Court Opinion

ID: 9525284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:01:44.692712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:13.481696
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring: I concur with the result reached by the majority because I believe it is mandated by the plain language of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) and our constitution. Section 115 — 3(b) of the Code, which sets forth the various findings a court may make following a bench trial, provides, “when the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial and acquittal is based solely upon the defense of insanity, the court shall enter a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.” 725 ILCS 5/115 — 3(b) (West 2004). Article VI, section 6, of our constitution, in turn, provides, “there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. Thus, because a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) verdict is clearly an acquittal, no appeal can be taken. Accordingly, the appellate court was correct to conclude that it had no jurisdiction. However, for the following reasons, I am concerned about the consequences of denying a defendant found NGRI the right to challenge the findings of the trier of fact. A finding of NGRI may be entered following a bench trial only if insanity is the sole basis for the trial court’s finding that the defendant is not guilty of the crime charged. 725 ILCS 5/115 — 3(b) (West 2004). In other words, as the majority has explained, the court will have determined that the “act” charged had been proven by the State, but, because the defendant was insane, he lacked the “ ‘substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct’ ” and thus did not commit the “crime.” 226 Ill. 2d at 436, quoting 720 ILCS 5/6—2(a) (West 2002). See also 725 ILCS 5/115—40) (West 2004) (following a trial by jury, “a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity may be returned instead of a general verdict but such special verdict requires a unanimous finding by the jury that the defendant committed the acts charged but at the time of the commission of those acts the defendant was insane”). Once an NGRI verdict is delivered, the court’s actions are governed by section 5 — 2—4 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which sets out the procedures that must be followed subsequent to an acquittal by reason of insanity. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 2—4 (West 2006). First, the court must determine whether the Department of Human Services will evaluate the defendant’s mental health on either an inpatient or outpatient basis. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 2—4(a) (West 2006). If a defendant is found to be in need of mental-health services on an outpatient basis, he may be conditionally released. But if a defendant is found to be in need of mental-health services on an inpatient basis, he faces a much different future. Section 5 — 2—4(a) of the Code of Corrections mandates that a defendant awaiting or receiving treatment on an inpatient basis is “placed in a secure setting” and is not “permitted outside the facility’s housing unit unless escorted or accompanied by personnel of the Department of Human Services or with the prior approval of the Court for unsupervised on-grounds privileges as provided herein.” Further, during any transportation “off facility grounds” these defendants “shall be placed in security devices or otherwise secured during the period of transportation.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 2—4(a) (West 2006). Thus, the distinction between inpatient and outpatient treatment is not a small one. As the majority notes, “[t]his court has recognized that ‘it is well settled that detention of an individual at a mental health care facility implicates a substantial liberty interest.’ ” 226 Ill. 2d at 437, quoting Radazewski v. Cawley, 159 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1994). A court determining whether a defendant requires mental-health services on an inpatient or outpatient basis must consider whether the defendant is one “who due to mental illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another and who would benefit from inpatient care or is in need of inpatient care.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 2—4(a)(1)(B) (West 2006). In making this determination, the trial court may consider, among other things, “whether the defendant appreciates the harm caused by the defendant to others and the community by his or her prior conduct that resulted in the finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 — 2—4(g)(1) (West 2006). It is this latter section that concerns me. The “prior conduct” that determines whether a defendant is in need of mental-health services on an inpatient care basis is the same act that the trial court found defendant committed during the trial proceedings. Under today’s ruling, defendant is precluded from challenging that finding. An NGRI defendant thus has no avenue to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence proving he committed the very conduct that will influence the court’s decision of whether he must be confined to inpatient treatment immediately following his trial or upon the filing of a challenge to continued inpatient treatment pursuant to section 5 — 2—4(e) of the Code of Corrections (720 ILCS 5/5 — 2—4(e) (West 2006)). I recognize that many defendants asserting an insanity defense admit to committing the acts charged. However, there will also be instances where a defendant will deny committing the act charged and also raise the affirmative defense of insanity. People v. Ford, 39 Ill. 2d 318, 321 (1968); see also People v. Moore, 147 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885 (1986). It is these situations that illustrate the problem with denying a defendant found NGRI the right to a review of the findings made by the trier of fact. Because of the serious consequences that follow a finding that an NGRI defendant is in need of mental-health services on an inpatient basis, I urge our legislature to craft a remedy that affords these defendants an opportunity to contest the finding that they committed the act charged. JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.