Court Opinion

ID: 9928190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:36.744678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:47.609766
License: Public Domain

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                          IN RE OLIVIA W.*
                              (AC 46196)
                    Bright, C. J., and Moll and Clark, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The respondent parents appealed to this court from the judgment of the
    trial court adjudicating their minor child, O, to be neglected and commit-
    ting her to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
    and Families. The Department of Children and Families received a report
    alleging emotional abuse and maltreatment of O by the respondent
    father, which was submitted after O’s school had discovered an elec-
    tronic document written by O indicating that the father had abused her.
    Approximately two weeks later, in November, 2021, while the first report
    was being investigated by the department, the department received a
    second report alleging abuse of O by the father, which indicated that
    the father had dropped O off at the emergency department of a local
    children’s hospital for concerns of her mental health and behavior. The
    report further indicated that O had told hospital staff that the physical
    injuries that she had sustained, from her head down to her left shin, had
    been inflicted by the father and that there had been physical altercations
    going on for a while between herself and the father. O was initially
    released from the children’s hospital into the respondent mother’s care,
    but the following day, after a safety assessment, the department deter-
    mined that O’s situation was unsafe and invoked a ninety-six hour hold
    on O. The petitioner subsequently applied for an ex parte order of
    temporary custody, which was granted by the court and sustained by
    the agreement of the parties. The petitioner filed a neglect petition on the
    grounds that O was being denied proper care and attention, physically,
    educationally, emotionally, or morally, or permitted to live under condi-
    tions, circumstances, or associations injurious to her well-being. In May,
    2022, O was admitted to the adolescent unit of another hospital, and
    she remained in that hospital’s care for the duration of the trial on the
    neglect petition, which spanned from May, 2022, through the middle of
    December, 2022. Each parent was represented at trial by an attorney
    until the end of November, 2022, when, on the fourteenth day of trial
    and during their case-in-chief, the parents filed appearances in lieu of
    their respective attorneys and proceeded to represent themselves for
    the remainder of the trial. Several days later, while the neglect trial was
    ongoing, the petitioner filed an emergency motion for an evidentiary
    hearing and an order authorizing the department to make medical, psy-
    chological, and educational decisions on behalf of O, which the court
    granted after conducting an evidentiary hearing and hearing argument
    from the parties. On the parents’ appeal to this court, held:
1. The respondent parents could not prevail on their claim that there was
    insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that O
    was neglected: after a careful review of the record, this court concluded
    that the trial court’s factual findings with regard to its neglect determina-
    tion were supported by sufficient evidence in the record, including, but
    not limited to, medical records, the testimony of the investigative social
    worker and his investigation protocol, and the photographs depicting
    O’s injuries; moreover, this court further concluded, as a matter of law,
    that the facts properly found by the trial court, which demonstrated
    that the respondent father had physical altercations with O and verbally
    demeaned her prior to November, 2021, that, in November, 2021, after,
    in his own words, having ‘‘lost his shit,’’ the father inflicted excessive
    physical injuries on O, and that the respondent mother did not intervene
    to protect O, were sufficient to support the court’s neglect determination.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in
    O’s best interest to be committed to the custody of the petitioner: in
    support of its determination, the court found that O suffered from severe
    mental health and behavioral problems that required long-term intensive
    care and therapy, the respondent parents engaged in conduct that was
    detrimental to O’s well-being following her May, 2022 hospitalization,
    particularly by rescinding medical releases, which prevented the depart-
     ment from communicating with O’s treatment providers and extended
     O’s hospitalization when other treatment was more appropriate, and,
     notwithstanding the respondent father’s completion of parenting classes
     and his participation in therapy, the parents’ relationship with O was
     fractured, as evidenced by the father’s physical actions toward O com-
     mitted with the respondent mother’s approval, the father’s decision to
     leave O alone at the children’s hospital in November, 2021, and the
     father demeaning O verbally during her later hospitalization; moreover,
     the court also expressed concern that, with the mother’s acquiescence,
     the father again would react in a physical manner toward O if a situation
     similar to the incident in November, 2021, occurred in the future; further-
     more, the court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence in the
     record, including, but not limited to, the testimony of medical personnel,
     department personnel, and the guardian ad litem.
3. The respondent parents could not prevail on their claim that they were
     denied equitable treatment stemming from numerous procedural or evi-
     dentiary errors that purportedly occurred during the neglect proceed-
     ings:
    a. The parents failed to adequately brief their claims that the trial court
    improperly precluded them from submitting certain evidence into the
    record, that the court impermissibly curtailed their right to recall wit-
    nesses during their case-in-chief, that the court improperly failed to
    invalidate a hospital record admitted into evidence that the petitioner
    had allegedly inappropriately obtained, and that the court impermissibly
    declined an oral request by the respondent father to permit his former
    attorney to remain available to him as advisory counsel, and, therefore,
    this court considered those claims to be abandoned.
    b. The parents’ claim that the court improperly made comments that
    prompted the petitioner to file the emergency motion was not supported
    by the record.
    c. Contrary to the parents’ claims, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
    tion when it precluded the parents, on the last day of their case-in-
    chief, from seeking to subpoena two children’s hospital employees as
    witnesses, when it declined the father’s offer on the last day of trial to
    introduce into evidence an audio recording of an incident that occurred
    outside of the courtroom on the fourteenth day of trial, which ultimately
    resulted in the remainder of the trial being held remotely, when it permit-
    ted the petitioner to call certain witnesses during the evidentiary hearing
    on the emergency motion notwithstanding that the petitioner had failed
    to disclose them in advance of the hearing, or when it permitted the
    petitioner to offer certain evidence into the record that the respondent
    mother did not receive in advance of the evidentiary hearing, given that
    the petitioner’s counsel represented that the document had been emailed
    to the mother, it was discovered that the petitioner’s counsel had emailed
    the document to an outdated email address of the mother, and the
    petitioner’s counsel represented that she would email the document to
    the mother’s current email address immediately.
    d. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny the parents’
    motion for a continuance to allow them to retain new counsel that they
    filed in December, 2022, on the eighteenth day of trial, on the basis of
    its reasoning that O’s needs required the neglect proceedings to be
    completed promptly, trial had been ongoing since May, 2022, and it had
    canvassed the parents when they elected to represent themselves and
    cautioned them about the perils of self-representation.
    e. The parents’ claim that they were not given equitable access to depart-
    ment records despite having submitted certain records requests to the
    department was untenable because the court, in fact, ordered the peti-
    tioner to provide the records to the parents, and at no point during the
    remainder of the trial did the parents indicate to the court that the
    petitioner had failed to comply with the court’s order.
    f. The parents failed to demonstrate any impropriety committed by the
    judge who presided over the pretrial in the underlying action, as their
    assertion that the pretrial judge engaged in ex parte communications
    with the petitioner and with a department social worker was belied
    by the transcript of the hearing, which indicated that the proceeding
    concerned neglect petitions filed as to the parents’ other two children,
    and any claimed error was outside of the scope of the present matter;
    moreover, although the pretrial judge granted preliminary relief prior to
    the evidentiary hearing on the emergency motion, the trial court judge
    who presided over the neglect trial conducted the evidentiary hearing
  and ultimately granted the emergency motion.
    Argued October 12, 2023—officially released January 4, 2024**

                         Procedural History

   Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child
neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, and tried to the
court, Hon. Stephen F. Frazzini, judge trial referee;
judgment adjudicating the minor child neglected and
committing the minor child to the custody of the Com-
missioner of Children and Families, from which the
respondent father appealed to this court; thereafter, the
respondent mother was granted permission to join the
respondent father’s appeal. Affirmed.
  Kristen W., self-represented, the appellant (respon-
dent father).
  Katrina W., self-represented, the appellant (respon-
dent mother).
  Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and
Evan O’Roark and Albert J. Oneto IV, assistant attor-
neys general, for the appellee (petitioner).
                          Opinion

   PER CURIAM. The self-represented respondents,
Kristen W. (father) and Katrina W. (mother), appeal1
from the judgment of the trial court adjudicating their
minor child, Olivia W., to be neglected and committing
her to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner
of Children and Families. On appeal, the respondents
raise numerous claims, which we interpret as asserting
that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
court’s neglect determination, (2) the court improperly
determined that committing Olivia to the custody of
the petitioner was in her best interest, and (3) they
‘‘were denied equitable treatment’’ as a result of various
procedural or evidentiary errors that purportedly
occurred during the neglect proceedings.2 We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
  The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. On November 5,
2021, the Department of Children and Families (depart-
ment) invoked a ninety-six hour hold on Olivia, who
was fourteen years old at the time. On November 9,
2021, the petitioner applied for an ex parte order of
temporary custody. On the same day, the trial court,
Hon. Stephen F. Frazzini, judge trial referee, issued
an order of temporary custody, which the court, Dan-
nehy, J., sustained by the agreement of the parties on
November 19, 2021.
   Additionally, on November 9, 2021, the petitioner
filed a neglect petition on the grounds that Olivia was
being (1) denied proper care and attention, physically,
educationally, emotionally, or morally, or (2) permitted
to live under conditions, circumstances, or associations
injurious to her well-being. Along with the neglect peti-
tion, the petitioner filed a summary of facts substantiat-
ing the allegations of neglect, which set forth the follow-
ing relevant allegations. On October 14, 2021, the
department received a report alleging ‘‘[e]motional
[a]buse/[m]altreatment’’ of Olivia by the father, which
was submitted after Olivia’s school had discovered an
electronic document written by Olivia indicating that
the father had abused her. Specifically, Olivia wrote
that (1) ‘‘ ‘[the father’s] ways of punishment never work
when it causes pain,’ ’’ (2) the father called her names
‘‘such as ‘retarded’ and ‘a disgrace,’ ’’ and (3) the father
got ‘‘ ‘physical’ ’’ with her at times by ‘‘throwing
objects.’’ When approached by school staff about the
electronic document, Olivia began crying and making
suicidal statements, which resulted in Emergency
Mobile Psychiatric Services responding and evaluat-
ing her.
  On October 21, 2021, the department conducted a
response visit, during which the father conveyed that
he did not believe that Olivia was suicidal but, rather,
that her ‘‘issues stem[med] from [her] being ‘unmoti-
vated and lazy.’ ’’ During the same visit, Olivia appeared
‘‘fearful’’ of the father as evidenced by ‘‘heavy breathing,
nervousness and motioning to the responding social
worker not to share the things in the [October 14, 2021]
report with [the] [f]ather.’’
   On November 2, 2021, the department received a
second report alleging abuse of Olivia by the father.
Per the report, on the morning of November 2, 2021,
the father brought Olivia to the emergency department
of the Connecticut Children’s Medical Center (CCMC)
‘‘for concerns of her mental health and behavior,’’ where
he expressed that he ‘‘ ‘just want[ed] the [s]tate to take
[Olivia]’ and to ‘put her in foster care.’ ’’ An evaluation
at the emergency department revealed that Olivia had
sustained ‘‘physical injuries on her body from her head
down to her left shin . . . .’’3 Olivia stated that the
father had caused her injuries and that ‘‘there ha[d] been
physical altercations ‘going on for a while’ ’’ between
herself and the father. Olivia further stated that (1) the
father had slammed and broken her computer during
the prior evening and (2) the father had ‘‘ ‘anger
issues.’ ’’
   The father’s initial explanation of the events preced-
ing Olivia’s arrival at CCMC was that (1) ‘‘Olivia was
‘being mean to [the] mother, swearing and giving [the
mother] the finger,’ ’’ (2) there was a ‘‘verbal alterca-
tion’’ about Olivia finishing her schoolwork, and (3) the
father ‘‘ ‘lost his shit’ and pushed Olivia into a closet
where she fell and tried to get [up] and fell again a few
times.’’ In subsequent communications, however, the
respondents stated that the father’s physical altercation
with Olivia that resulted in her injuries ‘‘occurred as a
reaction to protect [one of Olivia’s younger brothers]
from [her].’’ The father stated that, in the moment, ‘‘he
felt as though he had ‘no other choice’ ’’ and admitted
to physically injuring Olivia. The mother, who was pres-
ent at the time of the incident but did not intervene to
protect Olivia, supported the father’s account of the
incident, ‘‘stating that [the] [f]ather stepped in to ‘pro-
tect [Olivia’s younger brother],’ and that Olivia ha[d] a
recent history of aggressive and threatening behavior.’’4
    On November 4, 2021, the respondents presented a
safety plan that included (1) Olivia being discharged
from CCMC into the mother’s care and (2) the father
leaving the family home temporarily. Olivia was dis-
charged from CCMC on the same day. Later that eve-
ning, the mother contacted a department social worker
‘‘insist[ing] that [the] [f]ather and Olivia have contact
[that night] despite Olivia’s protest, due to th[e] situa-
tion being difficult for [the] [f]ather.’’ The next day,
Olivia reported that the father was present in the fami-
ly’s car when she was discharged from CCMC. The
father later (1) told a department social worker that,
notwithstanding the safety plan, he did not leave the
family home until 11:45 p.m. on November 4, 2021, after
Olivia had fallen asleep, and he returned to the home
at 4:45 a.m. the following morning, before Olivia had
woken up for school, (2) requested that the department
or another agency visit the family home to review the
respondents’ rules with Olivia and to direct her to abide
by them, and (3) asserted that the safety plan would
not be successful because (a) the mother was afraid to
be in the family home alone with Olivia and her two
brothers and (b) he was unable to spend a significant
amount of time outside of the home. On November 5,
2021, following a safety assessment, the department
determined Olivia’s situation was unsafe as a result of
(1) the respondents’ violation of the safety plan, (2)
the mother’s inability to maintain boundaries between
Olivia and the father, and (3) the father’s statements
questioning the viability of the safety plan.
   The trial on the neglect petition spanned twenty days
between May 26 and December 14, 2022. Numerous
witnesses testified at trial, including medical personnel,
department personnel, and the respondents, and the
court, Hon. Stephen F. Frazzini, judge trial referee,
admitted many exhibits in full into the record. Each
respondent was represented by an attorney until
November 29, 2022, the fourteenth day of trial, when,
during their case-in-chief,5 the respondents filed appear-
ances in lieu of their respective attorneys and pro-
ceeded to represent themselves for the remainder of
trial.6
   On December 5, 2022, while the neglect trial was
ongoing, the petitioner filed an emergency motion for
an evidentiary hearing and an order authorizing the
department to make medical, psychological, and educa-
tional decisions on behalf of Olivia (emergency motion).
On December 8, 2022, after conducting an evidentiary
hearing on December 7, 2022, and hearing argument
from the parties, the court granted the emergency
motion.7
  On December 14, 2022, the evidentiary portion of the
neglect trial was concluded and the court heard closing
arguments from the parties. Thereafter, the court issued
an oral decision on the record adjudicating Olivia to
be neglected and committing her to the custody of the
petitioner.8 This appeal followed.9 Additional proce-
dural history will be set forth as necessary.
   The self-represented respondents on appeal raise var-
ious claims, which we distill to be that (1) there was
insufficient evidence to support the court’s neglect
determination, (2) the court incorrectly determined that
it was in Olivia’s best interest to commit her to the
custody of the petitioner, and (3) they ‘‘were denied
equitable treatment’’ because of a litany of procedural
or evidentiary errors that purportedly occurred during
the neglect proceedings. We address these claims in
turn.
   Before examining the respondents’ claims, we
observe that, ‘‘[a]lthough self-represented parties are
not excused from complying with relevant rules of pro-
cedural and substantive law, [i]t is the established pol-
icy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-
represented] litigants and when it does not interfere
with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of
practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party.
. . . Thus, like the trial court, [this court] will endeavor
to see that such a litigant shall have the opportunity to
have his case fully and fairly heard so far as such latitude
is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party.
. . . Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-repre-
sented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-repre-
sentation provides no attendant license not to comply
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law
. . . and [w]e repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is
asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter
receives only cursory attention in the brief without sub-
stantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is
deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court
to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of
error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and
fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Randolph
v. Mambrino, 216 Conn. App. 126, 151–52, 284 A.3d
645 (2022).
                              I
  We first address the respondents’ claims that (1) there
was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
neglect determination and (2) the court improperly
determined that it was in Olivia’s best interest to be
committed to the custody of the petitioner. We are not
persuaded.
   ‘‘Neglect proceedings, under . . . [General Statutes]
§ 46b-129, are comprised of two parts, adjudication and
disposition. . . . The standard of proof applicable to
nonpermanent custody proceedings, such as neglect
proceedings, is a fair preponderance of the evidence.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ja-lyn R., 132
Conn. App. 314, 318, 31 A.3d 441 (2011).
                             A
  The respondents assert that the court’s determination
that Olivia was neglected was not supported by suffi-
cient evidence. We do not agree.
   ‘‘During the adjudicatory phase, the court determines
if the child was neglected. Practice Book § 35a-7 (a)
provides in relevant part: In the adjudicatory phase,
preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amend-
ment. . . . [General Statutes § 46b-120 (4)] provides
that a child may be found neglected if the child is being
denied proper care and attention, physically, education-
ally, emotionally or morally, or is being permitted to
live under conditions, circumstances, or associations
injurious to the well-being of the child or youth . . . .
   ‘‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, the function of an appellate court is to
review the findings of the trial court, not to retry the
case. . . . [W]e must determine whether the facts set
out in the memorandum of decision are supported by
the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and
the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous. . . . We also must determine whether
those facts correctly found are, as a matter of law,
sufficient to support the judgment. . . . [W]e give great
deference to the findings of the trial court because of
its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before
it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses . . . .’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 318–19.
   During the adjudicatory phase, the court stated in
relevant part as follows. ‘‘[T]he evidence established
[that] in October of 2021 Olivia told authorities at school
that [the] father ‘becomes physical’ toward her. The
evidence shows that at times she was distraught and
in distress and expressing suicidal thoughts and feelings
as a result of [the] father’s treatment of her. She told
her counselor at school on October [21, 2021] that [the
father] would throw objects at her and call her a ‘dis-
grace’ and ‘retarded.’
  ‘‘[The department] was in the process of investigating
that report when it received a report from [CCMC] . . .
on November [2, 2021] that . . . the father had dropped
Olivia off at [CCMC]; that she had multiple bruises and
abrasions on her arms, legs, back, and head; and that
she had told [CCMC] staff that [the] father had beaten
her up and ‘stomped on her.’ . . .
   ‘‘[The father] himself told [CCMC] staff that he had
. . . intervened in a dispute between Olivia and [the]
mother, and he had ‘lost,’ ‘his,’ ‘shit’ and pushed [Olivia]
in a closet. . . .
  ‘‘At trial [the mother] testified that [the father] had
intervened during an incident in which Olivia had been
threatening a younger brother with a sharp object and
that the father had pushed her into a closet, that she
had fallen to the floor after slipping on a dog bed near
the closet. But the mother denied that the father had
neglected or improperly harmed [Olivia] . . . [and]
basically said that all his actions that day were justified
and necessary.
  ‘‘[The father] . . . did testify [at trial] but didn’t dis-
cuss what happened in the incident. I’m not going to
hold . . . his failure to discuss that against him. . . .
   ‘‘[T]he essential issue here for adjudicatory purposes
is whether the physical conduct of the father and the
mother’s inaction during that conduct was reasonable
or, while taking into consideration the [respondents’]
constitutionally protected right to care for their child,
excessive. And the courts have long recognized that
there’s no precise rule about what is excessive physical
discipline. Each case must be examined on its own
facts.10
   ‘‘So the evidence the court . . . has here about the
injuries and what happened are the medical reports;
the testimony of the father and [the] mother . . . the
testimony from [Greyson Houle] the investigative social
worker and [an] investigat[ion] protocol he wrote; infor-
mation that’s in [a] social work affidavit . . . intro-
duced into evidence here that was used in support of
the [order of temporary custody]; and photographs of
the bruises and abrasions that were taken at [CCMC].
And I’ve looked at those photographs. They show
bruises, abrasions on [Olivia’s] arms, legs, head, shoul-
ders, neck.
   ‘‘At one point during the trial, the [respondents] also
introduced into evidence the boots that were being
worn [on November 2, 2021] by the father. [The mother]
said that the marks on Olivia’s body would not corre-
spond . . . to the toes on the boots. But I’ve looked
at the treads on the father’s boots, and on at least two
of the photographs there are marks on Olivia’s body
that correspond to the type of mark that could be left
by a tread, but . . . I didn’t measure them . . . . I
don’t accept the mother’s statement that those marks
. . . don’t show that the injuries were caused by his
boots. [Olivia] at [CCMC] said that [the] father stomped
on her.
   ‘‘Now, there’s also evidence that Olivia can become
impulsive, that she can lose self-control. There’s evi-
dence that she’s acted in a threatening manner towards
other people, and it was argued by the [respondents]
that Olivia was acting in a way to hurt her brother. The
father at [CCMC] said that he had lost his shit, and . . .
I regard that as an admission by him effectively that
he had lost control of his actions that day while inflicting
these injuries on Olivia. And they refute the mother’s
testimony that his actions were justified and necessary.
That type of remark is the remark of somebody
acknowledging that they lost self-control.
   ‘‘I don’t intend to discuss in great detail an analysis
of the injuries, but the evidence does show that the
physical injuries inflicted on Olivia that day were exces-
sive. They exceeded the bounds of the [respondents’]
lawful right to protect other children or to discipline and
parent Olivia; that both [respondents] denied [Olivia]
proper care and attention during this incident and the
days preceding when the father had disciplined [Olivia]
and the mother did not take action to protect [Olivia];
and that [Olivia] was living under conditions injurious
to her well-being.
  ‘‘And I therefore find neglect, as pleaded and proven
by a fair preponderance of the evidence.’’ (Footnote
added.)
   After a careful review of the record, we conclude
that the court’s factual findings with regard to its neglect
determination were supported by sufficient evidence in
the record, including but not limited to medical records,
Houle’s testimony and his investigation protocol, and
the photographs depicting Olivia’s injuries.11 We further
conclude that, as a matter of law, the facts properly
found by the court, which demonstrate that (1) prior
to November 2, 2021, the father had physical alterca-
tions with Olivia and verbally demeaned her, (2) on
November 2, 2021, after, in his own words, having ‘‘lost
his shit,’’ the father inflicted excessive physical injuries
on Olivia, and (3) the mother did not intervene to pro-
tect Olivia, were sufficient to support the court’s neglect
determination.
  In sum, we conclude that the court did not commit
error in adjudicating Olivia to be neglected.12
                             B
  The respondents also assert that the court incorrectly
determined that committing Olivia to the custody of
the petitioner was in her best interest. We disagree.
  ‘‘[W]hen making the determination of what is in the
best interest of the child, [t]he authority to exercise the
judicial discretion under the circumstances revealed by
the finding is not conferred upon this court, but upon
the trial court, and . . . we are not privileged to usurp
that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial
court. . . . A mere difference of opinion or judgment
cannot justify our intervention. Nothing short of a con-
viction that the action of the trial court is one which
discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant our
interference. . . . In determining whether there has
been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is
whether the court could reasonably conclude as it
did. . . .
  ‘‘After an adjudication of neglect is made, a court
may (1) commit the child to the [petitioner], (2) vest
guardianship in a third party or (3) permit the parent to
retain custody with or without protective supervision.
General Statutes § 46b-129 (j).’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ja-lyn R., supra,
132 Conn. App. 323. ‘‘In determining the disposition
portion of the neglect proceeding, the court must decide
which of the various custody alternatives are in the best
interest of the child. To determine whether a custodial
placement is in the best interest of the child, the court
uses its broad discretion to choose a place that will
foster the child’s interest in sustained growth, develop-
ment, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of
[the child’s] environment.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 323–24.
   During the dispositional phase, the court stated in
relevant part as follows. ‘‘In making a decision about
[Olivia’s] best interest, the court has to use its own
broad discretion to choose . . . the placement that will
best foster [her] interest in sustained growth, develop-
ment, and well-being. . . . [T]his is an inherently flexi-
ble and fact-specific standard. It gives the court broad
discretion to consider all the different and individual-
ized facts that may affect a specific child’s welfare. . . .
   ‘‘Evidence shows that Olivia has many serious mental
health and behavioral health problems. In the thirteen
months since removal from [the respondents], she has
been hospitalized several times for emergency situa-
tions; she’s need[ed] partial hospitalization and inten-
sive outpatient services; and she’s been, since May of
[2022], in the adolescent unit of the Manchester Memo-
rial Hospital [(hospital)]. For many months she was on
a waiting list for admission to a higher level of care at
a psychiatric residential treatment facility, PRTF. She
needs long-term, intensive care and therapy to help her
learn how to control and manage her moods, emotions,
and behaviors.
   ‘‘The [respondents] urge that they know what is best
for Olivia; that they’ve historically used and would still
use a system of rewards, structure, and discipline to
help Olivia manage her emotional and behavioral diffi-
culties if she were returned home. And they believe
that she needs continued inpatient treatment in the
interim before she returns home. But the evidence
shows that, while Olivia was hospitalized at [the hospi-
tal], the [respondents] did not act in her best interest.
[The respondents’] distrust of [the department] is so
great that it led them to make decisions that were detri-
mental to Olivia. They rescinded the releases that would
have enabled Olivia’s treatment providers to communi-
cate with [the department]. Doing so led to Olivia being
kept at [the hospital] when that facility was no longer
appropriate [for] her. It prevented her from being admit-
ted to a PRTF. It caused distress to Olivia, and it harmed
her emotionally and physically. I’m horrified to learn
that she may even now be a diabetic.
  ‘‘Moreover, the evidence shows that Olivia did not
know that it was [the respondents’] decision-making
that was causing her to languish in the [hospital]. And
while it’s probably appropriate that children and youths
not be aware of all the factors leading to their parents’
decision-making, in this particular instance that lack of
knowledge probably played a part in the fact that
[Olivia] blames [the department] for keeping her from
her family when, in fact . . . if [the respondents] had
not rescinded the releases, she may well have been now
back in the community if she had been admitted to
the PRTF [in] May [of 2022], received treatment there
enabling her to regulate her emotions and behaviors,
and if [the respondents], as part of the family work at
PRTF, had become better able to manage and parent
her safely and appropriately, maybe even back with
[the respondents].
   ‘‘[Olivia’s] lawyer advocated forcefully and eloquently
on her behalf that Olivia trusts [the respondents] to
make all her decisions and wants [the respondents] to
be her advocates. And usually those are feelings and
beliefs that are healthy to children because a child or
a youth needs to be able to feel that their caregiver will
take care of them and keep them safe and will allow
them increasing amounts of independence as it
becomes appropriate, based on the child’s develop-
ment. But here, [Olivia’s] trust in [the respondents’]
decision-making is not informed by the decisions the
[respondents] made here.
   ‘‘I also have to consider the fact about the events
that led to Olivia being removed from [the respondents’]
custody. [The father] engaged in excessive and harmful
physical punishment and interactions with [Olivia], and
[the] mother did not intervene. . . . [T]he mother’s tes-
timony about that event can only lead to the conclusion
that she approved of [the father’s] conduct during that
incident.
   ‘‘[The father] then took [Olivia] to [CCMC] and, even
while she was feeling suicidal, left her there. But a child
in the emotional state that the evidence shows that
Olivia was in when she was taken to [CCMC] needed
a parent there with her. There’s been no evidence pre-
sented that the father or [the] mother understood the
gravity of what happened in their home or in the father’s
decision to leave Olivia by herself at [CCMC] or that
[the respondents have] taken any steps to address the
inadequacies and deficiencies in their parenting of
[Olivia].
   ‘‘The evidence shows and I’m fully persuaded that
[the respondents] both love [Olivia] dearly. The evi-
dence shows that Olivia can be very difficult to manage,
both in terms of her emotions and behaviors. But, unfor-
tunately, there’s no evidence to conclude that if Olivia
once again became emotionally distraught or even if she
became physically out of control that the [respondents]
would not again respond in a similar manner. If Olivia
can become impulsive, if she sometimes lacks emo-
tional and behavioral self-control, the evidence shows,
at least on the incident on November [2, 2021], that the
father acted similarly, causing injuries to her with the
acquiescence and passive acceptance of the mother.
  ‘‘There’s also evidence that [the father] talked harshly
and demeaningly to Olivia when she was hospitalized.
And there’s only limited amounts of evidence about
those interactions, so I don’t have a lot of information
about them. I recognize that [Olivia] was distraught at
times [at] the hospital . . . [and] that she can be trou-
bling and difficult to interact with, so I’m not drawing
the worst of conclusions about the evidence about what
the father is reported to have said. But from the evi-
dence about what he said . . . I do conclude that the
rosy depiction that the [respondents] present of their
actions, of their interactions and relationship with
Olivia does not accurately portray the fact that their
relationship and their interactions with her are in seri-
ous need of repair and need extensive professional
assistance and guidance.
   ‘‘For example, although [the father] testified that he
had participated in and successfully completed parent-
ing classes, and although [a] social study [admitted into
evidence] reports that he was in therapy, the court
concludes that both [respondents], as of the end of trial,
still need more professional assistance in learning how
to interact appropriately and safely with [Olivia].
   ‘‘So, despite the love that is manifest and has been
manifest on every single minute of this trial, that the
[respondents] have displayed . . . [and] I’ve no doubt
that they’re dedicated to [Olivia], but I also have no
doubt here that [Olivia’s] best interest lies in her being
committed to the [petitioner], which . . . I find to be
in her best interest and order that as the disposition in
this case.’’13
   Upon a careful review of the record, we conclude
that the court reasonably determined that it was in
Olivia’s best interest to commit her to the custody of
the petitioner. In support of this determination, the
court found that (1) Olivia suffers from severe mental
health and behavioral problems that require long-term
intensive care and therapy, (2) the respondents engaged
in conduct that was detrimental to Olivia’s well-being
following her hospitalization in May, 2022, particularly
by rescinding medical releases, which (a) prevented the
department from communicating with Olivia’s treat-
ment providers and (b) extended Olivia’s hospitaliza-
tion when other treatment was more appropriate, and
(3) notwithstanding the father’s completion of parent-
ing classes and his participation in therapy, the respon-
dents’ relationship with Olivia is fractured, as evidenced
by (a) the father’s physical actions toward Olivia com-
mitted with the mother’s approval, (b) the father’s deci-
sion to leave Olivia alone at CCMC on November 2, 2021,
and (c) the father demeaning Olivia verbally during her
hospitalization. The court also expressed concern that,
with the mother’s acquiescence, the father again would
react in a physical manner toward Olivia if a situation
similar to the incident on November 2, 2021, occurred in
the future. These findings were supported by sufficient
evidence in the record, including but not limited to the
testimony of medical personnel, department personnel,
and the guardian ad litem appointed in this action, and
the court reasonably relied on these findings to deter-
mine that committing Olivia to the petitioner’s custody
was in her best interest.14
  In sum, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in committing Olivia to the custody of the
petitioner.15
                            II
   We next address the respondents’ claim that they
‘‘were denied equitable treatment’’ stemming from
numerous procedural or evidentiary errors that purport-
edly occurred during the neglect proceedings. The peti-
tioner maintains that this claim, including its various
subparts, is inadequately briefed, and, therefore, we
should decline to review it. For the reasons that follow,
we conclude that (1) parts of this claim have been
abandoned as inadequately briefed and (2) the
remaining parts of this claim lack merit.
    We iterate that self-represented parties, like the
respondents, are not relieved of the obligation to ade-
quately brief their claims on appeal. See Randolph v.
Mambrino, supra, 216 Conn. App. 151–52; see also
Traylor v. State, 332 Conn. 789, 807, 213 A.3d 467 (2019)
(‘‘[t]he solicitous treatment we afford a self-represented
party does not allow us to address a claim on his behalf
when he has failed to brief that claim’’). Insofar as the
respondents have adequately briefed claims of eviden-
tiary errors, ‘‘[t]he court’s evidentiary rulings must be
viewed in the context of the proceedings. . . . The trial
court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility
of evidence. The trial court’s ruling on evidentiary mat-
ters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear
abuse of the court’s discretion . . . .’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ryan C.,
220 Conn. App. 507, 535, 299 A.3d 308, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023). Mindful of these
principles, we turn to the alleged errors identified by
the respondents.
   The respondents contend that the court improperly
precluded them from submitting into evidence (1) cer-
tain audio recordings and (2) an email chain, which,
they argue, ‘‘resulted in an incomplete submission of
relevant facts’’ and prevented them from receiving a
‘‘fair judgment.’’ The record reveals, however, that the
proposed evidence in question either (1) was not
offered properly by the respondents or (2) was ruled
by the court to be inadmissible, which the respondents
do not address in their appellate brief. Moreover,
beyond their bald assertion of harm, the respondents
do not explain how the exclusion of this evidence was
harmful to them. See In re Nevaeh G.-M., 217 Conn.
App. 854, 885–86, 290 A.3d 867 (‘‘[i]t is well settled
that even if [an evidentiary error is proven], the [party
challenging the ruling] must also establish that the rul-
ing was harmful and likely to affect the result of the
trial’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 925, 295 A.3d 418 (2023).
Accordingly, we deem this claim to be abandoned.16
   The respondents also assert that the court impermis-
sibly curtailed their right to recall witnesses during their
case-in-chief, notwithstanding that they had ‘‘reserve[d]’’
such a right earlier in the trial. The record reveals that,
during trial on December 13, 2022, the court declined
the respondents’ requests to recall Houle or Jilienne
Charter, an ongoing department social worker, both of
whom had been called as witnesses during the petition-
er’s case-in-chief and both of whom the respondents
had the opportunity to cross-examine while represented
by counsel. The court reasoned that the questions that
the respondents sought to ask Houle and Charter could
have been posed to them on cross-examination and
were not relevant. The respondents fail to address the
court’s rationale for these evidentiary rulings in their
appellate brief. Therefore, we conclude that the respon-
dents have abandoned this claim.17
    We next turn to the respondents’ claim that the court
improperly failed to ‘‘invalidate’’ a hospital record
admitted into evidence that the petitioner allegedly had
‘‘inappropriately obtained . . . .’’ The record reveals
that, during trial on December 13, 2022, the petitioner
offered into evidence a hospital record, to which the
respondents objected on the grounds of hearsay and
undue prejudice. The court overruled the respondents’
objections and admitted the hospital record in full into
the record. The next day, the father indicated to the
court that he believed that the hospital record should
not have been admitted into evidence because it was
not ‘‘authentic.’’ Specifically, the father argued that the
petitioner’s counsel had obtained the hospital record
‘‘illegally’’ because she did not have access to the record
at the time of the ‘‘run date’’ printed on the record,
which was September 8, 2022. The petitioner’s counsel
represented that she had gained authorization to obtain
the hospital record. The court proceeded to determine
that the father had not raised a viable objection chal-
lenging the hospital record’s authenticity. The court
further stated that ‘‘[the father does not] think [that
the petitioner’s counsel] obtained the [hospital record]
properly. And that’s not something that I’m prepared to
address here today; I don’t think it’s within the Superior
Court’s concern in the trial of this case.’’ The respon-
dents on appeal have failed to present any substantive
legal analysis addressing the court’s reasoning or sup-
porting their position that the hospital record should
have been ‘‘invalidate[d].’’ Accordingly, we conclude
that the respondents have abandoned this claim.
  In addition, the respondents assert that the court
impermissibly declined an oral request by the father on
November 29, 2022, made after he had filed an appear-
ance in lieu of his former attorney, to permit his former
attorney to remain available to him as an ‘‘advisory
counsel.’’ The court construed the father’s statement
to be requesting hybrid representation, which the court
denied. The respondents have failed to provide any
meaningful legal analysis in support of this claim, and,
therefore, we deem it to be abandoned.
   The respondents also contend that the court improp-
erly declined the father’s offer to introduce into evi-
dence an audio recording of an incident that occurred
outside of the courtroom on November 29, 2022, the
fourteenth day of trial. The record reflects that, during
a recess on that day, the court was informed by a judicial
marshal that an incident had occurred outside of the
courtroom involving the father and the petitioner’s
counsel. Following the recess, the petitioner’s counsel
represented to the court that, during the recess, in view
of several others, the father threatened her, which led
to the intervention of three judicial marshals. The peti-
tioner’s counsel requested that, in light of the father’s
threatening statements, the remainder of the trial be
conducted virtually following the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding that day. Over the respondents’ objection,18 the
court granted that request.19 Subsequently, on Decem-
ber 14, 2022, the last day of trial, before he had resumed
his cross-examination of a witness following a recess,
the father (1) asked the court to articulate what it
believed he had said to the petitioner’s attorney on
November 29, 2022, to purportedly threaten her and (2)
indicated that he had an audio recording of the incident,
which, he posited, would verify that he did not say
anything threatening to the petitioner’s counsel. The
court responded that the father had not ‘‘raised anything
that [it] should address here’’ and directed the father
to resume his cross-examination of the witness. The
respondents argue on appeal that, to their ‘‘gross disad-
vantage . . . the court again abridged [them], based
on an unfounded complaint and [they] were denied
their . . . right [under the fifth amendment to the
United States constitution] to face their accusers and
to possible rebuttal.’’ On the basis of the record, we
conclude that the court acted reasonably in declining,
on the last day of trial, to entertain additional argument
or to hear evidence in relation to its ruling on November
29, 2022, switching the format of trial from in person
to virtual.20
   We next address the respondents’ assertion that the
court impermissibly denied a motion for a continuance
that they filed on December 12, 2022, the eighteenth
day of trial. The record reflects that, on December 8,
2022, after having granted the emergency motion, the
court ordered that it would permit three additional days
for trial on the neglect petition, concluding on Decem-
ber 14, 2022, with the respondents afforded two of those
days to continue presenting their evidence, and that
trial dates previously scheduled for January, 2023, were
stricken. On December 12, 2022, the respondents moved
for a continuance to allow them to retain new counsel.
In support of the motion, the father argued in part that
the respondents were disadvantaged by the court’s new
scheduling order entered on December 8, 2022, which
limited their time to prepare for trial. The court denied
the motion for a continuance, reasoning that (1) Olivia’s
needs required the neglect proceedings to be completed
promptly, (2) trial had been ongoing since May, 2022,
and (3) it had canvassed the respondents when they
elected to represent themselves on November 29, 2022,
and cautioned them about the perils of self-representa-
tion. The respondents maintain on appeal that they were
prejudiced by the court’s denial of their motion for a
continuance, as they were ‘‘forc[ed] . . . to conclude
their case-in-chief more than one month earlier than
initially scheduled . . . .’’ On the basis of the record,
we conclude that the court properly exercised its discre-
tion to deny the motion for a continuance.21 See In re
Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592, 604, 767 A.2d 155
(2001) (‘‘Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are
very often matters involving judicial economy, docket
management or courtroom proceedings and, therefore,
are particularly within the province of a trial court. . . .
Whether to grant or to deny such motions clearly
involves discretion, and a reviewing court should not
disturb those decisions, unless there has been an abuse
of that discretion, absent a showing that a specific con-
stitutional right would be infringed.’’ (Citation omit-
ted.)).
   The respondents also contend that the court improp-
erly prevented them, during their case-in-chief, from
seeking to present as witnesses two CCMC employees
to whom the father had spoken when he brought Olivia
to CCMC on November 2, 2021, and who, according to
the respondents, would have provided testimony that
contradicted other evidence regarding statements made
by the father. The evidence that the respondents sought
to discredit included Houle’s investigation protocol,
which was admitted as a full exhibit on July 12, 2022,
and which documented statements made by the two
CCMC employees.22 The record reveals that, during trial
on December 13, 2022, the respondents notified the
court that they had submitted to the court a request to
subpoena the two CCMC employees on December 12,
2022, to which the court responded: ‘‘Well, I told [you
that] today is the last day for you to present evidence.
So . . . it’s a little late for that.’’ The respondents argue
that ‘‘the judge decided [that] it was more important to
finish the trial than to allow the respondents to present
testimony and rebuttal evidence from these two declar-
ants . . . .’’ We conclude that the court acted reason-
ably in precluding the respondents, on the last day of
their case-in-chief, from seeking to call the two CCMC
employees as witnesses.
  In addition, the respondents claim that they ‘‘were
placed in an ambush situation, which the court
allowed,’’ in three ways. First, the respondents contend
that the court improperly made comments that
‘‘prompt[ed]’’ the petitioner to file the emergency
motion on December 5, 2022. This contention is not
supported by the record.23 Second, the respondents
assert that, during the evidentiary hearing on the emer-
gency motion, the court improperly permitted the peti-
tioner to call certain witnesses notwithstanding that
the petitioner had failed to disclose them in advance
of the hearing. The court rejected this argument after
the father had raised it at the evidentiary hearing, rea-
soning that the argument did not present ‘‘any impedi-
ment to our proceeding on the [emergency] motion.’’
The court maintained the discretion to allow testimony
from the undisclosed witnesses; see Natarajan v.
Natarajan, 107 Conn. App. 381, 389–90, 945 A.2d 540
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
testimony of witness who had not been disclosed prior
to trial), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 924, 951 A.2d 572 (2008);
and we conclude that the respondents have failed to
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in this
regard. Third, the respondents contend that the court
improperly permitted the petitioner to offer certain evi-
dence into the record that the mother did not receive in
advance of the evidentiary hearing. The record reflects
that, during the evidentiary hearing, the mother alerted
the court that she had not received a certain document,
which the petitioner was seeking to offer into evidence,
notwithstanding the representation of the petitioner’s
counsel that the document had been emailed to her.
Following additional discussion, it was discovered that
the petitioner’s counsel had emailed the document to
an outdated email address of the mother. After that
discovery, the petitioner’s counsel represented that she
would email the document to the mother’s current email
address immediately. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting the petitioner to submit evidence that the
mother had not received in advance of the emergency
hearing.
   The respondents also claim that they ‘‘were not given
equitable access to [department] records’’ despite hav-
ing submitted certain records requests to the depart-
ment. The record reflects that, on December 12, 2022,
the respondents sought a continuance of the trial on
the basis that the department had failed to respond
to certain records requests. The petitioner’s counsel
represented that she was unaware of any such requests.
The court declined to grant a continuance, but it
ordered the respondents to provide immediately a list
of the records that they were seeking to the petitioner’s
counsel, whom the court ordered ‘‘to notify her client
to obtain [the records] and provide them to [the respon-
dents] as expeditiously as possible.’’ On the basis of
the record, insofar as the respondents claim that they
were denied access to the records in question, this claim
is untenable because the court, in fact, ordered the
petitioner to provide the records to the respondents,
and at no point during the remainder of the trial did
the respondents indicate to the court that the petitioner
had failed to comply with the court’s order.24
   Last, we address two claims of error raised by the
respondents with respect to actions taken by Judge
Dannehy, both of which warrant little discussion. First,
the respondents assert that, during a hearing held on
December 21, 2021, without the respondents present,
Judge Dannehy engaged in ex parte communications
with the petitioner and with a department social
worker. The transcript of the December 21, 2021 hearing
reflects that the proceeding held on that day concerned
neglect petitions filed as to Olivia’s two brothers. Thus,
any claimed error regarding the December 21, 2021
hearing is outside of the scope of this appeal. Second,
the respondents assert that, notwithstanding having
‘‘recused himself’’ from participating in the underlying
proceedings, Judge Dannehy improperly ruled on the
emergency motion. The record reflects that Judge Dan-
nehy presided over pretrial proceedings in the underly-
ing action and commented to the parties on the record
on April 29, 2022, that another judge would preside over
the trial on the neglect petition because ‘‘at this point
[he had] gone too far into the case.’’ In addition to
presiding over the trial, Judge Frazzini conducted the
evidentiary hearing on the emergency motion and ulti-
mately granted the motion. At the outset of the eviden-
tiary hearing, Judge Frazzini noted that ‘‘[t]he hearing
was ordered for this morning. Judge Dannehy granted
preliminary relief prior to . . . the hearing . . . .’’ On
the basis of the record, the respondents have failed
to demonstrate any impropriety committed by Judge
Dannehy.
   The judgment is affirmed.
  * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
  ** January 4, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
  1
    This appeal was filed by the father only. On October 11, 2023, the respon-
dents filed a motion to permit the mother to join the appeal as an appellant,
which we granted on the same day.
  2
    For ease of discussion, we address the respondents’ claims in a different
order than they are set forth in their appellate brief.
  3
    The petitioner alleged that Olivia was found to have (1) ‘‘ ‘a patch of red
marks on the right side of her scalp from where [she] reported [the] [f]ather
pulling her hair,’ ’’ (2) ‘‘ ‘a 2 [centimeter] abrasion to her right eye on the
outside near her eyebrow,’ ’’ (3) ‘‘ ‘a 2 [centimeter] x 1 [centimeter] abrasion
to [the] right side of her neck,’ ’’ (4) ‘‘ ‘large patches of redness and bruising
to her upper back shoulder,’ ’’ (5) ‘‘ ‘bruising on her upper and lower right
arms [and] multiple linear abrasions on her left upper arm,’ ’’ and (6) ‘‘ ‘older
brownish bruises on her body.’ ’’
  4
    The petitioner further alleged that (1) Olivia’s two younger brothers were
present in the family home at the time of the incident between Olivia and
the father on November 2, 2021, (2) both brothers reported hearing the
incident, which included the father threatening to remove Olivia from the
family home, and observing portions of the incident, (3) one of the brothers
reported going to his bedroom because he ‘‘ ‘didn’t want to see what hap-
pened next,’ ’’ and (4) the other brother reported that the November 2, 2021
incident was ‘‘the second time something like this ha[d] occurred between
Olivia and [the] [f]ather . . . .’’
   5
     The petitioner rested her case-in-chief on October 14, 2022, the tenth
day of trial.
   6
     After having canvassed the respondents, the court accepted their respec-
tive decisions to represent themselves and determined that each respondent
had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her right to coun-
sel.
   7
     During trial on December 13, 2022, the court ruled that, in lieu of the
petitioner presenting rebuttal evidence, the court would incorporate the
evidence admitted during the evidentiary hearing on the emergency motion
into the record for the neglect proceedings.
   8
     On June 6, 2023, the respondents filed a notice pursuant to Practice
Book § 64-1 requesting that the trial court file a signed transcript of its oral
decision issued on December 14, 2022. On June 7, 2023, the court filed a
signed transcript of its decision.
   9
     The attorney for Olivia has adopted the petitioner’s appellate brief.
   10
      The trial court cited this court’s decision in Lovan C. v. Dept. of Chil-
dren & Families, 86 Conn. App. 290, 860 A.2d 1283 (2004), for the proposition
that ‘‘[t]here exists a parental right to punish children for their own welfare,
to control and restrain them and to adopt disciplinary measures in the
exercise of that right . . . . Limits on the right of parents to punish their
children do, however, exist. The common law rule and the provisions of
[General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-18 (1) require that the use of physical
force administered upon a minor child be reasonable. . . . Whether that
limit has been reached in any particular case is a factual determination to
be made by the trier of fact.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 299.
   11
      The respondents challenge the court’s factual finding that the father
stated, at CCMC on November 2, 2021, that he ‘‘lost his shit’’ during the
physical altercation with Olivia on that day, asserting that (1) the father did
not make that statement and (2) there was no evidence demonstrating that
he made that statement at CCMC. The record supports the court’s finding
that the father made the statement at issue. Ann Gorjanc, a pediatric physi-
cian’s assistant at CCMC, testified during trial that the father told her, during
a telephone conversation, that he ‘‘lost his shit and he pushed [Olivia] in
the closet,’’ which statement to Gorjanc was also documented in (1) notes
prepared by Gorjanc that were a part of medical records and (2) Houle’s
investigation protocol, both of which were admitted in full into evidence.
In addition, Jilienne Charter, an ongoing department social worker, testified
during trial that the father had ‘‘reported to the department [that] he lost
his shit and . . . physically put his hands on [Olivia] . . . .’’ Insofar as the
record does not reflect that the father made the statement at CCMC, we
cannot discern any harm stemming therefrom. See DiNapoli v. Doudera,
28 Conn. App. 108, 112, 609 A.2d 1061 (1992) (‘‘[w]here . . . some of the
facts found are clearly erroneous and others are supported by the evidence,
we must examine the clearly erroneous findings to see whether they were
harmless, not only in isolation, but also taken as a whole’’). On the basis
of the court’s decision, the court considered the father’s statement itself to
be relevant, not the location where the statement was made.
   Insofar as the respondents maintain that other factual findings by the
court with respect to its neglect determination were clearly erroneous, as
we explain in this opinion, the record supports the court’s findings.
   12
      The respondents raise a number of discrete arguments that we discern
to be directed to the court’s neglect adjudication and that, in essence, ask
this court to reweigh the evidence in the record in their favor. ‘‘This we
will not do, as it is not the function of a court of review to retry the facts.’’
In re Kamari C-L., 122 Conn. App. 815, 826, 2 A.3d 13, cert. denied, 298
Conn. 927, 5 A.3d 487 (2010).
   The respondents also argue that the ninety-six hour hold and the order
of temporary custody ‘‘were authorized without a complete investigation.’’
In In re Carl O., 10 Conn. App. 428, 523 A.2d 1339, cert. denied, 204 Conn.
802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987), and cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964
(1987), an appeal in part from an order of temporary custody, this court
held that the appellants’ claim of error as to the order of temporary custody
was moot because the order of temporary custody had expired when the
child was adjudicated to be uncared for and committed to the petitioner’s
custody. Id., 433–34; see also In re Forrest B., 109 Conn. App. 772, 776, 953
A.2d 887 (2008) (‘‘[o]ur case law specifically conceives of appeals from
temporary custody orders as moot when the children involved are adjudi-
cated neglected’’). Thus, if the respondents are attempting to argue, following
the neglect determination, that the order of temporary custody constituted
error, then that argument is not viable. If, in the alternative, the respondents’
argument is directed to the propriety of the court’s neglect determination,
then we are not persuaded that it undermines that determination.
   13
      The court also adopted specific steps, which previously had been
ordered, to facilitate reunification between Olivia and the respondents.
   14
      The respondents challenge certain factual findings made by the court
during the dispositional phase, citing evidence in the record purportedly
contradicting the court’s findings. We iterate that ‘‘[w]e give great deference
to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret
the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ja-lyn R., supra, 132 Conn. App.
319; see also In re Quidanny L., 159 Conn. App. 363, 375, 122 A.3d 1281 (‘‘[i]t
is the [fact finder’s] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence
and to determine the credibility of witnesses’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 639 (2015). As we conclude
in this opinion, the court’s factual findings in support of its dispositional
determination were supported by evidence in the record, and, therefore,
we decline to disturb them.
   15
      As with the court’s neglect determination; see footnote 12 of this opinion;
the respondents raise discrete arguments that we construe to be directed
to the court’s dispositional determination and that, in substance, ask this
court to reweigh the evidence in the record in their favor. ‘‘This we will not
do, as it is not the function of a court of review to retry the facts.’’ In re
Kamari C-L., supra, 122 Conn. App. 826.
   In addition, we note that, at the outset of the dispositional phase, the
court stated that ‘‘placing guardianship in a third party is not really—there’s
no evidence to support that here, and the practical alternatives are whether
to commit [Olivia] to [the petitioner] or [to] place [Olivia] back with the
[respondents] under protective supervision.’’ The respondents assert that
the court ‘‘should have taken the initiative to bring this consideration for a
third-party disposition to light,’’ as they were unaware that placing guardian-
ship in a third party was a dispositional option. The respondents have
not presented any substantive legal analysis in support of this claim, and,
therefore, we deem it to be abandoned. See Randolph v. Mambrino, supra,
216 Conn. App. 151–52.
   16
      The respondents further assert that the court impermissibly denied them
the ability to mark exhibits for identification only. In support of this claim,
the respondents cite to portions of the trial transcripts; however, none of
these transcript excerpts reflects a request by the respondents that an exhibit
be marked for identification only and the court refusing such a request. One
of the aforementioned excerpts establishes that during trial on December
13, 2022, the court explained to the respondents the difference between full
exhibits and exhibits for identification only, and that exhibits contained in
a party’s exhibit list indicate exhibits that the party intends to offer, but
such exhibits are not part of the record until they are presented to the court.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that the court admitted several exhibits
in full offered by the father after the respondents began representing them-
selves in the underlying action.
   In addition, the respondents make isolated assertions that (1) they were
not granted access to electronic filings in the neglect proceedings because
they were self-represented parties and (2) they were required at a certain
point to submit exhibits to the trial court clerk in person, notwithstanding
that they previously had been permitted to submit exhibits via fax. Insofar
as these are cognizable claims of error, these standalone contentions are
not supported by any substantive legal analysis, and, therefore, we deem
them to be abandoned.
   17
      The respondents separately contend that the court improperly precluded
them from introducing into evidence an audio recording of a conversation
involving Charter that purportedly contradicted a portion of her testimony
at trial. On the basis of the record, we construe the court as having deter-
mined such evidence to be irrelevant, which the respondents also fail to
address in their appellate brief.
   18
      The guardian ad litem and Olivia’s attorney did not object to the request.
   19
      After indicating that it had received the report of the incident from the
judicial marshal, the court commented: ‘‘I’m certainly not going to consider
that report in making my decision about this case, but I want the lawyers
to feel safe as they try this matter before me . . . .’’
   20
      Insofar as the respondents attempt to claim that their constitutional
rights were infringed by the virtual format of trial following the court’s
ruling on November 29, 2022, the respondents’ appellate brief is bereft of
any substantive legal analysis on that issue, and, therefore, we conclude
that the respondents have abandoned any such claim.
   21
      The respondents also assert that they ‘‘were forced to abide by’’ the
court’s granting of the emergency motion on December 8, 2022, ‘‘under
duress.’’ Insofar as this constitutes a cognizable claim of error, other than
baldly asserting a violation of their constitutional rights, the respondents
fail to set forth any substantive legal analysis in support of this claim.
Therefore, we conclude that the respondents have abandoned this claim.
   22
      The investigation protocol reflected that (1) one of the CCMC employees
told Houle that, on November 2, 2021, the father (a) brought Olivia into
CCMC, ‘‘pushing her towards the [reception] window and announced that
he was [there] to ‘drop her off for the [s]tate’ and that he ‘never wanted to
see her again,’ ’’ and (b) refused to provide consent for Olivia to be treated,
and (2) the other CCMC employee told Houle ‘‘that the father stated that
he wanted to ‘relinquish his rights.’ ’’
   23
      The respondents point to comments that the court made during trial
on November 30, 2022, (1) indicating that it wanted the parties to meet with
a court services officer to ‘‘streamline . . . the court process,’’ and (2)
stating, in response to a question asked by the attorney for Olivia, that it
would not rule out entering ex parte orders if such relief was sought pursuant
to the rules of practice. These comments do not amount to the court ‘‘prompt-
ing’’ the petitioner to file the emergency motion.
   24
      For the first time on appeal, the respondents assert that ‘‘[p]ortions of
[their records] request still were not fulfilled prior to the disposition [of the
neglect proceedings], despite the judge’s order.’’ The respondents failed to
present this claim to the trial court, and, therefore, it is not preserved for
appellate review. See In re Marie J., 219 Conn. App. 792, 816, 296 A.3d 308
(2023) (‘‘[A]n appellate court is under no obligation to consider a claim that
is not distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause our review is limited
to matters in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by
the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Even if the respondents
had preserved this claim, they have not identified the records that they
claim not to have received, thereby leaving us to speculate as to the harm
stemming therefrom. See In re Kiara Liz V., 203 Conn. App. 613, 624, 248
A.3d 813 (‘‘[w]e frequently have stated that speculation and conjecture have
no place in appellate review’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
denied, 337 Conn. 904, 252 A.3d 364 (2021).