Court Opinion

ID: 9898554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:28.862848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:09.010734
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        MAY 16, 2023
                                                               In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                              WA State Court of Appeals Division III

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                              DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                         )
                                             )         No. 38778-0-III
                    Respondent,              )
                                             )
      v.                                     )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                             )
LONNIE KAYE ENGLAND,                         )
                                             )
                    Appellant.               )

      FEARING, C.J. — We answer two distinct questions that overlap for purposes of

this appeal. First, when the sentencing court must sentence in accordance with the law in

effect at the time of the offense and when the offense could have occurred at a time

during which version 1 of the law applied or version 2 of the law applied, but we do not

know for sure what date applies, do we apply version 1, which is the earlier and milder

version, or version 2 to the sentencing? Second, does an offender acknowledge that he

committed a crime after September 1, 2001 when he admits that he committed the crime

sometime between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2001? The answer to the first

question is version 1. We answer the second question in the negative. We base the

answer to question two more on communication logic than the law. Based on both of our
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

answers, we hold that appellant Lonnie England’s sentencing court erred when

sentencing England under a sentencing statute effective after September 1, 2001 when the

charging period extended from January 1998 to December 2001.

                                         FACTS

      Because this prosecution never went to trial, we garner the scant underlying facts

from three law enforcement officer affidavits. In 2017, the Wenatchee Police

Department investigated Lonnie England for sex offenses against two former minors.

We give the minors pseudonyms. According to a law enforcement officer affidavit, the

first victim, Jane, born in 1991, reported that England sexually abused her between 1998-

2000. Also, according to the police affidavit, a second victim, Arthur, also a pseudonym,

born also in 1991, reported England sexually molested him during the same three-year

window of time.

                                     PROCEDURE

      The details underlying this prosecution impact the question on appeal as much as

the underlying facts. On September 27, 2017, the State of Washington filed an

information charging Lonnie England with seven sex crimes for acts committed against

Jane and Arthur. The information listed all charged crimes as occurring between January

1, 1998 and December 31, 2000. Because the nature of some of the charges might

preclude anonymity for the children, we do not detail each of the counts.

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       On January 23, 2020, the State of Washington filed a first amended information.

The first amended information added allegations of three sentencing aggravating factors.

The State changed the victim on one count to the other child. The amended information

listed all six charged crimes as occurring between January 1, 1998 and December 31,

2000, the same charging period advanced in the initial information.

       On March 8, 2021, the State of Washington filed a second amended information.

This final information reduced the various charges against Lonnie England to two counts

of child molestation in the first degree. One count alleged Jane to be the victim. The

second count alleged Arthur to be the victim. The new information removed the

sentencing aggravators. The second amended information also expanded the charging

period for both counts to January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001. We do not know the

circumstances behind expanding the charging period. None of the three law enforcement

officer affidavits recorded a crime occurring in 2001.

       On March 8, 2021, the same date as the second amended information’s filing,

Lonnie England pled guilty to the two charges of first degree child molestation. During

the plea colloquy, England informed the trial court he understood that by pleading guilty

he forfeited the right to trial.

       We closely examine the eleven-page “statement of defendant on plea of guilty to

sex offense” form that Lonnie England signed, on March 8, 2021, pursuant to his guilty

plea. On page 2, the State inserted in the standard plea form language a listing of the

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standard range of actual confinement for both counts to be 67-89 months, with a

maximum term of lifetime confinement. The inserted language also mentioned a lifetime

of community custody after any release from incarceration.

       On page 4 of the plea form, the form contained standard language concerning the

differences in sex offense sentencing on whether the accused committed the crime before

September 1, 2001 or thereafter. The lengthy paragraphs read:

               For sex offenses committed prior to September 1, 2001: In addition
       to sentencing me to confinement, the judge may order me to serve up to one
       year of community custody if the total period of confinement ordered is not
       more than 12 months. If the period of confinement is over one year, the
       judge will sentence me to community custody for 36 months. During the
       period of community custody to which I am sentenced, I will be under the
       supervision of the Department of Corrections, and I will have restrictions
       and requirements placed upon me.
               For sex offenses committed on or after September 1, 2001: (i)
       Sentencing under RCW 9.94A.507: If this offense is any of the offenses
       listed in subsections (aa) or (bb), below, the judge will impose a maximum
       term of confinement consisting of the statutory maximum sentence of the
       offense and a minimum term of confinement either within the standard
       range for the offense or outside the standard range if an exceptional
       sentence is appropriate. . . . In addition to the period of confinement, I will
       be sentenced to community custody for any period of time I am released
       from total confinement before the expiration of the maximum sentence.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 142. Table (aa) listed first degree child molestation as an offense

qualifying Lonnie England for sentencing under RCW 9.94A.507.

       On page 5 of the statement on plea of guilty, the State disclosed the sentencing

recommendation it would deliver to the sentencing court. The State would recommend

eighty-nine months in prison for each count, a lifetime sex offender registration, and

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lifetime community custody. The prosecution agreed to recommend that the sentences

run concurrently.

       On page 10 of the plea form, Lonnie England pled guilty to both counts of child

molestation as charged “in the Second Amended Information” and affirmed he had

“received a copy of that Information.” CP at 148. As for the factual admission attending

the guilty plea, the statement on plea declares:

              The judge has asked me to state what I did in my own words that
       makes me guilty of this crime, including enhancements and domestic
       violence relationships if they apply. This is my statement:
              Count 1: On or between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2001, I
       had sexual contact for the purpose of sexual gratification with [Jane].
              Count 2: On or between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2000, I
       had sexual contact for the purpose of sexual gratification with [Arthur].

CP at 148 (boldface omitted). We note that, while the admission to count 1 extended to

December 31, 2001, the admission to count 2 extended only to December 31, 2000.

       At Lonnie England’s sentencing hearing, the following colloquy occurred between

the sentencing court and England:

              THE COURT: Okay. And do you understand that the Court will
       impose a maximum term of confinement within the range—no, minimum
       term of confinement within the range and the maximum term of
       confinement consisting of the statutory maximums of this offense—do you
       understand that?—and that the minimum term can be imposed—can be
       increased by the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board if the board
       determines by a preponderance of the evidence that it’s more likely than not
       that you will commit sex offenses if released from custody?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. I understand.
              THE COURT: So that even if the Court sentences you to the
       maximum of 89 months, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board could

                                              5
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        increase that.
               THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
               THE COURT: Do you understand that?
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

Report of Proceedings (RP) (Mar. 8, 2021) at 233-34. The colloquy continued later:

                THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I want to—I want to make it
        clear that you have fully discussed your case with your attorney; is that
        correct?
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
                THE COURT: And do you have any other questions for him at this
        time?
                THE DEFENDANT: No. We went through it line by line and I
        understand it and I—and the questions that I had he answered truthfully and
        faithfully.
                THE COURT: Okay. And with all those things in mind what we
        just discussed, do you still wish to plead guilty?
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
                THE COURT: Okay. When you reviewed this plea form, did you
        read it or did Mr. Yedinak [defense counsel] read it to you?
                THE DEFENDANT: We went back and forth. So if I had a question
        on it, he explained it to me.
                THE COURT: Okay. But did you read the full—the full agreement?
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

RP (Mar. 8, 2021) at 241-42.

        After an extensive colloquy, the sentencing court took Lonnie England’s guilty

plea:

                All right. Sir, you’re charged in the Second Amended Information
        with Count I, Child Molestation in the First Degree, alleging this happened
        on or between January 1st, 1998, and December 31st, 2001, and the victim
        in this case being [Jane]. The maximum penalty for this Class A felony
        crime is life in prison and/or a $50,000 fine. How do you plead, guilty or
        not guilty?
                THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

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                  THE COURT: As to Count II, Child Molestation in the First Degree,
          the allegation is that this occurred on or between January 1st, 1998, and
          December 31st, 2001. The victim in this case and this charge is [Arthur].
          And, again, the maximum penalty is life in prison and/or a $50,000 fine.
          How do you plead?
                  THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
                  THE COURT: All right. And in your plea form, it gives your
          statement about what you did. And it says in paragraph 11, “Count I: On or
          between January 1st, 1998, and December 31st, 2001, I had sexual contact
          for the purpose of sexual gratification with [Jane].” “Count II: On or
          between January 1st, 1998, and December 31st, 2000, I had sexual contact
          for the purpose of sexual gratification with [Arthur].” These incidents
          occurred in Chelan County, Washington. Is that what happened here?
                  THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

RP (Mar. 8, 2021) at 243-45. Following this factual recitation, the sentencing court

indicated it had reviewed police reports and inquired whether the State had any

information to add. The State’s attorney replied, “No, your Honor.” RP (Mar. 8, 2021)

at 245.

          In allocution, Lonnie England denied the criminal allegations. England protested:

                 THE DEFENDANT: I’m just scared shitless. I’m sorry. But I
          didn’t do any of this. I can only hope I can get something down the road
          to—to show the truth. But I didn’t do any of this. It was a plea bargain.
          There was no choice in the matter. It was life—life or a plea bargain. And
          I’ve been made this monster.
                 THE COURT: Can you stand up, sir?
                 THE DEFENDANT: I’m sorry. But I’ve been made this monster,
          and I haven’t done any of this stuff. But we know who has. That’s just the
          biggest question that I gave him was how do you prove something that you
          didn’t do? So you find out if something actually did happen and we did.
          And we found who did it. And it was a chance to be able to do that.
                 During the readiness hearing, my fair trial was wiped out by all the
          suppression of the defense. I had no fair trial to go to. I only had a choice
          of an Alford plea with no defense or the plea deal. I’ve admitted to

                                                7
No. 38778-0-III
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       something that I didn’t do. And I admitted it to you, your Honor, and in
       a—and in a declaration that I lied to you. I know the rules coming here.
       You’re supposed to tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth, all
       that stuff. But I didn’t do this. And I’m not a monster. I don’t want to lose
       my family or be away from my family.
               THE COURT: Okay. If you could stand please, continue standing.
               THE DEFENDANT: I’m sorry.
               THE COURT: Put those back in your ears so you can hear. Okay?
               Okay. So, Mr. England, you pled guilty. You admitted to doing
               this. This was not an Alford plea.
               THE DEFENDANT: I know.

RP (May 5, 2021) at 285-87.

       Lonnie England’s felony judgment and sentence listed the date of both convictions

as extending between January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001. The sentencing court

imposed a concurrent sentence on both counts with a minimum term of confinement of

89 months and a maximum term of lifetime confinement. The trial court sentenced

England to community custody “for any period of time the defendant is released from

total confinement before the expiration of the statutory maximum.” CP at 203.

                                     LAW AND ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Lonnie England does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea. He instead

challenges his sentence. England assigns error to the trial court’s imposition of sentences

for both convictions because the superior court based the sentences on a sentencing

statute that became effective four months before the end of the charging period for one

conviction and after the charging period for the second conviction. He contends that no

facts support a finding by the sentencing court that a crime occurred during the effective

                                             8
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

date of the statute for either conviction, particularly since the witnesses stated, according

to the police reports, the molestation occurred from 1998 to 2000.

       We note that, contrary to Lonnie England’s contention, the second amended

charging information alleged that both crimes occurred as late as the end of 2001. In his

statement on plea of guilty, England pled guilty to both counts of child molestation as

charged in the second amended information, and he affirmed he had received a copy of

that information. Also in the plea statement, England acknowledged that he would

receive an indeterminate sentence, under which he might spend the rest of his life in

prison and, if and when released, he would undergo community custody supervision for

the rest of his life. During the colloquy with the sentencing court, England also admitted

he faced this interminable sentence. In the plea statement’s factual admission, England

declared that, for purposes of count one, he engaged in sexual contact with Jane between

January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2001. Oddly, for count two, the statement declares,

consistent with the police affidavits but contradictory to the information, that the sexual

contact occurred only between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2000. Then, when the

sentencing court accepted the guilty plea, she asked if Lonnie England committed both

crimes between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2001. Finally, after England pled

guilty to both charges, the court read the section from the plea statement that limits the

charging period for count two to the years 1998-2000. No one then apparently caught the

discrepancy that we must now encounter.

                                              9
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

       The State recasts Lonnie England’s argument as wishing relief because he lacked a

choice when pleading guilty and because he failed to understand the nature and

consequences of his plea. We disagree with this characterization of England’s

contention. Based on England’s allocution, we recognize that, like others who plead

guilty to avoid a tougher sentence if convicted after a trial regardless of guilt or

innocence, he deemed he lacked a viable choice. But he does not complain on appeal

about the lack of options. He also does not argue he did not know the consequences to

his plea. He contends that the law does not allow the sentencing court to base a sentence

on facts not found in the record, let alone untrue facts, regardless of what he understood.

       The State may also complain that Lonnie England seeks to breach his plea

agreement. But the State does not brief this implied contention. So, we do not explore

any alleged breach. We deem a contention not briefed to be waived. State v. Ford, 137

Wn.2d 472, 477 n.1, 973 P.2d 452 (1999).

       We first review the statutory change prompting Lonnie England’s challenge on

appeal. Before September 1, 2001, all sexual offenders were sentenced to a determinate

sentence. A determinate sentence declares with exactitude the number of months of

confinement and community custody. Offenses committed between June 6, 1996 and

September 1, 2001 also carried a requisite three years of community custody. Former

RCW 9.94A.712.

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State v. England

       In 2001, the Washington State Legislature implemented a new sentencing scheme

covering offenders convicted of child molestation in the first degree. LAWS OF 2001, 2d

Spec. Sess., ch. 12, § 303, initially codified at RCW 9.94A.712 (2001), currently codified

at RCW 9.94A.507. The legal community alternatively labels the new system as a

determinate-plus or an indeterminate system. The determinate-plus scheme applies to

crimes committed on or after September 1, 2001. LAWS OF 2001, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 12,

§ 505. A determinate plus scheme means the sentencing court imposes a minimum

number of months of incarceration and then declares a maximum sentence of lifetime. In

turn, the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board will, after expiration of the minimum

sentence, determine when to release the offender based on the board’s assessment of the

offender’s rehabilitation. On release, the offender faces a lifetime of community custody.

       In addition to the 2001 legislation expressly declaring that its terms only apply to

crimes committed after September 1, 2001, a separate Washington statute dictates this

effective date. RCW 9.94A.345 declares:

             [A]ny sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in
       accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed.

Pursuant to RCW 9.94A.345, Washington courts sentence under the version of the

sentencing reform act in effect at the time of the offense. State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708,

714, 487 P.3d 482 (2021).

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No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

       As a result of the effective date of the 2001 sentencing amendment, we must

juggle some irreconcilable principles and some complimentary rules controlling

sentencing. First, a reviewing court should correct an erroneous sentence regardless of

the reason for the error. Second, due process demands that any facts, which influence the

court’s sentencing, be found in the record. Third, the offender deserves an opportunity to

challenge facts utilized by the sentencing court when sentencing. Fourth, the offender

should object to any objectionable or erroneous facts before the sentencing court renders

a decision. Fifth, the offender should be bound by facts to which he acknowledges. We

proceed to discuss these principles and analyze them in the context of the unique

circumstances of Lonnie England’s appeal.

       Lonnie England did not spot, before the sentencing court, the discrepancy between

the charging period and police reports about the years of the alleged crimes. Nor did he

mention that the sentencing statute employed by the sentencing court took effect only

after the expiration of a portion of the charging period. Nevertheless, in the context of

sentencing, established case law holds that illegal or erroneous sentences may be

challenged for the first time on appeal. State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 477 (1999); State

v. Moen, 129 Wn.2d 535, 543, 919 P.2d 69 (1996). This principle promotes sentences

being in conformity and in compliance with existing sentencing statutes and avoids

permitting widely varying sentences to stand for no reason other than the failure of

                                             12
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

counsel to register a proper objection in the trial court. State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472,

478 (1999).

       Determinations regarding the severity of criminal sanctions are not to be rendered

in a cursory fashion. State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 484 (1999); State v. Lopez, 107 Wn.

App. 270, 279, 27 P.3d 237 (2001), aff’d, 147 Wn.2d 515, 55 P.3d 609 (2002). This

court has the power and duty to correct a sentencing error on its discovery even when the

parties not only failed to object but agreed with the sentencing judge. State v. Loux, 69

Wn.2d 855, 858, 420 P.2d 693 (1966), overruled in part by State v. Moen, 129 Wn.2d

535 (1996). All decisions standing for this duty of correction entail the sentencing court

rendering legal error or performing a miscalculation of an offender score, not employing

factual error. Although one might argue that Lonnie England’s sentencing court made a

legal error by applying the wrong version of the sentencing statute for first degree child

molestation, England’s assignment of error emphasizes that the court factually erred

when assuming he committed both crimes after September 1, 2001.

       Characterizing Lonnie England’s sentencing error as a factual mistake does not

end any analysis. Sentencing courts require reliable facts and information. State v.

Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 484 (1999); State v. Lopez, 107 Wn. App. 270, 279 (2001). In

accordance with basic principles of due process, Washington courts demand that, in

imposing a sentence, the facts relied on by the trial court have some basis in the record.

State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 482 (1999); State v. Knippling, 166 Wn.2d 93, 102, 206

                                             13
No. 38778-0-III
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P.3d 332 (2009); State v. Woldegiorgis, 53 Wn. App. 92, 94-95, 765 P.2d 920 (1988);

State v. Balkin, 48 Wn. App. 1, 4, 737 P.2d 1035 (1987); State v. Russell, 31 Wn. App.

646, 649-50, 644 P.2d 704 (1982); State v. Giebler, 22 Wn. App. 640, 644-45, 591 P.2d

465 (1979); State v. Bresolin, 13 Wn. App. 386, 396, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975). Any

extrinsic evidence must be part of the record when relied on by the sentencing court to

make a factual finding attending a guilty plea. State v. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 95, 684

P.2d 683 (1984). The State bears the burden of establishing such facts. State v.

Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 913, 920, 205 P.3d 113 (2009); State v. Chandler, 158 Wn. App. 1,

5-6, 240 P.3d 159 (2010).

       RCW 9.94A.530(2) governs what facts the sentencing court may consider:

               In determining any sentence other than a sentence above the
       standard range, the trial court may rely on no more information than is
       admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in a
       trial or at the time of sentencing, or proven pursuant to RCW 9.94A.537.
       Acknowledgment includes not objecting to information stated in the
       presentence reports and not objecting to criminal history presented at the
       time of sentencing. Where the defendant disputes material facts, the court
       must either not consider the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing on the
       point. The facts shall be deemed proved at the hearing by a preponderance
       of the evidence, except as otherwise specified in RCW 9.94A.537.

(Emphasis added.) The statute creates the “real facts” doctrine that limits a sentencing

court to consideration of facts that were acknowledged, proven, or pleaded to. State v.

Houf, 120 Wn.2d 327, 332, 841 P.2d 42 (1992). Under the statute, if not due process

considerations, the offender enjoys the opportunity to demonstrate that the information

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No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

relied on is inaccurate or incomplete. State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 185, 713 P.2d

719, 418 P.2d 796 (1986); State v. Woldegiorgis, 53 Wn. App. 92, 94-95 (1988); State v.

Balkin, 48 Wn. App. 1, 4 (1987).

       Still, information presented at sentencing without objection is deemed

acknowledged by the defendant. State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 483 (1999); State v.

Handley, 115 Wn.2d 275, 283, 796 P.2d 1266 (1990); State v. Burkins, 94 Wn. App. 677,

697-98, 973 P.2d 15 (1999). The court can also rely on statements from the defendant in

court. State v. Handley, 115 Wn.2d 275 (1990). Furthermore, RCW 9.94A.530(2)

authorizes a sentencing court to rely on information produced by something less than the

usual adversarial process. State v. Handley, 115 Wn.2d 275, 281 (1990); State v.

Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 430-31, 771 P.2d 739 (1989). A sentencing judge may consider

facts not admissible at trial. State v. Handley, 115 Wn.2d 275, 281 (1990).

       Lonnie England had a chance to object to a charging period of 1998 to the end of

2001. Instead, in both his written statement of plea and his oral plea at sentencing, he

acknowledged a charging period of January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001. If he had

specifically stated that he committed the crimes between September 1, 2001 and

December 31, 2001, we would likely affirm the sentences imposed, despite the police

reports identifying the dates of the crime being sometime during the years 1998, 1999,

and 2000. But England agreed to something else.

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       Lonnie England agreed that the two crimes occurred sometime between the

beginning of 1998 and the end of 2001. This concession does not acknowledge that the

crime occurred on or after September 1, 2001. Someone who recognizes that he

committed a crime on July 4, 1998 could accurately state that the crime occurred between

January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2001. Therefore, we rule that England did not

acknowledge that he committed the two crimes after the effective date of indeterminate

sentencing.

       One might argue that Lonnie England should have identified the discrepancy to

the sentencing court before pleading guilty or at least before the court announced the

sentence. But the State carries the burden of showing facts supporting a sentence. The

State could have, but did not, declare for the record the basis on which it amended the

information to extend the charging period to December 31, 2001. The only underlying

facts before the sentencing court and presented to this court on review establish the dates

of the crimes as sometime between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2000.

       Our ruling follows some of the principles we mentioned earlier. The State carries

the burden of proving any facts attended to the sentencing. Due process demands

accurate facts employed during sentencing.

       CrR 4.2(d) aids Lonnie England. Under CrR 4.2(d):

               The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is
       satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.

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State v. England

The factual basis requirement protects a defendant, who voluntarily pleads guilty with an

understanding of the nature of the charge, but who does not realize that his conduct does

not actually fall within the charge. In re Personal Restraint of Crabtree, 141 Wn.2d 577,

585, 9 P.3d 814 (2000).

       Case law also benefits Lonnie England. The Supreme Court first grappled with

the question posed by this appeal in State v. Parker, 132 Wn.2d 182, 937 P.2d 575

(1997). The State charged Larry Parker with child sex offenses that allegedly occurred

between 1987 and 1991. Trial evidence demonstrated that Parker committed the acts at

various times throughout the charging period. The verdict form did not ask the jury to

identify the dates on which the defendant committed the respective crimes. In

determining Parker’s sentence, the trial court applied a statutory amendment passed

during the fourth year of the charging period. The amendment significantly increased the

standard range for Parker’s convictions. The Supreme Court reversed Parker’s sentence

because the evidence presented at trial showed Parker committed some of the criminal

acts before the increase in penalties and the trial court did not require the State to prove

the acts occurred after the penalty increase. The court reasoned that any other outcome

would violate the ex post facto clause of both the United States and Washington

Constitutions.

       The Supreme Court addressed a variant of Lonnie England’s circumstances in

State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 975 P.2d 512 (1999). The State charged Fonua Aho with

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No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

child molestation during a time period between January 1981 and December 31, 1991.

The legislature, however, did not create the charged crime until 1988. A trial resulted in

a jury conviction for one count of first degree child molestation, but the verdict form did

not ask the jury to identify when the criminal act occurred. The Supreme Court observed

that the jury may have convicted Aho for an act occurring before the effective date of the

criminal statute. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for child molestation.

       Without ever citing to State v. Parker, the Supreme Court, in State v. Aho,

disagreed with the Parker view of justifying the holding in the ex post facto clause. The

ex post facto clause applies when the legislature enacts a law retrospectively altering the

definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for a crime. The ex post

facto clause does not apply to retroactive judicial decisions. Therefore, the clause does

not address any confusion surrounding the sentence to impose because of an uncertainty

of the date of the crime. The court reframed the issue as a due process question. The

underlying concern remained the same, however. Both clauses abhor punishing one

without fair warning of the consequences of his or her action. The Supreme Court

concluded:

               Application of the statute under the facts here cannot be attributed to
       legislative action; the Legislature plainly and clearly provided that the
       statute does not apply to acts occurring before July 1988. Instead, in direct
       violation of this clear legislative mandate both the state and defense counsel
       permitted this matter to go forward despite the fact that the charging period,
       set forth in the jury instructions, included a substantial period of time
       before July 1988.

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State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 742 (1999).

      In re Personal Restraint of Crabtree, 141 Wn.2d 577 (2000) represents the last

excursion of the Supreme Court into this area of the law. The court held that the Aho rule

did not bar Mark Crabtree’s conviction when he pled guilty to committing sex offenses

between June 1, 1988 and August 31, 1988 even though July 1, 1988 marked the

effective date of the statute under which he was sentenced. In holding Crabtree’s

sentence conformed with due process, the high court expressly noted that extrinsic

evidence demonstrated the acts occurred after July 1, 1988. The trial court must have

known of the relevant dates, because the court appropriately sentenced Crabtree under the

old scheme for a separate act of statutory rape that occurred in March of 1987. No

intrinsic or extrinsic evidence establish a crime being committed by Lonnie England after

September 1, 2001.

      Lonnie England does not specify the exact remedy he seeks or he deems correct.

The State does not enlighten the court as to what remedy we should direct in the event we

reverse the sentences for the two convictions. We remand to the superior court to

resentence England on both convictions under the sentencing scheme for first degree

child molestation effective before September 1, 2001.

                                           19
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

                                ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

                                   Statute of Limitations

       Lonnie England assigns five errors in a statement of additional grounds. England

first argues that his convictions violated the statute of limitations. Because England

could have been charged under the old statute when the legislature expanded the

limitation period for child molestation prosecutions, we disagree.

       To show entitlement to relief, Lonnie England must demonstrate that a controlling

statute of limitations expired before his prosecution. Once a statute of limitations period

expires, the law bars a prosecution, but, if the legislature expands the period of limitation

prior to the expiration of the original period, the State may commence prosecution at any

time within the newly established period. State v. Hodgson, 108 Wn.2d 662, 668, 740

P.2d 848 (1987).

       Lonnie England contends that the statute of limitations in effect at the time he

committed the crimes should control. Under that statute, the statute of limitations would

have expired in 2012, three years after both victims turned eighteen. Former RCW

9A.04.080(1)(c) (1988). But Hodgson rejects England’s proposed test.

       Based on the ages of the victims and considering the legislature’s expansions of

the limitation period for child molestation prosecutions, the State could validly prosecute

Lonnie England when it filed the original information in 2017. Both Arthur and Jane

were born in 1991.

                                             20
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

       For privacy purposes, and to avoid any possible prejudice to Lonnie England, we

analyze the statute of limitations as if both victims were born on January 1, 1991. Former

RCW 9A.04.080(1)(c) (1988) limited a prosecution for child molestation to “[no] more

than three years after the victim’s eighteenth birthday or more than seven years after their

commission, whichever is later.” In 2009, the legislature changed the limitation period to

allow prosecutions “up to the victim’s twenty-eighth birthday.” Former RCW

9A.04.080(1)(c) (2009). In 2009, both victims were eighteen years old, and so fell within

the 1988 statute’s allowance for prosecutions until three years after a victim’s eighteenth

birthday. The legislature again amended the statute in 2013 to permit prosecutions until a

victim’s thirtieth birthday. Former RCW 9A.04.080(1)(c) (2013). In 2013, both victims

were twenty-two years old, younger than twenty-eight, so England remained prosecutable

under the 2009 statute at the time of the amendment. When England was charged in

2017, the victims were twenty-six years old, younger than thirty.

                                 Prosecutorial Misconduct

       Lonnie England challenges evidence that the State might have offered at trial.

England’s arguments implicate facts not in the record. A statement of additional grounds

must be limited to evidence available in the record. A personal restraint petition is the

vehicle by which to introduce new facts or evidence for this court’s consideration. State

v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 569, 192 P.3d 345 (2008). In any case, by pleading guilty,

England relieved the State of its duty to prove the charges against him beyond a

                                             21
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

reasonable doubt to a jury of his peers. England’s plea rendered the admissibility of

evidence irrelevant.

                                   Due Process Errors

       Lonnie England again advances various arguments implicating facts not available

in the record. To the extent England cites to the record, his arguments are not cognizable

and do not provide notice of the nature and occurrence of the alleged errors as required

by RAP 10.10(c).

                               Amendment of Information

       Lonnie England argues that the expansion of the conviction date range in the

second amended information prejudiced him. Ordinarily, the State may amend an

information at any time prior to a verdict if such amendment does not prejudice the

substantial rights of the defendant. CrR 2.1(d). Nevertheless, an unjustified delay in

amending an information draws scrutiny if the delay prejudiced the defendant. See State

v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 244-46, 937 P.2d 587 (1997).

       Lonnie England acknowledged that he reviewed the second amended information

before pleading guilty. The amendment did not affect his substantial rights or prejudice

his defense. England could have chosen not to plead guilty after reviewing the second

amended information’s change in charging date range. In his factual statement, England

also could have specified a shorter time period in which the criminal acts occurred.

                                            22
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

                              Advisement of Right to Appeal

       Lonnie England argues that he was never given notice of his right to appeal at the

sentencing hearing as required by CrR 7.2(b). A sentencing court must advise the

defendant of the rights enumerated in CrR 7.2(b) “immediately after sentencing” and the

advisement “shall be made a part of the record.”

       The transcript of Lonnie England’s sentencing hearing does not show that the trial

court bespoke an advisement of appeal rights. But England appealed. He fails to assert

any prejudice resulting from the failure to give the advisement.

                             Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Lonnie England argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during

trial court proceedings and in plea bargaining. To the extent England argues facts and

evidence outside the record, he is precluded from doing so and must file a personal

restraint petition to advance those arguments. Otherwise, England faces a heavy burden

to establish ineffective assistance despite not contesting the validity of his guilty plea. To

show prejudice when a defendant has pleaded guilty, the defendant must show a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial. In re Personal Restraint of Riley, 122 Wn.2d 772,

780-81, 863 P.2d 554 (1993). The record on appeal does not permit this court to make

such a determination.

                                             23
No. 38778-0-III
State v. England

                                    CONCLUSION

      We remand this prosecution to the superior court for resentencing under the

former statutory scheme.

      A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                            _________________________________
                                            Fearing, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, J.

______________________________
Pennell, J.

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