Court Opinion

ID: 9863387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 04:15:55.807667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:49.356874
License: Public Domain

McCULLOUGH, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority opinion holds that the trial court’s order suppressing evidence seized by Reidsville Police Department officers from defendant must be reversed as the trial court applied a probable cause standard to the traffic stop at issue in this case. I concur with that part of the majority opinion.
The majority opinion then orders that the case be remanded to the lower court for a new suppression hearing where the proper legal standard of reasonable suspicion shall be applied. From this part of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent, as I believe that this Court has the capability of reviewing the record to determine if the actions of the police satisfied the appropriate legal standard. State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 665 S.E.2d 438 (2008) (reasonable suspicion standard applied even though the trial court reviewed for probable cause). As this Court is able to conduct a de novo review without remand, I believe we should address not only the traffic stop, but should also address a number of erroneous evidentiary rulings made by the lower court which may be repeated if the case is remanded for a new hearing.
I believe that a complete review of this case would be possible using the findings that the trial court seems to have made1 to which we would apply the correct legal analysis so that the erroneous evi*418dentiary rulings the trial judge made can be corrected expeditiously. The other “Findings of Fact” made by the lower court are not true “Findings” as most of the findings are merely recitations of testimony. In re Green, 67 N.C. App. 501, 505 n.1, 313 S.E.2d 193, 195 n.1 (1984) (purported “finding” which merely states that the witness testified under oath is a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact). While the trial court made some adverse credibility determinations based on discrepancies in the officer’s testimony as to the clothing of defendant, the location of defendant’s automobile after the stop was executed, and the proper make of the car, these were trivial and immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis, which the court is required to make.
From the findings that were made, it is apparent that the trial court found that an anonymous 911 caller reported following a car that was driving erratically and provided the license plate, color of the car and its current location, that being the Food Lion parking lot just off Way Street in Reidsville. The trial judge also seems to accept as fact that officers responded to the anonymous tip locating defendant’s automobile in the parking lot identified by the caller, bearing the license plate provided by the caller, and of the general description and color of the auto described in the call. At the suppression hearing, Officer Hampshire testified as follows:
Q. And what drew your attention to the Defendant?
A. We originally received a 911 phone call from a cell phone caller that was following the vehicle. He said that the vehicle was driving erratically, wasn’t able to stay in its lane. He originally described it as a small white car. That was the first call that went out. He was able — the—he was able to get closer to it, and eventually he did put out a — the dispatcher did put out a tag number for the vehicle. The tag number was YSE-6070. The caller advised that the vehicle had stopped and parked in the Food Lion parking lot. Several officers respond — went to that area. The car was found to be parked in that parking lot and it was — nobody was in the vehicle when it was originally found.
(Emphasis added.) The citations issued defendant and which were before the court identify defendant’s vehicle as a 1996 Nissan bearing license number YSE-6070. Based on the record before the trial court, there can be no doubt that the automobile stopped by the police was the same vehicle described by the tipster.
The trial court concluded that the tip was “unsubstantiated.” I disagree and believe that the facts as found provided reasonable sus*419picion regardless of whether defendant committed a traffic offense in the presence of the officers or otherwise drove erratically. If the trial judge applied the correct standard of reasonable suspicion under a totality of the circumstances test, then the court should have found that the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated by the officers to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld a traffic stop after an anonymous tipster correctly described the suspect vehicle’s location, time of departure and destination. The Court upheld the right of the police to stop the vehicle prior to its reaching the described destination, finding that the tip was sufficiently corroborated to provide the reasonable suspicion required before such a traffic stop could be executed.
Numerous cases following Alabama v. White have applied the reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances test to uphold traffic stops based on factual settings much like the one in the case at bar. In U.S. v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 175 L. Ed. 2d 377 (2009), reasonable suspicion was found when defendant’s location and description matched that provided by an anonymous 911 tip about an ongoing assault. A traffic stop was upheld by the Third Circuit when an anonymous tipster called 911 stating that they were following defendant’s automobile, described the vehicle, the locale and his observation that the defendant was brandishing a gun, U.S. v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit upheld a traffic stop based on a 911 call where the caller reported firsthand observation of the defendant’s driving and threats being made by the defendant. U.S. v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2007). In Elston the court stated:
It is well established that anonymous information can furnish grounds for a reasonable search or seizure if it exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 270; United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004). Our decisions provide guidance on the factors that can indicate the reliability of anonymous information. We have recognized, for example, that an anonymous call is more likely to be reliable if it provides substantial detail about the individuals and the alleged criminal activity it describes; if it discloses the basis of the informant’s knowledge; and, especially, if the informant indicates that her report is based on her contemporaneous personal observation of the call’s subject.
*420The cases cited above are just a few examples of the numerous cases similar to the case sub judice which found the corroboration to be adequate to substantiate the tip under the reasonable suspicion standard. Here, as in the example cases, the caller claims to be providing firsthand observation of defendant’s erratic driving; and the caller identified the location, general type of car (small), as well as the correct color and license plate. The trial court accepts the fact that the officers located the car in the described parking lot, and the fact that it was the same color, was a small car (Nissan), and bore the license plate described by the caller. Despite this detail of corroboration, the trial judge concluded the tip was “unsubstantiated,” perhaps because she was applying a probable cause standard rather than reasonable suspicion, and thus failed to apply the teachings of Alabama v. White and its progeny. In any event, I would reverse without remand as I believe the trial judge’s credibility determinations were superfluous.
Furthermore, I would address erroneous evidentiary rulings by the trial judge which were evidently made on the basis of the court’s misunderstanding of the correct legal standard applicable to the facts of the case. In her conclusions of law the court stated:
1. That there was insufficient evidence for probable cause to stop and arrest the defendant.
2. That there was insufficient evidence to conduct a search of defendant’s vehicle and that the search was in violation of the defendant’s 4th Amendment rights.
3. That there was insufficient evidence to seize defendant’s blood for testing and that there was no testimony that the defendant waived his rights with regard to blood testing.
BASED UPON the foregoing ... CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, it is hereby
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1. That any evidence or statements received from the defendant by the law enforcement officers, Reidsville Police Department, on or about the 13th day of March, 2009, shall be suppressed and shall not be introduced as evidence at the defendant’s trial.
First, as discussed above, based on Alabama v. White, Elston and other similar cases, I would find that there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle as the 911 tip had been adequately cor*421roborated as a matter of law. In her findings of fact the court noted that one of the officers testified that he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from defendant’s automobile as he approached the car. This fact was undisputed, and the testimony was received without objection. The trial court erroneously concluded that the officers had no authority to search defendant’s automobile, even though case law in this state has long provided probable cause to search a vehicle based on the odor of marijuana (or other drugs with distinctive odors). See State v. Greenwood, 301 N.C. 705, 708, 273 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1981). An evidentiary ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion; however, a ruling which is based on an erroneous understanding of the law constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. Hines v. Wal-Mart, 191 N.C. App. 390, 663 S.E.2d 337 (2008), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 126, 673 S.E.2d 131 (2009).
Next, the trial court sustained objections to the officer’s routine questioning of defendant during the traffic stop before he was taken into custody. It has long been the law that traffic stops do not trigger the need for Miranda warnings. At this point, defendant had exited his automobile and was answering questions related to the stop prior to the search of the vehicle. Once the search was conducted and items of drug paraphernalia in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.22(a) (2009) were discovered, defendant was formally arrested. During argument on the motion to suppress, the Assistant District Attorney attempted to cite the correct case law to the trial court, who cut the prosecutor off and refused to listen as she cited the controlling law. The colloquy was as follows:
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I would ask the Court to review the case of Herkimer [sicl versus McCarty. That’s a U.S. Supreme Court [case], Your Honor, citation 468 U.S. 420, which states, Your Honor: An Ohio law enforcement officer saw the defendant’s car—
THE COURT: Now, what is this for?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: This is for—
THE COURT: Something else?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: —his objection.
THE COURT: I’ve already ruled.
*422[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, this could be for the objection for whether he’s had his Miranda rights read to him.
THE COURT: But I’ve ruled.
The Assistant District Attorney was attempting to call the court’s attention to the case of Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984), the leading Supreme Court case which holds that routine questioning during a traffic stop does not implicate Miranda and warnings are not required. Accord, U.S. v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1992); State v. Sutton, 167 N.C. App. 242, 249, 605 S.E.2d 483, 487 (2004); disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 359 N.C. 326, 611 S.E.2d 847 (2005).
Finally, the trial judge sustained the defense counsel’s objection to the admission of defendant’s consent to allow blood to be drawn from him at the hospital without elaboration. It is unclear why the court ruled sümmarily and denied the prosecution the right to establish that defendant consented to the blood draw. Even without consent, I believe that the evidence from the blood draw was admissible, as it was done upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 723, 370 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1988). Perhaps the trial judge believed that if the State lacked probable cause to arrest, defendant should not have been at the hospital anyway as his car should not have been stopped. Since those rulings are now shown to be in error, it is clear that the consent form and the results should have been admitted.
In conclusion, I would reverse the trial judge’s suppression order without remand and would hold that the traffic stop was executed after reasonable suspicion, under the totality of the circumstances, was demonstrated based upon the officer’s undisputed corroboration of the anonymous 911 tip. I would further reverse the trial court’s order of suppression of defendant’s statements during routine roadside questioning and reverse the lower court’s suppression of the evidence gained from the search of defendant’s vehicle. Finally, I would reverse the trial court’s exclusion of defendant’s consent form and the blood draw evidence, all for the reasons stated above.

. “That, at the conclusion of Officer Hampshire’s testimony, the Court found as a fact:
v. That the defendant, by way of Affidavit in Support of Motion to Suppress, objected to the stop, search and arrest of the defendant, and maintained that he did have his seatbelt on.”