Court Opinion

ID: 9556715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 07:11:13.029271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:52.342628
License: Public Domain

In The

                          Court of Appeals

               Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                         __________________

                        NO. 09-22-00043-CR
                        NO. 09-22-00044-CR
                        __________________

              DAVID WILLIAM RUNYON, Appellant

                                  V.

                 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 435th District Court
                  Montgomery County, Texas
      Trial Cause Nos. 21-03-03965-CR and 21-03-03966-CR
__________________________________________________________________

                              OPINION

     After the trial court denied David William Runyon’s motion to

suppress, he pleaded guilty to two indictments charging him with

possession of child pornography. 1 Based on these pleas, the trial court

     1See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.26(a).

                                   1
found Runyon guilty, and in punishment, the trial court assessed

concurrent, seven-year sentences.

     In the two cases, the record shows the State obtained Runyon’s

indictments based on images it extracted from Runyon’s laptop, which

police searched after obtaining a search warrant. To obtain the search

warrant, police relied on information they were told about what was on

the laptop by a woman living with Runyon, his then girlfriend, whom we

will call Sally. 2 At issue in the appeal is whether, as Runyon argues, the

evidence shows that Sally illegally accessed Runyon’s laptop before

providing the information on it to the police.

     On appeal, Runyon argues the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to suppress the images police seized from his laptop. Runyon

argues that because Sally didn’t have his effective consent to access his

laptop when she did, the images she found were obtained in violation of

the Computer Security statute, which prohibits a persons from accessing

a computer owned by another without the owner’s effective consent.3

     2A pseudonym.
     3Id. § 33.02 (Breach of Computer Security).

                                    2
Runyon concludes that Sally’s search of his laptop, which he argues the

evidence in the suppression hearing shows was obtained without his

effective consent violated the Computer Security statute, which made the

search conducted by police even though police obtained a warrant illegal

too.

       After a careful review of the evidence, we conclude the evidence

addressing the issue of whether Sally had Runyon’s effective consent to

access the laptop is conflicting. The trial court’s finding that Runyon

failed to carry his burden of persuasion on the effective consent issue is

a fact issue, which is tied to the trial court’s express or implied

determinations of historical facts. Because the trial court properly

applied the law in concluding the search warrant was not based on

evidence illegally obtained by another given its historical findings of fact,

we conclude it did not err in denying Runyon’s motion to suppress. 4 For

the reasons explained below, we will affirm.

       4Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (providing that “[n]o
evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the constitution or laws
of the United States of America shall be admitted in evidence against the
accused on the trial of any criminal case”).
                                    3
                The Hearing on the Motion to Suppress

     Three witnesses testified in the hearing the trial court conducted

on Runyon’s motion to suppress: (1) Sally; (2) Runyon; and (3) Jarod

Tunstall, a detective employed by the Montgomery County Constable’s

Office, Precinct 3. Detective Tunstall signed the probable cause affidavit,

which police used to support the search warrant that a magistrate signed

to obtain Runyon’s laptop. The seizure of Runyon’s laptop and a search

of its hard drive led to the discovery of the images that were the subject

of Runyon’s motion to suppress.

     The testimony in the hearing shows that one day in July 2020, when

Runyon was at work, Sally accessed Runyon’s laptop to find out what he

was doing. Sally did so, she said, because she had a strange feeling in her

gut. According to Sally, when she saw Runyon’s laptop that day, it was

on, the screen was visible, it was unlocked, and “on an ESPN page.” The

laptop was in one of the guest bedrooms in Runyon’s home. Runyon and

Sally had been living together in the home for about a year before Sally

saw the images on Runyon’s laptop that she reported to the police.

According to Sally, when she accessed the laptop, she saw a file folder

                                    4
labeled “girls.” In that folder, she saw a file, which was labeled with the

name of her friend who had visited in their home. On opening it, Sally

discovered that the folder had a file in it that was a recording of her friend

getting undressed in the home’s guest bedroom. Then, she noticed other

files in the folder that had images of her and Runyon having intercourse,

which according to Sally had been taken without her knowledge or

consent. After seeing these files, Sally looked at other folders on Runyon’s

laptop, and when she looked in the laptop’s download folder, she found

that Runyon had downloaded images of naked children.

     Sally reported the presence of the images on Runyon’s laptop to

federal and state authorities. After police executed the search warrant on

Runyon at his home, Sally testified Runyon told her: “[H]is biggest regret

that day was leaving it unlocked. He recalled the day that he left it

unlocked.”

     Following the hearing, the trial court issued findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Among its findings, the trial court found:

     ...

     5. Detective Jarod Tunstall’s testimony was credible.

                                      5
     ...

     10. . . . [Sally’s] testimony was credible.

     ...

     16. [Runyon] allowed [Sally] to use his silver Hewlett Packard
     laptop on multiple occasions prior to July 22, 2020. 5

     17. [Runyon] was aware that [Sally] used Runyon’s silver
     Hewlett Packard laptop on multiple occasions prior to July 22,
     2020.

     18. [Sally] used numerous electronic devices belonging to
     [Runyon] at different times while living with him in their
     home.

     19. There were never any express or implied statements
     concerning the use of electronic devices in the home that
     [Sally] shared with [Runyon].

     20. There were no written statements, verbal statements, or
     any other evidence that would have suggested to [Sally] that
     she did not have permission to access [Runyon’s] silver
     Hewlett Packard laptop.

     ...

     22. [Runyon] never restricted [Sally’s] access to his Hewlett
     Packard laptop.

     5Though some evidence shows Sally accessed the laptop on July 22,

she said she accessed it on July 21st. We’ve used July 21st as the date of
access since that date is consistent with Sally’s testimony.

                                     6
     23. [Runyon] never told [Sally] not to access his silver Hewlett
     Packard laptop.

     24. [Runyon] shared access to numerous electronic devices in
     the home with [Sally].

     25. [Sally] did not knowingly access [Runyon’s] silver Hewlett
     Packard laptop without his effective consent.

Relying on these findings, the trial court determined that Runyon failed

to carry his burden to establish the search of his computer violated his

rights and denied Runyon’s motion to suppress.

     Turning to the hearing on which the trial court’s findings are based,

the evidence admitted in the hearing shows that Sally testified she met

Runyon in May 2018. They began dating about four months later,

eventually moving into a house that Runyon bought in May 2019. Even

though they were not married, Sally and Runyon shared certain expenses

incurred when they lived together in the home.

     Sally and Runyon lived in the home for around a year before

breaking up. While together, Sally explained, there was no express or

implied agreement that things were “off limits” in the home. According

to Sally, they mostly “shared everything[.]” Explaining the extent to

which she and Runyon shared their possessions, Sally pointed to an
                                    7
expensive deck of cards, which she said were owned for the most part by

Runyon. The cards were for a game known as “Magic: The Gathering,”

which Sally said were worth around $30,000.

     Even though Sally and Runyon owned the electronic devices kept

in the home separately, Sally discussed how she and Runyon shared

them. Sally testified she had four such devices: a tablet computer, a

laptop computer, and two cell phones. By Sally’s account, Runyon had a

laptop, a cell phone that worked, and a cell phone that didn’t.

     Sally testified that she and Runyon also shared around thirteen

electronic game platforms, manufactured by Sony and Nintendo, which

they separately owned. When asked whether she needed Runyon’s

permission to use “any of the electronic devices you guys had in the

house[,]” Sally answered: “No.” And when asked whether “there were

ever any statements expressed or implied concerning when you could use

certain electronic devices or not in the home[,] Sally answered: “No.”

     Turning to Runyon’s laptop, Sally testified that the day she

discovered the pornographic images, his computer “wasn’t password

protected.” That said, she agreed that she and Runyon never specifically

                                   8
discussed her use of his laptop or whether she could use his laptop at any

time. To be sure, Sally conceded that generally, Runyon’s laptop was

protected by a password, yet no one ever asked to explain why it wasn’t

password protected in July 2020 when she found and then reported that

it had pornographic images of children on it to the police.

     Sally also described how she had used Runyon’s laptop while living

with him since she first moved in. According to Sally, she had used

Runyon’s laptop to update her resume and to play “Arena,” an online

game. When asked whether she was alone with the laptop when she did

these types of things, Sally replied: “Like, he was maybe in the room, but,

like, I was by myself.” Sally then clarified her testimony, explaining that

when she played Arena on Runyon’s laptop, he was in the room. Sally

added that on a few other occasions, she and Runyon had used his laptop

to watch baseball games.

     When Runyon’s attorney asked Sally whether she believed she

“could access [Runyon’s] computer at any time [after updating her

resume and playing Arena on his laptop,] Sally answered: “I don’ t know.”

Runyon’s attorney also asked Sally whether she had Runyon’s effective

                                    9
consent to access his computer, as he asked her the following leading

question: “That on July 22nd, you would agree that you knowingly

accessed [Runyon’s] computer without [his] effective consent that

afternoon?” Sally answered: “I think it was the [July] 21st. I don’t know.”

In an effort to clarify his question, Runyon’s attorney then told Sally that

effective consent included “consent by a person legally authorized to act

through the owner.” Yet after explaining that to Sally, Sally stuck with

her same answer to the question about effective consent and repeated her

answer: “I don’t know.”

     Sally conceded that Runyon never gave her his express permission

to use his laptop the day she accessed it and found it contained

pornographic images of children. Sally also agreed that she waited until

Runyon left home, consciously decided to enter the guest bedroom, and

then was checking into what Runyon was doing by “snooping” around in

his laptop based on her fear that he might be cheating.

     Even though Sally agreed Runyon was not home when she accessed

his laptop, she said he never told her or did anything that suggested to

her that she couldn’t access his laptop when he wasn’t present. For

                                    10
instance, Sally said that when she used Runyon’s computer to update her

resume, Runyon didn’t place any limitations on her use. Likewise, when

she used his laptop to play an online game, Arena, she never asked

Runyon for his express consent before using his laptop. According to

Sally, she never had a conversation with Runyon where he told her she

could only use his laptop for a limited purpose, and he never implied to

her that she could only use his laptop while playing Arena online.

     During the hearing, Sally did admit she felt “guilty for snooping”

after accessing Runyon’s laptop. But she testified her feelings depended

on her sense of morals. She explained:

     A: I guess morally. I just never – I don’t know. Morally, I feel
     like it wasn’t the best move, but I never in the two years
     wanted – I don’t want – to be that kind of person. I wanted to
     not snoop, but – for the most part, I feel like it’s not the
     greatest, but –

     Q: Sure.

     A: – in my gut, I just didn’t feel like something was right, and
     I think that’s what I felt.

While questioned about her feelings as they related to her accessing

Runyon’s computer, Sally maintained that Runyon never did prohibit her

from accessing his laptop.
                                   11
     Detective Jarod Tunstall, the investigating officer who responded

to Sally’s report, testified in the hearing that his first contact with Sally

was on the phone. She agreed to come in for an interview. Detective

Tunstall interviewed Sally twice in August 2020, and the recordings of

the interviews were admitted into evidence in the hearing. During the

recorded interviews, Sally told the detective she accessed Runyon’s

laptop after he left home because “something told me to snoop[.]” In the

recording, Sally is heard explaining that she accessed the laptop because

it was unlocked. She also told the detective she didn’t have Runyon’s

password.

     Detective Tunstall explained that he relied on the information Sally

gave him to obtain the search warrant police used to seize Runyon’s

laptop and search it for evidence of a crime. When the detective was

asked whether in preparing his investigation and report if he “had any

concern about whether or not [Sally’s] access to [Runyon’s] laptop was

unlawful[,]” the detective answered: “No, I did not.”

     Runyon was the third witness who testified in the hearing.

Although he disputed some of Sally’s testimony, he didn’t dispute her

                                     12
claim he left his laptop on and unlocked on the day she found the images

that were the subject of his motion, nor her claim that there were

occasions in which he had allowed her to use his laptop in the past. To be

clear, Runyon’s position was that while she could use his laptop, she could

only do so on those occasions when they were in the same room.

     Turning to Runyon’s account about their general use of passwords,

Runyon testified that he and Sally didn’t share any passwords with each

other except to the online game, Arena. Runyon disputed Sally’s

testimony that he and Sally shared everything, for example he

specifically disputed her claim that they shared access to the deck of

cards for “Magic: The Gathering.” Instead, Runyon said, their custom was

to ask permission if one of them needed to use the other person’s items.

Still, Runyon agreed that he and Sally had “some form of shared access”

to around twenty electronic devices. That said, Runyon didn’t clearly

spell out the terms of the agreements he claims he had with Sally as to

their shared use of the twenty electronic devices he agreed that they

shared, except he did say that if he “ever used [two of Sally’s electronic

gaming platforms, which Runyon identified,] I believe I asked her

                                    13
permission[.] . . . [But] “I’m not sure if I would describe it as a

requirement or not.”

     Turning to Runyon’s laptop, Runyon testified that generally, he

kept his laptop protected by a password, which he didn’t share with Sally.

But he thought that Sally might have had it, because his password was

“onions,” and Sally had seen him unlock his laptop using his password

before. For example, when Sally used his laptop to update her resume,

she asked if she could use the laptop, he unlocked it, entered his

password, opened the word-processing program for her, and handed the

laptop to her. As to Sally’s testimony about using his laptop to play

Arena, Runyon testified he couldn’t recall if she used his laptop for that

purpose, but if she did, he “would have logged onto the [laptop], unlocked

it, entered the password, brought up Arena and then handed [the laptop]

to her to play on her account.”

     Runyon testified he would have expected Sally to have asked him

for his permission before she used his laptop. Runyon explained that his

laptop had a password, and it was his practice to “lock it and it would

have needed a password to get into it.” Still, when questioned about

                                   14
whether the laptop was locked when Sally discovered the images she

later reported to the police, Runyon testified: “I don’t remember how I left

it that day when I left for work.” According to Runyon, however, even if

Sally could have accessed his laptop without entering his password

because he left it on and open that day, it didn’t mean that he intended

to give Sally his effective consent to access his laptop without his express

permission. Runyon added, he never gave Sally “a blanket effective

consent to go into” his laptop.

     While Runyon explained what he intended, he also agreed that at

best what he intended was implied, not express. He agreed that he never

told Sally, “Don’t ever go on my laptop.” And he agreed that when Sally

either used his laptop or had asked him whether she could use it, he never

told her she could not.

     After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Runyon pleaded

guilty to two counts of child pornography. Based on the pleas, the trial

court sentenced Runyon to serve concurrent, seven-year sentences.

                                    15
                          Standard of Review

     Texas law requires that evidence obtained by a person in violation

of the Constitution be excluded even if the person has acted in good faith

when investigating a crime. 6 The exclusionary rule created by the

exclusionary statute, Article 38.23, encompasses private individuals even

though the private individual was not when gathering the evidence

acting as an agent of the state. 7 Under Article 38.23(a) the defendant

bears the initial burden to show a “causal connection” between the

alleged illegality and the evidence that is the subject of the motion to

suppress. 8 The evidence Runyon sought to suppress relates to images

found on his laptop by his girlfriend, images he claims she knowingly

accessed without his permission, which he alleged made the search illegal

under Texas law because the images were found as a result of a violation

of the Texas Computer Security statute. 9

     6Id.
     7See State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
     8See Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 468 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); Pham v. State, 175 S.W.3d 767, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
     9Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.02.

                                 16
     We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a

bifurcated standard of review. 10 In conducting our review, “[w]e afford

almost total deference to the trial court’s findings of historical facts that

are reasonably supported by the record and to its resolution of mixed

questions that turn on credibility or demeanor[.]” 11 “We review de novo a

trial court’s legal conclusions and its resolution of mixed questions that

do not turn on credibility and demeanor.” 12 As the judge of the credibility

of the witnesses in a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is

the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. 13

     A defendant claiming evidence is inadmissible under Article 38.23

because the evidence was illegally obtained by an individual not acting

on behalf of the government has the initial burden to establish the

individual obtained the evidence in violation of the law. 14 “Only when this

burden is met does the State bear a burden to prove compliance.” 15 Still,

     10Lopez  v. State, 610 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020);
Turrubiate v. State, 339 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
     11Id.
     12Id.
     13State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (2000).
     14State v. Robinson, 334 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
     15Id.

                                  17
“the burden of persuasion is properly and permanently placed upon the

shoulders of the moving party.” 16 “When a criminal defendant claims the

right to protection under an exclusionary rule of evidence, it is his task

to prove his case.” 17

      When, as here, the trial court makes findings of fact, we determine

whether the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s ruling supports the trial court’s findings. 18 We will reverse the

trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress “only if it is arbitrary,

unreasonable, or ‘outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.’” 19 In our

review, we afford the party that prevailed on the motion the strongest

legitimate view of the evidence and give that party all inferences that

may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. 20 We will uphold the trial

      16Pham, 175 S.W.3d at 773.
      17Id. (cleaned up).
      18State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also

State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
     19State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

(quoting State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
     20Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 571.

                                  18
court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on

any theory of law that applies to the case. 21

                                 Analysis

     On appeal, Runyon argues the record does not support the trial

court’s finding that Sally did not knowingly access Runyon’s laptop

without Runyon’s effective consent. According to Runyon, the trial court

abused its discretion in making this finding because in Runyon’s view,

the evidence shows his “laptop remained off limits unless he was

physically present.” As Runyon sees it, the record shows the trial court

should have inferred from the evidence in the hearing that because he

was not at home when Sally accessed his laptop, by accessing it she did

so without having his effective consent. Runyon concludes that because

the evidence doesn’t support the trial court’s finding that Sally did not

knowingly access his laptop without his effective consent, her search of

his laptop was illegal because it violated the Computer Security statute,

making the State’s seizure of his laptop and its search illegal too. 22

     21Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732; Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 150.
     22Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.02.

                                    19
     Under the Computer Security statute, “[a] person commits an

offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network,

or computer system without the effective consent of the owner.”23 To

establish a violation of this statute, the evidence must show the person

who accessed the computer did so when they knew they didn’t have the

effective consent of the computer’s owner to access the device. 24 Whether

or not someone acts knowingly is left to the factfinder based on the

inferences that the factfinder must draw from the evidence admitted in

the trial based on the conduct of the person being accused of engaging in

the conduct prohibited under the law. 25 Since Sally is the person Runyon

accused of violating the law in his motion to suppress, his motion and the

evidence in the hearing focused on whether Sally, when accessing

Runyon’s laptop, knew she didn’t have his permission to access it, and

whether the evidence police obtained following Sally’s report was

     23Id. § 33.02(a).
     24Thomas v. State, 586 S.W.3d 413, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d).
      25See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b) (defining what it means under

the Penal Code when a statute requires proof that a person acted
knowingly or with knowledge).
                                   20
“evidence obtained” in violation of the Constitution or the Texas

exclusionary statute. 26

     On appeal, Runyon argues he never gave Sally his express or

apparent consent to use his laptop “while he was not at his home.” But

under the Computer Security statute, the owner’s express consent isn’t

required. That’s because the Penal Code allows consent to be proven by

showing an owner’s consent was either “express or apparent.” 27

     During the hearing, Sally testified that she and Runyon never

discussed that they wouldn’t access each other’s “cell phones and

laptops[.]” As the factfinder in the suppression hearing, the trial court

could, in the exercise of its sound discretion, credit Sally’s testimony that

no express agreement existed about accessing each other’s cell phones or

laptops. The trial court could also reasonably reject Runyon’s testimony

to the contrary, suggesting that Sally should have understood from a

conversation they had before she moved in with him that she didn’t have

his express permission to use his laptop. In that conversation, according

     26See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a).
     27Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(11).

                                     21
to Runyon, they discussed another couple who they knew that were

having a problem in their relationship based on a breach of trust. As a

result, the other couple had agreed to share all passwords “between them

because they could not trust each other[.]” Runyon testified that during

that conversation, he and Sally agreed that “we did not want that for our

relationship.” From that conversation, Runyon argues, Sally should have

understood that Sally didn’t have his permission to access his laptop,

even though the conversation occurred over a year before Sally moved

into his home.

     Turning to the issue of apparent (or implied) consent, Runyon

argues the trial court failed to address material, uncontested facts that

show Sally didn’t have “consent to access [Runyon’s] laptop when he was

not present[.]” He also contends the trial court’s findings fail to address

uncontested facts, which he argues show that Sally knew she didn’t have

Runyon’s consent to access his laptop. We disagree. The evidence about

whether Sally knew of an implied agreement prohibiting her from

accessing Runyon’s laptop is conflicting. Under the bifurcated standard

that we must use to review suppression rulings, we are bound by the trial

                                    22
court’s findings on issues related to credibility and “who did what, when,

where, how, or why[.]” 28

     Here, the trial court heard testimony that before Sally found the

pornographic images on Runyon’s laptop, Runyon allowed Sally to use

his laptop and to access many other electronic devices that he owned in

the home. On the day Sally found the images on Runyon’s laptop, Runyon

left the laptop on, unlocked, and he didn’t take his laptop with him to

work. By Runyon’s telling, the fact that Sally admitted she felt guilty

because she was “snooping” shows she knew she didn’t have Runyon’s

permission to access his laptop. According to Runyon, the trial court’s

finding that Sally did not knowingly access his laptop without his

permission conflicts with this evidence and with Sally’s testimony that

she knew his laptop was protected with a password, which he didn’t share

with her. Runyon also argues that in its findings, the trial court failed to

consider Sally’s testimony that when she accessed Runyon’s laptop, Sally

admitted she knew it wasn’t right: “[I]n my gut, I just didn’t feel like

something was right, I think that’s what I felt.” Runyon concludes that

     28Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. 2013).

                                    23
the evidence is all consistent and shows that Sally “accessed [Runyon’s]

laptop without his permission and knew he had not consented to her use

of the laptop when he was not present.”

     First, we will address why we disagree with Runyon that Sally’s

testimony she was snooping when she accessed Runyon’s laptop isn’t

inconsistent with the trial court’s findings that Sally did not knowingly

access Runyon’s laptop without his effective consent. As commonly used,

the word snoop means “to look or pry in a sneaking or meddlesome

manner : search intrusively or pryingly.” 29 Runyon argues that because

Sally testified that she was snooping when she accessed Runyon’s laptop,

Sally knew she didn’t have his permission to use his laptop when he

wasn’t there. Even though we concede the trial court could have inferred

Sally’s snooping meant that she didn’t have Runyon’s permission to

access his laptop, we must view her testimony from the totality of the

circumstances and in the light that is most favorable to the trial court’s

     29Snoop,   Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2157
(2002).
                                   24
ruling. 30 As to Sally’s admission that she was snooping, the question is

was it reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Sally did not have a

clear understanding that she didn’t have Runyon’s apparent permission

to access his laptop unless he was in the room.

     We conclude that whether the trial court’s resolution of that

question is a reasonable one turns on Runyon’s burden to prove that Sally

clearly understood she could not access his laptop. 31 In Baird, the Court

of Criminal Appeals explained that when the issue of apparent consent

turns on a matter the computer’s owner didn’t “explicitly verbalize” under

the Computer Security statute, the party asserting a statutory violation

occurred must prove that the computer’s owner conveyed a “clear and

manifest understanding” to the person who accessed the computer that

the person who accessed the computer did not have the right to access

the owner’s computer. 32 Thus, the trial court could have reasonably

reconciled Sally’s testimony that she was “snooping” as evidence that she

     30State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008); Guitterez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
     31Baird, 398 S.W.3d at 229.
     32Id. at 230.

                                   25
felt guilty about prying into Runyon’s computer because she thought he

might be cheating on her, not as evidence that she did so while having a

clear understanding that the only times she could access Runyon’s laptop

was when he was there.

     Second, as to the remaining conflicts Runyon points to in the

evidence, we conclude the trial court was also entitled as the factfinder

in the hearing to resolve those in favor of the ruling it made denying

Runyon’s motion to suppress. For instance, the trial court could have

reasonably believed that Runyon left his laptop on and unlocked the day

Sally accessed the laptop, as Sally claimed. On that view of the evidence,

Sally would not have needed a password to access the laptop.

Alternatively, the trial court could have concluded that Runyon simply

didn’t meet his burden of persuasion to establish that he ever made it

clear to Sally that based on the fact he had allowed her to use his laptop

in the past, she didn’t have his permission to use his laptop unless he was

there with her and in the same room. In the hearing, Sally testified no

express or implied agreement existed with Runyon about “when [she]

could use certain electronic devices or not in the home[.]” Given the

                                    26
deference we must afford to the trial court’s historical findings, on this

record the trial court could have reasonably chosen to believe Sally’s

testimony.

     In sum, Runyon simply offers a different view of the inferences that

he argues the trial court should have drawn from the evidence than the

ones the trial court chose to draw after deciding which witnesses it

believed. But as the reviewing court, we must defer to the trial court’s

findings of historical facts since its findings are supported by the

evidence. 33 Because the trial court could reasonably conclude Runyon

didn’t meet his burden of persuasion to establish Sally knowingly

violated the Computer Security statute, the trial court applied the law

properly in finding the State did not obtain a search warrant based on

evidence illegally by another in violation of Article 38.23(a). 34 Because

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Runyon’s motion to

suppress, the issues he raises in his appeals in trial court cause numbers

21-03-03965-CR and 21-03-03966-CR are overruled.

     33See id. at 227.
     34Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a); Thomas, 586 S.W.3d at

422-23.
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                             Conclusion

     Because we conclude Runyon’s issues lack merit, we affirm the trial

court’s judgments in trial court cause numbers 21-03-03965-CR and 21-

03-03966-CR.

     AFFIRMED.

                                            _________________________
                                                 HOLLIS HORTON
                                                      Justice

Submitted on May 18, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 16, 2023
Publish

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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