Court Opinion

ID: 9955792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 15:03:36.212215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.595506
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 232414
                                            No. 1-23-2414B
                                      Opinion filed March 29, 2024

                                                                            SIXTH DIVISION

                                                IN THE

                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                           FIRST DISTRICT

     THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
     ILLINOIS,                                       )      of Cook County.
                                                     )
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                     )
            v.                                       )      No. 20 CR 09262
                                                     )
     ADOLPHUS McDONALD,                              )      The Honorable
                                                     )      Geraldine D’Souza,
            Defendant-Appellant.                     )      Judge, presiding.

                     PRESIDING JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court,
     with opinion.
                     Justices Hyman and C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                             OPINION

¶1               Defendant Adolphus McDonald was charged with first degree murder for the death of

       his three-month old son as a result of shaken-baby syndrome. In this appeal, brought pursuant

       to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023), defendant challenges the order

       entered by the trial court on December 6, 2023, that denied him pretrial release under the Code

       of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by

       Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255, 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (commonly referred to as the
     No. 1-23-2414B

         Pretrial Fairness Act). 1 For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further

         proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶2                                            BACKGROUND

¶3                                         I. The Alleged Offense

¶4                   In order to describe the underlying offense, we provide here a summary of the

         evidence regarding the offense that the State proffered at the detention hearing held on

         December 6, 2023. On August 21, 2020, Calumet City police officers and paramedics

         responded to a call regarding an unresponsive child. When paramedics arrived on the scene,

         defendant was standing outside and guided officers into the apartment. Inside the apartment,

         defendant’s mother was administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to the infant.

         Paramedics transferred the infant to St. Margaret’s Hospital in Hammond, Indiana. The infant

         was later airlifted to Comer Hospital for further care. Defendant informed officers that the

         child spent the night with him, and no one else was home. Defendant allegedly rocked the child

         to sleep and placed him on the bed. He then went into the living room to use the computer.

         When defendant checked on the child, the child was no longer breathing. defendant then called

         his mother, a registered nurse, to the home, and she began to render CPR. The child was

         reportedly in good health and had no listed medical problems before this incident.

¶5               Doctors at Comer Hospital observed that the child had suffered substantial internal

         brain bleeds in multiple locations, which were consistent with violent shaking. The child died

         from his injuries on August 25, 2020. Doctors found the cause of death to be severe brain

             1
               In 2021, the General Assembly passed two separate acts that “dismantled and rebuilt Illinois’s
     statutory framework for the pretrial release of criminal defendants.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4
     (discussing Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) and Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1,
     2023)).
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     No. 1-23-2414B

        injury, leading to brain death. The child had extensive retinal hemorrhages, abusive head

        trauma, and left radius and ulna fractures to the arm. Doctors ruled the death to be a homicide

        by child abuse. Defendant was arrested on September 2, 2020, and charged with four counts

        of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2020)), and one count of endangering

        the life or health of a child (id. § 12C-5(a)(1)), a Class 3 Felony. Defendant allegedly requested

        time from work to visit the child, but then never visited during the four-day period that the

        child was in the hospital. Defendant allegedly made admissions to the child’s mother in a phone

        call that he shook the baby.

¶6                                  II. Procedural History of the Case

¶7             As noted above, defendant was arrested on September 2, 2020. On September 3, 2020,

        bail was set at “$1,000,000 Deposit Bond[,] Collect: $100,000,” with conditions, including that

        he surrender his firearm owners identification card and gun to the Calumet City Police

        Department, that he report to a parole officer upon release, and that he have no contact with a

        named person or entry of her premises. Despite the grant of bail, the ultimate result was that

        defendant remained in custody. Every few months, the court entered a “Remain in Custody”

        order, which it noted were “By Agreement.”

¶8             However, on October 17, 2023, defendant filed a “Petition to Grant Pretrial Release

        Under New Law.” In his petition, defendant stated that he was arrested on September 2, 2020,

        that he was unable to post the bond that was set on September 3, 2020, and that, as a result, he

        had been in custody for 1140 days. The petition sought a hearing under the new law.

¶9             Apparently in response to defendant’s petition, the State filed a “Petition for Pretrial

        Detention Hearing.” (In pen, it states it was filed on October 1, 2023; however, it is stamped

        filed on November 11, 2023.) On this form petition, the State checked the boxes for “(a)(1)

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          non-probationable felony on charge/background,” “(a)(1.5) forcible felony,” and “poses a real

          and present threat.” However, the State did not check the box for “has a high likelihood of

          willful flight to avoid prosecution.” On the lines provided, the State described the offense. The

          State also noted that defendant had a 2004 misdemeanor for reckless driving.

¶ 10             The first two boxes checked by the State refer to subsections of section 110-6.1 of the

          Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). Subsection (a)(1), which was the first box checked

          by the State, allows a court to deny pretrial release if defendant is charged with a felony offense

          other than a forcible felony and defendant poses a threat. Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1).Subsection

          (a)(1.5), which was the second box checked by the State, allows a court to deny pretrial release

          if defendant is charged with a forcible felony and poses a threat. Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5).

¶ 11                                    III. Arguments at the Hearing

¶ 12             At the hearing held on December 6, 2023, the State proffered the evidence that we

          already described above regarding the underlying offense and argued that defendant should be

          detained based on it. The defense argued that defendant was 40 years old and a graduate of

          Englewood Tech High School, with no prior criminal history. Counsel argued that defendant

          had worked continuously since graduation and that his prior work history included

          employment with Walmart, as well as a position as a security guard for a trucking company,

          which he held when arrested. Defense counsel disputed that defendant made admissions,

          arguing that defendant’s statements were taken out of context. Counsel noted that defendant

          lived next door to his mother and brother and was a deacon in his church, where he taught

          Bible study and Sunday school. Defense counsel argued that defendant had no other children

          and that he did not pose a danger to anyone and asked the trial court to consider release with

          reasonable conditions. Neither side at the hearing informed the court that defendant had already

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          been granted release on bail or informed the court of the conditions upon which release had

          already been deemed safe. Neither side mentioned any facts that had arisen between the prior

          bail order and the December 6, 2023, detention hearing.

¶ 13                                      IV. Order Appealed From

¶ 14             At the close of the hearing on December 6, 2023, the trial court entered a form order

          denying pretrial release on the ground that defendant posed a threat and that no condition or

          combination of conditions could mitigate the threat that he posed to others. On the form, the

          court wrote in pen the details of the offense. The box regarding flight was not checked. The

          form contained a box that could be checked if the State had shown that no condition or

          combination of conditions could mitigate the risk of defendant’s flight. However, as noted, the

          box next to this option was not checked by the court and the lines under it were left blank. On

          December 15, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. On the form notice, defendant

          checked, among other things, that the State had failed to prove risk of flight.

¶ 15                                             ANALYSIS

¶ 16             On appeal, defendant challenges, first, the timeliness of the State’s petition to detain

          him. If the State’s petition is found to be timely, defendant then argues that the State failed in

          its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to

          the safety of any person or to the community.

¶ 17                            I. Timeliness of the State’s Detention Petition

¶ 18             Defendant argues that the State’s petition was untimely because it was filed more than

          3 years after both his arrest and the order releasing him on bail and more than 60 days after the

          implementation of the Pretrial Fairness Act. Defendant was arrested on September 2, 2020,

          and ordered released on September 3, 2020, by D-Bond of $1 million. Defendant states the

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          record contains no evidence that the State filed a no-bail petition at that time. Unable to post

          bail, defendant remained in custody. After the amendments to the Code by the Pretrial Fairness

          Act became effective on September 18, 2023, defendant argues that he promptly requested

          release on October 17, 2023, but that the State’s petition to detain him, filed on November 1,

          2023, was untimely.

¶ 19              The State responds that the timeliness issue was never raised before the trial court and

          was not included in defendant’s notice of appeal and, therefore, is forfeited for our

          consideration. Defendant concedes that he did not raise this issue in the trial court or include

          it in his notice of appeal but contends that this issue is reviewable under plain error. In the

          alternative, defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike the

          State’s detention petition or otherwise raise this issue before the trial court.

¶ 20              In general, a defendant preserves an issue for review by timely objecting to it and

          including it in a written posttrial motion. People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 27; People v.

          Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 51. Because defendant failed to file a motion to strike

          the State’s petition for detention or include it in his notice of appeal, the issue of the timeliness

          of the State’s petition is forfeited. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). We note that

          waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is the failure to

          make a timely assertion of a known right. People v. Dunlap, 2013 IL App (4th) 110892, ¶ 9;

          People v. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 51.

¶ 21              The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to address defects affecting

          substantial rights (a) if the evidence is closely balanced or (b) if fundamental fairness so

          requires it rather than finding the claims forfeited. People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 471 (2005).

          A defendant raising a plain error argument bears the burden of persuasion. People v.

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). The first step in a plain error review generally is to

          determine whether any error occurred, which is defendant’s burden to establish. Id.

          Accordingly, to establish plain error, a defendant must first show that a clear or obvious error

          occurred. Id. Next, he must show that the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone

          threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the

          error (People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008)), or that the error was sufficiently grave

          that it deprived defendant of a fair trial (People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005)).

¶ 22              In determining if the evidence was close, a reviewing court must evaluate the totality

          of the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of the evidence within the

          context of the case. Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 53 (citing People v. Sebby, 2017

          IL 119445, ¶ 53). If the defendant meets his burden, he has demonstrated actual prejudice, and

          his conviction should be reversed. Id. (citing Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 51).

¶ 23              When a defendant claims second-prong error under fundamental fairness, he must

          prove that a structural error occurred. Id. ¶ 54 (citing Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613). A structural

          error is one that renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable in determining a

          defendant’s guilt or innocence. People v. Bowens, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1101 (2011).

          Structural errors occur in very limited circumstances, such as the complete denial of counsel,

          denial of self-representation at trial, trial before a biased judge, denial of a public trial, racial

          discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, or a defective reasonable doubt instruction.

          Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 54. If the defendant fails to meet his burden of

          persuasion, the issue is forfeited, and the reviewing court will honor the procedural default. Id.

          ¶ 55.

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       No. 1-23-2414B

¶ 24             In asserting the application of plain error, defendant merely cites to People v. Smith,

          2016 IL App (1st) 140496, ¶ 15, and states that a misapplication of the law that affects a

          defendant’s fundamental right to liberty constitutes plain error as it affects the integrity of the

          judicial system. We will examine this issue as a second-prong claim of plain error.

¶ 25             We must first determine if the trial court committed any error in allowing the State to

          file a detention petition three years after defendant’s arrest. We find that it did not.

¶ 26             It is important to first note the circumstances under which this case is before us. While

          the vast majority of appeals under the Pretrial Fairness Act amendments to the Code are filed

          very soon after a defendant’s arrest and within fourteen days of the detention hearing, this is

          an older case, as defendant was arrested in September 2020. We do not have a report of

          proceedings related to defendant’s initial bond hearing at that time, we only know that a D-

          Bond was set for $1 million, and defendant was unable to make the bond and was held in

          pretrial custody. The statute in effect at that time did not allow the State to file a petition for

          pretrial detention. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2018). After the amended statute became

          effective in September 2023, defendant filed a petition requesting pretrial release under the

          amended statute, and the State subsequently filed the pretrial detention petition that is at issue

          here, in accordance with the new procedures contained in the amended statute. See 725 ILCS

          5/110-2 (West 2022).

¶ 27             This issue has previously come before the court in People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App

          (1st) 231807, People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890, and People v. Haisley, 2024 IL App

          (1st) 232163, with conflicting results. In Brown, the Third Division of the First District held

          that the State’s detention petition was untimely when it was not filed on June 24, 2023 (prior

          to the effective date of the amended statute). However, in both Whitmore and Haisley, the Fifth

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          and Fourth Divisions of the First District, respectively, the court found that the State could file

          petitions after the defendant’s first court appearance after the effective date of the amended

          statute. Here, however, defendant argues that the State’s petition was untimely because it was

          not filed until his second court appearance after the amended statute’s effective date. We

          disagree and find the decisions in Whitmore and Haisley to be instructive in our analysis here.

¶ 28              Here, defendant initiated the proceedings by filing his petition for pretrial release on

          October 17, 2023. Neither defendant’s memorandum nor the record indicates that the State or

          the trial court had advance notice that defendant was going to file such petition. The State

          ultimately filed its detention petition in response to defendant’s petition for pretrial release on

          November 1, 2023, just 14 days after defendant filed his petition for pretrial release. The

          hearing on October 17, 2023, was defendant’s first appearance before a judge since the

          amended statute became effective on September 18, 2023, and the hearing was continued to

          November 1, 2023. Whitmore specifically found that section 110-6.1 of the amended Code

          (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)) allows the State to seek detention of defendants who were

          granted pretrial release with cash bail prior to the Pretrial Fairness Act’s effective date. See

          Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 11. Therefore, we do not deem the State’s petition

          untimely, and the trial court did not err in hearing it. We believe that defendant’s filing of the

          pretrial release petition opened the door to proceedings dictated by the amended statute,

          including the State’s ability to file a pretrial detention petition in response. The amended statute

          anticipates the proceedings to occur just after a defendant’s arrest, at an initial pretrial detention

          hearing. However, in this case, defendant reopened the matter by filing a pretrial release

          petition three years after his initial bond hearing was held, thus availing himself of the benefit

          of the amended statute, but at the same time, he also subjected himself to the procedures

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          dictated by the amended statute. He cannot now complain about application of the very statute

          he requested relief under. See People v. Menssen, 263 Ill. App. 3d 946, 951 (1994) (a defendant

          cannot complain on appeal about evidence which was elicited on cross-examination by defense

          counsel and which defendant did not move to strike). We therefore conclude that the trial court

          did not err in allowing the State’s petition.

¶ 29             As we have concluded that there was no error, our inquiry for purposes of plain error

          review ends, and we therefore honor the procedural default of defendant’s claim. See

          Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 54. In the alternative, defendant argues that defense

          counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike the State’s detention petition. We disagree.

¶ 30             The standard for reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether the

          attorney’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether defendant

          was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

          To demonstrate prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

          for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

          reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

          at 694. If either prong of the Strickland test cannot be shown, then the defendant has not

          established ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 697.

¶ 31             We find that defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because

          counsel was not deficient where any objection to the State’s petition would have been

          unsuccessful because, as discussed above, the State was entitled to file a pretrial detention

          petition under the amended statute. Accordingly, defendant cannot meet his burden of

          establishing prejudice as there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding

          would have been different if counsel had filed a futile motion to strike the State’s petition.

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       No. 1-23-2414B

¶ 32                                II. Whether Defendant Posed a Threat

¶ 33             Defendant next contends that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

          that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and that no

          conditions could mitigate that threat. He argues that the State did not identify any specific

          person or persons who would be at risk if he was released and only relied on the gravity of the

          allegations against him. Defendant also contends that the State did not prove that no conditions

          could mitigate any threat and that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s

          detention petition.

¶ 34             The State responds that defendant is a danger to the community and that no condition

          or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to safety that he poses to

          others based on (1) the doctor’s conclusions after an autopsy, which showed that the cause and

          manner of death was homicide due to child abuse; (2) defendant’s alleged admissions to the

          mother of the victim that he shook the baby; and (3) defendant’s failure to appear at the hospital

          despite indicating he would. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

          finding that defendant is a danger to any person or the community. However, the State requests

          that this court remand this matter to the trial court for compliance with section 110-6.1(h)(1)

          (725 ILCS 5/110- 6.1(h)(1) (West 2022)). The State did not seek detention based on risk of

          flight, and as a result, the trial court’s order was not based on that ground.

¶ 35             Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West

          2022)). Under the Code, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release

          before conviction. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022). Pursuant to the Code, a defendant’s

          pretrial release may be denied only in certain statutorily limited situations. Id. § 110-6.1. Upon

          the State’s filing of a verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption

          great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial

          release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or a flight

          risk, and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety

          of any person or the community and or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.

          Id. §§ 110-2, 110-6.1(a)(1.5), (4), (8).

¶ 36             At all pretrial hearings, the prosecution has the burden of proving by clear and

          convincing evidence that any condition of release is necessary. Id. § 110-2(b). In any order for

          detention, the court shall make a written finding summarizing the court’s reasons for

          concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive

          conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or

          the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or prevent the defendant’s

          willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1).

¶ 37             We review the trial court’s detention decision for an abuse of discretion. People v.

          Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 12. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

          arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or when no reasonable person would agree with the position

          adopted by the trial court. Id.

¶ 38             A trial court’s finding that the State presented clear and convincing evidence that

          mandatory conditions of release would fail to protect any person or the community and/or that

          the defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, or that the defendant

          failed to comply with previous conditions of pretrial release thereby requiring a modification

          or revocation of the previously issued conditions of pretrial release, will not be reversed unless

          those findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the

          opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not

          based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). Under this

          standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact as it is in the best position to

          observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d at 332.

¶ 39              Here, the trial court noted that the State met its burden of proving that defendant

          committed an eligible offense of first degree murder. The court also stated that its decision to

          deny defendant pretrial release was based on the nature and circumstances of the charged

          offenses; namely, the doctor’s determination that the injuries to the three-month child were

          caused by “severe shaking,” and that defendant was alone with his infant son when the infant

          suffered abuse which resulted in bleeding to the brain, fractures, head trauma, and ultimately

          death. The court also indicated that it considered defendant’s lack of criminal history, his work

          history, his family situation, and the lack of a weapon used. The trial court concluded that

          defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of persons based on the facts of the case.

          The court further found that no conditions or combination of conditions could mitigate the

          threat to safety that defendant posed towards others.

¶ 40              We find that the trial court’s findings to be against the manifest weight of the evidence

          in this case. Defendant is a 40-year-old, who has no criminal background, who has been

          continuously employed since graduating high school, who was working as a security guard at

          the time of the offense, who lives next door to his mother and brother, and who served as a

          church deacon. He has no other children, and there is no indication defendant will be exposed

          to or responsible for the care of other children in his day-to-day life. Furthermore, defendant’s

          actions after finding his child unresponsive do not support a finding that he is a safety threat;

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       No. 1-23-2414B

          when he realized the infant was not responsive, he called his mother, a registered nurse, to the

          apartment to perform CPR. Last but not least, we observe that, three years earlier under less

          lenient laws than those that exist now, the trial court found defendant sufficiently safe for

          release on bond with conditions, and the State does not allege that the facts have changed in

          the intervening years while defendant has been in custody. Thus, we conclude that the trial

          court’s finding, that no conditions or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat to

          safety that defendant posed towards others, was against the weight of the evidence.

¶ 41             Having found that the reason given for the order was against the manifest weight of the

          evidence, we must necessarily find that the trial court’s detention order was an abuse of

          discretion. We note that the State has also requested a remand for the trial court’s compliance

          with section 110-6.1(h)(1).

¶ 42             The Code requires that, in any order for detention, the trial court shall make a written

          finding summarizing the court’s reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied

          pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present

          threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable

          facts of the case, or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-

          6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). However, the record does not indicate that the trial court considered

          any less restrictive means to pretrial detention or conditions of release, which was an abuse of

          discretion, and so we remand for the trial court to determine the detention alternatives and

          conditions that will mitigate any alleged threat, such as those, for example, that were previously

          ordered by the trial court in this very case several years ago.

¶ 43                                           CONCLUSION

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       No. 1-23-2414B

¶ 44             For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order entered on December 6,

          2023, requiring defendant’s pretrial detention and remand for consideration and imposition of

          detention alternatives and conditions that will mitigate any alleged threat posed to the safety

          of others. Mandate shall issue instanter.

¶ 45             Reversed and remanded with directions.

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No. 1-23-2414B

                    People v. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st) 232414

Decision Under Review:    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 20-CR-09262;
                          the Hon. Geraldine D’Souza, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                 Sharone R Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Rebecca
for                       Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                 Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Caitlin Chenus,
for                       Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.
Appellee:

                                         16