Court Opinion

ID: 9462924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:53:31.789966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:51.013689
License: Public Domain

*1226CLARK, Circuit Judge, with whom DYER and GEE, Circuit Judges, join,
concurring:
I concur in the result and Parts I, III and IV of Judge Tjoflat’s opinion for the en banc court.
In my view, the circumstances of Dinitz’s second trial are so similar to those displayed in In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1976), that the attempt in Part II to distinguish Evans must fail. Evans’ attorney was not refused the right to appear pro hac vice because of any generalized activity but because of his conduct in prior, related cases in the same court. As I see it, the attempt by Dinitz to have Wagner reinstated as his trial attorney at the second trial is squarely within the facts and rule of Evans.
Even if I am wrong about this, the failure to modify Evans unnecessarily beclouds the applicable rule for future eases involving motions for admission pro hac vice. The majority leaves the trial courts of this circuit without guidance as to how future cases of this kind should be handled. Have Evans’ rules of procedure and substance been supplanted sub silentio by a return to the vague standard of abuse of discretion in only this exact case, in some cases, or in every case? Are the standards for admissions pro hac vice bifurcated; i. e., one standard for civil rights cases in the Southern District of Mississippi and another for other cases and courts? Evans should be modified and this is both the time and the forum for it.
For example, we could establish as the rule that a court may deny permission to appear pro hac vice to an attorney who has committed acts in this or another court that warrant disciplinary action under the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, unless such denial would result in clear prejudice to the attorney’s client. If we thus modify the Evans — Sanders standard, it would permit a trial court to deal effectively with disruptive conduct without engaging in speculation about the degree of disciplinary action that a state bar committee would consider sufficient for disbarment.
Failing in my ability to distinguish Evans on its facts and lacking a modification of its rule, I cannot concur in all the majority writes in Part II. However, under the factual conclusions now established by the Supreme Court’s opinion, the first trial actions of Wagner warranted his dismissal there and Dinitz showed no substantial prejudice in the deprivation of Wagner’s services at his retrial. I, therefore, concur in the result.
JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, concurring, with whom COLEMAN and GEE, Circuit Judges, join:
I concur in Judge Tjoflat’s opinion and in the result except that I agree with Judge Clark’s separate opinion that In Re Evans cannot be squared with this result. I consider that whatever vitality In Re Evans had has necessarily been dissipated by the present en banc decision. Of course, In Re Evans is still on the books, but except for the highly restrictive application to the unusual situation described in that opinion, our action today affirms to District Judges that they are not circumscribed from exercising their constitutional discretion to assure deportment in their courts.