Court Opinion

ID: 9476454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:56:32.920086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:19.939770
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:
Benito Marrero petitioned for habeas corpus relief, alleging three constitutional violations: consecutive sentences imposed on him totalling 240 years were disproportionate to the crime and constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; the admission of custodial statements violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and his trial and sentence under a statute that was amended before trial denied him due process and equal protection.
The district court rejected all three of Marrero’s claims. This court affirmed. Marrero v. Wainwright, 690 F.2d 906 (11th Cir.1982). The Supreme Court vacated our decision and remanded for further consideration in light of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Marrero v. Wainwright, 463 U.S. 1223, 103 S.Ct. 3567, 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983). This court, in turn, remanded to the district court for reconsideration under Helm. Marrero v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 578 (11th Cir.1983).
On remand the district court concluded that the only issue properly before it was Marrero’s claim that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because this was the only issue addressed in Solem v. Helm. We agree. The district court did not, however, comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court requiring that on remand the Eighth Amendment claim be reconsidered under Helm. The case must therefore be reversed and remanded to the district court for compliance with the Supreme Court’s directive.
Marrero entered 12 unoccupied rooms in the same motel, each having a different key, during three days over a period of a month, and stole a television set from each room.1 The motel is located at the intersection of Interstate Highway 75 and State Road 54, in a rural area of Florida. The Florida map reveals that this road intersection is in Pasco County, a largely rural county north of Tampa, which abuts the Gulf of Mexico on the west and has only one sizable town.
Marrero was charged in three separate informations. They alleged a total of 12 counts of breaking and entering2 and 12 counts of grand theft of a television set.3
*1470A jury convicted Marrero of all 24 counts. He was given 12 “stacked” maximum 15 year sentences for the 12 breaking and entering charges, plus 12 “stacked” maximum five year sentences for the 12 thefts, a total of 20 years for the two offenses committed in each of 12 rooms, a grand total of 240 years.4
A U.S. magistrate first considered Marrero’s federal petition in 1980 and recommended denying relief. In 1981 the district court entered an order stating that it had considered the magistrate’s report and recommendation and made an independent examination of the file and that the petition was denied. The court did not adopt the magistrate’s findings or accept his report and gave no further reasons for its decision.
Marrero appealed, and in 1982 this court rejected Marrero’s Eighth Amendment argument and his other contentions, without any comment other than a conclusory statement that they lacked merit. 690 F.2d 906.
In 1983 the Supreme Court decided Helm. The Court held that the constitutional principle of proportionality applies to felony prison sentences under the Eighth Amendment:
In sum, a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
Helm, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. In applying this framework to Helm’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole the Supreme Court had to distinguish Rummel, in which it had found that a life sentence mandated by a Texas recidivist statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment. In Helm the Court emphasized that the possibility of parole had been critical to its decision that Rummel’s sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment and that Helm’s sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole clearly distinguished it from Rummel. Id. at 297, 303 n. 32, 103 S.Ct. at 3013, 3017 n. 32. Thus, while the possibility of parole was a significant factor in the analysis of proportionality, it was simply one factor relevant to prong (i) of the proportionality analysis, which included but was not limited to the three stated factors.
When reconciling its decision in Helm with Rummel the Court made it clear that Rummel had only rejected “a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence” and that, because Rummel “offered no standards for determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar factual situation.” Id. at 303 n. 32, 103 S.Ct. at 3017 n. 32. A “similar factual situation” is narrower than that class of cases in which there is a possibility of parole; a contrary interpretation would render Helm applicable only in those cases where a defendant is not eligible for parole — a limitation that would be inconsistent with the reasoning in that case. In Helm the Court did not say that the possibility of parole would always be sufficient to save a sentence from being struck down under the Eighth Amendment, nor did it say that the availability of parole negated the need to review the sentence for proportionality under the three-part framework it had just delineated. To the contrary, the Court said that criminal sentences are subject to proportionality review and that even a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances. Id. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009.
*1471When this case reached the district court on remand, the court granted Marrero’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief. In his supplemental memorandum of law Marrero set out the proportionality analysis language of Helm that is quoted above. In the appendices to his memorandum and in supplemental filings Marrero tendered data relevant to prong (ii) (the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction) of Helm. He offered data tending to show that the punishment in Florida for a number of violent and heinous crimes, including murder, manslaughter, assault, battery, rape, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and arson, would have been less than that imposed upon him at sentencing. He filed statistical data received from the Florida Department of Corrections, offered to show that of 26,473 inmates in Florida as of March 28, 1984 less than 300 had sentences of 100 years or greater (life and death sentences excluded), and the majority of these were for murder, sexual offenses, and robbery.5 Relevant to prong (iii) (sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions), Marrero discussed at length the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice, 18-4.5 (2d ed. 1982), and the statutes of a number of other states. In a supplemental filing he presented data tending to show that of an estimated 274, 564 state inmates in 1979, only .8 of 1% had sentences of 98 years or more. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1982 at 547 (T. Flanaga & M. McLeod 1982) (source of data).
Additionally, Marrero moved for funding under the Criminal Justice Act to obtain the services of a statistical expert, pointing out that Helm required comparison of penalties meted out in other states.
In his report and recommendation to the district court, the magistrate noted that the parties thought that statistical analysis was necessary to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court requiring reconsideration under Helm. But he skirted this view, skirted the statistical data submitted by Marrero, and skirted the request for CJA-authorized expenses to adduce further statistical data by holding that “extensive analysis” was not required. Having rejected “extensive” analysis (at least statistical, and presumably otherwise), the magistrate reached a conclusion based on the availability of parole to Marrero. The magistrate wrote:
To date, counsel for the parties and, indeed, the undersigned, have assumed that a full scale, extensive statistical analysis would be required in order to satisfy the mandate of the Supreme Court in this case. A review of the cases decided subsequent to Solem has now convinced me to the contrary. Solem, supra, does not require extensive analysis with respect to every excessiveness issue. The Court in Solen [sic] expressly did not require extensive analysis with regard to every petition for habeas corpus relief raising the Eighth Amendment proportionality issue.
The Solem majority opinion noted that its decision was not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 [100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382] (1980), and that Rummel was controlling in similar fact situations.
In Rummel the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for a series of rather minor offenses with eligibility for a reasonably early parole. In Helm the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for parole. The Supreme Court specifically distinguished Solem from Rummel on the basis of the availability of parole, although other distinguishing factors were noted. In the instant case, although the petitioner has been sentenced to a long sentence, he, like Rummel but unlike Helm, will be eligible for early release.
(footnotes omitted). The magistrate '•ec-ommended that the petition be denied and, in light of his recommended finding that Rummel applied and was not overruled by *1472Helm, incorporated the report and recommendation he had initially filed in the case.6
The district court entered an order in which it listed the three Helm criteria but noted that parole is an important factor in evaluating whether a sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate and discussed at length petitioner’s eligibility for parole. The court then adopted the magistrate’s report and denied the petition. Fairly read, the district court’s order rested upon petitioner’s eligibility for parole. Although Marrero had tendered data supporting Helm's criteria (ii) and (iii), and sought an expert to present additional data, the court did not refer to any criteria other than parole as a basis for decision. This reading is confirmed by the court’s order denying Marrero’s petition for reconsideration in which it explained its rationale for not considering Helm’s proportionality analysis: “Applying this analysis to the absolute number of years imposed in the sentence would be misleading when the possibility of parole is such that the sentence will potentially be reduced to a clearly appropriate one. Rummel v. Estelle, [445 U.S. 263], 100 S.Ct. 1133 [63 L.Ed.2d 382] (1980).” Marrero v. Wainwright, No. 80-114 CIV-T-10, (M.D.Fla. Sept. 3, 1985) (unpublished order).
The district court was required to reconsider its decision in light of Helm. It was not mandated to automatically apply Helm and its criteria. It could apply Helm and its criteria or it could hold, based upon proper legal grounds, that the case before it was not controlled by Helm. Or it could hold, as a matter of law or of fact, that some of the Helm criteria had probative value in this case and others did not. The court did none of these. It gave no basis for holding Helm not applicable at all. If it intended to apply Helm, it gave no basis for extracting the sole factor of eligibility for parole and resting its decision on that factor alone. The possibility of parole is not alone a determinative factor under Helm; it is only one element relevant to the first prong of the three prong proportionality analysis set out by the Supreme Court. In Helm the Supreme Court explicitly said that Rummel should not be read to foreclose proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment, that Rummel only rejected a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence and “is controlling only in a similar factual situation.” A “similar factual situation” is not presented every time a court is faced with a case in which there is a possibility of parole.
Moreover, a remand would have been unnecessary if the possibility of parole by itself could be dispositive. There was no reason for the Supreme Court to order a remand if the only factor to be considered by the district court was a factor — eligibility for parole, considered in light of Rum-mel —that was already before the Supreme Court.
Chief Judge Roney seems to suggest that we should assume that the Supreme Court really did not mean what it said when it remanded this case “for further consideration in light of Solem v. Helm.” A principled system could not survive with such a basis for decision-making by courts subject to Supreme Court review. The mandate of the Supreme Court is clear.7
*1473The lack of wisdom in focusing on the availability of parole to the exclusion of all other factors is demonstrated by the fact that if Marrero is arrested for even a minor charge while on parole, his parole can be revoked and he can be subjected to a 240 year sentence that has not been accorded the Helm proportionality analysis nor been the subject of a court determination on proper grounds that Helm does not apply.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

.Marrero entered one unoccupied room on June 24, 1975, seven unoccupied rooms on July 10, and four unoccupied rooms on July 23.

. The informations contained identical recitals, except as to room numbers, as follows:
[defendant did] break and enter a certain building other than a dwelling house, to-wit: that certain building known as motel room No. —, located at Day's Inn of Zephyrhills No. 6076, Interstate 75 and State Road 54_

. See note 3 on page 1470. *1470with intent then and there to commit a felony, to-wit: grand larceny; contrary to Chapter 810.02, Florida Statutes.
3. Each theft count charged felonious taking of a television set of a value in excess of $100, the property of Day’s Inn Motel.

. In his merits appeal Marrero questioned whether each of the separate unoccupied rooms, all in the same occupied motel building, could properly be treated as a separate "unoccupied dwelling.” The state court affirmed without comment. Marrero filed a 3.850 petition, and it was denied and the denial affirmed without opinion.

. In addition he attached to his memorandum new sentencing guidelines of Florida and submitted that, under their criteria, he had already spent more time in confinement than would be imposed under the new guidelines.

. In his first report and recommendation, the magistrate had recommended denying relief, relying on Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), for the proposition that the length of a sentence is a matter of legislative prerogative and on Whalen v. U.S., 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), for the proposition that consecutive sentences are a matter of legislative prerogative.

. Chief Judge Roney also suggests that a federal court has no authority to review state sentences that are within statutory limits. In Helm, 463 U.S. at 288-90, 103 S.Ct. at 3008-09, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment principle of proportionality applies to felony prison sentences.
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing criminals. But no penalty is per se constitutional.16 As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. [660] at 677 [82 S.Ct. 1417, 1420, 8 L.Ed.2d 758], a single day in *1473prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.
16 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestions, post, at 305 [103 S.Ct. at 3017], 315 [103 S.Ct. at 3022], we do not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
Id. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009. The Helm Court makes quite clear that a sentence within statutory limits can be found unconstitutional. Indeed even a sentence under a recidivist statute is one "within the statutory limits," thus the limit staked out by the legislature is not of itself a barrier to the reach of the United States Constitution.
Chief Judge Roney fears that the federal courts may be called upon to conduct a proportionality review of every state case involving consecutive sentences for individual crimes. The Court itself in Helm, 463 U.S. at 290 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 3009 n. 16, answers this floodgates concern.