Court Opinion

ID: 9537452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:18:30.57407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:41.883550
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
with whom BURKE, Justice, joins,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion on the issue of abandonment. Since that issue is dispositive of the case, there is no need to discuss the general doctrinal underpinnings of airport searches. However, the majority opinion does so in parts III, IV, and V. I do not join in those portions of the opinion.
As I interpret the majority opinion, airport security personnel conducting checkpoint carry-on luggage searches can initially search only by using an x-ray device. If the x-rays penetrate the item and show nothing which looks like a weapon, the item may not be physically inspected in the absence of “particular circumstances.” The majority opinion does not articulate what those circumstances may be, but the person conducting the search must be able to articulate them in court. A physical inspection cannot be justified by the fact that there are weapons which will not show up on an x-ray, because, according to the majority opinion, hijackers have not been using such weapons.
I think that in making that judgment, the court has departed from its area of competence. Since weapons do exist which will not show up on an x-ray,1 airport security personnel should be able to search for them. Whether every hand carried item is opened and physically inspected, or only a few items are, is of no constitutional significance.
I agree with the majority opinion that airport screening searches are not subject to the requirement that a search be preceded by a warrant. The circumstances which justify an exception to the warrant requirement are (1) unique danger, (2) the fact that the warrant requirement is unworkable in this area, and (3) the fact that the search is in a sense consented to by those wishing to fly.2 Those circumstances apply *259as strongly to physical inspections as to x-ray inspections.

. In United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374, 375 (6th Cir. 1974) the defendant had attempted to carry a non-metallic explosive device on board an airplane.

. Consent by status is a key factor in the United States Supreme Court cases allowing war-rantless searches of regulated businesses relied on by the majority opinion. Speaking of those cases, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 *259S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), the Court has stated: “[B]usinessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade . . The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2538, 37 L.Ed.2d 596, 601 (1973).