Court Opinion

ID: 9883700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:11:53.252188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:29.242260
License: Public Domain

HANSON, J.
(dissenting).
I join the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson but write separately to state additional grounds for dissent.
On the issue of the district court’s denial of Clark’s request for substitute counsel, I would structure the analysis differently than the majority opinion. First, because Clark’s request was not made until after the Rasmussen hearing had been completed and jury selection had commenced, Clark’s right to defend himself was not “unqualified,” but was “ ‘subject to the trial court’s discretion which requires a balancing of the defendant’s legitimate interests in representing himself and the potential disruption and possible delay of proceedings already in progress.’ ” State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Minn. 2003) (quoting United States v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155, 1155-56 (8th Cir.1986)). In Christian we held that when a self-representation motion is made after jury voir dire begins, the district court must exercise its discretion and we affirmed the district court’s denial of such a motion. Id. at 193-94.
Here, the district court did not exercise that discretion but simply proceeded to secure Clark’s waiver of his right to counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court’s grant of his own motion. But, because the court’s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant’s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel, has not waived the requirement that the district court exercise discretion.
More important, even if the district court does not consider the possibility of denying the motion for self-representation, the court is obliged to assure that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn.1998); Minn. R. Crim P. 5.02, subd. 1(4). And, where a defendant seeks substitute counsel on the basis of a claim that his present counsel is ineffective, a defendant’s waiver of counsel may not be voluntary where the court narrows the defendant’s options to either self-representation or proceeding with his present counsel. See, e.g., Pazden v. Maurer, 424 F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir.2005); Gilbert v. Lockhart, 930 F.2d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that a defendant’s waiver was invalid where he was required to choose between proceeding with unprepared counsel or no counsel). At the very least, the court was required to make a searching inquiry of Clark’s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark’s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for *472fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a defendant’s claim that his attorney did not meet with him or seek out witnesses required a searching inquiry before denying the request for new counsel).
The majority suggests that Clark’s claims do not constitute “serious allegations of inadequate representation.” But, to reach that conclusion, the majority must speculate because no inquiry was made on the record. In the end, the majority relies on the district court’s apparent conclusion, without record basis, that “appointed counsel had conducted a proper investigation, was thoroughly prepared for trial, and had, in fact, maintained contact with Clark.” Because the district court did not devise a procedure to inquire of appointed counsel about Clark’s claims,1 the court had no basis to know what investigation had been conducted or what contact had been maintained. The court’s only basis for knowledge was the performance of counsel in the Rasmussen hearing and voir dire, and perhaps the court’s familiarity with counsel in other cases, but neither of these would provide information about the nature and extent of counsel’s investigation or communication with Clark.
I would conclude that the district court abused its discretion by not making a searching inquiry into Clark’s claims; by narrowing Clark’s choices to only self-representation or representation by current counsel; and by granting Clark’s motion for self-representation without balancing all interests, including the interests of Clark in the effective assistance of counsel.
On the issue of the district court’s denial of Clark’s request for advisory counsel, I conclude that the harmless error analysis must not focus on the strength of the state’s case, which was not known to the court when the motion was made and which, even at the close of trial, only reflects a record that was created without the assistance of defense counsel. The analysis should focus, instead, on whether Clark was effective in his attempts at self-representation. My review of the record reveals that, as could be expected, Clark was repeatedly stymied by his lack of expertise in trial procedure. He could not assess the significance of evidence presented by the state, present proper objections to the state’s evidence, develop meaningful cross-examination of the state’s witnesses, or secure and present evidence of his own.
Accordingly, I would reverse Clark’s conviction and grant a new trial.

. See, e.g., State v. Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 294-95 (Minn. 1984).