Court Opinion

ID: 9674196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:24:32.706004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:26.028222
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that §§ 545.900 and 545.920, V.A.M.S., are applicable and that it is mandatory under their provisions that defendant’s motion to be discharged be sustained.
The principal opinion quotes § 545.900, but I repeat it to demonstrate that its provisions are clear and unambiguous and do not call for - any construction. The section reads as follows:
“If any person indicted for any offense, and held to answer on bail, shall not be *425brought to trial before the end of the third term of the court in which the cause is pending which shall be held after such indictment found, he shall be entitled to be discharged, so far as relates to such offense, unless the delay happened on his application, or be occasioned by the want of time to try such cause at such third term.”
The only thing added by § 545.920 is that when a defendant is at liberty on bond (as defendant was) and the county has more than two regular terms a year (as Stoddard County did), a defendant is not entitled to be discharged until four terms have passed without trial.
It is undisputed that after this case went to Stoddard County on change of venue, four terms in Stoddard County passed without defendant being tried. Hence, the issue squarely presented is whether, under §§ 545.900 and 545.920, the passage of those four terms without any showing that the delay happened on defendant’s application or was caused by want of time to try the case entitles defendant to be discharged.
The rule is well established that criminal cases are to be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused. State v. Chadeayne, Mo., 323 S.W.2d 680; State ex rel. Stevens v. Wurdeman, 295 Mo. 566, 246 S.W. 189; State v. McClary, Mo.App., 399 S.W.2d 597. Sections 545.900 and 545.920 expressly state that a defendant shall be entitled to be discharged as to an offense if four terms pass without the case being brought to trial unless (1) “the delay happened on his application” or (2) the delay “be occasioned by the want of time to try such cause” at the fourth term (in the factual situation here presented). I submit that this language could not be clearer or more direct. If the requisite number of terms pass (variable only on the basis of whether defendant is on bail and whether the county has more than two regular terms), defendant is entitled to be discharged subject only to the specifically delineated statutory exceptions. Neither of these is applicable here. Hence, it is clear under the unambiguous language of the statute that defendant was entitled to be discharged.
This would have been the result under our earlier cases of State v. Wear, 145 Mo. 162, 46 S.W. 1099, and State ex rel. Stevens v. Wurdeman, supra. The principal opinion overrules both of those cases. I believe that both are sound and correctly construe these statutory provisions. They should be followed, not overruled.
The principal opinion writes into these statutory provisions something which the legislature did not say either expressly or by implication. It wrote in two exceptions in the statute. The principal opinion now writes in a third which says, “We accordingly hold that a defendant is not entitled to be released under the statutes in question (assuming the statutory exceptions are not applicable) simply because the required number of terms have elapsed. In addition to that he must show that he has demanded a trial, and that such request was made without success for a reasonable length of time before his right to release has been asserted.”
Adding this third proviso to the two specified in § 545.900 is, in my judgment, judicial legislation. As a result of this third proviso the statute now is not to be applied, even though the delay was caused by the state, if defendant did not demand a trial and continue to do so “without success for a reasonable length of time.” This simply is not what the legislature said when it wrote these statutory provisions and is not how this Court en Banc in Wurdeman and Wear interpreted these statutory provisions.
This is a statute of limitation. A defendant is entitled to have it applied as written, just as a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to the benefit of a statute of limitation relating to the time in which prosecution must be commenced, and a party in civil litigation is entitled to the benefit of the particular statute of limitation applicable to that type of claim. In *426such circumstances a person is not required to take affirmative action and ask that a prosecution be instituted or that suit be brought as a condition to claiming the benefit of the applicable statute of limitation. The mere passage of the requisite period of time is sufficient to make the limitation effective, absent, of course, some applicable statutory exception or an affirmative waiver by the person. The same should be true here. The passage of the required period brings this limitation into play unless a statutory exception applies or defendant affirmatively waives the statute. Waiver does not occur by silence or by failure to actively demand a trial.
I recognize that the majority rule in this country probably is as the principal opinion states. However, there is a contrary line of authority. Annotation, 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 334.1 I will not lengthen this dissent by discussing these cases. Their philosophy is well stated in Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203, 207:
“The statute * * * is a limitation upon the right of the state to hold a person by recognizance to answer a criminal charge. * * * it casts no burden upon the defendant, but does cast an imperative duty upon the state and its officers, the trial courts and prosecuting attorneys, to see that a defendant held on recognizance is brought to trial agreeable with * * * the constitution and its implementing statute. It is not a fault of the defendant if he remain silent while under recognizance, * * * that is his right. He is not required to make any demand of the state or the court for a speedy trial. * * * A contrary statement made by this court in Chelf v. State, 1944, 223 Ind. 70, 58 N.E.2d 353 is hereby overruled.”
In my view, the minority rule is the correct one. It is the one adopted by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Criminal Justice. In its volume “Standards Relating to Speedy Trial,” page 16, Standard 2.2, relating to the running of time limits, it is stated that the statute runs “without demand by the defendant.” On page 17 of the Commentary the minority’ rule is noted and then appears this discussion :
“This latter view is adopted in the standard. One reason for this position is that there are a number of situations, such as where the defendant is unaware of the charge or where the defendant is without counsel, in which it is unfair to require a demand. * * * Jurisdictions with a demand requirement are faced with the continuing problem of defining exceptions, a process which has not always been carried out with uniformity. * * * More important, the demand requirement is inconsistent with the public interest in prompt disposition of criminal cases. Consistent with the policies expressed in Part I of these standards, the trial of a criminal case should not be unreasonably delayed merely because the defendant does not think that it is in his best interest to seek prompt disposition of the charge.”
There is a growing recognition, as expressed in the above quotation, of the interest of the public in prompt disposition of criminal cases. At the National Conference on the Judiciary at Williamsburg in March 1971, there was strong emphasis on the importance of speedy trial. The Con-census of that Conference included the following statement: “A speedy trial is as essential from the public’s point of view as from the defendant’s. If a speedy trial cannot be provided, the prosecution should be required to show cause why case should not be dismissed.”
Under these circumstances, I think it is unfortunate that instead of enforcing these statutory provisions as written and as interpreted in the Wear and Wurdeman cases, the principal opinion extracts teeth from the statute by writing in a judicial modification saying that the statute will not *427be enforced until defendant has taken affirmative action and has demanded trial without success for a reasonable time (whatever that period is determined to be).
It isn’t clear to me whether the requirement that defendant request trial for a reasonable length of time before he may assert his right to release means that he must do so only during the last term before the statute runs or whether he must do so during each term if it is to be considered in the computation, or just what the burden now imposed on defendants will be. Also, one can only wonder what the situation will be if defendant is without counsel and does not demand trial. Will the statute not run under these circumstances?

. See also Glasgow v. Alaska, 469 P.2d 682, decided subsequent to the foregoing annotation.