Court Opinion

ID: 9467316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:45:25.500245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:17.324648
License: Public Domain

*1100WINTER, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in Judge Hall’s opinion affirming the district court’s determination that defendant violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. But I would affirm the district court’s award of back pay, with interest, and not remand the case for a redetermination of back pay giving effect to the factor of seniority which defendant itself was proved not to have considered in fixing its wage rates.
The Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), unequivocally states that an employer shall not pay wages to employees of one sex less than the wages paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
The Act further provides that, when an employer has paid less than minimum wages prescribed by § 206, the Secretary 1 may sue to recover the amount of the unpaid minimum wages for the benefit of the underpaid employees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). If the allegations that less than the minimum wages were paid are sustained, the measure of recovery is “the amount of the unpaid minimum wages . . . and an equal amount of liquidated damages.” 2 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
With respect to three female employees who were employed as customer correspondents and who were paid less than their male counterparts, the district court found:
The pay differential between male and female customer correspondents did not result from merit, job performance, longevity or seniority. The defendant had no established merit system to reward exceptional performance. There is no showing in the record that the males who were paid higher salaries performed in a more meritorious or productive manner than any of the lower paid females.
I am in complete accord that these findings are amply supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. Notwithstanding affirmance of these findings, the majority concludes that, although the employer never raised the issue, the district court was in error when it awarded back pay for three women correspondents on the basis of a male correspondent who was hired as a customer correspondent in 1967.3
This ruling, in my view, is counter to the Act. The Act, as I read it, says that, unless an exception can be invoked, there shall be equal pay for equal work; and, upon proof that equal pay for equal work was not forthcoming, the measure of recovery is the unpaid wages. There is absolutely no statutory warrant for saying that the unpaid wages may be reduced to the level of what an employer might have legally paid had the employer established a bona fide seniority system and scaled his wage rates according to that system.
Moreover, on the facts of this case, it is particularly inappropriate that the back pay award to two of the three employees be reduced by any factor of seniority. The *1101male employee, Norris Price, whose salary was the standard for the back pay award was employed as a customer correspondent on July 10, 1967. He had only fourteen months seniority over Amelia Graham and only twenty-one months seniority over Mamie L. Plyler, the two employees who received the largest awards ($14,436.72 and $14,576.72, respectively).4 It is of course true that Graham and Plyler were not initially given the title of customer correspondent but were called “expediters.” But, as the district court found, the duties of expediters were largely identical to those of customer correspondents. Indeed, Price was trained in his duties as a customer correspondent by an expediter who resigned from employment beyond the limitations period. Thus, I think that there would be no inequity in affirming the district court’s back pay award.
Because I think the position of the majority as to damages both illogical5 and contrary to the Act, I respectfully dissent on this issue.

. The right of the Secretary of Labor to sue for equal pay for underpaid employees was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on July 1, 1979. Executive Order No. 12067, 43 Fed.Reg. 28967 (1978), Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed.Reg. 19807 (1978). This occurred while this suit was pending and EEOC was substituted for the Secretary.

. By virtue of the statute of limitations in the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, recovery for a willful violation of the minimum wage requirement is limited to the unpaid minimum wages for the three years preceding the filing of suit.

. Both in the written and oral arguments presented to us, defendant contended only that the unequal pay for women correspondents was authorized by one or more of the exceptions contained in § 206(d)(1). No argument was advanced that, if these contentions were rejected, the amount of the back pay award was improperly calculated.

. Price had four years seniority over the third woman employee who was awarded $2,258.33.

. To me, it defies logic to say that defendant is liable because of its failure to do an act, but that the damages which it must pay may be reduced because it might have done that act.