Court Opinion

ID: 9735291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:08:18.293552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:56.910443
License: Public Domain

SHARPNACK, C.J.,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
I concur with the majority’s resolution of all issues except one, and my disagreement on that issue is only partial. The issue upon which I disagree is whether any claim by the Eblings based upon defective design survives preemption under FIFRA. It is true, as the majority opinion states, that “the majority of jurisdictions have held that FIFRA does not preempt strict product liability claims relating to product design, manufacturing or testing as long as they are not based on inadequacy in the product’s labeling or packaging.” Op. at 900. The cases relied upon by the majority, however, do not focus upon design defect claims that are based upon the doctrine of consumer expectations, under Which liability arises when “the use of [the] product exposes the user or consumer to a risk of physical harm to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases the product with the ordinary knowledge about the product’s characteristics common to the community of consumers.” See Ind.Code § 34-6-2-146; Op. at 900. This issue was discussed in Lescs v. Dow Chem. Co., 976 F.Supp. 393 (W.D.Va.1997), aff'd sub nom Lescs v. William R. Hughes, Inc., 168 F.3d 482 (4th Cir.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 942, 145 L.Ed.2d 819 (2000). In Lescs, the court concluded that any claim based on consumer expectations is preempted by FIFRA. As the court stated,
*911“The court is of the opinion that plaintiff cannot proceed under a consumer expectations theory to show defective design because such a claim is preempted by FIFRA. Dursban, like the product in Papike, complied with federal product labeling and registration requirements. Like the product in Pa-pike, Dursban is regulated by a federal legislative scheme which broadly preempts state claims based on federally approved labeling. For this court to allow a claim-of defective design based on consumer expectations would represent an unwarranted end run around federal preemption. The court is of the opinion that this aspect of plaintiffs claim of unreasonably dangerous design is preempted by FIFRA.”
Id. at 399.
I agree with the Lescs court’s analysis. FIFRA provides the means by which consumers and users are informed of an insecticide’s properties and methods of application. State tort law that permits recovery based on consumer expectations different from those that could be supported by the information required to be set forth on labels by FIFRA is in effect no different than state tort law that allows recovery for failure to make warnings different from or in addition to those set forth on the label. Therefore, to the extent that the majority opinion would permit recovery on a design defect claim based upon consumer expectations, I dissent.
However, our product liability act also provides that “in an action based upon an alleged design defect in the product ... the party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product....” Ind.Code § 34-20-2-2. That language supports the concept of a claim based upon negligence in design where it can be shown that an alternative design was reasonably available that would have eliminated or significantly reduced the risk of harm that was caused to the plaintiff. See FMC Corp. v. Brown, 551 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind.1990) (holding that a jury could reasonably infer that a manufacturer defectively designed a crane where evidence existed that a safer, feasible design was available); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139, 1143 (Ind.1990), reh’g denied (stating that “a claimant [in an automobile design defect case] should be able to demonstrate that a feasible, safer, more practicable product design would have afforded better protection”); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), reh’g denied (holding that a design defect claim based upon the existence of a safer alternative cigarette design was not preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); Dias v. Daisy-Heddon, Inc., 180 Ind.App. 657, 664-665, 390 N.E.2d 222, 226-227 (1979) (noting that “evidence of alternative designs may be relevant to the question of whether the design in question is unreasonably dangerous,” and holding that evidence of a BB gun’s alternative design should have been admitted at trial, although the failure to do so was not error because the evidence was cumulative); Marshall v. Clark, 680 N.E.2d 1102, 1106, (Ind.Ct.App.1997), reh’g denied, 683 N.E.2d 1351, trans. denied, 698 N.E.2d 1186 (following Dias). Such a claim would not be preempted by FIFRA because it would not be based upon inadequacy of warnings or consumer expectations about the product that were in addition to the information concerning the product required by FIFRA. To the extent that the majority would permit a design defect claim based upon alternative design, I concur.