Court Opinion

ID: 9927237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:05:56.325468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:09.436386
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 126,570

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                        In the Interests of C.S. and J.S., Minor Children.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; JOAN M. LOWDON, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed January 26, 2024. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

        Chadler E. Colgan, of Colgan Law Firm, LLC, of Kansas City, for appellant natural mother.

        Ashley Hutton, assistant county attorney, and Todd Thompson, county attorney, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., MALONE and BRUNS, JJ.

        MALONE, J.: C.E.S., also known as C.G., (Mother) appeals the district court's
order terminating her parental rights over her two minor children, C.S. (YOB 2019) and
J.S. (YOB 2016). She also appeals the district court's order denying her post-termination
motion to consider new evidence, make additional findings, and to set aside, in part, the
order terminating her parental rights. For reasons we will explain below, we find the
district court's order terminating Mother's parental rights was supported by clear and
convincing evidence. We also find this court lacks jurisdiction to review the other order
that Mother seeks to appeal. The final appealable order in a child in need of care (CINC)
case is the termination order. Thus, we affirm the district court's judgment terminating
Mother's parental rights and dismiss the second issue Mother raises in this appeal.

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                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In March 2021, the State filed two petitions alleging that C.S. and J.S. were
children in need of care. The petitions stated that the Kansas Department for Children and
Families (DCF) received a report in February 2021 alleging that Mother and Father were
neglecting the children. Latoya Player, a child protection specialist, visited the home of
the children's paternal grandparents where Mother and Father had been residing for the
past two and a half years. The grandparents informed Player that they provided almost all
the care for the children. The grandparents reported that Mother and Father used crack
cocaine and that they had found drug paraphernalia and prescription pills strewn about
the basement where Mother and Father resided. They also reported that Mother and
Father would often leave the children unsupervised.

       DCF workers unsuccessfully tried to contact Mother and Father, both in person
and by telephone. Soon after DCF contacted the family, Mother and Father left without
telling anyone where they were going. According to the grandparents, Mother and Father
briefly returned to their house a couple of times and contacted them a few more times by
phone, usually to ask for money. During these contacts, the parents barely interacted with
the children. When the State filed the petitions, the grandparents did not know where
Mother and Father could be located. They believed Mother and Father were living out of
a truck somewhere in Leavenworth County.

       The district court entered an ex parte order of protective custody and DCF placed
the children with their grandparents. Cornerstones of Care (Cornerstones) was designated
to provide services in the case. The district court held a temporary custody hearing in
April 2021 and found that the children should remain in DCF custody. The court also
appointed counsel to represent each parent. In June 2021, the district court held an
adjudication hearing at which both children were adjudicated to be children in need of
care, and the court continued their out-of-home placement.

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       DCF prepared a case plan for Mother and Father. Under the plan, the parents were
supposed to obtain stable housing and provide verification, obtain stable income and
provide verification, maintain consistent visitation with the children, complete a
parenting education course, complete an initial assessment and follow the
recommendations, complete a mental health assessment and follow the recommendations,
resolve all legal issues, participate in a domestic violence assessment and follow the
recommendations, complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow the
recommendations, and submit negative drug tests.

       Mother completed the initial assessment, but after that she failed to work to
complete the case plan tasks. Father, on the other hand, made substantial progress and
eventually was permitted to have overnight visits with the children. In March 2022, one
year after the CINC petitions were filed, the State moved to terminate Mother's (but not
Father's) parental rights because Mother had failed to participate in the case plan.

       The termination hearing was initially scheduled for June 2022, but the matter was
continued because of a question about whether Mother had received notice of the hearing.
The district court reconvened on July 20, 2022. Mother had been personally served with
notice for the hearing. Mother failed to personally appear at the hearing but was
represented by counsel. The State proffered into evidence all the filings in the case
including the CINC petition and supporting affidavit, all the court reports from
Cornerstones including attachments, the motion for termination of parental rights, and the
original reintegration plan. Mother's attorney did not object to the State's proffer or make
his own, stating that he "had very little, if any, contact with [his] client."

       Based on the proffered evidence, the district court found Mother was unfit on
several statutory grounds and that her unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future. The district court also found that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the

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best interests of the children. The district court later filed a journal entry terminating
Mother's parental rights with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Post-termination proceedings

       Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's decision to
terminate her parental rights, but she did not timely docket her appeal with this court.
Meanwhile, the State kept working toward reintegration with Father. The children were
placed in Father's home in February 2023 as he kept progressing toward reunification.
The record reflects that Mother and Father were married at the time of the termination
hearing and have remained married afterward.

       Mother moved to dismiss her appeal in March 2023. She stated her belief that the
district court's 2021 temporary custody order operated as a "no contact" order which
prevented her from seeing her children without DCF or court approval. She also believed
that her pending appeal was delaying the closure of Father's CINC case. Mother thought
that by dismissing her appeal, Father's CINC case could be closed, and she could visit her
children again at Father's discretion and without needing DCF or court approval. Mother
acknowledged that dismissing her appeal would finalize the termination of her parental
rights, but she also said that she had made significant progress since her parental rights
were terminated and that "she would be able to present substantial evidence as to her
current fitness to be a parent to the minor children and be reunified with them."

       On April 28, 2023, before the district court had a chance to address Mother's
motion to dismiss her appeal, Mother filed a motion asking the court to consider new
evidence, make additional findings, and to set aside, in part, the order terminating her
parental rights. More specifically, she asked the district court to set aside its findings that
her unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future and that termination was in
the best interests of the children. Mother claimed that since the termination hearing, she

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had "significantly altered the course of her life." She claimed she had completed drug
treatment in July 2022 and had tested negative for drugs since then. Mother attached her
negative drug tests, pay stubs, and verification that she completed drug treatment as
exhibits to her motion. Mother suggested two bases on which the district court could set
aside the prior decision. First, she suggested that the new evidence was relevant to the
district court's ongoing statutory duty under K.S.A. 38-2264 to establish permanency for
the children. Second, she suggested that grounds existed under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
260(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(6) to set aside the relevant findings.

       On June 7, 2023, the district court heard arguments on Mother's motion to
consider new evidence, make additional findings, and to set aside, in part, the order
terminating her parental rights. At the time of the hearing, Father was doing well enough
that caseworkers recommended that the children be released from DCF custody. After
hearing arguments of counsel, the district court denied Mother's motion, finding that it
did not have statutory authority to set aside the termination order. The district court
granted Mother's request to proffer into evidence Mother's exhibits that were referred to
by her counsel at the hearing. The district court later filed a journal entry reflecting its
ruling at the June 2023 hearing.

       The district court never ruled on Mother's March 2023 motion to dismiss her
appeal. On June 13, 2023, the State also moved to dismiss Mother's appeal from the
termination order because the appeal had not been timely docketed. Four days before the
scheduled hearing on the State's motion to dismiss, Mother moved this court to docket
her appeal out of time. Mother also filed a second notice of appeal which included the
district court's decision at the June 2023 hearing along with all other adverse decisions.
This court granted Mother leave to docket her appeal out of time.

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     DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN TERMINATING MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS?

       Mother appeals from two district court orders: (1) the July 2022 order terminating
her parental rights, and (2) the June 2023 order denying her motion to consider new
evidence, make additional findings, and to set aside, in part, the termination order. Her
first issue is that the district court erred in terminating her parental rights.

       When a child has been adjudicated to be a child in need of care under the Revised
Kansas Code for Care of Children (Revised Code), K.S.A. 38-2201 et seq., the district
court may terminate parental rights "when the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or condition which renders the
parent unable to care properly for the child and the conduct or condition is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future." K.S.A. 38-2269(a). Upon making a finding of unfitness
of the parent, "the court shall consider whether termination of parental rights as requested
in the petition or motion is in the best interests of the child." K.S.A. 38-2269(g)(1). In
making such a decision, the court shall give primary consideration to the physical,
mental, and emotional needs of the child. K.S.A. 38-2269(g)(1).

       In reviewing the district court's fitness determination, "this court must determine,
after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, whether a rational
fact-finder could have found the ultimate determination to be highly probable, i.e., by
clear and convincing evidence." In re T.H., 60 Kan. App. 2d 536, 547, 494 P.3d 851
(2021). Appellate courts do not "weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of
witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact." 60 Kan. App. 2d at 547. This court reviews
the district court's best interests finding for abuse of discretion. 60 Kan. App. 2d at 555.

       The district court's termination of Mother's parental rights was somewhat unusual
because the court based its decision entirely on proffered evidence, but the court handled
the hearing properly under K.S.A. 38-2248(f). Mother failed to appear at the termination

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hearing although she had been personally served with notice of the hearing. Mother was
represented by counsel at the hearing, so she was not in default. In this situation, K.S.A.
38-2248(f) provides that "the case may proceed by proffer as to the parties not present,
unless they appear by counsel and have instructed counsel to object." The State proffered
into evidence essentially the entire case file including the CINC petition and supporting
affidavit, all the court reports from Cornerstones including attachments, the motion for
termination of parental rights, and the original reintegration plan. Mother's attorney did
not object to the proffer, stating that he "had very little, if any, contact with [his] client."

       Mother makes a conclusory argument that the State's proffer did not rise to the
level of clear and convincing evidence to support termination. Though she reviews the
evidence, she does not explain why she believes it was insufficient. The district court
relied on several statutory factors listed in K.S.A. 38-2269(b) and (c) to support its
finding that Mother was unfit. Specifically, K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(3) ("the use of
intoxicating liquors or narcotic or dangerous drugs of such duration or nature as to render
the parent unable to care for the ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs of the
child"); K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(4) ("physical, mental or emotional . . . neglect . . . of a child");
K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(7) ("failure of reasonable efforts made by appropriate public or
private agencies to rehabilitate the family"); K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(8) ("lack of effort on the
part of the parent to adjust the parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to meet the
needs of the child"); K.S.A. 38-2269(c)(2) ("failure to maintain regular visitation, contact
or communication with the child or with the custodian of the child"); and K.S.A. 38-2269
(c)(3) ("failure to carry out a reasonable plan approved by the court directed toward the
integration of the child into a parental home").

       The State presented clear and convincing evidence to support findings under each
factor. As for Mother's drug use, the State presented evidence from the children's
grandparents that Mother's drug use was impacting her fitness to care for the children.
The basement where Mother and Father were staying with the children was littered with

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torn up Brillo pads used to ingest crack cocaine. Mother was barely caring for the
children, either emotionally or financially, leaving their grandparents to care for them.
During the two and a half years that Mother lived with the grandparents, she cared for the
children less and less. The situation concerned the grandparents so much that they asked
for guardianship of the children a year before the CINC case was filed. Mother presented
no evidence at the termination hearing suggesting that her drug use had changed, and thus
the district court had a sound basis to find that Mother was unfit because her drug use
rendered her unable to care for the children. For similar reasons, the district court's
finding that Mother was unfit because she neglected the children was also sound. Not
only did Mother neglect the children before the CINC case began, but she continued to
neglect them by failing to provide any care after the case was filed. These facts support
the district court's findings under K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(3) and (b)(4).

       After removing the children from Mother's custody, the State presented her with a
case plan to reintegrate with the children. Court reports, prepared by Mother's
caseworkers, demonstrate that the State made reasonable efforts to contact Mother. The
State tried to call, text, and email Mother. Mother's caseworkers also searched for Mother
in several locations that people provided them, but the workers could not find her. There
is no sign that the State made anything less than reasonable efforts to contact Mother, and
there was only so much the State could do for her as she was avoiding contact with her
caseworkers. Mother made no effort to contact her caseworkers or adjust her
circumstances. Additionally, because she did not work with the caseworkers, Mother
failed to carry out the case plan that they prepared for her. Her failure to contact
caseworkers also made her unable to visit her children. These facts support the district
court's findings under K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(7), (b)(8), (c)(2), and (c)(3).

       The district court also found that Mother's unfitness was unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. This holding is supported by clear and convincing evidence. "In
determining whether a parent's conduct or condition is likely to change in the foreseeable

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future, the foreseeable future is to be considered from the child's perspective, not the
parents', as time perception of a child differs from that of an adult." In re S.D., 41 Kan.
App. 2d 780, Syl. ¶ 9, 204 P.3d 1182 (2009). The State's evidence showed that Mother
made no progress toward the reintegration plan in more than one year after the case was
filed. There was no evidence that would suggest that Mother was even willing to change
at the time of the termination hearing. Given that no evidence revealed a change in
Mother's condition, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that her unfitness
was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

       Finally, the district court found that termination of Mother's parental rights would
be in the best interests of the children. Mother claims that the district court described the
evidence supporting the best interests finding as "slim," but that mischaracterizes the
court's statement. What the district court said was that the State's motion for termination
included a conclusory statement that termination was in the best interests of the children.
The district court then looked at the evidence and found that Mother ignored the
reintegration plan. The district court believed that the children deserved permanency and
that Mother had made no effort to provide the necessary stability for her children. Mother
fails to meet her burden on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in finding
that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

       In sum, the State presented clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit
by reason of conduct or condition that rendered her unable to properly care for her
children and the conduct or condition was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
And the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that termination of Mother's
parental rights was in the children's best interests. Based on the evidence proffered at the
termination hearing, the district court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights.

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   DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING MOTHER'S MOTION TO CONSIDER NEW
         EVIDENCE AND TO SET ASIDE, IN PART, THE TERMINATION ORDER?

       The next issue is whether the district court erred in denying Mother's post-
termination motion to consider new evidence, make additional factual findings, and to set
aside, in part, the order terminating her parental rights. Mother argues that there were two
avenues through which the district court could have provided the requested relief. First,
she argues that the district court should have considered the new evidence as part of its
"ongoing statutory requirement to establish permanency for the minor children" under the
Revised Code. Second, she argues that grounds existed under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
260(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(6) to partially set aside the termination order. Mother
acknowledges in her brief that there may be a jurisdiction problem with this court
addressing this issue based on caselaw holding that the order terminating parental rights
is the last appealable order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), but Mother tries to distinguish the
prior caselaw.

       Resolution of this issue requires statutory interpretation and questions of statutory
interpretation are subject to unlimited review. In re T.S., 308 Kan. 306, 309, 419 P.3d
1159 (2018). The existence of jurisdiction is also a question of law subject to unlimited
review. In re N.E., 316 Kan. 391, 402, 516 P.3d 586 (2022).

       We must first address whether this court has jurisdiction to review the district
court's order denying Mother's post-termination motion to consider new evidence, make
additional findings, and to set aside, in part, the termination order. "The right to appeal is
purely statutory, and an appellate court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own
initiative. An appeal must be dismissed if the record shows that the appellate court does
not have jurisdiction." In re A.F., 38 Kan. App. 2d 742, 743, 172 P.3d 63 (2007).

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       The Revised Code contains its own statute on appellate jurisdiction that is more
specific than the statutory framework in the Code of Civil Procedure. K.S.A. 38-2273(a)
provides five categories of appealable orders: "An appeal may be taken by any party or
interested party from any order of temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, finding
of unfitness or termination of parental rights." We must first determine whether the order
from June 2023 hearing which Mother appeals fits within any of these five categories. If
it does not, then this court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of this issue.

       The Kansas Supreme Court performed an exhaustive analysis of K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 38-2273(a) in In re N.A.C., 299 Kan. 1100, 329 P.3d 458 (2014). The court noted
that each of the five categories of appealable orders represents a different phase of a
CINC proceeding. The steps are sequential, "with each step occurring in a specific order
leading toward permanency in the child's placement." 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 5. When one
phase ends, the next begins. The court's holding in In re N.A.C. is abundantly clear: "An
order terminating parental rights is the last appealable order under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-
2273(a)." 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6. The court reasoned that its interpretation of K.S.A.
2012 Supp. 38-2273(a) adheres to sound legislative policy:

               "Appellate review can come at a heavy cost for the young children caught up in
       CINC proceedings. Through its enactment of the Revised Code, the legislature has
       balanced whatever perceived value there may be in letting interested parties struggle back
       and forth among themselves at every stage in post-termination proceedings against the
       child's recognizable need for permanency. [Citation omitted.]" 299 Kan. at 1121.

       The Kansas Legislature has not amended K.S.A. 38-2273(a) since In re N.A.C.
was decided. The Kansas Supreme Court more recently reaffirmed its holding and
analysis in In re N.A.C. in In re N.E., 316 Kan. 391, 413-18, 516 P.3d 586 (2022).

       The order that Mother seeks to appeal was entered after the district court
terminated her parental rights in July 2022. In fact, Mother already had filed a notice of
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appeal from the district court's order terminating her parental rights. Nine months later, in
April 2023, Mother moved the district court to "consider new evidence" and to "make
additional factual findings" concerning the termination of her parental rights. Mother
asked the district court to set aside its findings that her unfitness was unlikely to change
in the foreseeable future and that termination was in the best interests of the children.
Before we can address whether Mother had any authority to file such a motion under the
Revised Code or under the Code of Civil Procedure, we must first decide whether the
district court's order denying the motion is an appealable order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a).
We conclude that it is not. K.S.A. 38-2273(a) does not provide this court with jurisdiction
to consider any orders entered after the order terminating Mother's parental rights.

       Mother suggests that In re N.E. and In re N.A.C. are distinguishable because "the
parties there were relatives or grandparents, not natural mother or father and not an intact
family unit where the parties remained married." But nothing in K.S.A. 38-2273(a)
suggests that the relationship between the parties impacts this court's jurisdiction, so this
argument is unpersuasive. Likewise, the fact that Mother was seeking to modify the
original termination findings does not make the district court's June 2023 ruling a
termination order appealable under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). To find otherwise would
contravene the sound legislative policy in favor of the child's need for permanency and
against allowing parties to struggle back and forth in post-termination proceedings.

       We recognize this is an unusual case. As we have discussed, the record shows that
the children have been reunited with Father. Father and Mother remain married and
presumably live together with the children. So the nuclear family is physically intact with
a peculiar twist: Mother has no legal right or authority to parent C.S. and J.S. That twist,
however anomalous, cannot alter the clear statutory rules limiting appeals under the
Revised Code. We find it commendable if Mother, in fact, has "significantly altered the
course of her life" for her children, and we suggest there may be proceedings under
Chapter 59, Articles 21 or 30, that might reestablish a legal relationship between Mother

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and her children. Also, procedures under Chapter 58, Article 6, may provide a way for
Mother to obtain some of the decision-making powers of a parent. But we find under the
Revised Code that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court's order denying
Mother's post-termination motion to consider new evidence and to set aside, in part, the
termination order. As a result, we dismiss the second issue Mother raises in this appeal.

       Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

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