Court Opinion

ID: 9378873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 21:02:22.430521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:15.010035
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/23 Marriage of Freeman CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re the Marriage of VANESSA and
 MICHAEL A. FREEMAN.

 VANESSA FREEMAN,                                                                            F083677

             Appellant,                                                      (Super. Ct. No. FL-18-001082)

                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
 MICHAEL A. FREEMAN,

             Respondent.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Alan K.
Cassidy, Judge.
         Vanessa Freeman, in pro. per., for Appellant.
         No appearance for Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         Vanessa Freeman, representing herself, appeals from an order awarding physical
custody of her daughter to Michael Freeman.1 Vanessa raises wide-ranging claims in

         1   According to the record, Vanessa and Michael are married but separated.
pursuit of “new orders granting [her] sole physical custody” or, alternatively, a “proper
long cause hearing in front of a different court/ judge.”
       In designating the record on appeal, Vanessa filed form APP-0032 and originally
elected to proceed with the reporter’s transcript on appeal. The form specifically
references the “Transcript Reimbursement Fund” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 8030.2 et seq.),
but Vanessa did not attach a copy of any reimbursement application.
       The superior court issued Vanessa a “notice of default” because she failed to
“deposit the cost of preparation of the Reporter’s Transcript ….” Vanessa subsequently
filed a corrected designation, electing instead to proceed without a reporter’s transcript
while acknowledging her election would severely limit this court’s review.
       The “Clerk’s Transcript” was prepared “at no cost” due to the fact “a fee
waiver … was granted ….” As Vanessa later explained, she “was under the impression
the reporters’ fees for transcripts for the record would be covered under [the] fee
waiver ….”3
       We have carefully reviewed the record with these facts in mind. We will affirm
the trial court’s September 8, 2021, order.
                                      BACKGROUND
       In early 2021, Vanessa filed an “ex parte application for orders” seeking injunctive
relief after Michael allegedly refused to return their then 11-year-old daughter in
compliance with the child custody order in place at the time. The trial court granted
temporary emergency orders awarding sole physical custody to Vanessa by removing
visitation from Michael and ordered Michael to return the minor child to Vanessa. The
case was set for a regular hearing.

       2APP-003 is the official record designation form approved for use by the Judicial
Council of California.
       3   This explanation is contained within Vanessa’s brief.

                                              2.
       Prior to the hearing, Michael replied to Vanessa’s request for orders. Michael
asked for temporary custody and claimed he kept his daughter “[f]or [h]er [s]afety” and
“[w]asn’t [w]illing [t]o [h]and [h]er [o]ver [t]o [h]er [a]buser.”
       At the hearing, the court left in place temporary orders including “sole physical
custody” to Vanessa and ordering “[n]either party [to] say anything, do anything, or
allow any conduct which might tend to alienate the affections of the minor child[] for the
other parent.” The case was again continued for a “hearing on the Family Court Services
Evaluator’s Report.”
       A few days later, Vanessa filed for a “change” in orders because Michael
“alienated” their daughter’s “feelings.” Specifically, Vanessa sought “[n]o visitation [for
Michael] until supervised visitation can be arranged.” The judge issued temporary orders
consistent with the request.
       After the hearing, Michael filed for temporary emergency orders, seeking “full
custody of [his] daughter … due to the physical/mental abuse that Vanessa … continues
to give to [their] daughter.” The court denied the request “until hearing/mediation.”
       On May 4,4 the court held a hearing after receiving the aforementioned report.
The court found “an immediate concern for the [child’s] well-being” and “generated”
“[f]ormal custody orders ….” The orders awarded Michael with “sole physical custody”
and all “non-designated time with the [child].” They also reiterated the prior anti-
alienation order.
       Because Vanessa objected to the report and orders, the case was set for trial. In
the interim before trial, Vanessa continued to file various requests for orders seeking to
regain physical custody of her daughter.
       On September 8, the court held a trial on Vanessa’s “objection to” the report. The
trial was not transcribed, but the minute order indicates the court “read and considered all

       4   Unless otherwise stated, all references to dates are to dates in 2021.

                                               3.
pleadings and declarations from June through and including current to date,” the
“[p]arties provide[d] testimony,” and Vanessa’s counsel argued the matter.
       The court, in confirming custody of the minor child to Michael, ruled as follows:

                “The Court considers all evidence and testimony presented by
                both sides; after consideration of the aforementioned, the
                Court finds minor child should/shall be in counseling
                forthwith.

                “The Court is going to follow the recommendation found in
                Ms. King’s report.

                “Court reiterates and strongly orders parents to be make sure
                minor child is engaged in counseling.

                “Court further orders a report form [sic] the minor child’s
                counselor at the next hearing.”5
The case was subsequently set for a “Status Review Hearing.”
       Vanessa continued to challenge the court’s custody orders, including filing a
nonstatutory motion to reconsider.6 The court ultimately denied the motion to reconsider.
On December 10, Vanessa filed a notice of appeal from the May 4 and September 8
rulings.
                                        DISCUSSION
       Vanessa raises numerous issues. She argues venue was improper, her fundamental
rights were violated, the court abused its discretion by delegating authority to the
“mediator,” “improper application of the rules of evidence,” the “mediator” violated the
California Rules of Court, the court was biased and abused its discretion, and her trial
counsel was ineffective.

       5   This ruling is contained within the minute order.
       6The record contains no actual motion to reconsider. It appears Vanessa included
“reconsideration” as part of a request-for-orders filing on September 22. On
November 9, the court calendared a “Motion for Reconsideration” to be heard on
November 30.

                                              4.
       On our own, we consider whether Vanessa’s claims are appealable. We conclude
an appeal from the September 8 hearing is timely.
       Addressing the issues on the merits, as best we can due to the limited record and
briefing, we find no error. We will affirm the trial court’s September 8 order.
I. Appealability
       “A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an
appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices
Com’n. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) “ ‘Compliance with the time for filing a notice of
appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. [Citation.] If a notice of appeal is not timely, the
appellate court must dismiss the appeal.’ ” (City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 180, 189.)
       California Rules of Court, rule 8.1047 sets the time to appeal at “60 days after” the
appealing party is served with “a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a
filed-endorsed copy of the judgment ….” (Rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) & (B).) If there is no
service, then the time to appeal is “180 days after the entry of judgment.”
(Rule 8.104(a)(1)(C).)
       Here, there is no notice of entry of judgment nor is there a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment. Accordingly, the time to appeal was 180 days. The September 8 ruling
falls within 180 days from the date the notice of appeal was filed, but the May 4 ruling
does not.
       The remaining question is whether the September 8 ruling is legally appealable.
Orders modifying final custody judgments are appealable as orders made after a final
judgment. (Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377-1378; Code
Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (a)(2).) We construe the September 8 ruling as an order after
judgment because it was made after a contested trial where the court essentially finalized

       7   All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                               5.
the emergency orders adopted on May 4. (See Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 901 [describing “ ‘well-established policy … of according’ ” right
to appeal “ ‘in doubtful cases’ ”].) Accordingly, the September 8 ruling is appealable.
II. Limitations Due To No Reporter’s Transcript
       “Under well-established principles of California’s constitutional doctrine of
reversible error, an order of the lower court is presumed correct—that is, all intendments
and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent—
and the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error. [Citation.]
Appellants fail to carry the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error if they, among
other things, do not provide an adequate record on appeal ….” (Herrera v. Doctors
Medical Center of Modesto (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 538, 547.)
       An appeal without a reporter’s transcript is treated “as an appeal ‘on the judgment
roll,’ to which the following rules apply[.] ‘ “Error must be affirmatively shown by the
record and will not be presumed on appeal [citation]; the validity of the judgment
[or order] on its face may be determined by looking only to the matters constituting part
of the judgment roll [citation]; where no error appears on the face of a judgment roll
record, all intendments and presumptions must be in support of the judgment [citation]
[citation] … and any condition of facts consistent with the validity of the judgment
will be presumed to have existed rather than one which would defeat it .…” ’ ”8
(Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574-575 (Elena S.).)

       8  Only two hearings were transcribed: October 6 and November 30. The
October 6 minute order leads us to believe the court simply continued the matter to
another date because Michael failed to appear. The November 30 hearing was the
nonstatutory motion to reconsider, but this ruling is not appealed. (Cf. Tate v. Wilburn
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150, 158-160 [statutory motion to reconsider not appealable];
Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 846 [appellate “jurisdiction is ‘limited in scope
to the notice of appeal and the judgment appealed from.’ ”) These two missing
transcripts appear immaterial, except to the extent they might reveal judicial bias and
ineffective counsel. We consider those possibilities post.

                                             6.
       “ ‘Where it does not appear affirmatively that a jurisdictional defect was present,
the absence of a recital that jurisdictional requisites were met does not produce a
judgment void on its face. [Citations.] To the contrary, all presumptions favor the
judgment. [Citations.] If the invalidity does not appear on the face of the record, it will
be presumed that what ought to have been done was not only done but rightly done.’ ”
(Elena S., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
III. Venue
       Vanessa claims “[w]hen [she] filed [her] request to have the orders modif[ied],
[she] was in fact requesting a change of venue.” Based on this explanation, there is, not
surprisingly, no motion to change venue in the record.
       Indeed, in the original filings Vanessa refers to, i.e., her January 2021 filings, there
is no mention of venue. Because venue is not jurisdictional, we cannot address the claim
for the first time on appeal. (See Capra v. Capra (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1083.)
       Most importantly, there is nothing in the record to suggest venue was improper.
(See Code of Civ. Proc., § 395.) Finally, because Vanessa’s primary complaint relative
to venue is the fact “the parties and witnesses … would have had to travel from Solano
and Yuba County [sic],” there is no prejudice because the record indicates everyone
appeared as necessary in the trial court.
IV. Due Process
       Next, Vanessa contends she did not receive notice “custody was at stake” because
Michael’s request for full custody was not properly served. We disagree.
       A. Additional Background
       Michael first requested full custody by filing a request for orders on February 23.
The April 6 minute order states the case was continued to May 4 for a hearing on both
Vanessa’s and Michael’s requests to modify the child custody order. At the May 4
hearing, the court modified custody by removing from Vanessa physical custody of the
child and awarding custody instead to Michael.

                                              7.
       B. Analysis
       Because there is no reporter’s transcript, we must presume the court’s orders were
valid. (Elena S., supra, 247 Cal.App.5th at pp. 574-575; see Evid. Code, § 664
[presumption official duty performed, meaning trial court would not have acted
improperly].) Although there is no proof of service in the record indicating Michael
served Vanessa with his request for full custody, the April 6 minute order stating the case
was set for a hearing on Michael’s request is sufficient to presume it was properly
served.9
       In any event, a court is authorized to grant or modify “a custody order on an ex
parte basis” if “there has been a showing of immediate harm to the child ….” (Fam.
Code, § 3064, subd. (a).)10 Here, the court made that requisite finding when, on May 4, it
first ordered sole physical custody of the child to Michael.11
V. Court Did Not Delegate Authority to “Mediator”
       “Mediation of custody issues is mandatory. (Fam. Code, § 3170, subd. (a).) The
report of a mediator in a custody case is ‘evidence to be weighed with all other
evidence ….’ ” (In re Marriage of Slayton (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 653, 659 (Slayton).)
       While it is true the court ultimately adopted the recommendations in the report at
issue,12 that is not improper delegation—the court itself made the order after a contested

       9 Notably, the record between Michael’s filing and the May 4 hearing supports this
conclusion. When Michael filed his request for full custody, the court noted “personal
service is required.” On March 16, the court continued the case for further hearing on
Vanessa’s request but not Michael’s request. The April 6 minute order is the first time
Michael’s request for custody was calendared for a hearing the following month, strongly
suggesting it was properly served.
       10   Subsequent statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise stated.
       11
        We also note the matter was ultimately set for a full and contested hearing at
which Vanessa appeared with counsel and presented evidence.
       12As mentioned post, the challenged report is not a mediation report but rather a
“child custody evaluation” under section 3111. “The report may be received in evidence

                                              8.
hearing. Accordingly, the court did not improperly delegate its authority. (See Slayton,
supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.)
       Vanessa’s main contentions on this point are “the court bullied [her] into
stipulating” to receiving the report in evidence, the court “state[d] that parental alienation
did not exist,” and “refused to hear from” her other daughter as a witness. These
arguments are better considered as evidentiary error, judicial bias, and ineffective
counsel. We address them post.
VI. Purported Evidentiary Violations
       Here, Vanessa claims the court improperly “based its decision on the child’s
preference as stated in the mediation report,” “relied solely on the statements [her]
daughter made in the mediation evaluation without verify[ing] the truth of them,” and the
abuse claims “are hearsay.” In summary, Vanessa argues:

              “[T]he evidence on [one] side is statements made by
              [Michael] and then repeated by our daughter. On the other
              side the evidence presented was documentation from [a]
              qualified licensed professional in the [m]ental health field
              who evaluated my mental state of mind and came to the
              conclusion that I was of sound mind and did not qualify for
              any type of treatment but would benefit from family
              counseling with my daughter. The same type of counseling
              that I was already in the process of receiving. Drug test
              results from a creditable [sic] third party which included hair
              follicle test along with random drug test results ….
              Documentation … that all of the [abuse] allegations that they
              investigated were unfounded. A statement that directly
              contradicted the statement in the mediation report which said
              the investigations [were] inconclusive and suggested that they
              were incomplete. The moving party or the party requesting a
              change in a custody has the burden of proof.”

on stipulation of all interested parties and is competent evidence as to all matters
contained in the report.” (§ 3111, subd. (c); see VII., post.)

                                              9.
She concludes the court thus erred because the burden of proof was not satisfied. We
disagree.
       A. Child’s Stated Preference
       “If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent
preference as to custody or visitation, the court shall consider, and give due weight to, the
wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying custody or visitation.”
(§ 3042, subd. (a).) Because there is no reason to believe the 12-year-old child in this
case was insufficient in age or reason, the court was required to consider the child’s
preference. The court did not err by following the law.
       B. Testimony From Vanessa’s Other, Adult Daughter
       As to whether the court refused to allow Vanessa’s other daughter to testify, the
claim is not supported by the record. Nowhere in the record is there a statement the court
refused to allow Vanessa to present the witness’ testimony. Even if the court did err,
Vanessa has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a better result.13 (See In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60 [“reversal [appropriate] only if the reviewing court
finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing
party but for the error.”].)
       More importantly, “ ‘[a] trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or
excluding evidence is reviewable for abuse [citation] and will not be disturbed except on
a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Christ v.
Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446-447.) “[I]t is the burden of appellants to show

       13Vanessa urges us to “[p]lease see the letter” written by her other daughter. We
have reviewed the letter because it is part of the record. (Rule 8.204(d).) We do not
believe Vanessa would have received a more favorable result had she elicited testimony
consistent with the letter.

                                             10.
that it is reasonably probable that they would have received a more favorable result …
had the error not occurred.” (Id. at p. 447.) Vanessa has not discharged this burden.
       C. Credibility Resolution
       The remaining contentions essentially challenge credibility determinations. But
“ ‘ “[o]n appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise” ’ of the trial court’s power to
‘ “judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw
factual inferences’ ’ and its ‘ “findings—whether express or implied—must be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846,
883.) “ ‘ “ ‘[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its [discretion] for that of the trial
court.’ ” ’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) We are not at liberty to
disagree with the trial court’s implied credibility determinations because they are
supported by substantial evidence.
       D. Abuse of Discretion
       Generally speaking, “ ‘[t]he standard of appellate review of ... visitation orders is
the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is whether the
trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the “best
interest” of the child. We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis,
regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.’ ” (Rich v. Thatcher (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1182.) “ ‘ “Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge.
The reviewing court should interfere only ‘ “if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence,
viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could reasonably
have made the order that he did.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       The trial court here ruled only after it “consider[ed] all evidence and testimony
presented by both sides ….” Because its ruling is not patently unreasonable, it did not
abuse its discretion.

                                              11.
VII. California Rules of Court, rules 5.210 & 5.220
       According to Vanessa, “the court adopted the mediators [sic] report in full after
the mediator spoke to [her] child once, without conducting any type of investigation or
inquiry into the allegations made during the mediation.” She also contends the mediator
failed to follow the rules delineated in rule 5.210. Chief among her complaints is the
allegation “[t]he mediator … did not contact [her]” and “did not attempt to speak” to her
other daughter.
       In truth, the report at issue is pursuant to section 3111 and is conducted by a “child
custody evaluator,” not a mediator.14 The procedure underlying the evaluator’s report is
prescribed in rule 5.220. Nonetheless, we address Vanessa’s complaints.
       The allegation the evaluator did not contact Vanessa is flatly contradicted by the
report. Not only did the evaluator confer with Vanessa, but the evaluator agreed with her
on some points, for example, the abuse allegations were not substantiated by an
investigating agency.
       Contrary to Vanessa’s contention, we are certain the report itself is impartial and
fair. There is no requirement the evaluator interview any witness. (Rule 5.220,
subd. (e).)
       Finally, the court did not abdicate its role by simply adopting the
recommendations in the report. Again, it held a full hearing on September 8 and
considered all evidence and testimony before issuing a ruling.
VIII. No Judicial Bias
       Canon 3B(5) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics states a judge must
“perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.” Due process mandates an impartial

        No report was included with the Clerk’s Transcript. On our own motion, we
       14
augmented the record with the evaluation report at issue.

                                            12.
and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. (Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 242-243.)
       “Absent a financial interest, adjudicators are presumed impartial. [Citations.] To
show nonfinancial bias sufficient to violate due process, a party must demonstrate actual
bias or circumstances ‘ “in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on
the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” ’
[Citation.] The test is an objective one. [Citations.] While the ‘degree or kind of
interest … sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting “cannot be defined with
precision” ’ [citation], due process violations generally are confined to ‘the exceptional
case presenting extreme facts ….’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County
Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 219.)
       To demonstrate bias, Vanessa offers a number of examples. Among others, she
claims the court “allowed [Michael] to violate the original order as well as the current
order,” “accepted filing[s] from [Michael] that were not properly filled out,”15 and
ultimately “told [her] to stop filing declarations and request[s] because [it] would not give
[her] custody back.”
       We have carefully considered each example and find no bias.16 Most alarming is
the purported statement the court admonished Vanessa to stop seeking physical custody
of her daughter because it would not find in her favor. No such statement appears in the
record. We note Vanessa alleges this statement occurred on two different dates:

       15 Vanessa claims, in one request-for-orders filing, Michael named himself as the
petitioner and her as the respondent. But this filing was a request from Michael. Even if
incorrect, this fact fails to move the needle towards objective—and exceptional—bias.
(Cf. People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 447 [“ ‘[A] trial court’s numerous rulings
against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias,
especially when they are subject to review.’ ”].)
       16For example, the court issued a warrant for Michael’s arrest when he failed to
appear on October 6. This hardly demonstrates favoritism.

                                             13.
September 8 as written in the notice designating record on appeal, or November 30 as
suggested in her brief.17
       Vanessa continued to litigate custody after September 8. The court even
entertained a nonstatutory motion to reconsider, allowing Vanessa’s attorney to twice
argue the matter. After twice denying the motion, the court still set the case for “status
review” on a future date. These facts do not demonstrate bias. Rather, they indicate a
quite accommodating and patient court.18
IX. Ineffective Counsel
       Last, Vanessa asserts her attorneys19 rendered ineffective assistance. She cites to
various disagreements with counsels’ performances, believing they ultimately
undermined her case.

       17  In her brief, filed on August 16, 2022, Vanessa claims the court “told [her] to
stop” litigating custody at “the next hearing after … November 9 ….” The next hearing
was November 30. The November 30 hearing was transcribed but again there is no
transcript on appeal.
       A “reviewing court” may, on its own motion, order the record augmented with the
reporter’s transcript “to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” (Rule 8.130(a)(4).) The
California Supreme Court “has not yet addressed the question under what circumstances
an in forma pauperis civil litigant may be entitled to obtain a free reporter’s transcript
when such a transcript is essential to the resolution of the litigant’s appeal on the merits.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 624.) In the absence of such authority, we
decline to augment the record.
       In the notice designating record on appeal, filed on December 30, Vanessa asserts,
“[T]he judge told me that his ruling was final and would not be changed for any reason[,]
he verbally ordered me to stop filing papers in this action because he would not change
custody no matter what.” This statement allegedly occurred on September 8, 2021. The
notice, filed much closer in time to this allegation, does not repeat the claim the judge
verbally admonished Vanessa to stop in November. We presume the notice is correct.
       18 Another major point Vanessa raises is “[t]he court went so far as to state that
parental alienation did not exist.” But the custody orders consistently barred alienation.
       19Two separate attorneys represented Vanessa at various stages of the
proceedings.

                                             14.
       “ ‘[T]he general rule is that there is no due process right to counsel in civil cases.
[Citation.] Generally speaking, the right to counsel has been recognized to exist only
where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Campi (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1574.) “Indeed, the general rule is that
attorney neglect in civil cases, if any, is imputed to the client.” (Id. at p. 1575.)
       While we do not foreclose some right to counsel, we note Vanessa has failed to
explain how counsels’ performances prejudiced her case warranting relief. In other
words, she has not carried her burden to prove her attorneys’ alleged errors resulted in an
outcome worse than she would have received absent those errors. (In re Marriage of
Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196, 205 [“ ‘appellant bears the
duty of spelling out in his [or her] brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of
justice.’ ”].) Our independent review leads us to conclude the record—as expected—
does not contain enough information to evaluate counsels’ performances. (Cf. People v.
Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 [“certain practical restraints make it more difficult to
address ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal …. [Citations.] The record on
appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as he or she did.”].)
                                       DISPOSITION
       The September 8, 2021, order is affirmed. Vanessa will bear her costs on appeal.

                                                                               SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

                                              15.