Court Opinion

ID: 9498533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:19:51.603282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:53.087829
License: Public Domain

POOLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING IN BANC
I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing in banc in United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.2005), and United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005), because I believe the precedent set by Martin is dangerous and will have far reaching consequences, a concern I know *76is shared by many of my colleagues.3
Once the false information is removed from the affidavit supporting the request for a search warrant, the only remaining allegations about the defendants before the magistrate were that they visited a website on which they could have engaged in both legal and illegal activity, clicked past a welcome message indicating that the website catered to people sexually interested in children, and then failed to remove their email address from the website. None of these activities in and of itself was illegal.. Thus there was no allegation that the defendants committed any crime, nor was there sufficient information to allow a reasonable magistrate to conclude that there was a fair probability that they possessed fruits or instrumentalities of any crime. Because legislatures, and not courts or community sentiment, define what is illegal, the moral repugnance we experience in reaction to all sexual interest in children does not make these websites wholly illegal. Therefore, the fact that the defendants visited them cannot support the inference that they committed the narrow crime at issue here, downloading illegal visual depictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.
“The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects ‘citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,’ while giving ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” ’ Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). “[P]robable cause to search ... exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). In addition, probable cause must be based on particularized information about the specific person or place searched, not on “mere propinquity” to illegal activity. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); see also Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, 124 S.Ct. 795.
The alarming principle for which Martin stands (and which Coreas follows by constraint) is that the government may rely solely on a weak association with an organization engaged in both legal and illegal activity to find probable cause to search an individual’s home. This type of guilt by association is unprecedented in the law of this circuit and has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. 338. This new rule may have far reaching consequences. Anyone who visits the website of a group that sometimes uses that site to facilitate illegal activity would be subject to search. This would include anyone who visits the websites of myriad political protest groups, from anti-abortion to anti-war, that at times engage in illegal activity.
In addition, the association on which probable cause in this case was based is slight. One of the “practical considerations of everyday life,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 116 S.Ct. 1657, in the information age that must be taken into account in assessing probable cause is the ease with which individuals today can use the internet to explore or associate with a large *77number of activities or organizations in which they may have no more than a passing curiosity. This increases the risk that the government can use the rule announced in Martin to search the homes of innocent individuals.
I would not dissent after being on the losing side of an in banc poll if I did not believe that the decision in Martin sets a perilous and plainly wrong precedent. Even if it were possible, we cannot wait for Martin to be limited on a case-by-case basis because the potential infringement on the rights guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments during the interim period is simply too great. See Coreas, 426 F.3d at 616 (rejecting the suggestion that Coreas can be distinguished from Martin). I urge the defense attorneys in these cases to seek certiorari, and, in the meantime, I caution the residents of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont to be careful which websites they visit because a few clicks of a mouse could subject their homes to search.

. There have already been six opinions in these cases. In addition to the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.2005), and the unanimous opinion in United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir.2005), both panels denied rehearing by opinion, again with a majority and dissenting opinion in United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2005), and a unanimous opinion in United States v. Coreas, 426 F.3d 615 (2d Cir.2005).