Court Opinion

ID: 9666005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:02:01.832742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:22.049061
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(concurring).
I c.annot agree that the trial judge is vested with discretion to grant a new trial after sentence by virtue of the fifth paragraph of Article 509 of the .Code of Criminal Procedure. LSA-R.S. 15:509. Manifestly, Article 509, which sets forth the reasons for which a new trial ought to be granted, applies only to cases in which a new trial is timely sought and is specifically limited by Article 505. LSA-R.S. 15 :505. That article, which is the first of the twelve Articles (see Articles 505-516) Title XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:505 to 15:516, entitled “Motion for New Trial”, declares in mandatory language that a motion for a new trial “* * * must be filed and disposed of before sentence.” (Italics mine.) This provision is in conformity with the long established jurisprudence of this Court. State v. Albritton, 157 La. 579, 102 So. 683; State v. Hughes, 170 La. 1063, 129 So. 637; State v. Seiley, 197 La. 405, 1 So.2d 675 and other cases.too numerous to mention.
In State v. Albritton, supra [157 La. 579, 102 So. 685], it was held that a motion for a new trial comes too late after sentence because the trial judge is “powerless to alter, amend, or set aside a sentence, when once imposed.”
In subscribing to the notion that the trial judge has discretion to consider a motion for a new trial filed after sentence, the majority has introduced an innovation in our criminal procedure which may lead to much abuse, aside from the extra burden it places upon the district judges of the State.
I concur in the result.