Court Opinion

ID: 9948563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 16:20:18.79878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:27.615758
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to revision before final
                      publication in the Pacific Reporter

                                  2024 UT 8

                                    IN THE

       SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

               LARRY H. MILLER THEATRES, INC., et al.,*
                            Petitioners,
                                       v.
          UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, SALT LAKE COUNTY
                 BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, et al.,*
                          Respondents.

                            No. 20220345
                       Heard September 6, 2023
                         Filed March 7, 2024

             On Petition for Review of Agency Decision

                     Utah State Tax Commission
                         Judge Jan Marshall
                            No. 20-2085

                                 Attorneys*:
 Steven P. Young, Nathan R. Runyan, Rebecca L. Taylor, Salt Lake,
      David J. Crapo, John T. Deeds, Bountiful, for petitioners
  Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Michelle Lombardi, Asst. Att’y Gen.,
  Melissa A. Holyoak, Solic. Gen., Stanford E. Purser, Deputy Solic.
    Gen., Salt Lake, for respondent Utah State Tax Commission
Sim Gill, Timothy A. Bodily, Bradley C. Johnson, Victoria Turner, Salt
    Lake, for respondent Salt Lake County Board of Equalization

   * Other petitioners in this case are: Omkara, LLC; Shree Ganesh,
LLC; The Ridge LP; Academy Square II, LLC; NNN Jamboree
Promenade, LLC; Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc.; Clinton City Center,
LLC; Layton Theater Investment Group LC; Legacy Crossing Theater
LLC; MMP Springville Inc.; A&A Hospitality; Thanksgiving Point-US
D LLC; Wilder Sage Enterprise Properties LLC; Tigriswoods LLC;
National Retail Properties LP; Grand America Hotel Company; Little
America Hotel Company; Larry H. Miller Arena Corp.; The District
                 MILLER THEATRES v. TAX COMMISSION
                         Opinion of the Court

LC; CF III SH Valley Fair LLC; Legacy Management Company LLC;
Jordan Commons Funding LLC; Municipal Building Authority, Salt
Lake City Corp.; Cotton Mill II LC; Sunset Corner Properties LC; and
Pineview Plaza LC.
   * Other respondents in this case are: Utah County Board of
Equalization, Utah County Assessor, Davis County Board of
Equalization, Weber County Board of Equalization, Cache County
Board of Equalization, and Washington County Board of Equalization.
    * Other Attorneys: Jeffrey S. Gray, Paul Jones, Provo, for
respondent Utah County Board of Equalization; Jeffrey S. Gray,
Benjamin Stanley, Provo, for respondent Utah County Assessor;
Troy Rawlings, Robert Tripp, Farmington, for respondent Davis
County Board of Equalization; Christopher F. Allred,
Courtlan Erickson, Ogden, for respondent Weber County Board of
Equalization; Dane Murray, K. Taylor Sorensen, Logan, for respondent
Cache County Board of Equalization; and Eric W. Clarke, Steven Scott,
St. George, for respondent Washington County Board of Equalization.

    JUSTICE POHLMAN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
      CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
             JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE HAGEN joined.

   JUSTICE POHLMAN, opinion of the Court:
                          INTRODUCTION
    ¶1 This case asks us to interpret Utah Code section 59-2-1004.6,
which, for ease of reference, we will often refer to as the Access
Interruption Statute. This taxation statute allows a property owner to
seek an adjustment to a county’s assessment of the fair market value
of the owner’s property if the “property sustains a decrease in fair
market value that is caused by access interruption.” UTAH CODE § 59-2-
1004.6(2). The statute defines “access interruption” as the
“interruption of the normal access to or from property” due to
circumstances beyond the owner’s control, including events such as
road construction, vandalism, and adverse weather. Id.
§ 59-2-1004.6(1).
    ¶2 A motley group of businesses (collectively, Taxpayers)—
operating various retail and hospitality-related enterprises—applied
for adjustments to the fair market value of their properties for tax year
2020. Taxpayers argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and associated

                                   2
                           Cite as: 2024 UT 8
                          Opinion of the Court
government-issued guidelines amounted to a circumstance beyond
their control for purposes of Utah Code section 59-2-1004.6.
    ¶3 The Utah State Tax Commission (Commission) rejected this
argument for two reasons. First, the Commission concluded that the
pandemic was not a qualifying circumstance under the Access
Interruption Statute, reasoning that the statute applies only if access
was interrupted due to any of thirteen enumerated events or due to a
similar event as determined by the Commission via administrative
rule. And because the pandemic was neither enumerated by the
legislature nor determined by administrative rule, the statute did not
apply. Second, the Commission reasoned in the alternative that
because the pandemic did not physically impede access to or from
Taxpayers’ properties, the pandemic was not a qualifying
circumstance under the Access Interruption Statute.
    ¶4 Taxpayers now petition for review of the Commission’s
decision. They contend that the pandemic qualifies as an “access
interruption event” under the Access Interruption Statute because it
interrupted normal access to or from their properties and was beyond
their control. Taxpayers recognize that the pandemic is not
enumerated as a qualifying circumstance either by statute or
administrative rule, but they argue that the statute “is broad enough
to include the COVID-19 pandemic.”
    ¶5 In contrast, the Commission maintains that the pandemic is
not a qualifying event. It first argues that for the Access Interruption
Statute to apply, any unenumerated event must be similar to the
enumerated events and must be added by the Commission through
the rulemaking process. Because the pandemic is not identified in the
statute or by rule, the Commission argues that Taxpayers cannot
invoke the statute to seek adjustments to the fair market value
assessments of their properties. The Commission also argues, in the
alternative, that because the pandemic did not physically interrupt
access to Taxpayers’ properties, the statute does not apply.
    ¶6 We agree with the Commission on its first rationale, without
opining on its alternative rationale or any potential rule on this subject.
Thus, we hold that subsection (1)(n) of the Access Interruption Statute
allows only the Commission to add to the statute’s list of qualifying
circumstances if the Commission determines by rule that the
additional event is similar to the events enumerated in the statute. We
further hold that because the pandemic is not an enumerated event

                                    3
                 MILLER THEATRES v. TAX COMMISSION
                          Opinion of the Court

and has not been added by administrative rule, the Commission’s
decision is correct.1
                           BACKGROUND2
   ¶7 On January 31, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared a global health emergency due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
COVID-19 is a respiratory disease caused by a coronavirus strain that
previously had not been identified in humans. It can easily spread and
lead to serious illness or death.
   ¶8 In March 2020, the State of Utah declared a state of emergency
due to the outbreak. WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic, and
Governor Gary R. Herbert then instructed people to stay home as
much as possible, not to gather with others outside of the same
household, not to travel to or participate in activities at places of public
amusement or activity, and to limit travel to only essential travel. In
April, Governor Herbert continued the March directives and added
the instruction that people wear face coverings in any place of public
accommodation.
    ¶9 By the end of April, Governor Herbert issued a plan to
mitigate the economic consequences of COVID-19 (ULT plan). The
ULT plan used color codes for the level of public health risk in the
state’s counties, and it used phased guidelines, including certain
industry-specific guidelines, with varying recommendations.
Meanwhile, various counties took local emergency measures to
respond to COVID-19. The Utah Department of Health issued a new
guide to economic engagement in October 2020. This guide involved
restrictions for individuals and businesses based on the weekly

_____________________________________________________________
   1 Because this case does not follow or arise from an agency decision

on any rulemaking petition, the question of whether the pandemic is
sufficiently similar to the listed events is not necessary to our opinion,
and we do not reach it. We stress that nothing in this opinion should
be read to endorse or reject the Commission’s conclusion that the
pandemic is dissimilar to the circumstances the legislature outlined in
the statute.
   2 This petition for review arises from the Commission’s decision on

cross-motions for summary judgment. When “there are cross-motions
for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable
to the losing party.” Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co., 2019 UT 27,
¶ 14, 445 P.3d 474 (cleaned up).

                                     4
                           Cite as: 2024 UT 8
                         Opinion of the Court
number of COVID-19 cases in each county and the statewide
availability of intensive care unit beds.
    ¶10 Against this backdrop, the Utah State Tax Commission issued
a July 6, 2020 news release titled, “Property Valuations After
COVID-19.” The news release explained that, under state law,
property is valued as of “January 1st” and that “[b]ecause the
COVID-19 pandemic happened after January 1, 2020, if there was any
impact to your value, it will not be reflected in the 2020 valuation of
your property.” The news release continued, “Any impact that may
occur such as a decrease in value due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
would not be reflected until the 2021 valuation.” Notably, the
Commission has not issued any rule stating that global pandemics or
related government orders are events that could cause “access
interruption” for purposes of the Access Interruption Statute.
    ¶11 Taxpayers applied to their county boards of equalization for
adjustments in their properties’ fair market values under the Access
Interruption Statute for tax year 2020. Taxpayers operate various
enterprises, such as hotels, movie theaters, and retail stores, and they
represent a variety of businesses identified in the ULT plan. Taxpayers
asserted that they had “reduced income attributable to the ongoing
pandemic” and that their properties had, since January 1, 2020,
sustained decreases in fair market value that were caused by “access
interruption.” In Taxpayers’ view, “the COVID-19 pandemic and its
attendant government-imposed restrictions” caused access
interruption in accordance with Utah Code section 59-2-1004.6,
entitling them to adjustments in the fair market values of their
properties.
    ¶12 The majority of the county boards of equalization denied
Taxpayers’ applications.3 Taxpayers then appealed to the
Commission. The respondents (collectively, Counties) and Taxpayers
agreed to consolidate the appeals with respect to the common legal
issue, but they stipulated that “with respect to factual issues, including
individual valuation issues, the appeals will not be consolidated but
will proceed individually for consideration by the Commission once
the common legal issue has been addressed.” Accordingly, the
Commission consolidated the numerous appeals for the limited
purpose of “deciding the legal, statutory interpretation issue.”

_____________________________________________________________
   3 The boards of equalization for Utah and Iron counties allowed for
a fair market value adjustment under the Access Interruption Statute.
The Utah County Assessor appealed to the Commission, but the Iron
County Assessor did not.
                                    5
                 MILLER THEATRES v. TAX COMMISSION
                         Opinion of the Court

    ¶13 Both sides moved for summary judgment, and the
Commission ultimately granted summary judgment to the Counties
on two grounds. First, although the Access Interruption Statute allows
for the possibility that “any circumstance beyond the control of the
owner” could interrupt access to a property, the Commission reasoned
that section 59-2-1004.6 is not without limit. Specifically, the
Commission concluded that if a circumstance (like the pandemic) is
not enumerated in the statute, it is not a qualifying event unless it is
both similar to the enumerated events and has been identified as a
qualifying event by Commission rule. It explained that the Access
Interruption Statute requires that additional qualifying events can be
added only by rulemaking, which “ensure[s] uniform application of
these circumstances by the counties.” Alternatively, the Commission
reasoned that because the pandemic did not create an impediment to
physically accessing Taxpayers’ properties, the pandemic did not
interrupt access and thus the statute did not apply. Taxpayers jointly
seek judicial review of the Commission’s decision.
               ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶14 Taxpayers contend that the Commission erred in concluding
that the COVID-19 pandemic is not a qualifying event under the
Access Interruption Statute. “We review the Commission’s statutory
interpretations for correctness, granting no deference to its conclusions
of law.” Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2012 UT 91,
¶ 7, 293 P.3d 369; see also UTAH CODE § 59-1-610(1)(b) (“When
reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: . . . grant
the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law,
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant
of discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate
court.”). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Summit Operating, 2012 UT 91, ¶ 7
(cleaned up).
                              ANALYSIS
    ¶15 The sole issue before us is the correct interpretation of the
Access Interruption Statute. After we set forth the principles that guide
our interpretation, we place the statute in context. We then analyze the
statute accordingly and hold that the plain language of subsection
(1)(n) of the Access Interruption Statute allows only the Commission
to add to the statute’s list of circumstances if the Commission
determines by administrative rule that the additional event is similar
to the events listed in the statute. And we conclude that because the

                                    6
                             Cite as: 2024 UT 8
                           Opinion of the Court
pandemic is not listed in the statute and has not been added to the list
by rule, the Commission did not err in granting summary judgment to
the Counties.
I. THE ACCESS INTERRUPTION STATUTE ALLOWS FOR AN ADJUSTMENT IN
FAIR MARKET VALUE WHEN PROPERTY SUSTAINED A DECREASE IN FAIR
           MARKET VALUE DUE TO ACCESS INTERRUPTION
    ¶16 Our primary objective when we interpret a statute “is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature.” Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah
State Tax Comm’n, 2012 UT 91, ¶ 11, 293 P.3d 369 (cleaned up). “[T]he
best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the
statute itself,” and we construe “each part or section . . . in connection
with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.”
Id. (cleaned up). We thus “interpret statutes to give meaning to all
parts, and avoid rendering portions of the statute superfluous.” Id.
(cleaned up). “When we can ascertain the intent of the legislature from
the statutory terms alone, no other interpretive tools are needed . . . .”
Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (cleaned up). We now
turn to the statutory issue before us.
    ¶17 In Utah, “[a]ll tangible taxable property located within the
state shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the
basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise
provided by law.” UTAH CODE § 59-2-103(2). Thus, the amount of
property taxes usually depends on the fair market value of the
property as of January 1. Id.
    ¶18 The Access Interruption Statute, under the Property Tax Act,4
is an exception. It provides that “if, during a calendar year, property
sustains a decrease in fair market value that is caused by access
interruption, the owner of the property may apply . . . for an
adjustment in the fair market value of the owner’s property as
provided in Subsection (4).” Id. § 59-2-1004.6(2).
    ¶19 To obtain an adjustment under the Access Interruption
Statute, the property owner has “the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence: (i) that the property sustained a
decrease in fair market value, during the applicable calendar year, that
was caused by access interruption; (ii) the amount of the decrease in fair
market value . . . ; and (iii) that the decrease . . . is not due to the action
or inaction of the applicant.” Id. § 59-2-1004.6(4)(c) (emphasis added).

_____________________________________________________________
   4 The Property Tax Act is codified at Title 59, Chapter 2 of the Utah

Code. See UTAH CODE §§ 59-2-101 to -1906.
                                      7
                 MILLER THEATRES v. TAX COMMISSION
                          Opinion of the Court

     ¶20 Most relevant here, the Access Interruption Statute states,
“For purposes of this section ‘access interruption’ means interruption
of the normal access to or from property due to any circumstance
beyond the control of the owner, including: (a) road construction;
(b) traffic diversion; (c) an accident; (d) vandalism; (e) an explosion;
(f) fire; (g) a flood; (h) a storm; (i) a tornado; (j) winds; (k) an
earthquake; (l) lightning; (m) any adverse weather event; or (n) any
event similar to the events described in this Subsection (1), as
determined by the commission by rule made in accordance with Title
63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.” Id. § 59-2-
1004.6(1).
   II. BECAUSE THE PANDEMIC IS NOT A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
     UNDER THE ACCESS INTERRUPTION STATUTE, THE COMMISSION
             CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    ¶21 Taxpayers challenge the Commission’s interpretation of the
Access Interruption Statute, asserting that the “COVID-19 pandemic
qualifies as access interruption.” Embedded in this framing is a
threshold question—whether the statute recognizes the pandemic as a
“circumstance beyond the control of the owner” that interrupted
“normal access to or from property.” See UTAH CODE § 59-2-1004.6(1).
This threshold question must be answered in the affirmative to bring
the Access Interruption Statute into play and to give a property owner
the opportunity to meet its burden under subsection (4)(c) of the
statute. See supra ¶ 19.
   ¶22 Taxpayers do not suggest that the pandemic fits into the plain
language of any of the legislatively enumerated circumstances that
potentially interrupt access. See UTAH CODE § 59-2-1004.6(1)(a)–(m).
The pandemic is not, for instance, road construction, vandalism, or an
adverse weather event. See id. Thus, this case ultimately boils down to
whether and how the list of qualifying circumstances can be expanded.
    ¶23 As to the first inquiry, there’s no debate that the list may be
expanded. The parties agree that the statute’s list of qualifying
circumstances is not exhaustive. After all, “access interruption” is
defined as the “interruption of the normal access to or from property
due to any circumstance beyond the control of the owner, including”
the enumerated events. Id. § 59-2-1004.6(1) (cleaned up) (emphasis
added). The legislature has instructed that generally its use of the term
“including” in statutes “means that the items listed are not an
exclusive list, unless the word ‘only’ or similar language is used to
expressly indicate that the list is an exclusive list.” Id. § 68-3-12(1)(f).
And we have similarly recognized that the term “is routinely
construed as introducing a non-exclusive, exemplary list.” Graves v.

                                     8
                           Cite as: 2024 UT 8
                         Opinion of the Court
N.E. Servs., Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 53, 345 P.3d 619. Thus, the legislature’s
use of “including” shows its intent for the enumerated events to be a
non-exclusive list of qualifying circumstances. See id.5
   ¶24 But that conclusion does not end our analysis. We next must
answer how the list can be expanded. Here, the legislature has
provided a specific means for expanding the list.
    ¶25 Subsection (1)(n) provides that besides the thirteen
enumerated events, “‘access interruption’ means interruption of the
normal access to or from property due to any circumstance beyond the
control of the owner, including . . . any event similar to the [listed]
events . . . , as determined by the commission by rule made in
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.” UTAH CODE § 59-2-1004.6(1)(n). The Access
Interruption Statute thus allows for the list of circumstances to grow
and dictates a specific avenue for doing so. The Commission, however,
has not taken that avenue here. It has not promulgated a rule adding
the pandemic as a circumstance that could interrupt access.
    ¶26 Still, Taxpayers ask us to hold that the pandemic “is an access
interruption event under the plain language” of the Access
Interruption Statute, which they assert “is broad enough to include the
COVID-19 pandemic, regardless of the Commission’s failure to promulgate
the same in [a] rule.” (Emphasis added.) This we cannot do. Nor could
the county boards of equalization for that matter. The statute’s plain
language tells us how “any event similar to” the listed events is added
as a “circumstance beyond the control of the owner”: an addition is
accomplished “by the commission by rule made in accordance with . . .
[the rulemaking procedures of the] Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act.” UTAH CODE § 59-2-1004.6(1)(n). Stated differently, to be
considered a qualifying circumstance, the Access Interruption Statute
requires the Commission to determine whether the additional event is a
“circumstance beyond the control of the owner” similar to the events
delineated by the legislature and to promulgate a rule to that effect

_____________________________________________________________
   5 In Graves, we concluded that the word “including” in the statutory

definition of “fault” provided support for construing the comparative
fault statute to include intentional torts. 2015 UT 28, ¶¶ 48–49, 53
(citing UTAH CODE § 78B-5-817(2)). As we explain, infra ¶¶ 24–26, the
Access Interruption Statute’s subsection (1)(n), unlike the fault
definition, specifies who may expand the statutory list. Compare UTAH
CODE § 78B-5-817(2), with id. § 59-2-1004.6(1)(n). The path for
expansion here goes to the Commission through the rulemaking
process, not to this court through statutory interpretation.
                                    9
                 MILLER THEATRES v. TAX COMMISSION
                         Opinion of the Court

through the rulemaking process.6 See id. We cannot simply declare the
pandemic a circumstance for purposes of the Access Interruption
Statute, usurp the Commission’s role, and thereby overlook
subsection (1)(n)’s plain language. See Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah
State Tax Comm’n, 2012 UT 91, ¶ 11, 293 P.3d 369 (explaining that we
construe “each part or section” of a statute “in connection with every
other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole” (cleaned
up)).
    ¶27 In sum, the Commission correctly granted summary
judgment to the Counties. Given that the Commission has not made a
rule adding the pandemic as a circumstance beyond the control of a
property owner that is similar to those events identified in the statute,
we conclude the pandemic is not an event that currently brings the
Access Interruption Statute into play. See UTAH CODE § 59-2-1004.6(1).
In so doing, we express no opinion on any potential administrative
rule designating the pandemic as a qualifying circumstance under
subsection 59-2-1004.6(1)(n).
                           CONCLUSION
¶28      We hold that Utah Code subsection 59-2-1004.6(1)(n) permits
only the Commission to add to the legislatively enumerated events
that put the Access Interruption Statute into play, provided that the
additional event is similar to the enumerated events and the
Commission makes the determination through the rulemaking
process. Because the pandemic is not an enumerated event and has not
been added as a qualifying event by rule, we allow the Commission’s
award of summary judgment to the Counties to stand.

_____________________________________________________________
   6  The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act allows interested
persons to “petition an agency to request the making, amendment, or
repeal of a rule.” UTAH CODE § 63G-3-601(2). See generally UTAH
ADMIN. CODE R15-2. In light of that process and subsection (1)(n)’s
language pointing to the Act, we are not at liberty to allow Taxpayers
to avoid that step and have us interpret section 59-2-1004.6 in a manner
that would deprive the Commission of its role under the Access
Interruption Statute.
                                   10