Court Opinion

ID: 9737629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:30:52.32574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.329513
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision to reinstate the magistrate’s award of benefits to Harry Eversman. The major purpose of Eversman’s activities the day and time of his injuries was not recreational or social; therefore, his injuries are presumed to arise out of and in the course of employment. MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3). Because there is no evidence that Eversman was “injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct,” MCL 418.305; MSA 17.237(305) does not bar worker’s compensation benefits.
I. THE TRAVELING EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE
The traveling employee doctrine is one well recognized in worker’s compensation law:
Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within the course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels and eating in restaurants *105away from home are usually held compensable. [2 Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law, § 25.01, pp 25-1 to 25-2.]
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals adopted this doctrine.1 Because Eversman was injured while traveling for his employer, I agree with the Court of Appeals that it is appropriate to apply the doctrine to this case.
n. THE STATUTE DOES NOT PRECLUDE BENEFITS FOR EVERSMAN
Eversman was injured while attempting to cross a street separating his hotel from a bar at which he had just finished his meal while traveling for his employer. The majority gives too little consideration to the position of one who must travel away from home at the request of his employer. It isolates Eversman’s activities on the day he was injured and determines that he engaged in activities that were mainly social or recreational in purpose, precluding benefits pursuant to MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3).
The first sentence of MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) embodies a presumption: employees are in the course of employment within a reasonable time of coming from and going to work and while on the employer’s premises.2 The second sentence limits the presumption:
*106Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under this act.
The major purpose of activities incidental to travel for one’s employer is not, by definition, social or recreational.3 This case illustrates the point. Eversman’s activities on the day of his injuries did serve an objective of his employer. He was staying in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, several hundred miles from his home in Dorr, Michigan, so that he could resume working once the weather cleared sufficiently for construction activities.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that “No work-related activities were expected of [Eversman]; his time was his own.” Ante, p 96. Eversman’s time was not completely his own. He could not, for instance, go home and enjoy a meal with his family. He could not meet his friends at the bar for an after-work drink. He was obliged to stay within the proximity of Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
Because he was traveling for his employer, Eversman’s employment necessitated a meal, probably one prepared by a restaurant. It was while returning from such a meal that Eversman was hit by an automobile and injured. The major purpose of his visit to the bar across from his hotel was not social or recreational, but to eat a meal. MCL 418.301(3); MSA *10717.237(301)(3) does not preclude Eversman from receiving benefits under the facts of this case.4
m. MICHIGAN LAW ALLOWS COMPENSATION TO AN EMPLOYEE INJURED WHILE TRAVELING FOR HIS EMPLOYER
The majority observes that this Court has not addressed the social activity exception to the coming and going presumption in MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3). Although it has yet to address the exception specifically, it has recognized that traveling employees are subject to unique circumstances for purposes of worker’s compensation benefits. The majority fails to take this consideration into account in its application of the social activity exception to the facts here.
In Thiede v G D Searle & Co,5 a traveling salesman died when the hotel where he was staying burned down. This Court found that, because plaintiff’s employment required him to stay at a hotel, “[t]he risks to which he was exposed in staying at hotels . . . were incidental to his employment.” Thiede, *108supra at 113. The plaintiffs estate was awarded worker’s compensation benefits. Id.
Likewise, Eversman was expected to stay at a hotel and eat his meals in restaurants as an incident of his employment. The majority arrives at the conclusion that his activities were mainly recreational after “[examining the totality of circumstances surrounding Eversman’s activities during the six-hour episode . . . .” Ante, p 96. But, it appears to have left out one important factor in its analysis: Eversman was in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, at the request of his employer. He could not go home, but had to occupy himself in that location until the weather cleared, so that he could finish his assignment.
The majority appears to believe that an employee who has been sent to an out-of-town work site is expected to do his job and nothing else. This leads to troublesome results. For example, if there were no washer and dryer in an employee’s hotel, and he ventured outside, would he be ineligible for worker’s compensation benefits if injured at a Laundromat?
I would not impose an unreasonable limitation on employees who must travel as a requirement of their employment.
IV. APPLYING THE TRAVELING EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE TO THIS CASE COMPORTS WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE WDCA
It is well established that this Court should liberally construe the wdca, so as to grant, rather than deny, benefits. Simkins v General Motors Corp (After Remand), 453 Mich 703, 710-711; 556 NW2d 839 (1996). Denying benefits to employees simply because they leave their hotel rooms to eat while on a trip for their employers does not comport with this *109principle. Eversman’s employer, who displaced him from home, should compensate him if he is injured when pursuing reasonable and necessary personal activities while traveling at the employer’s request. The majority’s rule allows employers to impose the inconveniences of being away from home and family while not accepting responsibility for injuries that arise from the necessities of travel.
While the majority seems to focus on the fact that Eversman spent his day drinking and shooting pool, ante, p 96, it does not conclude that Eversman’s intoxication caused his injuries. As the Court of Appeals correctly points out, there is not enough evidence to support such a conclusion. 224 Mich App 227.
MCL 418.305; MSA 17.237(305) precludes compensation for injuries “[i]f the employee is injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct . . . .” The evidence does show that Eversman was intoxicated. But it does not show that his injuries arose as a result of intoxication. If it did, then MCL 418.305; MSA 17.237(305) would compel a different result.6
V. CONCLUSION
Not all injuries caused by activities an employee pursues while traveling for an employer are compen-sable under the WDCA. The analysis should focus on whether the activity was incidental to traveling. Thiede, supra at 113.
*110Here, Eversman did not stray far from his hotel. He was injured while pursuing an activity that was not recreational or social. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, “Like other employees who travel for days at a time, [Eversman] had to eat and sleep.” 224 Mich App 225. It was in crossing a street returning to his hotel after eating a meal that Eversman was injured.
I also agree with the Court of Appeals that this would be a different case if Eversman’s drinking contributed to the accident. 224 Mich App 227-228. Since it did not, it was error for the wcac to consider it to be an important factor necessitating reversal of the magistrate’s award of benefits.
I would affirm the magistrate’s award of benefits and the Court of Appeals decision.

 224 Mich App 221, 225; 568 NW2d 387 (1997).

 The majority assumes that the first sentence’s presumption applies equally to employees who are traveling to and working at out-of-town work sites, as to those at their home bases. On its face, the presumption does not refer to traveling employees. Therefore, one might hesitate to conclude that the Legislature intended MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) to apply when an employee travels on the employer’s business.

 The majority mischaracterizes the dissent when stating that it applies the wrong test. Ante, p 95, n 8. The test is indeed whether the employee was injured while engaged in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational. What I disagree with is the majority’s conclusion that the dominant purpose of the activities here, which were incidental to traveling for one’s employer, was social or recreational.

 For the same reasons discussed above, I disagree with the concurrence’s conclusion that Eversman deviated from the employment relationship. Crossing the road that separated the bar from Eversman’s hotel did not dwarf the business purpose of the trip, but instead furthered it.
The concurrence points to the following “circumstances” as increasing the risk of injury: his “decision to return to the bar after a long day of drinking, and then to cross a well-traveled highway in the dark . . . .” Ante, p 104. The evidence does not show that drinking caused Eversman’s iiyuries. Nor was crossing the road that separated Eversman’s hotel from one of the few eating establishments available to him a risk unrelated to the business purpose of the trip. Eversman had to eat. There was no reasonably available and safer manner to cross that road at the location in question.

 278 Mich 108; 270 NW 234 (1936). Although the Thiede decision was decided before the enactment of the wdca, nothing in the act affects the validity of the decision.

 The majority mischaracterizes this dissent as focusing “on whether plaintiff was intoxicated and if the intoxication caused his injury.” Ante, p 95, n 8. In two paragraphs out of nineteen, I address the fact of plaintiffs intoxication to point out that, since it did not cause his injuries, MCL 418.305; MSA 17.237(305) should not preclude the payment of benefits to him.