Court Opinion

ID: 9520605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:45:13.285034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:31.254858
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority opinion only in Issue II, in which it finds that the petitioner's plea of guilty to the charge of rape must be vacated. I concur in the majority opinion in all other respects.
I cannot agree that the petitioner carried his burden of showing his guilty plea to the charge of rape was not knowingly and intelligently made since the record does not show that the trial judge expressly informed the petitioner of his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. The majority agrees that the record shows that the petitioner was aware of this right and demonstrated it by his use of compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his defense of the confinement charge. The record further shows that he was advised in detail by the trial judge and made it very clear he was voluntarily and knowingly pleading guilty to the crime of rape, knowing his position full well and knowing what rights he was giving up. The petitioner was fully aware that he was guilty of the crime of rape and admitted on the stand that he was guilty but hoped to convince the trier of fact that he was not guilty of confinement as well as rape. In examining the total record of this cause, no reason whatsoever is shown for vacating the conviction for rape based on the guilty plea of this petitioner. The burden was with the petitioner to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Turman v. State, (1979) Ind., 392 N.E.2d 483; Laird v. State, (1979) Ind., 385 N.E.2d 452; Ind.R. P.C. 1 § 5. Furthermore, the judge hearing the petition for post-conviction relief is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses and his decision will be reversed only where the evidence is without conflict and leads unerringly to a result not reached by the trial court. Turman, supra; Henson v. State, (1979) Ind., 392 N.E.2d 478; Laird, supra; Hoskins v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 291, 302 N.E.2d 499; Ind.R.P.C. 1.
The post-conviction hearing court made detailed findings regarding the entry of the guilty plea in question here and it is helpful to set them out:
(15) That immediately prior to the jury trial of January 29, 1976, under Cause Number $75-$75(2) Petitioner, by counsel, moved the Court to withdraw his plea of not guilty to rape in order to allow him to plead guilty to that count, which said motion was granted by the Court (Record of Proceedings-hereinafter "Record"page 186).
(16) That thereafter the Court inquired of Petitioner whether he understood the nature of the charge of rape and Petitioner responded that he did (Record, page 187), confirming his prior statement at arraignment that he understood the charge (Record, page 27), and Petitioner thereafter again stated that he understood the charge after hearing the victim's testimony establishing a factual basis for the plea (Record, page 142).
(17) That the Court also inquired of the Petitioner whether he understood that by pleading guilty to the charge he was required to be a witness against himself (Record, page 188), whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was subjecting himself to a sentence of not less than two (2) years and not more than twenty-one (21) years which said sentence was not suspendable. (Record, page 138), whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to require the State to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that on September 17, 1975, in Monroe County, Indiana, he unlawfully and forcibly made an assault on the victim and did forcibly and against her will unlawfully ravish and carnally know her (Record, page 143), and, after the testimony of the victim in open Court as to the commission of the offense by *1324Petitioner, whether Petitioner was, "in fact", guilty of rape as alleged (Record, page 143), and Petitioner responded affirmatively to each of said inquiries.
(18) That, in addition to the inquiry as to whether the Petitioner understood that by pleading guilty he was subjecting himself to a sentence of two (2) to twenty-one (21) years, the Court further inquired whether Petitioner understood that the Court would determine the penalty which would be imposed (Record, page 189), and whether Petitioner understood that a pre-sentence investigation would have to be accomplished and a report thereof made to the Court (Record, page 148), and Petitioner responded that he did.
(19) That the Court inquired of the Petitioner on two separate occasions whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to a trial by jury on that charge and each time Petitioner answered that he did (Record, page 187 and page 148).
(20) That immediately after the Petitioner pleaded guilty to rape the parties proceeded into a public and speedy trial on the kidnap charge, which occurrence was known to, and anticipated by, all parties when Petitioner pleaded guilty to rape (Record, pages 136, 189 and 1438).
(21) That the Court inquired of the Petitioner whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving the right to confront the witnesses against him on that charge and Petitioner answered that he did (Record, page 188).
(22) That the Court did not advise the Petitioner of his right to compulsory process or that by pleading guilty he waived such right, but that Petitioner 'did, in the jury trial on kidnap immediately thereafter, exercise such right and call witnesses in his own behalf during such trial (Record, pages 457-482).
(23) That the Court inquired of the Petitioner whether he understood that he had the right to remain silent and not be a witness against himself and that by pleading guilty he was waiving the right to remain silent and would be required to be a witness against himself and Petitioner answered that he did (Record, page 188).
(24) That the Court had theretofore, on January 14, 1976, denied a motion to suppress Petitioner's confession, necessarily finding that he had previously been informed of his right to remain silent and that Petitioner understood that right (Record, page 126).
(25) That the Court, on two separate occasions, asked Petitioner if he understood that he had the right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that by pleading guilty he was waiving that right, and Petitioner responded on each occasion that he did (Record, pages 137-138 and 142-148).
(26) That the Court informed the Petitioner of the minimum and maximum sentences to which his guilty plea subjected him (Record, page 138).
(27) That the Court informed the Petitioner that the sentence was not suspend-able and that the plea of guilty could result in revocation of any parole order to which Petitioner might be subject (Rece-ord, pages 138-189).
(28) That the Court did not inform the Petitioner of the possibility of consecutive sentencing if Petitioner pleaded guilty to rape and was thereafter found guilty of kidnap, but the circumstances of the mandatory life sentence in the event of conviction of kidnap rendered that advice immaterial.
(29) That the Court inquired of Petitioner whether his plea of guilty to rape was the result of any agreement between the State and Petitioner concerning any recommendation by the State as to penalty and Petitioner responded that it was not (Record, page 189).
(30) That the Court inquired whether the Petitioner understood that the Court was under no obligation to follow any recommendation which Petitioner's attorney or the State might make as to the penalty and Petitioner responded that he did (Record, page 189).
*1325(81) That the Court asked Petitioner whether he had been threatened, coerced or induced by anyone to cause him to plead guilty and Petitioner responded in the negative (Record, page 189).
(82) That the Court asked the Petitioner if he understood that the State intended to prosecute the kidnapping charge regardless of Petitioner's guilty plea and Petitioner responded that he did (Record, page 189).
(88) That thereafter the Court did not expressly accept Petitioner's plea of guilty nor make any finding thereon, but convened the jury trial on the kidnapping charge (Record, pages 148-144).
(84) That the Petitioner thereafter testified under oath in his own defense as to the kidnap charge and volunteered that he had already pleaded guilty to rape and stated that he had "no doubt in (his) mind" that he was going to jail as a result (Record, pages 499-500), and then described the events of the evening in question in detail (Record, pages 496-527).
(85) That Petitioner testified that he pleaded guilty with the knowledge that he would have to be sentenced to two (2) to twenty-one (21) years in jail (Record, page 509).
(36) That thereafter the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to kidnapping (Record, page 205), though no findings were entered by the Court on either charge until sentencing on February 19, 1976, at which time the Court found Petitioner guilty of rape pursuant to his plea and guilty of kidnapping pursuant to the jury verdict (Record, page 222).
(87) That Petitioner's allegations in his Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and his testimony at the hearing thereon are at odds with the Record concerning his plea of guilty and Petitioner testified at the hearing on July 18, 1980, that it was "true enough" that his recollection of those events was not possible without reference to the Record and that he could not recall specific advice from the Court.
The State points out that the only evidence presented by the petitioner at the post-conviction hearing about the guilty plea was his own account of the guilty plea hearing and what his counsel privately advised him. There was no corroborating evi-denee from that counsel. He makes many claims about the circumstances of the guilty plea that are not borne out by the record. At one point he stated to the court that he did not recall the questions and answers that were given to him at the guilty plea hearing and he had to rely on the transcript to establish what transpired. The trial court specifically found that it could infer from the record that the petitioner was not only informed of the right of compulsory process to obtain witnesses but he actively exercised it in the kidnapping case.
This Court has held that the personal advisement of rights prior to a guilty plea, as mandated by Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, and further implemented by our Legislature pursuant to Ind.Code § 85-4.1-1-8, did not depend on a didactic ritual recitation of words. In Neeley v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 588, 595-96, 382 N.E.2d 714, 718, we held that although we prefer the trial court to follow Ind.Code § 385-4.1-1-8 to the letter, where the petitioner was not specifically advised of the right to confront the witnesses against him pursuant to Ind. Code § 85-4.1-1-8(c), the court could find from the entire record that the petitioner was advised of and understood the substance of that right. The same was said in Mathis v. State, (1980) Ind., 406 N.E.2d 1182, concerning the failure of the trial court to specifically advise of the right to a speedy trial and the right to confrontation. In Mathis, we found that the requirements of Boykin and Ind.Code § 85-4.1-1-8 are satisfied when the record provides a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the petitioner was meaningfully informed of the specific rights enumerated in Boykin and in the above code section. Id. at 1188-84; see also Williams v. State, (1975) 268 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827; White v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 1269.
*1326The post-conviction hearing court found specifically "[that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of competent evidence that he was denied due process and fundamental fairness in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Indiana in that his plea of guilty to rape was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent."
The record substantially bears out the findings of the trial judge. Petitioner failed to maintain his burden and there is no showing whatever in the evidence that it is without conflict and leads unerringly to a result opposite that reached by the trial court. The trial court should be affirmed on this issue as well as all of the others enumerated in the majority opinion.
I dissent.
GIVAN, C.J., concurs in dissent.