Court Opinion

ID: 9364571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 17:08:52.808633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.046852
License: Public Domain

J-A27005-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    STUART WAYNE BRYANT                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1193 MDA 2021

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 18, 2021
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-44-CR-0000471-2019

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                              FILED JANUARY 19, 2023

        Appellant, Stuart Wayne Bryant, appeals from the Judgment of

Sentence entered on June 18, 2021 in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin

County, after a jury convicted him of, inter alia, Third-Degree Murder, Driving

Under the Influence (“DUI”), and Homicide by Vehicle While DUI. Appellant

challenges the trial court’s denial of two pretrial motions to suppress certain

evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review,

we affirm.

        This case involves a DUI car crash on January 28, 2019, caused by

Appellant, that killed Harry Aultz. Evidence and testimony at the hearing on

Appellant’s omnibus pretrial motion established that shortly before the crash,

Appellant drove erratically, dangerously, and at speeds up to 114 miles per

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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hour.1 When his car collided with Mr. Aultz’s vehicle head-on, Appellant was

driving 94 miles per hour.

       Granville Township Police Chief Craig Weston was the first emergency

responder to the scene of the crash. During investigation, Chief Weston found

a broken bottle of scotch whiskey on the front passenger-side floor of

Appellant’s vehicle.

       Appellant was taken by helicopter to Geisinger Holy Spirit Hospital.

Hospital personnel drew Appellant’s blood for medical purposes shortly after

his arrival. Then, several hours later and at Chief Weston’s request,

Pennsylvania State Trooper Christina Fow went to the hospital to obtain

Appellant’s consent for a second blood draw. After reading Appellant the

Pennsylvania DL-26 form,2 Trooper Fow obtained Appellant’s consent. The

State Police blood draw revealed that Appellant’s blood-alcohol content

(“BAC”) was 0.283% several hours after the crash.

       On September 18, 2019, police charged Appellant by criminal complaint

with, inter alia, Third-Degree Murder, Homicide by Vehicle While DUI, and

DUI. Police took Appellant into custody the following day.

____________________________________________

1 Witnesses testified that before he collided with Mr. Aultz, Appellant rear-
ended another vehicle, drove over three street signs, and made several illegal
and dangerous driving maneuvers. The crash occurred in a 35-mile-per-hour
zone.

2 The DL-26 form encompasses the warnings established pursuant to 75
Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2), commonly referred to as the Implied Consent Law.

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        On December 11, 2019, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion

seeking, inter alia, to suppress the State Police blood draw as the fruit of an

improper arrest conducted without a warrant or probable cause. After

conducting a hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion.

        On December 27, 2019, the Commonwealth issued a subpoena to

Geisinger Holy Spirit Hospital to obtain Appellant’s medical records, specific to

evidence of his BAC from the medical blood draw conducted on the night of

the crash.3 On January 7, 2020, the Commonwealth obtained the requested

records.

        On March 31, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his

BAC obtained from his medical records, as the Commonwealth obtained the

records without a warrant. The same day, the court held a hearing on

Appellant’s motion. At the hearing, the court found that the Commonwealth

was required to obtain a warrant to seize Appellant’s medical records. The

parties    agreed,    however,      that   prevailing   caselaw   would   allow   the

Commonwealth to obtain a warrant to remedy its error in subpoenaing

Appellant’s records.4 As a result, and because Appellant’s trial was scheduled

to begin 6 days later, the parties agreed that the Commonwealth would make

an oral proffer on the record of the evidence that would support issuance of a

warrant. That proffer, if sufficient to establish probable cause, would serve in
____________________________________________

3   Supplemental Pretrial Motion, 3/31/21, at ¶ 8(e).

4N.T. Hr’g, 3/31/21, at 20 (citing Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 948 A.2d 875,
882 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

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lieu of a warrant to allow the Commonwealth to use evidence derived from

Appellant’s medical records at trial.

       As discussed in detail infra, the court found that the Commonwealth’s

proffer established probable cause to support issuance of a warrant to seize

Appellant’s medical records. Following the Commonwealth’s proffer, Appellant

lodged an oral motion to suppress the evidence, challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence to support a finding of probable cause. The court denied

Appellant’s motion.

       Appellant’s 3-day jury trial began on April 6, 2021. At the conclusion of

trial, the jury convicted Appellant of, inter alia, Third-Degree Murder, Homicide

by Vehicle While DUI, DUI—General Impairment, and DUI—Highest Rate.5 On

June 18, 2021, the court, aided by a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report,

sentenced Appellant to a standard range sentence of 20-40 years’

incarceration for the Third-Degree Murder conviction. The court imposed

concurrent terms of incarceration for Appellant’s other convictions.

       Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion contesting the court’s

exercise of sentencing discretion. On August 10, 2021, the court denied

Appellant’s motion. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal and both he and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c); 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3735(a), 3802(a)(1), and 3802(c),
respectively.

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      1. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Motion
      to Suppress Evidence because there was insufficient probable
      cause to arrest [Appellant]?

      2. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Motion
      to Suppress the seizure of [Appellant’s] medical records because
      the search warrant was not supported by probable cause?

      3. Whether the lower court abused the discretionary aspects of
      sentencing when it sentenced [Appellant] to a de facto life
      sentence of 20 to 40 years?

Appellant’s Br. at 7.

                                     A.

      Appellant’s first two issues challenge the trial court’s denial of his

motions to suppress evidence. “Once a motion to suppress evidence has been

filed, it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the

defendant's rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047–1048

(Pa. 2012). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). “Our standard of review in

addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is

whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Evans,

153 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). We consider only the

evidence of the prosecution and uncontradicted evidence of the defense, as

presented at the suppression hearing. Id. “Where the record supports the

findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may

reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.”

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007).

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                                               B.

       In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not

suppressing the results of the State Police blood draw. Appellant’s Br. at 28-

31. He claims that when Trooper Fow read him the DL-26 form on the night

of the crash, she placed him under arrest.6 Immediately after, Appellant

consented to the blood draw. He alleges that Trooper Fow’s arrest was not

supported by probable cause and, therefore, the court should have suppressed

evidence of his BAC from the subsequent blood draw. Id.

       Appellant’s argument is based on the procedural misapprehension that

he was arrested on January 28, 2019. The record reveals, however, that police

arrested Appellant on September 19, 2019.7 Since the blood draw in question
____________________________________________

6The DL-26 form included the language: “You are under arrest for driving
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section
3802 of the Vehicle Code.” N.T. Hr’g, 5/27/20, at 27.

7 Whether Trooper Fow arrested Appellant is a “question of law subject to
plenary review.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014). An
arrest exists where the police (1) intended to take the person into custody,
and (2) subjected the person to actual control. Commonwealth v.
Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 518 (Pa. 2017). That the police read the person
form DL-26 is but one factor for the court to consider. See Maletic v. Dept.
of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 819 A.2d 640, 643-44 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2003) (en banc) (finding arrest where police read form DL-26 to
appellant and testified to a clear intent to arrest appellant). See also Mason
v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, No.
2684 C.D. 2010, 2011 WL 10893865 at *3-5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (finding,
based on totality of circumstances, that police did not arrest appellee despite
reading her form DL-26).

Here, the record is devoid of any indication that Trooper Fow physically denied
Appellant’s freedom of action in any way. Additionally, aside from reading
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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occurred prior to Appellant’s arrest, the legality of Appellant’s arrest that

occurred nearly nine months later has no bearing on whether the evidence

derived from the blood draw should have been suppressed.8 Consequently,

we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress the BAC

from the State Police blood draw.

                                               C.

        In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by

denying his oral motion to suppress evidence derived from his medical

records. Appellant’s Br. at 31-33. As stated supra, to remedy its error of

obtaining Appellant’s medical records without a warrant,9 the Commonwealth

provided an oral proffer on the record at the March 31, 2021 hearing of the

evidence to support a finding of probable cause. The Commonwealth asserted,

inter alia, that the State Police blood draw, which proved that Appellant’s BAC

was 0.283% after the crash, was sufficient to support issuance of a warrant

for Appellant’s medical records. N.T. Hr’g, 3/31/21, at 19.

____________________________________________

Appellant the DL-26 form, Trooper Fow expressed no intent to take Appellant
into custody. Except for “minor conversation” about “how he was feeling,”
Trooper Fow exchanged no other words with Appellant. N.T. Hr’g, 5/27/20, at
25-28. Trooper Fow knew nothing about Appellant’s case, did not interview
Appellant, and was otherwise not involved in the investigation. Id. at 20, 22-
25, 28. Thus, the record demonstrates that an objective person in Appellant’s
position would not believe that he was under arrest in January 2019.

8   Appellant does not contest the voluntariness of the blood draw.

9When hospital personnel perform a blood draw for medical purposes, police
must obtain a warrant to seize the associated medical records.
Commonwealth v. Shaw, 770 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 2001).

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      The court found, based on the proffer, that probable cause existed to

support issuance of a warrant to seize Appellant’s medical records. Id. at 20-

21. Appellant then lodged an oral motion to suppress, objecting to the

sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence to establish probable cause. Id.

The court denied the motion to suppress. Id. at 21. See also Trial Ct. Op.,

9/28/21, at 3-4.

      The record supports the court’s finding. The Commonwealth provided

probable cause for police to believe that Appellant was DUI by virtue of the

State Police blood test results. This would have been sufficient to allow the

Commonwealth to obtain a warrant for Appellant’s medical records. We

discern no trial court error.

                                       D.

      In his final issue, Appellant challenges the court’s exercise of sentencing

discretion. An appellant raising such a challenge is not entitled to review as of

right; rather, a challenge in this regard is properly viewed as a petition for

allowance of appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b); Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki,

522 A.2d 17, 18-19 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d

1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).

      To obtain this Court’s review, an appellant challenging the discretionary

aspects of his sentence must comply with the following requirements: (1) file

a timely notice of appeal; (2) preserve the issue at sentencing or in a motion

to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) include within his brief a concise

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal as required by

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Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) raise a substantial question that the sentence is

inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz,

64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa. Super. 2013).

       Here, Appellant timely filed his appeal, preserved his claim in a post-

sentence motion, and included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) Statement. In the

statement, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by

imposing upon Appellant an “unreasonable” and excessive sentence, which

will expire when he is 100 years old, without due consideration of his age and

lack of need for rehabilitation. Appellant’s Br. at 25-27. This raises a

substantial question for our review. Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599,

602 (Pa. Super. 2005). We will review Appellant’s claim.

       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and we will not disturb a sentence on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super.

2006). In this context, “the appellant must establish, by reference to the

record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a

manifestly unreasonable decision.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, since

the court sentenced Appellant to a standard-range sentence,10 we may only

vacate Appellant’s sentence if we find that “the case involves circumstances

____________________________________________

10See Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 809 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(explaining that a “sentence of twenty to forty years of incarceration for third-
degree murder [is] a standard-range sentence”).

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where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).

      When imposing sentence, “the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public,

gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and

rehabilitative needs of the defendant[.]” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34

A.3d 135, 144 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “Where the sentencing

court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report (‘PSI’), we can

assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating

statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super.

2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Before imposing the instant sentence, the court indicated that it had

read the PSI report, victim impact statements, and Appellant’s sentencing

memorandum, and reviewed the guidelines and verdict slip. N.T. Sentencing,

6/18/21, at 3. The court also heard argument by counsel for Appellant and

the Commonwealth and testimony from multiple witnesses. Id. at 4-63. The

court then heard from Appellant. Id. at 64-69.

      By reviewing the PSI report before imposing sentence, the court

satisfied the requirement that it consider and weigh all sentencing factors,

including Appellant’s age and rehabilitative needs. The court then imposed a

standard-range sentence for Third-Degree Murder. Nothing in the record gives

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us reason to conclude that imposition of the standard range sentence was

unreasonable.11 We, thus, discern no abuse of sentencing discretion.

       In conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motions to

suppress, and we discern no abuse of sentencing discretion.

       Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2023

____________________________________________

11Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, there is nothing inherently unreasonable
about the fact that Appellant’s maximum sentence will expire when he is 100
years old. Appellant, who was 62 years old at the time of sentencing, is not
entitled to a sentencing discount due to his age.

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