Court Opinion

ID: 9756118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:08:23.252416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:12.588694
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because, in my opinion, the facts establish that there was not a spontaneous declaration that would fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. The appellant, Robert Lewis Bailey, was separated from his common law wife, who retained custody of their two sons. The appellant had visitation rights and on a weekend in February, 1981, he took his two sons to his home in Centre County for a visit. His nine year old son, G.B., went to bed late on Friday evening. Sometime later, according to G.B.’s testimony, his father got into bed with him and sexually abused him.
G.B. and his brother remained with their father until Sunday evening when they returned home at about 10:30 P.M. and G.B. went to bed. On the next morning according to the testimony of his mother, she noticed that there was blood on her son’s underwear at about 7:00 A.M. Her testimony was as follows:
Q. Ms. Bailey, I’ll repeat my question. Directing your attention to Monday morning, March 2, 1981, you had a conversation with your son ... with regard to blood on his underpants. Would you please state as best you *399can recollect for the members of the jury the substance of that conversation?
A. He told me his dad made him do bad things. He said his dad stuck his penis in his bum. I asked him if he was telling the truth; he said yes. I asked him if he was willing to tell it to the police; and he said yes. Immediately I called the hotline for child abuse. They told me to call the hospital; they’d make arrangements for me to go down and have him examined, which I did. And then I notified the police.1
The court below admitted the hearsay testimony of the alleged victim’s mother concerning what her son told her about the incident, under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.2 The exception requires that a statement must be: "... a spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person had just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which he perceived, and this declaration must be so near the occurrence both in time and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part *400from his reflective faculties.” Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132, 137-8, 383 A.2d 858, 860 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Galloway, 302 Pa.Super. 145, 448 A.2d 568 (1982).
*399Now, I’m taking some pains to put this on the record as opposed to just making my decision because it does appear to the Court that this is — I would say so on the record, that this is a close decision because of the lapse of 36 hours. But the Court wants the record to reflect if it becomes important later that the Court is making its decision based upon the first opportunity of a 9 year old boy to speak in this case to his mother or to someone other than his father or father’s friends about the incident that occurred with his father.
*400The statement by G.B. to his mother more than 48 hours after the alleged incident and some 9 hours after he returned to his mother’s home was not a spontaneous utterance. On the Saturday after the incident G.B. played trucks and watched TV with his brother who was about 11 years old. Part of G.B.’s statement was in response to questions by his mother, and there was clearly time for reflection by him as the act occurred more than 2 days previously.3 See Commonwealth v. Kasko, 322 Pa.Super. 62, 469 A.2d 181 (1983). “... [TJhere is no clear cut rule as to the time sequence; whether the actual delay between the event and the statement is sufficient to negate ‘spontaneity’ must be resolved in the particular facts of each case.” Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. at 142, 383 A.2d at 863. While in this case the child remained with his father and his father’s friends until Sunday evening when he returned to his mother’s home, his first statements concerning the alleged abuse did not occur until the following morning and such statements do not have the requisite spontaneity. This case is controlled by our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Haber, 351 Pa.Super. 79, 505 A.2d 273 (1986).4 The following language from that opinion is appropriate to our situation:
*401It is clear that the testimony of Mrs. Leigh-Manuel and Mrs. Predmore as to what their children told them was hearsay, since it related out-of-court assertions that were offered to prove their truth. Thus it was inadmissible unless it fit within an exception to the hearsay rule. The exception most commonly used by the courts to allow the admission of a child’s statements regarding sexual abuse is the spontaneous declaration, or excited utterance exception. But in order to fall under this exception, the statement must have been made so spontaneously as to be under the excitement caused by the event, so as to preclude the possibility of fabrication.
(Emphasis added — 505 A.2d 274-75)
The reason for carving out an exception to the hearsay rule based on an excited utterance is the element of reliability that is present in such spontaneous declarations. The requirement of spontaneity is not diminished because the declarant is a child.
The Commonwealth contends that even if the testimony of the alleged victim’s mother was inadmissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, it could be admitted to show that G.B. made a prompt complaint about the offense, citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 295 Pa.Super. 467, 441 A.2d 1327 (1982). This argument lacks merit as the complaint was not prompt and of equal importance, it was pointed out in Freeman, supra, that “[t]he challenged testimony of the victim and his sister-in-law, [was] introduced solely to establish that Ms. Eachus immediately reported that she was raped, [and] was neither detailed nor protracted.” 295 Pa.Super. 476, 441 A.2d 1332. See also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 343 Pa.Super. 486, 495 A.2d 569 (1985). As noted in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 295 Pa.Super. at 475-76, 441 A.2d at 1131-32, “Hue and cry are thought to follow rape like smoke follows fire.” In the instant case, however, there *402was too long a delay after G.B. came home to his mother’s house to render his statements to his mother admissible, as a prompt complaint.
I would remand for a new trial.

. The victim’s mother also testified with respect to her questioning of her son as follows:
Q. Did you have any further conversation with him at that time?
A. Yes, I did. I asked him why and he said — well, the first thing, when he took his bath, I got his pajamas for him and I found blood stains on his underwear. I asked him what happened and he said dad did bad things to him. I said, 'What did he do?” And he said he stuck his penis in his butt.

. The trial court was troubled by the long lapse of time between the alleged incident early Saturday morning and G.B.’s responses to his mother’s questions on Monday morning. The court stated with respect to his decision to admit the hearsay:

. The following leading questions were asked of G.B. by the prosecutor concerning his statements to his mother:
Q. You told your mom?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you tell her that Sunday night, or was it so late that you had to go to bed?
A. It was so late I had to go to bed.
Q. Did you have school the next day?
A. Yeah. (Emphasis added)

. In Commonwealth v. Haber, supra, the court held that the hearsay testimony was crucial to the Commonwealth's case because the testimony of the children consisted mostly of monosyllabic answers to leading questions, and the children repeatedly stated that they were unable to remember details about what happened. In the instant *401case, G.B. described the sexual abuse in some detail, and a doctor testified that a subsequent physical examination revealed that the boy could have been sexually abused but the abrasions on his body could have had some other cause.