Court Opinion

ID: 9744661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:11:53.047401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.863327
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring in the judgment: I agree with the majority that this cause is appropriately addressed under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. I further agree that, if there were a vacancy in nomination as contemplated by section 7 — 61 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West 1992)), that section would still not authorize the nomination attempted by the Democrats in this case. I join these parts of the court’s opinion. However, I believe the majority errs in its determination that there was a vacancy in nomination under section 7 — 61. Further, for the sake of judicial economy I believe the court should address the constitutional issues that were raised in this case. Thus, while I join in the judgment of the court, I cannot join fully in its opinion. ELECTION CODE Judicial Vacancy The Democrats purported to nominate Arthur Janura as the Democratic candidate in the March 1992 primary election for circuit judge for the 13th judicial sub-circuit, judgeship B, Cook County, pursuant to section 7 — 61 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West 1992)). That section allows parties to fill vacancies in nominations under certain circumstances. The majority begins its analysis by looking to whether section 7 — 61 authorizes a political party to fill a judicial vacancy in nomination by party resolution. However, before turning to this issue, the court should first determine whether there was actually a vacancy in nomination. An examination of section 7 — 61 demonstrates that there was not. Section 7 — 61 provides: "A vacancy in nomination occurs when a candidate who has been nominated under the provisions of this Article 7 dies before the election (whether death occurs prior to, on or after the day of the primary), or declines the nomination; provided that nominations may become vacant for other reasons.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West 1992). Since there was no death or resignation of a nominee, Janura could only fill a vacancy if the nomination "became vacant for other reasons” within the meaning of the statute. This court has not yet been called upon to construe the scope of the phrase "become vacant for other reasons.” Such a challenge has not been made since 1948, in Progressive Party v. Flynn (1948), 401 Ill. 573. In Flynn, the court was presented with a version of section 7 — 61 which provided that" '[i]n case a candidate who has been nominated under the provisions of this Article 7 shall die before election, (whether death occurs prior to, or on or after the date of the primary) or decline the nomination, or should the nomination for any other reason become vacant,’ ” another candidate could be nominated. (Emphasis added.) (Flynn, 401 Ill. at 581, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 46, par. 7 — 61.) This court ruled that section 7 — 61 meant what it said, and that "the legislature intended to provide for the filling of a vacancy in any office caused by death or declination of the nominee and also for the filling of the nomination if for any reason it should become vacant.” Flynn, 401 Ill. at 582. Since Flynn, the legislature has amended 7 — 61 so that the word "any” has been deleted. Now, "nominations may become vacant for other reasons.” Thus, the issue turns on what the term "other reasons” includes. "Where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.17 (5th ed. 1992). Applying this principle here, it is evident that when the legislature provided that "nominations may become vacant for other reasons,” it intended to embrace only reasons similar to death and resignation. Thus, a "vacancy in nomination” would occur only in circumstances beyond the political party’s control. Refusal to field a candidate in the primary election did not create a "vacancy in nomination” within the meaning of the statute. Rather, we are presented with a clear case of conscious choice, default or waiver by the Democrats. Since section 7 — 61’s vacancy prerequisite was not met, the lower courts erred in concluding that it was a proper means of nominating Janura. Constitutional Considerations The court’s conclusion that the General Assembly did not provide a means for Janura’s nomination is buttressed by the fact that such a provision would be unconstitutional. The nomination of judicial candidates is controlled by article VI, section 12(a), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 12(a)). That section provides, in pertinent part, that "Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judges shall be nominated at primary elections or by petition.” The constitution affords no other method or procedure for judicial nomination. "The rule has become well established that where the office of judge is a constitutional one the General Assembly has no power to prescribe the manner of selection or election of the judge unless authorized by article VI.” (People ex rel. Nachman v. Carpentier (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 475, 477.) Also, constitutional language must be given its plain meaning. (Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 453, 464.) The constitutional provision at issue is clear. Section 12(a) prescribes that judicial candidates must be nominated by primary election or by petition. It does not contain any provision for nomination by political party resolution to fill a judicial vacancy in nomination. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment. CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC and JUSTICE NICKELS join in this concurrence.