Court Opinion

ID: 9580410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:41.880658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:15.708857
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority finds that the trial court inadequately advised the defendant John B. Chavez (Chavez) of his right to testify at trial pursuant to People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984). I disagree. I find that, in light of the purpose underlying Curtis, and of the cases construing our holding in Curtis, the advisement given by the trial court satisfied Curtis. I dissent.
I.
We have repeatedly stated that Curtis “requires that the trial judge ensure the defendant’s waiver of his right to testify is intelligently and competently made.” Roelker v. People, 804 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Colo.1991); see Tyler v. People, 847 P.2d 140, 142 (Colo.1993); Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514. We have additionally stated that,
[i]n order to ensure that the right to testify is voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally waived, Curtis requires that the trial judge give the defendant an “advisement” outside the presence of the jury:
“[T]hat he has a right to testify, that if he wants to testify then no one can prevent him from doing so, that if he testifies the prosecution will be allowed to cross-examine him, that if he had been convicted of a felony the prosecutor will be entitled to ask him about it and thereby disclose it to the jury, and that if the felony conviction is disclosed to the jury then the jury can be instructed to consider it only as it bears upon his credibility.”
Tyler, 847 P.2d at 142 (quoting Curtis, 681 P.2d at 515); see Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338. “‘[T]he actual holding of Curtis limits the trial judge’s responsibility to advising the defendant of his right to testify and the consequences of doing so.’” Tyler, 847 P.2d at 142-43 (quoting Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338); see Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338. “The purposes of advisement by the court on the record are to ensure that waiver of a fundamental constitutional right is intelligent and knowing, to preclude postconviction disputes between defendant and counsel over the issue, and to facilitate appellate review.” Curtis, 681 P.2d at 515 (rely*1154ing on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)).
“Curtis did not decide what the minimum requirements are to establish a waiver of a defendant’s right to testify in his own defense.” Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1339; see Tyler, 847 P.2d at 143. Since Curtis, our decisions regarding advisements on the right to testify have similarly declined to mandate that a particular litany must be given to every defendant. See Tyler, 847 P.2d 140; Roelker, 804 P.2d 1336. Such a requirement would frustrate the purposes of preventing postconviction disputes and facilitating appellate review. See Curtis, 681 P.2d at 515. Thus, Colorado courts have found satisfactory advisements when: (1) “the record contains no explicit reference that the defendant waived his right to testify,” Tyler, 847 P.2d at 143; (2) “[t]here is no indication that [the defendant] did not fully understand his right to testify, or that his decision not to testify was involuntary or was usurped by his lawyer,” Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1339; and (3) “the trial court’s advisement was defective because it did not warn [the defendant] of the disadvantages of testifying,” People v. Barros, 835 P.2d 587, 590 (Colo.App.), cert. denied (1992); see People v. McMullen, 738 P.2d 23, 24 (Colo.App.1987).
II.
The majority sets forth the advisement given by the trial judge to Chavez on August 8, 1989, during the trial for the attempted second-degree burglary charge. Maj. op. at 2-3. On August 9,1989, during the trial on the charge of being a habitual criminal, the trial judge additionally advised Chavez:
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Chavez, I have to give you another Curtis advisement. So I’ll tell you again the same thing I told you yesterday. Under the Constitutions, you have the right to testify or not to testify as you choose. And if you do testify, the district attorney can cross-examine you.
THE DEFENDANT: No, I don’t want to testify.
THE COURT: Okay. And you still understand what I told you yesterday?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Hon- or.
THE COURT: And your decision is not to testify?
THE DEFENDANT: (Nodded head.)
THE COURT: Okay, sir.
Counsel for Chavez did not object to the content of the advisement when given on August 8 and 9. Chavez was convicted of attempted second-degree burglary and as a habitual criminal. Chavez appealed his convictions, contending that the failure to give an advisement in perfect compliance with Curtis in the context of a habitual criminal proceeding requires reversal. Chavez did not argue then, and does not presently contend, that he did not know that the decision not to testify was only his to make, and that he did not know that he could elect to testify contrary to the advice of counsel. Chavez now contends that the advisement was misleading in part because it did not incorporate the word “personally.” Chavez also contends that the advisement was misleading because it did not inform him that, if he wished to testify, then his attorney could not prevent him from so doing, in spite of the fact that Chavez expressly informed the court that he did not wish to testify.
These arguments merely assert that the reversal of Chavez’ criminal convictions is warranted on the ground that the trial judge failed to deliver a technically perfect advisement, and not on the ground that Chavez would have made a different decision regarding the right to testify had the advisement been more complete. If this court is of the opinion that Curtis advise-ments should be delivered without technical error, then this court should set forth a precise statement that trial judges must give. Technical arguments alone, however, presented for the first time on appeal unaccompanied by contentions that the outcome would have been different, or that the defendant did not in fact know that the decision was personal, or that the defendant’s lawyer usurped his decision, should not amount to reversible error.
*1155Based on a review of the record, I find that the advisement given in this case, where the trial judge informed Chavez on the record that he had the right to testify as he chose, that the district attorney would be able to cross-examine him regarding his four prior felony convictions, and where Chavez expressly stated that he understood and did not wish to testify, to be no less satisfactory than the advisements given in Tyler, Roelker, Barros, and McMullen. See Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338 (quoting Curtis, 681 P.2d at 515) (“‘[T]he best means of demonstrating the defendant’s state of mind are his own declarations on the record.’ ”) I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA and Justice ERICKSON join in this dissent.