Court Opinion

ID: 9572504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:14.887739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:15.842623
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL,
concurring in part:
I agree with the majority’s analysis on the directed verdict issue, and concur with the result reached by the majority on the LWOP issue. However, I write separately to illuminate the inconsistency of this result in hopes that the General Assembly might remedy it.
As noted by the majority, the record in this case does not include any details of Lindsey’s 1976 rape conviction to instruct us in classifying the rape as either first or second degree CSC (enumerated in § 17-25-45 as most serious offenses). In State v. Washington, 338 S.C. 392, 526 S.E.2d 709 (2000), this Court held that a prior conviction for common law burglary constituted a “most serious offense” because “it *23contained the same legal elements as burglary, first degree that section 17-25-45(0(1) declares a ‘most serious offense.’ ” As discussed by the majority, neither first nor second degree CSC contain exactly the same legal elements as rape.1 Washington, 338 S.C. at 397, 526 S.E.2d at 711 (emphasis added). Under Washington, rape then cannot qualify as a most serious offense for purposes of § 17-25^45.
The irony of this result is that rape was arguably a more severe offense than either first or second degree CSC, both of which make a defendant eligible for an LWOP sentence. Rape required actual penetration of the female genital organ by the male genital organ without consent and with force;2 first and second degree CSC requires only sexual battery (which is defined as intercourse or “any intrusion, however slight of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body,”) and some degree of force as defined by statute.3 First and Second degree CSC encompass more conduct than rape, and include penetration by any object. In addition, second degree CSC only requires aggravated coercion — defined as a threat to use force — while rape required that actual force be used. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-71; Tuckness. Because rape was arguably a more serious crime than either'first or second degree CSC, and certainly more serious than third degree CSC, it is only logical that those with prior rape convictions should be eligible for LWOP sentences under § 17-25-45. However, where the terms of the statute are clear, the court must apply those terms according to. their literal meaning. City of Columbia v. American Civil Liberties Union of S.C., Inc., 323 S.C. 384, 475 S.E.2d 747 (1996).
Section 17-25-45 does not name rape as a most serious offense, and rape does not contain the same elements as any of the enumerated offenses. Therefore, I agree that Lindsey’s *24LWOP sentence must be reversed under Washington, but write in hopes that the General Assembly will correct the discrepancy this creates in the Two Strikes Law.
MOORE, WALLER and BURNETT, JJ., concur.

. Lindsey was convicted of rape in 1976, and the General Assembly amended the Code to provide for different levels of criminal sexual conduct in 1977. Prior to 1977, S.C.Code Ann. § 16-71 (1962) codified common law rape.

. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-71 (1962); State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 185 S.E.2d 607 (1971).

. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-652 and -653 (Rev.2003).