Court Opinion

ID: 9929865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 16:04:10.014076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:57:38.629596
License: Public Domain

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
 DARRYL ANDREW BONDS, JR. v. COMMISSIONER
             OF CORRECTION
                (AC 46191)
                 Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Schuman, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder, robbery in the
   first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree,
   sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, S, had
   provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations by, among other
   things, failing to adequately advise him to accept a plea deal and failing
   to adequately advise him regarding the strength of the state’s case.
   The petitioner alleged that, but for his counsel’s allegedly deficient
   performance, he would have pleaded guilty and received a more favor-
   able disposition. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the peti-
   tion, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed
   to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded
   that he had failed to prove that he was prejudiced by S’s deficient
   performance because there was a reasonable probability that, but for
   S’s failure to give specific and appropriate advice, he would have
   accepted the plea offer. Held that the habeas court’s determination that
   the petitioner did not prove that he was prejudiced by S’s allegedly
   ineffective assistance was not clearly erroneous: the habeas court found
   that the petitioner’s testimony that he would have pleaded guilty instead
   of proceeding to trial was not credible and therefore concluded that
   the petitioner did not establish that he would have accepted a plea offer
   had S advised him any differently about the plea offer or the state’s
   evidence, and the court’s findings regarding whether the petitioner
   would have accepted the plea offer, which were made solely on the
   basis of the court’s credibility determinations, were entitled to deference;
   moreover, the court did not single out the petitioner’s testimony with
   respect to whether he would have accepted the state’s plea offer but,
   rather, rejected his testimony as a whole, the court having heard the
   petitioner admit on cross-examination at the habeas trial that he had
   told the sentencing judge six times that he was innocent and that he
   would not admit to something that he did not do, and, accordingly, the
   court reasonably could have concluded that a petitioner who maintained
   his innocence so strongly on a felony murder charge was unlikely to
   plead guilty to the lesser charge of manslaughter offered by the state;
   furthermore, regardless of whether the court erred in its conclusion
   that there was no evidence that the trial court would have accepted the
   state’s plea offer, and, although there was no dispute that the plea offer
   would have involved a conviction and a sentence that was less severe
   than that which was imposed, the petitioner’s failure to prove that he
   would have accepted the plea offer was fatal to his appeal.
     Argued December 5, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

                             Procedural History

  Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, M. Murphy, J.; judgment
denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
granting of certification, appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
   Judie Marshall, for the appellant (petitioner).
   Danielle Koch, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Joseph Valdes, senior assistant
state’s attorney, and Erin Stack, deputy assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                          Opinion

   SCHUMAN, J. The petitioner, Darryl Andrew Bonds,
Jr., appeals from the judgment of the habeas court deny-
ing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal,
the petitioner claims that the court improperly rejected
his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We
affirm the judgment on the ground that the habeas court
properly found that the petitioner did not prove that
he was prejudiced by any ineffective assistance.
   The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our disposition of this appeal. On November
4, 2009, the petitioner and his friend, Tyrone Tarver,
participated in the robbery and shooting of the victim,
Denny Alcantara. State v. Bonds, 172 Conn. App. 108,
112–14, 158 A.3d 826, cert. denied, 326 Conn. 907, 163
A.3d 1206 (2017). The suspects took a black leather
jacket, gold chain, cell phone, money, and marijuana
from the victim, and the victim was shot twice in the
stomach. Id., 113. The victim ultimately died of a gun-
shot wound to the abdomen. Id.
   In December, 2010, the petitioner was arrested for
this incident pursuant to a warrant. Id., 114. In May,
2014, prior to trial, the state filed a second substitute
information charging the petitioner with one count of
felony murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to
2009) § 53a-54c, one count of robbery in the first degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and
one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the sec-
ond degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-48
(a) and General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-135. Id.,
114–15. A jury found the petitioner guilty of all counts.
Id., 115. The court, White, J., sentenced the petitioner to
a total effective term of fifty-five years of incarceration,
followed by five years of special parole. Id. This court
affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Id., 138.
   The petitioner subsequently filed the present habeas
action and, in his third amended petition, alleged that
his criminal trial counsel, Stephan Seeger, had rendered
ineffective assistance during plea negotiations prior to
his criminal trial.1 Specifically, the petitioner alleged
that Seeger provided constitutionally deficient perfor-
mance by, among other things, failing to adequately
advise him to accept a plea deal and failing to adequately
advise him regarding the strength of the state’s case.
The petitioner also alleged that, but for his counsel’s
allegedly deficient performance, he would have pleaded
guilty and he would have received a more favorable
disposition. The respondent, the Commissioner of Cor-
rection, filed a return denying the allegations in the
operative petition or leaving the petitioner to his proof.
  The court, M. Murphy, J., held a trial on the habeas
petition on May 17 and 26, 2022, at which five witnesses
testified: the petitioner; Seeger; Joseph Valdes, the pros-
ecutor at the petitioner’s criminal trial; Brian Carlow,
an attorney whom the petitioner presented as a legal
expert; and Yvania Collazo, the petitioner’s cousin, who
testified at the petitioner’s criminal trial. The parties
also submitted documentary evidence to the court,
including an email exchange between Seeger and Valdes
that took place after Tarver’s trial but more than six
months prior to the petitioner’s criminal trial, which
described aspects of the plea negotiations.
   On November 17, 2022, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The court summarized the evidence and made
the following relevant findings in support of its decision.
‘‘[The petitioner] was represented by [Seeger] at all
criminal proceedings at issue in the present matter.
Seeger reviewed police reports, witness statements,
conducted discovery, and met with [the petitioner] to
discuss the case and the state’s evidence. Seeger deter-
mined that the state’s evidence against [the petitioner]
and Tarver was significant. Seeger advised [the peti-
tioner] about the risk of going to trial and that, although
a jury could acquit him . . . the evidence connecting
[the petitioner] and Tarver at the time of the murder
could result in the jury convicting him. Seeger described
his advice as making sure that [the petitioner] ‘knew
exactly moving forward there were consequences of
him not taking the plea.’ . . . The decision whether
to accept the state’s plea offer or proceed to trial was
solely [the petitioner’s].
  ‘‘Tarver’s trial occurred prior to [the petitioner’s trial].
Thus, Tarver’s trial and outcome—a jury convicted him
of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and con-
spiracy to commit robbery in the third degree2—served
as a barometer for [the petitioner’s] upcoming jury trial.
Seeger’s advice, primarily premised on the identical
evidence in both Tarver’s and [the petitioner’s] cases,
was unaltered by the result of Tarver’s trial. Seeger
recalled that he may have informed [the petitioner] that
the state might want Tarver to cooperate and testify in
his case, which could benefit Tarver at his sentencing.3
Otherwise, the evidence in both defendants’ cases was
the same.’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes added; footnote
omitted.)
   On the basis of the email exchange and testimony
from Seeger and Valdes, the court also found that, after
the Tarver trial, the state offered the petitioner a sen-
tence of either twenty-five years of incarceration or,
alternatively, twenty years of incarceration, followed
by ten years of special parole, in exchange for a guilty
plea to a charge of reckless manslaughter. Although
the habeas court specifically found that Seeger commu-
nicated the twenty year offer to the petitioner and also
stated that ‘‘Seeger advised [the petitioner] about the
plea deals,’’ at no point did the habeas court find that
Seeger had specifically recommended or advised the
petitioner to accept or reject either offer. (Emphasis
added.)
   The court made the following additional findings.
‘‘Seeger discussed the state’s evidence with [the peti-
tioner] and gave him the pros and cons. Seeger noted
that juries can be fickle, and it is difficult to predict
what a jury will decide. [The petitioner] had to weigh
and balance the plea offer versus going to trial. Seeger
testified that he generally advises the client, but the
ultimate decision to go to trial is made by the client.
Regarding [the petitioner’s] case, Seeger testified that
he did not tell [the petitioner] that he would win the
case if he went to trial, and he advised [the petitioner]
of the consequences of not taking the plea.
   ‘‘On cross-examination, Seeger noted that [the peti-
tioner] was still quite young at the time his criminal
case was being prosecuted. Seeger wanted to make
sure that [the petitioner] paid attention to the offer
because a trial would likely lead to a fifty to sixty year
sentence. Seeger strove to make sure that [the peti-
tioner] understood the consequences of going to trial
following Tarver’s conviction.
   ‘‘[The petitioner] testified that he never saw a police
report and that Seeger never reviewed a police report
with him. Nor did Seeger review any witness statements
with him. According to [the petitioner], Seeger immedi-
ately prior to trial conveyed the twenty-five year plea
offer to him and advised him to not take the plea offer
because Seeger did not think the evidence was suffi-
cient and there was no eyewitness to the shooting. [The
petitioner] said that Seeger never explained to him what
the state needed to prove to convict him of felony mur-
der. [The petitioner] also stated that he never received
two offers, only one just prior to trial. . . . [The peti-
tioner] stated that had he fully understood the offer of
twenty years plus ten years [of] special parole, then he
would have accepted that plea offer.
   ‘‘On cross-examination, [the petitioner] acknowl-
edged that it was his decision to go to trial instead of
pleading guilty. However, he stated that, after Tarver’s
conviction and fifty year sentence, he asked Seeger
what he should do. Seeger, according to [the petitioner],
told him to still go to trial, and that he trusted that advice
because Seeger felt that [a certain witness] statement
would not be admitted and that he could impeach Col-
lazo with her multiple statements.’’
  On the basis of its findings, the court rejected the
petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court first concluded that Seeger did not render
deficient performance during plea negotiations. The
court explained: ‘‘As to the allegation that Seeger failed
to adequately advise [the petitioner] of the evidence
against him, the court concludes that this claim has
no merit. The court does not credit [the petitioner’s]
testimony that Seeger did not show him and review
items such as police reports and witness statements,
nor does the court credit his testimony that Seeger
never explained to him what the state needed to prove
to convict him of felony murder. The court credits See-
ger’s testimony about his review, investigation, and dis-
cussions with [the petitioner]. Therefore, the claim that
Seeger failed to adequately advise [the petitioner] of
the evidence against [him] must fail.
   ‘‘The court also does not find credible [the petition-
er’s] testimony regarding plea offer communications.
. . . The court does not find credible [the petitioner’s]
testimony that, after Tarver’s conviction and fifty year
sentence, he asked Seeger what he should do and that
Seeger told him to go to trial, and that he trusted that
advice because Seeger felt that [a certain witness] state-
ment would not be admitted and that he could impeach
Collazo with her multiple statements. To summarize:
the court does not find [the petitioner] to be a credible
witness regarding the salient plea negotiation issues.’’
  The court further found that ‘‘Seeger advised [the
petitioner] about the plea deals and the strength of the
state’s case. Seeger balanced the need to advise [the
petitioner] of what could happen if he did not accept
the plea deal and being prepared to go forward with
the trial if that is what [the petitioner] wanted to do.
[The petitioner] was aware from Seeger’s advice and
the outcome of Tarver’s trial that his own trial might
result in his conviction. In other words, [the petitioner]
fully understood the risk of proceeding to trial and
chose a trial knowing the significant risk he was taking.
[The petitioner’s] persistence in maintaining his inno-
cence molded his decision to proceed with the trial.
[The petitioner] continued to proclaim his innocence
even at the sentencing hearing.’’
   The court concluded that the petitioner also failed
to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s
allegedly deficient performance, explaining: ‘‘The court
does not find credible [the petitioner’s] present day
testimony that he would have pleaded guilty instead of
proceeding to trial. Furthermore . . . there is no evi-
dence establishing with a reasonable probability that a
judge would have conditionally accepted any of the
state’s plea offers as communicated in the negotiations
with Seeger. [The petitioner] has also not persuaded
this court that he would have accepted a plea offer had
Seeger advised him any differently about the plea offer
or the state’s evidence.’’ Thereafter, the court granted
the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, and
this appeal followed.
  On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
erred in determining that Seeger did not render deficient
performance in two related respects: (1) Seeger did not
make a direct recommendation to the petitioner about
whether to accept the state’s offer; and (2) Seeger failed
to advise the petitioner about the desirability of plead-
ing guilty in light of Tarver’s conviction, the risk of a
significantly higher sentence following trial, and the
admissibility of some of the key evidence that the state
would offer. Both of these claims implicate our
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Maia v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 449, 298 A.3d 588 (2023),
which the petitioner cites.4 The petitioner also claims
that the court erred in concluding that he had failed
to prove that he was prejudiced by Seeger’s deficient
performance because there is a reasonable probability
that, but for Seeger’s failure to give specific and appro-
priate advice, he would have accepted the plea offer
and therefore resolved his case more favorably. In sup-
port of his claim, the petitioner relies on his testimony
from the habeas trial that, had he been advised to take
the plea offer, he would have done so.
   The petitioner bears the burden of proving ineffective
assistance of counsel under the well established stan-
dard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Jordan v.
Commissioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 279, 281–82,
267 A.3d 120 (2021); Quintana v. Warden, 220 Conn.
1, 5, 593 A.2d 964 (1991). In cases such as this one,
involving plea negotiations, to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel the petitioner must
establish that ‘‘(1) counsel’s performance was deficient,
and (2) there was a reasonable probability that—but
for the deficient performance—the petitioner would
have accepted the plea offer, and that the trial court
would have assented to the plea offer.’’ Moore v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 338 Conn. 330, 340, 258 A.3d
40 (2021). ‘‘An ineffective assistance of counsel claim
will succeed only if both prongs [of Strickland] are
satisfied. . . . It is axiomatic that courts may decide
against a petitioner on either prong [of the Strickland
test], whichever is easier.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Commissioner of
Correction, 176 Conn. App. 616, 625–26, 170 A.3d 736
(2017). As stated in Strickland, a court ‘‘need not deter-
mine whether counsel’s performance was deficient
before examining the prejudice suffered by the [peti-
tioner] as a result of the alleged deficiencies.’’ Strick-
land v. Washington, supra, 697.
   We resolve this case on the basis of the prejudice
prong. ‘‘[T]o satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strick-
land test when the ineffective advice of counsel has
led a defendant to reject a plea offer, the habeas peti-
tioner must show [1] that but for the ineffective advice
of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the
plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e.,
that the defendant would have accepted the plea and
the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light
of intervening circumstances), [2] that the court would
have accepted its terms, and [3] that the conviction or
sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have
been less severe than under the judgment and sentence
that in fact were imposed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 343
Conn. 347, 355–56, 273 A.3d 680 (2022).
   As previously recited, the habeas court stated that it
‘‘does not find credible [the petitioner’s] present day
testimony that he would have pleaded guilty instead of
proceeding to trial. . . . [The petitioner] has also not
persuaded this court that he would have accepted a
plea offer had Seeger advised him any differently about
the plea offer or the state’s evidence.’’ We review these
findings deferentially. Ordinarily in a habeas appeal,
the ultimate question of whether a habeas petitioner’s
right to the effective assistance of counsel is ‘‘a mixed
determination of law and fact that requires the applica-
tion of legal principles to the historical facts of [the]
case. . . . As such, that question requires plenary
review by this court unfettered by the clearly erroneous
standard. . . . In the context of rejected plea offers,
however, the specific underlying question of whether
there was a reasonable probability that a habeas peti-
tioner would have accepted a plea offer but for the
deficient performance of counsel is one of fact, which
will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly errone-
ous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
343 Conn. 356–57.
   Not only does a clearly erroneous standard apply in
the present case on the issue of prejudice, but the
habeas court made its findings regarding whether the
petitioner would have accepted the plea offer solely on
the basis of credibility determinations, which calls for
further deference. ‘‘The habeas court had the opportu-
nity to observe firsthand the conduct, demeanor and
attitude of the witnesses, and, therefore, it is the sole
arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be given to their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 358. In this case, the habeas court heard
and saw the petitioner testify at considerable length.
   There were several other factors supporting the
habeas court’s determination that the petitioner was
not a credible witness on the issue of prejudice. First,
the habeas court did not single out the petitioner’s testi-
mony with respect to whether he would have accepted
the state’s guilty plea offer but, rather, rejected the
petitioner’s testimony across the board. The court ulti-
mately found that it ‘‘does not find [the petitioner] to be
a credible witness regarding the salient plea negotiation
issues.’’ Second, the court heard the petitioner admit
on cross-examination that he had told the judge at sen-
tencing six times that he was innocent and that he was
not going to admit to something that he did not do. The
court reasonably could have concluded that a petitioner
who maintained his innocence so strongly on a felony
murder charge was unlikely to plead guilty to a man-
slaughter charge.5 Thus, the habeas court had good
reason not to accept the petitioner’s testimony that
he would have pleaded guilty had Seeger advised him
differently about the state’s plea offer.
   The petitioner also attacks, as clearly erroneous, the
court’s finding on the issue of prejudice that ‘‘there is
no evidence establishing with a reasonable probability
that a judge would have conditionally accepted any of
the state’s plea offers as communicated in the negotia-
tions with Seeger.’’ The petitioner points to testimony
from Valdes, the prosecutor handling the case, that ‘‘the
judge wanted this case to be resolved,’’ and that he had
‘‘no reason to believe that the judge would have gone
on the record and said that he would have found the
offer . . . unacceptable.’’ We decline to reach this
issue. Regardless of whether the habeas court erred in
its conclusion with respect to the second factor of the
prejudice test, that the court would have accepted the
plea offer but for his trial counsel’s alleged deficient
performance, the petitioner still did not prove the first
factor, that he would have pleaded guilty to the offer.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner of Correction, 194
Conn. App. 339, 346 n.6, 221 A.3d 81 (2019) (‘‘[b]ecause
we conclude that the habeas court properly found that
the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstra-
ting that it is reasonably probable that he would have
accepted the plea deal but for his trial counsel’s alleged
deficient performance, we do not address the second
prong of the prejudice test’’). Indeed, there is also no
dispute about the third factor of the prejudice test,
namely, that the plea offer would have involved a con-
viction and sentence less severe than that which was
imposed. As is the case with the second factor, however,
the petitioner’s failure to prove the first factor, that he
would have accepted the plea offer, is fatal to his appeal.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     The third amended petition included additional counts against the peti-
tioner’s trial counsel, a claim against his appellate counsel, and a due process
count alleging that the state had failed to preserve certain evidence. The
petitioner withdrew these counts at the start of the habeas trial, and they
are not subjects of this appeal. In addition, the operative petition included
a count alleging that the state knowingly presented false testimony. The
habeas court concluded that the petitioner had abandoned this claim and,
in the alternative, that there was no merit to the claim. The petitioner does
not challenge that determination on appeal.
   2
     See State v. Tarver, 166 Conn. App. 304, 141 A.3d 940, cert. denied, 323
Conn. 908, 150 A.3d 683 (2016). Tarver received a total effective sentence
of fifty years to serve, followed by ten years of special parole. Id., 309. The
jury returned its verdict in that case on January 18, 2013. Id.
   3
     The court noted that Valdes had explained that, ‘‘in the state’s opinion,
based on the evidence, Tarver was not the shooter. The state offered Tarver
the ability to testify against [the petitioner], but Tarver declined to do so.’’
   4
     In Maia, the Supreme Court held: ‘‘There is no per se requirement that
defense counsel must recommend whether a client should accept a plea
offer. . . . This is because providing a specific recommendation implicates
two critical and sometimes conflicting rights: On the one hand, defense
counsel must give the client the benefit of counsel’s professional advice on
this crucial decision of whether to plead guilty. . . . As part of this advice,
counsel must communicate to the defendant the terms of the plea offer . . .
and should usually inform the defendant of the strengths and weaknesses
of the case against him, as well as the alternative sentences to which he
will most likely be exposed . . . . On the other hand, the ultimate decision
whether to plead guilty must be made by the defendant. . . . And a lawyer
must take care not to coerce a client into either accepting or rejecting a
plea offer. . . . The need to provide a specific recommendation in any
particular case depends on a number of factors, including the defendant’s
chances of prevailing at trial, the likely disparity in sentencing after a full
trial as compared to a guilty plea . . . whether the defendant has maintained
his innocence, and the defendant’s comprehension of the various factors
that will inform his plea decision.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Maia v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 463.
   5
     There was no discussion about whether the petitioner indicated a willing-
ness to plead guilty under the Alford doctrine, pursuant to which a defendant
‘‘does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against
him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea
nevertheless.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Higgins, 88 Conn.
App. 302, 303 n.1, 869 A.2d 700, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 913, 879 A.2d 893
(2005); see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L.
Ed. 2d 162 (1970).