Court Opinion

ID: 9838537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 18:07:48.044037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:38.065793
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/6/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION EIGHT

 BRIAN RANGER,                           B315302

         Plaintiff and Appellant,        Los Angeles County
                                         Super. Ct. No. 19STCV22806
         v.

 ALAMITOS BAY YACHT CLUB,

         Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
      Krissman & Silver LLP, Jarod Krissman and Kathie Sierra
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Cox, Wootton, Lerner, Griffin & Hansen, LLP, Neil S.
Lerner and Mitchell S. Griffin for Defendant and Respondent.
                       ____________________
      Brian Ranger fell while stepping from a dock to a boat. He
sued his employer—a yacht club in Long Beach—under federal
admiralty law. The state trial court correctly sustained the club’s
demurrer. Congress’s 1984 legislation remitted Ranger to the
exclusivity of workers’ compensation.
       The Alamitos Bay Yacht Club hired Ranger as a
maintenance worker. He helped the club with its fleet by
painting, cleaning, maintaining, repairing, unloading, and
mooring vessels. One day, Ranger used a hoist to lower a club
boat into navigable waters. He stepped from the dock onto its
bow, fell, was hurt, and applied for workers’ compensation. Then
he sued the club in state court on federal claims of negligence and
unseaworthiness. The trial court sustained the club’s final
demurrer to the second amended complaint. The court ruled
there was no admiralty jurisdiction.
       We independently review pleading challenges.
       We affirm the court’s ruling without deciding about
admiralty jurisdiction. That issue is supernumerary, for state
court jurisdiction is assured in every event, and irrelevant given
our holding. (See Madruga v. Superior Court (1954) 346 U.S.
556, 560–561 [state courts may adjudicate in personam maritime
claims]; Gault v. Mod. Cont’l/Roadway Constr. Co., Joint Venture
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 991, 997 [state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction in Jones Act, Longshore Act, and general
maritime law cases].)
       To summarize our analysis, Congress in 1984 specified
employees covered by state workers’ compensation law working
at a “club” are covered by state workers’ compensation law and
not federal law if they are eligible for state workers’
compensation. (33 U.S.C. § 902, subds. 3, 3(B).) Ranger concedes
the yacht club is a “club.” Federal law thus makes California
state workers’ compensation law paramount, which means

                                2
Ranger’s exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation. (Labor
Code, § 3602, subd. (a) [workers’ compensation is exclusive].)
       To set out our analysis in more detail, we begin by defining
admiralty law. The Constitution implicitly directed courts sitting
in admiralty to proceed as common law courts. Where Congress
has not prescribed specific rules, these courts developed an
amalgam of traditional, modified, and new common law rules.
That amalgam is the general maritime law, which is no longer
the exclusive province of federal judges. Congress and the states
legislate extensively in these areas. When exercising their
common law authority, admiralty courts look primarily to
legislative enactments for policy guidance. (Dutra Group v.
Batterton (2019) 139 S.Ct. 2275, 2278 (Batterton).)
       That last point is vital. “In contemporary maritime law,
our overriding objective is to pursue the policy expressed in
congressional enactments . . . .” (Batterton, supra, 139 S.Ct. at pp.
2285–2286, italics added.)
       A congressional enactment does guide our decision.
Congress enacted the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act of March 4, 1927 (Longshore Act), which
established a workers’ compensation program for “any person
engaged in maritime employment.” (See Swanson v. Marra
Brothers (1946) 328 U.S. 1, 5–6; 33 U.S.C. §§ 902, 905.)
       Congress amended the Longshore Act in 1972 and again in
1984. The 1972 amendments extended the coverage of the
Longshore Act but created uncertainty about the boundaries of
that extension. (E.g., Director v. Perini North River Associates
(1983) 459 U.S. 297, 305–325 (Perini).)

                                 3
        Congress later learned the 1972 law had created “a general
confusion as to whether or not the Longshore Act applies.”
(Sen.Rep. No. 98-81, 1st. Sess., p. 29 (1983) (Sen.Rep. 98-81).)
        “[T]he decade of experience under the 1972 Amendments
has vividly demonstrated that the effort to eliminate benefit
disparity and to promote systemic uniformity has exacted a price
. . . . The rules of coverage . . . have been a . . . prolific generator
of litigation. . . . ¶ This situation presents an unsatisfactory state
of affairs. Uncertainty of coverage fosters continued litigation,
with attendant expense and delay that is a burden to employers,
their insurance carriers, and claimants. Further, it was
repeatedly voiced at the hearings that employers were often
unsure whether to obtain [Longshore Act] insurance coverage.
Even when they opted for such insurance, they generally found
that the premiums were inordinately expensive. Or, in many
instances, employers were unable to buy insurance coverage,
because the insurance companies did not want to be faced with
vagaries of coverage.” (Sen.Rep. 98-81, supra, pp. 24–25, internal
quotation marks and footnotes omitted.)
        In 1984, Congress responded by introducing a degree of
clarity: Congress sharpened the Longshore Act’s focus to exclude
employees who, although they happened to work on or next to
navigable waters, lacked a sufficient nexus to maritime
navigation and commerce. In response to the experiences of
many witnesses, Congress adopted what it called a “case-specific
approach.” (Sen.Rep. 98-81, supra, at p. 25.) Congress
determined certain categories of activities identified by witnesses
did not merit coverage under the Longshore Act and “the
employees involved are more aptly covered under appropriate
state compensation laws.” (Ibid., italics added.)

                                   4
       The 1984 statute thus carved out specific employee
categories, placed them beyond the coverage of the Longshore
Act, and assigned these employees to the “appropriate state
compensation laws.” (Sen.Rep. 98-81, supra, at p. 25.)
       Among the carveouts were employees working for clubs.
(Sen.Rep. 98-81, supra, at pp. 25–26.)
       Which clubs? All clubs. Initially there was disagreement
between the Senate and the House of Representatives about
whether the Longshore Act should exclude only employees
working at nonprofit clubs. (H.R.Rep. No. 98-570, 1st Sess., p. 4
(1983) (H.R.Rep. 98-570).) The Senate wanted a broader
approach but the House initially favored the narrower one. The
Senate’s view prevailed: the exclusion applies to all club
employees and is not limited to nonprofits. (H.R.Rep. No. 98-
1027, 2d Sess., p. 23 (1983) (H.R.Rep. 98-1027).)
       We now quote the textual result: the pertinent provision—
subsection three of section 902 of the Longshore Act—as it stands
after the 1984 amendments. Our italics highlight key words.
       “The term ‘employee’ means any person engaged in
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other
person engaged in longshoring operations, . . . but such term does
not include—
       “(A) individuals employed exclusively to perform office
clerical, secretarial, security, or data processing work;
       “(B) individuals employed by a club, camp, recreational
operation, restaurant, museum, or retail outlet;
       “(C) individuals employed by a marina and who are not
engaged in construction, replacement, or expansion of such
marina (except for routine maintenance);

                                5
      “(D) individuals who (i) are employed by suppliers,
transporters, or vendors, (ii) are temporarily doing business on
the premises of an employer described in paragraph (4), and (iii)
are not engaged in work normally performed by employees of that
employer under this Act;
      “(E) aquaculture workers;
      “(F) individuals employed to build any recreational vessel
under sixty-five feet in length . . . ;
      “(G) a master or member of a crew of any vessel; or
      “(H) any person engaged by a master to load or unload or
repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net;
      “if individuals described in clauses (A) through (F) are
subject to coverage under a State workers’ compensation law.”
(33 U.S.C. § 902, subd. (3), italics added.)
      Paring this statute to its relevant essence shows the
Longshore Act does not cover club employees subject to state
workers’ compensation coverage. (33 U.S.C. § 902, subd. (3)(B).)
Congress determined in 1984 club employees “are more aptly
covered under appropriate state compensation laws” because
these employees lack “a sufficient nexus to maritime navigation
and commerce.” (Sen.Rep. 98-81, supra, at p. 25, italics added.)
Under California’s workers’ compensation law, employees may
not sue their employers in tort. (See Labor Code §§ 3351, 3600,
subd. (a).)
      This analysis of statutory language and history
demonstrates Ranger cannot sue his employer in tort. The trial
court correctly sustained the demurrer against Ranger.
      This result makes good sense. Ranger asserts federal law
preempts state law in this case, but national and state interests
do not clash here. Federal and state law are in accord. For

                               6
employees like Ranger, both Congress and the California
legislature have replaced the fault-based regime of tort with the
no-fault alternative of workers’ compensation. Both bodies have
preferred the virtues of speedy, predictable, and efficient
compensation for occupational accident victims like Ranger. The
“underlying philosophy [is] social protection rather than righting
a wrong.” (1 Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law (2023) chapter
1, syn.) The Longshore Act, its 1984 amendments, and California
workers’ compensation law all share this philosophy. This
federalism is harmonious, not discordant. (Cf. Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine (2002) 537 U.S. 51, 70 [a federal concern with
uniformity does not justify displacing state law remedies that
compensate accident victims and also serve prominent federal
objectives].)
       Ranger counters this analysis by repeatedly stressing the
importance of “uniformity” of the general maritime law. In this
quest, Ranger relies on Green v. Vermilion Corp. (5th Cir. 1998)
144 F.3d 332, 334–341 (Green).
       We respectfully but profoundly differ with Green. We
therefore also part ways with Freeze v. Lost Isle Partners (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 45, 51-52 (Freeze), which relied on Green without
adding to its analysis.
       We begin with Green’s facts. Sam Green worked as a cook
and watchman at a Louisiana duck hunting camp. He traveled
by boat to the camp, which was in a marshy area. Green also
assisted with mooring and unloading supply boats at the camp.
Green boarded a boat, slipped, fell, and was hurt. He sued his
employer, the Vermilion Corporation, under the Longshore Act
and for general maritime claims of negligence and
unseaworthiness. The trial court granted the defense motion for

                                7
summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed and permitted
Green to prosecute his maritime claims for unseaworthiness and
negligence. This appellate decision preempted the state law.
(Green, supra, 144 F.3d at pp. 333–341.)
      Green has encountered a mixed reception. Some later
courts apply it. (E.g., Moore v. Capital Finishes, Inc. (2010) 699
F.Supp.2d 772, 780–783.) Others reject it. (E.g., Valcan v.
Harvey’s Casino (S.D.Iowa 2000) 2000 WL 33673727, p. *1.)
      In particular, we join with the contrary result in
Brockington v. Certified Electric, Inc. (11th Cir. 1990) 903 F.2d
1523, 1527–1533 (Brockington). Green criticized Brockington.
(Green, supra, 144 F.3d at pp. 336–341.) A respected maritime
treatise praised Brockington as “an excellent example of
admiralty preemption analysis.” (1 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and
Maritime Law (6th ed. 2022 supp) § 4:5, Preemption in
admiralty, fn. 12.) Brockington balanced the comparative federal
and state interests to conclude admiralty law did not preempt a
state workers’ compensation statute. (Brockington, supra, 903
F.2d at pp. 1529–1533.) We submit Brockington’s result is valid
and Green’s is not.
      Like Ranger, the Green court emphasized “uniformity.”
The Green opinion used this word six times. (Green, supra, 144
F.3d at pp. 337, 341.) And like Ranger, the Green opinion
conceived of “uniformity” as meaning that national power, as
defined by judges, must displace the works of state legislatures.
      We reject Green’s and Ranger’s conception of uniformity,
which lacks the ability logically to discriminate. This kind of
uniformity is a one-way street, not a useful method of analysis: it
always insists on national uniformity, regardless of context, and
it always disfavors state power, which can be sound and richly

                                 8
diverse. (Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo (5th Cir.1987) 817
F.2d 307, 317–18, rev’d on other grounds, (1988) 486 U.S. 140
[uniformity is not an end in itself, for otherwise state law would
always be preempted].)
       Green’s approach clashes with our deep national strain of
federalism that celebrates states as laboratories of
experimentation. (E.g., National Pork Producers Council v. Ross
(2023) 143 S.Ct. 1142, 1160 [citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann
(1932) 285 U.S. 262, 311 (dis. opn. of Brandeis, J.)]; Fisher v.
University of Texas (2016) 579 U.S. 365, 388 [same].)
       Green’s notion of uniformity also collides with the kind of
uniformity praised in modern Supreme Court admiralty decisions
like Batterton, where the “uniformity” sought is with policies
enacted by democratically-elected representatives. (See
Batterton, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 2284.) This kind of uniformity is
sensible, as it seeks to anchor the law of admiralty in the
legitimacy of the electoral process.
       To be sure, Green’s and Ranger’s conception of “uniformity”
has antique support, but age has rotted some of those old
timbers. Green sought guidance from many Supreme Court
decisions around the Lochner era. (Green, supra, 144 F.3d at pp.
339–340 [citing over a dozen opinions dating from 1916 to 1936].)
From this survey Green concluded “the constant theme of these
Supreme Court opinions is that the uniformity of admiralty law
must be preserved and that state law may be applied only where
it works no material prejudice to the essential features of the
general maritime law.” (Green, supra, 144 F.3d at pp. 340–341,
italics added and internal quotation marks omitted.)
       These Lochner-era decisions lack modern force. Their
exemplar is Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U.S. 205

                                 9
(Jensen), an infamous 5-4 holding in favor of a steamship owner
against a worker who was killed unloading that ship. The state
of New York awarded state workers’ compensation to Jensen’s
widow and children. The railroad protested these awards were
unconstitutional. (Id. at pp. 209–210.) The Jensen majority
agreed and struck New York’s law as unconstitutional. (Id. at pp.
217–218.)
       The Jensen decision is infamous by virtue of Holmes’s
“celebrated” dissent. (Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty
(2d ed. 1975) p. 406.) Holmes wrote that the “common law is not
a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified . . . .”
(Jensen, supra, 244 U.S. at p. 222, italics added.) Holmes
dismissed “the specter of a lack of uniformity.” (Id. at p. 223.)
Instead, he posed the crucial question and gave the crucial
answer: “Taking it as established that a state has constitutional
power to pass laws giving rights and imposing liabilities for acts
done upon the high seas when there were no such rights or
liabilities before, what is there to hinder its doing so in the case
of a maritime tort? Not the existence of an inconsistent law
emanating from a superior source, that is, from the United
States. There is no such law.” (Id. at p. 220, italics added.)
Holmes acknowledged the common law power of judges but
accused the majority of exceeding that power: “I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they
can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to
molecular motions.” (Id. at p. 221.)
       The Jensen majority resorted to more than molecular
judicial motion. It engaged in wholesale judicial arrogation, as
the dissenting Holmes demonstrated in this and other cases of

                                10
the era. (E.g., Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45, 75 (dis.
opn. of Holmes, J.) [“This case is decided upon an economic theory
which a large part of the country does not entertain”];
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (1920) 253 U.S. 149, 166-170
(dis. opn. of Holmes, J.).) As elsewhere, Holmes’s dissents are a
better guide to modern law than the Lochner-era majority
opinions that sparked them. (E.g., Abrams v. United States
(1919) 250 U.S. 616, 624-631 (dis. opn. of Holmes, J.) [proposing
the clear-and-present-danger test for the First Amendment];
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) 261 U.S. 525, 567–570 (dis.
opn. of Holmes, J.) [“The question in this case is the broad one,
whether Congress can establish minimum rates of wages for
women”].)
       Another Lochner-era decision Green cited is Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl (1925) 266 U.S. 449, 457 (Dahl). (See
Green, supra, 144 F.3d at p. 339.) In Dahl, the Supreme Court
barred states from enlarging or impairing rights and remedies
arising from general maritime law. “However, Dahl was decided
in 1925, when the Supreme Court’s concept of tort jurisdiction did
not permit state law to apply seaward beyond the ship’s
gangplank, a border known as the Jensen line. . . . This limited
view of state jurisdiction was discredited almost as soon as it was
established, but nevertheless spawned many complex,
contradictory and inconsistent decisions that have been described
as one of the most depressing branches of federal jurisprudence.
Given the developments in admiralty jurisdiction over the past 80
years, Dahl is no longer reliable precedent. As the Supreme
Court itself stated . . . , the decisions between 1917 and 1926
produced no reliable determinant of valid state law coverage.”

                                11
(Gravatt v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 1998 WL 171491,
p. *11, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
       Green’s mistaken conception of “uniformity” is reason
enough to depart from it, but other flaws also corrode its appeal.
       Green failed to grapple with the governing statute: the
1984 amendments to the Longshore Act. Green cited those
amendments but did not appreciate their significance. (See
Green, supra, 144 F.3d at pp. 334-335.) To recap, the 1984
amendments excluded camp (and club) employees from the
Longshore Act’s workers’ compensation system and relegated
them to coverage under state workers’ compensation laws, which
are exclusive of tort. (33 U.S.C. § 902, subd. (3).) Green did not
consider this directive from Congress.
       Nor did Green mention the statements in the 1984
legislative history that club and camp workers like Green “are
more aptly covered under appropriate state compensation laws.”
(E.g., Sen.Rep. 98-81, supra, at p. 25, italics added.) That
appropriate Louisiana state law directed that workers’
compensation was exclusive. (See Green, supra, 144 F.3d at pp.
337, 338.) This authoritative legislative history contradicted
Green’s conclusion.
       Green also relied, incorrectly, on legislative history
pertaining to the 1972 amendments, not the 1984 amendments.
(Green, supra, 144 F.3d at p. 338 [quoting “H.R.Doc. 92–1441,
92th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4707,” italics
added].) The proper guides to the 1984 amendments are the 1984
Senate and conference reports. The 1972 amendments were the
problem, not the solution.
       Apart from Green and Freeze, Ranger cites cases predating
1984. These authorities deal with old superseded law, not the

                               12
new governing law. (E.g., Perini, supra, 459 U.S. at pp. 305–325;
Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson (1982) 457 U.S. 668; Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki (1946) 328 U.S. 85; Davis v. Dept. of
Labor and Industries of Washington (1942) 317 U.S. 249; Calbeck
v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1962) 370 U.S. 114; Aparicio v. Swan
Lake (5th Cir. 1981) 643 F.2d 1109, 1113–1118; Thibodaux v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (5th Cir. 1978) 580 F.2d 841, 843–848;
Hamilton v. County of Los Angeles (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 982,
996–997.)
      In sum, California’s workers’ compensation law is Ranger’s
exclusive remedy. Congress in 1984 decreed this state law aptly
covers his situation. A core part of the state workers’
compensation bargain is that injured workers get speedy and
predictable relief irrespective of fault. In return, workers are
barred from suing their employers in tort. The trial court
correctly dismissed Ranger’s tort suit against his employer.
                          DISPOSITION
      We affirm and award costs to the respondent.

                                         WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

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