Court Opinion

ID: 9551187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:49:02.942733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:14.460258
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that petitioner may have a right to appointed counsel at the pretermination hearing. I think that the requirement of Berwick v. *229termination hearing. I think that the requirement of Berwick v. AFSD, 74 Or App 460, 703 P2d 994 (1985), that a hearings officer actively assist an unrepresented claimant to develop the evidence, provides all the process due under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the availability of judicial review to enforce this obligation obviates any need for legal representation at the hearing.
In Berwick, we stated that the hearing officer’s responsibility is to assist unrepresented claimants “in part by following up on potentially favorable lines of inquiry and in part by helping claimants present their evidence in its best light.” 74 Or App at 466. We also stated that the officer has “broad discretion in how to carry out this duty” and that we may remand a case “if the officer acts outside the range of that discretion.” 74 Or App 466.1 agree that we should remand this case, because the officer did not fulfill his responsibility to assist petitioner’s presentation of evidence. The majority’s opinion points out the weaknesses in the officer’s performance and suggests how it could be improved. 76 Or App at 228. If, on remand, the officer assists petitioner in the suggested ways, due process rights will be vindicated. If the officer fails to satisfy his responsibilities, we may review the case again and remand with further specific instructions. In either event, petitioner will receive an adequate hearing without requiring appointed counsel.
Due process guarantees the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254, 267, 90 S Ct 1011, 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970). Consideration must be given to the nature of the decision-making process in deciding what due process requires in a particular case. Berwick v. AFSD, supra, notes that AFSD hearings are nonadversarial and informal in nature. These characteristics may be more effective than an adversarial proceeding to determine the merits of a claim. The majority, by holding that counsel may be required, potentially converts the proceeding into an adversarial one. We are required to presume that AFSD hearings officers fairly discharge their statutory duty to decide claims impartially and that they can adequately assist claimants in presenting evidence. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 349, 96 S Ct 893, 909 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976. I think that Berwick v. AFSD, supra, adequately assures that claimants have a meaningful opportunity to be *230heard, and I see no reason to inject the presence of an attorney into these proceedings.
The majority fails to accord sufficient weight to the nonadversarial nature of AFSD proceedings and incorrectly applies the United States Supreme Court cases which it cites. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, clearly holds that due process does not require appointed counsel in welfare pretermination hearings. 397 US at 270. There is no way the majority can dance around that holding. The majority’s reliance on Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 101 S Ct 2153, 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981), is misplaced. Lassiter involved a judicial proceeding to terminate parental rights. That was an adversarial proceeding in which the Department of Social Services was represented by an attorney. Even so, in applying the balancing test, the court concluded that the parent had not overcome the presumption that counsel be appointed only in cases where liberty is at stake.1 The fact is that the Supreme Court has never required appointed counsel in a case where liberty is not at stake. The majority’s discussion of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 93 S Ct 1756, 36 L Ed 2d 656 (1973), also ignores the point that liberty was at stake in that proceeding to revoke probation.
I think that the Due Process Clause requires us to remand this case but only to require the hearings officer actively to assist petitioner to present his evidence and to develop a more complete record. I would not also conditionally require the appointment of counsel to develop the record.

Even if the balancing test of Lassiter were to be applied, I disagree with the majority’s discussion of the factors. I would concede that the individual’s interest is commanding. The state’s interest in an efficient resolution of claims also appears to be significant. The risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits without legal representation does not appear to be so significant if the hearings officer takes an active role. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, 76 Or App at 225, when a determination turns on medical evidence, the need for legal representation would appear to be lower. See Mathews v. Eldridge, supra 424 US at 344-45. This application of the balancing test does not result in a situation in which the individual’s “interests were at their strongest, the State’s interest were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak,” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, supra 452 US at 31, which is necessary to overcome the presumption against requiring appointed counsel.