Court Opinion

ID: 9742327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:10:55.088833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:31.143398
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by Judge Hoffman but for radically different reasons.1
The obstacle to unanimity in our reasoning stems from what Judge Garrard has labeled “statutory overlap”. It exists between the reckless homicide statute, IC 1976, 35-42-1-5 (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.) (amended 1980), and the recklessness statute, IC 1976, 35-42-2-2 (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.) (amended 1981). Reckless homicide consists of the reckless killing of another person. Recklessness, under section (b) of IC 35-42-2-2, consists of the reckless infliction of “serious bodily injury” upon another person. The “statutory overlap” arises from the definition of “serious bodily injury,” which is defined by statute as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death. . . . ” IC 1976, 35-41-1-2 (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.). Since “serious bodily injury” includes bodily injury that causes death, Judge Hoffman and Judge Garrard presume that IC 35-42-2-2(b) and IC 35-42-1-5 proscribe the same conduct, i. e., the reckless infliction of death. From that presumption, they both conclude that Comer was entitled to have had the trial court give her recklessness instructions. Judge Hoffman treats the trial court’s failure to give the instructions as harmless error in light of Comer’s failure to tender the so-ealled definitional instructions; Judge Garrard treats the failure to give the instructions as reversible error. My reason for concurring in result does not embrace harmless error or reversible error. I subscribe to neither position.
This case does not present the traditional lesser included offense issue that this Court has reviewed on several occasions. The context in which this issue usually arises involves a defendant-appellant arguing that a particular offense on which the jury was not instructed constitutes a lesser included offense of the offense alleged in the charging instrument, and an instruction upon that offense was rejected erroneously. In such cases, this Court has resolved the issue by applying the two-step methodology developed in Roddy v. State (1979), Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 1098, and adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court in Easley v. State (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 435, Humes v. State (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 379, and Swafford v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 596. The first step involves determining whether the lesser offense is “included.” Once it is determined that the lesser offense is included, the inquiry then focuses upon the element that distinguishes the lesser included offense from the greater offense. The evidence relating to the distinguishing element must be examined to determine if that element is in factual dispute. If the evidence *57adduced at trial controverts the existence of the distinguishing element, then a properly tendered instruction on the lesser included offense must be given. If no factual dispute exists on that element, then the tendered instruction must be rejected.
The Roddy methodology may be applied only to criminal statutes that have a “greater-lesser” relationship. When statutes “overlap,” i. e., the statutes consist of the same material elements, a “greater-lesser” relationship does not exist. There can be no distinguishing element to which step two of the Roddy methodology may be applied when the statutes consist of the same material elements. Thus, reliance upon Roddy, supra, offers no relief when “overlapping” statutes are in issue.
It is evident that the legislature contemplated the existence of “overlapping” statutes. The legislature declared such statutes to have an “included offense” relationship to each other by defining “included offense” as an offense that “is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged....” IC 1976, 35-41-1-2 (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.). See, Roddy, supra, 394 N.E.2d at 1105, n. 11, and at 1109, at n. 22. However, that statute merely defines “included offense” and does not state when an instruction upon an “included offense” must be given. The legislature apparently intended the resolution of that legal issue to be made by the judiciary. Roddy, supra, and the Supreme Court cases following Roddy, supra, represent a judicial response to the situation when the offense charged and the “included offense” have a “greater-lesser” relationship. When the “included offense” consists of “the same material elements” as the offense charged, Indiana courts have not ruled upon the propriety of giving an instruction upon the “included offense.”
The resolution of this issue of first impression lies in the rationale supporting the law requiring the giving of instructions upon lesser included offenses. Instructions upon lesser included offenses are directed toward having a criminal defendant convicted of no offense greater than that which the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Roddy methodology, if the evidence relating to the element that distinguishes the greater offense from the lesser offense is controverted, then the jury is vested with the authority to resolve this evidentiary dispute. For the jury to execute its function, it must be properly instructed upon the relevant lesser included offense(s). Thus, it is apparent that the giving of instructions upon lesser included offenses is predicated upon the deep-rooted belief that a criminal defendant, if convicted of an offense, should not be convicted for any offense greater than can be proven by the State.
When a case involves a “statutory overlap,” an evidentiary dispute will not arise. The defendant either committed both offenses or he did not. The grey area that exists between a greater offense and a lesser offense does not exist between “overlapping” statutes. The only difference that may exist is the degree of punishment proscribed under the statutes. If the legislature enacted (wittingly or unwittingly) two statutes that proscribe the same conduct but prescribe different punishments, then, as Judge Hoffman observes in his opinion, the prosecutor is vested with the discretion to select the statute under which a defendant will be prosecuted. See, United States v. Batchelder (1979), 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755. Prosecution under the statute providing the greater punishment is constitutionally permissible so long as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications. Batchelder, supra. As noted previously in this opinion, the reason for giving an instruction upon a lesser included offense is to ensure that a criminal defendant is not convicted of an offense which the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. When a “statutory overlap” exists, there is no danger that a defendant will be convicted of a greater offense because a greater offense does not exist. The law on lesser included offenses is directed toward *58evidentiary disputes, not disputes over prescribed punishments. If a criminal defendant is entitled as a matter of law to have the jury instructed on an “included offense” that consists of the “same material elements” as the offense charged, the defendant will then be empowered to select the scheme of punishment. This entitlement would clearly negate the prosecutorial discretion that the United States Supreme Court found constitutional in Batchelder, supra. As the Court observed in that case:
“Just as a defendant has no constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution neither is he entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he will be sentenced. . . . ”
442 U.S. at 125, 99 S.Ct. at 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d at 766. By requesting an instruction upon an “overlapping” offense, a defendant is not offering a “theory of the case” to rebut that of the state. If a theory of defense was being asserted, and some evidence supported that theory, then a defendant would be entitled to an instruction. See, Johnson v. State (1981), Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d at 97. But, here, the defendant is not asserting a theory of defense, she is merely seeking a lesser punishment. Thus, the defendant should not be entitled to the giving of an instruction upon an “included offense” that consists of the “same material elements” as the offense charged when the request for the instruction is motivated solely to select the penalty scheme under which she will be sentenced.
For the reasons stated above, I concur in the result reached in Judge Hoffman’s opinion.

. I concur in the resolution of the issue involving Comer’s contention of prosecutorial misconduct. I also concur in the conclusion that battery is not a lesser included offense of reek-less homicide, thus affirming the trial court’s refusal to give the battery instruction tendered by Comer.