Court Opinion

ID: 2964063
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:19:53.762414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:33:20.855884
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-2233

                          ALAN AULSON ET UX. MAUREEN AULSON,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                              CHARLES BLANCHARD, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                  [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Stahl and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              _________________________

               Gary S. Sackrider for appellants.
               _________________
               Joyce Frank,  with whom Michele E. Randazzo and Kopelman and
               ___________             ___________________     ____________
          Paige, P.C. were on brief, for appellees.
          ___________

                              _________________________

                                    April 25, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  This appeal demands that we mull
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          the  prerequisites for liability under  the Ku Klux  Klan Act, 42

          U.S.C.   1985(3) (1994).  We hold that (1) the class-based animus

          required  to ground a private  right of action  under the statute

          applies to  conspiracies allegedly involving  public officials in

          the same way as it applies to all other conspiracies; and (2) the

          requirement  is not  satisfied  where, as  here, no  sufficiently

          defined  class  appears.   Accordingly,  we  affirm the  district

          court's dismissal of the action.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    Whether or not it  is true that all politics  is local,

          this  case  bears  witness  that  local  politics,  no less  than

          national  politics, can become meanspirited.   From 1984 to 1990,

          plaintiff-appellant  Alan  Aulson  served   as  a  selectman   in

          Georgetown, Massachusetts.  In his complaint, he alleges that the

          defendants   (a  cadre   of  elected   and  appointed   municipal

          officeholders)  are members of  an incumbent group  of "old guard

          politicians"  who more  or  less  run things  in  the town.    In

          contrast, he is a  "member[] of a political group  which supports

          candidates  who oppose  the politics  of the  `old guard.'"   The

          complaint  charges  that  Aulson  paid  a  stiff  price  for  his

          opposition:  the members  of the old guard collogued  against him

          and wreaked their vengeance by such nefarious means as conducting

          illegal searches pursuant to  sham prosecutions.  This course  of

          conduct,  he asserts, gives  rise to a  cause of  action under 42

          U.S.C.   1985(3).

                                          2

                    Aulson originally  brought his suit in  a state venue.1

          Remarking the federal question, the  defendants removed it to the

          district  court and then sought  dismissal under Fed.  R. Civ. P.

          12(b)(6).  Despite the  plaintiff's objection, the district court

          granted the motion to dismiss.  This appeal ensued.

          II.  ANALYSIS
          II.  ANALYSIS

                    Inasmuch as the trial judge dismissed the complaint for

          failure to state an  actionable claim, we review his  decision de

          novo, accepting  as true  all well-pleaded factual  averments and

          indulging  all  reasonable inferences  in the  plaintiff's favor.

          See  Leatherman v. Tarrant County N. I. & C. Unit, 507 U.S.  163,
          ___  __________    ______________________________

          164 (1993);  Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez,  903 F.2d 49,
                       _______________    __________________

          52  (1st  Cir.  1990).   We  hasten  to add,  however,  that this

          deferential standard does not force an appellate court to swallow

          the   plaintiff's  invective   hook,  line,   and  sinker;   bald

          assertions,      unsupportable      conclusions,     periphrastic

          circumlocutions,  and the like need not be credited.  See Correa-
                                                                ___ _______

          Martinez, 903  F.2d at 52;  Dartmouth Review v.  Dartmouth Coll.,
          ________                    ________________     _______________

          889  F.2d 13,  16 (1st  Cir. 1989).   It is  only when  the facts

          alleged,  if proven, will not  justify recovery that  an order of

          dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may stand.  See Gooley v. Mobil Oil
                                                    ___ ______    _________

          Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988).
          _____

                                          A
                                          A

                    Section    1985(3)   proscribes    certain   enumerated
                              
          ____________________

               1Technically there are two plaintiffs (Aulson and his wife).
          Since Mrs.  Aulson's presence  does not affect  the legal  issues
          before us, we omit further reference to her.

                                          3

          conspiracies.2   To  state a  claim under    1985(3)  a plaintiff

          must  allege   the  existence   of  (1)   a  conspiracy,   (2)  a

          conspiratorial  purpose to deprive a person  or class of persons,

          directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of the laws or of

          equal  privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an overt act

          in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) either (a) an injury to

          person or property,  or (b) a  deprivation of a  constitutionally

          protected right or  privilege.  See Griffin v.  Breckenridge, 403
                                          ___ _______     ____________

          U.S.  88, 102  (1971).  In  Griffin, the  Supreme Court  placed a
                                      _______

          gloss  on  these  four   elements,  effectively  adding  a  fifth

          requirement.   It  construed the  statute's references  to "equal

          protection" and "equal privileges  and immunities under the laws"

          to  signify that a plaintiff may recover thereunder only when the

          conspiratorial  conduct of  which  he complains  is propelled  by

          "some  racial,  or  perhaps  otherwise  class-based,  invidiously

          discriminatory animus."  Id.
                                   ___

                                          B
                                          B

                    This  added  requirement  looms  as  an  insurmountable

          obstacle to the plaintiff's  attempted embrace of   1985(3).   He

          seeks  to ameliorate this difficulty  in two different  ways:  he

          strives first  to detour around  the obstacle,  and, failing,  he

          then tries to climb over it.

                              
          ____________________

               2The statute  confers a private right of action for injuries
          occasioned when "two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the
          purpose of  depriving, either directly or  indirectly, any person
          or class  of persons of the  equal protection of the  laws, or of
          equal  privileges and  immunities under  the laws  . .  . ."   42
          U.S.C.   1985(3).

                                          4

                    1.    Public/Private  Conspiracies.    The  plaintiff's
                    1.    Public/Private  Conspiracies.
                          ____________________________

          effort to bypass the point entirely centers around his insistence

          that  the  requirement  of  a class-based  discriminatory  animus

          applies  only   to   wholly  private   conspiracies   (that   is,

          conspiracies  that  do not  involve  public  officials acting  as

          such),  and that he need  neither allege nor  prove a class-based

          animus in this  action (which  is directed at  a conspiracy  that

          allegedly involves public officials doing the public's business).

                    This gambit  has been  tried in several  other circuits

          and has uniformly been found wanting.  See Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d
                                                 ___ ______    ___

          1096,  1102 (10th  Cir.  1994), cert.  denied,  115 S.  Ct.  2577
                                          _____  ______

          (1995); Haverstick Enterps., Inc. v. Financial Fed. Credit, Inc.,
                  _________________________    ___________________________

          32  F.2d  989,  994 (6th  Cir.  1994);  Gagliardi  v. Village  of
                                                  _________     ___________

          Pawling,  18 F.3d 188,  194 (2d Cir.  1994); Burrell  v. Board of
          _______                                      _______     ________

          Trustees  of Ga.  Military Coll.,  970 F.2d  785, 794  (11th Cir.
          ________________________________

          1992),  cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1018 (1993); Munson v. Friske, 754
                  _____ ______                        ______    ______

          F.2d 683,  694-95 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1985).  Although this court has

          never squarely repudiated  the gambit,  we have on  at least  two

          occasions required  (albeit without substantive  comment) that  a

          class-based animus be shown notwithstanding that public officials

          were  alleged  to  be   active  participants  in  the  particular

          conspiracies there  at issue.   See Romero-Barcelo  v. Hernandez-
                                          ___ ______________     __________

          Agosto, 75  F.3d 23, 34  (1st Cir.  1996); Daley v.  Town of  New
          ______                                     _____     ____________

          Durham, 733 F.2d 4, 7 (1st  Cir. 1984).  Thus, following the path
          ______

          down which the plaintiff beckons not only would set us apart from

          our sister circuits but also would undermine our own precedents.

                                          5

                    In all events, an unforced reading of   1985(3) affords

          no principled basis for distinguishing between public and private

          conspiracies.    Griffin   neither  supports  nor  suggests   the
                           _______

          existence of such a distinction, and, at any rate, it  is not the

          proper province of a federal court to rewrite a statute under the

          guise  of  interpretation.    Thus, we  decline  the  plaintiff's

          invitation  to create by judicial  fiat two classes  of   1985(3)

          conspiracies along a public/private axis.

                    So ends this phase of our inquiry.  To the  extent that

          we  have  not  previously  made  the  scope  of  the  requirement

          explicit, we  now hold that to  state a claim under    1985(3) in

          respect  to  conspiracies  involving  public  officials,  private

          actors,  or  both,  plaintiffs   must  allege  that  the  conduct

          complained of  resulted from an invidiously discriminatory class-

          based animus.

                    2.   Cognizable Classes.  The  plaintiff next struggles
                    2.   Cognizable Classes.
                         __________________

          to surmount the  obstacle instead  of skirting it.   He  contends

          that he is a member of a class protected by  1985(3), and that he

          has  alleged  as much.   His  contention  does not  withstand the

          mildest scrutiny.

                    The complaint  is a lengthy, somewhat prolix narrative.

          In  regard to  the  class-based animus  requirement, however,  it

          states nothing more than that Alan Aulson and a named confederate

          (not  a  party to  the suit)  are  "representative members"  of a

          "class" that is composed solely of persons who support candidates

          opposed  to the  politics  of  the  "old  guard,"  and  that  the

                                          6

          defendants  are members  of  the "old  guard."   On  this  skimpy

          predicate,  the  plaintiff posits  that  the  ad hoc  "opposition
                                                        __ ___

          group"  is a  class,  and that  the  defendants' supposed  animus

          against it  is class-based  within the  meaning ascribed to  that

          adjectival term by the Griffin Court.  We do not agree.
                                 _______

                    We have  previously interpreted  the  Griffin gloss  to
                                                          _______

          denote that plaintiffs  must allege  facts showing  that (1)  the

          defendants conspired against them  because of their membership in

          a class, and (2)  the criteria defining the class  are invidious.

          See Hahn  v. Sargent,  523 F.3d 461,  469 (1st Cir.  1975), cert.
          ___ ____     _______                                        _____

          denied, 425 U.S. 904  (1976); Harrison v. Brooks, 519  F.2d 1358,
          ______                        ________    ______

          1360  (1st Cir.  1975);  cf. Bray  v.  Alexandria Women's  Health
                                   ___ ____      __________________________

          Clinic,  506 U.S.  263, 269  (1993) (holding  that  women seeking
          ______

          abortions  are not  a class  within the  confines of    1985(3));

          United  Bhd. of  Carpenters v.  Scott, 463  U.S. 825,  837 (1983)
          ___________________________     _____

          (holding  that  a group  defined  by economic  criteria  does not

          constitute a class for purposes of   1985(3)).  The Supreme Court

          has  not  decided  whether  political  differences are  invidious

          criteria  that qualify  the  classes  that  they define  for  the

          protection of    1985(3).  See Scott,  463 U.S. at 837 (reserving
                                     ___ _____

          the  question of  whether    1985(3)  covers  more than  racially

          directed conspiracies); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9 (same).
                                  _______

                    Although  other federal  courts  have  divided on  this

          question, see infra,  we have  not yet had  occasion to lend  our
                    ___ _____

          institutional voice  to the  rising cacophony that  surrounds it.

          Nor need  we do so today.   Whether or not  political classes are

                                          7

          covered by    1985(3), the particular class  that Aulson proposes

          does not constitute a cognizable class at all.

                    The notion of a  cognizable class includes two separate

          and  distinct components.   The  first component  focuses  on the

          substantive  characteristic defining  the  class, e.g.,  race  or

          gender  or  political  affiliation.    While  it  is  universally

          acknowledged  that  racial  classes are  within  the  ambit of   

          1985(3), see, e.g., Griffin,  403 U.S. at 102, no  such consensus
                   ___  ____  _______

          exists anent political classes.   Some courts have concluded that

          political  classes are  within the protective  pale of    1985(3)

          because  reference  to  political  characteristics  comprises  an

          invidious   method  for   subjecting   persons  to   differential

          treatment.  See, e.g.,  Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 549 (6th
                      ___  ____   _______    ______

          Cir. 1987) (holding that   1985(3) may shield a political class);

          Keating v. Carey,  706 F.2d  377, 387-88 (2d  Cir. 1983)  (same);
          _______    _____

          Perez  v.  Cucci, 725  F. Supp.  209,  252 (D.N.J.  1989) (same),
          _____      _____

          aff'd, 898  F.2d 139 (3d  Cir. 1990) (table).   Other courts have
          _____

          reached the opposite conclusion.  See, e.g., Grimes v. Smith, 776
                                            ___  ____  ______    _____

          F.2d  1359,  1366, 67  (7th  Cir. 1985)  (holding  that political

          classes are not so protected); Harrison v. KVAT Food Mgmt., Inc.,
                                         ________    _____________________

          766  F.2d 155,  163  (4th Cir.  1985) (same);  Morales-Narv ez v.
                                                         _______________

          Rossello,  852 F. Supp. 104,  115 (D.P.R. 1994)  (same), aff'd on
          ________                                                 _____ __

          other grounds, 65 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 1995) (table).
          _____ _______

                    The second  component, by contrast, focuses  not on the

          particular defining characteristic of  the putative class, but on

          whether there is  any identifiable  class at all.   We  emphasize

                                          8

          that  this inquiry  is distinct  from the  question of  whether a

          group  denominated by  a particular  characteristic is  sheltered

          from discrimination by    1985(3).   No matter  what the  alleged

          basis  for  discrimination,  the  allegation  of  a  "class-based

          animus" naturally presumes that there is a specific, identifiable

          class   against  whom  the  defendants  can  have  discriminated.

          Accepting for the sake  of argument that political  classes enjoy

          the prophylaxis of   1985(3), the present plaintiffs nevertheless

          stumble over this second prong.

                    Though  there  is no  comprehensive  set  of rules  for

          determining when individuals constitute a class for purposes of  

          1985(3), there are certain inescapable minimum requirements.  For

          instance, it is clear that at the very least a class must be more

          than  just a  group of  persons who  bear the  brunt of  the same

          allegedly  tortious behavior.  If  a class could  be defined from

          nothing more than a  shared characteristic that happened  to form

          the basis of  the defendants' actions, the requirement  of class-

          based animus would be drained of all meaningful content.  Justice

          Scalia put the proposition in these terms:

                    Whatever  may  be the  precise  meaning of  a
                    "class" for purposes of Griffin's speculative
                                            _______
                    extension of    1985(3) beyond race, the term
                    unquestionably connotes something more than a
                    group of  individuals who  share a  desire to
                    engage   in  conduct   that  the      1985(3)
                    defendant disfavors.   Otherwise, innumerable
                    tort  plaintiffs  would  be  able  to  assert
                    causes of action  under    1985(3) by  simply
                    defining the aggrieved class as those seeking
                    to  engage in the  activity the defendant has
                    interfered with. 

          Bray, 506 U.S. at 269.
          ____

                                          9

                    Our  own case  law  confirms  that  a class  cannot  be

          defined  solely  on the  basis of  harm  inflicted.   In Creative
                                                                   ________

          Environments,  Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d  822 (1st Cir.), cert.
          ___________________    _________                            _____

          denied,  459 U.S.  989 (1982),  we considered  a    1985(3) claim
          ______

          brought by a developer, alleging that a  municipal planning board

          discriminated against  a class of future homeowners in the course

          of rejecting  a proposed subdivision.   We held that  even if the

          developer could sue  on behalf of this class, no    1985(3) claim

          would lie because the class was no more than "an  undefined group

          of  people  with unknown  income,  racial,  political and  social

          characteristics."  Id. at  834.  The only thing that  the members
                             ___

          of  this  group  had  in  common  was  that  they  stood  to   be

          disadvantaged  by  the defendants'  actions.   Consequently,  the

          complaint  "failed to  identify  any definite  class which  would

          satisfy section 1985(3)'s requirement."  Id.
                                                   ___

                    The principle that emerges  from these cases is  that a

          class, to  be cognizable,  must be identifiable  by reference  to

          "something  more than  . . .  [the members'] desire  to engage in

          conduct  that the   1985(3) defendant disfavors."  Bray, 506 U.S.
                                                             ____

          at  269.   In  other  words, the  line  drawn by  the substantive

          characteristic must  divide individuals into  distinct, separate,

          and identifiable  groups.   This means,  for example, "white"  as

          opposed  to "non-white," see,  e.g., Stevens  v. Tillman,  568 F.
                                   ___   ____  _______     _______

          Supp. 289, 293 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that whites constitute a

          protected class under   1985(3)), "female"  as opposed to "male,"

          see,  e.g., Libertad v. Welch,  53 F.3d 428,  449 (1st Cir. 1995)
          ___   ____  ________    _____

                                          10

          (holding  that  women  constitute   a  protected  class  under   

          1985(3)), or, if political  classes are includable   a  matter on

          which  we do not opine    "registered Republicans"  as opposed to

          other voters, see, e.g.,  Keating, 706 F.2d at 379  (holding that
                        ___  ____   _______

          Republicans constitute a protected class under   1985(3)).

                    We  hold, therefore,  that  a class  is cognizable  for

          purposes of   1985(3)'s  class-based animus requirement only when

          it is comprised  of a  distinctive and identifiable  group.   For

          this purpose,  distinctiveness connotes that a  reasonable person

          can readily determine by  means of an objective criterion  or set

          of  criteria who is  a member of the  group and who  is not.  See
                                                                        ___

          Rodgers v. Tolson, 582  F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir.  1978) (rejecting
          _______    ______

          alleged class partly  because it was "impossible to determine who

          besides  the [plaintiffs] belong  to this class"  and because the

          plaintiffs had failed to  identify "a larger group that  could be

          objectively identified  by an  observer"); Bricker v.  Crane, 468
                                                     _______     _____

          F.2d 1228,  1233 (1st Cir.  1972) (noting  that a  class must  be

          "readily recognizable" in  order to  come within the  scope of   

          1985(3)), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
                    _____ ______

                    Measured against this benchmark, the group described by

          the plaintiff falls short of qualifying as a cognizable class for

          purposes  of    1985(3)'s  class-based animus  requirement.   The

          plaintiff  defines the group  only as  persons who  support other

          persons  "opposed to the politics  of the old  guard," and offers

          himself  and  one  other  former  selectmen   as  "representative

          members."   As far  as anybody  can  tell, aside  from these  two

                                          11

          "members" this  group is wholly indeterminate.   It might include

          all the voters in Georgetown, or it might include only voters who

          have spoken out against incumbent selectmen, or it  might include

          only the two individuals  featured in the complaint, or  it might

          include anyone whose inclusion would benefit the plaintiff at any

          given time.  There is simply no way to characterize this group as

          an  identifiable  segment of  the community  by reference  to any

          objective criteria, and,  hence, it cannot serve as  a cognizable

          class within  the purview of   1985(3).   See Gleason v. McBride,
                                                    ___ _______    _______

          869 F.2d 688,  695 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting class status under  

          1985(3)  when the plaintiff alleged only that he was "a political

          opponent  of  the  defendants  and  was  extremely  vocal in  his

          opposition  to their management of the [municipality]"); Rodgers,
                                                                   _______

          582  F.2d  at  317  (holding  that  a   complaint  which  alleged

          discrimination  against  a class  of  persons  "in political  and

          philosophical  opposition to"  municipal  commissioners  did  not

          describe a  "cognizable class"  and therefore failed  to state  a

          cause of action under   1985(3)).3

                    The lack  of distinctiveness is  especially striking in

          this  case because the proposed class is defined primarily in the

          negative; that is, the  plaintiff describes the class principally

          with  reference to what it opposes    the old guard   rather than

          with  reference to what it espouses.  The ambiguities inherent in
                              
          ____________________

               3Concededly, the definition of  any political class may face
                                               ___
          serious problems in this regard.   But cf. Cameron v. Brock,  473
                                             ___ ___ _______    _____
          F.2d 608 F.2d  608, 610  (6th Cir. 1973)  (holding that  "clearly
          defined" political classes are  covered by   1985(3)).   We leave
          those headaches for another day.

                                          12

          this negative definition compound  the problem of identifying the

          members  of the  class since  there is  no way  for  an objective

          observer to identify the members of the other  class.  They could
                                                  _____

          be a  few of  the incumbents,  most  of the  incumbents, all  the

          incumbents, or  some larger aggregation  that includes incumbents

          and  their adherents.  To put  it bluntly, membership in both the

          plaintiff's  proposed class  and  the antagonist  class (the  old

          guard)  is, like  beauty, almost  exclusively in  the eye  of the

          beholder.  This is not the stuff of cognizability.

                    To sum up, the lone criterion that the plaintiff offers

          to define the suggested  class is opposition to the  "politics of

          the old guard."  This description will not do because it draws no

          readily identifiable  line.  Objectively speaking,  a third party

          at most can observe that the putative class  is comprised of some

          (unknown) persons who support  some (unknown) political aspirants

          who object to some  (unknown) aspect of some  (unknown) political

          views or  practices  of some  other  (unknown) persons  who  have

          enjoyed some (unknown) degree  of political success in Georgetown

          for some (unknown) period of time.

                    We have said  enough on  this score.   By not  alleging

          discrimination against a  distinctive, readily identifiable class

          of persons, the plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim

          under   1985(3).  See Gleason, 869 F.2d at 695; Rodgers, 582 F.2d
                            ___ _______                   _______

          at 317; see also Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173,
                  ___ ____ _______    _____________________

          1176 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a

          claim when complaint did not "contain a description of a class of

                                          13

          persons  or group that is sufficiently definite or precise to set

          against the `class of persons'  terminology in   1985(3)"), cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied,  465 U.S. 1103 (1984).  Consequently, the lower court did
          ______

          not err in dismissing the action.

                                          C
                                          C

                    We must  attend to a  last detail.   At one  point, the

          plaintiff  asked  the  district  court  for leave  to  amend  the

          complaint  by naming one or two additional defendants.  The court

          denied  the  motion without  prejudice  to  renewal if  the  case

          survived  a   dispositive  motion  on  behalf   of  the  existing

          defendants.     The  district   court  subsequently  granted  the

          defendants' motion  to dismiss  without granting leave  to amend.

          On  appeal, the plaintiff makes an oblique reference in the reply

          brief that suggests he  should have been given an  opportunity to

          replead.

                    We rebuff  this suggestion  for three reasons.   First,

          relief from an appellate court, requested for the first time in a

          reply  brief, is  ordinarily denied  as a  matter of  course, see
                                                                        ___

          Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 1990), and
          _________    ______________

          this case fits comfortably  within the general rule.   Second, to

          the extent the request for leave to amend is before this court at

          all,  the   plaintiff  has   advanced  absolutely   no  developed

          argumentation in  support of it, and  so we deem it  to have been

          abandoned.   See Ryan v. Royal  Ins. Co., 916 F.2d  731, 734 (1st
                       ___ ____    _______________

          Cir. 1990); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d  1, 17 (1st Cir.),
                      _____________    _______

          cert.  denied, 494 U.S. 1082  (1990).  Third,  the only amendment
          _____  ______

                                          14

          that the plaintiff  sought below involved  adding defendants    a

          step  that would have done nothing in  terms of better defining a

          class  for purposes of    1985(3).  Thus,  the proposed amendment

          would have been futile  and the district court therefore  did not

          err in neglecting to  authorize an amended complaint.   See Foman
                                                                  ___ _____

          v.  Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at
              _____                            _______________

          59.    Relatedly,  if  what the  plaintiff  now  has  in mind  is

          something other  than adding  defendants, he has  not so  stated,

          and, in all events, we find nothing in the record which indicates

          that he  could possibly delineate a cognizable  class and thereby

          state  an actionable  claim under    1985(3).   Mindful  of these

          circumstances, we  will not permit  the plaintiff to  string this

          litigation  out further by attempting to replead in hopes that he

          can  resuscitate a case  that, by  all appearances,  is terminal.

          See  Correa-Martinez,   903  F.2d  at  59   (counselling  against
          ___  _______________

          "needlessly  prolong[ing] matters"  when "an  amendment would  be

          futile or would serve  no legitimate purpose"); Dartmouth Review,
                                                          ________________

          889 F.2d at 23 (similar).

          III.  CONCLUSION
          III.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need go  no further.   Because  the district  court

          appropriately granted the defendants'  motion to dismiss  without

          simultaneously granting  leave to amend, the  judgment below must

          be

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

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