Court Opinion

ID: 9689953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:50:16.376737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.852568
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached in this case, but write separately to express my opinion that the standards set forth in Strickland v Washington, 446 US 688; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), apply to all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought under either the Michigan Constitution or the United States Constitution. I find persuasive this Court’s reasoning in People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569; 419 NW2d 609 (1988), and the concurring opinion of Judge Harrison in People v Dalton, 155 Mich App 591, 601-603; 400 NW2d 689 (1986). People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), which is often applied to state constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, is based solely upon federal grounds. Accordingly, I would hold that Garcia has been superseded by Strickland.
*387I
The right of a criminal defendant to assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by art 1, § 20 of the Michigan Constitution. The language of these two constitutional provisions is nearly identical.1
In People v Bellanca, 386 Mich 708, 713; 194 NW2d 863 (1972), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the state constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel is coextensive with the federal constitutional guarantee. Our Supreme Court stated:
These statutory provisions must be read in conjunction with the provisions of Const 1963, art 1, § 20 that "In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. . . .”
We read this last provision to accord a defendant the same assistance of counsel contemplated in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution .... [Emphasis added.]
Although several panels of this Court2 have held that Strickland governs federal constitutional claims while Garcia applies to state claims, this dichotomy is not mandated by the language of the state constitution, Michigan constitutional history, or the holdings in Garcia. Contrary to the assump*388tion made by such panels, Garcia does not rest upon separate or independent state constitutional grounds. Rather, it is based upon federal case law which has now been overturned.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Garcia addressed a generalized claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In dealing with this issue, the Court made no distinction between federal and state constitutional rights. Instead, our Supreme Court looked to federal case law and applied the now discarded standard laid out in Beasley v United States, 491 F2d 687 (CA 6, 1974). Beasley was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland and accordingly is no longer employed by the Sixth Circuit or other federal courts. Since the Michigan right to counsel is "the same assistance of counsel contemplated in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,” Bellanca, supra, p 713, there likewise is no reason for Michigan courts to perpetuate Beasley.
ii
The "second prong” of Garcia addressed the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. The opinion recognizes that the due process right to a fair trial may be violated by a serious mistake of counsel which prejudices the likelihood of an acquittal:
However, even where assistance of counsel satisfies the constitutional requirements, defendant is still entitled to a fair trial. Defendant can be denied this right if his attorney makes a serious mistake. But a court should not grant a new trial unless it finds that but for this mistake defendant *389would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. [398 Mich 266.]
In analyzing the defendant’s claimed violation of a fair trial, the Supreme Court cited with approval People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702; 173 NW2d 317 (1969):
"A claim that an adequate lawyer made a serious mistake does not raise the constitutional issue of right to counsel; it does not involve the concept of ’effective assistance of counsel,’ it should not be measured against the sham trial standard which circumscribes the constitutional right.” [Emphasis added. 398 Mich 266.]
The conclusion of Garcia makes it abundantly clear that the separate issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and the due process right of a fair trial were being addressed:
We conclude that the defendant was deprived of neither a fair trial or effective assistance of counsel. [Id.]
Accordingly, I conclude that the second prong of Garcia is not an ineffective assistance of counsel standard but rather a fair trial, due process requirement. Thus, only in those cases raising a due process, fair trial issue need the second prong of Garcia be addressed.
I concur in the result in this case on the grounds that the defendant has not sustained his burden of demonstrating a violation of the right to counsel under the standards of Strickland v Washington.

 Const 1963, art 1, § 20 provides in part:
In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
US Const, Am VI provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

 See, e.g., People v Vicuna, 141 Mich App 486; 367 NW2d 887 (1985), and People v White, 142 Mich App 581; 370 NW2d 405 (1985).