Court Opinion

ID: 9725459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:48:37.575546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:15.407083
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREEN, dissenting: The theory of the majority is innovative and may well produce fairness in this particular case, but it is not supported by common law or statutory precedent and could cause injustice in many instances. The problem is that the common law rule of virtual representation applies to litigation and resulting judgments and not to agreements to settle disputes. One person can give virtual representation to another in a lawsuit when they have a common interest in reaching the same result. This does not happen when a person who would represent another settles for a consideration given to the one who settles purportedly for both of them. Here, if Charles and his children were at odds, allowing Charles to settle for consideration to him and promise, on behalf of his children, that the children would not contest the will would be grossly unfair. Likely, here, the consideration that Charles received from his promise enhanced his estate, and Charles’ children will eventually indirectly benefit from it. However, that would not always happen. Section 16.1 of the Trustees Act gives some authority for including the right of one person to settle the rights of another under special circumstances and does apply the rule of virtual representation to the situation there. However, section 16.1 concerns trusts and their beneficiaries and has no direct application to the instant situation. If the common law doctrine of virtual representation is as expansive as the majority makes it, no reason would exist to have a section 16.1.