Court Opinion

ID: 9688455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:48:00.253366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:38.971471
License: Public Domain

Burke, J.
(On Petition for Rehearing) Plaintiff has petitioned for a rehearing. In her petition she asks us to reconsider *858our conclusion that her appeal in this case required a review of the entire judgment. Plaintiff attempted to take a limited appeal. Her notice of appeal reads, “Plaintiff . . . appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota from that certain judgment entered and filed herein on the 16th day of September 1949 in the District Court in and for the County of Bottineau and State of North Dakota, and plaintiff demands a trial de novo upon the following questions of said action:
(1) As to and upon the custody of the minor child Donald Boland Henry:
(2) Upon the division of property and amount of the alimony and support money allowed the plaintiff . . . .” In support of her contention that this court extended the scope of the appeal beyond the issues submitted she cites Section 28-2732 BC 1943,'which provides among other things:
“A party desiring to ap£>eal from a judgment in any such action shall cause a statement of the case to be settled within the time and in the manner prescribed by chapter 18 of this title, and shall specify therein the questions of fact that he desires the supreme court to review, and all questions of fact not so specified shall be deemed on appeal to have been properly decided by the trial court.”
There is no question but that, under the provisions of the foregoing statute, an appellant may limit a review upon an appeal to specific questions of fact. This, plaintiff did not do. She asked a trial de novo in this court upon the issues of custody of the children and division of property. These are not issues of fact. That a trial anew of these issues requires a review of all of the issues of fact in the case needs no demonstration. The issues of the propriety of the divorce and that of the division of the property are so interdependent that a trial of the latter cannot be had without an examination of the former. As was said in Hoellinger v. Hoellinger, 38 ND 636, 166 NW 519, “What (plaintiff) really contends for is a right to have a review of a portion of the judgment appealed from. This court has held that there can be no such thing as a trial de novo in the supreme court upon an appeal from a portion of a judgment, and there *859are excellent reasons why an appellant cannot do indirectly, upon an appeal from a judgment, what he is not permitted to do directly by appealing from a portion of a judgment. See opinion by Young, Justice, in Prescott v. Brooks, 11 ND 93, 101, 90 NW 129. Prom the rule that there can be no appeal and trial de novo as to a portion of the judgment under Sec 7846 CL 1913, it must be accepted as a corollary that there can be no trial de novo in this court as to a portion of a judgment, where the whole is appealed from, except, of course, a partial review of questions of fact only.” Section 28-2732 RC 1943, is a reenactment of Section 7846, supra and that part of the section permitting a limited review of specified questions of fact appears in identical language in both enactments. We are clear therefore that in this regard we should adhere to the conclusion heretofore made.
Plaintiff also urges that our denial of a divorce divests this court of jurisdiction to make any order with respect to the custody of the children of the parties. In support of her contention she cites the case of Dallas v. Dallas, 268 NW 516, an Iowa case. The proposition is one on which there is no unanimity of opinion. It is our view that the better rule is that when parties come into court and submit the issue of divorce and the issue of the custody of the children, the court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate as to custody even though the divorce is denied. Stewart v. Stewart, 156 Fla 815, 24 So2d 529; Sauvageau v. Sauvageau, 59 Idaho 190, 81 P2d 731; Davis v. Davis, 194 Miss 343, 12 So2d 435; Kusick v. Kusick, 243 Wis 135, 9 NW2d 607; Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo 207, 73 P2d 953; Ex parte Saul, 31 Cal App 382, 160 P 695; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 136 Minn 190, 161 NW 525, LRA1917D 971; Horton v. Horton, 75 Ark 22, 86 SW 825, 5 Ann Cas 91. Furthermore, section 14-0526, RC 1943 provides.:
“Though a judgment of divorce is denied, the court in an action for divorce may provide for the maintenance of a wife and her children, or any of them, by the husband.”
In California, Wisconsin and Minnesota, statutes, identical in substance and almost identical in language, have .been construed as a statutory grant of jurisdiction to adjudicate as to the cus*860tody of the children of the parties to a divorce action even though the divorce is denied. Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Cal 48, 56 P 630, 57 P 81, 71 Am St Rep 17; Voss v. Voss, 157 Wis 430, 147 NW 634; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 136 Minn 190, 161 NW 525, LRA1917D 971. It is our conclusion therefore that jurisdiction existed to make the orders with respect to custody contained in the original opinion filed in this case.
Lastly, the petition asks for a clarification of what was said in the original opinion concerning the custody of the child, Donald Henry, and the allowances made to Gerda Henry. On these matters we think the original opinion is clear. However, we repeat that the custody of the older son, Donald, is awarded to the defendant, Roland Henry, such award to he effective from the date of the entry of judgment upon the remittitur from this court. With respect to the allowances made to Gerda Henry, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in all respects except that the award of $175.00 per month to Gerda Henry for the support of herself and Dale Henry is increased to $300.00 a month.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Christianson, and'Morris, JJ., and Wigen, Dist. J., concur.