Court Opinion

ID: 9896364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-10 01:00:36.973824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:49.351023
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60116        Document: 00516962776             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/09/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                                FILED
                                                                          November 9, 2023
                                       No. 23-60116
                                                                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                Clerk

   Anthony Walker,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 3:22-CV-124
                     ______________________________

   Before Southwick, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Walker appeals the district court’s
   judgment affirming the denial of disability benefits by the Social Security
   Administration Commissioner (the Commissioner). Walker contends that in
   hearing his case, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) errantly evaluated
   proffered medical opinions in denying benefits and that the error prejudiced

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 23-60116

   him. We find that even if the ALJ erred, Walker has not shown prejudice.
   Accordingly, we affirm.
                                          I.
          Walker visited Monroe Regional Hospital in Aberdeen, Mississippi,
   on June 8, 2020, complaining of back pain after doing “heavy work” the week
   prior and feeling a “pop in his mid back.” On November 12, 2020, Walker
   filed application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
   under 42 U.S.C. § 423, et seq., as well as an application for supplemental
   security income under 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. Walker alleged disability
   starting on June 8, 2020 (the Onset Date).
          Walker was informed by the Disability Determination Services
   (DDS), a Mississippi state agency that partners with the Social Security
   Administration (SSA), that as part of the application process he might need
   to submit to a medical examination arranged by DDS.1 On December 10,
   2020, Dr. Carol Kossman examined Walker. She noted that Walker filed an
   initial claim for disability because “7 disks in back are out of place that cause
   severe pain,” but she concluded that “all potentially applicable Medical-
   Vocational Guidelines would direct a finding of ‘not disabled’ given the
   individual’s age, education, and [residual functioning capacity]. Therefore,
   the individual can adjust to other work.” She noted that Walker was not
   limited to unskilled work because of the impairments, though he
   demonstrated that his “maximum sustained work capability” was light.
   Walker’s disability claims were then denied on December 11, 2020; he
   requested reconsideration of that decision on December 26, 2020.

          _____________________
          1
           The record does not include correspondence scheduling the appointment. But
   Dr. Kossman signed a Social Security Administration Form entitled “Disability
   Determination and Transmittal.”

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          On his own initiative, Walker sought a second opinion from Dr.
   Timothy J. Callaghan, who examined him in May 2021. Callaghan recorded
   Walker’s complaint of “continual pain from his middle back all the way down
   to his lower back” and his “intractable pain.” Callaghan’s report summary
   concluded:
          [Walker] is a 52-year-old male who has significant
          thoracolumbar pain and has an MRI report that was sent to me
          by disability that shows minimal disc bulge at C1-C2 and a tiny
          left paracentral disc protrusion T2-T3 and one at T4-T5, as
          well as one at T8-T9. [Walker] has enough multiple disc
          lesions that he certainly could have significant intractable pain.
          In June 2021, as part of DDS’s reconsideration of Walker’s claims,
   Dr. Eugene Bass also evaluated Walker. Bass came to similar conclusions as
   Kossman did, and on June 28, 2021, Walker’s disability claims were denied
   on reconsideration.
          After his request for reconsideration was denied, Walker filed in July
   2021 a written request for a hearing before an ALJ. The hearing occurred on
   November 8, 2021. Afterward, the ALJ issued a written opinion that Walker
   was not disabled under Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the
   Social Security Act (the Act),2 from the Onset Date through the date of the
   ALJ’s opinion. The ALJ considered, among other evidence, Walker’s
   hearing statements, relevant medical history, and the opinions of Kossman,
   Callaghan, and Bass.
          As relevant here, the Act defines disability as the “inability to engage
   in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
   physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

          _____________________
          2
            These sections are codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d), and 1382c(a)(3)(A),
   respectively.

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   which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
   than 12 months.”                42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.
   § 1382c(a)(3)(A).3 The ALJ employed the sequential, five-step approach
   prescribed by the Commissioner to determine whether a claimant is disabled:
           (1) the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
           activity, (2) he has a severe impairment, (3) the impairment
           meets the severity of an impairment enumerated in the relevant
           regulations, (4) it prevents the claimant from performing past
           relevant work, and (5) it prevents him from doing any relevant
           work.
   Keel v. Saul, 986 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2021) (paraphrasing steps
   enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)).
           At steps one and two, the ALJ found Walker had not engaged in
   substantial gainful activity since June 8, 2020, and that he had a severe
   impairment—thoracic spine degenerative disc disease.4 But at step three,
   she concluded that the impairment was not so severe that it “meets or
   medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments” in 20 C.F.R.
   Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix 1. At step four, the ALJ found “[a]fter careful
   consideration of the entire record,” that “the claimant has the residual
   functional capacity to perform light work” under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b)
   and 416.967(b), with some exceptions.5

           _____________________
           3
            The Act sets forth an additional definition of “disability” concerning individuals
   who are at least fifty-five years old and blind. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(B).
           4
            In her opinion, the ALJ first discussed an additional “step,” whether Walker met
   “insured status requirements of Sections 216(i) and 223” of the Act. The ALJ found
   Walker met these requirements, and this finding is not before us on appeal. Above the line,
   we reference the steps in conformity with the five prescribed by 20 C.F.R.
   § 404.1520(a)(4).
           5
            Specifically, the ALJ found that Walker had the “residual functional capacity to
   perform light work . . . except frequently [to] climb ramps and stairs, occasionally [to] climb

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           In her determination, the ALJ stated that she:
           considered all symptoms and the extent to which these
           symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
           objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the
           requirements of 20 C.F.R. [§§] 404.1529 and 416.929 and
           [Social Security Ruling] 16-3p. [She] also considered the
           medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s)
           in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R.
           [§§] 404.1520c and 416.920c.

   The ALJ concluded that Walker’s “medically determinable impairment
   could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however,
   [Walker]’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
   effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
   evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .”
           At the final step, the ALJ concluded Walker was “capable of
   performing past relevant work as a box printing machine operator,” which
   did not “require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the
   claimant’s residual functional capacity” noted earlier. Ultimately, the ALJ
   found Walker had “not been under a disability, as defined in the [Act]”
   during the relevant period.
           Walker appealed to the Appeals Council, which declined to change
   the ALJ’s decision. Walker sought review in the United States District Court
   for the Northern District of Mississippi, and the parties agreed to a final

           _____________________
   ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and frequently [to] stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.” She later
   noted that Drs. Kossman and Bass “determined that [Walker] could frequently climb
   ramps and stairs, occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, [and] frequently stoop,
   kneel, crouch, and crawl.” The ALJ concluded that their analyses were “persuasive.” It
   is thus unclear whether she found that Walker could perform those functions, but that
   unclarity does not affect Walker’s appeal.

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   disposition by the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).          The
   magistrate judge affirmed the agency’s decision. Walker timely appealed.
                                       II.
                                       A.
         The “Commissioner’s determination” may be “rendered by [an]
   ALJ.” See Legget v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). Thereafter, a
   claimant, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), may seek judicial review of the
   Commissioner’s determination in federal district court.       And, though
   procedurally we review the district court’s decision, and do so de novo, we
   remain bound by the same highly deferential standard towards the
   Commissioner’s determination as was the district court. Garcia v. Berryhill,
   880 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Reddin v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL
   2525051, *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 2023) (“We review the district court’s
   decision de novo, and our review of the Commissioner’s decision is
   limited . . . .”) (unpublished). “We ask only whether substantial evidence
   supports the decision and whether the correct legal standards were
   employed.” Garcia, 880 F.3d at 704 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Masterson v.
   Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002)). Substantial evidence is “more
   than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance.” Id. (citing Masterson,
   309 F.3d at 272). We neither “re-weigh the evidence” nor “in the event of
   evidentiary conflict or uncertainty . . . substitute our judgment for the
   Commissioner’s, even if we believe the evidence weighs against the
   Commissioner’s decision.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
                                       B.
         In “consider[ing] medical opinions and prior administrative medical
   findings,” an ALJ may not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,
   including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
   administrative medical finding(s),” including those of a claimant’s “medical

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   sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Instead, an ALJ must “articulate
   . . . how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior
   administrative medical findings in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R.
   § 404.1520c(b). “[T]he most important factors” are “supportability” and
   “consistency.” Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Specifically, the ALJ must “explain
   how [she] considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical
   source’s medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings in [the
   claimant’s] determination or decision.” Id.
          The thrust of Walker’s appeal is that the ALJ improperly considered
   the proffered medical testimony from Drs. Callaghan, Kossman, and Bass
   because she failed to articulate her analysis of their medical opinions using
   the “supportability” and “consistency” factors. We begin with Callaghan’s
   evaluation.
          Walker contends that had the ALJ properly evaluated Callaghan’s
   opinion and articulated the supportability and consistency analysis, she
   would have “determined Dr. Callaghan’s opinion to be persuasive [and . . .
   Walker] would have been deemed unable to work on a regular and continuing
   basis under applicable guidance.”              Walker contends that Callaghan’s
   conclusion that Walker “has enough multiple disc lesions that he certainly
   could have significant intractable pain” buttresses Walker’s “subjective
   complaints of debilitating pain which could lead to a finding of disability.” In
   Walker’s view, the ALJ errantly discounted Callaghan’s opinion about the
   disc lesions, intractable pain, and Walker’s subjective complaints of pain.
   Moreover, after proper consideration, the ALJ would have classified Walker
   in “sedentary or less than sedentary exertional level work which would have
   resulted in a finding of disability . . . .”
          The Commissioner responds that neither Callaghan’s “consultative
   report nor his summary therein contain a ‘medical opinion’” because

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   “statements from a medical source reflecting judgments about a claimant’s
   diagnosis and prognosis are no longer considered medical opinions because
   they do not necessarily provide perspectives about the claimant’s functional
   abilities and limitations.”        See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2)–(3);
   416.913(a)(2)–(3).    More specifically, the Commissioner asserts that
   Callaghan’s statements about Walker’s “intractable pain” do not meet the
   definition of a “medical opinion” under the applicable regulations. As a
   result, the Commissioner reasons, the ALJ had no duty to analyze
   Callaghan’s evaluation through the “supportability” and “consistency”
   lens.
           We need not decide whether Callaghan’s evaluation constituted a
   “medical opinion” or whether, if so, the ALJ inadequately discussed the
   “supportability” and “consistency” factors regarding Callaghan’s
   conclusions because Walker fails to show that any error prejudiced him. See
   Shineski v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407–08 (2009) (holding that doctrine of
   harmless error applies to administrative rulings).
           The ALJ thoroughly considered Callaghan’s report. She detailed
   Callaghan’s evaluation of Walker, including Callaghan’s conclusion that
   “the claimant had enough multiple disc lesions that he could reasonably have
   significant pain.” Then she outlined why she found Callaghan’s conclusions
   inconsistent with his exam and other medical evidence, and thus
   unpersuasive:
           Dr. Callaghan, a one-time consultative examiner, reviewed the
           claimant’s record and proceeded to perform a direct
           examination on the claimant. As a result of the physical
           examination, Dr. Callaghan reported that the claimant had full
           range of motion of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine, as
           well as full range of motion in all extremities. Dr. Callaghan
           reported that the claimant exhibited pain with flexion of the
           cervical spine and thoracolumbar spine, and he exhibited mild

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          tenderness to palpation over the midline of the thoracolumbar
          spinous processes and costal transverse processes, but no
          deformity or spasms were present. He also reported that the
          claimant had a negative straight leg raise test. Upon examining
          the claimant, Dr. Callaghan expressed that the claimant had
          multiple disc lesions that could cause him to have significant
          intractable pain. Dr. Callaghan’s opinion is inconsistent with
          his exam findings, as well as with the other objective evidence
          in the record.

   True enough, the ALJ did not expressly mention “supportability” and
   “consistency” in arriving at her decision. But Walker fails to show that “if
   the ALJ had given further explanation, then she would have adopted”
   Walker’s line of thinking and altered her outcome. Miller v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
   60541, 2023 WL 234773 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished); cf. Jones
   v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding insufficient showing of
   prejudice   when    claimant    “offered   no     evidence   that   additional
   records . . . would have had an effect on the judgment”). Walker bears the
   burden to show any error was prejudicial, Jones, 691 F.3d at 734, and his
   failure to do so dooms his argument.
          Walker’s contentions as to the ALJ’s analysis of Kossman’s and
   Bass’s opinions suffer the same fate. Walker asserts that the ALJ, in failing
   to articulate adequately the supportability and consistency requirements,
   “did not address or reconcile” what he believes are “internal
   inconsistencies,” relevant to the decision. According to Walker, had she
   done so, she would have “identified these internal inconsistencies, which
   were material and germane to the outcome of this case.” For instance,
   Walker believes Bass’s findings are contrary to his conclusions. He points to
   Bass’s finding that Walker’s “statements about the intensity, persistence,
   and functionality limiting effects of the symptoms [are] substantiated by the
   objective medical evidence alone,” but that Walker could “still be expected

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   to perform other work” and could stand or walk for six hours during an eight-
   hour workday.
          Walker also points to Bass’s finding Walker’s statements “credible,
   which included statements that [Walker] could only walk for one hour before
   need[ing] a 15-20-minute rest” (i.e., approximately 5 ⅓ hours of walking in a
   day), yet also concluding Walker could stand or walk up to six hours a day.
   Walker argues that after a proper analysis, the ALJ would have “recognized
   and addressed” these “internal inconsistencies” and reduced Walker to “no
   more than sedentary level work.” Ultimately, Walker asserts these errors
   prejudiced him.
          We disagree and conclude that any error by the ALJ in considering
   Kossman’s and Bass’s medical opinions was harmless. The ALJ noted that
   she found both opinions “adequately explained and supported with objective
   evidence in the record,” including Walker’s full range of motion, muscle
   strength, and normal sensation and strength, all of which shows the ALJ
   considered the opinions.         Walker does not outline how further
   “supportability” and “consistency” analysis would lead the ALJ to a
   different outcome, and thus fails to show prejudice. The ALJ considered all
   three evaluations at length in her decision.
                                        III.
          In determining that Walker was not disabled under the Social Security
   Act, the ALJ considered the evaluations of Drs. Callaghan, Kossman, and
   Bass, and she found Kossman’s and Bass’s medical opinions persuasive. She
   found Callaghan’s differing conclusions unpersuasive. Substantial evidence
   supports her determination. Even if the ALJ did not adequately articulate
   her reasoning using the “supportability” and “consistency” factors, any
   error was harmless because Walker fails to show that had she more fully done

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   so, she would have arrived at a different conclusion. Ultimately, Walker asks
   us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Garcia, 880 F.3d at 704.
         The district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner’s
   determination is
                                                                AFFIRMED.

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