Court Opinion

ID: 9736785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:06:32.572988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:54.634417
License: Public Domain

Inglis, J.
(dissenting). The purpose of the requirement of the statutes that, to be valid as against third parties, a conditional sale contract must state “all conditions” of the sale is to inform such third parties as to what interest the vendee has in the property sold. This purpose is fully accomplished if by a reasonable reading of the contract one is fairly apprised of its terms. Premium Commercial Corporation v. Kasprzycki, 129 Conn. 446, 450, 29 A. 2d 610; National Cash Register Co. v. Lesko, 77 Conn. 276, 280, 58 A. 967; see Mozwish v. Sirus, 113 Conn. 141, 144, 154 A. 166; Beach v. Osborne, 74 Conn. 405, 408, 50 A. 1019, 1118.
*548The only possible question concerning the statement of the terms of the sale in the contract involved in this case is whether the times of payments of the instalments of the purchase price are set forth with adequate certainty. The contract on its face is dated June 29, 1949. After stating the amount of each of the instalments and that there should be “24 equal monthly installments,” it reads: “the first installment to be paid on July 29th, 1949 and the remaining installments to be paid on or before the--day of each and every month thereafter until this contract is paid in full.” When these provisions are read in their entirety, it appears that the omission of the precise date of the month upon which the instalments were to become due does not materially detract from the certainty of the statement. The agreement was that the instalments would have become due “on or before” such a day, if one had been stated. It is quite apparent, therefore, that the actual agreement between the parties did not contemplate that any payment must be made on any specific day. It might be made at any time within a specified month. The contract did make it plain that the first instalment was due on July 29, that another instalment was due sometime within the month which followed that date, and that a further instalment was due within each successive month thereafter. The contract also made it plain that in no event could payments continue after the expiration of twenty-four months. To apprehend this much from a reading of the contract, it is not necessary to draw any inferences, still less to do any guesswork. It is the plain intendment of what the contract states. A reading of the contract fairly apprises one of what the agreement was with reference to the time for payment of instalments. It, therefore, satisfies the purpose and the requirement of the statute.
*549In only two cases has this court held that the statement of the due dates of instalments in conditional sale contracts was inadequate to meet the requirements of the statute. In C. I. T. Corporation v. Meyers, 129 Conn. 514, 517, 29 A. 2d 758, although the contract called for eighteen instalment payments, it completely failed to state when those payments should commence or end or whether they should be made in successive months. In Standard Acceptance Corporation v. Con-nor, 127 Conn. 199, 203, 15 A. 2d 314, although the contract was dated December 2, 1938, it stated that the instalment payments were to commence on January 10, 1938, an obvious error. The reasoning of the court which led to the conclusion that the requirement of the statute had not been satisfied was that, even if the error in the date were overlooked, the contract was left with no date stated for the commencement or ending of the instalment payments. Obviously, neither of these cases on their facts is analogous to the present case, nor does the reasoning of the opinion in either of them argue that the statement of terms contained in the contract now before us is inadequate. The present contract states plainly that an instalment is to be paid in each successive month commencing July 29, 1949.
The certificate of acknowledgment which was annexed to the conditional sale contract is set forth in the concurring opinion of Brown, C. J. In considering the question whether that certificate is adequate, it must be borne in mind that ordinarily the omission from the certificate of the name of the acknowledger is not fatal if his identity is fairly imported by referring to him in the certificate as the signer and sealer or the subscriber of the document acknowledged. Sanford v. Bulkley, 30 Conn. 344, 347; 1 C. J. S. 855, § 92 (a) (2); 1 Am. Jur. 364; notes, 29 A. L. R. 919, 1001, *55072 A. L. R. 1290, 1300. The same is true even though the certificate relates to acknowledgments by two or more persons. Bowles v. Lowery, 181 Ala. 603, 610, 62 So. 107; Brown v. Corbin, 121 Ind. 455, 458, 23 N. E. 276; Stephens v. Perkins, 209 Ky. 651, 655, 273 S. W. 545; Clewer v. Shields, 40 Pa. Super. 400, 403.
It obviously is impossible for a corporation to appear personally and acknowledge a document. Accordingly, the words “Windham Motor Sales, Inc. (Seller),” as they appear in the certificate in question, are to be treated as surplusage and ignored. If that is done, the certificate reads: “Personally appeared . . . and Emile W. Jacques (Purchaser) signers and sealers of the foregoing instrument. . . .” That is, the certificate does not specify by name one of the acknowledgers. It is apparent from the certificate, however, that at least two persons appeared and acknowledged the document, because it states that they were “signers and sealers” and that the instrument was acknowledged as “their” free act and deed. The quoted words are in the plural. The certificate is that those who appeared were the signers and sealers of the foregoing instrument. That can be interpreted in no way other than that it was “B. Hochberg, Pres.,” and “Emile W. Jacques.” It also means that B. Hochberg appeared in his capacity as president of Windham Motor Sales, Inc. The certificate further makes it clear that B. Hochberg as president acknowledged the instrument both as his free act and deed and as the free act and deed of the corporation. It, therefore, adequately complies with the requirements of a proper certificate of acknowledgment.
The case is distinguishable on the facts from Hayden v. Westcott, 11 Conn. 129; Commercial Credit Corporation v. Carlson, 114 Conn. 514, 159 A. 352; C. I. T. Corporation v. Hungerford, 123 Conn. 438, 196 A. 151; *551and C. I. T. Corporation v. Meyers, 129 Conn. 514, 29 A. 2d 758. In the Hayden case the certificate did not reveal even by way of inference who had appeared. In the Carlson case the certificate failed to state that the person who was making the acknowledgment on behalf of the corporation was an officer of the corporation or was acting in any official capacity. In each of the other two cases the certificate was so garbled as to be meaningless.
In this opinion Jennings, J., concurred.