Court Opinion

ID: 9928810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:53.726439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:49.005446
License: Public Domain

J-A25022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: M.L.F., A MINOR                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: P.A.F., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 616 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered April 28, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
                                2023 AD 13

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                         FILED: January 26, 2024

       P.A.F. (“Father”) appeals from the decree involuntary terminating his

parental rights to his two-year-old daughter, M.L.F. (“the Child”), pursuant to

the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)(5)(8) and (b).1 After careful

review, we affirm.

       Mother and Father have a prior history with Blair County Children and

Youth Services (“the Agency”) concerning other children. In 2014, Father’s

parental rights to another child were involuntarily terminated, and the child

was ultimately adopted. In 2017, Mother and Father’s parental rights were

terminated regarding the Child’s older sibling and that child was ultimately

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Child’s mother is B.M.B. (“Mother”).   Although the orphans’ court also
terminated her parental rights, she is not a party to this appeal.
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adopted.    See In re: A.A.F., 188 A.3d 518 (Pa. Super. 2018) (non-

precedential decision).

      In the instant case, the Child was removed from her parents’ care

shortly after her birth in December 2021 due to concerns raised by the hospital

personnel regarding the parents’ ability to provide appropriate care for a

newborn. The Agency subsequently obtained emergency protective custody

of the Child on January 3, 2022, after it became aware that a family placement

resource was no longer available.     Because the issues and concerns that

existed at prior proceedings continued at the time of the Child’s birth, the

Agency filed a dependency petition.     Following two hearings, the orphans’

court adjudicated the Child dependent on March 31, 2022. The court granted

the Agency legal and physical custody of the Child. The Child was to remain

with the foster care family where she was placed shortly after her birth.

      Based upon the opinion of Dr. Terry O’Hara, who conducted updated

psychological evaluations of both parents, the initial permanency goal was

reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption. Dr. O’Hara provided specific

treatment recommendations for Father including: 1) fully cooperate with all

recommended services and treatment; 2) participate in outpatient individual

mental health therapy; 3) participate in non-offender’s/IPV intervention

addressing protective capacity concerns; and 4) undergo a psychiatric

consultation to determine if medication management was appropriate. Father

was also to engage in parenting classes, with the goal of assessing his capacity

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to care for the Child independently, and to fully cooperate with the Agency’s

caseworkers, the service providers, and the guardian ad litem.

        Multiple permanency review hearings were held in 2022 and 2023. On

April 10, 2023, the Agency filed petitions to involuntary terminate the parental

rights of both Mother and Father.       As a result, the April 25, 2023 review

hearing also addressed the termination petitions.       At the April 25, 2023,

hearing, the Agency presented the testimony from a service provider, one of

its employees, and the Child’s Foster Mother. Father also testified, as well as

Anjelique Gorba, a licensed outpatient therapist with Blair Family Solutions,

who has provided individual and couples’ counseling to the parents. Following

the close of evidence on April 25, 2023, counsel provided closing arguments.

The parties agreed that the same attorney could act as Child’s guardian ad

litem and represent her legal interests. This counsel opined that termination

of Father’s parental rights would be in the Child’s best interests.

        By decree entered April 28, 2023, the orphans’ court terminated

Father’s rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2),(5), (8) and (b).        Father

appealed. Both Father and the orphans’ court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Father raises the following issues:

        I.    Whether the court erred in finding that the evidence
              presented by the Agency had sufficiently met the clear and
              convincing burden required for termination of parental
              rights under 23 [Pa.]C.S.A. Section 2511(a).

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       II.      Whether the court erred in placing too much weight on
                environmental factors and circumstances of Father, which is
                prohibited by 23 [Pa.]C.S.A. Section 2511(b).

Father’s Brief at 3.2

       We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

             The standard of review in termination of parental rights
             cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
             and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
             supported by the record. If the factual findings are
             supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
             court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
             decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
             upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
             partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
             decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
             the record would support a different result. We have
             previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
             often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
             multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

       Our Supreme Court has stated that in termination cases, deference to

the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580,

597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa.

2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive case

involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should review

the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports that
____________________________________________

2 By letter dated November 21, 2023, the Agency informed this Court that it

would not be filing a brief, but that its “position mirrors the sentiment set
forth” in the orphans’ court’s “well-reasoned [Rule] 1925(a) opinion and
remains in full support of the conclusions generated therein.” The Child’s
guardian ad litem and legal counsel has not filed a brief.

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trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record for

contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must

affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary

determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
         2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
         child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). We need only

agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as

well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the court’s decree. In re B.L.W.,

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843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc); see also C.S., 761 A.2d at

1201.

        Here, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)(5)(8) and (b). In his brief, Father complains that

the orphans’ court did not discuss each subsection individually. See Father’s

Brief at 24. For his part, Father argues that the Agency only met its burden

in proving that the Child has been out of his care for a twelve-month period.

See infra.    Thus, we focus on Section 2511(a)(8), which provides as follows:

           (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
           child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
           following grounds:

           (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
           by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
           agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
           removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
           removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
           termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
           and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

        To prove this subsection, the Agency must establish the following three

elements: “(1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent

for at least twelve months; (2) that the conditions which led to removal or

placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.” Interest of M.E., 283

A.3d 820, 832 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).       Unlike other Section

2511(a) subsections, subsection (a)(8) “does not require the court to evaluate

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a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the

placement” of the child. Id. Instead, the relevant inquiry “is whether the

conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus whether

reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” Id.

      Importantly, under this subsection, the court “shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described [in the termination

petition] which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing

of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This provision may seem harsh as

it prohibits the court from considering the parent’s recent progress. However,

as this Court has explained:

             [B]y allowing for termination when the conditions that led
      to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute
      implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
      while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
      assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
      subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
      stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
      Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates
      only a short period of time, to wit [eighteen] months, in which to
      complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child
      who has been placed in foster care.

M.E., 283 A.3d at 832 (citation omitted).

      Finally, although Section 2511(a) focuses generally on the parent’s

behavior, the third of element of subsection (a)(8) centers on the child’s

needs, thereby encompassing the needs and welfare analysis typically

reserved until the court’s Section 2511(b) analysis.

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     Here, the orphans’ court concluded that the Agency had proven, by clear

and convincing evidence, the statutory grounds for termination under Section

2511(a)(8). The court first summarized the expert testimony presented:

            Dr. O’Hara, a forensic psychologist who conducted global
     psychological evaluations of both parents on 3/2/22 and
     11/14/22, noted that he has likewise evaluated the parents
     previously during the dependency proceedings associated with
     their prior child, A.A.F., (proceedings for whom this court also
     presided over in 2016-2017).         More specifically, testimony
     established that Dr. O’Hara’s evaluations consisted of a review of
     collateral source information, an individual psychological
     evaluation of each parent and an interactional component that
     consisted of observing each parent interacting with [the Child] on
     an individual basis. The highlights of Dr. O’Hara’s testimony
     included his belief that, notwithstanding the length of time [the
     Child] had been in care or the services already provided, neither
     parent was capable of effectuating reunification.

           Namely, Dr. O’Hara expressed concern over the fact that
     [the Child’s] paternal grandfather (who by [Father’s] own
     testimony was previously diagnosed with schizophrenia and is
     currently unmedicated) continued to reside in the family residence
     and refused to partake in an evaluation to assess the current state
     of his mental health. This concern, coupled with his concern of
     the parent’s lack of protective capacity, resulted in Dr. O’Hara
     “strongly” recommending against unsupervised contact between
     the parents and [the Child]. In fact, Dr. O’Hara followed up his
     testimony with an explicit warning that any unsupervised contact
     permitted between [the Child] and her parents would place [the
     Child] at risk for exposure to inter partner violence, potential
     neglect, and safety concerns.

            Moreover, Dr. O’Hara would go on to cite [Mother’s]
     cognitive limitations and both [parents’] inability to take
     responsibility for any of their actions as ongoing areas of concern.
     Dr. O’Hara further testified that while [Father] had shown some
     positive parenting skills on an individual level, he did not believe
     either parent was capable of making the type of substantive gains
     necessary to allow for reunification to occur in a reasonable
     amount of time. This was particularly problematic when viewed
     in conjunction with [the Child’s] young age and the length of time

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      she has already been in care, as Dr. O’Hara concluded his
      testimony by noting that any delay in her achieving permanency
      in a safe, stable environment could result in her manifesting
      significant developmental problems moving forward. Dr. O’Hara
      stated that the opinions set forth in his testimony, as well as those
      noted in his evaluations, (which were submitted into the record as
      exhibits), were made within a reasonable degree of psychological
      certainty.

Orphans’ Court’s Opinion, 6/13/23, at 5-7 (excess capitalization and citations

omitted).

      The   orphans’   court   next   summarized     the   testimony    from   a

representative of Kids First, the service provider used by the Agency to work

toward the goal of reunification:

             The overarching concerns expressed by Dr. O’Hara were
      largely echoed by [the Agency’s] reunification provider’s
      testimony. More specifically, Ms. Cameron testified that she not
      only worked with the family for the duration of the reunification
      services provided during the present case (from 3/15/22 until
      4/4/22), but also during the parents attempted reunification with
      their older child, A.A.F.         It is significant to note that
      notwithstanding the reunification efforts made by Kids First during
      their involvement with A.A.F., the lack of progress made by the
      parents in that case resulted in their parental rights being
      terminated to that child who was subsequently adopted. Over the
      course of her involvement with the parents in [the Child’s] case,
      which lasted slightly over one year, Ms. Cameron testified that she
      not only saw the parents make no progress towards effectuating
      reunification with [the Child], but that she had even more
      concerns regarding the viability of this goal now when compared
      to the initiation of her services in March of 2022[.]

            More specifically, Ms. Cameron noted that the parents
      lacked the ability to consistently provide the [Child] with basic
      necessities, even in a supervised setting. Problems with feeding
      [the Child], as well as understanding her age[-]appropriate cues,
      remained problematic throughout Ms. Cameron’s involvement. In
      addition, the parents were noted to frequently lose focus and/or
      interest in providing care for and nurturing [the Child] during their

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       visits. Notably, neither parent ever acknowledged any of these
       fundamental issues as problems and rather spen[t] their time
       casting blame on the providers, the system, or anyone else they
       perceived to have wronged them as the sources of their problems.
       In fact, the [parents’] own testimony illustrated their belief that
       [the Child] should not only be returned to their care immediately,
       but that [the Child] should have never been placed outside their
       care in the first place.

              Moreover, Ms. Cameron went on to note that if the
       [parents’] contentions were not directed outward, they would
       often fight with each other during their visits, which create[d]
       enough tension that it began to negatively affect [the Child].
       [Foster Mother] noted during her testimony on 1/19/23 [that the
       Child’s] behavior and demeanor would dramatically change after
       the supervised visits with her parents had concluded. Namely,
       [the Child] would . . . exhibit night terrors, and would become
       much more clingy than usual for several days immediately after
       her visits with [Mother and Father]. In contrast, during her
       4/25/23 testimony, [Foster Mother] stated that she noticed a
       significant reduction in these behaviors since [the Child’s] visits
       with her parents had ceased earlier that month.[3]

             Ms. Cameron would go on to highlight her significant
       ongoing concern with the presence of the paternal grandfather in
       the family residence. More specifically, Ms. Cameron noted that
       during her last interaction with the paternal grandfather during
       her involvement with A.A.F., he was observed to be pacing back
       and forth in an aggressive fashion, mumbling to himself. Ms.
       Cameron noted that she was so alarmed by his behavior, she
       refused to provide reunification services in the family residence,
       as she viewed the paternal grandfather’s presence alone as a
       potential safety concern, even with providers present.
       Furthermore, beyond the specific parenting concerns, the
       [parents’] interpersonal issues only worsened over time,
       ultimately culminating in the parents separating as a couple at the
       end of March 2023. Nevertheless, as of the date of their 4/25/23
       hearing, the parents continued to live together, along with [the
       Child’s] paternal grandfather. [Father] acknowledged during his
____________________________________________

3 Father acknowledges that he had “discontinued services with” Kids First

“and requested a switch to another provider immediately prior to the TPR
hearing.” Father’s Brief at 14.

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      own testimony that the household bills were funded by [the]
      monthly SSI payments [Mother] and paternal grandfather
      received. Although [Father] claimed to be searching for a new
      residence, he acknowledged the fact that even if a residence was
      located, he possessed no independent source of income to fund
      his transition, as he did not have a job and did not receive any
      SSI benefits himself.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/13/23, at 7-9.

      After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its

discretion when it concluded that the conditions that led to the Child’s removal

continue to exist, and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the

Child’s best interest. In seeking a reversal, Father argues as follows:

             [Father] avers that the only element of [Section 2511(a)(2),
      (5), and (8)] proven by the [Agency] through clear and convincing
      evidence is a twelve-month period having elapsed from the date
      of removal. The evidence presented by the Agency was drastically
      inadequate to demonstrate that [Father] was unwilling or unable
      to remedy the conditions set forth in the underlying adjudicatory
      petition.

             In fact, with evidence that [Father] attended most visits
      with [the Child], was sufficiently capable of tending to her needs,
      and took further steps to address his own protective capacity over
      her, illustrates the exact opposite. While [Father] is not perfect,
      the underlying concerns of the Agency were adequately remedied,
      [Father] readily, if not eagerly, continued his growth as a parent
      to demonstrate his impassioned commitment to reunifying with
      [the Child].

             Father noted, without hesitation, his willingness to separate
      himself from [paternal grandfather and Mother] if it meant [the
      Child’s] return. He emotionally professed the fatherly love and
      care he held for [the Child]. Despite these ample measures taken
      in the reunification process, the court terminated his rights against
      the weight of the evidence presented.

Father’s Brief at 21-22 (formatting altered).

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      Our review of the record refutes Father’s claims that he has taken

“ample measures” to support the reunification with the Child; rather, our

review supports the orphan’s court’s conclusion that the conditions which led

to the Child’s removal and placement still exist. As mentioned above, Section

2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s willingness or

ability to remedy the conditions that led to the placement of the child, but

rather, the focus is on whether those conditions have been remedied to the

extent that “reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the

hearing.” M.E., supra.

      The record reveals that Father’s reunification with the Child was not

imminent. In his brief, Father complains that he only had a nine-month period

to remedy these conditions. Father’s Brief at 16. We disagree.         In short,

the record establishes that Father has made no progress in remedying the

conditions that led to the Child’s removal—the same conditions that led to the

older sibling’s removal almost seven years ago.

      Although Father stated his desire to separate himself from Mother and

paternal grandfather at the final evidentiary hearing, the three continue to live

together.   Moreover, Father proffered no evidence that he as seeking

employment, but rather appeared to be waiting to see if the denial of his

application for SSI benefits will be reversed on appeal. Finally, while Father

emphasized the testimony presented by the Blair Family Solutions counselor,

this witness acknowledged that she had never observed Father’s interaction

with the Child. See N.T., 4/25/23, at 82. As noted above, this Court will not

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countenance a delay in seeking permanency while a parent works to correct

his or her deficiencies. See id.

      In sum, there is ample evidence to support the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that the Agency met its burden of proof to terminate under Section

2511(a)(8).

      Next, we consider whether the termination was proper under Section

2511(b). That section provides:

         (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
         rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). With regard to this section, our Supreme Court has

stated as follows:

         [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
         met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs
         and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
         include [i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
         stability.... [T]his Court held that the determination of the
         child's “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
         emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
         attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child
         of permanently severing the parental bond. However, as

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         discussed below, evaluation of a child's bonds is not always
         an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (internal case citations omitted).

      As our Supreme Court has recently noted, “courts should consider the

matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their] developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.”          In the

Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). Moreover, in K.T., the

Court reaffirmed that “the parental bond is but one part of the overall

subsection (b) analysis.” Id. at 1113. Courts must consider multiple other

factors including: (1) the child’s need for permanency and length of time in

foster care; (2) whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and bond with the

foster parents; and (3) whether the foster home meets the child’s needs. Id.

      Here, the orphans’ court first summarized the Agency’s evidence

relevant to Section 2511(b) as follows:

      In contrast to the significant, ongoing concerns [the court] finds
      with regard to both parents, [the Child’s] transition into the []
      foster home has been very positive. [Foster Mother] testified to
      a strong, positive bond that existed between [the Child] and her
      foster parents, as well as to how well she has become incorporated
      into their family unit. This sentiment was shared by [the Agency],
      who noted they had no concerns with [the Child’s] care while in
      the care of [the foster parents]. [Foster Mother] went on to
      confirm that she and her husband were willing to be adoptive
      resources for [the Child] in the event the court was inclined to
      grant [the Agency’s] requested goal change and TPR petitions.
      [The Agency] likewise testified to their approval of [foster parents]
      being identified as [the Child’s] adoptive resources moving
      forward.

Orphans’ Court’s Opinion, 6/16/23, at 9 (excess capitalization omitted),

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      Based on this evidence, the orphans’ court concluded that it served the

Child’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. Our review of the

record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion. At the April 25, 2023 hearing,

Father did not testify about his bond with the Child. Father provided little, if

any, evidence or argument regarding his bond with the Child or how its

severance would harm her.

      Likewise, Father’s brief does not contain averments about the bond, but

rather, argues that the orphan’s court gave too much weight to financial and

other environmental factors. Father is correct that Section 2511(b) prohibits

termination based solely on environmental factors. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b). However, the record does not support his contention that the basis

of the court’s Section 2511(b) analysis was improper. Thus, we conclude the

court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined that the

termination of Father’s rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

Child under Section 2511(b).

      In sum, we hold that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion or

commit an error of law in terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

      Decree affirmed.

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DATE: 01/26/2024

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