Court Opinion

ID: 9747680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:27:18.122799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.575121
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
concurring.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I do not agree that Section (d) (1) of Rule 1100, Pa. R.Crim.P. is controlling. Section (d) (1) provides:
“(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney.” (Emphasis added.)
*521In construing the phrase “unavailability of the defendant” the majority opinion concludes: “We are of the opinion that a defendant ... is ‘unavailable’ when that defendant appears for proceedings in connection with his case without defense counsel and such defendant is financially capable of retaining counsel.” If he is present in court without any attorney the court concludes that he is “unavailable.” To say that a defendant is unavailable even though he is standing in front of the court is ludicrous.
Eather than reaching such a strained construction of the English language, I would conclude that on the basis of the record before us Section (d) (2) of Eule 1100, P. E.Crim.P., is controlling. Section (d) (2) provides:
“(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(2) any continuance in excess of thirty (30) days granted at the request of the defendant or his attorney, provided that only the period beyond the thirtieth (30th) day shall be so excluded.” (Emphasis added.)
In the record (7a) the following discussion took place:
“THE COUET: Have Mr. Millhouse come to the Bar of the Court.
Mr. Millhouse, this is about at least the second or perhaps the third time you’ve been back before me and you appreciate that I cannot permit this matter to drag on. I’m not going to permit it.
I interrogated you briefly on your resources and I concluded that the public ought not to furnish you an attorney; that you should be able to provide private counsel. My recollection is that Mr. Moran came in and asked for a delay. I assumed that you and he were going to work out some arrangement. The latest word we have from Mr. Moran is that that never developed.
*522THE DEFENDANT: That’s true.
THE COURT: Now, here we are, Mr. Millhouse. What’s the situation?
THE DEFENDANT: I was unable, as you apparently conferred with Mr. Moran, I was unable to meet financial commitments. I will assure you that in the next three days I will have an attorney, sir.” (Emphasis added.)
Since the appellee on several occasions did not want to proceed without an attorney, the continuances were properly chargeable to him under Section (d)(2) of Rule 1100.
Accordingly, the 69 day delay between March 20, 1974 and May 28, 1974, is attributable to appellee, however, because of Section (d) (2) of Rule 1100, he is not charged with the first 30 days. The remaining 39 days (69 days minus 30 days), are chargeable to appellee and properly excluded from the computation of the 270 day time period. So calculated, appellee’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1100 was made 263 days after indictment. (January 3, 1974 to November 1, 1974, equals 302 days, minus 39 days delay attributable to appellee, equals 263 days.) At the time the motion to dismiss was brought. (November 1, 1974) appellee could still have been tried within the period specified by Rule 1100, and his motion to dismiss was therefore properly denied.