Court Opinion

ID: 9402192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:56.893321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.053384
License: Public Domain

TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0289-KB

INQUIRY COMMISSION                                                       MOVANT

V.                            IN SUPREME COURT

RONNIE LEE GOLDY, JR.                                              RESPONDENT

                          OPINION AND ORDER
                   DISSOLVING TEMPORARY SUSPENSION

      This matter is before the Court upon Ronnie L. Goldy, Jr.’s motion to

terminate temporary suspension, pursuant to SCR 3.165(4). Goldy was

previously ordered temporarily suspended from the practice of law on

September 16, 2022. The Kentucky Bar Association has responded, arguing

that Goldy has not presented any new information to the Court justifying

termination of the temporary suspension, and that he continues to present a

substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public. For the following

reasons, we dissolve the temporary suspension.

      Goldy was the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the 21st Judicial Circuit

beginning January 1, 2013. In 2015 or 2016, he met Misty Helton when she

was incarcerated in the Rowan County Detention Center. Goldy and Helton

began a relationship. Goldy would communicate with Helton directly through

text messages and social media, frequently requesting and receiving nude

images and videos of Helton. In return, Goldy intervened on Helton’s behalf in

several criminal cases throughout his jurisdiction, and attempted to use his
position to influence a criminal case in Clark County. Specifically, Goldy had

multiple bench warrants recalled on Helton’s behalf and agreed to change

hearing dates.

      The Special Commissioner made findings of fact that
      The evidence establishes probable cause to believe that Ronnie Lee
      Goldy, Jr., while serving as the Commonwealth Attorney for the
      21st Judicial Circuit, engaged in personal communications with
      Misty Helton, a defendant in the 21st Judicial Circuit, regarding
      her various criminal cases. He discussed Ms. Helton’s criminal
      matters with her directly without her counsel being present and
      clearly intervened on her behalf by having court dates moved or
      warrants recalled. In return for his actions, Mr. Goldy solicited
      nude pictures and videos from Ms. Helton.
The Special Commissioner found that for a “period up to seven years” this

conduct occurred, and that “Mr. Goldy abused his power by using his official

position as Commonwealth’s Attorney to provide Ms. Helton with assistance in

criminal matters for her benefit while he expected and requested actions of a

sexual nature from her for his benefit.”

      Based upon the Special Commissioner’s findings and conclusion that

probable cause existed to believe that “Mr. Goldy’s professional misconduct

poses a substantial threat of harm to the public pursuant to SCR 3.165(1)(b),”

we ordered him temporarily suspended from the practice of law during the

pendency of the Inquiry Commission’s investigation.

      Since that time, Goldy has been formally charged with one count of

violation of SCR 3.130(4.2). That rule reads,

      In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
      subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
      represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has

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      the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a
      court order.
Additionally, the House of Representatives passed Articles of Impeachment

against Goldy, and the Senate duly impeached him on March 30, 2023. Goldy

is no longer the Commonwealth Attorney for the 21st Judicial Circuit and may

not hold any elected office again. Ky. Const. § 68.

      Goldy has argued that his temporary suspension for more than 180 days

is overly punitive when compared to other cases of attorneys who were also

found to have violated SCR 3.130(4.2). For example, he cites Callis v. KBA, 143

S.W.3d 603 (Ky. 2004); Moore v. KBA, 950 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1997); Brachter v.

KBA, 290 S.W.3d 648 (Ky. 2009); and Riley v. KBA, 349 S.W.3d 301 (Ky. 2011).

He also argues that both he and his wife have lost their jobs, and he is unable

to secure employment elsewhere.

      None of the cases cited by Goldy involved a Commonwealth’s Attorney, a

fact we think extremely important. Goldy is correct, however, that public

reprimand is the typical sanction when there is only a violation of SCR

3.130(4.2). Moore, 950 S.W.2d at 231; Callis, 143 S.W.3d at 604; Bratcher, 290

S.W.3d at 650; Sipes v. KBA, 290 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Ky. 2009). But all of these

were negotiated sanctions. In the Riley case, although it involved sexual

communications, the rule violated there was SCR 3.130(1.7(b)). 349 S.W.3d at

302. And again, it was a negotiated sanction.

      In the case of Stevens v. KBA, we issued a public reprimand for a former

Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney who had a sexual affair with a defendant,

although he was not the prosecuting attorney in her case. 186 S.W.3d 744, 744

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(Ky. 2006). That case is distinguishable, however, because Stevens admitted to

the affair, apologized and expressed regret publicly, was cooperative with the

investigation, “and he made no offers of compromise or any kind of deal to the

Defendant. His behavior did not prejudice the Commonwealth or any party.” Id.

at 745.

      SCR 3.165(4), in pertinent part, states “The Respondent may for good

cause request dissolution or amendment of any such temporary order by

petition filed with the Court . . . .” “Good cause” is defined as a “legally

sufficient reason.” Good Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This

raises the question of what is good cause or a legally sufficient reason to

dissolve or amend an order of temporary suspension. A temporary suspension

may only be ordered upon probable cause to believe one or more of four

circumstances exists: misappropriation of funds; a substantial threat to clients

or the public; a criminal conviction calling into doubt an attorney’s moral

fitness to practice law; or mental disability, mental incapacity, or substance

abuse. SCR 3.165(1)(a)-(d). In this case, the order was predicated on a finding

of probable cause existing to believe Goldy posed a substantial threat to his

clients or the public. That conclusion was inextricably linked to his position as

a Commonwealth’s Attorney. Thus, the precise question before the Court is

whether there is a legally sufficient reason to find that probable cause no

longer exists to believe Goldy poses a substantial threat to his clients or the

public. Generally, a respondent must demonstrate this affirmatively by

showing that the facts which predicated the probable cause finding either were

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incorrect or a change of circumstances has occurred that essentially nullifies

the finding of probable cause. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis.

      In this case, Goldy was the Commonwealth’s Attorney. He had no clients

but was the representative of the public-at-large. He has denied the charge

against him and refused to resign from his office. Goldy’s tenure in office is

now no longer in question. He has been impeached and is removed. Manifestly,

there is no longer probable cause to believe he poses a substantial threat to the

public by abusing the power of an office he no longer holds. But is there

probable cause to believe his practice of law as a private attorney poses a

substantial threat to his clients or the public? There simply are no facts in the

record to support that conclusion. There is no public record of Goldy having

ever been previously disciplined by this Court before our order of temporary

suspension. Moreover, nothing in the Special Commissioner’s report this Court

adopted as its own to support the order of temporary suspension mentioned,

much less relied upon, prior disciplinary history. Nothing in the Special

Commissioner’s report suggests that Goldy’s conduct towards Helton was part

of a general pattern with multiple persons. The pending charge of one count of

violating SCR 3.130(4.2) is predicated on Goldy’s conduct towards Helton. In

short, the facts in this record only support the conclusion that Goldy’s

conduct, while occurring over a seven-year period, was isolated to just one

person; and this conduct was bound up with Goldy’s position as a

Commonwealth’s Attorney.

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      We must also be cognizant that a temporary suspension is not punitive

in nature. It rests on a probable cause standard which, in a different context,

we have explained means “a good reason to act, . . . it does not mean certainty,

or even more likely than not . . . .” Goben v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.3d 890,

913 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Hanson v. Dane Cnty. Wisconsin, 608 F.3d 335, 338

(7th Cir. 2010)). Typically, sanctions may only be issued upon a preponderance

of the evidence standard. SCR 3.330(4).

      Therefore, good cause has been shown by a change in circumstances to

conclude there is no longer probable cause to believe Goldy poses a substantial

threat to his clients or the public. We caution, however, that nothing in this

order should be interpreted as pre-judging or anticipating the conclusions of

the Trial Commissioner regarding the pending charge against Goldy, or the

recommendation of the Board of Governors on that charge. We remind the

parties that this Court possesses the authority to impose discipline as it

determines is appropriate, should it ultimately be concluded that Goldy has

violated SCR 3.130(4.2). SCR 3.380; KBA v. Myers, 457 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Ky.

2015) (“[T]he Trial Commissioner's Report is advisory . . . .”).

      The temporary suspension of Ronnie L. Goldy, Jr., from the practice of

law is dissolved.

      All sitting. Conley, Lambert, Nickell, Thompson, JJ., concur. VanMeter,

C.J., and Bisig, J., dissent without separate opinion.

      ENTERED: June 15, 2023.

                                                    ___________________________
                                                    CHIEF JUSTICE
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