Court Opinion

ID: 9418806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:40:01.350034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:10.886615
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
The statute forbids admission of “ persons coming into the United States for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose.” The doctrine of this decision is that “ extra-marital relations ” of an unmarried *564woman that fall short of concubinage are not within the condemnation of the statute. But there is no ground for the assumption that petitioner is not the concubine of a married man. Since 1924 she has continued illicit relations with him. They cohabited as, and held themselves out to be, husband and wife abroad and in this country while not in ,the vicinity of his home. Admittedly, these relations were to continue until again they reached that neighborhood. . There is abundant warrant for the Secretary’s conclusion that petitioner returned to this country as, and intending to continue to be, that man’s concubine. The findings quote Webster’s definition — “ a woman who cohabits with a man without being his wife.” The Secretary found her to be such a person. He relied upon, and I think rightly applied, the opinion in United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393.
Bitty was indicted under a provision of the Act of February 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898, forbidding “ the importation into the United States of any alien woman ... for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose.” The indictment alleged importation of a woman for an.“ immoral purpose,” namely, “ that she should live with him as'his [Bitty’s] concubine.” The circuit court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute a violation of the statute. This court reversed. The phrase there construed is in the same words as that now under consideration. They undoubtedly have the same meaning. In. that case defendant’s counsel maintained that Congress did not by that Act intend to legislate against “ those isolated cases where certain individuals come into this country with their mistresses.” But repelling that construction, this court said (p. 401) that: In forbidding the importation of alien women ‘ for any other immoral purpose,’ Congress evidently thought that there were purposes in connection with the importations of alien women which, as in the *565case of importations for prostitution, were to be deemed immoral.” After reference to the rule of ejusdem generis relied on by the defendant, the court said (p. 402): “ But that rule cannot avail the accused in this case; for, the immoral purpose charged in the indictment is of the same general class or kind as the one that controls in the importation of an alien woman for the purpose strictly of prostitution. The prostitute may, in the popular sense, be more degraded in character than the concubine, but the latter none the less must be held to lead an immoral life, if any regard whatever be had to the views that are almost universally held in this country, as to the relations which may rightfully, from the standpoint of morality, exist between man and woman, in the matter of sexual intercourse. . . . (p. 403.) The statute in question, it must be remembered, was intended to keep out of this country immigrants whose permanent residence here would not be desirable or for the common good, and we cannot suppose either that Congress intended to exempt from the operation of the statute the importation of an alien woman brought here only that she might live in a state of concubinage with the man importing her, or that it did not regard such an importation as being for an immoral purpose.”
Moreover, the statute is not limited to prostitution and concubinage. While the Secretary regarded her as a concubine, his decision may not fairly be held to depend upon that characterization. Plainly it rests upon' the ground there stated “ that she entered for an immoral purpose ” condemned by the statute. The law does not require him more definitely to classify. Refinements of nomenclature adopted for.the sake of decency in speech may not be used to conjure up doubts and distinctions that obscure the real substance of the statute. The meaning of. the findings is that petitioner’s doings and course of living constitute a kind of immorality that bars admission. The *566Secretary rightly may have deemed that her admitted intention temporarily to continue, when coupled with environment, opportunity and temptation under which habitual transgression had developed and for years persisted, amounted to a fixed purpose indefinitely to remain in concubinage. That is enough.
And there is nothing in the opinion in United States v. Bitty, supra, or elsewhere, to support the idea that Congress intended to keep out only those coming exclusively for the purposes referred to and to admit prostitutes, concubines and the like intending to follow legitimate occupation while practicing, incidentally or otherwise, any of the immoralities covered by the statute. Indeed, the court’s opinion implies that if concubinage were her principal or primary purpose she ought to be excluded even though she intended regularly to pursue her work as a domestic. The 'making of exclusion to depend upon the determination whether the immoral purpose is dominant or subordinate goes far to strike down the statute by making its enforcement difficult and in many cases practically impossible. Congress undoubtedly intended to exclude those who entertain a purpose here to practice prostitution or immorality of that sort. That is the construction adopted by the Secretary, the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals. They are right. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied.