Court Opinion

ID: 9480329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:44:58.56676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:37.136184
License: Public Domain

DeMASCIO, Senior District Judge,
dissenting.
After careful analysis of an affidavit prepared by a government agent, a magistrate concluded that the government had probable cause for search warrants authorizing the seizure of property on premises owned by appellants. No one seriously disputes the fact that the government complied with requirements of the fourth amendment or reasonably thought it did. Nevertheless, the court today holds that the district judge had jurisdiction to entertain a pre-indictment motion for return of property filed pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e), and that appellants, on remand, are entitled to a hearing on the issues of consent and the overbroadness of the search warrants.
With all due respect, I dissent. I remain convinced that the district judge did not have jurisdiction to consider appellants’ pre-indictment motion for return of the seized property; that the order denying appellants’ Rule 41(e) motion is interlocutory within the holding of DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962); and that appellants are not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity of the search.
When the government conducts a search pursuant to a lawful warrant, a district court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a pre-indictment Rule 41(e) motion for return of seized property. There are no proceedings before the court to which the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply. Fed.R.Crim.P. 1 and 54(a). The essence of a pre-indictment Rule 41(e) motion for return of property is that the search and seizure procedures employed by law enforcement officers were “unlawful” and property was “illegally seized” in violation of the fourth amendment. If the property was not “illegally seized,” Rule 41(e) is inapplicable.1 A search conducted pursu*413ant to a lawful warrant is presumed valid and motions seeking the return and suppression of evidence must await the filing of a formal indictment. The subject of a search, however, may very well allege that law enforcement officers acting pursuant to a lawfully authorized warrant nevertheless unlawfully seized property, intentionally or otherwise. If this allegation is made, the court should not automatically set a Rule 41(e) hearing as the majority implies. The court should first examine the petition to determine whether the facts alleged, if true, warrant relief. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). In its analysis, the court should balance the interests of the government and the aggrieved party to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction over the pre-indictment motion. Failure to take the government’s interests into account has the result of giving the procedural rule broader scope than the constitutional amendment. The government would be required to endure the consequences of the exclusionary rule for engaging in an unlawful search, but receive no consideration for executing a constitutional search.
Yet, in complete disregard of the warrant issued in this case, the majority has decided that a Rule 41(e) motion can be filed at any time and when it is, “the assumption of jurisdiction is warranted under equitable standards ... and also because the plaintiffs motion here is, in effect, a civil action_”2 Majority Opinion 408. The court reads Rule 41(e) to implicitly “authorize such motions to be made in the district court before a criminal prosecution has begun.” The majority endorses the rationale of Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir.1979) which held that “equitable jurisdiction” exists to suppress illegally obtained evidence before an indictment has been issued. Pieper and a number of other courts have created their own jurisdiction for a number of reasons, without a statutory or constitutional basis. See Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir.1983) (judicially created “anomalous jurisdiction”); Marshal v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir.1979) (equitable jurisdiction based on inherent power over officers of the court); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.1975) (same); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29 (5th Cir.1974) (same); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir.1965) (same); Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.1960) citing Lapides v. United States, 215 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.1954) (Rule 41(e) motion treated as civil complaint); Russo v. United States, 241 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816, 78 S.Ct. 18, 2 L.Ed.2d 33 (1957) (treated pre-indictment Rule 41(e) motion as independent civil proceeding); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F.Supp. 684 (D.Mass.1963) (jurisdiction based on supervisory powers over federal law enforcement officers).
*414However, the cases that have exercised judicially created jurisdiction have done so with “caution and restraint” and then only where a warrantless search was involved; Lord v. Kelley, 223 F.Supp. 684; or law enforcement agents acted deceitfully, Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278; or acted with callous disregard of the fourth amendment; or the appellants would suffer needless injury by continued deprivation of the seized property. But, the circumstances that compelled some courts to exercise judicially created jurisdiction are not present in this case. Here, the agents did not act deceitfully or in callous disregard of appellants’ constitutional rights. Thus, there is no need to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the agents or the United States Attorney. The district court was not faced with a situation involving an egregious violation of the fourth amendment; the agents searching the premises were in possession of a warrant permitting a broad search to uncover a wide range of illegal activity. See Matter of Search of 4801 Flyer Ave., 879 F.2d 385 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1470, 108 L.Ed.2d 608 (1990). Further, appellants cannot allege that they are suffering needless injury from the continued deprivation of their property where government agents have offered to make available copies of all documents seized. By refusing to accept the government’s offer, appellants tacitly admit that they are not concerned with recovering their property as much as they are with the future suppression of the evidence. Thus, appellants would suffer no prejudice by waiting until criminal proceedings have been filed.
As suggested above, before the district court creates jurisdiction over a pre-indictement motion for the return of property, the interests of the parties should be balanced. In this case, the government’s interests in the ongoing criminal investigation far outweigh any possible prejudice to appellants by the delayed return of the seized property. The government has its entire investigation at risk whereas the appellants have not come forward with any reason why they should not be compelled to await the possible return of an indictment and the subsequent filing of a motion to suppress. Rule 41(e) provides that a motion to suppress should be made in the trial court rather than the district in which the property was seized. That policy is not furthered when a Rule 41(e) motion is entertained during a grand jury investigation. Judicial expansion of Rule 41(e) to encompass pre-indictment relief results in redundant and time-consuming litigation that permits appellants to challenge the evidence that will be presented to a grand jury. As a result, the grand jury proceedings can be jeopardized by the delay. On the other hand, appellants would suffer no prejudice if compelled to present this motion at a later date, assuming that indictments are eventually returned. If appellants’ substantive claims have any merit, there is ample opportunity to pursue them at the conclusion of the investigation. This holding does not impair constitutional rights. It only defers the time for asserting them. We should not read Rule 41(e) in a manner that does not take into account the government’s interest in the property seized during its administration of the criminal laws. As Judge Learned Hand points out:
It would be an intolerable burden upon the prosecution of crime, if it were possible to test in advance the competency of evidence which the accused, ... might be able to show was likely to be used against him. The protection of the individual from oppression and abuse by the police and other enforcing officers is indeed a major interest in a free society; but so is the effective prosecution of crime, an interest which at times seems forgotten.
In Re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 465 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J. concurring), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858, 67 S.Ct. 1751, 91 L.Ed. 1865 (1947).
With all due respect for the majority view, I would hold that there was no reason for the district court to consider the merits of this Rule 41(e) motion at the pre-indictment stage. The exercise of jurisdiction in this case has enabled appellants to needlessly obstruct the government’s investigation of their alleged illegal activi*415ties — an essential policy reason behind my view that pre-indictment Rule 41(e) motions should not be considered. Such judicial expansion of Rule 41(e) opens the door for the accused to involve the government in needless litigation in every case in which the accused anticipates a grand jury indictment.
Next, based upon Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 88 (1983), the majority assumes without discussion that this court has appellate jurisdiction to review the pre-indictment ruling of the district court.3 In DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32, 82 S.Ct. 654, 660, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962), the Court held that the denial of a pre-in-dictment motion under Rule 41(e) is appeal-able “[o]nly if the motion is solely for the return of property and is in no way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant.” Rule 41(e) as amended in 1972 automatically suppresses the evidence as part of the remedy provided by the rule. Thus, although entitled “Motion for Return of Property,” an order granting a Rule 41(e) motion automatically suppresses evidence. Since the appellants here also seek suppression of the evidence, their motion does not satisfy the “solely for return” requirement of DiBella. While not expressly stated in appellants’ motion, it is clear that they filed their motions to prevent the presentation of the evidence to a grand jury. In DiBella, the court stated:
Presentations ... before a grand jury ... are part of the federal prosecutorial system leading to a criminal trial. Order granting or denying suppression in the wake of such proceedings are truly interlocutory.
369 U.S. at 131, 82 S.Ct. at 660 (citations omitted).
In0 Sovereign News Co., 690 F.2d 569, this court ignored the first element of the DiBella test. The court also viewed the second element as one that asks whether the criminal process has shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory stage. Id. at 571. However, under DiBella, the criminal process does not shift to the accusatory stage until the filing is made by the grand jury. Thus, under DiBella, if there is a possibility that the movant may be brought to trial, courts should view Rule 41(e) motions as tied to a criminal prosecution. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, the Court, in holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury investigations, made it clear that grand jury proceedings must not be impeded by preliminary hearings, or interrupted by appeals. Id. at 349-52, 94 S.Ct. at 620-22. Finding appellate jurisdiction here ignores this authority. The cases that have dismissed appeals by persons under grand jury investigation have correctly applied DiBella. See, e.g., Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct. 1973, 72 L.Ed.2d 442 (1982); Imperial Distrib., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 249, 66 L.Ed.2d 116 (1980); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.1979) (per curiam).
Since I believe this appeal is interlocutory under either of the DiBella tests, there is no need to consider the merits of appellant’s claims. United States v. Modern Bookkeeping, Inc., 780 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir.1985) (Celebrezze, J. concurring). Nevertheless, I do so to point out how my conclusions differ from those of the majority. In my view, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold a hearing. The redacted affidavit, together with the government’s response to the motion, set out all of the circumstances surrounding CW# 3’s consent in sufficient de*416tail. These documents advised appellants of CW# 3’s possessory rights to the tapes, his relationship to appellants, and the circumstances as they objectively appeared to the government agents at the time of the search. Therefore, no hearing on the issue of consent is required. The government agents reasonably believed that CW# 3 had access to and the authority to consent to the viewing of the initial 50 tapes. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Whether the government acted reasonably under the circumstances known to it is a question of law not fact. Cf. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir.1988).
Moreover, the warrant was not objectionable under particularity principles. Based on the affidavit supporting the search warrant, there was probable cause to believe that appellants were engaged in a pervasive scheme that included distribution of obscene tapes and money laundering throughout 20 cities. When, as in this case, there is probable cause to believe that a business is permeated with illegal activity, a warrant may authorize a broad search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Kail, 804 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.1986).
Finally, a hearing is not necessary to consider the seizure of the additional tapes that were not viewed by the magistrate or depicted in the descriptions attached to the affidavit. Only single copies of these tapes were seized. It is clear that these tapes were seized as evidence of labeling and continuity of enterprise, rather than for content. The adversary proceeding that the Court in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S.Ct. 916 (1989), found necessary arose in the context of the seizure of all available copies of allegedly obscene books without a judicial determination of the obscenity issue. Here, there was no prior restraint and a remand for the purpose of a hearing is unwarranted. Therefore, I would dismiss the appeal and allow the government to continue its investigation unhampered by time-consuming hearings.

. Prior to the 1972 amendment, Rule 41(e) specified five grounds for the return of property and suppression of evidence. The first ground, that property was illegally seized, was most commonly used. The 1972 amendment eliminated these grounds and the rule applied when property was illegally seized. If the property is not "illegally seized,” there is no "person aggrieved” with standing to invoke Rule 41(e). The most recent amendment to Rule 41(e) took effect on December 1, 1989. It now provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access and use of the property in subsequent proceedings. If a motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be treat*413ed also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
The 1989 amendment again emphasizes its applicability to an "unlawful search and seizure.” The amended rule, however, was made applicable to lawfully seized property as well. A "person aggrieved” by a lawful search may seek the return of property held by the government for an unreasonable length of time. Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15 (7th Cir.1978).

. To support this conclusion, the court cites Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.1960). The court in Grant recognized that Rule 41(e) "embodies a practice which long antedated it but whose jurisdictional character, at least in those cases where the motion precedes the criminal proceeding to which the evidence relates, has been little discussed.” Id. at 168. Grant only considered the issue whether an order staying the United States Attorney from submitting evidence to a grand jury pending the determination of a Rule 41(e) application was appealable.
No case has satisfactorily explained how a rule applicable in criminal proceedings can be treated as a “civil” complaint. However, there has never been a need to treat Rule 41(e) as a civil action, or to exercise judicially created jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has always recognized that there is an independent plenary action for return of property seized without a warrant. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931); Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 49 S.Ct. 118, 73 L.Ed. 275 (1929); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S.Ct. 417, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918). See also, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

. The court also cites United States v. Giacalone, 541 F.2d 508 (6th Cir.1976) as an example of this court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction over an order granting a Rule 41(e) motion for return of property. This court, era banc, held that the appeal was not rendered moot by the subsequent issuance of a grand jury subpoena. This court was not cited to nor did it consider the holding in DiBella v. United States. The presiding district judge treated the Rule 41(e) motion as an appeal from the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Giacalone, 541 F.2d at 510. No issue other than the sufficiency of the search warrant was considered by the district court or this court on appeal.