Court Opinion

ID: 9462211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:34:34.47053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:27.458370
License: Public Domain

DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the trial judge was required to award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto. I cannot say that, in this case, it appears from Fields’ application that he is not entitled to the writ. The trial judge, however, in a written opinion and order, permitted Fields’ pro per petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be filed in forma pauperis and denied it. He did not issue an order to show cause and he did not hold a hearing. I think that in this case this was error.
The trial judge had before him only the petition, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Alaska, and the briefs filed in that court in Fields’ appeal. He did not have the trial transcript or the evidence that Fields says that the prosecutor withheld. I do not think, on this record, it is possible to say with any assurance that Fields is not entitled to the writ.
The trial judge, and the majority opinion, rely in part on a “positive” identification of Fields by one witness. Both of them rely on a statement by the Alaska Supreme Court that the identification was “positive.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “a determination after a hear*262ing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State were parties, evidenced by a written opinion . . . , shall be presumed to be correct . . . I have serious doubt that the opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court is the kind of opinion that is referred to in § 2254, subsection (d). I think that Congress was talking about an opinion by the fact finder. That would be the Alaska trial judge or jury, not the Alaska Supreme Court. But assuming that I am wrong, I think that Fields has, in his petition, met the presumption. He has shown, prima facie, that the “factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). He has made that showing by quoting the trial transcript, as § 2254(e) requires. He alleges that there were but two witnesses who saw the robbery. One of them, Chance, the bar owner, knew Fields, had seen him in the bar the day before the robbery, but could not identify Fields as one of the robbers, both of whom wore masks. The other, Blaney, a customer, who came in while the robbery was in progress, testified, as Fields quotes the record:
(Direct) Question: Were you able to recognize either of the two masked men as you saw them then at the time?
Answer: At that time I did not recognize them no. (tr. p. 48)
Question: And would you indicate which of the two masked men, you would identify as the defendant.
Answer: The defendant I would identify as the short one wearing the pea jacket.
Question: How would you describe the shorter one?
Answer: Well, actually he had the pistol, and I kept looking at the pistol, he was thin.
(Cross) Question: And I am asking you if he is in fact five-five, then, he is not the man that you are identifying as being the robber, is that correct?
Answer: I would say it would be very hard, to be the robber?
Question: Sir?
Answer: I would say it would be very hard for him to be the robber if he is five-five.
Fields then alleges:
This same witness testified that the shorter of the two robbers, he would judge to be five-nine, shorter than he was. The taller one he would judge to be in the neighborhood of six foot. However, he also said that they were stooped over slightly. If this was the case, this indicates that the robbers might be even taller if they were not stooped over, slightly. Petitioner’s height was established at (tr. p. 72) as being five-five. At this height of five-five, if your petitioner was stooped over slightly, he would be in the neighborhood of five-feet tall. A very distinct difference from five-feet-nine.
If what Fields alleges is true, I cannot see how Blaney’s identification can fairly be called “positive.” To me, even his direct testimony is not positive. Moreover, an identification which, on direct, is “positive” can be seriously shaken on cross. It will still be an identification, and it may be that a jury will accept it, but it is no longer “positive.” That is the situation here.
I stress the foregoing only to show that Fields’ case was close, and that therefore the missing evidence regarding fingerprints is important — or may be important — to his defense. The question is whether the state “failed to disclose evidence which, in the context of this particular case, might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about his [Fields’] guilt.” United States v. Hibler, 9 Cir., 1972, 463 F.2d 455, 460. To that question I would reply that, on this record, the answer is “prima facie, yes.” I base the answer on the state’s failure to disclose the fifteen or so other *263fingerprints, and the results of the examination of them by the F.B.I. This is not a case such as United States v. Durgin, 9 Cir., 1971, 444 F.2d 308, where the defendant was caught red-handed so that the presence of another’s fingerprint on the contraband was of no help to him. Here, the presence of the fifteen or sixteen other fingerprints, unless they are identified as being those of persons who had authorized access to the I.O.U. file, could support an argument that (a) someone else may have been the robber and that (b) Fields, as a customer of the bar, may have had access to the file at another time and so is not shown by the partial print to have been the robber. The inference would be strong if it could be shown that one or more of the prints were not those persons having such access. Supporting this argument would be at least the following: (1) the robbers wore gloves; (2) neither Blaney nor Chance could positively identify Fields; and (3) others besides employees and Fields had access to the I.O.U. file. I find nothing in the record to support an assumption that there was no identification made of the identities of the other persons whose fingerprints were found. We cannot know whether that is true without the F.B.I. reports.
Because of the rather doubtful nature of the identification evidence, I have misgivings as to whether Alaska has convicted the right man. A twenty-year sentence, especially where the record raises such misgivings, is a very serious matter. The undisclosed evidence may either help to eliminate or to strengthen those misgivings. Neither the trial judge nor this court can tell which unless or until that evidence is made available.
I would remand with directions to issue an order to show cause as provided in § 2243. I would also require the court to obtain a copy of the trial transcript and to order that the state of Alaska provide the court with whatever information it obtained from the F.B.I. or elsewhere about the sixteen or so fingerprints that were found in the I.O.U. drawer behind the bar.