Court Opinion

ID: 9377430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 19:12:06.079859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:14.172771
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               March 7, 2023
                                                                              EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                          SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                              OF WEST VIRGINIA

Michael Greene,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-0156 (Mercer County 21-C-231-WS)

Shelby Searls, Superintendent,
Huttonsville Correctional Center,
Respondent Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Michael Greene appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, entered
on January 20, 2022, denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1 Upon our review,
we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the
circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        Petitioner was arrested on January 9, 2010, when he was sixteen years old, 2 in connection
with the murder of Clayton Mitchum. Following an initial dismissal, petitioner was recharged with
murder as a juvenile (Mercer County Criminal Case No. 11-JD-11). At the same time, petitioner
was charged with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance (Mercer County Criminal Case
No. 11-JD-118). In April of 2012, petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the State, which
was approved by the circuit court. In that agreement, petitioner consented to an adjudication of
delinquency on the three charges of delivery of a controlled substance and placement in a facility
to complete a youthful offender program. Petitioner further consented to the filing of an
information, agreed to a transfer to adult jurisdiction, and entered a guilty plea to first-degree
robbery as an accessory, stemming from Mr. Mitchum’s murder.
        The plea agreement provided that petitioner’s first-degree robbery sentence would be

       1
        Petitioner is self-represented. Respondent Shelby Searls, Superintendent, Huttonsville
Correctional Center, appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant
Attorney General Lara K. Bisset.
       2
           Petitioner was born in September of 1993.

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capped at twenty years of incarceration and that his sentence would be suspended in favor of
probation in a deferred adjudication. If petitioner successfully completed the terms of his
probation, his guilty plea to robbery would be withdrawn and the case dismissed. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, the circuit court deferred adjudicating petitioner guilty of first-degree robbery and
placed him on five years of probation. Four days later, the State filed a petition to revoke
petitioner’s probation alleging that he broke curfew, associated with felons, and possessed a
concealed weapon. Thereafter, the circuit court revoked petitioner’s probation and, pursuant to the
plea agreement, adjudged him guilty and imposed the specified twenty-year sentence for
first-degree robbery. In State v. Greene (“Greene I”), No. 15-0402 2016 WL 3463468 (W. Va.
June 21, 2016) (memorandum decision), this Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to award
petitioner a total of 317 days of credit for time served. Id. at *4.

        Nevertheless, during petitioner’s first habeas corpus proceeding, initiated in 2015, he
included a claim alleging that his trial counsel failed to file an appeal in his criminal case.
Petitioner also raised additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner further
alleged that the State failed to fulfill the terms of the plea agreement by transferring him to adult
jurisdiction despite the provision in the agreement in which he consented to such a transfer. In
Greene v. Ames (“Greene II”), No. 18-0072 2019 WL 2246623 (W. Va. May 24, 2019)
(memorandum decision), this Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of petitioner’s first habeas
petition, rejecting the following assignments of error: (1) petitioner’s trial counsel failed to file an
appeal in his criminal case; (2) the evidence failed to establish that petitioner violated the terms of
his probation; (3) the circuit court failed to review the probation revocation hearing record; (4) the
circuit court erred in placing petitioner on adult probation when he was still under juvenile
jurisdiction; and (5) the circuit court erred in concluding that petitioner’s completion of a core
curriculum did not satisfy the term of his plea agreement requiring “successful completion of a
two-year [a]ssociate[’]s degree program or an equivalent trade-school certification.” Id. at *4.

         On November 22, 2021, petitioner filed his second habeas petition, alleging that habeas
counsel in his first habeas proceeding failed to: (1) discover all of the habeas grounds that would
possibly justify relief; (2) argue that the State failed to fulfill the terms of the plea agreement
because, according to petitioner, he was promised that he would remain in juvenile custody until
he turned twenty years old; (3) adequately raise petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to file an
appeal in his criminal case; and (4) raise additional claims that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance. The circuit court, by order entered on January 20, 2022, denied the second habeas
petition, finding that petitioner attempted to use ineffective assistance of habeas counsel as a guise
to relitigate issues previously waived and/or adjudicated in Green II.

        Petitioner now appeals the denial of his second habeas petition. This Court reviews a
circuit court order denying a habeas petition under the following standard:

               “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court
       in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review
       the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard;
       the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of
       law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va.
                                                 2
       417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).

Syl. Pt. 1, Anstey v. Ballard, 237 W. Va. 411, 787 S.E.2d 864 (2016). However, because we have
before us the denial of petitioner’s second habeas petition, we initially consider the application of
Syllabus Point 4 of Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981):

               A prior omnibus habeas corpus hearing is res judicata as to all matters
       raised and as to all matters known or which with reasonable diligence could have
       been known; however, an applicant may still petition the court on the following
       grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel at the omnibus habeas corpus hearing;
       newly discovered evidence; or, a change in the law, favorable to the applicant,
       which may be applied retroactively.

        On appeal, petitioner argues that habeas counsel provided ineffective assistance during his
first habeas proceeding. Respondent counters that the circuit court properly denied petitioner’s
second habeas petition. We agree with respondent and concur in the circuit court’s finding that
petitioner attempted to use ineffective assistance of habeas counsel as a guise to relitigate issues
previously waived and/or adjudicated.

        The circuit court held a habeas corpus hearing during the first habeas proceeding. Greene
II, 2019 WL 2246623, at *3. Petitioner filed a Losh checklist 3 in the earlier proceeding, and, in its
order denying the first habeas petition, the circuit court found that he “knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived all [Losh] issues not addressed herein.” Additionally, based upon our
review of the transcript of the March 24, 2017, habeas corpus hearing, petitioner had a fair and full
opportunity to raise of all of the issues he wanted to raise, including those issues that petitioner
believed relevant but were not raised by habeas counsel. 4 Finally, on appeal, we affirmed the
circuit court’s finding that petitioner violated the terms of the plea agreement because, while
petitioner successfully completed his juvenile sentence as to the three delivery charges, “he was
properly placed on adult probation [for first-degree robbery], and then properly sentenced to
incarceration following the revocation of that probation.” Greene II, 2019 WL 2246623, at *5
(footnote omitted).

       Petitioner successfully completed his juvenile sentence in May of 2013 when he was
nineteen years old. Id. at *5 n.3. Petitioner asserts that he was promised that he would remain in
juvenile custody until he turned twenty years old and argues that a May 25, 2012, letter from trial

       3
        The checklist of grounds typically used in habeas corpus proceedings, usually referred to
as the Losh checklist, originates from our decision in Losh, where we set forth the most common
grounds for habeas relief. 166 W. Va. at 768-70, 277 S.E.2d at 611-12.
       4
         For example, at the March 24, 2017, habeas corpus hearing, in addition to questioning by
petitioner’s habeas counsel, the circuit court permitted petitioner to pose his own questions during
the examination of his trial counsel.

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counsel constitutes newly discovered evidence of that promise. We set forth the test for evaluating
newly discovered evidence in the Syllabus of State v. Frazier, 162 W. Va. 935, 253 S.E.2d 534
(1979):

                “A new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly-discovered
        evidence unless the case comes within the following rules: (1) The evidence must
        appear to have been discovered since the trial, and, from the affidavit of the new
        witness, what such evidence will be, or its absence satisfactorily explained. (2) It
        must appear from facts stated in his affidavit that plaintiff was diligent in
        ascertaining and securing his evidence, and that the new evidence is such that due
        diligence would not have secured it before the verdict. (3) Such evidence must be
        new and material, and not merely cumulative; and cumulative evidence is
        additional evidence of the same kind to the same point. (4) The evidence must be
        such as ought to produce an opposite result at a second trial on the merits. (5) And
        the new trial will generally be refused when the sole object of the new evidence is
        to discredit or impeach a witness on the opposite side.” Syllabus Point 1, Halstead
        v. Horton, 38 W.Va. 727, 18 S.E. 953 (1894)[, overruled on other grounds, State v.
        Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955)].

We have further stated that, under the Frazier test, “[a]ll five factors must be proven before a new
trial will be awarded.” Anstey, 237 W. Va. at 422, 787 S.E.2d at 875.

         We find that petitioner cannot establish at least two of the five factors of the Frazier test. In
the May 25, 2012, letter, trial counsel informed petitioner that, if he accepted the plea agreement,
he “would walk out” of a juvenile facility at twenty years old. However, trial counsel made the
same or a substantially similar statement to petitioner in an April 27, 2012, letter, 5 and habeas
counsel questioned petitioner about his understanding of trial counsel’s statement at the March 24,
2017, habeas corpus hearing. Furthermore, we have previously found petitioner understood at the
plea hearing that he would be placed on adult probation for first-degree robbery either when he
completed a youthful offender program (which occurred when he was nineteen years old) or when
he turned twenty one years old, “which[ever] occurs first.” Green II, 2019 WL 2246623, at *5.
Thus, we find that trial counsel’s May 25, 2012, letter is cumulative evidence as it contains the
same or a substantially similar statement as the April 27, 2012, letter and that, due to our finding in
Green II, the existence of the May 25, 2012, letter would not produce an opposite result in
petitioner’s second habeas proceeding and so did not constitute newly discovered evidence.
Therefore, we find that the circuit court properly found that all of the claims set forth in the second
habeas petition were previously waived and/or adjudicated. Accordingly, we conclude that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s January 20, 2022, order.

        5
        The only difference between the two letters is that, in the April 27, 2012, letter, trial
counsel uses “could” instead of “would.”

                                                    4
                                        Affirmed.

ISSUED: March 7, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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