Court Opinion

ID: 9549748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:24:24.902252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:53.187198
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
with whom BURKE, Justice, joins, concurring.
Although I am in agreement with the court’s treatment and disposition of most of the issues in this appeal, I find I cannot agree with two aspects of the court’s opinion.
In part IV of the opinion, the court holds the rule that the release of a negligent party releases all who are vicariously liable will not be applied in Alaska. While I concur in this result, I disagree with the reasoning employed by the court. The majority undertakes an examination of the language of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, AS 09.16.010 —.060, and determines that the release situ*939ation in the case at bar is covered by that act. The suggestion that the Act is applicable to parties vicariously liable rather than solely to joint tortfeasors is one in which I cannot join. The concept of “contribution,” the focal point of the Act, is not applicable to vicarious liability situations. In vicarious liability matters, where one party is held liable for another’s negligence although personally innocent, the appropriate concept is indemnity.1 Indemnity shifts the entire burden of liability; contribution, as recognized in AS 09.16.010(b), provides for a pro rata distribution of damages among the negligent parties. In my opinion, AS 09.-16.010(f)2 illustrates the intent of the legislature to avoid application of the Act to situations involving vicarious liability and the concomitant concept of indemnity. However, in my opinion, the rationale employed in Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969), is also applicable to instances involving vicarious liability and, thus, I concur in the result reached by the majority regarding the release issue.
The second area of disagreement concerns the alternate method of computing the award of future retirement benefits advocated by the majority. The suggestion is made that the trial court might use the difference between the contributions made over the 30.7 years under the electrician plan and under the draftsmen plan, without reduction to present value, but also without enhancement for increases due to investment. In my view, this formulation ignores some basic differences between individual investment and institutional investment. Normally the small investor is not able to produce the same return on his investment dollar as the institutional investor. The small individual investor is faced with higher brokerage fees and investment advisor fees. If the small investor wants to diversify in order to maximize profit while minimizing risk, he must often purchase the shares of investment companies or mutual funds, most of which include a significant amount for “load,”3 thus decreasing the percentage return on the investment dollar. The goal of compensatory damages for personal injuries is to attempt to make the injured party whole. Since the party with a lump sum representing the difference between amounts contributed to the pension plans could not invest that money as effectively as the pension plan, the party would not be made whole by such a measure of damages. Thus, I would hold that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the amount of pension benefits that Sweat would have received under the electrician plan and the amount of benefits that he will receive under the draftsmen plan, reduced to present value.

. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 51, at 310 (4th ed. 1971).

. See note 19 for the text of AS 09.16.010(f).

.The term “load” refers to the additional charge on the securities of investment companies over and above the pro rata share of the underlying securities. The amount includes fees for investment advice and management of the investment company.