Court Opinion

ID: 9897975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:30.6101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:49.895075
License: Public Domain

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                                                                                                     Filed
                                                                                               Washington State
                                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                                Division Two

                                                                                                  June 6, 2023
           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                DIVISION II
        DEPARTMENT OF LABOR &                                              No. 56929-9-II
        INDUSTRIES,

                                      Appellant,

               v.                                                     PUBLISHED OPINION

        A PLACE FOR ROVER INC., DBA PLACE
        FOR ROVER A INC.,

                                      Respondent.

              MAXA, J. – The Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) appeals the superior court’s

       order denying DLI’s petition for review of a decision and order by the Board of Industrial

       Insurance Appeals (the Board). The Board ruled that A Place for Rover, Inc. (Rover), which

       operates an online platform that facilitates pet service providers entering into agreements with

       pet owners to provide services, is not an “employer” of the pet service providers and that the pet

       service providers were not “workers” under the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), title 51 RCW.

       Therefore, the Board concluded that Rover was not required to pay industrial insurance

       premiums.

              Former RCW 51.08.180 (2008) defines “worker” to include any person “who is working

       under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer

       under this title.” Former RCW 51.08.070 (2008) defines “employer” to include any person “who

       contracts with one of more workers, the essence of which is the personal labor of such worker or

       workers.”
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       No. 56929-9-II

              Rover operates a website and mobile application that allows pet owners to locate and

       communicate directly with pet service providers who offer a variety of pet-related services. In

       order to use the online platform, both pet service providers and pet owners must agree to Rover’s

       terms of service (TOS). The service providers and pet owners then negotiate the terms of

       agreements for services without any involvement of Rover.

              The pet service providers set their own rates, what type of services they provide, what

       hours they work, cancellation policies and other details, and what pet owners they will work

       with. After the service is scheduled, the pet owner transmits the agreed fee to Rover. Rover

       retains a percentage of the fee and transfers the remainder to the pet service provider.

              DLI conducted an audit and determined that Rover should have been paying industrial

       insurance premiums under the IIA because Rover was an “employer” and the pet service

       providers were “workers” under the statutory definitions. On appeal, the Board ruled that Rover

       was not subject to the IIA because the pet service providers were not “workers” and entered

       findings of fact supporting that ruling. The superior court denied DLI’s petition for review and

       affirmed the Board’s decision.

              We hold that the pet service providers did not fall within the statutory definition of

       “worker” because they were not “working under an independent contract” with Rover. Former

       RCW 51.08.180. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision and order.

                                                     FACTS

       Background

              Rover provides an online platform where pet owners can locate pet service providers who

       provide services for pets and request bookings from the providers. Pet owners and care

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       No. 56929-9-II

       providers can access the platform through a desktop web application, mobile app, and other

       tools.

                If pet service providers want to post a profile on the Rover platform, they must apply. In

       addition, pet service providers must submit to a criminal background check through a third party

       before they are able to post a profile. The purpose of the background check is to ensure the

       providers do not have a history of dangerous behavior toward people or animals. Other than an

       initial limited review of applications, Rover does not evaluate the suitability of pet service

       providers. But Rover reserves the right to suspend or terminate access to its platform based on

       the information in the background check or for any other reason, in its sole discretion.

                Once their application is accepted, a pet service provider posts a profile that provides

       information regarding the types of services they provide, the animals they will work with, and

       their prices. If a pet owner wants to locate a service provider, they can go to the platform and

       conduct a search for providers that offer the service they need. Through the platform, the pet

       owner can send a message to the provider, conduct a conversation, book the service, and pay for

       the service.

                Rover is not involved in the booking process. The pet service providers set their own

       rates, the types of services they provide, the types of animals they will work with, where the

       service is performed, the hours they work, and cancellation policies and other details. The

       providers also decide whether to work for a particular pet owner. In addition, Rover does not

       require that pet service providers use only its platform to market their services.

                In order for both pet owners and pet service providers to access and use Rover’s platform,

       they must agree to Rover’s TOS. The TOS states that the terms constitute a binding legal

       agreement between the user and Rover. Further, “[t]he Terms govern your use of our software

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       No. 56929-9-II

       applications, resources and services for pet owners and pet service providers to find each other,

       communicate with each other, and arrange for the provision of pet service services.”

       Administrative Record (AR) at 1326.

              The TOS states that Rover does not provide pet care services and does not “employ,

       recommend or endorse” pet service providers or pet owners. AR at 1326. Instead, Rover

       provides “a neutral venue” for pet service providers and pet owners. AR at 1326. The TOS

       states that although Rover’s platform may be used to offer and find pet care services, all

       transactions are between the pet owners and the pet service providers. And the pet owners are

       solely responsible for evaluating the suitability of the pet service providers.

              The TOS provides that both a pet service provider and a pet owner can agree to a booking

       that specifies the fees, time period, and other terms. By completing a booking, both parties agree

       to honor the price and other terms. The purchase of pet care services is a transaction between the

       pet owner and the pet service provider. The pet service provider, not Rover, is responsible for

       performing the agreed services.

              The TOS states that “Rover’s role is to facilitate payments from Pet Owners to Service

       Providers as limited payment agent for the Service Provider.” AR at 1331. Rover collects the

       agreed fee from the pet owner at the time the booking is made. Rover agrees to remit payment to

       the pet service provider within 48 hours after completion of the service period. But Rover first

       deducts a service fee, which is calculated as a percentage of the fees paid by the pet owner.

       Typically, the service fee is 25 percent of the fees paid by the pet owner.

              Rover’s only involvement with the provision of services is when pet service providers

       cancel near the start of the service period. In that event, the TOS states that Rover will use all

       reasonable efforts to find a replacement provider and will pay the cost difference between the

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       No. 56929-9-II

       original booking and the new booking up to 25 percent of the total cost. Rover also may become

       involved if a pet owner fails to retrieve their pet at the end of the service period.

              The TOS also contains a provision regarding substandard services:

              If we determine in our reasonable discretion that a Service Provider has failed to
              provide Pet Care Services as agreed with the Pet Owner or otherwise in accordance
              with these Terms then we may, in our reasonable discretion, cancel a Booking
              and/or issue a full or partial refund to a Pet Owner.

       AR at 1333.

              The TOS contains a list of prohibited conduct regarding the use of its platform. For

       example, users agree not to post materials that are “pornographic, threatening, harassing,

       abusive, or defamatory, or that contain nudity or graphic violence, [or] incite violence.” AR at

       1329. And users cannot provide false information on profiles or registrations. Rover reserves

       the right to suspend or terminate access to its platform if a user’s conduct is inappropriate, unsafe

       or violates the code of conduct or for any other reason.

              The closing paragraph of the TOS states, “Nothing in this Agreement will be construed as

       making either party the partner, joint venturer, agent, legal representative, employer, contractor

       or employee of the other.” AR at 1340.

              Rover does not provide any reviews or evaluations of pet service providers. However,

       Rover collects GPS data when a pet service provider takes a dog for a walk. Rover provides pet

       owners with information where their pet went and how long the walk was.

              Rover hires contractors – office workers – to provide support for its platform. These

       contractors perform services for Rover. For those people, Rover uses an independent contractor

       agreement. Such an agreement is not used for pet service providers or pet owners who use the

       Rover platform.

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       No. 56929-9-II

       DLI Audit and Rover Appeal

              In 2017, DLI received three workers’ compensation claims from pet service providers

       who posted on the Rover platform. DLI assigned an auditor to investigate whether the pet

       service providers were Rover’s workers. As part of the audit, DLI sent out 169 independent

       contractor questionnaires to various pet service providers and received over 50 responses.

              The auditor determined that the pet service workers using Rover’s online platform were

       covered workers and subject to industrial insurance coverage. As a result, DLI ordered Rover to

       pay an assessment of $219,947.75 in industrial insurance taxes and fines.1

              Rover appealed the assessment. An industrial appeals judge (IAJ) conducted a hearing

       considering testimony from several witnesses and multiple exhibits. The IAJ issued a proposed

       decision and order that reversed DLI’s assessment.

              DLI filed a petition for review with the Board, asking the Board to disregard the proposed

       decision and affirm its assessment. The Board agreed with the IAJ’s proposed decision and

       order and reversed the assessment order.

              The Board noted that Rover had virtually no control over the pet owners or pet service

       providers other than receiving payment and subtracting a fee for its services and the right to

       suspend or terminate use of its site. The Board stated that “Rover does not control the what,

       when, who, or how” pet services are provided and does not warrant the qualifications of the pet

       service providers. AR at 5. And the pet service providers who provided testimony did not state

       that they had consented to any form of employment agreement.

       1
         The assessment included industrial insurance taxes for 17 people who signed separate
       independent contractor agreement to perform services for Rover. Rover did not contest these
       taxes on appeal.

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       No. 56929-9-II

              The Board then considered whether the essence of the contract between Rover and the pet

       service providers was personal labor for Rover. The Board stated,

              Here, the pet service providers are not working or providing their services for Rover
              under a contract with Rover. The providers provide work under an agreement with
              the pet owners and provide the work for the pet owners. Rover is not involved in
              setting price, time, scope of service, or any other matter relating to the provider’s
              and owner’s agreement. The essence of the contract between Rover and the pet
              service provider is the use of Rover’s online platform in exchange for a fee, not the
              personal labor of the pet service provider.

       AR at 6.

              The Board issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and concluded that “A Place

       for Rover, Inc. is not an employer of pet services providers and the pet service providers are not

       workers of A Place for Rover, Inc. within the meaning of RCW 51.08.070 and RCW 51.08.180,

       respectively.” AR at 8.

              One Board member dissented. The dissent concluded that “[t]he service providers for

       Rover are working under an independent contact, the essence of which is their personal labor.”

       AR at 11. Therefore, the dissenting member would have affirmed DLI’s assessment order.

       DLI Petition for Review

              DLI filed a petition for review of the Board’s decision and order in the superior court.

       The superior court denied DLI’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s decision.

       Specifically, the court found that the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence

       and that the TOS were not a contract for personal labor. DLI filed a motion for reconsideration.

       The court granted the motion in part to clarify the proper applicable statutes, but reaffirmed its

       order denying the petition for review.

              DLI appeals the superior court’s order affirming the Board’s decision and order.

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       No. 56929-9-II

                                                  ANALYSIS

       A.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

              The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW, governs judicial review

       of the Board’s decision regarding an assessment of industrial insurance premiums. RCW

       51.48.131; Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enter. Inc., 185 Wn.2d 721, 731, 374 P.3d 1097

       (2016). Under the APA, on appeal we review the agency order based on the administrative

       record before the Board. Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 731.

              The APA provides nine grounds for reversing an administrative order. RCW

       34.05.570(3). Two grounds potentially are applicable here: (1) substantial evidence does not

       support the order, RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), and (2) the agency erroneously interpreted or applied

       the law, RCW 34.05.570(3)(d). We review the Board’s findings of fact under a substantial

       evidence standard, considering whether the record contains evidence sufficient to persuade a

       fair-minded, rational person that the finding is true. Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 731. We review

       de novo the Board’s legal conclusions, giving substantial weight to the agency’s interpretation.

       Id. at 731-32.

       B.     “WORKERS” UNDER RCW 51.08.180

              DLI argues that the Board erred in ruling that pet service providers who use Rover’s

       platform are not Rover’s “workers” as defined in RCW 51.08.180. We disagree.

              1.    Legal Principles

              Every “worker” injured in the course of their employment is entitled to receive workers’

       compensation benefits. RCW 51.32.010. And every employer of a worker must pay workers’

       compensation premiums. RCW 51.16.060. A finding that an entity employs “workers” is a

       prerequisite to the imposition of such premiums. Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 734.

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                    a.   Statutory Definition

              Former RCW 51.08.180 defines “worker” to include any person “who is working under

       an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer under

       this title.” Former RCW 51.08.070 defines “employer” to include any person “who contracts

       with one of more workers, the essence of which is the personal labor of such worker or workers.”

              Applying the statutory definitions of “worker” and “employer” requires this court to

       decide whether (1) the alleged worker was working under an independent contract, (2) the

       essence of the contact was personal labor, and (3) the personal labor was for the alleged

       employer. Dana’s Housekeeping Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 76 Wn. App. 600, 607, 886

       P.2d 1147 (1995); see also Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 738.

              The “essence” of the contract refers to the “ ‘gist or substance, the vital sine qua non, the

       very heart and soul’ of the contract between the independent contractor and the employer.”

       Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 735 (quoting Lloyd’s of Yakima Floor Ctr. v. Dep’t of Labor &

       Indus., 33 Wn. App. 745, 751, 662 P.2d 391 (1982)). To determine whether the essence of the

       contract is personal labor, we examine the contract itself, the work to be performed under the

       contract, the parties’ situation, and other circumstances. Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 735. Rather

       than focusing on the technical elements of the test, we focus on the reality of the situation. Id. at

       736.

              One test for determining when personal labor is not the essence of the contract was stated

       in White v. Department of Labor & Industries, 48 Wn.2d 470, 294 P.2d 650 (1956). See

       Delivery Express, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 9 Wn. App. 2d 131, 139, 442 P.2d 637 (2019).

       The test set out three factors in making this determination: (1) whether the contractor performs

       the contract using tools or machinery they own or supply, (2) whether the contractor needs

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       assistance to perform the contract, and (3) if the contractor chooses to or must hire others to

       perform the contracted work. Id. at 139-40.

              How the parties characterize a contract is not determinative of whether a contractor is a

       “worker.” Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 738-39. RCW 51.04.060 states, “No employer or worker

       shall exempt himself or herself from the burden or waive the benefits of this title by any

       contract.”

                    b.   Standard of Review

              Rover argues that whether the pet service providers were “workers” is a question of fact

       that must be reviewed under a substantial evidence standard. However, this court has held that

       whether a contractor is a worker is a mixed question of law and fact. B & R Sales Inc. v. Dep’t

       of Labor & Indus., 186 Wn. App. 367, 376, 344 P.3d 741 (2015). We review for substantial

       evidence the nature of the applicable contracts, the services the contractors provided, and other

       related issues. Id. But whether contractors are “workers” based on those facts depends on the

       interpretation of former RCW 51.08.180, which we review de novo. Id.

              Our analysis must account for RCW 51.12.010, which states that the IIA “shall be

       liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss

       arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment.” Under this statute,

       we must construe the IIA “ ‘in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all

       covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.’ ”

       Bradley v. City of Olympia, 19 Wn. App. 2d 968, 978, 498 P.3d 562 (2021) (quoting Spivey v.

       City of Bellevue, 187 Wn.2d 716, 735, 389 P.3d 504 (2017)).

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                 2.   Applicable Cases

                 The parties focus on three cases involving relationships somewhat similar to the one in

       this case: Dana’s Housekeeping, 76 Wn. App 600; Lyons Enterprises, 185 Wn.2d 721; and

       Cascade Nursing Services, LTD v. Department of Employment Security, 71 Wn. App. 23, 856

       P.2d 421 (1993).

                      a.   Dana’s Housekeeping

                 In Dana’s Housekeeping, Dana’s clients/customers were homeowners. 76 Wn. App. at

       603. Dana’s contracted with housecleaners to clean its customers’ houses, characterizing them

       as independent contractors. Id. at 602. Dana’s assigned housecleaners to specific jobs and made

       all the arrangements for them to clean the houses, including determining the amount charged for

       the service. Id. at 602-03. While housecleaners could decline jobs, Dana’s warned that they

       probably would be terminated if they did so. Id. at 602. Dana’s instructed housecleaners on

       specific cleaning methods and prohibited certain conduct on the job. Id. at 603.

                 Dana’s did not dispute that the housecleaners were working under independent contracts,

       so the court addressed only “the essence of the work and for whom the work is performed.” Id.

       at 607.

                 The court first affirmed the Board’s finding that personal labor was the essence of the

       contract. Id. at 607-08. The court stated, “Dana’s claims the essence of its relationship with the

       housecleaners is ‘an agreement to accept referrals and share a fee’. But the ‘essence’ with which

       the statute is concerned is the essence of the work under the independent contract, not the

       characterization of the parties’ relationship.” Id. at 607. The Board found that housecleaning

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       was personal labor, and the court agreed.2 Id. at 608. The court disregarded the fact that the

       contracts stated that the essence was the solicitation of housecleaning assignments. Id.

              The court then concluded that the personal labor was “for” Dana’s. Id. at 608-09. The

       court stated,

              Dana’s claims the housecleaner’s personal labor was not for Dana’s because the
              homeowner is the recipient of the house cleaning. Dana’s claims the relationship
              involving personal labor is between the housecleaners as sole proprietors and the
              homeowners. Personal labor “for the employer,” however, includes both direct
              labor for Dana’s and labor for Dana’s benefit. If the realities demonstrate the labor
              is for Dana’s benefit, the existence of a third party customer does not place the
              worker outside the scope of industrial insurance coverage.
              ....

              . . . Dana’s received a continuing benefit from its contract with the housecleaners –
              up to 48 percent of the cleaning fee paid by homeowners. Dana’s intensely
              controlled scope, manner, quality, and by whom the work was performed. Dana’s
              accepted the risk of nonpayment. There is evidence in sufficient quantum to
              persuade us that personal labor was performed for Dana’s; the existence of
              homeowners as end recipients of the cleaning service does not change the reality
              that the housecleaner’s labor was for Dana’s benefit.

       Id. at 608-09 (citation omitted).

                       b.   Lyons Enterprises

              In Lyons Enterprises, Lyons was a regional franchisor of a janitorial franchise that

       entered into franchise agreements with franchisees. 185 Wn.2d at 727. Lyons entered into

       cleaning contracts with customers and offered the accounts to its franchisees. Id. On each

       contract, the franchise was required to pay Lyons royalty and management fees. Id. And the

       contract remained Lyons’ property, as did any new contracts the franchisees obtained. Id.

       Franchisees were prohibited from providing commercial cleaning services outside of the

       2
         The court in Dana’s Housekeeping concluded that whether personal labor is the essence of a
       contract is a factual determination, and applied a substantial evidence standard. 76 Wn. App. at
       608. This court rejected this approach in favor of de novo review in B&R Sales, 186 Wn. App.
       at 376.

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       franchise agreement. Id. at 728. Lyons reserved the right to remove a franchisee from a cleaning

       contract for any reason. Id.

              As in Dana’s Housekeeping, Lyons did not dispute that the franchisees were independent

       contractors. Id. at 735. Therefore, the only issue the court addressed was whether the essence of

       the franchise agreements was the franchisees’ personal labor. Id.

              Lyons argued that “the essence of the relationship between itself and its franchisees is the

       bilateral contract between two independent businesses, not the franchisees’ personal labor.” Id.

       at 736. Relying in part on Dana’s Housekeeping, the court refused to base its decision on Lyons’

       characterization. Id. at 738-39. Instead, the court concluded that “the essence of the contracts

       between Lyons and its franchisees is the labor required to clean its customers’ buildings.” Id. at

       739.

              The court then addressed whether the personal labor was “for” Lyons or the customers:

              Lyons nevertheless maintains that the customers receive the personal labor of the
              franchisees. However, as the Dana’s court concluded, labor for an employer can
              include both direct labor and labor for an employer's benefit. Lyons receives 15
              percent of every cleaning contract. Lyons also exercises significant control over
              both the methods utilized by franchisees and the cleaning contracts themselves
              since Lyons retains ownership over every contract. Like Dana’s, the evidence in
              the present case indicates that the relationship remains beneficial to Lyons, and the
              cleaning benefits received by Lyons’ customers are not enough to exclude the
              franchisees from IIA coverage. We therefore find that Lyons’ franchisees are
              “workers” under the IIA.

       Id.

                   c.   Cascade Nursing Service

              In Cascade Nursing Service, the issue was not whether the IIA applied but whether

       Cascade was liable for unemployment tax contributions. 71 Wn. App. at 27-28. Cascade’s

       business involved referring registered nurses to medical facilities. Id. at 26. Cascade

       interviewed prospective nurses and determined whether they had certain qualifications. Id. The

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       nurses that Cascade selected signed contracts with Cascade stating that the nurses were

       independently self-employed. Id. Cascade then submitted a list of nurses to the medical facility,

       who selected a nurse from the list. Id. Cascade did not train or supervise the nurses and

       conducted no performance reviews. Id. at 27. However, Cascade negotiated the nurse’s fee and

       also received a specified hourly rate for each hour that a nurse worked. Id.

               The court noted that an entity is an “employer” and has to pay unemployment taxes if it

       has persons in “employment,” which is defined under RCW 50.04.100 as “personal service”

       performed for wages. Id. at 30. The question the court addressed under RCW 50.04.100 was

       “whether the services performed by the nurses under contract here were clearly for Cascade or

       for its benefit.” Id.

               The Employment Security Department argued that Cascade received benefits from the

       nurses’ services in the form of revenue, promotion of Cascade’s business, and goodwill. Id. at

       33. But the court concluded that this was not the type of benefit that RCW 50.04.100

       contemplated. Id. The court stated that “the services must still be clearly for the employer’s

       benefit,” and stated,

               In this case, the act or acts constituting personal services are the nursing services
               provided by the nurses to the hospitals. Cascade does not benefit from these
               services, but only receives a fee for referring qualified nurses to particular facilities.
               In other words, Cascade is simply a scheduling and billing agent for the nurses. . . .
               In addition to receiving no direct benefit from the services, Cascade has no general
               power to direct or influence the quality of the services performed. For these
               reasons, we conclude that the nurses are not in the employment of Cascade pursuant
               to RCW 50.04.100.

       Id. at 33.

               3.   Challenged Findings of Fact

               DLI assigns error to findings of fact 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. Although DLI asserts that

       substantial evidence does not support a few of the findings, it primarily argues that the findings

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       are immaterial and do not support the conclusion that the pet service providers are not Rover’s

       “workers.” We conclude that substantial evidence supports findings 3, 4 and 7, but we view

       finding 6 as a conclusion of law that must be reviewed de novo. And there is no question that

       finding 8 is a conclusion of law.

              The superior court made the following findings of fact regarding the nature of the

       arrangement among Rover, the pet service providers, and the pet owners:

              3. A Place for Rover, Inc. provides an electronic (Internet) platform through
              which pet owners and pet services providers can interact and come to an
              agreement for services. All services agreements are between pet owner and pet
              services provider. A Place for Rover, Inc. is not involved in setting price, time,
              scope of service, or any other matter relating to the provider’s and owner’s
              agreement.

              4. A Place for Rover, Inc., the pet owners, and the pet services providers enter
              into an agreement before the Rover electronic platform can be used wherein A
              Place for Rover, Inc., the pet owners, and the pet services providers agree A Place
              for Rover, Inc., does not provide pet services, does not employ pet services
              providers, and that the pet services providers are neither employees or
              independent contractors of A Place for Rover, Inc.
              ....

              7. A Place for Rover, Inc., does not provide pet services to pet owners.

       AR at 7. DLI does not seriously contend that substantial evidence does not support these

       findings. The findings accurately reflect the undisputed evidence presented at the IAJ hearing.

              Finding of fact 6 states, “The personal labor provided by the pet services providers was

       for the pet owners, not for A Place for Rover, Inc.” AR at 7. Substantial evidence supports the

       first clause. But we conclude that the second clause may reflect a legal conclusion that personal

       labor performed for the pet owners cannot also be “for” Rover.

              Finding of fact 8 states,

              8. A Place for Rover, Inc., did not owe any industrial insurances taxes for the pet
              services providers for the first through fourth quarters of 2017, nor any penalties

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              or interest for those time periods with regard to pet services provided to pet
              owners by pet services providers.

       AR at 7-8. This “finding” clearly is a conclusion of law.

              Rover focuses on the following statement in the Board’s order: “The essence of the

       contract between Rover and the pet service provider is the use of Rover’s online platform in

       exchange for a fee, not the personal labor of the pet service provider.” AR at 6. Rover argues

       that this statement must be evaluated under the substantial evidence standard. But whether

       personal service is the essence of the contract ultimately is a question of law, not a question of

       fact. See B & R Sales, 186 Wn. App. at 376.

              4.   DLI’s “Exemption” Argument

              DLI’s lead argument is that the Board erred in creating a general exemption under RCW

       51.08.180 for work involving an internet platform. DLI points out that the legislature did create

       an exemption (now reversed) for transportation-service drivers like Uber drivers, but did not

       create an exemption for this type of arrangement.

              But there is no indication in the Board’s decision and order that the Board applied such

       an exemption. Instead, the Board appeared to base its ruling on the specific facts of this case,

       which happens to involve an internet platform. Nor does Rover argue that a general exemption

       should be applied here. We conclude that there is no exemption for internet platform work and

       that the Board did not apply such an exemption.

              5.   Working Under Independent Contract

              As noted above, the first requirement of the definition of “worker” under former RCW

       51.08.180 is that the alleged worker was working under an independent contract. Dana’s

       Housekeeping, 76 Wn. App at 607; see also Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 738. DLI argues that

       the TOS was the independent contract between Rover and the pet service providers. Rover

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       argues that although the TOS was a contract, the pet service providers performed no services for

       Rover under that contract. Instead, the TOS related only to use of the internet platform.

              We acknowledge that this case involves a “grey area” between a person who clearly is a

       worker and a person who clearly is not. However, we conclude under the specific facts of this

       case that the pet service providers were not working under an independent contract with Rover.3

              There is no question that the TOS is a contract between Rover and the pet service

       providers. The TOS expressly states that its terms are a “binding legal agreement.” AR at 1326.

       But former RCW 51.08.180 states that a worker must be “working under an independent

       contract.” (Emphasis added.) The question here is whether the pet service providers were

       performing work for Rover pursuant to the TOS.

              Initially, we agree with DLI that it is immaterial that the TOS stated that it could not be

       construed as making a party the contractor of the other. The Board noted this fact in finding 4.

       RCW 51.04.060 precludes an employer from exempting itself by contract from the burdens of

       the IIA. And the Supreme Court in Lyons Enterprises stated that how the parties characterize a

       contract is not determinative of whether a contractor is a “worker.” 185 Wn.2d at 738-39.

              We also agree with DLI that Rover’s lack of control over the pet service providers’ work

       is immaterial regarding this factor. Rover references the fact that the alleged employer exercised

       control over the work in both Dana’s Housekeeping and Lyons Enterprises. But in both cases

       the existence of an independent contract was conceded. Dana’s Housekeeping, 76 Wn. App. at

       607; Lyons Enter., 185 Wn.2d at 735.

       3
        Because of this conclusion, we do not address the other two requirements of the “worker”
       definition.

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              The parties focus on the definition of “independent contractor” found in Black’s Law

       Dictionary: a person “who is entrusted to undertake a specific project but who is left free to do

       the assigned work and to choose the method for accomplishing it.” BLACK’S LAW DICT. at 920

       (11th ed. 2019). In a different context, the Supreme Court has defined an independent contractor

       as “a person who contracts with another to do something for [them] but who is not controlled by

       the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to [their] physical conduct in the

       performance of the undertaking.” Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wn.2d 114, 119, 52 P.3d

       472 (2002).

              Here, Rover did not contract with the pet service providers to “undertake a specific

       project” or to “do something” for Rover. Rover did not assign particular jobs to pet service

       providers. In fact, there was no requirement that pet service providers do any amount of work.

       Instead, the TOS set forth the terms under which pet service providers could use Rover’s online

       platform to enter into, perform, and get paid for undertaking specific projects and doing

       something for pet owners. The pet service providers were “working under independent

       contracts” not with Rover, but with the pet owners.

              The facts here contrast with the facts in Dana’s Housekeeping and Lyons Enterprises,

       where it was conceded that the alleged workers were independent contractors. In Dana’s

       Housekeeping, Dana’s agreed with its customers to clean their homes and then contracted with

       the housecleaners to perform that work. 76 Wn. App. at 602-03. In Lyons Enterprises, Lyons

       entered into contracts with its customers for janitorial services and then contracted with

       franchisees to perform those services. 185 Wn.2d at 727-28. In both cases, the alleged

       employers were obligated to provide certain services to third parties, and needed to contract with

       the alleged workers to fulfill those obligations by performing specific services.

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              Here, the pet owners were not Rover’s customers and Rover did not agree to perform any

       pet care services for them. Rover had no obligations to the pet owners that it needed the pet

       service providers to fulfill. In other words, Rover did not need to contract with the pet service

       providers to perform any services for the pet owners. Consequently, unlike in Dana’s

       Housekeeping and Lyons Enterprises, the purpose of the TOS was not to assign specific work to

       the pet service providers.

              Instead of constituting a contract for the pet service providers to perform work for Rover,

       the TOS primarily sets forth the requirements for the use of its online platform. The TOS

       initially provides how pet service providers can register to use the platform. The remainder of

       the TOS provisions apply only if a pet service provider actually enters into an agreement with a

       pet owner to perform certain services. At that point, the pet service provider is “working under

       an independent contract” not with Rover, but with the pet owner.

              DLI emphasizes that Rover rejects some pet service providers who apply to post on the

       online platform, conducts background checks that are used to exclude applicants, and can

       remove pet service providers from the platform based on poor performance. But these facts

       show that Rover exercises control over who can use its platform, not control over how the pet

       service providers perform their services.

              We recognize that there are some provisions in the TOS that may suggest that the pet

       service providers are working under an independent contract. For example, Rover would

       become involved if a pet service provider did not show up for a job, tracked pet walkers through

       GPS, and could withhold compensation if the pet service provider performed deficiently. But

       through these provisions, Rover was providing services to the pet owners, who also had

       contracted with Rover through the TOS.

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              We conclude under the specific facts of this case that the pet service providers were not

       “working under an independent contract” with Rover. Therefore, we hold that the Board did not

       err in reversing DLI’s assessment of workers’ compensation taxes.

                                               CONCLUSION

              We affirm the Board’s decision and order.

                                                           MAXA, J.

        We concur:

        CRUSER, A.C.J.

        PRICE, J.

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