Court Opinion

ID: 9831485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:08:18.809037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:35.321180
License: Public Domain

On Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing.
Since the order of dismissal in this cause, the record has been perfected by certiorari, showing that in the trial court it has been made to appear that the omission of Mrs. McClish’s name from the foreclosure judgment was through inadvertence and a mere clerical error.
Upon the merits of the case, it appears that the only ground of reversal is the denial by the trial court of a plea of usury to the notes sued upon. This plea is predicated upon the acceleration clause in a second trust deed securing an installment note given for a part of the interest on the principal notes secured by the first trust *382deed. The trust deed provisions are in all substantial. respects the same as those involved in Walker v. Temple Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 60 S.W.(2d) 826, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, 80 S.W.(2d) 935, in which it was held that the transaction was not tainted with usury.
Other points raised in the appeal are immaterial in view of this holding.
The order of dismissal is set aside, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Order of dismissal set aside; judgment affirmed.