Court Opinion

ID: 9385549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 13:06:15.661105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.632258
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Adoption of J.G.S., 2023-Ohio-1155.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.G.S.                            :   APPEAL NO.    C-220534
                                                          TRIAL NO.     2021000200
                                                      :

                                                      :

                                                      :      O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 7, 2023

James J. Whitfield, for Appellant Father,

Mark C. Epply for Appellee C.S.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}   Appellant Father challenges the adoption of his birth son, J.G.S., by

appellee C.S. In two assignments of error, Father contends that the adoption was

contrary to J.G.S.’s best interest under R.C. 3107.161. We disagree, overrule his

assignments of error, and affirm the probate court’s judgment.

                           I.     Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   When J.G.S. was born in 2011, his birth parents were unmarried. Three

months later, Father left the picture amidst substance-abuse issues and periods of

incarceration. Mother also struggled with substance-abuse issues of her own and

spells of incarceration. When he was three years old, J.G.S.’s maternal grandmother

was granted legal custody over him. But when she, too, became incarcerated in 2016,

Mother’s childhood friend C.S. was awarded custody of J.G.S. At the time, Father was

incarcerated and Mother failed to appear at the custody hearing.

       {¶3}    In January 2021, C.S. petitioned to adopt eight-year-old J.G.S. Weeks

later, Mother objected to the adoption. Roughly seven months later, Father’s attorney

filed a notice of appearance. After a hearing, the magistrate found that Father’s and

Mother’s consent was not necessary to proceed with the adoption.

       {¶4}   Father objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that his consent

was required under Ohio’s adoption laws. The probate court overruled Father’s

objections. First, the court noted that Father had been served with notice of the

adoption petition and failed to file an objection, obviating the need for his consent

under R.C. 3107.07(K). Second, the court found that Father had failed, without

justifiable cause, to provide for the maintenance and support of J.G.S. in the one-year

period before his placement with C.S. and the one-year period before C.S. petitioned

for adoption. See R.C. 3107.07(A). Third, the probate court found that Father lacked
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

justifiable cause due to his failure to maintain de minimis contact with J.G.S. in the

year before his placement with C.S. and the year before C.S. filed the adoption petition.

See id. Neither Mother nor Father appealed the probate court’s R.C. 3107.07

determination that their consent to J.G.S.’s adoption was unnecessary.

       {¶5}   Next, the magistrate held two best-interest hearings, where C.S., C.S.’s

father, Father, and Mother testified. In addition, the parties presented Facebook

messages between the parties and the child, photographs, an Ohio Department of Job

and Family Services (“ODJFS”) adoption assessment, and legal documents. The

evidence established that J.G.S. successfully integrated into and bonded with C.S.’s

family. By all accounts, J.G.S. and C.S.’s two daughters considered one another

siblings. J.G.S. knew C.S.’s father as “pawpaw.” J.G.S. was doing well in school and in

the community—he was a successful fifth grader with plenty of friends and hobbies.

       {¶6}   The evidence also demonstrated that both Father and Mother had

worked hard to rehabilitate themselves, recover from their addictions, and restore a

sense of stability in their lives. Yet, Father’s and Mother’s testimony revealed a lack of

involvement in, and knowledge of, J.G.S.’s life. Father accepted responsibility for

leaving J.G.S. in the first months of his life. He explained that he now was sober and

wanted to be in his son’s life. The evidence indicates that he began paying some child

support in 2020 and filed for custody of his son after C.S. filed the adoption petition.

Similarly, Mother had achieved sobriety and established a family of her own.

       {¶7}   Both Father and Mother testified that they were prevented from having

any contact with J.G.S. after 2016. Facebook messages in the record show that C.S.

periodically spoke with Father, telling him about J.G.S. and informing him that J.G.S.

was curious about Father. The conversations occasionally became contentious. C.S.

acknowledged as much but was concerned with Father’s reliability and the potential
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

impact on J.G.S.’s mental and emotional health. In addition, the record includes

Facebook messages from J.G.S. to Mother, where J.G.S. told her that he loved her and

missed her. Mother recalled a subsequent emotional and tearful 12-minute video call.

       {¶8}    In an in-camera interview, J.G.S. described feeling “very happy” with

C.S. and her daughters, who he referred to as his “mom” and his “sisters.” He felt close

to everyone in C.S.’s family, and importantly, felt safe. He liked his school and had

established friendships. He unequivocally wanted to be adopted and acknowledged

the possibility that he may lose contact with his birth parents if he were adopted.

       {¶9}    Following the hearing, the magistrate analyzed the relevant best-

interest factors under R.C. 3107.161(B) and found that granting the adoption petition

was in J.G.S.’s best interest. The magistrate incorporated all previous findings,

recounted J.G.S.’s custodial history and described C.S.’s continued care of J.G.S. The

magistrate acknowledged Mother’s and Father’s rehabilitation and increased stability,

as well as their testimony emphasizing the need for J.G.S. to know his family history.

But the magistrate noted that Mother and Father both failed to appear at the 2016

custody hearing and were unaware of who had custody of their son. Further, Father

had no contact with J.G.S. and paid no support until 2019. And both Mother and

Father admitted that they knew nothing about J.G.S. Likewise, J.G.S. had no memory

of Father and expressed a clear desire to be adopted. Ultimately, the stability and

permanence of C.S.’s family weighed in favor of adoption because J.G.S. “will feel more

like he is part of the family unit after the adoption” and will not be scared that “one of

his parents might file for custody and take him away from the home that he knows.”

       {¶10} The magistrate rejected Father’s argument that J.G.S.’s placement with

C.S. was not the least-detrimental alternative available. While the magistrate found

Father’s and Mother’s desire to be in J.G.S.’s life sincere, they failed to show that being
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

adopted by C.S. was not the least-detrimental alternative. Rather, C.S. provided safety

and stability, and J.G.S. lacked a relationship with his birth parents. The magistrate

explained that adoption is “not about the best interest of the biological parents and the

effects on them,” and their desires were outweighed by the substantial benefits that

C.S.’s day-to-day influence would provide to J.G.S.

       {¶11} Father objected. The probate court overruled his objection and adopted

the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found that the

adoption was in J.G.S.’s best interest under R.C. 3107.161 because “[n]either [Father]

nor [Mother] provided material evidence that granting the adoption would not be in

the minor’s best interest nor did either of them establish that the current placement is

not the least detrimental alternative.” Rather, the probate court concluded that C.S. is

“suitable and qualified to care for and rear the minor.”

                              II.    Law and Analysis

       {¶12} In two assignments of error, Father challenges the probate court’s

decision to grant the adoption petition. First, he contends that concluding that the

adoption was in J.G.S.’s best interest constituted an abuse of discretion. He maintains

that he satisfied his burden under R.C. 3107.161(C). Second, he maintains that C.S.

failed to prove that the adoption was the least-detrimental available alternative for

safeguarding J.G.S.’s growth and development under R.C. 3107.161(B)(1).

                      The Adoption was in J.G.S.’s Best Interest

       {¶13} Adoption cases are typically fact specific, and the decision to grant or

deny an adoption petition “must be made on a case-by-case basis.” In re J.A.M., 2d

Dist. Greene No. 2022-CA-14, 2022-Ohio-2313, ¶ 8, quoting In re Adoption of Charles

B., 50 Ohio St.3d 88, 94, 552 N.E.2d 884 (1990). The probate court maintains “broad

discretion in making th[at] determination,” which we review for an abuse of
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450

N.E.2d 1140 (1983). And the probate court is in the best position to weigh the

testimony and assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Adoption of Lauren Marie

Tucker, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-0154, 2003-Ohio-1212, ¶ 11, citing Bechtol v.

Bechtol, 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 23, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990). Therefore, we may not

“substitute [our] judgment for that of the probate court when competent, credible

evidence supports the probate court’s decision.” In re Adoption of M.R.P., 2022-Ohio-

1631, 189 N.E.3d 841, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of Cotner, 12th Dist.

Fayette Nos. CA2002-02-004 and CA2002-02-005, 2002-Ohio-5145, ¶ 5.

       {¶14} Ohio adoption proceedings are a “two-step process, which involves a

‘consent’ phase and a ‘best interests’ phase.” In re Adoption of S.J.M.H., 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-130683, 2014-Ohio-3565, ¶ 15, citing In re Adoption of Jordan, 72

Ohio App.3d 638, 645, 595 N.E.2d 963 (10th Dist.1991). When consent of the birth

parents is not required to proceed with the adoption, as it was here, the probate court’s

analysis must prioritize the child’s best interest when granting or denying the adoption

petition. See R.C. 3107.14(C). Ohio courts agree that a person petitioning the court for

an adoption retains the ultimate burden of proving that the adoption is in the child’s

best interest under R.C. 3107.161(B). In re M.R.P. at ¶ 19 (collecting cases).

       {¶15} In addition to any other relevant factors, R.C. 3107.161(B) identifies 11

best-interest factors that must be considered in an adoption proceeding:

       1.) The least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the

           child’s growth and development;

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             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2.) The age and health of the child at the time the best interest

   determination is made, and if applicable, at the time the child was

   removed from the home;

3.) The wishes of the child in any case in which the child’s age and

   maturity makes this feasible;

4.) The duration of separation of the child from a parent;

5.) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and

   permanent family relationship, taking into account the conditions of

   the child’s current placement, the likelihood of future placements,

   and the results of prior placements;

6.) The likelihood of safe reunification with a parent within a reasonable

   period of time;

7.) The importance of providing permanency, stability, and continuity

   of relationships for the child;

8.) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents,

   siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the

   child’s best interest;

9.) The child’s adjustment to the child’s current home, school and

   community;

10.) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the

   situation; and

11.) Whether any person involved in the situation has been convicted

   of, pleaded guilty to, or accused of any criminal offense involving any

   act that resulted in a child being abused or neglected[,] * * * a

   violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code involving a victim
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

           who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of

           the person’s family or household; [or] * * * any offense involving a

           victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a

           member of the person’s family or household and caused physical

           harm to the victim in the commission of the offense.

While the probate court must consider each factor in its best-interest analysis, no

single factor controls. See In re L.L., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200058, 2020-Ohio-

5609, ¶ 8, citing In re M., R., & H. Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170008, 2017-

Ohio-1431, ¶ 34.

       {¶16} Here, the magistrate analyzed the relevant best-interest factors. The

magistrate concluded that adoption was the least-detrimental alternative available.

See R.C. 3107.161(B)(1) and 3107.161(C). Further, J.G.S. wanted to be adopted, Father

was absent for nearly J.G.S.’s entire life, C.S. provides a stable familial relationship,

and granting the petition would provide a greater amount of certainty in J.G.S.’s life.

See R.C. 3107.161(B)(3)-(5). The magistrate recognized the increased stability in

Mother’s and Father’s lives. See R.C. 3107.161(B)(6). But again, the magistrate noted

that adoption provided J.G.S. with permanency, stability, and continuity in his

relationships. See R.C. 3107.161(B)(7). And J.G.S. is “very close” with C.S.’s daughters

and her father. See R.C. 3107.161(B)(8). Finally, J.G.S. was well-adjusted to his home,

school, and community. See R.C. 3107.161(B)(9).

       {¶17} Yet, Father maintains that his testimony “touch[ed] on nearly all of the

factors.” Specifically, he argues that denying the adoption was the least-detrimental

available alternative for the child in light of his testimony that he did not want to

interfere with J.G.S.’s “current arrangement.” His testimony stressed J.G.S.’s need, as

a biracial child, to know his background. He emphasizes his current employment,
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

sobriety, and desire to be a positive role model in J.G.S.’s life. But these contentions

generally focus on portions of his testimony that support his position and elude any

consideration of contrary evidence in the record.

       {¶18} When we consider the entirety of the record, the evidence is consistent

with the magistrate’s and probate court’s conclusion that granting the adoption was in

J.G.S.’s best interest. J.G.S.’s wishes, as expressed to the magistrate in the in-camera

interview and in the ODJFS assessment, made clear that J.G.S. wanted to be adopted

by C.S., and considered C.S. and her two daughters his family. In addition, J.G.S. did

“not wish to have a relationship” with his birth parents according to both the May 2021

ODJFS assessment and subsequent in-camera interview. Significantly, J.G.S. had no

history or relationship with Father. Father admitted as much. The ODJFS report states

that C.S. “has been a stable mother figure” for J.G.S. and he felt “safe and loved in

C.S.’s home and would not want anything to change.” Finally, all evidence indicates

that J.G.S. was well adjusted to his current home, school, and community–he was

“bright and mature,” was “well-behaved both at home and at school,” played baseball,

played with his friends frequently, and was “a good student and excels at both math

and science.” The record is replete with evidence supporting the magistrate’s and

probate court’s conclusions.

       {¶19} We recognize the work done by Father to improve his life and his desire

to repair his role as a parent. While we applaud Father’s efforts, the goal of adoption

in Ohio “is to protect the best interest of the child.” In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d

88, 104, 696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th Dist.1996), citing In re Adoption of Zschach, 75 Ohio

St.3d 648, 665 N.E.2d 1070 (1996). The law emphasizes the welfare of the child,

“ ‘specifically those children who lack and are in need of the security and benefits of a

loving home and family.’ ” Id. quoting In re Harshey, 45 Ohio App.2d 97, 102, 341
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

N.E.2d 616 (1975). Indeed, the statutory framework and case law both elevate the best

interest of the child over the rights of others in an adoption proceeding. See In re

Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 322, 574 N.E.2d 1055 (1991). While the magistrate

acknowledged Father’s progress, desires, and emphasis on his familial history, she

properly centered J.G.S.’s welfare in her best-interest analysis. It was therefore

reasonable for the magistrate and probate court to conclude that granting the adoption

petition was in J.G.S.’s best interest. We overrule the first assignment of error.

       Granting the Adoption was the Least-Detrimental Alternative Available

       {¶20} In his second assignment of error, Father argues that C.S. failed to

satisfy her burden to prove that the adoption was in J.G.S.’s best interest. Father

claims that C.S. failed to produce evidence that an adoption was the least-detrimental

available alternative for safeguarding J.G.S.’s growth and development under R.C.

3107.161(B)(1). Assuming, without deciding, that a petitioner carries any burden

involving the least-detrimental available alternative under R.C. 3107.161(B)(1), C.S.

satisfied that burden. See R.C. 3107.161(C); see also In re Adoption of M.R.P., 2022-

Ohio-1631, 189 N.E.3d 841, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.) (“person opposing adoption also has the

burden to establish that the child’s placement is ‘not the least detrimental available

alternative.’ ”). Father fails to acknowledge the overwhelming evidence in the record

demonstrating as much.

       {¶21} While an adoption petitioner retains the burden of persuading the

probate court that granting the adoption is in the best interest of the child, a party

opposing an adoption bears the burden of providing “material evidence” of the child’s

best interest and “establish[ing] that the child’s current placement is not the least

detrimental available alternative.” R.C. 3107.161(C). The “least detrimental available

alternative” is “the alternative that would have the least long-term negative impact on
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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the child.” R.C. 3107.161(A). In other words, a party opposing an adoption, like Father

in this case, must identify an alternative which, relative to the current placement,

offers the greater amount of long-term advantages to the child.

       {¶22} The magistrate and probate court determined that Father failed to

provide evidence that the adoption was not the least-detrimental alternative. In

contrast, the magistrate found that C.S. provided material evidence demonstrating

how adoption was the least-detrimental alternative available. The magistrate

explained that C.S. provided a stable, loving home for J.G.S. where he is happy. The

record supports this conclusion. Testimony from C.S. and her father, the ODJFS

report, the in-camera interview, and Father’s own testimony demonstrate that C.S.

provided J.G.S. with stability, family, and support. He was experiencing success in

academics and in his social life. And significantly, the in-camera interview made clear

that J.G.S. expressed fear over the possibility of the adoption petition being denied.

The evidence supports the magistrate’s and probate court’s findings. We therefore

overrule Father’s second assignment of error.

                                 III.   Conclusion

       {¶23} We overrule Father’s two assignments of error and affirm the probate

court’s judgment granting C.S.’s petition to adopt J.G.S.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.

Please note:

      The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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