Court Opinion

ID: 9764097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:10:10.77558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:53.428801
License: Public Domain

Peck, J.,
dissenting. I am unable to agree with the result reached by the majority; therefore, I have no alternative but to dissent.
In construing the word “public” as it appears in 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4) the opinion cites no authority for its result which is, in fact, contrary to the general law established throughout this country by judicial decisions involving organizations of a public nature, as well as the rule requiring the strict construction of tax exemptions against the claimant.
On the other hand, the “governmental function” test developed by this Court in our precedential decisions is entirely consistent with general law of long standing. Finally, the majority glosses over the consequences of its decision: the potential for a serious weakening of the tax base of every town, village and city in the state. The above comments summarize the grounds for this dissent; I will explain my objections in greater detail below.
*112I.
Under the rules of statutory construction there is a presumption that the legislature did not intend to use unnecessary language, In re Parker, 107 Vt. 463, 478, 181 A. 106, 112 (1935), and that the courts must give effect to every word, clause and sentence in a statute. Lewis v. Holden, 118 Vt. 59, 62, 99 A.2d 758, 760 (1953). We must, therefore, in construing § 3802(4), give separate and distinct meanings to the three key words “public,” “pious” and “charitable” in § 3802(4).
With that requirement as a guideline, there seems to be no reasonable argument to counter the obvious: the plaintiff is neither a pious nor a charitable organization. “Pious,” by definition, carries a religious connotation; “charity” and “charitable” relate primarily to the giving of assistance to the needy. Absent statutory definitions, words in a statute are to be given their ordinary meanings. Vincent v. Vermont State Retirement Bd., 148 Vt. 531, 535-36, 536 A.2d 925, 928 (1987). Plaintiff does not qualify under either term.
We are left then to consider the meaning of “public” as it is employed by the legislature in the subject statute, and whether, as the majority hold it does, it applies to plaintiff, and thus entitles it to a tax exemption.
One of the clearest shortcomings of the majority opinion is its failure to cite any authority in support of the meaning applied in construing the word “public.” This is the key word in this inquiry; the very foundation upon which the entire opinion is based, including the egregious set of standards which make eligible for a tax exemption almost any organization not otherwise covered as pious or charitable. The majority reaches this conclusion by saying it is what the legislature intended. This is out-of-the-hat, unsupported guesswork; it always lies within the power, if not the right, of a court to say almost anything in order to achieve a desired result, regardless of its validity.
On the other hand there is, in the general law applicable to situations involving “public” purpose and use, ample authority which indicates strongly, and far more logically than the whimsical construction embraced by the majority, that the legislature, in all probability, intended a meaning, not only consistent with general law, but consistent as well with the “governmental function” test which controlled similar cases until today.
*113The term or phrase “public use” means a purpose or use, the objects of which are customarily provided by the government. See Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). It is employed to distinguish like uses commonly left to private interest, inclination or liberality, id., including, presumably, museums, as an almost classical example; in fact, it is difficult to find a better one.
In view of the above, I submit that the “governmental function” test established by this Court in earlier decisions is supported by and entirely consistent with applicable law.
The majority is emboldened to criticize the defendants’ position and that of the trial court, both based on prior decisions of this Court, for, in effect, reading into § 3802(4) the words “ ‘mandated municipal services’. . . [and] ‘essential governmental functions.’ ” Neither phrase, of course, appears expressly in the statute.
This is a strange criticism indeed. The word “public” lacks statutory definition on the one hand, and because some meaning must be assigned, which distinguishes “public” from “pious” or “charitable,” the criticized phrases do not constitute a “reading in” in some improper sense; they are, rather, perfectly legitimate exercises in statutory construction, based on the authority of general applicable law. It was left to this Court to define the term “public.” This was done and well established over a period of time in prior decisions.
The criticism becomes even more egregious, however, when the majority does exactly the same thing in formulating its own new definition of “public use.” As one of the definitional criteria, the majority mandates that “the property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis.” The pot has called the kettle black. Where in the statute is there any not-for-profit requirement expressed? In fact, reading it into the statute, as the majority does, blurs distinctions between “public,” “pious,” and “charitable,” which the legislature clearly intended, or it would not have used three separate and distinct bases for the exemption entitlement. Nonprofit is characteristic of all three. Under certain circumstances, no distinction at all exists; the majority standards can apply to all three.
*114II.
Among the primary concerns to be addressed in the construction of statutes is their effect and consequences. Town of Cambridge v. Bassett, 142 Vt. 171, 177, 453 A.2d 413, 416 (1982). The potential “effect and consequences” of the majority decision are so appalling that it is inconceivable the legislature could possibly have intended any such result.
The majority glosses over this result without addressing it seriously; in fact it is given only the passing like-it-or-lump-it, let-them-eat-cake comment that, in substance, those dissatisfied can always go to the legislature for a remedy. But this is statutory construction turned upside down. Effect and consequences are among the first considerations to be addressed in statutory construction; they are not to be ignored completely except for “oh, by the way, if you don’t like the consequences, too bad, the Court has spoken, go see your senator or representative; don’t pester us again.”
The majority have opened the door to a tax exemption for virtually any and all business which deals with, or is open to, the general public. The opinion concedes that being nonprofit “does not mean that a property may never operate in the black.” Moreover, 11 V.S.A. § 2351 is extremely broad in authorizing the organization of nonprofit corporations. It is, in fact, even broader than the types of enterprises expressly listed. The statute qualifies the list with the following statement, immediately preceding the list: “Corporations may be organized under this chapter for any lawful purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or more of [twenty-one specific purposes].” (emphasis added).
It is clear that under the majority decision and the new and novel standards promulgated by the opinion, all that any enter-prize, with a few possible exceptions not relevant here, needs to do in order to qualify for a property tax exemption under the “public use” clause, is to make a management decision to organize or reorganize on a nonprofit basis. If the organization, once formed, is opened to all, its property becomes, almost automatically, entitled to an exemption as “public” under § 3802(4). Nonprofit corporations as well as those established for profit are permitted, inter alia, to realize a profit, to retain and pay employees, including high-level management personnel, with commensurate *115salaries. A decision to “go nonprofit” may, therefore, be particularly appealing, particularly to a small business or enterprise which would otherwise have to pay its fair share of property taxes to the municipality in which it is situated.
Under the majority-created standards there is nothing to preclude the property of virtually any business, which is open to all members of the public, from being “dedicated to a public use,” and the conferring of a benefit, including but not limited to food, clothing, professional services, recreational facilities, and so ad infinitum, on those who avail themselves of the goods or services offered. If a museum can be said to be “public” because it offers a benefit to all, organizations which provide the bare necessities of life are public to an even greater degree. Nor am I aware that charging for the goods or services furnished, including admission to the museums, theaters, athletic events and other recreational facilities, necessarily precludes a designation of property as being dedicated to a public use. No organization can survive on air. Where is one to draw the line?
The door has been opened wide for every fly-by-night enterprise to acquire property and forthwith remove it as a source of revenue for the town in which it is located. This is unjustified, unnecessary, and a most unfortunate result or consequence, which, I am convinced, the legislature never intended.
The majority charges that the governmental function test is too narrow. I disagree strongly. “Public use” is only one of three uses entitled to an exemption under § 3802(4). There are already a great many organizations whose property enjoys an exception as being pious or charitable in nature, or because it falls under one of the other exemptions contained in the same statute. These exemptions are many and beyond any control by, or any input from, the towns or their voters.
It is undisputed that, by far, the major source of revenue for every municipality in the state is the tax imposed on real property. The further effect and consequences of the majority decision is the potential removal from the tax rolls of even more real estate than under our prior decisions. This is seriously detrimental to both the towns and to those remaining taxpayers who cannot claim an exemption.
The burden created by local taxes on real estate is, and for some time now has been, notorious. Every year, almost without *116exception, those taxes are increased in order that the towns can continue to fulfill their obligations (many of which are required by the legislature). Studies are ongoing at many levels for ways to relieve the property tax burden, so far with little success; real property taxes continue to increase annually. We should also have in mind that towns must continue to provide police and fire protection, as well as other services, even to those properties and their owners, who pay no share of the taxes which support those services.
The majority opinion imposes still another reason for increasing local taxes. Every time realty is stripped from the tax rolls, the loss must somehow be recouped. Obviously there is only one way to accomplish this: by adding the loss factor to the cost of existing needs and programs (often mandated by the state) and the inflationary costs of municipal services (fire, police, schools, recreational facilities, building maintenance, and others). And where and on whom will this increasing burden be imposed? Of course — on the property owners who cannot avoid ever-increasing taxes through a loop-hole which permits other owners to escape paying a fair share of the municipal burden.
Far from being too narrow, I think any exemption over which the voters have no control or input was intended by the legislature to be narrow and should be so construed now, as it was in our prior decisions, and in tax cases generally involving claims for an exemption.
An exemption [from taxation] will be strictly construed against the party claiming it, Trustees of Vermont Wild Land Foundation v. Town of Pittsford, 137 Vt. 439, 444, 407 A.2d 174, 177 (1979), and any doubts as to its application will be interpreted against the exemption. Broughton v. Town of Charlotte, 134 Vt. 270, 272, 356 A.2d 520, 522 (1976).
In re Northeast Washington County Community Health Center, 148 Vt. 113, 115, 530 A.2d 558, 559 (1987) (emphasis added). The majority has the same indifference and contempt for this longstanding rule as it does for the added burden its decision loads upon the shoulders of municipalities and their taxpayers.
It is of great concern to me that the majority, with colossal indifference to the public interest and fiscal responsibility, can sit by in its ivory tower, divorced from reality, and blandly increase *117the potential for further loss if the revenues upon which the towns must rely, and at the same time add to the burden already faced by the local taxpayers. To shrug off the protections guaranteed to towns and their voters by our precedential decisions is unnecessary and unconscionable. The holdings of this Court which preceded today’s decision constituted legitimate statutory construction, and were, moreover, consistent with the established rule quoted immediately above. Id. Further, the legislature has acquiesced in these holdings without the slightest indication of demurrer. This tends to confirm the propriety of our prior view of legislative intent. In re Dixon, 123 Vt. 111, 115, 183 A.2d 522, 524 (1962). It is all the more persuasive when we consider that the majority’s view of intent is virtually the exact opposite. The legislature has been known to respond swiftly to decisions of this Court with which it is dissatisfied.* No such legislative reaction followed our prior decisions.
The majority states that our earlier decisions have created a “somewhat muddled state of affairs in this area of our jurisprudence,” and continues with a self-delivered pat on the back, saying it is about to bring order out of chaos by clarifying the whole thing. On the contrary, our preceding recent opinions, interpreting legislative intent, resulted in a clear standard which the majority itself has no difficulty understanding and stating. Today’s result, and the rationale which purports to support it, throws the law into a tangle it will take years of litigation and judicial guesswork to straighten out. Extreme and egregious judicial activism has carried the day to the detriment of realty taxpayers, and has done so without citing a single precedent. Muddle “now hath made his masterpiece.”

 See, for example, 1983, No 201 (Adj. Sess.), recognized as a legislative reaction to this Court’s decision in Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224 (1983), and 1987, No 122 (Adj. Sess.), enacted in response to State v. LeBlanc, 149 Vt. 141, 540 A.2d 1037 (1987).