Court Opinion

ID: 9911741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 19:02:23.451293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:02.144484
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/20/23 P. v. Walton CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097696

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 22FE011065)

           v.

 GREGORY WAYNE WALTON II,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon is available to certain felons who have
successfully completed their sentences and have undergone an additional period of
rehabilitation. (Pen. Code, §§ 4852.01 et seq.; all further section references are to the
Penal Code.) Here, defendant Gregory Wayne Walton II was convicted of human
trafficking, an offense requiring registration as a sex offender. (§ 236.1, subd. (b); § 290,
subd. (c)(1).) Just over five years later, he filed a petition for a certificate of
rehabilitation. The trial court denied the petition because defendant was subject to a 10-
year rehabilitation period that had not yet elapsed. The trial court also rejected
defendant’s assertion that he qualified for relief from the sex offender registration

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requirement. Defendant argues the trial court erred. We affirm because we conclude the
trial court correctly applied the relevant statutes.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant pled no contest to human trafficking (§ 36.1, subd. (b)) on March 13,
2017, and was sentenced to three years probation on the same day. He completed
probation on March 13, 2020. Three months later, he got a dismissal of his conviction
pursuant to section 1203.4.
       A little over five years after he was sentenced, defendant filed a petition for
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The prosecutor asked the court to drop the
petition as premature. In attempting to counter the prosecutor’s request, defendant said
he was going to request relief from sex offender registration.
       The trial court denied defendant’s petition as premature and noted defendant’s
ineligibility to have his registration requirement terminated. Defendant timely appealed.
                                         DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court erred in two ways: (1) in denying his petition
for a certificate of rehabilitation; and (2) in concluding he is ineligible for section 290
registration relief under section 290.5. Neither contention has merit.
                                                I
                 The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition
       A certificate of rehabilitation is an intermediate step toward securing a full pardon
and allows the superior court to investigate and recommend pardon applicants to the
governor. (People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 875-876.) A certificate of
rehabilitation procedure is available to felons, with certain exceptions, who have
successfully completed their sentences and have undergone an additional and sustained
period of rehabilitation in California. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a); see §§ 4852.01, subds. (a)-
(c), 4852.06; Ansell at p. 875.) The length of the rehabilitation period is a base five years
plus an additional period determined by the petitioner’s conviction. (See § 4852.03,
subd. (a).) A person is not eligible to file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation until
this period has elapsed. (§ 4852.03, subd. (b).)

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       Defendant contends he was subject to only the base five-year period. Defendant is
mistaken. An additional two-year period is added to the base five years regardless of the
nature of the conviction. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a)(3).) That additional period increases to
five years, for a total rehabilitation period of 10 years, in the case of a person convicted
of committing any offense requiring sex offender registration. (§ 4852.03, subd.
(a)(2)(A); see § 4852.22 [providing discretionary exemption from rehabilitation period
except for offenses requiring section 290 registration].) Defendant was convicted of
human trafficking and that crime requires registration. (§ 290, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, based
on section 4852.03, a 10-year rehabilitation period applies to defendant. There is no
dispute this 10-year period had not elapsed when defendant filed his petition.
       Defendant claims that a 10-year rehabilitation period cannot apply because his
underlying conviction was dismissed. He appears to rely on section 4852.01, subdivision
(b) within the chapter governing certificates of rehabilitation. But his focus on this
section is too narrow. Section 4852.01 identifies the persons who are eligible to file a
petition. Those persons include persons convicted of a felony violation of a sex offense
who are granted probation, the accusatory pleading of which has been dismissed pursuant
to section 1203.4. (§ 4852.01, subd. (b).) While this section does not set forth
rehabilitation periods, it specifies that the person can file a petition “pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter.” The chapter includes section 4852.03. We cannot read
section 4852.01, subdivision (b) in isolation while ignoring eligibility requirements found
elsewhere in the chapter. (People v. Miller (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 973, 982.)
       Defendant also makes the conclusory assertion that the denial of his petition is
unconstitutional. Because this assertion was not raised in the trial court and lacks
analysis or citation to authority, we consider it forfeited. (Allen v. City of Sacramento
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped
claims]; People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 628 [constitutional objections must
be interposed before the trial judge to be preserved for appeal].)
       In sum, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition.

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                                              II
    Section 290.5 does not provide defendant relief from registration as a sex offender
       Senate Bill No. 384 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) restructured the sex offender
registration requirements by establishing three tiers of registration. (See § 290,
subd. (d).) Offenders falling in the third tier are subject to lifetime registration. (§ 290,
subd. (d)(3).) Tier three includes persons “convicted of a felony offense described in
subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 236.1” (conviction-based tier three offenders). (§ 290,
subd. (d)(3)(I).) It also includes persons who committed a tier one or tier two offense
whose risk level is well above average, as specified (risk-based tier three offenders).
(§ 290, subd. (d)(3)(D).)
       Because defendant was convicted under subdivision (b) of Section 236.1, he is a

conviction-based tier three offender and subject to lifetime registration.1 Defendant’s
contention that he was statutorily entitled to a risk-based assessment before being placed
in this tier lacks merit. And he fails to develop any claim that the United States
Constitution entitles him to such an assessment or that the entire registration process is
unconstitutional. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)
       Because of defendant’s status as a conviction-based tier three offender, there is no
merit to his claim that he is eligible for relief from registration under section 290.5.
Section 290.5 provides such relief to three groups: (1) tier one offenders; (2) tier two
offenders; and (3) risk-based tier three offenders. (§ 290.5, subds. (a)-(b).) Defendant
does not fall within those groups, so he is not eligible for registration relief under
section 290.5.

1      Defendant vaguely questions his no contest plea based on coercion and a lack of
disclosure of a lifetime registration requirement. But defendant does not appeal from a
timely motion to withdraw his plea. (§ 1018.) Also, defendant does not sufficiently
develop this contention or provide a record to support it. (People v. Zaidi (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1481 [defendant must show by evidence in record that he would
not have entered plea].)

                                               4
       Defendant contends he should be eligible for relief because his conviction was
dismissed under section 1203.4. Not so. “Section 1203.4 dismissal . . . does not affect
sex offender registration.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287.) Defendant
also appears to rely on section 290.46 as providing relief from the registration
requirement. But that section is inapposite. It requires the Department of Justice to
maintain a public Internet Web site that provides information about registered sex
offenders. (§ 290.46, subd. (a).) A person may apply for exclusion from the Web site
through the department. (§ 290.46, subd. (d).) The Web site and the exclusion
application are separate from the general sex offender registration requirement and the
relief provided by section 290.5 that defendant seeks. (See People v. Brandao (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 436, 441 fn. 5 [persons excluded from section 290.46 Internet Web site
must continue to register as sex offenders]).
       For these reasons, the trial court correctly found defendant ineligible for
registration relief under section 290.5.

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                                     DISPOSITION
      The order denying the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is affirmed.

                                                 MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

HULL, Acting P. J.

MAURO, J.

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