Court Opinion

ID: 9460348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:47:47.585475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:52.227607
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(concurring) :
The requirement of corroboration in sex offenses, particularly rape, has come under sharp attack in recent years.1 Feminists have found the requirement unjust to women2 and prosecutors have argued that it makes convictions too difficult to obtain.3 These criticisms force us to examine the origins of the current views on corroboration.
I
The notion that the testimony of a single witness is inadequate to prove a crime is an ancient one. The Code of the Emperior Justinian provided that on any important issue the testimony of one witness was insufficient.4 Ecclesiastical law refined this approach by requiring, for example, that against the word of a Cardinal, forty-four witnesses were required.5 But the common law gradually moved toward other modes of inquiry into the truth. Ultimately the common law rejected the requirement of corroboration for all crimes except perjury.6 Thus there was no common law requirement of corroboration for any sex offense.7
Today thirty-five states have similarly rejected the corroboration requirement for rape.8 Of those jurisdictions that retain the requirement, about half, including the District of Columbia, do so in the absence of legislation.9 The substance of corroboration requirements varies enormously from state to state, ranging from a requirement of corroboration for force, penetration and identity, to minimal corroboration of any part of the complainant’s testimony.10
II
Numerous justifications have been advanced for the requirement of corroboration in sex eases. An examination of these rationales reveals a tangled web of legitimate concerns, out-dated beliefs, and deep-seated prejudices.
*553The most common basis advanced for the requirement is that false charges of rape are more prevalent than false charges of other crimes.11 A statement such as this is extremely difficult to prove, and little or no evidence has been adduced to support it.12 Two reasons are generally given for the belief that unfounded rape charges are common. It is argued, first, that women often have a motive to fabricate rape accusations and second, that women may fantasize rapes.13
It is contended that a woman may fabricate a rape accusation because, having consented to intercourse she is ashamed and bitter, or because she is pregnant and feels pressured to create a false explanation, or because she hates the man she accuses or wishes to blackmail him.14 It is said to be relatively easy to create a false description of rape in convincing detail.15
There are, however, countervailing reasons not to report a rape. One said to be a victim of rape may be stigmatized by society, there may be humiliating publicity, and the necessity of facing the insinuations of defense counsel may be a deterrent.16 Moreover, those claiming to have been raped may be treated harshly by the police and by hospitals.17 One result of all of these obstacles is that rape is one of the most under-reported of all crimes.18
It is difficult to say whether those inclined to falsify a charge of rape are deterred by the same factors that deter the reporting of actual rapes. A falsifier, for example, may be a seeker of publicity rather than one who shuns it.
In addition to fabricated rapes, it has been suggested that women may report fantasized rapes.19 Both the causes and prevalence of rape fantasies have been *554hotly disputed and it is not established that any significant number of rape charges arise out of fantasies.20 To the extent that rape charges do so arise, that could be the result of an inferior and oppressed status of women that is now being eroded 21
With both fabricated and fantasized rapes it appears well-established that what dangers do exist are greatest when the complainant is young.22 Care must be taken, however, not to blindly look at chronological age when the background and experience of a complainant may make her more or less likely to be prone .to the suggestiveness that at times makes the young unreliable witnesses.
In addition to the problem of false charges, the corroboration requirement is justified on the theory that rape is a charge unusually difficult to defend against. In 1680 Lord Chief Justice Hale wrote, in one of the most oft-quoted passages in our jurisprudence, that rape “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.”23 The same theme has been echoed by modern commentators and courts.24 The usual absence of eyewitnesses damages the defendant as well as the complainant. Juries are said to be unusually sympathetic to a woman wronged, thus weakening the presumption of innocence.25
Again, there is little hard evidence with which to test this theory. What studies are available suggest that a defendant is unlikely to be convicted of rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant in those jurisdictions that do not require corroboration.26 Thus juries may be more skeptical of rape accusations than is often supposed.
Another justification for the corroboration requirement is the prevalence of severe penalties for rape. For many years rape was punishable by death in many states.27 Today rape is still among the most severely punished of crimes.28 One result has been the development of rules such as the corroboration requirement. Proposals that the corroboration requirement be abandoned are at times coupled with proposals that the penalties for rape be reduced.29 Reformers are subject to certain tensions on this issue. On the one hand, they seek to bring standards of proof and punishment for rape in line with those for other crimes of violence. Thus it is argued that “As long as rape is. viewed primarily as a sexual crime rather than as a crime of violence and power, society will continue to react to rape as it has in the past. The goal . . . is to normalize the crime of rape.”30 On the other hand, reformers note that rape is an unusually traumatic experience. Special procedures are suggested for rape victims.31 We are told that “rape is considerably more than mere physical assault. It is a psychic violation also, a serious injury against the victim’s emotions and spirit that may cause mental torment difficult or impossible to be eased.”32 In light of this there may *555well be resistance to lowering the penalties.
Still another basis for the corroboration requirement lies in “the sorry history of racism in America.”33 There has been an enormous danger of injustice when a black man accused of raping a white woman is tried before a white jury.34 Of the 455 men executed for rape since 1930, 405 (89 percent) were black.35 In the vast majority of these cases the complainant was white.36
All of the safeguards that developed in this context should not be automatically applied today. Juries are more integrated than in the past and racial prejudice may be at a somewhat lower level. Numerous rape victims are black and their interests, as well as those of white women, may have been slighted by the concern for black defendants.
A final theory of the corroboration requirement is that it stems from discrimination against women. It is said that traditional sex stereotypes have resulted in rape laws that protect men rather than women. Penalties are high because a “good” woman is a valued possession of a man. Corroboration is required because to a “good” woman rape is “a fate worse than death” and she should fight to the death to resist it. If no such fight is put up, the woman must have consented or at least enticed the rapist, who is therefore blameless.37 In sum it is said to be the “male desire to ‘protect’ his ‘possession’ which results in laws designed to protect the male — both the ‘owner’ and the assailant — rather than protecting the physical well-being and freedom of movement of women.”38
This point of view, which has been expressed by men as well as women,39 may well have some validity. It would be surprising if entrenched notions of sexuality did not play a role in the law of crimes dealing with sexual violations. Corroboration rules may be structured, for example, to protect male rather than female defendants. This could explain the fact that conviction for soliciting for homosexual purposes requires corroboration while soliciting for heterosexual prostitution does not.40
Ultimately modern notions of sexual equality may help breakdown those aspects of rape law which stem from unjust discrimination against women.
Ill
Analyzing all of these justifications in order to separate the valid from the invalid is no easy task. As I have said in another context, we are in that terrible period known as “meanwhile.” We know enough to be troubled but not enough to know how to resolve our troubles.41 As evidence, mores, and attitudes change we too must remain open to change. Next year or twenty years from now available information may require at different approach. But at least for the immediate present, I find that the flexible corroboration rule developed *556by this Court provides the best accommodation of numerous conflicting considerations. There may still be the possibility of special fabrication problems relating to rape, particularly where, as in this case, the complainant is young. There are still severe penalties for rape. There is still racism in our society and that racism may be particularly likely to surface in a case involving alleged sexual violations.
To guard against these possible dangers we retain a corroboration rule which provides that “independent corroborative evidence will be regarded as sufficient when it would permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s account of the crime was not a fabrication.” United States v. Gray, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 275 at 276, 477 F.2d 444 at 445 (1973.) We adhere to no absolute tests or concrete guidelines.42 We only require evidence of the crime of probative value outside of the complainant’s testimony.43 In cases such as this one where that evidence is lacking the dangers to the defendant outweigh the difficulties created for the prosecution.
The net effect of our current approach does not appear to make convictions for rape unusually difficult in this jurisdiction. Available statistics indicate that the conviction rate for rape in the District of Columbia is actually higher than it is for the United States as a whole, and most states do not require corroboration.44
Thus I concur in the court’s opinion reversing defendant’s conviction.

. See, e. g., Report of the District of Columbia Public Safety Committee Task Force on Rape, at 51-55 (July 9, 1973) [hereinafter Task Force Report] ; Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J. 1365 (1972) [hereinafter Repeal Not Reform].

. See, e. g., Lear, Q. If you Rape a Woman and Steal Her TV, What Can They Get You for in New York? A. Stealing Her TV, N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 11.

. See, e. g., Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement in New York, 36 Brooklyn L.R. 378 (1970) [hereinafter Ludwig].
Criticism was particularly severe of the pre-1972 New York law which required corroboration of each material element of the offense. This criticism led to modification of the New York requirement. Repeal Not Reform at 1365,1368.

. Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses in New York, 40 Fordham L.Rev. 263 (1971) [hereinafter Younger]. Younger relies on 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2030-2032 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter Wigmore] and 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 203-211 (3d ed. 1944). Justinian’s general principle was called the rule of number.

. Id.

. Id. at 264.

. See 7 Wigmore § 2061, at 342. The statement to the contrary in People v. Friedman, 139 App.Div. 795, 796, 124 N.Y.S. 521, 522 (2d Dep’t 1910) is unsupported by authority.

. Repeal Not Reform at 1367.

. Id. at 1367, 1368, notes 14-18.

. Id. at 1368-1370.

. See, e. g., Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 1137 (1967) [hereinafter Corroborating Charges] ; Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 Law and Contemp.Prob. 217 (1960).

. The report of the District of Columbia Public Safety Committee Task Force, see note 1, supra, contends that:
That allegation, by now transformed into an accepted “truth”, even judicial doctrine, that women often fantacize or fabricate false charges of rape, has been reported over and over without citing any supporting evidence. . .
In all offenses, including rape, some false and mistaken accusations will be made. For example it is not uncommon for a person to complain that a friend pointed a gun or waved a knife at him — an assault with a dangerous weapon. It may well be that no weapon is found and the complainant has a motive to lie, but there is no corroboration requirement.

. See, e. g., Coltrane v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 295, 298-299, 418 F.2d 1131, 1134-1135 (1969) (“We know from the lessons of the past that all too frequently such complainants have an urge to fantacize or even a motive to fabricate . . .)

. See, e. g., Corroborating Charges at 1138; J. MacDonald, Rape: Offenders and Their Victims 209-31 (1971).

. 3 Wigmore § 924a.

. Repeal Not Reform at 1374.

. See Task Force Report at 11-21.

. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 21 (1967); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 1970 14 (1971). The President’s Commission found that forcible rapes occurred at 3 and one-half times the reported rate.

. See, e. g., 3A Wigmore § 924(a), at 736-746; Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 227-239, 143 N.E.2d 649, 656-662 (1957) (Emmert, J. dissenting). The Wedmore opinion quotes the following statement of Dr. Karl A. Menninger:
. . . fantasies of being raped are exceedingly common in women, indeed one may almost say that they are probably universal. By this I mean that most women, if we may judge from our clinical experience, entertain more or less consciously at one time or another fleeting fantasies or fears that they are being or will be attacked by a man. Of course, the normal woman who has such a fantasy does not confuse it with reality, but it is so easy for some neurotic individuals to translate their fantasies into actual beliefs and memory falsifications that I think a safeguard should certainly be placed upon this type of criminal charge. Wedmore, supra at 658.

. Repeal Not Reform at 1376-1378.

. Id.

. Id. at 1388-90, and sources cited therein.

. 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 636 (1680).

. Corroborating Charges at 1139.

. Id.

. Repeal Not Reform at 1382-1389.
The conclusion here is based on an analysis of the Kalven and Zeisel empirical study of criminal juries. H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury (1966).

. Task Force Report at 6.

. Id.

. Id. at 9.

. Id. at 35.

. Id. at 14.

. Coleman McCarthy, The Crime of Rape, The Washington Post, August 8, 1973, p. A18, col. 3. Bee, also, Mary Ann Largen, Coordinator,' Rape Task Forcé, National Organization for Women, Letter to The Washington Post, August 16, 1973, p. A21, col. 1 (“The emotional trauma of a rape victim is seldom, if ever, understood by the police, *555doctors, and courts. Likewise, it is seldom understood by the woman’s family, friends, and society in general.”)

. Task Force Report at 5.

. Repeal Not Reform at 1380.

. Id. at note 103.

. See Ronald Goldfarb, Rape and Law Reform, The Washington Post, August 2, 1973, p. A24, col. 2. Goldfarb reports the estimate that, although capital punishment is available for crimes other than rape, the single category of rapes of whites by blacks accounts for most sentences to capital punishment in the United States.

. Task Force Report at 3-4.

. Mary Ann Largen, supra.

. See, e. g., Younger at 276, note 105 (“When all is said and done, it just might be that the requirement of corroboration in prosecutions for sex offenses (where, remember, the complainant is usually female and the defendant almost always male) is nothing more than an illustration of the law’s unequal treatment of women.”)

. Cf. Kelly v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 194 F.2d 150 (1952) and Price v. United States, 135 A.2d 854 (D.C.Ct.App. 1957).

. David L. Bazelon, “Justice Stumbles Over Science,” Transaction (July/August 1967) 8, 11.

. Bailey v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 88, 405 F.2d 1352, 1358 (1968).

. United States v. Jones, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 477 F.2d 1213, 1218 (1973).

. The latest estimate for the District of Columbia is that about 45% of those charged with rape are convicted of rape. Task Force Report at 25-26 (120 convictions of 269 tried). The comparable figure for the United States as a whole is 36.1%. Repeal Not Reform at 1370, note 38. Statistics generally indicate that only states with a very strict corroboration requirement, such as the old New York requirement, have a markedly low percentage of rape convictions. Id.