Court Opinion

ID: 9375047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 19:00:21.386501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:55.389169
License: Public Domain

DLD-083                                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                  ___________

                                       No. 22-3216
                                       ___________

                               IN RE: KAI D. INGRAM,
                                                 Petitioner
                        ____________________________________

                      On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
           United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                      (Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:22-cv-00042)
                       ____________________________________

                       Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
                                     February 2, 2023

              Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed February 24, 2023)
                                        _________

                                        OPINION*
                                        _________

PER CURIAM

       Kai Ingram petitions pro se for a writ of mandamus in connection with his civil

rights action that is pending before the United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition in part

and deny it in part.

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
                                              I.

       In early 2022, Ingram filed a pro se civil rights complaint in the District Court

against a host of defendants. The defendants later moved to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In July 2022, the District Court

received Ingram’s opposition to that motion and his notification that he wished to have

his case assigned to a District Judge (as opposed to consenting to have the case decided

by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)).

       In November 2022, we received from Ingram a pro se mandamus petition asking

us to direct the District Court to assign his civil rights case to a District Judge and have

that judge rule on the motion to dismiss. 1 About a week later, the District Court’s docket

was updated to reflect that Ingram’s civil rights case has indeed been assigned to a

District Judge. The motion to dismiss remains pending.

                                              II.

       We will dismiss Ingram’s mandamus petition as moot to the extent that it asks us

to direct the District Court to assign his case to a District Judge. See Blanciak v.

Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur

during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome

of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be

dismissed as moot.”). And we will otherwise deny Ingram’s mandamus petition, for he

1
 When Ingram submitted his mandamus petition, he did not pay the filing fee for this
petition or move to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). He eventually submitted a
compliant IFP motion, which the Clerk of this Court granted on January 23, 2023.
                                              2
has failed to show that he is entitled to mandamus relief. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558

U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (explaining that, to obtain a writ of mandamus, a

petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he

desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the

writ is appropriate under the circumstances” (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Although a writ of mandamus may issue when a district court’s “undue

delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74,

79 (3d Cir. 1996), we cannot conclude at this juncture that those circumstances are

present here, cf. id. (concluding that mandamus relief was not warranted in a habeas case

where the petitioner’s most recent filing had been pending before the district court for

about eight months). We trust that the District Judge will rule on the pending motion to

dismiss without undue delay.

       To the extent that Ingram’s mandamus petition seeks an order compelling the

recusal of the Magistrate Judge who has entered certain non-dispositive orders in

Ingram’s case pursuant to her authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), we see no need for

such an order in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (setting forth standards of recusal).

Lastly, to the extent that Ingram’s petition discusses issues related to his appeal in

another case, those issues are not properly before us here.

       In view of the above, we will dismiss Ingram’s mandamus petition in part and

deny it in part.

                                               3