Court Opinion

ID: 9711979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:43:35.431846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.951193
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
McEWEN, P.J.E.:
¶ 1 Since the author of the majority opinion provides a perceptive analysis and astute expression of rationale, I hasten to join in the conclusion that appellant was not entitled to discharge upon the charge of simple assault. However, I write separately to express a slightly different view upon the construction of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.
¶ 2 Section 2701 of the Crimes Code defines the offense and grades of simple assault as follows:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of assault if he:
*1231(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon;
(B) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
(4) conceals or attempts to conceal a hypodermic needle on his person and intentionally or knowingly penetrates a law enforcement officer or an officer or an employee of a correctional institution, county jail or prison, detention facility or mental hospital during the course of an arrest or any search of the person.
(b) Grading. — Simple assault is a misdemeanor of the second degree unless committed:
(1) in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a misdemeanor of the third degree; or
(2) against a child under 12 years of age by an adult 21 years of age or older, in which case it is a misdemean- or of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.
¶ 3 The majority aptly notes that the text and structure of section 2701 evince the intent of the General Assembly to define formal elements of the offense, as well as factors related to grading. However, the distinction between elements and grading factors alone is not determinative, particularly in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), which requires that evidence regarding facts that increase the maximum penalty or change the grade of an offense be submitted to a jury, and that those “facts” be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally: Commonwealth v. Panko, 975 A.2d 1189 (Pa.Super.2009). Thus, for example, it is clear that since subsection (b)(2) increases the grade of simple assault the respective ages of the complainant and the accused would have to be submitted to a finder of fact and proven by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt prior to increasing the grade of the offense. Here, however, the grading of the offense committed by appellant was reduced or mitigated by the trial court. Thus, Apprendi is not implicated.
¶ 4 In my view, the confusion occasioned by the anomalous request of the trial court to hold a “charging conference”1 in a non-jury trial flows from the suggested standard jury instructions on the offense of simple assault, which state that the Commonwealth, in order to obtain a conviction upon simple assault graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree, bears an additional burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt that the offensive conduct occurred in the course of a mutual fight or scuffle.2 However, the Pennsylva*1232nia Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 574 Pa. 620, 832 A.2d 1042 (2003), specifically rejected the view that the creation of a mitigating factor imposes upon the Commonwealth an additional burden of negating that mitigating factor in order to obtain a conviction upon the more severe grade of an offense.3
¶ 5 In light of Bavusa, and the application of the principles of that decision to section 2701,1 agree with the conclusion of the majority that appellant’s request for discharge is meritless. While the information filed in this case clearly listed a count of simple assault graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree, that listing did not imply that the Commonwealth assumed a burden to disprove a mutual fight or scuffle, and appellant cannot complain that being convicted of a lesser graded offense than that of which she was charged entitled her to discharge on that count, or that she was prejudiced in the preparation of her defense.4 Rather, as the majority concludes, it was within the province of the trial judge, based upon the evidence, (1) to find a mitigating factor, (2) enter a verdict of guilt upon simple assault graded as a *1233misdemeanor of the third degree, and (3) sentence appellant accordingly.
¶ 6 Thus, I concur.

. I differ from the majority view that a discussion of waiver in the context of proposed jury instructions is necessary, since the parties here had proceeded to a nonjury trial. Moreover, a review of the comments of the trial judge before trial and during the purported "charging conference” evinces a concern of the court regarding the information filed in this case. Thus, one might regard the trial judge’s discussion of "jury instructions” as a suggestion to the prosecutor to amend the information. See: N.T., January 26, 2009, p. 10 (discussing the "charge" in reference to proposed amendments to the information); id., pp. 123-125 (recording the "charging conference”); id., pp. 141, 151-152 (recording the Commonwealth’s objections to the verdict and sentence upon the charge of simple assault graded as a misdemeanor of the third degree).

. Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction § 15.2701F states:
1. There has been evidence presented in this case that the defendant and [name of *1232victim] were, at the time of the alleged assault, engaged in a fight or a scuffle entered into by their mutual consent. In other words, it is contended that both of the parties engaged in the fighting mutually, both desiring to do so. If this was so, the effect would be to make the assault charged here a less serious offense than is charged in count [count],
2. Given this, to find the defendant guilty of that count, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the fighting involved here did not begin by mutual consent. In other words, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim [name of victim] did not, at the outset of the incident between [him] [her] and the defendant, consent to fighting with the defendant.
3. If the Commonwealth fails to prove that lack of consent by the alleged victim beyond a reasonable doubt, but does prove the other elements of simple assault as I have defined them for you, then you may only find the defendant guilty of the lesser type of simple assault I have designated on the verdict form. Of course, if the Commonwealth fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements of simple assault as I have defined them for you, your verdict must be not guilty.
Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 15.2701F (emphasis supplied). The Advisory Committee Note further states, "Because the lack of mutual consent is, in essence, an aggravating factor, the jury should be instructed to find such lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., Note (emphasis supplied).

. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 574 Pa. 620, 832 A.2d 1042 (2003) considered the text and structure of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a), which provides:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.
(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to possess a valid license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license and has not committed any other criminal violation commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a). The Court concluded that the text and structure of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a), did not create an additional element or affirmative defense to the offense of firearms not to be carried without a license, but that the eligibility to possess a valid license referenced in paragraph (2) constituted a grading factor. Commonwealth v. Bavusa, supra.

. It merits mention that the continued relevance of the decision relied upon by appellant, namely, Commonwealth v. Fleck, 372 Pa.Super. 546, 539 A.2d 1331 (1988), is in doubt following the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bavusa, supra, 574 Pa. at 637-645, 832 A.2d at 1042-1057, as well as Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 596 Pa. 475, 484-485, 946 A.2d 93, 98-99 (2008).