Court Opinion

ID: 9669433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:56:08.483486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:56.754553
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge,
dissenting.
I.
I respectfully dissent.
Our constitutional form of government allows for the will of the people to be expressed, for better or worse, through the laws enacted by their elected representatives. The role of the courts is merely to interpret such statutes and to rule upon their constitutionality, if necessary.
Missouri has enacted section 565.020.2, RSMo, providing that individuals over the age of sixteen, who knowingly cause the death of another after deliberation may be subjected to the death penalty. Although *419this statute is subject to serious controversy, it is the enacted will of the people of Missouri and must be enforced unless it is in violation of either the Missouri or the United States Constitutions.
The majority opinion of this Court holds that section 565.020.2 violates the United States Constitution. This opinion is directly in conflict with the United States Supreme Court decision of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), consolidated with Wilkens v. Missouri, No. 87-6026, which specifically states:
We discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Kentucky and the Supreme Court of Missouri are therefore affirmed.
492 U.S. at 380,109 S.Ct. 2969.
The United States Supreme Court has not overruled Stanford, even in light of its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), nor after recent consideration of the precise arguments relied upon by the majority of this Court, see Mullin v. Hain, 538 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1654, 155 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (mem.) (order granting application to vacate the stay of execution of defendant who was seventeen years old when he committed murder); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 123 S.Ct. 472, 154 L.Ed.2d 364 (2002) (denying writ of habeas corpus of petitioner who was seventeen years when he committed murder); Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 123 S.Ct. 24, 153 L.Ed.2d 887 (2002) (denying writ of habeas corpus of petitioner who was seventeen years old when he committed murder). It is the United States Supreme Court’s prerogative, and its alone, to overrule one of its decisions. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567, 121 S.Ct. 1782, 149 L.Ed.2d 820 (2001); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989).
This Court is bound by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stanford v. Kentucky and simply has no authority to overrule that decision.
II.
Petitioner, Christopher Simmons, was born on April 26, 1976. On September 10, 1993, when he was approximately seventeen-years and five-months old, petitioner was arrested for the murder of Shirley Crook. Following a botched robbery attempt, petitioner kidnapped Ms. Crook, bound and gagged her. Petitioner walked Ms. Crook down a railroad trestle, bound her more, and pushed her, while still alive, over the trestle and into the Meramec River. Prior to the robbery, petitioner stated to his accomplice that they could commit a robbery and murder and get away with it because they were juveniles.
Petitioner now asks this court for habe-as corpus relief, alleging that his death sentence is illegal because he was a juvenile at the time of his crime. Petitioner acknowledges that Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), explicitly held that the United States Constitution was not violated by the execution of a sixteen or seventeen-year-old defendant. However, petitioner alleges that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 *420(2002), “implicitly overrules the controlling precedent of Stanford....” (emphasis added).
Stanford specifically addressed Missouri’s capital punishment statute in determining that there was “neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age” and “such punishment does not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366, 380, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Stanford noted its petitioners failed to establish a societal “consensus against capital punishment for 16- and 17-year-old offenders through state and federal statutes and the behavior of prosecutors and juries-” Id: at 377, 109 S.Ct. 2969. The Supreme Court explicitly refused to consider “other indicia, including public opinion polls, the views of interest groups, and the positions adopted by various professional associations.” Id. “A revised national consensus so broad, so clear, and so enduring as to justify a permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must appear in the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people have approved.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court did not overrule Stanford in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Atkins did not deal with juveniles, but addressed capital punishment of mentally retarded persons. Id. at 2244. The Court held that capital punishment of the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual for two reasons: 1) mentally retarded persons “do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct,” Id.; and 2) the prevailing standards of decency reflected by objective standards such as legislatures, experts, and the public establish a consensus against imposing capital punishment upon the mentally retarded. Id.
United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution are the supreme law of the land. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958).1 “State court judges in Missouri are bound by the ‘supreme law of the land,’ as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States (Art. VI, Constitution of the United States).” Kraus v. Bd. of Educ., 492 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Mo.1973). See also Rodgers v. Danforth, 486 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Mo. banc 1972) (citing U.S. Const. art. VI; Cooper, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958) (This court “is bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.”)).
This Court’s solemn duty to abide by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States is not abridged simply because we disagree with that Court’s decision or even if it appears that a decision was clearly in error. Neither can this Court imply or anticipate the overruling of a decision of the United States Supreme Court.
In State Oil Co. v. Khan, the court of appeals “characterized [the United States Supreme Court’s previous decision] as ‘unsound when decided’ and ‘inconsistent with later decisions’ of [that] Court,” but “felt constrained to follow that decision.” 522 U.S. 3, 9, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the appellate court’s characterization of its previous opinion, but applauded the court *421of appeals for respecting the doctrine of stare decisis. Id. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 275
Despite what Chief Judge Posner aptly described as Albrecht’s “infirmities, [and] its increasingly wobbly, motheaten foundations,” there remains the question whether Albrecht [v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 869, 19 L.Ed.2d 998 (1968) ] deserves continuing respect under the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court of Appeals was correct in applying that principle despite disagreement with Albrecht, for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Similarly, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. noted a shift away from “the old judicial hostility to arbitration.” 490 U.S. 477, 480, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). That view had “been steadily eroded over the years” and the Court itself took notice of the shift in a prior opinion. Id. at 480-81, 109 S.Ct. 1917. However, the Supreme Court “did not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own authority should have taken the step of renouncing” the Court’s prior decision. Id. at 484,109 S.Ct. 1917.
If a precedent of [the Supreme Court of the United States] has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals [or other court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.

Id.

The Supreme Court of the United States has not chosen to exercise its prerogative of overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, despite several very recent opportunities to do so. See Mullin v. Hain, 538 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1654, 155 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (mem. order); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 123 S.Ct. 472, 154 L.Ed.2d 364 (2002); Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 123 S.Ct. 24, 153 L.Ed.2d 887 (2002). In each case, the defendant was seventeen-years-old when he committed the crime for which he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court refused to reexamine Stanford v. Kentucky despite vigorous dissents raising precisely the same arguments as presented to this Court.
While the majority of this Court might believe that Stanford v. Kentucky has been abandoned in light of Atkins and in light of their perception of a national consensus regarding capital punishment of juvenile offenders, their belief and perception are not sufficient to preempt the Supreme Court of the United States concerning its existing precedent.
It is the prerogative of the Supreme Court of the United States, and its alone, to overrule one of its decisions.
The proper venue for Simmons to seek relief on this issue is the Supreme Court of the United States. I would deny the writ.

. "[T]he interpretation of [the Constitution] enunciated by this Court in [its decision] is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' " Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18, 78 S.Ct. 1401.