Court Opinion

ID: 9717913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:12:42.123728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.046949
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the imposition of the sentence of death in this case but write separately to address the relationship of three aspects of this case to prior opinions of this court.
"Same Jury" Reqwfrement
Our eapital sentencing statute provides that "if the defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing." Ind.Code § 85-50-2-9(d) (1998). In both Brewer v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 338, 417 N.E.2d 889, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 18, 73 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1982), and Schiro v. State (1983), 451 N.E.2d 1047, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003, 104 S.Ct. 510, 78 L.Ed.2d 699 (1983), this court explicitly and unambiguously said that Indiana law requires that when the guilt issue was tried by jury, the sentencing hearing must be before the same jury. Brewer, 275 Ind. at 354, 417 N.E.2d at 898; Schiro at 10522
In this case, this court holds that there was no requirement that Gary Burris be sentenced by the same jury following remand or even a requirement that the state make an attempt to reconvene the same jury.
Thus, we'graft' a judicial exception to the plain language of the statute in holding that the "same jury" requirement does not apply where a case has been remanded for resen-tencing only and many years have expired since the original trial: "Common sense and judicial economy dictate that the trial judge should have the latitude to assemble a new jury in such a situation."
While it is certainly an unusual assertion of judicial power to suggest that such considerations authorize an exception to the plain language of a statute, I do think that such a reading of the statute is proper here. The statute does not contemplate the special case of re-sentencing following judicial remand. This court must fill in rules for proceeding in death penalty cases in those cireumstances where the legislature has not provided explicit guidance.
Furthermore, Burris has not shown prejudice as a result of this process. And, as noted above, a number of Indiana capital defendants have argued to this court that having the same jury was to their detriment because that jury had already made the determination of guilt and that there was a great probability that the jury had already determined to recommend the death penalty without considering the evidence of mitigating circumstances. Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 95. This is a more plausible argument than contending that the same jury that convicted the appellant (and, in this case, initially ree-ommended death) is more likely to recommend merey than an entirely new jury.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
When this court remanded this case for re-sentencing, Burris v. State (1990), Ind., 558 N.E.2d 1067, Chief Justice Shepard detailed substantial available mitigating evidence con*970cerning Burris's background which was not developed and presented at trial by defense counsel. Id. at 1075. In reviewing aggravating and mitigating cireumstances after remand, the trial judge found that the aggravating cireumstance charged had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and then reviewed almost all of the matters listed by Chief Justice Shepard. In respect of the potential mitigating effect of defendant's difficult childhood and background, the trial judge noted that "there was no testimony that his background would cause a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the alleged murder to cause the Defendant to commit the murder." She thus found that the mitigating cireumstances which existed were outweighed by the aggravating cireumstance. I agree that the trial judge properly considered and weighed the aggravating circumstance and the mitigating circumstances which existed and that sentencing was proper.
Absence of Jury Recommendation
The trial court here gave no weight or consideration in sentencing to the fact that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous recommendation either for or against imposing the death penalty. The majority in Roche v. State (1992), Ind., 596 N.E.2d 896, 899 held that "no meaning should be interpreted from the jury's failure to reach a recommendation" because the language of the statute provides that if the jury is unable to agree, the court must "proceed as if the hearing had been to the court alone," Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(f) (1998). Nevertheless, the statute does provide that the judge may consider any appropriate cireumstances in mitigation. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(8). That one or more members of the "conscience of the community" assembled to review the propriety of the death penalty believes that it should not be imposed is, in my view, a cireumstance appropriate for consideration, although not grounds for reversal here. See Roche at 902 (DeBruler, J., concurring opinion in which Krahulik, J., concurs).

. When appellants in subsequent death penalty cases argued that the statute was unconstitutional in requiring that they be tried by the same jury that convicted them, this court defended the constitutionality of the "same jury" requirement. Bieghler v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 78, 94, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1241, 89 L.Ed.2d 349 (1986); Boyd v. State (1986), Ind., 494 N.E.2d 284, 293, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987).