Court Opinion

ID: 9475480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:28:37.08572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:44.475315
License: Public Domain

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority affirms the district court’s holding that the defendant is guilty of violating 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). The crime is to transport in excess of $10,000 out of this country without reporting it. To export such an amount is not the crime. See United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir.1978). Yet in an oral opinion rendered following the trial, the district court stated: “I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that at a given time he did have the required knowledge that it was prohibited by law for him to take outside of this country the amount of money in excess of $10,000.” In other words, the district court found Salinas-Garza guilty and sentenced him for violation of a nonexistent offense. The majority ignores the district court’s statement in the oral opinion, apparently viewing it as a misstatement corrected by a later written conclusion that Salinas-Garza was guilty of violating 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). Even if the majority is correct in this respect, I must still dissent because of failure of the government to satisfy its burden of proof.
Based on the language of the statute, we have previously held that the government must prove “the defendant’s knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime.” United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir.1978). Here the district court found that the notice given was not effective “[bjecause none of us look at those [signs posted at the border].” In the written opinion, the court did find that “signs at the bridge area reminded travelers that they must declare any monetary instruments of more than $10,000.” I do not see this statement as in any manner negating, or even contradicting his prior finding that the signs are not read by travelers and therefore do not provide effective notice of the reporting requirement. In any event, it is clear that the district court’s only statement as to whether the signs supplied actual knowledge with respect to this defendant was its finding that they did not. Hence a key element of the offense is clearly missing from the district court’s opinion of guilt.
*840Furthermore, the district court did not satisfy this element when it went on to state in its oral opinion that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirement from the fact that the defendant failed to declare his excess money after he was taken into detention. The border officers only asked Salinas-Garza whether he was transporting money in excess of $10,000. In each instance he replied in the negative. We have previously held that a question on a customs declaration form regarding whether the traveler is carrying a certain amount of money is insufficient notice of the reporting requirement. United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.1978). “The effect, if any, of this question is merely to cause the traveler to think that it is illegal to carry a large amount of money into the country. The question in no way tells the traveler it is perfectly legal to enter or leave the country with more than $5,000.00 but that a form reporting this fact must be completed.” Id. Salinas-Garza was not told by the border officers that transporting the money was legal but must be reported. Just as the written question was determined to be ineffective in Schnaiderman, so must the oral questions here. Therefore neither the questions nor the defendant’s answer are dispositive of the question of Salinas-Garza’s knowledge of the reporting requirement.
Furthermore, I dissent because I think that it is inappropriate for this appellate panel to substitute itself as fact-finder. The majority, apparently acknowledging that the district court never made a finding that the defendant had actual knowledge, sets out all of the testimony regarding the location and content of the warning signs in footnote 2 and concludes, as a fact, that the defendant had actual knowledge of the reporting requirements, a fact that the district court in its express words did not find. All of this testimony concerning the location and content of the warning signs was before the district court who rejected it as a basis for knowledge. The majority fails to inform us whence it derives its authority to act as the district court in adjudging the defendant guilty of a crime by supplying a factual element rejected by the actual trial court.
In conclusion, I take pains to make it clear that I am not saying that the signs posted at the border are not adequate and competent evidence upon which the trier of fact can conclude that a defendant had actual knowledge of the reporting requirements. I am simply saying that the burden is on the government to prove to the trier of fact that the defendant had actual knowledge. If the trier of fact concludes that the signs did not provide a given defendant actual knowledge of the reporting requirements, we are not free to supplant the trial court as finder of fact. Stated differently, the government can post all the signs that the Government Printing Office can roll off its presses, but if a defendant, charged with failing to report, can convince the trier of fact that notwithstanding the signs he never gained actual knowledge of the reporting requirement, he is entitled to an acquittal and there is nothing that an almighty appellate panel can do about it in a criminal prosecution.
I respectfully dissent.