Court Opinion

ID: 9533658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:33:43.896505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:07.047057
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sutton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
*333This is an action in tort for damages. The parties appear here in the same order as in the trial court and will be so referred to herein.
Plaintiffs complaint alleged that defendant railroad on February 4, 1952 “carelessly, negligently and recklessly drove or caused to be driven one of its trains into and against a Ford Y8 truck owned by the plaintiff, at the intersection of its tracks with Cedar Street in the Town of Julesburg,” Colorado; further that Cedar Street is a main public highway; that as a result thereof plaintiffs truck was wrecked and damaged in the amount of $2700.00 and that plaintiff was deprived of its use for two months to his damage in the sum of $200.00. No claim was made for the death of the driver who was killed.
Defendant’s answer admitted the accident but denied that it was in any way careless, negligent or reckless, and denied plaintiff’s damages. Defendant further alleged as affirmative defenses that plaintiff’s father, William H. Buchholz, as agent of plaintiff, acting within the scope of his authority, was driving the truck at the time of the accident; and that said driver was negligent or guilty of contributory negligence. The defendant also set out a “cross-complaint” alleging that the driver recklessly and negligently drove upon the tracks of defendant and was there struck, damaging defendant’s train in the amount of $1,000.00 and its tracks and signal in the amount of $500.00.
Plaintiff’s answer to the cross-complaint admitted that plaintiff’s father was the driver, denied all other allegations and set up the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.
Trial was to a jury. Following presentation of plaintiff’s evidence the trial court directed a verdict for defendant on plaintiff’s complaint, and on defendant’s cross-complaint, and submitted the case to the jury on the question of defendant’s damage only. The jury returned a verdict for defendant on its cross-complaint in *334the amount of $397.77. Judgment was entered accordingly on April 26, 1955, with no costs awarded. Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was overruled and he is here by writ of error asserting it was error:
1. To take from the jury the question of negligence and contributory negligence.
2. To direct a verdict for defendant and to instruct the jury to find for the defendant as to its alleged damages.
3. To exclude plaintiff’s evidence and offer of proof that the flashing light signal was not effective because it allegedly was either not working or was apparently not working due to the reflection of the early morning sun.
4. To exclude evidence and offer of proof as to alleged prior accidents and near escapes of others at the same site.
5. To exclude evidence and offer of proof of the alleged large volume of traffic both in trains and cars that allegedly used the crossing and that the warnings provided were not sufficient or reasonable therefor.
6. To exclude evidence and offer of proof of a witness who allegedly knew that the morning sunlight reflected in such a manner as to make it impossible to know whether the signal was flashing.
7. To admit defendant’s Exhibits 2 and 3 although allegedly no witness could testify that either of them was correct except from hearsay.
For brevity we will consolidate the above alleged errors into four questions and answer them in a different order than presented.

The first question to he determined is: Did the trial court err in refusing to admit certain of plaintiffs evidence, and in denying offers of proof?

This question is answered in the negative.
These denials and offers were: Whether the flashing signal light was working or could be seen; evidence of alleged prior accidents and near escapes; the volume of *335traffic and adequacy of warning devices; and testimony as to alleged ineffectiveness of the signal light.
Plaintiff’s evidence disclosed that the accident occurred about 7:25 a.m. at a point where there were six railroad tracks; that the collision occurred at the northernmost track and involved a westbound train; that the flashing signal light involved was located between the switching tracks to the south and the main tracks to the north, and that the deceased driver, who was proceeding north, had stopped before entering his position of peril. Also that the driver was very familiar with the crossing and knew of the heavy train traffic, with trains running through the town at speeds of fifty-five to seventy miles per hour. It is clear from the record that even if the signal was not working, its failure was not a proximate cause of the tragedy. This is also true of the driver’s intermittently obstructed vision to the main tracks caused by railroad structures and railroad cars which lay to his right., The driver knew of the hazards and recognized all of them when he stopped his truck before he entered upon the main west bound track. He had a duty to look and listen and to stop if a train was approaching. He also had a duty not to proceed until he could do so with reasonable safety. The evidence established that his truck, after stopping, moved forward at a speed of four to six miles per hour and that the point from which he could first see the train, without further sight interference, was approximately twenty-one feet from the fatal site, according to defendant’s calculations and not less than nine feet according to plaintiff’s evidence. It is clear that if the driver had looked carefully he would have seen the train approaching, and would and should have stopped in time to avoid a collision.
There was no evidence to show that a flashing light would have made any difference, for the driver had in fact stopped before proceeding upon the tracks; or that the alleged prior accidents or near escapes were under comparable conditions; or that there was an un*336usual volume of vehicular traffic to distract the driver or that the volume of such was heavy at the hour in question. All this evidence was properly excluded. We note there was no evidence that defendant had violated any ordinance or statute.

The second question to he determined is: Was it error to direct a verdict in favor of defendant upon plaintiffs complaint?

This question is answered in the negative. It was the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict against plaintiff upon his complaint. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 181 Fed. 799. In so holding we note no evidence in the record to support the claim that defendant created a condition of apparent safety so as to mislead the driver or to lure him to his death, as plaintiff alleges.
It is inexplicable why this driver did not see the train approaching when he had stopped for that very purpose, and then entered upon a place known to be dangerous at a speed of four to six miles per hour, which even then would have enabled him to stop instantly. Such evidence shows a lack of due care and caution; was negligence, and a proximate cause of the accident.
In the early case of C.R.I.&P. Ry. Co. v. Crisman, 19 Colo. 30, 34 Pac. 286, this court said in reversing a judgment against the railroad:
“The degree of care to be used by a traveler in crossing a railroad is measured by the conditions surrounding the place of crossing, and where by reason of obstruction, his view of the railway track is shut off, it is his duty to exercise a higher degree of care than if the track is open to view; and the precautions to be taken must be such as are calculated to inform him of the fact whether a train is approaching or not.”
Later in Westerkamp v. C.B.&Q. Ry. Co., 41 Colo. 290, 92 Pac. 687, where negligence on the part of the railroad was admitted, this court said:
*337“From all the facts and circumstances, there is but one conclusion deducible, viz., he did not look; because, if he had, he could not have failed to discern the train approaching the crossing he was about to drive over. * * * Plaintiff not having looked for the approach of the train which struck his wagon, failed to exercise that degree of care which he should, and it is beyond dispute that such failure was the proximate cause of his injury.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The case of Headley v. D.&R.G.R. Co., 60 Colo. 500, 154 Pac. 731, cited by defendant, though different in its facts and involving admitted negligence of the railroad, nevertheless sets forth the duty of one who is crossing railroad tracks. There a verdict was directed in favor of the railroad and affirmed by this court saying:
“Moreover, the duty resting upon deceased to look and listen before advancing upon this track was a legal obligation, which he was bound to discharge, unless excused therefrom by some peculiar facts of the case. In other words, it is the imperative duty of one attempting to cross several tracks not to cease his watchfulness upon crossing the first or second in safety, but to continue to exercise his senses, and be observant of the obvious conditions until the crossing has been accomplished, unless the railroad company, through its acts, has produced a condition of apparent safety wherein reasonable men might have different views as to the necessity of looking and listening. Diligence, in order to be effective, must cover the whole field of danger, and where it is inherent in a continuing state of things the duty to exercise the care which the law imposes is a continuing obligation.”
Further, in answer to the contention that the silent crossing bell implied that no train was approaching, the court said at page 515:
“While there are cases which hold that a silent signal bell or an open gate may operate to excuse a traveler from looking and listening for an approaching train, and the questions should be submitted to a jury under proper *338instructions, the weight of authority and best-’reasoned cases are to the contrary. It is a matter of common knowledge that electric bells, or even gates, are liable to be out of order, and common prudence would not permit one to rely solely thereon.”
The same recognition of the duty of the driver has been set forth in other decisions of this court, such as Nucci v. C.&S. Ry. Co., 63 Colo. 582, 169 Pac. 273, (involving contributory negligence) and Great Western Ry. Co. v. Lee, 70 Colo. 140, 198 Pac. 270. In the latter case a judgment in favor of Lee was reversed with directions to enter judgment for defendant, the court saying:
“We are of the opinion that the request [for a directed verdict] should have been granted. The driver of the automobile was fully aware of the danger at the point of the collision. He had frequently been over the road. He is supposed to have known what, if anything, there was to prevent his seeing the motorcar at a distance from the crossing.”
The language quoted precisely fits the conditions and the knowledge of the plaintiff’s father, who drove the truck upon the crossing in the face of obvious peril.
The case of Gunby v. C.&S.R.R. Co., 77 Colo. 225, 235 Pac. 566, reaffirms the doctrine that one is presumed to see what is plainly visible and the doctrine of the Headley case that failure of crossing signals does not relieve one about to cross railroad tracks of the duty to look and listen.
In Freeman v. Wright, 81 Colo. 397, 255 Pac. 610, judgment for Wright against receivers of the Denver & Salt Lake R.R. Co. was reversed with directions to dismiss the case. The court said, regarding Wright’s actions:
“=:= * * £he plaintiff testified that because of trees and foliage he could not see, and did not see the engine till he got within five (sic) feet of the crossing; that he then tried to stop but was unable. This defeats him. He should have approached at such speed that he could stop after he saw the engine and if the situation was such *339that he could not do that he should have stopped before he saw it and looked and listened.”
Such was the duty required by law of the driver of the Buchholz truck in the instant case.
Later cases reaffirming the principles and the cases cited above are Interstate Motor Lines v. Neal, 116 Colo. 242, 179 P. (2d) 665; C.&S. Ry. Co. v. Barth, 117 Colo. 17, 183 P. (2d) 549. Also see Kutchma v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. Co., 23 F. (2d) 183 for a full discussion of the duties of travelers crossing railroad tracks. That opinion points out that such tracks are a constant warning of danger and that train operators alone cannot protect persons on the highways who cross them, and that travelers know that they must stop for the train and not the train for them. The court quotes an earlier case saying: “In such circumstances (as those here involved) it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near, he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and look. It seems to us that if he relies upon not hearing the train or any signal and takes no further precaution he does so at his own risk.”
As a matter of law the driver of plaintiff’s truck, in the situation disclosed by the record before us, was negligent in proceeding as he did to cross the railroad tracks. This bars his principal from recovery.
Plaintiff contends that the policy of the law has been to delegate the determination of such questions as “negligence,” “ordinary care,” and “reasonable prudence” to the jury under proper instructions from the court. He cites as authority Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417, 36 L. Ed. 485, and several other cases including Arps v. City and County of Denver, 82 Colo. 189, 257 Pac. 1094.
This is true as a bald proposition of law but the rule is not applicable under the facts disclosed by the record here. Higgins v. Boulder, 105 Colo. 395; 98 P. (2d) 996, and other cases cited by plaintiff in support of *340this theory are inapplicable or have been misconstrued. Questions of negligence and proximate cause are for the court where the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, is such that reasonable men, giving fair consideration thereto, must reach the same conclusion. See Westerkamp v. C.B.&Q. Ry. Co. and Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, supra.
On a motion for nonsuit plaintiff’s evidence is entitled to the most favorable construction that can be given it. So viewed the plaintiff here has failed to prove his case.

The third question to be determined is: Was it error to direct a verdict in favor of defendant upon its cross-complaint?

This question is answered in the affirmative. We hold that under the facts presented here it was a jury question as to whether the railway company was guilty of contributory negligence which would bar recovery on its counterclaim.

The fourth question to be determined is: Was it error to admit defendant’s testimony and its Exhibits 2 and 3 relating to damage to defendant’s signal and train?

This question is answered in the negative. The testimony of defendant’s witness Kalk related to the price of a new switch stand and the labor to install it. Kalk was the section foreman in charge of the repairs and was required to account for materials and labor used. He was furnished a price list by the defendant and testified he used such list as well as the prices marked on the materials in arriving at the cost of the switch stand. It is immaterial that he did not know whether the defendant actually paid the listed prices for such materials. He was a supervisory employee required to keep records of the cost of materials and labor expended under his supervision. Such records and his testimony with respect thereto were properly received in evidence.
Objections to the introduction of defendant’s Exhibits 2 and 3 were also properly overruled. These were typewritten statements of amounts relating to the costs of *341defendant in moving the damaged engine to Omaha for repairs and the itemized cost of the repairs. Defendant’s witness Mayer identified these as being correct summaries taken from regular business records kept under his supervision. Mayer was head clerk in defendant’s accounting department. As supervisor he did not personally make the book entries nor the summaries but he did check them for accuracy.
In any large enterprise the bookkeeping is a function handled by many persons and in the case of railroads at many places. It is not reasonable nor necessary to require the production of the original entries of each transaction concerned in damage to a railroad or other large enterprise with numerous accounts and it is probably impossible to have each of the entries identified by the person who originally made them. The sworn testimony of a proper supervisor that certain facts are shown by the corporate records, over which he has supervision, is competent evidence. Also, written, properly identified, summaries of such records may be received. This is in harmony with the intent of Rule 43 (f) R.C.P. permitting secondary evidence of a writing in certain cases. This rule provides in part: “(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the whole” then evidence of the contents of a writing other than the writing itself may be offered in evidence. In other words, summaries of complicated, burdensome or voluminous original records prepared by competent persons may be offered in evidence as the only practicable way of receiving such proof. This court has recognized such practice as proper. See McDonald v. McFerson, 80 Colo. 4, 249 Pac. 496. This rule is not harmful to the opposing party since by proper request and procedure when necessary, he can examine or subpoena original records which he contends are in conflict with the evidence so admitted. Use of pre-trial *342and other procedures under, the rules enable a party to determine in advance whether to subpoena such original records for use at the trial.
The judgment entered upon the directed verdict in favor of defendant upon plaintiff’s complaint is affirmed. The judgment upon the directed verdict in favor of the defendant upon defendant’s cross-complaint is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial upon the issues presented by the cross-complaint and the affirmative defense thereto.
Mr. Justice Frantz, Mr. Justice Hall and Mr. Justice Knauss dissent.