Court Opinion

ID: 9575987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:19:21.542667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:58.523613
License: Public Domain

McDonald, J.
(dissenting). I would find it unnecessary to address the interpretation and application of the ordinance at issue because the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the instant suit. This Court need not review an issue upon which the party has no standing to contest. Grace Petroleum *12Corp v Public Service Comm, 178 Mich App 309; 443 NW2d 790 (1989).
Generally our review is limited to issues and arguments decided below and raised and argued on appeal. Allen v Keating, 205 Mich App 560; 517 NW2d 830 (1994); People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Although the township failed to raise the standing issue in its brief on appeal, the issue was raised and addressed by the lower court by way of the township’s motion for summary disposition based on plaintiffs’ lack of standing.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges defendant LCS Homes, Inc.’s actions violate a township zoning ordinance and thereby create a public nuisance. Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing to bring suit to "vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where he is not hurt in any manner differently than the citizenry at large.” Alexander v Norton Shores, 106 Mich App 287, 288; 307 NW2d 476 (1981). Plaintiffs neither pleaded nor proved by way of affidavit or other documentary evidence that they suffered injuries distinct from any injuries suffered by the general public. Towne v Harr, 185 Mich App 230; 460 NW2d 596 (1990). When challenging a zoning ordinance as being unreasonable, the aggrieved party must show that (1) there is no reasonable governmental interest being furthered by the present zoning classification of the aggrieved party’s property or (2) the ordinance in question is unreasonable because it permits an arbitrary, capricious, and unfounded exclusion of the aggrieved party’s property from other types of legitimate land use. Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139; 215 NW2d 179 (1974). Thus, our Supreme Court has conferred standing on only the person whose property is directly affected by the zoning determination.
*13The majority holds plaintiffs would have standing under our Supreme Court’s ruling in D‘Agostini v Roseville, 396 Mich 185; 240 NW2d 252 (1976). Their reliance is misplaced because the Court held that only owners of immediately adjoining property who were possessed of rights that would be adversely affected by the litigation and whose interest in the action far exceeded that of the general public or other owners in the area would have the right to intervene or have standing to intervene. Plaintiffs failed to show any of these prerequisites. Consequently plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action to abate the alleged nuisance.
Although I was able to decipher from plaintiffs’ complaint their theory of nuisance against defendant LCS, the nature as well as the legal basis of their claim against defendant township remains unclear. Plaintiffs infer any concerned citizen has a right to bring an action against a governmental entity or official when the entity or official is perceived to be neglecting or negligently performing its duties. Plaintiffs have failed to provide any valid authority to support such a proposition nor do I believe any exists. If such actions were permitted, well-meaning, and perhaps some not-so-well-meaning citizens, would be flocking to the courts, causing all levels of government to incur endless attorney fees and to risk eventual bankruptcy. Rather, precedent indicates a reluctance to create liability with regard to the functioning of local government. In Randall v Delta Charter Twp, 121 Mich App 26, 32; 328 NW2d 562 (1982), this Court in finding a township immune from suit for allegedly failing to abate a zoning violation stated:
[W]e find that decisions of a planning commission, or other similar local agency, concerning *14whether to enforce zoning ordinances are decisions which are so basic to the operation of a municipality that any attempt to create liability with respect thereto would constitute "an unacceptable interference with [the municipality’s] ability to govern.”
In summary, plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for abatement of the alleged nuisance where they failed to demonstrate "special damages” unique to them rather than the general public and they failed to set forth a valid claim against the township independent of the nuisance claim.
The majority’s decision on the merits imposes an interpretation of the ordinance which is contrary to that given by the township, which, if enforced, may ultimately subject the township to further litigation as being in violation of the Subdivision Control Act. Although the majority opinion states its ruling does not contravene that act, it fails to state any basis for such a conclusion. Such an issue should not be decided until properly aligned parties with justiciable interests have litigated the issue in a lower court and have presented it on appeal in this Court.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court and dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint.