Court Opinion

ID: 9402115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 14:06:04.624937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.334799
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1114

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              TIFFANY CIPROTTI.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant appeals from an order that denied her motion

 to withdraw her plea of guilty to operating under the influence

 of intoxicating liquor (second offense).            The thrust of the

 defendant's argument is that she received ineffective assistance

 of counsel at the plea stage, because defense counsel did not

 advise her that she had a "complete defense" to a different

 charge that she was then facing -- for operating without a

 mandated ignition interlock device.           The interlock charge would

 have carried a mandatory minimum sentence of six months in jail,

 and was dismissed at the time the defendant made the plea at

 issue.

       We affirm the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea.

       Background.     The defendant was stopped by a State trooper

 while driving at 2:10 A.M. on January 16, 2020, in the city of
Leominster.   The defendant did not have a driver's license, and

had not had a driver's license since 2011.     The officer reported

that the defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and that

her speech was slurred.     The trooper noticed a strong odor of

alcohol emanating from the defendant's breath.     On exiting the

car, the defendant was unsteady on her feet, and was holding

onto the car for balance.     The trooper administered field

sobriety tests, and formed the opinion that the defendant was

under the influence.

    The defendant was charged with (1) unlicensed operation of

a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 10; (2) operating under the

influence of liquor (third offense), G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a)

(1); and (3) operating without an ignition interlock, G. L.

c. 90, § 24S (a).   In February 2022, the defendant pleaded

guilty, after a colloquy with a District Court judge, to

unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle and operating under the

influence of liquor (amended to second offense).     The

Commonwealth dismissed the ignition interlock charge as part of

the negotiated plea.   During the plea colloquy –- the propriety

of which is not challenged –- the defendant affirmed the truth

of the facts stated above.     The defendant also testified that

she had had sufficient time to speak with her attorney prior to

pleading guilty, and that she was satisfied with his advice.

The judge also inquired of defense counsel, who confirmed that

                                   2
he had reviewed with the defendant the elements of the various

charges, the maximum penalties, and the defendant's possible

defenses.   The defendant was sentenced to six months in the

house of correction, suspended for two years of probation, and

was ordered to complete an inpatient treatment program, to

abstain from alcohol, and to comply with alcohol testing.

    Four months later, in June of 2022, the defendant filed the

motion for new trial at issue, seeking to set aside her guilty

plea.   The defendant argued that she had received ineffective

assistance of counsel, because counsel had incorrectly advised

her that she had "no defense" to the operating without an

ignition interlock charge.    The defendant contended that, to the

contrary, she had a complete defense to that charge because she

was not a licensed driver, and thus could not be guilty under

G. L. c. 90, § 24S, because that crime required that she had

operated a vehicle "while" she was a licensed operator required

to have such a device.    See Commonwealth v. Pettit, 83 Mass.

App. Ct. 401 (2013).     The defendant asserts that counsel's error

was material, because had she known that she could not be

convicted of the interlock charge, she would have gone to trial

on the operating under the influence charge.

    The defendant submitted three affidavits in support of her

motion –- hers, her mother's, and defense counsel's.    The

defendant's affidavit set forth the contentions listed above

                                  3
about the advice she received from defense counsel, and the

defendant's mother's affidavit stated that she also had been

present during the meetings with defense counsel, and

corroborated the defendant's affidavit.   Defense counsel's

affidavit stated, in relevant part, that "[o]ver the life of the

case and on the day of trial, [he] believed that [the defendant]

had a viable defense" to all three charges, but that, "after

advising [the defendant] of the defenses . . ., she decided to

tender a guilty plea."   Defense counsel's affidavit thus appears

to contradict the defendant's affidavit, at least in part, by

indicating that he believed the defendant had an (unspecified)

defense to the interlock claim, and that he had advised her of

that defense.

    The District Court judge (the same judge that had taken the

plea) denied the defendant's motion.   The judge noted that he

"credit[ed] the [a]ffidavit of [defense counsel] where he

instructed the defendant that she had a viable defense(s) to the

charge of [o]peration without an [i]gnition [i]nterlock, but

that the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty nonetheless."

This appeal followed.

    Discussion.   A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated

as a motion for new trial under Mass R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as

appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), and is to be allowed only

"if it appears that justice may not have been done."    See

                                4
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 467 Mass. 1002, 1004 (2014).     We

review the denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion or

other error of law.    See id.   Where, as here, the judge who

denies the motion for new trial is the same judge who took the

guilty plea, we pay "[p]articular deference . . . to the rulings

of [the] motion judge."    See Commonwealth v. Lastowski, 478

Mass. 572, 575 (2018).

    A defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel

must meet a two-part test.    First, "a defendant must show that

. . . the 'behavior of counsel [fell] measurably below that

which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,'" and

second, that "counsel's poor performance 'likely deprived the

defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of

defence'" -- that is, that the defendant was "prejudice[d]"

(citations omitted).     Lastowski, 478 Mass. at 575-576.   The

thrust of the defendant's appeal is that the judge abused his

discretion here, because (she asserts) "there was no actual

dispute as to trial counsel's failure to advise the [defendant]

of an available, likely successful legal defense to the

interlock charge."     The premise of this argument is incorrect,

because as noted above, defense counsel averred that he did

advise the defendant that she had a defense to the interlock

charge, and the judge credited that averment in denying the

motion.   But here we need not rest our decision on defense

                                  5
counsel's averment, because in any event, the defendant did not

satisfy her burden of showing prejudice.

     To prevail, the defendant needed to show not only

ineffective assistance by her lawyer, but also that, but for the

lawyer's failure, there is a "reasonable probability" that the

"result of the proceeding would have been different" (citation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 46 (2011).

Here, that burden required the defendant to show at least (1)

that if properly advised, she would have gone to trial on the

operating under the influence charge,1 and (2) that doing so

would have been "rational under the circumstances," because she

had an "available, substantial ground of defence" (citations

omitted).   Id.   Cf. Commonwealth v. Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 432

(2016) ("defense is 'substantial' . . . where we have a serious

doubt whether [a] jury verdict would have been the same had the

defense been presented").

     The defendant, however, has not addressed why it would have

been rational for her to proceed to trial on the operating under

the influence charge, where the charge was a "third offense,"

which also carried a mandatory minimum jail sentence.     G. L.

c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).    The evidence recited by the

1 The defendant does not mention the driving without a license
charge, but the defendant had no chance of prevailing as to that
charge. The premise of her defense to the interlock charge is
that she did not have a license.

                                  6
Commonwealth was quite strong –- the defendant was stopped late

at night, had alcohol on her breath, admitted to having one

drink, could not navigate outside the car without holding onto

it, and apparently failed the field sobriety tests.   The

defendant does not address any of this evidence in her brief;

indeed, the police report as to the field sobriety tests is not

included in the record.   The defendant thus has not shown that

she had a defense and that it would have been rational for her

to go to trial, when doing so would have risked mandatory jail

time that was avoided by her guilty plea to the reduced charge.

Under the circumstances, even if the defendant had shown

ineffective assistance of counsel (and we do not hold that she

did), the defendant failed to meet her burden to show prejudice,

and we thus discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of her

motion.   See, e.g., Lastowski, 478 Mass. at 579 (no abuse of

discretion in denial of motion to withdraw plea where defendant

failed to show prejudice); Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 94 Mass.

App. Ct. 168, 179 (2018) (motion to withdraw plea properly

denied where case against defendant was strong and "nothing

                                 7
beyond [defendant's] affidavit . . . suggest[ed] the defendant

would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's conduct").

                                      Order denying motion for a
                                        new trial affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Henry,
                                        Desmond & Englander, JJ.2),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    June 15, 2023.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  8