Court Opinion

ID: 9386202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 17:08:43.599491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.109137
License: Public Domain

J-S06016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LUIS MANUEL VELEZ-DIAZ                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 279 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 12, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-CR-0005167-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: APRIL 11, 2023

        Appellant Luis Manuel Velez-Diaz appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after he was convicted of multiple counts of driving under

the influence (DUI) and related offenses. Appellant asserts that the trial court

erred in denying his suppression motion and challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence. After review, we reverse in part, and we affirm in part.

        The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

        On August 6, 2020, Trooper Elliot Wilker[1] was on Interstate 83
        northbound near exit 24, Emigsville, around 1:18 am. Trooper
        Wilker was stationary . . . and noticed a dark color sedan severely
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1The notes of testimony reflect that the trooper spelled his name “Wilker” and
not Walker. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 3/15/21, at 7; N.T. Trial, 1/12/22, at
6.   We have amended the trial court’s references to Trooper Wilker
accordingly.
J-S06016-23

     swerve from its lane, appearing to cross over a fog line. Trooper
     Wilker began following the vehicle northbound and observed the
     vehicle swerving within its lane and a fluctuation in speed. At that
     point, Trooper Wilker initiated a traffic stop and the vehicle pulled
     over with a delayed response. Everything except the initial swerve
     that caught Trooper Wilker’s attention was captured on the Motor
     Vehicle Recording [(MVR)].

     Once the vehicle stopped, Trooper Wilker observed two occupants
     in the vehicle, and the driver was identified as [Appellant].
     Trooper Wilker noticed the odor of marijuana emanating from the
     vehicle, a faint odor of alcoholic beverage, and a strong odor of
     perfume or cologne. [Appellant’s] eyes were bloodshot and
     glassy. [Appellant] admitted to smoking marijuana “a couple of
     hours ago.” [Appellant] also admitted to not possessing a driver’s
     license.

     Trooper Wilker then had [Appellant] step out of the vehicle and
     perform a field sobriety test. First, the walk-and-turn test was
     administered. Trooper Wilker indicated that six out of eight
     possible clues of impairment were observed. Then, the one-
     legged stand test was administered where [Appellant] exhibited
     two out of four clues of impairment. Finally, the Romberg
     balancing test was administered. During the Romberg balancing
     test, [Appellant] was observed exhibiting rapid eyelid tremor,
     body tremors, as well as hand and leg tremors.              After
     consideration of [Appellant’s] performance during the field
     sobriety test, Trooper Wilker asked [Appellant] to submit to a
     blood test.

     Initially, Trooper Wilker began to transport [Appellant] to booking
     after placing him under arrest. On the way, Trooper Wilker could
     smell the odor of marijuana and asked [Appellant] if he had
     marijuana on him. [Appellant] admitted to having marijuana in
     his underwear while in the patrol vehicle. When Trooper Wilker
     and [Appellant] arrived at booking, no phlebotomist was available
     to effectuate a blood draw. Then, [Appellant] was taken to York
     Hospital where a phlebotomist drew [Appellant’s] blood at
     approximately 2:11 a.m. The blood was packaged and sent to
     NMS Labs. The toxicology report indicated positive findings for
     Methamphetamine, 11-Hydroxy Delta-9 THC, Delta-9 Carboxy
     THC, and Delta-9 THC.

Trial Ct. Op., 3/22/22, at 2-3 (unpaginated) (some formatting altered).

                                     -2-
J-S06016-23

        Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress claiming that the traffic

stop was illegal. Mot. to Suppress, 1/20/21. Following a hearing on March

15, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Trial Ct. Order, 3/15/21,

at 6.

        Following a non-jury trial held on January 12, 2022, the trial court found

Appellant guilty of four counts of DUI and one count of driving on roadways

laned for traffic.2 At sentencing that same day, the trial court concluded that

Appellant’s DUI convictions merged for sentencing purposes and imposed a

sentence of three days to six months of incarceration, with credit for three

days of time served and a $1,000.00 fine for DUI under Section 3802(d)(1)(i).

The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay a $25.00 fine for the charge of

driving on roadways laned for traffic. Sentencing Order, 1/12/22.

        Appellant filed a timely appeal on February 10, 2022. Both Appellant

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        On appeal, Appellant raises two issues, which we have reordered as

follows:

        1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant] of
           75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1) where there was no evidence that his
           driving constituted a safety hazard?

        2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion
           to suppress the traffic stop on the basis of a lack of reasonable
           suspicion to stop the vehicle?

____________________________________________

275 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802(d)(1)(ii), 3802(d)(1)(iii), 3802(d)(2), and
3309(1), respectively.

                                           -3-
J-S06016-23

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

                                      Sufficiency

       Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction for driving roadways laned for traffic under 75 Pa.C.S § 3309(1).3

Appellant’s Brief at 15. In support, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth

failed to establish that he created a safety hazard. Id.

       When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our

standard of review is as follows:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all [of] the evidence admitted at trial in the
       light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
       evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
       crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
       may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
       fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
       established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
____________________________________________

3  Because Appellant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the
ruling of the suppression court, we address the sufficiency of the evidence
first. See Commonwealth v. Spence, ___A.3d___, 2023 PA Super 22, 2023
WL 2002292, at *4 n.4 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 15, 2023) (stating that because
“a successful sufficiency of the evidence claim warrants discharge on the
pertinent crime, we shall address this issue first” (citing Commonwealth v.
Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 33 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)). Moreover, we address
the sufficiency of the evidence without a diminished record.               See
Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. Super. 2005) (explaining
that “[i]n evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not review a
diminished record [and] the law is clear that we are required to consider all
evidence that was actually received, without consideration as to the
admissibility of that evidence or whether the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
are correct” (citations omitted)). “Where improperly admitted evidence has
been allowed to be considered by the [finder of fact], its subsequent deletion
does not justify a finding of insufficient evidence. The remedy in such a case
is the grant of a new trial.” Commonwealth v. Stanford, 863 A.2d 428, 432
(Pa. 2004) (citation omitted).

                                           -4-
J-S06016-23

     possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
     may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
     and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
     be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
     may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
     beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
     evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
     must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
     considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
     credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
     is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc) (citation omitted and some formatting altered).

     Section 3309(1) states as follows:

     (1) Driving within single lane.—A vehicle shall be driven as
     nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be
     moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that
     the movement can be made with safety.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1) (emphasis added).

     This Court has explained that although Section 3309(1) requires

motorists to maintain a single lane of travel “as nearly as practicable,” the

statute “does not foreclose minor deviations.” Commonwealth v. Enick, 70

A.3d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2013). Further, Section 3309(1) is intended to

prevent motorists from changing lanes in a manner that creates a safety

hazard. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1292 (Pa.

Super. 2010) (en banc).

     There are virtually no decisions by this Court that address the sufficiency

of the evidence necessary to prove the safety element of Section 3309(1)

beyond a reasonable doubt. However, this Court has routinely addressed the

                                     -5-
J-S06016-23

safety element in cases involving probable cause, which is a lower quantum

of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt.      “Whether an officer possesses

probable cause to stop a vehicle for a violation of [Section 3309(1)] depends

largely upon on whether a driver’s movement from his lane is done safely.”

Commonwealth v. Cook, 865 A.2d 869, 874 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted). As previously stated, although Section 3309(1) requires motorists

to maintain a single lane of travel “as nearly as practicable,” it “does not

foreclose minor deviations.” Enick, 70 A.3d at 847. Indeed, even in cases

that analyze the safety element under the lesser standard of probable cause,

Pennsylvania Courts have held that the Commonwealth must establish that

the vehicle departed from its lane of travel and that the driver did not first

determine if he could do so safely. See Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785

A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 859 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super.

2004).

      In Gleason, the defendant was stopped for violating Section 3309(1)

after he momentarily crossed “the berm line by six to eight inches on two

occasions for a period of a second or two over a distance of approximately one

quarter of a mile.” Gleason, 785 A.2d at 983. At trial, the police officer did

not testify that there were other vehicles on the road or that the defendant

moved from his lane without first determining if he could do so safely. Id. at

985. On appeal, the Gleason Court concluded that the Commonwealth had

failed to demonstrate that the officer had probable cause to believe that the

defendant had violated Section 3309(1) because the record did not establish

                                    -6-
J-S06016-23

that the defendant “created a safety hazard.” Id. at 989. Similarly, in Garcia,

this Court held that “where a vehicle is driven outside the lane of traffic for

just a momentary period of time and in a minor manner, a traffic stop is

unwarranted[,]” and “probable cause is lacking.” Garcia, 859 A.2d at 823.

      By comparison, in Enick, the Commonwealth presented evidence the

driver crossed the double yellow center line into oncoming traffic as a police

officer was driving in the oncoming lane. See Enick, 70 A.3d at 846, 848.

On appeal, the Enick Court concluded that because the driver crossed the

center line into oncoming traffic, the arresting officer had probable cause to

conduct a stop for a violation of Section 3309(1). Id. at 848.

      Here, at trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Trooper

Wilker and the motor vehicle recording (MVR) which depicted Appellant

weaving within his lane and making contact with the center line.         Trooper

Wilker also testified that before the MVR was activated, he witnessed Appellant

cross the fog line in a “severe” manner. N.T. Trial, 1/12/22, at 8-11.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court credited Trooper Wilker’s

testimony and explained:

      [The trial court] observed [Appellant’s] vehicle swerving within its
      lane and crossing lane designators on the MVR. Trooper Wilker
      could be heard in the MVR narrating what he was witnessing when
      following [Appellant’s] vehicle.      Trooper Wilker also credibly
      testified to witnessing lane deviations that were not captured on
      the MVR and that his attention was drawn to the vehicle due to an
      initial cross while he was finishing up a previous traffic stop.

      [Appellant], beyond a reasonable doubt, failed to drive his vehicle
      as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane without first
      having ascertained that the movement could be made with safety.

                                     -7-
J-S06016-23

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9 (unpaginated).

       However, our review of the record confirms that there was no testimony

or evidence concerning whether Appellant crossed the center line or fog line

without first ascertaining that the movement could be made safely. See 75

Pa.C.S. § 3309(1).

       Indeed, Trooper Wilker testified on direct examination as follows:

       Q. So you mentioned that you had finished a [separate] traffic
       stop. After you disengaged from that traffic stop, did another
       vehicle on Interstate 83 catch your attention?

       A. Yes. It was a dark in color sedan. It was a couple hundred
       yards ahead of my traffic stop. But I saw a severe swerve or
       movement from the lane, which from my vantage point the vehicle
       crossed over the fog line, so I was -- I wanted to investigate that.
       So I began following that vehicle northbound. I crawled up to it
       from my position and then began following it northbound.

       Q. When you continued to follow that vehicle then, did you see
       any additional things that raised your concern?

       A. Yes. I believe the vehicle was weaving within its lane. I believe
       its speed was fluctuating.

       Q. At some point did you then make a decision to conduct a traffic
       stop?

       A. Yes.

N.T. Trial, 1/12/22, at 8-9.

       Additionally, the record reflects that Appellant was on a divided

interstate highway and could not have entered an oncoming lane of travel.4
____________________________________________

4 Cf. Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 344 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding
that the testimony of two witnesses, as well as the investigating state
trooper’s testimony that the defendant admitted entering the opposite lane of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
J-S06016-23

Further, the record contains no evidence that any other cars were driving in

Appellant’s vicinity at the time of the stop. Although Trooper Wilker testified

that he saw Appellant travel outside his lane in a severe manner prior to the

activation of the MVR, and while the MVR and testimony reflected that

Appellant swerved within his lane, Trooper Wilker never mentioned or

addressed     whether      Appellant    executed   this   maneuver   without   first

determining if it could be done safely.

       Under these circumstances, we conclude that although the evidence

revealed a brief infraction or infractions, there was no evidence that

Appellant’s vehicle moved in an unsafe manner or that Appellant created a

safety hazard. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to

prove that Appellant violated Section 3309(1).5 Therefore, we are constrained
____________________________________________

travel and causing a head-on accident, was sufficient to support a conviction
under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1)).

5 We are cognizant that the Gleason Court was not reviewing a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to sustain a conviction for violating
75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1). Rather, it was determining whether this Court erred in
reversing the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s suppression motion
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995).
Under Whitmyer, and a former version of 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), law
enforcement were required to have “articulable and reasonable grounds to
suspect a violation of [the Motor Vehicle Code]” to effectuate a vehicle stop[,]
and “articulable and reasonable grounds” was held to be the equivalent of
“probable cause,” requiring police have probable cause to believe the vehicle
or its driver was in violation of the Vehicle Code. Gleason, 785 A.2d at 986;
Whitmyer, 668 A.2d at 1116-17. The Gleason Court held that, under the
facts of that case, the officers lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle.
Gleason, 785 A.2d at 989. However, we note that the Whitmyer and
Gleason line of cases applying former Section 6308(b) were superseded by
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -9-
J-S06016-23

to reverse the judgment of sentence on this count and discharge Appellant on

the conviction for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1).6

                                     Suppression

       Next, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied

Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant argues that

Trooper Wilker did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop, and

therefore, the traffic stop was unlawful. See id. at 12-14.

       We review Appellant’s challenge to the denial of his suppression motion

bearing in mind the following principles:

       [O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
       denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
       the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
       legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are
       bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they
       are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions
____________________________________________

statute as stated in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89 (Pa. 2011). In
Holmes, our Supreme Court held that the “quantum of cause a police officer
must possess in order to conduct a vehicle stop based on a possible violation
of the Motor Vehicle Code” is “reasonable suspicion,” and in order to establish
reasonable suspicion, the “officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code[.]” Holmes, 14 A.3d at 94, 96 (emphasis in original). We
reiterate that we are referencing Gleason only with respect to its recognition
of the “safety” element of Section 3309(1). Moreover, the quantum of
evidence necessary to justify a traffic stop will be addressed below in our
discussion of Appellant’s challenge to the suppression court’s ruling.

6 As noted above, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence with
respect to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1). Accordingly, although we reverse Appellant’s
conviction for 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1), we affirm the judgment of sentence in all
other respects. See, e.g., Spence, 2023 WL 2002292, at *4 n.4 (explaining
that a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “warrants
discharge on the pertinent crime” (citation omitted and emphasis added)).

                                          - 10 -
J-S06016-23

      of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the
      ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
      of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense
      as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
      rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
      evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (citations

omitted).

      Additionally,

      [w]hen a police officer initiates a traffic stop of a vehicle, the stop
      constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth
      Amendment and activates constitutional protections against
      unreasonable seizures and detentions. Whren v. United States,
      517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). Generally, a traffic stop must be
      supported by sufficient facts to provide an officer with reasonable
      suspicion to believe that the vehicle or driver was in violation of a
      provision of the Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).
      However, a stop based on reasonable suspicion under § 6308(b)
      must “serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected
      violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.
      Super. 2010) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d
      987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2015). Therefore, in circumstances where
      the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation,
      the officer must possess probable cause before initiating the traffic
      stop. Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291.

Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 282 A.3d 796, 800 (Pa. Super. 2022) (some

formatting altered), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___, 251 EAL 2022, 2023 WL

141925 (Pa. filed Jan. 10, 2023).         In determining what level of legal

justification is necessary to support a vehicle stop, this Court has explained:

      [W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable
      cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the
      nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary
      to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code
      has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the

                                      - 11 -
J-S06016-23

      vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary
      to further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer
      need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
      Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI.
      If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess
      probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a
      vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the
      speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a
      highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient
      knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer
      may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code
      violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
      opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under
      the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

Salter, 121 A.3d at 993 (citations omitted).         This Court has held that

reasonable suspicion of DUI is established when a police officer observes a

vehicle weaving within its lane of travel and drifting over the fog line, and this

reasonable suspicion of DUI is sufficient to support a lawful traffic stop. See

Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 543 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      During direct examination at the suppression hearing, Trooper Wilker

testified, in relevant part, as follows:

      Q. So let’s go to this case. On August 6th of 2020, tell me about
      what caught your attention.

      A. What caught my attention was a dark blue Mercedes Benz
      sedan which drifted to the right side of the lane crossing the lane
      designator.

      Q. When you say lane designator, what do you mean?

      A. In this case it was a dashed lane designator. It was an entrance
      ramp lane and then so -- first, it was northbound on [Interstate]
      83. There’s two northbound lanes, left and right lane. Then there
      was a far right lane which was an entrance ramp which had dash
      laned designators.

                                      - 12 -
J-S06016-23

     Q. Do you remember how far behind this vehicle you were
     traveling when that happened?

     A. When I originally saw the vehicle make that first cross, I was
     maybe 1 to 200 yards behind, in that ballpark.

     Q. Okay. And we’ll watch the video here or we’ll at least attempt
     to do so in a few minutes, but when you say it crossed that line,
     can you be more specific, if you were able to observe more
     specifically what portion of the car crossed over that line?

     A. That initial cross, it was about half of a car, so the dash line
     would have been roughly in the middle of the car between the two
     tires.

     Q. Okay. So you observed that. Then you’re following behind the
     car. What else do you see?

     A. As I continued following behind the car, I observed it to be
     weaving within its lane from the left side to the right side.
     Continued doing that, and then there was another slight cross on
     the center lane designator. Again, the vehicle is in the right lane
     at this time, so it crossed over the center lane designator. This
     was not as far across, but half the tire -- the whole tire crossed.

     Q. On that section of 83, what’s the roadway surface like? Is it
     good? Are there potholes every now and then?

     A. There can be potholes every now and then. Nothing egregious
     that sticks out in my mind.

     Q. As you’re following this car, are you in a state patrol police
     vehicle?

     A. Yeah, a marked State Police vehicle.

     Q. And was this vehicle traveling in the left lane or the right lane?

     A. It was traveling in the right lane.

     Q. And were you traveling in the right lane as well?

     A. Yes, behind it.

     Q. So eventually, you put on your lights and siren and pull the
     vehicle over; right?

     A. That’s correct.

                                    - 13 -
J-S06016-23

     Q. Why did you do that? What were you thinking was going on?

     A. Based on the driving, I suspected DUI.

     Q. Okay. There’s a dash cam in this case. Have you viewed it
     recently? By recently, I mean within the last couple of days.

     A. Yes.

     Q. I’m going to show you a portion of it, and then once we’re done
     viewing it, you can tell me if that is the dash cam from this case.

     A. Okay.

                                  *     *      *

     Q. What did we see on the right side of that video?

     A. In the beginning of the video, I was on a previous traffic stop.
     That is what you’re seeing there. I pulled out and turned off my
     lights and continued northbound. There’s a slight crest in the hill.
     As I’m coming up over that hill is when I initially saw the first
     cross, which we already talked about. The video’s, obviously, not
     clear, and when you’re looking through a windshield and not
     through a dash cam, it’ s a bit easier to see.

     So that’s what we saw so far, and then if you’re watching, the
     vehicle is starting to drift over to the left side. It’s moving at a
     strange rate of speed. If you watch the vehicle, within the lanes,
     it goes back and forth. At this time it’s closer to the right fog line.

     Q. I’m going to hit play again. When you see the behaviors that
     you noted when this actually happened, just let us know; okay?

     A. Okay.

     Q. I’m playing the video.

     (Whereupon, the video was played.)

     THE WITNESS: It’s moving there to the right side, as you can see,
     and coming back to the left. Going back to the right and to the
     left. Back to the right. Comes back to the middle. Going towards
     the left there. Back towards the left. Left. There’s a cross of the
     center lane. Back to the middle of the lane. To the left again.
     Over to the right. Back to the center.

N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 3/15/21, at 8-12.

                                      - 14 -
J-S06016-23

       Upon review, the record reflects that Trooper Wilker observed

Appellant’s vehicle cross the marked traffic lines and repeatedly weave within

its lane of travel, and, on this basis, Trooper Wilker suspected that Appellant

was driving while impaired. See id. at 10, 12. As noted previously, this Court

has held that such observations are sufficient to form reasonable suspicion of

DUI, which permits a lawful traffic stop for further investigation. See Walls,

206 A.3d at 543; Salter, 121 A.3d at 993. In light of our scope and standard

of review, we conclude that the traffic stop was legal and affirm the trial court’s

order denying Appellant’s suppression motion. See Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at

516.

                                   Conclusion

       For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the evidence was

insufficient to establish that Appellant violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1) beyond

a reasonable doubt. Additionally, we conclude that Trooper Wilker possessed

reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful traffic stop and affirm with respect

to the order denying suppression. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of

sentence for the conviction under Section 3309(1) and discharge Appellant on

that count only, and we affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects.

                                      - 15 -
J-S06016-23

      Judgment of sentence reversed in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2023

                                    - 16 -