Court Opinion

ID: 9395899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 19:03:58.034188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.544999
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/18/23 P. v. Galvez CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B319256

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. KA070312)
         v.

DAVID ALEJANDRO
GALVEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert M. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
      Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A.
Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                     I. INTRODUCTION

      Defendant David Alejandro Galvez appeals from the trial
court’s denial of his request to strike firearm enhancements
under Penal Code1 section 12022.53, subdivision (h). We affirm.

                      II. BACKGROUND

A.    Prior Proceedings

        In 2006, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first
degree murder. (People v. Galvez (Aug. 22, 2007, B194868)
[nonpub. opn.].) The trial court sentenced defendant to two terms
of life without the possibility of parole, plus an additional 25-
years-to-life firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) on each
count. (Ibid.)
        In 2015, defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that he was entitled to a resentencing hearing pursuant
to Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460. (People v. Galvez
(Feb. 22, 2018, B279420 [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court granted
the petition and conducted a hearing, after which it imposed the
same sentence. (Ibid.) Defendant appealed, and a prior panel of
this court, among other things, remanded the matter for the
limited purpose of allowing the court to consider whether to
exercise its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) to
strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements. (Ibid.)
        On remand, the trial court declined to strike the firearm
enhancements. Defendant appealed, and in 2019, this court
reversed and remanded for the court to take into consideration all

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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appropriate factors in determining whether to strike the
enhancements in the interests of justice under section 1385.
(People v. Galvez (Nov. 25, 2019, B294969 [nonpub. opn.].)
       Defendant did not appear at the hearing on remand, where
the trial court again declined to strike the firearm enhancements.
(People v. Galvez (Oct. 1, 2021, B306796) [nonpub. opn.].) In
2021, this court again reversed because there was no substantial
evidence that defendant had waived his right to be present at the
hearing. (Ibid.) In the remittitur, this court ordered, “[t]he order
is reversed and remanded for the trial court to conduct a section
12022.53, subdivision (h) hearing, at which defendant has the
right to be present unless defendant waives his appearance in
compliance with section 977, subdivision (b)(1).” (Ibid.)

B.    Current Proceedings

      On January 18, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing
on remand. It ordered that defendant appear but defendant
refused to be transported from prison. Defense counsel reminded
the court that defendant had previously told counsel both
telephonically and in writing that “he didn’t want to be in court.
He didn’t want to be brought down, and [counsel] had his
permission to go forward without him being present.”
      The trial court set the matter for a further hearing on
March 22, 2022, ordered that defendant appear, and advised
defense counsel, “in the interim, you can speak with, write to
him. And, if he doesn’t want to appear, he can indicate in writing
to the court through you that he is abandoning his
remittitur . . . .”

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        Defense counsel responded: “I don’t think because he
doesn’t want to appear means he’s abandoning his remittitur . . . .
[¶] I think he has a life and he’s been working his program, and
he doesn’t want to, in effect, move out of his house . . . . [¶] I will
write him and . . . I can [co]mpose a [section] 977 waiver,
although in order [for it] to be valid it has to be executed in court,
on the record.”
        The trial court directed defense counsel to advise defendant
that it would order an extraction of defendant if he failed to
appear and issued a removal order for defendant’s appearance at
the March 22, 2022, hearing.
        On March 4, 2022, defendant filed a “Waiver of Personal
Appearance P.C. § 977 (B),” which he had signed on
February 24, 2022. That document stated: “‘The undersigned
defendant, having been advised of his . . . right to be present at
all stages of the proceedings, . . . hereby waives the right to be
present at the hearing of any motion or other proceeding other
than trial in this cause. The undersigned defendant hereby
requests the court to proceed during every absence of the
defendant that the court may permit pursuant to this waiver, and
hereby agrees that his. . . interest is represented at all times by
the presence of his . . . attorney the same as if the defendant were
personally present in court, and further agrees that notice to his
. . . attorney that his . . . presence in court on a particular day at
a particular time is required is notice to the defendant of the
requirement of his . . . appearance at that time and place.’”
        Defendant also filed his February 24, 2022, letter to
counsel, in which he explained: “I am writing to you because I
received the letter & paper work that you sent me concerning my
case. [¶] Here I am sending you the waiver signed up back to

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you. I do not want to be present in court, I do not want to go back
down to court. I waive my right to be present, please proceed
without me. And we can get video visits, so you can contact the
prison and tell them that you want to video visit with me. But
again I do not want to be present on my next court date (3/22/22)
just proceed without me, please I’m tire[d] of going back down for
nothing. It seems like [J]udge Martine[z] has a personal
v[e]ndet[t]a again[st] me. I’m going to call you tomorrow. Thank
you for your help. Have a nice day. [¶] ‘I DO NOT WANT TO
BE PRESENT ON MY NEXT COURT DATE 3.22.22’ THANK
YOU!”
       On March 16, 2022, at defendant’s request, the trial court
held a hearing. Defense counsel stated: “I provided to the court
the 977(b) signed by [defendant] and his letter that was written
to me that specifically states, [‘]I do not want to be present. I
have executed the 977(b). I don’t want to be present.[’] He
doesn’t want to be brought out. [¶] . . . [¶] And [defendant] had
a family member call me this morning. He is very upset because
he is being told he is going to be taken, and he does not wish to
come to court.”
      The trial court2 responded: “This is Judge Martinez’s case,
and I have discussed that with him, and he goes, well, the Court
of Appeal[] wants him to be present.”
      Defense counsel responded that the reason for the remand
was that defendant had not previously executed a written waiver
pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1).
      The trial court read into the record the disposition from our
prior October 1, 2021, opinion, including its statement that

2    The judge for the March 16, 2022, hearing was Judge Juan
C. Dominguez.

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defendant had the right to be present “unless the defendant
waive[d] his appearance in compliance with 977, subdivision
(b)(1).” The court then asked counsel, “So that has been done?”
       Counsel responded, “[T]hat has been done, but I want to
put a proviso there. [¶] Because normally a 977(b)(1) is executed
on the record in court. However, the emergency procedures,
because of COVID, are still in effect with regard to 977(b), and,
therefore, we have a valid 977(b) waiver signed by [defendant]
with a letter from [defendant] confirming he did sign the 977(b).
He authorizes me to act on his behalf, and he does not wish to be
present.”
       The trial court stated, “I think that should be enough.”
Defense counsel agreed; and the court then rescinded the removal
order.
       On March 22, 2022, the trial court held the hearing on
remand without defendant being present. The court permitted
defense counsel to “supplement [counsel’s] comments and point
out the areas that [counsel] perceived to be inaccurate” regarding
defendant’s prison disciplinary record. Defense counsel did so.
       The trial court stated that the court of appeal had
“remanded the matter to come to this court to give the court the
opportunity to address whether or not it should exercise its
discretion. It did not say the court must exercise its discretion.”
The court then described various factors it considered and ruled,
“The motion to strike the use allegations is denied, in that the
court finds that the interest of justice would not be served by the
striking or reduction of the use allegations.”
       The trial court then expressed concern that defendant had
not appeared at the hearing and opined that “[t]he fact that the
written waiver was not executed in open court still leaves an

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open issue. On the other hand, the court is of the view that,
based on the cases of [People v. Fuimano (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
132 (Fuimano) and People v. Johnson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 938
(Johnson)], it appears that the hearing on the striking of the use
allegations in this matter should have been summarily denied
since [defendant’s] judgment was final and that he was not
entitled to the provisions of Senate Bill number 620 because of
the finality of his sentence.” Defendant timely appealed.

                        III. DISCUSSION

A.    Compliance with Section 977, Subdivision (b)(1)

       Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
proceeding with the hearing on remand when defendant had
failed to appear or execute a written waiver of his appearance in
open court as required by section 977, subdivision (b)(1). We
disagree.
       At the time of the hearing on remand, section 977,
subdivision (b)(1) provided, in pertinent part, “[t]he accused shall
be personally present at all other proceedings unless they shall,
with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of
their right to be personally present, as provided by paragraph
(2).”3 (See Stats. 2021, ch. 196, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) The fact
that defendant did not execute his written waiver in open court

3     Effective June 30, 2022, section 977, subdivision (b) was
amended to permit remote proceedings and to remove the
requirement that an appearance waiver be executed in open
court. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 57, § 12.)

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does not, however, necessarily render the court’s acceptance of
that waiver contrary to section 977, subdivision (b)(1).
       The doctrine of substantial compliance applies to section
977, subdivision (b)(1) waivers. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th
324, 406.) Under that doctrine, “substantial compliance may
suffice in some circumstances if the purpose of the statute is
satisfied.” (People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420.)
“‘Substantial compliance’ means actual compliance in respect to
the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the
statute, as distinguished from mere technical imperfections of
form. [Citations.] The essential inquiry is whether under the
circumstances the policies underlying the statute were served.
[Citation.] ‘“Where there is compliance as to all matters of
substance[,] technical deviations are not to be given the stature of
noncompliance.”’” (Id. at p. 1421)
       As our Supreme Court explained, section 977, subdivision
(b)(1), “though designed to implement a defendant’s right to be
present, also serves an important public interest. The efficient
functioning of the criminal justice system is enhanced by
compelling a defendant’s appearance at critical portions of his or
her case, and by requiring the court-authorized written waiver at
other covered proceedings to foreclose any doubt whether to
proceed in the defendant’s absence.” (People v. Safety National
Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 715.) This record
forecloses any doubt that defendant wished to waive his
appearance. Here, defendant submitted a written waiver that
included a recitation of the waiver language as set forth at
section 977, subdivision (b)(2). Further, in his letter to counsel,
defendant expressly stated, numerous times, that he did not wish
to appear for the remand hearing scheduled for March 22, 2022.

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      To the extent defendant now characterizes his letter as
expressing a willingness to participate in the remand hearing by
“video conferenc[e],” we disagree. The only reference to a “video”
in defendant’s letter was to “video visits” with his counsel.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court substantially
complied with section 977, subdivision (b)(1).

B.    Denial of Request to Strike Firearm Enhancements

       Defendant alternatively argues that the trial court erred by
relying on Fuimano, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 132 and Johnson,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 938, to summarily deny defendant relief on
the grounds that his conviction was final. To the extent
defendant contends that the trial court mistakenly believed that
it lacked discretion to strike the sentencing enhancements, we
disagree. The court expressly stated that it was considering
defendant’s motion and declined to exercise its discretion to
strike the firearm enhancements.
       Although the trial court opined that “it appear[ed]” that the
hearing on this matter “should have been summarily denied,”
(italics added) the context of the court’s statements made it clear
that this was an alternative ruling in the event that its
acceptance of defendant’s waiver of his right to be present at the
hearing was reversed on appeal. Having concluded that the court
substantially complied with section 977, subdivision (b)(1) in
accepting defendant’s waiver, we need not decide the merits of
the court’s alternative ruling.

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                        IV. DISPOSITION

      The order denying defendant’s request to strike the firearm
enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (h) is
affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             MOOR, J.

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