "an

(1) unnatural disposition has been made (2) by a person

susceptible to undue influence to the advantage of someone

(3) with an opportunity to exercise undue influence and (4) who

in fact has used that opportunity to procure the contested

disposition through improper means."     Maimonides Sch., 71 Mass.

App. Ct. at 255-256, quoting O'Rourke, 446 Mass. at 828.     "Any

species of coercion, whether physical, mental or moral, which

subverts the sound judgment and genuine desire of the

individual, is enough to constitute undue influence."     Matter of
                                                                  20

the Estate of Sharis, 83 Mass. App. at 842, quoting Neill v.

Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 369, (1920).   Finnegan disputes only

whether the 2016 agreement constituted an unnatural

disposition.12

     Here, the summary judgment record demonstrates that there

is no genuine issue of material fact that the 2016 agreement

constituted an unnatural disposition.   See O'Rourke, 446 Mass.

at 828 ("there is no suggestion in the record of an unnatural

disposition").   Between 2013 and 2016, Urban executed four

wills, all of which were drafted by Attorney Singleton, provided

for multiple beneficiaries (including Finnegan and her parents

and sister), and left "the rest and residue to the John P. Urban

Scholarship Fund."   Significantly, unlike the 2015 and 2016

wills, which listed eighteen and seventeen beneficiaries,

respectively, the 2016 agreement left Urban's entire estate to a

sole beneficiary, Finnegan.   The uncontradicted evidence,

however, established that Urban "was extremely proud of his idea

to establish the Scholarship Fund," that "he was happy to give

money to Mount Hermon and Middlebury College," and that "[he]

was a very social person" who had several close friends.

     Finnegan, by contrast, was one of Urban's many friends and

had visited him in Massachusetts only once or twice before

     12Finnegan correctly does not dispute the other elements of
undue influence.
                                                                    21

presenting him with the agreement.   Even when Urban was living

part-time in Florida, Finnegan complained to her attorney about

Urban's refusal to give her money and his "'control games' [that

she] really can barely tolerate these days."    Although "the law

respects the choices of the competent testator" and "does not

overrule them for reasons of questionable wisdom or social

utility," Maimonides Sch., 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 256, absent any

evidence of a falling out with the other potential

beneficiaries, the 2016 agreement constitutes an unnatural

disposition.13   See Hernon v. Hernon, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 498

(2009) (where "the testator had always expressed his intent to

split his estate evenly between both Peter's and Stephen's

children," "exclusion of his nephews Nicholas and Patrick . . .

made the disposition unnatural on the whole").

     5.   Motion to strike.   On March 6, 2020, Finnegan's

attorney noticed the March 20, 2020, deposition of Barbara

Cannon, a licensed social worker and owner of a geriatric care

     13Because of this conclusion, we need not reach the
question whether the 2016 agreement is a will. To be sure, the
agreement is "in writing," "signed by the testator," and "signed
by at least 2 individuals, each of whom witnessed . . . the
signing." G. L. c. 190B, § 2-502 (a). We note, however, that
the mere compliance with these formalities does not make the
agreement a will. Rather, the putative testator must "execute
it with the requisite testamentary intent." Duchesneau v.
Jaskoviak, 360 Mass. 730, 733 (1972). Cf. G. L. c. 190B, § 2-
502 (b) ("Intent that the document constitute the testator's
will can be established by extrinsic evidence").
                                                                  22

management practice.   On March 18, 2020, the parties agreed to

cancel the Cannon deposition.   Two days later, Finnegan's

attorney questioned Cannon under oath without providing notice

to opposing counsel.   See Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 (b) (1), as

appearing in 489 Mass. 1401 (2022) ("A party who wants to depose

a person by oral questions must give written notice to every

other party at least 7 days before").   In July 2020, Finnegan

attached a transcript of the questioning to her opposition to

the scholarship fund's motion for summary judgment.   The

scholarship fund promptly moved to strike Cannon's statement.

The judge ultimately allowed the motion to strike.

    We review a judge's allowance of a motion to strike for an

abuse of discretion.   See Saxonis v. Lynn, 62 Mass. App. Ct.

916, 917 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 819 (2005).   "An abuse

of discretion occurs only where the judge makes a clear error of

judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . .

such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable

alternatives."   Barbetti v. Stempniewicz, 490 Mass. 98, 105

(2022), quoting District Attorney for the N. Dist. v. Superior

Court Dep't, 482 Mass. 336, 342 (2019).

    Here, the judge acted within his discretion in striking the

Cannon statement from the summary judgment record.    The judge

found that "[t]he e mail exchange appended to that motion

warrants a conclusion that counsel agreed on March 18, 2020 to
                                                                     23

cancel the [Cannon] deposition. . . .     The statement under oath

is replete with hearsay and contains more than a few leading

questions. . . .   This was a deposition in everything but name."

    We discern no error.    The statement consists of thirty-

three pages of transcription of Finnegan's counsel asking

questions of Cannon under oath.    The transcribed questions and

answers present exactly like a deposition transcript, except for

the absence of opposing counsel and the corresponding absence of

stipulations, objections, and cross-examination.     See Anselmo v.

Reback, 400 Mass. 865, 868-869 (1987) (one-party deposition

inadmissible as "declaration of a deceased person" under G. L.

c. 233, § 65, because it "unfairly denied an opportunity to

cross-examine when such an opportunity could readily have been

afforded").

    A motion for summary judgment, or opposition thereto, may

be supported by "affidavits . . . made on personal knowledge"

and may be "supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or further affidavits."    Mass. R. Civ. P.

56 (e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974).     See Kourouvacilis v. General

Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 713-714 (1991).    Accord Geller v.

Allied-Lyons PLC, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 120, 125 n.8 (1997)

(nonmoving party with burden of proof at trial must "designate

by affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

admissions on file specific facts showing that there is a
                                                                     24

genuine issue for trial").14   Nothing in the rule allows for the

submission, for summary judgment purposes, of a transcribed

interview outside the context of a deposition, to which opposing

counsel is entitled to notice and the opportunity to attend and

cross-examine.   See Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 (b), (c).

     To be sure, Finnegan could have submitted an affidavit

signed by Cannon as part of the summary judgment record.15     A

signed affidavit and a transcript of answers under oath are

different creatures.   Had Finnegan presented Cannon with an

affidavit, she would have had the opportunity to consider

carefully the information therein, to direct what information

would be included or not included in the affidavit, and to

research any information of which she was uncertain before

signing.

     A transcribed examination, by contrast, has its advantages

of the formality of a court reporter, the spontaneity of the

responses, and the opportunity for follow-up questions.     In the

     14A party encountering difficulty obtaining an affidavit
must "make the tactical decision whether to seek a continuance
'to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had.'" Matter of the Estate of Nevers, 100
Mass. App. Ct. 861, 868 n.5 (2022), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P.
56 (f), 365 Mass. 824 (1965).

     15The hearsay provided, however, would have been
"unacceptable to defeat summary judgment," even if presented in
an affidavit. Locator Servs. Group, Ltd. v. Treasurer &
Receiver Gen., 443 Mass. 837, 865 (2005), quoting Madsen v.
Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 721 (1985).
                                                                     25

context of a deposition, it also allows for cross-examination by

opposing counsel and intervention, if appropriate, by counsel

for the witness.   See Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 (c).   It does not,

however, share the qualities of an affidavit.     Finnegan's claim

on appeal that the Cannon statement "was the same thing as an

affidavit" is without merit.   Accordingly, the judge acted

within his discretion in striking the Cannon statement from the

summary judgment record.

                                   Decrees affirmed.