Court Opinion

ID: 9634296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:14.99889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:00.198716
License: Public Domain

PRYOR, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
Appellant contends his conduct during a calendar call in the Landlord-Tenant court does not provide a basis for a finding of summary criminal contempt. He argues that the ruling was procedurally flawed and without sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
The Landlord-Tenant Branch of Superior Court is a daily point of contact for hundreds of citizens. Not surprisingly, that branch handles approximately 60,000 filings each year.1 In order to manage such a high volume of cases, the presiding judge, assisted by administrative persons, conducts a calendar call of scheduled cases in an effort to resolve many of them by settlement or mediation. It was in this setting that this matter arose.
When appellant’s case was initially called before the judge, it appeared to the judge that he was becoming irate. The judge admonished appellant to control himself, and passed the case to be called again. As the parties left the well of the court, appellant spoke loudly. When directed back to the judge, he was again warned about appropriate behavior. When the judge rendered her ruling as to appellant’s next court date, appellant, while departing the courtroom, made further statements, loud enough to be heard by the judge, which included profanity. The judge then held appellant in contempt and imposed sanctions.
Contempt powers, in this context, are interwoven with the functions of a trial judge. It is thus an accepted premise that a trial judge is responsible for fair, orderly procedures, and is obliged to control obstructions, interruptions, or abuse to judicial proceedings. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534, 45 S.Ct. 390, 394, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 252 (1991). It is because of these broad responsibilities that the power of summary contempt is entrusted to the court:
The pith of this rather extraordinary power to punish without the formalities required by the Bill of Rights for the prosecution of federal crimes generally, is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstruction to it. It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage. The power thus entrusted to a judge is wholly unrelated to his personal sensibilities, be they tender or rugged....
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954). This power has evolved through the years, by case decision, statute, and court rule. Our current *237rule, Super. Ct.Crim. R. 41(a), provides that a judge may adjudicate contemptuous behavior if committed in the actual presence of the judge.
Because this authority is unilateral and powerful, a number of appellate courts, including this one, have reminded trial judges to exercise restraint and care in this regal’d. See McCormick v. United States, 635 A.2d 347 (D.C.1993); In re Schwartz, 391 A.2d 278, 281 (D.C.1978). The concern is obvious and ever present. As stated in Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14, 75 S.Ct. at 13, judges are human and may, at times, use the contempt powers arbitrarily. See In re Gates, 248 A.2d 671 (D.C.1968) (court condemns bullying, socratic methods of trial judge).
With these concepts in mind I turn to this case. Implicitly, at least, appellant urges that the judge should have used a less restrictive response. After all, appellant’s ease was over and he was departing the courtroom. Therefore he was not interrupting his case. Indeed the judge had invoked no citation of contempt against him at that juncture. But it must be remembered that criminal contempt may be behavior which not only disrupts the proceedings, but is also disrespectful to the court. In re Thompson, 454 A.2d 1322, 1323 (D.C.1982). Here the trial judge cited both reasons in her order. It was not simply a matter of appellant’s own case which was tied to his departing behavior, but rather his impact on the remaining cases during the calendar call proceeding. The judge concluded that he disrupted the administration of those cases. In addition, given the earlier warnings to appellant, she concluded that his departing behavior and profanity, in her presence, was disrespectful and abusive to the judicial process in which she was engaged. See Jackson v. Bailey, 221 Conn. 498, 605 A.2d 1350, 1358 (1992) (profanity deemed disrespectful to the court); State v. Allen, 145 Vt. 593, 496 A.2d 168 (1985) (obscene remark made in open court).
Although we have consistently and rightfully given close scrutiny to adjudications of summary contempt, in an effort to avoid judicial overreaching, see Gates, supra, ultimately case decision, statute and court rule authorize summary contempt when it occurs in the judge’s presence. Stated simply, the trial judge has such power subject to appellate review.
There may be instances where a trial judge could impose contempt but chooses not to do so. There may be instances, in hindsight, where another course of action could have been taken. Those factors can not be a part of appellate review. We are left with primary focus on the stated authority of the rale, the elements of criminal contempt, and the procedural safeguards due the accused. Whether sufficiency of the evidence here is viewed from the familiar litmus, whether a reasonable person could find guilt under the circumstances, or by applying D.C.Code § 17-305, whether the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, I conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial judge’s ruling that appellant was disruptive and disrespectful. With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, I would affirm the conviction.

. 1995 D.C. Courts Ann. Rep. 84.