Court Opinion

ID: 9572910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:45:42.837721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:38.202423
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice
(concurring in the result on the conviction and dissenting as to the penalty):
Although I concur in the convictions of the defendant, I do not concur in the majority opinion. Among other points of disagreement with that opinion, I disagree that the trial court’s rejection of the examiners’ opinions as to Lafferty’s competence was in any way required by, or in accord with, the Constitution, as the majority opinion suggests, because “the religion clauses of the First Amendment prohibit courts from determining the validity of religious beliefs.” Nor do I believe that the examiners reached their conclusions because they “assumed that Lafferty’s religious experiences did not occur.”
The trial court did not err, however, in holding that the defendant could assist counsel in the defense of the case. He clearly knew what the charges against him were, the possible penalties, and that defense counsel would be available to represent him. Although the defendant’s memory of the events surrounding the homicide may have been less sharp after the suicide attempt, his memory of those events still existed in a degree sufficient to allow him to assist counsel.
Nevertheless, prejudicial error was committed in the penalty phase of the trial, in my view, and therefore the sentence of death should be reversed and the case remanded for another penalty hearing to determine the appropriate penalty.
In closing argument during the penalty phase of the case, the prosecutor contended:
He will kill again. He will murder. He will take another human life. The only thing, Ladies and Gentlemen, and believe me, I know exactly what I’m saying to you, ... the only thing between him and his next victim is you. The only thing that is going to save the life of the next victim of his is you.
This argument was improper because it was plainly wrong; the argument that the defendant would kill again unless the jury returned a verdict of death assumes that the Board of Pardons would not do its job properly in deciding whether Lafferty could ever be paroled — an assumption that has no basis in fact.
In a capital case, the only alternative to a death sentence is a life sentence. Whether an inmate may ever be paroled from such a sentence depends upon the decision of the Utah Board of Pardons, and its decision would necessarily be based in part upon an assessment of the likelihood that an inmate will not be likely to commit an act of violence if paroled. The prosecutor simply put the matter to the jury as a false alternative: either return a verdict of death or the defendant will kill again. The prosecutor could not possibly know whether the defendant would ever be paroled if he were given a life sentence, and it was just plainly wrong for him to have invoked fear and misstatement of both fact and law to the end'of moving the jury to impose a death penalty.
The United States Supreme Court in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) declared, “It is of vital importance to the defendant and the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” This Court has also emphasized that the prosecutor must use “scrupulous care” in a capital homicide case. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 271 (Utah 1980). In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), we held that a jury could *1263impose the death penalty only if it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances and the death penalty was appropriate, taking all factors into account. In the context of the decision the jurors had to make, the point of the prosecutor’s remarks could hardly have been more prejudicial.
Furthermore, I find the majority’s ruling with respect to the admission of unconvict-ed crime evidence in the penalty phase unpersuasive. The majority’s position that evidence of other unconvicted crimes may be proved in the penalty phase of a capital case is inherently prejudicial.
The rule limiting the admissibility of pri- or convictions in the guilt phase of a criminal case generally rests upon two foundations which are applicable to the penalty phase of a capital case. First, the courts have been unwilling to become engaged in the trial of collateral charges of crime, with all the attendant waste of time and diversion of resources that is entailed by making a systematic inquiry into the issues presented. Second, the evidence of other crimes is itself highly prejudicial and will undoubtedly taint a jury’s deliberations with respect to the appropriate penalty even if the jury does not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged crime was committed and even though an instruction is given not to consider the evidence of the other crime. Beyond that, the jury must make the determination of whether the defendant committed some uncharged crime, with the evidence of the homicide for which they just convicted still in the forefront of their minds. The procedure practically ensures prejudice in the consideration of evidence of other crimes and in the ultimate decision.
The problems inherent in the procedure adopted by the majority are discussed in State v. McCormick, 272 Ind. 272, 397 N.E.2d 276 (1979). In that case; the defendant had been charged with capital homicide and the prosecution sought to introduce evidence at the penalty phase of another, unrelated homicide for which the defendant had not been convicted. In holding unconstitutional the portion of the statute which allowed such evidence, the court stated:
The procedure to be utilized in this case as provided for by statute and case law will be, in fact, two trials. The defendant will first be tried to a jury for the killing of Douglass Overby. If he is convicted, a sentencing hearing will take place. At this sentencing hearing, the defendant will, in essence, be tried for the murder of Harold Lewis. This hearing will be before the same jury which will have just recently convicted the defendant of another, unrelated murder. The trial court noted that if McCormick were tried in an actual criminal trial for the murder of Harold Lewis, any evidence relating to the Overby killing would be inadmissible in the State’s case in chief. Likewise, no evidence of the Lewis killing may be admitted in this case in the trial of Count I, the Overby killing. Thus, the effect of the statutory procedure in the present case is obvious: defendant McCormick would be fully tried on two separate, unrelated charges before the same jury. He would be tried on the second count to a jury which has been undeniably prejudiced by having convicted him of an unrelated murder.
272 Ind. at 278, 397 N.E.2d at 280. The court further stated:
[T]he actual evidence of the [second] crime will be presented for the first time to the sentencing jury. The facts regarding this alleged aggravating crime will never have been presented to an impartial, untainted jury, and the risk that the previously tainted jury will react in an arbitrary manner is infinitely greater.
272 Ind. at 279-80, 397 N.E.2d at 281. The same risk is present in the system proposed by the majority even though it requires proof of the other crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Accord State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984).
I believe the better course is to completely exclude evidence of crimes for which there is no conviction.