Court Opinion

ID: 9828133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:08:05.89849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:44.434073
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellee in the motion for rehearing, referring to the judgment of the trial court with reference to the assessment of damages, says:
“Having the right and power to assess against the appellant such damages as he found from the evidence that the plaintiff sustained by reason of appellant’s negligence, this court cannot, as we understand the law, presume that the trial court, in awarding damages, did so to a great extent on account of the failure to feed, water, and rest the said cattle, and the length of time they were cn route, and there is no evidence to justify the conclusion of this court in the opinion rendered herein.”
We will not analyze the testimony again, except with the general statement that the burden of appellee’s testimony and of his witnesses was upon the question of the length of time these cattle were en route and confined in the cars without feed, water, and rest. We assume, of course, that he did not base such a judgment partially on the expenses of the plaintiff in recuperating his cattle, for the reason that such would be clearly double damages. If the trial court did not award the damages “to a great extent on account of the failure to feed, water, and rest said cattle,” we would be at a loss to know upon what he predicated such a judgment.
[11] Appellee did not brief this case, and in the motion for rehearing the position is strenuously presented and argued that there is no plea of contributory negligence of the owner accompanying the cattle by the carrier *770upon which this court could hive reversed the trial court’s judgment.
The answer specifically pleaded the terms of the written contract of shipment and that the shipper assumed, at his own risk and expense, to care for, feed, and water the stock in the course of transportation, and also charged that the plaintiff covenanted and agreed to hold “said carrier harmless on account of any loss or damage to his said stock while being so in his charge, * * * except such damages as may result from the negligence of the carrier.”
^Paragraph 11 of defendant’s answer, in substance, alleges that plaintiff accompanied the shipment. It is true there is no averment that the plaintiff failed in his duty or that the damages or any part of same resulted from the negligence of the shipper, unless it could be said that the final allegation, asserting “that plaintiff should be held estop-ped from setting up and recovering herein on his alleged cause of action,” constitutes such an allegation.
Plaintiff alleges as one of the grounds of negligence (which the statement of facts shows constituted the principal injury to the cattle) “that said cattle were confined in the defendants’ cars and pens for more than 49 hours, without food, water, or rest,” also alleging that the railway company negligently in its duty in that respect.
When the plaintiff charge's a duty and a violation of the same as a ground of negligence, and a consequent liability against the carrier, and the defendant pleads and shows a written contract that the very same duty so charged against it, for a valuable consideration, was assumed by the plaintiff, logically upon whom would the burden of proof then exist to further proceed with the question of negligence?
“The fact that the owner accompanies the stock and takes charge of it may also be important upon the question of contributory negligence. So, where the owner accompanies the stock under a special contract to care for them himself, he may well be presumed to be as well acquainted with the facts in regard to then-loss or injury as the carrier, and, as they may have been injured because of his own negligence, or because of their inherent nature and propensities, and not by the negligence of the carrier, it is but just to require him to show the facts. The rule in such cases, therefore, is that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that a breach of duty upon the part of the carrier caused the injury or loss, and if the carrier is liable only for negligence, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show such negligence.” Elliott on Railroads, vol. 4, § 1549.
As supporting the text, among others, the following authorities are cited: Railway Co. v. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129, 31 N. E. 781, 17 L. R. A. 339, 32 Am. St. Rep. 239; Clark v. Railway Company, 64 Mo. 440; Railway Co. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397, 8 S. W. 134, 7 Am. St. Rep. 104; Railway Co. v. Hedger, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 645, 15 Am. Rep. 740; Grieve v. Railway Co., 104 Iowa, 659, 74 N. W. 192, 193. Thompson, in his Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, expresses the same rule (volume 6, § 7714).
Justice Stephens, in the case of Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Arnold, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 77, 40 S. W. 829, announces the same doctrine, particularly quoting the text from Elliott on Railroads in support of the rule. The same rule is also announced in the case of Railway Co. v. Vaughan, 41 S. W. 415.
The Supreme Court of Iowa said, speaking of this character of contract:
“All this, however, the plaintiff had assumed to do, and, if his failure therein was caused by any act of the defendant, ho knew what it was as well as the company. If he demanded facilities for unloading the cattle, or for feeding and watering them, and these were not provided, or were refused, then the burden would be cast on the defendant to excuse itself for not so doing. * * * The burden is certainly on the shipper, in the first instance, to show that the injury did not result from his own negligence, and, if occasioned by failure to do what he has undertaken, then that such failure resulted from an omission on the part of the company to perform Some duty devolving upon it. This conclusion has ample support in the authorities.” Grieve v. Illinois Central Railway Co., supra, 104 Iowa, 664, 74 N. W. 193.
When the carrier pleaded, a contract, based upon a valuable consideration, that the shipper agreed to perform the very duty that he alleges the carrier should have performed (the lack of which constituted negligence), it is clear to this court that, logically, if his failure to perform the duty which he agreed to perform was caused by any act of the defendant, he was well aware of what that act was, and could have alleged and proved it. He agreed to hold the carrier “harmless” for damages to the cattle on account of failure to perform the particular duty which he charges the railroad company should have performed. When the written contract is shown the plaintiff’s duty is exhibited, and he should show, in order to impress the railroad company with the particular damages, that he was excused from the performance. We can find no authority really contrary to such a logical doctrine.
The appellee suggests a remittitur in the event the motion is overruled. On another trial, under the testimony, the jury probably could better determine the damages based on the negligence of the railway company for which it would be liable, and have a more determinable rule to ascertain this than we have in this record.
The motion for rehearing is in all things overruled.