Court Opinion

ID: 9852880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:38:15.956866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:36.236316
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
After careful review, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion. I agree with the majority that defendant was not seized when the detectives approached defendant outside of his grandmother’s house in order to question him about a recent drive-by shooting. However, unlike the majority, I would further find that under the totality of the circumstances, the detectives in this case had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant for officer safety.
I. Frisk of Defendant
A. Reasonable Suspicion Based on the Totality of the Circumstances
When the detectives in this case frisked defendant, a temporary seizure occurred. “ ‘A police officer may effect a brief investigatory seizure of an individual where the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime may be underway.’ ” State v. Williams, 195 N.C. App. 554, 557, 673 S.E.2d 394, 396 (2009) (quoting State v. Barnard, 184 N.C. App. 25, 29, 645 S.E.2d 780, 783 (2007), aff’d, 362 N.C. 244, 658 S.E.2d 643, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008)). “Reasonable articulable suspicion requires that ‘[t]he stop ... be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994)). Officers may conduct a “Terry” frisk of a person suspected of committing a crime to ensure that the individual is not armed; however, “[t]he scope of a search conducted pursuant to Terry v. Ohio is limited. The purpose ‘is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.’ ” Matter of Whitley, 122 N.C. App. 290, 293, 468 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1996) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617 (1972)).
In the case sub judice, the detectives had a reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot and that defendant could be armed. Under the totality of the circumstances, the detectives were aware of the following: 1) at least one confidential reliable informant *217who had provided information in the past had implicated defendant in a recent drive-by shooting; 2) several informants and anonymous tipsters had reported that defendant sold drugs in . that area; 3) defendant was traveling in the path from the Food Mart to his grandmother’s house as the informants and tipsters claimed he would; 4) defendant picked up his pace when he saw the detectives looking in his direction; 5) defendant was visibly nervous when the detectives attempted to question him; and 6) defendant was wearing red pants, which indicated to Detective Massey that defendant may be affiliated with a local gang. Any one of these factors alone may not justify reasonable suspicion; however, the totality of the circumstances, “ ‘as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer’ ” suggested that a pat down for weapons would be prudent for officer safety as criminal activity may have been afoot. Williams, 195 N.C. App. at 558, 673 S.E.2d at 396 (quoting Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70); see also State v. Garcia, 197 N.C. App. 522, 529, 677 S.E.2d 555, 559 (2009) (“Factors to determine whether reasonable suspicion existed include activity at an unusual hour, a suspect’s nervousness, presence in a high-crime area, and unprovoked flight. However, none of those factors are sufficient independently.”).
I firmly believe that the detectives in this case had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant could be armed based solely on the confidential informant’s tip that defendant was involved in a recent drive-by shooting and was wearing gang colors. A reasonable officer under the circumstances would think that defendant could be in possession of a weapon since he was reportedly involved in a drive-by shooting. The other evidence presented at the hearing, including defendant’s actions and the tips that defendant was dealing drugs in the area, were merely additional factors leading to reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err in concluding as a matter of law that “it was reasonable and justified to frisk the defendant for the presence of weapons.”
B. Confidential Reliable Informants and Anonymous Tipsters
While I find the tips to be rehable in this case, reasonable suspicion did not hinge solely on the reliability of the tips received by the detectives. First, an informant who Detective Hughes stated had provided reliable information in the past told-Detective Hughes that defendant was involved in a drive-by shooting. This tip formed the basis of the detectives’ decision to speak with defendant, which the majority correctly holds did not invoke Fourth Amendment scrutiny. *218Second, the information supplied to the detectives by other informants and anonymous tipsters that defendant was selling drugs in the area merely provided additional factors in the totality of the circumstances that would lead the detectives to believe a frisk was necessary for officer safety. In other words, the tips did not form the sole basis for reasonable suspicion. However, our Supreme Court has stated:
We reiterate that the overarching inquiry when assessing reasonable suspicion is always based on the totality of the circumstances. When police act on the basis of an informant’s tip, the indicia of the tip’s reliability are certainly among the circumstances that must be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. The potential indicia of reliability include all “the facts known to the officers from personal observation,” including those that do not necessarily corroborate or refute the informant’s statements.
State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 619, 669 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2008) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990)).
Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact, which were supported by the testimonies of Detectives Hughes and Massey:
8. Prior to that time [2 July 2006], Detective Hughes and Detective Massey had received information from confidential and reliable informants and concerned citizens in the area that the officers deemed reliable and tending to indicate that the defendant had been involved in a recent drive-by shooting on Burch Avenue in Roxboro and further tending to indicate that the defendant had been dealing in illegal drugs in the area.
14. The information within the knowledge of the officers as to the defendant’s involvement in the shooting and in the involvement of dealing in controlled substances had come from multiple sources and was fairly fresh, some having come within a day or two before July 2, 2006 and some as recent as two-four months prior. The last information provided to Detective Hughes as to the defendant’s involvement in the illegal sales of drugs was not as old as two months.
*219It appears from the detectives’ testimony that some of the information came from confidential and reliable informants used in the past and some from anonymous tipsters. Unlike the majority, for the following reasons I find that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the informants were confidential and reliable, and thus properly served as a basis for reasonable suspicion: 1) the detectives testified that they had utilized these informants in the past and they were reliable; 2) the information was sufficiently detailed; 3) the anonymous tips corroborated the statements made by the informants; and 4) defendant acted in conformity with the tips. However, assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in finding the informants to be reliable, I would still find that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the detectives’ actions based on the totality of the circumstances.
Furthermore, not only were there reliable informants that indicated defendant was involved in a drive-by shooting and selling drugs in the area, there were additional anonymous tipsters that also claimed defendant was selling drugs in the area. “An anonymous informant’s tip may form the basis for reasonable suspicion, but it must exhibit ‘sufficient indicia of reliability.’ But even ‘[a] tip that is somewhat lacking in reliability may still provide a basis for reasonable suspicion if it is buttressed by sufficient police corroboration.’ ” Garcia, 197 N.C. App. at 529, 677 S.E.2d at 559-60 (quoting State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 207, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000)). In Garcia, “[the] [defendant arguefd] that the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion before they put him into investigatory detention because the anonymous tips were insufficient and the police officers otherwise observed only innocent behavior.” Id. at 529, 677 S.E.2d at 560 (emphasis added).4 This Court addressed defendant’s argument and stated:
The anonymous tips provided specific information of illegal activity — possessing and selling marijuana. The tipster also provided a specific location — Defendant’s residence. Furthermore, the tipster specifically referenced the shed, the area from which Detective Jones later observed Defendant and his partner emerge carrying a black bag they placed in the rear seat of the black BMW.
*220Id. The Court found that defendant acted in a manner consistent with the tipster’s claims and went on to say, “[e]ven assuming information in the anonymous tips was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion, we hold that the trial court’s findings of fact support the conclusion that the police sufficiently corroborated the anonymous tips” through a background check and surveillance of the defendant. Id.
In the case sub judice, there was no evidence that the detectives independently corroborated the tips, but there was evidence that defendant acted in conformity with the tips. Like Garcia, the tipsters in this case named defendant, the specific crime he was committing, and the path he would be on from the Food Mart to his grandmother’s house where he stored the drugs. Unlike Garcia, defendant did not act in an otherwise innocent manner. Here, defendant picked up his pace when he saw the officers, was wearing clothing consistent with gang affiliation, and acted nervously when the detectives approached.
Assuming, arguendo, that the various tips alone were not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion, these additional factors, coupled with the tips, were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for the frisk. The majority cites to cases such as State v. Hughes and State v. Rhyne to support its argument, but in those cases a single anonymous tipster gave a vague description of the defendant, and the tip was the sole basis for the officers’ reasonable suspicion. Hughes, 353 N.C. at 208-09, 539 S.E.2d at 631; Rhyne, 124 N.C. App. 84, 90-91, 478 S.E.2d 789, 792-93 (1996). Here, the tips came from multiple sources (some from confidential and reliable informants and some from anonymous tipsters), were specific, and were only factors in the totality of the circumstances.
Based on the foregoing, I disagree with the majority’s analysis and would hold that the frisk of defendant for officer safety was based on reasonable suspicion. I will now address the remainder of defendant’s arguments.
II. Removal of the Scales
Defendant argues that the detectives’ search impermissibly exceeded a pat down for weapons and became a reconnaissance for contraband. Specifically, defendant contends that Detective Hughes unlawfully removed the scale from defendant’s pocket upon feeling it during the pat down.
[A] protective search — permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause — must be *221strictly “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 344 (1993) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 908 (1968)). However, “officers, at least under certain circumstances, may seize contraband detected during the lawful execution of a Terry search.” Id. at 374, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 344.
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified....
Id. at 375-76, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 346.
The officer must have probable cause to believe the item he or she feels is contraband. See State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. 222, 226, 612 S.E.2d 371, 376 (“Evidence of contraband, plainly felt during a pat-down or frisk, may also be admissible, provided the officer had probable cause to believe that the item was in fact contraband.”), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 75, 624 S.E.2d 369 (2005). “ ‘Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing the offense.’ ” State v. Bowman, 193 N.C. App. 104, 109, 666 S.E.2d 831, 834-35 (2008) (quoting State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 306, 612 S.E.2d 420, 425 (2005)).
Here, Officer Hughes testified that upon feeling the dimensions of the scale, he immediately knew what it was due to his experience and training. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.21 (2007), a scale is considered illegal contraband if used to weigh or measure a controlled substance. Officer Hughes testified that individuals selling drugs on the street will often carry a scale in his or her pocket to weigh the controlled substance before distribution. Furthermore, Detective Hughes asked defendant if there was a scale in his back pocket, and defendant confirmed it. Because Detective Hughes immediately identified the scale upon touching it, without manipulation, and based on his *222experience he believed the scale to be contraband, the trial court did not err in concluding that “Detective Hughes was reasonable and justified in seizing said scales from the defendant.”
III. Continued Search of Defendant
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly concluded that the detectives had probable cause to search defendant further upon finding the scale. Defendant claims that the following conclusion of law was erroneous5:
6. However, the officers had reasonable and justified suspicion to speak with the defendant and justification for a “Terry” frisk for weapons. Upon the discovery of the scales and with all of the other circumstances and information, the officers had probable cause under exigent circumstances to search the defendant for the presence of evidence of crime involving controlled substances.
Defendant strictly argues that the trial court erred in concluding that discovery of the digital scale provided probable cause for the continued search of defendant’s person, but defendant makes no argument concerning the trial court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances formed the basis for the warrantless search of defendant’s other pockets subsequent to the pat down.
Here, Detective Hughes testified that based on his experience in law enforcement, he immediately ascertained that the object he felt in defendant’s pocket was a scale due to its clearly ascertainable dimensions. He further testified that in his personal experience, drug dealers often early scales. These facts, coupled with information that defendant was selling drugs in the area, led him to believe that the scale was being used to weigh drugs prior to distribution, which meant that the scale constituted drug paraphernalia pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.21.6 The fact that defendant was coming from the area in which the informants claimed he was selling drugs, and his nervous behavior, are additional factors leading to the detectives’ belief that defendant was involved in illegal activity. Based on these facts and circumstances, I would find no error in the trial court’s con*223elusion that the scale provided probable cause to believe that defendant was also in possession of drugs.
After finding that probable cause existed to believe defendant was in possession of additional contraband, the next step would be to determine whether there were exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. See State v. Yates, 162 N.C. App. 118, 122-23, 589 S.E.2d 902, 904-05 (2004). However, defendant in this case does not argue that the trial court erred in finding exigent circumstances as the basis for the warrantless search; thus I decline to address that issue. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
IV. Findings of Fact
Defendant also takes issue with findings of fact eight, ten, and fourteen, claiming that these findings were not supported by competent evidence.
Finding of fact eight characterizes the detectives’ source of information concerning the drive-by shooting and defendant’s drug sales as “confidential and reliable informants.” Based on the enumerated factors discussed supra, I would find that this finding of fact was supported by competent evidence. Again, assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in finding the informants to be reliable, I would still find that there was reasonable suspicion for the detectives’ actions.
Finding of fact ten states that “[f]or his safety and that of his fellow officer, Detective Hughes conducted a pat down of the defendant as a frisk for weapons.” As discussed supra, I find that there was justification for the pat down. This finding is not erroneous as it was based on the evidence presented by the detectives .that they believed defendant to be involved in criminal activity and potentially armed.
The trial court, in finding number fourteen stated that the information from the informants was “fairly fresh.” The evidence tended to show that the information concerning the drive-by was relayed to Detective' Hughes approximately two days before 2 July, and the information concerning the drug sales was received between two to four months prior. There was competent evidence that the information was “fairly fresh.” Accordingly, I find no error in the trial court’s findings of fact.
Based on the above reasoning, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly the judgment in this case should be affirmed.

. While Garcia deals with an investigatory detention, not a frisk, the analysis pertaining to anonymous tipsters forming the basis for reasonable suspicion is applicable here.

. Defendant amended Ms assignments of error to incMde additional conclusions of law, but he did not seek to amend Ms brief or file a response brief in order to make arguments concerning these new assignments of error, thus they are abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).

. I do not address the trial court’s contention that the scale alone was insufficient evidence to arrest defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia.