Court Opinion

ID: 9945902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 19:04:43.152321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:19.145278
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 Sanchez v. MC Painting CA4/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
 OPINION AFTER TRANSFER FROM THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 LAURO SANCHEZ,                                                               D078817

            Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-00030754-
            v.                                                                CU-OE-CTL)

 MC PAINTING,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Timothy B. Taylor, Judge. Order reversed in part with directions.
          Finch, Thornton & Baird, Chad T. Wishchuk and Marlene C. Nowlin
for Defendant and Appellant.
          Moon Law Group, Kane Moon, Allen Feghali, Enzo Nabiev and Hyunjin
Kim for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      MC Painting appeals from an order denying its petition/motion to
compel arbitration of a Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab.
Code, § 2698 et seq.) action brought by a former employee, Lauro Sanchez.
In denying the petition, the trial court followed then-controlling precedent in
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348
(Iskanian), which held that a worker’s right to pursue a representative PAGA
action cannot be waived and that this state law rule is not preempted by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In our original unpublished opinion filed on
April 22, 2022, we affirmed the trial court’s order based on Iskanian.
      Since then, several things have happened. First, on June 15, 2022, the
United States Supreme Court decided Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana
(2022) 596 U.S. 639 (Viking River), holding that certain aspects of Iskanian
were preempted by the FAA. Two months later, the California Supreme
Court granted review of our opinion pending its decision in Adolph v. Uber

Technologies, Inc.1 That decision was filed on July 17, 2023. (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 (Adolph).) Then, on September 13,
2023, this case was transferred to us with directions to vacate our original
opinion and reconsider the matter in light of Adolph. We have since received
and considered supplemental briefs from both parties.
      At least for California courts, the three primary lessons to be distilled
from Viking River and Adolph are: (1) the FAA does not preempt Iskanian’s

“principal rule” that prohibits waivers of representative standing2 to bring

1    (Adoph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (Apr. 11, 2022, G059860 & G060198)
[nonpub. opn.], review granted July 20, 2022, S274671.)
2     In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court observed that the
term “ ‘representative’ ” is used in conjunction with PAGA claims “in two
distinct ways.” (596 U.S. at p. 648.) First, PAGA claims are always
representative in the sense that they are enforcement actions brought by
                                       2
PAGA claims (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 649; see DeMarinis v.
Heritage Bank of Commerce (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 776, 784 (DeMarinis));
(2) the FAA does preempt Iskanian’s secondary rule that prohibited parties
from contracting around PAGA’s claim joinder device by splitting arbitrable
individual claims from nonarbitrable nonindividual claims (Viking River,
supra, at p. 659; see Nickson v. Shemran, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 121, 129
(Nickson)); and (3) subject to any separate limitations on severability, trial
courts should generally compel arbitration of individual PAGA claims while
preserving the plaintiff’s ability to litigate nonindividual claims in court
(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1123; see Nickson, at pp. 134–135;
DeMarinis, at p. 787).
      Consistent with these precepts, we reject Sanchez’s contention that the
severability clause in the arbitration agreement precludes arbitration of
Sanchez’s individual claims. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order to
the extent it denied MC Painting’s petition to compel arbitration of Sanchez’s
individual claims with directions to enter a new order granting the motion in
part. As to Sanchez’s nonindividual claims, the court should consider MC
Painting’s request that litigation be stayed pending completion of the
arbitration.

employees as agents or proxies of the state. But in a second sense, some
PAGA claims are representative in that they are based on code violations
suffered by employees other than the plaintiff. This latter sense
distinguishes between the named plaintiff’s individual claims and the
nonindividual claims of other employees that are part of the plaintiff’s action.
(Id. at pp. 648–649.) We endeavor to consistently use the terms “individual”
and “nonindividual” when referring to the second sense.
                                        3
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      MC Painting is in the business of painting, concrete restoration, stucco
patching, and related services. In February 2018, it hired Sanchez, who
signed a Spanish language arbitration agreement. In English, it states in
relevant part:

         “In connection with any dispute, claim, or controversy
         (‘Claim(s)’) arising out of or in any way related to the
         employment, . . . whether based in contract, tort, or
         statutory duty or prohibition, the Parties agree to submit
         the Claim(s) to binding arbitration . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] All
         issues and questions concerning the construction, validity,
         enforcement, and interpretation of this Agreement shall be
         governed by, and construed in accordance with, the Federal
         Arbitration Act . . . . Employee agrees Employee is waiving
         the right to bring . . . a class action, representative action,
         or collective action, whether filed in a court of law or in
         arbitration, against Company . . . . The Parties agree that
         any arbitration will proceed on an individual basis. . . .
         [¶] . . . If any provision of this Agreement is deemed
         unenforceable, the remainder shall continue in full force
         and effect and only the unenforceable provision may be
         severed, to the fullest extent permitted under the law.”

      In 2020, Sanchez filed a putative class action complaint against MC
Painting alleging various wage and hour claims. Later, Sanchez voluntarily
dismissed his claims without prejudice, with the exception of a representative

PAGA cause of action.3

3      Sanchez’s request for dismissal is not in the record on appeal;
however, the parties’ briefs agree that Sanchez’s only remaining claim is a
representative PAGA action in the first sense of the term. (Ante, at fn. 2; see
Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 586,
fn. 5 [order sustaining demurrer not in record, but established by the parties’
briefs].) Moreover, the order denying the motion to compel arbitration is
consistent with the briefs, stating that “the class and individual allegations
                                        4
      MC Painting petitioned to compel arbitration. Citing Iskanian,
Sanchez opposed the motion stating, “the California Supreme Court has been
abundantly clear that representative PAGA claims are not subject to
arbitration.” After an unreported hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
stating, “Iskanian remains good law” and “several appellate courts” have held
that a “PAGA plaintiff may not be required to arbitrate” without the state’s
consent.
                                 DISCUSSION

A.   Viking River Partially Alters the PAGA Landscape as Painted by
     Iskanian

      PAGA “authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil penalties on
behalf of the state against his or her employer for Labor Code violations
committed against the employee and fellow employees, with most of the
proceeds of that litigation going to the state.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
p. 360.) “The civil penalties recovered on behalf of the state under the PAGA
are distinct from the statutory damages to which employees may be entitled
in their individual capacities.” (Iskanian, at p. 381.) A PAGA action is,
therefore, “ ‘ “fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the
public and not to benefit private parties.” ’ ” (Iskanian, at p. 387.)
      Iskanian held that “an arbitration agreement requiring an employee as
a condition of employment to give up the right to bring representative PAGA
actions in any forum is contrary to public policy.” (Iskanian, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 360.) This is true regardless of whether the waiver is construed
broadly—as waiving the right to act as an agent of the state for purposes of
PAGA enforcement—or more narrowly—as only waiving the right to pursue

have been dismissed from the [first amended complaint], leaving only the
representative PAGA claim.”
                                        5
nonindividual claims. Similarly, an arbitration agreement between the
employee and employer provides no basis to arbitrate nonindividual PAGA
claims “because the state is the owner of the claim and the real party in
interest, and the state was not a party to the arbitration agreement.”
(Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 621–622.)
As Viking River confirms and the parties do not dispute, these aspects of
Iskanian are not preempted by the FAA and remain good law. (Viking River,
supra, 596 U.S. at 656–659.)
      What Viking River did change is the portion of Iskanian that prohibited
splitting a PAGA action into an individual claim (which was subject to
arbitration) and a nonindividual claim (which could not be arbitrated).
(See Nickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 128 [“Iskanian rejected the
employer’s argument that the particular waiver it drafted should be upheld
because it only waived nonindividual PAGA claims and preserved the
employee’s right to arbitrate individual ones”].) The trial court here relied on
this aspect of Iskanian when it denied MC Painting’s arbitration demand in
its entirety. But in a post-Viking River world, where a PAGA action can be
split to facilitate arbitration, typically the plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim
would be subject to arbitration while the nonindividual claims would not.

B.    The Severability Clause Does Not Preclude Arbitration of
      Sanchez’s Individual PAGA Claim
      As Viking River emphasizes, arbitration under the FAA is
fundamentally a matter of the parties’ choice. (Viking River, supra, 596
U.S. at p. 651 [that arbitration is a matter of consent is the “ ‘first principle’ ”
of FAA jurisprudence].) Acknowledging Viking River’s holding that the FAA
preempts Iskanian to the extent that it prevents the parties from agreeing
they will arbitrate individual PAGA claims, Sanchez nonetheless contends
the trial court acted properly in denying the motion to compel arbitration in
                                         6
total. He argues that the severability clause in the arbitration agreement
reflects the parties’ choice to broadly sever unenforceable provisions, which in
his view includes the agreement to arbitrate both individual and
nonindividual claims.
        The arbitration agreement in Viking River “contained a severability
clause specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, any class, collective,
representative, or PAGA action would presumptively be litigated in court.
But under that severability clause, if any ‘portion’ of the waiver remained
valid, it would be ‘enforced in arbitration.’ ” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at
p. 647.) The severability clause in this case provides: “If any provision of this
Agreement is deemed unenforceable, the remainder shall continue in full
force and effect and only the unenforceable provision may be severed, to the
fullest extent permitted under the law.”
        We find no significant difference between the two clauses. Both provide
that if a provision of the arbitration agreement is deemed unenforceable, the
remainder will be enforced. Sanchez suggests that the last phrase in his
agreement—“to the fullest extent permitted under law”—refers to the act of
severing the unenforceable clause such that it mandates broader severance
and, consequently, broader unenforceability. But this proposed reading
ignores the import of the entire preceding phrase in the sentence—“the
remainder shall continue in full force and effect and only the unenforceable
provision may be severed . . . .” (Italics added.) This reflects a clear intent
that severance, and thus unenforceability, shall be limited such that the
arbitration agreement can be enforced “to the fullest extent permitted under
law.”
        Following Viking River, the law permits the arbitration agreement to
be enforced to the extent it requires arbitration of Sanchez’s individual PAGA

                                        7
claims. Fairly interpreted, this agreement contains such a requirement.
The parties expressly stated “that any arbitration will proceed on an
individual basis.” (Cf. Nickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 130 [plaintiff’s
individual PAGA claims were arbitrable where the agreement stated that all
claims could only be brought “ ‘on an individual basis’ ”].) By virtue of the
severability clause, the agreement allows for the arbitration of Sanchez’s
individual PAGA claim notwithstanding that his nonindividual claims can
neither be waived nor arbitrated.
      Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, the trial court erred in denying
MC Painting’s petition to compel arbitration in its entirety. It should have
granted the motion in part only with respect to Sanchez’s individual claims.

C.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Considering Sanchez’s Late
      Opposition Papers

      Where, as here, a lawsuit is already pending, a defendant may file a
petition to compel arbitration in lieu of filing an answer to a complaint.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.7.) MC Painting did so here on December 23, 2020,
with a proof of service by mail to an address in California filed the same date.
The hearing was scheduled for April 2, 2021. Absent an extension of time,
Sanchez’s response was due 15 days after service—that is, January 7, 2021.
(Id., §§ 1290.6, 1013.) But he did not file opposition until March 15, 2021.
      Where no timely opposition is filed, the allegations of a petition to
compel arbitration are deemed admitted. (Taheri Law Group, A.P.C. v.
Sorokurs (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 956, 962 (Taheri).) MC Painting invoked
that rule, but the trial court allowed the late filing, stating:

                                         8
         “[E]ven if [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1290.6 applies,
         the statute specifically allows the court to extend the time
         for filing an opposition for good cause. [MC Painting] has
         failed to show that the court has no good cause to consider
         the late opposition brief or that it has suffered undue
         prejudice by the tardy filing. To the contrary, it appears
         that [MC Painting] was able to timely file and serve an 11-
         page reply on the merits.”

      In a two-paragraph argument at the end of its opening brief, MC
Painting contends that the order should be reversed because Sanchez filed an
untimely response. But as the trial court correctly noted, Code of Civil
Procedure section 1290.6 expressly allows an extension of time “for good
cause”—and MC Painting makes no argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining good cause existed here.
      In any event, the consequence of an untimely opposition is merely that
the factual allegations in the petition are deemed admitted. The trial court
still must draw legal conclusions from those deemed admitted facts. (Taheri,
supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 962). Here, the petition alleges: (1) MC
Painting is a California corporation; (2) in the construction industry;
(3) engaged in interstate commerce; (4) Sanchez signed the arbitration
agreement; and (5) the allegations in Sanchez’s complaint arise out of or
relate to his employment. Even assuming these allegations are deemed true,
the court was still obligated to reach a legal conclusion whether and the
extent to which the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. Thus, even
assuming for the sake of discussion that the trial court abused its discretion
in considering late opposition, any such error was harmless.

                                       9
D.    MC Painting’s Request to Stay Litigation of the Nonindividual
      Claims Should Be Made to the Trial Court in the First Instance
      Viking River concluded that once a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim
was ordered to arbitration, the “the correct course is to dismiss her remaining
[nonindividual] claims.” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 663.) This
conclusion was based on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
California law and a plaintiff’s standing to pursue nonindividual PAGA
claims. In Adolph, the California Supreme Court clarified that Viking River
had misread California law on PAGA standing. Justice Liu’s opinion
explained that “a plaintiff who files a PAGA action with individual and non-
individual claims does not lose standing to litigate the non-individual claims
in court simply because the individual claims have been ordered to
arbitration.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1128.) Accordingly, granting a
motion to compel arbitration of a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim provides

no basis to dismiss any remaining nonindividual claims.4 Typically, courts
that order arbitration of individual claims will stay the nonindividual claims
pending the arbitration. (See, e.g., Gregg v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 786, 806 (Gregg).)
      Here, as in Gregg, the arbitration agreement itself suggests that
litigation of the nonindividual claims should be stayed pending completion of
the arbitration. (Gregg, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 806.) The agreement
provides that “[t]o the extent any portion of the Claim(s) cannot be arbitrated
under applicable law [(‘Excluded Claims’)], the Parties agree to bifurcate and
stay for the duration of the arbitration proceedings any such Excluded

4     As to the interpretation of California law, we are bound by the
pronouncements of the California Supreme Court notwithstanding any
contrary views expressed by the United States Supreme Court. (See Adolph,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1119.)
                                      10
Claims.” Still, “the trial court has not had the opportunity to rule on [any]
stay request, because it denied [the] motion to compel arbitration outright.”
(Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1129, 1142.) Once the court enters a
new order compelling arbitration of Sanchez’s individual claims, it should
consider MC Painting’s request to stay the remaining nonindividual claims
consistent with its overall management of the superior court litigation. (See
Nickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.)

                               DISPOSITION

      The order is reversed with directions to enter a new order granting in
part the petition to compel arbitration to the extent of Sanchez’s individual
PAGA claim. Following entry of the new order, the court should consider any
request to stay litigation of the remaining nonindividual claims. The parties
shall each bear their own costs for this appeal.

                                                                      DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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