Court Opinion

ID: 9625317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:36:15.363411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:06.182120
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
*678Before Warner, Chief Justice, and Tooze, Ross-man, Lusk and Perry, Justices.
PERRY, J.
After the rendition of our original opinion the plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing, setting forth his belief that the court erred in the following particulars: (1) in assuming equitable jurisdiction to award legal relief to the defendants; and (2) in ordering restitution of the purchase price paid by the defendants to the plaintiff under the original contract of purchase, the court did not permit the plaintiff his right of offset for the value of the use of the real property by the defendants, and also the court erred in allowing interest from the date upon which the $6,000 was paid to the plaintiff.
In our original opinion we stated:
“It needs no citation of authority that an action for money had and received, which is the right of action held by the defendants against the plaintiff for the recovery of their payment, cannot be set up as a defense to the possessory action of forcible entry and detainer brought by the plaintiff, and ordinarily this court could grant no relief to a defendant upon such an issue between the parties. However, in this case it appears from the record that the parties stipulated for the removal of the cause from the justice court to the circuit court. We do not have that stitpulation before us, but since the trial court considered the matter of placing the parties in statu quo, we may assume that the stipulation for removal was not only for the purpose of determining the right of possession, but also for fully determining the equities between the parties, and for us to remit this cause as presented without full determination would result only in a multiplicity of suits. Therefore, this court feels at liberty in this case to settle and determine this matter between the parties as fully as possible.”
*679It appears from this stipulation (which is now before the court on a motion for diminution of the record) that the stipulation does not provide, as between the parties, that the court should settle and determine all of the equities arising between the parties concerning the title to the real property in issue.
Since our assumption as to the contents of the stipulation was in error, the question is then posed—was this court in error in ordering a restitution of the purchase money?
The plaintiff commenced his action in forcible entry and detainer in the justice court of Malheur county, Nyssa district, alleging the defendants’ forcible withholding of possession of the property. The defendants answered, generally denying the plaintiff’s complaint, and setting up as a further defense that on February 21,1949, the defendants and the plaintiff had “entered into a contract of sale of the lands described in the complaint”, and that the defendants “paid on account thereof the sum of $6,000.00”; that thereafter this original contract of sale was cancelled in consideration of the plaintiff entering into a new contract of sale concerning these lands. In reply, the plaintiff admitted the contract of purchase, admitted the cancellation of the original contract of sale, but denied that the consideration for the cancellation of the contract of sale was the execution of a new contract; and alleged that the sole consideration was the sum of $1, the forgiveness of the defaulted payments, and other valuable consideration in hand paid by Charles E. Share and Cora E. Share to the defendants.
Upon the issues as they were then made up, trial was had before a jury in the justice court which resulted in a hung jury; thereafter by stipulation the matter was removed to the circuit court of the state of *680Oregon for Malheur county, and was tried in that court without a jury.
In the circuit court the defendants filed an amended answer generally denying the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint and asking for affirmative relief; they alleged that the purported cancellation agreement as to the original contract of sale and purchase was solely for the purpose of the plaintiff procuring a mortgage loan upon the real property and not as a full and complete cancellation of the original contract, and that during the period of time necessary to obtain the mortgage loan the defendants would continue in possession of the premises in the guise of tenants, although in fact the relationship of vendor and purchaser still existed between the parties, and that during this period of time in lieu of the payments to be made upon the purchase contract, the defendants would deliver to the plaintiff a share of the crops produced on the land. The defendants further alleged that it was in reliance upon the promise of the plaintiff to continue the original contract of purchase that the cancellation of the original agreement and the lease was executed; and further, as a separate affirmative matter, the defendants alleged that the cancellation agreement and the lease were obtained by fraud in that the plaintiff had no intention of carrying out his agreement to reinstate the contract after the mortgage was obtained at the time of the execution of the release; and his repudiation “results in a fraud on defendants in their loss of the payments made on the said purchase contract”. The defendants requested that all of their rights under the original contract and the amount, if any, still due upon the contract be determined, and that a reasonable time be fixed within which the defendants might make the payments, and for such other relief as was just and equitable in the premises.
*681In reply to the amended answer, the plaintiff admitted the execution of the original contract of purchase as set out and the execution of the claimed cancellation agreement, hut denied that the cancellation agreement was other than a full and complete cancellation agreement, and alleged that defendants were estopped by their execution of the lease agreement to claim that the relationship of vendor and purchaser existed.
The trial court, after hearing the issues, decreed that “the plaintiff is the owner of the lands and premises described * * * and is such owner free and clear of any right, interest, claim or estate of or in the defendants or either of them, and entitled to the immediate- possession thereof. That the plaintiff recover from the defendants, EL EL Williams and Edith Williams, the possession of the said lands and premises last above described, and that a Writ of Eestitution issue therefor; and that neither party shall have costs or disbursements in this cause”.
A search of the record discloses that the plaintiff did not request a jury trial after the conclusion of the equity suit, and no decree was entered by the trial court dismissing the equity proceedings. It is clear that the parties and the trial court treated the matter throughout as a suit in equity, the trial court decreeing the plaintiff to be the owner of the land “free and clear of any right, interest, claim or estate” of the defendants, and awarding neither party costs or disbursements.
No judgment at law was ever entered in this cause. The appeal is solely from a determination of the equitable issues presented.
In the case of Gellert v. Bank of California, National Association, 107 Or 162, 214 P 377, a carefully *682considered opinion by Mr. Justice Harris, this court stated:
“Now, as before the amendment of 1917, a party to secure a review of the decree, must appeal from' it, and to secure a review of the judgment must likewise appeal from it; for an appeal from one will not operate as an appeal from the other, and an appeal from the judgment will not permit a review of the decree.”
And Mr. Justice Lusk, in commenting upon the language of the above case, stated in Pacific General Contractors, Inc., v. Slate Construction Company, 196 Or 608, 618, 251 P2d 454, as follows:
“Of course, there being no decree, there was nothing, so far as concerns the equitable defense, from which the defendant could have appealed. The defendant, however, was not remediless. That it was the duty of the court to . enter a decree in accordance with its decision of the equitable issues, is the manifest implication of the Gellert case and of Friedenthal v. Thompson, 146 Or 640, 646, 647, 31 P2d 643, where it is said:
“ ‘It would appear that, where the defendant asserts an equitable defense and the parties stipulate that the court may hear the whole matter without the intervention of a jury, the court may and should dispose of the entire ease in the equitable proceeding : Crossen v. Campbell, supra. However, where the court finds against the defendant on the equitable defense, a decree may be entered accordingly and the case be allowed to proceed at law.’ ”
As we have stated, the trial court did not follow the procedure of either the Oellert case or the Friedenthal case, cited in the opinion of Mr. Justice Lusk, but, with the acquiescence and consent of the plaintiff, from which no appeal was taken, the trial court decreed “that the contract between plaintiff and defendants of February 21,1949, for the sale of lands and premises hereinafter described, was mutually cancelled on the 23rd *683day of January, 1950”, retained equitable jurisdiction, quieted title to the premises as against the defendants, and, as a court of equity alone may act, awarded costs to neither party.
In the case of Friedenthal v. Thompson, supra, this court held (p. 647):
“If, however, plaintiff in his reply sets up ‘equitable matter’ by alleging facts ‘not inconsistent with the complaint’ then ‘such equitable relief as is proper may be given to either party’: § 6-102, supra. [Oregon Code 1930]. When both plaintiff and defendant seek the aid of equity they thereby confer jurisdiction on the court to dispose of the entire case as in a suit in equity. In such case the court may use all the powers of a court of equity including injunctive relief to maintain or restore the status quo as was done in the instant cause.”
And to the same effect is the case of Crossen v. Campbell, 102 Or 666, 202 P 745.
It is true that in each of the above cases a stipulation was filed by the parties in which they consented to the entire matter being determined by the court. But consent may be given in ways other than by stipulation, and we are of the opinion that the plaintiff consented to a full determination of all of the issues of the equitable and legal title to the premises by acquiescing in a decree that quieted the title as against the claims of the defendants. Likewise, equity, having assumed jurisdiction of the equitable defenses in this proceeding, should proceed to a full adjudication to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Leathers et ux. v. Peterson, 195 Or 62, 244 P2d 619.
ORS 16.460 (formerly §9-102 OCLA), which provides for the interposing of equitable defenses in law actions, reads in part as follows:
“(2) * * * When such an equitable matter is interposed, the proceedings at law shall be *684stayed and the case shall thereafter proceed, until the determination of the issues thus raised, as a suit in equity by which the proceedings at law may be perpetually enjoined or allowed to proceed in accordance with the final decree; or such equitable relief as is proper may be given to either party. If, after determining the equities, as interposed by answer or reply, the case is allowed to proceed at law, the pleadings containing the equitable matter shall be considered withdrawn from the case, and the court shall allow such pleadings in the law action as are provided for in actions of law.”
Under the facts of this case this court was not in error in its adjustment of the equities between the parties.
In our original opinion we directed that a judgment be entered in the trial court in favor of the defendants for the sum of $6,000, with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the execution of the contract, less a reasonable rental of the premises from the date of the execution of the contract to January 23, 1950. We allowed no rentals from that date since it was determined that from January 23,1950, to February 1, 1951, the lease agreement between the parties was operative and that the parties had agreed to crop rentals during the period involved in this litigation, and which we understood had been fully satisfied in accordance with the agreement.
Since the reargument of this cause, we have been given to understand by the parties that the agreement was without prejudice to the rights of the parties to determine the reasonable rental value of the premises.
We are now modifying our previous opinion, and directing that the trial court determine as an offset against the judgment of restitution to the defendants the reasonable rental value of the real property while *685the possession was held by the defendants under the contract of sale, and the period of time from February 1, 1951, until surrender of the possession of the property was made by the defendants, and that the trial court may consider as an offset waste, if any, committed by the defendants while in possession of the real premises.
Except as herein modified, our former opinion is adhered to.