Court Opinion

ID: 9439256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:27:44.178981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:15.617261
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The indictment — read as a whole — fairly informs the defendant that the charged conspiracy included the shipment and delivery of machine tools and thus included *1027the alleged overt acts committed within the five-year limitations period. I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of Count One.
Though the indictment is long, the gist of its story — assumed to be true for these purposes — is simple enough. Facing reduced government business, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a defense contractor, decided to shut down its military aircraft plant in Columbus, Ohio. After considerable negotiation, McDonnell Douglas agreed to sell for $5.4 million various machine tools from the plant to China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (“CATIC”), its partner in an ongoing $1 billion joint venture. Indictment, Count One ¶ ¶ 18, 21-39. Some of the equipment could be legally shipped to China only with export licenses from the Commerce Department; the contract stated that if they could not be obtained McDonnell Douglas would have to buy the equipment back. Id. at ¶ 39. Before the deal was made, Robert Hitt, then the Director of the China Program Office at Douglas Aircraft (a -wholly-owned division of McDonnell Douglas), was called in to help resolve any problems in obtaining the licenses. Id. at ¶ 29. In submissions to the Commerce Department, both contracting parties falsely stated that the tools would be used only in a Beijing facility dedicated to the development of civilian aircraft as part of the joint venture. Id. at ¶ ¶ 41, 50. On September 14, 1994 the Commerce Department granted the licenses. Id. at ¶ 42. In November 1994, CATIC arranged, with the help of McDonnell Douglas, to ship the equipment to two different ports (some 600 miles apart) in China. Id. at ¶ ¶ 51(21)-(23). During approximately the next four months, CATIC diverted six machines (licensed for export to Beijing) to a factory in Nanchang. Id. at ¶ 51(25). At the request of the Commerce Department, McDonnell Douglas inspected the machine tools in China and reported that the terms of the licenses had been violated — setting off a Commerce Department investigation that ultimately led to the October 19, 1999 indictment before us. See United States v. Hitt, 107 F.Supp.2d 29, 31 (D.D.C.2000).
The key issue here is whether Count One of the indictment alleges a conspiracy continuing beyond October 19, 1994 and is thus properly chargeable under the five-year statute of limitations. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216, 67 S.Ct. 224, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946) (statute “runs from the last overt act during the existence of the conspiracy.”). Count One explicitly alleges five overt actions taken after that date, see Count One ¶ 51 (21-25), but these five acts would not count for our purposes unless performed pursuant to the conspiracy. “[T]he crucial question in determining whether the statute of limitations has run is the scope of the conspiratorial agreement, for it is that which determines both the duration of the conspiracy, and whether the act relied on as an overt act may properly be regarded as in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 397, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). In fact the indictment provides ample signs that the claimed conspiracy extended not merely to the securing of export licenses (issued September 14, 1994) but also to the shipment of the equipment to China through actions that bring the conspiracy well within the five-year .window.
An indictment need not be perfectly crafted to survive judicial scrutiny. “The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376, 74 S.Ct. 113, 98 *1028L.Ed. 92 (1953) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). It must “fairly inform^” the defendant of the charge, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), and tell him of its nature “with reasonable certainty,” United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362, 24 L.Ed. 819 (1877). We read the indictment “in its entirety,” and construe it “according to common sense with an appreciation of existing realities.” United States v. Inryco, Inc., 642 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir.1981).
Our specific task is to determine whether the alleged actions within five years of the indictment promoted the object of the alleged conspiracy. The query is similar to resolving claims that a trial court’s permissive evidence rulings broadened the indictment. While indictments cannot be “constructively amended” outside of the grand jury (to permit introduction of evidence), they are interpreted reasonably:
In order to prevail on his claim of constructive amendment, [a defendant] must show that the proof at trial “so altered an essential element of the charge that, upon review, it is uncertain whether the defendant was convicted of conduct that was the subject of the grand jury’s indictment.” No constructive amendment occurs “where a generally framed indictment encompasses the specific legal theory or evidence used at trial.” Accordingly, we have “consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof, provided that the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.”
United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir.2000)(internal citations omitted). Taken as a whole, this indictment adequately apprises Hitt that the conspiracy extended beyond the receipt of the export licenses and encompassed the shipment of the equipment to China.
A natural starting place is the language explicitly addressing the goal of the conspiracy — “to obtain export licenses allowing the sale and exportation of machine tools to [China].” Count One ¶ 44 (emphasis added). Taken alone, this passage is susceptible of the narrow reading assigned by the majority — that the goal was only to secure the licenses, with the parties lacking any shared purpose as to actual export or delivery. But the broader meaning asserted by the government is quite plausible. When a person says he wants to obtain “a visa allowing travel to Beijing,” the literal reading — that he is indifferent to the use of the visa — is possible but not necessarily likely. That depends on context. The remainder of the indictment, as we shall see, shows that the grand jury was asserting that the parties’ jointly intended to get the tools to China. The written contract between McDonnell Douglas and CATIC focused on obtaining the export licenses, to be sure, but parties can be (and often are) accused of having a conspiratorial agreement beyond that memorialized in a legitimate sales deal. There is no parol evidence rule that prevents a criminal agreement from being broader than a contract to which it is related.
Having chosen the narrow reading of the statement of conspiratorial “goal,” the majority then discounts everything in the indictment inconsistent with that reading. See Maj. Op. at 1022 (saying that CATIC defendants’ alleged purposes “extended beyond the common goal” of the conspiracy and thus cannot “broaden” its definition); 1023 (saying that “Manner and Means” paragraphs cannot “expand” or “redefine” scope of conspiracy because grand jury did not state goal in broad terms); 1023-24 (saying that overt acts cannot be accepted as stated because this would “extend” scope beyond stated goal); 1024 (saying that stated duration *1029of conspiracy to March 1995 cannot be accepted because it would conflict with alleged goal and would “expand” conspiracy); 1025 (saying that Paragraph 43(a) cannot function as a “catch-all, umbrella section” for the government because of its “generic language”); 1025 (saying that economic benefit to McDonnell Douglas from completing shipment must be disregarded because only CATIC was interested in delivery of the equipment). The more conventional approach, when confronted with an ambiguity, is to assume that other provisions of the document as a whole may shed light on the meaning of the ambiguous passage. Here they do indeed — the statements of purposes, of means and manner, of duration of the conspiracy, and of overt acts all point to the broader meaning. See Count One ¶ ¶ 1, 43-50, 51(21)-(25).
The indictment says that the CATIC defendants — unsurprisingly—cared about shipment: They wanted to get the equipment for “unrestricted use at undisclosed facilities within [China], including Nanchang, a factory known for its military production.” Id. at ¶ 44. And McDonnell Douglas and Hitt are explicitly said to have purposes that would extend beyond the issuance of the licenses: They wanted to “maintain the ongoing commercial relationship between McDonnell Douglas and CATIC and to promote the prospects for existing and future business contacts between the parties.” Id. Obviously McDonnell Douglas’s purpose of maintaining a favorable commercial relationship with CATIC would have been thwarted if the licenses were obtained but never used; thus McDonnell Douglas’s alleged purpose fits the broader meaning, and only the broader meaning, of the stated goal.
The majority asserts that McDonnell Douglas “would satisfy its purpose ... only by performing the acts that were under its control, namely selling the machine tools to CATIC and applying for the export licenses necessary to complete the sale.” Maj. Op. at 1022 n.13 (emphasis added). This reflects a mistaken idea of what was under McDonnell Douglas’s control. In fact the indictment explicitly alleges an affirmative post-October 19, 1994 act that ivas under McDonnell Douglas’s control, namely filling out forms coded to get the equipment to the two intended sites in China. See Count One ¶ 51 (21) (November 2, 1994 act); see also id. at ¶ 47(b) (explaining coding system). Thus McDonnell Douglas concretely and actively helped CATIC realize the shared goal of delivery to China.
Moreover, at least until the licenses were used, McDonnell Douglas could advance the joint interests of the alleged conspirators by keeping quiet. The indictment includes an allegation of “con-cealfing]” by trick, scheme or device material facts in the jurisdiction of the executive branch (Count One ¶ 43(a)) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and asserts that the conspiracy went on until March 1995 (Count One § 51 (25)), when the tools were delivered to Nanchang.1 The majority nonetheless throws out the period of shipment and delivery on the ground that inclusion of the period needed for the conspirators to reap the full benefits could properly “extend the duration of the conspiracy only if all de*1030fendants contemplated those benefits and agreed to receive them.” Maj. Op. at 1025. But McDonnell Douglas’s benefits included the relationship enhancement that completed shipment would bring, and in any event the cases allow inclusion of the period needed for each conspirator to receive his or her share of the benefits. See United States v. Mennuti, 679 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir.1982) (“Similarly, even if the main objective of the conspiracy in this case was to defraud [the insurance company], the conspiracy continued until its other objectives, including [one co-conspirator’s] own payoff, were achieved.”). And, given that the scheme of deceit and concealment is alleged to have culminated in a specific event (i.e., the delivery occurring in March 1995), there is no risk of defendants’ being charged with an eternal conspiracy. Properly understood, the indictment thus falls easily on the permissible side of the line drawn by then-Judge Breyer in United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.1989), distinguishing between receiving the fruits of an enterprise in “one action, or a handful of actions, taking place over a limited period of time,” id. at 61, and receiving them in the form of a “lengthy, indefinite series of ordinary, typically noncriminal, unilateral actions, such as receiving salary payments,” id. The former is permissible, the latter often not. Here the indictment is of the former type.
From the government’s acknowledgment at oral argument that the indictment would remain valid even if the ship containing the equipment sank before it reached China, the majority concludes that “[i]f delivery or shipment of the machinery was unnecessary to the common goal of the conspirators, then by definition the government cannot extend the conspiracy past the issuance of the export licenses.” Maj. Op. at 1026. On this basis, the majority simply reads out of the indictment all five post-October 19, 1994 overt acts. Id. But the government did not say that the shipment was unnecessary to achieve the conspiracy’s goal; it said only that the indictment would still be valid if the shipment were not successful. See Oral Argument Tr. at 10. This reflects a standard truth of conspiracy law: One can be convicted of conspiracy even if the goal is not realized, so long as there is an overt act in furtherance of the goal. See United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C.Cir.1985); Wayne R. LaFave, Modern Criminal Law 645 (2d ed. 1988). The sunk ship hypothetical is relevant only in that such a sinking would, in all likelihood, have conclusively thwarted the parties’ shared goal, thus ending the conspiracy. If that had occurred more than five years prior to indictment, the indictment for conspiracy would be time barred. But no ship sank, and indeed the equipment didn’t even leave Ohio until after the key date of October 19,1994.
Most telling is the indictment’s list of overt acts, expressly stated by the indictment to be “[i]n furtherance of the conspiracy and to accomplish the objects thereof.” Count One ¶ 51 (emphasis added). Five of the listed acts — including the shipment and diversion of the tools — plainly occurred after October 1994, within the statute of limitations for conspiracy. See id. at ¶ ¶ 51(21)-(25). Though the majority suggests otherwise, see Maj. Op. at 1019, 1020 n.10, it is irrelevant (1) that Hitt did not personally perform any of these acts, (2) that the records executed in Overt Act 21 are internal McDonnell Douglas records, (3) that four out of five acts relate to CATIC’s shipping efforts, and (4) that the parties did not agree specifically as to each of the acts. When parties join a scheme, they become responsible for the entirety of its execution, “joined together by their *1031knowledge of its essential features and broad scope,” Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947), and either party’s ignorance of the details of the overt acts committed by the other is of no consequence. Id. See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1058 (7th Cir.1992) (“The government is not required to prove any overt acts with regard to a particular defendant within the limitations period; instead, the government is required to prove that the conspiracy existed into the limitations period and that the defendants did not withdraw before that period.”).
The majority refuses to read the indictment as a whole when it argues that these acts are not in furtherance of the conspiracy because they do not relate to the receipt of the export licenses. See Maj. Op. at 1024. Although overt acts cannot extend the scope of the conspiracy unless they were committed in furtherance of a common goal, see id., an indictment’s allegations of overt acts can help interpret its other language. Accord Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 458, 28 S.Ct. 163, 52 L.Ed. 278 (1908) (using limited character of alleged overt acts to support narrow reading of remainder of indictment). Since only a single conspiracy is charged, the majority’s reasoning implies that the grand jury’s inclusion of these acts was unnecessary or mistaken. But we should not excise part of the indictment lightly. See United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1134 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[A] motion to strike surplusage [from the indictment] should be granted only if it is clear that the allegations are not relevant ... ”; “Rule 7(d) has been strictly construed against striking surplusage.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Manner and Means section of the indictment is in full accord. The grand jury alleged that “in seeking to achieve the goal of the conspiracy” CATIC “did ship the equipment to locations not reflected in such export applications,” and McDonnell Douglas and Hitt concealed from the government “that separate packing instructions, designating two ports of delivery, were being employed for all of the licensa-ble machine tools.” Count One ¶ ¶ 45, 47, 49(b)(2). The majority discards the allegedly false statements made to the Commerce Department and other activities after the licenses were issued, using the now familiar argument that these couldn’t have been in fulfillment of the conspiracy’s goal, as narrowly construed by the majority. See Maj. Op. at 1022-23. But the indictment specifies that the conduct described under Manners and Means was to “achieve the goal of the conspiracy.” The necessary implication is that the better reading of the “goal” statement is the broader one encompassing efforts to deliver the goods.
Finally, the indictment states in at least three places that the conspiracy ended in or around March 1995. Count One ¶ ¶ 43, 47(n), 51(25). In Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 80 S.Ct. 481, 4 L.Ed.2d 412 (1960), overruled on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the Supreme Court was similarly confronted with an ambiguous indictment that alleged its duration in years and asserted some overt acts even in the year of indictment. It explicitly relied on the overt acts to resolve the ambiguity. See 361 U.S. at 423, 80 S.Ct. 481.
Robert Hitt may be entirely innocent of the charges. Or the government may in fact be unable to prove his joinder in the broader goal of the conspiracy and thus his complicity in the activities after issuance of the licenses. But the indictment’s unequivocal assertions of McDonnell Doug*1032las’s purposes, of the conspiracy’s duration, of the manner and means of execution that involve completion of the shipment, and of the overt acts looking to that completion plainly resolve the indictment’s ambiguous statement of the conspiracy’s goal, making clear that it charges a conspiracy reaching into the five-year window. Since the indictment adequately apprised Hitt of the scope of the charged conspiracy, the statute of limitations defense cannot properly rest on its language.

. The indictment also explicitly alleges violation of 15 CFR § 787.5, which imposes a continuing obligation to disclose: “Every person who has made any representation, statement, or certification must notify, in writing, the Bureau of Export Administration ... of any change of any material fact or intention from that previously represented, stated, or certified.” 15 CFR § 787.5(a)(3); see also 55 Fed. Reg. 31,176 (1990). Because this reference is located in a subsection that appears to be focused on "obtaining” the licenses, Count One § 43(b), I do not rely on it.