Court Opinion

ID: 9684608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:03:40.534031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:57.758162
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
Appeal is from conviction for delivery of heroin. The jury assessed punishment at 35 years. Upon original submission the panel reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment holding that the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to quash the indictment for failure to specify manner of “delivery.”1
In its motion for rehearing the State contends that appellant filed no motion to quash the indictment. Appellant was tried jointly with codefendant Aaron Ferguson. At trial appellant was represented by the Honorable John J. Herrera and Ferguson was represented by the Honorable Jimmy Phillips, Jr. Appellant timely filed a bill of exception averring inter alia that the trial court had granted appellant’s motion “that for the purposes of Appeal, any objection made by the Attorney for the Defendant, Aaron D. Ferguson, whether through pretrial or trial motions and whether in the form of formal motions or objections during the course of trial ... [be] taken as if the Defendant, Daniel Garza, or his attorney had made such objections and motions. .. . ” The bill was not acted upon by the trial court.
A timely filed bill of exception not acted upon by the trial court is deemed approved without qualification. Art. 40.09, Sec. 6(a), V.A.C.C.P.; see Herrin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 525 S.W.2d 27; Dickhaut v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 223. Nevertheless, a bill of exception must be complete within itself and must stand or fall by its own allegations. Herrin v. State, supra. The bill must plainly set out any error sought to be preserved for review. Herrin v. State, supra. The bill of exceptions before us contains no motion to quash the indictment. It does not even contain any specific reference to a motion to quash. The instant bill of exceptions presents nothing for review. See McClelland v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 389 S.W.2d 678 (motion to quash not attached to a bill of exceptions nor incorporated by reference — nothing presented for review); Andres v. State, 229 S.W. 503, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 18 (bill of exceptions complaining of court’s action overruling motion to quash indictment cannot be considered where record fails to show motion to quash was filed).
The record before us contains no motion to quash the indictment. While appellant filed objections to the record on two separate occasions pursuant to Art. 40.09, Sec. 7, V.A.C.C.P., none of these objections relate to the omission of a motion to quash the indictment. In Lynch v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 502 S.W.2d 740 we stated: “[W]here the absence of material from the record is occasioned by the oversight or non-objection of the accused, it has generally been held that any error in the record has been waived.” Id. at 741 (on motion for rehearing). See Paige v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 573 S.W.2d 16; Stockton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 69; Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 466 S.W.2d 744. In his brief, appellant has directed us to the appellate record of his codefendant for a copy of the motion to quash the indictment. See Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). We decline to review the records of another case to find support for contentions raised in this appeal. See Parker *90v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 545 S.W.2d 151 n. 6; Salinas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 864 (“the general rule is that an appellate court cannot go to the record of another case for the purpose of considering testimony not shown in the record of the ease before it.”); Hale v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 509 S.W.2d 637; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 937; Donahue v. State, 277 S.W. 657, 102 Tex.Cr.R. 151 (agreement of counsel, approved by trial court, that testimony from one ease be considered as in record of second case will be disregarded by Court of Criminal Appeals). Nothing is presented for review.
In his ninth ground of error appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction. Initially we note that this Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be afforded testimony. E. g., Miller v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 566 S.W.2d 614.
Art. 4476-15, Sec. 4.03(a), V.A.C.S., provides in pertinent part that “a person commits an offense if he knowingly or intentionally ... delivers ... a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1, 2, 3, or 4.” Heroin is listed in Penalty Group 1, and delivery of heroin is classified as a felony of the first degree. See id. Secs. 4.02(b)(2)(K) and 4.03(b)(1). “Delivery” is statutorily defined in pertinent part as “the actual or constructive transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.” Id. Sec. 1.02(8).
The evidence shows that Jerry Powell was a narcotics agent employed by the Department of Public Safety on April 25,1975 —the date of the offense. Powell testified that he and another undercover police officer, Don Bush, were posing as heroin buyers. The two officers met appellant on a motel parking lot in Harris County. Following a discussion concerning a purchase of heroin, appellant left the officers and reentered the motel. The appellant returned a short time later and gave Agent Powell a small package containing a substance Powell believed to be heroin. This package was a sample delivered in contemplation of a purchase of approximately 53 ounces of heroin being negotiated by the parties.2 Agent Powell testified that he placed the package in the pocket of his trousers, and maintained custody and control of the package until the following morning when it was delivered to the Department of Public Safety Laboratory. A chemist employed by the Department of Public Safety testified that the package contained “3.73 grams of twenty-nine per cent (29%) heroin.” We find the evidence sufficient to support conviction for the “actual transfer” of heroin as proscribed by the aforementioned statutes. See Howery v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 528 S.W.2d 230. Ground of error number nine is without merit.
In his second ground of error appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence. When there is direct evidence of the main fact to be proven, a charge on circumstantial evidence is not required. See Cadd v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 587 S.W.2d 736; Bates v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 587 S.W.2d 121; Powell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 502 S.W.2d 705. The testimony summarized above constitutes direct evidence of delivery of heroin. See Barrera v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 491 S.W.2d 879. Cf. Powell v. State, supra. A charge on circumstantial evidence was not required. Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.
In his sixth ground of error appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Ferguson’s motion to sever. Appellant maintains that he and Ferguson were tried for separate offenses, and joint trial was not authorized under Art. 36.09, V.A.C.C.P.
*91Appellant filed no motion to sever at trial; this complaint is raised for the first time on appeal. Severance pursuant to Art. 36.09, supra, is not a matter of right but rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Robinson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 449 S.W.2d 239. Absent a motion for severance or a showing of prejudice there is no error in consolidating the trial of two or more defendants. Id. at 240; Beeson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 726.
If it be appellant’s contention that the trial court was without authority to consolidate, we find no merit in such argument. Art. 36.09, supra, provides in pertinent part: “Two or more defendants who are jointly or separately indicted or complained against for the same offense or any offense growing out of the same transaction may be, in the discretion of the court, tried jointly or separately as to one or more defendants; ...” If the offense charged against appellant and Ferguson did not relate to the same transaction, it was not within the trial court’s discretion to order joint trial over objection. Ex Parte Mitchell, 608 S.W.2d 915.
The evidence shows that after delivering the “sample” of heroin to Agent Powell, appellant led the two police officers to a motel room where he introduced the officers to Ferguson and another man. Once in the room the officers negotiated an agreement to purchase approximately 53 ounces of heroin for $92,500.00. After Powell inspected the substance to be purchased, the parties agreed that appellant would accompany the officers to the motel parking lot in order to see the money which was to be exchanged for the heroin. When appellant and the officers arrived at the automobile in which the money was located, appellant was arrested. Other police officers subsequently entered the motel room, arrested Ferguson and the third defendant, and seized the contraband. A chemist testified at trial that three plastic bags tendered to Agent Powell for inspection in the motel room contained “502.22 grams of twenty-five per cent (25%) heroin .. . 474.07 grams of twenty-five per cent (25%) heroin [and] .. . 485.64 grams of twenty-one per cent (21%) heroin,” respectively.
Thus, appellant met with the officers, discussed a sale of heroin, retrieved and delivered a sample of the merchandise for inspection, led the officers to the room where the negotiations were completed, remained in the room during negotiation, accompanied the officers back to their car to see the money to be exchanged, and was then arrested. We hold that the actual delivery of a sample of heroin and the subsequent meeting in the motel room grew out of the same transaction. Joint trial was authorized by Art. 36.09, supra; no abuse of discretion by the trial court is shown. Ground of error number six is overruled.
In his third ground of error appellant contends that the trial court erred in not applying the law to the facts in instructing the jury. The thrust of the contention is that the trial court erroneously failed to apply the law of parties to the facts.
In Romo v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 568 S.W.2d 298 we held:
“In circumstances where a defendant, if guilty at all, is guilty as a party, the court should properly apply the law of parties to the facts of the case, but the failure to do so is not reversible error unless there is a timely and sufficient objection to the court’s charge or a specially requested charge is timely filed.”
Id. at 303. There is nothing in the instant record showing that appellant timely objected to the court’s charge. Appellant directs us to the appellate record of his code-fendant for the objection. Again, we decline to review the records of another case to find support for contentions raised in the instant appeal. See Parker v. State, supra; Salinas v. State, supra; Hale v. State, supra; Jones v. State, supra; Donahue v. State, supra. Nothing is preserved for review.
Appellant also contends the trial court erred in not allowing him to call jurors to testify at the hearing on motion for new trial. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request that he be allowed to call jurors at the hearing in order to inquire *92about possible jury misconduct. A motion for new trial alleging jury misconduct must be supported by the affidavit of a juror or some other person in a position to know the facts. See e. g., Story v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 502 S.W.2d 764; Howard v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 903; Prince v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 320, 254 S.W.2d 1006. No such affidavit was presented in the instant case. No error is shown.
In his fifth ground of error appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a challenge for cause as to prospective juror Susan Clark. Appellant maintains that Clark should have been excluded for cause pursuant to Art. 35.-16(c)(2), V.A.C.C.P. because her answers to questions during voir dire indicated she was prejudiced against anyone who would sell heroin and such prejudice would render her incapable of considering probation as punishment. Clark stated that she had a “strong emotional feeling” about drug cases which “might” influence her if a defendant were found guilty. When asked by defense counsel whether she could consider probation in a sale of heroin case she stated “I still have a closed mind, and I have an emotional responsibility.” Nevertheless, at other points during voir dire Clark stated that she could be “fair and impartial,” and that she “would be reasonable and listen to the facts” when considering punishment. When asked if she could consider probation if appellant were convicted of selling heroin to a seven-year-old child, Clark initially responded “no,” then stated “I think there would be lot of circumstances involved; I would like to give you a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, but I can’t; I am leaning towards ‘no,’ if that answers your question.” In concluding his examination of the prospective juror, defense counsel elicited the following:
“MR. PHILLIPS: Let’s take the hypothetical and say that the Defendant was found guilty of selling four (4) pounds of heroin; would you consider granting probation then?
“THE COURT: Other than to a seven (7) year old child?
“MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor.
“MRS. CLARK: I could consider it.”
While this Court has a cold record before it, the trial judge reviewing answers of an equivocating venireman has the opportunity to observe the tone of voice and demeanor of the prospective juror in determining the precise meaning intended. Hughes v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 563 S.W.2d 581, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950, 99 S.Ct. 1432, 59 L.Ed.2d 640; Tezeno v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 374. We cannot say the trial court erred in refusing to sustain the challenge for cause as to Clark. See Von Byrd v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 569 S.W.2d 883, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2418, 60 L.Ed.2d 1073.3 Appellant’s fifth ground of error is overruled.
In his seventh ground of error appellant alleges the trial court erred in refusing to allow discovery of tape recorded conversations between appellant and police officers. The record before us contains only one motion for discovery filed by the appellant. That motion contains no reference to any tape recording. In his brief, appellant directs our attention to a pretrial hearing in which the Honorable Jimmy Phillips, Jr. “orally renewe[d] a motion for discovery” relating to such tape recordings on behalf of his client, Aaron Ferguson. There is nothing in the instant record to show that appellant ever filed a motion to discover any tape recordings in compliance with the provisions of Art. 39.14, V.A.C.C.P.
Further, the record on appeal contains no such recordings, and none of appellant’s objections to the appellate record relate to such recordings. We are unable to determine whether appellant has been harmed by the trial court’s ruling on any discovery motion. Nothing is presented for review. Cf. Mendoza v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 552 S.W.2d 444; Henriksen v. State, Tex.Cr. *93App., 500 S.W.2d 491; Alba v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 492 S.W.2d 555.
In ground of error number eight appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial following prejudicial jury argument not supported by evidence in the record. During jury argument the prosecutor stated that heroin “will turn young girls into prostitutes. ... ” Appellant’s objection was sustained, and the jury was admonished to disregard the remark. Generally, an instruction to disregard will cure error caused by improper jury argument unless the remark is so inflammatory that its “prejudicial effect cannot reasonably be removed by such an admonition.” E. g., Thomas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 578 S.W.2d 691; Blansett v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 556 S.W.2d 322; Carraway v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 507 S.W.2d 761. We hold that no reversible error is shown.
Appellant also complains of the prosecutor’s jury argument that heroin is “a drug that goes out in my streets and your streets in the community.” Defense objection that such argument was outside of the record was overruled. That heroin finds its way into the streets of Harris County constitutes an expression of common knowledge and a proper plea for law enforcement. See Salinas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 864. Cf. Cotton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 482 (common knowledge heroin is addictive). Appellant’s eighth ground of error is overruled.
In his tenth ground of error appellant contends his conviction is invalid because he was reindicted on a more severe charge after refusing to plead guilty to the original indictment. Even if appellant’s factual allegation were true, his contention is without merit. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604; Christiansen v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 575 S.W.2d 42.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.
McCORMICK, J., concurs in result.

. Art. 4476-15, Sec. 1.02(8), V.A.C.S., defines delivery as an actual or constructive transfer of or an offer to sell a controlled substance.

. Examination of evidence of the ensuing events is unnecessary for disposition of this ground of error.

. In Von Byrd a venireman stated he did not think he could consider probation when questioned by defense counsel. The trial court subsequently elicited from the prospective juror that he could consider probation. We found no error in the trial court’s denial of a defense challenge for cause. Von Byrd v. State, supra, at 891.