Court Opinion

ID: 9352054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:00:26.923344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:51.008688
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0004n.06

                                           No. 21-4125

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                                                   FILED
                                                    )                        Jan 04, 2023
ANSLY DAMUS,                                                             DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                    )
       Petitioner,                                  )
                                                    )
                                                            ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
v.                                                  )
                                                    )       FROM THE UNITED STATES
                                                    )       BOARD   OF  IMMIGRATION
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,               )       APPEALS
       Respondent.                                  )                        OPINION
                                                    )

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; DONALD and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

       MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Ansly Damus, a Haitian, seeks asylum in the United States

based on the harm that he suffered in his homeland. Under our asylum laws, however, immigrants

may not obtain asylum if they have “firmly resettled” in a different country before they enter the

United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). And we treat an immigration judge’s decision that

an immigrant has “firmly resettled” in another country as a factual finding subject to a deferential

standard of review. This standard forecloses Damus’s asylum request here because substantial

evidence supported the immigration judge’s finding that he had firmly resettled in Brazil before

coming to the United States. That conclusion leaves only Damus’s request for relief under the

withholding-of-removal statute, which would permit Damus to remain in this country if his “life

or freedom would be threatened” in Haiti as a result of his “political opinion[.]”               Id.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). Yet we likewise treat a judge’s conclusion that an immigrant would not face that
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

type of harm as a factual finding. Here again, substantial evidence supported the judge’s decision

that Damus had not shown the required likelihood of harm. We thus deny his petition for review.

                                                  I

       Damus was born and raised in Haiti. He married a Haitian and had two children, all of

whom remain in that country. Damus obtained a position as a teacher in 2007 and taught math

and science for the next seven years.

       In September 2014, Damus held a seminar at his church to teach young people about ethics,

morals, and staying out of trouble. During his talk, Damus identified a certain local politician as

someone that the youths should not emulate because the politician had become corrupt after his

rise to power. This politician’s private supporters—a group called different things in the record,

including “La Meezorequin”—learned of Damus’s statements and believed that he had attempted

to persuade people not to vote for the politician.        According to Damus, members of La

Meezorequin attacked him as he traveled to his father’s home after the seminar.

       Ten days later, Damus fled Haiti. He made his way to Brazil in December 2014. Damus

stayed there for a year and a half. After receiving a work permit, Damus took a job as an electrician

with a construction firm.

       Damus eventually entered the United States in October 2016. At the border, he told

immigration authorities that he had traveled to this country “[t]o find a better life and find work”

and that nobody would harm him if he returned to Haiti. Admin. R. (“A.R.”) 857.

       Damus backtracked on these statements two months later during an interview with an

asylum officer. After describing La Meezorequin’s prior attack, he now claimed that he feared

this group if he returned to Haiti. When asked about his separate time in Brazil, Damus noted that

he had “applied” for (and “eventually” would have obtained) “residency” in that country. A.R.

                                                 2
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

844. Damus reported, however, that he did not feel safe in Brazil because of discrimination against

Haitians. The asylum officer found that Damus had shown a credible threat of persecution in Haiti.

But the officer added that Damus might have “firmly resettled” in Brazil before he came here.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).

       Immigration authorities commenced removal proceedings against Damus. He conceded

his removability but applied for asylum and withholding of removal. (He also sought relief under

the Convention Against Torture but abandoned that request in the immigration proceedings.) Over

the next several years, Damus’s case took three trips back and forth between the immigration court

and the Board of Immigration Appeals.

       Round One. After an evidentiary hearing, an immigration judge granted Damus asylum.

The judge reasoned that La Meezorequin’s prior attack on Damus (among other evidence) showed

that he had suffered past persecution in Haiti and created a presumption of future persecution there.

The judge thought that this persecution had arisen on account of Damus’s membership in a

“particular social group”—what the judge defined as “well-known professors in Haiti who openly

teach young people.” A.R. 738–39.

       The Board reversed. It held both that La Meezorequin’s prior attack did not rise to the

level of “persecution” and that the immigration judge had not identified a cognizable “particular

social group.” The Board ordered the judge to consider on remand whether Damus might fear

persecution on account of his political opinion because the prior attack had allegedly resulted from

his criticism of a politician. It also ordered the judge to consider new evidence about whether the

asylum statute’s “resettlement bar” applied. A recently discovered “Joint Communique” from

Brazil allegedly showed that the country had awarded permanent residency to some 43,000

Haitians, including Damus.

                                                 3
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

       Round Two. After another evidentiary hearing, the immigration judge again granted

asylum to Damus. The judge rejected the resettlement bar on the ground that the government had

not made a prima facie showing that Damus could obtain permanent residency in Brazil. The Joint

Communique, the judge reasoned, left unclear whether Brazil had granted the listed Haitians

permanent residency or merely allowed them to apply. The judge next held that Damus had

established a well-founded fear of persecution in Haiti as a result of his political opinion.

According to the judge, Damus reasonably feared La Meezorequin because the local politician

backed by this group remained angry with him.

       The Board again reversed. It held that the immigration judge committed clear error in

finding that the government did not make out a prima facie case that the resettlement bar foreclosed

Damus’s asylum claim. As the Board saw things, the Joint Communique plainly noted that

everyone on the list qualified for permanent residency if they filed the proper paperwork. It

remanded again for the judge to consider whether Damus could establish that he remained

ineligible for permanent residency in Brazil despite this evidence.

       Round Three. After a third evidentiary hearing, the immigration judge denied Damus

asylum and withholding of removal. The judge found that the resettlement bar doomed Damus’s

asylum claim because he did not rebut the government’s proof that he could have stayed in Brazil.

The judge next rejected Damus’s request for withholding of removal because he had not shown a

likelihood that he would face harm in Haiti.

       This time, the Board upheld the judge’s decision. It agreed that the resettlement bar

prohibited Damus from seeking asylum. And it held that the immigration judge had not committed

clear error in finding that Damus did not prove a likelihood of future persecution in Haiti, which

foreclosed his withholding-of-removal claim.

                                                 4
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

                                                II

       Damus now argues that the record compels the conclusion that he had not firmly resettled

in Brazil (for asylum) and that he would face harm in Haiti (for withholding of removal).

                                           A. Asylum

       The asylum statute gives the government discretion to grant asylum to immigrants who

have faced “persecution” or have a “well-founded fear of persecution” in their home countries “on

account of” such things as their “political opinion[.]” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A).

But the statute goes on to list circumstances in which the government may not grant this relief,

including if an immigrant “was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United

States.” Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). Damus argues that the Board wrongly held that he had firmly

resettled in Brazil. Our deferential standard of review bars us from accepting his claim.

                                                1

       What did the phrase “firmly resettled” mean when Congress adopted it in 1996? See Ali v.

Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2001). The average person might have understood the phrase

to require an immigrant to have “establish[ed] a permanent residence” in that country without

“hesitation” or “doubt.” 5 Oxford English Dictionary 956 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “firmly”); 15

Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 82–86 (defining “settle”). But perhaps we should consider

how the average immigration lawyer would have understood the phrase, since the concept had

developed a legal meaning well before 1996. See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489–94

(B.I.A. 2011) (discussing history); see also Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 52–58 (1971).

       Ultimately, though, we need not start from scratch on this question. The executive branch

has long offered its own definition in a regulation that Damus does not challenge (and thus that we

may accept for his case). 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2019); see 62 Fed. Reg. 10,313, 10,343 (1997).

                                                5
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

(The government amended this regulation in 2020, see 85 Fed. Reg. 80,380, 80,397–98 (2020),

but the parties agree that the new rules do not apply retroactively.) The regulation adopted a

presumption that immigrants had “firmly resettled” in a country if that country had given them “an

offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement”

either before or after they entered it. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2019). But immigrants could rebut this

presumption if they made one of two showings, including that the “conditions” of their “residence”

“were so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country” that they were

not “in fact resettled.” Id. § 1208.15(b). To help courts decide whether an immigrant had made

this rebuttal, the regulation directed them to consider several factors, including the conditions in

which other residents lived and the housing and employment options available to the immigrant.

Id.

       The Board has adopted a four-step framework to determine whether an immigrant has

firmly resettled in another country within the meaning of § 1208.15. See Thiam v. Holder, 677

F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 2011)).

We may also accept this “framework” for purposes of Damus’s case because he again makes no

claim that it is “[in]consistent with the law.” Id.; cf. Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379, 394 (6th Cir.

2014). Like the regulation, the Board’s framework “focuses exclusively on the existence of an

offer” of permanent resettlement from the country. A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 501; cf. Garadah

v. Ashcroft, 86 F. App’x 76, 81 (6th Cir. 2004).

       The framework follows a burden-shifting approach. At the first step, the government must

introduce “prima facie evidence” that a country had made “an offer of firm resettlement” so that

an immigrant could stay in the country indefinitely. A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 501; see Hanna,

740 F.3d at 393. If the government makes this showing, the burden shifts to the immigrant at the

                                                   6
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

second step to present evidence that the immigrant nevertheless remained ineligible to reside in

the country indefinitely. A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 503. At the third step, the judge must consider

the entire record to decide whether the immigrant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence

that the country did not make an offer of firm resettlement. See id. If the judge finds that an offer

was in fact made, the immigrant could lastly attempt to prove at the fourth step that one of the two

regulatory exceptions nevertheless applies. See id.; see, e.g., Hanna, 740 F.3d at 395–96.

       When it comes to our own review of the Board’s analysis, we treat the ultimate conclusion

that an immigrant has “firmly resettled” in a country as a factual finding triggering the substantial-

evidence test that governs the findings of historical fact. See, e.g., Hussam F. v. Sessions, 897 F.3d

707, 719 (6th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Hanna, 740 F.3d at 386. The immigration laws thus require

us to view this “administrative finding[]” as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

be compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). That “highly” deferential

test does not permit us to overturn a firm-resettlement finding simply because we disagree with it;

rather, we may reverse only if no reasonable adjudicator could have reached the Board’s finding

on the record presented. Rodriguez de Palucho v. Garland, 49 F.4th 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021)).

                                                  2

       Applying this test here, we see no basis to overturn the finding that Damus had firmly

resettled in Brazil. Substantial evidence supported the Board’s reasoning at each of its steps.

       Step One. The Board reasonably found that Brazil’s Joint Communique was prima facie

evidence that the country had given Damus an offer to firmly resettle there. Under the Board’s

framework, the government may meet its burden using direct evidence of a country’s offer of

permanent residency (such as the issuance of official papers) or indirect evidence of it (such as the

                                                  7
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

passage of laws that render an entire class eligible for the residency). See A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec.

at 501–02. Here, the Joint Communique stated that Brazil “AWARDS permanent residence to

the” thousands of Haitians on its list, which included Damus and his passport number. A.R. 695–

97. To be sure, the Communique also required these Haitians to, among other things, file an

application with photos, a birth certificate, and a declaration that they had not been criminally

prosecuted. Id. Under the Board’s unchallenged framework, though, a failure to follow required

administrative steps is irrelevant at this initial stage. See A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 503.

       Damus argues that the Joint Communique did not establish a prima facie case because (he

claims) it incorporated an earlier Brazilian resolution that granted only temporary (not permanent)

visas to Haitians and required them to identify employment-related reasons for moving to Brazil.

The government counters with jurisdictional and merits arguments. It initially says that we lack

jurisdiction over this claim because Damus failed to exhaust it on his third trip to the Board. Yet

Damus raised the claim during the second appeal in which the Board held that the government had

established a prima facie case. He could not seek judicial review at that time because this second

decision did not qualify as a final order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). On the third appeal, moreover,

the Board held that its earlier decision qualified as “law of the case.” A.R. 4. So Damus sought

judicial review of the issue at the earliest time he could. And the Board’s later law-of-the-case

finding cannot insulate its earlier analysis from our appellate review under traditional law-of-the-

case principles. See Samons v. Nat’l Mines Corp., 25 F.4th 455, 465 (6th Cir. 2022).

       The government fares better on the merits. The record did not compel the Board to find

that the Joint Communique incorporated the earlier resolution’s limits. See Rodriguez de Palucho,

49 F.4th at 540. Among other things, the Joint Communique in a prefatory statement merely noted

that it had “[c]onsider[ed]” the earlier resolution, and its plain text later awarded “permanent” (not

                                                  8
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

temporary) residency. A.R. 695. The Communique also contained terms that conflicted with any

intent to incorporate the prior resolution’s limits. The resolution, for example, restricted the

number of temporary visas allowed to 1,200 Haitians per year, but the Communique made some

43,000 Haitians eligible for residency in one fell swoop.

        One final point about this first step. The Board’s second decision held that the immigration

judge had committed a “clear error” in finding that the government had not met its prima facie

case.   A.R. 330.    Because the Board does not make its own factual findings, 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A), this clear-error holding might look more like a legal determination than a

factual one. Cf. Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 161–62 (1st Cir. 2018). But Damus

conceded that we should apply the substantial-evidence test, so we need not consider the issue.

        Steps Two and Three. The Board (and immigration judge) next reasonably found that

Damus failed to rebut the government’s prima facie case with evidence that he did not qualify for

permanent residency. Damus agreed that his name showed up on the Joint Communique. And as

the immigration judge explained, he did not provide “any evidence” in any of his three evidentiary

hearings that he was nonetheless ineligible for permanent residency in Brazil on an immigrant-

specific ground. A.R. 102. He conceded, for example, that he had no criminal record.

        Damus responds that he did not even know of the Joint Communique or his eligibility for

permanent residency. Setting aside that he told an asylum officer that he had “applied” for (and

“eventually” would have obtained) “residency” in Brazil, A.R. 844, this claim legally fails under

the regulation and Board framework that Damus does not challenge. The regulation requires only

that the country make “an offer of permanent resident status,” not that an immigrant learn of and

accept this offer. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2019). The Board has thus held that an offer can be “made”

simply by a country’s legislative decision to have immigrant-friendly laws that rendered an

                                                 9
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

immigrant eligible. See A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 502–03. Just as the immigrant need not know

of these laws, so too Damus did not need to know of the Joint Communique.

       Step Four. Lastly, the Board (and immigration judge) reasonably found that Damus did

not fall within his requested regulatory exception because he failed to show that the Brazilian

government had “substantially and consciously restricted” the “conditions” on his “residence”

there. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b) (2019). Damus offered no evidence that Brazil’s offer of permanent

residence contained any strings attached limiting his freedom. He did not claim, for example, that

the Brazilian government limited his employment options. See id. To the contrary, he had its

approval to work in his chosen field as an electrician. Nor did he claim that this government

limited his housing options. See id. By all accounts, he made his own choice to rent the room in

which he lived with his brother-in-law. He also did not cite more general evidence suggesting that

the Brazilian government restricted the ability of Haitians to live in the country. Indeed, Brazil

issued its Joint Communique in recognition of “the reception and social integration of Haitians in

Brazilian territory.” A.R. 695.

       Damus responds that the conditions on his Brazilian residency were restricted because

Brazilians (including his coworkers) allegedly treated Haitians “like animals” and discriminated

against them. A.R. 124, 126. Damus also points to instances of criminal acts, including murders,

committed against Haitians. Yet this evidence did not compel the Board to find that he fell within

this regulatory exception. See Rodriguez de Palucho, 49 F.4th at 540. Most notably, Damus did

not identify anything to suggest that the government (in contrast to private parties) engaged in the

discriminatory or criminal acts—as the regulation requires. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b) (2019); cf.

Dort v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 2022 WL 1558918, at *7 (11th Cir. May 17, 2022) (per curiam). In fact,

one of his cited news articles about crimes against Haitians indicated that Brazilian officials

                                                10
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

condemned “violence and xenophobia” against Haitians. A.R. 275. Damus also failed to identify

specific acts of discrimination against him personally; his testimony remained, in the words of the

immigration judge, persistently “general and vague.” A.R. 130. And he conceded that he never

suffered physical harm of any kind. Substantial evidence thus supported the decision to apply the

resettlement bar to Damus’s request for asylum.

                                   B. Withholding of Removal

       The withholding-of-removal statute prohibits the government from removing an immigrant

to a country if the immigrant’s “life or freedom would be threatened in that country” because of

certain protected traits, including the immigrant’s “political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).

The Supreme Court has read this text as requiring immigrants to show that a “clear probability”

exists—in other words, that “it is more likely than not”—that they would face harm in a country

on account of a protected trait. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987); INS v.

Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421–29 (1984); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i). The circuit courts

have read the text as requiring immigrants to establish that they would likely face “persecution,”

a word used in the asylum statute. See Rodriguez de Palucho, 49 F.4th at 536 (citing cases).

       Under the regulations, immigrants may satisfy their burden to prove that they would likely

suffer persecution in two ways. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). They can trigger a rebuttable presumption

that they will face persecution in a country if they prove that they have suffered past persecution

(on account of a protected trait) there. Id. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). Alternatively, if immigrants lack

evidence of past persecution, they still may attempt to directly prove that they would face future

persecution (again on account of a protected trait) if they returned to the country. See id.

§ 1208.16(b)(2); Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir. 2006).

                                                11
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

       As with a firm-resettlement ruling, we treat the ultimate conclusion that an immigrant has

suffered past persecution or would likely face future persecution as a factual finding subject to the

deferential substantial-evidence test. See Lopez-Lopez v. Garland, 2022 WL 168788, at *2 (6th

Cir. Jan. 19, 2022); Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 817–18 (6th Cir. 2017); Ndayisaba v. Holder,

457 F. App’x 552, 557 (6th Cir. 2012). We thus must uphold an agency “finding[]” that an

immigrant’s evidence did not prove past or future persecution as long as a “reasonable adjudicator”

could have entered the finding.      8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).      Damus cannot overcome this

deferential standard of review with respect to either of his two theories of persecution.

       Past Persecution. We have described persecution as an “extreme concept” that requires

significant harm. Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 410 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Harassment

and discrimination generally do not suffice. See Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 389–90 (6th

Cir. 1998). Even a single instance of physical violence will fall short unless the violence rises to

a level of “sufficient severity[.]” Lumaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2006); see also,

e.g., Lopez-Lopez, 2022 WL 168788, at *3 & n.1 (citing cases).

       Our precedent also sets a high bar for determining when a single assault is “sufficiently”

severe. As one example, we held that an immigration judge reasonably rejected a past-persecution

claim when an immigrant alleged that he had been “beaten by policemen, resulting in head injuries

and a week-long hospitalization.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 954 (6th Cir. 2004). As another

example, we held that an immigration judge reasonably rejected a past-persecution claim when a

soldier had hit an immigrant “with a rifle until he fell to the floor unconscious” and the immigrant

woke up “tied to a tree with severe bruises and other injuries to his legs.” Traore v. Holder, 358

F. App’x 677, 678, 680 (6th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). As a third example, we held that an

immigration judge reasonably rejected a past-persecution claim when the police had beaten an

                                                 12
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

immigrant “with a wooden club and cut him with a steel blade such that he still ha[d] scars on his

back.” Lian v. Holder, 414 F. App’x 790, 792, 794–95 (6th Cir. 2011).

       When the record here is measured against this caselaw, the Board (and immigration judge)

could reasonably conclude that Damus did not establish past persecution. The immigration judge

found that he suffered a single “attack” that caused “minor injuries.” A.R. 103. A “reasonable

adjudicator” could have made this finding by the time of the third evidentiary hearing because

Damus’s story had morphed significantly over the proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). At one

point, he swore that members of La Meezorequin had “dragged and beat [him], breaking several

bones and leaving [him] with scars[.]” A.R. 280. Yet he later testified that he did not seek medical

treatment for this attack because he did not suffer any broken bones. A.R. 153–55. Damus also

at one point stated that his “skin got peeled off” his arms during the attack. A.R. 156. Yet, when

confronted with Facebook photos showing no arm injuries a few weeks after the attack, Damus

conceded that his injuries had been more like “scratches.” A.R. 162, 164. Those types of scratches

would be far less severe than other injuries that our prior cases have found insufficient to prove

past persecution. See, e.g., Pilica, 388 F.3d at 954.

       In response, Damus criticizes the immigration judge for issuing conflicting rulings between

the first opinion (which described his injuries as “serious”) and the third opinion (which described

his injuries as “minor”). Compare A.R. 739, with A.R. 103. Yet any discrepancy has a readily

identifiable source: Damus’s own evolving testimony. He failed to acknowledge that he had not

suffered “big injuries” or “big wounds” until the third evidentiary hearing. A.R. 162. And he

points to no law that bars a court from changing its findings in response to changing testimony.

       Damus next argues that the immigration judge did not adequately account for other

evidence of persecution. He also testified that individuals threatened his wife after he left Haiti

                                                 13
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

and that his sister and brother had been forced to relocate. True, an immigration judge should

consider the “overall context” when deciding whether an immigrant has been persecuted. Gilaj v.

Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). But even combining this other evidence

with the single assault, a reasonable adjudicator could still conclude that Damus failed to show

past persecution. Among other contrary evidence, Damus’s wife, father, and siblings all lived

harm-free in Haiti for years. In a letter of support, Damus’s brother also failed to mention any

threats against himself. And a supporting letter from Damus’s wife was vague on the who, when,

and why of the threats against her; it did not even mention the politician who was the source of the

purported harassment campaign. On this record, the immigration judge could reasonably find that

Damus had shown only the types of “isolated occurrences” that fall short of past persecution.

Pilica, 388 F.3d at 954.

       Future Persecution. Even though Damus did not establish past persecution, he still could

obtain relief if he showed that it was more likely than not that he would be persecuted in Haiti

upon his return. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). Here too, however, the immigration judge reasonably

found that Damus failed to prove such a likelihood. When entering the United States, Damus

himself admitted to immigration authorities that nobody in Haiti would harm him there. And

again, his family had lived in Haiti without injury for years.

       The concept of “persecution,” moreover, has a state-action element that required Damus’s

feared harm to originate from the Haitian government or from actors that this government could

not or would not control. See Rodriguez de Palucho, 49 F.4th at 536, 540–41; Ortiz v. Garland, 6

F.4th 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2021). It is thus noteworthy that, by the time of the last evidentiary

hearing, the politician whom Damus criticized had been voted out of office and no longer served

                                                 14
No. 21-4125, Damus v. Garland

in the government. Any future harm by members of La Meezorequin thus would not spring from

the orders of a government actor.

       In response, Damus argues that the political party from this local politician still holds power

in Haiti. Yet Damus offered no evidence that his 2014 speech criticizing a specific local politician

even mentioned—let alone criticized—the national party. Nor did he show that La Meezorequin,

an allegedly local gang, did the bidding of anyone other than the individual that he criticized. The

immigration judge thus reasonably concluded that any fear of harm from an out-of-office politician

for an eight-year-old slight was tenuous at best.

       We end with a disclaimer on another standard-of-review question. In the first appeal, the

Board treated the immigration judge’s ultimate conclusion that Damus had not shown “past

persecution” as resolving a legal question subject to its “de novo review[.]” A.R. 666. We, by

contrast, have characterized this ultimate conclusion as resolving a factual question subject to

deferential review. See Lopez-Lopez, 2022 WL 168788, at *2 (citing Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445,

451 (6th Cir. 2003)). Can the same question be legal for the Board and factual for us? We need

not attempt to reconcile this differential treatment in Damus’s case because he does not now take

issue with the Board’s standard of review and also concedes that we should apply substantial-

evidence review. Cf. Rosiles-Camarena v. Holder, 735 F.3d 534, 536–38 (7th Cir. 2013). His

briefing choices allow us to save this issue for another day.

       We deny the petition for review.

                                                    15