Court Opinion

ID: 9952787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 19:03:24.230449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:29.456532
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Coker CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

            IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085579
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF169369A)
                    v.

    RICKY LEE COKER,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Stephen D.
Schuett, Judge.
         Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez and
Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       In 2017, a jury convicted appellant Ricky Lee Coker of four crimes involving the
same victim: two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.
(a)(1);1 counts 1 & 2); making a criminal threat (§ 422; count 3); and intimidating a
witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 4). The jury found true that appellant used or
threatened to use force in intimidating the witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)).
       After two appeals in this court, which we summarize later in this opinion, the trial
court resentenced appellant in 2022. In count 1 (assault with a deadly weapon), the court
imposed an upper term of four years, which was doubled because of a prior strike. This
sentence was enhanced by five years for a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
(a)). In count 2 (assault with a deadly weapon) and count 3 (making a criminal threat),
the court imposed upper terms of four years and three years, respectively, which were
doubled because of a prior strike. The sentences in counts 2 and 3 were stayed. In
count 4 (intimidating a witness), the court imposed a concurrent middle term of three
years, which was doubled because of a prior strike. Appellant has an aggregate prison
term of 13 years.
       Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the
aggravated sentences. He argues he established that the middle term is appropriate
because he suffered childhood trauma that was a contributing factor in the present
offenses. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) He asks this court to find that error occurred and
to reduce his sentences to the middle term. We reject his arguments and affirm.
                                     BACKGROUND
I.     The Facts Supporting Appellant’s Convictions.
       Because the issues on appeal deal with sentencing, we provide only a brief
summary of the material facts underlying appellant’s convictions in this matter.

1      All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

                                             2.
       In 2017, appellant attacked and beat his brother’s girlfriend. On the night in
question, appellant had been ingesting methamphetamine with his brother and his
brother’s girlfriend. The brother left around 1:00 a.m. to buy some food. It was then
when appellant attacked the victim. Appellant struck the victim’s head four or five times
with a stepstool. He took and kept her cell phone. He threatened her with a knife, saying
he would “gut” her and cut her throat if she called the police or if the police came around.
He punched her with the hand holding the knife. (People v. Coker (July 17, 2020,
F077092) [nonpub. opn.].)
II.    The Procedural History.
       In 2018, appellant was originally sentenced in this matter. His original aggregate
prison term was 23 years. This included an aggravated sentence in count 1 (assault with a
deadly weapon), and four consecutive one-year prior prison enhancements (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)).
       In July 2020, we issued an opinion in which we vacated appellant’s sentence and
remanded for resentencing. In part, we directed the trial court to strike the enhancements
that had been imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b).2 In all other respects, we
affirmed appellant’s judgment.3 (People v. Coker, supra, F077092.)
       In October 2020, the trial court resentenced appellant. Neither appellant nor his
legal counsel were present. In fact, the prosecution was also absent when the court
resentenced appellant. In count 1 (assault with a deadly weapon), the court again

2      Following Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) it was undisputed that none
of appellant’s four prior prison terms qualified as sentencing enhancements under section
667.5, subdivision (b), because his prior prison terms were not for a sexually violent
offense.
3      In our 2020 opinion, the majority rejected appellant’s claim that he suffered
constitutional harm based on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).
Justice Meehan concurred with the majority regarding all claims, but she dissented on the
Dueñas issue. (People v. Coker, supra, F077092 (conc. & dis. opn. of Meehan, J.).)

                                             3.
imposed an upper term of eight years, and the court imposed a consecutive five-year
enhancement for a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). In count 4 (intimidating a
witness), the court again imposed a consecutive full midterm of six years. The court
struck the four one-year prior prison enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant
received an aggregate prison term of 19 years.
          In June 2022, this court issued an unpublished opinion in which we agreed with
the parties that resentencing was again required. We vacated appellant’s sentence and
directed that appellant had the right to be physically present at resentencing with the
assistance of legal counsel. In relevant part, we directed the court to consider retroactive
changes brought about by recent enactments.4 We remanded for resentencing but
otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Coker (June 10, 2022, F083191) [nonpub.
opn.].)
          In November 2022, the trial court resentenced appellant, which has already been
summarized in the introduction of this opinion. In short, appellant’s current aggregate
prison term is 13 years. The court imposed an aggravated sentence of eight years in
count 1 (assault with a deadly weapon), which was enhanced by five years (§ 667, subd.
(a)). Aggravated sentences were imposed in count 2 (assault with a deadly weapon) and
count 3 (making a criminal threat), which were stayed. In count 4 (intimidating a
witness), the court imposed a concurrent middle term of six years.
III.      Appellant’s Prior Criminal History.
          During the 2017 trial in this matter, a bifurcated proceeding occurred regarding
appellant’s prior convictions and strikes.5 The prosecution admitted into evidence a

4      The three recent enactments which the trial court was directed to consider at
resentencing were: (1) Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); (2) Assembly Bill
No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); and (3) Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).
5     On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of the records in appellate case
No. F077092. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

                                               4.
certified record of appellant’s criminal history. The certified record shows, in part, that
appellant has the following prior convictions:
       1.     A 1987 conviction for possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377);
       2.     A 1990 conviction for battery (§ 243, subd. (a));
       3.     A 1992 conviction for false imprisonment (§ 236);
       4.     A 1992 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1));
       5.     A 1999 conviction for eluding a pursuing peace officer in a willful or
wanton disregard for safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2);
       6.     A 1999 conviction for possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377); and
       7.     A 2004 conviction for voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)).
       The certified record also shows that appellant has violated parole multiple times.
IV.    Appellant’s Factors In Mitigation.
       Prior to the 2022 resentencing in this matter, appellant’s trial counsel filed a
resentencing brief. In part, the brief asserted that appellant’s criminal history, including
the present offenses, were generally the result of his addiction to methamphetamine. The
brief alleged that appellant was suffering from a “mental health episode” when he
committed the current crimes, and he has been diagnosed “with anxiety, anti-social
personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder.” It was asserted that appellant
has serious chronic health issues, including prostate cancer, Parkinson’s disease, a history
of sepsis and other acute infections, asthma, arthritis, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, and hepatitis C.
       Appellant’s brief summarized his conduct in custody after he was convicted for the
present charges. According to the brief, appellant had received prison reprimands for

                                              5.
various incidents, including two separate acts of battery on peace officers, and delaying
peace officers in the performance of their duties.
       In the resentencing brief, appellant’s trial counsel reminded the court that an
aggravated sentence cannot be imposed unless the factors in aggravation are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the defense brief articulated that a court is to
impose a low term if the defendant’s psychological, physical or childhood trauma was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense.
       The brief stated that appellant’s mental health records show he has “disordered
schemas” relating to “poor social development, early drug use, abuse and maladaptive
coping skills used as ways to manage conflict or social exchanges.” It was asserted that
appellant was exposed to drugs at an early age, and his means of coping led to substance
abuse and other concerns, such as chronic anger and violence. The brief declared that
appellant was seeking treatment.
       Appellant’s sentencing brief alleged that a clear connection existed between his
“abusive childhood” and “his legal troubles.” He was raised in an abusive home; his
stepfather physically and verbally assaulted and beat him. Appellant’s “childhood
trauma, physical and psychological abuse, coupled with mental illness resulted in
[appellant’s] maladapted response.” He did not develop normally given the verbal and
physical abuse he suffered from his stepfather. Appellant attended special education
classes and he did not graduate from high school.
       In the sentencing brief, appellant’s trial counsel asked the court to take into
account appellant’s “documented childhood trauma which interfered with his emotional
development.” The defense asserted that appellant’s sentence should be “appropriately
reduced.” In relevant part, the defense asked the court to sentence appellant to the middle
term of six years in count 1, and to strike the five-year enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a). It was asked that the remaining sentences in counts 2, 3 and 4 run
concurrently to the sentence imposed in count 1.

                                              6.
V.     The Sentencing Record.
       At the 2022 resentencing in this matter, the trial court noted that the probation
department had been unable to obtain information regarding appellant’s postsentencing
conduct in custody. The court stated it would rely on the “extensive summary” in the
defense brief.
       The court had read and considered an updated report from the probation officer,
including the evaluation of circumstances in mitigation and aggravation. The court had
also read and considered appellant’s resentencing brief.
       A.        The arguments from defense counsel.
       During the 2022 resentencing hearing, defense counsel asserted to the court that,
as noted in its moving papers, appellant had been “extremely ill” in prison, and he had
been released from Salinas Valley State Hospital only a few days prior to the hearing.
Defense counsel asked the court to take into account that appellant “has successfully
engaged in mental health treatment in light of the severe medical conditions that he has
suffered.” Appellant completed mental health classes, and he “acknowledges underlying
mental health issues” and he has been “performing very well.”
       Defense counsel reminded the court that it had a duty “to consider trauma” and
whether “it played a substantial role in the commission of the offense.” According to the
defense, the psychologist who was treating appellant had noted that trauma “was
something that impacted [appellant’s] development and it played a significant part in how
[appellant] responded to fearful situations, situations where he felt threatened.” Defense
counsel argued that, based on the moving papers, the notes and the doctor’s records,
childhood trauma played a role in how appellant “processes interactions with persons and
[his] willingness to engage in mental health treatment and [his] severe medical issues.”
The defense asked the court to consider “striking” appellant’s sentence as mentioned in
his moving papers.

                                             7.
       B.      The court’s findings during the 2022 resentencing.
       At the 2022 resentencing, the court noted that appellant’s “extensive criminal
record and prior performance record on probation and parole does not support the
granting of probation.” The court stated it had considered the circumstances in
aggravation and mitigation. According to the court, appellant’s prior convictions were
“numerous” and appellant had served a prior commitment in the California Youth
Authority. The court noted that appellant’s prior history on probation and parole “was
unsatisfactory.” The court also found that appellant had engaged in violent conduct,
which indicated he was “a serious danger to society, as evidenced by his current
conviction and behavior,” along with prior convictions, including (1) battery (§ 243,
subd. (a)); (2) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); (3) false imprisonment
(§ 236); and (4) manslaughter “with a weapon” (§ 192, subd. (a)). The court noted that,
based on his original statements to the probation officer, appellant had refused to accept
culpability for the present offenses.
       In mitigation, the court noted that appellant had successfully completed a one-year
term of parole. The court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances, so that “imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interest of justice.”
       The court stated it had also considered appellant’s postsentencing conduct while in
custody. According to the court, appellant had “not remained free from law violations
while in custody. Rather the record reflects a continuing pattern of violations, including
two instances of battery on a peace officer, one incident involving striking a prison guard
and resisting another officer who attempted to help the first officer.”
       Finally, the court acknowledged that appellant had asked the court to strike the
five-year enhancement due to his mental health illness, his prior victimization, and the
age of his prior conviction. The court stated it believed the dismissal of the enhancement
“would endanger public safety given the ongoing serious violent conduct exhibited by

                                             8.
[appellant] both prior to and subsequent to the conviction.” The court commented it had
chosen to impose the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). The
court believed the prison sentence was “appropriate.”
                                        DISCUSSION
I.      The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion.
        When a criminal statute specifies three possible terms, a sentencing court is to
exercise “its sound discretion” and order imposition of the middle term, unless certain
exceptions exist. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) Section 1170 directs a sentencing court to
impose the low term if the defendant’s psychological, physical, or childhood trauma “was
a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”6 (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
However, a sentencing court may find that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) In determining the “interests of justice,” a
sentencing court is permitted to consider the defendant’s “background and prospects,
including the presence or absence of a record,” as well as the mitigating factors of
subdivision (b)(6). (Advisory Com. com., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420.) A trial court
is required to state on the record “the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence
imposed,” and to “state the reasons for its sentencing choice.” (§ 1170, subds. (b)(5) &
(c).)
        At least four days prior to the time set for sentencing, the parties (and other
enumerated individuals) may submit a statement in aggravation or mitigation to the trial
court “to dispute facts in the record or the probation officer’s report or to present

6      Psychological, physical or childhood trauma may include, but is not limited to,
“abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) In March
2022, California Rules of Court, rule 4.420, which sets forth the criteria for selecting the
appropriate term of imprisonment in felony sentencing, was revised to incorporate this
provision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(e)(1).)

                                               9.
additional facts.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(4).) In part, the court may consider the record in the
case, the probation officer’s report, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by
the parties (and other enumerated individuals), and any further evidence introduced at the
sentencing hearing. (Ibid.)
         A.     We decline to reduce appellant’s sentence.
         Appellant argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in imposing
aggravated sentences in counts 1, 2 and 3. According to appellant, he produced
“sufficient facts” that showed a low term was required under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6)(A), because he suffered from childhood trauma and mental illness. He contends
that the trial court failed to state reasons why it imposed a sentence in excess of the
middle term. According to appellant, the trial court misunderstood the recent changes in
sentencing laws. Appellant asserts that, instead of remanding this matter for
resentencing, this court should reduce his sentences in counts 1, 2 and 3 to the middle
terms.
         We decline to reduce appellant’s sentences. He bears the burden to show that the
court’s sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376.) In the absence of such a showing, we presume that the trial court
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to
impose a particular sentence will not be set aside. (Id. at pp. 376–377.)
         Appellant fails to show an abuse of discretion. This record demonstrates that the
trial court read and considered the materials which appellant submitted. Nothing in the
record affirmatively shows the court was unaware of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).
To the contrary, appellant’s trial counsel thoroughly briefed this issue, and defense
counsel orally argued that the court should consider appellant’s trauma and mental health,
and whether that played a role in the commission of the offenses. The record amply
establishes that the court was aware of its discretionary sentencing authority.

                                              10.
       Moreover, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), by its plain language, does not
mandate a presumption in favor of the lower term in every case in which the defendant
experienced some form of trauma prior to or at the time the crime was committed.
Rather, the presumption applies only if that was “ ‘a contributing factor’ ” in the
commission of the offense. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991.)
Thus, “in order to trigger the presumption, there must be some initial showing that the
defendant’s [trauma] was a contributing factor, and only then must the record
affirmatively show compliance with the statute.” (Fredrickson, supra, at p. 992.)
       Here, the trial court never expressed its belief that appellant’s alleged childhood
trauma had played a contributing factor in the commission of the present offenses.
Although the materials provided by defense counsel alleged that appellant had suffered
an abusive childhood, appellant did not explain or demonstrate how his alleged childhood
trauma contributed to his unprovoked attack of the victim in this matter. In fact, during
his original interview with the probation officer, appellant denied culpability for the
present offenses. Appellant claimed the victim had lied. This record does not establish
that a presumption was triggered requiring imposition of the low term.
       Even if appellant did demonstrate that his childhood trauma was a contributing
factor in the commission of the present offenses, this record does not show that the trial
court abused its discretion. The court stated it had considered the circumstances in
aggravation and mitigation. The court found that appellant’s prior convictions were
numerous, and his prior performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory. The
court concluded that appellant posed “a serious danger to society” as evidenced by his
current convictions and certain prior convictions, including (1) battery (§ 243, subd. (a));
(2) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); (3) false imprisonment (§ 236);
and (4) manslaughter “with a weapon” (§ 192, subd. (a)). The court noted that appellant
had refused to accept culpability for the present offenses. The court expressly found the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the factors in mitigation so “the imposition of the

                                             11.
lower term would be contrary to the interest of justice.”7 Thus, the sentencing record
demonstrates that the court expressly rejected appellant’s position that the low term was
required. The court’s comments also show its compliance with the statute.
       Appellant does not affirmatively demonstrate that the court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion. To the contrary, the record amply shows that the court responded
to appellant’s arguments, but it concluded that imposition of a lower term “would be
contrary to the interest of justice.” Based on the numerous factors in aggravation, we
cannot state that the court’s sentencing decision was so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it. As such, this record does not establish that the trial
court abused its sentencing discretion in declining to sentence appellant to the low term
under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).
       As we explain below, the record also amply shows that the court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the aggravated sentences.
       B.     The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the aggravated
              sentences.
       A sentencing court may not impose a prison sentence exceeding the middle term
unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the
defendant’s stipulation to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived)
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified
record of conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3).)
       Appellant’s prior convictions were established by a certified copy of his criminal
record, which the prosecution moved into evidence in 2017. Appellant has numerous

7      In selecting between the middle and lower terms of imprisonment, the trial court
was permitted to consider any factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision,
including circumstances from the case record, the probation officer’s report, and
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, whether or not appellant had stipulated to
those factors or they were found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the
judge. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(d).)

                                             12.
prior convictions. His prior performance on parole is unsatisfactory. Finally, the certified
record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant has engaged in violent
conduct that indicates he is a serious danger to society. Appellant has prior convictions
for voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1)), and battery (§ 243, subd. (a)). The certified record of conviction establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt three separate factors in aggravation. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(1), (2) & (5).)
       Only a single valid aggravating factor is needed to justify imposition of an upper
term. (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1221; People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th
799, 815.) The trial court articulated the factors in aggravation, and this record amply
demonstrates why the court elected to impose an aggravated sentence. Thus, we reject
appellant’s assertion that the court failed to state why it was exceeding the middle term.
It cannot be stated that the court’s decision to impose upper terms in this matter was
arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, an abuse of discretion is not present.
       At sentencing, however, the trial court found other factors in aggravation which
are outside the record of conviction, and which were neither established by appellant’s
stipulation nor found true by a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. For instance, the
court stated that appellant did not accept culpability for the present offenses, which was
derived from appellant’s alleged comments to the probation officer. In addition, the court
relied on the information in the defense brief to find that appellant had suffered violations
in prison. Those violations, however, appear to have been sustained by prison officials
based on a mere preponderance standard.
       In his briefing before this court, appellant does not directly challenge the
imposition of the aggravated sentence based on concerns that the trial court failed to
comply with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). However, appellant concedes in his
briefing that a court’s failure to comply with these requirements is reviewable for
harmless error. To the extent appellant’s briefing has raised this particular issue, we hold

                                             13.
that appellant did not suffer prejudice. In light of the court’s comments at sentencing, a
“ ‘miscarriage of justice’ ” has not occurred because it is not reasonably probable
appellant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.
Consequently, the error is harmless under state law.8 (See People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836 [setting forth standard to review prejudice for error under state law].)
This claim is without merit and resentencing is not required.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

8       Imposition of an aggravated sentence does not violate a defendant’s constitutional
right to a jury trial so long as one legally sufficient aggravating circumstance is justified
based upon the defendant’s record of prior convictions. (People v. Black, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 816.)

                                             14.