Court Opinion

ID: 9663748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:49:55.196428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.065859
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Section 7-107, R. R. S. 1943, provides in part: “An attorney or counselor has power: * * * (2) to bind his client by his agreement in respect to any proceeding within the scope of his proper duties and powers; but no evidence of any such agreement is receivable except the statement of the attorney himself, his written agreement signed and filed with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court; * * It will be noted that a client is bound only when an in-court stipulation is entered into, the agreement is in writing, or the attorney verifies by his statement that he entered into an agreement which he had authority to make and thereby bound his client. Here the defendant’s attorney does not so state but rather denies the agreement.
There is considerable Nebraska authority on the subject. In German-American Ins. Co. v. Buckstaff, 38 Neb. 135, 56 N. W. 692, it is held: “Oral agreements of attorneys, entered into out of court, to submit matters in suit to arbitration will not be enforced when objection is made thereto. The only competent proof to establish an agreement made by an attorney in regard to the disposition of a cause is the evidence of the attorney himself, his written agreement signed and filed *699with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court.”
In Drake v. Ralston, 137 Neb. 72, 288 N. W. 377, it is stated: “ ‘Written agreements of attorneys, or those entered into by them in open court, in regard to the disposition of cases, will be enforced; but oral agreements, entered into out of court, will not be recognized or considered.’ ” See, also, State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Bachelor, 139 Neb. 253, 297 N. W. 138.
Oddo v. Fred F. Shields Co., 144 Neb. 111, 12 N. W. 2d 659, is similar to the present case in that there was a dispute as to whether an agreement had been entered into by plaintiff and the opposing attorney. The court there states: “Defendant’s evidence consisted of the testimony of its then attorneys specifically denying the plaintiff’s testimony.
“Section 7-107, Comp. St. 1929, provides: ‘An attorney * * * has power: * * * Second. To bind his client by his agreement in respect to any proceeding within the scope of his proper duties and powers; but no evidence of any such agreement is receivable, except the statement of the attorney himself, his written agreement signed and filed with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court; * * *.’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“Without regard to other errors assigned, it becomes apparent that, if plaintiff’s testimony of his conversation with the attorney was incompetent, the trial court erred in receiving the same when proper objection was made and plaintiff’s action must fail for want of proof. It is just as apparent that the evidence was incompetent.
“In German-American Ins. Co. v. Buckstaff, 38 Neb. 135, 56 N. W. 692, this court construing the statute said: ‘A client is only bound by the oral stipulations of his attorney made out of court, when the same are established by the testimony of the attorney making the same.’ ” See, also, Swartz v. Meredith Publishing Com*700pany, 254 Iowa 518, 117 N. W. 2d 898; Jorgensen v. Howland, 325 Mich. 440, 38 N. W. 2d 906. There are similar decisions in 25 other states.
A peculiar situation exists in this case. An attorney for plaintiff brought an action to set aside a deed. That action is still pending. A settlement was discussed. Plaintiff’s then attorney says a settlement was arrived at and trial postponed. Defendant, and defendant’s secretary, both deny that a settlement was agreed to and further deny that defendant’s then attorney was ever authorized to effect a settlement. Defendant’s then attorney agrees a discussion occurred with a view to settling the case but states no agreement for settlement was arrived at.
Both attorneys, the defendant, and the defendant’s secretary were present at the original discussion. Plaintiff’s then attorney states he left without any agreement being arrived at but later returned and was told by defendant’s then attorney that suggested terms of settlement were agreeable to defendant. The record does not disclose that the defendant was present at this time. It therefore does not appear from this record that the alleged agreement was arrived at directly between the plaintiff’s then attorney and the defendant as has been suggested. Only an alleged agreement between the attorneys is testified to. It was not entered in the records of the court, is not in writing, and is denied by defendant’s then attorney. The evidence is clearly barred by the statute. We have here a situation where the defendant denies his attorney was authorized to make any settlement. His then attorney agrees with this and further denies making any settlement. All this is verified by the defendant’s secretary.
This case had been pending for 2 years and trial was further postponed. The reason for the postponement is disputed. In any event, a settlement agreement has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence and *701it stretches the term to hold it was proved by even a “preponderance” of the evidence.
This is the very type of situation which statutes such as ours seek to avoid. In Mogote-Northeastern Consolidated Ditch Co. v. Gallegos, 69 Colo. 221, 193 P. 670, the court stated that it could not try a question of veracity of attorneys as to their oral agreements made out of court, nor correct their misunderstandings, and that if they trusted to such uncertainties, and did not take the prescribed and certain methods of written stipulations or regular orders made upon notice or appearance, they must understand that each was relying solely upon the other, and that in case of dispute the stipulation could not be enforced.
In Farmers State Sav. Bank v. Miles, 206 Iowa 766, 221 N. W. 449, the court held that understandings arrived at from conversations between counsel could not be considered, unless reduced to writing and filed in the case, or consented to in open court, the court stated that this was a wise rule, since the time of the court should not be taken in controversial matters of this character; that the court could not sit in judgment as to the veracity of reputable affiants as attorneys in the court, and determine misunderstandings between them; and that the theory of estoppel could not find its predicate on alleged conversations affirmed on one side and expressly denied by the other.
In Manowitz v. Gaenslen (Tex. Civ. App.), 142 S. W. 963, the court stated that the rule for the government of the court required agreements to be in writing to be enforceable, that the spectacle of counsel contradicting each other as to the existence of an agreement illustrated the reason why the rule was adopted, since the court could not be called upon to determine the merits of an issue of this kind.
The law favors settlements but not disputes in regard to them between attorneys. Misunderstandings frequently occur, even between very careful practitioners. *702If we are to hear and heed such disputes, settlements will be discouraged. Attorneys will be afraid to discuss settlements for fear of being misunderstood or wrongfully quoted.
I believe this judgment should be set aside as not a final determination of the cause and that the case be remanded for trial on the original petition to set aside the deed.
White, C. J., and Smith, J., concur in this dissent.