Court Opinion

ID: 9903195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:31:44.388639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:07.780428
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

SCOTT MCDERMOTT,

           Appellant,

v.                                     Case No. 5D22-0113
                                       LT Case No. 2019-102088-CFDL

STATE OF FLORIDA,

         Appellee.
_____________________________/

Opinion filed May 12, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Volusia County,
Dawn D. Nichols, Judge.

Jonathan E. Mills, Orlando,
for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Kristen L.
Davenport, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

SOUD, J.
      Appellant Scott McDermott was charged with first-degree sexual

battery of his step-daughter when she was older than twelve but less than

eighteen years old, while he was in a position of familial or custodial

authority.1 A jury of Appellant’s peers found him guilty of this charge but

found the State did not prove sexual penetration. Thereafter, Appellant was

designated a sexual predator and sentenced to twenty years in prison, to be

followed by ten years of sex offender probation. Appellant appeals his

judgment and sentence. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla.

Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

                                      I.

      Appellant married the victim’s mother when the victim was just two

years old. He lived with the victim, the victim's mother, and two additional

children shared in common by Appellant and the victim’s mother. Appellant

abused the victim until she moved out of the residence—the day after she

turned eighteen years old. The victim moved into her biological father’s

house.

      A few weeks later, and while the victim and her biological father were

on a trip, the victim told her father of the years of abuse by Appellant. The

      1
        The victim suffered the charged abuse from the time she was sixteen
until she turned eighteen years old. At time of trial, she was twenty-one years
old.
                                      2
victim’s father immediately returned home and met with the victim and her

mother. At that meeting, the victim told her mother about the abuse.

      Later that same evening, the victim’s mother—Appellant’s wife—

confronted Appellant, who admitted his guilt. Appellant first admitted to his

wife that he had engaged in oral sex with the victim. However, in the days

after this initial confession, he additionally admitted to inserting the tip of his

penis into the vagina of the victim.

      After Appellant confessed to the victim’s mother, the two met with Ryan

and Ashley Worden, their friends who volunteered in lay leadership at their

local church. 2 At this meeting, Appellant, while sitting on the couch of the

Wordens’ house, again admitted his guilt. 3 The victim’s mother also told the

Wordens all the allegations were true and that Appellant had sexually abused

the victim. Importantly, at the time of this meeting in the Worden residence,

while Mr. Worden was a layman who served in the church, he was not a

      2
       Appellant and the victim’s mother (Appellant’s wife) previously had
been to the Wordens’ house for Bible studies. The victim’s mother and Mrs.
Worden were also friends outside the church.
      3
        At trial, Appellant claimed he did not actually acknowledge that the
victim’s allegations were true, but rather only that it was true that she had
made the allegations. Mr. Worden, however, disputed this and testified
Appellant admitted his guilt.

                                        3
pastor or an ordained minister. 4 Mr. Worden received his license as a

minister a month or two after this meeting.

     Mr. Worden met with Appellant several more times after this initial

meeting and prayed with him “as a friend.” Mr. Worden reminded Appellant

that he (Mr. Worden) was not a pastor and told Appellant he needed to meet

with the pastor of their church because he needed “real help.” Mr. Worden

testified he was meeting with Appellant to make sure he was “doing the right

things” and taking the steps needed to ensure other children were not

harmed.

                                     II.

     Prior to trial, Appellant filed two separate motions seeking to exclude

evidence. First, he filed his “Motion to Suppress & in Limine” seeking to

exclude any evidence of the statements he made to Mr. Worden (with Mrs.

Worden and the victim’s mother present), claiming such were protected by

the clergy privilege. Appellant believed Mr. Worden had completed his

training to be a pastor, and he sought spiritual counseling from Mr. Worden,

instead of the pastor of the church, because he was closer in age to Mr.

     4
      Mr. Worden was taking, or had just completed, two years of online
seminary courses.

                                      4
Worden. He believed that any communications he made at the Wordens’

home would be confidential.

     Appellant also filed “Defendant’s Second Motion to Suppress & in

Limine” seeking to exclude admissions made to his wife, the victim’s mother.

He argued that any statements made to his wife concerning the victim’s

allegations were protected by the husband-wife privilege.

      The trial court denied both motions. Appellant argues the trial court

erred in its rulings on the motions and by allowing his statements into

evidence. 5 Appellant’s arguments are without merit.

     While Appellant styled both of his motions as motions “to Suppress &

in Limine,” we must look “to the substance of the motion[s] in determining

how to review [them].” United States v. Mays, 424 Fed. App’x 830, 833 (11th

Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Stossel, 348 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2003)). As both motions address the admission of testimony Appellant

claims is protected by privilege, we review the trial court’s decisions for

abuse of discretion. See Cuevas v. State, 310 So. 3d 60, 65 (Fla. 4th DCA

2021) (citing Fernandez v. State, 730 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 1999) (“[W]e find

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling against any claim to clergy

     5
       Appellant raises additional issues on appeal. We affirm on all such
matters without further discussion.

                                      5
communications privilege . . . .”)); see also Kaczmar v. State, 104 So. 3d

990, 999 (Fla. 2012) (noting that a claim of husband-wife privilege is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

      In Florida,

              [t]he only privileges recognized under Florida law are
              those established by The Florida Evidence Code,
              any other statute, the federal or Florida constitutions,
              and the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to its rule
              making authority. Thus, with the exception of rules
              adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, “privileges in
              Florida are no longer creatures of judicial decision.”

Guerrier v. State, 811 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citations

omitted); see also § 90.501, Fla. Stat. (2020).6 In this case, even if a privilege

existed in the common law, the Florida evidence code is the sole source of

both the clergy communications and husband-wife privileges, and the text of

      6   Section 90.501, Florida Statutes (2020), provides:

              Privileges recognized only as provided.—Except
              as otherwise provided by this chapter, any other
              statute, or the Constitution of the United States or of
              the State of Florida, no person in a legal proceeding
              has a privilege to:
              (1) Refuse to be a witness.
              (2) Refuse to disclose any matter.
              (3) Refuse to produce any object or writing.
              (4) Prevent another from being a witness, from
              disclosing any matter, or from producing any object
              or writing.

                                         6
the statute governs. See Hill v. State, 846 So. 2d 1208, 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA

2003) (footnotes omitted) (“In Florida, the marital communication privilege,

although originally created by the common law, is a creature of statute. It is

presently included as part of the Evidence Code. The Florida State courts

accept the statute, as modified from time to time, as the sole source of the

privilege.”).

                                          A.

      Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting his statements made

to Mr. Worden (in the presence of Mrs. Worden and the victim’s mother)

because they were protected by the clergy communications privilege.

Appellant’s argument fails.

      Section 90.505, Florida Statutes, provides in part:

                (1) For the purposes of this section:

                (a) A “member of the clergy” is a priest, rabbi,
                practitioner of Christian Science, or minister of any
                religious organization or denomination usually
                referred to as a church, or an individual reasonably
                believed so to be by the person consulting him or her.

                (b) A communication between a member of the
                clergy and a person is “confidential” if made privately
                for the purpose of seeking spiritual counsel and
                advice from the member of the clergy in the usual
                course of his or her practice or discipline and not
                intended for further disclosure except to other
                persons     present     in   furtherance     of     the
                communication.
                                          7
            (2) A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and
            to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential
            communication by the person to a member of the
            clergy in his or her capacity as spiritual adviser.

§ 90.505(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). Thus, under this statute, four requirements

exist for the privilege to attach: (1) Appellant must have made his statements

to a “member of the clergy”; (2) Appellant must have made the statements

for the purpose of seeking spiritual counseling or advice; (3) the clergyman

must receive the statements in the usual course of his practice or discipline;

and (4) Appellant must have made his statements privately and with the

intent they not be further disclosed beyond those present in furtherance of

the communication. See Nussbaumer v. State, 882 So. 2d 1067, 1074 (Fla.

2d DCA 2004); see also Elliott v. State, 49 So. 3d 795, 799 (Fla. 1st DCA

2010); Cuevas, 310 So. 3d at 65–66.

      We need look no further than the first requirement. At the time of the

statements by Appellant, Mr. Worden was not a member of the clergy, and

no reasonable basis existed to believe he was a minister.7 Appellant’s

suggestion that he spoke to Mr. Worden because Mr. Worden served in the

church, that he was closer in age to Mr. Worden than the pastor of their

      7
       Since Mr. Worden was not a member of the clergy at the time of
Appellant’s statements, it necessarily follows that Mr. Worden could not
receive these statements in the usual course of his practice or discipline.

                                      8
church, and that he believed the communications would be confidential, is

insufficient to establish the protection of the privilege.

      Mr. Worden himself testified he was not a pastor at that time. While he

volunteered in their church as a layman who helped lead various ministries,

Mr. Worden had not received his license. He was not a minister. Mr. Worden

told Appellant he needed to speak to the pastor of their church because

Appellant needed “real help.” Mr. Worden spoke to and prayed with Appellant

as a friend because he needed to make sure Appellant was “doing the right

things” and because he did not want others hurt. 8 As such, the privilege does

not attach to Appellant’s statements to Mr. Worden, and the statements were

properly admitted into evidence.

                                        B.

      Section 90.504, Florida Statutes, the husband-wife privilege statute,

provides in part:

            (1) A spouse has a privilege during and after the
            marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to
            prevent another from disclosing, communications
      8
        Even if the Appellant could establish the first three requirements of
the clergy communications privilege, he did not make these statements
privately with the intent they not be further disclosed. Appellant made his
statements to Mr. Worden with both the victim’s mother and Mrs. Worden
present. Appellant’s assertion that Mrs. Worden and the victim’s mother were
present in furtherance of the communication is without merit. Accordingly,
the statements were not made privately and, thus, would not be privileged.
See Fernandez, 730 So. 2d at 282; Cuevas, 310 So. 3d at 65–66.

                                        9
            which were intended to be made in confidence
            between the spouses while they were husband and
            wife.

            ....

            (3) There is no privilege under this section:

            ....

            (b) In a criminal proceeding in which one spouse
            is charged with a crime committed at any time
            against the person or property of the other spouse,
            or the person or property of a child of either.

            (c) In a criminal proceeding in which the
            communication is offered in evidence by a
            defendant-spouse who is one of the spouses
            between whom the communication was made.

§ 90.504, Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added).

      The plain text of the statute dictates and makes clear Appellant’s

admissions to his wife—the victim’s mother—are not protected by the

husband-wife privilege. In this criminal proceeding, Appellant was charged

with and convicted of sexual battery against his step-daughter. The victim

was his wife’s child. Therefore, since Appellant committed this crime “against

the person . . . of a child of either [spouse]”—i.e., the person of the daughter

of his wife—there is no privilege as expressly stated by 90.504(3)(b), Florida

Statutes. See Hill, 846 So. 2d at 1212–13.

                                      10
                                     III.

     Appellant’s statements made to Mr. Worden, who was not a member

of the clergy, were not protected by the clergy communications privilege.

Further, Appellant’s admissions to his wife were not shielded from disclosure

by the husband-wife privilege. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied

Appellant’s motions and admitted his statements into evidence.

     AFFIRMED.

     It is so ordered.

WALLIS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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