Court Opinion

ID: 9795165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:21:31.641086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:27:27.469353
License: Public Domain

ORDER DENYING REHEARING
Adam Hamilton seeks rehearing of our decision in his case, Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760 (2002). Although Hamilton raises several arguments, we conclude that only one *773of these arguments merits an explanatory response. ,
Hamilton's primary argument is that we misunderstood or misinterpreted the facts of the case when we upheld the investigative stop of Hamilton's vehicle Specifically, Hamilton contends that we misunderstood the relevance of Officer Turney's observation that Hamilton's license plate was obscured by snow. Hamilton argues that, even though Turney may have been aware that the license plate was obscured as she followed Hamilton's vehicle down the highway, Turney's supervisor (Sgt. Sodden) was unaware of this fact when he ordered her to conduct an investigative stop of Hamilton's vehicle. Moreover, Hamilton argues, Turney never testified that her decision to stop Hamilton's vehicle was motivated by the fact that: his license plate was obscured.
Hamilton's arguments rest on the implicit premise that the validity of the investigative stop hinges on Turney's subjective reasons for conducting the stop (or Sodden's subjective reasons for directing Turney to conduct the stop). This is incorrect. The validity of an investigative stop turns on an objective test: whether the investigative stop was objectively justified in light of the facts known to the police at the time they performed the stop. We clarified this point in our initial opinion in this case:
[The State is allowed to rely on an after-the-fact justification [for the investigative stopl, so long as the facts known to the officers at the time of the investigative stop are sufficient to establish the legal foundation for this justification. We decided this point of law in Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118 (Alaska App.1992). In Be-auvois, we held that the legality of an investigative stop hinges on an objective test: whether the facts known to the officers established a legitimate basis fqr'the stop. The officers' subjective theories as to why the stop was proper are irrelevant.
Hamilton, opinion at 764-65 (citing Beauvois, 837 P.2d at 1121 n. 1).
As we explained in our initial opinion, the facts known to the police provided an objective justification for stopping Hamilton's vehicle.
To summarize the situation at that point:
A serious assault had been committed in the middle of the night-an assault which, given the nature and the number of David Dixon's wounds, threatened to become a homicide at any moment. The state troopers and the Fairbanks police responded within minutes. As they made their way to the crime scene, they saw only one private vehicle driving toward central Fairbanks, away from the neighborhood of the crime. The officers had reason to believe that the occupant(s) of this car might have seen something that would aid their investigation. But because the license plate of this vehicle was covered with snow, it was not possible to identify the vehicle and contact the driver later. If the police were to speak with these potential witnesses, 1 had to be right then. §
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Coleman rule was satisfied: "a prompt investigation [was] required ... as a matter of practical necessity".
Hamilton, opinion at 767.
- Having considered this point as well as the other points raised in Hamilton's petition for rehearing, we conclude that Hamilton's petition should be DENIED.
Entered at the direction of the Court.