Court Opinion

ID: 9947781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:13:45.60162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:33.508661
License: Public Domain

J-S41006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LARRY ALLEN SLEDGE                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 76 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 31, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000722-2020

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LARRY ALLEN SLEDGE                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 77 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 31, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000388-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: March 5, 2024

       In this consolidated appeal, Larry Allen Sledge appeals nunc pro tunc

from the judgment of sentence entered in the Erie County Court of Common

Pleas on October 31, 2022. After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41006-23

      In January 2020, at docket 388 of 2020, a criminal complaint was filed

charging Sledge with attempted homicide, aggravated assault, and other

crimes related to the shooting of Jessica Crouch. Two months later, at docket

722 of 2020, a criminal complaint was filed charging Sledge with intimidation

of a witness for allegedly contacting Crouch to have her drop the charges.

      On August 12, 2022, following a jury trial, Sledge was convicted of the

charges in both dockets, i.e., attempted homicide and related offenses in 388

of 2020, and intimidation of a witness at 722 of 2020.

      On October 31, 2022, the trial court sentenced Sledge to an aggregate

term of twenty-six to fifty-two years’ incarceration.

      On November 21, 2022, Sledge filed a pro se petition for post-conviction

collateral relief seeking, among other relief, to have his appellate rights

reinstated. The trial court entered an order granting the petition to the extent

that Sledge could file a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. The order also stated

that Attorney Bruce Sandmeyer was to continue to represent Sledge during

the pendency of the appeal, and that “Counsel shall file his notice of appeal

within thirty (30) days.” Order, 11/30/2022.

      On December 7, 2022, Attorney Sandmeyer filed a post-sentence

motion and a motion to withdraw as counsel at both docket numbers. The

following day, the trial court entered orders granting Attorney Sandmeyer’s

motion to withdraw as counsel, directing that appellate counsel be appointed

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for Sledge, and ordering the Commonwealth to respond to the post-sentence

motion within fourteen days.

      On December 20, 2022, the trial court entered an order at both docket

numbers appointing Attorney Tina Fryling to represent Sledge. Two days later,

the Commonwealth filed its response to the post-sentence motion. On the

same date, the trial court entered an order denying the post-sentence motion,

based on the reasons set forth in the Commonwealth’s response. Notably, that

order did not mention Sledge’s appeal rights or the time within which an

appeal must be filed.

      On January 18, 2023, Attorney Fryling filed two separate notices of

appeal, one under each docket, on Sledge’s behalf.

      Preliminarily, we must address our jurisdiction to entertain this appeal

because an untimely appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain the

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Edrington, 780 A.2d 721, 725 (Pa. Super.

2001). We may address questions of our jurisdiction sua sponte. See id.

      “Absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court lacks the power

to enlarge or extend the time provided by statute for taking an appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted). “Thus, an appellant’s failure to appeal timely an order generally

divests the appellate court of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Id. (citations

omitted).

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      Generally, a post-sentence motion must be filed within ten days after

the imposition of sentence, and to be timely, an appeal must be filed within

thirty days of the entry of the order deciding the motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

720(A)(2)(a). An untimely post-sentence motion does not toll the time to file

an appeal. See Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 618 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc).

      Typically, “[w]hen the trial court issues an order reinstating an

appellant's appeal rights, the appellant must file the appeal within 30 days of

the order reinstating the appeal rights.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 846

A.2d 730, 734 (Pa. Super. 2004). The Wright court explained:

      [R]einstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc denotes that
      the appellant now has the same direct appeal rights as he would
      have had in the beginning. Since in the beginning an appellant
      ordinarily must file his direct appeal within thirty days of the date
      of imposition of sentence (or the date of entry of the order
      disposing post-sentence motions [pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]),
      it is logical and fair to apply the same thirty-day rule when an
      appellant's direct appeal rights are restored nunc pro tunc.

Id. at 735 (internal footnote omitted). Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has held that an order reinstating direct appeal rights does not

automatically grant the right to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc.

See Commonwealth v. Liston, 977 A.2d 1089, 1093-94 (Pa. 2009). An

appellant must request leave to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc in

addition to the request for restoration of appellate rights. See id. at 1094 n.9.

A trial court's resolution of an appellant's impermissible post-sentence motion

is no substitute for an order expressly restoring the right to file a post-

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sentence motion nunc pro tunc, and in these circumstances we treat such a

motion as untimely. See Wright, 846 A.2d at 733-34.

      Here, Sledge did not seek leave to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro

tunc and the trial court’s November 30, 2022 order reinstating Sledge’s appeal

rights did not also expressly reinstate Sledge’s right to file a post-sentence

motion nunc pro tunc. Further, the order clearly stated that counsel shall file

a notice of appeal within 30 days. Accordingly, Sledge’s post-sentence motion

was untimely and did not serve to toll the appeal period. It was error for the

PCRA court to review the merits of Sledge’s belated post-sentence motion

when he had never been granted the right to file such a motion.

      The notices of appeal filed on January 18, 2023, were therefore facially

untimely as they were filed more than thirty days after the entry of the order

reinstating Sledge’s direct appeal rights. See Pa.R.A.P. 903 (directing that a

notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from

which the appeal is taken); Wright, 846 A.2d at 734 (“When the trial court

issues an order reinstating an appellant's appeal rights, the appellant must

file the appeal within 30 days of the order reinstating the appeal rights.”).

      However, the trial court failed to inform Sledge that his untimely post-

sentence motion did not toll the thirty-day appeal period. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

720(B)(4)(a) (providing that “[a]n order denying a post-sentence motion ...

shall include notice to the defendant of the ... right to appeal and the time

limits within which the appeal must be filed....”). This Court has found that

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such circumstances constitute a breakdown in court operations and thus

provide    grounds     to    excuse     an    otherwise     untimely     appeal.

See Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (Pa. Super.

2022) (citation omitted). For these reasons, we consider Sledge’s appeal

timely.

      Sledge raises the following issues on appeal:

      1. The trial court erred in failing to grant [Sledge]’s motion under
      Rule 600, as the Commonwealth failed to bring the case to trial
      within the 365 day deadline cited in Pennsylvania Rule 600.

      2. The trial court erred in failing to rule that the Commonwealth
      erred in failing to turn over exculpatory evidence, namely that
      witness for the Commonwealth Ryan Nelson had been offered a
      plea deal for testifying at trial.

      3. The trial court erred in failing to rule that juror number 26
      should have been stricken for cause when that juror stated that
      she knew the assistant district attorney who was prosecuting the
      case and had grown up with her as a childhood friend.

      4. The trial court erred in failing to rule that juror number 24
      should have been stricken for cause when that juror stated that
      she worked with one of the police officers who was testifying for
      the Commonwealth.

      5. The trial court erred in failing to grant [Sledge]’s post sentence
      motion and grant him a new trial when after acquired evidence
      was attached to the post sentence motion.

      6. The trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony regarding
      the identification of [] Sledge as the shooter by the victim.

Appellant’s Brief, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      We consider the Rule 600 issue first, because if we were to find a

violation, it would dispose of the appeal. The proper remedy for the

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Commonwealth's failure to try a defendant within 365 non-excludable days is

dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a),

(D)(1); see also Commonwealth v. Sloan, 67 A.3d 1249, 1251 (Pa. Super.

2013) (discharging a defendant for a Rule 600 violation). However, we cannot

reach the merits of this issue as Sledge has failed to preserve his Rule 600

challenge for appellate review.

      We note that Rules 2117(c) and 2119(e) of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure mandate that litigants specify the manner in which issues

were preserved and the location in the record where the issue appears and

was preserved. See also Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 847 (Pa.

2003) (holding that this Court has no duty to peruse lengthy records to find

support for issues raised by a defendant). Sledge fails to point to any part of

the record where this issue was preserved. In fact, Sledge fails to cite to the

record at all in support of this issue.

      Although it is not our duty to do so, this Court has sifted through the

record and discovered numerous pro se filings under each docket requesting

nominal bond pursuant to Rule 600(B). However, we were only able to find

one document that could be construed as a Rule 600(A) motion. Even if we

could construe this document as a Rule 600 motion, there is no indication that

this motion was properly filed and served. Rule 600 requires the filing of a

written motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1). A written motion in a criminal

case is “filed” with the clerk of courts. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 567(A)(1). Here, it

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appears the motion was filed as it is timestamped by the clerk of courts.

However, we cannot locate a docket page in the record to verify that this filing

appears on the docket. Further, Rule 600 also mandates that a “copy of the

motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently

with filing.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. (“A copy

of the motion must be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth, who

has a right under this rule to be heard on the motion.”) There is no indication

in the record that service was made to the Commonwealth. Accordingly, we

are unable to tell from the record whether or not a proper Rule 600 motion

was filed. It is clear that a Rule 600 hearing was never held, and that Sledge

never requested relief from the trial court on this pro se motion either before

or during trial.

      On appeal, this Court cannot consider matters outside of the

record. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 96–97 (Pa. Super.

2012) (en banc) (“This Court does not rely on items dehors the record, such

as assertions in an appellate brief or a trial court opinion.”) We simply cannot

effectively review the denial of an improperly filed motion when combined with

the lack of a hearing that was never requested by Sledge. Accordingly, Sledge

failed to preserve his Rule 600 claim.

      We note, even if not waived, this issue is without merit. On appeal,

Sledge only challenges two time periods being counted against him: (1) the

33 days between March 31, 2021, when Sledge’s counsel filed a motion to

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withdraw as counsel, and May 3, 2021, the date trial was continued to due to

needing to address the motion to withdraw, and (2) the delay caused by the

court’s response to Sledge’s omnibus pretrial motion that he filed on his own

behalf, including the need for a suppression hearing, and a continuance of that

hearing requested by Sledge’s standby counsel. These delays were clearly not

attributable      to   the   Commonwealth      and   occurred   “as   the   result   of

circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due

diligence.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. As such, they would be excluded from the

computation of time under Rule 600. Therefore, there is no merit to Sledge’s

contentions under Rule 600.

       In his second issue, Sledge contends the trial court erred in declining to

find the Commonwealth committed a Brady1 violation by allegedly failing to

turn over exculpatory evidence; specifically, that Commonwealth witness

Ryan Nelson had been offered a plea bargain in exchange for his testimony at

Sledge’s trial.

       In order to establish a Brady violation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

has explained:

       There are three components of a true Brady violation: [t]he
       evidence must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
       exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have
       been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;
       and prejudice must have ensued.

____________________________________________

1 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 25 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted). Additionally, “[a] reviewing court is not to review the evidence in

isolation, but, rather, the omission is to be evaluated in the context of the

entire record.” Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 309 (Pa. 2011)

(citation omitted).

      First, Sledge fails to explain why he could not have raised this issue

earlier. Sledge admits that he learned of a promise made to Nelson in

exchange for his testimony during the Commonwealth’s closing argument at

trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 25. However, a review of the record shows that

the decision to not charge Nelson was actually discussed multiple times

throughout the trial.

      Detective Pilarski testified that he discussed with Nelson that due to his

involvement, there was a possibility that he could be charged. However,

Detective Pilarski clarified that Nelson was not charged because he was

forthcoming, and it was clear from his interview that Nelson believed he was

simply helping Sledge send a letter to his girlfriend and he did not know that

the letter was being used to intimidate a witness. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 3,

8/11/22, at 53-54. Next, the Commonwealth affirmed Detective Pilarski’s

testimony that Nelson was ultimately not charged due to his cooperation

during a sidebar, outside the presence of the jury, right after the close of the

Commonwealth’s case. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 4 – A.M. Session, 8/12/22, at

41. This was prior to Sledge presenting his case, including testifying on his

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own behalf. Finally, the Commonwealth again affirmed, during closing

arguments, that Nelson was ultimately not charged due to his cooperation.

See N.T., Jury Trial Day 4 – Afternoon Session, 8/12/22, at 73.

      Sledge has failed to explain why he did not challenge this information

during trial, prior to sentencing, or in a timely post-sentence motion.

Accordingly, this issue is arguably waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b)

(stating “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to

do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal[,] or in a prior

state postconviction proceeding”); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d

1111, 1129 (Pa. 2011) (concluding that the appellant’s Brady PCRA claim

concerning an alleged deal between the prosecutor and two material witnesses

was waived for failure to have raised it in an earlier proceeding).

      Even if not waived, the contention is without merit. The trial court found,

and the Commonwealth argues, that Sledge failed to present any evidence

that the Commonwealth made any promises to or deals with Nelson in

exchange for his testimony at Sledge’s trial. However, even if we assume

arguendo that a promise were made, we find that Sledge has failed to show

that evidence of a promise would have been exculpatory, or that he was

prejudiced by the withholding of that information.

      We first address Sledge’s failure to explain how a potential promise

made with Nelson was material or exculpatory. Sledge was charged under

docket 722 with intimidation of a witness based on a letter that was sent to

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Crouch. Crouch contacted the police after receiving the letter which bore

Nelson’s inmate number. The letter was also signed by another inmate Chester

Burrows. Crouch indicated that she did not know Nelson. While she knew

Burrows, she was certain the handwriting in the letter was Sledge’s.

      Nelson testified that he let Sledge use his inmate number to send a

letter “to his girl” but did not know why Sledge could not send the letter

himself, and Nelson never saw the letter. N.T., Jury Trial Day 2, 8/10/22, at

147-48. Nelson testified that he knew the handwriting on the letter was

Sledge’s because he had also given Sledge his inmate number for Sledge to

write a letter to Nelson’s girlfriend due to Nelson’s hand being broken. See id.

at 149.

      Nelson was not the only individual to testify regarding the letter sent to

Crouch. Crouch testified to receiving the letter. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 1,

8/9/22, at 77-82. While Burrows’ signature appeared on the letter, Burrows

testified that Sledge never asked him to write a letter, he never in fact wrote

a letter for Sledge, and the handwriting on the letter was not his. See N.T.,

Jury Trial Day 2, 8/10/22, at 143. Detective Ronald Pilarski testified regarding

his investigation of the letter, including his pretrial interviews with Crouch,

Burrows, and Nelson. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 3, 8/11/22, at 50-61. Finally,

a handwriting expert testified regarding his review of questioned documents

submitted to him, including the letter, and his ensuing report in which he

concluded the letter was authored by Sledge. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 4 - A.M.

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Session, 8/12/22, at 7-31. Consequently, Nelson’s testimony was not material

and could readily be considered cumulative evidence.

      Further, Sledge has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the

Commonwealth’s failure to tell him about the alleged promise to Nelson. At

trial, the Commonwealth pursued the charge of intimidating a witness as a

felony of the first degree, based on their theory that Sledge had conspired

with Nelson to send the letter to Crouch. Sledge focused his argument on

challenging the classification of the charge as a felony of the first degree. In

fact, Sledge ultimately confessed to sending the letter to Crouch and only

challenged that there was no conspiracy between him and Nelson to send a

letter to Crouch. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 4 – Afternoon Session, 8/12/22, at

33 (stating he had nothing to hide and wanted to accept responsibility for his

mistakes, but agreeing with Nelson’s and Burrows’ testimony that they had

no involvement with the letter). In his testimony, Nelson corroborated

Sledge’s argument. Nelson maintained that he simply allowed Sledge to use

his inmate number to send a letter to his girl, and that he did not know what

the contents of the letter were. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 2, 8/10/22, at 147.

Nelson denied corroborating with Sledge at all. See id. at 151-52. Since

Nelson’s testimony corroborated Sledge’s own version of events, it is unclear

how potential impeachment evidence would have benefited Sledge. Therefore,

Sledge has failed to prove prejudice.

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      As Sledge has failed to establish the evidence was material or that he

was prejudiced, his second issue merits no relief.

      In his third and fourth issue, Sledge argues the trial court erred in failing

to exclude two prospective jurors for cause. Specifically, Sledge asserts juror

number 26 should have been stricken for cause when she stated she knew the

assistant district attorney (“ADA”) who was prosecuting the case; and juror

number 24 should have been stricken for cause when she stated she worked

with one of the police officers who was testifying for the Commonwealth.

      During voir dire, Sledge’s counsel and the ADA had the following

exchange with juror number 24:

      [SLEDGE]: Hello. I put a circle right here because I was kind of
      figuring you had some type of issue.

      [ADA]: 24?

      [JUROR 24]: I know the one officer that was named.

      [ADA]: Matt Balou?

      [JUROR 24]: Mm-hmm.

      [ADA]: Does your knowledge of him, would you be able to --

      [JUROR 24]: I've been friends with him a few years and I've
      worked with him in different programs.

      [SLEDGE]: Okay.

      [ADA]: Would you be able to still listen to the evidence and make
      a determination?

      [JUROR 24]: In terms of, like, whether I would be more partial to
      what he said?

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      [ADA]: I'm not asking partiality. I'm just asking we'll ask you to
      listen to everyone on the stand and evaluate each individual.
      Would you be able to do that?

      [JUROR 24]: Sure.

      [SLEDGE]: I was wondering if you would have bias judgment
      towards maybe the defense because you have a relationship.

      [JUROR 24]: Because I have a relationship with him?

      [SLEDGE]: Yeah. So I want to know if you have like a bias
      judgment towards the defendant, because I mean, you know,
      police do make mistakes, too.

      [JUROR 24]: Right. I mean I would try my best to be impartial.

      [SLEDGE]: Okay.

      [ADA]: That's it. Thank you.

Voir Dire, 8/8/2022, at 38-40.

      The following exchange occurred with juror number 26 shortly

thereafter:

      [ADA]: Hello.

      [JUROR 26]: How are you doing?

      [ADA]: I know you indicated you know who I am. I would just for
      him ask you to describe how we know each other.

      [JUROR 26]: My -- you were friends with my sister in college.

      [ADA]: Would you say you and I are close?

      [JUROR 26]: No.

      [ADA]: Okay, would your knowledge of who I am make you unable
      to listen to the evidence and make a decision?

      [JUROR 26]: No.

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       [SLEDGE]: Would you have any type of bias for Mrs. Hoffman?
       We're, like, going against each other.

       [JUROR 26]: No. I do get what you're saying.

       [SLEDGE]: I don't her to feel -- you feel like it would be an
       awkward situation? I mean I understand.

       [JUROR 26]: No, I don't think awkward.

       [SLEDGE]: You know, because she might lose.

       [JUROR 26]: No, I feel -- I feel comfortable making a decision.

       [SLEDGE]: Okay. All right, well, thank you.

       [ADA]: All right, thanks.

       (The Juror was reseated.)

       [ADA]: I haven't seen her in 12 years.

       [SLEDGE]: She's all right I guess.

Id. at 41-42.2

       A review of the testimony of prospective jurors 24 and 26 given

during voir dire indicates that the nature of their relationships with the ADA

and a police officer testifying for the Commonwealth was not of such a nature

that a presumption of prejudice was warranted. Further, their answers to the

____________________________________________

2 In his issue statement for juror number 26, Sledge misconstrued the nature

of the relationship between the juror and the ADA. While Sledge asserted that
juror number 26 had grown up with the ADA as a childhood friend, this is
simply not true. Rather, juror 26 only knew the ADA because the juror’s sister
had gone to college with the ADA. See id.

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questions during voir dire did not evidence a likelihood that their ability to

serve as fair and impartial jurors had been prejudiced by these relationships.

      The voir dire transcript shows Sledge acquiesced to both juror 24 and

juror 26 and did not object to their inclusion as jurors. Further, a review of

the record shows that Sledge never raised an issue with the jurors either

during trial or at sentencing. As Sledge never motioned to strike for cause a

prospective juror, we cannot find the trial court erred in failing to dismiss

either juror for cause.

      Sledge’s fifth issue, challenging the denial of his post-sentence motion,

is easily disposed of. As we have already concluded Sledge’s post-sentence

motion was untimely filed, the court should not have ruled on the motion in

the first place. Accordingly, we cannot fault the trial court for failing to grant

the untimely post-sentence motion. Sledge’s fifth issue is without merit.

      In his final issue, Sledge asserts the trial court erred in allowing hearsay

testimony regarding the victim’s identification of Sledge as the shooter.

      On the first day of trial, prior to the jury coming in, Sledge orally raised

a motion in limine challenging the admission of a statement as a dying

declaration. See N.T., Jury Trial Day 1, 8/9/22, at 12-13. In the statement,

made by Crouch to Officer Matthew Valloud, Crouch identified Sledge as the

shooter. The Commonwealth responded that it was not seeking to admit the

statement under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule,

explaining as follows:

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     [THE COMMONWEALTH]: Thank Your Honor. Your Honor, the
     Commonwealth is not seeking to admit Jessica Crouch’s statement
     under dying declaration. She is not a declarant unavailable; she is
     very much so available. She will be testifying here today. That
     statement from Officer Valloud will be entered under Rule 803.12,
     that is a prior statement of identification.

     Jessica Crouch is available here today. She will be testifying to
     corroborate that statement that Patrolman Valloud will testify to.

     THE COURT: Well, basically if she's going to testify, then she
     obviously didn't pass away. So you'll be able to cross-examine her
     if there's any issue on that.

     MR. SLEDGE: No problem.

     THE COURT: All right?

     MR. SLEDGE: As far as her hearsay statement, I'm going to let
     that stay in.

Id. at 13-14. Accordingly, on direct examination, Officer Valloud was asked

about his interaction with Crouch, to which he explained as follows:

     [Commonwealth:] Okay. Did you speak to the victim at all?

     [Officer Valloud:] Yes, I did.

     [Commonwealth:] And what was the result of that?

     [Officer Valloud:] So when I approached her I asked her if she was
     shot or who shot -- or, I'm sorry. If she was shot where she was
     shot at. She said her head. At that time I did ask her who shot her.
     She said Larry Sledge.

     [Commonwealth:] Did she say this once?

     [Officer Valloud:] I asked her again, I said who shot you, she said
     it twice, she said, yes, Larry Sledge.

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Id. at 43. Sledge was then permitted to cross-examine Officer Valloud. Crouch

subsequently testified for the Commonwealth and she was subject to cross-

examination by Sledge as well.

      Sledge alleges Officer Valloud’s testimony was improper hearsay

because he accuses Officer Valloud of specifically stating that the victim’s

statement was a dying declaration. This claim is belied by the record. As

recounted above, Officer Valloud never stated the statement was a dying

declaration. Instead the statement was properly admitted as a statement of

pretrial identification. “Testimony by a police officer concerning acts of pretrial

identification by a witness is [admissible], where the identifying witness is

present in court and subject to cross-examination.” Commonwealth v.

Ballard, 460 A.2d 1091, 1092 (Pa. 1983) (citation omitted). Sledge clearly

acquiesced to Officer Valloud testifying regarding Crouch’s prior statement of

identification. Since Crouch was present in court and subject to cross-

examination, this issue is without merit.

      As all of Sledge’s issues are either waived or without merit, we affirm

the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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3/5/2024

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