Court Opinion

ID: 9881423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-02 16:07:56.962702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:32.528878
License: Public Domain

J-S20042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IDRIS ABDUS SABER                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.                       :   No. 3069 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 220502697

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 2, 2023

        Appellant Idris Abdus Saber appeals pro se from the Order entered by

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on August 15, 2022, which, in

relevant part, sustained Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Preliminary

Objections to strike Appellant’s Complaint seeking to quiet title to 147 Harvey

Street in Philadelphia (“the Property”). After careful review, we affirm the

Order.

        The sparse factual recitation set forth below is gleaned from Appellant’s

Complaint and other pro se filings in this case, which the trial court aptly

described as demonstrating “a fundamental misunderstanding of civil

procedure” and involving several fraudulent filings. Tr. Ct. Opinion, 12/1/22,

at 4.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20042-23

       In April 2014, Appellant received a $282,112.00 loan from Quaint Oak

Mortgage, LLC, secured by a note and mortgage on the Property (“the Note”).

Quaint Oak Mortgage assigned the Note to Appellee in August 2014. Appellant

does not deny that in 2015 Appellee commenced a mortgage foreclosure

action (“Foreclosure Action”) and that a court entered judgment in favor of

Appellee in October 2016.1

       Following the foreclosure judgment, a Mortgage Satisfaction Piece

declaring that Appellant satisfied the Note was recorded in Philadelphia in

March 2018, allegedly executed by Appellee’s employee. A court struck the

Mortgage Satisfaction Piece as fraudulent.2

       Following the Foreclosure Action and the court’s striking the Mortgage

Satisfaction Piece as fraudulent, several deeds relating to the Property were

recorded in Philadelphia County.          Notably, none of these deeds involved a

transfer to Appellant.

____________________________________________

1  Appellant did not reference the Foreclosure Action in his Complaint.
However, in response to Appellee’s Preliminary Objections, Appellant stated
that the averments addressing the Foreclosure Action “purport[ed] to
summarize facts that are on record” and baldly asserted that the Foreclosure
Action was “irrelevant to the matter at hand.” [Appellant’s] Reply to
[Appellee’s] Preliminary Objections and Brief in Support Thereof, 7/20/22, at
4, 12. Appellant has not included documents related to the Foreclosure Action
in the certified record forwarded to this Court.

2 Appellee and the trial court cite a May 9, 2019 Order striking the Mortgage

Satisfaction Piece as fraudulent, which is not included in the record before this
Court. Tr. Ct. Op. at 3, 6. Appellant does not deny the existence of the order
striking the document but instead asserts that it was a “single-sided
conclusion determined by default, not on the merits.” Appellant’s Br. at 14
n.2 He does not suggest that he was prevented from litigating this issue.

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       On May 31, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a complaint against Appellee

seeking to quiet title to the Property.        Relying on the fraudulent Mortgage

Satisfaction Piece to support his claim, Appellant sought to strike the deeds

set forth above, stating that those documents had been recorded after the

Mortgage Satisfaction Piece. He requested an order directing that the records

of the Philadelphia County Recorder of Deeds reflect only the Mortgage

Satisfaction Piece.     As relevant to his argument on appeal, Appellant also

asserted that he had possession of the Note.3

       On June 29, 2022, Appellee filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of

a demurrer, seeking dismissal of the Complaint on two grounds: (1) asserting

res judicata and collateral estoppel based upon the Foreclosure Action, and

(2) asserting that Appellant based his Complaint on the fraudulent Mortgage

Satisfaction Piece. Appellee claimed that “[s]ince the commencement of the

Foreclosure Action in 2015, [Appellant] has filed everything imaginable to

frustrate and delay the disposition of the foreclosure.” Preliminary Objections,

6/29/22, at ¶ 6. Appellee requested that the court declare Appellant to be a

vexatious litigant, sanction him, and bar him from filing further cases in

Pennsylvania courts regarding the Property.

       On August 15, 2022, the court entered an order sustaining both of

Appellee’s Preliminary Objections.         The court additionally barred Appellant

____________________________________________

3 Appellant attached the Mortgage Satisfaction Piece and the Note to his
Complaint. The attached Note included an endorsement of the Note to
Appellant signed by Appellant. Compl., 5/31/22, Exh. A.

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from bringing any future claims against Appellee relating to the Property but

denied Appellee’s request for attorney fees.4

       Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 9, 2022. Appellant and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents the following questions on appeal:

       1. Did the trial court commit an error of law in striking the
       Appellant[’]s complaint to quiet title strictly based on a foreclosure
       matter?

       2. In an action to quiet title does the Court have the power to
       determine the legal force of a negotiable instrument per 13
       Pa.C.S. [§ 3104(d)]?

       3. In considering a preliminary objection in the nature of a
       demurrer, can the trial court consider arguments the objecting
       defendants did not raise or would not have standing to raise?

Appellant’s Br. at 5.5

                                               A.

       In sustaining Appellee’s Preliminary Objections, the trial court concluded

that Appellant’s Complaint was legally insufficient, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.

1028(a)(4).      The question of whether a complaint is legally insufficient

____________________________________________

4  The court relied upon the Rules of Civil Procedure governing vexatious
litigation. Tr. Ct. Op., at 7; see Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1(c) (providing that “the court
may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation against
the same or related defendants raising the same or related claims without
leave of court.”).

5 Appellant did not include his second and third questions in his Rule 1925(b)

Statement.     Accordingly,        we    find       these   issues   waived.   Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii).

                                           -4-
J-S20042-23

involves a pure question of law, such that our standard of review is de novo.

Catanzaro v. Pennell, 238 A.3d 504, 507 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      In ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, trial

courts “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact and all

reasonable inferences deducible from those facts and resolve all doubt in favor

of the non-moving party.” Palmiter v. Commonwealth Health Sys., Inc.,

260 A.3d 967, 970 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted).   Appellate courts “apply the same standard as the trial court in

evaluating the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and examine whether, on the

facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible.” Id.

at 971.

      In this case, Appellant’s complaint sought to quiet title to the Property

under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1061. In quiet title actions, the plaintiff has “the burden of

proving a prima facie title, which proof is sufficient until a better title is shown

in the adverse party.” Poffenberger v. Goldstein, 776 A.2d 1037, 1041

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (internal citation omitted).

                                        B.

      Appellant asks this Court to reverse the trial court, overrule Appellant’s

Preliminary Objections, and grant Appellant quiet title. Appellant’s Br. at 23-

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24.   Appellant, however, fails to present this Court with a coherent legal

argument that the trial court erred.6

       After careful review of the record and the filings in this Court, we agree

with the trial court that Appellant’s quiet title action, which he premised upon

the Mortgage Satisfaction Piece, cannot stand in light of the order striking that

document as fraudulent. As the trial court explained, “[s]ince Appellant relied

upon a document that he knew was not valid, his Complaint is not well-

pleaded, and he failed to establish a prima facie title.”     Tr. Ct. Op. at 7.

Accordingly, we affirm the order sustaining Appellee’s Preliminary Objections

based upon the legal insufficiency of Appellant’s Complaint pursuant to

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4).7

       Order Affirmed.

____________________________________________

6 For example, Appellant now argues that the Mortgage Satisfaction Piece was

not the basis of his quiet title action, which he contends relied on the
possession of “the Property[,]” which he confusingly defines as the Note.
Appellant’s Br. at 8, 13-14. The Complaint belies this assertion.

7 Given this conclusion, we need not address the trial court’s alternative
determination that Appellant’s Complaint is barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. We emphasize that the trial court’s order
barring Appellant from bringing additional claims relating to the Property
remains in force.

                                           -6-
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Date: 10/2/2023

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