Court Opinion

ID: 9375724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 18:02:33.72554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.174039
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                           2d Crim. No. B322890
                                    (Super. Ct. No. F10903822)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,           (Fresno County)

v.

YUSEF LAMONT PIERCE,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      Yusef Lamont Pierce appeals from an order denying a
recommendation by the Secretary of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to recall his 2011
sentence and resentence him pursuant to Penal Code section
1170, former subdivision (d)(1).1 The People concede that,

       Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to
        1

the Penal Code.

      The appeal was originally filed in the Court of Appeal, Fifth
Appellate District. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal to
the Second Appellate District.
pursuant to section 1172.1, “this Court should reverse the order
denying the recall and remand for reconsideration of the
[Secretary’s] request.” We accept the concession, reverse and do
not reach additional contentions.
             Appellant’s Plea Agreement and Sentence
       “[A]ppellant . . . was charged in a criminal complaint with
four counts of second degree robbery involving different victims
(Pen.Code, § 211, counts 1–4), kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1),
count 5), four counts of false imprisonment, again involving
different victims (§ 236, counts 6–9), being a felon in possession of
a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 10), being a felon in
possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1), count 11), felony
evasion of a peace officer while operating a motor vehicle
(Veh.Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count 12), misdemeanor hit and
run driving (Veh.Code, § 20002, subd. (a), count 13), and
misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count 14).
Counts 1 through 5 alleged that appellant used a firearm within
the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). Counts 6
through 9 alleged a firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)). Appellant was also charged with a prior prison term
enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).” (People v. Pierce (No. F063064,
July 17, 2012) [nonpub. opn.] 2012 WL 2900484, at *1 (Pierce).)2
       “[A]ppellant entered into a plea agreement. Under the
terms of the plea agreement, appellant would . . . receive a
stipulated prison term of 19 years 4 months. . . . Appellant pled
no contest to two counts of second degree robbery and one count
of felony evasion of a peace officer. Appellant admitted two
[firearm enhancements pursuant to] section 12022.53,

      2The kidnapping charge in count 5 is punishable by
imprisonment for life.

                                 2
subdivision (b) and the prior prison term enhancement. The
remaining allegations were dismissed by the trial court upon the
motion of the People.” (Pierce, supra, 2012 WL 2900484, at *1.)
       In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court
sentenced appellant to prison for 19 years, four months: the
upper term of five years for the first robbery plus ten years for
the firearm enhancement, plus a consecutive term of one year
(one-third the middle term) for the second robbery plus three
years four months (one-third the 10-year term) for the firearm
enhancement as to that robbery. Appellant was sentenced to a
concurrent three-year upper term for evading a police officer.
The court stayed the sentence on the prior prison term.
       Appellant was not successful in his appeal to the Fifth
District Court of Appeal. (Pierce, supra, 2012 WL 2900484, at
*4.)
             CDCR Secretary’s Recommendation Letter
       The CDCR Secretary’s recommendation letter concerned
the two firearm enhancements imposed pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivision (b). The Secretary stated: “[P]lease
consider the amendment to PC Section 12022.53, subdivision (h),
which became effective January 1, 2018. This section previously
required a sentencing court to impose enhancements for personal
use of a firearm in the commission of enumerated felonies.
However, courts are now empowered with discretion to strike or
dismiss a personal use firearm enhancement at sentencing or
resentencing pursuant to PC Section 1170, subdivision (d)(l), in
the interest of justice pursuant to PC Section 1385. [Appellant]
received a term of 19 years 4 months and has a current earliest
possible release date of April 26, 2025. [¶] . . . I recommend
[appellant’s] sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced.”

                                3
       The Secretary’s recommendation letter was filed in the
superior court on July 31, 2020. Section 1170, former subdivision
(d)(1) then provided that, after a defendant has been sentenced to
prison, “the court may . . . at any time upon the recommendation
of the secretary [of CDCR] . . . recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in
the same manner as if he or she had not previously been
sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than
the initial sentence.” “The CDCR recommendation furnishe[d]
the court with jurisdiction it would not otherwise have to recall
and resentence and is ‘an invitation to the court to exercise its
equitable jurisdiction.’” (People v. McMurray (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040 (McMurray).)
                             Trial Court’s Ruling
       The trial court explained why it had summarily denied the
Secretary’s recommendation to recall appellant’s sentence and
resentence him: “[Appellant] pleaded to extremely violent and
serious crimes. He victimized three individuals by utilizing a
loaded firearm, threatening to shoot them while robbing the
business at which they worked. . . . [H]e attempted to evade
arrest by driving with a willful disregard for the safety and lives
of the people of Fresno County at estimated speeds of 100 miles
per hour . . . . He was only apprehended after crashing his
vehicle. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [G]ranting the request would, in effect,
negate a negotiated plea agreement . . . . Additionally, I don’t
believe that the interest of justice would . . . be served by
granting this request and following the recommendations of
CDCR.”

                                  4
       Amendment of Section 1170, Former Subdivision (d)(1)
                  and Addition of New Section 1172.1
        “Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7) (Assembly Bill 1540) came into effect on
January 1, 2022, and moved the recall and resentencing
provisions of former section 1170(d)(1) to new section 1170.03.”
(McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1038.) Effective June 30,
2022, section 1170.03 was renumbered as section 1172.1 with no
change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
       “Assembly Bill 1540 . . . clarifies the required procedures
including that, when recalling and resentencing, the court
‘shall . . . apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion.’ (§ 117[2.1], subd. (a)(2).) Where,
as here, the CDCR recommends recall and resentencing, . . . there
is now a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing of the
defendant, ‘which may only be overcome if a court finds the
defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety [as
defined in subdivision (c) of section 1170.18].’ (§ 117[2.1], subd.
(b)(2).)” (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.)
       Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(4) provides in part: “In
recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision, the court
may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to,
the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.”

                                 5
        The court “shall consider . . . if the defendant . . . was a
youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 [i.e.,
under the age of 26 years,] at the time of the commission of the
offense, and whether [this] circumstance[] [was] a contributing
factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).)
Appellant claims that he qualified as a youth because he was 22
years old at the time of the offense.
        “Resentencing shall not be denied . . . without a hearing
where the parties have an opportunity to address the basis for
the intended denial . . . .” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(8).) The court
“shall . . . appoint counsel to represent the defendant.” (Id., subd.
(b)(1).)
                              Conclusion
        Appellant’s plea bargain included a stipulated sentence of
19 years, four months. “‘[A] judge who has accepted a plea
bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that
bargain. [Citation.] “A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract
between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court
consents to be bound.” [Citation.] . . . Once the court has
accepted the terms of the negotiated plea, “[it] lacks jurisdiction
to alter the terms of a plea bargain so that it becomes more
favorable to a defendant unless, of course, the parties agree.”. . .’”
(People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931.) But section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(3)(A) provides that, “in the interest of justice and
regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after
a . . . plea agreement,” the resentencing court may “[r]educe a
defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence.”
        “Under the circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to
reverse and remand the matter, so that the trial court can
consider the CDCR's recommendation to recall and resentence

                                  6
defendant under the new and clarified procedure and guidelines
of section 117[2.1].” (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p.
1041.) We express no opinion whether appellant’s sentence
should be recalled or, if it is recalled, whether he should be
resentenced. (But see conc. opn. of Yegan, J.)
                               Disposition
       The order summarily denying the recommendation for
recall of appellant’s 2011 sentence and to resentence him is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for
reconsideration of the recommendation in accordance with the
requirements of section 1172.1.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                              YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                               7
       YEGAN, J., Concurring:
       The People have rights too. The People’s contractual rights
apparently have been disregarded by the Legislature. The
purpose of the law of contracts is to protect the reasonable
expectations of the parties. The defendant reaped the benefits of
the plea bargain and stipulated sentence bargain. His reasonable
expectations have been met. What about the People’s
expectations? Can the Legislature erase the defendant’s
signature from the negotiated disposition which specified an
exact term of imprisonment? I am quick to observe that if the
disposition did not specify the exact term of imprisonment, I
would have no hesitation about applying the newly enacted
statute. That is not the case here. And, it must be observed that
the defendant was originally subject to sentence vulnerability far
in excess of what he bargained for, i.e., life in prison.
       Factually, this reversal and remand is an exercise in
futility and an exhalation of form over substance. Given the trial
court’s articulated views (maj. opn. ante, at p. 4), there is no
chance that appellate will obtain relief even with aid of counsel
and after an evidentiary hearing. This will undoubtedly spawn
yet another appeal.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                    YEGAN, J.

                                1
                      Jon Kapetan, Judge

                Superior Court County of Fresno

                ______________________________

      Dwyer & Kim and John P. Dwyer, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.