Court Opinion

ID: 9671243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:20.580549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.888216
License: Public Domain

Danhof, P. J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the result reached by the majority, although I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
In examining the record and construing the testimony and the legitimate inferences therefrom in a *358light most favorable to the plaintiff, I agree with the trial court that while the proofs were not overwhelming in relation to the matter of arrest there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury. In Bonkowski v. Arlan’s Department Store (1968), 12 Mich App 88, 96, this Court said:
“From the facts of the incident established at trial, a jury could find such implicit coercion as would support a finding of that unlawful restraint of freedom of action which lies at the heart of a cause of action for false arrest.”
This is also true in the instant case.
However, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the defendant’s burden of proof. The instruction to which defense counsel made timely objection reads:
“Now, the plaintiff, in order to recover here, must show that she was unlawfully arrested and imprisoned. And, secondly, that she suffered injury or damage as a result thereof. The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove those items by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The defendant store on the other hand, if the plaintiff meets her obligation and proves by a preponderance of the evidence the matters I have just enunciated to you, it then falls to the lot of the defendant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that probable cause existed to believe the plaintiff had committed or attempted to commit an unlawful taking of property that was for sale at the store; and, secondly, that its employees did not use unreasonable force, did not detain the plaintiff an unreasonable length of time, did not act with unreasonable disregard of her rights or sensibilities and did not intend to injure the plaintiff.”
The applicable statute, MCLA § 600.2917 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2917) reads:
*359“In any civil action against a merchant, his or its agent, for false imprisonment, unlawful arrest, assault, battery, libel or slander, if the claim arose out of conduct involving a person suspected of removing or of attempting to remove from a store without right or permission goods held for sale therein, where the merchant, his or its agent had probable cause for believing and did believe that the plaintiff had committed or aided or abetted in the larceny of goods held for sale in the store, no damages for or resulting from mental anguish and no punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages shall be allowed a plaintiff, excepting when it is proved that the merchant, or his or its agent used unreasonable force or detained plaintiff an unreasonable length of time or acted with unreasonable disregard of plaintiff’s rights or sensibilities or acted with intent to injure plaintiff.”
This instruction was erroneous. See Bonkowski v. Arlan’s Department Store (1970), 383 Mich 90. In order for the plaintiff to recover damages for mental a aguish she has the burden, under the statute, of proving that the defendant’s employee used unreasonable force or detained the plaintiff an unreasonable length of time, or acted with unreasonable disregard of plaintiff’s rights or sensibilities, or acted with intent to injure the plaintiff. The burden is not upon, the defendant to show a lack of unreasonable action.
Reversed and remanded.