Court Opinion

ID: 9556115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:09:42.051033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:27.911013
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED; and Opinion Filed August 14, 2023

                                        In the
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00455-CV

                      DANAE RUTH MCGANN, Appellant
                                  V.
                        HANNAH J. LILLY, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
                             Collin County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 366-04515-2017

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
         Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Carlyle
                            Opinion by Justice Carlyle
      Danae McGann appeals from the trial court’s judgment after a jury trial. We

affirm as modified in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

      Ms. McGann sued Hannah Lilly for negligence based on a car wreck, claiming

it caused a debilitating post-concussion syndrome. At trial, Ms. McGann introduced

expert testimony from several medical providers. Emergency medicine physician Dr.

Martha Grimm testified that she has expertise in concussions, treated Ms. McGann

after the accident, diagnosed her with concussion and post-concussion syndrome,

and referred her to a neurologist for further treatment.
       Neurologist Dr. Pedro Nosnik also treated Ms. McGann after the accident.

Based on his examination and a review of her post-accident records and imaging,

Dr. Nosnik opined that Ms. McGann suffers from post-concussion syndrome

attributed to the accident. He further testified that although most patients fully

recover from post-concussion syndrome, there is a small percentage of patients who

have lingering symptoms. And he explained that certain pre-existing conditions,

including depression and migraines, can make recovery from a brain injury more

difficult.

       Optometrist Paul Kersjes testified that Ms. McGann sought treatment for

visual issues after the accident and reported suffering symptoms consistent with a

traumatic brain injury, including nausea, dizziness, and headaches. One of the

doctors at his practice diagnosed her with visual discomfort, spatial disorientation,

occulo motor dysfunction, and visual spatial deficiency, all of which are consistent

with brain injury.

       Diagnostic radiologist Dr. Louis Schruff testified that he reviewed a SPECT

scan of Ms. McGann’s brain following the accident. He explained that a SPECT scan

is different from an MRI or CAT scan in that it measures blood flow to assess brain

function, whereas the other scans look at structural damage. Dr. Schruff opined that

Ms. McGann suffers from decreased brain function in her frontal, temporal, and

occipital lobes, which could affect her mood, memory, concentration, vision, and

ability to perform complicated tasks. He further opined that a traumatic brain injury

                                        –2–
was the most likely cause for Ms. McGann’s abnormal brain function, although he

could not say whether the accident caused her injury because he did not have a pre-

accident SPECT scan for comparison.

      Neuropsychologist Dr. Richard Fulbright opined that Ms. McGann

demonstrated cognitive and emotional impairment, particularly in the area of coping

skills. Dr. Fulbright testified that Ms. McGann appeared to give her best efforts

during his examination, and he had no indication she was faking or exaggerating her

impairment. Dr. Fulbright attributed Ms. McGann’s impairment to the accident,

testifying that it affected multiple body systems and aggravated Ms. McGann’s

preexisting headaches. According to Dr. Fulbright, Ms. McGann can no longer work

and, although her biological recovery has plateaued, she will continue to need

medication and neuropsychotherapy in the future.

      Both Ms. McGann and her daughter testified about how the accident has

affected Ms. McGann’s life. They testified that the accident was extremely

debilitating, that Ms. McGann is not the same person she was before the accident,

and that she can no longer participate in many of her pre-accident activities.

      During her presentation of the case, Ms. Lilly elicited testimony establishing

that Ms. McGann had previously testified at least inconsistently. For example, in her

deposition, Ms. McGann testified that before the accident she had never received

treatment for depression, taken Prozac, or visited a psychiatrist, psychologist, or

neuropsychologist. Yet her medical records showed that she consistently received

                                         –3–
psychiatric treatment for depression in the years before the accident, which included

prescriptions for Prozac and Wellbutrin. In addition, her medical records showed that

she had previously received treatment from a neuropsychologist for memory loss

following an accident in 2011. Moreover, Ms. Lilly elicited testimony showing that,

despite denying as much during her deposition, Ms. McGann also sought treatment

before the accident for chronic headaches, dizziness, visual loss, visual changes,

vomiting, sensitivity to light, sensitivity to sound, fatigue, and concentration

difficulties—symptoms she claimed resulted from Ms. Lilly’s negligence.

      Beyond that inconsistent testimony, evidence at trial established that Ms.

McGann withheld her relevant medical history from many of the providers from

whom she sought treatment after the accident, including her testifying expert Dr.

Nosnik. One such provider, neurologist Dr. Sunil Thummala, testified that, after

reviewing multiple MRIs and EEGs, he could find no objective evidence to support

Ms. Lilly’s claims that her symptoms resulted from a post-accident traumatic brain

injury. He noted both that the symptoms Ms. McGann reported did not match the

injury she claimed to suffer and that her symptoms likely would have resolved in the

months following the accident, if she had in fact suffered such an injury. Dr.

Thummala wrote after his exam:

      Overwhelming majority of patients recover within a few months after
      accident. Certainly litigation is a major reason for symptom
      prolongation, and it is well-documented in literature. I believe her
      previous doctors perpetuated idea that her headaches are due to her
      brain damage, which at least I can’t see on exam today. Certainly, a

                                        –4–
      secondary gain as potential cause for her symptoms cannot be
      definitively ruled out.

      Dr. Thummala elaborated that it is well-documented in the medical literature

that “patients who have litigation pending and tend to file lawsuits, they tend to have

prolonged symptoms [compared to] an average patient who doesn’t go that route.”

He further explained that the term “secondary gain” refers to the patient “looking for

something else besides treatment,” which could include financial gain. He added

that, “[o]verall, looking at the records from past that we received and looking at the

exam and what she told us, the story was not making any -- much sense to me.” And

because there was “a disconnect, certainly we have to entertain the possibility that it

could be some secondary gain because I don’t want to treat somebody with [a] lot of

medications when the intent is not the medication but something else.”

      Dr. Thummala recalled that Ms. McGann’s husband became angry when he

explained he found no evidence of a brain injury. Dr. Thummala responded: “You

are free to seek opinion from other doctors. You came to me for an opinion, I’m

giving you an honest opinion that I’m not seeing any brain damage. If you’re fixated

on that, basically I can’t do much there.”

      Neuropsychologist Dr. Corwin Boake testified that his examination of Ms.

McGann revealed “invalid performance,” meaning that she did not give her best

efforts to reveal her true capabilities. He also found that she reported having many

more symptoms than concussion patients would normally report. And he found it

                                         –5–
noteworthy that, despite her long history of chronic mental health problems for

which she received medication and psychotherapy, Ms. McGann denied having ever

been treated by a psychiatrist. He explained that, based on the symptoms she reported

throughout her medical records, she would have been diagnosed with post-

concussion syndrome at least as far back as 2011. And based on his examination, the

evidence of invalid performance, Ms. McGann’s medical history, and her history of

mental-health issues, Dr. Boake opined that Ms. McGann did not need treatment for

“a traumatic brain injury or a neurocognitive impairment”; rather, she needed a

continuation of her “mental health treatment that has been going on for many years.”

        Ms. Lilly also introduced expert testimony from Dr. Rawson Wood, a licensed

physician, accredited accident reconstructionist, and biomechanical consultant. As

discussed in more detail below, Dr. Wood opined that, based on his reconstruction

of the accident, the resulting forces at play, the relevant medical literature, and his

review of Ms. McGann’s medical records, the accident did not cause her alleged

lingering symptoms, and a “substantial amount of secondary gain” was involved in

the case.

        The jury largely agreed with Ms. Lilly and awarded Ms. McGann damages

for only certain past medical expenses related to the accident. The trial court entered

judgment consistent with the verdict, and Ms. McGann appeals.1

    1
     We reject Ms. Lilly’s contention that Ms. McGann waived her right to appeal by filing a motion for
judgment on the verdict. Ms. McGann’s motion specifically noted that “she did not waive her pre-trial and

                                                  –6–
       Ms. McGann did not preserve her time limits complaint

       Ms. McGann first contends the trial court abused its discretion by limiting her

case presentation to between four and five hours, which she contends prevented her

from presenting “crucial testimony.” Ms. McGann failed to preserve this issue by

making an offer of proof or bill of exceptions providing the substance of the evidence

purportedly excluded as a result of the time limitations. See Jones v. Carson, No. 03-

22-00086-CV, 2023 WL 3873509, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 8, 2023, no pet.

h.) (mem. op.); Goss v. Goss, No. 04-16-00809-CV, 2018 WL 340139, at *2 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Jan. 10, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

       No abuse of discretion regarding evidence related to Ms. McGann’s husband

       Ms. McGann next contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

exclude certain evidence and argument concerning similar symptoms and injuries

Ms. McGann’s husband reported suffering in a previous traffic accident. The

evidence to which Ms. Lilly referred in argument came directly from Ms. McGann’s

Exhibit Number 35, records from Dr. Fulbright.

       Regarding Ms. Lilly’s closing argument highlighting that evidence, Ms.

McGann objected without stating a basis, asked to approach, and the bench

conference was not recorded. Thus, she failed to preserve the issue by making a

trial objections.” And she filed a motion for new trial raising many of the complaints she now raises on
appeal. See Edes v. Arriaga, No. 05-17-01278-CV, 2019 WL 2266391, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (no waiver where, among other things, party who moved for judgment also filed
motion for new trial).
                                                 –7–
sufficiently specific objection on the record. See Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC v.

Bishop, 553 S.W.3d 648, 676 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. granted); Warrantech

Corp. v. Comput. Adapters Servs., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 516, 529 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2004, no pet.) (“[T]his complaint is waived because the . . . general statement of

‘objection’ when the testimony was offered, followed by an off-the-record bench

conference, did not create a record sufficient to preserve the complaint for our

review.”). Although a general objection may suffice if its grounds are apparent from

context, see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A), that is not the case here. Even with the

benefit of Ms. McGann’s appellate arguments, we cannot determine with any

precision the basis of her trial objection.

      No abuse of discretion to exclude untimely disclosed evidence

      Ms. McGann next complains that the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding certain witnesses and documentary evidence that she failed to timely

disclose under the operative scheduling order. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6. She

contends the trial court should have allowed the evidence because she showed either

good cause for the untimely disclosure or a lack of unfair surprise or prejudice to

Ms. Lilly. See id. Assuming preservation and an abuse of discretion, Ms. McGann

has not demonstrated that the exclusion “probably caused the rendition of an

improper judgment.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1.

      With respect to the excluded lay witnesses, Ms. McGann offers only general

assertions that the testimony from these “disinterested third parties would have been

                                          –8–
offered to bolster observations of [her] doctors and family” and “provide the jury

with independent accounts of [her] affected behavior and suffering because of the

accident.” She does not identify the relevant testimony each witness would have

provided, except to say that each would “relat[e] evidence of behavior consistent

with [a closed-head] injury.” Moreover, she fails to explain why having these

additional witnesses “bolster” the testimony Ms. McGann, her doctors, and her

family provided would not have been cumulative. See Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d

645, 668 (Tex. 2018) (noting that “[e]xclusion is likely harmless if the evidence was

cumulative”). We can discern no harm.

      With respect to the excluded medical testimony and records, Ms. McGann

offers only a conclusory assertion that, “[h]ad the jury had a chance to listen” to her

“qualified expert doctors, there is a substantial chance this case could have come out

differently.” She neither identifies the specific subject matter of the excluded

medical testimony nor explains how that testimony would have been both

noncumulative and “crucial to a key issue.” See id. On this record, based on Ms.

McGann’s appellate arguments, we cannot conclude the trial court reversibly erred

by excluding her untimely disclosed evidence.

      No abuse of discretion to allow Dr. Wood’s expert testimony

      Ms. McGann next contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing

Dr. Rawson Wood to testify as an expert for the defense. Ms. Lilly contends Ms.

McGann failed to preserve this issue as well, because her trial objection lacked

                                         –9–
sufficient specificity.2 We disagree. To preserve a complaint that expert evidence is

unreliable, a party must object to that evidence either before trial or when the

evidence is offered. Baker v. Habeeb, No. 05-16-01209-CV, 2018 WL 1835566, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 18, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, Ms. McGann

moved to exclude Dr. Wood’s testimony as unreliable before trial, and has

sufficiently preserved her objections to Dr. Wood’s expert testimony at least to the

extent of the motion. See id.; Austin v. Weems, 337 S.W.3d 415, 421 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (where reliability is challenged by pre-trial motion

to exclude, there is no need to object again in front of the jury).

        The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of an

expert’s opinion, and we will reverse only if the trial court abuses that discretion by

acting without reference to any guiding rules or principles. E.I. du Pont de Nemours

& Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556–57 (Tex. 1995). Expert testimony is

admissible if: (1) the witness is qualified to testify as an expert based on his

“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” TEX. R. EVID. 702; and (2) the

testimony is both relevant and based on a reliable foundation. TXI Transp. Co. v.

    2
      Ms. McGann filed a motion to abate the appeal so the trial court could correct the reporter’s record,
which describes her trial objection as follows: “I would just like to renew for the record our objection to
the opinion testimony related to this based upon our---the information in our (unintelligible) motion.” Ms.
McGann urges that the portion of the record saying “(unintelligible) motion” should instead say “pre-trial
Daubert motion.” We denied Ms. McGann’s motion to abate the appeal, and she has filed a motion for
reconsideration. Because we conclude her objections to Dr. Wood’s testimony are preserved to the extent
asserted in her pre-trial motion to exclude, we deny her motion for reconsideration as moot.
                                                  –10–
Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2010). “An expert’s testimony is relevant when

it assists the jury in determining an issue or in understanding other evidence.” Id.

      If an expert testifies on scientific matters, the testimony must be both

“grounded in the methods and procedures of science” and based on reliable

foundational data. Helena Chem. Co. v. Cox, 664 S.W.3d 66, 73–74 (Tex. 2023)

(quotation omitted). A court cannot ignore “fatal gaps in an expert’s analysis or

assertions that are simply incorrect,” which “may include circumstances in which

the expert unreliably applies otherwise sound principles and methodologies, the

expert’s opinion is based on assumed facts that vary materially from the facts in the

record, or the expert’s opinion is based on tests or data that do not support the

conclusions reached.” Id. (quoting Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc., 464

S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2015)).

      The supreme court has identified six non-exclusive factors courts may

consider in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable: (1) “the

extent to which the theory has been or can be tested”; (2) “the extent to which the

technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert”; (3) “whether the

theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication”; (4) “the technique’s

potential rate of error”; (5) “whether the underlying theory or technique has been

generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community”; and (6) “the non-

judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique.” Id.

                                        –11–
      The record shows Dr. Wood is a licensed physician who has treated patients

with concussions and traumatic head injuries. He is board certified in aerospace and

occupational medicine, both of which he testified have crash investigation and

resultant injury causation as part of their formal curricula. He also has a degree in

aeronautical engineering and teaches as an adjunct professor at the United States Air

Force School of Aerospace Medicine, where he helps residents learn about impact

by biomechanics. Since 2016, Dr. Wood has worked as a consultant in the field of

“injury causation analysis (ICA).”

      In addition to his education, training, and experience in the areas of

engineering and medicine, Dr. Wood studied accident reconstruction at

Northwestern University and received full accreditation from the Accreditation

Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction in 2017. Dr. Wood co-authored two

published, peer-reviewed research papers “studying kinematics and injury potential

in low speed rear automotive impacts.” And he has performed biomechanical

analyses using the ICA methodology in more than 230 cases.

      According to Dr. Wood, ICA is adapted from the scientific method for the

primary purpose of developing safety and injury prevention technologies, and it is

used extensively by industry and government to develop enhanced safety measures.

It can be used “forensically to find the basis for a causal relationship between an

incident and an injury.”

                                       –12–
       Dr. Wood explained that ICA involves using physics and commonly accepted

accident reconstruction techniques to “reconstruct the subject event.” From there,

the process involves determining the event’s injury potential and comparing

expected injuries during the event with injuries documented in the medical records.

This allows conclusions to be drawn about the likelihood that the documented

injuries resulted from the subject event.

       With respect to accident reconstruction, Dr. Wood testified that “automotive

investigations typically include[] a determination of the Principal Direction of Force

(PDOF) and the impact-related change of velocity (delta-V),” which are often

“determined based on examination of the vehicle, including photographs and/or

repair estimates of the vehicle.” He explained that, “[a]s speeds increase, the

potential for damage and injury typically increases.” And “[a]s most events follow

commonly described patterns,” published scientific literature can support the

investigation process both with respect to the subject event and the pattern of

injuries.

       Dr. Wood testified about ICA’s potential error rates, noting that the primary

area of concern is measurement error. But “by conservatively over-valuing forces in

favor of a more significant interaction and providing those values in terms of ranges,

any error is accurately accounted-for.”

       Dr. Wood also testified that ICA theory and techniques are longstanding,

generally accepted in the scientific community, “and have been and are subject to

                                          –13–
extensive peer review and publication in numerous textbooks, journals and scientific

and professional conference proceedings.” He notes that “the application of the ICA

to incidents such as [Ms. McGann’s] accident are expressly set forth by publication

in the AMA Guides Newsletter, a peer-reviewed publication of the American Medical

Association.” And he adds that ICA theory and techniques have been used by

numerous governmental agencies, including the Department of Defense, the

Department of Transportation, the FAA, the NTSB, and OSHA.

      Dr. Wood further testified that the use of computer programs applying ICA

techniques to accident reconstruction is widespread. He explained that one such

program, EDSMAC, was developed at the request of the National Highway

Transportation Safety Agency (NHTSA), using elements of ICA “to determine the

conditions of impact, including vehicle dynamics and occupant kinematics.”

According to Dr. Wood, “EDSMAC is a validated and published physics-based

commercial software” program that “uses algorithms to extrapolate unknown data

from known values.” It does this by running simulations “in an iterative manner,

each time adjusting the unknown values in the interactions to solve the equations

until they correspond to the real world data points such as final points of rest.”

      With respect to the accident in this case, Dr. Wood said he relied upon, among

other things, the police crash report, the insurance loss report, a repair estimate for

Ms. McGann’s Dodge Durango, a recorded statement from Ms. Lilly, Ms. McGann’s

deposition, color photographs from the scene of the accident, color photographs of

                                         –14–
the cars involved, and Ms. McGann’s medical records. Dr. Wood testified that the

photographs helped him determine the direction of the force, magnitude of the force,

and the protective equipment inside the cars. He also obtained an exemplar Dodge

Durango from which to obtain relevant measurements.

      Dr. Wood testified he performed an accident reconstruction using two

independent methods. First, he performed a damage-based “crush” analysis using

equations taken from the relevant literature to determine that the barrier equivalent

velocity of the crash was 19.3 miles per hour. He explained that this meant the “crush

energy” and “crush characteristics” of the crash were equivalent to Ms. McGann

driving her Dodge Durango “into a rigid brick wall barrier at 19.3 miles per hour.”

Second, he used the EDSMAC program to recreate the accident using simulations,

ultimately determining that the delta-V, the impact-related change of velocity, was

18.9. His report noted that the EDSMAC results were “consistent with the damage-

based analysis and the vehicle rest positions are consistent with those in the police

diagram.”

      Dr. Wood testified based on NHTSA crash test data that Ms. McGann’s Dodge

Durango was designed to be safe at speeds up to 35 miles per hour. And in rigid-

barrier crash testing performed on the car by the NHTSA at that speed, the peak head

acceleration was measured at approximately 50 g. According to Dr. Wood’s report,

Ms. McGann’s peak head acceleration in the subject accident, which involved a

                                        –15–
barrier equivalent velocity of 19.3, would have been significantly less than 50 g—

approximately 30 g.

      According to Dr. Wood, published data from the NHTSA’s database, which

catalogs hospital records from people involved in tow-away crashes, shows that the

risk of suffering a concussion at a delta-V of 19 is almost zero. Dr. Wood likewise

added that published biomechanical literature showed the concussion risk at the peak

head acceleration Ms. McGann experienced would be “essentially zero.”

      In his report, Dr. Wood cited literature suggesting there was little evidence to

support a relationship between mild traumatic brain injuries and permanent

impairment. And he cited medical literature suggesting that claims of lingering post-

concussion symptoms are strongly associated with unresolved litigation and

compensation. Based on his review of Ms. McGann’s deposition and medical

records, Dr. Wood opined that Ms. McGann did not suffer a concussion or traumatic

brain injury as a result of the accident, and “[a]ny diagnosis, subsequent

investigations and treatment relate[d] to brain damage, visual or vestibular

dysfunction, depression, anxiety and other psychiatric disorders are not causally

related to the” accident. He did not dispute that Ms. McGann suffered from

psychiatric illness or other neurologic conditions, but those conditions “started

before, continued after and were unchanged from the subject event.” He also opined

that a “substantial amount of secondary gain” was involved in the case.

                                        –16–
      Though she did not attempt to present an expert to combat Dr. Wood’s

testimony, Ms. McGann makes a host of arguments under the aegis of a 702

challenge, purportedly in search of the fatal “analytical gaps,” but which in reality

are attempts to create an expert battle on appeal. We are not the fact-finder in this

case, and for this underlying reason, we reject most of Ms. McGann’s appellate

complaints. See Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 695–96 (Tex. 2012). In any event,

the trial on the merits, including cross-examination and her opportunity to present

an expert of her own, are the real-world remedies for Ms. McGann’s complaints. See

Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 728 (Tex. 1998) (“The

trial court’s gatekeeping function under Rule 702 does not supplant cross-

examination as the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but

admissible evidence.”) (cleaned up); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Allison, 414 S.W.3d

266, 276 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Conflicting theories

between experts . . . do not automatically render one unreliable.”).

      Atypically, Ms. McGann begins her argument on this issue by discussing the

harm she suffered due to Dr. Wood’s testimony. She next argues that, because other

courts have excluded other expert witness testimony from others associated with the

company he works for, Biodynamics Research Company, the trial court should have

excluded Dr. Wood’s testimony. “Whether another expert affiliated with [this expert]

was successfully or unsuccessfully challenged does not address [this expert’s]

qualifications or methodology.” Nabors Well Servs., LTD v. Romero, 508 S.W.3d

                                        –17–
512, 534–35 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied). “Other than the relatively rare

instance when our supreme court, or one of our sister courts of appeals have

specifically addressed the expert before us on similar facts, with similar

methodological challenges, merely reciting that another court has struck or allowed

an expert is little more than a make-weight argument.” Id. We find insufficient

similarities in any of Ms. McGann’s cases to use these other court’s conclusions—

from other cases with other experts and other facts—to conclusively govern our

analysis here.

      Ms. McGann also argues—citing no authority—that Dr. Wood is not qualified

to provide accident reconstruction testimony because he does not have a degree in

biomechanical engineering, has not worked as an engineer, is not licensed as an

engineer, and has not published papers regarding biomechanics. Dr. Wood testified

that he worked as a “human factors engineer” in the U.S. Air Force; has a degree in

aeronautical engineering; studied accident reconstruction at Northwestern

University; is fully accredited by the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident

Reconstruction; co-authored two published, peer-reviewed research papers

involving the injury potential of certain low-speed traffic accidents; and has

conducted ICA analyses in more than 230 cases. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by determining that Dr. Wood is qualified to provide his accident-

reconstruction opinions. See Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996).

                                       –18–
      Ms. McGann contends that Dr. Wood did not properly use accident

reconstruction tools, though she acknowledges that “if the rigors of scientific method

are used,” those tools “can be useful.” She argues that Dr. Wood’s testimony is

unreliable because he based it “entirely on his eyeball estimate” of the damage to

Ms. McGann’s car, using “blurry photographs” instead of a physical examination.

This mischaracterizes Dr. Wood’s analysis, which both his testimony and report

reveal was based on, among other things, the police report, insurance report,

photographs, third-party repair estimates, NHTSA crash-test data, witness

statements, and measurements taken from an exemplar vehicle. Dr. Wood also

testified that the sources he used to perform his analyses were sufficient under peer-

reviewed, industry-accepted accident reconstruction methodology.

      Ms. McGann points to no record evidence contradicting Dr. Wood’s testimony

that the sources and methodology he used are accepted within the field of accident

reconstruction. Instead, she quotes conclusory data from a single article she asserts

“specifically invalidates” Dr. Wood’s damage-based methodology, but makes no

attempt to explain how the data support her conclusory argument. See Bartlett, W. et

al., Evaluating the Uncertainty in Various Measurement Tasks Common to Accident

Reconstruction, JOURNAL OF PASSENGER CAR: MECHANICAL SYSTEMS JOURNAL, Vol

111 § 6, 657 (2002). The article describes a limited experiment and specifically states

that proper accident reconstruction would need more “details and analysis” than

                                        –19–
those used in the experiment. Dr. Wood’s crush analysis was not limited in the ways

the experiment was and we reject this argument.

      Ms. McGann also complains that Dr. Wood’s use of the EDSMAC software

was unreliable because he arbitrarily “guessed at” certain input values and ran the

program until he got the results he wanted. This mischaracterizes Dr. Wood’s

testimony and analysis: he explained that the EDSMAC software works by running

simulations “in an iterative manner, each time adjusting the unknown values in the

interactions to solve the equations until they correspond to the real world data points

such as final points of rest.” Thus, in order to get the simulation to match known

facts about the collision, he had to adjust certain input variables, such as starting

positions and steering angles, until the simulation matched the known data.

      Ms. McGann also challenges certain values Dr. Wood used in his ESMAC

analysis, including vehicle weight, speed, and the stiffness of Ms. Lilly’s vehicle.

The trial court was free to credit Dr. Wood’s explanation as to why his values were

appropriate under the circumstances. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by allowing Dr. Wood’s accident reconstruction testimony.

      Ms. McGann next attacks the validity of Dr. Wood’s causation opinions based

on his accident reconstruction analysis. She argues that Dr. Wood’s opinions about

vehicle impact are irrelevant because he did not use a “crash pulse” analysis to

calculate Ms. McGann’s “occupant impact velocity,” which she contends would

have provided a more accurate predictor of injuries than delta-V. She cites one article

                                        –20–
outlining certain limitations of delta-V as an injury predictor. See Tsoi, A. et al.,

Evaluation of Vehicle-Based Crash Severity Metrics, TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION

(2015). But that article’s authors acknowledge delta-V “is a widely used crash

severity metric used to estimate occupant injury risk,” thus undercutting Ms.

McGann’s assertions that Dr. Wood’s methodology is not widely accepted within the

field. As we suggested, any scientific disagreement about the relative predictive

value of delta-V in assessing injuries provides fertile ground for cross-examination,

but does not render it irrelevant. See Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728; New Hampshire

Ins. Co., 414 S.W.3d at 276.

      Similarly, Ms. McGann’s assertion that Dr. Wood’s analysis did not

adequately account for rotational forces and vehicle safety features does not render

his opinions irrelevant. Ms. McGann again cites a single article suggesting that

oblique impacts have a greater potential for brain injury than perpendicular impacts.

See Kleivan, S., Why Most Traumatic Brain Injuries are Not Caused by Linear

Acceleration but Skull Fractures Are, FRONTIERS OF BIOENGINEERING AND

BIOTECHNOLOGY (2013). But Ms. McGann cites no record evidence, much less

expert testimony, establishing either the significance of any rotational forces in this

accident or that Dr. Wood’s analysis fails to account for those forces such that his

conclusions are unreliable.

      Likewise, Ms. McGann argues that crush measurements taken from vehicles

with foam bumpers can be misleading because they do not account for the amount

                                        –21–
of force absorbed by the bumpers. But the article she cites for support addresses low-

speed collisions where the forces at issue are insufficient to cause visible vehicle

deformation, noting that in such cases, it can be difficult to visually assess crash

severity. See Happer, A.J. et al., Practical Analysis Methodology for Low-Speed

Vehicle Collisions Involving Vehicles with Modern Bumper Systems, JOURNAL OF

PASSENGER CAR: MECHANICAL SYSTEMS JOURNAL, Vol. 112, § 6, 414 (2003). The

collision in this case involved speeds sufficient to cause significant vehicle

deformation. Thus, it is unclear whether and to what extent the article’s observations

about bumper absorption in low-speed collisions apply. Regardless, Ms. McGann

fails to cite any record evidence establishing the types of bumpers at issue in this

case or that Dr. Wood’s analysis failed to sufficiently account for any forces absorbed

by them.

      Ms. McGann also contends that Dr. Wood “is wholly unqualified” to offer

medical or psychiatric conclusions about the cause of her symptoms. She argues

without citing any authority that “[o]pinions relating to secondary gain are the

province of mental health professionals.” Dr. Wood testified that he is a licensed

physician who has treated patients with concussions and other head injuries.

Although he is not a board-certified neuropsychiatrist, he testified that he has been

credentialed to perform neuropsychological exams, and he has made many

psychiatric diagnoses for which he has provided treatment. In addition, Dr. Wood

testified he is board certified in occupational and aerospace medicine, which

                                        –22–
includes formal curricula in investigating accident-related injury causation. And his

report demonstrates familiarity with reputable medical literature suggesting a strong

association between patients reporting persistent concussion symptoms and

unresolved issues of compensation and litigation. See, e.g., Ropper, A., et al.,

Concussion, NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (2007). On this record, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Dr. Wood is qualified to offer

his medical causation opinions.

      Ms. McGann also contends the trial court should have excluded Dr. Wood’s

medical causation opinions because they are “highly prejudicial” and “inherently

speculative,” arguing that Dr. Wood testified Ms. McGann’s “current complaints all

arose from a motive of secondary gain.” But Dr. Wood opined that Ms. McGann’s

symptoms arose from pre-existing conditions that were not medically affected by the

accident and also that there was a “substantial amount of secondary gain involved in

this case.”

      Regardless, in addition to the relevant medical literature cited above, the

record Dr. Wood considered in formulating his opinions contained substantial

evidence from which he could conclude secondary gain was a factor in Ms.

McGann’s persistent symptom reporting—including Dr. Thummala’s and Dr.

Boake’s observations, as well as evidence largely withheld from the jury concerning

similar claims and symptoms alleged by Ms. McGann’s husband and daughter. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Wood’s testimony.

                                       –23–
      The court should have awarded Ms. McGann her taxable costs

      Finally, Ms. McGann complains the trial court abused its discretion by failing

to award her taxable court costs. We agree. Under the rules of civil procedure, “[t]he

successful party to a suit shall recover of his adversary all costs incurred therein,

except where otherwise provided.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 131. A “successful party” is “one

who obtains judgment of a competent court vindicating a civil right or claim.” Mag

Instrument, Inc. v. G.T. Sales Inc., 294 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009,

pet. denied) (quoting City of Houston v. Woods, 138 S.W.3d 574, 581 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). “Whether a party is ‘successful’ is based on

success on the merits and not on the award of damages.” Id.

      Here, Ms. McGann sued Ms. Lilly for negligence, and Ms. Lilly disputed

liability. The claim went to trial, and the trial court granted Ms. McGann a directed

verdict with respect to liability. The jury awarded damages for certain past medical

care expenses that Ms. McGann incurred as a result of Ms. Lilly’s negligence, and

the trial court entered judgment in Ms. McGann’s favor. She is thus a “successful

party” for purposes of rule 131. And absent a record finding of good cause for

allocating costs otherwise, Ms. McGann is entitled to recover her costs. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 131, 141.

      We reject Ms. Lilly’s argument that the trial court was within its discretion to

deny Ms. McGann her costs without making a record finding of good cause because

Ms. McGann did not prevail on the “main issue” at trial and thus does not qualify as

                                        –24–
the “prevailing party” under cases applying section 38.001 of the civil practices and

remedies code. See Mag Instrument, Inc., 294 S.W.3d at 808 (“[T]he prevailing party

is typically the party who either successfully prosecutes the action or successfully

defends against it, prevailing on the main issue.”). But the standard for cost awards

under rule 131 is distinct from the “prevailing party” standard for attorney-fee-

shifting under civil practices and remedies code section 38.001. See id. The relevant

inquiry under rule 131 is whether Ms. McGann “obtain[ed] judgment of a competent

court vindicating a civil right or claim” on the merits, not whether she prevailed on

the “main issue” at trial. See id.

      We modify the trial court’s judgment to award Ms. McGann her court costs

and affirm the judgment as modified.

                                           /Cory L. Carlyle/
220455f.p05                                CORY L. CARLYLE
                                           JUSTICE

                                        –25–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

DANAE RUTH MCGANN,                             On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
Appellant                                      District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 366-04515-
No. 05-22-00455-CV           V.                2017.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
HANNAH J. LILLY, Appellee                      Chief Justice Burns and Justice
                                               Molberg participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is MODIFIED as follows:

      A sentence is added stating: “Danae Ruth McGann shall recover her
      court costs from Hannah J. Lilly.”

It is ORDERED that, as modified, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

       It is ORDERED that appellant Danae Ruth McGann recover her costs of
this appeal from appellee Hannah J. Lilly.

Judgment entered this 14th day of August, 2023.

                                        –26–