Court Opinion

ID: 9604016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:13:07.026091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:17.755383
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — I agree with the majority that a habitual criminal charge is a “criminal prosecution” within the meaning of CrR 8.3(b). I cannot accept its conclusion that a showing of governmental misconduct or arbitrariness is prerequisite to the dismissal of such a prosecution under that rule. Our prior cases, and those from other states with similar provisions, clearly establish that CrR 8.3(b) does precisely what it purports to do: it gives trial courts the *208power to dismiss a criminal charge whenever the circumstances call for it “in the furtherance of justice.” I believe the majority’s disposition of this case, if extended beyond the facts, unjustifiably narrows the scope of this rule and unduly interferes with the broad discretion we have previously afforded trial courts in exercising the power it vests in them.
Relatively few cases have interpreted the language of CrR 8.3 (b) in the near century it and its predecessor statute (RCW 10.46.090) have been in effect. Those cases have established that it authorizes dismissal not only in cases of official misconduct, but whenever a court’s “ ‘fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice’ ” requires it. State v. Satterlee, 58 Wn.2d 92, 94, 361 P.2d 168 (1961), quoting Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124, 100 L. Ed. 1003, 76 S. Ct. 663 (1956). Surely, “[o]ne of the purposes of [the rule] is to protect accused persons from arbitrary, albeit infrequent, actions of some prosecutors.” State v. Sonneland, 80 Wn.2d 343, 346-47, 494 P.2d 469 (1972). (Italics mine.) But that is not its only purpose.
We made this clear in State v. Satterlee, supra, by affirming the dismissal of a robbery charge which, we found, the prosecution was fully within its rights in pressing despite the defendant’s claim of double jeopardy. No governmental misconduct was involved, but we held that the court was justified in dismissing the charge in the interests of justice and in light of its duty “ ‘to see that a person charged with crime is fairly treated.’ ” State v. Satterlee, supra at 94, quoting State v. Silver, 152 Wash. 686, 694, 279 P. 82 (1929). In no case have we reversed a dismissal under CrR 8.3(b) or its predecessor on the grounds seemingly adopted by the majority today, that only prosecutorial misconduct justifies use of the power it gives trial courts. To the contrary, our decisions consistently indicate that the provisions of CrR 8.3 (b) are a tool broadly available to courts in the performance of their “role ... in effec*209tuation of a reasonable balance between the rights of society and the rights of the individual.” State v. Camp, 67 Wn.2d 363, 375, 407 P.2d 824 (1965) (Finley, J., dissenting) ; see State v. Satterlee, supra at 94; State v. Deloria, 129 Wash. 497, 501, 225 P. 405 (1924); State v. Hansen, 10 Wash. 235, 38 P. 1023 (1894).
Our cases also establish that a trial court has wide discretion in deciding whether a dismissal is or is not warranted under the principles of fairness and justice embodied in this rule (CrR 8.3(b)). Only twice before have we overturned a trial court’s decision either to dismiss or not to dismiss a prosecution under this rule or its predecessors. In Seattle v. Mathewson, 194 Wash. 350, 78 P.2d 168 (1938) we reversed a dismissal based solely on the trial court’s erroneous legal conclusion that the defendant had been once in jeopardy, and in State v. Satterlee, supra at 94, we reversed as to one of the two charges the trial court had dismissed because the state had a legitimate interest in the prosecution and no reason was given why the defendant had any valid interest in avoiding it. In every other appeal we have heard we have upheld the trial court’s exercise of the discretion vested in it by CrR 8.3 (b) or its predecessor. State v. Sonneland, supra; State v. Weiss, 73 Wn.2d 372, 438 P.2d 610 (1968); State v. La Vine, 68 Wn.2d 83, 86, 411 P.2d 436 (1966); State v. Camp, 67 Wn.2d 363, 407 P.2d 824 (1965); State v. Deloria, supra; State v. Hansen, supra; State v. Anderson, 12 Wn. App. 171, 528 P.2d 1003 (1974).12 It is thus well established that the power to dismiss “is *210discretionary with the trial court, reviewable only for manifest abuse of discretion.” State v. Anderson, supra at 175.
Several other states have or have had rules or statutes similar or identical to CrR 8.3 (b) .13 In every one of them in which such provisions have been interpreted, the courts have recognized these same two principles: that the rules authorize trial courts to dismiss prosecutions for any reason consistent with the “furtherance of justice,” and that trial courts’ exercise of this authority is discretionary and reversible only for manifest abuse. It is consistently held that CrR 8.3 (b) and similar statutes are to allow a trial court
to dismiss a case whenever in its judgment the furtherance of justice may be subserved thereby. It may be that the evidence would warrant a conviction, but, if the court is of the opinion that such conviction would be unjust and that the best interest of society would be subserved by the dismissal of a case, the statute . . . authorizes such action. It must never be forgotten that the enforcement of justice is the sole object of the law.
State v. McDonald, 10 Okla. Crim. 413, 416, 137 P. 362 (1914).14 No court in any jurisdiction has held, as the majority does in this case, that dismissals under these rules are proper only in cases of governmental misconduct.
The power created by CrR 8.3 (b) and like provisions is essentially a power to do equity. The trial court in exercising it must balance the interests of society in prosecuting criminals against the interests of individuals in unusual *211situations to avoid prosecution. People v. Orin, 13 Cal. 3d 937, 533 P.2d 193, 120 Cal. Rptr. 65, 71 (1975); People v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 491, 505, 446 P.2d 138, 72 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1968); State ex rel. Anderson v. Gile, 119 Mont. 182, 187, 172 P.2d 583 (1946); State v. Satterlee, supra at 94-95. “[I]n appropriate but rare circumstances” where strict enforcement of the law would be unjustified and unduly oppressive, these rules empower the court “to allow the letter of the law gracefully and charitably to succumb to the spirit of justice.” People v. Davis, 55 Misc. 2d 656, 659, 286 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1967).
The factors which determine whether a particular case presents the kind of “rare circumstances” in which termination of a prosecution is appropriate are too numerous and nebulous to permit the kind of narrow definition the majority attempts to give them. A trial court must be given considerable leeway in deciding, on the basis of all the information before it, whether a dismissal would be “in the furtherance of justice.” This does not mean the power vested by CrR 8.3(b) is unlimited, however. Trial courts’ discretion, “while broad, is by no means absolute.” People v. Orin, supra at 945. Decisions to dismiss or not to dismiss are subject to review on appeal, and if a prosecution is ordered dismissed the reason of the dismissal must be set forth in the order, which must be entered on the record. CrR 8.3(b). This provides a substantial safeguard against any possible judicial arbitrariness or caprice. People v. Ritchie, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1105, 95 Cal. Rptr. 462 (2d Dist. 1971); State v. Camp, supra at 374 (Finley, J., dissenting). Where the trial court’s decision is based on considerations that are clearly improper (see, e.g., People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d 876, 342 P.2d 538 (Super. Ct. App. Dep’t 1959)), or erroneous (Seattle v. Mathewson, supra), or on no cognizable reason at all (e.g., People v. Orin, supra; State v. Satterlee, supra), its error can be discovered and reversed. But so long as the reason for the dismissal is set out and is “one which would motivate a reasonable judge,” *212the trial court’s order should be upheld. People v. Orin, supra; People v. Curtiss, 4 Cal. App. 3d 123, 126, 84 Cal. Rptr. 106 (2d Dist. 1970).
The reason given by the trial court in this case for dismissing the habitual criminal charge against respondent Starrish was essentially that the purpose of the habitual criminal statute would not be served by trying him under it. Specifically, it found, on the basis of substantial evidence (1) that the state’s interest in restraining respondent was satisfied by the prior adjudication that subjected him to parole board control until he is 75 years old; and (2) that society’s interest in having him stop his antisocial behavior would be best served by alcoholism treatment, which he was amenable to but could not receive if adjudicated a habitual criminal. As the majority acknowledges in footnote 11, these considerations clearly could lead a “reasonable judge” to the conclusion that this dismissal was appropriate and in the interests of justice.
In a number of cases courts have upheld dismissals based on determinations that prosecution under a statute would not best serve the purposes for which the statute was enacted, and would adversely affect the defendant “beyond the point of the state’s proper and legitimate interest.” State v. Camp, supra at 375 (Finley, J., dissenting). In People v. Quill, 11 Misc. 2d 512,177 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1958), for example, the court held that the purpose of the criminal libel law, to avert violent retaliation by the victims of slander, would not be fulfilled by prosecution against the wishes of the defendant’s victim. It therefore dismissed the charge. People v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 684, 687, 97 Cal. Rptr. 886 (2d Dist. 1971), affirmed a dismissal ordered because a conviction could only have increased the minimum term of the sentence the defendant was serving for another offense and would have “contributed nothing to the over-all enforcement of the criminal law.” See also People v. Cina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 136, 138, 115 Cal. Rptr. 758 (2d Dist. 1974); People v. Davis, supra.
On the basis of similar reasoning, the courts in California *213have upheld precisely the kind of action the trial court took here. People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956), held that the dismissal of a prior offense allegation was proper under Cal. Penal Code § 1385 (on which the predecessor statutes to CrR 8.3(b) were modeled) where the interests of justice and the purposes of the habitual offender law would not be served by a conviction thereunder. Despite much litigation and attempted legislative encroachments, Burke remains the law in California. People v. Dorsey, 28 Cal. App. 3d 15, 104 Cal. Rptr. 326 (4th Dist. 1972); cf. People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970). I would follow it in this state.
Habitual criminal adjudications are essentially sentencing proceedings, not distinct prosecutions. State v. Bryant, 73 Wn.2d 168, 437 P.2d 398 (1968); Blake v. Mahoney, 9 Wn.2d 110, 113 P.2d 1028 (1941). A trial court’s discretion in sentencing is and must be particularly broad. People v. Dorsey, supra; State v. Birdwell, 6 Wn. App. 284, 492 P.2d 249 (1972). The determination that a habitual criminal prosecution should be dismissed does not deprive the state of the power to incarcerate or control a criminal defendant and therefore does not adversely affect the state’s interests as strongly as does the dismissal of an original criminal prosecution. Cf. State v. Satterlee, 58 Wn.2d 92, 95, 361 P.2d 168 (1961). For these reasons the context of habitual criminal prosecutions would seem to be one in which the free exercise of the power to act “in the furtherance of justice” afforded by CrR 8.3 (b) is particularly appropriate.
Statutes like CrR 8.3 (b) transfer to the court part of the prosecutors’ traditionally unbridled discretion to control criminal prosecutions. State v. McDonald, 10 Okla. Crim; 413, 415, 137 P. 362, 364 (1914); Timmins v. Hale, 122 Ore. 24, 42, 256 P. 770 (1927); F. Miller, Prosecution; The Decision to Charge a Suspect With a Crime 335 (1969). “[T]he court, for the purposes of the order of dismissal, takes charge of the prosecution and acts for the People.” People v; Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d 850, 854, 21 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1st Dist. 1962). The prosecutor retains the power to *214determine whether a habitual criminal charge, or any other charge, will be filed and pressed. State v. Nixon, 10 Wn. App. 355, 517 P.2d 212 (1973). But CrR 8.3(b) makes the courts something more than the passive instruments of prosecutorial policies.
Courts always have the authority to do justice, and CrR 8.3 (b) explicitly recognizes that authority in the context of unjustified or unfair criminal prosecutions. It places the responsibility to decide what are the interests of justice on the court, where it should be.
[T]he district attorney cannot be regarded as impartial. He is essentially an advocate who, believing in the justice of his cause, is seeking conviction and punishment of the accused. To make him also the court of last resort as to what punishment should be imposed, without any impartial tribunal to review his decision in the matter of sentencing, seems to me to do violence to our concept of constitutional government, and offends our oft repeated and proud boast that we are a government of law and not of men.
People v. Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645, 674-75, 375 P.2d 641, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).
CrR 8.3 (b) insures that the broad discretion of prosecutors and the rigidity of aggravated sentencing laws will not combine to reduce judges to the status of mere clerks assigned to stamp and file the decisions of other agencies of government. It is too important to be so tightly confined as the majority’s decision renders it. It should be read as being as broad and flexible as the principles of justice to which it refers, and against which exercise of judicial power should always be measured. There is no intimation in this record that the judge acted other than in a careful, considered manner. He received statements from eight independent witnesses, unrelated to the respondent, urging dismissal of the charge. These included a former president of the Seattle School Board and the victim of respondent’s latest criminal act.
For these reasons I would follow the overwhelming weight of authority and hold that the power to dismiss a *215criminal case under CrR 8.3(b) is not restricted to situations involving prosecutorial misconduct. I would further hold that the discretion that rule vests in trial courts is broad and was not abused here. I believe that the action taken by the court below was proper and consistent with “the furtherance of justice.” I would affirm its judgment.
I dissent.
Rosellini and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Utter, J.
Petition for rehearing denied January 29,1976.

In State v. Cory, 62 Wn.2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019, 5 A.L.R.3d 1352 (1963), we reversed a criminal conviction because it was tainted by flagrant police misconduct, and ordered that the prosecution be dismissed with prejudice. Nowhere in that case was ROW 10.46.090 mentioned, however, and our dismissal order was apparently based simply on our inherent power to fashion appropriate remedies for constitutional violations. Later cases made it clear that, under that power, just as under CrR 8.3 (b), the decision to dismiss or not dismiss is largely discretionary with the trial court. State v. Baker, 78 Wn.2d 327, 332-33, 474 P.2d 254 (1970).

See, e.g., former Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. rule 239 (1956); Cal. Penal Code § 1385 (West 1970); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-3504 (1948); Iowa Code Ann. § 795.5 (1950); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 631.21 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 95-1703 (1969); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 210.40 (McKinney 1971); former N.D. Cent. Code § 29-18-04 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. 22 § 815 (1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.755 (1974); Utah Code Ann. § 77-51-4 (1953).

Cf. People v. Quill, 11 Misc. 2d 512, 513, 177 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1958): “The power to discontinue prosecution of a crime vested ... in the court has little or nothing to do with the legal or factual merits of the charge. Nor is it concerned with the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Such a dismissal, is concerned, as the statute states, solely with principles of justice.”