Court Opinion

ID: 9676135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:15:46.273502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:44.375355
License: Public Domain

ANDELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The sole issue before this court is whether the trial judge’s conduct, when he questioned the primary witness for the defense, amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal despite appellant’s failure to object. I would hold that it did.
The testimony of Ms. Thompson directly contradicted that of the arresting officers in several crucial ways and, if believed by the jury, would have cast reasonable doubt on the State’s case against appellant. Appellant argues that the trial judge took an adversarial position in his questioning of the defense witness and wrongfully influenced the jury towards disbelieving her testimony in favor of the testimony of the State’s witnesses.1 In addition, the prosecutor, in his closing argument, made use of the theory brought out by the court’s examination of the witness, i.e., that the crack pipe Ms. Thompson saw the officer find may have been a different crack pipe also found on the scene, but unconnected to the case at trial.
Texas is “second to none” in its disapproval of the nonadversarial practice of trial judges’ examination of witnesses and virtually alone in rejecting adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 614 which authorizes trial judges to call and interrogate witnesses. Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 886 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
Both this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have consistently held that the failure to object to the trial court’s comments precludes subsequent challenges on appeal. However, we have also acknowledged that an exception to the general rule exists in cases *924in which the trial court’s comments and conduct amounted to fundamental error. “Where no objection is made, remarks and conduct of the court may not be subsequently challenged unless they are fundamentally erroneous.” Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (emphasis added). “The defendant’s counsel failed to object to the trial court’s comments. In the absence of fundamental error, the defendant has waived these points on appeal.” Cade v. State, 795 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd) (emphasis added). Such is the ease here.
Fundamental error is error that is so egregious and creates such harm that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Although there is no clear-cut test for determining when comments and conduct of the trial court have reached the level of fundamental error, an examination of the case law dealing with this issue clearly shows that several factors have weighed heavily upon the courts when considering this issue.
One factor considered by the courts in each case is whether the remarks by the trial court were made in the presence of the jury. See Silva v. State, 635 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, pet ref'd) (“whether appellant received a fair trial in light of the comments made by the court is a close question. But, we refuse to reverse because the statements were not made in the presence of the jury ...”). See also Bautista v. State, 632 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd untimely filed); Richardson v. State, 632 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no pet.).
Another issue the courts have considered is whether the trial court maintained an air of impartiality. It is permissible for the trial court to ask questions of a witness in order to clarify an issue or obtain a clearer idea of the merits of the case, so long as the judge maintains an impartial attitude when addressing such questions. Brewer, 572 S.W.2d at 721; Velasquez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.); see also Varela v. State, 561 S.W.2d 186, 192 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (to constitute reversible error, comment of court must be reasonably calculated to prejudice defendant’s rights).
The courts have also considered whether the trial judge’s comments, however impartially they may have been rendered, may have led the jury to infer the judge’s own opinion of the merits of the case. The jury is to be the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony of all of the witnesses and should be left to judge the weight and credibility of the testimony free from the influence of the trial judge. Jones v. State, 788 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.). Jurors are prone to seize with alacrity upon any conduct or language of the trial judge that they may interpret as shedding light upon the judge’s view of the weight of the evidence, or the merits of the issues involved. Bachus v. State, 803 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (citing Jones, 788 S.W.2d at 836). It defies logic and common sense to expect a jury to tell its “own judge” that the judge is wrong. Bachus, 803 S.W.2d at 405. Finally the courts must consider how the improper comments made by the trial court may have reverberated throughout the remainder of the trial. Cade, 795 S.W.2d at 45.
When viewing this case in light of each of the factors given weight by the courts in previous cases, I conclude that' the trial court’s questions to the witness here did, in fact, constitute fundamental error. Here, not only did the trial court question the witness in front of the jury, it also did so in a highly aggressive and sarcastic fashion that departed widely from the impartial demeanor required of the courts by this State.
The line of questions and the way in which they were asked clearly showed that the judge doubted the credibility of Ms. Thompson; the jury could hardly have avoided being influenced by this. Because no other evidence of drugs or drug use was found on *925appellant or at the scene, it was critical to the State’s case that the jury find that the crack pipe discovered at the scene was, in fact, dropped by appellant and retrieved by the officers who had seen him in possession of it.2 Since the testimony of Ms. Thompson directly contradicted that of the police officers as to who discovered the crack pipe and when it was discovered,3 the trial court, by questioning Ms. Thompson in such a way as to cause the jury to doubt her credibility, prevented appellant from receiving a fair and impartial trial.
Additionally, the State in its closing argument seized upon the judge’s comments and used them to suggest anew that even if Ms. Thompson had seen another officer pick up a pipe, it may have been a second pipe discovered at the scene and not the one discovered by Officer Parker. Thus, not only did the trial court influence the jury by showing a bias against the primary defense witness, the court’s line of questions was also used to bolster the State’s case.
Given these facts, I would hold that fundamental error resulted from the comments and conduct of the trial court, and, as such, no objection was necessary at trial to preserve the issue for review on appeal.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. This impression is supported by the fact that the trial court told the jury, during his final statements to them after the punishment phase of the trial, that he had believed the testimony of the police officers.

. The prosecutor admitted as much during his closing argument: “If there was one [crack pipe] there and the black officer came along and picked it up, I would have to come into court and said to y’all people that's the crack pipe that he had because it's in his front yard, but we don't have any evidence that he had it in his hand. You’d laugh at me and throw the case out in 30 seconds. It’s a joke. He didn't do that. The officers tied the crack pipe that they saw in his hand that he dropped.”

. According to the testimony of the witnesses for both the State and appellant, Ms. Thompson came outside as appellant was still on the ground and in the process of being handcuffed. The critical difference in their testimony was that the arresting officer claimed that he retrieved the crack pipe immediately after placing appellant in the patrol car, while Ms. Thompson claimed that the crack pipe was discovered by another officer after an extensive search of the area.