Court Opinion

ID: 9925933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 15:07:02.230157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:50.376680
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2485-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PASCAL EXILUS, a/k/a
PASCEL EXILUS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted December 20, 2023 – Decided January 23, 2024

                   Before Judges Gummer and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hunterdon County, Indictment No. 16-02-
                   0062.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (David Anthony Gies, Designated Counsel,
                   on the briefs).

                   Renee M. Robeson, Hunterdon County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Erin Rose Bolte, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Pascal Exilus appeals from a February 1, 2022 order denying

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing.

Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance

of counsel, we affirm.

      Early in the morning of November 20, 2015, Flemington Borough police

officer Robert Godown observed defendant's car with its hazard lights flashing

parked in the driveway of a store that was closed. When the officer approached

the car, he saw an individual, later identified as co-defendant Bereka Gelin,

urinating outside the car. The officer inquired of Gelin why he had not driven

to the Wawa, which was 1,000 feet away and open, to use its restroom. The

officer then asked defendant, who was seated in the car's driver seat, and Gelin

for identification. Gelin advised that he did not have identification and asked

the officer if he could get into the car because he was cold. Defendant provided

his driver's license and the car's registration information.

      While the officer worked to identify Gelin—who was described as drunk

and agitated—another officer arrived on the scene and proceeded to walk around

the car using his flashlight to peer into the interior cabin. The officer testified

he had observed marijuana "shake" or "shavings," a hollowed-out cigar or the

inside of a cigar on the passenger side floor, and a small, knotted plastic baggie

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on the back seat which was consistent with packaging used for narcotics. Upon

making these observations from outside the car, the officer asked defendant

whether there were any illegal substances or objects in the car and whether he

could conduct a search. Both occupants were ordered to exit the car, and, while

speaking to Officer Godown, defendant gave his consent for a further search of

the car that led to the discovery of suspected CDS inside a black plastic bag, an

empty beer bottle, and another black plastic bag containing $800 in hundred-

dollar bills along with a credit card issued to defendant retrieved from the back

seat of the car, which the officer described as having been altered.

      Moments later, Officer Godown observed the passenger door frame was

separated from the door panel. He moved the door panel and a black bag

containing a loaded handgun fell out. Defendant and Gelin were arrested. The

second officer then checked the driver's side door panel and discovered another

small black bag containing small plastic baggies containing suspected CDS

similar to the one found on the back seat of the car.

      On February 18, 2016, a grand jury returned an indictment charging

defendant and Gelin with the following: second-degree unlawful possession of

a handgun (count one), third-degree possession of cocaine (count two), third-

degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (count three), second-

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degree possession of a weapon while possessing cocaine with intent to distribute

(count four), second-degree conspiracy to possess a handgun (count five), third-

degree conspiracy to possess cocaine (count six), and second-degree conspiracy

to possess a weapon while possessing cocaine with intent to distribute (count

seven).

      Gelin and defendant were tried together. The jury acquitted Gelin of all

charges and found defendant guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a

handgun and third-degree possession of cocaine. Following the jury's verdict,

the court conducted a separate bench trial and found defendant guilty of the

certain persons offense. On these convictions, the court sentenced defendant to

a mandatory extended term of fifteen years in prison with a seven-and-one-half-

year period of parole ineligibility on the weapons offense and a concurrent term

of seven years on the CDS charge.

      We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State

v. Exilus, No. A-4282-16 (App. Div. Mar. 6, 2019). The Supreme Court denied

defendant's petition for certification. State v. Exilus, 239 N.J. 256 (2019).

      On August 12, 2020, defendant timely filed a petition for PCR alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel.     Defendant contended trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request that the court individually question the entire

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jury panel after the court's dismissal of one "tainted" juror who had contacted a

witness via phone following his testimony in the case. Defendant argued that

the court's decision to collectively ask the remaining jurors if they had discussed

the case with anyone was inconsistent with best practices, and the court should

have separately questioned each juror concerning the issue. Defendant also

contended trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to consult with him during

the fifteen-minute recess between his direct testimony and cross-examination

about a matter defendant believed relevant to his defense.           Additionally,

defendant contended trial counsel had erred by failing to pursue a defense based

on the origin of the weapon found in the car: that the gun found in his car was

connected to a homicide for which the perpetrator had been convicted and

counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of that case.

      In a thorough and well-reasoned written opinion, Judge Angela F.

Borkowski rejected defendant's arguments that trial counsel had been

ineffective, specifically addressing each point raised by defendant.1             In

1
   Defendant's PCR petition included additional arguments that we do not
address because they have not been included in this appeal. See generally
Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue
not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.").
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particular, as to defendant's claims that counsel should have developed a defense

based on the origin of the weapon found in his car, the judge concluded that

            possession of the weapon was an element of the
            offense, not ownership. [Defendant] has not provided
            a certification or affidavit from the individual outlining
            what his testimony would have been and that he had
            placed the weapon in the vehicle. [Defendant's]
            argument is based on speculation, not supported by
            fact.

The judge further rejected defendant's argument that trial counsel should have

objected to the judge's decision not to individually void dire remaining jurors

after one juror had been dismissed. On this point, the judge determined that

"even if defense counsel's failure to request that members of the jury be

individually questioned was in error, . . . [defendant] was not prejudiced by that

error, because all the jurors indicated that they had followed the judge's

instructions and had not behaved improperly."

      Applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the judge

rejected defendant's arguments and issued a written opinion denying the petition

without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

      Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration:

            POINT I

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            THE PCR JUDGE’S DECISION NOT TO CONDUCT
            AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS AN ABUSE OF
            DISCRETION.

            POINT II

            THE PCR JUDGE’S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S
            ADJOURNMENT REQUEST RESULTED IN A
            FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. We "conduct a de novo review" of the

court's "factual findings and legal conclusions" where the PCR court has not

conducted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 421; see also State v. Lawrence, 463

N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020). We apply these standards here.

      In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, the Court established a two-part standard,

later adopted under the New Jersey Constitution by our Supreme Court in State

v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), to determine whether a defendant has been

deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. To satisfy the standard's first

prong, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient by

demonstrating counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness" and that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

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functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

      Under the "second, and far more difficult prong," of the Strickland

standard, State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,

129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense[,]" State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). That is, "[t]he defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Gideon, 244

N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting standard."

Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). A defendant

seeking PCR "must affirmatively prove prejudice" to satisfy the second prong

of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must establish both prongs of the Strickland standard. 466 U.S. at 687; State v.

Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013). A failure to satisfy either prong requires the

denial of a PCR petition founded on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. "With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test,

a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden

of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." State

v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted).

                                        I.

      Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the

origin of the gun found in his car in order to present a defense based on third-

party guilt. According to defendant, trial counsel informed him that the handgun

found in his car had been used in a homicide for which another person had been

convicted but did not make any effort to locate or interview the person convicted

of committing the homicide. Defendant asserts that trial counsel's failure to

investigate the origins of the gun "impacted his fundamental right to present a

complete and credible defense."

      Relying on Court's analysis and holding in State v. Hannah, 248 N.J. 148

(2021), defendant contends trial counsel "did not use evidence within his

knowledge at the time in order to present a complete defense of third -party-

guilt." In Hannah, the defendant was convicted of two counts of felony murder

following a trial that largely turned on the testimony of a co-defendant, the

prosecution's key witness, who testified that he and Hannah had shot and killed

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two individuals. Id. at 155. In his PCR petition, Hannah argued that the jury

had not heard the full story as a result of trial counsel's failure to present two

pieces of evidence implicating another person as the killer. Id. at 162-63. The

first piece of evidence, which had been disclosed to trial counsel during

discovery, was a report authored by a lieutenant that contained an account of his

investigation and revealed that another person's pager number was in the victims'

possession at the time of the murder. Ibid. According to the Court, "[b]ecause

the defense did not call the lieutenant as a witness," the jury never heard what

was contained in the lieutenant's report, which Hannah's direct appeal and PCR

counsel both later testified was of "critical importance . . . to advancing the

defense of third-party-guilt." Id. at 182. Additionally, trial counsel also failed

to pursue pre-trial motions to seek the admissibility of testimonial evidence from

another potential key witness:     the mother of the other individual Hannah

identified as the killer. As a result, the jury also did not hear what the Court

deemed "damning testimony" of the mother "inculpating her son in the

murders. . . ." Id. at 183.

      The Court ultimately concluded that Hannah "clearly established" both

prongs under Strickland and that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors,

"combined with those made by the trial court and prosecutor," ultimately

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"deprived Hannah of his constitutional right to present a complete and credible

third-party-guilt defense." Id. at 155, 190.

      "The purpose of a PCR hearing is to provide a procedure to uncover

mistakes that may have caused an unjust result." Id. at 156 (quoting State v.

Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 144-45 (2011)). However, unlike the defendant in Hannah,

defendant does not present any evidence showing what counsel's investigation

into the prior use of the gun found in his car was likely to have revealed, or how

it would have aided his defense. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154,

170 (App. Div. 1999) ("[W]hen a petitioner claims his trial attorney

inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation

would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the

personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification.").

      Based on the record before us, defendant's contention that trial counsel

was ineffective rests on mere conclusory assertions—unsupported by any

evidence. Defendant makes no showing that further investigation into the gun

would have revealed information helpful to his defense. In the absence of such

a showing, defendant cannot sustain his burden under the first prong of the

Strickland standard.

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      Under Strickland's second prong, it is defendant's burden to "show that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J.

11598, 611 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). To establish prejudice,

"[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Here too, defendant argues he was

"deprived [of] meaningful representation" as a result of trial counsel's failure to

investigate the gun found in his car. The State argues the potential prejudicial

effect of revealing to the jury that the gun had previously been used in a

homicide could have led the jury to infer that defendant had been involved in

another, even more serious crime than the one for which he was indicted. A

defendant must "overcome a 'strong presumption' that counsel exercised

'reasonable professional judgment' and 'sound trial strategy' in fulfilling his

responsibilities." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. at 542 (quoting State v. Hess, 207 N.J.

at 147 (internal quotations omitted)).

      Defendant fails to sustain his burden of affirmatively proving prejudice as

required by the second prong of Strickland. Defendant's bare assertions do not

satisfy his burden as he has failed to show by a reasonable probability that if

counsel had further investigated the origins of the gun, he would have been able

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to present a viable defense to the possession charge—and the "result of the

proceeding would have been different."        Id. at 694.   Thus, on this claim,

defendant fails to satisfy either prong of Strickland.

                                        II.

      Defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective by refusing to

communicate with him during a "brief" recess of fifteen minutes following his

direct examination and immediately prior to cross-examination. We are not

persuaded by defendant's argument that counsel acted unreasonably by

instructing him not to talk with anyone about his testimony during that brief

interval, and none of the cases cited by defendant support the argument that

counsel's actions were unreasonable.

      The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Perry v.

Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).        Perry involved a fifteen-minute recess that

occurred between the defendant's direct and cross-examination. Id. at 274. In

that case, the trial judge told the defendant that he could not speak with anyone,

including his lawyer, during the recess. Ibid. The Court observed the potential

for taint in the "truth seeking function" of trial "where a witness, including a

criminal defendant, is permitted to consult with counsel after direct examination

but before cross examination" and held that "[o]nce the defendant places himself

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at the very heart of the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that the

story presented on direct is measured for its accuracy and completeness by

uninfluenced testimony on cross-examination." Id. at 282.

      Here, we consider that defendant relies solely on a certification to support

his allegation that he wanted to discuss "germane information" during the short

break between his direct and cross-examination. He asserts in a conclusory

fashion that the information he wished to convey "may have created reasonable

doubt in the State’s case" yet fails to identify what that information would have

been. Applying Strickland's first prong, we conclude that counsel's decision not

to confer with defendant during the recess was not an error that deprived

defendant of the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. We also conclude

that defendant has failed to sustain his burden under Strickland's second prong

as he has failed to set forth any facts to establish that but for counsel's

deficiencies, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. Thus, on this claim, defendant also fails to satisfy either prong of

Strickland.

                                        III.

      We next address defendant's argument that trial counsel was ineffective

by acquiescing to the judge's method of questioning remaining jurors after it was

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                                        14
determined that one juror had made an improper attempt to contact a witness.

The judge specifically asked the remaining jurors, collectively, rather than

individually, if anyone had been in touch with any witnesses. On this point, the

State argues that counsel was not ineffective by failing to object to the judge's

voir dire of the remaining members of the jury; rather, the State maintains that

"an extensive voir dire of remaining jurors was not necessary" because of the

potential risk that "it likely would have caused harm."            The State further

correctly argues that when the court "learns of potential juror misconduct, the

decision to voir dire remaining jurors individually is left to the court's

discretion." State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 561 (2001). In R.D., the Court rejected

a similar argument, reasoning that the tainted juror had no opportunity to impart

extraneous information to fellow jurors and counseled that review of a court's

"decision to voir dire individually the other members of the jury best rem ains a

matter for the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. at 561.

      After becoming aware that one juror had left a voicemail for an officer

witness in the trial, the judge interviewed and dismissed that juror and consulted

with the State and defense counsel regarding her proposed plan to address the

remaining jurors. At the request of defense counsel, who had expressed concern

that questioning individual jurors might raise suspicions among the remaining

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                                       15
jurors, the judge determined that it would address the jurors collectively. During

colloquy with the remaining jurors, the jurors responded that they had not

engaged in misconduct or inappropriate conversations about the case with

anyone.

      We reject defendant's contention that trial counsel's agreement with the

judge on how to voir dire the remaining juror constitutes ineffective assistance.

Importantly, the decision to voir dire remaining jurors was squarely within the

purview of the judge, and defendant offers no proof that by agreeing with the

judge, counsel's actions amounted to an unprofessional error that prejudiced him

in any way. Again, it is insufficient for defendant to allege prejudice, he must

show "a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. Defendant makes no such showing here and merely theorizes about the

possibilities of alternative trial strategies.

      Against this backdrop, we conclude defendant cannot meet the Strickland

two-prong test as defendant cannot show that counsel "was not functioning as

the 'counsel' guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that

there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's alleged errors, the result

of his trial would have been different. Id. at 687-88.

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                                       IV.

      We also consider defendant's argument that the PCR judge erred by

denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, he argues that his

affidavit set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, he is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing. We disagree. As discussed above, defendant is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing because he failed to establish a prima facie case for

ineffective assistance of counsel on each of his claims. Accordingly, defendant

is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158

(1997); see also R. 3:22-10.

                                       V.

      Lastly, we consider defendant's argument that the PCR judge erred in

denying his request for an adjournment to obtain a certification from trial

counsel explaining why he had not investigated the third-party guilt defense and

had "acquiesced to the trial judge's decision regarding the voir dire." He argues

it was "unreasonable" for the PCR judge to deny the request and that the judge

did not make any factual findings. The State argues defendant "had the benefit

of seventeen months' worth of prior continuances" between the filing of his

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                                       17
petition and oral argument and yet defendant failed to secure a certification from

trial counsel.

      In considering whether the PCR judge mistakenly applied her discretion,

we examine the proceeding in question and the reason defendant sought an

adjournment. State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 537 (2011). We find no abuse of

discretion in the PCR judge's denial of defendant's request to adjourn oral

argument on January 28, 2022. Defendant correctly cites the relevant case law,

which provides that an adjournment request is "left to the sound discretion of

the court, and its denial will not lead to reversal unless it appears from the record

that [] defendant suffered manifest wrong or injury." Hayes, 205 N.J. at 537.

Defendant does not dispute that several adjournments were previously granted

and offers no reasons for the delay in obtaining the certification from counsel.

He also has not demonstrated how trial counsel's certification would have

supported his petition.

      We disagree that the PCR judge's denial was unreasonable or that her

decision lacked a factual basis. The undisputed record shows the judge reached

a decision after having considered the age of defendant's petition, including that

it "ha[d] been adjourned since last year," and that she had already "granted

several adjournments at the request of petitioner wanting to thoroughly review

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all the briefs and documents." Thus, based on this record, defendant has not

established the PCR judge abused her discretion in denying the adjournment

request and makes no showing he suffered a manifest wrong or injury as a result

of that denial.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any of defendant's

remaining arguments, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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