Court Opinion

ID: 9639671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:43:58.378681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:20.930428
License: Public Domain

NORTHCUTT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
As I view this record, it is not a case of warranty as to the value of the automobiles with or without the warranties and service policies, but is one that deals with the effect it would have upon the resale of the automobiles by appellee. In other words, the appellee sued appellant for damages caused for failure of appellee to deliver the service policies as recommended and not for failure of consideration. A warranty is an agreement that, though it refers to the subject matter, is collateral to the contract’s main purpose. It is not an essential part of the contract either by the agreement of the parties or by the nature of the case.
In interpretation of contracts whether they be ambiguous or simply contain language of doubtful meaning, primary concern is to ascertain the true intention of the parties. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 412 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Civ.App.), affirmed 424 S.W.2d 216.
*302I think the only reasonable interpretation that could he placed upon the record here is that the appellee was purchasing the cars for resale. Then we would have to consider what the difference in sale price would be in reselling the cars with the service policies and the price without the service policies. I think that would be the manner in determining appellee’s damage.
There is testimony here that some persons will not buy a car without service policies and other testimony that some persons will buy an automobile without considering the service policies. I can not detect from this record how many of the cars appellee had to sell for less price because the service policies were not provided. Appellee testified he didn’t know how much he was damaged. It is not the policy of our law to award damages which would put a plaintiff in a better position than if defendant had carried out his contract and furnished the service policies. The fundamental principle upon which the rule of damages is based is compensation. Compensation is the value of the performance of the contract; that is, what the plaintiff would have made had the contract been performed. It is stated in Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 429 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.App., n. r. e.) as follows:
“As a general rule, damages for breach of contract seek to allow ‘the injured party to have the value to him of the contract’s performance.’ Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037, 60 A.L.R. 936 (1928) ; or as stated differently by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952). ‘The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustained.’ ”
I am further of the opinion that the court erred in the instruction in connection with Special Issue No. 3 inquiring about the difference between the market value of the vehicles with and without service policies and warranties where the court instructed the jury as follows: “You are further instructed that in answering this issue you will not consider the reasonable market value of the used vehicles, if any, which were beyond the warranty period.” There were two used vehicles that were not covered by the service policies and several of the cars were disposed of as junk, and under such charge as there given, would instruct the jury to consider the remaining 54 cars. There is evidence here that several of the 54 cars were sold for junk and naturally would not carry service policies. It is stated in J. A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327 (Sup.Ct.) as follows:
“The exclusion of some improper elements of damages when other non-recoverable items are not excluded tends to aggravate rather than alleviate the tendency of the instruction to mislead the jury into including non-recoverable items. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. McVey, 99 Tex. 28, 87 S.W. 328 (1905). Since the trial court undertook to exclude certain elements of damages from the jury’s consideration, it should have excluded all non-recoverable elements raised by the evidence, because the exclusion of some elements may cause the jury to infer that it may consider the elements of damages which were not excluded by the court’s charge. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. McVey, supra; Simpson v. Barham, 292 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Civ.App.1956, no writ); Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Bozeman, 135 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Civ.App., 1940, writ dism’d judg. corr.).”
I would reverse and remand the case.