Court Opinion

ID: 9698974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:05:44.12852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:18.947165
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220829-U

                                                                                SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                                  August 25, 2023

                                        No. 1-22-0829

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,           )     Cook County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 21 CR 2913
                                                )
KEVON SCURLOCK,                                 )     Honorable
                                                )     Stanley J. Sacks,
                  Defendant-Appellant.          )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment.
       Justice C.A. Walker dissented.

                                           ORDER

¶1     Held: The defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2     Following a bench trial, defendant, Kevon Scurlock, was convicted of two counts of

unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon based on his possession of firearm

ammunition. Scurlock was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment to run consecutively with
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sentences he received for convictions on two other unrelated matters for which he pled guilty.

Scurlock now appeals and argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the

following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶3                                   BACKGROUND

¶4     On February 4, 2021, at approximately 11 a.m., Chicago Police Officers Lawrence Kerr

and Delgado Fernandez were part of a team that executed a search warrant at a single-family

home located at 7749 South Saint Lawrence Avenue in Chicago. The officers knocked on the

door of the home and co-defendant Raymound Sankey 1 answered. While the officers were at the

door with co-defendant, Scurlock approached. Officers Kerr and Fernandez detained Scurlock

and Raymound while the rest of the team entered the residence to execute the search warrant.

¶5     Officer Kerr remained in the living room with Scurlock and Raymound while the other

officers secured the rest of the residence and determined there were no other occupants. Once the

residence was secure, Officer Kerr photographed every room before the other officers began

searching. The first floor of the single-family residence had a small foyer and a living room to

the right of the entrance. After he completed photographing the first floor, Officer Kerr

photographed the second floor, including two bedrooms. The bedroom on the west side of the

second floor had a television stand and a bed, and the bedroom on the east side of the second

floor appeared to be a child’s bedroom. Officer Kerr then went to the basement. There was a

bedroom on the east side of the basement with a living area or “common area” adjacent to the

bedroom.

1
       Raymound and Scurlock were tried in simultaneous bench trials and were represented by
the same attorney at trial. Raymound is not a party to this appeal.

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¶6      Officer Kerr observed in the basement bedroom on the windowsill a temporary state of

Illinois identification card in Scurlock’s name, a credit card in Scurlock’s name, and a piece of

mail that was forwarded from another address to the South Saint Lawrence Avenue house

addressed to Scurlock, dated December 9, 2020. Officer Kerr also observed a photograph of

Scurlock with another unknown male “wedged into the window frame.” Officer Kerr

photographed the items he observed in the windowsill and Officer Fernandez recovered and

inventoried the items.

¶7     In the closet of the basement bedroom, Officers Kerr and Fernandez observed a plastic

dresser with three drawers. Officer Fernandez located one .45 caliber bullet in the top drawer,

three photographs of Scurlock, two of Scurlock with a female and one of Scurlock licking a

human foot. The items were photographed and recovered.

¶8     In the common area of the basement, adjacent to the bedroom, Officer Kerr observed a

pool table and a counter area with drawers beneath the counter. A few of the drawers were

“pulled out.” In the top-drawer Officer Kerr observed pieces of mail with Scurlock’s name. In

the drawer below, Officer Kerr observed an extended magazine and three .40 caliber bullets.

Three pieces of mail addressed to Scurlock were located on the top of the counter above the

drawers. There were six pieces of mail addressed to Scurlock that were recovered from the

counter and drawers in the common area. Three of the six pieces had been forwarded from a

previous address to the South Saint Lawrence Avenue address and “the other ones had the Cook

County Sheriffs’ information regarding his person.” One of the pieces of mail recovered from the

top of the counter was an order confirmation or “receipt” from Saks Fifth Avenue for an order

placed on January 16, 2021, in Scurlock’s name, with the delivery address of 7749 South Saint

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Lawrence Avenue, the address where the warrant was executed. Officer Kerr photographed the

items and Officer Fernandez recovered them.

 ¶9    The parties stipulated that Scurlock was a convicted felon under case number 17CR

003556 for the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and that conviction was entered

on June 9, 2017. The State rested, and the defense made a motion for “acquittal of defendants,”

which was denied.

¶ 10   Kenyada Lester, Scurlock’s mother, testified for the defense. Kenyada testified that she

leased the residence at 7749 South Saint Lawrence Avenue. She lived there with her four

children: Darrialmond Sankey, Ja-Mah Sankey, Nevaeh Lester and Heaven Lester, all under the

age of 15. She indicated that she moved into the residence in March of 2020. Scurlock, who is

her oldest son, had come to live with her in November or December of 2020 because he was on

electronic monitoring. Kenyada acknowledged on cross examination that Scurlock was living at

the residence on South Saint Lawrence Avenue on February 4, 2021, the day the warrant was

executed, and that he lived in the basement.

¶ 11   Raymound is the father of her other four children, but he had had been living in Missouri

since April of 2019 with his mother. Raymound came to stay with Kenyada in February of 2021

and stayed in her bedroom on the second floor. Raymound was on house arrest and received mail

at the residence. Kenyada’s ten-year-old daughter stays in the other bedroom on the second

floor. The defense rested.

¶ 12   During closing argument, defense counsel argued that the State failed to prove

constructive possession of the ammunition because Scurlock was not the lessee of the residence

and was not present in the unlocked room where the bullet was found. In addition, defense

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counsel argued that the ammunition and magazine were found in a common room where “it

seems that every resident of the house would have access to that area.” Furthermore, defense

counsel highlighted that there were no fingerprints on the ammunition and no locks on the

basement bedroom door. Also, Scurlock had not made any admissions regarding the

ammunition or the magazine. Based on this, counsel argued that “there is no evidence of

knowledge by [Scurlock]” and “no argument that can be made that [Scurlock] had exclusive

control” of the bedroom and common area in the basement.

¶ 13     Defense counsel reminded the court that “both [Scurlock and Raymound] came to the

front door” when the police arrived. Raymound ‘voluntarily opened doors for the officers.”

Defense counsel argued that Scurlock’s actions could not be considered consistent with the

actions “of people who are aware of or have knowledge of any contraband in the house” because

“it’s not your usual scramble to toss or conceal any contraband.” Defense counsel noted that

Scurlock was polite to the officers and did not attempt to flee. He also reiterated that the State

failed to establish “all the necessary elements of constructive possession.”

¶ 14     The trial court found Scurlock and Raymound guilty. With respect to Scurlock the court

found:

                  “But aside from the pictures, the police also find the following things significant:

         When lawyers use the term “proof of residence,” that’s a misnomer. They don’t have to

         prove that [defendant] lived there, which apparently the evidence showed he did anyway.

         They have to really prove he had access and control and knowledge. Not that he lived

         there.

         ***

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              What does he have there that’s important? A Saks Fifth Avenue shipping

      summary bill dated January 16th. So what are we talking about, two weeks later is the

      arrest, a little over two weeks later. ***What else did they find that’s significant

      regarding [Scurlock]? It’s a credit card of some sort or another ***. Something you want

      to know where it’s at and keep is a credit card. You don’t want somebody else getting

      your credit cards. And then additionally***a statement of some sort, notice of decision,

      State of Illinois Department of Human Services. Beginning January 1st, 2021, your

      benefits will change as follows. Medical benefits***that’s important to keep around, a

      record of what you’re going to get as far as money from some other resource.

      ***

      Scurlock's mother, which was or is the other man’s girlfriend, former girlfriend, current

      girlfriend, whatever, basically put altogether, indicates beyond a reasonable doubt in my

      opinion that Scurlock stayed in the basement. Her son stayed in the basement with the

      stuff in the basement and that her former or current boyfriend, whatever, the father of

      four of her children stayed upstairs in the bedroom with her which is where they found

      the gun in the bedroom and all the other stuff attributable to Sankey in the same bedroom

      and the bullet downstairs in the basement attributable, in my opinion, to Kevon Scurlock.

              Hardly an earth-shattering offense, having one bullet. But nonetheless, one maybe

      three or four altogether. A minimum of one anyway. They found other stuff down there,

      too. Hardly an earth-shattering offense but nonetheless your client’s convicted for an

      offense, he cannot possess any weapons or ammunition for weapons. They have to use

      discrete judgment. If you don’t do it, it constitutes a crime. Is it like a capital offense kind

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       of a case to have a bullet with a felony conviction? It’s not a capital offense, but,

       nonetheless, it’s against the law to have one. I don't get involved with morals and stuff

       like that, whether one doesn’t mean anything or 25 means something, it’s illegal to have

       even a bullet.

               As far as upstairs with Sankey, he can't have any guns at all as a convicted felon.

       And I don’t believe that the testimony of Sankey’s former girlfriend aids the case of the

       defense at all. As a matter of fact apparently she wasn’t even there at the time on

       February 4th. Basically she shows, from the evidence I heard, (unintelligible) anyways --

       I'm not critical of the defense for calling her – established that they both lived there.

       When Sankey’s questioned about the bedroom -- questioned about where he lives,

       upstairs, you know. The evidence shows it wasn’t the little girl’s bedroom, the gun and

       other stuff they found.”

¶ 15   The trial court ruled, “as far as both, the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt both

charges, the charges against [Scurlock]*** one, maybe three or four bullets, and for [Raymound]

the gun.” The court sentenced Scurlock to four years’ imprisonment. Although the record

reflects that this matter was scheduled for post-trial motions on the same day as sentencing, a

written motion for a new trial does not appear in the common law record and no oral arguments

related to a motion for a new trial appear in the record of proceedings. Scurlock filed a timely

notice of appeal.

¶ 16                                   ANALYSIS

¶ 17   Scurlock does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him and does not

point out any flaws in the State’s case that would call into question the court’s finding of guilty

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beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, Scurlock argues that trial counsel was ineffective pursuant

to United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), where counsel, operating under a

misapprehension of the law, not only conceded that Scurlock constructively possessed the

contraband, but actually produced evidence establishing Scurlock’s possession. As a result,

defense counsel failed to subject the State’s case to a meaningful adversarial challenge. In the

alternative, Scurlock argues that counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984).

¶ 18   When faced to challenges to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, we generally apply the two-

prong test established in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, and adopted in Illinois in People v. Albanese,

104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under

Strickland, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) counsel’s

actions resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984); People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004). Under the first prong, a defendant must

demonstrate that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. Under the second prong, prejudice is shown where there is a reasonable

probability that the result would have been different but for counsel’s alleged deficiency. Id.

Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 19   However, the Strickland court also noted that there are some circumstances so likely to

prejudice a defendant that prejudice may be presumed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. In United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Court explained that with respect to ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claims, prejudice may be presumed where (1) the defendant “is denied

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counsel at a critical stage,” (2) counsel “entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing,” or (3) counsel is called upon to represent a client in

circumstances under which no lawyer could provide effective assistance. Id. at 659-61. Here,

Scurlock argues that defense counsel’s performance at trial triggers the second Cronic exception

because he failed to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. We disagree.

¶ 20   The second Cronic exception to Strickland’s prejudice requirement is “narrow” and

applies “infrequently.” People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶27 (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543

U.S. 175, 190 (2004)). Our supreme court has explained that the second Cronic exception

applies only when “counsel’s effectiveness has fallen to such a low level as to amount not merely

to incompetence, but to no representation at all.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 267 (1989) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659)). Since Cronic, our

supreme court has only found per se ineffectiveness under the second Chronic exception twice.

People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶27. The first time was in People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449

(1985), and the second was in People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004), overruled in part on

other grounds in People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502 (2004). Cherry, 2016 IL 118725, ¶27.

¶ 21   In Hattery, the defendant was charged with the murders of a mother and her two children.

The defendant pleaded not guilty. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 458. During his opening statement, one

of defendant’s attorneys conceded that defendant had committed the murders and was eligible

for the death penalty but argued that the only issue was whether the defendant should be

sentenced to death. Id. at 458-59. At trial, the defendant’s attorneys advanced no theory of

defense, presented no evidence, and did not make a closing argument. Id. Defense counsel did

attempt to establish through cross-examination that the defendant was compelled to kill the

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victims. Id. However, compulsion is not a defense to murder; it may merely serve as a

mitigating circumstance sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Id.

¶ 22   Our supreme court held that defense counsel’s actions did not subject the prosecution’s

case to the meaningful adversarial testing as required by the sixth amendment. Id. at 464. The

Hattery court noted that the strategy employed by defense counsel–to show that the defendant

was guilty of murder but undeserving of the death penalty–was inconsistent with the defendant’s

plea of not guilty. Id. at 464. The court held that “[c]ounsel may not concede his client’s guilt in

the hope of obtaining a more lenient sentence where a plea of not guilty has been entered, unless

the record adequately shows that defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to his

counsel’s strategy.” Id. at 465.

¶ 23   In Morris, defense counsel “readily admitted” defendant’s guilt to the jury during

opening statement. 209 Ill. 2d at 182. This admission of guilt was intended to lay the

groundwork for a plea of jury nullification based on sympathy or compassion, which the Morris

court characterized as “a minimal, nonlegal defense.” Id. at 184. Notwithstanding, our supreme

court emphasized that “defense counsel’s performance in the case at bar cannot be considered

per se ineffective simply because the defense * * * offered at trial was a nonlegal plea for jury

sympathy.” Id. After admitting guilt and pursuing a nonlegal defense, defense counsel then

introduced evidence of the defendant’s involvement in an unrelated murder, even though the trial

court had previously found the evidence inadmissible at defense counsel’s request. Id. at 184-85.

The court found that trial counsel was per se ineffective based on the “unusual convergence of

errors” (id. at 187), stating, “[d]efense counsel’s erroneous understanding of the trial court’s

ruling on the [other] murder opened the door to the introduction of graphic details regarding the

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murder, to the State cross-examining defendant for 45 minutes about the crime, and to

defendant’s admission of guilt for that murder.” Id. This was not only inherently prejudicial to

the defendant but, “[o]nce defense counsel introduced the extensive and inflammatory evidence

regarding the [other] murder, the minimal but constitutionally acceptable strategy of appealing to

the jury’s sympathy regarding the murder [at issue] was utterly negated.” Id. at 187-88.

Accordingly, the court concluded that “there was a breakdown of the adversarial process during

defendant’s trial such that there was no meaningful adversarial testing of defendant’s case.” Id. at

188.

¶ 24   Unlike the defense attorneys in Hattery and Morris, who conceded guilt, defense counsel

in this case subjected the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Given the overwhelming

evidence that Scurlock resided in the basement, the possible trial strategies available to defense

counsel were entirely limited. Nevertheless, as we explain further below, defense counsel

thoroughly represented Scurlock and challenged the State’s case by arguing that the State had

failed to prove constructive possession of the ammunition.

¶ 25   Here, the State alleged that Scurlock constructively possessed ammunition found in the

 basement bedroom and basement common area of the home in which he resided. Constructive

 possession exists where there is no actual, personal, present dominion over contraband, but

 defendant had knowledge of the presence of the contraband and had control over the area where

 the contraband was found. People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 19; People v. Davis, 2021 IL

 App (3d) 180146, ¶ 72. Knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. People v.

 Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 142726, ¶ 18. Proof of defendant’s mere presence in the premises

 where contraband is found is not sufficient; instead, there must be evidence that the defendant

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 controlled the premises or the contraband itself, which may be shown by defendant’s habitation

 in the premises where contraband is discovered. People v. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶

 17. Proof of residency in the form of rent receipts, utility bills, and clothing in closets is

 relevant to show that defendant lived on the premises and therefore controlled them. Terrell,

 2017 IL App (1st) 142726, ¶ 19.

¶ 26   Defense counsel entered a plea of not guilty, and extensively cross-examined the two

State witnesses. Through cross-examination of the officers, defense counsel was able to establish

that Scurlock was not found in actual possession of any contraband or in close proximity to the

contraband, that no fingerprints were recovered from the bullets, and that the officers did not see

Scurlock in the basement bedroom or common area where the ammunition was found. In

addition, defense counsel established that Scurlock never attempted to flee the residence or

discard contraband when the police arrived. In addition, defense counsel called Kenyada, who

established that she was the lessee of the residence and that six other people also lived in the

residence. Kenyada’s testimony enabled defense counsel to argue that the State could not meet

its burden to establish the knowledge and control elements of constructive possession.

¶ 27   Scurlock, however, argues that defense counsel did not go far enough in questioning

Kenyada, stating that “[w]ithout evidence that others used the basement living room and/or

bedroom, the fact that someone else could have accessed the living room or bedroom is

immaterial. Counsel needed to show that other residents or guests used the basement bedroom

and/or living room. But Kenyada never testified that she or anyone else resided in the basement

or used the living room.” We disagree.

¶ 28   As a threshold matter, Scurlock’s argument rests entirely on speculation that Kenyada

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would have offered such testimony if defense counsel had merely inquired. We see no reason to

draw that conclusion. More to the point, however, Kenyada testified that she was the lessee of

the property and that six other people lived in the home at the time, which was enough for

defense counsel to then argue that the ammunition could have belonged to any of the other six

people who resided in the house and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Scurlock had knowledge of and control over the area where the ammunition was recovered.

From Kenyada’s testimony a reasonable factfinder could infer that Kenyada and the six other

people living in the house at 7749 South Saint Lawrence on February 4, 2021, could have had

access to and control of the common areas and Scurlock’s unlocked bedroom. People v.

Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374-75 (1992) (the trier of fact is allowed to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.) Although we recognize that others’ access to the

ammunition found in the basement does not necessarily defeat the possibility of Scurlock

possessing them (People v. Hill, 226 Ill. App. 3d 670, 673 (1992)), it does provide an

explanation for how such items could have made their way into the home without Scurlock’s

knowledge.

¶ 29   Without Kenyada’s testimony about the six other people who resided in the home at the

time of Scurlock’s arrest, there would have been no evidence in the record upon which defense

counsel could have advanced such an argument in closing. Based on evidence elicited in cross

of the State’s witnesses, and Kenyada’s testimony on direct, defense counsel’s theory at trial

that, although Scurlock lived in the basement bedroom, he did not constructively possess the

ammunition at issue, was not entirely inconceivable. Nor was it unreasonable.

¶ 30   A number of cases illustrate why counsel was not per se ineffective because of the

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defense theory he employed. In People v. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, upon

execution of a search warrant, the police found heroin hidden in a statue on a bedside table and

ammunition in a box on a bedroom dresser and in a kitchen drawer. Although the defendant was

not present at the time of the search, the State asserted that he resided at the location. Id. at ¶26.

With respect to the heroin and ammunition, this court concluded that even if the State proved

that the defendant had control over the premises, it failed to prove that the defendant had

knowledge of the contraband. Regarding the heroin, we observed that the State failed to present

any evidence that would suggest or allow the inference that the defendant was aware of the drugs

inside the enclosed statue. Id. at ¶ 41. As for the ammunition found in the kitchen drawer,

although the kitchen was a common area for all occupants, the State failed to present any

evidence “that the defendant was in proximity to the ammunition at or after it was placed in the

kitchen to allow a reasonable inference that he knew of its presence.” Id. Similarly, in People v.

Wolski, 27 Ill. App. 3d 526 (1975), the police executed a search warrant in the apartment where

the defendant and his brother resided. Other people also had access to the apartment. During the

search, the officers discovered marijuana. Id. at 527. This court held that the State failed to prove

that the defendant constructively possessed the contraband, because it did not offer any evidence

connecting the marijuana to the defendant, as opposed to the defendant’s brother or the other

number of people who frequented the apartment. Id. at 528–29.

¶ 31    Because a reasonable factfinder could infer that Scurlock did not constructively possess

the ammunition based upon Kenyada’s testimony and defense counsel’s argument, defense

counsel did not pursue such an unreasonable strategy that we must assume Scurlock was per se

prejudiced. That the trial court found Kenyada’s testimony “basically put [the case] altogether”

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does not in any sense establish that defense counsel was per se ineffective. We note that the court

went on to say that “I’m not critical of the defense for calling her.” We therefore find no per se

ineffectiveness under Cronic.

¶ 32   Scurlock, however, argues that pursuant to People v. Salgado, 200 Ill. App. 3d 550

(1990), we must find counsel ineffective under Cronic. In Salgado, the defendant was charged

along with two of his codefendants with residential burglary and theft. At trial neither the State

nor defense counsel made opening statements. Although neither of his codefendants testified at

trial, defense counsel called defendant as a witness and during direct examination elicited a

confession to the offense of residential burglary. In addition, defense counsel presented no

defense other than to assert during closing argument that defendant had a right to explain his

participation in the crime. Id. at 553. The court found Salgado guilty of residential burglary and

his codefendants guilty of theft. In so finding, the trial judge stated that prior to defendant’s

testimony, he anticipated finding defendant guilty of just theft, but because defendant admitted

that he committed the residential burglary, the court had no choice but to convict him of that

offense. We found that defense counsel’s conduct amounted to ineffective assistance because

“by pleading not guilty, defendant was entitled to have the issue of his guilt or innocence of

residential burglary presented to the court as an adversarial issue.” Id.

¶ 33   We find Salgado factually distinguishable from the case at bar. This was not a case

where defense counsel conceded Scurlock’s guilt or failed to provide a defense. As previously

stated, defense counsel’s strategy was restricted by the overwhelming evidence that Scurlock

resided in the basement bedroom and the defense theory of seeking to sow doubt of Scurlock’s

guilt by offering evidence that others in the household had access to the basement bedroom and

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common room where the ammunition was found was not entirely unreasonable. Scurlock has

not shown that his defense counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful

adversarial testing.

¶ 34   We now turn to Scurlock’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland.

Scurlock argues that but for counsel’s comments and Kenyada’s testimony, he would not have

been convicted. Specifically, Scurlock argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because

counsel admitted that the basement bedroom was Scurlock’s in opening and closing when he

said, “[Scurlock’s] room” and that “[Scurlock] was staying with his mother,” and then called

Scurlock’s mother as a witness to corroborate this. Kenyada testified that Scurlock had been

living with her since being placed on electronic home monitoring in December. Kenyada further

testified that Scurlock “stay[ed] in the basement.” Scurlock also argues that defense counsel had

a fundamental misunderstanding of the law of constructive possession in that defense counsel

relied on his mistaken belief that the State could not prove constructive possession, despite the

fact that Scurlock lived in the basement, because Scurlock’s name was not on the lease, his

mother could have entered the basement if she wanted to, and he did not admit to possessing the

bullets. Scurlock argues that defense counsel basically admitted that Scurlock constructively

possessed the ammunition in this case.

¶ 35   To review, under the first prong of Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that his

attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at

220. Under the second prong, prejudice is shown where there is a reasonable probability that the

result would have been different but for counsel’s alleged deficiency. Id. Failure to satisfy either

prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland,

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466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 36   “[T]he choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy, and counsel has the

ultimate authority to decide this trial strategy. [Citation.] This court will generally not review a

claim of ineffectiveness of counsel based on inadequate trial strategy.” People v. Guest, 166 Ill.

2d 381, 394 (1995). An exception is “where counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful

adversarial testing.” The fact that another attorney might have pursued a different strategy or that

the strategy chosen by counsel ultimately proved unsuccessful, does not demonstrate

incompetence or suggest ineffective representation. People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 331 (2002).

¶ 37   The State presented significant evidence of Scurlock’s control over the basement

bedroom where the ammunition was found. Scurlock was present at the residence when the

police arrived. Inside the basement bedroom, officers found a temporary State identification

card in Scurlock’s name, a credit card in Scurlock’s name, several photographs of Scurlock, and

a piece of mail dated December 9, 2020, that was addressed and forwarded to Scurlock at the

residence on South Saint Lawrence Avenue from another address. In addition, the State

presented evidence of Scurlock’s control over the counter and drawers in the basement common

area where the additional ammunition was located. On top of the counter there were multiple

pieces of mail addressed to Scurlock, including correspondence from the Cook County Sheriff’s

Office, and a receipt for items ordered from a department store to be delivered to Scurlock at the

South Saint Lawrence Avenue residence.

¶ 38   Defense counsel attempted to challenge Scurlock’s constructive possession of the

ammunition in this case by arguing that Scurlock was not the lessee of the residence, Kenyada

was. Defense counsel also argued that although Scurlock’s personal items and mail were found

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in the basement bedroom and in and on top of the drawers in the common area of the basement,

other people resided in the home and had equal access to those areas so that the ammunition

could have belonged to someone other than Scurlock. Furthermore, defense counsel highlighted

that there was no physical evidence presented that established that the ammunition belonged to

Scurlock and that the officers did not see Scurlock in the bedroom or the common area of the

basement.

¶ 39   We disagree that defense counsel’s performance was unreasonable for these reasons and

for the reasons discussed in resolution of Scurlock’s Cronic argument. Defense counsel’s

theory in this case was that while Scurlock lived in the basement, there were six other people

who lived in the house at that time who had access to both the basement bedroom and the

common area in the basement. Kenyada’s testimony established that other people were living in

the home and therefore, the ammunition and magazine could have belonged to anyone. As we

see it, based on the evidence that the State presented, this was defense counsel’s only viable

strategy.

¶ 40   Scurlock relies on People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233 (1989), to support his argument

that counsel’s performance in this case was deficient. In Chandler, the defendant and his

codefendant were charged with murder, residential burglary, and aggravated arson. Id. at 238.

At trial, the defendant’s attorney conceded that the defendant had entered the victim’s house but

argued that it was the codefendant who had stabbed the victim. Id. at 239. Counsel apparently

mistakenly believed that the jury could find the defendant not guilty if it believed that he had not

personally inflicted the fatal wounds. Id. at 247. Nevertheless, the jury was instructed on both

felony murder and accountability and thus “had no choice but to find [the] defendant guilty of

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murder.” Id. Defense counsel also failed to cross-examine several key witnesses, and called no

witnesses to testify, not even the defendant, whom counsel had asserted would be called during

opening statement. Hence, the Chandler court held that defense counsel was ineffective. “By

failing to comprehend the law of accountability and felony murder, counsel’s strategy and

actions amounted to no real defense at all. The prosecution’s case, therefore, was not subject to

meaningful adversarial testing, and defendant was deprived of a fair trial.” Id. at 249. The court

stated:

          “Even when presented with a difficult case, counsel must provide reasonably effective

          assistance to a defendant. Counsel failed to do so here. Counsel’s defective performance

          clearly prejudiced defendant, as the jury was forced to convict defendant of the offenses

          charged. We also find that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

          deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different.” Id. at 250.

¶ 41      Here, in contrast to Chandler, defense counsel extensively cross-examined the State’s

witnesses and presented testimony that aligned with his theory of defense. It was the strength of

the evidence presented by the State that seriously undermined any claim of innocence that

Spurlock could muster, not counsel’s comments or Kenyada’s testimony.

¶ 42      In reality, defense counsel had two options in this case. The first was to call Kenyada to

establish that six other individuals were residing in the home on the date of the arrest and allow

the trier of fact to infer that those individuals had access to all the rooms in the home, including

Scurlock’s bedroom and the common areas of the basement. The second was to merely argue

that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Counsel made a strategic decision to pursue the former strategy. We make every effort to

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evaluate counsel's performance from his perspective at the time, rather than through the lens of

hindsight. People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 157 (1997). We cannot now second-guess counsel’s

strategic decision in this case, particularly considering that the trial court denied defense

counsel’s motion for “acquittal of defendants” after the State rested its case. Defense counsel’s

strategy may have been risky, but it was a reasonable strategy nonetheless, particularly where the

trial court had denied the defense motion for “acquittal of defendants” after the State rested its

case.

¶ 43    We find this case to be more similar to People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133 (1996), and

People v. Ganus, 148 Ill. 2d 466 (1992). In Shatner, the defendant was convicted of first-degree

murder, armed robbery, and arson. The defendant appealed and argued that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to present a defense to the charge of felony murder. During closing

argument, defense counsel told the jury “ ‘if he’s guilty of anything, he’s guilty of robbery.’ ”

Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 143. The defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective because he

admitted to felony murder by conceding the defendant took part in a robbery during which the

victim was killed. Id. at 145. Our supreme court distinguished its decision in Chandler, stating

claims of ineffective assistance must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 147. The court

stated that its finding of ineffectiveness in Chandler was not based solely on the defendant’s

alleged failure to develop a theory of innocence, but also on counsel’s failure to cross-examine

witnesses and failure to call any witnesses to testify. Id. ¶ 180. The supreme court compared the

representation offered by the defense attorney in Shatner with the defense attorney in Chandler,

finding that in Shatner counsel “aggressively cross-examined” nearly every prosecution witness

and called witnesses on defendant’s behalf to attempt to discredit the State’s witnesses and

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bolster defendant’s credibility. The court noted defense counsel tried to minimize his client’s

admitted involvement in the robbery scheme and shift the blame for both the murder and robbery

onto another person who voluntarily accompanied the defendant to the crime scene. Defense

counsel “aggressively attacked the credibility of [this other person] and portrayed her as a

calculating cocaine addict who seduced defendant into assisting her in a robbery during which

she killed the victim.” Id. at 148. “It is apparent that defense counsel sought to convince the jury

that defendant’s minimal involvement in the scheme warranted either a finding of innocence or a

conviction for robbery only. While this strategy was risky, it was strategy nonetheless, and

perhaps the only strategy which could have been seriously pursued given defendant’s admissible

incriminating statements and the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.” The court further noted:

       “Ultimately, it was the defendant’s own statements, both to the FBI and on the witness

       stand, and not the actions or strategy of his counsel, which undermined any claim of

       innocence that defendant may have had. If a defendant enters a not-guilty plea in the face

       of overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we are unwilling to find that his counsel was

       ineffective simply because he failed to contrive a leak-proof theory of innocence on

       defendant’s behalf. To do so would effectively require defense attorneys to engage in

       fabrication or subterfuge.” Id. at 148.

¶ 44   In Ganus, 148 Ill. 2d 466, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and argued

that trial counsel was ineffective because he elicited prejudicial testimony about gang activity

and the defendant’s ties to the gang. This testimony had been introduced in an effort to establish

an affirmative defense of compulsion, a defense not available to the defendant. Our supreme

court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective, stating:

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       “What the instant case presents is a situation where the defendant literally had no

       defense. Evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. His counsel conceived a compulsion

       defense which, though not a legal defense, could or might have persuaded a jury not to

       convict. Jury nullification is always a possibility. It is not inconceivable that a

       compulsion defense might have evoked empathy, compassion or understanding and

       sympathy in the minds of the jurors. It is a truism that if a man is drowning, he will grasp

       at a straw that comes floating by. A weak or insufficient defense does not indicate

       ineffectiveness of counsel in a case where a defendant has no defense. In this case it

       would appear that defense counsel used his imagination and resourcefulness to come up

       with something where he had nothing to go on.” Id. at 473-74.

¶ 45   While we need not determine whether Scurlock suffered prejudice because a criminal

defendant must show both unreasonable performance and prejudice under Strickland, we

nevertheless find that Scurlock suffered no prejudice as a result of defense counsel’s comments

and his decision to elicit certain testimony from Kenyada. First, defense counsel’s comments

made during opening and closing arguments are not evidence. Second, notwithstanding

counsel’s comments and Kenyada’s testimony, given that the evidence that Scurlock lived in the

basement bedroom where the ammunition was found was so strong, there is simply no

“reasonable probability” that the result would have been different without those comments or

testimony. Based on the court’s comments in finding Scurlock guilty, it is clear that the court

relied on Scurlock’s personal items that were found in the bedroom and on the counter in the

common area to find Scurlock guilty and certainly not solely or even predominantly on the basis

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of Kenyada’s testimony. We simply cannot find any reasonable probability of a different result

because of this choice by defense counsel.

¶ 46   Accordingly, we find that trial counsel was not ineffective as counsel’s representation

was not unreasonable and Scurlock suffered no prejudice where the evidence of Scurlock’s

constructive possession was sufficient.

¶ 47                                  CONCLUSION

¶ 48   Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 49   Affirmed.

¶ 50   JUSTICE C.A. WALKER, dissenting:

¶ 51   I respectfully dissent because I would find counsel was ineffective pursuant to Strickland

by misapprehending the law on joint possession and mistakenly believing that Kenyada's

testimony precluded a finding of constructive possession. The majority found defense counsel

rendered effective assistance pursuant to United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), because

counsel subjected the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing by extensively cross-

examining two State witnesses and presenting Kenyada's testimony to establish doubt that

Scurlock had constructive possession of the ammunition. The majority also found counsel

rendered effective assistance pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because

(1) counsel's performance was reasonable where he presented Kenyada's testimony as a viable

defense strategy and (2) no prejudice occurred where the State presented overwhelming evidence

that Scurlock had constructive possession of the contraband despite Kenyada's testimony. I

disagree with the majority's assessment of the case.

¶ 52   As the majority asserts, to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under

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Strickland, a defendant must show (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) counsel's

actions resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984); People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004). First, I will analyze the objective

reasonableness of defense counsel's conduct. The competence of trial counsel is to be determined

by the totality of the counsel's conduct. People v. Lemke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 391, 398 (2004).

"When a choice of trial strategy is based upon a misapprehension of the law, the claim is

reviewable and counsel may, in fact, have been ineffective." Id. at 399. To sustain Scurlock's

conviction, the State had to prove Scurlock had knowing possession of the ammunition found at

the Saint Lawrence Avenue residence and had a prior felony conviction. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(A)

(West 2020). Because Scurlock was not in actual possession of the contraband, the State had to

prove constructive possession. People v. Carter, 339 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879 (2003). Constructive

possession occurs when a defendant has knowledge of the presence of contraband and exercises

immediate and exclusive control over the area where the contraband was found. Id. The rule that

possession must be exclusive does not mean, however, that the possession may not be joint.

People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 335 (2010). "If two or more people share the intention and

power to exercise control, then each has possession." Id.

¶ 53   The majority states, given the State's overwhelming evidence, defense counsel's theory

that the ammunition could have belonged to anyone living at the residence was the only viable

strategy. Supra ¶ 38. However, I would find this strategy was not viable because it is contrary to

precedent that constructive possession may be established despite joint possession of the area

where the contraband is found. See Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 335.

¶ 54   During trial, the State presented evidence that the police found one bullet inside a dresser

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drawer in the basement bedroom. Several items belonging to Scurlock were found in the

basement bedroom, including a piece of mail addressed to Scurlock that listed the Saint

Lawrence Avenue residence as the forwarding address, Scurlock's temporary state identification

card, a credit card in Scurlock's name, and pictures of Scurlock. In the common area of the

basement, the police found an extended magazine and three .40 caliber bullets inside a drawer. In

a different drawer and on a counter in the common area, the police found pieces of mail

addressed to Scurlock, three of which listed the Saint Lawrence Avenue residence as the

forwarding address. The police also found a store receipt for an order in Scurlock's name on top

of the counter.

¶ 55   Contrary to established law on joint possession, defense counsel argued that the State

could not prove Scurlock had constructive possession because Kenyada had access to the

basement and elicited testimony that Kenyada was the lessee of the residence. In doing so,

counsel also continuously admitted Scurlock lived in the basement bedroom, thereby conceding

that Scurlock had constructive possession of the contraband. Counsel stated during opening

statements, "the evidence will show that there was a sum total of one bullet found in Kevon

Scurlock's room." Counsel also called Kenyada as a defense witness where she testified on cross-

examination that Scurlock was on electronic monitoring at the Saint Lawrence Avenue

residence, was living at the residence, and was staying in the basement. She further narrowed

Scurlock's living arrangement to the basement when she testified that her 10-year-old daughter

and Scurlock's co-defendant each stayed in one of the two bedrooms upstairs. Kenyada also

testified that the co-defendant lived in Missouri and temporarily came to her residence for his

children's birthdays. At the end of the trial, counsel repeatedly mentioned that the basement

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bedroom belonged to Scurlock during closing arguments.

¶ 56   The trial judge's repeated admonishments further evinced counsel's misapprehension of

the law. The judge explained to counsel that Scurlock's failure to make an incriminating

statement was not proof that he did not possess the contraband. When counsel argued that there

was a lack of evidence of knowledge because Scurlock did not make an admission, the court

informed counsel that "[y]ou cannot argue either before a judge or a jury defendant did not

confess and argue that's in his favor. Because he has a right to remain silent and not say

anything. If he doesn't say anything, how is that helpful to him at all?" The judge even

interrupted counsel's closing remark and questioned his decision to mention Kenyada's

testimony, stating "She did say both lived there pretty much at the time of the incident. So what

did she add that's helpful to the defense that is?" See People v. Baines, 399 Ill. App. 3d 881, 898

(2010) ("Another factor which also contributes to a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel

resulting in prejudicial and reversible error is the necessity of frequent intervention by the trial

court to guide defense counsel through rudimentary trial procedures and to correct mistakes

made by counsel."). However, counsel adamantly argued that Kenyada's testimony showed

Scurlock did not have constructive possession of the contraband.

¶ 57   The judge and prosecutor recognized the importance of Kenyada's testimony and used it

as a basis for conviction. Highlighting Kenyada's testimony during closing arguments, the

prosecutor stated Kenyada "says that [Scurlock] was staying there, he lived there, he was in the

basement." The trial judge relied on Kenyada's testimony in its finding of guilt, stating

"Scurlock's mother *** indicates beyond a reasonable doubt in my opinion that Scurlock stayed

in the basement. Her son stayed in the basement with the stuff in the basement *,** and the

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bullet downstairs in the basement [was] attributable, in my opinion, to Kevon Scurlock."

¶ 58   The majority states that defense counsel had two available trial strategies: (1) call

Kenyada as a witness or (2) argue that the State's evidence was insufficient. Supra ¶41.

However, the majority fails to acknowledge that counsel's decision to call Kenyada was tainted

by a misapprehension of the law, and in turn, helped reinforce the State's case. Even assuming

counsel intended to make the State's evidence of constructive possession more tenuous through

Kenyada's testimony that six other individuals lived at the residence, his strategy failed when her

testimony established where each person stayed in the residence, including Scurlock. This type

of assistance cannot be viewed as reasonable. Given counsel's multiple assertions about

Scurlock's joint possession of the basement, which established Scurlock's guilt, I would find

counsel's performance was deficient.

¶ 59   Furthermore, I would find counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Scurlock. Contrary

to the majority's reasoning (supra ¶ 44), the State's evidence was not overwhelming. The State

presented several pieces of evidence of habitation including pieces of mail addressed to

Scurlock, photos of Scurlock, his credit card, and his identification card. Each item is only part

of the evidence used to support an inference that a defendant controlled the location where the

contraband was found. See generally People v. Castino, 2019 IL App (2d) 170298, ¶ 19

("[c]ircumstantial evidence is proof of facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may

infer other connected facts that reasonably and usually follow according to common

experience"); see also People v. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 29 (noting that mail is

"part of the evidence used to support an inference that the defendant controlled the location

where the contraband was recovered").

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¶ 60    Indeed, this court found the aggregate of similar evidence insufficient to establish

constructive possession. See People v. Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 142726, ¶ 19-31 (finding large

men's clothes, two prescription bottles, an adult probation card bearing the defendant's name, a

passport, and a framed photo depicting the defendant recovered at the apartment was insufficient

evidence of habitation necessary to establish constructive possession). Additionally, the fact that

the ammunition was found either inside a dresser drawer in the bedroom or inside a drawer in the

common area further undermines the State's case. See People v. Macias, 299 Ill. App. 3d 480,

487 (1998) (finding no inference of defendant's knowledge of the contraband can be inferred

where the contraband was not in plain view to the defendant); Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 142736,

¶ 30 ("Assuming arguendo-due to the presence of his passport, the prescription bottles, the adult

probation card, the large men's clothes, and the framed picture in the living room and dining

room-that [defendant] had some connection with the residence, the fact that the contraband was

concealed in a compartment in the hallway closet undercuts the inference that he had knowledge

of its existence.").

¶ 61    Had defense counsel not called Kenyada, the State would have had trouble showing

defendant resided in the basement specifically, which would have weakened the inferences

needed to establish both control and knowledge. Without Kenyada testifying as to where

defendant and co-defendant stayed respectively, it would be difficult for the factfinder to

differentiate between who owned the firearm (found upstairs) and bullets (found downstairs). By

Kenyada testifying that co-defendant's area was upstairs, and defendant's area was in the

basement, the picture became much clearer, as the court itself acknowledged. Also, there was no

testimony of defendant's clothing in the basement bedroom. This is a fact defense counsel could

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have used to support an argument that the State's evidence suggested only transient presence. and

not residence such that inferences of control of the basement areas, and knowledge of the bullets,

became reasonable.

¶ 62   Considering the totality of the evidence, Kenyada's direct testimony that Scurlock lived in

the basement bedroom tipped the scale in favor of the State's circumstantial evidence. Kenyada's

testimony was the crux of the trial judge's finding that Scurlock had constructive possession of

the contraband. As previously stated, the judge found that Kenyada's testimony "indicates

beyond a reasonable doubt in my opinion that Scurlock stayed in the basement" and showed the

bullet found in the basement was "attributable" to Scurlock. Given the State's dubious evidence

of habitation and the court's finding that Kenyada's testimony connected Scurlock to the

basement bedroom, there is a reasonable probability that the results would have been different

had counsel not presented Kenyada's testimony.

¶ 63   I would find that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. By misapprehending

the law on joint possession, counsel conceded Scurlock had constructive possession of the

contraband. Counsel's performance prejudiced Scurlock where Kenyada's testimony tipped the

scale in favor the State's circumstantial evidence and was the crux of the trial court's finding that

Scurlock had constructive possession of the contraband. I would reverse Scurlock's conviction

and remand so that he may have a fair trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

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