Court Opinion

ID: 9447028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:23:32.570191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:52.389923
License: Public Domain

PRETTYMAN, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result).
I think Smith’s second motion was a “second or successive motion for similar relief” within the meaning of Section 2255. But I join in remanding the case because, although the trial court was not required by the statute to entertain the motion, I think it abused its discretion, in the legal sense of that term, in not entertaining the motion.
Smith’s second motion was based upon a ground (alleged mental incompetence) not theretofore presented or determined. But that ground was not new; it existed at the time of his first motion. And Smith makes no allegation that he was then ignorant of the fact of his incompetence or, if he was aware of it, that he had an excuse for failure to present it in that motion. Therefore, when this ground was presented as the basis for a second motion, that motion was a “second or successive motion for similar relief” and a hearing on it was not required by the statute. To state the matter differently: If a second motion under Section 2255 is based upon a ground (factual or legal) available to, and reasonably deemed to have been known by, the movant at the time of his first motion, and presents no justifiable reason why he was previously unable to assert his rights, the second motion is a “second or successive motion for similar relief” and the court is not required to entertain it. This is the interpretation given in Turner v. United States,1 and I think Turner was correctly decided.
The foregoing interpretation of Section 2255 makes the exemption from required hearing depend upon the grounds presented in a second motion rather than upon the relief sought by the motion. This is a departure from the language of the statute. But the departure is necessary to effectuate the intent of Congress in enacting this remedial statute. The Congress intended a motion under Section 2255 to be as readily available to a sentenced person seeking release from custody as is a petition for habeas corpus under the statute enacted at the same time.2 But, if habeas corpus is readily available upon second or successive petitions while second or successive motions under Section 2255 are not required to be entertained, obviously the procedure provided by the latter section *930would not be a substitute for habeas corpus — not by a great deal. So a second motion under Section 2255 must be held to be as readily available as is a second petition for habeas corpus under Section 2244.
The language of the statute on habeas corpus (Sections 2243 and 2244) is that a hearing is required on a second petition if the petition presents a “new ground not theretofore presented and determined”. It seems to me that my brethren for whom Judge Fahy writes omit the word “new” from their consideration. The habeas corpus statute not only requires that a second petition present a ground “not theretofore presented and determined” but requires that this ground be “new”. The intended meaning of those words is indicated in a “Statement” of the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure.3 That this Statement is pertinent as legislative history is established by Heflin v. United States4 and United States v. Hayman.5 The Statement outlined the necessity and purposes of two bills6 which were the forerunners of Sections 2244 and 2255. Two of the purposes of the bills were (1) “to compel petitioner to state in his petition all of the grounds for the writ then known to him” and (2) “to afford unlimited opportunity to present any grounds which petitioner may thereafter discover at any time”.
“The [first] purpose is self-explanatory and would seem to require no elaboration. Also see Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 [44 S.Ct. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999] (1924).
“The [second] purpose is brought about by allowing presentation of a subsequent petition based upon ‘new’ grounds ‘not theretofore presented and determined.’ ”
The Statement also says:
“Since release is sought from commitment after sentence under a criminal charge, the grounds stated in any of these petitions are necessarily confined to alleged unlawful actions in connection with the indictment, the trial, the sentence or the manner or place of executing the sentence under which petitioner is confined. Since these grounds usually have to do with past happenings, it is very rare that a petitioner does not state, or does not have the knowledge from which he could state, in his first petition all of the grounds he may ever have.” (Emphasis in original.)
The rule universally followed, as I read the authorities,7 is that a court to which a second petition for habeas cor*931pus is presented may take judicial notice of its own records (which include the prior petition) and then has a wide discretion as to granting a hearing. Slightly translated this means that a court is not required to grant a hearing on a second petition for habeas corpus if the record on the prior petition affords a reasonable basis for not holding a hearing. Thus, in Stewart v. Overholser,8 we said, correctly, I think, although by way of dictum, that in criminal cases “the legality of the detention usually may be established with finality in one proceeding. Jurisdiction of the court, conduct of the trial, legality of sentence — ■ these do not change, and having once been determined on adequate hearing are not new grounds when again brought forth in another application for the writ.” 9 That principle of finality when the facts have not changed was the bedrock of the Stewart case and the cases which were its background.
Some of my brethren say Price v. Johnston10 is contrary to what I have just been saying. I think that case does not touch our problem. The sole question there, the Court was emphatic in pointing out, concerned abuse of the writ. We are not here concerned with abuse; we are dealing with a statutory interpretation. Moreover that case arose under the old statute, which required a hearing if the petition on its face indicated possible relief. The only ruling made in the case was that the Government, if it claimed abuse of the writ, must make its allegation clearly, and that thereafter the burden was on the petitioner to negate the allegation.
The history of Sections 2244 and 2255 shows that the words “be required to” were inserted between “shall” and “entertain” in order to allow a judge to exercise his discretion and entertain a meritorious petition which had once been denied. The purpose was not to foreclose review of his action.
It is not necessary for me to repeat my conclusions, already stated in the beginning of this opinion. The reason I think the trial judge “abused his discretion” is that I think, when a person under sentence alleges for the first time in a motion under Section 2255 that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial, and alleges some factual basis for the claim, the allegation is of such a nature that he ought to be given a chance to present, or at least to proffer, his proof; that is, he ought to be granted a hearing on the motion. For the presentation of false statements of fact under oath in such a motion, the perjury statute applies.

. 103 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 258 F.2d 165 (1958).

. 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

. The Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), and the Reviser’s Notes to the Revision of Title 28, U.S.Code, specifically state that the language of Section 2244 is that approved by the Judicial Conference in September, 1947. Rep. of Jud. Conf., U.S., 17, 18 (1947). The proposed statute approved by the Conference in 1947 was, with amendments not here relevant, the same as that approved in 1943 and submitted to Congress with the Statement prepared by Circuit Judge Stone. S. 1452, H.R. 4232, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.

. 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (1959).

. 342 U.S. 205, 214-219, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952).

. S. 1451, S. 1452, H.R. 4232, H.R. 4233, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).

. Slaughter v. Wright, 135 F.2d 613 (4 Cir., 1943); United States ex rel. Karpathiou v. Jordan, 153 F.2d 810 (7 Cir., 1946), certiorari denied 328 U.S. 868, 66 S.Ct. 1372, 90 L.Ed. 1639 (1946); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 44 S.Ct. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999 (1924); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 44 S.Ct. 519, 68 L.Ed. 989 (1924). Accord: United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 156 A.L.R. 240 (2 Cir., 1944), certiorari denied 323 U.S. 790, 65 S.Ct. 313, 89 L.Ed. 630 (1944) ; Jackson v. Gough, 170 F.2d 630 (5 Cir., 1948), certiorari denied 336 U.S. 938, 69 S.Ct. 741, 93 L.Ed. 1097 (1949); *931Garrison v. Johnston, 151 F.2d 1011 (9 Cir., 1945), certiorari denied 328 U.S. 840, 66 S.Ct. 1009, 90 L.Ed. 1615 (1946).

. 87 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 186 F.2d 339 (1950).

. Id. 87 U.S.App.D.C. at page 406, 186 F.2d at page 343.

. 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948).