Court Opinion

ID: 9384362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 17:03:14.279009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.939377
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/30/23 P. v. Bartholomew CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
              Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A164830
 v.
 THEODORE BLAIR                                                         (City & County of San Francisco
 BARTHOLOMEW,                                                           Super. Ct. No. SCN122527)
              Defendant and Appellant.

          In 1987, defendant Theodore Blair Bartholomew pled guilty
to the second degree murder of Larry Gaines, and received a
sentence of 15 years to life in prison. This appeal is from the trial
court’s denial of Bartholomew’s petition to vacate his conviction
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95).1
The prosecution conceded that Bartholomew was not the actual
killer, but after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that
he could be convicted of second degree murder as an aider and
abettor who acted with implied malice. Bartholomew advances

        All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
          1

Section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, without
substantive change, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) For clarity, we will refer to the section by its current
numbering.

                                                      1
three arguments on appeal: (1) aiding and abetting implied
malice murder is not a viable legal theory; (2) the prosecution
presented insufficient evidence of his guilt; and (3) the trial court
violated his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to
properly consider his youth when deciding whether he acted with
implied malice.
      While we disagree with most of Bartholomew’s arguments,
the trial court’s own analysis indicated that this is a difficult
case. At the time of the crime in 1984, Bartholomew was a 16-
year-old runaway under the control of the actual killer, William
White—a man twice his age who raped and prostituted him.
Significantly, the trial court credited, at least to some extent,
evidence that before White “unexpectedly” cut Gaines’s neck,
Bartholomew thought White was engaged in a “head game”—a
brutal and sadistic sequence of acts intended to terrorize Gaines
but not to kill him. Ultimately, however, the trial court
concluded that Bartholomew “acted with the knowledge of Mr.
White’s unlawful intent, and that he did intend to assist William
White toward Mr. White’s unlawful ends.”
      The trial court identified evidence supporting its
conclusion, but the record leaves us with some uncertainty about
how it reconciled that evidence with the acknowledged possibility
that Bartholomew thought he was a participant in a vicious head
game. Because Bartholomew would lack the required mental
state for aiding and abetting implied malice murder in that
circumstance, to eliminate any doubt about the possibility of
error we conclude that the best course is to remand the case to

                                  2
the trial court to clarify its findings on this point and evaluate its
ruling under the standards discussed below.
                          BACKGROUND
A.    The Conviction and Petition
      In 1987, Bartholomew pled guilty to the second degree
murder of Larry Gaines. (§ 187.) Bartholomew was 16 years old
when the crime was committed, and Gaines was 17. The trial
court sentenced Bartholomew to a term of 15 years to life in state
prison, with the possibility of parole.2
      In 2019, Bartholomew filed a petition seeking resentencing
under section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The trial court
summarily denied the petition on the ground that the record
“support[ed] that Mr. Bartholomew had murder liability based on
a direct aiding and abetting theory.” This court reversed and
remanded, finding that the trial court engaged in improper fact
finding at the preliminary stage. (People v. Bartholomew
(Aug. 27, 2021, A160078) [nonpub. opn.].)
      On remand, the court received briefing and held an
evidentiary hearing, receiving into evidence, among other things,
Bartholomew’s 1984 statement to police and Inspector Frank
Falzon’s testimony, described below.

      2  This court affirmed Bartholomew’s conviction on direct
appeal, with the opinion addressing only his argument that there
was no probable cause for his arrest and that a statement he
made to police investigators should have been suppressed as
“fruit of the poisonous tree.” (People v. Bartholomew
(February 20, 1992, A053255) [nonpub. opn.].)

                                  3
B.    Bartholomew’s 1984 Statement to Police
      At the time of the murder, William White, David Murdock,
and Bartholomew lived together in a tent in San Francisco.
(According to information elsewhere in the record, White was “in
his thirties” and Murdock was 17.) Bartholomew told police he
first met White shortly after being released from four months in
the San Bruno jail. Bartholomew told White he wanted to leave
San Francisco because he didn’t want his parole officer to find
him. White invited him to go camping, telling him that they
would “live off the land” and that White would buy him whatever
he needed. White was living at a hotel. Bartholomew stayed
there one night with him, and the next morning they loaded the
car with their possessions, and a third person named John drove
them to the Santa Cruz County line. John then drove away, and
White and Bartholomew left their things near the side of the road
while they walked down a hill with their backpacks and radios to
find a place to camp. While there, they heard what sounded like
police radios, so they waited because Bartholomew said the police
were looking for him. When they went back up, all their
belongings were gone, and while White first told Bartholomew it
was all his fault for being too lazy, he then said they had too
much stuff anyway and they still had what they really needed.
      They pitched the tent, and Bartholomew went to sleep but
woke up to find White raping him. Bartholomew was in pain,
told White “I don’t do this,” but White said, “bullshit, punk, you
do now.” White again blamed him for their stuff being stolen.
Bartholomew said he would pay him back for everything, that

                                 4
they could go back to San Francisco where he would get the
money somehow, but White said Bartholomew wouldn’t be able to
get it. White grabbed a stick and hit him in the head, and started
beating him up. Afterwards, White told him he was his bitch and
to go back to sleep. When Bartholomew woke in the morning,
White raped him again. They returned to San Francisco, where
White told Bartholomew he had to pay him back $500. White
directed Bartholomew to go to Polk Street, where Bartholomew
started selling his body to get money for White, and “it went on
like this.”
      Bartholomew next described how, one day, White saw
Murdock and said, “I’d like to have that boy there.” White came
up with a plan, instructing Bartholomew to tell Murdock about a
man (i.e., White) who stays out in a tent and keeps $1,000 under
his pillow, and to suggest that Bartholomew and Murdock could
rob him. Bartholomew did so, but Murdock said he did not do
that, and Bartholomew took off. White then approached Murdock
and, “trying to play it out,” expressed surprise at what
Bartholomew had said, saying he thought Bartholomew was his
friend. White eventually learned that Murdock had a bus ticket
to return to Seattle, and, worried that he would leave, invited
him back to his tent to show him something. At the tent, White
raped Murdock and took his bus ticket, and told him he was now
his bitch and would have to do the same thing Bartholomew was
doing. White told Murdock he would give him a bus ticket after a
couple of weeks. Murdock started bringing in money to make
White happy, until eventually there was no more mention of a

                                 5
bus ticket and White had both Murdock and Bartholomew “out
there making money for him.”
      Bartholomew said that both he and Murdock were afraid of
White, who took all of the money they were bringing in. When
Bartholomew asked White what was happening with the money,
White would get mad and beat him. At various times, White hit
him with sticks, slapped him, and punched him with his fists.
When asked if he loved White, Bartholomew answered that at
one time he did, and so did Murdock.
      Bartholomew had previously seen the victim, Larry Gaines,
“a couple of times on the street.” On the night of the murder,
Bartholomew was in the tent and heard noise outside. He got a
flashlight and went out, where he saw Murdock and White with
Gaines. They all went inside the tent, where White said Gaines
wanted “to join the club,” but he then told Bartholomew and
Murdock that he wanted to talk to them outside. Once outside,
he told them that “this is the punk that got me fired from my job,
and had a couple of guys come and say they’d beat my ass,” and
that they were going to “take care of him tonight.”
      Back in the tent, White told Bartholomew to get White’s
.22-caliber rifle and bullets. White then told Gaines that the gun
was going to be the one that killed him. Gaines initially laughed
after White made this statement, then stopped when he saw that
White was serious. White told Murdock to get his gun, which he
did. White and Murdock both pointed their guns at Gaines.
White told Bartholomew to grab a stick, and White, Murdock,
and Bartholomew took turns beating Gaines with it. White

                                 6
directed Bartholomew and Murdock to grab leg shackles and
handcuffs, and “we put them on and put the—took the handcuffs
put them around him and then handcuffed his hand back to it.”
White said that Gaines should not have “fucked” him over.
Bartholomew and Murdock put bandanas around Gaines’s
mouth, and Bartholomew placed silver tape on Gaines’s mouth
because White told him to do so. After Murdock cut off half of
Gaines’s hair at White’s direction, White told Bartholomew and
Murdock to leave the tent, and he raped Gaines once they did.
      Bartholomew and Murdock went back inside the tent, and
White told Murdock to get the BB gun. The three of them took
turns shooting Gaines in the chest, back, and legs with it. After
that, White picked up a bottle of RID (lice killer) and drew liquid
into a syringe, asking Gaines whether he was body or head lice.
White told Bartholomew to push the syringe into Gaines’s
temple; Bartholomew and Murdock injected both of Gaines’s
temples. White injected the liquid into Gaines’s arm. When
Gaines began to weave in a circle, White said, “that wasn’t
nothing but water, punk,” and Gaines stopped weaving.
      Although Bartholomew and Murdock declined, White told
Gaines that he had to perform oral sex on them if he wanted to
live. White then said they would take a vote on whether Gaines
lived or died. Bartholomew told police, “So, we voted no.”
Investigator Falzon asked, “ ‘No’ what?” Bartholomew
responded, “That he dies.” Bartholomew said they voted by
putting their thumbs down. He continued, “Yeah, and then I go
‘no’ and then [Murdock] goes, ‘no,’ so [White] goes, ah, we’ll kill

                                  7
him, huh? And we go ‘yeah’; and then he goes I have the final
decision, he goes both of you have (inaudible) do you realize that;
so you know I didn’t think he was serious, you know, and we go
yeah, you know, started with just, you know, playing a head trip.”
Falzon responded, “You thought he was playing a head trip at
this time, still?” Bartholomew continued, “Yeah, I—you know, I
thought he’s always doing that, you know, playing trips; so then
he goes okay, but, you know after we had shot him and stuff you
know and put that syringe in there, you know, and squeezed the
stuff in, you know he said it was water I still thought he was
kidding, you know and then he sliced his neck, you know—.”
      Bartholomew said that White had gone to the other side of
the tent, picked up a knife and “all of a sudden” got up and sliced
Gaines’s neck. White then took a hatchet and chopped at
Gaines’s neck. Gaines, bleeding, was lying on his side and
making weird noises. Bartholomew listened as White started
kicking him. Bartholomew and Murdock then dismembered
Gaines’s body because White told them to finish the job, and they
took Gaines’s head off. They buried the body parts in various
places.
      In response to the following sequence of questions—“Why
did [White] say he killed [Gaines]?” “Why did [White] tell you
that he killed [Gaines]?” “Why did he kill [Gaines]? Why did the
three of you kill [Gaines]?”—Bartholomew stated, “Well, [White]
said that [Gaines] tried to hurt him once, you know, and I finally
figured out that he had our minds to you know he would tell us to
do something we’d do it and that’s why we killed [Gaines],

                                 8
because he said he hates me, you know, and tried to hurt me, you
know, so he said what do you want to do with him? We said well
he can’t be here if he wants to hurt you, you know, because he
told us that, you know, to always protect him no matter what,
you know.”
      Asked if he knew of any other crimes or murders that
White had committed, Bartholomew said no. Bartholomew was
then asked if he was ever with White when he hurt someone
other than Gaines, and Bartholomew described an incident when
a man came up to them and started tapping Murdock to try to get
his attention. White told him to get back and to leave “my boys”
alone, and then hit him in the chest. When the man walked
across the street, White chased after him with a knife. Murdock
and Bartholomew took off in the other direction, afraid that the
man would come after them. When they saw White later, he told
them that he had stabbed the man in the throat, but didn’t know
what had happened to him. Bartholomew said that this event
happened about a month before Gaines’s murder.
C.    Inspector Falzon’s Testimony
      Retired Police Inspector Frank Falzon testified that he had
interviewed White, who was an adult, and he described White as
a “psychotic serial pedophile murderer.” White told Falzon he
was living in a tent in San Francisco with three young boys and
that he killed one of the boys, later identified as Gaines.
According to Falzon, Gaines, Murdock, and Bartholomew were
“[t]hree young boys at the mercy of a very vicious killer.”

                                  9
      Falzon testified that he interviewed Bartholomew on
October 26, 1984. Bartholomew was 16 years old at the time, and
he gave a voluntary statement that led to his arrest. He told
Falzon that White had a grudge against Gaines stemming from
some incident, and White was not pleased by how Gaines was
treating White, so he wanted to make an example of him in front
of Bartholomew and Murdock.
      Falzon vaguely recalled that Bartholomew told him he was
a runaway and had been living in San Francisco for about three
years. In Falzon’s opinion, White, a man in his 30’s, was one of
the sickest individuals he had come across in his 22 years
working in homicide and what he did to these young boys was
diabolical. Falzon recalled that Bartholomew told him that he
had been sexually abused and sodomized by White, and may also
have said that White frequently beat him.
      Falzon believed that Bartholomew became aware of White’s
“beef” with Gaines at the time the murder occurred: “my belief
was it was all kind of spontaneous . . . I wasn’t aware that
Mr. Bartholomew knew ahead of time.” Falzon also believed
White was “pimping” Bartholomew and Murdock, ordering them
to sell their bodies on the street and turn over all their earnings
to White. Falzon also believed they completely depended on him
to provide for them.
      When Falzon interviewed White, White told Falzon he
sodomized Gaines in the tent that night. Falzon described it as
the more brutal of acts that started the vicious murder. Falzon
believed Bartholomew and Murdock were terrified of White. He

                                 10
also believed that White was the lead orchestrator of all the
events and everything that was done was on White’s orders. He
agreed that it didn’t matter what Bartholomew said or thought,
that White “was going to do what he was going to do, which
psychotic killers do.” Asked about Bartholomew’s statement that
Bartholomew thought White was playing “head games” or “was
actually kidding, with regard to this drastic killing,” Falzon
replied, “Of course these young boys would think he was kidding.
They had never seen anything like this. That’s what makes this
case so horrible.”
D.    Ruling on the Petition
      The trial court denied the petition in an oral ruling. The
court stated that the prosecution had rightfully conceded that
Bartholomew was not the actual killer. It rejected liability under
a felony-murder theory because neither kidnapping nor torture
were qualifying felonies for first degree felony murder when
Bartholomew was convicted, and second degree felony murder
was not a viable theory under current law. The court rejected a
theory of first degree murder by torture because such a theory
would be cognizable only “if in fact the torture was the cause of
death,” and the People did not establish the torture was a basis of
the victim’s death. Addressing “actual malice,” the court also
found that Bartholomew had not acted with intent to kill.
      The court nonetheless found that the prosecution had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Bartholomew directly
aided and abetted the murder with the requisite state of mind of
implied malice. The court explained its ruling as follows:

                                11
      “And the facts that the court finds that support Mr.
Bartholomew acting as an aider and abettor with implied malice
would be as follows: According to his statement—that’s Mr.
Bartholomew’s—William [W]hite said, quote, or this is pretty
close to exact words, ‘We are going to take care of him tonight.’
And, you know, Mr. White was discussing how the decedent had
gotten [him] fired from his job, Mr. White had apparently used
some type of rues [sic], along with Mr. Murdock, to get the
decedent out to Lands End, and then Mr. White took Mr.
Murdock and Mr. Bartholomew aside to say we’re going to take
care of him tonight.
      “Against this backdrop, it’s noted that Mr. Bartholomew
was aware, and he stated he’s aware, that Mr. White had been
violent in the past. He[] in fact raped Mr. Bartholomew, he had
raped Mr. Murdock, and later on, of course, he raped the
decedent. [¶] But in addition to that, Mr. White had told Mr.
Bartholomew that he had stabbed someone in the neck on Polk
Street over a relatively minor dispute, it seemed, but Mr.
Bartholomew was aware of that.
      “As the night went on, Mr. Bartholomew indicated that Mr.
White and Mr. Murdock, I believe both of them, were told to get a
.22 rifle, like a real gun not a BB gun, a .22. There were two .22s,
one belonged to Mr. Murdock, the other, I think, to Mr. White.
And Mr. White told the decedent, “This will be the gun that kills
you,” and [] the decedent initially acted as if this was a joke or
some kind of morbid kidding around. But according to Mr.

                                 12
Bartholomew, the decedent soon realized that Mr. White was
serious.
      “Then at that point, shortly afterwards, both Mr.
Bartholomew and Mr. Murdock hit the decedent with sticks at
the direction of Mr. White, they cuffed and shackled the decedent
at the request of Mr. White or at his direction. [¶] There’s some
ambiguity as to who exactly did the cuffing and shackling, but
there seems to be some evidence [] that both Mr. Murdock and
Mr. White—excuse me, Mr. Bartholomew participated in the
cuffing and shackling of the decedent.
      “It seems clear that Mr. Murdock and Mr. Bartholomew
taped the decedent’s mouth with duct tape and with bandannas.
After that, Mr. Bartholomew recounted that he and Mr. Murdock
went outside the tent and they heard behavior consistent with
Mr. White raping the decedent.
      “At some point Mr. Bartholomew returns to the tent with
Mr. Murdock, Mr. White was present while they both shot the
decedent with a BB gun, shoot him with BB’s. All three of the
men then, in turn, used the syringe, it either contained some type
of poison or possibly water, it was unclear, but they used it to
inject it into the head/temple area of the decedent. And it was at
that point that Mr. Murdock indicates that the—Mr. White
unexpectedly sliced the neck of the decedent.
      “Prior to that, Mr. White had indicated and told the victim
that he had to perform oral sex on Mr. Bartholomew or Mr.
Murdock if he wanted to live, this was said prior to the cutting
with the knife. Both of the men, Mr. Murdock and Mr.

                                 13
Bartholomew, declined that. But it’s notable that this statement
about wanting to live was made prior to the slicing.
      “Much has been made, and understandably by both parties,
regarding the vote about whether or not the decedent should live.
There’s certainly arguments both ways that the—it was
ambiguous as to whether it was thumbs up or thumbs down, but
I think at some point it’s not a much moment [sic]. Clearly, there
was a discussion later on whether it was thumbs up or thumbs
down. [¶] It seems clear to [sic] Mr. Bartholomew thought that
the—while he thought that Mr. White might have been kidding
or playing head trips, et cetera, that the—ultimately, the two
men, Mr. Murdock and Mr. Bartholomew, said because the victim
had done something to Mr. White that crossed him, that he had
to go. And I think that looking at it in the context of everything
that was said, Mr. Bartholomew was aware that he was voting
yes, that the decedent should be killed, even if he was not
completely sure that this wasn’t just one of Mr. White’s head
games.
      “As I noted, later on in his interview Mr. Bartholomew
indicated that he and Murdock agreed to kill the victim, because
the victim had crossed and was trying to hurt Mr. White by this
incident that got him fired.
      “According to Mr. Bartholomew, his best statement was
that the events took one-to-two hours, may have included some of
the things that happened after death. It’s not completely clear
when the decedent stopped breathing. There were more injuries
than the initial knife cut, and it wasn’t clear whether he

                                14
participated in some further cutting with the sharp instrument.
There was no description of, perhaps, the decedent still being
alive, also, while that was going on.
      “Again, the court raised those facts against some other
considerations, which were noted during the testimony by
Inspector Falzon, that William White was, in the Inspector’s
considered opinion based on his long-term training and
experience, [a] psychotic serial murderer who had to summarize
undue influence on Mr. Bartholomew and Mr. Murdock. I’m not
sure he used those words, but it’s tantamount to essentially what
he said.
      “The court[’]s also considering how impressionable Mr.
Bartholomew was, his circumstances being sixteen-and-a-half
years old, were guided by the contains [sic] In re Moore, M-o-o-r-
e, at 68 Cal.App 5th 434, which in the context of felony murder,
aiding—excuse me. Major participant, reckless indifference,
analysis, recently indicated the Moore case than— that it’s
appropriate for the court to weigh the age of a participant,
knowing what we know about young people. And, you know,
their lack of development, their lack of cognition in some of their
decision making. But weighing it all out and applying the
standard, whether or not the People have satisfied the burden
beyond a reasonable doubt, the court does find that Mr.
Bartholomew did act with implied malice. That he acted with the
knowledge of Mr. White’s unlawful intent, and that he did intend
to assist William White toward Mr. White’s unlawful ends.

                                 15
      “The court finds that Mr. Bartholomew knew his conduct
and danger of [sic] the decedent and that Mr. Bartholomew acted
with conscious disregard for that life. [¶] So the motion filed by
Mr. Bartholomew, pursuant to [section 1170.95] is denied, and
that’s the court’s ruling.”
                              DISCUSSION
   1. Legal Background
      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), effective
January 1, 2019, “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile).) Prior to this
amendment, the natural and probable consequences doctrine
constituted an exception to the requirement of either express or
implied malice for a murder conviction. (People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 953 (Vargas).) Now the natural and probable
consequences doctrine can no longer support a murder conviction.
(Ibid.; § 188, subd. (a)(3) [“Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime”].)
      Senate Bill No. 1437 also added what is now section 1172.6,
which permits a person to petition for relief if he or she could no
longer be convicted of murder under the amendments to
sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); Gentile, supra,

                                  16
10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Where the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court proceeds to an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) The prosecution has the
burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as
amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “If the prosecution
fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any
allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be
vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.” (Ibid.)
      On appeal from denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an
evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s decision for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298.) “Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s
job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all
the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable
doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.)
“We ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding
[the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

                                 17
   2. Validity of Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice Murder
      We first address Bartholomew’s threshold claim that, after
the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, he cannot be convicted of
second degree murder as a direct aider and abettor who acted
with implied malice. Starting with People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713 (Powell), many courts have rejected this
same argument. (See People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
576, 599–600 (Glukhoy); People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
437, 442; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388–392.)
Defendant contends Powell was wrongly decided and is
inconsistent with Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th 830. As set forth
below, we disagree.
      Powell held that aiding and abetting a murder with implied
malice is a valid theory of liability for second degree murder.
(Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 710–714.) In so holding, the
court explained the actus reus and mens rea elements of aiding
and abetting a murder with implied malice. The actus reus
required of the actual perpetrator is the commission of “a life-
endangering act.” (Id. at p. 712.) By “life-endangering act,” the
court meant an act for which the natural and probable
consequences are dangerous to human life and proximately
caused death. (Id. at p. 713, fn. 27.) To be culpable as a direct
aider and abettor of implied malice murder, the accomplice
“must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-
endangering act, not the result of that act.” (Id. at p. 713.) Thus,
the aider and abettor’s actus reus “includes whatever acts
constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.”

                                 18
(Ibid.) “The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the
direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the [life-endangering] act, intent to aid the
perpetrator in the commission of the [life-endangering] act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.” (Ibid.)
      Powell further recognized that Senate Bill No. 1437 did not
abolish second degree murder liability under this theory,
although it did so under a natural and probable consequences
theory. “That one may intentionally aid a perpetrator in doing an
act when he or she knows the act naturally and probably will
cause death and consciously disregards this probable result was
recognized by our high court in Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th 830. In
distinguishing liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the court in Gentile stated that ‘an aider
and abettor need not personally possess malice, express or
implied, to be convicted of second degree murder under a natural
and probable consequences theory.’ [Citation.] This language
clearly suggests an aider and abettor can be liable for implied
malice murder as a theory independent of the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Later in the opinion, after
referencing direct aider and abettor liability for an express malice
murder, the Gentile court went on to note that [‘notwithstanding
. . . [the] elimination of natural and probable consequences
liability for second degree murder,’] ‘an aider and abettor who
does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of
second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct

                                 19
endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard
for life.’ ” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 & fn. 29.)
      We agree with Powell that SB 1437 did not abolish second
degree murder liability under a theory of aiding and abetting
with implied malice. Bartholomew contends that the statement
from Gentile relied on by Powell is merely dicta, but our high
court’s “ ‘dicta generally should be followed, particularly where
the comments reflect the court’s considered reasoning.’ ” (People
v. Tovar (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 750, 759.) Thus, even assuming
our high court’s statement was dicta, we agree with other
appellate courts that “the Gentile court’s observation, in effect,
recognizing the validity of aiding and abetting implied malice
murder, was reflective of ‘considered reasoning,’ and it was
persuasive and should be followed.” (Glukhoy, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.)
      We also reject Bartholomew’s argument that this implied
malice theory “is an invalid work-around of the now prohibited
natural and probable consequences theory of murder.” Again,
courts have rejected similar arguments. (See, e.g., Glukhoy,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 590; People v. Superior Court
(Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 503–504; Powell, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 711–713.) “[U]nder the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the prosecution was not required
to prove the mental state required for implied malice.” (Glukhoy,
at p. 590.) By contrast, as Powell carefully explained, direct
aiding and abetting of an implied malice murder is based on “the
aider and abettor’s own mens rea.” (Powell, at pp. 712–713.)

                                 20
Emphasizing the point, Powell added that the requisite intent
“must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor” and
consists of “knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit
the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.” (Id. at p. 713, italics
omitted.) Powell is entirely consistent with Gentile in basing an
aider and abettor’s murder liability on a higher degree of
culpability (subjective awareness and conscious disregard of the
risk of death) than the now-invalid natural and probable
consequences theory of aiding and abetting murder.
   3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
      Having joined our sister courts in finding that the theory of
aiding and abetting implied malice murder remains viable, the
next question is whether the prosecution proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bartholomew could still be convicted of
implied malice murder as an aider and abettor. As discussed
below, on this issue we conclude that it is appropriate to remand
the case to the trial court to clarify its findings.
      Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a); Vargas, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 953.) Malice may be express or implied.
(§ 188, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) Malice is express when there is
manifested an intent to kill. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1); Vargas, at
p. 953.) “ ‘Malice is implied when a person willfully does an act,
the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to
human life, and the person knowingly acts with conscious

                                   21
disregard for the danger to life that the act poses.’ ” (Ibid.) A
finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the
defendant subjectively appreciated the risk involved and may be
proven by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Superior Court
(Costa) (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.)
      We begin with the actus reus element of implied malice.
(See Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 [accomplice must, by
words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering
act].) Bartholomew concedes that he helped shackle and tape
Gaines, shot him with BBs, and injected him with liquid.3 He
argues, however, that the life-endangering act was White’s
“sudden” and “unexpected” slicing of Gaines’s neck, and that
because there is no dispute that this specific act was, indeed,
sudden and unexpected, no substantial evidence could support a
finding that Bartholomew acted with the intent to aid it. But
this argument conflates the actus reus and mens rea elements of
the offense. Putting aside what Bartholomew knew of White’s
intent, if nothing else, by taping and shackling Gaines,
Bartholomew helped prevent Gaines from escaping and
facilitated White’s killing of him, which satisfies the actus reus
element of the offense.
      We turn, then, to mens rea. As an initial matter, we
disagree with Bartholomew’s argument that he would necessarily

      3 Bartholomew’s brief states that the liquid was water. The
trial court noted that there was “some ambiguity as to who
exactly did the cuffing and shackling,” but that there was
nonetheless some evidence that both Murdock and Bartholomew
“participated” in it.

                                 22
lack the requisite mental state simply because he did not know
the specific means by which White would kill Gaines, or because
the particular moment at which it occurred was unexpected.
Assuming Bartholomew knew that White intended to kill Gaines,
he could have believed he was facilitating that eventual act—
however and whenever it would take place—by following White’s
instructions to silence and restrain the victim. The question is
therefore what Bartholomew knew of White’s intent.
       The trial court identified several facts to support its
conclusion that Bartholomew had the requisite mental state.
First, when White arrived at the tent with Gaines, White told
Bartholomew and Murdock that Gaines had gotten him fired and
that they were going to “take care” of him that night. Second,
Bartholomew knew that White had been violent in the past, not
only because he had raped both Bartholomew and Murdock, but
also because he told them that he had stabbed someone in the
neck over a relatively minor dispute. Third, at White’s request,
Bartholomew brought him his .22-caliber rifle and bullets, heard
White tell Gaines that it would be the gun that kills him, and
saw Gaines initially laugh only to realize that White was serious.
All of this occurred before Bartholomew and Murdock hit Gaines
with sticks at White’s direction, cuffed and shackled him, taped
his mouth, shot him with BBs, and injected him with liquid that
could have been “some type of poison or possibly water.” The
trial court also pointed to two things that occurred just prior to
White slicing Gaines’s neck: White said that Gaines had to

                                 23
perform oral sex on Murdock and Bartholomew “if he wants to
live,” and Bartholomew voted that Gaines should be killed.
      Bartholomew contends that these events do not constitute
substantial evidence that he possessed the mental state for
implied malice. He argues, in effect, that the evidence is not
“solid” because it does not compel the conclusion that he knew
White intended to kill Gaines. For example, he argues that the
phrase “take care of” is ambiguous (particularly where White had
a history of “taking care” of boys by beating and raping them but
not killing them), and that the fact that Gaines ultimately
believed White was not kidding about the gun does not mean
Bartholomew reached the same conclusion. But these arguments
impose too high a standard for substantial evidence review; they
do not establish that the trial court could not reasonably have
drawn from this evidence the inferences that it did.
Bartholomew’s brief also misreads the record when referring to
the statement that Gaines needed to perform oral sex if he
wanted to live, incorrectly characterizing it as a statement “that
White intended to rape the victim, which is what happened” after
the statement was made. In fact, the statement referred to
performing oral sex on Murdock and Bartholomew, and was
made after White had raped Gaines. Presumably the trial court
meant that Bartholomew could infer that Gaines would not live if
he did not do as White instructed, at least assuming that
Bartholomew believed White was serious.
      However, Bartholomew points out that the trial court
apparently credited evidence that Bartholomew believed White

                                24
was playing “head trips.” We repeat the relevant portion of the
court’s ruling: “It seems clear to [sic] Mr. Bartholomew thought
that the—while he thought that Mr. White might have been
kidding or playing head trips, et cetera, that the—ultimately, the
two men, Mr. Murdock and Mr. Bartholomew, said because the
victim had done something to Mr. White that crossed him, that
he had to go. And I think that looking at it in the context of
everything that was said, Mr. Bartholomew was aware that he
was voting yes, that the decedent should be killed, even if he was
not completely sure that this wasn’t just one of Mr. White’s head
games.”
      With respect to the vote itself, the trial court’s finding
appears contrary to its conclusion that Bartholomew possessed
the requisite mental state under a standard that requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. To be convicted as an aider and
abettor under an implied malice theory, the defendant must
“know[] that his or her conduct endangers the life of another” as
well as “act [] with conscious disregard for life.” (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 850, italics added.) A “conscious disregard for
life” requires that “the defendant subjectively appreciated the
risk involved.” (People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998,
1008.) Bartholomew’s “aware[ness] that he was voting yes” is
therefore not sufficient by itself, and if he believed he was voting
yes as part of a “head trip” to terrify Gaines, then it cannot be
said he knew and subjectively appreciated that his conduct
endangered Gaines’s life.

                                 25
      We also do not read the trial court’s statement that
Bartholomew “thought that Mr. White might have been playing
head trips” to refer only to the vote that immediately preceded
the killing. Not only did the court refer in the plural to “head
trips,” but the same evidence the court credited indicated that
Bartholomew held this belief throughout the ordeal until White
“unexpectedly” sliced Gaines’s neck. In his 1984 interview with
Bartholomew, Falzon asked, “You thought he was playing a head
trip at this time, still?” and Bartholomew responded
affirmatively, bringing up the fact that, after White had
Bartholomew and Murdock inject Gaines with what appeared to
be lice killer, White said it was just water. So, Bartholomew said,
“I still thought he was kidding.” Similarly, at the hearing, Falzon
was asked whether Bartholomew thought White was playing
“head games” or “was actually kidding, with regard to this drastic
killing,” and he replied, “Of course these young boys would think
he was kidding. They had never seen anything like this.”
Because the evidence that Bartholomew thought White was
kidding or playing head trips was not limited to the vote, and
because the trial court did not say it was not crediting part of it
(and we discern no apparent basis for such line-drawing), we
cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding was so limited.
      Finally, a conviction cannot be premised on the trial court’s
qualifications that Bartholomew thought White “might have been
kidding or playing head trips,” or “was not completely sure” that
it was not a head game. “[A]n aider and abettor’s mental state
must be at least that required of the direct perpetrator.” (People

                                 26
v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 845.) “What this means here, when the charged offense and
the intended offense—murder or attempted murder—are the
same, i.e., when guilt does not depend on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, is that the aider and abettor
must know and share the murderous intent of the actual
perpetrator.” (McCoy, at p. 1118; see Gentile, at p. 850.) The
uncertainty posited by the trial court, even though qualified,
undermines a conclusion that Bartholomew knew and shared
White’s murderous intent, and would indicate that he had a
mental state “less culpable than that of the actual perpetrator.”
(McCoy, at p. 1118.) Bartholomew’s conviction as an aider and
abettor would not be permissible in that circumstance.
      Based on the record before us, we cannot foreclose the
possibility that the trial court erred by relying on this
uncertainty to conclude that the prosecution carried its burden to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Bartholomew was
guilty as an aider and abettor of implied malice murder. The
court did not explain how it reconciled the evidence it credited of
Bartholomew’s subjective uncertainty about whether White was
playing head games with the evidence from which it inferred that
Bartholomew knew White was serious.4 Under these

      4 While we reject Bartholomew’s argument that evidence
cannot be substantial where it allows for more than one
conclusion, we agree that the evidence the court identified is not
necessarily inconsistent with the possibility that Bartholomew
believed White was playing head games. Moreover, while the
court stated that, later in the interview with police, Bartholomew

                                 27
circumstances, a remand is warranted so that the court can
clarify its findings and evaluate its ruling under the standards
we have articulated.5
   4. Bartholomew’s Youth
      Bartholomew’s final argument is that the trial court failed
to meaningfully consider his youth, and, in particular, the factors
that a court must consider when deciding whether to sentence a
juvenile to life without parole (LWOP) under Miller v. Alabama

“indicated that he and Murdock agreed to kill the victim,” it
appeared to be referring to Bartholomew’s garbled response to
the questions, “Why did [White] say he killed [Gaines]?” “Why did
[White] tell you that he killed [Gaines]?” “Why did he kill
[Gaines]? Why did the three of you kill [Gaines]?” The Attorney
General does not reference this finding in arguing that the trial
court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, and even
assuming we could find the exchange susceptible to the trial
court’s construction, it is not clear that Bartholomew was
describing a before-the-fact agreement to kill Gaines, particularly
in light of the questions to which he was responding.
      5  It may be that Justice Brown, in her dissenting opinion,
has correctly discerned the trial court’s intent, but we do not
consider it unduly burdensome under the circumstances to
remand for clarification. Justice Brown expresses concern that
by doing so we create a perverse incentive for trial judges to
conceal their reasoning, on the assumption that their goal is to
render their decision “bullet-proof” on appeal. We hope not to
create such an incentive, and that the value of giving reasons is
evident enough and important enough to outweigh the burden
associated with this limited remand. We trust that our
colleagues on the trial bench will recognize the importance of
clarity to doing justice and will not engage in “strategic”
withholding—from convicted defendants, and from the public—of
the reasoning behind the profoundly consequential choices that
so often must be made in criminal sentencing.

                                28
(2012) 567 U.S. 460, in violation of the Eighth and Sixth
Amendments.
      Framed as a violation of his rights under the Eighth and
Sixth Amendments, Bartholomew’s claim is unconvincing. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and
encompasses the “foundational principle” that the “imposition of
a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot
proceed as though they were not children. (Miller v. Alabama,
supra, 567 U.S. at p. 474.) Given the constitutional significance
of youth, the United States Supreme Court has derived “a
number of limitations on juvenile sentencing: (1) no individual
may be executed for an offense committed when he or she was a
juvenile [citation]; (2) no juvenile who commits a nonhomicide
offense may be sentenced to LWOP [citation]; and (3) no juvenile
who commits a homicide offense may be automatically sentenced
to LWOP.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 273–274.)
Under Miller, a court deciding whether to sentence a juvenile to
LWOP must consider evidence regarding “ ‘a juvenile offender’s
“chronological age and its hallmark features—among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences” ’ [and] ‘ “the family and home environment that
surrounds [the juvenile]—and from which he cannot usually
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.” ’ ”
(In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1048.)6 But Bartholomew

      6 The sentencing court must also consider the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the
juvenile’s participation in the conduct and the way familial and

                                29
does not show a violation under the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence upon which he relies because the court here was
deciding whether he could be found liable for murder under
current law (hence whether he qualified for the leniency afforded
by section 1172.6), not whether he should receive LWOP. And
Bartholomew forfeited any claim that the court violated his
rights under the Sixth Amendment by failing to provide any
argument, analysis, or support therefor. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1); County of Butte v. Emergency Medical Services
Authority (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1196, fn. 7.)
      Bartholomew’s challenge would have been more aptly
framed as a substantial evidence challenge, given his reliance on
In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 453, which held that
youth is a factor to consider when assessing whether a defendant
acted with reckless disregard for human life under a felony
murder theory. (See also In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450,
470–472 [determining 16-year-old offender acted with a reckless
disregard for human life despite youth]; People v. Ramirez (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 970, 991 [“A juvenile’s immaturity and failure to
appreciate the risks and consequences of his or her actions bear
directly on the question whether the juvenile is subjectively
‘ “aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which

peer pressures may have affected him; whether the juvenile
might have been charged with and convicted of a lesser offense if
not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his
inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a
plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and
the possibility of rehabilitation. (In re Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 1048.)

                                 30
the particular offense is committed” ’ and has ‘consciously
disregard[ed] “the significant risk of death his or her actions
create” ’ ”].)
       Under Moore, youth is a factor that should be considered
along with the other Clark7 factors when assessing whether
substantial evidence supports a determination that a defendant
acted with reckless disregard for human life under a felony
murder theory. (In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.)
There, the defendant participated in a car theft and was present
when a codefendant got out of the car and robbed a couple in a
parking lot. (Id. at p. 440.) After the couple handed over their
valuables, the codefendant, without provocation, shot and killed
one of the victims. (Ibid.) The court held that, even if the
evidence in the case had been sufficient to “support[] a finding of
reckless indifference for an adult, it is not sufficient to establish
that Moore, who was 16 at the time of the shooting, had the
requisite mental state.” (Id. at p. 453.) It reasonably found that
the 16-year-old defendant “lacked ‘ “the experience, perspective,
and judgment” ’ to adequately appreciate the risk of death posed
by his criminal activities.” (Id. at p. 454.)

       7 People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618–623, set out a
nonexhaustive series of considerations relevant to determining
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life under section 190.2, subdivision (d) and 189, subdivision (e),
including use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or
weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to
restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime,
knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and
efforts taken to minimize risks.

                                  31
        Here, the trial court likewise considered Bartholomew’s
youth, referring to young people’s “lack of development, their lack
[of] cognition in some of their decision making.” Bartholomew
argues that the trial court should have expressly considered the
impact on his mental state of youth factors like immaturity,
heedless risk-taking, vulnerability to negative influences and
outside pressures, and children’s limited ability to control their
own environment and extricate themselves from horrific, crime-
producing settings, as well as the facts that Bartholomew was
“under the control of a psychopath,” had only a seventh-grade
education, and had lived on the streets since he was 13 years old.
        While the trial court’s discussion of Bartholomew’s youth
was brief, the brevity of the analysis alone would not furnish a
basis to conclude that the court’s consideration of this issue was
insufficient. But we need not address Bartholomew’s arguments
at length in light of our decision to remand the case so the trial
court can clarify findings that pertain to Bartholomew’s mental
state.8 In so doing, the court may articulate any additional
reasoning it deems appropriate of whether and how
Bartholomew’s youth bears on its determination whether
Bartholomew knew and shared White’s murderous intent, and
subjectively appreciated the risk his actions posed to Gaines’s
life.

       For example, when Falzon explained why he believed
        8

Bartholomew thought White was kidding, he pointed to
Bartholomew’s youth and inexperience.

                                 32
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded
to the trial court with directions to clarify its findings and
reconsider its ruling under the standards set forth in section 3.
(“Sufficiency of the Evidence,” ante at pp. 18–24.)
                                             GOLDMAN, J.

I CONCUR:

STREETER, J.

                                  33
BROWN, Acting P. J., Dissenting
      I join most of the majority’s opinion, but respectfully
dissent to the majority’s view that we should remand for
clarification and reconsideration with respect to the sufficiency of
the evidence issue presented in this appeal. I would affirm the
denial of the Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition because
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bartholomew
was guilty of implied malice murder as an aider and abettor.
      Our standard of review is well settled, but it bears
repeating. On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition
after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s finding
that a defendant is guilty of implied malice murder for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298 (Clements).) “Our job on review is different from the
trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge
must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all
under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid., italics added.)
       “We ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of

      1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                   1
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.”
’ ” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of
fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Nieber
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476.) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
      In conducting our review, we do not resolve credibility
issues or evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Owens (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) The trier of fact may believe or
disbelieve uncontradicted witnesses if there is any rational
ground for doing so. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582 (Schmidt).) “ ‘The trier of fact may
believe and accept a portion of the testimony of a witness and
disbelieve the remainder. On appeal that portion which supports
the judgment must be accepted, not that portion which would
defeat, or tend to defeat, the judgment.’ ” (People v. Thomas
(1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 669, 672; see also People v. Hill (1954)
126 Cal.App.2d 378, 380 [“The judge or jury may accept as true a
portion of the testimony of a witness, and disbelieve the
remainder or have a reasonable doubt as to its correctness”].)
Under substantial evidence review, a trial court, sitting as the
trier of fact, need not expressly specify which portions of evidence
or testimony it believes or disbelieves. (See People v. Cardenas
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 226–227 [all conflicts in evidence and
questions of credibility are resolved in favor of verdict]; Chase v.
Wizmann (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 244, 257 [“[A]bsent an express

                                  2
credibility finding, we must infer the trial court resolved
questions of credibility in a manner that supports its findings and
order”].)
      Here, the court denied Bartholomew’s petition with a brief
minute order: “Petition for resentencing pursuant to P[enal]
C[ode] [section 1172.6] is DENIED.” After citing People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and numerous other cases,
the court used similarly unambiguous words when orally
announcing its decision: “[T]he court does find that Mr.
Bartholomew did act with implied malice. That he acted with the
knowledge of Mr. White’s unlawful intent, and that he did intend
to assist William White toward Mr. White’s unlawful ends. [¶]
The Court finds that Mr. Bartholomew knew his conduct and
danger of [sic]2 the decedent and that Mr. Bartholomew acted
with conscious disregard for that life. [¶] So the motion filed by
Mr. Bartholomew, pursuant to [section 1172.6] is denied, and
that’s the Court’s ruling.”
      In my view, the court’s ruling that Bartholomew was guilty
of implied malice murder was both clear and supported by
substantial evidence. Viewing the life-endangering act as White’s
final attack on Gaines, I agree with the majority that evidence of
the shackling and gagging sufficiently supports the actus reus
element for aiding and abetting implied malice murder, as, I
believe, does Bartholomew’s vote that Gaines should die. I also

      2Here, the court likely said, “Bartholomew knew his
conduct endangered the decedent and that Mr. Bartholomew
acted with conscious disregard for that life.”
                                  3
agree with the majority’s observation that the court recited
“several facts” to support its conclusion that Bartholomew acted
with the requisite mens rea. Those recited facts, including
White’s statements about killing Gaines and Bartholomew’s own
actions, statements, and knowledge of White’s violent nature,
provide substantial evidence in support of the court’s ruling.
Under the applicable standard of review, that should be the end
of our analysis.
      It seems the majority would agree with the conclusion that
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the
section 1172.6 motion, but for concern about the court’s oral
comments with respect to Bartholomew’s statement regarding a
“head trip” or “head trips.” I turn then to these comments, as
they provide no cause for remand.
      The pertinent language is as follows: “Much has been
made, and understandably by both parties, regarding the vote
about whether or not the decedent should live. There’s certainly
arguments both ways that the—it was ambiguous as to whether
it was thumbs up or thumbs down, but I think at some point it’s
not a [sic] much moment. Clearly, there was a discussion later on
whether it was thumbs up or thumbs down. [¶] It seems clear to
[sic] Mr. Bartholomew thought that the—while he thought that
Mr. White might have been kidding or playing head trips, et
cetera, that the—ultimately, the two men, Mr. Murdock and
Mr. Bartholomew, said because the victim had done something to
Mr. White that crossed him, that he had to go. And I think that
looking at it in the context of everything that was said,

                                 4
Mr. Bartholomew was aware that he was voting yes, that the
decedent should be killed, even if he was not completely sure that
this wasn’t just one of Mr. White’s head games. [¶] As I noted,
later on in his interview Mr. Bartholomew indicated that he and
Murdock agreed to kill the victim, because the victim had crossed
and was trying to hurt Mr. White by this incident that got him
fired.” (Italics added.)
      The majority repeatedly assumes that, by these comments,
the trial court “credited” Bartholomew’s statement that he
believed White was playing head trips. The majority then seems
to conduct its own, independent review of the evidence and
concludes that the evidence that Bartholomew thought White
was playing a head game “was not limited to the vote,” (italics
added)—notwithstanding that the trial court’s two comments
about the head trips (or “head games”) were interspersed between
two references to the vote. From there, the majority asserts that
“the evidence the court identified [supporting its conclusion] is
not necessarily inconsistent with the possibility that Bartholomew
believed White was playing head games,” discounting as
“garbled” Bartholomew’s admission that “that’s why we killed
[Gaines], because [White] said [Gaines] hates me, you know, and
tried to hurt me, you know, so [White] said what do you want to
do with him? We [Murdock and Bartholomew] said well he can’t
be here if he wants to hurt you, you know, because he told us that,
you know, to always protect him no matter what.”
      In contrast to the majority, I do not read the court’s
comments about head trips as “crediting” Bartholomew’s

                                 5
statement that he thought White was playing a head trip,
particularly given that the court stated that “even if”
Bartholomew thought White “might have been kidding,” that
“ultimately the two men, Mr. Bartholomew and Mr. Murdock
said because the victim had done something to Mr. White that
crossed him, that he had to go.” (Italics added.) Far from
“crediting” Bartholomew’s statement about “playing a head trip,”
the trial court expressly concluded: “And I think that looking at
it in the context of everything that was said, Mr. Bartholomew
was aware that he was voting yes, that the decedent should be
killed, even if he was not completely sure that this wasn’t just one
of Mr. White’s head games.” (Italics added.) Immediately after
this statement, the court reiterated, “As I noted, later on in his
interview Mr. Bartholomew indicated that he and Murdock
agreed to kill the victim, because the victim had crossed and was
trying to hurt Mr. White by this incident that got him fired.”
(Italics added.) By its use of the phrases “even if,” “looking at it
in the context of everything” and stating its finding that
“ultimately” Bartholomew and Murdock decided the victim “had
to go,” I believe the court was not crediting Bartholomew’s
comments about his belief that White was playing a head trip (or
head trips). Rather, coupled with its repetition of evidence that
Bartholomew had agreed that the victim should be killed, the
court’s comments are more reasonably read as discounting
Bartholomew’s head trip statements and concluding that overall,
in the context of everything Bartholomew knew, saw, heard, and
did, the prosecution had presented proof beyond a reasonable

                                  6
doubt of Bartholomew’s mens rea and concomitant guilt for
implied malice murder, notwithstanding Bartholomew’s
comments about White’s mind games.
         Based on its assumption that the trial court was “crediting”
Bartholomew’s head trip comments, as well as its independent
reading of the 1984 interview to opine that Bartholomew’s
statements were not limited to the vote, the majority finds a need
for remand to “eliminate any doubt about the possibility of error”
and to “foreclose the possibility” of error. The majority thus turns
what it acknowledges as the applicable standard of review—
substantial evidence—on its head. Although it recognizes that
we must examine the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment and that our job on review is merely to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support the trial court’s decision, the majority
disregards the substantial evidence it acknowledges the trial
court identified supporting its ruling and seemingly invents a
new standard for appellate review: Regardless of the clarity of a
trial court’s final ruling and the undisputed existence of
substantial evidence supporting it, a trial court’s explanation on
the way to its ultimate conclusion must “eliminate any doubt
about the possibility of error” and “foreclose the possibility” of
error.
         But we review a trial court’s order, not its oral comments
leading up thereto. (Cf. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450–1451 (Whyte) [“Because we review
the correctness of the order, and not the court's reasons, we will

                                   7
not consider the court’s oral comments or use them to undermine
the order ultimately entered”].) Again, the court’s final
determination could hardly be more clear: “But weighing it all
out and applying the standard, whether or not the People have
satisfied the burden beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court does
find that Mr. Bartholomew did act with implied malice. That he
acted with the knowledge of Mr. White’s unlawful intent, and
that he did intend to assist William White toward Mr. White’s
unlawful ends. [¶] The Court finds that Mr. Bartholomew knew
his conduct and danger of [sic] the decedent and that Mr.
Bartholomew acted with conscious disregard for that life. So the
motion filed by Mr. Bartholomew, pursuant to [section 1172.6] is
denied, and that’s the Court’s ruling.” I therefore disagree that
we need to remand so that the trial court can “clarify its findings”
and “evaluate its ruling under the standards [the majority]
discusse[s].” The majority does not contend that, in announcing
this ruling, the trial court misunderstood the burden of proof
under section 1172.6 or the applicable legal principles under
Powell, nor could it. The trial court’s straightforward order
embodies its determination that Bartholomew is guilty of implied
malice murder, and its final ruling denying the section 1172.6
motion is what we review for substantial evidence. (Clements,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) Because there is substantial
evidence supporting that ruling—as the majority concedes when
it acknowledges that “the trial court identified evidence
supporting its conclusion”—I believe our decision should be a
simple affirmance.

                                 8
      My conclusion is reinforced by the fact that section 1172.6
does not require a trial court to prepare a statement of decision or
a written or oral statement explaining its reasoning following an
evidentiary hearing, nor does it require written or oral findings of
fact. (Contra § 1172.6, subd. (c) [requiring statement of reasons
for denial at prima facie stage].) Under such circumstances, the
court’s oral comments should not be used to undermine its ruling,
including its ultimate factual findings in support thereof, or to
argue that the court did not mean what it said in the order
entered. (Cf. Whyte, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451
[“[R]eviewing the trial court’s oral comments would in effect
require the trial court either to prepare a statement of decision
where none is required or to say nothing during argument to
avoid creating grounds for impeaching the final order. We
decline to place the trial courts in such an untenable position”].)
The majority’s decision to remand for clarification creates a
perverse incentive for trial judges: Trial judges—though
certainly not litigants—will be better off if they simply enter
orders denying all petitions and motions, rather than discussing
the evidence and the reasoning underlying their conclusions.3
      Moreover, the comments the majority uses to reverse do not
manifestly contradict the court’s conclusion that Bartholomew

      3 Indeed, this trial court on remand would render its ruling
bullet-proof by vacating its prior oral ruling and stating no more
than, “The petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 is
denied.” In the event of a third appeal in this matter, the
majority would surely have to agree (again) that there is
substantial evidence in the record to support such a ruling.

                                  9
knew of White’s unlawful intent and that his conduct endangered
Gaines’s life. Contrary to the majority’s assumption, the court
never impliedly or expressly “credited” Bartholomew’s statements
that he thought White was actually playing head games. As
explained previously, considering the court’s final ruling, if
anything, the court’s comments can (and should) reasonably be
read as discounting or expressing doubt as to the credibility of
Bartholomew’s statements about White’s game-playing.4
      Additionally, and contrary to the majority, when referring
to Bartholomew’s uncertainty, I believe the trial court was
discussing only the vote. After addressing at least ten other
pieces of evidence supporting its conclusion that Bartholomew
“act[ed] as an aider and abettor with implied malice,” the court
introduced the topic of “the vote”; discussed the ambiguity as to
“whether it [the voting mechanism] was thumbs up or thumbs
down”; stated that White, Murdock, and Bartholomew clearly

      4  I also believe the majority misinterprets the record when
it finds a “possibility that the trial court erred by relying on this
uncertainty”—meaning Bartholomew’s uncertainty about White’s
intentions—“to conclude that the prosecution carried its burden
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Bartholomew was
guilty as an aider and abettor of implied malice murder.” I
disagree that the trial court relied on Bartholomew’s stated
uncertainty to support its conclusion. Fairly read, the trial
court’s comments indicate that it minimized Bartholomew’s
stated uncertainty and found that such statements, “ultimately”
and “in the context of everything that was said,” did not outweigh
all the other evidence of Bartholomew’s culpability, including, of
course, his statement to Falzon that “he and Murdock agreed to
kill the victim, because the victim had crossed and was trying to
hurt Mr. White.”
                                 10
discussed whether to kill Gaines; found that Bartholomew and
Murdock ultimately said that Gaines “had to go” because he had
crossed White; and concluded that “looking at it in the context of
everything that was said, Mr. Bartholomew was aware that he
was voting yes, that the defendant should be killed, even if he was
not completely sure that this wasn’t just one of Mr. White’s head
games.” (Italics added.) In my view, when the court used the
phrases “looking at it in the context . . .[,]” and “not completely
sure that this wasn’t just one of Mr. White’s head games,” the
court’s references to “it” and “this” are reasonably read to mean
only the vote, not the entire evening. To infer that the trial court
found that Bartholomew was uncertain regarding White’s intent
throughout the night when the court never expressly so found,
and when both the court’s immediately subsequent comments
(that “he and Murdock agreed to kill the victim”) and final ruling
refute such a finding, is contrary to our standard of review.
Furthermore, even if it were appropriate for the majority to make
an independent determination on appeal that the only reasonable
reading of Bartholomew’s 1984 interview is that he believed
White was playing a head game throughout the entire evening,
that new assessment of the evidence could warrant remand only
if (1) the trial court fully credited Bartholomew’s statement,
which it did not; and (2) we disregard all other contrary evidence
supporting the denial of the section 1172.6 motion, including
Bartholomew’s knowledge of White’s repeated statements that
Gaines was going to die and Bartholomew’s above-described
statement in the same 1984 interview, “that’s why we killed

                                  11
[Gaines], because [White] said [Gaines] hates me, you know, and
tried to hurt me, so [White] said what do you want to do with
him? We said well he can’t be here if he wants to hurt you.”
(Italics added.) Faithful adherence to the substantial evidence
standard of review should preclude us from this unprecedented
remand for clarification.
      The majority disagrees that the court’s statement that
Bartholomew “ ‘thought that Mr. White might have been playing
head trips’ [ ] refers only to the vote,” and finds such
disagreement merits reversal. However, their rationale is
unpersuasive. The majority relies first on the appearance of the
plural term “head trips,” versus “head trip” in the reporter’s
transcript. But there are at least seven typographical errors in
this transcript, as can readily be seen in this opinion’s recital of
the court’s comments. The presence of “head trips” in a reporter’s
transcript replete with typographical errors is not a convincing
ground for reversal, especially considering the context in which
the phrase appears and the court’s ultimate order. While
discerning meaning from the use of a plural may be appropriate
when conducting de novo review of a legislative enactment, it is a
thin reed on which to divine an infirmity in an error-riddled
transcript of a busy trial court’s oral ruling.
      The majority also unpersuasively reasons that the court’s
statement was not limited to the vote because (1) “the same
evidence the court credited” included statements indicating that
Bartholomew held the belief that White was kidding throughout
the ordeal; and (2) the court did not expressly discredit those

                                  12
statements. The evidence the majority refers to as “credited” is
Bartholomew’s 1984 interview, wherein he first said that he did
not think that White was serious following what reasonably can
be inferred to be Bartholomew’s description to Falzon of White
telling Murdock and Bartholomew that, by their vote, they had
just sentenced a man (Gaines) to die. Again, given the ruling, I
do not believe the court “credited” the belief that White was in
fact playing a head trip, and the trial court certainly did not
make an express finding that Bartholomew actually believed that
White was kidding at any point. Furthermore, on substantial
evidence review, the court was not required to expressly state
that it credited some, but not all of a witness’s testimony. (See
People v. Thomas, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d at pp. 672–673.) We
must presume the court’s order is correct and draw all reasonable
inferences in support thereof. (People v. Mays (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 13, 33.) Contrary to our proper appellate role on
substantial evidence review, the majority instead seems to draw
inferences to undermine the trial court’s decision, rather than
indulging all intendments in favor of the ruling’s correctness.
(Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.)
      The majority also fails to adhere to the applicable standard
of review with its apparent determination that the trial court
could not reasonably have concluded Bartholomew thought White
might have been playing a head game solely with respect to the
vote. The majority “discern[s] no apparent basis for such line-
drawing” given Bartholomew’s 1984 interview and Falzon’s
testimony that “of course these young boys would think [White]

                                 13
was kidding.” The trier of fact, however, may believe or
disbelieve uncontradicted testimony where there is any rational
ground for doing so. (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582;
People v. Thomas, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d at p. 672.) Like all
suspects, Bartholomew was indisputably an interested witness
with a motivation to minimize his own culpability, and nothing in
the record suggests that the court believed Bartholomew thought
that White was actually playing a head game throughout. Given
the evidence before the court, including Bartholomew’s
description of White requiring Murdock to watch the killing
because “[t]his is what you decided,” the court could rationally
conclude Bartholomew knew of White’s unlawful intent to take a
life-endangering act, yet harbored some doubt as to whether his
own vote had in fact sealed Gaines’s fate. As for Falzon, his
foundationless, speculative opinion regarding his personal view of
Bartholomew’s mental state is irrelevant to our substantial
evidence review, and the trial court was certainly not required to
adopt his view as its own. Indeed, it is curious that the majority
emphasizes this part of Falzon’s testimony, while at the same
time omitting any mention of his testimony that White told
Bartholomew and Murdock that they had “just sentenced a man
to die.”
       Finally, I would affirm for the additional reason that the
yes-vote to kill Gaines constituted a life-endangering act under
the circumstances. This vote was taken after White, an
extremely violent individual who had bragged of recently
stabbing a man in the throat, voiced his grudge against Gaines,

                                 14
stated they would “take care” of Gaines that evening, and
indicated twice that he would kill Gaines. Gaines initially
laughed upon hearing the first death threat, but “then he seen
[White] was serious and stopped laughing.” Prior to the vote, at
White’s direction, Gaines had been shackled, gagged, beaten, and
tortured, and White had raped him. The natural and probable
consequences of the yes-vote in these circumstances were
dangerous to human life. (Cf. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 299 [defendant’s act of requesting and coordinating assault on
decedent by violent ex-husband who threatened to kill decedent
supported finding of guilt for implied malice murder].)
Substantial evidence shows Bartholomew intentionally engaged
in and assisted the yes-vote, and the trial court did not render a
finding that Bartholomew believed White was playing head
games during this vote or throughout the night. Moreover, even
if the court believed that Bartholomew was not 100 percent
certain that White intended to kill Gaines, the evidence is
nonetheless sufficient to support the inference that Bartholomew
was subjectively aware of the risk to Gaines’s life and consciously
disregarded that risk. (Cf. Clements, at p. 300.) “[I]mplied
malice requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct
that endangers the life of another—no more, and no less.”
(People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 [court erred in
ruling implied malice requires subjective awareness that conduct
had a high probability of resulting in death].)
      At the end of the day, the majority states that it is
remanding for the trial court to re-evaluate its ruling under the

                                 15
“standards [the majority] discusse[s].” But the trial court did not
apply the wrong legal standards. The legal standards discussed
by the majority are the same as those set forth by the trial court,
and no party contends otherwise. Applying those standards, the
court concluded that Bartholomew was ineligible for relief. The
only new “standard” announced by the majority appears to be one
requiring the trial court to convince us that there is not even a
possibility of infirmity in its reasoning, despite the lack of an
express finding establishing any such infirmity. I cannot agree
with this approach to substantial evidence review.
      In sum, the trial court’s conclusion that Bartholomew
committed implied malice murder as an aider and abettor is
supported by the record. On substantial evidence review, we
should not engage in any independent assessment of the record
and the relative credibility of conflicting statements, nor should
we flyspeck the court’s oral reasoning to undermine an
unambiguous final order denying the petition. Because there is
no basis to remand for clarification, I would affirm the denial of
the section 1172.6 petition. Respectfully, I dissent.

                                      BROWN, Acting P. J.

                                 16