Court Opinion

ID: 3607723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:52:45.411117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:07:29.608078
License: Public Domain

The agreement between the defendant Holcomb and the plaintiff's testator, was that the former should pay to the latter fifty dollars, and that the latter in consideration thereof, should purchase the bond and mortgage in question, and extend the day of payment of the principal for the period of five years, from the time of the making of said agreement. Holcomb thereupon, paid the money, and the testator purchased and took an assignment *Page 306 
of the bond and mortgage. The mortgage debt was then wholly due, and the testator's assignor was about proceeding to foreclose the mortgage. The principal, if not the only question in the case, is whether this being by parol, was a valid agreement, and operated to extend the time of payment of the indebtedness. If it was, and such was its effect, the action was prematurely brought, and the decision of the supreme court was right, whether the proper reason for the judgment was assigned or not.
That the time of the payment of a simple contract debt may be thus extended, so that no action will lie for its recovery until the expiration of the extended time, when the agreement to extend is founded on a good consideration, is too well settled to admit of question. Under the former system of practice, such an agreement, to defeat the action, could be proved under the general issue, as it went to show that nothing was due, and there was no cause of action when the suit was commenced. (1 Chit. Pl. 512.) And so, I suppose, under the present system, the same evidence may be given under a general denial, as it goes to controvert what the plaintiff is bound to establish by his evidence, to wit: the existence of a demand due at the commencement of the action. In such a case the subsequent agreement operates upon the instrument, where the demand is evidenced by writing, and becomes part of it, so that the obligation, instead of becoming due according to its terms, is only due at the expiration of the extended time, and until that happens, no action can be maintained upon the instrument. The subsequent agreement does not operate to destroy the original agreement, but only to modify it in respect to the time of payment.
It is claimed, however, on the part of the plaintiff, that this principle has no application to instruments under seal, and that in regard to instruments of that character, it requires an agreement in writing of equal solemnity to effect a change or modification in any material particular. This seems to be the rule in such cases, before any breach *Page 307 
of the specialty, and where the subsequent agreement is executory merely. It was so held in Allen v. Jaquish (21 Wend. 628), and in Eddy v. Graves (23 id. 84), cited in the opinion of the court in this case at general term.
But it is, I think, equally well settled that after the breach of a sealed agreement it may be modified in any respect, or wholly rescinded, by an executed parol agreement founded upon a sufficient consideration. (Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330; Dearborn v. Cross, 7 Cow. 48; Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528; Keating v. Price, 1 Johns. Cas. 22; Delacroix
v. Bulkley, 13 Wend. 71; Townsend v. Empire Stone-dressingCo., 6 Duer, 208.) Many other cases might be cited to the same effect, but the rule seems to be too well settled to require it.
That this was an executed and not a mere executory contract between the parties is extremely clear. The defendant's proposition was to pay $50, in consideration that the plaintiff's testator would buy the bond and mortgage and extend the time of payment. This proposition was accepted by the testator who received the money and made the purchase. Nothing else was to be done. The agreement did not contemplate the doing of any further or other act, to effect the extension. The extension was effected completely and perfectly in law the moment the agreement was consummated by the payment of the consideration on one side and the purchase of the securities on the other. The agreement was then completely executed, and took effect upon the bond and mortgage which, in the hands of the assignee, became due and payable as against the defendant Holcomb in five years, and not before. After that it was in no conceivable sense an executory agreement. Its entire object and purpose had been completely and perfectly fulfilled. It is upon this principle only that the proof of an agreement to extend the time defeats the action brought before the expiration of the extended time. The defense in such case does not proceed upon the ground of recoupment of damages for a breach of the agreement to *Page 308 
extend, but upon the ground that the agreement, by its own force, operates upon the original contract, and effects the extension by way of a modification of the contract. The statute of frauds has, clearly, nothing to do with the case.
The objection that the judgment is made personal for the costs is not reviewable on this appeal. But if it were it is not well taken. The code (§ 317) provides that in an action prosecuted or defended by an executor, administrator or trustee of an express trust, costs shall be recovered as in an action by and against a person prosecuting or defending in his own right, but such costs shall be chargeable only upon, or collected of, the fund or party represented, unless the court shall direct the same to be paid by the defendant or plaintiff personally, for mismanagement or bad faith in such action or defense.
There is no direction in the judgment that the plaintiff shall pay the costs personally; and it can only be collected from the assets in his hands. It is in law a judgment against him for costs as executor, and is properly rendered as though he was prosecuting in his own right.
The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.
All the judges were for affirmance, except SELDEN, J., who thought the agreement void under the statute of frauds, as not to be performed within a year. Judgment affirmed. *Page 309