Court Opinion

ID: 9720107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:16:23.588802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:13.217707
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(specially concurring) — I concur in the result of the foregoing opinion, and generally with the opinion itself. However, I think it necessary to make the following comments.
I. The plaintiff cites and relies upon Jesse v. Wemer & Wemer Co., 248 Iowa 1002, 1007, 1008, 82 N.W.2d 82, 84. The prevailing opinion there held flatly that “Clearly the word ‘stop’ used in the statute is intended as synonymous with ‘park’ or ‘leave standing!’ ” Also it held that a momentary stop upon the paved portion of the highway for the purpose of yielding the right of way to an oncoming vehicle at a narrow underpass was not a violation of section 321.354 as a matter of law, and required no instruction from the court as to the meaning of the statute and its application to the facts of that particular case.
In view of the fact that Jesse v. Wemer & Wemer Company, *157supra, is stressed by the plaintiff in argument and is cited in the opinion, I think it should be pointed out that the Jesse case is not in fact authority for the points stated in the foregoing paragraph of this concurrence. While the case was affirmed, only four justices concurred in the opinion. Four dissented, and Judge Smith concurred only in the result. The effect is therefore to. leave the questions undecided by a majority of this court.
Thornton, J., joins in this special concurrence.