Court Opinion

ID: 9781710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:16:27.122482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:34.134848
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(dissenting):
T 17 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, as I would affirm the trial court's denial of Lowe's motion to suppress. The majority opinion fails, in my opinion, to evaluate the totality of the cireumstances that were apparent to Officer Morgan when he arrived on the seene and proceeded to frisk Lowe for weapons. When all of the facts and cireumstances available to Officer Morgan are considered, I must disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that he lacked a reasonable belief that Lowe was armed and dangerous. To the contrary, the totality of the cireumstances made it eminently reasonable for Officer Morgan to conduct himself in the belief that Lowe "[was] dangerous, and that he [might] obtain immediate control of weapons," see State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 41, 229 P.3d 650 (internal quotation marks omitted). For this reason, I dissent.
118 I begin with a summary of the facts and circumstances known to Officer Morgan when he made the decision to frisk Lowe.1 Based on a stipulation between the parties, the trial court adopted the fact statements contained in the State's opposition memorandum, which described Officer Morgan's interaction with Lowe as follows:
Just after Deputy Taylor foreed Lamo-reaux to the ground, Provo Police Officer Troy Morgan arrived, having been dispatched to assist with a warrant service. Officer Morgan heard Deputy Taylor yelling as he approached the area. When he arrived, he saw Deputy Taylor with his gun out, one individual on the ground and at least one other individual ([Lowe]) present and unrestrained. Officer Morgan accordingly made contact with [Lowe]. As he did so, Deputy Taylor was removing [a] knife from Lamoreaux's pants pocket. At *166that moment, [Lowe] "turned into" Officer Morgan, immediately causing Officer Morgan to suspect that [Lowe] also had a weapon and to fear for his safety.
{ 19 If this were the full extent of the facts presented to the trial court, I might be persuaded to join my colleagues' appraisal of the reasonableness of Officer Morgan's beliefs about Lowe. However, Officer Morgan's undisputed testimony at the preliminary hearing contained significant additional facts that clearly justified his frisk of Lowe. The trial court's truncated summary of the facts as adopted by the parties is not inconsistent with the remainder of Officer Morgan's testimony, nor did the trial court give any indication that Officer Morgan lacked credibility-to the contrary, the trial court repeatedly referred to Officer Morgan's testimony throughout its oral ruling on Lowe's motion.2 Accordingly, I look to the transcript of the preliminary hearing to flesh out the totality of the cireumstances presented to the trial court. Cf. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 P2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984) ("Where the written findings are incomplete, inadequate, or ambiguous, as in this case, they may be elaborated or interpreted (in respects not inconsistent therewith) by reference to the trial court's written memorandum or its oral explanation of the decision.").
120 Officer Morgan testified that he was dispatched "to assist Utah Major Crimes with a possible warrants service" and that "the individual that they were going to make contact with has a flight risk, and is also a violent person, and will resist officers at the scene." When Officer Morgan arrived on the scene and was approaching on foot, he heard Deputy Taylor "yelling, 'Stop resisting. Show me your hands. Get on the ground," several times." Officer Morgan and his backup officer ran to Deputy Taylor's assistance, where Officer Morgan saw that Deputy Taylor "had two individuals at gunpoint. One of the individuals [was] on the ground resisting." On cross-examination, Officer Morgan specifically agreed that Deputy Taylor had his gun pointed at Lowe while he was scuffling with Lamoreaux. Deputy Taylor and the third officer subdued and searched Lamoreaux, while Officer Morgan "[took] possession" of Lowe and "had [him] up against [a] vehicle." Lowe was wearing a jumpsuit with a jacket over the top of it, and Officer Morgan testified that Lowe's clothing could have concealed a weapon. As Deputy Taylor discovered and removed a large knife from Lamoreaux, Lowe "turned around into [Officer Morgan]." Lowe had his hands up at the time and Officer Morgan "had him by the hands." Officer Morgan testified, "I was standing. His back was to me. He turned 180 degrees to face me.... I just turned him back around." Officer Morgan then frisked Lowe and, in the course of the frisk, discovered methamphetamine on his person.
T21 Generally speaking, "police may conduct a protective frisk only when they have reasonable suspicion that the detained individual is armed and dangerous." State v. Peterson, 2005 UT 17, ¶ 10, 110 P.3d 699; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). "[The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the cireumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868. "Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to subject an individual to a ... frisk is 'evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances." Peterson, 2005 UT 17, ¶ 11, 110 P.3d 699 (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 590). Considering the totality of the cireumstances described by Officer Morgan, I have little difficulty in concluding that he had an objectively reasonable belief that Lowe presented a danger and that, therefore, his frisk of Lowe was consti*167tutionally permissible. There are four areas of Officer Morgan's testimony that, in my opinion, demonstrate that he had the requisite justification to frisk Lowe.
122 First, before Officer Morgan even arrived on the scene, he was informed by dispatch that he was being called to assist "Utah Major Crimes" in possibly serving a warrant and that the individual involved was "a violent person, and will resist officers." While this information apparently (and somewhat accurately) referred to Lamoreaux, there is no indication in the record that Officer Morgan knew that Lowe was not the violent person described by dispatch until after the frisk occurred. To the contrary, when asked if he had received a report about Lowe prior to his arrival on the scene, Officer Morgan responded, "There were multiple suspects at the seene. His identification wasn't determined at the time."
128 Second, as Officer Morgan was approaching the seene on foot, he heard Deputy Taylor "yelling, 'Stop resisting. Show me your hands. Get on the ground,' several times." Unsurprisingly, this indicated to Officer Morgan that Deputy Taylor "was in some sort of trouble, and that he was being fought with." Again, as Officer Morgan approached, he had no way of knowing whether Deputy Taylor was fighting with one or more individuals or the identity of any of those individuals.
€24 Third, when Officer Morgan ran to assist Deputy Taylor and first observed the altercation, Deputy Taylor was pointing his gun at Lowe with one arm while scuffling with Lamoreaux with his other arm. In other words, when presented with an actively resisting individual, Deputy Taylor chose not to use both arms to subdue that individual but rather felt a need to use one arm to hold Lowe at gunpoint. Certainly, this indicated to Officer Morgan that Deputy Taylor believed that Lowe constituted a danger, just as surely as if Deputy Taylor had verbally indicated such a belief3 At the very least, Deputy Taylor's holding Lowe at gunpoint gave Officer Morgan reasonable grounds to believe, correctly or incorrectly, that Lowe had been part of the altercation that led to Deputy Taylor's yelling and that Lowe presented a potential threat until Officer Morgan could determine otherwise.
1 25 Finally, there is Lowe's "turning into" Officer Morgan, the majority opinion's de-seription of which is substantially at odds with Officer Morgan's actual testimony. The majority opinion describes the incident as, "Lowe, who was standing between the two officers, made a 180 degree turn toward Officer Morgan while continuing to hold his hands above his head." See supra ¶ 3. While I agree that Lowe's hands were apparently in the air throughout the incident, Officer Morgan testified that he had taken possession of Lowe, had him up against a vehicle, and had him "by the hands" when Lowe turned 180 degrees to face him, apparently in response to the discovery of the knife on Lamoreaux. Under these circumstances, Lowe's movement seems much more resistive or threatening, and much less like the common gesture or movement described by the majority opinion. See generally State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989) (concluding that a suspect's "common gestures and movements" did not give rise to reasonable suspicion).
[ 26 When these four factual cireumstances are added to the general description of events adopted by the trial court and de-seribed by the majority opinion, the objective © reasonableness of Officer Morgan's actions becomes imminently apparent. Officer Morgan was dispatched to the seene with a warning that violent resistance was likely, heard such resistance occurring as he approached, arrived to witness Deputy Taylor holding Lowe at gunpoint while struggling with La-moreaux, and then had Lowe turn into him while in his physical grasp as a weapon was being secured from Lamoreaux. This is not, in my opinion, a close call.
127 Nor am I persuaded by the majority opinion's suggestion that Officer Morgan was *168required to attempt to resolve his fears through questioning rather than by means of a frisk. See supra ¶ 13. See generally State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 662-63 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (discussing reasonable inquiry in the frisk context). Although there are certainly cases where questioning might appropriately resolve safety concerns, "an officer may fore-go [such] initial inquiry when, because of specific cireumstances, questioning would be dangerous to the police officer." White, 856 P.2d at 662. Here, the situation involved actual violence against an officer, the appearance that Lowe was potentially involved in that violence, Deputy Taylor's deployment of a deadly weapon to control the situation, and some resistive movement by Lowe coincident with the disarming of Lamoreaux. In my opinion, Officer Morgan's decision to frisk Lowe rather than question him was completely justified in light of, in the words of the trial court in its oral ruling, "the volatility of the circumstances."
T28 For these reasons, I believe that the totality of the cireumstances known to Officer Morgan at the time of the frisk gave him an objectively reasonable belief that Lowe was armed and dangerous. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's denial of Lowe's motion to suppress, and I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

 To this end, I omit the circumstances of Lamo-reaux's removal from the doorway and other matters unknown to Officer Morgan when he executed the frisk of Lowe. I note that Lowe makes no argument that events occurring prior to Officer Morgan's arrival on the scene precluded Officer Morgan from relying on his observations upon his arrival as part of his overall assessment of the need to frisk. Accordingly, I view facts that were not known to Officer Morgan at the time of the frisk to be irrelevant to the analysis of the reasonableness of Officer Morgan's beliefs. Cf. State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, ¶ 12, 988 P.2d 7 ("In determining whether this objective standard has been met, the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before the stop." (emphasis added)).

. I additionally note that the same trial court judge presided over both the preliminary hearing and oral argument on Lowe's motion; that the two hearings were held a scant five weeks apart; and that, at oral argument, the trial court repeatedly and expressly relied on Officer Morgan's testimony, as reflected in the court's own notes from the preliminary hearing, to discuss facts outside those agreed to by the parties. For example, the stipulated facts included only that "Deputy Taylor [had] his gun out," while the trial court observed that its notes indicated that Lowe "had a gun trained on him."

. Even without considering Deputy Taylor's need to restrain Lamoreaux, it seems beyond dispute that a peace officer should have good reason to hold a citizen at gunpoint and that a second officer arriving to find a suspect held at gunpoint can reasonably assume there is some justification for the first officer's threat of deadly force.