Court Opinion

ID: 9732124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:08:51.627458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:23.596430
License: Public Domain

Knutson, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority opinion. Apparently it is intended to rest this decision on the last statement of our opinion in Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 243 Minn. 58, 79, 66 N. W. (2d) 763, 776, where we said:
*222“If the trial courts abuse their discretion in the border-state cases suggested in the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Dell, relief will no doubt be available upon petition to this court.”
It seems clear to me that, under any fair reading of the opinion in that case, the position of the majority is untenable. All that the statement says, in rather plain language, is that, if there is an abuse of discretion by the trial court, relief may be had here. Whatever else the statement intended to do, surely a construction of it which attempts not only to undermine the entire decision itself but to rewrite the whole doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot be justified on any theory. It may have been unfortunate that it was included at all, but at best it simply is an assurance to those interested that, if trial courts abuse their discretion in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, relief may be had here. That follows even in the absence of such statement, if we properly exercise our appellate function. The statement neither adds to, nor detracts from, the decision itself.
Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens involves the exercise of judicial discretion by the trial court.2 The exercise of discretion requires the trial court to use its judgment based on the facts before it. “Discretion” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (1930) as “Freedom to decide or to act according to one’s own judgment.” In Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 285, 41 N. W. (2d) 438, 442, 16 A. L. R. (2d) 1015, 1021, we said:
“* * * Judicial discretion is the sound choosing by the court, subject to the guidance of the law, between doing or not doing a thing, the doing of which cannot be demanded as an absolute right of the party who asks that it be done.”3
Abuse means improper use or application.4 In order for the trial court to properly exercise its discretion in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, there are a number of factors it must take *223into consideration.5 Probably as good a statement of the principal factors involved as any is that of the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 507, 67 S. Ct. 839, 842, 91 L. ed. 1055, 1062, where the court said:
“The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. * * *
* -* * * •*
“* * * The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, * * *.
“If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,’ 'harass,’ or 'oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his rémedy. * * *
“Factors of .public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the *224country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.”
While it has now been determined that 62 Stat. 937, 28 USCA, § 1404(a), is not a codification of the forum non conveniens rule (Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U. S. 29, 75 S. Ct. 544, 99 L. ed. 789), in that under the Federal statute the cause of action is transferred from one court to another instead of being dismissed as under the forum non conveniens rule, substantially the same factors are involved in an exercise of the court’s discretion in applying one rule or the other. In discussing the factors to be considered, the court said in Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Igoe (7 Cir.) 220 F. (2d) 299, 304, citing in support Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra:
“* * * We give little weight to the claim that plaintiff will be required to hire an Iowa attorney if the transfer is ordered.
“Factors under the statute which demonstrate that a transfer should be made are: convenience of witnesses of both plaintiff and defendant; the ease of access to sources of proof; the availability of compulsory process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; the smaller amount of expense required for willing witnesses; the availability of a view of the premises; the congestion of the District Court calendar in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division ; that no controverted issue of fact depends upon any event that occurred in the Northern District of Illinois; and the burden of a jury trial should not be imposed upon the Northern District of Illinois, an area which has no relation to the litigation.”
Our function on appeal is, or should be, limited to a determination of whether there has been an abuse of discretion. The question for us is not what we would have done had we been sitting as a trial judge. In Webber v. Webber, 157 Minn. 422, 427, 196 N. W. 646, 648, we said:
“* * * We cannot interfere with this award, unless there has been an abuse of discretion which means a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by and clearly against reason and evidence; a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment — one that is *225clearly against the logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application, or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed. 1 C. J. 372.”
In this case the affidavits in support of the motion for a dismissal have set forth that a large number of witnesses who reside in Iowa will be required for the trial and that they cannot be compelled to attend the trial in Minnesota; that the accident occurred on the tracks of the railway company in Iowa and that the witnesses who would be compelled to be brought from Iowa would have to testify as to the condition of defendant’s tracks, the condition of defendant’s train and cars, and matters of that kind. It also alleges the additional expense of bringing the witnesses to Minnesota and that the testimony of medical witnesses would have to be taken by deposition in Iowa, which would be ineffective in presenting the case to a jury. The affidavits show that several courts are available to plaintiff in the State of Iowa and that the case can be tried more expeditiously and with less expense in that state.
The only affidavits in opposition are those of two of the attorneys for plaintiff setting forth nothing which would contradict the allegations in the affidavits of defendant. Based on these affidavits and the knowledge which the court had of the congestion of its own calendar, the court granted defendant’s motion. In its memorandum, among other things, the court said:
“* * * The clerk of the District Court advises that a check of his minutes for the calendar year of 1954 discloses that the time of the District Court in Mower County was taken up for 18 days in the trial of imported F.E.L.A. cases. There are, in addition, still three, possibly four (depending on the outcome of a pending motion), of these cases remaining for trial.
“The District Court calendar is now a heavy one, with purely local cases. Mower County cannot be expected to carry the additional burden arising from this kind of imported litigation.”
The court had reference to 18 trial days. This actually represents almost four weeks of trial work. If the remaining three or four *226cases take the time usually occupied by trial of this type of case, it is safe to say that an additional three weeks’ time will be used up in these trials. This illustrates the situation in only one of our counties near the Iowa border. It is apparent, therefore, that the court, in exercising its discretion, considered a number of factors commonly involved in the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The decision in this case now holds that there was an abuse of discretion for the sole and simple reason that the distance between the place of the accident and the place of trial is only about 112.2 to 142 miles. No weight is given to the trial court’s consideration of convenience or availability of witnesses; the congestion of the calendar in Mower County is ignored; all the factors involved, except only the number of miles of travel, apparently are discarded. The distance between the place of accident and place of trial no doubt is one factor to be considered, although a relatively unimportant one except as it affects the more important consideration of availability of witnesses and expense of trial. It does not and should not be the sole criterion. We might well ask: What would be our decision if this case were commenced in a court in the northern part of our state? Would we then hold that it was far enough so that the court could exercise its discretion? Cases may arise and do arise where it would be inequitable to refuse to entertain jurisdiction even though the case had its origin in a state far removed from our state. Suppose, for instance, a case where a person is injured in Oregon or Washington and is immediately brought here for medical attention. All medical witnesses may be available here and not in the state of origin. Other witnesses likewise may be here. In such a case, it undoubtedly would be an abuse of discretion to refuse to retain jurisdiction. Or cases may arise where there is no forum available in the state of origin because of the running of the statute of limitations or some other reason.6 In such case we should not refuse to entertain jurisdiction regardless of distance.
*227Nor do I believe that arbitrary state boundaries furnish any criterion for the application of the doctrine.7 The same factors are involved in applying the doctrine no matter what state the case comes from. It seems to me that here we are not determining whether there has been an atuse of discretion but, instead, we are substituting our discretion for that of the trial judge.
If it is to be the rule in this state that distance is to be the sole criterion in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it would seem that prudent attorneys engaged in this field of litigation might well be forewarned to start their actions in courts nearest the border of the state from which the case is imported or suffer the risk of having this court hold that they are far enough distant from the origin of the case so that the trial court may refuse to entertain jurisdiction. I do not believe that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be emasculated in that manner. Nor can I see any justification for compelling the county of Mower, or any of our border counties, to assume the burden and expense of trying these cases when there is such a clear showing that the case can be more expeditiously and more inexpensively tried in the state of its origin. A determined effort has been made of late years, by cooperation of the judges and lawyers alike, to clear up our congested court calendars. Much progress has been and is being made. I do not think that anyone desires to deprive litigants of the use of our courts for the trial of cases properly here, but neither do I believe that litigants having cases properly here should be compelled to wait long periods of time before their cases can be tried in order that we accommodate those who wish to clutter up our court calendars with cases that can be tried more equitably in the state where they originated. We might well ask: Why should the State of Minnesota, by furnishing more judges, and the counties, by standing the court and jury expenses, be saddled with these costs in the absence of any showing that the litigants cannot have a fair trial where the case ought to be tried ?
I think that we should approach this case as an appellate court. As such, we should determine whether there has been an abuse of *228discretion. If we are going to substitute our discretion for that of the trial judge, we should say so. If we are going to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we should take into consideration the state of the record as to all factors involved in the exercise of discretion by the trial court. If we do that, it seems to me that it is clear that there has been no abuse of discretion here. I think that the case should be affirmed.

 14 Am. Jur., Courts, § 230; Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A. L. R. 1407.

 Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, §§ 10, 12.

 Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, §§ 12, 13.

 Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380, 402.

See, for instance, In re Estate of Daniel, 208 Minn. 420, 294 N. W. 465.

 See, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 115.