Court Opinion

ID: 9565452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:21:34.392225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:39.335364
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion except Section II, dealing with statute of limitations defense raised by the architect Albanese. The majority has incorrectly interpreted the language defining the time of accrual for a cause of action of professional malpractice under I.C. § 5-219(4).
The general rule at common law was that a cause of action does not accrue for negligence, including professional malpractice, until some damage occurred.
The majority does not deny, however, that the legislature has the power to commence the accrual of a cause of action prior to any damage occurring. Indeed, the majority acknowledges as much by stating, ante at 46, that while the general rule is that “ ‘the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligence action until some damage has occurred ...’ the legislature has modified this general rule by enacting I.C. § 5-241 [which] section causes accrual only if one’s cause of action has not accrued prior to six years after completion of construction.”
The majority does not deny that the legislature, by enacting 5-219(4), in cases involving professional malpractice not involving a wrongful death, has set a specific time when the cause of action accrues irrespective of damage, i.e., “the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of____”
The majority states, however, that “plaintiff’s cause of action against Albanese alleges negligent inspection of the apartment complex. Thus, the facts of this case bring the cause of action within I.C. § 5-241 because plaintiff’s tort cause of action is one which arises out of the construction of an improvement to real property.” However, the majority does not analyze the limitation later set out in 5-241 which states, “Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action,” and the further statement in 5-241(a), where it states, “Tort actions, if not previously accrued, shall accrue and the applicable limitation statute shall begin to run six years after the final completion of construction of such an improvement.” By its express language, I.C. § 5-241 does not extend the limitation period for professional malpractice of an architect which is covered by any other statute.
The 1971 amendment to I.C. § 5-219(4), which added the special limitation provision for professional malpractice, used language implying fictional accrual without damage for actions of professional malpractice. As previously noted, we held in Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978), that the legislative intention of I.C. § 5-219(4) was to accrue an action for professional malpractice at the time of the negligent act or omission, in that case the probating of a will. By now holding that “accrual” under I.C. § 5-219(4), in the case at bar, requires damage or injury, the majority effectively reads out of the statute and repeals the following language:
“But in all other actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing *260consequences or damages resulting therefrom____” (Emphasis added.)
The majority implies that unless I.C. § 5-219(4) is interpreted to accrue a cause of action at the time of injury or damage, I.C. § 5-241(a) would be rendered effectively repealed or meaningless. However, I.C. § 5-241(a) would still apply to claims against building contractors and suppliers for property loss and consequential damages, which was probably the primary reason for adopting 5-241(a) in the first place. It is clear that because of the language in I.C. § 5-241 which states that “[njothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action,” I.C. § 5-241 was not intended to change the limitation set out in I.C. § 5-219(4) relating to professional malpractice of the architect Albanese.
The majority’s reliance on Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982), is misplaced. The holding in that case was that an architect, allegedly guilty of professional malpractice, could be estopped from asserting the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice under 5-219(4) because of his subsequent conduct in attempting to cover up his alleged negligence. The plurality opinion in that case did, by way of dicta, discuss the interplay of 5-219(4) and 5-241(a), but at no time discussed the specific language in 5-241 that “[njothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.” Nor did it discuss the language in 5-241(a) that “tort actions, if not previously accrued, shall accrue and the applicable limitation statute shall begin to run six years after the final completion of construction of such an improvement.” The Court seriously errs today in its opinion by failing to acknowledge and follow the specific language in 5-241 states that “[njothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.” I.C. § 5-219(4) is the latest expression of legislative will, and it is clear that by using the language, “the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom ...,” the legislature intended a result contrary to that obtained by the majority opinion today.