Court Opinion

ID: 9960576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 16:13:06.418557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:38.603092
License: Public Domain

J-A09030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 FRED L. AND ELLEN W. SHULTZ               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellants             :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
 YORK HOSPITAL, WELLSPAN                   :
 MEDICAL GROUP, T/D/B/A                    :
 WELLSPAN HOSPITALISTS                     :   No. 984 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 17, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
                           2016-SU-001288-82

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: APRIL 16, 2024

      As their first appellate issue, the Shultzes ask this Court a simple

question: “Did the trial court err in failing to grant [their] motion for summary

judgment, as a matter of law?” Shultzes’ Brief at 8. However, I believe that

question may eventually be deemed moot. Thus, I would prefer not to issue

a decision in this case until another appeal, pending before this Court en banc,

is resolved. Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that the Shultzes’ first

appellate issue affords them no relief. Thus, regardless of the outcome of that

separate en banc proceeding, I would affirm the judgment as the trial court

entered it, because the first issue is either moot or meritless.

      The majority addresses the Shultzes’ first issue regarding the denial of

summary judgment. As explained below, there is a conflict in our precedents

regarding whether a denial of summary judgment becomes moot after a case
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proceeds to trial. On January 9, 2024, this Court granted en banc certification

to decide that very issue in Coryell v. Morris, 1977 EDA 2021.

      In Coryell, Robizza Inc. owned and operated a franchise of Domino’s

Pizza. One of Robizza’s drivers, Steven Morris, was delivering pizza when he

struck and injured Clarence Coryell. Mr. Coryell and his wife sued Mr. Morris,

Robizza, and Domino’s. They alleged Domino’s was vicariously liable for Mr.

Morris’s negligence.

      Both Domino’s and the Coryells moved for summary judgement on the

issue of vicarious liability. The parties agreed the franchise agreement was

unambiguous and the trial court should determine vicarious liability, as a

matter of law, because the issue involved contract interpretation. The trial

court denied both motions for summary judgment; it ruled there was a

genuine issue of material fact as to the extent of Domino’s control over Morris.

The matter proceeded to trial.

      At the close of the Coryells’ case-in-chief, Domino’s moved for a nonsuit

on vicarious liability. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found

Morris to be negligent and Domino’s to be vicariously liable.

      On appeal by Domino’s, a panel majority considered whether it could

address the denial of summary judgment after a trial, in light of the disparate

treatment of the issue by this Court in several of our precedents, namely

Windows v. Erie Ins. Exch., 161 A.3d 953 (Pa. Super. 2017), Yoder v.

McCarthy Constr. Inc., 291 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2023), and Turnpaugh

Chiropractic Health & Wellness Ctr., P.C. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 297 A.3d

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404 (Pa. Super. 2023). Ultimately, the Majority believed it did not need to

resolve the issue of mootness, because much of the caselaw had developed

after Domino’s filed its brief. The majority found the question of whether it

should review the denial of summary judgment or the denial of JNOV was

irrelevant, because, at either stage, the trial court should have decided

Domino’s vicariously liablity, as a matter of law.

        Hence, the majority reached the issue and reversed the finding that

Domino’s was vicariously liable. The majority concluded that trial court erred

by not granting summary judgment to Domino’s, because the application of

the unambiguous contract was a question of law for the trial court, not the

jury.

        Dissenting, Judge Bowes disagreed with the majority’s decision to

address the denial of summary judgment. Although the dissent agreed there

is conflicting caselaw, Judge Bowes relied on more recent cases of Whitaker

v. Frankford Hospital of City of Philadelphia, 984 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super.

2009), Xtreme Caged Combat v. Zarro, 247 A.3d 42 (Pa. Super. 2021),

Yoder, and Turnpaugh, to make clear this Court’s duty is to review the trial

evidence to determine if Domino’s was entitled to JNOV, not to review a pre-

trial denial of summary judgment. If Domino’s had wished review of the denial

of summary judgment, she explained, it should have sought permission to

appeal under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b).

        Judge Bowes also disagreed with the finding that the trial court should

have determined the claim of vicarious liability. She maintained that whether

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Domino’s and Morris were in a master-servant relationship presented a mixed

question of fact and law for the jury.

         We granted review en banc. The primary issue is “whether the denial

of a summary-judgment motion can be addressed after the case has

proceeded to trial . . . .” Application for Reargument En Banc at 2.

         This case has a somewhat different procedural posture than Coryell,

because, here, the trial court granted a nonsuit. However, that is a distinction

without a difference. In both appeals, we are asked to address “the denial of

a summary-judgment motion . . . after the case has proceeded to trial.” Id.

As such, the potential mootness problem in this appeal is identical to potential

mootness problem in Coryell.

         Under Internal Operating Procedure of the Superior Court 455.H, this

Court is not to enter judgment on “an appeal when an identical issue is

pending before an en banc panel, pursuant to I.O.P. 433.B.6.”      Additionally,

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has said our “courts will not decide moot

questions.”     Public Defenders Off. of Venango County v. Venango

County Court of Common Pleas, 893 A.2d 1275, 1279 (Pa. 2006)

(emphasis added). Thus, if the Coryell Court determines that orders denying

summary judgment are moot after a case has proceeded to trial, this panel

would commit legal error by deciding the merits of the Shultzes’ first appellate

issue.    Thus, the safest procedure would be to await the Coryell Court’s

resolution of the mootness question before reaching the merits of this issue.

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      By reaching the merits of Shultzes’ first issue, the majority impliedly

holds that issues of summary judgment did not become moot upon

commencement of trial. Thus, the majority has ruled, sub silentio, on the

issue of mootness that is awaiting en banc decision in Coryell. Instead, we

should withhold a decision on the first appellate issue (and, thus, this appeal)

until the Court en banc has decided Coryell. Hence, I respectfully disagree

with deciding the summary judgment issue.

      Nonetheless, if it is proper for us to rule on the summary judgment issue

post-trial, I agree with the majority’s analysis.       Thus, on issue one, the

Shultzes would not be entitled to relief, regardless of the outcome of Coryell.

For this reason, I concur in the result on issue one.

      I join the majority’s analysis on issues two, three, four and six.

      On the Shultzes’ fifth issue, I find that the trial court properly granted a

nonsuit on the claim of corporate negligence.       In resolving this issue, the

majority sets forth the relevant testimony from Dr. Irfan Altafullah and Dr.

Brian Larkin and opines that the Shultzes presented expert testimony in

support of their corporate negligence claim against York Hospital.           See

Majority at 33-38.    The majority then concludes that such evidence was

insufficient to submit a cause of action of corporate negligence against York

Hospital to the jury under Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa.

1991).   See id. at 40.    It affirms the trial court’s decision to grant York

Hospital’s motion for a nonsuit on this basis.

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       I disagree that the Shultzes presented any expert testimony to establish

that the hospital breached its duty of care. When reviewing the testimony of

Dr. Altafullah and Dr. Larkin, I note that neither witness was asked how the

hospital breached its duty to Mr. Shultz, and neither gave any opinion

specifically addressing the acts or omissions of the hospital.

       Dr. Altafullah, is a neurologist, licensed to practice in Minnesota. See

N.T. Trial, 6/13/22 – 6/17/22, at 180-181.         He was offered as an expert

witness in neurology, specializing in strokes. Id. at 197. After describing in

great detail what he believed happened to Mr. Shultz, Dr. Altafullah was asked

whether the “stroke care providers” fell below the standard of care. Id. at

247.

       He responded, “that the doctors who saw [Mr. Shultz] were right on

target . . .” but, “[f]or some reason, the plan was not executed appropriately.”

Id. at 247.

       The doctor was then asked, “Did the physicians treating [Mr. Shultz]

comply with the standard of care…?” Id. at 248.

       He answered, “I would say they did not . . . And so, while it pains me to

say it about colleagues, I think there were some omissions there that fell

below the standard of care.” Id. at 248.      Although the doctor then indicated

that certain tests should have been done before discharging Mr. Shultz, he

never attributed fault to the hospital. Id. at 248-49.

       Likewise, Dr. Larkin is a physician, also licensed to practice in Minnesota.

Id. at 371. He was offered as an expert witness in “neuroradiology and in the

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matters of venous and lymphatic systems to diagnose and recommend and

perform treatment for persons who have symptoms of stroke.” Id. at 379.

He testified at length about the various scans and tests the doctors performed

on Mr. Shultz.     Id. 383-425. He was then asked whether, “the individual

health care providers who were providing care to Fred Shultz acted in a

manner that fell below the standard of care?” Id. at 425. He answered this

question and provided a litany of actions and omissions which he believed fell

below the standard of care. Id. at 425-31.       However, Dr. Larkin was never

asked nor opined about whether the hospital breached a duty of care.

       Significantly, these doctors were not offered to testify to corporate

negligence. Rather, they offered opinions about the care given by doctors.

They were both asked if they knew the Shultzes’ expert in corporate

negligence, Dr. Kevin Brady, and both answered that they did not. Id. at 204,

382.

       Here, the Shultzes attempted to use Dr. Kevin Brady as an expert to

establish a claim of corporate negligence.       Initially, the lawyers disputed

whether Dr. Brady was offered to testify as an expert in corporate negligence,

because that was not one of the areas for which the plaintiff offered him. 1

See id. at 623-26.         Then, once Dr. Brady began his testimony, defense
____________________________________________

1 The Shultzes’ counsel offered Dr. Brady as “an expert witness in the field of

internal   medicine,   critical  care   medicine,    emergency      medicine,
anesthesiology, and in cardiovascular anesthesia, and cardiac imaging.” N.T.
Trial, 6/13/22-6/17/22, at 622. Although counsel indicated he would go back
and recertify Dr. Brady as an expert in corporate liability, as the trial court
noted, he never did. T.C.O., 8/12/2022, at 15, n.3.

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counsel raised multiple objections as to the formulation of his opinions, as it

appeared the doctor was simply rephrasing findings from an article, Patient

Safety Advisory, issued in 2010 by the Pennsylvania Safety Advisory. Id. at

639-57. As defense counsel argued, such testimony contravened the court’s

pretrial rulings about how Dr. Brady could use the “learned treatise” in his

testimony. Id. at 657. The court sustained multiple objections. Ultimately,

defense counsel requested a mistrial, or alternatively, that Dr. Brady’s

testimony be excluded from evidence. Id. at 657.

      The trial court surmised that if it excluded Dr. Brady as a witness, then

the Shultzes would move for a mistrial, “because this is a corporate negligence

case, and Dr. Brady is their corporate negligence witness.” Id. at 661. In

response, the Shultzes’ counsel observed that it was not only a corporate

negligence case, but also a vicarious liability case. Id. at 661-62.   Although

counsel did not concede the case of corporate negligence, he did not move for

a mistrial after the court granted defense counsel’s motion to exclude Dr.

Brady’s testimony.    Id. at 662.   Instead, the Shultzes’ counsel opted to

continue with the trial.

      Without Dr. Brady’s testimony, however, the Shultzes did not offer any

evidence of corporate negligence. The trial court granted the nonsuit on the

corporate negligence claim, because the Shultzes did not produce expert

testimony to support this claim. The court observed that it told the Shultzes

they would need an expert to prove corporate negligence because the claim

was not “obvious.” T.C.O., 8/12/2022, at 15. The Shultzes “failed to produce

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such an expert, and therefore there was no factual basis to send that claim to

the jury.” Id. I agree with the reasoning of the trial court.

      In short, the majority decides the corporate negligence issue based on

Thompson, supra; it concludes the Shultzes presented evidence of corporate

negligence but that this evidence was insufficient to show a breach of duty

under one of the four duties of a hospital articulated in Thompson. Unlike

the majority, I would not reach the question of whether the Shultzes’ evidence

of corporate negligence was sufficient under Thompson, because there was

no expert evidence of corporate negligence at all against the hospital.

      As stated, while I do not believe it is procedurally proper to resolve this

appeal now, I agree with the ultimate decision to affirm. I join majority in its

merit analysis on issues one through four and issue six. On issue five, again,

I conclude the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, but on a basis

different from the majority.

      President Judge Panella joins this Concurring Memorandum.

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