Court Opinion

ID: 9531757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:14:19.723888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:34.535137
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
concurring.
I join in the court’s judgment but believe a few additional remarks are necessary to clarify our response to the defendant’s first argument.
Wamser’s conviction was based in part on Officer Campbell’s testimony that according to Campbell’s Loran C receiver Wamser was fishing in closed waters. Wamser argues that before presenting this testimony, the state was required to establish a foundation showing: (1) the validity of the Lor-an C navigational system in general, and (2) its significance in Wamser’s case. He relies on R. Lempert and S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 55 (1977). Wamser further contends that in order to meet the first prong of this test, the state would have to satisfy the test established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.App.1923):
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Wamser reasons that since the validity and reliability of the Loran C is in this “twilight zone,” a foundation based on expert testimony must be provided on a case-by-case basis before evidence of its operation can be admitted.
A majority of this court disagrees and concludes that the validity of the Loran C is sufficiently demonstrable so that it no longer occupies the twilight zone mentioned in Frye. As with radar and the breathalyzer machine, its validity may be assumed. I am not convinced that this determination is erroneous.
It is clear, however, that Alaska Rule of Evidence 201 governing judicial notice has absolutely nothing to do with the resolution of this question. A.R.E. 201 applies only to the kind of fact questions normally decided by the trier of fact. A.R.E. 201(a), Commentary at 37-38. A.R.E. 201 has absolutely no bearing on a judge’s determinations of foundation pursuant to A.R.E. 104(a). Accordingly, I do not join in that part of the court’s opinion purporting to apply A.R.E. 201 to Wamser’s claim.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(e) makes it clear that the trial court’s preliminary determination that a party has laid a proper foundation for the admission of evidence does not preclude the party’s opponent from contradicting that evidence with other evidence affecting its weight or credibility. Wamser argues that he was restricted in his cross-examination of Officer Campbell, but I agree with the majority that the record does not support his argument.
Finally, the court’s implicit conclusion that the Frye test was not intended to apply to this kind of situation, i.e., one where the validity of a scientific principle is so well established as to be beyond dispute, makes it unnecessary for the court to decide whether the rule in Frye survives the enactment of the Alaska Rules of Evidence. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice *167and Procedure: Evidence § 5168 at 91 (1978) (arguing that Frye is no longer applicable under the new federal rules of evidence upon which Alaska’s rules are patterned). Accord 3 J. Weinstein, Federal Rules of Evidence ¶ 702[03], at 702-16-17 (1982). Contra Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States A Half-Century Later, 80 Col.L.Rev. 1197, 1229 (1980). One federal court seems to agree with Wright and Weinstein. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir.1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1025, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979). Accord State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85-86 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927, 101 S.Ct. 1384, 67 L.Ed.2d 359 (1980) (rejecting Frye under the state rules patterned on the federal rules of evidence).3
The majority rejects Wamser’s argument that his cross-examination of Campbell was unduly restricted by holding, in effect, that Wamser failed to make a sufficient offer of proof. See, e.g., A.R.E. 103(a)(2):
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected; and

(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
This is a troublesome holding since the applicability of the federal counterpart of A.R.E. 103(a)(2) to questions on cross-examination is in some doubt. See 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5040, at 219-221 (1977). See, e.g., Saltzman v. Fullerton Metals Company, 661 F.2d 647, 653 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1981) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not differentiate between the exclusion of evidence on direct and cross-examination and have not been applied to create such a distinction.” (emphasis added)). But see Padilla v. State, 601 P.2d 189 (Wyo.1979).
The Alaska Supreme Court, in a decision admittedly reached prior to adoption of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, discussed this issue in an analogous context in determining whether limitations on cross-examination were harmless error. In Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 381 (Alaska 1976), the court said:
It does not matter that defense counsel cannot know in advance what pertinent facts may be brought out in cross-examination. As the United States Supreme Court has said:
It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them. To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. [Quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 219, 75 L.Ed. 624, 628 (1931)].
The court purported to hold that limitations on cross-examination could never be harmless error. I agree with the majority in this case that we should not follow the *168dicta in Lauderdale to that extent. Nevertheless, I think any harmless error test must be stringently applied. It is only because Wamser’s counsel in oral argument was unable to articulate any theory under which any possible answer to his questions might have been helpful to the defense that I join in the court’s opinion affirming Wam-ser’s conviction. See Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 435 (Alaska 1979) (holding a restriction on cross-examination of prosecuting witness in rape case not error in absence of offer of proof in accordance with AS 12.45.045).

. Wamser’s analysis, based on Frye, is flawed by his inability to distinguish between the role of the court in ruling on foundation and the role of the jury in determining the adjudicative facts of Wamser’s case. The analysis is also flawed by Wamser’s inability to understand that Loran C may be generally accepted in the field in which it belongs and, nevertheless, provide a totally inaccurate reading in a specific case. Wamser’s inability or unwillingness to keep these issues separate accounts, in part, for the majority’s rather cursory treatment of his argument.