Court Opinion

ID: 9744318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:00:38.032988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.530987
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Royse, C. J.
— In her petition for rehearing, appellant earnestly contends that our construction of the quotation we used from the case of Sharpe et al. v. Baker et al. (1912), 51 Ind. App. 547, 553, 96 N. E. 627, *462629, on the subject of estates by entireties, was erroneous and in direct conflict with the holding in that case.
In our original opinion we stated our interpretation of the quotation referred to the following language. “In other words entirety property is held by the entity created by marriage. It is not the separate property of either.”
In support of her contention, appellant quotes the following language from the Sharpe case:
“It has been held uniformly that the right of survivorship is one of the incidents of estates by entireties, and that the surviving tenant takes the whole of such estate, not by the jus aecreseendi as a joint tenant, but on the theory that the title to the whole estate vested in each one of said tenants ' at the time of the creation of the estate.... No court so far as we are advised has ever held that the estate by entireties vest in a legal entity distinct from both husband and wife, and we cannot so hold without going counter to many principles of law long recognized and applied by the courts.”
In that case in the paragraph immediately preceding the quotation we used in our original opinion herein, this court said:
“By a fiction of the common law, the husband and wife were regarded as one person, the legal existence of the wife being suspended during coverture, or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband. 1 Blackstone’s Comm. *442. Upon this legal fiction of the unity of husband and wife rests all the distinctions and peculiarities which distinguish the estate by entireties from other joint estates. ‘It is the legal notion of unity of two persons, who are husband and wife, which gives occasion to the construction of an entirety of interest on their tenancy.’ 1 Preston, Estates *132. An estate by entireties is created when a husband and wife take an estate to themselves jointly by grant or devise, or by limitation of a use made to them *463during coverture. 1 Preston, Estates *131. On account of the unity of persons of husband and wife by marriage, they take the estate as one person . ..” (our emphasis)
In that case we further pointed out that an estate by entireties can be created only as between husband and wife “and is dependent entirely on the unity of their persons by marriage”. And anything which has the effect of destroying this unity, such as divorce, destroys the estate. We further said in that case, “While the statutes of this state have removed ■ most of the common disabilities of a married woman, the common law unity of husband and wife is preserved in so far as that fiction is necessary to uphold the estate by entireties.” There are numerous other expressions to the same effect in both the original opinion and the opinion on rehearing in that case. The question before this court then was whether property owned by appellants as tenants by the entireties was subject to levy and sale in satisfaction of a joint judgment against them.
In the quotation from our original opinion in this case (set out above), we did not say entirety property was held in an “entity distinct from both husband and wife”. All we said is that such property “is held by the entity created by marriage”. Because as stated in the above quoted authorities, through a fiction of the common law, husband and wife are regarded as one person. Furthermore, the language from the Sharpe case relied on by appellant herein was used in rejecting the contention that the unity of husband and wife, recognized by the common law is to be regarded as a separate legal entity distinct from the husband or the wife, or both combined, in much the same way the directors and officers of a corporation represent the *464corporation. We adhere to our statement in the original opinion on this question.
In her petition she further contends that we erred in holding the question of the ownership of the entire-ties property was before the trial court in this action. She bases this contention on the fact that both the complaint and cross' complaint averred this property was held by the parties as tenants by the entirety. The complaint of appellee asked the court to determine the property rights of the parties. The cross complaint asked for alimony in the sum of $10,000.00.
We are of'the opinion these allegations were sufficient to not only authorize the trial court but made it its duty to take into consideration the value of this property in adjusting the property rights of the parties.
She next asserts the authorities we cited in support of the proposition that it is the right and duty of the court in such cases to settle and determine the property rights of the parties- have no application, because in those cases there was no “such question” as is presented here. The fact the cited cases did not involve entireties property does not change the principle. We know of no authority which' asserts that in such cases the trial court may not consider the value of entireties property in adjusting the property rights of the parties.
Appellant again reiterates her original contention that the order directing the conveyance of this property was in effect the allowance of alimony to the husband. She- therefore contends neither §3-1218 Burns 1946 Repl. nor the cases of Gray v. Miller (1952), 122 Ind. App. 531-538, 106 N. E. 2d 709 and Baker v. Baker (1952), 123 Ind. App. 152, 108 N. E. 2d 70, cited in our original opinion have any application because the statute is an alimony statute and in the cases cited the wife received the property in lieu of alimony. Our *465original opinion recognized .the above, section of the statute as an alimony statute by quoting with approval the statement in the Gray case. Nor did we cite either the Gray or Baker cases sis an authority for the granting of alimony to a husband. We specifically held the order directing the transfer of the property to appellee was not alimony. The finding of the trial court sustains this conclusion. It specifically stated it was- made in settlement of the respective property rights of the parties. We cited the last mentioned cases to show the broad powers of a divorce court to make a fair, equitable and final adjustment of all the property rights of the parties. However,-we believe as stated in the Gray case the legislature by enacting the above referred to section of the statute expressed its approval of the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court in their holdings that divorce courts had broad powers to adjudicate the property rights of parties and that in the exercise of those powers such courts had the authority where equity and justice required it to order the transfer of property, including entireties property, between the parties. .
Appellant contends our opinion contravenes a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court announced in the case of Alexander v. Alexander (1895), 140 Ind. 560, 40 N. E. 55. That case has no application. In that case there was no divorce. There was dicta in the opinion which would support appellant’s contention. However, such dicta has been overruled. Mendenhall v. Mendenhall (1946), 116 Ind. App. 545, 555, 64 N. E. 2d 806, and authorities there cited.
In our original opinion in summarizing the evidence, we intentionally omitted reference to some of the evidence as - to the gross misconduct of appellant. The record in this case discloses that after appellee contracted the loathsome disease from appellant which per*466manently crippled him and materially reduced his ability to earn a livelihood, he forgave her and bought the income property involved herein so that they might have a home. Subsequent to this magnanimous conduct the record is replete with evidence appellant committed repeated acts of adultery. Appellant, in her brief, as indicated in our original opinion, admitted this.
In the case of Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, supra, we quoted with approval the following rule from Walker v. Walker (1898), 150 Ind. 317, 328, 50 N. E. 68.
“Where the wife proves recreant to her marriage obligations, and has destroyed the marital union by acts of adultery or other gross misconduct, and her husband is thereby entitled to a decree of divorce, the court granting the same, has the discretionary power, and, under proper circumstances warranting the same, will generally exercise it, and allot to the injured husband such a portion of the property or means which he had settled upon the wife as will place him in the position, to some extent at least, which he would have occupied had the union continued.”
We again express our approval of this rule. It is based upon fundamental principles of decency and honesty. The record in this case demonstrates its justice.
Appellant, in her petition for rehearing, does not challenge our statement of the record as to the money appellee had at the time of their marriage and that he used all of this money on the property here involved and for living expenses. That while the wife earned about Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars during the last year of their marriage, she refused to contribute anything for the maintenance of this property. That she used practically all of her earnings for her own purposes.
We are of the opinion that under the circumstances in this case the trial court had the authority and prop*467erly exercised it in directing the transfer of this property to appellee.
Petition for rehearing denied.
Note. — Reported in 110 N. E. 2d 51 and rehearing denied 111 N. E. 2d 90.