Court Opinion

ID: 9925622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 15:08:56.612916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:17.253720
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of:                                      :
AZ Broad Street LLC                             :   No. 1354 C.D. 2021
                                                :
From a Decision of:                             :   Submitted: December 4, 2023
Zoning Board of Adjustment                      :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                     FILED: January 22, 2024
               The City of Philadelphia (the City) appeals from the order entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court), reversing the order
of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which had denied an application for a
use variance filed by AZ Broad Street, LLC (Applicant) in connection with the
development of a vehicle equipment sales facility. After careful review, we deny
Applicant’s application to quash the City’s appeal and reverse.
                                    I. BACKGROUND1
               In 2019, Applicant purchased a 19,053-square foot lot located at the
northeast corner of North Broad Street and Medary Avenue2 in the City of
Philadelphia (Property). The Property is in a CMX-2.5 Commercial Zoning District

       1
          Unless otherwise stated, the recitation of facts is derived from the ZBA decision. See
ZBA Decision, 12/9/20, at 1-9.
        2
          The ZBA decision incorrectly identifies the street name of the intersection on which the
Property is located as “Mediary” Avenue. This Court takes judicial notice that the proper spelling
of the avenue is “Medary.”
but has been used for auto-related uses since 1933,3 including as a gas station and
for new car sales. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 10/6/20, at 9-10; Agreement of
Sale, 5/16/19. The surrounding area includes gas stations, used car lots, auto repair
garages, collision shops, car washes, and tire shops, as well as near and adjacent
residences. See N.T., 10/6/20, at 9, 46-48; N.T., 12/2/20, at 17-18. The Property
currently consists of a “one story dilapidated structure defaced with graffiti and a
parking lot that is filled with nonworking damaged vehicles, old tires and
weeds . . . essentially a junk yard.” See N.T., 10/6/20, at 9.
              On January 22, 2020, Applicant filed a zoning/use registration
application with the Department of Licenses & Inspections (L&I) for the proposed
demolition of the existing structure on the Property and construction of a 6,000
square foot, one-story AutoZone retail building. The proposed use was identified as
“vehicle equipment sales.”4 L&I determined that the proposed use was prohibited
in the CMX-2.5 zoning district and that the proposed side yard did not meet the
Zoning Code’s (Code) minimum 5-foot depth requirement.                      Accordingly, on
February 17, 2020, L&I issued a notice of refusal.
              Applicant timely appealed the denial to the ZBA, which held
evidentiary hearings on October 6, 2020, and December 2, 2020.5 Of note, Applicant
presented expert testimony asserting that it was impracticable to develop the

       3
         Under a prior version of the Code, the Property was zoned C-2. See Philadelphia Zoning
Code § 14-303 (2012). Pursuant to the previous C-2 zoning, sales of automobiles and parts were
a permitted use. See id. In 2005, for example, the ZBA approved the Property for use as an
Advanced Auto Parts store, but the plans were never realized. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.),
10/6/20, at 9. However, in 2013, the Code was significantly amended, and the Property re-zoned
with the current designation. In CMX-2.5 districts, vehicle equipment and supply sales are not a
permitted use. See Philadelphia Zoning Code § 14-402 (2013); see also Table 14-602-2 (2013).
       4
         Applicant also sought a dimensional variance.
       5
         The ZBA also convened on November 10, 2020, but no evidence was taken; the matter
was continued. See N.T., 11/10/20, at 1-4.

                                               2
Property for a permitted use. See N.T., 10/6/20, at 13-27. Further, given the
Property’s history of automotive-related uses, the City Planning Commission did not
object to a variance. See N.T., 12/2/20, at 39. Nevertheless, the office of the local
councilwoman, as well as the registered community organization (RCO) for the
neighborhood, opposed the project.6 See id. at 8-12, 13-14.
                The ZBA denied the appeal, concluding that Applicant had not proven
an unnecessary hardship.             See ZBA Decision, 12/9/20, at 10-13 (specifically
rejecting Applicant’s expert testimony as not credible). Applicant timely appealed
to the trial court, and the City opposed the appeal.7 Following briefing and oral
argument, the trial court issued an order finding that the ZBA had abused its
discretion, reversing the ZBA’s decision, and remanding with instructions to grant
the variance. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/14/22, at 7-10.
                The City timely appealed to this Court.8

        6
          Prior to the hearings, the Oak Lane Community Action Association (OLCAA), which is
the RCO, had supported the application. N.T., 10/6/20, at 28-38.
        7
          Initially, Applicant requested both dimensional and use variances, both of which were
denied. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/14/22, at 5. On appeal to the trial court, Applicant challenged the
denial of the use variance but, based upon a stipulation to revised plans which resolved the need
for a dimensional variance, did not challenge the denial of the dimensional variance. See id. The
dimensional variance is not a subject of this appeal.
        8
          Applicant has filed an application to quash the City’s appeal. See Appl. to Quash, 3/8/22,
at 1-2. First, Applicant contends that the City does not have standing to appeal. See id. However,
Applicant did not challenge the City’s standing to participate in the proceedings before the trial
court. This contention is therefore waived. See Twp. of Bristol v. 1 Enters., LLC, 177 A.3d 1045,
1051 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (noting that objections to lack of standing must be raised at the earliest
opportunity and are waived if not properly raised). Second, Applicant contends that the City
waived its issues due to its failure to address in its brief before the trial court Applicant’s assertions
that (1) the history of the Property is evidence of the hardship; (2) there is no adverse impact to
the community; and (3) the use variance requested represents the minimum variance that will
afford relief. See Appl. to Quash at 9-10. However, because the historical use of the Property was
both discussed before the trial court and in the trial court’s opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a),
and because the additional issues regarding the variance were sufficiently preserved in the City’s

                                                    3
                                            II. ISSUE9
               The City contends that substantial evidence supported the ZBA’s
conclusion that Applicant failed to establish an unnecessary hardship.10 See City’s
Br. at 3.

brief, we decline to find waiver for this reason. Accordingly, we deny Applicant’s application to
quash the City’s appeal.
        9
          The parties presented no additional evidence to the trial court. Therefore, our review is
limited to determining whether the ZBA committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law.
Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Hr’g Bd., 873 A.2d 807, 811 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). As a result,
“[w]e do not address any argument related to the trial court’s decision.” See Pham v. Upper
Merion Tp. Zoning Hr’g Bd., 113 A.3d 879, 887 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “Assuming the record
contains substantial evidence, we are bound by the [ZBA’s] findings that result from resolutions
of credibility and conflicting testimony rather than a capricious disregard of evidence.” Macioce
v. Zoning Hr’g Bd. of the Borough of Baldwin, 850 A.2d 882, 887 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). A
zoning board may reject “even uncontradicted testimony it finds lacking in credibility, including
testimony offered by an expert witness.” See Taliaferro, 873 A.2d. at 811 (citation omitted). “In
Pennsylvania, the test to be applied when qualifying an expert witness is whether the witness has
any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation.
Qualification of an expert witness rests within the sound discretion of the [fact-finder], and absent
an abuse of that discretion, the decision of the [fact-finder] should be upheld.” Crystal Forest
Assocs., LP v. Buckingham Twp. Supervisors, 872 A.2d 206, 215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (citations
omitted).
        10
           The City also contends that the trial court usurped the ZBA’s role as the fact-finder in
these proceedings. See City’s Br. at 11-14. The City specifically rejects the trial court’s criticism
that the ZBA did not credit Applicant’s unrebutted evidence. See id. The City notes that it may
do so, that it may reject in whole or in part the testimony of any witness, and that it need not cross-
examine witnesses before questioning their credibility. See id. at 9-14. In holding otherwise, the
City reasons, the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof away from Applicant. See id.
at 13. There is simply no precedent, according to the City, that would require it, the ZBA, or any
objecting party to “disprove unnecessary hardship by providing evidence or testimony regarding
the feasibility of permitted uses.” Id. at 13-14. The City raises an additional argument that the
trial court improperly limited the decision-making authority of the ZBA by finding that the ZBA
was bound by a prior decision to grant a similar variance to a previous owner, absent evidence of
changed circumstances. See City’s Br. at 3-4.
        We agree that the trial court erred in finding that the ZBA had erred by failing to consider
the 2005 variance and explain how or why circumstances had changed since the grant of that
variance. See Order, 10/28/21. As noted above, the Code was amended in 2013 to specifically
exclude automotive-related uses. Additionally, pursuant to the Code, variances expire if not acted
upon within three years. See Philadelphia Zoning Code § 14-303(10) (2013). If the permit

                                                  4
                                       III. DISCUSSION
                                 A. The Parties’ Arguments
               The City contends that Applicant was not entitled to a use variance
because it failed to establish an unnecessary hardship. See City’s Br. at 7. The City
notes, for example, that an applicant must establish “unique physical circumstances
or conditions” that preclude any possible use that conforms to the Code, thus
necessitating a variance to enable a viable economic use of the subject property. Id.
at 8-9 (quoting Philadelphia Zoning Code § 14-303(8)(e)(.2)). However, according
to the City, Applicant limited its evidence to alleged difficulties with “certain
permitted uses” but failed to account for “any of the other myriad permitted uses.”
Id. at 10.11
               Moreover, the City asserts that Applicant’s emphasis on the abundance
of similar, auto-related uses in the surrounding area “misses the point” because an
applicant must introduce evidence demonstrating circumstances or conditions that
are unique to the Property itself, not the surrounding area. Id. at 14. Relatedly, the

expires, an applicant may apply for a new permit but “the application will be subject to all
provisions as if the original permit had never been issued.” See id. Further, after the abandonment
of a variance or exception, the use “will not resume unless a new permit is issued, either as of right
under then-existing Zoning Code provisions or by a new variance or special exception.” See id.
Accordingly, relying upon this 2005 variance would have been an improper consideration. The
trial court was incorrect to assert that the ZBA had made a decision unsupported by substantial
evidence for this reason. See Taliaferro, 873 A.2d at 811 n.1. However, because our review is
limited to whether the ZBA committed an abuse of discretion, this error is not the end of our
analysis. See, e.g., Pham, 113 A.3d at 887 n.6.
        11
           According to the City, Applicant presented evidence suggesting that the Property’s shape
and size made it difficult to accommodate “drive-through pharmacies and food establishments.”
See City’s Br. at 10. The City noted specifically that CMX-2.5 allows building supplies and
equipment sales, consumer goods, medical marijuana dispensaries, food, beverage, and grocery
stores, pet supplies, sundries, pharmaceuticals, and convenience sales, wearing apparel, and
accessories. See id. The Code allows for many other uses in addition to those singled out by the
City here, both by right, and with a special exception. See Philadelphia Zoning Code, Table 14-
602-2 (2013).

                                                  5
City rejects Applicant’s reliance on the history of the Property, in particular
Applicant’s reference to a 2005-approval for a similar use. Id. at 14-15. According
to the City, these are not appropriate considerations when evaluating a claim of
unnecessary hardship. Id.
               In response, Applicant asserts that it established a hardship unique to
the Property. See Applicant’s Br. at 11-12. According to Applicant, even though
the Property is zoned CMX-2.5, for nearly a century, it has never been used for a
permitted use by right but, rather, always for auto-related uses.12 See id. Applicant
contends that because the Property is surrounded by extensive auto-related uses, uses
other than auto-related uses are nearly impossible. See id. at 12. In addition, due to
its location, configuration, and size, development of the Property in strict
conformance with the Code is infeasible. See id.
                                   B. Decision of the ZBA
               At the hearings in this case, the evidence established that the Property
has been used for auto-related uses since 1933, including as a gas station and for
new car sales. See N.T., 10/6/20, at 9-10. It is currently used as a junkyard storing
inoperable vehicles. See id. Further, the majority of the surrounding uses are
automotive related. See id.
               In support of its application, Applicant presented testimony from
Gregory Newell, a civil engineering and planning consultant for the project. Newell
testified that he has appeared as an expert witness in nearly 500 different zoning

       12
          Applicant states that the Property has “never been used for a permitted use” but under
the former version of the Code, at least, automobile repair shops and automobile service stations
were permitted with certificates. See Philadelphia Zoning Code, Title 14, approved October 1,
1962, and repealed August 22, 2012. A certificate is identical to a special exception in other zoning
ordinances. See Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Phila., 405 A.2d 580, 581
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).

                                                 6
hearings over the years. See N.T., 10/6/20, at 12-18. His testimony as an expert was
not challenged by the ZBA. See id.
                According to Newell, an auto-related sales use was the only viable
option for the Property, due to the small size for a commercial lot and the other
permitted uses in the area. See id. at 14. Newell testified regarding certain other
uses permitted in the CMX-2.5 zoning district, including a building supply store, a
convenience store, a pharmacy, a coffee shop, or a daycare facility.13 See id. at 15-
18. However, he stated these uses were impossible due to space and parking
constraints: the lot was not large enough for the curb cuts or drive-throughs that
some of the proposed uses would require. See id. Newell stated that, logistically,
the size of the lot and its limited accessibility options made it difficult to utilize the
Property for purposes other than the proposed use. See id. at 18.
                In addition to the testimony of Newell, Applicant presented the
testimony of Marshall Cook, a regional manager of Auto Zone stores. See N.T.,
10/6/20, at 24-26. His testimony concerned his familiarity with Auto Zone stores,

        13
            A CMX-2.5 zoning district allows many permitted uses by right. See Philadelphia
Zoning Code, Table 14-602-2 (2013). Some permitted uses by right include residences, passive
recreation, adult care facilities, child care facilities, hospitals, libraries and cultural exhibits, safety
services, business and professional buildings, sole medical, dental, or other health practitioners;
government buildings; various retail uses including building supplies and equipment, consumer
goods, and medical marijuana dispensaries; food, beverage and grocery stores, pets and pet
supplies, sundries, pharmaceuticals, and convenience sales; wearing apparel and accessories sales;
various commercial uses including animal services, business support, eating and drinking
establishments including prepared food shops and sit-down restaurants, financial services,
maintenance and repair of consumer goods; personal services including body art services, radio,
television and recording services, commissaries and catering services; industrial uses including
artist studios and artisan industrial, research and development; and finally, urban agriculture uses
including community gardens and market or community-supported farms. See id. With special
exceptions, CMX-2.5 allows for personal care homes, active recreation, community centers,
fraternal organizations, religious assemblies, transit stations, group medical, dental, or other health
practitioners, assembly and entertainment, eating and drinking establishments including take-out
restaurants and smoking lounges, and structured parking. See id.

                                                     7
generally. See id. Ron Bednar, representing the City Planning Commission, stated
that given the historical and current use of the Property, the Commission had no
objection to the application. See N.T., 12/2/20, at 39.
             There was some disagreement at the evidentiary hearings regarding
community support for the project, first in the October 2020 hearing and again in the
December 2020 hearing. While the OLCAA RCO initially supported the project, it
later withdrew its support. See N.T., 10/6/20, at 28; N.T., 12/2/20, at 28-29. Further,
a representative of the local councilperson’s office testified that near neighbors did
not approve. See N.T., 10/6/20, at 28; N.T., 12/2/20, at 28-29. On the other hand,
testimony adduced from one neighbor in December indicated that she and other
neighbors on her block were not opposed to the project. See N.T., 12/2/20, at 23.
             Based on this evidence, the ZBA concluded that the requested use was
prohibited and that Applicant had not proven an unnecessary hardship. See ZBA
Decision, 12/9/20, at 10-13. Specifically, the ZBA concluded that while the Property
had historically been approved for auto-related uses, there were no physical
impediments precluding a permitted use going forward. See id. at 12. The ZBA did
not find Newell’s expert testimony “valid” or “credible,” particularly regarding other
viable uses of the site. See id. at 13-14. The ZBA noted that the identification of
similar surrounding uses was insufficient for the grant of a variance. See id.
Specifically, the ZBA noted that although there are many automotive uses
surrounding the Property, the lot itself is regularly shaped and there are a “myriad”
of other retail and commercial uses permitted. See id. at 14. Therefore, the ZBA
rejected Applicant’s contention that the only possible use for the Property was a
vehicle parts store as not credible or persuasive. See id. at 14. While the ZBA noted
its general deference to the concerns of neighbors and RCOs, ultimately, it

                                          8
concluded that even unanimous support of the community would be insufficient
where an applicant did not establish an unnecessary hardship. See id.
                           C. No Unnecessary Hardship
             The party applying for a variance bears the burden of proof, and it is
the function of the zoning board to determine whether the applicant has met the
criteria for granting a variance. Metal Green Inc. v. City of Phila., 266 A.3d 495,
506 (Pa. 2021). “A variance is a departure from the exact provisions of a zoning
ordinance,” and a use variance is permission to deviate from the ordinance regarding
the use of the land. S. Broad St. Neighborhood Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
208 A.3d 539, 547 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019); see also Nowicki v. Zoning Hr’g Bd. of
Borough of Monaca, 91 A.3d 287, 291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
             Generally, an applicant must prove that there is a unique hardship to the
property; that there will be no adverse effect on the public health, safety, or general
welfare; and that the requested variance is the minimum that will afford relief with
the least modification possible. See Marshall v. City of Philadelphia, 97 A.3d 323,
329 (Pa. 2014); see also Metal Green Inc., 266 A.3d at 508. These considerations
are “[c]onsistent with the plain language of the Philadelphia Zoning Code.” See
Metal Green, Inc., 266 A.3d at 510. The hardship must be unique to the property at
issue, not arising from the impact of the zoning regulations on the entire district. See
Marshall, 97 A.3d at 329. Further, the “special conditions or circumstances forming
the basis for the variance must not have resulted from the actions of the party seeking
the variance.” See id.
             With regard to use variances, parties may establish unnecessary
hardship with evidence that “(1) the physical features of the property are such that it
cannot be used for a permitted purpose; or (2) the property can be conformed for a

                                           9
permitted use only at a prohibitive expense; or (3) the property has no value for any
purpose permitted by the zoning ordinance.”14 See id. at 329 (citing Hertzberg v.
Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 721 A.2d 43, 47 (Pa. 1998)).
This does not mean that an applicant must show the property is valueless without the
variance or cannot be used for any permitted purpose. See Marshall, 97 A.3d at 330.
In addition to the plain language of the Philadelphia Zoning Code, other elements
may factor into the analysis, including the use of the adjacent or surrounding land,
the blighted or abandoned nature of a property, or economics, although mere
economic hardship alone will not justify the grant of a use variance. See Metal
Green Inc., 266 A.3d at 510; Marshall, 97 A.3d at 330; see also Valley View Civic
Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983).

       14
       Pursuant to the Code, to find an unnecessary hardship in the case of a use variance, the
ZBA must make all of the following findings:

       (.a) That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions (such as irregularity,
       narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or other
       physical conditions) peculiar to the property, and that the unnecessary hardship is due to
       such conditions and not to circumstances or conditions generally created by the provisions
       of this Zoning Code in the area or zoning district where the property is located;

       (.b) That because of those physical circumstances or conditions, there is no possibility that
       the property can be used in strict conformity with the provisions of this Zoning Code and
       that the authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to enable the viable economic
       use of the property;

       (.c) That the use variance, if authorized, will not alter the essential character of the
       neighborhood or district in which the property is located, nor substantially or permanently
       impair the appropriate use or development of adjacent property, nor be detrimental to the
       public welfare; and

       (.d) That the hardship cannot be cured by the grant of a dimensional variance.

Philadelphia Zoning Code § 14-303(8)(e)(.2) (2013).

                                                10
             When the ZBA considers expert testimony, the question is “whether the
witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under
investigation,” and that qualification is left to the discretion of the fact-finder. See
Crystal Forest Assocs., LP, 872 A.2d at 215. Examining Newell’s expert testimony,
the ZBA considered whether (1) the issues addressed fell within his area of expertise;
(2) whether his dual role as project engineer conflicted with his role as an expert
witness; and (3) whether the conditions cited in support of his conclusions were
legally sufficient to support a finding of hardship. See ZBA Decision, 12/9/20, at
12.
             The ZBA concluded that Newell’s testimony did not qualify him to
testify regarding the “feasibility of developing the property for a permitted use,”
including “limitations presented by the [Code], market demands, and industry
standards.” See id. at 13. Further, according to the ZBA, because Newell had been
hired by Applicant and because the project’s success was contingent upon his
testimony that other uses were not feasible, his testimony was not credible. See id.
Finally, the ZBA rejected Newell’s assertion that development options for the site
were limited as not credible. See id. at 13-14. The ZBA observed that the
limitations, which included the elimination of three of the site’s four existing access
driveways, were a result of Applicant’s voluntary concession. See id. It is entirely
within the ZBA’s purview to reject uncontradicted expert testimony it finds lacking
in credibility, where that decision is supported by the evidence of record, as the ZBA
did in this case. See Taliaferro, 873 A.2d. at 811.
             This does not end our inquiry. It is the applicant’s burden to establish
that it has met the criteria for a variance, and the ZBA concluded that Applicant had
not done so. Metal Green Inc., 266 A.3d at 506. In support of its position, Applicant

                                          11
asserts that the hardship is that the Property has never been used for a permitted use,
and that the surrounding uses are mostly automotive-related. See Applicant’s Br. at
11-12. Applicant also points to the fact that the ZBA granted a prior variance in
2005 for a similar automotive and vehicle equipment sales use. See id.
             We reject these assertions. The history of the Property and surrounding
uses may be factors considered by the ZBA when determining unnecessary hardship.
See Metal Green Inc., 266 A.3d at 510; Marshall, 97 A.3d at 330; see also Valley
View Civic, 462 A.2d at 640.          Nevertheless, there are two reasons these
considerations are irrelevant. First, the Code was revised in 2013 to specifically
exclude automotive uses from this district; any surrounding use decided under the
prior version of the Code is not relevant to the instant consideration. Second,
although a variance was granted under a previous version of the Code, the variance
has long expired and has no further legal effect. See Philadelphia Zoning Code §
14-303(10)(a)-(e) (2013) (permits and variances expire after three years; an
abandoned permit shall not resume unless a new permit is issued either as of right
under then-existing Code provisions or by a new variance or special exception).
             Additionally, Applicant contends that the size and shape of the
Property, including the need for curb cuts, make it impractical to use the Property
for any permitted purpose in strict compliance with the Code. See Applicant’s Br.
at 21-24. However, the evidence of record does not support this claim. While
Newell presented testimony that some of the permitted uses were not practical, the
ZBA appropriately rejected his testimony as not credible. Moreover, testimony from
the Auto Zone regional manager, Cook, was not relevant to any hardship factor.
Further, while the support of the local community and the RCO may factor into the
ZBA’s consideration, that support alone cannot establish unnecessary hardship. See,

                                          12
generally, Metal Green Inc., 266 A.3d at 510; Marshall, 97 A.3d at 330; Valley View
Civic Ass’n, 462 A.2d at 640. Finally, while the ZBA did note the testimony of the
City Planning Commission representative and his support of the project, this brief
testimony does not establish undue hardship.
                                IV. CONCLUSION
             Applicant failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish an
unnecessary hardship. Metal Green Inc., 266 A.3d at 506. Therefore, we discern
neither legal error nor abuse of discretion in the ZBA’s decision denying the
application for the use variance. Metal Green Inc., 266 A.3d at 506. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in reversing the order of the ZBA. See Marshall, 97 A.3d at 329;
Taliaferro, 873 A.2d at 811 n.1. For these reasons, the trial court’s order is reversed.

                                           LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

                                          13
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of:                            :
AZ Broad Street LLC                   :
                                      :   No. 1354 C.D. 2021
From a Decision of:                   :
Zoning Board of Adjustment            :

                                  ORDER

      AND NOW, this 22nd day of January, 2024, the Application to Quash Appeal,
filed by AZ Broad Street LLC on March 8, 2022, is DENIED, and the order entered
by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on October 29, 2021, is
REVERSED.

                                      LORI A. DUMAS, Judge