Court Opinion

ID: 9662170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:01:40.175527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.423526
License: Public Domain

W. J. Caprathe, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority opinion with respect to all defendants except Danny R. Daniel. I would affirm the trial court’s order granting a directed verdict in favor of defendant Daniel as well.
Where the material facts are not in dispute, the determination of probable cause in a malicious prosecution case is a question of law for the trial judge. In Clanan v Nushzno, 261 Mich 423, 427; 246 NW 168 (1933), cited by the majority, the Court stated:
" 'The general rule of the common law, sustained by the overwhelming weight of authority, both in England and America, is that what facts, and whether particular facts, constitute probable cause is a question of law, which the judge must decide upon the facts found to exist in the particular case, and which it is error for him to submit to the decision of the jury.’ 18 R.C.L. § 39, p 58.
" 'Probable cause is such reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by known circumstances, or by information of sufficient character, to justify an ordinarily cautious person in believing that the accused is guilty of the alleged crime.’ Gilecki v Dolemba (syllabus), 189 Mich 107 [155 NW 437 (1915)].
" 'Facts which would justify a reasonably prudent man in asking that a jury pass upon accused’s guilt would justify defendant in making the complaint.’ Weiden v Weiden (syllabus), 246 Mich 347 [224 NW 345 (1929)].”
*522Since the material facts in the present case were undisputed, it was for the trial court to determine whether plaintiff had sustained his burden of proving that defendant Daniel lacked probable cause to instigate the criminal charges of larceny by conversion. See, also, Drobczyk v Great Lakes Steel Corp, 367 Mich 318; 116 NW2d 736 (1962).
The majority relies on the fact that the district court judge dismissed the larceny by conversion charges on the merits at the preliminary examination. The majority looks to authority outside Michigan to support the proposition that a district court’s dismissal on the merits at the preliminary examination is either evidence of or a prima facie case of lack of probable cause, citing Banks v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 212 Md 31; 128 A2d 600 (1957). The Banks Court stated:
"The general rule seems to be that prima facie evidence of want of probable cause is shown either by discharge by a magistrate upon preliminary hearing on the merits or the termination of the proceedings at the instance of the private prosecutor who initiated them, or by reason of his failure to press the charge. Restatement, Torts, §§663, 665. * * * Some courts hold that neither an acquittal nor a discharge in preliminary hearing is relevant on the question of probable cause since the decisive time for determining its presence or absence is the time the defendant acted and that this test is not to be affected by what later occurs. Mr. Justice Brennan so held for the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in Shoemaker v Shoemaker, 11 NJ Super 471; 78 A2d 605 (1951).” (Emphasis supplied.)
In my opinion, the Shoemaker holding represents the more logical view. There are many reasons why a charge may be dismissed on the merits at the preliminary examination stage which did not exist at the time the warrant was signed. In *523the present case, for example, Dennis Carley, secretary-treasurer of the Madison Heights Police Officers’ Association, was available and apparently credible at the time defendant Daniel obtained the information which led to issuance of the warrant. On the other hand, at the time of the preliminary examination (held long after Daniel’s investigation), Carley was no longer available to testify. His credibility had been destroyed because his records were in terrible disarray and he had admitted stealing money from the trust account. Circumstances had changed dramatically by the time of the dismissal. In my opinion, dismissal of the charges at the preliminary examination should be used only to satisfy the requirement that the prosecution was terminated in favor of the plaintiff, and the dismissal of those charges is not relevant to the element of lack of probable cause to commence the prosecution.
The Michigan Supreme Court has apparently already taken the view that dismissal on the merits at the preliminary examination is not relevant to the question of probable cause in a malicious prosecution action. In Gooch v Wachowiak, 352 Mich 347, 350; 89 NW2d 496 (1958), the trial court directed a verdict of no cause of action upon a finding that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case as to the element of probable cause. The Court stated:
"Plaintiff says that the court erred in directing a verdict for defendant and that a case was made for the jury by a showing that the plaintiff had been discharged at the preliminary examination, that he had enjoyed a good character and reputation previously, which defendant knew and failed to tell the prosecuting authorities, and that the time element was such, after plaintiff’s leaving work at the Wall Wire Company at 3:30 p.m., *524standing in line to punch out at the time clock and to receive his pay check, walking 2 blocks to a parking lot and driving from 1 to 2 miles to the Kroger store, all before 3:50 p.m., that defendant could not have had probable cause to believe plaintiff guilty of the offense as claimed by Courtney Spencer.”
The Court thoroughly discussed the concept of probable cause and the conditions under which its existence or nonexistence is a legal question for the trial court. Nowhere did the Court authorize use of the dismissal at the preliminary examination as some evidence of lack of probable cause or as providing a prima facie case of lack of probable cause. Rather, the opinion directs the trial courts, even when the underlying case was dismissed at the preliminary examination, to examine the facts and determine whether there is a factual dispute and, if not, to decide the question as a matter of law.
In the present case, the facts upon which the trial court made its legal decision are virtually undisputed, such that determination of the issue of probable cause was properly for the trial court. I believe the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, support the granting of a directed verdict in favor of defendant Daniel. The plaintiff was required under the contract to deposit all checks in the association’s trust account. He was to be thereafter paid monies for expenses in publishing the magazine. Plaintiff claimed that there were monies due to him for those expenses and, further, that one of the members of the association had told him he could take $100. Plaintiff endorsed the name of the association on some of the advertisers’ checks, cashed them and used the money for payment of expenses, rather than placing the checks in the *525association’s account. Thus, the legal question is: Was there probable cause under these undisputed facts to institute larceny by conversion charges? In my opinion, there was. In Gooch v Wachowiak, supra, pp 351-352, the Supreme Court stated, quoting Thomas v Winters, 258 Mich 429, 432; 242 NW 780 (1932):
" 'As to what is probable cause, we quote syllabi of Wilson v Bowen, 64 Mich 133 [31 NW 81 (1887)]
"' ''To constitute probable cause, there must be such reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant an ordinarily cautious man in the belief that the person arrested is guilty of the offense charged.
" ' "A person may have 'probable cause’ for making a criminal complaint from information received from others, which he honestly believes to be true, and of such a character, and obtained from such sources, that business men generally, of ordinary care, prudence, and discretion, would act upon it under such circumstances, believing it to be reliable.” ’ ”
In the instant case, the total amount of the checks which plaintiff illegally endorsed and cashed was well above $100. Certainly the fact that he was told he could take "a hundred” did not give him the right to cash three checks totaling well above $100. More importantly, no interpretation of these facts would permit plaintiff to use the self-help method of collecting the civil debt which he believed was owed to him by the association. There were proper legal channels open to plaintiff to collect the alleged debt. The mere fact that plaintiff claimed the association owed a debt to him does not affect the probable cause issue, since it is clear that plaintiff had no legal right to endorse the checks with the association’s name or to cash them and convert the funds to his own use. *526In order to create a factual dispute sufficient to send the probable cause issue to the jury, there would have to be evidence that plaintiff legitimately believed he had a legal right to cash the particular checks involved. The case is distinguishable from Clanan v Nushzno, supra, because there plaintiffs claimed the right to retain the particular payments involved. No such evidence or allegation is present in the instant case.
An additional reason for upholding the trial court’s directed verdict as to defendant Daniel is that, as a non-lawyer, Daniel made a substantially full disclosure of the results of the investigation to the prosecutor, who then determined that a criminal prosecution was warranted. I agree with the majority that this is relevant to the element of probable cause. See Wilson v Yono, 65 Mich App 441, 444; 237 NW2d 494 (1975). I disagree with the majority, however, and agree with defendant Daniel that his failure to communicate to the prosecutor the plaintiff’s claimed entitlement to the advertising revenues did not involve a material fact. Daniel investigated the circumstances at the request of the prosecutor and presented the following evidence: at least three business entities had issued checks payable only to the association; plaintiff had obtained some of the checks without the approval of the association and had endorsed the association’s name on the checks and either cashed or deposited them in his own account; and plaintiff admitted this but alleged that the money was actually owed to him by the association. Even assuming Daniel did not make a full disclosure concerning plaintiff’s claim of a debt owed to him by the association, it does not affect the probable cause element. As discussed earlier, even if money from the association’s trust account was to be *527forwarded to plaintiff for expenses in publishing the magazine, plaintiff had no legal right to endorse the association’s name on the checks and convert the funds to his own use. Plaintiff’s claim of equitable title to the funds represented by the checks is not a material fact since plaintiff acted illegally. I would find that defendant Daniel made a full and fair disclosures to the prosecutor.
In conclusion, I would hold that whether defendant Daniel had probable cause to seek a warrant charging plaintiff with larceny by conversion was a matter of law. The trial judge, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, correctly found that defendant Daniel acted with probable cause based upon his investigation. In addition, by presenting the matter to the prosecutor, he was removed from any responsibility with respect to the prosecution since he completely and fairly communicated all materal facts. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court as to all defendants. I decline to discuss the element of malice since it was not addressed by the trial court and the question is not presently before this Court.