Court Opinion

ID: 9911519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 07:08:17.635785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:34.680457
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 12, 2023

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00832-CR

                  MARGARET ANN JOHNSTON, Appellant
                                V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court
                           Kaufman County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 21-10851-86F

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                          Opinion by Justice Breedlove
      Appellant Margaret Ann Johnston was convicted of murder after a jury trial

and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant appeals, complaining that the

evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                               I.     BACKGROUND

      On September 14, 2021, Cindy Rowan-Stutts was on the phone with her half-

sister, Connie Helms, when she heard Connie yelling and a gunshot go off while

Connie was at appellant’s house. As soon as Connie began screaming, Cindy started
to drive to Appellant’s house. Appellant is Connie’s mother and was 80 years old

at the time. Appellant picked up Connie’s phone and told Cindy to call 911. Cindy

called 911 while driving to appellant’s house. When Cindy arrived, she found

appellant leaning over Connie attempting to perform CPR. Connie had been shot in

the arm. Appellant had the gun she had shot Connie with in her front pocket, and

Cindy was scared that appellant would also shoot her after appellant said to her,

“You little bitch. You believe everything this little bitch had to say. Cindy returned

to her car at the end of the drive to wait for police to arrive. When police arrived,

they attempted, unsuccessfully, to resuscitate Connie.

      Because of appellant’s health conditions, Connie occasionally drove up from

Galveston to care for appellant. On the date of the murder, Connie was in town to

take appellant to the doctor. During the sisters’ phone conversation, Connie told

Cindy about an incident between herself and appellant earlier in the day. Appellant

needed to get a COVID-19 test in order to proceed with a surgery scheduled that

week. Connie told Cindy that appellant had gotten mad and began punching Connie.

However, appellant told police that in fact Connie had gotten mad at appellant and

began scratching her while they were in a carwash. Cindy later heard appellant in

the background of their phone call saying it was Connie’s fault she would be unable

to have her surgery because she could not get a COVID test.

      At some point during their call, Connie’s tone changed, and she screamed

Cindy’s name several times, immediately followed by a gunshot. Cindy then heard

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Connie ask for help. Cindy testified that appellant asked Connie, “How does it feel

to be dying, you little bitch?” Cindy heard Connie ask for help again, and then she

heard a gurgle, and she knew Connie was dead. Appellant then asked, “How does

it feel to be dead, you little bitch?” Appellant picked up the phone and said, “Cindy,

Cindy, I need you to call 911. I shot Connie. I only shot her in the arm, but she’s

acting like she’s dead.”

      Deputy Robert Dominguez was dispatched to appellant’s house in Kaufman

County. Officers retrieved a .38 revolver with one spent cartridge from appellant’s

pocket; Connie was unarmed. Appellant told police on the scene that Connie “went

to get her gun out of her car.” Appellant said that Connie had been threatening her

since July and that she was “meaner than hell.” Appellant accused Connie of trying

to kill her and scratching her arms in the car earlier that day. Officer Mitchel Hempel

saw the scratches on appellant’s arms but did not believe appellant’s version of

events. Dominguez testified that appellant appeared calm, matter of fact, and almost

unemotional. Investigator Justin Guy learned that she kept the gun in her bedroom.

Guy also observed information regarding nursing homes inside appellant’s house.

      During her interview with Hempel at the scene, appellant confessed several

times to shooting her daughter deliberately. Appellant tried, unsuccessfully, to get

Connie to leave the property before going into the house to get her firearm with the

intention of shooting Connie. Appellant said she shot Connie because she was afraid

Connie was going to shoot her. Appellant “felt as if Connie was gonna go get her

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gun out of her car,” and officers found a gun in Connie’s vehicle. However,

appellant also admitted that Connie did not have any weapons on her at the time she

was shot. Appellant did not deny saying “Are you dead yet, you little bitch,” to

Connie, but she did deny shooting Connie out of anger.

      Appellant told police she was angry with Connie about the COVID test and

because Connie was planning to put her in a nursing home. Appellant said that

Connie had threatened her in the past but not on the day of the shooting. Appellant

further theorized that Connie was trying to get her diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and

early dementia because she was trying to take appellant’s property away from her.

      An autopsy of Connie’s body was performed. A bullet was removed from

Connie’s right ventricle. Dr. Jessica Dwyer, a forensic pathologist, testified that the

bullet had entered the back of Connie’s right upper arm, traveled into the right upper

chest, striking the right lung, and ultimately penetrating Connie’s heart.

      Appellant was tried before a jury on August 1, 2022. The charges of murder

and manslaughter were presented to the jury. The jury found appellant guilty of

murder as charged in the indictment. The court sentenced her to life imprisonment.

Appellant moved for a new trial on August 22, 2022, which was denied by operation

of law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.038(b). This appeal followed. In one

issue, appellant complains that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the

verdict.

                                         –4–
                      II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

      In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal

conviction, we apply well-established standards. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 316 (1979). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

and determine whether a rational factfinder could have found all the elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313; Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The jury, as the fact-finder, may make

reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial in determining appellant’s

guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When there

is conflicting evidence, we presume the jury resolved those conflicts in favor of the

verdict and defer to that resolution so long as it is supported by the evidence.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007).

      We also defer to the trier of fact’s determinations of witness credibility and

the weight to be given their testimony. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323

S.W.3d at 899. Our role as an intermediate appellate court is restricted to guarding

against the “rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally.” Isassi v.

State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Laster v. State, 275

S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

                                        –5–
                                  III.   DISCUSSION

      A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly

causes the death of an individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1).

Alternatively, she also commits the offense when she intends to cause serious bodily

injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of

an individual. Id. at § 19.02(b)(2).

      “A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his

conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to

engage in the conduct or cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). “A

person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct

or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his

conduct or that the circumstances exist.        A person acts knowingly, or with

knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct

is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. at § 6.03(b). “A person acts recklessly,

or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of

his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and

unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.” Id. at

§ 6.03(c).

      Intent, being a question of fact, is in the sole purview of the jury. Brown v.

State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A jury may rely on collective

common sense and common knowledge when determining intent. Cravens v. State,

                                          –6–
No. 05-21-00947-CR, 2022 WL 17248836, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 28, 2022,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Ramirez v. State, 229

S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.)). Intent also may be

inferred from the circumstantial evidence surrounding the incident, which includes

the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.36(a); Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). “Attempts

to conceal incriminating evidence, inconsistent statements, and implausible

explanations to the police are probative of wrongful conduct and are also

circumstances of guilt.” Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004).

      “[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree

the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor

against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 9.31(a). “An actor is justified in using deadly force if, among other things, the

actor reasonably believes deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor

against another’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.” Cravens, 2022

WL 17248836, at * 2 (citing Green v. State, 589 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(1)–(2)(A)).

      In a claim of self-defense, defendant bears the burden to produce evidence

supporting the defense. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018); Moralez v. State, 450 S.W.3d 553, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

                                        –7–
2014, pet. ref’d). The defendant’s burden of production requires her to adduce some

evidence that would support a rational finding in her favor on the defensive issue.

Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

       After a defendant satisfies her burden by producing some evidence that

supports self-defense, the State then bears the burden of persuasion to disprove self-

defense. Braughton at 608. The State’s burden of persuasion “is not one that requires

the production of evidence; rather it requires only that the State prove its case beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Therefore, in resolving the evidentiary sufficiency issue, we look not to whether the

State presented evidence that refuted evidence of self-defense, but rather we

determine whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of

murder beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on

the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914;

Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609.

       In her brief, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support

the verdict because she presented evidence of self-defense which the State did not

rebut.1 Appellant’s defense is premised on her testimony regarding her account of

   1
      Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of any specific element of the crime and limits her
challenge to the jury’s rejection of her self-defense theory. Therefore, we address only those arguments
made by appellant.
                                                 –8–
the altercation between herself and Connie as well as the scratches on her arms.

However, the jury was the sole judge of credibility on this issue. See e.g., Clayton

v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (when record supports

conflicting inferences we presume the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the

verdict); Rodriguez v. State, 546 S.W.3d 843, 860 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2018, pet. ref’d) (jury not required to accept defense claims). The jury heard

testimony from Cindy saying that appellant had said “how does it feel to be dead,

you little bitch?” immediately after shooting Connie as well as appellant’s own

testimony to police that she had shot Connie intentionally and that Connie was

unarmed at the time of the shooting. They also heard testimony from Hempel, who

did not believe appellant’s version of events regarding the altercation earlier in the

day.

        The jury, rather than appellant, is the judge of credibility of the witnesses and

their testimony, and they were entitled to believe the testimony of Cindy and Hempel

over the conflicting and contradictory testimony of appellant. See Clayton, 235

S.W.3d at 778. Based on our review of the record, we conclude a rational trier of

fact could have rejected the self-defense theory and reasonably found the elements

of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609. We

overrule appellant’s sole issue.2

2
 Appellant’s brief requests the Court to acquit defendant or, alternatively, to reform the judgment to find
appellant guilty of only the lesser included offense of manslaughter. However, as discussed above, because

                                                   –9–
                                        IV.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /Maricela Breedlove/
220832f.u05                                           MARICELA BREEDLOVE
Do Not Publish                                        JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

there is legally sufficient evidence to support the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, we uphold
the jury’s verdict of murder. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609.
                                                  –10–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

MARGARET ANN JOHNSTON,                        On Appeal from the 86th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Kaufman County,
                                              Texas
No. 05-22-00832-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. 21-10851-86F.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Breedlove. Justices Carlyle and
                                              Goldstein participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 12th day of December, 2023.

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