Court Opinion

ID: 9941313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:15:58.947441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:31.529609
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2857-21

TATIANA UGARTE,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BARNABAS HEALTH
MEDICAL GROUP PC,
GIUSEPPE SALESE, M.D.,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

ANNETTE BURNETT,1

     Defendant.
___________________________

                   Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided February 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-3042-19.

1
  The correct spelling of defendant's last name is Burnett, improperly pled as
Burnette.
            Ionno & Higbee, attorneys for appellant (Sebastian Ben
            Ionno II, Debra Rebecca Higbee, and David B.
            Michelson, on the brief).

            Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, PC,
            attorneys for respondents (Mark J. Blunda, of counsel
            and on the brief; Neha Patel and Catherine A. Morris,
            on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Tatiana Ugarte appeals from the Law Division's April 28, 2022

order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants 2 Barnabas Health

Medical Group, PC (Barnabas) and Giuseppe Salese, M.D. (collectively,

defendants), on her claim of retaliatory discharge under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3)

of the Conscientious Employees' Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1

to -14, and dismissing her complaint with prejudice. Having reviewed plaintiff's

arguments and the record in light of the applicable standards, we affirm.

                                       I.

      Plaintiff was employed as the office supervisor of Barnabas's West Orange

medical office from September 3, 2015 to October 5, 2018. In 2014, Barnabas

purchased the medical practice, formerly Primary Medical Care (Primary),

where Salese was the president and a joint owner. After the acquisition by

2
  Plaintiff did not appeal the court's dismissal of defendant Annette Burnett for
lack of prosecution.
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                                       2
Barnabas, Salese no longer had unilateral authority to hire and fire employees,

which he had as an owner of Primary, and instead was required to obtain a

Barnabas regional manager's approval for those employment decisions.

      Plaintiff had approximately fourteen years' administrative experience

working in medical offices prior to her employment with Barnabas.           She

reported to Burnett, oversaw the daily operations of the office and supervised

eight to nine employees, including Salese's medical assistant, Delmis Macias .

Plaintiff conducted monthly meetings with her staff during which she regularly

discussed HIPAA3 compliance issues and violations.          Salese also attended

plaintiff's staff meetings.

      Burnett worked for Salese during the fourteen years preceding Barnabas's

acquisition of Primary.       During that time, she regularly brought HIPAA

compliance issues to Salese.      She worked with Salese through Barnabas's

acquisition of Primary, until her retirement five years later.

      In late summer 2018, plaintiff approached Salese to discuss her concerns

regarding two instances of HIPAA violations in the office. She told Salese that

3
  HIPAA is an acronym for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to 1320d-9, which in part "concerns the protection of
personal medical information and regulates its use and disclosure." N.J. Transit
PBA Local 304 v. N.J. Transit Corp., 384 N.J. Super. 512, 516-17 (App. Div.
2006) (citations omitted).
                                                                          A-2857-21
                                        3
Macias was taking patient charts home from Barnabas's Belleville office on

Fridays to bring them to the West Orange office on Mondays. She also told him

that Macias and other employees were taking home documents containing

patient information to study as part of their training. 4 According to plaintiff,

Salese said he had instructed them to do so, and because it was his office he

could do what he wanted. Plaintiff objected and instructed staff at her meetings

that they could not take patient information home. She was not aware of any

staff member who continued doing so after her instruction.

      At some point prior to summer 2018, Salese approached plaintiff about

his own concerns regarding HIPAA violations. As a result of their discussion,

Barnabas addressed the issue by providing staff with encrypted phones the

following week.

The September 26, 2018 incident

      Although the parties disputed the details of the September 26, 2018

incident, they agreed on the following facts. Around 8:00 a.m. that day, plaintiff

and Macias had a verbal altercation, which began after plaintiff, who was outside

4
   Defendants disputed plaintiff's allegations regarding HIPAA violations but
assumed their truth for purposes of summary judgment. During his deposition,
Salese acknowledged that removing documents containing patient information
from the office would violate HIPAA, but denied that he instructed the staff do
so or that he discussed the issue with plaintiff.
                                                                            A-2857-21
                                        4
the building, believed she saw Macias standing near plaintiff's desk. By the time

plaintiff entered the room, Macias had already begun walking towards her own

desk. The two women then started yelling at each other. Salese heard the

argument, came upstairs, and directed an employee to call the police. The police

arrived and spoke to plaintiff, Macias, and Salese; there is no indication that

officers made an arrest or filed any report about the incident.

      Plaintiff was excused from work for the rest of the day and two days later,

she was placed on paid leave pending investigation into the incident. Macias

continued working at the office.

      Later on the day of the altercation, Macias emailed a letter to the human

resources department complaining of a "hostile work environment" due to

"multiple unfriendly encounters" with plaintiff and being "called '[N*****]' by

favored staff" without their being reprimanded. The letter also detailed Macias's

account of the altercation. Kelly Holman, Barnabas's human resources contact

for the West Orange office, testified that she considered Macias's complaint

about the racial slur as a separate incident from the altercation.

      At Burnett's request, Sharon McSorley, a Barnabas employee who

periodically visited the West Orange office and witnessed the altercation,

provided her account in an email. According to McSorley, the incident occurred

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                                        5
when Macias stepped away from the area where she and Macias had been

training. The email went on to state:

            At the time she left our work area, [Macias] was quiet
            and calm. [Plaintiff] had just walked in as [Macias] was
            heading back to her work station. I heard shouting and
            heard [plaintiff] saying in a very loud voice "I only
            asked a question[]." [Macias] shouted back and
            responded "I didn't look through your desk." This
            repeated a number of times and their voices were quite
            loud. Neither [plaintiff] nor [Macias] responded to Dr.
            Salese's request to stop at which time he directed
            another employee to call the police. As the manager,
            [plaintiff] did not attempt to de-escalate the situation.

            [(quotation marks altered).]

By the next morning, the email had been forwarded to Barnabas's regional

manager, head of human resources, two members of its West Orange operations

team, and Salese and Holman.

      During her deposition, plaintiff testified that as she walked from her car

towards the office building, she saw Macias standing near her desk. After

entering the building and wishing Macias and others a "good morning," she said

to Macias, "I saw you around my desk area, were you looking for something?"

and Macias "immediately" began yelling that plaintiff was accusing her of

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                                        6
stealing. They went back and forth about whether plaintiff had accused Macias

of stealing, although plaintiff claimed she never raised her voice.5

      By the time Salese and Barbara Stevens, a Barnabas administrative

employee, entered the room, plaintiff was sitting at her desk and Macias was

walking away. Plaintiff testified the only people who witnessed the altercation

were McSorley and another Barnabas employee named Angela.

      Salese testified that prior to the September 26 incident, he had observed

plaintiff "picking on" Macias during staff meetings.        He believed plaintiff

instigated the altercation, but acknowledged he did not witness the start of it.

Upon hearing shouting, Salese went upstairs, where the argument was already

underway. He saw plaintiff scream at Macias, then Macias scream back and

walk towards her own workstation. He told them to stop three or four times, but

neither heeded him. He saw both women "almost coming towards each other"

and, fearing "an act of violence" was about to take place, instructed another

employee to call the police. He believed plaintiff, by virtue of her supervisory

role, was responsible for failing to de-escalate the situation.

5
  Macias admitted she raised her voice at some point, but maintained plaintiff
began yelling first, upon entering the building. She also testified the altercation
was still ongoing when Salese entered the room and plaintiff continued yelling
despite his requests to stop.
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                                         7
      Salese asked Macias about the incident but did not speak to plaintiff about

it because she never returned to work. At some point after his conversation with

Macias, Salese met with Holman and two members of the operations team to

relay his account. The meeting lasted about ten minutes, during which Salese

said he wanted Barnabas to transfer plaintiff out of the West Orange office but

did not want her terminated.

      Salese did not know who fired plaintiff. He maintained she caused her

own termination because she behaved unprofessionally as the supervisor,

explaining "the manager puts the fires out instead of making it into an erupting

volcano." Salese was notified of plaintiff's termination on October 5, 2018, by

email from a member of the operations team.

      During Burnet's deposition, she testified plaintiff and Macias had an

adversarial relationship for which she blamed plaintiff, because Macias was

"very quiet, nonconfrontational," and plaintiff was "the opposite ."

Investigation and termination

      Holman investigated the September 26 incident. She spoke with plaintiff,

Macias, Stevens, McSorley, Salese and "one or two other employees" whose

names she did not remember; she also met in person with Salese to hear his

account. Salese told her that other than hearing a lot of yelling coming from

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                                        8
upstairs, he had not witnessed the argument. Salese did not tell Holman he

wanted plaintiff terminated, but she could not recall if Salese said he wanted

plaintiff transferred.

      Holman described the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment as a

"collective decision" made by herself, two other human resources personnel and

three members of the operations team. They decided to fire plaintiff because

the statements from Stevens, McSorley, and "one or two other employees" "more

closely[] validated" Macias's version of the altercation than plaintiff's,

particularly about "the way that [plaintiff] entered the office and did not

appropriately de[-]escalate the situation," and that she "was not as calm" as

Macias. Holman said the decision was not based on Salese's account because

he did not witness the incident, and he did not participate in the decision to

terminate plaintiff.

      Holman and the other two human resources personnel involved in the

termination decision did not become aware of plaintiff's concerns about office

HIPAA violations until after they had terminated her. The other two human

resources staff members and a member of the operations team certified that

plaintiff was terminated for her mishandling of an altercation with a subordinate.

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                                        9
They did not discipline Macias because they determined she had not done

anything wrong.

      Holman and an operations team member               terminated plaintiff's

employment by phone on October 5, 2018. Holman sent plaintiff a letter the

same day, confirming that her employment was terminated because her

"behavior as an Office Supervisor [was] inappropriate and promoted a hostile

and unprofessional work environment that are in direct violation of [Barnabas's]

standard of workplace conduct."

                                       II.

      On September 27, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendants

violated CEPA by terminating her for reporting the HIPAA violations to Salese.

On April 28, 2022, the trial court heard argument on defendants' motion for

summary judgment and issued an oral decision on the record, which was

incorporated into an order filed that same day.

      The court found plaintiff failed to present evidence of a causal nexus

between her alleged whistleblowing and termination because Salese lacked

authority to terminate an employee and there was no evidence that the

individuals who made the decision to terminate plaintiff were aware of her

whistleblowing. The court also found plaintiff failed to present competent

                                                                          A-2857-21
                                      10
evidence that Barnabas's stated reason for her termination was pretextual,

finding it was "beyond dispute" plaintiff was terminated because of her

inappropriate handling of the altercation. Because there was no genuine issue

of material fact, the court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants .

      Plaintiff appeals, raising the following issues for our consideration:

            I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
            THERE WAS NO CAUSAL CONNECTION
            BETWEEN PLAINTIFF'S PROTECTED CONDUCT
            AND       PLAINTIFF'S     RETALIATORY
            TERMINATION AND/OR THAT NO REASONABLE
            JURY COULD CONCLUDE THAT PLAINTIFF
            WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED BUT-
            FOR HER CEPA PROTECTED CONDUCT.

                  A. Legal Standard Under CEPA and HIPAA.

                  B. The Trial Court Ignored the Inconsistencies
            and Implausibilities in Defendants' Arguments and
            Erred in Assuming that Salese Could Not Have Wanted
            to Retaliate Against Plaintiff for Objecting to
            Violations of HIPAA in His Office and that Salese
            Could Not Have Influenced Defendant Barnabas'
            Decision to Terminate Plaintiff With a Retaliatory
            Motive.

            II. PLAINTIFF   ESTABLISHED  LIABILITY
            UNDER THE "CAT’S PAW" THEORY THAT
            PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF HER CEPA
            PROTECTED CONDUCT CONTRIBUTED TO THE
            DECISION TO TERMINATE HER EMPLOYMENT,
            EVEN THOUGH THEY LACKED FORMAL
            DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY.

                                                                               A-2857-21
                                      11
             III. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MEET THE
             SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.

        The purpose of CEPA is "to protect and encourage employees to report

illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private

sector employers from engaging in such conduct." Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177

N.J. 451, 461 (2003) (quoting Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138

N.J. 405, 431 (1994)). In furtherance of that goal, the statute states in relevant

part:

             An employer shall not take any retaliatory action
             against an employee because the employee does any of
             the following:

                   ....

             c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity,
             policy or practice which the employee reasonably
             believes:

             (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation
             promulgated pursuant to law, including any violation
             involving deception of, or misrepresentation to, any
             shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer,
             employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the
             employer or any governmental entity, or, if the
             employee is a licensed or certified health care
             professional, constitutes improper quality of patient
             care; [or]

                   ....

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                                       12
            (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public
            policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare
            or protection of the environment.

            [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.]

      "CEPA is a remedial statute that 'promotes a strong public policy of the

State' and 'therefore should be construed liberally to effectuate its important

social goal.'" Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 555 (2013)

(quoting Abbamont, 138 N.J. at 431).

      The framework for proving a CEPA claim follows the same structure as a

claim filed under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -2.

Abbamont, 138 N.J. at 418. Consistent with that approach, New Jersey courts

also look to Title VII cases as precedent. Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 350

N.J. Super. 276, 290 (App. Div. 2001).

      An employment retaliation claim can be advanced on a "pretext" theory,

or a "mixed-motive" theory. Fleming v. Corr. Healthcare Solutions, 164 N.J.

90, 100 (2000) (quoting Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089,

1096 (3d Cir. 1995)). The difference between the two "lies in the directness of

proof" demonstrating the causal connection between the retaliation and adverse

employment action. Id. at 100-01. "In a mixed-motive case, 'direct evidence of

discriminatory animus leads not only to a ready logical inference of bias, but

                                                                         A-2857-21
                                       13
also to a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on it.'" Id.

at 101 (quoting Starceski, 54 F.3d at 1097).

      As discussed further below, the circumstantial nature of plaintiff's proof

of retaliatory animus made this a pretext case. "Where the plaintiff proceeds on

a 'pretext' theory, proof of [retaliatory discharge] involves" three stages. Kolb

v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999). First, a plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Fleming, 164 N.J. at 100. The

prima facie case creates a presumption of retaliatory discharge, shifting the

burden of production to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory

reason for the adverse employment action. Allen v. Cape May Cnty., 246 N.J.

275, 290-91 (2021). The presumption dissipates upon the employer's proof of a

legitimate reason for the employment action. Bergen Com. Bank v. Sisler, 157

N.J. 188, 211 (1999).

      In the final stage of the burden-shifting framework, the employee must

"prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated by the

employer was merely a pretext for discrimination and not the true reason for the

employment decision." Meade v. Twp. of Livingston, 249 N.J. 310, 329 (2021)

(quoting Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 449 (2005)). "Although

the burden of production shifts throughout the process, the employee at all

                                                                           A-2857-21
                                      14
phases retains the burden of proof that the adverse employment action was

caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination." Id. at 330 (quoting Bergen

Com. Bank, 157 N.J. at 211).

      If the employer fails to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case with a

legitimate reason, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. If "the plaintiff

can produce enough evidence to enable a reasonable fact finder to conclude that

the proffered reason is false, [the] plaintiff has earned the right to present . . .

[the] case to the jury." Zive, 182 N.J. at 449 (quoting Marzano v. Comput. Sci.

Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996)).

      To establish a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19 -

3(c), a plaintiff must show:

            (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her
            employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or
            regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear
            mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a
            "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-
            3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken
            against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists
            between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse
            employment action.

            [Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462 (quoting Kolb, 320 N.J. at
            476).]

      An appellate court reviews a trial court's summary judgment decision de

novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Samolyk v. Berthe,

                                                                              A-2857-21
                                        15
251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). A trial court should deny summary judgment only where

the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence showing a

genuine issue as to a material fact. R. 4:46-2(c). To determine whether a

"genuine issue" of material fact exists, the motion court must

            consider whether the competent evidential materials
            presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to
            the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
            factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor
            of the non-moving party. . . . If there exists a single,
            unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of
            fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to
            constitute a "genuine" issue of material fact for
            purposes of Rule 4:46-2.

            [Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J.
            520, 540 (1995).]

      For purposes of summary judgment, defendants assumed "plaintiff's

alleged complaints about a HIPAA violation" were true and plaintiff had

satisfied the first three prongs of her prima facie case. Thus, plaintiff reasonably

believed Macias and other staff were violating HIPAA by bringing documents

containing patient information to their homes; plaintiff told Salese she objected

to the practice in late summer 2018; and Barnabas's termination of plaintiff's

employment on October 5, 2018, was an adverse employment action.

Consequently, the determinative issues were whether plaintiff introduced

                                                                              A-2857-21
                                        16
sufficient prima facie evidence of a causal connection and competent evidence

of pretext to survive summary judgment.

      We first address whether a mixed-motive framework applied here.

Because the trial court found plaintiff failed to produce direct evidence of a

retaliatory motive, it limited its evaluation of plaintiff's case to a pretext model.

On appeal, plaintiff primarily argues this is a pretext case, but also suggests it is

mixed-motive. The fact that the employer considered more than one factor in

its decision to fire plaintiff does not entitle her to the burden-shifting framework

of a mixed-motive analysis, nor does it foreclose plaintiff from proceeding on a

pretext theory.

      The distinction between the two theories lies in the directness of proof of

discrimination. Fleming, 164 N.J. at 100. Direct evidence can include "conduct

or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be

viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude," id. at 101

(citations omitted), and which demonstrates "a direct causal connection between

that hostility and the challenged employment decision." Bergen Com. Bank,

157 N.J. at 208.

                                                                              A-2857-21
                                        17
      As the trial court noted, plaintiff did not introduce any direct evidence of

retaliatory animus and therefore it did not err in declining to evaluate plaintiff's

case under the mixed-motive framework.

      Plaintiff next contends she presented sufficient evidence to support the

inference of a causal link between her whistleblowing and termination, pursuant

to the "cat's paw" theory of liability, and that the court's finding to the contrary

was in error. The trial court acknowledged the "cat's paw" theory has not been

explicitly adopted by our Supreme Court but declined to make any determination

as to whether it applied to this case. Instead, the court found plaintiff could not

show a causal connection because Salese lacked firing authority and did not

recommend plaintiff's termination; the court also found the individuals with

such authority were not aware of plaintiff's whistleblowing activity to Salese.

The court further determined a causal connection could not be established by

either Barnabas's disparate treatment of plaintiff and Macias following the

altercation, or by inconsistencies in defendants' statements regarding the

decision to terminate plaintiff.

      "The evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage is 'rather modest: it is to

demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's factual scenario is compatible with

discriminatory intent—i.e., that discrimination could be a reason for the

                                                                              A-2857-21
                                        18
employer's action.'" Zive, 182 N.J. at 447 (quoting Marzano, 91 F.3d at 508).

"Simply stated, a plaintiff has established a prima facie case when" she has

introduced sufficient evidence to support the inference "that if the employer's

actions remain unexplained, it is more likely than not that such actions were

based on impermissible reasons." Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255,

265 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576

(1978)). "[T]he prima facie case is to be evaluated solely on the basis of the

evidence presented by the plaintiff, irrespective of defendants' efforts to dispute

that evidence." Zive, 182 N.J. at 448.

      "The cat's paw theory of liability applies to 'a situation in which a biased

subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker

as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.'"

Meade, 249 N.J. at 334 (quoting Marshall v. Rawlings Co. LLC, 854 F.3d 368,

377 (6th Cir. 2017)). Our Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted the cat's

paw theory of liability. See, e.g., Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 559 n.10 (eschewing

adoption of the theory in favor of "rely[ing] on our existing case law for

guidance of our courts.") However, it has endorsed the underlying premise: a

causal connection can be demonstrated by proof that "a non-decisionmaker's

                                                                             A-2857-21
                                       19
discriminatory views impermissibly influenced the decisionmaker to take an

adverse employment action against an employee." Meade, 249 N.J. at 336.

      Most recently, in Meade, the Court declined to adopt cat's paw because

the plaintiff's allegation of discriminatory beliefs was that of her subordinate

and consequently did not implicate the theory. Id. at 334. Instead, the Court

affirmed the holdings in Battaglia and Spencer v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co.,

156 N.J. 455 (1998), as authority for the proposition that

            unlawful employment discrimination—whether based
            on gender or on the exercise of protected conduct—can
            be predicated on claims that a non-decisionmaker's
            discriminatory views impermissibly influenced the
            decisionmaker to take an adverse employment action
            against an employee. In other words, actions taken to
            accommodate discriminatory views can support
            liability to the same extent as actions taken based on
            personally      held   discriminatory      views    [of
            decisionmakers].

            [Meade, 249 N.J. at 336.]

      Noting the equivalence of LAD's causal connection requirement to

CEPA's, the Court in Battaglia stressed

            that a jury could also find that an employee had
            demonstrated the requisite causal link indirectly. That
            is, . . . proof that a supervisor who did not have the
            authority to subject the complaining employee to a
            retaliatory employment action but who prepared a
            biased evaluation because of the employee's CEPA-

                                                                          A-2857-21
                                        20
            protected complaints might have sufficiently tainted the
            view of the actual decision maker to support relief.

            [214 N.J. at 559 (citing Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc.,
            164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).]

      Plaintiff does not argue, nor does the record support, that the decision to

fire her was based on the retaliatory animus of any of the actual decisionmakers.

Consequently, her CEPA claim rises and falls on Salese's retaliatory animus,

stemming from the HIPAA complaint she made to him in summer 2018.

However, there is nothing to support this contention because Salese did not

recommend or ask plaintiff to be fired; he only requested her transfer from the

West Orange location. The lack of proofs in this case stand in stark contrast to

the facts in Battaglia, where the subject of the whistleblowing activity

participated in a human resources meeting discussing plaintiff's employment,

recommended plaintiff's firing, and prepared a file about some of plaintiff's

transgressions which was "reviewed and considered" by one of the

decisionmakers. 214 N.J. at 550 n.6. Here, nothing in the record supports the

inference that Salese's request to transfer plaintiff influenced the decision to

terminate her.

      Plaintiff next argues the court erred in finding that her termination was

not pretextual because she submitted evidence showing "weaknesses,

                                                                           A-2857-21
                                      21
implausibilit[ies], inconsistencies, incoherencies, and contradictions presented

in [d]efendants' narrative," sufficient to support the inference that the purported

reason for her firing was pretextual. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that she

has produced sufficient evidence to support a finding that retaliation "made an

actual difference in [defendants'] decision." Plaintiff also contends the trial

court erred in affording defendants the favorable inference that plaintiff's

objection to HIPAA violations could not have motivated her termination.

      The trial court found defendants had carried their burden of showing a

legitimate,   nondiscriminatory    reason    for   plaintiff's   termination:      her

"inappropriate handling of an altercation with a subordinate on September 26 [],

2018." The court also found that defendants' disparate treatment of plaintiff and

Macias following the altercation and the inconsistencies in defendants'

statements regarding the decision to terminate plaintiff did not show pretext.

      A plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment "by either (i)

discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii)

adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was

more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse

employment action." DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528 (App.

                                                                                A-2857-21
                                       22
Div. 2005) (italicization omitted) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764

(3d Cir. 1994)).

      Even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case sufficient to create a

fact question as to whether Salese's recommendation to transfer plaintiff was

motivated by retaliatory animus, her claim would still fail because there is no

evidence to suggest that the decisionmakers based their decision to fire plaintiff

on Salese's recommendation rather than their investigation into the altercation.

As such, plaintiff cannot prove pretext by showing that retaliation was more

likely than not a motivating cause of her termination.

      Plaintiff argues Salese's proffered reason for her transfer is not worthy of

credence because it was based, either in whole or in part, on Macias's version of

the altercation, which was untrustworthy. She also points to inconsistencies in

Salese's and Holman's testimony regarding the investigation and termination

decision as a means of discrediting the proffered reason for it.

      To discredit the employer's proffered reasons for an adverse employment

action, a plaintiff

             must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
             inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
             employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action
             that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
             "unworthy of credence," and hence infer "that the

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            employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
            discriminatory reasons."

            [Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (alteration in original, citations
            omitted).]

"'[R]ejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to

infer the ultimate fact of intentional' retaliatory action." Fleming, 164 N.J. at

101 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).

      Plaintiff asserts Salese must have based his recommendation on Macias's

version of the account because the altercation had ended before he entered the

room. The only witness testimony substantiating this contention was her own,

while ample testimony contradicted it. Salese testified plaintiff and Macias were

yelling when he entered the room, he tried to intercede and, when neither

employee obeyed his repeated demands to stop, he directed a staff member to

call the police. Macias's testimony and McSorley's statement relay the same

sequence of events.

      And even if Salese's recommendation had been influenced by Macias's

account, plaintiff's assertion that Macias's account was not credible is

unconvincing and inconsequential. Plaintiff's primary basis for arguing that

Macias's account is unworthy of credence is that it contradicts plaintiff's version.

She also claims there are inconsistencies between Macias's testimony about an

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unrelated racist interaction with another employee and Macias's description of

that same interaction contained in her email.

      Even if Macias had fabricated information, which Salese then used as a

basis for his recommendation, that fact alone would not impugn the decision to

fire her, since no evidence was presented suggesting that Salese had reason to

disbelieve Macias's account. See Falco v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., 296 N.J. Super. 298,

309 (App. Div. 1997) ("The mere fact that plaintiff, in her certification, denied

committing the acts that constituted defendant's reason for termination does not

raise a genuine issue of material fact. The dispositive issue is whether

defendants had a good faith belief that plaintiff committed these acts and

considered those acts in reaching their decision to terminate plaintiff .").

      Moreover, Salese's proffered reason was consistent and substantiated by

direct evidence. Salese testified that he recommended plaintiff's transfer based

on her exacerbating the altercation rather than de-escalating it. These facts were

based on Salese's firsthand knowledge of the incident, not on Macias's account.

And according to Holman's testimony, every eyewitness account other than

plaintiff's described plaintiff's yelling at Macias and failing to heed Salese's

repeated requests to stop. Thus, plaintiff cannot overcome Salese's reason for

recommending her transfer with mere "'metaphysical doubt as to the material

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facts.'" Triffin v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div.

2004) (quoting Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. America, Inc., 974 F.2d

1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992)).

      Plaintiff also argues Salese's angry reaction to her HIPAA complaint, and

defendants' disparate treatment of her and Macias, supports the inference that

her whistleblowing was a determinative factor in Salese's decision to request her

transfer. To prove pretext by showing discrimination was a motivating factor,

a plaintiff does not need to show retaliatory discrimination was the employer's

"sole or exclusive consideration" in deciding to fire her. Meade, 249 N.J. at 330

(quoting Bergen Com. Bank, 157 N.J. at 211). Rather, the plaintiff need only

show that her whistleblowing was more likely than not "a determinative or

substantial, motivating factor in . . . [the] decision . . . that it made a difference."

Donofry, 350 N.J. Super. at 296. See also Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc., 226 N.J.

258, 283 (2016) (quoting with approval the CEPA model jury charge "if the

employer would have made the same decision in the absence of the plaintiff's

whistleblowing activity, then the employer wins.") "[I]n evaluating whether an

employer acted pursuant to a retaliatory motive, jurors are permitted to draw an

inference from all of the circumstances relating to the decision," including the

response of the plaintiff's superiors to the whistleblowing activity. Battaglia,

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214 N.J. at 558-59 (noting jury could infer complicity where whistleblower's

supervisor ignored the complaint or limited the investigation to questioning the

accused).

        The only testimony that suggested Salese reacted angrily to plaintiff's

HIPAA complaint was her own description of the interaction: "I said, well, they

still can't take information home. And it was his practice. It was his way or no

way. I didn't have a say in that. He didn't want to . . . hear it." However,

plaintiff also testified that the actions she believed were violative of HIPAA

ceased after she brought the issue to Salese's attention.

        Plaintiff's other testimony—and the record as a whole—overwhelmingly

discredited any inference Salese was hostile to HIPAA compliance. Plaintiff

testified Salese had approached her about his own concern regarding a

reoccurring HIPAA violation, and Barnabas resolved the issue the following

week.     Plaintiff also described her monthly staff meetings, which Salese

attended, where she regularly discussed HIPAA compliance and violations.

Additionally, Burnett testified that she regularly raised HIPAA compliance

issues to Salese throughout the nineteen years they worked together.

        Salese testified that he recommended plaintiff's transfer but not Macias's

because plaintiff, as the supervisor, should have de-escalated the altercation with

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                                        27
Macias, her subordinate. The expectation that a supervisor will not get in a

shouting match with her subordinate is a reasonable one, and plaintiff's bare

contention that the disparate job titles do not justify disparate treatment is

unavailing.

      Finally, plaintiff's contention the trial court erred in affording defendants

the favorable inference that they would not have fired plaintiff for objecting to

HIPAA violations is without merit, since plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue

of fact to suggest otherwise. The evidence negating the inference that Salese

was hostile to HIPAA compliance "'is so one-sided that [defendant] must prevail

as a matter of law'" on the issue of whether his recommendation was motivated

by the one HIPAA complaint plaintiff made to him in late summer 2018. Brill,

142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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