Court Opinion

ID: 9696254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:42:47.849925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:39.597212
License: Public Domain

REES, Justice
(concurring in result, but dissenting as to Division II).
I concur in the result reached by the majority and would reverse on the premise trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ causes of action against defendant Sneller. However, I am unable to agree with the majority in holding the factual allegations of plaintiffs’ petition show substantial compliance with the notice requirements of section 613A.5, Code.
I. We have refused to extend the true impact and literal meaning of section 613A.S, Code. American States Ins. Co. v. City of Dubuque (Iowa), 186 N.W.2d 601, 604. The cited section lays down the minimal essentials of the notice as to form and context and specifically provides for presentment of the notice to the governing body of the municipality. Irrespective of the pleaded conclusion, which the majority characterizes as a permissible one, the facts pleaded must be strained to permit of the result reached by the majority.
Nor am I satisfied the principles enunciated by this court in Heck v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58, and Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 138 N.W.2d 856, do not provide us with the proper answer to this question. These two cases involve notice of claim provisions of section 614.1(1), Code 1966, which did not differ materially from the notice requirements of section 613A.5, Code. The Heck and Halvorson cases were decided prior to the enactment of chapter 613A, Code, and the abrogation of the doctrine of governmental immunity, but any policy changes implicit in the adoption of chapter 613A must be influenced by this court’s pronouncements in Heck and Halvorson.
It is not improbable the insurance agent in the matter before us, in addition to his admitted relationship to the school district, might have been the agent for plaintiffs in securing for them health, accident or hospitalization insurance, and may have received reports of Marlene Vermeer’s injuries in that relationship. Assuming such to be true, the rationale followed by the majority would subject the school district to plaintiffs’ suit in just such a factual situation.
I would affirm the trial court in its finding the plaintiffs have not substantially complied with the statutory requirements of notice precedent to suit.
II. The conclusion of the majority that petition of plaintiffs demonstrated substantial compliance with section 613A.5 notice requirements as to defendant school *397district makes it obviously unnecessary for us to consider plaintiffs’ first assignment of error relating to waiver and estoppel.
Plaintiffs’ third assignment of error relative to their assertion Marlene Vermeer’s minority should act to toll the notice of claim requirements of section 613A.5 until she attains majority is flatly and squarely before us and should receive our attention in this opinion.
Section 614.8, Code 1971 provides for minority tolling the statute of limitations, but by its terms applies only to the time limitations and to actions referred to in chapter 614, Code 1971. Absent specific statutory provisions, nothing (including minority or disability) tolls a statute of limitations. Overbeck v. Dillaber, 165 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1969). Section 613A.-5 provides for disability extending the period of time in which an incapacitated or injured person can present the required notice of claim to a municipality. Sprung v. Rasmussen, 180 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Iowa 1970). There is nothing in the provisions of section 613A.5, Code 1971, which provides for a tolling of the notice of claim period because of the minority of the claimant. Without a provision in the statute allowing it to be tolled for minors, and noting that it is within legislative power to put adults and minors on an equal basis in regard to statutes of limitations (see Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 977, 299 N.W. 553, 554), we should now hold that the minority of Marlene Vermeer did not act to toll the notice of claim period of section 613A.5, Code 1971.
I would reverse the trial court as to the fourth assignment of error and otherwise affirm.
LeGRAND, J., joins in this dissent.