Court Opinion

ID: 9915985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:07:46.398241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:19.624471
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2968-21
                                                                   A-1043-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ELMO M. RIVADENEIRA,
a/k/a PETEY NA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued (A-2968-21) and Submitted (A-1043-22)
                   October 17, 2023 – Decided January 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 07-03-0435.

                   Elmo M. Rivadeneira, appellant, argued the case pro se.

                   Andrew Frank Guarini, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Andrew Frank Guarini, on
                   the briefs).

PER CURIAM
      In these appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for purposes

of this opinion, defendant Elmo Rivadeneira appeals from the March 30, 2022

Law Division order denying his third petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)

and the July 29, 2022 order denying his motion for a new trial. We affirm both

orders.

                                         I.

      The following facts are taken from our decision affirming defendant's

conviction after a jury trial:

             The victim, who was sixteen years old, was kidnapped
             while walking home from a bus stop in North Bergen
             on the night of May 17, 2005. The assailant grabbed
             her in a bear hug, and placed one hand near her neck as
             though he had a knife. He forced the victim into a car,
             punched her and threatened to kill her. He drove her to
             a deserted area with tall weeds, once again threatened
             to kill her, forced her to perform fellatio, and then raped
             her vaginally. He also took all of her clothing, cell
             phone, and jewelry. He then drove her to another
             deserted, weed-choked lot where he raped her anally,
             again threatening her with death if she did not
             cooperate. The victim testified that the assailant wore
             a condom and, after the assaults, he wiped her genital
             and anal areas with a liquid, which he said would avoid
             leaving evidence on her body. The assailant also wore
             blue latex gloves and had a stocking over his head and
             face. During one of the assaults, he repeatedly rubbed
             his sweaty face over the victim's face.

             According to the victim, as the assailant drove her from
             one location to another, she smelled cigar smoke and he

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told her that he was smoking Black and Mild cigars.
She could not see his face during the attacks, but she
saw his eyes, which she described as large and bulging.
She also described his very distinctive voice, which she
testified sounded like "Kermit the Frog" because he
sounded as though "he was talking through his throat."
She described the assailant as thin and short but very
strong.

Finally, the assailant drove the victim to a car repair
facility in Newark, where he forced her to put on an
oversized pair of white overalls and placed her in a
white Toyota parked in the facility's lot. After once
again threatening to kill her if she looked at him, he
drove away. The victim was able to make her way to a
local hospital where she was examined and a buccal
swab of her DNA was taken. Thereafter, the police
drove the victim around Newark until she was able to
identify the car repair lot where the assailant had
released her, as well as the white Toyota parked there.

Near the spot where the victim was released, the police
found a black sheer stocking which, upon being tested,
proved to have the victim's DNA on the outside and
defendant's DNA on the inside. The police also found
a blue latex glove on the ground near the location where
the victim was initially kidnapped. The State presented
testimony that defendant had previously worked as an
auto mechanic in the area of Newark where the victim
was released, that he typically wore blue latex gloves at
work, and that the car repair facility where the victim
was released had a business relationship with
defendant's employer.

One of defendant's former girlfriends, Ms. Teicher,
testified that defendant had a very distinctive raspy
voice, and was short, thin, and muscular. She also
testified that on multiple occasions during their

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            relationship, defendant would direct her to drive him to
            vacant lots overgrown with high weeds, where they
            would have sex in the back of her car. She also testified
            that defendant smoked Black and Mild cigars.

            Another witness, Mr. Cancinos, testified that in 2006,
            when defendant was in jail awaiting trial in this case,
            defendant sent Cancinos a letter asking him to "stage"
            a rape, with the cooperation of a female friend, and
            leave some of defendant's blood and pubic hair at the
            scene.     Defendant enclosed packets, apparently
            containing blood and hair, with the letter. Defendant
            explained to Cancinos that, if Cancinos did as he asked,
            it would then appear that someone was trying to frame
            defendant for a second rape, which he could not
            possibly have committed because he was in jail.
            Defendant believed that evidence would, in turn, cast
            doubt on the State's DNA evidence in the upcoming
            prosecution.    According to Cancinos, he refused
            defendant's request, and burned the letter.

            Ms. Dahl, who had been defendant's girlfriend at the
            time, corroborated Cancinos's testimony. She testified
            that Cancinos, who was a mutual friend of hers and
            defendant, told her about defendant's request, and asked
            her advice. She testified that Cancinos also showed her
            the letter, which was in defendant's handwriting, and
            that she read it. She advised Cancinos not to go along
            with defendant's plan.

            [State v. Rivadeneira, No. A-3348-11 (App. Div. May
            4, 2016) (slip op. at 3-6) (footnote omitted)].

      Defendant was found guilty of first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-

1(b); three counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a);

fourth-degree child abuse, N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, -3; third-degree aggravated criminal

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sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1;

third-degree aggravated assault involving significant bodily injury, N.J.S.A.

2C:12-1(b)(1); and third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b). We

affirmed the conviction but remanded to correct a clerical error in the judgment

of conviction and to clarify the merged counts and sentence. Id. at 15-16. On

remand, the trial court merged the aggravated assault with the kidnapping and

aggravated sexual assault convictions, and sentenced defendant to an aggregate

term of fifty years with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility term pursuant

to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      On November 14, 2016, defendant filed his first petition for PCR, which

was denied. He appealed the denial and while the appeal was pending, he filed

a second petition for PCR. He then filed motions in the appeal for a remand and

to supplement the record for "newly discovered evidence," which we granted.

On remand, the trial court denied the first petition, and we affirmed that

decision. State v. Rivadeneira, No. A-5573-17 (App. Div. May 19, 2020). From

the record before us, it does not appear that the second petition was addressed

by the trial court.

      On February 23, 2021, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the United States District Court, District of New Jersey. On February

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23, 2022, the federal court granted his motions to perfect the record and for a

stay of the petition to permit exhaustion of his claims in state court.

       On March 30, 2022, defendant filed his third petition for PCR, arguing the

State committed a Brady1 violation by failing to produce a supplemental DNA

laboratory report from 2011, which he claimed contained exculpatory evidence.

He argued the lab report was "newly discovered evidence" because he was

unaware of its existence until the State produced it in his federal habeas corpus

petition. He also argued his counsel was ineffective. The petition was denied

the same day.2

       On May 20, 2022, defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the

same grounds as his petition for PCR. The court denied the motion by order

dated July 29, 2022, which stated: "Defense's Motion is Denied. Appellate

Division (A-005573) affirmed and did not remand case to trial division pursuant

to N.J. Ct. R. 3-20."

                                        II.

1
    See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2
   The trial court's "order" consists of a memorandum to the judge from the
Hudson County Criminal Division Manager dated March 30, 2022, wherein the
judge determined "[g]ood [c]ause does not exist" to refer defendant's request for
counsel to the Office of the Public Defender, and indicated "PCR barred." The
memorandum mistakenly stated it was defendant's fourth petition.
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      Defendant raises the following issues for our consideration in his appeal

of the denial of his PCR petition:

            POINT 1.

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT BARRED
            [DEFENDANT'S] SUBSEQUENT PCR PETITION.
            BECAUSE        THE   PCR   PETITION    WAS
            APPROPRIATELY FILED PURSUANT TO THE
            EXCEPTION OF RULE 3:22-4(b)(2)(B) AND RULE
            3:22-12(a)(2)(B).  THUS, THE TRIAL COURT
            SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED THE MERITS OF
            [DEFENDANT'S] CLAIMS, PROCEDURALLY AND
            SUBSTANTIVELY, IN ACCORD WITH THE
            ABOVE EXCEPTION AND [DEFENDANT'S]
            RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY
            THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
            FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. THEREFORE, THE
            PCR PETITION HERE, SHOULD BE REMANDED
            WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT TO
            CONSIDER AND RULE ON THE MERITS OF
            [DEFENDANT'S]       APPROPRIATELY    FILED
            SUBSEQUENT PCR PETITION.

            POINT II.

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
            [DEFENDANT'S] APPLICATION TO ASSIGN
            COUNSEL ON SUBSEQUENT PCR PETITION
            PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-6(b).

            POINT III.

            ALTERNATIVELY, TO POINT I AND POINT II
            ABOVE, THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD
            EXERCISE  ORIGINAL   JURISDICTION  TO
            DETERMINE THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL

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            MERITS OF [DEFENDANT'S] PCR PETITION, DE
            NOVO. IN DOING SO, THE APPELLATE COURT
            SHOULD       REVERSE       [DEFENDANT'S]
            CONVICTION AND ORDER A NEW TRIAL
            BECAUSE THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT,
            IN WITHHOLDING THE 2011 LAB REPORT FROM
            THE DEFENSE AND THE JURY, VIOLATED
            [DEFENDANT'S] DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A
            FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO
            PRESENT    A   COMPLETE    DEFENSE,   IN
            VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE
            CONSTITUTIONS.

            POINT IV.

            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

            POINT V.

            EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

      Defendant raises the following issues for our consideration in his appeal

of the denial of motion for a new trial:

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
            DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED [DEFENDANT'S]
            MERITORIOUS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL,
            WHICH [DEFENDANT] BROUGHT UNDER THE
            GROUND THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD
            WITHHELD MATERIAL SPERM EVIDENCE FROM
            THE DEFENSE AND THE JURY IN VIOLATION OF
            THE BRADY RULE. AS SUCH, THE APPELLATE
            COURT SHOULD NOW REVIEW DE NOVO AND
            RECOGNIZE [DEFENDANT'S] TRUE BRADY
            CLAIM    AND   REVERSE     [DEFENDANT'S]
            CONVICTION AND ORDER A NEW TRIAL.

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                A.   THE APPELLATE DIVISION OWES
            THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL
            CONCLUSIONS NO DISCRETION AND SHOULD
            REVIEW [DEFENDANT'S] FACTUAL AND LEGAL
            CLAIMS DE NOVO.

                B.  THE FACTUAL ELEMENTS THAT
            ESTABLISH [DEFENDANT'S] BRADY CLAIM.

                         1. Brady's Favorability Requirement.

                         2. Brady's Suppression Requirement.

                         3. Brady's Prejudice Requirement.

      We first address defendant's petition for PCR. We "will uphold the PCR

court's findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."

State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013). An appellate court does not "defer to

a PCR court's interpretation of the law, a legal conclusion is reviewed de novo."

Id. at 540-41. However, where there is no evidentiary hearing, an appellate court

may "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions

of the PCR court." State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004).

      Pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(b), a second or subsequent petition for PCR is

barred unless:

            (1)    it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2); and

            (2)    it alleges on its face either:

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            (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
            constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's
            petition by the United States Supreme Court or the
            Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable
            during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or

            (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought
            could not have been discovered earlier through the
            exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts
            underlying the ground for relief, if proven and viewed
            in light of the evidence as a whole, would raise a
            reasonable probability that the relief sought would be
            granted; or

            (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
            ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the
            defendant on the first or subsequent application for
            post-conviction relief.

      Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) provides "no second or subsequent petition shall be

filed more than one year after the latest of:"

            (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
            was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
            Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right
            has been newly recognized by either of those Courts
            and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases
            on collateral review; or

            (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the
            relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate
            could not have been discovered earlier through the
            exercise of reasonable diligence; or

            (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
            application for post-conviction relief where ineffective
            assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on

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            the first or subsequent application for post-conviction
            relief is being alleged.

      The strict time bar imposed in these court rules may not be ignored or

relaxed. State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 292-94 (2018). Although it is

bereft of any reasons for its decision, we agree with the trial court's

determination the petition for PCR was time-barred. Because he was otherwise

out of time, defendant sought to file his third petition under the "newly

discovered evidence" exception contained in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B). However,

the document he claimed was new evidence, the 2011 supplemental laboratory

report, does not contain any "new" information. Rather, it refers to a 2006 DNA

laboratory report and reiterates what was contained in that report and already

known to defendant—he was excluded as a contributor to the DNA sample found

on the victim's overalls. This information was presented to the jury through

testimony of the State's forensic scientist and reiterated in defense counsel's

closing argument.    Therefore, the 2011 supplemental report is not "new"

information that would permit defendant to file his petition out of time.

      Because the petition is fatally time-barred, the trial court correctly denied

defendant's request for the assignment of counsel because it lacked good cause

pursuant to Rule 3:2-6(b). We therefore affirm that order.

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      We next address defendant's appeal of the order denying his motion for a

new trial. The trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial "shall not be

reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under

the law." R. 2:10-1. Although the trial court's order denying the motion only

points to our decision and does not address defendant's substantive claims, we

have reviewed defendant's contentions in light of the record and nevertheless

find there was no miscarriage of justice.

      Our Supreme Court has "stated repeatedly that to qualify as newly

discovered evidence entitling a party to a new trial, the new evidence must be

(1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or

contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable

diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury's

verdict if a new trial were granted." State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981).

      "A jury verdict rendered after a fair trial should not be disturbed except

for the clearest of reasons." State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 187 (2004). "Newly

discovered evidence must be reviewed with a certain degree of circumspection

to ensure that it is not the product of fabrication, and, if credible and material,

is of sufficient weight that it would probably alter the outcome of the verdict in

a new trial." Id. at 187-88.

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      A defendant must demonstrate three elements to establish a Brady

violation: "(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either as

exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the

evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be

material to the defendant's case." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019)

(citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 497 (1998)). "Evidence is material if there

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,

the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Here, defendant's motion for a new trial, which

hinges on a Brady violation, fails because the information contained in the 2011

supplemental report was known to defendant and presented to the jury, which

rendered a guilty verdict; therefore, he cannot show that the 2011 report would

have changed the outcome of the trial.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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