Court Opinion

ID: 9569553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:57.536005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:27.594276
License: Public Domain

*664BOGGS, Chief Judge,
concurring.
While I agree with the outcome and much of the reasoning in the court’s opinion, I do not think that the case is so clearly controlled by Murphy v. Cockrell, which occurred in quite a different context. Therefore, I would not assume that this case must be decided so easily on a mere “rational basis” test, and I would obviate the question of the appropriate test by holding that the statute would pass muster even under strict scrutiny.
Molina argues that his case is distinguishable because he is a state employee challenging the application of a federal act. Molina is correct that Congress’s interests in regulating state employees through the Act is different than its interest in regulating federal employees. Congress’s power over federal employees is derived from its position as employer, as is the power of the state government over state employees. Congress’s power over state employees, however, is derived from the restrictions it places on federal funds. That is, the Hatch Act does not authorize the MSPB to remove state employees who violate the Act, it authorizes the MSPB to withhold federal funds if the underlying state employer does not remove employees who violate the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 1506. Thus, Congress’s power to influence state employment is derived from its Spending Power and not from its position as employer. Alexander v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 165 F.3d 474, 485 (6th Cir.1999).
Molina argues that state employees affected by the federal act have a greater degree of constitutional protection than do federal employees regulated by the federal government or state employees regulated by the state government. Specifically, Molina requests that this court review § 1502(a)(3) under strict scrutiny. In support, Molina cites Broadrick’s dicta that, “[ujnlike ordinary breach-of-the-peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts,” statutes prohibiting political activity on the part of employees are “directed, by [their] terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 616, 93 S.Ct. 2908.
This is a matter of first impression. As the district court noted, previous cases involving state employees have failed to address this distinction and have summarily rejected the state employee’s First Amendment arguments. Molina Crespo v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F.Supp.2d 680, 692 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (collecting cases); see also Palmer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 297 F.2d 450, 453-54 (7th Cir.1962); Brandon v. Southwest Miss. Senior Serv., Inc., 834 F.2d 536, 537 (5th Cir.1987). The matter is further complicated by the fact that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit has recognized a fundamental right to be a candidate for elective office. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (“[T]he Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.”); Zielasko v. Ohio, 873 F.2d 957, 959 (6th Cir.1989) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny review to an age requirement for candidates for judicial office because age is not a suspect classification and running for office is not a fundamental right). Nevertheless, as the district court acknowledged, even if there is no fundamental right to candidacy, § 1502(a)(3) may still infringe on Molina’s First Amendment rights to free speech and free association. Molina Crespo, 486 F.Supp.2d at 692.
Though this case presents the opportunity to address the question of whether we should review the Hatch Act’s application to state employees under strict scrutiny, *665the case’s resolution does not require us to do so. Because the challenged provision of the Hatch Act, § 1502(a)(3), would pass constitutional muster even under strict scrutiny, I would affirm the district court without specifically addressing whether applying strict scrutiny is actually required. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”).
In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, the Act’s restrictions must be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). Molina concedes that the Act’s prohibitions found in § 1502(a)(1) & (2) are “necessary and highly desirable as a matter of public policy in order to ensure the integrity of the political process and to prevent public employees from feeling pressured to work for or contribute money to the political campaigns of their bosses or colleagues.” Appellant’s Br. 13. Molina attacks § 1502(a)(3), the prohibition on running for elective office, on the grounds that “[tjhere are many narrower ways to remove partisan political influence from the administration of federal funds.... ” Appellant’s Br. 25. It is true that under strict scrutiny, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.” Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997)). Unfortunately, Molina does not offer any examples of narrower, but effective, restrictions. Furthermore, Molina’s concessions do not accurately describe the purpose of the Hatch Act. The Act’s application to state employees is not for the benefit of employees (i.e., shielding employees from pressure to contribute to political campaigns). Rather the purpose is to remove “partisan political influence from the administration of federal funds.” Alexander, 165 F.3d at 485; see also Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143, 67 S.Ct. 544 (“The end sought by Congress through the Hatch Act is better public service by requiring those who administer funds for national needs to abstain from active political partisanship.”). In addition to limiting actual influence, the Act also inspires confidence in the government by eliminating the appearance of influence. As the Supreme Court explained in Letter Carriers, “it is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” 413 U.S. at 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that preventing corruption or the appearance thereof is a compelling state interest. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 557, 93 S.Ct. 2880 (“Such decision on our part would no more than confirm the judgment of history, a judgment made by this country over the last century that it is in the best interest of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service, and that the political influence of federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited.”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (“Preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and [sustaining] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government are interests of the highest importance.”) (in*666ternal quotation marks omitted); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”).
The Act’s prohibition on candidacy, § 1502(a)(3), is narrowly tailored to serve this interest. Without commenting on the limits of what Congress may proscribe, I note that the 1974 amendments to the Hatch Act removed many of the constraints formerly placed on state employees administering federal funds. Prior to those amendments, state and local employees were prohibited from “tak[ing] an active part in political management or in political campaigns.” 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (1967, superseded). This included:
(1) Serving as an officer of a political party, a member of a National, State, or local committee of a political party, an officer or member of a committee of a partisan political club, or being a candidate for any of these positions;
(2) Organizing or reorganizing a political party organization or political club;
(3) Directly or indirectly soliciting, receiving, collecting, handling, disbursing, or accounting for assessments, contributions, or other funds for a partisan political purpose;
(4) Organizing, selling tickets to, promoting, or actively participating in a fundraising activity of a partisan candidate, political party, or political club;
(5) Taking an active part in managing the political campaign of a partisan candidate for public office or political party office;
(6) Becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office;
(7) Soliciting votes in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate for public office or political party office;
(8) Acting as recorder, watcher, challenger, or similar officer at the polls on behalf of a political party or a partisan candidate;
(9) Driving voters to the polls on behalf of a political party or partisan candidate;
(10) Endorsing or opposing a partisan candidate for public office or political party office in a political advertisement, a broadcast, campaign literature, or similar material;
(11) Serving as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political party convention;
(12) Addressing a convention, caucus, rally, or similar gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate for public office or political party office; and
(13) Initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition.
5 C.F.R. 151.122(b) (1974, superseded).
Under the current version of the Hatch Act, state and local employees have much greater freedom to participate in political campaigns and to associate publically with candidates and political parties. The Act’s remaining prohibition on candidacy, however, is at the core of the Act’s purpose and cannot be further narrowed without eviscerating the force of the law. The appearance of partisan influence cannot be avoided when administrators of federal funds are allowed to declare themselves publically as partisan candidates. Congress pared the Act’s restrictions on covered state and local employees to a minimum; the challenged restriction is clearly narrowly tailored. Accordingly, I would reject Molina’s First Amendment chai-*667lenge on the grounds that the Act would pass constitutional muster even under strict scrutiny.