Court Opinion

ID: 9654558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:25:53.986604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:10.552287
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent in part.
Our review of this administrative agency decision proceeds under the legislative directive of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8)(f) (1995). By that section, we are directed to reverse the agency action if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the agency action is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency. Our review applies this standard to determine if our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Bromeland v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 562 N.W.2d 624, 625 (Iowa 1997). The district court, like our court in reviewing an agency action, exercises only appellate jurisdiction. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 263 N.W.2d 766, 768-69 (Iowa 1978). We will reverse an agency’s findings if, after reviewing the record as a whole, we determine that substantial evidence does not support them. Sierra v. Employment Appeal Bd., 508 N.W.2d 719, 720 (Iowa 1993).
The substantial evidence question turns on whether the evidence is such that a reasonable person would find it adequate to reach the agency’s conclusion. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 394 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Iowa 1986); Gordon v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 389 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1986). The agency’s conclusion, which the majority holds as a matter of law is supported by “substantial” evidence, is that officer Lentsch had reasonable grounds to believe Ramsey was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See Iowa Code § 321J.9. In considering what is substantial evidence, we should apply the distinction already cited by our court in State v. Braun, 495 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1993). That is, that our implied consent law recognizes a line between “reasonable grounds to believe a person has been drinking intoxicating liquids” and “reasonable grounds to believe a person is intoxicated.” See Braun, 495 N.W.2d at 738. In the instant case, the majority'has amalgamated this distinction.
“Supported by substantial evidence” is more than a floating aphorism attaching itself to all police work that pursues a worthy goal. The dictionary definition of “substantial” embraces these meanings:
1. of or having substance.
2. real; actual; true; not imaginary.
*1083. strong; solid; firm; stout.
4. considerable, ample; large.
Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d college ed.1986).
The evidence in this case falls woefully short of matching these illustrations of what is substantial. The stop of Ramsey’s vehicle proceeded from a conclusion based on an observation of behavior that was not even a traffic offense. Officer Lentsch observed Ramsey’s vehicle half way through an intersection and concluded from this observation of speed that Ramsey must have failed to stop at the stop sign. Officer Lentsch testified that the vehicle was not exceeding the speed limit when he observed it and he did not actually see whether Ramsey stopped his vehicle at the stop sign. The net weight of this evidence adds up to a conclusion fortified by a hunch.
After stopping the vehicle, officer Lentsch observed that Ramsey had bloodshot eyes. This condition could be caused by hemorrhage, sinusitis, allergies, blepharitis, injury, or conjunctivitis. Excessive alcohol consumption may or may not be a cause of this condition. Officer Lentsch was examined as to other causes for bloodshot eyes. He testified the cause could be from being sleepy, being ill, or having eye strain or irritation from chemicals, paint, or something else.
Officer Lentsch testified finally that Ramsey “had the odor of an alcoholic beverage about his person.” There is no testimony that Ramsey had the smell of alcohol on his breath. Officer Lentsch also testified forthrightly that he made no claim that he could tell by the strength of the odor whether a person was intoxicated. He also testified that Ramsey’s ear was searched after arrest and prior to its being towed away. No alcoholic beverages or beer were observed in Ramsey’s hands or his car. Like smoke, the aura of alcohol can be about a person’s body from proximity to people who have consumed beer or alcohol as well as from personal consumption.
Officer Lentsch proceeded from a feeling about something not based on known facts. He had a premonition or suspicion. Our implied consent law requires more than that. Officer Lentsch did not have reasonable grounds to believe Ramsey was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated. See Iowa Code §§ 321J.2, .6. The record made at the revocation hearing convinces me that there was not substantial evidence to support the Department of Transportation’s decision to revoke Ramsey’s driver’s license. Our review requires the establishment of substantial evidence, or else it becomes nothing more than a rubber stamp of well intentioned police action.
I would reverse the district court and remand to the administrative agency for restoration of petitioner’s driver’s license.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, J. join this dissent.