Court Opinion

ID: 9719422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:52:15.385441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:07.145925
License: Public Domain

Garrard, J.
— Appellant Batchelder filed suit for injuries sustained in an automobile collision between her vehicle and one owned by the City. The City answered in three paragraphs, one of which asserted as a defense the failure of Batchelder to give the notice required by statute. The City’s subsequent motion for summary judgment was granted for Batchelder’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of the tort claims statute. IC 1971, 18-2-2-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 48-8001 (Burns 1983 Repl.)1
■ On appeal Batchelder asserts the statute is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. She also asserts that her compliance with the statute was excused.
Batchelder’s primary contention is that the notice statute is an unconstitutional violation of the protections afforded by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. 1, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution. It is asserted that the statute imposes an unreasonably short statute of limitations upon the class of plaintiffs who wish to sue municipal, as opposed to private, tortfeasors.
It is true that some jurisdictions have found that similar provisions deny equal protection where the purpose of the statute containing the notice provision was- to abrogate governmental immunity. See, Reich v. State Highway Dept. (1972), 388 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700; Turner v. Staggs (1973 Nev.), 510 P.2d 879.
In the absence of such a construction, other jurisdictions have found such provisions valid. Thus, the California court in Roberts v. State (1974), 39 Cal. App.3d 844, 114 Cal. Rep. *84518, rejected the Reich rationale because they determined the legislative purpose to be other than an intention to put governmental and private tortfeasors on the same footing. See also, Lunday v. Vogelmann (1973 Iowa), 213 N.W.2d 904; Housewright v. City of La Harpe (1972), 51 Ill.2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437; McCann v. City of Lake Wales (1962 Fla.), 144 So.2d 505.
Prior Indiana cases have stated that the statute in question does not establish a condition precedent to liability of a municipality, nor is it properly a statute of limitations. Instead it establishes a procedural step necessary to the remedy of bringing an action. Its purpose is to enable the City to make a prompt investigation as to its liability. Aaron v. City of Tipton (1941), 218 Ind. 227, 32 N.E.2d 88; City of Logansport v. Gammill (1957), 128 Ind. App. 53, 145 N.E.2d 908.
Following these interpretations of the purpose of the Indiana statute, the First District recently held the notice of claim statute applicable to counties, IC 1971, 17-2-1-1 (Burns Code Ed.), constitutional in the face of an equal protection claim. Foster v. Co. Commr’s. (1975), 163 Ind. App. 518, 325 N.E.2d 223.
Furthermore, in Thompson v. City of Aurora (1975), 263 Ind. 187, 325 N.E.2d 839, our Supreme Court applied the statute- before us and underscored its notice purposes.2
Accordingly, it appears that our statute establishes governmental tortfeasors as a classification entitled to notice to permit prompt investigation of claims. Governmental units are different from private tortfeasors. There are basic differences in the manner and responsibility of passing on claims and the sources of funds used to com*85pensate those innocently injured. The nature of the employment process of their agents and servants also differs.- Consideration of these differences is proper since litigation is not the only means of compensating injured individuals. The fact that the statute in question might oftentimes produce a harsh result through application of the short notice period it provides does not elevate the problem to constitutional proportions. We are unable to say the classification .does not rest upon any reasonable basis. We find the statute constitutional in this regard.
Batchelder next asserts the City had actual notice, although there is no contention that there was any attempt to give formal notice. Thus, to sustain the argument, notice of the potential claim must be inferred from mere knowledge of the collision by city employees.
While substantial compliance with the statute in attempting to give notice will suffice, mere knowledge of the incident acquired independently will not. Touhey v. City of Decatur (1911), 175 Ind. 98, 93 N.E. 540. This interpretation of our statute remains valid because the statutory purpose of providing opportunity to investigate is not fully realized except when notice is had in the context that one is claiming municipal liability for injury. See, Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis (1970), 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225, which discusses substantial compliance at length.
Finally, it is urged that Batchelder was excused from giving notice because of her physical condition. While Touhey, supra, rejected a similar contention, we do not reach the issue. If Batchelder desired to rely upon such a contention to excuse her noncompliance with the statute, it was incumbent upon her under Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56(E) by affidavit, or as otherwise provided in the rule, to set up facts demonstrating the existence of an issue. This was not done, and she may not now complain.
*86The judgment is affirmed.
Hoffman, J., concurs; Staton, P.J., dissents with opinion.

. This act was repealed by the Acts of 1974. The present law appears at IC 1971, 34-4-16.5-6 et seq. (Burns Code Ed.).

. The opinion did not discuss the constitutional issue. While the argument had been raised on appeal, the Court of Appeals’ opinion rejected its consideration since it had not been raised at trial. See, Thompson v. City of Aurora (1974), Ind. App., 313 N.E.2d 713, 717.