Court Opinion

ID: 9956945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:01:13.671368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.080537
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LAWRENCE BRENNER,                               DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          NY-0714-19-0007-M-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 2, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Alan E. Wolin , Esquire, Jericho, New York, for the appellant.

      Aaron L. Robison , Esquire, Sacramento, California, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has filed a
cross petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s
removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for
review, VACATE the initial decision, DENY the appellant’s cross petition for

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

review, and REMAND the case to the New York Field Office for further
adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                 BACKGROUND
       The appellant was employed as an Attorney-Advisor with the Department
of Veterans Affairs’ (DVA) Office of General Counsel. Brenner v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. NY-0714-19-0007-I-1, Initial Appeal File
(IAF), Tab 10 at 23. On September 28, 2018, the agency removed him based on
three charges of unacceptable performance in the critical elements of his position:
(1) unacceptable performance in the critical element of timeliness for the rating
period of October 1, 2016, to September 30, 2017; (2) unacceptable performance
in the critical element of professional responsibility and accountability for the
rating period of October 1, 2016, to September 30, 2017; and (3) unacceptable
performance in the critical element of timeliness for the rating period that began
October 1, 2017. 2 Id. at 23-28. The decision notice indicated that the removal
action was being taken under the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability
and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (VA Accountability Act), Pub. L. No.
115-41, § 202(a), 131 Stat. 862, 869-73 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 714).
Id. at 24.
       Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal with the Board challenging the
removal and raising,      among other     things,   the   affirmative   defenses   of
discrimination based on disability and age, reprisal for filing a prohibited
personnel practice complaint and whistleblower reprisal complaint with the
Office of Special Counsel, and harmful procedural error.        IAF, Tab 1.    After
holding the appellant’s requested hearing, id. at 2, the administrative judge issued
an initial decision affirming the removal action, IAF, Tab 41. In doing so, she
concluded that the agency proved all its charges by substantial evidence, as
required by 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(A). Id. at 6-26. Stating that the Board lacks
2
  Charge 3 covered the period from October 1, 2017, until the agency proposed the
appellant’s removal on March 26, 2018. IAF, Tab 10 at 26, 240.
                                                                                    3

the authority to mitigate the agency’s penalty selection, id. at 7 (citing 38 U.S.C.
§ 714(d)(2)-(3)), the administrative judge did not consider the reasonableness of
the penalty of removal, but, based on her finding that the agency proved all its
charges, she affirmed the removal action, id. at 26. Additionally, she found that
the appellant failed to prove any of his affirmative defenses. Id. at 26-48.
      After that initial decision became final, the appellant appealed the decision
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). Before the
Federal Circuit, he argued that (1) the Board erred in concluding that it was
prohibited from reviewing the reasonableness of the penalty; and (2) the DVA
and the Board improperly applied the VA Accountability Act, which became
effective on June 23, 2017, to actions that occurred prior to that date, dating back
to October 1, 2016. See Brenner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 990 F.3d
1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2021). On March 9, 2021, the Federal Circuit issued an
opinion, vacating the initial decision and remanding the appeal to the
administrative judge. Id. at 1330. Regarding the first issue, the court referenced
its prior decision in Sayers v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 954 F.3d 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2020), wherein it found that review of the penalty must be included in
the Board’s review of an agency action under section 714.        Brenner, 990 F.3d
at 1323-27 (citing Sayers, 954 F.3d at 1375-79).       Accordingly, in the instant
matter, the court found that the administrative judge erred when she concluded
that the Board lacked authority to review the agency’s penalty selection.         Id.
Regarding the second issue, the court found that the administrative judge erred in
applying the VA Accountability Act retroactively to conduct that occurred prior
to the statute’s effective date, and, therefore, further found that her affirmance of
the removal action was not in accordance with the law. Id. at 1327-28, 1330. As
a result, the court remanded the matter to the Board with instructions to consider
whether the removal action, including the penalty, is supported by substantial
                                                                                     4

evidence based on the evidence that postdates the VA Accountability Act. 3
Id. at 1330.
      Following the remand, but prior to the issuance of the remand initial
decision, the Federal Circuit decided Rodriguez v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 8 F.4th 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2021), wherein it found that the DVA erred when
it applied the substantial evidence burden of proof to its internal review of a
disciplinary action under 38 U.S.C. § 714. Id. at 1296-1301. The same day it
decided Rodriguez, the Federal Circuit also decided Connor v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 8 F.4th 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2021), wherein it found that the DVA
and the Board must still apply the Douglas 4 factors to the selection and review of
penalties in DVA disciplinary actions taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714.
Id. at 1326-27.   Recognizing that these cases affected the adjudication of the
appellant’s removal appeal, the administrative judge issued an order informing
the parties of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Rodriguez and Connor and
reframing the issues on remand to comport with the court’s Brenner remand
opinion, Rodriguez, and Connor.       Brenner v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
MSPB Docket No. NY-0714-19-0007-M-1, Remand Appeal File (RAF), Tab 16.
In doing so, the administrative judge framed the issues to be decided on remand
as follows: (1) whether the agency proved by preponderant evidence its three
charges based on the evidence of record that postdates the VA Accountability
Act; (2) whether the agency considered the Douglas factors in determining the
appropriate penalty; and (3) whether the penalty of removal is supported by
preponderant evidence, in accordance with Sayers. 5 Id. at 4.
3
  The Federal Circuit also explained that, if the agency wished to rely on evidence of
record that predated the VA Accountability Act, it must proceed with an action under
chapters 75 or 43. Brenner, 990 F.3d at 1330.
4
  In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to the penalty determination in
adverse actions.
5
  The administrative judge also considered as an issue on remand whether the agency
proved charges one and three by preponderant evidence, in light of the deciding
                                                                                      5

      With its close of record submission, the agency submitted declarations
made under penalty of perjury from the proposing and deciding officials.
RAF, Tab 20 at 22-27, 29-34. In the deciding official’s declaration, he stated that
the appellant’s performance after the effective date of the VA Accountability Act
still “satisfied the charges of unacceptable performance in the critical element of
timeliness and warranted removal.”         Id. at 23.     He further stated that the
“evidence file” supports the unsuccessful performance that occurred after
June 23, 2017, as cited in all three charges “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id. at 25. Finally, he stated that, while he did not complete a “formulaic Douglas
factor analysis on paper” in this matter, he did consider the relevant Douglas
factors at the time he made his decision. Id. at 26. In the proposing official’s
declaration, she also asserted that the evidence file supports the charges of
unsuccessful performance on conduct that occurred after June 23, 2017, by a
preponderance of the evidence and that she considered the relevant Douglas
factors at the time she proposed the appellant’s removal. Id. at 32-34.
      Without taking additional testimony, RAF, Tab 14 at 1, the administrative
judge issued an initial decision on the written remand record, RAF, Tab 23,
Remand Initial Decision (RID). In discussing the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Rodriguez, she reasoned that, although the Board’s standard of review is
“substantial evidence,” the DVA was required to prove its charges and chosen
penalty by “preponderant evidence.” RID at 9-13. In applying this standard of
proof to the charges, the administrative judge considered the proposing and
deciding officials’ declarations asserting that the evidentiary record on the
appellant’s performance issues postdating June 23, 2017, supported the charges of
unacceptable performance by a preponderance of the evidence, but she found that

official’s admission that the proposing official applied an incorrect standard regarding
the timeliness of the appellant’s work when discussing his performance under the
critical element concerning timeliness. RAF, Tab 16 at 4. Because this is related to the
issue of whether the agency proved the charges by preponderant evidence, we do not
address this issue separately.
                                                                                   6

this “post-hoc justification” did not overcome the actual language used in the
proposing and decision letters or testimony at the hearing that the charges were
supported by substantial evidence. RID at 7-8. Thus, she found that the agency
failed to prove the charges by preponderant evidence. RID at 6-8.
       Assuming, alternatively, that the agency had met its burden with respect to
the charges, the administrative judge then discussed whether it met its burden
regarding the reasonableness of the penalty of removal.        RID at 9.    In her
analysis, the administrative judge reiterated that Connor requires the DVA to
consider the Douglas factors. RID at 9. Although she considered the deciding
official’s   declaration asserting that he    did consider these      factors,   the
administrative judge found the declaration “unworthy of belief” in light of his
prior testimony that he did not consider the Douglas factors because they “are not
applicable under our current procedure.”      Id.; Hearing Compact Disc (HCD)
(testimony of the deciding official).    Accordingly, she found that the agency
failed to prove that the penalty of removal was supported by preponderant
evidence. RID at 9. Based on the foregoing, the administrative judge found that
the removal was not in accordance with the law, and she reversed the removal
action. RID at 1, 4-5, 13-14. Although the administrative judge determined that
the appellant was the prevailing party, she did not order interim relief. RID at 15
(citing 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(7)).
       The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.           Therein, it argues that neither of the
administrative judge’s conclusions that the agency failed to prove its charges by
preponderant evidence or to consider the Douglas factors renders the removal
decision “not in accordance with the law” and that the administrative judge
should have applied the “harmful error” analysis. Id. at 7, 12-15. It also argues
that the administrative judge erred in finding that the deciding official did not
consider the relevant Douglas factors and in failing to provide the deciding
official with an opportunity to determine whether the evidence supported the
                                                                                         7

charges by preponderant evidence. Id. at 15-17. Finally, the agency argues that
the administrative judge erred in requiring it to prove before the Board its charges
and the reasonableness of the penalty by preponderant evidence, rather than by
substantial evidence.     Id. at 17-18.    The appellant has filed a response to the
agency’s petition for review and has filed a cross petition for review. 6 PFR File,
Tab 3.      In his cross petition for review, the appellant argues that the
administrative judge erred in not ordering interim relief, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(b)(2)(A). Id. at 29. The agency has replied to the appellant’s response to
its petition for review, and it has responded in opposition to his cross petition for
review. 7 PFR File, Tabs 5-6.

                 DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The appellant’s cross petition for review is denied.
       As stated above, the appellant has filed a cross petition for review, arguing
that the administrative judge erred in not ordering interim relief despite the fact
that she determined that the appellant was the prevailing party in this matter.
PFR File, Tab 3 at 29; RID at 15. We discern no error in the administrative
judge’s decision not to order interim relief. Title 38, United States Code, Section
714(d)(7) provides that, in a removal action taken under § 714, an appellant who
files a Board appeal “may not receive any pay, awards, bonuses, incentives,
allowances, differentials, student loan repayments, special payments, or benefits
6
  The appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s original findings that he
failed to establish any of his affirmative defenses. PFR File, Tab 3. We discern no
basis to disturb those findings here.
7
  The appellant has also filed a motion for leave to file a reply to the agency’s response
to his cross petition for review. PFR File, Tab 8. The Office of the Clerk of the Board
acknowledged the appellant’s motion but explained that the Board’s regulations do not
provide for pleadings other than a petition for review, a cross petition for review, a
response to the petition for review or cross petition for review, and a reply to a response
to a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 9 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5)). It
informed the appellant that the Board would decide to grant or deny his request. Id.
at 1. We have reviewed the appellant’s motion for leave to file a reply to the agency’s
response but are not persuaded by his argument regarding the need for the additional
submission. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5). Accordingly, the appellant’s motion is denied.
                                                                                    8

related to the employment of the individual by the Department [of Veterans
Affairs]” after his or her removal by the agency until “the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit issues a final decision on such appeal.”         The
Board has construed this language to preclude an award of interim relief in an
appeal brought pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 714.         See Schmitt v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 40, ¶¶ 11-16. Although the appellant argues that
38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(7) “is not applicable to this situation” and asserts that the
interim relief provisions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2) should govern,
PFR File, Tab 3 at 29, the Board has found that, despite the conflicting nature of
those two provisions, 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(7) controls and precludes an award of
interim relief, see Schmitt, 2022 MSPB 40, ¶¶ 11-16.              Accordingly, the
appellant’s cross petition for review is denied.

The agency’s application of the substantial evidence standard of proof to its
internal deliberation of the charges is subject to the harmful error standard.
       In the agency’s decision notice removing the appellant, the deciding
official concluded that the agency’s charges were supported by substantial
evidence. IAF, Tab 10 at 24-26. As explained above, the administrative judge
informed the parties of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez, which found
that the preponderant evidence is the proper standard for the DVA to apply in
determining whether an employee has engaged in misconduct that justifies
discipline. 8   RAF, Tab 16; see Rodriguez, 8 F.4th 1297-1301.        Although the
deciding official submitted a declaration stating that the “unsuccessful
performance that occurred after June 23, 2017” is supported by a preponderance
of the evidence, RAF, Tab 20 at 23, the administrative judge gave greater weight
to the “statutorily required decision letter,” which relied on “substantial

8
  We address later in this Remand Order the administrative judge’s apparent confusion
in requiring the agency to also prove before the Board its charges by preponderant
evidence. Our discussion here is limited to the burden of proof applied by the agency
during its internal disciplinary proceedings, which the administrative judge
appropriately determined to be in error.
                                                                                        9

evidence,” 9 CID at 6-8. She, therefore, found that the agency’s application of the
incorrect standard of proof rendered the removal action “not in accordance with
the law.” RID at 6-8, 13-14.
      In the agency’s petition for review, it argues that a failure to apply the
correct standard of proof does not render a decision “not in accordance with law”
and that the administrative judge should have analyzed the error under a harmful
procedural error framework.        PFR File, Tab 1 at 7, 12-13.          We agree.     In
Semenov v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 16, the Board held that,
because the Board adjudicates an action taken under the VA Accountability Act
under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1), see 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(4)(A), (d)(1), actions taken
under 38 U.S.C. § 714 are subject to the harmful error test from 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(c)(2), Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 23. As such, the proper inquiry here is
whether the agency’s error in applying the incorrect standard of proof was likely
to have caused the agency to reach a different conclusion from the one it would
have reached in the absence or cure of the error.             See id. (citing Ronso v.
Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 14 (2015); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r)).
Accordingly, we vacate the initial decision and remand this appeal for the
administrative judge to consider whether the agency committed harmful error.

The agency must prove its charges by substantial evidence before the Board.
      If, upon remand, the administrative judge determines that the agency’s
error in applying the incorrect standard of proof to its internal proceedings was
not harmful, the subsequent analysis is whether the agency met its burden of

9
  We find nothing inconsistent between the deciding official’s statement in the decision
notice that the charges are supported by substantial evidence and his later statement in a
declaration that the charges are supported by preponderant evidence. IAF, Tab 10 at 24;
RAF, Tab 20 at 23-25. A determination that the charges are supported by preponderant
evidence necessarily includes an implicit acknowledgment that the charges are also
supported by substantial evidence. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p), (q) (explaining that
substantial evidence is a “lower standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence”).
Thus, we discern no reason to disregard the deciding official’s subsequent statement
that the charges are supported by preponderant evidence based solely on the fact that he
made a prior determination under a lower standard of proof.
                                                                                      10

proof with respect to the charges before the Board.           As noted above, in the
remand initial decision, the administrative judge interpreted Rodriguez to suggest
that, while “the Board’s standard of review is ‘substantial evidence,’ . . . the
[D]VA was required to prove its charges [] by ‘preponderant evidence.’” RID
at 13. Because, as previously explained, the administrative judge did not give
weight to the deciding official’s declaration explaining that he determined the
charges to be supported by preponderant evidence, she found that the agency
failed to meet its burden of proof before the Board. RID at 6-8.
      Although not directly argued by the agency on review, we find the
administrative judge’s interpretation of Rodriguez to be in error. In that case, the
Federal Circuit clarified that “the DVA is not required to prove its case before the
Board by a preponderance of the evidence, as is the case for employee
disciplinary actions brought under chapter 75 of Title 5” and that “on any appeal
to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the administrative judge and the Board
will review the [] action under the ‘substantial evidence’ standard.”           8 F.4th
at 1297. Thus, the agency was required to prove its charges before the Board by
“substantial evidence.”
      We acknowledge that, in the original initial decision in this matter, the
administrative judge found that the agency proved its charges by “substantial
evidence.” 10   IAF, Tab 41 at 8-26.        On review before the Federal Circuit,
however, the court concluded that the agency erroneously included in its charges
against the appellant performance-related matters that predated the effective date
of the VA Accountability Act.         Brenner, 990 F.3d 1327-30.         Therefore, on
remand, if the administrative judge determines that the agency’s error in applying
the incorrect standard of proof to its internal review of the removal action was not
harmful, then she must consider whether the agency proved by substantial
evidence its three charges of unacceptable performance based only on evidence of

10
  Notably, in the Brenner opinion, the Federal Circuit did not disturb the administrative
judge’s application of the “substantial evidence” standard of proof. 990 F.3d at 1321.
                                                                                      11

record that postdates the June 23, 2017 effective date of the VA Accountability
Act. In analyzing an unacceptable performance charge brought under 38 U.S.C.
§ 714,     the     administrative   judge   should   consider   whether   the   agency’s
performance standards are reasonable and provide for an accurate measurement of
the appellant’s performance, and whether the appellant’s performance was
unacceptable according to that measurement. Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 19.

If applicable, the administrative judge should consider whether the agency proved
that the penalty of removal is supported by substantial evidence.
         When determining whether the agency’s decision to remove the appellant
under the VA Accountability Act is supported by substantial evidence, the Board
must also consider the agency’s penalty choice as part of that review. Sayers,
954 F.3d at 1376; see Brenner, 990 F.3d at 1323-24. As previously explained, in
Connor, the Federal Circuit held that the DVA and the Board “must continue to
apply the relevant Douglas factors in considering the reasonableness of the
penalty in [D]VA disciplinary action cases.” 8 F.4th at 1326. Accordingly, the
administrative judge considered the penalty in the remand initial decision.
RID at 9.        As stated above, she found that the deciding official’s declaration
claiming that he considered the Douglas factors was “unworthy of belief” in light
of the fact that he had previously testified that he did not consider the Douglas
factors because they were not applicable under the “current procedure.” Id.; HCD
(testimony of the deciding official). Thus, she concluded that the agency failed to
prove that the penalty of removal was supported by preponderant evidence,
thereby rendering the removal action “not in accordance with the law.” RID at 9,
13-14.
         On review, the agency argues that, although the deciding official did not
formally call it a Douglas factor analysis, he nonetheless considered the factors
relevant to a proper penalty determination and concluded that the penalty of
removal is “appropriate and warranted,” as indicated in his declaration. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 16-17; RAF, Tab 20 at 25-27. It further argues that, even if the agency
                                                                                   12

failed to prove that it considered the Douglas factors, the proper result is a lack of
deference to the deciding official—not a determination that the action was “not in
accordance with law.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-16.
      Looking at the deciding official’s declaration, we do not find it obvious on
its face that the statements made therein contradict his prior testimony. In his
testimony, he stated that he did not consider the Douglas factors because the
agency believed they were not applicable to the current adverse action procedure;
however, in his declaration, he stated that consideration of the factors is
“generally reflected in [his] written decision” and in his hearing testimony.
RAF, Tab 20 at 26.          For example, during the hearing, he testified that
he considered, among other things:       (1) the appellant’s job and grade level;
(2) whether a lesser penalty would have been more appropriate than removal;
(3) whether the appellant lost the trust and confidence of his supervisor that he
would perform satisfactorily; (4) whether the appellant showed potential for
rehabilitation; and (5) any mitigating factors such as the appellant’s workload.
HCD (testimony of the deciding official). In the decision notice, the deciding
official stated that the deficiencies related to the timeliness critical element were
“egregious” and “significant in terms of the Office of General Counsel’s ability to
provide timely advice to its clients in support of the Department’s mission of
service to Veterans.” IAF, Tab 10 at 26. He also stated that the appellant’s
deficiencies “undermine [his] supervisor’s ability to effectively manage the office
and undermine [her] trust that [he] will bring mistakes to her attention.”         Id.
Although the deciding official recognized that the appellant had “provided many
years of satisfactory service to the agency,” he nonetheless determined that
“removal is appropriate and the only suitable option.” Id. at 27. Thus, although
the deciding official may not have completed a Douglas factor worksheet or some
formal analysis similar thereto, he asserts that he nonetheless considered the
substance of the factors, and we believe the record supports that assertion. HCD
(testimony of the deciding official); RAF, Tab 20 at 26-27.
                                                                                13

      Moreover, contrary to the administrative judge’s assertion in the remand
initial decision that the agency’s choice of penalty must be supported by
preponderant evidence, RID at 9-13, we reiterate that the agency must prove that
the penalty is supported by “substantial evidence,” see Sayers, 954 F.3d at 1376;
Brenner, 990 F.3d at 1323.        Accordingly, on remand, if applicable, the
administrative judge should consider whether the penalty of removal is supported
by substantial evidence based on the sustained conduct that postdates the VA
Accountability Act.

                                     ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to New York Field
Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.           As
outlined above, the administrative judge shall first address whether the agency’s
error in applying the substantial evidence standard of proof to its original action
was harmful. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1), (b)(1); Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 24.
If the administrative judge determines that the agency’s error was not harmful,
she should then consider whether the agency proved its charges by substantial
evidence based only on evidence that postdates the June 23, 2018 effective date
of the VA Accountability Act, and, if so, whether the penalty of removal is
supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with Connor.
      In conducting this adjudication, the administrative judge shall hold a
supplemental hearing but may limit the subject matter to issues deemed relevant
on remand. She shall then issue a remand initial decision discussing these issues.
See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management , 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980)
(explaining that an initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and
law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
                                                                                 14

administrative judge’s conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the
authorities on which that reasoning rests). 11

FOR THE BOARD:                          ______________________________
                                        Gina K. Grippando
                                        Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

11
   To the extent any of the evidence or argument taken on remand affects the
administrative judge’s prior discussion of the appellant’s affirmative defenses, her
remand initial decision should reflect that analysis.