Court Opinion

ID: 9897497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:21.35426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:29.645834
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                             SUPREME COURT

     In Case No. 2022-0178, State of New Hampshire v. Joseph
Gorman, the court on October 24, 2023, issued the following
order:

       The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). After a jury trial in Superior Court (Nicolosi, J.), the
defendant, Joseph Gorman, was convicted on three counts of aggravated
felonious sexual assault. See RSA 632-A:2, I(b) (2016). On appeal, the
defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for in
camera review of the mental health counseling records of the victim. We
remand for a review of the records in camera.

       We need state only those facts relevant to the narrow issue raised by the
defendant on appeal. See State v. King, 162 N.H. 629, 630 (2011). The
defendant was indicted by a grand jury on three counts of aggravated felonious
sexual assault, all of which were alleged to have occurred on or about July 22,
2020, on the theory that the victim was physically helpless to resist due to
intoxication. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion for in camera review of
the victim’s confidential counseling records.

       The defendant’s motion stated that on August 17, 2020, during a
recorded interview, the victim disclosed to a detective that she had confronted
the defendant about the alleged assault and recorded their conversation. The
detective reviewed the recording, in which the victim told the defendant that if
he turned himself in, “it would help her not to having to go through these
things, and not having to deal with it in therapy because she already has
enough PTSD to work through.” The defendant’s motion also stated that
roughly a year later, on August 9, 2021, a New Hampshire Public Defender
investigator reached out to the victim to discuss the case and spoke with her
sister, who informed her that the victim had been hospitalized. It is unclear
whether the hospitalization was related to the victim’s mental or physical
health.

      The defendant argued in his motion that the trial court should “order the
State to produce for in camera review” by the court the records from the
counseling practice the victim attends because there is a reasonable probability
that the records would “contain information that is relevant and helpful to the
defense.” See State v. Gagne, 136 N.H. 101, 105 (1992) (stating that to obtain
in camera review, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that
records contain information that is material and relevant to his defense). The
defendant asserted in the motion that his defense at trial would be that the
allegations against him are not true, and that the jury would look to the
defense to provide all rational reasons and information regarding why the jury
should not find the victim credible. The trial court denied the motion stating,
“Simply because an alleged victim is in counseling and may have discussed the
allegations with a counselor does not give[] rise to a probability that the
information may be helpful to the defense to meet the [Gagne] standard.”

        Each of the indictments in this case alleged that on or about July 22,
2020, the defendant knowingly engaged in the sexual penetration of the victim
when she was physically helpless to resist. The primary issue contested at the
trial, held over the course of three days in March 2022, was whether the victim
and the defendant engaged in consensual sex on or about July 22, 2020. The
defendant was convicted, and this appeal followed.

      The defendant argues on appeal that his due process rights under both
the State and Federal Constitutions were violated when the trial court applied a
“demanding” standard and denied his motion. We first address the defendant’s
claim under the State Constitution. State v. Ball, 134 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983).
Because the defendant prevails under the State Constitution, we need not
analyze his argument under the Federal Constitution. See State v. Hoag, 145
N.H. 47, 48 (2000).

      As the defendant accurately states in his brief, the trial court cannot,
consistent with the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions,
simply bar access to a victim’s confidential counseling records under all
circumstances. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. “[T]o
determine whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege must cede to due
process considerations such that the privileged records must be disclosed to a
criminal defendant, the trial court must balance the confidentiality of such
records against the defendant’s right to obtain evidence helpful to his defense.”
State v. Girard, 173 N.H. 619, 627 (2020). Our case law establishes a
procedure designed to balance the right to privacy in one’s counseling records
against a defendant’s due process rights. As we noted in Girard, a defendant’s
request to obtain privileged records raises two distinct issues. Id. The first is
what standard must be met to obtain in camera review of the privileged
material. Id. The second is what standard must be met for the defendant to
obtain access to the records. Id. At issue in this appeal is whether the
defendant met the standard that requires a trial judge to conduct in camera
review of the documents in order to determine whether the confidential
material must be disclosed to the defense.

      In Gagne, 136 N.H. at 105, we held that to obtain in camera review, “the
defendant must establish a reasonable probability that the records contain

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information that is material and relevant to his defense.” This threshold
showing is not high, because if the bar were set too high, “we risk depriving the
defendant of his constitutional right to due process.” State v. Graham, 142
N.H. 357, 363 (1997). “In contrast, the harm done by disclosing the
information to the trial court in the first instance is minimal.” Id. Accordingly,
the threshold showing requires only that a defendant meaningfully articulate
how the information sought is relevant and material to his defense. To do so,
he must present a plausible theory of relevance and materiality sufficient to
justify review of the protected documents, but he is not required to prove that
his theory is true. At a minimum, a defendant must present some specific
concern, based on more than bare conjecture, that, in reasonable probability,
will be explained by the information sought. King, 162 N.H. at 632 (quotation
and citation omitted).

       We conclude that the defendant has met the Gagne standard as a matter
of law with respect to the victim’s counseling records. This conclusion is
supported by our decisions in State v. Hoag, 145 N.H. 47 (2000), and State v.
Eaton, 162 N.H. 190 (2011). The defendants in both Hoag and Eaton sought
access to counseling records, to the extent that any existed. Hoag, 145 N.H. at
49-50; Eaton, 162 N.H. at 194-95. In both cases, we concluded that the
assertions made by the defendants were sufficient to trigger in camera review
because, given the facts in each case, the defendants reasonably believed that
the victims were in counseling, and that this counseling concerned each
defendant’s alleged conduct. Hoag, 145 N.H. at 49-50; Eaton, 162 N.H. at 194-
95. Similarly, the assertions set forth in the defendant’s motion in this case
establish that the defendant reasonably believed that the victim was in
counseling, and that this counseling concerned his alleged conduct.

       According to the defendant’s motion, the victim told the defendant in a
recorded conversation on August 17, 2020, within weeks of the alleged July 22,
2020 assault, that if he turned himself in, “it would help her not to having to go
through these things, and not having to deal with it in therapy because she
already has enough PTSD to work through.” Also, according to the motion,
“[t]here is information that [the victim] was engaged in counseling prior to this
alleged incident.” The victim’s statement to the defendant strongly implied that
she was in counseling and that she felt a need to discuss the allegations
against the defendant as a part of her therapy. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court erred when it refused to conduct an in camera review of the
victim’s counseling records.

       The State cites a number of our decisions to support the statement that
“simply asserting a reasonable basis for believing that a sexual assault victim
is in counseling and may have discussed pending allegations of sexual assault
in therapy does not, without more, meet the Gagne standard to trigger in
camera review.” (Emphasis added.) See State v. Sargeant, 148 N.H. 571, 574
(2002); State v. Ellsworth, 142 N.H. 710, 713-15 (1998); State v. Locke, 139

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N.H. 741, 744 (1995); State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 98 (1994). While each of
these cases supports the statement, each is factually distinguishable from this
case. The defendant’s motion established more than that the victim may have
spoken about the assault. The motion quoted a statement made by the victim
herself within weeks of the alleged assault urging the defendant to “turn[]
himself in” and strongly suggesting that she was “in therapy” and dealing with
PTSD. The timing, in conjunction with these two statements, suggests not
merely that the victim “may” have been discussing her accusations against the
defendant in therapy, but that there was a reasonable probability that she was.

        On remand, the trial court should direct the appropriate treatment
providers to provide the victim’s counseling records for in camera review. The
trial court should then review the confidential records in accordance with the
standard set forth in Girard. If the trial court concludes that the records do
contain evidence that should have been disclosed to the defense, the court may
release that evidence to the parties with any necessary protective order, taking
into account the victim’s rights under Part I, Article 2-b of the New Hampshire
Constitution and RSA 21-M:8-K (Supp. 2022), if any. In addition, following the
review of the counseling records, the trial court should consider whether there
is a reasonable probability that the victim’s hospitalization records contain
information that is material and relevant to the defense. If the court concludes
that there is such a reasonable probability, it should direct the treatment
providers at the hospital to provide the victim’s records for in camera review. If
the trial court concludes that the records do contain evidence that should have
been disclosed to the defense, the court may release that evidence to the
parties with any necessary protective order, taking into account the victim’s
rights under Part I, Article 2-b of the New Hampshire Constitution and RSA 21-
M:8-K, if any. If the court releases any evidence to the parties, the court
should then provide the parties with an opportunity to make arguments as to
whether a new trial is warranted. Cf. Graham, 142 N.H. at 364 (if records
contain evidence that should have been disclosed, the trial court “should order
a new trial unless it finds that the error of not admitting the evidence in the
first trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).

                                                  Remanded.

    MACDONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and
DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

                                                  Timothy A. Gudas,
                                                       Clerk

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