Court Opinion

ID: 9412645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 12:06:32.606599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:21.308824
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                  No. COA22-208

                               Filed 01 August 2023

Johnston County, Nos. 19 CRS 51651-52; 21 CRS 477

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

SCOTT LEE BRIDGES, Defendant.

      Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 23 July 2021 by Judge James F.

Ammons, Jr., in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4

October 2022.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Terence D.
      Friedman, for the State.

      Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Katherine
      Jane Allen, for defendant-appellant.

      MURPHY, Judge.

      When a trial court denies a defense counsel’s motion to withdraw due to an

alleged conflict of interest, the defendant may demonstrate reversible error by

showing that either (1) defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest which

implicated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel or (2)

despite the absence of an actual conflict of interest, the defense counsel provided

ineffective assistance which prejudiced the defendant. However, when the trial court

had notice of a potential conflict of interest and conducted an adequate inquiry into
                                  STATE V. BRIDGES

                                  Opinion of the Court

that conflict, and the defendant gave a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of

that conflict, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claims fail.

      Here, Defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free

counsel was implicated both when his defense counsel became a necessary witness

and when, outside the presence of the jury, the State accused counsel of misconduct.

Defendant further argues that the denial of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, in

light of these potential conflicts, violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel. However, Defendant’s arguments fail because the trial court

had notice of defense counsel’s potential conflicts; the trial court conducted an

adequate inquiry into these conflicts; and Defendant gave a knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary waiver of these conflicts. Defendant further raises an ineffective assistance

of counsel challenge based on defense counsel’s statements regarding his renewed

motion to withdraw, which he argues were inconsistent with his interest in its

granting. We dismiss this claim as being raised prematurely on appeal without

prejudice to Defendant’s ability to bring an MAR in the trial court.

                                  BACKGROUND

      On 5 October 2018, Defendant and two other individuals, Carmen Williams

and Ramu Damu, traveled to a used car lot in Garner. There, Williams expressed

interest in purchasing a red Cadillac and accompanied the manager to his office to

discuss details of the purchase. Around this time, Defendant and Damu left the office,

and Defendant and an individual with a shirt covering his face returned with a

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                                  Opinion of the Court

handgun. One of the men ordered the manager to “give up” his money as Williams

exited the office. When the manager turned his back towards the men, one of them

fired the gun. A bullet pierced the manager in the back of his neck and went through

his right cheek. After the shooting, Defendant and Damu fled the scene in the car

which they drove to the lot, and Williams “jumped in” the car. Afterwards, Williams

called 911, provided a fake name, and told the dispatcher that someone had been shot.

      After law enforcement tracked Williams from her phone call, she gave a series

of inconsistent statements as to her presence at the lot. In January 2019, she denied

being present and making the 911 call. However, in February 2019 and March 2019,

she admitted and maintained that she was present at the scene with Defendant and

Damu. In March 2019, and again at trial, Williams identified Defendant as the

shooter.

      Beginning 12 July 2021, Defendant was tried in Johnston County Superior

Court for charges associated with the 5 October 2018 shooting. During his trial,

Williams served as a witness for the State. Prior to her testimony, defense counsel

observed Williams crying in the hallway outside of the courtroom, approached her,

and asked if she would like to talk to an attorney.          The morning after this

conversation, defense counsel asked the public bar if anyone would like to talk to her,

and an attorney said he would advise her.         After this exchange, the trial court

addressed Williams outside of the presence of the jury in an unsworn conversation.

During this conversation, Williams stated that she was never at the scene of the

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incident, and that she did not wish to take the witness stand and perjure herself by

claiming she was present. The trial court permitted the State to speak with Williams

during the lunch recess, and after this recess, Williams was again willing to tesify

without an attorney. Ms. Williams ultimately testified that she was present at the

scene and that she did call 911.

      Outside of the jury’s presence, the trial court heard defense counsel’s verified

motion to withdraw as counsel. Counsel argued that he was “an essential, necessary

witness to [Defendant’s] case” because of “what [he] witnessed [outside of the

courtroom] as an officer of the court, and what [the judge] witnessed in [the

courtroom].” He also moved to withdraw on the basis that a conflict of interest was

created when the State alleged that he “tampered with the witness” and “chilled her

testimony[,]” and that he could not defend both Defendant and himself.            The

Defendant further asked that the trial court declare a mistrial. However, the trial

court denied the Motion to Withdraw and motion for a mistrial. Defense counsel

cross-examined Williams in the presence of the jury, and during this cross-

examination, Williams admitted that she lied to the court about not being at the scene

of the crime and about not calling 911. However, despite the court’s permission to do

so, counsel did not question Williams about the hallway conversation. He later

renewed the motion to withdraw based on his alleged conflict of interest, but this

motion was again denied.

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      The jury found Defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent

to kill inflicting serious injury, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon,

conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm

by felon. Defendant timely appealed.

                                    ANALYSIS

      Defendant first argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment

rights to conflict-free counsel and effective assistance of counsel when it denied

defense counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and permitted him to continue representing

Defendant.   Specifically, Defendant argues defense counsel became a necessary

witness for Defendant and defense counsel was accused by the State of misconduct

related to the case. Defendant also argues that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance because, after renewing his motion to withdraw, he made statements

which were inconsistent with a desire for this motion to be granted.

1. Conflict-Free Counsel

      We “analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on conflicts under

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), rather than employ the standard ineffective

assistance of counsel analysis under Strickland.” State v. Williams, 285 N.C. App.

215, 232 (2022) (citation omitted). While a defendant must generally demonstrate

prejudice under a Strickland framework, “a defendant who shows an actual conflict

of interest ‘may not be required to demonstrate prejudice.’” Id. (quoting State v.

Choudhry, 365 N.C. 215, 219 (2011)). We determine whether to apply Sullivan or

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Strickland based on “the level of notice given to the trial court and the action taken

by that court in regard to the conflict issue.” Id. (marks omitted).

             When the court knows or reasonably should know of a
             particular conflict, that court must inquire into the
             conflict. If the trial court fails to inquire into the conflict
             or the trial court's inquiry is inadequate or incomplete,
             reversal is automatic only if the defendant objected to the
             conflict issue at trial. If the defendant did not object to the
             conflict issue and the trial court failed to adequately
             conduct the required inquiry, prejudice will be presumed
             under Sullivan only if a defendant can establish on appeal
             that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
             lawyer's performance. However, if a defendant is unable to
             establish an actual conflict causing an adverse effect, he
             must show that he was prejudiced in order to obtain relief.

             Thus, in reviewing the alleged conflict issue, we employ a
             multi-step test. First, we ask whether the trial court had
             notice of the conflict such that it was required to inquire
             into the conflict. Second, we determine whether the trial
             court conducted an adequate inquiry into the conflict. If
             the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry, our review
             ends. See State v. Yelton, 87 N.C. App. 554, 557–59 (1987)
             (linking the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry with
             whether a defendant has made a “knowing, intelligent and
             voluntary waiver” of their rights to be free from conflicted
             counsel such that either the record reflects a knowing,
             intelligent, and voluntary waiver of any conflict or “an
             actual conflict of interest exists” without such waiver such
             that “the attorney must be disqualified”). But if the trial
             court did not conduct an adequate inquiry, we third
             consider whether the defendant objected to the conflict
             issue at trial; if the defendant objected to the conflict, we
             must reverse. See Choudhry, 365 N.C. at 220, 224
             (explaining “prejudice is presumed” if a defendant objected
             and was not given the opportunity to show the dangers of
             the potential conflict through a trial court inquiry). If,
             however, the defendant did not object to the conflict, we
             move to the fourth step and determine whether the

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             defendant can establish an actual conflict of interest
             adversely affected his lawyer's performance. If a
             defendant can establish such adverse performance, we
             presume prejudice. If a defendant cannot establish
             adverse performance, we move to the fifth and final step
             and determine whether the defendant can show prejudice
             and thus obtain relief.

Williams, 285 N.C. App. at 232-234 (citations and marks omitted).

      “The trial court is on notice if it knows or reasonably should know of a

particular conflict.” Id. at 234 (marks omitted); see, e.g., Choudhry, 365 N.C. at 220-

22 (holding the trial court was on notice of a potential conflict based on defense

counsel’s previous representation of a witness for the State because the State told the

trial court of this potential conflict). Here, the trial court was put on notice when the

parties addressed outside of the presence of the jury “on the record … what happened

with [Williams] and [defense counsel] outside [of the court room], and also [that] she

ha[d] been threatened prior to her testimony.” Thus, the trial court was required to

conduct an “adequate inquiry into the conflict” to “protect a defendant’s right to

conflict free counsel” and “avoid the appearance of impropriety.” Id. at 235; see

Yelton, 87 N.C. App. at 557 (“Foremost in the court’s inquiry must be the preservation

of the accused’s constitutional rights. The hearing by the trial court must ensure that

the defendants are aware of these rights and that any waiver is a knowing, intelligent

and voluntary waiver.”); see also State v. Shores, 102 N.C. App. 473, 475 (1991)

(explaining that courts “have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials

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                                  Opinion of the Court

are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession” and such an inquiry is

important to “avoid[ ] the appearance of impropriety”).

      The trial court’s “inquiry must be adequate to determine whether there exists

such a conflict of interest that the defendant will be prevented from receiving advice

and assistance sufficient to afford him the quality of representation guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment.” Williams, 285 N.C. App. at 235 (quoting State v. Lynch, 275

N.C. App. 296, 299 (2020) (citation and marks omitted).         The trial court must

“ensur[e] that the defendant fully understands the consequences of a potential or

actual conflict” and “has the discretion to decide whether a full-blown evidentiary

proceeding is necessary or whether some other form of inquiry is sufficient.” Id.

(citation omitted). The defendant’s understanding must be sufficient “to ensure a

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the potential conflict of interest.”

Choudhry, 365 N.C. at 224.

      In Choudhry, the trial court asked the defendant whether he “had any concerns

about [his attorney’s] ability to appropriately represent him, if he was satisfied with

[his attorney’s] representation, and if he desired to have [his attorney] continue to

represent him.” Id. Nevertheless, this inquiry was not adequate for the defendant

to give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver because “the trial court did not

specifically explain the limitations that the conflict imposed on defense counsel’s

ability to question” the witness about the case in which he had previously represented

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                                   Opinion of the Court

her, “nor did defense counsel indicate he had given [the] defendant such an

explanation.” Id.

      The trial court, State, defense counsel, and Defendant discussed the alleged

conflict of interest and its potential implications at great length after the State had

begun, but not finished, direct examination of Williams. Defense counsel explained

he believed his “client now need[ed] [him] as a witness because of what [he] witnessed

out[side of the court room] as an officer of the court, and what [the judge] witnessed

in [the court room,]” and that “with [the State’s] allegations [of misconduct], [he] can’t

defend [himself] and [Defendant].” The trial court asked counsel if he had “talked

with [his] client about the results of [him] withdrawing,” and counsel confirmed he

had. The trial court then addressed Defendant directly:

             THE COURT: … Have you heard everything that [defense
             counsel] has said to me this morning?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

             …

             THE COURT: Do you understand it?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

             THE COURT: Do you understand that there are very few
             options the court would have if he withdraws from
             representing you? One of those would be that you would
             be representing yourself. Is that something that you want
             to do?

             THE DEFENDANT: No.

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             THE COURT: Another would be that I would declare a
             mistrial and we’d throw this out and start over again at
             another time with a different attorney. Do you want me to
             do that?

             THE DEFENDANT: Something to think about. I mean –

             THE COURT: Okay.          Well,   you need to talk to your
             attorney about that?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

The trial court then addressed defense counsel:

             THE COURT: … What is it that you would testify to?

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What she stated out there.

             THE COURT: You can simply ask her that on the witness
             stand.

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s not the same, because then
             she told you, and then everything changed.

             THE COURT: “Didn’t you tell me outside such-and-such?
             Didn’t I see you outside and didn’t you say such-and-such?”

After this, counsel conferred with Defendant and returned to the court.

             THE DEFENDANT: I believe that I need another attorney.
             I don’t believe that we can go further with this trial.

             …

             THE COURT: So what is it that you want me to do? Let
             him withdraw? Declare a mistrial? Start over?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

             THE COURT: All right. I’ve listened to you.

Subsequently, the trial court ruled:

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                                    Opinion of the Court

              [T]here is nothing about the conduct of the parties that
              requires the court to allow [defense counsel] to withdraw.
              There is nothing about the conduct of the parties that
              require the court to declare a mistrial. It would be an
              injustice for the court to stop this trial at this point. So I’m
              going to allow [defense counsel] to cross-examine her. I will
              give [counsel] wide latitude in cross-examining her,
              although I will not allow [counsel], as I’ve said before, to
              badger her or to harass the witness, but [counsel] can cross-
              examine her….

       The entirety of this inquiry demonstrates the trial court conducted an adequate

inquiry to determine “whether there exists such a conflict of interest that the

defendant will be prevented from receiving advice and assistance sufficient to afford

him the quality of representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Williams,

285 N.C. App. at 235.        The transcript also reflects that the trial court ensured

Defendant fully understood “the consequences of a potential or actual conflict” and

properly exercised its discretion in deciding “whether a full-blown evidentiary

proceeding [was] necessary or whether some other form of inquiry [was] sufficient.”

Id. Furthermore, unlike in Choudhry, defense counsel indicated he had also given

Defendant such an explanation.         The only remaining determination is whether

Defendant, in light of this inquiry, made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver

of the potential conflict.

       “[E]ffective assistance of counsel, like any other constitutional right, [can] be

waived but only so long as the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”

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Yelton, 87 N.C. App. at 558 (citing United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th

Cir. 1975).

              As in [F.R.Crim.Pro.] 11 procedures, the district court
              should address each defendant personally and forthrightly
              advise him of the potential dangers of representation by
              counsel with a conflict of interest. The defendant must be
              at liberty to question the district court as to the nature and
              consequences of his legal representation.                 Most
              significantly, the court should seek to elicit a narrative
              response from each defendant that he has been advised of
              his right to effective representation, that he understands
              the details of his attorney's possible conflict of interest and
              the potential perils of such a conflict, that he has discussed
              the matter with his attorney or if he wishes with outside
              counsel, and that he voluntarily waives his Sixth
              Amendment protections.

Id. (citations and marks omitted). After trial counsel had the opportunity to cross-

examine Williams, he renewed his motion to withdraw based on the argument that

Williams had alleged misconduct. During Williams’s testimony before the jury, she

stated that she “wanted to make the right choice, and the right choice is telling the

truth and not allowing somebody to badger [her], belittle [her], or scare [her] into not

having [her] testimony.” She also claimed defense counsel was “questioning” her and

“had lawyers trying to talk to [her]” prior to her testimony. During its consideration

of the renewed motion, the trial court again addressed Defendant:

              THE COURT: All right. [Defendant], you understand what
              [counsel] has just said? …

              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

              THE COURT: All right…. Do you want him to withdraw?

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                                  Opinion of the Court

             THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

             THE COURT: Okay….

{T 726-27}

       Defendant’s statement, made after witnessing several discussions amongst the

parties and the trial court regarding both grounds upon which he now alleges

violations of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free and effective counsel,

constitutes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Defendant explicitly stated,

after witnessing the entirety of Williams’s testimony, including his counsel’s cross-

examination of her, that he did not wish for his counsel to withdraw. The trial court

conducted an adequate inquiry, and Defendnt voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently waived his right to conflict-free counsel. See Williams, 285 N.C. App. at

233.

2. Counsel’s Statements During Renewed Motion to Withdraw

       Defendant asserts a separate claim that he was provided ineffective assistance

by counsel “filing a motion to withdraw and asking the trial court not to grant it.”

Defendant claims this prejudiced him because when counsel asked the trial court to

deny his motion, “it increased the likelihood the judge would do so.” During the

proceedings, counsel made a renewed motion to withdraw, expressing that he felt he

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                                       Opinion of the Court

had “an ethical obligation to do [so]” after Williams accused him of felony intimidation

of a witness.1 The transcript reads as follows:

               THE COURT: Okay. So do you really want me to grant it?

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s not the point. It’s never
               the point with what I do. The point is, I’ve got to do my job
               and I’ve got to tell you that under the rules of professional
               conduct, if I am alleged to commit a crime in the case I’m
               representing somebody, I have to file a motion to
               withdraw.”

               ...

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . I think we all agree that this
               is unusual circumstances. This is a road I’ve never been on
               before. So I’m just trying to do my job to the best of my
               ability. I think – I mean, I would assume that you are the
               honor – you’re the judge. You can determine whether or
               not I can withdraw or not. I’m just covering my part of the
               rule. That’s it.”

               ...

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I don’t really want you to
               grant it, but that’s not ever the point. That point is, I’ve
               got to ask for it.

               THE COURT: So that’s kind of the place I’m getting to, that
               you don’t really want it because it’s not in your client’s best
               interest at this point to –

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, but I have to ask for it, and

1 N.C.G.S. § 14-226 provides:

       (a) If any person shall by threats, menaces or in any other manner intimidate or attempt to
       intimidate any person who is summoned or acting as a witness in any of the courts of this
       State, or prevent or deter, or attempt to prevent or deter any person summoned or acting as
       such witness from attendance upon such court, the person shall be guilty of a Class G felony.
       (b) A defendant in a criminal proceeding who threatens a witness in the defendant's case with
       the assertion or denial of parental rights shall be in violation of this section.
N.C.G.S. § 14-226 (2022).

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                                    Opinion of the Court

              this is no way me wavering on my motion. So I’ve made
              the motion. I leave it in your discretion, what you want to
              do.

      Ineffective assistance of counsel claims “brought on direct review will be

decided on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further investigation is

required, i.e., claims that may be developed and argued without such ancillary

procedures as the appointment of investigators or an evidentiary hearing.” State v.

Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166 (2001). When a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is

“prematurely asserted on direct appeal, [we] dismiss [it] without prejudice to the

defendant’s right to reassert [it] during a subsequent MAR proceeding.” Id. at 167.

Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s above-

referenced statements is prematurely asserted on direct appeal, as there was very

little inquiry into or discussion of these statements in the Record.

                                    CONCLUSION

      Defendant’s claims asserting the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment

rights to conflict-free and effective assistance of counsel fail, as the trial court was on

notice of any potential conflict arising from his counsel’s conversation with Williams,

the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into this potential conflict, and

Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to conflict-free

counsel when he told the trial court, after observing the entirety of Williams’s

testimony, that he did not wish for his counsel to withdraw. Accordingly, we find no

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                                  Opinion of the Court

error on these issues. However, Defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel

on the basis of counsel’s statements regarding his renewed motion to withdraw is

dismissed without prejudice to his right to bring an MAR in the trial court.

      NO ERROR IN PART; DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART.

      Chief Judge STROUD and Judge GORE concur.

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