Court Opinion

ID: 9791483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:11:36.20599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.281428
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion of the court in this case, but feel compelled to comment on the dissenting opinion. The dissent asserts Duckett’s wife could not claim a right of self-defense as to Hetler because Hetler “[njever, in any way threatened Duckett’s wife with any serious bodily injury.” Dissent, at 4. This analysis overlooks, or chooses to ignore, 2 Robinson, Ckiminal Law Defenses § 131(b) (1984), whether the full or truncated version. Relying on this section, the majority’s position is that Hetler was, in effect, threatening Mrs. Duckett by restraining her husband from coming to her aid. In other words, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Duckett, Hetler and Carlson were acting in concert. Just as X and Y are aggressors in the hypothetical, Carlson and Hetler were, due to their concerted actions, aggressors against Mrs. Duckett. She thus had a right to defend herself against both. If, as the dissent acknowledges, Duckett steps into the shoes of his wife in his claim of defense of others, then Duckett was entitled to repel either aggressor, Carlson or Hetler. Admittedly, the hypothetical posed by the Robinson treatise is more intriguing and would perhaps better adapt to a screenplay than the drunken melee that took place in Carlson’s garage. However, it is hard to see how this sophistication makes any difference.
Also, the dissent’s application of Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379 (Wyo.1979) is misguided, if not disingenuous. The dissent avows, “If the rule adopted by the majority here were *949the law, then Mrs. Leeper would have been justified in shooting and perhaps killing every person who might have attempted to interfere with her effort to dispatch Johann-sen.” Dissent, at 951. Two critical facts distinguish Leeper from the case at bar. First, Leeper’s husband and Johannsen were mutual combatants. Since her husband could not assert self-defense, Mrs. Leeper could not invoke the defense of others. In the present case, viewing the facts in Duckett’s favor, Mrs. Duckett and Carlson were not mutual combatants. Carlson was the aggressor. Mrs. Duckett would thus assert self-defense, which in turn permits her husband to invoke the defense of others.
Second, Johannsen was not using deadly force against Leeper’s husband. For this reason, Mrs. Leeper was not justified in using deadly force against Johannsen or against anyone acting in concert with Jo-hannsen. This is true even if Johannsen had been the aggressor. In this case, Carlson was slamming Mrs. Duckett’s head into a concrete floor. Thus, it becomes a question for the jury whether the use of force by someone acting on Mrs. Duckett’s behalf was reasonable and necessary. Leeper, 589 P.2d at 383. The majority’s reliance on Leeper is sound.
Finally, the dissent insists that “[t]he defense of defense of others should be limited to those situations in which the person to be rescued is clearly entitled to a claim of self-defense.” Dissent, at 951. This is precisely what the majority opinion endeavors to do. More important, the majority attempts to reach a workable resolution of a difficult problem. Justifications for battery or homicide should not be easily invoked. However, the majority opinion recognizes that, at times, a person is left no choice but to come to the aid of a loved one, or even a stranger, in need of assistance. We must trust that juries, as arbiters of the facts, will be able to determine when such actions are justified.