Court Opinion

ID: 9550285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:33:26.210923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:20.070872
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance, but dissent from the majority holding that appellant was not accorded his full right to representation by counsel in the Court of Appeal.
The majority now require an appellate court to abandon its traditional role as an adjudicatory body and to enter the appellate arena as an *444advocate. Whatever the right of a person convicted of crime to an appeal, an appellate court cannot be burdened first, with determining what contentions should be urged on appeal and then, with resolving those contentions.
Neither Anders v. California (1967) 368 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396] nor People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 [62 Cal.Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21] requires the procedures proposed by today’s majority opinion. The precise holding in Anders was that a “no merit” letter by appointed appellate counsel “was not enough” to satisfy an indigent’s constitutional right to representation. Just what is “enough” is not clear, but the majority of the court in that case certainly did not require an appellate court to function as cocounsel with counsel of record as do the majority in this case.
The majority in Anders appear to require the appellate procedure afford “full consideration and resolution of the matter as is obtained when counsel is acting” as an advocate. (Anders v. California, supra, 368 U.S. 738, 743 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 498].) “His role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw.”1 (Id., at p. 744 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 498].) Counsel finding no issue which can be conscientiously raised must nevertheless submit a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses . . . .” (Id., [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 498]).
The Anders procedures have been substantially complied with in the . instant case. There is no basis for the conclusion counsel has not acted as an advocate to the best of his ability. In fact, the majority of this court, like appellate counsel, have concluded the appeal is without merit following full and conscientious examination of the record. Additionally, *445counsel—after determining the appeal to be meritless—has so advised the court; has submitted a brief setting forth a summary of the proceedings and evidence with citation to the transcript; has stated that the principal issue at trial was credibility of witnesses; has delivered a copy of the brief to defendant and has advised him in the manner required by Anders.
The only step counsel has not undertaken is an affirmative request for permission to withdraw. However, he stated that he would and apparently did advise defendant that defendant could move to have counsel relieved if defendant desired, and that the court would permit defendant to file a brief on his own behalf. Thus, while counsel did not request to be permitted to withdraw he nevertheless advised defendant how he might effect counsel’s withdrawal. We must assume defendant did not wish counsel to be relieved, and did not wish to raise any issue on appeal beyond matters stated in counsel’s brief. As far as the record shows, defendant had at all times during his initial appeal been represented by counsel to whom defendant did not object, and counsel has diligently performed in the manner required by Anders. I am unable to discern a denial of constitutional dimension because, in place of an affirmative request to withdraw as defendant’s counsel, counsel has advised defendant how he may effect such withdrawal.
Contrary to the majority holding, Anders imposes no duty on an appellate court to intervene in a defendant’s behalf to examine a record for error when counsel has already done so and has submitted a brief similar to that filed in this case. Anders requires the appellate court make a full examination of the “proceedings”—not record—determining the merit—if any—of the appeal. (Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, 744 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 498].) Anders simply commands the appellate court to ascertain whether appellate counsel and the courts have performed in the manner required by law. If counsel has so performed, then his determination of arguable issues to be presented on appeal, if any, affords to defendant full constitutional representation. Further, it seems clear the Supreme Court intended that it not be the appellate court’s function to search the record to ascertain arguable issues because only after defendant is afforded an opportunity “to raise any points that he chooses,” is the appellate court to appoint new counsel if it finds, “any of the legal points” arguable on the merits. (Id., at p. 744 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 498].) Thus the appellate court shall respond only to issues raised to it, not to issues raised by it.
*446The majority hold the right to appellate counsel is offended when conscientious examination of the record fails to reveal error where none exists; Anders neither requires nor supports the majority holding.2
Feggans, like Anders, does not support the majority holding. In that case this court held that counsel “must prepare a brief to assist the court in understanding the facts and the legal issues in the case. The brief must set forth a statement of the facts with citations to the transcript, discuss the legal issues with citations of appropriate authority, and argue all issues that are arguable. . . .” (People v. Feggans, supra, 61 Cal.2d 444, 447.) Counsel in the instant case has complied with the foregoing mandate. Feggans further requires that when counsel concludes there is no arguable issue “he may limit his brief to a statement of the facts and applicable law,” and that he “may” ask to withdraw from the case. (Id.) Again, counsel has complied. He did not elect the Feggans option to withdraw although he did not foreclose withdrawal should defendant have so elected. According to Feggans, counsel is to remain of record “until the court is satisfied that he has discharged his duty to the court and his client to set forth adequately the facts and issues involved.” (Id.) Here, the Court of Appeal was so satisfied and it cannot be said that its satisfaction was unreasonable. Appellant was thus continually represented by appellate counsel.
Only when counsel is allowed to withdraw, creating a situation where appellant is unrepresented, is defendant to be given an opportunity to present a brief and thereafter the court is to determine whether the appeal is without merit. However, even then the court responds only to issues raised rather than to issues it seeks out by an independent examination of the record. “If any contention raised is reasonably arguable . . . the court must appoint another counsel . . . .” (Id., at p. 448; italics added.) Thus Feggans does not require the court intervene to examine the record for error when an appellant is represented by counsel who has examined the record. As already stated, there is nothing to indicate that counsel’s evaluation of the record was in any way inadequate. In fact, both the Court of Appeal and all members of this court have agreed with counsel there is simply no arguable issue.
*447The majority today effectively designate our already overburdened Courts of Appeal as cocounsel to indigents convicted of crime on unassailable records.
The judgment should be fully affirmed.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied November 21, 1979. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The majority in Anders first quibble with an appellate court conclusion the appeal in that case was “without merit,” when the appellate court should have concluded that the appeal was “frivolous,” as grounds for denying relief. (Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, 743 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 498].) I cannot accept this distinction. An appeal which is without merit is entitled to no different appellate treatment from one which is frivolous, if in fact there is any distinction between those terms in this context. Near the close of their opinion, the majority seem to agree that there is no distinction when they state: . . if [the court] finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous). . . .” (Id., at p. 744 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 498]; see also dis. opn. by Stewart, J., at p. 745 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 499].)

The majority opinion leads to a further anomaly. Counsel who determines after conscientious examination of the record there may be marginal error could prejudice his client by asserting such error. If instead of urging the error he states the appeal is without merit and withdraws, and defendant asserts such error, the appellate court will afford defendant a more thorough, careful review of the entire record.