Court Opinion

ID: 9379119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 18:06:49.048078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:49.627580
License: Public Domain

J-S06026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RAYMOND PAUL BUHROW                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1454 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 15, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-21-CR-0003334-2015

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED MARCH 14, 2023

        Appellant Raymond Paul Buhrow appeals pro se from the order denying

his second Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition as untimely. Appellant

raises multiple claims for relief and argues that the PCRA court erred in

dismissing his petition as untimely. We affirm.

        The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. See

PCRA Ct. Op., 11/18/22, at 2-5. Briefly, Appellant pled nolo contendere to

sexual assault and related charges in 2016. On November 2, 2016, the trial

court imposed the agreed-upon aggregate sentence of three and one-half to

ten years’ incarceration.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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       Appellant filed his first timely pro se PCRA petition on April 3, 2017.2

The PCRA court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed an amended petition on

Appellant’s behalf.      On August 21, 2017, PCRA counsel filed a motion to

withdraw Appellant’s petition and noting that the motion was being filed after

“consultation with, and the consent of, [Appellant].” See Mot. to Withdraw

PCRA Pet., 8/21/17. After the PCRA court granted the petition, Appellant took

no further action on his PCRA.

       On June 13, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate his judgment

of sentence, which the PCRA court treated as Appellant’s second PCRA

petition.    The PCRA court appointed Jacob M. Jividen, Esq., to represent

Appellant.    The Commonwealth filed a response in which it argued that

Appellant’s petition was untimely and that he had failed to plead any exception

to the PCRA time-bar. Attorney Jividen subsequently filed a Turner/Finley3

letter and a petition to withdraw as counsel. On August 25, 2022, the PCRA

court conducted a hearing and granted Attorney Jividen’s motion to withdraw.

The PCRA court also informed Appellant on the record of its intent to dismiss

his petition and issued a written Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice reflecting the same.

       Appellant filed a motion for extraordinary relief, which the PCRA court

denied. On September 15, 2022, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing
____________________________________________

2 In relevant part, Appellant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective and
presented new evidence in the form of letters from his wife and daughters.

3Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

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Appellant’s PCRA petition.    Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of

appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.         The PCRA court

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion concluding that Appellant’s PCRA petition was

untimely and that he was not entitled to relief.

      On appeal, Appellant has filed a pro se brief in which he raises

approximately fourteen claims.

      Initially, we note that appellate briefs must conform to the briefing

requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Where an appellant’s brief contains substantial defects, we

may quash or dismiss the appeal. Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496,

497-98 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

      “This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on

behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa.

Super. 2007) (citation omitted).      “[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present

arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review.       The brief must

support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and

with citations to legal authorities.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a)-(c). As such, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed

in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for

review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v.

Sanford, 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citations omitted).

      “Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a

pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit.” Commonwealth

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v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017).            “[A]ny layperson

choosing to represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some

reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise and legal

training will prove [his] undoing.”     Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d

1011, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted and some formatting altered).

      Here, although Appellant’s brief includes a table of contents listing

fourteen claims of error, his brief does not contain a statement of questions

or a summary of argument. See Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771; see also Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a)-(c).       As a result, the basis for Appellant’s individual claims is

somewhat unclear.         However, because we can glean that Appellant is

attempting to challenge the PCRA court’s conclusion that his petition was

untimely, we decline to dismiss the appeal.

      In reviewing an order denying a PCRA petition, our standard of review

is well settled:

      [O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is
      limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
      supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
      error.    The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
      supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
      apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
      conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a threshold jurisdictional question.

See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014); see

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also Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(stating that “no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition”

(citation omitted)). “A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one,

must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence

became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the three exceptions outlined

in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa.

2012) (citation and footnote omitted). A judgment of sentence becomes final

at the conclusion of direct review, or at the expiration of time for seeking such

review. See id. at 17.

      Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a

judgment of sentence becomes final if the petitioner pleads and proves one of

the following three statutory exceptions:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner asserting one of these exceptions

must file a petition within one year of the date the claim could have first been

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presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).4 It is the petitioner’s “burden to

allege     and   prove    that   one    of     the   timeliness   exceptions   applies.”

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (citations

omitted and some formatting altered).

         Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on December 2,

2016, the date on which the time to file a direct appeal expired.               See 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating that the judgment of sentence becomes final at

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the

review); Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3) (requiring that when no post-sentence motion

has been filed, a notice of appeal to Superior Court must be filed within thirty

days of the imposition of the judgment of sentence in open court).

Accordingly, the deadline to file a timely PCRA petition was December 4,

2017.5 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, filed

on June 13, 2022, is therefore facially untimely.

         Appellant claims that he met the newly discovered fact exception to the

PCRA time bar and that he is entitled to a hearing on “the timeliness and

____________________________________________

4 On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended Section 9545(b)(2)
and extended the time for filing a petition from sixty days to one year from
the date the claim could have been presented. See 2018 Pa.Legis.Serv.Act
2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018. The amendment applies
only to claims arising one year before the effective date of this section,
December 24, 2017, or thereafter.

5 We note that the deadline for Appellant’s PCRA petition fell on Saturday,
December 2, 2017. Therefore, Appellant had until Monday, December 4, 2017
to file his PCRA petition. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.

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jurisdictional issues.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. In support,6 Appellant claims

that he discovered new facts between May 5, 2022 and June 10, 2022. Id.

at 41. Appellant asserts that “after seeing for the first time the emails, [and]

discovery by the Commonwealth[,] and getting the pictures to prove [his]

innocence and notarized alibi statements[,]” he filed the instant PCRA petition.

Id. Appellant argues that the evidence “was known to [his] ineffective [trial]

counsel but [he] failed to tell [Appellant] or introduce it in court.”       Id.

Appellant also attaches several exhibits to his petition, including the affidavit

of probable cause, an email from the victim’s mother to the prosecutor, and

statements from Appellant’s wife, Appellant’s daughters, and the victim’s

babysitter. See id. at 67-77 (unpaginated).

       To establish the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar,

“the petitioner must establish that: 1) the facts upon which the claim was

predicated were unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the

exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176-

77 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted and formatting altered). Due diligence

requires that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests.

Id. at 176 (citation omitted). A petitioner raising this exception “must explain
____________________________________________

6 Appellant also argues that our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth
v. Finnecy, 249 A.3d 903 (Pa. Super. 2021) announced a new rule of law and
constitutes a newly discovered fact. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-14. However,
our Supreme Court’s holding in Finnecy, which addressed RRRI eligibility, has
no bearing on Appellant’s case, nor does it constitute a newly discovered fact
for purposes of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987
(Pa. 2011) (stating that “subsequent decisional law does not amount to a new
‘fact’ under section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA”).

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why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due

diligence.” Id. (citations omitted). “Additionally, the focus of this exception

‘is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing

source for previously known facts.’”     Id.   However, Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)

“does not require any merits analysis of an underlying after-discovered

evidence claim.” Id. at 177 (citation and footnote omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      Here, Appellant’s allegations merely represent an attempt to
      present a new source to again present previously known facts and
      claims. Notably, Appellant contended that he was innocent in his
      self-represented 2022 PCRA petition and based his claims of
      innocence on the same factors presented in his self-represented
      2017 petition. Specifically, Appellant contended in his self-
      represented 2017 PCRA petition that [the v]ictim lied, that
      Appellant had sworn statements and photographic evidence
      demonstrating his innocence, and that his plea counsel was
      ineffective for failing to prevent him from pleading nolo
      contendere when he was actually innocent. Appellant withdrew
      that self-represented 2017 PCRA petition, then withdrew his
      counseled 2017 PCRA petition after a hearing on the merits, and
      then took no further action in this case for approximately five
      years. While the self-represented PCRA petition filed by Appellant
      was not finally litigated, the petition is of record and demonstrates
      that Appellant had prior knowledge of all the facts alleged in his
      current PCRA petition. Because Appellant clearly knew about
      those purported newly discovered facts five years ago in 2017,
      they cannot be newly discovered facts in 2022.

      Further, as the Superior Court held in Commonwealth v.
      Shaffer, []569 A.2d 360, 363 ([Pa. Super. 1990), “[w]here an
      appellant has voluntarily withdrawn a previous post-conviction
      petition, and then files a subsequent postconviction petition, the
      second petition will be dismissed unless the withdrawal of the first
      petition was not intelligent.” Here, this court could not decipher
      any arguments or allegations from Appellant regarding whether
      the withdrawal of his counseled PCRA petition was intelligent.
      Instead, a review of the record reflects that Appellant consented

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     to that withdrawal after consultation with his PCRA counsel, and
     thus there is no evidence upon which this court could conclude
     that the withdrawal was not intelligent. In short, . . . Appellant
     solely contends that he possesses a new vector to present
     information already known to him on the date of his plea; namely,
     that he was purportedly innocent of the charge to which he pled
     nolo contendere.       As such, this court properly dismissed
     Appellant’s 2022 PCRA petition on the basis that it was untimely
     filed and duplicative of the 2017 PCRA petition.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 9-11 (footnotes omitted).

     Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the PCRA court’s

finding is supported by the record and free of legal error. See Sandusky,

203 A.3d at 1043. As noted by the PCRA court, Appellant’s instant claim is

based on facts that were known to him at the time he filed his first PCRA

petition in 2017. For these reasons, Appellant’s newly discovered fact claim

must fail and no relief is due. See Brown, 111 A.3d at 176-77. Accordingly,

we affirm.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/14/2023

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