Court Opinion

ID: 9662129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:00:05.499273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.094833
License: Public Domain

Garfield, C.J.,
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
I. The majority refers to “the flood of authority” it says supports its view that Code sections 553.15 to 553.18 are not within the sphere of the police power and therefore violate due process of law. A dozen cases are cited at the beginning of its Division III as so holding. Many of the decisions cited for this and other propositions are not authority therefor.
For example, the latest of the dozen citations is Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N. J. 203, 104 A.2d 310. The majority cites it three times. It does not even consider any constitutional question. This is also true of Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 226 P.2d 501, which holds merely plaintiff’s stamp plan does not violate the state Blue Sky law, principally because trading stamps are not “securities” as defined by the law; Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Garfield, 20 Cal.2d 228, 125 P.2d 3, which holds only that giving trading stamps does not violate the state Unfair Practices Act — there was no claim “the legislature is without power constitutionally to prohibit the issuance and use of trading stamps, and it may be noted, the United States Supreme Court has sustained the validity of anti-trading stamp legislation.” (Page 232 of 20 Cal.2d, page 5 of 125 P.2d)
Another of the majority’s citations, to which particular attention is directed, People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666, 124 A. L. R. 316, involves a statute prohibiting dealers in bakery and petroleum products from giving away any commodity to promote the sale of any other commodity. Defendant-was convicted under the statute for giving awajr with the sale of five gallons of gasoline a drinking glass worth less than five cents. A majority of the court held the law violated due process. The Michigan statute is not similar to ours. What was done there *26would not violate our law and what plaintiff does here would not violate the Michigan statute. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Kent Prosecuting Attorney, 287 Mich. 555, 283 N.W. 686, follows People v. Victor, supra, and also rejects the claim the Michigam statute (applicable only to dealers in bakery and petroleum products) violates the 14th amendment in denying equal protection of the laws.
The other case the majority particularly commends in its Division III is Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269, 131 A. L. R. 1254, involving a statute requiring dealers in motor fuels to post prices on each fuel pump to remain in effect at least twenty-four hours and prohibiting the giving of premiums or rebates so as to permit a purchase at a net price below the posted price. Both requirements of the statute were held to be an invalid exercise of the police power. The decision conflicts with State v. Woitha, 227 Iowa 1, 287 N.W. 99, 123 A. L. R. 884, State v. Hardy, 227 Iowa 12, 287 N.W. 104, and Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737, 133 A. L. R. 1071. In any event it is not in point here. City of Denver v. United Cigar Stores Co., 68 Colo. 363, 189 P. 848, cited by the majority, is a mere memorandum decision involving the validity of a city ordinance prohibiting issuance of trading stamps and gifts of like character.
Although the majority seems to feel plaintiff’s plan is simply a cash discount system and our statute is an improper exercise of the police power in violation of due process, its decision is confined to the point that the law violates the equality and uniformity provision (section 6, Article I) of the Iowa Constitution and presumably the equal protection clause (section 1, 14th Amendment) to the United States Constitution. Seven decisions of many said to be to the same effect are cited in the majority’s Division IV to support this holding.
Two of these decisions, State v. Dalton (1900), 22 R. I. 77, 46 A. 234, 48 L.R.A. 775, 84 Am. St. Rep. 818, and State v. Dodge (1903), 76 Vt. 197, 56 A. 983, 1 Ann. Cas. 47, do not even consider the. question, of uniformity or class legislation but hold merely the statutes there considered were not valid police measures because they did not promote the public health, safety or morals and therefore violated the due process clause of the 14th *27Amendment. In State v. Dodge this is the only constitutional provision it was claimed the statute violated.
Further, State v. Dalton, supra, says the court does not differ from the condemnation of the trading stamp business described in Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 11 App. D.C. 512 (the Sperry & Hutchinson plan) and again, “ * * * we do not approve of the trading-stamp business as some of the cases above referred to inform us it is conducted, * * * nor do we decide that it is not competent for the, General Assembly to prohibit it.” (Emphasis added.) See page 92 of 22 R. I., page 239 of 46 A.
Such a decision as in the Dalton and Dodge cases could not have been reached since 1916 when Rast v. Can Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 36 S. Ct. 370, 60 L. Ed. 679, L. R. A. 1917A 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B 455, Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 36 S. Ct. 379, 60 L. Ed. 691, and Pitney v. State of Washington, 240 U. S. 387, 36 S. Ct. 385, 60 L. Ed. 703, were decided. As plaintiff concedes, decisions of the United States Supreme Court on matters relating to the Federal Constitution are binding on state courts. See State Tax Commission v. General Trading Co., 233 Iowa 877, 886, 10 N.W.2d 659, 664, 153 A. L. R. 602; Elk River Coal & Lbr. Co. v. Funk, 222 Iowa 1222, 1232, 271 N.W. 204, 110 A. L. R. 1415; Tolerton & Warfield Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, 222 Iowa 908, 911, 270 N.W. 427; American Asphalt Roof Corp. v. Shankland, 205 Iowa 862, 864, 219 N.W. 28, 60 A. L. R. 986, and citations; 21 C. J. S., Courts, section 206; 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 104.
Further, decisions of fifty years ago such as State v. Dalton and State v. Dodge, both supra, People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker (1902), 72 App. Div. 308, 76 N.Y.S. 111, and People ex rel. Appel v. Zimmerman (1905), 102 App. Div. 103, 92 N.Y.S. 497 (others of the seven decisions the majority cites in its Division IY for its holding of lack of uniformity of our statute) when the police power was thought to be limited to measures that promote merely the public health, safety or morals are no longer authoritative. The scope of the police power is now universally recognized as much less restricted. It has long been held to include also at least the promotion of the general welfare, prosperity, comfort and convenience.
*28See Benschoter v. Hakes (Mulroney, J.), 232 Iowa 1354, 1362, 8 N.W.2d 481, 486; State v. Woitha, supra, 227 Iowa 1, 7, 8, 287 N.W. 99, 123 A. L. R. 884 (“ ‘What was at one time regarded as an improper exercise of the police power may now * * * be recognized as a legitimate exercise of that power.’ ”); City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1104, 184 N.W. 823, 827, 188 N.W. 921, 23 A. L. R. 1322; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People of Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U. S. 561, 592, 26 S. Ct. 341, 50 L. Ed. 596, 609, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 140 P. 918, Ann. Cas. 1916A 209, 210; State ex rel. Hughes v. Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 141 P.2d 192, 200; 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 253, page 982 (“It is obvious that the tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the police power. * * * The state may, in the exercise of the power, declare an act or^eonduet invalid or unlawful which has theretofore been regarded as valid.”).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly approved the statement “The police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguard of the public interests.” See for example Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 524, 17 S. Ct. 864, 866, 42 L. Ed. 260, 262; Tanner v. Little, supra, 240 U. S. 369, 386, 36 S. Ct. 379, 60 L. Ed. 691, 703. Again, “the police power extends to all the great public needs.” Camfield v. United States, supra; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, 31 S. Ct. 186, 188, 55 L. Ed. 112, 116, 32 L. R. A., N.S., 1062, Ann. Oas. 1912A 487.
Further, in State v. Dalton and State v. Dodge, both supra, as in People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker, supra, and several other early cases, perhaps the main question considered is whether the trading stamp device was a lottery. Much of the discussion in the three last cited decisions and others is of that question. This is also true of State ex rel. Simpson v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (1910), 110 Minn. 378, 126 N.W. 120, 30 L. R. A., N.S., 966, cited at the beginning of the majority’s Division III.
In re Opinion of the Justices (1917), 226 Mass. 613, 617, 115 N.E. 978, 979, cited in the majority’s Division IY, is based in part upon the holding that a previous decision in a cause between parties will not be overruled in an advisory opinion but “only after argument in another cause between party and party * * *29In People ex rel. Attorney General v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 197 Mich. 532, 164 N.W. 503, L. R. A. 1918A 797, also cited by the majority, the distinction sought to be made in the statute between merchants and manufacturers Avas much narrower than in our law and the decision is based in part upon a defect in the title of the statute. Then too the court seems to have fallen into the error of assuming that the exercise of the police power was limited to what protects the “public morals, health and safety for the general good.” (Page 537 of 197 Mich., page 504 of 164 N.W.) This is the case cited in 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, section 511h, page 1027, as authority for the statement that equal protection is denied by statutes forbidding issuance of trading stamps except by dealers redeeming them.
II. I am not so credulous as to agree the elaborate plan plaintiff calls its “co-operative cash discount system” is a mere cash discount plan. Plaintiff’s licensing agreement expressly permits dealers to issue as many stamps where credit is extended to the 15th of the following month as for cash sales and it contains no express prohibition against giving stamps for payment of bills of longer standing. Further, it appears plaintiff acquiesces in “double stamp days” when twice the usual number of stamps is given with purchases. It is not suggested there is a “familiar discount” of about four per cent for purchases for cash or on credit up to forty-five days.
Dealers pay plaintiff $3 a thousand for the stamps, “license” and “services” — $3.60 for the 1200 stamps to fill a single book. For this cost of $3.60 to dealers the customer, if he saves the stamps and presents them for redemption, is supposed to get merchandise of an aA^erage retail value of $2.50. Dealers also must pay for the large number of stamps given out that are never presented for redemption for which plaintiff parts with no merchandise.
If plaintiff’s plan is a mere discount for cash it would seem dealers are unAvise to pay so much for so little. The obvious fact is that plaintiff’s plan is a promotion scheme designed to induce the public to purchase merchandise from its dealers exclusively and it appears plaintiff’s agents so represent the plan to prospective licensees. As said in Tanner v. Little, supra, 240 U. S. *30369, 384, 36 S. Ct. 379, 384, 60 L. Ed. 691, 702: “There must, therefore, be something more in it than the giving of discounts, something more than the mere laudation of wares. If companies * * * are able to reap a profit from it, it may well be thought there is something in it which is masked from the common eye and that the purchaser at retail is made to believe that he can get more out of the fund than he has put into it, something of value which is not offset in the prices or quality of the articles which he buys.”
III. It may be conceded a majority of the decisions before 1916 held antitrading stamp laws were not a proper exercise of the police power and violated rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. As indicated in Division I hereof most of these cases were decided when it was thought, the police power was much more limited in scope than is now accepted. See State v. Pitney, supra, 79 Wash. 608, 140 P. 918, Ann. Cas. 1916A 209, 212; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, 681, L. R. A. 1918B 374; State v. J. M. Seney Co., 134 Md. 437, 107 A. 189, 192, 193. State v. Pitney and State v. J. M. Seney Co. each overrules an earlier decision holding anti-trading stamp legislation invalid.
The annotation in 26 A. L. R. 707, 708, on “Constitutionality of trading stamp legislation” says: “An important change, however, in the attitude of the courts toward such legislation occurred in 1916, when the Federal Supreme Court, in the case of Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. Ed. 679, L. R. A. 1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455, sustained the validity of a statute imposing a license tax on merchants using trading stamps, even though the legislation might be of a prohibitive character; and this decision has been followed in other cases in that court.”
11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 281, page 1042, states: “The courts in the several jurisdictions differ greatly in their attitude toward the validity of laws restricting the issuance of trading stamps as a device to -further sales of merchandise, and authority on this question is fairly well divided, although many of the recent cases sustain such legislation.” (Emphasis added.)
*31East v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., Tanner v. Little, and Pitney v. State of Washington, all supra, hold antitrading stamp statutes there considered do not violate either the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. As previously pointed out these decisions are conclusive upon us. Consequently we are bound to hold our statute does not violate section 1 of the 14th Amendment.
The due process clause of the 14th Amendment is identical with Article I, section 9, of our state Constitution which plaintiff alleges and the majority obviously feels our statute violates. We have repeatedly pointed out that the equality or uniformity provision (Article I, section 6) of our state Constitution is the same in substance and effect as the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment and if a statute does not offend against one of these provisions it is inoffensive to the other. Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 400, 35 N.W.2d 66, 72, certiorari denied 338 U. S. 843, 70 S. Ct. 88, 94 L. Ed. 515; Vilas v. State Board of Assessment and Review, 223 Iowa 604, 612, 273 N.W. 338; Duncan v. City of Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 227, 268 N.W. 547; Berg v. Berg, 221 Iowa 326, 331, 332, 264 N.W. 821; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Iowa 702, 705, 706, 133 N.W. 895, 42 L. R. A., N. S., 821; McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Iowa 340, 348, 108 N.W. 902, 33 L. R. A., N. S., 706.
Thus the majority indicates our statute is a violation of the due process provision of our state Constitution although the highest court in the land has held statutes similar in principle (at least on that point) do not violate an identical provision of the Federal Constitution. And the majority squarely holds the statute violates Article I, section 6, Iowa Constitution although the Federal Supreme Court has held statutes not unlike ours in effect do not violate a similar provision of the 14th Amendment. This is most unsatisfactory, if not anomalous, especially since there is no Iowa decision that conflicts with those of the supreme court. It is obvious our statute violates both Constitutions in the respects indicated or it violates neither one.
In Des Moines J. S. L. Bank v. Nordholm, 217 Iowa 1319, 1335, 253 N.W. 701, it was claimed a statute violated the contract clause (Article I, section 21), Iowa Constitution, although the Federal Supreme Court had held a similar Minnesota statute did *32not violate the contract clause (Article I, section 10) of the United States Constitution. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413, 88 A. L. R. 1481. We upheld the statute. This from the opinion (page 1335 of 217 Iowa) is persuasive here:
“There is no doubt that this court- has the power, in interpreting the Constitution of Iowa, to reach a conclusion on the contract clause different from that reached by the Supreme Court of the United States when interpreting a similar clause of the Federal Constitution,- * * *.
“But assuming that to be true, good policy and a desired consistency between the two Constitutions rather dictate that the interpretation of the two clauses be similar. Such consistency in interpretation will accomplish consistency in operation. Uniformity in the construction of these contract clauses is most desirable, if not absolutely necessary.”
The annotation above referred to in 26 A. L. R. 707, 710, 711, says upon this very question: “It seems desirable that there should be harmony of judicial interpretation so far as similar constitutional provisions are concerned, and that the grounds of the Federal Supreme Court decisions should be recognized as valid in construing provisions of state constitutions similar in effect to the provisions of the Federal Constitution involved in those cases.”
21 C. J. S., Courts, section 205, page 363, states -. “* * * where the question presented is as to the construction or violation of a provision of the state constitution which is similar to a provision of the federal constitution, and the same question has been decided by the federal supreme court with respect to the federal constitution, the federal decision is strongly persuasive as authority, and is generally acquiesced in by the state courts, although it is not absolutely binding.” To like effect is 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 105.
The majority completely ignores these considerations. Apparently it is under the misapprehension that these decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the trading stamp cases are no more persuasive than precedents of other state courts. The rule is they are strongly persuasive. I think they should be followed.
*33IV. The majority’s Division IV holds onr statute lacks equality in the constitutional sense because it does not prohibit the issuance of trading stamps to be redeemed by dealers who issue them. It may be conceded the legislature might well have so extended the scope of the statute or even that it should have done so. But doubtless for reasons it deemed sufficient it did not see fit to so extend the law. It was under no constitutional compulsion to do so.
Such a statute as ours is not unequal in the constitutional sense because it is not all-embracing, does not apply a complete remedy to an existing evil, or prohibit other conduct which cannot be distinguished in kind from that prohibited. If the majority’s reasoning were followed to its logical conclusion countless police regulations would be held unconstitutional as not uniform.
“It is well settled that the legislature of a State may (in the absence of other controlling provisions) direct its police regulations against what it deems an existing evil, without covering the whole field of possible abuses [citations].” Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 661, 43 S. Ct. 651, 656, 67 L. Ed. 1157, 1164, 30 A. L. R. 635, 644. To the same effect are Patsone v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144, 34 S. Ct. 281, 282, 58 L. Ed. 539; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 177, 43 S. Ct. 24, 25, 67 L. Ed. 194, 198 (“ * * * regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”); Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Committee on W.P., 260 Wis. 229, 50 N.W.2d 424, 438.
“If the legislature shares the now prevailing belief as to what is public policy and finds that a particular instrument of trade war is being used against that policy in certain cases, it may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it .may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed [citations].
“ * * * If a class is deemed to .present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and. merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law [citation].” (Emphasis added.) Central Lbr. Co. v. South *34Dakota (Holmes, J.), 226 U. S. 157, 160, 161, 33 S. Ct. 66, 67, 57 L. Ed. 164, 169.
See also Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 55, 295 N.W. 737, 743, 133 A. L. R. 1071.
Substantially the same language is quoted with approval from Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, 26 S. Ct. 66, 50 L. Ed. 246 (involving an Iowa statute applicable only to fire insurance companies), in State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. (Evans, J.), 153 Iowa 702, 713, 133 N.W. 895, 899, 42 L. R. A., N.S., 821: “If an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business, the Constitution embodies no prohibition of laws confined to the evil, or doctrinaire requirement that they should be couched in all-embracing terms.”
Further, I think the majority’s holding that our statute classifies merchants into two classes — those who issue trading stamps redeemed by others and those who issue stamps redeemed by themselves — is fallacious. The prohibition of the law applies to everyone. None may issue stamps to be redeemed by others by gifts or premiums except upon the conditions stated in the Act. There is no unconstitutional discrimination in this. See Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, supra, 237 Wis. 41, 55, 295 N.W. 737, 743, 133 A. L. R. 1071.
State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa 553, 555, 246 N.W. 390, 391, 88 A. L. R. 218, the only Iowa decision the majority opinion cites, is a typical case dealing with classification for legislative purposes. It bears no resemblance to the present controversy. It involves a 1981 statute applicable “only to cities now or hereafter having a population of 125,000 or more.” As a practical matter the law has applied only to Des Moines. We held the law meets all constitutional requirements of uniformity.
Even where legislation makes a classification, “logical appropriateness of the inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons is not required.” Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 354, 28 S. Ct. 114, 119, 52 L. Ed. 236, 244.
I am not convinced the legislature could not in effect prohibit use of trading stamps redeemable by others pursuant to a previous “contract arrangement or scheme” without forbidding issuance of all trading stamps. Just what considerations may have induced the lawmakers to enact the law in its present form *35we do not know. However, it is not necessary that we find facts existed which justified the legislation.
If any conceivable state of facts will sustain the law we are bound to presume such condition existed. See Tolerton & Warfield Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, supra, 222 Iowa 908, 914, 270 N.W. 427, citing with approval Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., supra, 240 U. S. 342 (see page 357); McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Iowa 340, 350, 108 N.W. 902, 33 L. R. A., N.S., 706 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369, 377, Ann. Cas. 1912C 160; State v. Pitney, supra, 79 Wash. 608, 140 P. 918, Ann. C'as. 1916A 209, 211.
“Further, it is plaintiff’s burden to negative every conceivable basis which may support this statute [citations].” Dickinson v. Porter, supra, 240 Iowa 393, 399, 35 N.W.2d 66, 71.
It is not necessary that the evils the legislature believed justified the enactment of the law actually did exist so long as its belief was not purely arbitrary. Tanner v. Little, supra, 240 U. S. 369, 385, 36 S. Ct. 379, 60 L. Ed. 691, 702, and citation. If there is any reasonable ground for a difference of opinion as to the existence of such evils the determination of the lawmakers thereon is final. State v. Wilson, supra, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, 684, L.R.A. 1918B 374. To like effect is State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., supra, 153 Iowa 702, 707, 133 N.W. 895, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 821.
“It is the duty and function of the legislature to discern and correct evils, and by evils we do not mean some definite injury but obstacles to a greater public welfare [citations].” Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., supra, at page 357 of 240 U. S., page 374 of 36 S. Ct., page 687 of 60 L. Ed.
These are some of the considerations which may have persuaded the legislature to forbid, in effect, the issuance of trading stamps redeemable by others, pursuant to previous arrangement or scheme:
Such a plan presents such a conspicuous example of what the legislature regarded as an evil as to justify special treatment. (See State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., supra, at page 713 of 153 *36Iowa.) The injurious effect upon the public of the issuance of trading stamps to be redeemed by others is much greater and more prevalent than where redemption is by the individual dealer. The seductive effect of the stamps is increased where redemption is made by a third party from a special line of premiums rather than from the merchant’s general stock. State v. Wilson, supra, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, 684, L.R.A. 1918B 374. Legislation of this kind may make distinctions depend upon the degrees of evil without being arbitrary or unreasonable. Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, supra, 207 U. S. 338, 355, 28 S. Ct. 114, 119, 52 L. Ed. 236. See also State v. J. M. Seney Co., 134 Md. 437, 107 A. 189, 193; State v. Wilson, supra.
But there is a difference in kind as well as of degree in the conduct prohibited. It may reasonably be thought issuance of stamps procured from and redeemed by another engaged in that business leads to monopolistic tendencies that do not exist where the stamps are furnished and redeemed by the dealer. The former plan tends to concentrate business in those who utilize it and to give them an undue advantage over their competitors to the latter’s injury. Then a so-called company stamp plan might practically be forced upon unwilling dealers by threats of loss of trade if they do not “sign up.” There is substantial support in the evidence for this consideration. The majority’s suggestion that business houses generally or wholesalers in particular resort to like acts of coercion, if true, is wholly immaterial on the issue of uniformity of this statute.
When this law was passed the legislature may have concerned itself with the increased cost of living and sought means of combatting it. Under plaintiff’s plan and those like it the merchant is compelled to pay three per cent of his receipts to a middleman who in turn redeems such stamps as are saved and presented with premiums of an average retail value of 2.08% of the cost of the merchandise for which the stamps were issued.
As stated in District of Columbia v. Kraft, 35 App. D. C. 253, 269, 30 L.R.A., N.S., 957, 965, and followed in State v. Wilson, supra, at page 804 of 101 Kan., page 686 of 168 P.: “An entirely unnecessary middleman, for his own profit solely, has injected himself between the regular merchant on the one hand, *37and his customers on the other. * * * ¥e have then this large sum of money annually taken from the merchant and his customers, and added to the gross cost of living of all the people of the District, without return. Is it not for the public welfare * * * to prohibit such an undertaking ? We think that it is.”
And this from State v. Wilson, supra, must be kept in mind: “One may regard these arguments by which the objectionable character of the trading stamp business is sought to be established as unsound, and still hesitate to say with confidence that they are not fairly debatable — that their acceptance is inconsistent with a fair consideration of the subject by, a reasonable mind.” (Page 805 of 101 Kan., page 686 of 168 P.)
The majority says, “The legislature has no general power to pass laws dispensing* with a ‘middleman.’ ” Throughout its existence this court has repeatedly pointed out the unsoundness of such an approach to the question of constitutionality of legislation. McMillen v. County Judge (1858), 6 (Clarke) Iowa 391, 394, states: “The true inquiry, however, is, whether the exercise of the power is inhibited. In ascertaining the power of the legislature under the constitution, we look not to what the instrument authorizes to be done, but to what is prohibited.” Our decisions on this subject are carefully reviewed in Knorr v. Beardsley (Bliss, J.), 240 Iowa 828, 842-845, 38 N.W.2d 236, 244, 245, which quotes this with approval from Dickinson v. Porter, supra, 240 Iowa 393, 399, 35 N.W.2d 66, 71: “We have pointed out repeatedly the General Assembly has power to enact any kind of legislation it sees fit provided it is not clearly and plainly prohibited by some provision of the State or Federal Constitution.”
The conclusion herein reached that Code sections 553.15 to 553.18 do not violate the equality or uniformity provision of our state Constitution or its equivalent, the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, finds special support from State v. Wilson, supra, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, 684, L.R.A. 1918B 374; State v. J. M. Seney Co., supra, 134 Md. 437, 107 A. 189,193; State ex rel. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle, 166 Wis. 613, 166 N.W. 54, Ann. Cas. 1918D 707; Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, supra, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737, 743, 744, 133 A.L.R. 1071, 1080, 1081; Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 11 App. D.C. 512; District of Columbia v. Kraft, 35 App. D.C. 253, 30 L.R.A., N.S., 957.
*38Since the majority confines its actual decision to the point of claimed lack of uniformity I do not cite a number of precedents that could be added to those just mentioned which hold antitrading stamp legislation does not violate due' process. '
I would reverse.
Thompson and Larson, JJ., join in this dissant.