Court Opinion

ID: 9788408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:50:16.383205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:10.683744
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J.
Obviously, I concur in the majority opinion I have prepared for the court. I am writing separately to comment on the absurdity of trial and appellate courts—as well as prosecutors and defense attorneys—expending energy and resources dealing with lesser sentencing issues when the defendant has also been sentenced to death or prison for life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and to suggest a legislative solution.
In People v. Moore (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 709 [208 Cal.Rptr. 771], the trial court sentenced the defendant to LWOP for two murders but also calculated a 60-year sentence for many other felony convictions. The defendant “complain[ed] of numerous sentencing errors in this 60-year sentence, and urge[d] remand for resentencing.” (Id. at p. 718.) The Court of Appeal, however, refused to consider those contentions. “[A]s we are affirming the judgment in its entirety, including the special circumstances findings, we need not address the sentencing errors alleged by appellant.” (Ibid.) Other courts *770have not followed this approach, possibly because no statutory provision expressly permits it, and have decided sometimes complex sentencing issues while affirming a death or LWOP sentence. In People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112 [255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32], for example, we affirmed a judgment of death but also considered numerous other sentencing issues and remanded for the trial court to resentence the defendant on noncapital counts. (Id. at pp. 160-166.) Later, we affirmed the new judgment on appeal from that resentencing. (People v. Coleman (1991) 53 Cal.3d 949 [281 Cal.Rptr. 146, 809 P.2d 921].) Other examples abound. (E.g., People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728-732 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640] [considering sentencing issues despite affirming judgment of death]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 551-552 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [similar]; People v. Bracamonte (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 704 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 334] [published portion of opinion considers only sentencing issues despite affirming an LWOP sentence].)
When a person has been sentenced to death or LWOP, no need exists to impose any other sentence. Especially in these days of increasingly tight judicial budgets, courts and attorneys can make better use of their resources than litigating issues that have no practical significance. The Legislature might want to consider legislation to minimize this waste of resources. Such legislation might take many forms, but one simple approach comes readily to mind. The Legislature might provide that if the trial court imposes a sentence of death or LWOP on any count, it need not impose any other senténce, including enhancements. If the convictions are ever set aside or modified to reduce the sentence to something less than LWOP, the court can resentence the defendant on the remaining counts at that time. The defendant could appeal the resentencing, with the appeal limited to issues arising out of that resentencing. Even now, when a murder conviction or special circumstance is reversed, resentencing is often necessary, so little would be lost by such a procedure. In most cases, the court would never have to sentence on the remaining counts, and the parties would never have to litigate meaningless issues.
These are just thoughts. Better approaches might exist. In the meantime, I concur in the court’s opinion, including rejecting defendants’ claims of noncapital sentencing error.
Appellants’ petitions for a rehearing were denied June 9, 2004.