Court Opinion

ID: 9958363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 00:06:23.854966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.815804
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                            Minn. R. Civ. App. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                 STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                 IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                       A23-1285

           In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: K. F. and M. L., Parents.

                                     Filed April 8, 2024
                                          Affirmed
                                      Johnson, Judge

                                St. Louis County District Court
                                  File No. 69-DU-JV-22-286

Rachel L.F. Weis, Weis Legal Solutions, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant-father
M.L.)

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Benjamin Ranallo, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human
Services Department)

Jody M. Alholinna, St. Paul, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Joan Mahle)

      Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and

Halbrooks, Judge. ∗

                             NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

       The district court terminated a man’s parental rights to a child. We conclude that

the district court did not err by finding that the petitioner proved at least one statutory

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
       ∗

to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interests. Therefore, we

affirm.

                                             FACTS

          K.F. is the biological mother of a child, M.X.L., who was born in April 2021. M.L.

is the father of the child due to his having signed a recognition of parentage. At the trial in

this case, K.F. voluntarily terminated her parental rights to M.X.L. Only M.L.’s parental

rights are at issue in this appeal.

          As stated by the district court, K.F. had a “long-term struggle with substance abuse.”

K.F. had given birth in January 2020 to a child who tested positive at birth for the presence

of methamphetamine and amphetamines. K.F. voluntarily terminated her parental rights

to that child in early 2021.

          The St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services Department became

concerned about K.F. in January 2021, when law-enforcement officers executed a search

warrant at her home and found heroin and methamphetamine and observed that K.F. was

visibly pregnant. In addition, the county received a report in April 2021, that K.F. had

tested positive for amphetamines at a pre-natal appointment. When M.X.L. was born, a

sample of umbilical-cord blood tested positive for methamphetamine.

          Soon after K.F.’s and M.X.L.’s discharge from the hospital, the county petitioned

the district court for an adjudication that M.X.L. is a child in need of protection or services

(CHIPS). In June 2021, K.F. admitted to a CHIPS adjudication, and the district court

ordered that custody of M.X.L. be granted to the county and that M.X.L. be placed in foster

care. The county developed case plans for both K.F. and M.L. M.L.’s case plan required

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him to, among other things, find and maintain safe and drug-free housing, remain law

abiding, not affiliate with anyone deemed unsafe or unlawful, maintain sobriety, and

comply with drug testing.

       In July 2021, M.L. was arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant. After he was

released from jail, he moved out of the home that he had shared with K.F. M.L. returned

to K.F.’s home in approximately November 2021, but he moved out again in February

2022. Throughout this period of time, M.L. repeatedly either failed to show up for drug

tests or submitted samples that tested positive.

       In March 2022, a search warrant was executed at M.L.’s residence.              Law-

enforcement officers found heroin and fentanyl. M.L. was arrested and charged with two

counts of first-degree controlled-substance crime. Soon thereafter, M.L. was incarcerated

at the Minnesota correctional facility in St. Cloud, apparently because of the revocation of

probation that had been ordered for previous convictions of drug crimes. M.L. later was

convicted of one count of first-degree controlled-substance crime for possessing drugs in

his home in March 2022. In March 2023, he was sentenced to 95 months of imprisonment,

with approximately 12 months of custody credit.

       Meanwhile, the district court approved a trial home visit in K.F.’s home in January

2022. The CHIPS case was closed in April 2022 because K.F. was doing well. But the

matter was reopened in September 2022 after the county learned that K.F. was using

methamphetamine and heroin and was selling drugs from her home.

       The county petitioned for the termination of K.F.’s and M.L.’s parental rights on

September 13, 2022. The county alleged four statutory grounds for termination against

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M.L. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2022). The case was tried

on July 13, 2023. During trial, K.F. stipulated to the voluntary termination of her parental

rights. The county called five witnesses, including K.F. M.L. called three witnesses,

including himself.

       In August 2023, the district court filed an order in which it concluded that the county

had proved three statutory grounds for termination and that termination of M.L.’s parental

rights is in M.X.L.’s best interests. Accordingly, the district court granted the county’s

petition and terminated M.L.’s parental rights to M.X.L. M.L. appeals.

                                        DECISION

       M.L. argues that the district court erred by granting the county’s petition and

terminating his parental rights.

       This court reviews an order terminating parental rights “to determine whether the

district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re

Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “Parental rights are

terminated only for grave and weighty reasons,” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370,

375 (Minn. 1990), but this court gives “considerable deference to the district court’s

decision to terminate parental rights,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We apply a clear-error

standard of review to a district court’s findings of historical fact and an abuse-of-discretion

standard of review to a district court’s determinations concerning the existence of statutory

grounds for termination, the child’s best interests, and the ultimate decision to terminate

parental rights. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App.

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2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); see also In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920

N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018).

                                   I. Statutory Grounds

       M.L. first argues that the district court erred by finding that the county proved three

statutory grounds for the termination of his parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,

subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (8). Because only one statutory ground is necessary for the termination

of parental rights, a termination may be affirmed if at least one statutory ground has been

properly established. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004).

       We begin by considering M.L.’s argument that the district court erred by concluding

that he “is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship.” See Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). This statutory ground exists if

              a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
              relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct
              before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the
              parent and child relationship either of which are determined by
              the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent
              unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
              appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional
              needs of the child.

Id.

       The district court determined that M.L. is palpably unfit for multiple reasons. The

district court noted that M.L. had been convicted of multiple drug crimes since 2019 and

had not changed his behavior. The district court credited the testimony of M.L.’s probation

officer, who testified that M.L. was likely to re-offend, in part based on M.L.’s prior

statement that he had no intention of ceasing his drug-dealing. The district court also noted

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M.L.’s testimony that he keeps drugs away from M.X.L. but expressly deemed that

testimony to be not credible. The district court found that M.L. uses controlled substances

based on evidence that he repeatedly tested positive for controlled substances or failed to

show up for testing, contrary to his case plan. The district court also found that M.L.

allowed M.X.L. to remain in the care of K.F. even when M.L. knew that she was abusing

drugs. The district court further found that M.L. had exposed M.X.L. to potentially

dangerous, non-law-abiding persons in the course of his drug trade. The district court

stated that, as a consequence of his persistent criminal conduct, M.L. is incarcerated and

unlikely to be released soon and, thus, unable to provide for M.X.L. either physically or

financially, both at present and for the reasonably foreseeable future.

       M.L. contends that the district court erred on the ground that its findings do not

satisfy the statutory requirement of “a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the

child.” See id. To be clear, the statute requires “a consistent pattern of specific conduct

before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child

relationship” that makes the parent unable to care for the child. Id. (emphasis added). The

district court’s findings concerning M.L.’s palpable unfitness are sufficiently connected to

M.X.L. and to the parent-child relationship between M.L. and M.X.L. The district court

reasoned that M.L.’s repeated sales of controlled substances and his substance use created

the condition that M.L. is unable to care for M.X.L. while incarcerated and also would be

unable to care for M.X.L. if he were not incarcerated because his behavior would endanger

the child and impair his judgment while caring for the child.

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       M.L. also contends that the district court erred on the ground that substance abuse,

by itself, is not a sufficient basis for a finding of palpable unfitness if the substance abuse

does not affect a parent’s ability to care for the child. He cites In re Welfare of Children

of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2008), in which the supreme court stated that “our case

law suggests that alcohol or substance use does not render a parent palpably unfit in the

absence of a causal connection between that substance use and the parent’s inability to care

for the child.” Id. at 662. But the district court found, as stated above, that M.L.’s use of

controlled substances affected his ability to care for M.X.L. and would affect his ability to

do so whenever he is released from prison. Furthermore, the district court’s determination

of palpable unfitness was not based solely on M.L.’s drug use; it was based on multiple

factors.

       M.L. further contends that he has expressed interest in the department of

correction’s Challenge Incarceration Program (sometimes called “bootcamp”), which

might allow him to be released from prison earlier than indicated by his 95-month sentence.

The district court noted M.L.’s interest in that program but found that it was uncertain

whether and when M.L. might be accepted into the program. The district court’s finding

of uncertainty is appropriate. As a matter of law, M.L. will not be eligible for the program

until he has “48 months or less in or remaining in [his] term of imprisonment.” See Minn.

Stat. § 244.17, subd. 2(a)(2) (2022).

       Thus, the district court did not err by determining that M.L. is palpably unfit to be a

party to the parent-child relationship. Because the existence of one statutory ground for

termination is sufficient, we need not consider whether the district court erred by

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concluding that the county also proved two other statutory grounds. See R.W., 678 N.W.2d

at 55.

                                       II. Best Interests

         M.L. also argues that the district court erred by finding that the termination of M.L.’s

parental rights is in M.X.L.’s best interests.

         If a statutory basis for termination exists, the paramount consideration in a

termination proceeding is the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7;

In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Minn. 2008). A district court may

not order the termination of parental rights without determining that the termination is in

the child’s best interests. S.E.P., 774 N.W.2d at 385. A best-interests analysis should

include consideration of “all relevant factors,” including, “a review of the relationship

between the child and relatives and the child and other important persons with whom the

child has resided or had significant contact.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a), (b) (2022). Three

factors must be balanced “when considering a child’s best interests: ‘(1) the child’s interest

in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-

child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.’” In re Welfare of Child of

S.B.G., 981 N.W.2d 224, 232 (Minn. App. 2022) (quoting J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905),

aff’d, 991 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. 2023); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii).

“Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations

and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992).

         In considering M.X.L.’s best interests, the district court noted that he had been in

an out-of-home placement for 612 days, which was 70 percent of his life at the time of

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trial. The district court found that the conditions that gave rise to the out-of-home

placement had not been corrected. The district court found that those conditions “would

very likely endanger the child’s physical, mental and emotional health.” The district court

found that M.X.L. “requires and deserves to receive consistent care and guidance from a

parental figure in a safe, stable and loving home environment free of violence, drugs, and

criminal activity,” that M.L. cannot provide such an environment, and that M.X.L. “is in a

safe and stable foster home with his biological brother [and] the foster family is willing to

adopt him.”

       M.L. contends that the district court erred on the ground that the disadvantages of

extending M.X.L.’s out-of-home placement is lessened by the fact that he is so young as

to be “unaware of the status of the foster home being temporary.” M.L.’s contention is

undermined by the fact that M.X.L. will be considerably older before M.L. is likely to be

released from prison. M.L.’s contention also is inconsistent with the legislative policy of

permanency, which is an important goal of the juvenile-protection statutes and does not

vary based on the age of a child. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.503, subd. 1(a) (2022) (requiring

permanency proceedings within 12 months of child being in foster care or care of

noncustodial parent). In addition, M.L.’s contention is inconsistent with the testimony of

the county’s social worker, who testified that it would be in M.X.L.’s best interests to

terminate M.L.’s parental rights because an extended out-of-home placement could cause

him to develop “significant attachment issues” and “mental health concerns.”

       Thus, the district court did not err by determining that the termination of M.L.’s

parental rights is in M.X.L.’s best interests.

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       In sum, the district court did not err by granting the county’s petition and terminating

M.L.’s parental rights.

       Affirmed.

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