Court Opinion

ID: 9919230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:15.670643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:28.450992
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION SEVEN

 PETER HENRI DRAGONES III,            B329659

         Plaintiff and Respondent,    (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. 22PDRO00962)
         v.

 KERRY CALKINS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.
     David D. Diamond for Plaintiff and Respondent.
     Law Office of Boice & Associates and Bruce A. Boice for
Defendant and Appellant.

                 _________________________________
       In 2022, Kerry Calkins and Peter Henri Dragones III1
sought domestic violence restraining orders against each other.
The trial court granted Dragones’s request for a restraining order
and denied Calkins’s request. In early 2023 Dragones moved for
attorney’s fees pursuant to Family Code section 6344.2 The court
granted the motion, awarding $6,000 in attorney’s fees to
Dragones. Calkins appeals from the fee order.
       Section 6344 provides authority for courts to award
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in actions brought pursuant
to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (§ 6200 et seq.). While
this case was pending in the trial court, the Legislature repealed
the prior version of section 6344 and enacted a new section 6344,
effective January 1, 2023. The new statute makes it easier for a
prevailing petitioner to obtain fees, and harder for a prevailing
respondent to obtain fees. The parties contend that the prior
version of section 6344 applies. We hold that the current version
of section 6344 applies retroactively to all cases pending on its
effective date, including this case. Notwithstanding the
presumption against retroactive application of new statutes,
amendments to the Family Code are governed by section 4, which
establishes a general rule of retroactivity. Additionally, attorney
fee statutes are procedural in nature, and a newly enacted
attorney fee statute applies to cases pending on its effective date.

1     On appeal and in the trial court, the parties (including
respondent’s counsel) spell the respondent’s name as both
“Dragones” and “Dragonas.” It is not clear which is the correct
spelling. Because the case is captioned “Dragones,” we use that
spelling throughout.
2     Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s
fees under the new statute.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Calkins and Dragones were in a dating relationship when,
on the night of June 30, 2022, they had a fight that gave rise to
the restraining orders at issue in the underlying case. Dragones
alleged, among other things, that Calkins punched or elbowed
him in the face during a physical altercation and that Calkins
poured water on him and his bed. Dragones videotaped the
water-pouring incident. Calkins acknowledged the water-pouring
incident, but denied she punched or elbowed Dragones,
contending instead that Dragones was the primary aggressor in
the physical altercation.
      Each party filed a request for a domestic violence
restraining order against the other, and the court consolidated
the matters and held a hearing on September 7, 2022. At the
hearing, Dragones was represented by counsel and Calkins was
not. After hearing testimony from both parties, the court granted
Dragones’s request for a restraining order and denied Calkins’s
request for a restraining order. The court explained that it was
issuing a one-year restraining order against Calkins based on the
videotaped water-pouring incident, finding that Calkins “actually
start[ed] the battering part when [she threw] the water on him.”
As to the physical altercation, the court found both parties “got in
a physical tussle at the door.”
      The court denied Calkins’s request for a restraining order
on the basis that “the court doesn’t find sufficient evidence to
issue a restraining order” protecting Calkins. The court

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reiterated that both parties sustained bruises because they “both
got into a physical altercation.”
      On January 26, 2023, Dragones filed a motion for
attorney’s fees in the amount of $13,659 pursuant to
section 6344. Dragones argued that he was entitled to fees as the
prevailing petitioner in his request for a restraining order and as
the prevailing respondent in Calkins’s request for a restraining
order. In support of the motion, Dragones filed a declaration
from counsel explaining the attorney’s fees Dragones had
incurred. Dragones did not submit any evidence of his income or
his ability to pay attorney’s fees.
      Calkins, for the first time represented by counsel, filed an
opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees arguing that the
motion should be denied because Dragones had the ability to pay
his own attorney’s fees and Calkins lacked the ability to pay
Dragones’s fees. Calkins also argued that the amount of fees
requested was unreasonable. With her opposition, Calkins filed a
declaration stating that she earned $3,082 the prior month and
that Dragones typically earned more than $20,000 per month.
      The motion for attorney’s fees was heard on March 24,
2023. The court ordered Calkins to pay Dragones attorney’s fees
in the amount of $6,000. The order contemplates that Calkins
would pay the fees in monthly installments in an amount to be
negotiated by the parties.

                         DISCUSSION

A.    The Current Version of Section 6344 Applies to This Case
      Calkins’s appeal is premised on the assumption that the fee
order in this case is governed by the former version of

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section 6344 that was in effect in 2022, when the restraining
orders were litigated and decided, and not the version of the
statute in effect in 2023, when the attorney fee motion was filed
and decided. Under the former statute, a prevailing petitioner’s
right to recover attorney’s fees depended on the petitioner’s
demonstrated inability to pay fees and a disparity in income
between the parties. The statute provided, for actions brought
pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act:
       “(a) After notice and a hearing, the court may issue an
order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the
prevailing party.
       (b) In any action in which the petitioner is the prevailing
party and cannot afford to pay for the attorney’s fees and costs,
the court shall, if appropriate based on the parties’ respective
abilities to pay, order that the respondent pay petitioner’s
attorney’s fees and costs for commencing and maintaining the
proceeding. Whether the respondent shall be ordered to pay
attorney’s fees and costs for the prevailing petitioner, and what
amount shall be paid, shall be determined based upon (1) the
respective incomes and needs of the parties, and (2) any factors
affecting the parties’ respective abilities to pay.” (Former § 6344,
added by Stats. 2004, ch. 472, § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 2005.)
       By the time Dragones filed his January 26, 2023 motion for
attorney’s fees, former section 6344 had been repealed and
replaced by the current version of section 6344 (see Stats. 2022,
ch. 591, §§ 1-2), which requires the court to award fees to a
prevailing petitioner, subject only to the respondent’s ability to
pay. The newly enacted statute obviates the need for a prevailing
petitioner to show inability to afford attorney’s fees and

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eliminates the requirement to show a disparity in access to funds.
Effective January 1, 2023, section 6344 provides:
       “(a) After notice and a hearing, a court, upon request, shall
issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a
prevailing petitioner.
       (b) After notice and a hearing, the court, upon request, may
issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a
prevailing respondent only if the respondent establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the petition or request is
frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause
unnecessary delay.
       (c) Before a court awards attorney’s fees and costs pursuant
to this section, the court shall first determine pursuant to
Section 270 that the party ordered to pay has, or is reasonably
likely to have, the ability to pay.” (§ 6344, added by Stats. 2022,
ch. 591, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.)
       The trial court did not explain which version of the statute
it applied when awarding attorney’s fees to Dragones. Both
parties argued in the trial court and on appeal that this case is
governed by the former version of the statute. In support of this
contention, the parties recite the general presumption that new
statutes do not apply retroactively. Neither party suggests that
applying the current version of section 6344 in this case would be
unfair, impair any vested rights, or violate due process.
       We review de novo whether a statute applies retroactively.
(In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 183 (Fellows).)
We conclude that the current version of section 6344 applies
retroactively and governs the attorney fee motion in this case. As
we explain, statutes operate retroactively if “‘the Legislature
plainly intended them to do so’”; here, the Legislature has

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decreed that Family Code revisions are presumptively
retroactive. (Fellows, at p. 183, quoting Western Security Bank v.
Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243.) Further, it is well
established that a newly enacted statute that modifies the
standard for awarding attorney’s fees applies to cases pending on
its effective date. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City
Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 931 (Woodland Hills).)

      1.     Newly enacted provisions of the Family Code
             generally apply retroactively
       In section 4 of the Family Code, the Legislature expressed
its intention that newly enacted provisions of the Family Code
presumptively apply to cases pending on the effective date.
Section 4, subdivision (c), provides: “Subject to the limitations
provided in this section, the new law applies on the operative
date to all matters governed by the new law, regardless of
whether an event occurred or circumstance existed before, on, or
after the operative date, including, but not limited to,
commencement of a proceeding, making of an order, or taking of
an action.” Section 4, subdivision (d), further provides: “If a
document or paper is filed before the operative date, the contents,
execution, and notice thereof are governed by the old law and not
by the new law; but subsequent proceedings taken after the
operative date concerning the document or paper, including an
objection or response, a hearing, an order, or other matter
relating thereto is governed by the new law and not by the old
law.” “‘New law’” includes any amendment, addition, or repeal of
a provision of the Family Code. (§ 4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Section 4
provides for limited exceptions to the general presumption of
retroactivity where retroactive application would alter an

                                 7
existing duty or impair vested rights. (See id., subds. (f) & (h).)
Section 4 “establishes that amendments to the Family Code apply
retroactively unless otherwise provided by law.” (Fellows, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 186.)
      In Fellows, supra, 39 Cal.4th 179, a father sought to vacate
a 17-year-old child support order on the ground of laches. (Id. at
p. 182.) A laches defense would have been valid at the time the
award was entered, but the Legislature subsequently amended
the Family Code to eliminate the defense of laches. (Id. at
p. 185.) The Supreme Court held that Family Code section 4
establishes that, “as a general rule, future changes to the Family
Code apply retroactively.” (Fellows, at p. 186; see In re Marriage
of Kelkar (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 833 [following Fellows and
affirming retroactive application of Family Code provision that
establishes a presumption against awarding spousal support to
spouse convicted of domestic violence].) Finding there was no
applicable exception to the section 4 presumption of retroactivity,
the Fellows court held that the amended statute eliminating the
laches defense applies retroactively. (Fellows, at pp. 187-190.)
      Section 6344, like the amended statute in Fellows, does not
expressly state whether it applies retroactively. Therefore,
pursuant to section 4, we presume retroactivity unless one of the
statutory exceptions applies. We analyze the two potentially
relevant exceptions to the presumption of retroactivity:
Section 4, subdivisions (f) and (h).
      Section 4, subdivision (f), provides, “No person is liable for
an action taken before the operative date that was proper at the
time the action was taken, even though the action would be
improper if taken on or after the operative date, and the person
has no duty, as a result of the enactment of the new law, to take

                                 8
any step to alter the course of action or its consequences.” This
section has no application here because Calkins’s liability for
attorney’s fees does not arise from any action she took prior to
2023 that was “proper at the time the action was taken.” (§ 4,
subd. (f).) Her liability stems from her acts of domestic violence.
Both before and after the enactment of the current version of
section 6344, Calkins was under a duty not to engage in acts of
domestic violence. The change in Section 6344 did not alter that
duty.
         Section 4, subdivision (h), provides an exception for
circumstances where “application of a particular provision of the
new law or of the old law in the manner required by this
section or by the new law would substantially interfere with the
effective conduct of the proceedings or the rights of the parties or
other interested persons in connection with an event that
occurred or circumstance that existed before the operative date.”
This exception is characterized by Fellows as the codification of
the rule that, “[e]ven in the face of specific legislative intent,
retrospective application is impermissible if it ‘impairs a vested
. . . right without due process of law.’” (Fellows, supra, 39 Cal.4th
at p. 189.) Here, neither party contends that retroactive
application would impair vested rights or violate due process.
And rightly so. The newly enacted provision merely changes the
standard under which a prevailing party can obtain an award of
attorney’s fees. As we explain, statutes that modify the standard
for awarding attorney’s fees are procedural in nature, and the
application of such statutes to a pending case does not violate
fundamental rights.

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       2.    New attorney fee statutes apply to pending cases
       It has long been recognized that a new statute governing
the standard for awarding attorney’s fees applies to actions
pending on the statute’s effective date. In Woodland Hills, supra,
23 Cal.3d at page 931, the Supreme Court held that newly
enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (permitting an
award of attorney’s fees under a private attorney general theory)
applied to a case pending on appeal at the time the legislative
enactment became effective. The Woodland Hills decision rests
on a long line of cases holding that newly enacted attorney fee
provisions apply to cases pending in the trial court or on appeal
“on the effective date of the statutes.” (Woodland Hills, at
pp. 931-932; see Olson v. Hickman (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 920
[newly enacted statute permitting award of attorney’s fees in
mandamus actions applies to administrative mandamus action
pending on appeal when the attorney’s fees statute was enacted].)
       Since Woodland Hills, California courts have consistently
held that “statutory provisions that alter the recovery of attorney
fees are deemed procedural in nature and apply to pending
litigation.” (USS-Posco Industries v. Case (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 197, 201 (USS-Posco); see California Housing
Finance Agency v. E.R. Fairway Associates I (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1512-1513 [applying revised Health and
Safety Code attorney fee provision to pending case, where code
was amended during trial to provide for an award of attorney’s
fees and costs to the prevailing party]; Mir v. Charter Suburban
Hospital (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1477-1478 [Business and
Professions Code section 809.9, which took effect after trial court
judgment became final, allowed for award of fees incurred both
before and after effective date of statute]; ARA Living Centers-

                                10
Pacific, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1562
[applying Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657, which
was amended during trial court proceedings to allow prevailing
plaintiff to obtain attorney’s fees in elder abuse cases]; Harbor
View Hills Community Assn. v. Torley (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 343,
350 [holding new Civil Code attorney fee provision applies to case
pending on appeal and rejecting contention that such application
would “deprive either party of a matured right”]; Wood v.
McGovern (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 772, 774-776 [Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.4, allowing fees against defendant who is
convicted of a felony for the conduct giving rise to the civil suit,
applies to suits pending when it became effective]; Estate of
Schuster (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 [applying revised
probate attorney fee provision to pending case and holding,
“Statutes authorizing attorneys’ fees are applicable to cases in
which an appeal is pending, even if only as to the attorney fee
issues, on the effective date of the statute”].)
       Most recently, in USS-Posco, the court considered the
retroactive application of an amended Labor Code provision that
curtailed a prevailing employer’s ability to recover attorney’s fees
in a dispute over nonpayment of wages. (USS-Posco, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at p. 215.) There, the employer had prevailed on
summary judgment, and the employer’s fee motion was pending
on the effective date of the statutory amendment. (Ibid.)
Surveying the case law on the retroactive application of attorney
fee statutes and other statutes affecting the recovery of costs, the
court held that the amended attorney fee provision applied

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because the case was pending when the statute was amended.
(Ibid.)3
       In light of the general presumption of retroactive
application of new provisions of the Family Code, and the long
line of cases establishing that newly enacted attorney fee statutes
apply to cases pending on the effective date, we hold that the
current version of section 6344 applies to cases pending on its
January 1, 2023, effective date, including this case.

B.    The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Fees
      The new statute mandates an award of attorney’s fees to a
prevailing petitioner in an action brought pursuant to the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act, subject only to the trial court’s
consideration of the respondent’s inability to pay. (§ 6344,
subds. (a) & (c).) Calkins contends that the trial court failed to

3      The USS-Posco court pointed out an anomaly in the case
law: Courts applying an amended attorney fee statute to a case
currently pending do not deem such application “‘retroactive’”;
instead, they term such application “‘prospective’” because an
attorney fee statute is deemed to address a “‘procedural’ matter
that is ‘prospective’ in character and thus not at odds with the
general presumption against retroactivity.” (USS-Posco, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at p. 219.) Courts have consistently adhered to
this terminology, even though, as the USS-Posco court noted,
“legislation changing when attorney fees are available could
readily be said to change the legal consequences of past conduct
and substantially affect preexisting rights and obligations.” (Id.
at pp. 217-218.) Notwithstanding the oddity in nomenclature and
its potential for masking a material change in rights and
obligations, the USS-Posco court followed the well-established
rule, applying the amended Labor Code attorney fee statute to
the pending case. (Id. at p. 221.)

                                12
consider salient financial circumstances when it issued the
attorney fee award, and that the award is too high.
       “We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the
amount of an attorney fee award. [Citation.] ‘[A]n experienced
trial judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to
assess the value of the legal services rendered in his or her court,
and the amount of a fee awarded by such a judge will therefore
not be set aside on appeal absent a showing that it is manifestly
excessive in the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘The only proper
basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the
amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience
and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the
determination.’” (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
1495, 1509.)
       Calkins argues that the attorney fee order must be
reversed because the trial court failed to consider her inability to
pay Dragones’s fees, and that the resulting fee order “shocks the
conscience.” Calkins submitted a declaration in the trial court
showing that in the prior month she had earned $3,082 (an
increase from her 2022 earnings) and that, after expenses, she
had only a small amount of disposable income. She thus
demonstrated a very limited ability to pay attorney’s fees. She
did not, however, show that she was unable to afford any amount
in fees. The trial court awarded $6,000 in fees, less than half of
the $13,659 requested by Dragones. The order contemplates that
Calkins will pay the fees in installments, rather than a lump
sum. This was not an abuse of discretion and does not
demonstrate that the award was the result of passion or
prejudice. The reduced fee amount and the installment structure
indicate that the fee award resulted from the court’s exercise of

                                 13
discretion after considering the facts of the case, including
Calkins’s limited income. (See Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car
Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) Should Calkins find
herself unable to afford the installment payments, she can file an
appropriate request to modify the installment payments, with
sufficient facts to demonstrate her inability to pay.
       Calkins also argues that the court abused its discretion
because Dragones failed to show that he cannot afford to pay his
own fees and because Dragones earns substantially more money
than she does. However, the operative version of section 6344
eliminates the requirement that a prevailing petitioner
demonstrate inability to pay attorney’s fees and a disparity in the
parties’ income. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees in the absence of that
showing.4

4     Because we affirm the trial court’s order awarding fees to
Dragones as a prevailing petitioner, we need not address whether
the court could also have awarded fees to Dragones as a
prevailing respondent.

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                        DISPOSITION

       The order awarding attorney’s fees is affirmed. Dragones is
entitled to recover his costs on appeal.

                                    EVENSON, J.

We concur:

      FEUER, Acting P. J.

      MARTINEZ, J.

     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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