Court Opinion

ID: 9917267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 20:02:20.548859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:01.920109
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/24 P. v. Tessmer CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Siskiyou)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C095868

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                           (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                      SCCRCRF20191989)
           v.

 ROBERT HENRY TESSMER, JR.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

          Defendant Robert Henry Tessmer, Jr., beat an elderly acquaintance to death using
his fists and a piece of firewood. A jury found him guilty of first degree murder and
elder abuse resulting in death and found true allegations that he personally used a
dangerous and deadly weapon in committing elder abuse, and proximately caused the
death of a person 70 years old or older. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found
true allegations that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction and a prior strike
conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life plus five years in state
prison.

                                                             1
       Defendant appeals, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence of premeditation
and deliberation to support the jury’s finding that he committed first degree murder; (2)
the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the meaning of “provocation” in the
context of second degree murder; (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to request clarifying instructions on the meaning of “provocation” in the context
of second degree murder; (4) the trial court’s sentence on the elder abuse count violates
section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
567); and (5) remand is required for the trial court to exercise its discretion as to which
counts to stay pursuant to section 654, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518). We will reject these contentions and affirm.
                                    I. BACKGROUND
       Donald Hobrecht, age 70, lived alone in a small house in Siskiyou County. He
was a private person and mostly kept to himself; however, he regularly spoke by phone
with Michael, a friend from the Bay Area, and neighbors were generally aware of his
comings and goings.
       Defendant, age 37, had known Hobrecht for nearly 30 years, having lived across
the street from him as a child. Over the years, defendant started using drugs and had
frequent run ins with the law. He had a volatile temper and often found himself in
physical altercations. By September 2019, defendant was homeless and living with his
girlfriend in a Motel 6. He was also on parole.
       Hobrecht liked defendant in spite of his difficulties. Hobrecht tried to help
defendant by hiring him to perform yard work and odd jobs around the house. These
efforts did not always go to plan. During their regular telephone conversations, Hobrecht
complained to Michael that defendant was unreliable and rarely followed through on
things he promised to do. He also told Michael that he sometimes felt unsafe around
defendant due to his temper. When Michael asked whether he would ever consider

                                              2
allowing defendant to stay with him, Hobrecht responded he would not feel safe with
defendant living in the house.
       Hobrecht and Michael spoke by phone as usual on the afternoon of September 17,
2019. It was a short conversation, which ended when defendant appeared at Hobrecht’s
house. Hobrecht asked Michael to call him back later, and Michael agreed to do so.
A.     Hobrecht Disappears
       Michael called Hobrecht on the evening of September 17, 2019. Hobrecht did not
answer the phone. Michael called back six or seven times over the next couple of days
and continued calling two or three times a day for the next two weeks. Sometimes
Michael’s calls went to an answering machine, sometimes they did not. Michael grew
increasingly concerned and suspicious.
       In the meantime, neighbors were starting to have suspicions of their own. One
neighbor saw defendant and his girlfriend standing outside Hobrecht’s house with three
black trash bags. The neighbor watched as defendant spoke with Hobrecht and the men
walked together towards the back of the house. He never saw Hobrecht again. But the
neighbor saw defendant at Hobrecht’s house almost every day. He also saw people
coming and going from the house and removing furniture and other items.
       Several neighbors saw defendant driving Hobrecht’s car and truck. Another
neighbor heard Hobrecht’s car backing out of the driveway after 9:00 p.m., which was
unusual, as Hobrecht was not one to leave the house at night. Still another neighbor
noticed defendant and his girlfriend were living in Hobrecht’s house and “taking over his
life,” while Hobrecht was “nowhere to be seen.” Eventually, neighbors became
concerned enough to call the sheriff’s department. Michael had also called the sheriff’s
department.
B.     Welfare Checks and Calls to Dispatch
       The sheriff’s department conducted a series of welfare checks on Hobrecht
between late September and early October 2019. Sheriff’s deputies went to Hobrecht’s

                                            3
house on September 26 and 27, 2019, and spoke with defendant and his girlfriend, each
of whom said Hobrecht was visiting a friend in Yreka. The sheriff’s department then
received a call from a person purporting to be Hobrecht. The caller said he was fine and
staying at a friend’s house.
       Sheriff’s lieutenant Ben Whetstine conducted a welfare check on Hobrecht on
October 1, 2019. Defendant and his girlfriend answered the door. Defendant told
Whetstine that he was housesitting for Hobrecht, who was on a fishing trip in Oregon,
and expected to return on October 2 or 3, 2019.
       Lieutenant Whetstine conducted another welfare check on October 3, 2019. This
time, defendant said Hobrecht had decided to extend his fishing trip. Defendant also said
Hobrecht was becoming annoyed by the welfare checks, since he was a grown man and
could do as he pleased.
       Lieutenant Whetstine returned for yet another welfare check on October 4, 2019.
No one answered the door, so he walked around the property towards the backyard.
There, he found a pile of freshly turned dirt, about six feet long and two to three feet
wide. Whetstine called sheriff’s detectives.
       On October 5, 2019, the sheriff’s department received another call from a person
purporting to be Hobrecht. The caller said he was fishing in Oregon and trying to enjoy
himself. He said he was okay, and there was no reason for sheriff’s deputies to continue
bothering his “tenant.”
C.     Investigation and Interviews
       Detective James Randall reviewed audio recordings of the calls from the person
purporting to be Hobrecht.1 He noticed the caller sounded younger than 70 and seemed
to have difficulty pronouncing the name “Hobrecht.” He compared the audio recordings

1 The recordings were later played for the jury.

                                               4
to recordings of jail calls made by defendant and determined the voices were the same or
similar. He then determined the calls were placed by means of an application called
“TextNow,” using a number that was registered to defendant.
       Sheriff’s deputies and detectives executed a search warrant on Hobrecht’s property
on October 10, 2019. They found change of address confirmations from the United
States Postal Service showing Hobrecht’s address for defendant and his girlfriend. They
also found a body in the backyard.
       Defendant was detained in a patrol car, where he made a series of statements to
investigating detectives.2 Defendant initially claimed Hobrecht had returned from his
fishing trip and left again for some “alone time.” However, he admitted calling the
sheriff’s department and pretending to be Hobrecht. After the body was found, defendant
admitted beating Hobrecht to death (or “put[ting] him down”) with his hands and a piece
of firewood. When asked whether his girlfriend was involved in Hobrecht’s death,
defendant replied, “She wasn’t even here.”
       Defendant was arrested and taken to the sheriff’s department, where he made
another, more detailed statement. He explained that he had been working in Hobrecht’s
yard. He went inside for a snack, and Hobrecht started an argument about the way he
was trimming some plants. According to defendant, Hobrecht “took a swing at me,
basically.” Defendant said Hobrecht had done this sort of thing before, and defendant
had not made an issue of it. But this time, defendant said, he “just fucking took it kind of
offensive.” He remembered thinking, “ ‘Man, this old motherfucker took a swing at me,’
you know. I’m thinking, ‘fuck that. I ain’t taking this shit.’ ”
       Defendant then hit Hobrecht “square in the mouth.” The older man fell to the
floor. Defendant straddled Hobrecht and hit him eight or nine times in the head and

2 Recordings of the statements were played for the jury.

                                              5
ribcage. Defendant recalled that Hobrecht was “wiggling around” and “trying to dodge
the punches and shit.” When he was “already halfway through doing it,” defendant
thought, “ ‘Fuck. What am I going to do?’ ” “You know,” he told detectives, “I figured
fucking I already had him half beat. I figured I’ll finish him off and bury him. No one
will fucking know.” Defendant then grabbed a piece of firewood and “smack[ed] him in
the head with it to make sure he[ was] dead.” Defendant said he threw the firewood,
which he described as 16 inches long and four inches wide, “to make sure he was fucking
all the way out. You know, finished off.” When asked how much time elapsed between
the eight or nine punches with defendant’s fists and the blow to the head with the piece of
firewood, defendant replied, “It wasn’t that fucking long. Long enough for me to run
over there and grab it and hit him with it.”3
       Defendant waited until nightfall to wrap Hobrecht’s body in a blanket and drag
him into the backyard. He then buried the body in a hole he had already started digging
as part of his yardwork. He cleaned some blood from the floor using tissues, but there
was not very much blood to clean—“It wasn’t like a horror scene or nothing.” Defendant
opined the blow to the head with the piece of firewood was “probably” what killed
Hobrecht. As defendant put it, Hobrecht, “w[as]n’t moving. I figured he was done.”
D.     Charges and Jury Trial
       Defendant was charged by second amended information with premeditated murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)—count 1)4 and elder abuse resulting in death (§ 368, subd.
(b)(1)—count 2). It was alleged as to both counts that defendant had personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon (the firewood) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and as to count 2,
that defendant had proximately caused the death of the 70-year-old victim (§ 368, subd.

3 The record does not disclose the distance from the attack to the place where firewood
was stored.
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                6
(b)(3)).5 The second amended information also alleged that defendant had prior strike
and serious felony convictions. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subd. (a)(1).)
Defendant pled not guilty and denied the allegations.
       The matter was tried to a jury in December 2021 and January 2022. The
prosecution’s witnesses testified substantially as described ante. The prosecution also
presented evidence that defendant broke into Hobrecht’s safe, spent money he found in
Hobrecht’s house, and called the Department of Health and Human Services as Hobrecht
and requested a new electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card and pin number. Defendant
and his girlfriend also placed Hobrecht’s belongings into trash bags and moved their own
belongings into his drawers and closets.
       The prosecution also offered the testimony of Dr. James Olson, a medical
examiner and certified forensic pathologist. Dr. Olson performed an autopsy on
Hobrecht on October 11, 2019. By then, Hobrecht had been dead for several weeks, and
his body was in an advanced state of decomposition. The brain was particularly
decomposed; so much so that Dr. Olson was unable to draw definitive conclusions as to
the mechanism of death. All the same, Dr. Olson was able to form several opinions
based on his observations and autopsy findings.
       Dr. Olson observed a deep laceration above Hobrecht’s left eyebrow, measuring
approximately 1.5 inches. Hobrecht’s left ear was severely injured, “almost torn off.”
Dr. Olson opined these injuries were caused by blunt force trauma, probably from a blow
to the head with a heavy object. He further opined that the injuries were consistent with
defendant’s account of having struck Hobrecht in the head with a piece of firewood.
       Dr. Olson also observed areas of hemorrhage on the right side of Hobrecht’s
forehead, on his sternocleidomastoid muscle, and his lower ribcage. Dr. Olson opined

5 The trial court subsequently granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the deadly
weapon allegation as to count 1. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)

                                             7
that these injuries occurred around the time of death and were consistent with blunt force
trauma, “quite likely” from punching. These injuries, too, were consistent with
defendant’s account of the beating.
       Dr. Olson also observed that Hobrecht suffered from preexisting heart conditions;
namely, coronary artery disease and arthrosclerosis. Dr. Olson observed—and later
confirmed—that Hobrecht had undergone coronary artery bypass surgery some years
before.
       Dr. Olson appeared to have little difficulty classifying Hobrecht’s manner of death
as a homicide. But the cause and mechanism of death were another story. Given the
advanced decomposition of the brain, Dr. Olson could not say for certain that the cause of
death was blunt force trauma to the head causing fatal brain injury. It was also
possible—indeed, “quite likely”—that the stress of the assault triggered an arrythmia in a
person with significant heart disease.6
       Dr. Olson made several concessions on cross-examination. For one thing, he
acknowledged that the cause of death may have been the multiple blows with defendant’s
fists, rather than the single blow with the piece of firewood. For another, he
acknowledged that the absence of significant quantities of blood at the scene suggested
Hobrecht may have already been dead when defendant struck him with the piece of
firewood. In that case, Dr. Olson allowed, the laceration above Hobrecht’s left eyebrow
and avulsion of his left ear could have been caused by dragging the body to the burial site
after death. However, he said, “you still have obvious blunt force and you have to be
pretty rough in moving the body and striking objects.”
       Forensic pathologist Dr. Katherine Raven testified for the defense. Dr. Raven
explained that she had reviewed Dr. Olson’s autopsy findings and saw no evidence that

6 A cardiac arrythmia is an electrical disturbance that causes the heart to stop beating and
thus causes cardiac arrest.

                                             8
any particular injury caused Hobrecht’s death. 7 She opined the hemorrhage on the right
side of Hobrecht’s forehead was inflicted before death but was not sufficient to cause
death. She added that there was no way to tell how the injury might have been inflicted.
It could have been the result of a punch to the head, but it could also have been from
knocking the head on the side of a sink (or presumably, any other inanimate object).
       Dr. Raven further opined that the injuries to Hobrecht’s ribs and neck area
occurred around the same time, probably around the time of death. By contrast, Dr.
Raven said it was possible that the laceration on the left side of Hobrecht’s forehead and
avulsion of the left ear were inflicted after death. According to Dr. Raven, these injuries
would have produced substantial quantities of blood in a still-living victim, but very little
blood was found at the scene or observed on Hobrecht’s clothes or the blanket used to
wrap his body. Consequently, Dr. Raven opined the injuries could have been caused by
dragging or burying the body after death.
       According to Dr. Raven, the mechanism of death could well have been
arthrosclerosis and cardiac arrythmia. Thus, she said, there was nothing to contradict the
theory that Hobrecht may have fallen and hit his head, then got up and fell again, and
then died from the stress of having done so.8
       On cross-examination, however, Dr. Raven acknowledged that she could not
exclude the possibility that Hobrecht’s death was the result of blunt force trauma causing

7 Dr. Raven also testified that she would have liked to examine tissue samples, but Dr.
Olson failed to collect any. Dr. Olson, for his part, said tissue samples would have been
meaningless given the advanced state of decomposition of the body.

8 Furthermore, Dr. Raven said, it was possible that Hobrecht could have been dead for as
long as four weeks prior to the autopsy.

                                              9
injury to the brain. She also agreed that the avulsion of Hobrecht’s left ear would have
been unlikely to have occurred from falling or being buried.
       Dr. Olson testified again in rebuttal. He confirmed that the autopsy produced
“evidence of blunt force [trauma] of the face and head in an individual with severe
arthrosclerotic heart disease.” As before, he could neither confirm nor exclude the
possibility that the cause of death was significant brain injury given the severe
decomposition of the brain. Thus, he opined the cause of death was either blunt force
trauma from multiple blows to the head or blunt force trauma causing arrythmia due to
arthrosclerosis.
       Dr. Olson clarified that he believed the laceration on the left side of Hobrecht’s
forehead and avulsion to the left ear occurred either at the moment of death or
immediately thereafter. Although Dr. Olson allowed that some of Hobrecht’s injuries
might have been consistent with falling (rather than an assault), the laceration on the left
side of Hobrecht’s forehead and avulsion to the left ear were not. Furthermore, Dr. Olson
observed that Hobrecht’s injuries suggested he would have had to have fallen more than
once, and in more than one location. Thus, Dr. Olson opined that Hobrecht’s injuries
were not likely to have been caused by falling following a heart attack. Nevertheless, Dr.
Olson acknowledged that Hobrecht could have died from sudden cardiac death.
       In closing argument, the prosecutor framed the jury’s decision as a choice between
first and second degree murder. The prosecutor acknowledged that “it’s a stronger
second-degree murder case than it is first-degree murder.” She urged the jury to focus on
defendant’s statements, particularly the statement that Hobrecht wiggled after defendant
hit him. She suggested it did not matter whether the cause of death was blunt force
trauma or blunt force trauma causing fatal cardiac arrythmia. Either way, the prosecutor
argued, Hobrecht would not have died but for defendant’s actions.
       Defendant’s trial counsel argued that all the evidence could be explained by the
theory that Hobrecht died from cardiac arrythmia alone in his home and was found dead

                                             10
by defendant sometime later. Sensing an opportunity, defendant buried Hobrecht in the
backyard and moved himself and his girlfriend into the dead man’s house. As for
defendant’s incriminating statements to law enforcement, trial counsel argued he was
under the influence of drugs and lied to protect his girlfriend.
E.     Verdict and Sentence
       On January 7, 2022, after approximately 2.5 hours of deliberations, the jury found
defendant guilty on both counts and found the enhancements true as to count 2.
Defendant admitted the truth of the prior conviction allegation, and the trial court found
true that the prior conviction constituted a strike and serious felony.
       Defendant appeared for judgment and sentencing on March 1, 2022. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life for the murder in count 1, plus five years for
the prior serious felony enhancement. The trial court imposed and stayed sentence on
count 2, elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1)), as follows: eight years for the elder abuse
offense (the upper term doubled) (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), plus an
enhancement of seven years for elder abuse resulting in death (§ 368, subd. (b)(3)), plus
one year for the deadly weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
       This appeal timely followed.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
A.     Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation
       Defendant acknowledges the sufficiency of the evidence that he was responsible
for Hobrecht’s death, but argues the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that he acted with premeditation and deliberation. At most, defendant says, the
evidence shows he acted rashly, without any planning or motive to kill. We disagree.
       When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we review “ ‘ “the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a

                                             11
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 241.) We “ ‘must
accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if [we]
would have concluded otherwise.’ ” (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence or
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
       “ ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that
circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt
and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be
convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.)
We may reverse a conviction for lack of substantial evidence only if it appears “ ‘ “that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
       “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.”
(§ 187, subd. (a).) If the murder is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” it is first
degree murder. (§ 189, subd. (a).) “ ‘ “ ‘In this context, “premeditated” means
“considered beforehand,” and “deliberate” means “formed or arrived at or determined
upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the
proposed course of action.” ’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and
deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than
unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ” [Citations.] “The true test is not the duration of time as
much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ” (People v. Morales
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88.)
       In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson), our Supreme Court
identified three categories of evidence that are typically sufficient to sustain a finding of

                                              12
premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning evidence; (2) motive evidence; and (3) a
manner of killing from which the jury could reasonably infer a deliberate intent to kill.
(Id. at pp. 26-27.) These factors need not be present in “some special combination” or
“accorded a particular weight” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247), and “it is not
essential that there be evidence of each category to sustain a conviction” (People v.
Gonzalez (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 875, 887). Rather, the factors are “simply intended to
guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the
killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than an unconsidered or rash
impulse.” (People v. Pride, supra, at p. 247.)
       Defendant argues the prosecution failed to introduce evidence of planning, motive,
and manner of killing sufficient to support a finding he committed the murder with
premeditation and deliberation, rather than as a rash and unconsidered act. Again, the
Anderson factors are not “a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor
are they exclusive.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125.) In any case,
evidence of all three factors is present here.
       We do not need to look far for evidence of planning. Defendant’s statements to
detectives suggest the beating took place in stages. According to defendant, the
confrontation began when Hobrecht either “took a swing at [him]” or attempted to do so.
Defendant became enraged and hit Hobrecht “square in the mouth.” He then straddled
Hobrecht and hit him eight or nine times in the head and ribcage. We will assume for
argument’s sake that defendant’s actions up to this point were unplanned and
spontaneous. What happened next, in defendant’s telling, was not.
       After describing the initial blows, defendant suggested there had been a break in
the action in which he asked himself, “ ‘Fuck. What am I going to do?’ ” He recalled:
“Thinking in my head. ‘I’m going to jail. I’m going to do this, this, or this.’ I just
fucking did it. Figured fucking I’d get away with it and it didn’t work.” “You know,” he
continued, “I figured fucking I already had him half beat. I figured I’ll finish him off and

                                                 13
bury him. No one will fucking know.” He then retrieved a piece of firewood,
presumably from somewhere else in the house. He described looking down at Hobrecht
before throwing the piece of firewood, saying, “I just—fuck, I looked at him before I
threw the piece of log. You know, I looked around, looked at him. He’s fucking down
for the count. I’m thinking, ‘Fuck, he ain’t coming out of this.’ So I had to—I just did
it.” He then described throwing the piece of firewood “pretty hard”; arguably with
enough force to produce a deep laceration on the left side of Hobrecht’s forehead and an
avulsion of his left ear.
       These events appear to have unfolded in rapid succession. As defendant told
detectives, “It wasn’t that fucking long. Long enough for me to run over there and grab it
and hit him with it.” But premeditation and deliberation may be formed in a very short
span of time. (People v. Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 88 [“ ‘ “Thoughts may follow
each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly” ’ ”]; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658 [“The act of
planning—involving deliberation and premeditation—requires nothing more than a
‘successive thought[] of the mind’ ”]; and see People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792,
813 [a “preexisting reflection, of any duration,” distinguishes first degree premeditated
and deliberate murder from second degree murder].) And here, though only seconds may
have elapsed between the initial blows with defendant’s fists and the final blow with the
piece of firewood, defendant’s own words show he considered the consequences of the
initial beating (“I’m going to go to jail”), formulated a plan of action (“I’ll finish him off
and bury him”), and concluded he could get away with it (“No one will fucking know”).
Even assuming the initial blows were unplanned, defendant’s thought process, as he
himself described it, shows he reflected on his actions as the attack was occurring,
considered next steps, and deliberately chose to “finish [Hobrecht] off.” The jury could
reasonably infer from defendant’s statements that he engaged in planning activity after
the attack began but before he retrieved the piece of firewood and struck the final blow.

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(People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 493 [“what matters . . . is the extent of
the defendant’s reflection on his actions, not its duration]; see also People v. Wright
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 593, fn. 5 [obtaining a deadly weapon in advance of killing
supports an inference of planning activity].)
       We next consider the second Anderson factor, motive. (Anderson, supra, 70
Cal.2d at pp. 26-27.) Defendant acknowledges there was “some evidence” of motive,
inasmuch as he “seized upon an opportunity to live in Hobrecht’s home, spent what little
money was in the home, and attempted to use Hobrecht’s EBT card.” These things were
not strong evidence of motive, defendant says, because Hobrecht was a man of modest
means, and had very little to steal. This argument misses the mark. Defendant told
detectives that “halfway through” the beating, he thought to himself: “ ‘Fuck. What am I
going to do?’ ” and “ ‘ I’m going to go to jail.’ ” It was then, defendant said, that he
“figured” he would “finish [Hobrecht] off and bury him.” On the record before us, the
jury could reasonably believe that defendant, a parolee, was primarily motivated to
“finish [Hobrecht] off” to avoid returning to prison. There was substantial evidence of
motive.
       This brings us to the final Anderson factor, the manner of killing. (Anderson,
supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27.) Defendant argues the manner of killing, as suggested by
Hobrecht’s injuries, was consistent with a “sudden, violent explosion.” That is certainly
one interpretation of the evidence, but it is not the only one. As we have shown, the
evidence also supports an inference that the killing “occurred in stages.” (People v.
Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 244.) Though the initial blows may have been
spontaneous, the jury could reasonably conclude the final blow to the head—which was
different in kind from the others—was calculated to ensure death, rather than an
unconsidered “explosion” of violence. Indeed, defendant said as much. Thus, the
manner of the killing, like the other Anderson factors, also supports an inference of
deliberation and premeditation.

                                             15
       Defendant raises another challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of
premeditation and deliberation. He acknowledges that his statements to detectives
amounted to evidence of premeditation and deliberation but observes that Dr. Olson and
Dr. Raven each opined that Hobrecht may have already been dead when struck with the
piece of firewood. In that case, defendant says, “he did not engage in premeditation and
deliberation until after Hobrecht was dead.” Again, this may be one way of looking at
the evidence, but it is not the only way. Defendant told detectives he grabbed the piece
of firewood to “finish [Hobrecht] off.” He repeatedly and unequivocally said he thought
Hobrecht died from the blow to the head with the piece of firewood, just as he evidently
intended. The jury could reasonably credit defendant’s firsthand account of what killed
Hobrecht, while attributing Dr. Olsen’s willingness to entertain other possibilities to the
inconclusive state of the forensic evidence. Substantial evidence thus supports the jury’s
implicit finding that Hobrecht was alive, even if only barely, when defendant struck him
with the piece of firewood.
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must,
we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the killing of Hobrecht was deliberate and premeditated. Our conclusion on this point
also disposes of defendant’s claim that the conviction violated his right to due process
under the United States Constitution.
B.     Jury Instructions on Provocation
       Defendant next challenges the trial court’s jury instructions on provocation. He
argues the instructions could have misled the jury into believing that provocation can
reduce first degree murder to second degree murder only if the objective test is met; i.e.,
the provocation would have provoked a person of average disposition into a heat of
passion. He asserts the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give an additional instruction
explaining that provocation sufficient to reduce the killing to second degree murder is

                                             16
measured by a subjective standard. In the alternative, he says his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. We will reject these contentions.
       1.     Additional Background
       Jurors were instructed with CALCRIM No. 520 that, if they decided that
defendant committed murder, it was murder in the second degree unless the prosecution
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was first degree murder as set forth in
CALCRIM No. 521. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 521 that defendant
was guilty of first degree murder if he acted “willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation,” and “[a] decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful
consideration is not deliberate and premeditated.”
       The trial court gave two instructions regarding provocation. First, the trial court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 522 as follows: “Provocation may reduce a
murder from first degree to second degree and may reduce a murder to manslaughter.
The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide. [¶] If you
conclude that the defendant committed murder but was provoked, consider the
provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second degree murder. Also,
consider the provocation in deciding whether the defendant committed murder or
manslaughter.”
       Second, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 570 that a killing
that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant
killed because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if: (1) the defendant was
“provoked”; (2) “[a]s a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the
influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment”; and (3) “[t]he
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly or without
due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.”
       The jury was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 570 that: “It is not enough that
the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up his own

                                             17
standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether
the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the
same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from judgment.” As before, the
jury was reminded that the prosecution has “the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
passion.”
       2.     Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct
       Defendant does not argue any of these instructions are incorrect statements of law.
Instead, he argues their combined effect was to mislead the jury on an important point of
law: that an objective test applies to provocation for purposes of reducing murder to
voluntary manslaughter, while a subjective test applies for purposes of reducing malice
murder from first to second degree. (See People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675,
678 [“The test of whether provocation or heat of passion can negate malice so as to
mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter is objective. The test of whether provocation
or heat of passion can negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree
murder to second degree murder, on the other hand, is subjective”].) Although he did not
request it, defendant argues the trial court should have given an additional instruction
clarifying that the provocation necessary to reduce first degree murder to second degree
murder is judged by a subjective standard. These arguments fail.
       CALCRIM No. 522 is a pinpoint instruction and, as such, need only be given upon
request. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 328; People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th
56, 99 (Hardy).) It follows that additional instructions amplifying or clarifying
CALCRIM No. 522 are also pinpoint instructions and need not be given sua sponte. (See
People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1333-1334 (Hernandez) [“[T]he fact
that a trial court is not required to instruct on provocation for second degree murder at all
supports that it is not misleading to instruct on provocation without explicitly stating that

                                             18
provocation can negate premeditation and deliberation”].) Defendant’s trial counsel
requested and received CALCRIM No. 522; she did not request any additional instruction
amplifying or clarifying “provocation.”
       Even when a trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on a particular
legal point, when it does choose to instruct, it must do so correctly. (People v. Castillo
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1015; Hernandez, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1332.)
Furthermore, the trial court generally has a sua sponte duty to give amplifying or
clarifying instructions “ ‘ “where the terms used [in the instruction] have a technical
meaning peculiar to the law.” ’ ” (People v. Richie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1360.)
“ ‘ “A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the
court is one that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning.” ’ ” (People v.
Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 68.) We independently review whether a jury instruction
correctly states the law. (People v. Bates (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1, 9.)
       We have little difficulty concluding the instructions given here correctly conveyed
the law. As even defendant appears to recognize, several cases have so held. (See, e.g.,
Hernandez, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1333-1334; People v. Jones (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 (Jones).) In Hernandez, for example, the defendant argued that
“CALCRIM No. 522 is inadequate because it does not specifically inform the jury that
provocation is relevant to determine whether the defendant killed without premeditation
and deliberation.” (Hernandez, supra, at p. 1333.) The court rejected the defendant’s
argument, stating: “Although CALCRIM No. 522 does not expressly state provocation is
relevant to the issues of premeditation and deliberation, when the instructions are read as
a whole there is no reasonable likelihood the jury did not understand this concept. Based
on CALCRIM No. 521, the jury was instructed that unless the defendant acted with
premeditation and deliberation, he is guilty of second, not first, degree murder, and that a
rash, impulsive decision to kill is not deliberate and premeditated. Based on CALCRIM
No. 522, the jury was instructed that provocation may reduce the murder to second

                                             19
degree murder. [¶] In this context, provocation was not used in a technical sense
peculiar to the law, and we assume the jurors were aware of the common meaning of the
term. [Citation.] Provocation means ‘something that provokes, arouses, or stimulates’;
provoke means ‘to arouse to a feeling or action[;] . . . to incite to anger.’ [Citations.]
Considering CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 522 together, the jurors would have understood
that provocation (the arousal of emotions) can give rise to a rash, impulsive decision, and
this in turn shows no premeditation and deliberation.” (Id. at p. 1334.)
       In Jones, supra, as here, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521,
522, and 570. (Jones, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) The defendant argued the
instructions “were misleading because they did not, or did not explicitly, inform the jury
that the objective standard applies only for reduction of murder to voluntary
manslaughter, and does not apply to reduce first to second degree murder.” (Ibid.)
Relying on Hernandez, the Jones court rejected the defendant’s argument stating: “[T]he
instructions are correct. They accurately inform the jury what is required for first degree
murder, and that if the defendant’s action was in fact the result of provocation, that level
of crime was not committed. CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 522, taken together, informed
jurors that ‘provocation (the arousal of emotions) can give rise to a rash, impulsive
decision, and this in turn shows no premeditation and deliberation.’ ” (Id. at p. 1001.) So
too here. Following Hernandez and Jones, we conclude the instructions as a whole
accurately instructed the jury as to provocation for second degree murder and were not
misleading.
        Defendant tries to avoid this conclusion by arguing “provocation” has a technical
meaning peculiar to the law which should have been defined sua sponte by the trial court.
Not so. “A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by
the court is one that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning.” (People v.
Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574.) “Provocation,” as used here, “bore [its] common
meaning, which required no further explanation in the absence of a specific request.”

                                              20
(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1217-1218; see Hernandez, supra, 183
Cal.App.4th at p. 1334 [“Provocation means ‘something that provokes, arouses, or
stimulates’; provoke means ‘to arouse to a feeling or action[;] . . . to incite to anger’ ”].)
We reject defendant’s claim of instructional error.
       3.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant argues in the alternative that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to request clarifying instructions on provocation in the context of
second degree murder. As previously discussed, no such instructions were necessary. In
any case, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails.
        To prevail on such a claim, defendant must establish “not only deficient
performance, i.e., representation below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also
resultant prejudice. [Citation.] Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and
counsel’s decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts.”
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.) “In the usual case, where counsel’s trial
tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will
not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable
reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926.)
       Here, defendant’s trial counsel made a tactical decision to argue that defendant
was not responsible for Hobrecht’s death at all. Instead, she theorized that Hobrecht
suffered a fatal arrythmia alone in his home and defendant happened upon the body
sometime later. That theory, though unsuccessful, was not objectively unreasonable
given the forensic evidence, and we cannot say defendant’s trial counsel was deficient in
failing to request an instruction that would have called attention to the possibility that
defendant might have been present at the time of death after all. (See Jones, supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at p. 1002 [no deficient performance where counsel chose to focus on theory
of mistaken identity rather than provocation].) Defendant has not established ineffective
assistance of counsel.

                                              21
C.     Sentencing Issues
       Defendant raises two sentencing issues. First, he argues the trial court’s sentence
on the elder abuse count violates section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill 567. Second,
he argues remand is required for the trial court to exercise its discretion as to which
counts to stay pursuant to section 654, as amended by Assembly Bill 518. We conclude
both issues have been forfeited.
       1.     Senate Bill 567
       Defendant argues the trial court violated section 1170, subdivision (b) in imposing
the upper term sentence on count 2. He argues the trial court relied on aggravating
factors that were not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and were not based on prior
convictions established by a certified record of conviction. He urges us to vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing. We conclude defendant forfeited this claim by
failing to object to the upper term sentence in the trial court.
       Senate Bill 567 became effective January 1, 2022, two months before the
sentencing hearing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).) As
relevant here, Senate Bill 567 limits the trial court’s ability to impose the upper term
sentence except where there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
imposition of the upper term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been (1)
stipulated to by the defendant, or (2) found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial or by
the judge in a court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2).) An exception to this rule authorizes
the court to consider defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on
certified records of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to the jury. (§
1170, subd. (b)(3).)
       In imposing the upper term, the trail court relied on the probation department’s
recommendation and the following aggravating factors: (1) the victim was particularly

                                              22
vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)),9 (2) defendant engaged in violent
conduct that indicated a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)), (3) defendant’s prior
convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), (4)
defendant had served a prior term in prison (rule 4.421(b)(3)), (5) defendant was on
parole when the crime was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)), and (6) defendant’s prior
performance on parole was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)). The trial court found no
factors in mitigation.
       The jury, having found true the special allegation that defendant proximately
caused the death of a victim 70 years of age or older (§ 368, subd. (b)(3)), implicitly
found the first aggravating factor true beyond a reasonable doubt.10 The trial court was
therefore permitted to impose the upper term sentence. (See generally People v. Black
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 812-816 [a jury’s finding of a single aggravating circumstance is
sufficient to make a defendant eligible for an upper term sentence]; see also People v.
Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1110 [“if a trial court found true a single
aggravating fact that it believed supported imposition of an upper term sentence, and if a
jury necessarily would have found that same fact true had it considered the matter, then a
reviewing court would not remand for resentencing simply to address this plainly
harmless error].)
       It is true, as defendant observes, that none of the other aggravating factors were
found to have been true beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also true that defendant did not
stipulate to any circumstances in aggravation, and no certified records appear to have
been introduced at sentencing hearing. But defendant did not object to any of the trial
court’s findings of factors in aggravation, much less the court’s decision to impose the

9 References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

10 Defendant also admitted the prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction
allegations.

                                             23
upper term sentence on count 2. As a result, the claim is forfeited. (See People v.
Flowers (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 683-684, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276237
[defendant’s argument trial court relied on improper factors in imposing upper term
sentence were forfeited where defendant failed to object in the trial court]; see also
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [“waiver doctrine should apply to claims
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices”].)
       2.     Assembly Bill 518
       Finally, defendant argues remand for resentencing is required to allow the trial
court to stay the sentence on either count 1 or count 2 in accordance with section 654, as
amended by Assembly Bill 518. This claim has also been forfeited.
       Section 654, former subdivision (a) provided, in pertinent part: “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be
punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment.” Effective January 1, 2022, as amended by Assembly Bill 518, section
654, subdivision (a) now provides, in pertinent part: “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either
of such provisions.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
       Defendant was sentenced on March 1, 2022, two months after Assembly Bill 518
became effective. Defendant could have objected and argued for an alternative sentence
under the newly amended section 654, such as imposing the shorter sentence on count 2
and staying the longer sentence on count 1. For whatever reason, he failed to do so. The
claim is thus forfeited. (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.)

                                              24
                                  III. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                     /S/

                                              RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

MAURO, Acting P. J.

/S/

MESIWALA, J.

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