Court Opinion

ID: 9838830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 14:05:48.918318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:14.051448
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals
                     NO. 2022-CA-0094-MR

TIMMY MAYNARD                                        APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 21-CI-00189

COOKIE CREWS, COMMISSIONER,
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; RANDY WHITE,
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; SKYLA GRIEF,
DEPUTY WARDEN, KENTUCKY
STATE PENITENTIARY; JOSH
PATTON, ADJUSTMENT
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN,
KENTUCKY STATE
PENITENTIARY; RACHEL HUGHES,
ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE
MEMBER, KENTUCKY STATE
PENITENTIARY; SUSAN KNIGHT,
ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE
MEMBER, KENTUCKY STATE
PENITENTIARY; DANIEL AKERS,
WARDEN, LEE ADJUSTMENT
CENTER; PATRICIA STACY, CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER, LEE
ADJUSTMENT CENTER; AND
CHARLES PERRY, INMATE
ACCOUNTS FINANCIAL OFFICER,
LEE ADJUSTMENT CENTER                                                 APPELLEES

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Timmy Maynard, pro se, brings this appeal from a November

8, 2021, Order of the Franklin Circuit Court granting summary judgment and

dismissing his complaint as time-barred under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

413.140(1)(k) and (7). We affirm.

             In late 2013, Maynard was an inmate serving a ten-year sentence of

imprisonment at the Lee Adjustment Center in Beattyville, Kentucky. On

November 28, 2013, Maynard was involved in a physical altercation with another

inmate. Apparently, Maynard repeatedly stabbed the victim in the head and body

with a six-inch sharp weapon. A disciplinary hearing was conducted on January

22, 2014, and the adjustment committee found Maynard guilty of physical action

resulting in death or injury of an inmate. The adjustment committee also imposed

restitution in the amount of $14,748.98 against Maynard for the medical expenses

associated with his victim’s injuries. On January 23, 2014, Maynard received a

notification of restriction informing him that his inmate “account shall be frozen”

as a result of the adjustment committee’s decision that Maynard owed restitution in

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the amount of $14,748.98. On March 10, 2014, the warden concurred with the

adjustment committee’s decision. Maynard did not file an appeal of the warden’s

decision.

              Some seven years later, on March 16, 2021, Maynard filed a civil

complaint in the Franklin Circuit Court. In the complaint, Maynard named the

following parties as defendants: Cookie Crews, Commissioner, Kentucky

Department of Corrections; Randy White, Deputy Commissioner, Kentucky

Department of Corrections; Skyla Grief, Deputy Warden, Kentucky State

Penitentiary; Josh Patton, Adjustment Committee Chairman, Kentucky State

Penitentiary; Rachel Hughes, Adjustment Committee Member, Kentucky State

Penitentiary; Susan Knight, Adjustment Committee Member, Kentucky State

Penitentiary; Daniel Akers, Warden, Lee Adjustment Center; Patricia Stacy, Chief

Financial Officer, Lee Adjustment Center; and Charles Perry, Inmate Accounts

Financial Officer, Lee Adjustment Center. In the complaint, Maynard generally

alleged that funds were being illegally seized from his inmate account to satisfy the

restitution. A response and motion for summary judgment was subsequently filed

by Crews, White, Grief, Patton, Hughes, and Knight (collectively referred to as

appellees).1 Therein, appellees asserted, inter alia, that Maynard’s complaint was

1
 Although Daniel Akers, Warden, Lee Adjustment Center; Patricia Stacy, Chief Financial
Officer, Lee Adjustment Center; and Charles Perry, Inmate Accounts Financial Officer, Lee
Adjustment Center, were named as appellees in the Notice of Appeal, they have not filed a brief

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time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in KRS 413.140(1)(k) and

(7). By Order entered November 8, 2021, the circuit court determined that the

action was time-barred by KRS 413.140(1)(k) and (7); therefore, the court granted

summary judgment in favor of appellees and dismissed Maynard’s complaint.

This appeal follows.

               An appellate court’s standard of review where summary judgment has

been granted is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). And, the

record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all

doubts are to be resolved in its favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,

Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). And, as “summary judgment involves only

legal questions and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an

appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will review the

issue de novo.” Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001).

               Maynard contends that the circuit court erred by granting summary

judgment and dismissing his complaint after it determined that “the dispute

stemmed from the disciplinary hearing and was barred by the [one year] statute of

or otherwise participated in this appeal. Therefore, Akers, Stacy, and Perry are not included
when referring to “appellees” in this Opinion.

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limitations imposed by KRS 413.140(1)(k) and (7).” Maynard’s Brief at 10. More

particularly, Maynard asserts that the five-year statute of limitations found in KRS

413.120(11) should apply as his claim is one of “unjust enrichment.” Maynard’s

Brief at 11. We disagree.

             KRS 413.140 provides, in relevant part:

             (1) The following actions shall be commenced within one
               (1) year after the cause of action accrued:

                 ....

                 (k) An action arising out of a detention facility
                   disciplinary proceeding, whether based upon state
                   or federal law;

                 ....

             (7) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (k) of
               subsection (1) of this section, the cause of action shall
               be deemed to accrue on the date an appeal of the
               disciplinary proceeding is decided by the institutional
               warden.

KRS 413.140(1)(k) and (7).

             KRS 413.120(11) states:

             The following actions shall be commenced within five
             (5) years after the cause of action accrued:

                   ....

             (11) An action for relief or damages on the ground of
               fraud or mistake.

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             In the case sub judice, the warden’s decision affirming the adjustment

committee’s imposition of restitution for his victim’s medical expenses was

entered March 10, 2014. Maynard filed his complaint in the circuit court more

than seven years later, on March 16, 2021. In Maynard’s complaint, he alleged

that appellees were improperly seizing funds from his inmate account to satisfy the

restitution imposed in the detention facility disciplinary proceeding. We believe

KRS 413.140(1)(k) is applicable as this action emanated from the decision to

impose restitution in the prison disciplinary proceeding in 2014. And, KRS

413.140(7) clearly provides that an action arising out of a detention facility

disciplinary proceeding must be commenced within one year after the cause of

action accrued. The cause of action shall be deemed to accrue on the date an

appeal of the disciplinary proceeding is decided by the warden. KRS 413.140(7).

Here, the cause of action accrued on March 10, 2014, the date of the warden’s

decision affirming the adjustment committee’s imposition of restitution.

Therefore, Maynard’s complaint filed on March 16, 2021, is time-barred by

application of the one-year statute of limitations set forth in KRS 413.140(1)(k)

and (7).

             Thus, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of

appellees and dismissed Maynard’s complaint as more than one year had passed

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since the warden’s decision affirming the adjustment committee’s imposition of

restitution. We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit.

            For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Franklin Circuit Court is

affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, COOKIE
                                         CREWS, COMMISSIONER; SKYLA
Timmy Maynard, Pro Se                    GRIEF, DEPUTY WARDEN;
Fredonia, Kentucky                       RACHEL HUGHES, ADJUSTMENT
                                         COMMITTEE MEMBER; SUSAN
                                         KNIGHT, ADJUSTMENT
                                         COMMITTEE MEMBER; JOSH
                                         PATTON, ADJUSTMENT
                                         COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN; AND
                                         RANDY WHITE, DEPUTY
                                         COMMISSIONER:

                                         John Hamlet
                                         Department of Corrections
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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