Court Opinion

ID: 9545432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:12:15.913474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:46.041411
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting: I do not view K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 60-1610(b)(2) as constitutionally impermissible. In the vast majority of factual situations the parental preference doctrine is appropriate and should control. The statute in question merely provides a trial judge a discretionary alternative when certain conditions precedent are found to exist. Simply put: (1) When the trial court has acquired ongoing jurisdiction of a minor child through a divorce, annulment or separate maintenance action; and (2) when the parent receiving custody consents to another person having physical custody of the child; and (3) when a parental relationship has been established between the child and the third person — then and then only may the third person move for custody of the child in the original domestic relations action. In determining the motion the statute mandates that the court consider “all relevant factors, including but not limited to the following: (A) The length of time that any such child has been under the actual care and control of any person other than a parent and the circumstances relating thereto; (B) the desires of the child’s parents as to custody; (C) the desires of the child as to the child’s custodian; (D) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; (E) the child’s adjustment to such child’s home, school, and community; and (F) *155the mental and physical health and age of all individuals involved.”
Unlike a juvenile court proceeding, the State is not attempting to take custody of a child. The proceeding authorized by K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 60-1610 is, of necessity, only one chapter in an ongoing domestic relations action. By virtue of its specialized conditions, relatively few custody changes could arise from it. However, it is a valuable addition to a trial judge’s meager alternatives in child custody disputes.
Nowhere in the majority opinion is there any reference to a child’s rights. Does the majority believe that only a parent has any rights? If the parent granted custody of a child sees fit to place that child with another person under such circumstances that a new family unit is created, does the child have no rights at all in the continuance of the new family unit? Does the majority consider the child as only a chattel belonging to the parents, to be lent and returned upon demand?
As a former district court judge I can certainly recall instances where this statute would have been highly desirable. The parent having custody may leave a child with relatives for many years, then suddenly want it back in a fit of guilt or due to changed circumstances. The relatives may well be the only home the child has known and a strong family unit has been created. The trial court should have the discretion to preserve the family unit as it now exists — whether such discretion should be exercised is dependent upon all relevant factors and is subject to judicial review.
I believe K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 60-1610(b)(2) does not fail the requisite test as enunciated by the majority in Syl. ¶ 1 as follows:
“The test as to whether a statute comports with the due process clause is whether the legislative means selected has a real and substantial relation to the objective sought, or whether the regulation is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interest of the community.”
I would affirm.