Court Opinion

ID: 9900425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:44.783569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.312817
License: Public Domain

No. 309                 June 22, 2023                       469

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
              JEFFERY JERALD SKOTLAND,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Washington County Circuit Court
                   19CR77935; A176291

   Erik M. Buchér, Judge.
   Submitted January 26, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Stacy M. Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
   EGAN, J.
   Reversed and remanded.
   Kamins, J., dissenting.
470                                                      State v. Skotland

          EGAN, J.
          In this criminal case, defendant appeals from a
judgment of conviction for unlawful purchase of a firearm,
ORS 166.425 (Count 1), false information in connection
with the transfer of a firearm, ORS 166.416 (Count 2), and
attempted felon in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270;
ORS 161.405 (Count 3). In his first two assignments of error,
defendant argues that the trial court improperly allowed
the state to shift the burden of proof in closing argument
by suggesting that defendant had a burden to (a) identify
the attorney on whose advice he had relied in purchasing a
firearm; and (b) produce copies of the relevant paperwork.1
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court
erred in its ruling before closing arguments, which permit-
ted the prosecutor’s arguments that raised a “realistic possi-
bility of confusing the jurors about the ultimate standard or
burden of proof.” State v. Totland, 296 Or App 527, 531, 438
P3d 399, rev den, 365 Or 502 (2019). We further conclude
that that error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand.
                          I. FACTS
          Defendant has two prior felony convictions for
second-degree theft in the State of Washington from 1993
and 2008. In October 2019, defendant went to Bi-Mart and
filled out and submitted a “Firearms Transaction Record
(ATF Form 4473)” form generated by the United States
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for the pur-
chase of a firearm. The form required a description of the
make, model, serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the
firearm to be purchased. On the form, defendant answered
“no” to the question whether he had been convicted of a
felony.
          A Bi-Mart employee, Simmons, submitted the form
to the Oregon State Police (OSP). While waiting, defendant
    1
      In a third assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in refusing to provide an “impossibility” instruction. Given our reversal based on
the first two assignments of error, we do not address that assignment of error.
See State v. Cuffy, 322 Or App 642, 643, 521 P3d 516 (2022) (“Finally, we do not
reach defendant’s two supplemental assignments of error challenging the jury
instructions on Counts 1 and 2 because our disposition on Counts 1 and 2 based
on the evidentiary error obviates the need to do so.”).
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                             471

told Simmons that he was “a bit worried that it might not
go through” because defendant said there was “an issue
with trespassing or something and that he had it absolved
through court though, and that he should be okay to buy a
firearm.” OSP denied defendant’s background check.
         After denying the background check, OSP dis-
patched the Hillsboro Police Department, and Officer
Patenaude began to investigate the firearm purchase
denial. Patenaude went to Bi-Mart to collect the ATF form
and review it, and he also spoke to Simmons. Patenaude
then went to defendant’s home and asked defendant about
his application. Defendant said he thought OSP denied his
application because his license was suspended, but defen-
dant also said that his license was not suspended any-
more. Patenaude asked defendant if he had ever been con-
victed of a felony, and defendant answered no. Eventually,
defendant admitted that he had been convicted of a felony
in Washington in 1996. Patenaude asked defendant if he
remembered a 2007 conviction, and defendant said that he
did not know that it was a felony. Defendant told Patenaude
that he had “just got done with some lawyer stuff, and it
was supposed to be all wiped away.” Defendant did not tell
Patenaude his lawyer’s name.
         The state charged defendant with unlawfully pur-
chasing a firearm, ORS 166.425; providing false information
in connection with a transfer of a firearm, ORS 166.416; and
attempted felon in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270.
Defendant was tried by a jury. Before opening statements,
the trial court gave preliminary instructions and explained
to the jurors that “defendant is innocent of any crime unless
and until the state proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
         After the state’s case-in-chief, defendant testified.
He said that before this incident, he had been working on
expunging his records for four or five months and had com-
pleted the paperwork for expunging the Washington con-
victions with help from an attorney. Defendant “assumed
or was hoping” that he was eligible to buy a gun three or
four months after filling out the expungement paperwork.
Defendant also testified that when he filled out the ATF
472                                           State v. Skotland

form, he did not want to purchase a gun, but he wanted
to see if he was eligible to buy one for his job. He said that
other gun owners had told him that the only way to find out
if he was eligible to purchase a firearm was to try to buy a
gun. When asked whether his attorney had given him the
“go ahead” to purchase a firearm, defendant testified that he
did not receive that confirmation, and he “just got impatient
because [he] was told to wait[,] * * * and [he] thought maybe
it was time.” Defendant testified that he did not “want to
spend more money to see if it was okay to go get a gun.”
         On cross examination, the state asked defendant
to identify the attorney he had worked with to expunge his
records. Defendant said “[i]t’s irrelevant,” and he invoked
attorney-client privilege. Defendant also testified that he
did not have a copy of the expungement paperwork in his
possession and that his house had caught on fire, so he had
lost everything that he owns.
        Before closing arguments, defendant made a “pre-
emptive objection” to prevent the state from shifting the
burden of proof to defendant regarding defendant’s expunge-
ment claims:
       “So I do want to just make a preemptive kind of objec-
   tion just to make sure we’re not getting into an issue that
   comes up during closing.
       “Not that I’m assuming the state’s going to do anything,
   but I see the potential that the state could be saying that
   if the defense is going to rely that my client spoke to an
   attorney, we should be bringing in that attorney. We should
   bring in whatever documents for the expungement.
      “I didn’t print the case out, but there’s one from just a
   few months ago. It was very specific that that is improper
   argument. It’s the state’s burden. I don’t have to present
   anything, and they can’t stand up and say I should have
   brought stuff in, so—including witnesses.”
         The trial court agreed, but it also said that the state
“can comment on things [defendant] did state, though[,] * * *
because that’s not burden shifting because it’s just talking
about the facts in evidence.” The trial court provided exam-
ples of permissible and impermissible arguments:
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                                  473

      “But [the prosecutor] could say things like, ‘[h]ey, the
  defendant was testifying, and he didn’t say the attorney’s
  name, and he didn’t have to, but he could have if he wanted
  to, you know, because he was asked about that.’

      “I told him you could—you can say the name if you want
  to. I’m not requiring it because I can’t, but you can if you
  want to. And he decided not to.

     “You can’t say that he should have brought in the attor-
  ney. He should have brought in the paperwork or whatever.
  Yeah. You can just talk about how—what happened on the
  stand—and he talked about. You said, did you have the
  stuff with him now—with you now, and he said no. Right?”

The prosecutor said that the state “intended to say that we
don’t have that before us.” To which, the trial court added,
“Right, we don’t. Exactly. And you can talk about that.”
The state added that it “was not going to say that [defen-
dant] should have or that [defendant] could have” brought in
defendant’s expungement attorney or documents. The trial
court replied,
       “Exactly. Like, ‘[t]his guy could have brought this stuff
  in with him.’ We’re just like, ‘No, no, no. He’s not required
  to,’ but, yeah.
       “But you can talk about what he testified to and
  exactly—you know where that fine line is, but as long as
  it’s not burden-shifting, you’ll be totally fine.”

        Before closing arguments, the trial court again
instructed the jury on the burden of proof: “The defendant
is innocent unless and until the defendant is proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is on the state and
the state alone to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
        In closing, the state argued:
     “He claimed that he filled out a bunch of paperwork in
  the state of Washington. We don’t have that paperwork
  here today. He claims that the paperwork was lost in a fire,
  or his dog ate it, or we don’t know. But perhaps it doesn’t
  exist.
474                                            State v. Skotland

     “He also claims that an attorney, who he refused to
   name, told him that he could mark ‘no’ on the ATF form.
   And that’s what he told officers when he was confronted.
      “But, today, he said that attorney who he refuses to
   name told him that he needed to wait. So which is it? Was
   he told to wait, or * * * was he told he was good to go ahead
   and write ‘no’?
      “We don’t know who that attorney is or if that attorney
   exists because he refuses to tell us.”
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s argu-
ment, and the trial court did not interject. In closing argu-
ment, defense counsel argued that the burden of proof is on
the state, and “[s]o this idea that ‘[w]ell, we don’t have the
expungement paperwork. We don’t know who the attorney
is.’ It’s left to the state to disprove any defenses.”
        Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty on all
three charges.
                        II. ANALYSIS
         As an initial matter, we address whether defen-
dant preserved his first two assignments of error. As noted
above, on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by allowing the state to shift the burden of proof in
closing arguments by commenting on defendant’s failure to
(1) identify the attorney on whose advice he had relied in fill-
ing out the ATF form and (2) produce copies of the relevant
expungement paperwork. Those are improper assignments
of error because they do not “identify precisely the legal, fac-
tual, or other ruling that is being challenged.” ORAP 5.45(3)
(emphases added). Generally, noncompliance with ORAP
5.45 “renders the claim of error unreviewable on appeal.”
Village at North Pointe Condo. Assn. v. Bloedel Constr., 278
Or App 354, 359-60, 374 P3d 978, adh’d to as modified on
recons, 281 Or App 322, 383 P3d 409 (2016) (citations omit-
ted). But “if a claim of error is discernible from the opening
brief, we will typically address it, notwithstanding noncom-
pliance with ORAP 5.45.” Timber Town Living v. Dept. of
Human Services, 320 Or App 154, 158, 513 P3d 28, rev den,
370 Or 602 (2022) (citing Village at North Pointe Condo.
Assn., 278 Or App at 361).
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                                                 475

          Here, defendant’s arguments in support of preser-
vation and harmless error identify a ruling sufficient for our
review. According to defendant, the trial court’s ruling on
his “preemptive objection” to the prosecutor shifting the bur-
den of proof during closing arguments was in error because
the trial court’s ruling permitted the prosecutor to shift
the burden of proof: “[D]efendant’s motion was sufficient to
afford the trial court an opportunity to rule correctly, and
defendant was not required to renew his objections when
the prosecutor later made arguments the trial court ruled
would be permissible.” (Emphasis added). In addition, when
discussing harmless error, defendant argues that “the trial
court’s failure to * * * properly tailor its ruling at the out-
set * * * was not harmless.” Thus, defendant argues in his
opening brief that the trial court’s ruling on his “preemp-
tive objection” was erroneous because it enabled the prose-
cutor to make burden shifting arguments. We may review
that claim of error notwithstanding his noncompliance with
ORAP 5.45 because we are able to discern that claim from
defendant’s opening brief.2
          The state argues that defendant did not preserve
his first two assignments of error. First, the state argues
that “if defendant believed that the prosecutor’s arguments
exceeded the permissible scope of the trial court’s antici-
patory ruling, it was incumbent on defendant” to object.
(Emphasis added). Because defendant argues in his brief
that the trial court’s anticipatory ruling was erroneous, he
was not required to again object when the prosecutor made
arguments consistent with that ruling. See, e.g., State v.
Pitt, 352 Or 566, 573, 293 P3d 1002 (2012) (“[A] motion in
limine is preferred because, if counsel must wait to make
an objection and receive a ruling in front of the jury, the
client could be prejudiced even though the ruling was in
    2
      In the dissent’s view, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s prelimi-
nary ruling in this appeal, he only challenges the prosecutor’s statements during
the state’s closing arguments, and defendant’s challenges to the state’s closing
arguments were not preserved because defendant did not object. Although defen-
dant argues that the prosecutor’s arguments shifted the burden of proof, as noted
in our opinion, defendant also argues that the trial court erred in its preliminary
ruling at two points in his opening brief. Since that claim of error is “discern-
able” from defendant’s briefing, we may review it despite defendant’s failure to
comply with ORAP 5.45(3). Village at North Pointe Condo. Assn., 278 Or App at
360-61.
476                                         State v. Skotland

the client’s favor.” (Internal quotation marks and citation
omitted.)). Second, the state argues that defendant did not
identify any error in the court’s ruling on his preliminary
objection. But defendant argues that the trial court’s rul-
ing permitted the prosecutor to shift the burden of proof in
closing arguments because the ruling was not “properly tai-
lor[ed].” Thus, defendant identifies in his brief a ruling that
is sufficient for our review—the trial court’s ruling on his
preliminary objection regarding burden shifting.
         We acknowledge that some might consider this a
close case, and reasonable minds may differ as to whether
defendant preserved these claims. Therefore, we consider
the policies underlying preservation and conclude that they
are served in this case. State v. Parkins, 346 Or 333, 341,
211 P3d 262 (2009) (“Ultimately, the preservation rule is
a practical one, and close calls * * * inevitably will turn on
whether, given the particular record of the case, the court
concludes that the policies underlying the rule have been
sufficiently served.”). Our preservation policy (1) “gives a
trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention,
thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting
one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an
appeal”; (2) ensures fairness to an opposing party because it
gives the party a chance to respond to the issue presented;
and (3) “fosters full development of the record, which aids
the trial court in making a decision and the appellate court
in reviewing it.” Peeples v. Lambert, 345 Or 209, 219-20, 191
P3d 637 (2008) (citations omitted). In considering whether
an argument is preserved, our Supreme Court has cautioned
that “problems * * * may arise if the preservation onion is
sliced too thinly.” State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 629, 89 P3d
1163 (2004).
         In this case, the policies underlying the preserva-
tion rule have been sufficiently served by defendant’s antici-
patory objection before the trial court. Defendant presented
his concerns regarding possible burden shifting and alerted
the trial court to his concerns such that the trial court had
a chance to properly define arguments that constitute bur-
den shifting; the state had a sufficient chance to respond to
defendant’s objection, as evidenced by prosecutor’s discus-
sion with the trial court as to how it intended to argue the
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                                                   477

evidence; and defendant made a sufficient record regarding
his concerns, particularly since he noted recent caselaw “was
very specific that that is improper argument,” and “[i]t’s the
state’s burden.”3 Thus, defendant sufficiently preserved his
claim of error by making a preliminary objection to the
state shifting the burden of proof, and he was not required
to object again, moments later, when the court articulated
the boundaries for closing arguments. See State v. Walker,
350 Or 540, 549-50, 258 P3d 1228 (2011) (citation omitted)
(“Once a court has ruled, a party is generally not obligated
to renew his or her contentions in order to preserve them for
the purposes of appeal.”).
         Turning to the merits, we must decide whether the
trial court’s ruling permitted the state to make arguments
that shifted the burden of proof. “Generally, we review a
trial court’s ruling to limit argument for abuse of discre-
tion. However, when the court’s decision to limit argument
is based on a legal determination, as it was in this case, we
review the court’s decision for legal error.” State v. Sanchez-
Cacatzun, 304 Or App 650, 660, 468 P3d 964 (2020), rev den,
367 Or 559 (2021) (citations omitted).4
        “In arguing that the state has met its burden to
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, a
prosecutor may attempt to persuade the jury that it should

    3
      Although defendant did not specifically name the case, the trial court and
the state had notice that recent case law provided the boundaries regarding bur-
den shifting during closing arguments such that the state could “make an appro-
priate record in response” and the reference “enable[d] the court to avoid error.”
See State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 549-50, 258 P3d 1228 (2011) (“The point * * * is
whether a party provides sufficient information to enable opposing parties to
meet an objection and the trial court to avoid error.”).
    4
      Both the state and defendant contend that we review the trial court’s rul-
ing under an abuse of discretion standard, but the circumstances of this case
require that we review the trial court’s ruling for legal error. See State v. Rogers,
330 Or 282, 310-12, 4 P3d 1261 (2000) (“If there is only one legally correct out-
come, ‘discretion’ is an inapplicable concept. It follows that we first must review
evidentiary rulings without deference to determine whether proper principles of
law were applied correctly.”). In State v. Chitwood, the Supreme Court articulated
the abuse of discretion standard of review when addressing plain error in the
context of a trial court’s failure to sua sponte grant a mistrial in the face of pros-
ecutorial misconduct. 370 Or 305, 311-12, 518 P3d 903 (2022). Here, we review for
legal error the trial court’s ruling that articulated the permissible scope of the
prosecutor’s arguments. For that reason, we conclude that the abuse of discretion
standard articulated in Chitwood does not apply.
478                                          State v. Skotland

believe one version of the events and not another.” Totland,
296 Or App at 530-31 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “However, the prosecutor must not inappropriately
characterize the jury’s fact-finding function in a manner
that raises some realistic possibility of confusing the jurors
about the ultimate standard or burden of proof.” Id. at 531
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have
“recognized two limited circumstances in which a prose-
cutor is permitted to comment on a defendant’s failure to
present or contradict evidence”: (1) affirmative defenses (e.g.,
an extreme emotional disturbance defense), and (2) defenses
where, “as a practical matter, defendant bears the initial
burden of production, but fails to present any evidence[,]”
(e.g., an alibi defense). State v. Mayo, 303 Or App 525, 531-
32, 465 P3d 267 (2020) (citing State v. Spieler, 269 Or App
623, 640-42, 346 P3d 549 (2015)).
          In Mayo, we clarified the circumstances in which a
prosecutor can and cannot comment on a defendant’s failure
to present corroborating evidence. In that case, an officer
found methamphetamine in the defendant’s backpack during
a traffic stop in which the defendant was a passenger in the
car, and the state subsequently charged the defendant with
possession of methamphetamine. Id. at 526-27. At trial, the
defendant testified that he owned the backpack in the car,
but that the methamphetamine was not his, and that he did
not know there was methamphetamine in his backpack. Id.
at 527. The defendant also testified that the car belonged
to his friend, Gillenwater; that he forgot his backpack in
the car a couple days before; that he called another friend,
Claros, to recover his backpack and give him a ride home
in Gillenwater’s car; and that someone moved his backpack
before he retrieved it from the car. Id. The defendant did
not call either Gillenwater or Claros to testify at trial. Id. at
528.
        During closing arguments, the defendant argued
that he did not know that the methamphetamine was in
his backpack and, therefore, he was not guilty. Id. During
the state’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued that
there was “no evidence that he actually did leave the back-
pack overnight. There [was] no evidence from his friend,
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                                   479

[Gillenwater], that, ‘Yeah,’ you know, ‘I remember him
using this.’ ” Id. at 529. Defendant objected, arguing that
the state’s arguments improperly shifted the state’s burden,
and the trial court overruled that objection. Id. The prosecu-
tor subsequently argued, “We didn’t hear from [Claros]. The
only person who’s telling you this story about this backpack
being left overnight somewhere where things are planted is
the defendant in this case.” Id.
         On appeal, we held that the trial court erred in
overruling the defendant’s objection, because the prosecu-
tor’s comments raised a “realistic possibility of confusing the
jurors about the ultimate standard or burden of proof.” Id. at
526 (quoting Totland, 296 Or App at 531). We reasoned:
   “The state cannot comment on a defendant’s failure to
   adduce evidence to prove that the defendant did not have
   the requisite mental state necessary to establish criminal
   liability, because doing so could erroneously lead the jury to
   believe that the defendant carried the burden of introduc-
   ing evidence to prove his or her innocence.”
Id. at 537. Because we had previously recognized only two
circumstances where the prosecutor may comment on the
defendant’s failure to produce evidence, we held that the
prosecutor could not do so where the evidence related to the
defendant’s “lack of knowledge.” Id. at 534. And, by arguing
that the defendant lacked corroborating evidence as to what
he knew about his backpack, the prosecutor suggested that
the “defendant had the burden to prove * * * that his version
of events was true” in order to create reasonable doubt about
his knowledge. Id. at 537.
         This case is like Mayo. Here, the state had the bur-
den to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew
that he had a felony conviction that precluded him from pur-
chasing a firearm (Count 1), and he knew that the infor-
mation he provided on the ATF form was false (Count 2).
ORS 166.425(1); ORS 166.416(1). Similar to the defendant’s
arguments in Mayo, here, defendant’s defense at trial cen-
tered on the state’s failure to meet its burden to prove that
he had the requisite knowledge. The trial court’s ruling
before closing arguments permitted the prosecutor to argue
that defendant “could have,” but did not, present certain
480                                                         State v. Skotland

evidence “if he wanted to * * * because he was asked about”
that evidence. Thus, the trial court’s ruling permitted the
prosecutor to argue that defendant could have presented
certain evidence even though defendant had no burden to
do so. By permitting the state to make that argument—
that defendant “could have” brought forward certain evi-
dence to corroborate his lack of knowledge during his cross
examination—the trial court allowed the state to imper-
missibly shift the burden, as evidenced by the prosecutor’s
subsequent closing arguments that complied with the trial
court’s anticipatory ruling.
         The prosecutor’s comments during closing argu-
ment asserted that defendant had failed to provide addi-
tional evidence to corroborate his testimony that he did not
have knowledge of his felon status. The state argued that
defendant “refuse[d]” to provide his attorney’s name and
that defendant “claim[ed] that the paperwork was lost in a
fire or his dog ate it,” or that the documents did not exist.
The trial court’s ruling permitted the prosecutor to make
those arguments. By suggesting that defendant “could have”
presented corroborating evidence by answering the prosecu-
tor’s questions on cross examination, the trial court allowed
the state to “suggest[ ] [that] defendant had the burden” to
produce that corroborating evidence “to prove that his ver-
sion of events was true, to create a reasonable doubt about
his knowledge” of his felon status.5 Mayo, 303 Or App at 537.
         In the dissent’s view, this case is distinct from Mayo
because defendant testified that he did not have corroborat-
ing evidence—i.e., defendant did not provide his attorney’s
name or his paperwork when asked during cross examina-
tion. 326 Or App at (so7) (Kamins, J., dissenting). We disagree
with the dissent that that is a meaningful distinction in this
case. When the trial court permits the state to argue that
a defendant failed to present corroborating evidence when

    5
      The dissent, correctly, notes that a proper analysis of the trial court’s antic-
ipatory ruling does not turn on the state’s subsequent arguments because our
review “is limited to the record as it had developed at the time of the ruling.”
State v. Sperou, 365 Or 121, 137, 442 P3d 581 (2019). Here, however, we note the
state’s arguments to illustrate the problem with the trial court’s ruling and to
demonstrate that the state’s arguments conformed with the trial court’s antici-
patory ruling.
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                                               481

he “could have” done so, those arguments shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. If we allow such arguments, once
a prosecutor asks a defendant about evidence that he “could
have” brought to corroborate his testimony that he did not
have the requisite mental state, the trial court must then
permit a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s failure to
bring that evidence by arguing that defendant “could have”
done so. That argument impermissibly shifts the burden of
proof because a defendant has no burden to offer evidence to
prove that he did not have the requisite mental state.6 Mayo,
303 Or App at 537.
         Because “[t]he state cannot comment on a defen-
dant’s failure to adduce evidence to prove that the defendant
did not have the requisite mental state necessary to estab-
lish criminal liability,” the trial court’s ruling before closing
arguments permitted the prosecutor to “improperly shift[ ]
the burden to defendant by inviting the jury to convict defen-
dant for failing to call witnesses [or present documents] to
create a reasonable doubt about his knowledge of” his felon
status. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred
in ruling that those arguments were permissible.
           Under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the
Oregon Constitution, we must affirm despite error if there
is “little likelihood that the particular error affected the ver-
dict[.]” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003).
Defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling, and the state’s
arguments, likely affected the verdict on all counts, because
the arguments “were targeted at undermining a core pillar
of the defense,” and the arguments also “cast defendant as
a liar specifically for failing to prove something he had no
burden to prove.” The state has not provided any argument
relating to harmless error.

    6
      We appreciate the dissent’s position that preventing the prosecutor from
commenting on defendant’s responses on cross-examination “hinders the adver-
sarial process.” 326 Or App at (so8) (Kamins, J., dissenting). In Mayo, however,
we also recognized that concern, and we noted that we have “recognized two
limited circumstances in which a prosecutor is permitted to comment on a defen-
dant’s failure to present or contradict evidence.” 303 Or App at 531 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). As in Mayo, this case does
not fall into one of those two circumstances, and we specifically held in Mayo
that the state cannot comment on defendant’s failure to present corroborating
evidence relating to the knowledge element. Id. at 537.
482                                         State v. Skotland

         In Mayo, we concluded that the trial court’s error in
overruling the defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s bur-
den shifting arguments was not harmless. 303 Or App at
538-40. We noted that the standard instructions provided to
the jury did not cure the error: “[G]eneric instructions, while
clarifying that the state bore the ultimate burden of proof,
failed to specifically inform the jury that [the] defendant
need not present witnesses to corroborate his testimony to
create a reasonable doubt as to whether he had knowledge
of the drugs in this backpack.” Id. at 538. Additionally, the
state’s arguments pertained to a noncollateral matter—
the defendant’s credibility—in a case where the defendant
never admitted he knew about the methamphetamine and
“credibility was key to determining that issue * * *.” Id. at
539. Lastly, the prejudicial impact of the state’s arguments
was “compounded when, after [the] defendant objected to
the prosecutor’s comment on his failure to call Gillenwater,
the prosecutor went on to comment on defendant’s failure to
call Claros[,]” which “invited the jury to speculate that [the]
defendant did not call Gillenwater or Claros to corroborate
his version of events because their testimony would be unfa-
vorable to [the] defendant.” Id. at 539.
         Here, we conclude that the trial court’s error was
not harmless. As an initial matter, we note that the court’s
instructions at the beginning and the end of the case dis-
cussed the burden of proof generally, but like in Mayo, they
did not clarify that defendant did not need to corroborate
his testimony to create reasonable doubt as to whether he
knew he was a felon. Additionally, the trial court permit-
ted arguments that “did not pertain to an incidental or a
collateral matter.” Id. The core of defendant’s defense was
that he did not know that he was a felon. The trial court per-
mitted the prosecutor to argue that defendant “could have”
named his attorney “if he wanted to.” When the prosecu-
tor subsequently argued, as permitted by the trial court,
that defendant “refused” to name his attorney and that the
expungement documents did not exist because defendant
did not have them, the state “improperly undercut defen-
dant’s credibility in a case in which credibility was key[.]”
Id. Therefore, the improper arguments were harmful to the
main theory of defendant’s case and, in our view, had some
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                              483

likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict on all of the counts.
Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the
trial court’s error in permitting the prosecutor’s improper
argument was not harmless.
         In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred
in its ruling on defendant’s anticipatory objection to burden
shifting during the state’s closing arguments, because its
ruling permitted the state to make arguments that shifted
the burden of proof to defendant. In addition, the trial court’s
error was not harmless.
        Reversed and remanded.
        KAMINS, J., dissenting.
         The problem defendant identifies on appeal is that
the prosecutor’s closing argument—to which defendant did
not object below—may have strayed into improper burden-
shifting. However, the majority opinion describes that prob-
lem not as defendant does, but rather as a challenge to the
trial court’s anticipatory ruling delineating the proper scope
of closing, a ruling that occurred before the prosecutor made
any argument at all. The difficulties with that approach are
twofold: defendant himself requested that ruling and it was
correct—the trial court granted defendant’s request to allow
the prosecutor to comment only on defendant’s testimony,
not to engage in burden-shifting. Because I believe that
defendant does not actually challenge that (correct) ruling
that he himself invited and did not preserve the challenge
to the prosecutor’s closing argument that he is making, I
respectfully dissent.
        At trial, defendant testified to support the defense
theory that he thought his prior convictions were expunged,
enabling him to obtain a firearm. He testified that he and his
attorney “did the paperwork * * * to apply for a gun.” Defense
counsel asked, “What was the advice you were given, ulti-
mately, from an attorney?” and defendant responded: “To
get the expungements, that was the attorney’s job.” On
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant for the
name of the attorney who helped him with the expunge-
ment. Defendant initially responded that the attorney’s
name was “irrelevant.” The trial court indicated that it was
484                                         State v. Skotland

relevant “unless [defendant] wants to invoke some kind of
right,” at which point his attorney stated, “he does have the
right to attorney-client privilege.” Defendant then testified,
“I’ll stick with attorney-client privilege.” The prosecutor
later asked if defendant had a copy of the paperwork and he
testified: “Actually, my house caught on fire, so I lost every-
thing I own, so, no.”
         Before closing, defendant made “a preemptive kind
of objection” to ensure that the prosecutor did not argue that
defendant bore the burden to produce evidence to support
his claim of expungement. The court agreed with defen-
dant’s request and responded, “Oh, yeah. They can’t bur-
den shift.” The court clarified, however, that the prosecutor
“can comment on things your client did state, though” and
defense counsel responded “Correct.”
         The court asked if defendant would provide an exam-
ple of what would be objectionable. Defendant responded
that it would be a problem if the prosecutor argued “that
we should have brought in the attorney to testify as to what
occurred, we should have brought in maybe the expunge-
ment paperwork as evidence.” The court responded “Oh,
right. Right. And he can’t do that.” Defendant once again
agreed with the court, repeating “He can’t do that.” The
court clarified that the prosecutor was limited to discussing
“what happened on the stand,” including the fact that defen-
dant was asked on cross-examination to provide his attor-
ney’s name and he declined. The court once again empha-
sized that the prosecutor could not cross the “fine line” into
burden-shifting. At the end of that explanation sustaining
defendant’s objection, the court asked, “Anything else for
the defense?” and defense counsel responded, “No.” During
closing argument, defendant did not object or otherwise
alert the court to any concerns with whether the prosecutor
complied with that ruling.
         On appeal, defendant does not challenge the court’s
anticipatory ruling, which makes sense both because he
invited that ruling and because it was correct. His assign-
ments of error state that the “trial court erred by allowing
the prosecutor to shift the burden of proof in closing argu-
ment,” which, as the majority recognizes, do not identify the
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                                                  485

“ruling” being challenged. ORAP 5.45(3).1 In elucidating
those assignments, defendant’s brief focuses almost entirely
on the content of the prosecutor’s closing argument, not the
trial court’s anticipatory ruling. Specifically, defendant con-
tends that “[t]he prosecutor impermissibly commented on
defendant’s failure to adduce evidence on a matter on which
the state bore the burden of proof” and laments the fact that
the trial court failed “to take any remedial action in the
face of the prosecutor’s improper argument.” (Emphasis in
original.)
         Nevertheless, the majority concludes that defen-
dant is actually challenging the trial court’s anticipatory
ruling about closing argument—the ruling that defendant
himself asked for, received, and appeared to agree with.
The majority identifies two sentences of defendant’s brief in
support of its interpretation: one in the preservation section
that “defendant was not required to renew his objections
when the prosecutor later made arguments the trial court
ruled would be permissible,” and the other at the end of the
argument about whether any error was harmless, that the
trial court failed to “properly tailor” its anticipatory ruling.
326 Or App at (so7). Defendant’s arguments on the merits
only address the prosecutor’s comments, not the trial court’s
anticipatory ruling, and nowhere does defendant identify
which particular aspects of the lengthy anticipatory ruling
he now considers to be objectionable.
         The distinction is important because it dictates the
scope of our review. If the challenged ruling is an antici-
patory one, our review “is limited to the record as it had
developed at the time of the ruling[,]” without considering
what happened later. State v. Sperou, 365 Or 121, 137, 442
P3d 581 (2019); see also State v. Pitt, 352 Or 566, 574-75, 293
P3d 1002 (2012) (noting that the “defendant’s reliance on
the trial court’s pretrial ruling for his assignment of error
does affect the scope of the record that an appellate court
may consider”). In other words, a proper analysis of the trial
court’s anticipatory ruling, contrary to the approach taken

    1
      It appears that, in light of State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305, 312-13, 518 P3d 903
(2022), a defendant may assign error to a prosecutor’s closing argument regard-
less of ORAP 5.45(3), although defendant does not make such an argument.
486                                                       State v. Skotland

by the majority opinion, would not consider the prosecutor’s
subsequent argument, except to determine whether any
error was harmless.
         Determining which ruling we are reviewing is also
important in determining whether the principles of preser-
vation are served. Here, defendant asked the trial court to
delineate the proper scope of argument and worked with the
trial court to draw those lines. Defendant now appears to
contend not that those lines were wrong, but that the prose-
cutor failed to color within them. If that was the case, defen-
dant needed to say so in the moment, so that the trial court
could ensure compliance with its own ruling. Had he done
so, at a minimum, the trial court could have given a cura-
tive instruction reminding the jury of the correct burden
of proof. See State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 752, 359
P3d 232 (2015) (noting that one of the primary purposes of
the preservation rule is to allow the trial court to consider
a contention and correct any error immediately). Instead,
defendant expressed no dissatisfaction with the trial court’s
anticipatory ruling—indeed, he verbally agreed with it—nor
with the prosecutor’s apparent interpretation of that ruling.
Although it is true that “parties are not required to repeat
their objections after the trial court has ruled against
them[,]” here, the trial court sustained defendant’s objection
and was not alerted to any concern that the way it did so was
legally erroneous or that the prosecutor’s subsequent argu-
ments crossed the line. Charles v. Palomo, 347 Or 695, 701-
02, 227 P3d 737 (2010); see also State v. Walker, 350 Or 540,
550, 258 P3d 1228 (2011) (concluding that the defendant’s
failure to reiterate her argument was not dispositive where
the trial court rejected it); State v. Clarke, 300 Or App 74, 79,
451 P3d 1022 (2019) (concluding that the defendant’s argu-
ment was unpreserved where he “affirmatively indicated to
the trial court” that the state’s objection was correct).
         Turning to the merits of the anticipatory ruling
that defendant does not challenge but the majority reverses,
I believe that the trial court got it right.2 The court properly

    2
      I also disagree with the majority that the standard of review is legal error,
not abuse of discretion. 326 Or App at (so10). See State v. Mayo, 303 Or App 525,
530, 465 P3d 267 (2020) (reviewing for abuse of discretion).
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                           487

ruled that the prosecutor could not comment on evidence
that defendant should have produced, but could comment on
the evidence that defendant did present—including his own
testimony. Just as a prosecutor cannot comment on a defen-
dant’s silence, a prosecutor cannot incorrectly imply that a
defendant bears the burden of proof or production. However,
a prosecutor may comment on anything the defendant does
decide to say, such that, when a defendant decides to testify
in their own defense, the prosecutor may comment on that
testimony. Cf. State v. Jay, 273 Or App 373, 379, 359 P3d
417 (2015) (drawing a distinction between cases where the
prosecutor’s comments regarded the defendant’s “silence”
and those where they regarded “what a defendant ‘said’ ”).
Here defendant testified in his own defense and responded
to the prosecutor’s inquiries seeking clarification about his
testimony. Defendant does not now argue that those ques-
tions were improper. Because defendant put that evidence
into the record, the prosecutor was allowed to comment on
those answers in closing.
         The majority takes issue with one part of the antic-
ipatory ruling, which allowed the prosecutor to argue that
defendant “could have” presented certain evidence about
which he was asked on cross-examination. 326 Or App at
(sp13). However, in context, that statement did not authorize
burden-shifting. In context, and specifically after the trial
court spelled out that any argument suggesting that defen-
dant “could have” provided evidence was out of bounds, the
reference to evidence that defendant “could have” produced
was simply a reference to defendant’s own testimony: the
trial court allowed the prosecutor to remind the jury that
when asked to identify his attorney, defendant declined. 326
Or App at (so4) (“But the prosecutor could say things like,
‘hey, the defendant was testifying, and he didn’t say the
attorney’s name, and he didn’t have to, but he could have if
he wanted to, you know, because he was asked about that.’ ”
(Brackets omitted; emphasis added.)).
         Because the trial court’s ruling authorized only
a comment on defendant’s testimony and not any burden-
shifting, the majority’s reliance on State v. Mayo is mis-
placed. There, the prosecutor argued that the defendant did
not produce any evidence to corroborate his testimony about
488                                          State v. Skotland

how methamphetamine ended up in his backpack, an argu-
ment that we concluded improperly shifted the burden. 303
Or App 525, 537, 465 P3d 267 (2020). Nothing in that case
was about commenting on a defendant’s testimony regard-
ing the evidence in the record. In contrast, as the trial court
correctly ruled, defendant here did testify as to the precise
matter at issue, so the prosecutor was allowed to comment
on that testimony. In other words, because the questions
were permissible, it must also be permissible for the prose-
cutor to comment on defendant’s responses to them—a situ-
ation that Mayo did not address.
         That distinction is meaningful because it gets to
the heart of the issue—whether the argument “raises some
realistic possibility of confusing the jurors about the ulti-
mate standard or burden of proof.” Id. at 531. In Mayo, the
prosecutor argued that there was “no evidence” that the
defendant’s testimony was true and that “the only person
who’s telling you this story” was the defendant. Id. at 529.
Such comments cross the line into burden-shifting because
they may lead the jury to believe that a defendant’s tes-
timony alone is insufficient to negate the state’s theory.
By contrast, when, as here, a prosecutor draws the jury’s
attention to specific portions of the defendant’s testimony to
argue that it is implausible, it is not likely that the jury will
consequently fail to follow the instructions about the ulti-
mate burden to proof. See State v. Williams, 276 Or App 688,
695, 368 P3d 459, rev den, 360 Or 423 (2016) (“We presume
that jurors follow their instructions, ‘absent an overwhelm-
ing probability that they would have been unable to do so.’ ”
(Citing State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 26, 791 P2d 836 (1990).)).
         A contrary result hinders the adversarial process.
Attorneys are allowed to comment on admissible evidence—
that is, in fact, much of their job. If a defendant puts evi-
dence into the record, through their testimony or other-
wise, the prosecutor must be able to tell the factfinder how
that evidence comports with other admissible evidence or
the state’s theory of the case. See Cler v. Providence Health
System-Oregon, 349 Or 481, 487-88, 245 P3d 642 (2010) (“In
general, in presenting closing arguments to the jury, counsel
have a large degree of freedom to comment on the evidence
submitted and urge the jury to draw any and all legitimate
Cite as 326 Or App 469 (2023)                                         489

inferences from that evidence.” (Internal quotation marks
and citation omitted.)); State v. Purrier, 265 Or App 618,
620-21, 336 P3d 574 (2014) (“[T]he state permissibly may
attempt to persuade the jury that it should believe one ver-
sion of events and not another.”).
         In my view, defendant did not preserve a challenge
to the prosecutor’s argument itself and does not assign error
to the trial court’s ruling delineating the limits of that argu-
ment, and, in any event, that ruling was correct. Accordingly,
I would affirm the convictions.3

    3
      I would also reject defendant’s third assignment of error because the
error—if any—was harmless.