Court Opinion

ID: 9793719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:51:55.742749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:41.593922
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Chief Justice,
dissenting with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.
I must dissent from the disposition of this case in accordance with the majority opinion. While the holding of the majority opinion might appear appropriate to all in the context of an effort to learn the skill of “sky-diving” or parachuting, I submit that the result might not seem as appropriate in other contexts. In my judgment a different rule would fit more aptly into the overall policy of the State of Wyoming.
In a case involving an indemnity agreement this court said:
“Generally, contracts exculpating one from the consequences of his own acts are looked upon with disfavor by the courts. Kansas City Power & Light Company v. United Telephone Company of Kansas, Inc., 458 F.2d 177 (10th Cir.1972). Therefore, an agreement for indemnity is construed strictly against the indemnitee, particularly when the in-demnitee was the drafter of the instrument. Allison Steel Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima, 22 Ariz.App. 76, 523 P.2d 803 (1974). If the indemnitee means to throw the loss upon the indemnitor for a fault in which he himself individually shares, he must express that purpose beyond any peradventure of doubt. Mostyn v. Delaware L. & W.R. Co., 160 F.2d *106315 (2nd Cir.1947). The test is whether the contract language specifically focuses attention on the fact that by the agreement the indemnitor was assuming liability for indemnitee’s own negligence. Sweetman v. Strescon Industries, Inc., Del.Super., 389 A.2d 1319 (1978).” Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 96, 99 (1983).
In considering a settlement agreement which we held was required to clearly express the intent of the parties to release other tortfeasors we said:
“The thrust of the public policy announced in § l-l-113(a)(ii) is to retain the liability of tortfeasors, thus abrogating the common-law release rule. Therefore the phrase ‘unless its terms so provide’ should be narrowly construed. Beck v. Cianchetti, [1 Ohio St.3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982) ] supra. To permit discharge of noncontributing tortfeasors where a plaintiff has received only partial compensation, based upon broad, general language which does not identify the tortfeasors, effectively perpetuates the English rule in contravention of the legislature’s intention, Beck v. Cianchetti, supra. The phrase ‘unless its terms so provide’ (§ l-l-113(a)(i)) compels the releasor to name or otherwise specifically identify the released tortfeasors in order that the intent of the parties be fulfilled. Beck v. Cianchetti, supra. These resolutions are fortified, not only by Beck v. Cianchetti, but by other well-reasoned opinions. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, [Alaska, 568 P.2d 916 (1977) ] supra; Young v. State, [Alaska, 455 P.2d 889 (1969)] supra; Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, [101 Ill.2d 196, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984)] supra; Robertson v. McCarte, [13 Mass.App. 441, 433 N.E.2d 1262 (1982)] supra; Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, [Tex., 665 S.W.2d 414 (1984) ] supra; McMillen v. Klingensmith, [Tex., 467 S.W.2d 193 (1971) ] supra.
“Such a rule will most nearly assure that courts will be able to identify the intention of the parties with certainty, and it will have the effect of eliminating the ambiguity factor which, without the rule, will forever plague release agreements in tort actions.” Bjork v. Chrysler Corporation, Wyo., 702 P.2d 146, 162-163 (1985).
I would opt for the line of authority which requires that the word “negligence” be included in an exculpatory agreement such as this. See Jones v. Dressel, Colo., 623 P.2d 370 (1981); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 400 N.E.2d 306 (1979); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961); Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, 281 App.Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1953). This requirement is most likely to alert the other party to the extent of the release which he is granting in the contract, which usually is prepared in advance. In many respects this simply would seem to be fair.
As I indicated the result may well be deemed appropriate with respect to parachuting activities. I wonder how comfortable this court and others will feel with such a rule when it is invoked in favor of day care centers; youth activity organizations; health clubs; public or private schools; landlords; or any of a myriad of activities to which this concept logically can be extended. Because of my concern with the public policy implications of this holding by the court, which I submit may be rather far-reaching, I would vote to reverse the disposition by the trial court and require that if one is to be released from the consequences of his own negligence the release must say exactly that and use the word negligence specifically.