Court Opinion

ID: 9665910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:59:28.017968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.510238
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
We are faced in this appeal with the application of a complicated set of rules, i.e., the statute of limitations and case law relating to medical malpractice.
The continuing treatment rule first pronounced by this court in Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941), had, as its purpose, the rescue of otherwise barred claims when the physician continued to treat the physical condition long after the act or incident of medical malpractice occurred. Overtones of fraud, misrepresentation, and estoppel appear to be the justification offered for the creation of the doctrine.
On the other hand, the discovery rule in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222 (Reissue 1985) recognized that in the area of medical treatment an unexpected condition may occur, but the naming of the cause is not infrequently difficult to immediately specify.
No dispute exists that suit was brought here within 1 year of the discovery of the act of malpractice and that discovery was made more than 2 years after the act of malpractice, thus *157seeming to place the action squarely within the limits described in § 25-222.
Inherent in the majority view is the notion that what was thought to be a shield against the bar of the statute has now become a sword cutting off the appellant’s recourse to the courts.
Obviously, I believe the continuing treatment rule has no application to this factual situation. Further, I submit that if a suit is clearly brought within the statute under one theory, it ought not be barred if it offends another and different theory of limitation.