Court Opinion

ID: 9942708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 19:01:23.763013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:28.240950
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 21 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARMEN JUAREZ RIBERA,                           No.    22-2091

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A215-816-509

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Submitted February 16, 2024**
                            San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Carmen Juarez Ribera,1 a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing her

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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             Although Juarez Ribera’s minor son is listed as a rider on her asylum
application, he was not included in the BIA appeal at issue before us.
appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying her applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

      We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA adopts

the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886

F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual

findings for substantial evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748

(9th Cir. 2022). We deny the petition.

      1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Juarez Ribera

did not demonstrate a nexus between her feared harm and a protected ground for

her asylum and withholding of removal claims. The IJ assumed without deciding

that “business owners in Mexico” was a cognizable group but found that Juarez

Ribera was “not being singled out” on account of her membership in that group.

Rather, she was experiencing the same potential harms that anyone else would face

in Mexico, because “criminals target anyone who they believe will further their

desire for economic gain.” See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012,

1019-20 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that where a “persecutor’s actual motivation

for threatening a person is to extort money,” there is no nexus to a protected

ground (citing Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004))); see

also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to

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be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by

gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). The record substantially

supports the IJ’s conclusion, as Juarez Ribera testified that the criminals left her

alone after she showed them high electrical bills for the business, which prevented

her from being able to afford to meet their demands.

      The IJ also correctly found that Juarez Ribera’s fourth proposed social group

of “individuals returning to Mexico” is not cognizable based on our precedent in

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010). Juarez Ribera

makes no argument regarding the IJ’s finding that no nexus existed between her

indigenous identity or her membership in a family unit and the various forms of

persecution she alleges. Although these alternative PSGs are “referred to in the

appellant’s statement of the case,” Juarez Ribera’s failure to discuss them “in the

body of the opening brief” means they are forfeited. Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94

F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).

      Because “lack of a nexus to a protected ground is dispositive of

[Petitioner’s] asylum and withholding of removal claims,” Riera-Riera v. Lynch,

841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016), we do not consider Juarez Ribera’s other

arguments.

      2. Juarez Ribera has not “specifically and distinctly argued and raised” the

issue of relief under the Convention Against Torture. She has forfeited that claim.

                                           3
Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Arpin v.

Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001)).

      PETITION DENIED.

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