Court Opinion

ID: 9634716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:21:38.173898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:08.915495
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.,
dissenting. The majority reasons that if a lump sum award may be suggested to a jury, it cannot be impermissible to explain how the lump sum was determined. The difficulty with this rationale, however, is that, until today, it has been improper in Vermont to mention to the jury the lump sum *547being sought. Scrizzi v. Baraw, 127 Vt. 315, 321, 248 A.2d 725, 729-30 (1968); Mattison v. Smalley, 122 Vt. 113, 118, 165 A.2d 343, 347-48 (1960). As stated in Mattison, the amount which the plaintiff hopes to recover is not evidence, proof of the amount due, or a standard for estimating the damages.
It is unnecessary here to set forth the various arguments in favor of or against per diem arguments as they have been thoroughly and exhaustively discussed in opinions from virtually every other jurisdiction over the past thirty years. See cases cited in Annotation, Per Diem or Similar Mathematical Basis for Fixing Damages for Pain and Suffering, 3 A.L.R.4th 940 (1981). I believe the better answer is to permit counsel to argue to the trier of fact the appropriateness of employing a time-unit calculation technique for fixing damages for pain and suffering, but to prohibit any suggestion by counsel of specific monetary amounts either on a lump sum or time-unit basis. This approach was suggested in King v. Railway Express Agency, 107 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1961), and adopted by rule in New Jersey.* Rule 1:7-1(b), New Jersey Rules of Court.
The ultimate objective should be to aid the jury in determining what sum of money will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for the pain and suffering endured. The attainment of this goal is not enhanced by counsel arguing the dollar amounts that they desire to have a jury return. The fair and practical solution is to permit the jury to hear about the methodology and to apply its dollar amounts from the evidence rather than sums suggested in argument.
I further disagree with the majority in its reluctance to require a specific cautionary instruction, beyond the general language offered that “the arguments of the attorneys and any statements which they made in their arguments or in their summation [are] not in evidence and will not be considered by you as evidence.” The instruction approved by the majority may be adequate to deal with remarks of an attorney that are plainly argumentative. The difficulty is that remarks regarding num*548bers or dollar amounts may not appear to be argument, but rather evidence itself. Hence, an instruction not to consider argument as evidence does not cure the problem.
As the Hawaii Supreme Court said in overruling an earlier case and allowing per diem arguments:
With proper guidance by the trial judge the objections advanced in [an earlier holding] can be avoided and formula arguments can be usefully made by both sides. The trial judge should make it clear that the formula is just that, argument, and no more. He should emphasize that it is part of counsel’s function as an advocate to persuade the jury and that formulas are but illustrations which serve only to focus the inquiry on the issue which the jury must ultimately resolve, the extent of money damages.
Barretto v. Akau, 463 P.2d 917, 923-24 (Haw. 1969) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
When a per diem argument is used,
[t]he trial judge should tell the jury that they are not to be governed by the amount of damages suggested by counsel for whatever unit of time counsel employed, that this argument does not constitute evidence but is merely an approach to the damages issue which the jury may consider but need not adopt, and that the jury’s ultimate obligation is to arrive at a lump sum amount which, in its view, is supported by the evidence and is fair and just to both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Weeks v. Holsclaw, 295 S.E.2d 596, 601 (N.C. 1982).
The majority relies on the proposition that “[i]n closing argument, plaintiff’s counsel told the jury the per diem figure was only a suggestion for its consideration, and that determining a fair amount would be entirely up to the jury.” The majority is overly generous. Counsel’s remarks are at best ambiguous and come at the beginning of a lengthy and detailed mathematical presentation. That presentation, stated in part, follows:
What award will it take to tell Grand Union what accountability means and that this is what the people in Bennington County think a human life and human suffering is worth[?]
Now, let’s just take one element. We have talked about pain and suffering. What would be fair compensation for *549pain and suffering? Entirely up to you. I have a suggestion. If you think about what it is like for Susanne to go through one day with the pain that she has and think about what would be fair compensation for that one day, what do you think it would be? Would it be $100 to go through that in a day? Would it be $75? Would it be $50, $40?
Ladies and gentlemen, we want to be scrupulously fair about our request to you. So I am going to suggest to you that you award Susanne $30 a day for the loss of those three elements: pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life. That is $10 a day for each one. I put it to you for your consideration to follow that through.
You would do it this way, there are 365 days a year. I am just going to put here pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life. Now there are 365 days in a year. And Susanne’s six years she has already suffered in these ways and 29 more, that is 35 years total that she should be compensated for. And if you multiply 35 times 365, there are 12,775 days. And if you multiply that figure by the $30 per day I just suggested, it comes out to $383,250 — sorry. $383,250.
Now, another way of thinking of that is if you divide 35 years into this figure of $383,250 it comes out to slightly under $11,000 a year. Maybe that would be a help to think for you $11,000 a year to live the way she lives, to lose what she has lost. Perhaps that would be a help for you; I don’t know. (Emphasis added.)
The caveats in this argument are nearly invisible, and an additional statement in rebuttal is no better. The residue is a set of specific numbers that are, by the majority’s holding, proper, but which at least deserve a specific cautionary instruction. Yet the majority would substitute counsel’s at best ambiguous message for a clear instruction from the bench about the use of the numbers.
I would not, and I dissent.

 In Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J. 1958), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that it was improper for counsel to suggest to the jury specific monetary amounts for pain and suffering per hour or day or week. The decision has been overruled in part by the rule.