Court Opinion

ID: 9490196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:35:38.401879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:56.659328
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to express my dismay about the result in this case. Clarence Robinson, a young black man, was a small player in a large cocaine conspiracy. He was brought into the enterprise late in the game by a long-time friend who was one of the leaders of the enterprise. There is no evidence that Robinson distributed any drugs, and although the cocaine base attributable to the conspiracy had a street value of approxi*1329mately $150,000, Robinson pocketed only $1,000 for Ms small role. Because Robinson had two prior felony convictions for drug possession and because those convictions were noticed by the government prior to trial, Robinson will serve a mandatory life sentence for Ms crime. None of the other members of tMs conspiracy — including the three leaders — were sentenced to longer than 120 months in prison.
At sentenemg, the district court’s hands were tied. Despite the court’s statement that it was “disturbed” about its lack of discretion and that it thought the sentence was unjust, a life sentence without possibility of parole was mandatory for Robinson under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Congress has clearly elected to eschew individualized sentencing for repeat drug offenders in favor of a dracoMan approach that is unmistakably tough on crime. I am aware that our circmt has held the three-strikes scheme constitutional. United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 657-59 (8th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836 (8th Cir.1996) (rejecting double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), which imposes mandatory life sentence for persons convicted of three or more specified “serious violent crimes”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2570, 135 L.Ed.2d 1086 (1996). I fear, however, that fairness is too often sacrificed in the process.
Any sentenemg discretion in this case rested with the prosecution, not the court. First, if the government had not elected before trial to file with the court a written notice of Robmson’s prior convictions as required under 21 U.S.C. § 851, the court could not have imposed the statutory enhancement. Barring the government’s failure to give notice, the only possible way Robinson could have avoided a life sentence after Ms conviction would have been if the government moved for a downward departure based on Ms substantial assistance. See United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 658 (8th Cir.1997). Here, where Robinson would not admit to being part of a large drug conspiracy, puttmg the government to its proof may have literally cost him his life. One of Robinson’s co-defendants, who also faced a mandatory life sentence under section 841(b), chose instead to cooperate with the government. Based on the government’s request for a sentencing departure, the co-defendant received only a 120-month sentence notwithstanding that he was undeMably one of the leaders in the operation. The contrast between that punishment and Robinson’s, in light of the relative culpability, is unconscionable.
Unfortunately, Congress has taken away the court’s ability to use its informed discretion in these matters, placing any discretion instead in the prosecution. Under existing law, one can only hope that prosecutors will use that discretion wisely.