Court Opinion

ID: 9773704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:55:32.61508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:54.812589
License: Public Domain

YATES, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the right to make an opening statement is a valuable right, the denial of which constitutes reversible error. I write separately merely to elaborate on the importance of the right to offer an opening statement.
Although not a constitutional imperative or mandate, the right to make an opening statement is an important part of an accused’s right to a trial by jury. If trial courts were allowed to deny an accused this valuable right it would chip away at the fundamental right of trial by jury that Americans and Texans hold so dear. As Judge Clinton eloquently pointed out in his dissent in Moore v. State, 868 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Crim.App.1993);
Having declared independence from the ruling government in part because it denied, and having fought the ensuing revolution in part to obtain, the right to trial by jury, our forbearers enshrined that right in the Sixth and Ninth Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of Texas. [T]hey maintained it in the Bill of Rights in all successive constitutions: “the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”
[T]he practice of making “opening statements” is a feature of the common law, “followed from time immemorial.” The manifest function is to inform jurors of the nature of the accusation and the facts the State expects to prove in support thereof, and the nature of the defenses and facts the accused expects to support them. Thus the jury is “put in a position to understand and apply the evidence as delivered.” Also and not so incidentally, obviously each side gains more insight into the opposing theory of the case.
Id. at 791 (Clinton, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
Thus, it has been the law in this State since the early 1900’s that although a trial judge has the discretion to control the opening statement and limit it to its proper scope, “when an accused in a timely manner seeks to avail himself of the privilege of making an opening statement, and does not seek to abuse the privilege by commenting upon improper or inadmissable facts, converting it into argument, or otherwise misusing it, it should be accorded, and when its denial ... is brought before this court for review, the denial will not be sanctioned.” Dugan v. State, 199 S.W. 616, 617 (Tex.Crim.App.1917) (citing House v. State, 76 Tex.Crim. 338, 171 S.W. 206 (1914)).
It is unfortunate that we are compelled to order a new trial for appellant on what may be perceived by some as a “technicality.” It is more unfortunate, however, that the trial court hastily dismissed a critical component of the right to trial guaranteed to every citizen. With these brief additional remarks, I concur with the majority.
O’NEILL, J., joins in this concurrence.