Court Opinion

ID: 9945930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 20:02:50.542874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:21.369701
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 Wilkes v. LA Clippers CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 JOHNNY WILKES,                                                    B324394
                                                                   (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Super. Ct. No. 20STCV47642)
           v.
                                                                   ORDER MODIFYING
                                                                   OPINION (NO CHANGE IN
 LA CLIPPERS LLC et al.,
                                                                   JUDGMENT) AND DENYING
                                                                   APPELLANT’S PETITION
           Defendants and Respondents.                             FOR REHEARING

      The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on January
30, 2024 is modified as follows:

       On page 2, after the sentence beginning with the words,
“Under the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) ‘tampering
rule,’ NBA teams are prohibited,” insert the following:

More particularly, “ ‘[n]o person may, directly or indirectly,
(i) entice, induce, persuade, or attempt to entice, induce or
persuade, any player who is under contract to, or whose exclusive
negotiating rights are held by, any other member of the [NBA] to
enter into negotiations for or relating to his services or negotiate
or contract for such services or (ii) otherwise interfere with
any such employer-employee relationship (or prospective
employer-employee relationship in the case of a player subject
to exclusive negotiating rights) of any other member of the
[NBA].’ ” (Capitalization omitted.)

      This modification does not constitute a change in the
judgment.
      Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on February 14,
2024 is denied.

____________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.      CHANEY, J.         WEINGART, J.

                                     2
Filed 1/30/24 Wilkes v. LA Clippers CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 JOHNNY WILKES,                                                    B324394

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. 20STCV47642)
           v.

 LA CLIPPERS LLC et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
     KRA Legal and Kenechi R. Agu for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, Duane R. Lyons and
Dylan C. Bonfigli for Defendants and Respondents.
                                    ____________________
      Plaintiff Johnny Wilkes sued defendants LA Clippers
LLC (the Clippers) and Jerry West (West) (collectively, the
defendants) alleging causes of action for breach of contract and
fraud, among others. The court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary adjudication as to certain causes of action and
sustained the defendants’ demurrer as to others without leave
to amend. After the court entered judgment in favor of the
defendants, Wilkes appealed. We affirm.

   FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      A.    The Second Amended Complaint
       On December 14, 2020, Wilkes filed his complaint
commencing the underlying action. He filed his second amended
complaint on July 7, 2021, alleging causes of action against the
Clippers and West for breach of contract, breach of the covenant
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
promissory estoppel. He alleged the following facts.
       Dennis Robertson is the uncle of professional basketball
player Kawhi Leonard. In 2019, Wilkes and Robertson were
best friends. In April 2019, Leonard was under contract to play
for the Toronto Raptors basketball team. Under the National
Basketball Association’s (NBA) “tampering rule,” NBA teams are
prohibited from negotiating with a player who is under contract
with another team. Leonard’s contract with the Raptors was set
to expire on June 30, 2019; thereafter he would be “a free agent”
and able to sign with any team. (Capitalization omitted.)
       West is “a consultant and/or executive of the Clippers,”
and “an agent of the Clippers” with “the authority to enter
into agreements and make decisions on behalf of the Clippers.”
According to Wilkes, West was interested in recruiting Leonard

                                   2
to join the Clippers and sought to circumvent the tampering
rule by communicating with Wilkes.
       On April 10, 2019, Wilkes met with West, and West’s
friends Sam Watson and Jim Gray, “for the sole purpose of
asking for [Wilkes’s] assistance with getting . . . Leonard to
sign with the Clippers.” Wilkes and West exchanged contact
information and communicated frequently thereafter.
       On June 25, 2019, Wilkes and West discussed by telephone
the Clippers’ interest in recruiting Leonard. The next day, West
sent pictures to Wilkes by text message showing billboards of
Leonard with the phrase, “King of SoCal. #KAWHI2LAC.”
“LAC,” Wilkes explained, refers to the Clippers.
       On June 28, 2019, Wilkes and West spoke by telephone.
West asked Wilkes for his “assistance in getting . . . Leonard
to sign with the Clippers. [Wilkes] agreed to assist . . . West and
the Clippers provided that certain renumerations [sic] be paid
upon . . . Leonard’s signing with the Clippers. Most notably,
[Wilkes] told . . . West that he would only assist if . . . West and
the Clippers agreed to pay him $2,500,000.00 for his services. . . .
West assured [Wilkes] that they would take care of him and
agreed to the terms.”
       Wilkes thereafter “immediately went to work.” Among
other actions, Wilkes informed Robertson that he “was in talks
with . . . West and the Clippers regarding getting . . . Leonard to
sign with the Clippers,” and gave Robertson’s cell phone number
to West.
       On July 1, 2019, West, Steve Ballmer (the owner of the
Clippers), and Doc Rivers (the Clippers’ coach) were to meet
with Leonard, Leonard’s mother, and Robertson. According to
Wilkes’s complaint, West, Ballmer, and Rivers “didn’t know what

                                    3
to pitch to [Leonard]” at the meeting. Prior to the meeting,
Wilkes spoke with West and provided West with “vital”
information that West “needed to pitch to . . . Leonard.”
Specifically, Wilkes told West to tell Leonard: (1) Leonard
“will have a great life as a Clipper and after basketball if he
signs with the Clippers”; (2) that the Clippers’ roster “possessed
a great deal of upside and would be around for years to come”;
and (3) the Clippers “will do whatever it takes to compete with
the Los Angeles Lakers and Lebron James, such as acquiring
another star to play alongside . . . Leonard; specifically Paul
George.”
       After the meeting, West “was extremely concerned” that
Leonard was going to sign with the Lakers. Wilkes assured
West, however, that West has nothing to worry about and that
Wilkes “would do everything in his power to ensure that . . .
Leonard signs with the Clippers.”
       On July 7, 2019, Leonard “signed with the Clippers.”
       On July 23, 2019, Wilkes met with West and West’s
friends Watson and Gray at a restaurant. Wilkes “demanded
the $2,500,000.00 that he and . . . West originally agreed upon.”
West told Wilkes that he and the Clippers “would take care of
him and honor their agreement.” West told Wilkes to email his
request for payment to Gray. Wilkes set forth his request in
writing and emailed it to Gray soon afterward.
       West and the Clippers thereafter failed to pay Wilkes
the $2,500,000 they had agreed upon.
       The Clippers and West filed an answer to the second
amended complaint in July 2021.

                                    4
      B.    The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
            and Summary Adjudication
       In January 2022, the Clippers and West filed a motion
for summary judgment or in the alternative for summary
adjudication of the causes of action in the second amended
complaint. West asserted that he is not liable for breach of
contract because he allegedly acted only as an agent for the
Clippers and did not make a personal promise to pay. The
Clippers asserted that West did not have actual or ostensible
authority to enter into a contract on behalf of the Clippers. The
defendants further argued that there was no agreement on all
material points, and that Wilkes’s promissory estoppel cause
of action fails because West never made a promise to pay him
and, in any case, Wilkes cannot demonstrate reasonable reliance.
       The Clippers and West submitted evidence supporting the
following facts.
       At all relevant times, Jerry West was a “consultant”
for the Clippers. On April 10, 2019, Sam Watson, a friend of
West’s, introduced Wilkes to West at the Staples Center arena
during a basketball game. They did not discuss the possibility
of Leonard joining the Clippers at that time.
       Wilkes and West spoke by telephone on June 17 and
June 25, 2019. According to West, during this time he wanted
to learn more about “Leonard’s personality, work ethic, and
interests”; he did not attempt or ask Wilkes to “attempt to
solicit Kawhi Leonard to play for the LA Clippers.” According
to Wilkes’s deposition testimony, they talked about how “Kawhi
was a good kid and things like that.”
       On June 26, 2019, West texted Wilkes a photo of a billboard
that Clippers fans put up along a freeway that features a picture

                                   5
of Leonard with the heading, “ ‘King of SoCal’ ” and the hashtag,
“#KAWHI2LAC.” West called Wilkes later that day and they
spoke for three minutes. Wilkes then forwarded the pictures of
the billboard to Robertson.
       On June 28, 2019, Wilkes, West, and Watson spoke by
telephone for about nine minutes. At that time, Wilkes was
aware that West was a “consultant” with the Clippers, and not
a general manager of the team.
       Wilkes asserts that he and West entered into an oral
contract during the June 28 call. West stated in a declaration
that he did not promise to pay Wilkes any money either during
that call or otherwise. When counsel asked Wilkes at his
deposition what he told West during the June 28 call, Wilkes
testified that he said he “wanted” or “needed to be compensated”
for his “program,” and for “helping [West] get one of the best
players in the NBA.” West and Watson “asked [Wilkes] how
much.” Wilkes testified that he and Watson “talked about it,
[$]2.5 [million], and after that they were saying, ‘We can’t give
you cash,’ then we have to go through some 501 and things like
that.”
       Wilkes testified further as follows.
       “Q. Just so I’m clear, you said, ‘I want to be
compensated’?
       “A. Correct.
       “Q. What was Jerry West’s reaction when you said you
wanted to be compensated?
       “A. He said we could sit down and talk about it. Let me
rephrase that. They said yes. Because this is what they were
pitching me all along, and Mr. Ballmer could take care of me, so

                                   6
it was stated Mr. Ballmer would take care of me, that’s not a
problem.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “Q. I asked you what Mr. West’s response was, and you
said his response was ‘[w]e can sit down and talk about it.’ Did
he say that to you, yes or no?
       “A. He said a lot of things in that conversation that
night. That was one of the things he said to me. A lot of other
things said to me. I just wanted to be paid. So we were trying to
figure out a way for me to get paid, and it was a lot of things said,
sir.
       “Q. . . . So just so that you understand, my question to
you was: You said, ‘I want to be compensated,’ and Mr. West
said, ‘We can sit down and talk about it.’ Did he say that before
or after you told him how much money you wanted?
       “A. I don’t recall.
       “Q. When you told him that you wanted to be
compensated $2.5 million, tell me as best you can exactly
what he said as soon as he [sic] said you wanted $2.5 million?
       “A. Mr. Ballmer [owner of the Clippers] will take care [of
me]. That was the whole pitch they sold me; that Steve Ballmer
would take care of me.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “Q. On this telephone conversation [on June 28,
2019], . . . was there any negotiation after you said to
Mr. West, . . . ‘I want $2.5 million’?
       “A. He said Mr. Ballmer would take care of me.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “Q. . . . [D]id Jerry West tell you that Mr. Ballmer would
take care of it—

                                     7
      “A. Yes.
      “Q. —with $2.5 million?
      “A. Yes.
      “Q. And as you sit here today, you recall those words
coming out of Jerry West’s mouth?
      “A. Yes.
      “Q. And so as far as you understood, that Mr. Ballmer
was going to be paying the $2.5 million?
      “A. Correct.
      “Q. You didn’t think that Jerry West was going to be
paying using money out of his pocket?
      “A. No.
      “[¶] . . . [¶]
      “Q. . . . Just so that we’re clear, Jerry West did not try to
negotiate you down from $2.5 million, correct?
      “A. No.
      “Q. And he didn’t say, ‘That’s a lot of money’?
      “A. No.
      “Q. And he didn’t say, ‘What am I getting for my $2.5
million’? He said, ‘Mr. Ballmer will take care of you’; is that
correct?
      “A. That was the pitch. They knew my relationship with
[Robertson] so they knew what they were getting.”
      On the subject of what Wilkes would do in exchange for his
compensation, the following testimony took place:
      “Q. [During the June 28 telephone call,] [w]hat did you
tell Mr. West you were going to do to make the princely sum of
$2.5 million?
      “A. I didn’t discuss anything at that time on the
telephone with him.

                                    8
        “Q. Just so I’m clear, as far as your understanding, what
did you think Jerry West was going to be paying $2.5 million for?
        “A. For my help trying to get Kawhi Leonard to sign with
the Clippers.
        “[¶] . . . [¶]
        “Q. . . . Did you tell Jerry West that you would do
anything for $2.5 million?
        “A. At that time, no.”
        In an errata sheet attached to his deposition transcript,
Wilkes added to this answer the words, “It was discussed
previously.”
        On June 30, Wilkes provided West with Robertson’s cell
phone number. West called Robertson and told him he looked
forward to meeting with him and Leonard on the afternoon of
July 1.
        As of July 1, 2019, Leonard was no longer under contract
with the Toronto Raptors. At 2:10 p.m., Wilkes sent West a
text message acknowledging that West would be meeting with
Robertson and Leonard at 3:00 p.m. Wilkes texted to West:
“[I]t’s between you and Toronto please tell everyone to pitch life
after basketball to Kawai [sic] that’s what he really wants to
about how family also convince [Robertson] that the players you
have a lots of upside [sic].” West did not relay this information
to others or use it at any time.
        During the afternoon on July 1, West, Ballmer, Doc Rivers,
and others met with Leonard, Leonard’s mother, and Leonard’s
agent. Wilkes did not attend the meeting.
        On July 4, West texted to Wilkes, “ ‘When can we expect a
decision?’ ” Wilkes responded, “ ‘Friday will call you later[.] Will
talk to [Robertson] again at [4:00 p.m.]’ ” That same day, West

                                    9
sent a text message to Ballmer stating that Leonard “is
making his decision known tomorrow, one of my guys . . . is
talking with [Robertson] at [4:00 p.m.,] he . . . is going to let me
know if he . . . can find out anything, will let you know when I
hear from him.’ ” The next day, Ballmer texted West, “ ‘Where
did your guy . . . think he . . . is leaning.’ ” West responded,
“ ‘Could not get indication. I would hope that with everyone
involved on his . . . side who are pro Clippers they are telling
him . . . that this is a chance of a lifetime to be involved with
[you] and our organization.’ ”
       On July 7, 2019, Leonard signed with the Clippers.
       Wilkes did not speak with anyone affiliated with the
Clippers other than West, and he never spoke to Leonard about
his conversations with West.
       On July 23, 2019, West met with Wilkes, Watson, and
Gray at a restaurant for lunch. Near the end of the meal, Wilkes
handed a letter to Watson, who handed it to West. The letter
set forth certain “requests,” and includes the following: “Over
the past [two] years, Johnny Wileks [sic] worked with Kawhi to
position his need to come ‘back home’ so that it was specifically
as a member of the ‘LA Clippers.’ Johnny consistently pursued
several networking opportunities where he then became a center
of influence for Kawhi Leonard. Therefore, representing the
interest of the LA Clippers. The [two]-year network building
investment was close to $200,000 used for air travel; hotel; cars
etc. in networking ‘to bring Kawi [sic] home.’ With that in mind,
I am asking for a cash infusion to a non-profit or a trust of $2.5
million which equals the commission given to an NBA agent
who on average gets about 2-2.5 [percent] of the player’s signing
contract.” (Capitalization omitted.) West considered the requests

                                   10
to be “outrageous” and discarded the letter without showing it to
anyone connected to the Clippers.
       About one year later, on July 10, 2020, Wilkes sent West
a text message stating: “I am coming to you to discuss a matter
regarding a negotiation that has become of concern to me,” and
“I would like to talk to you . . . regarding issues that have not
been addressed.” West did not recall receiving or responding
to this text message.
       Wilkes filed opposition to the motion for summary
judgment and summary adjudication, supported by his
declaration. In the declaration, Wilkes describes the June 28,
2019 telephone conversation as follows: “On June 28, 2019,
West and I had a telephone discussion where West asked for
my assistance in getting Kawhi Leonard to sign with the
Clippers. I agreed to assist West and the Clippers provided
that certain renumerations [sic] be paid upon Kawhi Leonard’s
signing with the Clippers. Most notably, I told West that I would
only assist if it is agreed that I would be paid $2,500,000.00 for
my services. West assured me that . . . Ballmer . . . and the
Clippers would take care of me and agreed to the terms to pay me
$2,500,000.00 in exchange for my services in effectuating Kawhi
Leonard’s signing with the Clippers.”
       According to Wilkes, after the June 28 telephone call, he
performed the following services in furtherance of the alleged
contract. He “reached out” to Robertson to let him know that
he “was in talks with West and the Clippers as it pertained to
getting Kawhi Leonard to sign with the Clippers.” West thanked
Wilkes for his efforts and called him the next day “to find out how
[his] discussions with [Robertson] . . . went.” On June 29, Wilkes
told Watson that the Clippers needed to sign Paul George in

                                   11
order to get Leonard to sign with the Clippers. Watson
communicated this information to West. On June 30, Wilkes
gave Robertson’s cell phone number to West, and West called
Robertson. On July 1, West called Wilkes and sent him a text
message thanking him “for being so helpful,” and offered to
take Wilkes to dinner to “ ‘pay [his] respects.’ ” That same day,
Wilkes informed West that West “needed to pitch to Kawhi
Leonard the following in an extremely specific and detailed
manner: (1) Kawhi Leonard will have a great life as a Clipper
and after basketball if he signs with the Clippers; (2) explain,
emphasize and demonstrate in substantial detail that the
Clippers’ roster at the time possessed a great deal of upside and
would be around for years to come; and (3) the Clippers will do
whatever it takes to compete with the Los Angeles Lakers and
Lebron James, such as acquiring another star to play alongside
Kawhi Leonard; specifically Paul George.” According to Wilkes,
this “was the exact information that Kawhi Leonard wanted
to hear at the time in order to effectuate his signing with the
Clippers.”
       On July 4, Wilkes, at West’s direction, informed Robertson
that if Leonard signed with the Clippers, Robertson would receive
a house in Southern California and “a travel expense account,”
and Ballmer would fund a $1 million marketing campaign for
Leonard.
       When West expressed concern to Wilkes that Leonard
would sign with the Los Angeles Lakers, Wilkes assured him
that he “would do everything in [his] power to ensure that Kawhi
Leonard signs with the Clippers.”
       On July 4, West sent text messages to Wilkes asking him,
“When can we expect a decision?” and asking Wilkes to let West

                                  12
know if he “hear[s] anything” or if Wilkes receives “any indication
of [Leonard’s] plans.” West further stated that “[w]e need to sign
another player. Not many left. Not trying to put any pressure on
you. Thank you for all your help.” (Boldface & italics omitted.)
According to Wilkes, “pressure” was a reference to “the agreed
upon money.”
       According to Wilkes, during the July 23, 2019 lunch
meeting with West and Watson, he “demanded the $2,500,000.00
that West and [he] originally agreed upon. West reconfirmed
that Ballmer, and the Clippers would pay the agreed upon
moneys and honor the agreement.”
       Wilkes further stated that he “relied on West’s
representations to pay [him] the moneys agreed upon” and
he “substantially changed [his] position” by “work[ing] diligently
to get Kawhi Leonard to sign with the Clippers.” In particular,
the Los Angeles Lakers had offered to pay Wilkes $2 million
for his “efforts to get Kawhi Leonard signed with the Lakers.”
After “the Clippers agreed to pay [him],” however, he provided
no further assistance to the Lakers, and the Lakers were unable
to sign Leonard.
       Regarding West’s relationship with the Clippers, Wilkes
stated that West, in his conversations with Wilkes, always
referred “to the Clippers as ‘we’ or ‘our organization,’ ” and
that West “never gave the impression that he was not an agent,
employee or otherwise affiliated with the Clippers,” and never
told Wilkes “that he did not have the authority to make any
decisions on behalf of Ballmer or the Clippers.”

                                   13
      C.    The Third Amended Complaint and West’s
            Demurrer
       On July 6, 2022, while the motion for summary judgment
and summary adjudication was pending, the court granted
Wilkes’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.1
The next day, Wilkes filed the third amended complaint, which
included the three contract causes of action alleged in the second
amended complaint and added three tort causes of action for:
fraud by intentional misrepresentation; fraud by concealment;
and fraud by false promise. The new causes of action were
asserted against West only.
       In support of the fraud causes of action, Wilkes alleged
the following. Beginning with the first meeting between Wilkes
and West in April 2019 and continuing through September 2019,
West consistently represented and promised to Wilkes “that
he was an agent of the Clippers and had the authority to enter
into agreements and make decisions on behalf of the Clippers.”
In particular, West promised and “represented to [Wilkes] that
he had the authority to bind the Clippers . . . and would pay
[Wilkes] $2,500,000.00 for his services in securing . . . Leonard
as a Clipper.” These promises and representations were false,
and West either knew they were false when he made them or
he made them “recklessly and without regard for [their] truth.”

      1 The third amended complaint superseded the second
amended complaint. (See State Compensation Ins. Fund v.
Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130.) It appears
that the court treated the pending alternative motion for
summary adjudication of the causes of action in the second
amended complaint as a motion for summary adjudication of the
three contract causes of action in the third amended complaint.

                                   14
West intended that Wilkes rely on the false promises and
representations, and Wilkes reasonably did rely on them to
his detriment. In particular, Wilkes “substantially changed
his position in that he worked diligently to get . . . Leonard to
sign with the Clippers in reliance on . . . West’s promises.”
       West also allegedly fraudulently failed to disclose to
Wilkes the fact that he is an independent contractor, and “not
an agent / employee” of the Clippers, that he did not have the
authority to enter into agreements and make decisions on behalf
of the Clippers. Wilkes was unaware of these facts and West
intended to deceive Wilkes by concealing them.
       Wilkes further alleged that if he had known the truth
regarding the false promises and the facts West misrepresented
and concealed, he would have devoted the time he had spent
working to get Leonard to sign with the Clippers on “other
jobs, tasks and endeavors.” As a result of West’s false promises,
misrepresentations, and concealment, Wilkes was harmed
because “he was not provided the $2,500,000.00, which he was
promised.”
       On July 29, 2022, West filed a demurrer to the fraud causes
of action on the ground that they failed to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. West argued that Wilkes failed
to plead his fraud claims with particularity, and that the “fraud
claims are a sham.”

      D.    The Court’s Ruling
      At a hearing held in August 2022, the court granted
the defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as to each of
the contract causes of action. The court explained that “[t]aken
together, the evidence indicates that the alleged oral agreement
is invalid because of the absence of any clear and definite

                                  15
agreement as to two material terms of the alleged oral contract:
(i) the services plaintiff would provide to ‘help’ the Clippers
sign Leonard and (ii) the compensation that plaintiff would be
provided for rendering those services.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The court further found that Wilkes’s promissory estoppel cause
of action failed because “the evidence of West’s alleged promise
is too uncertain to create a triable issue of material fact,” and
Wilkes failed to submit “evidence that supports a reasonable
inference of reliance.” In light of these conclusions, the court
did not reach the issues of whether West had authority to bind
the Clippers to the alleged agreement or that he assumed the
obligation personally.2
       The court sustained West’s demurrer on the ground that
Wilkes failed to plead the allegations of misrepresentation with
specificity and failed to plead facts showing that West had a
duty to disclose that he was an independent contractor. The
court denied Wilkes leave to amend because the allegations in
the fraud causes of action are inconsistent with his discovery
responses.
                          DISCUSSION
      A.    Summary Adjudication of the Contract and
            Promissory Estoppel Causes of Action
      We review a ruling on a motion for summary adjudication
de novo. (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248,
273.)

      2 The court expressly declined to rule on the parties’
objections, noting that objections not ruled upon are preserved
for appellate review. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

                                   16
       A motion for summary adjudication of a cause of action is
governed by the same principles governing a motion for summary
judgment. (Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1361, 1370.) A trial court properly grants a motion
for summary adjudication when the papers submitted establish
that one or more elements of the challenged cause of action
cannot be established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a)(1) &
(p)(2).)
       “[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract
are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff ’s performance
or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the
resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821; accord, Piedmont Capital
Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 961, 968.)
The existence of a contract requires the “ ‘manifestation of assent
to the “same thing” by both parties.’ ” (Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc.
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208.) Whether the parties assented
to the same terms “is determined under an objective standard
applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the
parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and
not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.” (Alexander
v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 141.)
       To be enforceable, the terms of a contract must be
“ ‘reasonably certain’ ”; that is, they must “ ‘ “provide a basis
for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy.” ’ ” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811.) “If, by contrast, a supposed
‘contract’ does not provide a basis for determining what
obligations the parties have agreed to, and hence does not make

                                   17
possible a determination of whether those agreed obligations
have been breached, there is no contract.” (Ibid.)
        Here, Wilkes alleged that West or the Clippers agreed to
pay him $2.5 million in exchange for his “services,” including
“assisting [them] with contacting Kawhi Leonard while he was
still ‘under contract’ ” with the Toronto Raptors. The Clippers
and West submitted Wilkes’s deposition testimony regarding the
telephone call during which the parties entered into the alleged
contract. As set out above, Wilkes testified initially that when
he asked West to be paid $2.5 million for his services, West said
that they “could sit down and talk about it,” and that Ballmer—
the owner of the Clippers—would “take care” of Wilkes. When
counsel questioned him further, however, he testified that
West told him “that Mr. Ballmer would take care of it” “with
$2.5 million.”
        As to the identity of the parties to the contract, Wilkes
testified that he understood that “Mr. Ballmer,” not West,
would be obligated under the contract to pay him. West, in
his declaration, stated that he did not “promise to pay [Wilkes]
any amount of money.” Thus, even if Wilkes’s testimony is
sufficient to establish a triable issue as to the price term of the
contract—$2.5 million—the undisputed evidence establishes
the absence of mutual assent as to a contract obligating West
personally. West is therefore entitled to summary adjudication
of the breach of contract cause of action.
        Wilkes never spoke with Ballmer or any other authorized
representative of the Clippers, and the parties dispute whether
West had actual or ostensible authority to bind the Clippers
to a contract. Even if we assume arguendo that West had such
authority, the alleged contract is fatally uncertain as to what

                                    18
performance was due on Wilkes’s part. When Wilkes was asked
at his deposition what he would do in exchange for $2.5 million,
he initially referred vaguely to his “program,” and to “helping
[West] get one of the best players in the NBA.” When questioned
further as to whether he told West during the June 28, 2019
telephone call what he “would do . . . for $2.5 million,” Wilkes
responded, “[a]t that time, no.” In an errata sheet to the
deposition transcript, Wilkes added to this the words: “It
was discussed previously.” On appeal, Wilkes appears to rely
on these additional words in asserting that the parties had
“hammered out” the “terms of the contract . . . over many days,
and not one [nine]-minute phone call.” When asked about the
previous discussions at a subsequent deposition, Wilkes stated
that he and West “already knew what kinds of services [he] was
going to provide”; he “was providing the service to help them get
Kawhi Leonard.”
       In his declaration submitted in opposition to the motion for
summary adjudication, Wilkes provided no further clarification
on this point, stating, “West asked for my assistance in getting
Kawhi Leonard to sign with the Clippers. I agreed to assist
West and the Clippers provided that certain renumerations [sic]
be paid upon Kawhi Leonard’s signing with the Clippers. Most
notably, I told West that I would only assist if it is agreed that
I would be paid $2,500,000.00 for my services.” Wilkes’s vague
references to “help,” “assistance,” and unspecified “services”
do not provide a basis for determining what actions Wilkes must
perform to be entitled to $2.5 million. Because the terms of the
alleged contract as to Wilkes’s performance are uncertain, no
contract was formed, and the breach of contract cause of action is
without merit.

                                   19
       Wilkes’s cause of action for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is based on the same alleged facts and
seeks the same relief as his breach of contract cause of action.
It may thus “be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim
is actually stated.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business
Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395; accord, Levy v.
Only Cremations for Pets, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 203, 215.)
In any case, it fails for the same reasons that Wilkes’s breach
of contract cause of action fails: The terms regarding Wilkes’s
obligations are too uncertain to support the formation of a
contract.
       Wilkes’s third cause of action is for promissory estoppel.
“ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise
clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party
to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both
reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the
estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” [Citation.]’ ” (Jones v.
Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945.) Here, the
alleged promise to pay Wilkes $2.5 million—if it was made at
all—was a conditional promise to pay Wilkes if Wilkes performed
some service for the Clippers. In the absence of any certainty
as to what the Clippers would be paying for, the alleged promise
to pay $2.5 million was not sufficiently “clear and unambiguous”
to support an estoppel. (See Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1179 [bank’s promise to allow
borrowers to modify loan did not support promissory estoppel
claim because the promise did not specify the terms of the
modification].)
       The defendants have submitted evidence showing that
at least one element of the contract and promissory estoppel

                                   20
causes of action cannot be established, and Wilkes failed to show
that a triable issue of material fact exists as to such elements.
The defendants are therefore entitled to summary adjudication
of these causes of action.

      B.     Demurrer to Fraud Causes of Action
        Wilkes asserted causes of action for fraud by intentional
misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, and false promise.
        Fraud by intentional misrepresentation requires pleading
of “ ‘ “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment,
or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent
to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and
(e) resulting damage.” ’ ” (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003)
30 Cal.4th 167, 173 (Small).) “ ‘In California, fraud must be pled
specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.’ ”
(Id. at p. 184.) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes.
The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant
with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ ”
(Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.) Second, “the pleading should be
sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the
facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for
the charge of fraud.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 217.) “ ‘ “Thus ‘ “the policy of
liberal construction of the pleadings . . . will not ordinarily be
invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.” ’
[Citation.] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading
facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what
means the representations were tendered.’ ” ’ ” (Small, supra,
at p. 184; accord, Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)

                                     21
       Wilkes’s causes of action for intentional misrepresentation
is based on the allegations (1) that from April 10, 2019 through
September 2019, West “consistently represented to [Wilkes] that
he was an agent of the Clippers and had the authority to enter
into agreements and make decisions on behalf of the Clippers,”
and (2) that West “falsely represented to [Wilkes] that he had
the authority to bind the Clippers . . . and would pay [Wilkes]
$2,500,000.00 for his services in securing Kawhi Leonard as
a Clipper.” His cause of action for fraud by false promise is
substantially identical, except that he replaced the word
“represented” with “promise.”
       Wilkes alleges, in essence, that West represented or
promised to Wilkes that West had the authority to contractually
bind the Clippers to pay Wilkes $2,500,000 for Wilkes’s services
in securing Leonard as a Clipper. These allegations do not aver
the “ ‘ “ ‘how, when, where, . . . and by what means,’ ” ’ ” West
made the representations and promises. (Small, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 184.) Wilkes does not allege how West made
the representations or promises, such as orally or in writing,
expressly or impliedly, in person or telephonically. Nor does
he allege the particular dates or times the representations were
made, where West made the representations, or the means by
which West made them. The allegations are thus insufficient
to state a cause of action for fraud.
       In pleading his cause of action for fraud by concealment,
Wilkes alleges that West failed to disclose: that he “was not
an agent / employee of the Clippers”; that he “did not have any
authority to enter into agreements and make decisions on behalf
of the Clippers”; that he “is an independent contractor of the
Clippers”; and that he “did not have the authority to bind the

                                   22
Clippers . . . and would pay [Wilkes] $2,500,000.00 for
his services in securing Kawhi Leonard as a Clipper.”
       To state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment,
Wilkes is required to plead: “ ‘(1) the defendant . . . concealed
or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant [was] under a
duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant . . .
intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent
to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff [was] unaware of the
fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of
the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the
concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have
sustained damage.’ ” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb &
Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1130 (Prakashpalan).)
       The requisite “duty to disclose may be established
where there is a confidential relationship between the parties,
defendant has made a representation which was likely to
mislead due to the nondisclosure, there is active concealment
of undisclosed matters, or one party has sole knowledge of or
access to material facts and knows such facts are not known to
or discoverable by the other party.” (Prakashpalan, supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at p. 1130.) Here, Wilkes does not allege that West
owed him a duty to disclose the facts he allegedly concealed; nor
does he allege facts that would establish such a duty under these
tests. He does not allege a confidential relationship between
himself and West, he fails to identify any specific representations
West made to mislead Wilkes, he alleges no facts of active
concealment, and does not aver that West’s relationship with
the Clippers was not discoverable. He has thus failed to state a
cause of action for fraud by concealment.

                                   23
      C.    Denial of Leave to Amend
       Wilkes contends that the court erred in denying his request
for leave to amend his fraud causes of action. We review the
denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. (Greenwood
v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 851, 857.) “The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure
the defect.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4
Cal.5th 145, 162.)
       In opposing Wilkes’s request for leave to amend, West
requested judicial notice of certain discovery responses from
Wilkes to argue that he cannot cure the defective pleading. In
particular, West asked Wilkes in an interrogatory to identify
the basis for his contention that he “had the authority to enter
into agreements and make decisions on behalf of the Clippers,”
and Wilkes responded: “West had the apparent ability to
make decisions, and enter into contacts, on behalf of defendant
LA Clippers” and “West consistently told [Wilkes] that Steve
Ballmer would take care of him.” Wilkes gave a substantially
similar response to an interrogatory asking him to identify the
basis for his contention that West “was an agent of the Clippers.”
       West pointed out that Wilkes was required by law to
respond to the interrogatories with answers that are “as complete
and straightforward as the information reasonably available
to [him] permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (a); see
Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
64, 76 [“ ‘[p]arties must “state the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth in answering written interrogatories” ’ ”].)
Because Wilkes’s “complete” answers to questions about the basis
of West’s alleged agency and authority to bind the Clippers failed
to specify any representations or promises—only the “apparent

                                  24
ability to make decisions”—West argued that any curative
allegation of specific representations or promises would be
inconsistent with his responses. The trial court agreed with
West, and concluded that “leave to amend would be futile.”
The court’s conclusion is not an abuse of discretion.
       On appeal, Wilkes contends that, if given leave to do so,
he can allege the additional facts that West had told him during
their first meeting in April 2019 that he “works for the Clippers,”
and that on June 29, 2019—the day after the alleged contract
was formed—that West said he was a consultant for the
Clippers and was working with the team to acquire Leonard.
The proposed allegations that West stated that he worked for
the Clippers or acted as a consultant, however, if true, do not
constitute a representation or promise that he had the authority
to contractually bind the Clippers to pay $2.5 million. Even
if Wilkes believed otherwise, any reliance on his part would
not be reasonable or justifiable, and therefore insufficient to
state a cause of action for fraud. (See Beckwith v. Dahl (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1066 [“plaintiff must set ‘forth facts to
show that his or her actual reliance on the representations
was justifiable’ ”].) Therefore, the court did not err in denying
Wilkes leave to amend.

                                   25
                       DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                       ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 CHANEY, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

                                26