Court Opinion

ID: 9853276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:45:45.410534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:44.137586
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, Gourmet of Macon, Inc. d/b/a Western Sizzlin’ Steak House, failed to carry its burden of showing that plaintiff’s knowledge of the defect was equal to or greater than its knowledge of the defect. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
On December 17, 1989, plaintiff Rosalyn Dunn went to dinner at the Western Sizzlin’ Steak House with her husband and son. The trio left the restaurant between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., heading towards their car. Plaintiff’s husband and son walked along the sidewalk adjacent to the restaurant; plaintiff followed them, a few steps behind. Plaintiff decided to take a little more direct route to the car: She stepped off the sidewalk to the parking lot; all of a sudden, her feet went out from under her and she fell flat on her back.
Plaintiff deposed that she slipped on debris (sand, leaves, cigarette butts) which had accumulated in a depression in the parking lot. *829The depression was rectangular and was located between the sidewalk and a concrete parking curb. It was not evenly graded; rather, it sloped inward. In other words, it was somewhat deeper in the middle (about one-and-one-half inches deep) than on the sides.
Decided March 3, 1993
Reconsideration denied March 16, 1993
Reynolds & McArthur, Charles M. Cork III, for appellant.
Anderson, Walker & Reichert, Robert A. B. Reichert, Brown W. Dennis, Jr., for appellee.
Plaintiff further deposed that she intended to step carefully into the depression, realizing that it contained debris. She added that she did not see the depression as being “something that would cause [her] to slip as [she] did” and she did not comprehend “the total situation.” Thus, although plaintiff deposed that she was aware of the depression and debris, she made it clear that she did not fully appreciate the danger it presented — she did not know the depression sloped and that debris would be sliding on it.
“ ‘(I)t is a plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific hazard which precipitates the slip and fall which is determinative, not merely his knowledge of the generally prevailing hazardous conditions or of the hazardous conditions which he observes and avoids.’ [Cits.] Plaintiff knew of the [depression and debris] and knew that walking [on a depression can be] somewhat dangerous, but there is evidence that [she] did not know there was [a slope] underneath nor that the [slope and debris] caused a slippery condition.” Showalter v. Villa Prado Assoc., 182 Ga. App. 705, 706 (356 SE2d 895). See Atkinson v. Kirchoff Enterprises, 181 Ga. App. 139 (351 SE2d 477). Thus, it cannot be said that plaintiff’s knowledge of the defect was equal to or greater than that of Western Sizzlin’.
In my view, the majority’s reliance upon Powell v. Woodridge Condo. Assn., 206 Ga. App. 176 (424 SE2d 855), is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff was aware of the full extent of the danger, i.e., the crack in the railroad crosstie. Nothing prevented that plaintiff from seeing the crack for what it was. In the case sub judice, on the other hand, plaintiff was not aware of the full extent of the danger. She had no way of knowing that the depression sloped (and that the debris would slide) because the depression was filled with debris.