Court Opinion

ID: 9383264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 00:00:37.342267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:44.700961
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40186        Document: 00516693921             Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/29/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                            March 29, 2023
                                       No. 21-40186                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk

   Justin Tyler Davis,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Lieutenant Kristine Gentry, also known as Kristen
   Zambrano,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 2:18-CV-110

   Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Justin Davis, an inmate, sued Lieutenant Kristine Gentry under 42
   U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment rights. Gentry
   now appeals the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on
   qualified immunity.         For the following reasons, we REVERSE and
   REMAND.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                          No. 21-40186

                                            I. Facts
           “Because this case arises from the denial of [Gentry’s] motion for
   summary judgment,” the relevant events are described “in the light most
   favorable to the nonmoving party,” Davis. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
   768 (2014); see also Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2020) (a
   summary judgment case noting: “When assessing an interlocutory appeal for
   qualified immunity,” we “must . . . review the complaint and record to
   determine whether, assuming that all of [the plaintiff’s] factual assertions are
   true, those facts are materially sufficient” to avoid qualified immunity
   (quotation omitted)). We thus set forth the facts as supported by Davis.1
           Davis is incarcerated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In
   August 2016, other inmates severely beat Davis and stabbed him eighteen
   times. Davis was treated at an outside hospital, and prison medical staff
   issued him a temporary medical pass granting him permission to use a
   walking cane. He was also transferred to a new facility for his safety.
           A few days after the transfer, two corrections officers came to Davis’s
   cell to escort him to the showers. While Davis was in his cell, the officers
   attempted to apply “rear-cuff restraints”—in other words, secure Davis’s
   hands behind his back. Because this would prevent Davis from using his

           1
              Our discussion of the facts omits the events following Davis’s fall, which are
   irrelevant to determining the claims that are properly before us. Davis’s complaint alleged
   that Gentry was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety, in violation of his Eighth
   Amendment rights, when she ordered officers to (1) apply rear-cuff restraints despite
   knowing that he needed a walking cane; (2) roll Davis onto his stomach after he fell, injuring
   his arm; and (3) leave his legal mail exposed during a cell search, contributing to his
   subsequent assault. The district court granted summary judgment as to the last claim.
   Additionally, Davis abandoned the second claim by failing to adequately brief it on appeal.
   See Mackey v. Astrue, 486 F. App’x, 421, 423 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that a
   litigant’s failure to press a claim constitutes abandonment on appeal). Accordingly, we
   need only discuss the events relevant to Davis’s first claim.

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                                          No. 21-40186

   cane, Davis asked the officers to use front-cuff restraints instead. They
   refused, and Davis requested a supervisor.                 Shortly thereafter, Gentry
   arrived.2
            Davis informed Gentry about his injury and cane pass. According to
   Davis, Gentry responded, “Well, don’t worry about it, the shower is just
   right there. We’re going to support you.” When Davis continued to protest,
   Gentry threatened Davis with disciplinary action. In response, Davis finally
   submitted to the rear-cuff restraints.
           As the officers were applying the rear-restraints, Davis’s cane fell. Per
   Davis, when he alerted the officers, they did not pick up the cane. Rather,
   they responded, “okay, well, we’ll support you, here we are,” and stood near
   the opening of the cell door “ready to grab [Davis].” When Davis tried to
   take a step, he felt a sharp pain in his leg and fell to the ground. Despite
   Gentry’s and the officers’ prior reassurances, Davis contends that they “just
   let [him] fall down” and “didn’t grab [him] . . . like they said.”

           Gentry called prison medical personnel to assist. Several minutes
   later, nurses arrived and transported Davis to the prison’s medical clinic.
   There, he was prescribed medication and new medical restrictions.
           Davis subsequently filed the underlying § 1983 suit, alleging that
   Gentry violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing him at a substantial
   risk of serious harm by disregarding his medical restriction. Gentry moved
   for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court
   denied the motion as to this claim, concluding there were several genuine
   issues of material fact. Gentry timely appealed.

           2
            Davis testified that he had only resided at the new facility for a few days prior to
   these events. Accordingly, he “wasn’t familiar with [Gentry] and she wasn’t familiar with
   [him].”

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                     II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
            We begin by explaining our limited jurisdiction over this appeal. We
   may review the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified
   immunity only “to the extent that the appeal turns on a question of law.”
   Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
   When, as here, the district court denied summary judgment due to the
   existence of genuine issues of material fact, we may review the
   “material[ity],” but not the “genuine[ness],” of those factual disputes.
   Joseph ex. rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 331 (5th Cir. 2020).
            In assessing the materiality of factual disputes, we “take [Davis’s]
   version of the facts as true and view those facts through the lens of qualified
   immunity.” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (summary judgment case). If Gentry “would still be entitled to qualified
   immunity under this view of the facts, then any disputed fact issues are not
   material, the district court’s denial of summary judgment was improper,”
   and reversal is warranted. Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir.
   2009).
                          III. Law of Qualified Immunity
            Next, we turn to the substantive law dictating whether Gentry is
   entitled to qualified immunity. To determine whether the defense applies on
   a given set of facts, we ask: (1) whether “the official’s conduct violated a
   constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right was clearly established.”
   Cunningham, 983 F.3d at 190–91 (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted). “We can analyze the prongs in either order or resolve the case on
   a single prong.” Id. at 191 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
   also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Given the “fact-bound”
   nature of the constitutional question presented, we take the latter course of
   action here. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 385 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)

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   (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 819). Accordingly, our inquiry focuses solely
   on whether Gentry’s conduct—based on Davis’s version of the facts—
   violated clearly established law.
                           IV. Clearly Established Law
          “The ‘clearly established’ prong is difficult to satisfy.” Cunningham,
   983 F.3d at 191. A constitutional right is only clearly established if it is
   “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
   what [s]he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11
   (2015) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). “The central concept is that of ‘fair
   warning’”—that is, for the law to be clearly established, prior precedent
   must provide officials with “reasonable warning that the conduct then at
   issue violated [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d
   492, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
          Here, the district court determined that Davis satisfied this prong
   because “it is clearly established by the Supreme Court and in the Fifth
   Circuit that deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition violates the
   law.” Davis v. Zambrano, No. 2:18-CV-110, 2020 WL 8513711, at *6 (S.D.
   Tex. Sept. 8, 2020) (citing Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir.
   2006) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)). However, this cursory
   analysis plainly contravenes the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition to
   courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”
   Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quotation omitted).
          “Of course, general statements of the law are not inherently incapable
   of giving fair and clear warning” to officials. White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79
   (2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the
   general rules articulated in Gobert and Estelle “do not by themselves create

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   clearly established law outside an obvious case.”3                    Id. at 80 (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, to satisfy this prong, plaintiffs
   typically must point to a case that is sufficiently factually similar so as to have
   “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix,
   577 U.S. at 12 (quotation omitted).
           Even accepting Davis’s version of the facts, see Walsh, 975 F.3d at 481,
   he has not met this burden.               To establish unconstitutional deliberate
   indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs, Davis needed to
   demonstrate: (1) “objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm,”
   and (2) “that prison officials acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference
   to that risk.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345–46.
           First, it’s plainly not obvious that Davis’s allegations satisfy either
   prong. To be sure, Davis alleges that Gentry demanded that he submit to
   rear-cuff restraints, preventing him from using his prescribed cane.
   However, it is also undisputed that both Gentry and the officers told Davis
   they would support him as he walked to the showers. Moreover, Davis
   himself testified that, as he started to walk, the officers stood near the
   opening of the cell door “ready to grab [him].” Though ultimately futile,

           3
             Though the district court only cites Gobert and Estelle for their general rules, we
   note that their facts are also too inapposite from this case to satisfy the “clearly
   established” prong. First, both cases concluded that the plaintiff failed to plead or establish
   that defendant-officials violated the Constitution. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 343; Estelle, 429 U.S.
   at 107. Additionally, both suits (1) challenged the conduct of medical professionals, not
   non-medical prison officials like Gentry; (2) did not involve situations—like the one at
   hand—in which defendant-officials were attempting to balance prison security concerns
   and the plaintiff’s medical restrictions; and (3) involved scenarios where plaintiffs asserted
   that they repeatedly complained to medical professionals about symptoms to no avail. See
   Gobert, 463 F.3d at 343–44; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99–101. Therefore, these cases could not
   have provided Gentry with “fair warning” that her conduct was illegal.

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   these actions would seem to mitigate any risk of substantial harm by Gentry.
   They also sound in negligence—not recklessness or malice.
           Additionally, Davis fails to point to any caselaw clearly establishing
   that such conduct violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Davis cites five
   precedents he claims provided Gentry with fair warning that her refusal to
   honor his cane pass amounted to unconstitutional medical indifference.4 Yet,
   none of these cases reflect clearly established law under the facts presented
   here (with the officers available to help him get there). First, Monceaux v.
   White, 266 F. App’x 362 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) and Hotchkiss v. David,
   713 F. App’x 501 (7th Cir. 2017) are unpublished, and therefore cannot
   “clearly establish the law.” See Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 525 n.8 (5th
   Cir. 2016). Additionally, both Hotchkiss and Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929
   (7th Cir. 2007) are Seventh Circuit cases (not addressing the qualified
   immunity defense). To be sure, the Supreme Court has indicated that in rare
   instances a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority”—including out-of-
   circuit precedents—can clearly establish the law. See Wilson v Layne, 526
   U.S. 603, 617 (1999); Swanson, 659 F.3d at 371–72 (same). However, Davis

           4
             See Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (denying
   qualified immunity when defendant nurse knowingly failed to treat heart problems);
   Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming damages awarded
   against Dallas County because its medical personnel knowingly failed to comply with
   prescribed treatment of severe ulcers); Monceaux v. White, 266 F. App’x 362, 365–66 (5th
   Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (denying qualified immunity when defendant
   knowingly failed to treat infected thumb); Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929, 931–33 (7th Cir.
   2007) (holding that a plaintiff had cognizable Eighth Amendment claim based, in part, on
   the defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s use of cane “while forcing him to work at a job that
   require[d] walking and lifting”); Hotchkiss v. David, 713 F. App’x 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2017)
   (unpublished) (reversing the district court’s screening dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
   § 1915A(a) due to allegations of the defendant’s knowing failure to treat complications of
   leg length discrepancy).

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   fails to point to any other out-of-circuit precedents demonstrating such a
   “consensus.”
           Thus, we are left with Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (per curiam) and Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
   Both, however, are inapposite.
           In Easter, we concluded that a nurse’s wholesale failure to address an
   inmate’s severe chest pain violated his constitutional rights. 467 F.3d at 465.
   Davis contends that while Easter involved a different medical infirmity, it
   nonetheless clearly establishes the general principle that “violat[ing]
   doctor’s orders” by “refusing treatment” is unconstitutional. But the type
   of illness at issue is not the only—or even most significant—distinction
   between Easter and this case.
           First, the plaintiff in Easter alleged medical indifference by a medical
   professional. 467 F.3d at 461. To be sure, we have never explicitly stated that
   prison medical professionals and other non-medical officials are held to
   different standards, at least in this context. But as discussed, medical
   indifference claims turn on officials’ subjective knowledge of the risk of harm
   posed by their conduct. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 (quotation omitted). In the
   absence of something obvious, and given that a defendant’s medical training
   is plainly relevant to this inquiry, it seems unreasonable to assume the
   standard is the same.
           Second, the nurse in Easter, unlike Gentry, did not merely temporarily
   forego the appropriate treatment for a short period of time. Rather, she
   refused to provide the plaintiff with any medical attention for four hours
   despite his repeated complaints of severe pain.                  467 F.3d at 461. 5

           5
            By contrast here, of course, it was agreed that Gentry stated the officers would
   provide assistance as an alternative to the cane.

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   Additionally, unlike this case, there was no evidence that the nurse was
   attempting to “balanc[e] the needs of the prisoner against” other legitimate
   penological interests, like prison security.            Carlucci, 884 F.3d at 538
   (quotation omitted). Accordingly, Easter is inapposite.
           Lawson also fails to clearly establish the right Davis proposes. There,
   a paraplegic inmate alleged that nurses failed to adequately treat his severe
   bedsores—contravening doctor’s orders—in violation of his constitutional
   rights. 286 F.3d at 260–63. On Davis’s side, Lawson, like this case, involved
   jail employees’ failure to follow medical orders. Id. at 262.
           However, there are far more differences than similarities between that
   case and this one. Lawson, like Easter, involved alleged misconduct by
   medical professionals, not non-medical officials. Additionally, the suit was
   against Dallas County, not the individual nurses. Thus, qualified immunity
   was not at issue in that case. Indeed, the court expressly addressed the fact
   that part of the reason the nurses did not do what was needed was because
   they were following the official policy of the County. Id. at 263–64. How that
   “following the policy” issue (relevant to Gentry’s concerns about safety)
   may have impacted the individual nurses’ defense if they had been sued was
   not at issue.6
           In any event, the facts of Lawson’s situation are different in many
   other ways. For example, Lawson, unlike Davis, was plainly at death’s door.
   We noted that his decubitus ulcers had progressed to the point where he had
   “holes exposing his left and right trochanter bones” and “was confined to
   his bed for weeks” with severe pain. 286 F.3d at 261. A hospital physician

           6
             Importantly, the court stated: “Had these policies [restricting what the nurses
   could do for Lawson] not been in effect, it is reasonable to expect that Lawson would have
   received much more personal assistance from the nurses at the jail.” Id. at 264.

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   was so alarmed by Lawson’s condition that he “determined that the jail could
   not effectively treat [him] and refused to release Lawson back to the jail.” Id.
   Further, Lawson’s case involved a much longer period of time than the few
   minutes at issue here.
           The facts of Lawson are simply incomparable to those presented here.
   Accordingly, Lawson could not have provided Gentry with fair warning that
   temporarily disregarding Davis’s cane pass, while having the officers agree
   to care for Davis during his walk, would violate the Constitution. Thus, a
   reasonable official could have assumed that requiring Davis to submit to rear-
   cuff restraints to walk to the showers, preventing him from using his cane,
   did not violate the Constitution.7
                                   V. Conclusion
           In sum, regardless of whether Gentry’s conduct actually violated
   Davis’s Eighth Amendment rights, those rights were not “clearly
   established” under controlling authority at the relevant point in time.
   Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the general legal
   principles articulated in Gobert and Estelle could have provided Gentry with
   fair warning that her conduct was illegal. For these reasons, we REVERSE
   the district court’s order and REMAND for entry of summary judgment in
   favor of Gentry.

           7  Because Davis fails to demonstrate that Gentry’s conduct violated “clearly
   established” law, we need not address his argument that Gentry was motivated by personal
   antagonism against him (despite his admission that he did not know her before she arrived
   at the time of the handcuff-argument).

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