Court Opinion

ID: 9556783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 17:08:46.015516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:55.747852
License: Public Domain

J-A10029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  RAHEEM ROBINSON                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1570 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 3, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001523-2015

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED AUGUST 18, 2023

       Appellant, Raheem Robinson, appeals from the order entered in

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition filed under

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Appellant was arrested and charged with first-degree murder and related

offenses in connection with the murder of Shaquille Hall (“Victim”). Sakinah

Wyatt, Appellant’s girlfriend at the time of the murder, testified that she met

Victim approximately three weeks before he was murdered when Victim asked

Ms. Wyatt if she wanted to buy a phone from him. Ms. Wyatt did not have

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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her ID card with her, so she invited Victim into her home while she looked for

the card. She did not find the card, but she told Victim she would buy the

phone later.

      On April 30, 2014, Appellant and Ms. Wyatt were in her bedroom when

she heard noises outside of the room.       Upon opening the door, Ms. Wyatt

found Victim standing in her hallway. Neither Appellant nor Ms. Wyatt had

invited Victim into the home. Ms. Wyatt testified that she saw Appellant yell

at Victim, pull out a gun, and shoot Victim. Ms. Wyatt ran out of the home

after the first shot but heard a second shot. At trial, the jury viewed a video

taken on the day of the murder which showed Appellant entering a nearby

store, walking out, and pouring bleach on his hands. A couple of days later,

Victim’s body was found in an alley by the same store. The body was wrapped

in a sheet and had bleach poured over it.

      Appellant testified that Ms. Wyatt called him on April 30, 2014, and

frantically asked him to come over. When Appellant arrived at her home, Ms.

Wyatt and a man named “Money” asked Appellant to help move a body

wrapped in a sheet.    Appellant began to help but threw up on his hands.

Appellant explained that he went to the store to wash the vomit off with

bleach, and he did not return to help with the body.

      During her direct examination, Ms. Wyatt testified that after the murder,

she visited Appellant six times while Appellant was incarcerated for charges

unrelated to the current incident. Ms. Wyatt explained that she visited him

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because, “I was scared because he threatened my life” and wanted Appellant

to “think everything is still cool” between them. (N.T. Trial, 1/6/16, at 120-

21). Defense counsel did not object to Ms. Wyatt’s testimony. During cross-

examination, the following exchange took place:

        Defense: Now, you said you were so frightened, but you
        agreed yesterday, when [the prosecutor] asked you some
        questions, that you had gone to visit [Appellant] while he
        was in jail, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: Yes.

        Defense: And you agreed that he was in jail for some other
        offense, not this, not this homicide, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: Right.

        Defense: As a matter of fact, it was a domestic violence
        case, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: Right.

        Defense: With his girlfriend, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: I guess.

        Defense: Now, you didn’t go visit him one time, two times,
        or three. You went and visited him six times, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: Yes.

        Defense: As a matter of fact, this was all before, this was
        all before the police went and got you and brought you down
        to Homicide for you to ask you what you knew about this
        homicide; right? This was all before that, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: Right.

                                 *    *    *

        Defense: And then when it’s time to leave, the person that

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        you’re saying that you’re afraid of and that you’re scared of
        and who threatened to kill you and called you all sorts of
        defaming language, you actually give him a kiss on the
        cheek and embrace when you leave, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: I give him a hug. I don’t kiss.

                                 *      *   *

        Defense: You give him a hug. You hug the man who killed
        a man in your house and threatened to do you or have
        somebody else do it. You saw him six times and hugged
        and embraced each time, right?

        Ms. Wyatt: Yes.

(See N.T. Trial, 1/7/16, at 18-20).         Appellant later testified that the

Commonwealth dropped the charges for the prior domestic violence arrest.

     Additionally, the court instructed the jury as follows:

        You have heard evidence that in June of 2014, [Appellant]
        was arrested on charges relating to allegations of domestic
        violence.    Those charges were withdrawn by the
        Commonwealth at the scheduled preliminary hearing.

        This evidence is before you for a limited purpose, and that
        is to explain the circumstances under which Sakinah Wyatt
        visited [Appellant] during the summer of 2014 at the House
        of Corrections.

        You must not consider this evidence for any purpose or in
        any manner other [than] the purpose I just stated. You
        must not consider this evidence as tending to show that
        [Appellant] is a person of bad character or that he has
        criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined to
        infer his guilt on this case.

(See N.T. Trial, 1/13/16, at 182-83).

     Ms. Wyatt also testified about damage to her home, stating “when we

had to start coming to court, that’s when my door was kicked in, my windows

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was busted out.” (N.T. Trial, 1/6/16, at 119). During closing arguments, the

prosecutor argued that Ms. Wyatt was scared because “after she testified, she

believes people came after her because her property was burglarized shortly

thereafter.” (See N.T. Trial, 1/13/16, at 135).

      The jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, possessing an

instrument of crime, and abuse of a corpse on January 14, 2016. On the same

day, the court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for first-degree

murder, a concurrent sentence of two and a half to five years’ imprisonment

for possession of an instrument of crime, and a consecutive sentence of one

to two years’ imprisonment for abuse of a corpse. Appellant filed a direct

appeal on January 22, 2016, and this Court dismissed the appeal on March

18, 2016 for failure to file a brief.   Subsequently, Appellant filed a PCRA

petition, and the court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro

tunc on June 8, 2017. On June 28, 2018, this Court affirmed the judgment of

sentence, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December

19, 2018. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1870 EDA 2017 (Pa.Super

June 28, 2018) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 650 Pa. 136, 199

A.3d 346 (2018).

      Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on November 22, 2019.

The court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on February

1, 2021. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied relief on

June 3, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 11, 2022. On

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June 14, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant timely complied

on June 17, 2022.

      Appellant raises two issues for our review:

         Did the trial court err in denying post-conviction relief after
         an evidentiary hearing when trial counsel was ineffective
         for:

         (a)   failing to file a motion in limine to preclude testimony
               regarding [Appellant’s] incarceration for an unrelated
               offense, failing to object when this testimony was
               elicited, repeating the information himself, and failing
               to object during the Commonwealth’s closing
               argument when this information is again brought up
               by the Assistant District Attorney; and

         (b)   failing to file a motion in limine to preclude testimony
               regarding damage to witness Sakinah Wyatt’s home
               (which could not be connected to [Appellant] in any
               way), then failing to object when the information was
               elicited,    and     failing  to   object   during   the
               Commonwealth’s closing argument when this
               information       is   again    brought   up    by   the
               Commonwealth?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

      In his issues combined, Appellant argues that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to certain prior bad acts evidence. Specifically

in his first issue, Appellant asserts that mention of his prior arrest for an

unrelated offense suggested Appellant had a propensity to commit criminal

acts. In his second issue, Appellant complains that Ms. Wyatt’s testimony

about property damage to her home insinuated that Appellant caused the

damage. Appellant contends that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for

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failing to object to introduction of these prior bad acts, especially where the

conviction relied solely on the credibility of Ms. Wyatt’s testimony about

witnessing Appellant shoot Victim against the credibility of Appellant’s own

testimony. Appellant reasons that the verdict may have been different but for

counsel’s ineffectiveness, and this Court should grant a new trial.           We

disagree.

      Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination

and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway,

14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795

(2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if

the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd,

923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74

(2007). “The PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports

them, and we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth

v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa.

___, 268 A.3d 386 (2021).

      Pennsylvania law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is required

to demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had

no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and, (3) but for the

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errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v.

Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). The failure to satisfy any prong

of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail.   See Williams,

supra.

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit….” Commonwealth

v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot be

found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.”

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).

         Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’
         test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was
         designed to effectuate his client’s interests. If we conclude
         that the particular course chosen by counsel had some
         reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s
         assistance is deemed effective.

Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted).

      “A finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not

warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a

potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.”

Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 274, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (1998).

         As a general rule, a lawyer should not be held ineffective
         without first having an opportunity to address the
         accusation in some fashion. …

         In recent years, this Court has expressed a distinct

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         preference for a hearing on counsel’s strategy before
         venturing to hold that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for
         his or her actions or inactions. …

         …Review of the reasonableness of counsel’s trial
         performance is not measured by an exercise in “spot the
         objection,” as might occur in a law school evidence
         examination. Counsel are not constitutionally required to
         forward any and all possible objections at trial, and the
         decision of when to interrupt oftentimes is a function of
         overall defense strategy being brought to bear upon issues
         which arise unexpectedly at trial and require split-second
         decision-making by counsel. The fact that an appellate
         court, reviewing a cold trial record, cannot prognosticate a
         reasonable basis for a particular failure to raise a plausible
         objection does not necessarily prove that an objectively
         reasonable basis was lacking.

Commonwealth. v. Colavita, 606 Pa. 1, 34-37, 993 A.2d 874, 895-96

(2010)   (internal   citations   omitted),   overruled   on   other   grounds   by

Commonwealth v. Bradley, ___ Pa. ___, 261 A.3d 381 (2021).

         Prejudice is established when [an appellant] demonstrates
         that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse effect
         on the outcome of the proceedings. The [appellant] must
         show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
         counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
         would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
         probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
         outcome. In [Kimball, supra], we held that a “criminal
         [appellant] alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s
         errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
         trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)

(some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404 provided at the time of Appellant’s

offense: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove

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a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) (effective March

18, 2013 to March 31, 2022).          Nevertheless, the Commonwealth may

introduce such evidence for another purpose, “such as proving motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (effective March 18, 2013 to

March 31, 2022).

      Further, “[n]ot all improper references to prior bad acts will mandate a

new trial[; m]ere passing references to criminal activity will not require

reversal unless the record indicates that prejudice resulted from the

reference.”   Commonwealth v. Stafford, 749 A.2d 489, 496 (Pa.Super.

2000), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 660, 795 A.2d 975 (2000).           As well, “[a]n

appellate court will not attribute error when the [t]rial [j]udge provides a

[cautionary] instruction that fully explains the purpose for which the jury may

consider specific evidence.” Commonwealth v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, 502

(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 671, 916 A.2d 1101 (2007).

“[U]nless evidence to the contrary is shown, a presumption exists that the

jury will obey the trial court’s instructions.” Id. at 501.

      Instantly, Appellant’s PCRA filings did not include a signed certification

from trial counsel addressing Appellant’s claims. Likewise, trial counsel did

not testify at the PCRA hearing. By failing to proffer input from trial counsel,

Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to satisfy the “reasonable strategic

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basis” prong for both ineffectiveness claims presented in his PCRA petition.

See Colavita, supra.

      Nevertheless, the PCRA court determined from the record that trial

counsel had a reasonable strategy for allowing in evidence that Appellant was

incarcerated for an unrelated charge. The PCRA court found that trial counsel

used this evidence to challenge the credibility of Ms. Wyatt’s testimony that

she did not come forward earlier about witnessing the murder because she

was fearful of Appellant. Specifically, the court noted that counsel highlighted

the inconsistency of Ms. Wyatt claiming she was so afraid of Appellant from

witnessing him murder someone and yet willingly chose to visit Appellant six

times while he was incarcerated.

      The record supports the court’s conclusion.     Trial counsel vigorously

cross-examined Ms. Wyatt regarding her statements that she was fearful of

Appellant by questioning why she continued to associate with Appellant while

he was incarcerated. Additionally, trial counsel highlighted her visits in his

closing argument when he argued to the jury that Ms. Wyatt’s testimony was

not credible. As Appellant acknowledges in his brief, this case hinged largely

on the credibility of Ms. Wyatt’s testimony naming Appellant as the shooter.

Thus, we agree with the PCRA court that trial counsel had a reasonable

strategic basis for permitting the introduction of testimony that Appellant was

incarcerated for an unrelated charge. See Pierce, supra. Additionally, the

jury was informed that the unrelated charges were dropped, and the trial court

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instructed the jury that the evidence could only be used to provide context for

the witness visiting Appellant in prison, minimizing any potential prejudice to

Appellant. See Dargan, supra. See also Chambers, supra.

      Regarding counsel’s failure to object to the testimony about property

damage to Ms. Wyatt’s home, the PCRA court found that Appellant did not

suffer prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to this testimony. Ms. Wyatt

testified that someone caused damage to her property around the time she

initially testified, which caused her to be afraid. She did not state or imply

that Appellant caused the damage or that Appellant instructed anyone to

cause the damage.

      On this record, we agree with the PCRA court’s analysis. Evidence of

vandalism to Ms. Wyatt’s property which was not even attributed to Appellant

has minimal prejudicial value in light of the compelling evidence of Appellant’s

guilt, including Ms. Wyatt’s testimony that she witnessed Appellant shoot

Victim, and the video evidence that showed Appellant pouring bleach on his

hands on the day of the murder in the same area where Victim’s body was

later discovered with bleach poured over it. Therefore, we discern no error in

the court’s conclusion that Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to testimony about damage to Ms.

Wyatt’s home. See Chambers, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/18/2023

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