Court Opinion

ID: 9598327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:07:58.103393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:55.831064
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(Supplemental Dissent):
I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Hall as correctly stating what has been long established as the decisional and statutory law of this state. But, because of the substantial change in our law projected by the main opinion, with due deference to my colleagues, who are of a different opinion in this instance, I am impelled to add some supplementary comments in disagreement with what I think is transgression beyond the proper bounds of the judicial prerogative.
It is pleasing to note that the main opinion correctly states in its first paragraph that:
“The [only] issue on appeal is whether the operation of [the] golf course is a governmental function for which the City is immune from tort liability.”
And it is reassuring to reflect that the decision can properly be regarded as standing only for its ruling on that issue.
One of the serious difficulties with the position taken in the main opinion is that it departs from the principle of judicial restraint, and in projecting a diametric change in the law, intrudes into the prerogative which belongs to the legislature and not to the courts. Another is what I think is a misguided expression of concern for people “mercilessly and senselessly barred from recovery for their injuries sustained at the hands of the entities designed to serve them.” That expression implies that public institutions rendering services for people are ogres bent on willful harm — an obvious misconception. It is my judgment that, instead of helping the under-privileged and oppressed, this decision will result in having the opposite effect: of dissuading and preventing public entities from rendering some of the wholesome and useful services the people now enjoy.
The effect this decision will have upon public golf courses may not be of any great importance. But the language of the court’s decision goes far beyond that issue. The test it states is: “whether the activity . is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity.”
I suggest that befpre adopting any such broad brush ukase, some consideration should be given to how it will apply to many wholesome and necessary activities and services provided by government, its agencies and institutions. I spare any attempt at extensive or all inclusive listing. But surely no elaboration is needed on the social desirability and the benefits for the *1240peace, good order and general social welfare of such things as public parks, playground areas and adjunctive equipment, including public swimming pools, tennis courts and other recreational facilities. Under the stated test, the question also arises: what happens to public schools and to public programs for health and disease control: e. g. eyes, blood pressure, heart, lungs, mental health, and immunization for diseases. The same is to be said with respect to furnishing emergency first aid, emergency hospital facilities, and the whole gamut of services which various governmental agencies can and do furnish which could be, but are not furnished by private businesses or individuals.
The suggestion that everything is all right because it will be taken care of by insurance is but an unrealistic illusion. Whether the city (or other public institutions) acts as its own insurer, and pays any losses it incurs, or pays the premiums for insurance to cover such losses, the burden must be borne; and the cost of bearing that burden, whether by the city itself, or by the payment of such premiums, must be correlated to the exposure of risk, which this decision very substantially increases. Thus, the cost of government must increase, or services must be eliminated or curtailed.
In summary, I state these propositions: First, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed as soundly decided on existing law. Second, I would adhere to the judicial duty and decide the issue presented, and avoid any such extensive change in existing law as the main opinion projects. Third, if the law with respect to the municipal golf course is to be so changed, that change should be legislative, and in any event, simple honesty and fairness to all parties affected requires that such a change should not be retroactive but prospective only.1

. Sometimes referred to as the Sunburst Doctrine, from Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 cited in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389.