Court Opinion

ID: 9743513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:35:40.317513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.661557
License: Public Domain

STOUDER, J., dissents. I do not agree with the majority of the court since it is my opinion that the order of the trial court quashing the indictment was proper and its order should be affirmed. In the revision of our system of criminal jurisprudence the draftsmen of the Criminal Code, chap 38, Ill Rev Stats 1963, endeavored to promote simplicity, reason and avoidance of technical distinctions, the reasons for which had long ago disappeared. The drafting committee fully recognized that its revisions were subject to constitutional principles and interpretations. In the committee’s comments following chap 38, § 111-3, Ill Rev Stats 1963, as referred to in People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill2d 527, 212 NE2d 97, it is said, “The charge must tell the accused the nature and cause of the accusation against him "(Ill Const art 11, § 9). Two general methods of drafting the charge formerly existed. The offense could be charged in the language of the statute or the facts which constitute the crime could be set out. (See People v. Barnes, 314 Ill 140, 145 NE 391 (1924).) It has been sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the statute when the words of the statute so far particularize the offense that by their use alone the Defendant is notified with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he is charged. (People v. Sims, 319 (393) Ill 238, 66 NE2d 86 (1946).)” It is therefore clear that there has been no diminution of the importance of the right of the accused to know the nature of the offense with which he is charged. It should be noted that two sections, 16 and 17 of chap 38, Ill Rev Stats, 1963, dealing with theft and related offenses, replace 74 former sections dealing with the same offenses. Offenses heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement, false pretenses, confidence game, as well as offenses dependent on the position of, or the relation between persons are now included under the offense of theft. The codification of the offenses against property under the single offense of theft, in broad and inclusive language, recognizes the common elements in offenses against property, namely the requisite mental state and the conduct with respect to the property itself. I do not agree with the majority that section 16 sets forth the nature and elements of the offense of theft in such terms that an accused will know the nature of the theft with which he is charged if the charge is in the terms of the statute. On the contrary the statute, in its effort to avoid technical distinctions, has left it to the drafter of the charge to particularize the offense coming within its terms. The substance of the indictment in this case is that during a period of time A knowingly obtained unauthorized control over money of B. In effect, the indictment merely charges theft in general statutory language without in any way indicating the nature of the proscribed conduct or act. The failure of the indictment to reveal the nature of the offense is illustrated by the argument of Appellant. Appellant argues dehors the record of the indictment that the Defendant took money from her employer and that one act or a series of acts may be involved. If this be the gist of the proscribed offense it cannot be ascertained from the indictment. It is equally apparent that under the statutory language employed in the indictment, evidence that the Defendant entered the premises of the cable company and took the money from the cash register would be within the terms of the indictment. Surely an indictment which encompasses such divergent conduct cannot be said to advise the accused of the charges. In addition the reference to a period of time indicates either a continuous offense or a series of acts or conduct thus characterizing the conduct itself, which characterization is not supported by the remainder of the charge. Characterization of the proscribed conduct relates to the nature of the offense and is not merely a description of the date of the occurrence of the offense as provided in section 111-1 (a) (4), chapter 38, Ill Rev Stats 1963. Therefore, I believe that People v. Blanchett, supra, is distinguishable on principle from the instant case. In Blanchett the court was concerned with the problem created when the indictment charged the commission of the offense on a date different to that of its actual commitment, the court reaffirming the principles that the date or time of an offense did not refer to the nature of the offense itself. In my view of this case, the characterization of conduct resulting from the language employed in the description of a period of time is a part of the nature of the offense charged and both repugnant to or unsupported by the remainder of the charge, thereby failing to sufficiently advise the accused of the offense charged.