Court Opinion

ID: 9431563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:34.710598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:29.047206
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting in No. 87-614, and concurring in part and dissenting in part in No. 87-470.
The Court correctly decides that we have jurisdiction and that the pretrial seizures to which petitioner' in No. 87-470 *71was subjected are unconstitutional. But by refusing to evaluate Indiana’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) and Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity (CRRA) statutes as an interlinked whole, the Court otherwise reaches the wrong result.
It is true that a bare majority of the Court has concluded that delivery of obscene messages to consenting adults may be prosecuted as a crime.1 The Indiana Legislature has *72done far more than that: by injecting obscenity offenses into a statutory scheme designed to curtail an entirely different kind of antisocial conduct, it has not only enhanced criminal penalties, but also authorized wide-ranging civil sanctions against both protected and unprotected speech. In my judgment there is a vast difference between the conclusion that a State may proscribe the distribution of obscene materials and the notion that this legislation can survive constitutional scrutiny.
I
At the outset it is important to identify the limited nature of the “racketeering activity” alleged in No. 87-614. Petitioner is accused of selling to the same willing purchaser three obscene magazines in each of two stores. There is no charge that anyone engaged in any sexual misconduct on petitioner’s premises,2 that his stores displayed or advertised their inventory in an offensive way,3 that children were given access to any of their publications or films,4 or that they foisted any obscene messages upon unwilling recipients.5 There is no claim that petitioner’s bookstores are public nuisances operating in inappropriate places, manners, or times.6
*73In Indiana the sale of an obscene magazine is a misdemeanor.7 A person who commits two such misdemeanors, however, engages in a “pattern of racketeering activity” as defined in the State’s RICO statute.8 If by means of that pattern the person acquires, maintains, or otherwise operates an “enterprise,”9 he or she commits the Indiana felony *74of “corrupt business influence.”10 Thus does Indiana’s RICO Act transform two obscenity misdemeanors into a felony punishable by up to eight years of imprisonment.11
Proof of a RICO violation further exposes a defendant to the civil sanctions prescribed in the CRRA Act, including an order dissolving the enterprise, forfeiting its property to the State, and enjoining the defendant from engaging in the same type of business in the future. Ind. Code §§ 34-4-30.5-2 to 34-4-30.5-4 (1988).12 Thus, even if only a small fraction of *75the activities of the enterprise is unlawful, the State may close the entire business, seize its inventory, and bar its owner from engaging in his or her chosen line of work. .
In its decision upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana RICO/CRRA scheme, the Indiana Supreme Court expressly approved the civil remedies as well as the criminal sanctions, and unequivocally rejected the suggestion that the nature of a business or of its assets should affect a court’s remedial powers. 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N. E. 2d 559 (1987). It categorically stated that if the elements of a pattern of racketeering activity have been proved, all of a bookstore’s expressive materials, obscene or not, are subject to forfeiture.13
*76II
This Court finds no merit in the claim that Indiana’s RICO law is unconstitutionally vague as applied to obscenity predicate offenses. Since Indiana’s obscenity law satisfies the strictures set out in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), the Court reasons, the predicate offense is not too vague; necessarily, a “pattern” of such offenses is even less vague. See ante, at 57-58, and n. 7. This is a non sequitur. Reference to a “pattern” of at least two violations only compounds the intractable vagueness of the obscenity concept itself.14 The Court’s contrary view rests on a construction of the RICO statute that requires nothing more than proof that a defendant sold or exhibited to a willing reader two obscene magazines — or perhaps just two copies of one such magazine. I would find the statute unconstitutional even without the special threat to First Amendment interests posed by the CRRA remedies.15 Instead of reiterating what I have al*77ready written, however, I shall limit this opinion to a discussion of the significance of the civil remedies.
I disagree with the Court’s view that questions relating to the severity of the civil sanctions that may follow a RICO conviction are not ripe for review. See ante, at 60. For the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in 444-7 Corp. v. Goldsmith, supra, makes it perfectly clear that the RICO and CRRA Acts, enacted at the same time and targeting precisely the same subject matter, are parts of a single statutory scheme. It is also obvious that the principal purpose of proving a pattern of racketeering activity is to enable the prosecutor to supplement criminal penalties with unusually severe civil sanctions. The Indiana court’s descriptions of the “overall purpose of the anti-racketeering laws”16 and specifically of “the purpose of the Indiana RICO/CRRA scheme as it pertains to the predicate offense of obscenity”17 confirm what is in any event an obvious reading of this legislation. The significance of making obscenity a predicate offense comparable to murder, kidnaping, extortion, or arson cannot be evaluated fairly if the CRRA portion of the RICO/CRRA scheme is ignored.
Ill
Recurrent in the history of obscenity regulation is an abiding concern about media that have a “tendency to deprave or corrupt” those who view them, “to stir sexual impulses and lead to sexually impure thoughts,” or to “appeal... to prurient interest.” See Alberts v. California (decided with Roth v. United States), 354 U. S. 476, 498-499 (1957) (Harlan, J., *78concurring in result). Antecedents of the statutory scheme under review in these cases plainly reflect this concern. Early Indiana statutes classified as crimes “Against Public Morals” or “Against Chastity and Morality” the distribution not only of “obscene” materials, but also of materials that were “lewd,” “indecent,” or “lascivious” or that described or depicted “criminals, desperadoes, or . . . men or women in lewd and unbecoming positions or improper dress.” Ind. Rev. Stat. §§2107-2109 (1897); Ind. Code Ann. §§2359-2361 (Burns 1914). Prohibited in the same category were profane cursing, advertising drugs for female use, Sunday baseball, and letting stallions in public. Ind. Rev. Stat. §§2110, 2111, 2113, 2117 (1897); Ind. Code Ann. §§2362-2364, 2369, 2373 (Burns 1914). Indiana’s regulation of morals offenses paralleled efforts elsewhere in the United States and in Great Britain. 1 Report, at 240-245. Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 104-105 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (outlining obscenity laws’ history). Quite simply, the longstanding justification for suppressing obscene materials has been to prevent people from having immoral thoughts.18 The failure to do so, it is argued, threatens the moral fabric of our society.19
*79Limiting society’s expression of that concern is the Federal Constitution. The First Amendment presumptively protects communicative materials. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496, 504 (1973). Because the line between protected pornographic speech and obscenity is “dim and uncertain,” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 66 (1963), “a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity,” Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 731 (1961), but must employ careful procedural safeguards to assure that only those materials adjudged obscene are withdrawn from public commerce. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965); see Miller v. California, 413 U. S., at 23-24.20 The Constitution confers a *80right to possess even materials that are legally obscene. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). Moreover, public interest in access to sexually explicit materials remains strong despite continuing efforts to stifle distribution.21
Whatever harm society incurs from the sale of a few obscene magazines to consenting adults is indistinguishable from the harm caused by the distribution of a great volume of pornographic material that is protected by the First Amendment.22 Elimination of a few obscene volumes or videotapes *81from an adult bookstore’s shelves thus scarcely serves the State’s purpose of controlling public morality. But the State’s RICO/CRRA scheme, like the Federal RICO law, 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq., after which it was patterned, 504 N. E. 2d, at 560, furnishes prosecutors with “drastic methods” for curtailing undesired activity.23 The Indiana RICO/ CRRA statutes allow prosecutors to cast wide nets24 and seize, upon a showing that two obscene materials have been sold, or even just exhibited, all of a store’s books, magazines, films, and videotapes — the obscene, those nonobscene yet sexually explicit, and even those devoid of sexual reference.25 *82Reported decisions indicate that the enforcement of Indiana’s RICO/CRRA statutes has been primarily directed at adult bookstores.26 Patently, successful prosecutions would ad*83vanee significantly the State’s efforts to silence immoral speech and repress immoral thoughts.
In my opinion it is fair to identify the effect of Indiana’s RICO/CRRA Acts as the specific purpose of the legislation.27 The most realistic interpretation of the Indiana Legislature’s intent in making obscenity a RICO predicate offense is to expand beyond traditional prosecution of legally obscene materials into restriction of materials that, though constitutionally protected, have the same undesired effect on the community’s morals as those that are actually obscene.28 *84Fulfillment of that intent surely would overflow the boundaries imposed by the Constitution.
The Court properly holds today that when the predicate offenses are obscenity violations, the State may not undertake the pretrial seizures of expressive materials that Indiana’s RICO/CRRA legislation authorizes. See ante, at 66-67. Yet it does so only after excluding from its holding pretrial seizures of “nonexpressive property,” ante, at 67, n. 12, and “assuming] without deciding that bookstores and their contents are forfeitable” and otherwise subject to CRRA’s post-trial civil sanctions. Ante, at 65, and n. 11. I would extend the Court’s holding to prohibit the seizure of these stores’ inventories, even after trial, based on nothing more than a “pattern” of obscenity misdemeanors.
For there is a difference of constitutional dimension between an enterprise that is engaged in the business of selling and exhibiting books, magazines, and videotapes and one that is engaged in another commercial activity, lawful or unlawful. A bookstore receiving revenue from sales of obscene books is not the same as a hardware store or pizza parlor funded by loan-sharking proceeds. The presumptive First Amendment *85protection accorded the former does not apply either to the predicate offense or to the business use in the latter. Seldom will First Amendment protections have any relevance to the sanctions that might be invoked against an ordinary commercial establishment. Nor will use of RICO/CRRA sanctions to rid that type of enterprise of illegal influence, even by closing it, engender suspicion of censorial motive. Prosecutors in such cases desire only to purge the organized-crime taint; they have no interest in deterring the sale of pizzas or hardware. Sexually explicit books and movies, however, are commodities the State does want to exterminate. The RICO/ CRRA scheme promotes such extermination through elimination of the very establishments where sexually explicit speech is disseminated.
Perhaps all, or virtually all, of the protected films and publications that petitioners offer for sale are so objectionable that their sales should only be permitted in secluded areas. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976). Many sexually explicit materials are little more than noxious appendages to a sprawling media industry. It is nevertheless true that a host of citizens desires them, that at best remote and indirect injury to third parties flows from them, and that purchasers have a constitutional right to possess them. The First Amendment thus requires the use of “sensitive tools” to regulate them. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958). Indiana’s RICO/CRRA statutes arm prosecutors not with scalpels to excise obscene portions of an adult bookstore’s inventory but with sickles to mow down the entire undesired use. This the First Amendment will not tolerate. “‘[I]t is better to leave a few . . . noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits,’”29 for the “right to receive information and ideas, *86regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.”30
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision in No. 87-614. In No. 87-470, I would not only invalidate the pretrial seizures but would also direct that the complaint be dismissed.

 Each of the cases the Court cites to demonstrate that this proposition is “well established,” ante, at 54, n. 4, was decided by a 5-to-4 vote. The dissenters in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436 (1957), were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan; in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented. In Splawn v. California, 431 U. S. 595 (1977), and Pinkus v. United States, 436 U. S. 293 (1978), Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens expressed the opinion that criminalv prosecution for obscenity-related offenses violates the First Amendment.
In 1970, moreover, the President’s Commission on Obscenity and Pornography advocated that laws regulating adults’ access to sexually explicit materials be repealed. Report of The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 51-56 (1970). The most recent federal pornography commission disagreed with this conclusion yet acknowledged that scholarly comment generally agrees with the dissenters:
“Numerous people, in both oral and written evidence, have urged upon us the view that the Supreme Court’s approach is a mistaken interpretation of the First Amendment. They have argued that we should conclude that any criminal prosecution based on the distribution to consenting adults of sexually explicit material, no matter how offensive to some, and no matter how hard-core, and no matter how devoid of literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, is impermissible under the First Amendment.
“We have taken these arguments seriously. In light of the facts that the Supreme Court did not in Roth [v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957)] or since unanimously conclude that obscenity is outside of the coverage of the First Amendment, and that its 1973 rulings [Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49; Kaplan v. California, 413 U. S. 115; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123; United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139] were all decided by a scant 5-4 majority on this issue, there is no doubt that the issue was debatable within the Supreme Court, and thus could hardly be without difficulty. Moreover, we recognize that the bulk of scholarly commentary is of the opinion that the Supreme Court’s resolution of and basic approach *72to the First Amendment issues is incorrect.” 1 Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, Final Report 260-261 (July 1986) (hereinafter Report).

 See, e. g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U. S. 697 (1986).

 See Splawn v. California, 431 U. S., at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 236 Va. 168, 372 S. E. 2d 618 (1988), answering questions certified in 484 U. S. 383 (1988).

 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968).

 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975); Miller v. California, 413 U. S., at 18.

 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976).

 The Indiana obscenity law underlying these cases provides that a “person who knowingly or intentionally
“(1) sends or brings into Indiana obscene matter for sale or distribution; or
“(2) offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to another person obscene matter;
“commits a class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-49-3-1 (1988), enacted by 1983 Ind. Acts 311, §33, to replace identically worded §35-30-10.1-2, which had been repealed by 1983 Ind. Acts 311, § 49.
Indiana punishes Class A misdemeanors with fines of up to $5,000 and imprisonment of up to one year. § 35-50-3-2.

 Indiana Code § 35-45-6-1, entitled “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,” provides in part:
“ ‘Pattern of racketeering activity’ means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intent, result, accomplice, victim, or method of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics that are not isolated incidents ....
“ ‘Racketeering activity’ means to commit, to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit... a violation of IC 35-49-3; murder (IC 35-42-1-1); battery as a Class C felony (IC 35-42-2-1); kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2); child exploitation (IC 35-42-4-4); robbery (IC 35-42-5-1); arson (IC 35-43-1-1); burglary (IC 35-43-2-1); theft (IC 35-43-4-2); receiving stolen property (IC 35-43-4-2)_”
This enumeration of predicate offenses inexplicably omits a parenthetical description of Ind. Code § 35-49-3. That latter statute is Indiana’s current obscenity law, which makes it a misdemeanor to disseminate or distribute matter that is obscene or harmful to minors, or to present a performance that is obscene or harmful to minors.

 The term “enterprise” is defined in both the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and the Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity (CRRA) Act to include a sole proprietorship and a corporation. See Ind. Code §§ 35-45-6-1,34-4-30.5-1 (1988). Thus, each of the stores , at which obscenity offenses allegedly occurred is an enterprise within the *74meaning of Indiana RICO. Cf. Alvers v. State, 489 N. E. 2d 83, 89 (Ind. App. 1986) (corporation is an enterprise within the meaning of State RICO Act).

 Indiana Code § 35-45-6-2(a) (1988) provides that a “person
“(1) who has knowingly or intentionally received any proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, and who uses or invests those proceeds or the proceeds derived from them to acquire an interest in real property or to establish or to operate an enterprise;
“(2) who through a pattern of racketeering activity, knowingly or intentionally acquires or maintains, either directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of real property or an enterprise; or
“(3) who is employed by or associated with an enterprise, and who knowingly or intentionally conducts or otherwise participates in the activities of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;
“commits corrupt business influence, a Class C felony.”

 Under Indiana law, a person convicted of a Class C felony such as this is subject to a $10,000 fine and to a term of five years, which may be increased to eight or reduced to two years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (1988).

 Eschewing criminal proceedings, the prosecutor in No. 87-470 brought a civil action alleging a RICO violation and seeking the gamut of relief available under the CRRA Act. App. 7-49. The trial court found probable cause to believe that the Indiana RICO statute had been violated and the bookstore padlocked and its inventory, furnishings, and other contents seized. Petitioner in No. 87-470 appealed on a number of constitutional grounds. Consolidating petitioner’s case with one originating in Indianapolis, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the relevant RICO/CRRA provisions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N. E. 2d 578 (1985).
A few months after this opinion issued, a trial judge granted the motion of petitioners in No. 87-614 to dismiss the two RICO charges against them *75on the ground that Indiana’s RICO statute is unconstitutionally vague. The Indiana Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Indiana Court of Appeals in No. 87-470, sustaining the RICO/CRRA statutes and the actual pretrial seizures. 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N. E. 2d 559 (1987). The Indiana Appellate Court then reversed the dismissal of the RICO counts against petitioners in No. 87-614. State v. Sappenfield, 505 N. E. 2d 504 (1987).

 The Indiana Supreme Court explained:
“We believe the overall purpose of the RICO statute is as applicable to obscenity violations as it is to the other enumerated predicate offenses which have no conceivable First Amendment ramifications. Thus we cannot agree with either appellants or the Court of Appeals that the purpose of the Indiana RICO/CRRA scheme, as it pertains to the predicate offense of obscenity, is to restrain the sale or distribution of expressive materials. It is irrelevant whether assets acquired through racketeering activity are obscene or not. They are subject to forfeiture if the elements of a pattern of racketeering activity are shown. The other CRRA remedies, such as license revocation, are also available regardless of the nature of the racketeering enterprise.” 504 N. E. 2d, at 564.
“[T]he purpose of the forfeiture provisions is totally unrelated to the nature of the assets in question. The overall purpose of the anti-racketeering laws is unequivocal, even where the predicate offense alleged is a violation of the obscenity statute. The remedy of forfeiture is intended not to restrain the future distribution of presumptively protected speech but rather to disgorge assets acquired through racketeering activity. Stated simply, *76it is irrelevant whether assets derived from an alleged violation of the RICO statute are or are not obscene.” Id., at 565.
“In sum, these actions seeking various CRRA remedies were instituted in an attempt to compel the forfeiture of the proceeds of alleged racketeering activity and not to restrain the future distribution of expressive materials. We hold that the RICO/CRRA statutes as they pertain to the predicate offense of obscenity do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id., at 565-566.

 See, e. g., Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 85 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
Ironically, the legal test for determining the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity has been likened to “Justice Stewart’s famous test for obscenity — T know it when I see it’ — set forth in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197 [(1964)].” Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F. 2d 970, 977 (CA7 1986) (citing Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1410 (ND Ill. 1986)).

 long has been “my conviction that government may not constitutionally criminalize mere possession or sale, of obscene literature, absent some connection to minors or obtrusive display to unconsenting adults.” Pope v. Illinois, 481 U. S. 497, 513 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See *77Smith v. United States, 431 U. S. 291, 311, 315-316 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Ward v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 767, 777-782 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Splawn v. California, 431 U. S., at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marks v. United States, 430 U. S., at 198 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Cf. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U. S., at 305 (Stevens, J., concurring) (in the absence of Court’s precedents, would not sustain federal obscenity law).

 504 N. E. 2d, at 565.

 Id., at 564.

 As Professor Henkin explained, American obscenity laws are “rooted in this countiy’s religious antecedents, of governmental responsibility for communal and individual ‘decency’ and ‘morality.’ ” Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391 (1963). He continued:
“Communities believe, and act on the belief, that obscenity is immoral, is wrong for the individual, and has no place in a decent society. They believe, too, that adults as well as children are corruptible in morals and character, and that obscenity is a source of corruption that should be eliminated. Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection of others. Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the community and for the salvation and welfare of the ‘consumer.’ Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is sin.’’ Id., at 395.

 In proposing the addition of state and federal obscenity violations as predicate offenses under Federal RICO, 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., Senator Helms stated:
*79“[W]e are experiencing an explosion in the volume and availability of pornography in our society. Today it is almost impossible to open mail, turn on the television, or walk in the downtown areas of our cities, or even in some suburban areas, without being accosted by pornographic materials. The sheer volume and pervasiveness of pornography in our society tends to make adults less sensitive to the traditional value of chaste conduct and leads children to abandon the moral values their parents have tried so hard to instill in them.
“. . . Surely it is not just coincidental [sic] that, as [sic] a time in our history when pornography and obscene materials are rampant, we are also experiencing record levels of promiscuity, veneral [sic] disease, herpes, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), abortion, divorce, family breakdown, and related problems. At a minimum, pornography lowers the general moral tone of society and contributes to social problems that were minimal or nonexistent in earlier periods of our history.” 180 Cong. Rec. 844 (1984). The amendment was enacted in the Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2143, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1961(1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).

 “To the extent, therefore, that regulation of pornography constitutes an abridgment of the freedom of speech, or an abridgment of the freedom of the press, it is at least presumptively unconstitutional. And even if some or all forms of regulation of pornography are seen ultimately not to constitute abridgments of the freedom of speech or the freedom of the press, the fact remains that the Constitution treats speaking and printing as special, and thus the regulation of anything spoken or printed must be *80examined with extraordinary care. For even when some forms of regulation of what is spoken or printed are not abridgments of the freedom of speech, or abridgments of the freedom of the press, such regulations are closer to constituting abridgments than other forms of governmental action. If nothing else, the barriers between permissible restrictions on what is said or printed and unconstitutional abridgments must be scrupulously guarded.” 1 Report, at 249-250.

 The videotape dealers’ association, for example, reports that in the “three-quarters of the nation’s video stores carry[ing] adult titles,” that material, often to be viewed by private individuals on their own video cassette recorders, “accounts for about 13% of their business, valued at $250 million annually.” Groskaufmanis, What Films We May Watch: Videotape Distribution and the First Amendment, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1263, 1273, n. 75 (1988).
The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography quotes Geoffrey R. Stone, now dean of the University of Chicago Law School, as follows: “ ‘[T]he very fact. . . that there is a vast market in our society for sexually explicit expression suggests that for many people, this type of speech serves what they believe to be, it may be amusement, it m[a]y be containment, it may be sexual stimulation, it may be fantasy, whatever it is, many of us believe that this expression is to our own lives, in some way, valuable. That value should not be overlooked.’” 2 Report, at 1269. See also Marks v. United States, 430 U. S., at 198 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“However distasteful these materials are to some of us, they are nevertheless a form of communication and entertainment acceptable to a substantial segment of society; otherwise, they would have no value in the marketplace”).

 The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography highlighted this fact as follows:
“A central part of our mission has been to examine the question whether pornography is harmful. In attempting to answer this question, we have *81made a conscious decision not to allow our examination of the harm question to be constricted by the existing legal/constitutional definition of the legally obscene.” 1 Report, at 299.
“As a result, our inquiry into harm encompasses much material that may not be legally obscene, and also encompasses much material that would not generally be considered ‘pornographic’ as we use that term here.” Id., at 302.
“To a number of us, the most important harms must be seen in moral terms, and the act of moral condemnation of that which is immoral is not merely important but essential. From this perspective there are acts that need be seen not only as causes of immorality but as manifestations of it. Issues of human dignity and human decency, no less real for their lack of scientific measurability, are for many of us central to thinking about the question of harm. And when we think about harm in this way, there are acts that must be condemned not because the evils of the world will thereby be eliminated, but because conscience demands it.” Id., at 303.

 Drastic methods to combat [organized crime] are essential, and we must develop law enforcement measures at least as efficient as those of organized crime.” i 116 Cong. Rec. 35199 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). See also Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 26-29 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 586-593 (1981).

 Cf. United States v. Elliott, 571 F. 2d 880, 903 (CA5) (“[T]he [Federal] RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish”), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 953 (1978).

 The Court of Appeals of Indiana made this observation, 479 N. E. 2d, at 601:
“[T]he state concedes that the obscenity of the seized inventories of books, magazines, and films is irrelevant and need not even be alleged. This ar*82gument reflects an accurate reading of the statutes but also reveals the deeply-flawed nature of the regulatory scheme as a response to obscenity. May avant-garde booksellers and theaters be padlocked and forfeited to the state upon a showing that alongside literary, political, and cinematic classics, they have twice disseminated controversial works subsequently adjudged to be obscene? . . . [T]he guarantees of the First Amendment mean nothing if the state may arrogate such discretion over the continued existence of bookstores and theaters.”
The State Supreme Court did not deny that the RICO/CRRA Acts permitted that result, but rather professed faith that prosecutors would not abuse the power given them under the statutes. 504 N. E. 2d, at 565, rev’g 479 N. E. 2d 578 (Ind. App. 1985).
Even the suppression only of sex-oriented materials on the borderline between protected and unprotected speech might remove a vast number of materials from circulation. See Dietz & Sears, Pornography and Obscenity Sold in “Adult Bookstores”: A Survey of 5132 Books, Magazines, and Films in Four American Cities, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 7, 42 (1987-1988) (36% of materials in adult bookstores surveyed would be obscene “in the eyes of a juror with sexually liberal attitudes and values,” while 100% would be obscene “in the eyes of those with sexually traditional attitudes and values”).

 In five of the eight reported opinions reviewing prosecutions pursuant to Indiana’s RICO/CRRA statutes, the predicate offenses are obscenity violations. Sappenfield v. Indiana, 574 F. Supp. 1034 (ND Ind. 1983) (dismissing for lack of standing suit by petitioner in No. 87-614 seeking to prevent prosecutor in LaPorte County from adding civil sanctions to criminal RICO prosecution already under way there); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N. E. 2d 559 (Ind. 1987) (case below), rev’g 479 N. E. 2d 578 (Ind. App. 1985) (Allen and Marion Counties); Studio Art Theatre of Evansville, Inc. v. State, 530 N. E. 2d 750 (Ind. App. 1988) (upholding RICO convictions in Vanderburgh County, based on alleged sale of movies harmful to minors); State v. Sappenfield, 505 N. E. 2d 504 (Ind. App. 1987) (Howard County). See also J. N. S., Inc. v. Indiana, 712 F. 2d 303 (CA7 1983) (dismissing for lack of standing Indianapolis distributors’ suit challenging constitutionality of CRRA).
The first Federal RICO prosecution based on obscenity violations occurred in United States v. Pryba, Crim. No. 87-00208-A (ED Va., Nov. 10, 1987). After the District Court had rejected constitutional challenges *83to the inclusion of obscenity offenses in the Federal RICO statute, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (ED Va. 1987), a jury found defendants “ ‘guilty of interstate distribution of $105.30 worth of obscene material and decided that Dennis Pryba’s three Washington, D. C., area hardcore bookstores and eight videotape clubs [valued at $1 million] were forfeitable under the terms of the RICO statute.’ ” Eggenberger, RICO vs. Dealers in Obscene Matter: The First Amendment Battle, 22 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 71 (1988) (quoting Hayes, A Jury Wrestles with Pornography, American Lawyer 96, 97 (Mar. 1988)).

 “Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of governmental action which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 708 (1931) (“[I]n passing upon constitutional questions . . . , the statute must be tested by its operation and effect”).

 Indiana is far from the only governmental entity to have moved against undesirable, sexually explicit materials in this manner. Of 26 States besides Indiana that have passed laws patterned after the Federal RICO statute, 14 include violations of obscenity laws as predicate offenses upon which a RICO-type prosecution may be based. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2301(D)(4)(u) (Supp. 1988-1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-103(5)(b)(VI) (1986); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 1502(9)(a), (9)(b)(7) (1987); Fla. Stat. § 895.02(l)(a)(27) (1987); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-14-3(3) (A)(xii) (1988); Idaho Code § 18-7803(8) (Supp. 1988); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:41-l(e) (West Supp. 1988-1989); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-3(c)(2) (1987); N. D. Cent. Code § 12.1-06.1-01(2)(e)(17) (Supp. 1987); Ohio Rev. Code *84Ann. §§2923.31(I)(1), (I)(2) (1987); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 1402(10)(v) (Supp. 1988); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.715(6)(a)(T), (6)(b) (1987); Utah Code Ann. § 76 — 10—1602(4)(fff)-(iii), (zzz) (Supp. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code §9A.82.010 (14)(s) (Supp. 1988).
The trend toward using RICO statutes to enforce obscenity laws comports with the urgings of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography. 1 Report, at 435 (Recommendation “10. STATE LEGISLATURES SHOULD ENACT A RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO) STATUTE WHICH HAS OBSCENITY AS A PREDICATE ACT”); id., at 437 (Recommendation “15. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS SHOULD USE THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT (RICO) AS A MEANS OF PROSECUTING MAJOR PRODUCERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF OBSCENE MATERIAL”); id., at 464, 498, 515. Cf. id., at 433, 465, 472, 497 (recommending that Federal and State Governments enact statutes authorizing forfeitures even if two predicate offenses cannot be proved, barring a RICO prosecution).

 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S., at 718 (Hughes, C. J.) (quoting 4 Writings of James Madison 544 (1865)).

 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969) (citation omitted).