Court Opinion

ID: 2963884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:50.232347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:32.256997
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          February 14, 1996 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1777

                                DANA BLACKIE, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                               STATE OF MAINE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The opinion of  this court  issued on January  30, 1996,  is
          corrected as follows:

          On  page  3,  line 5,  change  "them"  to "the  holders  of those
          positions."

          On page 18, line 15, change "some level" to "some degree"

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1777

                                DANA BLACKIE, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                               STATE OF MAINE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               John R. Lemieux for appellants.
               _______________
               Peter J. Brann, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Andrew
               ______________                                        ______
          Ketterer,  Attorney  General,  and  Thomas  D. Warren,  Assistant
          ________                            _________________
          Attorney General, were on brief, for appellees.

                              _________________________

                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit   Judge.    In  this   appeal,  several
                    SELYA,  Circuit   Judge.
                            _______________

          probation officers employed by  the State of Maine seek  to evade

          the consequences of  what they  belatedly deem to  be a  Faustian

          bargain.   The  district  court thought  the probation  officers'

          claim took  too much license,  and rejected  it.  See  Blackie v.
                                                            ___  _______

          Maine,  888 F. Supp. 203 (D.  Me. 1995).  The plaintiffs appeal.1
          _____

          We affirm.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    The  subsidiary  facts  are  not  in  serious  dispute.

          Beginning in 1978,  collective bargaining agreements between  the

          State of  Maine and certain  state workers stipulated  that those

          employees whose  positions demanded that  they work  non-standard

          hours, i.e., irregular schedules  exceeding forty hours per week,

          instead  of, say,  regular 9:00-to-5:00  shifts, would  receive a

          sixteen percent premium  over and  above their base  pay (but  no

          overtime compensation).  Probation  officers' jobs satisfied this

          definition  and  therefore  carried  an entitlement  to  the  pay

          premium.

                    In 1985, the United States Supreme Court handed down  a

          resipiscent decision in which  it confessed error, reversed prior

          precedent, and held that the wage and hour provisions of the Fair

          Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.   201-219, applied to state

                              
          ____________________

               1The plaintiffs, appellants here, occupy  positions that are
          variously  classified  as   "Probation  Parole   Officer/Juvenile
          Caseworker"  and  "Probation Parole  Officer  II."   Because  the
          distinction  between  these  positions makes  no  difference  for
          present purposes, we refer to the plaintiffs simply as "probation
          officers."

                                          3

          employers.  See Garcia  v. San Antonio Metro. Transit  Auth., 469
                      ___ ______     _________________________________

          U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985).  Maine promptly evaluated its work force

          to  determine which  state  jobs came  under the  FLSA's overtime

          compensation provisions and which did not.  After concluding that

          many  positions within  the  law enforcement  services bargaining

          unit of  the Maine State  Employees Association (the  Union) were

          FLSA-covered,  the State  negotiated  side  agreements  with  the

          holders  of those positions.   In general, these  pacts eased the

          transition by  confirming the  affected workers'  eligibility for

          overtime  compensation,  increasing  their  base salaries  by  an

          average of four percent, and eliminating the sixteen percent non-

          standard pay  premium.  The  State concluded,  however, that  the

          probation officers fell within an FLSA exemption for professional

          employees,  see 29  U.S.C.    213(a)(1), and  therefore permitted
                      ___

          them  to retain  their  wonted status.   Consequently,  probation

          officers continued to  receive the pay  premium (but no  overtime

          compensation).

                    In negotiations leading to the adoption of a collective

          bargaining  agreement (CBA) to take effect in 1986, the State and

          the Union  locked horns over the  interplay between FLSA-mandated

          overtime  compensation and  the  non-standard pay  premium.   The

          probation officers set  out to secure  guaranteed payment of  the

          premium  for the life of the contract, regardless of their status

          under  the  FLSA.   The State  balked.   Eventually,  the parties

          resolved  the impasse  by agreeing  to the  non-standard workweek

          article reprinted in the appendix.

                                          4

                    Several years passed.   Then, on  December 18, 1992,  a

          cadre of probation officers sued the State seeking the shelter of

          the  FLSA.  One  year and  three days  later, the  district court

          vindicated the probation officers' right to receive time-and-one-

          half overtime compensation under  the federal law.  See  Mills v.
                                                              ___  _____

          Maine, 839  F. Supp. 3, 4-5 (D. Me. 1993).  The State eschewed an
          _____

          appeal.    Instead,  on January  3,  1994,  Nancy Kenniston,  the

          director of Maine's Bureau of Human Resources (BHR), notified all

          probation officers  (including those who had  not participated in

          the Mills litigation) that  they would no longer receive  the pay
              _____

          premium.  The  State reasoned that, under  the terms of the  non-

          standard workweek article, job  classifications had to meet three

          enumerated criteria to qualify  for non-standard status; the lack

          of   FLSA  coverage   constituted  one   such   criterion;  Mills
                                                                      _____

          established  juridically  that  the probation  officers  did  not

          fulfill this criterion, i.e., they did not occupy "[p]ositions in

          a  classification . . . exempt for overtime compensation from the

          FLSA"; and, having lost  their non-standard status, the probation

          officers had also lost their entitlement to the pay premium.

                    The Union countered this reclassification  by proposing

          a  side agreement similar to those entered into between the State

          and certain other bargaining  units nearly a decade earlier.   On

          February  2, 1994, Kenneth  Walo, director  of Maine's  Bureau of

          Employee  Relations,  rejected  this  overture  because  the  CBA

          expressly addressed the linkage  between FLSA coverage status and

          the non-standard pay premium   a circumstance that did not obtain

                                          5

          when the State  negotiated the  earlier pacts    and because  the

          CBA's  "zipper clause" made it  pellucid that the  parties had no

          obligation  to renegotiate  matters  so addressed.2   Stymied  by

          this turn of events, several probation officers sued a phalanx of

          defendants  (collectively,  the  State)  under  the  FLSA's anti-

          retaliation  provision.3   They  charged,  inter  alia, that  the
                                                     _____  ____

          State's decision to eliminate  the pay premium while at  the same

          time  abjuring  a side  agreement  constituted  acts of  reprisal

          provoked by  the probation officers' successful  crusade for FLSA

          overtime pay.  The State denied the allegations.

                    After the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, the

          district court granted the  State's motion.   As to the lost  pay

          premium,  the court concluded that  the bargained language of the

                              
          ____________________

               2The zipper clause states:

                         Each  party agrees  that  it  shall  not
                    attempt  to  compel  negotiations during  the
                    term of this agreement on  matters that could
                    have been raised during the negotiations that
                    preceded  this  agreement, matters  that were
                    raised during the negotiations  that preceded
                    this   agreement,   or   matters   that   are
                    specifically addressed in this agreement.

          Maine's Supreme Judicial Court has given  such clauses full force
          and effect.  See,  e.g., Bureau of Employee Relations  v. AFSCME,
                       ___   ____  ____________________________     ______
          614 A.2d 74, 77 (Me. 1992).

               3The statute provides in part that no employer may

                    discharge or in any other manner discriminate
                    against  any  employee because  such employee
                    has  filed  any  complaint  or  instituted or
                    caused  to be instituted any proceeding under
                    or related to [the FLSA].

          29 U.S.C.   215(a)(3).

                                          6

          CBA, as opposed to any retaliatory animus, compelled the  result.

          See  Blackie, 888 F. Supp. at 207.  As to the State's spurning of
          ___  _______

          a  side  agreement,  the court  held  that  this  rebuff did  not

          constitute  an adverse employment action under the FLSA.  See id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          at 208.  This appeal ensued.

          II.  ANALYSIS
          II.  ANALYSIS

                    The  district court's closely reasoned opinion mortally

          wounds the arguments that the appellants parade before us.  Thus,

          we  affirm   the  judgment   largely  for  the   reasons  already

          articulated, adding only the finishing touches.

                    First:   The appellants labor  to convince us  that the
                    First:
                    _____

          parties'  disagreement  over  the  meaning  of  the  non-standard

          workweek article forestalls the entry of summary judgment.  Their

          labors are both unproductive and unpersuasive.

                    Of course, summary judgment  is appropriate only if the

          record reveals no genuine  issue of material fact and  the movant

          demonstrates an entitlement to judgment as a matter of  law.  See
                                                                        ___

          Fed. R. Civ. P.  56(c); see also McCarthy v.  Northwest Airlines,
                                  ___ ____ ________     ___________________

          Inc.,  56 F.3d  313,  315  (1st  Cir. 1995)  (collecting  cases);
          ____

          National Amusements, Inc.  v. Town  of Dedham, 43  F.3d 731,  735
          _________________________     _______________

          (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  115 S. Ct.  2247 (1995).   Under this
                       _____ ______

          standard,  "a  party  seeking  summary  judgment  [must]  make  a

          preliminary  showing  that  no  genuine issue  of  material  fact

          exists.  Once  the movant  has made this  showing, the  nonmovant

          must  contradict  the  showing  by  pointing  to  specific  facts

          demonstrating  that  there  is,  indeed,  a  trialworthy  issue."

                                          7

          National Amusements,  43 F.3d  at 735.   Nonetheless, genuineness
          ___________________

          and materiality are not infinitely elastic euphemisms that may be

          stretched to fit whatever pererrations catch a litigant's fancy.

                    In the lexicon  of Rule 56, "genuine" connotes that the

          evidence on the  point is  such that a  reasonable jury,  drawing

          favorable inferences,  could resolve the fact in the manner urged

          by the nonmoving party, and "material"  connotes that a contested

          fact has the potential to alter the outcome of the suit under the

          governing   law  if   the   controversy  over   it  is   resolved

          satisfactorily to the nonmovant.  See United States v. One Parcel
                                            ___ _____________    __________

          of Real  Property (Great  Harbor Neck,  New Shoreham,  R.I.), 960
          ____________________________________________________________

          F.2d  200, 204  (1st  Cir. 1992).    The happenstance  that  both

          parties move  simultaneously for brevis disposition  does not, in
                                           ______

          and of  itself,  relax the  taut  line of  inquiry that  Rule  56

          imposes.   "Barring special  circumstances, the nisi  prius court

          must consider each motion  separately, drawing inferences against

          each  movant in  turn."   EEOC v.  Steamship Clerks  Union, Local
                                    ____     ______________________________

          1066, 48 F.3d  594, 603 n.8 (1st Cir.), cert.  denied, 116 S. Ct.
          ____                                    _____  ______

          65  (1995).   Matters  of  law, however,  are  for  the court  to

          resolve.  See  Stauble v. Warrob,  Inc., 977 F.2d  690, 693  (1st
                    ___  _______    _____________

          Cir. 1992).

                    In  this instance,  the appellants  confuse matters  of

          fact with matters of law.  It  is for the court, not the jury, to

          ascertain  whether  the  terms  of an  integrated  agreement  are

          unambiguous, and if so, how  to construe those terms.  See  Allen
                                                                 ___  _____

          v. Adage,  Inc., 967 F.2d  695, 698  (1st Cir. 1992).   "In  this
             ____________

                                          8

          sense, questions about the  meaning of contractual provisions are

          questions of law, and  we review the district court's  answers to

          them de novo."   United States Liab. Ins. Co.  v. Selman, 70 F.3d
                           ____________________________     ______

          684, 687 (1st Cir. 1995).

                    The appellants  try to  bypass these familiar  rules by

          portraying  the non-standard  workweek article as  freighted with

          ambiguity.   But  a contract  is not  ambiguous merely  because a

          party  to it,  often  with a  rearward  glance colored  by  self-

          interest, disputes an interpretation that is logically compelled.

          See FDIC v. Singh, 977  F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1992).   Nor must a
          ___ ____    _____

          contract  "negate every  possible  construction of  its terms  in

          order  to be  unambiguous."   Triple-A  Baseball Club  Assocs. v.
                                        ________________________________

          Northeastern Baseball, Inc.,  832 F.2d 214,  220 (1st Cir.  1987)
          ___________________________

          (quoting Waxler v. Waxler, 458 A.2d 1219, 1224 (Me. 1983)), cert.
                   ______    ______                                   _____

          denied, 485 U.S.  935 (1988).   Rather, a  contract is  ambiguous
          ______

          only when its terms  lend themselves to more than  one reasonable
                                                                 __________

          interpretation.  See  Fashion House,  Inc. v. K  Mart Corp.,  892
                           ___  ____________________    _____________

          F.2d 1076, 1083  (1st Cir.  1989); RCI Northeast  Servs. Div.  v.
                                             __________________________

          Boston  Edison Co., 822 F.2d  199, 202 (1st  Cir. 1987); American
          __________________                                       ________

          Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Kyes, 483 A.2d 337, 340 (Me. 1984).
          _______________________    ____

                    The specific provision at issue here   the non-standard

          workweek  article    most  assuredly is  not  a model  of syntax;

          indeed,  it  appears  to  create a  tautology  in  defining which

          classes of  employees qualify  for the non-standard  pay premium.

          Yet the circle formed by the contract language is virtuous rather

          than vicious,  and does not render the text ambiguous.  Read as a

                                          9

          whole,   the   article   can    sustain   only   one   reasonable

          interpretation.     Section   1   provides   that  the   employee

          classifications listed in  section 3  (e.g., probation  officers)

          must  meet each of three  criteria (exemption from FLSA coverage,

          elongated workweek,  irregular work schedule) to  qualify as non-

          standard positions.   Section  2 merely  makes  explicit what  is

          implicit in  a combined reading of  the other two  sections:  the

          State's power to delete  an employment category from non-standard

          status once it appropriately determines that the employees within

          that category are not exempt from  the FLSA.  The short of it  is

          that,  under the  terms of  the article,  FLSA coverage  and non-

          standard status  are mutually  exclusive.  Accordingly,  the FLSA

          overtime  matrix and  the non-standard  pay premium  are mutually

          exclusive methods of remuneration.

                    The appellants challenge this seemingly straightforward

          construction by training their  sights single-mindedly on section

          3.  Doing enormous violence to context, they suggest that because

          certain   job  classifications  enumerated   in  section   3  are

          designated therein  as "meeting  the above criteria,"  those jobs

          are frozen into  place (and,  thus, entitled to  receive the  pay

          premium)  for the duration of the CBA.  This infrigidated reading

          melts under the most mild scrutiny.

                    It is  hornbook law that an  interpretation which gives

          effect to all  the terms of a contract is  preferable to one that

          harps  on isolated provisions, heedless of context.  See Smart v.
                                                               ___ _____

          Gillette Co.  Long-Term Disability  Plan, 70 F.3d  173, 179  (1st
          ________________________________________

                                          10

          Cir. 1995); Fashion House, 892 F.2d at 1084; Salmon Lake Seed Co.
                      _____________                    ____________________

          v.  Frontier Trust Co.,  153 A. 671,  672 (Me. 1931).   Since the
              __________________

          whole of an integrated  agreement ordinarily should be considered

          in order to  determine the  meaning of any  individual part,  the

          appellants'  Cyclopic reading of section  3   a  reading that not

          only  ignores  but also  flatly contradicts  sections  1 and  2  

          cannot be countenanced.  If the parties intended to guarantee the

          probation  officers  a  pay premium  for  the  life  of the  CBA,

          sections  1 and 2 would  be totally superfluous  (and, indeed, at

          cross-purposes).

                    To sum up, the district court appropriately treated the

          non-standard  workweek article  as  unambiguous, gave  its  terms

          their plain and ordinary meaning, and did not err in interpreting

          it favorably to the State at the summary judgment stage.

                    Second:   The appellants trumpet that  summary judgment
                    Second:
                    ______

          should have entered in  their favor because the  State admittedly

          eliminated the probation officers' pay premium in response to the

          Mills lawsuit.  Because  this ipse dixit relies upon  a contorted
          _____                         ____ _____

          view of the law, we reject it.

                                          A
                                          A

                    The  FLSA's  anti-retaliation  provision  prohibits  an

          employer from penalizing  an employee who seeks to enforce rights

          guaranteed  by the  federal  law.   See  29 U.S.C.     215(a)(3).
                                              ___

          Although the framework for  proving that an employer took  an eye

          for an eye can vary depending upon the evidence available to show

          retaliatory animus, cf. Fields v. Clark Univ., 966 F.2d 49, 51-52
                              ___ ______    ___________

                                          11

          (1st  Cir.  1992)  (elucidating  this  point  in  the  Title  VII

          environment), cert. denied,  113 S. Ct. 976  (1993), the elements
                        _____ ______

          of a retaliation claim remain much the same.  They comprise, at a

          minimum, a showing  that (1) the plaintiff engaged in statutorily

          protected activity, and (2) his employer thereafter subjected him

          to  an adverse  employment action  (3) as  a reprisal  for having

          engaged  in the protected activity.  See Mesnick v. General Elec.
                                               ___ _______    _____________

          Co., 950  F.2d 816, 827 (1st  Cir. 1991), cert. denied,  504 U.S.
          ___                                       _____ ______

          985 (1992);  York v. City of Wichita  Falls, 944 F.2d 236, 239-41
                       ____    ______________________

          (5th Cir.  1991) (York  I); Connell v.  Bank of Boston,  924 F.2d
                            _______   _______     ______________

          1169,  1179  (1st Cir.),  cert.  denied,  501 U.S.  1218  (1991);
                                    _____  ______

          Petitti  v. New Eng. Tel. &  Tel. Co., 909 F.2d  28, 33 (1st Cir.
          _______     _________________________

          1990).  The third  element is of pivotal importance in this case.

          Under  it,  a  plaintiff  must  proffer  evidence  from  which  a

          reasonable factfinder  could infer  that the  employer retaliated

          against him for engaging in the protected activity.  See Mesnick,
                                                               ___ _______

          950 F.2d  at 828.   In other  words, the record  must enable  the

          trier plausibly to find that "a causal connection existed between
                                                                    _______

          the  protected conduct  and  the adverse  action."   Id.  at  827
          ________________________________________________     ___

          (emphasis supplied) (citing Connell, 924 F.2d at 1179).
                                      _______

                    The  appellants  easily   demonstrated  the  first  two

          elements of their prima  facie case; it is uncontested  that they

          engaged  in a protected activity (filing suit under the FLSA) and

          that  the State  subsequently took  an adverse  employment action

          (eliminating the non-standard pay premium).  On the third element

          the appellants made a  much more tenuous showing:   they limned a

                                          12

          close temporal  link   the change in  classification followed hot

          on the heels  of the  Mills decision    and produced evidence  of
                                _____

          statements  by certain officials to the  effect that the district

          court's  order in Mills led to the State's decision to reclassify
                            _____

          the  probation officers  and revoke  their pay  premium.4   As we

          elucidate  below, this  evidence,  taken most  hospitably to  the

          appellants, fails to create  a genuine question of  material fact

          in respect to the third element of their cause of action.

                                          B
                                          B

                    The  fundamental  flaw in  the appellants'  argument is

          that it depends on applying a black-letter legal rule in a purely

          mechanical fashion,  divorced from considerations  of policy  and

          logic.   They  begin, auspiciously  enough, with  the proposition

          that  the  FLSA  prohibits  an employer  from  taking  an adverse

          employment action because an employee participates in a protected

          activity.   They  then observe  that the  State scrapped  the pay

          premium because of the Mills lawsuit.  On this basis, they assert
                                 _____

          that the  State violated the FLSA.  This  is a non sequitur:  one

          plus one does not equal three.

                    The appellants' argument assumes that the FLSA's ban on

          retaliating  against  an  employee  who engages  in  a  protected

          activity is  the functional equivalent of  a straightjacket which
                              
          ____________________

               4The State  contends that  these  statements are  immaterial
          because none of them was attributable to the actual decisionmaker
          (Kenniston).   See, e.g.,  Medina-Munoz v. R.J.  Reynolds Tobacco
                         ___  ____   ____________    ______________________
          Co., 896  F.2d 5, 10  (1st Cir. 1990).   We need not  pursue this
          ___
          point  because even if the statements are probative of the matter
          asserted    an issue  on which we  express no opinion    they are
          insufficient to turn the tide.

                                          13

          restrains  an  employer  from  responding  on  the  basis  of its

          business judgment to  the outcome brought about  by the protected
                                    _______

          activity.   We disagree  with this assumption.   The  FLSA   like

          other anti-retaliation  laws    does not immobilize  employers in

          this manner.   An employer  may reorganize its  affairs and  take

          other necessary  employment actions in order to manage the impact

          of compliance with the outcomes produced  by a protected activity

          so long  as it does so for legitimate reasons and not in reprisal

          for the fact of an employee's participation.  See, e.g.,  York v.
                  ____                                  ___  ____   ____

          City of Wichita  Falls, 48 F.3d 919, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1995) (York
          ______________________                                       ____

          II) (finding no retaliation under the FLSA when city restructured
          __

          compensation  arrangements "to  comply with  Garcia and  the FLSA
                                                       ______

          within   existing  budgetary  constraints");  Adams  v.  City  of
                                                        _____      ________

          McMinnville,  890 F.2d  836, 839  (6th Cir.  1989) (similar).   A
          ___________

          contrary  rule would  mummify  the  status  quo  and  prevent  an

          employer from complying with a court  order in the manner that it

          deems  most compatible with the lawful operation of its business.

          Nothing in the FLSA even remotely suggests this grotesque result.

                    Recognizing  this  abecedarian principle  leads  to the

          following  conclusion.   The anti-retaliation  provision mandates

          that  an employer  must  put to  one  side an  employee's  lawful

          efforts to secure rights assured by the FLSA.  At  the same time,

          the statute does not foreclose  the employer from exercising  its

          business judgment  simply because doing so may affect an employee

          who successfully asserted FLSA-protected rights.

                    The  other  side of  the coin,  of  course, is  that by

                                          14

          engaging  in a  protected activity an  employee does  not acquire

          immunity  from  the  same  risks that  confront  virtually  every

          employee every  day in every work  place.  The FLSA  is neither a

          shield  against  legitimate  employer  actions  nor  a  statutory

          guaranty  of undiluted compensation,  come what  may.   This case

          aptly illustrates  the  point:    applying  the  anti-retaliation

          provision  as  the appellants  ask  would bar  the  employer from

          enforcing  a valid  preagreed contractual  provision specifically

          negotiated  to guard against the  very eventuality    a change in

          the parties' status   that the appellants subsequently labored to

          achieve.  That is not the law.

                                          C
                                          C

                    The appellants' thesis  suffers from another  infirmity

          as well.  The thesis necessarily depends on the existence of some

          evidence  that  the  statutorily protected  activity  (i.e.,  the

          appellants'  instigation  of,  and  participation  in  the  Mills
                                                                      _____

          litigation) furnished the motive driving the State's execution of

          the    adverse   employment   action    (i.e.,   the   shift   in

          classification).  We agree  with the lower court that  the record

          contains no such evidence.

                    The CBA provides in  substance that probation  officers

          will receive the non-standard pay premium as long as they remain,

          among  other  things,  exempt  from  coverage  under  the  FLSA's

          overtime  pay  provisions.    Once  Mills  established  that  the
                                              _____

          probation  officers were not so exempt, the CBA dictated that the

                                          15

          non-standard pay  premium be  eliminated.5  The  State's decision

          to  abolish the  pay  premium applied  equally  to all  probation

          officers,  regardless  of  whether  they  had  joined  the  Mills
                                                                      _____

          plaintiffs.  What is  more, that decision  was  taken in response

          to the  Mills ruling only  in the  sense that the  State believed
                  _____

          itself obligated to follow both the letter and the  spirit of the

          federal court's  decree.  There is simply no basis for a reasoned

          inference that the State's reliance on  the CBA was a pretext for

          retaliation.

                    In  a nutshell,  then,  the State  plainly changed  the

          appellants'  classification  for   a  nondiscriminatory   reason,

          namely,  to implement the terms  of a contract  that required the

          State  to eliminate  the pay  premiums to  match  the recipients'

          status  vis-a-vis the FLSA.   That the State's  action took place

          because  of a  judicial  declaration of  the appellants'  status,

          brought  about by  the appellants'  suit, neither  transforms the

          character of the action nor renders it per se  unlawful under the

          FLSA.   For  aught that appears,  the State would  have taken the

          same action regardless of the presence or absence of  retaliatory

          animus.

                              
          ____________________

               5The appellants argue  that the  letter of the  CBA did  not
          require the BHR to reclassify  their positions merely because the
          federal district court had so ruled.  This amounts to little more
          than  whistling past the graveyard.   Once the  federal court had
          spoken, state  officials were duty  bound to enforce  the State's
          rights under  the terms of the CBA in order to protect the public
          fisc   especially where, as here, the CBA expressly addressed the
          situation.  And, moreover, the appellants had no  possible reason
          to  anticipate that the  State would refrain  from exercising its
          explicitly reserved rights under the CBA.

                                          16

                    Third:   Next, the  appellants bombard the  CBA itself.
                    Third:
                    _____

          They  have lately come to the view  that a contract which permits

          the  State to forgo the non-standard pay premium whenever a court

          determines  that a  class of  employees is  not exempt  from FLSA

          coverage is an abomination, and thus unenforceable.

                    This  barrage is  fired from two  different directions.

          Both volleys land well wide of the mark.

                                          A
                                          A

                    The appellants asseverate that if  the terms of the CBA

          ensure that  a successful  FLSA  suit inevitably  will result  in

          ending the pay  premium, then  the CBA contains  a veiled  threat

          against  pursuing FLSA  rights and  is per  se retaliatory.   The

          asseveration lacks force.

                    The CBA leaves no room to doubt that the State bestowed

          the non-standard pay premium on the probation officers in lieu of

          overtime  compensation.6   It  simply is  not retaliatory  for an

          employer  and an  employee to  agree  to alternative  methods for

          compensating overtime work based  on the latter's coverage status

                              
          ____________________

               6Based  on actions taken by  the Mills court, the appellants
                                                _____
          contend that  the sixteen percent  pay premium comprised  part of
          their  base wage rate.   This contention is  disingenuous.  While
          the  Mills  court  included  the  pay  premium  in  the probation
               _____
          officers' "regular rate of pay," see Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp.
                                           ___ _____    _____
          551, 554 (D. Me. 1994),  it did so solely as part  of calculating
          the  probation  officers' damages  under the  FLSA.   That damage
          computation has no bearing on the contractual question of whether
          the parties intended the  premium to be a surrogate  for overtime
          compensation.

                                          17

          under the  FLSA.7   See, e.g., Walling  v. Belo  Corp., 316  U.S.
                              ___  ____  _______     ___________

          624,  630 (1941)  (holding that  "nothing in  the [FLSA]  bars an

          employer from contracting with his employees to pay them the same

          wages  that they  received previously");  Anderson v.  Bristol, 6
                                                    ________     _______

          F.3d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir. 1993)  (holding that the FLSA "does not

          prohibit  changes in  wage  rates; it  prohibits  the payment  of

          overtime at less  than one  and one-half times  the regular  wage

          rate");  Adams, 890 F.2d at 839 (finding no retaliation when city
                   _____

          altered  employees' compensation  structure  to offset  budgetary

          impact of Garcia decision).
                    ______

                                          B
                                          B

                    The   appellants   also   claim  that   the   either-or

          proposition   contained  in  the  non-standard  workweek  article

          amounts to an  unenforceable waiver  of their FLSA  rights.   See
                                                                        ___

          Barrentine  v. Arkansas-Best  Freight Sys.,  Inc., 450  U.S. 728,
          __________     __________________________________

          745-46 (1981) (holding that employees may not contract away their

          FLSA  rights).  This is an  old whine in a new  bottle.  As Judge

          Hornby observed, see Blackie, 888 F. Supp. at 207, the appellants
                           ___ _______

          enjoyed the full  panoply of rights secured to them  by the FLSA.
                              
          ____________________

               7The appellants bewail the fact that their take-home pay may
          decrease under  the new format.   This herring  is very red.   If
          there  is a decrease, the record contains nothing to suggest that
          it  will  be brought  about by  anything  other than  the State's
          efforts  to  contain  overtime.   Though  the  FLSA  requires  an
          employer to pay a covered employee time-and-one-half for overtime
          work, the employee has no  vested entitlement to such work.   See
                                                                        ___
          Adams, 890 F.2d at  840; see also Joint Explanatory  Statement of
          _____                    ___ ____
          the  Committee of the Conference,  H.R. Conf. Rep.  No. 357, 99th
          Cong., 1st Sess.  8 (1985), reprinted  in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.  651,
                                      _________  __
          670.  In any event,  the pivotal issue here is not the  degree of
          the appellants'  alleged harm,  but whether the  State retaliated
          against them at all.

                                          18

          Indeed,  they  successfully prosecuted  their  action  and, as  a

          consequence, stand to recover substantial damages.8

                    Fourth:  Shifting gears,  the appellants posit that the
                    Fourth:
                    ______

          State's  refusal   to  negotiate  a  side   agreement  with  them

          comparable  to the pacts entered into between the State and other

          law  enforcement   bargaining  units   in  the  wake   of  Garcia
                                                                     ______

          constitutes an unlawful reprisal under the FLSA.  We think not.

                    In  a  retaliation  case,  as in  virtually  any  other

          employment discrimination  case premised on  disparate treatment,

          it is essential  for the plaintiff to show that the employer took

          a materially adverse  employment action against him.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          York I, 944 F.2d at 239-41; Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch.  Dist.,
          ______                      ______    __________________________

          865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1989).  Determining whether an action

          is   materially  adverse  necessarily   requires  a  case-by-case

          inquiry.  See Welsh v. Derwinski, 14 F.3d 85, 86 (1st Cir. 1994);
                    ___ _____    _________

          see also 2  Lex K. Larson,  Employment Discrimination  34.04  (2d
          ___ ____

          ed.  1994).   Moreover,  the inquiry  must  be cast  in objective

          terms.  Work  places are  rarely idyllic retreats,  and the  mere

          fact  that  an employee  is displeased  by  an employer's  act or

          omission does  not elevate that act or omission to the level of a

          materially adverse employment action.

                    Withal, some degree of generalization can be attempted.

          Typically,  the  employer  must  either  (1)  take  something  of
                              
          ____________________

               8The appellants attempt to blunt this thrust by arguing that
          the State will use the  savings from its elimination of the  non-
          standard pay premium  to fund the  damage award.  This  is beside
          the point.    How  the State  chooses  to spend  any  savings  it
          realizes from eliminating the premium is the State's business.

                                          19

          consequence from  the employee,  say, by discharging  or demoting

          her,  reducing  her  salary,  or  divesting  her  of  significant

          responsibilities, see Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 993
                            ___ _____    _____________________________

          F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993); Connell, 924 F.2d at  1179, or (2)
                                         _______

          withhold  from the  employee  an accouterment  of the  employment

          relationship, say, by failing  to follow a customary practice  of

          considering  her  for  promotion  after a  particular  period  of

          service, see, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75-76
                   ___  ____  ______    _______________

          (1984).    Thus,  the  first   employment  action  of  which  the

          appellants complain   altering  the probation officers' status in

          a way that  rendered them ineligible for  the preexisting sixteen

          percent  pay premium    constituted  a materially  adverse taking

          (albeit not an actionable  one because it was not  retaliatory in

          nature).    But  the  second  employment  action   to  which  the

          appellants advert    the State's unwillingness,  in the aftermath

          of Mills, to negotiate a side agreement with them   does not rise
             _____

          to the level of a materially adverse action.  We explain briefly.

                    The  appellants hinge  their claim  on the  notion that

          past practice  created an expectation that, when  the FLSA became

          applicable to a particular position,  the State would negotiate a

          side  agreement.  By refusing to follow this practice, the thesis

          runs,  the State deprived the appellants of their expectancy.  We

          agree that under certain circumstances an employer's inaction can

          operate  to deprive an employee of a privilege of employment that

          an employee had reason  to anticipate he would receive;  in those

          situations, the  deprivation  constitutes an  adverse  employment

                                          20

          action.  See, e.g., Hishon, 467 U.S. at 75-76; Petitti, 909  F.2d
                   ___  ____  ______                     _______

          at 32.  But  trying to fit this case within the  contours of that

          doctrine is like  trying to fit a square peg  snugly into a round

          hole.

                    Here, the presence of the non-standard workweek article

          accomplished  two things:    (1) it  relieved  the State  of  any

          obligation to  dicker in the event  of a change  in the probation

          officers'  FLSA  status;  and   (2)  it  effectively  dashed  any

          realistic  expectation  that the  State  would  negotiate a  side

          agreement in the  event of  a change in  FLSA status  (especially

          since the  CBA's zipper  clause, see  supra note  2, specifically
                                           ___  _____

          relieves  both  parties  of  any  duty  to  renegotiate  contract

          provisions in midstream).  Accordingly, the appellants' professed

          expectancy is only wishful thinking.

                    If this  were not enough, the  historical parallel that

          the appellants  draw is not a  parallel at all.   It conveniently

          ignores  the fact that, when the State negotiated side agreements

          nearly a decade earlier, the  CBA then in effect did  not address

          the interplay of FLSA overtime and the non-standard pay  premium.

          By contrast,  the  contemporaneous  CBA  expressly  defines  this

          relationship  and indicates  the  results that  will flow  from a

          change  in  status.   To put  it  plainly, the  circumstances had

          changed so  dramatically that the appellants  step into quicksand

          once they march under the banner of past practice.

                    To say more would be to knight a monarch.  On the facts

          of this case, the State's decision to abjure a side agreement did

                                          21

          not  constitute  an  adverse   employment  action.    It  follows

          inexorably, as night follows day, that the appellants have failed

          to validate this aspect of their claim.9

          III.  CONCLUSION
          III.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need  go  no  further.     Having  agreed  to   the

          elimination of their pay premium if found to be eligible for FLSA

          overtime compensation,  the appellants have no  right to complain

          that, when they pressed, the State held them to their bargain.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               9We have remarked, time and again, that irony is no stranger
          to the law.   See, e.g., United States v.  LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396,
                        ___  ____  _____________     _______
          1401 n.1  (1st Cir. 1995);  Amanullah v.  Nelson, 811 F.2d  1, 18
                                      _________     ______
          (1st Cir. 1987).  This  case provides yet another example.   When
          the Mills plaintiffs first  sued, the State offered to  discuss a
              _____
          settlement predicated on a side agreement, but the Union's lawyer
          (now counsel for the plaintiffs in this case) turned a deaf ear.

                                          22

                                       APPENDIX
                                       APPENDIX

          [Note:  This provision  is excerpted from the  1986-87 CBA.   The
          parties  represent  that all  subsequent  iterations  of the  CBA
          (including  the 1993-95  version,  which was  in  force when  the
          current  controversy  developed) contain  substantially identical
          language.]

                    C.  Non-Standard Workweek

                         1.  Classifications listed in Section 3 which meet
                         the following criteria shall be designated as non-
                         standard:

                         (a)  Positions in a classification have been
                         determined by the [BHR] to be exempt for overtime
                         compensation from the [FLSA];

                         (b)  Employees are required by working conditions
                         to work a variable workweek in excess of forty
                         (40) hours; and

                         (c)  Employees' workweek are [sic] irregular and
                         work hours cannot be scheduled or determined
                         except by the employee.

                         2.  Employees in a classification which is
                         designated as non-standard shall be compensated at
                         a rate of sixteen percent (16%) above the basic
                         rates in their salary grades, except that any
                         position that is found by the [BHR] not to be
                         exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act for
                         overtime compensation purposes shall not be
                         designated non-standard.

                         3.  The following classes are designated as
                         meeting the above criteria:

                              Forest Ranger IV
                              Game Warden Pilot
                              Marine Patrol Pilot
                              Probation Parole Officer/Juvenile Caseworker
                              Probation Parole Officer II
                              Special Agent Investigator
                              Special Investigator

          State of Maine-Maine State Employees Association Agreement, Law
          Enforcement Services, Art. 10.C. at 13-14 (1986-1987), reprinted
                                                                 _________
          in Blackie, 888 F. Supp. at 205.
          __ _______

                                          23