Court Opinion

ID: 9384155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 00:00:26.757767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.015095
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60192     Document: 00516696674         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/31/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit

                                  No. 22-60192
                                Summary Calendar

   Gianni Williams,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   City of Greenwood; Police Chief Ray Moore, in his
   individual and official capacity; Officer Jerry Williams, in his
   individual and official capacity; Officer Kevin S. Hayes, in his
   individual and official capacity,

                                                         Defendants—Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Mississippi
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-89

   Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-60192        Document: 00516696674             Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                        No. 22-60192

           In this appeal, Appellant Gianni Williams (“Gianni”) seeks review of
   the district court’s order granting summary judgment for Appellees and
   dismissing his claims. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
                                   I.      Background
           This case arises from an incident that occurred around midnight on
   January 31, 2019, in Greenwood, Mississippi. Gianni was driving home when
   Officer Jerry Williams of the Greenwood Police Department observed him
   turn without signaling. Officer Williams followed Gianni to his residence.
   When Gianni exited his vehicle, Officer Williams commanded Gianni to stop
   and lay on the ground. Gianni initially protested, but finally complied when
   Officer Williams unholstered his taser and approached. 1 Officer Williams
   then straddled Gianni’s back and attempted to handcuff him. Gianni tried to
   pull away, and Sergeant Kevin Hayes, who had just arrived at the scene, came
   over to assist. After the officers succeeded in handcuffing Gianni, they
   hoisted him to his feet and tried to walk him to the patrol car. Gianni
   continued to yell and resist. One officer unholstered his taser and held it to
   Gianni’s back, warning Gianni that officers would “tase him if they ha[d]
   to.” A few seconds later, Gianni cried out in pain and yelled, “They shot me
   with their taser gun.” After continuing to resist for several more seconds,
   Gianni finally allowed officers to place him in the back of a patrol car.
           As a result of the incident, Gianni was charged and convicted of
   disorderly conduct, failure to signal, no driver’s license, no proof of motor
   vehicle liability insurance, and possession of marijuana.
           Gianni sued the City of Greenwood, Chief of Police Ray Moore,
   Officer Williams, and Sergeant Hayes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations

           1
            A video taken by Gianni’s child’s mother captures most of the incident from this
   point forward.

                                              2
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                                            No. 22-60192

   of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, 2 and Fourteenth Amendment rights and for
   various state law claims. The district court granted Appellees’ motion for
   summary judgment as to Gianni’s federal claims and dismissed them. In light
   of this holding, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
   Gianni’s state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Gianni timely
   appealed.
                               II.     Standard of Review
           We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
   Mills v. Davis Co., 11 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is
   proper where there is an absence of a material fact issue and the movant is
   entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851
   F.3d 422, 425–26 (5th Cir. 2017). Where the non-movant would have the
   burden at trial, the movant is required only to point to the absence of
   evidence, and then the burden at summary judgment shifts to the non-
   movant to raise a genuine issue of material fact that warrants a trial. Nola
   Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015). A
   party has raised a “genuine issue” if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to
   return a verdict for that party in a full trial on the merits. In re La. Crawfish
   Prods., 852 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2017).
                                     III.      Discussion
           We will begin by analyzing Gianni’s § 1983 claims, which allege that
   Appellees violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.3

           2
              Gianni did not brief the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim on appeal. As
   such, it is deemed waived. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
           3
            Given that Gianni’s Fourteenth Amendment claim pertains to his arrest by city
   law enforcement officers, we analyze it under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v.
   Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that “all claims that law enforcement officers
   have used excessive force . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its

                                                 3
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                                      No. 22-60192

   To sue a municipality, a plaintiff must show the existence of (1) “a
   policymaker,” (2) “an official policy,” and (3) “a violation of constitutional
   rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” Piotrowski v. City of
   Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). Additionally, when, as here, law
   enforcement officers sued in their individual capacities properly invoke
   qualified immunity, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the
   inapplicability of the defense.” Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th
   Cir. 2015). To determine if the plaintiff has met this burden, we ask:
   “(1) whether the undisputed facts and the disputed facts, accepting the
   plaintiff’s version of the disputed facts as true, constitute a violation of a
   constitutional right, and (2) whether the [officers]’ conduct was ‘objectively
   reasonable in light of clearly established law.’” Id. (quotation omitted).
   Here, “the record evidence, read in the light most favorable to [Gianni], does
   not show that his [constitutional] rights were violated.” Salazar-Limon v.
   City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2016). Therefore, Gianni
   necessarily failed to satisfy the requirements of either test, and his federal
   claims fail.
          First, Gianni asserts that Officer Williams and Sergeant Hayes
   violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force while
   attempting to handcuff him and escort him to the patrol car. To establish an
   excessive force claim, plaintiffs must show that they “suffer[ed] an injury
   that result[ed] directly and only from a clearly excessive and objectively
   unreasonable use of force.” Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d
   319, 332 (5th Cir. 2020). Several factors guide our analysis when evaluating
   these claims, including “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the
   suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

   ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”
   (emphasis in original)).

                                           4
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                                           No. 22-60192

   (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
   arrest by flight.” Id. at 396 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
   (1989)).
          Here, factor three is most relevant. Our precedent explains that a
   suspect’s active resistance to arrest justifies an enhanced degree of force,
   including the use of a taser. See, e.g., Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384–87
   (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that an officer did not violate a constitutional right
   when the officer tased a defendant resisting handcuffing); Collier v.
   Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an
   officer acted reasonably when he pushed an arrestee onto the hood of his
   police cruiser after the arrestee resisted the officer’s attempts to handcuff
   him by “pull[ing] his hand back and turn[ing] away from the officer”).
          There is no question here that Gianni resisted arrest. 4 Moreover,
   Gianni failed to raise a fact issue as to whether the officers’ response was
   objectively unreasonable under Fifth Circuit precedent. Though Gianni
   asserts that Officer Williams “repeatedly tased him until he was in the police
   car,” the video plainly shows that Gianni was tased only once. See Scott v.
   Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different
   stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
   reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
   facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Carnaby
   v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We assign greater
   weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to the facts evident from video
   recordings taken at the scene.”); Collier, 569 F.3d at 219 (“The video
   evidence shows that [the plaintiff] physically resisted when [the defendant]
   attempted to place handcuffs on him.”). Additionally, even where the video

          4
              The video makes this clear, and Gianni concedes this point in his brief.

                                                 5
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   is inconclusive, Gianni presented no evidence to support his assertion that
   officers struck his side or back; his deposition alleged only one act related to
   the throat. 5 See Nola Spice Designs, 783 F.3d at 536 (explaining burden shift
   to non-movant on raising a fact issue).
           Accordingly, at most the record shows that Officer Williams (1) tased
   Gianni once after he continued to resist arrest, and (2) pressed his knees into
   Gianni’s throat while struggling to handcuff him. Given Gianni’s persistent
   and vigorous resistance to arrest, these actions could not amount to
   “excessive force” under Fifth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Cloud, 993 F.3d
   at 384–87. Therefore, there was not a material fact issue on this point, and
   Gianni’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim fails.
           We similarly reject Gianni’s claim that Appellees unlawfully detained
   and arrested him without probable cause. A plaintiff convicted of a crime is
   barred from bringing § 1983 claims that would undermine his conviction. See
   Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Gianni’s false arrest claim
   arises from the same facts implicated by charges for which he was ultimately
   convicted. Therefore, it is barred. 6
           Gianni also argues in his brief that Appellees violated his Fifth
   Amendment right to due process by unlawfully detaining him and seizing his

           5
            Indeed, Gianni only cites two sources for this contention: (1) his complaint, which
   is improper summary judgment evidence, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
   256 (1986) (emphasizing that “a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
   judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading” (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted)), and (2) his deposition, in which he specifically stated that his
   only physical injuries stemmed from the handcuffs, the tase, and when Officer Williams
   “placed his knees in [his] throat.”
           6
             Moreover, Gianni admits that Officer Williams witnessed him turn without
   signaling. Therefore, Officer Williams had probable cause to arrest him for violating
   Mississippi’s criminal code.

                                                 6
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                                          No. 22-60192

   vehicle. However, plaintiffs may only assert Fifth Amendment claims against
   federal officers. See Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir.
   2000). Officer Williams, Sergeant Hayes, and Chief Moore are municipal
   officers employed by the Greenwood Police Department. Therefore, this
   claim also fails. 7
           Gianni asserts three additional § 1983 claims: (1) supervisory liability
   against Chief Moore, (2) bystander liability against Sergeant Hayes, and
   (3) municipal liability against the City of Greenwood for failure to train and
   supervise Officer Williams and Sergeant Hayes. But all three claims are
   predicated on the existence of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Peña v. City
   of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 619–20 (5th Cir. 2018); Whitley v. Hanna,
   726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013); Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579; Becerra v. Asher,
   105 F.3d 1042, 1047–48 (5th Cir. 1997). Since Gianni’s evidence does not
   raise a fact issue as to whether Appellees violated his constitutional rights,
   these claims fail as well.
           Finally, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion to
   dismiss without prejudice Gianni’s state law claims after concluding that
   Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on their federal claims. 8 In
   the Fifth Circuit, “[d]istrict courts enjoy wide discretion in determining
   whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal
   claims are dismissed.” Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993) (per

           7
             Gianni’s assertions of other alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations, which
   can apply in these circumstances, do not add anything new to the points already addressed.
           8
               Gianni’s brief seems to misunderstand the grounds for the district court’s
   dismissal of his state law claims. Gianni argues that his state law claims are not barred by
   the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. But the district court dismissed Gianni’s claims pursuant
   to its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to forego exercising supplemental jurisdiction
   over state law claims remaining after dismissal of all federal law claims. Therefore, the
   applicability of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act is irrelevant.

                                                7
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                                     No. 22-60192

   curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Therefore, the court did not abuse
   its discretion.
                               IV.      Conclusion
          In light of these conclusions, we AFFIRM.

                                          8