Court Opinion

ID: 9533882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:35:15.087685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:12.037996
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent to this decision. The majority opinion properly quotes the third paragraph of the syllabus to In re Bishop, supra, but that statement provides that failure to cross-examine at preliminary examination MAY constitute a waiver of the right of confrontation. Consequently, the determination of whether or not such failure to cross-examine, constitutes a waiver depends upon the particular facts of each case. In this appeal I feel that the facts to not constitute the waiver referred to in Bishop.
In the instant appeal, Jack Wilkerson was a hired law enforcement officer, who defense counsel had every right to expect would be present at trial. In addition, Jack Wilkerson was the principal witness against the defendant, and he was allegedly the person who made the purchase of marihuana from defendant. Therefore, I can clearly distinguish the situation in this appeal from one in which another witness becomes unavailable to testify, and wherein the preliminary transcript is allowed to be used, as being proper circumstances referred to in Bishop. Under the circumstances of the instant appeal, I cannot agree that proper circumstances exist to meet the confrontation provisions of both the United States Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution. It is a foregone conclusion that the examination of a witness at preliminary examination is not as searching as that engaged in at trial. Notwithstanding the fact that the District Attorney testified concerning such efforts as he exerted to find the missing witness, Jack Wilkerson, it is not such diligence alone which is intended to meet the confrontation requirements. The United States Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967):
“To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at *896a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).”
Admittedly, in Barber the state knew the whereabouts of the witness, and no showing of diligence was made by the prosecution. But of equal importance in the instant matter is the fact that the prosecution witness was allegedly a recognized law enforcement officer. The record reflects that the prosecution witness was either “bought off” by defendant’s mother, or that his credibility was of such questionable nature that he found other reasons for borrowing a thousand dollars from defendant’s mother for the purpose of leaving the country. Nonetheless, as the record now exists defendant was unable to test the prosecution witness’ credibility by proper cross-examination. Consequently, I conclude that the facts herein are not sufficient to constitute “proper circumstances” referred to in In re Bishop, supra. I concede that the District Attorney testified concerning the efforts he made to locate Jack Wilkerson, and that according to his testimony that effort, under other circumstances, might constitute sufficient diligence to show the unavailability of the witness; but under these facts, I cannot concede that such diligence alone waives the confrontation requirements.
Further, I believe the separate charges should have been filed under the provisions of 22 O.S., 1973, § 404, as separate counts in one information. I believe it is fundamentally unfair for the law enforcement officers to make consecutive buys of controlled dangerous substances in order to file separate charges against any defendant. Under such procedures, the law enforcement officers are permitted to determine the extent of punishment a defendant is to receive, which is a judicial function. Consequently, as I see the proper administration of justice, these several incidents should be included as separate counts in one information for the benefit of the jury. The initial objective of law enforcement having been accomplished, the subsequent incidents merely go to corroborate the charge of distribution. Thereafter, either the jury or the court should set the extent of punishment premised upon the facts presented.
Therefore, having concurred in the first appeal lodged by defendant for the illegal distribution of controlled dangerous substances, which occurred immediately prior to this incident, I feel compelled to dissent to this decision.