Court Opinion

ID: 9430788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:35.87889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.875197
License: Public Domain

*536Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
The Court’s disposition of this case raises two troublesome questions.
First, why did the Court decide to exercise its discretion to grant review in this case? The facts of the case are surely unique. They do not give rise to any issue of general or recurring significance. There is no conflict among the state or federal courts on how the narrow question presented should be resolved. It is merely a case in which one State Supreme Court arguably granted more protection to a citizen accused of crime than the Federal Constitution requires.1 The State “asks us to rule that the state court interpreted federal rights too broadly and ‘overprotected’ the citizen.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). If this is a sufficient reason for adding a case to our already overcrowded docket, we will need, not one, but several newly fashioned “intercircuit tribunals” to keep abreast of our work.
Second, why was respondent’s request for the assistance of counsel any less ambiguous than the request in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981)? In that case, the defendant said that he wanted an attorney “‘before making a deal.’” *537Id., at 479. He also said he would talk to the police ‘“but I don’t want it on tape. ’ ” Ibid. The police interrogation complied with the everyday meaning of both of those conditions; it occurred before Edwards made any “deal” — indeed, he never made a deal — and no tape recording of the session was made. The Court nevertheless found the interrogation objectionable. In this case, respondent requested an attorney before signing a written statement. Why the police’s compliance with the literal terms of that request makes the request — as opposed to the subsequent waiver2 — any less of a request for the assistance of counsel than Edwards’ is not adequately explained in the Court’s opinion. In all events, the Court does not purport to change the governing rule of law that judges must “give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant’s request for counsel.” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, 633 (1986).
I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

 “The central contention of the Petitioner in this action is that the Connecticut Supreme Court unduly expanded the protections accorded criminal defendants under the Fifth Amendment to the United States [Constitution when it determined that this defendant involuntarily waived his right to assistance of counsel at his interrogation. This result was possible only through use of a prophylactic rule which ignored the circumstances of this case.” Pet. for Cert. 5.

 In this case, the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted the trial court’s ruling as embodying a factual finding that respondent had requested the assistance of counsel but thereafter waived his right to counsel. It agreed with that factual determination but held that the subsequent waiver was ineffective as a matter of law. 197 Conn. 50, 60, 495 A. 2d 1044, 1050 (1985).