Court Opinion

ID: 9671122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:31:28.709949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.814468
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
WILLIAMS, Justice.
In a very able Motion for Rehearing, the appellee complains of several holdings in our original Opinion. We will discuss the pertinent ones of these.
The appellee (plaintiff below) strenuously attacks our holding that the evidence was *936insufficient to show that the meat in question was delivered to the railroad in good condition. He first relies on the two very recent decisions by the San Antonio court, to-wit, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trautmann Brothers, Tex.Civ.App., 301 S.W.2d 240, and S. & D. Wolf Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Railway Co., Tex.Civ.App., 301 S.W.2d 272. In these cases the bills of lading recited, “apparent good order”, and no more. However, our bill of lading says:
“Received * * * The property described below, in apparent good order, except as noted (contents and condition of contents of packages unknown) * * *.”
Therefore, we do not consider the above authorities controlling. However, appellee also insists that the holding of insufficient evidence to show good condition must be set aside, since all assignments of error and points of error by the appellant stated that there was “no evidence” to support said finding and that, therefore, this court was without jurisdiction to find that the evidence was “insufficient.” For this contention he cites Wisdom v. Smith, 1948, 146 Tex. 420, 209 S.W.2d 164. We have carefully reviewed the record in this regard, and we have come to the conclusion that the challenge of the jury’s finding is not properly- raised, either by assignment in the Motion for New Trial, or by point of error in the brief. In fact, we fail to find any assignment or point specifically challenging this finding of the jury. Wherefore, we withdraw our holding in the original Opinion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that the meat was delivered in good condition, and we now find that holding by the jury should be, and. the same is, respected.
The only other incident in the record wherein we said that the evidence was insufficient appears in the paragraph:
“We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of neg-';<r.ence on the part of appellant in failing to inspect, and in failing to discover the defects, if any.”
The purport of the whole paragraph, although we use that expression, is to hold that, as a matter of law, under the circumstances, the railroad was not negligent in not discovering the defects in the door, if any. Therefore, we think that the Wisdom case is not applicable to this point.
The sentence in our original Opinion,
“However, it seems this would not extricate the railroad from liability under the presumption above mentioned, had the merchandise been received in good condition”,
is hereby withdrawn from the Opinion, because it is a correct statement of the law only when non-perishable property is involved. Here, we are dealing with perishable property, and a different rule applies, as will be hereinafter discussed.
The appellee strenuously assails our holding that the railroad was extricated from liability by the jury’s finding that the negligence of someone other than the railroad was responsible for the spoilage. For this contention appellee says that a common carrier is an insurer of the goods it carries except for one of the excepted causes. For this contention he relies on 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 71, p. 131; 8 Texas Jurisprudence 227; and many other authorities. Unquestionably he is correct in this contention where the property carried is inanimate, non-perishable property. But here we are dealing with perishable property, and a different rule as to it applies. One theory is expressed in 8 Texas Jurisprudence 397, section 269, as follows:
“But it seems that a prima facie case is not made merely by proof that perishable property was delivered to the carrier in sound condition and was subsequently delivered by it in a damaged condition. In such a case the burden is on the shipper to show negligence where the inferences are conflicting as to whether the damage was *937caused by negligence or natural processes.”
See: St. Louis & Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Grant, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W. 714; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Woldert Grocery Co., Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W. 1139.
These authorities go so far as to say there is no presumption. We think the better rule is expressed below.
It seems to us that many Texas' cases have failed to differentiate between perishable and non-perishable property and, many of them at least, intimate that the rule is the same. However, we find that in a very recent case, Lee Roy Crawford Produce Co. v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1950, 228 S.W.2d 344, Chief Justice Murray, after stating one rule to be as contended by appellee, above, that the carrier is an insurer except for the excepted causes, in the next paragraph recognizes that as far as perishable property is concerned, a different rule often applies, and cites Southern Pacific Co. v. Itule, 51 Ariz. 25, 74 P.2d 38, 42, 115 A.L.R. 1268. We have carefully read that case and think that it very logically and correctly states the rule as to perishable property. After relating delivery in good condition and receipt in damaged condition, it says:
“This, of course, was sufficient to sustain the burden of making a prima facie case.”
It then says:
“ * * * when the carrier shows affirmatively that it handled them in the method requested by the shipper, and that it exercised reasonable care to prevent any damage from any cause not necessarily involved in the method of transportation so chosen, that it has satisfied the requirements of the law in regard to the quantum of proof required to establish a defense to the action.”
In 9 American Jurisprudence 947, section 844, after stating that a prima facie case is made out by a showing of delivery in good condition and receipt in bad condition, it is said:
“ * * * a prima facie case of liability is made out, and the burden of proof is then on the carrier to show that damage was not caused by its negligence.” (Citing cases.)
In the supplement to the above authority, it is stated that some courts hold that the railroad may extricate itself by showing that it was not negligent, while other courts “however, place upon the carrier the burden of proving the specific cause of the damage or injury, as a condition of avoidance of liability.” In the instant case, as is shown by our original Opinion, the railroad showed that it was not negligent in icing and in carrying the property, etc. The jury, in the instant case, also found that the cause was the faulty door which we held, as a matter of law, was not chargeable to the carrier. The Itule case, above, holds with the first of these propositions, but in this case we do not have to rely on that only, although we agree that it is sound law, because in this case we have the added reason that the cause of the spoilage, the faulty door, was the negligence of someone other than the carrier. We therefore think our original Opinion is correct in this regard, and in its conclusion.
For a complete collation of the authorities, pro and con, concerning perishable property, see the annotations under the Itule case, in 115 A.L.R. 1268.
Appellant insists, in his reply brief to the Motion for Rehearing, that appellee, after pleading specific negligence, to-wit, the faulty door of the car, could not thereafter rely on the presumption' above discussed. For this contention he relies largely on Myers v. Texas Land & Development Co., Tex.Civ.App., 282 S.W. 919. That case does not make it clear whether the plaintiff plead these causes in the alternative, or not, but regardless of this, we think the better rule is expressed in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Willis, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.*9382d 235, wherein it is held if the pleading is in the alternative, plaintiff’s failure to prove the specific negligence does not prevent him from falling back upon the presumption. Plaintiff herein plead in the alternative. Therefore, we hold the presumption above discussed was available to the appellee in this case, but that same was overcome.
This case involves an interstate shipment and is, therefore, under the Car-mack Amendment (49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11)), and therefore the Federal authorities and law control. Cleburne Peanut & Products Co. v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., Tex.Com.App.1920, 221 S.W. 270.
The doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply. Lee Roy Crawford Produce Co. v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1950, 228 S.W.2d 344-348.
Therefore, this case if tried again should be submitted under the theory of apportionment of damages. Thompson v. Bob Tankersley Produce Co., Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1956, 289 S.W.2d 840.
Finding no error in our original Opinion, except the one first above corrected, the Motion for Rehearing is overruled.