Court Opinion

ID: 9528873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:55.303571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:25.803476
License: Public Domain

Owsley, J.,
dissenting: I disagree with the court’s decision. A careful reading of the statute (K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 44-501) prohibits recovery for a coronary or coronary artery disease if it occurs in the workman’s usual work; however, the statute plainly reads if the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability is more than the usual work, recovery is permitted. The emphasis is on unusual exertion.
The claimant testified he had been carrying sheetrock during the whole nineteen years he had worked for the respondent. He testified that immediately prior to his attack he had been carrying sheetrock from the street up five or six steps to the sidewalk. He then carried the sheetrock up four or five steps to the porch. After entering the house the sheetrock was carried up the steps to the second floor of the house. He further testified it was not unusual to carry sheetrock up to the second floor of the house, but it was unusual to carry it from tihe street up two sets of stairs before entering the house and going to the second floor.
A fellow employee of the plaintiff, Morrison, testified to the same effect, and when asked whether the work was unusual, he said, “Well, what we had out in front was unusual. That was unusual. *406About going up the stairs it is not unusual. We have to take that up all the time like that. Carrying it from the street, that was just unusual that day, that’s all.”
The testimony of claimant and his fellow employee, Morrison, was the whole of the evidence before the trial court as to whether there was exertion beyond the claimant’s usual work. Any inferences drawn from the testimony must be limited to the foregoing. The statement in the opinion for the court that “exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability was no more than that of his usual work” was erroneous. It was also erroneous to state that “there was substantial competent evidence to support the lower court’s decision.”
The statute does not give any light on the issue of how much exertion beyond usual work is necessary to support a recovery. In order to reach the conclusion of the majority the statute must be strictly construed against the workman, contrary to the frequently stated rule that the workmen’s compensation law should be liberally construed in favor of the workman.
I would reverse the trial court on this issue.
Prager, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.