Court Opinion

ID: 9956517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 15:02:45.934219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:34.429093
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                     )
                                       )
     v.                                )        ID Nos.     1901013794
                                       )                    1906005528
WILBUR MEDLEY,                         )
                                       )
     Defendant.                        )

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

  Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief:

                                  DENIED.

Wilbur Medley, SBI #00324345, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution,
Wilmington, Delaware, pro se.

Julia C. Mayer, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State of Delaware.

Monika G. Germono, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, DELAWARE OFFICE OF
DEFENSE SERVICES, Wilmington, Delaware, Trial Counsel.

Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire, GRETO LAW, Wilmington, Delaware, Sentencing
Counsel.

RENNIE, J.
                                  INTRODUCTION

      After committing a string of break-ins and thefts from residences in New

Castle, Delaware, Defendant Wilbur Medley (“Defendant”) pled guilty to Burglary

in the Second Degree and related charges and was sentenced. He has now filed a

pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief (the “Motion”),1 pursuant to Superior Court

Rule of Criminal Procedure 61, to set aside that sentence. For the reasons set forth

below, the Motion is denied.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On November 20, 2018, Defendant sold an assortment of stolen power tools

at a pawn shop. As part of the sale, he signed an agreement, in which he falsely

stated that he legally owned the tools.

      On April 29, 2019, based on Defendant’s conduct at the pawn shop, a Superior

Court grand jury indicted him on charges of (1) Receiving Stolen Property; (2)

Selling Stolen Property; (3) three counts of Theft by False Pretense; and (4) two

counts of Falsifying Business Records.2

      On June 5, 2019, at night, Defendant broke into the garage of a New Castle

residence and stole power tools. That same night, he broke into a second residence

1
  D.I.s 1901013794-96, 1906005528-123. Defendant subsequently supplemented the Motion in a
memorandum submitted to the Court. D.I.s 1901013794-97, 1906005528-124.
2
  D.I. 1901013794-3.

                                            2
and stole a bicycle. Then, he broke into a third residence through a basement

window and left through a side door.

         Three days later, on June 8, 2019, Defendant broke into a New Castle

residence and stole a television and wall mount. That same day, he opened the back

door to a second residence without removing any items. At a third residence, he

climbed to the second story deck and pulled on the sliding doors, unable to gain

entry.

         On August 19, 2019, based on Defendant’s conduct at these New Castle

residences, a Superior Court grand jury indicted him on charges of (1) three counts

of Burglary in the Second Degree; (2) two counts of Attempted Burglary in the

Second Degree; (3) two counts of Burglary in the Third Degree; (4) three counts of

Theft; (5) four counts of Attempted Theft; (6) two counts of Criminal Mischief; (7)

Aggravated Possession; and (8) Resisting Arrest.3

         On February 19, 2020, Defendant wrote a letter to this Court, in which he

stated that his counsel, Monika G. Germono, Esquire (“Trial Counsel”), was

providing ineffective assistance.4

         On July 6, 2020, Defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss, despite being

represented by counsel.5 On September 22, 2020, before he had entered a plea in

3
  D.I. 1906005528-3.
4
  D.I. 1906005528-24.
5
  D.I. 1906005528-32.

                                          3
this case, he filed a pro se motion for ineffective assistance of counsel.6 On October

27, 2020, the Court denied the motions.7

      On October 11, 2021, Defendant pled guilty to (1) Burglary in the Second

Degree (Class D Violent Felony); (2) Attempted Burglary in the Second Degree

(Class D Violent Felony); (3) Burglary in the Third Degree (Class E Violent Felony);

(4) Selling Stolen Property (Class G Felony); and (5) Falsifying Business Records

(Class A Misdemeanor).8 Sentencing was deferred for a later time, and a presentence

investigation was ordered.9

      On February 4, 2022, prior to sentencing, Trial Counsel filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel.10 On February 9, 2022, Defendant filed a pro se petition for a

writ of habeas corpus.11 On February 15, 2022, the Court denied that petition.12 On

February 15, 2022, the Court granted Trial Counsel’s motion to withdraw. The

Court stated that Defendant would be assigned conflict counsel.13

6
  D.I.s 1901013794-33, 1906005528-34.
7
  D.I. 1906005528-35.
8
   D.I.s 1901013794-40, 1901013794-54, 1901013794-67, 1906005528-43, 1906005528-55,
1906005528-94. No trial was held.
9
  See D.I.s 1901013794-51, 1901013794-76, 1906005528-103.
10
   D.I.s 1901013794-58, 1906005528-85. On February 8, 2022, Trial Counsel filed an amended
motion to withdraw. D.I.s 1901013794-59, 1906005528-86.
11
   D.I. 1906005528-87.
12
   D.I. 1906005528-90.
13
   D.I.s 1901013794-62, 1906005528-89.

                                            4
       On March 15, 2022, Defendant requested, by letter, that the Court allow him

to proceed pro se, rather than wait for conflict counsel to be appointed.14 On March

17, 2022, the Court replied that it would schedule a hearing with him to discuss his

intent to proceed pro se, if requested, but suspected that conflict counsel would be

appointed before such a hearing could be scheduled.15 Then, conflict counsel

Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire (“Sentencing Counsel”), was appointed to

represent Defendant at sentencing.16

       On April 25, 2022, Defendant filed his first motion to withdraw his guilty

plea.17 On October 24, 2022, Defendant withdrew his first motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. Then, sentencing was delayed because Sentencing Counsel became

unavailable for medical reasons.18

       On December 20, 2022, Sentencing Counsel filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel.19 On January 5, 2023, Defendant moved to proceed pro se.20 On January

9, 2023, the Court denied Sentencing Counsel’s motion to withdraw. On January

14
   D.I.s 1901013794-67, 1906005528-94.
15
   D.I.s 1901013794-68, 1906005528-95.
16
   See D.I. 1906005528-96.
17
   D.I.s 1901013794-69, 1906005528-96.
18
   At the October 24, 2022 hearing on Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Sentencing
Counsel stated that he was having his knee replaced on October 27, 2022, and would not be
available until after December 12, 2022. State v. Medley, ID Nos. 1901013794, 1906005480,
1906005528, at 44:7-11 (Del. Super. Oct. 24, 2022) (TRANSCRIPT); D.I.s 1901013794-72,
1906005528-99.
19
   D.I.s 1901013794-73, 1906005528-100.
20
   D.I.s 1901013794-74, 1906005528-101.

                                               5
12, 2023, Defendant withdrew his motion to proceed pro se.21 The Court scheduled

Defendant’s sentencing for January 20, 2023. However, sentencing was delayed

again due to issues related to COVID-19 at the detention facility.

       On February 17, 2023, this Court sentenced Defendant to (1) Burglary in the

Second Degree, eight years of Level V supervision, suspended after four years for

one year of Level IV supervision (Home Confinement), followed by eighteen

months of Level III supervision (GPS); (2) Attempted Burglary in the Second

Degree, eight years of Level V supervision, suspended for eighteen months of Level

III supervision (GPS); (3) Burglary in the Third Degree, three years of Level V

supervision, suspended for eighteen months of Level III supervision; (4) Selling

Stolen Property, two years of Level V supervision, suspended for eighteen months

of Level III supervision; and (5) Falsifying Business Records, one year of Level V

supervision, suspended for one year of Level III supervision.22

       On March 13, 2023, Defendant appealed his conviction to the Delaware

Supreme Court.23 Patrick Collins, Esquire, was appointed to represent Defendant in

his direct appeal. On April 5, 2023, Defendant filed a pro se motion for sentence

modification.24

21
   D.I.s 1901013794-75, 1906005528-102.
22
   D.I.s 1901013794-83, 1906005528-109. On March 21, 2023, and March 23, 2023, the Court
modified Defendant’s sentence order in a manner that does not affect this description. D.I.s
1901013794-84, 1901013794-87, 1906005528-110, 1906005528-113.
23
   See D.I. 1906005528-108.
24
   D.I.s 1901013794-90, 1906005528-116.

                                             6
       On May 1, 2023, Defendant filed the instant Motion, which includes

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of the right to a speedy

sentence, and bias on the part of the sentencing judge.25 On May 3, 2023, Defendant

filed a memorandum to supplement the Motion26 and voluntarily withdrew his appeal

to the Supreme Court.27

       On May 18, 2023, the Court denied Defendant’s pro se motion for sentence

modification.28 On May 29, 2023, Defendant wrote a letter to this Court, in which

he stated that he did not receive the sentence he requested and that he was entitled

to credit time.29

       On July 13, 2023, Sentencing Counsel filed an affidavit in response to

Defendant’s ineffective assistance allegations against him.30 On July 18, 2023, Trial

Counsel filed an affidavit in response to Defendant’s ineffective assistance

allegations against her.31 On August 10, 2023, Defendant filed a pro se brief in

response to Sentencing Counsel’s affidavit.32 On August 16, 2023, Defendant filed

a pro se brief in response to Trial Counsel’s affidavit.33 On August 31, 2023, the

25
   D.I.s 1901013794-96, 1906005528-123.
26
   D.I.s 1901013794-97, 1906005528-124.
27
   D.I. 1906005528-122.
28
   D.I.s 1901013794-99, 1906005528-126. The court order was erroneously dated May 18,
“2022.” Id.
29
   D.I.s 1901013794-100, 1906005528-127.
30
   D.I.s 1901013794-103, 1906005528-131.
31
   D.I.s 1901013794-104, 1906005528-132.
32
   D.I.s 1901013794-106, 1906005528-134.
33
   D.I.s 1901013794-107, 1906005528-135.

                                         7
State filed a brief in opposition to the Motion.34 On October 3, 2023, Defendant filed

a pro se brief in further support of the Motion.35

       This matter is now ripe for the Court to consider.

                                    LEGAL ANALYSIS

       Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 provides the remedy for “a person in custody

under a sentence of this court seeking to set aside the judgment of conviction.”

When evaluating a Rule 61 motion, this Court considers procedural requirements

before substantive requirements.36            The motion must satisfy the procedural

requirements of “timeliness, repetitiveness, procedural default, and former

adjudication.”37 These procedural requirements are considered on a claim-by-claim

basis.38

       The Court considers the procedural bars of procedural default and former

adjudication separately with regard to each of Defendant’s claims below. In the

Motion, Defendant raises three grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of

counsel; (2) speedy sentence violation; and (3) biased sentencing judge.

34
   D.I.s 1901013794-108, 1906005528-136.
35
   D.I.s 1901013794-109, 1906005528-137.
36
   Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989)).
37
   State v. Galindez, 2022 WL 17076594, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 18, 2022); Super. Ct. Crim. R.
61(i)(1)-(4). These procedural bars do not apply to a claim of lack of jurisdiction or which pleads
with particularity new evidence of the defendant’s actual innocence or an applicable new rule of
constitutional law made retroactive on collateral review. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
38
   See Thomas v. State, 1996 WL 663020 (Del. Super. Sept. 10, 1996) (analyzing postconviction
motion procedural bars separately for each claim).

                                                8
       A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Procedurally, Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not

barred for procedural default. Ineffective assistance claims are not subject to Rule

61(i)(3)’s procedural default bar because they cannot be asserted in the proceedings

leading to the judgment of conviction.39 Further, the claims are not barred as

formerly adjudicated. Defendant filed pro se papers alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel by Trial Counsel on February 19, 2020, and September 22, 2020.40 The

second of these was made in the form of a motion, which the Court then denied on

October 27, 2020.41 That motion did not reference Trial Counsel’s conduct related

to the guilty plea, as that plea had not yet been entered.42 Also, Defendant’s claims

against Sentencing Counsel have not previously been adjudicated. Hence, the

ineffective assistance claims are not procedurally barred.

               1. Trial Counsel

       Defendant argues that Trial Counsel’s representation was ineffective. He

alleges that Trial Counsel misrepresented that she had contacted Detective Rodney

Stern, a potential witness requested by Defendant, in order to convince Defendant to

39
   Slaughter v. State, 2022 WL 211378, at *1 (Del. Jan. 25, 2022) (quoting Green v. State, 238 A.3d
160, 175 (Del. 2020)).
40
   D.I.s 1901013794-33, 1906005528-24, 1906005528-34.
41
   D.I. 1906005528-35.
42
   State v. Jones, 2022 WL 2827004, at *6-7 (Del. Super. July 20, 2022) (quoting Green, 238 A.3d
at 176) (“[T]he mere fact that a post-conviction claim might bear some resemblance to a formerly
adjudicated claim does not trigger Rule 61(i)(4)’s bar.”).

                                                9
accept the guilty plea in this case.              Defendant states that Detective Stern

subsequently told Defendant that Trial Counsel had not contacted him.43

       Trial Counsel responds that she did not coerce Defendant into entering a guilty

plea. She states that Defendant initially told her not to contact Detective Stern,

whose name was included within a list of potential witnesses that Defendant had

shared with Trial Counsel. Trial Counsel states that she referred the investigation to

an Office of Defense Services investigator to contact the individuals from the list.

Trial Counsel asserts that the only individual from the list that she contacted herself

was Defendant’s sister and that Trial Counsel kept Defendant updated about the

status of the outsourced investigation.44

       The State asserts that Trial Counsel’s representation was not ineffective and

that Defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the representation.45

Sentencing Counsel adds that “at the time of his initial plea Medley indicated he was

satisfied” with Trial Counsel’s representation.46

43
   D.I.s 1901013794-96, 1901013794-97, 1906005528-123, 1906005528-124. In the Motion,
Defendant raises a “coerced guilty plea” claim, separate from his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Id. However, both claims raise the same issues and facts, so the Court considers the coerced
guilty plea allegations as part of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
44
   D.I.s 1901013794-104, 1906005528-132.
45
   D.I.s 1901013794-108, 1906005528-136. The State emphasizes that Defendant filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, but then withdrew that motion, allowing the case to proceed to
sentencing. Id.
46
   D.I.s 1901013794-103, 1906005528-131.

                                               10
        To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must

satisfy the two prongs of the Strickland v. Washington test.47 The defendant must

show that (1) the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and (2) but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have differed.48 When the ineffective assistance claim concerns a

guilty plea, the defendant must show that, “but for his counsel’s unprofessional

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to

trial.”49

        Without concrete, substantiated allegations of actual prejudice, an ineffective

assistance claim risks summary dismissal.50                 Further, “review of counsel's

representation is subject to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was

professionally reasonable.”51 The question is whether trial counsel’s conduct was

adequate, not whether trial counsel could have performed better.52

        A defendant’s claim that he was coerced into accepting a guilty plea because

his trial counsel allegedly misrepresented the length of his sentence “operates as a

47
   466 U.S. 668 (1984).
48
   Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
49
   Slaughter v. State, 2022 WL 211378, at *1 n.5 (Del. Jan. 25, 2022) (quoting Miller v. State, 840
A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del 2003)).
50
   State v. Hohn, 2015 WL 301982, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 2015).
51
   State v. Williams, 2001 WL 1335719, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 25, 2001) (quoting Flamer v. State,
585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990)); Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996) (“Counsel’s
efforts enjoy a strong presumption of reasonableness.”).
52
   See Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (Del. 1997).

                                                11
challenge to his guilty plea, which he waived when the guilty plea was accepted by

the Court.”53 The defendant is bound by statements he made during the plea

colloquy, absent “clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not

understand the plea agreement, that he was forced to accept the plea, or that he was

not satisfied with trial counsel’s representation.”54 Under Strickland, counsel’s

“strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable

precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations

on investigation.”55

       Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails the Strickland test. He has not

established that Trial Counsel’s representation fell below an objective level of

reasonableness or that, but for her alleged errors, Defendant would not have entered

a guilty plea. Trial Counsel outsourced some of her factual investigation efforts to

the Office of Defense Services investigator, a reasonable professional decision in the

circumstances.     Further, Trial Counsel remained in regular contact with the

investigator and Defendant’s sister during the time period in question. Defendant

has failed to present any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, that but

for Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to contact Detective Stern, he would not have

53
   State v. Marquin-Mendoza, 2022 WL 2373864, at *5 (Del. Super. June 30, 2022).
54
   Id.
55
   State v. Laster, 2018 WL 1896488, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 16, 2018) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984)).

                                             12
pleaded guilty but instead would have insisted on going to trial. This glaring

deficiency in the record requires that Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails.

                2. Sentencing Counsel

         Next, Defendant argues that Sentencing Counsel provided ineffective

representation. He alleges that Sentencing Counsel (1) gave away his case file; (2)

refused to call witnesses that Defendant mentioned; (3) argued ineffectively; and (4)

misrepresented to Defendant what witnesses had told Sentencing Counsel and

whether the duress defense was available.56

         Sentencing Counsel maintains that, even though he made an error in

delivering Defendant’s case file to his sister, his representation was otherwise

effective. First, he explains that Defendant asked him to give certain discovery

materials to Defendant’s sister for copying. Sentencing Counsel believes that he

sent her the full case file by accident. A representative from Sussex Correctional

Institution, Defendant’s detention facility at the time, told Sentencing Counsel that

a large box of discovery files that was mailed to Defendant had been recovered.

Sentencing Counsel thinks that this box may have contained Defendant’s case file.

Yet the case file was never returned.57

56
     D.I.s 1901013794-96, 1901013794-97, 1906005528-123, 1906005528-124.
57
     D.I.s 1901013794-103, 1906005528-131.

                                            13
           Second, Sentencing Counsel describes his attempts to contact potential

witnesses named by Defendant. Sentencing Counsel states that he followed up on

information from Defendant about potential witnesses. One potential witness had

died. Another potential witness indicated that she could only communicate with him

by Facebook Messenger or email. When Sentencing Counsel replied to the potential

witness that he does not have a Facebook account, but offered to talk by phone, she

did not discuss Defendant’s case.           Separately, Sentencing Counsel contacted

Detective Stern, who stated that he had received information about alleged threats

to Defendant. Detective Stern passed on this information to a second detective, who,

after investigation, determined that Defendant’s allegations lacked merit.58

           Third, Sentencing Counsel states that, after reviewing the police reports and a

transcript of the plea hearing, he determined that Defendant’s motion to withdraw

his guilty plea was not in Defendant’s best interests. Nonetheless, after Defendant

requested that they proceed with the motion, Sentencing Counsel filed the motion.

Eventually, Defendant withdrew that motion. Sentencing Counsel emphasizes that

Defendant ultimately received a sentence of four years of Level V supervision, rather

than the five years of Level V supervision that the State had previously sought. He

58
     Id.

                                             14
argues that Defendant’s withdrawal of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea

indicates that Defendant was satisfied with the terms of his plea.59

      Fourth, Sentencing Counsel states that he explained to Defendant that the

duress defense would have been difficult to prove, given the factual record in the

case. He states that he was in constant communication with Defendant about this

during his representation.60

      The State argues that Sentencing Counsel’s representation was not ineffective

and that Defendant has failed to establish prejudice.61

      After considering Defendant’s arguments and the record in this case, the Court

finds that Defendant has not shown that Sentencing Counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Sentencing Counsel erroneously

delivered Defendant’s case file to his sister, which was then lost, and he was unable

to make contact with a potential witness requested by Defendant. Nonetheless, he

ultimately secured a more lenient sentence for Defendant than what the State had

originally sought. Also, Defendant’s allegation that Sentencing Counsel failed to

describe the duress defense to him is implausible and does not serve as a valid basis

for his ineffective assistance claim. Notably, Sentencing Counsel was not appointed

59
   Id.
60
   Id.
61
   D.I.s 1901013794-108, 1906005528-136.

                                           15
until after Defendant had pled guilty, so he need not have described defenses that

would potentially have been available at a trial.

         Defendant has not shown that his sentence in this case would have differed if

not for Sentencing Counsel’s errors. He moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to

proceed pro se, but then withdrew those motions before the Court could rule on

them, so his challenge to Sentencing Counsel’s conduct is directed at the outcome

of his sentencing, rather than at the overall outcome of the litigation. To be sure,

Defendant does not allege that the outcome of the litigation would have been more

favorable if not for Sentencing Counsel’s errors.           Hence, Defendant has not

overcome the strong presumption that Sentencing Counsel’s conduct was

professionally reasonable. Therefore, his ineffective assistance claim fails.

         B. Speedy Sentence Violation

         Defendant argues that his right to a speedy sentence was violated because he

pled guilty on October 11, 2021, but was not sentenced until February 17, 2023.62

The State argues that Defendant’s claim is procedurally barred for procedural

default. In the State’s view, Defendant waived this claim when he failed to raise the

argument and have it addressed in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, which was

voluntarily withdrawn.63 Sentencing Counsel argues that the delay in Defendant’s

62
     D.I.s 1901013794-96, 1901013794-97, 1906005528-123, 1906005528-124.
63
     D.I.s 1901013794-108, 1906005528-136.

                                            16
sentencing “must be attributed totally to Medley” because his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, and the attendant motion practice, created the delay.64

          When a defendant raises a ground for relief in his postconviction motion that

was not raised in the proceedings that led to his judgment of conviction, that ground

is barred for procedural default unless he shows cause for relief or prejudice. For

instance, if the defendant failed to assert a claim in his direct appeal, but asserts that

claim in his postconviction motion, he must provide justification for this procedural

default.65

          Defendant appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court on March 13, 2023,

but he did not raise the issue of delayed sentencing in that appeal. This failure to

raise delayed sentencing in his direct appeal procedurally bars him from raising it

for the first time in the Motion. And he has not established any cause for relief from

this procedural default or any prejudice that resulted from a violation of his rights.

Accordingly, his speedy sentence violation claim is procedurally barred.

          C. Biased Sentencing Judge

          Defendant argues that Sentencing Judge had a “closed mind” when she

sentenced him in this case. He asserts that Sentencing Judge was biased because,

before becoming a judge, she worked as a colleague with a victim in this case at the

64
     D.I.s 1901013794-103, 1906005528-131.
65
     Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3); Browne v. State, 2003 WL 21364452, at *1-2 (Del. June 9, 2003).

                                                 17
Delaware Department of Justice.66 Incredibly, Defendant makes this argument even

though Sentencing Judge followed the parties’ agreed upon sentence

recommendation and imposed the very sentence that Defendant had negotiated.67

       Defendant did not raise this bias claim before he pled guilty, at sentencing, or

on direct appeal. And he has not shown that he was impeded from making the claim

or has just cause for relief from this procedural default. As a result, Defendant is

now procedurally barred from raising it as a Rule 61 postconviction claim.68

                                       CONCLUSION

       After reviewing the Motion, record, and sentence in this case, the Court finds

that Defendant’s postconviction claims lack merit. He has not shown that the

representations by Trial Counsel and Sentencing Counsel fell below an objective

66
   D.I.s 1901013794-96, 1901013794-97, 1906005528-123, 1906005528-124.
67
   D.I.s 19010137954-54, 1906005528-55 (“The State will not recommend more than 5 years of
unsuspended level V.”); D.I.s 1901013794-83, 1906005528-109 (Defendant received four years of
unsuspended Level V time).
68
   See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (“Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings
leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred,
unless the movant shows cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from violation
of the movant’s rights.”). By contrast, Defendant did raise a bias claim involving another judge
but failed to take up that issue on direct appeal. On February 7, 2020, Trial Counsel wrote a letter
to the Court, in which she stated that the appearance of a conflict of interest had been created
because the presiding judge (a judge other than Sentencing Judge) had worked at the Delaware
Department of Justice with a victim in one of the cases. D.I. 1906005528-21. On February 11,
2020, that judge responded that there was no conflict of interest under Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381,
384-85 (Del. 1991), because over sixteen years had passed since the two worked together. D.I.
1906005528-23. Understandably, Defendant did not raise that claim as one of his postconviction
claims because he would be barred from doing so pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4). Super. Ct. Crim. R.
61(i)(4) (“Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading
to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding is thereafter barred.”).

                                                18
standard of reasonableness, and his claims that his right to a speedy sentence was

violated and that Sentencing Judge sentenced him with a closed mind are

procedurally barred. Hence, the Motion is DENIED.

      IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of March, 2024.

                                            ___________________ __________
                                                Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge

                                       19