Court Opinion

ID: 9950327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 19:04:44.088857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:37.285550
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 Marriage of Manning and Kim CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 In re the Marriage of JEREMIAH F.
 MANNING AND LUCY J. KIM
 JEREMIAH F. MANNING,
           Appellant,
                                                                        A164125
 v.
 LUCY J. KIM,                                                           (San Mateo County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. FAM0123613)
           Respondent.

         Appellant Jeremiah F. Manning appeals from a post-judgment order
denying an ex parte request to modify child-custody terms and awarding
sanctions to respondent Lucy Kim. We affirm.
                                                    I.
                                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                                               BACKGROUND

         This is the second appeal we have considered in connection with the
parties’ dissolution of their marriage. As we noted in our first opinion
(Manning v. Kim (April 10, 2019, A149875) [nonpub. opn.] (Manning I)),
Manning is an attorney licensed to practice in New York, and Kim is a doctor.
The two were married for around 12 years, and they have three children.
They separated in November 2013, and dissolution proceedings were initiated

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the following month. Manning has been unrepresented for most of the
proceedings, including in this appeal. The trial court’s final judgment was
entered in September 2016, and it awarded the parties joint legal custody of
the children, Kim sole physical custody, and Manning reasonable visitation
and monthly child and spousal support. In Manning I, we considered and
rejected Manning’s challenge to the final judgment.
      Post-judgment litigation continued. But appellant’s appendix contains
only four documents, providing little insight into the nature of those
proceedings. The first is Manning’s request for temporary emergency orders
regarding child custody and other issues (an “ex parte” request) filed on
March 15, 2021,1 two days before a regularly scheduled noticed hearing.
According to Manning’s declaration supporting the ex parte request, the
parties’ three kids were “in immediate crisis” because of Kim’s “bullying of
[their] sons” and her “vituperative and continuous campaign of disparaging
comments targeting” Manning, which had led him to not see his oldest child
in more than a year. Manning asked that if the trial court was not willing to
grant his ex parte request to intervene to address Kim’s alleged “parental
alienation,” that the court hold “an immediate long cause hearing to be set on
this issue so that fact witnesses and expert testimony may be heard and this
situation may be remedied.”
      The record does not include any response filed by Kim. The second and
third documents Manning includes in the record are two declarations he filed
in May, one of which was a “reply.” A hearing was held on Manning’s request
on June 4. The record contains a reporter’s transcript of the hearing as well
as of various other hearings.

      1 All further unspecified date references are to the 2021 calendar year.

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          The fourth and final document included in the record is the August 20
order denying Manning’s request and ordering to him to pay $5,000 in
sanctions to Kim for his misuse of the ex parte process. The court’s order
indicates that the parties agreed to the appointment of a “reconnection
therapist.”
                                          II.
                                     DISCUSSION

          As was the case in Manning I, our ability to fully evaluate the appellate
issues is limited because we lack a complete record and because Kim declined
to file a respondent’s appendix or brief. When we issued a tentative opinion
in this matter on January 30, 2024, we noted that Manning’s appendix lacked
even the required register of actions (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122(b)(1)(F),
8.124(b)(1)(A)). More than a month later, and one court day before scheduled
oral argument, Manning filed a motion to augment the record with the
register of actions, which spans 285 pages and lists every event in the action
from November 2013 to future scheduled actions in summer 2024. Although
we shall grant the untimely motion to augment, it does not ultimately assist
Manning in carrying his burden of demonstrating prejudicial error. (See In
re Marriage of Kushesh & Kushesh-Kaviani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 449, 435,
fn. 5.)
                A. Manning Was Not Entitled to Present Live Testimony on His
                   Ex Parte Request.

          The trial court concluded that there was “no evidence” that Kim “ha[d]
engaged in any behavior to alienate the children from” Manning. Manning
does not directly challenge this conclusion and instead argues he was
prejudiced because the trial court denied him the ability to present live

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testimony to prove Kim was improperly alienating the children from him. He
has not carried his appellate burden of demonstrating prejudicial error.2
      To begin with, Manning’s argument contravenes the rules applicable to
ex parte requests, also known as applications for emergency orders. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.151(a) (rule 5.151).) “Various court rules govern ex
parte proceedings, which are designed to afford relief on an essentially
emergency basis. ‘A court will not grant ex parte relief “in any but the
plainest and most certain of cases.” ’ ” (Newsom v. Superior Court (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1097.) “The purpose of [an ex parte request] is to
address matters that cannot be heard on the court’s regular calendar.”
(Rule 5.151(b).) A declaration must be submitted with the request, and it
“must contain facts within the personal knowledge of the declarant that
demonstrate why the matter is appropriately handled as an emergency
hearing, as opposed to being on the court’s regular hearing calendar.”
(Rule 5.151(d)(2).)
      The local rules for the San Mateo Superior Court applicable to family
court proceedings state, “Ex parte applications are strongly disfavored.
Orders will be issued thereon only upon a substantial showing of need. The
court’s policy is to decide ex parte applications solely based upon the
affidavits/declarations submitted in favor of, or in opposition to, the
applications.” (Super. Ct. San Mateo County, Local Rules, rule 5.6(A), italics
added.) These rules defeat Manning’s appellate argument. Having made the
choice to ask for emergency ex parte relief, Manning cannot complain that he

      2 In light of our decision affirming the August 20 order, we decline

Manning’s entreaty for us to vacate the order and then proceed to rule on the
retroactive effect of Senate Bill No. 331 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess., Stats 2023,
ch. 865, §§ 1–5), which imposes new restrictions on courts’ ability to order
certain family reunification treatments.

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was bound by the rules applicable to such a request, which do not
contemplate the presentation of live witnesses.
      In addition, Manning cannot otherwise demonstrate error or prejudice.
The record indicates that at the June 4 hearing he had not identified an
actual witness, let alone one who was available and ready to testify. What
Manning sought at the hearing was not the ability to present a live witness,
but instead to proceed with a future “long-cause hearing so that [he could]
retain an expert” to address the harm caused by one parent alienating
children from the other parent. Manning cites to Family Code, section 217,
subdivision (a), which generally directs that courts “shall receive any live,
competent testimony that is relevant.” But he presents no authority for the
notion that the trial court here was required to transform his ex parte
request into a motion to be heard at a later date on the court’s regular
calendar so he could call an unidentified witness to testify.
      The cases Manning relies on are inapposite. Our Supreme Court in
Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 invalidated a local rule that
marital dissolution trials presumptively be decided on written declaration
without live testimony. (Id. at pp. 1344–1345.) And In re Marriage of Swain
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 837 held that Family Code, section 217 precludes
reliance on hearsay declarations over a party’s objection where a party has no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Neither case held that a trial
court is required to hear live testimony in ex parte proceedings.
      Moreover, Manning fails to explain how his inability to have a live
witness testify was prejudicial, particularly in light of the trial court’s
eventual finding that there was “no evidence that [Kim] has engaged in any
behavior to alienate the children from [Manning].” An expert’s opinion on the
effects of alienation is manifestly immaterial when a court has found that

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there was no such alienation. Thus, for several reasons, Manning has not
sustained his burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its
discretion by not allowing him to present live witness testimony.
            B. Manning Has Not Demonstrated an Abuse of Discretion in the
               Sanctions Award.

      Manning’s next argument—that the trial court wrongly imposed
sanctions against him under Family Code Section 271 (section 271)—fares no
better. Section 271 is “designed to punish ‘a party [who] has unreasonably
increased the cost of litigation.’ ” (In re Marriage of Blake & Langer (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 300, 310.) “The section vests family law courts with an
additional means with which to enforce this state’s policy of promoting
settlement of family law litigation, while reducing its costs through mutual
cooperation of clients and their counsel. ‘Thus, a party who individually, or
by counsel, engages in conduct frustrating or obstructing the public policy is
thereby exposed to liability for the adverse party’s costs and attorney fees
such conduct generates.’ ” (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1295, 1318.)
      A sanctions award under section 271 is “reviewed for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] . . . [W]e will overturn such an order only if,
considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and
indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably
make the order.” (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205,
1225-1226.) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating an abuse of
discretion (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 16), and the trial court’s
order “is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.)

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      Manning has again failed to carry his appellate burden. At the June 4
hearing, the trial court stated, “there’s a question of sanctions for filing all
these ex partes . . . as opposed to just regular [requests for hearing].” The
court asked Manning, “I want you to comment as to why the Court should
not grant 271 sanctions against you to the respondent for your not abiding by
local court rules and filing requests for ex partes for non-emergency matters.”
After Manning gave a non-responsive answer, the court awarded sanctions
because Manning “fil[ed] numerous ex parte applications without good cause
and without any emergency.” It specifically found that Manning’s March 15
ex parte request was “totally inappropriate and unnecessary given the
noticed custody hearing scheduled two days later.” This reference to a
“noticed custody hearing” was apparently to a regularly calendared motion
for a change of custody terms that occurred on March 17.
      On this record, we can discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court. While our record includes a transcript of the March 17 hearing, it
does not include the pleadings filed in connection with it, nor does it include
any of Manning’s other ex parte requests.3 Accordingly, we are unable to
evaluate the trial court’s finding that Manning abused the process with his
“numerous” ex parte requests, and we must therefore consider Manning’s
argument forfeited. (See Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416 [when record is inadequate for meaningful review,
appellant defaults and trial court’s decision is affirmed].)

      3 The transcripts suggest that on May 21, 2021, another hearing on a
different ex parte request was held. The record does not include the
pleadings filed in connection with this hearing. According to Kim’s attorney,
the subject matter involved “pretty much the same issues” as the hearing on
Manning’s ex parte request that was scheduled for the June 4 hearing.

                                         7
      Manning also argues that the trial court wrongly failed to consider his
income when it awarded sanctions to Kim. Again, we must consider the
argument forfeited. For starters, Manning fails to provide a citation to the
record showing that he raised and preserved his objection in the trial court.
(See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.) More importantly, the
record is fatally incomplete, as it does not include copies of any of the
pleadings or declarations filed in connection with the request for sanctions.
We simply do not know what declarations or arguments may have been
presented for the court’s consideration.
      At oral argument in this court, Manning seemed to believe that he
could not be found to have provided an inadequate record since the trial
court’s register of actions was available on the court’s website. And he
further contended that the register he belatedly provided to the court
demonstrates that he did not receive proper notice of the proposed
sanctions—an issue he had mentioned in a single clause of his opening brief
that did not include a citation to the record. Manning directed the court to
other sanctions requests and claimed they were docketed in such a way to
indicate that proper notice had been given, unlike the request here.
Manning’s conclusion is not self-evident from a review of the docket,
especially in the absence of briefing supported by record citations. And what
is still missing from the record is a copy of any written sanctions request and
supporting documentation.
      An appellate court “need not consider . . . a perfunctory assertion [in a
brief] unaccompanied by supporting argument.” (People v. Smith (2003)
30 Cal.4th 581, 616, fn. 8.) In short, the record is far too incomplete, and
Manning’s brief is far too undeveloped, for us to conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. We are similarly unpersuaded

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by Manning’s argument that he should not have been sanctioned for filing
non-emergency ex parte motions, because Kim was allowed to file such a
motion “over solely a money judgment.”
                                     III.
                                 DISPOSITION
      Manning’s motion to augment the record filed on March 8, 2024, is
granted. The trial court’s August 20, 2021 order is affirmed.

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                                           _________________________
                                           Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Castro, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Alameda, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Manning v. Kim A149875

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