Court Opinion

ID: 9690533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:21:58.59356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:49.134215
License: Public Domain

Justice GRANT.
It is difficult for an appellate court to review a case in which there is no reporter’s record. I recognize that Perkins waived many of his rights, including his right to the making of a record, but the trial judge has a duty to determine that waivers of fundamental rights are voluntarily and intelligently made. The seventeen-year-old defendant was not represented by an attorney at the time his guilty plea was entered and his punishment was assessed.2 Fundamental fairness requires that the defendant in a criminal case understand the nature of the proceeding and the possible consequences. The question this Court is asked to decide is whether the defendant’s due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to admonish him as to the range of punishment and there was no showing that the defendant was aware of the range of punishment when he entered his plea of guilty.
IS ADMONISHMENT OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE RANGE OF PUNISHMENT REQUIRED IN MISDEMEANOR CASES?
The majority opinion holds that the statutes do not require admonishments in mis*688demeanor cases, citing Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 27.14 (Vernon 1989). Most of Article 27.14 deals with misdemeanors for which the maximum possible punishment is a fíne. The statute itself does not specifically require an admonishment, nor does it provide that no admonishment be given. Some earlier cases citing the statute have concluded that an admonishment is not required for misdemeanors. But Perkins does not seek relief under this statute, but rather under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
Due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea not only be voluntary but “be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (emphasis added). Hence, in a felony case, failure to admonish a defendant as to the range of punishment, or at least the maximum possible punishment, renders his guilty plea invalid on constitutional and not just statutory grounds. See Barbee v. Ruth, 678 F.2d 634, 635 (5th Cir.1982); Wade v. Wainwright, 420 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1969). And, when a defendant is charged with an offense for which jail time can be received, we should not make a distinction between felonies and misdemeanors for the purpose of constitutional due process. The no-dis-tmction standard between felonies and lesser offenses which carry a punishment of imprisonment has been applied to a number of due process rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-97, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971) (holding that its right of due process requires that an indigent be furnished a record of the trial to satisfy whether it is a felony or nonfelony prosecution).
In McMillan v. State, the Court of Appeals held that due process requirements are applicable to misdemeanors and that a guilty plea is not voluntary if the defendant is not admonished as to the range of punishment. The court further held that, for the purpose of determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made, there should be no distinction between felonies and nonfelonies that result in imprisonment. As such, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant’s guilty plea was involuntary because there was no showing in the record that the defendant knew the range of punishment when he entered his plea. However, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. McMillan v. State, 727 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The Court of Criminal Appeals limited its decision to the specific issue raised by the State’s petition and only considered whether the record affirmatively showed that-the defendant knew the punishment range for the misdemeanor offense to which he pled guilty. The Court found that the defendant stated on the record that he knew the range of punishment.
In a later case, Tatum v. State, 846 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), the Court of Criminal Appeals again declined to address the question of whether the record in a misdemeanor case must reflect a judicial admonishment as to the range of punishment and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals.3 On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant must be aware of the range of punishment he might receive after pleading guilty, but that this can be shown without judicial admonishments. Unlike the present case, Tatum involved a collateral attack in a *689habeas corpus proceeding, therefore, the defendant had the burden to show harm. Ultimately, the case was determined based on this burden, as the Court held that the defendant failed to show harm.
I agree with the Court of Appeals in McMillan and Tatum. In a misdemeanor case that results in imprisonment, due process requires that the defendant know the range of punishment before entering a plea of guilty. Therefore, because there was no showing in this case that Perkins was aware of the range of punishment, the trial court committed error by failing to admonish him.
WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE HARM ANALYSIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO ADMONISH?
The Court of Criminal Appeals has recently written on the trial court’s failure to provide the defendant’s statutory admonishment on the range of punishment before accepting a guilty plea. See Aguirre-Mata v. State, 992 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In Aguirre-Mata, the Court held that nonconstitutional harm analysis applies to the trial court’s failure to admonish on the range of punishment in compliance with Article 26.13(a)(1), and as such, the defendant has the burden to show harm on appeal. Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1) (Vernon 1989). The Court of Criminal Appeals was careful to point out that this case was not decided on constitutional due process grounds, because only the violation of Article 26.13(a)(1) was complained about on appeal. In the present case, constitutional due process is raised, and the harmless error rule for constitutional errors puts the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.4 Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a).
In Boykin v. Alabama,5 the United States Supreme Court held that “It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The Court in Boykin further said that “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709. According to the Boykin case, the record must show, or there must be an allegation the evidence would show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently rejected the offer.6 Anything less is not waiver.
The same standard applies to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made in the absence of a proper admonishment. An affirmative showing, in the record, that defendant knew the range of punishment to which he was subjecting himself is constitutionally required. See Price v. State, 866 S.W.2d 606, 615 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), citing Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.
The majority in the present case concludes that failure to admonish as to the range of punishment is not a structural error requiring automatic reversal, but that it is a constitutional error. Assuming arguendo that it is not a structural error, the majority correctly takes the position *690that the State has the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, for proof that Perkins was not harmed, the majority surreptitiously points to the fact that Perkins never contended or testified that he did not know the range of punishment. As such, the majority has effectively .shifted the burden from the State to the defendant. Silence by the defendant does not fulfill the State’s burden of proving that the defendant was not harmed by the error. See Boykin, 895 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. This is not an affirmative showing by the State that there was no harm, and Perkins never conceded that he was not misled or harmed.
For this reason, this ease should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

. Although this dissent is based solely on the issue of admonishment and the defendant's understanding of the range of punishment, I want to briefly address the contention that the trial court’s comment at the post-trial hearing showed bias. The complained-of statement included the following: "And I urge you to search your memory, Mr. Perkins, while you are in jail, and if your memory improves, then we may consider some sort of a modification.”
Cooperation with the police is a matter that may be considered in sentencing and granting probation; however, a judge should be careful not to go outside his role as a judge and assume the role of prosecutor by openly plea bargaining with the defendant. Upon a recommendation by the State, the judge could certainly consider modification based upon the defendant’s cooperation with the State, but our system does not encourage the judge to adopt a dual role in the sentencing process. Yet, in this case I would not find this to be harmful error because it happened after the finding of guilt and sentencing.

. In Tatum, the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that they had previously declined to address the constitutional issue in the McMillan case. The Court gave the following explanation: "We held that contrary to the court of appeals’ finding, McMillan was adequately informed on the record of the maximum punishment, so that the federal due process requirement, if any, was satisfied. We expressly declined to address the constitutional question.” Tatum, 846 S.W.2d at 326 n. 1.

. It should be pointed out that the application of a state harmless error rule by a state court reviewing a state question involves only errors of state and procedural state law; however, when a state criminal conviction involves federal constitutionally guaranteed rights, the requirements are federal in nature. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

. In his brilliant concurring opinion in High v. State, 998 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.), Justice Murry Cohen discusses a similar case in which there is no record of any admonishment as to deportation consequences. Justice Cohen explains and gives a background on Boykin.

.The two dissenting justices in Boykin explain that the majority required reversal "solely” because no admonishments were in the record and that the majority did so even though Boykin never even alleged, much less proved, his guilty plea was involuntary or that he did not know the consequences.