Court Opinion

ID: 9707812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:21:52.536515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.208723
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring: I concur in the judgment of the court, and I join the majority opinion. I write separately to add several observations about the partial dissent filed by Justice Harrison and his comments concerning our review of capital cases. In the present case, Justice Harrison contends that we are unable to administer the state’s capital sentencing statute in a just manner. He suggests that legislatures and courts are unconcerned with the fairness and reliability of the capital sentencing system, and he maintains that their “dominant goals” instead are to achieve finality in death penalty cases and to do so expeditiously. 185 Ill. 2d at 227. Justice Harrison asserts that this court specifically is willing to “disregard the law” for the sake of affirming a death sentence (185 Ill. 2d at 227-28), and he concludes that because of our actions in administering the death penalty statute we “will feel ashamed.” 185 Ill. 2d at 228. Justice Harrison himself once remarked, “If the law commands a certain result, that is the result this court should reach. We do not also need to find personal fault with the parties or establish some shortcoming on the part of their attorneys in order to justify our position.” Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 51 (1994) (Harrison, J., dissenting). Contrary to the admonition in Zimmerman, however, Justice Harrison frequently chooses, as he does in this case, to impugn the integrity of other members of the court and to impute improper motives to those with whom he disagrees. Thus, at various times, he has characterized majorities of this court as enemies of labor unions (City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 211-12 (1998) (Harrison, J., dissenting); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 342 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting)), as foes of children (American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 173 Ill. 2d at 337 (Harrison, J., dissenting); Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 393-94 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting); Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 128 (1995) (Harrison, J., dissenting)), as biased against plaintiffs in civil actions (Burrell v. Southern Truss, 176 Ill. 2d 171, 178 (1997) (Harrison, J., dissenting)), and even as vigilantes (People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 60 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting)). Judges often disagree about what result the law requires in a particular case. The existence of these disagreements, and the ability of our legal system to thrive on them, are virtues of the judicial process and of our system of government. The terms of the debate, however, must be framed by civility and respect, and not by suspicion and untruths. When rancor eclipses reason, the quality of the debate is diminished, the bonds of collegiality are strained, and the judicial process is demeaned. We cannot prescribe civility to members of the bar when our own opinions are disfigured by comments as offensive as those we have admonished lawyers for making. See, e.g., Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d at 53-54. We should receive no less from our colleagues than we expect from lawyers who appear in our courts. CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN and JUSTICE McMORROW join in this special concurrence.