Court Opinion

ID: 9522176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:19:02.276868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:21.894720
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 32. {concurring). I agree with the majority opinion that the *35matter must be remanded to the circuit court. I write separately for two reasons: (1) the majority opinion lost its way in its analysis of the validity of the assessment charge, and (2) I disagree with the instructions on remand to the circuit court.
I I
¶ 33. The Green Lake Sanitary District's power to levy special assessments is governed by Wis. Stat. § 66.0703.1 Our case law requires a reviewing court to consider three factors in determining whether an assessment in the exercise of the police power has a *36"reasonable basis:" (A) Is the method of assessment reasonable? (B) Is the assessed property benefited by the assessment? (C) Is the effect of the assessment reasonable in that the assessment is in proportion to the benefit accruing to the assessed property?2
¶ 34. All three factors go to a determination of reasonable basis.3 Unfortunately the majority opinion merges these factors. This merger is not surprising, given that some overlap among the three factors exists and that prior cases do not always carefully distinguish among the factors; some cases fuse the reasonableness of the method (that is, the reasonableness of the exercise of the power of assessment) and the reasonableness of the effect (or result) of an assessment.
¶ 35. The law presumes the municipality proceeded reasonably in making the assessment. Courts may intercede only when the exercise of the police power is clearly unreasonable.4 Reasonableness is a question of law; this court determines reasonableness independent of the circuit court or court of appeals but *37benefiting from their analyses.5 The challenger bears the burden of going forward with the evidence and must overcome the presumption that the municipality proceeded reasonably. If the challenger meets its burden, the burden of persuasion that the chosen assessment method comported with the statutory requirement that it be reasonable rests with the municipality. The circuit court's factual determinations are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.6
A
¶ 36. The first factor a court addresses in reviewing an assessment under this standard of review is whether the method of assessment is reasonable. The method of assessment is reasonable if all the property owners are assessed uniformly, that is, by the same method.7 An assessment based upon lineal footage, for example, is uniformly based.8 Assessing each unit or lot the same base amount regardless of use of the waste water treatment plant and collection system is a uniform assessment.9
¶ 37. I conclude that the method of assessment in the present case is uniform. Each tax parcel is assessed an equal share of the direct and indirect costs of installing the single lateral access pipes necessary to connect to the new sewer system.
*38¶ 38. According to the statutes governing condominiums, each condominium unit shall be deemed a parcel and shall be subject to separate assessment and taxation by each assessing unit and special district for all types of taxes authorized by law.10 The Sanitary District uniformly assessed properties on this basis.
¶ 39. The majority attempts to characterize the tax parcel method of assessment as not meeting the uniformity requirement by pointing out that a tax parcel with multiple living units is assessed for a single stub, while each of the condominium units is a separate tax parcel and is assessed for one stub even though all 18 condominiums benefit from access to only one stub.11
¶ 40. The majority opinion ignores the uniformity of assessment method and looks to the nature of habitable units on various tax parcels. Few if any properties are exactly alike, and the majority's approach of looking at differences means a court may characterize any method of assessment as not uniform. By examining differences or the effect of the assessment rather than the method of assessment, any uniform method can be made to appear non-uniform.
¶ 41. My point is this: The Sanitary District clearly used a uniform method for all property owners in determining the assessment, namely, each tax parcel was assessed the same amount.
*39¶ 42. Nevertheless, "mere uniformity does not answer a reasonableness challenge."12 Whether a uniform method of assessment fairly apportions the cost or arbitrarily or capriciously burdens any group of property owners presents a different question than whether the method of the assessment is uniform. Analytically, a court should separate these questions for the benefit of municipalities trying to conform to the statutory standards and for the benefit of litigants and courts.
¶ 43. I conclude the first factor has been satisfied.
B
¶ 44. The next question a reviewing court must answer is whether the assessed property is benefited by the assessment. Although the condominiums had an operating septic system, the circuit court recognized that a septic system can fail and that a sewer extension project is of benefit. This finding of fact must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.13
¶ 45. I conclude that the second factor has been satisfied.
C
¶ 46. The final question a reviewing court must answer is whether the effect of the assessment is reasonable, that is, whether the assessment is appor*40tioned fairly and equitably among the property owners and is in proportion to the benefit accruing to the assessed property.
¶ 47. The cases set forth the following rules for determining whether an assessment made under the police power is reasonable in effect:
• "[A]n assessment is unfair when property owners in comparable positions face a marked disparity in cost for the receipt of equal benefits when an alternate, more equitable, method of assessment is feasible."14
• Using the same method to assess a group of property owners is unreasonable "when it results in an entirely disproportionate distribution of costs which easily could be avoided by using another basis for assessment."15
• It is unreasonable for a municipality to assess one group of property owners by a method that is completely different from the method used to assess another group of property owners, resulting in disproportionate distribution of costs among various taxpayers.16
• When the statute does not prescribe a specific method for apportioning costs, " 'the municipality may adopt any plan that is fair and equitable and such that will bring about an assessment in proportion to the benefits accruing.' "17
• An assessment must be in proportion, but not necessarily identical, to the benefits accrued by the *41assessed property. The assessment may exceed the value of the benefit as long as the property is benefited and the assessment is made on a reasonable basis.18
• A municipality need not "show that the property is benefited to the full extent of the dollar amount collected."19
• The determination of reasonableness must be made on a case-by-case basis.20
¶ 48. Three court of appeals cases are instructive in making the determination of reasonableness-in-effect in the present case.
¶ 49. In Peterson v. City of New Berlin, 154 Wis. 2d 365, 453 N.W.2d 177 (Ct. App. 1990), the property owner challenged a special assessment to pay for water and sewer improvements. The assessment was based on a uniform method, the front footage of the assessed properties. All of the assessed properties were of approximately the same size. The uniform method of assessment did not, however, make the assessment per se reasonable.21
¶ 50. In Peterson the "pie shape" of the properties meant that approximately half of the properties had substantially more front footage than the other properties. Thus, the properties with more front footage incurred a substantially disproportionate share of the assessment for sewer and water compared to the properties with less front footage.
¶ 51. The present case is similar to Peterson. As in Peterson, the assessment in the present case was made *42in a uniform manner, but the effect of the uniform assessment was that some property owners paid substantially more than others for the same benefit.
¶ 52. The court of appeals explained in Peterson that "not only must the exercise of police power be reasonable; its result must be reasonable as well."22 The court of appeals concluded that the assessment was unfair because "property owners in comparable positions face[d] a marked disparity in cost for the receipt of equal benefits when an alternative, more equitable, method of assessment [was] feasible."23
¶ 53. The second case is Village of Egg Harbor v. Mariner Group, Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 568, 457 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1990). In that case, the Village of Egg Harbor constructed a wastewater treatment plant and collection system, and under the police power, levied a lump sum assessment (one base unit amounting to $3,067) against each property, without regard to the property's use of the system.24 The Village elected a lump sum assessment considering both the availability of the benefit and a minimum level of sewer use 25
¶ 54. The properties benefited were very different. Some village properties were part-time summer residences; others were year-round residences; some included seasonal commercial businesses; others were year-round commercial businesses; some were vacant lots.
*43¶ 55. In both Egg Harbor and the present case, the municipality assessed properties in a uniform, lump sum manner based on legal ownership.
¶ 56. In Egg Harbor, each of 14 shops in a shopping mall was separately owned, and each shop was assessed $3,067. The owners of the mall properties challenged the lump sum assessment for each of the 14 units because the units had a limited number of restroom facilities. Only the two largest units had internal restrooms, and the development contained two larger public restrooms. According to the owners, they had a cumulative 2.3 unit-use equivalent, not a 14 unit-use equivalent.
¶ 57. The court of appeals upheld the assessment, explaining, in a somewhat conclusory manner, that in this resort community reasonableness requires only that the cost be fairly apportioned; that a base level assessment under the circumstances of that case was not an arbitrary or capricious burden upon any group of property owners; and that the assessment was reasonable because all property owners were assessed by the same method and the mall owners were no more burdened than any other property owner.26
¶ 58. A third case, Lac La Belle Golf Club v. Village of Lac La Belle, 187 Wis. 2d 274, 522 N.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1994), is also helpful. The assessment apportioned the cost of a new sanitary sewer system based on the number of single-family homes that could be accommodated on a property. The method of assessment was uniform, and an equal amount was assessed against *44each affected unit.27 The golf club conceded it benefited from the sanitary sewer system.
¶ 59. The golf club challenged the assessment, asserting that it was unreasonable to assess the 14th hole of the golf course as ten theoretical single family lots, thus charging ten assessments for the 14th hole.28 Specifically, the golf club argued that the economic costs of reaping the benefit of the sanitary sewer system were so out of proportion to the benefit conferred that the result of the assessment was unreasonable.29
¶ 60. The 14th hole was not available for division into single family home lots without great cost and damage to the golf course. The court of appeals in Lac La Belle therefore concluded that the golf course was forced to "bear an inordinate share of the assessment in comparison to other properties similarly situated" because "the cost of reaping the benefit is wholly out of proportion to the benefits accruing."30 Thus the uniform assessment based on theoretical single-family home lots was unreasonable in its effect on the 14th hole of the golf course.
¶ 61. The present case is like Lac La Belle in that both cases address a uniform method of assessment. In both cases, however, the method of assessment was not reasonable considering the nature of the property and the benefit.
¶ 62. Lac La Belle stands for the proposition that the effect of an assessment accomplished by a reasonable (uniform) method may be unreasonable as applied because of the nature of the particular property.
*45¶ 63. I now apply the teachings of these cases to the present case. The assessment at issue pays only for the cost of the equipment and installation of the sewer stub. The actual sewer system and use of that system are financed by the connection assessment that is not challenged in the present case.
¶ 64. The benefit at issue in the present case is therefore the benefit of having access to the sewer system.
¶ 65. Each condominium owner, like each owner of a tax parcel with multiple dwelling units or each owner of a tax parcel with a single family home, is charged one assessment. This single charge is proportional to the value and the cost of access to the sewer system. The group of condominium owners, like the owner of a property with multiple dwelling units or a single unit, gets a single access to the sewer system. Thus, the effect of the assessment is to charge each condominium owner a sum for access to the system greater than that charged to any other individual tax parcel.
¶ 66. Applying the tests of fairness, equity, and proportionality to the instant case, I conclude that the 18 condominium property owners receiving one access as a group are in a comparable position to each of the other property owners who received one access. Together, the 18 condominium owners, like a single owner of a single-family home, receive access to one sewer stub. Each of the 18 condominium property owners faces a marked disparity in cost for the receipt of this equal benefit. In the present case the 18 condominium owners are more burdened than other property owners who received the same access.
¶ 67. Although the benefit need not be equal to the assessment, charging each condominium owner 18 *46times more for access than is charged to other property owners is not a proportional charge. Thus, there is a marked disparity in the amount charged to the condominium owners as compared to the amount charged to the other property owners who received access.
¶ 68. I conclude that in the instant case, using the tax parcel method is not a reasonable basis upon which to assess the condominium owners. The tax parcel method results in a disproportionate distribution of costs that might be avoided by using another basis for assessment. An alternative, more equitable method of assessment is available that would not produce such a disparity.
¶ 69. The majority opinion appears to conclude that the simple alternative is to divide the cost by the number of stubs. I do not determine the more appropriate method of assessment that the Sanitary District should use. That is a task better left to the Sanitary District than performed by a court.
II
¶ 70. The majority opinion remands the cause to the circuit court to reinstate its judgment and order requiring the Green Lake Sanitary District to modify the existing availability charge against the condominium owners to the amount equal to one-eighteenth of the amount originally charged as an availability assessment. I disagree with this instruction. There is not sufficient evidence in the record from which the court can determine the correct assessment. The briefs make clear that the circuit court's solution was not necessarily a reasonable assessment.
¶ 71. The District's brief points out that any unequal treatment may not necessarily be remedied by simply dividing the cost by the number of stubs. The *47size of tax parcels ranges from less than a quarter acre to more than 40 acres; some parcels are used seasonally; the valuation of tax parcels ranges widely.
¶ 72. The amicus brief of the Wisconsin Realtors Association argues that a more rational and fair approach for the District would have been to impose one charge for each actual buildable lot or for each sewer lateral actually installed to connect a property to the sewer system.
¶ 73. Further, because the assessments were based on the total cost of the project, reducing the assessments on condominium owners to one-eighteenth of the original amount may not raise sufficient funds.
¶ 74. The court should not determine the appropriate method of assessment. That is a task assigned by the legislature to the Sanitary District, although a court may reduce an assessment and affirm an assessment as so modified.31 I would remand the cause to the circuit *48court to remand the cause to the Sanitary District, the municipality upon which the legislature imposed the duty to levy and collect assessments, for a determination of an alternative, more equitable method of assessment that would not produce the disparity pointed out in the present case.
¶ 75. For the reasons set forth I write separately.
¶ 76. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703 states in relevant parts:
66.0703 Special assessments, generally.
(1) (a) Except as provided in s. 66.0721, as a complete alternative to all other methods provided by law, any city, town or village may, by resolution of its governing body, levy and collect special assessments upon property in a hmited and determinable area for special benefits conferred upon the property by any municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or improvement out of the proceeds of the special assessments.
(b) The amount assessed against any property for any work or improvement which does not represent an exercise of the police power may not exceed the value of the benefits accruing to the property. If an assessment represents an exercise of the police power, the assessment shall be upon a reasonable basis as determined by the governing body of the city, town or village.
(c) If any property that is benefited is by law exempt from assessment, the assessment shall be computed and shall be paid by the city, town or village.
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.60 was renumbered Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 by 1999 Wis. Act 150. No changes have been made to § 66.60 since its original passage during the 1945 legislative *36session that affect the issues addressed in the present case. In this opinion, § 66.0703 and its predecessor will be referred to as Wis. Stat. § 66.0703.

 See Berkvam v. City of Glendale, 79 Wis. 2d 279, 287, 255 N.W.2d 521 (1977) (quoting Mullins v. City of El Dorado, 436 P.2d 837, 844 (Kan. 1968)); Lac La Belle Golf Club v. Village of Lac La Belle, 187 Wis. 2d 274, 285-87, 522 N.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1994); Peterson v. City of New Berlin, 154 Wis. 2d 365, 371, 453 N.W.2d 177 (Ct. App. 1990); Gelhaus & Brost, Inc. v. City of Medford, 144 Wis. 2d 48, 52-53, 423 N.W.2d 180 (Ct. App. 1988).

 Lac La Belle, 187 Wis. 2d at 283; Peterson, 154 Wis. 2d at 371; Gelhaus & Brost, 144 Wis. 2d at 52-53.

 CIT Group/Equip. Fin. Inc. v. Village of Germantown, 163 Wis. 2d 426, 433, 471 N.W.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. den., 502 U.S. 1099 (1992).

 CIT Group, 163 Wis. 2d at 433; Peterson, 154 Wis. 2d at 370.

 CIT Group, 163 Wis. 2d at 433; Peterson, 154 Wis. 2d at 371.

 Genrich v. City of Rice Lake, 2003 Wis. App 255, ¶¶ 20-22, 268 Wis. 2d 233, 673 N.W.2d 361.

 Gelhaus & Brost, 144 Wis. 2d at 53.

 Village of Egg Harbor v. Mariner Group, Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 568, 571, 573, 457 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1990).

 Wis. Stat. § 703.21(1).
Property owners whose adjacent properties had more than one tax parcel number were given the opportunity to combine the tax parcels into one tax parcel for taxation and assessment purposes to reduce assessments. According to the Green Lake Sanitary District's brief, combination of parcels may risk loss of development rights under zoning or other regulatory laws.

 Majority op., ¶ 27.

 Lac La Belle, 187 Wis. 2d at 285.

 Citing Peterson v. City of New Berlin, 154 Wis. 2d 365, 370, 453 N.W.2d 177 (Ct. App. 1990), the majority opinion at ¶ 10 treats this finding as one of fact that must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. The Peterson case says no such thing. Several cases do so hold, however. See, e.g., Village of Egg Harbor v. Sarkis, 166 Wis. 2d 5, 14, 479 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1991); Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 118, 334 N.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1983).

 Peterson, 154 Wis. 2d at 373.

 Peterson, 154 Wis. 2d at 373.

 Gelhaus & Brost, 144 Wis. 2d at 52 (citing Schulenberg v. City of Reading, 410 P.2d 324, 329 (Kan. 1966)).

 Berkvam, 79 Wis. 2d at 287 (quoting Mullins, 436 P.2d at 844); Gelhaus & Brost, 144 Wis. 2d at 52 (citing Schulenberg, 410 P.2d at 329).

 Gelhaus & Brost, 144 Wis. 2d at 51-53.

 Gelhaus & Brost, 144 Wis. 2d at 51.

 Peterson, 154 Wis. 2d at 374.

 Id. at 373-74.

 Peterson, 154 Wis. 2d at 371.

 Id. at 373.

 Another assessment was made against properties that were projected to use the system in excess of300 gallons per day.

 Village of Egg Harbor v. Mariner Group, Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 568, 571, 457 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1990).

 Village of Egg Harbor v. Mariner Group, Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 568, 573, 457 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1990). See also CIT Group, 163 Wis. 2d at 436-37.

 Lac La Belle, 187 Wis. 2d at 285.

 Id. at 278-79.

 Id. at 280.

 Id. at 286.

 See Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(d), allowing a circuit court to modify an excessive special assessment if there is evidence in the record from which the court can determine the correct assessment. Area Bd. of Vocational, Tech. & Adult Educ. v. Town of Burke, 151 Wis. 2d 392, 401, 444 N.W.2d 733 (Ct. App. 1989).
When a special assessment is declared invalid, the statutes empower a municipality to start over. See Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(10), providing as follows:
(10) If the actual cost of any project, upon completion or after the receipt of bids, is found to vary materially from the estimates, if any assessment is void or invalid, or if the governing body decides to reconsider and reopen any assessment, it may, after giving notice as provided in sub. (7) (a) and after a public hearing, amend, cancel or confirm the prior assessment. A notice of the resolution amending, canceling or confirming the prior assessment shall be given by the clerk as provided in sub. (8) (d). If the assessments are amended to provide for the refunding of special assessment B *48bonds under s. 66.0713 (6), all direct and indirect costs reasonably attributable to the refunding of the bonds may be included in the cost of the public improvements being financed (emphasis added).
See Town of Burke, 151 Wis. 2d at 401-02.