Court Opinion

ID: 9376612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 10:08:34.23872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.839830
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                              TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                       No. 10-22-00175-CR

KORRINN KQUAME MCGRUDER,
                                                                       Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                                       Appellee

                             From the 272nd District Court
                                  Brazos County, Texas
                            Trial Court No. 20-01066-CRF-272

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

        In two issues, appellant, Korrinn Kquame McGruder, challenges his convictions

for one count of assault family violence-strangulation with a prior family violence

conviction (“Count 1”) and one count of assault family violence with a prior family

violence conviction (“Count 2”). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2). We affirm.1

        1As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we only recite those
necessary to the disposition of the case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4.
                         The Complainant’s Statements to Police

       In his first issue, McGruder contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing the complainant’s hearsay statements to be testified to as excited utterances

under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2). See TEX. R. EVID. 803(2). McGruder argues that

body-camera videos of Officer Frazier Honkomp of the Bryan Police Department, as well

as a 911 call, undermine Officer Honkomp’s testimony that the complainant was

dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event; thus, this evidence was

not admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

       The admissibility of an out-of-court statement under exceptions to the general

hearsay rule is within the trial court’s discretion. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2003). The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is so clearly wrong

as to lie outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.

       As stated earlier, the complained-of evidence was admitted under the excited-

utterance exception to the hearsay rule. An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to

a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement

caused by the event or condition.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(2); see Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. In

determining whether a hearsay statement is admissible as an excited utterance, the court

may consider a number of factors, including the length of time between the occurrence

and the statement, the nature of the declarant, whether the statement was made in

McGruder v. State                                                                       Page 2
response to a question, and whether the statement is self-serving. Apolinar v. State, 155

S.W.3d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). These are simply factors to consider; they are

not, by themselves, dispositive. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. The critical determination is

whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of

the event or condition at the time of the statement. Id.

DISCUSSION

       Officer Honkomp responded to a 911 call alleging domestic violence. When he

arrived, Officer Honkomp spoke with the complainant, who explained that McGruder

had hit her, choked her, and pulled her hair. At trial, Officer Honkomp described the

complainant’s demeanor as follows:

       As I contact her outside, so we were by the road on Finfeather in a parking
       lot there. She came out. She seemed nervous and a little shaken up. As she
       began talking to me about the event that had taken place that night, her
       hands were shaky. Her voice was shaky. Her eyes got watery and voice
       got nasally. I could tell she was kind of holding back crying.

             She told me she was scared as cars were passing by. She kept looking
       around as cars passing by afraid that the suspect or someone that knew the
       suspect would see her.

Counsel for McGruder objected to Officer Honkomp’s testimony as hearsay. The State

responded that the foregoing testimony laid the predicate for an excited utterance, which

is an exception to the hearsay rule. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(2). The trial judge agreed with

the State and overruled McGruder’s objection.

McGruder v. State                                                                    Page 3
       Thereafter, Officer Honkomp recounted that “[the complainant] was also

nauseous while—as I was speaking to her” and that “she was afraid that [McGruder]

would retaliate against her.” Officer Honkomp testified that nausea is a sign and

symptom of strangulation, and he also recalled that the complainant “was dry heaving

and throwing up” during the interview that evening.

       Later in Officer Honkomp’s testimony, the State offered State’s Exhibits 1-A, 1-B,

1-C, and 1-D—videos from Officer Honkomp’s body camera—for admission into

evidence. Counsel for McGruder objected to the videos as hearsay and a violation of the

Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. While State’s Exhibit 1-A was

playing, counsel for McGruder further argued that the video did not show that the

complainant is “in the throes of excited utterance. She’s not, you know, upset by this.

She seems to be having a conversation with the officer and doesn’t seem to meet the

exception that the prosecutor laid forth earlier that this is some sort of exception to [the]

hearsay rule.” The trial court overruled McGruder’s objections to State’s Exhibits 1-A, 1-

B, 1-C, and 1-D.

       Later at trial, the State presented State’s Exhibits 37 and 38 for admission into

evidence through the testimony of Kris Fox, the custodian of records for Brazos County

911 District. These exhibits are the audio recording of the 911 call and the written

transcript of the 911 call. Counsel for McGruder objected to State’s Exhibit 37 (the audio

recording of the 911 call) on hearsay grounds and to State’s Exhibit 38 as an improper

McGruder v. State                                                                      Page 4
comment on the weight of the evidence. The trial court overruled McGruder’s objection

to State’s Exhibit 37 and admitted it for all purposes. The trial court also overruled

McGruder’s objection to State’s Exhibit 38, but only admitted the exhibit for the purpose

of the record.

       Regarding Officer Honkomp’s testimony and State’s Exhibits 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D,

and 37, we cannot say that the trial court’s admission of this evidence as excited

utterances is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Specifically, Officer Honkomp

testified that the complainant was nervous, scared and shaken up; that her voice was

shaky; that her eyes were watery and her voice was nasally; and that she was throwing

up and dry heaving. This is enough to show that the complainant was still dominated

by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event or condition at the time of the

statement. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596; see also Apolinar, 155 S.W.3d at 187.

       However, despite the foregoing, McGruder emphasizes that the complainant’s

statements to Officer Honkomp were not excited utterances because the videos from

Officer Honkomp’s body camera show the complainant to be calm and collected, and

because a significant amount of time passed between the incident and the interview. We

disagree.

       Although the complainant recounted the incident in a calm tone of voice in the 911

call and the videos from Officer Honkomp’s body camera, a witness’s tone of voice when

making a statement is not, standing alone, dispositive of the key question of whether the

McGruder v. State                                                                  Page 5
witness was still under the stress of excitement from viewing a startling event at the time

the statement was made. See, e.g., Rios v. State, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7835, at **33-34 (Tex.

App.—El Paso Aug. 28, 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Daisy v. State, No. 05-01-01791-CR, 2002

Tex. App. LEXIS 8117, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 15, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for

publication) (recognizing that a witness need not be hysterical to be dominated by the

emotions or fear of a startling event)). “To the contrary, when a witness makes a

statement in a calm manner, it may still be considered an excited utterance if there is

evidence that the witness was nevertheless still upset, scared, or otherwise in the grip of

emotions as the result of a startling event when she made her statement.” Id. at *34 (citing

Biggins v. State, 73 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (concluding that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the victim’s statements to police

as an excited utterance, despite the fact that the victim appeared to have “calmed down”

prior to making her statements, because she was still in the “grip of the emotions,

excitement, fear, or pain” from her father’s assault on her).

       Here, Officer Honkomp testified about the complainant’s fear and the fact that she

appeared to be nervous, scared, shaken up, on the verge of crying, and nauseated at the

time of the interview.     Moreover, the body-camera videos also showed that the

complainant repeatedly moved around Officer Honkomp’s vehicle to try to obscure the

fact that she was speaking to police, indicating that she was still dominated by fear of the

event or condition at the time of the statement. This is further demonstrated when the

McGruder v. State                                                                      Page 6
complainant told Officer Honkomp that she believed McGruder would kill her if he

found out she called the police. Given this evidence, we conclude that there is evidence

in this record showing that the complainant was still upset, scared, or otherwise in the

grip of emotions as a result of the incident of domestic violence.

       McGruder also asserts that the complainant’s statements were not excited

utterances because a significant time passed between the incident and when the interview

occurred. Officer Honkomp testified that he received a dispatch regarding this incident

at 11:02 p.m. on the night in question. The complainant told Officer Honkomp that the

incident of domestic violence began when McGruder ordered the complainant to get out

of his house at 10:21 p.m. There is no evidence as to what time the assault ended, but the

record does show that the complainant called 911 at 10:59 p.m. Even if we were to

presume that the incident of domestic violence occurred at 10:21 p.m., this delay of

approximately forty minutes is not enough, after reviewing the evidence in light of the

factors, to show that the complainant’s statements to Officer Honkomp were not excited

utterances. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d 589, 596 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse

it discretion by admitting statements under the excited-utterance exception where the

time delay between the event and the statement was twenty hours); Dixon v. State, 358

S.W.3d 250, 261 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the trial

court did not abuse it discretion by admitting statements under the excited-utterance

exception where the time delay between the event and the statement was one hour); see

McGruder v. State                                                                    Page 7
also Potts v. State, Nos. 01-02-00919-CR & 01-02-00920-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 10407, at

*19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 11, 2003, pet. ref’d) (“Although complainant’s

statements regarding the kidnapping and assault were made to Carter approximately

three hours after she was found, they were made while complainant was still dominated

by the emotions and pain of the physical and sexual assault.”).

        Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting Officer Honkomp’s testimony regarding what the complainant

told him that evening, as well as State’s Exhibits 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, and 37.2 We overrule

McGruder’s first issue.

                                               Charge Error

        In his second issue, McGruder asserts that the trial court erred by submitting a

deadly weapon special issue to the jury in the court’s charge during the guilt-innocence

phase of trial.3 McGruder argues that the deadly weapon special issue should not have

        2 Although McGruder alludes to State’s Exhibit 38 (the written transcript of the 911 call) in his brief,
he does not specifically argue how the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this exhibit. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 38.1(i). And to the extent it can be argued that McGruder’s complaint about State’s Exhibit 37
(the audio recording of the 911 call) somehow extends to State’s Exhibit 38, we note that McGruder’s
complaint on appeal—that the 911 call should be excluded as inadmissible hearsay—does not comport
with the objection made at trial—that the 911 call is an improper comment on the weight of the evidence.
See Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that where a trial objection does not
comport with the issue raised on appeal, appellant has preserved nothing for review); see also Dixon v. State,
2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on reh’g) (“[A]n objection stating one legal theory may not
be used to support a different legal theory on appeal.”).

        3The deadly weapon special issue was submitted in the guilt-innocence charge as to Counts 1 and
2. The jury found that McGruder did use a deadly weapon as to Count 1 but did not use a deadly weapon
as to Count 2.

McGruder v. State                                                                                       Page 8
been included in the guilt-innocence charge because the indictment did not include a

deadly weapon allegation, the deadly weapon finding affected a punishment issue

(parole eligibility), and because McGruder had elected the trial court to assess

punishment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

       “Our first duty in analyzing a jury-charge issue is to decide whether error exists.”

Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Middleton v. State, 125

S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). If we find error, then we consider whether to

reverse based on the resultant harm. Gonzalez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020) (citing Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)); see Almanza v.

State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g). If the error is preserved,

as it was here, the record must demonstrate that appellant suffered “some harm.” Wooten

v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d 232,

242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam)); see Cornet v. State, 417 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013).     “Some harm” means actual harm and not merely a theoretical

complaint. Rogers v. State, 550 S.W.3d 190, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Reversal is

required if the error was calculated to injure the rights of the defendant. Id. at 192; see

Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In evaluating harm, we review the whole record, including

the jury charge, the state of the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and other relevant

information. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

McGruder v. State                                                                       Page 9
DISCUSSION

        We are not persuaded by McGruder’s contention that the guilt-innocence charge

was erroneous for several reasons. First, it is undisputed that the State provided written

notice of its intention to seek an affirmative deadly weapon finding. See Brooks v. State,

847 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“A defendant is entitled to notice that the

State will seek an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used during the

commission of the charged crime. Such notice need not be contained in the indictment

under which the defendant is ultimately tried. Rather, the defendant is simply entitled

to notice in some form that the use of a deadly weapon will be a fact issue at the time of

prosecution.” (internal citations & quotations omitted)).

        Next, the Court of Criminal Appeals has specifically stated that: “We agree that

the better practice is to submit the deadly weapons special issue charge at the

guilt/innocence phase of trial.”4 Hill v. State, 913 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)

        4   We recognize that, in Fann v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that: “When the
punishment hearing is held before the trial judge, the trial judge is the trier of fact as to the punishment
issues. An affirmative finding can be and is perhaps more suited to be a punishment issue.” 702 S.W.2d
602, 604-05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citations omitted). However, nothing in the Fann opinion, which
predates Hill, mandates that a deadly weapon special issue be decided only during the punishment phase.
See id. at 604 (“[W]here, as in the instant case, the trial judge is the trier of fact at the punishment stage and
he has heard evidence on the issue, he has the authority to make an affirmative finding as to the use or
exhibition of a deadly weapon if the jury has not decided the matter.” (emphasis added)); see also Polk v. State,
693 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (stating that the jury, when it is the trier of fact for guilt-
innocence, may make an affirmative finding on a deadly weapon special issue); Vasquez v. State, 25 S.W.3d
826, 827 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 56 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001) (“The trial judge may ‘make’ an affirmative deadly weapon finding only when the judge is the trier
of fact, either at the guilt phase or the punishment phase.” (citing Hooks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 110, 112 n.4
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Fann, 702 S.W.2d at 604-05; Butler v. State, 936 S.W.2d 453, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston

McGruder v. State                                                                                        Page 10
(emphasis in original). And while a deadly-weapon finding is used to calculate a

prisoner’s parole eligibility date, see Johnson v. State, 233 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2007, pet. ref’d), the Court of Criminal Appeals has “never held that it is improper

to submit the deadly weapons special issue at the guilt-innocence phase.” Id. (citing

Luken v. State, 780 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); McIntosh v. State, 855 S.W.2d

753, 771 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d)); see, e.g., Quiroz v. State, No. 03-19-00478-CR,

2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 289, at *18 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (“As an initial matter, we note that a trial court must enter a

deadly weapon finding when a jury makes an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon “was used

or exhibited during the . . . commission of a felony offense; or . . . immediate flight from

the commission of a felony offense; and . . . the defendant . . . used or exhibited a deadly

weapon; or . . . was a party to the offense and knew that a deadly weapon would be used

or exhibited.” (emphasis added) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.054(b)-

(d))).

         And although it was addressing potential harm associated with the failure to

submit a deadly weapon special issue in the guilt-innocence charge, the Luken Court

emphasized that:

         Evidence of any weapon used would invariably be admissible at the guilt
         stage of trial as res gestae of the offense. That the specific character of
         weapon or manner of its use was erroneously made an issue to be resolved

[14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d))). Moreover, it is particularly telling that McGruder concedes that he has found
no authority holding charge error under the circumstances in this case.

McGruder v. State                                                                                     Page 11
       concurrently with the question of guilt or innocence could not, in our view,
       have so inflamed or distracted the jury as to deprive appellant of a fair and
       impartial trial.

780 S.W.2d at 268-69. McGruder’s use of his hands, in a manner capable of causing

serious bodily injury or death to the complainant by strangling her, is res gestae of the

offense and properly considered during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. See Wesbrook

v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“This evidence is considered ‘res

gestae,’ under the reasoning that events do not occur in a vacuum, and the jury has a right

to hear what occurred immediately prior to and subsequent to the commission of that act

so that it may realistically evaluate the evidence.”); see also Freeman v. State, No. 10-12-

00183-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8566, at **7-8 (Tex. App.—Waco July 11, 2013, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by admitting evidence that the defendant showed the child victim a

pornographic video that provided pertinent background information that assisted the

jury in understanding the underlying sexual assaults, specifically the defendant’s efforts

to make the child victim comfortable with the actual sexual acts perpetrated).

       Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that it was error to submit the deadly

weapon special issue in the court’s charge for the guilt-innocence phase. We therefore

overrule McGruder’s second issue.

McGruder v. State                                                                      Page 12
                                     Conclusion

       Having overruled both of McGruder’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

                                             STEVE SMITH
                                             Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson,
       and Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed March 1, 2023
Do not publish
[CR25]

McGruder v. State                                                            Page 13