Court Opinion

ID: 9701282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:13:50.485662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:22.056185
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Justice,
dissenting on petition for discretionary review.
In January, the majority determined that a Brady violation occurred which required reversal of this case. I dissented because the issue was not preserved for our review. Now that the State has also addressed preservation in its Petition for Discretionary Review, Justice Vance changes course and decides that, although Keeter’s Brady complaint was preserved, Keeter was not required to do so. Once again, I find myself writing a dissent in this case. See Keeter v. State, 43 S.W.3d 667 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001) (Gray, J., dissenting), rev’d 74 S.W.3d 31 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Keeter v. State, 97 S.W.3d 709 (Tex.App.-Waco, 2003) (Gray, J., dissenting) (opinion withdrawn).
I still contend the issue is not preserved for our review.
Rule 33.1 provides that as a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that:
(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection or motion that:
(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context; and
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(2) the trial court:
(A) ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly; or
(B) refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal.
Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. In summary, to be preserved, a complaint must be: made to the trial court; specific; timely; and it must be ruled upon. I contend that none of these four requirements are met in this case.
Keeter’s entire motion for new trial is as follows:
Jackie Russell Keeter, Defendant, files this Motion for New Trial and shows:
The verdict in this cause is contrary to the law and the evidence.
Evidence establishing the defendant’s innocence was withheld by a material prosecution witness.
Defendant prays that the Court set aside the judgment of conviction entered in this cause and order a new trial on the merits.
(C.R. 2nd Supp.93). This motion does not raise a contention that a Brady violation occurred. Keeter contended a witness withheld evidence, not the State.
Although Justice Vance now says the complaint cannot be waived, an argument I will address later, he continues, as he did in the withdrawn opinion, to argue that the issue was preserved, citing two cases as examples of when a complaint of a Brady violation is preserved. I still disagree with Justice Vance’s manner of using these cases in his analysis. Justice Vance cites McFarland v. State for the proposition that a Brady violation complaint is preserved when urged by a pre-trial discovery motion. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), overruled on other grounds, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 (Tex.*151Crim.App.1998). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not decide whether the issue was preserved. It assumed, ar-guendo, that the defendant preserved the issue and overruled the issue. Id. at 511. Justice Vance next cites Nickerson v. State, proposing that a Brady violation complaint is preserved by a motion for mistrial during the punishment phase of the trial. Nickerson v. State, 69 S.W.3d 661 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd). Nickerson did not decide or discuss preservation and should not be used as an example of when a Brady violation complaint is preserved. Id. at 672-76.
Now, via a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Davis cites two cases to support his conclusion that a Brady violation complaint was preserved. The first is only for the general proposition that a complaint must . be made as soon as the basis for the complaint is evident. See Wilson v. State, 44 S.W.3d 602 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). With this, I have no quarrel. The second case is specifically a Brady case in which preservation of a Brady complaint was an issue. See Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In this Wilson case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a Brady complaint was not preserved by a motion for mistrial and continuance upon which an adverse ruling was obtained because counsel had been aware of the alleged Brady evidence for at least five days before the complaint was raised. Id. at 146. The issue being considered by the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether what was clearly a Brady violation complaint was raised in a timely fashion. The Court held that it was not. Neither of these Wilson cases help us determine if, on the facts in this case, a timely Brady complaint was actually made to the trial court.
Now, some may contend that Keeter’s alleged Brady violation claim was stated with sufficient specificity in the motion to make the trial court aware of the complaint, or that the Brady violation claim was apparent from the context of the attachments to the motion or from the testimony supplied at the hearing on the motion for new trial. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(l)(a).
Rhonda King, the victim’s step-mom, declared in her notarized statement that she told the District Attorney, “that I did not believe that Jackie had not done what [J.K.] said.” Of course, this double negative turns into a positive statement of belief, but from the tenor of the statement, the second “not” was probably a mistake. If this statement was sufficient to put the trial court on notice that a Brady violation complaint was contemplated, then it would also be sufficient to put counsel on notice and, therefore, should have been specified in the motion as a ground for relief. It was not a ground for relief. Although a new trial may be granted on grounds not enumerated in the rules of appellate procedure, an accused is required to allege sufficient grounds in the motion to apprise the trial court and the State as to why he believes himself entitled to a new trial. See State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). I contend that neither the motion alone nor when Rhonda’s statement is added to the motion was sufficient to raise the issue for the trial court.
Now we turn our attention to the actual hearing. Recall that this hearing was about the recantation by the victim of her trial testimony and, specifically, the credibility of the recantation. See Keeter v. State, 74 S.W.3d 31 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Travis and Rhonda King both essentially testified1 at the motion for new trial hear*152ing that they told the District Attorney prior to trial that they did not believe J.K.’s accusation against Keeter. Keeter’s attorney also testified and stated that the State did not tell her Travis and Rhonda did not believe J.K’s accusations. There was no argument by either party at the conclusion of the testimony. Did the Kings’s testimony or the defense attorney’s testimony sufficiently put the court on notice that a Brady claim was contemplated?
If Keeter’s counsel (1) had not determined that a Brady violation occurred when she filed her motion for new trial, and (2) if counsel then discovered during the hearing that a potential Brady violation occurred, then counsel should have specifically brought it to the court’s attention at the point she discovered the potential Brady violation. See Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Counsel did not, I contend, because she did not contemplate the claim. If counsel did not contemplate the claim, how could the trial court?
If this is not enough, let’s look at how the trial court ruled. In a letter2 to the parties, the trial court stated:
I have finally had a chance this afternoon to review your submissions of case authority in connection with this motion for new trial. I don’t find the new testimony that recants the trial testimony to be credible. To do so would require me to believe that this young child made up her testimony because her (younger!!!) sister told her she would have to make something up about the defendant so she could get to go and spend the summer with her dad, when she did not previously know her dad was coming and when she had not seen him in two years.
Accordingly the motion for new trial is denied and IT IS SO ORDERED.
There is absolutely no discussion about a potential Brady violation, which leads me to believe it was not raised, argued, or otherwise considered and certainly was never ruled on.
Even if the record before us presents some indication of the possibility of a Brady violation, we cannot decide this issue in this direct appeal. As in reviewing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we need a record which is sufficiently developed for us to determine whether there is, in fact, exculpatory evidence to be disclosed. The record regarding the alleged exculpatory evidence was not sufficiently developed because no one raised or argued a Brady violation at the motion for new trial hearing.
Unlike most alleged Brady violations, there is a fact question here about whether the alleged exculpatory statements were even made to the District Attorney. In a situation, like this case, where there is no tangible evidence, the trial court must first determine if there was, in fact, exculpatory evidence to disclose. This means the trial court must determine, as a factfinder, whether the potentially exculpatory statements were made to the District Attorney. In making the factual determination, the trial court must be able to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. If the Brady complaint was preserved, then the trial court resolved the credibility determination against Keeter’s witnesses. We should not disturb that implied factual determination. See State v. Terrazas, 4 *153S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). The majority has become the factfinder and we have no authority to assume that role.
Further, I strongly disagree -with Justice Vance’s arguments that a Brady claim cannot be waived. A majority of the court has already decided that the complaint was preserved. Thus, it is totally unnecessary to launch into a dissertation about why a Brady complaint is a non-waivable “category one” right. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
Additionally, Justice Vance incorrectly bases his analysis on the United States Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002). Justice Vance contends in Ruiz the Supreme Court “ruled that, in a plea-bargain agreement such as Ruiz’s, a defendant may waive the right to Brady impeachment evidence of the witnesses against him.” (op. at 7). And thus, his argument goes, because the Supreme Court did not say that a defendant may waive his right to Brady material when there is a trial, Justice Vance finds by implication, the right to Brady material is a non-waivable due process right, (op. at 8).
Interestingly, “waiver” of the right to Brady evidence was not the issue in Ruiz. The issue was, as stated in the opening paragraph of that opinion, “whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors, before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose ‘impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses.’ (citation omitted). We hold that the Constitution does not require that disclosure.” Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. at 2453. (emphasis added). There is no question that the State is required to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant to avoid an unfair trial. The Supreme Court simply decided in Ruiz that the prosecutor is not constitutionally required to disclose the same information prior to entering into a plea bargain agreement with the defendant. Id. at 2457.
And have we, as lower courts, not learned that we should not read into Supreme Court opinions what is not there? Was our expansive reading of Anders v. State, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) not summarily rejected in Robbins in which we were told the decision in Anders did not require a “straightjacket” application by the states of the procedures enunciated in that opinion for the disposition of frivolous criminal appeals? Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 274-76, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). Was our expansive reading of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) not summarily rejected in Martinez in which we were told the opinion in Faretta did not hold there was a constitutional right to self-representation in appellate proceedings? Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528, U.S. 152, 163, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). Should we now give Ruiz an expansive reading and infer that the constitutional requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence, Brady material, is a non-waivable, constitutional right and, therefore, a claim of a Brady violation does not require preservation? We should definitely not.
Claims of Brady violations have been determined to be waived even since Marin was decided. As late as 1999, the Court of Criminal Appeals has said that a defendant can procedurally default a Brady violation claim by failing to assert it timely. Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Likewise, this court has said that the failure to request a continuance at the time the Brady violation became evident waives the Brady complaint. Yates v. State, 941 S.W.2d 357, 364 (Tex.App.-Waco *1541997, pet. ref'd); see also Dominguez v. State, No. 10-02-028-CR (Tex.App.-Waco August 7, 2002) (not designated for publication).
In this ease, Keeter is complaining that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because of a Brady violation. Keeter did not raise a Brady complaint in his motion for new trial. And, therefore, the State had not been called upon to defend against a Brady complaint by presenting controverting evidence. See Tex. R.App. P. 21.5. Keeter should not be able to assert a Brady complaint in this direct appeal when he had an opportunity to specifically do so in his motion for new trial or at the time of the hearing on the motion but failed to do so.
Based on this record, the issue of a Brady violation was not made to the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, was not apparent from the context of the motion or the testimony at the motion for new trial hearing, and was not ruled on by the trial court. Thus, it was not preserved and we should not be reversing a case on an un-preserved issue. Because the majority does so, I respectfully dissent.

. Travis also stated that, one month before trial, he told the District Attorney he believed *152J.K.

. I seriously question whether this is a "ruling" but will save that discussion for a later date. There is no other order or ruling in the record.