Court Opinion

ID: 9412665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 12:08:13.398932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:22.544268
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-22-00002-CV

                                   Robert Norton, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                     Camtu Phan, Appellee

             FROM THE 368TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
        NO. 20-1075-C368, THE HONORABLE RICK J. KENNON, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            M E M O RAN D U M O PI N I O N

               Robert Norton sued his landlord, Camtu Phan, in district court for breach of

contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Phan filed

a trespass counterclaim and a motion for an injunction against Norton. Norton appeals the district

court’s grant of: (1) Phan’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion dismissing Norton’s claims;

(2) Phan’s traditional summary-judgment motion on Phan’s trespass claim and related temporary

and permanent injunctions; and (3) Phan’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the district court’s judgments

on Phan’s traditional summary-judgment motion and permanent injunction but reverse the trial

court’s grant of the no-evidence summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.
                                        BACKGROUND

               On March 19, 2019, Norton and Phan executed a one-year residential lease

agreement for a property owned by Phan in Round Rock. The lease term was from April 5, 2019,

to April 30, 2020. Phan declined to extend the lease period. Norton did not vacate the property

when the lease expired. On July 23, 2020, Norton sued Phan in district court, alleging breach of

contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

               In April 2021, the district court granted Phan’s no-evidence motion for summary

judgment, dismissing Norton’s claims and noting in the order that the only remaining issue in the

case was the calculation of attorney’s fees. In October 2021, Phan filed a petition asserting a

counterclaim for trespass and requesting a temporary injunction. The district court granted Phan’s

temporary injunction, which prohibited Norton from occupying the rental property.

               Phan filed a traditional motion for summary judgment regarding her trespass claim

and requesting a permanent injunction. Norton did not file a response but did attend the pretrial

hearing, which included discussion of the motion for summary judgment and the injunction. After

the hearing, the district court granted Phan’s summary-judgment motion and request for permanent

injunction. The district court also awarded Phan her attorney’s fees related to defending against

Norton’s claims. Norton appealed the final judgment.

                                          DISCUSSION

               In his pro se appellate brief, Norton states that he “simply seeks all orders of [the

district] court reversed by this Appeals Court based on the many errors and clear showing of bias

. . . .” His brief presents two lists of nine issues each, which include some overlap, and together

raise thirteen separate issues. He also asserts that the lists are “not comprehensive and limited to

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the most serious issues to reverse this judge’s orders.” However, because appellants bear the

burden of identifying and discussing their assertions of error, we will only address the alleged

errors that Norton has identified. See Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2007, pet. struck) (“An appellate court has no duty to perform an independent review of

the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.”).

               Norton generally fails to present substantive arguments or cite to relevant

authorities. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain “a clear and concise

argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”).

Pro se litigants must comply with all rules applicable to licensed attorneys. Mathis v. Lockwood,

166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). However, we construe pro se filings “liberally and with patience

‘so as to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the parties’ rights.’” Housing Auth. of City

of Austin v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (quoting Veigel

v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc., 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018,

no pet.)). In the interest of justice, we will address Norton’s issues, as best we can, based on his

arguments. See Onkst v. Onkst, No. 03-15-00636-CV, 2017 WL 2628245, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Austin June 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (deciding to address “pro se issues ‘as best we can’ in

the interest of justice” (quoting Forbes v. Forbes, No. 03-15-00130-CV, 2016 WL 612175, at *4

(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.))).

               Reading Norton’s brief liberally and renumbering his claims to combine his two

lists into one set of issues, we understand him to raise thirteen issues on appeal. Norton contends:

(1) that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear Phan’s counterclaim for trespass and

associated injunction requests because only justice of the peace courts may hear a forcible entry

and detainer suit pursuant to Texas Property Code Section 24.004, see generally Tex. Prop. Code

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§§ 24.001–.011 (addressing cause of action for forcible entry and detainer); (2) that the district

court erred by denying him “extra time for discovery;” (3) that the trial court abused its discretion

when it granted Phan’s no-evidence summary judgment that disposed of Norton’s claims because

there were disputed facts and opposing counsel refused to cooperate during discovery; (4) that the

district court erred when it allowed Phan to file her counterclaim fourteen months into the case

“after the deadline for a counterclaim had expired” in violation of Rule 47 of the Texas Rules of

Civil Procedure; (5) that the district court erred by allowing Phan to raise her counterclaim after

the first summary judgment was decided; (6) that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s

temporary injunction; (7) that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s injunction because

she did not show irreparable harm, but rather only showed economic harm; (8) that the district

court’s first through third findings of facts in its order for temporary injunction were not supported

by evidence; (9) that the district court’s award of attorney’s fees was unlawful and inappropriate

because Norton had a reasonable belief that he could stay in the property until a proper eviction

and writ were issued; (10) that the trial court’s award of Phan’s attorney’s fees was an abuse of

discretion because the landlord was attempting to evict him during “the federal and Texas

moratorium on evictions”; (11) that the judge displayed inappropriate behavior and violated his

duty to be impartial when he “stated he believed the permanent injunction was not warranted,

discussed legal strategy with counsel, and then chang[ed] his mind when the defendant’s attorney

pressed multiple times and appeared to be asking a favor”; (12) that the district court judge should

have recused himself after “eleven documented acts of bias,” violating the code of civil procedure

by allowing Phan to bring her counterclaim for trespass, and ignoring the requirements of an

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injunction; and (13) that Phan’s “Notice to Vacate” did not conform to the requirements of Texas

Property Code Section 24.002. 1

Jurisdiction

                 Norton contends that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear Phan’s

counterclaim for trespass and associated injunction requests because only justice of the peace

courts may hear a forcible eviction and detainer suit pursuant to Texas Property Code Section

24.004. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 24.001–.011 (addressing cause of action for forcible entry

and detainer).

                 Whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we

review de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998). Norton correctly

asserts that a justice court has exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions under

the Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004; Breceda v. Whi, 224 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) However, a justice of the peace court does not have exclusive

jurisdiction over all cases that require a determination of the right of possession of real property.

Breceda, 224 S.W.3d at 240. A suit for eviction under the forcible entry and detainer statute “does

not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.” Tex. Prop. Code § 24.008.

       1 Phan asserts in her appellate brief that the only relevant issues on appeal are those related

to the district court’s grant of Phan’s traditional motion for summary judgment and the permanent
injunction. Thus, Phan briefed only those issues. Norton has not raised any issues regarding the
second summary-judgment motion. Thus, we do not address Phan’s arguments defending that
ruling. Further, Phan does not provide any support or any explanation for her contention that
Norton’s issues are limited. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain “a
clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and
to the record”), 38.2 (applying requirements of Rule 38.1 to appellee’s brief, subject to exceptions
not applicable here). We address all of Norton’s issues as we understand them. We address Phan’s
briefing as it relates to Norton’s issue challenging the permanent injunction.
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Further, while Chapter 24 does provide procedural protections for a holdover tenant, it does “not

grant to tenants at sufferance any legal interests in or possessory rights to the property at issue,”

and they remain a trespasser on the property. Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp.,

417 S.W.3d 909, 920 (Tex. 2013). Thus, evictions under Chapter 24 involving a holdover tenant

and trespass suits requesting an injunction for a trespasser are distinct proceedings. Here, Phan’s

trespass claim requiring a determination of the right of possession of property and the grant of an

injunction did not divest the district court of jurisdiction because it was not a Chapter 24 eviction

case. See Breceda, 224 S.W.3d at 240 (affirming district court’s grant of temporary injunction

barring interference with enjoyment of property).

               We overrule Norton’s jurisdictional issue.

Denial of continuance

               Norton contends that the district court erred by denying him “extra time for

discovery.” Although Norton does not specify when this alleged error occurred, based on a review

of the record we understand him to be referring to the district court not granting his request for “a

continuance of discovery” that Norton made at the pretrial hearing on Phan’s traditional

summary-judgment motion.

               We review the district court’s order denying a motion for continuance for a clear

abuse of discretion. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002).

A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to

a clear and prejudicial error. Id. The rules of civil procedure permit a district court to grant a

continuance to a party opposing a motion for summary judgment if that party files an affidavit

explaining the reasons such continuance is necessary. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g) (“Should it

appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present

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by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for

judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken

or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.”); Stierwalt v. FFE Transp. Serv.,

Inc., 499 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). Here, Norton did not file any

response, including any affidavit, in response to Phan’s second motion for summary judgment.

Nor did Norton file or otherwise make any motions to compel discovery after his original claims

were dismissed. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Stierwalt,

499 S.W.3d at 189 (“In general, a litigant is not entitled to a continuance if he or she fails to

diligently use the rules of civil procedure for discovery purposes prior to filing a motion

for continuance.”).

               We overrule Norton’s issue regarding the denial of his motion for a continuance

made at the pretrial hearing.

No-evidence summary judgment

               Norton contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Phan’s

no-evidence summary judgment that disposed of Norton’s claims because there were disputed

facts, and opposing counsel refused to cooperate during discovery. We understand Norton’s

complaint regarding discovery to be asserting that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s

no-evidence summary-judgment motion without there being “an adequate time for discovery.” See

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a. Phan did not respond to this issue in her appellate brief. Phan’s no-evidence

motion filed in the district court also did not address the issue of “adequate discovery.”

               “After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment

evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more

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essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof

at trial.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a. “When a party contends that it has not had an adequate opportunity

for discovery before a summary-judgment hearing, it must file either an affidavit explaining the

need for further discovery or a verified motion for continuance.” Tempay, Inc. v. TNT Concrete &

Constr., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 517, 520–21 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied) (citing Tenneco Inc.

v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996)); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g)

(“Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons

stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the

application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or

depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.”). Norton

filed an affidavit in response to Phan’s no-evidence motion asserting that there had not been

adequate time for discovery because both the previous and current opposing counsel would not

cooperate with him. He also referred the district court to his then pending motion to compel

discovery and set a discovery schedule.

               An appellate court reviews “a trial court’s determination that there has been an

adequate time for discovery on a case-by-case basis, under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”

McInnis v. Mallia, 261 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). When

deciding whether the district court permitted an adequate time for discovery, we consider the

following factors: (1) the nature of the cause of action; (2) the nature of the evidence necessary to

controvert the no-evidence motion; (3) the length of time the case had been active in the trial court;

(4) the amount of time the no-evidence motion had been on file; and (5) the amount of discovery

that had already taken place. Tempay, Inc., 37 S.W.3d at 522. “Furthermore, a party should not

be able to abuse the discovery process, withhold key evidence from its opponents, and then use

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that lack of evidence to win a judgment.” Id. (citing Robert W. Clore, Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 166a(i): A New Weapon for Texas Defendants, 29 St. Mary’s L.J. 813, 843 (1998)

(asserting that plaintiffs “who could show the defendant delayed discovery by failing to answer

the plaintiff’s interrogatories would likely be entitled to further discovery”)).

               Norton filed his complaint on July 23, 2020.                     Phan’s no-evidence

summary-judgment motion was filed on March 31, 2021. The district court held a hearing and

granted Phan’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Norton’s motion to compel discovery

as moot on April 30, 2021. Thus, Norton’s case had been pending for about eight months when

Phan filed her no-evidence motion. See McInnis, 261 S.W.3d at 200 (concluding that there had

not been adequate time for discovery when no-evidence motion filed six months into case and less

than half of discovery period had expired). The record reflects that there was no discovery

schedule set and no trial date set. Norton has argued consistently before the district court and on

appeal that opposing counsel refused to cooperate with him on discovery, including not responding

to his requests for discovery. In Norton’s affidavit he asserted that no discovery had occurred

including initial disclosures. Norton also filed a motion to compel discovery. Both Norton’s

affidavit and his motion to compel were filed during the one-month period between Phan’s

no-evidence motion and the hearing.

               Norton’s discovery requests sent to Phan’s attorney on April 14, 2021, are in the

record. Norton requested documents and communications between Phan and her listing agent and

her broker. Norton’s fraudulent inducement claim was premised in part on his argument that Phan

had intentionally misrepresented the condition of the property with the assistance of her listing

agent and broker knowing that he was out of state and relying on Phan’s and Phan’s representatives’

representations. Norton also requested all versions of the property lease and documents of

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maintenance records or inspections of the property. As part of his breach-of-contract claim Norton

argued that additional agreements were reached between Norton and Phan regarding the property

that were not included in the lease agreement that both parties filed with the court and that he had

relied on those agreements in making repairs to the property. Phan has not responded to this

allegation in her brief.

                  Under these circumstances, Norton was not provided an adequate opportunity to

conduct discovery. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant

Norton’s request for additional discovery time. See Tempay, Inc., 37 S.W.3d at 522–23 (concluding

appellant had not been given adequate time for discovery when opposing party refused to

participate in discovery). We do not reach Norton’s issue regarding whether he presented material

issues of fact.

                  We sustain Norton’s issue challenging Phan’s no-evidence motion.

Allowing Phan’s counterclaim

                  Norton contends, in two issues, that the district court erred when it allowed Phan to

file her counterclaim fourteen months into the case “after the deadline for a counterclaim had

expired,” and after the first summary-judgment motion was granted in violation of Rule 47 of the

rules of civil procedure. Tex. R. Civ. P. 47. Rule 47 sets substantive requirements for “[a]n original

pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original petition, counterclaim, cross-claim,

or third party claim . . . . Id. However, Rule 47 contains no time limit and no prohibition on filing

a counterclaim after a district court has ruled on a summary judgment motion on different claims.

See id. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in allowing Phan to file her

counterclaim. See In re Bustamante, 510 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, orig.

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proceeding) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing issue alleging trial court error

under Rule 47.)

               We overrule Norton’s issues asserting that Phan was barred from filing her

counterclaim pursuant to Rule 47.

Temporary injunction

               Norton contends that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s temporary

injunction. Norton also contends that the district court’s first through third findings of facts in its

order for temporary injunction were not supported by the evidence. Because the district court

rendered final judgment in this case, including a permanent injunction, Norton’s

temporary-injunction issues are moot. See Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A.,

802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (“If, while on the appeal of the granting or denying of the

temporary injunction, the trial court renders final judgment, the case on appeal becomes moot.”);

Norton v. Phan, No. 03-21-00603-CV, 2022 WL 243191, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 26, 2022,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing Norton’s interlocutory appeal challenging temporary injunction

because issues became moot).

Permanent injunction

               Norton contends that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s request for a

permanent injunction.

               We review a trial court’s issuance of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion.

Operation Rescue–National v. Planned Parenthood, 975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998). An abuse

of discretion occurs when a district court acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, or without

any reference to any guiding rules or principles. Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health

                                                  11
Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). “To be entitled to a

permanent injunction, a party must prove (1) a wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) an irreparable

injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law.” Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC,

610 S.W.3d 763, 792 (Tex. 2020).       When determining the appropriateness of a permanent

injunction, a court should balance the competing equities by considering the injury that would

result to the complainant, the defendant, and the public. Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co.,

226 S.W.2d 615, 618–19 (Tex. 1950).

                Norton argues that Phan did not show irreparable harm, but rather only showed

economic harm. We understand Norton to allege that the only harm that Phan demonstrated was

the loss of rent. Phan argues that the irreparable harm was the loss of her use and enjoyment of

her property. Contrary to Norton’s assertion that Phan’s claimed harm was unpaid rent, she did

not request back-rent damages in the district court but rather argued that Norton’s continuing

trespass prevented her from selling her property or otherwise using it as she saw fit. When “a

trespass invades the possession of a person’s land, or destroys the use and enjoyment of that land,

an injunction is a proper remedy.” Beathard Joint Venture v. W. Houston Airport Corp., 72 S.W.3d

426, 432 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). Here, by living in her home as a trespasser, Norton

was continuing to trespass on Phan’s property in a way that prevented her from using and enjoying

her property.

                Norton also contends that Phan failed to show that there was no adequate remedy

at law because she could have waited for the resolution of her eviction case in the justice of the

peace court. Phan asserts that an injunction was a proper remedy because Phan had an inadequate

remedy due to the continuous nature of Norton’s trespass. See id. (“An injunction is also a proper

remedy to restrain repeated or continuing trespasses where the remedy at law is inadequate because

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of the nature of the injury . . . . In such situations, the requirements of no adequate remedy at law

and irreparable damage are satisfied.”). The record reflects that the justice of the peace court that

was hearing Phan’s eviction would be closed for about three more months as of the day of the

injunction hearing. At the injunction hearing, Norton expressed his intention of staying in the

home until the eviction was final or until a permanent injunction was ordered and upheld on appeal.

Thus, he intended to continue to benefit from Phan’s inability to get adequate relief due to court

closures by continually trespassing on her property and preventing her from using and enjoying it.

                  Norton also contends that the district court abused its discretion when it resolved

the equitable balance against him because his “business will have to be shut down completely by a

forced, rapid eviction doing great potential damage to his business,” he was suffering from health issues

at the time of the district court’s ruling, and this type of injunction would set a dangerous precedent

by allowing evictions to be done through a trespass claim. Phan correctly points out in her

appellate brief that Norton neither filed a response to Phan’s traditional motion for summary

judgment regarding her trespass claim nor otherwise presented any evidence of either the

anticipated effect on his business or of his health issues for the district court to consider as part of

balancing the competing equities. Additionally, we are unconvinced by Norton’s assertion that

upholding the injunction would set a dangerous precedent because it would allow injunctions

instead of evictions. Injunctions and evictions will still have different requirements and injunctions

will still require a showing of inadequate remedy at law. Further, the legislature chose to explicitly

allow for a property owner to pursue available relief through both a Chapter 24 eviction case and

a trespass case.         See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.008 (“An eviction suit does not bar a suit

for trespass . . . .).

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                  Based on the record in this case, the district court’s grant of the permanent

injunction was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, or without any reference to any guiding rules or

principles. See Texas Health Care Info. Council, 94 S.W.3d at 850. We conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion.

                  We overrule Norton’s issue regarding the permanent injunction.

Attorney’s fees

                  In two issues, Norton challenges the district court’s award of Phan’s attorney’s fees.

The district court awarded Phan’s attorney’s fees pursuant to the lease agreement, which provides:

“Any person who is a prevailing party in any legal proceeding brought under or related to the

transaction described in this lease is entitled to recover prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, costs

of service, and all other costs of the legal proceeding from the non-prevailing party.” The district

court ordered “that Phan recover [her] attorney’s fees from Norton as the prevailing party on the

claims raised in Norton’s Original ‘Complaint’ . . . .” Because we are sustaining Norton’s issue

challenging Phan’s motion for no-evidence summary judgment we vacate the related attorney’s

fees order. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of Norton’s attorney’s fees issues.

Biased judge claims

                  In two issues, Norton complains of behavior of the district-court judge, which

Norton asserts demonstrated bias. First, Norton contends that the judge displayed inappropriate

behavior and violated his duty to be impartial when he “stated he believed the permanent injunction

was not warranted, discussed legal strategy with counsel, and then changing his mind when the

defendant’s attorney pressed multiple times and appeared to be asking a favor.” We understand

Norton to be referencing part of the hearing on Phan’s traditional summary-judgment motion, in

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which the judge asked both parties for their views on the legal implications for a possible appeal

of the case if he granted the summary judgment versus if they went to trial and received the same

outcome through a jury. That hearing occurred after Norton filed his only motion for recusal and

Norton did not otherwise object to the judge’s questions. Thus, Norton has waived this issue on

appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (“As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review,

the record must show that [] the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request,

objection, or motion . . . .”).

                Norton also contends that the district court judge should have recused himself after

“eleven documented acts of bias,” for violating the rules of civil procedure by allowing Phan to

bring her counterclaim for trespass, and for ignoring the requirements of an injunction. We

understand the “eleven documented acts of bias” to be referring to the eleven grounds that Norton

asserted in support of his motion requesting that the district court judge recuse himself.

                Among other requirements, Rule 18a of the rules of civil procedure requires that

requests for judges to recuse themselves be made through a verified motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a.

“The procedural requirements of Rule 18a regarding recusal are mandatory, and a party who fails

to comply with them waives the right to complain of a judge’s failure to recuse himself.” Pease

v. Pease, No. 03-03-00644-CV, 2004 WL 2028023, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 10, 2004, no

pet.) (mem. op.); see also Kennedy v. Staples, 336 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011,

no pet.). Norton’s motion was not verified. Because Norton’s motion did not satisfy the mandatory

recusal procedures, his issue regarding the judge’s failure to recuse himself is waived. See id.

                We overrule Norton’s two issues regarding alleged judge bias.

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Notice to vacate

                Norton contends that Phan’s “Notice to Vacate” did not conform to the requirements

of Texas Property Code Section 24.002. As discussed above in our discussion of the jurisdictional

issue, this is not a Chapter 24 eviction case. This is a trespass case. Norton has not explained how

the procedural requirements of an eviction case apply to this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We

overrule his final issue.

                                         CONCLUSION

                We affirm the district court’s judgments on Phan’s traditional summary-judgment

motion on her claims and the permanent injunction. We reverse the district court’s judgment

granting Phan’s no-evidence summary judgment that dismissed Norton’s claims and the attorney’s

fees granted for this. We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                               __________________________________________
                                               Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Theofanis

Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part

Filed: July 27, 2023

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