Court Opinion

ID: 9705199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:59:41.62522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:08.861271
License: Public Domain

LÓPEZ, Justice,
concurring.
The majority reaches the correct result and I join in the panel’s opinion. However, there is an additional reason why this summary judgment should be reversed. NATCO moved for summary judgment, arguing that Salazar could not recover because she sustained her injuries during the commission of a crime — driving while intoxicated (DWI). NATCO relied on subsection (a) of section 86.001 of the Texas Practices and Remedies Code. Salazar responded, arguing that subsection (b) of the section created an exception to subsection (a) and that her claim fell within the exception. Albeit an oddly-worded provision, *415Salazar is correct: as written, subsection (b) creates an exception.
Ordinarily, a court need not reach the question of legislative intent when interpreting the meaning of the statute. Where the language of the statute is clear, a court can simply rely on the plain meaning of the language. But where only part of the statute is clear, the court must look further. Arguably, subsection (a) standing alone is clear: it bars a person convicted of a criminal offense from recovering damages for injuries sustained during the commission of a crime. In effect, subsection (a) creates an affirmative defense for potential defendants. But despite the clarity of subsection (a), subsection (b) is ambiguous. Subsection (b) is poorly drafted and contains double negatives that obscure the drafters’ intentions. As a result, this court must consider the legislative intent to give meaning to section 86.001.
The legislative history of the applicable bill indicates that section 86.001 was intended to prevent the perpetrator of a crime from suing the victim of his crime. See generally Public Hearing for HB 692 before the House Civil Practices Committee, 74th Leg., R.S. (April 12, 1995 & May 11, 1995) (tape recordings on file with the Texas House of Representatives, House Audio-Video Services); Public Hearing for HB 692 before the Senate Jurisprudence, 74th Leg., R.S. (May 25, 1995 & May 27, 1995) (tape recordings on file with the Senate Staff Services Office). The bill was written after a husband intervened in the sexual assault of his wife and the husband injured the assailant. The assailant sued the couple, and although the case was ultimately justly resolved, the woman experienced a great deal of grief and expense. HB 692 was drafted to preclude this from happening again.
Only one concern was raised when the bill was discussed in the House committee. That issue is reflected in subsection (b)(2). The bill was amended to add subsection (b)(2), to ensure a convicted person was not precluded from recovering from an injury sustained as a result of a “trap gun” type device. The legislative history does not mention DWI or any other criminal offense.
With all this in mind, section (a) can be reconciled with section (b) so that the statute makes sense. The drafter probably intended the statute to mean:
A claimant who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor may not sue the victim of the felony or misdemeanor for an injury sustained during the prevention or commission of the felony or misdemeanor if the injury would not have been sustained but for the commission of the felony or misdemeanor, or for injury that resulted from the claimant’s apprehension during or immediately folloio-ing the commission of the felony or misdemeanor.
Under this reading, a claimant could sue for injury he sustained as a result of a retaliatory action' — e.g., the husband subsequently discovers who assaulted his wife and then attacks and injures the perpetrator. As logical as this interpretation is, the statute is not written this way. Instead, the statute is written to establish an affirmative defense — subsection (a), and an exception to the affirmative defense — subsection (b).
DWI is ordinarily a victimless crime.1 In this particular DWI, Salazar was perhaps her own victim. As a result, the *416statute doesn’t seem to apply at all. Nonetheless, the language of the subsection (a) applies to “a claimant that has been convicted of a felony or a misdemean- or” — language that prevents the majority from reaching the legislative intent. But Salazar should prevail in this appeal even without reaching legislative intent because NATCO asserted the affirmative defense created by subsection (a), and Salazar asserted that her claim fell within the exception to the affirmative defense as provided in subsection (b). As a result, the summary judgment burden shifted to NATCO to raise a fact question about whether subsection (b) applied. NATCO never addressed subsection (b). I believe this to be an additional ground for reversal of summary judgment.

. I state this only in the context that the majority of people charged with DWI are apprehended before they cause an accident and injure others. I recognize that the ravages of alcoholism do take their toll on the alcoholic and well as on family, co-workers, and friends.