Court Opinion

ID: 9845409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:21:14.515623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:06.271766
License: Public Domain

Judge Hedrick,
dissenting:
I agree with the maj ority that the question argued in plaintiff’s brief and on oral argument — i.e., when does the one-year period under G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(2), commence if an appeal has been taken from the order allowing the voluntary dismissal — is not properly raised in the record on appeal, as provided by the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, to prevent a manifest injustice, I feel we should suspend the rules pursuant to Rule 2, N.C. Rules App. Proc., and consider the question on its merits, since the matter not in the record is an opinion of this Court in the same case reported at 38 N.C. App. *138370, 248 S.E. 2d 112, filed 17 October 1978, and counsel during oral argument suggested that we surely could take judicial notice of our own decisions.
When we examine the opinion of this Court filed in the first appeal, we learn that the defendant appealed from an order denying its motion to dismiss pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(2), and an order allowing plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Both orders were affirmed by this Court in the opinion filed 17 October 1978. After the opinion of this Court was filed, plaintiff commenced his action in the District Court by re-filing his complaint on 28 November 1978.
Thereafter, the District Court, in allowing defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruled that the plaintiff had not re-commenced his action within one year from the date of the order allowing the voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff now argues that since the order allowing the voluntary dismissal and the order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss was on appeal, he had one year from the date of the filing of this Court’s opinion within which to re-file.
G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(2) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (1) of this section, an action or any claim therein shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the judge and upon such terms and conditions as justice requires. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this subsection is without prejudice. If an action commenced within the time prescribed therefor, or any claim therein, is dismissed without prejudice under this subsection, a new action based on the same claim may be commenced within one year after such dismissal unless the judge shall specify in his order a shorter time.
The order allowing the voluntary dismissal did not provide that the action must be re-commenced within a shorter period of time. Thus, the sole question posed is: When does the one-year period begin to run?
*139Plaintiff cites and relies upon Rowland v. Beauchamp, 253 N.C. 231, 116 S.E. 2d 720 (1960), and Parrish v. Uzzell, 41 N.C. App. 479, 255 S.E. 2d 219 (1979). Defendant cites and relies upon Carl Rose & Sons Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Thorp Sales Corp., 36 N.C. App. 778, 245 S.E. 2d 234, cert. allowed, 295 N.C. 552, 248 S.E. 2d 725 (1978). I find all these cases distinguishable and not determinative.
In the present case plaintiff had obtained proper service, but the defendant appealed from the denial of his 12(b)(2) motion. Plaintiff almost immediately sought and was granted a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), and defendant likewise appealed from this order. To me, it would have been nonsensical to have required plaintiff to re-file his action pending the determination in this Court of the validity of the voluntary dismissal, as well as the validity of service. For example, if such were the case, plaintiff could have found himself in the middle of a lawsuit which he had no right to pursue had this Court reversed either order in the first appeal. Obviously, any delay in the final determination of plaintiffs claim was occasioned by defendant’s appeal, not by plaintiffs failure to re-file pending the appeal. In my opinion the one-year period of time within which the plaintiff was required to re-file commenced to run on the date the opinion of this Court filed 17 October 1978 was certified to the trial court.
I vote to reverse the order of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.