Court Opinion

ID: 9912115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 17:09:42.190043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:08.626815
License: Public Domain

J-A23044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WILLIAM SANCHEZ                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1632 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 2, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0005344-2015

BEFORE:       LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: DECEMBER 21, 2023

       Appellant, William Sanchez, presents this counseled appeal from the

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County dismissing as

meritless his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Herein, Appellant contends PCRA counsel

denied him of his rule-based right to counsel as a first-time PCRA petitioner

by failing to communicate with him through a Spanish language interpreter

prior to filing her motion to withdraw as counsel. We affirm.

       The PCRA court has set forth the pertinent facts and procedural history,

as follows:

       Following [Appellant’s criminal] trial held October 3, 2017,
       through October 6, 2017, the jury found [Appellant] guilty of
       Murder in the First Degree and Resisting Arrest. The [trial] court
       imposed a sentence of life without parole on the Murder conviction
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A23044-23

     and a concurrent sentence of 1-2 years on the conviction of
     Resisting Arrest.

     [Appellant] filed a Post Sentence Motion on October 16, 2017, to
     which the Commonwealth filed an Answer on October 18, 2017.
     The [trial ]court denied [Appellant’s] Post Sentence Motion by
     Order of November 16, 2017.

     [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal on December 8, 2017. The
     Superior Court affirmed the judgment by Memorandum Opinion
     filed December 18, 2018.           The Supreme Court denied
     [Appellant’s] Petition for Allowance of Appeal on August 2, 2019.

     [Appellant] filed a timely Pro Se Petition for Post Conviction
     Collateral Relief on November 4, 2019.         The [PCRA] court
     appointed Michael Palermo, Esq. as PCRA counsel on November 6,
     2019. On December 5, 2019, [Appellant] filed a Motion to
     Schedule Grazier Hearing. Following several continuances, [the
     trial court] conducted a Grazier hearing on May 24, 2021, at
     which [Appellant] stated his desire to proceed with representation
     by Attorney Palermo. By Order filed May 24, 2021, [the PCRA
     court] directed that Attorney Palermo file a PCRA Petition on
     [Appellant’s] behalf within 20 days thereof. Attorney Palermo did
     not comply with [the PCRA court’s] May 24, 2021, Order.

     On November 30, 2021, [the PCRA court] ordered Attorney
     Palermo removed and appointed Kristen Weisenberger, Esq. as
     PCRA counsel. On January 4, 2021, [the PCRA court] granted
     Attorney Weisenberger’s Request for Extension of Time to File
     Supplemental PCRA Petition.       On March 2, 2022, Attorney
     Weisenberger file the instant Motion to Withdraw under the Post-
     Conviction Relief Act.

     Based upon the averments in the Motion to Withdraw, as
     discussed infra, [the PCRA court] deemed it necessary to conduct
     an evidentiary hearing as to [Appellant’s] claim that trial counsel
     failed to adequately meet with him prior to trial. With respect to
     that single issue, on April 8, 2022, [the PCRA court] appointed
     LaTasha Williams, Esq., to represent [Appellant]. On June 7,
     2022, Attorney Williams filed Appellant’s Motion for Leave of Court
     to Supplement [Appellant’s] Pro Se PCRA petition. On June 21,
     2022, [the PCRA court] ordered that [Appellant’s] Motion for
     Leave of Court to Supplement [Appellant’s] Pro Se PCRA petition
     would not be entertained in that [the PCRA court’s] April 8, 2022

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      Order limited the scope of Attorney Williams’ representation at
      that juncture to representation of [Appellant] at the evidentiary
      hearing on the single issue identified in our appointment Order,
      that is, the allegation of “counsels’ failure to meet and prepare for
      trial.”

      After the grant of continuances, [the PCRA court] conducted an
      evidentiary hearing on August 24, 2022.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/19/23, at 1-2.

      On October 10, 2022, the PCRA Court filed its memorandum opinion and

order granting Attorney Weisenberger’s Motion to Withdraw and giving Rule

907 notice of its intention to dismiss Appellant’s petition for PCRA relief. On

October 31, 2022, Attorney Williams filed on Appellant’s behalf objections to

the PCRA Court’s Rule 907 notice, but the PCRA court issued a final Order of

November 2, 2022, dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal

follows.

      Appellant, through Attorney Williams, raises the following issue for this

Court’s consideration:

      Did the PCRA Court commit an abuse of discretion and error of law
      when it denied Attorney Williams’s Motion for Leave of Court to
      Supplement/Amend Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition?

Brief of Appellant, at 3.

      We first consider the applicable standard of review:

      [A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court's findings of fact to
      determine whether they are supported by the record and reviews
      its conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from
      legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of the
      PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most
      favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.

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Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted). “It is an appellant's burden to persuade us that the PCRA

court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d

157, 161 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

        The crux of Appellant’s claim is that the PCRA court erred in denying

Attorney Williams’s motion to supplement Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition

where it was evident that appointed PCRA counsel, Attorney Weisenberg, had

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when she failed to meet with

Appellant to discuss, with the aid of a Spanish language translator, amending

his PCRA petition with issues not included in his pro se PCRA petition. After

careful review, we disagree.

        A PCRA petitioner has a rule-based right to the appointment of counsel

for a first petition and, with that right, is entitled to the effective assistance of

counsel.    Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 391 (Pa. 2021);

Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 687 A.2d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 1996).                    It

follows that PCRA counsel must file either an amended PCRA petition or seek

withdrawal with a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. Commonwealth v.

Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2010). Counsel seeking to withdraw

under      Turner/Finley     must    have     reviewed     the    case    zealously.

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 510–11 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citations omitted).

                                        -4-
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      A petitioner is permitted to raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at

the first opportunity, even if on appeal. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 405. It is well

settled that,

      counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption, the
      PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance
      was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him. Strickland
      v. Washington, [ ] 104 S. Ct. 2052, [ ] (1984). This Court has
      characterized the Strickland standard as tripartite, by dividing
      the performance element into two distinct parts. Commonwealth
      v. Pierce, [ ] 527 A.2d 973, 975 ([Pa.] 1987). Thus, to prove
      counsel ineffective, [a]ppellant must demonstrate that: (1) the
      underlying legal issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions
      lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) [a]ppellant was
      prejudiced by counsel's act or omission. Id. at 975.

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012).

             Generally, counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally
      effective if the chosen particular course of conduct had some
      reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client's interests. To
      demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a
      reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
      errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A
      reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to
      undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

            ***

            [A petitioner] is required to show actual prejudice; that is,
      that counsel's ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it ‘could
      have reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the
      proceedings.’

Charleston, 94 A.3d at 1019 (paragraph breaks added), citing, inter alia,

Strickland; Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).                With

these principles in mind, we turn to Appellant's claim.

                                     -5-
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      Appellant’s position that he was denied effective assistance of PCRA

counsel turns on Attorney Williams’s assertion that her own translator-aided

meeting with Appellant led her to believe that meritorious claims may be

discovered through consultation with Appellant. The entirety of Appellant’s

argument in this regard reads,

      [u]ndersigned counsel virtually met with Mr. Sanchez on May 20,
      2022. Through an interpreter, Mr. Sanchez articulated to the
      undersigned his concerns with clarity, intelligibility, and
      conciseness—a diametrical difference from his written pro se
      Petition. As a result, the undersigned believes that Mr. Sanchez
      has meritorious claims that extend beyond the scope of
      “Counsel(s)’ failure to meet and prepare for trial.”

Brief of Appellant, at 10-11.

      Attorney Williams fails to specify either what those claims are that

Attorney Weisenberger could have presented to the PCRA court had she

conducted a translator-aided interview with Appellant or how such claims

possess arguable merit. The absence of such a discussion is detrimental to

the present appeal, as it was Appellant’s burden to establish, inter alia, the

arguable merit of the legal issues he claims PCRA counsel should have

asserted. See Koehler, 36 A.3d at 132. Thus, he fails to prove that Attorney

Weisenberger rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

      To the extent Appellant appears to suggest, without further discussion,

that Attorney Weisenberger’s failure to meet with him amounted to an entire

denial of his right to PCRA counsel, the record belies the suggestion. Here,

the record shows that Attorney Weisenberger’s no-merit letter discussed each

                                    -6-
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issue set forth in Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition and determined that each

lacked merit.      Her no-merit letter also explained that she undertook a

comprehensive review of the record and discerned no colorable claim to raise

in a counseled amended petition. See Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d

509, 510–11 (Pa. Super. 2016) (outlining a counsel’s compliance with

procedural   requirements    for   withdrawing   as   counsel).   As   Attorney

Weisenberger satisfied her obligations as PCRA counsel under Turner/Finley,

Appellant was not effectively uncounseled during his PCRA phase.

      For the reasons discussed, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to the

relief he seeks.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/21/2023

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