Court Opinion

ID: 9953996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 14:08:57.687188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.932393
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0113-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN P. FRATTELONE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided March 25, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Municipal Appeal No. MA
                   21-07.

                   Mitchell Jonathan Ansell argued the cause for appellant
                   (Ansell Grimm & Aaron, PC, and Kingston Coventry
                   LLC, attorneys; Mitchell Jonathan Ansell and Deborah
                   Lynn Gramiccioni, of counsel and on the briefs).

                   William Kyle Meighan, Supervising Assistant
                   Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Bradley
                   D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney;
                   Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of
                   counsel; William Kyle Meighan, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

        Defendant John P. Frattelone appeals his Law Division trial de novo

conviction for harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), arising from his conduct

towards one of his employees. We affirm.

                                         I.

        Defendant is an oral maxillofacial surgeon who owns and operates three

dental offices throughout New Jersey. M.V. (Mary),1 one of defendant's dental

assistants, filed a complaint with the Barnegat Township Municipal Court

alleging defendant harassed her on three occasions in the township.

        At trial, Mary, the State's only witness, testified about defendant's

misconduct. The first incident occurred when Mary was telling a co-worker

about her sore mouth and defendant, while standing behind the co-worker, made

gestures that resembled oral sex, suggesting that caused Mary's ailment. Two

days later, Mary was suctioning a sedated patient's mouth during surgery when

defendant said to her, "you like sucking, huh[?]" The last incident occurred

almost a month later. Mary was in the office's changing area removing her jacket

when defendant asked her, "are you wearing a lace bra and thong panties to

1
    We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim. See R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
                                                                             A-0113-22
                                         2
match [the black] shirt [you're wearing?]" Mary testified she "looked at him and

said[] no, with a face of disgust[,] and then left."

      About a month prior to filing her municipal court complaint, Mary

reported these incidents to the Barnegat Township police. She also reported

these incidents and a few others that allegedly occurred in defendant's Lincroft

Township office, located in Middletown Township, to the Middletown Police

Department.

      At the conclusion of the State's case, defendant moved for a judgment of

acquittal, arguing Mary's testimony was not credible considering the pending

civil lawsuit she filed against him and his practice, she received treatment from

defendant after the alleged harassment, as well as the year delay in filing her

municipal court complaint. Defense counsel further argued the State failed to

prove he intended to harass Mary, explaining:

             By the State's own admission and giving them every
             favorable inference, . . . defendant's admission . . . was
             playful. So even if [the court] take[s] everything that
             [Mary] said [as] true, . . . defendant's initial reaction—
             his spontaneous reaction when confronted about this
             harassment was it was playful, it was not intended to
             harass[,] and he actually said I didn't know it bothered
             [Mary].

             [(Emphasis added).]

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       The municipal court denied the motion, finding the State "made a per se

[showing of defendant's] violation of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:33-4(a)." Considering the

parties' proofs and arguments, the court ruled:

                    It's necessary that pursuant to State v. Locurto,2
             that the court make credibility findings as to all parties
             testifying in front of the court. We've only had one
             witness, we've had one witness, [Mary]. . . .

                   ....

                    I found her testimony to be credible. I found her
             testimony to be believable[,] . . . detailed and [it] to
             ma[d]e sense to the [c]ourt. [It] [d]id not sound by any
             stretch of the imagination to be fabricated testimony.

                   ....

             [D]efendant himself claimed that he thought that his
             communications to [Mary] were playful. That's the
             language [Mary] used, that's the language that the
             defense relied upon in indicating that this can't be
             harassment or doesn't rise to the level of harassment
             because . . . defendant said it was playful or he thought
             it was playful, or he asserted that it was playful.

                   Just because he says it, does not make it so.

             [(Emphasis added).]

       Defendant then testified on his own behalf. He denied mocking oral sex,

stating "[he] would never do a gesture [like] that." He said he could not "recall"

2
    157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).
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                                         4
the sucking comment, "[b]ecause [he] never spoke like that."                As for the

undergarment incident, defendant claimed:

             I was working at my computer, [Mary] came in at the
             end of the day to change the way she always did, she
             engaged me in conversation as she did every time she
             walks into my office. I was working at my computer as
             I always did when I wasn't treating patients, and she
             called my name and I turned around, and she had taken
             off her scrub jacket and was wearing a t-shirt and she
             [then] slung her pocketbook over her neck, which
             consequently pulled her shirt down exposing her bra
             and her upper breast[.] . . . I looked at her and I said you
             might want to fix that.

      Following the parties' written summations, the municipal court issued an

oral decision finding defendant guilty of harassment. The court noted Mary's

failure to report the incidents to "[defendant] or [his] . . . wife"3 did not diminish

her credibility, as defendant did not put her in a reasonable position.

Additionally, neither Mary's pending civil lawsuit against defendant nor her

continued employment and treatment from defendant after the alleged

harassment "convince[d] the [c]ourt in any fashion that [the harassment] didn't

happen." The court further reasoned defendant's testimony amounted to "an

admission" that something happened, "but it's not what [he is] accused of doing,"

3
  Defendant testified his wife was the office manager. Mary testified she did
not know what position defendant's wife held.
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                                          5
and that "if it did happen, it was playful." Defendant appealed the conviction to

the Law Division.

      After a trial de novo, the Law Division judge issued an order and well-

reasoned seventeen-page written opinion affirming defendant's conviction. The

judge found the municipal court applied the correct legal standard and

defendant's guilt was based "solely on the testimony presented on the record."

The judge also found, that as described "in [State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577

(1997)], the lack of legitimate purpose for the communications [with Mary]

support[] a finding that [d]efendant had the purpose to harass." The judge

reasoned, "the municipal court, as the fact-finder, was entitled to use its common

sense and experience to find that, viewed objectively, [d]efendant's explanation

was disingenuous" and dismissed the contention his conduct was playful. As

for defendant's contention the municipal court's findings in denying his motion

for acquittal created "undue pressure" on him to testify, the judge held the

findings, at most, "may have influenced [his] decision to testify in a colloquial

sense," but he was not "unduly pressured or coerced into waiving his" right to

remain silent.

      Finally, the judge rejected defendant's argument that the Barnegat

municipal prosecutor's failure to provide him with the Middletown police report

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                                        6
constituted a discovery violation depriving him of the opportunity to impeach

Mary. Applying the municipal court discovery rules, R. 7:7-7(b)(7)-(9), and

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the judge determined no discovery

violation occurred given the prosecutor's certification that "the Middletown

Township police report was not in his possession, custody or control," and

nothing suggested the prosecutor "knew about the . . . police report at the time

of [d]efendant's discovery request or before trial." The judge also determined

defendant's contention that Mary's statement to the Middletown police regarding

the date and location of the undergarment comment contradicted her testimony

was not material to his defense. The judge stressed Mary's testimony about the

two other incidents was consistent and "even after vigorous challenges to [her]

credibility on cross-examination and in summation[], the municipal court

believed her testimony over [d]efendant's."     Considering the totality of the

record, the judge held "there is no reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different had [d]efendant obtained the Middletown

police report before trial.

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                                       7
                                      II.

     Before us, defendant contends:

           POINT I

           THE CREDIBLITY DETERMINATIONS AND
           ERRONEOUS RULINGS BY THE LOWER COURTS
           WERE TANTAMOU[N]T TO VIOLATING THE
           CONSTITUTIONAL       RIGHT      AGAINST
           COMPULSIVE        TESTIMONY        [AND]
           ULTIMATELY[] A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE
           UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
           CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

           POINT II

           THE RECORD BELOW LAC[K]S SUFFICIENT
           CREDIBLE   EVIDENCE   TO   SUSTAIN     A
           CONVICTION OF HARRASMENT, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-
           4,  BEYOND    A   REASONABLE     DOUBT.
           ACCORDINGLY, THE FAILURE ON PART OF THE
           MUNICIPAL COURT AND LAW DIVISION TO
           ENTER A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN THIS
           MATTER WAS CLEAR ERROR.

           POINT III

           THE MUNCIPAL PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO
           PRODUCE      THE      COMPLAIN[T]ANT[']S
           CONFLICTING STATEMENTS PRIOR TO HER
           TESTIMONY DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT-
           APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-
           EXAMINE      HER       ON     MULTIPLE
           INCONSISTENCIES, AND THUS DEPRIVED THE
           DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.

We address defendant's arguments in the order presented.

                                                           A-0113-22
                                       8
                                        A.

      Defendant contends the municipal court's finding that Mary gave credible

testimony as a basis for denying his motion for acquittal compelled him to waive

his right to remain silent. We disagree.

      The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no

person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

U.S. Const. amend. V. New Jersey similarly guarantees the right against self-

incrimination. N.J.R.E. 503; State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381-82 (2017). "[T]he

touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion . . . ."             Lefkowitz v.

Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App. Div. 1994). However, the "very

fact of [a] trial, or the probative force of the proofs adduced by the prosecution,"

or the "fear that [a] criminal charge will go unrebutted" are not "compelling"

influences that could offend the constitutional privilege. State v. Burris, 298

N.J. Super. 505, 514-15 (App. Div. 1997) (holding the trial court compelled the

defendant to testify because it "inextricably linked" her "right not to testify and

her right to present psychiatric evidence").

      The municipal court did not violate defendant's right not to testify. See

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)

                                                                              A-0113-22
                                         9
(holding appellate review of the trial court's interpretation of "the legal

consequences that flow from established facts" is de novo). Given defendant's

motion for acquittal, the municipal court was required to determine whether

Mary's testimony established defendant was guilty of harassment. The court

correctly complied with the rule governing a motion to dismiss, R. 3:18-1, by

applying the test set forth in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458 (1967). The court

considered "the State's evidence in its entirety" and gave "the State the benefit

of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which

reasonably could be drawn therefrom," and found sufficient evidence to support

a conviction that defendant harassed Mary. Reyes, 50 N.J. at 458-59. This is

not a situation where defendant's desire to present his own evidence was

"inextricably linked" to his ability to testify. See Burris, 298 N.J. Super. at 514.

Defendant has cited no New Jersey case law to support his argument.

      Moreover, if the municipal court erred in assessing the credibility of

Mary's testimony when making its findings to decide defendant's motion, the

State's contention that it was an invited error has merit. See State v. A.R., 213

N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (under the "invited-error doctrine . . . trial errors that 'were

induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel

ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal'" (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107

                                                                              A-0113-22
                                        10
N.J. 339, 345 (1987))). Defendant cannot reverse his conviction after requesting

the municipal court decide his motion to dismiss and then claim the court's

action compelled him to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. The court's findings

were entirely induced by defendant's motion for acquittal.

                                       B.

      Defendant argues that because Mary's subjective reaction is not relevant

in assessing his "purpose" to harass, the record lacks substantial credible

evidence of harassment. We disagree.

      In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) provides harassment occurs when,

with the purpose to harass, a person "[m]akes, or causes to be made, one or more

communications anonymously . . . , or in offensively coarse language, or any

other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." See Corrente v. Corrente,

281 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App. Div. 1995) (holding a fact finder must determine

the defendant acted with the purpose to harass (citing D.C. v. T.H., 269 N.J.

Super. 458, 461-62 (App. Div. 1994))). Because "direct proof of intent" is often

absent, "purpose may and often must be inferred from what is said and done and

the surrounding circumstances." State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606

(App. Div. 2006) (citing State v. Siegler, 12 N.J. 520, 524 (1953)). Finding the

defendant's purpose to harass must be supported by evidence that the defendant's

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                                      11
"conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might

be alarmed or annoyed is insufficient." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 487 (2011)

(citing State v. Fuchs, 230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1989)). Even if the

defendant's comments were subjectively "vulgar," "unsolicited," "unwelcome,"

or "sexually suggestive," the subjective perception of the recipient is insufficient

to warrant a criminal conviction for harassment." Id. at 487; see also RG. v.

R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 226 (App. Div. 2017). In determining whether the

defendant's conduct constitutes harassment, a judge may use "[c]ommon sense

and experience," and "[t]he incidents under scrutiny must be examined in light

of the totality of the circumstances." Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 577, 585. "Absent a

legitimate purpose behind [the] defendant's actions, the trial court could

reasonably infer that [the] defendant acted with the purpose to harass [the

victim]." Id. at 577.

      Defendant fails to show the Law Division judge's guilty finding was

flawed. Defendant correctly asserts "sexually suggestive" comments alone are

insufficient to establish purpose to harass. The judge's analysis, however, was

more nuanced. Upon finding Mary's assertions of defendant's conduct credible,

the judge reasoned that given defendant's supervisory role over Mary,

defendant's comments served no legitimate purpose and that it defied common

                                                                              A-0113-22
                                        12
sense to view them as playful as he contended. See Hoffman 149 N.J. at 577.

The judge, in employing the "substantial evidence rule," State v. Heine, 424 N.J.

Super. 48, 58 (App. Div. 2012), correctly made independent findings of facts

and conclusions of law based on the record developed in the municipal court ,

see State v. Avena, 281 N.J. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 1995) (citing State v.

Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). The judge's findings "g[ave] due, although

not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the" court to evaluate

witness credibility. Johnson, 42 N.J. at 157. We, therefore, agree with the

judge's finding that defendant's statements under the circumstances sufficiently

established his comments were made with the "purpose" to harass Mary.

                                       C.

      Lastly, defendant contends the Barnegat municipal prosecutor's failure to

produce a "material" Middletown police report constitutes a Brady violation and

violation of our discovery rules. Defendant asserts if he had the police report

he could have impeached her because the reported date Mary claimed the

undergarment incident occurred conflicts with the date she testified at trial.

Again, we disagree.

      Under Rule 7:7-7(b)(9), a municipal court defendant is entitled to "police

reports that are within the possession, custody[,] or control of the prosecuting

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                                      13
attorney." See also R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(H) (regarding the prosecution's general

obligation to disclosure of "police reports that are within the possession,

custody, or control of the prosecutor"). In accordance with Brady, a defendant's

due process rights are violated when: "(1) the evidence at issue [is] favorable

to the [defendant], either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State

must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3)

the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." State v. Brown, 236 N.J.

497, 518 (2019).

      The undisputed record reflected the Barnegat municipal prosecutor never

had knowledge, possession, custody, or control of the Middletown police report.

Defendant, however, cites State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487 (1998), arguing the non-

prosecuting Middletown law enforcement's knowledge of Mary's report of

defendant's conduct to them should be imputed onto the Barnegat prosecutor,

making him constructively aware of the Middleton police report. Defendant's

reliance is misplaced.

      In Nelson, the Court held the State violated Brady when it to failed to

disclose to the defendant a civil complaint filed by a detective, employed by a

borough within Camden County, against the borough and the county alleging he

was improperly trained by Camden County and the borough. Nelson, 155 N.J.

                                                                          A-0113-22
                                      14
at 498, 500. The detective's alleged improper training purportedly contributed

to the defendant's second-degree aggravated assault against the detective and

was thereby material to the defendant's guilt and punishment. Id. at 491, 499.

The Court "imput[ed] awareness of the [detective's] complaint to the trial

prosecutor and [held] that the [complaint] was suppressed for Brady purposes"

because "the complaint was filed by one of the 'law enforcement personnel'

involved in the investigation of defendant's 'particular criminal venture,' and it

was brought against the 'prosecutor's entire office.'" Id. at 499-500 (citations

omitted).

      Here, unlike the detective's involvement in the defendant's prosecution in

Nelson, there was no connection between the respective Barnegat and

Middletown municipal courts and prosecutors. This is not the relationship akin

to a county prosecutor and one of the local municipal governments within its

jurisdiction as in Nelson. Defendant's trial took place in Barnegat municipal

court only for incidents occurring in Barnegat. Middletown's law enforcement

personnel were not involved in any aspect of Barnegat's "criminal venture."

The fact that the Middletown police report stated "[Mary] fi[l]ed a report with

the Barnegat Police Department[,] who advised her to respond to Middletown

Police to make a report with [them] as well because . . . incidents she was

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                                       15
reporting . . . occurred in [Middletown]," does not establish Barnegat police

were aware of the Middletown police report. This is not a case where the non-

disclosed evidence was stored at the prosecuting municipality's office. See

Brown, 236 N.J. at 509 (recognizing "the prosecutor turned over eighteen reports

not previously given to defense counsel that 'were in a file that was actually in

[the State's] office in homicide'" (alteration in original)).

      Moreover, even if the Middletown police report should have been turned

over, the judge determined the report's conflicting statements do not rise to the

level of materiality required for Brady. Defendant points to how the report

indicates the undergarment incident occurred eight months later – during another

conversation – than the date Mary testified it occurred. We discern no reason to

conclude that the date confusion would have affected the findings by the

municipal court and Law Division judge that Mary was credible and defendant

was not credible. See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474 ("Under the two-court rule,

appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of

facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very

obvious and exceptional showing of error." (citation omitted)).           Mary's

accusations of defendant's conduct were consistent in court and to the

Middletown police.

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                                        16
      To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's

arguments, it is because we conclude they are of insufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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