Court Opinion

ID: 9630190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:04:33.71046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:44.549948
License: Public Domain

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge, Because the Arkansas Constitution guarantees a citizen the right to appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals handles a high volume of appeals. We are able to handle this high volume of appeals because we adhere to certain conventions and practices. With few very limited exceptions, we do not have a plain error rule in Arkansas appellate practice. Accordingly, we routinely affirm cases where the appellant has failed to make an argument to the trial court. See, e.g., Parker v. BancorpSouth Bank, 369 Ark. 300, 253 S.W.3d 918 (2007). However, it is beyond dispute that the same rules do not apply to the appellee. One of our most important conventions in appellate jurisprudence is that we will affirm a trial court if it reaches the right result; indeed, our supreme court has held that it is “axiomatic” that we affirm if we can determine that the trial court reached the right result even if it is for a different reason. Stromwall v. Van Hoose, 371 Ark. 267, 265 S.W.3d 93 (2007); Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark. 377, 260 S.W.3d 266 (2007); see also Davis v. State, 367 Ark. 330, 240 S.W.3d 115 (2006); Alphin v. Alphin, 364 Ark. 332, 219 S.W.3d 160 (2005); Regions Bank v. Griffin, 364 Ark. 193, 217 S.W.3d 829 (2005); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Andrews, 363 Ark. 67, 210 S.W.3d 896 (2005); Warr v. Williamson, 359 Ark. 234, 195 S.W.3d 903 (2004); Bright v. Zega, 358 Ark. 82, 186 S.W.3d 201 (2004); Ouachita Trek & Dev. Co. v. Rowe, 341 Ark. 456, 17 S.W.3d 491 (2000); Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999); State v. Hatchie Coon Hunting & Fishing Club, 98 Ark. App. 206, 254 S.W.3d 11 (2007); McKenzie v. State, 69 Ark. App. 186, 12 S.W.3d 250 (2000). Given that our practice of affirming a trial court if it reaches the right result is so well settled, it is untenable that the majority has decided this case on the appellees’ failure to raise certain arguments. The appellees were not even required to raise any issue for the trial judge to grant a new trial. Rule 59(e) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure invests the trial court with the power “on its own initiative [to] order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on a motion of a party.” The specifically enumerated grounds stated in Rule 59(a) include: “(5) error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large or too small;” and “(6) the verdict or decision is clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence or is contrary to law.” I think our analysis need go no further than to note that Pamela M. Cornwell-Hindes, a non-negligent passenger, recovered nothing in this lawsuit, which is a patently erroneous assessment of damages and a result that is clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. On the inadequacy of the verdict alone, the trial court was correct in granting a new trial and should be affirmed. See Tirado v. O’Hara, 70 Ark. App. 152, 15 S.W.3d 715 (2000). I note further that there was an irregularity in the proceeding that would have justified a new trial. That irregularity came through the submission of the case on special interrogatories that the appellant essentially concedes “should have been written differently.” The majority, however, accepts the appellant’s obviously fallacious argument that the deficiencies in the interrogatories are of no consequence because the objection that the appellees made to the trial court was not adequate under Rule 51 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, the appellees were not required to make any objection at all. Our review focuses on the trial court’s ruling, not what the appellees said to the trial court before the trial court made that ruling. Furthermore, it must be noted that the majority has confused “instructions” with “interrogatories.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines a jury instruction as “A direction or guideline that a judge gives a jury concerning the law of the case.” It defines a special interrogatory as “A written jury question whose answer is required to supplement a general verdict.” Through instructions, a jury receives information from the court, whereas through interrogatories, the court receives information from the jury. Remarkably, the majority purports to support its holding that the appel-lees’ objection to the appellant’s interrogatories was inadequate under Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 51, which only concerns jury instructions. While Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 51 expressly requires a specific contemporaneous objection and proffer of the party’s proposed jury instruction to preserve the issue for appellate review,1 Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 49, the rule concerning special interrogatories, imposes no equivalent requirement of a contemporaneous objection and proffer. I have never seen a more obvious mistake of law. As a consequence, the majority’s holding is completely unsupported by any relevant authority. I believe that this case must be affirmed, therefore, I respectfully dissent. Bird, J., joins.   In pertinent part, Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 51 states: No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before or at the time the instruction is given, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection, and no party may assign as error the failure to instruct on any issue unless such party has submitted a proposed instruction on the issue.