Court Opinion

ID: 9468751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:22:46.562218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:02.246094
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring.
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, I concur in the position adopted by Judge McKay, to affirm the judgment of the district court.
In this case, Corriz, the plaintiff, was shot by a law officer and was later charged with a crime in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico. These acts were alleged to be wholly without justification; the case filed against Corriz was allegedly entirely devoid of substance. The plaintiff was again stopped on a subsequent occasion by other officers who sought to arrest him and, indeed, claimed that they had a warrant for his arrest. If they had such a warrant they did not execute it. On that occasion, the officers fired at him as he departed. All of this is set forth in the fact statement of Judge McKay.
*900Judge McKay has adopted the position that the question of possible double recovery is not reviewable because objections and exceptions were not made in the trial court. Judge McKay further concluded that the verdicts were not excessive, and that the instruction complained of by appellants on damages due to violation of constitutional rights was not erroneous.
Defendants objected to the trial court’s instructions on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the pendent state claims alleging malicious prosecution, and the claim based on false charges. Defendants also objected to submission to the jury of the plaintiff’s claim that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law. The ground advanced was not duplication in the federal and state claims; the objection was that there was insufficient evidence. Also objected to was the damage instruction, which listed the deprivation of various civil rights with elements of damages.
The final objection at issue here was the objection to Instruction No. 43, which stated in part that “the value of constitutional rights, while difficult to assess, must be considered great.” Defendants contend that this instruction improperly directed the jury to assess a large amount in damages for deprivation of constitutional rights, if the evidence showed that constitutional rights had been violated. The instruction as a whole is somewhat ambiguous. It can be read as an instruction that constitutional rights are valuable and important. If the judge had intended to tell the jury that the damages should be high he could have done so. In any event, the verdict was not excessive in light of the evidence.
The important factor is that the objections to the instructions reveal no suggestion of concern for double recovery. Defendants argued that there was not sufficient evidence to submit two of plaintiff’s theories to the jury, but did not argue that the claims overlapped or that the verdict forms were such that double recovery would be likely. Judge Barrett suggests, in his opinion, that defendants did make objection to Instructions No. 4 and 20 as “duplicitous,” and that from that objection the trial court was apprised that the “crux of the objections was the likelihood of double recovery.” I do not agree with this interpretation of the objections.
Instruction No. 4 contained all of plaintiff’s theories of relief. In objecting thereto, defendants only asserted that the malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed based on the evidence. Instruction No. 20 was objected to as being repetitious of Instruction No. 4, and on the ground that the evidence did not support the deprivation of liberty claim. But nowhere is there a specific objection that the plaintiff’s claims for relief were overlapping or duplicative.
It is important to be specific about the grounds for objection. There is a sound reason for this requirement. The requirement of precision is the only way to assure that the court shall have an opportunity to make corrections. The judge depends on counsel to point up deficiencies. Where the objections are in general terms, they do not serve the purpose. Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. (Emphasis added.)
The terms of the rule show that a general objection is not sufficient.
This court has repeatedly held that in the absence of a timely objection in accordance with Rule 51 in the trial court, alleged errors in instructions to the jury will not be considered on appeal.1 A general objection *901or an objection on other grounds is not adequate; the particular matter objected to must be specified.2 The same requirements are applicable where the form of verdict is attacked.3
It seems clear from the above that defendants’ contentions with regard to double recovery were not properly called to the court’s attention, and were not preserved for review. However, this court has recognized a narrow exception to the requirements of Rule 51 where there is plain error. Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978); Fiedler v. McKea Corp., supra.
[W]e will review instructions not properly objected to at trial where the error is plain and significant. This power is to be used sparingly. Pridgin v. Wilkinson, 296 F.2d 74 (10th Cir. 1961). Ordinarily we do not exercise it unless it is felt that the error “may well have been a generating factor which culminated in a verdict not warranted under the law,” id. at 76, or “where it is apparent on the face of the record that a miscarriage of justice may occur.” 5A Moore’s Federal Practice, Par. 51.04. Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 786 (10th Cir. 1978).4
If the jury had returned a general verdict in this case, there would be no plain error in the sums awarded against the various defendants. The evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to sustain such awards. It is not possible to tell at this point what the jury’s reasoning was in its allocation of amounts to the various counts. The jury may have awarded $2,273.00 under Count III as compensation for out-of-pocket type losses flowing from the battery, while all mental anguish and emotional damages re-suiting from that incident might have been awarded under Count I.
There were several different transactions and incidents which could have been the basis for the awards. As suggested, the amount awarded is within reasonable limits considering the seriousness of the invasions of plaintiff’s rights. Whatever lack of clarity there is in the verdicts could have been cured by specific instructions. Alternatively, specific verdict forms could have been provided which would have cured the problem entirely. It is the defendants’ failure to object or raise the question that precludes reversal, under the principles stated above.
Our decision in Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979) is relied on by Judge Barrett. In that case, the plaintiff had been abused by fellow prisoners while confined in a county jail. He sought to recover damages under state law and also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the defendant’s objections were general and somewhat vague as to the civil rights claim, the court found that the question of double recovery was adequately preserved for appeal. There was no discussion of Rule 51 and why it did not apply in that case.
Regardless of that, I believe that the Clappier case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Clappier, the plaintiff claimed to be entitled to damages based on essentially a single claim, abuse suffered while in prison. The plaintiff here sought to recover for a variety of alleged violations which occurred over a long period of time. Thus, the possibility of submitting duplicate claims for relief to the jury was far less likely here than in Clappier. In this case, in *902the absence of a pertinent objection, the trial court was entitled to assume that the form of the verdicts was proper. Moreover, this case, unlike Clappier, does not bespeak a double recovery.
Also, civil rights cases are not subject to a special rule different from Rule 51; the party who takes exception to the form of the verdict should make objection. He owes that to the court.
Judge McKay’s opinion also discusses Instruction No. 43 (the value of constitutional rights must be considered great), and I agree with his conclusion that this instruction was not erroneous and was not prejudicial.
For the reasons which are set forth above, I concur in the conclusion of Judge McKay.

. Pool v. Leone, 374 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 943, 88 S.Ct. 309, 19 L.Ed.2d 300; Iannacito v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 380 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1967); Locke v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 309 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1962); Sanders v. Buchanan, 407 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1967); Hidalgo Properties, *901Inc. v. Wachovia Mortgage Co., 617 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1980).

. Hardware Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lukken, 372 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1967); Rogers v. Northern Rio Arriba Electric Cooperative, Inc., 580 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1978).

. Fiedler v. McKea Corp., 605 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1979); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Lumbert, 401 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1968); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1852, 64 L.Ed.2d 272 (1980); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Fox, 361 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1966); Markel Service, Inc. v. National Farm Lines, 426 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1970).

. See also Glasscock v. Wilson Constructors, Inc., 627 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1980); Key v. Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1981); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 433 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1970).