Court Opinion

ID: 9593588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:23:21.93676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:31.467515
License: Public Domain

Agid, J.
(dissenting) — The majority relies on State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wn.2d 828, 791 P.2d 897 (1990) for its conclusion that the instant case must be reversed.
*237Fjermestad held that the use of an electronic body wire by law enforcement personnel without prior court authorization and in violation of Washington's privacy act, RCW 9.73, renders all evidence of the transaction inadmissible, including visual observations by the officers involved. Fjermestad, at 836. While the majority is correct in concluding that there is no meaningful factual basis on which to distinguish Fjermestad, that case involved interpretation of the provisions of RCW 9.73.050 prior to its amendment in 1989.2 The Legislature adopted Substitute House Bill 1793, 51st Legislature (1989), wherein it amended RCW 9.73, with the following findings, now codified at RCW 9.73.200:
The legislature finds that the unlawful manufacturing, selling, and distributing of controlled substances is becoming increasingly prevalent and violent. Attempts by law enforcement officers to prevent the manufacture, sale, and distribution of drugs is resulting in numerous life-threatening situations since drug dealers are using sophisticated weapons and modem technological devices to deter the efforts of law enforcement officials to enforce the controlled substance statutes. Dealers of unlawful drugs are employing a wide variety of violent methods to realize the enormous profits of the drug trade.
Therefore, the legislature finds that conversations regarding illegal drug operations should be intercepted, transmitted, and recorded in certain circumstances without prior judicial approval in order to protect the life and safety of law enforcement personnel and to enhance prosecution of drag offenses, and that that interception and transmission can be done without violating the constitutional guarantees of privacy.
RCW 9.73.210, which establishes the procedure by which wiretaps may be authorized for the protection of the consenting party without prior judicial approval, also provides:
*238Nothing in this section heirs the admission of testimony of a participant in the communication or conversation unaided by information obtained pursuant to this section.
RCW 9.73.210(5).
Similarly, RCW 9.73.230, which permits wiretaps in certain circumstances where there is probable cause to believe that the conversation in question involves a drug-related offense, provides:
Nothing in this subsection bars the admission of testimony of a party or eyewitness to the intercepted, transmitted, or recorded conversation or communication when that testimony is unaided by information obtained solely by violation of RCW 9.73.030.
RCW 9.73.230(8). RCW 9.73.230(8) provides that evidence obtained through a wiretap under that section is admissible in a subsequent judicial proceeding only if the court finds that the requirements of RCW 9.73.230(1) are met. Here, there is no dispute that written authorization was not obtained.3 However, the evidence at issue is not based or derived from any information obtained by use of the unauthorized body wire in violation of RCW 9.73.030. Rather, the evidence is based solely on the visual observations of the officer wearing the wire. There is no causal connection between the wire worn for officer safety and the evidence he observed while in the house. Because the information obtained through direct observation is unaided by information obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030, it follows that, under the amended statute, it was admissible. Although any evidence obtained by use of the body wire would, of course, have not been admissible, the State did not seek to use any evidence other than the officer's visual observations. Under either RCW 9.73.230(8) or the common law "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, see Fjermestad, 114 Wn.2d at 838 (Guy, J., dissenting), the trial court correctly concluded that evidence obtained completely independently of the wire was *239properly considered by the judge who issued the warrant. I would therefore affirm.
Review granted at 120 Wn.2d 1018 (1993).

 Indeed, in deciding Fjermestad, the Supreme Court relied on the absence of any exceptions to the requirement of court authorization in the original statute:
We are bound to interpret the proclamations of the Legislature and not create an exception in the law where there is none. RCW 9.73 has no provisions for an undercover police operation to use electronic eavesdropping devices to transmit conversations without first obtaining court authorization, no matter how laudable the reasons.
114 Wn.2d at 836.

 As noted by the trial court, however, the substantive requirements of RCW 9.73.230(1), i.e., the consent of one party and probable cause, were met, even though proper written authorization was not obtained.