Court Opinion

ID: 9546634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:33:16.613085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:42.286379
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Judge
(specially concurring):
Because of the dissent written in this case, it becomes imperative that a special concurring opinion be rendered, even though this writer is acutely aware of Bacon’s admonition in his. Essay of Judicature: “An over speaking judge is no well tuned cymbal.”
While both opinions written by my colleagues dwell11 at some length upon the standing of the defendant in this case to object to the seizure of the items stolen in the' burglary, it is to be emphasized that defendant did not object to the introduction of the questioned evidence nor did he object to any testimony concerning same at the time it was offered. The initial attempt to have this evidence suppressed came at the close of the state’s case.
The dissent concedes defendant’s objection to this evidence should have been entered prior to, or when the prosecution offered it into evidence, “but notwithstanding the objection was entered before his demurrer to the evidence was entered.” And the author of the dissent would have sustained a demurrer.
The transcript reflects that defendant, in the following order:
(1) Demurrered to the Evidence (Tr-48;
(2) Moved to Dismiss (Tr-49);
(3) Moved for a Directed Verdict (Tr-50); and finally,
(4) Moved to Suppress (Tr-50).
In addition to Fischer v. State, and Shirey v. State, as cited by Judge Bussey, the rule is most clearly enunciated in Thacker v. State, Okl.Cr., 303 P.2d 448 (1956):
“Counsel for the accused did not make timely objection to the introduction of the evidence. No motion to suppress the evidence was interposed and at the time the officers testified no objection was made to their testimony concerning the search and seizure of the whiskey. It was only at the conclusion of the evidence that counsel made a motion to strike the evidence pertaining to the whiskey for the reason that it was unlawfully obtained. Such motion came too late.” Unless objection is made at the first opportunity when the alleged illegal evidence is sought to be introduced, the right of the accused to object to the admissibility of such evidence is waived.”
See, also, Veales v. State, Okl.Cr., 374 P.2d 792 (1962).
Establishing, therefore, that the property taken in the burglary was not improperly before the jury, this question is then raised: “Is the presence of the defendant at the apartment where the stolen property is located a fact sufficient to corroborate an accomplice?
Turci v. State, Okl.Cr., 482 P.2d 611 (1971), supplies the answer. Turci was convicted of the offense of Burglary Second Degree, After Former Conviction of a Felony. He was arrested in an automobile with two other persons, and the automobile contained firearms taken in the burglary. *415At trial, one of the persons arrested in the automobile, an accomplice, testified against the defendant. Judge Nix, addressing himself to the question of corroboration of an accomplice, wrote:
“It is defendant’s further assignment of error that he was unlawfully convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice in violation of 22 O.S.1961, § 742, which provides: [statute quoted verbatim]

“Defendant is correct that the witness Donald Stoltz was an accomplice and his uncorroborated testimony would be insufficient to support a conviction. However, aside from Stoltz’s testimony, the evidence established defendant’s presence in the vehicle with the stolen guns and that he had one of the guns on his person. This is independent evidence which ‘tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense’ corroborating the accomplice’s testimony beyond merely showing the commission of the offense.” (Emphasis Added)
“It is not essential that evidence corroborating accomplice shall cover every material point testified to by the accomplice, or be sufficient alone to warrant a verdict of guilty. Crum v. State, Okl.Cr., 383 P.2d 45 (1963). From the corroboration by independent evidence of a material fact, the jury may infer that the accomplice speaks the truth as to all. Hardesty v. State, Okl.Cr., 291 P.2d 351 (1956). Corroboration as to a single material fact by independent evidence may be sufficient. Bliss v. State, 47 Okl.Cr. 225, 287 P. 778 (1930). Thus, we find in the instant case that there was corroboration by independent evidence of material facts that connect defendant with the commission of the crime.”
Defendant, in this case, like Turci, was found together with the accomplice to be in possession, constructive or actual, of fruits of the burglary, and this independent evidence is, as a matter of law, corroborative of an accomplice and sufficient to submit the case to the jury.
The dissent complains of the failure of the state to prove “specific intent.” What the defendant intended up until the moment he entered the burglarized house is of no legal consequence insofar as a determination of this appeal is concerned. The critical issue is his intent when he entered the house with his accomplices. That a burglary had in fact occurred is not in dispute.
This Court said in Cherry v. State, Okl. Cr., 276 P.2d 280 (1954):
“It has been held that, whether one intended to commit a crime in a house is determined by the intent of the individual at the time the unlawful entry was made. Logan v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 76, 239 P.2d 1044. Intent was one of the questions of fact for the determination of the jury, and it was their sole province to weigh the evidence and the facts. Sadler v. State, 84 Okl.Cr. 97, 179 P.2d 479; Potter v. State, Okl.Cr., 266 P.2d 647, 649, wherein we said:
‘Exclusive of the direct testimony to the facts of the burglary, the circumstantial evidence of the state, in the absence of any reasonable explanation of the defendant, is sufficient to support the conviction.’
“That the jury did not believe the defendant’s explanation is apparent.”
Contrary to the statement in the dissent pertaining to the reliance of the prosecution upon two former convictions of the defendant, no evidence of these convictions were presented to the jury until such time as the defendant elected to testify and they were elicited from defendant on cross-examination as affecting his credibility.
By reason of the foregoing, I must concur in the result reached by Judge BUSSEY.