Court Opinion

ID: 9964895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 13:03:15.89416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:46.952622
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                              T.M., a child,

                               Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellee.

                           No. 2D2023-0025

                              May 1, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Kim Brennan,
Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Jami L. Chalgren, Assistant
Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Natalia Reyna-
Pimiento, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

LABRIT, Judge.
     T.M. appeals a juvenile disposition order finding him guilty of
burglary of an occupied dwelling. We reverse and remand for a new
adjudicatory hearing because the trial court did not conduct a
Richardson1 hearing after the defense brought the State's discovery

     1 Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
violation to its attention, and we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt
that the violation did not procedurally prejudice T.M.
     During discovery, the State produced a police report stating that
T.M. had "provided a confession" and that he had returned some of the
stolen property. The police report directed the reader to "see
supplement" in reference to the confession, but there was no supplement
attached and none was provided to the defense in discovery. Before the
adjudicatory hearing, the State disclosed its witness list identifying the
author of the police report, Officer Tyler Shue, as one of its witnesses.
The State also listed Officer Mollie Drenth as a witness.
     The State called both officers to testify at the hearing. Officer
Shue's testimony was relatively brief. He explained that he attempted to
locate T.M. and prepared the warrant for T.M.'s arrest but had limited
involvement in the case after that. The State called Officer Drenth next.
She testified that T.M. turned himself in, after which time she placed
T.M. under arrest and read him his Miranda2 warnings. Officer Drenth
then obtained a confession from T.M., but before she reached this point
in her testimony the defense objected. The defense argued that the State
committed discovery violations by not producing T.M.'s confession and
by not disclosing Officer Drenth's involvement in obtaining it. The
defense moved for a Richardson hearing on these grounds, but the State
maintained that it satisfied its discovery obligations by disclosing the
police report and by listing Officer Drenth on its witness list. The trial
court acknowledged that the motion was a "tough one," but it denied the
defense's request for a Richardson hearing and overruled the defense's
objection to Officer Drenth's testimony.

     2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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      Officer Drenth then continued her testimony and explained that
T.M. confessed while in custody. She testified that T.M. told her that "he
took the stuff and he opened the window [to the dwelling] because it was
unlocked and took the belongings." The trial court ultimately found T.M.
guilty of burglary of an occupied dwelling. And in doing so, the trial
court remarked that without Officer Drenth's testimony, T.M. "would
have been prevailing in this case."
      Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.060 sets forth the State's
discovery obligations in juvenile cases.3 Under subsection (a)(2)(A)(i)c,
the State must include in its Category A witness list any "witnesses who
were present when a recorded or unrecorded statement was taken from
or made by the child," and such witnesses "shall be separately identified
within" Category A. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.060(a)(2)(A)(i)c. Relatedly, under
subsection (a)(2)(C), the State must disclose "the substance of any oral
statements made by the child . . . , together with the name and address
of each witness to the statements." Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.060(a)(2)(C). These
provisions place particular emphasis on identifying witnesses to a child's
statement. And the State's mere listing of Officer Drenth on its witness
list did not satisfy the plain language of the rule.
      The State thus violated its discovery obligations by not separately
identifying Officer Drenth as a witness to T.M.'s statement, and by not
disclosing Officer Drenth's name and address with its disclosure of T.M.'s
confession.4 The trial court should have held a Richardson hearing to

      3 T.M. cites to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 in his brief,

but rule 8.060 applies and it is materially identical for our purposes. See
M.H. v. State, 151 So. 3d 32, 35 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).
      4 We also question whether the State complied with its obligation to

disclose the substance of T.M.'s statement by producing a police report
stating that T.M. "provided a confession." But we need not decide this

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assess the State's violation and any resulting prejudice. See Henry v.
State, 42 So. 3d 328, 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Luis v. State, 851 So. 2d
773, 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Because it didn't, we must determine
whether the trial court's error was harmless. See State v. Schopp, 653
So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995); Henry, 42 So. 3d at 329–30.
      In the Richardson context, the harmless error inquiry focuses on
"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the discovery violation
procedurally prejudiced the defense." Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1020.
Procedural prejudice means that "there is a reasonable possibility that
the defendant's trial preparation or strategy would have been materially
different had the violation not occurred." Id. "[O]nly if [we] can say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally
prejudiced" can we consider the error harmless. Id. at 1021. And where
the record is insufficient to determine prejudice, "the error must be
considered harmful." Id. at 1020; see also Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d
1138, 1148 (Fla. 2006) (" '[T]he vast majority of cases' will not have a
record sufficient to support a finding of harmless error . . . ." (quoting
Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1021)).
      T.M. submits that the record is insufficient to determine prejudice.
We agree. T.M.'s trial strategy is not clear from the record, as defense
counsel waived opening statements and conducted only limited cross-
examination of the State's witnesses. Because we cannot determine
what T.M.'s trial strategy was, we cannot say whether it would have been
materially different had the State complied with its discovery obligations.

issue because the State otherwise violated rule 8.060 by not disclosing
Officer Drenth as a witness to T.M.'s statement. We further disagree
with the State's contention that the record is insufficient for us to
conclude that a discovery violation occurred, as the transcript of the
adjudicatory hearing provides for meaningful review.

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      We also find it significant that Officer Drenth's testimony was the
only evidence the State presented that linked T.M. to the burglary. In
this respect, Officer Drenth was more than an investigating officer; she
was a direct witness to T.M.'s confession and her testimony was highly
material to—if not wholly determinative of—T.M.'s guilt or innocence.
Had the State disclosed Officer Drenth's involvement, the defense
possibly could have taken steps to counteract her testimony, such as
developing impeachment evidence, evaluating whether the confession
was coerced, or potentially preparing T.M. to testify in his defense. See
M.H. v. State, 151 So. 3d 32, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); see also Scipio, 928
So. 2d at 1149 ("An analysis of procedural prejudice . . . considers how
the defense might have responded had it known about the undisclosed
piece of evidence and contemplates the possibility that the defense could
have acted to counter the harmful effects of the discovery violation."). It
is unclear from the record whether these avenues were available to the
defense, further precluding a finding of harmless error.
      At bottom, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that T.M. was
not procedurally prejudiced by the State's failure to identify Officer
Drenth as a witness to T.M.'s statement. We therefore cannot consider
the trial court's error harmless, and we must reverse and remand for a
new adjudicatory hearing.
      Reversed and remanded.

SLEET, C.J., and KELLY, J., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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