Court Opinion

ID: 9738319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:49:47.311859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.372726
License: Public Domain

Brodkey, J.,
dissenting.
I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial. The record reveals that at the close of all the evidence, a conference was had between the court and counsel for the parties at which the following occurred: “MR. SCHREMPP: Comes now the plaintiff and at the close *698of all of the evidence moves the Court for an Order allowing plaintiff to amend his Petition to allege that the defendant under the present state of the evidence — that there is evidence of the fact that the defendant was operating her vehicle on the wrong side of the street, and further requests the Court that on the allowance of such an amendment that the same be included as a specification of negligence in Instruction No. 2.
“THE COURT: There is no evidence in the record that the defendant was operating her car on the wrong side of the street, under Nebraska law operating on the wrong side of the road or street. The evidence is that the defendant attempted to make a left turn at an intersection. Overruled and denied. Your request is denied and your motion is overruled.”
In this, I believe the court erred, as a review of the record reveals that there was testimony and evidence received during the trial from which the jury might well have concluded that the defendant, in fact, was driving on the wrong side of the street. This evidence exists apart from the evidence pointed out by counsel for the plaintiff relative to his claim that the defendant allegedly cut the corner in making a left-hand turn before reaching the east line of 40th Street as extended in a northerly direction through the intersection. I direct attention to the testimony of Ida Johnson, who was called as a witness for the defendant. She testified that on August 7, 1972, she was driving her car east on Center Street near the intersection of 40th and Center Streets at the time of the accident. She had stopped for a red light at 42nd and Center Streets, and when the light turned green she proceeded east in the right-hand lane. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff’s motorcycle passed her on the left and swerved in front of her and then swerved out in the middle between the cars on both sides. She lost sight of the motorcycle when it was approximately 1/2 block ahead of her and the next time *699she observed it it was going up in the air above the trees. She then proceeded through the intersection of 40th and Center Streets. She testified at that time the Volkswagen was stopped and to her left. She also testified that after she passed through the intersection, the driver of the Volkswagen moved it to the south curb, as shown in exhibit 2, which shows the Volkswagen with its front wheels against the south curb of Center Street. She went back to the scene of the accident and saw plaintiff lying in the street, and his motorcycle by a tree. The front of the Volkswagen was “mashed in.” We add parenthetically at this point that exhibits 9, 10, and 29, colored photographs showing the damage to the Volkswagen, strongly indicate that the collision between the motorcycle and the Volkswagen was a head-on collision, as the hood of the Volkswagen appears to have been pushed directly back toward the windshield of the automobile.
Witness Johnson was examined in great detail and at some length, both in direct examination and in cross-examination, as to the location of the Volkswagen when she observed it, and it is necessary and helpful to set out verbatim certain portions of her testimony. In direct examination by defendant’s attorney, as it appears in the record, the following questions were asked and answers given: “Q. What lane were you in when you passed in front of the blue Volkswage (sic)? A. Well, I was to the right of her. Q. What lane were you in? A. I was in the south lane. Q. And what lane was she in at that time? A. In the left lane. Q. Was she moving or stopped? A. No, she was stopped.” Later, on cross-examination by counsel for the plaintiff, the following appears: “BY MR. SCHREMPP: Q. Mrs. Johnson, you say that when you went past going east there was enough room in the curb lane for you to get by south of the Volkswagen, is that right? A. Yes. Q. The Volkswagen then was in the lane — A. To the left of me. Q. To the left of you? A. Yes. Q. In other words that *700would be the lane between the center line — well, it would be the first lane south of the center line, wouldn’t it? You were in the curb lane? A. Yes. Q. And the Volkswagen was in the lane immediately north of you? A. It was north of me. I had enough room to get past. Q. So there was one whole clear lane but the other lane was occupied by the Volkswagen, was it not? A. Yes. Q. At the time you drove past it after the accident in what direction was the Volkswagen facing in this lane? A. Well, it looked to me like it was just practically straight west. Q. Would you come here and put this up for us then, if you would, ma’am? Well, maybe I can help. If you place the car facing straight west in approximately that position, would that be about correct? A. I expect. It looked to me like it was just about straight. Q. In other words it was facing due west, wasn’t it? A. Yes. Q. This was after the whole collision was over? A. Yes.”
On further cross-examination of the witness, Ida Johnson, she gave these answers to questions propounded to her: “Q. All right, I will ask you this: You say that after you saw the motorcycle go up toward the trees that you drove east? A. Right. Q. On Center Street? A. Right. Q. And that you drove east on the curb lane, which would be the lane closest to the- south - right? A. Yes. Q. And in the next lane over; in other words, the lane next to you you saw the Volkswagen for the first time? A. Yes. Q. And it was in the lane right next to your lane, was it not? A. Yes. Q. And it was facing you say due west? A. Right. Q. No problem then about that where it was. A. I was going east and she was going west. Q. And you are sure of that? A. Sure, I am sure. I know which direction I was going. Q. Well then that would be correct as to where you saw the car, would it not? A. I was in the south lane and she was in the north lane. Q. All of course south of the center line? A. Yes.” She also testified that following the impact she saw the defendant drive her Volkswagen *701to the south curb and thought to herself “You shouldn’t have moved that.”
In addition, debris, which the police accident investigator testified was similar to that on the undercarriage of vehicles, was found in the left or northern east bound lane. ’■=
From the testimony quoted above and the evidence noted, it is clear there was indeed evidence in the record from which the jury could find that af the time of the accident the defendant was driving on the wrong side of the street. Had the jurors been iñstructed that driving on the wrong side of the street could be considered by them as evidence of negligence, and had they chosen to believe witness Johnson’s testimony, they might well have found, at least circumstantially, that at or immediately before the moment of impact the defendant was driving her Volkswagen in a westerly direction on the north half of the east bound lane of Center Street, all south of the centerline of Center Street.
The law applicable to this situation is that when a motion has been made to amend a pleading to. include a material allegation upon which some evidence has been received, such amendment should be allowed. Of course, whether or not the evidence is sufficient to support a favorable finding thereon remains a question of fact. Curren v. Certain Parcel of Land, 149 Neb. 477, 31 N. W. 2d 405 (1948); Seeman v. Pagels, 184 Neb. 757, 172 N. W. 2d 100 (1969); § 25-852, R. R. S. 1943. A litigant is entitled to have the jury instructed as to his theory of the case as shown by the pleadings and evidence, and a failure to do so is prejudicial. Maska v. Stoll, 163 Neb. 857, 81 N. W. 2d 571 (1957); Coyle v. Stopak, 165 Neb. 594, 86 N. W. 2d 758 (1957); Stillwell v. Schmoker, 175 Neb. 595, 122 N. W. 2d 538 (1963).
Since both the negligence of the defendant, and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff were issues in this case, it is possible that had the jury been instructed on the issue of whether the defendant, Mrs. Andersen, *702was driving on the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident, there being evidence in the record to sustain that contention on the part of the plaintiff, its conclusions and verdict may have been different, either as to defendant’s negligence, or as to the degree of contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
There being evidence in the record on the issue, the plaintiff was entitled to have his theory of defendant’s liability submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and I conclude that the failure of the court to do so was, in this case, prejudicial.
Finally, I am of the opinion that plaintiff’s objection to the testimony of witness Madsen as to the speed limit at the scene of the accident should have been sustained. While it is undoubtedly true that a witness may testify as to the posted speed limit at a given location if an appropriate foundation is laid, the record in this case is absolutely silent as to whether the witness had even seen a speed limit sign and his testimony as to his opinion of the applicable speed limit at that place was, to say the least, indefinite. During the course of the trial, the court, over objection of plaintiff’s counsel, permitted the attorney for defendant to read the following city ordinance to the jury: “It shall be unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle on, over or upon any street or streets in the City of Omaha at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the traffic, surface, width and condition of the road and the hazard at intersections, nor at a rate of speed such as to endanger life or limb of any person, nor in any case at a greater rate of speed than twenty-five miles per hour, except on street or streets where a greater rate of speed is permitted, as designated by signs installed along such street or streets.” It is the general rule that municipal ordinances must ordinarily be pleaded and proved. Perrine v. Hokser, 158 Neb. 190, 62 N. W. 2d 677 (1954). The District Court may not, in original actions, take judicial notice of mu*703nicipal ordinances. Section 14-138, R. R. S. 1943, provides that city ordinances “may be proved by a certificate of the clerk under the seal of the city, and when printed or published in a book or pamphlet form, and purporting to be published or printed by authority of the city counsel, shall be read and received in all courts and places without further proof.” There is no showing in the record that counsel for the defendant read the ordinance in question to the jury out of such a book or pamphlet. Before permitting the counsel to read the ordinance in question to the jury, the judge commented that he would possibly give the ordinance to the jury as part of the instructions. In instruction No. 14, the court told the jury: “If you find from the evidence that any of the parties violated any of the laws of the State of Nebraska or City of Omaha Ordinances which are set out in these Instructions, the violation thereof is not in and of itself negligence as a matter of law; but the violation thereof is evidence of negligence which you should consider with all the other evidence in the case to determine whether or not the parties or either of them were guilty of negligence.” (Emphasis supplied.) However, the court did not instruct the jury as to the Omaha ordinance relative to speed, nor did he inform it of what the specific speed limit was at the location in question. This may have well resulted in confusing the jury, to the prejudice of the plaintiff. I feel that the plaintiff should be afforded a new trial, and an opportunity to present his theory of the case to the jury under proper instructions.