Court Opinion

ID: 9953609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 15:05:48.49715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:18.520779
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            No. 125,031

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                  v.

                                  MICHAEL ANTHONY SEARS SR.,
                                          Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Riley District Court; KENDRA LEWISON, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 22, 2024. Affirmed.

        Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        David Lowden, deputy county attorney, Barry R. Wilkerson, county attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., ATCHESON, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

        ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J.: Michael Anthony Sears Sr. was charged and convicted of
rape, attempted rape, and four counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child for
incidents involving two young girls. At the trial on the charges, the jury heard that Sears'
daughter, A.S., recanted her allegations against Sears while her friend, C.B., did not. The
jury found Sears guilty of all charges. The district court denied Sears' motion for
departure and sentenced him under the Jessica's Law sentencing scheme. The court also
ordered Sears to register as a sex offender under the Kansas Offender Registration Act.
Finding no reversible error in the issues raised on appeal, we affirm.

                                                  1
                           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Because sufficiency of the evidence is central to several of Sears' claims, we will
begin by giving a detailed recitation of the facts as revealed at various stages of this
proceeding, beginning with a conversation between a 12-year-old girl and her mother.

       In April 2018, A.S., who was younger than 14 years old at the time, told her
mother (Mother) that she had seen a video of a father raping his daughter and asked what
Mother would do if somebody did something like that to her. Mother responded that she
would hunt the person down and there would be no place for them to hide. Mother asked
A.S. if something like that had happened to her or her brother and A.S. started crying and
said that Sears had done that to her. A.S. told Mother that Sears touched her on multiple
occasions while Mother and A.S.'s brother (Brother) were at Boy Scout meetings.
According to A.S., Sears would have her pull down her pants and underwear and try to
touch her, attempt to insert his fingers into her, and did put his fingers inside her on a
couple of occasions.

       Mother immediately took A.S. to the police station after talking to her friend B.B.,
whose daughter, C.B., was a close friend to A.S. Mother told Officer Eric Beaubien what
A.S. told her and then A.S. provided more details. The interview was videotaped, and a
redacted version was shown to the jury.

       In the redacted interview, A.S. stated that the abuse started in early 2017 when she
and Sears were in their garage and A.S. complained about some itching and stinging in
her vagina. Sears told A.S. to let him look. He looked at it and told her to pull up her
pants. Over the next few days, Sears checked A.S.'s vagina, rubbed it, and went further
down each time. On a couple of occasions, he tried to put his finger in her "hole," but she
grabbed his hand because it would sting and made her cry. Sears usually used his finger,
but on one occasion he used a paper towel. He would have her sit on his lap on a chair in

                                              2
the game room when he did this. A.S. said that on one occasion, while she was in fifth
grade, Sears put his finger inside her up to his "first knuckle" which caused her to scream
so he stopped. A.S. also said that Sears had "tried to go deeper" after the "first knuckle"
incident, but he stopped after she screamed in pain. He would tell her to "shhh." Sears
told her that if she told anyone he would "make it a lot worse for me." She said it
happened every time her mom was taking Brother to Boy Scouts. A.S. said she tried to
get out of the house to avoid him. After each time Sears asked A.S. if she liked it, and she
told him she did not and tried to pull away. A.S. said that Sears told her that if she
"fingered" herself that it would "break a wall," so that it would not hurt and would feel
better when he did it. According to A.S.'s interview, Sears tried to stick his finger into her
vagina around five times. The last time occurred sometime in January 2018.

       During the interview, B.B. texted Mother and said that her daughter, C.B., could
corroborate A.S.'s story because A.S. had told her about it, but not in great detail. After
receiving the call from Mother, B.B. asked C.B. if Sears had done anything to her—
because C.B. frequently visited the Sears' residence. C.B. started crying and nodding her
head. So B.B. took C.B. to the police station the same evening.

       When B.B. texted Mother that they were on their way to the police station based
on C.B.'s corroboration of A.S.'s allegations, Mother told A.S. that C.B. said A.S. had
told her about it but she didn't know details. Mother then took over the questioning of
A.S. and asked her what she had told C.B., becoming a bit aggressive in questioning
A.S., becoming openly critical when she told the officer C.B.'s middle name—saying he
did not need to know that. A.S. apologized and then proceeded to tell how C.B. came to
know what happened.

       A.S. told Mother and Officer Beaubien that C.B. had been spending the night on
an evening when just Sears was home. She relayed that Sears had been mixing Pepsi with
alcohol and told them it was "children appropriate." He made them drink it. They then

                                              3
went back to Sears' bedroom to watch television because A.S. did not have Netflix on her
television. Mother interrupted and said, "[C.B.] is saying she knows something happened
with Daddy, but she doesn't know what." A.S. responded that he "tried to do it to [C.B.]."
Mother again interrupted, "that is not what she said." And A.S. responded, "but he did."

       Mother started texting on her phone, and Officer Beaubien resumed questioning
and asked A.S. to describe what happened. A.S. described Sears putting his hands down
her pants and her squirming to get away from Sears' touching and getting up to go to the
bathroom. When she came back, she and C.B. went to her room and C.B. told her that
Sears had tried to put his hands down her pants. A.S. told C.B. that Sears had done that to
her. C.B. advised A.S. that she should tell an adult. A.S. told C.B. she was too nervous to
"because I didn't want Mom and Dad's relationships to end," and she was "too scared
what he would do to me."

       Mother asked if Sears actually did something to C.B., and A.S. responded that she
did not know if he did or just tried to. Mother pointed out that C.B. was claiming she did
not know any details and A.S. repeated that she told C.B. what happened. Mother
speculated that C.B. may just be afraid to say something, just like A.S. was afraid to
come forward.

       The recorded interview with A.S. also included discussions between A.S. and
Mother—after Officer Beaubien stepped out of the interview room—where A.S.
indicated that she was scared that Mother would not believe her and was worried that
Mother would be mad at her. Mother advised A.S. that she was upset that this had
happened and that she had not told her about it. She was also upset that Sears tried to do
something to C.B. She also said she hoped A.S. was telling the truth and not lying. A.S.
responded, "I am not lying, mommy." The following discussion took place between A.S.
and Mother, while Officer Beaubien was absent from the room:

                                             4
Mother: "I hope you are not just saying this to start trouble or just because you watched
on a tv show or a movie or because it happened to some of your friends."
A.S.: "No, I am not."
Mother: "Because you know your dad is going to get arrested."
A.S.: "Yes, I know. I am not lying."
Mother (whispering): "And if he gets arrested, he is going to go to jail."
A.S. (looking surprised): "To jail?"
Mother: "Yes, he molested you."
A.S.: "How long is that for?"
Mother: "For however long. So your dad's life is over right now. They're going to
investigate this, the detectives are going to come investigate it, they're going to get him,
they're going to ask him questions, and if they can find him guilty, he's going to jail."
A.S.: "What if they don't?"
Mother: "Why would they not find him guilty, are you lying about something?"
A.S.: "No I am not lying mommy, why would I be lying if daddy is going to go to jail?"
Mother: "I am just asking and I'm trying to figure out you are now telling me this and it
has supposedly been going on for a year. It went on for a year and you never said
anything."
A.S.: "Because I was scared what he was going to do to me. I didn't know what he was
going to do to me."
Mother: "All those times you were laying on your dad, loving on your dad, hugging up
on your dad, what was that all about? What was that for?"
A.S.: "Because I still loved him."
Mother: "Oh, really? And when he deployed and stuff like that you were crying and
sobbing your eyes out, acting all dramatic and stuff like that but he's been sexually
assaulted you, molesting you, right? If that's what happens, it happened. I believe you.
A.S. (slaps hand on lap angerly): "No, no you don't."
Mother: "Yes, yes I do."
A.S. (curling up on the chair, crying): "No, you don't."
(unintelligible)
Mother: "[A.S.] I believe you."
A.S.: "No, you don't."

                                              5
Mother: "[A.S.] I believe you. If I didn't believe you, I wouldn't have brought you here. I
wouldn't have called [B.B.], but I just want to make sure you are fully aware that if all of
this stuff is what happened, that's it."
A.S. (crying): "It did happen. I am not making this up."
Mother: "Well, ok, ok. That's it. You will never be able to see your dad again. You know
that right?"
A.S.: "Yes."
Mother: "[A.S.] put your legs down, it's fucking stop. Stop with the bullshit. Ok. Just
stop, just stop. Put your feet down and stop. Please do us all a favor."
A.S.: (Sits up straight.)
Mother: "It happened. If I didn't believe you, I wouldn't have brought you here. . . . I just
want to make sure you are fully aware of what is about to happen. That they may take
you and your brother from me, I just want you to know that."
A.S.: "Why you?"
Mother: "They are probably going to make you go through testing and they are probably
going to find out if you are telling the truth and they will do the same thing to your dad.
So I hope for your sake that you are telling the . . . I believe you, I'm just saying you
better be telling the truth and the whole truth and if you don't it will come out. It will
come out so you better, you need to make sure you're telling them everything they need
to know and telling the whole truth that's all I'm going to say. I believe you. If I didn't
believe you, you think I would bring you here?"
A.S.: "No."
Mother: "Do you think I would have called [B.B.] and drag [her] through all this?"
A.S.: "No."
Mother: "So trust me, I believe you I am just telling you make sure you understand the
severity of the situation because as of right now, it's done. It's done. Me and your dad are
over. There is no going back. There's no fixing that. It's over."
A.S.: "Where are we going to live?"
Mother: "We will figure it out. I promise, we are going to figure it out. But he is not
going to be allowed to see you guys unless it's supervised, somebody from the court
watching you and even then, I don't know. . . . If he's found guilty of child molestation
he's going to go to jail."
A.S.: "Does that mean grandma and grandpa are going to hate me?"

                                               6
         Mother (shrugging shoulders): "I don't know. I already texted grandma and told her what
         was going on."
         A.S.: "What does she say?"
         Mother: "She doesn't know what to think."
         A.S.: "Nobody believes me besides you."
         Mother: "She just doesn't know. . . ."
         A.S.: "No I'm just saying nobody believes me except you two."
         Mother: ". . . [B.B.] says [Brother] is crying because he thinks it is his fault it happened
         while we were at Boy Scout stuff."
         A.S. (breaks down crying): "It is not his fault."
         Mother: "I know."

At this point, Officer Beaubien stepped back in and asked if Sears is A.S.'s biological
father, and Mother responded, "No, he is her adopted father he adopted her when she was
born." A.S. still crying said, "Tell [Brother] it is not his fault." Mother responded, "I
will."

         C.B. was interviewed twice, and both interviews were recorded and played for the
jury. C.B.'s statements were consistent with what A.S. told police that first night.
According to C.B., the incident occurred during the weekend of "Og Fest." C.B. was at
A.S.'s house with A.S. and Sears while Mother and Brother were at a Boy Scout camp.
Sears was drinking a variety of alcohol including Jack Daniels. He offered the girls
alcohol. C.B. took a sip and gagged recognizing it to be alcohol. Every time he poured a
drink for himself, he asked the girls if they wanted one. C.B. thought he was acting
different than normal. While they were playing games in the game room, Sears pulled
C.B. onto his lap, even though she protested saying she was fine on the couch. He kept
bouncing her on his knee.

         Later they went to Sears' bedroom to watch television. According to C.B., the
three of them were watching television on Sears' bed when A.S. got up to go to the
bathroom. When A.S. got up, C.B. mouthed to her "Why?" A.S. mouthed back "I'll tell

                                                       7
you later." At that point, Sears rolled over and started using both hands to touch C.B.'s
"lower private parts" under her clothes while A.S. was in the bathroom. He was
"spooning" her from behind while she was lying on her side. C.B. then clarified that
Sears' hands were rubbing her under her clothing, near her vagina, touching skin. C.B.
testified that Sears put his hands down her pants and underwear and was touching where
her pubic hair grew and around her clitoris but not actually in her vagina. This took place
for about three minutes. C.B. attempted to get away but was unable to do so. She yelled
for A.S. and as A.S. returned from the bathroom, Sears stopped. At that point A.S. started
jumping on the bed and trying to pull C.B. off the bed. Sears told the girls that they could
just sleep in his bed. When C.B. and A.S. attempted to leave, Sears lifted C.B.'s shirt and
blew "raspberries" on her stomach, which made her laugh because it tickled but made her
uncomfortable.

       The girls left the room and went to A.S.'s bedroom where C.B. told A.S. what
happened. A.S. said the same thing happened to her which is why she left to go to the
bathroom. Sears then walked into the bedroom and said that he heard what they said. A.S.
started crying and told C.B. not to tell anyone because she did not want Sears to get in
trouble. Sears apologized and said he sometimes gets "'handsy'" when he has had alcohol.
He also advised C.B. that she did not have to come over anymore if she didn't want to,
but to please not tell anyone. So she did not tell anyone.

       After Sears left, A.S. continued to cry and ask C.B. not to tell anyone because she
did not want to get in trouble. The next morning C.B. wanted to talk about it but A.S. did
not. By this time A.S.'s mother was home and she said she didn't want to talk about it in
front of her mom. C.B. continued to frequent A.S.'s house after the incident occurred and
did not indicate any hesitancy in going there. But neither girl spoke of the incident again
until A.S. told her mother in April 2018.

                                              8
         Just a few days later, A.S. recanted her allegations. From that point and through
both the preliminary hearing and trial A.S. testified that any information she gave to
Beaubien about Sears touching her inappropriately was false. A.S. testified that she lied
about Sears inappropriately touching her because she saw Mother with a different man
while Sears was out of town for work and that she thought by making the accusations
Sears would come back to town and things would be better. But it soon became clear that
A.S. did not see Mother with another man until 2019, well after making the claims of
abuse.

         Contrary to A.S.'s recantation, C.B.'s story remained consistent from her first
interview with police through the preliminary hearing and trial.

         Both girls later interacted with Detective Jessie Ehrlich. Ehrlich interviewed A.S.
in mid-May 2018. A.S.'s mother refused to allow the interview to be recorded. A.S. told
Ehrlich that she lied to Beaubien in the recorded interview because she wanted Sears to
come home. A.S. also told Ehrlich that her mother told her that Sears was going to get in
trouble based on her allegations and that her mother also bribed her to come and talk to
Ehrlich. Near the end of her interview, A.S. told Ehrlich that it was just easier to say that
the inappropriate touching did not happen.

         Ehrlich also recorded her interview with C.B., which was consistent with what she
said in her interview with Beaubien. All the recorded interviews were admitted at trial, as
well as live testimony from both A.S. and C.B., the officers who interviewed them, and
Mother and B.B. Both A.S. and Mother remembered little about what was said to police
while being recorded and proved to be somewhat hostile and uncooperative witnesses
during trial.

         The State rested its case and Sears moved for judgment of acquittal on count 6,
which was aggravated indecent liberties with a child, C.B. In response, the State argued

                                               9
that C.B. "said that [Sears] touched her where her pubic hair, where her clitoris, her clit
is, which [the State thought] common verbiage would indicate that's the clitoris." The
State continued by arguing that it was up to the jury to determine if that qualified as lewd
fondling, which was an element of the charge against Sears. The trial court agreed and
denied Sears' motion.

       Sears presented his own witnesses in his defense, beginning with Dr. Robert
Barnett, a clinical psychologist. Barnett's testimony largely focused about interview
methods. Barnett testified that he reviewed the videotaped interview between Ehrlich and
C.B. Barnett testified that he saw problematic interview techniques used by Ehrlich,
specifically he pointed out that she used leading and suggestive questions and that there
was a lack of assessment for alternative hypotheses.

       Sears also called Rhea Barrett, A.S.'s therapist. Barrett testified that A.S. told her
that she missed Sears while he was deployed for work. Barrett also testified that she did
not show any indications of sexual abuse and that any abuse that led to this case was not
discussed in therapy.

       Dr. Gregory Nawalanic, a clinical psychologist, also testified on Sears' behalf.
Nawalanic conducted a Gregg evaluation on A.S. Nawalanic testified that during the
evaluation, A.S. told him that she made the allegations because her mother had cheated
on Sears while Sears was away from home in the past and she thought making the
allegations was the only way she could keep her family together. According to
Nawalanic, A.S. thought the allegations would not have a significant impact on Sears and
that at most he would get something akin to probation. Nawalanic also testified that A.S.
was upset that C.B. did not recant her allegations against Sears.

       Finally, Sears testified in his own defense. Sears generally denied all the
allegations against him. He testified that C.B. was at their home often, to the point they

                                              10
joked that if she was going to be there so much, they should just adopt her. He treated her
as a second daughter. He also testified that he rarely drank alcohol, and then usually
drank beer.

       The jury found Sears guilty on all charges. Prior to sentencing, Sears moved for a
departure to the grid and a further departure from the presumptive sentence. Sears argued
that a departure was appropriate because: He had no criminal history, the degree of harm
was less than typical in similar cases given that one of the victims had recanted her
allegations and the other continued to spend time at Sears' home after the alleged abuse
occurred, he had a successful career in the military, and he was a low risk for causing
further harm to the community.

       The district court denied Sears' motion for departure and sentenced him to six
concurrent life sentences, without the possibility of parole for 25 years. The court also
ordered Sears to register as a sex offender for life. Sears appeals his convictions and
sentence.

                                              ANALYSIS

I.     THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS AGAINST
       SEARS

       A. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.

               "'When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, we
       review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational
       factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate
       court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the
       credibility of witnesses.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189, 209, 485
       P.3d 576 (2021).

                                                   11
       B. After reviewing the evidence, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the
          convictions.

       Sears argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for crimes
against A.S. and C.B. He argues that A.S. recanted her allegations against him and only
made the allegations because she did not want him leaving the house for an extended
period for work. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
convictions involving C.B. He argues that while C.B. testified that Sears touched her
"'spot'" it was not clear what the "'spot'" was. This coupled with the testimony that Sears
was blowing raspberries on her stomach meant there was insufficient evidence to show
that Sears engaged in "lewd fondling . . . with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desires of either the child" or himself as required by K.S.A. 21-5506(b)(2)(A).

       Sears' argument is unpersuasive. When viewed in a light most favorable to the
State, there was sufficient evidence to support Sears' convictions. Evidence presented at
trial by the State established that Sears inserted his finger inside A.S.'s vagina, attempted
to insert his finger inside A.S.'s vagina, touched A.S. inappropriately on three separate
occasions, and that he "spoon[ed]" C.B. and put both of his hands underneath her
underwear and touched her pubic region and around her clitoris. Sears asks this court to
reweigh the evidence presented at trial, which this court cannot do. See Aguirre, 313 Kan.
at 209. The jury heard the testimony and evidence presented by both parties and
determined that Sears was guilty of the crimes charged. The record on appeal shows that
there was sufficient evidence to support those convictions.

II.    SEARS WAIVED ANY ALLEGED ERROR FOR DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR
       JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE

       Sears argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal of the charges related to C.B. But based on existing Kansas caselaw, we must
find that he waived any error through his actions at trial.

                                             12
       The Kansas Supreme Court has long held that "when a defendant unsuccessfully
moves for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence and then proceeds to
present evidence, the defendant waives any error in denial of the motion." State v. Frantz,
316 Kan. 708, 732, 521 P.3d 1113 (2022) (citing State v. Blue, 225 Kan. 576, 578, 592
P.2d 897 [1979]). The rule was later modified to allow the defendant to present rebuttal
evidence so long as it was confined to the substance and credibility of the witnesses for
the State or a codefendant and does not try to refute any elements of proof adduced in the
State's case. Frantz, 316 Kan. at 733.

       Sears acknowledges the holding in Blue and recognizes that this court is duty
bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent, absent some indication that the
Kansas Supreme Court is departing from its earlier ruling. State v. Beck, 32 Kan. App. 2d
784, 788, 88 P.3d 1233 (2004). However, Sears argues that the Kansas Supreme Court
indicated in Frantz that it might be departing from the holding in Blue.

       Sears points to the Kansas Supreme Court's acknowledgment that some courts
have criticized the waiver rule because it limits a defendant's rights to have the
prosecution prove a prima facie case. Frantz, 316 Kan. at 735. He also points to the
concurring opinion in Frantz, where three justices noted that they would have abrogated
the waiver rule. 316 Kan. at 751 (Stegall, J., concurring).

       While there are indications that portions of the Kansas Supreme Court would
abrogate the waiver rule, that is not the same as indications that the entirety of the court is
making those same indications. For now, even if this court agrees that continued reliance
on Blue should be reexamined, we remain duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court
precedent. The Kansas Supreme Court has continued to hold that a defendant waives any
potential error in the denial of a motion for acquittal by presenting evidence, other than
certain rebuttal evidence, after the State rests its case. Frantz, 316 Kan. at 732; see Beck,
32 Kan. App. 2d at 788.

                                              13
       But even if we assume the Supreme Court has signaled its dissatisfaction with
Blue and we agreed Blue should be reversed, the district court did not err in denying the
motion. As outlined above, the evidence as presented during the State's evidence-in-chief
was sufficient to present the issue to the jury.

III.   THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY ADMITTING CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE
       REGARDING THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SEARS

       For his next argument on appeal, Sears contends that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting the video interviews of A.S. and C.B. with Beaubien.

       A. We review whether the court abused its discretion.

       Appellate courts review the question of whether evidence was cumulative for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156, 289 P.3d 85 (2012). A
judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State
v. Bilbrey, 317 Kan. 57, 63, 523 P.3d 1078 (2023).

       B. The evidence presented was not unduly cumulative.

       This court has noted that repetition of certain evidence is "characteristic in the
prosecution of child sex crimes and generally draws no objection." State v. Kackley, 32
Kan. App. 2d 927, 934-35, 92 P.3d 1128 (2004). But we have also acknowledged that
"Kansas has embraced the general rule that prior statements of a witness, consistent with
his or her own testimony at the trial, are not admissible in corroboration of the witness'
testimony unless the witness has been impeached and then only for the purpose of
rehabilitation." 32 Kan. App. 2d at 935.

                                               14
       An exception to the general rule applies where the defendant is charged with rape.
There, evidence of the complaint of the victim "is permitted for the express purpose of
corroborating [the victim's] testimony through the testimony of other witnesses." 32 Kan.
App. 2d at 935 (citing State v. Washington, 226 Kan. 768, 770, 602 P.2d 1377 [1979]).
This court extended the exception to prosecutions for sexual abuse of children in Kackley.
32 Kan. App. 2d at 935.

       Moreover, while the general rule is that there should not be cumulative evidence,
the decision to limit the number of witnesses on a single issue lies within the authority of
the trial court. 32 Kan. App. 2d at 935. As Sears acknowledges in his brief, the Kansas
Supreme Court has previously found that the trial court did not err by allowing two
witnesses for the State to give cumulative testimony on the same issue. State v. Johnson,
231 Kan. 151, 156-57, 643 P.2d 146 (1982).

       Sears argues that allowing the State to present the police interview videos was
unduly cumulative because C.B.'s and A.S.'s mothers testified about their daughters'
disclosures to them, in addition to C.B.'s and A.S.'s own testimony at trial. As Sears puts
it, "[t]here was no additional relevance added by the videos."

       That said, during his opening statement at trial, Sears discussed how A.S. recanted
her allegations soon after making them. Sears also attacked C.B.'s credibility, pointing
out that her allegation changed over time and how it was influenced by interview
techniques used by the police.

       Under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting Beaubien's interviews of A.S. and C.B. Sears' defense relied largely on the fact
that A.S. recanted her allegations shortly after making them. Playing her interview with
Beaubien would allow the jury to see A.S.'s demeanor during the initial interview where
the allegations were made.

                                             15
       Similar considerations apply for C.B.'s interview. While C.B. did not recant her
allegations, Sears spent a large part of his case attempting to undermine her credibility.
He also called Barnett, who testified about problematic interview techniques. By
admitting C.B.'s interview, the jury was able to examine the interview themselves and
could better determine the credibility of C.B.

       While the general rule is to limit repetitive evidence at trial, the standard of review
for this court is whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing additional
evidence. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. at 1156. Sears fails to show that the district court's
decision to admit the video interviews at trial was an abuse of discretion under the
circumstances.

IV.    THE STATE DID NOT COMMIT PROSECUTORIAL ERROR

       Sears argues that the State committed prosecutorial error by arguing facts not in
evidence or by misstating evidence during cross-examination.

       A. We use a two-step process to evaluate claims of prosecutorial error.

       Appellate courts use a two-step process to evaluate claims of prosecutorial error:
error and prejudice. State v. Sieg, 315 Kan. 526, 535, 509 P.3d 535 (2022).

               "To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, the appellate court must
       decide whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude
       afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a
       manner that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. If error is
       found, the appellate court must next determine whether the error prejudiced the
       defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. In evaluating prejudice, we simply adopt the
       traditional constitutional harmlessness inquiry demanded by Chapman [v. California, 386
       U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)]. In other words, prosecutorial error is

                                                     16
       harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
       complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire
       record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the
       verdict.' [Citation omitted.]" State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016).

       B. The prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in closing.

               i.       Evidence about Sears' touching of C.B.

      First, Sears contends that the State committed error by telling the jury during
closing arguments that C.B. testified that Sears touched her clitoris when her testimony
was clear that Sears did not touch her clitoris. To be more specific, the complained of
statement was: "Do you believe that [C.B.] was touched by Mr. Sears? Remember what
[C.B.] said regarding the incident. She said that he had his hand down her pants, that it
was on her pubic hair, on her clitoris." Sears objected to the statement and the district
court overruled the objection and told the jury to "recall the testimony as they recall it."

       The State's comment was not erroneous. During direct examination C.B. appears
to say he touched her clitoris but was rather ambiguous in response to several follow-up
questions from the prosecutor. The exchange between Sears' counsel and C.B. went as
follows:

       "Q. What do you consider the vaginal area? The State said touched you in your vaginal
           area. You said yes.
       "A. In between the vaginal lips.
       "Q. Okay. But you said he didn't actually touch you there. Right?
       "A. No, ma'am.
       "Q. But when the State just asked you that, didn't you agree that that had happened?
       "A. No, ma'am.
       "Q. Okay. Did not touch you in the vaginal area?
       "A. No, ma'am."

                                                     17
       The way the questions and answers were worded makes it a bit unclear on what
C.B.'s answers were. It could be read as she was agreeing that Sears did not touch her
vaginal area, or it could be read as she was disagreeing with Sears' counsel's question.
Regardless, she indicated on direct examination that Sears touched her clitoris, bringing
the State's comment during closing argument within the realm of fair comment on the
evidence.

           ii.   Evidence concerning Barrett's failure to discuss the allegations A.S. made
                 concerning her abuse.

       Sears argues that the State erred by stating in closing argument that A.S.'s
therapist, Barrett, never spoke to A.S. about abuse because A.S. never brought it up. In
other words, it misstated the evidence. In its closing, the State said that

       "Ms. Barrett did not go over with [A.S.] the sexual abuse allegation, because [A.S.] never
       brought it up. [A.S.] never brought up that she had alleged her father abused her. She
       never brought up that she recanted. They didn't discuss either one, because [A.S.] didn't
       bring it up in the child led therapy session."

Sears objected and the district court instructed the jury to remember the evidence as they
saw fit.

       The State's comments were not erroneous based on the testimony presented at
trial. During cross-examination, Barrett was asked if "[A.S.] ever [brought] up the sexual
abuse allegation" and if she brought up her recantation of that allegation. Barrett said that
she did not.

                                                    18
       D. Cross-examination question assumed facts not in evidence.

       Sears called a military colleague and friend of the Sears family as a character
witness. The witness had no direct knowledge about the abuse alleged by C.B. and A.S.
The testimony focused on the fact that his family socialized with the Sears family and
that the Sears family was a good and loving family that appeared to communicate well
with each other. Sears argues that the following exchange constituted reversible error
because it assumed facts not in evidence and invaded the province of the jury.

       "Q. Do you think that Mr. Sears is a good person, knowing that he sexually touched
           [C.B.]?
       "A. I know Michael Sears is a good person, yes.
       "Q. Even though he touched [C.B.]?"

       Sears objected to this line of questioning and the district court sustained the
objection. Even if this court assumes that the State's question was erroneous, it was not
prejudicial under the circumstances. The jury was instructed to disregard testimony that
was objected to where the objection was sustained. The district court did not immediately
reinstruct the jury to disregard the question, but it had reminded the jury to disregard on
several other occasions.

       In sum, two of Sears' alleged instances of prosecutorial error were not erroneous
under the circumstances. Instead, they were fair comments on the evidence elicited at
trial. His third allegation of prosecutorial error, that the State erred during cross-
examination of a witness, is harmless even if it was erroneous. The exchange was brief,
Sears properly objected to the question, and the district court sustained the objection.

                                                 19
V.     CUMULATIVE ERROR DID NOT DEPRIVE SEARS OF A FAIR TRIAL

       For his final issue regarding his trial, Sears argues that even if no single trial error
deprived him of his right to a fair trial, then the cumulative impact of multiple errors did.

       A. We review whether any errors together or alone affected the outcome of the
          trial.

       Cumulative trial errors, when considered together, may require reversal of the
defendant's conviction when the totality of the circumstances establish that the defendant
was substantially prejudiced by the errors and denied a fair trial. In assessing the
cumulative effect of errors during the trial, appellate courts examine the errors in context
and consider how the trial judge dealt with the errors as they arose; the nature and
number of errors and whether they are interrelated; and the overall strength of the
evidence. If any of the errors being aggregated are constitutional in nature, the party
benefitting from the error must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the cumulative
effect did not affect the outcome. State v. Alfaro-Valleda, 314 Kan. 526, 551-52, 502
P.3d 66 (2022).

       B. The cumulative error rule does not apply.

       If, as here, there are no errors or only a single error, the cumulative error rule does
not apply. State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021). Because we
assumed, without finding, that there was only a single trial error—the State's erroneous
questioning of a witness during cross-examination—which we found to be harmless, the
cumulative error rule does not apply.

                                              20
VI.    THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING SEARS' MOTIONS FOR
       DEPARTURE

       Sears' next argument on appeal is that the district court erred when it denied his
motion for a departure to the grid and for a further durational departure.

       A. We review whether the court abused its discretion.

       When deciding a motion to depart in a Jessica's Law case, the district court must
first review the mitigating circumstances without any attempt to weigh them against any
aggravating circumstances. Then the district court determines, based upon all of the facts
of the case, whether the mitigating circumstances rise to the level of "'substantial and
compelling reasons'" to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence. State v. Powell,
308 Kan. 895, 913-14, 425 P.3d 309 (2018) (citing State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 324, 342
P.3d 935 [2015]).

       An appellate court reviews the determination of whether substantial and
compelling reasons to depart exist in a Jessica's Law case for an abuse of discretion. 308
Kan. at 902. That said, the district court does not err simply because it fails to announce
that it has considered the defendant's mitigation evidence without weighing that evidence
against any aggravating factors. In fact, K.S.A. 21-6627(d)(1) does not oblige a district
court to state any of its reasons for denying a departure motion. 308 Kan. at 908.

       B. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

       To grant a departure in a Jessica's Law case, the district court must find substantial
and compelling reasons exist to depart from the mandatory minimum. K.S.A. 21-
6627(d)(1). "The term 'substantial' refers to something that is real, not imagined;
something with substance and not ephemeral. The term 'compelling' implies that the court

                                             21
is forced, by the facts of a case, to leave the status quo or go beyond what is ordinary."
State v. McKay, 271 Kan. 725, 728, 26 P.3d 58 (2001).

       Under K.S.A. 21-6627, a defendant who is over the age of 18 and is convicted of
certain crimes involving a child under the age of 14 "shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for life with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not less than
25 years" unless the crime is a first-time conviction of one of the listed crimes and there
are substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the mandatory sentence. K.S.A. 21-
6627(a)(1), (d)(1).

       Sears raised several factors to support his motion for departure. First, he argued
that he had no significant criminal history because these were his first convictions. He
then argued that the amount of harm suffered was less than usual because A.S. recanted
her allegations and did not display signs of abuse that her therapist could see. Similarly,
according to Sears, C.B. did not attempt to distance herself from Sears' family and C.B.'s
mother did not notice any change in C.B.'s behavior. Sears also pointed to his extensive
employment history and military commendations as a "testament to the service he has
provided the nation." Finally, he argued that Dr. Mark David Goodman's testimony that
Sears was a very low risk to the community and a very low risk of committing a future
sex offense was a sufficient reason to depart.

       The district court determined that Sears' lack of criminal history was not a
substantial and compelling factor because "if the legislature's intent was to give a
departure to all people with no prior criminal history, it would have created a special
category" for them. On appeal, Sears argues that the district court's determination was an
abuse of discretion because it confuses the concept of a sentencing departure, which is
decided on a case-by-case basis, and a presumptive sentence.

                                             22
       But when examining the context of the district court's comments, it is clear that the
court did base its decision on the facts of this particular case. The district court stated:

               "I feel like if the legislature's intent was to give a departure to all people with no
       prior criminal history, it would have created a special category for those who fall into the
       criminal history I category. And I would find this argument related to his lack of criminal
       history to be more persuasive if Mr. Sears had been convicted of only one offense, but in
       this case he was convicted of six offenses, some of which occurred on the same day,
       others which occurred on different days over the course of time.

               "So this was not a one-time lapse in judgment, it was a pattern of conduct, and
       for that reason I find that the lack of criminal history, in light of the number of counts that
       he was convicted of, is not a substantial and compelling factor."

       Beyond that, the district court considered Sears' other arguments and found them
unpersuasive. The court disagreed that the degree of harm to A.S. and C.B. was less than
typical because the jury found the defendant guilty of abusing A.S. over a period of time
and C.B.'s victim impact statement revealed that the abuse had significant psychological
impact on her. Nor did Dr. Goodman's testimony sway the court because it was
"incongruent with the verdict" and Dr. Goodman acknowledged that his testing was not
foolproof. The district court also considered, and dismissed, Sears' argument that a
departure was appropriate given his military service and employment history due to the
nature of the crimes. Finally, the court discounted the victim's support of leniency since it
was a "mixed bag" with A.S. in favor of a departure while C.B. was not.

       After examining the record, we find the district court's denial of Sears' motion for
departure was not an abuse of discretion. The court did not deny the motion by
mistakenly treating Sears' sentence as a presumptive sentence. Instead, the court
considered Sears' arguments, including his lack of criminal history, and found them
wanting. The court considered each of Sears' arguments and found that they were not

                                                     23
substantial or compelling reasons to depart under the circumstances. Sears has failed to
establish that the court committed an error of fact, an error of law, or that its decision was
unreasonable.

VII.   SEARS FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE HIS ARGUMENT THAT KORA VIOLATES
       THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
       STATES CONSTITUTION

       For his next argument on appeal, Sears argues his rights under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution are violated because he is required to
register as a sex offender under the Kansas Offender Registration Act.

       A. Sears did not properly preserve this argument.

       Sears acknowledges that he did not object to his registration requirement before
the district court. However, he argues that this court should address his arguments
because (1) it involves only a question of law on proved or admitted facts and is
determinative of the case and (2) consideration of the claim is necessary to prevent the
denial of fundamental rights. See State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068
(2015).

       B. We decline to review this issue for the first time on appeal.

       Several appellants have raised similar First Amendment challenges to KORA,
which has led this court to repeatedly decline to review the issue for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Harpe, No. 124,732, 2023 WL 5992237, at *8 (Kan. App. 2023)
(unpublished opinion), rev. denied 318 Kan. ___ (February 2, 2024). In State v. Pearson,
No. 125,033, 2023 WL 2194306, at *1 (Kan. App.), petition for rev. filed March 20,
2023, this court stated that it was refraining from addressing the issue for the first time on
appeal because:

                                             24
               "Identifying the compelling governmental interests KORA is meant to protect
       and then determining whether it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve those interests
       involves examining a host of issues best explored first at the district court level.
       Analyzing the proportionality of KORA requires an in-depth balancing of its benefits and
       costs, along with exploring potential alternatives to achieving those benefits and the
       accompanying costs and anticipated effectiveness of those alternatives. It may even
       involve evaluating KORA's effectiveness in protecting the compelling governmental
       interests it is meant to serve, which could involve the presentation of evidence and fact-
       finding. And '[f]act-finding is simply not the role of the appellate courts.' [Citations
       omitted.]"

       As this court noted in Harpe, the fact-finding aspect is especially important "given
that this court has also declined to review this argument while noting that it has weak
legal support." Harpe, 2023 WL 5992237, at *8. In State v. Masterson, No. 124,257,
2022 WL 3692859, at *2 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 316 Kan. 762
(2022), this court stated that because "Masterson raises this issue for the first time on
appeal, we need not address this issue. . . . Nevertheless, if we were to address this issue,
it is legally and fatally flawed." (Emphasis added.) Most notably, federal courts have
previously upheld the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, the federal
equivalent to KORA. See United States v. Fox, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1221-24 (D. Kan.
2018). KORA has also survived a compelled speech challenge in the federal court
system. Davis v. Thompson, No. 19-3051-SAC, 2019 WL 6327420, at *3 (D. Kan. 2019)
(unpublished opinion).

       "Laws that compel speech are constitutional only if they can survive strict
scrutiny." Harpe, 2023 WL 5992237, at *8; see Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994). Strict scrutiny would
require the State to show a compelling government interest that justifies restricting Sears'
First Amendment rights, and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 680, 440 P.3d 461 (2019).

                                                    25
Because Sears did not challenge the KORA requirement below, that type of fact-finding
is not available in the appellate record. Like the court in Harpe, we decline to address the
issue for the first time on appeal.

VIII. SEARS FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE HIS ARGUMENT THAT KORA VIOLATES
      THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
      UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

       For his final argument on appeal, Sears argues that KORA violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
because some offenders are able to petition to remove themselves from the registry while
others, such as Sears, are unable to do so.

       A. Our review of this issue is unlimited.

       Whether a statute violates equal protection is a question of law over which
appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Mueller, 271 Kan. 897, 902-03, 27 P.3d
884 (2001).

       B. Sears did not properly preserve this argument.

       Like in his compelled speech argument, Sears acknowledges that he failed to raise
this issue before the district court but urges this court to address it for the first time on
appeal.

       C. We decline to review this issue for the first time on appeal.

       Sears argues that the KORA requirement results in different treatment for
similarly situated individuals. He argues that drug offenders and certain out-of-state
offenders may be purged from KORA registration under certain circumstances while sex
                                               26
offenders are not given the same opportunity. But, like this court found in Harpe, the
equal protection argument also requires additional fact development. See Harpe, 2023
WL 5992237, at *9.

       Appellate courts apply a rational basis test to equal protection challenges to a
criminal statute when there is no suspect class at issue. See State v. Huerta, 291 Kan.
831, 834, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011). Statutes "may treat similarly situated individuals
differently, without violating equal protection, if the classifications distinguishing
individuals bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective." Harpe,
2023 WL 5992237, at *9. The party challenging constitutionality bears the burden of
showing more than one set of facts in which the classifications of similarly situated
individuals does not advance a government interest. "Under the rational basis standard,
the party asserting that the statute is unconstitutional has the burden to negate '"every
conceivable basis which might support"' the classification." Alliance Well Service, Inc. v.
Pratt County, Kansas, 61 Kan. App. 2d 454, 476, 505 P.3d 757 (2022).

       Like the defendant in Harpe, Sears "failed to bring this challenge before the
district court" thus "the record is simply not sufficiently developed to allow us to conduct
an adequate rational basis analysis." See Harpe, 2023 WL 5992237, at *9. Accordingly,
we decline to address Sears' argument on appeal.

       In sum, there was substantial evidence to support Sears' convictions. While some
of the evidence presented at trial was cumulative, Sears fails to establish that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting the cumulative evidence at trial. Under the
circumstances of this case, the decision to admit the evidence was reasonable and not
based on an error of law or an error of fact.

       Sears also fails to establish that the State committed reversible prosecutorial error.
The State's comments during closing were fair comments on the evidence presented at

                                                27
trial. The State's comment during cross-examination was brief, properly objected to, and
the district court sustained the objection. Any error made was harmless under the
circumstances.

        Nor did cumulative error deprive Sears of a fair trial. The State's erroneous cross-
examination question was brief, and the district court sustained a quick objection to the
question. A single error is insufficient to show that cumulative error deprived Sears of a
fair trial.

        The district court did not err in denying Sears' motion for departure. The district
court carefully considered Sears' arguments and determined that there were not
substantial and compelling reasons to support a departure to the grid and a further
departure to a reduced grid sentence. The court's decision to deny the departure was not
an abuse of discretion.

        Finally, Sears fails to properly preserve his KORA arguments and we decline to
address them due to a lack of necessary fact-finding before the district court.

        Affirmed.

                                              28