Court Opinion

ID: 9639216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:08:18.911686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:40.795244
License: Public Domain

J-S24036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID LOUIS O'DONNELL                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1727 MDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 23, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-06-CR-0000806-2022

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: AUGUST 22, 2023

       Appellant David Louis O’Donnell appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County after Appellant pled

guilty to burglary and strangulation.1 Appellant challenges the trial court’s

decision to allow him to enter a plea and argues that his guilty plea was

involuntary due to the ineffectiveness of his plea counsel. We affirm.

       On November 23, 2022, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to

the burglary and strangulation charges. On the same day, the trial court

sentenced Appellant consistent with his plea agreement to two concurrent

terms of three to ten years’ imprisonment. Appellant signed a written

acknowledgment that he had received notice of his post-sentence and

appellate rights.
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1)(i), 2718(a)(1), respectively.
J-S24036-23

      On December 2, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal while

represented by counsel. In the notice of appeal, which was dated November

27, 2022, Appellant indicated that he would “like to assert his right of post-

sentence motion” but requested that “higher courts” reconsider Appellant’s

sentence, review the validity and legality of his sentence, and evaluate

whether he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. Appellant did

not serve plea counsel with the notice of appeal.

      On December 20, 2022, the trial court forwarded Appellant’s notice of

appeal to this Court. There is no indication in the record that the trial court

clerk of courts sent plea counsel a copy of the notice of appeal. On December

27, 2022, this Court docketed Appellant’s notice of appeal.

      On January 3, 2023, Appellant’s plea counsel, Kimm Montone, Esq., filed

a motion for appointment of counsel outside the Public Defender’s office, as

Appellant had alleged in the notice of appeal that plea counsel’s representation

was ineffective. On January 6, 2023, the trial court permitted Atty. Montone

to withdraw and appointed Douglas Whitman, Esq. to serve as appellate

counsel. Thereafter, Atty. Whitman complied with the trial court’s direction to

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

            1. Whether the Guilty Plea Court erred in accepting
               Appellant’s plea of guilty where Appellant indicated that
               “… I’m still not remembering everything, I still have to
               accept this happened[,]” suggesting that he accepted

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                responsibility for his acts but that he didn’t actually
                remember them?

            2. Whether Guilty Plea Counsel was ineffective for
               responding to Appellant’s lack of memory by asserting
               the “clarification” that Appellant admits his guilt instead
               of either consulting with Appellant or by clarifying the
               matter on the record by eliciting the necessary
               clarification from his client?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

      Appellant first claims the trial court erred in accepting Appellant’s guilty

plea as voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made when Appellant made

remarks on the record that suggesting he was taking responsibility for his

actions but did not remember committing the crimes at issue.

      As a general rule, “upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all

claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court,

the validity of the plea, and what has been termed the ‘legality’ of the sentence

imposed[.]” Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1275 (Pa. 2014)).

      In addition, to preserve a challenge to a guilty plea, an appellant must

either “object at the sentence colloquy or otherwise raise the issue at the

sentencing hearing or through a post-sentence motion.” Commonwealth v.

Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 468–69 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citations

omitted). “[A] request to withdraw a guilty plea on the grounds that it was

involuntary is one of the claims that must be raised by motion in the trial court

in order to be reviewed on direct appeal.” Jabbie, 200 A.3d at 506. See also

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Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal”).

      As noted above, neither Appellant nor plea counsel filed a post-sentence

motion. Instead, Appellant filed a pro se document entitled “notice of appeal”

in which he asked this Court to reconsider his sentence and to evaluate “the

validity and legality of his sentence” as well as a claim of the ineffectiveness

of counsel. Notice of appeal, 12/2/22, at 1.

      This Court will not allow a defendant to file a pro se motion while he or

she is represented by counsel as hybrid representation is not permitted; such

motions are deemed to be legal nullities. Commonwealth v. Williams, 151

A.3d 621, 624 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). However, this Court is

required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite the appellant being

represented by counsel as the notice of appeal protects the constitutional right

to appeal. Id.

      As such, to the extent that Appellant was attempting to file a post-

sentence motion while represented by counsel, such a filing was a legal nullity.

The trial court correctly docketed the filing as a notice of appeal and properly

forwarded it to this Court.

      As a result, Appellant failed to raise his claim that his plea was not

knowing, intelligent, or voluntary before the trial court at sentencing or in a

post-sentence motion. Thus, this issue is waived on direct appeal.

      Appellant also claims that plea counsel was ineffective in two respects.

First, Appellant claims that plea counsel failed to consult with Appellant during

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the plea hearing when Appellant accepted responsibility for his actions in

committing burglarizing the victim’s home and strangling the victim, but

claimed he did not remember taking these actions. Second, Appellant claims

that plea counsel abandoned him by failing to file a timely post-sentence

motion or seek to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc.

       Generally, claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are deferred to collateral

review in a PCRA petition, and should not be reviewed on direct appeal.

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013). However, our

Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to this rule requiring

ineffectiveness claims to be deferred to collateral review:

       The first exception ... affords trial courts discretion to entertain
       ineffectiveness claims in extraordinary circumstances where a
       discrete claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the
       record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration
       best serves the interests of justice. The second exception ... gives
       trial courts discretion to address ineffectiveness claims on post-
       sentence motions and direct appeal if there is good cause shown
       and the defendant knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement
       to seek subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence.

Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 360 (Pa. 2018) (citing Holmes,

79 A.3d at 563-64). The third exception permits “trial courts to address claims

challenging trial counsel's performance where the defendant is statutorily

precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review.” Delgros, 183 A.3d at

361.

       The second exception to allow review of ineffectiveness claims on direct

appeal is not applicable in this case as there is no indication in the record that

Appellant waived his right to PCRA review. Likewise, the third exception is

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not applicable as Appellant is not statutorily precluded from obtaining PCRA

review.   Instead, Appellant solely claims that this Court should review his

ineffectiveness claims as he believes they are apparent from the record.

      Appellant suggests that the ineffectiveness of plea counsel was clear as

plea counsel failed to consult with Appellant during the plea hearing. As noted

above, Appellant agreed to take responsibility for the crimes at issue but

admitted that he did not remember committing the crimes. The record does

not contain counsel’s explanation for his actions or inactions during the plea

hearing. As such, the record is deficient for this Court to review Appellant’s

claim on direct appeal.

      In the same manner, Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness based on plea

counsel’s failure to file a post-sentence motion is not apparent from the

record.   There is no evidence in the record that Appellant asked his plea

counsel to file a post-sentence motion on his behalf. Further, while Appellant

claims that plea counsel should have filed a post-sentence motion after

learning that Appellant had filed a pro se notice of appeal, it is also unclear

when plea counsel became aware that Appellant had filed his pro se notice of

appeal as Appellant did not serve plea counsel with his notice of appeal. There

is no indication in the record that the trial court forwarded the pro se notice

of appeal to counsel for his review.

      Therefore, as Appellant has not shown that he is entitled to review of

his claims of ineffectiveness of counsel on direct appeal, such claims must be

deferred to collateral review in a PCRA petition.

                                       -6-
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     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 08/22/2023

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