Court Opinion

ID: 9382359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 15:00:23.070109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.892505
License: Public Domain

20-3457
     He v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                              Sponzo, IJ
                                                                           A206 583 322

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 27th day of March, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 9            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10            MYRNA PÉREZ,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   HUI HE,
15                   Petitioner,
16
17                   v.                                          20-3457
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                  Aleksander Boleslaw Milch, Esq.,
25                                    The Kasen Law Firm, PLLC,
26                                    Flushing, NY.
27
28   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Brian Boynton Acting Assistant
29                                    Attorney General; Anthony C.
30                                    Payne, Assistant Director; Jeffery
31                                    R. Leist, Senior Litigation
 1                                  Counsel; Jessica D. Strokus, Trial
 2                                  Attorney; Kirsten Williams, Law
 3                                  Clerk, Office of Immigration
 4                                  Litigation, United States
 5                                  Department of Justice, Washington,
 6                                  DC.
 7
 8         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is GRANTED.

12         Petitioner Hui He, a native and citizen of the People’s

13   Republic of China, seeks review of a September 29, 2020,

14   decision of the BIA denying her motion to reconsider.         In re

15   Hui He, No. A 206 583 322 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2020).        We assume

16   the   parties’   familiarity    with   the   underlying   facts   and

17   procedural history.

18         We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider for

19   abuse of discretion.    See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d

20   109, 111 (2d Cir. 2006).   The BIA abuses its discretion where

21   it “provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs

22   from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or

23   contains only summary or conclusory statements; that is to

24   say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious

                                       2
 1   manner.”     Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 265 F.3d 83,

 2   93 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

 3       The BIA offered two reasons for summarily dismissing He’s

 4   appeal, which it reiterated in its decision declining to

 5   reconsider that dismissal.      First, it noted that He’s notice

 6   of appeal was infirm.       Immigration regulations provide that

 7   the BIA may “summarily dismiss any appeal” if a notice of

 8   appeal “fails to specify the reasons for the appeal.”             8

 9   C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A) (2020).       Although Petitioner He

10   did fail to specify the reasons for her appeal, the operation

11   of another regulatory provision renders this justification

12   for the summary dismissal unavailing.         That provision, 8

13   C.F.R.   §   1003.1(e)(1)    (2020),   requires   that   “[a]ppeals

14   subject to summary dismissal as provided in paragraph (d)(2)

15   of this section . . . be promptly dismissed.”

16       The BIA did not dismiss He’s appeal promptly.         He filed

17   her notice of appeal on July 25, 2018, but the BIA did not

18   dismiss the appeal until May 8, 2020.      We conclude that this

19   nearly two-year lag was not prompt.       Although the effective

20   regulation did not specify what constitutes prompt dismissal,

21   a subsequently enacted version of the regulation does.         The
                                      3
 1   regulation now in effect requires the BIA to dismiss appeals

 2   pursuant to § 1003.1(d)(2) “no later than 30 days after the

 3   Notice of Appeal was filed.”         8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(1) (2022).

 4   This change, though not dispositive, confirms our conclusion

 5   that the BIA waited too long to dismiss He’s appeal for a

 6   technicality that was evident on the face of the notice of

 7   appeal.

8         The BIA’s second rationale for summarily dismissing He’s

9    appeal was that she “did not file a brief within the time set

10   for filing.”     The BIA may summarily dismiss an appeal when

11   an   appellant   indicates    that       “she   will   file   a   brief   or

12   statement in support of the appeal and, thereafter, does not

13   file such brief or statement, or reasonably explain [her]

14   failure to do so, within the set time for filing.”                8 C.F.R.

15   § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E).        In her request for reconsideration,

16   He alleged that her failure to file a brief ought to be

17   excused because she never received the briefing schedule or

18   hearing transcript.     She supported this claim with her own

19   affidavit of nonreceipt and an affidavit from her attorney’s

20   office manager stating that the office has a process for

21   electronically logging mail and had no record of receipt of
                                          4
 1   these documents.

 2       “[A] presumption of receipt is proper so long as the

 3   record establishes that the notice was accurately addressed

 4   and mailed.”      Lopes v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir.

 5   2006)   (emphasis      added).     “[A]   stringent   presumption    of

 6   delivery” applies to certified mail, whereas “the burden of

 7   proof to overcome the slight presumption in the context of

 8   regular mail is significantly lower.”            Silva-Carvalho Lopes

 9   v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 156, 159–60 (2d Cir. 2008).              The lower

10   presumption      may    be   overcome     by   affidavits    indicating

11   nonreceipt.      Matter of M–R–A–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 674

12   (B.I.A. 2008).         “In determining whether a respondent has

13   rebutted the weaker presumption of delivery . . . an [IJ] may

14   consider a variety of factors,” including “the respondent’s

15   affidavit,” “affidavits from . . .               individuals who are

16   knowledgeable about the facts,” “due diligence . . . in

17   seeking    to    redress     the   situation,”      and     “any   other

18   circumstances or evidence indicating possible nonreceipt of

19   notice.”   Id.

20       In this case, the BIA’s analysis of He’s claim of non-

21   receipt of the briefing schedule or hearing transcript was
                                         5
 1   insufficient.    The BIA stated that the briefing notice was

 2   mailed, but there is no evidence of that mailing in the

 3   record, nor any statement of the type of mail used.      Given

 4   that the “slight” presumption of delivery of regular mail

 5   “does no more than to shift a tie-breaking burden of proof to

 6   the alien claiming non-receipt,” Silva-Carvalho Lopes, 517

 7   F.3d at 160, the BIA should have explained why the affidavits

 8   of nonreceipt did not rebut the presumption, particularly

 9   given the lack of evidence of mailing and the diligence

10   exercised following the BIA’s dismissal of the appeal.    See

11   Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 93 (holding that abuse of discretion

12   may occur where agency fails to “provide[] . . . rational

13   explanation” or where its decision “contains only summary or

14   conclusory statements”).

15       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

16   GRANTED and the matter is REMANDED to the BIA for further

17   consideration.

18                               FOR THE COURT:
19                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
20                               Clerk of Court

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