Court Opinion

ID: 9955799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 15:04:51.397928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.798258
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,926

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                      WILLIAM J. PEWENOFKIT,
                                            Appellant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; SETH L. RUNDLE, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 29, 2024. Reversed and restitution vacated.

        David L. Miller, of The Law Office of David L. Miller, of Wichita, for appellant.

        Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., HILL and CLINE, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: After William J. Pewenofkit pleaded no contest to multiple crimes,
the district court sentenced him to 221 months' imprisonment and orally imposed a
"restitution requirement" that was later identified as a sexual assault kit and examination
fee in the journal entry. Over three years after his direct appeal concluded, Pewenofkit
moved to correct his illegal sentence and argued that the district court erred by imposing
restitution for his crimes. The district court denied the motion, and Pewenofkit appealed.
Pewenofkit renews his argument on appeal and persuasively argues that we have
jurisdiction to consider his claim. We agree and conclude that the district court erred in

                                                     1
denying his motion. Because the sentencing court imposed restitution—rather than court
costs or fees—from the bench without the authority to impose such restitution, we reverse
and vacate the restitution order.

                                           FACTS

       In keeping with a plea agreement in November 2012, Pewenofkit pled no contest
to four counts of kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of
aggravated burglary. Pewenofkit's convictions were based on events committed with
three additional men on March 16, 2011. Of relevance to this appeal, Pewenofkit
admitted to breaking into a home and kidnapping multiple women and children alongside
his three codefendants.

       At sentencing, the district court determined that Pewenofkit's criminal history
score was E and imposed a total of 221 months' imprisonment. The district court also
notified Pewenofkit of his duty to register as a lifetime offender upon his release from
imprisonment. At the end of sentencing, the State requested "a $1,450 restitution fee
associated with this for the sexual assault exam kits of both women." Defense counsel
objected to the State's request, arguing the amount should be waived for Pewenofkit
because his codefendants were the "sex offenders" who had "been ordered to pay that
jointly and severally." Ultimately, the district court imposed the "restitution requirement"
and ordered "it be joint and several with the other codefendants" based on Pewenofkit's
presence when the sexual assault actions were committed.

       When the journal entry was filed later, it indicated the relevant $1,450 was a
"Sexual Assault Kit/Exam Fee" that "shall be paid jointly and severally with co-
defendants." The journal entry does not reflect a specific order of restitution.

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       This court summarily dismissed Pewenofkit's direct appeal based on his failure to
preserve his constitutional challenge to his offender registration. See State v. Pewenofkit,
No. 109,542, 2014 WL 3843080 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion). Our Supreme
Court accepted Pewenofkit's petition for review but summarily affirmed this court's
decision to dismiss because he failed to properly challenge this court's rulings in his
petition for review. State v. Pewenofkit, 307 Kan. 730, 731-32, 415 P.3d 398 (2018).

       Over three years after our Supreme Court issued the mandate dismissing
Pewenofkit's direct appeal, Pewenofkit filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence
under K.S.A. 22-3504. Among other claims, Pewenofkit argued that he was serving an
illegal sentence because the order for him to pay $1,450 was a "restitution fee associated
with two sexual assault exam kits" that arose from conduct outside the offenses or
convictions for which he pled.

       Soon after the State filed its response, the district court appointed an attorney to
represent Pewenofkit on the motion. Defense counsel filed a supplemental document
supporting Pewenofkit's motion and argued that Pewenofkit was serving an illegal
sentence because the district court lacked a causal link between Pewenofkit's actions and
"the restitution damages for which [he] is held liable."

       After a hearing, the district court denied the entirety of Pewenofkit's motion to
correct an illegal sentence. First, the district court noted that it was "doubtful" that a
motion to correct an illegal sentence is an available avenue for relief because the fees
challenge could have been raised in Pewenofkit's direct appeal. But upon reviewing the
record and the statutes, the district court ruled that the $1,450 was a fee imposed by the
court, not restitution. The district court refused to construe the amount as restitution and
denied the motion.

                                               3
       Pewenofkit moved to reconsider the issue of whether he is serving an illegal
sentence based on the lack of causality between his offenses and his restitution order. The
district court held a hearing on this issue but noted it was "continuing to find that these
were not restitution dollars, but rather were costs of the case." Nevertheless, Pewenofkit
argued that the district court lacked causation to order the restitution, and his motion to
correct an illegal sentence provides the legal authority to correct the order. The State
argued that the amount is considered a fee, not restitution, under the applicable statute.
And the State argued that the language regarding restitution, costs, and fees, is often
conflated: "[T]he Court . . . at a prior hearing may have referred to it as restitution, . . .
within these walls, we tend to use 'fees' and 'court costs' and 'restitution' all kind of
somewhat interchangeably, and that may have been what happened here."

       The district court agreed with the State and refused to change its ruling that the
amount related to the rape kits "were fees or costs and not restitution." After Pewenofkit's
counsel was unable to provide caselaw supporting his contention that the district court
had jurisdiction to consider this claim in a motion to correct an illegal sentence,
Pewenofkit's counsel argued that the $1,450 could be considered a clerical error that
could be amended at any time under K.S.A. 22-3504(b). The district court was not
persuaded by Pewenofkit's jurisdiction arguments and denied Pewenofkit's motion to
reconsider.

       Pewenofkit appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

Did the district court err in denying Pewenofkit's motion to correct an illegal sentence
and motion to reconsider?

       In his first issue on appeal, Pewenofkit contends that the district court erred when
it denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 because the

                                                4
$1,450 sexual assault examination fee was part of his criminal sentence as restitution.
And because he believes the $1,450 was restitution, he argues that the district court erred
in finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the causal connection
between his crimes and the amount he alleges was ordered as restitution. In his second
issue, he repeats his argument in Issue I to contend that the district court erred when it
denied his motion to reconsider. But he also alternatively argues that "the journal entry
should be corrected to remove the erroneous fee . . . as the court was without discretion to
impose such a fee."

       In response, the State argues that the district court did not err when it denied both
motions, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Pewenofkit's
claim because Pewenofkit cannot challenge the sexual assault examination fee in a
motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State rejects Pewenofkit's contention that the
fee was a clerical mistake and argues that Pewenofkit abandoned this claim when he
failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.

       Whether a sentence is illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-3504 is a question
of law over which the appellate court has unlimited review. State v. Sartin, 310 Kan. 367,
369, 446 P.3d 1068 (2019). A sentence is illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 when: (1) it is
imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (2) it does not conform to the applicable
statutory provisions, either in character or the term of punishment; or (3) it is ambiguous
about the time and manner in which it is to be served. State v. Hambright, 310 Kan. 408,
411, 447 P.3d 972 (2019).

       A court may correct an illegal sentence at any time while the defendant is serving
the sentence. K.S.A. 22-3504(a).

       Preliminarily, it is worth addressing the State's brief attempt to argue Pewenofkit
cannot bring this claim under K.S.A. 22-3504 because he did not raise the issue on direct

                                              5
appeal. The State contends: "Res judicata applies to motions to correct illegal sentence,
and defendant cannot breathe new life into the issue of the $1,450 'Sexual Assault
Kit/Exam Fee' by trying to stretch K.S.A. 22-3504 to challenge the issue he previously
abandoned."

       But while Kansas appellate courts have applied the doctrine of res judicata to
motions to correct an illegal sentence, our court has noted those cases "involve claims
that previously were resolved on the merits or claims that would not render a sentence
illegal, even if true." State v. Martin, 52 Kan. App. 2d 474, 481, 369 P.3d 959 (2016).
Contrary to the State's argument, the Martin court stated: "[I]interpreting the doctrine of
res judicata to bar challenges of an illegal sentence merely because they could have been
brought in a direct appeal would undermine the clear statutory directive that courts may
correct an illegal sentence at any time under K.S.A. 22-3504(1)." 52 Kan. App. 2d at 481.

       To support its position, the Martin court relied on State v. Neal, 292 Kan. 625,
631, 258 P.3d 365 (2011), where our Supreme Court held that "the motion to correct
illegal sentence is not subject to our general rule that a defendant must raise all available
issues on direct appeal."

       Based on Neal and Martin, we can consider Pewenofkit's claim under K.S.A. 22-
3504, if he can show that his claim, if true, would render his sentence illegal. As this
analysis will find, Pewenofkit's argument likely supports his claim that his sentence is
illegal based on the sentencing court's restitution order. And just because he did not raise
this issue in his direct appeal, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar consideration of
Pewenofkit's claim.

       That said, the illegal sentence statute has very limited applicability. See State v.
Alford, 308 Kan. 1336, 1338, 429 P.3d 197 (2018). To overcome the limited applicability
of K.S.A. 22-3504, Pewenofkit contends that the sentencing court imposed restitution as

                                              6
part of his criminal sentence which did not conform to the applicable statutory provisions
because it lacked a causal connection to his crimes. But of course, the majority of
Pewenofkit's argument rests on his contention that the district court imposed $1,450 as
restitution, not a fee under the statute, when it made its oral pronouncement from the
bench. As he argues, a judge's oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over a
conflicting written journal entry, and clerical errors in a journal entry may be corrected at
any time. State v. Edwards, 309 Kan. 830, 835, 440 P.3d 557 (2019); see K.S.A. 22-
3504(b) (clerical mistakes in judgments may be corrected by the court at any time). Thus,
we must first determine whether the sentencing court imposed restitution or fees when it
ordered Pewenofkit to pay $1,450 for the sexual assault exam kits.

       The sentencing court's oral pronouncement ordered restitution.

       At sentencing, the State requested a "$1,450 restitution fee associated with this for
the sexual assault exam kits of both women." The district court agreed and made an oral
pronouncement that it would "impose the restitution requirement for Mr. Pewenofkit and
order that it be joint and several with the other codefendants." But when the journal entry
was filed later, there was no restitution order and the $1,450 was identified as a "Sexual
Assault Kit/Exam Fee." No documents in the record indicate whether the State and the
district court were relying on any specific statute to request and order the $1,450 fee. And
Pewenofkit did not challenge the imposition of the amount on direct appeal. See
Pewenofkit, 307 Kan. at 730-32; Pewenofkit, 2014 WL 3843080, at *1-2.

       Important to this analysis, Kansas courts have recognized the difference between
restitution and court costs in a criminal case. See State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 737-38,
449 P.3d 429 (2019). The Gentry court explained restitution is controlled by K.S.A. 2018
Supp. 21-6604(b)(1), which provides "'the court shall order the defendant to pay
restitution, which shall include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the

                                              7
defendant's crime, unless the court finds compelling circumstances which would render a
plan of restitution unworkable.'" 310 Kan. at 737.

       But court costs are governed by K.S.A. 22-3801 and K.S.A. 28-172a. 310 Kan. at
737. Under K.S.A. 22-3801, "[i]f the defendant in a criminal case is convicted, the court
costs shall be taxed against the defendant and shall be a judgment against the defendant
which may be enforced as judgments for payments of money in civil cases." And,
notably, under K.S.A. 28-172a(d):

       "All other fees and expenses to be assessed as additional court costs shall be approved by
       the court, unless specifically fixed by statute. Additional fees shall include, but are not
       limited to, fees for Kansas bureau of investigation forensic or laboratory analyses, fees
       for detention facility processing pursuant to K.S.A. 12-16,119, and amendments thereto,
       fees for the sexual assault evidence collection kit, fees for conducting an examination of a
       sexual assault victim, fees for service of process outside the state, witness fees, fees for
       transcripts and depositions, costs from other courts, doctors' fees and examination and
       evaluation fees." (Emphasis added.)

       At the hearing on Pewenofkit's motion to correct an illegal sentence, the State
argued that "we are talking about fees and not restitution" and appeared to reference
K.S.A. 28-172a(d) as the authority for the $1,450 the sentencing court ordered. The State
concluded by arguing Pewenofkit should have to pay the amount "under the fee statute."
When it made its findings, the district court found that it would agree with Pewenofkit "if
this is a restitution issue." But because the district court found that the sentencing court
intended to impose fees, not restitution, the district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider whether the fees were improper.

       Critical to this analysis, and as argued by Pewenofkit, Kansas courts have long
held that a sentencing court's oral pronouncement from the bench controls over a

                                                     8
conflicting journal entry because a criminal sentence is effective when pronouncement is
made from the bench:

               "When the defendant appears for sentencing in a criminal case, the court may
       commit the defendant to the custody of the appropriate authority, impose a fine, grant
       probation, suspend the imposition of sentence, or impose any combination of those
       alternatives. Regardless of which of the alternatives the court selects, the judgment is
       effective upon its pronouncement from the bench; the filing of a formal journal entry is
       but a record, evidence of what has been done. The court's order does not derive its
       effectiveness from the journal entry, or from any act of the clerk; it is effective when
       announced. The defendant is personally present, and thus knows that at that moment he
       or she has been sentenced, fined, or placed on probation, or that the imposition of
       sentence has been suspended. [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) State v. Moses, 227
       Kan. 400, 402-03, 607 P.2d 477 (1980).

See also Abasolo v. State, 284 Kan. 299, 304, 160 P.3d 471 (2007) ("This court has
further explained that where the sentence announced from the bench differs from the
sentence later described in the journal entry, the orally pronounced sentence controls.").

       And notably, our Supreme Court has concluded that the intent of the sentencing
court is irrelevant when a journal entry conflicts with a judge's oral pronouncement:

       "What the court may or may not have intended is irrelevant. The sentences as pronounced
       were effective upon their pronouncement and control over the journal entries herein. A
       journal entry which imposes a sentence at variance with that pronounced from the bench
       is erroneous and must be corrected to reflect the actual sentence imposed." State v.
       Hegwood, 256 Kan. 901, 906, 888 P.2d 856 (1995).

       But in other situations, our Supreme Court has held that a sentencing court did not
err in using the wrong verbiage if it was clear from the entirety of the sentencing
proceedings that the sentencing court meant to say the correct words. For example,

                                                     9
recently in State v. Hill, 313 Kan. 1010, 1012, 492 P.3d 1190 (2021), our Supreme Court
concluded that a sentencing court did not err when it used incorrect verbiage to sentence
the defendant to a hard 50 sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the judge repeatedly
referred to the sentence for capital murder as a term of "'life imprisonment without
possibility of parole'" despite the parties consistently clarifying that the State was seeking
a hard 50 sentence. 313 Kan. at 1012. And the journal entry of sentencing later reflected
Hill was to serve a hard 50 sentence. On appeal, Hill argued that the district court
imposed an illegal sentence based on its oral pronouncement of life without parole. But
our Supreme Court was not persuaded. After reviewing the entirety of the sentencing
hearing, the Hill court determined that it was "sufficiently clear to everyone present that
Hill was to receive the mandatory hard 50 sentence and they acted accordingly." 313
Kan. at 1015. And "the meaning of the sentence pronounced from the bench is the
sentence reflected in Hill's journal entry. There is ultimately no ambiguity and Hill is
serving a legal sentence." 313 Kan. at 1016.

       One year later in State v. Juiliano, 315 Kan. 76, 81-82, 504 P.3d 399 (2022), our
Supreme Court relied on Hill to find a sentencing court did not impose an illegal sentence
when it used the phrase "'hard 40 sentence of life without parole'" to impose a hard 40
sentence. Like in Hill, the Juiliano court reasoned that the entirety of the sentencing
proceedings reflected the proper sentence:

               "Applying the principle from Hill to this case—i.e., evaluating the meaning of a
       sentence based on the context of the entire sentencing hearing—we find the district court
       imposed a hard 40 sentence. While the court could have used better wording, the context
       makes it clear the court ordered Juiliano to serve a hard 40 sentence. The State filed a
       motion specifically requesting a hard 40 sentence under K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4638.
       Defense counsel responded, arguing that the hard 40 sentence should not apply in this
       case. At the sentencing hearing, before the parties' arguments, the court noted on the
       record that it had read through the State's hard 40 sentence motion and Juiliano's
       response. This readily establishes the court understood the State was seeking the hard 40

                                                   10
       sentence as outlined in K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4638. Throughout the hearing, the
       prosecutor and defense counsel repeatedly referred to the proposed sentence as the hard
       40 sentence. The prosecutor also consistently asked the court to 'impose the hard 40'
       sentence. In making its finding, the court made clear it was granting the State's motion for
       the 'hard 40 sentence on the first degree premeditated murder case.' All of this came
       before the judge finally declared, 'The defendant will be sentenced . . . to the hard 40
       sentence of life without parole.' We find no ambiguity in the sentence pronounced, which
       conformed to K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4638." 315 Kan. at 81-82.

       Here, the sentencing record does not provide the clarity that the record provided in
Hill and Juiliano. Nothing in the record reflects that the State, or the district court, relied
on any statutory authority to impose the $1,450 restitution or fee. And the record is silent
on how the $1,450 figure was calculated. No party filed a document citing to the statutes,
and no parties referenced the statutes at the hearing. And unlike Hill and Juiliano, the
sentencing court's intent was not clear despite using the wrong turn of phrase.

       The State argues that its request for a "'$1,450 restitution fee associated with this
for the sexual assault exam kits of both women' . . . was plainly a reference to the fee
required by K.S.A. 28-172a(d)" because the fee "had to be ordered on the record" under
the statute. But this argument is not persuasive because our Supreme Court has
determined that the district court is not required to impose such fees under K.S.A. 28-
172a(d). In State v. Alvarez, 309 Kan. 203, 207-08, 432 P.3d 1015 (2019), our Supreme
Court considered whether the "'shall'" language in the statutes authorizing court costs—
K.S.A. 22-3801(a) and K.S.A. 28-172a—required sentencing courts to impose the
relevant costs. The Alvarez court interpreted the plain language of K.S.A. 28-172a to find
a district court is not required to tax a defendant for expenses and explained:

               "The language in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 28-172a indicates that docket fees and other
       costs that are specifically fixed by statute must be taxed against the defendant, but that
       other fees to be assessed as court costs need to be approved by the district court before
       they are taxed. This does not mean that the district court must tax a defendant for trial

                                                    11
       preparation expenses, as the Court of Appeals concluded, but that those expenses must
       first bear a reasonable relation to the prosecution and then be approved by the district
       court before they are taxed as court costs.
               "K.S.A. 22-3801 does state that 'court costs shall be taxed against the defendant,'
       which suggests that perhaps the taxing of court costs is mandatory. However, since
       K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 28-172a indicates that this is not the case, it becomes apparent that the
       'shall' in K.S.A. 22-3801 is directory. See [State v. ]Raschke, 289 Kan. [911,] 915-
       16[, 219 P.3d 481 (2009)] (noting that 'shall' in one statute was treated as directory
       'because of the discretionary effect of other provisions')." 309 Kan. at 208.

       Because the district court was not required to impose fees to cover the sexual
assault exam expenses, the district court's use of "restitution requirement" does not
provide the directional guidance that the State suggests.

       In this vein, the State also argues that the sentencing court's use of the phrase
"'restitution requirement'" is a reference to a fee because "[r]estitution is not required
where unworkable [under K.S.A. 21-6604(b)(1)], whereas a fee or court cost must be
paid even if a defendant is going to prison."

       While the verbiage used by the State and the sentencing court may lend some
support to the State's position, we must assume that the State was referencing K.S.A. 28-
172a(d), or any statute, to find the journal entry properly reflected the district court's
sentence. At the hearing on Pewenofkit's motion to reconsider, the State made a similar
argument that required the district court to assume the intent of the State and the
sentencing court during sentencing. The State recognized the sentencing court "may have
referred to it as restitution" but argued that "sometimes we—within these walls, we tend
to use 'fees' and 'court costs' and 'restitution' all kind of somewhat interchangeably, and
that may have been what happened there." The State's argument similarly assumes all
parties and the district court intended to impose a fee despite using the word "restitution"
repeatedly.

                                                     12
       But even if the district court had the statutory authority to award the fees under
K.S.A. 28-172a(d), our Supreme Court has held that a sentencing court abused its
discretion when it ordered restitution, rather than a statutory fee, when the sentencing
court had the statutory authority to cover over $3,000 in witness and exhibit expenses.
Gentry, 310 Kan. at 738. The Gentry court noted that the district court had the statutory
authority to tax the expenses as court costs, such as here, but the judge specifically
ordered the expense to be reimbursed as "'restitution'" in its oral pronouncements and
sentencing order. 310 Kan. at 737-38. Despite the State's contention that "everyone
understood that they were talking about court costs and not restitution," the Gentry court
went on to hold that it "cannot simply ignore the district court's language; restitution and
court costs are two different things." 310 Kan. at 738. And because the sentencing court
specifically used the language "restitution," our Supreme Court held that the sentencing
court made a legal error in imposing the witness expenses as restitution rather than a fee.
310 Kan. at 738.

       Under Gentry, a sentencing court's improper restitution order cannot be converted
into a proper order of fees under the relevant statutes. Put another way, an illegal order of
restitution is not cured by the existence of some statutory authority which supports an
order of fees. And given the distinct characteristics of restitution compared to the
characteristics of fees and court costs—which the State repeatedly emphasizes throughout
its brief—the State's argument contending that the sentencing court conflated the word
"restitution" to mean "fee" at the hearing is not persuasive. As the Gentry court pointed
out, this court cannot ignore the district court's language because "restitution and court
costs are two different things." 310 Kan. at 738.

       If the State and sentencing court wanted to impose a fee rather than restitution,
then they should have used the proper verbiage. As noted, a court's order does not derive
its effectiveness from the journal entry; it is effective when announced. Moses, 227 Kan.
at 402-03. And importantly, Pewenofkit was personally present when the sentencing

                                             13
court imposed "restitution" and thus knew that at that moment he had been ordered to pay
restitution. He was not present, as required, when the district court imposed the fee
identified in the journal entry, and so he was not aware that he had been ordered to pay a
statutory fee. See K.S.A. 22-3405.

       As a result, we determine that the district court made an oral pronouncement
ordering Pewenofkit to pay $1,450 in restitution to cover the expense of the sexual
assault exam kits. And because restitution is part of a criminal defendant's sentence, we
have jurisdiction to consider whether Pewenofkit's restitution sentence conforms with the
applicable statutory provisions, either in character or punishment, under K.S.A. 22-
3504(c)(1). See State v. Eubanks, 316 Kan. 355, 361, 516 P.3d 116 (2022) (considering
whether restitution order resulted in an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 for first
time on appeal); Hambright, 310 Kan. at 411 (considering illegal sentence challenge for
first time on direct appeal).

       The district court erred in ordering Pewenofkit to pay restitution.

       Next, we must then decide whether the district court's restitution order created an
illegal sentence. To argue his sentence is illegal, Pewenofkit argues that his restitution
judgment does not conform to the applicable statutory provision in either character or
punishment. See Hambright, 310 Kan. at 411.

       Pewenofkit was sentenced on January 8, 2013. Under K.S.A. 21-6604(b)(1), "the
court shall order the defendant to pay restitution, which shall include, but not be limited
to, damage or loss caused by the defendant's crime . . . unless . . . the court finds
compelling circumstances that would render restitution unworkable."

       In Gentry, our Supreme Court relied on an unpublished opinion by this court for
the proposition that the State could not collect restitution for expenses related to

                                              14
witnesses and trial exhibits because the State "was not a victim of the defendant's crime."
Gentry, 310 Kan. at 737 (citing State v. Harley, No. 93,349, 2005 WL 2665768, at *2
[Kan. App. 2005] [unpublished opinion]). The Gentry court did not opine on the
correctness of this proposition but nevertheless relied on the proposition to find the
district court lacked authority to order restitution—rather than fees—to collect the
witness and trial exhibit expenses. The Gentry court reasoned:

               "We cannot simply ignore the district court's language; restitution and costs are
       two different things. As previously mentioned, restitution is controlled by K.S.A. 2018
       Supp. 21-6604 and court costs are subject to K.S.A. 22-3801 and K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 28-
       172a. When a defendant is incarcerated, restitution is due upon sentencing only if the
       court orders a certain amount of money be withheld from the defendant's monthly prison
       account. Otherwise, restitution orders at sentencing are advisory calculations of damages
       for the Prisoner Review Board, which can impose restitution upon the defendant's parole.
       State v. Alderson, 299 Kan. 148, 151, 322 P.3d 364 (2014). The taxation of court costs
       are not viewed in the same way. See State v. Douglas, 47 Kan. App. 2d 734, 742, 279
       P.3d 133 (2012) (noting that, unlike restitution, court must order a convicted defendant to
       pay court costs even if defendant is going to prison)." 310 Kan. at 738.

       Here, like in Gentry, the State argues that reimbursement of the sexual assault
exams should be considered an order for fees under K.S.A. 28-172a(d) because that
provision allows for the collection of fees for such purpose. See K.S.A. 28-172a(d) ("All
other fees and expenses to be assessed as additional court costs shall be approved by the
court . . . includ[ing] . . . fees for the sexual assault evidence collection kit, fees for
conducting an examination of a sexual assault victim . . . ."). In Alvarez, 309 Kan. at 205-
07, our Supreme Court interpreted the same provision, along with K.S.A. 22-3801, to
hold that expenses for photographic trial exhibits can be classified as court costs. The
Gentry court relied on the reasoning in Alvarez to find the district court abused its
discretion when it ordered restitution, rather than fees, to cover witness and exhibit
expenses. 310 Kan. at 737-38.

                                                   15
       Under Gentry and Harley, we hold that the sentencing court erred when it ordered
Pewenofkit to pay for the sexual assault examinations through a restitution order. Like
the type of fees in Gentry, the fees here could have been collected under K.S.A. 28-
172a(d). But it would be improper for the district court to collect such fees as restitution
because the State "was not a victim of the defendant's crime." Gentry, 310 Kan. at 737.
While there is nothing in the record that explicitly states the $1,450 was collected by the
State to recoup the sexual assault exam expenses, there is also nothing in the record to
suggest otherwise. No evidence was presented to suggest restitution was being used to
reimburse the victims for the cost of the exam.

       This conclusion seems appropriate given the lack of restitution hearing and
evidence presented. Typically, the standard for reviewing restitution orders depends on
which aspect of restitution is at issue:

               "Issues regarding the amount of restitution and the manner in which it is made to
       the aggrieved party are normally subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.
       A district judge's factual findings underlying the causal link between the crime and the
       victim's loss are subject to a substantial competent evidence standard of review. And this
       court has unlimited review over interpretation of statutes. [Citations omitted.]" State v.
       Hand, 297 Kan. 734, 736-37, 304 P.3d 1234 (2013).

       In Gentry, our Supreme Court reviewed the restitution issue for an abuse of
discretion based on a challenge to the amount of restitution awarded. 310 Kan. at 737.

       "A district court abuses its discretion when: (1) no reasonable person would take the
       view adopted by the trial judge; (2) a ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial
       competent evidence does not support a finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion
       is based. [Citation omitted.]" 310 Kan. at 737.

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The Gentry court concluded that the district court abused its discretion because it made
an error of law. 310 Kan. at 738.

       The court's reasoning in Gentry is applicable here. We are not able to review the
district court's factual findings underlying the causal link between the crime and the
victim's loss for substantial competent evidence because no such factors were identified
by any party. No victim loss was identified, and no evidence was presented to establish
any sort of causal link between Pewenofkit's crime and the sexual assault exam kits.
Thus, like in Gentry, we conclude that the district court here made a legal error when it
included $1,450 for sexual assault exam expenses as a restitution order. Because the
order was based on a legal error, it was an abuse of discretion, and we vacate the
restitution order. See Gentry, 310 Kan. at 738 (vacating restitution order).

       Reversed and restitution vacated.

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