Court Opinion

ID: 9778003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:29:52.738588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.019575
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
DORSEY, Justice.
Only two of appellants’ points of error on motion for rehearing dealing with the admissibility of a Stock Purchase Agreement merit further discussion. Appellants complain of our ruling that they failed to preserve error regarding the admission of the Stock Purchase Agreement because they failed to object when it was tendered and admitted.
A review of the proceedings reveals that the following transpired on August 27, 1984:
MR. HARRIS: At this time I’d like to offer this Stock Purchase Agreement.
MR. HATCH: We have no objection to it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Plaintiff’s Exhibit Number 4 is admitted.
Appellant argues that this Court is being “highly technical about a rule of evidence and procedure in a time when our courts have looked to the reasonableness of a matter rather than form.” Appellant contends that his objection to the admissibility of the evidence on the following day was sufficient to preserve error for appeal. A review of the proceedings on August 28, 1984, reveals the following colloquy:
MR. HATCH: No, Judge, and let me— before we proceed any further, can we backtrack, and I want to get an objection into the record.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. HATCH: As the Court will recall, my Special Exception Number one went to the Exhibit Number 1 to their Plaintiff’s Original Petition—
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. HATCH: —which is now Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4, which has been offered in evidence, which is that Stock Purchase Agreement signed between the parties and dated January 12, 1978.
My special exception at that time excepted to them using it for the reason that it was of no further force and effect, and that no cause of action could be based thereon.
I think the Court’s comment — and the Court will correct me if I’m wrong, or the record will correctly reflect what the Court’s feelings were — the Court had to carry this along because there is no way to tell whether or not that allegation— that allegation by me is correct until all the evidence is in.
I overlooked that fact and erroneously stated in the record that I had no objection to that exhibit. That exhibit has not been offered to the jury yet — presented to the jury, nor has it been read to the *720jury. I think that’s where we stopped yesterday.
So for the record, before we go any further, I want to state that I do have an objection to the introduction of Plaintiffs Exhibit Number 4, which was the subject matter of my Special Exception Number One.
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So again for the record, I do object to the introduction of Plaintiffs Exhibit Number 4 for the reason that, as stated in my Special Exception, it is of no further force and effect and no cause of action can be based thereon, and that any allegations and references to the Stock Purchase Agreement as a basis of claim should not be permitted by the Court.
All I want to do is protect the record, that we don’t later on have the claim that I waived my objection to claiming that this document has been superseded by not objecting to it.
So again, I respect the Court’s ruling that it previously made that the document will come in, and reserve the ruling on whether it has been superseded to a later time, and I want the record to reflect clearly that I am not waiving my objections that it is a superseded contract and cannot be made the basis of a recovery.
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THE COURT: For the record, I’ll give you a running objection from this moment forward as to Plaintiff’s Exhibit Number 4. [Emphasis added]
Generally, in order to be considered on appeal, an objection to the admission of evidence must be made when the evidence is offered, not after it has been received. Montes v. Lazzara Shipyard, 657 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no writ). But, assuming that this late objection was good, we find no explicit ruling by the court on this objection. “An objection must actually be overruled before it preserves error for our review.” Perez v. Baker Packers, A Division of Baker International Corp., 694 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Viewing the matter in the light most favorable to appellant, that the objection that the Agreement was “superseded” was really an objection to its relevance and assuming that the trial court implicitly overruled this objection, the trial court is granted broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Hughett v. Dwyre, 624 S.W.2d 401, 408 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Luvual v. Henke & Pillot, Division of Kroger Co., 366 S.W.2d 831, 838 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
All of appellants’ points on motion for rehearing are overruled.