Court Opinion

ID: 9855466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:25:26.752719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:47.055218
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent.
The majority lays out the premises for a decision reversing PERC, and then fails to draw the obvious conclusion of its own argument. A hearing was held on Richland's complaint against Local 1052 (hereinafter the Union), and the hearing examiner dismissed the complaint. PERC reversed, but, as the majority relates, it simply disregarded the hearing, deciding the case on an erroneous view of the law. PERC's decision was incorrect. Instead of reversing PERC, however, the majority remands this case for a new determination at another hearing. The remand is entirely unnecessary.
The Issue
The underlying issue is whether the Union violated its duty to bargain in good faith by insisting to impasse on an issue which is not the subject of mandatory bargaining. The contract proposal which the Union insisted on concerns equipment staffing levels. The Union contends that such levels affect safety and are therefore the subject of mandatory bargaining.
*209PERC held that equipment staffing levels were not subject to mandatory bargaining. The majority speculates on the reasoning that might have led PERC to that conclusion, but clearly PERC must have decided that such levels do not affect safety. It is undisputed that matters of safety are subject to mandatory bargaining. The majority decides correctly that PERC's decision was erroneous. Instead of reversing outright, however, the majority remands for a determination on whether equipment staffing levels affect safety and are therefore subject to mandatory bargaining. The majority notes that that determination should be made in the first instance by a hearing examiner. See footnote 5.
The problem is that a hearing examiner has already made that determination. As the majority itself recognizes, PERC did not find fault with the hearing examiner's conclusions. Instead, it simply ignored them. Given that PERC's decision was wrong, as the majority acknowledges, I cannot see any sense in remanding for a hearing that has already been held and the results of which have not been directly challenged. We should simply reverse PERC and reinstate the hearing examiner's dismissal of Richland's claim.
The Evidence
The hearing examiner's decision that equipment staffing levels do relate to safety was based on a substantial body of evidence, submitted by both sides and carefully considered.
Richland offered the testimony of its fire chief, Robert Panuccio, who contended that the issues addressed in the Union's proposal related to fire fighting effectiveness, not safety, and were therefore managerial considerations not subject to bargaining. He testified that none of the measures already taken to ensure safety related to crew size or equipment staffing levels. He testified that none of the injuries sustained in the recent past related to those levels and opined that smaller crews were in fact more safe than larger crews.
*210Richland Fire Department's operations chief, Duane Shrag, testified on the safety training of fire fighters. He noted that the procedures were not affected by crew size. He drew the conclusion that equipment staffing levels had no relation to safety.
Shrag and Panuccio both testified regarding existing grievance mechanisms and other opportunities which permit fire fighters to have a say on safety matters. Shrag described specific instances in which those suggestions and complaints had been heeded, and had changed policy.
The Union presented the testimony of an actual fire fighter, Tim Sharp, president of the Union and a lieutenant in the Department. He described his own injuries in the line of duty and explained how they might have been averted by the presence of additional personnel:
Q . . . the safety that's involved for the people out doing the job is directly in line with the number of people that are there and their qualifications and skills. If you have less people on the scene, then you're not going to have as many people seeing what's going on nor are you going to have the safety factor afforded of somebody being able to drag you out if you get hurt.
Transcript, at 118-19.
Sharp also submitted a report by Warren Kimball, a retired chief fire service specialist for the National Fire Protection Association and apparently an acknowledged expert on fire fighting safety. The Kimball report describes the multiple effects of reduced staffing on safety, including increasing the weight of hose fire fighters must carry and increasing the risk associated with raising and moving ladders. Risk is increased as fire fighters are diverted from manning equipment to rescue operations. Risk is also heightened by an increase in fatigue: a smaller crew may take longer to suppress a fire, leaving fire fighters on the line for longer periods of high-stress duty.
After hearing this evidence, the hearing examiner issued findings of fact and conclusions of law determining that equipment staffing levels do have an impact on safety, that the Union's proposal was therefore a matter of mandatory *211bargaining and that the Union therefore could not have violated its duty to bargain in good faith.
Review and Remand
We stated the standards governing review of cases such as this in Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, 101 Wn.2d 435, 440, 680 P.2d 40 (1984):
The review procedures of the administrative procedure act must be adhered to in the instant case. This court's review, like that of the superior court, is under RCW 34.04.130(6) which provides:
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(f) arbitrary and capricious.
Our review of the administrative decision is limited to the record of the administrative tribunal itself, not to that of the superior court. Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 323-24, 646 P.2d 113 (1982).
It is not necessary for this opinion to detail the respects in which PERC's decision is arbitrary and capricious and affected by errors of law. The majority itself demonstrates this clearly enough:
The problem with PERC's approach is that it assumes, rather than decides, the dispositive issue in this case: whether Local 1052's proposal regarding equipment staffing and deployment concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining. PERC did not determine from the facts presented to the hearing examiner that the substance of Local 1052's contract proposal properly may be regarded as a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. Rather, it treated the issue as already decided
Majority, at 202. Reversal is clearly required here.
*212Where I depart from the majority is in remanding the case. If this were an ordinary civil case, we would reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the trial court. Unless the original trial were tainted by some error, we would not remand for a new trial. Where the error lies solely with the reviewing court, the trial court's first determination stands.
The appellate procedures and standards in administrative cases are not so different from the ordinary civil case that a different practice should govern here. As the majority describes at length, the error lies solely at the level of review: PERC failed to considered the record before it in making its decision; the Superior Court failed to correct PERCs error in this regard. There has been no demonstration at all that the hearing examiner's decision was arrived at improperly or that it is erroneous. Given that the determination at the fact-finding level is trustworthy, there is no justification at all for remanding for further fact-finding. We should reverse outright and reinstate the determination of the hearing examiner.
Conclusion
The majority describes how PERC simply disregarded the hearing examiner's conclusions, rather than reviewing them. PERC therefore reached an erroneous decision. Given that the hearing examiner's determination has never been rejected as erroneous by PERC, I do not see the point of remanding for a new hearing. No one can seriously expect Richland and the Union to introduce different evidence from what has already been presented. Richland has already lost one hearing and is not entitled to a new one. Remanding for a determination on a question which has already been litigated and determined is unnecessary and unfair. I would reverse PERC and reinstate the hearing examiner's decision dismissing Richland's complaint.