Court Opinion

ID: 9657466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:27:15.127465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:31.662021
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant had breached the employment contract by not returning plaintiff to a position of equal or greater responsibility. As the majority stated: "While defendant was not duty bound to establish a policy for employees returning from social service leave, having done so, the policy became a contractual obligation. Defen*832dant’s employees could expect that the policies would be followed.” See generally Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). Here, defendant enhanced its standing in the community and with its employees through its social service leave policy. Plaintiff was induced to participate in this program by the defendant’s assurance that an assignment of equal or greater responsibility awaited him upon his return and defendant benefited by plaintiff’s participation in the program. However, while I agree with the majority in this respect, I cannot agree with the majority that plaintiff was entitled to only nominal damages for defendant’s breach of contract.
Having found the contract broken, the majority would limit plaintiff to only nominal damages for the sole reason that plaintiff was an employee at will. The majority reason that as an employee at will, defendant could have fired plaintiff at any time, and therefore continued employment was speculative at best, too speculative to entitle plaintiff to actual damages for lost income. However, the simple fact that contractually defendant could have fired plaintiff at any time does not mean that they were likely to fire him at any time. The more reasonable presumption given common experience is that barring difficulties in defendant’s business or plaintiff’s performance, factors also present where the employment is not terminable at will, plaintiff’s employment would have continued. Rather than being speculative, plaintiff’s employment was likely to have continued and defendant’s breach more likely than not did lead to the actual loss of income.
The majority’s opinion is not only contrary to reasonable expectations, it also throws on the plaintiff the burden of proving a negative — namely *833that defendant would not have fired him. That burden more reasonably belongs to the defendant to show that in fact circumstances were such that it more likely than not would have fired plaintiff. McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 337, pp 788-789, states:
"In summary, there is no key principle governing the apportionment of the burdens of proof. Their allocation, either initially or ultimately, will depend upon the weight that is given to any one or more of several factors, including: (1) the natural tendency to place the burdens on the party desiring change, (2) special policy considerations such as those disfavoring certain defenses, (3) convenience, (4) fairness, and (5) the judicial estimate of the probabilities.”
Considering that the information is more readily available to the defendant than to the plaintiff, convenience favors placing the burden of proof on defendant to show that plaintiff would likely have been discharged. Moreover, here the breach has been established by plaintiff and the only issue remaining is damages. Under the majority’s reasoning, every employee at will who establishes a breach of employment contract will be barred from recovering actual damages because the damages are supposedly speculative. It is my view that the damages are not so speculative as to entitle plaintiff to only nominal damages and that, in any event, public policy and fairness favor allocating the burden to defendant to show that in fact plaintiff would have been discharged. The result in this case allows defendant to appear to the world to be a good corporate citizen by placing its employees in public service while at the same time stripping the innocent employee of rights he likely would not have lost had he chosen not to participate in the program.
*834Defendant in this case offered no proofs that plaintiff would have been fired. I would conclude that in light of the lack of this evidence, plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable presumption that he would have continued employment but for defendant’s breach. Since plaintiff put in proofs of his damages, I would affirm the jury’s verdict.