Court Opinion

ID: 9949087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 19:03:01.826661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:36.626807
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 P. v. Green CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                      (El Dorado)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097287

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. S21CRF0006)

           v.

 MICHAEL ERIC GREEN,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Decades ago, on July 7, 1985, the victim Jane Hylton was killed in the El Dorado
Hills house where she was staying, having sustained 29 knife wounds including wounds
to her jugular vein, lungs, and five wounds in her back, a battered face, and a bite wound
to her shoulder. After her case went cold for many years, after a factually innocent man
spent 15 years in prison for the murder, and after action taken by the Northern California
Innocence Project led to new DNA testing, defendant Michael Eric Green’s DNA profile
was matched to DNA found on Hylton’s nightgown near where she had been bitten and
to DNA found in her fingernail scrapings. In 2022, defendant pleaded no contest to

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second degree murder, the trial court denied defendant’s application for probation, and
the court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison. On
appeal, defendant’s sole contention is that the court abused its discretion in denying his
application for probation. We affirm.
                                     BACKGROUND
                     The Killing of Jane Hylton and the Investigation
       At approximately 3:30 a.m. on July 7, 1985, El Dorado County Sheriff’s Office
deputies responded to a report of a homicide at a home in El Dorado Hills. In a bedroom,
deputies found Hylton in her nightgown lying on a bed. “The coroner’s report indicated
the victim had a battered face, a bite mark on her left rear shoulder, and 29 stab wounds.
The stab wounds included four to the head, one to the jugular vein, one to the chest that
perforated a rib and injured a lung, seven on her hands and forearms, and five on her back
(one of which pierced her lung).” (M.G. v. Superior Court (Nov. 29, 2021, C093615)
[nonpub. opn.].) A large piece of flesh was discovered on the floor, which was
determined to be tissue from Hylton’s chin and jaw. Hylton bled to death as a result of
the knife wounds to her jugular vein and lung.
       The investigation into Hylton’s murder went cold for years. In 1999, Connie
Dahl, offering what would eventually turn out to be a false confession, told investigators
that she and Ricky Davis killed Hylton. Davis was the son of the woman with whom
Hylton had been staying, and Dahl was his girlfriend. Dahl pleaded guilty to involuntary
manslaughter and testified against Davis, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to
15 years to life plus one year in prison. Dahl died in 2014. As a result of action taken by
the Northern California Innocence Project, new DNA testing was performed on evidence
collected from Hylton and the results excluded Davis. His conviction was overturned in
2019, all charges against him were dropped in 2020, and, being found factually innocent,
he was released after spending 15 years in custody.

                                             2
       The new DNA testing revealed an unknown male DNA profile found on the
shoulder area of Hylton’s nightgown near where she had been bitten. DNA from
Hylton’s fingernail scrapings was consistent with the DNA recovered from the
nightgown. DNA surreptitiously recovered from defendant’s garbage matched the DNA
found on Hylton’s nightgown. A buccal swab subsequently taken from defendant was
also a match.
       In February 2020, investigators John Gaines and Joe Ramsey of the El Dorado
County District Attorney’s Office contacted defendant. Defendant denied any knowledge
of the murder, denied knowing Hylton, and did not remember biting anyone. Defendant
acknowledged he carried a knife in 1985, and told Gaines that he and his friends from his
youth, K.B.1 and S.G., all carried knives at that time. Defendant had no explanation why
his DNA would be found at the El Dorado Hills house. He denied committing the
murder. Gaines asked if defendant could possibly have done it, and defendant responded,
“I’d like to say no.” Gaines took defendant into custody. Later, while in custody,
defendant said he “[f]ucked up” in the past.
       The next day the investigators met with S.G. They told S.G. they were
investigating the 1985 murder of Hylton, and S.G. said, “Yes, I know all about it.” S.G.
said that on July 7, 1985, he and defendant were at a keg party at K.B.’s house. They
took a mini keg from the party and went to a nearby park where they met up with a 14-
year-old girl who was Hylton’s daughter, A.A., now A.S.
       The group drank and smoked marijuana. Hylton’s daughter went off with K.B.
Later, K.B. walked Hylton’s daughter home and defendant and S.G. began to walk back
towards K.B.’s house. At some point, S.G. and defendant became separated, and, when
S.G. arrived at K.B.’s house, K.B. was asleep but defendant was not there. S.G. went to

1      We use initials of testifying witnesses and/or Hylton’s family members pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).

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sleep. He later awoke to find defendant sleeping in the room, and defendant was covered
in blood. Thinking defendant might have been injured, he checked on him, but defendant
seemed okay. In the morning, S.G. awoke to find defendant outside rinsing his clothes in
a kiddie pool in the backyard. The water in the pool was red. S.G. asked defendant about
the blood and defendant told him he had killed a rabbit as a sacrifice to “Cthulhu,” a
character from H.P. Lovecraft books.
       On a subsequent day, S.G. saw an article about a murder in El Dorado Hills, and
he confronted defendant about it. Defendant admitted killing Hylton. He appeared
excited rather than remorseful. Defendant said he had gone to the house “to talk to the
girl,” and he was confronted by a woman. Defendant told S.G. he had stabbed Hylton
with his buck knife and that the tip of the knife broke off in her skull. He said, “she just
would not die.” Defendant also told S.G. he kicked Hylton in the face and “kicked her
jaw off.”
       S.G. never reported what he knew out of fear of defendant. By way of illustration,
during an argument, defendant once told S.G., “You know what I’m capable of,” which
S.G. believed was a reference to Hylton’s murder. S.G. also told investigators he saved a
file on his computer including news about Davis “so that if anything happened to him,
somebody would see it and put two and two together . . . .”
                                     Charging and Plea
       In February 2020, defendant was charged with the murder in juvenile court
because he was 17 when he allegedly committed the murder. The trial court granted the
prosecution’s motion to transfer the case from juvenile court to adult criminal court. A
criminal complaint filed on January 8, 2021, which was superseded by an information
and two amended informations, charged defendant with a single count of murder. (Pen.

                                              4
Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1.)2 Defendant pleaded no contest to murder in the second
degree.
                              Defendant’s Criminal History
       Defendant’s criminal history included the following convictions and dispositions:
1995 convictions for having a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle (former § 12025,
subd. (a)(1)) and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,
subd. (a)), for which he received 40 days in jail and three years’ probation; a 2001
conviction for negligently discharging a firearm (§ 246.3), for which he received 90 days
in jail and three years’ probation; a 2001 conviction for driving under the influence (Veh.
Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), for which he received 90 days in jail and three years’
probation; and a 2005 conviction for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (a)), for which he received 30 days in jail and four years’ probation.
                                  Application for Probation
       Defendant filed an application for probation. He asserted he did not have any
prior felony convictions that would disqualify him from probation, and that, under section
1203, subdivision (e), this was an unusual case in which the interests of justice would be
served by granting probation. He relied on a 2020 psychological evaluation by forensic
psychiatrist Dr. Matthew Soulier, and a 2022 psychological evaluation by psychologist
John Hupka, Ph.D.
       Dr. Soulier’s Evaluation
       According to the account defendant relayed to Dr. Soulier, defendant, K.B., and
S.G. drank at a party and took more alcohol to a park where they met Hylton’s daughter,
A.S., whom they did not previously know. Defendant left the park briefly, and, when he
returned, he could not find his friends. He drank more—he had at least 10 drinks that

2      Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                             5
night and smoked marijuana—and “stagger[ed]” around, eventually, somehow, finding
himself at A.S.’s house. He knocked on the door and someone told him to come in. He
stepped into a room where he saw a woman. She grabbed him, and she then fell. She
grabbed defendant’s legs and defendant then fell down. The woman got up and hit him
in the head with a lamp, and his knife, which he always carried, fell to the floor.
Defendant grabbed the knife and stabbed the woman. The woman fell and he left. He
made his way back to K.B.’s house, found K.B. and S.G. asleep, and he fell asleep on the
floor. Days or weeks later, S.G. confronted defendant and said, “You did it,” and
defendant denied it. However, he conceded he had been worried he would be arrested.
But he returned to Roseville and “went on with life.” He stated he initially did not realize
Hylton was dead, but S.G. offered some details from the newspaper, and “then it was
heavy.” He continued: “I felt horrible about doing the crime. That was someone’s
daughter, mother, and aunt. There was another failure. I killed another human. As a
man, I hurt a woman.” When Dr. Soulier asked defendant how often he thought about
the crime, defendant responded, “I don’t remember the last time I gave it meaningful
thought (before the arrest). Not something that haunted me. I stuffed it all away.”
       Dr. Soulier emphasized defendant did not have a history of violence, and this
murder was completely out of character. Additionally, Dr. Soulier observed that, at the
time of the murder, as an adolescent, defendant’s frontal brain was immature, and he was
more prone to act in an impulsive, short-sighted, and risky manner. Dr. Soulier opined
defendant had “excellent rehabilitative potential.” Other than the murder, defendant had
no history of violence and did not demonstrate antisocial orientation. Dr. Soulier opined
defendant’s risk of future violence was very low. Past behavior, according to Dr. Soulier,
is the best predictor of future behavior, and the murder was defendant’s only known
violent act.

                                              6
       Dr. Hupka’s Evaluation
       Dr. Hupka stated that, in his interview with defendant, defendant told him of the
1985 offense that he had just turned 17 and he “got into a fight with this lady and ended
up stabbing her.” He said he had knocked on the door of a house looking for a girl he
had met that night. Someone said, “come in,” he went upstairs, and he found the lady
standing in a bedroom. The woman grabbed him, would not let go, and hit him with a
lamp. He picked up a knife and stabbed her, although he did not remember stabbing her
multiple times. He also acknowledged kicking the woman in the jaw because he was
“trying to get her off my legs.” After she stopped attacking him, he left. When Dr.
Hupka asked why defendant had a knife, defendant responded that he and his friends
always carried knives. Defendant stated he had not known the “lady died.”
       Defendant registered as a “low” to “low moderate” risk for future violence on the
HCR 20 risk assessment instrument. On the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide-Revised,
defendant placed at the 44th percentile for risk of future violent offenses when compared
with other male forensic patients, and thus Dr. Hupka characterized him as “in the below
average range for risk of future violent offenses.”
       Dr. Hupka characterized the murder as “an anomaly” in defendant’s life, as
defendant had no other history of violence. Dr. Hupka noted that, in the 35 years since
the murder, defendant had been living in the community and demonstrated no propensity
for violence. However, he also stated defendant “has given little thought to the offense,
and afterward just continued on with his aimless life. I see no indication of emotional
maturity or wisdom with age.”
       Of defendant’s likelihood to reoffend, Dr. Hupka stated: “[T]he psychologist’s
opinions are only opinions, and the best way to know if someone is likely to reoffend is
simply to release them into the community and see what happens. Obviously no Court
would rely on such a simple but definitive experiment. Except in this case. In this case,
the experiment has been done. In this case [defendant] has been in the community from

                                             7
1985 to 2020. During that 35 year period of time he has absolutely no history of any
violent behavior towards others. To the contrary, he is described in his record as a gentle
and sweet man. . . . This is an interesting case in which there is no need to speculate on
[defendant’s] risk of future violence after the incident. We have the advantage of simply
looking retrospectively into his past and seeing that in reality he was at no risk to
reoffend with violent behavior toward others after the instant offense. Violence towards
others is not part of his life course outside of the instant offense.” Dr. Hupka noted that,
at 54 years old, defendant had aged out of the high-risk age for violent behavior and
criminal activity. According to Dr. Hupka, advancing age and time spent in the
community without reoffense are two of the most powerful factors in assessing risk. He
concluded the “combination of his current age, his demonstrated ability to maintain
himself in the community for 35 years completely free of any violent behavior, and the
risk assessment tools used in this evaluation, all lead to the conclusion that this man is at
low risk to reoffend.” Dr. Hupka concluded that, from “a psychological and risk
management perspective, incarceration as a deterrent to future offenses is not required.”
                                         Sentencing
       Witnesses for Defendant
       At sentencing, defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Cauffman, who
testified as an expert in developmental psychology with a focus on adolescence. She
testified that cognitive growth and emotional growth develop at different rates. An
individual will reach adult-like levels of cognitive development at 16, but emotional
development continues into early adulthood. Thus, there is a gap between cognitive
development, which is what someone knows, and emotional development, which is what
someone can control. She testified the prefrontal cortex, which allows individuals to
pause, self-regulate, and “look at nuance in situations,” is not fully developed until 25
years of age.

                                              8
       Dr. Cauffman testified that an adult may perceive an individual’s facial expression
as demonstrating fear, shock, or surprise, where an adolescent may perceive the same
expression as demonstrating anger. Thus, adolescents can misread cues and misinterpret
emotional responses.
       Dr. Cauffman also testified that if an individual uses substances, the individual is
more likely to be impulsive. Substance use will enhance impulsivity, decrease inhibition,
“decrease the brakes, that stopping system,” and cause the individual to exercise poor
judgment.
       Dr. Cauffman testified about a study that followed approximately 1,000 felony-
level offenders from when they were 14 to 17 years old until they were 25. The study
revealed that approximately 9 percent of the offenders persisted committing felony-level
crimes into adulthood while 39 percent desisted. Dr. Cauffman testified that the reason
those individuals desisted was the development of impulse control and the ability to think
long term.
       Defendant also presented several witnesses to testify to his character.
       M.D. testified she dated defendant when she was a teenager. She described him as
very popular, personable, “the life of the party,” and well liked. She was never afraid of
him, and he never physically touched her in a harmful way. He could become angry,
agitated, and a little aggressive when he drank. However, she never saw him act out in a
physical manner. She acknowledged telling an investigator that defendant was short-
tempered when he drank, that he drank a lot, and that, when they dated, he had a
tendency to be violent. However, she did not mean to imply he was ever violent with her.
       Sandra S. testified she and defendant attended middle school and part of high
school together. She described defendant as funny, personable, very well liked, and
friendly with everybody. As far as she knew, he did not have a reputation for violence.
She never saw him angry. Sandra testified she continued to be friends with defendant
into adulthood and that defendant had a relationship with her young daughter. She was

                                             9
shocked defendant admitted to this homicide; she had never seen defendant engage in any
violence or aggression and what he admitted to seemed very much out of character.
       Sara S. knew defendant in high school. He had a reputation as being jovial and
fun. Later, they both attended American River College, Sara would give defendant rides
to and from school, and they would also spend weekend nights together at a mutual
friend’s house. They remained friends through their adult lives. She never observed
defendant act violently when he was drinking; she never saw any signs of anger or
violence.
       T.M. knew defendant since the seventh grade. He described defendant as very
popular and a funny guy everyone liked to spend time with. He testified that, in high
school, he never saw defendant become violent when defendant was drinking. T.M. was
surprised to learn defendant admitted to this homicide because it seemed out of character.
       K.G. was defendant’s former wife. She described defendant as having a good
sense of humor and a lovely nature. She testified there was “just not a bad bone in”
defendant. She had never been afraid of him. She had never seen him become violent
when drinking or otherwise.
       Victim Impact Statements
       Hylton’s daughter A.S. emphasized that, at the time Dahl implicated Davis,
detectives influenced her family to believe she was responsible for or involved in
Hylton’s murder. As a result, one of her family members assaulted her, and she was
placed in foster care at 13. In connection with the Davis trial, she was obligated to meet
with a doctor to confirm she was not repressing memories, that doctor testified at the trial
to discredit her, and the prosecution treated her as a hostile witness. She also emphasized
that she had given defendant’s name to investigators, but that, at the trial, to further
discredit her, they put the wrong Michael Green on the stand to testify he did not know
her. She emphasized she had been subjected to aggressive police interrogations
numerous times over the years. A.S. also addressed the fact that she lives with the guilt

                                              10
of “knowing that if [she] never met [defendant], [her] mother might still be with us
today.” She experienced survivor’s guilt.
       S.S., also Hylton’s daughter, addressed the chronology of events over the
preceding 37 years, including the fact that A.S. distanced herself from her family as a
result of the false accusation that she was present during the murder. She emphasized
defendant allowed Davis to spend 15 years in prison for the murder. She stated that the
“sorrow I feel for [Davis] and his family only multiplies the path of the pain, heartache,
and destruction [defendant] has caused.”
       H.M., another of Hylton’s daughters, also emphasized the rift in the family created
by the false accusation of A.S., as well as the 15-year imprisonment of Davis. H.M.
stated she and her family were forced to move. She felt that this ordeal seemed endless.
       A.B., another of Hylton’s daughters, discussed having her family “torn apart
because of this horrible event.” She discussed the disbelief, sorrow, blame, shame, and
denial her family experienced.
       I.P., Hylton’s son, also addressed the unwarranted blame focused on A.S. and the
harm it did to the family.
       Imposition of Sentence
       Defense counsel addressed factors she believed militated in favor of granting
probation. When defense counsel stated that, if the trial court was considering not
imposing a prison term, she would seek a continuance for the crafting of an appropriate
probation plan, the court stated it would not be placing defendant on probation. With
that, defense counsel submitted.
       Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court remarked that, in 26 years of experience
on the bench, “this stands out as the single most brutal murder that I can imagine just
based on the sheer number and quantity and type of wounds that Ms. Hylton sustained
before she died.” The court emphasized defendant’s remark that “she just didn’t want to
die,” indicating defendant “knew exactly what he did.” The court also emphasized the

                                            11
crime’s impact on the family, particularly A.S., who “was treated like a criminal, had her
entire life uprooted independent of the loss of her mother.”
          The court first determined that this was not an “unusual case” within the meaning
of California Rules of Court, rule 4.4133 such that probation would serve the interests of
justice. Although the court made this determination, it nevertheless went on to conclude
that, under rule 4.414, the factors against probation outweighed the factors in favor of
probation. The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in
prison.
                                         DISCUSSION
          Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying his application for
probation. He asserts the court abused its discretion in finding this was not an unusual
case in which the interests of justice would be served by granting probation (see § 1203,
subd. (e); rule 4.413), contending that the overwhelming evidence establishes this case
was sufficiently unusual to overcome the presumption of ineligibility for probation.
Defendant emphasizes he was a youth with a prefrontal cortex that was not fully
developed when he committed the crime, and he has no significant record of prior or
subsequent criminal offenses. He further contends his minimal risk of committing future
offenses overwhelmingly supports overcoming the presumption of ineligibility. We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining this was not an unusual
case in which the interests of justice would best be served by granting probation.
          “A denial of a grant of probation generally rests within the broad discretion of the
trial court and should not and will not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that
the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” (People v.
Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796, 807.) The same abuse of discretion standard applies to

3         Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                                12
the review of the trial court’s determination of whether a case is an unusual one
permitting probation. (People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831.)
       “The trial judge’s discretion in determining whether to grant probation is broad.
[Citation.] ‘[A] “ ‘decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might
disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]hese precepts establish
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ [Citation.] Generally, ‘ “ ‘[t]he
burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision
was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 165, 178-179 (Stuart).)
       “Except in unusual cases in which the interests of justice would best be served if
the person is granted probation, probation shall not be granted to,” among others, “[a]ny
person who used, or attempted to use, a deadly weapon upon a human being in
connection with the perpetration of the crime of which that person has been convicted.”
(§ 1203, subd. (e)(2).) Defendant acknowledges he is such a person, as he used a knife in
murdering Hylton.4
       In determining whether a statutory limitation on probation has been overcome, the
court is required to use the criteria set forth in rule 4.413. (See People v. Superior Court
(Du), supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) Rule 4.413(c) states: “The following factors may

4      In light of our analysis and conclusion, we need not address the People’s
contention that defendant was also presumptively ineligible for probation because he
“willfully inflicted great bodily injury” in the perpetration of the crime of which he was
convicted. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(3).)

                                               13
indicate the existence of an unusual case in which probation may be granted if otherwise
appropriate: [¶] Factors relating to basis for limitation on probation: [¶] (1) A factor or
circumstance indicating that the basis for the statutory limitation on probation, although
technically present, is not fully applicable to the case, including: [¶] (A) The factor or
circumstance giving rise to the limitation on probation is, in this case, substantially less
serious than the circumstances typically present in other cases involving the same
probation limitation, and the defendant has no recent record of committing similar crimes
or crimes of violence; and [¶] (B) The current offense is less serious than a prior felony
conviction that is the cause of the limitation on probation, and the defendant has been free
from incarceration and serious violation of the law for a substantial time before the
current offense. [¶] (2) Factors limiting defendant’s culpability [¶] A factor or
circumstance not amounting to a defense, but reducing the defendant’s culpability for the
offense, including: [¶] (A) The defendant participated in the crime under circumstances
of great provocation, coercion, or duress not amounting to a defense, and the defendant
has no recent record of committing crimes of violence; [¶] (B) The crime was
committed because of a mental condition not amounting to a defense, and there is a high
likelihood that the defendant would respond favorably to mental health care and
treatment that would be required as a condition of probation; and [¶] (C) The defendant
is youthful or aged, and has no significant record of prior criminal offenses. [¶]
(3) Results of risk/needs assessment [¶] Along with all other relevant information in the
case, the court may consider the results of a risk/needs assessment of the defendant, if
one was performed. The weight of a risk/needs assessment is for the court to consider in
its sentencing discretion.”
       “Under rule 4.413, the existence of any of the listed facts does not necessarily
establish an unusual case; rather, those facts merely ‘may indicate the existence of an
unusual case.’ ” (Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178, italics omitted.) “ ‘[M]ere
suitability for probation does not overcome the presumptive bar . . . . [I]f the statutory

                                              14
limitations on probation are to have any substantial scope and effect, “unusual cases” and
“interests of justice” must be narrowly construed,’ and rule 4.413 ‘limited to those
matters in which the crime is either atypical or the offender’s moral blameworthiness is
reduced.’ ” (Ibid.)
       In considering rule 4.413(c)(1)(A) and whether the instant offense was
“substantially less serious than the circumstances typically present in other cases
involving the same probation limitation,” the probation limitation at issue is defendant’s
use of a deadly weapon, a knife, “upon a human being in connection with” his murder of
Hylton. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(2).) The record established that Hylton sustained 29 knife
wounds resulting in her death. These included four knife wounds to the head, one to the
jugular vein, one to the chest that perforated a rib and injured a lung, seven on Hylton’s
hands and forearms, and five knife wounds on her back, one of which pierced her lung.
According to S.G., defendant told him he had stabbed Hylton and that the tip of
defendant’s knife broke off in Hylton’s skull. Additionally, Hylton had a battered face,
and she sustained a bite mark on her left shoulder. Defendant told S.G. he kicked Hylton
in the face and “kicked her jaw off.” A large piece of flesh discovered on the floor was
determined to be tissue from Hylton’s chin and jaw. Defendant also told S.G. that Hylton
“just would not die.” Defendant questions the veracity and interpretation of statements
made by S.G. However, he has not established S.G.’s statements were false or that the
trial court misinterpreted them.
       The trial court stated that, in 26 years on the bench, “this stands out as the single
most brutal murder that I can imagine just based on the sheer number and quantity and
type of wounds that Ms. Hylton sustained before she died.” The court also stated,
“whatever happened in that home and whatever happened to give rise to the struggle, it is
abundantly clear that this woman fought, fought, fought for her life. It wasn’t just a
simple shot in the back that many of the murder victims that I’ve dealt with have had to
sustain.” The court characterized it as a “horrific crime.” The trial court’s remarks make

                                             15
clear it did not find this case to be “substantially less serious than the circumstances
typically present in other cases involving the same probation limitation . . . .” (Rule
4.413(c)(1)(A).)
       Defendant principally relies on two factors, those in rule 4.413(c)(2)(C) and (c)(3).
Rule 4.413(c)(2)(C) addresses where the “defendant is youthful or aged, and has no
significant record of prior criminal offenses.” In short, this factor does apply here.
Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the murder, and it does not appear he had any
significant record of prior offenses. Dr. Cauffman testified at length about the fact that,
while cognitive development may reach adult levels at the age of 16, emotional
development continues into adulthood and that the prefrontal cortex, which allows
individuals to self-regulate, is not fully developed until the age of 25. She testified
adolescents can misread cues and misinterpret emotional responses. She also testified
substance use will increase impulsivity and cause the individual to exercise poor
judgment. Dr. Soulier stated in his evaluation that, at the time of the crime, as an
adolescent, defendant’s frontal brain was immature, and he was more prone to act in an
impulsive, short-sighted, and risky manner.
       Rule 4.413(c)(3) provides that, “[a]long with all other relevant information in the
case, the court may consider the results of a risk/needs assessment of the defendant, if
one was performed. The weight of a risk/needs assessment is for the court to consider in
its sentencing discretion.”
       Dr. Soulier in his evaluation stated defendant had “excellent rehabilitative
potential.” Other than the murder, defendant had no history of violence. Dr. Soulier
believed defendant’s risk of future violence was very low. Past behavior, according to
Dr. Soulier, is the best predictor of future behavior, and the murder was defendant’s only
known violent act.
       Dr. Hupka characterized defendant as a “low” to “low moderate” risk for future
violence based on the HCR 20 risk assessment instrument. He further stated defendant

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placed in the 44th percentile for risk of future violent offenses on the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide-Revised, which, technically, supports his statement that defendant was
“in the below average range for risk of future violent offenses . . . .” Of defendant’s
likelihood to reoffend, Dr. Hupka stated: “[T]he best way to know if someone is likely to
reoffend is simply to release them into the community and see what happens. . . . In this
case, the experiment has been done. In this case [defendant] has been in the community
from 1985 to 2020. During that 35 year period of time he has absolutely no history of
any violent behavior towards others. . . . This is an interesting case in which there is no
need to speculate on [defendant’s] risk of future violence after the incident. We have the
advantage of simply looking retrospectively into his past and seeing that in reality he was
at no risk to reoffend with violent behavior toward others after the instant offense.
Violence towards others is not part of his life course outside of the instant offense.” Dr.
Hupka also noted that, at 54 years old, defendant had aged out of the high-risk age for
violent behavior and criminal activity. According to Dr. Hupka, advancing age and time
in the community without reoffense are two of the most powerful factors in assessing
risk. He concluded the “combination of his current age, his demonstrated ability to
maintain himself in the community for 35 years completely free of any violent behavior,
and the risk assessment tools used in this evaluation, all lead to the conclusion that this
man is at low risk to reoffend.”
       Even accepting as established these two factors on which defendant relies, we
cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in determining this was not an
unusual case in which the interests of justice would best be served if defendant were
granted probation (§ 1203, subd. (e)(2)), particularly in light of the brutal nature of the
crime and defendant’s decades-long evasion of responsibility. Even assuming the
existence of the factors on which defendant relies, their presence does not necessarily
establish an unusual case, but instead only indicates the case may be an unusual one.
(Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.)

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       Defendant contends the trial court “entirely ignored” the factors on which he
relies. We do not agree. The record establishes the trial court expressly considered the
evidence and argument. However, “ ‘[t]he trial court may but is not required to find the
case unusual if the relevant criterion is met under each of the subdivisions.’ ” (Stuart,
supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.)
       Defendant also notes the court mentioned the fact that Davis was convicted of the
murder and asserts “that is not something [defendant] had anything to do with.”
However, even if we accept the premise that defendant was unaware of Davis’s plight,
his position elides the fact that, (1) defendant committed the murder for which Davis was
convicted, and (2) had defendant acknowledged killing Hylton, the circumstances that
allowed for the wrongful incrimination of Davis would not have existed. Moreover,
while defendant represented at least once that he had been unaware of Hylton’s death,
there is contradictory evidence in the record indicating he knew Hylton died from her
knife wounds.
       As stated, “ ‘ “unusual cases” and “interests of justice” must be narrowly
construed,’ and rule 4.413 [is] ‘limited to those matters in which the crime is either
atypical or the offender’s moral blameworthiness is reduced.’ ” (Stuart, supra,
156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.) The murder here was indeed atypical, but in the sense that, in
the trial court’s estimation, it was “the single most brutal murder that I can imagine just
based on the sheer number and quantity and type of wounds that Ms. Hylton sustained
before she died,” which obviously does not militate in favor of probation. While
defendant would argue his moral blameworthiness was reduced based on his age and the
fact that, as an adolescent, he was emotionally underdeveloped relative to an adult, and
he would further argue his record in the community proves he is a low risk to reoffend,
we cannot conclude defendant satisfied his burden of establishing the trial court abused
its discretion in determining this was not an unusual case in which granting probation
would have best served the interests of justice. In other words, we cannot conclude the

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trial court’s decision to deny probation was “ ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.’ ” (Id. at p. 179.)
       In light of our determination, we need not address defendant’s additional
contention that, based on a balancing of the factors in rule 4.414, the trial court should
have granted him probation. (See rule 4.413(b) [if court determines statutory limitation
on probation is overcome, it “should then apply the criteria in rule 4.414 to decide
whether to grant probation”]; People v. Superior Court (Du), supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at
p. 830 [“If the court finds the case to be an unusual one, it must then decide whether to
grant probation, utilizing the statutory criteria set forth in” rule 4.414]; accord, Stuart,
supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.)
                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                       /s/
                                                   EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
RENNER, J.

    /s/
FEINBERG, J.

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