Court Opinion

ID: 9770267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:56:24.403368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:16.412866
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. For a number of reasons, I believe the trial court’s order of summary judgment was correct and should be affirmed. On the issue of malicious prosecution, the law requires malice and a lack of probable cause. Rogers v. General Electric Company, 341 F. Supp. 971 (1972); Malvern Brick & Tile Co. v. Hill, 232 Ark. 1000, 342 S.W.2d 305 (1961). As to malice, there is not the slightest evidence that the appellees acted from an ulterior motive or in furtherance of malice or rancor. The only motivation suggested by the evidence before the trial court is that appellees sought only the timely delivery of the cargo to the customer, Sam’s Wholesale, and even agreed to pay $4,300 owed by Westport to the appellant (an amount five times greater than the $800 charge for delivery) in order to bring that about. When they learned that appellant had driven away from the JoMar Warehouse without delivering the cargo as promised, they acted as any reasonable person would — they consulted their attorney and, on his advice, reported the problem to the prosecuting attorney. Thus, the actions of the appellees when faced with a dilemma not of their making was entirely appropriate and neither irresponsible nor spiteful. Second, there can be no serious question as to the existence of probable cause to suspect that appellant had committed a crime. Gazzola v. New, 191 Ark. 724, 87 S.W.2d 268 (1935). That was the opinion of the Houston police, of appellees attorney and of the deputy prosecuting attorney. The majority concludes that an ordinarily cautious person would not believe Cox was guilty of fraud in the initial acquisition of the cargo, citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-37-524 (1987). Of course, that was the charge brought by the prosecutor and not attributable to the appellees. Beyond that, there are two fallacies — first, whether appellant had a specific intent to withhold the cargo when he first acquired the goods, is not conclusive, as the statute makes it a violation if the accused “fails to deliver the products in the time and manner prescribed by the contract, with the intent to defraud the owner or shipper of the goods.” Too, the majority maintains that appellant did not learn that the $209 check had bounced until after the cargo was in his possession, and thus he could have had no fraudulent intent. But there was evidence that the check had been previously presented and payment refused by the bank. If appellant’s state of mind were crucial, of far greater importance is the fact that appellant admittedly knew that Westport owed his father approximately $4,000, and it was payment of this amount, not the mere $209, which appellant was demanding. But whether appellant had a specific intent to defraud when he acquired the goods for shipment is beside the point, as it can hardly be denied that when he refused to deliver cargo that he was legally bound to deliver [See Car Transportation v. Garden Spot District, 305 Ark. 82, 805 S.W.2d 632 (1998)], he subjected himself to the likelihood of prosecution. Whether the particular offense was fraud in the acquisition, or theft by bailee, or extortion, or yet another offense, the party aggrieved by that conduct had, I submit, every right to consult legal advice from private and public counsel and to act in accordance with that advice. There has been no showing in this case that appellees did anything other than that. A third element of malicious prosecution is the requirement that appellant’s prosecution was at the insistence of the defendant. Rogers v. General Electric, supra. Here it is shown simply that appellees consulted the prosecutor and reported the facts with reasonable accuracy, with no indication that they demanded prosecution. Finally, even if probable cause was lacking, this court has held from the earliest that it is a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution if the defendant initiated the prosecution on the advice of a prosecutor or an attorney knowledgeable in the law. Jennings Motors v. Burchfield, 182 Ark. 1047, 34 S.W.2d 455 (1931); Price Mercantile Co. v. Cuilla, 100 Ark. 316, 141 S.W. 194 (1911); Laster v. Bragg, 107 Ark. 74, 153 S.W. 1116 (1913). The testimony of the prosecutor renders that question beyond dispute, as well as the contention that the discrepancy as to the length of time appellant held the goods: As far as I can recall and based upon my investigation subsequent to the filing of charges, nothing told to me or my office by Harold McLaughlin or Terry Lafarlette was materially inaccurate or misleading. I now understand, however, that the statement that the load was supposed “to be delivered two weeks ago” is wrong and that it was only six days late. This played no part in my decision to prosecute, as the important facts were Toby Cox was alleged to have retained a load which did not belong to him and would not release it unless someone paid him money. Turning to the breach of contract claim, I disagree that conduct plainly intended to coerce one party to pay a sizeable sum it does not owe or risk losing a valued customer, can rise to the level of a “contract.” The approximate cost of transporting this cargo from Nebraska to Houston was $800, yet appellant refused to complete the delivery until appellees agreed to pay $4,300 owed by Westport to his father. Since appellant could not legally have refused to deliver even against Westport, [see Car Transport v. Garden Spot Dist., supra,] he certainly could not have done so against appellees.The theory that an anticipatory breach occurred which enabled appellant to negotiate a new agreement overlooks the fact that appellee Champion did not break its contract with Westport, the carrier, in any manner. The breach in this case occurred because of the wrongful acts of the appellant and in that context appellant cannot maintain that he is entitled to enforce a coerced agreement to pay $4,300, five times the cost of the carriage. DeSoto Life Insurance Co. v. Jeffett, 210 Ark. 371, 196 S.W.2d 243 (1946). For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. Brown, J., joins.