Court Opinion

ID: 9513330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:34:23.246563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:49.592284
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 23] I would affirm the entire Judgment of the district court. The majority says “[i]t is clear from the trial court’s Memorandum Opinion that it never included the ‘premarital’ property in the marital estate.” To the contrary, Finding 25 of the trial court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment states:
“The real and personal property of the marital estate, the value of the property, the marital debt, the net worth of the marital estate and the division of the marital property and debt is set forth in the Division of Assets and Liabilities that is based upon the Rule 8.3 Asset and Debt Listing of the parties and the reference to numbers shall correspond to the numbers on the 8.3 Asset and Debt Listing. The Division of Assets and Liabilities is attached to the Judgment and incorporated therein by reference.”
[¶24] A reference to the Rule 8.3 Asset and Debt Listing immediately reveals that all property, including the premarital property, was included and considered by the trial court. Although the premarital property was subsequently awarded to Gene, it is apparent it was considered. If there is a discrepancy between the trial court’s memorandum opinion and its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the findings of fact prevail. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Schmidkunz v. Schmidkunz, 529 N.W.2d 857 (N.D.1995).
[¶ 25] I agree with the majority that the trial court must explain a substantial disparity in the distribution of the property. The issue then becomes whether or not the trial court provided adequate reasons for not giving Dorothy a share of the premarital property Gene brought into the marriage. One need only examine the legal references listing our cases to be aware we have repeatedly said the trial court’s findings must be adequate to afford a clear understanding of the
trial court’s decision but if the Supreme Court understands from the findings the factual basis for the trial court’s determination, the findings are adequately specific. E.g., Gross v. Star-Rite Industries, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 679 (N.D.1982), appeal after remand, 336 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.1983).
' [¶ 26] I believe the trial court’s findings are adequate here, although the trial court might have been clearer. If, from the trial court’s findings of fact, this court understands the factual basis upon which the trial court reached its conclusions, no good purpose is served by remanding for more adequate findings. E.g., Voskuil v. Voskuil, 256 N.W.2d 526, 530 (N.D.1977).
[¶ 27] The trial court found that in addition to Gene bringing substantial property into the marriage, all of Gene’s farming and ranching income was deposited into a joint account with Dorothy and used to pay the farm and ranch operating expenses and the family living expenses. The court also found the income Dorothy earned outside the home went into her own separate account and was not used to contribute to the farming operation or to the family living expenses, but was “accumulated as cash assets that she has kept personal to herself.”
[¶ 28] Gene, age 69, is ten years older than Dorothy and is retired. The court found Gene’s income from social security, retirement payments, and the lease of his farmland and equipment provides him with a total income of $14,012, slightly less than the $14,-902 Dorothy is able to currently earn as a certified nurse’s assistant. Still, the court awarded Dorothy rehabilitative support of $150 per month for five years because of a vision disability. Spousal support and property division must often be considered together because a difference in earning power is an important factor for both. Pfliger v. Pfliger, 461 N.W.2d 432, 436 (N.D.1990). The court’s property division gives the parties roughly equivalent incomes after the divorce.
[¶ 29] The court also made a specific finding that the net value of Gene’s premarital property when he and Dorothy entered the marriage was $131,500 and at the time of the divorce was $140,005. Consequently, there was very little appreciation or added value *117during the marriage to that property. The court also found Dorothy brought into the marriage an automobile, household furnishings, and some cash, property which would ordinarily be consumed during a 20-year marriage. The trial court, nevertheless, awarded Dorothy property valued at $22,500 as “replacements” for that premarital property.
[¶30] The trial court did not directly tie the allocation of the premarital property to these findings. Considering the court’s specific explanation for dividing the property accumulated during the marriage, there can be no other reason for the court making these findings than to explain its division of the premarital property. I conclude these findings adequately explain why the court awarded each party the premarital property he or she brought into the marriage and why, under the circumstances, the disparity is justified. The property division results in the parties realizing nearly equal incomes so neither is unfairly disadvantaged by the divorce. Whether or not I would have reached the same conclusion, I am not left with a firm and definite conviction the trial court made a mistake in dividing the property. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; see e.g., Gibbon v. Gibbon, 1997 ND 210, ¶ 6, 569 N.W.2d 707.
[¶ 31] Although the majority appears to recognize these findings, it rejects them as a sufficient reasoning for not dividing the property equally. If, as the majority opinion clearly implies, the majority believes an equal distribution of the property is required under these circumstances, I suggest it say so and hold the findings distributing the property to be clearly erroneous, or conclude that a mistake has been made even if the findings are not clearly erroneous, and order an equal division of the property. Under the relatively uncomplicated facts of this ease, a remand for further findings is simply another hoop through which the parties and the trial court must jump before the majority orders an equal distribution and the majority ought' to say so.
[¶ 32] SANDSTROM, J., concurs.