Court Opinion

ID: 2963959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:18:00.791198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:49.242560
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1479

                                 BRENDAN MCGUINNESS,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                               LARRY E. DUBOIS, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.
                                 ___________________

        No. 95-1480

                                BRENDAN M. MCGUINNESS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               LARRY E. DUBOIS, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________
                                 ____________________
                                        Before
                                Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________
                                 ____________________

            Brendan M. McGuinness on brief pro se.
            _____________________
            Nancy  Ankers  White,  Special  Assistant  Attorney  General,  and
            ____________________
        Philip W.  Silva, Department of  Correction, on  brief for  appellees,
        ________________
        Larry E. Dubois, et al.
                                 ____________________

                                  February 12, 1996
                                 ____________________

                 Per   Curiam.     The   defendants,   John   Treddin,  a
                 ____________

            disciplinary  hearing  officer at  Massachusetts Correctional

            Institute  - Cedar  Junction (MCI-CJ)  and Ronald  Duval, the

            superintendent at  MCI-CJ, appeal the grant  of a declaratory

            judgment in  favor of inmate Brendan  McGuinness.  McGuinness

            cross-appeals the grant of summary judgment on the  ground of

            qualified  immunity in favor of  the defendants on his claims

            for damages.  We reverse the declaratory judgment in favor of

            McGuinness  and affirm  the summary  judgment on  the damages

            claims.

                                          I.

                 In  November 1991,  McGuinness got  into  an altercation

            with a  prison guard, Sergeant John Andrade,  and was charged

            with  various prison disciplinary  code violations, including

            being  out  of  place,  disrupting the  security  or  orderly

            running  of  the institution,  fighting  and  use of  abusive

            language.  A  few days  later, McGuinness was  notified of  a

            disciplinary  hearing  and   moved  to  MCI-CJ's   West  Wing

            Segregation  Unit ("West Wing").1  He was placed in the upper

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The  West Wing  is comprised  of two  sections.   The two
            upper  tiers are  denominated as  the "Awaiting  Action Unit"
            ("AAU").   The AAU is  a secure  holding area  for an  inmate
            while he is awaiting a disciplinary hearing.  The lower tiers
            of  the  West  Wing  are the  Departmental  Segregation  Unit
            ("DSU").  According to  prison regulations, an inmate may  be
            placed in the DSU only after a finding by the Commissioner of
            Correction  (or his designee)  based on  substantial evidence
            that, if confined in the general population, the inmate poses
            a substantial threat  (i) to  the safety of  others, (ii)  of
            damaging or destroying property, or (iii) to the operation of

                                         -2-

            tier  of  the  West Wing,  i.e.,  in  the  AAU.   McGuinness'

            disciplinary  hearing was held in the West Wing on January 9,

            1992.   Both  McGuinness  and Andrade  testified and  Andrade

            submitted his  written report.   McGuinness admitted  that he

            argued with,  used foul language toward,  and struck Andrade,

            but claimed  that he was  provoked when  Andrade pushed  him.

            Andrade  acknowledged that  he  pushed  McGuinness away  when

            McGuinness  got right up in his face.  McGuinness' request to

            call three inmate witnesses from the general population, (who

            he  alleged  were  eyewitnesses),  was  denied  "for security

            reasons."   However, Officer Treddin considered their written

            affidavits.   Ultimately, Treddin deemed the three affidavits

            "non-credible" because in Treddin's opinion all three inmates

            saw the confrontation only in part.  Treddin found McGuinness

            guilty  based  on McGuinness'  own  admissions  and Andrade's

            written report and  testimony.  Treddin imposed a sanction of

            30 days in isolation and recommended that McGuinness lose 100

            days of good-time credit.

                 McGuinness    appealed    the   matter    to   defendant

            Superintendent  Duval,  claiming,  inter  alia,  that Treddin

            wrongfully   portrayed  McGuinness   as  the   aggressor  and

            wrongfully   denied   his  request   for  witnesses   due  to

            McGuinness' placement in the  West Wing.  He argued  that his

                                
            ____________________

            the correctional  facility.   Mass.  Reg.  Code tit.  103,   
            421.09 (1990).

                                         -3-
                                         -3-

            witnesses "would have been able to explain what they saw much

            better if given a chance  to give an oral testimony."   Duval

            denied  McGuinness' appeal.    Eventually, the  incident  was

            referred to the DSU  board and, pursuant to a  finding, based

            on this November  1991 incident and a  subsequent incident or

            incidents  in  January  1992,  that  McGuinness  presented  a

            substantial  threat  to  the  safety  of  others,  McGuinness

            received  a two year sentence  of confinement to  the DSU (in

            addition to the sanction of 30 days in  isolation and loss of

            100 days of good-time credit).

                                         II.

                 In  November 1993,  McGuinness  filed an  action in  the

            district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.   1983, naming  Officer

            Treddin and  Superintendent Duval  as defendants (as  well as

            other  prison  officials not  pertinent  here).   McGuinness'

            complaint  raised  several  claims,  most of  which  are  not

            involved  in these  cross-appeals.   The counts  which remain

            relevant  are these:  Count 2  alleged that  Treddin violated

            McGuinness' right to due  process.  In particular, McGuinness

            alleged that he  had been unlawfully transferred to  the West

            Wing prior to any  guilty finding and that Treddin  used this

            alleged illegal placement in the West Wing as the sole reason

            for  denying his request for witnesses.  Count 4 alleged that

            Superintendent  Duval  violated   McGuinness'  right  to  due

            process  by  denying  his  appeal  without  any  explanation.

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

            McGuinness  asked  for compensatory  and punitive  damages on

            these  claims.  In Count 6 McGuinness requested a declaratory

            judgment  that his placement in the West Wing was illegal and

            the denial  of witnesses due to his  placement there violated

            due process.

                 The  parties cross-moved  for  summary judgment.   In  a

            memorandum  and order,  dated  March 15,  1995, the  district

            court concluded that genuine  issues of material fact existed

            as  to   whether  (a)   McGuinness'  placement  in   the  AAU

            constituted an unlawful placement in a segregation unit prior

            to a  guilty finding,  the imposition of  sanctions, and  the

            appropriate   finding   of   "substantial  threat"   by   the

            Commissioner; and  (b) Treddin's refusal to  allow McGuinness

            to  call   witnesses  violated   "the  rule  of   Kenney  [v.
                                                              ______

            Commissioner  of  Correction, 393  Mass.  28  (1984)]."   The
            ____________________________

            court,  therefore, declined to  enter a declaratory judgment,

            as requested in Count 6, in any party's favor.  The court did

            conclude,  however, that the state  of the law  on this issue

            was confused and,  thus, Treddin and  Duval were entitled  to

            summary  judgment  on the  ground  of  qualified immunity  on

            McGuinness' damages claims  -- Count 2 (Treddin)  and Count 4

            (Duval).2

                                
            ____________________

            2.  The district court  construed Count 4 as  a claim against
            Duval, not on the  basis of respondeat superior  (which would
            not lie,  pursuant to   1983,  in any event), but  as a claim
            that Duval was personally liable for failing to take remedial
            action after  learning of  the alleged due  process violation

                                         -5-
                                         -5-

                 Count  6 then  went to  a one-day  bench trial  at which

            Officer  Treddin testified.  The court's findings of fact and

            rulings of law  can be found at McGuinness v.  Dubois, 887 F.
                                            __________     ______

            Supp. 20,  21-23 (D. Mass. 1995).   In brief, the court ruled

            that  the  AAU  is  not  a DSU.    Thus,  the  court rejected

            McGuinness' initial premise, i.e.,  that his placement in the

            AAU constituted an unlawful placement in the DSU prior to the

            required  findings  by the  Commissioner.    Nonetheless, the

            court  held that  McGuinness was  "not given  the protections

            afforded  him by  Department  of Correction  regulations"  as

            interpreted  by Kenney  and  subsequent caselaw.   The  court
                            ______

            declared that  Treddin's determination must be  set aside and

            that the  rulings that followed the  disciplinary hearing are

            void and  of no effect and may play no part whatsoever in any

            further  classification,  penal,  disciplinary,   or  release

            decisions with respect to McGuinness.

                 As  noted at the  outset, Treddin and  Duval appeal this

            declaratory judgment  and McGuinness cross-appeals  the March

            15 summary judgment denying his claims for damages.

                                         III.

                 In Wolff  v. McDonnell, 418  U.S. 539 (1974),  the Court
                    _____     _________

            held  that  a state-created  right  to  good-time credit  for

            satisfactory   behavior,   forfeitable   only   for   serious

                                
            ____________________

            through   McGuinness'   appeal  following   the  disciplinary
            hearing.   Thus  construed, the  district court  found Duval,
            nonetheless, entitled to qualified immunity.

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            misbehavior,  is  a sufficient  liberty  interest  within the

            Fourteenth Amendment to entitle  the inmate to "those minimum

            procedures appropriate  under the circumstances  and required

            by the Due  Process Clause to  insure that the  state-created

            right  is not  arbitrarily  abrogated."   Id.  at 557.3    In
                                                      ___

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Recently, the Court, in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293
                                        ______    ______
            (1995),  refocused  the due  process  inquiry  away from  the
            parsing  of  the mandatory/discretionary  language  in prison
            regulations and back to the  nature of the deprivation, i.e.,
            whether  the  restraint  "imposes  atypical  and  significant
            hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary  incidents
            of prison  life" or "will  inevitably affect the  duration of
            his  sentence."   Id.  at 2299-302.    In Sandin,  the  Court
                              ___                     ______
            concluded that solitary confinement  did not present the type
            of atypical,  significant deprivation in which  a state might
            conceivably create a liberty interest.  Id. at 2301.  Nor did
                                                    ___
            it inevitably affect  the duration of Conner's sentence.  Id.
                                                                      ___
            at 2302.
                 Sandin, however,  did not  retreat from Wolff's  holding
                 ______                                  _____
            that,  if  a  state  statutory provision  created  a  liberty
            interest in  a shortened  prison sentence which  results from
                     ________________________________
            good-time credits, revocable only if  the inmate is guilty of
            serious misconduct, that inmate is entitled to the procedural
            protections outlined in Wolff.  Id. at 2297; see also Gotcher
                                    _____   ___          ________ _______
            v. Wood, 66  F.3d 1097,  1110 (9th Cir.  1995) (opining  that
               ____
            Wolff's  due process  principles  remain  applicable  in  the
            _____
            context  of revocation of  statutory good-time  credits after
            Sandin).
            ______
                 Massachusetts has  a statutory provision,  Mass. Gen. L.
            ch. 127,    129, awarding  a good conduct  deduction from  an
            inmate's   maximum   imprisonment   term,   forfeitable   for
            violations of prison rules.   And, in the instant  case, as a
            result  of the  guilty  finding on  the disciplinary  charge,
            McGuinness forfeited  100  days of  good-time.    McGuinness,
            therefore, was entitled to  the procedural protections of the
            Due Process Clause  prior to the revocation  of his statutory
            good-time  credits.  (Although Mass.  Gen. L. ch.  127,   129
            was repealed on  July 1, 1994,  the repealing provision  also
            provided that the  law in  effect at the  time an offense  is
            committed  governs  sentencing  for that  offense,  i.e., the
            repealed  section still applies  to McGuinness, whose offense
            was committed prior to July 1, 1994.)
                 As  explained in  greater  detail, infra,  the issue  in
                                                    _____
            these  appeals  is what  process  was due  McGuinness  at his

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            Wolff, the Court determined  that, at a minimum,  due process
            _____

            entitled  an inmate,  facing a  disciplinary hearing,  to (1)

            advance (no less than 24 hours) written notice of the claimed

            violation,  (2)  a  qualified  right to  call  witnesses  and

            present documentary evidence in  his defense when  permitting

            him  to do so will  not be unduly  hazardous to institutional

            safety or correctional  goals, and (3) a written statement of

            the  factfinders  as  to  the evidence  relied  upon  and the

            reasons for the disciplinary action taken.  Id. at 563-67.
                                                        ___

                 These  cross-appeals concern  the  second of  these  due

            process  requirements  --  the  parameters  of  the  inmate's

            qualified right to call witnesses.  The district court found,

            and  the  defendants  do  not  dispute,  that  MCI-CJ  has an

            institutional policy  of denying an inmate's  request to call

            inmate   witnesses   from  the   general   population   at  a

            disciplinary  hearing held in the West Wing.4  This policy is

            based  on the  heightened security  requirements in  the West

            Wing, which houses inmates with a demonstrated proclivity for

            violence  and disruption,  and on  the resulting  effect that

            bringing witnesses into  the West Wing has on  the allocation

            of  corrections officers there and in the rest of the prison.

                                
            ____________________

            disciplinary hearing under federal constitutional law.
                                       _______

            4.  The court also found, however, that there were occasions,
            although  rare,  when  a disciplinary  hearing  involving  an
            inmate  housed in the West  Wing had been  moved outside that
            wing.

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

            Any inmate entering the West Wing from the general population

            has to  be strip-searched  and accompanied by  two correction

            officers; restraints are required  to move inmates within the

            West Wing; and  restraints may, or  may not, be  used in  the

            presence of hearing officers at disciplinary hearings.

                 The court held that the Kenney decision, i.e., "the rule
                                         ______

            of Kenney,"  and subsequent  caselaw prohibits the  denial of
               ______

            witnesses' testimony simply based  on an inmate's location in

            the West Wing and that the caselaw and the prison regulations

            require   an   individualized  assessment   that   calling  a

            particular witness would be unduly hazardous to institutional

            safety  or  correctional goals.    The  court found  that  no

            individualized  assessment occurred  in McGuinness'  case and

            thus McGuinness was not given the protections afforded him by

            the regulations as interpreted by Kenney and its progeny.
                                              ______

                 To  a  large  extent,  however,  Kenney  was  simply  an
                                                  ______

            interpretation of the requirements of state law.   In Kenney,
                                                  _________       ______

            inmate  Kenney had been transferred  to the DSU  prior to his
                                                 __________

            disciplinary hearing  on assault  charges and confined  there

            under the same conditions as those inmates transferred to the

            DSU  pursuant to  a finding  by the  Commissioner that  their

            behavior  posed  a  substantial  threat   to  the  residents,

            property,  or  operations  of  the institution.    Kenney  v.
                                                               ______

            Commissioner  of  Correction,  393  Mass.  at  29.    At  his
            ____________________________

            disciplinary hearing, Kenney's  request that the  two alleged

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            victims (both  inmates in the general  population) be allowed

            to  appear  as witnesses  was  denied.   Kenney  subsequently

            brought an action in state court  and on appeal the SJC found

            that the prison officials had violated their own regulations,

            which have the force of state law, by placing Kenney in a DSU

            cell for committing a  disciplinary offense before Kenney had

            been  found guilty,  before sanctions  had been  imposed, and

            before  the  Commissioner  had  found  that  Kenney  posed  a

            substantial threat to  the institution.   Id. at  33-34.   As
                                                      ___

            Kenney  was  illegally incarcerated  in  the  DSU, the  court

            rejected the  prison  officials'  attempt  to  justify  their

            denial  of  his request  to call  witnesses  on basis  of his

            location in the DSU.  Id. at 35.
                                  ___

                 To the extent that "the rule of Kenney" is solely a rule
                                                 ______

            of state law,  it has no  application in this    1983  action

            claiming a  deprivation of McGuinness' rights  secured by the

            federal  Constitution  and  laws.5    "Federal constitutional

            standards  rather than state statutes define the requirements

            of procedural due process."   Russell v. Selsky, 35  F.3d 55,
                                          _______    ______

            60  (2d Cir.  1994)  (internal quotation  marks and  citation

            omitted).  "The failure of the [disciplinary] board to comply

            with its  own regulation  would  constitute a  denial of  due

                                
            ____________________

            5.  To  the  extent  that  the  prison officials  arbitrarily
            violated  their own  state law  regulations, it  would appear
            that  McGuinness could  have  pursued state  judicial review.
            See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2302 n.11.
            ___ ______    ______

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

            process if  the regulation were mandated  by the Constitution

            or federal  law."  Domegan v. Fair, 603 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D.
                               _______    ____

            Mass.  1985); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-
                          ________ ____    __________

            51 (1983) ("The  State may choose  to require procedures  for

            reasons   other  than   protection  against   deprivation  of

            substantive rights, of course, but in making that  choice the

            State  does not  create an  independent substantive  right.")

            (Footnote  omitted).   "The  rule of  Kenney," therefore,  is
                                                  ______

            relevant to McGuinness'   1983 action only to the extent that

            Kenney  accurately  recites  the  parameters  of  federal due
            ______

            process.

                 The SJC did consider whether Kenney's due process rights

            were  violated by the denial  of his request  to call certain

            witnesses.   Kenney v. Commissioner of  Correction, 393 Mass.
                         ______    ___________________________

            at  34.  But that  determination was based  on its conclusion

            that due process requires  some support in the administrative

            record to justify the  denial and none was found  in Kenney's

            case.    Id.  at 35,  citing  Real  v.  Superintendent, Mass.
                     ___          ______  ____      _____________________

            Correctional  Inst., Walpole,  390  Mass.  399,  407  (1983).
            ____________________________

            However,  the Supreme Court  has since held  that due process

            does not  require that  support for  the denial  of witnesses
                 ___

            exist  as part  of the  administrative record;  rather prison

            officials may satisfy due  process by presenting testimony in

            court if the deprivation of a liberty interest  is challenged

            because  of that  claimed defect  in the  hearing.   Ponte v.
                                                                 _____

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

            Real, 471  U.S. 491,  496-97 (1985), vacating  and remanding,
            ____                                 _______________________

            Real  v. Superintendent,  Mass. Correctional  Inst., Walpole,
            ____     ___________________________________________________

            supra.
            _____

                 Insofar as Kenney speaks to the commands of due process,
                            ______

            therefore, we disagree with  the district court's  conclusion

            that,   "properly  interpreted,"   Kenney   stands  for   the
                                               ______

            proposition   that  "witnesses   cannot   be   denied  in   a

            disciplinary hearing  simply based  upon the location  of the

            individual within  the prison."  McGuinness v. Dubois, 887 F.
                                             __________    ______

            Supp.  at 22.    Further, of  import  is the  Kenney  court's
                                                          ______

            treatment  of Devaney  v. Hall,  509 F.  Supp. 497  (D. Mass.
                          _______     ____

            1981).  In Devaney, the district court held that the "across-
                       _______

            the-board"  policy of  MCI-CJ  [then  called MCI-Walpole]  of

            permitting   only   written   statements   of   witnesses  in

            disciplinary hearings held in the DSU [then called  Block 10]

            did  not  violate due  process as  it  was not  arbitrary nor

            beyond the discretion of prison authorities to adopt.  Id. at
                                                                   ___

            500-01.   In Kenney,  the SJC  distinguished  Devaney on  the
                         ______            _____________  _______

            ground that, unlike Devaney, Kenney was  not lawfully held in

            the DSU and reliance  on his location as a  justification for

            the denial  of witnesses was therefore  unreasonable.  Kenney
                                                                   ______

            v. Commissioner of  Correction, 393  Mass. at 35  n.11.   If,
               ___________________________

            "properly interpreted,"  Kenney  stands for  the  proposition
                                     ______

            that  witnesses cannot  be denied  in a  disciplinary hearing

            simply  based upon the location  of the individual within the

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

            prison, whether lawfully confined  in that area or  not, then

            the SJC would not have distinguished Devaney; rather, the SJC
                                   _____________ _______

            would  have expressed  disagreement  with Devaney's  holding.
                                                      _______

            But the SJC did not do that.

                 Although  we   disagree   with  the   district   court's

            interpretation  of  "the  rule  of Kenney,"  insofar  as  the
                                               ______

            district  court  interprets  that  rule as  speaking  to  the

            requirements  of  federal  due  process,6  we  note  that  to

            prohibit live  defense  witness testimony  at a  disciplinary

            hearing,  numerous courts  have  interpreted the  due process

            teachings of  the Wolff opinion to  require an individualized
                              _____

            decision,  based on  the  facts of  each  case.   See,  e.g.,
                                                              __________

            Mitchell  v. Dupnik, 67 F.3d 216, 223 (9th Cir. 1995); Forbes
            ________     ______                                    ______

            v.  Trigg, 976 F.2d 308,  317 (7th Cir.  1992), cert. denied,
                _____                                       ____________

            113 S.  Ct. 1362 (1993); Ramer v.  Kerby, 936 F.2d 1102, 1104
                                     _____     _____

            (10th Cir. 1991);  King v. Wells, 760  F.2d 89, 93  (6th Cir.
                               ____    _____

            1985);  Dalton v.  Hutto, 713  F.2d 75,  78 (4th  Cir. 1983);
                    ______     _____

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Similarly, we conclude that neither Guyton v. Dubois, No.
                                                    ______    ______
            92-1819 (Mass. Super.  Ct. July 20, 1992), nor  Abrazinski v.
                                                            __________
            Dubois, 876 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1995), further support any
            ______
            due process  determination.   Guyton was  found to  have been
            unlawfully  held in  the  DSU and  thus  Guyton is  simply  a
                                                     ______
            straightforward   application  of  Kenney.    The  Abrazinski
                                               ______          __________
            court's discussion of Kenney was dicta and, in any event, for
                                  ______
            reasons  discussed, supra,  we  disagree  with  that  court's
                                _____
            reading of Kenney as holding that "isolation in a segregation
                       ______
            unit alone, even  if legal,  is not sufficient  to support  a
                        ______________
            denial  of witnesses."  Abrazinski v. Dubois, 876 F. Supp. at
                                    __________    ______
            323 (emphasis added).

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

            Bartholomew v. Watson,  665 F.2d 915,  918 (9th Cir.  1982)7;
            ___________    ______

            but see Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 749 (2d Cir. 1991).
            _______ ______    ________

            The Supreme Court,  itself, has addressed the  validity of an

            "across-the-board"  policy  denying  witness   requests  only

            indirectly.     While,  in  Ponte,  it   disagreed  with  the
                                        _____

            Massachusetts prison officials' contention that "'across-the-

            board'  policies  denying  witness  requests  are  invariably

            proper,"  Ponte v.  Real,  471 U.S.  at  496, as  the  Second
                      _____     ____

            Circuit has said, the Court "has not ruled that such policies

            are invariably improper."   Powell v.  Coughlin, 953 F.2d  at
                                        ______     ________

            749  (holding  that an  across-the-board  policy barring  the

            testimony of mental  health staff in an  inmate's presence at

            prison disciplinary hearings does  not violate due process as

                                
            ____________________

            7.  We note that while the Bartholomew opinion stated  that a
                                       ___________
            blanket   proscription  against  calling   certain  types  of
            witnesses  violated   the  "suggestion"  in  Wolff  that  the
                                                         _____
            decision to deny live  witness testimony should be made  on a
            case-by-case analysis of the potential hazards which may flow
            from  the  calling of  a  particular  person, Bartholomew  v.
                                                          ___________
            Watson, 665  F.2d at 918, later cases, in citing Bartholomew,
            ______                                           ___________
            have,  without comment, transformed  this characterization of
            Wolff's "suggestion" into a requirement.  See, e.g., Mitchell
            _____                                     _________  ________
            v. Dupnik, 67 F.3d at 223.
               ______
                 We  also note that,  apart from Bartholomew,  all of the
                                                 ___________
            above-mentioned  cases  that opine  that  an across-the-board
            proscription  against  live  witness testimony  violates  due
            process appear distinguishable from  the present case in that
            nothing   in   those  cases   suggests   that  the   absolute
            prohibitions  on  the calling  of  any  witnesses or  certain
            categories of  witnesses were even  purported to be  based on
            institutional security.   And, in each  case cited, including
            Bartholomew,   the   across-the-board  prohibition   extended
            ___________                                          ________
            prison-wide   in   an   undifferentiated   fashion   to   all
            ___________
            disciplinary hearings.

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

            the  policy  is reasonably  based  on  legitimate penological

            interests and is not an exaggerated response).

                 Although some particular case  in the future may present

            compelling  evidence  that MCI-CJ's  policy  of denying  live

            testimony  from inmate  witnesses at  a  disciplinary hearing

            held  in  the  West  Wing  violates  due  process,  we  leave

            consideration of such  a case where  it appears presently  to

            reside --  in the future.  We find that, on the facts of this

            case,  the  district  court  erred  in  concluding  that  the

            application of  this policy to McGuinness  violated his right

            to due  process.   McGuinness contends that  he was  provoked

            into  striking Andrade  and  that should  lessen any  penalty

            imposed.   McGuinness concedes  that, contrary to  the prison

            rules, he did not inform Officer Treddin in advance about the

            content  of the expected testimony of  Justin Holmes and Jack

            Shea,  other  than   characterizing  them  as   eyewitnesses.

            Nonetheless,  Treddin obtained  their affidavits,  along with

            the  affidavit  of  a   third  inmate,  Michael  Dowd,  whose

            testimony McGuinness had not  previously requested.   Treddin

            concluded  that none of the three saw the whole confrontation

            - a factual determination  certainly within his discretion to

            make  and not within a  court's competency to  overturn.  See
                                                                      ___

            Superintendent,  Mass. Correctional Inst.,  Walpole, v. Hill,
            ___________________________________________________     ____

            472  U.S. 445,  454-55  (1985) (holding  that procedural  due

            process  is satisfied  if  the decision  to revoke  good-time

                                         -15-
                                         -15-

            credits is supported by "some evidence"  in the record, which

            "does  [not]  imply  that  a  disciplinary's board's  factual

            findings ... are subject to second-guessing upon review").

                 The  guilty finding  was based  on the  undisputed facts

            that McGuinness was  out of his cell,  acting disruptive, and

            used  abusive   language  and   assaulted  a   staff  member.

            McGuinness was permitted to present his defense, supported by

            witness affidavits,  that  he was  provoked.   He  has  never

            suggested what  their live testimony would  have added, other

            than that they would have been able to "explain what they saw

            much  better."8     The  live  testimony   of  the  requested

            witnesses was  denied on the  basis of a  policy --  the bona

            fides of which  have not  been challenged here  -- rooted  in

            legitimate   institutional  security  concerns.     In  these

            circumstances, the defendants  have carried  their burden  of

            proving  that  the  denial  of  live  testimony  was  neither

            arbitrary  nor  capricious,  see  Smith  v.  Mass.  Dept.  of
                                         ___  _____      ________________

            Correction,  936 F.2d  1390, 1399  (1st Cir. 1991),  and that
            __________

            Treddin did  not clearly  abuse his considerable  discretion,

            see Hurney v. Carver, 602  F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979),  in
            ___ ______    ______

            denying McGuinness' request for the live testimony of Holmes,

            Shea, and  Dowd, even if  the denial  was based on  a general

                                
            ____________________

            8.  And, it is not certain that even this suggestion was made
            at the  disciplinary hearing  so that Treddin  could consider
            it.  Rather, on  the record before us, this  suggestion first
            appears  in McGuinness'  written  appeal of  the disciplinary
            finding to the prison superintendent.

                                         -16-
                                         -16-

            policy of denying  live witness testimony  in the West  Wing.

            "[S]o long as the reasons are logically related to preventing

            undue  hazards  to   'institutional  safety  or  correctional

            goals,'   the  explanation   should  meet  the   due  process

            requirements  as outlined in Wolff."  Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S.
                                         _____    _____    ____

            at 497.

                                         IV.

                 The  declaratory judgment of  May 1,  1995, in  favor of

            plaintiff  McGuinness on  Count 6  is reversed.   As  we have
                                                  ________

            concluded  that  McGuinness' constitutional  rights  were not

            violated, the March 15,  1995 order granting summary judgment

            in favor of defendants Treddin and Duval on Counts 2 and 4 is

            affirmed.  So ordered.  No costs.
            _________

                                         -17-
                                         -17-