Court Opinion

ID: 9940503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 17:12:32.856138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:56.303555
License: Public Domain

No. 88              February 14, 2024                  653

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                In the Matter of C. A. C.,
         a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                            v.
                         C. A. C.,
                        Appellant.
              Marion County Circuit Court
                   21CC07313; A177831

  Matthew L. Tracey, Judge pro tempore.
  Submitted December 9, 2022.
    Alexander C. Cambier and Multnomah Defenders, Inc.,
filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  AOYAGI, P. J.
  Reversed.
654                                                        State v. C. A. C.

           AOYAGI, P. J.
        Appellant appeals a judgment of civil commitment.
In January 2022, the trial court ordered that appellant be
committed to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for
a period not to exceed 180 days, as well as prohibited from
purchasing or possessing firearms, based on his being a “per-
son with mental illness.”1 ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C). Specifically,
he was found to be a danger to others as a result of a men-
tal disorder. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). On appeal, appellant
does not contest that he has a mental disorder. However,
he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish a
resulting danger to others. We agree with appellant that
the evidence was insufficient under ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A).
Accordingly, we reverse.
                                   FACTS
          Appellant has not requested de novo review, nor do
we provide it.2 We are therefore “bound by the trial court’s
findings of historical fact that are supported by any evi-
dence in the record,” and we “review the court’s disposi-
tional conclusions, predicated on those findings, for errors
of law.” State v. B. B., 240 Or App 75, 77, 245 P3d 697 (2010).
We state the facts accordingly. Because appellant does not
contest that he has a mental disorder, we describe only
the most pertinent evidence regarding his mental disor-
der and focus our fact summary on the evidence regarding
dangerousness.
         Appellant is a 31-year-old man. He was previously
married to H, with whom he has a seven-year-old daughter,
X. On December 28, 2021, appellant was placed on a physi-
cian’s hold after being taken to a hospital emergency room
for a wellness check. A civil commitment hearing was held on
    1
      Because of collateral consequences, “an appeal from a civil commitment
order does not become moot after the expiration of the commitment period.” State
v. B. A. F., 290 Or App 1, 2, 414 P3d 486 (2018).
    2
      See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (“Upon an appeal in an equitable action or proceeding
other than an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of
parental rights, the Court of Appeals, acting in its sole discretion, may try the
cause anew upon the record or make one or more factual findings anew upon the
record.”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (“The Court of Appeals will exercise its discretion to
try the cause anew on the record or to make one or more factual findings anew on
the record only in exceptional cases.”).
Cite as 330 Or App 653 (2024)                            655

January 3, 2022. During the hearing, as found by the court,
appellant was “respectful and quiet” and “stayed seated,”
although he seemed to be experiencing “some degree of pres-
sure” insofar as the court noticed “sort of intense forms of
eye contact and sort of nods.”
         The first witness was Dr. Wolf, appellant’s attend-
ing physician on the hospital’s psychiatric unit. Wolf opined
that appellant has bipolar affective disorder and was suf-
fering a manic episode. Appellant had been brought to the
emergency room at 2:00 a.m. after calling the police to report
his belief that his daughter had been sexually molested
by someone. Appellant was agitated, grandiose, reported
not sleeping well, and said his neighbors were listening
through the walls and calling him a rapist. Appellant was
in that state when Wolf first met him on December 29, but
appellant had been “calm since then.” Appellant had not
taken any medications at the hospital, because he did not
believe that he had a condition that required medication.
Wolf noted that appellant reported very frequent mari-
juana use, and that marijuana can cause paranoia, which
could explain some paranoia about neighbors, but mari-
juana does not cause mania. Regarding danger to others,
appellant had “not been threatening” to anyone at the hos-
pital or “inappropriate” with anyone on the unit. Appellant
had “absolutely” not endorsed any homicidal ideations, had
not threatened anyone in Wolf’s presence, and had not said
anything in Wolf’s presence that caused Wolf concern for
anyone’s safety.
         The next witness was H. H testified that she and
appellant were married from 2013 to 2021. H is now engaged
to someone else and sees appellant only when transferring
X. When asked about past violence toward her, H testified
that appellant was never physically violent and had never
hit or “touched” her, but that he had blocked her from leav-
ing areas or punched walls directly next her on an unspec-
ified number of occasions. As for violence toward other peo-
ple, H saw a physical altercation between appellant and a
neighbor on a stairwell on October 16, 2021, but she did not
see who started it. In the past, H has seen appellant yell
and flip off people, without provocation, in parking lots or
656                                                          State v. C. A. C.

driving by. On November 5, 2021, appellant told H that “it’s
only a matter of time before I murder you.”3
         On December 8, 2021, H had to pick up X at appel-
lant’s house after the police took appellant to the hospital. H
saw that appellant’s door was dented and covered in writing
in red marker. X was lying in her underwear on a bed made
on the floor. H did not see anything else. On December 30
(four days before the hearing), H filed for a restraining
order, because of the threat on November 5 and the incident
on December 28. H is afraid for herself, and she does not feel
safe leaving X with appellant.
         The next witness was the civil commitment investiga-
tor, de Obaldia, who met with appellant once, on December 29,
2021. He agreed with the bipolar diagnosis. When they
met, appellant was “a bit disorganized in his thought pro-
cess, tangential in his thinking,” and had difficulty staying
on topic. Regarding the incident on December 28, appellant
told de Obaldia that he wiped X’s bottom with sensitive baby
wipes, “[i]t looked different,” and he “didn’t know what to
do,” so he called 9-1-1. When asked for his opinion whether
appellant was a danger to others, de Obaldia stated that he
believed appellant would be dangerous to X, based on reading
the police report (which was not admitted into evidence) and
talking to family members.
       The civil commitment investigator’s report (pre-
pared by de Obaldia) was admitted into evidence in part.4

    3
       There was also evidence that, in a phone call in October 2021, appellant
told H that he was “worried” about her, because she “was dying” and “was going
to die,” so he was “worried” about her. There was no other evidence regarding that
phone call. The state did not rely on that statement in its arguments to the trial
court, the trial court does not appear to have relied on it, and the state does not
rely on it on appeal.
    4
       Appellant made very specific hearsay objections to the investigator’s report.
In ruling on those objections, the trial court clearly ruled that police statements
to hospital staff recounted in the report would not be admitted for any purpose.
The court’s rulings on other challenged portions of the report are less clear,
particularly as to which statements were admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted, under the hearsay exception in OEC 803(4), and which would be con-
sidered only as information on which the investigator relied in forming his opin-
ion on appellant’s diagnosis. As to portions of the report for which the ruling is
unclear, we include statements on which the state relies on appeal, because it is
plausible that they were admitted for their truth and appellant does not contest
the state’s understanding that they were so admitted.
Cite as 330 Or App 653 (2024)                             657

According to the report, appellant told hospital staff on
December 28 that he “inspect[ed]” X’s vagina “because
it appeared to be in distress”; that he “looked at her
vagina”; that he called the police because he “thinks with-
out a doubt that [X] may have been sexually abused on
December 26th” by her mother; that his home is bugged and
people are calling him a rapist; and that he had not slept for
more than 24 hours. The report also indicates that appellant
repeatedly expressed concern about X to hospital staff on
December 28. When de Obaldia interviewed appellant on
December 29, appellant made paranoid statements about
his neighbors bugging him, surveilling him, mimicking him
when he walks to the bathroom, bullying him, and making
“sexualized moans” when he cuddles X while they watch a
movie, as well as describing what happened on December 28
in the manner to which de Obaldia testified.
         Finally, appellant was examined on the record by
the mental health examiner, Dalton. Appellant testified that
he works full time as a computer systems analyst. He uses
marijuana regularly and last used it on December 25, 2021.
He disagrees that he is paranoid about his neighbors and,
rather, feels “bullied” by the neighbors who live below him,
as they use a broom on the ceiling and otherwise react to his
every movement, even during the night, and listen closely to
him in his home. After examining appellant, Dalton opined
to the court that appellant has bipolar affective disorder,
currently manic; that he is dangerous to X and H (without
elaboration); and that he should take psychiatric medica-
tion, which will happen only if he is civilly committed, so he
should be civilly committed.
          Having heard all the evidence, the trial court called
it a “very close case” but decided that the standard for civil
commitment was met. The court found that appellant has
bipolar disorder and, as a result, is a danger to others, spe-
cifically H and X. The court identified the evidence that it
considered most relevant to the danger-to-others finding
as (1) the threat against H on November 5, 2021, albeit an
“older” statement; (2) appellant having inspected X’s genita-
lia on December 28, 2021, based on a well-intentioned but
658                                                          State v. C. A. C.

delusional belief that X had been sexually abused;5 and (3)
appellant’s delusional belief that the neighbors were spying
on him and making moaning sounds. Ultimately, after reit-
erating its finding that appellant had inspected X’s genitalia
on “a delusional basis,” the court explained its danger-to-
others finding:
       “Having not heard a sufficient factual record to suggest
    otherwise [the court] is concerned that there is a realistic
    nonspeculative probability in the near future that you will
    engage in some form of conduct towards either your daugh-
    ter or your wife that will constitute some form of violence
    towards their person, their physical integrity.

        “And so notwithstanding your good intentions, because
    of the delusional contour of your bipolar manic disorder
    that you have not yet come to grips with, this Court is going
    to find that there is a sufficient basis under threat of dan-
    ger to others to civilly commit you.”

                                 ANALYSIS
         ORS 426.130 allows for civil commitment of a
“person with mental illness.” A person with mental illness
includes a person who, because of a mental disorder, is “dan-
gerous to self or others.” ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A); see also State
v. Miller, 198 Or App 153, 161, 107 P3d 683 (2005) (a per-
son may not be civilly committed based solely on having a
mental disorder). The question here is whether the evidence
was sufficient to support a determination that appellant is
a danger to others. We review that question as a matter of
law. State v. C. L., 313 Or App 539, 542, 495 P3d 748 (2021).
         To prove that a person is a danger to others, the
state must establish by clear and convincing evidence “a
factual foundation to predict appellant’s future dangerous-
ness based on his condition at the time of the hearing in the
context of his history.” State v. M. G., 296 Or App 714, 718,
440 P3d 123 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t

    5
      During its extended oral ruling, the trial court referred to appellant having
inspected X’s genitals “on two separate occasions.” No admitted evidence sup-
ports that finding, so we disregard it. See B. B., 240 Or App at 77 (“[W]e are bound
by the trial court’s findings of historical fact that are supported by any evidence
in the record[.]”).
Cite as 330 Or App 653 (2024)                                                659

is appropriate for a court to consider the testimony of men-
tal health experts, the person’s past acts, and the person’s
apparent condition at the time of the hearing.” State v. Lott,
202 Or App 329, 335, 122 P3d 97 (2005), rev den, 340 Or
308 (2006). “[A]ctual future violence” must be “highly likely.”
State v. K. M., 314 Or App 586, 592, 496 P3d 1099 (2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. M. A.,
276 Or App 624, 629, 371 P3d 495 (2016) (“Conclusions
based on conjecture as to whether appellant poses a dan-
ger to others are insufficient.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)). “Although ‘dangerous’ is a common term that,
in ordinary usage, may refer to a broad range of threats,
the type of ‘danger’ necessary to justify an involuntary civil
commitment is a narrow range of serious and highly proba-
ble threats of harm.”6 State v. S. R. J., 281 Or App 741, 749,
386 P3d 99 (2016).
         Appellant contends that the evidence admitted at
his commitment hearing was legally insufficient to establish
that, as a result of his bipolar disorder, appellant is a dan-
ger to others within the meaning of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A).
The state maintains that the evidence was sufficient. Like
the parties, we understand the trial court to have found
appellant to be a danger to H and X specifically, rather
than a general danger to others, so we focus our discussion
accordingly.
        Appellant was married to H for eight years. At
the time of the hearing, they were recently divorced, H
was engaged to someone else, and H saw appellant only at
child exchanges. There is evidence that appellant had been
aggressive toward H at unspecified times in the past, but had
never hit or otherwise “touched” her at such times. Against
that backdrop, on November 5, 2021—approximately two

    6
      In its answering brief, the state asserts that well-intentioned but mis-
guided concerns about due process have led our court to stray too far from the
ordinary meaning of “danger” and that the text, context, and legislative history
of the civil commitment statutes support a less rigorous interpretation of “dan-
ger” than our case law employs. The state does not ask us to overrule existing
precedent as to the meaning of “dangerous to self or others.” Instead, it suggests
that, if we deem this a “close case,” we should rely on those considerations to tip
us toward affirming. Given the analytical path that we take to our disposition, it
is unnecessary in this case to engage in an intensive reevaluation of existing case
law on the “dangerous to self or others” basis for civil commitment.
660                                             State v. C. A. C.

months before the commitment hearing—appellant said to
H that “it’s only a matter of time before I murder you.” The
record is silent as to the circumstances of that statement.
The record is also silent as to any nexus between that threat
(or other past conduct) and appellant’s bipolar disorder.
           It is well established that a person who makes a
threatening statement cannot be civilly committed as a dan-
ger to others unless the threat is accompanied by overt acts
or other circumstances that evince that the person is likely to
commit actual violence in the future and unless the person’s
dangerousness is the result of a mental disorder. Appellant
focuses on the first point, which is dispositive. See, e.g., State
v. J. P., 295 Or App 228, 234, 433 P3d 452 (2018) (“[T]hreats
of violence must be accompanied by an overt act to follow
through with the threat or be made under circumstances
that make actual future violence highly likely.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)); State v. E. D., 264 Or App 71, 74,
331 P3d 1032 (2014) (similar); State v. D. L. W., 244 Or App
401, 405, 260 P3d 691 (2011) (recent threats combined with
past overt violence is generally enough to establish a dan-
ger to others); State v. K. S., 223 Or App 476, 486, 196 P3d
30 (2008) (finding the appellant to be a danger to others,
where he had a history of violent behavior when off medica-
tion, had recently been involved in a physical confrontation,
and had destroyed property at both his parents’ home and
the hospital); State v. Bodell, 120 Or App 548, 551, 853 P2d
841 (1993) (recent threats combined with past threats may
establish a danger to others, if they provide ample evidence
to predict future violence).
         In other words, an empty threat that is not likely to
be carried out, even if disturbing or distressing, is not a basis
for involuntary civil commitment. See, e.g., State v. E. J. J.,
308 Or App 603, 614, 479 P3d 1073 (2021) (“mere verbal
threats of violence made in the past are generally insuffi-
cient” to establish a danger to others (internal quotation
marks omitted)); State v. S. F., 291 Or App 261, 266, 420
P3d 691 (2018) (verbal threats “without some other evidence
that the person would follow through with the threats, even
if alarming, cannot establish a foundation for a finding of
future dangerousness”); State v. L. R., 283 Or App 618, 626,
Cite as 330 Or App 653 (2024)                             661

391 P3d 880 (2017) (the evidence was insufficient for a danger-
to-others finding where the appellant had “made threats of
harm” but there was no evidence that he “had harmed any-
one, attempted to harm anyone, or that any of his broad,
vague threats would or could have been carried out”); State
v. G. A. K., 281 Or App 815, 821, 384 P3d 555 (2016) (“vague
threats, in the absence of any overt act to carry them out,”
were insufficient to establish a danger to others).
         In this case, appellant made a threatening state-
ment to H two months before the commitment hearing, tell-
ing her that “it’s only a matter of time before I murder you.”
Such a statement is obviously inherently alarming. There is
no evidence of an accompanying overt act, however, or other
circumstances evincing that appellant was likely to carry
out that threat or otherwise act violently toward H absent
commitment. The trial court expressed concern that appel-
lant’s delusional belief that H might be sexually abusing X
could increase the risk of his being violent toward H, but that
concern is impermissibly speculative on this record. There
is no evidence that the threat against H in early November
had anything to do with appellant’s concerns about X in late
December, and the only evidence of how appellant dealt with
his concerns about X was his calling 9-1-1 on December 28.
This record does not support the determination that appel-
lant is dangerous to H as a result of his mental disorder
within the meaning of the civil commitment statutes.
         Whether the record is sufficient to establish that
appellant is dangerous to X due to his mental order presents
a more complicated question. As the trial court recognized,
this case involves an unusual fact scenario for which there is
no helpful precedent. It also raises complex questions about
the types of “danger” the legislature intended to capture with
the phrase “dangerous to self or others.” Those questions
have not been explored in existing case law—which focuses
almost entirely on the risk of physical “violence” and physical
injury—and the parties shy away from addressing them in
a way directly connected to the facts of this case. Appellant
focuses on existing case law regarding the need to prove that
“actual future violence” and “physical harm” is highly likely
and argues that standard is not met. In response, the state
662                                                     State v. C. A. C.

leans away from existing case law—including case law rec-
ognizing that the “danger” necessary for civil commitment
“is a narrow range of serious and highly probable threats
of harm,” rather than the “broad range of threats” to which
“danger” may refer in ordinary usage, S. R. J., 281 Or App at
749—and asserts that the ordinary meaning of “danger” is
met. See 330 Or App at 659 n 6 (describing the state’s view of
existing case law).
         Under the circumstances, we decide this case on
the narrowest grounds possible, rather than unnecessarily
addressing complex issues of statutory construction with
far-reaching implications. We begin by addressing a thresh-
old preservation issue raised by the state, then proceed to
the merits, making certain assumptions arguendo for pur-
poses of deciding whether the state proved that appellant is
a “danger” to X within the meaning of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A).
         With respect to preservation, the state argues that,
although appellant generally preserved his claim that the
evidence was legally insufficient to establish a danger to
others within the meaning of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A), he did
not preserve any argument that a danger of “potential psy-
chological harm” would not meet the statutory standard,
and that we should therefore “not address” that argument.
We agree that we should not address whether the state can
meet the standard for involuntary civil commitment by prov-
ing that a person poses a danger of “psychological harm” to
others, but for a different reason—because that issue was
neither argued nor decided in the trial court, and, even on
appeal, the parties’ positions on it are unclear.
        In the trial court, the parties’ arguments focused
more on H, and, as to X, no one mentioned or even alluded
to psychological harm as a consideration. There also was no
evidence offered on that issue. Appellant generally argued
that he could not be committed unless the state proved
that it was highly likely that he would “commit an act of
actual violence in the future,” the state did not dispute that
that was the applicable standard,7 and the trial court ruled
   7
     The parties agreed on the legal standard for commitment but disagreed on
whether it was met and, as mentioned, made more detailed arguments about H
than X, perhaps because the live testimony was more focused on H.
Cite as 330 Or App 653 (2024)                            663

under that standard, finding a danger to others based on a
near-term risk of appellant engaging in “some form of vio-
lence towards [X’s or H’s] person, their physical integrity.”
On appeal, appellant makes one reference to “potential psy-
chological harm” in his brief, noting the lack of any case
law on that issue. In response, the state discusses psycho-
logical harm only in its preservation section, as previously
described. In arguing the merits, the state does not mention
psychological harm, and it is unclear whether the state is
implicitly relying on a danger of psychological harm as rele-
vant to the sufficiency of the evidence for civil commitment.
          Under the circumstances, this is not the appropri-
ate case to decide whether a “danger to self or others” in
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A) encompasses a danger of psychological
harm, and we do not decide that issue. We do, however, make
certain assumptions, in aid of narrowing the issue that we
decide today. First, we assume arguendo that a person who
is likely to commit child sexual abuse as a result of a mental
disorder is a danger to others under ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A).
Second, more generally, we assume arguendo that a person
who is likely to commit a person crime against a child or
adult, as a result of a mental disorder, is a danger to others
under ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). See generally ORS chapter 163
(setting forth offenses against persons).
         With those assumptions in place, we consider
whether the hearing evidence was legally sufficient to estab-
lish that appellant is highly likely to physically harm X due
to his mental disorder, which was the issue presented to and
decided by the trial court.
         On December 28, 2021, appellant “inspected” or
“looked at” his seven-year-old daughter’s vagina, possibly
in connection with wiping her bottom with a diaper wipe,
and called 9-1-1 to report possible sexual abuse. The evi-
dentiary record is silent as to any details of what occurred
beyond those basic facts. The trial court found, and the evi-
dence supports, that appellant’s conduct was the result of a
delusional belief that X had been sexually abused. That is,
appellant was not sexually motivated and therefore, by defi-
nition, did not sexually abuse X. See ORS 163.305(5) (defin-
ing “sexual contact,” as used in the sexual-abuse statutes
664                                          State v. C. A. C.

and other criminal statutes, to mean any touching of sexual
or intimate parts “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
the sexual desire of either party”). There also is no evidence
that appellant committed any other crime against X, such
as unlawful sexual penetration—which may be committed
even without “sexual or injurious intent,” State v. Gilbreath,
310 Or App 724, 728, 489 P3d 144, rev den, 368 Or 637
(2021)—or criminal mistreatment, ORS 163.205(1), which
includes intentionally or knowingly causing physical injury
to a dependent person.
         Appellant argues that a single instance of his “look-
ing at his own daughter’s vagina to see if [she] had been
harmed and then immediately calling 9-1-1 to report the
potential abuse does not provide a sufficient basis to predict
a high likelihood of actual future violence by the appellant.”
On this record, we agree that the record is legally insuffi-
cient to meet the statutory standard. The record is exceed-
ingly thin as to what actually occurred on December 28.
Moreover, the trial court specifically found that appellant
acted out of a delusional belief that his daughter had been
sexually abused, and that finding is binding on appeal
because it is supported by the record. Ultimately, the exist-
ing record does not support the trial court’s finding of a high
likelihood of “violence towards [X’s] person, [her] physical
integrity.”
         Accordingly, on this record, the trial court erred in
civilly committing appellant on the basis that he is a dan-
ger to others as a result of his bipolar disorder. We again
emphasize the very narrow issue that we decide in this case
and, conversely, the issues that we do not decide, including
whether “danger to self or others” in ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A)
encompasses psychological harm. We also emphasize that
the only issue before us is the sufficiency of the evidence
for involuntary civil commitment and that other proceed-
ings—such as custody modification proceedings and juve-
nile dependency proceedings—are subject to entirely differ-
ent legal standards.
        Reversed.