Court Opinion

ID: 9690131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:54:40.195984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.738509
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. After determining that the trial court erred in admitting the Spreigl evidence, the majority nevertheless concludes that such error was harmless. I disagree. Given the extremely prejudicial nature of Brynteson’s testimony and the inadequacy of the notice given to defense counsel, admission of this evidence was overly prejudicial and unfairly influenced the jury.
Allegations of sexual misconduct are fraught with potential for bias, and particular caution must be exercised. The majority opinion outlines the “more troublesome” aspects of the trial court’s decision to admit Brynteson’s testimony: the offer of proof of Casady’s participation in that alleged offense was weak and not clear and convincing; the trial court refused to conduct a hearing on the Spreigl evidence but allowed the evidence and Brynteson testified as part of the State’s case-in-chief. The trial court’s action was all determined by an offer of proof by the prosecuting attorney. Any connection between the alleged offense and present charge was “far too tenuous” in time, place, and modus operan-di to meet the relevancy requirement. These concerns render admission of the testimony undeniably prejudicial. Its introduction likely resulted in an unjust verdict.
Nor does the majority fully appreciate the prejudicial effect that the lack of notice had on Casady’s case. It holds that because there is no evidence that the prosecutor’s delay was intentional, and because there was an opportunity for cross-examination and for Casady to deny the allegation himself, admission of the evidence with only one day’s notice was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Such a conclusion defeats the very purpose of a Spreigl notice, which is to assure that the accused has adequate time to prepare a defense.
Casady was notified one day before the trial was to begin that the State would seek to introduce Brynteson’s testimony regarding an isolated incident which occurred about 13 years before. This lack of notice left Casady little or no opportunity to in*636vestigate and gather evidence. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult for any attorney to prepare and effectively conduct cross-examination or to persuasively question and attack relevancy. The majority nevertheless finds admission of Brynteson’s testimony harmless error partly because Casady had an opportunity to cross-examination, question relevancy, and deny the allegation himself. Such reasoning fails to recognize that Casady’s opportunity to rebut Brynteson’s testimony effectively was seriously limited by the lack of notice. See State v. Doughman, 384 N.W.2d 450 (Minn.1986) (error in admission of Spreigl evidence prejudicial, warranting new trial where defendant had no notice of state’s intent to introduce such evidence, and its introduction may have resulted in unjust verdict).
Admission of evidence of a prior sexual offense without adequate notice is particularly prejudicial.
To allow such testimony is to infringe the constitutional right of the defendant to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Such procedure might be palliated if there was any provision for giving the defendant notice of the other charges in such cases; but it is utterly repugnant to justice and fair play to accuse a person of a stated crime and make that the excuse for what is really trying him for a number of others by springing them unheralded upon the attention of the jury to produce a verdict of guilty which might not result except for the bias thus imparted to the minds of the jurors * * *.
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496-97 n. 20, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 n. 20 (1965) (quoting State v. Jensen, 70 Or. 156, 158, 140 P. 740, 741 (1914)).
None of the criteria outlined in Spreigl as to identity or common scheme and plan were met here — nor could such evidence establish the absence of mistake or accident. In effect, the evidence could only be construed as an attack on defendant’s character — and this kind of evidence is inadmissible to show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith. See State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224 (Minn.1986). Defendant was not charged with any crime alleged to have occurred involving sexual misconduct toward Brynteson.
Under the guise of harmless error, the majority easily circumvents an important safeguard. The Brynteson evidence, similar in respect to the current charge (a sexual offense against a minor female), would certainly unfairly influence a jury. The defendant was helpless to combat this Spreigl evidence (already 13 years old). However distasteful the charge, fundamental rights .must be protected. Too often, by too many of us judges, the term “harmless error” is used, sometimes to the point of becoming hackneyed and a serious impediment to the basic notion of a fair trial. This is such a case. No trial is perfect, but it must at least be fair. This was not. I would reverse and grant a new trial.