Court Opinion

ID: 9379364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 15:03:49.569604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.159465
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed March 15, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-0431
                        Lower Tribunal No. 21-4960
                           ________________

                          Paula Grace Willis,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         Accenture, Inc., et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Oscar
Rodriguez-Fonts, Judge.

     Behren Law Firm, and Scott M. Behren (Weston), for appellant.

     Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., and Michelle D. Cofiño, and
Reginald J. Clyne, for appellees.

Before SCALES, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Appellant, Paula Grace Willis, challenges a final order dismissing her

amended complaint alleging violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992

(FCRA), as amended, codified in section 760.01 et seq., Florida Statutes

(2019), and tortious interference with a business relationship. Bound by the

holding in Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d

891, 897 (Fla. 2002), we find that the dismissal and notice of rights letter by

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was not the

equivalent of a reasonable cause finding by the Florida Commission on

Human Relations (FCHR). See § 760.11(3), Fla. Stat. (“Within 180 days of

the filing of the complaint, the commission shall determine if there is

reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in

violation of the [FCRA].”); see also Sheridan v. State, Dep’t of Health, 182

So. 3d 787, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“[T]he EEOC’s right-to-sue notice

cannot operate to circumvent the administrative prerequisites of the FCRA.”);

Cisko v. Phoenix Med. Prod., Inc., 797 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)

(“[W]e conclude that the EEOC’s finding that ‘the EEOC is unable to

conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes’

does not amount to a finding that there is not reasonable cause to believe

that a violation of the [FCRA] has occurred.”). As retroactive application of

section 760.11, Florida Statutes (2020), is not supported by the expressed

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intent of the legislature or the chronology of this dispute, and the parties

stipulated below the tortious interference claims should be dismissed

“without prejudice,” we are constrained to reverse and remand for further

proceedings. See Dade County v. Ferro, 384 So. 2d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 1980)

(quoting 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 57) (“[I]n the absence of a

clear manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary, statutes of limitation

are construed as prospective and not retrospective in their operation, and

the presumption is against any intent on the part of the legislature to make

such a statute retroactive.”); Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales, 400 So. 2d 965,

967 (Fla. 1981) (“[A] statute of limitations will be prospectively applied unless

the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect is express, clear and

manifest.”).

      Reversed and remanded.

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