Court Opinion

ID: 9949302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 13:09:50.972397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:53.747452
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mark Ivory,                                     :
                              Petitioner        :
                                                :
              v.                                :    No. 1380 C.D. 2022
                                                :    SUBMITTED: February 6, 2024
Pennsylvania Parole Board,                      :
                        Respondent              :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER                                             FILED: March 11, 2024

               Petitioner, inmate Mark Ivory, petitions for review from the
Pennsylvania Parole Board’s denial of his request for administrative relief.
Petitioner’s counsel, Victoria Hermann, Esquire, has filed both a renewed
application to withdraw as counsel and a Turner letter.1 After review, we grant
counsel’s renewed application and affirm the Board’s order.2 In addition, we dismiss
as moot Petitioner’s Motion for Change of Appointed Counsel.

    1
       See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988). Counsel files such a letter when
seeking to withdraw from representing a parole violator on the grounds that the violator’s case
lacks merit. These no-merit letters go by many names, including “Turner letters.” In these letters,
counsel must detail the nature and extent of counsel’s review and list the discrete issues that the
petitioner wishes to raise, with counsel’s reasons why those issues lack merit.
    2
      This Court denied counsel’s January 3, 2023 application to withdraw as counsel without
prejudice, affording counsel 30 days to file either an amended application, along with an adequate
Turner letter, or submit a brief on the merits of Petitioner’s petition for review and the claims
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                The pertinent background of this matter, as summarized from Ivory
 v. Pennsylvania Parole Board (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1380 C.D. 2022, filed Nov. 17,
 2023) (Ivory I), is as follows. In February 2013, Petitioner received a sentence of
 4 to 15 years of incarceration following convictions for possession of a controlled
 substance with intent to deliver and conspiracy to commit these crimes.3 See
 Certified Record (C.R.) at 1, 3. After receiving credit for pre-sentence
 incarceration, his minimum and maximum sentence dates on the original sentences
 were December 1, 2015, and December 1, 2026, respectively. See id. at 1. On
 March 5, 2019, Petitioner was released on parole from the original sentences. See
 id. at 4.
                On December 11, 2019, the Board issued a Warrant to Commit and
 Detain based on Petitioner’s multiple technical parole violations. See C.R. at 15.
 On December 24, 2019, Petitioner was recommitted to serve six months as a
 technical parole violator (TPV) with automatic reparole on June 11, 2020. See id.
 at 18-22.

               Following Petitioner’s reparole, on January 13, 2021, the Board issued
a second Warrant to Commit and Detain based on his arrest on new drug charges.
See C.R. at 25-27. On September 17, 2021, he was convicted of the new drug
charges and sentenced to 30 to 60 months of incarceration. See id. at 27. By decision
dated October 14, 2021, the Board ordered him to serve 36 months’ backtime as a
convicted parole violator (CPV). See id. at 67-70. The October 2021 Board decision

raised in his brief. Ivory v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1380 C.D. 2022, filed Nov. 17, 2023)
(Ivory I).
    3
       Petitioner’s conspiracy sentence was to be served concurrently to the possession with intent
to deliver sentence. See Certified Record (C.R.) at 1.

                                                2
also noted that the recommitment was ordered pending the resolution of separate new
charges in Blair County. See id. at 67.
             Ultimately, by separate Board Decision recorded June 9, 2022, the
Board denied Petitioner credit for time spent at liberty on parole due to the similarity
between his original Pennsylvania conviction and the new conviction. See C.R. at
71. The June 2022 Board Decision further noted his intervening conviction for the
Blair County charges but determined that no further action would be taken as to that
conviction. See id. at 71. Petitioner filed a pro se administrative appeal seeking to
have the Board reconsider his recalculated maximum sentence and its decision not
to award him credit for time spent at liberty on parole. See id. at 57-67. He argued
that the Board lacked the authority to deny him credit for time spent at liberty on
parole where the October 2021 Board decision had not denied such credit and
where the June 2022 Board Decision indicated that no further action would be
taken as to the Blair County conviction. See id. at 79, 81-82.
              By letter mailed November 16, 2022, the Board denied Petitioner’s
 administrative appeal. See C.R. at 70-71. Later, in affirming the October 2021
 Board decision and June 2022 Board decision, the Board explained:

              [Petitioner’s] administrative appeal . . . seeks relief from
              the 36-month recommitment term. The [October 2021
              Board Decision] recommitted [him] to serve 36 months
              for the offense of Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession
              with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver Heroin (F[elony])
              ([]PWID[]) which carries a presumptive range of 24 to
              36 months, as outlined in 37 Pa. Code §§ 75.1-75.2.
              Because the 36-month term falls within that range, it is
              . . . not subject to challenge. Smith v. [Pa. Bd.] of Prob[.
              &] Parole, 574 A.2d 558 (Pa. 1990)[.]

                                           3
             [I]n the pro se administrative remedies form received on
             July 18, 2022 (postmarked 7/14/2022), [Petitioner]
             claims the Board erred in denying him credit for the time
             spent at liberty on parole. The decision on whether to
             grant or deny a CPV credit for time at liberty on parole is
             purely a matter of discretion. [Section 6138(a)(2.1) of]
             [t]he Prisons and Parole Code authorizes the Board to
             grant or deny credit for time at liberty on parole for
             certain criminal offenses. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1).
             Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pittman v.
             [Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 159 A.3d
             466, 474 (Pa. 2017)], the Board must articulate the basis
             for its decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time
             spent at liberty on parole. In this case, the Board
             articulated that [Petitioner] was denied such credit
             because his new conviction was the same or similar in
             nature to his original crimes. Considering that he was
             on parole for PWID and Criminal Conspiracy to
             Commit PWID[] and that he suffered a new conviction
             for PWID, the reason provided is sufficient and
             supported by the record.

C.R. at 84-85.
            On December 15, 2022, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely
Petition for Review with this Court. On January 3, 2023, counsel filed a Turner
letter and an application to withdraw as counsel with this Court.       Thereafter, on
March 17, 2023, the Court executed an order informing Petitioner that he could
either obtain substitute counsel at his own expense to file a brief on his behalf, or he
could file a pro se brief on his own behalf within 30 days of the service of the order.
On March 17, 2023, Petitioner filed a Motion for Change of Appointed Counsel.
On March 24, 2023, he filed a brief arguing that counsel misconstrued his
arguments and/or confused them with the arguments of another client, that he was
entitled to credit for time spent at liberty on parole, and that counsel provided

                                          4
 ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 8, 2023, the Court entered an order
 directing that Petitioner’s Motion for Change of Appointed Counsel be decided
 with the application to withdraw as counsel.

              Subsequently, the Court denied counsel’s January 2023 application to
withdraw as counsel without prejudice and directed her within 30 days of the
November 17, 2023 order to file either a renewed application, along with an adequate
Turner letter, or submit a brief on the merits of the Petition for Review and the issues
raised in Petitioner’s March 2023 brief. In December 2023, counsel filed both a
renewed application and a Turner letter.

              In the Turner letter, counsel identified the following issues for this
 Court’s review: first, that the Board unlawfully recommitted Petitioner for 36
 months and denied him credit for time spent at liberty on parole after he previously
 had been granted that time; and second, that the Board could not take further action
 on his recommitment because it already stated that no further action would be taken
 in a previous decision. Dec. 7, 2023 Turner letter at 1. In his brief, Petitioner states
 that he has not received credit for time spent in custody awaiting trial on the new
 convictions.4 See Mar. 27, 2023 Petitioner’s Br. at 2. He also argues that the Board

    4
      The Board determined that the January 2022 administrative remedies form filed by Anthony
Kattouf, Esq., Offender’s/Petitioner’s Attorney (C.R. at 77), asserting that Petitioner was not
granted credit for time served and seeking relief from the October 2021 Board Decision was filed
past the 30-day deadline. Accordingly, the Board determined that the request for relief was not
properly before the Board and could not be accepted. Nov. 16, 2022 Response to Administrative
Remedies and Correspondence at 1; C.R. at 84. Consequently, Petitioner’s challenge to time spent
in custody is not properly before us.

                                               5
 erred by revoking a previously awarded street time credit, referencing the Board’s
 statement that no further action would be taken. See id. at 3-4.5
               Before this Court can consider the merits of the petition for review, we
must first address counsel’s renewed application to withdraw as counsel and
determine whether she has satisfied the requirements that appointed counsel must
meet before leave to withdraw may be granted. Seilhamer v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 996 A.2d 40, 42-44 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In that regard, the following is well
established:

               A court-appointed counsel who seeks to withdraw
               representation because issues raised by the petitioner are
               frivolous must fulfill the following technical
               requirements: (1) [s]he must notify [the] parolee of [the]
               request to withdraw; (2) [s]he must furnish [the] parolee
               with a copy of an Anders [v. California, 386 U.S. 738
               (1967),] brief or no-merit letter; and (3) [s]he must advise
               [the] parolee of his right to retain new counsel or raise any
               new points that he might deem worthy of consideration.

Banks v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 827 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)
(footnote omitted). Further, “[c]ounsel’s brief or no-merit letter must set forth: (1)
the nature and extent of h[er] review of the case; (2) the issues the parolee wishes to
raise on appeal; and (3) counsel’s analysis concluding that the appeal has no merit
and is frivolous.” Encarnacion v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 990 A.2d 123, 126
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citations omitted). Where, as here, there is no constitutional

    5
      Petitioner further avers that counsel argued claims that he did not wish to raise and otherwise
confused his case with the case of some other client and that, therefore, counsel’s representation
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Petitioner’s Br. at 1-2, 4-5. We addressed this
averment in denying counsel’s January 2023 application to withdraw and cited it as support for
the notion that she may have inadequately reviewed the matter. Ivory I, slip op. at 8 n.13. Because
we ultimately conclude that counsel’s renewed application satisfies the requirements that must be
met before leave to withdraw may be granted, this averment is now moot.

                                                 6
right to counsel, counsel may satisfy his or her obligations by filing a no-merit letter
and the standard is whether the claims on appeal are without merit. Seilhamer, 996
A.2d at 42 n.4.

             Upon review of counsel’s renewed application and Turner letter, we are
 satisfied that counsel met both the procedural and substantive requirements
 necessary to withdraw. With regard to the procedural requirements, counsel: (1)
 notified Petitioner of her request to withdraw as appointed counsel; (2) furnished
 Petitioner with a copy of her application to withdraw and no-merit letter in support
 of that application; and (3) advised Petitioner of the right to retain new counsel, to
 proceed pro se, and to raise any additional issues that Petitioner deems worthy of
 review by this Court. Further, in her no-merit letter, counsel set forth: (1) the nature
 of her review of the case; (2) the issues that Petitioner sought to raise in his petition
 for review; and (3) an explanation as to why counsel believes that each issue is
 without merit. Counsel specifically addressed Petitioner’s arguments concerning
 his challenges to the Board’s authority to recommit him for 36 months as a CPV
 and deny him credit for time spent at liberty on parole as well as to take further
 action on his recommitment because it had already stated “no further action will be
 taken.” Counsel concluded that Petitioner’s arguments were without merit. We
 turn to the merits of the Petition for Review.
             Petitioner maintains that the Board lacked authority to recommit him
for 36 months. However, the Board has authority to extend a maximum sentence
date beyond that imposed by the sentencing court pursuant to Section 6138(a) of the
Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a). If a parolee commits a crime while on parole
and is convicted “at any time thereafter,” he may be recommitted as a CPV. Id. As
we explained in Miskovitch v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 77 A.3d

                                            7
66, 74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), “[i]t is well-settled law that the Board retains jurisdiction
to recommit an individual as a parole violator[, and thus recalculate his maximum
sentence date,] after the expiration of the maximum term, so long as the crimes that
lead to the conviction occurred while the individual [was] on parole.” In addition,
Petitioner’s offense carries a presumptive range of 24 to 36 months. 37 Pa. Code §§
75.1-75.2. The recommitment term of 36 months falls within that range and,
accordingly, is not subject to challenge. Smith, 574 A.2d at 560.
             Petitioner also argues that the Board erred by failing to give him credit
for time spent at liberty on parole where the October 2021 Board decision had not
denied such credit and where the June 2022 Board decision indicated that no
further action would be taken as to the Blair County conviction. As counsel stated
in her Turner letter, however, the “statement [that no further action would be taken]
was based on [Petitioner’s] technical violations and was [made] before [his]
conviction[.]” Turner Letter at 2. Pursuant to Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole
Code, the Board in its discretion is authorized to grant or deny a CPV credit for time
spent at liberty on parole for certain criminal offenses if it provides a sufficient
reason for doing so. Pittman, 159 A.3d at 474. Here, the Board denied such credit
because Petitioner’s new conviction for which his parole was revoked was the same
or similar in nature to his original crimes, for which he was on parole. This
explanation is sufficient for denying a CPV credit for street time. Barnes v. Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole, 203 A.3d 382, 391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Thus, we cannot find
that the Board abused its discretion in denying credit for time spent at liberty on
parole.

                                           8
            Accordingly, we grant counsel’s renewed application to withdraw as
counsel and affirm the Board’s order. In addition, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s
Motion for Change of Appointed Counsel.

                                     _____________________________________
                                     BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                     President Judge Emerita

                                        9
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mark Ivory,                               :
                          Petitioner      :
                                          :
          v.                              :   No. 1380 C.D. 2022
                                          :
Pennsylvania Parole Board,                :
                        Respondent        :

                                       ORDER

              AND NOW, this 11th day of March, 2024, Victoria Hermann, Esquire’s
renewed application to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED and the order of the
Pennsylvania Parole Board is AFFIRMED. Petitioner’s Motion for Change of
Appointed Counsel is DISMISSED as moot.

                                        _____________________________________
                                        BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                        President Judge Emerita