Court Opinion

ID: 9550716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:41:05.938206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:14.860192
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the reversal. I dissent only on that portion of the majority opinion which allows the same trial judge to preside at the hearing if he desires to do so. In my opinion, disqualification exists as a matter of law. This dissent is not directed against the present trial judge. It is directed in favor of a rule which the sound administration of justice requires. Mr. Wollen stated: Well, if the Court please, then I would have to state to the Court that this Court cannot render an impartial decision. / have been informed that the Court has been approached off the bench by opposing counsel insisting that this Court hear the matter, and I think if there is any taint of partiality that a Judge should recuse himself. [Emphasis added]. ****** The Court: Mr. Wollen, if you have any evidence concerning the statements you made in the record, you can produce it now. I will advise you for your information if you leave this Court you are going to be held in contempt. [Emphasis added]. The foregoing charge by Wollen could be considered a violation of Canon 3A (4) of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct (1972) that a judge should “neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.” [Emphasis by Code]. One purpose of the hearing is to show the partiality or involvement or unethical acts of the trial judge. The judge should not hear accusations that he has violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He should not judge his own case. In a contempt proceeding, “[t] rial before ‘an unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971). People v. Kurz, 35 Mich.App. 643, 192 N.W.2d 594, 602, 603 (1971) reviewed the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited in our opinion. It concluded : We have concluded that, although the judge who sat in this case may not have been constitutionally barred from sitting because in this case Walter Kurz did not at any time personally insult or attack the judge in any way whatsoever, the sound administration of justice requires, in the light of the Mayberry rule, that in every case where a judge defers consideration of a contempt citation until after the conclusion of the trial the charge must be considered and heard before another judge. United States v. Bradt, 294 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1961) involved an attorney who left the courtroom after a verbal exchange with the' presiding judge, contrary to the order of the judge for him to remain. The Court of Appeals set aside the criminal contempt judgment and remanded the case for hearing and disposition by a different judge. This rule was followed in United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968). The hearing and disposition of the instant case should be before another judge. The present trial judge can avoid probable future appeals in this case if he voluntarily recuses himself.