Court Opinion

ID: 9536817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:07:31.048644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:23.381306
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s denial of Jenkins’s motion for a new trial on the defamation claim because the evidence does not establish the truthfulness of the defamatory statements. I would also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy because Jenkins had no notice and opportunity to be heard on the court’s sua sponte action. In view of these crucial errors, I would reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
Truth of Defamatory Statements
Jenkins challenged the jury’s verdict in his motion for a new trial, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the defamatory statements made by Weis were in fact true. The trial court denied his motion.
Where the trial court has denied the motion for new trial, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there was “an evi-dentiary basis for the jury’s decision_” The trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial will be reversed only if “the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.”
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982) (quoting McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977)); see also Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (“we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury where a verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence”).
Typically, an appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence must first marshal the evidence in support of the jury verdict and then show how the evidence is insufficient. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d *1381789, 799 (Utah 1991). In this case, however, Jenkins asserts that there is no evidence that establishes the truthfulness of the defamatory statements.1 Since there is purportedly nothing to marshal, the marshaling requirement is satisfied without rehearsing the evidence. Inasmuch as Weis does not assert that there is evidence to establish that Jenkins was in fact a “paranoid schizophrenic,” “mentally deranged,” or “a vicious, vicious person,” we should accept Jenkins’s assertion that there is no such evidence.
Weis acknowledges that she did not present at trial any expert testimony or any other evidence that Jenkins was in fact a paranoid schizophrenic, mentally deranged, or a vicious person. She argues, however, that Jenkins misconstrues her defense, which is that she did not use those terms in a clinical sense. She contends that she used the terms only as “street expressions,” much like saying a person is “nuts” or “crazy.” In other words, she claims she did not really mean that Jenkins actually met the “psychiatric diagnostic criteria of a ‘paranoid schizophrenic.’ ” Although claiming truth as a defense, Weis asserts that she had no burden to prove that Jenkins was in fact a paranoid schizophrenic, mentally deranged, or a vicious person. Weis’s argument fails as a matter of law.
While Weis’s subjective intent may have some relevancy to whether she acted with malice, it has no relevancy to the question of whether her statements were in fact true.2 It is not the truth of her privately-intended, subjective message that is at issue — it is the message that damages the plaintiffs public reputation that must be true.
“Libel” means a malicious defamation, expressed either by printing or by signs or pictures or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) (1993).
To say that a person is mentally deranged, and then to provide a specific clinical diagnosis such as paranoid schizophrenia, and to accuse the person of being so vicious that the speaker fears for her family’s safety, cannot be dismissed as mere “street expressions” simply because Weis subjectively intended that they be so interpreted.3 Such statements do not convey any objective message *1382other than the plain meaning of the words used. They are not “rhetorical hyperbole.” See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 108 S.Ct. 876, 879, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (rhetorical hyperbole is protected because it cannot “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts” about an individual); accord Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 1541-42, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970). A reasonable person, taking Weis’s statements, as a whole, would objectively assume that she was saying that Jenkins was in fact a paranoid schizophrenic, mentally deranged, and a vicious person. The jury itself held that the statements were defamatory, a conclusion it would not likely draw from simple “street expressions.”
Because of Weis’s strategic failure to present any expert evidence to prove that Jenkins was in fact a paranoid schizophrenic, mentally deranged, or a vicious person, the special jury verdict completely lacks supporting evidence.4 The trial court erred as a matter of law in not vacating the special verdict and granting a new trial. Because I would remand for a new trial, I would also hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Jenkins was a public figure in view of Weis’s failure to establish the bases for the privilege. Specifically, Weis did not sufficiently identify a public controversy or show that Jenkins had voluntarily and successfully placed himself at the forefront of the controversy in an attempt to order society. See generally Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C.Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 898, 101 S.Ct. 266, 66 L.Ed.2d 128 (1980).
Sua Sponte Dismissal
Jenkins asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing, on its own motion, his causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. The trial court did not explain under what authority or for what reason it dismissed Jenkins’s causes of action. We do know, however, that the court dismissed the causes of action “on its own motion.”
“Generally, a trial court may not dismiss an action when neither party has sought dismissal and there is no notice or hearing on whether there exists a justifiable cause for dismissal.” Rubins v. Plummer, 813 P.2d 778, 778 (Colo.App.1990). Unless expressly granted authority to act on its own motion, a trial court must typically limit its rulings to the motions placed before it. “[A] trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues [presented] are a nullity.” Combe v. Warren’s Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984); see also Utah R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1) (“application to the court for an order shall be by motion”). Because Weis did not make a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court plainly erred when it dismissed Jenkins’s *1383causes of action without first giving Jenkins notice and an opportunity to argue against dismissal. Cf Preuss v. Wilkerson, 858 P.2d 1362, 1362-63 (Utah 1993) (trial court must give notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing claim for failure to prosecute).
Weis nevertheless asserts that any “procedural error” committed by the trial court was harmless because insofar as the merits of the trial court’s ruling are concerned, directed verdicts were appropriate. Regardless of whether a directed verdict might have been granted had the motion been properly made, noticed, and heard, the trial court’s ruling was void at its inception. A judgment is void “if the court that rendered it ... acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.” Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App.1991) (quoting Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 221 Kan. 17, 558 P.2d 101,104 (1976)); accord In Re Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993); Brim-hall v. Mecham, 27 Utah 2d 222, 224, 494 P.2d 525, 526 (1972); Workman' v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 753 (Utah App. 1990).
In our judicial system, except in extraordinary circumstances that are not present here, all parties are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before decision. The failure to give adequate notice and opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted).
Sua sponte decisions by trial courts are inconsistent with the notion of due process when parties are not provided advance notice that the court is considering a given course of action, and the losing party is not allowed to be heard thereon.5 “The right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard is a critical part of our judicial system.... A method of resolving cases that bypasses this requirement can not be accepted as a fair, neutral, and rational process.” Rubins, 813 P.2d at 780 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)); see also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) (“Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness.”).
A trial court should normally refrain from dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim unless such a deficiency is brought to its attention by way of pleadings or motions by the parties. If the court is inclined to dismiss sua sponte, it must afford the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard_ While we agree that circumstances might arise when a trial court is justified in raising the dismissal sua sponte, it should, as a matter of fundamental fairness, if not procedural due process, give plaintiff an opportunity to persuade the court that dismissal is not proper.
Rubins, 813 P.2d at 779 (citations omitted).
The lack of notice and opportunity to be heard are further aggravated by the fact that a trial court acting sua sponte has abandoned its impartial position and has become an advocate for one party over the other. See Ricketts v. Midwest Nat. Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1184 (7th Cir.1989). “Preservation of the integrity of the adversarial system of conducting trials precludes the court from infringing upon counsel’s role of advocacy.... [T]he interests of justice are not *1384enhanced when the court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would otherwise be dead....” Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983).
Since the sua sponte dismissal of Jenkins’s causes of action was void, it cannot be affirmed, regardless of whether a directed verdict’ would have been permissible had the motion been properly made. Cf. Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993) (trial court erred in granting permanent injunction on motion for preliminary injunction, regardless of whether permanent injunction would have been appropriate upon proper motion). A void judgment cannot subsequently become a valid judgment. “Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly.” Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986) (quoting 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862 (1973)). I would therefore vacate the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of Jenkins’s second and third causes of action. *1385fenses, trial courts must consider carefully all attendant circumstances in individual cases before concluding that exigent circumstances exist, always mindful of heavy burden government must bear in overcoming presumption of unreasonableness associated with war-rantless home searches. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4.

. Contrary to the majority's suggestion as to how this case was argued in his brief on appeal, Jenkins directly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. In challenging the court's decision to submit Weis’s affirmative defense to the jury, Jenkins urged that "there was no expert testimony provided by the appellee" to establish that the defamatory statements were true.

. The fact that Weis couched her statements in opinion language does not allow her to escape liability for her comments by merely showing that she in fact believed what she said she believed. Opinions regarding facts are not unconditionally privileged. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2705-06, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged in Milkovich that the statement, “[i]n my opinion John Jones is a liar” implies "a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth.” Id. This statément is therefore just as damaging as a direct assertion that “Jones is a liar.” The Supreme Court explained that if the substance of a statement couched in opinion language is capable of being proven true or false, it is subject to suit. Id.; see also West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 P.2d 179, 183-87 (Utah App.) (interpreting Milkovich), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
Weis’s statements imply knowledge of conduct that leads to a conclusion that Jenkins is in fact a paranoid schizophrenic, mentally deranged, and a vicious person. These assertions are capable of being proven true or false and are therefore subject to suit for defamation. The evidence summarized by the majority goes not to the truth of Weis's statements, but only to the validity of her opinion. In order to assert truth as a defense, Weis must prove that Jenkins was in fact a paranoid schizophrenic, mentally deranged, and a vicious person, not merely that she believed him to be so. Her subjective beliefs go only to the question of malice. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 n. 7, 110 S.Ct. at 2706 n. 7.

.Calling an individual "clinically paranoid” is a diagnosis that requires expert testimony to verify the condition. See, e.g., Alpar v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 20 N.C.App. 340, 201 S.E.2d 503, 507 (defendant's pleading alleging both nonutterance and defense of truth for libelous interoffice letter, which accused plaintiff of being "clinically paranoid,” prompted plaintiff to have expert witness *1382to rebut defendant's clinical diagnosis), cert, denied, 285 N.C. 85, 203 S.E.2d 57 (1974). Similarly, as in the instant case, calling an individual a "paranoid schizophrenic” is a clinical diagnosis that requires expert testimony to verify the condition. Cf. Webster's Medical Desk Dictionary 640 (1986) (defining "schizophrenia” as a "psychotic disorder,” or psychosis); id. at 588 (defining psychosis as a "serious mental illness (as schizophrenia)"). To say that a person has a "serious mental illness” is not merely street language, but clearly requires an expert witness to verify the truthfulness of the diagnosis. Cf. Bre-hany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991) (defense of truth can only be established if defamatory charge is "true in substance"). Therefore, since terms such as "paranoid schizophrenic” are specific clinical diagnoses, the only way they can be “true in substance” is if an expert witness verifies such diagnoses.

. The majority points to Jenkins's own expert, Dr. Mohr, to establish that Jenkins had a disordered thinking pattern. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that Dr. Mohr's testimony that "people with disordered thinking patterns have a tendency to see conspiracies against them" in any way infers that Jenkins had a disordered thinking pattern. The other evidence summarized by the majority does not prove that Jenkins was in fact a paranoid schizophrenic, mentally deranged, or a vicious person. While I do not concede that the evidence is even admissible, I believe it can only go to the validity of Weis's opinion. See note 2.

. From all that appears in the record, Jenkins had no notice and hearing on the court’s sua sponte dismissal of his causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. Jenkins claims that the dismissal was "without findings and on the Judge’s own motion in his chambers without a court reporter present.” In any event, the minute entry itself indicates:
Based upon the arguments of respective counsel, court orders that the motion for a directed verdict is granted in part on the issues of damages resulting from the heart attack and damages resulting from the loss of the home. Court further orders, on its own motion, that the 2nd and 3rd causes of action are dismissed. (Emphasis added.)