Court Opinion

ID: 9382370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 15:06:35.757685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.145358
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Rossi v. Atrium Med. Ctr., 2023-Ohio-984.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                            WARREN COUNTY

 ARTHUR ROSSI,                                        :

        Appellant,                                    :    CASE NO. CA2022-05-027

                                                      :           OPINION
     - vs -                                                        3/27/2023
                                                      :

 ATRIUM MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,                       :

        Appellees.                                    :

              APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                             Case No. 22-CV-94845

Michael Todd McIntosh, for appellant.

Bieser, Greer & Landis, LLP, and John F. Haviland and Elizabeth D. Wilfong, for appellee,
Atrium Medical Center.

Lindhorst & Dreidame Co., LPA, and Michael F. Lyon and Bradley D. McPeek, for appellees,
Mid-Valley Gastroenterology Associates, Dr. Daryl Hacker, and Dr. Kuldip Sharma.

        HENDRICKSON, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Arthur Rossi, individually and as executor of the Estate of Nancy J.

Rossi, appeals from a decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas dismissing

the medical malpractice and wrongful death claims asserted against appellees, Atrium

Medical Center ("Atrium"), Mid-Valley Gastroenterology Associates ("MVGA"), Dr. Daryl
                                                                    Warren CA2022-05-027

Hacker, and Dr. Kuldip Sharma, upon finding the claims are barred by the four-year statute

of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial

court's decision.

                          I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2}   Nancy J. Rossi died on March 22, 2017, allegedly as a result of medical

negligence committed by appellees. In March 2017, Nancy, in the care of MVGA, had a

colonoscopy and polypectomy performed by Dr. Sharma. She subsequently experienced

rectal bleeding and significant blood loss and sought treatment at Atrium. Though Nancy

needed a blood transfusion, Atrium would not perform the procedure without an order from

MVGA. Dr. Hacker, an associate at MVGA, denied the request for a transfusion until he

could physically examine Nancy. Prior to Dr. Hacker performing an examination, Nancy

suffered cardiac arrest and died.

       {¶3}   On March 20, 2018, Rossi, Nancy's husband, filed a complaint for medical

malpractice and wrongful death. On January 27, 2021, Rossi dismissed the action without

prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). He refiled the case on January 20, 2022—within

one year of his voluntary dismissal, again asserting claims of medical malpractice and

wrongful death.

       {¶4}   On February 8, 2022, MVGA, Dr. Hacker, and Dr. Sharma filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), contending the complaint was filed

outside the time period permitted by the applicable statute of repose, R.C. 2305.113(C).

Atrium filed a similar motion to dismiss on April 6, 2022. Relying on the Ohio Supreme

Court's decision in Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, appellees

argued in their respective motions that the saving statute set forth in R.C. 2305.19(A) could

not be applied to allow Rossi to refile his claims after the four-year statute of repose for

medical claims had expired. Because Rossi had not brought his claims by March 22, 2021,

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four years from the date of Nancy's medical treatment and subsequent death, appellees

contended Rossi's claims were time barred. Appellees did not differentiate between the

medical malpractice and wrongful death claims but, rather, argued that all of Rossi's claims

should be dismissed as they fell outside the four-year statute of repose for medical claims

set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C).

       {¶5}    Rossi filed a memorandum in opposition to appellees' motions to dismiss,

arguing that that the supreme court's decision in Wilson was "in direct conflict with the law

as it appears in the very same statute, fails to recognize basic interpretation of terms within

the statute, and stands against the basic and fundamental principles of statutory

interpretation." Rossi urged the trial court to disregard the precedent in Wilson, declare his

claims timely filed, and permit his claims to proceed to trial.

       {¶6}    The trial court, applying Wilson, held that the "statute of repose dictates that

[Rossi] must have brought these claims by March 22, 2021. * * * [T]he Court finds that

[Rossi] is seeking to commence a medical malpractice suit, outside the applicable statute

of repose." The court therefore granted appellees' respective motions and dismissed

Rossi's claims with prejudice. In dismissing all of Rossi's claims, the trial court implicitly

applied the four-year statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C) to his wrongful death

claims.1

                                            II. ANALYSIS

       {¶7}    Rossi appealed the dismissal of his claims, raising two assignments of error.

Prior to addressing the merits of his assignments of error, we set forth the standard that

governs our review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.

1. The trial court granted MVGA's, Dr. Hacker's, and Dr. Sharma's motion to dismiss on April 4, 2022. It
subsequently granted Atrium's motion to dismiss on April 22, 2022. The analysis in both decisions was
identical.

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                                   A. Standard of Review

       {¶8}   Civ.R. 12(B)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Marchetti v. Blankenburg, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-

09-232, 2011-Ohio-2212, ¶ 9. "In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, 'it must

appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling

relief.'" Id., quoting DeMell v. The Cleveland Clinic Found., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88505,

2007-Ohio-2924, ¶ 7. In ruling on a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the trial court

must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190,

192 (1988). "A trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

is subject to de novo review on appeal." BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Kolenich, 194

Ohio App.3d 777, 2011-Ohio-3345, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.).

                              B. Medical Malpractice Claims

       {¶9}   Assignment of Error No. 1:

       {¶10} THE        TRIAL        COURT          ERRED         IN      GRANTING           THE

DEFENDANTS'/APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

CLAIMS.

       {¶11} In his first assignment of error, Rossi argues that in dismissing his medical

malpractice claims, the trial court erred by applying the holding in Wilson v. Durrani, 2020-

Ohio-6827. He contends that the holding in Wilson should be abandoned and the one-year

savings clause set forth in R.C. 2305.19(A) be applied to his medical malpractice claims,

making the claims timely filed.

       {¶12} In Wilson, Sands and Wilson, two patients who had undergone spinal surgery

by Dr. Durrani in April 2010 and February and April 2011, respectively, filed suit in

December 2015 against Dr. Durrani, his clinic, and two hospitals. Id. at ¶ 2. Prior to bringing

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that suit, Sands and Wilson had previously filed claims against the defendants but

voluntarily dismissed them pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). Id. at ¶ 3. Sands' initial complaint

was first filed in March 2013 and dismissed without prejudice on November 25, 2015. Id.

Wilson's initial complaint was filed in April 2013 and dismissed without prejudice on

December 11, 2015. Id. After Sands and Wilson refiled their complaints in December 2015,

the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending Ohio's medical-claim

statute of repose, R.C. 2305.113(C), barred the refiled claims because they arose out of

surgeries that had been performed more than four years earlier. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court

agreed and granted the defendants' motions. Id.

        {¶13} On appeal, Wilson and Sands argued that the trial court erred in granting

judgment to the defendants because Ohio's saving statute afforded them one year after

voluntary dismissal to refile their claims, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of

repose. Id. at ¶ 5. The appellate court agreed and reversed the trial court's decision. Id.

The supreme court accepted the defendants' discretionary appeal to address "whether a

plaintiff may take advantage of Ohio's saving statute to refile a medical claim after the

applicable one-year statute of limitations has expired if the four-year statute of repose for

medical claims has also expired." Id. at ¶ 1.

        {¶14} After considering the interplay between the one-year statute of limitations for

medical claims set forth in R.C. 2305.113(A),2 the four-year statute of repose for medical

claims set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C),3 and the one-year saving statute set forth in R.C.

2. R.C. 2305.113(A) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, an action upon a medical * * *
claim shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued."

3. The medical-claim statute of repose, R.C. 2305.113(C), provides in relevant part as follows:

                Except as to persons within the age of minority or of unsound mind as
                provided by section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, and except as provided in
                division (D) of this section, both of the following apply:

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2305.19(A),4 the supreme court answered the aforementioned question in the negative. Id.

at ¶ 1, 7. It held, in relevant part, as follows:

                In light of the purpose of a statute of repose—to create a bar on
                a defendant's temporal liability—exceptions to a statute of
                repose require "a particular indication that the legislature did not
                intend the statute to provide complete repose but instead
                anticipated the extension of the statutory period under certain
                circumstances," as when the statute of repose itself contains an
                express exception. California Pub. Emps.' Retirement Sys. [v.
                ANZ Sec., Inc.], U.S. , 137 S.Ct. 2042, 2050 (2017)] * * *.
                The General Assembly did incorporate into R.C. 2305.113(C)
                two express exceptions. First, the statute of repose is tolled "as
                to persons within the age of minority or of unsound mind as
                provided in" R.C. 2305.16. Second, R.C. 2305.113(D) extends
                the four-year repose period for two specific categories of claims:
                (1) those that accrue in the last year of the repose period, R.C.
                2305.113(D)(1), and (2) those based upon a foreign object left
                in a patient's body. R.C. 2305.113(D)(2). R.C. 2305.113(C)
                notably does not contain an exception for application of the
                saving statute, and we may not read one into the statute by
                implication. Unless one of the stated exceptions applies, R.C.
                2305.113(C) clearly and unambiguously prohibits the
                commencement of any action upon a medical claim more than
                four years after the act or omission upon which the claim is
                based.

(Emphasis added.)         Id. at ¶ 29.       "Expiration of the statute of repose precludes the

commencement, pursuant to the saving statute, of a claim that has previously failed

otherwise than on the merits in a prior action." Id. at ¶ 38. The supreme court therefore

                (1) No action upon a medical * * * claim shall be commenced more than four
                years after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged
                basis of the medical * * * claim.

                (2) If an action upon a medical * * * claim is not commenced within four years
                after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of
                the medical * * * claim, then, any action upon that claim is barred.

4. The saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), provides as follows:

                In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, * * * if the
                plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff * * * may commence
                a new action within one year after the date of * * * the plaintiff's failure
                otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable
                statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.

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concluded that Sands' and Wilson's refiled medical claims were barred by the statute of

repose and that judgment on the pleadings had been appropriately granted to the

defendants by the trial court. Id. at ¶ 39.

       {¶15} The circumstances in the present case mirror those in Wilson. Rossi refiled

his medical malpractice claim on January 20, 2022—more than four years after Nancy's

medical treatment and subsequent death on March 22, 2017. The statute of repose set

forth in R.C. 2305.113(C) therefore precludes the commencement of Rossi's medical

malpractice claim.

       {¶16} Rossi urges this court to overrule the holding of Wilson, contending it was

incorrectly decided. However, "[a]s an intermediate appellate court, we 'cannot either

overrule or modify the law established by the Ohio Supreme Court but, rather, are duty

bound to follow the law as pronounced by the Ohio Supreme Court, and must leave any

desirable modification thereof to the Supreme Court."' Vanderbilt v. Pier 27, LLC, 12th Dist.

Butler No. CA2013-02-029, 2013-Ohio-5205, ¶ 15, quoting McVey v. Terrell, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 75AP-140, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 8465, *7 (Sept. 9, 1975).

       {¶17} Accordingly, we find that the trial court appropriately relied on the supreme

court's decision in Wilson v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6827, in granting appellees' motions to

dismiss the medical malpractice claims. As Rossi commenced his action for medical

malpractice more than four years after the alleged conduct that formed the basis of his claim

occurred, the statute of repose barred his refiled action for medical malpractice. Rossi's

first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.

                                 C. Wrongful Death Claims

       {¶18} Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶19} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS OF THE

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT AS A WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM SHOULD SURVIVE A

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DISMISSAL OF A CONCOMITANT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM.

        {¶20} In his second assignment of error, Rossi argues the trial court erred in

dismissing his wrongful death claims as such claims are "separate and distinct" from his

medical malpractice claims and are not subject to the four-year statute of repose set forth

in R.C. 2305.113(C).5

        {¶21} We begin our analysis by noting that "wrongful death is a separate and unique

cause of action from other claims." Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 21AP-74, 2022-Ohio-629, ¶ 16. "[A]n action for wrongful death, creates a new

cause or right of action distinct and apart from the right of action which the injured person

might have had and upon the existence of which such new right is conditioned." Karr v.

Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527 (1946), paragraph one of the syllabus.

                 [W]hen a person is injured by the tortious conduct of another
                 person and the person later dies from the injury, two claims
                 arise. The first is a claim for malpractice or personal injury,
                 enforced either by the injured person herself or by her
                 representative in a survival action. The second is a wrongful
                 death claim, enforced by the decedent’s personal
                 representative on behalf of the decedent’s beneficiaries.

Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 179 (1994). A wrongful death action begins where

the malpractice or personal injury action ends and "a recovery upon both in the same action

is not a double recovery for a single wrong but a single recovery for a double wrong." Klema

v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 519, 521 (1960).

        {¶22} A wrongful death action is a special statutory action which did not exist at

common law. Id. at 524. A cause of action for wrongful death is governed by R.C. Chapter

2125. R.C. 2125.01 provides, "[w]hen the death of a person is caused by wrongful act,

neglect, or default which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and

5. We find the issue is properly before us, given the trial court's implicit application of the four-year statute of
repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C) to Rossi's wrongful death claims.

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recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death

had not ensued * * * shall be liable to an action for damages." The statute of limitations for

a wrongful death action is set forth in R.C. 2125.02(D) and provides as follows:

                (1) Except as provided in division (D)(2) of this section, a civil
                action for wrongful death shall be commenced within two years
                after the decedent's death.

                (2)

                (a) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (D)(2)(b), (c), (d),
                (e), (f), and (g) of this section or in section 2125.04 of the
                Revised Code, no cause of action for wrongful death involving
                a product liability claim shall accrue against the manufacturer or
                supplier of a product later than ten years from the date that the
                product was delivered to its first purchaser or first lessee who
                was not engaged in a business in which the product was used
                as a component in the production, construction, creation,
                assembly, or rebuilding of another product.

Divisions (D)(2)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) provide exceptions to the products-liability statute

of repose set forth in R.C. 2125.02(D)(2)(a). R.C. 2125.04, in turn, provides a saving statute

for wrongful death actions, which allows the actions to be refiled when certain situations

occur.6      Thus, R.C. 2125.02(D) expressly provides only one exception to the

commencement period provided in R.C. 2125.02(D)(1) for wrongful death claims and that

exception is applicable to wrongful death claims related to product liabilities. Ewing v. UC

Health, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210390, 2022-Ohio-2560, ¶ 15.

        {¶23} The trial court found that Rossi's wrongful death claims were additionally

6. The wrongful death saving statute set forth in R.C. 2125.04 provides as follows:

                In every civil action for wrongful death that is commenced or attempted to be
                commenced within the time specified by division (D)(1) or (D)(2)(c), (d), (e),
                (f), or (g) of section 2125.02 of the Revised Code, if a judgment for the plaintiff
                is reversed or the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or,
                if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the personal
                representative of the plaintiff may commence a new civil action for wrongful
                death within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the
                plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period specified
                by any of those divisions, whichever occurs later.

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subject to the medical-malpractice statute of repose contained in R.C. 2305.113(C). This

statute provides as follows:

             Except as to persons within the age of minority or of unsound
             mind as provided by section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, and
             except as provided in division (D) of this section, both of the
             following apply:

             (1) No action upon a medical * * * claim shall be commenced
             more than four years after the occurrence of the act or omission
             constituting the alleged basis of the medical * * * claim.

             (2) If an action upon a medical * * * claim is not commenced
             within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission
             constituting the alleged basis of the medical * * * claim, then,
             any action upon that claim is barred.

R.C. 2305.113(C).

      {¶24} As used in R.C. 2305.113, a "medical claim" is defined as:

             any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a physician,
             podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility, against any
             employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or
             residential facility, or against a licensed practical nurse,
             registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse, physical
             therapist, physician assistant, emergency medical technician-
             basic, emergency medical technician-intermediate, or
             emergency medical technician-paramedic, and that arises out
             of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.
             "Medical claim" includes the following:

             (a) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical
             diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person;

             (b) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the plan of care
             prepared for a resident of a home;

             (c) Claims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or
             treatment of any person or claims that arise out of the plan of
             care prepared for a resident of a home and to which both types
             of claims either of the following applies:

                     (i) The claim results from acts or omissions in providing
                     medical care.

                     (ii) The claim results from the hiring, training, supervision,
                     retention, or termination of caregivers providing medical

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                       diagnosis, care, or treatment.

               (d) Claims that arise out of the plan of care, medical diagnosis,
               or treatment of any person and that are brought under section
               3721.17 of the Revised Code;

               (e) Claims that arise out of skilled nursing care or personal care
               services provided in a home pursuant to the plan of care,
               medical diagnosis, or treatment.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2305.113(E)(3).

       {¶25} This appeal, therefore, asks us to determine whether the medical-claim

statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C) limits the time for commencing a wrongful

death claim where such claim arises from the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the decedent.

This issue has been addressed in several of our sister districts and has created a conflict

among those districts.

       {¶26} The Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Districts have held that a wrongful death claim

related to the medical care, diagnosis, or treatment of the decedent was subject to the

medical-claim statute of repose, R.C. 2305.113(C). See Smith v. Wyandot Mem. Hosp., 3d

Dist. Wyandot No. 16-17-07, 2018-Ohio-2441; Mercer v. Keane, 5th Dist. Coshocton No.

20CA0013, 2021-Ohio-1576; Martin v. Taylor, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2021-L-046, 2021-Ohio-

4614; Kennedy v. Western Reserve Senior Care, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0055,

2023-Ohio-264. These courts acknowledged that wrongful death claims are subject to their

own statute of limitations outside R.C. 2305.113(A), but still found that the claims are subject

to the medical-claim statute of repose based on the language of R.C. 2305.113(E). See

Smith at ¶ 22 ("[b]ecause any action bringing a medical claim is barred by Ohio's medical

claim statute of repose if it is not timely commenced, we conclude that wrongful-death

actions fall within the scope of 'any action' and are subject to the time restraints of the statute

of repose"); Mercer at ¶ 38; Martin at ¶ 44-46 (holding that "although the wrongful death

claim is subject to a different statute of limitations, it does not follow that [it] is not a 'medical

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claim' for purposes of the statute of repose"); Kennedy at ¶ 29-32 (noting that the statute of

repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C) applies where the definition of "medical claim" is met;

that is, the claim is asserted in a civil action, against those medical defendants identified

and listed in the statute, and it arose from the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any

person). As further evidence that a wrongful death action based on a medical claim is

subject to the statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C), the Third District noted that

Civ.R. 10(D)(2) affidavits of merit are required for wrongful death claims arising out of

medical malpractice. See Smith at ¶ 30 ("[the] estate included with its complaint affidavits

of merit as required by Civ.R. 10(D)(2). Therefore [the] estate's wrongful-death action

asserts a medical claim * * * [and] is subject to Ohio's medical-claim statute of repose").

        {¶27} Conversely, the First, Sixth, and Tenth Districts have recently held that a

wrongful death claim related to the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a decedent is

not subject to the medical-claim statute of repose contained in R.C. 2305.113(C). See

Ewing v. UC Health, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210390, 2022-Ohio-2560, appeal accepted,

168 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2022-Ohio-4268; Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-21-1095, 2022-Ohio-1266, appeal accepted, 167 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2022-Ohio-2788;

Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-74, 2022-Ohio-629,

appeal accepted, 167 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2022-Ohio-2162.7 In so holding, the First, Sixth,

7. The Supreme Court of Ohio certified a conflict in Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp., 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 21AP-74, 2022-Ohio-629, appeal accepted, 167 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2022-Ohio-2162, finding the Tenth
District's decision in conflict with decisions from the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh appellate districts, namely Smith
v. Wyandot Mem. Hosp., 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-17-07, 2018-Ohio-2441, Mercer v. Keane, 5th Dist.
Coshocton No. 20CA0013, 2021-Ohio-1576, and Martin v. Taylor, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2021-L-046, 2021-
Ohio-4614. The court ordered the parties to brief the following issue: "Does the statute of repose for medical
claims, set forth under R.C. 2305.113(C), apply to statutory wrongful death claims?" Subsequently, the
supreme court found that the First District's decision in Ewing v. UC Health, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210390,
2022-Ohio-2560, appeal accepted, 168 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2022-Ohio-4268, and the Sixth District's decision in
Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1095, 2022-Ohio-1266, appeal accepted, 167
Ohio St.3d 1490, 2022-Ohio-2788, were also in conflict with decisions from the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh
Districts. The court ordered that briefing be stayed in Ewing and Davis and the cases held for the decision in
the Everhart appeal. Oral argument was held before the supreme court in the Everhart appeal on February
28, 2023.

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and Tenth Districts focused on the statutory language of R.C. 2125.02, noting that the only

statute of repose included in the wrongful death statute is in the products liability context.

Everhart at ¶ 21; Davis at ¶ 58; Ewing at ¶ 27.

       {¶28} "No exception is recognized within R.C. 2305.113 for medical negligence

resulting in death, yet it is well-established that a wrongful-death claim premised on medical

malpractice is governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C.

2125.02(D)(1)—not R.C. 2305.113(A). * * * If a wrongful-death claim is not subject to the

statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.113(A), we see no reason that it would be subject to the

other limitations periods set forth in that statute." Davis at ¶ 57. The court reasoned:

               R.C. 2125.02(D)(1) states that "except as provided in division
               (D)(2)," a wrongful-death claim must be commenced within two
               years after the decedent's death. (Emphasis added.) In other
               words, the only exceptions to the limitations period are provided
               in (D)(2). R.C. 2125.02(D)(2)(a) creates a ten-year statute of
               repose for wrongful-death actions involving product-liability
               claims (subject to certain exceptions further described in
               division (D)(2)). No similar repose period is established for
               wrongful-death actions involving medical claims.           If the
               legislature had intended to impose a repose-period for wrongful-
               death actions involving claims of medical malpractice, it could
               have done so in the same manner that it did for wrongful-death
               actions involving claims of product liability.

Id. at ¶ 58.

       {¶29} The court further noted that

               R.C. 2305.10 contains a separate—but substantially similar—
               provision creating the same repose period for actions for non-
               fatal product-liability claims. R.C. 2305.10(C)(1) broadly states
               that, subject to certain exceptions, "no cause of action based on
               a product liability claim shall accrue against the manufacturer or
               supplier of a product later than ten years from the [initial delivery
               of the product.]" In this respect, the breadth of the product-
               liability statute of repose is similar to the breadth of the medical-
               claim statute of repose. That is, R.C. 2305.113(C) broadly
               states that, subject to certain exceptions, "[n]o action upon a
               medical * * * claim shall be commenced more than four years
               after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the
               alleged basis of the medical * * * claim." Despite the

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unambiguously-broad nature of both statutes of repose, the
legislature found it necessary to restate the product-liability
statute of repose—but not the medical-claim statute of repose—
within the Wrongful Death Act, thereby creating a statute of
repose specifically applicable to wrongful-death actions. We
must assume that if the medical-claim statute of repose was
intended to apply to wrongful-death actions based upon medical
claims, the legislature would have included it within the Wrongful
Death Act, as it did for wrongful-death actions based upon
product-liability claims. Indeed, if we were to interpret the
medical-claim statute of repose as nonetheless applicable to
wrongful-death claims even though it is not included within the
Wrongful Death Act, we would render R.C. 2125.02(D)(2)(a)
redundant, meaningless, or superfluous—which is an
interpretation we must avoid under well-established rules of
statutory construction. See State v. Pettus, 163 Ohio St.3d 55,
2020-Ohio-4836, 168 N.E.3d 406, ¶ 14; D.A.B.E., Inc. v.
Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. Of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-
Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 26.

Further to this point, we are aware of two statutes applicable to
wrongful-death claims that exist outside the Wrongful Death Act
itself—R.C. 2305.131(A)(1) and R.C. 2305.101(A).               R.C.
2305.131(A)(1) establishes a ten-year statute of repose for
actions for wrongful death that arise out of a defective and
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property. But this
provision expressly states that "[n]otwithstanding an otherwise
applicable period of limitations specified * * * in section 2125.02
of the Revised Code * * *, no cause of action to recover
damages for bodily injury, an injury to real or personal property,
or wrongful death that arises out of a defective and unsafe
condition of an improvement to real property * * * shall accrue *
* * later than ten years from the date of substantial completion
of such improvement." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, R.C.
2305.101(A), applicable to claims for bodily injury or wrongful
death caused by the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, provides
a specific limitation period for those claims "[n]otwithstanding
the limitations provided for in section[] 2125.02 * * * of the
Revised Code." (Emphasis added.) When enacting R.C.
2305.131(A)(1) and R.C. 2305.101(A), the legislature included
express language within those statutes to clarify that it was
creating repose periods for wrongful-death claims that run
counter to the limitations periods that are otherwise set forth in
the Wrongful Death Act—making it clear that the legislature
knows how to carve out such exceptions. There is no similar
language within R.C. 2305.113(C) to indicate that the legislature
was enacting a statute of repose for wrongful-death actions
based upon medical claims that would apply "notwithstanding
the limitations provided for in section 2125.02."

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                                                                       Warren CA2022-05-027

Davis at ¶ 58-60. Accord Everhart at ¶ 21-29; Ewing at ¶ 27-31.

       {¶30} As for the significance of Civ.R. 10(D)(2), the Davis court stated:

              we disagree that because courts have held that the Civ.R.
              10(D)(2) affidavit-of-merit requirement applies to wrongful-death
              claims arising from medical negligence, this dictates the
              conclusion that the medical-claim statute of repose is also
              applicable. Certainly, numerous Ohio appellate districts have
              held that wrongful-death claims that arise from "the medical
              diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person," are subject to the
              Civ.R. 10(D)(2) affidavit requirement. See e.g., Wilson v. Mercy
              Health, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2021-T-0004, 2021-Ohio-2470,
              ¶ 33; Wick v. Lorain Manor, Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No.
              12CA010324, 2014-Ohio-4329, ¶ 18; Flynn v. Cleveland Clinic
              Health Sys.-E., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105720, 2018-Ohio-
              585, ¶ 4. But the Civ.R. 10(D)(2) affidavit-of-merit requirement
              is a procedural rule. Oglesby v. Consol. Rail Corp., 6th Dist.
              Erie No. E-08-055, 2009-Ohio-1744, ¶ 24. We see a distinction
              between applying Civ.R. 10(D)(2) to all claims, including
              wrongful-death claims, arising from "the medical diagnosis,
              care, or treatment of any person," and applying R.C. 2305.113's
              limitations periods to those claims—particularly given that
              courts do not apply R.C. 2305.113(A) to wrongful-death claims.

Davis at ¶ 62.

       {¶31} We have considered the conflicting approaches and rationales taken by our

sister courts and are persuaded to follow the approach taken by the Third, Fifth, and

Eleventh Districts. R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) defines a "medical claim" as "any claim that is

asserted in any civil action against a physician [or] * * * hospital * * * that arises out of the

medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person."              (Emphasis added.)        R.C.

2305.113(C)(2), in turn, provides that "[i]f an action upon a medical * * ** claim is not

commenced within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the

alleged basis of the medical * * * claim, then any action upon that claim is barred."

(Emphasis added). The plain language of R.C. 2305.113 subjects Rossi's wrongful death

claims—claims which arose out of a medical claim—subject to the four-year statute of

repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C). As Rossi did not file the wrongful death claims by

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                                                                     Warren CA2022-05-027

March 22, 2021, the statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C) barred his refiled action.

Rossi's second assignment of error is without merit and is therefore overruled.

                                     III. CONCLUSION

       {¶32} For the reasons stated above, we find that the trial court did not err in applying

the four-year statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C) to Rossi's medical malpractice

claims or to his wrongful death claims. Rossi's claims were time barred and properly

dismissed.

       {¶33} Judgment affirmed.

       S. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.

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