Court Opinion

ID: 9450073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:34:18.116214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:08.314539
License: Public Domain

MERCER, District Judge
(concurring).
Although inexpertly drafted and documented this pro se petition, together with the published opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Toler, 26 Ill.2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874, cert. denied, Toler v. Illinois, 374 U.S. 813, 83 S.Ct. 1705, 10 L.Ed.2d 1036, alleges facts which appear to be consistent only with the conclusion that petitioner was entrapped, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court notwithstanding.
There is no evidence of record that petitioner had ever engaged in the sale of narcotics prior to the two instances of which he stands convicted or that he had any prior criminal record whatsoever. (Dissenting opinion, 26 Ill.2d at 103, 185 N.E.2d 874). There is no dispute in the evidence related to the defense of entrapment. Petitioner had been approached some twenty times over a period of two months by Unsell, an acquaintance and former fellow employee, who requested that petitioner obtain narcotics for a dying addict in dire need thereof. Unsell was, in fact, a special employee of the office of the State’s Attorney for Cook County, 26 Ill.2d at 101, 185 N.E.2d 874, who had been requested by Officer Tracy to try to get petitioner to make a sale of narcotics. Petitioner repeatedly refused each of those requests by Unsell. *427Finally, Unsell introduced petitioner to Tracy, who was represented to be an employee of the father of the needy addict. In response to the further importunings of Tracy, who said that the needy addict had little time to live, petitioner accepted money from Tracy on two separate occasions and obtained narcotics therewith. Such narcotics were never seen in petitioner’s possession. In each instance, petitioner conducted Tracy to an alley and told him where narcotics would be found in the alley. Petitioner testified that he made no profit from either transaction, but that he finally agreed to act as a go-between and obtain narcotics out of sympathy for the dying addict. The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court makes no reference to proof that any of the money furnished by Tracy was ever recovered in petitioner’s possession. Tracy testified that he had told petitioner at the time of his arrest that the police were not interested in him, but that they were interested in his connection, except to the extent of his testimony that the packets had been placed in the location where he pointed them out to Tracy by a man named Harry.
If we accord every presumption to the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, in the light of the allegations of this petition, there is lacking any proof of a predisposition on petitioner’s part to commit the offense charged. We must ignore the repeated importuning of Unsell and Tracy to conclude that the offense charged emanated from any intent on petitioner’s part. Compare People v. Hall, 25 Ill.2d 297, 185 N.E.2d 143, narcotics sale made in response to an informer’s telephone call and on the same day thereof; People v. Wells, 25 Ill.2d 146,182 N.E.2d 689; narcotics sale made to informer on the single contact shown by the record; People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill.2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833, narcotics sale made through an informer on a single contact shown of record.
Thus, we have an undisputed factual situation which is strikingly similar to that of Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848. The crime was committed only after repeated suggestions and urging by police officials who had brought the full weight of human sympathy and Unsell’s friendship into play. In my opinion, the facts alleged by this petition, as complemented by facts recited by the Illinois Supreme Court, reveal entrapment as a matter of law. Since there is no conflict in the evidence, the court below would not be bound to accept the findings of the state court, but might make an independent determination of the facts relevant to any constitutional issue. Cf., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246.
When this appeal was taken, I was of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for a hearing upon petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The question whether conviction by entrapment by a state court might constitute a denial of federal due process was then an issue of first impression for which no precedent was found. To me, however, it seemed clear that the circumstances of an entrapment case such as shown by this record are so offensive to the conscience of our society that it must be embraced within the fluid concept of the due process requirement. Cf., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183. It seemed unnecessary to seek a rationale between the entrapment question and the illegal search and seizure cases, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, and the involuntary confession cases, e. g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760, which deal with the use of evidence. A conviction based upon illegally obtained evidence seems no more offensive than a conviction based upon the failure of a state to recognize a clear-cut defense of entrapment to obtain a conviction. The spectacle of the police hounding a man, not shown to have had any connection with the narcotics trade, for more than *428two months, with appeals to sympathy and friendship, to obtain the commission of a crime seemed to me to be a monstrous offense against the ordered concepts of our constitutional society.
However, the question which was unprecedented when this appeal was taken under advisement has now been resolved by this court in Hall v. People of the State of Illinois, 7 Cir., 329 F.2d 354. In Hall, the court held that no constitutional question is presented in any case in which a petitioner’s right to plead and prove the defense of entrapment has not been denied by a state.
Upon the authority of the Hall decision, I concur in the decision upon this appeal.