Court Opinion

ID: 9717367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:02:24.927181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.875338
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I must respectfully dissent because I believe the erroneous instructions given to the juries in cause Nos. 68603 and 69054 constituted plain error, requiring reversal of Feresi’s and Thomas’ convictions. Accordingly, I would affirm the appellate court opinions in these causes. The majority correctly rejects defendants’ argument that our opinion in Reddick is to bé understood as requiring reversal of those convictions arising from trials in which the defective jury instructions were used. (143 Ill. 2d at 445.) We concluded in Reddick that the defendants therein had not received a fair trial after finding that the juries had not been apprised of the prosecution’s burden of proof. (People v. Reddick (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 184, 198.) Subsequent decisions, as noted by the majority, have affirmed the Reddick principle. See, e.g., People v. Austin (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 118, 124. I do not disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, rather than automatically reversing a conviction and remanding for a new trial where improper instructions on voluntary manslaughter and murder were given to the jury, the instructions should be considered “in light of the record as a whole, including the evidence and arguments presented to the jury.” (143 Ill. 2d at 446.) However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the instructions in cause Nos. 68603 and 69054 were harmless error. In cause No. 68603, I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous instructions did not affect the jury’s deliberations. Flowers testified that Paretei precipitated the argument between Paretei and Fercsi by making sexual comments about Flowers’ daughter. After Paretei and Fercsi began arguing, Flowers left his room and was not a witness to the ensuing events. Fercsi testified that he also left Flowers’ room when Flowers left but Paretei followed him to his room and kicked in his door. Although the majority observes that the police did not discover any damage to Fercsi’s door, they did find blood in the hallway “leading to Flowers’ room” where Paretei’s body was found. (143 Ill. 2d at 449.) The evidence of the trail of blood from Fercsi’s room to Flowers’ door supports Fercsi’s testimony that Paretei pursued him into his room after Fersci and Flowers left Flowers’ room. In light of Flowers’ testimony that Paretei initiated the argument, and the physical evidence supporting Fercsi’s testimony that Paretei pursued him into his room, I believe that a properly instructed jury may have concluded that Paretei feared for his safety and believed that use of force was necessary to prevent death or serious harm to himself. In cause No. 69054, I believe there was sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could have concluded that Thomas believed that he needed to use force to defend himself, even if his belief was unreasonable. Thomas testified that Morris pointed out Archie and Jones as the two drove in Morris’ car and identified the two men as the ones who had “jumped” Thomas the night before. (143 Ill. 2d at 453.) Thomas testified that Morris told him that one of the two men was armed and urged him to take a gun he had hidden under the driver’s seat. There was no evidence that Thomas sought out these men or knew their whereabouts before Morris identified them to him, nor was evidence presented that Thomas was armed prior to Morris giving him his gun. Further, Archie testified that when Thomas approached the two men, Jones precipitated any contact among the men by asking Thomas if he had come back to “finish the fight.” (143 Ill. 2d at 452.) The majority notes that no evidence was found that Jones had a gun “or any other weapon” (143 Ill. 2d at 453), although Thomas testified that Archie had swung at him with an unidentified object. There was no evidence presented that Archie was unarmed. In light of this evidence, as well as the history of violence among these men, I cannot say that a properly instructed jury could not have concluded that Thomas believed he needed to use force to defend himself, whether or not that belief was reasonable.