Court Opinion

ID: 9651709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:32:02.278082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:37.764538
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with majority’s analysis and conclusion regarding the liability of Industrial Valley Title Insurance Company, I must dissent from the majority’s discussion regarding laches and the remedy accorded Mrs. Hicks.
The chancellor concluded in his findings of facts that Mrs. Hicks had some inkling about the fraudulent transfer in 1978 although she did not actually learn of the conveyance until 1979. As a result of this information, she contacted a Mississippi lawyer and a Montgomery County lawyer. Although Mrs. Hicks confirmed that her signature on the 1961 deed was a forgery, she took no further action until 1983. Despite learning through her daughter in 1978 of the transfer of the property to the Saboes, Mrs. Hicks did nothing *389with regard to the property until 1983, one year after her husband’s death.
Finally, at trial, Mrs. Hicks failed to give any satisfactory explanation for her delay in suing thereby permitting her deceased husband the opportunity to dissipate the net proceeds of the sale of the real estate in the amount of $24,000.
In Rusiski v. Pribonic, 511 Pa. 383, 515 A.2d 507, 510 we reiterated the proper scope of review in an appeal from a final decree.
The scope of review of this court in consideration of an appeal from a final decree is well established.
... the findings of the chancellor will not be reversed unless it appears that he has clearly abused his discretion or committed an error of law. Where credibility of witnesses is important to the determination, the chancellors findings are entitled to particular weight because of his opportunity to observe their demeanor. Where a reading of the record reasonably can be said to reflect the conclusions reached by the chancellor, a review in court may not substitute its judgment for that of the chancellor. A reviewing court, however, is not bound by findings which are without support in the record or have merely been derived from other facts, (citations omitted) (citing Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 142, 425 A.2d 412, 415 (1981).
Reviewing this record in light of our proper scope of review, I must conclude that the chancellor’s determination that Mrs. Hicks’ action is barred by laches is supported by competent evidence. Since the chancellor has not abused his discretion or committed an error of law, we are bound by his determination. Accordingly, I would affirm that determination and dismiss Mrs. Hicks’ complaint against the Saboes on the basis of laches.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.