Court Opinion

ID: 9635028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:32:47.440351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:15.080476
License: Public Domain

ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the district court did not err in deny*981ing Banks’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, and in defining and applying the terms “masturbation” and “lascivious.” I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Banks’s spouse that he told her he produced a video for distribution on the internet to other pedophiles that depicts him masturbating their two-year-old grandchild. I would affirm that ruling.
I am persuaded that the majority has erred in holding that the law of this Circuit precludes us from deciding a question it has not previously considered, i.e., whether the marital communications privilege is applicable to the voluntary testimony of a spouse concerning the statements of an accused that connect him to the sexual abuse of their grandchild. In so holding, the majority has neglected its duty pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to decide questions involving the applicability of the marital communications privilege on a case-by-case basis “in light of reason and experience.”1 The majority’s remarkable finding that a grandchild is not the “functional equivalent of a birth or step-child,” (Majority Opinion at 975) will surely come as a complete surprise to grandparents.
I
The majority has determined that “[o]ur governing precedent” in determining whether the marital communications privilege should apply to an accused’s admission to his spouse of committing a crime against their grandchild is United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir.1992). Majority Opinion at 977. That issue was not before this court in White. Instead, this court addressed a discrete question in White, i.e., whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of a spouse that the accused had threatened to kill her and her daughter. White, 974 F.2d at 1137.
In affirming the trial court’s ruling that the spouse’s testimony was admissible, we reasoned as follows:
This court has counseled that the marital communications privilege must be narrowly construed because it obstructs the truth seeking process. Use of the privilege in criminal proceedings requires a particularly narrow construction because of society’s strong interest in the administration of justice. The public policy interests in protecting the integrity of marriages and ensuring that spouses freely communicate with one another underlie the marital communications privilege. When balancing these interests we find that threats against spouses and a spouse’s children do not further the purposes of the privilege and that the public interest in the administration of justice outweighs any possible purpose the privilege serves in such a case.
Id. at 1138 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
This court did not hold in White that the marital communications privilege should not apply to an admission by the accused to his or her spouse that he or she had *982sexually abused their grandchild. Without citation to any relevant language in White, the majority has erroneously construed that decision to limit the exception to the marital communications privilege in prosecutions for crimes against children to statements made by “the functional equivalents of parents.” Majority Opinion at 977. Our holding in White was limited as follows: a trial court can properly balance the admission of the voluntary testimony of a spouse, regarding the threats by the accused to harm a stepchild, against the privilege that communications between spouses should be treated as confidential and inadmissible in a criminal proceeding to maintain marital harmony. White, 974 F.2d at 1138.
We held in White that the critical question in determining if the marital communications privilege should apply is whether or not the conduct is “inconsistent with the purposes of the marital communications privilege: promoting confidential communications between spouses in order to foster marital harmony.” Id. Obviously, an admission to a spouse by the accused that he produced a video for distribution on the internet depicting his masturbation of their grandchild to other pedophiles would destroy the harmonious relationship of marital partners.
Indeed, the impact of Banks’s admission that he abused their grandchild must have been emotionally devastating to his wife in view of her knowledge that “the [grandchild in question [was] the son of the very person[Banks] plead guilty to molesting and going to prison for in 1990.” Transcript of Record at 371, United States v. Banks, Case No. 1:06-CR-00051-S-BLW-WBS. See also Indictment, Case No. 1:06-CR-00051-S-BLW, March 14, 2006.2 After Banks pled guilty to sexually molesting their son, he was imprisoned for twelve years. Transcript of Record at 3, 371, Banks, Case No. 1:06-CR-00051-S-BLW-WBS.
II
Any inquiry concerning the federal court’s extension of a testimonial privilege necessarily begins with Rule 501. The genesis of the language of Rule 501 can be traced to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212, 78 L.Ed. 369 (1933) and Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 54 S.Ct. 279, 78 L.Ed. 617 (1934). The Funk decision tracks language from Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 13 S.Ct. 60, 36 L.Ed. 991 (1892). In Benson, the government called as a witness a codefendant whose trial had been severed from that of the accused. Benson, 146 U.S. at 335, 13 S.Ct. 60. Precedent appeared to require that the court declare the codefendant was not competent. Id. at 336, 13 S.Ct. 60 (“It is familiar knowledge that the old common law carefully excluded from the witness stand parties to the record, and those who were interested in the result; and this rule extended to both civil and criminal cases.”) In Benson, the Supreme Court held that it was not “precluded by [precedent] from examining this question in the light of general authority and sound reason.” Benson, 146 U.S. at 335, 13 S.Ct. 60. In reviewing the historical grounds for excluding a codefendent from testifying, the Supreme Court explained that
[t]he courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors. But the last fifty years have wrought a great change in these respects, and today the tendency is to enlarge the domain of competency *983and to submit to the jury for their consideration as to the credibility of the witness those matters which heretofore were ruled sufficient to justify his exclusion. This change has been wrought partially by legislation and partially by judicial construction.
Id. at 336, 13 S.Ct. 60.
Thus, because traditional reasons for holding a codefendant incompetent to testify against an accused were no longer deemed sound, the Court revised the rule, supporting its conclusion by citing a trend toward a rule against incompetency. Id. at 337, 13 S.Ct. 60 (“Legislation of similar import prevails in most of the States. The spirit of this legislation has controlled the decisions of the courts ... ”).
In Funk, the Supreme Court overturned the rule prohibiting spousal testimony in federal criminal trials. Funk, 290 U.S. at 387, 54 S.Ct. 212 (overruling, in part, Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 31 S.Ct. 193, 55 L.Ed. 102 (1911) and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 41 S.Ct. 98, 65 L.Ed. 214 (1920)). Citing Benson, the Supreme Court in Funk rejected the notion “that the courts, in the face of greatly changed conditions, are still chained to the ancient formulae and are powerless to declare and enforce modifications deemed to have been wrought in the common law itself by force of these changed conditions.” Funk, 290 U.S. at 379, 54 S.Ct. 212. Instead, the Court held that the question should be “disposed of ... in the light of general authority and sound reason.” Id. at 380, 54 S.Ct. 212. Reviewing the early, common law rule that a spouse was incompetent to testify for an accused spouse, in Funk the Court reasoned as follows:
The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest — if they are to rest upon reason — is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth. And since experience is of all teachers the most dependable, and since experience also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule.
Id. at 381, 54 S.Ct. 212. The Court further explained that
the exclusion of the wife’s testimony, in the face of the broad and liberal extension of the rules in respect of the competency of witnesses generally, [can no longer be] justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public policy. It has been said that to admit such testimony is against public policy because it would endanger the harmony and confidence of marital relations, and, moreover, would subject the witness to the temptation to commit perjury. Modern legislation, in making either spouse competent to testify in behalf of the other in criminal cases, has definitely rejected these notions, and in the light of such legislation and of modern thought they seem to be altogether fanciful. The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another.
Id. (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854).
In Wolfle, decided a year after Funk, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling by the Ninth Circuit that a husband’s statement, made to his wife through the use of a stenographer, was not privileged, even though it was intended to be communicated to his wife.3 Wolfle v. United States, 64 *984F.2d 566 (9th Cir.1933). The Supreme Court held that evidentiary rules are “governed by common-law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience.” Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 12, 54 S.Ct. 279 (emphasis added). The examination of “general authority” as described in Funk, thus evolved into an assessment of “experience” in Wolfle. As part of its assessment of “experience,” the Court in Wolfle reviewed various state court privilege rulings, some predicated on state statutes, and concluded that the defendant’s statement was not protected by the privilege protecting marital confidences. Id. at 17, 54 S.Ct. 279.
It is indisputable that Congress endorsed inclusion of state law in directing federal courts to develop “common law principles ... in light of reason and experience” in enacting Rule 501. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (“The authors of the Rule borrowed this phrase from our opinion in Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12, 54 S.Ct. 279, 78 L.Ed. 617 (1934)”). In Jaffee, the court stated that “it is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both ‘reason’ and ‘experience.’ ” 518 U.S. at 13, 116 S.Ct. 1923.
The Supreme Court held in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) that in “enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege.” 445 U.S. at 47, 100 S.Ct. 906. Under Rule 501, federal courts are authorized to “develop[ ] ... testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience.” Id. In enacting Rule 501, Congress did not restrict development in the law of privilege to federal legislation, and declined to limit the range of possible privileges. Congress instead crafted Rule 501 in order to “provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.” Id. citing 120 Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate). It was Congress’ intent “to leave the door open to change.” Id. After embarking on a comprehensive review of the history of the marital testimonial privilege, as well as the evolving trends in state law concerning the marital communications privilege, the Court noted that “support for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony ha[d] eroded” in recent years, and affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the witness-spouse alone holds the privilege to refuse to testify adversely. Id. The Court noted in Trammel that
[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding — whatever the motivation — their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. In these circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits the accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace.
Id. at 52, 100 S.Ct. 906 (emphasis added).4
The courts’ intent to foster evolution in the area of testimonial privilege was reinforced more recently in Jaffee. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that communications within the psychotherapist-patient relationship are privileged. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9, 116 S.Ct. 1923. In recognizing the new testimonial privilege, the Court insisted that reliance upon laws enacted by state legislatures *985should be used as a model for developing the common law of privilege pursuant to Rule 501 is entirely “appropriate.” See id. at 13, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (“In Funk v. United States, we recognized that it is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both ‘reason’ and ‘experience.’ ”) (citation omitted). The Court explained
[t]hat it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege. We have previously observed that the policy decisions of the States bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one.
Id. at 12, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906; United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368, n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 1185, 63 L.Ed.2d 454 (1980)).
The Court reasoned in Jaffee that “[b]e-cause state legislatures are fully aware of the need to protect the integrity of the factfinding functions of their courts, the existence of a consensus among the States indicates that ‘reason and experience’ support recognition of the privilege.” Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The Court also noted that “[i]t is of no consequence that recognition of the privilege in the vast majority of states is the product of legislative action rather than judicial decision.” Id. “The present unanimous acceptance of the privilege” by “state lawmakers” is persuasive proof of a solid social “consensus” that the psychotherapist-patient relationship merits the protection of an evidentia-ry privilege. Id. Thus, the stated policy underlying Rule 501 is served by consideration not only of state case law, but also laws enacted by the states in developing the law of privilege. The majority has failed to look to laws enacted by Idaho and other states that permit a spouse to testify regarding a spouse’s admission in a state prosecution concerning sexual abuse of a minor child.
A
The two primary assumptions underlying the recognition of testimonial privileges as articulated by the Court in Jaffee are that
there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and, any exceptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many dero-gations from a positive general rule. Exceptions from the general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges may be justified, however, by a “public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.”
Id. at 9, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50-51, 100 S.Ct. 906 (holding that because “[tjestimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that ‘the public ... has a right to every man’s evidence,’ ... they must be strictly construed”)).
The traditional justification for a marital adverse testimonial privilege is that it serves the “public good” because forcing one spouse to testify against another in a criminal case would lead to one of two unacceptable results: it could potentially cause a break up of the marriage if the witness spouse voluntarily inculpated her husband, or it could promote perjury. See, e.g., Clements v. Marston, 52 N.H. 31 (1872). As explained by the court in Clements:
At common law ... [a]ny person not a party, if interested in the result of the suit, was excluded as a witness on the ground of interest. Wives were excluded, — 1st, on the ground of interest, they being interested wherever their hus*986bands were; and 2d, upon the ground of public policy, that it was not expedient to place husband and wife in a position that might lead to dissensions and strife between them, or that might encourage perjury. Hence, wives were not allowed to testify for or against their husbands when they were parties to civil proceedings, and, for the same reason, both were excluded when either was a party in a criminal case.
Id. at 37; see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44, 100 S.Ct. 906 (“The modern justification for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.”).
B
Since Trammel was decided in 1980, courts, federal and state, and state legislatures, have continued to limit the marital communications privilege in obedience to the Court’s direction that it “must be strictly construed and accepted ‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilization of all rational means for ascertaining the truth.’ ” Id. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 {quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)). This trend undeniably demonstrates that marital communications regarding the sexual abuse of a minor child are not protected because they are antithetical to society’s concept of the marital relationship. In analyzing the question whether the marital communications privilege should apply to communications concerning crimes against the grandchild of an accused, it is not only instructive to review this evolving trend, it is required that we do so if we are to interpret “the principles of the common law ... in the light of reason and experience.” Fed.R.Evid. 501.5
In United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir.1975), the Eighth Circuit held, in an opinion announced prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Trammel, “that a serious crime against a child is an offense against that family[’s] harmony and to society as well.” Id. at 1366. The court held in Allery that the marital facts privilege did not apply in a case where the defendant’s step-child was the victim. Id. at 1367.
In United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir.1992), this court cited Allery in extending the exception to the marital communications privilege to include statements relating to crimes against step-children. White, 974 F.2d at 1138. We held in White that “the marital communications privilege should not apply to statements relating to a crime where a spouse or a spouse’s children are the victims.” Id. We reasoned in White that “[protecting threats against a spouse or the spouse’s children is inconsistent with the purposes of the marital communications privilege: promoting confidential communications between spouses in order to foster marital harmony.” Id. We also stated in White that because the marital communications privilege “obstructs the truth seeking process,” its use “in criminal proceedings requires a particularly narrow construction *987because of society’s strong interest in the administration of justice.” Id.
In United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir.1997), the Tenth Circuit held that “we recognize an exception to the marital communications privilege for spousal testimony relating to the abuse of any minor child within the household.” Id. at 1446. The Tenth Circuit reasoned as follows in Bahe:
We see no significant difference, as a policy matter, between a crime against a child of the married couple, against a stepchild living in the home or, as here, against an eleven-year-old relative visiting in the home. Child abuse is a horrendous crime. It generally occurs in the home ... and is often covered up by the innocence of small children and by threats against disclosure. It would be unconscionable to permit a privilege grounded on promoting communications of trust and love between marriage partners to prevent a properly outraged spouse with knowledge from testifying against the perpetrator of such a crime.
Id. at 1446 (citation omitted). Since we published our decision in White, a number of jurisdictions have held that an accused’s statements to his spouse relating to crimes against children are admissable without limiting the exception to crimes against children of the marriage or of either spouse.
In United States v. Martinez, 44 F.Supp.2d 835 (W.D.Tex.1999), the district court held that “in a case where one spouse is accused of abusing minor children, society’s interest in the administration of justice far outweighs its interest in protecting whatever harmony or trust may at that point still remain in the marital relationship.” Id. at 836. “Reason and experience dictate that the marital communications privilege should not apply to statements relating to a crime where the victim is a minor child.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
In Fisher v. State, 690 So.2d 268 (Miss. 1996), the defendant challenged his conviction for the capital rape of his 11-year-old niece on the ground that the trial court erred in allowing his wife to testify that he admitted sexually abusing his niece to her. The Supreme Court of Mississippi interpreted Mississippi Rule of Evidence 504(d) to except from the marital communications privilege testimony relating to crimes against any minor child. Id. at 272.
In State v. Modest, 88 Wash.App. 239, 944 P.2d 417 (Wash.Ct.App.1997), the court held that under Rev.Code Wash. (ARCW) § 5.60.060, “the guardianship exception applies when any spouse acts in loco parentis, meaning when he or she assumes the parental character or discharges parental duties, even if for a very short time.” Id. at 247-48, 944 P.2d 417. The Washington statute construed in Modest provided that communications between spouses are not protected by the marital privilege in a “proceeding for a crime committed by said spouse or domestic partner against any child of whom said spouse or domestic partner is the parent or guardian.” Rev.Code Wash. (ARCW) § 5.60.060. The court in Modest considered “the paramount legislative intent to insure effective prosecutions for sexual crimes against children,” and concluded that “[i]n light of this overriding concern, [the court] liberally interprets the word ‘guardian’ to punish child abusers and protect children from further mistreatment.” Id.
In State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1997), the Iowa Supreme Court held that Iowa Code § 232.74, which prohibited the disclosure of communications between married persons, did not apply in a child abuse prosecution. Id. at 561.
In Munson v. State, 331 Ark. 41, 959 S.W.2d 391 (1998), the defendant was *988charged with sexually assaulting his wife’s 14-fourteen-year-old sister, who was visiting in their home when the crime occurred. Id. at 392. Rule 504(d)(3) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence sets forth an exception to the marital privilege when one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of a person “residing” in the household of either. Ark. R. Evid. 504(d)(3). The Supreme Court of Arkansas held in, Munson that the victim in the case was “residing” in the accused’s household because her “temporary residence with the Munsons presented the same opportunity to Mr. Munson he would have had if the victim intended to remain in the household indefinitely.” Id. at 393.
In Villalta v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 429, 702 N.E.2d 1148 (Mass.1998), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the question whether the marital communications privilege applied to preclude the accused’s spouse from testifying against her husband, who was charged with rape, indecent assault and battery, and assault and battery on a two-year-old girl. The child was unrelated to the wife or the husband. She periodically received day-care services from the accused’s spouse in their home. Id. at 429-30, 702 N.E.2d 1148. The trial court allowed Mrs. Villalta to invoke the marital communications privilege. Id. at 430, 702 N.E.2d 1148. The trial court concluded Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 233, § 20 was inapplicable when the alleged victim was not a child of either spouse and did not live with them. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed. Section 20 provides that “except in any proceeding relating to child abuse, including incest, neither husband nor wife shall be required to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding against the other.” Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 233, § 20. The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the statute as follows:
We see no logical reason for the Legislature to deny the spousal privilege when a young victim of abuse is a child of one or both spouses (or other child closely related by consanguinity) but to perpetuate the privilege when the young victim is related to neither spouse. The abuse is the same. Society’s interest in convicting and punishing one who commits child abuse is the same. The threat to the preservation of the family unit arising from one spouse being compelled to testify against the other seems substantially identical in all instances. Indeed, if the defendant’s alleged child abuse was not incestuous, the spouse’s compelled testimony might be less threatening to the marriage than if she were compelled to testify, as the wife and defendant agree she must, concerning incestuous child abuse, which involves an even greater stigma than child abuse alone. The criminal conduct asserted in this case, abuse of the victim in the defendant’s home, shows that the need for the testimony of a defendant’s spouse may be as great as it would be if the alleged victim were their own child. We choose to apply the literal meaning of the words “child abuse” to § 20, cl. Second. Child abuse in common usage is not limited to the abuse of one’s own child but means the abuse of any child.
Id. at 434-35, 702 N.E.2d 1148.
In J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 714 A.2d 924 (1998), a civil action was filed against the wife of a 64-year old man, who had pled guilty to criminally sexually assaulting two unrelated, adolescent neighbor girls- — ages 12 and 15. Id. at 334, 714 A.2d 924. The parents of the children alleged the perpetrator’s wife was liable for their physical and emotional injury, because she “was aware of her husband’s history of pedophilia as well as his conduct involving these children.” Id. at 335 n. 1, 714 A.2d 924 (citing J.S. v. R.T.H., 301 N.J.Super. *989150, 693 A.2d 1191 (App.Div., 1997)). The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the defendant-wife could be held liable for her husband’s criminal conduct if she knew of or should have known of his sexual proclivities but failed to warn others. Id. at 352, 714 A.2d 924.
Noting that the New Jersey legislature had dealt comprehensively with the subject of child abuse, and enacted statutes designed to prevent the sexual abuse of children, the court commented that “it is the intent of this legislation to assure that the lives of innocent children are immediately safeguarded from further injury and possible death and that the legal rights of such children are fully protected.” Id. at 343, 714 A.2d 924. The court acknowledged that “[wjhile the interest in protecting children from sexual abuse is great, this Court must also take into consideration defendants’ interests in a stable marital relationship and in marital privacy.” Id at 345, 714 A.2d 924 (citing State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406, 414, 640 A.2d 817 (1994)). The court concluded, however, that “[t]he societal interest in enhancing marital relationships cannot outweigh the societal interest in protecting children from sexual abuse. The child-abuse reporting statute itself has mandated that balance — it applies to every citizen, including a spouse.” Id. (citations omitted). “As the Appellate Division here described, ‘the Legislature’s adoption of that statute [i.e., “Megan’s Law”] is an expression of New Jersey’s strong public policy favoring protection of children over the privacy of an offending adult.’ ” Id. (citing 301 N.J.Super. at 157, 693 A.2d 1191). “Thus, ‘[t]he protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.’ ” Id. (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976)). The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the Appellate Division’s decision to overrule Rozycki v. Peley, 199 N.J.Super. 571, 579, 489 A.2d 1272 (Law Div.1984) “to the extent that it ‘places a higher priority upon preserving the defendants’ marital relationship than upon protecting children from abuse.’ ” Id. (citing 301 N.J.Super. at 157, 693 A.2d 1191). The court explained its ruling as follows:
This Court has recognized that the sexual abuse of children not only traumatizes the victims, but also exacts a heavy toll on society: Recent research indicates that a number of psychosocial problems — including chronic depression and anxiety, isolation and poor social adjustment, substance abuse, suicidal behavior, and involvement in physically or sexually abusive relationships as either aggressor or victim — are more common among adults molested as children than among those with no such childhood experiences. Victims of sexual abuse can suffer an impaired ability to critically evaluate the motives and behavior of others, making them more vulnerable to revictimization. An especially disturbing finding about child sexual abuse is its strong intergenerational pattern; in particular, due to the psychological impact of their own abuse, sexually abused boys have been found to be more likely than non-abused boys to turn into offenders against the next generation of children, and sexually abused girls are more likely to become mothers of children who are abused. And studies show that adult male aggressive behavior, particularly sexual aggression, is associated with the trauma of childhood sexual abuse. Thus, apart from the substantial personal trauma caused to the victims of such crimes, sexual crimes against children exact heavy social costs as well.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Huddleston v. State, 997 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.App. Houston 1st Dist.1999), the court upheld the trial court’s admission of a spouse’s testimony against her husband *990who was charged with raping the ten-year-old daughter of a neighbor. Id. at 321. The court held that “Rule 504(b)(4)(A) states that the privilege does not apply in any proceeding in which the person is charged with ‘a crime against the person’s spouse, a member of the household of either spouse, or any minor.’ ” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Tex.R. Evid. 504(b)(4)(A)). “The language of amended rule 504(b)(4)(A) makes it clear that the exception applies when the spouse is charged with a crime against any minor.”6 Id. (emphasis in original). See also Ludwig v. State, 872 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.App. Waco 1994) (holding that a wife may testify against a husband charged with killing his nephew because the exception to the marital communications privilege involving crimes “against the person of any minor child or any member of the household of either spouse” included crimes against any minor child, whether or not the child of either spouse).
In Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180, 753 A.2d 84 (2000), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106, testimony concerning “the abuse of a child under 18” is exempted from the “non-compellability of a spouse to testify as an adverse witness in a criminal ease.” Id. at 197, 753 A.2d 84. In State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 2001), the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the exception to the marital communications privilege provided for in Iowa Code § 232.74 applies to cases of child abuse that result from acts or omissions of a care provider. Id. at 36-37. In § 232.68(7), a “person responsible for the care of a child” is defined as:
a. a parent, guardian, or foster parent; b. a relative or any other person with whom the child resides and who assumes care or supervision of the child, without reference to the length of time or continuity of such residence; c. an employee or agent of any public or private facility providing care for a child, including an institution, hospital, health care facility, group home, mental health center, residential treatment center, shelter care facility, detention center, or child care facility; or, d. any person providing care for a child, but with whom the child does not reside, without reference to the duration of the care.
See Iowa Code § 232.68(7).
In Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 572 Pa. 17, 813 A.2d 707 (2002), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the admissibility of communications between the ac-*991eused and his wife concerning the rape of his step-daughter. The court stated that:
Even if it is assumed that the [statutory-exceptions to the marital communications privilege specifically addressing child abuse do] not act directly to provide a broad child abuse “exception” to [the application of Pennsylvania’s marital communications privilege] in criminal proceedings, it certainly affects what a spouse’s “reasonable expectation” of continued confidentiality may be with respect to marital communications that reveal the previous or intended abuse and intimidation of a child.
Id. at 42, 813 A.2d 707. Accordingly, the court held that the accused who described to his wife his previous abuse of a child had no reasonable expectation under Pennsylvania law that such communication will “remain confidential.” Id.
C
Thirty-eight states, and the District of Columbia, have enacted legislation expanding, by statute or rule, exceptions to the marital communications privilege. In twenty-six jurisdictions, there is no privilege where the accused has been charged with criminal abuse of any child, regardless of whether there is a familial affiliation with the victim-child. See Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4062 & 13-604 (eliminating the privilege in cases involving any “dangerous crime against children” and “[s]exual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age”); Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-518 (no marital privilege shall prevent anyone from testifying concerning child maltreatment); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18 — 3— 411(5) (2006) (no marital communications privilege in cases involving sexual offenses, including sexual offenses against children); Conn. GemStat. § 46b-129a (2007) (eliminating the privilege in all child abuse cases); Dist. Columbia St. § 22^4124 (“Laws attaching a privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses or domestic partners are inapplicable in prosecutions ... where the victim is a child”); Ga.Code Ann. § 24-9-23 (2007) (no privilege in crimes against any minor child); Id. R. Evid. 504(d)(1) (eliminating privilege in all child abuse cases) and Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203 (precluding use of the privilege in “any case of physical injury to a child where the injury has been cause as a result of physical abuse or neglect by one or both of the parents” and “any case of lewd and lascivious conduct or attempted lewd and lascivious conduct where either party would otherwise be protected by this privilege”); Ind.Code § 31-32-11-1 (“The privileged communication between ... the husband and wife ... is not a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report of a child who may be a victim of child abuse or neglect”); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 439 (Iowa 1982) (holding that Iowa Code § 232.74 eliminates the privilege in all cases involving child abuse); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 620.050 (“the husband-wife ... privilege ... shall [not] be a ground for refusing to report., or for excluding evidence regarding a dependent neglected, or abused child or the cause thereof’); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14403(B) (2007) (eliminating privilege in child abuse cases); Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106(a)(1) (2007) (eliminating the privilege in all child abuse cases); Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 233, § 20 (eliminates the privilege in proceedings involving abuse of any child); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2162(c) (2007) (providing an exception to the marital privilege for offenses committed against any person under 18); Minn.Stat. § 595.02(l)(a) (2006) (eliminating the privilege in cases involving crimes against any child under the care of either spouse); Miss. R. Evid. 504(d)(1) (“no privilege ... in a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against ... any minor child”); Mo.Rev.Stat. *992§ 546.260(2) (2007) (eliminating privilege in crimes against any minor); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1046(a)(vii) (2007) (eliminating the privilege in proceedings for child abuse or neglect); Ore.Rev.Stat. § 419B.040 (“the husband-wife privilege, shall not be a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child’s abuse, or the cause thereof, in any judicial proceeding”); 23 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 6381 (2006) (eliminating privilege in child abuse cases); R.I. Ann. § 12-17-10 (“The husband or wife of any respondent in a criminal prosecution, offering himself or herself as a witness, shall not be excluded from testifying because he or she is the husband or wife of the respondent”); S.C.Code of Laws Ann. § 19-11-30 (“a husband or wife is required to disclose any communication, confidential or otherwise, made by one to the other during the marriage where the suit, action, or proceeding concerns or is based on child abuse or neglect, the death of a child, criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the commission or attempt to commit a lewd act upon a minor”); Tex.R. Evid. § 504 (“The privilege of a person’s spouse not to be called as a witness for the state does not apply ... [i]n any proceeding in which the person is charged with a crime against ... any minor”); Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-271.2 (2007) (providing exception to the privilege in crimes where a minor is the victim); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-210 (2007) (eliminating privilege in child abuse cases).
In addition, thirteen jurisdictions have passed legislation exempting from the marital communications privilege statements concerning crimes against children who were in the care or custody of either spouse, or against any person, including any child, “residing” in the household of either. As discussed in Munson, supra, a child may “reside” in a household even if only there temporarily. See Del. R. Evid. 504(d)(3) (“no privilege ... in a proceeding in which 1 spouse is charged with a wrong against ... a person residing in the household”); Haw. R. Evid. 505(c)(1)(C) (“no privilege ... in proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime against ... a third person residing in the household”); Ky. R. Evid. 504(c)(2)(C) (no privilege in “any proceeding in which one spouse is charged with wrongful conduct against ... [a]n individual residing in the household”); Me. R. Evid. 504(d) (“no privilege ... in a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against ... any person residing in the household”); N.D. R. Evid. 504 (“no privilege ... in a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against ... a person residing in the household”); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2504 (2007) (“no privilege ... in a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against ... a person residing in the household”); Utah R. Evid. 502(b)(4)(C)(iii) (no privilege “[i]n a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime ... against ... a person residing in the household”); Vt. R. Evid. 504(d)(3) (“no privilege ... in a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime ... against., a person residing in the household”); People v. Eveans, 277 Ill.App.3d 36, 214 Ill.Dec. 49, 660 N.E.2d 240, 246-47 (1996) (citing 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/115-16 and holding that the Illinois legislature “broadened the scope of the child interest exception to include the interests not only of the children of the testifying and accused spouses, but also the interests of any children in then- care, custody or control”); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 49.295(2)(e)(2) (2007) (eliminating the privilege if the crime is against “a child in the custody or control of either spouse”); 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5913 (2006) (providing exception to privilege “in any criminal proceeding against either [spouse] for bodily injury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon ... any minor child in [the] care or custody [of either spouse]”); TenmCode. Ann. § 24-1-201 (2007) (“privilege shall not apply to proceedings con*993cerning abuse of ... a minor in the custody of or under the dominion and control of either spouse”); Wash. Rev.Code § 5.60.060(1) (2007) (providing exception to privilege where either spouse or domestic partner is considered parent or guardian of victim).
In its opinion, the majority notes that several states, including Idaho, have enacted statutes “encompassing an even broader concept” than a limitation of the marital communication privilege to the “functional equivalent of a birth or step-child,” Majority Opinion at 974-75. The majority has failed to explain, however, why it has ignored the fact that Idaho, and many other states, have adopted an exception to the marital communications privilege in prosecutions for crimes against children. The majority has also failed to consider or explain the paradoxical impact on the public’s perception of the rule of law that will result from the fact that an accused’s admissions of the abuse of any child are admissible in most state courts, but cannot be presented into evidence in the federal court across the street.
Most of the states within the Ninth Circuit have adopted laws that extend the marital communications exception beyond our holding in White. Indeed, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon have eliminated the privilege entirely where the communication relates to a crime against any child while in the custody or control of either spouse. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4062 & 13-604 (eliminating the privilege in cases involving any “dangerous crime against children” and “[sjexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age”); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203 (precluding use of the privilege in “any case of physical injury to a child where the injury has been cause as a result of physical abuse or neglect by one or both of the parents” and “any case of lewd and lascivious conduct or attempted lewd and lascivious conduct where either party would otherwise be protected by this privilege”); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 49.295(2)(e)(2) (2007) (eliminating the privilege if the crime is against “a child in the custody or control of either spouse”); Ore.Rev.Stat. § 419B.040 (“the husband-wife privilege, shall not be a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child’s abuse, or the cause thereof, in any judicial proceeding”).
The Washington legislature has created an exception to the privilege where either spouse or domestic partner is considered the parent or guardian of a child victim. Wash. Rev.Code. § 5.60.060(a) (2007). The Supreme Court of Washington held in State v. Waleczek, 90 Wash.2d 746, 585 P.2d 797 (1978) that a husband and wife who hosted a seven-year-old girl for an overnight sleepover (during the course of which she was sexually assaulted), were considered “guardians” under Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(1). Waleczek, 90 Wash.2d at 753, 585 P.2d 797. In Waleczek, the court explained:
Defendant and his wife voluntarily undertook duties that are normally characterized as parental: They agreed to let Theraesa sleep at their house, wake her up in the morning, provide her with breakfast, and make sure she went to school. In addition, we have no doubt that Theraesa, being only 7 years old, would trust, respect, and obey defendant and his wife principally because she had been left in their care by her own mother.

Id.

In California, the legislature has created an exception to the marital communications privilege when a spouse is charged with “[a] crime against the person or property of the other spouse or of a child, parent, relative, or cohabitant of either.” Cal. Evid.Code § 972(c)(1) (emphasis added). Hawaii has eliminated the privilege *994“in proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime against ... a third person residing in the household.” Haw. R. Evid. 505(c)(1)(C).
The statutes in Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon have unambiguously eliminated the privilege entirely where the communication relates to a crime against any child while in the custody or control of either spouse. The majority has failed utterly to discuss the impact of state-created exceptions to the marital communications privileges or “recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy.” Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir.1981). In declining to consider the evolutionary development of the law throughout the United States rejecting the marital communications privilege where the victim of a spouse’s crime is them grandchild, the majority has cobbled together an amorphous standard that limits the exception to the functional equivalent of a child or stepchild. This undefined concept will no doubt baffle anyone who tries to apply it.
CONCLUSION
In explaining its reasons for admitting the testimony of Banks’s spouse concerning his admission that he produced the video depicting the crime Banks committed against his grandchild, the district court, unlike the majority in this matter, scrupulously fulfilled its duty to apply Rule 501 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Trammel. The district court reasoned as follows:
The question then is under those relevant facts, does the exception to the marital communications privilege apply? And does the court extend or interpret the Ninth Circuit’s decision in White to apply to those circumstances? In making that determination, you have to look to the reasons for the privilege. And the reasons for the privilege are discussed by the Ninth Circuit in White. First of all, the Ninth Circuit cautions us that the privilege must be narrowly construed because it obstructs the truth seeking process. And they say the use of the privilege in criminal proceedings requires a particularly narrow construction because of society’s strong interest in the administration of justice.
The public policy reasons for the privilege are to protect the integrity of marriages and insure that spouses are able to freely communicate with each other. There has to be somebody that you can go to to bear your soul. But the privilege says if it isn’t your priest, if it isn’t your lawyer, it’s your spouse.
But when you balance the interests involved, the court in White found that threats against the spouse or the spouse’s children don’t further the purposes of the privilege. Likewise, abuse of the spouse or abuse of the spouses’ children don’t further the privilege. It doesn’t further the privilege to allow someone to talk about abusing the spouse or the spouse’s children with impunity. It doesn’t further the sanctity of the marriage or the family relationship.
Well, when you have grandchildren who under the facts of this case have that kind of relationship to the grandparents, it is not even a small step from what the court ruled in White. It is almost exactly the same.
Transcript of Record at 501-02, Banks, Case No. 1:06-CR-00051-S-BLW-WBS.
The district court also noted “that in determining the principles of the common law as they are interpreted in the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience, the court looks to the state laws of not just Idaho but other states for the reasoning in those decisions and stat*995utes and the experience in those states.” Id.
I would affirm the district court’s well-reasoned assessment of common law jurisprudence and the law of Idaho and other states regarding the child victim exception to the marital communications privilege. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that an accused’s admission to his spouse that he produced a video depicting his masturbation of their grandchild was inadmissible under Rule 501.

. Rule 501 reads as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.

. According to the indictment in this case, and testimony at trial, Banks was convicted in Ada County Case No. CR 16884 on two counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Age Sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code § 18— 1508, for aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse and abusive sexual conduct on his 11-year old son.

. The stenographer testified that the defendant dictated a letter to his wife which con-tamed the following reference to the Cantu Mine: "I am going to break in and whenever *984I do, I am going to rob every last one oí them blind.” Id.

. The majority has failed to cite Trammel or discuss its duly not to freeze the law of privilege.

. In Trammel, the Supreme Court admonished federal courts to continue "the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.” 445 U.S. at 47, 100 S.Ct. 906. In other contexts, such as in Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has instructed that federal courts may give “great weight” to "objective evidence of contemporary values.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2658, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (reviewing state statutes for “objective indicia of consensus” as to whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment in cases of child rape).

. There is ample statistical data concerning the increase in child sexual abuse. For example, "from 1976 to 1986, the number of reported cases of child sexual abuse grew from 6,000 to 132,000, an increase of 2,100%.” Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2671 n. 2 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing A. Lurigio, M. Jones, & B. Smith, Child Sexual Abuse: Its Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 Sep Fed. Probation 69 (1995) and Abuse & Incest National Network Statistics, online at http://www.rainn.org/get-inf ormation/statistics/sexual-assault-victims.) Justice Alito, in his dissent, noted that "reported instances of child abuse have increased dramatically; and there are many indications of growing alarm about the sexual abuse of children.” Id. at 2671; see also M. Elliott, K. Brown and J. Kilcoyne, Child Sexual Abuse Prevention: What Offenders Tell Us, Child Abuse & Neglect, 5, 579-594 (1995) (reporting that nearly 70% of child sex offenders have between 1 and 9 victims; at least 20% have 10 to 40 victims). More recent data is equally alarming. According to "Statistics Surrounding Child Sexual Abuse,” found online at http ://www. darkness21ight. org/KnowAbout/ statistics_2.asp: "The median age for reported abuse is 9 years old; more than 20% of children are sexually abused before the age of 8; nearly 50% of all victims of forcible sodomy, sexual assault with an object, and forcible fondling are children under 12; and, 30-40% of victims are abused by a family member.” Id.