Court Opinion

ID: 9931366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 20:07:47.32418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:30.126312
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Kirks, 2024-Ohio-468.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                             No. 112473
                 v.                              :

MARCUS KIRKS,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :

                                 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 8, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-22-668950-A

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and John Hirschauer, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Allison F. Hibbard, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

                Appellant Marcus Kirks (“appellant”) brings this appeal challenging his

conviction by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas of numerous charges

including aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and aggravated burglary.
After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

                         I. Factual and Procedural History

             This matter arises from the shooting death of 29-year-old Deandre

Graham (“Graham”) in October 2021. Graham had been dating Angel Brown

(“Brown”) on and off for over two years at the time of his death. On the night of the

shooting, Graham had gone over to Brown’s house, which was a duplex on East 47th

St. in Cleveland.

             Appellant is the former boyfriend of Brown. They had stopped seeing

each other in 2019 and had not spoken for some time until several weeks prior to

the shooting. At that time, they had run into each other at a gas station and had

become friendly again, texting and calling each other. Appellant’s number was saved

in Brown’s phone under the nickname “My Giant.”

              On the night in question, Brown and Graham had engaged in sexual

relations and later, Brown heard tapping on the back door, which was glass. She

looked out and because it was dark, she could only see a tall male with a silver

handgun. She told Graham about it, and he pulled her away from the window. He

looked out the window himself and was shot through the window. The bullet hit

him in the neck, and he died from the wound.

             In the ten days leading up to the shooting, Brown and appellant had

communicated via cell phone nearly every day. On the night of the shooting,

appellant called Brown several times after 2:30 a.m.; all of the calls went
unanswered. He then texted, “Well, I’m on my way,” and then “Tell yo (sic) side1 to

leave now.” These texts were sent just minutes prior to the shooting.

             Brown called appellant after the shooting and asked why he had called

her. He told her that he was drunk and did not remember the reason. He stated

that he was at The Dstrkt Lounge in Cleveland that night but that he was home at

2:54 a.m.

             A surveillance camera at a funeral home captured a silver Mercedes

Benz that drove by and parked near Brown’s residence. The video was not clear

enough to show the license plate of the vehicle; however, a 2015 silver Mercedes

Benz was registered to appellant. Police were able to utilize the footage from various

city surveillance cameras to track the vehicle as it had made its way from East 26th

St. and St. Clair Avenue, the direction of the Dstrkt Lounge, to the vicinity of Brown’s

residence. After the vehicle left the scene, cameras showed it heading eastbound

until around the intersection of St. Clair Avenue and Addison Road.

             Police were able to subpoena appellant’s cell phone number and

determine the area where his cell phone was located in the minutes prior to and after

the shooting.    At the time the homicide occurred, appellant’s cell phone had

connected to the cell phone tower that was in the general area of Brown’s residence.

      1 Brown testified that “side” meant “someone that you cheat on outside of your

relationship” and acknowledged that it was basically “someone that you’re sleeping with.”
She denied that Graham was a “side.”
             The day after the shooting, appellant began using a new cell phone with

a different number. He sent messages to his contacts telling them to erase his old

number and only use the new one.

               Appellant was arrested and told police that he had not seen or talked

to Brown in over a year and a half. When asked about what vehicles he owned or

that were registered to him, he did not mention the Mercedes Benz. Regarding his

cell phone, appellant denied using the number that had been subpoenaed by police

and denied that he had texted or called Brown.

              Appellant was charged with two counts of aggravated murder

(Counts 1 and 2), two counts of murder (Counts 3 and 4), three counts of felonious

assault (Counts 5, 6, and 8), one count of attempted murder (Count 7), two counts

of aggravated burglary (Counts 9 and 10), and four counts of having weapons while

under a disability (Counts 11 through 14). Counts 1 through 10 had accompanying

one- and three-year firearm specifications. Counts 11 through 14 also had forfeiture

specifications.

                  The day before trial was scheduled to begin, the state sought a

material witness warrant for Brown because it had been unable to locate her. The

state had issued subpoenas to multiple locations,2 and detectives had tried to contact

       2 In his brief and at oral argument, appellant, through counsel, disputed the state’s

assertion that it had served the subpoenas at “multiple locations” and accused the state of
making “patently false” representations regarding the issuance of the subpoenas, which
the state vehemently denied. As will be fully discussed below, we need not determine this
issue.
her numerous times. The court granted the warrant request but did not move the

trial.

                Brown later appeared at court that afternoon without the execution of

the warrant and voluntarily testified regarding Graham’s murder. The state also

presented the testimony of Rick Graham, the victim’s brother; Cleveland Police

Officer Stevie Green; Cleveland Police Detective Shane Bauhof; Macie Kalinowski, a

civilian analyst in the Cleveland Police Department Real Time Crime Center; Dr.

Thomas Gilson, the director of the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner and Crime

Laboratory; Eric Strick, a crime scene detective with the Cleveland Police

Department; Matthew Seabold, a crime analyst with the Cuyahoga County

Prosecutor’s Office; Cleveland Police Detective Lisette Gonzalez; Lisa Moore of the

DNA Department of the Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory;

Steven Gamble, who worked in Information Technology for the City of Cleveland,

Public Safety; Thomas Morgan, of the firearm and toolmark section of the Cuyahoga

County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory; and Cleveland Police Detective

Raymond Diaz.

                The jury found appellant guilty on all counts except the attempted

murder count, which related to Brown. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of

31 years to life. Appellant then filed the instant appeal, raising three assignments of

error for our review:

         1. The trial court erred in issuing a material witness warrant where the
         state’s efforts were insufficient to establish probable cause that a
      material witness warrant was necessary, and probable cause was not
      established that the witness would not appear at trial.

      2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to cell phone map
      testimony by a non-expert witness who was an employee of the
      Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office.

      3. Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the
      evidence; therefore, his convictions are in violation of the Ohio state
      constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
      States Constitution.

                              II. Law and Analysis

                         A. Material Witness Warrant

              In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

erred in granting a material witness warrant for Brown.

              Pursuant to R.C. 2937.16 through 2937.18 and R.C. 2941.48, a

material witness warrant may be issued to secure the presence and testimony of a

witness at trial. However, the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution must be observed in order to deprive witnesses of their

liberty. State ex rel. Dorsey v. Haines, 63 Ohio App.3d 580, 582, 579 N.E.2d 541

(2d Dist.1991). A material witness warrant “‘must be supported by probable cause,

supported by oath or affirmation, to believe that the witness is material and that the

detention of the witness is necessary to procure her attendance at trial.’” State v.

Hollins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103864, 2016-Ohio-5521, quoting Haines at 581.

             The requirements for the issuance of a material witness warrant set

forth above are necessary to protect the due process rights of the witness, not the

defendant. See State v. Eatmon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108786, 2020-Ohio-3592,
¶ 32, quoting Robinson v. Green, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0134, 2016-Ohio-

5688, ¶ 9, quoting Haines at 581. This court has previously noted that it “could find

no Ohio case where a defendant successfully appealed the grant of a material witness

warrant in an effort to vindicate the due process rights of a witness because the

warrant was not supported by probable cause, or oath or affirmation.” State v. Kidd,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109126, 2021-Ohio-503, ¶ 11. We further noted that

“[w]itnesses have the ability to vindicate these due process rights on their own.” Id.,

citing State v. Jeffery, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24850, 2012-Ohio-3104.

As such, a defendant lacks standing to raise potential violations of the rights of a

witness. State v. Rice, 2019-Ohio-1415, 135 N.E.3d 309, ¶ 44-50 (11th Dist.).

              In the case sub judice, appellant is not simply asserting the rights of

the witness but is also maintaining that his own rights were violated by the state

making “patently false” misrepresentations in order to obtain the warrant. We do

not need to resolve this issue, though, because the warrant was never executed and

Brown voluntarily testified at trial. Any argument regarding the warrant has

therefore been rendered moot.

              Appellant’s first assignment of error is therefore overruled.

                     B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

              In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his counsel

was ineffective by failing to object to cell phone map testimony by a nonexpert

witness. He contends that the evidence regarding the locations of towers to which

appellant’s cell phone connected on the night of the murder was unreliable and
should have been provided by an expert, rather than by Matthew Seabold

(“Seabold”), a crime analyst in the prosecutor’s office, who was merely a lay witness.

Further, appellant asserts that he was prejudiced by the testimony because the state

placed considerable weight on it, arguing that it was all they needed to convict him.

              In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been

different. State v. Jenkins, 2018-Ohio-483, 106 N.E.3d 216, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984). The defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test in order to prove

ineffective assistance of counsel. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109083, 2020-

Ohio-4138, at ¶ 28, citing Strickland at 687.

              Under Ohio law, “every properly licensed attorney is presumed to be

competent.” State v. Knight, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109302, 2021-Ohio-3674, ¶ 47,

citing State v. Black, 2019-Ohio-4977, 149 N.E.3d 1132, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985).            Therefore, when

“evaluating counsel’s performance on a claim of ineffective assistance counsel, the

court must give great deference to counsel’s performance and ‘indulge a strong

presumption’ that counsel’s performance ‘falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.’” Id., quoting Strickland at 689.
              “Objecting is a tactical decision.” State v. Frierson, 2018-Ohio-391,

105 N.E.3d 583,¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 16

JE 0002, 2016-Ohio-7937, ¶ 46. Accordingly, “‘the failure to make objections is not

alone enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” Id., quoting

State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 103.

              Regardless, we have repeatedly found cell phone map testimony by a

lay witness admissible. State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101648, 2015-Ohio-

3138, ¶ 43-46 (A layperson could compare the locations depicted on the phone

records to the corresponding location on the analyst’s site map.); State v. Daniel,

2016-Ohio-5231, 57 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 68-72 (8th Dist.) (testimony regarding a

comparison of cell phone date records to locations where crimes occurred does not

require “specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” regarding

cellular networks); State v. Bradford, 2018-Ohio-1417, 101 N.E.3d 710, ¶ 86 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Wilson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104333, 2017-Ohio-2980 (cell

phone tower mapping by a lay person permits an inference to be drawn by the

factfinder that the cell phone owner was in the area at the listed time and to

corroborate other evidence of the defendant’s presence at a crime scene); State v.

Lucus, 2020-Ohio-1602, 154 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 98 (8th Dist.) (testimony about the

defendant’s cell phone records, the location of the cellular tower defendant’s phone

connected to, or a map based on this information was admissible as lay testimony).

              In light of the foregoing, we find that Seabold’s testimony was

admissible as lay testimony. Accordingly, any objection by appellant’s trial counsel
to the presentation of such testimony would have been meritless. “The failure to do

a futile act cannot be the basis for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor

could such a failure be prejudicial.”      State v. New Bey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 109424, 2021-Ohio-1482, ¶ 58, citing State v. Kilbane, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 99485, 2014-Ohio-1228, ¶ 37.

              Appellant has not demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective or

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the cell phone map testimony.

Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                      C. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that his convictions

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that (1)

there was no DNA or ballistics linking him to the incident; (2) the cell phone tower

testimony was unreliable; (3) there was no testimony regarding the license plate of

the vehicle seen on the surveillance video in order to definitively tie it to appellant;

(4) there was no evidence that appellant knew where Brown lived; (5) there was no

evidence that appellant had any motive to harm Graham; and (6) Brown did not

believe that appellant was the shooter when questioned after the incident and only

identified him later after meeting with Graham’s brother.

              When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court

“‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Virostek, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).       A reversal on the basis that a

verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “‘only in the

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin at

175.

               As this court has previously stated:

       The criminal manifest weight of-the-evidence standard addresses the
       evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382,
       2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio
       St.3d at 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Under the manifest
       weight-of-the-evidence standard, a reviewing court must ask the
       following question: whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or
       the defendant’s? Wilson at id. Although there may be legally sufficient
       evidence to support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against the
       manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins at 387; State v. Johnson,
       88 Ohio St.3d 95, 2000-Ohio-276, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000).

       When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
       that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
       appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact
       finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Wilson at id., quoting
       Thompkins at id.

State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 86-87.

               In its role as the “thirteenth juror,” an appellate court must review

the entire record, weigh the direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, and consider the credibility of the witnesses to

determine “‘whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin.

“Direct evidence exists when ‘a witness testifies about a matter within the witness’s

personal knowledge such that the trier of fact is not required to draw an inference

from the evidence to the proposition that it is offered to establish.’” State v. Wachee,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110117, 2021-Ohio-2683, ¶ 36, quoting State v. Cassano, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97228, 2012-Ohio-4047, ¶ 13. Conversely, “circumstantial

evidence requires ‘the drawing of inferences that are reasonably permitted by the

evidence.’” Id., quoting id. “‘Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts by direct

evidence from which the trier of fact may infer or derive by reasoning other facts in

accordance with the common experience of mankind.’”             Id., quoting State v.

Hartman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90284, 2008-Ohio-3683, ¶ 37. “Circumstantial

evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value.” State v.

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus.

              In the instant matter, Brown testified that, at the time of the shooting,

it was very dark outside, and she could only see that someone was standing outside

with a gun who was tall and had a “bald or low cut.” She further testified to receiving

missed calls and text messages from “My Giant,” which was her nickname for

appellant, minutes prior to the shooting. The text messages stated that appellant

was “on [his] way” and that she should tell her “side” to leave.

              When police initially asked Brown if she thought the shooter was

appellant, she wanted to “give him the benefit of the doubt” and told them that she
was “almost sure that it wasn’t him.” However, Brown further testified that during

her second interview with police, she told them that she was sure the shooter was

appellant. She had called appellant the morning after the shooting on speakerphone

while her sister and Graham’s brother were present. During the call, she asked

appellant why he had called her the night of the murder and what time he got home.

He told her that he had been at The Dstrkt Lounge, was drunk, and had arrived home

at 2:54 a.m. Brown testified that she changed her mind and decided that appellant

was the perpetrator because of the text messages he sent and the specific time that

he stated he arrived home.

               In addition to Brown’s testimony, the prosecution presented a strong

circumstantial case to establish the identity of the shooter. “Although there are

obvious differences between direct and circumstantial evidence, those differences

are irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence — circumstantial evidence

carries the same weight as direct evidence.” Cassano at ¶ 13, citing State v. Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d 460, 485, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). “A conviction can be sustained

based on circumstantial evidence alone.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 124,

580 N.E.2d 1 (1991), citing State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 154-55, 529 N.E.2d

1236 (1988).

               In this case, the state presented the cell phone mapping data that

showed appellant near The Dstrkt Lounge and then moving eastbound toward

Brown’s residence. At the time the shooting occurred and the 911 call was made,
appellant’s cell phone had connected with the tower that was in the general area of

the crime scene.

              In addition, there was testimony presented that Brown and appellant

were previously in a relationship. They had reconnected in the weeks prior to

Graham’s murder and had been communicating via cell phone. Appellant lied

during his interview with police and stated that he had not talked to Brown. The

state presented the text messages sent between appellant and Brown since they had

reconnected, including the ones sent by appellant minutes before the shooting,

stating that he was on his way and telling her to have her “side” leave.

              Further, a silver Mercedes Benz was seen on surveillance video driving

from The Dstrkt Lounge to East 47th St., which the jury was able to view. The vehicle

stopped on East 47th St. for a few minutes, then departed, heading east. Appellant

had registered a 2015 silver Mercedes Benz in his name only three months prior to

the murder. Yet, when police asked him to list the vehicles registered in his name,

he did not mention the Mercedes Benz.

              Brown had appellant’s number saved in her phone under “My Giant”

and mentioned the same to him during their initial text messages after reconnecting

at the gas station. But when asked by police about the nickname, appellant denied

any knowledge of it.

              Regarding the lack of direct physical evidence linking appellant to the

shooting, as we have explained, circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are

indistinguishable so far as the jury’s fact-finding function is concerned. All that is
required of the jury is that it weighs all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial,

against the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Having reviewed the

entire record, we cannot say the jury in this case clearly lost its way and created such

a manifest miscarriage of justice that appellant’s convictions must be reversed and

a new trial ordered.

               Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                     III. Conclusion

               The trial court did not err in ordering the material witness warrant,

and appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.            Appellant’s

convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

               All of appellant’s assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

       It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

       The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.             The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR