Court Opinion

ID: 9633866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:04:19.611921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:44.347097
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion holds that the designation of plaintiffs as “anti-IWA and pro-employer” is libelous per se, and that it is not necessary to allege and prove special damages to sustain a judgment against defendants. I cannot agree.
The repute and status of organizations, such- as the International Woodworkers of America, and those who may be designated as employers, is well established and long accepted in the economic life of this country. To my mind, no opprobrium attaches to an individual who is designated as either anti or pro-IWA, anti or pro-employer; certainly, such designation is not opprobrious nor libelous pér se. If special damages are alleged and proved, a different question is presented; but the words cannot be expanded by.insinuation or innuendo.
In view of the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, the second paragraph of the publication, which the trial court found to be libelous per se, is not considered. The paragraph reads:
“Every member must carefully weigh the proven record of performance against the slanderous distorting unfounded accusations and downright lies being used to further the recall efforts.”
Plaintiffs were not public officers, union officers at the time of publication, nor candidates for public or union office. The quoted paragraph does not charge plaintiffs with the commission of a crime, moral turpitude, breach of duty, nor want of integrity. In fact, the paragraph is not directed against individuals but against previous accusations. Expressions of opinion or severe criticism, such as involved here, are not libelous per se if they clearly go only to the merits or demerits of a cause or controversy.
*484The justness of the recall action was questioned without any words casting doubt:upon plaintiffs’ character or the integrity of their actions, apart from their active support of the recall. The quoted paragraph does not charge anything that would affect plaintiffs in their private lives, stamp them as dishonest, or bring upon them hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy.
In my opinion, to hold that the article is libelous per se would mean that a denial of a charge would itself be libelous per se; for in denying the charge, the one making the denial would be, in effect, calling his accuser a liar. As appellants point out in their brief, this “would render a great amount of current political oratory libelous per se — a result neither necessitated by precedent nor reason.”
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
Hill, C. J., and Foster, J., concur with Weaver, J.
Finley, J., did not participate.
August 26, 1957. Petition for rehearing denied.