Court Opinion

ID: 9619860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:34:13.555445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:27.505060
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority lays down a rule of law with which I find no fault. At least it is sustained by a majority of the appellate courts of this country. I find fault with the opinion because it says that nothing remained to be done but to deliver the policy to the insured when it was dropped in the mail in Oklahoma City, March 16, 1948. This is absolutely contrary to the provisions of the application which provides as follows:
“I declare on behalf of myself and of any person who shall have or claim any interest in any policy issued hereon that each of the statements and answers contained 'herein is full, complete and true; and agree (1) That the Company shall not.incur any liability upon this application until the policy has been issued ⅞ by the Company and the first premium has actually been paid to and accepted by the Company or its authorized agent .and the policy has been delivered- to and accepted by me during my lifetime and good health; * *
'There clearly remained something to be 'done after this policy had been mailed' to defendant’s agent in Seminole. It had to be delivered to the applicant in his lifetime and.accepted by him. This was net done as the applicant was dead before the policy was taken out of his mailbox in Seminole on the morning of March 17 at 7:30 a. m. In De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 Colo. 518, 256 P. 317, it was held that when the policy must be received by the applicant while in good health, the mere mailing of the policy does not constitute delivery.
Mailing has not been recognized as delivery in those cases where conditional, delivery has been provided for. In 44 C.J.S,, Insurance, § 265(5) (a), page 1061, this statement is made:
*325“It is usual for an applicant for life insurance and the company to agree, as by an express stipulation in the application, or in both the application and the policy, or sometimes in a receipt for the first premium, that the policy or contract of insurance shall not take effect or become binding on the company, or that the company shall not incur any obligation unless and until the policy is delivered during the lifetime and good health of the applicant, during the continuance of his good health, or while the health of the applicant is in the same condition as described in the application. Such a stipulation in the application is valid, and such stipulation has been held reasonable, binding, and enforceable ; * *
This is supported by the citation of cases from eighteen jurisdictions. In at least two cases we have approved the provision that the policy must be accepted by the applicant. The following was a paragraph of the syllabus in Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. House, 156 Okl. 285, 10 P.2d 718, and Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Trumbly, 170 Okl. 639, 41 P.2d 913:
“In an application for insurance which’ provides that the company shall not incur any liability upon said application until the policy has been issued by the company and the first premium has actually been paid to and accepted by the company and the policy has been accepted by said insured during ’ her life time and good health, held: That such a provision is for the benefit of the insurer to protect such company against a contingency which might arise in that interim during which the insured might become ' se-1 riously ill, suffer a severe injury impairing her health, and to guard against the delivery of such policy in the event of the death of the insured.”
The insurer has the right to say when its liability would start. The contract between the parties provided that the company would not be liable unless the policy was accepted by the applicant. No doubt there is a valid reason for such a provision from the insurer’s standpoint. That was the basis on which the company was undertaking to insure the life of the applicant. Their liability should not be enlarged contrary to the plain provisions of the application. The company had the right to rely on previous expressions of this Court on the question.
In the note in 145 A.L.R., p. 1435, this statement is made:
“There is no question but that the provision of an insurance contract that the policy shall not take effect ‘until delivered,’ ‘actually delivered,’ or ‘until delivered and received’ constitutes a valid clause, in the nature of a condition precedent to the taking effect of the policy. See for instance; Person v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. (8 Cir., 1929) 32 F.2d 459; Jensen v. New York Life Ins. Co. (8 Cir., 1932) 59 F.2d 957 (writ of certiorari denied in (1932) 287 U.S. 626, 53 S.Ct. 80, 77 L.Ed. 543); Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (8 Cir., 1934) 73 F.2d 391; Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co. (8 Cir., 1938) 94 F.2d 675 (reversed on other grounds in (1938) 304 U.S. 263, 58 S.Ct. 874, 82 L.Ed. 1330).”
The majority opinion relies primarily on Unterharnscheidt v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 223, 138 N.W. 459, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 743, and two cases from Arizona, Acacia Mutual Life Ass’n v. Berry, 54 Ariz. 208, 94 P.2d 770, and Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Merkley, 59 Ariz. 125, 124 P.2d 313. In the Un-terharnscheidt case there were facts which distinguish it from the case at bar in that in that case, the policy was mailed on July 10th from St. Louis, Missouri, to. the agent, Kinzer, in Sioux City, Iowa. Kinzer left town on July 15 and left n.o one in charge of his business and did not return till August 7. In. the meantime the applicant had taken sick on July 23 and died on August 2nd from an ailment which he had not previously had. In the regular course of events this policy would have been delivered to the applicant before he took sick. The syllabus of ‘ the opinion says the defendant was “estopped to ques*326tion the health of the applicant at the time ■of the issuance of the delivery of the policy.” In the case at bar there can he no •estoppel as the policy was not received by the agent until after the death of the applicant and no' fault can attach either to the agent or the defendant for any delay.
The Supreme Court of Iowa did not •discuss the provision in the application “That the insurance hereby applied for-shall not take effect unless the premium is paid and the policy delivered to and accepted by me during my lifetime and good health.” The Court was undoubtedly moved .by the fact the agent had been so dilatory about delivering the policy.
Of the two Arizona cases cited by plaintiff only Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Merkley, supra, is helpful. It held that the words “ ‘delivered to and received by insured’ ” mean the same thing and do not imply actual manual delivery. In my opinion those words are not as strong as “delivered to and accepted by me during my lifetime and good health.” Certainly this last phrase contemplates that the applicant see the policy after it came from the insurer. How could a thing be delivered and accepted without the recipient actually receiving and accepting. The only other cases that I find supporting plaintiff’s theory are some Alabama cases but the overwhelming weight- of authority in the United States where the phrase “delivered and accepted by me in my lifetime” necessitates actual receiving of the policy or direct information of its contents.
In Ravenscroft v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 47 Idaho 425, 276 P. 303, it was held that there could be no constructive delivery of a policy if there is anything for the agent to do other than deliver the policy. In the case at bar there was something to be done by the agent, that is to deliver the policy to the applicant in his lifetime and good health. Also, the applicant was to accept the policy. It could have been possible that the applicant did not want to accept the policy.
I think it would be better for us to follow the Kansas case of Klein v. Farmers’ & Bankers’ Life Ins. Co., 132 Kan. 748, 297 P. 730, where it was held that when an applicant agreed in the application for insurance that no liability should attach to the company until the policy was delivered to and received by him while in good health and, although he was passed as insurable by the medical examiner of the insurance company, the delivery of the policy, which had been sent to the local agent of the company, was refused by the latter because the applicant was then suffering from a disease, which caused his death seven months later. The court, refuting the contention that there had been a constructive delivery, of the policy of insurance, declared that the contract should not be deemed to be complete until the delivery of the policy and that this condition had never been complied with.
I think that the case of Pruitt v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 202 La. 527, 12 So.2d 261, 262, 145 A.L.R. 1427, is practically on all fours with the case at bar and should be followed by us. There the application provided that the insurance shall not take effect unless a written or printed policy “ ‘shall have been actually delivered to and accepted by [applicant] while * * * in good health’ ” and the condition was not satisfied and consequently the risk did not attach where the application was received at the home office December 16, and in due course of business a policy was issued and mailed to the soliciting agent for delivery and received by him December 30, but he did not go to the home of the applicant to make delivery until January 4, and then learning that the applicant had died on January 1, retained the policy and returned it to the company. Recovery was denied the beneficiary under the policy in that case. It cites with approval American Home Life Ins. Co. v. Melton, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W. 362, where the same form of application was construed.
To allow a recovery in this case would necessitate a disregard of plain words and in effect would be making a new and different contract for the parties. •
I dissent.