Court Opinion

ID: 9766202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:36:53.834915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.330574
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
The appellee, Frank McKetta, was indicted in 1971 under the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of September 26, 1961, P.L. 1664, 35 P.S. § 780-1 et seq., (now repealed, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 43, 35 P.S. 780-101 et seq.) for possession of dangerous drugs and for dealing in dangerous drugs. The drug appellee allegedly possessed and dealt in was “Ritalin.” During the trial, the question arose as to whether the drug Ritalin was a “dangerous drug” within the meaning of the statute. After hearing testimony outside the presence of the fury, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that Ritalin was a “dangerous drug” and so instructed the jury.
With several exceptions not relevant here, the Act of September 26, 1961, P.L. 1664, § 4(q), 35 P.S. 780-4 (q), made possession of or dealing in dangerous drugs illegal. That sub-section’s prohibition of the possession of or dealing in dangerous drugs did not define “dangerous drug.” A “dangerous drug,” however, was defined elsewhere in the Act as,
*234“. . . a drug other than a narcotic drug [as elsewhere defined] which . . . is limited under the Federal Act to use under the professional supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug.”
Act of September 26, 1961, P.L. 1664, Sec. 2(h) (4), 35 P.S. 780-2 (h)(4).
The term Federal Act means the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Title 21, U.S.C. § 301 et seq., 52 Stat. 1040 et seq. See Act of September 26, 1961, P.L. 1664, Sec. 2(p), 35 P.S. 780-2 (p).
The Federal Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 353(b)(1)(B), limits the dispensing of a drug which,
“. . . because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug. . . . ”
Thus, to be guilty of possessing or dispensing a “dangerous drug” as defined by the Pennsylvania Statute, 35 P. S. 780-2(h)(4), one must possess or dispense a drug so limited by the Federal Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B).
United States v. Key, 371 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1967), involved a federal prosecution for dispensing certain drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1) (B) — the same section incorporated in Pennsylvania’s Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. The court in Key held that the prosecution’s burden of proving all elements of the offense charged required it to prove that the substance
“was not safe for use, except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such a drug and that it was dispensed without a prescription from a practitioner licensed by law to administer such a drug.”
Id. at 423.
*235The appellant here was entitled to a jury trial as to all elements of the crimes with which he was charged. Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974). The prosecution, therefore, had a burden to convince the jury that Ritalin was a “dangerous drug” as defined by the Pennsylvania Statute. Because 35 P.S. 780-2(h) (4) defines “dangerous drug” as a drug limited by the Federal Act to being dispensed by prescription, the prosecution must show that Ritalin is so limited. To meet this burden, the prosecution here, like the prosecution in Key, is required to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Ritalin, because of its toxicity, or the method of its use, or because of other factors necessary for its use, it is not safe for use except under the supervision of a licensed practitioner, and that appellant in fact “possessed” and “dealt in” such a “dangerous drug” without a prescription. This jury function could only have been performed had the jury been permitted to hear evidence concerning whether the substance in question met the statutory definition of a dangerous drug.
As stated in Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 389, 321 A.2d 880, 884 (1974), “the Commonwealth has an unshifting burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime.” The trial court’s original ruling here deprived appellant of his right to a determination by the jury as to the existence of all elements of the crime; the trial court therefore properly granted a new trial.
For these reasons, I would affirm the order of the Superior Court and grant appellee a new trial.