Court Opinion

ID: 9401092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-10 00:00:58.376016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.566287
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10336        Document: 00516780920             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/09/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-10336
                                    Summary Calendar                                   FILED
                                    ____________                                     June 9, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Clinton Battle,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:20-CR-157-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         A jury convicted physician Clinton Battle of one count of conspiracy
   to distribute a controlled substance and one count of distribution of a
   controlled substance. He subsequently pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
   commit mail fraud. The charges stemmed from an alleged scheme in which
   Battle, and his employees using his credentials, issued prescriptions for

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10336      Document: 00516780920           Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/09/2023

                                    No. 22-10336

   controlled substances after Battle performed minimal or no medical
   examination. Battle charged patients for office visits and, at times, received
   illicit drugs from another co-conspirator in exchange for writing
   prescriptions. He now appeals, arguing that: (1) the district court erred in
   admitting a statement made by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the
   controlled substance conspiracy; (2) there was a material variance between
   the superseding indictment, which alleged a single controlled substance
   conspiracy, and the evidence presented at trial, which revealed that there
   were multiple conspiracies; and (3) the district court violated his due process
   and equal protection rights by imposing time limits for his trial.
          As for the first claim, Battle challenges the admission of an out-of-
   court statement made by his office manager’s husband, Michael Blanchard
   (Michael). Battle argues that Michael was simply narrating past conduct
   when he told his wife, Kendrea Blanchard (Kendrea), that he had an
   agreement with Battle to exchange cocaine for prescriptions.            Thus,
   according to Battle, Kendrea should not have been permitted to testify about
   Michael’s out-of-court statement. We review the evidentiary rulings of the
   district court for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d
   687, 692 (5th Cir. 2011). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E),
   statements “made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of
   the conspiracy” are not hearsay. In order to introduce a statement under this
   exception, the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
   that (1) the conspiracy exists, (2) the statement was made by a co-conspirator,
   (3) the statement was made within the course of the conspiracy, and (4) the
   statement was made in an effort to further the conspiracy. See United States
   v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524, 535 (5th Cir. 2018).
          The record supports that Michael’s statement was intended to inform
   another co-conspirator, Kendrea, about the details of an ongoing scheme,
   likely in order to encourage her continued participation in the conspiracy.

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                                    No. 22-10336

   Because the Government demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
   that the statement was made within the course and in furtherance of the
   conspiracy, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
   statement was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See Gurrola, 898 F.3d at
   535-36.
          In his material variance claim, Battle contends that the Government
   presented evidence of two separate conspiracies: a “street dealing”
   conspiracy and an “office visit” conspiracy. “The question whether the
   evidence establishes the existence of one conspiracy (as alleged in the
   indictment) or multiple conspiracies is a fact question within the jury’s
   province.” United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 2007). A
   jury’s finding that there was a single conspiracy should be affirmed “unless
   the evidence and all reasonable inferences, examined in the light most
   favorable to the [G]overnment, would preclude reasonable jurors from
   finding a single conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.”          Id. (internal
   quotation marks and citations omitted). This court primarily considers three
   factors: “(1) the existence of a common goal; (2) the nature of the scheme;
   and (3) the overlapping of the participants in the various dealings.” United
   States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 406 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted).
          Here, the allegedly distinct conspiracies shared a common goal: to
   profit from the illegal prescribing of controlled substances, using Battle’s
   clinics and credentials, without a legitimate medical purpose. See United
   States v. Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1995). Moreover, they relied on
   the same tactics and were run through Battle’s clinics, where Battle operated
   as a “key man.” Id. at 416-17. Although some participants in the conspiracy
   did not work together and were not involved in every deal, “there is no
   requirement that every member must participate in every transaction to find
   a single conspiracy.” Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and

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                                      No. 22-10336

   citation omitted). And “[t]he members of a conspiracy which functions
   through a division of labor need not have an awareness of the existence of the
   other members, or be privy to the details of each aspect of the conspiracy,”
   United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1987). Accordingly,
   viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
   Government, Battle’s material variance claim fails. See Rojas, 812 F.3d at
   406-07; Morris, 46 F.3d at 415-17.
          Regarding Battle’s challenge to the time limits, our review is for plain
   error as he did not object to the limits or request additional time in the district
   court. See United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 1997). To
   demonstrate plain error, Battle must show a forfeited error that is clear or
   obvious and that affects his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States,
   556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes this showing, we have discretion to
   remedy the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets,
   and citations omitted). The district court “may impose reasonable time
   limits on the presentation of evidence and the examination of witnesses.”
   United States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2005). Thus, we have
   allowed “limits that do not unreasonably curtail a defendant’s right to
   examine [G]overnment witnesses and present an effective defense.” United
   States v. Morrison, 833 F.3d 491, 505 (5th Cir. 2016).
          Battle failed to make an offer of proof during trial, and on appeal, he
   does not point to any information he was prevented from presenting to the
   jury. See Morrison, 833 F.3d at 505-06; Gray, 105 F.3d at 965. His arguments
   that the time limits impaired his defense are conclusory, and his contention
   that the jury was confused because of the time limits is not supported by the
   record. Moreover, even if the district court improperly cited a district-wide
   civil rule as the source of its authority to impose time limits in this criminal
   case, any such error did not affect Battle’s substantial rights. See Puckett, 556

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                                   No. 22-10336

   U.S. at 135; see also Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).          Finally, Battle fails to
   demonstrate that the allegedly unfair time limits rendered his subsequent
   plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud unknowing or involuntary.
   See United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2014).
          AFFIRMED.

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