Court Opinion

ID: 9884430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:56:27.749465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:17.583444
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hershey, dissenting: I dissent from the majority opinion, but for different reasons than those assigned in the other dissenting opinion. The majority opinion, finding that the jurors could not have considered the evidence fairly after reading the newspaper accounts referred to, concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial or grant the petitioner a new trial. It is stated that the petitioner was thereby deprived of the fundamental requirement of a fair trial, which is constitutionally guaranteed. The other dissenting opinion states that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, since proper cautionary measures were taken by the trial judge. In addition, it is said that the jurors returned the only verdict that could honestly and intelligently be returned under the circumstances. As authority for the conclusions thus arrived at, cases are cited and considered wherein a direct appeal was taken from the conviction. The fact that a reviewing court deems the trial court to have abused its discretion will, of course, be reason for a reversal upon a writ of error, appeal, or other direct review of the conviction. But it does not follow that such reversal is upon a constitutional, as distinguished from a nonconstitutional, ground. Moreover, it does not follow that the abuse complained of deprives the defendant of a substantial constitutional right, thus entitling him to relief in a collateral proceeding such as this proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Presumably the “fundamental requirement of a fair trial” referred to in the majority opinion is based upon the due process.clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal constitution. See Shepherd v. Florida, where the Supreme Court of the United States said that newspapers, in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights, may not deprive accused persons of their right to a fair trial. It is extremely difficult to determine the scope of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as it pertains to State criminal procedure. However, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, although dealing with a different subject than the reading of newspaper articles by jurors, has been regarded as a touchstone where the due process clause is invoked to vitiate criminal proceedings. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that an accused has not been deprived of due process of law, even though his conviction be erroneous, unless his trial has been void of “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” and in violation of “principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be regarded as fundamental.” In Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, it is stated that as applied to a criminal trial “denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it * * * [the court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Questions arising from what has been referred to as a “conflict between the constitutional guarantees of fair trial and free press” have recently come in for serious thought and study. (See, for example, Ottenbourg, “Fail-Trial and Free Press: A New Look in 1954,” 40 American Bar Association Journal 838.) Two recent cases of the Supreme Court of the United States, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, show that no very definite rules have been formulated and, as is true of all due process questions, the many problems will find solution only on a case-by-case basis. I agree with much of what is said in the majority opinion relative to the character of these newspaper articles, and were this case here on direct appeal from the conviction would be inclined to the position that the failure to declare a mistrial or to grant a new trial was reversible error. However, more should be required now, since by the very statute which the petitioner invokes he is confined to constitutional questions. Obviously the mere reading of a newspaper article by the jurors which reports the trial proceedings, or even indicates what the parties intend to prove, would not in and of itself so fatally infect the trial as to deprive the accused of due process of law. Moreover, even if the comments were inflammatory and prejudicial as in this case, an attempt must be made to measure their impact upon the jury in the context of what action was taken by the trial judge. Here it is to be noted that after it came to his attention that each of the jurors had read one or both of these newspaper articles, the trial judge made a reasonable effort to prevent, or at least minimize, their effect upon the jury. He questioned the jurors and received answers from them that they would not be influenced thereby. Further, he instructed the jury to ignore the articles, to regard them as unfair and to consider only the evidence introduced in the case. He thus did everything he could reasonably do to prevent these articles from influencing the verdict. It has been recognized that a matter which otherwise might be a violation of due process may in certain instances be cured by proper instructions to the jury. See Scott, “State Criminal Procedure, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Prejudice,” 49 Northwestern University Law Review 319. Under these circumstances, I do not believe it can be said that the matters complained of necessarily prevented a fair trial. In my opinion, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate so shocking an abuse of discretion upon the part of the trial court as to nullify the conviction upon constitutional grounds. Mr. Justice IClingbiel, also dissenting.