Court Opinion

ID: 9763889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:00:15.02524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:50.907205
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne:
The Commonwealth purchased the surface estate of a 990 acre tract of land in Lycoming County for use as (a) State Game Preserve (b) Wild Life Management and (c) Public Recreation. The owner of the coal estate has commenced a strip mining operation. According to the findings of the hearing judge, defendant has already uncovered the overburden from the bituminous coal for an area of approximately 2800 feet long and 38 to 70 feet wide, such overburden so removed being from 12 to 20 feet deep. The court below granted an injunction restraining such operation. This appeal followed.
The predecessor-owners of the surface estate, under their deed, neither by express words nor necessary implication waived or released their rights in the land. I would, therefore, affirm the decree of the court below.
The facts, as narrated by the majority, are not in dispute. Grantors, owners of the fee, separated the surface and minerals. They conveyed the land, reserving the minerals, including coal. The question is whether the words of the reservation expressly or by necessary implication waived or released surface rights.
When coal is conveyed apart from the land, or vice versa, two separate estates in realty exist, each of which is distinct from the other: Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., *432347 Pa. 290, 32 A. 2d 227; Babcock Lumber Company v. Faust et al., 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 19, 28, 39 A. 2d 298, and cases therein cited. The respective rights of owners of the surface and coal are well settled. While there is an estate in the surface and an estate in the coal, there also exists a right, sometimes referred to as the third estate, viz.: the right of surface support. For an accurate summary of these principles see: Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Company, 214 Pa. 544, 63 A. 1032. The opinion of Judge Kelly of Lackawanna County was adopted by this Court per curiam. He said, p. 547:
“The law upon the respective rights of the owners of the surface and the owners of the coal, is clearly stated in Barranger and Adams on Mines and Mining, 675 et seq.: ‘Where there has been a horizontal division of the land, the owner of each subjacent estate owes to the owner of the superincumbent estate the support of his land in its natural condition, and the owner of the super-incumbent estate has conversely a right to this support. This is an absolute proprietary right, necessarily arising out of the ownership of the surface, and not an easement depending upon a grant. The mine owner in taking-out his minerals must leave sufficient support for the superincumbent land. This he may do by leaving ribs or pillars, or by constructing artificial supports. If he fails to do this, and the land sinks he is liable for the damage that occurs to the surface owner by reason thereof, and he may be enjoined from the further removal of minerals. Whether the mine owner has worked his mine skillfully or negligently does not affect the existence of the right to surface support. . . .’ ‘The owner of the minerals has a right to so much only as he can take out without injury to the surface. . . .’ ‘Though the right of surface support is absolute, yet the subjacent owner may be relieved of the corresponding obligation by a release from the surface owner, or by the terms of the instrument creating his estate. But upon him who *433thus attempts to control the rule of law, lies the burden of proof. To destroy or injure the surface, there must exist some statutory or contract authority. The intention to part with the right of surface support must appear by plain and explicit language in the grant of the minerals, or by an express exception from a reservation of them. It may not be taken away by mere implication from language not necessarily importing such a result.’ These general principles are fully supported by the cases in Pennsylvania: Lowry v. Hay, 2 Walk. 239; Gumbert v. Kilgore, 6 Cent. Repr. 406; Robertson v. Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566; Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429; Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15; Coal Co. v. Hopkins, 198 Pa. 343; Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485; and McDade v. Spencer, 6 Lacka. Leg. News, 84.”
The burden rests upon him who seeks to assert the right to destroy or injure the surface. There exists no applicable statutory enactment. Defendant must rely upon a construction of the words of the reservation in the deed. Such words must be interpreted in the light of the apparent object or purpose of the parties and of the conditions existing when the words were employed: Price et al., Trustees, v. Anderson et al., 358 Pa. 209, 220, 56 A. 2d 215, and the cases therein cited. In 1855, when the present deed was executed, it is conceded that strip mining was unknown in the bituminous coal fields. For the past fifteen years defendant deep mined only, but now has commenced to strip mine. It is, therefore, most persuasive that when, in 1855, the owners of the combined surface and coal estates made the “horizontal division”, both grantors and grantees contemplated coal mining operation as they then understood them.
Upon separation of the estates, the owner of the coal possesses an implied easement (even by necessity) to pass over the surface in order to mine the coal and remove it: Big Mountain Improvement Company’s Ap*434peal, 54 Pa. 361; Webber v. Vogel, 159 Pa. 235, 28 A. 226; Babcock Lumber Company v. Faust et al., supra.
In the light of these principles, the court is required to construe the language of the reservation. In separating the two estates and making the reservation of the coal, the deed states that the ownership of the coal is to remain: “as though the present conveyance had not been made”. I agree with what the Chancellor said: “There is a distinction between ownership of minerals and mining rights. Carlin v. Chappel, 101 Pa. 348. Parties may own all of the minerals as though the conveyance had not been made and still not be able to remove all of them due to a limitation on the mining rights. The remaining parts of the reservation which are relied upon by the defendant have to do with the right of the defendant in entering upon the land, and excavating and digging coal.” The remaining words are: “to enter into and upon and pass over [the surface]”, and “to explore, search for and excavate”; “to dig excavate or penetrate any part of the said premises” and “at all times to have free ingress and egress” and “to dig mine raise and take remove and carry away any and every kind of ore mineral, metal or coal . . . [and] that such digging explorations or searches shall be conducted with as little injury or damage ... as shall be practicable”. Certainly such words and phrases do not expressly release or waive surface rights. Neither do they unequivocally disclose the intent of the parties that the owner of the coal is to be permitted to destroy the entire surface of the land in order that he might mine the underlying coal. Unless the right has been released or waived, the owner of the surface is entitled to the unrestricted enjoyment of it except for the necessary means of egress and ingress, exploration, and reasonable facilities for mining and hauling the coal. Under the surrounding circumstances, the equivocal words of this *435deed seem more applicable to deep mining than to strip mining.
Where this Court (and courts below) has construed words and phrases concerning releases or waivers of surface rights, the cases have related to surface support. But the legal principle is the same. Where the surface sinks because of lack of proper support, that portion of the land becomes as useless to the owner as if the overburden had been removed. In the absence of express waiver or release, the following words have been held not to waive impliedly or release surface support: “All the merchantable coal in and underlying all that tract of land, . . . with the right to mine and carry away all the said coal and with all the mining rights and privileges necessary or convenient to such mining and removal of the same.”: Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal Company, 216 Pa. 195, 65 A. 545;
“All the coal and other minerals, lying or being in, upon or under [a certain tract].” “And the [grantee] is hereby granted the full and exclusive privilege, right and liberty of entering at will upon said land and searching for, quarrying and mining, raising, delivering, taking and carrying away said coal and other minerals, such mining operations however are not to interfere with the surface of said land. . . .” “. . . and all of the said rights ... to be used and exercised without any liability for damages arising or resulting from the use and exercise of the same. . . .” Dignan v. Altoona Coal & Coke Company, 222 Pa. 390, 71 A. 845;
“To have and to hold the said coal in, under and upon the said piece or parcel of land . . . together with the sole and exclusive right to mine and remove the same . . . until all . . . the merchantable coal in, under and upon the . . . premises shall have been mined out and removed.” “. . . to mine all the merchantable coal upon the . . . premises in a skillful and careful manner . . . *436be.”: Murray v. Mineral Spring Coal Company et al., 23 D. & C. 280.
My view is further strengthened by the use in the deed of the following language: “. . . provided always that such digging explorations or searches shall be conducted with as little injury or damage to the said [grantees] their heirs or assigns as shall be practicable consistently with the success of the same. . . .”
It is unreasonable to suppose that this language would have been used if the parties had already agreed that grantees released or waived their rights in the surface. It is difficult to comprehend what possible use an owner of the surface could make of this land if the owners of the coal could freely enter upon and tear apart any portion or all of the surface in order to remove the overburden and take out the coal. Strip miners are required by statute to fill in excavations. But unsightly scars from such operations, nevertheless, remain visible for many years. The damage to the land, including trees and foliage, is irreparable. Furthermore, strip mining operations would obviously defeat the very purpose of the Commonwealth’s use.
Because, in my opinion, defendant has no right to strip mine on this tract, I would also affirm the action of the court below in granting plaintiff equitable relief. I would not relegate plaintiff to an action at law for money damage, which would inevitably result in successive and numerous law suits, as and when the strip mining was extended. The cases cited by the majority in their facts have no application to this case. Defendant’s virtual seizure of plaintiff’s property was not an unintentional encroachment. It amounts to a seizure of plaintiff’s property without its consent. Under the facts there is no adequate remedy at law. See Restatement, Torts, §933; Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co., 293 Pa. 152, 159, 141 A. 855. The cases cited by appellant dealing with the doctrine of “balance of injury” or “relative hardship” have no application to *437the present case. The typical illustration of this principle is cited in Restatement, Torts, §941, viz.: the erection of a large building which inadvertently encroaches slightly upon the adjoining premises. See also: Evans v. Reading Chemical Fertilizing Co., Ltd., 160 Pa. 209, 28 A. 702.
For these reasons I dissent.