Court Opinion

ID: 9928197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:03:52.889572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:32.899665
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (2d) 220351-U
                                         No. 2-22-0351
                                  Order filed January 30, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

In re MARRIAGE OF MEGAN B.             ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
VERMAATEN,                             ) of Kendall County.
                                       )
      Petitioner-Appellee,             )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 20-D-45
                                       )
JACOB A. VERMAATEN,                    ) Honorable
                                       ) John F. McAdams,
      Respondent-Appellant.            ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       PRESIDING JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Birkett and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the husband’s request for
             appointment of an evaluator; the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
             awarded the wife attorney fees. The trial court is affirmed.

¶2     Respondent, Jacob A. Vermaaten, challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to

appoint an evaluator under section 604.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act

(Act) (750 ILCS 5/604.10 (West 2022)) and the court’s grant of respondent, Megan B.

Vermaaten’s, motion for attorney fees under section 508(b) of the Act (id. § 508(b)). For the
2024 IL App (2d) 220351-U

reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Jacob’s motion for a section 604.10

evaluator and its grant of Megan’s motion for attorney fees.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     The parties were married in 2005 and had four children together: J.V., born in 2008, L.V.,

born in 2010, C.T., born in 2016, and D.V., born in 2017. In February 2020, Megan filed a petition

for dissolution of the parties’ marriage, citing as grounds irreconcilable differences. In April 2020

the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated the parties’ agreed

joint parenting plan. The parenting plan provided that Megan was solely responsible for making

decisions regarding the children’s education, healthcare, religion, and extracurricular activities.

Megan was granted authority to remove the children from Illinois to Ohio to reside. Megan had

the majority of parenting time and Jacob had parenting time every other weekend, Christmas and

spring breaks, one week during summer vacation, and alternating holidays. In June 2020, Megan

and the children relocated to Ohio.

¶5     In November 2021 Megan filed a petition to restrict Jacob’s parenting time pursuant to

section 603.10(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/603.10(a) (West 2020)). She alleged that since entry of

the judgment of dissolution of marriage Jacob “engaged in a course of conduct that [was]

concerning and seriously endanger[ed] the minor children [and that his] harassment and negative

conduct ha[d] begun to escalate.”

¶6     Specifically, Megan alleged the following:

               “a. On October 14, 2021, Megan and Jacob were scheduled to meet and exchange

       the minor children for Jacob to exercise parenting time. The parties agreed to meet at a

       truck stop gas station to exchange the children. Not only was Jacob approximately 30

       minutes late but he wanted the children to be left alone until he got there. In fact, when

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      Megan would not leave the children alone, he became enraged and sped into the parking

      lot, exited the car angrily while screaming and swearing at Megan in front of the children.

      Based on Jacob’s erratic behavior, Megan called the police and maintained possession

      of the children.

             b. Jacob uses J.V. as a go between with Megan. J.V. has told Jacob he does not

      want to be the go between. Jacob has told J.V. that he has blocked Megan’s cell phone and

      email. As recently as November 1, 2021, Jacob sent text messages to J.V. demanding that

      J.V. have L.V. call Jacob. Jacob then threatened J.V. that if he didn’t have L.V. call him

      that Jacob would have someone stop by to check on her (inferring the police).

             c. It is suspected that Jacob then ‘reported’ Megan to Child and Family Services

      with allegations such as L.V. has no access to a phone and the children do not learn

      anything at daycare.

             d. On August 15, 2021, Megan sent Jacob an email regarding parenting time in

      September. In response, Jacob sent Megan an inappropriate response with a list of

      “demands.”

             e. In June 2021, Jacob intentionally harassed L.V. with a high volume of calls.

             f. In June 2021, Jacob sent Megan over 80 inappropriate messages, such as pictures

      of dancing poop emojis.

             g. In May 2021, Megan attempted to discuss the parenting schedule with Jacob to

      no avail. Jacob’s responses were often off course and not good faith communication.

             h. Jacob fails to respond appropriately, if at all, to Megan's communications.

             i. Jacob has a history of yelling at L.V. if she doesn’t answer or call back.

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                 j. Jacob often sends email correspondence to Megan which is programmed to expire

       by a certain date and is intended to not have the option to forward, copy, print or

       download.” (Emphasis in original).

¶7     Megan sought an order to suspend Jacob’s parenting time and have video visits instead

until he successfully completed anger and parenting behavior treatment programs and participated

in counseling with the children, or to reduce Jacob’s parenting time and limit electronic

communication. Megan also sought an order to direct Jacob to communicate with Megan over

“Our Family Wizard,”1 and to award Megan attorney fees and costs.

¶8     On November 15, 2021, Megan filed a petition for rule to show cause, or, in the alternative,

to enforce the judgment of dissolution of marriage, and other relief. Megan alleged that Jacob

failed to “transfer $31,000 from his retirement account directly into a retirement account of

Megan’s choosing” in violation of the parties’ judgment of dissolution of marriage. Megan alleged

that Jacob’s failure to comply with judgment was willful and contumacious and asked the court to

hold Jacob in indirect civil contempt.

¶9     On November 16, 2021, without objection, the trial court appointed guardian ad litem

(GAL) Jody Thompson-Weis.

       1
           Our Family Wizard is an application designed to promote better communication between

divorced or divorcing parents. It is a tool to help parents communicate, schedule custody, and enter

specific appointments for their children. It allows the parents to send messages to each other about

what the children are or should be doing during the week and provides a contemporaneous record

of those communications. Barry D. Bayer, Better Searching, and Matrimonial Communication on

the Web, Law Office Technology Review, Nov. 14, 2001, 2001 WL 1829161.

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¶ 10   In December 2021, Jacob filed a petition to modify the parenting plan.

¶ 11   Also in December 2021, Jacob filed a response to Megan’s petition to restrict parenting

time, essentially denying the material allegations contained therein. He also filed a petition for rule

to show cause against Megan, alleging, inter alia, that she had intentionally interfered with Jacob’s

visitation and communication with the children in violation of the parenting plan. Jacob also filed

a petition for rule to show cause, alleging that Megan had knowingly, willfully, and

contumaciously violated the parenting plan.

¶ 12   In February and April 2022, the GAL provided reports to the court and the parties that do

not appear in the record on appeal.

¶ 13   Also in April, Jacob filed a petition to enforce allocated parenting time and a second rule

to show cause. He also filed a petition to appoint an evaluator pursuant to section 604.10(b) of the

Act (750 ILCS 5/604.10(b) (West 2022)). In his 604.10(b) petition, Jacob alleged that D.V. (born

2017) had “an undiagnosed mental condition,” and needed an evaluation to address “his learning

disabilities, antisocial behavior and difficulties in communication.” Specifically, Jacob alleged:

D.V. (1) was “much farther behind in speech capability [than] other children of similar age [and]

*** his siblings when they were [his] age”; (2) “exhibited anti-social behavior [in that he did] not

socialize with other children in an appropriate manner *** and spends too much time watching

television or a tablet alone without supervision”; (3) “does not like to go outside, [or] go to parks;

(4) developed a ‘flat head’ [that was] corrected with a helmet”; and (5) “had mobility problems

and needed to go to physical therapy *** to learn how to ‘crawl.’ ”

¶ 14   Jacob also alleged that both D.V. and L.V. were hypersensitive, had severe undiagnosed

anxiety, had shut down completely especially over matters of discipline or disagreements with

Jacob, had anger management issues and exploded over trivial matters, and displayed extreme

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shyness, high levels of irritability over trivial matters, and had traits of depression and episodes of

uncontrollable crying. Jacob further alleged that it was in the best interest of the children for the

court to appoint a 604.10(b) evaluator to investigate and to report concerning the allocation of

parenting time, and decision-making authority and parental responsibilities for the four children.

¶ 15   On May 10, 2022, prior to hearing argument or testimony on Jacob’s petition to appoint an

evaluator, the court asked the GAL if she was “in favor of” the appointment of an evaluator. GAL

replied, “I’m not, your Honor.”

¶ 16   Jacob testified that he did not believe that the GAL’s investigation was thorough. Jacob

raised his concerns with the GAL in notes and letters but during his interview with her he was not

given the opportunity to articulate his concerns, he did not get a chance to speak, and she dismissed

his views. D.V. demonstrated traits of slow development; the same traits shown by Jacob’s

younger brother who had been diagnosed with a learning disability many years earlier. According

to Jacob, it was not normal for a four-year-old to not want to go outside or interact with people.

Jacob’s daughter, L.V. was “submerged in negativity against [him] just based on the circumstances

we’re in. She lives far away. I don’t get to see her or talk to her very often, and that’s not being

taken into consideration. *** [W]ith a proper diagnosis, it will get her much farther ahead, as well

as [with D.V.]. We can get them both the help they need so that they won’t be shut down and be

completely debilitated like they are now.” Jacob and Megan have four children and he had no

decision-making authority regarding their health issues.

¶ 17   Jacob testified that he asked Megan to have the children evaluated for mental health issues.

D.V. needed to be evaluated for learning disabilities. Megan “got him speech therapist, that’s all.”

Megan refused to have D.V. evaluated by a medical doctor. The older child, L.V., age 12, had

severe anxiety and, likely, depression, she cries uncontrollably when spoken to in a soft tone and

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2024 IL App (2d) 220351-U

says she is being yelled at even though “your voice is not raised.” She does not have the ability to

process problems and deal with them. L.V. completely shuts down. Her problems became worse

after the move to Ohio. As an example, Jacob stated that when he is on the phone with L.V. and

asks her any question, she asks him why he wants to know. Jacob tells L.V., because I am your

father; “it’s information I should know [and] you shouldn’t question me.”

¶ 18   The trial court denied Jacob’s petition to appoint an evaluator, finding that it was not in the

children’s best interests. The trial court reasoned that he understood Jacob’s argument that it may

be in his strategical best interest to have an evaluator to rebut the GAL’s recommendation, but it

was not in the best interests of the children to go through more interviews. Jacob’s counsel then

advised the court that there was a jurisdictional problem because Illinois was no longer the

children’s home state and that they would be filing a motion to transfer venue to Ohio.

¶ 19   On June 13, 2022, Jacob moved to dismiss his motion to modify the parties’ parenting plan

and allocation judgment, petition to enforce allocated parenting time, and first and second petitions

for rules to show cause. The trial court granted Jacob’s motions to dismiss.

¶ 20   On June 21, 2022, Jacob filed a three-count motion for temporary relief (motion to

disqualify the GAL). Count I alleged that the GAL failed to submit the renewal of her application

to the court administrator in a timely manner and was not properly certified. Count II alleged that

the GAL misunderstood section 610.5 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/610.5 (West 2020)) in that she

mistakenly believes that Jacob was prohibited from seeking a modification of the parties’ parenting

plan and allocation judgment because he sought modification within two years after the judgment

was entered. Count III alleged the GAL improperly conducted her investigation in that Jacob met

with the GAL only once and during that meeting, she berated and taunted him, had a hostile

demeanor towards him, refused to allow him to voice his concerns about his children, and denied

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that he raised certain concerns regarding the children in a letter he sent to her and failed to

investigate his concerns.

¶ 21   On June 24, 2022, Jacob’s counsel (David Lee) asked the trial court about its order denying

the petition to appoint a 604.10 evaluator, and the following colloquy occurred:

               “MR. LEE: —it was my understanding in the order that you were denying our

       604.10 petition as to paragraphs (b) and (c); is that correct, judge?

                                               ***

               THE COURT: But you asked for (b).

               MR. LEE: As—so there is a 604.10(b), which is the court’s witness, and the

       604.10(c), which would be our witness, Judge. And so—

               THE COURT: But you asked for (b).

               MR. LEE: I asked for both, Judge, (b) and (c).

               THE COURT: Am I looking at the wrong motion? Enter an order appointing

       604.10(b) evaluator to perform an investigation and create a report as to their

       recommendations. Best interest of the child -- this was from April 20th. Is there another

       motion?

               MR. LEE: No, judge. So I just want to be clear, judge. If we file -- I don’t want to

       be in a situation where I have to file another 604.10 motion.

               THE COURT: My rationale for denying the 604.10(b) evaluator would be the same

       rationale for your own expert because it’s what I just said before. It’s what’s necessary –

       what’s necessary for these children and what’s in their best interest[s]. *** I would not

       want to put them through a doctor, a 604.10(b) doctor appointed by the court, or a 604.10(c)

       doctor hired by you, excuse me, or by [Megan].

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             MR. LEE: *** the only issue we have with the denial of the 604.10(c) is we have

      no way to rebut [the GAL’s] recommendation.

                                              ***

             THE COURT: And your focus is where it should be on your client, putting your

      client in the best position it can be. My focus is on what’s best for the children, not what’s

      best for mom or dad strategically in court.

             Certainly I understand why you would want the court appointed one or even your

      own one, but here's the difficulty: The difficulty is if we left it up to the parties and we

      didn’t think about the kids, what would happen is the court-appointed [GAL] *** would

      make a recommendation, then what would happen is if one side, one party didn’t like that

      recommendation, they do a [604.10(b)], a hired person. And then let’s say that person is

      either consistent or inconsistent with the [GAL]. One side is not going to like that. So what

      will happen is they’d hire a 604.10(c) so that they could come back with, the [GAL] or

      [604.10(b)] evaluator, to again put themselves in the best strategical position.

                                              ***

             So then what you have is you have a guardian doing an investigation, interviewing

      the kids several times. You have a court-appointed evaluator interviewing the kids several

      times. You have one party, first party's doing the same thing, and the second party’s doing

      the same thing. *** So you are talking four extensive evaluations for the four kids. That’s

      not in their best interest. It may be in the parties’ best interest strategically to have

      somebody on their side—or, I mean, or strategically, you know, maybe look, to use your

      words, I don’t have anybody to rebut the guardian, so I want a (b), a [604.10(b)].

                                              ***

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               Then let’s assume that evaluator is consistent with the GAL. All right. well, now I

       want a (c) cause now you really need it ‘cause now you got two people against you, right?

       How are you going to win your case? To rebut two people, well, you gotta hire a third. So

       now you have a third one. And who knows, maybe the third one would say the same thing

       as the other two. But the point is it’s not a matter of what’s best strategically for the mom

       or the dad. The issue is what's best for the children and is it necessary for the children. I

       found before that there were no special circumstances that we needed to do that and that’s

       within my discretion. And I’m not going to – I’m going to exercise my discretion in a way

       that shelters and favors the children over the parties’ strategical positions.

               There is no need, we have a guardian that’s been doing this for over 10 years, since

        before I was a judge. She was—when I was a lawyer, she was a guardian. So it’s been over

        11 years she’s been doing this and I’m just not inclined to do the 604(b) as I said and the

        same rationale for that on a (b) would apply to a (c).”

¶ 22    On July 18, 2022, a hearing began on Jacob’s motion to disqualify the GAL. On Jacob’s

motion, count I was voluntarily dismissed. The hearing continued on the remaining two counts.

After considering the evidence the court determined that Jacob “failed to meet his burden,” and

denied Jacob’s motion to disqualify the GAL.

¶ 23    On July 27, 2022, a hearing began on Megan’s petition to restrict Jacob’s parenting time.

Jacob objected to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Illinois was no longer

the home state of the children because they resided in Ohio. After argument on Jacob’s oral motion

the trial court denied his request to decline subject-matter jurisdiction reasoning, in part, that Jacob

had acquiesced to the court’s jurisdiction when he raised the issue seven months after Megan filed

her petition to restrict parenting time, and after Jacob failed to object when the court appointed the

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2024 IL App (2d) 220351-U

GAL and then filed numerous motions. In response to the trial court’s ruling, Jacob’s counsel

stated that he refused to participate in the hearing on Megan’s petition to restrict his parenting

time.

¶ 24    The GAL testified that she had interviewed Jacob and Megan “multiple times,” all four

children, J.V. once, and L.V. once, read Jacob’s letters, and reviewed the parties’ emails and text

messages. Jacob wanted to separate the children; the two older children would live with Megan in

Ohio and the younger children would live with Jacob in Illinois. The parties communicate very

poorly, with profanity and name calling, with the bigger problems occurring when Jacob does not

get the answers he wants. Also, Jacob prods L.V. for information and uses her as a go between

with Megan. Jacob persistently calls and messages the children. The two younger children are very

gregarious, “a lot of fun, and did not seem to have anti-social issues.” Although D.V. was quiet as

a toddler, by all accounts he has been socializing more ever since C.V. entered kindergarten. D.V.

“has been really coming out of his shell.”

¶ 25    The GAL testified that, according to the children, Megan, and Megan’s fiancé, during an

exchange of the children at a truck stop, Jacob pulled into the parking lot behind Megan’s car,

slammed on the brakes, gravel flying, and Jacob got out of his car and yelled at Megan. J.V., the

oldest boy, told the GAL that he and all the kids were scared. He was the only one not crying

because he did not want anyone to know that he was scared. Megan’s fiancé called the sheriff’s

department. When Jacob found out that Megan’s fiancé had called the sheriff’s department, he left

the scene without the children. Jacob told the GAL that he did not return the sheriff department’s

phone calls but did not give a reason. J.V. told the GAL that Jacob speaks poorly about Megan but

Megan does not speak poorly about Jacob. J.V. wished his parents lived in the same town. He did

not want to live at his dad’s house because he did not want to be separated from his siblings. It

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seemed obvious to J.V. that his dad did not know how to parent a girl (L.V.). The GAL provided

examples of situations when Jacob “joked” with L.V. in a way that hurt her feelings, like calling

her spoiled when she showed him a cellphone that she earned the money for and telling her that

coming in third in a swimming competition was not good enough.

¶ 26   L.V. told the GAL that her father insults her mother and is very angry with her. L.V. was

afraid that her dad was so mad at her mom that he would come into the house and kill them all

including their dog. L.V. told the GAL that her dad thinks she’s crazy because she knows who he

is. The GAL opined that there were problems based on Jacob’s negative behaviors.

¶ 27   The GAL recommended counseling for L.V, specific communication schedule, a

prohibition from using any child as a go-between, and, as Jacob suggested to her, “one weekend

per month that coincides with a long school holiday during the school year and a non-holiday

weekend during the summer.”

¶ 28   On July 28, 2022, the trial court granted, in part, Megan’s petition to restrict Jacob’s

parenting time and modified the parties’ parenting plan. The court reduced Jacob’s regular

parenting time to an extended three- or four-day weekend based on the children’s school calendar

and a non-holiday week during the summer and a non-holiday weekend during the summer.

Telephone calls and video chats were limited to 15 and 30-minute sessions at scheduled times in

the evenings. Most notably, the court ordered the following. “[Megan] shall enroll [L.V.] in

counseling, immediately. Both parties shall cooperate and participate as directed by the counselor.”

¶ 29   Also, on July 28, 2022, a hearing began on Megan’s petition for rule to show cause. The

trial court found Jacob in contempt, but that the contempt had been purged by Jacob’s payment to

Megan in April 2022. The court granted Megan leave to file a petition for attorney fees.

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¶ 30   On August 3, 2022, Megan filed a three-count petition for attorney fees pursuant to section

508 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2022)). Citing section 508(b) of the Act, count I sought

attorney fees and costs (in the amount of $3498) related to Megan’s petition for rule to show cause

against Jacob, and fees and costs (in the amount of $700) related to filing the petition for attorney

fees. Count II sought attorney fees and costs for vexatious litigation pursuant to section 508(b).

Megan alleged that Jacob’s voluminous filings of pleadings followed by the dismissal of said

pleadings, his request for an evaluator, and his litigation to disqualify the GAL were for “improper

purposes and needlessly increased the cost of litigation.” Count III sought contribution to attorney

fees pursuant to section 508(a) of the Act. She alleged that she earns approximately $77,000 a year

and Jacob earns approximately $150,000 a year. Megan sought $20,292.00, less any amount

awarded under Count I or II for attorney fees and costs and $700 for attorney fees and costs

incurred in preparing the petition.

¶ 31    On August 5, 2022, the trial court granted Megan’s petition for attorney fees as to all three

counts. Regarding count II the trial court found that Jacob’s litigation related to his request to

disqualify and remove the GAL was “vexatious.” The trial court also found that Jacob’s actions

were “precipitated or conducted for an improper purpose.”

¶ 32   On August 26, 2022, Jacob filed a two-count “Post-trial Motion (Motion to Reconsider)”

(post-judgment motion). Count I alleged that the trial court erred “both legally and factually when

[it] denied [his] request” for 604.10(b) and 604.10(c) evaluators, and that the court abused its

discretion when it found that the appointment of an evaluator was not in the best interests of the

children. Count II alleged that the trial court erred when it determined that it had subject-matter

jurisdiction even though Illinois was not the home state of the children pursuant to section 201 of

the UCCJEA (750 ILCS 36/201 (West 2022)).

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¶ 33   On September 2, 2022, the trial court heard argument on Jacob’s post-judgment motion

with Jacob’s counsel standing on the arguments set forth in the motion. At the end of the hearing,

the trial court denied Jacob’s motion. On September 30, 2022, Jacob filed a notice of appeal listing

three orders: (1)the order granting, in part, Megan’s motion to restrict Jacob’s parenting time

(entered July 28, 2022), (2) the order granting Megan’s petition for attorney fees (entered August

5, 2022), and (3) the order denying Jacob’s post-judgment motion (entered September 2, 2022).

¶ 34                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 35   Initially, we address Megan’s argument that we should dismiss Jacob’s appeal for his

failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (an

argument must “contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of

the authorities and the pages of the record relied on”). Although we agree that Jacob advances a

perfunctory analysis of the issues, fails to cite relevant authority, and misstates the record, the

deficiencies do not hinder or preclude our review. We therefore decline to dismiss Jacob’s appeal.

See Carter v. Carter, 2012 IL App (1st) 110855, ¶ 12 (“Although our review of [appellant’s] brief

reveals that it fails to comply with Rules 341(h)(6) and (h)(7), we conclude that her violations of

those rules do not hinder our review of the case ***.”).

¶ 36   We note that Jacob’s brief does not challenge the trial court’s order that granted, in part,

Megan’s petition to restrict Jacob’s parenting time. Rather, Jacob’s brief attacks only the trial

court’s orders that denied his request for an evaluator, granted Megan’s motion for attorney fees,

and allocated certain GAL’s fees to be paid by Jacob.

¶ 37                      A. Denial of Motion to Appoint an Evaluator

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¶ 38   Jacob argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to request an evaluator

under section 610.04(b) and (c) of the Act. Jacob contends that the trial court departed from the

plain language of the statute when it read into it conditions that the legislature did not express.

¶ 39   Our review of the record reveals that Jacob failed to present the issues he now presents to

this court regarding the interpretation of section 610.04 to the trial court for argument and

consideration or in his post-judgment motion. Indeed, he raises these arguments for the first time

in this appeal. As such, these issues are forfeited. It is well settled that “[i]ssues not raised in the

trial court are [forfeited] and cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.” In re Marriage of

Minear, 181 Ill. 2d 552, 564 (1998); McKinney v. Castleman, 2012 IL App (4th) 110098, ¶ 20.

¶ 40   The forfeiture in this case is a particular form of forfeiture called a procedural default.

Jacob never raised the claim of error in the trial court and thus did not give the trial court the

opportunity to clarify, explain or reconsider its decision regarding its alleged erroneous

interpretation of section 604.10. Having failed to address these issues below Jacob seeks de novo

review of the trial court’s order denying his request for the appointment of a 604.10 evaluator.

Megan does not raise forfeiture. However, it is not our function to review matters raised for the

first time on appeal, especially exercises of discretion (see In re Marriage of Iqbal and Khan, 2014

IL App (2d) 131306, ¶ 44 (the determination of whether a child custody evaluator should be

appointed is within the broad discretion of the trial court)).

¶ 41   Forfeiture notwithstanding, we do not accept that Jacob’s arguments have merit. Jacob

claims that the trial court “violated every rule of statutory construction” because it (1) inserted the

need for “special circumstances” into the statute, (2) noted its “policy in the past,” and

(3) improperly asked the GAL how it should rule on his motion.

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¶ 42   The record establishes that the trial court properly applied section 604.10(b) and (c).

Section 604.10(b) provides, in part, that “The court may seek the advice of any professional,

whether or not regularly employed by the court, to assist the court in determining the child’s best

interests.” 750 ILCS 5/604.10(b) (West 2022). Section 604.10(c) provides, in part:

               “In a proceeding to allocate parental responsibilities or to relocate a child, upon

       notice and motion made by a parent or any party to the litigation within a reasonable time

       before trial, the court shall order an evaluation to assist the court in determining the child’s

       best interests unless the court finds that an evaluation under this Section is untimely or not

       in the best interests of the child.” Id. § 604.10(c). (Emphasis added.)

The purpose of the statute is to make the information available to assist the court and protect the

interests of minor children regarding issues of custody and visitation. In re Marriage of Debra N.

& Michael S., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ¶ 51 (construing prior version of statute).

¶ 43   We will not disturb a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to appoint an evaluator absent

an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Iqbal and Khan, 2014 IL App (2d) 131306, ¶ 44. A

trial court abuses its discretion only where its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where

no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Brown v. Illinois State Police,

2021 IL 126153, ¶ 49.

¶ 44   Jacob fails to explain how any of the cherry-picked, out of context remarks he lifts from

the record affected the trial court’s interpretation of section 604.10(b) or (c) leading to its denial

of his motion to appoint an evaluator. When read in context, it is clear that the trial court did not

require “special circumstances,” rather it considered the best interests of the children. The trial

court stated, “[t]he issue is what’s in the best interests of the children. I found before that there

were no special circumstances that we needed to do that and that’s within my discretion.”

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¶ 45   Further, the record shows that the trial court asked the GAL’s opinion about the

appointment of an evaluator. However, the record reveals that the trial court did not “rubber stamp”

the GAL’s recommendation and did not rely solely on the GAL’s opinion.

¶ 46   Similarly, Jacob fails to explain how the trial court’s comment regarding his “policy in the

past” affected its decision. The record reveals that after considering Jacob’s testimony, the GAL’s

recommendation, and counsel’s argument, the trial court expressly found that it would not be in

the children’s best interests to appoint an evaluator under section 604.10(b) or (c). The court

acknowledged that Jacob had a strategical interest in the appointment of an evaluator and then

weighed that interest against the four children’s interests of being repeatedly interviewed.

Ultimately, the trial court found that the appointment of a 604.10(b) or (c) evaluator was not in the

best interests of the children. On this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision was

arbitrary or unreasonable, or that the court abused its discretion.

¶ 47    In addition, we note that Jacob failed to comply with section 604.10(c), which required

notice and a motion within a reasonable time before trial. 750 ILCS 5/604.10(c) (West 2022).

Indeed, he never moved for a 604.10(c) evaluator in the trial court. Instead, 33 days before trial,

Jacob’s counsel admitted to the court that he had not filed a 604.10(c) motion and then asked the

court how it would rule if he filed the motion. Yet, nothing in the record indicates that Jacob

actually moved for a 604.10(c) evaluator. For this reason, Jacob failed to comply with the statute.

¶ 48                                      B. Attorney Fees

¶ 49   Next, Jacob argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, after it rewrote section

604.10, it ordered him to pay Megan’s attorney fees after it found his motion to appoint an

evaluator to be vexatious. Megan argues that the trial court properly granted count II of her petition

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for attorney fees pursuant to section 508(b) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2022)). Section

508(b) provides in part:

               “If at any time a court finds that a hearing under this Act was precipitated or

       conducted for any improper purpose, the court shall allocate fees and costs of all parties

       for the hearing to the party or counsel found to have acted improperly. Improper purposes

       include, but are not limited to, harassment, unnecessary delay, or other acts needlessly

       increasing the cost of litigation.” Id.

¶ 50   Thus, the statute mandates the assessment of costs and attorney fees when the court finds

that a hearing was “precipitated or conducted for any improper purpose,” including, but not limited

to, “harassment, unnecessary delay, or other acts needlessly increasing the cost of litigation.” 750

ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2022); In re Marriage of Mouschovias, 359 Ill. App. 3d 348, 357-58 (2005).

An award of attorney fees under section 508(b) will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of

discretion by the trial court. In re Marriage of Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 706, 715 (2005). Under

this standard, we will reverse only if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court. In re

Marriage of Keller, 2020 IL App (2d) 180960, ¶ 11.

¶ 51   Here, contrary to Jacob’s representation, the trial court found that Jacob’s motion to

disqualify the GAL was vexatious. The court did not find that Jacob’s motion to appoint an

evaluator was vexatious. The court stated:

               “Regarding count 2, the vexatious litigation [claim], I started to go through the

       history of this case and that’s what leads me to believe that the motions regarding [the

       GAL] were vexatious. The motions seeking to remove her as [GAL] were vexatious in the

       fact that they were filed only after a recommendation was given. They were only filed after

       the motion for a 604.10 evaluator was denied. *** [Jacob argued] that the 604.10 evaluator

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       was necessary to rebut the recommendations from the [GAL]. I think when that failed, the

       next step was to ask that she be disqualified. And then when that failed *** then this

       jurisdictional issue came up. I find these actions by [Jacob] in trying to have [the GAL]

       removed were vexatious. They were not necessary or reasonable under the circumstances

       because I felt that the improper purpose was to have her removed to allow him to be able

       to argue that he should have the time he was asking for *** contrary to what [the GAL]

       said.

                                                ***

               I find these acts needlessly increased the cost of litigation. Clearly, I found that

       [Megan’s counsel] had to spend 9.5 hours defending an action that I didn’t think was

       necessary under the circumstances. *** So I’m gonna award $300 an hour for 9 hours

       which is $2,700.”

¶ 52   Quite simply, Jacob cites nothing in the record that contradicts the trial court’s findings.

Accordingly, based on our review of the proceedings, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in granting Megan’s request for attorney fees on count II of her petition.

¶ 53   Finally, Jacob notes that the trial court ordered him to pay $2612 to the GAL for fees

associated with time expended on his motion to disqualify her. However, Jacob did not raise this

issue in his post-judgment motion or in his notice of appeal, and so he forfeits the issue. 1010 Lake

Shore Ass’n, 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 14; In re Marriage of Goesel, 2017 IL 122046, ¶ 12. Further,

Jacob raises this issue in only one conclusory sentence in his brief and makes no argument in

support of it in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We are

entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority and coherent arguments presented;

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arguments inadequately presented on appeal are forfeited. Maday v. Township High School

District 211, 2018 IL App (1st) 180294, ¶ 50. Thus, this issue is forfeited.

¶ 54                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55   For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County is affirmed.

¶ 56   Affirmed.

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