Court Opinion

ID: 9556972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 08:08:12.595029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.924991
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 15, 2023

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                             NO. 01-22-00243-CV
                          ———————————
                    ROBERT H. GOODE, JR., Appellant
                                      V.
                     STEPHANIE MCGUIRE, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 468981-401

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This case is related to the guardianship proceedings for Lockie Goode, the

wife of appellant Robert H. Goode, Jr. (“Bob”). See Goode v. McGuire, No. 01-20-

00028-CV, 2021 WL 4432534, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 28,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming appointment of permanent guardian of person
of Lockie Goode); Goode v. McGuire, No. 01-21-00535-CV, slip op (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] August 15, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (affirming appointment

of   permanent    guardian     of   estate       of   Lockie   Goode),   available   at

https://www.txcourts.gov/1stcoa/.

      When Stephanie McGuire became involved with Lockie in 2017, she

worked with Lockie to take charge of real and personal property that Bob and

Lockie owned while Bob was recovering from surgery. McGuire later made an

accounting to the probate court in the guardianship proceedings. Bob filed suit

against McGuire alleging that she committed a variety of bad acts in connection

with taking charge of his and Lockie’s property. The trial court granted summary

judgment in McGuire’s favor.

      On appeal, McGuire has argued that we lack jurisdiction because Bob’s

notice of appeal was untimely. Bob opposed McGuire’s motion to dismiss,

confoundingly arguing that his notice of appeal was not untimely because the order

from which he appeals is not a final judgment.

      We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                                    Background

      McGuire moved for traditional and no evidence summary judgment on

Bob’s claims. Bob did not respond initially, and the trial court granted partial

summary judgment on McGuire’s traditional motion on December 6, 2021. The

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trial court granted Bob’s motion for reconsideration on December 17, 2021, and

after another hearing, the court granted McGuire’s no evidence motion for

summary judgment on January 12, 2022. The summary judgment order did not

include a Mother Hubbard clause and did not state that it was a final judgment or

disposed of all parties and claims. When the no evidence summary judgment was

entered, McGuire had pending counterclaims for sanctions. Bob filed a motion for

new trial on February 14, 2022, and he filed his notice of appeal on March 25,

2022.

        On appeal, McGuire filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction

arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction because Bob’s notice of appeal was

untimely. Bob responded, arguing that McGuire’s motion to dismiss should be

denied, but confoundingly argued that his notice of appeal was not filed too late

because the order from which he appealed was not a final judgment. He did not

assert that a final judgment has been filed or that the January 12, 2022 summary

judgment was an appealable interlocutory order.

        This Court generally has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments

and specific interlocutory orders that the Texas Legislature has designated as

appealable orders. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011). In

cases in which a judgment has been rendered without a conventional trial on the

merits, the judgment is not final unless it (1) actually disposes of all pending

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claims and parties or (2) clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of

all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do so. In re Guardianship of

Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,

39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001). If an order that is purported to be a final

judgment contains a “clear and unequivocal” finality phrase disposing of the entire

case, it is final—and the failure to actually dispose of all claims and parties renders

it erroneous but not interlocutory. Jones, 629 S.W.3d at 924; In re Elizondo, 544

S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also Lehmann,

39 S.W.3d at 206 (“A statement like, ‘This judgment finally disposes of all parties

and all claims and is appealable,’ would leave no doubt about the court's

intention.”).

      The January 12, 2022 order was rendered without a conventional trial on the

merits. It does not dispose of all parties and claims because McGuire’s sanctions

claims remain pending. It does not purport to be a final judgment or include clear

and unequivocal language disposing of the case and indicating that it is a final

judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that it is not a final judgment. In addition, it

is not an appealable interlocutory order. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 51.014.

      In addition, even if the January 12, 2022 order was a final judgment, we still

would not have jurisdiction in this case. To invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, a

notice of appeal must ordinarily be filed within 30 days after the entry of judgment.

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See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. When a party timely files a motion for new trial, the

deadline to file a notice of appeal is extended to 90 days after the entry of

judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). A motion for new trial must be filed

“prior to or within thirty [30] days after the judgment or other order complained of

is signed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a).

      Here, the trial court signed the no evidence summary judgment on

January 12, 2022, and Bob filed his motion for new trial 33 days later, on

February 14, 2022. Thus, his motion for new trial was not timely filed, and it did

not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal to 90 days after the entry of

judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). Bob filed his

notice of appeal on March 25, 2022, which was 72 days after the date of the no

evidence summary judgment. Accordingly, Bob’s notice of appeal was untimely.

                                       Conclusion

      We grant McGuire’s motion to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction

and dismiss this appeal.

                                               Peter Kelly
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

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