Court Opinion

ID: 9636497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:31:17.374395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:46.459197
License: Public Domain

*114CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
Although I agree with the result in this case, I believe the issue is not as intricate as set forth by the Majority. Simply put, the issue is whether Appellant is barred from seeking compensation from her co-employee, Appellee Dennis. The answer is clear under 77 P.S. § 72 of the Workers Compensation Act (the “Act”):
If disability or death is compensable under this act, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such disability or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong.
[Emphasis added]. Accordingly, under the so-called “co-employee rule” of § 72, Dennis,is not liable to Appellant. Apple v. Reichert, 443 Pa. 289, 278 A.2d 482 (1971); Sylvester v. Peruso, 286 Pa.Super. 225, 428 A.2d 653 (Pa.Super.1981).
Where I believe the Majority errs is in the way the Majority frames the issue: whether the MVFRL expressed a legislative intent to alter the law regarding an employee’s tort liability for injuries sustained by a co-employee.1 The Majority and the Superior Court below have equated this cáse to those involving § 481 of the Act, the exclusivity provision, and have attempted to reconcile § 72 of the Act with the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq. (MVFRL). That exercise is not required in this case. The cases involving the interaction between § 481 of the Act and §§ 1719, 1720 and 1735 of the MVFRL are not analogous to the facts of this case.
It must first be noted that §§ 1719, 1720 and 1735 of the MVFRL do not determine liability; rather, they pertain to subrogation, coverage, and the coordination of benefits among the liable parties. Thus; whether one party is liable to another must first be determined by looking to other relevant law. In this case, it is § 72 of the Act, which provides a type *115of “immunity” for co-employees. Since that law provides that Appellee cannot be held liable in this case, §§ 1719, 1720 and 1735 of the MVFRL are not implicated.
This conclusion is further borne out by scrutinizing the cases cited by the Majority which have examined the interplay between § 481 of the Act and the MVFRL. These cases involve a fundamentally different issue than that in question here. Section 481 of the Act refers to the exclusivity of the employer’s liability, and recognizes that the employer has in fact already assumed liability:
The liability of an employer under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees ...
77 P.S. § 481 [emphasis added]. Thus, the employer has already assumed liability and the purpose of § 481 is to limit the amount of damages the employee can receive. In the cases discussed by the Majority, the respective plaintiffs obtained Workers’ Compensation benefits from their employer (who therefore has conceded liability), but were also trying to obtain insurance benefits under their employer’s policy of motor vehicle insurance. Clearly, the exclusivity of remedies provision, § 481, is implicated in those scenarios, since the employer has conceded liability, and thus the question remains: to what damages is the employee entitled?
That is quite different from the instant case. Although Appellant has received Workers’ Compensation benefits from her employer, she is also trying to hold her co-employee liable> and receive benefits under her co-employee’s personal policy of insurance. I believe this is a significant difference, and as noted above find that the Act answers the question without regard to what the MVFRL provides. In this case, there is simply no liability on the part of the co-employee in the first instance; the question of what damages Appellant may be entitled to under the MVFRL from the co-employee is therefore irrelevant. The legislature has made it clear that co-employees are not liable to one another, 77 P.S. § 72, and I do not believe that because the employee is covered by motor *116vehicle insurance the analysis is altered.2 Simply put, the JVTVFRL does not alter the Workers’ Compensation Act’s scheme for determining liability. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the analysis of the Majority but concur in the result.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. I acknowledge that this is the way the issue was framed in Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal, which was granted' by this Court.

. For instance, if one employee injured another at work by the negligent use of machinery, the injured employee would be barred from suing the negligent employee, even though die negligent employee may be covered by some form of insurance (typically, homeowners' insurance). In the typical case, we do not even consider any other insurance the negligent employee may have.