Court Opinion

ID: 9737658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:31:37.62564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.521191
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I dissent. The majority, under the guise of applying well-established rules of law, creates an unduly restrictive rule for examining waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination *646as protected by Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).1 The question presented on appeal is much more complex than the majority implies. I would hold that the trial court did not clearly err in its determinations that the defendant was delusional at the time he confessed and that he was unable to understand the actual consequences that could arise as a result of his confession. I would further affirm the legal conclusions drawn below because the prosecution did not carry its burden of proving that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutionally protected rights under the totality of the circumstances.
*647I
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
I agree with the majority that “we review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings regarding a defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights . . . Ante at 629, citing People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). I further agree that questions of law are reviewed de novo. Ante at 629-630. Yet, the majority opinion is incomplete to the extent that it: (1) fails to fully explore the burden of proof that must be borne by the prosecution, and (2) fails to distinguish the factual issues from the legal issues in this case.
B. PROSECUTORIAL BURDEN
The majority announces that “the prosecution has the burden of establishing a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ante at 634. Although I am willing to proceed under the assumption that the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence because the prosecution failed to prove its case even by a preponderance, I do not believe that the applicable burden is as clearly established as the majority implies.
The preponderance test employed by the majority springs from Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 168; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986), a United States Supreme Court case discussing the voluntary waiver of constitutional rights protected by Miranda. Traditionally, constitutional waiver cases place a “heavy” burden on the prosecution. Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938); see, also, Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564, 581; 107 S Ct 851; 93 *648L Ed 2d 954 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and Connecticut v Barrett, 479 US 523, 531; 107 S Ct 828; 93 L Ed 2d 920 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). Our Supreme Court has also recognized that, “ ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights, and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ ” Johnson at 464.
To date, the United States Supreme Court has never expressly declared that a preponderance standard should be applied in knowing and intelligent waiver cases. In Connelly itself, Justice Brennan’s dissent reiterated the fact that Connelly was a voluntariness case, Connelly at 187-188, and explained why the imposition of a preponderance standard was undesirable:
In holding that the government need only prove the voluntariness of the waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court ignores the explicit command of Miranda: “If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation.” ... In recognition of the importance of the Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment, we always have characterized the State’s burden of proof on a Miranda waiver as “great” and “heavy.” [Id. at 184-185.]
Although Connelly’s imposition of the preponderance standard arguably extends to knowing and intelligent waiver cases, the proposition is certainly open to debate. In announcing the preponderance standard *649in Connelly, the Supreme Court examined cases involving the exclusion of evidence, and built upon other cases examining voluntary waiver. Connelly at 167-169. The United States Supreme Court’s recent recognition that Miranda was a constitutional decision,2 lends some support that Connelly's rationale should not be extended to knowing and intelligent cases.
The majority is correct that the Supreme Court stated that “[w]henever the [s]tate bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the [s]tate need prove waiver only by preponderance of the evidence.” Connelly at 168. The entirety of the Supreme Court’s statement was as follows, however, “We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Connelly at 168, referring to Lego v Twomey, 404 US 477; 92 S Ct 619; 30 L Ed 2d 618 (1972). In Lego, the inquiry focused solely on voluntariness. There, the Supreme Court held: “the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. Of course, the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.” Id. at 489.
*650C. FACTUAL ISSUES v LEGAL ISSUES
Although the majority recognizes that the trial court’s findings of fact must be reviewed for clear error, nowhere does the majority apply the standard it announces. Instead, the opinion proceeds with an open-ended analysis after concluding that “the meaning of ‘knowing and intelligent’ is a question of law.” Ante at 629. After broadly categorizing the entire discussion as a legal issue, the majority then conducts an independent review of the trial court’s factual findings. See id. at 639-644.
Given the broad range of issues that may be considered factual, I am not prepared to summarily conclude that all questions remotely related to the knowing and intelligent inquiry are legal in nature. Rather, it is incumbent upon us to laboriously separate the factual issues from those issues that are purely legal, and to separate legal conclusions from factual inferences.
1. FACTUAL ISSUES
In the present case, the trial judge weighed the credibility of the competing witnesses and found “the testimony and reports of Dr. Mogy and Dr. Grisso to accurately reflect the nature of Defendant’s mental state at the time,” and that “there is no question that Defendant, at the time of his arrest, was psychotic.” The trial court also expressly stated:
The nature and subject matter of Defendant’s delusions prevented rational comprehension of the specific topic at issue—his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. His delusional process required self-incrimination to effectuate freedom.
*651As previously noted, in Miranda-waiver cases, findings of fact made by the trial judge are entitled to deference unless clearly erroneous. In order to overturn a trial judge’s findings as clearly erroneous, we must be left with the “definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 449; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). I am left with no such conviction in this case. Clearly, the trial judge weighed the competing testimony, considered the credibility of the expert witnesses, and made a reasoned interpretation after thorough deliberation. Nothing in the record convinces me that the trial court made a mistake. I would, therefore, hold that the trial judge’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
2. LEGAL ISSUES AND PREMISES
Because the trial judge’s findings were not clearly erroneous, the key legal question in this case is whether the defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive his rights despite the delusion causing him to believe that God would set him free as a reward for confessing. As stated previously, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Yet, the concept of de novo review does not relieve this Court of its duty to operate within the constitutional parameters.
It is well settled that our examination of Miranda-based knowing and intelligent waiver cases must proceed with a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. See Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated:
*652[T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. [Fare v Michael C, 442 US 707, 724-725; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979).]
In Fare, the Supreme Court examined whether a juvenile defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights as protected by Miranda even though he asked to see his probation officer. In holding that the waiver determination must be made pursuant to a totality of the circumstances inquiry, the Supreme Court stated:
There is no reason to assume that such courts—especially juvenile courts, with their special expertise in this area—will be unable to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so as to take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved. Where the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent, the totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this into account in making a waiver determination. [Id. at 725.]
The Supreme Court then went on to apply the totality of the circumstances test, and concluded that “no special factors indicate that respondent was unable to understand the nature of his actions” and that “[t]here is no indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be.” Id. at 726.
*653The majority summarily cites Fare for the proposition that courts should examine Miranda waivers objectively. Although the totality of the circumstances test has an objective component, I believe that Fare clearly explained that courts have the flexibility to consider special factors that may affect waiver. Mental illness fits naturally within the totality of the circumstances test, and it may be a factor tending to indicate that the defendant cannot “understand the rights he [is] waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be.” Id.
D. APPLICATION
In the present case, the prosecution argues only: (1) that the trial court clearly erred in its factual findings, and (2) that the law does not require that the defendant be able to comprehend how Miranda applies to his own situation. As stated previously, I am unconvinced that the trial judge clearly erred. Similarly, I believe that the prosecutor has proceeded under a flawed legal interpretation of Miranda. The prosecution has offered nothing to persuade me that mental illness should not be factored into the totality of the circumstances equation. Thus, the prosecutor’s case must fail, even by a preponderance of the evidence.
ii
Nothing in the majority opinion persuades me that only a literal understanding of Miranda is required. Not only does the majority build its case upon a shaky foundation, but it supports its substantive legal arguments with premises that are only tangentially *654relevant. I see two primary problems with the analysis offered by the majority: (1) it quotes case law only selectively, and (2) it assumes that cases involving mentally ill defendants may be easily analogized to cases involving persons with low intelligence quotas.
A. WHAT THE CASE LAW SAYS BUT THE MAJORITY DOES NOT
The majority begins its knowing and intelligent waiver analysis by stating that, though determining whether a suspect’s waiver was knowing and intelligent requires a degree of subjective inquiry,3 suspects need not understand the consequences of waiver. Ante at 637. Yet the quotations the majority selects are taken from opinions that leave open the possibility that the defendant’s level of comprehension about the consequences of waiver will be relevant. None of the authority cited by the majority holds that a waiver will be valid per se if the defendant is able to literally comprehend Miranda, even though that defendant may be unable to apply the literal meaning of Miranda to his own situation.
The majority erroneously concludes that the trial court misapplied Cheatham by requiring that the defendant be able to understand how his Miranda rights applied to his situation. The majority quotes Cheatham for the proposition that, “ ‘[t]o knowingly waive Miranda rights, a suspect need not understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or exercise the rights that the police have prop*655erly explained to him.’ ” Ante at 636, quoting Cheatham at 28. However, when the aforementioned quotation is taken in the context of the entire Cheatham opinion, the quotation does not so easily support the majority’s holding.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the Cheatham Court did not hold that courts need not ever determine whether a defendant understood the consequences of his actions. Rather, Cheatham held only that defendant Cheatham sufficiently understood his rights, and that he had the capacity to provide a valid waiver. Id. at 27. Unlike the present case, Cheatham focused on the defendant’s intellectual capacity, and the analysis of that intellectual capacity was implicitly tied to the defendant’s understanding of his own circumstances. The Cheatham excerpt quoted by the majority was taken from the middle of Cheatham’s totality of the circumstances analysis. When read in context, it is apparent that the Court was examining both whether the defendant literally understood the Miranda warnings, as well as whether he understood the meanings of the words as applied to his own situation.
Similarly, the majority’s citation of Colorado v Spring, supra, provides little support for the proposition that the defendant must only possess a literal understanding of the Miranda warnings in order to provide a knowing and intelligent waiver. While the Spring Court explicitly stated that “[t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege,” id. at 574, it also stated, “In this case there is no allegation that Spring failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed by *656the Fifth Amendment. Nor is there any allegation that he misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to the law enforcement officials.” Id. at 575. Thus, Spring implicitly recognizes that, if a defendant does misunderstand the consequences of speaking freely to law enforcement officials, then his Miranda waiver could be considered invalid under the knowing and intelligent prong. A conclusion that a defendant need not understand every consequence of confessing is different than a conclusion that the defendant must understand the most basic consequences of confessing. This case presents exactly the type of situation envisioned but not presented in Spring—the defendant misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to the police. He lacked a basic comprehension of what could actually occur if he waived his rights.
The trial court’s analysis comports with Supreme Court observations that a defendant must possess at least a basic understanding of his rights under the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Moran at 421. Although the defendant may have been able to understand what it means to be silent, to have a lawyer present, and to have his statements used against him, his decision to confess was directly tied to his delusion that God would control the police and set him free. It is, therefore, questionable whether the defendant ever truly comprehended the actual meaning of the Miranda warnings.
As I wrote in Cheatham, “the ultimate focus for purposes of the knowing and intelligent prong remains on the level of the suspect’s comprehension.” Id. at 56. I further agree with Justice Mallett’s Cheatham assessment that “[t]he validity of a waiver *657does not depend on a verbatim recitation of the Miranda litany, but rather depends on an actual understanding on the part of the individual of his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them.” Id. at 59. Even the Cheatham lead opinion recognized that the knowing and intelligent prong of Miranda focuses “on the knowledge of the accused irrespective of improper police behavior,” id. at 18, and that courts must evaluate whether the defendant has the capacity to understand the warnings given to him under all the circumstances. Id. at 27.
B. WHAT THE MAJORITY SAYS BUT THE CASE LAW DOES NOT
The majority secondarily finds support for its holding from the proposition that “a defendant need not have a wise or shrewd basis for waiving Miranda rights for the waiver to be valid.” Ante at 642. The majority accurately points to precedent providing that the defendant cannot successfully challenge a waiver as invalid on the basis that he failed to realize that his decision was imprudent. Id. at 642-644.4 However, I fail to see how wisdom is relevant to this defendant’s confession. This case differs from the cases offered in support of the majority opinion in that the defendant’s waiver defense springs not from a lack of wisdom, but from an inability to fully understand that the dictionary meaning of the Miranda warning would actually apply to his own circumstances. The trial court held that his delusions about the consequences of his actions brought about his confession. No
*658amount of information or wisdom would have altered the delusion compelling the defendant to confess. Even a fully informed person or a person with a genius level intelligence quotient can suffer from a delusional perception of reality. Mental illness and shrewdness are simply not equivalent concepts.
ni
The prosecutor has failed to carry its burden that this defendant provided a knowing and intelligent waiver. Similarly, the majority has failed to persuade me that its conclusions are supportable. I am not prepared to sign an opinion that narrows Miranda’s knowing and intelligent prong to the point of near extinction, especially when the opinion only pretends to hide behind well-established principles.
I would hold that the totality of the circumstances test allows a determination whether an individual defendant’s mental illness precludes him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights. Here, the defendant’s delusional episodes vitiated his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 I expressly disagree with the majority’s editorialism that
[i]n light of the fact that the Fifth Amendment itself protects only against compelled self-incrimination, the requirement of a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights is puzzling. [Ante at 637.]
I further disagree with the dicta following the majority’s conclusion. Id. at 645. As I pointed out in People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30, 57; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), the overarching consideration in Miranda-weiver cases is not deterrence, but rather the protection and vindication of constitutional rights. See also Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 481 (2000).
I am not puzzled by the Supreme Court’s bifurcation of the Miranda-waiver analysis, because the voluntariness prong protects aspects of the defendant’s rights distinct from the aspects protected by the knowing and intelligent prong. The voluntariness prong of Miranda seeks to protect defendants against the compulsion envisioned by the Fifth Amendment. Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986). The knowing and intelligent prong ensures that a suspect understands the substantive protections of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. For these reasons, I do not share the majority’s hesitation to follow case law requiring that a defendant be able to understand his rights as a prerequisite to waiving them.

 See Dickerson, n 1 supra at 120 S Ct 2334, n 4.

 Curiously, the majority levies the charge that I somehow interpret the majority opinion as suggesting “that a suspect’s subjective mental state plays no role in a determination whether there was a knowing and intelligent Miranda waiver.” Ante at 634, n 10. Obviously, that is not the case.

 Citing Cheatham, Spring, and Connecticut v Barrett, supra at 525-526.