Court Opinion

ID: 9694213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:29:41.456128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:04.456673
License: Public Domain

Yeager, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. There are two questions which are basic in the deter*659mination of the issues involved in this case a correct approach to either or both of which requires a decision the direct opposite of that made by the majority opinion. Only one was considered.
The question considered and determined was that of whether or not the provisions of the ordinance of the city of Hastings, Nebraska, which were brought into question are inconsistent with the provisions, of the Nebraska Liquor Control Act. If they are, then the majority opinion to the extent that it deals with the issues involved is wrong and this dissent stands on a firm basis. I insist that inconsistency does exist and my purpose is to point it out.
I desire to point out that, as I believe, none of the cases cited in the majority opinion except Hanson v. Gass, 130 Neb. 685, 267 N. W. 403, has a bearing on the question involved and this one completely supports the contentions of the plaintiffs in this case.
The plaintiffs according to the petition were holders of licenses from the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission to sell, at designated premises in the city of Hastings, Nebraska, alcoholic liquors, including beer, regardless of alcoholic content, sales to be made in the original packages and for consumption off the premises. This type of license is designated in the act as class D.
The defendants demurred generally to the petition the effect of which was of course to admit the possession of the licenses and the propriety of their issuance.
These licenses were the measure of the rights of the plaintiffs to dispense alcoholic liquors. Section 53-123.04, R. S. Supp., 1949, makes this clear. The provision is: “A retailer’s license shall allow the licensee to sell and offer for sale at retail either in the original package or otherwise, as therein prescribed, in the premises specified in such license, alcoholic liquors or beer regardless of alcoholic content for use or consumption but not for resale in any form.”
Applied to this case that is a declaration that these *660plaintiffs were on the premises designated in their respective licenses granted the right to. sell alcoholic liquors, including beer, regardless of alcoholic content, sales to be made in the original packages and for consumption off the premises. This was a clear, unequivocal, and unmistakable right which flowed to them from the act itself through the license issued by the Liquor Control Commission.
The following which appears as section 53-147, R. S. 1943, is a provision of the Nebraska Liquor Control Act: “The governing bodies of cities and villages are hereby authorized to regulate by ordinance, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, the business of all beer licensees carried on within their corporate limits.” Apparently pursuant to this authority the governing body of the city of Hastings enacted the following:
“It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, holding a license to sell beer at retail ‘off sale’ and alcoholic liquors other than beer in the original package, at retail, to sell or keep the same for sale at retail in the same room or on the same premises. It shall be unlawful for any person or persons holding a license or licenses for the sale at retail of beer ‘on sale’ and of alcoholic liquors other than beer in the original package, to sell, or keep for sale the same at retail, except in separate and distinct rooms or premises. Rooms or premises shall be deemed separate and distinct only when located in buildings which are not adjacent, or when so separated by walls or partitions that access can not be had directly from one to the other by means of doors or other openings.”
A penalty provision was also enacted for violation which shall not be set forth here.
The plaintiffs by their petition declare that this provision of the ordinance which by its terms denies them the right to sell beer from the same premises as other alcoholic liquors is directly inconsistent with the rights *661granted, to them under the law through the instrumentality of the Liquor Control Commission.
It is directly contrary to the legislative grant of rights which shall attend a class D license. Being contrary to the statute I .am unable to comprehend how it can be free from inconsistency therewith.
It cannot well be said that the defendants may be aided in this instance by consideration of any general regulatory right or right under police power. The specific subject with which the ordinance deals was a thing specifically dealt with by the Legislature, and the effect of the legislative declaration, which conferred the only power of the city to act at all, is to effectually bar contrary or inconsistent municipal legislation.
■ It is apparent to me that the majority opinion fails to comprehend the true perspective of the case of Hanson v. Gass, supra., In the majority opinion it is stated: “The opinion in that case points out that the city of Omaha had voted for the sale of alcoholic liquors at retail. No restrictions on the part of the city appear to have been imposed. We have no hesitancy in saying, under such circumstances, that the sale of alcoholic liquors on the premises described in the license would include the sale of beer, since the latter is included within the term ‘alcoholic liquors’ by statutory definition.”
Analyzing and applying that statement together with the opinion in Hanson v. Gass, supra, let us see at what point we arrive. Like in that case these plaintiffs had proper licenses, or at least we must so assume, since by their petition they so declared and by the general demurrer the defendants so admitted.
,The right of these plaintiffs to sell beer on the same premises with other alcoholic liquors is statutorily more conclusive than was true under the license involved in Hanson v. Gass, supra. As to licenses such as the plaintiffs have the statutory provision contains the words “including beer” whereas as to the other it does not.
It is quite true that in the case of Hanson v. Gass, *662supra, no restriction on the part of the city of Omaha was involved. It is not true however that a restriction like or similar to that contained in the ordinance of the city of Hastings was not involved. The similar restriction was contained in the Liquor Control Act itself.
The opinion in that case points out quite certainly that this restrictive provision was contrary to and inconsistent with the right of the licensee under his license to sell beer from the same premises where he was engaged in selling other alcoholic liquors. If the conclusion of this court with respect to consistency was correct there, how reasonably can an opposite conclusion be correct here?
Fairness requires that I point out here that it may reasonably be said that the decision in that case did not in the last analysis turn on the question of conflicting provisions of the statute. The court determined that the conflicting provision there was not substantive law but was only a declaration of public policy in the nature of a preamble, and hence could not be considered a substantive abridgement of the rights of the licensee under his license. Obiter dicta though it may be, it stands as reasoning of this court employed in a case wherein the majority opinion fails to deny its correctness, and a case, as I believe, involving a principle exactly the same as is involved in this case.
The other reason why I conclude that the majority opinion is wrong is that the provision of section 53-147, R. S. 1943, gives cities and villages no control whatever over licenses such as these plaintiffs have. That provision extends power to cities and villages to regulate the business of holders of beer licenses. These plaintiffs do not have beer licenses. They have class D licenses which permit the sale of all kinds of alcoholic liquors including beer. Beer licenses are separately classified. Retail beer licenses are classed as A, B, and F.
*663I repeat, I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. The decree of the district court should be affirmed.