Court Opinion

ID: 9781488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:40:32.114038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.036872
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
While I concur fully in Division 2 of the majority opinion, I do not agree with all that is said in Division 1 concerning the admission of the statements to the police officer made by the victim of the prior similar transaction. Therefore, I concur in Division 1, but in the result only. Division 1 of the majority opinion thus decides only the issues in this case and may not be cited as binding precedent. Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a).
The circumstances surrounding the prior victim’s statements to the police officer were unique. As the majority indicates, the prior victim made her statements to the officer only a few minutes after her home was burglarized by a young man holding a knife, and the young man was observed standing in a nearby yard during the course of the victim’s statement, leading the officer to cut off his conversation with the victim and give immediate chase. In light of these unusual facts, I believe that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency” such that the prior victim’s statements to the officer were not testimonial hearsay under the framework discussed in Michigan v. Bryant, _ U. S. _ (131 SC 1143, 179 LE2d 93) (2011). However, neither Bryant nor the present case should be construed as opening the floodgates for the admission of out-of-court statements by a *208victim or witness merely because the statements occurred at the scene of the crime or would fall within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
Decided March 22, 2011
Reconsideration denied April 11, 2011
Brandon A. Bullard, Colin J. Bellair, for appellant.
Fred A. Lane, Jr., District Attorney, Paul E. Hemmann, Anthony B. Williams, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.