Court Opinion

ID: 9734175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:27:00.881939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:46.212609
License: Public Domain

Thomas Gallagher, Justice
(dissenting).
I am of the opinion that under M. S. A. 1949, § 176.16, the employer through its representative W. J. Smith, assistant chief of the Duluth fire department and the immediate superior of the employee, had actual notice of the occurrence of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Section 176.16 states:
“Unless the employer shall have actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury, or unless the injured workman, or a dependent, * * * shall give notice thereof * * * then no compensation shall be due * * (Italics supplied.)
It is to be noted that throughout this section actual knowledge is treated as synonymous with notice in writing, and that emphasis is placed not upon knowledge of the accident but rather upon knowledge of the occurrence of an accidental injury. In discussing what constitutes actual knowledge thereunder, in Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 557, 18 N. W. (2d) 535, 537, this court stated:
“* * * The statute does not require written notice of death or injury where the employer has actual knowledge. Actual knowledge by an officer or agent standing in the employer’s place for the time being is actual knowledge of the employer. Markoff v. Emeralite Surfacing Products Co. 190 Minn. 555, 252 N. W. 439 (actual knowledge of employer’s superintendent acquired ten minutes after the injury); State ex rel. City of Northfield v. District Court, 131 Minn. 352, 155 N. W. 103, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 866 (actual knowledge of city’s mayor and street commissioner acquired immediately after the injury). Actual knowledge of an officer in charge of a fire station of the happening of an accidental injury is actual knowledge on the part of the city. Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm. 104 Utah 436, 140 P. (2d) 644 (lieutenant in charge of fire station).” (Italics supplied.)
*579The Ugren case has been cited and followed on the question of notice of injury in two subsequent decisions. Sokness v. City of Virginia, 231 Minn. 215, 42 N. W. (2d) 551; Rinne v. W. C. Griffis Co. 234 Minn. 146, 47 N. W. (2d) 872.
Here, Mr. Smith testified as to employee’s appearance and condition immediately after the rescue work had been completed. He testified that he had observed the employee after he got to the top of the embankment where the rescue work was taking place. In his own words, “he was pretty much all in. He was gasping for breath. I’m not sure, but I think I said, ‘You’d better go and take a breather.’ As I recall, he went over and sat on the running board of the apparatus.” He described the operation as “really a tough job.” In addition, he had a general knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the entire operation. He knew of the steepness of the slope and the distance to the bottom of the pit. He knew the manner in which the injured man was strapped upon the ladder, and observed that the crew rescuing him, including respondent, attempted to hold the ladder in a horizontal position during the trip to the top of the slope. He knew of the employee’s advanced years. Another fireman described the operation as “one of the worst things I have ever done in my life.”
The employee testified that when he had reached the “top” the pain in his heart was almost “impossible”; “ungodly” and “inhuman.” The fact that he made no complaint at that time should not be of controlling significance since his failure in this respect may have been occasioned by his unawareness of the seriousness of his condition or by his hope that a rest might restore him to full capacity. While all firemen involved in the rescue operation no doubt showed signs of fatigue, only the employee here involved appeared in such poor condition that his superior promptly suggested that he take a “breather.”
Based upon the evidence outlined, I am of the opinion that the commission’s finding that the employer had actual knowledge that the employee had sustained an accidental injury is amply sustained, particularly in view of the liberal construction which should be *580applied to the workmen’s compensation act. Graf v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc. 234 Minn. 485, 49 N. W. (2d) 797; Jurich v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. 233 Minn. 108, 46 N. W. (2d) 237.