Court Opinion

ID: 9955778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:17:10.465734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.318507
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Coffman, 2024-Ohio-1182.]

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
           FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                               :    APPEAL NO. C-230411
                                                   TRIAL NO. 23CRB-7133
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                :

     vs.                                      :         O P I N I O N.

 TIMOTHY COFFMAN,                             :

           Defendant-Appellant.               :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 29, 2024

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Ashton Tucker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

B OCK , Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}    In this criminal appeal, defendant-appellant Timothy Coffman appeals

his conviction for obstructing official business. Coffman’s sole assignment of error

asserts that his conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we sustain the

assignment of error on sufficiency grounds, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and

discharge Coffman from further prosecution in this matter.

                             I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}    Cincinnati Police officers investigating a breaking and entering at the

Western Hills Shopping Mall received a description of a person of interest and

information that a person matching that description was squatting with others in a

house on Glenway Avenue. When officers searched the Glenway Avenue house, they

found no one matching the description of the person of interest.

       {¶3}    As the officers were concluding the investigation at that address, an

officer saw a person, who was later identified as Coffman, walking down the other side

of Glenway Avenue pushing a lawn mower. The officer believed that Coffman matched

the description of the person of interest.

       {¶4}    The officer’s body-worn camera footage showed the officer crossing the

road to intercept Coffman and Coffman continuing to push the lawnmower around a

corner and down a side street. Once the officer got within earshot of Coffman, he asked

Coffman to “come here for a second.” Coffman turned to face the officer, who repeated

his request. Coffman then left the lawn mower and began to run down the street, away

from the officer. Within a few steps, Coffman dropped a bag he was carrying. The

officer followed Coffman, twice warning him that he would use his taser on Coffman if

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

he did not stop, but Coffman continued running. The officer deployed the taser and

Coffman fell onto the pavement. Officers surrounded Coffman and arrested him. The

whole chase lasted approximately 20 seconds.

       {¶5}    The assembled officers placed Coffman in handcuffs and searched him.

Because an officer deployed his taser, a supervisor had to come to the scene. After

approximately ten to 15 minutes, the assembled officers verified Coffman’s identity

and determined he was not the person of interest. The state charged Coffman with

obstruction of official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A). Coffman was held one

night at the Hamilton County Justice Center.

       {¶6}    After a bench trial, the trial court found Coffman guilty and sentenced

him to one day of imprisonment, with credit for the one day that he spent in jail. The

trial court did not impose a fine, court costs, or other sanctions.

       {¶7}    Coffman now appeals.

                               II. Law and Analysis

   A. Coffman did not voluntarily serve his sentence

       {¶8}    As an initial matter, we address whether Coffman’s appeal is moot

because Coffman completed his sentence before this appeal. Where defendants have

fully served their sentences before their appeals are heard, appellate courts have

jurisdiction over the appeals if the defendants show either (1) they did not voluntarily

serve their sentences; or (2) they will suffer ongoing collateral disabilities or loss of

civil rights. State v. Ekouevi, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220267, 2023-Ohio-703, ¶ 4,

citing In re Chambers, 2019-Ohio-3596, 142 N.E.3d 1243, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.).

       {¶9}    Coffman did not voluntarily serve his sentence. The trial court

sentenced Coffman to one day of imprisonment and gave him credit for the one day

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that he spent in jail on the date that he was arrested. Coffman had no choice whether

to spend that time in jail—police arrested him, took him to the justice center, and

detained him in jail overnight before he appeared in court the next day for his

arraignment. He had no opportunity to ask the court to stay his sentence or otherwise

object to his sentence before he served it. And Coffman had no need to request a stay

of execution of the sentence before the trial court or this court—by the time the trial

court sentenced him, he had already involuntarily served his entire sentence. Thus,

there was nothing left for him to seek to stay after the trial court imposed its sentence.

       {¶10}   Because Coffman served his one-day sentence involuntarily, his appeal

is not moot.

   B. Coffman’s conviction was based on insufficient evidence

       {¶11}   In his sole assignment of error, Coffman argues that his obstruction-

of-official-business conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because we find Coffman’s challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence dispositive of the appeal, his manifest-weight

challenge is moot and we do not address it. See State v. Parrish, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-190379, 2020-Ohio-4807, ¶ 16, citing App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

       {¶12}   A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction

requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of production at

trial. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (Cook, J.,

concurring). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

two of the syllabus. In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve

evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Thomas, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, ¶ 45. Whether sufficient evidence

supported a conviction is a question of law for the court to determine and a court is

not to weigh the evidence unless, after viewing the evidence, it weighs heavily against

conviction. Id.

       {¶13}      To   support   an    obstructing-official-business-conviction     under

R.C. 2921.31(A), the state must prove the defendant “(1) performed an act; (2) without

privilege; (3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public

official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that

hampered or impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.” In re Payne,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, ¶ 11.

       {¶14}      Coffman argues his conviction must be reversed for several reasons.

First, Coffman argues that he did not perform an affirmative act, but merely refused

to cooperate with the officer’s demand to halt. Second, Coffman contends that the

court could not infer he acted with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the

officer’s performance of his official duties. Third, Coffman argues that his conduct did

not hamper or impede the officer’s investigation.

       1. Affirmative act

       {¶15}      Coffman contends that rather than performing an affirmative act, he

merely refused to cooperate with the officer’s demand to stop. And an R.C. 2921.31

conviction requires the state to prove the defendant performed an affirmative act.

State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 10

(1st Dist.). A defendant’s refusal to comply with a police officer’s order is not an

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

affirmative act and cannot, standing alone, support an obstructing-official-business

conviction. See State v. Buttram, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190034, 2020-Ohio-2709,

¶ 12 (collecting cases).

       {¶16}    But this court has long held that a person performs an affirmative act

within the meaning of R.C. 2921.31 by fleeing from a police officer when the person

has some knowledge that the police officer intends to lawfully detain that person. See,

e.g., State v. Lohaus, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020444, 2003-Ohio-777, ¶ 11 (fleeing

from an officer conducting a lawful Terry stop); State v. Harris, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-230074, 2023-Ohio-4387, ¶ 24 (walking away from an officer while the officer

was issuing a ticket); State v. Davis, 140 Ohio App.3d 751, 753, 749 N.E.2d 322

(1st Dist.2000) (walking away from officers attempting to detain defendant).

       {¶17}    Coffman was walking down the street pushing a lawn mower and

carrying a bag. When the officer stated, “Come here for a second, I want to ask you

something,” Coffman ran away from the officer, leaving his lawn mower behind and

dropping his bag. This constitutes an “act” under R.C. 2921.31(A) because the

circumstances show Coffman knew that the police officer intended to detain him. After

the officer issued his command, Coffman changed his actions from walking to running

and left his lawn mower and bag behind. He did not merely refuse to answer questions

or fail to stop walking. Rather, Coffman made a conscious decision to flee from the

officer in response to the officer’s request for him to stop. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence that Coffman

performed an affirmative act.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       2. Purposeful mental state

       {¶18}     Coffman asserts that the court could not infer he acted with purpose

to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officer’s performance of his official duties. A person

acts “purposely” when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result. R.C.

2901.22(A). “The purpose with which a person does an act is determined from the

manner in which it is done, the means used, and all the other facts and circumstances

in evidence.” In re Payne, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 15.

       {¶19}     Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, a rational trier

of fact could have found that Coffman knew the officer was conducting an investigative

stop and intended to delay the officer’s investigation by his choice to run from the

officer. The officer asked Coffman to stop and submit to questioning. Coffman turned,

saw the uniformed officer, and ran. Coffman discarded his lawn mower and bag when

he ran. The officer warned Coffman that if he continued to flee, he would be subdued

with a taser. Yet, he continued to refuse to comply. See Buttram, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-190034, 2020-Ohio-2709, at ¶ 17-18 (inference of purpose from the defendant’s

conscious decision to act contrary to the officer’s instructions). Viewing this evidence

in a light most favorable to the state, sufficient evidence supported that Coffman’s

fleeing from a uniformed officer showed his purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the

investigation.

       3. Hamper or impede

       {¶20}     To support Coffman’s conviction, the state must also prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Coffman’s conduct in fact hampered or impeded the officers’

investigation. Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953,

879 N.E.2d 215, at ¶ 17.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶21}    Not every act that “can conceivably be said to hinder a police officer

rises to the level of criminal conduct.” Harris, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230074,

2023-Ohio-4387, at ¶ 22, quoting In re Payne, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705,

2005-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 16. R.C. 2921.31(A) does not criminalize every “minor ‘delay,

annoyance, irritation, or inconvenience’ ” put on a police officer. Id., quoting State v.

Harris, 2018-Ohio-4316, 121 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Vitantonio,

2013-Ohio-4100, 995 N.E.2d 1291, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.), quoting Lakewood v. Simpson,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80383, 2002-Ohio-4086, ¶ 16.

       {¶22}    Rather, the statute criminalizes conduct where the defendant commits

an affirmative act, and that affirmative act creates a “substantial stoppage” in the

police officer’s official business. Id., quoting State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700,

2009-Ohio-372, 906 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), citing Wellman at ¶ 17. There is no

particular period of time that constitutes a “substantial stoppage.” Wellman at ¶ 18,

citing State v. Dunn, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-790319, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 11877

(Mar. 26, 1980). So long as the record demonstrates that the defendant’s act hampered

or impeded the officer in the performance of his duties, the evidence supports the

conviction. Id., citing State v. Stayton, 126 Ohio App.3d 158, 163, 709 N.E.2d 1224

(1st Dist.1998).

       {¶23}    “When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must ‘defer

to the trier of fact on questions of credibility and the weight assigned to the evidence.’ ”

State v. Wing, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2023-03-022, 2023-Ohio-4171, ¶ 17, quoting

State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 132.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶24}    After the close of evidence, the trial court stated, “Here I find that there

is no substantial stoppage and find him guilty of the affirmative act of running and

then the time it took to call the supervisor or superior. So that’s guilty.”

       {¶25}    The video showed that the time between the officer calling for Coffman

to stop and handcuffing Coffman was approximately 20 seconds. And the officer

testified that it took ten to 15 minutes to summon his supervisor and rule Coffman out

as the perpetrator of the breaking-and-entering crime. He testified that had Coffman

not run, he would have been able to ask Coffman questions and could have ruled him

out as a suspect.

       {¶26}    First, any delay caused by Coffman’s passive act—failing to answer

questions or otherwise assist the officers in clearing him as the suspect in the breaking

and   entering—cannot       support    an   obstruction     conviction.   See    Wellman,

173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, at ¶ 10.

       {¶27}    Second, any delay caused by the officer summoning his supervisor

cannot be attributed to Coffman. There must be a nexus between the defendant’s

affirmative act and the alleged substantial stoppage of the official’s business. See

Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700, 2009-Ohio-372, 906 N.E.2d 1203, at ¶ 16. The officer

testified, “Every time we have a tasing on scene [the supervisor] shows up.” But the

officer needing to summon a supervisor was dictated by internal police policy on the

use of tasers, not Coffman’s decision to flee. See id. at ¶ 3, 16 (finding no nexus between

defendant’s false statement to police officers and the two hours to fingerprint and

identify the defendant at the Hamilton County Justice Center); see also In re Payne,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 13 (focusing on the actor’s

conduct and the effect that conduct has on the public official).

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶28}    The nexus between Coffman’s flight and the alleged substantial

stoppage of the police officer’s investigation ended after approximately 20 seconds—

the time it took for the officer to spot, intercept, stop, and handcuff Coffman. While no

set amount of time is necessary to constitute substantial stoppage, the amount of time

is a relevant factor for this court to consider. See Grice at ¶ 12.

       {¶29}    We agree with the trial court that Coffman’s flight did not create a

substantial stoppage to the officers’ investigation. The chase, from beginning to end,

lasted approximately 20 seconds. The state did not establish that Coffman’s brief flight

was anything more than a de minimis interference, rather than conduct that hampered

or impeded the officer. See In re R.B., 2021-Ohio-3749, 179 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 24-25

(1st Dist.) (de minimis interference where the defendant briefly hid from police

officers conducting a search of a residence for trespassers). And without evidence of

“hampering” or “impeding” beyond that 20-second delay in apprehending Coffman,

the state failed to show that Coffman hampered or impeded the officers’ breaking-and-

entering investigation.

       {¶30}    Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, the state

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Coffman’s running from police

hampered or impeded the officers’ performance of their duties. Therefore, Coffman’s

conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and we sustain Coffman’s

assignment of error.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                  III. Conclusion

       {¶31}   For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Coffman’s assignment of error on

sufficiency grounds, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and discharge Coffman from

further prosecution in this matter.

                                        Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.

K INSLEY , J., concurs.
W INKLER , J., dissents.

W INKLER , J., dissenting.

       {¶32}   I respectfully dissent because in my view this appeal is moot.

Consequently, I would dismiss the appeal.

       {¶33}   The general rule on the mootness of criminal appeals provides that

“[w]here a defendant, convicted of a criminal offense, has voluntarily paid the fine or

completed the sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered

from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral

disability or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction.” In re Chambers,

2019-Ohio-3596, 142 N.E.3d 1243, at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236,

325 N.E.2d 236 (1975), syllabus. Here, the trial court sentenced Coffman to one day

of imprisonment with credit for one day served and did not impose a fine, court costs,

or other financial sanction. Thus, Coffman had fully served his sentence before he filed

his appeal. For an appellate court to have jurisdiction over an appeal in which the

defendant has fully served the sentence before the appeal is heard, the defendant must

show either that the sentence was not served voluntarily or that she or he will suffer

ongoing collateral disabilities or loss of civil rights. Ekouevi, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-220267, 2023-Ohio-703, at ¶ 4, citing In re Chambers at ¶ 9; Wilson at

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Farris, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150567,

2016-Ohio-5527, ¶ 4.

       {¶34}   With regard to whether a sentence was served voluntarily, this court

has most recently stated:

       [t]he completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an

       appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the

       appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right

       to appellate review, that the appellant has a substantial stake in the

       judgment of conviction, and that there is subject matter for the appellate

       court to decide.

Ekouevi at ¶ 5, quoting City of Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389,

2011-Ohio-2673, 953 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 26. Coffman was appointed counsel, contested the

charge at trial, accepted the sentence, and filed a notice of appeal. But Coffman did

not seek a stay of execution of the sentence in the trial court and did not seek a stay in

this court. See App.R. 8(B). Had he done so, Coffman’s appeal would not be moot,

regardless of whether either stay was denied. See Lewis at ¶ 23. Without any

indication on the record that Coffman did not abandon his right to appeal when he

accepted the court’s sentence, Coffman’s appeal is moot.

       {¶35}   Nor is there any basis to infer that Coffman suffered ongoing collateral

disabilities or loss of civil rights from his misdemeanor conviction for obstructing

official business. The collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction can be

significant. See Lewis at ¶ 28-34 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring). But Coffman

already has multiple misdemeanor convictions, including a conviction for obstructing

official business. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Coffman, Hamilton M.C. No. 23CRB-1044

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

(Feb. 14, 2023) (conviction for obstruction of official business).1 Thus, Coffman

already suffers any potential ongoing collateral disabilities from that conviction. His

appeal in this case cannot change the outcome in those other cases.

        {¶36}    Because Coffman does not demonstrate anything to indicate he served

the sentence involuntarily and Coffman already suffers the collateral disabilities of a

misdemeanor conviction for obstructing official business, I would dismiss the appeal

as moot. See Andrew v. Dennis, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210638, 2022-Ohio-2567,

¶ 6 (appellate courts may sua sponte dismiss an appeal as moot), citing Hammond v.

Hammond, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190376, 2020-Ohio-3443, ¶ 9.

Please note:
        The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

1 A reviewing court may consider an event that renders an appeal moot that is outside the record.

See Pewitt v. Superintendent, Lorain Corr. Inst., 64 Ohio St.3d 470, 472, 597 N.E.2d 92 (1992).

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