Court Opinion

ID: 9474940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:12:59.008018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:25.054031
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s view that the “cause and prejudice” requirement must determine whether an inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused. But I cannot agree that Sanchez failed to demonstrate “prejudice.” In my view, the requirement that there be some indicia in the record of the reliability or credibility of confidential informants is implicit in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).1 I would therefore remand this case to take evidence on the question of whether the petitioner had “cause” for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies.2
My fundamental difficulty with the majority’s approach is its ruling that Wolff requires nothing more than the procedures specifically enumerated therein. This ruling means that if prison officials observe, pro forma, Wolffs express procedures, prison inmates have no cause to complain. This cannot be correct. In granting specific procedures and discussing in detail the objectives to be promoted thereby, the Court in Wolff clearly did not intend to grant inmates a hollow shell of procedural protections, devoid of any meaningful content. See Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386, 1390 (11th Cir.1982); Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 495 (3th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Rather, it intended to compel not only those expressly enumerated procedures, but any other due process requirements necessary to give meaning to those procedures.
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court support this conclusion: Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); and Ponte v. Real, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 85 L.Ed.2d 553 (1985). In each case, the Court considered whether a particular safeguard was required under Wolffs assurances of “the minimum requirements of procedural due process.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558, 94 S.Ct. at 2976. In Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional Institution, the Court considered whether due process was denied if the prison disciplinary decision was not supported by any evidence in the record. In Ponte, the Court considered whether due process required prison disciplinary officials to state their reasons for refusing to hear one of the inmate’s proposed witnesses. In both cases, the Court acknowledged that nowhere in Wolff did it consider either of the safeguards at issue. Nonetheless, the Court held that each of them was compelled by due process, and it suggested that each of them was, in fact, implicit in one of Wolffs expressly articulated procedures. Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional Institution, — *705U.S. 105 S.Ct. at 2762; Ponte, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. at 2196. As the Court in Ponte explained:
To hold [in Wolff ] that the Due Process Clause confers a circumscribed right on the inmate to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing, and then conclude that no explanation need ever be vouched for the denial of that right ... would change an admittedly circumscribed right into a privilege conferred in the unreviewable discretion board. We think our holding in Wolff... meant something more than that.
Id. at-, 105 S.Ct. at 2197.
In effect, the Court in Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional Institution and Ponte held that in Wolff it had implicitly recognized rights in addition to those that were specifically enumerated therein— those rights that are necessary to fulfill those purposes, although the Court had not gone further and prescribed the specific procedures that must be observed to fulfill those requirements.
Significantly, the Court in each of these cases applied its holding to the facts of the case before it, whereas in Wolff it refused to do so on the ground of non-retroactivity. To be sure, the issue of retroactivity was not directly raised in either of those cases. Nevertheless, as the majority in this case recognizes, Wolff clearly signalled that retroactivity was an important consideration in any case in which new procedural rules are promulgated. It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that had the Court conceived of its holdings in Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional Institution and Ponte to be something more than articulations of principles already inherent in Wolff it would have considered the question of retroactivity.
The right claimed in this case is inherent in Wolff for two reasons. First, this court has previously concluded that Wolff’s requirement of a written statement of evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision presumes the inherent right not to be found guilty except by an “appropriate quantum of evidence.” Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55, 60 (7th Cir.1975), vacated on other grounds, 425 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1721, 48 L.Ed.2d 191 reinstated as modified on other grounds, 547 F.2d 372 (7th Cir.1976). The Supreme Court has recently approved of this conclusion, holding in Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional Institution, — U.S. at-, 105 S.Ct. at 2774, that fundamental due process requires that the prison disciplinary decision be justified by “some evidence” in the record. In reaching this result, the Court expressly referred to Wolffs requirement of a written statement of evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision and its purpose of protecting the inmate against arbitrary decisionmaking. Lawyers and judges may disagree on how much evidence is “some evidence,” but it cannot seriously be doubted that uncorroborated hearsay obtained from confidential informants whose good motives are highly questionable, see Kyle, 677 F.2d at 1390; McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir.1982), is tantamount to no evidence whatsoever.
Second, other circuits have recognized that the right claimed by the petitioner in this case is inherent in Wolffs requirement of a written statement of evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision. For example, in Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir.1973), the First Circuit decided that prison inmates were entitled to due process before being transferred for disciplinary reasons from a prison in one state to one in another. It further decided that the pre-transfer process due was the procedures set forth in the consent decree adopted in Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 857, 871-74 (D.R.I.1970), and later adopted as law by the State of Rhode Island. Gomes was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court, Travisono v. Gomes, 418 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 3200, 41 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1974), and remanded for reconsideration in light of Wolff.
On remand the First Circuit specifically addressed the issue of whether any requirements of the Morris rules not expressly identified in Wolff should apply to interstate transfers which are alleged to *706have been punitive in nature. Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537 (1st Cir.1974). One of those requirements was that the prison disciplinary board’s findings be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence as defined by the decree included the requirement that “if any of the facts establishing a Board determination are derived from an unidentified informant,” “the record must contain some underlying factual information from which the Board ... [could] reasonably conclude that the informant was credible or his information was reliable.” Id. at 540.
In affirming this term, upon reconsideration in light of Wolff, the First Circuit noted that, “if the written statement is intended to withstand scrutiny and guard against misunderstanding, it cannot indicate reliance on speculation or on facts not in the record.” It further implied that this requirement was a “necessity in meeting the requirements of Wolff,” and that it did not demand anything more than Wolff Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See Langton v. Berman, 667 F.2d 231, 235 (1st Cir.1981) (“We continue to advise ... [prison officials] to follow Wolffs mandate to devise regulations to assure that the disciplinary board's procedure is adequate to enable it to reasonably conclude that any confidential information upon which it relied was reliable.”); Rinehart v. Brewer, 483 F.Supp. 165, 170 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (written statement must indicate why prison officials believe the confidential information relied upon to be credible); Bartholomew v. Reed, 477 F.Supp. 223, 228 (D.Oregon 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 915 (9th Cir.1982) (same). Cf. Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Boles v. Chavis, 454 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 415, 70 L.Ed.2d 225 (1981) (pro forma statement of evidence relied on and reasons for guilt with no statement regarding credibility determinations does not fulfill Wolffs requirement of written statement of reasons and evidence); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (pro forma written statement does not fulfill purposes behind Wolffs requirement of written statement of evidence relied on, and therefore does not satisfy due process); Finney v. Mabry, 455 F.Supp. 756, 775 (E.D.Ark.1978) (“This Court ... does not view ... Wolff as a direction to the federal courts to consider no constitutional claims involving prison disciplinary procedures except those explicitly addressed in that case.”).
Moreover, this court in McCollum also implicitly recognized that it was not promulgating a “new” rule. We held that where the prison disciplinary action is based solely on information provided by confidential informants and where most traditional procedures cannot be afforded because of valid concerns with institutional safety, other procedures were required to guarantee the accuracy of the prison disciplinary decision. The court simply assumed, correctly in my view, that a decision based solely on untested, possibly vindictive hearsay was a denial of due process under Wolff. It then went on to discuss particular procedures short of confrontation that prison officials might employ to demonstrate that the confidential informants were either credible or reliable. Thus, the court in McCollum did not promulgate a heretofore unheard of due process requirement. In fact, we recognized that that requirement was compelled a fortiori by the holding in Wolff. In conformity with Wolff, however, the court in McCollum left to prison officials the task of devising procedures to implement the requirement.
This reading of McCollum is supported by our subsequent decision, Dawson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1714, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984), in which we held that McCollum “recognized ... that when confidential information is the basis of a prison disciplinary decision, there must be some indication of reliability” (emphasis added), but that it was up to the Supreme Court to mandate which specific procedures were constitutionally necessary to imple*707ment this particular requirement. See also Kyle, 677 F.2d at 1390.
Finally, the right claimed by the petitioner in this case is inherent in Wolff because it is a sine qua non of procedural due process; it is implicitly compelled by any decision that compels due process. The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the essence of due process is the protection against arbitrary deprivations, in particular deprivations resulting from information provided by nameless, biased accusers shielded by anonymity from accountability for lying. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S.Ct. 1400,1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). Other courts have recognized that it is a contradiction in terms to say that although one is entitled to due process he may still be deprived of a protected interest on the basis of uncorroborated, untested hearsay. Such reasoning results in a denial of reasonably accurate decision-making, and hence amounts to a denial of fundamental fairness. See, e.g., Kyle, 677 F.2d at 1390-91.
The facts of this case demonstrate why implicitly requires that there must be indicia of reliability or credibility of the confidential informants. Sanchez was found guilty by the prison board solely on the basis of the confidential information contained in the prison investigator’s report. The confidential information was uncorroborated, and there was no corroborating physical evidence. As the Government concedes, there was absolutely no attempt to ascertain the reliability or credibility of any of the informants, any one of whom could have had a personal vendetta against Sanchez. None of the confidential information was set forth in detail in any public record and hence none of it was available to Sanchez. Sanchez received notice of the charges, and attended the hearing. He denied participating in the stabbing, and he presented three alibi witnesses. The UDC found him guilty of planning the murder and of the murder itself. According to Sanchez, the UDC official who made this finding had a personal score to settle with Sanchez because the Regional Director had earlier reversed a finding by the UDC that Sanchez had assaulted a staff member. On appeal the Regional Director overturned the finding of guilty of murder, noting that there was absolutely no evidence to support it; yet, he sustained the disciplinary sanction in its entirety. Sanchez was ultimately acquitted of all three charges by a jury, presumably because the Government’s sole evidence was the inadmissible uncorroborated hearsay of the confidential informants.
As these facts demonstrate, although nominally accorded some procedural safeguards, Sanchez in fact was denied any kind of meaningful due process. We have no way of knowing whether the prison disciplinary action had any basis in fact or was simply the result of fabricated information provided by a vengeful co-inmate or the aftermath of a vendetta by prison officials who were unhappy with Sanchez’ acquittal on an unrelated assault charge. Sanchez was in fact no better off than he would have been if the prison disciplinary board had simply informed him that he was being deprived of good time credits because of his participation in a murder. Indeed, he may be worse off given today’s holding because any suspicion that he may have harbored that prison disciplinary proceedings are arbitrary and, in fact, a meaningless set of pro forma steps designed to pay lip service to the real holding of Wolff was confirmed.
In sum, the reason why the Supreme Court in Wolff did not expressly articulate a requirement that there be indicia of the reliability or credibility of confidential informants in the record is that it did not have to. The right to be adjudged guilty on the basis of competent (including reliable) evidence is a prerequisite to the right to a statement of evidence relied on and reasons for the decision. Indeed, it is implicit in any guarantee of meaningful due process. By recognizing a prison inmate’s right to due process, the Court in Wolff assumed the fundamental right claimed in this case. McCollum did nothing more than articulate what was already self-evident in Wolff by mandating that prison *708officials afford some procedures to ensure the credibility or reliability of the confidential informants. The ratio decidendi of the majority’s holding, non-retroactivity, is therefore irrelevant.
The judgment in the instant case should be reversed and the cause remanded.

. It is important to focus on the precise question presented for review in this case. The petitioner is not complaining about the prison board’s failure to employ any particular method for ascertaining the reliability or credibility of the confidential informants. The petitioner’s complaint is that he was found guilty solely on the basis of information provided by confidential informants which the UDC did not find to be either credible or reliable and whose credibility or reliability is not readily verifiable from any facts in the record. Thus, the question is not whether the specific procedures set forth in McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (7th Cir.1982) (and as developed in other cases such as Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1985)) are mandated by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). And it is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal that “ ‘[t]he Court in Wolff did not address what specific procedures were required to guarantee the reliability and credibility of confidential informants relied upon by the prison disciplinary committees.’ ” Ante at note 13 quoting petitioner’s opening brief. Rather, the question is whether Wolff implicitly requires that there be some indicia in the record, arrived at by whatever means, that the confidential informants were reliable or credible when this information forms the basis for the disciplinary decision.

. Because I would find this requirement to be inherent in Wolff, I do not address either the question of retroactivity or the question raised by Cox v. Cook, 420 U.S. 734, 95 S.Ct. 1237, 43 L.Ed.2d 587 (1975).