Court Opinion

ID: 9397999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-28 07:11:23.490939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.009273
License: Public Domain

Motion Granted; Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 25, 2023.

                                       In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-22-00820-CV

                            ANGELA CAO, Appellant
                                         V.
                     MTGLQ INVESTORS, L.P., Appellee

             On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4
                           Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 1188190

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this forcible detainer action, appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the appeal has become moot. Appellant
filed a response to the motion to dismiss.

      An action for forcible detainer is intended to be a speedy, simple, and
inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property.          Marshall v.
Housing Auth. of the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006).
Judgment in a forcible detainer case is not intended to be a final determination of
whether the eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to
immediate possession. Id. (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.008)). The only
issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to possession of the property. Olley v.
HVM, LLC, 449 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet.
denied).

      The question in a mootness analysis in a forcible detainer action is not
whether the appellant has moved off the premises, but whether she asserted a
potentially meritorious claim for current possession.          Compare Kennedy v.
Andover Place Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (potentially meritorious claim for current possession asserted,
so appeal was not moot), and Geters v. Baytown Housing Authority, 430 S.W.3d
578, 582-83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (same) with Briones
v. Brazos Bend Villa Apartments, 438 S.W.3d 808, 812-13 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (no potentially meritorious claim for current possession
asserted, so appeal was moot).

      Here, appellant asserts that she raises two issues meeting this standard:
(1) the trial court’s judgment is not final because it did not dispose of her “statute
of limitations counterclaim,” and (2) the trial court “failed to produce findings and
conclusions.” But these issues do not constitute potentially meritorious claims for
current possession of the premises.

      With respect to appellant’s first issue, counterclaims are not permitted in
eviction cases. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3; see also, e.g., Burton v. Leawood
Homeowners Ass’n, LLP, No. 14-17-00864-CV, 2019 WL 13339318, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding the
county court could not exercise jurisdiction over the appellee’s counterclaims in a
forcible detainer case). Moreover, the trial court signed its final judgment after a

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bench trial and the judgment expressly states that it “disposes of all parties and all
claims and is a final and appealable judgment.” See C. Chambers Enters., Inc. v.
6250 Westpark, LP, No. 14-02-00808-CV, 2002 WL 31835459, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 19, 2002, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting the
appellants’ contention that the judgment was not final because it did not expressly
address their counterclaim, we noted that “the judgment followed a jury trial on the
merits and contain[ed] a ‘Mother Hubbard’ clause”). Therefore, the judgment is
presumed to be final. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 199 (Tex.
2001).

      As to Appellant’s second issue, the trial court’s failure to issue findings of
fact and conclusions of law does not preclude an appeal from a forcible detainer
action from being dismissed as moot. See, e.g., Tehuti v. Ha To Tu, No. 02-17-
00440-CV, 2019 WL 1186791, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 14, 2019, pet.
dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (“the trial court’s failure to make findings and
conclusions does not confer on [appellant] a legal or possessory interest in the
property”).

      Accordingly, Appellant failed to assert a potentially meritorious claim for
current possession of the property. See Olley, 449 S.W.3d at 575. Therefore, the
appeal is moot.

      We grant appellee’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal for mootness.

                                   PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Zimmerer and Poissant.

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