Court Opinion

ID: 9766299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:40:20.960997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:21.116041
License: Public Domain

*125WATKINS, President Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The complaining witness testified that three men invaded her apartment after ringing the doorbell, held her at bay and raped her one at a time. The men fled, taking some household appliances with them after making threats to kill the complaining witness if she talked. The appellant was identified by the complaining witness from police photographs as one of the three men. Appellant retained counsel to represent him. Because of appellant’s counsel’s continued unavailability for trial, the case was not tried until 1974 (three years and seven months after his arrest) when the court appointed present counsel. Appellant was on bail during this time. The first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury was hopelessly deadlocked.
The complaining witness and her husband had moved to California before the case came to trial. They returned to Pennsylvania at the Commonwealth’s expense for the first trial. Before going back to California they informed the district attorney’s office in Philadelphia that they would not return for the second trial. The district attorney, however, submitted a petition under the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State in Criminal Proceedings (19 P.S. § 622.-3) to the California court as well as forwarded air transportation and expense money to the district attorney of the county of their residence. The complaining witness moved to have the subpoenas quashed in the California courts. The court granted this. At the second trial, the trial court allowed the complaining witness’ testimony from the previous trial to be read to the jury on the ground that the witness was “unavailable”. The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery and burglary, but not guilty of rape.
I agree with the majority that the appellant’s claim of an unduly delayed trial is without merit.
*126It has been held that the Commonwealth must make a bona fide effort to find and serve the witness in order to avail itself of this section. Commonwealth v. Faison, 452 Pa. 137, 305 A.2d 44 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). The Commonwealth argues that as it has made such a good faith effort, the reading of the prior testimony was proper. I disagree that the complaining witness was unavailable within the meaning of 19 P.S. § 582.
Appellant’s first trial ended in the declaration of a mistrial because of a deadlocked jury. The record shows that the jury deliberated for several days before the trial court would declare the mistrial. From the evidence it appears that the key issue at both trials was the credibility of the complaining witness. While the reason for the deadlock is not on the record, it is a very strong presumption that one or more jurors remained unconvinced that appellant raped and robbed the complaining witness.
Under these circumstances it would deprive appellant of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and the jury of the opportunity to assess the demeanor of the complaining witness if the former testimony was permitted to be used.
The real issue is not whether the Commonwealth made a good faith effort to secure the attendance of the witness, which admittedly it did, but whether the complaining witness was “unavailable” within the meaning of 19 P.S. § 582, supra. The key portion of the Act is: “. . . such witness ... be out of the jurisdiction so that he cannot be effectively served with a subpoena, or if he cannot be found . . . .”
In this case the complaining witness was served with the subpoena but refused to return for the trial. Her testimony was very important in order that the jury be able to assess the complaining witness’ demeanor and observe the cross-examination of the witness as to identifi*127cation. As she was aware of the trial, the complaining witness’ refusal to return to Philadelphia to testify is not unavailability but rather a refusal to prosecute the case. The record will disclose that the principal objection raised by the appellant in this case was to the effect that the defendant had the right to confront his accuser and that the jury should not have been permitted to listen to a “cold” record without the privilege of observing the witness’ demeanor as she testified to determine her credibility.
Appellant should have been granted a new trial.
CERCONE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.