Court Opinion

ID: 9570113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:14.646153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:58.515531
License: Public Domain

ORDER
Goolsby, Judge:
This action for breach of a construction contract was initiated by the respondent Robert D. Broom against the appellants Allen Marshall, Colonel 0. Rogers, and John Taylor, individually, and against the defendant Columbia Architectural Group, Inc. The issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in failing to grant appellants’ motions for a directed verdict and for judgment non obstante ver dicto (n.o.v.) and whether the jury verdict was excessive so as to indicate passion, prejudice, or caprice.
We hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to direct a verdict for the appellants and in failing to grant their motion for judgment n.o.v. and therefore reverse the judgment below.
Broom, an architectural draftsman, contacted Columbia Architectural Group, Inc., for the purpose of obtaining plans for a house he wanted to build on his vacant lot. Columbia Architectural Group, Inc., is a corporation whose shareholders include Marshall, Rogers, and Taylor. Taylor drew the plans according to Broom’s request.
Broom then signed a contract with CAG Investments, Inc., on April 19, 1977 for the construction of his home pursuant to the specifications and plans drawn by Taylor. Rogers signed the contract as an authorized agent for CAG Investments. Although the heading on the contract listed CAG Invest*532ments as a corporation, it was a partnership with Marshall, Rogers, Taylor, and James E. Bruce as partners.
CAG Investments proceeded to build the house. During its construction, Broom and his wife dealt with Rogers. The Brooms moved into the house in September 1977 and began to encounter numerous problems. They submitted to Rogers several “punch lists” of items that needed repair. Among the main problems were the incorrect application of redwood siding, an improperly built chimney, uncaulked windows, clogged plumbing, unaligned doors, and warped floors. Some items were repaired by CAG Investments, and others were repaired through Broom’s own efforts.
Broom brought suit against the appellants individually and the architectural corporation alleging a breach of contract for the failure to construct the residence in a good and workmanlike manner. He did not name Bruce as a defendant. Broom sought $30,000 in damages. Columbia Architectural Group, Inc., was dismissed from the suit at trial for reasons not disclosed in the trial transcript. In their answer, the appellants specifically denied they contracted individually with Broom alleging that Broom contracted with CAG Investments, a partnership, and that Rogers signed the contract as an agent for the partnership.
A jury verdict was subsequently returned against Marshall, Rogers, and Taylor for $30,000. Their motions for a non-suit, directed verdict, and judgment n.o.v. were all denied.
In an action at law tried by a jury, our standard of review applies only to the correction of errors of law. The jury’s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record discloses that there is no evidence to support its findings. Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S. C. 81, 221 S. E. (2d) 773 (1976). The jury’s verdict can be reversed when the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is one contrary to the factual findings implicit in the jury’s verdict. Bell v. Harrington Manufacturing Co., 265 S. C. 468, 219 S. E. (2d) 906 (1975); Moran v. Jones, 281 S. C. 270, 315 S. E. (2d) 136 (1984).
I.
The first issue concerns whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the appellants’ motion for a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. In determining these mo*533tions, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Skipper v. Hartley, 242 S. C. 221, 130 S. E. (2d) 486 (1963); Mylin v. Allen-White Pontiac, Inc., 281 S. C. 174, 314 S. E. (2d) 354 (S. C. App. 1984).
The appellants’ motions were based upon the ground that the evidence showed that Broom entered into a contract with CAG Investments, a partnership, and not with individuals who were members of the partnership. Broom expressly maintained throughout the trial and during oral argument before this court that he sought recovery against the named* individuals and not the partnership.
In order for Broom in this instance to recover against Marshall, Rogers, and Taylor, individually, he must establish that a contract existed between him and each appellant. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 579 at 1115 (1963); Dehler v. Setliff, 153 Ga. App. 796, 226 S. E. (2d) 516 (1980). The evidence presented consisted of the following testimony:
(a) Broom stated that he met with Taylor and Rogers to sign the building contract. The contract to construct the home was with CAG Investments, which he discovered was a partnership. Further, he admitted that he did not enter into a contract with Marshall.1
*534(b) Broom’s wife testified that she and her husband contracted with Rogers, Marshall, and Taylor as partners in CAG Investments to build their home.2
(c) Taylor, who was subpoenaed as a witness for Broom, stated that he, Marshall, Rogers and Bruce were stockholders in Columbia Architectural Group, Inc., and were partners in a building company, CAG Investments. Taylor produced the partnership income tax return for 1977 which showed that CAG Investments was a partnership when the building contract was signed. Rogers, according to Taylor, had authority to act on behalf of the partnership and thereby bind it when he signed the building contract.
(d) The appellants’ witness Cynthia Hilton corroborated Taylor’s testimony. Hilton was office manager for Columbia Architectural Group, Inc. Taylor, Marshall, Rogers, and Bruce are shareholders. In addition, during 1977 when Brooms’ home was under construction, Hilton assisted CAG Investments by working with Rogers to obtain the necessary building materials and subcontractors.
(e) During cross-examination, Hilton stated that Marshall signed the application for a building permit on behalf of CAG Investments. Even though the letterhead on the stationery used to draft the contract listed CAG Investments as being *535incorporated, this was a printing mistake. CAG Investments was in fact a partnership and Rogers signed the contract with the knowledge of the other partners on behalf of the partnership.
On the other hand, no evidence can be found in the record that either Broom or his wife ever thought that they were contracting with Rogers, Taylor, and Marshall as individuals. The evidence suggests only that they believed they were dealing with a business entity, either a corporation or a partnership.3
Although the evidence does not support the finding that a contract existed between Broom and each appellant individually, it does support a finding that a contract existed between Broom and a partnership whose members included each appellant. “A partnership under the law is an entity separate and distinct from the persons who compose it.” Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S. C. 262, 267, 1 S. E. (2d) 162, 164 (1939). “This principle has been applied solely in determining the legal relationships and liabilities of the partners.” Marvil Properties v. Fripp Island Development Corp., 273 S. C. 619, 620, 258 S. E. (2d) 106, 107 (1979). Thus, “[w]hen a partnership enters into a contract,... such contract is not with the individual members of the firm but with the partnership as an entity distinct from its members.” Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S. C. at 268, 1 S. E. (2d) 162.
Broom does not proceed against the appellants on the theory that they were members of a pretended corporation, in which case each of them could be held personally and individually liable [Guilford Builders Supply Co. v. Reynolds, 249 N. C. 612, 107 S. E. (2d) 80 (1959) ]; and, as we mentioned, he does not seek recovery against the appellants on the basis that a partnership contract existed whereby each partner is liable jointly. Instead, Broom asserts that the appellants are individually liable because the appellants, not an alleged partnership or pretended corporation, “entered into a written contract... to build” him a home.
Broom also claims that because the partnership entity did not exist at the time the suit was filed he had no alternative but to sue the appellants individually. *536Broom improperly relied on this assumption. Even if the partnership had been dissolved, and Rogers testified that it still exists, although it is inactive, the dissolution of the partnership did “not of itself discharge the existing liability of any partner.” S. C. Code of Laws § 33-41-1010 (1976); 60 Am. Jur. (2d) Partnership § 208 at 120 (1972). “The right of third persons to enforce obligations and contracts binding on a firm at the time of its dissolution usually continues after the termination of the partnership.” Id.; see S. C. Code of Laws § 33-41-920 (1976).
The evidence at trial, therefore, proved an obligation by a partnership to construct a home in a good and workmanlike manner. The record is devoid of any evidence from which the jury could determine that any of the appellants contracted in his individual capacity to construct Broom’s home; therefore, the appellants’ motion for a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. should have been granted.4
*537II.
We need not address the second issue raised by the appellants. Since we have determined that the trial court erred in not granting the motions for a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v., it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the jury verdict was excessive so as to indicate passion, prejudice, or caprice.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment5 of the trial court is
Reversed.
Cureton, J., concurs and Gardner, J., dissents.

 The following excerpts from Broom’s testimony at trial demonstrate that Broom knew he was dealing with a partnership:
Q. (By Mr. Beale) All right, sir,... what’s the name of the group at the top of that?
A. (Mr. Broom) CAG Investments, Inc.
Q. [D]id you later determine that CAG Investments was a partnership with Mr. Rogers and his other two partners? ...
* ;fc * *
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. All right. Who were you doing business with when you entered into this contract? .
A. I was doing business with CAG Investments, the partners are John Taylor, Colonel Rogers and Allen Marshall.
Q. (By Mr. Jackson) Did you have a contract with Allen Marshall to construct your home?
A. I don’t believe I had a contract with Allen Marshall.
Q. ... Was your contract to construct your home with CAG Investments?
*534A. That’s correct.
Q. And to the best of your knowledge, is CAG Investments a partnership?
A. Yes, sir.
* * * * *
Furthermore, on May 2, 1978, approximately ten months before the summons and complaint in this action were served, Broom reported in a complaint to the South Carolina Residential Home Builders Commission that “[ajfter dozens of phone calls and several meetings with the partners of CAG Investments (Colonel Rogers, John Taylor and Allen Marshall), my wife and I are convinced that they have certainly been given sufficient time to finish the house” and that “when I call CAG, the partners are not available and do not return my calls.” [Emphasis added.]

 The testimony that supports this statement was more or less volunteered. Viz.:
Q. (By Mr. Beale)... Is there anything else that you want to tell the Jury before I turn you over to Mr. Jackson?
A. (By Mr. Broom)... We signed a contract with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Marshall and Mr. Taylor as partners in CAG.

 For example, in a letter dated October 22, 1977, Broom addressed a letter to “Mr. Colonel O. Rogers, CAG Investment Inc. ” [Emphasis added.]

 The dissenting opinion would hold Rogers “individually liable on the contract he signed” and would hold that, because of “his conduct, Rogers bound his co-defendants Marshall and Taylor who... disclosed themselves to be his partners.” Our Brother, in other words, would hold Rogers liable as an individual and Marshall and Taylor liable as his partners in their individual capacities.
In our Brother’s view, Rogers’ individual liability is central to the individual liability of the other two appellants. The authorities cited in support of his conclusion that Rogers should be held individually liable on the contract are a Georgia case, Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Echols, 160 Ga. App. 539, 287 S. E. (2d) 577 (1981) and a South Carolina case, Bulova Watch Co. v. Roberts Jewelers of Rock Hill, Inc., 240 S. C. 280, 125 S. E. (2d) 643 (1962).
Don Swann is not at all like the case here. It simply holds that the defense of corporation by estoppel is not available so as to allow an individual defendant to deny liability on an open account where the corporation was not in existence at the time the plaintiff conducted business with the defendant. The appellants in this case neither claim they were a corporation nor assert the defense of corporation by estoppel. They maintain that they were, and still are, a partnership and liable as such and that Rogers acted as the partnership’s agent when he entered into the contract with Broom. Furthermore, as pointed out in the body of our opinion, Broom does not proceed against Rogers, Marshall, and Taylor upon the theory that they purported to act for a non-existent corporation.
Bulova Watch is likewise inapposite. That case involved an individual who continued to order goods in his own name after the charter of the corporation which operated a jewelry store and in which he held stock was cancelled. There was no evidence here that appellants ever dealt with Broom in their individual capacities. Moreover, Broom nowhere contends, as the plaintiff did in Bulova Watch, that Rogers and the others acted “for and on the behalf of a non-existent corporation.” Again, the theory Broom proceeds upon is that the three appellants contracted with him individually.

 At no time did Broom move to amend the complaint pursuant to Section 15-13-920 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1976) to change the action from one against individuals to an action against a partnership. See 59 Am.Jur.2d Parties § 287 at 766 (1971) (“An amendment has been held proper which charges as partners defendants who were sued as individuals ...”); see also Baker v. Hornik, 51 S. C. 313, 28 S. E. 941 (1898) (where the court held it was within the discretion of the trial court to allow an amendment to a complaint converting it from an action against a partnership to one against the individual members thereof).