Court Opinion

ID: 9720927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:44:55.234468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.365797
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying the Litchfields's motion to suppress. -In its opinion, the majority relies primarily on Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind.1994), reh'g denied, while rejecting State v. Stamper, 788 N.E.2d 862 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied, as incorrect for having "created a bright-line test." Op. at 716.
It is well settled that the purpose of Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution is to protect from unreasonable police activity, those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private. See Moran, 644 N.E.2d at 540. Thus, the provision must receive a liberal construction in its application to guarantee the people against unreasonable search and seizures. See id. In Moran, our supreme court upheld the search and seizure of garbage left at the curb in front of Moran's house. The supreme court observed that: (1) the police conducted themselves in the same manner as those who pick up the garbage, (2) the police did not disturb Moran or his neighborhood, and (8) the police did mot trespass into Moran's property. Moran, 644 N.E.2d at 541. (Emphasis added).
Subsequently, in Bell v. State, 626 N.E.2d 570 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. de-mied, an intermediate decision between Moran and Stamper, we upheld a police search of Bell's garbage where Bell placed his trash outside of the fenced-in area of his property and the police seized it without stepping onto his property. Id. at 572. (Emphasis added).
Analyzing the facts in Stamper using the Moran test, we held that Stamper had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash bag located on his own property. After reviewing the facts in Stamper, we were particularly concerned that: (1) the police officer trespassed onto Stamper's property, and (2) the police officer waited two hours after Stamper took out his trash before picking up the garbage bag, during which the officer could have attempted to obtain a search warrant. Stamper, 788 N.E.2d at 866-67.
We further clarified in Stamper that "iJn Moran and Bell, our supreme court and this court have held that coming onto the property was the benchmark. As long as the police did not have to enter the property, the search was considered reasonable." See Stamper, 788 N.E.2d at 866. Our supreme court, by denying transfer in both Bell and Stamper, implicitly granted its approval of our characterization of the weight afforded to the Moran factors. To hold otherwise would result in police officers searching everyone's garbage bags on their property without reason and thereby learning of a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. See id. at 867 (quoting State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985)). It is exactly this type of overbroad government intrusion that Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution was intended to prevent. See id.
Here, our review of the record reveals that not only had the Litchfields contracted with a private waste collection service company for the removal of their garbage, Trooper Ringer clearly trespassed onto *718the Litchfields's property to seize the trash bags. As such, I find that the Litch-fields's expectation of privacy was reasonable, and thus, the trial court erred by denying their motion to suppress.
Furthermore, the majority appears to curtail the Moran decision by introducing a new element to the test. In its analysis, the majority, after describing the area where the trash containers were held, concluded that "[tlhese facts demonstrate that the area where the trash containers were located was not curtilage, i.e{,] connected with 'the conduct of family affairs and for carrying on domestic purposes."" Op. at 717. Although the element of "curtilage" is frequently discussed under a Fourth Amendment analysis, a claim under Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution is analyzed independent of federal law. See, eg., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-43, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628-30, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); U.S. v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 979-80 (7th Cir.1996), cert. demied 519 U.S. 1135, 117 S.Ct. 1002, 136 L.Ed.2d 881. To date, no reported Indiana cases have made a distinction between the curtilage of someone's domain and other property for the purpose of the trespassing requirement under Moran. In its adoption of this distinction, the majority represents a sweeping change to, and in my opinion an unnecessary deterioration of, our supreme court's liberal interpretation of Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.