Court Opinion

ID: 9727083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:19:26.083807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.375529
License: Public Domain

*885DEVICH, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment reversing the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995.
In addition, I feel it is important to discuss why the case at bench does not fall within the ambit of another Los Angeles International Airport narcotics case, Irwin v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 423 [82 Cal.Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12], overruled on other grounds in In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957], In fact, had the factors of the case at bench been present in the Irwin case, I believe our Supreme Court would have arrived at a different result.
In Irwin, the police were summoned when an airline employee discovered marijuana in a passenger’s baggage. The police arrested Cauwels when he claimed the baggage. One of the police officers observed Irwin “just standing” in the lobby next to two pieces of luggage and a paper bag. One of the pieces of luggage had a tag attached to it bearing the next sequential number to the tag attached to Cauwels’ baggage.
After being told by Irwin that he had no baggage, the police officer examined the baggage. When he picked up the paper bag, the officer detected an odor similar to the odor emanating from Cauwels’ baggage. The officer then searched through the baggage and discovered marijuana.
In ordering the evidence suppressed, our Supreme Court stated: “‘[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . .’ [H] Thus, a detention based on ‘mere hunch’ is unlawful [citation], even though the officer may have acted in good faith [citation]. ‘There must be a “rational” suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place . . . some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity. . . . [and] some suggestion that the activity is related to crime.’ [Citation.] . . . [1Í] Although the discovery that Cauwels had shipped a box of marijuana showed criminal activity, there is nothing unusual in the activity of Irwin who was standing close to baggage near the United Airlines baggage area in the Los Angeles International Airport. The basis of Officer Simmons’ initial decision to see if Cauwels was accompanied by anyone else does not appear in the record; we can assume only that he had a ‘hunch’ that marijuana shippers might be traveling in pairs. [11] . . . [T]here is nothing in Irwin’s activity to distinguish him from any other embarking or debarking passenger at the Los Angeles airport. [H] Nor does the circumstance that one of the pieces of luggage near where Irwin was standing contained the next-numbered tag to Cauwels’ baggage tag rationally suggest criminal activity by Irwin, or *886provide a rational connection to Cauwels’ criminal activity.” (Irwin v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 426-427.)
Since the only factor the police officers had to connect Irwin to the contraband and to Cauwels was that Irwin was “standing close” to baggage that contained the next-numbered tag to Cauwels’ baggage, the California Supreme Court correctly granted a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to suppress the evidence consisting of the paper bag and its contents. The officers had no knowledge that Irwin was even with Cauwels. Surely, as noted in Irwin, it is reasonable to assume “that Irwin was the next passenger in line at the baggage check-in counter. ’ ’ (Id., at p. 427.) There was nothing to show any criminal activity on the part of Irwin.
The basic fundamental constitutional principles set forth in Irwin have been established through case law and are not subject to dispute. However, in the case at bench, other circumstances were present and known to the experienced federal agent that were not available to the officers in Irwin.
Agent Wood knew that Profit, Dawkins, and Manuel were together as he had observed them enter the ticket counter area where Profit paid cash for three airline tickets. Conversely, in Irwin, the sole link between Cauwels (a person known to be carrying contraband) and Irwin was that Irwin was standing near baggage containing the next-numbered tag to the box containing contraband.
Also, Agent Wood testified that he had observed what he felt to be “extremely nervous activity” on the part of Dawkins and Manuel. Additionally, two crucial factors to be considered are the substantial background possessed by Agent Wood and the purpose for which he was specifically assigned to the airport detail, i.e., to work on drug enforcement. Compare this to Irwin where the court was dealing with two patrol officers who performed diligently under the circumstances of that case but who apparently did not have Agent Wood’s vast drug investigation experience.
In assessing probable cause to arrest, judges should not ignore an officer’s experience. Professionals develop a “sixth sense,” over the years, as to how to handle a given situation and what to look for in arriving at a successful result. For example, with experience, doctors, lawyers, laborers, and businessmen all acquire instincts which enable them to perform their jobs in more productive ways than when they first started their careers. It is no different with federal agents such as Agent Wood. His instinct as to what he was observing was more than just a “mere hunch.” He knew something was not in order. In Agent Wood’s professional opinion, Profit, Dawkins, and Manuel were acting in a manner uncharacteristic of the usual passenger. *887This is in direct contravention to Irwin where “there [was] nothing in Irwin’s activity to distinguish him from any other embarking or debarking passenger at the Los Angeles Airport.” (Irwin v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 427.)
As noted by our Supreme Court, “experienced police officers develop an ability to perceive the unusual and suspicious, and we recognize the right and duty of officers to make reasonable investigation of such activities. [Citations.]” (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477 [198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240].)
The intuition of an experienced officer, while not enough in and of itself to justify an arrest, is certainly an important factor to be considered in analyzing whether probable cause existed.
Agent Wood knew that the defendants were together, that they were nervous, that they made a half-hearted attempt to separate, and that they said they had no identification. After receiving permission to look into Profit’s briefcase, Agent Wood saw what he believed to be a narcotics sales ledger sheet and an airline ticket in a different name from the tickets previously shown to him. This was followed by Profit’s statement regarding possible marijuana possession. A major factor then arose. Profit suddenly struck another federal agent (Moore) while Dawkins and Manuel stood there. Profit then fled while throwing a bottle at Moore containing a liquid that smelled very strongly of ether.
At that point, legitimately forming the opinion that the liquid was phencyclidine (PCP) and illegal to possess, the agents had sufficient cause to arrest Profit. In addition, based upon the knowledge they had, it was reasonable for them to believe that Dawkins and Manuel were likewise involved in criminal activity, i.e., a conspiracy to transport PCP.
As noted in Irwin v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 426, “although ‘a police officer . . . may detain and question a person when the circumstances are such as would indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course is necessary to the proper discharge of [his] duties,’ the circumstances must be such as to distinguish the activity of the detained person from that of any other citizen and must be based on an objective perception of events rather than the subjective feelings of the detaining officers. (See also, People v. Moore [(1968)] 69 Cal.2d 674, 683 . . . .) [11] ‘[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . .’”
*888Here, Agent Wood was able to completely point out to the magistrate each “specific and articulable fact” which led up to the rational detention and the justifiable arrest of all three suspects.
In reality, not all criminal incidents that occur on our public streets or in our airports unfold in the precise factual manner described in case law. When they do not, law enforcement officials have to adapt to the situation. Here, the facts firmly reveal that we are dealing with a seasoned federal agent who was applying his vast experience to proper use, relying not on mere hunches but on stated objective factors. In cases such as this, the officers’ efforts should be supported and legally sustained.
*889Appendix A
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*890Appendix A1
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*891Appendix A2
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Appendix B
*893Appendix C
Defendant Profit
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People’s Exhibit No. 3
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People’s Exhibit No. 11
*894Appendix D
Defendant Manuel
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People’s Exhibit No. 4
People’s Exhibit No. 5
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People’s Exhibit No. 6
*895Appendix E
Defendant Dawkins
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People’s Exhibit No. 7
People’s Exhibit No. 8
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People’s Exhibit No. 9
People’s Exhibit No. 10