Court Opinion

ID: 9898166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:54.045134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:12.296554
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                    DIVISION ONE
                       Respondent,
                                                    No. 84662-1-I
               v.
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 DAVID C. BELZER,

                       Appellant.

       DWYER, J. — David Belzer appeals from the order denying his motion to

vacate the record of his criminal conviction. He contends—and the State

concedes—that the order should be vacated in light of our Supreme Court’s

decision in State v. Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 519 P.3d 182 (2022). We agree.

Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court to exercise its discretion

consistent with Hawkins.

                                           I

       In December 2017, Belzer pleaded guilty to one count of attempted

promoting prostitution in the second degree, a gross misdemeanor. In June

2022, Belzer moved for vacatur of his conviction pursuant to RCW 9.96.060(2).

At a September 2022 hearing, Belzer asserted—and the State conceded—that

he satisfied the threshold eligibility requirements to request that the trial court

vacate the record of his conviction. Nevertheless, the State urged the court to
No. 84662-1-I/2

exercise its discretion under the vacatur statute to deny Belzer’s motion in light of

the facts underlying his conviction.

       The trial court denied Belzer’s motion, finding that “based on the particular

facts of this case . . . it would not be reasonable nor appropriate and against

public policy to vacate Mr. Belzer’s conviction, and I am exercising my discretion

not to do so.”

       Belzer appeals.

                                                II

       RCW 9.96.060(2) provides that

       [e]very person convicted of a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor
       offense may apply to the sentencing court for a vacation of the
       applicant’s record of conviction for the offense. If the court finds the
       applicant meets the requirements of this subsection, the court may
       in its discretion vacate the record of conviction.

(Emphasis added.)

       In Hawkins, the Washington Supreme Court held that a trial court abused

its discretion under a felony vacatur statute by basing its denial of vacatur solely

on the facts underlying the applicant’s conviction.1 200 Wn.2d at 498. The court

instructed that the statute, read as a whole, “focuses on whether the applicant

currently demonstrates rehabilitation. Thus, in deciding a motion to vacate, the

court may not rely solely or even primarily on facts about the underlying crime

and it may not treat the qualifying conviction as a bar to vacatur.” Hawkins, 200

Wn.2d at 494. Instead, the court explained, the trial court must treat the

       1 The court issued its decision in Hawkins one month after the trial court’s denial of

Belzer’s motion. See 200 Wn.2d 477.

                                                2
No. 84662-1-I/3

underlying conviction as one of the prerequisites for vacatur, after which the trial

court

        must then exercise its discretion by considering information about
        whether the defendant has shown sufficient rehabilitation since the
        time of the crime.
               Information relevant to rehabilitation will be specific to each
        individual and each crime. For example, if the individual has a
        substance abuse problem that contributed to the crime, information
        that they have taken steps to address that problem will be relevant
        to rehabilitation. Likewise, if the individual has mental health issues
        or an anger management problem, evidence that they have
        addressed those issues will be relevant.

Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d at 497.2

        On appeal, Belzer contends—and the State concedes—that in light of the

Supreme Court’s ruling in Hawkins, the trial court abused its discretion and its

order should be vacated. We agree.3

        Belzer next contends, however, that the proper remedy in light of the trial

court’s abuse of discretion is vacatur of his conviction. We disagree. In

Hawkins, the Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded the matter “to the

trial court to exercise its discretion consistent with this opinion.” 200 Wn.2d at

502. We afford the same remedy to Belzer.4

        Reversed and remanded.

          2 The matter before us concerns RCW 9.96.060, the misdemeanor vacatur statute. The

Supreme Court’s decision in Hawkins involved the interpretation of RCW 9.94A.640, the felony
vacatur statute. 200 Wn.2d at 489-93. Similar language and logic underpin each of these
statutes, and as pertinent to the matter on appeal, we interpret RCW 9.96.060 similarly.
          3 Belzer further contends that the trial court erred by relying on the probable cause

statement in making its decision. We disagree. In Hawkins, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he
plain language of the statute does not bar the court from considering a probable cause
certification, whether or not the defendant stipulated to its consideration for sentencing purposes.
Indeed, the statute does not bar the court from considering any specific source of information.”
200 Wn.2d at 493 (footnote omitted).
          4 Belzer submitted additional arguments in his briefing. Because of our resolution of this

matter, these claims are now moot, and we decline to address them.

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No. 84662-1-I/4

We concur:

                  4