Court Opinion

ID: 9717762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:09:58.97818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.160042
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the conclusion of the majority that, pursuant to step two of the methodol*978ogy outlined in Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330, 375 N.E.2d 208, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Likewise, I join the majority’s conclusion that Estep v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 111, must be overruled insofar as it incorrectly states the law with respect to step one of the Lawrence inquiry. I am unable to join, however, particular statements contained in the majority opinion.
The majority has stated:
“Acknowledging, arguendo, that the “Hash" rule was an impermissible impingement upon a defendant’s rights under the statutes then in effect, that barrier was removed by the passage of our present code.” Majority Opinion, supra.
I do not join the majority’s renunciation, albeit obiter dictum, of the rule utilized in Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692, 284 N.E.2d 770.
The “Hash" rule, as the majority characterizes it, simply deems that when there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant might be guilty only of the included offense, an instruction on that offense should not be given to the jury. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the rule was not employed for the first time in Hash; rather, the advent of the rule occurred in Cole v. State, (1922) 192 Ind. 29, 134 N.E. 867.
However the rule may be characterized, it has enjoyed longstanding and widespread usage in our courts. This Court, for instance, employed it in Goodpaster v. State, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 1239; Minton v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 39, 378 N.E.2d 639; Lawrence v. State, supra, Harris v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 661, 366 N.E.2d 186; Hester v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 284, 315 N.E.2d 351; Wathen v. State, (1965) 246 Ind. 245, 204 N.E.2d 526, and Watford v. State, (1957) 237 Ind. 10, 143 N.E.2d 405, to name a few. Our Court of Appeals has employed the rule in numerous instances, including Roddy v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 1098; Phillips v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 377 N.E.2d 666; Lash v. State, (1977) 174 Ind.App. 217, 367 N.E.2d 10, overruling Ellis v. State, (1977) 173 Ind.App. 131, 362 N.E.2d 1162, and Joy v. State, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 130, 346 N.E.2d 604.
I do not join the majority’s “acknowledgment” that the defendants’ rights under the statutes in effect were violated by our holdings in Goodpaster; Minton; Lawrence; Harris; Hester; Hash; Wathen; Watford; Cole; Roddy; Phillips; Lash, and Joy, as well as in other cases which have not been cited. Nor does there appear to be any need to reach that question, “arguendo” or otherwise, for it has not been argued by the defendant.
Inasmuch as the majority’s statement suggests that for over half a century we have been violating defendants’ statutory rights, the rationale upon which that conclusion is founded should be explored. A misconception of fundamental concepts concerning the law of included offenses is the catalyst for the majority’s error.
Prior to the enactment of our revised Criminal Code, which took effect October 1, 1977, the statutes which governed lesser and included offenses were codified at Ind. Code § 35-1-39-1 et seq. (Burns 1975), as quoted by the majority. Of particular relevance here is Ind. Code § 35-1-39-2, supra, which reads:
“In all other cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment or information.”
Defined in the statute were the circumstances in which a defendant properly could be convicted of a lesser included offense. The language employed by the legislature bestowed no advantage to either the state or defendant in the matter of when the conviction for an included offense could stand.
The majority apparently has overlooked the neutral posture of the statute, as its discussion dwells on “defendant’s rights” and the proposition that “an accused” had a “statutory right” under our former code. The language of the statute, however, defined a rule of evenhanded application: *979when the given statutory circumstances were satisfied, a defendant properly could be convicted of a lesser included offense. There was wisdom in the neutral posture of the statute, for as the majority acknowledges, either the defendant or the state in any given case might, as a tactical matter dependent upon the relative strengths and weaknesses of the evidence, desire conviction for a lesser included offense. See Roddy v. State, supra; Allison v. State, (1973) 157 Ind.App. 277, 299 N.E.2d 618.
It is also significant that while the legislature established the propriety of convictions for lesser included offenses, it did not address or define the circumstances in which an instruction on a lesser included offense should be given to a jury. The relevant statutes, Ind.Code § 35-1-39-1 et seq., supra, were silent on that subject.
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that if a statute is designed to modify an existing and fundamental common law rule, that intent must be clearly stated; it cannot be supplied by implication. Maroon v. State Dept. of Mental Health, (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 404; Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, (1953) 124 Ind.App. 30, 112 N.E.2d 891. In 1905, when Ind.Code § 35-1-39-1 et seq., supra, was enacted, our common law had recognized as a fundamental premise of our criminal trial procedure that the final instructions which are given to the jury must conform to the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, (1898) 152 Ind. 304, 53 N.E. 223; Miller v. State, (1896) 144 Ind. 401, 43 N.E. 440; Clem v. State, (1869) 31 Ind. 480. The rule, of course, retains its vigor today. French v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d 834.
It was in this context that Cole v. State, supra, the source of the Hash rule (as embodied in step two of the Lawrence inquiry), was decided. Defendant Cole had been charged and convicted of murder in the commission of a robbery. He appealed, arguing his instruction on voluntary manslaughter had been improperly refused. This Court rejected Cole’s contention, noting that his sole defense consisted of an alibi. This Court reasoned correctly that Cole either was guilty of felony murder or not guilty of the crime charged. For the Court, Chief Justice Ewbank explained its rationale:
“And there being no evidence whatever tending to prove that the accused, if he robbed and killed Johnson, as charged in the fourth count of the indictment, killed him under any other circumstances than those recited in that count, by striking him a blow which caused his death while engaged in the perpetration of the robbery, the court was not required to instruct on manslaughter in case the jury found the facts charged in that count, unless the Constitution and statutes of Indiana require such an instruction without reference to the nature of the charge or the evidence. State v. Roselli (1921), 109 Kan. 33, 198 P. 195, 198.
“That an instruction need not be given in a criminal case unless there is evidence to which it is applicable has been decided by this court. Harlan v. State (1921), 190 Ind. 322, 130 N.E. 413, 418.
5k * # * * sfc
“A jury might have power to stultify itself by returning a verdict contrary to what it knew to be the law, since jurisdiction to decide includes power to decide wrong. But the court, when giving instructions, is not required to insult the jurors by a suggestion that they may do so.” Id., 192 Ind. at 36-7, 134 N.E. at 870.
It was this precise language which was expressly followed in Hash and its progeny. See, e.g., Hester v. State, supra, 262 Ind. at 289, 315 N.E.2d at 354, quoting Cole v. State, supra; Roddy v. State, supra, 394 N.E.2d at 773, n.26, quoting Cole v. State, supra.
As this Court also recognized in Lawrence v. State, supra, and Hester v. State, supra, the rule enunciated in Cole and utilized in Hash serves to eliminate the potential for dubious compromise verdicts between jurors who believe a defendant is guilty of the charged crime and those who would acquit him of the charge. See also, *980Roddy v. State, supra. Unless an evidentia-ry dispute exists with respect to the elements) which distinguishes the offense charged from the included offense, neither defendant nor the state can obtain an instruction on the included offense—and the jury is precluded from a compromise verdict which bears no relationship to the evidence. Cole v. State, supra; Hash v. State, supra.
In interpreting Ind.Code § 35-1-39-2, supra, to grant defendant a “statutory right” to an instruction on any lesser offense which was included in the crime charged, and in turn decrying the Hash rule as an “impermissible impingement” of that “right,” the majority attributes an intent to the legislature to promote the opportunity for compromise verdicts which do not comport with the evidence. This Court has often acknowledged the rule of statutory construction, however, that it must be presumed that our legislature did not intend its enactment to work an illogical or absurd result. Walton v. State, (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 667; Chaffin v. Nicosia, (1974) 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867; In re Adoption of Jackson, (1972) 257 Ind. 588, 277 N.E.2d 162; Town of Homecroft v. Macbeth, (1958) 238 Ind. 57, 148 N.E.2d 563.
There is no language contained in Ind. Code § 35-1-39-1 et seq., supra, which indicates, either expressly or impliedly, that our legislature intended to open the door for defendants to obtain compromise verdicts unrelated to the evidence. The rules of statutory construction, as applied to the statutes at issue, dictate the conclusion that the legislature intended its provisos to be applied in an evenhanded manner, one consistent with the long-standing rule that instructions must conform to the evidence. The Hash rule, notwithstanding its renunciation by the majority, serves to promote this equilibrium between the parties, perpetuate the common law rule that instructions conform to the evidence, and eliminate the potential for compromise verdicts. The Hash rule did not violate any aspect of Ind.Code § 35-1-39-1 et seq., supra.
It should be noted that the majority correctly states that the Hash rule, as embodied in step two of the methodology outlined in Lawrence v. State, supra, and Roddy v. State, supra, has continuing validity under our revised Criminal Code. Ind.Code § 35-41-1-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.); see, e.g., Easley v. State, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 435; Swafford v. State, (1981) Ind., 421 N.E.2d 596; Payton v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 430 N.E.2d 1175; Copeland v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 430 N.E.2d 393. Likewise, the majority properly found that pursuant to the rule, the instruction tendered by defendant was properly refused.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the overruling of Estep v. State, supra, and the conclusion that defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser offense. Otherwise, I concur in result.