Court Opinion

ID: 9609420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:59.096578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:50.435039
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the prosecutor’s comments during *896summation as “impermissible.” I would use the adjectives unprofessional and irresponsible. The comments were not, however, prejudicial in this context.
“ * * * A reversal and remand for a new trial — because of prosecutorial misconduct — will not be ordered as punishment for a prosecutor’s misdeeds, but only because such misdeeds denied the accused a fair trial. [Citations.] * * * ” Jones v. State, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1978).
Here, the comments were so clumsy that it is more likely they eroded the State’s case. Defense counsel here was sophisticated, experienced, highly regarded and very knowledgeable. The prosecutor, on the other hand, was trying his first major case. There is no support in the record for the majority’s statement that “prosecutors are very respected members of our society,” but reading the entire record lends some support to my characterization of the lawyers in this case. If defense counsel had thought for a moment that the prosecutor’s comments were prejudicial to his client, he could have objected immediately. In that fortuitous event, the trial judge would have sustained the objection, administered an admonition at the bench or otherwise, and that would have been the end of that nonsense.
“ * * * Objection should be made at the time of allegedly prejudicial comments so that the trial court will have an opportunity to take corrective action. [Citations.]” Goodman v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 178, 187 (1979).
Another purpose served by an objection would have been that the trial judge would have had an opportunity to give an instruction, thus possibly curing any error. Defense counsel, however, by not objecting, played out enough rope so that the prosecutor could “hang” himself — which he did, not at the trial level, as defense counsel probably expected, but in the appellate court. Defense counsel served his client well by not objecting.
Other courts usually require that defense counsel make an objection at the time improper comments are made. In State v. Williams, 228 Kan. 723, 621 P.2d 423, 431 (1980), the court held:
“The prosecuting attorney, in concluding his jury argument, said: ‘I have no doubt in my mind that this defendant killed Pamela Parker and is guilty of the crime charged.’ Defendant now contends that this was reversible error. We agree that the statement was improper. State v. McClain, 216 Kan. 602, 607, 533 P.2d 1277 (1975). A prosecutor should not inject his personal opinion into the argument. However, no contemporaneous objection was made, although defendant was represented by counsel at that stage of the proceedings, and it has long been our rule that reversible error cannot be predicated upon a complaint of misconduct of counsel in closing argument to the jury where no objection is lodged. [Citations.] * * ”
The Idaho Supreme Court took a similar view:
“ * * * Our review of the record discloses misconduct by the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument. * * * The literal language of the prosecuting attorney need not be set forth herein, it is enough to say that his closing argument referred to facts which were not in evidence and urged conclusions on the part of the jury which would have been relevant to a charge of first degree murder. He portrayed the defendant as having deliberately planned and carried out the murder of her husband in a cold and calculated manner, continuing to fire shots into the body of her husband while he was in a helpless position and pleading for mercy. “While such statements might constitute prosecutorial license, if based on some peripheral view of the facts in a first degree murder case, the statements were improper in the case at bar were unsus-tained by the record. * * *
“Even if we assume, however, that the misconduct of the prosecutor in the case at bar is egregious, unprofessional and reprehensible, it alone is not sufficient to warrant reversal. [Citations.] * * * ” *897State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980).
The Colorado Supreme Court summarized some of the improper comments by the prosecutor as follows:
“1. The prosecutor made several comments on the .credibility of the defendant as a witness, specifically with respect to defendant’s claim that he suffered a memory loss and could not recall the shooting incident.” People v. Sepeda, 196 Colo. 13, 581 P.2d 723 (1978).
“2. The prosecutor appealed to the jury as the ‘conscience of the community’ and admonished them to convict defendant for the safety of the community.”
The Court then held:
“The first two improprieties noted above were not objected to at trial, and we have held on numerous occasions that prosecu-torial misconduct in closing arguments rarely, if ever, is so egregious as to constitute plain error, within the meaning of Crim.P. 52(b), so that we may consider it on appeal absent a contemporaneous objection. See, e.g., People v. Plotner, 188 Colo. 297, 534 P.2d 791; People v. Símbolo, 188 Colo. 49, 532 P.2d 962. We find no misconduct so flagrant as to constitute plain error.” People v. Sepeda, supra, at 732.
The majority states repeatedly that the evidence was close in this case, and that the comments therefore were prejudicial; this is where I part company with the majority. Methinks the majority is trying to talk itself into something. This case is close only if the evidence produced by appellant is considered, evaluated and weighed in this court. That is to say, if the Supreme Court views the evidence as though it were the trier of fact, then it is a close case and the Supreme Court could go either way. This, of course, violates the most basic appellate rules, stated by the two following cases:
“In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict of guilty, an appellate court will not weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the credibility of the witnesses; and it must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution * * Harris v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 800, 801 (1971).
“ ‘The oft-repeated rule by which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is that we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, and we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way — it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. [Citations.] * * * ’ ” Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 803 (1980).
The majority sets out in great detail evidence favorable to appellant. It is quite obvious to me that the majority did in fact consider, weigh and evaluate defense evidence against the State’s evidence, despite protestations to the contrary. For example, the majority said:
“Back at her trailer, J either invited or allowed appellant and Frith back, depending who was telling the story.
******
“Other evidence was introduced that appellant went about bragging about having forced some girl to have sex with him. However, some damaging impeachment was done. * * *
“Some evidence was admitted to demonstrate that a forced entry had been máde into the bathroom, but it was not particularly overwhelming. Moreover, no fingerprints were taken; and thus, there was nothing but J’s testimony indicating that it was appellant and Frith who forced the bathroom door.”
The majority’s justification for delineating evidence favorable to appellant is that it was necessary to show that the evidence was close and that “The prosecutor’s closing *898may have tipped the scales.” I read into that reasoning the suggestion that if it had not been a close case the comments by the prosecutor would not have been prejudicial, thus requiring a reversal. I say again the case is close because the majority evaluated and weighed the evidence favorable to appellant against the evidence of the State, contrary to appellate rules. This seems to be a circuitous and invalid way to find prejudicial error.
If appellate rules are followed, the critical evidence before this court is: Appellant threatened J, forced entry into J’s bathroom, sexually assaulted her and then went around town bragging about it. There is nothing close about this case if those are the only facts considered.
I
The prejudicial errors that the majority found in the State’s rebuttal are that the prosecutor vouched for his own credibility, and that the prosecutor asserted his personal beliefs relating to matters in issue. This finding cannot be reconciled with our ruling in Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981).
In Hopkinson v. State, supra, at 112-113, this Court quotes the prosecutor in his opening statement as saying:
“ * * I don’t see my roll [sic] in the courtroom as somebody who will misguide, misstate, mislead a jury to a false conclusion. * * * ’”
With reference to this segment of the prosecutor’s opening statement we said, “It is impossible to see prejudice there.” Hopkinson v. State, supra, at 113. In Hopkinson the prosecutor in effect said, “I am credible.” In the case here the prosecutor in' effect said, “I am not a liar.” In Hopkinson the prosecutor vouched for his credibility in the positive; here the prosecutor vouched for his credibility in the negative. If there is a distinction, it is without a legal difference. In Hopkinson the prosecutor was eloquent and used carefully chosen words; here the prosecutor was not and did not. Respective abilities of prosecutors are hardly a basis for a distinction.
In United States v. Murphy, 374 F.2d 651, 655 (2nd Cir. 1967) the court stated:
“As a general rule a prosecutor may not express his personal belief in the testimony of witnesses. United States v. White, 324 F.2d 814, 816 (2 Cir. 1963); Greenberg v. United States, 280 F.2d 472 (1 Cir. 1960). However, the stray inclusion of the phrase T think’ in this portion of his argument hardly, if at all, constitutes an expression of his belief in the witnesses. It could not have been prejudicial, and it was not objected to below. [Citations.]”.
In United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 281, 282 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 905, 85 S.Ct. 196, 13 L.Ed.2d 178 (1964), the Court stated:
“No objection was taken to the Government’s summation nor were any protective instructions sought. Although the prosecutor’s statement that he ‘vouched for’ the credibility of certain government witnesses was improper, cf. ABA Canon of Professional Ethics # 15 (1963), it was not, at least absent objection, reversible error.”
In Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 323, n. 15, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958), reh. denied 355 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 529, 2 L.Ed.2d 542 (1958), the Court stated:
“Petitioner Lawn also contends that a statement made by the Government’s attorney in his closing summation to the jury, saying, in pertinent part, ‘we vouch for [Roth and Lubben] because we think they are telling the truth,’ deprived him of a fair trial. No objection was made to the statement at the trial. The Government’s attorney did not say nor insinuate that the statement was based on personal knowledge or on anything other than the testimony of those witnesses given before the jury, and therefore it was not improper. Cf. Henderson v. United States, 6 Cir., 218 F.2d 14, 19; United States v. Holt, 108 F.2d 365, 370; Tuckerman v. United States, 291 F. 958, 969. * * * ”
The majority here stated: “While the occasional inclusion of phrases like ‘I believe’ or T think’ in an argument is not *899prejudicial, * * * the prosecutor here went overboard.” “Occasional” suggests more than once. The majority does not say how many times a prosecutor may say “I think,” nor should it. That is a fine line which is best drawn by the trial judge.
II
In the case here, the court said objections were not necessary “where the errors constitute plain error,” but it said nothing about plain error in Hopkinson. Instead, it attached considerable significance to the fact that defense counsel did not always object to the prosecutor’s comments.
“We agree with the trial judge where, as here, (1) the appellant’s counsel did nothing to try and prevent the jury from hearing the questionable comments * Hopkinson v. State, supra, at 147.
This Court, as well as others, blows hot and cold on plain error. Courts agonize in trying to identify “that hazy line which divides harmless and plain error.” Jones v. State, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1978). Decisions are made on a case by case basis without any solid guidelines. It would appear that the propensity of the Court weighs more heavily than any other factor. I think we should give greater weight to the discretion of the trial judge, who is in the superior position to determine if comments are prejudicial. ■ A factor considered by the trial court and which should be considered by this Court is silence of counsel. If highly competent counsel does not object, that is at least some indication that his client is not being harmed. It is also some indication that the client is not being harmed when competent counsel, after cool reflection, still does not make a post conviction motion for a mistrial or for a new trial based on the prosecutor’s comments. Both of those things happened here. Apparently the first time it dawned on appellant that he had been prejudiced was when he wrote his appellate brief.
The majority here also talks about cumulative error in conjunction with plain error:
“In determining whether plain error has occurred, the facts of the case must be viewed in light of the trial record as a whole and not as to whether any one single incident standing alone would be reversible. United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2nd Cir. 1970). This cumulative effect approach has been applied in numerous cases. In particular, it was used by the United States Supreme Court in Berger, supra. [Berger v. United States, 795 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. In 1314 (1935)].”
In suggesting cumulative error the majority alludes to the prosecutor mentioning facts not in evidence. In Hopkinson, supra, the prosecutor in summation said:
“You remember that [Hopkinson] tried to bribe poor old J.R. Goo with loans and flattery and when that didn’t work J.R. Goo was beaten up.”
* * * * * *
“Hopkinson controlled the county attorney for years.
* * * * * *
“Hopkinson had been moving ‘illegal items.’ •
******
“Hopkinson knew exactly where the Ve-har investigation stood because he had the information from the county attorney, his lawyer.
******
“Hopkinson had Goo beaten up and controlled Gary Greenhalgh, Green’s attorney.”
The foregoing comments by the prosecutor were not in evidence in the Hopkinson trial. Defense counsel objected to some of these comments and asserted on appeal that these comments amounted to prejudicial error. Apparently the court in Hopkinson considered the foregoing comments so innocuous that they were not even mentioned in the opinion.
Courts resort to the doctrine of cumulative error when they have identified several errors but have misgivings about their prejudicial effect. If a court has a predilection *900to find prejudicial error, it says that any single error standing alone may not be prejudicial but the cumulative effect of numerous errors was prejudicial to appellant and denied him a fair trial. On the other hand, if a court is predisposed to find harmless error, it says that cumulative error is a nebulous concept difficult to demonstrate, and that appellant has not demonstrated that the cumulative effect of the errors has been prejudicial.
Both explanations of cumulative error are superficial, uninspirational and totally unsatisfactory.
Whether remarks made by counsel in summation are prejudicial is a discretionary matter with the trial court. The trial judge is in a better position to determine what prejudicial effect impermissible statements have on the jury than the appellate court. Hopkinson v. State, supra, at 145.
The trial judge here instructed the jury: “You are the exclusive judges of the facts and of the effect and value of the evidence, but you must determine the facts from the evidence produced here in Court. * * * As to any statement made by counsel in your presence concerning the facts of the case, you must not regard such a statement as evidence * *
We must assume that the jury followed the court’s instructions. I would further assume that the jury had more intelligence and judgment than the majority seems to credit it with. The jury knows that the prosecutor believes in the State’s case. The jury knows that the prosecutor and defense counsel are given to hyperbole. I would be surprised if a jury convicted because the prosecutor thought something. Juries are more intelligent, fair and sophisticated than that. The members of the jury are not marionettes, swayed to and fro by the fervid protestations of counsel. We trust juries with a person’s life and property; and we must, therefore, credit juries with more discernment and trust them to follow the court’s instructions by disregarding inept comments by counsel.
The result of this case is manifestly unfair to the trial judge. The trial court is being reversed on a matter that it did not act on, and was not given an opportunity to act on. The Bar might glean a message from this case that it is better to be silent than to object. Appellant in Hopkinson, supra, objected repeatedly and it profited him nothing. Appellant here did not object and the Supreme Court bailed him out. Appellant is the beneficiary of a special dispensation. He appeared here at a propitious time when the Court was in an uncharacteristic commiserative mood.
I would affirm.