Court Opinion

ID: 9963031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:01:13.060236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.845939
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12447    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12447
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JOYCE ISAGBA,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cr-00064-JA-PRL-2
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12447

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and GRANT,
       Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Joyce Isagba appeals her convictions and sentence for three
       counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2, and one count of
       conspiring to defraud the United States, id. § 286, stemming from
       a scheme by her and her former husband, David Isagba, to defraud
       the government by filing fraudulent tax returns seeking refunds for
       sham trusts and shell entities. Of the 227 fraudulent tax returns filed
       seeking a total $2.9 billion in refunds between 2009 and 2019, the
       couple obtained eight fraudulent tax refunds totaling $5.3 million.
       Isagba argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting evi-
       dence of prior uncharged conduct, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and chal-
       lenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions.
       She also argues that the district court erred at sentencing by stating
       that she must comply with the “mandatory and standard condi-
       tions adopted by the” district court, without pronouncing each
       standard condition of supervised release. We affirm.
               We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and view
       “the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with
       all inferences and credibility choices drawn in the government’s fa-
       vor.” United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.
       2019) (quotation marks omitted). The evidence will be sufficient to
       sustain a conviction unless “no rational trier of fact could have
       found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
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       23-12447                Opinion of the Court                           3

       Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1221 (11th Cir. 2018). Although we review
       a ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion,
       United States v. Wilk, 572 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2009), our re-
       view is for plain error only when a defendant failed to object on
       that basis in the district court, United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265,
       1275 (11th Cir. 2007).
               Isagba argues that the district court plainly erred by admit-
       ting evidence that she filed a fraudulent tax return in 2009, about
       five years before the conduct charged in the indictment, because
       this tax return was too remote in time and was inadmissible under
       Rule 404(b) without pretrial written notice. We disagree.
              The district court did not plainly err by admitting evidence
       of Isagba’s 2009 fraudulent tax return. Although Isagba was
       charged and convicted of filing fraudulent tax returns beginning in
       2014, evidence of the 2009 fraudulent tax return was not extrinsic
       under Rule 404(b) because it was necessary to complete the story
       of her crimes and was inextricably intertwined with the evidence
       regarding the charged offenses. See United States v. Edouard, 485
       F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). An Internal Revenue Service in-
       vestigator testified that in 2009 a federal income tax return for tax
       year 2008 was signed by Isagba as the fiduciary for an estate or trust
       called “Eneziakpezi” and requested a tax refund of $459,023, even
       though Eneziakpezi made no payments to the Service for tax year
       2008. A month later, the Service issued a refund check for
       $462,557.62 to the account of “The Irrevocable Trust of Eneziak-
       pezi, Joyce Isagba, trustee.” Although Isagba testified that David
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12447

       had access to the account, Isagba was the only individual with sig-
       nature authority over the account, and she deposited the paychecks
       she earned working as a registered nurse into that account. The day
       after the deposit, the couple signed a purchase agreement for the
       house, and most of the refund—$257,500—was used to pay the bal-
       ance due at time of purchase. The couple lived at this house until
       their separation eight years later, the address for the house ap-
       peared on many of the fraudulent tax refunds, and Isagba’s name
       appeared on three fraudulent “Eneziakpezi” tax returns. Within
       two weeks of the deposit, only $28,000 remained in the account,
       which the couple drew on for over a year, and Isagba admitted that
       she used money from the account to make payments. Isagba criti-
       cizes trial counsel for failing to object to the 2009 tax return, but
       we will not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on a
       record that is insufficiently developed on that issue. United States v.
       Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2010).
               Next, Isagba argues that the government failed to present
       sufficient evidence to support her convictions. She concedes that
       her husband was responsible for the scheme but argues that no ev-
       idence connected her to a conspiracy or to the fraudulent tax re-
       turns underlying her three mail fraud convictions. We disagree. To
       prove that Isagba committed mail fraud, the government was re-
       quired to prove that she intentionally participated in a scheme to
       defraud a person of money or property and used the mails in fur-
       therance of that scheme. United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1222
       (11th Cir. 2007). She may be convicted “without personally com-
       mitting each and every element of mail fraud, so long as [she]
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       23-12447               Opinion of the Court                         5

       knowingly and willfully joined the criminal scheme, and a
       co-schemer used the mails for the purpose of executing the
       scheme.” Id. (footnote omitted). To prove that she conspired to de-
       fraud the government by filing false tax returns, the government
       was required to prove “the existence of an agreement to achieve an
       unlawful objective,” her “knowing and voluntary participation in
       the conspiracy,” and the “commission of an overt act in furtherance
       of it.” United States v. Pierre, 825 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir. 2016).
              Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Although
       Isagba’s name and signature did not appear on the three fraudulent
       tax returns underlying her mail fraud convictions, the government
       was not required to prove that Isagba personally mailed the re-
       turns. See Ward, 486 F.3d at 1222. The government introduced ev-
       idence that Isagba began participating in the scheme with her hus-
       band by opening the Eneziakpezi account in 2008, maintaining sole
       control over the account, endorsing the fraudulently-obtained Ene-
       ziakpezi refund check in 2009, and utilizing those funds the next
       day to purchase the home that was listed on other fraudulent tax
       returns and that the couple lived in for eight years. This evidence
       also supports the jury’s determination that Isagba committed an
       overt act in furtherance of their extended conspiracy to defraud the
       government with false claims. See Pierre, 825 F.3d at 1193.
              The government also presented evidence that, despite
       Isagba’s testimony that she earned about $60,000 annually and was
       “supporting the household” during 2007 to 2009 when her husband
       “wasn’t working,” the couple was able to write a check for over a
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12447

       quarter-million dollars to purchase a home in 2009. And the gov-
       ernment presented evidence that in 2014, David used more than
       $368,000 from fraudulently-obtained refund checks on four luxury
       automobiles, including purchasing two BMWs and a Cadillac Esca-
       lade on the same day and another BMW several months later, and
       Isagba admitted to driving some of these luxury vehicles, which es-
       tablished her continued intent to participate in and benefit from the
       scheme. See United States v. Naranjo, 634 F.3d 1198, 1207 (11th Cir.
       2011) (“Evidence that a defendant personally profited from a fraud
       may provide circumstantial evidence of an intent to participate in
       that fraud.”); United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th
       Cir. 2007) (“Mail fraud can be proved by circumstantial evi-
       dence . . . .”). Moreover, the jury was entitled to discredit Isagba’s
       testimony because her contradictions about whether she ques-
       tioned David about the refunds—that she asked no questions, that
       she discussed the returns with him, and that she “didn’t question”
       the refunds because she “didn’t think of anything” and “didn’t think
       [income tax] was related to how much you make”—suggested that
       she was not telling the truth about the extent of her knowledge and
       involvement. See United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1234–35 (11th
       Cir. 2020) (“[A] statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the jury,
       may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt
       when combined with other evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)).
       And because the jury’s finding related to the highly subjective ele-
       ments of her intent and knowledge, we apply our substantial def-
       erence to the jury’s credibility determination “with special force.”
       United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314–15 (11th Cir. 1995).
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       23-12447               Opinion of the Court                         7

               Isagba also argues that the district court erred at sentencing
       by failing to orally pronounce the “standard conditions” of super-
       vised release that were included in her written judgment. We ex-
       plain why plain error review applies and why we disagree. When a
       defendant was deprived of the opportunity to object to the condi-
       tions of her supervised release at sentencing, we review her argu-
       ment de novo. United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 n.5
       (11th Cir. 2023). But when the defendant had the opportunity to
       object to the conditions and failed to do so, we review for plain
       error. Id. For example, in Rodriguez, the district court stated that
       the defendant would serve a term of supervised release but did not
       reference the discretionary conditions, and we held that the district
       court violated the defendant’s right to due process by failing to
       orally pronounce the discretionary conditions that were included
       in the written judgment. Id. at 1240.
               We review for plain error because, unlike in Rodriguez, the
       district court told Isagba that on probation she should “comply
       with the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court
       in the Middle District of Florida” and recited each special condition.
       Although the district appears to have no standing administrative
       order containing the standard conditions, the district court website
       provides a template for criminal judgments that contains the 13
       standard conditions, and these are the same 13 standard conditions
       contained in Isagba’s written judgment. Further, unlike in Rodri-
       guez, by orally pronouncing that Isagba must comply with the
       “standard conditions adopted by the” Middle District of Florida and
       asking Isagba if she had any objections to her sentence or the
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12447

       manner in which it was imposed, the district court provided Isagba
       the opportunity to inquire about these adopted standard condi-
       tions, but she failed to do so. See id. at 1240, 1246, 1249.
              The district court did not plainly err by failing to pronounce
       each of the discretionary, standard conditions of supervised release
       because the district court expressly incorporated the standard con-
       ditions adopted by the Middle District of Florida. See id. at 1246 n.5.
       The district court pronounced, as it was required to do, the inclu-
       sion of the discretionary, standard conditions, which track the same
       13 “‘Standard’ Conditions” listed in U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(c). See id. at
       1246. As we explained in Rodriguez, although district courts must
       pronounce discretionary conditions, district courts are not required
       to pronounce each discretionary condition if at sentencing the dis-
       trict court expressly incorporates a list of those conditions. Id. at
       1249. Insofar as Isagba argues that the district court failed to pro-
       vide an individualized assessment of how each standard condition
       relates to her offenses or the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a), she identifies no controlling law requiring the district
       court to articulate this assessment. See United States v. Ramirez-Flo-
       res, 743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hamilton, 66
       F.4th 1267, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that section 3553(c)
       does not require “two separate explanations—one for the term of
       imprisonment and one for the term of supervised release,” so long
       as the explanation for the entire sentence is adequate).
              We AFFIRM Isagba’s convictions and sentence.