Court Opinion

ID: 9729354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:32:50.993188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:57.179248
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CERDA, specially concurring: I disagree with a portion of the reasoning of the majority but concur in the result. Section 508(a) provides that contribution to attorney fees may be awarded from the opposing party in accordance with subsection (j) of section 503. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1998). Awards may be made in connection with the maintenance or defense of any proceeding under the Act. 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(l) (West 1998). The relevant portion of section 503(j) provides that a petition for contribution to attorney fees must be decided before judgment is entered in the proceeding: “After proofs have closed in the final hearing on all other issues between the parties (or in conjunction with the final hearing, if all parties so stipulate) and before judgment is entered, a party’s petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the proceeding shall be heard and decided, in accordance with the following provisions: (1) A petition for contribution, if not filed before the final hearing on other issues between the parties, shall be filed no later than 30 days after the closing of proofs in the final hearing or within such other period as the court orders.” 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 1998). In re Marriage of Konchar, 312 Ill. App. 3d 441, held that a petition for contribution to attorney fees (incurred in connection with a postjudgment motion concerning visitation) that was filed within 30 days of the closing of proofs but after judgment was entered was untimely. The Konchar court read section 503(j) to mean that before a judgment is entered, a party’s petition for contribution to fees must be heard and decided. This interpretation was supported by section 508(a), which provides in part: “The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering the financial resources of the parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable amount for his own or the other party’s costs and attorney’s fees. *** At the conclusion of the case, contribution to attorneys’s fees and costs may be awarded from the opposing party in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1998). After considering both section 508(a) and section 503(j), the Ron-char court held that a petition for attorney fees must be heard and decided before the final judgment is entered. I agree with this finding. The April 28, 1999, court order decided the issue of child support of Colleen and was, in effect, the final judgment order. The April 28, 1999, court order which decided the issue of child support for Colleen was the final judgment in this case. The Ronchar interpretation that section 503(j) requires that a petition for attorney fees must be decided before final judgment dictates that the August 16, 1999, petition for attorney fees was untimely and the March 9, 2000, order in our case was ineffective. Although the Ronchar interpretation of section 503(j) was not made in the context of an issue of appellate jurisdiction, nevertheless it requires dismissal of our case. If the proper procedure had been followed, the attorney fee petition would have been decided before the April 28, 1999, order was entered disposing of the petition to modify child support. Since it was not, appellant should have appealed within 30 days of the August 27, 1999, order, which ruled on the motions to reconsider the April 28, 1999, order. I therefore agree with the majority that we lack jurisdiction.