Court Opinion

ID: 9684308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:53:10.726078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:54.882819
License: Public Domain

Brickley, C.J.
(dissenting). Because I believe that the defendant made a bona fide offer of reasonable employment to the plaintiff, I respectfully dissent. Although the majority feels that the job duties were described with sufficient specificity, it finds the offer defective because it concludes that the plaintiff might have been asked to perform more strenuous work. *343Because the only job that was offered to the plaintiff was both sufficiently described and within his physical limitations, I would uphold the Court of Appeals decision to suspend benefits.
The magistrate concluded that the medical evidence showed that the plaintiff was able to perform the specially created job and that the testimony of the police supervisors demonstrated that they did not intend to return the plaintiff to a regular-duty job. The wcab found that the record did indicate that the plaintiff was offered “favored work,” the equivalent of reasonable employment. Because the plaintiff failed to make a good-faith effort to perform his duties, his benefits were suspended on the date the supervisors’ testimony clarified that the offer was for the restricted position, not for a regular-duty position. The wcab also noted that “[i]f any other duties than those within Dr. Newman’s restrictions are prescribed for plaintiff after he is reexamined by Dr. Barber in compliance with defendant’s announced policy in such situations, benefits are to be reinstated.” 1990 WCABO 1515, 1525.
The Court of Appeals relied on the testimony that the specially created job was still available to the plaintiff as support for its conclusion that there “was competent evidence in the record to support the wcab’s conclusion that the city made an offer of favored work . . . .” Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 21, 1993 (Docket No. 150640). On appeal this Court is asked to determine if there is competent, material, and substantial evidence supporting the administrative findings. In so- doing, the Court examines the whole record. MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3).
*344I
The majority concludes that “the duties associated with this job were described with sufficient specificity . . . Ante at 340. Nevertheless, it holds that the “defendant did not definitively offer specific employment within the physical limitations found to exist by the magistrate and WCAB.” Id. at 341. In order to reach this conclusion, the majority looks beyond the actual job that was offered. Because the Court’s decision should be based on the facts established below, it should rely on the offer that the magistrate found, rather than engage in speculation about what other jobs might have existed.
The Court must determine what constitutes an offer of reasonable employment. The plaintiff cites two cases for the proposition that the offer must sufficiently describe a specific job. In Kolenko v United States Rubber Products, Inc, 285 Mich 159; 280 NW 148 (1938), the defendant employer requested that the employee report to its factory, where she would be given a job. The employee went to the defendant’s employment office and asked to be advised of what kind of work she would be expected to do. The defendant refused to tell her and would not permit her attorneys to enter the factory to ascertain what the work would be. The Court found that this did not constitute a bona fide offer:
The burden was on the defendant to show that it offered plaintiff work which she could perform. . . . Plaintiff was under no obligation to comply with the unreasonable and arbitrary demand of defendant that she accept whatever work the company thought suitable for her. [285 Mich 162.]
*345In Maddox v General Motors Corp, 1986 WCABO 578, the WCAB found that the employee had not unreasonably refused to perform favored work. The plaintiff worked in a foundry and was assigned to work as an “extra man” in the light assembly department, where he could potentially participate in approximately seventy jobs as he was needed. On any given day, the employee could be asked to perform any one of the jobs. The decision that this did not constitute a bona fide offer was premised on two conclusions: the plaintiff consistently attempted to perform his duties, but was unable to continue because of his injury, and, as cited by the majority, “there [was] no specific restricted job to which plaintiff would return, but only a[n] unspecified grouping of them.” Id. at 581.
In neither of the cases cited by the majority did the employee know the duties attendant to the job. In one case, the employer refused to tell the employee anything at all about the job, and in the other the employee was assigned to rotate as needed among a large number of jobs. Although I recognize that these were situations in which an employer had failed to make a bona fide offer, I would distinguish these cases from the instant dispute. Unlike Kolenkó and Maddox, this case does not involve an employer who refused to provide a job description or an employee assigned to rotate between several dozen jobs. The plaintiff had already worked at the job offered to him, so he cannot claim he did not understand its scope. Nor had he been requested to rotate among unspecified jobs. However, the majority still concludes that the offer was not sufficient because of the possibility that the plaintiff would be assigned additional responsibilities.
*346The majority states that its holding is not based on the medical-examination requirement, and it apparently would have no difficulty with a situation in which the contents of a job offer changed after and on the basis of the results of the examination. I am unable to distinguish between that situation and the possibility, contemplated by the majority in the instant case, that the plaintiff would be asked to perform different work with unknown requirements.
The majority concludes that “plaintiffs ultimate employment duties may be far more demanding than those previously described.” Ante at 342. This conclusion can only be based on speculation that, if the defendant’s doctor had found that the plaintiff could work without restrictions, the plaintiff might have been assigned to a regular-duty job, and therefore had not received an offer of a specific job with sufficiently detailed duties. I dissent because I disagree with that inference.
First, I do not believe that the case law states that the mere possibility of additional duties destroys an otherwise sufficient offer of reasonable employment. As stated above, the instant case is distinguishable on its facts from the cases cited by the majority where offers were insufficiently specific. Here, the offer was specific. In fact, the plaintiff was familiar with all the responsibilities that he might be called on to perform, since he had previously worked both a regular-duty job and a regular desk job. Moreover, the employment was with the police department and not at a factory where he could be called upon to perform a large number of jobs. I admit that there was a slight possibility that the plaintiff would be offered other work that he had not previously performed. However, *347this scenario is not comparable to situations in which an employee was offered work consisting of unspecified duties. Rather, here the defendant’s offer was sufficiently specific regarding any other potential job requirement.
Second, the WCAB specifically excluded the possibility that the plaintiff could be asked to perform a different job regardless of the results of the medical examination. As the majority notes, the police supervisors testified before the magistrate that they never intended the plaintiff return to a regular, unrestricted job. Id. at 332. Even on cross-examination, although admitting that the city doctor might conclude that the plaintiff could work without restrictions, the police chief testified that “that never entered into my mind, putting him back on the road.” The WCAB reflected this finding in holding that benefits would be reinstated if the plaintiff were assigned to additional duties. The majority notes this qualification, but concludes that it is not supported by the record. Id. at 341-342.
The wcab’s qualification is supported by the record. The magistrate concluded, on the basis of the medical evidence, that the plaintiff could perform the specially created job. She also concluded that the job was described in detail sufficient to constitute a bona fide offer of reasonable employment. The wcab followed those findings in imposing the qualification that the plaintiff could not be required to do other work. Additional responsibilities would not necessarily fall within the medical limitations that the magistrate found to exist. Also, the finding that an offer had been made referred only to the special job, not to other duties. Thus, the wcab’s decision to reinstate the plaintiff’s benefits if he were required to perform *348other duties is supported by the record as a whole, and in fact is necessary to accurately reflect the facts as established by the record. Without the qualification, the plaintiff might be required to perform work outside the boundaries established by the magistrate, which would constitute a failure to follow the magistrate’s medical fact finding. The qualification should be upheld.
n
Because I conclude that there was a bona fide offer of reasonable employment, I reach the question whether the plaintiff was reasonable in his refusal to accept the offer. In Pulver v Dundee Cement Co, 445 Mich 68; 515 NW2d 728 (1994), this Court articulated several factors to be considered when relevant in determining the reasonableness of a refusal of an offer of reasonable employment. These include the timing of the offer, the employee’s reasons for moving away from the place of employment, the diligence of the employee in trying to return to work, and whether the employee has returned to work with some other employer. Of relevance in this case is the plaintiff’s lack of diligence in attempting to perform the work offered. As of April 21, 1986, the testimony established that the specially created job was available to the plaintiff. For ten years, he has failed to attempt to perform the job. I conclude that his refusal was unreasonable and that it was therefore proper to suspend his benefits.
This result is supported by the cases cited by the majority. Both Kolenko and Maddox involved employees who demonstrated diligence in attempting to return to work. The Kolenko Court found that
*349[p]laintiff in her attitude and conduct with regard to the proposed job clearly appears to have been actuated by good faith. . . . The only lack of cooperation that appears from the record in this case is on the part of defendant. [285 Mich 162.]
Similarly, in Maddox, the plaintiff employee attempted to perform the work offered, but was unable to continue. The holdings in these cases were based at least partly on the employees’ demonstrated good faith and diligence in attempting to work.
The Court of Appeals also requires an employee to at least attempt to perform reasonable employment once the employer has met its burden of offering that employment. In Christiansen v Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc, 89 Mich App 440, 444; 280 NW2d 463 (1978), the Court held:
The board’s statement that plaintiff had the “burden of attempting to perform same” is not inconsistent wdth the case law. Plaintiff refused to even examine the jobs offered. In light of this total refusal it cannot be said that plaintiff acted in good faith, as was found to be the fact in Kolenko ....
The same conclusion was reached in Parmeter v Grand Rapids Public Schools, 168 Mich App 97, 102; 424 NW2d 6 (1987). The Court stated, “[i]t is true that, where the defendant meets his burden of making a good-faith job offer of sufficiently favored work, the plaintiff must attempt to perform it . . . .” The employee’s obligation to attempt work attaches only after the employer has met its burden of offering reasonable employment. Under this test, the plaintiff’s failure to report to work supports the decision to suspend his benefits.
*350m
I conclude that the WCAB and Court of Appeals were correct in concluding that the evidence demonstrated that the defendant made a bona fide offer of reasonable employment to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff refused that offer by failing to attempt to perform the work. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision to suspend the plaintiffs benefits.
Riley and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Brickley, C.J.