Court Opinion

ID: 9523317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:38:56.862878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:53.186691
License: Public Domain

*147Concurring on Petition for Rehearing
Bowen, J.
I agree with Judge Kelley in his concurring opinion on petition for rehearing in this cause. I concur only in the result in the opinion denying rehearing. In one sentence the opinion denying rehearing decides the matter on the merits in the following words: “Appellees have filed a petition for rehearing in this case, which, in our opinion, does not show error and should be denied.” Thereafter, such opinion asserts in substance that such petition should not be considered because it does not technically comply with the rules. In my opinion I respectfully submit that this is a most unusual anomaly, and an inconsistent determination of the questions presented by the parties to this appeal. The petition is either sufficient or it is not sufficient. Holding the petition to be sufficient in the first instance and denying it on the merits, completely negates any added reasoning hinting that it might have been technically insufficient under Rule 2-22, Rules of the Supreme Court. By all rules of practice and common sense any reference to the technical insufficiency of a petition for rehearing must be treated as pure obiter dieta since the decision flatly and definitely determines the matter on the merits, and a majority of this court determined that this case should be decided on the merits. Furthermore, in my opinion, even to hint that a party should be denied his rights for a consideration of his petition for rehearing on the merits simply because he may have added thereto citations of authority and argument, and to assert that this practice is a violation of Rule 2-22 seems to be an unwarranted and unreasonable paralogism. In fact the rules do not even require that a brief be filed in connection with a petition for rehearing, and to indicate even by dictum that a petition for rehearing, which clearly sets forth the particular cause or errors by reason of which the decision of the court is claimed *148to be erroneous, must not be considered simply because the party filing the same has added some citation of authority and argument, in my humble opinion seems highly specious and technical.
The decisions cited in support of the contention that the petition should not be considered, Reed v. Kalfsbeck et al. (1897), 147 Ind. 148, 157, 46 N. E. 466; The Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company v. Conoyer (1898), 149 Ind. 524, 532, 49 N. E. 452; Goodwin v. Goodwin, Executor (1874), 48 Ind. 584, 596; Terre Haute, Indianapolis and Eastern Traction Company v. Scott (1930), 91 Ind. App. 690, 694, 172 N. E. 659 (Transfer denied), are not applicable in that in each of these cases it was held that the petitions were insufficient because they did not state particular reasons why the decisions were deemed to be erroneous, and the petition itself was held insufficient and not by reason of the fact that it contained citations of authority and argument.
Also, by way of analogy, in considering the application of rules of court, it has been so well-settled as not to admit of argument, by enlightened decisions of the courts of this state that a good faith effort and a substantial compliance with the rules as to the preparation of briefs so that under the rules and with a full consideration thereof, this court is fully able to understand the various points made, is all that is required. Pierce v. Clemens (1943), 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836; Linville v. Chenoweth (1945), 115 Ind. App. 355, 59 N. E. 2d 129; Kist v. Coughlin (1944), 222 Ind. 639, 57 N. E. 2d 199, 57 N. E. 2d 586.
Courts, by reason of human fallibility, should have a constant interest in petitions for rehearing to the end that justice be done to the litigants. Under Rule 2-22 when a petition is filed, as in the instant case, which states concisely the reasons why the decision is thought *149to be erroneous, the matter should be determined on the merits, even though such petition may contain surplus-age in the form of citation of authority and argument, the addition of which is not prohibited by any rule of court. The rule merely states that application for rehearing should be made separate from the briefs. Certainly the surplusage contained in this petition for rehearing, either by the same type of technical reasoning asserted in attempting to hold the petition for rehearing insufficient, or in substance, could not be called a brief under Rule 2-19, Rules of the Supreme Court.
Note. — Reported in 130 N. E. 2d 62.
Rehearing denied 131 N. E. 2d 357.
Transfer denied, Achor C. J., Bobbitt J. dissents.