Court Opinion

ID: 9684296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:52:45.591937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:54.426497
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that a voluntary inculpatory statement made to the police by a child described in § 211.0711 of the juvenile code is admissible in evidence at his trial for the commission of an offense with which he is charged under the general law.
In 1966, we construed § 211.061 to require the exclusion of an incriminating statement elicited from a fifteen-year-old child by the police while in their custody. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26, 30[3]. That section of the code requires that when a child is taken into custody by the police they deliver him immediately to the juvenile court or juvenile officer; it does not mention evidence or its admissibility.
The court said in Arbeiter, supra, referring to and quoting from an Arizona case,2 that the philosophy of our juvenile code is that in the majority of cases involving criminal offenses by a child “ * * * there is both a responsibility and an opportunity for the state, through special treatment in a non-criminal proceeding, to redirect and rehabilitate these young people * * that “[t]his operates for the benefit of the individual, and for society as a whole * * that one of the purposes of § 211.061 was to protect the child from the effects of interrogation by the police which was said to be “adverse” to any rehabilitative efforts by the state; that to enforce this purpose of § 211.061 it was necessary to exclude from the evidence any statement obtained from the child by the police during the period when they were disregarding the command of § 211.061 that the child be delivered immediately to juvenile authorities. The court also recognized in Arbeiter, supra, as does our juvenile code in § 211.-071, that there are persons within the chronological classification of “child” who are not in fact “children,” and for whom special treatment under the juvenile code is futile. Among these is the particular individual the juvenile court has determined, after a hearing, is not susceptible of redirection or rehabilitation, “is not a proper subject to be dealt with under the * * * [juvenile code],” and, therefore, may be prosecuted under the general law as an adult. There is no reason for excluding from evidence at his trial under the general law any statement made to police by this person, so long as the statement is voluntary, because he was not a proper subject for rehabilitation efforts by the state in the first place; he is one of those, the juvenile court has determined, for whom special treatment under the juvenile code is, and was at the time he was taken into custody, futile.
There may be some reason for the Arbeiter exclusionary rule where a child susceptible of rehabilitation is retained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for treatment, but there is none where he is released for prosecution as an adult. As to the theory that a purpose of § 211.061 is to protect the child for rehabilitation, I dare say the “effect” of an interrogation by the police would be no more adverse to the success of rehabilitative efforts by the state than would the child’s living with the fact that he had taken the life of another human being. Furthermore, as to the so-called “responsibility and opportunity” of the state to rehabilitate these young people, there has been, so far, little more than lipservice recognition by the state that this is the philosophy of the juvenile code. True, there have been efforts in this direction by many, but the steady yearly increase of violent crime in Missouri committed repetitively by children 12 years of age and older refutes any notion that the state has the trained personnel and the facilities *732adequate for the task. We provide little more than “warehousing.” Until a sustained intensive effort is made and we have secured sufficient trained personnel and facilities to provide the special treatment referred to, it may not be said that Missouri is truly committed to rehabilitation.
I concurred in the Arbeiter decision, but am convinced now that it is not sound and would overrule it and its progeny.
In the instant case, the juvenile court has determined that defendant was not a proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code. The circuit court has determined that the statement he gave police was voluntary and admissible in evidence. For the reasons stated, I would hold there was no error in admitting the statement and would affirm the judgment.

. References to sections of the statutes are to RSMo 1969 and V.A.M.S.

. State v. Shaw, 93 Ariz. 40, 378 P.2d 487 (1963).