Court Opinion

ID: 9845011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:13:48.517639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.240192
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, J.,
dissents.
Y.
FAILURE TO MITIGATE AS GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL.
The trial court granted Simplot’s motion for new trial on the breach of employment contract, and retaliatory discharge claims as to the issue of damages only. The court reasoned that the jury’s award was against the clear weight of the evidence because O’Dell had failed to mitigate his damages by refusing to accept the position as Risk Manager of the Food Division offered by Simplot as an alternative to its original offer to reinstate O’Dell unconditionally to his former position.
A plaintiff asserting wrongful discharge is not required to mitigate damages by accepting an alternative position which requires the employee to relinquish claims arising from the employer’s breach. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 676 F.2d 865 (1st Cir.1982); Redman v. Department of Educ., 519 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1974); Stanspec Corp. v. Jelco, Inc., 464 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir.1972); Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal.App.2d 858, 211 P.2d 621 (1949); Farmers’ Co-operative Ass’n v. Shaw, 171 Okla. 358, 42 P.2d 887 (1935). Although Simplot’s final offer of the Food Division position was not explicitly contingent on a release of claims by O’Dell, by accepting the alternative position O’Dell would in fact be relinquishing the right of reinstatement to his former position which he claimed pursuant to the violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act by Simplot.
Further, although a plaintiff claiming breach of an employment contract is required to mitigate damages, Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796, 606 P.2d 90 (1980), mitigation does not require a party to a contract to enter into a new contract proffered as an alternative by the breaching party where there is a finding that bad faith surrounds the breach of the original contract. Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. United States, 603 F.2d 171, 221 Ct.Cl. 37 (1979); Food Handlers Local 425 v. Valmac Industries, Inc., 528 F.2d 217 (8th Cir.1975). Where there is no finding of bad faith, the issue becomes the reasonableness of the non-breaching party’s efforts to mitigate losses caused by the breach. Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680 (1988); Casey v. Nampa & Meridian Irrig. Dist., 85 Idaho 299, 379 P.2d 409 (1963).
In this case, having considered the issues of bad faith and reasonableness, the jury found that the conduct surrounding the breach of the employment contract involved a violation by Simplot of the provisions of the Idaho Human Rights Act, and imposed punitive damages against Simplot for willful violations of that Act. Under these circumstances a bad faith breach was established, and O’Dell was not bound to mitigate damages by accepting employment from Simplot other than the position to which he pursued a legal right of reinstatement.
*817We do not intend our holding today to be construed as eliminating the requirement for an employee claiming a breach of employment contract to mitigate their damages by trying to obtain employment elsewhere. We hold that under these circumstances, O’Dell was not required to accept the position in the Food Division offered by Simplot. O’Dell’s rejection of the Simplot’s offer to work in the Food Division cannot be used to establish his failure to mitigate.
The jury was instructed that in order to find for O’Dell on the breach of employment contract claim, it would have to find that he was constructively discharged. The trial court correctly instructed that an employee who resigns is not entitled to recover for wrongful termination of employment absent proof of circumstances establishing constructive discharge. Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835 (9th Cir.1986); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.1984); Knee v. School Dist., 106 Idaho 152, 676 P.2d 727 (Ct.App.), rev. denied (1984); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Assoc., 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.1975).
In finding that Simplot was liable on the claim for breach of employment contract (a finding that was explicitly affirmed by the trial court in its order granting a new trial on the issue of damages), the jury necessarily found that the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the offer for unconditional reinstatement to O’Dell’s former position and the offer of the Food Division position constituted constructive discharge, defined as “harassment, intimidation, coercion, or other aggravating conduct that renders working conditions intolerable” and that “a reasonable person would terminate the relationship under similar circumstances.” Instruction number 24. The issue is whether this finding by the jury is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.
In its motion for new trial, defendant Simplot argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of liability for the breach of the employment contract, which was based on constructive discharge. The trial court responded by explicitly holding the jury’s verdict of liability on that issue was not against the weight of the evidence. In order to reach this conclusion, the trial court implicitly accepted the jury’s finding that O’Dell was justified in considering himself constructively discharged after Simplot rescinded its offer of unconditional reinstatement and offered the Food Division position as an alternative.
The trial court’s acceptance of the jury’s conclusion that Simplot was liable for breach of the employment contract based on constructive discharge is not consistent with its conclusion that O’Dell’s refusal of the alternative position offered by Simplot constituted a failure to mitigate his damages. Therefore, we reverse the grant of a new trial on the issue of damages based on a claim of breach of employment contract. We hold that O’Dell was not required to accept the alternate position in the Food Division offered by Simplot.
JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., concur.