Court Opinion

ID: 9882559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:16:41.144546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:52.395659
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Estate of Snider, 2023-Ohio-3576.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                            JUDGES:
IN RE: THE ESTATE OF:                               :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
JONATHON LEE SNIDER                                 :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
                                                    :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
                                                    :
                                                    :
                                                    :       Case No. 2023CA00011
                                                    :
                                                    :
                                                    :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                Appeal from the Stark County Court of
                                                        Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case No.
                                                        241100

JUDGMENT:                                               Reversed and Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                 October 3, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For: Appellant                                          For: Appellee

LIPSON O'SHEA LEGAL GROUP                               VIVIANNE W. DUFFRIN
MICHAEL J. O'SHEA                                       4450 Belden Village Street N.W., Ste. 208
The Hoyt Block Building                                 Canton, OH 44718
700 West St. Clair Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44113
[Cite as In re Estate of Snider, 2023-Ohio-3576.]

Gwin, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant Tayloure Donahue appeals from the January 4, 2022 judgment

entry of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, which apportioned

the settlement proceeds from a wrongful death action. Thomas Snider, as custodian of

I.S., is the appellee. Diane Snider, decedent’s mother, passed way during the pendency

of this appeal.

                                           Facts & Procedural History

        {¶2}     Decedent Jonathon Lee Snider died on September 6, 2021, due to injuries

he sustained as a passenger in a motor vehicle crash on September 1, 2021.

        {¶3}      On October 8, 2021, decedent’s mother, Diane Snider (“Diane”), filed an

application for authority to open an estate for decedent in order to investigate potential

wrongful death and survival claims. Diane listed decedent’s known next of kin as: herself,

Thomas Snider (“Thomas”), decedent’s father, and I.S., decedent’s then-nine-year-old

son. Diane was appointed as the administratrix of decedent’s estate by the trial court on

October 14, 2021. Six months later, on April 8, 2022, Diane filed an amended next of kin

form adding appellant, decedent’s daughter, as decedent’s next of kin.

        {¶4}     On October 12, 2022, Diane filed an application to approve settlement and

distribution of wrongful death and survival claims. The application indicates as follows:

the total amount of settlement is $1,300,000; there are funeral expenses of $7,947.82;

reasonable compensation for the fiduciary is $10,000; there are subrogation claims for

medical bills in the amount of $3,323.37; reasonable attorney fees are due in the amount

of $433,333.33; and reasonable litigation expenses are due in the amount of $290.73.

Thus, the net proceeds of $845,104.75 remained to be distributed to decedent’s next of
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                            3

kin. All of the next of kin approved and consented to the amount of the settlement.

However, the next of kin did not agree on how the net proceeds should be distributed.

Diane filed an amended application to approve the settlement on November 16, 2022.

The litigation expenses increased to $1,505.73, thus reducing the net proceeds available

to $843,889.75.

       {¶5}   The trial court held a hearing on December 1, 2022 to determine how the

net proceeds should be distributed.

       {¶6}   I.S. is ten years old and is in fifth grade. I.S. lived with decedent prior to his

death, and currently lives with decedent’s parents. I.S. testified to a close relationship

with decedent, including watching movies, camping, and hanging out. I.S. spent a lot of

time with decedent every day. Decedent told I.S. that appellant was his sister, and I.S.

met her once “a while ago.” I.S. did not remember doing anything with decedent and

appellant together.

       {¶7}   Diane has lived with I.S. and decedent since 2017 when decedent got

divorced from I.S.’s mother. From 2017 until the time of his death, decedent had custody

of I.S. I.S. lived with decedent for I.S.’s entire life. I.S.’s mother sees him once per month

for supervised visits. Diane and Thomas have had legal custody of I.S. since decedent’s

death. Diane described I.S. and decedent’s relationship as very good, with them being

together on a daily basis.     In the home, decedent did all of the cooking, cleaning,

maintenance, and outdoor work. Since decedent’s death, Diane has had to hire someone

to maintain the lawn and perform household maintenance. Diane has not had to hire

anyone to do anything for I.S. since decedent’s death. Decedent was unemployed for a

number of years due to back issues.           Diane testified decedent’s death has been
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                      4

emotionally devastating for her. I.S. seems to have accepted he will never see his father

again.

         {¶8}   Diane last saw appellant six years ago when appellant introduced Diane to

her baby. When appellant was a baby, Diane saw her and sometimes took care of her.

However, appellant’s maternal grandfather told Diane never to call appellant again. Thus,

Diane never called her again. Diane did see appellant for a visit after appellant obtained

her driver’s license. When asked when decedent last saw appellant, Diane stated, “that

I could not tell you. I couldn’t tell you exactly when.” When asked if she knew whether

decedent contacted appellant via his cell phone, Diane stated she did not know, as she

did not have access to his cell phone, and “[had] no idea when the last time they were

together.” Diane testified she was not aware of decedent’s contact with appellant, but

she did not dispute appellant’s testimony that appellant and decedent had phone contact

prior to his death.

         {¶9}   Diane testified that, approximately two or three months before decedent

died, appellant called and told decedent she completed an ancestry.com analysis, and

decedent was not appellant’s father. Prior to his death, decedent never told Diane he

wanted to do a DNA test as a result of the ancestry.com analysis. However, Diane wanted

appellant to take a DNA test after decedent passed away. Accordingly, Diane obtained

the name of an attorney in Summit County, and filed a motion for DNA testing and/or

declaration that appellant was not decedent’s child in the Summit County Court of

Common Pleas. Diane admitted that she knew the paternity declaration had been made

more than twenty years ago, but testified she wanted to change that determination after
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                         5

decedent’s death. Diane testified she did not initially list appellant as decedent’s next-of-

kin on the probate forms because appellant told decedent she was not his daughter.

       {¶10} Diane did not attempt to locate appellant and tell her that decedent passed

away. Similarly, Diane did not try to locate appellant or notify her about the wrongful

death application or settlement.

       {¶11} Meghan Donahue (“Meghan”) is decedent’s sister. She lives two hours

away from her parents, and visits on holidays, birthdays, and several days during the

summer.     The last time she saw appellant at her parents’ house was right before

appellant’s last name was changed from Snider to Donahue. Meghan also saw appellant

at an Indians game when both of them happened to be there. Meghan could not recall

seeing appellant and decedent together for a long time.

       {¶12} Meghan viewed appellant and decedent’s relationship as “rocky.” When

asked why it was rocky, the sole reason Meghan provided was, “because of the way

[appellant’s] grandparents were towards my parents.” She believes the rocky relationship

between her parents and appellant’s maternal grandparents was the primary thing that

interfered with decedent and appellant having a closer relationship. To the best of her

understanding, decedent loved appellant and wanted a relationship with her. Meghan

could not remember how many times she saw decedent and appellant together, but it

was more than ten times. Meghan testified decedent would cook, clean, do laundry, and

all of the outside work at their parents’ house. Decedent cared for I.S., and was very

close to I.S.

       {¶13} Rebecca Donahue (“Rebecca”) is appellant’s maternal grandmother. She

obtained custody of appellant when she was three years old because both decedent and
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                        6

appellant’s mother were using drugs. For the first five years of appellant’s life, she saw

decedent every other week-end. When appellant was eleven years old, decedent re-

married. However, he continued to see appellant. When appellant was thirteen years

old, decedent moved to Texas for several months. Upon his return, decedent would call

and visit appellant. Once appellant got her driver’s license, she would drive herself to

visit with appellant, even after I.S. was born. Rebecca testified that appellant had regular

and frequent contact with decedent when appellant was a teenager. Rebecca believes

the relationship changed when appellant called children’s services due to I.S.’s care.

Rebecca stated decedent stopped talking to appellant for a year or two, but then resumed

talking and texting with appellant.

        {¶14} Rebecca agreed that appellant and decedent’s relationship was sometimes

rocky, but stated they loved each other. Further, that decedent loved appellant the best

he knew how, given his substance abuse issues.          As to appellant’s name change,

Rebecca testified the name change had nothing to do with appellant’s relationship with

decedent. Rather, appellant wanted to have the same last name as the people she lived

with.

        {¶15} Appellant first remembers visits with decedent when she was around five or

six years old at Diane’s home. From age five to ten, decedent saw appellant regularly at

his own home, and he regularly took appellant camping, fishing, and on trips. Appellant

felt like she did not fit in because her last name was not the name of the people she lived

with, so she filed an application to change her last name. Appellant believes decedent

was hurt by the name change. Appellant and decedent did not speak for approximately
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                         7

one year, but then re-established a relationship. When I.S. was born, appellant spent a

lot of time at her father’s home, particularly in the summer.

       {¶16} Appellant testified that both decedent and his then-wife had substance

abuse issues. Appellant knew decedent was doing drugs when she visited him, but she

wanted to visit I.S. In August of 2015, after a visit with decedent in which decedent flipped

the kitchen table and screamed at appellant and I.S., appellant reported the incident to

children’s services. After this incident, decedent told her that his wife did not think

appellant should visit anymore.      However, after some time, they re-established a

relationship. When appellant was nineteen years old, decedent called her and asked for

money for I.S.’s school clothes and Christmas gifts. Appellant gave him money because,

when she visited the home, decedent had no food and no diapers for I.S. In 2020,

appellant gave decedent $250.00 to help purchase a video game console for I.S. At that

time, she conversed with decedent via text message, Facebook messages, and

telephone calls.

       {¶17} Towards the end of his life, appellant believed decedent had a lot of “issues

going on,” but they still kept in contact via Facebook and text messages. Appellant

described the relationship as “rocky,” but still loving. When decedent passed away,

appellant became very depressed.        After decedent’s death, she started counseling.

Appellant was still going to counseling at the time of the hearing.

       {¶18} As to the ancestry.com test, appellant testified that her mother told her that

decedent may not be her father. Appellant called decedent and decedent told her that

information may be wrong because the other putative father had been deceased for over

twenty years. The ancestry.com test showed that a relative of the putative father was not
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                         8

a blood relative of appellant. Appellant testified she doesn’t know who her biological

father is, even after the ancestry.com testing. After the ancestry.com testing, decedent

and appellant continued to communicate via texts and Facebook messenger. Decedent

never met appellant’s son. Appellant testified she and decedent discussed them meeting,

but she had concerns due to decedent’s substance abuse issues.

       {¶19} On cross-examination, appellant testified she saw appellant in the past few

years, but not regularly. She last saw him in November of 2020. After that time, she

communicated with him via calling, texting, and Facebook messenger.

       {¶20} Appellant entered into evidence numerous exhibits, including: appellant’s

birth certificate dated July 21, 1998 and listing decedent as her father; a judgment entry

from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, finding that decedent

is the biological father of appellant; a 2002 agreed judgment entry from the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, stating appellant’s

maternal grandparents were granted custody of her, with parenting time granted to

decedent; a 2011 judgment entry from the Medina County Court of Common Pleas,

Probate Division, changing appellant’s name from Tayloure Snider to Tayloure Donahue;

a motion for relief from paternity determination filed by Diane in the Summit County Court

of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division; text messages between appellant and

decedent; and photographs. In the text messages appellant sent to decedent in the fall

of 2020, he apologized because he “hasn’t been a great dad for the past 10 years,” he

told appellant, “I am so very proud of you,” “no matter what, I will always love you,” and “I

never stopped loving you and never will.” Further, decedent told appellant she was the

“best” sister to I.S.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                        9

       {¶21} The trial court issued a judgment entry on January 4, 2022. The trial court

first found that, pursuant to R.C. 3111.25 and R.C. 3111.27, the issue of paternity as to

appellant was established in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic

Relations Division, and was not rescinded.

       {¶22} Next, the trial court found I.S. is entitled to a “rebuttable presumption,” and

that the presumption “was not rebutted” in this case because I.S. had a close relationship

with decedent, spent a great deal of time with decedent, decedent was a large presence

in I.S.’s life, and they shared a typical father-son bond.

       {¶23} Finally, the trial court found appellant is entitled to a “rebuttable

presumption.” However, the court found the presumption “was rebutted” by the following

testimony at the hearing: the relationship between appellant and decedent was rocky;

the communication between appellant and decedent was sporadic because they “would

go years without talking”; the last time they saw each other was almost a year prior to

decedent’s death; and decedent never met appellant’s child.

       {¶24} The trial court found the net proceeds should be distributed as follows:

$802,739.33 and the other funds remaining following the resolution of the Medicaid lien

to I.S., and $12,000 to appellant.

       {¶25} Appellant appeals the judgment entry of the Stark County Court of Common

Pleas, Probate Division, and assigns the following as error:

       {¶26} “THE ORDER WHICH ALLOCATED ALL OF THE PROCEEDS TO I.S. IS

CONTRARY TO OHIO LAW.”
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                     10

                                               I.

      {¶27} Appellant contends the trial court’s allocation of the wrongful death

proceeds was contrary to law. A trial court has broad discretion in apportioning wrongful

death proceeds among beneficiaries. In re Estate of Marinelli, 99 Ohio App.3d 372, 650

N.E.2d 935 (11th Dist. Trumbull 1994). Since R.C. 2125.03 confers discretion on the

probate court to distribute the proceeds of a wrongful death settlement, appellate courts

will not reverse a trial court’s apportionment absent an abuse of discretion. Id. However,

appellant’s argument that the court abused its discretion in the conclusions of law it

reached is, in essence, a manifest weight of the evidence argument.

      {¶28} In a manifest weight of the evidence review in a civil case, a reviewing court

is to examine the entire record and determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage

of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”        Eastley v.

Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517. “In a civil case, in which

the burden of persuasion is only by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond

a reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each element (sufficiency) and the

evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of persuasion (weight).” Id.

      {¶29} As an appellate court we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility

of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent, and

credible evidence upon which the fact-finder could base its judgment. Cross Truck Equip.

Co. v. Joseph A. Jeffries Co., 5th Dist. Stark No. CA5758, 1982 WL 2911 (Feb. 10, 1982).

Accordingly, judgments supported by some competent and credible evidence going to all

essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                     11

of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d

578 (1978).

      {¶30} R.C. 2125.03 directs the probate court to distribute wrongful death

settlement proceeds in such “a manner that is equitable, having due regard for the injury

and loss to each beneficiary resulting from the death and for the age and condition of the

beneficiaries.” There is no precise mathematical formula for apportioning wrongful death

proceeds. In re Estate of Steigerwald, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2003-AP-10-079, 2004-

Ohio-3834. Further, the surviving spouse, children, and parents of a decedent are

“rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by reason of the wrongful death.” R.C.

2125.02(A).

      {¶31} Appellee contends appellant was not decedent’s biological daughter. Diane

attempted to vacate the establishment of appellant’s paternity after decedent’s death.

However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the term “child” as used in R.C.

2125.02(A)(1), includes all natural or adopted children, whether legitimate, legitimated,

acknowledged, or illegitimate. Brookbank v. Gray, 74 Ohio St.3d 279, 1996-Ohio-135,

658 N.E.2d 724. R.C. 3111.13(A) provides that “the judgment or order of the court

determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is

determinative for all purposes.” Further, R.C. 3111.25 provides that an acknowledgment

of paternity is final and enforceable. Pursuant to these statutes and the judgment entry

from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, finding decedent is

the biological father of appellant, appellant is decedent’s child for purposes of Revised

Code Chapter 2125. Accordingly, she is entitled to the rebuttable presumption contained

in R.C. 2125.02(A).
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                       12

       {¶32} R.C. 2125.02(D) provides a non-exhaustive list of criteria upon which

wrongful death damages may be awarded, including loss of support from the expected

earning capacity of the defendant; loss of services of the decedent; loss of society of the

decedent, including loss of companionship, care, assistance, attention, advice, counsel,

instruction, training and education, suffered by the dependent children; loss of prospective

inheritance to the decedent’s heirs at law at the time of decedent’s death; and the mental

anguish incurred by the dependent children. In this case, there is no demonstration of

pecuniary loss by either party. Diane testified she has not had to hire anyone to do

anything for I.S. since decedent’s death and that decedent was unemployed for a number

of years due to back issues. Further, there is no evidence that either I.S. or appellant had

a prospective inheritance from decedent. There was unrefuted testimony from appellant

that she was very depressed after decedent’s death and she sought counseling due to

his death. There was also unrefuted evidence that decedent was I.S.’s daily caregiver.

       {¶33} We recognize that the trial court has wide discretion in determining what is

an equitable division.    However, in this case, the trial court awarded I.S. 98.6%

($802,739.33, plus funds remaining after the resolution of the Medicaid lien) of the

wrongful death proceeds, and appellant 1.4% ($12,000) of the wrongful death proceeds.

Based upon the undisputed evidence in this case, we find this distribution is not supported

by competent and credible evidence, and is an abuse of discretion.

       {¶34} The trial court found the communication between appellant and decedent

was sporadic. However, all of the testimony and evidence demonstrates that appellant

and decedent had a normal father-daughter relationship until appellant was approximately

fifteen or sixteen years old, with her visiting decedent regularly.      Though appellant
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                       13

described two one-year periods of time when they did not communicate, appellant’s

unrefuted testimony and the unrebutted evidence (decedent’s texts) demonstrate that,

after these one-year lapses, appellant and decent re-established communication. Diane

testified she “could not dispute” appellant’s testimony that appellant and decedent were

communicating via phone and texts at the time of his death.

       {¶35} The trial court next cited appellant and decedent’s “rocky relationship” and

lack of in-person visits to support of the 1.4% award to appellant. While the witnesses

described the relationship as “rocky,” none described it as non-existent or not loving. The

text messages decedent wrote to appellant after the ancestry.com testing stated he never

stopped loving her, and would always love her. There is unrebutted testimony about the

communication between appellant and decedent in the years preceding decedent’s

death, and unrebutted testimony about the depression appellant suffered as a result of

decedent’s death.

       {¶36} Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that the relationship and lack of in-

person visitation was rocky due to factors outside of appellant’s control. See In the Matter

of the Estate of John C., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-398, 2017-Ohio-8648 (award to

decedent’s estranged daughter to the exclusion of an award to the decedent’s siblings

was warranted because the estrangement was due to the acts of the decedent, not the

acts of the daughter).     Meghan testified the primary factor causing appellant and

decedent’s rocky relationship was the rocky relationship between appellant’s maternal

and paternal grandparents. Rebecca and appellant provided undisputed testimony that

the relationship was difficult due to decedent’s substance abuse issues. In the text

messages, decedent apologized for not being a great father for the past ten years.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                        14

       {¶37} The undisputed evidence presented at the hearing is that decedent

acknowledged and considered appellant his daughter, and had no intention of attempting

to rescind, revoke, or in any way change this acknowledgment. The evidence shows that,

even after the ancestry.com testing, decedent communicated with appellant.

       {¶38} In cases analogous to this case in which courts have affirmed large

percentages of wrongful death proceeds to one next of kin when all of the next of kin

involved are parties entitled to a rebuttable presumption of damages (surviving spouse,

children, and parents of the decedent), there are specific facts and circumstances

involved that are not present in this case. In re Hackworth, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-93-

2, 1993 WL 194122 (June 4, 1993) (surviving spouse proved an economic and pecuniary

loss in excess of the proceeds available for distribution), In re Dye, 12th Dist. Fayette

Nos. CA2011-04-004, CA2011-04-005, CA2011-04-006, 2012-Ohio-2570 (low award

given to surviving spouse when marriage lasted only eight months and surviving spouse

lived with her boyfriend at the time of the decedent’s death), In re Estate of Lynch, 3rd

Dist. Wyandot No. 16-10-05, 2010-Ohio-6376 (a 1.4% award to the mother of the

decedent and 98.6% award to the father of the decedent was not an abuse of discretion

when the mother dropped the child on the father’s doorstep without notice, was willing to

have her parental rights terminated and the child adopted, had no visitation, and refused

to assist in the wrongful death case despite an attorney’s request), In re Estate of Barnett-

Clady, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-386, 2006-Ohio-616 (a 10% award to the decedent’s

father was not an abuse of discretion when the father’s interaction with the decedent

consisted of a handful of conversations), In re Estate of Marinelli, 99 Ohio App.3d 372,

650 N.E.2d 935 (11th Dist. Trumbull 1994) (a father who never initiated contact with the
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                       15

decedent for over ten years prior to his death), Engle v. Schilling, 4th Dist. Washington

No. 99CA50, 2000 WL 33226316 (Dec. 22, 2000) (a surviving spouse received a large

amount of secondary benefits as a result of decedent’s death that was more than each

child received from the wrongful death proceeds, and the marriage was troubled and was

of short duration), In re Estate of Walter, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2942-M, 1999 WL 82077

(Oct. 13, 1999) (no abuse of discretion when husband received 3.3% and children got the

remainder because, at the time of decedent’s death, she was separated from her husband

and had filed for divorce).

       {¶39} Further, even in cases where courts have reduced the percentage of the

award to one party based upon the level of participation of each next of kin in a decedent’s

life, courts have allocated more than 1.4% of the wrongful death proceeds to the party

who saw the decedent less frequently. In re Estate of Barnett-Clady, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 08AP-386, 2006-Ohio-616 (awarding 10% of the wrongful death proceeds to a father

who only had a handful of conversations with the decedent); In re Vogley, 5th Dist. Stark

No. CA-5958, 1982 WL 5601 (Dec. 14, 1982) (awarding 7% to child who had the least

contact); In the Matter of Estate of McFarland, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-90-357, 1991 WL

224988 (Nov. 1, 1991) (awarding 10% of wrongful death proceeds to a father who had

less contact with decedent); Estate of Haralson, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-97-041, 1987

WL 102207 (Feb. 27, 1998) (15% to decedent’s mother and the rest to young child).

Thus, the caselaw does not support such a low award (1.4%).

       {¶40} Appellant makes several arguments in her brief about the “abandonment”

provision of Revised Code Chapter 2125. However, in this case, the trial court did not

make a finding of abandonment. Further, the provision only applies to a “parent who
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                       16

abandoned a minor child who is the decedent.” R.C. 2125.02(A). In this case, the

decedent is not a minor child, and appellant is not the decedent’s parent. Accordingly,

R.C. 2125.02(A) is inapplicable in this case.

       {¶41} Further, appellant suggests in her brief that there is a “presumption of equal

division where there is proof of good relationships with each child,” and “the proceeds

should have been divided equally between appellant and I.S.” Appellant requests this

Court instruct the trial court to divide the proceeds equally between appellant and I.S.

However, nowhere in R.C. 2125.02 or R.C. 2125.03 is language which could be

interpreted to provide a presumption of equal distribution of the proceeds. In re Estate of

Lynch, 3rd Dist. Wyandot No. 16-10-05, 2010-Ohio-5376. Rather, the statute specifically

provides that all children of the decedent are rebuttably presumed to have suffered

damages, but allows the probate court discretion to distribute the proceeds in an equitable

manner, “having due regard for the injury and loss to each beneficiary resulting from the

death and for the age and condition of the beneficiaries.” R.C. 2125.02 and R.C. 2125.03.

       {¶42} We agree with appellee that there is no presumption of equal division of the

proceeds. Further, that the equitable division of the proceeds should reflect I.S.’s young

age, and reflect the disparity between the relative participation decedent had in I.S.’s and

appellant’s lives. “Logically, family members who spent significant time with decedent

suffered a greater loss * * *.” In re Estate of Barnett-Clady, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-

386, 2008-Ohio-6126. There is competent and credible evidence to support a larger

distribution to I.S., given the undisputed testimony concerning his age and how decedent

was his daily caregiver. However, in light of the uncontroverted evidence concerning the

relationship between appellant and decedent as detailed above, we find the disparity
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00011                                                   17

between the distribution to I.S. (98.6%) and the distribution to appellant (1.4%) is not

supported by competent and credible evidence, and is an abuse of discretion.

      {¶43} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s assignment of error is sustained.

      {¶44} The January 4, 2022 judgment entry of the Stark County Court of Common

Pleas, Probate Division, is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

By Gwin, P.J.,

Hoffman, J., and

King, J., concur