Court Opinion

ID: 9615595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:38:56.722718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:22.484189
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by Judge Singleton on the sentencing issue. However, I prefer to set out my views separately on that issue.
Bolhouse was sentenced to serve two consecutive nine-year terms following conviction for two unrelated incidents of attempted first-degree sexual assault. A two-year portion of each sentence was suspended. Thus, Bolhouse received a total of eighteen years to serve, with four years suspended. Each of Bolhouse’s offenses was, at the time, a class B felony, punishable by a maximum term of ten years’ imprisonment. Former AS 11.41.410(b); AS 11.31.100(d)(2); former AS 12.55.125(d). Since Bolhouse had never previously been convicted of a crime, he was not subject to presumptive sentencing.
In Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657, 657-58 (Alaska App.1981), we held that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a first felony offender should normally receive a sentence more favorable than the presumptive sentence applicable to a second felony offender for the same class of offense. Under the sentencing statutes applicable to his ease, Bolhouse would have been subject to a presumptive term of four years’ imprisonment for each of his offenses if he had previously been convicted of a felony. AS 12.55.125(d)(1). Thus, under Austin, a sentence of nine years with two years suspended for each offense would be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances — either statutory aggravating factors or circumstances that might have warranted referral of the cases to a three-judge sentencing panel if presumptive sentencing applied.
In imposing sentence, Judge Van Hoom-issen made findings consistent with the existence of one aggravating factor: he found that Bolhouse’s conduct was among the most serious within the definition of the offense. See AS 12.55.155(c)(10). Judge Van Hoomissen based this finding on the manner in which Bolhouse committed his offenses and on the conclusion that Bolhouse’s attempted sexual assaults came close to completed acts of first-degree sexual assault.
I do not believe that Judge Van Hoomissen erred in concluding that Bol-house’s offenses bordered on completed acts of first-degree sexual assault. However, standing alone, this conclusion would not justify imposition of a near-maximum term. Had Bolhouse'actually been convicted of first-degree sexual assault, as a first offender he would have been subject to presumptive terms of six years if he had used a firearm in committing his offenses. Former AS 12.55.125(c)(1). The circumstances of Bolhouse’s offenses, viewed in their entirety, cannot reasonably be characterized as being more aggravated than a case of first-degree sexual assault in which a firearm is used. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the aggravating circumstances relied on by Judge Van Hoomissen in this case ^ould justify imposition of indi*1178vidual sentences exceeding the presumptive terms that would have applied if Bolhouse had actually been convicted of committing first-degree sexual assault while using a firearm.
A similar conclusion is supported by an analysis of Bolhouse's sentences in light of currently applicable law. Recent amendments to the statutes governing sentencing for sexual assault are relevant, since they embody the most recent expression of legislative intent. See Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619, 622 (Alaska App.1981). Certainly, the sentencing provisions in effect at the time of Bolhouse’s offenses govern. However, when sentencing provisions are amended by the legislature, a person who is being sentenced under prior law should normally not receive a greater sentence than that person would receive under the amended law. See Wright v. State, 651 P.2d 846, 849 (Alaska App.1982); Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d at 622.
Attempted first-degree sexual assault is currently a class A felony. AS 11.41.-410(b); AS 11.31.100(d)(1). Where, as in this case, a class A felony other than manslaughter is committed by a first felony offender who does not carry a firearm, use a dangerous instrument or cause serious physical injury, the offense is subject to a presumptive term of five years. AS 12.55.-125(c)(1), (2). Thus, under present law, Bol-house would be subject to a presumptive term of five years for each of his offenses.
Considering Bolhouse’s case in the context of the presumptive sentencing structure applicable at the time of his offenses and under current law, I would conclude that individual sentences exceeding five years of unsuspended imprisonment for each offense would be clearly mistaken.1
Separate consideration must also be given to the totality of Bolhouse’s sentence. Since Bolhouse’s offenses were committed at different times and involved separate conduct and different victims, there is little doubt that consecutive sentencing was permissible. See Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204, 1210 (Alaska 1975). However, the sentencing court could not properly impose consecutive sentences exceeding the maximum or presumptive sentences prescribed for the single most serious count unless the court expressly found that Bolhouse was a dangerous offender and that it was necessary to confine him for the full period of the consecutive sentences in order to protect the public. See Mutschler v. State, 560 P.2d 377, 381 (Alaska 1977); Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856, 862 (Alaska App.1982). In view of Bolhouse’s lack of a prior criminal record, and given the fact that he did not use a dangerous instrument or cause serious physical injury, I do not think the record supports the conclusion that confinement of Bolhouse was necessary for a period greater than the ten-year maximum sentence for a single class B felony. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 18-2.1 (2d ed. 1980); Viveros v. State, 633 P.2d 289, 291 (Alaska App.1981). Furthermore, I believe a total of more than ten years of unsuspended incarceration would be inconsistent with the Chaney sentencing criteria,2 since the record would not justify a conclusion that Bolhouse cannot be rehabilitated or deterred from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.
On the other hand, Bolhouse committed two separate but similar crimes in*1179volving violent, sexual attacks. Each crime resulted in at least some physical injury to the victim and posed a clear threat of serious physical injury. Bolhouse committed the second offense despite the fact that he had nearly been apprehended during commission of the first. There is little in the record to shed light on Bol-house’s precise motivation for committing these crimes, and there is little to indicate that his prospects for rehabilitation are particularly favorable. Given the seriousness of Bolhouse’s offenses and their repetitive and unexplained nature, I believe the record fully supports a finding that Bol-house poses sufficient danger to the public to require his confinement for a period of ten years, the maximum term for a single class B felony.
I would therefore conclude that the sentences imposed by the superior court are excessive, and I would remand for resentencing, with instructions to impose consecutive five-year sentences.3

. A different conclusion might be warranted if Bolhouse had been sentenced concurrently for his offenses. If concurrent sentences had been imposed, it would be appropriate to consider the totality of Bolhouse’s conduct in determining the appropriateness of his sentence. At least in cases to which presumptive sentencing does not directly apply, a sentence that would be excessive for a single offense might be justified if imposed concurrently with sentences for other, separately punishable crimes. See Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199, 202 (Alaska 1971). We have not applied the Waters rationale to cases that are subject to presumptive sentencing. See Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska App.1982), modified on rehearing, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska App. 1983).

. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970).

. I agree with Judge Singleton’s disposition of the peremptory challenge and jury voir dire issues.