Court Opinion

ID: 9758895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:55:07.671225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:29.582073
License: Public Domain

RUIZ, Associate Judge,
concurring.
Appellants, Capitol Hill Hospital and Irene Trowell Harris, contend that trial counsel for appellee, Venus Baucom, employed peremptory strikes for discriminatory purposes in contravention with the holdings of the United States Supreme Court and this court. The trial court concluded that appellee’s counsel had not intentionally struck the jurors because of their race. Because the trial court’s consideration of the challenge that appellee’s peremptory strikes were constitutionally defective under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), was flawed, the case should be reversed and remanded for a proper redetermination, if still possible, or, if not, for a new trial.
I.

Factual Background

Appellee, Venus Baucom, as personal representative of the estate of her grandmother, Luerinda Baucom,1 deceased, brought a medical malpractice action against appellants, Capitol Hill Hospital (the “Hospital”) and Jack Trowell, M.D.2 According to the complaint, decedent was admitted to the Hospital on May 11, 1988, under the direction of Dr. Trowell — decedent’s private attending physician — with complaints of abdominal pain, dehydration, weight loss, anorexia, anemia, and a history of falls. The complaint primarily alleges that due to the Hospital’s and the doctor’s negligence, including the failure to order the use of a “posey” restraint, decedent fell again on May 13, 1988, and fractured her left hip. She was operated on the following day to repair the fracture. During the course of subsequent treatment for her hip fracture, decedent suffered acid burns to the wound,3 causing further injury. Baucom *761alleges that this additional injury resulted from improper application of acetic acid dressing to the surgical wound by members of the Hospital staff.
The record reflects that as a result of the concentration of the acetic acid being higher than prescribed, decedent sustained a second and third degree burn on the left hip from the acetic acid applied to the wound. The record also reflects that decedent fell yet again attempting to go to the bathroom on July 1, 1988. Decedent was discharged on July 13,1988, from the Hospital to Grosvenor Nursing Home, which refused her admission and returned her to the Hospital because she needed continued care of the caustic burn on her left hip. Decedent remained a patient at the Hospital until August 1, 1988, when she was discharged and admitted to Grosvenor Nursing Home, where she remained until she died of unrelated causes on October 13, 1988.
The Hospital and Dr. Trowell denied the allegations of negligence in Baucom’s complaint. The action came to trial and a jury was chosen. At the close of jury selection, the Hospital and Dr. Trowell made a Batson challenge to Baucom’s use of peremptory strikes which was denied by the trial court. The case was tried to the jury, which returned a verdict for Baucom in the amount of $300,000. After judgment was entered in accordance with the jury verdict, notices of appeal were timely filed by both the Hospital and Dr. Trowell.

Jury Selection

There were twenty-eight members in the venire of potential jurors, of whom five were not African-Americans. Of the fourteen prospective jurors who were seated in the jury box before the parties exhausted their peremptory strikes, only three were not African-Americans, Jurors # 061, # 494 and # 800. Baucom’s counsel had three peremptory strikes and used all three to eliminate these three prospective jurors. The resulting jury was all African-American.4
Baucom’s counsel first struck Juror # 061, a twenty-six-year-old Caucasian woman, who worked as an accountant for GreenPeace Development. Baucom’s counsel did not ask her any questions.
Baucom’s counsel’s second peremptory strike was on Juror # 494, also a Caucasian woman, who worked as vice-president of a management consulting firm with hospitals and physician organizations among its clients. During voir dire, she stated that her work did not relate to medical malpractice and that she was not familiar with the Hospital. Additionally, in response to questioning by Baucom’s counsel, Juror #494 indicated that although she “would err on the side of understanding the issues” facing hospitals and doctors, she would endeavor to set aside her own experiences in order to render an impartial verdict in this matter. Baucom’s counsel did not ask her any further questions.
Appellee’s counsel’s third peremptory strike was used on Juror # 800, another Caucasian woman, with a Hispanic surname. At the time of the voir dire, this juror was the director of a maternal and child health clinic, a position she had held for the previous five years. Juror # 800 had done a six-week internship in the Outpatient Clinic at the Hospital in 1975, in connection with her nursing training. She indicated that she could fairly decide this case on the merits. Bau-com’s counsel asked Juror # 800 whether she had an ownership interest in the company in which she worked and whether she ever had the opportunity to apply posey restraints to a patient. Juror # 800 answered that she had no ownership interest in the clinic, and that she had some experience applying posey restraints.
At the close of jury selection, the trial court inquired if counsel were satisfied with the process. The Hospital’s counsel objected, challenging Baucom’s counsel’s use of peremptory strikes pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, supra, and moved for a mistrial. Dr. Trowell joined in this challenge. In sup*762port of their motion for mistrial, counsel argued to the trial court that Baucom’s counsel had eliminated all of the prospective Caucasian jurors who had progressed to the jury-box during jury selection for the purpose of empaneling an all African-American jury. In particular, counsel brought to the trial court’s attention that Baucom’s counsel’s first strike, Juror # 061, a twenty-six-year-old Caucasian woman who was never asked a single question, was inconsistent with counsel’s failure to strike Juror # 862, also a twenty-six-year-old woman, but an African American.
In response to the Batson challenge, Bau-com’s counsel gave his reasons for exercising the peremptory strikes as he did. With regard to the first strike, Juror # 061, Bau-com’s counsel stated that she was struck, not because of her race, but that because of her apparent youth, she would be “[unjable to relate to the ability of a seventy-five-year-old lady to ambulate after having suffered a stroke.”5 Additionally, Baucom’s counsel noted that this juror was employed by GreenPeace Development and that he was not interested in having someone working for an organization with “something of a liberal nature” on the jury. Moreover, Baucom’s counsel stated that Juror # 061 was struck “on the basis that in looking at her and in looking at the way that she responded to the questions, I struck her on that basis.” 6
With regard to his second strike, against Juror #494, Baucom’s counsel stated that his strike had nothing to do with Juror # 494’s race, pointing out that the court itself thought she would be a good peremptory strike.7 Further, counsel explained that he struck her because of her association with the management of doctors and hospitals and also because during voir dire Juror #494 had answered that she was unable to measure the extent to which her background would prejudice her with respect to the merits of the case.
Baucom’s counsel stated that his third strike, against Juror # 800, was based on the fact that she was a nurse with training in applying posey restraints and worked in the medical field. He stated that he feared that she would substitute her training and skill for the opinion of Baucom’s experts.8
The Hospital’s counsel pointed out to the judge a number of inconsistencies in the proffered race-neutral reasons. With regard to Juror # 061, the twenty-six-year-old Caucasian woman who worked for GreenPeace, Baucom’s counsel had stated that she was struck primarily because of her age. As the Hospital’s counsel emphasized, however, Juror # 862, another twenty-six-year-old woman, but who was African-American, was not struck by Baucom’s counsel. The Hospital’s counsel also argued that it was the first time he had heard a plaintiffs attorney indicate that a presumably liberal individual was someone that a plaintiff would not want seated on her case. In response, Baucom’s counsel stated that after he struck Juror # 061, he had no more strikes left to strike Juror # 862 because she had been seated after the third round.9 The Hospital’s counsel observed that if age had been of such great *763concern Baucom’s counsel could have struck into the panel to eliminate Juror # 862.
With respect to the strike against Juror # 800, counsel for the Hospital pointed out to the trial court that there were several African-American jurors, who where not struck, with similar backgrounds and experience as Juror # 800, who was struck. Specifically, counsel argued that Juror # 668, an African-American who sat on the jury, had nursing assistance experience in geriatrics and experience with the use of posey restraints; however, Baucom’s counsel did not question or strike her. Additionally, Hospital’s counsel pointed out that Juror # 747, who was struck by the Hospital and not Baucom’s counsel in the first round, was a certified medical aide for seven years. When Baucom’s counsel inquired from Juror # 747 whether she had ever applied a posey restraint, she responded that she had. Nevertheless, Baucom’s counsel did not ask her any other questions and did not strike her.10 The Hospital’s counsel argued that the only distinguishing characteristic between Juror # 668, who remained on the jury, Juror # 747, who was struck by him, and Juror #800, who was struek by Baucom’s counsel, was that Juror # 800 was not African-American.
Without asking for any further explanation from either party, the trial court ruled that there was no basis for a Batson challenge. The trial court stated that because the numbers were so small, a statistical analysis could not be applied. Furthermore,, the court stated that since statistics were inapplicable, it was necessary to establish that Bau-com’s counsel had a personal animosity toward, or an intention to remove, people from a particular race. Assuming that a prima facie case had been made, the trial court found counsel’s responses persuasive. The trial judge found counsel’s articulation of why Juror # 494 was stricken to be very convincing. With respect to the explanation as to why Juror # 061 was stricken, the trial court found it to be “less convincing but still not irrational.” He also stated, however, that he did not find Baucom’s counsel’s explanation with respect to Juror #061’s employment with GreenPeace “completely or immediately persuasive.” 11 The trial court found that Baucom’s counsel’s explanation for wanting to strike her because of her age was “understandable.” The trial judge also found that Juror #800, the Caucasian woman with a Hispanic surname, was under a different racial category for Batson purposes and that, in any event, she was stricken for a satisfactory reason.12 In short, the trial judge found that the reasons given were not pretextual and that the strikes were reasonable and exercised in good faith. Further, the trial judge found no invidious or “indirect discrimination arising from the impact of the way that the panel was composed or the way that the rounds were permitted to go in making the peremptories.” The trial court considered that since the venire itself was ninety-five percent African-American, it was not surprising that the resulting jury was all African-American.13 Therefore, appellants’ motions for a new trial were denied, and a trial took place, leading to the jury verdict for Baucom.
During his Batson challenge, counsel for the Hospital cautioned the trial court that “you don’t know if it’s a Batson situation until you see all of the strikes.” As described above, trial counsel identified two jurors (# 668 and # 747) who were not struck by Baucom’s counsel notwithstanding their previous experiences with posey re*764straints. On appeal, appellants supplement this contention by arguing that a number of other potential jurors also could have been stricken pursuant to Baucom’s counsel’s reasoning, but they were not struck because they were African-Americans. Juror # 836 worked at the Hospital from 1960 through 1971 as a nurse on the evening shifts with some experience applying posey restraints; her mother had been treated by the same orthopedic surgeon who treated decedent, and was satisfied with his care. Furthermore, even though this juror stated that she had nothing but “good vibes” from the Hospital and its administration, the only inquiry made by Baucom’s counsel of this juror was whether she had ever applied restraints.14 Juror # 862, a twénty-six-year-old African-American woman, was not struck or questioned by Baucom’s counsel even though she had a sister who worked at Capitol Hill Hospital. On appeal, the Hospital and Dr. Trowell clarify that Juror # 862 was seated after the second round of strikes and not the third round as had been misstated by both parties at trial. Therefore, contrary to Bau-com’s counsel’s explanation to the trial court that he had no strikes left after striking Juror # 061 with which to strike Juror # 862, Baucom’s counsel still had an opportunity to strike Juror # 862 in the third round. Instead, he chose to strike Juror # 800, the Caucasian Hispanic nurse, according to the Hospital and Dr. Trowell, because she was not African-American. They further note on appeal that during the voir dire, Baucom’s counsel made detailed inquiries of the Caucasian venire members, and only superficial inquiries of the African-American members. Particularly, of the four panel members with nursing experience, one of whom was Caucasian and the other three African-Americans, Baucom’s counsel asked the Caucasian and two of the African-Americans about their experience with posey restraints. Although each responded having had such experience, Baucom’s counsel only pursued the questioning with respect to the Caucasian nurse and struck her.
II.
In Batson v. Kentucky, supra, the Supreme Court set forth a three-step process for evaluating whether counsel’s use of peremptory strikes violates the Equal Protection Clause.15 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-24. First, the party challenging the strike must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was based upon race. Id. Second, after a prima facie showing has been made by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to articulate a legitimate race-neutral reason for striking the juror in question. Id. Third, the trial court must determine whether the moving party carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id.
We have stated with respect to the first step, that “the burden of establishing a prima facie showing is not onerous and that its primary function is to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the ... peremptory strikes.” Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 885 (D.C.1992). Similarly, we have said with respect to the second step, that the “burden in rebutting a prima facie case is neither onerous nor time-consuming.” Id. at 888.16 Thus, in the context of evaluating a Batson challenge the responsibility falls on the trial court, in the third step of the process, to determine whether the race-neutral explanations are merely a pretext for racial discrimination. Burkett, supra, 514 U.S. at 767-69, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (“It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant — the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.”); see Moore v. Keller Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir.1991). On appeal from the trial court’s determination, *765“fa] trial court’s findings pertaining to purposeful discrimination turn largely on evaluations of credibility and are entitled to great deference ... [b]ut unless the trial court rigorously scrutinizes the ... race-neutral explanations, Batson’s promise ... will be an empty one.” Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1210-11 (D.C.1993). In light of these principles, the trial court erred in its consideration of the Batson challenge in this ease.
First, the trial court erred in entirely discounting the statistical evidence. In Tursio, the fact that the prosecutor used ninety percent of his peremptory strikes against a group that constituted twenty-six percent of the venire was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Tursio, supra, 634 A.2d at 1213. In this case, the statistics are even more troubling because Baucom’s counsel used one hundred percent of his peremptory strikes against a group that comprised only eighteen percent of the venire and twenty-two percent of the persons who were seated in the jury box during jury selection.17 The end result, as in Tursio, was an all African-American jury. The trial court’s view was that because the numbers were so small the statistics were insignificant.18 Although statistics may be less elucidating when based on a small sample, the fact that Baucom’s counsel used all of his strikes on a small pool of potential Caucasian jurors strengthens the conclusion that the trial court should not have discounted the statistics. To the contrary, these statistics should have alerted the trial court to the possibility of jury manipulation on impermissible grounds. As Judge Schwelb explains in his separate opinion, based on the race of the prospective jurors seated in the jury box during each successive round, the probability that a non-African-American would randomly be struck declined significantly with each round. See pages 769, 770, post; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (“[T]he Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection mechanism is subject to abuse.”). Even though these statistics, without more, do not conclusively prove that there was a discriminatory purpose behind Baucom’s counsel’s peremptory strikes, they were sufficient, when considered in the context of counsel’s unpersuasive reasons for striking Juror #061, to make a prima facie case and to require that counsel explain his strikes. Little, supra, 613 A.2d at 886. (“[T]he defendant is required to ‘come forward with facts not just numbers alone,’ in making a prima facie showing ... although the trial court may examine statistical disparities as one factor in assessing the prima facie case.”) (quoting United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 485 (8th Cir.1990)).
Second, the trial court did not consider all relevant factors when it credited Baucom’s counsel’s explanations concerning Juror # 061, the Caucasian twenty-six-year-old GreenPeaee worker. The trial court failed to consider the disparate treatment given to Juror # 061 in relation to Juror # 862, even though the disparity was pointed out by the Hospital’s trial counsel. Although in the first round, Baucom’s counsel chose to strike Juror # 061 instead of Juror # 800 — the Caucasian, Hispanic nurse — during the final round, Baucom’s counsel thought it more important to strike Juror #800 rather than Juror # 862, the twenty-six-year-old, African-American female clerk. Therefore, Juror # 061 (the twenty-six-year-old Caucasian GreenPeaee worker) was treated disparately from similarly-situated Juror # 862 (the twenty-six-year-old, African-American clerk). As we found wanting in Tursio, the trial court “focused exclusively on whether the ... explanations about each rejected juror were logical and believable rather than assessing each challenge in the entire context of the case and probing the [appellee’s eoun-*766sell to determine why he had treated similarly situated black and white persons differently.” Tursio, supra, 634 A.2d at 1211-12. As Tursio further states, the credibility of individual explanations as to each stricken juror are not sufficient to rebut a prima facie showing of racial discrimination when jurors of different races who are similarly situated receive different treatment. Id. at 1212. As in Tursio, a more comprehensive scrutiny was necessary in this case with respect to the peremptory strike of Juror # 061. Therefore, the trial court erred by not considering the full context in which this strike was made — -as the Hospital’s counsel pleaded that it should do — -and instead, evaluating in isolation each explanation given by Baucom’s counsel.
Finally, the trial court erred when it accepted at face value counsel’s proffered race-neutral explanations even after the Hospital pointed out that Baucom’s counsel struck only the prospective jurors who were not African-American and gave reasons why the proffered explanations appeared to be pretextual.19 The Hospital’s counsel identified a number of apparent inconsistencies between the explanations given and the actual exercise of the peremptory strikes. The trial court itself found Baucom’s counsel’s explanations with respect to the strike of Juror # 061 less persuasive than others. Under these circumstances, the court should have adopted a more questioning attitude toward the proffered explanations. Purkett, supra, 514 U.S. at 767-69, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (“At that stage [the judge’s determination whether there was known purposeful discrimination], implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”). Notwithstanding our deferential standard of review, the trial court’s failure to evaluate independently the challenged peremptory strikes and the proffered reasons in the overall context of jury selection undermines the reason for that deference.20
The prima facie case made by appellants based on statistics and counsel’s unpersuasive rationalization for the challenged strikes, particularly of Juror # 061, strongly suggested that the proffered race-neutral explanations were pretextual. It then fell to the trial court, during the third step of the Bat-son analysis, to evaluate whether counsel’s peremptory strikes had a discriminatory purpose. The “rigorous scrutiny” required by Tursio in these circumstances could have dispelled the taint of pretextuality, further developing the record as the trial court explored counsel’s proffered reasons and allowing the trial court to evaluate counsel’s credibility.
The statutory right to peremptory challenges coexists, somewhat uneasily, with the constitutional right to equal protection. See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 102, 106 S.Ct. at 1726, (Marshall, J., concurring). The existence of this obvious tension, and the preeminence of the constitutional right, requires vigilance on the part of the trial courts that evaluate Batson challenges in the first instance, and of the appellate courts that review them. Vindication of the right to equal protection is uniquely important where the alleged violation occurs in the courts because, as the Supreme Court has observed:
[T]he injury caused by .the discrimination is made more severe because the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself. Few places are a more real expression of the constitutional authority of the government than a courtroom, *767where the law itself unfolds. Within the courtroom, the government invokes its laws to determine the rights of those who stand before it. In full view of the public, litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries render verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure that justice is done.
Race discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 [99 S.Ct. 2993, 3000, 61 L.Ed.2d 739] (1979); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 [61 S.Ct. 164, 165, 85 L.Ed. 84] (1940). In the many times we have addressed the problem of racial bias in our system of justice, we have not “questioned the premise that racial discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts.” Powers [v. Ohio] 499 U.S. [400,] at 401 [111 S.Ct. 1364, 1365, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)] [ (1991) ]. To permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin.
Edmonson, supra, 500 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at 2087 (emphasis added).
In the absence of appropriate judicial scrutiny, we are presented with a very slim record. On the evidence of record before us, consisting of strong statistics supporting a conclusion of impermissible discrimination and weak race-neutral reasons for the challenged strikes, the trial court failed to apply all the relevant principles. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further evaluation by the trial court.21
III.
There is one evidentiary issue raised on appeal that might come up at a new trial.22 Appellants claim that the trial court erred in allowing Baucom to testify about hearsay statements, made by an unnamed individual, that decedent’s treatment at the Hospital “was not right.” The Hospital objected to questioning involving Baucom’s conversation with a nurse who Baucom claimed treated her grandmother at the Hospital. After an in-depth bench conference, the trial judge allowed Baucom to testify about the absent nurse’s statement under the hearsay exception for admissions made by a party’s employee, pursuant to District of Columbia v. Washington, 332 A.2d 347 (D.C.1975). The trial judge considered the Hospital’s objection that there was a “certain amount of ambiguity as to who said it,” and whether the woman who made the statement was an employee of the Hospital or even had the expertise to make such a statement. The trial court admitted the statement with the condition that Baucom’s counsel would not argue to the jury that the nurse was recognizing liability.
Appellants argue that Washington is distinguishable from this case because in Washington the out-of-court declarant was identified by name and position. Instead, appellants argue, this case is controlled by Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 (D.C.1979). We conclude that Pratt is not dispositive. In Pratt, the out-of-court de-clarant was not identified and information from which the out-of-court declarant could be identified was not provided. Id. at 616. In those circumstances, we concluded the evidence to be insufficient to establish that the declarant was an employee of a party speaking on a subject within the declarant’s scope of employment. Id. However, in this case, unlike Pratt, Baucom submitted hospital records of all nurses who treated the *768decedent and established at pre-trial depositions the approximate time the statement was made. We find that the concern in Pratt was significantly lessened in this case because the Hospital was given information from which it could have identified the out-of-court declarant. It is anomalous that even though the trial court admitted the statement under the hearsay exception for admissions of a party, the trial court did not allow the statement to be used as an admission of liability, but as evidence of negligence, without first establishing the declar-ant’s competence to opine on the standard of care. In light of the limited purpose for which the statement was admitted and the ample testimony showing appellant’s negligence, however, the statement was not unduly prejudicial. See McIntyre v. United States, 634 A.2d 940, 945 (D.C.1993). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the absent nurse’s statement into evidence.

. A sevcnty-five-ycar-old, African-American woman.

. Dr. Trowell died in July 1993; his estate was substituted as a defendant. Appellant Irene Tro-well-Harris is the personal representative of Dr. Trowell’s estate.

.Because decedent’s wound was healing poorly, an infectious disease specialist was consulted regarding patient care management on May 19, 1988. As a result of this complication, on May 28, the orthopedic surgeon ordered that a one-percent acetic acid wet-to-dry dressing be applied once every eight hours during a twenty-*761four-hour period. Thereafter, on May 31, the skin around the wound was noted to be desqua-mated — shedding, peeling or scaling off of the epidermis — and discolored.

. In his concurring opinion, Judge Schwelb summarizes in chart form the race of each prospective juror seated in the jury box during each successive round. See pages 768-769, post.

.Baucom's counsel summarized as follows:
It's my prerogative to strike anybody that I want for any reason other than the basis of their sex or race or religion. I didn’t strike her on the basis of her sex or religion.
Your Honor, I struck her on the basis that in looking at her and in looking at the way that she responded to the questions, I struck her on that basis.
I 'don't believe that she would be able to sit and judge the ability or non-ability of a 75 year old lady to ambulate.
In addition, her employment with Green-Peace was such that at least to my experience, I thought that I didn’t want her sitting here judging a hospital case of this nature.

. The voir dire transcript, however, does not reflect Juror #061 as having answered any questions prior to being stricken.

. In fact, however, the transcript reveals that the trial court had indicated that Juror # 800 (not Juror # 494) "may be a very attractive candidate for a peremptory [strike],” after it denied counsel’s request to strike Juror # 800 for cause.

. See note 7, supra.

. In fact, however, Baucom's counsel had two strikes left because Juror #061 was struck in the first round and Juror # 862 was seated after the second round. Therefore, Baucom’s counsel had an opportunity to strike Juror # 862 during the third round. See page 764, infra.

. Each counsel’s peremptory strikes were separately submitted in writing to the trial court.

. The judge stated:
Now, with respect to 061, I don't think that I find Mr. Costello’s explanation completely or immediately persuasive ... I don’t understand how someone employed at Greenpeace ... I don’t know exactly according to his calculations ... that he has a view someone associated with that organization might have some view about nature taking its course and the survival of the fittest or that it’s wrong to lavish too many resources on old people or in keeping them in good shape or whatever and that may be his reason behind it.

. See note 7, supra.

. This percentage is incorrect. Of the venire of twenty-eight persons, five, or eighteen percent, were not African-Americans. As mentioned supra, at 4, of the fourteen prospective jurors who were considered during jury selection, three, or twenty-two percent, were not African-Americans.

. Juror # 836 replied she had not done so.

. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), the Court applied the Batson reasoning to civil actions.

. With respect to the proponent’s burden during the second step, the Supreme Court has said that "a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.” Burkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).

. As noted supra, at note 13, the trial court appears to have operated under the incorrect impression that the venire was ninety-five percent African-American; in fact it was eighty-two percent African-American.

. The trial court was also of the view that the prospective Hispanic Juror, a Caucasian woman, was in a separate category for [Batson ] analysis. Although that observation would be correct if the charge were that Hispanics were being struck, it is not relevant where the challenge is that jurors were struck because they were not African-American. See concurring opinion of Judge Schwelb, page 768, footnote 4, post.

. Trial counsel specifically identified inconsistencies in the treatment of Juror #061 when compared to Juror # 862, discussed above, and of Juror # 800, who is not African-American, when compared with Jurors # 668 and # 747, who are African-Americans. On appeal, we are directed to further inconsistencies between the explanations proffered for striking Jurors # 800 and # 494. We do not rely on these inconsistencies in concluding that the trial court should have applied a stricter scrutiny because trial counsel did not specifically point them out to the trial judge. However, it is likely that the incon-sistencics would have come to the trial court’s attention had the strike of Juror #061 been viewed in the context of the juty selection as a whole. In any event, ”[t]he exclusion of even one ... member of the venire for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause.” Little, supra, 613 A.2d at 885.

. As Judge Schwelb states in his separate concurrence, post at 772, in the important area of Batson challenges we “cannot simply rubber stamp the judge’s findings.”

. Although the case is being returned to the trial court to develop further the record and make more specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, it may be impracticable to do so years after the fact. Moreover, the value of an on-the-spot exploration of counsel’s motives, including the trial court's opportunity to assess counsel’s candor, is likely to be significantly diminished once the appellate court has set out its difficulties with the explanations already given. It is for the trial court, in the first instance, to determine the viability of a remand, or declare a mistrial.

. The other evidentiary issues raised on appeal are not addressed because they are unlikely to arise in the same context in a retrial.