Court Opinion

ID: 9745726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:29:10.607737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.310075
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority’s opinion except for its treatment of counts I and IV of Rish’s postconviction petition. I would affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of those counts. Count I: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel I agree that during precharge custodial interrogation a person can invoke article I, sections 2 (due process) and 10 (right against self incrimination), of the Illinois Constitution to secure the presence of an attorney. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10; see also People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994). I also have no objection to adopting the standard prescribed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), for judging such an attorney’s performance. In applying that standard, however, we must account for the necessities of context. The strictures of representation at the precharge stage are considerably lower than those at the prosecution stage (where the Strickland standard originated). This principle flows naturally from the fact that jeopardy has not attached during precharge proceedings. Thus counsel’s role is limited to protecting the suspect’s right against self incrimination. As the United States Supreme Court has noted in the fifth amendment context, the purpose of requiring counsel is to preserve Miranda rights, not to vindicate the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n.5, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146, 154 n.5, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 n.5. (1984). I believe this observation applies equally under the Illinois Constitution. In fact, the sixth amendment’s counterpart in the Illinois Constitution carries the heading, “Rights after Indictment.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. With this understanding of precharge counsel’s role, the inquiry under the first prong of Strickland is whether counsel provided objectively reasonable protection of the suspect’s right against self-incrimination. In the instant case, the record contains considerable evidence that attorney Swaim met this requirement. He explicitly informed Kish that she had a constitutional right to remain silent. When Kish chose to continue speaking with the police, Swaim informed her that she could terminate the discussions at any time. He also advised that he would remain in the room in case “anything got to be a problem.” He subsequently accompanied Kish during 35 hours of interrogation — periodically stopping the questions and asking the police to leave the room so he could discuss certain matters with her. Swaim testified that he did not observe any coercion or mistreatment of Kish by the police. Based on the information Kish gave him about her knowledge of the crime, Swaim did not see a problem with her cooperation in the investigation. During the interrogation, Swaim called State’s Attorney William Herzog on the telephone twice to assert Kish’s innocence. When Herzog advised that Kish could not go home, Swaim became furious and threatened to sue the State on her behalf. Kish does not dispute these facts; rather, she speculates about Swaim’s loyalty because of his acquaintance with the victim and a police officer. But the facts illustrate that Swaim fulfilled his limited precharge responsibilities in an objectively reasonable manner. Thus, Kish cannot carry her burden under the first prong of Strickland, and the circuit court properly dismissed count one of her postconviction petition. Count IV: Prosecutorial Misconduct Our supreme court has aptly observed that “[i]f *** the knowledge of every State employee who is involved in a criminal case is imputed to the prosecution, the control over criminal cases would be placed in the hands, and at the mercy, of every employee who touches the case.” People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 80 (1993). Accordingly, imputation depends on factors like reasonableness, whether the failure to transmit knowledge up the informational chain was inadvertent or intentional, and whether real prejudice occurred. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68. The evidence indicates that Officer Willis did not intend to conceal his “electric chair” comment to Kish; after all, he repeated the comment to millions of people on national television. Furthermore, I do not believe Kish suffered real prejudice as a result of the comment. Even if the jury believed she told the truth about Detective Erickson threatening her with the electric chair, the State still presented compelling circumstantial evidence of her guilt. For instance, she was involved in purchasing materials to construct the burial box, purchasing the water left inside the box with the victim, and casing the victim’s house. Additionally, her fingerprints were discovered on a tape recorder used during one of the ransom calls. Such facts support a reasonable inference that Rish gave inconsistent statements because she wanted to conceal her guilt, not because she was frightened by a single comment about the electric chair. Under these circumstances, it would be unreasonable to impute Willis’s knowledge about the “electric chair” comment to the prosecution. The court properly dismissed count IV of Rish’s postconviction petition. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority’s opinion dealing with counts I and IV