Court Opinion

ID: 9566890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:44:26.17769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:44.284771
License: Public Domain

ANNUNZIATA, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s finding that Officer Cox entered the curtilage of the Robinson residence and that he conducted the challenged search from that vantage point. I write separately, however, because I do not agree that the search can be found constitutionally proper on the theory that the Robinsons had impliedly invited Officer Cox’s entry, thereby extinguishing any reasonable expectation of privacy they had in the curtilage. Cox’s sole and undisputed purpose for entering the curtilage was to search for criminal activity. Consistent with the guarantees of the United States Constitution, it cannot be said that citizens impliedly extend an invitation to the police to enter their home or curtilage to conduct a search. On that ground, I would hold that Cox violated the Robinsons’ rights under the Fourth Amendment.
“Curtilage” is defined as the “space necessary and convenient, habitually used for family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employment; the yard, garden or field which is near to and used in connection with the dwelling.” Wellford v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 297, 302, 315 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
The doctrine of curtilage is grounded in the peculiarly strong concepts of intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy associated with the home. The home is fundamentally a sanctuary, where personal concepts of self and family are forged, where relationships are nurtured and where people normally feel free to express themselves in intimate ways. The potent individual privacy interests that inhere in living within a home expand into the areas that enclose the home as well. The backyard and area immediately surrounding the home are really extensions of the dwelling itself. This is not true simply in a mechanical sense because the areas are geographically proximate. It is true because people *623have both actual and reasonable expectations that many of the private experiences of home life often occur outside the house. Personal interactions, daily routines and intimate relationships revolve around the entire home place. There are compelling reasons, then, for applying Fourth Amendment protection to the entire dwelling area.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir.1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986).
Determining what constitutes curtilage is rooted in the specific facts of each case. Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 1, 16, 497 S.E.2d 474, 481 (1998). In determining whether the area in question constitutes curtilage, “particular reference” to the following four factors is helpful:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987); see Jefferson, 27 Va.App. at 16, 497 S.E.2d at 481.
Although the area in question was not enclosed by gate or fence, I concur that the place in the Robinsons’ driveway from which Cox gathered the challenged evidence was within the curtilage.8 Cox was located in close proximity to the house *624and in an area hidden from public view by an island of dense tree growth and a large bush just beyond. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. at 1140; cf. Shaver v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 789, 797, 520 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1999) (holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an area that was not restricted from public view by means of a fence, shrubbery, or other barrier). In addition, the area was used for unloading groceries and washing cars, activities that are home-related and that evidence the “nature of the uses to which the area is put.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. at *6251140; see Vanessa Rownaghi, Driving Into Unreasonableness: The Driveway, the Curtilage, and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 11 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1165, 1181-82 (2003) (explaining that in addition to application of the Dunn factors, the essential inquiry that remains in determining what areas deserve Fourth Amendment protection is “whether the area harbors ‘intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life’ ” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))).
However, Cox’s presence upon and search from the curtilage notwithstanding, the majority concludes that the Robin-sons did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area because Cox had an implied invitation to approach the house and talk to its occupants.9 I disagree, not with the general principle underlying the conclusion, but with its applicability here under these facts and circumstances.
In Shaver, we addressed the theory of implied invitation, stating that “ ‘[i]n the course of urban life, we have come to expect various members of the public to enter upon such a driveway, e.g., brush salesmen, newspaper boys, postmen, Girl Scout cookie sellers, distressed motorists, neighbors, Mends.’ ” 30 Va.App. at 796, 520 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting State v. Corbett, 15 Or.App. 470, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (1973)). The implied invitation theory permitting entry into the curtilage of a home has been discussed and applied, either expressly or impliedly, in case law from several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Gregory S., 112 Cal.App.3d 764, 169 Cal.Rptr. 540, 546 (1980) (noting that resident has minimal, if any, expectation of privacy in area where public has been implicitly *626invited); State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 923 P.2d 469, 477 (Ct.App.1996) (noting that “the direct access routes to the house, including parking areas, driveways and pathways to the entry, are areas to which the public is impliedly invited, and that police officers restricting their activity to such areas are permitted the same intrusion and the same level of observation as would be expected from a ‘reasonably respectful citizen’”); State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Me.1988) (noting that “the owner impliedly invites to intrude upon his or her property only those with a legitimate social or business purpose”); People v. Kozlowski, 69 N.Y.2d 761, 513 N.Y.S.2d 101, 505 N.E.2d 611, 612 (1987) (holding that, “[a]bsent evidence of intent to exclude the public, the entryway to a person’s house offers implied permission to approach and knock on the front door”). Therefore, an officer of the law does not violate the Fourth Amendment if, in entering private property, the officer does nothing more than what a reasonably respectful citizen would do. See State v. Dyreson, 104 Wash.App. 703, 17 P.3d 668, 672 (2001); Mei Fung So, Annotation, Search and Seizure: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Driveways, 60 A.L.R. 5th 1 § 2a (1998 and Supp.2004).
It follows that, where the evidence establishes the police have entered the curtilage of a home without a warrant for the purpose of speaking to an occupant of the home, the entry is generally upheld. See, e.g., Shaver, 30 Va.App. at 793-94, 520 S.E.2d at 395 (noting that “investigators intended to speak with the defendants”); Alvarez v. Montgomery County, 147 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir.1998) (upholding officers’ entry into the curtilage where they had a “ ‘legitimate reason’ for entering the Alvarezes’ property ‘unconnected with a search of such premises’ ” (quoting United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1100 (4th Cir.1974))); United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850, 862 (7th Cir.1994) (finding that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment where they used a walkway, which was part of the curtilage of the home, “[i]n their attempt to reach the lower floor residents”); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir.1990) (finding that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment where they observed a firearm through a *627kitchen window while attempting to contact the defendant homeowner and holding that a “policeman may lawfully go to a person’s home to interview him”); Kozlowski, 513 N.Y.S.2d 101, 505 N.E.2d at 612 (noting that the “the officer walked up the driveway and onto an open-ended porch [and that h]e opened the screen door in order to knock on the front door”); see generally Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582, 587 (2002) (stating that “ ‘there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person’s right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man’s castle with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law5 ” (some internal quotations omitted) (quoting Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir.1964))).
That said, this case is manifestly not one that comes within the umbrella of implied invitation decisions. Cox made no attempt whatsoever to approach or knock on the front door of the Robinsons’ home and speak to the occupants, nor did he testify to any such intent.10 Indeed, as discussed below, his testimony established that he was there to conduct a search. Thus, the theory of implied invitation upon which the majority relies for its rationale remains just that: a theoretical proposition of what Cox could have done, but not what he, in fact, did. The judicial decisions that invoke the implied invitation exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a search be conducted pursuant to a warrant do not turn on such an *628abstract or hypothetical application of principles, wholly unmoored from the facts of the case. Absent an examination of the evidence showing the purpose underlying the police intrusion into constitutionally protected property, a court cannot determine whether the entry complied with constitutional mandates. As noted in Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 289 (4th Cir.2001), police officers have no right to enter upon curtilage to make an investigation based on reasonable suspicion. Instead, the right police officers have is
the right to “knock and talk,” that is, to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants, not the right to make a general investigation in the curtilage based on reasonable suspicion. A contrary rule would eviscerate the principle of Oliver and Dunn that the curtilage is entitled to the same level of Fourth Amendment protection as the home itself.
Id.11 The Fourth Circuit underscored the same principle in Bradshaw, 490 F.2d at 1100, noting, after considering all the evidence bearing on the question, that an incursion into the curtilage of a rural home to speak to the occupants was lawful when “unconnected with a search of such premises directed against the accused.” Id. at 1104 (emphasis added).12
*629These cases demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between a police officer's right by implied invitation to “knock and talk,” that is, to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise approach the residence by implied invitation seeking to speak to the inhabitants, and a police officer’s attempt to make a general investigation in the curtilage based on reasonable suspicion. Failing to make the distinction, as the Rogers court warned, would unconstitutionally “convert[] this limited license to do what any citizen may do — approach the house and speak to the inhabitant or owner — into a license to search for ‘evidence.’ ” Rogers, 249 F.3d at 294.
An officer’s purpose in entering the curtilage is thus a critical factor in determining whether police intrusion on private property falls within the property owner’s implied invitation to the public. See, e.g., id. at 289; Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 358; Bradshaw, 490 F.2d at 1100; see also Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 520 (3d Cir.2003) (“Where officers are pursuing a lawful objective, unconnected to any search for the fruits and instrumentalities of criminal activity, their entry into the curtilage after not receiving an answer at the front door might be reasonable as entry into the curtilage may provide the only practicable way of attempting to contact the resident____’’(emphasis added)); United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir.2001) (“Law enforcement officers may encroach upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants.” (emphasis added)); Daoust, 916 F.2d at 758 (“A policeman may lawfully go to a person’s home to interview him.” (emphasis added)); cf. LoJi Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979) (rejecting the state’s argument that store owners had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the items for sale in their store because “there is no basis for the notion that, because a retail store invites the public to enter, it consents to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees”); see generally Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966) (explaining that undercover agents, “in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to *630do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant” but that when entry is gained by invitation “an agent is [not] authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating materials” (emphasis added)).
The majority dismisses the import of these cases on the ground that Fourth Amendment inquiries are' typically based on “ ‘an objective assessment of the officer’s actions ... and not on the officer’s state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.’ ” Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 532, 538, 383 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989) (en banc) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985)). While the principle is sound, it has no applicability in cases involving a homeowner’s implied invitation to enter constitutionally protected property to contact the occupants of the home and, it appears, the principle has not been applied in such cases. Indeed, the very colloquialism used to refer to the exception, viz., “knock and talk,” signifies subjective purpose as the effective analytical principle. Entry into the curtilage without a warrant to search is wholly incompatible with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,13 and *631judicial validation of such a result under the aegis of an implied invitation rationale, applied in the abstract as suggested by the majority, “eviscerate[s] the principle of Oliver and Dunn that the curtilage is entitled to the same level of Fourth Amendment protection as the home itself.” Rogers, 249 F.3d at 289.
In the instant case, not only is there no evidence that Cox was in the Robinsons’ curtilage in order to go to their front door and speak to the occupants of the house, Cox’s testimony *632makes clear that he entered the Robinsons’ property in order to find evidence of a crime, viz., to surprise juveniles in the incriminating act of drinking beer and confirm his suspicion that the Robinsons were hosting an underage drinking party.14 Under the facts of this case, it cannot be said that Cox’s purpose was “unconnected with a search.” See Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 358; Bradshaw, 490 F.2d at 1100. I would therefore hold that Cox’s entry into the curtilage violated the Robinsons’ reasonable expectation of privacy and their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I would further hold that Cox’s observations of criminal activity from his vantage point in the curtilage were not admissible pursuant to the plain view doctrine because, as discussed above, Cox’s entry into the curtilage of the Robin-sons’ home was not lawful. See Hamlin v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 494, 502, 534 S.E.2d 363, 367 (2000) (finding that in order for a search to come within the plain view exception, two requirements must be met: “ ‘(a) the officer must be lawfully in a position to view and seize the item, [and] (b) it must be immediately apparent to the officer that the item is evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure’ ” (citations omitted)), aff'd en banc, 35 Va.App. 375 545 S.E.2d 556 (2001). Cox was not lawfully in a position to view the minors consuming alcohol. See id. Therefore, the trial court’s admission of Cox’s observations of juveniles drinking beer, which he made as a result of his illegal entry, cannot be affirmed on the ground that the evidence was in plain view.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.

. The testimonial and photographic evidence reveal that a large bush, when viewed from the street, stands immediately in front of the walkway to the front door that intersects the driveway. The bush and walkway are but a few feet in front of the garage. Cox testified repeatedly that he was next to this bush in the driveway when he first saw the juveniles on the other side of the tree. Closer scrutiny of Cox’s testimony reveals that, after driving his vehicle into the driveway, he continued moving down the driveway up to and past the bush that shielded the garage doors and the sidewalk leading to the front door from public view. According to his testimony, Cox was continuing his investigation into the curtilage as the nature of his observations and their implications of criminal activity became clearer.
At one point in his testimony, the following exchange took place:
*624Q: And as you proceeded up the driveway further and further, the first thing you saw was [sic] persons who appeared to you to be young.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Strike that. The first thing you saw was some activity.
A: Correct.
Q: And you kept moving. You never stopped.
A: That’s correct.
Q: The second thing you saw was a couple of people that appeared to you to be underage; okay?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at or about the same time, you saw something in their — you saw long necked glass — white glass bottles in their hand.
A: Clear; yes, sir.
Q: And then you were some distance—
A: Still, yes.
Q: And you kept on going?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you kept on going because, although they appeared to be young and it might have been beer, your experience told you that you wouldn’t know for sure until they ran when they saw you.
A: Not necessarily; when they — I didn’t know what they were going to do. I wanted to identify them, to find out what their age was, and to see if it was alcohol.
Q: And you weren’t able to do that from a distance. But when they dropped whatever it was, you could see the label; is that right?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And they scattered. And that, in your mind, was telling.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Before that, it was maybe. After that, it was probable.
A: Yes, sir.
This exchange demonstrates that Cox conducted a search into the driveway with his vehicle, continuing forward until he reached the bush that hides part of the driveway, the garage and the sidewalk to the front door, and proceeding until the alleged juveniles dropped the beer and *625scattered. Such conduct goes beyond the implied invitation that any citizen has to enter the driveway and approach the front door.

. The majority reasons that the police had an implied invitation to approach the Robinsons’ front door because, in order to gain access to the door, they, like any visitor, would have to enter the curtilage and cross the area from which Cox observed individuals he believed to be juveniles drinking beer. Therefore, according to the majority, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

. When asked repeatedly if he entered the Robinsons’ driveway with the intent to speak to an occupant of the house, the following exchange ensued:
Q: Officer Cox, isn’t it true that it was not your intent to walk to the front door and knock on it, as you proceeded up that driveway that night?
A: My intent when I drove up the driveway was to establish probable cause, to investigate the scene further.
Furthermore, the evidence establishes that, consistent with his intent to "investigate the scene,” Cox drove directly up the driveway until he came to a point where he could observe what he expected to find: juveniles in the act of drinking beer. See discussion supra note 8.

. In Rogers, the officer encountered the defendant homeowner in the front yard of his house. 249 F.3d at 284. The officer testified that after speaking with the defendant, who asked him to leave, the officer wanted to speak with someone "who was sober.” Id. The officer then informed the defendant that he intended to conduct a search of the premises. Id. The court found these facts sufficient to show that the officer's intention was to search for evidence rather than to contact another homeowner. Id. at 287-90. Thus, any intrusion into the curtilage violated the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Id.

. In Bradshaw, the court held that the officer subsequently exceeded the "legitimate reason” for his visit when, without legally sufficient justification, he searched a vehicle near the residence. Id. at 1101. The court found that the officer’s intent to conduct a search was evidenced by the fact that while en route to the back door to speak with the occupant of the house, the officer strayed from his path to peer into the crack between the closed doors of a nearby parked vehicle. Id. This detour made clear that the officer’s intent was no longer to seek to speak with the defendant. Id.

. The majority cites only two cases in support of its contention that an examination of the purpose underlying a police officer’s entry onto the curtilage of private property is improper: Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, and Alvarez, 147 F.3d 354. A close reading of these cases establishes that neither supports the majority's conclusions. To the contrary, both decisions are rooted in an examination of the evidence establishing the police officer’s subjective intent in entering the curtilage.
The court in Marasco found that where the police officers approached and knocked on the defendant’s front door, and then telephoned his residence from the front door in an attempt to contact him, it was clear that the officers' purpose was to speak to the occupants in response to a complaint the police had received. Marasco, 318 F.3d at 520. Noting the lawfulness of that purpose, the Third Circuit then addressed whether, having received no answer to the knock at the front door, it was reasonable for the police to proceed to the backyard of the house and enter the garage. In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Third Circuit determined that "there remain questions of fact as to whether the officers' intrusion into the curtilage was reasonable in light of their asserted purpose in making their entry into Smith’s property which was not to make a search." Id. at 521 (emphasis added). The court emphasized that, to be lawful, the police objective must be *631"unconnected to any search for the fruits and instrumentalities of criminal activity.” Id. at 520.
Similarly, in Alvarez, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the officers entered the Alvarezes’ property "simply to notify the homeowner or the party’s host about the complaint and to ask that no one drive while intoxicated.” Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 358-59 (emphasis added). In reaching its decision, the court cited, with approval, other cases standing for the proposition that the purpose for which an officer enters the curtilage is a paramount consideration. Id. That consideration persists whether the court must determine the propriety of the initial intrusion by implied invitation or whether it must determine the lawfulness of intrusions beyond the front door of the house. The latter analysis is likewise predicated on the reasonableness of the intrusions beyond the front door, examined in light of the officer’s original purpose, viz, to interview the occupants.
In short, both cases stand for the proposition that entry into curtilage must be independent from any intent or purpose on the part of the police to conduct a general search for evidence of criminal conduct. Logically, whether the purpose of an intrusion into curtilage is unconnected to a search for evidence necessarily involves an examination of the officer’s subjective intent, as established by the testimony or the evidence of police conduct presented. See supra notes 11-12 (demonstrating that courts determine the purpose of an intrusion into curtilage by examining evidence of officers’ subjective intent).
Consistent with the theory that an officer’s purpose, or subjective intent, is a determinative factor in assessing reasonableness is the requirement applied by other Circuit Courts of Appeals that an officer act in "good faith” before moving from the front door to contact an occupant of a house. See, e.g., Hammett, 236 F.3d at 1060 ("[A police officer] may, in good faith, move away from the front door when seeking to contact the occupants.”); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that sheriff did not interfere with defendant’s "privacy interest when he, in good faith, went unimpeded to the [rear of the home] to contact the occupants”). "Good faith” is defined, inter alia, as "[a] state of mind consisting in ... honesty in belief or purpose.” Black’s Law Dictionary 713 (8th ed.2004).
*632Thus, the case law clearly recognizes and requires an inquiry into an officer’s subjective purpose for being on the curtilage of a home.

. Cox testified that he "planned to enter the property to investigate the allegations of underage consumption of alcohol.” In addition, when asked if he was "looking for a reaction of people scattering to confirm [his] suspicion that [he] had an underage drinking party,” Cox responded affirmatively.