Court Opinion

ID: 9540567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:17:48.201607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:01.213040
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Presiding Judge.
Earl Daniels, Jr., was charged by accusation with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, but the trial judge denied the motion. Daniels waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a trial before the judge sitting without a jury. The judge found Daniels guilty of the charged offense and sentenced him to serve two years in confinement, followed by eight years on probation. Daniels appeals from his conviction of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute.
1. Daniels contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The contention is without merit.
“In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence most favorably toward upholding the trial court’s findings *264and judgment. We apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts.”1 In the instant case, the pertinent facts are not in dispute.
Construed in favor of the trial court’s judgment, the evidence shows that at 6:05 p.m., on October 17, 2004, a City of Conyers police officer received a telephone call from an anonymous tipster. The caller stated that he had witnessed a drug transaction and that the man who bought the drugs had them in his vehicle. According to the tipster, the buyer and a woman, both of whom were approximately 26 years old, would be traveling east toward South Carolina on Interstate 20 in a navy blue, 2002 to 2004, four-door, sport utility vehicle with 22-inch chrome wheels. The tipster also gave the officer the SUV’s tag number and stated that the vehicle would go through Conyers in approximately 20 to 30 minutes, possibly up to an hour if the driver stopped for some reason.
After speaking with the tipster, the officer ran a computer check of the tag number and confirmed that it was registered to a 2002 General Motors SUV He then went to a location beside the interstate to watch for the vehicle. Precisely at 6:30, a blue SUV with 22-inch chrome wheels passed the officer, heading east on 1-20. The officer followed the vehicle and confirmed that its occupants matched the race and gender of the occupants described by the tipster and that the SUV had the same tag number given by the tipster. The officer then stopped the vehicle.
As he approached the vehicle, the officer smelled strong odors of both raw and burnt marijuana. A short time later, a second officer arrived at the scene with a drug dog, which sniffed the air around the SUV and indicated that there were narcotics in the vehicle. The officers then searched the vehicle and discovered a bag containing 7.75 ounces of marijuana under the driver’s seat.
Daniels argues that the anonymous tip did not justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore evidence of the drugs found during that stop should have been suppressed. We disagree and conclude that the instant case is materially similar to and controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Alabama v. White.2
In White, the police received an anonymous telephone tip that a woman would leave an apartment at a particular time in a brown station wagon with a broken taillight, that she would go to a particular motel, and that she would have cocaine in a brown attaché case.3 Officers went to the apartment building and saw a brown station *265wagon with a broken taillight in the parking lot.4 They saw the woman leave the building with nothing in her hands, get into the station wagon and drive the most direct route toward the motel. Before reaching the motel, they stopped the car.5
The Supreme Court held that the anonymous tip, as corroborated by the officers, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of the car.6 In reaching that holding, the Court noted that the anonymous tip contained a range of details about not only easily obtained facts at the time of the tip, but also about future actions that ordinarily are not easily predicted.7
What was important was the caller’s ability to predict respondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information — a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs. The general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent would shortly leave the building, get in the described car, and drive the most direct route to [the motel]. Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities.8
The anonymous tip in the instant case likewise contained not only facts easily obtained at the time of the tip, such as the make of the vehicle and the physical description of the occupants, but also predicted the future actions of those third parties. As in White, the tipster in the present case knew the precise time and route of travel of the occupants of the described vehicle. The tip came in at 6:05 p.m., the tipster said the particular vehicle would head east on 1-20 through Conyers in approximately 20 to 30 minutes, and the officer then saw that very vehicle heading in that direction on that road 25 minutes later.
The instant case is significantly different from Florida v. J. L.9 In that case, an anonymous caller told police that a young male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.10 Officers went to the bus stop and, based solely on the tip, *266frisked a male who was wearing a plaid shirt.11 The Supreme Court held that the anonymous tip was not sufficiently reliable and did not justify the frisk because it provided no predictive information by which the police could test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.12
Likewise, we recently held in Baker v. State13 that a tip about a purported drug transaction by an informant of unknown reliability was not sufficiently specific and did not provide adequate details predicting future behavior to justify a stop of a vehicle. In that case, the informant gave an imprecise description of the vehicle as either a Jeep or a truck that could be either green or black. The informant also gave an imprecise description of the location for the purported drug transaction as one of two completely different fast-food restaurants, both of which ultimately turned out to be incorrect. And the informant gave an imprecise time-frame for the transaction as taking place “in the near future.” The only piece of the informant’s tip that fit was the physical description of the suspect.
Conversely, the tip in the instant case specifically described the vehicle in question, its occupants and how the tipster knew about the illegal drugs. Moreover, the detailed tip accurately predicted the future behavior of where and when the occupants of the vehicle would be traveling. “In this instance the information provided to and corroborated by the [officer] was very detailed and included information that was not available to the general public, such as the route and time of travel.”14 Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the anonymous tip, which contained predictive information and was corroborated by the officer, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of the car. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
2. Daniels claims there is insufficient evidence that he intended to distribute the marijuana. It is true that mere possession of marijuana, without more, will not support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.15 But additional evidence may prove such intent, including the packaging of the illegal drugs, the possession of a certain amount of money, a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and expert testimony that the amount of the contraband possessed was consistent with the larger amount usually held for sale rather than for personal use.16
*267In this case, the officer who stopped Daniels testified that he has been a police officer for 11 years and has received specialized training in drug offenses, including classes on highway drug interdiction. He further testified that he has patrolled 1-20 on a regular basis; that he personally has made various drug arrests on the interstate, including those involving large quantities of marijuana; that his department has made other arrests for large quantities of drugs on 1-20; and that the portion of 1-20 from Atlanta to South Carolina is known as a drug corridor, with Atlanta being the hub for trafficking. The officer also gave his opinion, based on his law enforcement experience, that the amount of marijuana found in Daniels’ SUV is consistent with an amount used for distribution purposes rather than for personal use.
Although the officer was not formally tendered as an expert witness, the state laid the foundation for his opinion by eliciting the testimony about his experience and training in drug enforcement.17 Moreover, Daniels never objected to the officer’s opinion based on his experience.18 This evidence allowed the trial judge to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Daniels possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute.19

Judgment affirmed.

Blackburn, P. J., Smith, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Miller, JJ., dissent.

 (Citations omitted.) Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga. App. 760 (605 SE2d 400) (2004).

 496 U. S. 325 (110 SC 2412, 110 LE2d 301) (1990).

 Id. at 327.

 Id.

 Id.

 Id. at 332.

 Id.

 Id.

 529 U. S. 266 (120 SC 1375, 146 LE2d 254) (2000).

 Id. at 268.

 Id.

 Id. at 271.

 277 Ga. App. 520 (627 SE2d 145) (2006).

 (Citation omitted.) Edgerton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 786, 788 (516 SE2d 830) (1999).

 Talbot v. State, 261 Ga. App. 12, 13 (1) (581 SE2d 669) (2003).

 Id.

 See Burse v. State, 232 Ga. App. 729, 730 (1) (503 SE2d 638) (1998).

 Id.

 See Talbot, supra; Burse, supra at 730-731.