Court Opinion

ID: 9427353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:20:28.619697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:06.536031
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
Early in its opinion, the majority identifies the critical issues in this case as to the “meaning and scope” of § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902. In quest of suitable answers, the majority launches on an extensive survey of 19th- and 20th-century statutory and judicial precedents that partially delineate the relationship between federal and state law with respect to the conservation and use of the water resources of the Western States. At the end of this Odyssean journey, the conclusion seems to be that under the relevant federal statutes containing the reclamation policy of the United States, the intention of the Congress has been to recognize local and state law as controlling both the “appropriation and distribution” *680of the water resources that are the object of federal reclamation projects.
Straightaway, however, and with obvious reluctance, it is conceded in a footnote that § 8 does not really go so far and that Congress, after all, “did not intend to relinquish total control of the actual distribution of the reclamation water to the States.” Ante, at 668 n. 21. Where following state law would be inconsistent with other provisions of the Reclamation Act or with congressional directives to the Secretary contained in other statutes, § 8 and local law must give way.1 Otherwise, however, it is insisted that by virtue of § 8, state policy must govern federal projects. The next section of the majority opinion is devoted to defending this conclusion and to explaining why it refuses to follow our prior cases construing § 8 much more narrowly than the present temporal majority finds acceptable.
Meanwhile, the opinion has also concluded that because of § 8, the United States may not acquire water rights by appropriation or condemnation except in accordance with state law. If, for example, particular water rights are not subject to condemnation under state law by private interests, neither may they be taken by the United States. This issue, going to the acquisition by the United States of water rights *681by eminent domain, is not among the questions presented in this case, and the views expressed in this respect are no sounder and no less inconsistent with our prior cases than is the majority’s view that the distribution of water developed by federal reclamation projects is to be governed by state law.
I
Four of the five major cases bearing on the construction of § 8 have arisen out of the Central Valley Reclamation Project, a massively expensive reclamation undertaking which aimed at redistributing the water in California’s Central Valley, which the State was unable to finance and which the Federal Government eventually undertook.2 The salient features of the project, which need not be repeated, have been outlined in the Court’s cases. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950); Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609 (1963); and City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 (1963). One of the project’s principal components is the Friant Dam, which interrupted the flow of the upper San Joaquin River, the impounded waters being distributed to irrigate lands not theretofore served by San Joaquin water. To supply the needs of the lower river basin, water was imported from the Sacramento River Valley to the north. The difficulty was that Sacramento water was delivered to the San Joaquin some 60 miles below the Friant Dam. The riparian owners and others along this section of the river, the flow of which would at the very least be severely diminished, naturally sought their remedy.
*682In Gerlach, supra, the Court of Claims had made compensation awards to the owners of certain riparian grasslands that had been watered by the seasonal overflow along this section of the river. This overflow would no longer take place. The United States insisted that the project was an undertaking under the commerce power to control navigation and that the Government need not compensate for the destruction of riparian rights. The Court disagreed, concluding that Congress, in an exercise of its constitutional power to tax and spend for the general welfare, had elected to proceed under the reclamation laws and to pay for any vested rights taken by the Government: “[W]hether required to do so or not, Congress elected to recognize any state-created rights and to take them under its power of eminent domain.” 339 U, S., at 739 (footnote omitted).
Since the closing of the Dam would terminate the annual inundation of the lands involved, the inquiry became whether there had been a taking of any water rights defined and recognized by state law. After an extensive inquiry, the Court determined that the Court of Claims had properly understood state law, and the compensation awards were affirmed.
The next case before this Court involving the Central Valley Project was Ivanhoe, supra. That case arose out of proceedings in the state courts, required by federal statute, to confirm contracts for the use of water entered into between state irrigation districts and a state water agency, on the one hand, and the United States on the other. The contracts' contained provisions against the use of project water on tracts in excess of 160 acres, a provision specified by § 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and substantially re-enacted in the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 650, as amended, 70 Stat. 524, 43 U. S. C. § 423e.3 They also contained the *68340-year payout provisions provided for in § 9 of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1193, as amended, 72 Stat. 542, 43 U. S. C. § 485h. The California Supreme Court refused to confirm the contracts because it construed § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 as requiring the contracts to conform to state law and because the 160-acre limitation and the payout provisions were, for separate reasons, contrary to the law of California. This judgment rested in part on the theory that the water rights acquired by the United States were, by virtue of § 8, subject to the normal trust obligations to water users that were imposed by state law and that were inconsistent with the proposed contract provisions.4 As described by the Attorney General of California, who represented the state water districts in this Court, the California Supreme Court reasoned that the water rights needed to perform the contracts *684could not be acquired by the United States; this was an untenable position, the Attorney General contended, because “never before has it been held that property rights in a state could be endowed with attributes which would prevent the United States from acquiring the rights it needs to accomplish a federal purpose.” Brief for Appellants in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, O. T. 1957, Nos. 122-125, p. 21.5
This Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the California Supreme Court. It first ruled: “[T]he authority to impose the conditions of the contracts here comes from the power of the Congress to condition the use of federal funds, works, and projects on compliance with reasonable requirements. And ... if the enforcement of those conditions impairs any compensable property rights, then recourse for just compensation is open in the courts.” 357 U. S., at 291. The Court also rejected the argument that § 8 required the Secretary to follow state law that was inconsistent with § 5. As the Court understood § 8, “it merely requires the United States to comply with state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein.” 357 U. S., at 291. (Emphasis added.) The United States would be obliged to pay for any water rights which were vested under state law and which it took, “ [b] ut the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal projects.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The Court could find nothing in § 8 that “compels the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the State,” 357 U. S., at 292 (emphasis added), and quoted with approval from Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 615 (1945): “‘We do not suggest that where Congress has provided a system of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an inconsistent state system.’ ” Accord*685ingly, the Court held that § 8 did not require the Secretary to ignore § 5, the provisions of which had been national policy for over 50 years.
Like Gerlach, the Dugan and Fresno cases involved the consequences of the Friant Dam on those dependent on the first 60 miles of the San Joaquin downstream from the project. These cases arose from the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in a suit brought by water-right claimants below the Friant Dam, including the city of Fresno, for an injunction to prevent the storing and diverting of water at the Dam until a satisfactory remedy for the deprivation of their rights had been achieved. State v. Rank, 293 F. 2d 340 (1961). The defendants were local officials'of the United States Reclamation Bureau, a number of irrigation and utility districts, and later the United States itself. The District Court overruled the claim that the suit was an unconsented suit against the United States and ordered that the injunction issue unless the Government effected a “physical solution” adequate to satisfy plaintiffs’ water rights, which it held the United States was obligated to respect. The Court of Appeals dismissed the United States from the action and then inquired whether the suit against the officials and the districts was also a suit against the United States. This depended in the first instance on whether these officers were acting within their statutory and constitutional authority. If they were not, the suit could go forward. Plaintiffs contended, among other things, that Congress had not conferred any right to condemn water rights along this stretch of the river and that in any event plaintiffs had rights under California’s county-of-origin and watershed-of-origin statutes that were not subject to condemnation under state law and hence, pursuant to § 8, were not seizable by the United States.6
*686The Court of Appeals rejected the argument based on § 8 and state law. Section 7 of the original Reclamation Act had authorized the Secretary to acquire any rights necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act and to do so by purchase or by condemnation under judicial process. Moreover, in expressly authorizing the Central Valley Project in 1937, the Rivers and Harbors Act, 50 Stat. 850, provided that the Secretary could “acquire by proceedings in eminent domain, or otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, water rights, and other property necessary for said purposes . . . The Court of Appeals thus found ample authority for the condemnation or taking of the plaintiffs’ rights and held that, even if California law gave these plaintiffs a preference over the United States and the other defendants as to rights to appropriate surplus waters, it did not follow that the preferred rights could not be taken by the United States. “While a state can bestow property rights on its citizens which the United States must respect, it cannot take from the United States the power to acquire those rights.” 293 F. 2d, at 354. Although holding that the United States had ample power to seize the water rights at issue, the Court of Appeals went on to hold, nevertheless, that no taking in the legal sense had transpired; the officials were mere trespassers, were acting outside their authority, and could be enjoined. Absent condemnation of vested rights, § 8 required the project to respect those rights in operating the project.. Hence, an injunction was warranted.
The case was brought to this Court where the public officers continued to claim that they were acting legally and were not subject to suit. Plaintiffs argued, among other things, *687that their riparian rights could not be taken by condemnation for purposes of use outside the county of origin or the watershed of origin. Brief for Respondents in Delano-Earlimart Irrig. Dist. v. Rank, O. T. 1962, No. 115, pp. 30-41. This Court in Dugan, however, unanimously agreed with the Court of Appeals that the United States had ample statutory authority to take the asserted rights. “The question was specifically settled in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken . .., where we said that such rights could be acquired by the payment of compensation 'either through condemnation or, if already taken, through action of the owners in the courts.’ ” 372 U. S., at 619. Furthermore, the Court noted: “The power to seize which was granted here had no limitation placed upon it by the Congress, nor did the Court of Appeals bottom its conclusion on a finding of any limitation. [The United States had] plenary power to'seize the whole of respondents’ rights in carrying out the congressional mandate . . . .” Id., at 622-623.
Disagreeing, however, with the Court of Appeals as to the taking issue, the Court ruled that the power to take had actually been exercised, and properly so, and that the suit against the officers was therefore a suit against the United States and should be dismissed. The remedy of the plaintiffs, as it was in Gerlach, was in the Court of Claims.
The Court also granted the petition for certiorari filed by the city of Fresno and dealt separately with the city’s case. 372 U. S. 627 (1963). Fresno, as a riparian, overlying landowner, had vested rights to underground waters from a source fed by the San Joaquin River. These rights were threatened by the anticipated diminishment of the San Joaquin below Friant Dam. Among other things, the city claimed that the water necessary to satisfy its rights was being diverted to areas beyond the limits permitted by the county-of-origin and watershed-of-origin statutes of the State of California; under these statutes the city’s rights were preferred and were not *688subject to condemnation under § 8 and state law.7 Opinions of the Attorney General of California were submitted in support of this claim. Brief for Petitioner in City of Fresno v. California, O. T. 1962, No. 51, pp. 148-150.8 These claims were essentially those of a riparian owner to the maintenance of the flow of the San Joaquin River. Fresno also claimed, however, that under the county-of-origin and watershed-of-origin statutes, it had a prior right to Friant Dam water in an amount necessary to satisfy its needs and that project water could not be delivered beyond the limits prescribed by these statutes until the city's needs were met.9 Section 8, it was argued, required the United States to respect the city’s rights under these statutes. The city also claimed a statutory priority for municipal uses, as well as the right to purchase project water for less than the price Bureau officials proposed to charge.
The Court rejected each of these claims. The United States had authority, despite § 8 and state law, to acquire Fresno’s riparian rights, and had done so. To that extent, the city’s recourse was in the Court of Claims, as in Dugan. Section 8 “does not mean that state law may operate to pre*689vent the United States from exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire the water rights of others. This was settled in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken . . . 372 U. S., at 630. Nor did § 8 require “compliance with California statutes relating to preferential rights of counties and watersheds of origin and to the priority of domestic over irrigation uses.” 372 U. S., at 629-630. The more limited role of § 8 “is to leave to state law the definition of the property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made.” 372 U. S., at 630. The Court went on to say that in any event the California watershed and county statutes did not give Fresno the priority claimed and that the claims with respect to a municipal priority and to a lower water price were contrary to § 9 of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939.10
Fresno was decided on April 15, 1963, having been argued on January 7 of that year. The opinion and judgment in Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, were announced on June 3, 1963, the case having been argued for the second time in November 1962. In Arizona, the Special Master had concluded that in choosing between users within each State and in settling the terms of his contracts with them, the Secretary was required to follow state law by virtue of §§ 14 and 18 of the Project Act and by reason of § 8 of the Reclamation Act. The Court expressly disagreed, relying on Ivanhoe and Fresno and saying with respect to § 8:
“The argument that § 8 of the Reclamation Act requires the United States in the delivery of water to follow priorities laid down by state law has already been dis*690posed of by this Court in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958), and reaffirmed in City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 (1963). In Ivanhoe we held that, even though § 8 of the Reclamation Act preserved state law, that general provision could not override a specific provision of the same Act prohibiting a single landowner from getting water for more than 160 acres. We said:
“ 'As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights' or vested interests therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal projects. As the Court said in Nebraska v. Wyoming, [325 U. S.,] at 615: “We do not suggest that where Congress has provided a system of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an inconsistent state system.” . . . We read nothing in § 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the State.’ [357 U. S.„] at 291-292. “Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act did not subject the Secretary to state law in disposing of water in that case, we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold that the Secretary must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the Project Act.” 373 U. S., at 586-587.
The Court thus held again that § 8 did not require the Secretary to follow state law in distributing project water because § 8 dealt with acquisition, not distribution, of reclamation water.
II
The majority reads Ivanhoe as holding that § 5 and similar explicit statutory directives are exceptions to § 8’s otherwise controlling mandate that state law must govern both the acquisition and distribution of reclamation water. This mis*691interprets that opinion. It is plain enough that in response to the argument that § 8 subjected the § 5 contract provisions to the strictures of state law, the Court squarely rejected the submission on the ground that § 8 dealt only with the acquisition of water rights and required the United States to respect the water rights that were vested under state law. That the Court might haye saved the § 5 provision on a different and narrower ground more acceptable to the present Court majority does not render the ground actually employed any less of a holding of the Court or transform it into the discardable dictum the majority considers it to be.
It is also beyond doubt that both Fresno and Arizona considered Ivanhoe to contain a holding that § 8 was limited to water-right acquisition and did not reach the distribution of reclamation water. But whatever the proper characterization of the Court’s pronouncement in Ivanhoe might be, Fresno itself held that in distributing project water the United States, despite state law and § 8, not only was not bound by the municipal-preference laws of California, which were contrary to a specific federal statute, but also could export water from the watershed without regard to the county- and watershed-of-origin statutes. The Court held the latter even though no provision of federal law forbade the federal officers from complying with the preferences assertedly established by those state laws.
Much the same is true of Arizona, where the Court heard two arguments totaling over 22 hours and considered voluminous briefs that dealt with a variety of subjects, including the important issue of the impact of § 8 on the Secretary’s freedom to contract for the distribution of water. In its opinion, the Court not only dealt with both Ivanhoe and Fresno as considered holdings that § 8 did not bear on distribution rights, but also expressly disagreed with its Special Master and squarely rejected claims that the Secretary could not contract for the sale of water except in compliance with the priorities *692established by state law. Nor, as suggested by the majority, is there anything in the Arizona case to suggest that the Court arrived at its conclusion by factors peculiar to the statutes authorizing the project. The particular terms of the Secretary’s contracts were not authorized or directed by any federal statute. The Court’s holding that he was free to proceed as he did was squarely premised on the proposition that § 8 did not control the distribution of the project water.
The short of the matter is that no case in this Court, until this one, has construed § 8 as the present majority insists that it be construed. All of the relevant cases are to the contrary.
Our cases that the Court now discards are relatively recent decisions dealing with an issue of statutory construction and with a subject matter that is under constant audit by Congress. As the majority suggests, reclamation project authorizations are normally accompanied by declarations that the provisions of the reclamation laws shall be applicable. Here, the New Melones Dam, which was and is a part of the Central Valley Project, was first authorized in 1944, 58 Stat. 901, and again in 1962, 76 Stat. 1191. The latter legislation provided for construction of the Dam by the Army Corps of Engineers but for operation and maintenance by the Secretary of the Interior “pursuant to the Federal reclamation laws ... .” Those laws included § 8, which by that time had been construed in Ivanhoe as set out above. There were no amendments to § 8, which is now codified in 43 U. S. C. §§ 372 and 383, when the project was reauthorized in 1962.
Furthermore, in amending the reclamation laws in 1972, Congress provided that except as otherwise indicated in the amendments, “the provisions of the Federal reclamation laws, and Acts amendatory thereto, are continued in full force and effect.” 43 U. S. C. § 421d (1970 ed., Supp. V). More specifically, § 421g stated that nothing in the amendments “shall be construed to repeal or limit the procedural and substantive requirements of sections 372 and 383 of this title.” *693There is no hint of disagreement with the construction placed on these sections in Ivanhoe, Dugan, Fresno, and Arizona.
Only the revisionary zeal of the present majority can explain its misreading of our cases and its evident willingness to disregard them. Congress has not disturbed these cases, and until it does, I would respect them. In contrast to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), there is no problem here of reconciling inconsistent lines of cases or of correcting an error with respect to an issue not briefed or argued and raised by the Court sua sponte. All of the relevant cases are contrary to today’s holding, and in none of them was the Court on a frolic of its own. The courts below were quite right in holding that the State was without power under the reclamation laws to impose conditions on the operation of the New Melones Dam and on the distribution of project water developed by that Dam, which would be undertaken with federal funds.
Ill
Even less explicable is the majority’s insistence on reaching out to overturn the holding of this Court in Fresno, which reflected the decision in Dugan and was in turn grounded on a similar approach in Ivanhoe, that state law may not restrict the power of the United States to condemn water rights. The issue was squarely presented and decided in both Dugan and Fresno. In both cases it was claimed — and State Attorney General’s opinions supported the claim — that some of the rights at issue were not condemnable under state law and that § 8 therefore forbade their taking by the Federal Government. In both cases, the claim was rejected by this Court, just as it was in the Court of Appeals. Without briefing and argument, the majority now discards these holdings in a footnote. See ante, at 671-672, n. 24.
Section 7 of the Reclamation Act, now 43 U. S. C. § 421, authorizes the Secretary to acquire any rights or property *694by purchase or condemnation under judicial process, and the Attorney General is directed to institute suit at the request of the Secretary. Also, as Mr. Justice Jackson explained for the Court in Gerlach, 339 U. S., at 735 n. 8, when the Central Valley Project was authorized in 1937, the Secretary of the Interior was “authorized to acquire ‘by proceedings in eminent domain, or otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, water rights, and other property necessary for said purposes . . . .’ 50 Stat. 844, 850.” Furthermore, § 10 of the Reclamation Act, now 43 U. S. C. § 373, authorizes the Secretary to perform any and all acts necessary to carry out the Act. As the Court said in United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 228, 233 (1914), “the Government was authorized by § 7 of the act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, under which this improvement was being made to acquire any property necessary for the purpose and if need be to appropriate it.” And in Henkel v. United States, 237 U. S. 43, 50 (1915), the Court, referring to §§ 7 and 10, said:
“In carrying out the purposes of the act, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire any rights or property necessary for that purpose, and to acquire the same, either by purchase or by condemnation. He is specifically authorized to perform any and all acts necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the act. Authority could hardly have been conferred in more comprehensive terms, and we do not believe it was the intention of Congress, because of the Indians’ right of selection of lands under the circumstances here shown, to reserve such lands from the operation of the act. To do so might defeat the reclamation projects which it was evidently the purpose of Congress to authorize and promote.”
Never has there been a suggestion in our cases that Congress, by adopting § 8, intended to permit a State to disentitle the Government to acquire the property necessary or appropriate *695to carry out an otherwise constitutionally permissible and statutorily authorized undertaking. Oerlach, Ivanhoe, Dug am, and Fresno are to the contrary.
The Court’s “disavowal” of our prior cases and of the Government’s power to condemn state water rights, all without briefing and argument, is a gratuitous effort that I do not care to join and from which I dissent.
IV
Although I do not join the Court in reconstruing the controlling statutes as it does, the Court’s work today is a precedent for “setting things right” in the area of statutory water law so as to satisfy the views of a current Court majority. And surely the dicta with which the Court’s opinion is laced today deserve no more or no less respect than what it has chosen to label as dicta in past Court decisions. Of course, the matter is purely statutory and Congress could easily put an end to our feuding if it chose to make it clear that local authorities are to control the spending of federal funds for reclamation projects and to control the priorities for the use of water developed by federal projects.

 Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, 32 Stat. 390, now 43 U. S. C. §§ 372, 383, provided:
“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of' the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.”

 As the United States said in its brief in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958), the Central Valley Project was “the largest single undertaking pursuant to the federal reclamation program. The project was adopted by the United States at the instance of the State of California, at an estimated cost to the United States of more than $800,000,000.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1957, Nos. 122-125, p. 28.

 Section 5 of the Reclamation Act, 32 Stat. 389, provided in pertinent part: “No right to the use of water for land in private ownership shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one land*683owner, and no such sale shall be made to any landowner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such land, or occupant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said land, and no such right shall permanently attach until all payments therefor are made.”

 The issue posed was revealed by the brief for the United States in Ivanhoe:
“The California Supreme Court also erred in upholding the claim of denial of just compensation. Chief Justice Gibson correctly stated in his dissenting opinion below that ‘if there is any state-recognized vested right which, in fact, conflicts with the acreage limitation, that right may be taken and compensated for by the federal government under its power of eminent domain' (AJS 73, 79; cf. p. 48). The trust declared and applied by the majority of the court cannot have the effect of imposing a state restriction on the federal power of eminent domain. That power ‘is inseparable from sovereignty’ because it permits ‘acquisition of the means or instruments by which alone governmental functions can be performed.’ ‘It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any State prescribe the manner in which it must be exercised. The consent of a State can never be a condition precedent to its enjoyment.’ Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371-372, 374. It makes no difference whether the property 'sought to be condemned is held ... in trust instead of in fee.’ United States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230, 239. The beneficiaries may press their claims to compensation.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1957, Nos. 122-125, p. 56.

 The California Attorney General’s analysis of the California Supreme Court’s opinion is to be found in his Brief for Appellants 54r-60.

 As the Court of Appeals explained, one of the three reasons submitted by the riparian owners for the lack of authority to condemn on the part of the United States was as follows:
“The third contention of the plaintiffs is that California’s County of *686Origin and Watershed of Origin statutes . . . (which under § 8 of the Reclamation Act . . . the United States is bound to respect), prevent diversion of waters of the San Joaquin beyond its watershed until the rights of these plaintiffs have been satisfied; that to condemn the rights of these plaintiffs for the purpose of such diversion is to disregard California law contrary to § 8.” 293 F. 2d, at 354.

 Question 3 of Fresno’s petition for certiorari specifically posed the issue whether the United States “can take percolating underground waters . . . by condemnation or eminent domain for agricultural use in areas outside the county and watershed of origin.” Pet. for Cert., 0. T. 1962, No. 51, p. 6.

 The State Attorney General’s opinion submitted was in relevant part:
“ ‘The legislative background of the priority makes it difficult to conceive that the Legislature intended that the authority could destroy the priority b[y] condemnation. Since the priority exists only as against the authority, such a construction would completely destroy the effect of Section 11460 and make its enactment an idle gesture.’ ” Brief for Petitioner, 0. T. 1962, No. 51, pp. 148-149.

 The dual nature of Fresno’s claim, first as a riparian owner with vested rights to percolating water, and second as a municipality claiming watershed preference under state law to project-developed water, is made clear in 293 F. 2d, at 351-352, 360-361.

 The usual rule in this Court is that when two independent reasons are given to support a judgment, “the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with the other.” Union Pacific R. Co. v. Mason City & Fort Dodge R. Co., 199 U. S. 160, 166 (1905); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U. S. 472, 486 (1924). See also Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535, 537 (1949); Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611, 623 (1948).