Court Opinion

ID: 9847533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:01:40.711332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:19.668127
License: Public Domain

Shaw, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent with the majority opinion. The majority correctly states a trial judge and this court, when ruling on motions for nonsuit, directed verdict and judgment n.o.v., must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the resisting party (the Howards). The majority also correctly points out the motions must be denied if the evidence yields more than one inference or its inferences are in doubt. Vacation Time of Hilton Island, Inc. v. Lighthouse Realty, 286 S. C. 261, 332 S. E. (2d) 781 (Ct. App. 1985). I disagree with the majority’s finding the only reasonable inference from the evidence is favorable to SCN.
First, Bright’s promise to give the Howards until February 4, 1983 to make the payments current is supported by independent consideration in the form of an advantage or benefit to SCN as contemplated in General Electric Co. v. Gate, 273 S. C. 88, 254 S. E. (2d) 305 (1979), cited by the majority. This benefit is twofold. First, by extending the period for payment to a day certain, the loan was saved from default and the bank would not be faced with disposing of a fire damaged camper. Banks are in the business of lending money for a profit not selling repossessed items. This profit was protected by giving the borrower a breathing period under the existing circumstances of the fire. All prior payments were currently made prior to fire. Second, the Howards, believing they were secure from default, actively pursued and attained payment of their claim from the insurance company. This certainly benefited SCN as loss payee on the insurance.
I also agree with the Howards SCN should be estopped from claiming there was a lack of consideration for its promise to defer payments. “It is a general rule that a party to a conditional sale contract may expressly or impliedly *428waive the right to insist upon strict performance of the terms of sale by the other party.” G.M.A.C. v. Herlong, 248 S. C. 55, 1949 S. E. (2d) 51, 53 (1966). Estoppel seeks to bar a party from lulling another party into the belief strict performance is not required and then taking advantage of the other party’s imperfect performance. See G.M.A.C. v. Herlong. Finally I note the Herlong court stated:
It has been said for this court that ‘the principle of estoppel in equity stands upon the very foundations of right and fair dealing. It considers and weighs the conduct of men in their dealings with each other, and gives that effect and meaning to their actions which common sense and justice dictate.’
G.M.A.C. v. Herlong, 149 S. E. (2d) at 54 (quoting Palmer v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 197 S. C. 379, 15 S. E. (2d) 655, 661.).
I would hold the trial judge, faced with widely varying testimony, properly left the fact finding to the good sense of a jury. I would affirm.