Court Opinion

ID: 9926617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 15:05:42.729037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.985327
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2300-22

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.S.R.,

          Defendant-Appellant,

and

T.D.,

     Defendant.
________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF S.C.R.,
a minor.

                   Submitted January 8, 2024 – Decided January 25, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County,
            Docket No. FG-11-0017-22.

            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
            appellant (Steven Edward Miklosey, Designated
            Counsel, on the brief).

            Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
            respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney
            General, of counsel; Adam Robert Meisle, Deputy
            Attorney General, on the brief).

            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
            attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
            Public Defender, of counsel; Jennifer Marie Sullivan,
            Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
            the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant C.S.R. ("Casey") appeals from the Family Part's March 14,

2023 judgment terminating her parental rights to S.C.R. ("Samuel").1 Casey

challenges the court's decision regarding the second part of the third and the

fourth prong under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1. The Division of Child Protection and

Permanency ("Division") and the Law Guardian contend the judgment is

1
  We refer to the parties, child, and other family members involved in this case
using either initials or pseudonyms to protect their privacy and the
confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
                                                                          A-2300-22
                                       2
supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. Having considered

the arguments in light of the record and applicable legal standards, we affirm.

                                        I.

      Casey is the biological mother of Samuel who was born in October 2012.2

Samuel has two maternal siblings, an adult sister I.J., and a fourteen-year-old

brother X.C., who lives with his father.

      In October 2017, the Division received its first referral regarding Casey's

care of Samuel due to allegations of physical abuse, substance abuse, and

domestic violence that resulted in Samuel sustaining a broken femur. These

allegations were unfounded. 3 In February 2019, the Division received another

referral from a healthcare facility because Casey, while under the influence, took

Samuel to the emergency room for a rash. Specifically, the referral explained

Samuel informed the doctor "his father hit him on his arm . . . [and] in the

abdomen." Additionally, Casey appeared to be intoxicated after going to the

restroom, when she came back "with an unsteady gait and slurred speech . . . ."

2
   T.D. is Samuel's biological father. He rarely participated in the FN or FG
proceedings. He entered a voluntary surrender of his parental rights a day before
the guardianship trial. He is not a party to this appeal.
3
  The Division had prior involvement with Casey involving I.J. dating back to
2005.
                                                                            A-2300-22
                                        3
Casey asserted she was prescribed Percocet, Zanaflex, and Ambien. She was

referred to the Child Protection Substance Abuse Initiative. She was dismissed

for non-compliance. Ultimately, the allegations of abuse were not established.

      In July 2020, the Division was again contacted concerning Casey's care of

Samuel.    The reporter, who was a close family friend, was concerned for

Samuel's safety.     Casey was ultimately substantiated for neglect due to

inadequate supervision. It was alleged Casey locked Samuel out of the house to

use substances, and her boyfriend choked him during a domestic violence

incident. The reporter also indicated Samuel was making inappropriate TikTok

videos. He was depicted "holding knives such as butcher knives and a cleaver

knife [and putting] the knife to his neck like he is slitting his neck . . . ." When

a Division worker went to the residence to investigate, a woman who matched

Casey's description, but denied being Casey, answered the door and refused the

worker entry. The worker left, called the police, and returned to the home, where

she met with the police who were investigating a different matter involving

Samuel.    Samuel, then aged seven, was allegedly part of a burglary of a

neighboring home. The worker attempted to speak with Casey again, and she

said, "I don't fuck with [the Division] and I don't fuck with the police[,]" and

she walked away.

                                                                              A-2300-22
                                         4
      During this interaction, the Division worker noticed "a cut on [Samuel's]

right eyelid, an abrasion to the right side of his forehead[,] and bruising under

both eyes." EMTs were called to the scene and suggested Samuel be taken to

the hospital to have his injuries documented and evaluated. The Division worker

accompanied Samuel to the hospital, but Casey did not go, nor did she inquire

about his condition when at the hospital. When the Division worker asked about

what led to Samuel's injuries, he explained, "[M]om didn't punch me in the face

but she told me not to tell how I got them." Because Casey did not go to the

hospital, the Division took emergency custody of Samuel to consent to his

medical care. The Division thereafter conducted an emergency removal.

      Samuel was evaluated at the Dorothy B. Hersh Regional Child Protection

Center on July 31, 2020. When the child abuse pediatrician asked Samuel about

the injuries to his face, he responded, "[m]y mother didn't hit me. Fat Boy hit

me with a remote." The pediatrician determined the injuries neither confirmed

nor denied the possibility of abuse and recommended Samuel undergo a

psychological evaluation. In August 2020, Casey denied the domestic violence

allegations and physical discipline allegations.

      Following Samuel's emergent removal from Casey's care, he was placed

in a non-relative resource home while the Division assessed numerous potential

                                                                           A-2300-22
                                        5
placements with his relatives.4 His father T.D. advised the Division he did not

want to be involved in Samuel's care because of Casey's erratic behavior and his

own legal problems. The Division ruled out Samuel's cousin D.D. and family

friend E.K.C. because neither were able to care for him. Although Samuel's

grandmother J.T. ("Jenny") was able to care for Samuel for a period of time, she

eventually advised she could not care for Samuel due to her declining health,

Samuel's behavior, and concerns about dealing with Casey. Samuel's maternal

grandfather R.R. did not respond to the Division's inquiries. Casey did not

provide the names of any other potential family members who could care for

Samuel. Samuel's step-maternal grandfather B.J. was later determined to be

unable to care for him. The Division also subsequently explored Samuel's

maternal aunt K.T. and again followed up with his maternal grandfather R.R.,

however, both were ruled out as neither was able to care for Samuel. Lastly,

Samuel's "godfather" R.T. was ruled out due to an ASFA disqualifier. 5

4
   Specifically, Samuel was removed due to Casey's inadequate supervision based
on (1) the TikTok videos of Samuel with knives and flashing gang signs, (2) the
alleged burglary that Samuel was involved in on July 28, 2020, and (3) Casey leaving
the scene while Samuel received medical care for his injuries observed by the
Division worker.
5
  ASFA is an acronym for the federal "Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,"
adopted by Congress in 1997. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.S.,

                                                                             A-2300-22
                                         6
      When Samuel was first removed, he was delayed academically because he

had missed a significant amount of school. While Samuel should have been in

the third grade, he was placed into first grade special education because he did

not know how to read, write, or do basic math.        Samuel made significant

academic progress despite lingering behavioral issues after he began attending

school regularly. Moreover, after entering placement, Samuel began to recount

violent incidents in or around Casey's home. On one occasion, he stated he saw

his "dad" hitting Casey.6 On another occasion, Samuel witnessed Casey and a

paramour having sexual relations, which prompted the paramour to throw

Samuel against a wall, before Casey told Samuel to stop crying and began

choking him.

      On May 11, 2021, Samuel's resource parents requested his removal from

463 N.J. Super. 142, 153 n.3 (App. Div. 2020). It "requires a state receiving
federal funding to adopt procedures to prohibit persons who have been convicted
of child abuse or neglect, spousal abuse, or any crime against children, or for a
crime involving violence, from becoming resource parents." Ibid. (citing 42
U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(20)). R.T. also denied he was Samuel's godfather.
6
   Samuel stated to Dr. David Brandwein, Psy.D., that he recalled domestic
violence incidents, seeing Casey getting into fights, and him feeling scared.
Casey later acknowledged to Dr. Brandwein she had been a victim of domestic
violence.
                                                                           A-2300-22
                                       7
their home due to his behavioral issues. Samuel was placed in a temporary

respite home while the Division tried to locate a new resource home, however ,

Samuel's initial resource parents welcomed him back just over a week later.

Nevertheless, in July 2021, Samuel's resource parents again requested his

removal because of Samuel's behavior.7

      When Samuel was again removed from this resource home, Jenny,

Samuel's maternal grandmother, advised the caseworker she was willing to be a

placement for Samuel, and he was placed with her in August 2021. At first,

Jenny expressed a desire to adopt Samuel but soon indicated she was struggling

with his behavioral issues and her own health issues.8 In March 2022, despite

Samuel being provided with services, Jenny requested that he be removed from

her home.9

7
   The resource parents indicated Samuel would punch, kick, scratch, and
threaten them.
8
  Casey also began to leave hostile voicemails for Jenny, referring to Samuel
using racial slurs and stating, "everyone can die a slow death."
9
   In October 2021, Samuel completed a psychological evaluation with Dr.
Brandwein. Dr. Brandwein recommended individual therapy and a child study
team evaluation. Shortly after Samuel's initial evaluation with Dr. Brandwein,
he began receiving twice-weekly therapy and made significant progress.
                                                                        A-2300-22
                                      8
      In March 2022 Samuel was moved to a new, non-relative resource home

where he has resided to the present time. Samuel expressed that his resource

parents "love him" and wanted to adopt him. At the resource home, Samuel

continued to maintain contact with his biological family. The resource parents

confirmed their interest in adopting Samuel as opposed to a kinship legal

guardianship ("KLG") in order to avoid dealing with Casey's behavior.

      The Division set up visits with Casey immediately following Samuel's

removal, which she initially attended on a regular basis. However, the visits

were not without issue. Periodically, Samuel told the Division worker that he

did not want to attend visits with his mother. For example, he would observe

that his mother seemed "strung out or high" and he did not want to see her in

that condition. At one visit in March 2021, Samuel indicated, "I'm mad because

she did use to beat me. . . . She did choke me. I had red marks on my face."

Casey later admitted to a Division worker she had "yoked [Samuel] up by his

shirt." After this March 2021 visit, Casey's visits became sporadic.

      Casey was referred to Children's Home Society ("CHS") for therapeutic

visitation and other services. In May 2021, Casey began therapeutic visits with

Samuel through CHS. At the first visit, Samuel recounted how his father would

hit him, which Casey denied. Samuel explained: "My mom is not listening to

                                                                         A-2300-22
                                       9
me, and you guys understand. When she doesn't do this for me, I don't want to

live with her." Their visits were suspended from May 18 to August 12, when

Samuel stabilized in his placement and obtained a behavioral assistant. When

visits resumed, Casey missed nearly all of her scheduled visits between August

2021 and February 2022. While Casey's attendance improved from March to

May 2022, she stopped visiting thereafter. In November 2022, CHS eventually

terminated the therapeutic visitations due to Casey's failure to participate. 10

      Regarding Casey's treatment services, she was scheduled to complete a

psychological evaluation in October 2020, but it did not take place until January

2021 because Casey was hospitalized after a domestic violence incident. At the

evaluation, Casey reported that she was involved in domestic violence situations

and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression.            It was

recommended that Casey attend parenting classes, substance abuse treatment,

individual therapy, a psychiatric examination, therapeutic visitations with

Samuel, and obtain routine drug screens. Casey did not complete any of these

10
   On December 8, 2022, a Division caseworker attempted to call Casey but was
informed by the Atlantic County Jail that she had been arrested on November
24, 2022, for violating a restraining order. She remained incarcerated
throughout the guardianship trial.
                                                                              A-2300-22
                                        10
services. Casey refused to complete the MICA11 program, failed to attend a

bonding evaluation, continuously tested positive for alcohol, and failed to

submit to drug screens after March 2021.

        The three-day guardianship trial was held in January 2023. The Division

presented testimony from Division intake worker Erin Kelly, adoption worker

Wanda Hernandez, casework supervisor Debra Gomez, Dr. Brandwein, and

social worker Nicole Kries-Wyszynski. Casey testified on her own behalf, but

she did not call any witnesses.12 The Law Guardian also did not call any

witnesses but joined the Division's request for termination of Casey's parental

rights followed by resource parent adoption.

        Kelly testified Casey had been involved with the Division dating back to

2005. She also testified that there were no family placements able to accept

Samuel when he was removed from Casey's care. 13 Kelly explained that Samuel

confided in her about the TikTok videos that showed Samuel holding knives,

11
     This program provides mental health and substance abuse treatment.
12
  The court noted Casey had been incarcerated in the Atlantic County Detention
Center from November 24, 2022, until the time of trial and entered a writ,
ensuring her attendance at trial.
13
   Gomez confirmed there were no previously explored relatives that had sought
to be reassessed as potential caregivers for Samuel.
                                                                          A-2300-22
                                       11
and he told her that Casey filmed the video for him. She also discussed the

police records she obtained concerning domestic violence incidents in 2017

when Casey's paramour broke her jaw and 2020 when the paramour poured

boiling water on her.

      Hernandez testified regarding Casey's inconsistent visits with Samuel and

Samuel's eventual request to end visitation in November 2022, due to Casey's

failure to appear for visits. She further stated Samuel loved his resource parents,

thrived in their care, and wished to be adopted by them. Hernandez also testified

that the resource parents were advised about the difference between KLG and

adoption multiple times and that they executed the Division's "KLG v.

Adoption" form. The resource parents were steadfast in their desire to adopt

and did not want a KLG.

      Kries-Wyszynski testified that bonding evaluations between Samuel and

Casey could not be completed because Casey did not show up on two occasions.

While waiting at one of the evaluations Casey missed, Kries-Wyszynski testified

she observed the resource parents' interactions with Samuel and noted they

verbalized their intention to maintain Samuel's contact with the biological

family in the future. Samuel also told Kries-Wyszynski that he believed his

mother loved him but was not capable of taking care of him.

                                                                             A-2300-22
                                       12
      Dr. Brandwein, an expert in psychology, testified about his evaluations of

Casey and Samuel. Dr. Brandwein testified that he believed Casey was under

the influence of a "sedative" and aborted her testing "due to concerns about the

validity of it." Overall, Dr. Brandwein found Casey unwilling to engage in the

necessary services to manage her mental health and unable to explain why

Samuel was removed from her care.            He testified Casey could not be an

independent caretaker for Samuel.

      Regarding Samuel, Dr. Brandwein testified he suffered from anger issues,

poor focus, and hyperactivity. Dr. Brandwein explained that Samuel had some

good memories with his mother but remembered various incidents of domestic

violence in the home. At the time of the evaluation, Samuel told Dr. Brandwein

that he would go back to his mother if certain conditions were satisfied , such as

the elimination of domestic violence.

      Casey testified she was willing to enter an inpatient mental health facility.

Additionally, Casey testified about her willingness to consent to a KLG. Casey

indicated that she was currently incarcerated for violating a restraining order.

She claimed that she as unaware of why Samuel was removed from her care.

Casey could not recall incidents of domestic violence and denied having a

                                                                             A-2300-22
                                        13
substance abuse problem. She conceded her paramours had hit Samuel in the

past, but she denied choking him.

      The court found all the Division witnesses to be credible. It noted they

were "forthright, candid, and sincere when they testified on direct and cross-

examination. Although they all relied on the documentary evidence to refresh

their memories, on the whole their recollection of events were good." Moreover,

the court stated, "the Division's witnesses gave testimony that [was] reasonable

and made logical sense. Their demeanors were pleasant and cooperative." The

court noted that the "inconsistencies were minor and of no consequence to the

overall believability of their testimony."

      On the other hand, the court did not find Casey to be a credible witness.

"Her testimony was self-serving and evasive. Her demeanor was guarded and

suspicious especially when she testified that she could not recall critical facts,

especially to those questions concerning domestic violence in which she . . .

[was a] victim[]."

      On March 14, 2023, the trial court issued a well-reasoned and

comprehensive sixty-four-page written decision, discussed more fully below,

finding the Division met its burden of proof as to all four prongs under N.J.S.A.

                                                                            A-2300-22
                                       14
30:4C-15.1, by clear and convincing evidence. The court entered a judgment of

guardianship terminating Casey's parental rights to Samuel.

                                      II.

      Casey raises the following issues on appeal:

            POINT I

            [KLG] WAS A VIABLE OPTION WITH THE
            CURRENT RESOURCE PARENTS, BUT WAS NOT
            PURSUED SINCE THE RESOURCE PARENTS
            PREFERRED ADOPTION.

            POINT II

            TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ["TPR"]
            WOULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD BECAUSE
            TERMINATION    WILL    SEVER   SAMUEL'S
            RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FAMILY DESPITE HIS
            CONSISTENT    EXPRESSED     DESIRE   TO
            MAINTAIN    RELATIONSHIPS    WITH    HIS
            BIOLOGICAL FAMILY.

      More particularly, as to the second part of prong three, Casey argues the

court found TPR was the only viable option because the resource parents desired

adoption. That is, the court allowed the preferences of the resource parents to

become "the determinative factor in whether KLG, as opposed to adoption, was

in Samuel's best interest." Casey further relies on the 2021 amendments to

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) for the proposition that "[k]inship care is the preferred

resource for children who must be removed from their birth parents because use

                                                                          A-2300-22
                                      15
of kinship care maintains children's connections with their families" and that

parental rights must be preserved whenever possible. L. 2021, c. 154, § 1.

      Casey next contends, with respect to prong four, the trial judge did not

consider Samuel's biological family relationships, whereas the judge that

presided over the majority of the FG proceedings recognized "that Samuel

wanted his mother and the rest of his family to remain in his life . . . ." Casey

further argues that Samuel wanted to have visits with his grandmother and

siblings, despite requesting visitation with his mother be suspended during this

litigation. Casey also reiterates that a KLG arrangement would have preserved

Samuel's contacts with his family, and the court simply accepted the resource

parents' request against a KLG in favor of adoption.

      Our scope of review in appeals from orders terminating parental rights is

limited. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.D., 454 N.J. Super. 353,

379 (App. Div. 2018). "[W]e apply a deferential standard in reviewing the

family court's findings of fact because of its superior position to judg e the

credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence[.]" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 368 (2021) (internal citations omitted). In

such cases, we will generally uphold the trial court's findings, so long as they

are supported by "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of

                                                                           A-2300-22
                                      16
Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014); see N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012) ("It is not our place to

second-guess or substitute our judgment for that of the family court, provided

that the record contains substantial and credible evidence to support the decision

to terminate parental rights."). Such a decision should only be reversed or

altered on appeal if the trial court's findings were "so wholly unsupportable as

to result in a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180

N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472

(2002)).

      "We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has

the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before

it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family."

F.M., 211 N.J. at 448 (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Even

where the parent alleges "error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying

facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom," deference must be afforded

unless the judge "went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made."

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (first

quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188-89 (App. Div.

                                                                            A-2300-22
                                       17
1993); then quoting C.B. Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 233 N.J.

Super. 65, 69 (App. Div. 1989)).

      When the State seeks to terminate parental rights, the Division must prove

by clear and convincing evidence each of the following:

            (1) The child's safety, health, or development has
            been or will continue to be endangered by the parental
            relationship;

            (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
            harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
            provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
            delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;

            (3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
            provide services to help the parent correct the
            circumstances which led to the child's placement
            outside the home and the court has considered
            alternatives to [TPR]; and

            (4)   [TPR] will not do more harm than good.

            [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

Importantly, these fact-sensitive factors "overlap with one another to provide a

comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." N.J. Div. of

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 606-07 (2007) (quoting In re

Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999)).

      Although Casey only challenges the court's holding as to the second part

of prong three and the court's evaluation of prong four, we address the other

                                                                          A-2300-22
                                        18
factors addressed by the court because the prongs are interconnected in

determining what constitutes the child's best interest. This will provide context

for the court's findings concerning the prongs contested by Casey.

                                            A.

      "The first two prongs [of] N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) . . . are 'the two

components of the harm requirement' and 'are related to one another.'" T.D.,

454 N.J. Super. at 380 (quoting In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 379

(1999)). "Therefore, 'evidence that supports one informs and may suppo rt the

other as part of the comprehensive basis for determining the best interests of the

child.'"   Ibid.   Under the first prong, "the Division must prove harm that

'threatens the child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects

on the child.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 25 (2013)

(quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352). Under prong two, "the inquiry centers on

whether the parent is able to remove the danger facing the child." F.M., 211

N.J. at 451 (citing K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352). Prong two may be proven by

"indications of parental dereliction and irresponsibility, such as the parent's

continued or recurrent drug abuse, [and] the inability to provide a stable and

protective home . . . ." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 353. See also N.J. Div. of Youth &

Fam. Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 592 (App. Div. 1996) (finding the

                                                                            A-2300-22
                                       19
"inability or unwillingness to resolve the problems with respect to . . . mental

health and substance abuse" satisfies the second prong).

       As to prong one, Casey does not dispute her conduct—which prompted

the removal—endangered Samuel's health and wellbeing. Specifically, the court

found Casey exposed Samuel to domestic violence in the home with her intimate

partners and that Samuel himself faced abuse from her paramours. She further

assisted Samuel in making a TikTok video playing with knives and simulating

slitting his throat. She further inadequately supervised him resulting in Samuel's

involvement in a burglary as a young child. Lastly, the court determined Casey's

untreated mental health and substance abuse impaired her ability to care for her

son.

       As to the second prong, despite extensive efforts and services provided by

the Division, the court held that Casey had not been able to remedy her serious

issues that significantly impaired her ability to be a parent. Not only did she fail

to take advantage of the various therapeutic services, but she did not consistently

attend visitation with Samuel and eventually stopped attending several months

before trial. She has been either unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing

Samuel and has been unable to provide him anything resembling a safe and

stable home. This, in turn, denied him stability and permanent placement which

                                                                              A-2300-22
                                        20
added to the harm suffered by Samuel.         The court noted that despite the

Division's efforts, Casey and Samuel "find themselves in much of the same

position, and arguably even a worse position than at the start of this case." Casey

also lacked insight into her condition. Her failure or inability to acknowledge

her condition affected her capacity to effectively and safely parent. The trial

court's decision, in this regard, was well-supported by the record.

                                        B.

      The first part of the third prong requires the Division to make "reasonable

efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led

to the child's placement outside the home . . . ." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

That provision of the statute "contemplates efforts that focus on reunification of

the parent with the child and assistance to the parent to correct and overcome

those circumstances that necessitated the placement of the child[.]" K.H.O., 161

N.J. at 354. As discussed above, it is undisputed the Division provided extensive

services to help Casey remediate the issues leading to Samuel's removal.

Unfortunately, they were unsuccessful.

      We now turn to the second part of prong three, which is contested by

Casey. That provision requires the court to "consider[] alternatives to [TPR.]"

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Those alternatives may include placement of the

                                                                             A-2300-22
                                       21
child with a relative caretaker, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a), or the establishment of

a KLG. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. L.L., 201 N.J. 210, 222 (2010). As

the trial court recognized, in July 2021, the Legislature enacted amendments to

various sections of Title 9, governing acts of child abuse and neglect; Title 30,

governing TPR proceedings; and Title 3B, governing KLG proceedings. L.

2021, c. 154.14

14
     The preamble to the amendments provides:

             The Legislature finds and declares that:

             a. Foster care is intended by existing state and federal
             statute to be temporary.

             b. Kinship care is the preferred resource for children
             who must be removed from their birth parents because
             use of kinship care maintains children's connections
             with their families. There are many benefits to placing
             children with relatives or other kinship caregivers, such
             as increased stability and safety as well as the ability to
             maintain family connections and cultural traditions.

             c. Federal law permits [KLG] arrangements to be used
             when the child has been in the care of a relative for a
             period of six months.

             d. Parental rights must be protected and preserved
             wherever possible.

             e. Children are capable of forming healthy attachments
             with multiple caring adults throughout the course of

                                                                           A-2300-22
                                        22
      With respect to TPR proceedings, the Legislature amended the second

prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) to delete its second sentence. L. 2021, c. 154,

§ 9. The second prong formerly read as follows:

            The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm
            facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a
            safe and stable home for the child and the delay of
            permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm
            may include evidence that separating the child from his
            resource family parents would cause serious and
            enduring emotional or psychological harm to the
            child[.]

            [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (2015) (amended 2021).]

            their childhood, including with birth parents, temporary
            resource parents, extended family members, and other
            caring adults.

            f. The existence of a healthy attachment between a child
            and the child's resource family parent does not in and
            of itself preclude the child from maintaining, forming
            or repairing relationships with the child's parent or
            caregiver of origin.

            g. It is therefore necessary for the Legislature to amend
            current laws to strengthen support for kinship
            caregivers, and ensure focus on parents' fitness and the
            benefits of preserving the birth parent-child
            relationship, as opposed to considering the impact of
            severing the child's relationship with the resource
            family parents.

            [L. 2021, c. 154, § 1.]
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      The amendments also altered the KLG analysis. L. 2021, c. 154, § 4.

Prior to 2021, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3) required a court to find by clear and

convincing evidence that adoption was neither feasible nor likely before

awarding KLG, rendering KLG unavailable when a caretaker was willing to

adopt the child. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.I., 423 N.J. Super.

127, 130 (App. Div. 2011) ("[W]hen a caregiver in a case brought by the

Division . . . unequivocally asserts a desire to adopt, the finding required [by

N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3)] for a KLG that 'adoption of the child is neither

feasible nor likely' cannot be met.").      The 2021 amendments deleted this

language, thereby making KLG an equally available permanency plan for

children in Division custody. L. 2021, c. 154, § 4; N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3).

      Additionally, the Legislature amended Title 9 to require the Division to

"make reasonable efforts" to place children with suitable relatives or kinship

caregivers before placing them elsewhere when effectuating an emergency

removal. L. 2021, c. 154, § 5 (amending N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.30(a)). It also required

judges to "first consider" placement with suitable relatives or kinship caregivers

before ordering other placements during Title 9 proceedings. L. 2021, c. 154,

§§ 6, 7 (amending N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.31(b) and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.54(a)). Further, it

amended Title 30 to require the Division to consider placement of children with

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relatives or kinship caregivers, and to conduct a search for such relatives or

kinship caregivers within thirty days of accepting a child into Division custody.

L. 2021, c. 154, § 8 (amending N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a) & (b)).

      Based on these amendments, Casey asserts KLG is "expressly favored as

the default option when reunification cannot be effectuated" and "it becomes

difficult to fathom a set of circumstances where kinship care should ever be

rejected in favor of [TPR]."     We are unpersuaded by Casey's contentions.

Although kinship care is the preferred resource for children removed from their

biological parents, the amendments do not override the clear statutory text in

cases involving the TPR. Prongs three and four of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) were

unaltered by the 2021 amendments.           Notwithstanding the Legislature's

declaration that "[p]arental rights must be protected and preserved whenever

possible[,]" L. 2021, c. 154, § 1, this language cannot be used to substantively

alter the otherwise clear directive set forth in prong three that the Division

"prove by clear and convincing evidence that 'alternatives to [TPR]' have been

appropriately considered." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Services v. J.S., 433

N.J. Super. 69, 87 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3)). In

short, the amendments do not preclude the Division from seeking to terminate

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parental rights when it is in the child's best interest. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot.

& Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4 (2023).

      We are also unconvinced the court placed undue weight on the resource

parents' preference for adoption. Initially, we observe a caretaker's preference

to adopt is relevant, though not dispositive, in the court's analysis regarding

alternatives to the TPR. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.M., 459

N.J. Super. 246, 264 (App. Div. 2019). Moreover, the trial court here found by

clear and convincing evidence that the Division exhausted every other

alternative to terminating parental rights and placing Samuel in a resource home.

The court discussed the Division's reasonable efforts, including multiple

different treatment services for Casey, educational and behavioral services for

Samuel, and therapeutic visitation between Samuel and Casey. Specifically, the

trial court determined the Division fully considered alternatives to TPR. The

court noted:

               This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
               the Division thoroughly assessed and exhausted every
               other alternative to [TPR] and placement of [Samuel]
               in [a] . . . resource home for purposes of adoption. This
               included attempts to place [Samuel] with kin, as well as
               exploring [KLG] with known kin and even with the
               current non-relative resource parents versus adoption.

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      The court found, and the record amply supported, the Division properly

and extensively explored KLG for Samuel with numerous relatives. Efforts to

place Samuel with relatives continued up until the trial. Unfortunately, none of

his relatives were willing or able to care for Samuel. The court also determined

the Division properly explored KLG with both Samuel's relatives and with the

resource parents. The resource parents ultimately decided against KLG, in favor

of adoption, after being provided with information about both alternatives,

which is their prerogative. The courts cannot force a KLG on resource parents.

That said, we are unpersuaded by Casey's arguments that the court allowed the

parents' preference to "usurp" the court's role in deciding what was in Samuel's

best interest. Rather, the court properly determined the totality of the evidence

presented at the trial supported a finding that termination of Casey's parental

rights was in Samuel's best interest.

                                        C.

      The fourth prong of the statute requires the court to determine termination

"will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). It serves as a

"'fail-safe' inquiry guarding against an inappropriate or premature [TPR]." F.M.,

211 N.J. at 453 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596,

609 (2007)). "The question ultimately is not whether a biological mother or

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father is a worthy parent, but whether a child's interest will best be served by

completely terminating the child's relationship with th[e] parent." N.J. Div. of

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008). "The crux of the fourth

statutory subpart is the child's need for a permanent and stable home, along with

a defined parent-child relationship." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. H.R.,

431 N.J. Super. 212, 226 (App. Div. 2013) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 119 (App. Div. 2004)). "Overall, the court's

focus should be on the child's need for permanency." Id. at 227 (citing M.M.,

189 N.J. at 281).

      "Keeping . . . child[ren] in limbo, hoping for some long[-]term unification

plan, would be a misapplication of the law." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.

v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 438 (App. Div. 2001) (citing In re P.S., 315 N.J.

Super. 91, 121 (App. Div. 1998)); see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. S.D., 453 N.J. Super. 511, 524 (App. Div. 2018) (finding

"[p]arents do not have the right to extend litigation indefinitely until they are

able to safely care for their children . . . ."). We have noted permanency is

favored over protracted efforts for reunification. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. at 111.

      Regarding prong four, the trial judge opined:

                 In this case, this court finds by clear and
            convincing evidence that [Casey] is neither able to

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           safely and appropriately care for [Samuel], nor is there
           any realistic likelihood that she will be able to in the
           foreseeable future.     [Casey] continues to exhibit
           parenting deficiencies, as well as continues to struggle
           with unremedied issues with domestic violence, mental
           health, and substance use of alcohol and over use of
           prescription medication. There is no proof in the trial
           record that a positive or healthy bond exists between
           [Casey] and [Samuel].

                  Because of [Casey's] personal instability and
           inconsistency in engaging in Division services as well
           as visitation, this court finds that it is in [Samuel's] best
           interest to remain in his current placement. This court
           finds that . . . [Samuel] has made significant progress
           in his current placement, including improvements in his
           behavior and performance in school.

     The trial judge concluded:

                  This court finds by clear and convincing evidence
           that there is no evidence that any harm will occur to
           [Samuel] should [Casey's] parental rights be
           terminated. This court finds by clear and convincing
           evidence that [Casey] is not currently fit to parent
           [Samuel] and he would suffer more harm if he returned
           to her custody and care. It is contrary to [Samuel's] best
           interest to prolong the opportunity of permanency, as
           well as the opportunity of stability and guidance into
           adulthood by his current resource parents, because of
           [Casey's] inability and refusal to remedy the concerns
           that led to [Samuel's] removal.

     We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the court. The court

correctly found that the Division proved clearly and convincingly that TPR

would not do more harm than good, and it is in Samuel's best interest to

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terminate Casey's parental rights. The trial court's conclusion that the Division

satisfied the fourth prong is well-supported by the overwhelming evidence in

the record. Casey and Samuel do not have a relationship, as evidenced by

Samuel requesting an end to their visitation and his acceptance that his mother

cannot parent him.

      Samuel is deserving of a stable and permanent home, which is now

available to him as a result of his resource parents' efforts and their desire to

adopt him. Casey failed to remediate the various issues that lead to Samuel's

removal, he thrived in his resource home, and made significant progress with

his behavior and education.        The Division established that Casey has

continuously failed to help herself or her son.

      There was ample evidence in the record to support the trial judge's

conclusion that Casey has no ability to independently parent, and termination of

her relationship with Samuel will not do more harm than good. We do not

question that Samuel had a positive relationship with Jenny and his siblings.

That is not, however, the dispositive inquiry for the purposes of the best interest

analysis.   The court correctly considered Samuel's need for safety and

permanency in terminating Casey's parental rights. The resource parents have

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demonstrated they have provided a secure and nurturing environment for Samuel

and have provided him with the stability he desperately needs.

      Finally, to the extent we have not otherwise addressed any of defendant's

other arguments, we determine they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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