Court Opinion

ID: 9762260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:17:58.999863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:32.439910
License: Public Domain

Shea, J.
(concurring). I concur without reservation in the disposition of the plaintiff’s appeal in which the majority opinion finds no error.
Although I agree with the result, I disagree with the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement adopted by the majority in deciding the defendants’ cross appeal, in which the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust the grievance procedure established by the bargaining agreement is claimed to bar any of the relief sought in this action. The agreement defined “[gjrievance” to mean “a claim by a teacher . . . that there has been a violation, *105misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of this Agreement or of the rules, regulations, administrative directives or policies of the Board of Education.” A four step procedure for processing such grievances is prescribed, culminating in a decision of an arbitrator which “shall be advisory.” Neither in brief nor in argument before us has the plaintiff contended that her dispute with the defendants was not a grievance within the terms of the bargaining agreement. She maintains only (1) that the jury to whom the special defense of failure to exhaust the contractual remedy was submitted settled the issue by their verdict and (2) that, where the decision of the arbitrator is merely advisory, the failure to follow that avenue does not bar her action.
At variance with the claims of the parties, the majority opinion adopts a construction of the agreement that the plaintiff’s dispute, which involved her transfer to another school, was not subject to the grievance procedure. Reliance is placed upon a clause in the preamble which reserves to the board of education the full right to operate the schools, including the authority “to employ, assign and transfer teachers,” and which excepts from the grievance procedure any action of the board exercising such right, “other than as there are specific provisions herein elsewhere contained . . . .” The opinion points then to a provision that changes in teacher assignments within a building unit made by the supervisory principal are “subject to appeal through the grievance procedure . . . .” There is no other reference in the entire agreement to the availability of the grievance procedure for a particular subject matter. The majority relies upon the failure to mention the grievance procedure in the article of *106the agreement dealing with transfer of teachers from one school to another by the superintendent of schools, the subject of the present controversy, as signifying its unavailability for such purpose, but the same logic would mean that any dispute concerning the many other matters covered by the agreement, such as compensation, sickness benefits, sabbatical leave, working conditions, and promotions, would also be exempt from the grievance procedure established. Under the majority view, the sole area in which this procedure would apply is the change in the assignments of a teacher within a single school made by the principal. This unusual result ought not to be imposed upon the parties contrary to their intentions, as indicated by the absence of any suggestion of such an interpretation before now, unless it is mandated by the language used in the agreement.
My reading of the agreement is that the preamble clause reserving to the board of education its statutory prerogative of full authority for the operation of the schools and excepting the exercise of this power from the grievance procedure “other than as there are specific provisions herein elsewhere contained” does not narrow the definition of grievance in the agreement but seems merely to stress that only those disputes falling within that definition are subject to that procedure. A preamble cannot be given the effect of overriding an operative provision of a document.
It cannot be questioned that the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendants fits the definition of a grievance as “a claim by a teacher ... that there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of this Agree*107ment or of the rules, regulations, administrative directives or policies of the Board of Education.” That such a broad definition would have been adopted if the only intended subject of the grievance procedure were a change in teacher assignments within a single school, as the majority opinion concludes, is highly unlikely. It is not clear why express reference is made to the availability of the grievance procedure for disputes about such changes in assignments. Since there are no precise guidelines for making such changes by a principal comparable to those established for transfers to other schools by the superintendent, it is at least arguable that a dispute over such a change would not involve a claimed “violation, misinterpretation or misapplication” of the terms of the agreement or regulations of the board. Scriveners commonly prefer redundancy to uncertainty, a habit which explains why the maxim inclusio unius, exclusio alterius is merely an aid to construction and not a rule of law having universal application. Any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of giving the arbitration provision in a labor contract as broad a scope as the language of the agreement will permit. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960); International Union v. General Electric Co., 148 Conn. 693, 699, 174 A.2d 298 (1961). I would construe the agreement as making the grievance procedure available for resolution of the present controversy between the parties, a view which is reinforced by the absence of any claim to the contrary made by them.
My interpretation of the agreement as making the grievance procedure available to the plaintiff *108does not respond to her claims that the general verdict of the jury must be deemed to have resolved the issue of non-exhaustion of contractual remedies in her favor and that, where the final outcome of the arbitration which culminates the grievance procedure is merely advisory, resort to that procedure is not a prerequisite to the institution of a legal action.
In her brief the plaintiff refers to the pages of the transcript wherein the trial court submitted to the jury the question of whether she had exhausted her contractual remedy, charging that she could not recover if she failed to avail herself of the grievance procedure. No exception to this portion of the jury instruction was taken by either party. Although the defendants in their brief state that the failure of the plaintiff to utilize the contractual grievance procedure is “undisputed,” there is no reference to the transcript or the record supporting this assertion. Upon appeal the parties may not rely upon any fact not supported by such references. Practice Book §§ 3060P (b), 3060G- (b). In any event, the failure of the defendants to except to the charge leaving the issue to the jury precludes their belated claim that there was no factual dispute concerning this special defense. Practice Book § 3063.
My conclusion that the verdict resolving the issue of exhaustion of contractual remedies in favor of the plaintiff cannot now be challenged makes it unnecessary to consider her second claim that, where the final outcome of the grievance procedure is merely an advisory opinion by an arbitrator, a party may bypass it and proceed directly with a lawsuit. See Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steel*109workers of America, AFL-CIO, 429 F. Sup. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 106n. (1972).
I concur in the result reached by the majority.