Court Opinion

ID: 9638823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:55:32.631815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:09.982763
License: Public Domain

Swepston, P. J.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority view. I am aware of the modification of the former rule of West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S. W. 301, and Knoxville Ry. & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487, 178 S. W. 1117, L. R. A. 1916A, 1111, so that now proof from which “exceptional circumstances” may be found to exist requires submission to the jury of the question whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence under those circumstances, but I am unable to see any exceptional circumstances in this case.
Plaintiff testified he had been traveling this route for about twenty-five years, was familiar with the surroundings and that vehicles were frequently parked at the curb in that vicinity, that he had seen defendant’s trailers parked there before, although never so close to the north *434opening of the viaduct; that the lights under the viaduct were brighter than the street lights outside the viaduct; that the lights under the viaduct were the only lights that bothered him and they were the only bright lights he saw, but he was not blinded by any lights exactly ,and could see at all times; that there was a street light north of the viaduct on the east side and one on the west side of the street; that when a car behind him coming at a rapid rate sounded its horn, he pulled to the right to let it pass and struck the trailer without having seen it.
He testified that when he emerged from under the viaduct it was dark outside but it is perfectly clear that he only meant it was not as light outside as it was under the viaduct, in view of his testimony above referred to.
The case made by his own testimony and that of his witnesses is that the street light on the east side north of the viaduct was between the viaduct and the trailer and that the entire area around there was well lighted and that Main Street is a ‘‘white way”. One officer did testify that he had to use a flashlight to enable him to read the license plate on the rear of the trailer, but particularly in view of the dirty condition of the trailer as well as the difference between being able to see the numbers on a dirty license plate and being able to see the trailer itself that evidence has no probative value under the undisputed evidence above mentioned as to the area being well lighted.
The plaintiff’s testimony eliminates also any “blind spot” theory or contention that the lights of the cars approaching from the other direction blinded him, as that theory was developed and applied in the Main Street Storage case first modifying the old rule where the collision occurred at night on a highway when the plaintiff *435liad to depend solely on Ms headlights to be able to see ahead.
I think the whole case according to the evidence for plaintiff, despite the averments of his declaration and the argument of his counsel, boils down to two facts — he did not see the trailer when in the exercise of ordinary care by simply looking he should have seen it, and he pulled to the right because a car behind him sounded its horn and he pulled to the right without looking.
There was nothing unusual about a vehicle being parked near the curb in that area, he had seen that happen before; there was nothing unusual nor any emergency about a car coming from behind and sounding its horn to pass. There was nothing unusual about the light situation.
This case does not fall into the category of any case where the modified rule has been applied. The weather conditions were good, the street was dry and the weather was clear. There was no obstruction in the usual line of travel and plaintiff would not have struck the trailer had he not pulled out of the regular line of travel — -nobody drives close to the curb on a fifty-foot street especially when he knows vehicles are customarily parked against the curb, whether legally or illegally so parked. There was nothing abnormal about an underpass under a railroad, with a division in the center, being well lighted under the viaduct with lights brighter than the street lights outside — the whole area was well lighted and common experience evidences that one does not even need automobile headlights burning on a well lighted city street in order to see perfectly in -spite -of viaduct lights, neon signs, lights in business building fronts and so on.
I think the case as made by the plaintiff shows contribu*436tory negligence per se and a verdict should have been directed for defendant.
I thoroughly agree that the old rule should have been modified to meet present driving conditions so as to allow a case of “exceptional circumstances” to go to the jury, but if slight variations from perfect road, weather and light conditions etc., are going to be called exceptional circumstances, we might as well abolish the doctrine of contiibutory negligence per se and let all cases go to the jury.