Court Opinion

ID: 9706538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:45:50.74048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.476830
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
Lest my position be misunderstood, I begin this dissenting opinion with the recognition that, rather than a grant of immunity from punishment, “probation is a matter of grace, not entitlement, which permits a wrong-doer to keep his *650freedom ‘as long as he conducts himself in a manner consonant with established communal standards and the safety of society’ ”. Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 75, 400 A.2d 419 (1979), quoting Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208 A.2d 575 (1965). To avoid revocation, the probationer is obliged to substantially comply with the conditions of his probation; unless resulting from circumstances beyond his or her control, the violation of one or more lawful conditions of probation is sufficient justification for its revocation. Humphrey v. State, 290 Md. 164, 167-68, 428 A.2d 440 (1981). See Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 202, 434 A.2d 552 (1981). Of course, to be lawful, the conditions must be reasonable and have a rational basis, Watson v. State, 17 Md.App. 263, 274, 301 A.2d 26 (1973), and they must “provide the probationer with reasonable, specific direction within the ambit of the initially expressed general condition.” Hudgins v. State, 292 Md. 342, 348, 438 A.2d 928 (1982). With these principles in mind, we must consider Maryland Code Ann. art. 27 § 36, Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100, 387 A.2d 762 (1978), and part one of the majority’s opinion to place this matter in context.
Section 36, captioned Carrying or wearing concealed weapon; carrying openly with intent to injure; carrying by person under eighteen at night in certain counties, by its terms, in subsection (a), expressly exempts from its coverage, penknives without switchblades and handguns. Unlike handguns, the wearing, carrying, and transporting of which are covered by Maryland Code Ann, art. 27 § 36B, there is no separate or special statutory treatment of penknives. Thus, their exclusion from the reach of § 36(a) inexorably leads to the conclusions that carrying a penknife without switchblade in one’s pocket is not illegal and that such a knife is not a dangerous and deadly weapon per se. Mackall supports both conclusions: whereas the Court characterized the items specifically enumerated in the statute as “dangerous and deadly weapons per se ”, it characterized penknives without switchblades simply as “dangerous and deadly weapons”, which it found simply did not fall *651within the ambit of § 36(a). 283 Md. at 106, 387 A.2d 762. Further support is provided by the Mackall Court’s requirement that the proof in a prosecution pursuant to § 36(a) must affirmatively demonstrate the inapplicability of the exception for penknives. Id. at 111, 387 A.2d 762. Moreover, what constitutes a penknife is not to be determined by its size since “[p]enknives today are commonly considered to encompass any knife with the blade folding in the handle, some very large.” Id. at 113, n. 13, 387 A.2d 762.
I am satisfied that a person over eighteen may carry a penknife without switchblade, even though very large, in his pocket, day or night, without violating the law of this state. On the other hand, the same may not be said for a person under the age of eighteen in certain counties between certain hours.1 That the legislature drew this dis*652tinction is very significant in view of the argument advanced by the majority on p. 641 of the majority opinion. See page 642 infra. As the majority sees it,
The question before us, therefore, is not whether the State met its burden of proving that appellant’s knife was not a penknife, but whether Judge Melbourne erred in determining that the knife was a dangerous weapon at the time, in the place and under the circumstances of its being taken from appellant by Cpl. Groves.
It answers that question by holding that “Judge Melbourne was not clearly erroneous in finding, under the totality of the circumstances, that appellant had violated a condition of his probation by possessing a dangerous weapon without permission from his probation officer.” Along the way, the majority concludes that whether the knife appellant was carrying was a penknife within the meaning of Art. 27 § 36(a) has no significance except with respect to condition number four of his probation, which required that he obey all laws, and recognizes that a variety of items, some quite innocuous and clearly not weapons per se, may be used or intended to be used as weapons and, when so used, or, by circumstances, are shown to have been intended to be so used, may be dangerous and deadly weapons.
I agree with the majority that the condition that appellant obey all laws is not here at issue. I disagree, however, that the statute is not relevant to the determination required to be made by the trial judge. As I see it, § 36(a) provides the standard against which appellant’s action and knowledge regarding the carrying of the knife must be measured. If the knife is a penknife without switchblade, in the absence of a specific instruction to the contrary, it may not be assumed that appellant was aware that carrying that particular knife was prohibited by his probation order. This is true because it is not against the law to carry such a knife at anytime or in anyplace, day or night. If, on the other *653hand, the knife is not a penknife, it would be a dangerous and deadly weapon per se, the mere possession of which would be a violation of probation. By permitting the trial judge to revoke appellant’s probation without first determining if the knife is a penknife, the majority, in effect, endorses the revocation of probation for something the probationer could not possibly have known to be a violation of the terms of his probation. This, I think, is fundamentally unfair.
The majority recognizes that a penknife is not a weapon per se and it correctly observes that its character as a weapon, therefore, must be determined from the surrounding circumstances. I do not quarrel with this observation. And ordinarily I would not quarrel with the majority’s assertion that “[i]f the object, although normally a tool, is closely akin to a weapon, as a knife or an axe, far less proof should be required to persuade one of its character as a weapon on a given occasion than if the object bears little or no resemblance to traditional weapons ...”. This is not, however, the ordinary case. Here, a statute may specifically exempt the knife from its coverage. This circumstance distinguishes this case from the case postulated by the majority and, to my mind, requires a greater, rather than lesser or even equal, showing by the State that the knife was a weapon on this occasion, than would be required in the case of an item, which could be used as both a tool or weapon, but as to which there is no statutory pronouncement as to its status.
In the absence of a prior determination that the knife is not a penknife, the circumstances of this case do not support the court’s finding. Appellant was found near a vacant apartment, on which the outside lock was broken. He had the knife in question in his pocket. There is no requirement in law that, to qualify for the exception, a penknife without switchblade, even one “closely akin to a dirk or dagger when open” must be shown to have been carried for use as a tool, rather than as a weapon. The majority has engrafted onto § 36(a), requirements that neither it, nor *654Mackall contemplates. Therefore, in the absence of a finding that the knife was not a penknife, I would find these circumstances insufficient to show that the knife was being used as a weapon or was intended to be so used. Were it determined that the knife is not a penknife without switchblade, the inference drawn by the majority would clearly be rational.
The State does not contend that appellant was given specific instructions respecting the nature of the weapons that he could not possess. While there are weapons about which he would not need to have been instructed, in view of § 36(a)’s exemption, this knife, if it is a penknife, does not fall within that category. As previously mentioned, carrying a penknife is not per se illegal, and, the knife itself is not per se a dangerous and deadly weapon.
If appellant had been advised that he could not carry a penknife without switchblade,2 a different, but equally interesting question would be before us — may a probation condition prohibit the doing of an otherwise lawful act? — an issue as to which, I suspect, I would have fewer problems. When, however, he is not specifically so advised, to apply the condition to include a penknife without switchblade would be fundamentally unfair because that condition, as initially expressed, did not “provide the probationer with reasonable, specific directions” as to its requirements. Probation revocation proceedings must be fundamentally fair, which necessarily requires that revocation be ordered only on sufficient evidence and only if the probationer fails to conform his conduct to the requirements of his conditions of *655probation. If the probationer cannot conform his conduct because he was not advised of the requirements, the proceedings are unfair and the evidence insufficient. That is the case here.
Because so many things can be weapons and because no clear rule is announced for assessing whether a given item is a dangerous and deadly weapon, the possession of which is a violation of probation, this decision sets a dangerous precedent. It has been reasoned: just as a penknife may be a weapon, so too could a piece of cord, a musical instrument or a necktie. It is essential that before someone’s probation may be revoked for possessing an object that is not a weapon per se, substantial and clear proof that it is being used or is intended to be used as a weapon must be adduced. Otherwise, how would one on probation know whether he could safely hang up his laundry, serenade his lady friend, or get dressed up for a job interview?
Under the majority opinion, he could not.
I do not consider the majority’s discussion of collateral estoppel in part two of its opinion to be necessary to the decision in this case. Therefore, I will limit my comments thereon to a query — Do the unique facts of this case justify the application of the doctrine? — and a tentative answer — I am not so sure.
I would remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the knife in question is a penknife without switchblade.

. Since the majority has not set out all of § 36(a), in light of the above, I will do so here:
(a) Carrying concealed or openly with intent to injure; carrying by persons under eighteen at night in certain counties. — Every person who shall wear or carry any dirk knife, bowie knife, switchblade knife, sandclub, metal knuckles, razor, nunchaku, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever (penknives without switchblade and handguns, excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such weapon, chemical mace or tear gas device openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned in jail, or sentenced to the Maryland Department of Correction for not more than three years; and in case of conviction, if it shall appear from the evidence that such weapon was carried, concealed or openly, with the deliberate purpose of injuring the person or destroying the life of another, the court shall impose the highest sentence of imprisonment prescribed. In Cecil, Anne Arundel, Talbot, Harford, Caroline, Prince George’s, Montgomery, St. Mary’s, Washington, Worcester, Kent, and Baltimore Counties it shall also be unlawful and a misdemeanor, punishable as above set forth, for any person under eighteen years of age to carry any dangerous or deadly weapon, other than a handgun, between one hour after sunset and for one hour before sunrise, whether concealed or not, except while on a bona fide hunting trip, or except while engaged in or on the way to or returning from a bona fide trap shoot, sport shooting event, or any organized civic or military activity.
*652By amendment, effective July 1, 1984, a star knife was included in the list of prohibited items and defined.

. The probation rule allegedly violated provides:
3. Get permission from his Probation Agent before:
d. owning, possessing, using or having under his control any dangerous weapon or firearm of any description.
There is no punctuation of any kind following the term, "firearm”; thus, the phrase, "of any description", refers only to “firearm" and not to "any dangerous weapon." I conclude, therefore, that this rule cannot be read as advising appellant that he could not carry a penknife without switchblade.