Court Opinion

ID: 9561822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:16:57.171885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:32.691989
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I write separately because I cannot agree with all that is said by the majority and because I believe the appellant is entitled to a ruling on several enumerations of error not considered by the majority.
1. I agree that the appellant should have been allowed to introduce evidence of its settlement negotiations with the appellee, but only because the appellee “opened the door” to such evidence attempting to prove that he had made an unconditional offer to permit the appellant to “pick up” its equipment. The rule prohibiting the use as evidence of “[a]dmissions or propositions made with a view to a compromise” (OCGA § 24-3-37) furthers the important public policy of encouraging out-of-court settlements by protecting “parties who freely engage in negotiations directed towards” such settlements. Graves v. Graves, 252 Ga. 27, 28 (310 SE2d 901) (1984). This protection is not to be disregarded lightly. See Newton Bros. v. Shank, 240 Ga. 471 (241 SE2d 231) (1978). However, where one party introduces evidence purporting to show that he has made an unconditional offer *841to settle a claim, he has clearly abandoned the protection of the rule with respect to any evidence the other party might seek to introduce to prove that no such unconditional offer was in fact made.
Decided February 19, 1987.
Robert H. Benfield, Jr., for appellant.
L. David Wolfe, for appellee.
2. The appellee testified unequivocally at trial that he and the appellant were “partners” on the job. It follows that the trial court erred in failing to give the appellant’s requested charge that a coequal partner does not have a right to a materialman’s lien on partnership property. See Stephens v. Clark, 154 Ga. App. 306, 308 (268 SE2d 361) (1980).
3. The trial court’s failure to charge on malicious abuse of process is rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s decision in Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92, 95-96 (344 SE2d 414) (1986), replacing that tort with the new, judicially created tort of “abusive litigation,” an adjudication of which must await the disposition of the underlying action.
4. I would hold that the appellant’s requested charge number 8 was not adjusted to the evidence and was properly refused.
5. I would hold that the trial court erred in charging the jury that “[acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an answer, a denial, or other conduct, may amount to an admission.” OCGA § 24-3-36. This charge was apparently predicated on the evidence purporting to show that the appellant had made no effort to retrieve the equipment being held by the appellee after receiving the appellee’s interrogatory response stating that he was holding these items “for [appellant] to pick up.” The appellee does not suggest what relevant factual admission might have resulted from such inaction on the appellant’s part, and I am unable to imagine any.
6. The jury’s award of attorney fees to the appellee in the amount of $5,000 was not supported by evidence showing that the appellee actually incurred such expenses. See Wahnschaff Corp. v. O. E. Clark &c. Co., 166 Ga. App. 242 (2) (304 SE2d 91) (1983). See generally OCGA § 13-6-11. However, I agree with the majority’s implicit holding that the jury was otherwise authorized by the evidence to award attorney fees based on the absence of any bona fide controversy regarding the existence of liability on the appellant’s part. See generally Jackson v. Brinegar, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 432 (2) (301 SE2d 493) (1983).