Court Opinion

ID: 9476232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:50:44.955356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:11.874094
License: Public Domain

ENSLEN, District Judge,
dissenting.
Although I agree with most of Judge Nelson’s opinion, I must dissent from his treatment of appellant’s Edwards claim. The majority bases its rejection of this claim on two factors. First, plaintiff was read her Miranda rights three times before she was arrested and booked at the stationhouse, and on each occasion she waived those rights and spoke to the police about the auto theft. Second, appellant, according to the majority, never “put the authorities on notice that [she] intended to retract her waiver and invoke her right to consult a lawyer.” Supra, maj. op. p. 616. The Magistrate in his Report and Recommendation similarly rejected appellant’s claim that she had invoked her right to counsel. The District Court did not expressly address the Edwards issue. Because I believe that appellant did adequately inform the authorities of her desire to consult with counsel, I must dissent from the majority’s treatment of this issue.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court stated that if an accused person “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); see also id. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (“If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present”). The Supreme Court strengthened this rule in Edwards v. Arizona, holding explicitly that “an accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Supreme Court further held in Edwards that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1885.
Appellant cannot directly claim the benefit of the Edwards decision because it does not apply to cases that were pending on habeas appeal when it was issued. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 650, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1345, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); compare Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) (holding that Edwards does apply to cases that were pending on direct appeal in a state court at the time it was decided). She can, however, claim the benefit of directly applicable precedent from this circuit that predates Edwards. See Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir.1978) (indicating that there may be a per se rule “barring custodial interrogation of a suspect after a request for counsel has been made”); Brooks v. Perini, 384 F.Supp. 1011, 1017-18 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.1974); see also Rose v. Engle, 722 F.2d 1277, 1280 (6th Cir.1983) (noting that “Edwards did not alter Sixth Circuit law substantially, but rather confirmed the practice of this court”) (citing Maglio and Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96, 98-99 (6th Cir.1972)), motion for stay granted sub nom., Tate v. Rose, 466 U.S. 1301, 104 S.Ct. 2186, 80 L.Ed.2d 805 (1984), motion to vacate stay denied, 467 U.S. 1249, 104 S.Ct. 3529, 82 L.Ed.2d 835 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1353, 84 L.Ed.2d 376 (1985). In this case, appellant did not initiate further “communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police” after she had been formally arrested and booked, and the only question is whether she adequately “expressed [her] desire to deal with the police only through counsel.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885.
*619On this point, I must disagree with the majority. I agree that appellant’s attempt to contact her family attorney after the 6:10 a.m. interview did not constitute an invocation of her right to counsel. I believe, however, that appellant did adequately invoke this right when in response to the jail matron’s query about using the telephone after she had been arrested and booked, she stated “No, my husband will call the attorney upstairs.” This statement constituted an unequivocal assertion of appellant’s desire to seek assistance of counsel. See McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 799-801 (8th Cir.1982); White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 189-90 (7th Cir.1979), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1013, 101 S.Ct. 3000, 69 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981), on remand, 687 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.1982); Maglio, 580 F.2d at 203-05. At a minimum, appellant’s statement should have alerted the authorities and caused them to conduct further inquiry into the matter. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 490, 493 n. 3, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (noting cases where courts have held that when an accused indicates he may desire counsel, “all interrogation must immediately cease except for narrow questions designed to ‘clarify’ the earlier statement and the accused’s desires respecting counsel”).
Finally, my reading of the record is that the police were aware of appellant’s belief that her husband would call an attorney. Detective Stiles testified at the state court suppression hearing that he was present when the Matron asked appellant if she would like to call her attorney. Although this point is not clear from the record, presumably if Detective Stiles heard the Matron’s question, then he also heard appellant’s reply. At that point, he at least should have inquired further into appellant’s desire to have counsel present. His failure to do so and to respect appellant’s expression of her desire to seek the assistance of counsel rendered his subsequent questioning of her invalid.
For the above reasons, I respectfully must disagree with the majority’s decision to affirm the district court’s decision.