Court Opinion

ID: 9706292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:39:00.258464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:21.418255
License: Public Domain

Haneman, J.
(concurring). I concur in the opinion of the majority, except insofar as that opinion under heading IX changes the law enunciated in State v. Bunk, 4 N. J. 461 (1950), and State v. Tune, 17 N. J. 100 (1954).
Prior to 1916 a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree automatically carried with it a mandatory death sentence, under L. 1898, c. 235, sec. 108, which provided:
“Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, his aiders, abettors, counselors and procurers, shall suffer death * *
In that year, the Legislature amended the 1898 statute to read as follows:
“Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, his aiders, abettors, counsellors and procurers, shall suffer death unless the jury at the time of rendering the verdict in such case shall recommend imprisonment at hard labor for life, in which case this and no greater punishment shall be imposed * * L. 1916, c. 270.
In 1919 the Legislature again amended the 1898 statute to read:
*189“Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, Ms aiders, abettors, counsellors and procurers, shall suffer death unless the jury shall by their verdict, and as a part thereof, upon and after consideration of all the evidence, recommend imprisonment at hard labor for life, in which case this and no greater punishment shall be imposed * * L. 1919, c. 134, now N. J. 8. 2A :113-4.
The history of these amendments has been adequately treated in State v. White, 27 N. J. 158 (1958).
In State v. Bunk, supra (1950), 4 N. J., at p. 476, this court, in construing N. J. S. 2A:113-4, concluded that “the purpose of the jury is to determine guilt, the punishment being fixed by legislative enactment and that punishment [death] must be imposed unless the jury by their verdict make a contrary disposition. Before that contrary disposition can be made it must be agreed upon by the jury unanimously or else the death penalty attaches.” Mr. Justice Heher wrote a strong dissenting opinion expressive of the thesis of the majority in the instant matter. In 1954 this court reaffirmed State v. Bunk in State v. Tune, supra. Thus it is seen that the judicial construction accorded the statute by this court in Bunk has stood for 13 years, reaffirmed in Tune nine years ago. The Legislature has not seen fit to amend the statute to adopt the views of Justice Ileher set forth in the Bunk dissent, or to otherwise alter the conclusion of the majority in that ease. This legislative inaction for 13 years signifies, I take it, legislative acquiescence in the Bunk and Tune conclusion. Egan v. Erie R. Co., 29 N. J. 243 (1959), Asbury Park Press v. City of Asbury Park, 19 N. J. 183 (1955). The majority decision herein would appear to me to breach the policy against judicial legislation. If a departure from the Bunk and Tune statutory construction is desired, for policy reasons or otherwise, it should not now be by judicial action but rather by legislative action.
In any event, it seems to me that the death penalty, in the very language of the act, is automatic upon a finding of guilt unless a jury unanimously recommends life imprisonment. I find nothing in the statute which raises any doubt that this *190result was intended. I am confirmed in my opinion that the Legislature so intended from a reading of the report of the New Jersey Senate “Committee to Inquire into the Subject of Capital Punishment” of 1908 which, in the language of our Chief Justice in State v. White, 27 N. J. 158, 173 (1958), “foreshadowed” the 1916 amendment. The report, at p. 37, suggested:
“Eor particularly revolting and heinous crimes, involving in their perpetration a great degree of moral wrong, it does not seem wise or sound as a matter of state policy to entirely abolish the death penalty, especially so if the guilt of the accused is supported by direct and positive evidence.
Could not all such cases be properly provided for by some arrangement whereby the jury in bringing in a verdict for murder in the first degree could state the nature of the punishment by adding the words ‘with capital punishment’ or ‘without capital punishment?’ ” (Emphasis supplied)
The Legislature patently decided to ignore the Committee recommendation which in plain and unambiguous language would have added to a murder trial the issue of “capital punishment or no capital punishment” and instead, in 1916, adopted the language which, to me, clearly makes the issue to be “recommendation of life imprisonment or no recommendation of life imprisonment.” That the Legislature understood that L. 1916, c. 270 was intended to make the death penalty automatic unless the jury recommended life imprisonment is strengthened by the statement appended to the bill which eventually became L. 1919, c. 13-1, which reads in part:
“In the Martin case [State v. Martin, 92 N. J. L. 436], the Court holds that, under the language of the Act of 1916, the jury are not bound to consider the evidence in determining whether to make or refuse a recommendation. The purpose of this is to make it clear that the recommendation is a part of the verdict, and that in determining whether or not the recommendation shall be made, the jury shall consider all the evidence in the case.” (Emphasis supplied)
Nor do I find anything in Mount which requires the conclusion that the “character of the punishment, whether life or *191death” (Emphasis supplied), rather than recommendation for life imprisonment, as well as guilt, is an issue in a murder trial. The difference in the statements of the issue additional to guilt connotes more than a semantic distinction. If the former were the true concept of the meaning of the statute it would follow that where the jury finds a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree without a recommendation of life imprisonment, for capital punishment to follow, the jury would be obliged to include in its verdict a specific statement either (1) that the defendant “shall suffer death” or (2) that the verdict is without “recommendation of imprisonment at hard labor for life.” This is something never, to my knowledge, done or required to be done in this State. A verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, without any further statement appended, has always carried with it the death penalty. The recognized effect of a simple “guilty” verdict, in and of itself, demonstrates that a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree automatically brings into play the death penalty and has so been regarded since the adoption by the Legislature in 1916 of c. 270. That the Legislature intended in 1916 to ameliorate the harshness of the punishment as it existed prior to the amendment of that year, only where a jury affirmatively decides upon life imprisonment, and has continued to harbor that intention, is borne out by the public and judicial recognition for 47 years of the above cited effect of a “guilty” verdict. This practical construction of the plain statutory language strengthens the conclusion that the death penalty, although unexpressed, automatically accompanies a guilty verdict, unless the jury unanimously decides that it shall be life imprisonment.
The jury then, must approach a verdict under N. J. S. 2A:113-4 in two stages: (1) guilt or innocence; (2) possible modification of the death penalty which automatically attaches to a finding of guilt. Unless the jury unanimously agree to modify the death penalty, then that recommendation cannot be appended to the guilty verdict and it follows that the verdict of guilty with the unexpressed death penalty *192shall stand. Thus the two issues under N. J. 8. 2A:113-4 are guilt or innocence and recommendation or no recommendation of life imprisonment, both of which would have to result from a unanimous verdict, and the jury should be so instructed.
I appreciate that People v. Hicks, 287 N. Y. 165, 38 N. E. 2d 482, 138 A. L. R. 1222 (Ct. App. 1941), construing the Uew York statute which is phrased somewhat differently from our statute, reached a result contrary to my above-stated views by a four to three vote. However, I am persuaded by the reasoning of the dissenting opinion rather than by that of the majority. What was there said is as well applicable to our act. Judge Finch reasoned in the dissent (38 N. E. 2d, at 488, 138 A. L. R. 1222)
“A majority of the Court would have us say that the Legislature, in granting this permissive power to the jury, meant also that unless the jury should reach an agreement in reference to this mitigation of punishment, no verdict of guilt can be had. The statute does not so provide, and it is submitted that in the absence of any language in the statute lending itself to that construction, no intention of the Legislature to that effect should be inferred. It is the function of the Court to read the statute as it was written by the Legislature. The Legislature has modified the rigidity of our Penal Law by providing that a unanimous jury may, by its recommendation, save the defendant from the punishment of death, but it has not gone further and provided that a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree may avoid conviction because a single member of the jury does not concur in refusing to recommend leniency.
A majority of the Court are using the words, ‘as a part of its verdict’ to mean not only as a part of the verdict, which would be satisfied by an accompanying recommendation unanimously agreed upon, but also to include a meaning that the verdict of guilty although found by the jury cannot continue to prevail until the jury either votes a recommendation unanimously or unanimously fails so to do. An examination of this decision reveals that if the Court holds that the jury must be unanimous on the question of the recommendation and can make no finding of guilt unless they also either make or unanimously reject a recommendation for mercy, then although the jury unanimously finds a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, no verdict may be had if one juror, although he agrees that the defendant is guilty of felony murder, insists upon voting for a recommendation for life imprisonment.”
*193The charge in the case sub judice was sufficiently broad to encompass the theory of the majority herein. I consider that this accorded the defendant a more favorable treatment than the law requires. Hence, although in my opinion it was erroneous, the defendant suffered no prejudice.
I would affirm.
Hanemam, J., concurring in result.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Wehttbaub, and Justices Jacobs, Pkoctob, Hall, Sohettino and Haneman—6.
For reversal—-Hone.