Court Opinion

ID: 9393996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 20:03:57.408029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.746593
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 210161-U

                                   Order filed May 11, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )       Appeal No. 3-21-0161
             v.                                       )       Circuit No. 17-CF-2387
                                                      )
      JASON C. ERRICHETTO,                            )       Honorable
                                                      )       Daniel Rippy,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices McDade and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ___________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court did not err in imposing an extended sentence. Defendant’s
                  multiple convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule.

¶2          Defendant, Jason C. Errichetto, appeals his extended-term sentence, arguing (1) the State

     failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his conduct was accompanied by exceptionally brutal

     and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, and (2) several of his convictions should be

     vacated pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule. We vacate several of defendant’s convictions but

     otherwise affirm.
¶3                                               I. BACKGROUND

¶4          Defendant was charged with attempted first degree murder (count I) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a),

     9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), three counts of aggravated domestic battery: causing great bodily harm

     (count II), causing permanent disability (count III), and causing permanent disfigurement (count

     IV) (id. § 12-3.3(a)); four counts of aggravated battery: causing great bodily harm (count V),

     causing permanent disability (count VI), causing permanent disfigurement (count VII), and

     causing bodily harm while on a public way (count VIII) (id. § 12-3.05(a)(1), (c)); and one count

     of domestic battery (count IX) (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)).

¶5          The case proceeded to a bench trial on August 3, 2020. The evidence presented at trial

     established that on November 30, 2017, at approximately 7 a.m., Rockdale Police Officer John

     Borgens was dispatched to assist a woman who had been found on the roadway outside the fence

     at a bar known as the Untamed Motorcycle Club (the clubhouse). 1 The woman, later identified as

     Michelle Astrowski, had a jacket placed on top of her, and her pants were pulled down below her

     buttocks. Astrowski was transported to the hospital for serious injuries. Defendant and Astrowski

     had been dating for several months at the time of the incident.

¶6          Carol Cleaver testified that she worked with Astrowski at RJ’s bar. On the night of

     November 29, 2017, Cleaver testified she was not working but was at RJ’s while Astrowski

     worked. She stated that defendant was at RJ’s and seemed upset with Astrowski before leaving

     shortly after midnight. Approximately 15 minutes later, Astrowski asked Cleaver to close the bar

     for her and left in her own car.

¶7          The State introduced silent video footage from two security cameras from the clubhouse.

     One camera depicted a fenced-in concrete pad outside the entrance to the clubhouse and the other

            1
                The witnesses referred to the bar as “the clubhouse” so we will continue to do so for consistency.
                                                           2
       camera depicted inside the clubhouse. Defendant arrived at the clubhouse shortly after midnight.

       Astrowski arrived at 12:49 a.m. and was let in by defendant. They drank alcoholic beverages and

       talked in the clubhouse until approximately 2:02 a.m. when Astrowski exited and defendant

       followed her. Seconds later, the outside security footage showed a cell phone slide on the concrete

       pad and defendant retrieved it.

¶8            Over the next 30 minutes, defendant was mostly out of frame but could occasionally be

       seen in the bottom right corner of the footage. During this time, defendant walked outside of the

       fenced-in area and back several times before he drove Astrowski’s vehicle onto the concrete pad.

       Defendant was then seen in the bottom right corner of the video again before he parked the vehicle

       outside of the fenced-in area.

¶9            Defendant is then seen again in the bottom right corner of the footage dragging Astrowski

       across the concrete pad. Defendant spent four minutes dragging Astrowski, falling over himself

       twice, and stopping occasionally to talk and kick her several times. Defendant then left Astrowski

       on the ground outside the fenced-in area after closing the gate at approximately 2:45 a.m.

       Astrowski was discovered shortly before 7 a.m. None of defendant’s actions depicted on the

       recording account for Astrowski’s most serious injuries to her head.

¶ 10          The parties stipulated that, if called to testify, the emergency room physician would state

       that Astrowski suffered several skull fractures with a hole in the rear of her skull; fractures and

       severe bruising to her face; severe road rash to her back, buttocks, and thighs; bruising to both

       forearms; and bruises and cuts on both knees.

¶ 11          Ilona Nie, Astrowski’s mother, testified that Astrowski arrived at the hospital on November

       30, 2017, and was transferred to a rehabilitation center on December 18, 2017. Astrowski remained

       at the rehabilitation center for two months. While at the rehabilitation center, Nie explained

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       Astrowski could not move due to a plate on the side of her head. Nie also testified that the

       rehabilitation center helped Astrowski with her speech and physical therapy to teach her how to

       eat and walk. After leaving the rehabilitation center, Astrowski received outpatient rehabilitation

       therapy three to four times a week and underwent surgery on her skull on March 11, 2018. Since

       the incident, Astrowski had not been able to live by herself, had trouble with her eyes, could not

       hear out of one ear, had a scar on her forehead, and became confused when talking.

¶ 12          The court found defendant not guilty of attempted first degree murder but guilty of the

       remaining charges. Following a sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to an extended term

       of 11 years’ imprisonment for counts II through IV, and concurrent 3-year sentences for counts V

       through IX. The court found each of these offenses was accompanied by brutal and heinous

       behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In support of the extended sentence, the court stated:

                             “I think one of the things I found most troubling in the facts of this case—I

                      don’t know what happened exactly, as to how [Astrowski] in this case ended up in

                      the original condition she was in because it’s not on video, nobody testified.

                             But what was on the video frankly disturbed me tremendously and what was

                      on the video was that the defendant after whatever happened didn’t offer her any

                      aid. He didn’t offer her any help. He didn’t call anybody. He drug her across a

                      parking lot, placed her outside of a fence in what, in fact, were freezing cold

                      conditions and left her there.”

¶ 13          Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative,

       for a new trial, which was denied. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider the sentence,

       asserting the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s conduct was

       accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Defendant

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       argued there was no evidence of premeditation, of what precipitated the incident, or of the actual

       temperature the day of the incident. Defendant also argued the sentence was otherwise excessive

       and improper because the court failed to tailor the sentence “with the objective of restoring the

       offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.

¶ 14           The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the imposition of the extended sentence

       but reduced his sentence from 11 to 10 years’ imprisonment, giving more weight to the statements

       in mitigation. The court found that while there was no specific testimony regarding the temperature

       on the day of the incident, the videotape demonstrated it was a cold night out as the parties were

       “bundled up,” their breath was visible, and frost formed on the grass. Defendant appealed.

¶ 15                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16           On appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

       his conduct was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton

       cruelty so as to support an extended-term sentence on his conviction for aggravated domestic

       battery, and (2) his convictions violate the one-act, one-crime rule as they were based on the same

       conduct. We consider each of these arguments in turn.

¶ 17                                          A. Extended Sentence

¶ 18           Aggravated domestic battery is a Class 2 felony which carries a sentence of not less than

       three years and not more than seven years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2016). However, if the

       offense is accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty,

       the circuit court may impose an extended-term sentence of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Id. § 5-

       5-3.2(b)(2). This finding must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d

       400, 409 (2006). On review, when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for a

       finding of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, we view the evidence in the light most

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       favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have concluded

       that the finding was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,

       490 (2000); People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002); People v. Holman, 2014 IL App (3d)

       120905, ¶ 62.

¶ 19          “To qualify for a finding of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, defendant’s conduct

       must be both: (1) exceptionally brutal or heinous; and (2) indicative of wanton cruelty.” Holman,

       2014 IL App (3d) 120905, ¶ 63. “The term ‘brutal’ is defined as cruel and cold-blooded, grossly

       ruthless, or devoid of mercy or compassion; the term ‘heinous’ is defined as enormously and

       flagrantly criminal, hatefully or shockingly evil, or grossly bad; and the term ‘wanton cruelty’ is

       defined as consciously seeking to inflict pain and suffering on the victim of the offense.” Id.

¶ 20          “ ‘[T]he extended-term provision was not intended to convert every offense into an

       extraordinary offense subject to an extended-term sentence.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Pugh, 325

       Ill. App. 3d 336, 346 (2001)). However, a single act that causes injury may be sufficient to

       demonstrate the existence of wanton cruelty. Pugh, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 346. “When assessing the

       brutality and heinousness of a crime, the trier of fact must consider all of the facts surrounding the

       incident in question, and each case must be decided on its own facts.” Holman, 2014 IL App (3d)

       120905, ¶ 63. Several factors that courts have considered in determining whether behavior is

       exceptionally brutal or heinous and indicative of wanton cruelty include:

                       “whether the offense was premeditated, whether the defendant was provoked to act,

                       the senseless nature of the act, the number of wounds inflicted, the danger created

                       by the act, the extent of the injury inflicted, whether the defendant exhibited

                       remorse, whether the defendant inflicted prolonged pain or torture, whether

                       defendant shot the victim at close range, and whether defendant inflicted mental

                                                         6
                      suffering on the victim. [Citation.] In addition, although cases in which

                      exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior has been found to be present have

                      generally involved prolonged pain, torture, or premeditation, the presence of such

                      conduct is not required for a finding of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior to

                      be made.” Id.

¶ 21          First, defendant argues the court failed to make the correct finding because it stated

       defendant’s behavior was “brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty” but did not state that it

       was “exceptionally” so. This issue was never raised in the circuit court, and so it is forfeited. See

       People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Even if defendant had not forfeited the issue, it is

       without merit. There is no requirement that the court articulate its express finding that the crime

       was exceptionally brutal and heinous. People v. Keller, 267 Ill. App. 3d 602, 610 (1994).

       Moreover, the court is presumed to know the law and apply it properly. People v. Howery, 178 Ill.

       2d 1, 32 (1997). The court found the conduct “brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty” after

       significant briefing and argument on the matter. The court knew the law and its failure to expressly

       use the word “exceptionally” does not indicate any error. See Keller, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 610.

¶ 22          Second, defendant argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s

       conduct was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton

       cruelty. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we believe a rational

       trier of fact could conclude an extended sentence was appropriate. Here, defendant’s conduct

       reflects a complete lack of mercy or compassion and shows that he consciously sought to inflict

       pain on Astrowski. After striking Astrowski with such force as to render her unable to stand and

       causing serious and permanent injury, he left her on the ground for over half an hour before

       dragging her limp body across concrete. While dragging her across the concrete, causing serious

                                                        7
       road rash, defendant stopped to kick Astrowski multiple times. Astrowski was left outside in

       freezing cold conditions for over four hours before being found and taken to the hospital where

       she remained for nearly three weeks. After the incident, defendant showed no remorse or concern

       for what he had done and did not attempt to help Astrowski. See Holman, 2014 IL App (3d)

       120905, ¶ 64. At the time of trial, Astrowski continued to suffer physically and mentally as a result

       of this attack, years later. We, therefore, believe defendant’s senseless acts of violence could

       rationally be classified as exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.

       Additionally, we recognize the infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability was inherent

       in the charge against defendant, but “[s]ome behavior is so much more brutal or heinous and so

       clearly indicative of wanton cruelty that it qualifies a defendant for extended term even if it is the

       predicate act of the offense.” People v. Yarbrough, 156 Ill. App. 3d 643, 648 (1987). The facts of

       this case clearly exemplify this. Thus, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

       we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the acts in this case were accompanied

       by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. See Holman, 2014 IL

       App (3d) 120905,¶ 64 (upholding such a finding where the defendant attacked his much older and

       smaller uncle, pressed his thumbs into the victim’s eyes, and failed to show remorse or call for

       help).

¶ 23            In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Reiner, 251 Ill.

       App. 3d 1065 (1993), where this court held that the defendant’s actions were not exceptionally

       brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty. There, following a conversation, the defendant

       punched the victim once in the side of the head and then ran away. Id. at 1066. This conduct cannot

       be equated to the behavior exhibited by defendant, here. Defendant struck Astrowski with such

       force that she became unresponsive. He then dragged her barely conscious or unconscious body

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       across concrete, continuing to kick her as she laid on the ground, and left her outside in freezing

       cold conditions.

¶ 24                                     B. One-Act, One-Crime Rule

¶ 25          Defendant additionally argues, and the State agrees, that counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, and IX

       should be vacated pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule. A defendant may not be convicted of

       multiple offenses that are based on precisely the same physical act. People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551,

       566 (1977). Where multiple convictions derive from a single physical act, a court should impose

       a sentence on the more serious offense and vacate the less serious offense. People v. Artis, 232 Ill.

       2d 156, 170 (2009).

¶ 26          As acknowledged by defendant, neither trial nor posttrial counsel preserved this one-act,

       one-crime issue for appellate review by raising it in a posttrial motion. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.

       However, a one-act, one-crime violation is a reversible plain error because the error affects the

       defendant’s substantial rights. People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 389 (2004). Here, the parties

       agree that all of the counts, except for count VIII, arise from the same act of striking Astrowski

       about her body. During sentencing, the court indicated that count II was the most serious of the

       offenses. We, therefore, vacate defendant’s convictions for counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, and IX.

¶ 27                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 29          Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

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