Court Opinion

ID: 9365285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-23 17:07:42.94713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:44.401491
License: Public Domain

J-S39043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LAMARCUS EUGENE DRAYTON                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 229 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 12, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0002609-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED JANUARY 23, 2023

        Appellant Lamarcus Eugene Drayton appeals from the order denying his

timely first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant argues that

his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call potential

witnesses and for failing to object to written jury instructions given to the jury

during its deliberations. We affirm.

        The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. See

PCRA Ct. Op. & Order, 1/12/22, at 2-4. Briefly, Appellant was arrested in

2016 based on allegations that he sexually abused his minor nephew, M.B.

On March 15, 2016, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the following

offenses: two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person

less than 16 years of age, and one count each of unlawful contact with a

____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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minor—sexual offenses, indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of

age, and corruption of minors.2

       At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence from M.B. establishing

that Appellant had sexually abused M.B. on multiple occasions over the course

of several years at different homes in Harrisburg where different members of

M.B.’s family resided.       Specifically, the jury heard testimony about abuse

taking place at houses on 6th Street, 16th Street, Emerald Avenue, Curtin

Street, and Peffer Street.

       Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty on all charges. On August

20, 2018, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of ten to twenty

years’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ probation.       Appellant filed a

timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. On direct appeal,

this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth

v. Drayton, 1742 MDA 2018, 2020 WL 886050 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 24,

2020) (unpublished mem.). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of

appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

       On March 24, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, counseled, first PCRA

petition. Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition on March 29, 2021. The

PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on August 24, 2021, hearing testimony

from Kevin Drayton, Elvira “Denise” Drayton, Anna Carroll, and Appellant’s

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), and 6301(a)(1)(i),
respectively.

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trial counsel, Jonathan Crisp, Esq. In an opinion and order entered on January

12, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.

        Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on February 7,

2022.    Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with the mandates of

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues for our review:

        1. Did the [PCRA] court err and abuse its discretion in denying
           Appellant’s PCRA [petition] given trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
           for failing to call potential witnesses?

        2. Did the [PCRA] court err and abuse its discretion in denying
           Appellant’s PCRA [petition] given trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
           for failing to object to written jury instructions being sent back
           with the jury during deliberations?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (formatting altered).

        In his first issue, Appellant contends that Attorney Crisp was ineffective

for failing to call certain fact witnesses to testify on Appellant’s behalf. Id. at

11.   Specifically, Appellant argues that Attorney Crisp should have called

Appellant’s parents, Kevin Drayton (Mr. Drayton) and Elvira “Denise” Drayton

(Mrs. Drayton), and Appellant’s older sister, Anna Carroll (Ms. Carroll), as all

three witnesses would have provided the jury with potentially exculpatory

evidence disputing some of M.B.’s claims and testimony.            Id.   Appellant

further claims that Attorney Crisp lacked a reasonable basis to not call these

witnesses because their testimony would have “buttress[ed Appellant’s] own

argument that the allegations were vague and therefore doubtful.” Id. at 13.

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      Our review of the denial of PCRA relief is limited to “whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).         “The PCRA court’s credibility

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court;

however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595

(Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “[t]his Court grants great deference to the

findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those

findings” (citation omitted)).

      When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we are

governed by the following standard:

      [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
      defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
      ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
      the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
      that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
      place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the
      following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;
      (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her
      action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of
      counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
      proceedings would have been different.

      We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the
      factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.
      Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal
      determination.

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      The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
      his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have
      chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen,
      offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
      Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they
      effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight
      analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he
      may have taken.

      Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
      but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
      been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
      to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      When a PCRA petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to call

a witness at trial, the petitioner must plead and prove:

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 16 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted and formatting altered). If a petitioner establishes the elements set

forth in Selenski, he or she must still prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to call the witnesses

at issue. Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 560 (Pa. 2009). “If we

conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable

basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s assistance is deemed effective.”

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Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 645 A.2d 189, 194-95 (Pa. 1994)).

      Here, at the PCRA hearing, Appellant presented testimony from Mr.

Drayton, Mrs. Drayton, Ms. Carroll, and Attorney Crisp. Mr. Drayton stated

that although he was available to testify on Appellant’s behalf, Attorney Crisp

had directed him to remain outside the courtroom during trial. N.T. PCRA

Hr’g, 8/24/21, at 8. Mr. Drayton further testified that he met with Attorney

Crisp prior to trial and discussed, among other things, the layout of his house

on 6th Street in Harrisburg. Id. at 14. During cross-examination, Mr. Drayton

admitted that he never provided law enforcement authorities with any

exculpatory information. Id. at 16. When asked if he spent twenty-four hours

a day, seven days a week with Appellant, Mr. Drayton testified that he would

spend “whole evenings” with Appellant until he graduated from high school.

Id. at 16-17. Mr. Drayton further stated that he kept Appellant involved in

sports and that he “spent a lot of [] time with him.” Id. at 17.

      The PCRA court next heard testimony from Mrs. Drayton, who stated

that the allegations of abuse against Appellant were not possible because he

and M.B. were never in Mrs. Drayton’s home at the same time. Id. at 22. On

cross-examination, Mrs. Drayton admitted that she never reported that

information to authorities. Id. at 23. Mrs. Drayton further admitted that she

was not with Appellant at all times as he was growing up. Id.

      The PCRA court also heard testimony from Appellant’s older sister, Ms.

Carroll. Id. at 24. Ms. Carroll is also the victim’s aunt. Id. at 26. Ms. Carroll

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testified that she lived on 19th Street from 2008 until 2014. Id. at 27. Ms.

Carroll further testified that she did not witness any abuse by Appellant. Id.

at 28.    On cross-examination, Ms. Carroll admitted to not telling law

enforcement authorities that the allegations against Appellant were untrue

and she further conceded that she was not with Appellant twenty-four hours

a day, seven days a week. Id. at 29-30.

      Finally, the PCRA court heard testimony from Attorney Crisp. Attorney

Crisp is a criminal defense attorney with twenty-two years’ experience, which

includes involvement in approximately fifty to sixty cases involving sexually

based offenses against children.    Id. at 32, 36-37.    During his testimony,

Attorney Crisp described his overall trial strategy as follows:

      So my overarching strategy was to attack the imprecision in M.B.’s
      testimony. He changed his story in terms of how things took
      place, he changed his story in terms of number of times that these
      things happened, he couldn’t give any specificity as to when, and
      couldn’t give specificity as to who.

      So it was a very vague, broad-brush allegation, in my opinion, and
      my intent was to attack the vagueness of when, where, and how,
      and so on and so forth.

Id. at 33. Attorney Crisp addressed M.B.’s recantation and explained:

      I certainly thought that M.B.’s recantation was strong. I didn’t put
      on the mother or the father, Mr. [Drayton] or Mrs. Drayton,
      because they couldn’t speak to every single moment in the home
      and I thought that would be a distraction and I didn’t think that
      would be relevant, because then the cross, as I would see the
      government coming after them, would have simply been, you
      can’t say you were there 24 hours a day, and I didn’t want it to
      look like a [H]ail [Mary] desperation pass from the family to come
      in and say that.

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      So I was trying to just keep it strictly to credibility at the time –

Id. at 36.

      With regard to his decision to not call Ms. Carroll as a witness, Attorney

Crisp testified as follows:

      Again, I don’t believe M.B. ever said that [Ms. Carroll] was present
      when these allegations took place. So if M.B. is not saying she
      was there in the home at that time, that would make it sort of
      irrelevant and not specific to the issue.

      And one of those issues – one of the incredible aspects, in my
      opinion, of M.B.’s testimony is this took place while a portion of
      the family was down in South Carolina, and so that would have
      obviously placed the family outside the home and outside the
      state.

      So the fact that [a portion of the family was] not there at that
      point in time would have mooted any testimony as to whether
      they think it happened during that time period.

Id. at 38.

      In its opinion, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      [Appellant] claims that his trial counsel, Jonathan Crisp, Esquire,
      was ineffective for failing to call [Mr. Drayton, Mrs. Drayton, and
      Ms. Carroll] as defense witnesses to establish that [Appellant] did
      not have the opportunity to commit the alleged offenses. We find
      that this claim lacks merit.

      As Attorney Crisp explained in his testimony at the PCRA hearing,
      he chose to build his trial strategy around various inconsistencies,
      recantations, and lack of specificity in the alleged victim’s
      statements in an effort to attack the victim’s credibility.
      Considering this strategy, Attorney Crisp believed that the
      testimony of [Mr. Drayton, Mrs. Drayton, and Ms. Carroll] would
      not add anything of benefit to [Appellant’s] defense and would
      serve as a distraction to the defense’s efforts to discount the
      victim’s credibility, and, therefore, Attorney Crisp chose not to call

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      them to testify. We find that Attorney Crisp had an entirely
      reasonable basis for this decision.

      To the extent the victim was unable to provide specific dates for
      any of the alleged assaults, it would be impossible for [Mr.
      Drayton, Mrs. Drayton, and Ms. Carroll] to serve as alibi
      witnesses, or “lack of opportunity” witnesses. Because they
      obviously were not with [Appellant] every waking moment of his
      life, it would be impossible for them, without specific date
      references, to testify that [Appellant] was not with the victim at
      the time the alleged incidents occurred, and the Commonwealth
      almost certainly would have emphasized this when cross-
      examining the witnesses. If the victim had provided specific
      incident dates, then perhaps [Appellant’s] relatives could have
      provided specific alibis for those dates, but given the lack of
      specific dates, it would have been reasonable for Attorney Crisp
      to believe that the purported testimony would have been largely
      irrelevant and ineffective to [Appellant’s] defense in this matter.
      Consequently, [Appellant] cannot establish that calling [Mr.
      Drayton, Mrs. Drayton, and Ms. Carroll] as witnesses offered a
      potential for success substantially greater than the course
      pursued, and, therefore, trial counsel did not render ineffective
      assistance by failing to call them. In the same vein, for the
      reasons set forth above, [Appellant] also has failed to establish
      that he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision not to call [Mr.
      Drayton, Mrs. Drayton, and Ms. Carroll] as defense witnesses.

PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 9-10.

      Based on our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court’s

conclusions. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44. The record reflects that

Attorney Crisp had a reasonable basis for declining to call Mr. Drayton, Mrs.

Drayton, and Ms. Carroll as witnesses at trial. As noted by the PCRA court,

the Commonwealth did not argue that the abuse at issue took place at a

specific date, time, and place. Rather, M.B. testified that he was abused at

multiple locations over a period of approximately five to six years. N.T. Trial,

5/9/18, at 76, 83, 88, 96. At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Crisp explained that

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because the Commonwealth did not argue that the abuse occurred on a

specific date, that had the potential to render the testimony of Mr. Drayton,

Mrs. Drayton, and Ms. Carroll irrelevant. See N.T. PCRA Hr’g., 8/24/21, at

41. Accordingly, because Appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that Attorney Crisp had no reasonable basis for failing to call those

witnesses at trial, the PCRA court did not err when it denied his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. See Smith, 167 A.3d at 788.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues that Attorney Crisp was ineffective

for failing to object when the trial court provided the jury with written

instructions during deliberations.      Appellant’s Brief at 14.     Specifically,

Appellant claims that “at least two, if not more, prohibited jury instructions

were sent to the jury” which included “at the very least, the jury instructions

for ‘reasonable doubt’ and ‘presumption of innocence[.]’”         Id.   Appellant

argues that because Pa.R.Crim.P. 646 prohibits the court from providing

written instructions to the jury, this constitutes reversible error which entitles

Appellant to a new trial. Id. at 16.

      Rule 646 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a

jury is permitted to “have for use during deliberations written copies of the

portion of the judge’s charge on the elements of the offenses, lesser included

offenses, and any defense upon which the jury has been instructed.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(B).    However, a jury is not permitted to have any other

written jury instructions in its possession during deliberations. Pa.R.Crim.P.

646(C)(4).

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      This Court has explained:

      The underlying reason for excluding certain items from the jury’s
      deliberations is to prevent placing undue emphasis or credibility
      on the material, and de-emphasizing or discrediting other items
      not in the room with the jury. If there is a likelihood the
      importance of the evidence will be skewed, prejudice may be
      found; if not, there is no prejudice per se and the error is
      harmless.

      Therefore, should we find that the trial court erred, such error
      does not constitute prejudice per se. “This inquiry requires us to
      determine whether providing the [item] to the jury was
      prejudicial: ‘If there is a likelihood the importance of the evidence
      will be skewed, prejudice may be found; if not, there is no
      prejudice per se and the error is harmless.’”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 241 A.3d 398, 403-04 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citations omitted and some formatting altered).

      In his brief, Appellant relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Karaffa, 709 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1998). See Appellant’s Brief

at 16. In Karaffa, our Supreme Court considered whether the trial court erred

when it permitted a jury to have written jury instructions on one of the

offenses charged, as well as a written instruction regarding reasonable doubt

during its deliberation.   Karaffa, 709 A.2d at 888.       The Court, citing its

precedent in Commonwealth v. Oleynik, 568 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 1990), held

that sending written jury instructions with a jury for use during deliberations

constituted reversible error. Karaffa, 709 A.2d at 888. The Supreme Court

further held that in an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, there is an

“inherent prejudice” in sending written instructions with a jury for use during

deliberations. Id. at 890; see also Commonwealth v. Young, 767 A.2d

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1072, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2001) (discussing Karaffa and concluding that,

“[b]oth written jury instructions and written confessions are prohibited . . .

from going out with the jury during deliberations” and stating that “[b]oth

types of items should be treated in like manner, as inherently prejudicial if the

rule has been violated, requiring a vacation of the judgment of sentence,

regardless of whether the counsel performed otherwise effectively”).

      At the time that Karaffa and Young were decided, the Rules of Criminal

Procedure did not permit any written material to be in the jury’s possession

when it deliberated aside from “such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper,”

with any transcripts of trial testimony, a written copy of a confession by the

defendant, or a copy of the bill of information being specifically prohibited

from being in a jury’s possession during deliberations.      Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114

(renumbered to Rule 646, April 1, 2001).        In 2010, our Supreme Court

amended Rule 646 to permit trial judges to send written copies of the court’s

charge with a jury including the elements of the offense at issue, lesser

included offenses, and the elements of defenses set forth, if applicable. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(B). As noted above, Rule 646 prohibits a jury from having

any other written instruction in its possession as it deliberates.          See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(C)(4).

      In Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015 (Pa. Super. 2018), an en

banc panel of this Court addressed whether counsel was per se ineffective for

failing to object to a violation of Rule 646. In Postie, the defendant argued

that the trial court violated Rule 646(C)(4) by permitting a copy of the

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defendant’s written statement to go back with the jury during its deliberations.

Id. at 1027-28; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(C)(2).         On appeal, this Court

concluded that even if the trial court violated Rule 646, “counsel’s trial

strategy to allow [the defendant’s] written statement to go out with the jury

during deliberations simply does not fall into one of the limited per se

categories subject to presumed prejudice.” Postie, 200 A.3d at 1030 (citation

omitted). In reaching that conclusion, the Postie Court expressly rejected

the proposition that there was a “per se ineffectiveness standard for a violation

of Rule 646(C) . . . as our courts have presumed prejudice in only the rarest

of circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, because the defendant’s

counsel had a reasonable basis for allowing the statement to be provided to

the jury, the Postie Court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to

relief. Id. at 1030-31.

      In   the   instant   case,    the   PCRA   court   addressed   Appellant’s

ineffectiveness claim as follows:

      As PCRA counsel conceded during his argument at the PCRA
      hearing, [Appellant] is unable to specify any specific deficiencies
      regarding the jury instructions, nor is he able to identify any
      specific objectionable written jury instructions that were sent to
      the jury.     Therefore, [Appellant’s] claims that he suffered
      reversible error because certain inappropriate written jury
      instructions were sent to the jury are merely speculative, and he
      has not satisfied his burden of establishing that he was prejudiced
      by the jury instructions. It thus follows that [Appellant’s] claims
      of trial counsel ineffectiveness, as it pertains to the failure to
      object to the written jury instructions, is meritless as well.

PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 8-9.

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      Following our review of the record, it is clear that the trial court allowed

the jury to review written instructions for reasonable doubt and the

presumption of innocence during deliberations. See N.T. Trial, 5/9/18, at 228.

Rule 646 clearly precludes the jury from considering such materials during

deliberations.     Therefore, because the trial court violated Rule 646, we

conclude that Appellant’s claim has arguable merit.                 See Pa.R.Crim.P.

646(C)(4).

      As noted previously, Appellant appears to argue that Attorney Crisp’s

failure to object to the Rule 646 violation constitutes per se ineffective

assistance of counsel.     Appellant’s Brief at 16.      However, as noted by the

Postie Court, per se ineffectiveness claims are limited to select extraordinary

circumstances. Postie, 200 A.3d at 1030. Indeed, our Supreme Court has

limited ineffective assistance of counsel per se to the following situations:

complete denial of counsel, be it actual or constructive; state interference with

the   assistance    of   counsel;   defense    counsel    failing    to   subject   the

Commonwealth’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; or whether counsel’s

representation is affected by a conflict of interests.         Commonwealth v.

Rosado, 150 A.3d 425, 430 n.7 (Pa. 2016) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-93 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466

U.S. 648, 658-62 (1984); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 (2002)).

      Based on the changes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure since our

Supreme Court announced its decision in Karaffa and the definition of

ineffective assistance of counsel per se set forth in Rosado, we find that

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sending written instructions for presumption of innocence and reasonable

doubt with the jury for its use during deliberations does not rise to the level

of ineffective assistance of counsel per se. Accordingly, Appellant is required

to prove that there was no reasonable basis for counsel’s action or inaction

and that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s error. Commonwealth

v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015); Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44;

see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 18 A.3d 1147, 1154 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      At no point in either his amended PCRA petition or in his brief to this

Court did Appellant reference or provide discussion regarding whether trial

counsel had a reasonable basis for failing to object to the trial court providing

written jury instructions. See Appellant’s Am. PCRA Pet., 3/29/21; Appellant’s

Brief at 14-16.   Because Appellant failed to establish the reasonable basis

prong, his claim fails. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa.

2010) (reiterating that the failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim). Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/23/2023

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