Court Opinion

ID: 9469404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:39:52.165685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:22.552594
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Circuit Judge, specially
concurring.
I concur in the result in this case only because I am firmly convinced that it is required by this court’s recent broad holding in Fields v. Wyrick, supra. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Fields, I am steadfast in my belief that Fields was wrongly decided and inconsistent with this court’s prior decision in United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978).
The majority’s conclusion in Fields v. Wyrick that the defendant’s confession was involuntary does not rest on considerations of coercive conduct by the polygraph administrator, Fields’ age, intelligence, emotional condition, or any other factors which *171clearly would be relevant to a determination of whether he might not have voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made the incriminating statement or waived his right to have counsel present. Instead, the majority relies solely on the facts that: (1) polygraph interrogation inherently holds “significant potential for abuse,” see Fields v. Wyrick, supra, at 159; (2) even though Fields submitted to the polygraph upon the advice of his counsel, was fully advised of his constitutional rights and signed a written consent to the polygraph examination, there was “no evidence that Fields or his lawyer anticipated that the CID officer would attempt to elicit incriminating statements from Fields after the examination was run,” id. at 160;4 and (3) Fields was questioned immediately after administration of the polygraph without being reminded of his right against self-incrimination and his right to have counsel present. Id. at 160.
Thus, I am left with no alternative but to conclude that the majority in Fields has created a per se rule that, even though a defendant has been fully advised of his constitutional rights and has consented to a polygraph interrogation, his confession made after he has been advised that his polygraph examination shows deceit is involuntary unless the defendant is given an additional Miranda warning between the polygraph and the immediately subsequent questioning, or the government has explicitly advised the defendant prior to the polygraph that he may undergo questioning after the polygraph examination. Apparently, this rule obtains regardless of whether the defendant might be considered to understand completely his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present at any time. See Fields v. Wyrick, supra, at 163 (Ross, J., dissenting). As I noted in Fields, the majority in Fields failed to offer convincing support for such a rule.5
*172Moreover, I believe that any attempt to distinguish the instant case from Fields would result in reliance on the kind of irrelevant factual differences which characterizes the majority’s attempt in Fields to distinguish this court’s prior opinion in United States v. Little Bear, supra. In Little Bear the defendant was questioned by BIA agents concerning her husband’s death. She was fully advised of her constitutional rights and signed a waiver form. Two months later she was again questioned, this time by an FBI agent, and she consented to take a polygraph examination. Prior to taking the polygraph she was given a “Consent to be Interviewed with Polygraph” form which she signed. She was also advised by the agent of her constitutional rights and she signed that form’s waiver provision. During the polygraph examination Little Bear was asked if she stabbed her husband. She responded in the affirmative and said she wanted to talk about it. At this point she was not reminded of her right to an attorney or to remain silent. Upon further interrogation, Little Bear signed a written confession. On appeal, Little Bear contended that the confession should have been suppressed because it was not voluntarily given under the circumstances. This court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that “Mrs. Little Bear had voluntarily confessed and knowingly and intelligently waived her rights even though no second, post-polygraph Miranda warning was given.” 583 F.2d at 414.
In distinguishing Little Bear, the majority in Fields relied primarily on the fact that “Little Bear had not retained counsel when she went to take the polygraph,” and therefore, “the Court was not required to determine whether the agent’s procedure had deprived Little Bear of a previously asserted right to deal with the authorities through counsel.” Fields v. Wyrick, supra, at 161, n. 13. However, it must be noted that Fields, although retaining counsel, had not asserted his right to counsel at the polygraph examination, and in fact, as the majority noted in Fields, must be viewed as having initiated the further dialogue with authorities. Id. at 158. As the Supreme Court’s opinion in Edwards v. Arizona clearly indicates, in either the Little Bear factual circumstances or the Fields factual circumstances, the basic standard for determining the voluntariness of the confession is the same, i.e., “whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver is knowing and intelligent * * * under the totality of the circumstances * * 451 U.S. at 486 n.9, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 n.9. See id. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1883.
The majority in Fields also appears to have found some distinguishing significance in the label attached to and the wording of the form Little Bear signed in consenting to the polygraph examination. The FBI form which Little Bear signed was entitled “Consent to be Interviewed with Polygraph” and stated that she agreed to the “use of a polygraph * * * during this interview or any part of it.” United States v. Little Bear, supra, 583 F.2d at 412. The majority in Fields construed this form to somehow indicate a broader scope of consent to be interrogated than did the CID form in Fields.
First, it must be emphatically noted that there is absolutely no indication in the opinion in Little Bear that the court’s decision even remotely turned on the wording of the FBI polygraph consent form. Furthermore, placing any legal or practical significance upon the use of the word “interview” in the FBI consent form used in Little Bear appears to raise inconsequential form over real substance.
Little Bear, Fields and the instant case all involve factual circumstances in which a defendant has clearly and fully been advised on at least two occasions prior to the administration of the polygraph of the constitutional rights to remain silent and to the presence of counsel during any questioning by the authorities. Furthermore, I can find no evidence in any of these cases that the defendants did not fully comprehend the meaning and the consequences of a waiver of those rights. As I stated in Fields, in these circumstances, “it is difficult to un*173derstand * * * how one more recitation of Miranda warnings would prove knowing and intelligent waiver if waiver of two prior sets of warnings, one of which was given minutes before [an incriminating statement is made] does not.” Fields v. Wyrick, supra, at 163 (Ross, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Fields seems to dictate that, in the circumstances of this case, another Miranda warnings should have been given between the polygraph examination and the following interrogation in order to find Eagle Elk’s confession voluntary. For this reason, I am compelled to concur in the court’s holding in the instant case that Eagle Elk’s incriminating statement made during the post-polygraph questioning was not voluntarily made, and, consequently, his conviction obtained through the use of that statement must be reversed.

. As I noted in my dissent in Fields v. Wyrick; 682 F.2d 154, at 162 (8th Cir. 1982) (Ross, J., dissenting), the following detailed statement of rights was read to Fields before the polygraph was administered:
“Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You do not have to answer my questions or say anything. Anything you say or do can be used as evidence against you in a criminal trial. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning or have a lawyer present with you during the questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer of your own choice, or a military lawyer, detailed for you at no expense to you. Also, you may ask for a military lawyer of your choice by name and he will be detailed for you if superiors determine he’s reasonably available. If you are now going to discuss the offense under investigation, which is rape, with or without a lawyer present, you have a right to stop answering questions at any time or speak to a lawyer before answering further, even if you sign a waiver certificate. Do you want a lawyer at this time?” Defendant answered “No.”
State v. Fields, 538 S.W.2d 348, 350 n.1 (Mo.Ct.App.1976) (emphasis added).
Apparently, the majority in Fields has now engrafted an additional requirement that unless additional Miranda warnings are given after the polygraph but before further questioning, the initial Miranda warnings and waiver must be supplemented by not only advising the defendant that anything he says or does during the questioning may be used against him, and that he may stop answering questions or speak to a lawyer at any time, but must advise the defendant that questions may be asked after the polygraph examination had been completed.

. Although the majority in Fields refers to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) as somehow providing some support for its holding in Fields, see, e.g., Fields v. Wyrick, supra, at 158, I am at a loss to see how Edwards has any relevance whatsoever to the question presented in Fields or in the instant case. Moreover, the majority in Fields appears to admit this when it states: “The per se rule enumerated in Edwards does not resolve the issue present here,” since Fields “initiated further dialogue with the authorities after his right to counsel had been invoked.” Fields v. Wyrick, supra, at 158.
As the Supreme Court noted in Edwards: If * * * in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be “interrogation.” In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.