Court Opinion

ID: 9931631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:06:40.33157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:43.020713
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            Nos. 125,094
                                                 125,095

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                         STATE OF KANSAS,
                                             Appellee,

                                                   v.

                                    CODY WILLIAM SCHULTZ,
                                          Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Ellis District Court; GLENN R. BRAUN, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed February 9, 2024. Affirmed.

       Hope Faflick Reynolds, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

       Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., MALONE and ISHERWOOD, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: Cody William Schultz was convicted of aggravated indecent
liberties with a child, electronic solicitation of a child, and rape. His conviction rested, in
part, on incriminating statements that Schultz made to police on the day of his arrest.
Prior to trial, he moved the court to suppress those statements, but his request was denied
following a hearing. Schultz urges this court to reach a contrary finding regarding the
voluntariness of his statements on the grounds that he was not adequately Mirandized, his
will was overborne during the interview, his statements were the product of coercion, and
officers failed to execute his arrest warrant properly. We have thoroughly reviewed the

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totality of the circumstances from the record before us and find no error in the district
court's conclusion. The denial of Schultz's motion to suppress is affirmed.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In December 2019, twelve-year old N.D. confided in a library staff member that
she had a sexual encounter with an older man whom she met on Snapchat. N.D. could
only identify him by his Snapchat username. The staff member notified the police, who
came to the library and talked with N.D. about the encounter. Afterwards, they collected
N.D.'s phone, along with her shirt and shoe because both had semen on them.

       The police sent N.D.'s shirt and shoe to the KBI for DNA testing and submitted an
emergency request to Snapchat for information on the identified username. Snapchat
responded with records of pictures and conversations associated with that username. The
photos included a picture of Schultz, and the records contained a conversation Schultz
shared with another underage girl, J.D. During that exchange, Schultz discussed sexual
acts and continued to do so after J.D. advised him that she was only 13 years old. He
even went so far as to suggest that they engage in such sexual activity together. Armed
with the information provided by N.D. and Snapchat, the police obtained a search warrant
for Schultz's residence, his electronics, and two of his vehicles. The warrant also
extended to his body so DNA evidence could be collected.

       Detective Burkholder of the Hays Police Department made an audio recording of
law enforcement's encounter with Schultz at his home during the execution of the search
warrant. Approximately six officers were present at the scene, either in the front of the
house or in the back to guard the perimeter, and approached with handguns and rifles
drawn due to the severity of the allegations and information they received that indicated
Schultz possessed firearms in his residence.

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       Detective Burkholder and Special Agent Thayer knocked on the front door and
when Schultz's fiancée answered, the officers informed her they needed to talk to Schultz.
When Schultz came to the door, he was asked to step outside, at which time officers
handcuffed him and proceeded with execution of the search warrant.

       Once Schultz was handcuffed, approximately three of the officers left the scene.
Detective Burkholder read Schultz his Miranda rights, and Schultz verbally indicated that
he understood. Burkholder spoke with Schultz for roughly two minutes and Schultz
acknowledged that he used his Snapchat account to meet a girl who said she was 18 but
claimed he left upon learning she was not actually that old. At that point, Schultz was
transported to the Ellis County Law Enforcement Center for further questioning. During
the ride, Schultz made unsolicited incriminating statements, which were recorded by
Detective Hancock. Schultz asked Hancock, "what's this all about," to which the
detective simply responded, "she's 12, man." Schultz reiterated that he met with a girl
who claimed to be 18 years old but once she told him she was only 12, after they already
started "messing around," he took off running.

       At the Law Enforcement Center, while waiting to be formally interviewed, Schultz
agreed to prepare a written statement. Before he did so, officers inquired whether
Burkholder had advised him of his Miranda rights and if he had agreed to speak with the
detective. Schultz responded affirmatively to both questions. The police then requested
that Schultz "go into detail" and stated, "there is more than one incident, so you need to
talk about them all."

       In his written statement, Schultz admitted to meeting a girl on Snapchat and
performing sexual acts with her at a park. He also stated that she brought a friend with
her who wanted to join in the sexual activity. He claimed that just as he ejaculated, the
girl told him that her friend was only 13 so he immediately "took off running." Schultz
concluded his written statement with a description of a separate incident involving a

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different girl he met on Snapchat who claimed to be 18, but that he stopped talking to her
after learning "she was not who she said she was."

       Detective Burkholder conducted a formal interview with Schultz and inquired
whether he recalled the Miranda warnings he received earlier; Schultz indicated that he
did. The detective then told Schultz that his "end goal in all this is to get you help so you
can get back to your family." Schultz informed Burkholder that he is schizophrenic, and
he initially attempted to control it with medication and therapy but it "made [him] feel
weird." He then explained his version of events, which essentially simply recounted the
version of events he outlined in his written statement, plus a few additional details. He
also relinquished the password for his Snapchat account. The collective time Schultz
spent in police custody amounted to less than four hours.

       DNA was collected from Schultz and the sample ultimately revealed that he could
not be excluded as a contributor for the semen found on N.D.'s shirt and shoe. That
sample further indicated that Schultz could not be excluded as the contributor of semen
that was part of a rape kit for an unsolved 2014 case where a woman, M.E., was raped by
an unknown assailant. The results gave rise to charges against Schultz in two separate
cases. In 20-CR-2, the State charged him with (1) aggravated indecent liberties with N.D.
and (2) electronic solicitation of J.D. In 20-CR-328, he was charged with the rape of M.E.

       Prior to trial, Schultz moved to suppress the incriminating statements he made to
law enforcement officers. The district court denied his motion and ruled the statements
were admissible. Specifically, the district court found that officers were under no
obligation to re-Mirandize Schultz at the Law Enforcement Center. It also rejected
Schultz's contention that his statements were the product of coercion or impermissibly
elicited while he was exhibiting signs of mental problems. Finally, the district court
addressed Schultz's complaints concerning execution of the search warrant and
determined that law enforcement was justified in bringing more officers and firearms to

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Schultz's residence due to the potential threat of violence and that overall, the officers
conducted themselves in a non-threatening, respectful manner during its execution.

       The parties engaged in mediation and agreed to proceed to a bench trial on
stipulated facts, then consolidate the two cases for sentencing. Schultz was convicted as
charged and received consecutive prison sentences of 186 months and life with a
mandatory minimum term of 25 years in prison for the child sex offenses, and another
consecutive prison sentence of 186 months for the rape conviction.

       Schultz now brings his case to our court for an analysis of the district court's
denial of his motion to suppress.

                                     LEGAL ANALYSIS

The district court properly declined to suppress the voluntary statements Schultz made to
law enforcement officers.

       Standard of Review

       An appellate court reviews the district court's decision on a motion to suppress
using a bifurcated standard. State v. Gilliland, 294 Kan. 519, 545, 276 P.3d 165 (2012),
cert. denied 568 U.S. 1176, 133 S. Ct. 1274, 185 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2013). Without
reweighing the evidence, the district court's findings are reviewed to determine whether
they are supported by substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion
regarding the suppression of evidence is then reviewed using a de novo standard. When
the facts material to a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in
dispute, the question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate
court has unlimited review. 294 Kan. at 545.

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       "The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that
the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement—the right of a person to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
suffer no penalty . . . for such silence." Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489,
12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964). Under the right against self-incrimination, a defendant’s
statement is inadmissible at trial if it is involuntary. An involuntary statement is one
made when the will of the suspect was overborne. To be admissible, the statement must
be made "freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion." Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 513, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1963). The list of nonexclusive factors a
district court must consider when looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a defendant's statements are voluntary is the duration and manner of the
interrogation; the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside
world; the accused's age, intellect, and background; and the fairness of the officers in
conducting the interrogation." State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 971, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994).

       The bare fact of police detention and questioning in private do not render a
detainee's statements involuntary. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 437, 78 S. Ct.
1287, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1448 (1958). Rather, to establish involuntariness, a defendant needs
evidence of coercive police conduct causally related to the statements at issue. Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). Mere trickery by
the police does not necessarily amount to coercive police conduct. See Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S. Ct. 1420, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1969) (suspect was not coerced
when his confession was prompted by police falsely telling him that his co-defendant
confessed). However, conduct that cannot obviously be defined as coercive may
nonetheless give rise to a claim of involuntariness if it is sufficiently egregious. To meet
that designation the challenged conduct must be particularly shocking to the conscience,
such as that which is intended to injure in some way and is unjustifiable by any
government interest. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed.
2d 984 (2003).

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       Schultz's Miranda Rights

       We first undertake an analysis of Schultz's claim that the Miranda warnings he
received were insufficient to ensure his understanding of the same given that officers
only provided the warnings verbally, within minutes of his arrest, and failed to re-
Mirandize him between interviews. We are not persuaded that these factors cast a pall
over Schultz's statements such that they render the statements involuntary.

       Generally, statements uttered during a custodial interrogation are only admissible
at trial if they were accompanied by particular procedural safeguards which ensured that
a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was adequately protected. Such
safeguards include informing the person in custody, prior to interrogation, of his or her
Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, and to have an
attorney present during interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). In determining whether law enforcement officers
adequately complied with Miranda, the inquiry is simply whether the warnings
reasonably conveyed the suspect's rights. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60, 130 S. Ct.
1195, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (2010).

       Schultz's first complaint concerning the Miranda warnings he received is that law
enforcement officers only provided him with the warnings in a verbal format. While not
directly addressed by Kansas courts, other states have declined to find that law
enforcement officers are required to issue Miranda warnings both verbally and in writing.
See Matter of A.S., 163 N.E.3d 1143, 1150 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (proper for detective to
give only verbal Miranda warnings to minor prior to interview); People v. Fiorino, 130
A.D.3d 1376, 1379, 15 N.Y.S.3d 498(2015) (proper for police to give only verbal
warnings to defendant prior to interview). These cases suggest there is no requirement
that Miranda warnings be issued in both formats in order for Schultz to receive the
protections to which he is entitled and to ensure his subsequent statements are properly

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considered voluntary. We are convinced that what is contemplated by Miranda was
satisfied here when Detective Burkholder verbally informed Schultz of those rights,
Schultz communicated that he understood the same and agreed to speak with the
detective and failed to assert his right to remain silent or his right to an attorney.

       Schultz's next complaint consists of the claim that officers were required to re-
Mirandize him after he was transported to the Law Enforcement Center. The question of
whether a suspect should be re-Mirandized after a waiver is one of law that this court
answers by considering the totality of the circumstances. A key factor in the analysis is
the time between the initial waiver and the statements sought to be suppressed. State v.
Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 706-07, 207 P.3d 208 (2009).

       The total time that Schultz was in police custody and subject to questioning
amounted to less than four hours. This is a reasonable period for a suspect to go without
triggering the need for he or she to be reminded of their Miranda rights. See United
States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995) (24-hour interval between
waiver of Miranda rights and defendant's statement to law enforcement was reasonable);
Stumes v. Solem, 752 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1985) (5-hour interval between waiver of
Miranda rights and defendant's statement to law enforcement was reasonable); People v.
Gonzalez, 5 A.D.3d 696, 697, 774 N.Y.S.2d 739 (2004) (11.5 hours after first questioning
defendant was reasonable).

       A thorough review of the totality of the circumstances makes clear that law
enforcement officers honored Schultz's rights under Miranda. Again, officers gave the
required advisement, Schultz indicated that he understood those warnings and opted to
waive the same. The facts of this case do not give cause to issue repeat warnings. Thus,
their absence fails to demonstrate that Schultz's statements to police were involuntary.

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       Execution of the Search Warrant

       Schultz next argues that his statements should be suppressed because they were
the product of coercion given the manner in which law enforcement officers executed
their search warrant. Specifically, he directs our attention to his warrantless arrest and the
officers' "significant and intimidating show of force" as examples of excessive conduct.
We have analyzed the claim and disagree with Schultz's contention that these factors
reflect that his statements to the officers were involuntary.

       For Fourth Amendment purposes, a warrant to search for contraband founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupant of the
premises while a proper search is conducted. If the search then uncovers evidence
establishing probable cause to arrest the occupant, that arrest is constitutionally
permissible. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-05 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d
340 (1981). This rule serves two legitimate law enforcement interests: (1) preventing
flight in case incriminating evidence is found, and (2) minimizing the risk of harm to
officers. 452 U.S. at 702.

       Under Summers, it is immaterial that Schultz was arrested without an arrest
warrant. He was initially detained pursuant to the search warrant which was a detention
that is justified by the dual law enforcement interests identified in Summers. Due to the
severity of the crime and Schultz's ownership of firearms, there were legitimate risks that
Schultz would either attempt to flee or harm officers. While detained, Schultz was read
his Miranda rights and opted to utter incriminating statements. At this point, probable
cause was established, so the officers transported Schultz to the Law Enforcement Center
for further questioning. We detect nothing unlawful in that phase of the encounter and
thereby reject Schultz's first contention that his warrantless arrest demanded suppression
of the statements that followed.

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       As for the show of force exhibited by the officers, it is worth noting that they
actually de-escalated the situation by the time Schultz was detained and questioned. That
is, approximately half of the officers left the scene and those who remained holstered
their weapons. Additionally, the record does not disclose, nor does Schultz highlight any
evidence of disrespect exhibited by Detective Burkholder during the time he questioned
Schultz. We decline to find that the law enforcement officers here engaged in the type of
coercive conduct necessary to render Schultz's statements involuntary. Cf. United States
v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466-67 (10th Cir. 1993) (defendant's statements were
involuntary when questioned in an isolated area, face down in the dirt, with officer's guns
aimed at him, prior to Miranda warnings, while police helicopters hovered overhead).

       Nothing about the officers' execution of the search warrant on Schultz's property
suggests that his incriminating statements were involuntarily made. To the contrary,
Schultz was properly detained, and officers diffused the situation before the detective
questioned Schultz. Therefore, we share the district court's conclusion that the claims
advanced by Schultz fail to undermine the voluntary nature of the statements he made to
officers.

       Police Interview Techniques

       Schultz's next claim of error is directed at the interview techniques employed by
officers during his questioning at the Law Enforcement Center. Specifically, Schultz
contends that officers incentivized him to cooperate by implying that if he simply
confessed, they would allow him to leave and return home to his family. Schultz further
asserts that it was improper for the officers to request that he be thorough and descriptive
while confessing. For the reasons explained below, we find neither argument persuasive.

       The first example Schultz offers as a foundation for his claim is a remark made by
Detective Burkholder during the interview at the law enforcement center that his "end

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goal in all this is to get you help so you can get back to your family." Schultz cites two
out-of-state cases to support his argument that Burkholder's statement provided a false
sense of security that can render a confession involuntary: Cole v. State, 923 P.2d 820
(Alaska Ct. App. 1996); and State v. Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32 (Iowa 2012).

       In Cole, the Alaska Court of Appeals suppressed Cole's statements to law
enforcement officers, partly because they falsely assured him that their questioning was
motivated by a desire to help him and his daughter. 923 P.2d at 831-32. However, the
Alaska court stated that these assurances by the officers, standing alone, "fall somewhere
within the gray area, arguably landing closer to the impermissible than the permissible
boundary." 923 P.2d at 831. More important to the court's holding were the statements
made by officers which implied that the psychological help Cole requested would be
withheld until he confessed. 923 P.2d at 831-32. These statements were also
accompanied by what the reviewing court deemed to be two improper ruses. First, the
officers falsely claimed that the district attorney had authorized a polygraph test and they
threatened to obtain a court order requiring Cole to take one. In actuality, the issuance of
a court order mandating that Cole submit to a polygraph test would infringe upon his
right against self-incrimination. Second, the police falsely claimed that they obtained a
warrant to electronically monitor and tape-record the crime that occurred the previous
night. Thus, it was the totality of the circumstances that drove the Alaska court to
conclude that Cole's statements were involuntary. 923 P.2d at 830.

       Cole is readily distinguishable from the case before us given the existence of
additional interrogation tactics found to be questionable. Notably, the Alaska court
observed that "the fact that an interrogator is sympathetic or friendly toward a defendant,
or professes a general desire to help, does not in itself render a subsequent confession
involuntary." 923 P.2d at 831. This language arguably encompasses the tactics Schultz
challenges from his interview. Thus, Cole actually suggests that, when occurring in

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isolation, it was not improper for investigating officers to tell Schultz that their goal was
to help him return home to his family.

       The next out-of-state case cited by Schultz, Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32, is also
distinguishable. In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court suppressed Howard's confession
after finding that the officers misled him with an implied promise of leniency. That is,
investigating officers improperly conveyed the false impression that, if Howard
confessed, he would be sent to a treatment facility in lieu of further punishment. Unlike
Howard, the language officers used while questioning Schultz never amounted to an
inducement likely to cause a false confession. The police never implicitly or explicitly
promised Schultz leniency in exchange for cooperation. Therefore, Howard does not
serve to advance Schultz's claim that the officers' statements concerning their desire to
help him return home was improper.

       The same result emerges with an analysis of Kansas precedent. To render a
defendant's statement involuntary, an officer must promise an "action to be taken by a
public official." State v. Garcia, 297 Kan. 182, 196, 301 P.3d 658 (2013) (finding
confession involuntary where officers withheld treatment for gunshot wound until after
interrogation and promised leniency to induce the confession); State v. Harris, 284 Kan.
560, 579-80, 162 P.3d 28 (2007) (finding confession voluntary where officers only said
that the prosecutor would view cooperation favorably and warned that the police had no
power to make deals). No such promises were made to Schultz.

       Turning to Schultz's contention that it was improper for the officers to request that
he be thorough and descriptive while confessing, he fails to support his claim with any
legal authority which firmly establishes that such requests are coercive. Therefore, we
find the claim is waived. See State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 919, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012)
(failure to support a point with pertinent authority is akin to failing to brief the issue).

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       We decline to find that any of the interview tactics used against Schultz crossed
the line into coercion. It was not improper for Detective Burkholder to feign either
sympathy or a desire to help during his questioning of Schultz. Nor was it improper for
officers to request that Schultz provide a comprehensive and descriptive written
statement.

       Schultz's Suspected Mental Disability

       Schultz's final point of error is that law enforcement officers failed to
accommodate his suspected mental disability. This claim arises out of comments Schultz
made during his interview at the Law Enforcement Center about his alleged
schizophrenia. We are not persuaded that this issue amounts to error.

       We believe that State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 32, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994), offers a
fair amount of guidance on resolution of Schultz's claim. In that case, Mack had a
verifiable record of mental illness which rendered him incompetent to stand trial for a
period of three months. Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme Court found that Mack's
mental health issues did not demand suppression of the statements he made to law
enforcement officers. 255 Kan. at 32. In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered
the absence of coercion exhibited by investigating officers, their respect for Mack's
Miranda rights, Mack's voluntary waiver of those rights, and his ability to easily
communicate with the officers. 255 Kan. at 32.

       The sole difference between Mack and Schultz's case is that Mack could
substantiate his mental illness. Here, the only evidence of Schultz's alleged schizophrenia
are the statements he made during the interview at the Law Enforcement Center.
Therefore, considering Schultz was properly Mirandized, he waived those rights and
agreed to speak to officers, he participated in an interview that was not tainted by
coercive tactics, and freely communicated with them, his case closely aligns with Mack

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and warrants a similar outcome. We are not persuaded by Schultz's argument that his
isolated comment concerning his struggle with schizophrenia strips his statements of their
voluntary quality.

       Considering the totality of the circumstances, it cannot be said that the
incriminating statements Schultz made to investigating officers were involuntary. Each
aspect of the officers' conduct that Schultz alleges to be coercive or otherwise improper
was permissible under Kansas and federal law. Accordingly, the district court properly
denied Schultz's motion to suppress.

       Affirmed.

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