Court Opinion

ID: 9892052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 14:00:36.169372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:04.104531
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22-3031                                                    September Term, 2023
                                                               FILED ON: OCTOBER 20, 2023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                   APPELLEE

v.

WILBER VIGIL-BENITEZ, ALSO KNOWN AS SOLITARIO,
                   APPELLANT

                           Appeal from the United States District Court
                                   for the District of Columbia
                                      (No. 1:20-cr-00170-1)

       Before: HENDERSON and RAO, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

                                        JUDGMENT

        This case was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia and on the briefs and oral arguments of the parties. The court has afforded the issues
full consideration and determined they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d).
For the following reasons, it is
       ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the appeal be dismissed.
                                             *   *    *
        Wilber Vigil-Benitez voluntarily entered into a plea agreement: in exchange for pleading
guilty to seven counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and waiving
his right to appeal, the government dropped two charges and agreed to Guidelines range reductions
for assistance and acceptance of responsibility.
       The district court judge accepted his plea, adopted the Guidelines range reductions, and
imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 84 months of imprisonment followed by 36 months of
supervised release.
       Vigil-Benitez now appeals, challenging the reasonableness of the sentence. While he does
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not dispute that he received the benefits of the plea agreement—the two dropped charges and the
Guidelines range reductions—he now seeks to avoid the appeal waiver.
        But appeal waivers are enforceable. United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir.
2009). The plain text of the waiver covers this appeal. The agreement waived the “right to appeal
[his] sentence … and the manner in which the sentence was determined,” subject to three narrow
exceptions: if the court imposed a sentence “above the statutory maximum”; if the court imposed
a sentence above the “guidelines range determined by the Court”; or if he appeals “on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Vigil-Benitez does not suggest that any of the explicit
exceptions apply, nor do they by their plain terms.
         We have acknowledged other general exceptions to enforcement of an appeal waiver such
as if the waiver was not “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,” id.; if the defendant “received
ineffective assistance of counsel in agreeing to the waiver,” id. at 530; or “if the sentencing court’s
failure in some material way to follow a prescribed sentencing procedure results in a miscarriage
of justice,” id. at 531. Vigil-Benitez does not argue that any of these apply. From our review of the
record, we conclude that no exceptions apply. The transcript of his hearing demonstrates that the
waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The district court judge explained the waiver at
length, and Vigil-Benitez affirmed that he understood it. He does not claim ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. And in these circumstances, enforcing the agreement is not a miscarriage of justice.
Vigil-Benitez’s waiver bars this appeal.
                                              *   *    *
        For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36(d), this
disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until
seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc.
See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41(a)(1).
                                            Per Curiam

                                                               FOR THE COURT:
                                                               Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                       BY:     /s/
                                                               Daniel J. Reidy
                                                               Deputy Clerk

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