Court Opinion

ID: 9898546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:25.613969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:20.406270
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                          May 23, 2023

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                              DIVISION II
    In the Matter of the Detention of:                               No. 57176-5-II

    C.C.,

                                  Appellant.
                                                               UNPUBLISHED OPINION

            CRUSER, A.C.J. – CC appeals the superior court’s 180-day commitment order for

involuntary treatment under the “Involuntary Treatment Act” (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW.1 CC

argues that the superior court erred when it concluded that she continues to present a substantial

likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior because the evidence

presented was not recent and “was largely hearsay.” Br. of Appellant at 12. We affirm.

                                                FACTS

                                         I.      BACKGROUND

            On August 10, 2018, CC met with her former boyfriend in violation of a no contact order

(NCO) prohibiting her from contacting him. During this meeting, CC punched her former

boyfriend in the face and struck him with her car.

1
  Because an involuntary commitment order may have adverse consequences on future involuntary
commitment determinations, this appeal is not moot even though CC’s commitment period under
the challenged order has expired. In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 625-30, 279 P.3d 897
(2012).
No. 57176-5-II

        The State charged CC with first degree assault and assault in violation of a protective order.

CC later assaulted two corrections officers while in jail, and the State added two counts of third

degree assault.

        CC was determined to be incompetent, and the criminal charges were dismissed. On

October 5, 2018, a superior court commissioner committed CC to 180 days of involuntary

treatment after finding that CC, as the result of a mental disorder, presented “a substantial

likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charge criminal behavior” and was “gravely disabled.”

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 136.

                     II.      PETITION TO EXTEND INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT

        On April 1, 2022, examining physician Rosa Epistola, MD, and examining mental health

professional Rosario Archer, PhD, petitioned to for an additional 180 days of involuntary treatment

under RCW 71.05.280(3). They asserted that CC continued to present a substantial likelihood of

repeating acts similar to the charged behavior. In a supporting declaration, Dr. Epistola and Archer,

provided the facts to support the petition.

        The declarants stated that CC had a significant mental health history consisting of more

than “270 contacts with the mental health system . . . since 2005” and several hospitalizations for

mental health concerns. Id. at 5. CC’s admission to Western State Hospital (WSH) at that time was

her third.

        Her first civil commitment was from October 9, 2017 to October 13, 2017, following an

assault of her former boyfriend and a violation of an NCO. Her second commitment was from

January through June 2018, following another violation of the NCO. During these commitments,

CC was diagnosed with “Delusional Disorder,” “Bipolar Disorder,” and “Autism Spectrum

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No. 57176-5-II

Disorder.” Id. at 6. She was released from the 2018 commitment on conditional release on June 5,

2018, just two months before the August 10 incident.

       Regarding the commitment period at issue here, the declarants stated CC had not violated

the still-existing NCO with the victim. But they further stated that CC’s “behavioral functioning”

had not significantly changed, that she was dismissive of boundaries when enforced, and that she

continued to engage in “defiant behavior” and to have difficulty complying with various phone

and ward protocols. Id. at 7, 11. They noted that CC frequently displayed irrational emotional

responses when stressed, told no, or believed her rights were violated. And she justified her

attempts to violate any phone restrictions by asserting that it was her right to make phone calls to

anyone she chose. The declarants concluded that these behaviors demonstrated that CC’s judgment

was still “markedly impaired,” and that her oppositional and defiant behaviors were likely a

manifestation of her behavior health disorders. Id. at 11.

       The declarants also stated that, based on “clinical chart documentation,” CC continued to

resist meaningful participation in treatment, she did not believe she had a mental health disorder,

and she continued to claim that there was no evidence that she had actually struck the victim with

her vehicle and she was just “ ‘trying to teach him a lesson.’ ” Id. at 7-8 (italics omitted). They

further stated that although CC had not engaged in any “significant assaultive behavior since

04/05/2019,” CC continued to engage in other behaviors that were “provocative, criminal and

defiant” as the result of non-conscious impulsive, reflexive, or compulsive efforts to deal with

underlying anxiety. Id. at 12.

       Additionally, the declarants stated that on March 23, 2022, CC’s social worker noted that

CC “reported she feels the NCO holder has to pay in some way for her staying at WSH and that

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No. 57176-5-II

she is ‘likely’ to contact him upon her discharge from WSH.” Id. at 7 (italics omitted). The

declarants found this comment particularly concerning. And when they asked CC during the

mental status examination about whether she intended to comply with the NCO if she was released,

CC had refused to respond.

       The declarants summarized,

       During the last 180 days [CC] has demonstrated some evidence of reckless
       disregard for the safety of herself and others. She has continually stated that her
       phone calls have nothing to do with safety, including ward safety and the safety of
       the alleged victim of her index offense. Despite this assertion she has demonstrated
       greater compliance with them, evidencing some positive aspects of her current
       treatment regime on insight. [CC] has demonstrated a lack of remorse, as indicated
       by her indifference to causing others harm and continual rationalizing of her
       behaviors. As she discussed, he[r] primary goal in initiating phone calls or contact
       to the victim of the alleged index offense was to achieve fairness and justice[,] “I
       wanted to teach him a lesson” (her answer when asked to detail her index offense.)
       . . . . [CC] has shared with treatment providers that her intention is to share her
       feelings towards the protected party as she believes he should bear some
       accountability for her commitment.

Id. at 14-15 (internal citation omitted). The declarants also emphasized that although CC had not

contacted the victim during this review period, “[a]ccording to medical records[,] [CC] has stated

that she inten[ds] to contact [the victim] upon release and is concerned that this may ‘blow up’ if

she [is] not allowed to contact him prior to her release.” Id. at 15.

       The declarants further stated,

       It is [hypothesized] that her desire to be heard and validated by the protected party
       and for him to “acknowledge what he’s done” continues to enhance her desire to
       reach out to him (including indirectly) since she believes he no longer listens to her
       voice messages. In addition, she also believes that he will change his mind since
       [CC] reports he has set limits historically but not been consistent [in] maintain[ing]
       those limits. Despite holding these beliefs, [CC] has demonstrated that with specific
       rules and staff preventing her she can adhere to the NCO and has not reached out
       to him as documented in [her] chart over this review period.

                                                  4
No. 57176-5-II

                It is the view of the undersigned that given her previously documented
        attempts to contact the victim, there is a high likelihood this would occur if
        release[d] directly to the community without any supportive structure in place. [CC]
        has expressed a desire and motivation to participate in therapy in a less restrictive
        alternative [(LRA)] to address her feelings toward the protected party and to
        process her admission to [WSH].

Id. at 15-16.

                            III.   HEARING AND COMMITMENT ORDER

        On June 14, 2022, a pro tem commissioner considered the petition. After permitting CC to

read a statement, the commissioner considered the petition and supporting declaration. CC did not

attempt to rebut the petition and declaration with her own expert’s opinion. The court granted the

petition.

        Three days later, a second commissioner filed an amended order granting the petition and

finding that “as a result of a behavioral health disorder [CC] continues to present a substantial

likelihood of repeated acts similar to the charged criminal behavior.” 2 Id. at 44. For the facts in

support of the petition, the commissioner “adopt[ed] by reference findings as stated by experts in

declaration in support thereof.”3 Id.

        CC moved for revision of the commissioner’s decision. The superior court concluded that

the commissioner’s decision was supported by the evidence, denied the motion for revision, and

“adhere[d] the ruling of the commissioners.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 15, 2022) at

16.

2
 The original order issued by the first commissioner contained errors, and the parties agreed to an
amended order that was then entered by a different commissioner.
3
  The commissioner also found that an LRA was in CC’s best interest. The parties do not challenge
that finding.
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No. 57176-5-II

       CC appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

       CC argues that the superior court erred by concluding that she continues to present a

substantial likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior because the

evidence in the supporting declaration either related to behaviors that were two to four years old

or was hearsay. We disagree.

                                    I.      LEGAL PRINCIPLES

       When the superior court decides a motion to revise an order granting a petition for

involuntary treatment, we review de novo the superior court’s decision, not the court

commissioner’s decision. In re Det. of L.K., 14 Wn. App. 2d 542, 550, 471 P.3d 975 (2020). We

review the superior court’s decision “ ‘based on the evidence and issues presented to the

commissioner.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Vulnerable Adult Pet. for Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 829,

460 P.3d 667 (2020)). The court commissioner’s findings and orders, if not successfully revised,

become the orders and findings of the superior court. Id.

                       II.     RCW 71.05.320(4)(c) SPECIAL PROCEDURE

       Because the commitment proceeding at issue here differs from other commitment

proceedings, a brief summary of the procedures that apply to this petition is helpful.

       RCW 71.05.280(3) provides that a person may be committed for involuntary treatment

when that person has been determined to be incompetent; the criminal charges have been

dismissed; and the person “has committed acts constituting a felony, and as a result of a behavioral

health disorder, presents a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts.” After the initial

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No. 57176-5-II

commitment under RCW 71.05.280(3) expires, a party can file a petition to extend the commitment

for an additional 180-day period under RCW 71.05.320(4)(c).

       RCW 71.05.320(4) provides:

                The person shall be released from involuntary treatment at the expiration of
       the period of commitment . . . unless the superintendent or professional person in
       charge of the facility in which he or she is confined, or in the event of a less
       restrictive alternative, the designated crisis responder, files a new petition for
       involuntary treatment on the grounds that the committed person:
       ....
                (c)(i) Is in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3) and as a result of a
       behavioral health disorder or developmental disability continues to present a
       substantial likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior,
       when considering the person’s life history, progress in treatment, and the public
       safety.
                (ii) In cases under this subsection where the court has made an affirmative
       special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b), the commitment shall continue for up
       to an additional one hundred eighty-day period whenever the petition presents
       prima facie evidence that the person continues to suffer from a behavioral health
       disorder or developmental disability that results in a substantial likelihood of
       committing acts similar to the charged criminal behavior, unless the person
       presents proof through an admissible expert opinion that the person’s condition
       has so changed such that the behavioral health disorder or developmental
       disability no longer presents a substantial likelihood of the person committing acts
       similar to the charged criminal behavior.

(Emphasis added.)

       RCW 71.05.320(4)(c)(ii) “provides a special procedure for petitioning for the continued

commitment of individuals incompetent to stand trial when the court has determined they

committed an act constituting a violent felony.” In re Det. of M.W., 185 Wn.2d 633, 643-44, 374

P.3d 1123 (2016). “Unlike other proceedings under the ITA that proceed directly to a full

evidentiary hearing upon the State’s petition for recommitment, [this] process begins with a

preliminary hearing before a full evidentiary hearing is warranted.” Id. at 644.

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No. 57176-5-II

       At this preliminary stage, the superior court first determines whether “the State’s petition

meets its initial burden.” Id. To meet its burden, the petitioner must present “prima facie evidence”

that “ ‘the person continues to suffer from a mental disorder or developmental disability that results

in a substantial likelihood of committing acts similar to the charged criminal behavior.’ ” Id.

(quoting former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) (2013), now codified as RCW 71.05.320(4)(c)(ii)).

Prima facie evidence is “evidence of sufficient circumstances which would support a logical and

reasonable inference of the facts sought to be proved.” State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d 782, 796,

888 P.2d 1177 (1995)).

       The petitioner must establish this evidence through affidavits signed by two individuals

who are either physicians, physician assistants, psychiatric advanced registered nurse practitioners,

or mental health professionals. M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 644 (citing former RCW 71.05.290(2)(e)

(2009), now codified as RCW 71.05.290(2)(a)(i)).4 These affidavits must describe in detail the

facts that justify recommitment. M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 644.

       If the superior court finds that the petitioner has met this burden, “then the [respondent]

may rebut the [petitioner’s] showing by presenting ‘proof through an admissible expert opinion

that the person’s condition has so changed such that the mental disorder or developmental

disability no longer presents a substantial likelihood of the person committing acts similar to the

charged criminal behavior.’ ” M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 644 (quoting former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)).

4
 RCW 71.05.290(2)(a)(i) states that “[t]he petition shall summarize the facts which support the
need for further commitment and shall be supported by affidavits based on an examination of the
patient and signed by” two individuals who are either physicians, physician assistants, psychiatric
advanced registered nurse practitioners, or mental health professionals.
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No. 57176-5-II

       If the respondent does not rebut the petitioner’s evidence, the court “shall” grant the

petition for additional involuntary treatment. RCW 71.05.320(4)(c)(ii); see also M.W., 185 Wn.2d

at 644. The petition will only proceed to a full evidentiary hearing if the respondent presents

evidence rebutting the petitioner’s evidence. M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 644-45.

                                          III.   DISCUSSION

       CC argues that the petitioners failed to present prima facie evidence establishing that she

presented a substantial likelihood of repeating acts similar to the dismissed criminal acts because

the evidence presented was not recent and “was largely hearsay.” Br. of Appellant at 12. Given

the nature of the proceedings here, we disagree.

A.     PRIOR BEHAVIOR

       The declaration presented to the superior court did describe CC’s prior behavior. RCW

71.05.320(4)(c)(i) requires the court to consider “the person’s life history” when determining

whether to extend the commitment. And CC’s prior behavior was relevant to how CC would

potentially behave if she was no longer in custody, so CC does not show that the court’s

consideration of these facts was error.

       Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that the superior court considered CC’s

behavior for any improper purpose or that the court’s conclusion was based solely on CC’s past

behavior. Instead, the court’s decision, which adopted the declarants’ statements, was based on (1)

CC’s persistent and ongoing refusal to comply with rules, (2) her continuing reactions when forced

to comply with the rules, (3) her recent statements that she would contact the victim again when

released and that he “should bear some accountability for her commitment,” and (4) her stated

concern that if she was unable to contact the victim before her release her intended communication

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No. 57176-5-II

with him might “ ‘blow up.’ ” CP at 15. Thus, to the extent the court relied on any historical

information, such reliance was appropriate.

B.     HEARSAY

       Regarding CC’s hearsay argument, CC does not cite any authority prohibiting the court

from relying on hearsay statements in a declaration or affidavit supporting a petition brought under

RCW 71.05.320(4)(c). And when “ ‘no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, [we are]

not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found

none.’ ” Nguyen v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn. App. 155, 171, 317 P.3d 518 (2014) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting State v. Logan, 102 Wn. App. 907, 911 n. 1, 10 P.3d 504 (2000)).

       Additionally, there is nothing in RCW 71.05.320(4)(c) or RCW 71.05.290(2)(a)(i) that

requires the supporting affidavits or declarations to be based on first-hand knowledge. RCW

71.05.290(2)(a)(i) requires only that a petition summarize the facts supporting the need for

continued commitment and that the petition be supported by affidavits signed by two specially

qualified individuals. And limiting these individuals’ statements to facts for which they have first-

hand knowledge would not make sense in this context because there is no mechanism by which

another witness can present their own affidavit at the first stage of proceedings under RCW

71.05.320(4)(c). M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 644.

       CC relies on State v. Dang, 178 Wn.2d 868, 879, 312 P.3d 30 (2013). But Dang addresses

the revocation of conditional release following an adversarial hearing at which live testimony was

taken. It does not address whether a court can rely on hearsay within a declaration submitted under

RCW 71.05.320(4)(c)(ii) when determining whether the petitioner had met its burden of presenting

prima facie evidence.

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No. 57176-5-II

        CC also argues that because the declarants did not have personal knowledge of the

information they obtained from staff and treatment team members, the declarants could not declare

that the information in the declaration was true and accurate and, therefore, the petitioner did not

prove that CC presented a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts. But this argument

ignores the structure of the special proceedings under RCW 71.05.320(4)(c), under which the

supporting declaration or affidavit is required to describe in detail the facts that justify

recommitment. M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 644. And an expert can consider hearsay in forming his or her

opinion. In re Det. of Mashall, 156 Wn.2d 150, 157, 125 P.3d 111 (2005).

        CC fails to establish that the superior court erred when it concluded that she continues to

present a substantial likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior.

Accordingly, we affirm.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                     CRUSER, A.C.J.
 We concur:

 LEE, J.

 VELJACIC, J.

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