Court Opinion

ID: 9949404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 16:11:38.953385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:49.012473
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CHRISTOPHER M. SPARROW                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 756 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 24, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0001732-2021

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: MARCH 11, 2024

       Appellant Christopher M. Sparrow appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed following his convictions for driving under the influence

(DUI) of a Schedule I controlled substance1 and a related summary offense.

Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw and an

Anders/Santiago2 brief.            After review, we grant Counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this

case as follows:

       On October 28, 2020, [] Appellant was operating a motor vehicle
       in the city of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, when his vehicle
       collided with a Wilkes-Barre City Police patrol car. Police observed
____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i).

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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      that [] Appellant demonstrated signs of impairment.               []
      Appellant’s blood was drawn at Geisinger Wyoming Valley Hospital
      and sent to a laboratory for analysis. The lab results indicated
      that [] Appellant’s blood tested positive for marijuana, a [Schedule
      I] controlled substance.

      A criminal information filed on July 9, 2021, alleged that Appellant
      “drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the
      movement of a vehicle when there was in his blood marijuana, a
      [Schedule I] controlled substance.” [The trial court conducted] a
      non-jury trial on February 27, 2023. After hearing the evidence,
      [the trial court] found [] Appellant guilty of [DUI] beyond a
      reasonable doubt.

      On April 24, 2023, [the trial court] sentenced [] Appellant to six
      (6) months in the restrictive probation program with the first ten
      (10) days to be served subject to home confinement with
      electronic monitoring.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/21/23, at 1-2 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court subsequently issued an opinion addressing

Appellant’s claim.

      Counsel has identified the following issue in the Anders/Santiago brief:

      Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to establish,
      beyond a reasonable doubt, that [] Appellant committed an
      offense under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i) in that the amount of
      the alleged controlled substance was de minimis?

Anders/Santiago Brief at 2 (formatting altered).

      “When faced with a purported Anders[/Santiago] brief, this Court may

not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining

counsel’s request to withdraw.”    Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d

379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Counsel must comply with the

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technical requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for

leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2)

providing a copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant

of the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional

arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s attention. See

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc). In an Anders/Santiago brief, counsel must set forth the issues that

the defendant wishes to raise and any other claims necessary to effectuate

appellate presentation of those issues. Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873

A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2005).

      Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements

established in Santiago, namely:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
      counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
      counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

      “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an

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independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-

frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113

A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted); accord

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

      Here, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for

seeking withdrawal by filing a petition to withdraw, sending Appellant a letter

explaining his appellate rights, informing Appellant of his right to proceed pro

se or with private counsel, and supplying Appellant with a copy of the

Anders/Santiago brief.       See Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290.           Counsel also

provided this Court with a copy of his letter to Appellant informing him of his

rights.    Moreover, Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief complies with the

requirements of Santiago.        Counsel includes a summary of the relevant

factual and procedural history, refers to the portions of the record that could

arguably support Appellant’s claim, and sets forth the conclusion that the

appeal is frivolous. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, we conclude

that Counsel has met the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago,

and   we   will   proceed   to   address   the   issue   presented   in   Counsel’s

Anders/Santiago brief.

      The sole issue identified by Counsel is that the evidence was insufficient

to sustain Appellant’s conviction for DUI of a Schedule I controlled substance.

Anders/Santiago Brief at 7. Specifically, Appellant argues that the amount

of Delta-9 THC present in his blood at the time he drove, operated, or was in

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physical control of a vehicle was de minimis. Id. Appellant further argues

that the Commonwealth “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

was incapable of safely operating his vehicle under [Section] 3802(d)(1)(i).”

Id. at 9.

      When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are

governed by the following standard:

      A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
      law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
      when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
      and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
      doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in
      contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human
      experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient
      as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the court
      is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
      inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

      In applying the above test, we may not [re]weigh the evidence
      and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.

Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 764 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations

omitted and formatting altered), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---, 362 MAL 2023,

2023 WL 8614241 (Pa. filed Dec. 13, 2023).

      The Vehicle Code prohibits individuals from driving, operating, or being

“in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle” with any amount of

a Schedule I controlled substance, as defined by the Controlled Substance,

Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, present in the individual’s blood. 75 Pa.C.S.

§ 3802(d)(1)(i). Marijuana is defined as a Schedule I controlled substance.

35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(iv). As this Court has noted, the DUI statute mandates

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that “it is illegal to drive with any amount of marijuana, medical or otherwise,

in one’s system.” Commonwealth v. Whitmire, 300 A.3d 484, 490-91 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (citation and emphasis omitted), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---,

202 WAL 2023, 2024 WL 92130 (Pa. filed Jan. 9, 2024). To obtain a conviction

under Section 3802(d)(1)(i), the Commonwealth need only prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant had any amount of a specifically

enumerated controlled substance in his or her blood; proof of a defendant’s

impairment at the time of driving is not required.        Commonwealth v.

Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302, 310 (Pa. Super. 2012).

      In the instant case, the Commonwealth presented evidence establishing

that Appellant was driving a vehicle when he was involved in a motor vehicle

accident on October 28, 2020.       See N.T. Trial, 2/27/23, at 6-7, 10-11.

Following the accident, Appellant was taken to Geisinger-Wyoming Valley

Hospital and a blood draw was completed. Id. at 12-13. The Commonwealth

then presented evidence that six nanograms per milliliter of Delta-9 THC—the

active component of marijuana—was present in Appellant’s blood. Id. at 29.

      Based on this record, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction under Section 3802(d)(1). See

James, 297 A.3d at 764.       As noted above, the Commonwealth was not

required to establish that Appellant was impaired; rather, the Commonwealth

was only required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that marijuana was

present in Appellant’s blood. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i); Whitmire, 300

A.3d at 490-91; Hutchins, 42 A.3d at 310.

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      For these reasons, we agree with Counsel’s assessment that the claim

presented in the Anders/Santiago brief is frivolous.            Further, our

independent review of the record does not reveal any additional, non-frivolous

issues. See Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250; see also Goodwin, 928 A.2d at

291. For these reasons, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm

the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/11/2024

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