Court Opinion

ID: 9744066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:45.625939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.475246
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The immunity granted was transactional and the defendants were properly found to be in contempt of court. The colloquy between the State’s Attorney and the court as to each of these defendants did not refer specifically to section 106 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 106—1). It is not necessary, however, to specifically refer to this section of the statute if a clear reading of the record indicates statutory compliance. As to defendant Goodwin, the State’s Attorney asked for a grant of immunity for “any charge that may arise out of this testimony” except for the charge of perjury. The court indicated in response to the offer by the State that the order would be granted and that the witness Goodwin would be granted immunity on any questions which the State might ask for which criminal prosecution might be brought except for the charge of perjury. After defendant Goodwin proceeded to refuse to testify, the court again admonished him that he had been granted immunity to any possible incrimination that might arise. With respect to defendant Smith, the State’s Attorney indicated that it was immunity from “any charges that could arise from his testimony” except for the offense of perjury. The court, in granting Smith’s order of immunity, specifically noted that it was granting transactional immunity. The court informed the defendant that the State could ask him any questions and if he gave answers, he could not be charged for any criminal violation except for the charge of perjury. The colloquy as to each defendant is sufficient under the statute to grant the defendant’s transactional immunity. People ex rel. Scott v. Walsh (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 831, 412 N.E.2d 208. The majority is correct in stating that a grant of immunity under statutory authority must be in strict compliance with the terms of the statute. (People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 546, 363 N.E.2d 835.) The order in each of these cases granting immunity is broad enough to protect the defendant against all future punishment for any offense which is brought out by the testimony. People v. Walker (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 585, 589-90, 192 N.E.2d 819, 822. While the issue of what constitutes strict compliance with the immunity statute has not been specifically addressed, numerous courts have considered the matter for substantial compliance with Rule 402 for the taking of guilty pleas. (87 Ill. 2d R. 402; see People v. Sutherland (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 415, 470 N.E.2d 1210.) In reviewing alleged compliance with Rule 402, the entire record is to be considered in determining whether or not there was an understanding by the accused of the admonishments. (128 Ill. App. 3d 415, 470 N.E.2d 1210.) Similarly, we must look to the entire record to determine whether the immunity granted to Goodwin and Smith was in compliance with section 106 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 106—1). As with Rule 402, if an ordinary person would have understood the court to be in statutory compliance in granting transactional immunity, the essentials have been fulfilled. The statute requires strict, not literal compliance. In Walsh, the State’s request and the court’s order specifically cited the statutory authority for immunity. (Order granting immunity “as prayed in petition.”) Petitioner requested relief of defendants from all liability to be prosecuted for any charges as enumerated in the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1 et seq.). The reviewing court stated that even though there may have been some ambiguity in the court’s order, the immunity granted was full transactional immunity. Similarly, in the case at hand the record is clear. Although the statutory authority was not cited, the immunity was transactional, complied with the statutory requirements, and was a sufficient basis for finding both defendants in contempt. There was no error.