Court Opinion

ID: 9612573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:09:57.684792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:43.549734
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
concurring specially.
Although I concur in the majority’s conclusion that sanctions for dilatory service on the State as a party do not pertain to the notice required to be given to the Attorney General as State’s counsel under OCGA§ 50-21-35,1 write separately to emphasize that a court should not be powerless to dismiss a case when the plaintiff fails to timely notify the Attorney General without justification.
The stated intent of the Act at issue, which creates a limited right to sue the State, is “to balance strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity . .. against the need for limited ‘exposure of the state treasury to tort liability.’ [Cit.]” Norris v. Dept. of Transp., 268 Ga. 192 (486 SE2d 826) (1997). Pursuant to OCGA § 50-21-35, a plaintiff has a responsibility to immediately inform the Attorney General that a legal proceeding has been initiated. The purpose of this requirement is to promote the efficient administration of justice by providing the Attorney General with the immediate and maximum opportunity to investigate a claim against the State and to file a prompt and timely answer.
The undisputed facts of this case show that the plaintiff, without any cogent justification, failed to notify the Attorney General of the pendency of the case until almost a year after his lawsuit had been instituted, and for over nine months after the oversight had been brought to the plaintiffs attention by way of a “special appearance” answer filed by the State. Nothing in OCGA § 50-21-35 allows a plaintiff to so completely abrogate the duty to notify the Attorney General. Accordingly, while I agree with today’s decision that trial courts can order the dismissal of a lawsuit for lack of prompt notice to the Attorney General where the delay in giving notice is prejudicial, I am of the opinion that a sensible and meaningful reading of the statute also allows a court to bar a plaintiffs limited right to pursue a tort remedy against the State when compliance with the mandatory notice requirement is wholly disregarded, even in the instance where actual prejudice cannot be established. To hold otherwise would *205wholly upset the balance between the longstanding doctrine of sovereign immunity and the limited rights extended to plaintiffs to sue the State in certain exceptional circumstances.
Decided January 17, 2006
Reconsideration denied February 13, 2006.
Vaughan & Evans, Donald C. Evans, Jr., for appellant.
ThurbertE. Baker, Attorney General, Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy Attorney General, Loretta L. Pinkston, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richard V. Merritt, Robert C. Edwards, Assistant Attorneys General, Hawkins & Parnell, Brenda Godfrey, Kim M. Jackson, for appellees.