Court Opinion

ID: 9376485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 19:06:33.645771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.134633
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re C.B., 2023-Ohio-620.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE C.B., ET AL.                            :

Minor Children                                :              No. 112112

[Appeal by A.M., Mother]                      :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 2, 2023

           Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                  Juvenile Division
          Case Nos. AD21902930, AD21902932, AD21902933, AD21902934,
                                  and AD21902935

                                       Appearances:

                 Gregory T. Stralka, for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorneys, for appellee.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                   Appellant, A.M. (“mother”), appeals from a decision of the Cuyahoga

County Juvenile Court in these matters denying a continuance of trial. Ultimately,

her parental rights were terminated and permanent custody was granted to the
Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the

Agency”).

                 Appellant raises only one assignment of error in this appeal, to wit:

      The trial court’s denial of Appellant’s request for a continuance was an
      abuse of discretion since no opportunity was made to contact the
      Appellant.

                 A complaint for neglect and temporary custody was filed by the

Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the

Agency”) on April 13, 2021 with respect to the minor child C.B. (d.o.b. 12/28/11), the

minor child C.D. (d.o.b 9/11/16), the minor child A.D. (d.o.b. 1/20/18), the minor

child K.W. (d.o.b. 12/16/19) and the minor child J.W. (d.o.b. 3/20/21).

                 The complaint alleged that A.M. and child J.W. both tested positive

for oxycodone and benzodiazepines at the time of J.W.’s birth. It further alleged

that mother has substance abuse issues and, although she has engaged in treatment,

she has been unable to maintain sobriety and she has a mental health diagnosis

which is untreated and which interferes with her ability to provide adequate parental

care for the children. The complaint also alleged that C.D. has special needs for

which mother has failed to engage him in services.

                 The fathers of these children have not been involved in their

children’s lives and are not a part of this appeal.

                 A case plan was developed for A.M. and her children with the goal of

reunification.
              Trial before the court on a motion to modify temporary custody to

permanent custody was scheduled for, and called on, June 14, 2022. Present before

the court was an assistant Cuyahoga County prosecuting attorney; counsel for

mother; counsel for P.B., who is the father of C.B.; counsel for alleged father, J.W.

and the guardian ad litem for the children. Also present were a family advocate and

a social worker, employees of CCDCFS, both of whom testified.

              Prior to trial, counsel for P.B. sought excusal since he has been

unsuccessful in his attempts to communicate with P.B. and, therefore, cannot

advocate on his behalf. That request was granted by the trial court.

              Also prior to testimony being taken, counsel for A.M. requested a

continuance of the trial because “I have not been able to have any contact with her

either. I do not know her position * * *.” Counsel for the Agency objected, stating

that service was perfected on mother, that the anticipated testimony from the social

worker is that mother has not visited the children in the past two months and that

mother has had no contact with the Agency. Counsel for the Agency also cited the

length of the pendency of this case.

              The trial court summarily denied the motion for continuance and trial

commenced.

              Ultimately, the trial court granted permanent custody of the children

to CCDCFS and terminated mother’s parental rights.
               Appellant had appeared at hearings on May 6, 2021, May 27, 2021,

July 1, 2021, July 8, 2021 and August 17, 2021 but, conversely, failed to appear at

hearings held on April 6, 2022, April 26, 2022 and May 17, 2022.

               The decision whether to grant or deny a continuance rests in the

sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Ungar, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d

1078 (1981).

               Thus, a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance will only be

reversed on appeal if the trial court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion

connotes more than an error of law or judgment, and implies that the trial court’s

attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5

Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

               “In evaluating a motion for continuance, a court should note, inter

alia, the length of the delay requested, whether other continuances have been

requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel

and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is

dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the

circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant

factors, depending on the unique facts of each case.” Ungar at 67-68.

               In this case, mother had appeared for prior hearings. In fact, it was

the testimony of the Agency’s family advocate that she had been in contact with

mother in the morning hours on the day of the hearing which contradicts the

statement made to the court by the attorney for CCDCFS.
                The trial court made no findings with respect to the decision to deny

mother’s request for a continuance.

                We take our responsibility in reviewing cases involving the

termination of parental rights and the award of permanent custody very seriously.

A parent has a ‘“fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody and management”

of his or her child, In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), and the

right to raise one’s own child is ‘“an essential and basic civil right.’” In re N.B., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, quoting In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d

46, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997). Because the termination of parental rights is “‘the family

law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case,’” it is “an alternative [of] last

resort.” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In

re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14.

                Under the particular circumstances of this case, we find that the trial

court did abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion.

                Judgment reversed. Case remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings.

         It is ordered that the appellant recover from the appellee the costs herein

taxed.

         The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

         It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

___________________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS;
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., DISSENTING:

               Respectfully, I dissent.

               Applying the factors set forth in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423

N.E.2d 1078 (1981), I find the trial court acted within its discretion in denying

appellant counsel’s request to continue the permanent custody trial.

               The record indicates appellant was properly served with notice of the

permanent custody trial and also that she had failed to appear at three pretrial

hearings prior to the trial. On the day of trial, appellant’s counsel requested a

continuance after trial had commenced, but could not explain appellant’s absence,

stating merely that he had been unable to have any contact with appellant and did

not know what her position was on the permanent custody matter. Counsel did not

request any specific length for the continuance. Further consideration of the Unger

factors, including the limited statutory time (120 days) given to the agency to resolve

the custody matter while the permanent custody motion had been pending for 116

days, as well as the resulting inconvenience to the witnesses, the opposing counsel,
the GAL, and the court, indicates that the trial court justifiably denied the request

for a continuance. See, e.g., In re A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109239, 2020-Ohio-

3373; In re C.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109219, 2020-Ohio-3189; and In re S.R.,

6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-09-024, 2010-Ohio-3073.

              In applying Unger, I do not find significant the testimony of the

agency’s family advocate regarding her request to appellant for a drug screen on the

morning of the trial. Her testimony indicates that she mostly communicated with

appellant by text messages, since appellant generally did not answer or return phone

calls, and, while she attempted weekly contact with appellant regarding her drug

tests, appellant responded only once a month or every other month. Therefore, the

testimony, read in context, does not indicate that there was any response or

communication from appellant to the family advocate on the morning of the trial. I

find the family advocate’s testimony immaterial to the Unger analysis in this case.

              I further note that under Juv.R. 23, “[c]ontinuances shall be granted

only when imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties.”         In addition,

Loc.R. 35(C) of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,

provides:

      No case will be continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good
      cause shown, which cause was not known to the party or counsel prior
      to the date of trial or hearing, and provided that the party and/or
      counsel have used diligence to be ready for trial and have notified or
      made diligent efforts to notify the opposing party or counsel as soon as
      he/she became aware of the necessity to request a postponement. This
      rule may not be waived by consent of counsel.
               The record here does not reflect good cause for the continuance of the

trial. While I recognize that biological parents have a constitutionally protected

right to be present at a permanent custody hearing, In re Sears, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 01AP-715, 2002-Ohio-368, ¶ 11, “a parent facing termination of parental rights

must exhibit cooperation and must communicate with counsel and with the court in

order to have standing to argue that due process was not followed in a termination

proceeding.” In re Q.G., 170 Ohio App.3d 609, 2007-Ohio-1312, 868 N.E.2d 713,

¶ 12 (8th Dist.). While biological parents have certain rights concerning their

children, ‘“the focus of a permanent custody hearing and decision is not the parent’s

rights but rather the child’s best interests.”’ In re J.H., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-

126, 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 87, quoting In re West, 4th Dist. Athens No. 05CA4, 2005-

Ohio-2977, ¶ 49. The trial court’s decision here comports with “the Ohio General

Assembly’s intent to ensure the timely placement of children into a permanent

home.” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 116.

               “The grant or denial of a continuance is a matter that is entrusted to

the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.” Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, at syllabus.

An abuse of discretion implies that court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983). Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court acted within its

discretion in denying the request to continue the trial. Therefore, I dissent.