Court Opinion

ID: 9540699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:58.868621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:12.378095
License: Public Domain

DEITS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority begins its analysis with the proposition that, in construing a statute, we should give effect to every word of a statute. It then proceeds to ignore the words of the pertinent statutes, as well as the legislative intent in the adoption of the statutes and a well reasoned opinion of the Board interpreting the statutes.
As the majority correctly points out, the critical question is whether the process set out in ORS 656.327 for review by the Director of disputes concerning whether medical treatment is “excessive, inappropriate, ineffectual or in violation of rules regarding the performance of medical services” is exclusive or whether the Board also has jurisdiction of such disputes.1 The majority concludes that the parties to such a dispute have the discretion to decide whether to seek *225review by the Director or to seek a hearing before a referee and the Board.
Beforé the amendment to the Workers’ Compensation Act in 1990, the majority’s conclusion was correct and the Board had so interpreted the statutes. However, in 1990, the legislature amended ORS 656.704(3), which governs the respective jurisdiction of the Director and the Board. That subsection was amended to provide that “matters concerning a claim” over which the Board has review authority do not include “any proceeding for resolving a dispute regarding medical treatment or fees for which a procedure is otherwise provided in this chapter.” That subsection now reads:
“For the purpose of determining the respective authority of the director and the board to conduct hearings, investigations and other proceedings under this chapter, and for determining the procedure for the conduct and review thereof, matters concerning a claim under this chapter are those matters in which a worker’s right to receive compensation, or the amount thereof, are directly in issue. However, such matters do not include any proceeding for resolving a dispute regarding medical treatment or fees for which a procedure is otherwise provided in this chapter.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As the Board correctly explains in its order in this case, the language added to ORS 656.704(3) in 1990 changed the authority of the Board regarding review of disputes concerning medical treatment or fees:
“Under amended ORS 656.704(3), ‘matters concerning a claim’ over which the Board, and thus the Hearings Division, has jurisdiction, do not include any dispute regarding medical treatment or fees for which a resolution procedure is otherwise provided in ORS Chapter 656. ORS 656.327 provides a procedure for the resolution of disputes between the insurer and the injured worker concerning medical treatment that is allegedly ‘excessive, inappropriate, ineffectual or in violation of rules regarding the performance of medical services.’ Accordingly, unlike the situation in Lillie M. Willis, supra, [42 Van Natta 1923 (1990)] original jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the frequency of medical treatment is no longer shared by the Director and the Hearings Division. Rather, because such disputes are no longer matters concerning a claim, original jurisdiction lies exclusively with the Director.” (Footnote omitted.)
*226The Board noted that its reading of the statutes is consistent with the apparent purpose of the amendment to ORS 656.704(3) to remove questions concerning the reasonableness of medical treatment from the litigation process. As the Board explained:
“This conclusion is supported by the legislative history. The amendments to ORS 656.327 and 656.704 were proposed in Senate Bill 1197. In explaining the bill to the Special Committee of the legislature, a member of the Governor’s Workers’ Compensation Labor-Management Advisory Committee testified that the purpose of the amendments was to remove questions concerning the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment from the litigation process and allow such decisions to be made by a physician rather than a referee.”
It is often unclear how procedures provided in different statutes are to relate to each other. In such cases, we often have to apply principles of statutory construction to decide how the statutes should be read together. This is a case, however, where the legislature directly states how these statutes are to relate to each other. It adopted specific language defining the respective jurisdiction of the Board and Director concerning disputes regarding medical treatment. ORS 656.704(3) specifically states that “matters concerning a claim” over which the Board has jurisdiction does not include proceedings for resolving disputes concerning medical treatment or fees when there is a procedure otherwise provided in chapter 656. ORS 656.327 sets out specific procedures to handle such disputes.
The majority decides that ORS 656.704(3) does not really mean what it says, that when the statute says that the Board does not have jurisdiction of disputes regarding medical treatment for which a procedure has already been provided in chapter 656, what it really means is that it is up to employers and workers to decide whether they want to have such disputes resolved by the Director or the Board. That simply is not what the statute says. The majority acknowledges that ORS 656.704 does concern the respective jurisdiction of the Board and the Director, but reasons that you do not get into a question of respective jurisdiction unless one of the parties invokes the Director’s jurisdiction. That reasoning is quite circular and blatantly ignores the last sentence in *227ORS 656.704(3) that says that when a dispute concerning medical treatment or fees is involved for which a procedure has been provided elsewhere in chapter 656, the Board does not have jurisdiction.
Further, the majority’s interpretation is completely inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation to remove such disputes from the litigation process. The legislature has adopted a process for dealing with this type of dispute in ORS 656.327. The Workers’ Compensation Department has also adopted extensive administrative rules further detailing the process to be followed by the director in resolving disputes concerning medical treatment and fees. These rules include detailed requirements as to the timing of requests for review and the process to be used in reviewing such disputes. Under the majority’s reading of these statutes, an employer or a worker has the authority to decide that they simply do not feel like following those well-defined procedures and to ask the Board to undertake the review.
The majority’s result is not compelled by the language of the statutes; it is inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation. It allows the parties to avoid a detailed and well-defined process for resolving these disputes before the Director if they wish to do so. I believe that the Board’s reasoning was sound and that it was correct in concluding that it lacked authority to review the insurer’s partial denial of claimant’s chiropractic treatments, because the statutes give jurisdiction of such matters to the Director.
The majority also concludes that the Board erred in upholding the denial of claimant’s aggravation claim, because “ORS 656.273 does not require claimant to prove a diminished capacity to work” in order to receive additional medical services for his worsened condition. The majority holds that when the Board rejected the aggravation claim, it was then required to determine “whether the need for medical services was the result of the injury” under ORS 656.245.
The majority is correct that, under ORS 656.245, an employer is responsible for medical services for conditions resulting from the compensable injury, regardless of whether the claimant has suffered an aggravation, and that responsibility continues for the life of the claimant. See Evans v. *228SAIF, 62 Or App 182, 660 P2d 185 (1983). However, the majority overlooks the fact that this aggravation claim is a separate claim from the claim for medical services discussed above. Claimant’s request for a hearing on employer’s June 1, 1990, denial involved only a claim for aggravation under ORS 656.273 and penalties and attorney fees. His claim for an aggravation did not include a claim under ORS 656.245 for additional medical services resulting from the original com-pensable injury. Because of that, Smith v. SAIF, 302 Or 396, 730 P2d 30 (1986), is not applicable. In my view, the aggravation issue was correctly decided, and the Board should not address it on remand. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Richardson, C. J., and Warren and Edmonds, JJ., join in this dissent.

 As the Board noted in its opinion, this case concerns jurisdiction to review the appropriateness of medical treatment. It does not concern jurisdiction involving cases where the dispute relates to the extent of the causal relationship in fact and law between the claimant’s medical condition and the claimant’s compensable injury or occupational disease.