Court Opinion

ID: 9930553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 07:12:40.123524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:30.860384
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 24, 2024.

                                     S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-23-00180-CV

                  STEPHEN RICHARD SELINGER, Appellant
                                 V.
                   CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court
                             Collin County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 429-04150-2018

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      Following the City Council’s denial of his plat application for subdivision of

a tract of land located in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City, Stephen Richard

Selinger filed suit against appellee the City of McKinney. After a bench trial, the

trial court rendered judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, Selinger urges the trial

court erred (1) in rendering judgment in favor of the City on his takings claim and

(2) in denying his request for a declaration that portions of the City’s subdivision

ordinance are unconstitutional and conflict with section 212.904 of the Texas Local
Government Code. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Because the dispositive

issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

                                    BACKGROUND

      In 2018, Selinger entered into an option contract with Nancy Dail for the

purchase of an 82-acre tract of land located in the City’s extraterritorial jurisdiction

(the “Property”). At that time, the Property did not have access to the City’s water

and sewer services, as the closest transmission lines were located approximately

three miles from the Property.

      In early 2018, Selinger submitted a plat application to the City proposing to

subdivide the Property into approximately 331 residential lots, in a development that

would be called Cambridge Meadows. His application further indicated he would

construct sewer infrastructure for the subdivision, including a package treatment

plant permitted through the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and that

he would arrange water service through the North Collin Special Utility District.

      The City concluded Selinger’s plat application did not comply with the City’s

subdivision ordinance and standards for various reasons, including that it did not

provide for the connection of the proposed subdivision to City water and sewer

systems and did not provide for the payment of City water and sewer impact fees.

In an effort to work with Selinger, despite his application’s shortcomings, the City

proposed entering into a Facilities Agreement (Rough Proportionality of Required

Improvements) that contained a number of waivers and variances to the City’s

                                          –2–
subdivision ordinance requirements, which were necessary to develop the Property

as Selinger proposed, and which required Selinger to pay water and sewer impact

fees to the City, ultimately calculated to be $482,214.02, if, and only if, the City ever

extended its water and sewer transmission lines to the Property.1 According to

Selinger, the only issue he had with the proposed Facilities Agreement was the

contingent exaction of the water and sewer impact fees.

          Selinger’s plat application was before the City Council at its August 6, 2018

meeting. At that meeting, Selinger’s attorney advised the City Council that Selinger

would not agree to pay the proposed impact fees. Because Selinger declined to enter

into the Facilities Agreement, the review of his plat reverted to the requirements of

the subdivision ordinance.              Without the Facilities Agreement, Selinger’s plat

application did not comply with the ordinance. Thus, the City Council denied

Selinger’s plat application.

    1
        The proposed Facilities Agreement contained the following provision:
          At such time as the Property or any part or portions of the Property is connected to the
          City’s potable water system and/or sanitary sewer system, DEVELOPER shall pay all
          then applicable tap fees, connection fees, meter fees, impact fees, pro rata fees and/or
          service fees as may be required by CITY regardless of the name by which such fees and
          charges may be called subject to the requirements of state law. A deed restriction will
          be recorded for the Property and the Subdivision thereon notifying future lot purchasers
          that each owner of a lot within the Cambridge Meadows Addition will be required to
          connect to each such Future Transmission Line for potable water or sanitary sewer, at no
          cost to City, within 180 days after each such Future Transmission Line becomes
          operational.
(emphasis added). The City determined, and informed Selinger, that the amount of such fees would be
$482,214.02, which was calculated using a fee schedule that was in effect in 2018. The amount would not
change even though it might be years, possibly decades, before the City extended the lines to the Property
and payment would be due.
                                                   –3–
      Ten days later, Selinger and Dail filed suit against the City, asserting various

claims in connection with the denial of Selinger’s plat application. The City filed a

plea to the jurisdiction challenging Selinger and Dail’s pleadings on several grounds,

chief among them lack of ripeness and, with respect to Selinger, lack of standing.

The trial court sustained the City’s plea and dismissed Selinger and Dail’s lawsuit.

Selinger and Dail appealed that ruling, and this Court affirmed the dismissal of their

request for attorney’s fees on their takings claims under the Texas Constitution,

which was not challenged on appeal, and otherwise reversed the trial court’s order

dismissing Selinger and Dail’s lawsuit and remanded the case for further

proceedings. See Selinger v. City of McKinney, No. 05-19-00545-CV, 2020 WL

3566722, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      At the time of trial, Dail was no longer a party to the suit and Selinger’s live

pleading asserted the City’s exaction of the contingent water and sewer impact fees

was an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of the United States and

Texas Constitutions and that his plat was denied solely because of his refusal to agree

to the exaction. In addition, Selinger sought a declaration that the City’s subdivision

ordinance requiring connection to water and sewer facilities and the payment of

applicable water and sewer impact fees as a condition of development is

unconstitutional and a violation of section 212.904 of the Texas Local Government

                                         –4–
Code (addressing “Apportionment of Municipal Infrastructure Costs”).2 Selinger

asserted that “[b]y requiring that the property owner request such service, pay for

such service later when service is still not wanted or needed, and record a document

agreeing to this in the property records, the City’s Subdivision Ordinance is

unconstitutional as it violates the Takings Clause of the Texas and United States

Constitutions.” Selinger also claimed requiring him to pay water and sewer impact

fees when he would not use or otherwise impact such services constitutes a

deprivation of his due process rights.

        The case proceeded to a bench trial on November 14, 2022. At trial, the

parties stipulated to various facts including the following:

        The Property . . . was located within the City’s Certificate of
        Convenience and Necessity (“CCN”) for the provision of water service
        and, as a result the City had the right to provide water service to the
        Property.3

        The Cambridge Meadows plat did not comply with [the City’s]
        standards because, among other requirements, the plat did not provide
        for the connection of the proposed subdivision to City water and sewer
        facilities, and it did not provide for payment of required City water and
        sewer impact fees.

        The City’s subdivision, utility, and impact fee ordinances require
        connection to water/sewer facilities and the payment of applicable

    2
       The Texas Declaratory Judgment Act provides that if a municipal ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional, “the attorney general of the state must also be served with a copy of the proceeding and is
entitled to be heard.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(b). Selinger represented in his live pleading
that he complied with section 37.006(b)’s requirement.
    3
     A CCN is a permit issued by the Public Utility Commission which authorizes and obligates a retail
public utility, including a municipality, to furnish, make available, render, or extend continuous and
adequate water or sewer utility service to a specific geographical area. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 24.3;
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 291.3(3).
                                                    –5–
          water/sewer impacts fees as a condition of development. Additionally,
          because the Property was located in the City’s water CCN, the City had
          the exclusive right to provide water service to the Property absent an
          agreement by the City to allow another water service provider to
          provide water to the Property.4

          Aside from a brief testimonial comment by Selinger’s attorney,5 Selinger was

his only witness at trial. He urged that the package plant arrangements he made and

    4
        In his reply brief, Selinger contends he testified contrary to this stipulation by stating the Property
“was in two CNNs. There was overlapping CCNs. It was in both McKinney and North Collin” without
objection, and claims this stipulation is therefore mere evidence, rather than a judicial admission. In
Mendoza v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., the Supreme Court of Texas drew a
distinction between testimonial declarations and true judicial admissions by stating:

          A party’s testimonial declarations which are contrary to his position are quasi-admissions.
          They are merely some evidence, and they are not conclusive upon the admitter. (citations
          omitted) The weight to be given such admissions is decided by the trier of fact. These are
          to be distinguished from the true judicial admission which is a formal waiver of proof
          usually found in pleadings or the stipulations of the parties. A judicial admission is
          conclusive upon the party making it, and it relieves the opposing party’s burden of proving
          the admitted fact, and bars the admitting party from disputing it. (citations omitted).

606 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. 1980). In this case, after both parties rested and closed, Selinger’s attorney
moved to withdraw this particular stipulation stating his client informed him that he did not agree to the
stipulation. The trial court denied his request, and Selinger does not challenge that ruling in his opening
brief or the trial court’s finding “because the Property was located within the City’s water CCN, the City
had the exclusive right to provide water service to the Property absent an agreement by the City to allow
another water service provider to provide water to the Property.” Thus, Selinger waived any complaint
with respect to the weight of this stipulation and finding. And, nevertheless, as the trial judge noted, she
was the “Judge of the credibility of the evidence, the weight to be given it.”

With respect to CCNs, Selinger asks this Court to take judicial notice of various documents, including an
executed settlement agreement entered into by the City of McKinney, the City of Melissa, and the North
Collin County Special Utility District amending the North Collin County Special Utility District’s CCN.
Generally, appellate courts take judicial notice of facts outside the record only to determine jurisdiction or
to resolve matters ancillary to decisions which are mandated by law. SEI Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Bank One Texas,
N.A., 803 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ); see Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado,
372 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2012). Accordingly, we decline Selinger’s request that we take judicial notice
of the documents he attached to his reply brief.
    5
        Selinger’s attorney stated:
          Your honor, Mr. Selinger - - except I would like to, I guess, testify briefly on a point [the
          City’s attorney] raised in his opening. I didn’t think that this argument would come in so
          - - we don’t have a transcript of the proceedings before the appellate court, but my
          recollection is that the issue came up - - it was not in the pleadings, but the issue came up

                                                      –6–
his agreement with the North Collin Special Utility District were permanent sewer

and water solutions, making it unnecessary for the City to construct any

infrastructure to serve the tract now or in the future. Selinger acknowledged that if

he connected to the City water and sewer systems the approximate $482,000 impact

fee would be justified, but claimed any exaction imposed by the City would

constitute a compensable taking because he did not plan on using the City’s systems.

      On cross-examination, Selinger acknowledged that this is not the only lawsuit

he had pending against the City regarding the Property, that in 2019, he filed a

lawsuit against the City as a representative of Norhill Energy, LLC regarding a

different plat application for the same Property, and that he sold the option contract

he had with Dail to Poetry Road, LLC, an entity he controls, for an nominal sum,

approximately $10 or $100, which then purchased the Property from Dail. He

further established that the City approved a plat application that Poetry Road, LLC

submitted, and Poetry Road, LLC sold the Property to D.R. Horton, a home builder,

netting a profit of $3,700,000.

      The City’s sole witness at trial was Michael Quint, the City’s Executive

Director of Development Services.               Through Quint, the City established the

following. Quint oversees Building Inspections, Code Services, and the Engineering

and Planning Departments for the City. The Engineering and Planning Departments

      before the Court and I informed the Court that it was, in fact, an option contract so the
      Court was fully aware of that in issuing its opinion.
                                                –7–
oversee and process plats in the City and the City’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Quint was familiar with the Cambridge Meadows plat application Selinger submitted

to the City. Selinger’s plat application did not comply with the City’s subdivision

ordinance requirements. In an effort to accommodate Selinger, the City offered him

a Facilities Agreement to allow the Cambridge Meadows plat to be approved with

variances and waivers from the City’s subdivision standards. Among other things,

the Facilities Agreement required Selinger to pay water and sewer impact fees to the

City if, and only if, the transmission lines were extended to the Property. Selinger

proposed a different version of the Facilities Agreement that was not acceptable to

the City.

      Quint further established the following with respect to the impact fees. The

City’s impact fees are calculated and determined in accordance with Chapter 395 of

the Texas Local Government Code, which governs the financing of capital

improvements required by new development, based on the impacts generated on the

overall system necessary to serve new development on a unit-by-unit basis. The

impact fees assessed take into account the impacts of proposed developments on the

City’s water and sewer systems. The 2018 impact fees that were contemplated by

the Facilities Agreement in Selinger’s case were based on engineering studies

prepared by engineers and based on land-use studies and assumptions and are

intended to apply evenly to every new development. Quint addressed Plaintiff’s

Exhibit 10, which included an email from the City’s attorney to Selinger’s attorney

                                        –8–
providing him with the ordinance provision under which the water and sewer

assessment was calculated, namely section 130-27(a)(4) of Ordinance Number

2013-11-109. He indicated that the last page of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 contained a

table outlining actual water and wastewater impact fees charged for plats recorded

on or after November 20, 2013, and which was still in effect when Selinger

submitted his plat application. Using the lowest fees associated with a 3/4th inch

meter line, resulted in water and sewer impact fees per residential lot of $1,294.70

and $162.14, respectively, resulting in a total impact fee per residential lot of

$1,456.84. When the total impact fee of $1,456.84 per residential lot is applied to

the 331 lots in Selinger’s proposed subdivision, it calculates to (subject to rounding

errors) a total impact fee of $482,214.04 for the entire Property, which is

approximately the $482,214.02 in water and sewer impact fees at issue here.

      Quint further established that in general there is a nexus between the City’s

water and sewer impact fees that are charged and the impact of the development on

the City’s water and sewer systems, and the impact fees are roughly proportional to

the impact of development on the City’s water and sewer systems. If Selinger’s

development were to connect to the City’s water and sewer systems, it would have

an impact on those systems and the impact fees contemplated by the Facilities

Agreement are roughly proportional to the impact of Selinger’s development on

those systems. Without an approved Facilities Agreement, Selinger’s plat did not

meet the City’s subdivision requirements.

                                         –9–
      In addition, with respect to whether the proposed development of the Property

would benefit from access to the City’s water and sewer facilities, Quint established

the City is a reliable source of high-quality water with sufficient water pressure to

provide fire flow to the Property, which fire flow would allow for fire hydrants for

emergency use with sufficient water pressure for fire personnel to fight fires. The

City’s sewer is very reliable and would relieve the developer of the Property from

the ongoing obligation to operate and maintain an on-site sewage package treatment

plant. There are many instances where, over time, such on-site sewage package

treatment plants deteriorate, and residents of the developments served by the

treatment plants will request that the City provide them with City sewer so that they

do not have to pay for the regular maintenance of the treatment plants. Quint further

stated that even if the Property did not connect to the City water and sewer lines, the

infrastructure would be there and could potentially make the Property more

marketable.

      On December 15, 2022, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the City.

Thereafter, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact, 118 in total, and

conclusions of law, 30 in total, in support of its judgment. In its findings of fact, the

trial court included the parties’ stipulated facts. In addition, among the trial court’s

many findings are the following:

      Selinger does not dispute the calculation of the $482,214.02 in impact
      fees; but rather is disputing whether he should be required to use City

                                         –10–
      water and sewer services and pay the impact fees since he had other
      water and sewer sources available to serve the Property.

      Selinger is not contending that in the event that the Property did connect
      to McKinney’s water and sewer system, that the impacts of that
      subdivision would not put a burden on the City’s water or sewer system.

      Selinger is not contending that if the Property did connect to the City’s
      water and sewer systems, that the impacts of the development on
      McKinney’s water and sewer system impacts would not support the
      roughly $482,000 impact fee number.

After detailing the facts established through Quint’s testimony, the trial court found:

      Quint’s testimony was direct, honest, credible, and qualified, and was
      useful to the Court. Given Quint’s involvement in the City’s platting
      and impact fee processes, and his familiarity with Selinger’s Cambridge
      Meadows plat, the Court finds that Quint’s opinion that the plat did not
      meet the City’s subdivision requirements in the absence of waivers and
      variances to be credible and entitled to great weight by the Court.

      Similarly, the Court finds that Quint’s opinion that the impact fees
      contemplated by the Facilities Agreement were roughly proportional to
      the impact of Selinger’s development, if such development were to
      connect to the City’s water and sewer system, to be credible and entitled
      to great weight by the Court.

      Quint explained to the Court’s satisfaction how the impact fee was
      calculated using Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10.

The trial court further found, when discussing the exhibits that were admitted into
evidence:

      The Facilities Agreement Council Materials . . . provided that the City
      had not been provided any agreements between Selinger and North
      Collin Water Supply Corporation that demonstrated that Selinger had
      agreed to make necessary improvements to North Collin’s system to
      provide the required potable water and fire flow service to the
      Cambridge Meadows subdivision.

      The Facilities Agreement Council Materials further provided support
                                        –11–
      that the documentation provided to the City showed that the potable
      water and fire flow service required to serve the Cambridge Meadows
      subdivision did not currently exist in the North Collin system.

The trial court found there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to establish:

      That the City’s subdivision ordinance is unconstitutional and in
      violation of Texas Local Government Code Section 212.904.

      That the City violated Selinger’s right to due process.

      That the City’s actions constituted a taking of Selinger’s property.

The trial court found that credible and sufficient evidence was provided to establish:

      That the proposed exaction in the Facilities Agreement, if applied to
      Selinger’s proposed development, would have been roughly
      proportional to the anticipated impact of the proposed development on
      McKinney’s water and sewer system and the City’s construction of
      water and sewer infrastructure to serve Selinger’s property under the
      City’s utility CCN.

      That the $482,214.02 fee was based on McKinney’s 2018 water and
      sewer impact fees, which fees were adopted after extensive studies were
      performed by the City’s engineering consultants, and such fees are
      roughly proportional to the impact of the developments for which the
      fees are assessed and collected.

      Selinger is the alter ego of Poetry [Road, LLC], which is an entity that
      Selinger wholly controls. Selinger assigned his option contract to
      purchase the property to Poetry, which entity then in turn sold the
      Property to D.R. Horton, a developer, for a profit of approximately $3.8
      million. As a result, all compensation received for the sale of the
      Property to Poetry is tantamount to Selinger receiving such funds as
      Selinger is the sole principal in Poetry. Selinger has used Poetry as a
      façade to cover his personal dealings and the corporate veil in this
      instance must be pierced.

Among the trial court’s conclusions of law were the following:

      The City did not take Selinger’s Property in violation of the Texas and
                                        –12–
United States Constitutions.

The proposed exaction of which Selinger complains – a contingent
liability payment obligation of approximately $482,000 contained in an
unexecuted and unapproved Facilities Agreement between Selinger and
the City – if applied to Selinger’s proposed development would not
constitute a taking of Selinger’s property under Article I, Section 17 of
the Texas Constitution or the United States Constitution because the
fee, if applied, would be roughly proportional to the anticipated impact
of the proposed development on the City’s water and sewer system and
the City’s construction of water and sewer infrastructure to serve the
Property under the City’s utility CCN.

The $482,214.02 impact fee was based on the City’s 2018 water and
sewer impact fees, which fees were adopted after extensive studies were
performed by the City’s engineering consultants, and such fees are
roughly proportional to the impact of the developments for which the
fees are assessed and collected.

Selinger is not entitled []to a declaratory judgment on any of the matters
requested in the Petition.

Selinger, or an entity that Selinger controls, sold the Property for a
profit and, therefore has suffered no economic damages in this matter.

The City’s subdivision ordinance is not unconstitutional and in
violation of Section 212.904.

The impact fee exaction is roughly proportional as it is an impact fee
calculated and established through the impact fee process.

The Court finds that Selinger is the alter ego of Poetry, which is the
entity who sold the Property to D.R. Horton, for a profit of
approximately $3,700,000. All compensation received for the sale of
the Property in this case to Poetry is tantamount to Selinger receiving
such funds as Selinger is the sole principal in Poetry.

                                  –13–
                                      DISCUSSION

    I.       Standard of Review

         This case is before us on appeal from a bench trial after which the trial court

issued findings of fact and conclusions of law at Selinger’s request. In an appeal

from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the same weight as a jury

verdict. Sheetz v. Slaughter, 503 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no

pet.). When a party challenges a trial court’s findings of fact on legal or factual

sufficiency grounds, we review the trial court’s findings under the same sufficiency

of the evidence standards used when determining if sufficient evidence exists to

support jury findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). When

a party challenges a trial court’s conclusions of law, we review the challenged

conclusions de novo. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d

789, 794 (Tex. 2002). The trial court’s conclusions of law are not subject to

challenge for lack of factual sufficiency, but we may review the legal conclusions

drawn from the facts to determine their correctness. Id.; Dallas Cnty. v. Sweitzer,

881 S.W.2d 757, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); see also Walker v.

Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 908 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (trial court’s

conclusions of law are independently evaluated to determine whether trial court

correctly drew legal conclusions from facts). We are not bound by the trial court’s

legal conclusions, but conclusions of law will be upheld on appeal if the judgment

                                          –14–
can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Sheetz, 503 S.W.3d

at 502.

          Before starting our analysis, we note that, in his opening brief, Selinger

generally challenges the trial court’s disposition of his takings claim and his request

for a declaration the City’s subdivision ordinance violates article 212.904 of the

Local Government Code and is an unconstitutional taking,6 but he does not

specifically challenge any of the trial court’s findings of fact other than the trial

court’s alter ego finding. Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on this Court,

unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support

the finding. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Walker,

232 S.W.3d at 907. In his reply brief, Selinger clarified that his position is that the

parties’ factual stipulations left the trial court with pure legal questions that should

be reviewed by this Court de novo. Thus, it appears Selinger accepts the trial court’s

factual findings, other than the alter ego finding,7 and is challenging whether the

findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law and judgment in favor of the

City on his takings claim and request for a declaratory judgment.

        II.   Exactions as a Potential Basis for a Takings Claim

          Selinger’s first issue addresses the trial court’s ruling on his takings claim.

    6
     Selinger’s briefing on appeal does not challenge the trial court’s judgment with respect to his due
process claim. That claim will not be further mentioned or discussed herein.
    7
     As stated supra in footnote 4, Selinger attempts to challenge the trial court’s findings with respect to
the City’s CCN with new evidence. As we stated supra, we will not take judicial notice of the documents
Selinger attached to his reply brief.
                                                   –15–
Takings can be classified as either physical or regulatory. Mayhew v. Town of

Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998). A physical taking occurs when the

government authorizes an unwarranted physical occupation of an individual’s

property. Id. A regulatory taking may occur when a government conditions the

granting of a permit or some other type of government approval on an exaction from

a landowner seeking that approval. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–

85 (1994); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620,

634 (Tex. 2004). An exaction occurs if a governmental entity requires an action by

a landowner as a condition to obtaining government approval of a requested land

development. Mira Mar Dev. Corp. v. City of Coppell, 421 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (citing Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates

Ltd. P’ship, 71 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002), aff’d, Town of Flower

Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004); City of

Carrollton v. RIHR, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet.

denied)). An exaction can occur even if the owner refuses to agree to the condition.

RIHR Inc., 308 S.W.3d at 449. And the definition of an exaction is broad enough

to include a demand that the owner assume a contingent liability. Selinger, 2022

WL 3566722, at *5.

      Selinger’s takings claim falls under the category of a regulatory taking by

exaction. For an exaction to be compensable, it must be a cost that, in fairness and

justice, should be borne by the public instead of the individual. Mira Mar, 421

                                       –16–
S.W.3d at 82. The touchstone of the constitutional takings protections is that a few

not be forced to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be

borne by the public as a whole. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835

n. 4 (1987); Stafford Estates, 135 S.W.3d at 642. To apply this sense of “fairness

and justice,” the Texas Supreme Court has adopted a “rough proportionality” test to

determine whether an exaction constitutes a compensable taking:

      [C]onditioning government approval of a development of property on
      some exaction is a compensable taking unless the condition (1) bears
      an essential nexus to the substantial advancement of some legitimate
      government interest and (2) is roughly proportional to the projected
      impact of the proposed development.

Stafford Estates, 135 S.W.3d at 634; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483

U.S. at 837.    Under this test, the government must make an “individualized

determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the

impact of the proposed development.” Stafford Estates, 135 S.W.3d at 633 (citing

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391). Thus, after the plaintiff proves an exaction, the burden of

proof shifts to the government to prove the exaction imposed meets the test. See id.

at 643; Mira Mar, 421 S.W.3d at 83.            The government’s proof of rough

proportionality of the impact must be more than bare conclusions; the government

is “required to measure that impact in a meaningful, though not precisely

mathematical, way, and must show how the impact, thus measured, is roughly

proportional in nature and extent to the required improvements.” Stafford Estates,

135 S.W.3d at 643.

                                        –17–
      Selinger’s first issue calls upon us to review the trial court’s conclusion the

exaction of the impact fees did not constitute a compensable taking. The trial court’s

conclusion the City did not take Selinger’s Property in violation of the Texas and

United States Constitutions flowed from its factual findings that the exaction bears

an essential nexus to the substantial advancement of some legitimate government

interest and the impact of the proposed development on the City’s water and sewer

systems and is roughly proportional to the projected impact of Selinger’s proposed

development.

      Chapter 395 of the Local Government Code addresses the Financing of

Capital Improvements by New Development in Municipalities, Counties, and

Certain Other Local Governments. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 395.011(a), et. seq.

Chapter 395 permits the imposition of impact fees to pay the costs of constructing

capital improvements or facilities expansions. Id. § 395.012. The municipality

determines the amount of impact fees by preparing a “Capital Improvements Plan.”

See id. § 395.014. The plan is prepared by a licensed engineer and must include: an

analysis of the total capacity, the level of current usage, and commitments of usage

of existing capital improvements; the total number of projected service units

necessitated by and attributable to new developments in the service area; and the

projected demand for capital improvements or facility expansions required by new

service units projected over a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 10 years. Id.

§ 395.014(a). Chapter 395 also sets out the method for determining the maximum

                                        –18–
fee per service unit. See id. § 395.015.

      At trial, the City established a capital improvements plan was prepared in

accordance with Chapter 395 of the Texas Local Government Code and was based

on engineering and land-use studies and permitted assumptions. The plan is a

precise mathematical formulation of the impact of development on the City’s water

and sewer facilities. From this plan, the City could determine Cambridge Meadows’

projected impact with precision that far exceeded the constitutional requirement of

rough proportionality. See Mira Mar, 421 S.W.3d at 97. Because the statute requires

the impact fees be spent only on the designated capital improvements, water and

sewer services in this case, the impact fees bear an essential nexus to the substantial

advancement of legitimate government interests. See LOC. GOV’T § 395.012; see

also Mira Mar, 421 S.W.3d at 97. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in

concluding the proposed exaction, if applied to Selinger’s proposed development,

would not constitute a taking of Selinger’s property because the impact fee, “if

applied, would be roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development

on [the City’s] water and sewer system and the City’s construction of water and

sewer infrastructure to serve the Property under the City’s utility CCN.”

      Nevertheless, Selinger asserts because he had no intention of ever using the

City’s water and sewer systems, the City’s proposed impact fee exaction lacks the

required essential nexus and rough proportionality. Thus, contends Selinger, the

extension of sewer and water transmission lines to the Property, if it ever happens,

                                           –19–
will confer no benefit on the Property. We find Selinger’s argument unavailing for

the following reasons.

        Selinger cites no authority in support of his contention that his unilateral

decision not to connect to the City’s water and sewer transmission lines, if and when

they become available to the Property, impacts the essential nexus and rough

proportionality analysis here. Moreover, with respect to the water impact fee,

Selinger stipulated, and the trial court found, that the Property is located within the

City’s water CCN and because it is so located, the City had the exclusive right to

provide water service to the Property absent an agreement by the City to allow

another water service provider to provide water to the Property. Thus, Selinger

acknowledged the City’s authority to require connection to its water service when,

and if, it became available.8 Selinger’s assertion that he did not want the City’s water

did not impact the City’s rights.

        Moreover, with respect to both the water and sewer impact fees, the City

established through Quint, whose testimony the trial court found to be “direct,

honest, credible, and qualified,” that the Property would benefit from receiving

reliable City utilities and might become more marketable. With respect to Selinger’s

takings claim, we conclude the trial court correctly drew its conclusion, “The City

    8
      If Selinger wanted to indefinitely obtain water from another provider and the City refused to assent,
the appropriate action would have been to file an application with the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality seeking to amend the City’s CCN. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 24.227 (setting forth criteria for
granting or amending a CCN). This he did not do.
                                                  –20–
did not take Selinger’s Property in violation of the Texas and United States

Constitutions,” from the facts. Accordingly, we overrule Selinger’s first issue.

          Based upon our resolution of Selinger’s first issue, and conclusion the trial

court did not err in concluding the impact fee exaction did not constitute a

compensable taking and Selinger’s plat was properly denied because Selinger

refused to agree to the exaction, we need not address his second issue urging other

bases advanced by the City at trial for denying his plat were pretextual. TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.1. In addition, we need not address Selinger’s third, fifth and sixth issues

addressing the measure of damages and the trial court’s alter ego finding, as they are

moot absent a finding a compensable taking occurred. Id.

        III.   Section 212.904 Texas Local Government Code

          While it is not entirely clear from Selinger’s opening brief, it appears from the

relief he requests,9 that, in his fourth issue, he is challenging the trial court’s

conclusions, “The City’s subdivision ordinance is not unconstitutional and in

violation of Section 212.904” and “Selinger is not entitled [] to a declaratory

judgment on any of the matters requested in his Petition.”

          A city’s ordinance is presumed to be valid. Eddins Enters., Inc. v. Town of

Addison, 280 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). However, no

    9
      In his prayer, Selinger asks, in part, that this Court “declare that the City’s Subdivision Ordinance
violates Local Government Code § 212.904 in regard to the sections requiring unlimited extensions of City
water and sewer lines and road.” At trial, Selinger’s attorney represented that all issues were resolved
except the City’s requirement that Selinger pay impact fees of sewer and water service under the City’s
subdivision ordinance. Accordingly, we will not discuss any road requirements.
                                                  –21–
city ordinance “shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of this

State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” Id. (quoting

TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5).         The party challenging the ordinance bears an

“extraordinary burden” to establish the ordinance is invalid or that no conclusive or

even controversial or issuable fact or condition exists that would authorize passage

of the ordinance. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792–93

(Tex. 1982). We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on the validity of an

ordinance, and we consider all the circumstances and determine as a matter of law

whether the legislation is invalidated by a relevant statute or constitutional provision.

Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998).

      Selinger’s live pleading did not identify a specific City ordinance in

connection with his request for a declaration the City’s subdivision ordinance

requiring “connection to water/sewer facilities and the payment of applicable

water/sewer impact fees as a condition of development” is unconstitutional. But by

stipulation, incorporated into the trial court’s findings of fact, the parties recognized

that “the City’s subdivision, utility, and impact fee ordinances require connection to

water/sewer facilities and the payment of applicable water/sewer impacts fees as a

condition of development.” Selinger’s complaint with respect to these subdivision

requirements is in essence, a restatement of his taking by exaction complaint, but on

a more global basis. We have already resolved Selinger’s takings issue against him,

and he does not advance any argument that would invalidate the City’s requirements

                                         –22–
on a wholesale basis.

         With respect to Selinger’s assertion the City’s subdivision ordinance violated

section 212.904 of the Local Government Code, at trial, Selinger’s attorney

identified section 130-27 (Assessment of impact fees)10 and schedule 1, table A,11

attached to Ordinance Number 2013-11-109 as the specific provision Selinger

claimed violated section 212.904 of the Local Government Code. In his reply brief,

Selinger identifies, for the first time, sections 142-6 and 142-105 of the City’s

subdivision ordinance, which were once located in Chapter 142 of the City’s Code

of Ordinances addressing improvements and containing 203 sections,12 claiming

    10
       Section 130-27(a)(4), located in Chapter 130 of the City’s Code of Ordinances addressing land
development regulations, provides that “[f]or a new development for which recordation of the final plat
occurred on or after November 20, 2013, assessment impact fees shall occur at the time of final plat
recordation and shall not exceed the maximum assessable impact fee per service unit (post credit) as set
forth in schedule 1, table D, attached to Ord. No. 2013-11-109 and incorporated herein by reference, for
each meter size and meter type for each proposed development unit as set forth in schedule 1, table D.”
    11
      Schedule 1, table A, identifies the “Maximum assessable utility impact fee if date of final plat
recordation is prior to September 1, 2003 for which no replatting is necessary.” We believe Selinger
intended to reference table D, which sets forth impact fees if the date of final plat recordation is on or after
November 20, 2013, and is the table the City used to calculate the impact fees applicable in this case.
    12
      The City’s current Code of Ordinances indicates that Chapter 142 is reserved and instructs for
previous contents of this provision, Subdivision Regulations, please see Chapter 150, “Unified
Development Code,” which was adopted on November 15, 2022.
    As it existed at the time Selinger’s plat was denied, section 142-6 provided:
         All of the improvements required under these regulations, or improvements specified in
         the comprehensive plan of the city, or improvements which, in the judgment of the director
         of engineering are necessary for the adequate provision of streets, utilities, drainage,
         services, and facilities to the subdivision and to surrounding areas of the city, shall be
         constructed at the sole expense of the developer, unless other provisions are approved
         by the city council. All improvements required by this chapter shall be constructed by the
         developer and accepted by the director of engineering prior to filing an associated plat with
         the county, unless otherwise specified in a binding contractual facilities agreement.
         Payment for any and all improvements that are not to be made at the time of the primary
         construction of the subdivision or development shall be made a part of a binding
         contractual facilities agreement, signed by the developer and approved by the city.

                                                    –23–
they violate section 212.904 of the Local Government Code because they do not

contain a proportionality requirement. A complaint may not be raised for the first

time in a reply brief. Not only is Selinger’s reference to ordinances 142-6 and 142-

105 untimely, it also does not comport with his assertion at trial. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (record must show complaint was made to trial court with sufficient

specificity to make court aware of complaint); see also Whisenant v. Arnett, 339

S.W.3d 920, 926 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (complaint on appeal must

comport with complaint at trial); Threlkeld v. Urech, 329 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (complaint may not be raised for first time on

appeal). Accordingly, Selinger has waived any complaint with respect to sections

142-6 and 142-105. Russell v. Campbell, 725 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

(emphasis added).
       Section 142-105 provided, with respect to water and sewer:
       The improvements referenced herein must be constructed per the engineering design
       manual, standard construction details and specifications and accepted by the director of
       engineering prior to filing an associated plat for record with the county clerk, unless
       otherwise specified in an approved facilities agreement.
       ...
       (8) Sanitary sewers. Sanitary sewer facilities shall be provided per the engineering design
       manual to adequately service the subdivision and conform to the city wastewater collection
       system master plan. Should the subdivision abut and use a sewer main of the city, the
       developer shall pay to the city, a pro rata charge as prescribed by ordinance for use of same.
       (9) Water. Water systems shall have a sufficient number of outlets and shall be of sufficient
       size to furnish adequate domestic water supply, to furnish fire protection to all lots, and to
       conform to the city water distribution master plan. Water system facilities shall be
       provided per the engineering design manual.

                                                  –24–
      To the extent Selinger is claiming section 130-27(a)(4) of Ordinance Number

2013-11-109 violates section 212.904 of the Local Government Code, we conclude

his complaint lacks merit. The trial court found that the City is a home-rule city.

Selinger does not challenge that finding. Under article eleven, section five of the

Texas Constitution, home-rule cities have broad discretionary powers, provided that

no ordinance shall contain any provision inconsistent with the state constitution or

with general laws enacted by the state legislature. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5; Dallas

Merchant’s & Concessionaire’s Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex.

1993); West End Pink, Ltd. v. City of Irving, No. 05-99-00086-CV, 1999 WL

1140122, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 14, 1999, no pet.). An ordinance of a home-

rule city that attempts to regulate a subject matter preempted by a state statute is

unenforceable to the extent it conflicts with the state statute. Dallas Merchant’s,

852 S.W.2d at 491. As the party challenging the ordinance, Selinger had the

“extraordinary burden” at trial to show the ordinance was invalid. Comeau, 633

S.W.2d at 792.

      Section 212.904(a), titled “Apportionment of Municipal Infrastructure Costs,”

provides:

      If a municipality requires, including under an agreement under Chapter
      242, as a condition of approval for a property development project that
      the developer bear a portion of the costs of municipal infrastructure
      improvements by the making of dedications, the payment of fees, or the
      payment of construction costs, the developer’s portion of the costs may
      not exceed the amount required for infrastructure improvements that
      are roughly proportionate to the proposed development as approved by

                                       –25–
      a professional engineer who holds a license issued under Chapter 1001,
      Occupations Code, and is retained by the municipality. The
      municipality’s determination shall be completed within thirty days
      following the submission of the developer’s application for
      determination under this subsection.

LOC. GOV’T § 212.904(a). Section 130-27(a)(4), located in the chapter addressing

land development regulations, provides that “[f]or a new development for which

recordation of the final plat occurred on or after November 20, 2013, assessment

impact fees shall occur at the time of final plat recordation and shall not exceed the

maximum assessable impact fee per service unit (post credit) as set forth in schedule

1, table D, attached to Ord. No. 2013-11-109 and incorporated herein by reference,

for each meter size and meter type for each proposed development unit as set forth

in schedule 1, table D.” Quint established the City calculated the proposed impact

fees in accordance with Section 130-27(a)(4) and using table D and that the impact

fees were roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development and

Selinger did not offer any evidence to the contrary. There is no conflict between

section 130-27(a)(4) or schedule 1, table D and Section 212.904 of the Local

Government Code because section 130-27(a)(4) and schedule 1, table D implement

a rough proportionality apportionment.

      Next, Selinger contends that any part of the subdivision regulations requiring

a developer to release the City from any and all liability is null and void. Selinger

has failed to identify any such regulation and, thus, has waived this argument. See

Alphonso Crutch Life Support Ctr. v. Williams, No. 03-13-00789-CV, 2015 WL

                                         –26–
7950713, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 30, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). To the

extent Selinger’s complaint concerns the proposed Facilities Agreement’s provision:

         DEVELOPER specifically reserves its right to appeal the apportionment
         of municipal infrastructure costs in accordance with TEX. LOC. GOV’T
         CODE ANN. § 212.904. However, notwithstanding the foregoing,
         DEVELOPER hereby releases the City from any and all liability under
         TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 212.904 regarding or related to the cost
         of those municipal infrastructure improvements required for the
         development of the Property[,]

his complaint is moot because the exaction complied with section 212.904(a)’s

rough proportionality requirement so the City’s liability is not an issue and any

opinion on the validity of this provision would be advisory. See TEX. CONST. art. V,

§ 6; City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985) (“A court has no

jurisdiction to render an opinion on a controversy that is not yet ripe.”); see also In

re Duncan, No. 05-16-0119-CV, 2016 WL 5723964, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct.

3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellate court is not authorized to issue an advisory

opinion). Moreover, this provision did not preclude Selinger from appealing the

City’s determination or from recovering applicable costs and reasonable attorney’s

fees, including expert witness fees, had he prevailed, and thus, did not conflict with

section 212.904(d)13 and (e).14

         With respect to Selinger’s declaratory judgment claim, we conclude the trial

    13
       “A municipality may not require a developer to waive the right of appeal authorized by this section
as a condition of approval for a development project.” LOC. GOV’T § 212.904(d).
    14
      “A developer who prevails in an appeal under this section is entitled to applicable costs and to
reasonable attorney’s fees, including expert witness fees.” LOC. GOV’T § 212.904(e).
                                                 –27–
court did not err in concluding the City’s subdivision ordinance is not

unconstitutional and in violation of section 212.904 of the Local Government Code,

and that Selinger is not entitled to a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, we overrule

Selinger’s fourth issue.

                                   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s final judgment.

                                           /Nancy Kennedy/
                                           NANCY KENNEDY
                                           JUSTICE
230180F.P05

                                       –28–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

STEPHEN RICHARD SELINGER,                      On Appeal from the 429th Judicial
Appellant                                      District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 429-04150-
No. 05-23-00180-CV           V.                2018.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS,                       Kennedy. Justices Nowell and Miskel
Appellee                                       participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

       It is ORDERED that appellee CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS recover its
costs of this appeal from appellant STEPHEN RICHARD SELINGER.

Judgment entered this 24th day of January 2024.

                                        –29–