Court Opinion

ID: 9785506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:05:57.896762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:27.669149
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(dissenting):
[22 If the settlors of the trust had simply signed the preprinted form they started out with, I would have no problem with the majority opinion. However, in this case the settlors specially added to the preprinted form several new provisions in an effort to set out their own unique intent in creating the trust. These typewritten additions are the essence of the intended trust arrangement and, when inconsistent, supercede the preprinted provisions. Cf. Copper State Leasing Co, v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1988) ("If a printed form is modified by inserted words in writing or otherwise, the inserted words 'take precedence over the printed matter.'") (citation omitted). When taken in conjunction with the rest of the document, they set out quite clearly the intent of the settlors when they created the trust. Two of the added provisions state:
If the home is sold the money is to be put into a trust, designated "the Thurber Trust", to be drawn out at 20 [percent] per year.
If one of the above listed [ie., Mr. or Mrs. Thurber] should be deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed.
123 Considering the entire instrument, with appropriate emphasis on the provisions specially added by the Thurbers, their intent is apparent. See Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974) ("[In ascertaining the intention of the settlor we may consider the entire instrument aided by the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of creation of the trust."). As the trial court aptly observed, "the parties wanted to set up a trust that would not be changed after one died. I mean, I read that as the intent of the language where it says, 'If one of the above listed should be deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed."" That intent is manifest, and I cannot imagine that the settlors intended to countenance the kind of legerdemain sought to be perpetrated here, whereby wearing her settlor's hat the surviving Mrs. Thurber could not write any of the children out of the trust, but by putting on her trustee's hat she was entirely free to transfer trust assets to some children. at the exclusion of others. I assume it would be no comfort to Mr. Thurber that his widow subverted their mutual intent acting as a trustee rather than as a settlor.1
"f 24 The conclusion reached by the majority opinion is premised on In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997), where the same or a similar form, unchanged by the *299settlors, was in issue. See id. at 354. West held that any surviving trustee " 'succeed{s] to all the powers, duties, and discretionary authority given to the trustees jointly." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(2) (1993)). The majority's reliance on West is misplaced for two reasons. First, West deals only with the retained powers of a surviving trustee-not the powers of a surviving settlor who created the trust jointly with another, for particular purposes, and must remain true to the intent of that instrument.2
[ 25 Second, as recognized in West, a surviving trustee's powers, duties, and discere-tionary authority are limited if something "in the trust instrument denies to a sole trustee any of the powers possessed by the joint trustees." Id. The settlors in this case, agreeing while they were both alive to treat all of their children equally, did intend to significantly limit the survivor's prerogatives with their added language, clearly distinguishing our situation from the facts in West, where the preprinted form was not altered.
126 The trust instrument was intended to accomplish three things: first, to create a trust in order to avoid probate; second, to set it up in a way that the trust assets were fully accessible to the settlors during their lifetimes; and third, to ensure that after the death of one of the settlors, their four children would share equally in the assets of the trust by restricting the survivor from benefiting one child at the expense of another. I believe this third purpose is only heightened in the case of the primary trust asset, the residence, in view of the added provision specially restricting the dissipation of proceeds from the home's sale.
127 Mrs. Thurber went awry in her duty in two respects. First, the trust instrument required that if the house was to be sold, which occurrence is the cause of the present dispute, "the money is to be put into ["the Thurber Trust"]." This never occurred. Second, the provision that the beneficiaries not be changed after the death of either settlor made it apparent that the intent of the Thurbers was to ensure that all the children were to benefit equally from the home or its proceeds. Instead, Mrs. Thurber benefited her "favorites" at the expense of the other children.
128 Upon Mr. Thurber's death, Mrs. Thurber retained the power, as trustee, to deal as she pleased with the res of the trust, so long as she did not disadvantage or prefer one contingent beneficiary over another. Because Mrs. Thurber sold the house in a manner and to a purpose inconsistent with the terms of the trust instrument, she violated her duty as a trustee3 Because the Thur-bers' mutual intent as expressed in the trust instrument should be given effect, I would reverse the summary judgment in favor of defendants and remand with instructions to grant plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

. Contrary to the majority's assertion in footnote 3 of the main opinion that it would be rewriting the trust, making it an irrevocable one, if it were to refuse Mrs. Thurber the right to deny two of the children a share of any remaining trust asset, the reality is that such a refusal would fulfill the seitlors' original intent rather than alter it. Their intention was that the trust be regarded as revocable to benefit the surviving settlor, but not to benefit one of the children over the others.

. Mrs. Thurber cannot, as a trustee, take an action that would be at odds with what she is obligated to do as a surviving joint settlor. While the parties have analyzed this case in terms of Mrs. Thurber repeatedly changing hats from trustee to settlor to beneficiary, a trustee who is also a settlor and a beneficiary actually has the difficult challenge of wearing all three hats at once, and is not at liberty to selectively remove one or the other to accomplish a personal objective contrary to the intent of the trust instrument.

. Vision in this case is clouded by Mrs. Thurber's various roles as trustee, beneficiary, and settlor. To simplify the analysis, let us assume that Mr. and Mrs. Thurber, instead of designating themselves as trustees, designated the trust department of Zions Bank as trustee. Zions Bank would have the ability, as trustee, to sell the home during Mrs. Thurber's lifetime. Suppose for example, she had chosen to enter a retirement home and needed the proceeds from the sale of her home to pay her rent, or simply wished to travel around the world. It would be completely appropriate for Zions to sell the home on contract, as Mrs. Thurber did here, to facilitate her goals. As here, Mrs. Thurber would have the exclusive benefit of the monthly income during her life. But would Zions, as trustee, be allowed on Mrs. Thurber's death to distribute the remaining proceeds from the home only to two children, excluding the other two as Mrs. Thurber did? Absolutely not. Such action would work a de facto change in beneficiaries, contrary to the language of the trust.
Mrs. Thurber, as trustee, would be under the same obligation that Zions would be. Her additional roles as beneficiary and settlor should not change that.