Court Opinion

ID: 9771202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:36:40.199883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:54.161836
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring. Justice Dudley’s concurring opinion suggests the trial court committed patent error when it allowed courtroom video taping conditioned upon the taping not being disruptive. I respectfully disagree with Justice Dudley’s opinion because I believe the Judicial Canon provides some discretion with the trial judge who must decide such issues. In pertinent part, Canon 3(A)(7)(a) provides that a judge may authorize photography in the courtroom provided neither the participants will be distracted nor the dignity of the proceeding will be impaired. Provision (b) of that section states that a party’s or attorney’s timely objection shall preclude photography. This court has previously considered cameras in trial proceedings. In Jim Halsey Co. v. Bonar, 284 Ark. 461, 683 S.W.2d 898 (1985), Jim Halsey Co. objected to the use of cameras, but the trial court allowed them so long as they did not become distracting. On appeal, this court held the trial court erred by disregarding Canon 3(A)(7), and although the majority court in Bonar announced its notice that further violation of this Canon would not be tolerated and “may well” result in automatic reversal, it affirmed the trial court’s decision because prejudice was absent. In Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982), this court stated willful disobedience of Canon (A)(7) would, no doubt, be dealt with in an appropriate manner which could go so far as to cause a retrial. Nonetheless, the Ford court upheld the trial court’s ruling to permit cameras because no prejudice was shown. In sum, this court has never automatically reversed a case on appeal because a trial court allowed cameras over counsel’s objection. This court has not modified Canon 3 since the Ford and Bonar decisions to put the bench and bar on notice that the mere violation of the Canon would result in automatic reversal. Here, while Smith’s counsel objected to video taping, he showed no prejudice resulting from the taping, presumably because none occurred. Smith neither argued below nor in this appeal that the trial court abused its discretion or that automatic reversal should occur from the trial court’s ruling on the taping issue. To date, this court has expressed that a retrial could occur if a trial judge willfully violated Canon 3(A)(7) and automatic reversal may well happen if a violation of the Canon is shown and no prejudice was involved. Obviously, this court has struggled during the past eight years or more over how cameras and video taping and media coverage should be handled and enforced at trial proceedings, but, as yet, the court has been unwilling to address this exact issue in its rules or canons. Other sanctions are available to the court to insure enforcement of Canon 3 rather than declaring error and requiring automatic reversal and retrial of a case which otherwise was tried without flaw, prejudice or impairment to a fair trial. If this court should decide to enforce Canon 3 by declaring error and reversing, I feel the court should notify the bench and bar by saying so in our canons and rules. Perhaps, with modern-day technology as it is, this court’s study and consideration of this subject might lead it to clarify its rules to permit non-intrusive or non-disruptive videotaping in many, if not most, cases. In any event, trial courts should have discretion in making these decisions.