Court Opinion

ID: 9566244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:35:30.907746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:39.939097
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Vice Presiding Judge,
concurring in part/dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s determination that the eye witness identity evidence was properly admitted, however, I must respectfully dissent to the finding that Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel.
The record, when viewed in its entirety, demonstrates that Appellant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver in this case. He initiated his request in a calculated and articulate fashion by filing a Motion to Proceed Pro Se and a Brief in Support of Motion to Proceed Pro Se. (O.R.14-16) After having the opportunity to review this pleading the Special Judge, prior to preliminary hearing, inquired of the Appellant to ensure the request set forth in the motion and brief was really his desire and election. Appellant was unequivocal in his request to proceed pro se and affirmed that self representation was his preference. (P.H.Tr.3-5) In accordance with the prior directions of this Court, the Special Judge granted Appellant’s further request for stand-by counsel who was available to assist Appellant through the completion of the trial of the case. Appellant’s capacity, knowledge and understanding is further evidenced by his subsequent filings of a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in support of the motion (O.R.17-21), Motion in Limine and Brief in support of the motion (O.R.22-25), Notice of Alibi (O.R.26-27), Motion to Vacate Order Striking Application for Late Appeal, Re-instate Application and Issue Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum (O.R.80-82) and Motion for Appointment of Appellate Counsel (O.R.92-93). In fact, the Motion for Appointment of Appellate Counsel evidences Appellant’s knowledge and understanding of the right to counsel and responsibilities of representation sufficient to defeat his argument.
When viewed in its totality, the record in this case supports a finding that the Appellant unequivocally, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and requested to represent himself fully understanding the responsibility he was assuming. In addition, the record complies with the requirements set forth in Swanegan v. State, 743 P.2d 131, 132 (Okl.Cr.1987), and Coleman v. State, 617 P.2d 243, 245-246 (Okl.Cr.1980). Whether there has been a valid waiver of right to counsel is to be determined from the total circumstances of the individual case including background, experience and conduct of the accused. United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d *995721 (10th Cir.1977). Further, where a defendant elects self-representation, he may not later be heard to complain that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Green v. State, 759 P.2d 219, 221 (Okl.Cr.1988), citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and Johnson v. State, 556 P.2d 1285, 1297 (Okl.Cr.1976). Appellant is now trying to get two bites at the apple after the first bite did not turn out as he had hoped it would. I cannot join in the Court’s application of form over substance by disregarding the overwhelming evidence of the Appellant’s valid waiver of counsel and determining that because “magic words” were not used the waiver cannot be accepted. Appellant’s work product and self representation at trial reveal a sophisticated and knowledgeable defendant who is now attempting the manipulate the appellate process to his own advantage when the record reveals a conscious election to waive his right to counsel and represent himself. I must therefore respectfully dissent to the Court’s decision to reverse and remand this case for retrial.