Court Opinion

ID: 9384593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 14:01:04.448606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.906920
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    DAKOTA RURAL ACTION, et al.,
              Plaintiffs,
         v.
                                                          Civil Action No. 18-2852 (CKK)
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    AGRICULTURE, et al.,
              Defendants.

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                     (April 4, 2023)

        Since the Great Depression, the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”), 1 resident within the

United States Department of Agriculture, has extended loans to family farmers. Like all agency

actions, these loans are subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). After

notice-and-comment rulemaking, NEPA permits agencies to categorically exempt (“CatEx”)

certain agency actions from further environmental review upon finding that they do not

individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. On August 3,

2016, FSA promulgated a new rule doing just that for, among other things, loan actions to

medium-sized “concentrated animal feeding operations” (“CAFOs”). Plaintiffs argue that this

rule was arbitrary and/or capricious and should be vacated pending remand. Defendants agree

that the rule is procedurally infirm, but argue that the agency error was so minor that the Court

should remand the rule to the agency without vacating it. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs

1
  Defendants in this matter are the United States Department of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack in his
official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture, FSA, and Zach Ducheneaux in his official capacity
as FSA Administrator. Because FSA is the promulgating agency, the Court refers to all
Defendants by “FSA.”

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have the better of the argument and, upon consideration of the pleadings, 2 the relevant legal

authorities, and the entire record, DENIES Defendants’ [31] Motion for Voluntary Remand and

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ [35] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

                                    I.      BACKGROUND

       The central question before the Court is whether it must vacate the FSA’s promulgation of

a rule creating a new categorical exemption from environmental review for loan actions to

medium CAFOs. The applicable statute, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §

4332(2)(C), requires all agencies to undertake a certain degree of environmental review before

effecting an agency decision or policy. Nat’l Trust for Historic Preservation in U.S. v. Dole, 828

F.2d 776, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In addition to requiring an agency to consider the environmental

consequences of its actions, NEPA ensures that “‘the agency will inform the public that it has

indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.’” Brady Campaign to

Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009) (CKK) (quoting Balt. Gas

& Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)).

       The default for such analysis is an “environmental impact statement” (“EIS”) which, by

statute, requires a particularly searching review before an agency takes an action that will

“significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment.” Found. on Econ. Trends v.

2
 The Court’s analysis has focused on the following documents:
          • Defendant’s Motion for Voluntary Remand, ECF No. 31 (“Defs.’ Mot.”);
          • Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion for Remand Without Vacatur and Cross-Motion for
              Summary Judgment, ECF No. 35 (“Pls.’ Mot.”);
          • Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Motion for Remand Without Vacatur and
              Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 36 (“Defs.’
              Repl.”)
          • Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 38 (“Pls.’
              Repl.”); and
          • the Administrative Record, ECF Nos. 39-45 (“AR”).
The Court held oral argument in this matter on September 9, 2022.
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Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985). More commonly, however, an agency prepares an

“environmental assessment” (“EA”) when environmental impact is not clearly established, in

which it explains in more limited terms why an EIS is unnecessary and there will be no

significant environmental impact. See id.; Dole, 828 F.2d at 780. Finally, an agency need not

publish an EA if it determines that the decision falls within a category of actions that “do[es] not

individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.” Brady, 612 F.

Supp. 2d at 14 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(d)).

       Here, FSA concluded that it need not employ any environmental analysis before taking

certain loan actions to benefit medium-sized CAFOs. CAFOs are industrial operations that raise

animals for harvest, including slaughter. See Gov’t Accountability Office, Concentrated Animal

Feeding Operations: EPA Needs More Information and a Clearly Defined Strategy to Protect Air

and Water Quality from Pollutants of Concern (Sept. 2008) available at

https://www.gao.gov/assets/a280238.html#:~:text=This%20is%20the%20accessible%20text%20

file%20for%20GAO,Concern%27%20which%20was%20released%20on%20September%2024

%2C%202008 (last accessed April 4, 2023 9:03 AM). These businesses, some of which are

family-owned, “raise[] animals in a confined situation for a total of 45 days or more during a 12-

month period and [] bring[] feed to the animals rather than having the animals graze or seek feed

in pastures and fields or on rangeland.” Id. The byproducts of these operations may have

environmental consequences. Id. Among other things, FSA provides certain loan services to

CAFOs. See AR001610. At issue here are loans to “medium” CAFOs, which “stable[] or

confine[][:]” (1) “200 to 699 mature dairy cows, whether milked or dry;” (2) “300 to 999 veal

calves;” and (3) “300 to 99 cattle,” and (4) “37,500 to 124,999 chickens;” among other

categories of animals. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(6)(i). Plaintiffs challenge a new rule

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implementing a categorical exclusion from environmental review for these operations, 7 C.F.R.

§§ 799.41(a)(9)-(10) (“Final Rule”).

       Previously, FSA was required to conduct, at the very least, some degree of environmental

review before providing financial assistance for most medium CAFOs. AR 000019. FSA then

proposed a new rule in which FSA would use an “environmental screening worksheet” (“ESW”)

to determine whether a particular loan action to a medium CAFO should require an EA. AR

001515 (Sept. 3, 2014). The proposed rule did not provide notice that FSA would forgo an ESW

for loan actions to medium-sized CAFOs and instead categorically exempt those actions from

NEPA review.

       The record provides no indication the FSA began to consider this course of action until it

received, sometime between September 2014 and August 2016, precisely one comment placed

into the Federal Register, arguing in short shrift: “As proposed the provisions for medium

CAFOs would be an onerous impediment to obtaining financing for operations that will often

include young or beginning farmers.” AR 001610. FSA evidently inferred that the commenter

viewed ESW review for the actions at issue here as overly onerous, so it replied that, under the

proposed rule, “ESW review will be completed for small and medium CAFOs . . . .” Id.; see

also AR 001515 (proposed 7 C.F.R. § 799.41(9)-(10) (Sept. 3, 2014)). In other words, FSA

disagreed, and would continue onwards with ESW review. Oddly, FSA repeated the same reply

to a similar comment in the notice of the Final Rule, despite reversing course in the Final Rule.

See AR 001608, 001620 (Aug. 3, 2016). Again, at this time, FSA provided essentially no notice

that it would reverse course in the Final Rule.

       Upon exhaustive review of the record, the Court has been unable to locate FSA’s

reasoning for this change or the sources of data upon which FSA relied. In August 2013, it

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appears that FSA discussed certain new categorical exemptions, although these proposed

categorical exemptions predated the August 2016 exemption for loans to mediums CAFOs. See

AR 000308. There, FSA stated in conclusory fashion that it relied on “its experience

implementing similar actions, the experience of other agencies, and information provided by the

public.” AR 000313. The only category that has any discussion in the record is the “experience

of other agencies” as to the “[p]artial or complete release of loan collateral.” AR 000329. Of

this category, FSA identified only certain practices by the National Park Service which

categorically exclude NEPA review only when an applicant has already demonstrated that its

application would not disturb, inter alia, “the kind and amount of recreational, historical or

cultural resources of the area[,] or the integrity of the existing setting.” AR 000330. The other

agency practices identified utilized environmental worksheets and do not apply a categorical

exemption. See AR 000329-30.

       Additionally, although FSA received public comments in 2014 that argued there should

be a CatEx for all loan actions to medium CAFOs, AR 001439, 1444, these comments are largely

the same as the sole comment included in FSA’s 2016 discussion, which repeated FSA’s 2014

position. Again, because this review predates public comments in both 2014 and 2016, there is

no indication in the record that FSA returned to this material when it decided to reverse course

between 2014 and 2016. Moreover, the record does not indicate the extent of FSA’s review of its

own prior loan actions to medium CAFOs, and there is no indication that the review included

loan actions to medium CAFOs.

                                  II.     LEGAL STANDARD

       Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

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and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” However, “when a party seeks review

of agency action under the APA [before a district court], the district judge sits as an appellate

tribunal. The ‘entire case’ on review is a question of law.” Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson,

269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, “the standard set forth in Rule 56[ ] does not

apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record . . . .

Summary judgment is [ ] the mechanism for deciding whether as a matter of law the agency

action is supported by the administrative record and is otherwise consistent with the APA

standard of review.” Southeast Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.D.C. 2010).

       The APA “sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency

action for procedural correctness.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513

(2009). It requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and

conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “This is a ‘narrow’ standard of review as courts

defer to the agency’s expertise.” Ctr. for Food Safety v. Salazar, 898 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). As the “focal point” in administrative review, the Court’s inquiry

is limited to the administrative record before it. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).

Absent special circumstances, the Court is not to consider evidence outside the record or

arguments not raised before the agency. See Am. Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 992 F.3d 1129, 1139

(D.C. Cir. 2021).

                                       III.    DISCUSSION

       The Final Rule here suffers from two fatal infirmities. First, FSA provided no notice that

it would categorically exempt all loan actions to medium CAFOs from any NEPA review, and

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provided the public no opportunity to comment on this change. Second, the record provides

essentially no reasoning for this change. Given the severity of these procedural errors, FSA does

not overcome the presumption of this jurisdiction that a procedurally infirm environmental rule

must be vacated pending remand to the promulgating agency.

       As described above, a federal agency may promulgate a regulation identifying

“categories of actions that do not normally have a significant effect on the human environment,

and therefore do not require preparation of an [EA] or [an] [EIS].” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a). Such

a category is termed a “categorical exclusion” or a “CatEx.” To create a CatEx, an agency must

first determine, through notice-and-comment rulemaking, that the excluded actions do not

individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. See

Earthworks v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 496 F. Supp. 3d 472, 493 (D.D.C. 2020); Colo. Wild,

Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2006). The agency must then

publish the proposed CatEx in the Federal Register, provide an opportunity for public comment,

and submit the CatEx for approval to the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) (a federal

agency that effects NEPA). Heartwood, 435 F.3d at 1210. Because both notice and comment are

necessary to sustain a CatEx, simply consulting with CEQ, without more, is insufficient to pass

APA review. Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 73 F. Supp. 2d 962, 975 (S.D. Ill. 1999)

(CatEx excluding environmental review of certain amount of timber harvests failed under APA

review where agency failed to explain during notice-and-comment rulemaking why amount of

harvest would not have a significant impact on the environment); see also Pub. Emps. for

Environ. Responsibility v. Nat’l Park Serv., 605 F. Supp. 3d 28, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2022).

       Here, FSA concedes that it did not make a finding as to environmental impact. Defs.’

Repl. at 8. Although FSA concedes this error, it evidently concludes that its notice-and-comment

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rulemaking was not otherwise deficient. FSA declaims that it relied on “substantial data,” Repl.

at 11, which “presumably” included loan actions to medium-sized CAFOs, Mot. at 12. Yet it can

point to nothing in the record supporting such a proposition. On the Court’s review of the

record, there is very little data discussed to support any of the new categorical exemptions, much

less the challenged CatEx. See AR 000313-33. In both 2014 and 2016, in response to public

comments, FSA explained that it would not create a CatEx for loan actions to medium CAFOs.

AR 001439 (2014); AR 001610 (2016). In 2016, FSA’s answer is also the last time FSA’s

reasoning for the particular challenged CatEx is mentioned in the record.

       As a result, the administrative record itself belies FSA’s arguments in its briefing. More

importantly, FSA’s baseless arguments are post-hoc rationalizations which a reviewing court may

not accept to determine the scope of procedural error. See Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Johanns, 520

F. Supp. 2d 8, 33 (D.D.C. 2007) (CKK). Although FSA may be correct that it undertook a

searching and comprehensive review of the environmental effects of the challenged CatEx, a

regulation may be sustained only on the administrative record before the Court, not an agency’s

mere say-so. See Am. Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 992 F.3d 1129, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2021). As such, not

only did FSA fail to provide notice-and-comment rulemaking, but it also evidently failed to

undertake the reasoned analysis required by NEPA before creating a CatEx.

       The severity of these errors require vacatur. “The ordinary practice is to vacate unlawful

agency action, and district courts in this [C]ircuit routinely vacate agency actions taken in

violation of NEPA.” Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engs., 985 F.3d 1032,

1050 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). That said, “[a] court is not without discretion to leave

agency action in place while the decision is remanded for [reexamination].” Id. at 1051. The

decision whether to remand without vacatur depends on whether “‘there is at least a serious

                                                 8
possibility that the agency will be able to substantiate its decision,’ and [whether] ‘vacating

would be disruptive.’” NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 244 (D.D.C. 2018) (JDB) (cleaned

up) (quoting Radio-TV News Directors Ass’n v. FCC, 184 F.3d 872, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

       This exception to the general rule is an exception for good reason. Although NEPA is

often considered a “procedural” statute, its purpose is “not to generate paperwork or litigation,

but to provide for informed decision making and foster excellent action.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a).

If an agency does not explain its actions, and does not afford the public an opportunity to weigh

in, the purpose of environmental notice-and-comment rulemaking is severely undermined. See

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 317-18 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part). Moreover,

“‘experience suggests that remand without vacatur sometimes invites agency indifference.’”

Friends of the Earth v. Haaland, 583 F. Supp. 3d 113, 157 (D.D.C. 2022) (RC) (cleaned up)

(quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Griffith, J.,

concurring)). This case provides an excellent example. Although FSA admitted error in

September 2019, to date, it appears that FSA has taken no action to correct its error. More

importantly, however, there is nothing in the record to confirm FSA’s insistence that it will be

able to substantiate the challenged CatEx on remand. Therefore, on the administrative record

before the Court, vacatur is necessary under this Circuit’s default rule.

                                      IV.    CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ [31] Motion for Voluntary Remand is DENIED

and Plaintiffs’ [35] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Court

DECLARES that Defendant Farm Service Agency’s August 3, 2016 final rule implementing the

National Environmental Policy Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 51,274 (Aug. 3, 2016) is, in part, arbitrary,

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capricious, and not in accordance with law pursuant. The CAFO provisions of the Final Rule are

VACATED. An appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: April 4, 2023                                 /s/
                                                  COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
                                                  United States District Judge

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