Court Opinion

ID: 9369967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 15:04:29.292765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.418569
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                   NO. 2021-CA-1337-MR

REGO THOMAS CRUSE                                                     APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE KAREN L. WILSON, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 16-CR-00256

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Rego Cruse appeals an order of the Henderson Circuit

Court denying relief pursuant to CR1 60.02. We affirm.

                In June 2016, Cruse was indicted on multiple felony and misdemeanor

charges related to an incident involving his wife. On January 23, 2017, Cruse

entered a plea of guilty to the following charges: (1) first-degree unlawful

1
    Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
imprisonment; (2) carrying a concealed weapon by a prior deadly weapon

offender; (3) tampering with physical evidence; (4) driving on a DUI suspended

license (3rd offense, aggravator); (5) first degree possession of a controlled

substance; (6) fourth degree assault (domestic violence); (7) possession of drug

paraphernalia; (8) DUI, third offense (aggravator); and (9) possession of

marijuana. Cruse also entered a plea to being a persistent felony offender (“PFO”),

second degree. The PFO status enhanced the sentences for counts 1-4, and Cruse

ultimately agreed to a sentence of ten years on each count, to be served

concurrently for a total of ten years’ incarceration.2 Cruse was sentenced and final

judgment entered on April 25, 2017.

                On January 7, 2019, Cruse filed a motion to set aside his conviction

pursuant to CR 60.02. The trial court denied the motion and Cruse did not appeal.

On September 24, 2021, Cruse filed a second motion to set aside his conviction

pursuant to CR 60.02 and RCr3 10.02, 10.06, and 10.26.4 The trial court denied the

2
 Cruse also received three years’ incarceration on count 5; 12 months’ incarceration on each of
counts 6 and 7; and 45 days’ incarceration on count 9, all to be served concurrently with counts
1-4.
3
    Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.

4
  The trial court did not address issues related to RCr 10.02, 10.06, and 10.26. “An appellate
court is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.” Ten
Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

                                               -2-
motion, primarily reasoning that all of Cruse’s arguments should have been

brought up on direct appeal or in an RCr 11.42 motion. This appeal followed.

              We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion under an abuse of

discretion standard. Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Ky. App.

2009) (citations omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial

judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

              Cruse makes six arguments on appeal. He asserts that (1) he was

entitled to a separate hearing to determine his status as a PFO; (2) he incorrectly

received a “double enhancement” on the conviction of carrying a concealed deadly

weapon;5 (3) he incorrectly received a “double enhancement” on the conviction of

driving on a DUI suspended license, third offense; (4) his refusal to submit to a

blood test was used as aggravating circumstances against him, in contravention of

Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 628 S.W.3d 18 (Ky. 2021);6 (5) he was ineligible to

5
  Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 527.020(10) provides that carrying a concealed deadly
weapon is a Class A misdemeanor “unless the defendant has been previously convicted of a
felony in which a deadly weapon was possessed, used, or displayed, in which case it is a Class D
felony.” Cruse faced a Class D felony for this charge which was then enhanced by the PFO as
agreed to in his plea.
6
  Because he entered a guilty plea, Cruse’s refusal to submit to a blood test was never admitted
into evidence, nor was a motion to suppress filed. See McCarthy, 628 S.W.3d at 26. Moreover,
as the trial court pointed out, Cruse’s conviction was final in 2017 and McCarthy was rendered
in 2021.

                                               -3-
be charged and convicted of first-degree unlawful imprisonment; and (6) the trial

court abused its discretion because he was “overcharged.”

                The Commonwealth urges this Court to affirm the trial court, in part,

because Cruse’s current CR 60.02 motion is successive. The Commonwealth’s

argument is well-taken. The trial court addressed the merits of each of Cruse’s

arguments and only briefly mentioned that this was his second CR 60.02 motion.

We do not disagree with the trial court’s general reasoning that each issue raised

by Cruse could have been resolved by direct appeal or under a motion pursuant to

RCr 11.42. The Kentucky Supreme Court has clarified the use and timing of the

various procedural remedies available to a defendant post-conviction. To wit,

                        [t]he structure provided in Kentucky for attacking
                 the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not
                 haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and
                 complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to
                 direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02.
                 CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional
                 opportunity to raise Boykin[7] defenses. It is for relief that
                 is not available by direct appeal and not available under
                 RCr 11.42. The movant must demonstrate why he is
                 entitled to this special, extraordinary relief. Before the
                 movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must
                 affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating
                 the judgment and further allege special circumstances
                 that justify CR 60.02 relief.

Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).

7
    Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).

                                                -4-
              Additionally, Kentucky law is clear that a successive CR 60.02 motion

is impermissible upon any ground that could have been raised in a prior CR 60.02

proceeding. Stoker, 289 S.W.3d at 597. Stated differently, “CR 60.02 does not

permit successive post-judgment motions[.]” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425

S.W.3d 880, 884 (Ky. 2014). Accordingly, Cruse’s successive CR 60.02 motion is

procedurally barred and we do not reach its merits.8 The order of the Henderson

Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

               ALL CONCUR.

    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

    Rego Thomas Cruse, pro se                    Daniel Cameron
    La Grange, Kentucky                          Attorney General of Kentucky

                                                 Christina L. Romano
                                                 Assistant Attorney General
                                                 Frankfort, Kentucky

8
  We also note that, in contravention of Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”)
32(A)(4) (formerly CR 76.12(4)(c)(v)), Cruse does not have a statement of preservation at the
beginning of his arguments. Nor does he cite to the record. Our options when an appellant fails
to abide by the RAP are: “(1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) to strike
the brief or its offending portions, CR 76.12(8)(a) [now RAP 31(H)]; or (3) to review the issues
raised in the brief for manifest injustice only[.]” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky.
App. 2010). See also Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147 (Ky. 2021). However, because
we affirm on other grounds, we decline to further address violations of RAP.

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