Court Opinion

ID: 2965291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:38:20.303153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:06.470385
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                                
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit
                                
                                

No. 97-2378

                    AWILDA DE-LA-CRUZ-ARROYO,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                       Defendant, Appellee.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                      Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                 Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                          
                                
     Raymond Rivera Esteves and Juan A. Hernandez Rivera on brief
for appellant.
     Honorable Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Lilliam
Mendoza Toro, Assistant United States Attorney, and Donna McCarthy,
Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, on
brief for appellee.

May 27, 1998

            Per Curiam.  Appellant Awilda De-La-Cruz-Arroyo
    appeals from the dismissal of her action for lack of
    prosecution.  Specifically, process never was served on the
    defendant, the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
              The district court did not abuse its discretion in
    ordering dismissal of the case after nine months had passed
    without service and without any other action on appellant's
    part to move the case forward.  See Caribbean Transp. Sys.,
    Inc. v. Autoridad de las Navieras de Puerto Rico, 901 F.2d 196,
    197 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs'
    case where they failed to serve the amended complaint for seven
    months and did little to move the action along).  The question
    then becomes whether the district court abused its discretion
    in denying appellant's request, made in her Fed. R. Civ. P.
    60(b) motion, for an extension of time in which to serve the
    Secretary.  We think not.  
              Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), an extension of time for
    service of process is permitted upon a showing of "good cause." 
    It is appellant's burden to demonstrate the requisite cause. 
    See United States v. Ayer, 857 F.2d 881, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1988). 
    Here, the error made by appellant's attorney shows
    inadvertence.  However, this is not enough to require the
    district court to grant an extension under Rule 4.  See Powellv. Starwalt, 866 F.2d 964, 965 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
    attorney inadvertence as amounting to "good cause" under Rule
    4(j), the predecessor to Rule 4(m)); Braxton v. United States,
    817 F.2d 238, 239 (3rd Cir. 1987) (same). 
              Counsel argues that he nonetheless acted diligently
    by reviewing the case and filing the motion in June 1997,
    asking to be notified when the court decided the case.  Rather
    than exhibiting diligence, however, this motion underscores the
    want of prosecution.  Specifically, we think that any
    reasonable review of the case should have revealed, in addition
    to the lack of a decision, the absence of an answer or other
    responsive pleading from the Secretary.  In turn, this should
    have alerted appellant's attorney to the possibility that the
    Secretary never had been served.
              We find the lack of any explanation, even now, for
    appellant's inactivity from June 18, 1997 until the case was
    dismissed on September 26, 1997 dispositive.  See Resolution
    Trust Corp. v. Starkey, 41 F.3d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1995) (good
    cause for failure to timely serve defendant was lacking where
    plaintiff offered no explanation for not having acted
    diligently in discovering defendant's address).  That appellant
    was not proceeding in bad faith is not controlling.  See id.(lack of a "sinister motive" is not enough to excuse delay in
    failing to serve defendant).  Rather, "the fact that
    [appellant] was careless is sufficient to militate against the
    showing of good faith required for shelter under" Rule 4.   Seeid.
              Affirmed.