Court Opinion

ID: 9779810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:48:00.28283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:15:36.523298
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARTER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority’s analysis and conclusions on the issues, with one exception in the instant case. I have an additional comment regarding the use of exhibit 17 at the trial. I dissent on the issue regarding the examination of the plaintiffs’ expert regarding bed-wetting. I agree with the majority’s analysis that it was error for the trial court to admit the chart from a medical article as defense exhibit 17 as substantive evidence. The error was compounded when the exhibit was sent to the jury room. Under current Illinois law, the admissibility of information from learned treatises is permitted under both direct examination, as part of the basis of the expert’s opinion, and cross-examination, for impeachment, if the information is authenticated as a reliable authority. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §§202.1, 703.1, 705.1, 705.2 (9th ed. 2009). However, in Illinois the information is still not admissible as substantive evidence because of the absence of a “learned treatise” hearsay exception. See Costa v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11, 642 N.E.2d 898, 905 (1994); Fornoff v. Parke Davis & Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 681, 690-91, 434 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1982); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §§703.1, 705.1 (9th ed. 2009). Even under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(18), the “learned treatise” hearsay exception, the statements, if admitted and read into evidence, are still not to be received as exhibits. Fed. R. Evid. 803(18). I dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion regarding the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court erred by allowing defense counsel to question plaintiffs’ expert, Gibbons, about whether the parents’ divorce may have caused the child’s bed-wetting, wherein the majority determined that the evidence was irrelevant. In the instant case, the child’s continued bed-wetting is claimed as an aspect of the injury as well as the damage suffered by the child. At the discovery deposition, the expert indicated that family disturbances, such as divorce, could cause bed-wetting. At trial, defense counsel questioned Gibbons regarding alternative explanations for the child’s bed-wetting, such as divorce. Although the discovery deposition testimony arguably is not a direct contradiction to the trial testimony, I believe that the prior discovery testimony was sufficiently inconsistent with the trial testimony to allow defense counsel to question the expert on this matter as having a tendency to impeach the witness. See Smith v. Silver Cross Hospital, 339 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72, 790 N.E.2d 77, 81-82 (2003); Ogg v. City of Springfield, 121 Ill. App. 3d 25, 38-39, 458 N.E.2d 1331, 1340-41 (1984); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §§613.2, 705.2 (9th ed. 2009). In addition any permissible kind of impeaching matter is allowed to be developed in cross-examination to test the credibility of a witness or the accuracy of a witness’s opinion. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §705.2 (9th ed. 2009). Since the matter of bed-wetting is a fact of consequence and material in this case, I would find it to be error not to allow defense counsel to cross-examine on that point. Thus, I would find that the trial court properly allowed defense counsel to cross-examine the plaintiffs’ expert on other possible causes of bed-wetting. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.