Court Opinion

ID: 9452636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:46:50.240096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:17.707022
License: Public Domain

TAMM, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the action taken by the majority in this case. Upon the entire record, the evidence is overwhelming that the action of the appellee Greyhound Corporation was in no manner or degree a proximate cause of the appellant's injuries. The trial judge would have been completely justified, upon the basis of appellant’s evidence, in granting a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the appellee at the termination of appellant’s evidence. From an abundance of caution and guided by the principles which we established for district *325court judges in this type of case1 in interpreting Rule 50, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the learned trial judge permitted the case to go to the jury in order that there would be a complete record if appellate review became necessary. I am of the view that it is an utter waste of time to remand the case with this factual background to an overworked trial court for further and ultimately meaningless proceedings. The questions and answers upon which the majority predicates its action are technical trivia when considered against the evidence relating to the proximate cause of the accident.

. Shewmaker v. Capital Transit Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 143 F.2d 142 (1944); Williams v. Greenblatt, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 272 F.2d 564 (1959) ; Smith v. Steward, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 292 F.2d 735 (1961) ; see also 5 Moore’s Fed. Prac., 50.03.