Court Opinion

ID: 9428961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:18.890891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:16.496133
License: Public Domain

*43Per Curiam.
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Ross, directed that respondent Edward Fields’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted; it did so on the ground that Fields had been convicted with evidence obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present at an interrogation. 682 F. 2d 154 (1982). We have concluded that the Court of Appeals’ majority misconstrued this Court’s recent decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), and imposed a new and unjustified limit on police questioning of a suspect who voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his right to have counsel present.
I — I
Respondent, a soldier then stationed at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., was charged with raping an 81-year-old woman on September 21, 1974. After his arrest on September 25, Fields was released on his own recognizance. He retained *44private defense counsel. After discussing the matter with his counsel and with a military attorney provided him by the Army, Fields requested a polygraph examination. This request was granted and the examination was conducted on December 4 by an agent of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) at the fort.
Prior to undergoing the polygraph examination, Fields was given a written consent document, which he signed, informing him of his rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and of his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Eighth Amendment. In addition, the CID agent read to Fields the following detailed statement:
“Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You do not have to answer my questions or say anything. Anything you say or do can be used against you in a criminal trial. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning or have a lawyer present with you during the questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer of your own choice, or a military lawyer, detailed for you at no expense to you. Also, you may ask for a military lawyer of your choice by name and he will be detailed for you if superiors determine he’s reasonably available. If you are now going to discuss the offense under investigation, which is rape, with or without a lawyer present, you have a right to stop answering questions at any time or speak to a lawyer before answering further, even if you sign a waiver certificate. Do you want a lawyer at this time?” See State v. Fields, 538 S. W. 2d 348, 350, n. 1 (Mo. App. 1976) (emphasis added).
Fields answered: “No.”
At the conclusion of the polygraph examination, which took less than two hours, the CID agent told Fields that there had been some deceit, and asked him if he could explain why his answers were bothering him. Fields then admitted having *45intercourse with the victim on September 21, but said that she had instigated and consented to it. The agent asked Fields if he wished to discuss the matter further with another CID agent and with the Waynesville, Mo., Chief of Police. Fields said that he did. Then, in his turn, the Police Chief read Fields his Miranda warnings once again before questioning him. Fields repeated that he had had sexual contact with the victim, but that it had been consensual.
Respondent was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court, Pulaski County, Mo. He sought to suppress the testimony of the two CID agents and the Police Chief regarding his “confessions” to voluntary intercourse. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Fields had waived his rights. The testimony was admitted. Fields was convicted, and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on the ground that Fields “had been repeatedly and amply advised of his rights and . . . voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. ” 538 S. W. 2d, at 350.
Eventually, Fields sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The District Court, agreeing with the Missouri Court of Appeals that Fields had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, denied respondent’s petition. On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with directions to order the State either to release Fields or to afford him a new trial. 682 F. 2d, at 162.
II
The Court of Appeals found that the police conduct in question contravened the “clear import” of this Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona: “a defendant’s right to have counsel present at custodial interrogations must be zealously guarded.” 682 F. 2d, at 158. In Edwards, this Court had held that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel is pro*46vided unless the suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities. 451 U. S., at 484-487. The Eighth Circuit recognized that what it called the “per se rule” of Edwards “does not resolve the issue present here.” 682 F. 2d, at 158. Fields and his counsel had agreed that Fields should take the polygraph examination, and Fields appeared voluntarily and stated that he did not want counsel present during the interrogation. Thus, the Court of Appeals conceded that “Fields thereby ‘initiated’ further dialogue with the authorities after his right to counsel had been invoked.” Ibid.
When the suspect has initiated the dialogue, Edwards makes clear that the right to have a lawyer present can be waived:
“If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be ‘interrogation.’ In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.” 451 U. S., at 486, n. 9.
Citing this language, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged — as it had to — that “[t]here is no question that Fields waived his right to have counsel present while the [polygraph] examination itself was being conducted.” 682 F. 2d, at 160. Yet that court found that the State had failed to satisfy its burden of proving that “Fields knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present at the post-test interrogation.” Ibid. The court suggested that had the CID agent merely “paus[ed] to remind the defendant” of his rights, thus *47providing “meaningfully timed Miranda warnings” (emphasis in original), there would have been no violation. Ibid.
I — I HH h — I
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals did not examine the “totality of the circumstances,” as Edwards requires. Fields did not merely initiate a “meeting.” By requesting a polygraph examination, he initiated interrogation. That is, Fields waived not only his right to be free of contact with the authorities in the absence of an attorney, but also his right to be free of interrogation about the crime of which he was suspected. Fields validly waived his right to have counsel present at “post-test” questioning, unless the circumstances changed so seriously that his answers no longer were voluntary, or unless he no longer was making a “knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment” of his rights. 451 U. S., at 482.
The Court of Appeals relied on two facts indicating the need for a new set of warnings: the polygraph examination had been discontinued, and Fields was asked if he could explain the test’s unfavorable results. To require new warnings because of these two facts is unreasonable. Disconnecting the polygraph equipment effectuated no significant change in the character of the interrogation. The CID agent could have informed Fields during the examination that his answers indicated deceit; asking Fields, after the equipment was disconnected, why the answers were bothering him was not any more coercive. The Court of Appeals stated that there was no indication that Fields or his lawyer anticipated that Fields would be asked questions after the examination. But it would have been unreasonable for Fields and his attorneys to assume that Fields would not be informed of the polygraph readings and asked to explain any unfavorable result. Moreover, Fields had been informed that he could stop the questioning at any time, and could request at any time that *48his lawyer join him. Merely disconnecting the polygraph equipment could not remove this knowledge from Fields’ mind.*
The only plausible explanation for the court’s holding is that, encouraged by what it regarded as a per se rule established in Edwards, it fashioned another rule of its own: that, notwithstanding a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to have counsel present at a polygraph examination, and notwithstanding clear evidence that the suspect understood that right and was aware of his power to stop questioning at any time or to speak to an attorney at any time, the police again must advise the suspect of his rights before questioning him at the same interrogation about the results of the polygraph. The court indicated that this rule was needed because it thought that the use of polygraph “results” in questioning, although it does not necessarily render a response involuntary, is inherently coercive. But Courts of Appeals, including a different panel of the Eighth Circuit itself, and state courts, have rejected such a rule. See, e. g., United States v. Little Bear, 583 F. 2d 411, 414 (CA8 1978); Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F. 2d 238, 241-242 (CA9 1975); People v. Barreto, 256 Cal. App. 2d 392, 64 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967); State v. Henry, 352 So. 2d 643 (La. 1977). Cf. Henry v. Dees, 658 F. 2d 406 (CA5 1981) (waiver not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent in the total circumstances of the case, including mental retardation of suspect). The Eighth Circuit’s rule certainly finds no support in Edwards, which emphasizes that the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the suspect initiated the questioning, is controlling. Nor is the *49rule logical; the questions put to Fields after the examination would not have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had understood moments before. The rule is simply an unjustifiable restriction on reasonable police questioning.
IV
According to the dissent, a substantial question as to the admissibility of Fields’ statements may be raised under the Sixth Amendment. Post, at 52-55. The Sixth Amendment issues raised by the dissent, however, are not before us. The Court of Appeals rested its judgment exclusively on the Fifth Amendment “right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation” and on its interpretation of this Court’s decision in Edwards. 682 F. 2d, at 158. That interpretation was flawed and the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We express no view as to whether any constitutional safeguards not mentioned by the Court of Appeals bear on this case.
Because the Court of Appeals misapplied Edwards and created an unjustified per se rule, the petition for a writ of cer-tiorari is granted and that court’s judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.

It is so ordered.

The dissent suggests that, because the results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible in Missouri, Fields might reasonably have expected that he would not be subjected “to additional questioning that can produce admissible evidence.” Post, at 51, n. 2. Although the results of the polygraph examination might not have been admissible evidence, the statements Fields made in response to questioning during the course of the polygraph examination surely would have been.