Court Opinion

ID: 9621881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:08:31.654206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:38.400449
License: Public Domain

ALOK AHUJA, Judge,
Concurring.
I concur in the result.
*155The trial court granted Homfeld’s motion for remittitur in the same order which also denies his new trial motion. Addressing the new trial issue, the order finds that Dr. Scowley’s testimony concerning Wiley’s need for future medical treatment, and the cost of that potential treatment, “was subject to conjecture and speculation.” Further, by specifically noting that “Defendant’s failure to object to the cost of the possible treatments waived any objection Defendant had thereto,” the court suggests that, in its view, evidence of the cost of possible future treatments was erroneously admitted. Following this discussion, the court’s order addresses Hom-feld’s alternative remittitur motion. Its brief discussion once again notes that “[n]o future medical expenses were established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” referencing its earlier conclusion that Dr. Scowley’s testimony concerning Wiley’s future medical care was incompetent.
Homfeld’s brief acknowledges that, in making its remittitur ruling, “the trial court disregarded [Dr. Scowley’s] testimony [regarding plaintiffs claimed future medical needs and costs for such needs] based upon its finding that such testimony was subject to conjecture and speculation.”
I believe that the trial court’s failure to consider Dr. Scowley’s testimony in assessing the reasonableness of the jury’s damages award, standing alone, establishes that its remittitur ruling constituted an abuse of discretion, and that we need not defer to that ruling. As the majority notes, expert testimony concerning a personal injury plaintiffs increased risk of requiring particular future medical treatments, and the cost of those potential treatments, is admissible to prove the full extent of a plaintiffs compensable present injuries, even if the future treatments are not reasonably certain to occur. Moreover, the fact that the need for such treatments may depend on future developments (such as the success or failure of more conservative therapies) “ ‘does not render the evidence ... inadmissible speculation and conjecture.’ ” Swartz v. Gale Webb Transp. Co., 215 S.W.3d 127, 131-32 (Mo. banc 2007) (quoting Bynote v. Nat’l Super Markets, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 117, 125 (Mo. banc 1995)).
Whether or not Dr. Scowley’s testimony rose to the level of certainty necessary for Wiley to recover the costs of any possible future medical treatments themselves, see Seabaugh v. Milde Farms, Inc., 816 S.W.2d 202, 210-11 (Mo. banc 1991), I agree with the majority that his testimony concerning Wiley’s potential need for such treatments was admissible under Swartz and similar cases. Yet the trial court wholly disregarded that testimony in making its remittitur ruling, based on the erroneous view that Dr. Scowley’s testimony constituted incompetent “conjecture and speculation.”
Whatever the full scope of a trial court’s discretion in remitting a jury’s damages award, and whatever degree of deference we may owe its decision, at a minimum a trial court abuses its discretion where its action is based on a material error of law. See, e.g., Dick v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 140 S.W.3d 131, 137 & n. 3 (Mo.App. W.D.2004). The remittitur ruling here is based on just such an error. I accordingly concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion, although I find it unnecessary to address the broader issues the majority and dissenting opinions so thoughtfully explore.