Court Opinion

ID: 9390813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 17:08:36.574455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.284077
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
                                          :
               v.                         :
                                          :
                                          :
 MICHAEL STARK                            :   No. 759 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-63-CR-0000976-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                         FILED: April 28, 2023

      The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from an order entered on

June 24, 2022, which granted a motion to suppress filed by Appellee, Michael

Stark. The Commonwealth contends that the trial court abused its discretion

or committed an error of law in granting Appellee’s motion.        After careful

review, we reverse the trial court’s suppression ruling and remand for further

proceedings.

      The trial court summarized the relevant facts established at the May 31,

2022 suppression hearing as follows:

       On January 2, 2022, Officer [Richard] Oddi of the Cecil
       Township Police initiated a traffic stop of a silver Ford Mustang
       [because] the registered owner of the vehicle [possessed] a
       suspended drivers’ license. The driver of the vehicle matched
       the profile of the registered owner, [Appellee]. The officer was
       in an unmarked vehicle but wore full uniform.                After
       approaching the vehicle, [Officer Oddi] confirmed that
       [Appellee] . . . was the driver. [Appellee] acknowledged that
       his license was suspended and[, upon Officer Oddi’s request for
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      his license and registration, Appellee gave him] a credit card for
      identification. The passenger of the vehicle provided a drivers’
      license. [Officer Oddi] took the credit card and license to his
      patrol vehicle, [and instructed] the occupants of the [vehicle]
      to “sit tight[”] and “[not to] get out of the car.” [After several
      minutes, Officer Oddi] again returned to the vehicle to ask
      [Appellee] his address, which he provided [via] two traffic
      citations[.     During this interaction, Officer Oddi] asked
      [Appellee] where he was coming [from], to which [Appellee]
      responded, “[c]ame from Pittsburgh[, Pennsylvania], came to
      see him . . . not even gonna [sic] lie, I came to smoke with
      him.”

      [Officer Oddi’s] next question to [Appellee] was, “Did you have
      some already?” [Appellee] admitted that he smoked about an
      hour prior. [Officer Oddi then asked if either Appellee or the
      passenger had a medical marijuana card. Appellee indicated he
      did not. The passenger stated he did have a medical marijuana
      card, but it was not with him. Lastly, Officer Oddi] asked if
      there [was] any marijuana in the vehicle, to which [Appellee]
      answered, “Yes.”

      Officer Oddi then returne[d] to his patrol vehicle. When another
      officer arrive[d] at the scene[, the officer asked what was] going
      on [and] Officer Oddi responde[d], “[Appellee] admitted to
      smoking an hour and a half ago, said there [was] weed in the
      car, someone has a medical marijuana card but it [is] not him .
      . . gonna [sic] take the driver out first.”

      The officers then instructed [Appellee] to exit the vehicle.
      [Appellee] consented to a search of his person and his vehicle.
      The officers did not find any other paraphernalia or contraband
      in the vehicle or on [Appellee]. The passenger was arrested for
      possession and placed in the patrol vehicle. The officers []
      subjected [Appellee] to [Standardized Field Sobriety Tests
      (“SFST”) and Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement
      (“ARIDE”)] field testing. Officer Oddi testified that the field
      testing revealed [that Appellee] showed signs of impairment,
      but did not so indicate in either the affidavit of probable cause
      or his testimony [during the suppression hearing] which test
      [revealed] signs of impairment, nor was it evident from the
      bodycam footage. [Appellee] was [subsequently] arrested and
      taken to the hospital for blood testing, to which he consented.
      The blood testing results indicated positive [] marijuana and its
      metabolites.

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Trial Court Order, 6/24/22, 1-3.

        The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts of driving under

the influence (“DUI”): controlled substance – schedule I; DUI: controlled

substance – Section II or III; and driving while license is suspended or revoked

DUI. On March 23, 2022, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, seeking

to suppress the evidence obtained from the sobriety field testing, as well as

his blood test results. Appellee argued that, at the time Officer Oddi asked

him if “he [already] smoke[d] some marijuana” he was subjected to a

custodial interrogation, warranting the issuance of Miranda1 warnings.

Appellee’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 3/23/22, at 7. Hence, Appellee claimed

Officer Oddi’s failure to issue Miranda warnings rendered “all of [his] answers

to [police] questioning, . . . [the] field sobriety testing, [the] observations and

the blood draw . . . fruit of the poisonous tree requiring suppression.” Id. As

such, Appellee asked the trial court to suppress his statement indicating he

smoked marijuana an hour prior to driving, together with the results of his

blood test.

        A suppression hearing was held on May 31, 2022, during which Officer

Oddi testified. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at 1-33. On June 24,

2022, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion. Trial Court Order, 6/24/22,

at 1-6. Specifically, the trial court held that Appellee was “in custody” after

Officer Oddi initiated the traffic stop and then told Appellee to “‘sit tight’ and

____________________________________________

1   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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remain in his vehicle.” Id. at 4. In addition, the trial court concluded that

Officer Oddi’s question, “[d]id you have some already?”, lodged in response

to Appellee’s admission that he “intend[ed] to smoke marijuana once he

reached his destination” was “the functional equivalent of interrogation” and,

as such, Appellee was subjected to a custodial interrogation, necessitating the

issuance of Miranda warnings. Id. Because Officer Oddi failed to Mirandize

Appellee, the trial court held that Appellee’s admission that he smoked

marijuana an hour prior to driving was inadmissible. Id. In addition, the trial

court held that, absent Appellee’s statement, Officer Oddi “did not have

reasonable suspicion to conduct the field testing and subsequently arrest

[Appellee] for suspicion of DUI.” Id. at 6. Based upon the foregoing, the trial

court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result, i.e., Appellee’s field test

and blood test results. Id.

       On June 29, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal

from the trial court's June 24, 2022, interlocutory order and, within the

Commonwealth's notice of appeal, the Commonwealth properly certified that

the   order    “terminates       or   substantially   handicaps   the   prosecution.”

Commonwealth's Notice of Appeal, 6/29/22, at 1; see also Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).2
____________________________________________

2“Certification of pretrial appeals by the Commonwealth [under Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d)] is an exception to the requirement that
appeals may be taken only from final orders.” Commonwealth v. Cosnek,
836 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. 2003). As our Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen
a pretrial motion removes evidence from the Commonwealth's case, only the
prosecutor can judge whether that evidence substantially handicaps his ability
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal:3

        Does the initial questioning during a roadside investigation
        regarding the driver’s use of marijuana require the defendant
        to be given Miranda warnings?

Commonwealth Brief at 6.

       When reviewing a challenge to a suppression ruling, our standard of

review is

        limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual
        findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
        conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
        [defense] prevailed before the suppression court, we may
        consider only the evidence of the [defense] and so much of the
        evidence for the [Commonwealth] as remains uncontradicted
        when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
        suppression court's factual findings are supported by the
        record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may
____________________________________________

to prove every essential element of his case. Additionally, only the prosecutor
can judge whether he can meet his constitutional burden of proving his case
without that evidence.” Id. at 875 (citations omitted). In following, the
Supreme Court has held that the Commonwealth may utilize Rule 311(d) to
immediately appeal “a pretrial ruling [that] results in the suppression,
preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence.” Id. at 877.

3 On October 28, 2022, Appellee filed an application to dismiss, arguing that
the Commonwealth failed to comply with various appellate rules in drafting its
brief and failed to file a reproduced record, and, as such, this Court should
dismiss or quash this appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See Appellee’s
Application to Dismiss Appeal for Failure to Comply with Pennsylvania Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 10/28/22, at 1-5. On November 2, 2022, the
Commonwealth filed its reproduced record. Although we do not condone the
Commonwealth’s failure to strictly comply with the appellate rules, the defects
in the Commonwealth’s brief and the untimely filing of the reproduced record
do not hinder our appellate review and therefore we decline to quash or
dismiss the appeal. See Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of the Sisters of
Christian Charity, 32 A.3d 800, 804 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc), aff'd,
91 A.3d 680 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

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        reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous.
        Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court
        turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal
        conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty
        it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the
        law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
        below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted and formatting altered).

       Herein, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erroneously

suppressed the incriminating statement Appellee made to police during a

lawful traffic stop. i.e., Appellee’s admission that he smoked marijuana before

driving.4 In particular, the Commonwealth argues that, under the precedent

set forth by the United States Supreme Court, “police need only give Miranda

warnings” if a motorist is “placed under arrest or when the questioning of a

suspect is so prolonged or coercive as to approximate the atmosphere of a

station house interrogation.” Commonwealth Brief at 17. Because Appellee

was only subjected to a temporary investigatory detention and was not, in

fact, “in custody” at the time he made the challenged statement, the

Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting suppression

because “Miranda warnings [were] not essential.” Id. We agree.

       Under Pennsylvania law, there are three categories of police-citizen

interactions. As our Supreme Court has clearly articulated:

____________________________________________

4There is no dispute “that the traffic stop for driving under suspension was
valid.” Trial Court Order, 6/24/22, at 3.

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       The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
       information) which need not be supported by any level of
       suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to
       respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be
       supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a
       stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such
       coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of
       an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be
       supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012),

appeal denied, 48 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis,

662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995).

      “It is long-settled that Miranda warnings are only required for the

third-level interaction, i.e., custodial interrogation.”   Commonwealth v.

Spence, 2023 WL 2002292 *1, *9 (Pa. Super. Feb. 15, 2023), citing

Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5 (Pa. 2003). Importantly, though, “it

is equally settled law that a motor vehicle stop is generally a second-level

interaction, an investigatory detention.”     Id., citing Commonwealth v.

Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2006). We previously stated:

       [a] traffic stop constitutes an investigative rather than a
       custodial detention, unless, under the totality of the
       circumstances, the conditions and duration of the detention
       become the functional equivalent of arrest. Since an ordinary
       traffic stop is typically brief in duration and occurs in public
       view, such a stop is not custodial for Miranda purposes.

Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en

banc) (citations omitted).

       The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of
       the circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive
       as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the

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       basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the
       suspect was transported against his or her will, how far, and
       why; whether restraints were used; whether the law
       enforcement officer showed, threatened or used force; and the
       investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019-1020 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citations omitted), aff’d, 78 A.3d 1044 (Pa. 2013).

       An ordinary traffic stop becomes “custodial” when the stop
       involves coercive conditions, including, but not limited to, the
       suspect being forced into a patrol car and transported from the
       scene or being physically restrained. Such coercive conditions
       constitute “restraints comparable to arrest” so as to transform
       the investigative nature of an ordinary traffic stop into custodial
       interrogation.

Mannion, 725 A.2d at 202 (internal citation omitted). Thus, “police need only

give Miranda warnings while detaining a suspect by the side of a public

highway when the suspect [has] actually [been] placed under arrest or when

the questioning of the suspect is so prolonged or coercive as to approximate

the atmosphere of a station house interrogation.”          Commonwealth v.

Toanone, 553 A.2d 998, 1003 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations and footnote

omitted).

      Herein, the testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Officer

Oddi initiated a valid traffic stop after he “ran the registration plate for

[Appellee’s] vehicle” and learned that “the registration showed that [Appellee]

was DUI suspended.”      N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at 5-6.          After

initiating the traffic stop based upon probable cause, Officer Oddi approached

the vehicle and asked Appellee for “identifying information.”          Id. at 6.

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Appellee responded that he “lost his license” but provided Officer Oddi with a

credit card. Id. Officer Oddi then returned to his patrol vehicle to “confirm”

Appellee’s identity, requesting him to “sit tight” and not to “get out of the car.”

Appellee’s (Defendant) Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1, 5/31/22, at 3:48. After

approximately six minutes passed, Officer Oddi reapproached Appellee’s

vehicle “to gather a correct address.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at

7. Appellee handed Officer Oddi vehicle citations which presumably contained

his address. Id. During this interaction, Officer Oddi asked Appellee “where

he   was    coming   from,”   to    which   Appellee   responded,    “Pittsburgh[,

Pennsylvania,]” and voluntarily offered that he and the passenger “were going

to go smoke [marijuana].”          Id. at 8; see also Appellee’s (Defendant)

Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1, 5/31/22, at 10:26. In response to Appellee’s

statement, Officer Oddi asked Appellee “[d]id you smoke some already?” Id.

at 10:30.    Appellee responded in the affirmative, adding that he smoked

marijuana about an hour prior. Id. Officer Oddi then asked whether there

was any marijuana in the vehicle and Appellee again responded in the

affirmative. Id. at 10:46.

      The fundamental question on appeal is whether, after Appellee was

subjected to an investigatory detention during a valid traffic stop, the

circumstances elevated to a custodial interrogation, requiring the issuance of

Miranda warnings. The following factors are relevant to our review: (1) the

stop occurred on a public roadway during the day; (2) during the relevant

time, Officer Oddi was the only officer present at the scene and interacting

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with Appellee; (3) Officer Oddi detained Appellee because his registration

showed DUI suspended; (4) during the initial encounter, Appellee admitted

his license was suspended; (5) Officer Oddi requested Appellee’s identifying

information and Appellee provided Officer Oddi with a credit card, rather than

a driver’s license; (6) Officer Oddi then returned to his patrol car to run

Appellee’s information through the police data system and, before doing so,

told Appellee to “sit tight” and not to “get out of the car;” (7) because Appellee

only provided Officer Oddi with his credit card, Officer Oddi reapproached

Appellee’s vehicle to obtain additional information regarding Appellee’s

address; (8) Officer Oddi asked where Appellee was coming from, Appellee

responded, and then, without prompting, revealed his intention to smoke

marijuana with the passenger of the vehicle; (9) based upon Appellee’s

statement, Officer Oddi asked whether Appellee already smoked marijuana,

Appellee responded that he did about an hour prior; (10) Officer Oddi asked

whether there was marijuana in the vehicle, and Appellee indicated there was;

(11) the second interaction between Appellee and Officer Oddi lasted less than

one minute; and (12) the detention, before Appellee made the incriminating

statement, lasted less than 10 minutes, most of which Officer Oddi spent in

his own patrol vehicle.

      Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, it is apparent that

Appellee was not subject to custodial arrest, and that the duty to issue

Miranda warnings was not triggered when Appellee admitted to smoking

marijuana an hour before driving.        Officer Oddi, while investigating the

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circumstances for which he originally initiated the traffic stop (driving under a

suspended license) requested Appellee’s identifying information and then told

Appellee to “sit tight” so that he could run Appellee’s information through the

police data system. This order, itself, does not convert the interaction to a

custodial detention. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 33 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (explaining that the officer’s order to “sit tight” did not make the

appellant’s “initial detention . . . so coercive or her freedom so curtailed as to

constitute a former arrest,” warranting the issuance of Miranda warnings).

      However, because Appellee only provided Officer Oddi with a credit card

during the initial encounter, Officer Oddi reapproached Appellee’s vehicle to

verify Appellee’s address.    At that time, Appellee, unprompted, provided

Officer Oddi with additional information that gave Officer Oddi reasonable

suspicion that Appellee may be impaired. Indeed, at the suppression hearing,

Officer Oddi agreed that, after Appellee stated that he came to smoke

marijuana with the passenger of his vehicle, Officer Oddi’s investigation

shifted “from [Appellee] just violating driving under suspension DUI related to

also including . . . an investigation about whether or not [Appellee was] driving

DUI.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at 19. Hence, Officer Oddi was

permitted to ask Appellee “a moderate number of questions . . . to try to

obtain information confirming or dispelling [his] suspicions.” Spence, 2023

WL 2002292 at *9 (quotation omitted). That is exactly what Officer Oddi did.

      Based upon for foregoing, we conclude that Appellee’s statement was

not   made    under   “coercive   conditions”   that   “constitute[d]   ‘restraints

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comparable to arrest.’”    Mannion, 725 A.2d at 202.         To the contrary,

Appellee’s inculpatory admission was voluntarily uttered during a brief and

relatively collegial encounter with police.   Accordingly, Miranda warnings

were not required, and the trial court erred in concluding Appellee’s statement

was inadmissible. See Spence, 2023 WL 2002292 at *9-11 (holding that the

trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s motion to suppress because the

relevant statements were made during an investigatory detention, not a

custodial interrogation); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 581 A.2d 956,

957-958 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that a defendant-motorist was not in

custody when subjected to an ordinary traffic stop and, as such, his

spontaneous admission that he was intoxicated was not subject to Miranda).

      Moreover, we note the trial court also erred in concluding that Officer

Oddi lacked reasonable suspicion to further investigate Appellee for DUI even

without Appellee’s statement. This Court previously explained:

       A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an
       investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the
       individual is engaging in criminal conduct. “This standard, less
       stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as
       reasonable suspicion.” In order to determine whether the police
       officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the
       circumstances must be considered.              In making this
       determination, we must give “due weight ... to the specific
       reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw
       from the facts in light of his experience.” Also, the totality of
       the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
       examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
       conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when
       taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
       officer.”

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Commonwealth v. Raglin, 178 A.3d 868, 872 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal

citations omitted), quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189

(Pa. 2004).

       Herein, testimony from the suppression hearing revealed that, during

his initial interaction with Appellee, Officer Oddi noted Appellee was

“annoyed,” “antsy,” and had “bloodshot and kind of swelling around the eyes.”

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22 at 7. Moreover, when Officer Oddi asked

for Appellee’s identification, Appellee handed him a credit card. Id. Then,

after Officer Oddi reapproached and requested additional information

regarding Appellee’s address, Appellee handed Officer Oddi previous traffic

citations.    Id.   Finally, Appellee readily admitted his intention to smoke

marijuana. Id. at 8. In contrast to the trial court’s decision, this behavior,

taken together, was sufficient to provide Officer Oddi reasonable suspicion

that Appellee was driving while impaired.

       We    therefore    conclude     that    the   suppression   court   improperly

suppressed the field test and blood test results.5 As such, we reverse the

suppression court’s June 24, 2022 order and remand this case for trial.
____________________________________________

5 In its June 24, 2022 order, the trial court noted that Officer Oddi “did not
give Miranda warnings at any point during the encounter, even while
informing [Appellee] that he was under arrest.” Trial Court Order, 6/24/22,
at 4. This was confirmed by our review of the body camera footage. However,
the record does not indicate that Appellee made any inculpatory statements
after his arrest, nor did Appellee argue before the trial court that any other
statements should have been suppressed. In addition, there was no testimony
at the suppression hearing that Officer Oddi issued Miranda warnings to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Order reversed. Appellee’s application to dismiss appeal denied. Case

remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/28/2023

____________________________________________

Appellee before he submitted to a blood draw. The results of a blood draw,
however, are not subject to suppression as a result of a 5th Amendment
violation. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding
that “the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of
compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some
communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on
privilege grounds”).

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