Court Opinion

ID: 9572247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:40:04.09872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:08.869870
License: Public Domain

Rees, J.:
I concur. However, I wish to express an additional reason for the result reached. This other reason was not addressed by the parties on appeal.
*247This litigation arises out of an accident on October 15, 1974.
The exclusive remedy language of K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 44-501 has remained unchanged since 1967. It concerns the employer’s liability for injury.
With the exception of immaterial amendments, our comparative negligence statute, K.S.A. 60-258a, was enacted effective July 1,1974. It concerns causal negligence. I take this to mean what it says, causal negligence without distinction as to degree or kind. My present view is that the right of a party guilty of passive negligence to be indemnified by a party guilty of active negligence has been abrogated by the statutory adoption of comparative negligence. Although it may, it does not necessarily follow that there has been abrogation of the right of indemnity in instances of vicarious liability and other instances not involving, obviously, express contract or agreement.
As stated in the majority opinion, K.S.A. (now 1977 Supp.) 44-501 bars recovery in indemnity by Noble against Chemico upon proof of active negligence on the part of Chemico and passive negligence on the part of Noble. Beyond its responsibility for payment of workmen’s compensation benefits and by the language of the statute, Chemico is not liable for the plaintiff’s injury. Application of the active-passive negligence principle to avoid this bar is not available to Noble because that principle has been abrogated.