Court Opinion

ID: 9601612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:47:50.266649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:59.107740
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ROVIRA
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I cannot agree that the Denver occupational tax or “head tax” is an income tax for purposes of bringing it within the meaning of the Buck Act and yet is not an income tax within the meaning of Colorado constitutional and statutory provisions. Denver v. Duffy Storage and Moving Co., 168 Colo. 91, 450 P.2d 339 (1969); Johnson v. Denver, 186 Colo. 398, 527 P.2d 883 (1974).
The passage of Public Law 93-340 does not convert the Denver occupational tax into an income tax as that term is defined in the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §110.
The Congress has clearly set out in the Buck Act that city and state income taxes must be paid by those residing within a federal area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such areas. 4 U.S.C § 106. To the same effect, sales and use taxes were permitted to be collected by city and state government. 4 U.S.C. §105.
If the Congress wishes to allow the Denver occupational tax to be collected from federal employees, as the majority opinion indicates, then a *506simple, straight forward amendment of the Buck Act would accomplish that purpose.
I find it incongruous that in 1974 we rejected, by a unanimous court (Pringle, C.J., and Hodges, J., not participating), the contention of Denver that “the head tax should be defined as an income tax for purposes of complying with the Buck Act”, and today, because of the passage of Public Law 93-340, accept that very argument.
The reliance on United States v. Lewisburg Area School District by the majority does not add strength or validity to the opinion. The occupation tax in Lewisburg was determined by three methods of assessing occupations and is far different from the two dollar per person tax of Denver.
I agree with the majority opinion in section I.
I would affirm the trial court’s granting the permanent injunction as to the federal enclave employees and reverse the trial court’s judgment denying the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs working at the post office branch offices.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE LEE and MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON join with me in this concurrence and dissent.