Court Opinion

ID: 9964014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 19:01:04.315131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.983014
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12680    Document: 21-1      Date Filed: 04/26/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                  No. 23-12680
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                             ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        VICTOR NATSON,
        a.k.a. Silverback,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                             ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cr-00050-LGW-CLR-3
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                    23-12680

                              ____________________

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                In 2018, a jury found Victor Natson guilty of conspiracy to
        commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count
        1); Hobbs Act robbery in violation of § 1951 (Count 2); using,
        carrying, brandishing and discharging a firearm during and in
        relation to a crime of violence, namely, Hobbs Act robbery as
        alleged in Count 2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count
        3); attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951
        and 2 (Count 5); and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm
        during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely, attempted
        Hobbs Act robbery in violation of § 924(c) (Count 6). Following
        the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845
        (2022), 1 Natson filed a successful motion to vacate sentence under
        28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the district court vacated Count 6 and held a
        full resentencing hearing. Natson now appeals from the new
        judgment.
              On appeal he argues that (1) his § 924(c) conviction in
        Count 3 must be vacated because the offense of completed Hobbs
        Act robbery is no longer a crime of violence post-Taylor, and
        (2) Count 3 was jurisdictionally invalid because the jury

        1 The Supreme Court in Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does

        not categorically qualify as a predicate crime of violence for purposes of
        § 924(c). 596 U.S. at 851.
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        23-12680                   Opinion of the Court                         3

        instruction, which was based on the Eleventh Circuit’s Pattern Jury
        Instruction, was overbroad and the jury could have convicted him
        under circumstances that would not constitute a crime of violence
        for purposes of § 924(c). After review, we affirm.
                                      I.      Background
               A grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging
        Natson and two other defendants with seven offenses related to the
        armed robbery of, and a second attempted armed robbery of,
        Brinks armored trucks. The indictment charged Natson with six
        counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1); Hobbs Act robbery in violation of § 1951
        (Count 2); using, carrying, brandishing and discharging a firearm
        during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely, Hobbs Act
        robbery as alleged in Count 2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
        (Count 3); attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        §§ 1951 and 2 (Count 5); and using, carrying, and brandishing a
        firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely,
        attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of § 924(c) (Count 6).
               Natson proceeded to a jury trial. Prior to deliberations, with
        regard to Count 2—which served as the predicate offense for
        Count 3—the trial court gave the jury this Court’s pattern jury
        instruction for Hobbs Act robbery. 2 That instruction provides as
        follows:

        2 Natson requested the trial court give this instruction.
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        4                   Opinion of the Court                 23-12680

             It’s a Federal crime to acquire someone else’s
             property by robbery and in doing so to obstruct,
             delay, or aﬀect interstate commerce.

             The Defendant can be found guilty of this crime only
             if all the following facts are proved beyond a
             reasonable doubt.

                   (1) the Defendant knowingly            acquired
                   someone else’s personal property;

                   (2) the Defendant took the property against the
                   victim's will, by using actual or threatened
                   force, or violence, or causing the victim to fear
                   harm, either immediately or in the future; and

                   (3) the Defendant's actions obstructed,
                   delayed, or aﬀected interstate commerce.

             “Property” includes money, tangible things of value,
             and intangible rights that are a source or element of
             income or wealth.

             “Fear” means a state of anxious concern, alarm, or
             anticipation of harm. It includes the fear of ﬁnancial
             loss as well as fear of physical violence.

             “Interstate commerce” is the ﬂow of business
             activities between one state and anywhere outside
             that state.

             The Government doesn’t have to prove that the
             Defendant speciﬁcally intended to aﬀect interstate
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        23-12680               Opinion of the Court                        5

              commerce. But it must prove that the natural
              consequences of the acts described in the indictment
              would be to somehow delay, interrupt, or aﬀect
              interstate commerce. If you decide that there would
              be any eﬀect at all on interstate commerce, then that
              is enough to satisfy this element. The eﬀect can be
              minimal.

        See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction O70.3.
               The jury found Natson guilty on all six counts, and he was
        sentenced to a total of 240 months’ imprisonment. We affirmed
        his convictions and sentence on appeal. See United States v. Scott,
        798 F. App’x 391 (11th Cir. 2019).
               Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor—which
        as noted above held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not
        categorically qualify as a predicate crime of violence for purpose of
        § 924(c)—Natson filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his
        § 924(c) conviction that was predicated on attempted Hobbs Act
        robbery (Count 6). The district court granted the motion, vacated
        the conviction, and ordered a full resentencing.
               At the resentencing stage, Natson argued that the district
        court could not resentence him under Count 3 because the pattern
        jury instruction for the predicate crime in Count 3—Hobbs Act
        robbery—was overbroad in allowing the jury to convict him of
        Hobbs Act robbery merely by causing his victims to fear economic
        loss, and, therefore Count 3 was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction.
        Acknowledging that we had held in In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      23-12680

        (11th Cir. 2016), that completed Hobbs Act robbery categorically
        qualified as a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c), Natson
        argued that Saint Fleur was no longer good law in light of Taylor.
              The district court overruled Natson’s objections, and
        resentenced him to a below-guidelines total sentence of 166
        months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
                                      II.     Discussion
                   A. Whether completed Hobbs Act robbery is crime of
                      violence post-Taylor
              Natson argues that our precedent holding that completed
        Hobbs Act robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence for
        purposes of § 924(c) is no longer valid and must be reconsidered in
        light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor. 3 Natson’s
        argument is squarely foreclosed by binding precedent.
               Section 924(c) prohibits the use, carrying, or possession of a
        firearm during and in relation to or in furtherance of “any crime of
        violence or drug trafficking crime” and provides for a mandatory
        consecutive sentence for any defendant who uses a firearm during
        a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Section 924(c)’s
        “elements clause” defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has

        3 Whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c) is a question of law

        that we review de novo. United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355, 1360 (11th Cir.
        2023).
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        23-12680                  Opinion of the Court                                7

        as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
        force against the person or property of another.” § 924(c)(3)(A).
                The Hobbs Act robbery statute criminalizes:
                the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property
                from the person or in the presence of another, against
                his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or
                violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his
                person or property, . . . or the person or property of
                . . . anyone in his company at the time of the . . .
                obtaining.

        18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(1).
               In In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), we
        concluded that a completed Hobbs Act robbery offense “clearly”
        qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause,
        noting that it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
        threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
        another.” Id. at 1340–41 (quoting § 924(c)(3)(A)). 4
              Subsequently, in United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335
        (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by Taylor, 596 U.S. 845,

        4 To the extent that Natson argues that Saint Fleur should not apply to his case

        because it was issued in the context of an application for permission to file a
        second or successive motion to vacate sentence, this argument is squarely
        foreclosed by our precedent. See In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir.
        2015) (“To be clear, our prior-panel-precedent rule applies with equal force as
        to prior panel decisions published in the context of applications to file second
        or successive petitions. In other words, published three-judge orders issued
        under [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(b) are binding precedent in our circuit.”).
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12680

        we reaffirmed Saint Fleur, holding that Hobbs Act robbery is a
        crime of violence because “[a] conviction for Hobbs Act robbery
        by definition requires ‘actual or threatened force, or violence, or
        fear of injury, immediate or future, to person or property.’” Id. at
        348 (alteration adopted) (quoting § 1951(b)(1)). In so holding, we
        reasoned that there was no “plausible scenario” in which the Hobbs
        Act applied to a robbery “that did not involve, at a minimum, a
        threat to use physical force,” or a situation “in which a Hobbs Act
        robber could take property from the victim against his will and by
        putting the victim in fear of injury (to his person or property)
        without at least threatening to use physical force capable of causing
        such injury.” Id.
               Although Natson argues that Saint Fleur and its progeny
        were wrongly decided in the first instance and have been
        undermined to the point of abrogation by Taylor, we have held that
        “Taylor did not disturb our holding that completed Hobbs Act
        robbery is a crime of violence” for the purposes of § 924(c). Wiley,
        78 F.4th at 1365; see also United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255
        (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that to disturb our existing precedent,
        a “Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point” and “actually
        abrogate or directly conflict with, as opposed to merely weaken,
        the holding of the prior panel”). Under the prior-panel-precedent
        rule, we are bound by Wiley, Saint Fleur, and the otherwise valid
        portions of St. Hubert, “unless and until it is overruled or
        undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
        this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249,
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        23-12680                Opinion of the Court                            9

        1265 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1376 (2022) (quotations
        omitted). Accordingly, Natson is not entitled to relief on this claim.
                   B. Whether Count 3 is a nullity for lack of jurisdiction
                      due to the jury instruction
               Natson argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
        Count 3 because our pattern jury instruction for Hobbs Act
        robbery is categorically overbroad as it allowed the jury to convict
        him based on mere fear of financial loss, which would remove the
        Hobbs Act robbery predicate from § 924(c)’s “crime of violence”
        definition. He maintains that “the [c]ourt does not have
        jurisdiction to issue judgment as to the categorically overbroad
        offenses because such offenses are not ‘offenses against the laws of
        the United States’ pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.”
                “We review de novo a district court’s subject matter
        jurisdiction even when it is raised for the first time on appeal.”
        United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1290 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
        144 S. Ct. 178 (2023).
               “Subject-matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to
        hear a given type of case.” Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732,
        734 (11th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630
        (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction . . . involves a court’s power
        to hear a case. . . .”). “Congress bestows that authority on lower
        courts by statute.” Alikhani, 200 F.3d at 734. For federal crimes,
        Congress has bestowed federal district courts with “original
        jurisdiction . . . of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”
        18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have held that “[s]o long as the indictment
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        23-12680

        charges the defendant with violating a federal statute . . . it alleges
        an offense against the laws of the United States, and, thereby,
        invokes the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” United
        States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889, 902 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations
        omitted); United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (same).
               Natson does not take issue with court’s subject matter
        jurisdiction based on the § 924(c) offense alleged in the indictment.
        Nor could he do so because the United States filed an indictment
        charging Natson with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which no
        one disputes is an offense against the laws of the United States.
        Rather, Natson argues that the allegedly overbroad jury instruction
        essentially stripped the district court of subject matter jurisdiction
        that it otherwise possessed. However, he cites no binding
        authority5—and we have located none—holding that an erroneous
        jury instruction can deprive the district court of its authority and
        power to adjudicate a particular type of case under 18 U.S.C.

        5 In support of his position, Natson relies primarily on a two-page unpublished

        district court order in United States v. Louis, No. 21-CR-20252, 2023 WL
        2240544, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2023), granting a post-trial motion to arrest
        judgment and dismissing numerous § 924(c) counts, under Federal Rule of
        Criminal Procedure 34 for lack of jurisdiction. The district court concluded,
        without sufficient explanation, that the Hobbs Act robbery pattern jury
        instruction O70.3 is categorically overbroad and summarily concluded that
        “such overbroad offenses are not offenses against the laws of the United
        States.” (quotations omitted). However, as Natson concedes, Louis is not
        binding on this Court. Furthermore, the Louis court’s determination is
        entirely conclusory and finds no support in the law.
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        23-12680                   Opinion of the Court                                 11

        § 3231. See United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1142 (11th Cir.
        2021) (“[A] jurisdictional defect occurs only where a federal court
        lacks power to adjudicate at all.” (quotations omitted)). To the
        extent that Natson argues that because the Hobbs Act robbery jury
        instruction was allegedly overbroad, it could not satisfy the “crime
        of violence” element of § 924(c), that would mean only that one of
        the elements of the § 924(c) charge was not met—not that the
        district court would have been stripped of its jurisdiction. See
        United States v. Grimon, 923 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding
        that “the government’s alleged failure to sufficiently establish an
        [element] does not deprive the district court of its subject matter
        jurisdiction under § 3231.”). In short, although Natson casts his
        jury instruction challenge as one that goes to the district court’s
        subject matter jurisdiction, it does not.6
                Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

        6 Natson’s challenge, at best, amounts to a garden-variety jury instruction

        challenge, which we review for plain error because he failed to preserve the
        issue at trial. United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239, 1257 (11th Cir. 2023). To
        establish plain error, the defendant must show that (1) there was error; (2) the
        error was plain; (3) the error “affect[ed] [his] substantial rights”; and (4) “the
        error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
        proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). Natson cannot show that the alleged
        error was plain because neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has held
        that the pattern jury instruction at issue is overly broad. See United States v.
        Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir.2000) (“[W]here neither the Supreme
        Court nor this Court has ever resolved an issue . . . there can be no plain error
        in regard to that issue.”).
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        12                   Opinion of the Court              23-12680

                                III.   Conclusion
              For the above reasons, we affirm Natson’s sentence.
              AFFIRMED.