Court Opinion

ID: 9544178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:52:57.729631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:18.743882
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Justice
-dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in this case. I cannot agree with appellants in their argument that the repeal of the reserved powers clause in 1978 was a result of a "clerical error." Al though the 1986 legislature did make statements to that effect, which are recorded in the journal, it defies reason to believe that the legislature did not understand what they were doing when they repealed the reserved powers clause. This is demonstrated by the fact that the clause remained repealed until 1986. If the 1978 repeal in fact had been accidental and the result of clerical error, it surely could have been discerned readily, and if not corrected in that general session of the General Assembly, it certainly could have been corrected in the succeeding session. To say that a mere clerical error could exist for eight years and then to have the 1986 General Assembly state that the 1978 General Assembly had erred is not an acceptable application of the General Assembly's power to rectify an error.
Under any reasonable hypothesis, it must be determined that for whatever reason or *1231possibly however unwise the 1978 General Assembly in fact did deliberately repeal the reserved powers clause in the General Corporations Act. It is true that the expression of a subsequent legislature as to the proper construction of a prior statute is entitled to respectful consideration whenever the meaning of the statute is in doubt. See Hilligoss v. LaDow, et al. (1977), 174 Ind.App. 520, 368 N.E.2d 1365. However, the Court of Appeals also observed that:
"5. The expression of a subsequent legislature's opinion as to the proper construction of a statute passed by a previous legislature has no judicial force. The reasons behind this rule as presented in Bettenbrock v. Miller (1916), 185 Ind. 600, 112 N.E. 771, are worth restating. First and foremost, the responsibility for construing doubtful statutes is a judicial power which is vested exclusively in the courts of this State. Legislative interference with that judicial function is prohibited by the Indiana Constitution, Art. 3, § 1. It is furthermore the intent of the legislature that passed the act which the court seeks to ascertain, not the intent of a subsequent legislature." Id. at 525-26 n. 5, 368 N.E.2d at 1369 n. 5.
In the case at bar, we should presume the intent of the 1978 legislature to be the express repeal of the reserved powers clause. We should not accept the 1986 observation that the 1978 legislature made an inadvertent error.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.