Court Opinion

ID: 9541867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:29:06.809264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:05.414425
License: Public Domain

*322POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
Having reviewed the record, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusions that the appellant was entitled to an alibi instruction, moreover I disagree that the instruction given herein did not qualify as an “alibi instruction.”
First, I believe that the majority ignores the definition of an alibi defense after it correctly defines it in accordance with Commonwealth v. Whiting, 409 Pa. 492, 187 A.2d 563 (1963). “Alibi is a defense that places the defendant at the relevant time in a different place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.” (emphasis added) Whiting, 409 Pa. at 498, 187 A.2d at 566; See also Commonwealth v. Pound, 490 Pa. 621, 631, 417 A.2d 597, 602 (1980); Commonwealth v. Wade, 501 Pa. 331, 333, 461 A.2d 613, 614 (1983).
Instantly, the victim testified that, at approximately 11:00 p.m., she was walking to the AM-PM Mini Mart on Jefferson Street in Butler, Pennsylvania, when the appellant robbed her at gun-point. Unsatisfied with the amount of his ill-gotten proceeds, he decided to rape the victim. Forcing the victim into an alley, he then made the victim take off her clothes and perform oral sex upon him. Thereafter, the victim was raped several more times. She testified that her ordeal lasted nearly two hours and ended upon her release at approximately 1:00 a.m. (N.T., pp. 7-19).
At trial, the appellant testified that he was at The Keg on the evening in question from approximately 8:30 p.m. until closing time at the bar, approximately 1:00 a.m. The appellant further testified that he was in the company of Larry Lawson the entire evening. However, Mr. Lawson, though subpoenaed, did not appear to testify. Significantly, The Keg is located less than one-half a mile from the AM-PM Mini Mart on Jefferson. (N.T., pp. 90-92).
The appellant’s testimony is not an alibi. Clearly, the appellant was not so far removed from the scene of the series of rapes as to “render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.” The appellant was within a few city blocks *323of the crime scene. Even if the appellant was in The Keg at 10:45 p.m., he could have easily left the bar, robbed, raped and released the victim before 12:45 a.m., and then returned to the bar prior to its 1:00 a.m. closing time. As stated by Justice Larsen in his dissenting opinion in Pound, supra, “If two persons are in a house and one is found dead in the bedroom, the jury should not be instructed on the alibi defense merely because the other claimed that he never left the kitchen.” Pound, 417 A.2d at 604 (dissent). Similar to Justice Larsen’s analysis of the Pound facts, I read the appellant’s testimony as no more than a general denial of guilt. Consequently, I dissent based on my conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the alibi defense.
Secondly, even, arguendo, accepting the majority’s assumption that the appellant’s testimony amounted to an alibi, it creates a distinction where there is no difference between the charge of the trial court and the Pennsylvania Standard Jury Instruction on the subject of alibis. That instruction reads as follows:
Obviously the defendant cannot be guilty unless he was at the scene of the alleged crime. The defendant has offered evidence to show that he was not present at the scene but rather was at ( ). You should consider this evidence along with all the other evidence in the case in determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the defendant himself committed (or took part in committing) it. The defendant’s evidence that he was not present, either by itself or together with other evidence, may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt in your minds. If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt you must find him not guilty.
Here, the trial court did, in fact take special note of the appellant’s testimony:
The critical question for you to decide is whether or not the defendant was the actor in the event that took place *324between eleven p.m. and one a.m. on the ninth and tenth of January. In behalf of the Commonwealth you have the testimony of Phyllis Weirich particularly as to the description of the assailant, the composite she put together of her assailant and the photo identification which is Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2.
In behalf of the defendant he states that he was not in the area but drinking beer at The Keg from eight p.m. until closing on the night in question; that he was bearded at the time of the incident. In his behalf his mother-in-law and commonlaw wife testified that he was bearded.
(N.T., pp. 122-123)
Immediately thereafter, the trial court went on to charge on presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt. Thus, it is clear to this writer that the trial court did indeed emphasize and elucidate the focal point of the testimonial conflicts.
When the standard charge is read juxtaposed to the actual charge of the court, one can discern precious little difference, certainly none that rises to the level of reversible error. See, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 336 Pa.Super. 1, 485 A.2d 397 (1984) (Pa.S.J.I. on alibi defense satisfies Pound). Finding that the trial court’s charge in this uncomplicated case that encompassed just over one hundred (100) testimonial pages was precise and elucidating, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion to the contrary.