Court Opinion

ID: 9772343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:04.320763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.629964
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Judge
(dissenting)
The argument complained of in Bill of Exception No. 3 shows upon its face that it was made in reply to the argument of Mr. Booth, counsel for appellant.
*328The remarks preceding the portion set out in the majority opinion read: “Now, Mr. Booth did not need to put on any testimony at all. He didn’t have to offer any testimony, but he did put on testimony, and I say that he has gotten up here and complained about the quality of the State’s testimony * * * .”
Objection being made, the court made no ruling except to instruct the attorney for the state to “make no reference to the Defendant.”
It is in the light of the foregoing that we should determine the effect of the language of the bill which appears to be a certification by the trial judg'e that the complained of argument was a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, and was so prejudicial and manifestly improper that the effect thereof could not be withdrawn from the jury and no instruction could cure.
Appellant passed to Mrs. Swor, Teller at Citizens State Bank in Richardson, Texas, the $159.10 check set out in the indictment, and received the proceeds thereof.
The check was drawn by Braniff Airways Incorporated to be charged to Flight Crew Expense. Appellant was a Braniff employee and was responsible for expense voucher claims including that upon which the check was issued.
Barbara H. Kenyon, formerly a hostess of Braniff, was the payee in the check, and the endorsement of her name on the back thereof was alleged to have been forged.
Barbara H. Knyon, who became Mrs. R. W. Louis upon resigning her position with Braniff several months before the check in question was issued, testified that she did not receive the check; did not present an expense claim or voucher; was due nothing from Braniff; was not acquainted with appellant; did not endorse her name on the check or authorize anyone to do so for her and that her endorsement was forged.
The indictment charged that appellant forged the endorsement, and in a second count that she passed the check to Mrs. Swor, knowing the endorsement to be forged.
Appellant did not testify, but filed her affidavit denying that the signature “Barbara H. Kenyon” was signed or forged by her or made under her authority. The state’s evidence that she did forge the endorsement was circumstantial, and included *329opinion evidence of an expert witness based upon comparison of the endorsement with specimens of appellant’s handwriting.
It was upon this evidence and the charge of the court submitting both counts to the jury upon circumstantial evidence that the attorney for the state, in reply to the argument of defense counsel “about the quality of the State’s evidence,” pointed out that appellant’s counsel had offered no hint or explanation as to how or under what authority or right appellant would have possession of the check payable to Barbara H. Kenyon.
It is now well settled that this court will not be bound by a certification of the trial judge of a conclusion of law or fact, where this court is in as favorable position as was the trial court to draw a proper conclusion. Free v. State, 165 Texas Cr. Rep. 374, 307 S.W. 2d 808, and cases cited; Pounds v. State, 128 Texas Cr. Rep. 519, 81 S.W. 2d 698; Taylor v. State, 156 Texas Cr. Rep. 452, 243 S.W. 2d 582.
In order to be entitled to a reversal because the trial court certified error there must be no reasonable construction of the language used in the bill other than that reversible error was committed. Moore v. State, 154 Texas Cr. Rep. 417, 227 S.W. 2d 564.
Assuming that the trial judge reached the conclusion indicated by the language of the bill and intentionally certified such conclusion (rather violent assumptions in view of the well recognized courage, ability and experience of the trial judge who declined to grant a new trial despite such conclusions) under the rule stated, this court is not bound by such certification of the trial judge.
No evidence was offered to meet the prima facie effect of the state’s evidence that appellant cashed the check issued by her employer under the circumstances mentioned, but not delivered to the payee, with the forged endorsement thereon. The attorney for the state directed attention to this. How did she come into possession of the cheek with a forged endorsement thereon if she did not know it was forged?
If she acquired the check in some manner consistent with her innocence, without knowledge that it was forged, it does not follow that her counsel could explain or furnish evidence as to *330how she came into such possession only by calling his client as a witness.
The rule is well settled that to constitute a reference to the failure of the defendant to testify the complained of remarks must be held to have had reference to the defendant and not to the absence of testimony other than that of the defendant. Byers v. State, 166 Texas Cr. Rep. 34, 310 S.W. 2d 331; French v. State, 162 Texas Cr. Rep. 48, 284 S.W. 2d 359; Alford v. State, 158 Texas Cr. Rep. 311, 255 S.W. 2d 519. It is not sufficient that the language might be construed as an indirect allusion to the defendant’s failure to testify. Hart v. State, 163 Texas Cr. Rep. 472, 293 S.W. 2d 659.
In Smith v. State, 131 Texas Cr. Rep. 322, 98 S.W. 2d 806, cited in the majority opinion, it was shown in the bill of exception and noted in the opinion that Smith, the defendant, was the only person who could have given an explanation of his possession of the stolen pistol. There is no such showing here.
As to the certification that the remarks were prejudicial, attention is directed to the fact that the minimum punishment was assessed.
The concurring opinion completely overlooks the evidence showing that the check bearing the forged endorsement was issued upon a false voucher or claim for which appellant was responsible.
The state did not rely only upon evidence based upon comparison of handwriting. In fact, excluding the testimony of the handwriting expert, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for passing the forged check.
I respectfully dissent.