Court Opinion

ID: 9388858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 20:02:32.076438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.349942
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/21/23 In re C.G. CA2/8
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re C.G. et al., Persons Coming                                B321941
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 ______________________________                                   Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                               Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00739A, B
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 Karla A.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
      Suzanne M. Nicholson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       ____________________
      The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over Karla A.’s two
sons under subdivisions (a), (b), and (j) of section 300. We affirm,
except that we reverse one finding. Undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
                                  I
      Karla A. has two sons: C.G., born in 2012, and M.R., born
in 2017. C.G.’s father is Christopher G. M.R.’s father is Martin
R.
      In early January 2022, M.R.’s paternal grandparents called
the police and said the mother left nonverbal, four-year-old M.R.
on their doorstep at 8 p.m. without notifying them or ensuring
they were home. Eventually the police reached Martin R., M.R.’s
father, at work, and Martin R. later retrieved his son from his
parents. The Department learned of the incident and
interviewed the mother. She explained she had told Martin R.
she would be dropping M.R. off at the paternal grandparents:
she showed the social worker the text messages in which Martin
R. wrote “okay” in response to her message. The mother said she
knocked, and the paternal step-grandfather answered the door.
She told him Martin R. knew she was dropping M.R. off, and the
paternal step-grandfather took M.R. inside. The mother believed
the paternal grandmother was making up lies to cause trouble
because she does not like the mother. The paternal step-
grandfather claimed M.R. was alone when he opened the door,
but he had seen a car that looked like the mother’s driving
around the corner. The paternal grandmother initially said she

                                 2
saw no one, but later changed her story to match the paternal
step-grandfather’s about the car. The paternal grandparents said
they called the police because they could not reach Martin R. and
wanted the mother to face consequences for her actions. The
paternal grandmother said the mother had done this at least
three times before.
       Martin R. said the mother often threatened to drop M.R.
off, but usually did not, so Martin R. did not believe she was
going to follow through on her threat. Martin R. said their text
message conversation frustrated him so he had turned his phone
off.
       Martin R. told the Department that, in the past, the mother
had vandalized his car by slashing the tires. He also said the
mother had broken into his apartment, left the water on to cause
water damage, and stolen his computer. He said she then
returned the computer but had changed the password so he could
not use it. The mother admitted she vandalized his car and took
the computer, but said Martin R. had asked her to set it up for
him.
       C.G.’s paternal grandmother said the boy C.G. told her his
mother had broken Martin R.’s windows and keyed his car. C.G.
also said he had seen Martin R. push his mother.
       Martin R. said the mother was temperamental and had a
temper. He said that, about five years ago, the mother accused
him of domestic violence, and he pleaded no contest to avoid
going to jail. The mother said Martin R. had been abusive toward
her when they were together, including when she was pregnant
and once after M.R.’s birth.
       C.G.’s paternal grandmother said the mother was hard to
deal with but that they had a good relationship. The mother

                                3
dropped C.G. off with his paternal grandmother every other
weekend for visits. During this time, the paternal grandmother
would coordinate calls and/or visits with C.G.’s father, who lived
in Las Vegas. Christopher G. told the Department the mother
was very abusive towards him. He stated he had obtained a
restraining order against her but had been unable to serve her.
The mother also evaded service of custody papers. Christopher
G. said he and his wife moved to Las Vegas to get away from the
mother.
      In early February, the mother went to Martin R.’s
apartment to drop off M.R. Martin R. let her in the apartment.
The mother became upset and began yelling at Martin R. about
him liking other women’s pictures on Facebook. The mother
punched a hole in the bathroom wall. The mother said Martin R.
pushed her out of the bathroom and she fell. Martin R. said the
mother threatened to call the police and tell them he had hurt
her so he would go to jail. Martin R. said he did not push the
mother but only argued with her and told her to leave. M.R. was
present during the event. The mother and M.R. left; the mother
called the police and said Martin R. had dragged her. The police
told her to return to Martin R.’s apartment. After initially
refusing, the mother did return. She told the police Martin R.
had grabbed her and dragged her across the room. The police
examined the mother’s arm and saw no marks. The mother then
said she might have tripped and there had not been a physical
altercation and continued to change her story. The police noted
in their report it seemed as though the mother might be under
the influence, though Martin R. said he did not smell any alcohol,
and the mother said she was just emotional. A neighbor said the
mother and Martin R. argued, but there was no physical

                                4
altercation. The police concluded no crime had occurred. The
police informed the Department of the incident.
       The Department obtained removal orders detaining the
children with their respective fathers. Because Christopher G.
was out of state, the Department initially placed C.G. with his
paternal grandmother.
       The Department filed a petition alleging the court should
assert jurisdiction over the children under subdivisions (a), (b),
and (j) of section 300. As to subdivision (a), the petition alleged
the children were at risk of nonaccidental serious physical injury
by a parent because of the mother’s “history of violent and
assaultive behaviors, in that on prior occasions, the mother has
slashed . . . Martin [R.’s] car tires” and “broke into [Martin R.’s]
home and left a water faucet on causing water damage to [Martin
R.’s] home and stealing [Martin R.’s] computer.” The petition
listed two allegations under subdivision (b). First, it alleged the
mother placed M.R. in a dangerous situation when she left him
alone on his paternal grandparents’ doorstep without notifying
an adult and that this conduct also endangered C.G. Second, it
alleged the mother endangered both children due to the same
allegations listed in support of subdivision (a). Finally, as to
subdivision (j), the petition alleged C.G. was at risk due to the
mother’s conduct in leaving M.R. alone on his grandparents’
doorstep. After a hearing, the juvenile court ordered the children
detained from the mother and continued their detention with
their respective fathers.
       Before the jurisdictional hearing, the Department filed a
Jurisdiction/Disposition Report. In the section discussing the
evidence supporting the allegations in the petition, the report
added facts about the February incident at Martin R.’s apartment

                                 5
in support of the allegations under subdivisions (a) and (b). At
the adjudication hearing, the court sustained the petition in its
entirety. The court then ordered the children to remain detained
with their respective fathers and ordered enhancement services
for the mother. The court also ordered monitored visits for the
mother.
       The mother appealed the jurisdictional and dispositional
orders.
                                  II
       We affirm the orders except for the juvenile court’s finding
of jurisdiction over the children under subdivision (a).
       We assume justiciability and reach the merits. (See In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 286 [it may serve justice to review a
parent’s appeal “where a parent does not challenge all
jurisdictional findings, but only one finding involving particularly
severe conduct”].)
       Although the mother appeals both the jurisdictional and
dispositional orders of the juvenile court, she makes no
arguments regarding the disposition. She thus forfeits this issue.
(Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
574, 599-600.)
       We review the jurisdictional findings for substantial
evidence. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602) (Cole L.),
We independently review any questions of statutory
interpretation, including whether alleged conduct can support a
jurisdictional finding. (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
594, 598) (Giovanni F.).
                                  A
       We reverse one element of the juvenile court’s order
because the mother’s vandalism, even in the presence of the

                                 6
children, did not put them at risk of suffering a nonaccidental
injury at her hands.
        Subdivision (a) applies when the child “has suffered, or
there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the
child’s parent . . . .” (§ 300, subd. (a), italics added.)
        The petition alleged the mother “has a history of violent
and assaultive behaviors, in that on prior occasions, the mother
has slashed . . . Martin [R.’s] car tires. On a prior occasion, the
mother broke into [Martin R.’s] home and left a water faucet on
causing water damage to [Martin R.’s] home and stealing [Martin
R.’s] computer.” The Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report
added information about the February incident as “supporting
evidence” for the subdivision (a) allegations.
        We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment.
        Even so, the record shows the mother had engaged in
violent acts only against property in the presence of the children.
C.G. said he was with the mother when she keyed Martin R.’s
car. M.R. was there when the mother punched a hole in the
bathroom wall.
        The court found the mother used the children as pawns to
manipulate the fathers and her acts of vandalism were “designed
to intimidate or get some type of benefit from a partner that she
is still very frustrated with.” The court also found that engaging
in vandalism in the presence of the children put them in danger.
The court reasoned that a third party, including the owner of the
vandalized property, or a bystander, or law enforcement, could
become involved, and the situation could spin out of control. In
such a scenario, the children could be injured.

                                 7
       Vandalizing property in the presence of the children indeed
could put them in danger, as we discuss below. But this conduct
does not fall under subdivision (a). Two features of this
subdivision are the requirements that the injury be nonaccidental
and that it be inflicted by the parent. (§ 300, subd. (a).)
       The juvenile court’s finding that the mother’s vandalism in
the presence of the children endangered them focused on the risk
of another person becoming involved and the situation spinning
out of control. But subdivision (a) requires that the parent causes
the injury. (Giovanni F., supra, at599 [subdivision (a) is
inapplicable where the violent perpetrator is not the parent].)
The subdivision likewise requires the injury to be inflicted
“nonaccidentally.” If a third person intervened in response to the
mother’s vandalism, the intervenor’s target would be the mother,
not the children. (See Cole L., supra, at 603 [unintentional injury
to a bystander child, even one that results from an intentional act
against another, does not satisfy subdivision (a)].)
                                    B
       The record supports subdivision (b) as a basis for the
court’s order. This subdivision applies when the child “has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . the failure or
inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b).) The petition contained two
allegations under subdivision (b). We address each in turn.
                                     1
       The first allegation is that the mother endangered M.R. by
leaving him alone on the doorstep of his paternal grandparents
without notifying an adult. The petition also alleges this
behavior places C.G. at risk.

                                  8
       The mother does not appeal the juvenile court’s finding as
to M.R. under this allegation. She concedes the juvenile court
accepted the paternal grandparents’ version of events and that
their statements are substantial evidence supporting the finding.
       As to C.G., however, the mother argues the finding was
incorrect. She argues C.G. is differently situated than M.R.
because he was nearly six years older and was verbal. She also
argues she had a good relationship with C.G.’s paternal
grandmother and never left C.G. alone on her doorstep.
       Substantial evidence supported the finding as to C.G. The
juvenile court was entitled to believe a parent who would leave a
four year old alone at a front door could do the same with a 10
year old. The court also was right to think to do so would put the
10 year old at risk. Children can be childish. Even responsible
10 year olds can be unpredictable. They can be vulnerable to
sudden attractions and dangers and can lack the judgment and
strength to resist.
       Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that the mother’s conduct placed C.G. at risk of serious physical
harm.
                                   2
       The petition reiterated the same facts in support of the
second allegation as it listed in support of the subdivision (a)
allegation, referencing the mother’s “history of violent and
assaultive behaviors” and describing the acts of vandalism. The
Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report also repeated the
information about the February incident as supporting evidence
with regard to the subdivision (b) allegations.
       Under subdivision (b), the court must determine whether
there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer serious

                                9
physical harm due to the parent’s failure or inability to supervise
or protect the child. (§ 300, subd. (b).) For this provision, the
injury need not be nonaccidental or inflicted by a parent. As
noted, the juvenile court said the mother’s vandalism created
situations that could spin out of control if third parties
intervened. These situations could cause injury to bystanding
children.
       The mother incorrectly argues this is pure speculation. To
the contrary, these inferences are reasonable and valid. With her
children as bystanders, the mother was triggering provocative
violence with a foreseeable potential she could not control, which
posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the children.
       The mother’s contrary arguments are unavailing.
       The mother complains the court denied her due process
because the petition did not include information about the
February incident. Any error was harmless. The Department
filed its jurisdiction/disposition report on April 15, 2022. The
court held the adjudication hearing on June 29, 2022. The report
explicitly listed facts about the February incident as “supporting
evidence” for the subdivision (a) and (b) allegations. The mother
had notice the Department planned to rely on those facts.
       The mother similarly argues the juvenile court improperly
allowed the Department to use facts about the February incident
to argue she had exposed the children to domestic violence,
changing its theory of the case. Although the juvenile court did
reference domestic violence, it rested its findings on the mother’s
vandalism. To the extent the mother argues the February
incident can be viewed only as domestic violence rather than as
part of a pattern of her violent vandalism, this is incorrect. The

                                10
juvenile court properly viewed this incident in the context of the
case as a whole.
       Finally, the mother complains the juvenile court
improperly asserted jurisdiction under subdivision (b) because it
found the mother’s conduct caused the children emotional harm.
While the juvenile court did express its belief that the mother’s
behavior caused the children emotional harm, as discussed above,
it also properly found the children’s presence during the mother’s
acts of vandalism exposed them to the risk of serious physical
harm. This satisfied subdivision (b).
                                   C
       Substantial evidence supported the finding under
subdivision (j), which applies where a “child’s sibling has been
abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or
(i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or
neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” (§ 300, subd. (j).)
The petition repeats the allegations made in the first allegation
under subdivision (b), alleging the mother’s actions in leaving
M.R. alone on the grandparents’ doorstep endangered C.G. As
discussed, substantial evidence supports the finding the mother
put C.G. at risk. The court properly asserted jurisdiction over
C.G. under subdivision (j).
///

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                           DISPOSITION
      We reverse the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (a) as to both children. We otherwise
affirm the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

                                           WILEY, J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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