Court Opinion

ID: 9666877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:29:17.426108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:33.309860
License: Public Domain

OSBORN, Chief Justice,
concurring.
In a case of first impression in this state, this Court is required to decide what conduct upon the part of a trial judge might result in that judge’s impartiality being reasonably questioned. In this case, the issue is limited to a question arising from the solicitation and receipt of a campaign contribution. The issue is further narrowed by the fact that the contribution in this ease was solicited by the judge personally and the amount received was small. The contribution did not come from an attorney of record but from an attorney who may be considered to have something other than a financial interest in the case and whose affidavit was filed in support of the motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted some two months after the contribution was made.
The case raises the following issues:
(a) Is the amount of the contribution a controlling issue?
(b) Is the time between the receipt of a contribution and a court ruling a controlling issue?
(c) Is the determination that the contribution was not made by an attorney of record a controlling issue?
(d) Is the determination that the contribution was solicited by the judge personally a controlling issue?

Standard of Review

In 1984, the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Logan, 236 Kan. 79, 689 P.2d 778 (1984) considered the question of disqualification under a Canon which provided that “a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Logan, 689 P.2d at 784. The Court said it was required to determine whether “a reasonable person on the street” — not the judge, the litigant or his attorney — would question the judge’s impartiality. Id. The Court went on to find no appearance of partiality, but it concluded that even if there was a basis for holding that a recusal was required, the appellate court shouid apply a harm test and determine if there had been a showing of bias or prejudice before deciding that there was reversible error.
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Collins v. Windsor, 505 So.2d 1205 (Ala.1987) in construing the same Canon as the Kansas Court said:
Under the Canon 3C(1) recusal test adopted by this Court, a judge should disqualify himself if a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find that there is a reasonable bias for questioning the judge’s impartiality.
Collins, 505 So.2d at 1208.
We conclude that it is as the Kansas Court said the “reasonable person on the street” test which must be used. After all the impartial standard has been adopted in order that the public, i.e., the person on the street, might have confidence in the judiciary and to protect judges from unjustified complaints about their being partial in their *805decision. But, that “reasonable” person must be aware of the “facts of life” which surround the judiciary. In states which elect judges, the “reasonable” person must know that judges have to stand for election on a regular basis, that elections cost money and that in metropolitan areas and in state-wide races those races are very expensive for an effective campaign. Stuart Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 Stan.L.Rev. 449, 452-55 (1988). That “reasonable” person must also know that in judicial races most contributions are made by practicing attorneys. Mark Andrew Grannis, Safeguarding the Litigant’s Constitutional Right for Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 382, 408 (1987). We might even expect the “reasonable” person to have some knowledge as to the motives for contributing to a judicial campaign. 40 Stan.L.Rev. at 478-90.

Amount of a Contribution

The Courts in Florida dealt with the question of whether a contribution of $500 was sufficient to establish a disqualification of a trial judge where the contribution was made not to the judge but to the judge’s spouse who was involved in a judicial campaign. The Court of Appeals in a 5 to 4 decision ruled that the trial judge was disqualified. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So.2d 1164 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989).5 The Florida Supreme Court, on the issue of the amount, reversed with three concurring opinions. MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1990). The Court reached that result in part based upon Florida’s statutory limitation on campaign contributions which permitted contributions to a candidate for a circuit judge (for which the trial judge’s husband was a candidate) of $1,000. Currently, Texas has no such statute and much has been made, and rightly so, of one contributor giving $200,000 to a candidate for the Texas Supreme Court. 40 Stan.L.Rev. at 460. I have no problem in concluding that in a county with a population of over 500,000, a self-imposed restriction of $100 per contributor is most reasonable and should never result in a determination that the judge’s impartiality could be reasonably questioned. I would reach the same results as the Florida Supreme Court if the contribution was $500. I do not believe the “reasonable person on the street” would conclude that receipt of a $100 contribution or even a $500 contribution, with today’s standards and cost of campaigns, would result in a trial judge being biased or prejudiced.
To go further is surely dicta, but should there be a bright-line-test; where do you draw the line? Clearly, there should be a limit and the line should be drawn by the legislature.6 Until limits are established, cases must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this case, I conclude that the amount of the contribution was not grounds for sustaining the Motion to Re-cuse.

Time of Ruling

In this case, the time between the giving of the contribution and the ruling on the motion causes greater concern than the amount of the contribution. Courts must take note of timing considerations if they are to reach an accurate conclusion about contributions which are in other respects questionable. 86 Mich.L.Rev. at 404. Although the record does not reflect these facts, it seems unlikely that the trial judge knew in December when the contribution was solicited and received that the Motion for Summary Judgment either was or would be set for hearing within about-two months. But, he did know from prior hear*806ings that the case was pending and rulings would be required at some future date. We have no bright-line-test which says a judge may be disqualified from ruling on a motion the day after receiving a contribution from one interested in a particular case but will not be disqualified a week, or a month or a year later. Knowing no standard by which to review this issue, I arbitrarily conclude that in this case the time of the ruling was not such as to require this Court to hold that the trial judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned and was not grounds for sustaining the Motion for Recusal.

Contribution by One Not Attorney of Record

Again there is no bright-line authority that provides for sustaining a motion for recusal depending on whether the contribution is made by a litigant, an attorney of record or a person having an interest in the case. In the interest of protecting both the public and the members of the judiciary, it would appear that any rule with regard to contributions and recusal because the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned should apply equally to litigants, their attorneys and others with an interest in the litigation. I would find no basis for a recusal in this case even if the contribution came from the attorney of record.

Solicitation by the Trial Judge

Texas has not adopted Canon 5 C(2) of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct. That provision of the Model Code provides that a candidate for a judicial office shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions. Under the Model Code, only established committees of responsible persons may solicit and accept reasonable campaign contributions. Until such time as the Model Code provision is adopted, Texas judges may continue to solicit campaign contributions.7
While prior to the February 10, 1988 amendment to Canon 5 B(2), Texas judges may have been prohibited from soliciting funds for any political organization, including their own, that restriction was removed long before the solicitation in this case in December 1989. Thus, there was no violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct in the solicitation made by the trial judge in this case. If this Court is to conclude that a trial judge who has personally solicited campaign contributions, with a self-imposed limitation of $100 per contributor, is disqualified when that contributor appears in court, then many trial and appellate judges may soon be faced with valid recu-sal motions.

Conclusion

I conclude that the trial judge was not disqualified to hear the Motion for Summary Judgment, that there has been no showing of bias or prejudice and that the solicitation and receipt of a $100 contribution as a matter of law does not result in the trial judge’s impartiality reasonably being questioned.8
*807I concur both as to the determination of the recusal question and as to the harm analysis which reflects no reversible error regardless of the determination of the recu-sal question.

. The majority opinion notes in footnote 10 that the size and nature of contributions permitted under the Texas standard has been the subject of much criticism.

. For a recommendation as to voluntary limitations on contributions to candidates for particular state-wide and local judicial offices, see Darrell Jordan, Financing Judicial Campaigns: A Crisis in Public Confidence, 52 Tex. B.J. 1248 (1989). His suggestion was a cap of §3,000 for most district court elections.

. This conduct seems to have been encouraged when the Texas Supreme Court in February 1988 amended Canon 5 B(2) to remove the provision that a judge should not solicit funds for any "political” organization. 51 Tex.B.J. 396 (1988). Prior to that amendment, the Judicial Ethics Committee in Opinion Number 10, had noted that Canon 5 B(2) manifests the clear prohibition that "[a] judge should not solicit funds_” Texas Judicial Service Handbook p. 140 (1990). All doubt was removed when Canon 5C(1) was amended in December 1989 to provide that the limitation on financial and business dealings “does not prohibit either a judge or candidate from soliciting funds for appropriate campaign or officeholder expenses as permitted by law.” 53 Tex.B.J. 240-41 (1990).

. The record in this case, as noted in Justice Larsen’s footnote, shows the folly of amending the rules to provide that the clerk of the court shall prepare the transcript to include the live pleadings upon which the trial was held. Tex. R.App.P. 51. While the attorneys may designate parts of the record to be included in the transcript, most do not and there is no penalty for failure to do so. How is a deputy clerk with no legal training supposed to decide what are the “live pleadings” particularly in multiple party cases where there are cross-actions, answers, pleadings for indemnity and other relief? Why do we place that responsibility upon a deputy clerk with no legal training, rather than the attorneys with that training who are charging clients substantial rates for the appeal? Had the attorneys in this case designated only the last *807pleadings and motions which superseded all others, the cost of appeal would have been substantially reduced and the time to review the record to locate only the “live pleadings” would have been greatly reduced. Perhaps requiring an appellant to designate the exact instruments ■ to place in the transcript is too much to ask of professionals. See Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Stodghill, 570 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1978), reversed, 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.1979).