Court Opinion

ID: 9390183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 21:04:44.879308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.237969
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                 2023 IL App (4th) 220574-U
This Order was filed under                                                         FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                      April 26, 2023
not precedent except in the
                                          NO. 4-22-0574
                                                                                  Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).             IN THE APPELLATE COURT                             Court, IL
                                          OF ILLINOIS

                                      FOURTH DISTRICT

DETRICK CULLUM,                                )     Appeal from the
           Petitioner-Appellant,               )     Circuit Court of
           v.                                  )     Fulton County
FELICIA ADKINS, Warden,                        )     No. 21MR129
           Respondent-Appellee.                )
                                               )     Honorable
                                               )     Bruce C. Beal,
                                               )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

                JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
                Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1      Held: The trial court did not err by dismissing petitioner’s pro se petition for
              habeas corpus relief.

¶2              In September 2021, petitioner, Detrick Cullum, an inmate in the Illinois Department

of Corrections (DOC), filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief. He named as respondent,

the warden of the DOC facility in which he was imprisoned. (Petitioner currently resides in

Danville Correctional Center, a different DOC facility than where he was incarcerated when his

petition was originally filed. We substitute Felicia Adkins, the warden of petitioner’s current

facility, as respondent in the case. See Hennings v. Chandler, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 23-24 n.2, 890 N.E.2d

920, 923 n.2 (2008) (stating that the proper responding party in a habeas corpus case is the

petitioner’s current custodian)). In June 2022, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s habeas corpus

petition on respondent’s motion. Petitioner appeals that dismissal. We affirm.
¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4             Following a March 2011bench trial, petitioner was found guilty of three counts of

aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2), (3), (4) (West 2008)); two counts of

aggravated kidnaping (id. § 10-2(a)(3)); two counts of kidnapping (id. § 10-1(a)(1), (3)); one count

of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2008));

one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (id. § 4-103(a)(1)); one count of aggravated

battery on a public way (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8) (West 2008)); and one count of aggravated fleeing

or attempting to elude a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(3) (West 2008)). The trial court

sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment for each offense, imposing an aggregate

term of 10 years in prison.

¶5             Petitioner filed a direct appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against

him; arguing the trial court erred at sentencing by failing to merge various counts or comply with

the one-act, one-crime rule; and asserting the court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into his

pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Cullum, 2013 IL App (1st)

111776-U, ¶ 6. On review, the First District affirmed the lower court’s findings of guilt but

determined it erred when imposing petitioner’s sentence. Id. ¶¶ 73-75. Specifically, it found

(1) petitioner’s convictions for kidnapping and possession of a stolen motor vehicle merged into

his other offenses; (2) two of petitioner’s convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault and

one of his convictions for aggravated kidnapping should be vacated under the one-act, one crime

rule, and (3) petitioner’s sentences were void because the trial court improperly failed to impose

consecutive sentences (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2) (West 2012) (requiring the trial court to impose

consecutive sentences where the defendant is convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault)).

Id. The First District remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 75.

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¶6             In April 2014, the trial court resentenced petitioner to 10 years in prison for

aggravated criminal sexual assault, 6 years in prison for aggravated kidnapping, 5 years in prison

for aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle, 3 years in prison for aggravated battery on a

public way, and 2 years in prison for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.

The trial court also ordered petitioner’s 10-year sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault to

run consecutively to his 6-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping. It otherwise ordered

petitioner’s remaining sentences to run concurrently.

¶7             Petitioner appealed from his resentencing. He argued, in part, that his original

concurrent sentences were not void and, thus, neither subject to increase nor appeal by the State.

People v. Cullum, 2016 IL App (1st) 141546-U, ¶ 12. Relative to that claim, petitioner agreed that

his original concurrent sentences were improper and that he should have received consecutive

sentences. Id. ¶ 14. However, he asserted that his original sentence “should never have been

addressed in” his prior appeal, relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v.

Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, 43 N.E.3d 932. In that case, the supreme court abolished the void

sentencing rule, under which a sentence that failed to conform to statutory requirements was

deemed void. Id. ¶ 19. It also held that absent the void sentencing rule, the State’s argument during

the defendant’s direct appeal that a statutory 15-year sentencing enhancement should be applied

to his sentence, “was a de facto cross-appeal” and “impermissible.” Id. ¶ 23.

¶8             The First District rejected petitioner’s argument and affirmed the trial court’s

judgment. Cullum, 2016 IL App (1st) 141546-U, ¶ 36. First, it concluded that its judgment in

petitioner’s 2013 appeal was “the law of the case,” where, following its decision, petitioner had

not been granted rehearing or leave to appeal to the supreme court. Id. ¶ ¶ 16-18. It noted that one

exception to the law of the case doctrine was “where the supreme court makes a contrary ruling

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on the precise issue of law on which the appellate court had based its prior decision.” Id. ¶ 17.

However, it found that exception inapplicable “because Castleberry abolished the void sentence

rule in the context of a sentence being increased,” and petitioner’s case “involved the imposition

of the same sentences to run consecutively versus concurrently rather than a sentence increase.”

(Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 18. (Although the appellate court stated the trial court imposed the

same sentences on remand and identified petitioner as having been originally sentenced to 6 years

in prison for aggravated kidnapping (id. ¶ 2, 18), both the attachments to petitioner’s

habeas corpus petition in this case and the First District’s 2013 decision reflect that the trial court

originally sentenced petitioner to 10 years in prison in connection with all of his aggravated

criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and kidnapping counts (Cullum, 2013 IL App (1st)

111776-U, ¶ 5). Thus, petitioner’s aggravated kidnapping sentence actually decreased from 10

years in prison to 6 years in prison upon resentencing.).

¶9             The First District also held that regardless of whether it applied the law-of-the-case

doctrine, it would still find Castleberry distinguishable and that it did not require reinstatement of

petitioner’s “unauthorized previous sentences.” Id. ¶ 19. In particular, it held: “Unlike Castleberry,

the case at bar deals with a voidable sentence that was remanded to the trial court for resentencing

and which, upon resentencing, was not increased.” Id. ¶ 20. Following that decision, petitioner

filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court, which the supreme court denied.

See People v. Cullum, No. 121410 (March 29, 2017).

¶ 10           In September 2021, petitioner filed the pro se petition for habeas corpus relief that

is the subject of this appeal. He argued that in connection with his 2013 appeal, the First District

“exceeded its jurisdiction” by addressing the State’s de facto appeal “to correct a statutory

non-conforming sentence.” Petitioner also asserted that “by extension,” the trial court lacked

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jurisdiction to impose the consecutive sentences that “increase[ed] his ‘punishment.’ ” He

maintained that, as a result, there was also no “jurisdiction” for his confinement past the ending

date of his original concurrent sentences, which he asserted was on February 8, 2020.

¶ 11           In January 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s petition under

section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)), alleging he

failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief. In June 2022, the trial court issued a written order,

granting respondent’s motion and dismissing petitioner’s petition. In setting forth its decision, the

court found petitioner raised the “exact same argument” that had been addressed and rejected in

his 2016 appeal from his resentencing and, thus, the claim could not be relitigated under the

law-of-the-case doctrine. The court also found that the habeas corpus petition was insufficient on

its face where both the circuit court and appellate court properly exercised jurisdiction in the

underlying proceedings and petitioner failed to allege a postconviction event that warranted his

immediate discharge from custody.

¶ 12           This appeal followed.

¶ 13                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14           Petitioner appeals pro se, arguing the trial court erred by granting respondent’s

section 2-615 motion to dismiss his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that the

appellate court in his 2013 appeal, and subsequently the trial court on remand, lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to order the imposition of consecutive sentences. Petitioner also maintains that

he sufficiently identified a postconviction event that warranted his immediate discharge from

custody, specifically, his “void ab initio” resentencing hearing and “the expiration of his originally

imposed sentence,” which he asserts occurred on February 8, 2020. Further, petitioner contends

that the court erred in finding that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred him from raising his

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habeas corpus claim.

¶ 15           “A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint

based on defects apparent on its face.” Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 57, 896 N.E.2d 327,

331 (2008). “In ruling on the motion, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the

complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and taking all well-pleaded facts as

true, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” Rehfield v. Diocese

of Joliet, 2021 IL 125656, ¶ 20, 182 N.E.3d 123. A trial court should not dismiss a cause of action

pursuant to section 2-615 “unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would

entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58. The grant of a section 2-615 motion to

dismiss is subject to de novo review. Id. at 57.

¶ 16           A petitioner may obtain habeas corpus relief only upon the grounds set forth in

section 10-124 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2020)). Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58.

Ultimately, under that section, a prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief only when (1) he “has

been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the

person of the petitioner, or” (2) “where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the

prisoner’s conviction that entitles him to release.” Id. 58; see also People v. Purnell, 356 Ill. App.

3d 524, 528, 825 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (2005) (stating the grounds for relief set forth in section 10-

124 of the Code “fall into two general categories—either the trial court lacked jurisdiction or there

has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner’s conviction that entitles him to release”).

“A complaint for order of habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit

one of these defects, even though the alleged error involves a denial of constitutional rights.”

Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 58.

¶ 17           The denial of a habeas corpus petition is subject to de novo review. Ragel v. Scott,

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2018 IL App (4th) 170322, ¶ 19, 99 N.E.3d 610. Further, “[w]e may affirm the trial court’s ruling

for any reason supported by the record regardless of the basis relied upon by the trial court.” Id.

¶ 18           Here, the trial court correctly determined that petitioner failed to state a cause of

action upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. In particular, petitioner failed to

sufficiently allege either that he was incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked

jurisdiction or there was some occurrence subsequent to his conviction that entitled him to release.

¶ 19           Petitioner contends that both the appellate court in his 2013 appeal and the trial

court on remand from that decision lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the imposition of

consecutive sentences. However, “[a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction relates to ‘the power of a

court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question

belongs.’ ” People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 20, 983 N.E.2d 439 (quoting Belleville Toyota,

Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334, 770 N.E.2d 177, 184 (2002)). The

appellate court has subject matter jurisdiction over final judgments entered by the circuit court. Ill.

Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (“Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to

the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in which the Circuit Court is located.”). “The final

judgment in a criminal case is the sentence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 19, 160 N.E.3d 833. Further, “[a] timely filed notice of appeal is the

only jurisdictional step required to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court.” Id. ¶ 21; see also

People v. Coleman, 2017 IL App (4th) 160770, ¶ 15, 90 N.E.3d 1043 (“Our subject-matter

jurisdiction depends on the filing of a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by [Illinois

Supreme Court] Rule 606(b).”).

¶ 20           Additionally, a reviewing court’s mandate “is the transmittal of the judgment of

that court to the circuit court, and revests the circuit court with jurisdiction.” PSL Realty Co. v.

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Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 304, 427 N.E.2d 563, 569 (1981). “[T]he trial court on

remand is vested with jurisdiction only to take action that complies with the reviewing court’s

mandate.” People v. Hill, 2021 IL App (1st) 131973-B, ¶ 20, 204 N.E. 3d 841; See also People v.

Harrison, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1060, 589 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1992) (“[W]here a reviewing court

remands a cause, the court to which the cause is remanded has no jurisdiction to enter any orders

other than those required in furtherance of, and in conformity with, the mandate.”).

¶ 21           In his habeas corpus petition, petitioner failed to allege facts that would support a

finding that the appellate court in his 2013 appeal, and subsequently the trial court on remand,

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The record indicates petitioner’s appeal was taken following a

final judgment—the trial court’s imposition of his original sentence—and petitioner alleges no

defect in the notice of appeal. Also, on remand, the court had jurisdiction to act consistent with the

appellate court’s decision, which included resentencing petitioner and imposing consecutive

sentences. See Cullum, 2013 IL App (1st) 111776-U, ¶ 75 (finding petitioner’s concurrent

sentences were imposed in violation of the Unified Code of Corrections and were void.)

¶ 22           In claiming a lack of jurisdiction for the imposition of his consecutive sentences,

petitioner relies on case authority subsequent to his April 2014 resentencing and which concerns

the abolition of the void sentencing rule. See Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19 (abolishing the

void sentencing rule as constitutionally unsound); see also People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶ 27,

76 N.E.3d 1240 (holding Castleberry applied prospectively and to all cases pending when the

court’s decision was announced, including the defendant’s pending section 2-1401 petition for

relief from judgment).

¶ 23           Generally, “[j]urisdiction over a cause depends on the state of facts at the time the

action is brought.” In re Marriage of Allen, 265 Ill. App. 3d 208, 211, 638 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1994).

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At the time of petitioner’s 2013 appeal and his resentencing in the trial court, Illinois Supreme

Court case authority explicitly authorized the actions taken by the First District. See People v.

Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1995), abrogated by Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916

(holding that because the trial court’s sentencing “order imposing concurrent [prison] terms was

void, the appellate court had the authority to correct it at any time [citation], and the actions of the

appellate court were not barred by [the Supreme Court Rules] which limit the State’s right to appeal

and which prohibit the appellate court from increasing a defendant’s sentence on review”).

¶ 24           Moreover, we agree with respondent’s contention, raised below and on appeal, that

petitioner’s habeas corpus claim, which stems from Castleberry’s abolition of the void sentencing

rule, is barred from being relitigated by collateral estoppel. “The doctrine of collateral estoppel

bars relitigation of an issue that was already decided in a prior case.” Hurlbert v. Charles, 238 Ill.

2d 248, 255, 938 N.E.2d 507, 512 (2010). For collateral estoppel to apply, the following three

requirements must be met:

               “(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented

               in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior

               adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in

               privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

               Id.

¶ 25           In his habeas corpus petition, petitioner, relying on Castleberry, argued that the

First District exceeded its authority in his 2013 appeal by addressing the State’s de facto appeal

“to correct a statutory non-conforming sentence.” He sought release from prison based upon the

alleged expiration of his original concurrent sentences. In his 2016 appeal from his resentencing,

petitioner raised the same issue. He relied on Castleberry and argued that “his original sentences

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were not void and thus not subject to increase by [the appellate court] or appealable by the State.”

Cullum, 2016 IL App (1st) 141546-U, ¶ 14. He asserted his “original sentence should never have

been addressed in” his 2013 appeal and sought reinstatement of his original concurrent sentences.

Id. The First District rejected petitioner’s claim and affirmed his consecutive sentences. Id.

¶¶ 18-19. Further, the Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioner leave to appeal from that judgment.

People v. Cullum, No. 121410 (March 29, 2017).

¶ 26           We note that, below, the trial court determined the law-of-case-doctrine barred the

relitigation of petitioner’s sentencing claim in the underlying habeas corpus proceeding. However,

“[t]he law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of an issue previously decided in the same case.”

People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 25, 106 N.E.3d 944; see also People ex rel. Madigan v.

Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 394 Ill. App. 3d 382, 391, 915 N.E.2d 453, 461 (2009) (“Unlike

collateral estoppel, however, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to issues already determined in

the same case.” (Emphasis in original.)). Because petitioner’s action for habeas corpus relief is a

different cause of action from his previous criminal case and its ensuing appeals, the law-of-the-

case doctrine is inapplicable. However, as we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on any basis

supported by the record, we agree with respondent that collateral estoppel applies to the present

case.

¶ 27           As stated, petitioner also argues on appeal that he sufficiently identified a

postconviction event that warranted his immediate discharge from custody, namely, his “void

ab initio” resentencing hearing and “the expiration of his originally imposed sentence.” However,

the trial court’s judgment upon resentencing cannot be considered void. A judgment will be

considered void in only two circumstances: “(1) when it is entered by a court that lacked personal

or subject-matter jurisdiction or (2) when it is based on a statute that is facially unconstitutional

                                               - 10 -
and void ab initio.” People v. Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 28, 181 N.E.3d 201. For the reasons

already stated, both the appellate court in petitioner’s 2013 appeal and the trial court on remand

properly exercised jurisdiction. Further, there is no claim by petitioner that his resentencing

judgment was based on a facially unconstitutional statute.

¶ 28           To the extent petitioner, again, relies on case authority decided after his

resentencing to show an event warranting discharge or that error occurred as a result of his

resentencing, he cannot establish his entitlement to relief. “New case law is not a subsequent act,

occurrence, or event that entitles a prisoner to be discharged within the meaning of section 10-124

of the Code.” Ragel, 2018 IL App (4th) 170322, ¶ 18. Further, a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim

that his sentence was unconstitutional or imposed in error is “simply not cognizable under section

10-124.” Schlemm v. Cowan, 323 Ill. App. 3d 318, 321, 752 N.E.2d 647, 649 (2001).

¶ 29           Accordingly, under the circumstances presented, we find petitioner failed to state a

claim for habeas corpus relief, and the trial court committed no error by granting respondent’s

motion to dismiss his petition.

¶ 30                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 32           Affirmed.

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