Court Opinion

ID: 9535866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:45:49.5398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:22.235538
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the Majority opinion.
I write separately only to note the inherent limitations of a strict elemental equivalency analysis such as is reflected in Section 9714 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714, as I believe such limitations are highlighted by the circumstances of the present case. Examining the undisputed facts underlying Appellee’s New York arson conviction — that Appellee intentionally burned a building housing a business — it is apparent that Appellee’s conduct, if committed in Pennsylvania, would have supported a conviction under Pennsylvania’s “Arson endangering persons” statute.1 Indeed, given the substantial overlap between the New York and Pennsylvania statutes, it is certainly possible that the General Assembly did not contemplate that such conduct would elude the enhanced sentencing equation under Section 9714.
On the other hand, various complexities attend the administration of an enhancement scheme accounting for specific factual elements, including: provision for the determination of particular facts in a system employing general verdicts; and the involvement of constitutional issues connected with sentencing enhancements, such as those arising under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In the face of such complexities, and consistent with the application of judicial restraint in defining the scope of *562criminal liability, I continue to support the notion that “equivalent crimes” are to be evaluated at an elemental level, absent more specific direction from the Legislature. Accord Commonwealth v. Shaw, 560 Pa. 296, 744 A.2d 739 (2000). To the degree the General Assembly wishes to effectuate a change, there are various models available,2 which may be studied in devising a clear and coherent statutory framework that is consistent with governing law.

. In Pennsylvania, a person commits "Arson endangering persons” where "he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion ... and if: (i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily injury ... or (ii) he commits the act with the purpose of destroying or damaging an inhabited building or occupied structure of another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a). An "occupied structure” is "[a]ny structure, vehicle or place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is actually present.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301 (j).

. See, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 17-10-7(c) (defining a repeat offender to include "any person who, after having been convicted under the laws of [Georgia] for three felonies or having been convicted under the laws of any other state ... of three crimes which if committed within [Georgia] would be felonies, [who then] commits a felony within [Georgia] ..."); see also Woodson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 67, 530 S.E.2d 2, 5 (2000) (holding that, under Section 17-10-7(c), the State bears the burden of establishing that the foreign convictions were "for conduct which would be considered felonious under the laws of [Georgia] ...") (citation omitted); Nelson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 92, 625 S.E.2d 465, 473 (2005) (applying Section 17-10-7(c) and finding that, where the defendant's conduct underlying a prior New York conviction would have constituted a felony under Georgia law, the trial court properly treated the New York conviction as a prior felony conviction for sentencing purposes).