Court Opinion

ID: 9576205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:44.066299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:29.707744
License: Public Domain

*454McMurray, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the judgment of affirmance in these cases but not necessarily with all that is said in the opinion and with particular reference to the majority’s implications as to Collins v. State, 143 Ga. App. 583, 586 (2) (239 SE2d 232), and in overruling same. I also cannot concur in the language setting forth the so-called proper procedure instruction to trial courts as to how to handle Brady motions.
1. We are concerned here with a motion made pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215), wherein a Maryland appellate court held that a prosecutor, in suppressing exculpatory evidence, denied the defendant due process of law. In that case, defendant’s counsel had requested the prosecution to allow him to examine an extrajudicial statement made by a companion who had “admitted the actual killing” in that murder case.
The United States Supreme Court therein held, at p. 87 of its opinion, that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Numerous and voluminous appellate court decisions have since been written in attempts to follow the case law of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, supra.
In Collins v. State, 143 Ga. App. 583, 585 (2), supra, error was enumerated to the refusal of the trial court to order the district attorney to insert his file into the record of that case on appeal. However, the trial court did make an in camera inspection of the district attorney’s file in an attempt to reveal all exculpatory favorable or “arguably favorable” material. As none was furnished to the defendant, counsel contended that at trial there was testimony in the file which might well have contained “arguably favorable” information, and “the only meaningful way of obtaining review of the trial court’s inspection” was to have the district attorney’s file inserted in the record. Based upon Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 737 (12) (182 SE2d 779), this court held that since Brady does not require the prosecution to open its files for general inspection or for pretrial discovery and since there is no Georgia statute which would require such opening of the file for general inspection other than the decision of Brady, an in camera inspection appears to have been in compliance with the Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland, supra, citing Fleming v. State, 236 Ga. 434, 438 (224 SE2d 15).
We are now concerned with the recent death penalty case of Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 62, 65 (1980), wherein after an in camera inspection of the district attorney’s file counsel was permitted to *455examine exculpatory materials and then filed a notice to produce calling for production of certain documents examined at trial pursuant to Code Ann. §§ 38-801, 38-802 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 502, 504; 1968, pp. 434, 435; 1968, p. 1200; 1978, pp. 925, 926).
Our Supreme Court then discussed the difference between our statutes as to notice to produce provisions and Brady v. Maryland, supra, citing its case of Natson v. State, 242 Ga. 618, 623 (5) (250 SE2d 420). Our Supreme Court again held that a notice to produce cannot be used in a criminal case “to require the production of the district attorney’s work product; reports, memoranda and documents in the files of law enforcement officers; addresses and telephone numbers of the state’s witnesses; or the names and addresses of other persons with knowledge of the facts.” It was again held that “witness statements are not subject to notice to produce, although exculpatory witness statements are subject to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, supra,” citing Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 35-37 (1) (247 SE2d 838); Hamby v. State, 243 Ga. 339, 340 (2) (253 SE2d 759); Spain v. State, 243 Ga. 15, 17 (2) (252 SE2d 436) (1979).
In Wilson v. State, supra, our Supreme Court again approved the trial court in camera inspection method as to Brady motions. The following is then found: “On Motion by the defendant [Brady, or motion to seal and file — ?] the material examined in camera should either be sealed and filed, Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697 (3b) (238 SE2d 334) (1977); or an inventory or record of the examined material made, so as to permit appellate review, Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634, 637, fn. 1 (242 SE2d 55) (1978).” It was then held that once the material is sealed or inventoried by the trial court, “the appellate court can, upon the defendant’s showing cause, exercise its discretion and call for the examined material.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Supreme Court in that case (Wilson) then exercised its discretion, called for and examined the material, in particular, statements alleged to have been exculpatory which were made available to the defendant, and since they were furnished to the defendant held that it was no longer the duty of the court “to determine if those statements were exculpatory.” No reversible error was found as to the handling of the matter by the trial court, and the judgment was affirmed.
In Collins v. State, 143 Ga. App. 583,586, supra, we did not have for review a motion by the defendant that the material examined in camera should be either sealed and filed or an inventory or record of the examined material made so as to permit appellate review. Consequently, our case of Collins v. State, supra, was not in conflict with the cases of Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697 (3b), supra, and Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634, 637, fn. 1, supra. Hence, we are in nowise *456required to overrule it although considerable water has flowed under the bridge in interpretation of Brady motions since the Collins case. I therefore do not agree to criticize it, and I disagree with the overruling of our earlier decisions which may become obsolete by reason of later decisions of the Supreme Court. I simply find no conflict between Collins and the recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Georgia.
2. I next call attention to our constitutional mandate as set forth in Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VIII (Code Ann. § 2-3108) of the Constitution of Georgia of 1976, that our court is still one having jurisdiction “for the trial and correction of errors of law” only “in all cases in which such jurisdiction has not been conferred by this Constitution upon the Supreme Court, and in such other cases as may now or hereafter be prescribed by law.” As such a court under the separation of powers doctrine we are not empowered with any rule-making duty, or to legislate in any form as to practice and procedure; although in a given case we may render direction to the trial court in carrying out our decision making duty in the correction of errors of law only. Under the doctrine of stare decisis it is our duty to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
In the case sub judice the majority has simply attempted to set forth “the proper procedure for appellate review of in camera inspections of the state’s files where defendant’s counsel is not granted an opportunity to review the files.” In my opinion, we are going beyond that set forth by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. State, supra. As stated above, in that case, following a Brady motion and an in camera inspection in which some material was made available to defense counsel, the Supreme Court stated: “On motion by the defendant the material examined in camera should either be sealed and filed ... or an inventory or record of the examined material made, so as to permit appellate review...,” and “the appellate court can, upon the defendant’s showing cause, exercise its discretion and call for the examined material.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Supreme Court’s decision left it where the appellate court can exercise its discretion and call for the examined material that has either been sealed or inventoried by the trial court. The trial court rightfully has been and should be left with some discretion as to whether to seal or merely to inventory the reviewed material for possible future review if the appellate court exercises its discretion and calls for the examined material. The majority here, in the case sub judice, goes much further and requires that the material be sealed and transmitted to this court, the exercise of discretion in calling for it notwithstanding. The majority also sets forth in detail as to how the trial court shall carry out these instructions which is far beyond that *457required in Wilson v. State, supra, and in also holding that the filing of enumerations of error to review the in camera inspection “shall constitute sufficient cause for this court to require that the procedure set forth above shall be followed.” I also do not agree that the filing of an enumeration of error as to the Brady motion would be “sufficient cause” requiring the exercise of our discretion in calling for the examined material.
I simply cannot agree to such direction by this court which goes much further than that required by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. State, supra, inasmuch as I do not believe we have any such authority in directing the trial court as to the handling of Brady motions.
I am authorized to state that Judge Smith and Judge Banke join in this special concurrence.