Court Opinion

ID: 9663890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:54:33.969031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:58.553147
License: Public Domain

Gribbs, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that revocation of acceptance is an action at law and that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.
However, I would find that revocation of acceptance is available against the manufacturer. This Court has held that, in breach of warranty actions, a "contractual relationship” can be said to exist between a remote manufacturer and a retail pur*344chaser where, as here, the manufacturer extends an express warranty. Great American Ins Co v Paty’s, Inc, 154 Mich App 634, 641; 397 NW2d 853 (1986).
Although not a majority view, there are cases in other jurisdictions in line with existing Michigan law. The court in Durfee v Rod Baxter Imports, Inc, 262 NW2d 349, 357 (Minn, 1977), found the existence of a warranty significant when the defendant, Saab-Scania, argued that it had no direct contractual link with the plaintiff:
The existence and comprehensiveness of a warranty undoubtedly are significant factors in a consumer’s decision to purchase a particular automobile. Saab-Scania evidently warrants its automobiles to increase retail sales and indirectly its own sales of Saab automobiles. When the exclusive remedy found in a warranty fails of its essential purpose and when the remaining defects are substantial enough to justify revocation of acceptance, we think the buyer is entitled to look to the warrantor for relief. If plaintiff had sued SaabScania for breach of either express warranty or implied warranty, the absence of privity would not bar the suit despite the language of the pertinent Code sections. McCormack v Hankscraft Co Inc, 278 Minn 322, 337; 154 NW2d 488, 499 (1967); Beck v Spindler, 256 Minn 543, 557; 99 NW2d 670, 679 (1959). See generally, Milbank Mutual Ins Co v Proksch, 244 NW2d 105, 109 [Minn, (1976)]. We see no reason why the result should differ merely because plaintiff has chosen to revoke his acceptance instead of suing for breach of warranty. The remedies of the Code are to be liberally administered. Minn.St. 336.1-106(1). [UCC 1-106, see MCL 440.1106; MSA 19.1106.]
The same reasoning led the court in Volkswagen of America, Inc v Novak, 418 So 2d 801, 804 (Miss, 1982), to reject the manufacturer’s claim that it *345was not liable in an action for revocation of acceptance:
VWoA argues however that they were not a party to the sales contract, therefore, revocation of acceptance and return of the purchase price is not available because they are not "sellers” as defined by Miss.Code Ann. § 75-2-103(l)(d) (1972). [UCC 2-103(1)(2), see MCL 440.2103(l)(d); MSA 19.2103(1) (d)]. While the argument is somewhat persuasive, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the retailers sales contract accompanied by the manufacturer’s warranty, are so closely linked both in time of delivery and subject matter, that they blended into a single unit at the time of sale. We are fortified in this statement by the general observance that sales are usually made, not only upon the make and model of the automobile, but also upon the assurance of the manufacturer, through its warranty, that the vehicle will conform to the standards of merchantability.
In this case, too, the lower court found that because plaintiff could sue Chrysler for breach of warranty without regard to privity, Chrysler should be subject to the legal remedy of revocation of acceptance. I believe this is consistent with the ucc, which provides that where a limited warranty fails in its essential purpose, a plaintiff may seek remedies as provided by the ucc. MCL 440.2719; MSA 19.2719. Plaintiffs warranty in this case was given by Chrysler and was essentially part of the sales transaction.
The majority disingenuously suggests that "a typical purchaser of a motor vehicle” is not left without a remedy. The "lemon law” cited in the majority opinion, MCL 257.1402; MSA 9.2705(2), did not become effective until 1986, long after the plaintiff here purchased his truck in 1982. I decline to second-guess the strategy decisions made *346by counsel in this unsettled area of law, but note that all other remedies are now foreclosed by the passage of time.
Moreover, I believe the Legislature, by enacting MCL 257.1402; MSA 9.2705(2), endorsed the minority view that existence of warranty liability between the manufacturer and the buyer is a sufficient link to invoke the remedy of revocation of acceptance.
I would affirm.