Court Opinion

ID: 9913172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:12:20.860797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:38.928145
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL                     No. 84466-1-I
 TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a regional
 transit authority, dba SOUND TRANSIT,            DIVISION ONE

                          Plaintiff,

                  v.

 LMRK PROPCO 3 LLC, a Delaware
 limited liability company,

                          Appellant,

 CCTMO LLC, a Delaware limited liability
 company; T-MOBILE WEST TOWER
 LLC, a Delaware limited liability
 company; and SPRINT SPECTRUM                     PUBLISHED OPINION
 L.P., a Delaware limited partnership,

                         Respondents,

 MARYMOOR STORAGE PARTNERS
 LLC, a Washington limited liability
 company; PUGET SOUND ENERGY,
 INC., a Washington public utility
 corporation; AT&T INC., a Delaware
 corporation; KING COUNTY, a
 Washington municipal corporation; and
 ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND
 UNKNOWN TENANTS,

                          Defendants.

      BOWMAN, J. — Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound

Transit) paid $16.65 million as full and just compensation to condemn by eminent

domain property owned by Marymoor Storage Partners LLC. The property
No. 84466-1-I/2

included a cell tower in which LMRK PROPCO 3 LLC (Landmark), CCTMO LLC,

T-Mobile West Tower LLC (T-Mobile Tower), Sprint Spectrum LLC, and T-Mobile

West LLC1 asserted compensable leasehold interests. Landmark appeals the

trial court’s disbursement of just compensation funds to CCTMO, T-Mobile

Tower, Sprint, and T-Mobile West. Landmark argues those entities were

judicially estopped from moving for disbursement based on an agreement that

their interests would be determined after an evidentiary hearing. It also argues

that the trial court did not follow statutory procedures before disbursing the funds

and that the disbursement was inequitable. We affirm.

                                          FACTS

       Marymoor owned 2.5 acres in Redmond. It used most of the property for

a self-storage facility. But it leased a small section on the northwest corner of the

property and several adjacent storage units to T-Mobile Tower. T-Mobile Tower

then built and operated a 100-foot-tall cell tower on the land, leasing space on

the tower for telecommunications antennae to several phone companies.

Marymoor assigned Landmark the right to collect rent from T-Mobile Tower’s

ground lease.

       By 2018, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West each held leasehold interests

in the cell tower, granting the companies access and utility easements for affixing

and operating clusters of telecommunication antennae. AT&T, Sprint, and T-

Mobile West also held leasehold interests in the storage facility, granting each

company access to and use of a storage unit for equipment. T-Mobile Tower

       1
           T-Mobile Tower and T-Mobile West are different entities.

                                             2
No. 84466-1-I/3

held a leasehold interest in the cell tower, authorizing it to rent space on the

tower. T-Mobile Tower leased back its entire interest to CCTMO. And it granted

CCTMO a power of attorney to act on its behalf on matters related to the cell

tower leases. So, CCTMO held a sublease interest in the management of the

tower and the rent paid by AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West. Finally, Landmark

held the ground lease for the cell tower site and the storage units. That interest

gave Landmark the right to collect income from T-Mobile Tower for use of the site

and from AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West for rental of the storage units.

       In early 2018, Sound Transit notified Marymoor that it intended to

condemn by eminent domain Marymoor’s property to construct, operate, and

maintain a portion of the “Downtown Redmond Link Extension” of its light rail

project. In preparation, Sound Transit hired property advisors to appraise

Marymoor’s property. The October 2018 appraisal valued the collective interests

in the property at $16.65 million—$15.5 million for the land and $1.15 million for

the cell tower interests.

       In early 2019, Marymoor tried selling the property to Sound Transit to

avoid condemnation proceedings. But to do so, it needed to free its title from all

encumbrances. So, following mediation in June 2019, Marymoor and Landmark

executed a settlement agreement. Marymoor agreed to pay Landmark

$950,000, and Landmark agreed to secure releases of all the cell tower tenants’

leasehold interests. Marymoor then agreed to sell the property to Sound Transit

for $16.7 million. But Landmark failed to clear the title, and in September 2019,

Marymoor and Sound Transit’s purchase and sale agreement fell through. As a

                                          3
No. 84466-1-I/4

result, Marymoor and Landmark sued each other for breach of the June 2019

settlement agreement. The case proceeded to arbitration.

       In October 2019, Sound Transit petitioned to condemn by eminent domain

Marymoor’s fee simple interest in the property as well as all encumbrances on

the land. It named Marymoor, Landmark, and CCTMO as respondents.2 The

court set the matter for trial in June 2020.

       In January 2020, the court entered a stipulated order granting Sound

Transit immediate use and possession of the property once it deposited $16.65

million into the court registry as just compensation for the taking. Soon after, T-

Mobile Tower petitioned to intervene, which the court granted. After T-Mobile

Tower intervened, CCTMO’s attorneys represented its interest because their

interests were coextensive.3

       In February 2020, Marymoor moved to release $15.5 million of the funds

in the court registry. CCTMO objected, arguing the motion was premature

because the parties had not yet determined their separate cell tower and land

interests. Alternatively, CCTMO requested that the court leave $2 million in the

registry to ensure compensation for the remaining interests. The court granted

Marymoor’s motion but left $2 million in the registry. It ordered the release of

$14.65 million to Marymoor.

       A few weeks later, AT&T and Sprint joined as parties to the condemnation

proceeding. In April 2020, Sound Transit filed a second amended eminent

       2
           It also named several other entities not involved in this appeal.
       3
       We refer to CCTMO and T-Mobile Tower collectively as CCTMO for the
remainder of this opinion.

                                               4
No. 84466-1-I/5

domain petition identifying the new parties’4 interests in the property. Although

the amended petition did not name T-Mobile West, it was a cell tower tenant and

became a claimant and interested party in the condemnation proceedings under

RCW 8.04.140.5

       In May 2020, the court entered a “Stipulated Judgment and Decree of

Appropriation” between Sound Transit and Marymoor establishing $16.65 million

as full and just compensation for the “Condemned Property and all rights,

estates, and interests therein, and for termination of any and all leases and

easements, recorded or unrecorded, that burden the Property.” The other parties

did not sign the stipulation. But in July 2020, the remaining parties—Landmark,

CCTMO, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West—entered a stipulated order with

Marymoor to strike their June 2020 trial date and affirm the full condemnation

value of the property as $16.65 million.

       The stipulated order noted that $2 million was available to be appropriated

between the remaining interests. The parties agreed to set a “post-trial briefing

schedule” and an “evidentiary hearing . . . to determine allocation of the

remaining funds” in the court registry and that the trial court could allocate the

remaining funds “via post-trial motions.” The parties agreed on a briefing

schedule that included a November 2020 deadline to exchange appraisals, a

December 2020 discovery deadline, and a March 2021 evidentiary hearing.

       4
           T-Mobile Tower, AT&T, and Sprint.
       5
         Chapter 8.04 RCW governs eminent domain actions by the State. But under
RCW 8.12.120, a person or entity unnamed in a city’s eminent domain petition and
claiming an interest in the subject property may also be admitted as a party to the
lawsuit.

                                           5
No. 84466-1-I/6

       CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West exchanged appraisals of their

interests before the November 2020 deadline. CCTMO’s appraisal valued its

interest at $1,045,000, Sprint’s appraisal valued its interest at $68,000, and T-

Mobile West’s appraisal valued its interest at $125,000.

       Landmark also provided appraisals of AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West’s

interests by the deadline. But Landmark’s appraisals did not estimate those

parties’ leasehold interests in the cell tower. Instead, its appraisals valued those

parties’ interests in only the storage units at $3,000 for AT&T, $23,500 for Sprint,

and $22,100 for T-Mobile West. Landmark also submitted a copy of Sound

Transit’s appraisal of the property as a whole. Landmark did not provide an

appraisal of its own interest in the cell tower.

       After the exchange of appraisals,6 Landmark and CCTMO each moved for

summary judgment, seeking an order dismissing the other from the

condemnation proceeding. Both parties alleged the other had no compensable

interest in the condemned property. The court denied both motions.7

       In March 2021, the arbitrator issued a ruling resolving the lawsuit between

Marymoor and Landmark. The arbitrator determined that Landmark breached its

agreement by failing to extinguish the leaseholds encumbering the property. The

arbitrator awarded Marymoor money damages and assigned to Landmark

       6
       AT&T did not provide its own appraisal and ultimately never sought
compensation for its interest.
       7
        The court denied Landmark’s motion in February 2021 and CCTMO’s motion in
June 2021.

                                           6
No. 84466-1-I/7

Marymoor’s remaining interest, “if any,” to the funds in the registry from the

condemnation action.

       March 2021 passed without an evidentiary hearing despite the parties’

earlier stipulated agreement. The parties did not schedule another hearing.

       On June 1, 2021, Marymoor formally assigned “any and all” of its residual

interest in the property to Landmark. Then, two days later, Landmark moved to

disburse $762,000 of the $2 million in the court registry. It argued that the

registry held $762,000 more than the appraised interests claimed by the other

parties. And it argued that it was entitled to those funds because it “not only has

a claim to the monies in the court as the easement owner,” but because it also

“now owns [Marymoor]’s claims as the owner of the property.” According to

Landmark, “no party other than [it] has a claim to the excess $762,000[ ] held in

the court registry.”

       CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West objected, arguing that the court

should distribute the remaining funds only after an evidentiary hearing under

RCW 8.12.150 and that Landmark had not identified the specific interest for

which it requested disbursement. It also argued that Landmark presented no

expert opinion on the fair market value of the interest for which it sought a

disbursement of funds. The court granted Landmark’s motion, disbursing to

Landmark $762,000. $1,238,000 remained in the court registry.

       The case sat dormant for a year. Then, in July 2022, Sprint and T-Mobile

West jointly moved for disbursement. Those parties requested disbursement of

$193,000 based on the appraisals of their cell tower lease interests. Landmark

                                         7
No. 84466-1-I/8

objected, arguing that the court could allocate funds only after an evidentiary

hearing. Landmark also argued that Sprint and T-Mobile West’s cellular leases

were not compensable interests. But Landmark agreed that Sprint and T-Mobile

West had a combined $45,600 leasehold interest in the storage units. Sprint and

T-Mobile West then increased their request for disbursement from $193,000 to

$238,600 to account for their storage unit leasehold interests. On August 9,

2022, the court granted the motion and disbursed a total of $238,600 to Sprint

and T-Mobile West.

       CCTMO then moved for disbursement of funds and set a hearing date of

August 31, 2022. CCTMO asked for the remaining $999,400 in the court registry

for compensation of its interest based on its appraisal of $1,045,000. Landmark

again objected. It disputed the value of CCTMO’s interest, argued that the court

should appropriate funds only after an evidentiary hearing, and asserted that it

was the only party remaining with a compensable interest in the property.

       On August 25, five days before CCTMO’s hearing, Landmark cross moved

for disbursement of the remaining funds in the registry. In support of its cross

motion, Landmark submitted a declaration from its chief financial officer valuing

its “real property interests” at $1,041,985. CCTMO moved to strike Landmark’s

cross motion and declaration, arguing they were untimely under King County

Local Civil Rule (KCLCR) 7(b)(4)(A).

       The court granted CCTMO’s motion and ordered disbursement of the

remaining funds in the court registry to CCTMO. The court struck Landmark’s

cross motion because it was not properly noted under the local court rules. And

                                         8
No. 84466-1-I/9

it struck Landmark’s chief financial officer’s valuation of its interest because

Landmark presented the declaration almost two years after the deadline to

exchange appraisals and the close of discovery.

       Landmark appeals.

                                       ANALYSIS

       Landmark argues that CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were judicially

estopped from moving for disbursement of funds from the court registry, and that

even if they were not, the trial court did not follow the proper statutory

procedures. Landmark also asserts the court erred by striking its cross motion

for disbursement and supporting declaration. We disagree.

1. Judicial Estoppel

       Landmark argues that CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were judicially

estopped from seeking disbursement of funds from the court registry without an

evidentiary hearing. It asserts it “reasonably relied” on the parties’ stipulated

order to strike the trial date and set a post-trial briefing schedule, including an

evidentiary hearing. CCTMO contends Landmark waived that argument because

it did not raise judicial estoppel before the trial court.

       Generally, we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

RAP 2.5(a). This rule encourages “ ‘the efficient use of judicial resources’ . . . by

ensuring that the trial court has the opportunity to correct any errors, thereby

avoiding unnecessary appeals.” State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304-05, 253

P.3d 84 (2011) (quoting State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492

                                            9
No. 84466-1-I/10

(1988)). Landmark did not raise judicial estoppel below, so it waived that

argument on appeal.

         In any event, judicial estoppel does not apply here. Judicial estoppel is an

equitable doctrine that “ ‘precludes a party from asserting one position in a court

proceeding and later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent

position.’ ” Arp v. Riley, 192 Wn. App. 85, 91, 366 P.3d 946 (2015)8 (quoting

Arkinson v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 535, 538, 160 P.3d 13 (2007)). The

doctrine’s primary purposes are to (1) preserve respect for judicial proceedings

and (2) avoid inconsistency, duplicity, and waste of time. Anfinson v. FedEx

Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 861, 281 P.3d 289 (2012). It is

intended to protect the integrity of the courts, not the litigants. Arp, 192 Wn. App.

at 91.

         In determining whether judicial estoppel applies, we look to see if (1) the

party asserts a position inconsistent with one made in an earlier proceeding, (2)

acceptance of the position would create the perception that a party misled a court

in either proceeding, and (3) the party asserting the inconsistent position would

derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment. Arp, 192 Wn. App. at

92. But “judicial estoppel does not apply absent a prior judicial proceeding in

which the alleged inconsistent position was taken.”9 Kellar v. Est. of Kellar, 172

         8
             Internal quotation marks omitted.
         An exception to this rule is when a party offers evidence that is “inconsistent
         9

with ‘sworn testimony the party has given in the same or prior judicial proceedings.’ ”
Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 864 (quoting King v. Clodfelter, 10 Wn. App. 514, 519 P.2d 206
(1974), abrogated on other grounds by Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 865). Landmark does
not allege that CCTMO, Sprint, or T-Mobile West offered evidence inconsistent with their
prior sworn testimony.

                                                 10
No. 84466-1-I/11

Wn. App. 562, 581, 291 P.3d 906 (2012).

       Landmark seeks to estop CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West from taking

a position contrary to the one they expressed in their stipulated order. But the

court entered the stipulated order in the same judicial proceeding. So, the court

was aware of the order and could assess the parties’ positions without risk of

being misled.10 As a result, the doctrine does not apply.

2. Disbursement Procedure

       Landmark argues that even if CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were

not estopped from seeking disbursement of funds without a hearing, the court

used an unlawful and inequitable procedure to distribute the money. Landmark

contends that under chapter 8.12 RCW, it was entitled to “separate trials to

resolve factual disputes regarding the total value of the condemned property” and

“the value of the competing interests in the property from which that total value is

derived.”

       We interpret statutes de novo. Robertson v. Wash. Parks & Recreation

Comm’n, 135 Wn. App. 1, 5, 145 P.3d 379 (2005). In interpreting a statute, we

aim to determine and carry out the legislature’s intent. Id. If the statute’s

meaning is plain on its face, we must give effect to that plain meaning. Id. We

derive a statute’s plain meaning from the language of the statute as a whole and

the related statutes that reveal legislative intent about the specific provision at

issue. Id.; Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Pac. County v. Comcast of Wash. IV, Inc., 8

       10
          We note that the parties did set a briefing schedule and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing for March 2021 consistent with the order. But Landmark let that date
pass without rescheduling the hearing.

                                          11
No. 84466-1-I/12

Wn. App. 2d 418, 450, 438 P.3d 1212 (2019). If the plain language of the statute

is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, our inquiry ends. Cito v. Rios, 3

Wn. App. 2d 748, 759, 418 P.3d 811 (2018).

       We review a trial court’s application of a statute for an abuse of discretion.

See Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 833, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007) (a court

abuses its discretion when it enters a ruling based on an erroneous view of the

law). And we review a trial court’s exercise of its broad authority to fashion an

equitable remedy for an abuse of discretion. SAC Downtown Ltd. P’ship v. Kahn,

123 Wn.2d 197, 204, 867 P.2d 605 (1994). A trial court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or

reasons. O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 183 Wn. App. 15, 21, 332 P.3d 1099

(2014). A court rests a discretionary decision on untenable grounds or bases it

on untenable reasons if it relies on unsupported facts or applies the wrong legal

standard. Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 677, 684, 132 P.3d 115 (2006).

The court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable if “ ‘the court, despite applying

the correct legal standard to the supported facts, adopts a view that no

reasonable person would take.’ ” Id.11 (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647,

654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)).

       Chapter 8.12 RCW establishes the procedures for condemnation

proceedings initiated by a city.12 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County v. N. Am.

       11
            Internal quotation marks omitted.
       12
          Sprint and T-Mobile West moved for disbursement of funds under chapter 8.04
RCW, the statutes governing eminent domain actions by the State. But on appeal, the
parties agree that chapter 8.12 RCW governs here.

                                                12
No. 84466-1-I/13

Foreign Trade Zone Indus., LLC, 159 Wn.2d 555, 567, 151 P.3d 176 (2007).

After a city petitions in eminent domain and the court determines the taking is for

a public use, the court must hold a trial to determine just compensation. RCW

8.12.050. The court “shall impanel a jury to ascertain the just compensation to

be paid for the property taken or damaged” as a whole.13 RCW 8.12.100. Where

there are separate interests in the property, and “if any defendant or party in

interest shall demand,” the court may impanel separate juries “as to the

compensation or damages to be paid to any one or more of such defendants or

parties in interest,” so long as the party is “first admitted as a party defendant.”

Id.; RCW 8.12.120. The jury must then “ascertain the just compensation to be

paid to any [party] claiming an interest” in the condemned property. RCW

8.12.120.

       Here, Sound Transit and Marymoor agreed in the May 2020 Stipulated

Judgment and Decree of Appropriation that Sound Transit would pay $16.65

million as just compensation for the property as a whole. Landmark did not

contest the stipulated judgment. Nor did it object to the disbursement of $14.65

million to Marymoor as just compensation for its interest. Indeed, in the July

2020 stipulated order to strike the trial date, Landmark agreed with Marymoor,

CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West that “[o]nly the allocation of the Reserved

Funds remains to [be] determined in this action.” And Landmark did not demand

a trial to determine the value of its separate interest as provided for in RCW

8.12.100 and .120. Instead, it agreed that “allocation of the [$2 million] in

       13
         The parties may waive a trial by jury “as in other civil cases” and have the
matter heard by the court. RCW 8.12.090.

                                            13
No. 84466-1-I/14

Reserved Funds can take place via post-trial motions . . . pursuant to an agreed

schedule.” As a result, Landmark waived its right to trials to establish just

compensation for the property as a whole and its separate interest.

       Landmark argues that even if it was not entitled to a trial, the court still

should have determined by some means the extent and value of each parties’

separate interest in the property before distributing any of the funds. Citing State

v. Spencer, 90 Wn.2d 415, 583 P.2d 1201 (1978), Landmark contends that if, as

here, the funds fall short of fully compensating each parties’ appraised interest,

the court must ensure that each party receives a proportional share of the

remaining funds. According to Landmark, the trial court used an inequitable

procedure because it precluded Landmark from compensation for any of its

leasehold interests.

       In Spencer, the State condemned 2.6 acres owned by Elmer and Alice

Spencer, part of which was subject to a lease held by Socony Mobil Oil

Company. 90 Wn.2d at 416. The Spencers and Socony entered a stipulated

judgment and decree of appropriation under which the State paid $393,500 as

just compensation for all interests in the property. Id. at 417. At trial, Socony

urged the court to value its and the Spencers’ interests and then equitably

apportion each a share of the condemnation award. Id. The trial court refused.

Id. Instead, it awarded Socony $75,033, the amount it found to be the fair market

value of the leasehold. Id. The court then awarded the remaining funds to the

Spencers. Id. We reversed, concluding that the trial court should have equitably

apportioned the funds. Id.; State v. Spencer, 16 Wn. App. 841, 844-45, 559 P.2d

                                          14
No. 84466-1-I/15

1360 (1977). Our Supreme Court affirmed, holding that courts have both

statutory and equitable authority to apportion damages in condemnation

proceedings, and an equitable apportionment of the lump-sum condemnation

award was appropriate “under the applicable statute and the facts and

circumstances of [the] case.” Id. at 419.

        Contrary to Landmark’s argument, Spencer does not mandate a particular

procedure trial courts must follow to disburse funds in condemnation

proceedings. Instead, it recognizes a court should use its discretion, guided by

statutory and equitable authority, to resolve conflicting claims and apportion just

compensation in a manner called for by the facts and circumstances of each

case.

        Here, RCW 8.12.150 provides that “[n]o delay in ascertaining the amount

of compensation shall be occasioned by any doubt or contest which may arise

. . . as to the extent of the interest of any defendant in the property.” After the

court establishes the total value of the condemned property, it may “require

adverse claimants to interplead, so as to fully determine their rights and interests

in the compensation ascertained.”14 Id. And it “may make such order as may be

necessary in regard to the deposit or payment of such compensation.” Id. The

plain language of the statute affords the court broad equitable authority to resolve

        14
          Interpleading is an equitable action in which multiple claimants to the same
money or property can have their claims “adjudged, determined, and adjusted” as
described in RCW 4.08.160. See Smith v. Dement Bros. Co., 100 Wash. 139, 139-40,
144-45, 170 P. 555 (1918) (quoting REM. REV. STAT. § 199, recodified as RCW 4.08.160
(LAWS OF 1890, at 93, § 1)). In an interpleader action, the court may make all necessary
orders “for the preservation and protection of the rights, interests, or liens of the several
parties.” RCW 4.08.180.

                                             15
No. 84466-1-I/16

disputed interests in condemned property and disburse funds accordingly. See,

e.g., City of Tacoma v. Nyman, 154 Wash. 154, 157, 281 P. 484 (1929) (holding

that the trial court properly resolved contested interests under Rem. Rev. Stat. §

9225, recodified as RCW 8.12.150 (LAWS OF 1907, ch. 153, § 11), because its

procedure “opened the way for doing justice between the contending parties”).

       The procedure employed by the court to disburse funds to CCTMO,

Sprint, and T-Mobile West was tenable under the circumstances of this case.

After the court’s disbursement to Landmark, the case lay dormant for a year.

Then, in July 2022, Sprint and T-Mobile West jointly moved for disbursement.

Those parties requested disbursement of $193,000 based on the appraisals of

their cell tower lease interests. The trial court received and considered briefing

from all interested parties. In its brief, Landmark argued the other parties had no

compensable interest in the cell tower. The court rejected that argument.

Instead, the court disbursed the funds consistent with Sprint, T-Mobile West, and

eventually CCTMO’s undisputed appraised values of their respective leasehold

interests.15

       Landmark also fails to show that the court’s procedure deprived it of any

compensation for its leasehold interest. Indeed, Landmark received a $762,000

disbursement for its interests. While Landmark now argues that the

       15
          Landmark challenges the trial court’s finding that the appraisals were
undisputed. But the record shows that Landmark submitted no competing appraisals of
the other parties’ interests. Landmark also complains that it had no opportunity to
challenge whether the other parties’ appraisers “followed sound appraisal practices”
before the court accepted their appraised values. But the record shows that Landmark
received the appraisals before the November 2020 deadline and made no effort to
depose the other parties’ experts over the next two years.

                                         16
No. 84466-1-I/17

disbursement was compensation for only its ownership interest received from

Marymoor, neither its motion to disburse nor the trial court’s order of

disbursement identify those funds as such.

       Under the circumstances of this case, the procedure the trial court used to

determine the value of the parties’ separate interests and disburse funds does

not amount to an abuse of discretion.

3. Cross Motion to Disburse Funds

       Landmark argues that the trial court erred by striking its cross motion for

disbursement and supporting declaration. We review a trial court’s ruling on a

motion to strike for an abuse of discretion. Farmer v. Davis, 161 Wn. App. 420,

431, 250 P.3d 138 (2011).

       Under KCLCR 7(b)(4)(A), a moving party “shall serve and file all motion

documents no later than 4:30 p.m. nine judicial days before the date the party

wishes the motion to be considered.” A party can request that timing

requirement “be shortened only for good cause [and] upon written application to

the court.” KCLCR 7(b)(10)(A).

       Landmark cross moved for disbursement five judicial days before the

hearing date of CCTMO’s motion to disburse. As a result, Landmark’s cross

motion was untimely under the local rules. And Landmark did not seek to show

good cause to shorten time under KCLCR 7(b)(10)(A). The trial court did not

abuse its discretion by enforcing the applicable court rules.16

       16
           Even if the court found good cause for the late filing of Landmark’s cross
motion, Landmark submitted the supporting declaration appraising the value of its
interest almost two years after the November 2020 deadline to exchange appraisals.
The trial court correctly identified this as an independent basis to exclude that document.

                                            17
No. 84466-1-I/18

      In sum, CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were not estopped from

seeking disbursement of just compensation funds from the court registry without

a hearing, and the trial court did not use an unlawful or inequitable procedure to

disburse the funds. We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

                                        18