Court Opinion

ID: 9731255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:40:30.541758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:16.581888
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, concurring in part, dissenting in part: Although I initially agreed with the majority, the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing has convinced me of one error in the decision: This court should not reverse the jury’s determination that the defendant’s conduct justifies an award of punitive damages, for that determination is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Lawson v. G. D. Searle & Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779.) The evidence on this issue is close, and for that reason we should defer to the jury. Punitive damages are intended to punish the defendant and to deter him and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353; Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509.) They are recoverable when the underlying tort is “committed with fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.” (Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359.) To be sure, punitive damages are not favored by the courts. (Glass v. Burkett (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 676, 381 N.E.2d 821.) Punitive damages are not available when the improper act does not rise above the level of mere negligence (Galayda v. Penman (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 423, 399 N.E.2d 656), and I agree that they do not follow by necessity from every award of actual damages in cases involving reckless or intentional torts. (Crumble v. Blumthal (7th Cir. 1977), 549 F.2d 462.) In O’Brien v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 401 N.E.2d 1356, 1359, this court said that “punitive damages should not be awarded if the defendant’s misconduct is not above and beyond the conduct needed for the basis of the action.” Some intentional torts are defined in terms of outrageous conduct, with the minimum required to state a cause of action under the tort so high that, once the elements of the action are there, no room remains for conduct that exceeds, that is more wanton and malicious, than that which defines the underlying tort. Thus in Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 88, 174 N.E.2d 157, 165, in recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court said: “We believe, nevertheless, that punitive damages cannot be sanctioned as an additional recovery in such an action. Since the outrageous quality of the defendant’s conduct forms the basis of the action, the rendition of compensatory damages will be sufficiently punitive.” I do not believe that the tort involved here is similarly insusceptible to punitive damages. Whether punitive damages may be recovered in a particular case is a question of law for the trial judge to decide; the proper amount of punitives is a factual question entrusted to the trier of fact. (Delano v. Collins (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 791, 364 N.E.2d 716.) These decisions should be reversed only when an abuse of discretion has been shown. Shaw v. Miller (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 743, 381 N.E.2d 985; Glass. The facts in this case are quite different from those in Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540, rev’d on other grounds (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75, discussed by the majority. Although recognizing that parties to an insurance contract are obligated to deal with each other in good faith, the appellate court in Ledingham reversed an award of punitive damages; there, the health insurance became effective August 1, 1969, and the illness manifested itself two days later. The insurer denied the claim for medical bills, arguing that the illness was preexisting and thus excluded by a provision to that effect in the policy. The insurer based its opinion, reached in good faith, on a statement by the insured’s doctor that he “could not be certain whether the condition was preexisting on August 1, 1969, or not.” (29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 342, 330 N.E.2d 540,542.) Considering the evidence on the course of the insurer’s dealings, the appellate court expressly noted that the insurer neither had accused the insured of misrepresentation nor had interposed defenses known to be false to pressure the insured into settling the claim. 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351, 330 N.E.2d 540, 549. In this case, however, we have evidence that the defendant relied on at least one defense it knew to be false, that concerning other insurance, and instructed Lynch and Boes to close their business. Furthermore, the majority concede that the jury could have believed that the defendant did not provide Lynch and Boes with proof-of-loss forms, that defense counsel’s participation in the foreclosure of the mortgage on the property, when the insurance policy would have protected the mortgagee’s interest regardless of the fire’s cause, indicates bad faith on the insurer’s part, and that use of the other-insurance defense by the insurer pertained to the nature of its dealings. The majority even conclude that a cause of action was stated for this tort and that the jury’s implicit finding of bad faith was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, yet inexplicably reverse the award of punitive damages. Here a jury and an able and experienced trial judge concluded that the defendant’s conduct was such as to warrant punitive damages. We cannot say that such determination is wrong or contrary to law. I join the majority in remanding on the issues of actual damages. Punitive damages may be awarded only in conjunction with actual or nominal damages and may not be awarded alone. Thus, if we were reversing the award of actual damages without remanding too, then the award of punitivos would also have to be reversed. (Tonchen v. All-Steel Equipment, Inc. (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 454, 300 N.E.2d 616.) Here, however, because we are merely remanding the case for a recalculation of the actual loss, I would let the award of punitives stand.