Court Opinion

ID: 9667352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:43:26.734849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.302514
License: Public Domain

Neil, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority opinion that the petitioner is entitled to recover the amount of doctors’ and surgeons’ bills in this case in view of the admitted fact that the employer was furnishing competent medical aid and the petitioner refused to accept such aid, and without reason employed his own doctor without notice to the employer that he desired additional medical services.
The rights of the parties, both employer and employee, are governed by our Workmen’s Compensation Law, Section 50-1004, T.C.A.
Nor can I agree that the opinion in Atlas Powder Co. v. Grimes, 200 Tenn. 206, 292 S.W.2d 13, controls the instant case. Whether or not Grimes was entitled to a surgeon of his own selection without notice to, or consultation with, the company doctor is controlled by the statute, 50-1004, T.C.A. The fact that he may have been in need of an *624operation is not determinative of the question. In the Grimes case the company doctor knew he was in need of further medical care. In the instant case the employee was at work, and the company doctor called his attention to callous and grease on his hands which clearly indicated that he was not suffering from any disabling injury. It was thus, in a fit of anger, that he employed his own doctor, and not because of any refusal of the employer to furnish him with medical aid. In neither the Grimes case nor the instant case was the employer given an opportunity to furnish a surgeon or otherwise comply with Section 50-1004, T.C.A.
I am unable to agree that the statute relating to the duty of the employer to furnish free medical aid, or the right of an employee to the services of his own doctor, is any different now than what it was when Irwin v. Fulton Sylphon Co., 179 Tenn. 346, 166 S.W.2d 610, was decided.
The amendatory act reaffirms the duty of the employer to furnish free of charge certain specified services and adds this qualification:
“* * * provided, that the employer shall designate a group of three (3) or more reputable physicians or surgeons if available in that community from which the injured employee shall have the privilege of selecting the operating surgeon or the attending physician; provided, however that total liability of the employer under this section shall not exceed the sum of one thousand and five hundred dollars ($1,500).”
Other pertinent parts of the Section clearly give the employer the right to notice of the need for “specialized medical attention”. He is given the right to demand a special examination and the employee must comply, but at the same time having present his own doctor. "Why *625such an examination, if it was not to determine tlie nature of the injury and tlie need for an operation? Regardless of the result of this consultation, if the employee’s doctor should advise an operation, then in that event the employer would at least know about it. He is then entitled to “designate three (3) or more reputable physicians or surgeons if available in that community from which the injured employee shall have the privilege of selecting the operating surgeon”.
Now, is it true that an injured employee is privileged to ignore the foregoing provision of the statute, and, without any notice to his employer, go wherever he chooses and secure an operating surgeon at the expense of his said, employerf I think not. Both the employer and employee are confined to the express provisions of the statute. As I construe the statute, the Legislature had it in mind that before an employer should be onerated with a heavy surgeon’s fee of $1,500 he should be consulted and given an opportunity to comply with the statute. Of course, he could not arbitrarily refuse any request made by the employee. A liberal construction of this statute is not authorized so as to create duties, rights and liabilities which do not exist.
I am not in disagreement with the majority that an injured employee may engage the services of his own doctor, but he should at least consider the rights of his employer before so doing. The employee could very well say to his employer, “I feel that my own doctor should be consulted with regard to my condition”, and it is my view that the employer would in these circumstances be required to consult with a doctor of the petitioner’s choosing. But he cannot arbitrarily and without reason abandon the services tendered him and proceed to pile *626pip an enormous medical bill incurred by himself with other doctors attempting to furnish medical aid. I feel that my view of the instant case is supported by Irwin v. Fulton Sylphon Co., supra.
In Schneider’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Section 2005, Volume 10, page 43, it is said:
“An injured employee is not entitled to be treated ‘at any particular clinic, or by any particular doctor,’ but the employer is required to furnish ‘reasonable medical, surgical, or other treatment as may be reasonably necessary. ’ ”
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“The employee may not abandon proper medical and hospital service being provided by the employer, obtain other such service and expect the employer to pay for it.” (Volume 10, page 46.)
In 58 Am. Jur. (Workmen’s Compensation), Section 328, it is said:
“As a result of the privilege given the employer of selecting the physician or hospital to care for the injured employee, it necessarily follows that the employer cannot be held liable in a case in which the employee unreasonably refuses to accept the services of the designated physician or hospital.”
In these circumstances we take judicial notice of the fact that doctors and surgeons often differ in their diagnosis as to whether or not the petitioner’s disability results from his occupation, and in fact whether he has any disability at all from any cause. It is also a well known fact that they disagree as to the need of surgery. This important issue should not be left to the employee’s *627doctor alone. It is my view that the real object of the Workmen’s Compensation Law in requiring the employer to furnish medical aid and the employee to accept it was that there should be a consultation between them in order to fix liability where the employee elects to insist upon the services of a doctor of his own selection.
The case of Stone & Webster Eng. Corp. v. Davis, 191 Tenn. 42, 231 S.W.2d 376, 380, does not control the instant case. The question of notice to the employer by the employee that he desired further medical aid was not challenged in the trial court. On the defendant’s request for a “finding of facts” as to six important factual issues no mention was made as to charges for medical and hospital expenses. It is true the question of notice was considered, but, as we said: “Since the assignment of error does not complain of any excess in charges for hospitalization, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed.” The total award for medical and hospital expenses was only $217. At that time the statute provided that where the expense exceeded $200 the injured employee shall have the right to petition the court to require the employer to pay the added expense, but not to exceed $300 for medical expense and $200 for all hospital expenses. It thus plainly appears that at that time the statute recognized the right of the employer to have notice of the added financial burden that might be adjudged against him.
I entertain the greatest respect for my brother Pre-witt’s opinion. But under his holding the rights of the employer to name a group of doctors, “three or more” from which the employee shall select, is entirely disregarded.
*628I am not in disagreement with the Court as to the compensation allowed in these cases. I only dissent as to the amount of doctors’ and hospital bills which the petitioner incurred by the employment of his physician.
Tomlinson, Justice, joins in this dissent.