Court Opinion

ID: 9531221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:46.4443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:22.297639
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the murder in this case was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior warranting an extended sentence. The majority’s reliance on People v. Lindsay (1993), 247 Ill. App. 3d 518, although technically accurate, is in my considered opinion wrong. If any crime warranted an extended sentence, such was the crime in Lindsay. I agree with the dissent. Lindsay, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 537 (Doyle, J., dissenting). As that dissent notes, the evaluation of the heinousness and brutality of an offense requires analysis of the entire spectrum of facts surrounding the incident. (Lindsay, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 537 (Doyle, J., dissenting), citing People v. Grady (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 970, 977.) Defendant’s actions, luring the victim into a situation wherein defendant could beat him up and rob him; beating him into flight and then pursuing him to beat him senseless; binding him hand and foot so as to pillage his home; and leaving him to die in a pool of his own blood or vomit, should stand as textbook examples of what is hateful or shockingly evil, grossly bad, enormously and flagrantly criminal, devoid of mercy and compassion, cruel and coldblooded. (People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 501.) These actions do not rise to the level of monstrous brutality in Lindsay, repeated strangulation with an electrical cord; taping shut the victim’s mouth and nose; encasing the victim’s head in plastic; and entombing the victim in a sewer; but Lindsay was wrong. There, as here, the crime was excessively brutal and heinous, warranting an extended sentence. "Heinous or brutal behavior toward the victim can occur even after the victim is dead.” (Lindsay, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 537 (Doyle, J., dissenting), citing People v. Devine (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 914, 925.) Defendant’s cold-blooded lack of compassion echoed in his flight from justice and in his statement shortly after he left defendant, that he "robbed a faggot and beat the guy up and tied him up and left him in the house.” The majority places itself in the position of the trier of fact, finding from defendant’s unsworn statement that he had remorse. The trial court, however, heard defendant’s statement and had the opportunity to evaluate the timbre of the voice and the genuineness of the man. We cannot know by reading them in the record whether the words were hollow or sincere. The trial court also found that defendant’s extensive and violent criminal history and the need to deter future crimes of this nature necessitated lengthy imprisonment of defendant for the protection of society. I agree. The Lindsay case, if extended, will serve to eviscerate extended sentencing step by step. Today’s crime must "beat” yesterday’s crime, and tomorrow’s must be worse than today’s, in order to merit extended sentences. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. (State v. Mikusch (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247.) The majority opinion in this case fails to give effect to the statute. I therefore dissent.