Court Opinion

ID: 9705663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:15:17.965782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.914521
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
concurring in result.
I respectfully concur in result. I agree that the evidence recovered from Lacey's residence ought to be suppressed.
I concur that there was a "no-knock" violation here and that we ought to suppress the evidence because of that violation, notwithstanding Hudson v. Michigan. None of us wants in any way or at any time to jeopardize the safety of a police officer. However, as the majority articulately points out, there was no reason here why the officers could not have applied for a "no-knock" warrant before a neutral magistrate. All of the reasons given for the "no-knock" at the seene were known in advance, and the police encountered no other problems that would have hindered their entry.
As for whether we ought to diverge from Hudson and continue to apply the exclusionary rule for "no-knock" entries that violate the Indiana Constitution, it is well-settled that "(elven where an Indiana constitutional provision is substantially textually coextensive with that from another jurisdiction, ... we may part company with the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States or any other court based on the text, history, and deci-sional law elaborating the Indiana constitutional right." Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 929 (Ind.1998). See also Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 575, 586 (1989) (arguing that protection of civil liberties must come not only from the federal constitution and United States Supreme *664Court, but also state constitutions and state courts). Thus, Hudson does not control here. The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for violations of the Indiana Constitution well before the United States Supreme Court mandated use of the rule in the states for violations of the federal constitution in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In 1922, the Indiana Supreme Court held, "If ... property was secured by search and seizure under the pretext of a search warrant, which was invalid for any reason, then the property so seized could not be used as evidence against the appellant, and its admission over his objection was prejudicial error." Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 96, 138 N.E. 817, 818 (1922).
Five years after Callender, the Indiana Supreme Court held that, where an officer failed to announce the basis of his authority before conducting a search of the premises pursuant to a warrant, the evidence thereafter obtained was inadmissible. Speybroeck v. State, 200 Ind. 69, 72-73, 155 N.E. 817, 818 (1927). The court has applied the exclusionary rule to similar "no-knock" violations of the Indiana Constitution in later years as well. See State v. Dusch, 259 Ind. 507, 510-11, 289 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1972). Adopting what could be considered the "minimum" federal standards necessarily erodes the exclusionary rule as it has been interpreted and applied by the Indiana Supreme Court. Any chink in that exclusionary armor ought to come from them.
The majority also makes a telling point, I believe, when they highlight the fact that the possible penalties for a federal Fourth Amendment violation include civil remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its considerable clout. This potential informed a significant part of the Hudson majority's reasoning. Although Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-7 provides for some damages in the event of an unlawful entry to serve a search warrant, it does not have the teeth that § 1983 does, and thus its deterrent effect, in my view, is considerably less formidable than that of its federal cousin.
Because I conclude that we ought to order suppression of the evidence on the basis of the "no-knock" entry, I find it unnecessary to address the legality of the search warrant that led to the entry in the first place. Thus, I do not join in part L.B. of the majority opinion. I do have some qualms about whether the trash pull at Lacey's residence, which formed a considerable part of the probable cause for the search warrant, complied with the "reasonable suspicion" mandate of Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 364 (Ind.2005). Those reservations need not be addressed in light of our holding regarding the "no-knock" violation.
For these reasons, I concur in result.