Court Opinion

ID: 9388622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 05:04:55.361532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.417134
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                      UNPUBLISHED
In re HARDEN, Minors.                                                 April 20, 2023

                                                                      No. 362580
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC No. 2018-000014-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and BOONSTRA and RIORDAN, JJ.

BOONSTRA, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

        I concur in the majority’s analysis of the trial court’s rulings with regard to jurisdictional
and visitation issues. I part company with the majority solely with respect to its analysis of our
appellate jurisdiction. Whereas the majority concludes that the trial court’s June 9, 2022 order was
not appealable by right (but the majority nonetheless exercises its discretion to treat respondent’s
claim of appeal as an application for leave to appeal and grant it), I conclude that the June 9, 2022
order was appealable by right. While the majority and I get to the same place (consideration of
the issues on the merits), and agree upon the result, we do so through different avenues. I therefore
dissent from the majority opinion only with regard to its determination to treat the matter before
us as on leave granted, rather than as an appeal by right.

        The simple fact is that the trial court’s June 9, 2022 order found both (1) grounds for
exercising jurisdiction over the minor child, JLH, and (2) statutory grounds for terminating
respondent’s parental rights to JLH.1 That order was entered after the trial court held, over multiple
days, what is referred to in the record as a “dispositional review hearing and bench trial.”2 The

1
  The order also scheduled a best interests hearing. Ultimately, after that best interests hearing was
held, the trial court found that it was not in JLH’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental
rights.
2
 The hearing related to both JLH and another child, KRH. It is not entirely clear whether the
“dispositional review hearing” aspect of the hearing initially related to both JLH and KRH, but the
“bench trial” aspect appears to have related solely to JLH, inasmuch as the trial court had

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June 9, 2022 therefore operated both as an order of adjudication and as an initial dispositional
order with respect to JLH.3 I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority to the extent it
concluded that the June 9, 2022 was not an initial dispositional order because “disposition still
depended on the outcome of the best-interests hearing.”

        Once a trial court authorizes a petition in a child protective proceeding, “the adjudication
phase of the proceedings takes place, and the ‘question at adjudication is whether the trial court
can exercise jurisdiction over the child (and the respondent-parents) under MCL 712A.2(b) so that
it can enter dispositional orders, including an order terminating parental rights.’ ” In re Mota, 334
Mich App 300, 312; 964 NW2d 881 (2020), quoting In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 15, 934 NW2d
610 (2019). It is permissible for the trial court to combine an adjudication trial and a dispositional
hearing in a single proceeding. Id. at 315-316. Regardless of whether that was done properly in
this case4—an issue that is not before us—or whether the trial court accurately understood or
characterized respondent’s appellate rights, the resulting order unmistakably constituted both an
order of adjudication (finding grounds for exercising jurisdiction) and an initial dispositional order
(finding statutory grounds for termination of parental rights). As an initial dispositional order, it
was appealable by right under MCR 3.993(A) (“The following orders are appealable to the Court
of Appeals by right: . . . (2) an initial order of disposition following adjudication in a child
protective proceeding.”).

                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra

previously found grounds to exercise jurisdiction over KRH. Regardless, the resulting June 9,
2022 order made findings that were both adjudicative and dispositional with respect to JLH.
3
 Plaintiff, petitioner, and the lawyer-guardian ad litem for JLH all appear to agree in this respect,
and I believe the record supports their position.
4
  Under the process outlined by this Court in In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300; 964 NW2d 881
(2020), the proper procedure would be to initially hold an adjudication trial, make findings as to
jurisdiction, and then (if grounds for exercising jurisdiction are found) “the dispositional hearing
in which termination is sought may immediately be commenced.” Id. at 315-316. Whether the
trial court properly did so in this case is not before us on appeal. But even assuming that the trial
court may have erred by failing to clearly separate the adjudication and dispositional aspects of the
hearing, it would be subject to plain-error review, which would require a showing—for which no
one has argued in this case—“that respondent’s substantial rights were affected or that the
integrity, fairness, or public reputation of the proceedings were seriously affected by the court’s
procedural errors.” Id. at 317.

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