Court Opinion

ID: 9728135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:59:27.945377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.125350
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Notwithstanding the heavy burden of proof demanded to sustain a constitutional challenge to an act of the General Assembly, it is my considered opinion that the trial court was correct in concluding that due process requires that paternity be established by clear and convincing evidence. The preponderance standard specified by section 6704(g) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6704(g), is therefore unconstitutional.
The function of a standard of proof is “ ‘to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court has identified three factors which must be balanced in determining the standard of proof required by due process in a particular type of proceeding:
[Fjirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute *598procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (citation omitted).
The private interests of the putative father in a paternity action are of considerable importance. These interests were cogently described by the United States Supreme Court in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981):
The private interests implicated here are substantial. Apart from the putative father’s pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child relationship. This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651-652, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 92 S.Ct. 1208 [1212-1213] (1972). Just as the termination of such bonds demands procedural fairness, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, post, [452 U.S.] p. 18, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (1981), so too does their imposition. Through the judicial process, the State properly endeavors to identify the father of a child born out of wedlock and to make him responsible for the child’s maintenance. Obviously, both the child and the defendant in a paternity action have a compelling interest in the accuracy of such a determination.
Id. at 13, 101 S.Ct. at 2209 (footnote omitted).
The second factor, the risk of an erroneous decision, also militates in favor of a heightened standard of proof. The testimony offered by the parties in a paternity suit is often *599of questionable reliability and the availability of eyewitnesses is unlikely. See, e.g., Little v. Streater, supra at 14, 101 S.Ct. at 2209.
The final factor to be considered is the government’s interest in the standard of proof to be selected. The state shares the interest of the child and the putative father in a just and accurate determination. See Little v. Streater, supra at 14, 101 S.Ct. at 2209; Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2159, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Moreover, the imposition of a more stringent standard of proof entails no additional time or expense to the government.
From the foregoing it is clear that the use of the preponderance standard in paternity proceedings does not satisfy the requirements of due process. The preponderance standard is the least demanding standard known to the law. Commonwealth v. Ehredt, 485 Pa. 191, 401 A.2d 358 (1979); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 553, 372 A.2d 826 (1977); Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc. v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 45, 70 A.2d 854 (1950). To satisfy that standard the party bearing the burden need only present evidence which outweighs the opposing evidence in probative value. Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc. v. Margulies, supra. In contrast a “clear and convincing evidence” standard requires that
[T]he witnesses must be found to be credible, that the facts to which they testify are distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due order, and that their testimony is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the jury to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue____ It is not necessary that the evidence be uncontradicted ..., provided it “carries a clear conviction to the mind” ... or carries “a clear conviction of its truth.....”
*600In re Estate of Fickert, 461 Pa. 653, 658, 337 A.2d 592, 594 (1975) quoting La Rocca Trust, 411 Pa. 633, 640, 192 A.2d 409, 413 (1963).
See also Thomas v. Seaman, 451 Pa. 347, 304 A.2d 134 (1973); Broida v. Travelers Insurance Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 A. 492 (1934).
The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is required in Pennsylvania to prove a number of types of claims in civil actions. See, e.g., Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975) (facts necessary to overcome presumption of gift); Elliott v. Clawson, 416 Pa. 34, 204 A.2d 272 (1964) (incompetency sufficient to rescind transaction); Stevenson v. Stein, 412 Pa. 478, 195 A.2d 268 (1963) (title by adverse possession); Hale v. Sterling, 369 Pa. 336, 85 A.2d 849 (1952) (resulting trust); Gilberti v. Coraopolis Trust Co., 342 Pa. 161, 19 A.2d 408 (1941) (fraud); Mooney’s Estate, 328 Pa. 273, 194 A. 893 (1937) (wages owed by decedent for personal service); Boyertown National Bank v. Hartman, 147 Pa. 558, 23 A. 842 (1892) (reformation of contract on grounds of mistake); McKenna v. McKenna, 282 Pa. super. 45, 422 A.2d 668 (1980) (change of domicile).
Paternity is at least as if not more fundamental than the above-enumerated subjects. Most compelling is the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), which held that clear and convincing evidence must be presented in order to terminate the parental relationship. It would appear that that issue and the issue with which we are here faced are on equal footing. The individual rights affected by the creation of a parental relationship are as significant as the rights affected by the extinguishment of that relationship. I would hold that the same quality of evidence should be required to create that relationship as to destroy it. I therefore dissent.