Court Opinion

ID: 9631422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:37:48.740736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:53.869271
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
concurring.
The issue in this case is the meaning of the phrase, “previously been convicted,” as it appears in ORS 137.635: “[w]hen * * * a court sentences a convicted defendant who has previously been convicted * * (Emphasis supplied.) The question is, previous to what? In my view, the plain language of the statute suggests two alternatives: a defendant must have been convicted of one crime before sentencing for the second crime or before conviction of the second crime. The majority accepts defendant’s contention that there is a third alternative: a defendant is subject to sentencing under ORS 137.635 only if he or she has been convicted of a crime listed in the statute before committing the crime for which sentencing is about to occur. The statute says nothing about commission of another crime. The majority reads that requirement into ORS 137.635 based on an approach to statutory construction that I believe is faulty and that leads to a conclusion in this case that I believe is at odds with what the voters intended.
*257As a threshold matter, I agree with the majority that the word “conviction” has two generally-accepted meanings, the first referring to a finding of guilt and the second referring to a final judgment. Vasquez v. Courtney, 272 Or 477, 480, 537 P2d 536 (1975). I also agree that as used in ORS 137.635, the term “conviction” refers to a finding of guilt. Furthermore, I agree with the majority that the phrase “previously been convicted” in ORS 137.635 is susceptible to more than one interpretation and that resort to legislative history is required in order to determine what the voters intended when they enacted that phrase as part of Ballot Measure 4. Finally, I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Miller, 317 Or 297, 855 P2d 1093 (1993) and State v. Bucholz, 317 Or 309, 855 P2d 1100 (1993) are inapplicable to the analysis of ORS 137.635.
I part company with the majority, because it reads into the statute a requirement that the statute does not contain and one that I do not believe was intended. The majority observes, correctly, that statements in the Voters’ Pamphlet and in various newspapers indicate that Ballot Measure 4 targeted “repeat offenders.” 143 Or App at 252-53. However, the majority then imposes on the statute what it terms the “generally-understood meaning” of “repeat offender”: “one who has failed to respond to a conviction for an earlier crime.” 143 Or App at 254. It concludes that, because Ballot Measure 4 was described as a repeat offender statute, the term “previous conviction” must mean what it generally means in habitual offender statutes in other jurisdictions: the prior offense must precede the commission of the principal offense. Consequently, it imports that meaning into ORS 137.635.
In support of its conclusion, the majority quotes from an annotation for the proposition that
“the prevalent view is that enhanced punishment cannot be imposed unless all of the defendant’s prior convictions preceded commission of the principal offense, and each prior offense and conviction occurred in chronological sequence.” 7 ALR 5th 263, 289 (1992) (quoted in 143 Or App at 248-49).
Significantly, the majority fails to provide the context in which that statement appears:
*258“Courts adopting this view have reasoned that habitual offender statutes are intended to warn the potential career criminal of the consequences of persistent criminal activity, and to give the offender an opportunity to reform through exposure to the restraining influences of conviction and punishment before the more severe punishment of an habitual offender statute is imposed. The offender is deemed incorrigible not so much because he or she has sinned more than once, but because the offender has demonstrated, through persistent criminal behavior, that he or she is not susceptible to the reforming influence of the conviction process.’’/d. (Emphasis supplied.)
I find nothing in the language of Ballot Measure 4 or its legislative history to suggest that the voters intended to offer repeat offenders “the reforming influences of the criminal conviction process” before subjecting them to the determinate sentences specified in that measure. The legislative history indicates that when supporters of Ballot Measure 4 referred to it as targeting “repeat offenders” they intended its plain, common-sense meaning: one who violates the law again. See Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing, § 7:5 at 156 (2d ed 1991) (“Repeat offender statutes vary widely concerning eligibility criteria and formulas by which to determine what the enhanced sentence may or must be.”). Use of the term “repeat offenders” to describe the ballot measure does not transform the phrase “previously been convicted” into a term of art with a well-defined legal meaning that was intended by the voters. I believe that the majority errs in accepting defendant’s third alternative in interpreting the meaning of “previously been convicted” in ORS 137.635.
In interpreting a statute enacted by initiative, we apply standard principles of statutory construction. Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Commission, 318 Or 551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 612 n 4, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Our purpose is to determine the intention of the voters, first by examining the text of the measure in its context, giving words of common usage their plain and ordinary meaning. PGE, 317 Or at 610-11. If the intent is still not clear, we then consider the legislative history “along with the text and context to determine whether all of those together make the legislative intent clear.” Id. at 611-12. (Emphasis supplied.) To *259resolve the ambiguity in the language of a measure adopted through the initiative process, we look to the ballot title, voters’ pamphlet arguments and contemporaneous news reports and editorial comments. See Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 560 and n 8 (prescribing same method of analysis for constitutional provision and statute proposed by initiative); PGE, 317 Or at 612 and n 4 (analytical template applies to statutes enacted by initiative or referendum).
In my view, the phrase, “previously been convicted,” in ORS 137.635 has only two plausible meanings; namely, previous to conviction for the subject offense or previous to sentencing for the subject offense.1 The language of the statute makes no reference to repeat offenders and contains no suggestion that it applies only to an individual who commits a listed crime after having been convicted of a predicate offense. We are precluded by ORS 174.010 from adding language to the statute. See Fernandez v. Board of Parole, 137 Or App 247, 252, 904 P2d 1071 (1995) (courtis constrained by the reasonable construction .of the language actually enacted).
I turn to the legislative history to determine which of the two plausible constructions was intended. The ballot title for Measure 4 explains that it would eliminate indeterminate sentences, probation and parole “for persons convicted of any of the [listed crimes] after previous conviction of any crime in the class.” Official 1988 Voters’ Pamphlet at 17. Similarly, the explanatory statement drafted by the bipartisan committee appointed to provide an impartial statement informs the reader that “Ballot Measure 4 applies to persons convicted of any of the following crimes after previous conviction of any crime in the class.” Id. at 18. Both explanations make clear that “previously been convicted” of a predicate offense was intended to mean previous to conviction for the subject crime. No other statement submitted for publication in the voters pamphlet unequivocally expresses a contrary view.
*260Other sources of information that were available to the voters at the time Ballot Measure 4 was adopted reveal that it was proposed by former Congressman Denny Smith and Oregonians Against Crime, because, in Smith’s words, “I think Oregonians are fed up with the crime epidemic and want to do something about it.” Sarah B. Ames and Stan Federman, “Lawmaker Turns In Signatures For Oregon Anti-Crime Initiative,” The Oregonian, June 7, 1988, at Al. According to Smith, “We’ve got to take the P out of parole and put it back into punishment.” “Smith Says Get Tough On Crime,” Statesman-Journal, February 21, 1988, at 6G. In a guest opinion in the Statesman-Journal, Smith described Ballot Measure 4 as an initiative measure “to deny early release to those convicted a second time of a violent felony.” Denny Smith, “Oregonians Take The Initiative Against Crime,” Statesman-Journal, March 6, 1988,. at 3G. Newspaper reports explained Ballot Measure 4 this way:
“Smith’s initiative would require that criminals convicted on their second violent crime be required to serve their full sentence without parole.” “Neil: Crime Initiative Ignores Cost,” Corvallis Gazette-Times, January 20, 1988, at IB.
“Smith’s initiative would simply lock up a certain group of twice-convicted felons without the possibility of early, supervised release.” Steven P. Jackson, “Stopping Crime In Oregon,” Statesman-Journal, August 28, 1988, at 1G.
“Ballot Measure 4 would require that second-time offenders of some 10 serious felonies — ranging from murder to first-degree burglary — would have to serve their full sentences without possibility of parole or probation.” Jeff Mapes, “Dire Predictions Quickly Fade As Measure 4 Gains Favor,” The Oregonian, October 27,1988, at 3C.
My review of the Voters’ Pamphlet, the articles and commentaries on Ballot Measure 4 on file with the state library, and the report that appeared in the City Club of Portland Bulletin regarding the measure, reveals one consistent message: If Ballot Measure 4 were to become law, “Oregon criminals convicted of their second violent crime [would] serve their full sentence without parole.” William R. Stone, “Many Ideas Combat Crime,” Statesman-Journal, January 24, 1988, at 2G. Of all the accounts quoted by the majority, 143 Or App at 250-51 n 3, only one supports its construction *261of ORS 137.635. That statement appeared in a sidebar to the article I quote above and stated that Ballot Measure 4 would “Eliminate ‘indeterminate sentences,’ probation and parole for already convicted felons who later commit murder, rape and some other sex crimes[.]” Mapes, “Dire Predictions.” Other Oregonian articles gave other descriptions. For example, one stated that “Measure 4 eliminates parole for second-time felons,” Steve Sherburne, “State’s Proposal Less Costly, More Effective Against Crime,” The Oregonian, November 4, 1988, at Ell, while another stated that Measure 4 “would affect criminals who, after Jan. 1, 1990, are convicted more than once of murder or of [certain] first-degree charges.” Ames and Federman, “Lawmaker Turns In Signatures.”
Even if the majority’s reading of the phrase, “previously been convicted,” in ORS 137.635 were plausible, I find no suggestion in the legislative history that use of the terms “repeat offenders,” “two-time offenders,” career offenders” and “criminals convicted of a second violent crime” to describe the targets of Ballot Measure 4 meant that the voters intended it to be an habitual offender statute of the sort that the majority declares, namely, one aimed at giving offenders the opportunity to reform thorough exposure to the restraining influences of conviction and punishment before being exposed to more severe punishment. In Denny Smith’s words, “A crime epidemic is ambushing Oregon citizens, and this action [Ballot Measure 4] is being taken to make the state safer.” Rolla J. Crick, “Bereaved Mom Collects Most Petition Signatures,” The Oregonian, March 8, 1988, at D14. I believe the majority errs in imputing to the voters an intention that they did not have and reading into ORS 137.635 a requirement that it does not contain.
Applying my construction of the statute to this case, I conclude that the subject convictions, i.e., the convictions on counts 3, 4 and 8 to which the trial court applied ORS 137.635, were not preceded by a conviction on a predicate offense. Because it believed that sentencing was a component of conviction, the trial court concluded that defendant had been previously convicted of count 7 at the time that it sentenced him on counts 3, 4 and 8. Under the terms of the statute, however, defendant was “convicted” when the trial court entered its findings of guilt. The trial court found defendant *262guilty of each of the indicted crimes at the same time after a single trial. However, convictions entered in the same proceeding are simultaneous. They are not sequential, based on the order of the court’s findings. I conclude that two or more convictions entered in the same proceeding must be treated as a simultaneous conviction for purposes of ORS 137.635. Accordingly, I would hold that counts 7, 3, 4 and 8 should be regarded as a simultaneous conviction for the purpose of ORS 137.635 and that defendant had not “previously been convicted” of one of the crimes enumerated in ORS 137.635(2) at the time he was convicted on counts 3,4 and 8. Consequently, despite my disagreement with its construction of the term “previously been convicted” in ORS 137.635,1 agree with the majority that the trial court erred in applying the statute in this to defendant’s convictions on counts 3, 4 and 8.
Deits, Riggs and De Muniz, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.

 The majority appears to believe that previous to sentencing is a construction that is unlikely, because that construction would allow the previous conviction to be the same conviction for which the determinate sentence is to be imposed under the statute. 143 Or App at 247. However, context reveals that the “previous” conviction is to be a different conviction from the one that is the subject of sentencing under ORS 137.635(2).