Court Opinion

ID: 9368317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 18:02:23.14634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.930652
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/3/23 P. v. Gonzales CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C095585

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 95F07960)

           v.

    JOSEPH GONZALES,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 1997, when defendant Joseph Gonzales was 25 years old, he was sentenced to
multiple life terms under the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12.)1 After a modification in 2000, the total aggregate term of defendant’s sentence
was 121 years to life.
         In 2021, after the law regarding parole of youthful offenders changed, defendant
filed a postjudgment motion for a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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261 (Franklin) to make a record of youth-related evidence for an eventual youth offender
parole hearing. The court denied the motion, concluding that defendant is statutorily
ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing because he was sentenced under the Three
Strikes law.
       On appeal, defendant concedes that he is statutorily ineligible for a youth offender
parole hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h), and instead advances two new
arguments as to why his motion should have been granted. First, he argues the statute’s
differential treatment of Third Strike offenders violates equal protection. Second, he
argues that, as a youthful offender with an indeterminate life sentence, he should have
been granted a Franklin proceeding even if he is not entitled to a youth offender parole
hearing. We reject defendant’s equal protection claim, but agree with the latter
contention. Thus, we shall reverse the order denying defendant’s Franklin motion.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In 1994 and 1995, when defendant was between the ages of 21 and 23, he
committed four separate robberies using a firearm. Defendant had two prior qualifying
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. In September 1997, the court
sentenced defendant as a third strike offender to six consecutive indeterminate life terms
(25 years to life) on four counts of robbery (§ 211) and two counts of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. (Former § 12021, subd. (a).) The court also imposed four
consecutive four-year terms for firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), plus a five-
year prior serious felony conviction enhancement, for a total aggregate term of 171 years
to life. The court subsequently modified defendant’s sentence to stay execution of the
two unlawful firearm possession counts, leaving the remainder of the sentence intact.
       In September 2021, defendant, acting in propria persona, filed a postjudgment
motion for a proceeding under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 and section 1203.1.
Defendant alleged that because he was a “ ‘youthful offender’ ” under the age of 26 at the

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time of his offense, he was entitled to a Franklin proceeding to preserve mitigating
youth-related evidence for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under section 3051.
       On December 30, 2021, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that
defendant is ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051,
subdivision (h) because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. Defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling on two grounds, both of which are
raised for the first time in this appeal. First, he contends section 3051 on its face violates
equal protection because it irrationally excludes youthful offenders sentenced under the
Three Strikes law. Second, he argues that irrespective of his right to a youth offender
parole hearing, as a youthful offender with an indeterminate life sentence, he is entitled to
a Franklin proceeding under section 4801, subdivision (c) to preserve youth-related
evidence for his future parole hearing.
                                               I
                                          Forfeiture
       As a preliminary matter, we consider whether defendant forfeited his claims by
failing to raise them below. “As a general rule, a party who does not raise an argument
below forfeits the argument on appeal. [Citation.]” (In re Abram L. (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 452, 462.) The forfeiture rule applies to claims based on alleged statutory
violations, as well as the deprivation of constitutional rights. (In re Seaton (2004) 34
Cal.4th 193, 198; People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.) However,
application of the rule is not automatic. (In re Abram L., supra, at p. 462.) An appellate
court has discretion to excuse forfeiture where a case involves an important question of
law. (People v. Espiritu (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 718, 725; People v. Aviles (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1074.)

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       We invited supplemental briefing from the parties on the forfeiture issue. In their
supplemental briefs, both parties argued that we can address the merits of defendant’s
claims, either because the claim was not forfeited or because the claim presents a pure
question of law that is well suited to appellate review. We accept the concession and
shall address the merits of the contentions raised on appeal.2
                                             II
                                     Equal Protection
       The trial court denied defendant’s Franklin motion on the ground he is statutorily
ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. On appeal, defendant concedes that he is
statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, subdivision
(h). But he contends the statutory exclusion of offenders sentenced under the Three
Strikes law violates his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. We find no
equal protection violation.
       A.     Legal framework
       In a series of cases addressing limits on juvenile sentencing, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment “encompasses the ‘foundational principle’ that the ‘imposition of a
State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were
not children.’ [Citation.] From this principle, the high court has derived a number of
limitations on juvenile sentencing . . . .” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 273-274; see
also People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268-269 [Eighth Amendment prohibits
de facto sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders].) “The

2       In reaching this conclusion, we assume defendant intends to raise only a facial
constitutional challenge to the statute. To the extent defendant also intends to raise an
“as-applied” challenge to the statute, we deem the claim forfeited due to his failure to
raise it below. (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.)

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underlying rationale of these decisions is that ‘[b]ecause juveniles have diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform,’ as compared to adult offenders, ‘ “they are
less deserving of the most severe punishments.” ’ [Citation.] [Citation.] Consequently,
except in the rarest of circumstances[,] . . . juvenile offenders facing lifelong prison terms
must be given a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to
reenter society at some point in the future. [Citation.]” (People v. Delgado (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 95, 100 (Delgado).)
       In response to these court decisions, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260
(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 260), which added section 3051 and amended
sections 3041, 3046, and 4801. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 197-198
(Sands); In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980.) The stated purpose of the act was
“to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for
crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or
she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity . . . .” (Stats.
2013, ch. 312, § 1.)
       “At the heart of Senate Bill No. 260, was the addition of section 3051, which
requires the [parole board] to conduct a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 15th,
20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration,” depending on the term of the
offender’s “controlling offense.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.) “By ensuring
that those eligible for youth offender parole hearings ‘will have a meaningful opportunity
for release no more than 25 years into their incarceration’ [citation], section 3051 made it
unnecessary for courts ‘to decide Eighth Amendment challenges to sentences of 25 years
or more for a broad range of juvenile homicide and nonhomicide offenses’ [citation].”
(In re Woods (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 740, 750, review granted June 16, 2021, S268740;
Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 276-277, 280-281.)
       As originally enacted, section 3051 made youth offender parole hearings available
only to juvenile offenders, and it excluded juvenile offenders sentenced to life without the

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possibility of parole (LWOP). (People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 346.) The
Legislature subsequently increased the age threshold, first to 23 years, and then to 25
years, and amended section 3051 to allow parole hearings for juvenile offenders (but not
youthful offenders) sentenced to LWOP. (Ibid.) As a result, most offenders 25 years of
age and younger at the time of their offense are now eligible for a youth offender parole
hearing after 15, 20, or 25 years in prison, depending on the sentence. (Sands, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 198; § 3051, subd. (b).) However, section 3051, subdivision (h)
provides that certain youthful offenders, including those sentenced under the “One
Strike” law (§ 667.61), or the Three Strikes law, are ineligible for youth offender parole
hearings. (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
       After the enactment of section 3051, our Supreme Court decided Franklin, which
recognized a right, rooted in the language of section 4801, subdivision (c), for offenders
who qualified for a youth offender parole hearing to preserve youth-related mitigating
evidence. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.) The goal of such proceeding, the
court held, is “to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the
juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the
[parole board], years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’
youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to
rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes
of the law.’ ” (Franklin, at p. 284.)
       In In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), the California Supreme Court extended
the right to a Franklin proceeding to youthful offenders whose judgments are otherwise
final. (Cook, supra, at pp. 448-449, 451.) Cook further held that the proper avenue for a
youthful offender to request a Franklin proceeding is through a motion under section
1203.01. (Cook, at pp. 446-447; People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 748
(Benzler).)

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       B.     Analysis
       “ ‘ “In considering a facial constitutional challenge to a statute, we uphold the
statute unless its unconstitutionality plainly and unmistakably appears; all presumptions
favor its validity.” ’ [Citations.]” (Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184,
195.) To prevail, the challenger must show that the statute “inevitably poses a present
total and fatal conflict with the Constitution” or “is unconstitutional in the . . . great
majority of cases.” (Ivory Education Institute v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 975, 981.) The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law,
which we review de novo. (Persky v. Bushey (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 810, 817.)
       Where, as here, a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, a court’s
inquiry is twofold. It first must determine whether the “ ‘the state has adopted a
classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’
[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all
purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ ”
(Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) If such a showing is made, and
no suspect class or fundamental rights are at issue, the court must determine whether
there is any rational basis to support treating the two groups differently. (Sands, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.)
       The rational basis test “sets a very high bar.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p.
204.) To successfully challenge a statute as violating equal protection, the defendant
must negate every conceivable basis for the differential treatment. (People v. Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 862.) “[A] classification does not violate equal protection if
there is any rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose. [Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, “[e]qual
protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of the law.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

                                               7
       “A legislative classification does not fail rational basis review because it is
‘ “imperfect” ’ or ‘ “because it may be ‘to some extent both underinclusive and
overinclusive.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 205, quoting Johnson
v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.) A legislative classification is not
irrational simply because some offenders may be sentenced to harsher sentences than
others who are arguably less culpable. (Sands, at p. 205.)
       Defendant argues that youthful Three Strike offenders are similarly situated to
youthful offenders who were not sentenced under the Three Strikes law, including first
degree murderers, and he argues there is no rational basis to deny a youth offender parole
hearing to youthful Three Strike offenders while providing that benefit to “the worst
[youthful] offenders.” He relies on People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, which
held that the statutory exclusion of youthful offenders sentenced under the One Strike law
violates equal protection because there is no rational basis for punishing youthful One
Strike offenders more harshly than youthful first degree murderers. (Id. at p. 199.)
       Assuming we agree with defendant that youthful Three Strike offenders are
similarly situated to youthful offenders not sentenced under the Three Strikes law, we
nevertheless conclude defendant’s equal protection challenge fails because the
Legislature had a rational basis for the differential treatment. “The well-recognized
purpose of the three strikes law is to provide increased punishment for current offenders
who have previously committed violent or serious crimes and have therefore not been
rehabilitated or deterred from further criminal activity as a result of their prior
imprisonment. [Citation.]” (People v. Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1, 14.) The
Legislature rationally could determine that a youthful offender with a criminal history of
prior strikes should be punished more severely than one who does not. (Id. at p. 12;
People v. Cooper (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 828-830.)
       In People v. Wilkes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1159 (Wilkes), Division Five of the
First Appellate District rejected an equal protection challenge to section 3051’s

                                               8
differential treatment of Three Strike offenders. (Id. at pp. 1164-1167.) The court found
no constitutional violation because the Legislature could rationally determine that “ ‘a
recidivist who has engaged in significant antisocial behavior and who has not benefited
from the intervention of the criminal justice system’ [citation] presents too great a risk of
recidivism to allow the possibility of early parole.” (Id. at p. 1166.)
       The reasoning in Wilkes has been followed by other appellate courts. (Delgado,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 102; People v. Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 863-864.)
We agree with the reasoning of these cases and hold that equal protection does not
prohibit the Legislature from excluding youthful offenders sentenced under the Three
Strikes law from the benefits of section 3051.
       Defendant’s reliance on People v. Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 183 is
misplaced. There, the court considered an equal protection challenge to the exclusion of
youthful offenders sentenced under the One Strike law, “ ‘an alternative, harsher
sentencing scheme that applies to specified felony sex offenses.’ ” (Wilkes, supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at p. 1166, quoting Edwards.) Thus, the court was comparing one group of
first-time offenders to another. (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 102.) As Wilkes
explained, “[t]he distinguishing characteristic of Three Strike offenders . . . is that they
are not being sentenced for a first-time offense. Thus, the ample authority rejecting equal
protection challenges from Three Strikes offenders did not apply in Edwards. Indeed,
Edwards itself took pains to ‘note that criminal history plays no role in defining a One
Strike crime’ and that ‘[t]he problem in this case is’ the categorical exclusion of ‘an
entire class of youthful offenders convicted of a crime short of homicide . . . , regardless
of criminal history . . . .’ ” (Wilkes, at pp. 1166-1167.)
       We acknowledge defendant’s point that section 3051 is intended to benefit
youthful offenders who committed crimes before outgrowing the impetuosity of youth.
But the Legislature still rationally could determine that Three Strike offenders, including
those who commit offenses during their youth, present too great a risk of committing

                                               9
more violent or serious crimes to allow the possibility of early parole, especially where,
as here, the “controlling offense” was committed after the age of majority. (Wilkes,
supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.)
        For these reasons, we conclude the differential treatment of youthful offenders
sentenced under the Three Strikes law does not violate equal protection.
                                              III
                                Section 4801, Subdivision (c)
        Defendant contends that even if he is ineligible for an expedited parole hearing
under section 3051, he nevertheless is entitled to a Franklin proceeding under the
standard rules applicable to all parole hearings. We agree.
        In conjunction with the enactment of section 3051, Senate Bill 260 added section
4801, subdivision (c). (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 5.) That subdivision now provides:
“When a prisoner committed his or her controlling offense . . . when he or she was 25
years of age or younger, the [parole] board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole
pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth
as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” (§ 4801, subd.
(c).)
        In In re Brownlee (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 720, the Fifth Appellate District
considered whether the parole board’s duty to give “ ‘great weight’ ” to youth-related
evidence is limited to youth offender parole hearings under section 3051. The court held
that section 4801, subdivision (c) is not so limited. Rather, “it applies to all parole
hearings.” (Id. at p. 725.) Thus, even if a prisoner is not eligible for an expedited youth
offender parole hearing, the parole board still must give “ ‘great weight’ ” to the youth-
related factors at the prisoner’s future parole hearing. (Id. at pp. 724-726.) The Brownlee
decision has been followed by other appellate courts (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 103; People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 147), and we see no reason to

                                              10
depart from it here. It follows, as a logical extension of Franklin, that a youthful offender
who is eligible for release on parole must be given an opportunity to create a record of
the kinds of information that section 4801, subdivision (c) deems relevant for the future
parole hearing. (Delgado, at pp. 103-104; Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459;
Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 285-286.)
On our own motion, we notified the parties that we were contemplating taking judicial
notice of the fact that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s inmate locator
Web site indicates defendant has a parole suitability hearing set for July of 2032 under
the Elderly Parole Program. ( [as of Feb. 1, 2023], archived at  and
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/elderly-parole-hearings-overview/> [as of Feb. 1, 2023],
archived at .) We invited the parties to submit letter
briefs relevant to the propriety of our taking judicial notice of this fact as well as any
impact it may have on the legal issues raised in this case. Both sides responded and
agreed that judicial notice was proper, and that the information is relevant because it
demonstrates there is a reasonable likelihood defendant will receive a parole suitability
hearing within his lifetime. Thus, we shall take judicial notice of defendant’s scheduled
parole suitability hearing date. (See Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 750, fn. 3;
People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1372-1373; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h),
459, subd. (a).)
       Because defendant was a youthful offender who is technically eligible to be
considered for future release on parole, and there is a reasonable likelihood that defendant
will receive a parole suitability hearing within his lifetime, the Attorney General
concedes that a limited remand for a Franklin proceeding is justified. We accept the
concession. We shall order a limited remand in this case to give defendant the
opportunity to make a record of youth-related evidence so that the parole board may, in
the future, properly discharge its obligation under section 4801, subdivision (c).

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       We note that, on remand, “the manner and extent of a Franklin hearing is left to
the discretion of the trial court.” (Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 749; see People v.
Howard, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.) The trial court may “ ‘exercise its discretion
to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant,
noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and
regulations.’ [Citation.] The court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding
the evidence the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence
is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record.
It may also determine whether testimony is ‘appropriate’ [citation], or if other types of
evidentiary submissions will suffice.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s motion seeking a Franklin proceeding is reversed
and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                        KRAUSE                 , J.

We concur:

      HULL                  , Acting P. J.

      DUARTE                , J.

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