Court Opinion

ID: 9366417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 18:04:32.425301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:52.133783
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220316-U
                                Nos. 2-22-0316, 2-22-0317, cons.
                                  Order filed January 26, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                              IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

In re Au.F. & Al.F., Minors            ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                       ) of Kane County.
                                       )
                                       ) Nos. 19-JA-20
                                       )       19-JA-21
                                       )
                                       )
(The People of the State of Illinois,  ) Honorable
Petitioner-Appellee v. Amanda I.,      ) Kathryn Karayannis,
Respondent-Appellant).                 ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Jorgensen and Hudson concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: In these consolidated appeals, mother’s attorney is granted leave to withdraw where
             counsel demonstrated that there was no nonfrivolous issue to raise on appeal.

¶2     On August 26, 2022, the circuit court of Kane County entered orders terminating the

parental rights of respondent, Amanda I., in her children Au.F., and Al.F. Amanda appeals the trial

court’s findings of unfitness in that she: (1) suffered from habitual drunkenness or addiction to

drugs (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 2018)); (2) failed to protect the children from conditions

injurious to their welfare; and (3) failed to make reasonable efforts or progress during a nine-month

period after the children were adjudged neglected. Amanda’s appointed appellate counsel filed a
2023 IL App (2d) 220316-U

motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and In re Alexa J., 345

Ill. App. 3d 985 (2003), which asserted that there are no issues of arguable merit to be raised on

Amanda’s behalf. On our own motion, we consolidated the appeals for decision. We grant

counsel’s motion and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On March 6, 2019, the State filed petitions for adjudication of neglect pertaining to the

minor children, Au.F. (born February 20, 2015) and Al.F. (born March 30, 2017). The rights of

the father of both children, William F. are not at issue here. The case was initiated after Au.F.,

when he was three, was found wandering his neighborhood alone in July of 2018. The record

indicates he was found wandering alone on multiple occasions in Elgin. The amended petitions

alleged that the minors were neglected based on the following: (1) Amanda’s history and/or issues

of substance abuse and William’s failure to protect; (2) William’s history and/or issues of

substance abuse and Amanda’s failure to protect; (3) an open “INTACT” case with the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and Amanda’s and/or William’s failure to

fully cooperate with the recommendations; (4) William leaving the minors with Amanda

unsupervised, and William’s failure to protect; and (5) Amanda’s inadequate supervision of Au.F.,

placing him and his sibling Al.F. at risk of harm, and William’s failure to protect.

¶5     A shelter care hearing was held on March 7, 2019. Both parents were present and were

appointed attorneys. At the hearing, Jeannette Camacho from Children’s Home and Aid Society

of Illinois (CHASI) testified that she was an intact caseworker assigned to the cases of both minors

in 2018 after the incident with Au.F. Camacho testified that both parents were placed into the

Families and Children in Treatment (FACT) program. As part of the program, the parents were

drug tested. Camacho was familiar with the results of the parents’ drug tests and testified that

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Amanda tested positive for benzodiazepines, opiates, Oxycodone, and cannabis in July of 2018;

positive for benzodiazepines, opiates, and cannabis on August 14, 2018, and August 16, 2018;

positive for benzodiazepines, opiates, buprenorphine, Oxycodone, cannabis, and alcohol on

August 23, 2018; and failed to appear for her drug test on August 24, 2018. Amanda did not

complete the FACT program and it was terminated on August 30, 2018. Additionally, an integrated

assessment was conducted, a domestic violence assessment was completed by William, and

Amanda started, but did not complete her domestic violence assessment because she did not want

to finish.

¶6      A safety plan was put into place in August of 2018. Amanda was not permitted to be with

the minors unsupervised from August through December of 2018. Amanda, William, and the

children lived together until Amanda moved nearby to a family member’s home. A second safety

plan was put into place in February of 2019 because Amanda had tested positive for cocaine,

opiates, cannabis, THC, amphetamines, and methamphetamines on February 5, 2019. Both

Amanda and William denied the results of the drug test and refused to sign the safety plan. Amanda

claimed to have prescriptions for any positive drops, but no proof of the prescriptions was

presented. On February 28, 2019, Camacho observed Amanda leave William’s house with Au.F.,

get into her car, and drive away in violation of the safety plan. The trial court found probable cause

and an urgent and immediate necessity to remove the children from the home. The trial court

awarded temporary custody of the minors to DCFS on March 7, 2019.

¶7      On June 5, 2019, an adjudicatory hearing was held on the neglect petitions. Amanda

stipulated to the allegation that the minors were neglected based on her history and/or issues of

substance abuse and William’s failure to protect. On June 26, 2019, the trial court found that both

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parents were unfit and unable to safely care for Au.F. and Al.F. and the children were made wards

of the court. On December 19, 2019, the trial court terminated Amanda’s visitation.

¶8     On February 25, 2020, the first permanency review hearing was held. At that hearing the

goal was changed from return home to substitute care pending the termination of parental rights.

Amanda’s drug drops showed a decline in drug use. She completed an intake assessment for a

substance abuse recovery program with Lighthouse Recovery. She additionally reported to her

CHASI caseworker that she was enrolled in a medically assisted treatment for outpatient services

related to substance abuse. At the time, however, no treatment programs had been completed. On

December 5, 2019, Amanda tested positive for opiates, THC, and amphetamines. She began

individual therapy but stopped attending and was assigned another therapist. Amanda did not start

domestic violence services. Amanda successfully completed eight parenting classes. Amanda was

diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder, and case management suggested that she seek on-

going psychiatric care, but Amanda refused to sign a release for information so caseworkers could

not reevaluate her treatment.

¶9      At the time of the first permanency review hearing, the children were together in the same

foster home and the trial court found that they were doing very well and getting the care and

attention they needed.

¶ 10   On June 29, 2020, the State filed petitions to terminate Amanda’s parental rights as to both

Au.F. and Al.F. The petition alleged that Amanda: (1) suffered from habitual drunkenness or

addiction to drugs (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 2018)); (2) failed to protect the children from

conditions injurious to their welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2018)); and (3) failed to make

reasonable efforts or progress during a nine-month period after the children were adjudged

neglected (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2018)). A second permanency review hearing was held

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intermittently from December 15, 2020, until February 3, 2021. The trial court heard five

witnesses, two CHASI caseworkers, a Jewish Child and Family Services of Chicago (JCFS)

caseworker, a therapist at Ecker Center for Behavioral Health, and a doctor at the Greater Elgin

Family Care Center. The court found that the appropriate goal should remain substitute care

pending termination of parental rights.

¶ 11   On August 3, 2021, the trial court conducted a third permanency review hearing. The trial

court considered DCFS and CASA reports, as well as two letters from therapists at the Ecker

Center and Greater Elgin Family Care, which indicated Amanda was complying with therapy and

medication treatment programs, including Suboxone treatments, and her drug tests were

appropriate. The trial court found that Amanda had made efforts, but not reasonable or substantial

progress and the goal remained substitute care.

¶ 12   On March 22, 2022, a fourth permanency review hearing was held. The trial court reviewed

notes provided by Amanda from her psychiatrist indicating she was in remission from bipolar

disorder and diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and prescribed aripiprazole and

dextroamphetamine. Amanda offered documents from Ecker Center that showed she completed

31 sessions and three reassessments as of January 10, 2022, and that it was recommended Amanda

be discharged satisfactorily from treatment. The trial court found that Amanda was working on her

individual goals but had not shown how she addressed the root causes of her case coming into

court, and the goal remained substitute care.

¶ 13   On June 22, 2022, an order of protection was entered prohibiting Amanda from contacting

the foster parents or Au.F. or Al.F. due to threatening communication. We also note that throughout

these proceedings, the trial court repeatedly admonished Amanda regarding her conduct when

appearing via Zoom. Specifically, because these are closed, confidential, sensitive proceedings,

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Amanda was instructed to appear in private. Amanda repeatedly caused disruptions in the publicly

accessible Zoom lobby and also appeared via Zoom from settings in which other persons were in

the background, and thus able to overhear what was occurring in court. After several violations of

the court’s direction regarding Zoom, the trial court ordered Amanda to appear in court in person

for future proceedings. Amanda did not comply with that direction either, and thus elected to be

absent from future hearings.

¶ 14   On July 12, 2022, William surrendered his parental rights and consented to the adoption of

Au.F. and Al.F. by their foster parents.

¶ 15   The hearing on the State’s termination of parental rights petition began on August 15, 2022.

We note that Amanda initially filed a request to continue the trial so that she could appear in

person. Then, she subsequently requested another continuance so that she could appear via Zoom.

The trial court declined to delay the case any further and Amanda did not personally appear at

further hearings. After the unfitness hearings, the trial court found that Amanda was unfit based

on clear and convincing evidence of each count alleged in the State’s petition. The trial court

further determined that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. There

were no post-hearing motions. Amanda timely appealed.

¶ 16                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17   As noted, Amanda’s appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw. Counsel’s motion states

that he has thoroughly reviewed the record, researched the applicable statutes and case law, and

concluded that there are no meritorious issues to be raised on appeal. Counsel’s motion includes a

thorough statement of facts, analyzes each count for which Amanda was found unfit, and

ultimately explains why this appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues. Counsel further states that he

served Amanda with a copy of the motion by email at an email address provided by Amanda for

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privacy, because she lived out of state in Florida. We advised Amanda that she had 30 days to

respond to the motion. Amanda filed a four-page reply which we considered.

¶ 18      In his motion to withdraw, counsel discusses the evidence in the record and explains why

he believes there is no reasonable argument that the trial court’s finding of unfitness or termination

of parental rights, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Upon review of the record, we

agree with counsel’s assertions.

¶ 19      The Juvenile Court Act of 1987, 705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2018), provides a two-stage

process for involuntary termination of parental rights. The trial court initially holds an unfitness

hearing, during which the State must prove the parent is unfit, as defined in section 1(D) of the

Adoption Act, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Deandre D., 405 Ill. App. 3d 945, 952

(2010). If the court finds the parent to be unfit, the court then conducts a best-interests hearing to

determine, by the preponderance of the evidence, whether it is in the best interests of the child to

terminate the unfit parent’s rights. Id. We will reverse a trial court’s unfitness or best-interests

determination only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re S.H., 2014 IL App

(3d) 140500, ¶¶ 28, 34. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the

opposite result is clearly evident from the record. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064

(2006).

¶ 20      We first address unfitness. Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act provides various grounds

under which a parent may be found unfit and, here, the trial court found Amanda unfit on all three

grounds alleged in the State’s petition. Counsel addresses each of these findings in his motion and

argues no meritorious arguments could be made with respect to all three counts. We agree.

¶ 21      We note that any one count, properly proven, is sufficient to sustain a finding of parental

unfitness. See In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 296 (2004). Accordingly, we first review the trial court’s

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finding that Amanda failed to protect the children from an environment injurious to their welfare.

This count is supported by the multiple documented occurrences of Au.F. being found walking

around on his own when he was a toddler. The petition also asserts that this failure to supervise

not only endangers Au.F., but also Al.F. We agree. The Elgin Police Department documented

finding Au.F. on multiple occasions, when he was approximately 3 years old, wandering

unsupervised away from the home. On the occurrence that instigated this case, he was found in the

parking lot of a strip mall across the street from William’s house where he was last left in the

backyard. An onlooking couple noticed him and observed that he was alone for more than 15

minutes and they called the police. Amanda and William had been instructed to install sliding

chain locks above the height of the door handle because it was known that Au.F. could reach the

door handles and let himself out of the home. At least one of these chain locks was not engaged at

the time Au.F. left the yard.

¶ 22   The record reflects that Amanda and William had multiple episodes of domestic violence

which resulted in the police being called, and DCFS becoming involved over 10 times. Amanda

failed to complete any domestic violence services, and repeatedly exposed the children to

traumatic incidents. Amanda failed to comply with the safety plan, engaged in continued substance

abuse, repeatedly tested positive for substances not prescribed to her, and failed to complete

recommended counseling and drug treatments.

¶ 23   The children’s wellbeing and development were impacted by these events. Au.F. is

diagnosed with ADHD and PTSD. He is behind in academic subjects for his grade level. Al.F. is

diagnosed with PTSD and she is behind in the social and emotional areas for her grade level. Both

children have been to substantial therapy and continue to require resources.

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¶ 24   There is no fixed definition for “injurious environment,” but it has been interpreted to

include “ ‘the breach of a parent’s duty to ensure a “safe and nurturing shelter” for his or her

children.’ ” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463 (quoting In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346, quoting In

re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995)). We agree with counsel that the trial court’s

determination that Amanda breached her parental duty of ensuring a safe shelter for the minor

children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 25   Next, we determine whether there are any potentially meritorious issues regarding the trial

court’s best-interests determination. At this stage, we consider the children’s welfare and whether

the termination of a parent’s rights will improve their future. See In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766,

771-72 (2002). “The issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is

whether, in light of the child’s needs, parental rights should be terminated.” (Emphasis in original.)

In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004).

¶ 26   When considering whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the

trial court must consider a number of factors within the context of the child’s age and

developmental needs including: (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child; (2) the

development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of

attachments; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the

child’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and

other relatives; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks attendant to entering and

being in substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705

ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a)-(j) (West 2018). At this point in the proceedings, a parent’s interest in

maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home

life. In re M.C., 2018 IL App (4th) 180144, ¶ 34.

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¶ 27   As counsel notes, the trial court considered the statutory factors, and during the best-

interests hearing found that both minors have a close relationship with their foster parents, a foster

sibling who was born after they were already placed in the home who they consider a sibling, and

their extended maternal foster family who live nearby. The children have ties to the community

through numerous sports activities, including swimming, gymnastics, tennis, soccer, and

basketball; the activities are different for each of them according to their interests. Additionally,

the children are enrolled in school and both have IEP plans in place, which the foster parents were

involved in creating. The children each have their own bedroom, which includes space for clothes,

toys, and play. There are other kids in the neighborhood for them to play with, and the foster

parents have relationships with the parents of those children. The trial court took into consideration

the GAL’s opinion that both of the children be freed for adoption. The evidence overwhelmingly

showed that the children are attached to their foster parents, call them “mom” and “dad,” and are

loved. The foster parents have facilitated therapy for both children and have seen great

improvements in the children’s coping mechanisms and responses.

¶ 28   The trial court weighed the evidence presented by Amanda, namely an affidavit from her

mother, Jennifer. In Jennifer’s experience the children were always fed, clothed, and safe. The trial

court found this to be incorrect and that Jennifer “clearly had no knowledge of what these children

were doing in Kindercare,” pointing to Au.F.’s disruptive and violent behavior in daycare. The

foster parents have indicated a willingness and intent to adopt the children. Based on the foregoing,

we agree with counsel that the termination of Amanda’s parental rights was not contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002).

¶ 29   Finally, even though it was not raised after the hearings in a post-hearing motion, which

would have allowed the trial court to address any error that may have occurred, we note that in her

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response filed with this court, Amanda alleged that the trial court denied her the ability to be

present at the termination hearings and was biased against her. We have carefully reviewed the

record and determined that both assertions lack merit. The trial court repeatedly admonished

Amanda about her conduct on Zoom and emphasized strong concerns regarding the security of

information related to this case. Amanda did not heed or respect those warnings. Then, Amanda

ignored the trial court’s admonishment that she appear in person and sought to further delay the

termination hearings.

¶ 30   The purpose of the Act is to ensure that children receive a prompt, just, and final resolution

of their status rather than to remain in limbo. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000). Amanda was

repeatedly admonished about the hearing dates in this case and her need to be present in court due

to legitimate security concerns. As numerous cases instruct, “[a]lthough a parent has a right to be

present at a hearing to terminate parental rights, [their] presence is not mandatory, and the trial

court is not obligated to delay the proceedings until the parent chooses to appear.” In re J.P., 316

Ill. App. 3d 652, 663 (2000). Consequently, “[a] trial court should not hesitate to determine fitness

in the absence of a parent who is attempting to manipulate the system to her or his own advantage.”

Id. The trial court had ample evidence that Amanda’s requests for continuances had no basis in

law or fact. Accordingly, we cannot say—and it cannot be argued—that the trial court abused its

discretion in proceeding with scheduled hearings in Amanda’s absence.

¶ 31   We also have carefully examined the record and discovered no hint of bias from the trial

court judge. The abuse and neglect and termination proceedings here went on for years.

Throughout the pendency of this case, the trial court displayed the patience and sensitivity that we

expect of the judges who hear these cases. The court also attempted to move this case along, again,

to ensure the minors’ permanency and bring this case to a conclusion, rather than leave the children

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in limbo. Finally, the court ensured that Amanda personally was aware of each court date and what

was expected of her in terms of proper courtroom decorum. We are satisfied that the trial court did

everything in its power to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Amanda’s claim to the

contrary is baseless.

¶ 32                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33   For the reasons stated, we grant counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw and affirm the

judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 34   Affirmed.

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