Court Opinion

ID: 9964463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 00:00:42.728583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:30.559514
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40474           Document: 46-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/29/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                     FILED
                                                                               April 29, 2024
                                   No. 23-40474                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                     Clerk

J.V., by next friends Jose Vega and Margarita Vega,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Brownsville Independent School District,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:21-CV-115
                  ______________________________

Before Jones, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Plaintiffs Jose and Margarita Vega, on behalf of their son J.V., filed a
series of claims with the Texas Education Agency and in federal court against
Brownsville Independent School District. In the last-filed federal case, the
district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Less than a year
later, the Supreme Court abrogated relevant caselaw, and Plaintiffs moved
the district court to “amend or correct [the] judgment” pursuant to Federal

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-40474          Document: 46-1          Page: 2      Date Filed: 04/29/2024

                                      No. 23-40474

Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6). The question now before us
is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’
motion under either rule. We affirm.
                                            I.
        J.V. is an individual who suffers from disabilities including cerebral
palsy, orthopedic and speech impairments, and a low IQ. 1 He has limited
motor skills and requires extensive help in daily functions, including using
the bathroom.        In March 2016, J.V. was allegedly injured by Enrique
Rodriguez, a Brownsville Independent School District (BISD) employee,
while Rodriguez helped J.V. use the bathroom on a school trip.
        In August 2017, J.V.’s parents filed claims on J.V.’s behalf against
BISD with the Texas Education Agency (TEA), asserting violations of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et
seq., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. 2 The
TEA dismissed without prejudice all non-IDEA claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and the parties later filed a stipulation dismissing the
IDEA claim because “Plaintiffs . . . agreed that BISD provided J.V. with a
free appropriate public education pursuant to IDEA.”
        In January 2018, Plaintiffs filed their first lawsuit, alleging similar
claims as in their TEA action, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.           The court concluded that the stipulation
dismissing Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims in the TEA action did not equate to an

        _____________________
        1
         At the time of the March 2016 incident, J.V. was a minor, but he is now over
eighteen years old.
        2
          Plaintiffs also asserted constitutional claims and a Title IX claim, which are not
relevant in this appeal because they were not alleged in the current action.

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                                  No. 23-40474

adjudication on the merits and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction because Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their state administrative
remedies. J.V. ex rel. Vega v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:18-cv-8, 2020
WL 3415747, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2020) (citing Fry v. Napoleon
Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 171–73 (2017)). The court reasoned:
       A plaintiff cannot circumvent the IDEA’s administrative
       exhaustion requirement by repacking [claims] as claims under
       some other statute when those same claims could have been
       brought under the IDEA. A plaintiff alleging claims under
       § 504 or the ADA must first exhaust his or her administrative
       remedies for claims under the IDEA when the relief being
       sought is also available under the IDEA’s remedial scheme.

Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted). The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims
“without prejudice to allow Plaintiffs to exhaust their state administrative
remedies.” Id. at *10.
       In December 2018, while their first federal action was pending,
Plaintiffs filed a second TEA action against BISD, asserting an IDEA claim
based on events after the March 2016 incident. The TEA denied the claim
on the merits. Plaintiffs challenged the dismissal via a second federal action,
but the parties filed a stipulation dismissing that claim.
       Plaintiffs filed a third TEA action against BISD in February 2021,
alleging violations of the ADA, § 504 of the RA, and IDEA based on events
stemming from the March 2016 incident. But the parties again stipulated to
the dismissal of the case, and this time the TEA dismissed all claims with
prejudice.
       Plaintiffs filed the current federal suit in August 2021 following
dismissal of their third TEA action. They asserted claims against BISD
under the ADA, § 504 of the RA, and the Texas Human Resources Code

                                        3
 Case: 23-40474         Document: 46-1         Page: 4      Date Filed: 04/29/2024

                                     No. 23-40474

(THRC), but not IDEA. 3 Relevant here, Plaintiffs sought compensatory
damages under the ADA and RA.
        BISD moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, which the court granted. The court, relying on McMillen v. New
Caney Independent School District, 939 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2019), held that
“Plaintiffs’ ADA and § 504 claims require exhaustion with the TEA because
they seek redress for denial of a [free appropriate public education] and thus
invoke the IDEA’s prelawsuit administrative process.” The court dismissed
these claims with prejudice because “Plaintiffs had more than sufficient
opportunities to adequately plead this [c]ourt’s subject matter jurisdiction.” 4
Plaintiffs did not appeal.
        Less than a year after the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims in
this third federal action, the Supreme Court abrogated McMillen and other
relevant caselaw, holding that the “administrative exhaustion requirement
applies only to suits that seek relief . . . also available under IDEA.” Perez v.
Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142, 146–47 (2023) (emphasis added) (internal
quotations omitted). The Court explained that “where a plaintiff brings a
suit under another federal law for compensatory damages,” IDEA does not
create an exhaustion bar because IDEA “does not provide” compensatory
damages as a form of relief. Id. at 147–48.
        Following Perez, Plaintiffs moved the district court to “amend or
correct [the] judgment” in this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(1), because the court made a “mistake of law,” and

        _____________________
        3
         Plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint in November 2021, but this request
was “rejected.”
        4
           The court also dismissed the THRC claim, declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.

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                                   No. 23-40474

60(b)(6), “to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” Plaintiffs premised
their motion on Perez’s holding that a plaintiff need not meet IDEA’s
exhaustion requirements for claims for compensatory damages under other
federal statutes—here the ADA and § 504 of the RA—and various equitable
factors they contend support relief. The district court denied the motion.
The court concluded that a change in the law after judgment does not equate
to a “mistake of law” entitling Plaintiffs to relief under Rule 60(b)(1), and
that Plaintiffs could not seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) when their argument
fell under Rule 60(b)(1).
       Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their Rule 60(b) motion. They argue
that they are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because the district court
made several mistakes of law and that Perez, coupled with equitable factors,
supports their motion. As to Rule 60(b)(6), Plaintiffs again highlight the
change in law under Perez and offer different equitable reasons that they
believe justify relief.
                                       II.
       “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a party to seek relief
from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set
of circumstances.” Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Applicable here, the rule provides:
       (b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or
       Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve
       a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order,
       or proceeding for the following reasons:
       (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
       ...
       (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

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                                        No. 23-40474

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (emphasis in original).                     “We review Rule 60(b)
decisions for abuse of discretion.” Roberts v. Wal-Mart La., L.L.C., 54 F.4th
852, 854 (5th Cir. 2022).
        We begin with Plaintiffs’ three proffered grounds for relief under Rule
60(b)(1). Each fails.
        First, Plaintiffs contend the district court could not properly dismiss
their claims with prejudice based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Second, they contend the district court erred in relying on McMillen at the
time of judgment because their case was readily distinguishable. However,
Plaintiffs forfeited both arguments by “failing to raise [them] in the first
instance in the district court” within their motion. Rollins v. Home Depot,
USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892,
899 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that one of petitioner’s arguments was “not
properly before [the court] because [petitioner] did not raise it in his Rule
60(b) motion”). 5
        Plaintiffs’ last argument as to Rule 60(b)(1), which is properly before
us, is that the change in law embodied by Perez, coupled with equitable factors
articulated in Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan.
1981), entitles them to relief. See Blue Br. 31–34. In Seven Elves, our court
outlined eight factors that inform our consideration of Rule 60(b) motions:
        (1) That final judgments should not lightly be disturbed;
        (2) that the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute
        for appeal; (3) that the rule should be liberally construed in
        _____________________
        5
          Regardless of forfeiture, the issue of whether the district court erred in dismissing
the case with prejudice “should have been raised on appeal,” and “Rule 60(b)(1) cannot
be considered an appropriate avenue of relief.” United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, More
or Less, 695 F.2d 922, 925–26 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Benson v. St. Joseph Reg’l Health Ctr.,
575 F.3d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that Rule 60(b)(1) motions do not substitute for
timely appeals).

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                                         No. 23-40474

        order to achieve substantial justice; (4) whether the motion was
        made within a reasonable time; (5) whether . . . the interest in
        deciding cases on the merits outweighs, in the particular case,
        the interest in the finality of judgments, and there is merit in
        the movant’s claim or defense; (6) whether if the judgment was
        rendered after a trial . . . the movant had a fair opportunity to
        present his claim or defense; (7) whether there are intervening
        equities that would make it inequitable to grant relief; and
        (8) any other factors relevant to the justice of the judgment
        under attack.
635 F.2d at 402 (citing United States v. Gould, 301 F.2d 353, 355–56 (5th Cir.
1962)). Plaintiffs contend that they merit relief under Rule 60(b)(1) after
Perez because they timely filed their motion 6 and because their case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, rather than on the merits.
        Plaintiffs do not show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s
denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(1). To begin, they fail to offer another
circumstance in which the Seven Elves factors plus a change in caselaw
constituted a “mistake” entitling a party to relief under the rule. While we
grant that a few factors weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor—they moved timely, and
the court’s dismissal was not on the merits—more factors militate against
them: Final judgments should not be disturbed. And Plaintiffs effectively
attempt to bootstrap Rule 60(b)(1) as a substitute for an appeal of the district
court’s dismissal of their claims with prejudice for failure to meet IDEA’s
exhaustion requirements. Yet Plaintiffs could have appealed that decision,
just as the Perez plaintiffs did. Also, they were repeatedly admonished to
exhaust state remedies, but never did so. Among other grounds for declining

        _____________________
        6
          Rule 60(b) requires a plaintiff to file “at most, one year after the entry of the order
under review” under subsection (1) and “within a reasonable time” under subsection (6).
Kemp, 596 U.S. at 531–32 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (c)(1)). BISD does not dispute
that Plaintiffs timely filed their motion.

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                                       No. 23-40474

to do so, these “intervening equities . . . would make it inequitable to grant
relief” under Rule 60(b)(1). Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 402.
        Turning to their Rule 60(b)(6) arguments, Plaintiffs first contend that
the district court erred in holding that they could not premise their motion
on Rule 60(b)(6)’s catch-all provision in addition to traveling under Rule
60(b)(1)’s “mistake” ambit. But “[t]he categories of relief under Rule 60
are mutually exclusive from one another, meaning that an action cannot be
brought through the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6) if it could have been
brought through one of the Rule’s first five subsections.” D.R.T.G. Builders,
L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 26 F.4th 306, 313 (5th
Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Pertinent here, “Rule
60(b)(1) covers all mistakes of law made by a judge.” Kemp, 596 U.S. at 534.
While the Supreme Court expressly has “not decide[d] whether a judicial
decision rendered erroneous by subsequent legal or factual changes also
qualifies as a ‘mistake’ under Rule 60(b)(1),” id. at 535 n.2, and nor have we,
we may pretermit whether Plaintiffs’ motion properly “could have been
brought” under Rule 60(b)(1) because Plaintiffs’ arguments fail under either
rule, see D.R.T.G. Builders, 26 F.4th at 313. 7
        “[W]hen seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a movant is required to
show extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening of a final
judgment.” Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535
(2005)). Standing alone, “a change in decisional law after entry of judgment
        _____________________
        7
          Though the district court did not evaluate Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6) argument
because it held that Plaintiffs could only proceed under Rule 60(b)(1), we may nonetheless
review Plaintiffs’ preserved arguments and “may affirm a judgment upon any basis
supported by the record.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Price
v. Admin. Receiver for the Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 670 F. App’x 259, 261 (5th Cir. 2016)
(pretermitting a Rule 60(b) timeliness question and affirming on alternative grounds).

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                                      No. 23-40474

does not constitute exceptional circumstances and is not alone grounds for
relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 375–76 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d
157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990); citing Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743,
749 (5th Cir. 1995)). True enough, this court has suggested that a “change
in decisional law combine[d] with other factors [can] tip the delicate balance
between the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of the
court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Priester v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 927 F.3d 912, 913 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Gould, 301 F.2d at 355–56. 8 “It is not
apparent, however, that we have ever found such a situation.” Priester, 927
F.3d at 913. And on reviewing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, “it is not enough that
the granting of relief might have been permissible, or even warranted—denial
must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”
Diaz, 731 F.3d at 374 (citation and punctuation omitted).
        Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6) argument echoes their contention under Rule
60(b)(1), namely that Perez and its progeny, coupled with equitable
considerations slightly distinct from those they offer under Rule 60(b)(1),
create an extraordinary circumstance entitling them to relief. They point to
J.V.’s “multiple disabilities,” their case’s dismissal on procedural grounds
rather than on the merits, and “no other possible remedy at law.” But as
with Rule 60(b)(1), Plaintiffs fail to cite, and we do not find, any circumstance

        _____________________
        8
          The interplay between the Seven Elves factors and Rule 60(b)(6)’s “extraordinary
circumstances” test may be attenuated. See Diaz, 731 F.3d at 376 n.1 (noting that “Seven
Elves reflects factors most applicable to relief sought under Rule 60(b)(1)–(5),” while Rule
60(b)(6) “require[s] truly ‘extraordinary circumstances’” lest the rule “supersede the
companion provisions”). We need not delve further into this topic though, because
Plaintiffs’ arguments neither succeed under Seven Elves nor rise to “extraordinary
circumstances.”

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                                        No. 23-40474

in which this court has found an abuse of discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6)
relief based on a district court’s failure to consider equitable factors alongside
a change in decisional law. 9 See Priester, 927 F.3d at 913. We decline to break
such ground in today’s case. At base, Plaintiffs fail to show that the district
court’s denial of their Rule 60(b)(6) motion was “so unwarranted as to
constitute an abuse of discretion.” Diaz, 731 F.3d at 374.
                                            III.
        Plaintiffs fail to show that the district court made a cognizable
“mistake” of law under Rule 60(b)(1) at the time of its judgment dismissing
their claims, and the Seven Elves factors do not change the calculus. Plaintiffs
fare no better under Rule 60(b)(6). “[A] change in decisional law after entry
of judgment does not constitute exceptional circumstances . . . under Rule
60(b)(6),” Diaz, 731 F.3d at 375, and even adding their proffered equitable
factors, Plaintiffs fail to show that the district court abused its discretion in
denying their motion.
                                                                           AFFIRMED.

        _____________________
        9
         Plaintiffs cite Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970),
to support their position. But the Bankers Mortgage panel affirmed the denial of the
taxpayer’s Rule 60(b) motion, holding that the taxpayer could not “relitigate [the]
question” at issue. 423 F.2d at 81.
         Plaintiffs also offer Chavez v. Brownsville Independent School District, No. 22-40085,
2023 WL 3918987 (5th Cir. June 9, 2023), and Heston v. Austin Independent School District,
71 F.4th 355 (5th Cir. 2023), for support. But neither case involved Rule 60(b) motions;
rather, this court vacated and remanded in those cases in order for the district court to
consider appellants’ claims afresh in the light of Perez. See Chavez, 2023 WL 3918987, at
*2; Heston, 71 F.4th at 357. Those circumstances greatly differ from this case, where
Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s underlying dismissal.

                                              10