Court Opinion

ID: 9431408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:14.440215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:28.362987
License: Public Domain

Justice Scalia,
concurring in the judgment;
I agree with the judgment of the Court, but I db not believe that the principles set forth in its opinion produce it. If it is the fact that the requirements of the rulés of procedure should be “liberally construed,” that “‘mere .technicalities’ should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits,” and that a rule is complied with if “the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires,” ante, at 316, it would seem to me that a caption listing the first party to the case and then adding “et al.” is enough to suggest that all parties are taking the appeal; arid that the later omission of one of the parties in listing the appellants can, “liberally viewed,” be deemed to create no more than an *319ambiguity which does not destroy the effect of putting the ap-pellee on notice.
The principle that “mere technicalities” should not stand in the way of deciding a case on the merits is more a prescription for ignoring the Federal Rules than a useful guide to their construction and application. By definition all rules of procedure are technicalities; sanction for failure to comply with them always prevents the court from deciding where justice lies in the particular case, on the theory that securing a fair and orderly process enables more justice to be done in the totality of cases. It seems to me, moreover, that we should seek to interpret the rules neither liberally nor stingily, but only, as best we can, according to their apparent intent. Where that intent is to provide leeway, a permissive construction is the right one; where it is to be strict, a permissive construction is wrong. Thus, the very first of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe that they are to be “liberally construed,” but rather that they are to be “construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1.
The Appellate Rule at issue here requires the appellant to “specify the party or parties taking the appeal,” Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c), which suggests to me more than just a residual “et al.” Moreover, that it was thought necessary to specify that “informality of form or title” would not entail dismissal, ibid., suggests that a strict application was generally contemplated. I concur in today’s judgment, therefore, for essentially the same reasons that I dissented from the judgment in Houston v. Lack, ante, p. 266, which the Court appropriately cites to support its reasoning in the present case, but which in my view stands in stark contrast to its conclusion.