Court Opinion

ID: 9474386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:55:56.679071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:15.502653
License: Public Domain

LOGAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I must dissent.
I do not see any significant distinctions between the case before us and Thigpen v. United States Parole Commission, 707 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.1983), and Franklin v. Fenton, 642 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.1980), both of which allowed withdrawal of an issued parole violator warrant. Accord Thompson v. United States Parole Commission, 553 F.Supp. 1027, 1030 (D.D.C.1983).
I would not hesitate to create a split in the circuits if I were convinced that these other courts were interpreting the law incorrectly. I think, however, that Thigpen and Franklin properly interpreted the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act), given the gloss the Supreme Court provided in Moody v. Dag-gett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976). The 1976 Act, particularly at 18 U.S.C. § 4214, grants the United States Parole Commission broad discretion in its handling of parole revocations.
The majority uses the principle of strict statutory construction to conclude that Still’s hearing rights were violated. Still was “retaken,” the majority holds, and under 18 U.S.C. § 4214 a retaking requires a hearing. As the majority correctly notes, no express provision in the parole statutes provides for the withdrawal of a warrant once it has been executed. But similarly there is no express provision in the parole statutes for delay of execution of an issued warrant. Despite this, Moody expressly held that the Parole Commission could issue a warrant against an incarcerated parole violator without executing it promptly and without triggering the right to a hearing. 429 U.S. at 89, 97 S.Ct. at 279. The Parole Commission can instead lodge an issued warrant as a detainer against the parolee, to be executed when the parolee is released from present custody. Id. The Moody Court held that the lack of an express provision in the statute and the general due process hearing rights found earlier for parolees in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), did not require a contrary decision.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Moody cannot reasonably be reconciled with the majority’s holding today. The execution and withdrawal of the violator warrant here seem to me to be the functional equivalent of the issuance without execution that Moody upheld. Still was not removed from the state jail at the time of this warrant’s “execution,” and he remained incarcerated on the state charge at all times thereafter. There is every indication that the Parole Commission’s attempted execution here was simply a bureaucratic mistake. Because we must say that the Commission could have initially issued the warrant and lodged it as a detainer, I believe *855we also must say that the Commission could correct its error by withdrawing the executed warrant and restoring Still to his intended detainer status.
The majority points to various “detriments” that would flow from the delay in Still’s revocation hearing if we allow withdrawal of the executed warrant. But any such detriment is identical to the delay and detriment experienced by a parolee subject to an issued but unexecuted warrant. In Moody the Supreme Court discussed these detriments at length and expressly found that they did not raise any due process or statutory construction problems. See Moody, 429 U.S. at 85-88 & n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 277-79 & n. 9. I do not see how we can now say that these detriments do raise due process and statutory construction problems.
I add that I think it is generally to the parolee’s advantage to permit the Commission to delay the parole revocation hearing, even when the deferral results from withdrawal of an executed warrant. If the Commission were forced to hold an immediate hearing, it surely would order the parolee’s original sentence to begin running again only on release from the confinement portion of the new sentence or on the date of reparóle, and not concurrently. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.47(d)(2) (general policy is to restart only on release from new confinement). The Commission presently can act favorably to the prisoner even while he is being detained on unrelated charges; the statute itself contemplates a review of parole detainers within 180 days of notification to the Commission of placement serving a new sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(b)(1).1
Further, as noted in Thigpen, the flexibility of being able to defer setting the procedural scheme in motion
“serves the salutary policy of allowing a suspected parole violator to clear himself of state charges prior to his revocation hearing, thus avoiding the necessity of his choosing between pleading his right against self-incrimination, making admissions against his interests, or testifying falsely to exculpate himself. It also conforms to the philosophy expressed in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89, 97 S.Ct. 274, 279, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976), that the Commission should be permitted to consider, before its final decision, events occurring after the issuance of the warrant.”
707 F.2d at 976.
In the recent case of Brock v. United Transportation Union, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct 286, 88 L.Ed.2d 2, (1985), the Supreme Court considered the question of the Secretary of Labor’s power to withdraw a citation already issued to an employer for allegedly unsafe working conditions in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. An interested party argued that the Secretary of Labor could not withdraw the citation once it had been issued. In upholding the Secretary’s power to withdraw the citation, the Court stated:
“It is the Secretary, not the Commission, who sets the substantive standards for the work place, and only the Secretary has the authority to determine if a citation should be issued to an employer for unsafe working conditions, 29 U.S.C. § 658. A necessary adjunct of that power is the authority to withdraw a citation and enter into settlement discussions with the employer.”
Id. at 288.
Although Brock does not deal with the power to reissue a withdrawn complaint, the Supreme Court’s comment seems applicable to the instant situation. The Parole Commission has broad discretion to administer the 1976 Act. If it can defer the execution of a warrant that it had issued during the service of a sentence for a separate crime, as Moody expressly holds, it should also be empowered to withdraw an issued warrant, without prejudice to reis-*856suance, even after a purported “execution,” at least in circumstances in which there was no new incarceration because of the execution of that warrant.
Finally, even if I were to agree with the majority that the withdrawal of the warrant violated the 1976 Act, I still would disagree with its holding that Still’s federal sentence recommenced on the day the warrant was executed and was never tolled thereafter. Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.1983), upon which the majority relies for that proposition, did not consider a situation at all like that at issue here. For time spent serving a state sentence in a state institution to count against a parole violator’s original federal sentence, two things are required: (1) a revocation of the federal parole, and (2) a redesignation by the United States Attorney General of the state prison as the one in which the remainder of the original sentence could be served. Hash v. Henderson, 385 F.2d 475, 477 (8th’Cir.1967). Neither step was taken here.
Further, it is settled law that if there has been no prejudice to a petitioner from a failure to hold a hearing within sixty days pursuant to § 4214, the only remedy for that violation is to give the petitioner a parole revocation hearing. See Smith v. United States, 577 F.2d 1025, 1027-29 (5th Cir.1978) (fully discussing remedy problem); accord Hopper v. United States Parole Commission, 702 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir.1983); Carlton v. Keohane, 691 F.2d 992, 993 (11th Cir.1982); Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755, 761-62 (10th Cir.1981).
Here Still has not been prejudiced. As noted, his experience was essentially identical to that of a parolee in state custody against whom an issued violator warrant has been lodged as a detainer. Under Moody this latter circumstance is legal. I therefore see nothing in Still’s circumstance that could be labeled as prejudice from the denial of a prompt parole revocation hearing. The Commission retains the same power to refuse revocation or to consider the time spent in state custody in its eventual revocation decision. Also, here, as in Smith, the Commission’s failure to hold a hearing was not an intentional violation of § 4214. See Smith, 577 F.2d at 1029; see also Carlton, 691 F.2d at 993. As Smith emphasized, an unintentional violation does not warrant the “draconian” remedy the majority here imposes. 577 F.2d at 1028-29.
For the above reasons, I dissent.

. If evidence of mitigation may be lost unless some action is taken promptly, the Commission has the power to conduct an immediate hearing at which the evidence can be preserved. See Moody, 429 U.S. at 88 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 279 n. 9.