Court Opinion

ID: 9530477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:09.110388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:07.511849
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.
(dissenting): I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds there was evidence from which a jury could find that the appellees were guilty of negligence. In my opinion there was no evidence from which a jury could find that the appellees were negligent.
The only allegation of negligence in the appellant’s petition, concerning which the evidence might be considered debatable, is the allegation that the appellees failed to warn the appellant of the dangers created by the wet and slippery floor.
The evidence indicates that the appellant was told that her coat would be splattered with blood and water if she left it in the “killing room,” and that the employee in the “killing room” was not through cleaning at the time she entered. This was a normal *559condition in the “killing room.” This was the place where poultry was killed and blood as a matter of course splattered on the floor. She had taken her turkeys to the appellees for the purpose of having them dressed, and being from a farm near Carbondale where she and her husband raised chickens and turkeys which they sold to stores and individuals, it may be fairly assumed she was fully aware that dressing poultry was a messy affair.
When the appellant was asked what kind of a dress she was wearing, she answered:
“I just had a wash dress on because I came up there to work.” (Emphasis added.)
On cross examination the appellant testified:
“When I first entered the defendants killing room, I saw Mr. Vaughn. Mr. Vaughn was, at that time, standing over close to where the vats were with a hose in his hand. I then saw that the floor of the killing room was damp.
“Q. Now, when you started to hang up your coat you asked him where you could hang it I believe you said, is that correct?
“A. He said, ‘Lady, hang your coat around here in this closet where we hang our coats so it wont get soiled’.” (Emphasis added.)
There is no evidence whatever that there were any defects in the floor of the “killing room” on the appellees’ premises, nor does the appellant so contend.
In Steinmeyer v. McPherson, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P. 2d 236, the court said:
“. . . The proprietor of a trade or business is not an absolute insurer of the safety of customers. He is, however, liable for failure to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition for the protection of customers unless they know, or from facts they should know, of the possessor’s activities and of the risk involved therein . . .” (p. 278.) (Emphasis added.)
The proprietor of a store is not an insurer of his customers against injury, but is chargeable only with such care as is reasonable under the circumstances. (Thompson v. Beard and Gabelman, Inc., 169 Kan. 75, 216 P. 2d 798.)
The duty of care owed to business invitees who used the appellees’ “killing room” is not equivalent to, or the same as, the duty of care owed to business invitees who enter a grocery store for the purpose of buying groceries as illustrated in Little v. Butner, 186 Kan. 75, 348 P. 2d 1022. A case in point is George v. Ayesh, 179 Kan. 324, 295 P. 2d 660, where a salesman called on the defendant, a liquor dealer, for the purpose of selling him merchandise. He went into the back room where the liquor was stored and fell, tripping over *560a cardboard filler. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence and this court affirmed, saying:
“. . . The trouble, from plaintiff’s standpoint, is that the evidence here simply does not establish any such hidden dangerous defect as was present in the last-mentioned cases. ■
“In fact, as we read this record, there is a total lack of negligence on the part of defendant and no showing of a violation of any duty. The responsibility of a merchant or storekeeper varies according to the circumstances. The mere fact that an invitee slips or falls in a place of business does not necessarily render the owner or proprietor liable in damages. As a practical matter, it seems utterly unreasonable to say that the operator of a liquor store who allows a cardboard filler to remain on the floor of his storeroom in plain view of anyone who takes the trouble to observe, is guilty of negligence for so doing.” (pp. 326,327.) (Emphasis added.)
In my opinion the appellees owed no duty to the appellant to keep their floor in the “killing room” dry and free from blood and water. It was a normal condition to have blood and water on the floor of the “killing room.” The appellant knew the floor was wet. She was told by the employee in charge that he had not completed cleaning the floor, and that her coat would become splattered with blood and water if she hung it in the “killing room.” Knowing the condition of the room and the purpose for which it was used, any further warning to the appellant by the appellees would have been superfluous. She therefore entered this room at her own risk and the appellees had no further duty to warn the appellant of the condition of the floor in the “killing room.”
It is respectfully submitted the trial court did not err in sustaining the appellees’ demurrer to the appellant’s evidence.
Parker, C. J., and Price, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.