Court Opinion

ID: 9731305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:41:48.209467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:14.147628
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand for a new trial. A trial court should allow expert testimony only where (1) the expert has knowledge and qualifications uncommon to laypersons that distinguish her as an expert; (2) the expert’s testimony would help the jury understand an aspect of the evidence that it otherwise might not understand, without invading the province of the jury to weigh facts and make credibility determinations; and (3) the expert’s testimony would reflect generally accepted scientific or technical principles. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 681, 697 N.E.2d at 310, citing People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 288, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1164 (1990). In Enis, a case that largely turned upon the credibility of eyewitnesses, the court cautioned against the overuse of expert testimony. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 289, 564 N.E.2d at 1165. The defense’s expert witness, Dr. Solomon Fulero, planned to detail four areas where jurors tend to hold misconceptions about eyewitnesses and the identification process, including the following: (1) a confident witness is more likely to be accurate in her identification (in fact, there is no significant relationship between confidence and accuracy); (2) higher stress levels at the time of identification cause a witness to be more accurate (actually, studies show the opposite to be true); (3) identification is more accurate where a weapon was present (again, the opposite is true); and (4) jurors give too much weight to time estimates. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 285, 564 N.E.2d at 1163. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to preclude expert testimony by Dr. Fulero, reasoning that the testimony would amount only to speculation. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 285, 564 N.E.2d at 1163. The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that in weighing the probative value of the expert’s testimony against the likelihood of prejudice, the trial court should “carefully consider the necessity and relevance of the expert testimony in light of the facts in the case before him.” Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 290, 564 N.E.2d at 1165. In Enis, Fulero’s testimony would not have aided the jury in reaching its conclusion. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 288, 564 N.E.2d at 1164. For example, the last three “misconceptions” to which Dr. Fulero planned to testify were not even relevant to the case at hand. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 288-89, 564 N.E.2d at 1164-65. The State’s eyewitnesses did not observe defendant under stressful situations involving a weapon and did not testify concerning time estimates. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 288-89, 564 N.E.2d at 1164-65. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Fulero’s expert testimony. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 289, 564 N.E.2d at 1165. Though eyewitness confidence may have been relevant, it was not enough to tip the scales in favor of remanding to allow Dr. Fulero’s testimony. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 289, 564 N.E.2d at 1165. The court then stated: “We caution against the overuse of expert testimony. Such testimony, in this case concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, could well lead to the use of expert testimony concerning the unreliability of other types of testimony and, eventually, to the use of experts to testify as to the unreliability of expert testimony. So-called experts can usually be obtained to support most any position. The determination of a lawsuit should not depend upon which side can present the most or the most convincing expert witnesses. We are concerned with the reliability of eyewitness expert testimony [citations], whether and to what degree it can aid the jury, and if it is necessary in light of defendant’s ability to cross-examine eyewitnesses. An expert’s opinion concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony is based on statistical averages. The eyewitness in a particular case may well not fit within the spectrum of these averages. It would be inappropriate for a jury to conclude, based on expert testimony, that all eyewitness testimony is unreliable.” Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 289-90, 564 N.E.2d at 1165. Courts have applied reasoning similar to that set forth in Enis where the issue is the admissibility of expert testimony concerning a sexual-abuse or assault victim’s behavior. “In a prosecution for an illegal sexual act perpetrated upon a victim, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of [s]ections 12 — 13 through 12 — 16 of the Criminal Code of 1961, *** testimony by an expert, qualified by the court relating to any recognized and accepted form of post-traumatic stress syndrome shall be admissible as evidence.” 725 ILCS 5/115 — 7.2 (West 2002); see also Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 682-83, 697 N.E.2d at 311-12 (expert testimony concerning recantation of allegations by child sex abuse victims excluded). However, as implied by this court in Simpkins, section 115 — 7.2 is not a “free pass” to allow in all expert testimony concerning the symptoms and behavioral characteristics of child victims of sexual abuse. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 681-82, 697 N.E.2d at 310-11. In Simpkins, the trial court allowed an expert to testify regarding the tendency of child victims of sexual abuse to recant their accusations where family is unsupportive or blames the child victim for the negative repercussions of his accusations. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 697 N.E.2d at 311. However, the State did not present any evidence that the child victim at issue in that particular case had an unsupportive family or felt like a scapegoat. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 697 N.E.2d at 311-12. In part because of this, the court held that the expert testimony did not help the jury in making its decision, and that, stripped to its basic level, the expert’s testimony constituted an improper commentary on the victim’s credibility. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 697 N.E.2d at 312. Simpkins relied largely upon Enis, noting that in Enis, the expert testimony would not have aided the trier of fact because the testimony regarding “myths” of eyewitness testimony had little or no similarities to the eyewitnesses in that case. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 697 N.E.2d at 312. The majority distinguishes Simpkins on the ground that the expert in our case “found support in the testimony of the laywitnesses.” 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1064. Dr. Appleton testified that teen victims of sexual abuse often provided delayed and piecemeal reporting due to shame. The victim at issue here did in fact testify regarding her delayed and piecemeal reporting, stating, “This is something very personal. It’s not something you tell everyone. *** I was ashamed. I was scared.” Our case is indeed different from Simpkins in that the expert’s testimony involved more than just a “stereotyped generalization” of child victims. See People v. Wilson, 246 Ill. App. 3d 311, 322, 615 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (1993) (“stereotyped generalizations” of child victims generally not admissible). However, that the expert in Simpkins offered a stereotyped generalization of child victims rather than information relevant to the particular child at issue was merely one factor in our determination that the expert testimony should have been excluded. In Simpkins, we also relied upon the expansive cautionary language of Enis, quoted above, as well as Wilson, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 320, 615 N.E.2d at 1288, which held that expert testimony concerning the tendency of young children to make false accusations in order to please investigators or parents “would not have provided the jury with much — if any— information beyond the knowledge of an average layperson.” Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 682, 697 N.E.2d at 311. As stated in Enis, it is fairly easy to find an expert to support most any position. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 289, 564 N.E.2d at 1165. That the victim in this case provided delayed and piecemeal reporting because she felt ashamed could have been presented through examination of the witness just as easily as through expert testimony. See Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 289, 564 N.E.2d at 1165 (expert testimony is discouraged where it is not necessary in light of the defendant’s ability to cross-examine the witnesses). The victim in this case was 16 years old at the time of the offense and nearly 20 at the time of trial. The victim presumably would have been perfectly capable of explaining her delayed and piecemeal reporting to the jury for herself; she was 20 years of age and had nearly 4 years to mentally process all that had allegedly happened to her. It was the role of the jury to determine whether the victim’s explanation for any apparent inconsistencies was reasonable and credible. Experts undoubtedly carry a certain aura of authority and their mere presence improperly adds weight to the prosecution’s case. The introduction of Dr. Appleton’s testimony under these circumstances invaded the province of the jury to determine the victim’s credibility and did not introduce specialized principles of which laypersons may not already be aware on a commonsense level.