Court Opinion

ID: 9849748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:45:33.199632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.644949
License: Public Domain

I’Anson, J.,
Dissenting
I do not agree with the holding of the majority opinion that the same burden of proof rule respecting suicide on life insurance policies is applicable to actions on accident policies and the double indemnity provisions of life policies, and that we “inferentially, if not explicitly” so held in Brockman and Harless.
The Brockman and Harless opinions do not even “inferentially” support such a conclusion. This court has not heretofore decided the issue involved.
In Brockman the action was brought to recover death benefits under an ordinary life policy which excepted suicide as a risk. Since double indemnity for death resulting from violent, external and accidental means was not in issue, Brockman is not in point and further discussion of it is unnecessary.
*343In Harless the action was brought on a life policy with a double indemnity clause attached, providing for the payment of an additional amount if death of the insured resulted from bodily injury effected through external, violent and accidental means. The company’s defense was death by suicide within the two-year exclusion clause of the policy. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court sustained the company’s motion to strike out plaintiff’s evidence and . held as a matter of law that the company had successfully carried the burden of proof by clear and satisfactory evidence that suicide was the cause of death. In affirming the trial court, we did not discuss the question as to the burden of proof (or persuasion) under the double indemnity provisions of the policy, although this question was raised in the defendant’s brief, because it was unnecessary to the decision. Once the insurer had borne its burden of proving suicide by clear and satisfactory evidence as to the principal action under the life policy, the double indemnity claim necessarily failed.
The majority has established a rule, contrary to the great weight of authority, that the same burden of proof rule respecting suicide adopted in actions on life policies is applicable in actions on accident insurance policies or the double indemnity provisions of life policies, without recognizing that the risks assumed are quite different. There is a clear and rational distinction between actions on life insurance contracts providing for the payment of stipulated benefits in the event of death, but excepting death by suicide, and contracts like the present one which insure against death by violent, external and accidental means. As to the former contracts, since death is the insured event, the plaintiff-beneficiary need only prove death while the defendant-insurer has from the inception the burden of proof as to suicide which is there raised as an affirmative defense; whereas under the latter contracts, since the risk insured against is not death alone but accidental death, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff-beneficiary to prove that death was accidental. See Hinds v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A. 2d 721, 85 A.L.R. 2d 703, 710 (1959); Beaver v. Fidelity Life Association, 313 F. 2d 111 (10 Cir. 1963); Headlee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 S. D. 499, 12 N. W. 2d 313, 315 (1943); Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 206 Minn. 562, 289 N. W. 557 (1939); Watkins v. Prudential Ins., Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644, 649, 95 A.L.R. 869, 875 (1934); Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F. 2d 724, 103 A.L.R. 171 (4 Cir. 1935).
*344Traditionally, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff who alleges in his pleadings the existence of a certain fact or the truth of a particular proposition. Moreover, this burden remains during the entire trial on the party who assumes it in the first instance and never shifts to the adverse party. It is only the duty of going forward with the evidence that may shift from one party to another during the course of the trial. Hall v. Hall, 181 Va. 67, 80, 23 S. E. 2d 810, 815, 816 (1943); Brooks v. Worthington, 206 Va. 352, 359, 143 S. E. 2d 841, 847 (1965); 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 123, 124, pp. 154-156.
The plaintiff-beneficiary here was aided by the presumption against suicide and in favor of accidental death, but I cannot agree that the presumption had the weight and effect of shifting to the defendant-insurer the burden of proving suicide. The majority in effect has said that the party having the benefit of the presumption may rely upon it alone and need not produce further proof when contravening proof is introduced by the opposing party. Such holding runs counter to the established principle that the burden of proof, as distinguished from the burden of going forward with the evidence, never shifts from the proponent to the party against whom the presumption operates. The holding is also contrary to the great weight of authority that the presumption against suicide does not remove the burden from the plaintiff of proving death by accidental means in actions on accidental death policies or for double indemnity benefits under life policies. O’Brien v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of United States, 212 F. 2d 383 (8 Cir. 1954); Ward v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 352 S.W. 2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Combined Am. Ins. Co. v. Blanton, 163 Tex. 225, 353 S.W. 2d 847 (1962); Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, supra; Tower v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 125 W. Va. 563, 26 S.E. 2d 512 (1943); 21 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 12157, pp. 113-115, and the numerous cases there cited.
The provision in the policy excepting suicide, sane or insane, is not an exception under the general risk covered, but a definite limitation. Death by suicide is clearly not accidental. Hence suicide is not an affirmative defense under an accident policy. Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 42 Cal. 2d 460, 267 P. 2d 777, 785 (1954); Hrybar v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St. 437, 24 Ohio Ops. 437, 45 N.E.2d 114 (1942); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 742, 743 (1943).
The majority justifies its holding that the burden on the defendant should be the same in each instance by stating that if we invest the *345beneficiary of a life insurance policy with a firm presumption against suicide, we should accord the same presumption to the beneficiary of an accidental death policy.
I do not agree with this reasoning. In an action on a life policy the plaintiff-beneficiary only has to prove death to make out her case because suicide is an excepted risk under such a policy and is an affirmative defense which the insurer is required to prove from the very outset. Thus the burden of persuasion is not on the insurer because of the presumption. It would be strange indeed to speak of a presumption as allocating the burden of proof to a party upon whom it clearly rests before the presumption arose. Presumptions operate against the party not having the burden of persuasion on the particular issue. It has been aptly stated that to hold that a presumption operates against a party already having the burden of persuasion is “like throwing a handkerchief on a man already covered with a blanket.”
I agree with the majority that “The courts and commentators are in agreement that when [unexplained] death by external and violent means is proven, a presumption arises * * *.” In this situation the presumption against suicide operates in favor of the plaintiff-beneficiary who has the burden of proving accidental death within the terms of the insuring agreement. Suicide is not an affirmative defense under an accident policy and the plaintiff-beneficiary makes out a prima facie case with the aid of the presumption. The majority recognizes that the burden is on a plaintiff-beneficiary to prove accidental death in an action on an accident policy; but the opinion disregards this established principle and the presumption is given greater force and effect than can be justified under the provisions of such a policy.
The majority further says that if the same burden of proof rule applicable to actions on life policies is not applied to accident policies or the double indemnity provisions of life policies, an anomalous situation would be created in actions to recover under life policies with double indemnity benefits. The opinion states that it would be difficult for a judge to instruct the jury, but “Assuming that such instruction could be framed, it is unreasonable to expect a jury of laymen to draw the fine distinctions that would be demanded of them.”
I disagree. In such actions the plaintiff may rely upon accidental death by external violence as a basis for recovery of double the amount of the face of the policy, and the defendant may rely on suicide as a defense to the entire claim. In such event the burden of persuasion rests upon the plaintiff to bring himself within the double indemnity provisions, and upon the defendant to bring itself within the protec*346tion of the suicide clause. If the jury are satisfied that the death was accidental, their verdict should be for the plaintiff for the full amount. If, on the contrary, they are satisfied from the evidence that the cause of death was suicide, they should find for the defendant. But, if the minds of the jury are in a state of equipoise and they are unable to determine from the evidence whether the death was accidental or suicidal, they should find not for the full amount but only for the face amount of the policy; in such event the plaintiff will have failed to meet the burden of persuasion as to accident, and the defendant will have failed to meet the burden of persuasion as to suicide.
I do not think that by so instructing the jury they would be confused. The principles stated are not conflicting. Juries are quite often called upon to draw “fine” distinctions because of the principles of law involved in a case. For instance, in a tort action where there are two defendants a jury may be told that in order to find a verdict against one the plaintiff must prove gross negligence, while as to the other only simple negligence. To carry it a step further, a jury may have to decide whether the negligence of one defendent was a proximate or remote cause of the accident. Other illustrations could be multiplied, but they would serve no useful purpose. Such situations require juries to make fine distinctions, but we have not abandoned the principles because they might confuse the jury.
I agree with the majority that whether the insured’s death was accidental or suicidal was a jury question, but I would reverse the judgment and remand the case to the court below for a new trial solely because the jury was misdirected.
Eggleston, C.J., and Gordon, J., concur in this dissent.
*347Rules of Court
Order Amending
VIRGINIA:
.In the Supreme Court of Appeals held at the Supreme Court of Appeals Building in the City of Richmond on Wednesday the 16th day of October, 1968.
It is ordered that the Rules adopted and promulgated by this Court ■on the 13 th day of October, 1949, to become effective on the 1st day of February, 1950, be and they are hereby amended, effective the 2nd day of January, 1969.
Amend § 1 of Rule 5:3 to read as follows:
§ 1. Form and Contents of Petition. Except as provided in this Rule, and except when the appeal is a matter of right, the form, contents and length of the petition for appeal shall conform in all respects to the requirements for the appellant’s opening brief, but need not be printed. The petition for appeal may be adopted as and in lieu of the opening brief if the election to do so is stated in the manner required by § 2 of this Rule. If so adopted it shall be printed and distributed as the record is printed and distributed under Rule 5:12, § 4, except that it shall be printed under separate cover.
Amend § 2 of Rule 5:3 by adding a new subsection to be designated Subsection (d) as follows:
(d) Whether or not supersedeas is requested.
Amend § 5 of Rule 5:3 to read as follows:
§ 5. Brief in Opposition. Within fourteen days from the date on which the copy of the petition is mailed or delivered to opposing counsel, he may file a written brief in opposition to granting the appeal but will not be heard orally. Within the same time he shall mail or deliver a copy to counsel for petitioner. In a criminal case, the Commonwealth’s Attorney shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen days from the date a copy of the petition is mailed or delivered to him. The brief may be filed with the clerk of this Court or presented to the Justice to whom the petition was presented. Except by special permission of a Justice, the brief shall *348not exceed twenty-five pages, excluding appendices setting forth exhibits or other documents. If the brief exceeds ten pages, it shall contain a subject index and table of cases alphabetically arranged.
When it clearly appears that an appeal ought to be allowed without further delay, an appeal may be allowed prior to the filing of the brief in opposition.
Amend Rule 5:10 to read as follows:
Rule 5:10. Oral Argument.
Except by special permission of the Court, not more than forty minutes will be allowed each side for oral argument. The time may be apportioned between counsel on the same side at their discretion, except that only one counsel may present the opening argument for the appellant and he shall make a fair opening of the case.
In no case is it necessary or proper to read the record to the Court, but counsel may refer thereto and state what they consider proved. It is recommended that counsel select and cite only the most pertinent authorities.
Any party may waive his privilege of oral argument.
Amend Rule 5:12 by adding a new section to be designated Section 3A as follows:
§ 3A. Length of Briefs. Except by special permission of a justice, neither the opening brief of the appellant nor the brief of the appellee shall exceed fifty pages, nor shall the reply brief (if any) of the appellant exceed fifteen pages, excluding appendices setting forth exhibits or other documents.
In pursuance of the provisions of the Code of 1950, § 8-86.1, it is ordered that the amendments to the Rules as adopted shall be certified to every court of record in this State.
A Copy,
Teste:
H. G. Turner, Clerk