Court Opinion

ID: 9959538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 01:00:37.388228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.983470
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50268           Document: 61-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/11/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit
                                   No. 23-50268
                                  ____________                                     FILED
                                                                               April 11, 2024
Jose Castro,                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                   Clerk
                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Kimberly Kory; Michael Thornton; Carl Kerawalla;
Shawn King,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 5:20-CV-1022
                  ______________________________

Before Jolly, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      San Antonio police officers woke delivery driver Jose Castro from a
nap in his truck and arrested him at gunpoint for unspecified charges that
local prosecutors ultimately refused to pursue. Castro filed a civil rights
lawsuit against the officers involved, who invoked qualified immunity to
dismiss Castro’s claims. The district court granted qualified immunity as to

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                 No. 23-50268

Castro’s initial unlawful seizure claim, but it denied qualified immunity as to
Castro’s unlawful prolonged seizure, illegal search, excessive force, and
failure to intervene claims. The officers filed this interlocutory appeal hoping
to avoid trial on the merits of Castro’s Fourth Amendment claims. We
REVERSE the denial of qualified immunity on Castro’s unlawful prolonged
arrest claim, AFFIRM the other denials of qualified immunity, and
REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
                                       I.
       While patrolling San Antonio at about 5:00 a.m., Officer Carl
Kerawalla spotted an Enterprise box truck. It was parked on private property
behind a strip mall, with its driver’s side door open. Jose Castro, a delivery
driver, had parked the truck to take a nap while on break from delivering
animal supplies to veterinary clinics. Kerawalla, a plainclothes officer in an
unmarked police car, parked behind Castro’s truck and ran its license plates.
The vehicle was not listed as stolen. Still, Kerawalla’s suspicion lingered,
and he called for backup.
       Uniformed officers Michael Thornton and Kimberly Kory soon
arrived in police cruisers. Thornton called out to the truck requesting its
occupants to exit. There was no immediate response. Thornton drew his
service weapon and pointed it toward the truck’s cab. Castro was startled
and unsure whether these intruders were truly police officers. Castro refused
to get out of the truck, but he explained to the police his delivery break and
asked the officers in broken English “what kinda of police you are?” Castro
was confused by the commotion and called 911 to request police intervention.
He then turned on his truck’s emergency flashing lights so that dispatched
officers could find and assist him. Meanwhile, the officers continued to
command Castro to exit his vehicle. At some point, Thornton requested that
dispatch send Shawn King, an officer who speaks Spanish.

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         Kerawalla then approached the truck from the passenger door and
pointed his AR-15 at Castro’s forehead. At this point King arrived. He and
Thornton approached the driver’s side cab and attempted to remove Castro.
Castro pulled away from the officers and flailed his arms to avoid being
removed from his truck. King struck Castro in the head and leg and then
subdued him by pointing his pistol at Castro’s head. Once Castro was out of
the truck, King twice struck Castro’s left arm, Thornton executed a leg
sweep, and Kerawalla helped them both take Castro to the ground to
handcuff him. While Kerawalla handcuffed Castro, King and Thornton
applied pain compliance techniques to Castro’s back, neck, wrists, arms,
knees, and shoulders. The handcuffs—which the officers left on Castro for
over an hour—caused swelling, numbness, pain, and visible trauma on
Castro’s hands for over five hours after the incident. Kory testified that even
at this point in the incident that he still did not know whether Castro was
engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity. During the confrontation,
no officer perceived an immediate threat to the safety of his life or saw Castro
with a weapon.
         While Castro was handcuffed on the ground and out of reach of the
truck, Kory searched the truck’s cab.             Kory located manifests that
corroborated Castro’s story, but she did not inform the other officers. King,
Kerawalla, and Thornton also searched the truck’s cab and cargo hold.
Thornton radioed for a K-9 unit to search Castro’s truck for narcotics. No
officer attempted to log or inventory the items found in Castro’s truck. At
some point, an officer placed Castro in the back of a police cruiser at the
scene.
         After half an hour of investigating, an officer called out that the scene
was clear, meaning there was no evidence of illegal activity. Half an hour
later, an assistant district attorney telephonically informed Thornton that the
officers had lacked probable cause to search Castro and that the district

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attorney would not accept charges against him. Thornton then pulled a
handcuffed Castro out of the police cruiser and verbally harassed him before
releasing him. None of the officers intervened on Castro’s behalf during the
incident. Hours later, Castro sought medical care at a local hospital for pain
and swelling stemming from the assault. Castro testified that the encounter
had caused him to experience mental and emotional distress, nightmares, and
physical pain, which have affected his professional and personal life.
       Castro sued Kory, Thornton, Kerawalla, and King for claims under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, including excessive force,
unreasonable seizure, unreasonable search, failure to intervene, and
unreasonably prolonging the search and seizure. Castro moved for partial
summary judgment on the merits of his claims, arguing that the initial
investigatory stop lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that he had
committed a crime. The officers moved for summary judgment, claiming
qualified immunity. The district court: (1) denied Castro’s motion; (2)
granted the officers’ qualified immunity as to their initial seizure of Castro;
and (3) denied the officers’ qualified immunity as to the claimed prolonged
arrest of Castro, the search of Castro’s truck, excessive force, and the failure
to intervene. The officers now appeal the denial of qualified immunity.
                                       II.
       It is very well established, of course, that we have interlocutory
jurisdiction to review denials of qualified immunity “to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law.” Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 393 (5th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation omitted). As such, we “consider only whether the
district court erred in assessing the legal significance of the conduct that the
district court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary
judgment.” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir 2004). In this
limited inquiry, we accept the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, though

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we may consider record evidence that blatantly contradicts or utterly
discredits his facts. Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656, 664 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81). We review de novo the
district court's conclusions concerning the materiality of the facts. Kinney,
367 F.3d at 349.
         A defendant’s good-faith assertion of qualified immunity shifts the
ordinary summary judgment burden to the plaintiff to rebut legal immunity.
King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653–54 (5th Cir. 2016). To satisfy this burden,
Castro must show that (1) the officers violated his constitutional rights and
(2) that those rights were “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
misconduct. See Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted). Under the second step, “[a] Government official’s conduct
violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct,
the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (cleaned up).
                                        III.
         On appeal, the officers challenge the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity as to Castro’s claims for (1) unlawful prolonged seizure, (2) illegal
search, (3) excessive force, and (4) failure to intervene. We will address each
claim.
                                        (1)
         We turn first to the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
regarding the prolonged arrest of Castro. As earlier stated, the officers
arrested Castro after he refused to exit his vehicle and held him arrested for
over an hour, including approximately 45 minutes after they had cleared the
scene and concluded their evidentiary mission.

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       We begin with the fundamental premise that to make a lawful arrest,
an officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect committed a crime.
Flores, 381 F.3d at 402. “Probable cause exists when the totality of facts and
circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed
or was committing an offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
       Here, Castro’s repeated refusals to exit his vehicle interfered with a
peace officer’s duty in violation of TEXAS PENAL CODE § 38.15. Failure to
comply with a police officer's instructions creates probable cause for an arrest
under this statute. See Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2017)
(collecting cases where courts affirmed convictions of defendants who failed
to comply with an officer's instructions).
       Although Castro argues he lacked the requisite mental state to commit
this offense, his blatant refusals to exit his vehicle, pulling away from the
officers, and flailing his arms illustrate his culpability. See Berrett v. State, 152
S.W.3d 600, 603-05 (Tex. App. 2004) (affirming a defendant's conviction for
public interference when the defendant repeatedly moved his arm out of the
officer's reach to avoid being placed in handcuffs despite the officer's
repeated commands to comply). The district court’s reasonable suspicion
holding involving the initial stop and seizure confirms that the officers were
exercising lawful duty as required by this statute.
       Because the law justified Castro’s arrest, we turn our attention to the
arrest’s duration. The officers held Castro handcuffed for approximately 45
minutes after they had cleared the scene while they determined whether to
charge him. The entire incident lasted well under two hours. Even a five-
hour arrest prior to release is “an insignificant restraint on … liberty” that
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of a warrantless
arrest made pursuant to probable cause that does not ultimately result in

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charges being filed. Shelton v. Rivera, 12 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 1993). See also
Flanagan v. Hinton, 983 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the district
court incorrectly denied the officers qualified immunity on Castro’s
prolonged arrest claim.
                                     (2)
       We now turn to the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the
officer’s search of Castro’s vehicle. As we have noted, the officers searched
the passenger cab and cargo area of Castro’s rented box truck while Castro
was handcuffed and out of reach.          On appeal, the officers argue that
exceptions to the warrant requirement permitted the search: the search-
incident-to-arrest and inventory search exceptions.
       Although warrantless searches generally violate the Fourth
Amendment, police may “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's
arrest…when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 343 (2009). These searches, however, are limited to “the area from
within which [the suspect] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.” Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here,
Castro was restrained and out of reach of the truck. This exception is
inapplicable.
       The Fourth Amendment also may permit warrantless inventory
searches in which automobiles are impounded and their contents are
inventoried. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1976); see also
United States v. Andrews, 22 F.3d 1328, 1334 (5th Cir. 1994). Inventory
searches do not, however, circumvent the warrant requirement if they are
evidentiary in nature rather than for a caretaking function of the impounded
vehicle and/or its contents. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990); United
States v. Como, 53 F.3d 87, 92 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Andrews, 22 F.3d at

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1336).    Circumstances here show that this search was for evidentiary
purposes rather than for inventory purposes: (1) the officers created no log or
inventory of items searched or located in Castro’s truck; (2) Thornton
radioed for a K-9 unit to search Castro’s truck for narcotics; and (3) the
officers never actually impounded Castro’s truck. This exception is also
inapplicable.
         Thus, neither of the two warrant exceptions that are suggested by the
officers justify the officers’ search here. Molina, 37 F.4th at 281. As such,
the district court correctly denied the officers qualified immunity on Castro’s
illegal search claim.
                                       (3)
         We continue our analysis of the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity, turning to Castro’s excessive force claim. As earlier noted, the
officers pointed firearms at Castro, forcibly removed him from his vehicle,
and then tackled and handcuffed him. On appeal, the officers argue that the
severity of Castro’s crime, the immediate threat to the safety of the officers,
and Castro’s resisting arrest justified their use of force.
         The Fourth Amendment enshrines the right to be free from excessive
force. Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 500–01 (5th Cir. 2008). To determine
excessive force violations, courts examine the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect posed a threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The “threat-of-harm factor
typically predominates the analysis when deadly force has been deployed.”
Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021).
         Here, the officers had no probable cause to suspect Castro of a crime
beyond his initial resistance to police commands. Nor did the officers
reasonably believe Castro to be a genuine threat to their safety. Although

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Castro initially pulled away from the officers and flailed his arms in defense
while they removed him from his vehicle, the force used by the officers,
particularly pointing a gun at his head, was clearly disproportionate to
Castro’s resistance, which did not endanger the police. Petta v. Rivera, 143
F.3d 895, 900–903 (5th Cir. 1998).
       Consequently, Castro has made a showing of injuries resulting directly
from excessive, unreasonable force, which if proved at trial, can qualify as a
violation of his protected constitutional rights. Strain, 513 F.3d at 500–01.
Finally, there can be no question that the right at issue here, i.e., freedom
from excessive force, is clearly established. Although we have previously
held in some cases that pointing a gun at a suspect does not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation, this case is not the case. Hinojosa v. City of
Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 1230–31 (5th Cir. 1988). Here, the officers pointed
multiple guns throughout the encounter at an unarmed, confused, and only
mildly disruptive suspect. To the point, the district court correctly denied
the police claim of qualified immunity on Castro’s excessive force claim.
                                      (4)
       Finally, we consider the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
on Castro’s failure to intervene claim against all four officers. As earlier
indicated, no officer intervened on Castro’s behalf during the incident. On
appeal, the officers argue that because there were no underlying
constitutional violations, they had no obligation to intervene, and, thus, they
are entitled to qualified immunity.
       A failure to intervene claim arises when an officer, who can prevent
harm caused by a fellow officer’s constitutional violations, fails to act.
Kitchen v. Dallas Cty., Tex., 759 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, given
that we have already held that Castro has made a showing of constitutional
violations, the predicate of the officers’ defense, i.e., no underlying

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constitutional violations, is without merit. It follows that the district court
correctly denied each of the officers qualified immunity to this claim.
                                     IV.
       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
REVERSED on its denial of qualified immunity for the officers’ prolonged
arrest of Castro and AFFIRMED in all other respects.
               AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
                                                             REMANDED.

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