Court Opinion

ID: 9621675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:03:28.999097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:06.875445
License: Public Domain

OPINION
SUE WALKER, Justice.
I. Introduction
A jury found Appellant Shannon Williams guilty of driving while intoxicated (DWI), and the trial court assessed his punishment at sixty days in jail, probated for eighteen months, and a $750 fine. In two points, Williams contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred by including the per se theory of intoxication in the jury charge. We will affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
One night at approximately 1:18 a.m., Officer Nicholas Brown of the Fort Worth Police Department saw Williams’s vehicle run a red light and change lanes without signaling. Officer Brown activated his overhead lights and stopped Williams. Officer Brown noticed that Williams had a “heavy odor of alcohol about him,” bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech. Officer Brown asked Williams if he had been drinking, and Williams said he had consumed three or four beers that night.
*864Officer Brown called for a DWI Unit1 and spoke with Officer Dena Evans, a DWI investigator who asked Officer Brown to begin field sobriety tests until she arrived. Officer Brown administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Williams and, based on Williams’s performance, concluded that Williams had alcohol in his system. When Officer Brown asked Williams to perform the walk and turn test, Williams refused and “just turned around, put his hands behind his back[,] and said, ‘I’m not doing anything else.’ ” Officer Brown arrested Williams.
Officer Evans arrived at 1:36 a.m. and put Williams in her patrol car. She smelled an odor of alcohol on him. While en route to the jail, Williams lay down in the backseat of the patrol car. Officer Evans testified that “[Williams] was definitely passed out.” When they arrived at the jail, Williams told Officer Evans that he was going to throw up and to hurry and let him out. Williams threw up in the sally port.
Officer Evans took Williams to the in-toxilyzer room, where she had him perform the one-leg stand and walk-and-turn tests. Officer Evans testified that Williams was slow to respond to her instructions during the field sobriety tests. Williams swayed during the one-leg stand test. He could not keep his balance while listening to directions and while performing the walk-and-turn test, and he had to reach for the wall for support at one point.
Williams took the intoxilyzer test at approximately 2:46 a.m. and 2:48 a.m., about ninety minutes after Officer Brown had stopped him; the results of both tests showed that his alcohol concentration was 0.097 at that time.
Williams was charged by information with DWI “by not having the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol into his body or by having an alcohol concentration of at least 0.08.”2 At trial, Officer Brown, Officer Evans, and the senior forensic chemist for the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s office testified for the State. The State played two videotapes for the jury. State’s Exhibit 1 is a videotape of the beginning of Officer Brown’s stop of Williams.3 State’s Exhibit 3 is a videotape of the inside of Officer Evans’s car while she transported Williams to the jail and of Williams performing the field sobriety tests inside the intoxilyzer room. The State also introduced the results of Williams’s intoxilyzer tests.
After both sides rested, Williams objected to the inclusion of the per se theory of intoxication in the jury charge, claiming that the State had failed to present any evidence that his alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more “at the time Mr. Williams was driving.” [Emphasis added.] The trial court overruled his objection and charged the jury on both the impairment and per se theories of intoxication. The jury entered a general verdict of “guilty” *865without specifying which definition of intoxication it found applied to Williams.
III. Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second point, Williams argues that factually insufficient evidence existed that he was intoxicated under either of the two statutory definitions of intoxication. Specifically, Williams contends that “the State enjoyed a lower standard when attempting to prove the [impairment] definition of intoxication because the jury was allowed to consider convicting on insufficient evidence” and that factually insufficient evidence existed that his alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more for the per se definition of intoxication.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tex.Crim.App.2008), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1037, 173 L.Ed.2d 471 (2009); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). We then ask whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the factfinder’s determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the conviction that the factfinder’s determination is manifestly unjust. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417. To reverse under the second ground, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, contradicts the verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.
In determining whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction that is nevertheless supported by legally sufficient evidence, it is not enough that this court “harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to overturn [the] conviction.” Id. We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have decided differently than the jury or because we disagree with the jury’s resolution of a conflict in the evidence. Id. We may not simply substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Unless the record clearly reveals that a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the jury’s determination of the weight to be given contradictory testimonial evidence because resolution of the conflict “often turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were in attendance when the testimony was delivered.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8. Thus, unless we conclude that it is necessary to correct manifest injustice, we must give due deference to the factfinder’s determinations, “particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Id. at 9. Our deference in this regard safeguards the defendant’s right to a trial by jury. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704. An opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a discussion of the most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant’s complaint on appeal. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The existence of an alternative reasonable hypothesis may be relevant to, but is not determinative in, a factual review. Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
B. Factually Sufficient Evidence
The impairment and per se theories of intoxication do not involve separate *866violations of the law. Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). Instead, they set forth “alternate means by which the State may prove intoxication, rather than alternate means of committing the offense.” Id. When a trial court submits alternate means by which the State may prove intoxication, the evidence is sufficient to support a general verdict of “guilty” if it is sufficient to prove any one of the alleged means. Id. at 762 n. 5; Reardon v. State, 695 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.). Consequently, in a factual sufficiency review, factually sufficient evidence of dither theory of intoxication will support the jury's finding of guilt. See Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 762 n. 5.
Here, because the jury could convict Williams if it found that he was driving while intoxicated under either the impairment or per se definition of “intoxicated” and because the jury entered a general verdict of “guilty,” factually sufficient evidence of either theory will support the jury’s finding. See id. Regarding the impairment definition of “intoxicated,” the evidence at trial demonstrated that Williams ran a red light and changed lanes several times without signaling. Officer Brown testified that Williams smelled of alcohol; that he had red, bloodshot eyes; and that he slurred his speech. The officer said that Williams had told him that he had consumed alcohol that evening. The officer also explained that Williams had failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, showing that he in fact had alcohol in his system. Officer Brown further testified that Williams had to lean against his vehicle for balance when talking to Officer Brown.
Officer Evans also smelled alcohol on Williams. She testified that Williams passed out on the way to the jail, and the videotape of Officer Evans’s car shows that Williams lay down in the back of the officer’s car during the ride to the jail.4 Williams vomited when they arrived at the jail, and Officer Evans testified that his vomit smelled like alcohol. Officer Evans explained that during the field sobriety tests in the intoxilyzer room, Williams swayed and could not keep his balance. At one point, Williams had to grab the wall behind him to keep his balance while listening to the officer’s instructions.5
Williams appears to argue that the State had a lower standard of proof regarding the impairment theory of intoxication because the jury could consider the results of Williams’s intoxilyzer tests. The intoxilyzer results showing that Williams’s alcohol concentration was 0.097 ninety minutes after his arrest, however, provided further evidence that Williams had consumed alcohol that night and were relevant to both theories of intoxication. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (noting that results of intoxilyzer tests are probative of both per se and impairment theories of intoxication because they indicate whether defendant had consumed alcohol); Stewart v. State, 129 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (same); *867see also Maxwell v. State, 253 S.W.3d 309, 316-17 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd) (holding, in sufficiency analysis, that absence of extrapolation evidence was irrelevant to jury’s finding of guilt because jury was charged on both theories of intoxication).
Williams testified at trial and offered another explanation for some of his actions that night. He explained that he had eaten some sushi at a party, had felt sick, and had run the red light on purpose so that he could get home to throw up.6 He also explained that he had changed lanes without using a blinker because he saw Officer Brown’s car, thought the officer was in a hurry, and wanted to get out of his way. Although the jury could have found Williams’s testimony to be true, the mere existence of a reasonable alternative hypothesis for his running a red light, changing lanes without signaling, and throwing up does not render the evidence factually insufficient. See Wilson, 7 S.W.3d at 141; Love v. State, 199 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd).
We have reviewed the evidence in a neutral light and have given due deference to the jury’s determinations, particularly those regarding the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility. We find no objective basis in the record to hold that the jury’s verdict was clearly wrong or manifestly unjust or that it was contradicted by the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704; Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417. Rather, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict, and no contrary evidence exists that would render the evidence factually insufficient under the applicable standard of review. See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704; Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support Williams’s conviction.7 We overrule his second point.
IY. Jury Charge
In his first point, Williams contends that the trial court erred by including the per se theory of intoxication in its charge to the jury because the State presented insufficient evidence to show what his alcohol concentration was at the time he was driving.
Appellate review of error in a jury charge involves a two-step process. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). Initially, we must determine whether error occurred. See id. at 731-32. If so, we must then evaluate *868whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Id.
The jury charge must distinctly set forth the law applicable to the case. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (Vernon 2007). The trial court errs when it charges the jury on a theory of conviction that is not supported by the evidence. Sanders v. State, 814 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).
Here, as we explained in our factual sufficiency review above, the results of in-toxilyzer tests are relevant to both theories of intoxication because they may show that a defendant has consumed alcohol and thus “tend to make it more probable that [the defendant] was intoxicated at the time of driving.” Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 440; see Stewart, 129 S.W.3d at 96. The court of criminal appeals recently explained,
BAC-test results, even absent expert retrograde extrapolation testimony, are often highly probative to prove both per se and impairment intoxication.[8] However, a BAC-test result, by itself, is not sufficient to prove intoxication at the time of driving. There must be other evidence in the record that would support an inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving as well as at the time of taking the test.... Other evidence that would logically raise an inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving as well as at the time of the BAC test includes, inter alia, erratic driving, post-driving behavior such as stumbling, swaying, slurring or mumbling words, inability to perform field sobriety tests or follow directions, bloodshot eyes, any admissions by the defendant concerning what, when, and how much he had been drinking — in short, any and all of the usual indicia of intoxication.
In sum, the evidence is sufficient to support a jury charge on the “per se” theory of intoxication if it includes either (1) expert testimony of retrograde extrapolation, or (2) other evidence of intoxication that would support an inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving as well as at the time of taking the test.
Kirsch v. State, No. PD-0379-09, 2010 WL 447437, at *4-5 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb. 10, 2010).9
Here, the jury heard evidence that Williams ran a red light and changed lanes without signaling; smelled of alcohol; had red, bloodshot eyes; slurred his speech; leaned on his vehicle for balance; and said he had consumed alcohol that evening. The jury also heard evidence that Williams passed out on the way to the jail, vomited upon arrival, and failed field sobriety tests. Following Kirsch, we hold that this evidence “supports] an inference that [Williams] was intoxicated at the time of driving as well as at the time of taking the breath test.” Id. Consequently, the intoxi-lyzer results, when coupled with the other evidence at trial, were sufficient to support a jury charge on the “per se” theory of intoxication. See id. We overrule Williams’s first point.
Y. Conclusion
Having overruled both of Williams’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DAUPHINOT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

. Officer Brown explained that the Fort Worth Police Department’s DWI Unit handles only DWIs and that, although he is qualified to investigate DWIs, the DWI Unit can process them in "half the time we can, just all the paperwork, being familiar with it.”

. The penal code defines "intoxicated” as "not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol ... into the body” (the impairment definition) or "having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more” (the per se definition). Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2) (Vernon 2003).

.Officer Brown explained at trial that the remainder of the stop was not recorded because the videotape ran out of tape.

. The dissent contends that the videotape is contrary to Officer Evans’s testimony and shows that Williams was not passed out. The videotape shows that Officer Evans left the scene for the jail at approximately 2:05 a.m. and that Williams lay down in the backseat at that time. He did not talk again or sit up until they arrived at the jail at 2:17 a.m., at which time he asked the officer to stop so that he could throw up. Thus, the videotape does not contradict Officer Evans’s testimony that Williams was passed out.

. The dissent also asserts that the videotape contradicts Officer Evans's testimony about Williams's behavior in the intoxilyzer room. We find no contradiction between Officer Evans’s testimony and the videotape.

. The dissent takes issue with the fact that the video recording of the stop began after Williams ran the red light, stopped before Williams got out of his car, and did not include audio. No evidence in the record suggests that the videotape was not full or that Officer Brown intentionally turned off the videotape before getting out of his car. Instead, Officer Brown testified that the video "[j]ust ran out of tape” and that he did not realize it until he “took it out and placed it into property.” He also testified that he did not recall if his patrol car that night was equipped with a microphone but that if it had one, he would have been wearing it. Any suspect motive on the part of the police to which the dissent alludes is not supported by the record and is not an issue raised in this appeal. See Tex. R.App. P. 47.1.

. The dissent claims that the evidence is factually insufficient to show that Williams was intoxicated at the time he was driving, but the evidence demonstrates that Williams ran a red light (a fact that he admitted at trial), admitted drinking alcohol that night (also a fact that he admitted at trial), lay down in the backseat of the patrol car (again, an admitted fact), vomited upon arrival at the jail (yet again, an admitted fact), and failed field sobriety tests and the intoxilyzer test. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party, this evidence is certainly not "so weak that the factfinder's determination is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.” See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704.

. "Extrapolation evidence explains the correlation between the breath test results and the level of intoxication at the time of the arrest in a given case.” Martin v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 964 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).

. The court of criminal appeals issued its opinion in Kirsch after Williams filed this appeal.