Court Opinion

ID: 9693654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:54:31.340586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:49.101877
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
With all deference, the majority’s reversal of this misdemeanor conviction for disturbing Congress while in session enshrines into the Chutzpah Hall of Fame the particularly ironic objection made by appellant to the conduct of his trial, alongside such other fabled defenses of gall as that presented by *846the child who murdered his parents and then sought mercy on the ground he was an orphan.
Consider the irony of appellant’s contention in this case: that his $300 fine for yelling in the Senate gallery should be reversed because the trial judge failed at voir dire to inquire specifically of the jurors if they might have a prejudice against appellant because of his political views and associations, yet it was the appellant who presented to the jury, over government objection both before and during trial, the very matter of his political views and affiliations. (Supp. Record at 13 and 53-54.)
It was appellant who insisted upon testifying, over the prosecutor’s protest, that he was a twice-wounded combat veteran of the Vietnam War who was honorably discharged with a disability and then joined the Vietnam Veterans Against the War because he “wanted to end the Vietnam War.” (Record at 53-54.) Surely, even cloistered appellate judges can discern that in today’s world, in contrast to a decade ago, the knowledge that appellant had joined an organization of combat veterans dedicated to end the Vietnam War is scarcely apt to drive jurors to prejudicial anger against appellant.1 Certainly, defense counsel recognized the appeal of appellant’s organization as he hammered away about it to the jury. (Record at 99.)
The record also contains appellant’s testimony that he came to the Senate gallery on the day of his arrest (after having “cased” it on the day before) because he “wanted to speak to the American people ... and make a statement about World War III ... I wanted the American people to understand that the government and the United States were planning and involved in preparing for World War III and did not at all care about the fact that millions of people around the world were killed ... in a nuclear war . ...”2 (Record at 55-56.) When he arose in the Senate gallery, according to his own testimony (Record at 58), he shouted “those millionaires down there, are planning a World War III, they don’t care how many millions are incinerated.” In light of the recent statement by the Catholic Bishops on the dangers of nuclear war, appellant’s political view of alarm concerning nuclear war would appear to put him on the side of the angels, figuratively speaking, so far as the jury was concerned.
Defense counsel in his argument (Record at 99), continued the political theme of the defense, pointing out to the jury the fact that appellant was a Purple Heart veteran who had honorably served his country in the Vietnam War and then, after enduring the crucible of combat, became a fierce advocate of world peace. Thus, appellant’s attorney trumpeted in closing argument (Record at 100-02):
And he gets accused because he got [up in] a gallery and said I don’t want any more war, I don’t want any more war.. .. (Record at 10Ó.) He didn’t think the Senators would listen because when he was in Vietnam being shot at, the Senators weren’t listening then ....
A person gets up and says no more war? We have had a nuclear accident. Let’s not have a War over it. We have been to Vietnam. Let’s not have another one. (Record at 101.)
* * * * * *
Is he trying to do something to prevent the war? Yes. What’s disturbing here? We’ve got the wrong people on trial. Maybe it’s the Roland Corderos of the World who are trying to show those of us who don’t have enough interest, who just let events pass. (Record at 102.)
The majority, appearing to return to the Great Red Scare of the post-Pirst World *847War or at least the so-called McCarthy era, seizes upon the words “revolution” and the “Revolutionary Communist Party” which were contained in a typewritten, single sheet of paper (Supp. Record II at 2), appellant threw into the air in the gallery before he could be arrested and ejected. The majority posits that appellant's “advocacy of revolution” and “membership in the Revolutionary Communist Party,” as depicted in the typed sheet,3 are matters about which the population at large harbors strong feelings. Accordingly, the majority, ignoring the fact that appellant paraded before the jury his membership in an organization of former American soldiers who had served their country in Vietnam and his generally popular political views concerning world peace, concludes reversal is necessary because of the trial court’s failure to ask the prospective jurors whether they could be impartial in light of appellant’s political views or associations.4
Under the particular circumstances here, I am unable to agree that appellant suffered “substantial prejudice,” which is the only ground under the decisional law of the District of Columbia for not upholding the trial judge in the exercise of the considerable discretion vested in him in his conduct of the voir dire. This test was announced by this court as recently as 1979. Khaalis v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 313, 335 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092, 100 S.Ct. 1059, 62 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980). Lo and behold, however, not only does the majority ignore the fact that appellant played upon his political views and political associations before the jury despite government protests, but the majority now changes the scope of review to be used henceforth by this court for complaints concerning the conduct of the voir dire.
For reversal, no longer must there be a showing by the accused on appeal that the trial court has abused its discretion in the voir dire’s conduct to the “substantial prejudice of the accused,” as enunciated in Khaalis. Now, the majority has imported word-for-word from the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in the celebrated trial of Abbie Hoffman and the so-called Yippies, among others, for riots occurring in 1968, United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir.1972), a new test for determining whether the trial court in the District of Columbia has erred in conducting voir dire. The majority now pronounces:
There is “substantial prejudice to the accused” in the context of voir dire when the procedure used for testing impartiality [does not] create [ ] a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present. [Supra at 845, quoting Del-linger, supra at 367.]
In sum, according to the majority, the accused need not show that the voir dire he challenges has caused him “substantial prejudice;” now the government must demonstrate with “reasonable assurance” that any possible prejudice to the accused would have been discovered by the voir dire employed by the judge at trial. Since the majority is overruling a prior line of decisions by this court culminating in our 1979 Khaalis case and the appellant profited from his own reference at trial to his political associations and affiliations and hence incurred no substantial prejudice from the voir dire conducted, I must dissent.

. Indeed, one of the leaders of appellant’s organizations was just elected lieutenant governor of Massachusetts. Washington Post, November 7, 1982.

. Appellant’s defense at trial comes close to being in effect a plea of nolo contendere; he admitted standing and speaking while the Senate was in session without caring whether the Senate heard him or not. (Record at 57.)

. Thus, the crudely lettered sheet refers to Vietnam and the possibility of World War III and reads at one point:
People we got to make it a revolutionary civil war against them. Follow the leadership of the Revolutionary Communist Party and be determined to make revolution to end this system of misery.

. The court asked standard questions at voir dire, referring to this case as a “disturbing the peace type” of offense. Appellant presented before trial an eight-page Proposed Voir Dire Examination composed of some 55 questions to be propounded to prospective jurors. (Record at 6-13.)