Court Opinion

ID: 9622201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:13:25.42312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:14.796432
License: Public Domain

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I do not agree with all that is contained in the majority opinion, specifically Part I.A. of that opinion. (I do not quarrel with Part I.B., involving the April 1, 1997 date.) Application of the Barahona-Gomez settlement agreement should be based on the facts of the particular situation, and I do not think the broad interpretation stated by the majority opinion will lead to sensible results in all cases.
But it seems to me that these petitioners fairly fall within the definition of “the Class” contained in the settlement agreement: “all persons who have had (or would have had) suspension of deportation hearings conducted before April 1, 1997,” where the “immigration judge reserved or withheld granting suspension of deportation” on the basis of the directive issued by Chief Immigration Judge Creppy.
To briefly summarize, that directive was issued on February 13,1997. On March 3, 1997, the Navarros and their attorney appeared before the Immigration Judge, conceded deportability, and stated that they wished to apply for suspension of deportation. The IJ instructed the Navarros to file applications for suspension of deportation and scheduled a merits hearing on their applications for April 1, 1997. On April 1, 1997 the IJ held the merits hearing and denied the, Navarros’ applications for suspension of deportation pursuant to the IIRIRA stop-clock rule which went into effect that day. In 1997, April 1 fell on a Tuesday. If the Navarros’ hearing had been scheduled one day earlier, on Monday, March 31, the new law would not have applied and they might have been eligible for and obtained the relief they sought. It cannot reasonably be assumed that scheduling their hearing for March 31 or some earlier date was out of the ques*738tion, so it is clearly possible that the directive influenced the IJ to push the new hearing date past the effective date of the stop-clock rule. If so, then the Navarros were in the situation that the settlement agreement was intended to cover. Thus, I agree that their petition for review should be granted and concur in the judgment.