Court Opinion

ID: 9552658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:14:48.616076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:34.884195
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff’s injuries directly resulted from an employee’s conduct expressly forbidden by defendant employer. Under these circumstances, defendant was not liable under respondeat superior principles.
As the majority concedes, the record would support a finding that the employer had forbidden employees to allow any passengers aboard tractors because of the obvious dangers involved. Nonetheless, employee Garcia allowed plaintiff, his nephew, to ride while seated on a raised toolbox in the tractor. Quite predictably, an accident occurred when plaintiff was struck by a low-hanging branch. The majority holds, contrary to the finding of the jury in this case, that Garcia was at all times acting within the scope of his employment. The majority emphasizes that Garcia was busy with his usual work when the accident occurred. But the accident did not occur by reason of Garcia’s attention to his authorized work—it arose because Gar*972cia, for personal reasons, deviated from his employment and violated an express company rule forbidding passengers aboard tractors. Under these circumstances, respondeat superior liability should not be imposed.
The majority acknowledges that no liability may be imposed in cases where the employee “has substantially deviated from his duties for personal purposes.” (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 960 [88 Cal.Rptr. 188, 471 P.2d 988]; see 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Agency and Employment, § 166, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) The majority also realizes that “Generally, the issue of scope of employment is a question of fact.” (Ante, p. 968; see Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 722 [159 Cal.Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755].) Nonetheless, the majority believes that here, scope of employment was established as a matter of law because the accident occurred while Garcia was engaged in his assigned task of disking the orchard. In this regard, the majority cites Meyer v. Blackman (1963) 59 Cal.2d 668, 679 [31 Cal.Rptr. 36, 381 P.2d 916], for the proposition that “the fact that [an employee] was not authorized to take a passenger is immaterial. ” (Ante, p. 969.) The Meyer case is wholly inapposite.
In Meyer, there was no indication whatever that accepting the passenger contributed in any way to the subsequent collision with another car. The sole question in Meyer was whether the act of accepting a passenger, contrary to company policy, necessarily took the employee/driver out of the scope of his employment. We properly concluded that if the employee continued to carry out his employer’s business, the mere acceptance of a passenger was immaterial to the issue of scope of employment.
In my view, a contrary rule should govern where the employer’s rule is in the nature of a safety order ignored by the employee, and where the accident could have been avoided had the order been obeyed. In other words, wilful disobedience of such an order should be deemed a “substantial deviation” from employment within the Hinman exception to respondeat superior liability.
I would affirm the judgment.