Court Opinion

ID: 9882113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 08:28:52.123517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:49.174567
License: Public Domain

In The
                               Court of Appeals
                      Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                      No. 07-22-00280-CR

                            JOSE ELISO ZAVALA, APPELLANT

                                                  V.

                            THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                           On Appeal from the 84th District Court
                                 Hansford County, Texas
             Trial Court No. CR01789, Honorable Curt W. Brancheau, Presiding

                                    September 29, 2023
                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

      Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Jose Eliso Zavala, was convicted by a jury

of aggravated sexual assault of a child under age fourteen and sentenced to fifty-two

years in prison and assessed a fine of $10,000.1 By three issues, Appellant (1) challenges

the constitutionality of article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as applied

to him when defense counsel was denied cross-examination of witnesses outside the

      1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(2)(B).
jury’s presence; (2) contends the extraneous offense evidence provided was more

prejudicial than probative; and (3) asserts the trial court erred in permitting the State to

ask improper commitment questions to the jury panel and in refusing to strike potential

jurors who changed their answers. We affirm.

                                           BACKGROUND

       Appellant and Mrs. Gomez, who separated in April 2021 for reasons unrelated to

the underlying case, have ten children together. They lived in a one-bedroom house

during the alleged incidents. She has three grown daughters from a prior marriage. After

the separation, their daughter, V.Z., attempted suicide twice because she had been raped

when she was younger but would not disclose by whom.2 Appellant’s wife questioned

some of her children to see if they knew the perpetrator’s identity. K.Z., the victim in the

underlying case, responded by asking her mother if Appellant was the offender because

he had assaulted her. Mrs. Gomez’s older daughters, Angelica and Maria also made

allegations Appellant had inappropriately touched them when they were much younger.

Mrs. Gomez reported the allegations to law enforcement and Appellant was arrested.

       The trial court held a pretrial hearing pursuant to article 38.37 of the Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure, which generally allows for admission of extraneous offenses of a

sexual nature committed against a child. At the commencement of the hearing, the

following colloquy occurred:

       [Prosecutor]: Your Honor, the State and defense counsel have discussed
       this matter and we have agreed that the State will tender the witnesses.
       And we think what’s proper is we’ll tender the witness and defense counsel
       will not cross-examine.
       2 The record shows Appellant was not the person V.Z. eventually disclosed as the perpetrator.

                                                  2
       [Defense Counsel]: It is my understanding that I don’t have a right to cross-
       examination, at least the way that the case law has come out. So I’m –
       would object to just tendering the notices. I don’t think that’s sufficient to
       establish beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                                 ***

       I would just like to make objection to 38.37 generally. I do believe it violated
       his right to due process. I do believe it is unconstitutional.

                                                 ***

       I would ask that the Court still engage in the 403 balancing test . . . .

The trial court overruled the objection based on constitutional grounds and reminded

defense counsel to re-urge her request for a Rule 403 balancing test at the conclusion of

the testimony.

       Maria and Angelica,3 as well as Appellant’s daughter, Y.Z., testified during the

38.37 hearing. Maria testified when she was approximately seven or eight years old,

Appellant inappropriately touched her vaginal area under her clothing while she was

asleep. His conduct would awaken her, and he would stop. According to Maria, it was

not an isolated incident. She described other occurrences in which Appellant would tickle

her vaginal area aggressively, but she knew he was not playing. She did not tell her

mother of his conduct because he had told her she would not be believed. His behavior

did not stop until she moved out of the house at age fourteen.

       After Maria testified, the prosecutor requested a ruling on whether defense counsel

could cross-examine the witnesses during the 38.37 hearing.                       Defense counsel

         3 The stepdaughters alleged the abuse against them began while they were living in Florida. At

that time, the stepdaughters shared a bedroom.
                                                  3
responded it was within the trial court’s discretion and also requested a ruling to avoid

procedural default. The trial court overruled the request to cross-examine the witnesses

during the 38.37 hearing.

       The hearing continued with Angelica testifying Appellant began touching her

inappropriately “all over [her] body parts,” including her vaginal area and breasts, when

she was in the third grade. The touching, which occurred over her clothes, would begin

with tickling or pillow fights. She would kick him in his private parts to get him to stop.

When she asked him to stop, he told her no one would believe her if she said anything.

She began blocking the bedroom door with a dresser so he would not enter. She

indicated the touching stopped when Appellant kicked her out of the house at age sixteen.

Angelica claimed she discussed the abuse with Maria when they were much older but

had not discussed it with her half-sister, Y.Z.

       Y.Z., a decade younger than her oldest half-sister, testified the family moved to the

one-bedroom house when she was in fifth grade. She confirmed Appellant touched her

in ways which made her feel uncomfortable. She described the way Appellant hugged

and grabbed her tightly with his hands across her breasts. He would have her sit on his

lap as if she “was a kid.” She felt “weird” because she was older and although she told

him to stop because she was “not a little kid,” he would hold her tighter.

       Y.Z. and her siblings all slept in the living room of the one-bedroom house

wherever there was space. The room had two couches, bunk beds, and floor space for

sleeping. She testified Appellant would try to unzip her pants while she slept, and she

would “move and fidget” so he would stop. According to Y.Z., there were many such

                                              4
occurrences. She occasionally slept under the bunk beds because she felt safer there.

She told of a particular time when she was in the sixth grade and had returned from a

band trip. She was tired and fell asleep on the floor but woke up when she felt him lift her

shirt. She testified, “I was on the floor with him. He pushed me down and he was on top

of me. But he wouldn’t let me go and he made me feel uncomfortable.” When asked if

Appellant ever woke her up by touching her vaginal area, she answered, “no.” She denied

ever being touched underneath her clothes.

       Appellant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine any of the witnesses. The

prosecutor argued the evidence met the threshold of article 38.37. He advised the trial

court the victim in the underlying case planned to testify to a similar pattern of

inappropriate touching, tickling and wrestling, unbuckling clothing, and touching her

vaginal area as she slept. Defense counsel disputed whether the evidence showed a

pattern of conduct that would fall within the statute because Y.Z. did not testify Appellant

touched her underneath her clothing. Counsel also argued the testimony of Appellant’s

stepdaughters was too vague, would cause confusion for the jury, take too much time,

and be more prejudicial than probative.

       The trial court observed the statute does not require the conduct to be identical

and believed the testimony of the stepdaughters would establish an “MO.” The trial court

ruled the testimony of all three witnesses would have a bearing on the underlying case

and found the probative value of their testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect.

                                             5
       At trial, K.Z., who had just turned eighteen, testified when she was in sixth or

seventh grade, Appellant began molesting her.4 She was sleeping on a couch one night

and was awakened with his fingers inside her vaginal area. He was hovering over her

but stopped when she turned around and saw him. Although she previously reported five

or six occurrences to a forensic interviewer, she testified she “for sure” remembered that

one particular incident. She recalled another time when she was awakened by Appellant

trying to unbuckle her jeans. She, just as Y.Z. testified at the pretrial hearing, also claimed

to sleep under the bunk beds so she would not be out in the open when she was asleep.

       During cross-examination, the defense pointed out that K.Z. made inconsistent

statements regarding the frequency of the incidents during her forensic interview. K.Z.

explained she remembered things differently during the interview. Defense counsel

attempted to discredit K.Z.’s description of how Appellant abused her.

       At trial, Angelica and Maria repeated their testimony from the pretrial hearing.

Cross-examination was brief. After presentation of the evidence, defense counsel re-

urged her objections based on article 38.37 and the highly prejudicial nature of the

testimony versus its probative value. She requested an appropriate limiting instruction.

After less than an hour of deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict.

ISSUE ONE—CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 38.37

       Appellant maintains article 38.37 is unconstitutional as it was applied to him

because it violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by denying cross-

examination of witnesses during the pretrial hearing rather than limiting the scope of

       4 K.Z. did not testify at the 38.37 hearing.

                                                      6
cross-examination.        Appellant also faults the trial court for failing to consider each

witness’s testimony individually because there were significant differences negating a

propensity to commit sexual assault of a child in conformity with the allegations. Cross-

examination, Appellant urges, would have revealed whether the witnesses spoke with

each other to compare or concoct stories. We agree the complete denial of the right to

cross-examination under article 38.37 was error but find the error did not harm Appellant.

                                                ANALYSIS

        In an as-applied constitutional challenge, the claimant “concedes the general

constitutionality of the statute but asserts the statute is unconstitutional as applied to his

particular facts and circumstances.”5 Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d 691, 698 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018). Because a statute may be valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid as

applied to a different set of facts, a litigant must show that in its operation, the challenged

statute was unconstitutionally applied to him. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011). We presume the statute is valid and the Legislature did not act

unreasonably or arbitrarily in enacting it. Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733, 744 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015).

        This Court has previously held article 38.37, section 2(b) does not violate an

appellant’s due process rights and is therefore, not unconstitutional. Bezerra v. State,

485 S.W.3d 133, 139–40 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, 580 U.S.

        5 Although Appellant does not specifically concede constitutionality of the statute, he nevertheless

vehemently objected at the 38.37 hearing and during trial to its unconstitutional nature and its highly
prejudicial effect as applied to him.
                                                     7
998, 137 S. Ct. 495, 196 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2016). Nothing in the underlying case persuades

this Court to deviate from Bezerra.

      Article 38.37 carves an exception to the prohibition of use of extraneous offenses

to show an actor’s character and that he acted in conformity therewith as provided in

Rules 404 and 405 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. As relevant here, article 38.37

provides as follows:

      Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, and subject
      to Section 2-a, evidence that the defendant has committed a separate
      offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be admitted in the trial of
      an alleged offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the
      evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant
      and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b). Section 2-a requires the trial court to

determine whether the evidence sought to be admitted can be “adequate to support a

finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a

reasonable doubt.”

      The Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s right to physically confront

witnesses who testify against him. Haggard v. State, 612 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2020). Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a

witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315,

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39

L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974)). The right to ask probing, adversarial cross-examination questions

“lies at the core of an American criminal trial’s truth-seeking function.” Coronado, 351

S.W.3d at 325.

                                           8
       The right to cross-examination is not unqualified. A trial court may limit the scope

and extent of cross-examination, so long as those limits do not infringe on the right of

confrontation. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). However,

it is not within a trial court’s discretion to prohibit a defendant from engaging in otherwise

appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part

of a witness. See id. (citing Johnson v. State, 433 S.W.3d 546, 551 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014)). See also Thompson v. State, No. 07-20-00101-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1849,

at *20 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (citing Harris v. State, 475 S.W.3d 395, 403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2015, pet. ref’d) (observing a defendant’s right to a fair trial is protected by procedural

safeguards within article 38.37 and that defense counsel has the right to challenge any

witness’s testimony by cross-examination)).6

       This Court concludes the trial court’s complete denial of cross-examination of the

three witnesses during the article 38.37 hearing was error. Because article 38.37 is an

evidentiary statute, a violation does not result in constitutional error. Rather, we review

the error for harm under rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R.

APP. P. 44.2(b). We must disregard non-constitutional error if, after examining the record

as a whole, we have a fair assurance the error did not have a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Id.

        6 The State argues the right to cross-examination is not a pretrial right. The Court of Criminal

Appeals has not squarely addressed the issue in the context of an article 38.37 pretrial hearing. See
generally Ex parte Estrada, 640 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d).
                                                   9
        The witnesses at the pretrial hearing all testified to incidents of sexual contact

committed against them by Appellant. There were similarities in the testimony including

how the touching was initiated by tickling or horseplay and escalated to touching of the

breasts and vaginal areas. Defense counsel had an unfettered opportunity to cross-

examine the witnesses at trial. The cross-examination, however, was brief. Because

K.Z.’s testimony alone would have been sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction, TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07, Appellant has not shown any harm by the trial court’s

denial of cross-examination at the pretrial hearing. This Court has a fair assurance the

error did not influence the jury’s verdict. Issue one is overruled.

ISSUE TWO—BALANCING TEST OF TEXAS RULE OF EVIDENCE 403

        Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony

of Appellant’s adult stepdaughters at trial. Specifically, he asserts Angelica’s and Maria’s

testimony did not indicate he had a signature or modus operandi.7 He complains of the

lack of evidence of conversations they had regarding the alleged abuse or whether they

compared their stories. He maintains the testimony should have been excluded as more

prejudicial than probative. We disagree.

                                                ANALYSIS

        We review a trial court’s ruling under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. Pawlak v.

State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A reviewing court must afford the

decision “an especially high level of deference.” Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205,

         7 Appellant does not challenge admission of the testimony of his daughter, Y.Z., who also testified

at the article 38.37 hearing.
                                                    10
218 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 354

(5th Cir. 2007)).

       Rule 403 provides that otherwise relevant and admissible evidence may be

excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of

the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. “The plain language of

Rule 403 does not allow a trial court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence when that

evidence is merely prejudicial.” Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 217–18. Evidence is unfairly

prejudicial when it has “an undue tendency to suggest that a decision was made on an

improper basis.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op.

on reh’g) (emphasis added). Sexually related bad acts and misconduct involving children

are inherently inflammatory. Id. at 397. This is so because all evidence against a

defendant is, by its very nature, designed to be prejudicial. Pawlak, 420 S.W.3d at 811

(citing Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Keller, P.J.,

concurring) (explaining that arguing proffered evidence is prejudicial is insufficient to

exclude it under Rule 403 because only unfair prejudice is addressed by Rule 403)

(emphasis in original)).

       In conducting a Rule 403 balancing test, the trial court weighs the following factors:

       (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered evidence along with
       (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against
       (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis
       (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the
       main issues

                                             11
       (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that
       has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and
       (6) the likelihood presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate
       amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.

Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Gigliobianco v. State, 210

S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

       The testimony of Appellant’s stepdaughters was probative to establish a pattern of

conduct by Appellant in touching his victim’s private parts.      The witnesses testified

similarly that he engaged in tickling which would escalate into inappropriate touching that

made them feel “weird” or uncomfortable. The State’s need to establish a pattern of

conduct justified admission of Angelica’s and Maria’s testimony given the lack of any

physical evidence to support the allegations made by K.Z.

       The jury charge included a limiting instruction for the jurors to consider the

objected-to testimony only if they believed the testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, the jury could not have been confused or distracted from the main issue because

the testimony of Appellant’s stepdaughters shed light on his propensity to inappropriately

touch them.

       The testimony of Angelica and Maria consumed approximately thirty-eight pages

of a 232-page volume of the reporter’s record. It did not consume an inordinate amount

of time.

       It does not matter that the complained-of extraneous testimony was used to

establish character and conformity therewith for that is one of the reasons the statute

permits its use. Rambo v. State, Nos. 07-18-00214-CR, 07-18-00215-CR, 07-18-00216-
                                          12
CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2206, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 20, 2019, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, we cannot say the trial court

abused its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s Rule 403 challenge. Issue two is overruled.

ISSUE THREE—IMPROPER COMMITMENT QUESTION

      Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in not striking Jurors Reid

and Gibson after they changed their answers to an improper commitment question asked

by the prosecutor. He contends the error was harmful. We agree the question was

improper but disagree it was harmful.

      A trial court has broad discretion over jury selection and whether to grant or deny

any objections. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. 2002). An abuse of discretion

occurs when an improper question is allowed to be asked. Id.

      A commitment question commits a prospective juror to resolve or refrain from

resolving an issue a certain way after learning a particular fact. Davis v. State, 349

S.W.3d 517, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001). Such questions are often designed to elicit a “yes” or “no” answer in

which one or both of the possible answers commit the jury to resolving an issue a certain

way. Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 179. Not all commitment questions are improper. Id. at

181. For a commitment question to be proper, one of the possible answers to that

question must give rise to a challenge for cause. Id. at 182. Even if the question meets

this challenge for cause requirement, “the question may nevertheless be improper if it

includes facts in addition to those necessary to establish a challenge for cause.” Id.

(Emphasis added). To be proper, a commitment question must contain only those facts

                                           13
necessary to test whether a prospective juror is challengeable for cause.           See id.

(Emphasis in original). See also Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005).

                                            ANALYSIS

         During voir dire, defense counsel posed the question of whether prospective jurors

could consider community supervision. Juror Close responded she could not if Appellant

was found guilty. Juror Reid answered, “Possibly. I’ll be honest. Probably not.” Gibson

answered, “No.”

         The trial court interjected as follows:

         I want to be sure that, for everyone who said there is no way they could
         consider probation whatsoever . . . if you had a sixteen-year-old and a
         twenty-year-old, you understand that would -- even if it was a consensual
         act, that would mandate that there’s no way you could give that person
         probation. . . . So I just want to be sure everyone, when they said, “No, I
         can’t go with probation,” that you’re saying there is absolutely no scenario
         whatsoever . . . where probation would be eligible.

The prosecutor offered a different scenario and asked the panel if they could consider

community supervision for a conviction involving a “twenty-year-old girl and a sixteen-

year-old boy.” Juror Close responded, “yes, I could.” Juror Reid answered, “possibly.”

Juror Gibson replied, “I could.” All three changed their answers under the new fact

scenario.

         After the named jurors vacillated, defense counsel suggested the prosecutor had

asked “a commitment question as to a specific set of facts.” The trial court responded,

“She’s got a point.” Defense counsel objected, argued Appellant would suffer irreparable

                                               14
harm, and requested that prospective jurors who had answered earlier that they could not

consider community supervision be struck for cause. The trial court suggested the State

rehabilitate jurors as a group.

        Without defense counsel moving for mistrial, the trial court preemptively

announced it would deny such a request and added, “No more commitment --” to which

the prosecutor answered, “[y]es.” Challenges for cause by defense counsel to Reid and

Gibson were denied and they were seated on the jury. Juror Close was not seated on

the jury.

        The prosecutor’s injection of new facts—a sexual assault involving a twenty-year-

old girl and a sixteen-year-old boy—asked the jurors to commit to whether they could

consider community supervision. (Emphasis added).8 The question was designed to

elicit a “yes” or “no” answer. A negative answer to such a question could be interpreted

as the inability of a juror to consider the full range of punishment making the juror

challengeable for cause. Montoya v. State, No. 03-15-00125-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS

9113, at *3–9 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).     Here, however, under the hypothetical presented by the prosecutor,

additional facts were introduced beyond what was necessary to sustain a challenge for

cause. Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182. Thus, the question was an improper commitment

question.

          8 The word “consider” often marks a commitment question in which a potential juror is asked to

refrain from resolving an issue after learning a fact that could be used to resolve that issue. Standefer, 59
S.W.3d at 180.
                                                    15
        Having found the prosecutor asked an improper commitment question, we must

evaluate the error for harm pursuant to Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure. Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 713. This Court must focus on “whether a biased

juror—one who had explicitly or implicitly promised to prejudge some aspect of the case

before the State’s improper questioning—actually sat on the jury.” Id. In other words,

was the jury or any specific juror “poisoned” by the improper commitment question on a

legal issue or fact that was important to the determination of the verdict or sentence? Id.9

        Defense counsel exhausted her peremptory strikes without attempting to strike

Jurors Reid and Gibson. The record does not reflect she requested additional peremptory

challenges. Her request to have them stricken was denied by the trial court and they

were seated on the jury.10 She argued Appellant would suffer irreparable harm because

those jurors who changed their minds on community supervision would expect to hear

        9 A non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in assessing harm include the following:

        (1) whether the questions were unambiguously improper and attempted to commit one or
        more veniremen to a specific verdict or course of action;
        (2) how many, if any, veniremen agreed to commit themselves to a specific verdict or
        course of action if the State produced certain evidence;
        (3) whether the veniremen who agreed to commit themselves actually served on the jury;
        (4) whether the defendant used peremptory challenges to eliminate any or all of those
        veniremen who had committed themselves;
        (5) whether the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges upon those
        veniremen and requested additional peremptory challenges to compensate for their use on
        improperly committed veniremen;
        (6) whether the defendant timely asserted that a named objectionable venireman actually
        served on the jury because he had to waste strikes on the improperly committed jurors; and
        (7) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict or course of action in
        reaching a verdict or sentence was substantially affected by the State’s improper
        commitment questioning during voir dire.

Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 714.

        10 The State notes defense counsel did not object to the final make-up of the jury. However, the

record demonstrates she opposed Jurors Reid and Gibson throughout the discussion on the prosecutor’s
commitment question and clarified she was asking for them to be stricken to preserve error.
                                                    16
testimony consistent with the prosecutor’s hypothetical rather than the actual facts which

they had earlier indicated would prevent them from considering community supervision.

      Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under age fourteen

under section 22.021 of the Penal Code. As such, he was not eligible for community

supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.056(4) (providing a defendant is

not eligible for jury-recommended community supervision following a conviction under

section 22.021). The record does not establish Appellant was tried by an impartial jury

or that any specific juror was “poisoned” by the improper commitment question. Sanchez,

165 S.W.3d at 713. We conclude the sentence imposed by the jury was not substantially

affected by the improper commitment question and Appellant was not harmed by the

improper commitment question. Issue three is overruled.

                                      CONCLUSION

      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                       Alex Yarbrough
                                                           Justice

Do not publish.

                                           17