Court Opinion

ID: 9752818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:36:02.244544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:45.574922
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, President Judge,
dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the majority’s determination that appellant’s “Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty” was a motion to modify sentence. I should hold that the motion was a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. I should further hold that Commonwealth v. Villaloz, 303 Pa.Super. 518, 450 A.2d 47 (1982), was incorrectly decided, and that under Pa.R.A.P. 343 and Pa.R.A.P. 1701, appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed with respect to both challenges to the guilty plea and challenges to the sentence.
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On June 5, 1981, three days after sentencing, appellant filed a motion entitled “Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty.” In that motion appellant requested permission to withdraw his previously entered plea of guilty and further requested that the case be listed for trial. Appellant did not request that his sentence be modified.
On July 7, 1981, the trial court held a hearing on appellant’s motion, at which appellant was the only witness. At the hearing appellant’s attorney questioned appellant about his understanding at the time he pleaded guilty of the possibility that he could go to jail for up to 10 years. N.T. *2324-5. The district attorney questioned appellant regarding the facts of the offense to which he had pleaded guilty. N.T. 5. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that appellant had not presented “any reasonable basis for allowing the withdrawal of the plea.” N.T. 6. The court further noted that appellant had waited until after sentencing to challenge the guilty plea and that the sentence imposed was “extremely lenient.” Id.
In concluding that appellant’s motion was a motion to modify sentence, the majority relies on the fact that the only reason appellant set forth to support his request for permission to withdraw his plea was that the sentence imposed was “excessive and unwarranted.” I agree that this is the only reason offered by appellant and that excessiveness of sentence does not alone amount to “prejudice on the order of manifest injustice [that] is required before withdrawal [of a guilty plea after sentencing] is properly justified.” Majority Opinion at 3. However, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not any less a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because the reasons offered in the motion are legally insufficient to support it. The motion was entitled a motion to withdraw a guilty plea; withdrawal of the guilty plea was the only relief sought in the motion; the hearing held addressed only whether appellant was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea; and the trial court disposed of the motion on the basis that appellant had not established his entitlement to this relief. I should therefore hold that appellant timely filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that the timeliness of his appeal must be determined on that basis.
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As the majority notes, Majority Opinion at 2 n. 4, reargument before the court en banc was scheduled so that the court could consider the proper interpretation of Pa.R.A.P. 343 and whether Commonwealth v. Villaloz, supra, was properly decided. However, the majority, relying on its interpretation of appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, now declines to undertake such consideration. I am *233unable to follow the majority in this course of action since in my view, as I have explained, its interpretation of appellant’s motion is contrary to the record.
Appellant appealed on July 22, 1981, within 30 days of the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea (July 7, 1981). Appellant did not, however, appeal within 30 days of the imposition of sentence (June 2, 1981). On appeal, appellant challenges the validity of both his guilty plea and his sentence. In Commonwealth v. Villaloz, supra, a panel of this court was faced with the same situation. The panel considered only the appellant’s challenge to the validity of his guilty plea, holding that by not appealing within 30 days from the imposition of sentence, he had waived any challenge to the validity of the sentence. The panel stated that Pa.R.A.P. 343 extends the time for appeal only with respect to challenges to the guilty plea. Thus, here, under Villaloz appellant’s challenge to the sentence would be considered waived for failure to take a timely appeal. I believe that this court, sitting en banc, should hold that Villaloz was wrongly decided, and that under Pa.R.A.P. 343 and Pa.R. A.P. 1701 the time for taking an appeal, regardless of the issues raised, does not begin to run until the motion to withdraw the guilty plea is disposed of.
Pa.R.A.P. 343 provides:
If a timely motion has been filed pursuant to Rule 321 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (challenge to guilty plea), any appeal taken as of right shall be from the final order disposing of such motion. Such timely motion shall have the effect, for the purposes of Rule 1701(b)(3) (authority of lower court or agency after appeal), of an order expressly granting reconsideration of the judgment previously entered on the plea of guilty. (Emphasis added.)
The note to Rule 343 provides:
Pa.R.Crim.P. 321 provides a procedure whereby a timely motion challenging the validity of a plea of guilty, or the *234denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, shall be heard by the lower court. In such event, the time for filing an appeal from the judgment on the plea does not begin to run until such motion is decided by the lower court.
In the event an appeal from the judgment on a plea of guilty has been filed before a timely motion under Pa.R. Crim.P. 321 has been made, the filing of such motion acts as an automatic grant of reconsideration under Rule 1701(b)(3) (authority of lower court or agency after appeal), so as to render inoperative the prior appeal. In such event, an appeal could be filed anew after disposition of the Pa.R. Crim.P. 321 motion.
(Emphasis added.)
The rule expressly provides that any appeal shall be taken from the order disposing of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The rule does not make any distinction between appeals challenging the guilty plea and appeals challenging the sentence. The rule further provides that a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea shall have the effect under Rule 1701(b)(3) of an order expressly granting reconsideration of the judgment previously entered, i.e., the judgment of sentence. Under Rule 1701(b)(3) a timely order granting reconsideration renders “inoperative” any notice of appeal “theretofore or thereafter filed” “with respect to the prior order,” i.e., the judgment of sentence.
Under the express terms of Rule 343 and Rule 1701(b)(3), therefore, any appeal must be taken from the order disposing of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and any notice of appeal filed before the motion is disposed of is rendered inoperative. The decision in Villaloz is therefore contrary to the express terms of the rules and should be overruled.
I should hold that appellant filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that he timely appealed from the court’s denial of the motion.