Court Opinion

ID: 9622879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:24:33.438766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:50.834890
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, J.
I concur in the judgment, but write separately out of a concern that the majority opinion may be read as holding that the State of California is forever and in all circumstances barred from acting to preserve a scarce natural resource located on Indian lands within the state. As explained below, I do not read either People v. McCovey (1984) 36 Cal.3d 517 [205 Cal.Rptr. 643, 685 P.2d 687] or the pertinent federal authorities as so holding, nor, in my view, does our decision today preclude the exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction over tribal activities on Indian lands where the state’s interest is sufficiently compelling. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that the preservation of a scarce, common resource may constitute such an interest. (New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe (1983) 462 U.S. 324, 342 [76 L.Ed.2d 611, 625-626, 103 S.Ct. 2378]; Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept. (1977) 433 U.S. 165, 173-177 [53 L.Ed.2d 667, 674-677, 97 S.Ct. 2616]; United States v. State of Or. (9th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 299, 304-305; see also People v. McCovey, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 532, fn. 18.) When federal law is silent or unavailing, state law must be adequate to preserve the survival of endangered fish and wildlife resources.
*375A. Prosecution Is Barred in This Case
As noted above, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that our holding in McCovey bars the prosecution of defendants in this matter. The alleged violations of Fish and Game Code sections 8434 and 8685.6 occurred in 1981, three years prior to our holding in McCovey that federal regulations preempt the state’s fishery conservation laws as applied to the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. Thus, McCovey is clearly dispositive of this matter. Even if one were to accept the Court of Appeal’s novel theory that changes in the escapement levels of Klamath River salmon could somehow resurrect sections 8434 and 8685.6 from the dustbin of preemption, the prosecution in this case would not be valid, as the violations occurred prior to the alleged change of circumstances.
Moreover, the broader ramifications of the Court of Appeal’s theory are simply unacceptable. When escapement levels of salmon are high, the theory suggests, McCovey governs; when low, McCovey may be ignored. The Court of Appeal would thus reduce our holding to little more than a chimera, subject to the whim of the prosecutor and the fortunes of the anadromous fish. Clearly, this approach must be rejected.
Equally unacceptable, however, is the notion—vigorously condemned by Justice Mosk in his dissenting opinion—that “the State of California is necessarily and for all time barred from conserving a natural resource located within its borders.” (Dis. opn. of Mosk, J. at p. 378.) Our decision in McCovey, it should be emphasized, does not stand for the proposition that federal “conservation” regulations preempt this state’s environmental protection laws under any and all circumstances. While a full exploration of McCovey’s impact on cases unrelated to the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation must necessarily await another day, it is clear, in my view, that even “pervasive” federal regulatory schemes leave room for state laws directed explicitly to the preservation of an endangered species and supported by a sufficiently compelling factual record.
In the unusual case, such as that presented here, where we previously held that existing federal regulations “adequately protected” the state’s interest (People v. McCovey, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 533), but subsequent events occur which suggest otherwise, a valid assertion of state regulatory authority would require (1) that the state adopt new provisions narrowly tailored to meet the exigency, and (2) adduce sufficient facts to show that the state law serves a compelling interest which the federal regulations do not address or fail to safeguard. Although the state in this matter failed to meet these criteria, as explained below, I believe that both state and federal decisions allow such an exercise of state authority.
*376B. Federal Preemption of State Environmental Laws
So far as I am aware, no court has ever decided that a state lacks the power to regulate tribal fishing on an Indian reservation in the express interest of preserving an endangered anadromous fish population. Mattz v. Arnett (1973) 412 U.S. 481 [37 L.Ed.2d 92, 93 S.Ct. 2245] held merely that the Klamath River Reservation had not been extinguished, but expressed no view as to the state’s authority to regulate fishing on the reservation. (Id. at p. 485 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 95].) On remand in Arnett v. Five Gill Nets (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 454 [121 Cal.Rptr. 906], the Court of Appeal did not reach the issue because it found that state intervention “in the interest of preserving the fish” was not supported by the record. (Id. at pp. 463-464.) Similarly, our decision in McCovey was based, in part, on the fact that the state had not shown the exercise of its police power was necessary to preserve a scarce, common resource. (36 Cal.3d at pp. 532-533.) Our holding today, in my view, stands only for the limited proposition that state intervention may not be premised upon laws previously held to be preempted.
What these and other decisions do establish, however, is the principle that state jurisdiction over fish and wildlife resources located on federally regulated Indian reservations depends, in part, upon the nature of the state interests asserted. Though it is admittedly the rare case, the United States Supreme Court has nevertheless expressly recognized “that in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.” (New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 331-332 [76 L.Ed.2d at pp. 618-619].) In so stating, it is significant that the high court referred expressly to Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., supra, 433 U.S. 165, the third in a trilogy of cases dealing with the State of Washington’s authority to regulate on-reservation fishing by members of the Puyallup tribe. Though not a preemption matter, the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of the State of Washington’s “power to conserve an important natural resource” is significant. (Id. at p. 175 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 676].) Coupled with Justice Douglas’s typically pungent observation in Puyallup II (Washington Game Dept. v. Puyallup Tribe (1973) 414 U.S. 44 [38 L.Ed.2d 254, 94 S.Ct. 330]) that the State of Washington’s “police power ... is adequate to prevent the steelhead [trout] from following the fate of the passenger pigeon” (id. at p.49 [38 L.Ed.2d at p. 258]), it suggests that a state’s jurisdiction to preserve an endangered species survives the enactment of a federal regulatory scheme— even one which includes “conservation” among its stated goals.
Preemption of California environmental protection laws does not automatically follow from a finding that federal regulations applicable to Indian lands appear to address “similar” concerns. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 367.) The *377instant matter presents a classic case in point. The fishing regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation state several goals: the protection of the reservation’s fishery resources, the ensurance of equal access to the fishery resources by all eligible Indians, the preservation of fishing for traditional subsistence and ceremonial purposes as well as the promotion of economic self-sufficiency through commercial fishing. (25 C.F.R. §§ 250.1, 250.9.) The federal regulations permit the limited use of gill nets for these purposes. (25 C.F.R. § 250.9.)
McCovey found—on the facts presented—that the foregoing federal scheme “adequately protected” the “state’s interest in the conservation of salmon.” (36 Cal.3d at p. 533.) As we explained: “[T]he state has not shown that its interest in conservation is sufficient to justify assertion of concurrent authority. Thus, the state is preempted from exercising jurisdiction over appellant McCovey.” (Ibid.)
McCovey, however, did not consider the validity of state intervention pursuant to a state statute or regulation enacted for the express preservationist or “environmentalist” purpose of preserving an endangered species from imminent extinction. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only circumstance in which state intervention would be proper. I do suggest, however, that an environmentalist measure of this nature differs in kind from the typical “conservationist” regulations enacted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the aegis of the Department of the Interior. The objective of the federal government in this, as in many other cases, is sustained economic development on the reservation enlightened by rational management of its resources. This “scientific” approach to resource management lies at the heart of the “conservationist” ethic, an idea championed by the Progressives at the turn of the century and since institutionalized by resource management experts in various government agencies. (See Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement 1890-1920 (1959) pp. 1-4, 145-146.) “Environmentalism,” on the other hand, is a movement of more recent origins, and generally has its goal the preservation of resources from development. (See Schrepfer, The Fight to Save the Redwoods: A History of Environmental Reform 1917-1978 (1983) pp. 16, 229-244; Weyeneth, The Color Green: Politics in the Age of Ecology (1988) 16 Reviews in American History 298, 303-305.)
I am not suggesting that the federal regulations at issue here contemplate the annihilation of the Klamath River salmon. On the contrary, as noted above, they appear to seek sustained economic development. I do suggest, however, that federal conservationist goals are not necessarily congruent with local environmental concerns. The federal regulations, it must be re*378membered, seek to create private rights on the reservation for purely personal financial gain. As the Court of Appeal noted, however, that small stretch of the Klamath River which passes through the reservation serves as a veritable “gateway” for salmon seeking freshwater spawning grounds hundreds of kilometers away from the reservation. Many of these salmon actually originated in state-operated hatcheries located off the reservation. What occurs on the reservation may dramatically affect fishery resources throughout the state. Thus, the state has a distinct and valid interest in the preservation of this common resource for all of its citizens.
Accordingly, the existence of a federal regulatory scheme that purportedly includes among its goals the “conservation” of reservation resources does not terminate the preemption analysis. Courts must continue to determine the respective federal, state and tribal interests, and where a sufficiently compelling environmental concern—such as the preservation of an endangered species—necessitates state enforcement, must be free to find concurrent state jurisdiction.
Panelli, J., concurred.