Court Opinion

ID: 9759458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:17:02.439455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.825107
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority’s reasoning and holdings with regard to points of error two and three, I disagree with their holding that the structure burglarized, an unrented apartment, was not a habitation (point of error number 1). The majority in its opinion cites Jones v. State, 532 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Crim.App.1976), wherein a new house, never occupied was held not to be a habitation but which holding, quoted by the majority, defines a habitation as a “structure ... actually adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons or at least at some prior time used for the overnight accommodation of persons and still adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons.” (emphasis added) The prior time position of the holding is squarely on point with the case before us since the apartment in our case had been rented many times before.
Other cases cited by the majority, Hargett, Lewis, Bazroux, and Blankenship, I read to support the overruling of Appellant’s first point of error. Moss v. State, 574 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), also cited by the majority, admittedly appears to support a holding that a house formally rented but not rented at the time of the burglary is not a habitation. However, the evidence in Moss indicates that the house was being used as a storeroom for furniture and thus was not then adapted for the overnight accommodations of persons.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the conviction for burglary of a habitation.