Court Opinion

ID: 9386570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 21:00:23.173822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.332316
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4653

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        DARIUS ERIC WILDER,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Maryland, at
        Greenbelt. George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:17-cr-00528-GJH-1)

        Submitted: October 18, 2022                                       Decided: April 11, 2023

        Before AGEE, RUSHING and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Sapna
        Mirchandani, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
        DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney,
        Jason D. Medinger, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               After this Court vacated one of Darius Wilder’s two convictions and remanded his

        case for resentencing, the district court imposed a 132-month term of incarceration. On

        appeal, Wilder argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the

        132-month sentence. Wilder claims that the district court committed three procedural

        errors: (1) presuming that Wilder, who has a chronic kidney condition, would survive a

        132-month sentence, (2) using the statutory maximum 240-month sentence, rather than the

        applicable Guidelines range of 60 to 63 months, as the starting point for deciding the

        sentence, and (3) inadequately explaining why a 132-month sentence was necessary to

        satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. We reject these arguments and affirm

        for the reasons below.

               A jury originally convicted Wilder of one count of arson affecting interstate

        commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and one count of possession of a firearm in

        furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). Wilder

        faced a Guidelines range of 60 to 63 months (including a 60-month mandatory minimum

        term) for the § 844(i) conviction. Additionally, he faced a mandatory minimum 360-month

        sentence, to be served consecutively to any other term, for the § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)

        conviction. Accordingly, the court sentenced Wilder to the statutorily required 420 months’

        imprisonment. Wilder appealed these convictions and his sentence. On appeal, this Court

        vacated Wilder’s § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) conviction, holding that federal arson is not a crime of

        violence under § 924(c)(3). United States v. Wilder, 834 F. App’x 782, 783 (4th Cir. 2020).

        On remand for resentencing on the § 844(i) conviction, Wilder faced a Guidelines range of

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        51 to 63 months’ imprisonment with a 60-month mandatory minimum. The Government

        sought an upward variance, recommending a 240-month sentence. The district court

        sentenced Wilder to 132 months’ imprisonment.

                 This Court reviews the district court’s sentence “under a deferential

        abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This standard

        applies whether the sentence is “inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines

        range.” United States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

        In reviewing a sentence, this Court first must ensure that the district court did not commit

        a significant procedural error. United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020).

        A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court improperly calculated the

        Guidelines range, “treat[ed] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[ed] to consider the § 3553(a)

        factors, select[ed] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[ed] to explain the

        chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”

        Id. (citation omitted). This Court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error

        and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Burnley, 988 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir.

        2021).

                 Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

        sentencing Wilder to 132 months’ imprisonment. The record discloses that the district court

        explicitly considered Wilder’s medical condition when explaining its reasoning for

        imposing the sentence. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)

        (requiring sentencing courts to address a defendant’s non-frivolous arguments in the

        context of the sentence imposed). Further, the district court’s discussion of Wilder’s

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        medical condition accurately reflected the information provided by Wilder’s medical

        expert. Thus, the district court’s assessment of Wilder’s condition did not reflect a failure

        to consider or misunderstanding of his prognosis. Accordingly, it is not clearly erroneous.

               Next, we conclude that the record does not support Wilder’s assertion that the

        district court used the statutory maximum 240-month sentence, rather than the applicable

        Guidelines range, as its starting point. The sentencing transcript demonstrates that the

        district court referred to the applicable Guidelines range on numerous occasions during the

        resentencing hearing, including at the outset of the hearing and at multiple points during

        the Government’s argument. Additionally, the district court’s only reference to the

        240-month statutory maximum was made during its colloquy with the Government. In that

        exchange, the district court acknowledged that the Government was seeking a 240-month

        sentence. However, the district court then stated that the Government bore the burden of

        justifying an above-Guidelines sentence. This exchange cannot be construed as the district

        court using the 240-month statutory maximum sentence as its starting point. Therefore, the

        district court did not rely on an incorrect Guidelines range and did not procedurally err.

               Finally, we conclude that the district court extensively explained the rationale for

        imposing the 132-month sentence, considering nearly all the § 3553(a) factors. See United

        States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 395 (holding that district courts are not required to

        “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” (citation omitted)); see also United

        States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating that “the adequacy of the

        sentencing court’s explanation depends on the complexity of each case”); see also United

        States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 2019) (requiring only that the district court

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        conduct “an individualized assessment” of the relevant factors that influenced the

        sentencing decision). The district court reflected on Wilder’s history and characteristics,

        addressed his medical condition, and praised his limited criminal record and expression of

        remorse. However, the district court determined that despite Wilder’s progress, his crime

        was a serious offense deserving of significant punishment. The district court also noted that

        deterrence was necessary and took time to consider other arson cases in order to avoid

        unwarranted sentencing disparities. In addition, the record demonstrates that as part of the

        court’s explanation, it addressed Wilder’s mitigation arguments and clarified how each of

        those arguments impacted the sentence. See United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 205 (4th

        Cir. 2018) (stating that where “the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered

        the evidence and arguments,” the district court is not required “to write more extensively”

        (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007))). Thus, the district court’s

        explanation covered the required grounds adequately and does not constitute procedural

        error.

                 For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s imposition of the 132-month

        sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the

        decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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