Court Opinion

ID: 9738676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:00:24.326427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:07.865403
License: Public Domain

BURKE, P. J., concurs in part and dissents in part: Plaintiff, as a third-party beneficiary upon obtaining judgment against the three policy holders had the right to sue the insurers as effectively as though he had been named a beneficiary. Ill Rev Stats 1963, chap 73, § 1000. See Simmon v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co., 3 Ill2d 318, 121 NE2d 509; Slavens v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. of Detroit, Mich., 27 F2d 859 (p 324); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Murray, 242 F2d 549. Lincoln and Highway admitted that plaintiff is a beneficiary under their policies. These two insurers to the extent of the terms of the policies are admittedly liable for plaintiff’s claim. Neither has advanced a valid reason why it should not contribute its share. Plaintiff admits that he is beneficiary under the policies issued by these three insurers. Michigan in its answer as garnishee said that it has “outstanding an insurance policy under which it was obligated to pay on behalf of Alvin Trampf one-third of the $18,000 judgment in favor of Michael McDonald.” The third-party complaint alleges that Highway issued its policy which covered the claim of McDonald to the extent of $15,000; that Lincoln issued its policy which covered the claim of McDonald to the extent of $15,-000 and that it (Michigan) had issued a policy with a limit of $20,000. The burden was and is on the judgment creditor to prove the liability of the garnishee. Kores Mfg. Co. v. Western Office Supply, 349 Ill App 208, 110 NE2d 461; Ancateau v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 318 Ill App 553, 48 NE2d 440; Wold for Use of Wegener v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 269 Ill App 407; Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 135 Ill App 49. Plaintiff did not produce any evidence to overcome the allegations in the garnishee’s answer that it was obligated to pay only one-third of the judgment. The third-party complaint alleged that Lincoln was obligated to pay one-third and that Highway was obligated to pay one-third of the judgment. Without the policies we are unable to determine the obligations of the respective insurers. We have held that under the Coffey ease because of the public policy manifested in the Dram Shop Act those who are sued under that Act are not allowed to recover against a joint tortfeasor. Michigan asserts that there is a prorata clause in every standard automobile policy issued in Hlinois. These policies are required to be filed with the Commissioner of Insurance. Ill Rev Stats 1963, chap 73, § 755(2). We decide, following the Coffey case, that there may not be contribution between Trampf, Skovanek and Hopper, the original defendants. Without the policies we cannot determine the liability of any of the insurers, including Michigan. The rights and obligations of the three insurers between themselves may be based on a different conception than the rights of the plaintiff against the three original defendants and against any or all of the insurers. These third-party defendants are in the insurance business and therein are licensed and regulated by the State. A stipulation of the policies to prorate the loss between the insurers does not offend against any theory of public policy inhibiting contribution between the individual tortfeasors. The cases holding that an insurance carrier of the tortfeasor stands in the shoes of the tortfeasors do not affect the rights and obligations of the insurers among themselves. The judgment against Michigan should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the third-party complaint against Lincoln Cas. Co., and Highway Ins. Co., and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.