Court Opinion

ID: 9380407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 22:04:07.253894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:24.837243
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
           in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                       2023 IL App (3d) 210493-U

                                  Order filed March 17, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 IN THE

                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                           THIRD DISTRICT

                                                  2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF             )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                              )     of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                             )     Will County, Illinois,
            Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                             )     Appeal Nos. 3-21-0493 and 3-21-0494
            v.                               )     Circuit Nos. 17-CF-1567 and
                                             )     16-CF-1743
                                             )
      ERIK C. WOYTOWYCH,                     )     Honorable
                                             )     Amy Bertani-Tomczak,
            Defendant-Appellant.             )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Brennan and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                               ORDER

¶1         Held: (1) Defendant’s conviction and sentence for AUUW does not violate the
                 proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, and (2) the sentences
                 imposed on defendant’s convictions for AUUW and aggravated domestic battery
                 are not excessive.

¶2         Defendant, Erik C. Woytowych, appeals his conviction of aggravated unlawful use of a

     weapon (AUUW), arguing that this conviction and sentence for AUUW violates the
     proportionate penalties clause. Alternatively, defendant argues that the sentences imposed by the

     Will County circuit court were excessive. We affirm.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4          In August 2016, the State charged defendant with five counts of AUUW, Class 4 felonies

     (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5), (d)(2) (West 2016)), and one count of unlawful violation

     of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor (id. § 12-3.4(a)(1)(i)). The allegations, in

     pertinent part, alleged that defendant committed the offense of AUUW where he knowingly

     carried an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm, in public, at a time when he did

     not possess a valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act or a valid Firearm Owner’s

     Identification card.

¶5          In June 2017, defendant was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment and therapy. The court

     ordered a fitness evaluation to be performed. On August 2, 2017, prior to the fitness evaluation’s

     completion, defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated domestic battery, a Class 2

     felony (id. § 12-3.3(a-5)), and AUUW (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(C)).

¶6          The aggravated domestic battery charge alleged that defendant “made contact of an

     insulting or provoking nature with [R.D-W.], a family or household member, in that said

     defendant strangled [R.D-W.]” At the initial hearing on the newest charges, the court was

     informed that defendant had been diagnosed with depression and an anxiety disorder.

     Additionally, defendant had been experiencing seizures and confusion and was being evaluated

     for a potential diagnosis of bipolar disorder or posttraumatic stress disorder. Defendant was

     found fit to stand trial on November 30, 2017. During the pendency of the case, defendant sought

     treatment for his alcohol abuse on several occasions. Defendant completed both an inpatient and

     outpatient program in late 2019.

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¶7            Defendant entered a partially negotiated plea of guilty on August 16, 2021. Specifically,

       he pled guilty to one count of AUUW from the 2016 case and aggravated domestic battery from

       the 2017 case. All remaining charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea. There was no

       agreement as to the sentence. The State provided a factual basis for each charge.

¶8            The factual basis for AUUW indicated that police received complaints of two vehicles

       driving erratically. The vehicles did not strike one another. Defendant and another individual

       were driving. A road rage incident occurred. During that incident, defendant exited his vehicle

       and “displayed a revolver type of a firearm.” Defendant returned to his vehicle and drove to his

       residence. The other driver recorded defendant’s license plate number and informed the police.

       When police arrived at defendant’s residence, a search of the vehicle revealed several firearms,

       including a revolver which was uncased and loaded with live ammunition.

¶9            The factual basis for aggravated domestic battery indicated that defendant and his wife,

       R.D-W., had argued. Defendant twisted R.D-W.’s arm and wrist. He also placed his hands

       around her throat and squeezed for approximately 10 seconds during which time she had trouble

       breathing. The court accepted the plea and set the matter for a sentencing hearing on

       September 20, 2021.

¶ 10          At the sentencing hearing, R.D-W. was called to testify. During her testimony, she read a

       victim impact statement where she detailed various abuse and threats perpetrated on her by

       defendant throughout their relationship. Regarding the strangulation incident, she stated:

                      “I thought I was going to die that day. And if I hadn’t *** been able to get out of

                      it, I would have. It is certain [defendant] was angry about nothing and had thrown

                      something at me that hit me in the lip and busted my lip open. I called 911

                      because I could always tell when the abuse was going to [be] severe. I was trying

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to get out of the house. I was pulled back in. I don’t recall why he was angry.

Then again, he’s always angry for no reason.

       When I was trying to walk out of the room, he used his leg to slam the

door and pinned my arm in the door with such force I thought he broke it. When

he let free of the door, it was only to grab me and start to punch me and slap me. I

kicked and fought back, but he’s 6 foot 4, he was intoxicated, and he also used

drugs such as Tramadol, Klonopin, and Norco to get more high off the alcohol.

       He smashed my head against the armoire in the bedroom and was still

punching and hitting me. He grabbed me by my hair and pulled me toward the

closet. He had me pinned against the closet doors and my feet off the ground and

his hands around my throat and he was choking me. I was nowhere near the floor

or even my tippy toes. I was already a bit fuzzy from my head being smashed so

much already, and he was also banging my head against the closet doors at this

point. I thought I was going to die. I could not breathe. I could not touch the floor

and my head was taking an enormous amount of blows. *** I reached for

something, anything, on the dresser next to me to hit him with so I could free. I

was getting dizzy and close to losing consciousness. I don’t recall what my hands

found, but I picked it up and swung at his face with it. It was enough for him to

drop me, and half conscious, I ran for the front door. He came out after me with a

screwdriver, yelling since he was going to jail he might as well kill me. At this

point, the police just showed up. He dropped the screwdriver and immediately

told them I was hitting him and wanted me arrested. He was bleeding from his

nose. The police had been in my home so many times at this point that they were

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                      aware of [defendant] and his abuse and arrested him. *** I was shaken and

                      terrified and grateful to be alive.”

       After reading her statement, R.D-W. was cross-examined by defense counsel.

¶ 11          The presentence investigation report (PSI) detailed defendant’s criminal background.

       Defendant’s prior criminal history included only misdemeanors, including two operating while

       under the influence convictions from Michigan which defendant received while on bond for the

       instant felony cases in 2018 and 2020. Defendant was placed on a term of probation on his 2018

       operating while under the influence conviction and served 270 days in a Michigan county jail on

       his 2020 operating while under the influence conviction. The PSI also detailed defendant’s

       physical and mental health and substance abuse issues, as well as his educational and

       employment history and familial relationships. Evidence of defendant’s completion of various

       treatment programs was presented. Letters of support for defendant were also submitted to the

       court from neighbors, friends, and family members outlining his good character and helpful

       nature. The parties presented their arguments and sentencing recommendations. In his statement

       in allocution, defendant detailed his struggles with alcohol and his continued efforts to maintain

       sobriety.

¶ 12          At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated:

                              “I’ve had a chance to consider the nature of the charges, *** and the

                      evidence presented here in aggravation and mitigation. The testimony of—that the

                      State presented via the victim impact statement, the letters that were presented to

                      the Court that I took a break to look at, the arguments of counsel.

                              This case has been going on for a long time. *** These are serious

                      charges, especially the aggravated domestic battery, the Class 2 felony. I think

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                        probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offenses and would not serve the

                        ends of justice. And, in addition, I believe that [R.D-W.] also deserves some

                        peace in her life. And for those reasons and because, though you have no prior

                        felony history, you do have in-and-out misdemeanor history.”

       The court imposed a sentence of two years’ imprisonment for AUUW and a consecutive term of

       five years’ imprisonment for aggravated domestic battery. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider

       sentence, which was denied. Defendant appeals.

¶ 13                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14             Defendant argues that his conviction under the AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1),

       (a)(3)(A-5), (a)(3)(C) (West 2016)) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

       Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), because the statute contains the identical elements as

       the Class A misdemeanor unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) statute (id. § 24-1(a)(4)).

       Accordingly, defendant maintains that his conviction and sentence for AUUW must be vacated,

       and he should be convicted and sentenced on the misdemeanor offense of UUW. Alternatively,

       defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing excessive sentences on his

       convictions where overwhelming mitigating evidence warranted minimum terms of

       imprisonment.

¶ 15                              A. Proportionate Penalties Clause Challenge

¶ 16             When reviewing the constitutionality of the AUUW statute, we presume the statute is

       constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute carries the burden of

       proving it is unconstitutional. People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 15. We review issues

       involving the constitutionality of a statute de novo. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 486-87

       (2005).

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¶ 17          The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll

       penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the

       objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Relevant to

       this appeal, criminal sentences may be found unconstitutionally disproportionate where identical

       offenses are given different sentences. People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002). If two

       statutes require the same elements, but result in different penalties, then one of these penalties

       has not been set in accordance with the seriousness of the offense and is unconstitutionally

       disproportionate. People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 20.

¶ 18          Regarding defendant’s AUUW claim, we recently decided this same issue in People v.

       Brooks, 2022 IL App (3d) 190761, ¶ 21. The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in

       Brooks and raises the same argument. Like this case, the defendants in Brooks were charged with

       AUUW and argued on appeal that they should be sentenced under the UUW misdemeanor

       statute as the charges required the same essential elements. Id. ¶ 8. In Brooks, we found that

       AUUW and UUW offenses do not carry identical elements, and the higher sentence was not

       constitutionally disproportionate. See id. ¶ 20 (“Under the UUW statute, a conviction may be

       sustained based on possession of an unloaded gun that is uncased and immediately accessible or

       on possession of a loaded gun that is encased and immediately accessible. An AUUW conviction

       could not be sustained under either of these scenarios.”). We find Brooks applicable to the instant

       case. Accordingly, we find that defendant’s AUUW conviction and sentence does not violate the

       proportionate penalties clause.

¶ 19                  B. Excessive Sentencing on AUUW and Aggravated Domestic Battery

¶ 20          Next, we consider whether the court imposed excessive sentences on defendant’s

       convictions for AUUW and aggravated domestic battery. A court’s sentencing decision will not

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       be reversed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Bush, 2022 IL App (3d) 190283,

       ¶ 118. A reviewing court “must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court simply

       because the reviewing court would have weighed the factors differently.” People v. Jackson, 375

       Ill. App. 3d 796, 800-01 (2007). “[A] sentence within the statutory limits will not be considered

       excessive unless it greatly varies with the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly

       disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Lee, 379 Ill. App. 3d 533, 539 (2008).

¶ 21          “Importantly, it is the seriousness of the crime—rather than the presence of mitigating

       factors—that is the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence.” People v.

       Decatur, 2015 IL App (1st) 130231, ¶ 12. The court is presumed to have considered any

       mitigating evidence unless the record contains some indication to the contrary. People v. Franks,

       292 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779 (1997). The court is not required to “recite and assign a value to each

       factor.” People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11. It is defendant’s burden to show that

       the court did not consider the relevant factors. Id.

¶ 22          The statutory range for a Class 4 felony is one to three years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS

       5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2016)), while the range for a Class 2 felony is three to seven years’

       imprisonment. (id. § 5-4.5-35(a)). Defendant’s two-year sentence for AUUW and five-year

       sentence for aggravated domestic battery fall well within the applicable statutory range for each

       offense. Sentences which fall within the applicable range are presumptively valid. See People v.

       Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27.

¶ 23          Defendant argues that the court erred in considering R.D-W.’s victim impact statement

       where she discussed other uncharged instances of abuse and bad acts outside the conduct for

       which he had been convicted. However, the court may properly consider evidence of other

       criminal conduct perpetrated by defendant, even if defendant has not been criminally charged or

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       convicted. People v. English, 353 Ill. App. 3d 337, 339 (2004). To be properly considered,

       “[e]vidence of other criminal conduct should be presented by witnesses, who can be confronted

       and cross-examined *** so that the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the testimony.” Id.

       Here, R.D-W. testified to numerous instances of abuse and other criminal conduct perpetrated on

       her by defendant. She was cross-examined by defense counsel. Accordingly, the court did not err

       in considering the entirety of R.D-W.’s testimony.

¶ 24          The remainder of defendant’s arguments support his assertion that the mitigating

       evidence presented was entitled to more weight than it was afforded. The court indicated that it

       weighed the factors in mitigation and aggravation when deciding its sentence. Defendant has

       failed to affirmatively show that the court failed consider any of the relevant mitigating factors or

       the mitigating information he presented. See Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11 (“[A]

       defendant ‘must make an affirmative showing that the sentencing court did not consider the

       relevant factors.’ ” (quoting People v. Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600, ¶ 38)). Defendant is

       essentially asking this court to reweigh that mitigating evidence, however, the weight to be given

       mitigating factors is within the court’s discretion and this court is not to reweigh those factors on

       appeal. See People v. Hageman, 2020 IL App (3d) 170637, ¶ 19.

¶ 25          While defendant may believe that the mitigating evidence merited a minimum sentence,

       the court was not required to agree. The record demonstrates that the court considered the

       relevant factors and even recessed the proceedings to review each of the character letters that

       defendant submitted. The court considered the evidence presented by R.D-W. and defendant’s

       misdemeanor history. While defendant had no felony background, he did have several

       misdemeanor convictions, some of which occurred while defendant was out on bond for the

       present cases.

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¶ 26          Further, the court found that the offenses were very serious in nature, especially the

       aggravated domestic battery charge. During the AUUW incident, defendant displayed a loaded

       revolver to another individual in the midst of a road rage incident and regardless of the severity

       of the injuries, aggravated domestic battery is a violent crime. See 725 ILCS 120/3(c) (West

       2016) (“ ‘Violent crime’ means *** any felony in which force *** was used against the

       victim.”). We cannot say that the weight the court afforded the seriousness of the crimes

       constitutes an abuse of discretion.

¶ 27          We find that the court considered the relevant factors in mitigation and aggravation, and

       it did not consider any improper evidence. Defendant’s sentences were within the applicable

       range, did not greatly vary from the spirit of the law, and were not manifestly disproportionate to

       the nature of the offense. Accordingly, we find that defendant’s sentences are not excessive, and

       the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. See Lee, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 539.

¶ 28                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 30          Affirmed.

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