Court Opinion

ID: 9631440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:38:17.686135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:54.190978
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that ORS 30.275(8) contains no tolling provision and that that statute compels the *535result in this case. Consequently, the majority is correct that plaintiffs action is time-barred. Nonetheless, this is a case in which the technically correct legal result does a great disservice to children.
Plaintiffs complaint alleges that her teacher touched her inappropriately and made sexual advances toward her in November and December 1992. Plaintiff did not tell anyone about the incidents, because she “was afraid they might think that I had done something wrong.” Plaintiff was hospitalized on March 15, 1993, suffering from depression and “suicidal ideation.” Only after her hospitalization did she disclose to her sister and to Dr. Sardo, her psychologist, the allegedly improper contacts with her teacher. Dr. Sardo stated in an affidavit that
“[i]t is typical in this type of case that the child will not inform anyone, including parents or other authority figures, of the contacts until some point after the contacts occur. It is typical for the child to keep the feelings hidden inside, which causes a build-up of pressure, which can later lead to actual symptoms and damage.
“That was the case with [plaintiff]. She advised [me] that she had told no one about her prior improper contacts with the teacher, until her hospitalization in March, 1993. She was a very naive young woman, who was in a position of trust with a teacher that [sic] exploited her. This manifested itself in fears by [plaintiff] that she may have been a homosexual, which lead [sic] to a build-up of internal pressure, culminating in the events leading to her hospitalization of March 15,1993.”
Plaintiffs father, acting as her guardian ad litem, filed a complaint on January 11, 1995, within two years of the time of plaintiffs disclosure.
The legislature has provided other statutes of limitation to accommodate the type of delay in reporting that Dr. Sardo stated is typical in cases such as this. For example, ORS 12.117 provides that an action based on conduct that constitutes child abuse, including sexual abuse, shall be commenced not more than six years after that person attains 18 years of age, or, if not discovered, not more than three years *536from the date the injured person discovers or should have discovered the injury, whichever is longer.
ORS 30.275(8), by contrast, provides public officials, including teachers, absolute immunity from liability after two years from the time of injury, if they act in the course and scope of their employment.1 In this case, that immunity bars plaintiffs action against this defendant. Assuming that Dr. Sardo is correct, and that in cases such as this it is typical for children to keep their feelings hidden and to delay reporting, the absolute time bar in ORS 30.275(8) is troubling at best. Nonetheless, this case presents a question of statutory construction and, within that confine, the majority cannot be faulted.

 The record does not indicate whether plaintiff has sued her teacher individually, alleging that she did not act in the course and scope of her employment. See Kreiger v. Just, 319 Or 328, 876 P2d 754 (1994); Finney v. Bransom, 143 Or App 154, 924 P2d 319 (1996).