Court Opinion

ID: 9900310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:10:45.955106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.106413
License: Public Domain

No. 590             November 15, 2023                   127

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                    Plaintiff-Respondent,
                              v.
                 JESSE ALLEN PETRIE,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
                 Polk County Circuit Court
                   20CR34337; A176222

  Rafael A. Caso, Judge.
  Argued and submitted April 26, 2023.
   Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
128                                                          State v. Petrie

          SHORR, P. J.
          Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for one count of aggravated harassment and one count of
disorderly conduct in the second degree. At trial, defendant
primarily relied on the defense of guilty except for insanity
(GEI). Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s admis-
sion of expert testimony describing defendant’s past con-
duct, arguing that the testimony was both irrelevant to the
claimed defense under OEC 401 and unfairly prejudicial
under OEC 403. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
          We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence
over objections to relevance for legal error. State v. Serrano,
355 Or 172, 191, 324 P3d 1274 (2014). When evidence is chal-
lenged as unfairly prejudicial, we review a trial court’s deci-
sion for abuse of discretion. Id. at 192.
          The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are undis-
puted. Defendant, while purportedly undergoing a mental
health crisis, sat in the middle of the street, blocking traffic.
Officers arrested defendant and brought him to jail. At jail,
defendant resisted deputies’ commands and spat on one of
them. Before trial, defendant gave notice of intent to rely on
a GEI defense. The court then ordered a “criminal respon-
sibility” evaluation of defendant, which was conducted by a
forensic psychologist, Dr. Duncan. Duncan testified in an
offer of proof that defendant has antisocial personality traits
but no mental disorders that would qualify defendant for a
GEI defense. In forming his opinion, Duncan relied, in part,
on an incident at a Proud Boys rally where defendant had
a confrontation with officers for holding a flag upside down.
Defendant brought a motion to exclude evidence related to the
rally under two theories: (1) that defendant’s conduct at the
rally was irrelevant to a consequential fact under OEC 401;1
and (2) specific testimony referring to the Proud Boys and
the upside-down flag would be unfairly prejudicial to defen-
dant under OEC 403.2 The trial court ultimately excluded
    1
      OEC 401 provides, “ ‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”
    2
      OEC 403 provides, “relevant[ ] evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
Cite as 329 Or App 127 (2023)                                                129

any testimony referring to the Proud Boys as unfairly prej-
udicial under OEC 403 but admitted testimony describing
defendant’s actions at the rally because it was “integral to
[Duncan’s] analysis * * * that the defendant did not have
an issue standing up for his rights.” Still, to address defen-
dant’s concerns regarding the potential prejudicial nature
of the upside-down flag evidence, the trial court permitted
defendant to propose a limiting instruction that would limit
the jury’s use of that evidence. Defendant did not ask for
that instruction. On appeal, defendant revives his OEC 401
and OEC 403 arguments against admitting any reference to
the upside-down flag. We turn to defendant’s arguments in
the order they were made.
          Expert testimony is admissible only if it is relevant
under OEC 401. State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 409, 687 P2d
751 (1984). Evidence is relevant so long as it has some prob-
ability to establish a fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action. State v. Davis, 269 Or App 532, 541,
345 P3d 499, rev den, 358 Or 69 (2015). In the case before
us, defendant asserted the affirmative defense of GEI.
Accordingly, the central factual issue at trial was whether
defendant, due to a qualifying mental disorder at the time of
engaging in criminal conduct, “lack[ed] substantial capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or
to conform the conduct to the requirements of law.” ORS
161.295(1). Applying that statutory text, defendant argues
that “[t]he fact that defendant once flew a flag upside down
at a rally had no bearing on whether he lacked substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his later conduct
* * * or conform his conduct to the law.” Defendant further
insists that the fact that Duncan relied on the upside-down
flag incident to form his opinion is “beside the point.”
         Taken out of the context of Duncan’s expert testi-
mony, we might be inclined to agree with defendant that
a prior confrontation with police at a political protest has
dubious relevance to defendant’s mental capacity at the time
of the crimes that he is presently charged with. However,
OEC 703 provides that experts, such as Duncan, may rely

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”
130                                                            State v. Petrie

on facts made known to them in forming their opinion.3
Although defendant challenges the relevance of Duncan’s
testimony under OEC 401—not OEC 703—the relevance of
the evidence offered by an expert is directly tied to its use
by the expert. In other words, we evaluate the admissibility
of expert testimony in the context of the expert opinion—not
outside it. See McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 332 Or 59,
70, 23 P3d 320 (2001) (holding that evidence of prior acts
offered by an expert witness was nonhearsay because that
evidence was necessary for the expert to explain their opin-
ion); see also State v. Goss, 33 Or App 507, 511-12, 577 P2d 78
(1978) (holding that “other-crimes” evidence, although irrel-
evant for other purposes, was relevant to the issue of the
defendant’s mental state because it was an integral part of
the expert’s diagnosis of the defendant).4
         In McCathern, a forensic engineer who specialized
in accident reconstruction testified that the car accident in
that case was “substantially similar” to several other car
accidents involving the petitioner-manufacturer. 332 Or at
67. To explain his reasoning, the expert disclosed details of
the other car accidents, to which the petitioners objected. Id.
at 70. The petitioners argued that details of the other car
accidents were hearsay, and thus inadmissible under OEC
801. Id. The court disagreed and held that evidence of the
other accidents was admissible because “[the respondent]
offered the evidence of the details surrounding the 15 other
    3
       OEC 703 provides,
         “The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
     opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert
     at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
     particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
     or data need not be admissible in evidence.”
Defendant does not contend under OEC 703 that the evidence that the expert
relied upon is not of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
Defendant also does not contend that the expert evidence was inadmissible under
OEC 702, because it would not assist the trier of fact. See State v. Jesse, 360 Or
584, 385 P3d 1063 (2016) (concluding that trial court did not err in excluding
expert testimony that was unhelpful to the jury, because the testimony was only
relevant to a conditional fact not ultimately put at issue). We therefore do not
consider those issues.
     4
       Defendant contends that Goss is no longer good law because the decision
predates the legislature’s adoption of the Oregon Evidence Code. We conclude
that the principle stated in Goss is consistent with OEC 703 and the subsequent
case law interpreting that rule.
Cite as 329 Or App 127 (2023)                              131

rollover accidents only to provide the foundation necessary
to explain [the expert’s] opinions, not for its truth.” Id.; see
also State v. Thomas, 279 Or App 98, 379 P3d 731, rev den,
360 Or 423 (2016) (statistical evidence not admissible as non-
hearsay when expert did not rely on that evidence in form-
ing the basis of their opinion). In the case before us, defen-
dant argues that we should construe McCathern to apply
narrowly to hearsay objections. Our reading of McCathern
is not so narrow. Instead, McCathern illustrates our prac-
tice of evaluating objections to evidence introduced through
expert testimony within the context of the expert’s opinion.
In McCathern, the expert testimony was objected to as hear-
say under OEC 801. As is our practice, the court determined
the nonhearsay purpose of the evidence by evaluating how
the evidence was used to develop the expert opinion. Here,
defendant objects to evidence relied on by Duncan (regard-
ing defendant flying the upside-down flag at the rally) as
irrelevant under OEC 401. Thus, the appropriate question
before us is whether the upside-down flag evidence was rele-
vant as a foundation for Duncan’s opinion. We conclude that
it was.
         Duncan established the relevance of the upside-
down flag incident when he testified that he believed there
was a nexus between defendant’s behavior at the rally and
the essential elements of defendant’s GEI defense. Duncan
opined that defendant’s history of being able to conform his
conduct to the law, while passionately standing up for his
rights in confrontational scenarios with police (such as the
upside-down flag incident), suggested that defendant had
the mental capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct when he spat on a deputy. Defendant contends on
appeal that Duncan’s testimony was not relevant because
“Duncan acknowledged that he could give his opinion with-
out discussing the flag incident.” Defendant slightly mis-
states the trial court record. The trial court judge asked
whether Duncan could reach his conclusion without relying
on defendant’s “political views.” Duncan responded that he
could, so long as he could rely on defendant’s “history of pas-
sionately defending himself” while conforming his conduct
to the law. Accordingly, Duncan testified about the upside-
down flag incident as follows:
132                                                 State v. Petrie

     “Q [by the state]: Did he provide you with any other
  instances of being challenged by authority?
      “A:   Yes.
      “Q: When was that?
     “A: So he volunteered, you know, going to political
  rallies. And so that was—the exact date was before this
  incident.
      “But essentially, you know, he stopped working when he
  was 49 due to primarily medical reasons and then started
  attending these rallies. He talked about one incident where
  he’s at a rally and, you know, flying his flag upside down.
  Police, you know, confront him about that, telling him to
  put the flag down and his not doing that, refusing to do so
  and then recording the officer as that was unfolding.
      “Q: Why is that significant here?
     “A: Well, during that line of questioning he’s also, you
  know, talking about how he doesn’t have a problem stand-
  ing up for his rights. You know, that sort of thing.
      “So what it’s telling me is that, you know, it’s telling you
  how he’s spending his time, you know, going to these ral-
  lies. That that has involved previous confrontation by law
  enforcement and that he’s been oppositional.
      “Also, that he values, you know, again, he—he stands up
  for himself. He values, you know, that self-determination.
     “Q: Do you know if during this confrontation whether
  criminal charges stemmed from that?
      “A:   I don’t think there were.
     “Q: Is that indicative of a choice to engage with law
  enforcement?
      “A:   Yes.
     “Q: Is that indicative of a pattern of engaging with law
  enforcement?
     “A: I mean what—so what we know if that there is, you
  know, this one incident that he talked about. He’s attend-
  ing other rallies where likely law enforcement are present.
     “And then this incident happens, you know, several
  few—a few years later where I, you know, opine that he’s
Cite as 329 Or App 127 (2023)                                                 133

    able to, you know, maintain—he appreciates what he’s
    doing at the time. He’s oppositional towards authority. He’s
    not acutely mentally ill.”
Because Duncan’s testimony regarding the rally was limited
to facts relevant to explaining his ultimate opinion on defen-
dant’s mental state, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in admitting his testimony as relevant foundation for
his expert opinion. In other words, the incident was proba-
tive of whether defendant had a qualifying mental disorder
because the expert’s ultimate opinion regarding defendant’s
mental status used that incident as part of the foundation to
support his testimony. OEC 401. We now turn to defendant’s
OEC 403 argument.
         Expert testimony may be unfairly prejudicial under
OEC 403. McCathern, 332 Or at 71. We review a trial court’s
OEC 403 ruling for abuse of discretion. Id. In relevant part,
OEC 403 provides that evidence may be excluded if its “pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice”; whereas “discretion” refers to the author-
ity of a trial court to choose among several legally correct
outcomes. State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 312, 4 P3d 1261
(2000). Thus, to determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion in the case before us, we review its OEC 403
ruling to ensure that it conducted the required OEC 403
balancing. From there, we determine whether the trial
court reached a legally permissible outcome. We conclude
that it did.
         The trial record reflects that the trial court con-
ducted the required OEC 403 balancing test. The trial court
granted defendant’s motion to exclude evidence related to
defendant’s “political views” because admitting the evidence
“would be substantially prejudicial with very little probative
value in this case.” Applying the same test, the trial court
admitted the testimony regarding the upside-down flag inci-
dent because it was “more integral to [Duncan’s] analysis
* * * that the defendant did not have an issue standing up
for his rights.”5 In other words, the court engaged in a 403
balancing process and exercised its discretion in excluding
    5
       As previously noted, the trial court also invited defendant to propose a lim-
iting instruction, which defendant declined to do.
134                                           State v. Petrie

some evidence while concluding that other evidence from
the rally was not so unfairly prejudicial as to substantially
outweigh its probative value to the expert’s opinion. For
those reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the probative value of the
doctor’s description of defendant’s actions at the rally was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting
that testimony.
         In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in denying defendant’s motion to exclude evidence describ-
ing defendant’s actions at a rally, including holding an
upside-down flag, because that evidence is relevant to the
expert’s opinion and its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
        Affirmed.