Court Opinion

ID: 9796157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:50:46.338671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:26.284833
License: Public Domain

Judge DAILEY
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that claimant’s request for and receipt of a lump sum payment of PPD benefits did not preclude her from subsequently disputing the FAL, requesting a DIME, and seeking payment of TTD benefits.
The majority’s opinion is based, in large part, upon one premise (namely, that claimant had to knowingly and intelligently waive her rights to dispute the FAL and request a DIME) and one fact (namely, that, unlike the case involving larger lump sum payments authorized by the director, claimant was not explicitly advised that she was accepting the FAL by applying for the lump sum).
The majority correctly cites Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 1140, 1147 (Colo.1988), for the proposition that waiver involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right. However, that articulation of the waiver standard is very close to, if not the same as, that used in determining a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. See People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070, 1075 (Colo.1984)(standard for assessing waiver of “basic constitutional rights”: “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a right or privilege adequately understood by the defendant”); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo.1984) (“Waiver of a fundamental right must be voluntary, knowing and intentional.”).
The present case does not involve a waiver of constitutional rights. The waiver at issue here — of the right to challenge MMI by contesting the FAL and seeking a DIME — is statutory in nature.
The waiver of a statutory right “must be voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent.” People v. Duran, 757 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo.App.1988); see also Padilla v. D.E. Frey & Co., 939 P.2d 475, 478 (Colo.App.1997) (“statutory rights may be waived so long as the waiver is performed voluntarily”); First Interstate Bank v. Cent. Bank, 937 P.2d 855, 861 (Colo.App.1996)(“In general, both substantive and procedural statutory rights may be waived so long as the waiver is voluntary.”).
*484The Johnson decision should not be read as contrary to these authorities. Indeed, in Johnson, the supreme court noted that a waiver could be explicit or implied. An implied waiver occurs “when a party engages in conduct which manifests an intent to relinquish the right or privilege or acts inconsistently with its assertion.’’ Johnson v. Indus. Comm’n, supra, 761 P.2d at 1147 (emphasis added); see First Christian Assembly of God v. City & County of Denver, 122 P.3d 1089, (Colo.App.2005)(“A party’s actions inconsistent with a right may constitute a waiver of that right.”); cf. Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 618 (Colo.2002)(estoppel and invited error doctrines preclude parties from taking positions inconsistent with those initially taken).
In my view, a request for and acceptance of a lump sum payment of PPD benefits is antithetical to a further request for a DIME to challenge the prior MMI determination that was the basis for obtaining PPD benefits.
Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, MMI marks the point at which PPD benefits become available and TTD benefits become unavailable. See §§ 8-42-105(3)(a), 8-42-107(8)(c), C.R.S.2005; Culver v. Ace Elec., 971 P.2d 641, 652 (Colo.1999).
Logically and legally, then, there can be no determination or payment of PPD benefits until and unless MMI is reached. See MGM Supply Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 62 P.3d 1001, 1005 (Colo.App.2002)(“Evaluation for permanent disability cannot precede the determination that the claimant has reached MMI.”).
The lump sum paid to claimant here is a form of PPD benefit. See Cooper v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 109 P.3d 1056, 1057-58 (Colo.App.2005).
Consequently, the effect of the majority’s decision is to allow claimant to keep PPD benefits while seeking TTD benefits. In my view, she cannot do both, regardless of whether she was so advised. Thus, I would hold that, having requested and accepted the PPD benefits, claimant voluntarily waived, or at least is estopped from asserting, her right to obtain TTD benefits through the DIME process. See Brunetti v. Indus. Comm’n, 670 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Colo.App.1983)(“the claimant himself precipitated the closing of his claim by requesting a lump sum settlement,” and “the claim was closed upon payment of the settlement”); see also Hanna v. Print Expediters Inc., 77 P.3d 863, 866-67 (Colo.App.2003) (employee who had already received an award of PPD benefits was es-topped from requesting subsequent medical treatment).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.