Court Opinion

ID: 9398523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:10:59.006411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.182431
License: Public Domain

J-S13017-23

                                   2023 PA Super 93

    O.H. BEL AIR PARTNERS LP                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAMAL HINTON                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 147 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 21, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                         Civil Division at No. 210801992

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                     FILED MAY 31, 2023

        Jamal Hinton (Appellant) appeals pro se1 from the $3,946.75 judgment

entered in favor of his former landlord, O.H. Bel Air Partners LP (Bel Air). After

careful review, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

        In November 2015, Appellant leased a studio apartment (premises)

owned by Bel Air.         Appellant’s lease ran from November 23, 2015, to

November 30, 2016. Pertinently, the lease agreement provided:

        (i) This lease does not end on the ending date indicated above
        unless Landlord or Tenant gives written notice to the other not
        less than Sixty days in advance of ending date.

        (k) Renewal length of this lease if not ended by either party as
        require [sic] in paragraph (i) Month-to-month with a 60-day
        notice[.]

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*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   Appellant has appeared pro se throughout the proceedings.
J-S13017-23

Lease Agreement, 11/23/15. The lease required Appellant to pay monthly

rent of $625, and a $35 late charge if the rent was not paid within five days

of the due date (the first day of each month). Id. ¶ 3.

       On August 26, 2020, Bel Air notified Appellant that his lease would

expire on October 31, 2020, and would not be renewed. At the end of the

lease, Appellant refused to tender possession and continued to occupy the

premises as a holdover tenant.

       Bel Air filed a complaint for possession of the premises and the balance

of unpaid rent on December 10, 2020. The case proceeded to a hearing in

Philadelphia Municipal Court on April 1, 2021. The municipal court entered

judgment for Appellant because Bel Air did not have a rental license on the

day of the hearing.2 Bel Air did not appeal.

       On July 1, 2021, Bel Air filed a second complaint against Appellant for

possession of the premises and unpaid rent.         On August 13, 2021, the

municipal court awarded Bel Air possession and $1,276.75 in back rent, based

upon the lease termination and Appellant’s nonpayment of rent. Bel Air gained

possession of the premises on September 10, 2021. See N.T., 6/27/22, at

18. Appellant timely appealed to the trial court.

____________________________________________

2 Bel Air’s rental license expired on February 28, 2021, and Bel Air did not
renew the license until April 6, 2021. See Phila. Code § 9-3901(4)(e)
(providing property owner may not recover possession or collect rent “during
or for the period of noncompliance” with the licensure requirement).

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        Following a June 27, 2022, bench trial, the trial court awarded Bel Air

$3,946.75 for Appellant’s nonpayment of rent and termination of the lease.3

Appellant filed an appeal with Commonwealth Court, which transferred the

case to this Court. We quashed the appeal, but permitted Appellant 10 days

to file a post-trial motion. O.H. Bel Air Partners LP v. Hinton, 2584 EDA

2022 (Pa. Super. Nov. 30, 2022) (order). Appellant thereafter filed a post-

trial motion titled as a motion for reconsideration.4      The trial court denied

Appellant’s motion, and Appellant timely appealed.5 Appellant and the trial

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

____________________________________________

3   Appellant had vacated the premises.

4   Appellant alleged the trial court abused its discretion by

        allowing [Bel Air] to keep rental payments for March and April of
        2021, wherein [Bel Air] did not have a[] rental license at the time
        ….

Motion for Reconsideration, 12/7/22, ¶ 7. Appellant’s motion complied with
this Court’s directive to file a post-trial motion. See, e.g., Bennett v. Rose,
183 A.3d 498, 503 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (holding that motion for
reconsideration is a post-trial motion where a specific allegation of trial court
error is made); Green v. Trustee of Univ. of Pa., 265 A.3d 703, 710 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (citing Bennett and holding that the nature of the requested
relief controls the styling of the motion).

5 On February 14, 2023, this Court directed Appellant to praecipe for
judgment. The trial court entered judgment on February 21, 2023, and thus
the appeal is properly before us for disposition. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before
the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and
on the day thereof.”).

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       Appellant presents the following issues for review:

       1. Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion by fail[ing] to uphold
          the Philadelphia Municipal Court Civil Rule 109(4)[6]?

       2. Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion by not allocating paid
          rent of March and April of 2021 [t]o the months of August and
          September of 2021?

       3. Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion by allowing [Bel Air] to
          falsely claim [A]ppellant’s Lease was terminated?

       4. Did [Bel Air] make false claims of back rent owed?

       5. Did [Bel Air] violate and breach contract law?

Appellant’s Brief at vi (footnote added).

       At the outset, we recognize:

       Our review in a non-jury case is limited to whether the findings of
       the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether
       the trial court committed error in the application of law. We must
       grant the court’s findings of fact the same weight and
       effect as the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb
       the non-jury verdict only if the court’s findings are
       unsupported by competent evidence or the court
       committed legal error that affected the outcome of the
       trial. It is not the role of an appellate court to pass on the
       credibility of witnesses; hence we will not substitute our judgment
       for that of the factfinder. Thus, the test we apply is not whether
       we would have reached the same result on the evidence
       presented, but rather, after due consideration of the evidence
       which the trial court found credible, whether the trial court could
       have reasonably reached its conclusion.

____________________________________________

6 Appellant cites Municipal Court Civil Rule 109(4) for the proposition that Bel
Air cannot collect rent during periods it lacked a valid rental license. As we
discuss infra, Appellant is referring to Phila. Code § 9-3901(4)(e).

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Leb. County Hous. Auth. v. Landeck, 967 A.2d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super.

2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).

      Furthermore,

      the factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence,
      and the Superior Court will not disturb the trial court’s credibility
      determinations.      Assessments of credibility and conflicts in
      evidence are for the trial court to resolve; this Court is not
      permitted to reexamine the weight and credibility determinations
      or substitute our judgments for those of the factfinder.

Gutteridge v. J3 Energy Grp., Inc., 165 A.3d 908, 916 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Appellant’s first and second issues are related and dispositive. Appellant

first claims the trial court abused its discretion by not upholding Philadelphia

Municipal Court Civil Rule 109(a)(4). Appellant’s Brief at 1. Appellant argues:

      [Bel Air] did not have a valid rental license for the months of March
      and April of 2021. [Bel Air] never filed an appeal from the Order
      of April 1, 2021, Judgment for [Appellant], [and] therefore they
      were not permitted to collect rent and other fees for the months
      of September, October, November, and December of 2020, and
      January, February, March, and April of 2021, pursuant to
      Pa.R.A.P. 341, 902 and 903[,] which states failure to file an appeal
      in a timely manner will result in any issues raised in a claim from
      those issues [to] be deemed waived[.]

Id. Bel Air counters that the trial court found no rent was collected for March

and April 2021. Appellee’s Brief at 7.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court improperly allocated

Appellant’s rental assistance payments to March and April 2021. Appellant’s

Brief at 4. Appellant argues the trial court erred “by allowing [Bel Air] to keep

rent that they were not permitted to collect.” Id.

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     Appellant cites “Philadelphia Municipal Civil Rule 109(4),” which states:

     Where the claim is based upon a writing, a copy of the writing or
     pertinent portions thereof shall be attached. If the writing is not
     available, it is sufficient to so state, together with the reasons,
     and to set forth the substance of the writing.

Phil. Cnty. Pa. Rule 109(a)(4). However, Appellant apparently refers to the

law stated in Section 9-3901(4)(e) of the Philadelphia Code, which provides:

     Non-compliance. Any owner who fails to obtain a rental license
     as required by § 9-3902, or to comply with § 9-3903 regarding a
     Certificate of Rental Suitability, or whose rental license has been
     suspended, shall be denied the right to recover possession
     of the premises or to collect rent during or for the period of
     noncompliance or during or for the period of license suspension.
     In any action for eviction or collection of rent, the owner
     shall attach a copy of the license.

Phila. Code § 9-3901(4)(e) (emphasis added).

     This Court addressed Section 9-3901(4)(e) and its prohibition on

recovering rent or possessing a property in the absence of a valid rental

license in Frempong v. Richardson, 209 A.3d 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019). We

explained:

     … “While the Statutory Construction Act is not expressly applicable
     to the construction of local ordinances, the principles contained
     therein are nevertheless useful.” Phila. Eagles Football Club,
     Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 573 Pa. 189, 823 A.2d 108, 127
     n.31 (Pa. 2003).

     Our state appellate courts have consistently held that when
     “applying [the] normal rules of statutory construction, [the]
     presence of disjunctive word ‘or’ in [a] statute indicates that
     elements of statute are met when any particular element is
     satisfied, regardless of whether other elements are also
     met.” See Wagner v. Wagner, 887 A.2d 282, 286 (Pa. Super.
     2005). See also Ben. Consumer Disc. Co. v. Vukman, 621 Pa.
     192, 77 A.3d 547, 555 (Pa. 2013).

                                    -6-
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      … [T]he trial court in this case found that “the plain language of
      [Subsection    §    9-3901(4)(e)]     denies    a   non-compliant
      owner either the right to possession or the right to collect rent.”
      Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/18, at 14. It thus found that awarding
      possession of the property to Landlords, where unpaid rent was
      not awarded, was proper. After careful review, we disagree, and
      conclude that under Section 9-3901(4)(e), Landlords were
      prohibited from recovering rent as well as possession of the
      property.

                                      ***

      We acknowledge that the word “or” generally connotes a
      disjunction. However, we emphasize that the statue is written in
      the passive voice (“shall be denied”) and in reading the entire
      context of the statute, we interpret Section 9-3901(4)(e) to
      mean that a noncompliant owner may not recover
      possession “or” collect rent, meaning he cannot receive
      either. … Section 9-3901(4)(e) does not allow recovery of
      rent or possession….

Frempong, 209 A.3d at 1010-11 (emphasis added).

      Instantly, Bel Air averred that on June 9, 2021, Appellant was approved

for $3,125 in Philadelphia rental assistance,

      and [the rental assistance] was applied to [Appellant’s] balance of
      unpaid rent. After this payment, [Appellant] still carried a balance
      of $4,806.12 in overdue rent.

Complaint, 9/1/21, ¶ 15. Bel Air did not indicate whether it applied the rental

assistance payments to March and April 2021, the period of time Bel Air lacked

a valid rental license.

      The trial court found Bel Air did not collect rent for March and April 2021.

The trial court stated:

      The only witness brought forth during the bench trial in this matter
      was [Bel Air]’s property manager, Cheryl Campbell [(Ms.

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      Campbell)]. During cross examination, Appellant asked Ms.
      Campbell about [Bel Air] receiving rental assistance payments
      from the Philadelphia Housing Authority on behalf of Appellant on
      June 9, 2021, in the amount of $3,125. See [N.T., 6/27/22,] at
      pp. 11-12[,] Attached as Exhibit 5. Appellant asserted during his
      questioning that rent for March and April would be included in
      these payments[,] which Ms. Campbell denied. Ms. Campbell
      testified that the payments went to Appellant’s outstanding
      balance due to [Bel Air] from previous months of unpaid rent. See
      [id.] at pp. 16-18, 23. Further, Ms. Campbell testified during
      direct examination that potential rent claims for March and
      April of 2021 were not included in [Bel Air’s] claim for
      damages due to [Bel Air’s] admission that during those two
      (2) months they were prohibited from collecting rent from
      Appellant due to the lapse of their rental license. Id.
      Appellant did not produce any evidence to contradict this
      testimony.

      … Based on the evidence adduced, this court came to the
      conclusion that rent was not collected by [Bel Air] from Appellant
      for the months of March and April of 2021. [Bel Air] did not violate
      Philadelphia Municipal Court Rule 109(4).

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/22, at 2-3. Our review discloses otherwise, as the

record lacks evidence to support the trial court’s findings.

      At trial, Ms. Campbell confirmed that Bel Air did not have a rental license

from February 28, 2021 to April 6, 2021. N.T., 6/27/22, at 15. Ms. Campbell

testified that Bel Air sent Appellant a notice to quit the premises on June 17,

2021, and filed this action on August 13, 2021. Id. at 17. Critically, Ms.

Campbell testified that Appellant received rental assistance which paid

Appellant’s rent for March and April 2021, when Bel Air was unlicensed. Id.

at 22.   Ms. Campbell testified that Appellant vacated the premises on

September 10, 2021. Id. at 18. Ms. Campbell reiterated that Bel Air accepted

rental assistance payments for dates through and including May 2021. Id. at

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19. On cross-examination, Ms. Campbell expressly confirmed that on June 9,

2021, Bel Air received five payments of $625 in rental assistance for Appellant,

which were attributed to March, April, May, June, and July of 2021. Id. at 22.

        Based on Ms. Campbell’s testimony, Bel Air allocated Appellant’s rental

assistance payments to March and April 2021, when Bel Air was not licensed.

See Frempong.          As the record indicates the trial court’s findings “are

unsupported by competent evidence,” we are constrained to vacate the

judgment and remand for further proceedings, so the trial court may

determine what amount, if any, Appellant owes to Bel Air, consistent with

Section 9-3901(4)(e).7

        Judgment vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2023

____________________________________________

7
    Given our disposition, we do not address Appellant’s remaining issues.

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