Court Opinion

ID: 9780878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 03:05:59.913837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:15.421037
License: Public Domain

Justice HEARN.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I wholeheartedly agree with the majority’s statement that vexatious re*602moval can warrant sanctions, and I agree that the sanctions before us on appeal should be reversed. While I further agree with the finding that the second removal was interposed for delay, it is my opinion that Appellants had a good faith belief in the legal underpinnings of the second removal.
In my view, the majority places too much emphasis on the original pleadings filed in this case. All parties agree that based on the district court’s resolution of the original removal, the complaint itself does not raise questions of federal law. However, removal is not always “based upon the claims alleged in the initial pleading”; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) specifically permits removal “[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable ” and it later becomes removable based on an “amended pleading, motion, order or other paper.” (emphasis added). At this juncture, we must therefore examine Appellants’ belief that these other papers stated a federal question, not whether the complaint implicated questions of federal law.
In 2004, Appellants’ removal was premised upon the necessity of resolving substantial questions of federal law raised by a state law cause of action, not traditional federal question jurisdiction.11 The district court remanded this matter because the only federal questions raised related to Appellants’ defenses. However, Appellants did remove specifically on the basis of pure federal question jurisdiction in 2010.12 Although the complaint itself only raised state law claims, Appellants relied on section 1446(b) to remove based on Dr. Wieters’ submissions to the circuit court in the weeks leading up to trial. Appellants accordingly removed because these other papers — the memorandum, pre-trial brief, and proposed jury instructions stating that the HCQIA grants “explicit authority” for his claims and even preempts certain areas of state *603law — purported to raise a federal law-based claim. Thus, contrary to the view of the circuit court and accepted by the majority, Appellants did not seek to remove on the same grounds in 2010 as they did in 2004. Furthermore, the second removal was not based on Appellants’ defenses, but rather on Dr. Wieters’ statements that he was bringing his claims under the explicit authority of federal law.
Given the statements contained in Dr. Wieters’ filings and the advice Appellants sought from their general counsel, counsel for their insurance company, a law professor, and a highly respected local attorney, I believe the only reasonably conclusion is that Appellants had a good faith basis for removal in 2010. Based on the record before the Court, it is purely conjectural to conclude otherwise. Additionally, in my opinion the removal was not based on frivolous grounds but rather on the novel issue within the Fourth Circuit of whether the HCQIA provides for an independent cause of action. The fact that the district court predicted the Fourth Circuit would not find a private cause of action has no bearing on Appellants’ subjective beliefs. Therefore, this is not a situation with “attorneys engaging in semantic games with the courts” but rather attorneys paying close attention to arguments made by their adversaries during litigation. While this undoubtedly is a fine line to walk, the record before us in this case convinces me that Appellants had a good faith belief in the grounds supporting the second removal.
However, I agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the removal was interposed for delay. I too wish to reiterate that a defendant generally has a right to remove a case up to the start of trial. Holding otherwise would undoubtedly chill the statutory right a defendant has to remove a case to federal court. The record shows Appellants received notice of Dr. Wieters’ arguments knowing full well that the trial had a date certain set less than one month away. Moreover, Appellants could and should have sought clarification from Dr. Wieters or taken some other action to determine whether he was raising a federal question before receiving the additional filings on the eve of trial. Given the impending date certain for trial, there certainly were steps Appellants could have taken to ameliorate the inevitable delay their removal would cause. Because they *604did not do so in spite of this knowledge, I do not believe the circuit court abused its discretion.

. This is known as the "litigation provoking problem.” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-810, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). In those cases, jurisdiction is not premised on the existence of federal law creating a cause of action, but instead on the "presence of a federal issue in a state-created cause of action.” Id. at 809-10, 106 S.Ct. 3229.

. Appellants also reargued the 2004 grounds in the alternative. It is in response to these reargued grounds that the district court repeated that federal questions raised solely as a defense are not a sufficient basis for removal.