Court Opinion

ID: 9493467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:09:08.050001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:51.592156
License: Public Domain

Cudahy, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I cannot agree that the essential element of identity of parties is absent here. Nonetheless, because I believe that the two claims may not be identical, I concur in the result.
The majority cites the following as the applicable rule: “the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes the same rights, title and interest possessed by the assignor.” Maj. Op. at 953, quoting Plumb v. Fluid Pump Service, Inc., 124 F.3d 849, 864 (7th Cir.1997). From this rule, the majority reasons that, when Perry took the assignment of Lahucik’s claim, Perry also took Lahucik’s right to bring the claim. However, whether Perry bought a valid claim from Lahucik — which be doubtless did — does not resolve whether the parties in the previous case and in this case are identical. The inescapable fact is that Perry was the plaintiff in the previous case and Perry is the plaintiff in the present case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) states that “every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Further, “[t]he federal courts ... and all of the state courts ... have been in full accord in holding that the unconditional assignee of a complete chose in action is the real party in interest....” Overseas Development Disc Corp. v. Sangamo Construction Co., Inc., 686 F.2d 498, 505 n. 17 (7th Cir.1982) (quoting 3A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.09(1.-1) at 17-84) (now found at 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 17.11[1][a] (3d ed. 1998)). Hence, the claim in the present case belonged to Lahucik, but the party in the present case is Perry. Put another way, *955Perry bought Lahueik’s claim, but he did not buy his identity.
The majority intimates two policy justifications for grounding the reversal in a lack of identity between parties. First, every individual has a right to his day in court, and barring Perry because of an identity of claims might impair Lahueik’s right. But that cannot be so; the majority correctly states that, regardless of Perry’s initial failure on his claim, Lahucik was entitled to bring his own claim in his own name. At most, barring Perry from bringing the suit because of his prior failure would reduce by one the number of people interested in buying Lahueik’s claim.
The majority also states that banks and insurance companies routinely take assignments of large numbers of claims arising out of a single transaction or occurrence, “and given the vagaries of litigation they undoubtedly win some and lose some.” Maj. Op. at 953. However, banks and insurance companies must buy the bulk of their claims before litigating them. If a bank bought a single claim, litigated it and lost, one might argue that the bank is (or should be) precluded from rustling up a second case to try its luck again. The situation seems different when a bank buys claims without any forewarning that the claims lack merit and then pursues them simultaneously to mixed results. In such cases, as well as here, it may be more appropriate to deny claim preclusion because the claims themselves are different in some respects.
In spite of the fact that an identity of parties is present here, the result reached by the majority is sustainable under another analysis that seems to be more consistent with the basic principles of claim preclusion. Beyond the question of identity of parties lies the need for identity of claims, and here the requirements of claim preclusion may not be met. The present RICO suit involves allegations of predicate acts of acceptance of bribes and conspiracy. Since Perry appears to have alleged a later terminal date for the conspiracy than in his previous complaints, he seems to have alleged new predicate acts of bribery. Consequently, even though Perry may have made a concession on this point, there may well be different claims here. So, even though the same party is bringing both claims, the second claim may still survive preclusion. However, on remand, Perry’s claim should be limited to only the new dates of conspiracy he has alleged.