Court Opinion

ID: 9463502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:09:06.793193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:09.280064
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
Our court has unequivocally held that it is constitutionally impermissible for the prosecution to use against an accused his pretrial silence, maintained in the exercise of his privilege against incrimination, unless the accused waives that privilege by offering “any testimony as to the contents of any conversation” at the relevant time in question. Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 55 (9th Cir. 1969). The present case is controlled by Fowle. Accordingly, Helina’s conviction should be reversed if the District Court erroneously allowed the prosecution to question witnesses regarding théir “lack of access” to Helina’s records.
With all due respect, I submit that the first exchange, found in footnote six of the majority’s opinion, did, without question, involve a prejudicial comment upon Helina’s privileged refusal to supply his personal records. United States v. Grammer, 513 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cited by the majority as support for its proposition that the first colloquy did not involve a comment on the exercise of Helina’s fifth amendment privilege, is inapposite. In Grammer, the prosecutor remarked during closing argu*721ment that the defendant’s failure to call an expert witness left the testimony of a Government’s witness uncontradicted. The court held that this remark “in no way commented upon the defendant’s failure to testify.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, Grammer differs obviously and materially from the case now under review. Here, it is clear that the interchange with Agent Huntsman was intended for the jury to appreciate that the defendant had not authorized access to his personal records.
The majority attempts to bolster its conclusion that this interchange did not involve an impermissible “comment” by emphasizing defense counsel’s failure to record a specific objection. The majority’s perspective ignores the context of the colloquy and, in effect, converts Helina’s constitutional privilege of silence to a meaningless technicality. While it is true that Helina’s counsel did not object every time the prosecution improperly raised the issue of Helina’s refusal to supply his records, the significant point is the very fact that the defense attorney had made a motion in limine, prior to the impaneling of the jury, requesting the exclusion of all evidence concerning Helina’s invocation of his fifth amendment right. Following the jurors’ selection, defense counsel reiterated his motion in open court (out of the presence of the jury), thereby evidencing an undeniable intent that the motion would serve as a continuing objection throughout the trial.1 (Tr. 58).
Thereafter, at a hearing in the midst of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s request that he be permitted to elicit testimony from government witnesses in respect to their “lack of access” to Helina’s records. Helina’s attorney remarked:
“My reaction is exactly the same as it was yesterday when Your Honor made the ruling [that the prosecution could not introduce evidence of Helina’s silence in its case-in-chief], I think essentially this is just a back door attempt to do the same thing.” (Tr. 116).
When the trial judge later stated that he did not “see any constitutional problem” (Tr. 119), defense counsel further responded:
“ . . . [I]t’s just cumulative and getting into an area that is very dangerous and for him [the special IRS agent] to go back and rehash essentially what Mr. Marx already testified to as to why the net worth method is used is again just essentially a subtle back door method of getting the facts in that for some reason or another, the special agent didn’t have the books and records.” (Tr. 119-20).
The court then ruled that the prosecution’s witnesses would be allowed to testify concerning their inability to review Helina’s records.
It was following this hearing that the colloquy between the prosecutor and Agent Huntsman occurred. I simply cannot agree that the significance of this interchange is dissipated because defense counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection. Only shortly before Agent Huntsman testified, Helina’s counsel had expressed to the judge his specific objection to the admission of such evidence. The judge nevertheless decided to admit it. In light of the defense attorney’s motion in limine and his objection to the .particular line of questioning that the prosecutor ultimately pursued with Agent Huntsman, it is, in my view, manifestly unreasonable and unfair to hold that this colloquy did not give rise to a prejudicial comment of the most flagrant character.
Because we are here concerned with one of the most basic and substantial rights enjoyed by all citizens of this country, we should, I think, have a duty to look a little beyond procedural irregularities. Our court has never thought itself to be inextricably constrained by the failure of counsel always *722to raise an objection at a precise time. When we find plain error affecting substantial rights, we may, should, and often do consider the issue even though no objection whatsoever has been made, either during a trial or even on the appeal. Beadnell v. United States, 303 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1962). As I see it, the trial court’s ruling in this case, allowing the prosecutor to raise the question of the agent’s access to Helina’s records, is pivotal. Under our decision in Fowle, supra, this ruling was egregious error, error of constitutional dimension. Surely, it cannot be held that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
I would reverse.

. In Helina’s motion for a new trial, his defense counsel again emphasized the view, which I think correct, that the motion in limine served as a continuing objection, making it unnecessary for him to object time after time, repeatedly reasserting Helina’s privilege against self-incrimination. See footnote 9 supra.