Court Opinion

ID: 9691202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:16:28.599117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:12.905868
License: Public Domain

RICK STRANGE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding a material and substantial change in circumstance. The record is absent any evidence that the parties’ circumstances materially and substantially changed — as opposed to events normally occurring during the passage of time — subsequent to their mediation. Rather, it appears that the trial court modified the divorce decree based upon a determination that it would be in the children’s best interest to remain in Abilene. Because this approach is contrary to the Texas Family Code and is also contrary to public policy favoring mediation agreements in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, I believe the trial court abused its discretion.
Our review is complicated by the hybrid analysis utilized in family law cases involving children. This requires combining an abuse of discretion review with a traditional sufficiency review and factoring in the children’s best interest. Texas courts have developed several rules or guidelines to implement this hybrid analysis. For example, we must initially ascertain whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion utilizing a traditional sufficiency review. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.). Next, we determine whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion, which requires that we decide whether the trial court made a reasonable decision. Knight v. Knight, 131 S.W.3d 535, 539 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.). At first blush, these guidelines sound helpful; but, in application, they beg several questions. For example, what evidence do we consider?1 when is that evidence sufficient? and what role does the children’s best interest play?
The majority is clearly correct when it notes that the children’s best interest is our primary consideration. I further agree with the majority that allowing the children to stay in Abilene would in many ways be advantageous for them. But, when a party seeks to modify a divorce decree, the children’s best interest is the second question not the first. The first question is whether a material and substantial change of circumstance has occurred because the original decree is res judicata of the children’s best interest. Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Absent a material and substantial change of circumstance, revisiting the prior determination of best interest is inappropriate. See In re M.N.G., 113 S.W.3d 27, 34 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (requiring *700proof of a material and substantial change “serves a valid purpose of significantly limiting the trial judge’s discretion and prevents the modification statute from being unconstitutionally broad”). Consequently, while it may sound counter-intuitive, the trial court had no discretion to make a best interest determination absent proof of the required change.
What evidence should we consider to determine if Leverton met her burden of proof? Trial courts have been instructed to compare the conditions existing at the time of the mediation agreement with the conditions existing at the time of the modification hearing. Agraz v. Carnley, 143 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Obviously, the fact that Leverton may no longer be happy with the mediation agreement is insufficient. Leverton’s burden was to prove a change in circumstance. Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 411, 424 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.). This burden is by design more stringent than simply showing that a requested modification would be in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 156.101(1) (Vernon Supp.2006).
At trial, Leverton testified that her residency request was based upon the realization that, if she moved, it would be more difficult for her to obtain a music education degree. Leverton did not advance that issue before this court. Instead, she pointed out that she would make less money if she moved; that one of her children, A.C., has been diagnosed with ADD/ADHD; that A.C. is settled and doing well in school; and that continuity was important for her children.
I do not believe that any of these reasons is evidence of a change in circumstance. Leverton may not have appreciated the difficulty she would encounter completing her degree when she signed the mediation agreement, but that difficulty was not due to anything that happened subsequent to the mediation. Similarly, the fact that she would make less money if she worked for another employer other than her father is a factor that was present, but perhaps not fully appreciated, when the mediation agreement was signed.
The only other change of circumstance identified by Leverton is the fact that A.C. is receiving needed stability for his ADD/ ADHD condition at his present school. The majority bases its holding on this factor, concluding that the children’s current stability is a material change of circumstance. I respectfully disagree because A.C.’s condition had already been diagnosed and was being treated when the parties signed their mediation agreement. The facts that his condition had improved and that allowing him to remain at his present school would in some ways be beneficial are not a change of circumstance. A.C.’s improvement is presumably exactly what the parties anticipated would occur during the upcoming school year when they signed the mediation agreement. The difficulty the move would cause and its impact on his progression were also factors the parties surely considered. No evidence was offered that anything happened subsequent to mediation which materially altered these factors beyond the changes one would expect to occur during the normal passage of time.
Structure and stability are important for all children. Merely because these factors are more critical for A.C. due to his ADD/ ADHD is not a change in circumstance. Moving injects uncertainty into children’s lives and is always difficult as they adjust to a new home, neighborhood, school, and *701church.2 The irony is that Leverton helped create the problem when she decided not to honor the mediation agreement because the longer the children stay in Abilene the more difficult any move will be. Leverton moved to Abilene with the children when the parties separated. At mediation, she agreed to return to Denton or Tarrant County at the end of the current school year. Leverton knew when she made this promise that in a few months she and her children would have to move and make the necessary adjustments. The fact that the difficulties inherent with this promise must now be faced is not a change in circumstance.
We have no way of knowing what transpired during the mediation session and, thus, do not know what Child may have conceded to Leverton in exchange for her agreement to return with the children. But, it is reasonable to believe that this concession did not occur in a vacuum. When the legislature adopted the Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, it became public policy to “encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes, with special consideration given to disputes involving the parent-child relationship, including the mediation of issues involving conservatorship, possession, and support of children, and the early settlement of pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 154.002 (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added). Allowing Leverton to modify the decree without requiring proof of a material and substantial change in circumstance is counter to this policy, and I worry that our decision sends the wrong message.
Moreover, the trial court which granted the parties their divorce knew that Lever-ton and her children would necessarily have to move at the end of the school year.3 Despite this, the original trial court determined that the decree was in the children’s best interest. Neither party appealed that ruling. I worry also that we are sending the wrong message on the role of res judicata when family law cases are transferred from one county to another.
The Austin Court of Appeals recently held that a trial court abused its discretion by modifying a divorce decree based on circumstances that were clearly contemplated by the parties at the time of the rendition of their original divorce decree. Zeifman v. Michels, No. 03-05-00533-CV, 2006 WL 2190525, 212 S.W.3d 582 (Tex.App.-Austin Aug. 4, 2006, no pet.). In that case, the parties agreed at mediation that their daughter would attend a specific public school. Subsequently, the child’s mother successfully applied for her daughter’s admission to a private school. The mother sought to modify the decree to allow her daughter to attend the private school. The trial court granted her petition.
Several similarities exist between that case and our own. Principal among them is the fact that in neither case was there truly a change of circumstance. Rather, in Zeifman, the trial court presumably determined that it would be better for the child to attend the private school because of the strength of its academics. In our case, the trial court apparently determined that it *702would be better for the children to stay at their school in Abilene. The Austin Court noted Texas public policy favoring mediation in divorce cases and discouraging re-litigation with respect to children. Id. at 588, 2006 WL 2190525, at *11-12. The court found that the latter was accomplished by requiring proof of a material and substantial change. Id. Because the child’s education was a circumstance given considerable attention by the parents when they signed their mediation agreement and because there was no change in circumstance beyond changes incident to the passage of time, the court held it was improper to modify the decree.
In our case, the children’s residence was similarly given considerable attention by the parties, and their agreement was approved by the court. I respectfully submit that we should follow the example set by our sister court. A comparison of the circumstances existing at the time of the mediation agreement with the circumstances existing at the time of the modification reveals no material or substantial change. Because there is no evidence of the required change, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the divorce decree.

. I recognize that, when reviewing a legal sufficiency complaint, we are to consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court’s finding and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex.2001). My concern is evidence of what?

. See Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., James A. Vaught, Karl E. Hayes, and Jennifer L. Tull, Dealing with Mobile Parents: Domicile Restrictions and Relocation, State Bar of Texas Advanced Family Law Course ch. 69 at 27 (2001).

. The parties’ divorce proceedings were filed in Denton County and their divorce was granted in Denton County. When Leverton filed her petition to modify, she also filed a motion to transfer venue to Taylor County. That motion was granted, and the case was transferred.