Court Opinion

ID: 9468289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:11:19.884142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:48.432822
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent. The majority affirms the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that plaintiffs failed to prove that the admitted defect in the steering mechanism caused the accident. In my judgment, plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence to create a jury question on the issue of proximate causation; the district court, therefore, erred in granting a JNOV.
George Fenner testified that as he was driving north on the Florida Turnpike, the steering “jammed,” and his automobile veered to the left into the median and struck an abutment. It is undisputed that the Fenners’ car was manufactured with an inherent steering defect (i. e., the possibility of stone interference) and that General Motors had knowledge of the defect. The issue at trial was whether this defect was the proximate cause of the accident.
Evidence at trial showed that General Motors was aware of the defect in Oldsmobile Delta 88 models and that the defect could be corrected by installation of an inexpensive shield device; it had not, however, warned the Fenners of the defect and potential danger. The car was totally demolished by the impact and was never returned to the Fenners. Unfortunately, both Fenners were severely injured and hospitalized. As a result, the car was not subjected to an auto autopsy to ascertain the possible presence of a stone. Moreover, as noted above, General Motors had not notified the Fenners of the possibility of stone interference; consequently, they had no reason to examine the steering mechanism for a stone before the automobile was disposed of.
Because the automobile was not inspected after the accident, the plaintiffs attempted to prove causation by circumstantial evidence. The majority concludes that in order to find that stone interference caused the accident, the jury must have engaged in speculation and conjecture. I disagree. In Franks v. National Dairy Products Corp., 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969), a products liability case, this court held that circumstantial evidence of causation is sufficient to present a jury question where the plaintiff has negated all other possible causes. General Motors asserts that the accident could have been caused by driver carelessness, a medical blackout, a blown tire, or any number of other causes. It did not, however, present any direct evidence that an event other than steering malfunction caused the accident. The# majority notes that one witness observed a puff of smoke which appeared to come from the front left tire which was flat on the wreckage and that the car appeared to dip to the left. This was contradicted by testimony of an *652eyewitness that the ear did not dip to the left and by the state trooper who testified that the tire marks discounted the flat tire theory. This conflicting testimony created a question of fact for the jury.1
Mr. Fenner testified that he did not suffer a blackout nor did the tire blow out; rather, he stated that the steering locked for no apparent reason. Thus, through his testimony plaintiffs offered direct evidence that the steering malfunctioned. Mr. Fenner’s credibility was for the jury to decide, not for the trial judge or this court. If the jury believed his testimony, the only inference necessary was that the admitted steering defect caused the steering malfunction. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I find such an inference entirely reasonable, in fact more logical than the inference we upheld in Franks: here, the defect was proven; there, we permitted the fact finder to infer from circumstantial evidence both the existence of a defect in the product and that the defect caused the plaintiff’s injuries.2
The majority emphasizes that the expert testimony is uncontradicted that stone interference could not have caused the accident. I do not find this testimony conclusive. Both defense experts conceded that stone interference could occur after a right turn; they concluded, however, that a stone could not have entered the steering coupling based on Mr. Fenner’s facts. Plaintiffs’ expert, in answer to a lengthy hypothetical question and based upon tests performed by him on a mock-up of the steering column similar to the Oldsmobile model, stated that the accident was not due to stone interference. He based this conclusion on the fact that no noticeable binding occurred in the steering after his initial left turn. Plaintiffs’ expert, however, conducted all of his tests on a model that was static and did not have power steering as did the Fenner vehicle. For that reason, his opinion would not be conclusive. Moreover, jurors are not bound to accept the uncontradicted opinions of expert witnesses, but have a right to use their own common sense and experience to draw all reasonable inferences from the physical facts and occurrences. Remington Arms Co. v. Wilkins, 387 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1967).
Hence, I find that plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to the cause of the accident. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, I dissent.

. See Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that under Florida law the issue of proximate cause is a factual question that must be submitted to the jury unless the facts are susceptible of only one inference).

. The D.C. Circuit has held that in an automobile accident products liability case, a plaintiff may prove the existence of a defect by circumstantial evidence that 1) tends to negate causes for the accident other than a defect in the car; and 2) tends to show that the defendant-manufacturer introduced into the car whatever defeet that might have existed. Stewart v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130, 137 (D.C.Cir.1977). The amount of evidence necessary for these showings is not great. Id. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has held that a case may go to the jury not only on a specific theory that an identifiable automobile part had failed, but also on the basis of a general theory that some unpin-pointed defect introduced into the automobile by the manufacturer was responsible for the accident. Hall v. General Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C.Cir.1980).