Court Opinion

ID: 9691731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 00:00:26.646196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:19.903107
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30169      Document: 00516871311          Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/24/2023

                              REVISED August 24, 2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                             FILED
                                                                      July 26, 2023
                                   No. 22-30169
                                 ____________                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                          Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                               Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                        versus

   Christopher Kinzy,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:21-CR-102-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.*
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:**
          Christopher Kinzy pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm
   after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and
   was sentenced to a term of 87 months’ imprisonment. He appeals his
   sentence, arguing that his state conviction for resisting an officer does not
   qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, and that

          _____________________
          * Judge Barksdale concurs in the judgment only.

          ** This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                       No. 22-30169

   the district court lacked a reliable factual foundation for imposing a four-level
   enhancement for having committed the offense in connection with another
   felony.
             Although we conclude that the district court erred in determining that
   Kinzy’s prior conviction was a crime of violence, we nonetheless AFFIRM.

                                           I.
             Kinzy’s conviction in this case arises out of a traffic stop on January
   25, 2021, in Kenner, Louisiana.         According to the presentence report
   (“PSR”), a police officer pulled Kinzy over because the officer was unable to
   read Kinzy’s vehicle’s tinted license plate. The windows of the car were also
   heavily tinted. When the officer approached the vehicle, he saw a firearm
   near Kinzy’s lap. The officer instructed Kinzy to put his hands out the
   window, and when the officer grabbed Kinzy’s hands, Kinzy began pulling
   his hands inward, toward the firearm. According to the PSR, while reaching
   for the gun, Kinzy said, “I’m not going back to jail. I’m going to shoot you.
   I’ll kill you.” Then, “[a] struggle ensued and [officers] were able to disarm
   [Kinzy] and remove him from the vehicle.” Then, while Kinzy was being
   handcuffed, he elbowed an assisting officer in the chest, causing the officer
   to lose his grip on Kinzy. Kinzy then pushed the officer to the ground.
   According to the PSR, the officer sustained “an internal injury to his upper
   body” requiring “immediate hospitalization and surgery for pectoralis and
   major muscle repair to his right shoulder.”
             On August 12, 2021, a grand jury indicted Kinzy on one count of
   possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18
   U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On December 14, 2021, Kinzy pleaded guilty without a
   written plea agreement.

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          Kinzy’s PSR calculated a base offense level of 20, pursuant to
   U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), because he committed the firearm offense after
   sustaining a felony conviction for a “crime of violence.” 1 The PSR cited
   Kinzy’s March 18, 2019, conviction for resisting police with force or
   violence, in violation of Louisiana Rev. Stat. § 14:108.2. The PSR also
   included a four-point increase in his offense level under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for
   using or possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense,
   noting that Kinzy “threatened to shoot and/or kill” the officer during the
   traffic stop. Kinzy received a three-point reduction for his acceptance of
   responsibility. Based on his total offense level of 21 and his criminal history
   category of VI, Kinzy’s guideline range was 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment.
          Kinzy filed written objections to the PSR’s base offense level,
   asserting that his prior conviction for resisting police by force or violence is
   not a “crime of violence.”          Kinzy also objected to the four-level
   enhancement, denying that he threatened to shoot or kill an officer and
   denying that he reached for the firearm. Kinzy contended that, during the
   traffic stop, he was “tackled by multiple officers; one of his teeth [was]
   knocked out and another was broken by the officers.”
          The Government opposed Kinzy’s objections, attaching the probable-
   cause affidavit and a crime report in support of the four-level enhancement.
   The Government also asserted that Kinzy’s state conviction for resisting
          _____________________
          1   The enhancement at issue also covers prior felony convictions for a
   “controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The U.S. Probation
   Office originally maintained that Kinzy’s base offense level was 20 because of his
   having a prior “controlled substance offense.” But the Government agreed with
   Kinzy’s objection that his drug conviction was not a “controlled substance
   offense,” and the PSR was revised in a supplemental addendum to reflect the
   “crime of violence” predicate, rather than the “controlled substance offense”
   predicate. The base offense level remained 20.

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   police with force or violence constituted a crime of violence.               The
   Government argued that the underlying state statute is divisible and that the
   offense described in the subsection at issue is a crime of violence under the
   Sentencing Guidelines. The Government submitted the charging document
   from the state conviction, and the U.S. Probation Office supplemented that
   documentation with the transcript from Kinzy’s plea hearing in state court.
          At Kinzy’s sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that the
   Louisiana statute forming the basis of Kinzy’s predicate conviction was
   divisible and that the charging document showed that Kinzy’s conviction
   qualified as a crime of violence. The district court also overruled Kinzy’s
   objection to the four-level enhancement, finding that the PSR was accurate
   and reliable.
          The district court sentenced Kinzy to 87 months of imprisonment and
   three years of supervised release. At the end of the hearing, the Government
   asked the court if it had considered the alternative guideline range suggested
   by Kinzy. The court responded: “The sentence that I crafted is what I
   believe is appropriate for the defendant in this case. It reflects the seriousness
   of his offense, his criminal history, and also protects the public. And I would
   have imposed the same sentence under either scenario to answer your
   question.”
          Kinzy timely appealed. He argues that the district court erred by
   assigning him a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4) on the
   basis that he had a prior felony conviction for a “crime of violence,” and by
   imposing a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for
   committing the offense in connection with another felony, i.e., threatening to
   shoot or kill the arresting officer.

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                                         II.
          We begin with the simpler of Kinzy’s two challenges on appeal. Kinzy
   contests the district court’s imposition of a four-point enhancement under
   U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with
   another felony. Under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), a defendant’s offense level is
   increased by four points if he “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition
   in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
   Kinzy’s PSR recommended application of the enhancement because Kinzy
   “threatened to shoot and/or kill” the police officer during his arrest. Kinzy
   objected to the enhancement, denying that he made such a threat, and the
   district court overruled the objection and imposed the enhancement, finding
   the PSR sufficiently reliable and “supported by a proper investigation.”
          “In determining whether a Guidelines enhancement applies, the
   district court is allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the facts, and
   these inferences are fact findings reviewed for clear error.” United States v.
   Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 708 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Caldwell,
   448 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2006)). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous
   “if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Zuniga,
   720 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing United States v.
   Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2011)). A factual finding is clearly
   erroneous if the evidence as a whole leaves the reviewing court “with the
   definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Coleman,
   609 F.3d at 708 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir.
   2001)).

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          Kinzy disputes the facts of his offense and thus challenges the factual
   foundation for imposition of the enhancement. 2 “The proponent of an
   adjustment to the defendant’s base offense level bears the burden of
   establishing the factual predicate ‘by a preponderance of the relevant and
   sufficiently reliable evidence.’” United States v. Aguilar-Alonzo, 944 F.3d
   544, 549 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 781 F.3d 237,
   249 (5th Cir. 2015)). Generally, a PSR’s factual recitation “bears sufficient
   indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence by the sentencing judge in
   making factual determinations.” United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230
   (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted).           A district court may
   therefore “adopt the facts contained in a PSR without further inquiry if those
   facts have an adequate evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability
   and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence or otherwise
   demonstrate that the information in the PSR is unreliable.” Id. (cleaned up)
   (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2007)). To rebut
   facts in a PSR that are supported by adequate evidence, a defendant must
   submit “evidence demonstrating that those facts are ‘materially untrue,
   inaccurate or unreliable.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Huerta, 182 F.3d 361,
   364-65 (5th Cir. 1999)). “Mere objections are generally insufficient,” but an
   objection “may sufficiently alert the district court to questions regarding the
   reliability of the evidentiary basis for the facts contained in the PSR.” United
   States v. Fields, 932 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting
   Harris, 702 F.3d at 230 & n.3).
          Here, the PSR recommended the enhancement based on Kinzy’s
   threat to shoot or kill the arresting officer, and Kinzy filed an objection,
          _____________________
          2  Importantly, Kinzy does not dispute that the facts, if true, support the
   enhancement as a matter of law. We therefore assume without deciding that the
   asserted conduct satisfies the language of the enhancement.

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   writing through counsel that he “denies ever threatening to shoot or kill any
   officer.” Counsel continued:
          [Kinzy] also denies reaching for the firearm at any time. To the
          contrary, he fully complied by stopping his vehicle, rolling his
          window or leaving his window rolled down, and reaching his
          hands out of his car window when instructed to do so. He
          pulled one arm back from the officer’s tight grip but that was
          because he was attempting to get away from the firearm by
          opening his car door. He repeatedly asked the officers to let
          him open the door to get out of his vehicle. He was eventually
          tackled by multiple officers; one of his teeth were knocked out
          and another was broken by the officers. He did not
          intentionally injure, threaten, or attempt to injure any officer.
          The U.S. Probation Office reviewed Kinzy’s objection and
   maintained the enhancement in the final PSR, writing that “[b]ased upon the
   probation officer’s independent investigation of the investigative material in
   this case, the information contained in this section of the PSR is accurate, has
   an indicia of reliability, and can be supported by the investigative material.”
   The Probation Office attached the arrest report and probable-cause affidavit
   from the Kenner Police Department to support its finding. The affidavit
   states that, when the arresting officer grabbed Kinzy’s hands, Kinzy
   “immediately began pulling his hands away from the arresting officer and
   pulling his hands towards the firearm in his lap in an attempt to grab it while
   saying ‘I’m not going back to jail. I’m going to shoot you. I’ll kill you.’”
   The affidavit is sworn to and subscribed on January 26, 2021, the day after
   the arrest.
          After the Probation Office’s rejection of defendant’s challenge, the
   Government also responded to Kinzy’s objection, arguing, along similar
   lines, that the facts in the PSR were supported by evidence from the Kenner
   Police Department, including the probable-cause affidavit describing the

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   event in detail. In addition to the affidavit, the Government also attached a
   “crime report” naming three police officers as victims of an assault on a law
   enforcement officer and noting that one of the officers had a “possibly torn
   pectoral muscle” as a result of the incident.            The report identifies
   Christopher Kinzy as the suspect, lists three additional witnesses, and states
   that Kinzy “threatened to kill officer during traffic stop, with firearm.” The
   report also contains a five-page single-spaced “narrative” attachment
   authored by a responding officer and time-stamped on January 30, 2021, five
   days after the incident. The narrative proceeds moment by moment and
   recounts the interaction in significant detail. The narrative says, in relevant
   part:
           Kinzy then placed his hands outside the window. However,
           immediately upon doing so, Christopher Kinzy reached his
           right arm down towards the handgun in his lap. Officer Lawler,
           fearing Christopher Kinzy was attempting to grab the handgun
           and discharge it at Officers, quickly grabbed Christopher
           Kinzy’s right wrist with his left hand. Officer Lawler, with his
           handgun still in his right hand, then pulled Christopher
           Kinzy’s right wrist towards the window. It was at this time,
           Officer Gagliano arrived to assist. Officer Gagliano positioned
           himself at the front driver’s side window of the white Charger
           and observed Christopher Kinzy pull away from Officer Lawler
           and towards the firearm in his lap. Officer Gagliano was able
           to quickly gain control of Christopher Kinzy’s left wrist by
           grabbing it with both hands.
           . . . Officer Lawler felt Christopher Kinzy stiffen his right arm.
           Officer Gagliano[] simultaneously began pulling Christopher
           Kinzy’s left arm outside the window, away from the firearm.
           Christopher Kinzy then began aggressively pulling his arms
           away from Officers Lawler and Gagliano, pulling Officer
           Lawler and Gagliano aggressively into the side of the white
           Charger so strongly that the entire vehicle was swaying side to
           side. Officer Lawler tightened his grip on Christopher Kinzy’s

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          wrist, and pushed off of the white Charger in order to combat
          Christopher Kinzy’s attempts to break free and arm himself
          with the handgun. When Christopher Kinzy initially reached
          for the handgun, and while Officers Lawler and Gagliano were
          attempting to restrict his wrists, Christopher Kinzy was
          continuously and loudly yelling “I’m not going back to jail. I’m
          going to shoot you. I’ll kill you.”
          . . . During the entirety of the above described struggle, the
          firearm in the lap of Christopher Kinzy was in his immediate
          control and arm span. Officer Lawler was also commanding
          Christopher Kinzy to stop resisting and to not reach for the
          handgun during the struggle.
          Following issuance of the final PSR and submission of these
   evidentiary materials, Kinzy filed a sentencing memorandum, in which he
   again contested the facts of the arrest through counsel and “maintain[ed]
   that he did not threaten to shoot or kill any officer.” He pointed out that,
   “although the arresting officers originally charged him with aggravated
   assault with a firearm and battery on an officer, those charges were rejected
   by the state prosecutors well before the case went federal.” Kinzy also
   contended that the arresting officers had been sued for conduct arising out of
   circumstances similar to those of Kinzy’s arrest. Kinzy did not attach any
   evidence in support of his account of the arrest.
          In light of this record evidence, Kinzy’s challenge to the district
   court’s factual finding supporting the enhancement fails. The Government
   offers extensive evidence in support of the fact that Kinzy threatened to shoot
   or kill the officers, in the form of a sworn arrest affidavit and a detailed
   narrative attached to a crime report. Kinzy, on the other hand, offers no
   evidence and instead rests on his unsworn assertions made through counsel.
   This is not sufficient to rebut the PSR’s facts. See United States v. Rodriguez,
   602 F.3d 346, 363 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that the PSR was not rebutted by
   a defendant’s objections to the PSR because objections are “not evidence”

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   and are “merely ‘unsworn assertions’” (emphasis in original) (citations
   omitted)).
          Kinzy argues that he “could not provide any direct evidence to
   corroborate his account,” “because he had none.” But this is wrong. Kinzy
   could have at least submitted his own sworn affidavit contradicting the
   officers’ version of the arrest. He did not do so, nor does he attempt to
   explain why not. See United States v. Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1990)
   (finding no error where the defendant “did not request an evidentiary
   hearing on the issue, nor did he submit affidavits or other sworn testimony to
   rebut the evidence contained in the officer’s affidavit and the presentence
   report”). And while Kinzy’s reliance on the dropped assault charge and a
   lawsuit against the arresting officers may have “alert[ed] the district court to
   questions regarding the reliability of the evidentiary basis for the facts
   contained in the PSR,” Fields, 932 F.3d at 320 (citation omitted), Kinzy does
   not explain why any such questions could not ultimately be resolved in favor
   of the facts as stated in the PSR, particularly in light of the detailed evidence
   submitted by the Government and the dearth of evidence offered by Kinzy.
   See Alfaro, 919 F.2d at 966 (“An affidavit prepared and submitted in support
   of a search warrant . . . bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered
   by the trial judge in making sentencing decisions.”).
          Accordingly, the record evidence supporting the facts beneath
   Kinzy’s § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement does not give rise to a “definite and
   firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Coleman, 609 F.3d at
   708 (citation omitted). There was therefore no clear error. We affirm the
   district court’s imposition of the enhancement.

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                                         III.
          Kinzy also argues that his state conviction under Louisiana Rev. Stat.
   § 14:108.2 for resisting an officer is not a “crime of violence,” and that he
   thus should not have received a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a)(4).
   This court reviews preserved challenges to the district court’s interpretation
   and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact
   for clear error. United States v. Torres-Perez, 777 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (citation omitted). The sentencing court’s characterization of a prior offense
   as a “crime of violence” is a question of law subject to de novo review. United
   States v. Herrera, 647 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2011).
                                         A.
          Under § 2K2.1, which covers certain firearm offenses, a defendant’s
   offense level is 20 if he “committed any part of the instant offense subsequent
   to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a
   controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The Guidelines
   define a “crime of violence,” in relevant part, as “any offense under federal
   or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
   that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
   physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).
          To determine whether a predicate conviction qualifies as a “crime of
   violence,” courts use the “categorical approach,” which looks not to the
   conduct beneath the prior offense but instead to the statutory definitions, i.e.,
   the elements, of the statute of conviction. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.
   254, 261 (2013); United States v. Garner, 28 F.4th 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (per curiam).3 If a statute contains “multiple, alternative versions of the

          _____________________
          3 Much of the case law governing whether prior offenses qualify as federal
   predicates arises in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).

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   crime,” rather than one set of elements, it is deemed “divisible,” and courts
   assessing such statutes instead apply a “modified categorical approach.”
   Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261-62 (citation omitted).              Under the modified
   categorical approach, courts “determine which statutory phrase was the
   basis for the conviction by consulting the trial record—including charging
   documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact
   and conclusions of law from a bench trial, and jury instructions and verdict
   forms.”     Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010).               These
   documents are often called “Shepard documents,” named after the Supreme
   Court’s decision in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
          The district court imposed the crime-of-violence enhancement based
   on Kinzy’s 2019 state conviction for resisting arrest by force or violence, in
   violation of Louisiana Rev. Stat. § 14:108.2. The statute provides as follows:
          A.      Resisting a police officer with force or violence is any of
                  the following when the offender has reasonable grounds
                  to believe the victim is a police officer who is arresting,
                  detaining, seizing property, serving process, or is
                  otherwise acting in the performance of his official duty:
                  (1)     Using threatening force or violence by one
                          sought to be arrested or detained before the
                          arresting officer can restrain him and after notice
                          is given that he is under arrest or detention.

          _____________________
   E.g., Descamps, 570 U.S. at 258; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1990).
   The parties agree that ACCA case law guides our analysis, despite that Kinzy’s
   challenge arises under the Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Moore, 635
   F.3d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that, because of “similarities” between certain
   Guideline provisions and ACCA, “we treat cases dealing with these provisions
   interchangeably” (citations omitted)); Garner, 28 F.4th at 682 (explaining that
   ACCA case law applies to a § 4B1.2(a)(1) “crime of violence” analysis because of
   similar statutory language).

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                 (2)    Using threatening force or violence toward or
                        any resistance or opposition using force or
                        violence to the arresting officer after the arrested
                        party is actually placed under arrest and before
                        he is incarcerated in jail.
                 (3)    Injuring or attempting to injure a police officer
                        engaged in the performance of his duties as a
                        police officer.
                 (4)    Using or threatening force or violence toward a
                        police officer performing any official duty.
   La. R.S. § 14:108.2(A).
          Kinzy does not dispute that the statute is divisible, nor that the
   modified categorical approach is appropriate here. He instead contends that
   the Government has not shown that he was convicted under any particular
   subsection of the statute, thus ending the inquiry. He argues alternatively
   that no subsection of the statute qualifies as a crime of violence.
          “The Government bears the burden of showing that, based on [the
   Shepard] documents, the offense of conviction necessarily constituted a
   qualifying offense under the Sentencing Guidelines.”          United States v.
   Rodriguez-Negrete, 772 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v.
   Castaneda, 740 F.3d 169, 174 (5th Cir. 2013)). Where the documents do not
   identify the offense of conviction, the court “must consider whether the
   ‘least culpable’ means of violating the statute of conviction qualifies as an
   offense under the Sentencing Guidelines.”           United States v. Sanchez-
   Rodriguez, 830 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Rodriguez-
   Negrete, 772 F.3d at 225).
          Here, the Government relies only on Kinzy’s state-court indictment
   to show which subsection formed the basis of his conviction. But the
   indictment does not specify a subsection of the statute. It alleges, in relevant

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   part, that Kinzy “violated La.R.S. 14:108.2 in that he did resist a police
   officer . . . with the use of violence or threats of violence, knowing that said
   officer was acting in his official capacity.” The Government argues that this
   language tracks only the language of subsection (4), while Kinzy argues that
   the language merely tracks the generic offense as described in the preamble
   of the statute and does not identify any particular subsection of § 14:108.2.
          We agree with Kinzy. The statute’s description of the generic offense
   provides that “[r]esisting a police officer with force or violence is any of the
   following when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a
   police officer . . . acting in the performance of his official duty.” La. R.S.
   § 14:108.2(A). The indictment, in turn, says that Kinzy violated § 14:108.2
   by “resist[ing] a police officer . . . with the use of violence or threats of
   violence, knowing that said officer was acting in his official capacity.” The
   resemblance is close. The only word that substantively distinguishes the
   indictment’s language from the generic offense in the statute is the
   indictment’s use of the word “threats,” which does not appear in the
   generic-offense definition. But the word “threats” does not clarify which
   subsection formed the basis of Kinzy’s conviction, because three of the four
   subsections use the word “threatening.” See id. § 14:108.2(A)(1), (2), (4)
   (referring to “threatening force or violence”). We are thus unpersuaded by
   the Government’s contention that the word “threats” in the indictment is
   meant to refer exclusively to subsection (4), as opposed to any of the three
   subsections using that word.
          Moreover, it is true that subsection (4), unlike (1) and (2), refers to “a
   police officer performing any official duty,” which sounds like the
   indictment’s language. But this language also shows up in the generic-
   offense description. See id. § 14:108.2(A). Indeed, the indictment’s language
   resembles the generic offense more than subsection (4) in this regard: the
   indictment refers to Kinzy’s “knowing that said officer was acting in his

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   official capacity,” thus satisfying the generic offense’s requirement that the
   offender have “reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a police officer . . .
   acting in the performance of his official duty.” Id. (emphasis added).
   Subsection (4), on the other hand, refers to “force or violence toward a police
   officer performing any official duty.” Id. § 14:108.2(A)(4) (emphasis added).
   The indictment contains no such language.
          Because the indictment fails to specify a subsection of conviction, and
   because its sparse language closely resembles the statute’s description of the
   generic offense, we cannot say with any degree of certainty that Kinzy was
   convicted under subsection (4) of § 14:108.2(A).
          In support of its argument that Kinzy’s indictment corresponds only
   to subsection (4), the Government cites this court’s decisions in United
   States v. Sanchez-Espinal, 762 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014), and United States
   v. Torres-Jaime, 821 F.3d 577, 580-51 (5th Cir. 2016).           But, far from
   supporting the Government’s position here, those cases further illustrate
   why Kinzy’s indictment fails to identify a subsection of conviction. In those
   cases, the charging documents’ language tracked the statutory language
   much more clearly and unambiguously than the unsatisfying comparison
   urged here.    For example, in Sanchez-Espinal, the charging document
   included the lengthy phrase, “in violation of a duly served order of
   protection, or such order of which the defendant had actual knowledge
   because the defendant was present in court when such order was issued.”
   762 F.3d at 430. The New York statute at issue had three subsections, one
   of which contained this language essentially verbatim, while the other two
   subsections contained no language of the sort. See N.Y. Penal Law § 215.52.
   Similarly, in Torres-Jaime, the court considered a state-court aggravated-
   assault charge in which the indictment alleged that the defendant “did
   unlawfully make an assault upon [the victims], with his 2000 Chevrolet
   Express Van, an instrument which when used offensively against a person is

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                                    No. 22-30169

   likely to result in serious bodily injury.” 821 F.3d at 580-81. Georgia’s
   aggravated-assault statute contains three subsections, one of which covers
   assaults “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument
   which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does
   result in serious bodily injury.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21(a)(2). The other
   subsections contained no comparable language, and the court found that the
   defendant’s indictment “unquestionably track[ed]” subsection (2). Torres-
   Jaime, 821 F.3d at 581. What’s more, the statutes at issue in Sanchez-Espinal
   and Torres-Jaime did not contain subsections that at all resembled the generic
   offense or any preamble language.
          The Government has therefore not carried its burden to show which
   subsection formed the basis of Kinzy’s predicate state conviction.
   Accordingly, we must ask if the “‘least culpable’ means of violating the
   statute of conviction qualifies as an offense under the Sentencing
   Guidelines.” Sanchez-Rodriguez, 830 F.3d at 173 (citation omitted). As the
   Government concedes, the statute fails this test. For instance, subsection
   (1) accommodates a conviction for “[u]sing threatening force or violence by
   one sought to be arrested or detained before the arresting officer can restrain
   him and after notice is given that he is under arrest or detention.” La. R.S.
   § 14:108.2(A)(1). This does not “ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted
   use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
   U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (emphasis added).            Furthermore, subsection
   (3) accommodates a conviction merely for injuring an officer, La. R.S.
   § 14:108.2(A)(3). This does not satisfy § 4B1.2(a)(1). See Leocal v. Ashcroft,
   543 U.S. 1, 7-10 (2004) (holding that a Florida felony that requires “causing
   serious bodily injury” does not satisfy a substantially similar “crime of
   violence” definition because it includes “negligent or merely accidental
   conduct”).

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          Because the indictment fails to identify a particular subsection as the
   basis of Kinzy’s conviction, and because the least culpable means of violating
   the statute does not qualify as a “crime of violence” as defined in U.S.S.G.
   § 4B1.2(a)(1), the district court’s imposition of the crime-of-violence
   enhancement was an error.
                                         B.
          But our inquiry does not end here. The Government contends that
   any error in the guideline calculation was harmless. Kinzy disagrees. Under
   our harmless-error doctrine, the Government is right.
          Challenges to guideline calculations are subject to harmless-error
   review. United States v. Greer, 20 F.4th 1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 2021). In the
   Fifth Circuit, “there are two ways to show harmless error if the wrong
   guidelines range is employed.” United States v. Guzman-Rendon, 864 F.3d
   409, 411 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 511
   (5th Cir. 2012)). The first is “to show that the district court considered both
   ranges (the one now found incorrect and the one now deemed correct) and
   explained that it would give the same sentence either way.” Id. The second
   “applies even if the correct guidelines range was not considered.” Id. Under
   this method, the government must “convincingly demonstrate both (1) that
   the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not made the
   error, and (2) that it would have done so for the same reasons it gave at the
   prior sentencing.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Ibarra-Luna,
   628 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2010)).
          Kinzy asks us to apply the latter standard from Ibarra-Luna, which
   demands a higher showing from the Government. As a threshold matter,
   Kinzy contends that the “two paths” to showing harmless error “are not
   independent tests,” and are instead “two alternative means for the
   government to meet its ‘heavy burden’ of ‘proving that the sentence the

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                                       No. 22-30169

   district court imposed was not influenced in any way by the erroneous
   Guidelines calculation.” To this end, Kinzy cites Ibarra-Luna’s statement
   that the harmless-error doctrine applies “only” if the Government meets this
   heavy burden.4 628 F.3d at 714. But this court has already rejected this
   argument based on our rule of orderliness. In Guzman-Rendon, we explained
   that, notwithstanding Ibarra-Luna’s use of the word “only,” the Ibarra-Luna
   method is not the only way to show harmless error in a guideline-range
   calculation. The court explained as follows:
          Ibarra-Luna contains some language suggesting that it
          represents the exclusive manner for examining harmless error
          in this circuit. Specifically, it suggests that the “harmless error
          doctrine applies only” if the procedure described above is
          followed. Richardson[5] postdates Ibarra-Luna, so if Ibarra-
          Luna’s claims of exclusivity were correct, Richardson might not
          be valid precedent under this circuit’s rule of orderliness,
          which prohibits one panel from overruling another panel absent
          intervening en banc or Supreme Court decisions. However,
          Ibarra-Luna in turn postdates two cases, United States v.
          Duhon, 541 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) and United States v.

          _____________________
          4  Even where Kinzy refrains from urging the Ibarra-Luna test directly, he
   bases his harmless-error arguments on cases that apply the Ibarra-Luna standard.
   E.g., United States v. Alfaro, 30 F.4th 514, 521 (5th Cir. 2022) (applying the Ibarra-
   Luna standard); United States v. Martinez-Romero, 817 F.3d 917, 924-25 (5th Cir.
   2016) (same); United States v. Tanksley, 848 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir.), supplemented,
   854 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2017); see Tanksley, 854 F.3d at 286 n.1 (noting that the panel
   opinion’s “harmless error analysis relied exclusively on the test set forth in [Ibarra-
   Luna], because the district court did not consider the correct guidelines range”).
          5  Richardson articulates both methods of showing harmless error, 676 F.3d
   at 511, and in this way contradicts the proposition that the Ibarra-Luna method is
   the “only” means of showing harmless error.

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          Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2008),[6] which draw the same
          distinction Richardson does, and thus, to the extent Ibarra-
          Luna claimed exclusivity, that claim would be foreclosed by the
          rule of orderliness.
   Guzman-Rendon, 864 F.3d at 411 n.1 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original)
   (internal citations omitted).
          We therefore reject Kinzy’s argument that the harmless-error inquiry
   consists exclusively of the test articulated in Ibarra-Luna. There are, as
   explained in Guzman-Rendon, “two ways to show harmless error if the wrong
   guidelines range is employed.” Id. at 411; see also Richardson, 676 F.3d at 511.
          Having so concluded, we must decide whether the district court’s
   error here was harmless under either of these tests. The Government
   contends that the requirements of Bonilla and Duhon are satisfied, because
   the district court (1) considered the correct range and (2) stated that it would
   impose the same sentence either way.7 Kinzy argues that the Government
   fails to satisfy Bonilla and Duhon because the record here shows that the
   district court did not actually consider the alternative guideline range.8 The
   result, if Kinzy were right, would be to apply the demanding Ibarra-Luna
   standard. See United States v. Juarez, 866 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2017)

          _____________________
          6  Bonilla was overruled on other grounds—not implicating its harmless-
   error analysis—by our en banc decision in United States v. Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d
   169, 177-78, 187 (5th Cir. 2018).
          7   The Government states that it “does not pursue” the Ibarra-Luna
   method.
          8   Kinzy did not make this argument in his briefs; counsel raised it for the
   first time at oral argument. We generally do not consider arguments raised for the
   first time at oral argument. United States v. Robinson, 67 F.4th 742, 752 n.3 (5th Cir.
   2023) (citation omitted). We address the argument here only to explain why it is
   unavailing in any event.

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   (explaining that the Ibarra-Luna test governs situations “when a court does
   not consider the proper sentencing range” (quoting United States v.
   Martinez-Romero, 817 F.3d 917, 924 (5th Cir. 2016)).
          But Kinzy’s argument fails under our case law, which, for the
   purposes of the Bonilla-Duhon harmlessness test, requires only that the
   district court “entertain[] arguments as to the proper guidelines range.”
   United States v. Nanda, 867 F.3d 522, 531 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
   For example, in Duhon, we explained that “the district court was aware of
   the correct Guideline range because it was in the PSR, and the Government
   had vehemently argued for the [contested] enhancements during the
   sentencing proceeding.” 541 F.3d at 396. Similarly, in Bonilla, we explained
   that, “[a]lthough the district court did not comment on the guideline ranges
   that would apply with and without the enhancement, the record reflect[ed]
   no disagreement between the parties or confusion by the district court about
   the guidelines range before and after the enhancement.” 524 F.3d at 656.
   There, the defendant had argued in his objections to the PSR that “he should
   be scored at Level 6, at a Category I, with a sentencing range of 0-6 months,”
   and, at sentencing, the district court “specifically referenced his
   consideration of the parties’ arguments made at sentencing and in the reports
   before” imposing the defendant’s sentence. Id. at 656-57; see also United
   States v. Medel-Guadalupe, 987 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding the
   Bonilla-Duhon requirements satisfied where “the district court was aware of
   the guidelines range absent the enhancements because Medel-Guadalupe
   advised the court of this range in his written PSR objections”).
          Guided by these principles, we conclude that the district court here
   did “consider” the proper range, i.e., the range that would apply absent the
   erroneous     crime-of-violence finding,        because that     range featured
   prominently in the parties’ written sentencing materials and at the
   sentencing hearing. Specifically, Kinzy filed written objections to the PSR’s

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                                    No. 22-30169

   use of a base offense level of 20, arguing that his state conviction was not a
   crime of violence under § 2K2.1(a). He accordingly contended that his
   proper base offense level was 14. (This reflects a six-point decrease from the
   PSR’s offense level, and, after Kinzy’s other adjustments, would have
   resulted in a sentencing range of 41 to 51 months. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A
   (sentencing table)). Kinzy also filed a sentencing memorandum, arguing that
   the crime-of-violence enhancement increased his guideline range “from 41-
   51 months to 77-96 months.” He requested a sentence of 51 months, which
   he acknowledged was at the top of the lower guideline range for which he
   advocated. The Government argued in its sentencing memorandum for the
   77-to-96-month range, and further requested, “should the Court sustain
   defendant’s objection regarding his prior conviction for a crime of violence,”
   that it impose “an upward variance to the same range, 77 to 96 months.”
          At Kinzy’s sentencing hearing, the district court explicitly stated that
   it had “read the defendant’s [sentencing] memorandum and the responses
   of the United States Probation Office and also of the Government.” It then
   proceeded through Kinzy’s objections, including his objection to the crime-
   of-violence enhancement. The court stated, “as for the objection to [the
   crime-of-violence enhancement,] . . . [a]fter reviewing the defendant’s
   objection and the government’s response, I find that the final PSR does
   properly evaluate the United States Sentencing Guidelines Section
   2K2.1(a)(4).” The court then overruled the objection and used a base
   offense level of 20 because it found that the crime-of-violence enhancement
   under § 2K2.1(a)(4) was appropriate.
          Then, after announcing that the guideline range of imprisonment was
   therefore 77 to 96 months, the court again mentioned Kinzy’s sentencing
   memorandum and invited Kinzy and the attorneys to speak before the
   imposition of sentence. Kinzy’s counsel reminded the court: “[I]n our sealed
   memorandum, we asked the Court to consider a sentence of 51 months,

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                                      No. 22-30169

   which would have been the top of the guidelines had the Court sustained the
   objection to the crime of violence.” Counsel then asked the court “when
   fashioning [Kinzy’s] sentence . . . not to sentence him . . . within the 77 to 96
   range, because under the equitable circumstances of the prior [offense], it’s
   not . . . the type of crime of violence which commands a severe punishment.”
   After arguing a series of mitigating factors, Kinzy’s counsel again “ask[ed]
   the Court to sentence him to a sentence of 51 months in prison.” The
   Government responded by reminding the court of its sentencing
   memorandum and again “requesting a within guideline sentence between 77
   and 91 . . . months.”9 The court then imposed an 87-month sentence. Under
   our precedents, this is more than enough to demonstrate that the district
   court considered the proper guideline range.
          At oral argument, Kinzy argued against this conclusion by pointing to
   our decision in United States v. Sanchez-Arvizu, 893 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (per curiam).10 There, the court held that it could not “conclude that the
   district court considered and rejected the correct Guidelines range,” even
   though the range deemed correct on appeal—15 to 21 months—was
   mentioned at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 316-17. But Kinzy’s reliance on
   Sanchez-Arvizu is misplaced for at least two reasons.
          First, Sanchez-Arvizu did not involve a district court’s statement that
   it would impose the same sentence in the event of a guideline-calculation
   error. Accordingly, the court in Sanchez-Arvizu did not have occasion to

          _____________________
          9The top of the range is 96, not 91. The Government appears to have
   misspoken.
          10 Kinzy cited Sanchez-Arvizu for the first time in his reply brief, and even
   then, he did not cite it for the proposition later urged at oral argument. Again, we
   generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral argument and
   address the issue here solely for the sake of thoroughness.

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   consider the issue presented by Kinzy’s appeal—namely, whether, under the
   Bonilla-Duhon harmlessness standard, the district court “considered” the
   proper guideline range, such that its articulation of an alternative basis for the
   same sentence was sufficient to render any error harmless. That distinction
   alone is enough to reject Kinzy’s comparison to the case.
          But even assuming that the case is instructive for the Bonilla-Duhon
   issue presented here, the case is materially distinct on its facts. In Sanchez-
   Arvizu, there was considerably less evidence that the district court
   considered the correct sentencing range. Specifically, defense counsel in
   Sanchez-Arvizu did not object to the probation officer’s calculation of the
   higher range, so the lower, correct range was not included in the defendant’s
   written sentencing materials. Id. at 314. And the lower range was mentioned
   only once at the sentencing hearing, when defense counsel stated
   (incorrectly) that under a proposed amendment to the Guidelines, the
   defendant’s range would be 15 to 21 months. Id. at 316. The probation officer
   calculated an even lower range—one to seven months—and the exchange
   with the court “centered on” that estimation. Id. Notably, the district court
   stated that any amended range would not be retroactive and that it was “not
   inclined to follow it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This passing
   reference to a hypothetical lower range under a proposed amendment is a far
   cry from Kinzy’s repeated pressing of the relevant range in both written and
   oral submissions to the sentencing court.
          For these reasons, Sanchez-Arvizu does not undermine our conclusion
   that, based on this record, under the relevant case law, the district court here
   “considered” the proper guideline range. Guzman-Rendon, 864 F.3d at 411
   (citation omitted).
          The only remaining question, then, is whether the district court
   “explained that it would give the same sentence either way.” Id.; see also

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                                      No. 22-30169

   Nanda, 867 F.3d at 531 (“[W]hen a district court entertains arguments as to
   the proper guidelines range and explicitly states that it would have given the
   same sentence it did regardless, any error in the range calculation is
   harmless.” (citations omitted)).
           Here, the court made the requisite statement. At the end of the
   hearing, the Government asked the court if it had “considered the alternative
   guideline suggested by the defendant.”            The court responded: “The
   sentence that I crafted is what I believe is appropriate for the defendant in
   this case. It reflects the seriousness of his offense, his criminal history, and
   also protects the public. And I would have imposed the same sentence under
   either scenario to answer your question.”
          This case thus falls in the camp of situations in which “the district
   court considered both ranges” and “explained that it would give the same
   sentence either way.” Guzman-Rendon, 864 F.3d at 411. Accordingly, the
   district court’s error in applying the § 2K2.1(a)(4) crime-of-violence
   enhancement was harmless. See Nanda, 867 F.3d at 531; Richardson, 676 F.3d
   at 512; Duhon, 541 F.3d at 396; Bonilla, 524 F.3d at 656-57.
          On this basis, we affirm Kinzy’s sentence despite the error.
                                          C.
          This case pushes the outer bounds of our harmless-error doctrine.
   Christopher Kinzy was sentenced to a term of imprisonment that exceeds the
   top of his correct sentencing range by three years. The sentence imposed is
   nearly double the length of the midpoint of his correct range. And the
   sentence imposed sits at the very center of a range whose calculation rests on
   a legal error. But, bound by our case law, we are compelled to conclude that
   the sentence must stand.

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                                     No. 22-30169

          To be sure, the Bonilla-Duhon rule has a degree of merit. In some
   cases, the rule simply gives effect to the commonsense proposition that
   “[n]ot all errors in determining a defendant’s guideline sentence require
   reversal.” Bonilla, 524 F.3d at 656. The rule reflects the post-Booker reality
   that the Sentencing Guidelines are just the starting point for a district court
   and that, ultimately, sentences are to be individualized based on the
   circumstances of a particular defendant in a particular case. See Molina-
   Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016) (explaining that, while
   “[t]he Guidelines inform and instruct the district court’s determination of
   an appropriate sentence,” the “sentencing process is particular to each
   defendant,” and, “[t]he record in a case may show, for example, that the
   district court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of
   the Guidelines range”).
          Moreover, the Bonilla-Duhon rule does not exclusively favor the
   Government’s defense of higher sentences imposed after the erroneous
   application of sentencing enhancements. The rule applies equally to lenient
   sentences that follow the erroneous non-imposition of enhancements. Duhon
   itself was such a case. There, the Government appealed the district court’s
   downward variance to a sentence of sixty months’ probation in part on the
   basis that the district court failed to impose certain sentencing enhancements
   supported by facts in the PSR. 541 F.3d at 395-96. We concluded that,
   although the court “ultimately erred by failing to apply the enhancements,”
   the error was not reversible because the court was aware of the correct
   guideline range and “declared that it would have sentenced Duhon to sixty
   months of probation even if it miscalculated the . . . range.” Id. at 396.
          Understood as a doctrine that is compelled by the discretionary nature
   of sentencing and is balanced in its applicability, the Bonilla-Duhon rule may
   be both reasonable and fair. But in this case, we confess that its application
   unsettles us. A more probing review of the record reveals why.

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                                    No. 22-30169

          It was under odd circumstances that the district court made its final
   statement that it would impose the same sentence “under either scenario.”
   The court had already ruled on Kinzy’s objections, announced its guideline-
   range calculations, heard Kinzy’s allocution and other arguments from the
   parties, imposed sentence, advised Kinzy of his appellate rights, and ordered
   that Kinzy be remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshals. Then, the court
   attempted to adjourn the hearing. When the court said, “If there’s nothing
   further,” the Government interjected. Counsel said, in relevant part:
          I would ask your Honor, in light of the fact there’s no waiver of
          appeal in this case, I would ask whether your Honor has
          considered the alternative guidelines range suggested by the
          defendant and whether you would have imposed the same
          sentence had that alternative guideline range been in effect. If
          your Honor has considered that.
          The court did not engage the Government’s request. It said, “Will
   you submit this in writing, please, submit this in [a] post sentencing brief.”
   Defense counsel spoke up, and the exchange continued as follows:
          [DEFENSE]: Your Honor, it sounds that the Court hasn’t
          made the decision to impose the sentence regardless, and we
          just ask that the sentence remain as is, that it not be extended
          further, he’s ready to begin his term, you know. We’re ready
          to conclude this matter. I don’t think there needs to be a
          further—
          THE COURT: What are you requesting, Mr. [prosecutor]?
          [GOVERNMENT]: So, your Honor, I guess if your Honor has
          considered the alternative guideline suggested by the
          defendant and then would have imposed the same sentence
          anyway, then should this case be appealed and the Fifth Circuit
          find that the Court committed error with respect to the
          guidelines calculations, that error would arguably be harmless
          error since you would have imposed the same sentence.

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                                      No. 22-30169

          THE COURT: The sentence that I crafted is what I believe is
          appropriate for the defendant in this case. It reflects the
          seriousness of his offense, his criminal history, and also
          protects the public. And I would have imposed the same
          sentence under either scenario to answer your question.
          [GOVERNMENT]: Thank you, your Honor.
          THE COURT: Court’s adjourned.
          [DEFENSE]: Please note our objection for the record. Thank
          you.
          We emphasize three salient features of this sentencing record that give
   us pause in applying our Bonilla-Duhon harmlessness rule. First, the district
   court’s statement was made as an afterthought, at the very end of the
   sentencing hearing, after imposition of the sentence. The court did not issue
   the statement when one might expect it—namely, in imposing the term of
   imprisonment and articulating its reasons for doing so.
          Second, the statement was made only at the Government’s repeated
   request.11    Not only was the court evidently not inclined to make the
   statement on its own volition, but it indeed appeared confused when the
   Government raised it. The court first rebuffed the Government by telling it
   to file a written motion. It then had to ask counsel, “What are you
   requesting . . . ?”   Most concerning, the Government’s request was an
   acknowledged attempt to insulate the sentence on appeal. The Government

          _____________________
          11 We observe that this practice is apparently not new. In at least one other

   Bonilla-Duhon case, from over a decade ago, the court made its statement at the
   invitation of the Government. See Richardson, 676 F.3d at 510 (“After the district
   court finished announcing its sentence, the Government asked the court whether it
   would state on the record that it would have imposed the same sentence,
   notwithstanding the enhancements that had been applied to Richardson’s offense
   level.”).

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   said as much, telling the court that its request was “in light of the fact [that]
   there’s no waiver of appeal in this case,” and explaining that, “should this
   case be appealed and the Fifth Circuit find that the Court committed error
   with respect to the guidelines calculations, that error would arguably be
   harmless error since you would have imposed the same sentence.”12
          Third and finally, the court’s statement of reasons for the alternative
   sentence was perfunctory. The court said that the same sentence would have
   resulted “under either scenario,” without explaining why, if Kinzy’s
   conviction were not a crime of violence, the court would have decided to vary
   upward by three years, nearly doubling the guideline range, and why it would
   have landed at the center of the heightened (and wrong) range.
          These troubling aspects of the record, however, cannot alter our
   resolution.    Our Bonilla-Duhon jurisprudence, as it stands, does not
   interrogate record-based oddities like these, much less instruct that the
   harmlessness of a sentencing error turns on factors like when the district
   court’s statement was made or whether it came at the Government’s urging.
   Nor has our case law required that district courts offer a more detailed
   explanation of the alternative sentence.13         To turn these disconcerting
          _____________________
          12   The Government made the same argument in its written submission
   before sentencing. In its response to Kinzy’s PSR objections, the Government
   wrote in a footnote:
          The government also notes that any error in calculating the
          guidelines related to the crime-of-violence enhancement would be
          subjected to harmless error review on appeal, so long as the Court
          contemplated the guidelines range suggested by defendant and
          “stated that it would have imposed the same sentence even if that
          range applied.”
          13 At least two sister circuits require more than a simple statement that the

   court would have imposed the same sentence in the event of a guideline-calculation
   error. For example, while the Third Circuit, like us, acknowledges that an error in

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                                       No. 22-30169

   features of the record into case-dispositive facts would be to create new
   carveouts from our Bonilla-Duhon doctrine. In an appropriate case, it may be
   prudent to do so, but Kinzy has not, at least to this panel, asked that we take
   such a step.14
          _____________________
   a guideline-range calculation can be harmless if the district court “explicitly states
   that it would have imposed the same sentence even under the correct Guidelines
   range,” United States v. Raia, 993 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2021), the court scrutinizes
   those statements and requires that alternative sentences be fully explained. See id.
   at 196 (“[E]ven an explicit statement that the same sentence would be imposed
   under a different Guidelines range is insufficient if that alternative sentence is not
   also a product of the entire three-step sentencing process.”); see also United States
   v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 154 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (remanding for resentencing where
   the district court said it would have imposed the same sentence even without an
   enhancement, but “without explaining what the Guidelines range would have been
   without the enhancement, and without explaining why an upward departure or
   variance would be merited from that range”).
           The Tenth Circuit also demands more than we do. In United States v. Pena-
   Hermosillo, the Tenth Circuit remanded for resentencing despite that the “district
   court found that the same sentence would be appropriate . . . even if the correct
   offense level were five points higher and the recommended guidelines range 136
   months higher,” explaining that “[s]urely that requires some explanation beyond a
   vague statement that the sentence is appropriate under § 3553(a).” 522 F.3d 1108,
   1117 (10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.). The court noted that it is “hard” to
   “imagine a case where it would be procedurally reasonable for a district court to
   announce that the same sentence would apply even if correct guidelines calculations
   are so substantially different, without cogent explanation.” Id.
          14     Instead, Kinzy has based his opposition to the Government’s
   harmlessness position on the assertion that we should apply the Ibarra-Luna
   standard because (i) Bonilla-Duhon is not an “independent test,” and, alternatively,
   (ii) the district court did not sufficiently “consider” the correct range. For the
   reasons given supra Section III.B, these arguments are foreclosed by our case law.
          As to that law, we note that the Bonilla-Duhon rule appears best suited for
   scenarios where the district court imposes a non-guidelines sentence. Indeed, this
   was the situation in both Bonilla and Duhon. See 524 F.3d at 656; 541 F.3d at 394-
   96. But the rule has since been expanded to cover situations like Kinzy’s, where

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Case: 22-30169     Document: 00516871311           Page: 30   Date Filed: 08/24/2023

                                    No. 22-30169

          For now, we simply warn that the workability and fairness of our
   harmless-error doctrine depend fundamentally on the good faith of the
   Government, defense counsel, and the district courts. The doctrine is meant
   to reflect the reality that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and that not
   all errors arising from the complex process of calculating guideline ranges
   require reversal and resentencing. The doctrine is not to be deployed as a
   talisman to insulate sentences that otherwise ought to be revisited by all
   participants: opposing counsel, the parties, and sentencing judges.

                                        IV.
          Kinzy’s prior state conviction does not categorically qualify as a crime
   of violence, and the district court’s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.
   But our harmless-error doctrine compels us to hold that the sentence must
   stand. We accordingly AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

          _____________________
   the imposed sentence is within a different—and purportedly incorrect—guideline
   range. See, e.g., Guzman-Rendon, 864 F.3d at 410-12.

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