Court Opinion

ID: 9955551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:08:10.097602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.540324
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion
                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    IN THE MATTER OF I.S., A CHILD AS                   No. 86035
                    DEFINED BY NRS 62A.030.                                              '

                   1.S.,                                                   tFï LED
                   Appellant,
                   vs.                                                     MAR 28 20
                   THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                  EU
                                                                       CLE
                   Respondent.                                        BY
                                                                            IEF DEPUTY CLERK

                              Appeal from a district court order affirming and adopting a
                   juvenile master's recommendations to adjudicate appellant a delinquent
                   child and to impose formal probation conditions. Second Judicial District
                   Court, Family Division, Washoe County; Bridget E. Robb, Judge.
                              Affirmed.

                   Evelyn Grosenick, Public Defender, John Reese Petty, Chief Deputy Public
                   Defender, and Katherine C. Maher, Deputy Public Defender, Washoe
                   County,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
                   District Attorney, and Shelly K. Scott, Chief Deputy District Attorney,
                   Washoe County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, CADISH, C.J., and PICKERING and
                   BELL, JJ.

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                                                  OPINION

                By the Court, CADISH, C.J.:
                            The district court affirmed and adopted a juvenile court
                master's recommendations to adjudicate appellant I.S. a delinquent and
                place I.S. on formal probation despite Juvenile Services' recommendation
                for informal supervision. In doing so, the court rejected I.S.'s argument that
                NRS 62C.200(1)(b) creates an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto by
                requiring the    district   attorney's written    approval before      informal
                supervision may be ordered notwithstanding that NRS 62C.230(1)(a) gives
                a juvenile court authority to dismiss a petition without prejudice and refer
                the child to a probation officer for informal supervision. I.S. maintains on
                appeal that NRS 62C.200 is inconsistent with the separation of powers
                doctrine.
                            As I.S. is no longer under supervision, we first address whether
                this appeal is moot. Because I.S. is under 18 and his record has not been
                sealed, collateral consequences of the underlying adjudication remain, and
                thus, we conclude that this appeal is not moot. As to the merits, we conclude
                that NRS 62C.200(1) does not create a separation of powers issue because
                the court's ability to dismiss a petition without prejudice and refer a juvenile
                to informal probation is not a sentencing decision in nature, and thus, the
                statute does not encroach on the court's sentencing discretion. We therefore
                affirm.
                                  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            The Washoe       County District Attorney filed a          juvenile
                delinquency petition against appellant I.S., charging I.S. with the unlawful
                acts of possessing a schedule I controlled substance and placing graffiti on
                or otherwise defacing property. If I.S. had been charged with the same

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                   unlawful acts in the adult criminal justice system, the drug possession
                   would have been charged as a felony and the graffiti act would have been
                   charged as a gross misdemeanor.       The Washoe County Department of
                   Juvenile   Services   (Juvenile   Services) filed   a   dispositional   report,
                   recommending the petition be dismissed and I.S. be referred to juvenile
                   probation for informal supervision.       Juvenile Services indicated the
                   informal supervision should require I.S. to complete 100 hours of a work
                   program or community service and a youth development program, and that
                   I.S. should be required to pay restitution.
                               During the plea entry hearing, I.S. "freely, knowingly and
                   voluntarily admitted to the allegations contained in the Petition." At the
                   subsequent dispositional hearing, Juvenile Services recommended the
                   informal sanctions outlined in its dispositional report.     Meanwhile, the
                   State argued I.S. should proceed to formal adjudication. In response, I.S.
                   argued that NRS 62C.200(1)(b)'s requirement of prosecutorial consent
                   before a juvenile court may dismiss a petition and send a juvenile to
                   informal supervision under NRS 62C.230 unconstitutionally violated the
                   separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of
                   government. The parties then briefed whether the court should sever the
                   language in NRS 62C.200(1)(b) as an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto.
                               In his opening brief before the juvenile master, I.S. asserted
                   that NRS 62C.200(1)(b) unconstitutionally infringed on the juvenile court's
                   sentencing discretion by requiring the prosecutor's written consent to
                   dismissal of a petition and referral of the juvenile to informal supervision
                   as a prerequisite to the juvenile court taking such action. I.S. argued the
                   juvenile court's sentencing discretion was invoked when I.S. admitted to
                   both counts in the petition and entered a plea. Therefore, I.S. contended,

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                  the prosecutorial-consent portion of NRS 62C.200(1)(b), as incorporated in
                  NRS 62C.230, unconstitutionally conditioned the juvenile court's exercise
                  of its sentencing discretion upon prosecutorial approval.
                              In opposition, the State first argued that the juvenile court,
                  unlike adult criminal courts, is a creation of statute and only possesses the
                  jurisdiction specifically provided for it in Title 5 of the Nevada Revised
                  Statutes. Second, the State argued that In re Steven Daniel P., 129 Nev.
                  692, 309 P.3d 1041 (2013), disposed of the very separation of powers
                  argument presented by I.S. Third, the State posited that I.S.'s case was
                  distinguishable from State v. Second Judicial District Court (Hearn), 134
                  Nev. 783, 432 P.3d 154 (2018), on which I.S. relied, in part because, unlike
                  the veterans court program at issue there, NRS 62C.200 and NRS 62C.230
                  allow for resolution without any court involvement.
                              The juvenile master entered findings and a recommendation
                  wherein she determined that NRS 62C.230(1) grants the juvenile court
                  sentencing power, which is then unconstitutionally limited by NRS
                  62C.200(1)(b)'s requirement for written prosecutorial approval.          The
                  juvenile master recommended the district court decline to follow the portion
                  of the statute requiring the prosecutorial consent. On the State's objection,
                  the district court reversed the master's recommendations, finding NRS
                  62C.200(1)(b) did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The district
                  court pointed to the limited statutorily prescribed jurisdiction of the
                  juvenile court and how the juvenile statutes allow for resolution of a
                  juvenile's alleged violations of criminal laws without any court involvement.
                              On remand, the juvenile master recommended adjudicating I.S.
                  guilty of the two charges, deeming him a ward of the court, and placing him
                  on formal probation. The master found I.S. subject to the same conditions

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                of probation and supervision outlined in the dispositional report, some of
                which I.S. had already completed, and recommended I.S. participate in a
                program and pay restitution. With no timely objection filed, the district
                court entered an order affirming and adopting the juvenile master's
                recommendations. This appeal followed.
                                                DISCUSSION
                The appeal is not moot because an adjudication of juvenile delinquency
                creates a presumption of collateral consequences
                            After LS. appealed, the juvenile court entered an order adopting
                the juvenile master's recommendation that I.S. was no longer subject to
                juvenile probation supervision pending the final closure of the matter. I.S.
                acknowledges that his appeal may have become moot because he is no
                longer subject to juvenile probation supervision. "The question of mootness
                is one of justiciability." Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 254
                P.3d 572, 574 (2010). Therefore, an actual controversy must be present at
                all stages of the proceeding. Id. Within the context of criminal cases, we
                have recognized that such a controversy still exists even after the sentence
                is completed due to "disabilities or burdens" resulting from a conviction. See
                Martinez-Hernandez v. State, 132 Nev. 623, 626, 380 P.3d 861, 864 (2016)
                (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968)). Thus, a habeas
                petitioner possesses a "substantial stake" in the judgment of conviction that
                survives satisfaction of the petitioner's resultant sentence. Id. (quoting
                Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237); see also id. at 627, 380 P.3d at 864 ("Dr instances
                where collateral consequences of a conviction exist, a habeas petition
                challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction does not become moot
                when the petitioner, who was in custody at the time the petition was filed,
                is released frorn custody subsequent to the filing of the petition.").

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                            We conclude that the same reasoning applies in juvenile
                delinquency adjudications. Collateral consequences inay continue from a
                juvenile delinquency adjudication even where the juvenile is no longer
                subject to supervision, including that a juvenile record may appear on
                subsequent presentence investigation reports and could impact a judge's
                sentencing decision.      Thus,      there is a presumption of collateral
                consequences of such an adjudication that prevents a challenge to that
                adjudication from becoming moot at the completion of juvenile supervision.
                However, after the juvenile's record is sealed, see NRS 62H.140 (addressing
                the sealing of juvenile records, which generally occurs when the juvenile
                reaches age 18), a juvenile delinquency adjudication no longer carries a
                presumption of collateral consequences.       See NRS 62H.030(3)(b) ("The
                following records and information may be opened to inspection without a
                court order: ... Hecords which have not been sealed and which are
                required by the Division of Parole and Probation for preparation of
                presentence investigations and reports pursuant to NRS 176.135 or general
                investigations and reports pursuant to NRS 176.151 . . . ."). Here, I.S. is
                still a minor, so his record could be included in presentence investigation
                reports addressing any subsequent juvenile delinquency matters involving
                I.S. Because collateral consequences of this adjudication are presumed to
                remain, I.S.'s appeal is not moot.
                NRS 62C.200(1)(b)'s requirement for prosecutorial consent, as incorporated
                in NRS 62C.230, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine
                            Consistent with his argument below, I.S. argues that NRS
                62C.200(1), as incorporated in NRS 62C.230, creates an unconstitutional
                prosecutorial veto because it conditions the juvenile court's sentencing
                powers on the approval of the district attorney. The State argues that the
                statute does not create a separation of powers problem because the juvenile
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                court is not exercising its sentencing discretion when it dismisses a petition
                without prejudice, and unlike the district court in adult criminal cases, the
                juvenile court's authority is not derived from the constitution and is instead
                limited to the authority expressly prescribed to it by statute. We agree with
                the State.
                             We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v.
                Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Hearn), 134 Nev. 783, 786, 432 P.3d 154, 158 (2018).
                "Because statutes are presumed to be valid," I.S. bears the heavy burden of
                demonstrating that NRS 62C.200(1)(b)'s requirement for prosecutorial
                consent as incorporated in NRS 62C.230 is unconstitutional.           Aguilar-
                Raygoza v. State, 127 Nev. 349, 352, 255 P.3d 262, 264 (2011); Douglas
                Disposal, Inc. v. Wee Haul, LLC, 123 Nev. 552, 557, 170 P.3d 508, 512
                (2007). Under NRS 62C.230, "[i]f the district attorney files a petition with
                the juvenile court, the juvenile court may . . . [d]ismiss the petition without
                prejudice and refer the child to the probation officer for informal supervision
                pursuant to NRS 62C.200." NRS 62C.200(1) provides that a child against
                whom a complaint has been made "may be placed under the informal
                supervision of a probation officer if:"
                                   (a) The child voluntarily admits participation
                             in the acts alleged in the complaint; and
                                   (b) The district attorney gives written
                             approval for placement of the child under informal
                             supervision, if any of the acts alleged in the
                             complaint are unlawful acts that would have
                             constituted a gross misdemeanor or felony if
                             committed by an adult.
                             Both   the   United   States Constitution     and the     Nevada
                Constitution contain separation of powers provisions requiring the "discrete
                treatment of the three branches of government."        Comm'n on Ethics v.
                Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 292, 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009); Hearn, 134 Nev. at
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                      786, 432 P.3d at 158; see Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1(1).         "But 'Nevada's
                      Constitution goes one step further; it contains an express provision
                      prohibiting any one branch of government from impinging on the functions
                      of another." Hearn, 134 Nev. at 786, 432 P.3d at 158 (quoting Hardy, 125
                      Nev. at 292, 212 P.3d at 1103-04); see Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1(1). Our caselaw
                      supports the proposition "that charging decisions are within the executive
                      realm and sentencing decisions are inherently judicial functions." Hearn,
                      134 Nev. at 786, 432 P.3d at 158. Once a court has been granted sentencing
                      discretion, it "cannot be conditioned upon the prosecution's approval
                      without running afoul of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 787, 432
                      P.3d at 158.
                                     In Steven Daniel P., this court analyzed the plain language of
                      the statutes at issue here. 129 Nev. 692, 309 P.3d 1041 (2013). There, the
                      juvenile court dismissed a juvenile delinquency petition and referred the
                      juvenile to informal supervision without the written approval of the district
                      attorney. Id. at 695, 309 P.3d at 1043. Applying the statutes, we concluded
                      "that written approval is required from the district attorney before the
                      juvenile court can place a juvenile under informal supervision when the
                      juvenile has allegedly committed an unlawful act that would be a gross
                      misdemeanor or a felony if committed by an adult." Id. at 697, 309 P.3d at
                      1044. Further, relying on State v. Barren, we concluded the juvenile court's
                      discretion to dismiss the petition and refer Steven for informal supervision
                      was expressly limited by statute. Id. at 700, 309 P.3d at 1046 (citing State
                      v. Barren, 128 Nev. 337, 341, 279 P.3d 182, 184 (2012) ("[T]he juvenile court
                      system is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction
                      expressly provided for it in the statute." (quoting Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791,
                      792-93, 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980)))).       While the State posited that the

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                juvenile court's dismissal and referral without the written approval of the
                district attorney usurped the legislative and executive power provided
                under the separation of powers doctrine, we did not conduct a separation of
                powers analysis, instead relying on our conclusion that the court had
                exceeded its statutory authority to reverse. Steven Daniel P., 129 Nev. at
                700, 309 P.3d at 1046.
                             In Hearn, we analyzed Nevada's separation of powers doctrine
                within the context of a district court's decision to assign a criminal
                defendant to the veterans court program. 134 Nev. at 787, 432 P.3d at 159.
                At the tirne, NRS 176A.290(2) required the stipulation of the prosecuting
                attorney before a district court could assign an eligible defendant to
                veterans court if the offense charged or the defendant's prior convictions
                involved the use or threatened use of force or violence. Id. at 783-84, 432
                P.3d at 156.    We held the prosecutorial-consent element constituted a
                prosecutorial veto, which violated the Nevada Constitution's separation of
                powers doctrine. Id. at 788, 432 P.3d at 159. We characterized assignment
                to the veterans court program as "a statutorily approved alternative to
                entering a judgment of conviction and imposing a term of incarceration."
                Id. at 787, 432 P.3d at 159. In analyzing the application of the separation
                of powers doctrine in this context, we stated "the principle gleaned is that
                once a defendant's guilt has been determined, the prosecutor's charging
                discretion is complete and the judiciary's sentencing discretion, if any, is all
                that remains." Id.
                            Applying that reasoning in the juvenile context, we conclude
                that a juvenile court's decision to disrniss a petition without prejudice and
                refer a juvenile to informal supervision is not a sentencing decision, as it
                does not involve imposition of a period of detention or imposition of

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                requirements under the supervision of the court with consequences to be
                imposed by the court if they are not satisfied. 6 Wayne R. LaFaye, Jerold
                H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 26.1(a), at
                863 (4th ed. 2015) (categorizing sentencing options into five categories:
                "capital punishment, incarceration, community release (probation),
                intermediate sanctions [(typically a combination of incarceration and
                probation or a suspended term of incarceration)], and financial sanctions");
                see Sentencing, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
                wex/sentencing (last visited Feb. 14, 2024) ("A criminal sentence refers to
                the formal legal consequences associated with a conviction.        Types of
                sentences include probation, fines, short-term incarceration, suspended
                sentences, which only take effect if the convict fails to meet certain
                conditions, payment of restitution to the victim, community service, or drug
                and alcohol rehabilitation for minor crimes. More serious sentences include
                long-term incarceration, life-in-prison, or the death penalty in capital
                murder cases."). NRS 62C.230 does not implicate the juvenile court's
                sentencing discretion because it permits the juvenile court to simply dismiss
                the petition with a referral for informal supervision without entry of
                judgment or any further involvement or supervision of the juvenile court.
                Hearn is distinguishable because the assignment of a criminal defendant to
                a program like veterans court is a procedure that occurs in lieu of a
                defendant being sentenced to a term of incarceration and the district court
                maintains involvement in the case after it assigns a defendant to veterans
                court. If the defendant is not successful in their completion of the program,
                which is supervised by the court, the district court may enter a judgment of
                conviction and impose an appropriate sentence. See NRS 176A.290(2)(b).
                Alternatively, if the defendant is successful in their completion of the
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                     program, the district court may then discharge the defendant and either
                     dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction. See NRS

                     176A.290(3)(a).
                                  Conversely, when a juvenile court exercises its discretion under
                     NRS 62C.230 to dismiss a petition, there is no further involvement from, or
                     supervision by, the juvenile court. Should a juvenile fail to comply with the
                     requirements of informal supervision, the onus is on the district attorney to
                     refile the petition if the juvenile is to face formal adjudication. See NRS
                     62C.200(6) ("The district attorney may not file a petition against the child
                     based on any acts for which the child was placed under informal supervision

                     unless the district attorney files the petition not later than 180 days after
                     the date the child entered into the agreement for informal supervision.").
                     NRS 62C.230 provides no mechanism for a juvenile court to directly
                     formally adjudicate a juvenile as delinquent if they fail to complete all terms
                     of informal supervision. Permitting the juvenile court to dismiss a petition
                     without prejudice and refer a juvenile to informal supervision under NRS
                     62C.230 without the written approval of the district attorney would be
                     analogous to permitting the juvenile court to accept a plea bargain from a
                     juvenile without the district attorney's involvement in the bargaining for
                     and acceptance of a plea. Cf. People v. Andreotti, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 462, 465,
                     469, 471 (Ct. App. 2001) (determining that a trial court could not defer entry
                     of judgment without the State's consent because it would be an

                     unconstitutional infringement on the State's ability to plead and prosecute
                     a case). Further, unlike the situation addressed in Hearn, which pertained
                     to the district court's authority as set forth in the constitution, the juvenile
                     court is entirely a creature of statute, and its authority is expressly limited
                     to that provided to it by the Legislature. Barren, 128 Nev. at 341, 279 P.3d

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                    at 184. For this reason, and because dismissal and referral of a juvenile for
                    informal supervision under NRS 62C.230 does not constitute an exercise of
                    the   juvenile   court's   sentencing   discretion,   we   conclude   that   the
                    prosecutorial-consent requirement of NRS 62C.200(1)(b), as incorporated in
                    NRS 62C.230, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
                                                       CONCLUSION
                                 We conclude that I.S.'s appeal is not moot because, like an adult
                    criminal conviction, a formal adjudication of juvenile delinquency carries
                    with it a presumption of collateral consequences until the juvenile reaches
                    age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed. We also conclude that NRS
                    62C.230's incorporation of NRS 62C.200(1)(a)'s prosecutorial-consent
                    requirement does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. When a
                    juvenile court exercises the option to dismiss a petition under NRS 62C.230,
                    it is not exercising its sentencing discretion. Rather, the option to dismiss
                    a petition without prejudice and refer a juvenile to informal supervision
                    under NRS 62C.230 is more akin to a charging decision. Therefore, the
                    requirement for the written approval of the district attorney before a
                    juvenile court can dismiss a petition at this stage is not an unconstitutional
                    prosecutorial veto and does not run afoul of the separation of powers
                    doctrine. We therefore affirm the order of the district court.

                                                                                      ,   C.J.

                    We concur:

                            Poem                , J.
                    Pickering
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