Court Opinion

ID: 9677605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:12.629416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.075622
License: Public Domain

Connor, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. I believe the trial court erred in granting Kaufman & Payton, P.C., and Alan J. Kaufman1 summary disposition. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10) tests whether there is *259factual support for a claim. Giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opponent, the court must determine whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Amorello v Monsanto Corp, 186 Mich App 324, 329-330; 463 NW2d 487 (1990).
In this case, the motion tested whether Nikkila could establish retaliation. Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman argued below that what they did could not have been retaliation because they did not know Nikkila was going to file a grievance with the Attorney Grievance Commission.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that showing actual knowledge of an imminent report is required to establish retaliation. The Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee is about to report a suspected violation of law. MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). Employers do not always wait to discriminate until they have proof that an employee is going to blow the whistle. They may discriminate against an employee they fear may blow the whistle either to nip the problem in the bud, or to give the employee a taste of things to come should the employee actually blow the whistle. If an employer actually discriminates against an employee, it should not matter whether that discrimination is motivated by knowledge or fear. Employers should not be allowed to peremptorily retaliate against employees with impunity. See McLemore v Detroit Receiving Hosp, 196 Mich App 391, 396; 493 NW2d 441 (1992). Both Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman, Nikkila’s supervisor, knew that Nikkila thought Alan J. Kaufman’s billing practices were illegal, and both knew that she was very unhappy *260about being asked to participate in those practices. Giving Nikkila the benefit of reasonable doubt, I believe a reasonable factfinder could decide that Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman suspected Nikkila was going to report those billing practices and made Nikkila’s work environment intolerable as a result.
Moreover, even if a showing of actual knowledge is required, I would find that Nikkila made such a showing through the affidavit of her former attorney, Ronald Prebenda. Prebenda swore that, before Nikkila left Kaufman & Payton’s employ, he had told a member of Kaufman & Payton that Nikkila intended to file a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission. This conclusively demonstrates that Kaufman & Payton knew that she was going to report the billing practices. Considering that Alan J. Kaufman was an officer of Kaufman & Payton, the object of the complaint, and Nikkila’s supervisor, I think a reasonable factfinder could infer that this information would have been passed on to Alan J. Kaufman.
I also disagree with the majority that Prebenda’s affidavit is contradicted by his deposition testimony. Prebenda was deposed by Kaufman & Pay-ton and Alan J. Kaufman over his own strong objections based on attorney-client privilege. He answered many questions by saying he had "no present recollection,” and gave responses so unsatisfactory that the trial court later ordered him to be redeposed. Regardless, a careful reading of his testimony shows no direct contradiction with his affidavit.
Finally, even if Prebenda’s December 18, 1989, affidavit and his March 15, 1990, deposition testimony were contradictory, I disagree with the majority that the result should be to reject the evidence most favorable to Nikkila and accept the *261evidence most favorable to Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman. When reviewing the supporting materials to determine whether a question of material fact exists, courts are supposed to give the benefit of reasonable doubt to the party opposing a motion for summary disposition, not to the party making the motion. See Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 372; 207 NW2d 316 (1973).
There is a longstanding rule, followed in Griffith v Brant, 177 Mich App 583, 587-588; 442 NW2d 652 (1989), that a party, having testified to facts in a deposition in a clear, intelligent, and unequivocal manner is bound by those statements and cannot avoid summary disposition by later swearing in an affidavit that testimony at trial would be different. See Barlow v John Crane-Houdaille, Inc, 191 Mich App 244, 250; 477 NW2d 133 (1991); Gamet v Jenks, 38 Mich App 719, 726; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). However, in this case Prebenda is not a party,2 his deposition testimony was not clear and unequivocal, and his affidavit was prepared months before he was deposed.
I believe that by extending the rule in Griffith to this case, the majority is engaging in impermissible fact finding. As already noted, both the trial court and this Court must give the party opposing a motion for summary disposition the benefit of reasonable doubt, and determine whether a record might be developed that would create an issue of material fact. If Prebenda has testified one way, but in an earlier affidavit swore the facts were otherwise, I believe there is a reasonable doubt regarding how he would testify at trial. The majority fails to give Nikkila the benefit of that doubt as is her due.
1 would reverse._

 As a preliminary matter, I must discuss which parties and claims are before this Court. Kaufman & Payton filed an action against Nikkila. Nikkila then filed several counterclaims against Kaufman & Payton. She also filed claims against Alan J. Kaufman in a separate action. The trial court ordered the two cases to be "joined and consolidated.” Thus, there was only one case in the trial court, albeit with several parties and many claims.
The caption of the trial court order from which Nikkila appeals lists only Kaufman & Payton and Nikkila as parties. However, the order expressly grants summary disposition both to Kaufman & Payton and Alan Kaufman with regard to Nikkila’s whistleblower claims against each. Nikkila’s claim of appeal likewise does not list Alan Kaufman as a party or appellee.
By not listing Alan Kaufman as a party or an appellee, Nikkila’s claim of appeal failed to conform to the requirements of MCR 7.204(D)(1). However, Alan Kaufman was represented by the same attorneys who represented Kaufman & Payton. Those attorneys filed an appeal brief on behalf of both Kaufman & Payton and Alan Kaufman that listed Alan Kaufman as an appellee. I would conclude that, because Nikkila filed a claim of appeal from the order dismissing her whistleblower claim against Alan Kaufman, because she raised the issue of the dismissal of that claim on appeal, and because Alan Kaufman had actual notice of the appeal and filed an appellee brief, the dismissal of Nikkila’s whistleblower claim against him is properly before this Court. Pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(1) and (2), I would amend the caption of this opinion to conform it to the actual parties before this Court and their respective relationships.

 And contrary to the majority’s assertion, there is nothing in the record to indicate that, either at the time of Prebenda’s affidavit or his deposition, he was still acting as Nikkila’s attorney.