Court Opinion

ID: 2963922
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:27.054803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:48.157216
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1674

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 PHILIP GRANDMAISON,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                   [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                             and Keeton,* District Judge.
                                          ______________

                                 ____________________

            Martin G. Weinberg, with whom Oteri,  Weinberg & Lawson, Cathy  J.
            __________________            _________________________  _________
        Green,  and Kimberly  Homan,  Sheketoff &  Homan,  were on  brief  for
        _____       _______________   __________________
        appellant.
            Peter E. Papps, First Assistant United States  Attorney, with whom
            ______________
        Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
        ______________

                                 ____________________

                                    March 1, 1996
                                 ____________________

        ______________________
        *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.  On February 8, 1995,
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            pursuant to a plea  agreement with the government, defendant-

            appellant  Philip  Joseph  Grandmaison  ("Grandmaison")  pled

            guilty to a one count information charging him with utilizing

            the mail system to defraud Nashua, New Hampshire, citizens of

            their right to the honest services of their public officials,

            in violation of  18 U.S.C.     1341, 1346.   Grandmaison  now

            appeals  the  eighteen-month  sentence  of   imprisonment  he

            received, contending that the district court failed to depart

            downward  from  the  minimum  prison  term  mandated  by  the

            Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") because of the erroneous

            view that  it lacked authority to  do so.  We  agree that the

            district  court  misapprehended   its  authority  to   depart

            downward  on   aberrant  behavior   grounds.     See  Federal
                                                             ___

            Sentencing  Guidelines Manual  Ch. 1,  Pt. A,  Introduction  

            4(d) (1994).   Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand

            to  the  district  court  for a  determination  of  whether a

            downward  departure  on the  basis  of  aberrant behavior  is

            warranted  in this case.  Jurisdiction stems from 18 U.S.C.  

            3742.

            I.        THE FACTS
            I.        THE FACTS

                      We  consider   the  facts  as  set   forth  in  the

            unobjected-  to  portions  of  the  Presentence Investigation

            Report  ("PSR"),  the  information  to  which  defendant pled

            guilty, and  the sentencing  hearing transcript.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

                                         -2-
                                          2

            United  States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340, 342 (1st Cir.), cert.
            _________________________                               _____

            denied, -- U.S. --, 115  S. Ct. 250 (1994); United  States v.
            ______                                      _________________

            Brewster,  1 F.3d 51, 52 (1st Cir. 1993).  Grandmaison served
            ________

            as  an  "at-large" member  on  the Nashua  Board  of Alderman

            ("Board") from 1986 to  1993.  The Board consists  of fifteen

            members -- six of whom are elected  at-large and nine of whom

            are  elected from one of Nashua's nine electoral wards -- and

            functions   as  Nashua's  chief   legislative  arm,  enacting

            municipal  legislation   and  approving  all   financing  and

            municipal construction  projects.  Grandmaison  served on the

            Board's Secondary School Coordinating Committee  ("SSCC") and

            the Joint Special School Building Committee ("JSSBC").

                      Like many of his aldermanic colleagues, Grandmaison

            also  had  a full-time  job.   He  was employed  as Marketing

            Director   of  the   Eckman  Construction   Company  ("Eckman

            Construction"),  a Bedford, New Hampshire-based company, from

            1989  to  1993.     In   addition  to  his   job  as   Eckman

            Construction's  Marketing Director,  Grandmaison participated

            in a number of charitable activities.    

                      In 1990, the Board  began seeking construction bids

            for a $6.3 million project, the renovation of Nashua's sixty-

            year old  Elm Street Junior High  School.  Both the  SSCC and

            the JSSBC,  the two  committees on which  Grandmaison served,

            play  integral  roles  in  selecting  a  school  construction

            contractor and  in overseeing the construction  process.  The

                                         -3-
                                          3

            SSCC, inter alia, preselects school construction contractors,
                  _____ ____

            oversees  school construction or  renovation work,  and makes

            recommendations   concerning   contractor  expenditures   and

            payments.  The JSSBC, which is comprised of both alderman and

            Nashua    School   Board   members,    reviews   the   SSCC's

            recommendations regarding contractors, payments, and contract

            modifications.

                      Eckman   Construction  submitted  a   bid  for  the

            lucrative Elm  Street School Project  contract.  In  spite of

            the conflict  in interest,  Grandmaison remained on  both the

            SSCC  and  the JSSBC  for  months  after Eckman  Construction

            submitted its  bid.   He publicly  recused himself  from both

            committees on January 9, 1991, but only after questions  were

            raised  about his  connections to  Eckman Construction.   The

            subcommittee  vacancies  created by  Grandmaison's departures

            were filled  by Alderman Thomas Magee  ("Magee"), an at-large

            member of the Board and purported construction aficionado.

                      After  recusal from the SSCC and JSSBC, Grandmaison

            continued  as an  at-large  member of  the  Board.   He  also

            secretly  took steps to manipulate the contacts he enjoyed as

            an  alderman  to  Eckman   Construction's  advantage.    From

            February 1991 until shortly before the Elm Street Project was

            completed,  Grandmaison  lobbied  three  of   his  aldermanic

            colleagues -- Magee, Steve Kuchinski ("Kuchinski"), and  Anne

            Ackerman   ("Ackerman"),  SSCC   chairperson  --   on  Eckman

                                         -4-
                                          4

            Construction's behalf.  Grandmaison distributed informational

            materials  and video cassettes  about Eckman  construction to

            both  Ackerman  and  Magee.   At  the  behest  of Hal  Eckman

            ("Eckman"),  president  of  Eckman Construction,  Grandmaison

            gave  gratuities,  gifts,  and   other  things  of  value  to

            Kuchinski,  Magee,  and  Ackerman   before  and  after  major

            contract selection  votes.   These gratuities and  gift items

            included  pay-per-view  sporting   events,  dinners,   money,

            campaign  contributions,  and  promises of  future  political

            support.  Grandmaison also  extended Ackerman a personal loan

            and steered Eckman Construction printing jobs to the printing

            business she owned.

                      These lobbying  efforts eventually bore fruit.   In

            June 1991, the Board awarded  the Elm Street Project contract

            to  Eckman Construction  by a  vote of  eight to  seven, with

            Kuchinski  casting  the  tie-breaking  vote.     The  project

            contract,  which  the  Board  subsequently  mailed  to Eckman

            Construction,  served as  the basis  for the  charges brought

            against Grandmaison.  The government charged Grandmaison with

            violating  18 U.S.C.     1341, 1346, the  mail fraud statute.

            Specifically,  it maintained  that  Grandmaison utilized  the

            mail system to  forward a fraudulent  scheme in violation  of

            the oath of  honest, faithful, and impartial  service he took

            before becoming an  alderman and  a host of  state and  local

            laws  pertaining,  inter  alia,  to  conflicts  of  interest,
                               _____  ____

                                         -5-
                                          5

            influencing discretionary decisions  by public servants,  and

            acceptance of  pecuniary benefits  by public officials.   See
                                                                      ___

            New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated  640 et seq. (1986 &
                                                          __ ____

            Supp. 1994);  Nashua, N.H., Rev. Ordinances     2-273, 2-274,

            2-276, 2-278;  and   Nashua, N.H.,  Rev. Ordinances     7:56,

            7:59.  The government also prosecuted Magee and Kuchinski for

            their roles in this case.

                      Pursuant to a  plea agreement with the  government,

            Grandmaison pled  guilty to a one  count information charging

            him with utilizing the mail system to defraud Nashua citizens

            of their  right  to  the  honest  services  of  their  public

            officials.  The district court scheduled a sentencing hearing

            and  prior   thereto  received  a  PSR   from  the  Probation

            Department.   The  PSR prepared  by the  Probation Department

            recommended  a  total  adjusted  guideline offense  level  of

            fifteen.    This  recommendation  reflects  an   eight  level

            increase in the base  offense because a public official  in a

            decision  making position  committed  the crime  and a  three

            level  decrease   for  acceptance  of  responsibility.    See
                                                                      ___

            U.S.S.G.      2C1.7(b)(1)(B), 3E1.1  (a)  and  (b).   Because

            Grandmaison  had  no  prior criminal  record,  the  Probation

            Department  placed  him  in  Criminal History  Category    I,

            resulting in  a sentencing  range of eighteen  to twenty-four

            months.

            II.       THE SENTENCING HEARING
            II.       THE SENTENCING HEARING

                                         -6-
                                          6

                      At  the sentencing hearing, Grandmaison requested a

            downward  departure  to  an  offense level  of  eight,  which

            corresponds  to a  sentencing range  of zero  to six  months.

            Grandmaison based this request on three interrelated grounds:

            1)  his  criminal  conduct  constituted  "aberrant  behavior"

            within  the  meaning  of  Guidelines  Manual  Ch.  1, Pt.  A,

            Introduction   

            4(d); 2) his extraordinary contributions  to family, friends,

            and  the  community  were  not adequately  addressed  by  the

            Guidelines; and 3) the facts of his case warranted a downward

            departure by analogy to section 2C1.3 of the Guidelines.  The

            defense  also submitted  one  hundred  letters  attesting  to

            Grandmaison's  good deeds  and  character  at the  sentencing

            hearing.   Based  on  these letters  and Grandmaison's  prior

            record,  the  government agreed  that  downward  departure on

            aberrant  behavior grounds was  appropriate and recommended a

            reduced prison sentence of twelve months and one day.

                      The district court  declined to depart  downward on

            any of the three grounds advanced by Grandmaison.  The court,

            citing  our decision in United States v. Catucci, 55 F.3d 15,
                                    ________________________

            19  n.3 (1st Cir. 1995),  as support, found  that a "downward

            departure  based  on 'aberrant  behavior,'"  though generally

            available  under  the Guidelines,  "was  not  available as  a

            matter of law" in this case.  It concluded that Grandmaison's

            conduct  did  not  fall  within the  definition  of  aberrant

                                         -7-
                                          7

            behavior.  The  definition adopted  by the  court required  a

            showing of first-offender status, behavior  inconsistent with

            otherwise  good or  exemplary  character, and  spontaneity or

            thoughtlessness in committing the crime of conviction.   

                      Next, the  court concluded  that the facts  did not

            warrant  downward departure  on  the  basis of  Grandmaison's

            contribution  to family, friends, and  the community.  It did

            not make a specific finding on the section 2C1.3 claim raised

            by  Grandmaison, but did  state that "no other  grounds . . .

            advanced [by defendant or the government].  . . would justify

            departure  downward."   Accordingly,  the  court adopted  the

            PSR's  factual  findings  and offense  calculations  in full.

            Honoring  the government's  request for  leniency, the  court

            selected the lowest end of the applicable guideline range and

            sentenced   Grandmaison   to  an   eighteen  month   term  of

            imprisonment and two  years of supervised release.  The court

            also assessed Grandmaison $50.00, as required by statute.  

            III.      REFUSALS TO DEPART FROM THE GUIDELINES
            III.      REFUSALS TO DEPART FROM THE GUIDELINES

                      Before   addressing  the  three  grounds  on  which

            defendant  rests his  appeal,  we briefly  discuss the  rules

            pertaining to refusals to depart from sentences prescribed by

            the Guidelines.  Under  the Sentencing Reform Act, sentencing

            courts are expected to apply  the Guidelines, adjust the base

            offense level  as the  facts require, calculate  a sentencing

            range,  and impose  a sentence  within the  identified range.

                                         -8-
                                          8

            United States v. Jackson,  30 F.3d 199, 201 (1st  Cir. 1994);
            ________________________

            see  18 U.S.C.    3553(b);  Guidelines Manual  Ch. 1,  Pt. A,
            ___

            Introduction    4(b).  In  general, sentencing courts  are to

            regard "each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of

            typical   cases   embodying   the   conduct   each  guideline

            describes."   Guidelines  Manual Ch.  1, Pt.  A, Introduction

            comment 4(b).   Departures are warranted only where a case is

            atypical  or where  the facts  are significantly  outside the

            norm.  Jackson, 30 F.3d at 201.  
                   _______

                      Decisions  to depart  generally  fall into  one  of

            three  categories:  forbidden,  discouraged, and  encouraged.

            Forbidden departures  are those  based, inter alia,  on race,
                                                    _____ ____

            sex,  national  origin,  creed,  religion,  or  socioeconomic

            status.   See  Jackson,  30 F.3d  at  202; United  States  v.
                      ___  _______                     __________________

            Rivera, 994  F.2d 942, 948-49  (1st Cir.  1993); U.S.S.G.    
            ______

            5H1.10, 5H1.12.  The Sentencing Commission ("Commission") has

            expressly precluded  departure on these  grounds, even  where

            they make a case atypical or extraordinary.  Rivera, 994 F.2d
                                                         ______

            at 948-49.  Discouraged departures involve factors which were

            considered  by the Commission -- such as age, family ties and

            responsibilities, employment record,  good works, or physical

            condition -- but which present themselves to an extraordinary

            degree in a  particular case.   United States  v. DeMasi,  40
                                            ________________________

            F.3d 1306, 1323-24 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, -- U.S. --,
                                                _____ ______

            115 S. Ct. 947 (1995); United States v. Hilton, 946 F.2d 955,
                                   _______________________

                                         -9-
                                          9

            959  (1st Cir.  1991).   Encouraged departures,  in contrast,

            involve  considerations not previously  taken into account by

            the Commission.  Hilton, 946 F.2d at 959. 
                             ______

                      Because the Commission  intended departures on  any

            grounds to be the  exception rather than the rule,   Jackson,
                                                                 _______

            30  F.3d  at 201,  a district  court's  refusal to  depart --

            upward  or downward  -- is  ordinarily not  appealable.   See
                                                                      ___

            United  States  v. DeCosta,  37 F.3d  5,  8 (1st  Cir. 1994);
            __________________________

            United States v.  Gaines, 7  F.3d 101, 105  (7th Cir.  1993);
            ________________________

            Hilton, 946 F.2d at  957.  The well-established rule  is that
            ______

            appellate  courts lack  jurisdiction to  review discretionary

            district court decisions not to depart from sentences imposed

            under the Guidelines.   See  United States v.  Byrd, 53  F.3d
                                    ___  ______________________

            144, 145 (6th Cir.  1995); United States v. Gifford,  17 F.3d
                                       ________________________

            462, 473 (1st Cir.  1994); United States v. Amparo,  961 F.2d
                                       _______________________

            288, 292 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 878 (1992).  
                                 _____ ______

                      There  are,  however,  certain  exceptions  to this

            rule.   Appellate  jurisdiction attaches, for  example, where

            the record indicates that the trial court's failure to depart

            was  the product of  a mistake of  law.  Gifford,  17 F.3d at
                                                     _______

            473; Amparo, 961 F.2d at 292; Hilton, 946 F.2d at 957.  If it
                 ______                   ______

            appears that a misapprehension of the applicable guideline or

            miscalculation of the authority to deviate from the guideline

            range prevented the court from departing downward,  appellate

            review  is  appropriate.   Gifford,  17 F.3d  at  473; United
                                       _______                     ______

                                         -10-
                                          10

            States v. Pierro,  32 F.3d  611, 619 (1st  Cir. 1994),  cert.
            ________________                                        _____

            denied, -- U.S. --, 115 S. Ct. 919 (1995).   
            ______

                      Our review as to  whether such a misapprehension of

            judicial  authority occurred  is plenary.   United  States v.
                                                        _________________

            Ovalle-M rquez,  36  F.3d 212,  221  (1st  Cir. 1994),  cert.
            ______________                                          _____

            denied, -- U.S. --,  115 S. Ct. 1322 (1995).   Plenary review
            ______

            also  governs where the issue on appeal pertains to the scope

            or interpretation of a guideline.  United States v. Marcello,
                                               _________________________

            13  F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1994)("The question of whether the

            district    court   adopted    the   proper    standard   [of

            interpretation]  is  a question  of  law  subject to  plenary

            review."). 

            IV.       DISCUSSION
            IV.       DISCUSSION

                      The  crux  of  Grandmaison's  appeal  is  that  the

            district  court  misunderstood  the  scope of  its  departure

            authority.   He argues  that the court  erroneously concluded

            that it was precluded from departing downward  on the grounds

            of    aberrant    behavior    and   extraordinary    offender

            characteristics.  Additionally, he  maintains that the  court

            misapprehended  its power  to depart  downward by  analogy to

            section 2C1.3 of the  Guidelines, which concerns conflicts of

            interest.  See  U.S.S.G.   2C1.3.  We begin  by analyzing the
                       ___

            claim that the  facts of this case  permit downward departure

            on  the  basis  of  aberrant  behavior  and  discuss the  two

            remaining bases for appeal in turn.

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      A.   Aberrant  Behavior as  a  Basis  for  Downward
                      A.   Aberrant  Behavior as  a  Basis  for  Downward
                           Departure.
                           Departure

                           1.   Jurisdiction  and  the  District  Court's
                           1.   Jurisdiction  and  the  District  Court's
                                Refusal to Depart.
                                Refusal to Depart.

                      The  threshold issue raised by defendant's aberrant

            behavior claim is whether we  have jurisdiction to review the

            district court's refusal to depart downward.  Pierro, 32 F.3d
                                                          ______

            at 619.   We note at  the outset, though  it does not  relate

            directly to questions of jurisdiction, that the basic premise

            of  defendant's aberrant  departure  claim is  correct.   The

            Guidelines  permit  downward  departures  on  the  basis   of

            aberrant behavior.   See, e.g.,  Catucci, 55 F.3d  at 19  n.3
                                 ___  ____   _______

            (citing  cases); Marcello,  13  F.3d at  760 (citing  cases);
                             ________

            Gifford, 17 F.3d at  475; United States v. Morales,  972 F.2d
            _______                   ________________________

            1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.  denied, -- U.S. --, 113 S.
                                        _____  ______

            Ct.  1665 (1993).    Such departures  fall into  the category

            embracing   factors  not   previously   considered   by   the

            Commission.  United States v. Premachandra, 32  F.3d 346, 349
                         _____________________________

            (8th  Cir. 1994);  United States  v. Fairless, 975  F.2d 664,
                               __________________________

            668-69 (9th Cir. 1992);  see Guidelines Manual Ch. 1,  Pt. A,
                                     ___

            Introduction   4(d)("The Commission, of course, has not dealt

            with  the single  acts of  aberrant behavior  that still  may

            justify   probation  at   higher   offense   levels   through

            departures.").  And they may be employed whether the sentence

            computed  involves imprisonment  or  merely probation.    See
                                                                      ___

                                         -12-
                                          12

            United  States  v.  Duerson,  25  F.3d  376,  380  (6th  Cir.
            ___________________________

            1994)(citing cases); Fairless, 975 F.2d at 668.
                                 ________

                      Consistent  with  the  departure recommendation  it

            entered  at  sentencing,  the  government  acknowledges  that

            aberrant   behavior  departures   are  available   under  the

            Guidelines, but maintains that we lack jurisdiction to review

            defendant's  claim because  the district  court's refusal  to

            depart  was an  exercise of  discretion.   Defendant disputes

            this, arguing  that he has cleared  his jurisdictional hurdle

            because the record clearly  shows that the   district court's

            refusal  to  depart stemmed  from  a  misapprehension of  its

            authority  to  depart  on  aberrant behavior  grounds.    See
                                                                      ___

            Gifford, 17 F.3d  at 473;   Pierro, 32 F.3d  at 611.   Having
            _______                     ______

            reviewed the totality of  the record, as we are  obligated to

            do, see United States v. Morrison, 46 F.3d 127, 130 (1st Cir.
                ___ _________________________

            1995)(citing United States  v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340, 348 (1st
                         _________________________

            Cir.), cert. denied, --  U.S. --, 115 S. Ct. 250  (1994)), we
                   _____ ______

            find  that  the  truth   lies  somewhere  between  these  two

            positions.

                      The   record  reveals   that  the   district  court

            understood  its  general  authority  to  depart  on  aberrant

            behavior  grounds,  but   adopted  the   wrong  standard   in

            determining whether defendant's behavior was "aberrant" under

            the Guidelines.  The court erroneously held that  an aberrant

            behavior  departure  in  this  Circuit  requires  an  initial

                                         -13-
                                          13

            finding    of   "spontaneity"   or   a   "thoughtless   act."

            Anticipating our review, the court also made it clear that it

            would  have granted  the departure  requests entered  by both

            defendant and the government had it not believed itself bound

            to this standard:

                      THE COURT:     And   so   I'm  going   to
                      sentence  you at  the  lowest end  of the
                      guidelines   range   that  otherwise   is
                      applicable in your case.  If the Court of
                      Appeals disagrees  with my interpretation
                      of  aberrant behavior  and  the  case  is
                      returned,  if  it   helps  the  Court  of
                      Appeals in terms of imposing  sentence on
                      appeal  or  resolving  the   question  on
                      appeal,  assuming you  do appeal,  I will
                      say  on the  record that  if I  thought I
                      could  depart on  a principled  basis and
                      consistent with  the law, I  would follow
                      the U.S. Attorney's recommendation  and I
                      would  sentence you  to  one  year --  12
                      months and one day.

            Based on this  statement, we  think it plain  that the  court

            misunderstood its authority to  depart downward under the law

            of this Circuit.

                      We therefore agree  with defendant on  this initial

            matter of jurisdiction.  The district court's misapprehension

            of  its  departure  authority confers  jurisdiction  on  this

            court.  See Gifford, 17 F.3d  at 473; Pierro, 32 F.3d at 619.
                    ___ _______                   ______

            The de novo  standard of  review governs our  review of  this
                __ ____

            aspect of defendant's claim.  See Marcello, 13 F.3d at 755.  
                                          ___ ________

                           2.   A Definition of Aberrant Behavior.
                           2.   A Definition of Aberrant Behavior.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      The Guidelines refer  to "single  acts of  aberrant

            behavior,"  but neither  define that  phrase nor  provide any

            insight into  what the  Commission might  have meant  when it

            used it.  See Guidelines Manual Ch. 1, Pt. A,  Introduction  
                      ___

            4(d);  United States v. Williams,  974 F.2d 25,  26 (5th Cir.
                   _________________________

            1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 934 (1993).   Defendant's claim
                   _____ ______

            presents  an issue of first  impression in this  Circuit.  We

            have considered cases  involving departure requests based  on

            aberrant  behavior, see,  e.g., Catucci,  55 F.3d at  19 n.3;
                                ___   ____  _______

            United  States  v. Pozzy,  902 F.2d  133, 137-38  (1st Cir.),
            ________________________

            cert.  denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990); United States v. Russell,
            _____  ______                       ________________________

            870 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1989), but have not had occasion to

            define that term with specificity until now.  Catucci, supra,
                                                          _______  _____

            which the district court erroneously  regarded as foreclosing

            departure, did not require  us to define "aberrant behavior."

            In that case, we acknowledged disagreement among the circuits

            as  to what type of conduct aberrant behavior entails but did

            not  deem it necessary to articulate a definition for our own

            Circuit because we  found that the  defendant had waived  his

            departure claim.  Grandmaison's claim, in contrast, hinges on

            an  articulation  of  an  aberrant behavior  standard.    We,

            therefore, turn our attention to that task.  

                      Two cases establish what have come to be recognized

            as the  outer boundaries  of the aberrant  behavior spectrum.

            United States v. Russell, 870 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1989), stands
            ________________________

                                         -15-
                                          15

            at one  end of the  spectrum and United States  v. Carey, 895
                                             _______________________

            F.2d 318 (7th  Cir. 1990),  at the other.   Russell  involved
                                                        _______

            criminal  conduct  which  was impulsive  and  unpremeditated.

            Tempted by  the prospect  of  instant wealth,  a Wells  Fargo

            armored truck driver and his partner decided to keep an extra

            bag of money mistakenly handed them.   The driver, who had no

            prior criminal record, returned  the money almost immediately

            after committing  his crime and cooperated  in the subsequent

            police   investigation.    In   contrast,  Carey  involved  a
                                                       _____

            premeditated criminal  scheme carried out over  a long period

            of  time.  There, a  trucking company president  engaged in a

            check-kiting scheme  over a fifteen-month period.   Each work

            day during  this period  the company president  concealed his

            two over-drawn bank accounts by having his bookkeeper prepare

            checks to cover the fund shortage.  He signed each  check and

            frequently deposited them himself.   The Seventh Circuit held

            that this behavior was  not "aberrant."  895 F.2d  at 324-25.

            Uncertainty about the reason for the district court's refusal

            to depart precluded  this court from  deciding that issue  in

            Russell. 
            _______

                      Circuit  courts  are  divided over  where  criminal

            conduct  must  fall  on  the aberrant  behavior  spectrum  to

            justify downward  departure.   As we  noted in  Catucci, some
                                                            _______

            have  adopted an  expansive  view of  what aberrant  behavior

            means  in  the  context  of the  Guidelines,  whereas  others

                                         -16-
                                          16

            require  a  spontaneous  or   thoughtless  act  of  the  sort

            committed by the defendant in Russell.  The Seventh Circuit's
                                          _______

            decision in Carey provided the  moorings for the latter group
                        _____

            of circuits.   The Carey court  held that "[a] single  act of
                               _____

            aberrant behavior . . .  generally contemplates a spontaneous

            and  seemingly thoughtless act rather than  one which was the

            result of  substantial planning  because an act  which occurs

            suddenly and  is  not the  result of  a continued  reflective

            process is one for  which the defendant may be  arguably less

            accountable."   895 F.2d at  325.  The  Seventh Circuit later

            reinforced  this  tight interpretation  in  United States  v.
                                                        _________________

            Andruska, 964  F.2d 640, 645-46  (7th Cir. 1992),  a decision
            ________

            reversing a district court's decision to depart downward in a

            case  involving  a  woman  found  guilty  of  concealing  her

            fugitive paramour from arrest.    

                      The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth  Circuits have

            embraced  the Seventh  Circuit's  view of  aberrant behavior.

            For example, in Marcello,  supra, the Third Circuit explained
                            ________   _____

            that "there must be  some element of abnormal  or exceptional

            behavior"  before adopting the  Seventh Circuit's spontaneity

            requirement and  reversing the  district court's  decision to

            depart downward.  13 F.3d at 761.  The Marcello defendant was
                                                   ________

            an attorney who, on seven separate occasions, structured bank

            deposits to avoid tax  reporting requirements in violation of

                                         -17-
                                          17

            31 U.S.C.    5322(a),  5324(3).  He committed  these offenses

            over the span of seven consecutive working days.  

                      Cases  involving  extensive  planning  or  repeated

            criminal acts  received  similar  treatment  in  the  Fourth,

            Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.   In United States v.  Glick, 946
                                             _______________________

            F.2d  335, 338 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit reversed a

            downward departure  decision after noting that  the defendant

            transported  letters containing  stolen trade  secrets across

            state lines  on several occasions.   In Williams,  supra, the
                                                    ________   _____

            Fifth Circuit  affirmed a district court's  refusal to depart

            downward  because  the  robbery  executed  by  the  defendant

            involved planning.  Similarly,  the Eighth Circuit found that

            a bank fraud scheme carried out over a one year period lacked

            the  level of  spontaneity  and  thoughtlessness required  by

            cases such as Carey.  See United States v. Garlich,  951 F.2d
                          _____   ___ ________________________

            161, 164 (8th Cir.  1991); see also Premachandra, 32  F.3d at
                                       ___ ____ ____________

            349.   

                      In  contrast,  the Ninth  and  Tenth Circuits  have

            eschewed any focus on spontaneity and thoughtlessness, opting

            instead  for a broad view of aberrant behavior.  They require

            reviewing courts to employ  the totality of the circumstances

            test in making aberrant  behavior determinations.  Under this

            test, courts  consider a variety of  mitigating factors, such

            as  pecuniary gain to the defendant, prior good deeds, and an

            effort to  mitigate the  effects of  the crime in  evaluating

                                         -18-
                                          18

            whether   a   defendant's  conduct   was  unusual   or,  more

            specifically, "aberrant."  See, e.g., United States v. Takai,
                                       ___  ____  ______________________

            941 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1991).  

                      In Takai, the  Ninth Circuit affirmed  the district
                         _____

            court's decision  to depart  downward after finding  that the

            defendants who  pled guilty to  bribery of and  conspiracy to

            bribe  an  Immigration and  Naturalization  Service official,

            inter  alia,  received no  pecuniary  gain,  had no  criminal
            _____  ____

            record, and had  been influenced  by a government  agent.   A

            convergence  of  factors,  such  as  the  defendant's   manic

            depression,  suicidal  tendencies,  and recent  unemployment,

            also led  the Ninth Circuit  to affirm downward  departure in

            Fairless, supra, an armed robbery case.  Similarly, in United
            ________  _____                                        ______

            States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486,  1494 (10th Cir. 1991), a drug
            ______________

            possession  case,  the  Tenth  Circuit   held  that  downward

            departure  was appropriate  because the  defendant's behavior

            was  an   aberration  from  her  usual   conduct,  which  was

            highlighted  by  long-term  employment,  no  abuse  or  prior

            distribution of controlled  substances, and economic  support

            of her family. 

                      We are persuaded, after reviewing the cases decided

            by our colleagues in other circuits, that the approach  taken

            by the Ninth and Tenth  Circuits achieves the balance between

            uniformity in  sentencing and district  court discretion  the

            Guidelines  were intended to strike.  See Jackson, 30 F.3d at
                                                  ___ _______

                                         -19-
                                          19

            201-02.  We, thus, hold that  determinations about whether an

            offense constitutes a single  act of aberrant behavior should

            be  made  by reviewing  the  totality  of the  circumstances.

            District court judges may  consider, inter alia, factors such
                                                 _____ ____

            as pecuniary  gain to  the defendant, charitable  activities,

            prior  good deeds, and efforts to mitigate the effects of the

            crime in  deciding whether a defendant's  conduct is aberrant

            in  terms  of other  crimes.   See  DeMasi, 40  F.3d  at 1324
                                           ___  ______

            (departure determination should be  made by comparing case to

            other  cases  involving  the  stated  reason  for departure).

            Spontaneity and thoughtlessness may also be among the factors

            considered, though they are not prerequisites for departure.

                      That  aberrant behavior departures are available to

            first  offenders whose  course of  criminal conduct  involves

            more than  one criminal act is implicit  in our holding.  See
                                                                      ___

            Takai, 941 F.2d at 743.  We think the Commission intended the
            _____

            word "single" to refer to the crime  committed and not to the

            various  acts involved.  As a result, we read the Guidelines'

            reference to  "single acts  of aberrant behavior"  to include

            multiple acts leading up to  the commission of a crime.   See
                                                                      ___

            id.    Any other  reading  would  produce an  absurd  result.
            ___

            District courts would  be reduced to  counting the number  of

            acts  involved in  the  commission of  a  crime to  determine

            whether  departure is  warranted.   Moreover,  the  practical

            effect of such  an interpretation would  be to make  aberrant

                                         -20-
                                          20

            behavior  departures virtually unavailable to most defendants

            because  almost every  crime  involves a  series of  criminal

            acts.  Even the  Russell defendant, whose spontaneous actions
                             _______

            are  widely  regarded  as   a  classic  example  of  aberrant

            behavior, could be  understood to have committed  more than a

            single  act of  aberrant  behavior.   He  conspired with  his

            partner to take money  from the armored truck he  drove; took

            the money;  and then  kept the  money for  a short period  of

            time.    Thus,  we  think  that  focusing  on  the  crime  of

            conviction instead of the criminal acts committed in carrying

            out that crimebest comports with what theCommission intended.

                      The approach  we now  adopt does not  unnecessarily

            expand opportunities for departure under the Guidelines.  The

            totality of the circumstances test, though admittedly broader

            than the  spontaneity test  employed in Carey,  is consistent
                                                    _____

            with the Commission's intention  to limit applications of the

            aberrant behavior principle.  See Andruska, 964  F.2d at 645.
                                          ___ ________

            Concerns  that it  ensures  every first  offender a  downward

            departure  from their Guidelines-imposed sentence are without

            foundation.   As the Ninth Circuit explained in United States
                                                            _____________

            v. Dickey, 924  F.2d 836 (9th Cir.  1991), "aberrant behavior
            _________

            and first offense are not synonymous."   924 F.2d at 838; see
                                                                      ___

            Glick, 946 F.2d at 338.   Without more, first-offender status
            _____

            is not enough to warrant downward departure.    

                                         -21-
                                          21

                      District  courts are  not, however,  precluded from

            considering   first-offender  status  as   a  factor  in  the

            departure  calculus.    Departure-phase  consideration  of  a

            defendant's criminal  record  does  not,  we  think,  wrongly

            duplicate   the  calculations  involved   in  establishing  a

            defendant's criminal  history category under  the Guidelines.

            First, as we just  noted, it is  obviously not the case  that

            every  defendant  in  Criminal  History Category  I  will  be

            qualified for  an aberrant behavior departure.  There will be

            individuals  in  that category  who,  for  instance, are  not

            entitled to departure because  they were convicted of several

            unrelated offenses  or who have been  regular participants in

            elaborate  criminal enterprises.   See  Morales, 972  F.2d at
                                               ___  _______

            1011.  Second,  to the extent that  considering a defendant's

            criminal record  at both  the criminal history  and departure

            stages amounts  to  double counting,  the Guidelines  clearly

            permit  it.   But  see  Marcello, 13  F.3d at  755  (3d Cir.)
                          ___  ___  ________

            (concluding  that  the   Guidelines  prohibit  considering  a

            defendant's criminal record at  both the criminal history and

            departure stages).   The  Guidelines explain that  "the court

            may  depart .  . .  even though the  reason for  departure is

            taken  into consideration . . . if the court determines that,

            in  light  of  unusual  circumstances,  the  guideline  level

            attached to that factor is inadequate."  U.S.S.G.   5K2.0.  

                                         -22-
                                          22

                      The  question  now   becomes  whether   defendant's

            conduct falls within the ambit of aberrant behavior under the

            standard  we have articulated.  We leave this to the district

            court's discretion.  It occupies the best vantage point  from

            which to  make the decision.   Rivera, 994 F.2d at  950.  We,
                                           ______

            therefore,  vacate  defendant's  sentence  and  remand    for

            resentencing.  

                      B.   Extraordinary  Offender  Characteristics as  a
                      B.   Extraordinary  Offender  Characteristics as  a
                           Basis for Downward Departure.
                           Basis for Downward Departure.

                      Defendant's second  argument on appeal is  that the

            district court  misunderstood its authority to  depart on the

            ground of  his extraordinary characteristics.   We agree that

            extraordinary   characteristics   such   as  unusual   family

            obligations  or  exceptional  charitable activities  may,  in

            certain   circumstances,  provide  a  basis  for  a  downward

            departure.   See, e.g.,  United States v.  Haverstat, 22 F.3d
                         ___  ____   ___________________________

            790, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 116 S.
                                         _____ ______

            Ct. 671 (1995); United  States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d  893, 905-07
                            _______________________

            (7th Cir. 1994); Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948-53; United States v.
                             ______                      ________________

            Sclamo,  997 F.2d 970, 973-74 (1st Cir. 1993); Pena, 930 F.2d
            ______                                         ____

            at 1495; United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326,  1332 (8th
                     _________________________

            Cir.  1990).  We  disagree, however, that  the district court

            misunderstood its authority to depart.  It appears clear that

            the  court  found  that defendant's  family  obligations  and

            charitable  activities,  though   noteworthy,  were   neither

            extraordinary nor exceptional.

                                         -23-
                                          23

                      The   best  indicator   of  the   district  court's

            unwillingness   to   depart   downward   on   the  basis   of

            extraordinary characteristics is the stark difference between

            the  court's sentencing-hearing statements about departure on

            this basis and  on the  grounds of aberrant  behavior.   When

            asked  to  make  a finding  about  defendant's  extraordinary

            offender characteristics claim, the district court stated:

                      THE COURT:  To the extent you've asked me
                      to  depart based  on that,  I  would find
                      that  those, extraordinary  commitment to
                      family    and   extraordinary    offender
                      characteristics, don't rise to  the level
                      that would justify a departure out of the
                      heartland of the guidelines .  . .  So to
                      the  extent I  have  discretion  in  that
                      regard, I  exercise my discretion  not to
                      depart downward.

            These  statements make  it  plain that  the district  court's

            refusal  to depart  stemmed from  an exercise  of discretion.

            See  DeCosta, 37  F.3d at  8 ("[we  suggest] . .  .[t]hat the
            ___  _______

            district  court  say  .  .  .  that  it  has  considered  the

            mitigating factors urged but  does not find them sufficiently

            unusual  to warrant a departure in the  case at hand.").  And

            even   if  we  were  to  assume  that  these  statements  are

            ambiguous, that ambiguity, without  more, would not be enough

            to make  the district  court's refusal to  depart appealable.

            Morrison, 46 F.3d  at 132;  see United States  v. Romero,  32
            ________                    ___ ________________________

            F.3d 641, 654 (1st Cir. 1994).  Our review of this matter is,

            thus, at an end.  We lack jurisdiction to review the district

                                         -24-
                                          24

            court's  refusal   to  depart   downward  on  the   basis  of

            extraordinary offender  characteristics.   Byrd,  53 F.3d  at
                                                       ____

            145; Gifford, 17 F.3d at 473.
                 _______

                       C.  The Heartland of Section 2C1.7 of the
                       C.  The Heartland of Section 2C1.7 of the
                           Guidelines.
                           Guidelines.

                      Defendant's final argument  on appeal concerns  the

            scope of  section 2C1.7 of the  Guidelines, which corresponds

            to 18 U.S.C.    1341,  1346, the mail fraud statute  to which

            he pled  guilty.   Without disputing section  2C1.7's general

            applicability to  his conduct,  defendant maintains  that the

            district  court  misapprehended  its authority  to  impose  a

            shorter prison term by departing downward, by analogy, to the

            sentence  prescribed under section  2C1.3 of  the Guidelines.

            For individuals in Criminal History Category I, section 2C1.3

            -- which concerns conflicts of interest by present and former

            federal officers and employees  -- carries a sentencing range

            of  zero to six months.   Section 2C1.7  imposes a sentencing

            range of  eighteen to  twenty-four months for  individuals in

            the same  category.   See U.S.S.G.    2C1.7  (Fraud Involving
                                  ___

            Deprivation of the Intangible Right to the Honest Services of

            Public Officials); U.S.S.G.   2C1.3 (Conflict of Interest).  

                      Though  cast as  a claim  relating to  the district

            court's refusal to depart, defendant's argument, at its core,

            primarily  concerns the  heartland  of section  2C1.7 of  the

            Guidelines.   Defendant essentially  argues that  his conduct

            falls outside the  heartland of section 2C1.7  and within the

                                         -25-
                                          25

            scope  of  section  2C1.3  because it  primarily  involved  a

            conflict   of  interest,  not   fraud.     Because  questions

            concerning  the  scope and  meaning  of  a guideline,  unlike

            questions pertaining to the facts which lead a district court

            to render  its departure decision, are quintessentially legal

            in nature, see LeBlanc,  24 F.3d at 345, Rivera, 994  F.2d at
                       ___ _______                   ______

            952,  we have jurisdiction to  review defendant's claim.  Our

            review is  plenary,  as it  is  whenever a  district  court's

            decision "reflect[s] a determination of the purpose of, or an

            interpretation of  the language in, a  guideline or statute."

            LeBlanc, 24 F.3d  at 344;  see United States  v. Rosales,  19
            _______                    ___ _________________________

            F.3d 763, 769 (1st Cir. 1994).

                      To determine whether defendant's  conduct is of the

            sort   which   generally   falls   within   section   2C1.7's

            "heartland," we  must determine the nature  of the underlying

            crime of mail fraud.  See, e.g., LeBlanc, 24 F.3d at 346.  We
                                  ___  ____  _______

            look in part to the language of the mail fraud statute and to

            the  legislative  history  which accompanies  it.    Id.   In
                                                                 ___

            relevant part, section 1341 provides:

                      Whoever, having devised  or intending  to
                      devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
                      or  for obtaining  money  or property  by
                      means of false  or fraudulent  pretenses,
                      representations,  or promises  . .  . for
                      the purpose  of executing such  scheme or
                      artifice  or attempting  so to  do, [uses
                      the mail system or  causes it to be used]
                      shall  be  fined   under  this  title  or
                      imprisoned  not more than  five years, or
                      both.    If   the  violation  affects   a
                      financial institution,  such person shall

                                         -26-
                                          26

                      be  fined not  more  than  $1,000,000  or
                      imprisoned  not more  than  30 years,  or
                      both.

                      Congress  enacted  this  statute  in  1872,  as  "a

            general  proscription  against using  the  mails to  initiate

            correspondence in  furtherance of 'any scheme  or artifice to

            defraud.'"   McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 355, 359
                         ________________________

            (1987).    The  legislative history  suggests  that  Congress

            intended  the  mail  fraud  statute to  protect  people  from

            "schemes to deprive them of their money or property."  Id. at
                                                                   ___

            356.  Before 1987,  section 1341 was read as  a broad shield,

            protecting individuals  against schemes  to  deprive them  of

            intangible, as  well as tangible,  property.  Then,  in 1987,

            the  Supreme  Court held  that  the statute  did  not embrace

            intangible rights.  McNally held  that the mail fraud statute
                                _______

            does  not prohibit  schemes to  defraud individuals  of their

            intangible rights to  the honest services of government.  483

            U.S.  at 359-60; see Carpenter v. United States, 489 U.S. 19,
                             ___ __________________________

            25 (1987).

                      In 1988,  Congress enacted section 1346, the honest

            services amendment,  to reverse the Supreme  Court's decision

            in  McNally.  United States  v. Bucuvalas, 970  F.2d 937, 942
                _______   ___________________________

            n.9 (1st Cir. 1992);  United States v. Alkins, 925  F.2d 541,
                                  _______________________

            548 (2d  Cir. 1991); McEvoy  Travel Bureau, Inc.  v. Heritage
                                 ________________________________________

            Travel,  Inc., 904  F.2d 786,  790 (1st  Cir. 1990);  see 134
            _____________                                         ___

            Cong.  Rec. S17360-02 (daily ed. November 10, 1988)(Judiciary

                                         -27-
                                          27

            Committee analysis)("This section  overturns the decision  in

            McNally v. United States  . . . Under [this]  amendment, [the
            ________________________

            mail and wire fraud] statutes will protect . . . the right of

            the  public to  the honest  services of  public officials.").

            Section  1346  became  effective  on November  18,  1988  and

            provides:

                      For  the purposes  of  this chapter,  the
                      term  "scheme  or  artifice  to  defraud"
                      includes  a scheme or artifice to deprive
                      another of the intangible right of honest
                      services.

            See Anti-Drug Abuse Act  of 1988, Pub. L. No.  100-690, Title
            ___

            VII,    7603 (a), 102  Stat. 4508 (1988).   It  restores mail

            fraud convictions to their pre-McNally status by allowing the
                                           _______

            government   to   predicate   mail   fraud   prosecutions  on

            deprivations  of  the intangible  right  of  honest services.

            United States  v. Bryan,  58 F.3d  933, 940  n.  1 (4th  Cir.
            _______________________

            1995); Waymer, 55 F.3d  at 568 n.3; see 135 Cong.  Rec. S1063
                   ______                       ___

            (daily ed.  February 2, 1989)(statement  of Sen. Biden).   An

            offense under  section 1346 is established  when the evidence

            demonstrates that the use of the mail system played a role in

            executing  the   deprivation  of   the  honest   services  of

            government.   Schmuck v.  United  States, 489  U.S. 705,  710
                          __________________________

            (1989)(citing Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944));
                          _____________________

            see United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 890, 892 (1st Cir.
            ___ _______________________

                                         -28-
                                          28

            1993); United States v.  Dray, 901 F.2d 1132, 1137  (1st Cir.
                   ______________________

            1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990).  
                   _____ ______

                      Section  1346  includes  cases  in  which  the mail

            system  plays an  integral  role  in  the scheme  to  defraud

            citizenry of  the honest services  of government, as  well as

            schemes in which use of the mail system is only incidental to

            the larger plan.  Id. at 710-11; see United States v. Morrow,
                              ___            ___ _______________________

            39 F.3d 1228, 1236-37  (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied,  115 S.
                                                    _____ ______

            Ct. 1421 (1995) (mail fraud generally includes incidental use

            of  the mails  in furtherance  of a  scheme to  defraud). The

            Eleventh  Circuit recently affirmed  a defendant's conviction

            on twenty-two counts of mail  fraud even though the defendant

            only  used the  mail  system  to  receive payments  from  his

            partner  in a money laundering the scheme.  In Waymer, supra,
                                                           ______  _____

            the  court rejected  claims  that section  1346 is  vague and

            overbroad  and reiterated the  Supreme Court's  conclusion in

            Schmuck, supra, that "[i]t is  sufficient for the mailing  to
            _______  _____

            be 'incident to  an essential part of the  scheme' or 'a step

            in the  plot.'"  55 F.3d  at 569; see also  Badders v. United
                                              ___ ____  _________________

            States,  240  U.S.  391,  393-94  (1916).    In  Waymer,  the
            ______                                           ______

            defendant  was an  elected  member of  the  Atlanta Board  of

            Education who failed to  fully disclose his relationship with

            the   contractor  who  provided   pest  control  services  to

            Atlanta's public  schools.   Unbeknownst to the  other school

            board members, the defendant  received fifteen percent of all

                                         -29-
                                          29

            the proceeds from the  contractor's contracts with the school

            system. 

                      Courts have read section 1346 to include efforts by

            public  officials and  employees to conceal  their fraudulent

            acts  from  the  public  "by means  of  false  or  fraudulent

            pretenses,  representations,  promises,  or  other  deceptive

            conduct."  See McEvoy Travel, 904 F.2d at 791.  For  example,
                       ___ _____________

            the Fourth Circuit recently upheld the conviction of a public

            official on such grounds  in United States v. Bryan,  58 F.3d
                                         ______________________

            933 (4th Cir. 1995).  In that case, the Director  of the West

            Virginia  Lottery orchestrated  a scheme whereby  he secretly

            ensured that lottery contracts and contract bids were awarded

            to companies with whom  he had a personal relationship.   The

            Fourth  Circuit  held  that   section  1346  applied  to  the

            defendant's  conduct.  58 F.3d at  939-41.  Similarly, United
                                                                   ______

            States  v.  Alkins, 925  F.2d 541  (2d  Cir. 1991),  a Second
            __________________

            Circuit case,  upheld the section  1346-based convictions  of

            six Department  of  Motor  Vehicles  employees  because  they

            failed to  disclose their fraudulent activities to department

            officials.   925 F.2d  at 549.   The defendants  in that case

            secretly  processed  improperly  documented applications  for

            driver's   licenses,   identification   cards,  and   vehicle

            registrations in return for monetary disbursements.  

                      We hold that the  conduct to which Grandmaison pled

            guilty falls within the range of conduct Congress intended 18

                                         -30-
                                          30

            U.S.C.     1341, 1346 to encompass  and, concomitantly, rests

            squarely within the heartland  of section 2C1.7.  Grandmaison

            continued  to  lobby  Board   members  on  behalf  of  Eckman

            Construction after his recusal  from the SSCC and JSSBC.   He

            secretly   delivered  gratuities  to   Magee,  Ackerman,  and

            Kuchinski to secure favorable  votes on Eckman Construction's

            bid.   He  distributed informational  materials about  Eckman

            Construction  to  Magee and  Ackerman without  disclosing his

            actions to other Board members.  And he caused the Elm Street

            Project contract to  be sent to  Eckman Construction via  the

            mail  system.  Though  there is no  evidence that Grandmaison

            received direct monetary benefit  from his actions, there can

            be little doubt that  under cases such as Waymer,  Bryan, and
                                                      ______   _____

            Alkins  he deprived  the  citizens of  Nashua  of the  honest
            ______

            services of their government under section 1346.  This is not

            an unusual case.

                      Defendant maintains that he is mainly guilty of not

            revealing  a conflict of interest.   To be  sure, his conduct

            involved  some  element of  such a  violation.   It  does not

            follow  from this, however,  that he should  not be sentenced

            pursuant to section 2C1.7, the guideline corresponding to the

            mail fraud 

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            statute to which  he pled  guilty.  First,  we are  convinced

            that 18 U.S.C.     1341, 1346 encompasses crimes of  the sort

            committed by defendant.  Second, even if the applicability of

            section 1346 were  suspect, we  are not at  all certain  that

            downward  departure  to  the sentence  prescribed  by section

            2C1.3  would be  appropriate.   This  is principally  because

            section 2C1.3  linguistically does not apply  to defendant or

            his  conduct;  that  guideline  only addresses  conflicts  of

            interests by present or former federal officers and employees

            and, therefore, does not reach state  or local officials such

            as defendant.   In the final analysis, defendant  has managed

            to persuade us of only one  thing: that had he been a federal

            employee or official, the government might have been able  to

            charge  him  with violating  other statutes  as  well.    See
                                                                      ___

            U.S.S.G.   2C1.3  (listing statutory provisions corresponding

            to  that guideline).  Because  this argument clearly does not

            merit the  application of a lower  sentencing range defendant

            seeks,  we  affirm the  district  court's  refusal to  depart

            downward by analogy to section 2C1.3.  

            V.        CONCLUSION
            V.        CONCLUSION

                      For the foregoing  reasons, we vacate Grandmaison's

            sentence  and  remand  for  resentencing under  the  aberrant

            behavior  standard formulated in  this opinion.   Defendant's

            appeal   for  downward   departure  on   the  basis   of  his

            extraordinary  offender characteristics is dismissed for lack

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            of jurisdiction.  And we affirm  the district court's refusal

            to depart  downward  by  analogy  to  section  2C1.3  of  the

            Guidelines.

            It is so ordered.  
            It is so ordered.  
            ________________

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