Court Opinion

ID: 9478912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:02:22.239033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:41.779557
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The administrative record in this case clearly establishes that Zenker cannot perform his present job as a dishwasher at the Elks Lodge on a full-time basis. As the majority concedes, Zenker’s wife, employer, rehabilitation counselor and treating physician all testified to this fact. In light of this testimony, I cannot understand how the majority can deny Zenker the benefits to which he is entitled. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
In the face of substantial contradicting evidence, the majority argues that Zenker must be denied benefits because he stated at the administrative hearing that he would work more than 20 hours at the Elks Lodge if that work were available. No credence should be given to such an isolated statement. First, Zenker outlined the physical and emotional difficulties he experiences with his minimal work load. He testified that he suffers from pain in the back of his neck and headaches from the pressures placed on him at work. Second, Zenker’s wife and supervisor testified that Zenker misses a lot of work due to illness. They both concluded that Zenker could not perform his work on a full-time basis.
Third, Bryan Wetch of Pride Industries stated:
Terry's health concerns were compounded by his desire to tell people what they want to hear. When he’s not feeling well, he will still go to work or go out with others when they ask, instead of taking care of himself. Eventually, this lead[s] to more serious illness which results in lost work.
Wetch did not believe Zenker has the stamina for a full-time position. This evidence appears credible in light of Zenker’s intellectual limitations and his past inability to maintain a nutritionally balanced diet. Thus, Zenker’s statement does not prove that his very real mental and physical limitations do not preclude him from tolerating a full-time job. Even if I felt Zenker understood his own limitations and truly believed he could work full-time as a dishwasher, I do not believe that statement alone outweighs all of the evidence to the contrary.
Furthermore, Zenker now holds a job in a somewhat “sheltered” environment. Zenker obtained his part-time job at the Elks Lodge through Pride Industries. From the record, it is clear that Zenker’s employer is very understanding of his intellectual limitations and his physical impairments. Bernice Garen, Zenker’s supervisor, suffers from a speech impediment similar to Zenker’s. The record indicates that Zenker’s last hernia operation and hospitalization for his alcoholism occurred while he was employed at the Elks Lodge. Zenker obviously performs his job as a dishwasher within a supportive environment.
The regulations draw a distinction between competitive and sheltered employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(4) provides that if a claimant works in “a sheltered workshop or a comparable facility especially set up for severely impaired per*273sons,” and the claimant earns less than $300 a month, the Secretary will presume that he or she is not capable of substantial gainful activity. The AU found that Zenker’s earnings have consistently been under the $300.00 amount. Because Zenker is presently working in a fairly sheltered environment and is earning less than $300.00 a month, I feel that such a presumption is warranted in this case. Furthermore, this Court has held that work in a sheltered workshop is not, in and of itself, substantial evidence supporting a denial of disability benefits. Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d at 1198; Iamarino v. Heckler, 795 F.2d 59, 60 (8th Cir.1986).
Finally, Zenker did not state that he could perform 40 hours a week at a job outside of the non-competitive environment at the Elks Lodge. The exchange, so heavily relied upon by the majority, is comprised of the following:
Q: Now, this job you have at the Elks, would you be able to work a full day, eight-hour shift, if they would ask you to?
A: If they asked, but they won’t ask because they’re cutting down their hour, some of them hours.
* * * * * *
Q: But you feel you could then put longer hours if they’d have the work?
A: Right.
Tr. at 49-51.
At most, I interpret these answers to mean that Zenker believes he could work longer than six hours at a time if necessary. I see no mention of full-time work or a 40-hour work week. Thus, I believe the majority places too much weight on these statements.
The majority also points to the first letter of Dr. Van Vranken as evidence supporting a finding that Zenker can perform substantial gainful activity. I do not read Dr. Van Vranken’s letter as an unequivocal statement that Zenker could work a 40-hour week. At most, he stated that Zenker could tolerate a 40-hour week in a non-competitive atmosphere, such as is provided by Pride Industries. Because of the ambiguity of the letter and his subsequent unequivocal statement that Zenker could only perform his job on a part-time basis, little weight should be given to Dr. Van Vranken’s first letter.
There is some evidence to support the majority’s view, but we cannot sustain the Secretary’s decision unless it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 272 (8th Cir.1988); Piercy v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 190, 191 (8th Cir.1987); Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987). As we clearly established in Pi-ercy and Gavin, this review is “more than a rubber stamp of the Secretary’s decision and is more than a search for the existence of substantial evidence supporting the Secretary’s decision.” 835 F.2d at 191 (emphasis added). This standard requires us to scrutinize a record very closely to take into consideration the weight of the evidence in the record and to apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory. Gavin, 811 F.2d at 1199. The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Id.
Although the majority painstakingly recounts the evidence which contradicts the AU’s decision, it proceeds to hold, in con-clusory fashion, that sufficient evidence exists to support the determination that Zenker can perform substantial gainful activity. No attempt is made to evaluate the weight of this evidence, and no care is taken to balance out the contradictory evidence.
If I follow the procedure outlined in Gavin, I can only come to one conclusion — the evidence supporting the AU’s decision to deny benefits is clearly outweighed by the contradictory evidence. The balance is in Zenker’s favor.
Because I feel the evidence in this record clearly establishes that Zenker cannot perform substantial gainful activity, I would reverse the district court’s order and remand the case with instructions to remand the case to the Secretary for a computation of disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income to begin as of June 1, 1983.