Court Opinion

ID: 9945852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 17:11:09.76025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:16.011850
License: Public Domain

58                   February 22, 2024             No. 111

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

               Robert R. PARKER, JR.,
                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                            v.
                   John D. BURNES
                         et al.,
                      Defendants,
                          and
                   John D. BURNS;
 Miller Nash, LLP; John Kitzhaber; Chevron Industries;
     Union Oil Company of California; Texaco, Inc.;
             and Exxon Mobil Corporation,
               Defendants-Respondents.
           Multnomah County Circuit Court
                 880502842; A178691

     Judith H. Matarazzo, Judge.
     Argued and submitted September 29, 2023.
   Robert R. Parker, Jr., argued the cause pro se. Also on
the brief was Law Office of Robert R Parker, Jr., LLB, LLC.
   Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent John Kitzhaber. Also on the brief
were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin
Gutman, Solicitor General.
   B. John Casey argued the cause for respondents Chevron
Industries, Union Oil Company of California, and Texaco,
Inc. Also on the brief were Rachelle D. Collins and Stoel
Rives LLP.
   Anthony Copple and Sarah J. Ryan argued the cause for
respondent Exxon Mobil Corporation. Also on the brief was
Jackson Lewis P.C.
   Shayna M. Rogers argued the cause for respondents
John D. Burns and Miller Nash LLP. Also on the brief were
Paul A. Berg and Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP.
Cite as 331 Or App 58 (2024)                       59

  Before Egan, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  EGAN, P. J.
  Affirmed.
60                                          Parker v. Burnes

        EGAN, P. J.
         Plaintiff appeals an order denying his motion to set
aside a judgment and reinstate his defamation claims, which
he brought against defendants and voluntarily dismissed in
1988. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred, because he
was entitled to relief from the judgment pursuant to ORCP
71 B and C. In addition, plaintiff argues that, due to systemic
racism and bias in the Oregon courts, he has not been able to
resolve his claims against defendants for over 30 years.
        The legal question before us is a narrow one:
whether the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff’s
motion to vacate the judgment and reinstate his defamation
claims. We conclude that it did not err, because the Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure compelled it to reach that result.
          At the outset, however, we highlight that in 2021,
the Legislative Assembly in Senate Concurrent Resolution
22 (“SCR 22”) determined that plaintiff was damaged by
the allegations that underlie his defamation claims, that
those allegations were “grounded in discrimination and
racism,” and that those allegations have been “determined
to be unfounded[,] or [have] been dismissed or vacated.” It
bears mention that SCR 22 is a legislative resolution, not a
judicial determination of wrongdoing reached after a trial
on the merits. We also highlight that the trial court stated
that the result in this case—the denial of plaintiff’s motion
to set aside the 1988 judgment and reinstate his defamation
claims—did not provide what it “would consider to be jus-
tice” to plaintiff.
         We do so because, although this court is aware of
the need for stability and predictability in the administra-
tion of justice, and aware of the need for litigants to have a
measure of finality when they receive a judgment, we are
also cognizant of the historical and ongoing harm caused
by racism, institutional and otherwise. This case is difficult,
because it demonstrates that our desire for stability, pre-
dictability, and finality in the law, can, at times, operate to
deny people, such as plaintiff, the opportunity to prove their
allegations in court and obtain appropriate redress upon
such proof.
Cite as 331 Or App 58 (2024)                                                  61

          Nevertheless, as noted, the legal question before us
is a narrow one: whether the trial court erred when it denied
plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment and reinstate his
defamation claims. We affirm the order on appeal because
the trial court did not err when it determined that the
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure compelled it to deny plain-
tiff’s motion to vacate and set aside the 1988 judgment.1
                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We review “whether a moving party has asserted a
cognizable ground for relief under ORCP 71 B * * * for errors
of law.” Kerridge v. Jester, 316 Or App 599, 604, 502 P3d
1206 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 507 (2022). “[I]f we determine
on appeal that the moving party has not asserted a valid
basis for relief, our inquiry ends there.” Id. at 604-05. If the
moving party has asserted a valid basis for relief, then we
review the trial court’s determination for granting relief
from a judgment under ORCP 71 B for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 604. Likewise, “[w]e review a court’s ruling under
ORCP 71 C for abuse of discretion.” A. B. A. v. Wood, 326
Or App 25, 26, 530 P3d 522 (2023) (citing Hill v. Hill, 323
Or App 458, 459, 523 P3d 163 (2022)).
                      I. BACKGROUND
          The following summary of allegations are in plain-
tiff’s First Amended Complaint and other pleadings filed
in plaintiff’s state and federal lawsuits. In the 1987 leg-
islative session, Senator Jim Hill hired plaintiff to serve
as the Committee Administrator for the Oregon Senate’s
Business Housing and Finance Committee of which Hill
was the chair. During that session, Senate Bill 664 (“SB
664”) was referred to the Committee, and various oil
companies—including Chevron Industries, Union Oil
Company, Texaco, Inc., and Exxon Mobil Corporation—
opposed the bill. Shortly afterwards, plaintiff was accused
of improperly soliciting money from lobbyists to start a
business, using his legislative position to influence parking
tickets, and using a lobbyist’s credit card. On May 29, 1987,
two uniformed officers with the Oregon State Police stopped
    1
      Although plaintiff has no remedy through the court, our decision does
not foreclose the possibility of a legislative remedy for the harms that plaintiff
alleges he experienced over the last 30 years.
62                                                          Parker v. Burnes

plaintiff when he arrived at work, and the officers denied
plaintiff entry into his office. Then-Senate President John
Kitzhaber informed plaintiff that he was placed on admin-
istrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation into
plaintiff’s activities.
         The Oregon Attorney General’s Office, the Oregon
State Police, and the Marion County District Attorney’s
Office began widely publicized investigations of plaintiff
based on those allegations. Plaintiff resigned from his posi-
tion as committee administrator due to the “excruciating
pressure” stemming from the investigations. The Marion
County District Attorney’s Office subsequently submitted
the case to a grand jury for a felony indictment against
plaintiff on three separate occasions, and the grand jury did
not indict him. Afterwards, plaintiff was charged with three
“unrelated” misdemeanors for filing false financial state-
ments. The misdemeanor charges were later dismissed.2
         After failing to indict plaintiff, the district attorney
transmitted the investigation file to the Executive Director
of the Oregon Government Ethics Commission (“OGEC”)
Betty Reynolds, and the OGEC prepared a report in which
Reynolds included “highly inflammatory, prejudicial,
derogatory, and irrelevant personal and private informa-
tion about plaintiff * * *.” Reynolds released the report to the
press and the public—without plaintiff’s consent—before the
OGEC had approved the report and before confirming any
of the allegations contained in the report. On December 8,
1987, plaintiff appeared at a probable cause hearing
before the OGEC and responded to the allegations in the
report. Plaintiff made a motion to strike the irrelevant
background information as prejudicial and inflammatory.
Without taking testimony, the commission passed a motion
to accept Reynolds’ recommendation that probable cause
existed that plaintiff had violated the Oregon Ethics in
Government Act.

     2
        To resolve those charges, plaintiff signed a statement from the district
attorney’s office that “relieve[d]” Marion County District Attorney Dale Penn and
Attorney General David Frohnmayer “from racially motivated intent by their
conduct in the investigation and bringing of the criminal charges against plain-
tiff * * *.” The statement also said that plaintiff admitted to gross errors in judg-
ment regarding credit applications that served as the basis for those charges.
Cite as 331 Or App 58 (2024)                                                   63

          In May 1988, plaintiff filed a defamation claim in
the Multnomah County Circuit Court, naming as defen-
dants John Burns,3 Miller Nash LLP, Senate President
John Kitzhaber, Chevron Industries, Union Oil Company,
Texaco Inc., and Exxon Mobil Corporation.4 Burns worked
as a lobbyist and lawyer with defendant Miller Nash, and
in that role, he represented the oil companies named as
defendants. Plaintiff alleged that Burns told Kitzhaber that
plaintiff solicited money from Burns to start a business, and
that that allegation led to the investigations against plain-
tiff. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants’ conduct cost him
his job with the Oregon Senate Committee, and that defen-
dants’ lies triggered a probe by the OGEC.5 In September
1988, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit pursuant
to ORCP 54 A(1).6 The court entered a judgment dismissing
plaintiff’s claims and imposed sanctions against plaintiff
for failing to appear for a court-ordered deposition.
          Then, in 1988, plaintiff filed claims against defen-
dants in the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon based on the same allegations. The federal dis-
trict court struck and dismissed most of the defendants and
claims—although it denied Burns’s motion to dismiss plain-
tiff’s claim for tortious interference. The parties worked to
settle that claim, and plaintiff signed a settlement agreement
and release of claims on December 20, 1989, in exchange
for $500. In that document, plaintiff released certain defen-
dants “from any and all causes of action, * * * including but
     3
       Although the case caption spells Defendant John Burns’s name as “John
Burnes,” we spell Defendant Burns’s last name as “Burns” throughout this opin-
ion, because the “John Burns and Miller Nash Answering Brief” spells his name
as such and, throughout the trial court record, his name is spelled as “Burns.”
     4
       Defendants Chevron Industries, Union Oil Company, Texaco Inc., and
Exxon Mobil Corporation—who are named in this appeal—are referred to as
the “oil companies” in this opinion. Plaintiff’s 1988 complaint also named as
defendants the Secretary of State Barbara Roberts, Attorney General David
Frohnmayer, Marion County District Attorney Dale Penn, Executive Director of
the OGEC Betty Reynolds, Mobil Oil Corp., Shell Oil Co., Atlantic Richfield Co.,
Jason Boe, the Oregon Petroleum Marketers Association, and Donald Fordyce.
     5
       Plaintiff brought several claims against defendants including claims for
conspiracy, ORICO, abuse of process, defamation, and tortious interference with
economic relations.
     6
       ORCP 54 A(1) permits a plaintiff to “dismiss an action in its entirety,” and
“[u]pon notice of dismissal or stipulation under this subsection, * * * the court
shall enter a judgment of dismissal.”
64                                                      Parker v. Burnes

not limited to any claims in any way connected with or aris-
ing out of [plaintiff’s] employment with or severance from
employment with the Oregon State Legislature.”7 Plaintiff
filed unsuccessful appeals in both the Multnomah County
case and the federal district court case. Plaintiff also sought
to void the release and reinstate his complaint in the federal
district court. The district court denied those motions and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed those decisions.
          In 1990, plaintiff passed the Oregon State Bar
Examination. The Board of Bar Examiners conducted an
examination into plaintiff’s character and fitness, and follow-
ing the board’s recommendation, the Oregon Supreme Court
denied plaintiff’s admission. Plaintiff argues that his admis-
sion was denied due to the false allegations against him.
          Over 30 years later, the Oregon legislature passed
SCR 22 during the 2021 Regular Session. In SCR 22, the
Senate issued a formal apology to plaintiff for the role that
racism and discrimination had played in the ultimately
unfounded investigations against plaintiff and for the “31
years of damage wrongfully done” to plaintiff. The Senate
made the following findings in SCR 22: (1) opponents of SB
664 sought to derail enactment of that legislation by making
the false allegations against plaintiff; (2) the investigations
into those allegations failed to yield evidence of an indict-
able offense, as the grand jury refused to indict plaintiff on
three separate occasions; (3) the OGEC investigated plaintiff
based on a letter from the Marion County District Attorney
in which he expressly acknowledged that the letter was not a
complaint, and without a complaint, the OGEC did not have
proper jurisdiction to undertake that investigation; (4) the
OGEC’s investigation report contained references to plain-
tiff’s race, faith, and interracial dating; (5) when plaintiff
sought bar admission, the Board of Bar Examiners under-
took an investigation to determine whether plaintiff had the
requisite character and fitness, and members of that inves-
tigation team included people who had participated in past
allegations against plaintiff and who had been named as
defendants in plaintiff’s previous lawsuits; and (6) plaintiff
    7
      That release specifically named the following defendants: John Burns,
Miller Nash LLP, the Oil Companies, and Richard Cantlin. Cantlin was not
named as a defendant, but he was the subject of some of plaintiff’s allegations.
Cite as 331 Or App 58 (2024)                                                     65

suffers from the impacts of unfounded, dismissed, or vacated
allegations “that are grounded in discrimination and rac-
ism.” SCR 22 requested that the Supreme Court vacate its
decision denying plaintiff’s admission to the Oregon Bar
and order plaintiff’s admission. On December 23, 2021, the
Supreme Court admitted plaintiff to the Oregon State Bar.
         After SCR 22, plaintiff filed motions to vacate and
set aside the judgment of dismissal and reinstate the 1988
defamation claim in Multnomah County Circuit Court. The
court held a hearing, and plaintiff argued that ORCP 71 B8
and C9 gave the court authority to reinstate his defamation
case. He argued that he had obtained new evidence (ORCP
71 B(1)) and that there had been a fraud upon the court based
on a 1989 deposition of then-Governor Barbara Roberts,
who testified that two defendants “may have participated
in starting the story” (ORCP 71 C). Plaintiff requested that
the court hold a hearing for the presentation of the new
evidence.
         The trial court rejected plaintiff’s arguments. As
it related to ORCP 71 B, the trial court determined that
plaintiff’s motion was untimely, because the rule gives only
one year for a plaintiff to present new evidence after receiv-
ing the notice of the judgment. As for ORCP 71 C, the court
determined that plaintiff’s motion was too late based on
the statute of limitations of each claim. In so ruling, the
trial court judge stated that although Oregon Rules of Civil
Procedure required that result, it did not provide “what [the
trial court] would consider to be justice” to plaintiff.
   8
       ORCP 71 B(1) states:
   “[T]he court may relieve a party * * * from a judgment for the following rea-
   sons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly dis-
   covered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
   time to move for a new trial under Rule 64 F; (c) fraud (whether previously
   called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
   adverse party[.] * * * The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
   for reasons (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after receipt of notice by the
   moving party of the judgment.”
   9
     ORCP 71 C states:
   “This rule does not limit the inherent power of a court to modify a judgment
   within a reasonable time, or the power of a court to entertain an independent
   action to relieve a party from a judgment, * * * or the power of a court to set
   aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.”
(Emphasis added.)
66                                          Parker v. Burnes

         The trial court then entered an order denying plain-
tiff’s motion to vacate and reinstate his claim. Plaintiff now
appeals that order.
                     II. DISCUSSION
         On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to vacate the previous judgment. He
argues that (1) the trial court did not give appropriate weight
to SCR 22 in evaluating his motion under ORCP 71 B and C,
and (2) the trial court erred in determining that the time
limitations of ORCP 71 precluded relief. We determine that
plaintiff was not entitled to relief under ORCP 71, but that,
even if he were, the release that plaintiff signed to resolve
the federal district court claims precludes relief in this case
as to most defendants.
         We begin by addressing plaintiff’s arguments relat-
ing to ORCP 71 B(1). That rule permits a court to relieve a
party from a judgment due to “newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 64(f).” ORCP 71 B(1)(b).
Motions based on “newly discovered evidence” must be made
within one year of a party’s notice of the judgment. ORCP
71 B(1).
         Plaintiff argues that the one-year time limitation of
ORCP 71 B was tolled due to defendants’ “fraudulent conceal-
ment” of evidence. In MAT, Inc. v. American Tower Asset Sub,
LLC, a breach of contract case, we determined that, “a party
claiming tolling based on fraudulent concealment must show
that (1) the breaching party fraudulently concealed the fact
of their breach and (2) notwithstanding reasonable diligence
on the part of the nonbreaching party, the breaching par-
ty’s wrongful conduct prevented the discovery of the breach.”
312 Or App 7, 16, 493 P3d 14 (2021) (citing Chaney v. Fields
Chevrolet, 264 Or 21, 26-27, 503 P2d 1239 (1972)).
        We have never, however, applied equitable tolling
based on fraudulent concealment to ORCP 71 B. Assuming
without deciding that fraudulent concealment could toll the
one-year time limit of ORCP 71 B, we conclude that plaintiff
has not submitted evidence that would support a finding of
fraudulent concealment. Fraudulent concealment requires
Cite as 331 Or App 58 (2024)                                  67

a plaintiff show that (1) the defendants fraudulently con-
cealed the facts of the case, and (2) “notwithstanding reason-
able diligence on the part of the [plaintiff], the [defendant’s]
wrongful conduct prevented the discovery of the [cause
of action].” MAT, Inc., 312 Or App at 17. On appeal, plain-
tiff argues that defendants fraudulently concealed evidence
in their possession—“the very evidence relied upon by the
Oregon Legislature during its consideration of SCR 22 and
Oregon Supreme Court in its Conditional Admission to the
Practice of Law of the Appellant[.]” But plaintiff does not pro-
vide information about what evidence the legislature relied
on for SCR 22. Plaintiff also argues that the 1989 deposition
of then-Governor Barbara Roberts, taken by plaintiff, shows
that defendants fraudulently concealed the defamation claim,
because Roberts said that Burns and Boe “may have partici-
pated in starting the story.” But plaintiff knew that fact when
he took the deposition in 1989, and it was one of the allega-
tions that he made in his original complaint, so that “fact”
was not concealed from plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff can-
not meet the second requirement for fraudulent concealment.
Plaintiff has filed numerous state and federal claims against
defendants, which indicates that defendants’ conduct did not
prevent plaintiff from discovering the claims. Thus, even if
we were to accept plaintiff’s argument that fraudulent con-
cealment tolls the one-year time limit of ORCP 71 B, plaintiff
has not met the requirements for fraudulent concealment.
         We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that ORCP 71 C does not pro-
vide plaintiff a basis for relief. Before the trial court, plain-
tiff argued that defendants lied about the purposes of the
investigations against him. That type of “intrinsic fraud”
does not provide a ground for setting aside the judgment.
See Dept. of Human Services v. M. M. R., 296 Or App 48, 51,
437 P3d 1233, rev den, 365 Or 194 (2019) (“A court’s inherent
authority does not extend to setting aside a judgment for
intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud that consists of acts that per-
tain to the merits of the case, such as perjured testimony.”
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)). Indeed,
in A. B. A., 326 Or App at 27, we concluded that a trial court
lacks authority entirely to grant a motion under ORCP 71 C
in circumstances such as these. We conclude that the trial
68                                                        Parker v. Burnes

court did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to reinstate
under ORCP 71 C.10
        Finally, plaintiff signed a release in his federal case
in which he agreed to release
     “any and all claims asserted, or which could have been
     asserted, in Civil No. 88-1089-FR in the United States
     District Court for the District of Oregon and in Case No.
     A8805-02842, initially filed in Multnomah County Circuit
     Court and transferred to Marion County Circuit Court,
     together with any appeal thereof.”11
Even if ORCP 71 B or C provided plaintiff a basis to set
aside the judgment, which they do not, plaintiff’s claims
against most of the defendants would have been barred by
his signed release that covered the defamation claim. See
Ristau v. Wescold, Inc., 318 Or 383, 387, 868 P2d 1331 (1994)
(“[W]e will enforce an unambiguous release that covers the
claim at issue.”).
                     III. CONCLUSION
         In the end, we conclude that the trial court did not
err when it denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate and reinstate
his defamation claim. As explained above, that result is
required by the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.
         Given the determinations in SCR 22, including the
determination that the allegations against plaintiff were
grounded in racism and discrimination and caused 31 years
of damage to plaintiff, we emphasize that we share the trial
court’s view that the result in this case, although required,
does not provide substantial justice to plaintiff. Indeed, this
case may demonstrate that the law, as it stands, is an imper-
fect instrument in the pursuit of racial justice. Nevertheless,
given the law and the record, we are compelled to affirm the
trial court’s ruling.
           Affirmed.
    10
       Because the trial court lacked authority to grant the motion under ORCP
71 C, we do not need to discuss the trial court’s rationale for denying the motion.
    11
       As we previously noted, that release specifically named Burns, Miller
Nash LLP, the Oil Companies, and Cantlin. Kitzhaber was not included in the
release, and the claims against him had already been dismissed at the time of
the release; but as we previously concluded, the trial court did not err in denying
reinstatement under ORCP 71 B and C.