Court Opinion

ID: 9754521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:02:59.229286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.356040
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Judge,
concurring.
I concur as to the result in this case, the suspension of Pa.R.C.P. 238, but write separately to reiterate my view *67that the rule addresses substantive issues which are outside our rule-making jurisdiction and, therefore, inappropriate for consideration by a procedural rules committee.
Now six years after Rule Pa.R.C.P. 238 went into effect, we are acknowledging that this well-intentioned rule has violated the due process rights of defendants under the United States Constitution, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973),1 and altered the substantive rights of litigants in violation of our own Constitution. The rule was designed to expedite the judicial process and to relieve injured plaintiffs of the adverse effect of unreasonable delay by creating an irrebutable presumption that defendants are the only source of delay in tort litigation.
This case demonstrates the need for greater sensitivity to the policy behind the constitutional separation of powers in exercising our rule-making power. The rule-making power is embodied in Article V, § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution: “The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing the practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts. . . .” (emphasis added), but reserving to the General Assembly the determination of the substantive rights of litigants. Under the provision, a general rule concerning damage delay is best left to the *68legislature, but the judiciary remains free to give substantive relief against its consequences on a case by case basis. The wisdom of restraining ourselves to the common law’s case specific method of altering substantive rights is shown by our experience with this Rule.
In this connection, the comments of Justice Roberts’ (later Chief Justice Roberts) dissent in Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981) are most appropriate:
The unfairness of Rule 238 is further compounded by its imposition of duties and sanctions only upon defendants, and not upon plaintiffs. If the object of the Rule is to discourage delay, the Rule should not only require defendants to make reasonable settlement offers, but also should require plaintiffs to make reasonable demands. Failure of either party to make a reasonable effort to settle should result in the imposition of similar sanctions.
Ill
Thus it is clear that, in promulgating Rule 238, a majority of this Court embarked upon a misguided, improper journey, wholly beyond its constitutional procedural rulemaking authority. As a result, the lawmaking function of our Legislature improperly has been usurped. So too, trespass litigants needlessly have been subjected to unfair treatment.
Id., 496 Pa. at 78, 436 A.2d at 160-161.
Today’s opinion properly notes the rationale and salutary purpose of Pa.R.C.P. 238, but a salutary goal is not enough to override basic constitutional restraints. Courts, more than any other law making institution, should recognize this. We, above all, ought not to deal cavalierly with the constitutional authority of a coordinate branch to prospectively determine and generally define substantive rights. The problem of delay in tort litigation can be properly dealt with by a judiciary which sets standards in its case law, allowing a trial judge, familiar with the facts of a case, to exercise discretion in applying appropriate sanctions, finan*69cial or otherwise, for unreasonable delay. This traditional method of the judicial process permits reasoned adjustment at the trial level, subject to this Court’s judicial function of appellate review, without intruding on the legislature’s power of changing substantive law by statute. I, therefore, concur in the result.

. Speaking for the Court, Justice Stewart said:
We hold ... that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence — the means adopted by Connecticut to preserve that legitimate interest — is violative of the Due Process Clause, because it provides no opportunity for students who applied from out of State to demonstrate that they have become bona fide Connecticut residents.
412 U.S. at 453, 93 S.Ct. at 2237. Subsequent cases (Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975), Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 98 S.Ct. 1338, 55 L.Ed.2d 614 (1978), Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982), Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1982), Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 75 L.Ed.2d 879 (1983) and our opinion in Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare v. Molyneaux, 498 Pa. 192, 445 A.2d 730 (1982)) have limited the scope of Vlandis so as to permit legislative classifications based on a rational relationship to governmental goals but the underlying principle still applies.