Court Opinion

ID: 9884997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:27:20.402835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.209448
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Chief Judge,
concurring in result.
While I agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that summary judgment was improper and should be reversed, I reach that conclusion by a different path. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in result.
I do not find it “axiomatic” that “before the time limits to respond to a motion for summary judgment can be altered, a motion for summary judgment must be filed.” Maj. Op., p. 1160. I believe that case management for trial courts facing significant case loads is an imprecise art and that, notwithstanding the best efforts of trial court judges and counsel and parties, last minute matters arise on the eve of trial that must be approached pragmatically if the trial rules’ goal of the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action” is to be attained.
Here, the trial court was faced with a difficult decision. Thirty-five days before trial, the defendant states that he believes he has discovered the basis for a motion for summary judgment that, if granted, will obviate the necessity for a trial. If the time limits set forth in T.R. 56(C) are followed, however, the matter cannot be set for hearing before the trial date. Thus, unless the time periods set forth in the rule are to be altered, it makes no sense for the defendant to go to the time and expense of filing the motion. Thus, the trial court had three options: alter the T.R. 56 time limits; deny the motion to alter the time limits and proceed to conduct the trial as scheduled; or continue the trial to allow for the filing of a summary judgment motion and conducting the proceedings thereon in accordance with the T.R. 56 time limits.
None of the options available to the trial court was without its detriments. Granting the motion to shorten the T.R. 56 time limits put an additional burden on the plaintiff and on the court on the eve of trial. Denying the motion to shorten time limits and proceeding to trial runs the risk that the time and expense of the trial to the parties, their counsel, the jury and the court might be wasted if the matter turns upon an unresolved question of law. Finally, continuing the trial of necessity leads to delay and its attendant expense if the motion for summary judgment is not granted.
Given the difficulties posed by each of the options confronting the trial court in this proceeding, I cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in shortening the time limits for the T.R. 56 proceedings. Indeed, it may have been the least of the three evils. Here, the burden imposed on *1162the court and the plaintiff was minimal, and the benefits if the motion were well-taken were significant — the parties, their counsel, the court and the jury would have avoided the costs of a jury trial.
I do not think that trial courts should in all cases be denied the discretion to shorten the time limits prior to the actual filing of the motion. The preparation and filing of a motion for summary judgment, supporting memoranda and other documents can involve significant time and expense. Where, as here, the motion would be mooted by a trial if the time limits were not shortened, is it not the best practice to determine the applicable time limits before incurring the expense of filing a motion that will be meaningless if the time limits are not shortened? The discretion of our trial courts should not be limited by the bright-line rule set forth by the majority.
Here, while I think that the trial court was within its discretion to shorten the T.R. 56 time limits, I think the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because it impermissi-bly shifted the burden of coming forward with evidence to the plaintiff contrary to the directions of our Supreme Court in Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind.1994). Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by my colleagues.