Court Opinion

ID: 9401286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 17:10:14.975855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.802266
License: Public Domain

J-S35012-22

                                  2023 PA Super 105

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                          Appellant            :
                                               :
                                               :
                     v.                        :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHAEL T. MARTIN, JR.                     :      No. 791 MDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-28-CR-0002065-2019

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED: JUNE 12, 2023

        The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s May 13, 2022 order

granting the post-sentence motions filed by Appellee, Michael T. Martin, Jr;

vacating the jury’s August 31, 2021 verdict finding Appellee guilty of

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child (“IDSI”) and indecent

assault,1 with prejudice; and discharging him from custody. Following our

careful review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s post-

sentence motions and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to

enter an order reinstating the jury’s guilty verdict and re-committing Appellee

to serve the balance of his sentence.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b) and 3126(a)(7), respectively.
J-S35012-22

      The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

            Sometime in 2019, eleven-year-old J.K. indicated to
            her mother that [Appellee, her uncle,] had behaved
            inappropriately with her sexually. After an interview
            at Over the Rainbow Children’s Advocacy Center,
            which lasted just under an hour, J.K. did not disclose
            any abuse. However, on November 16, 2019, in a
            thirty-minute interview with the same interviewer,
            J.K. disclosed several incidents of abuse. As a result
            of her second interview, on November 25, 2019,
            [Appellee] was charged with one count of [IDSI], a
            felony of the first degree, and Indecent Assault of a
            Person Less than 13 Years of Age, a felony of the third
            degree. The offense date listed for each of these
            offenses is September 11, 2013, although the
            Commonwealth        acknowledges      repeatedly,    as
            discussed below, that this date was set arbitrarily.

            After numerous continuances due to the COVID-19
            pandemic, [a jury] trial on these charges commenced
            on August 31, 2021, and [Appellee] was convicted.
            [Appellee] was sentenced on December 15, 2021, to
            an aggregate sentence of 75 to 150 months in a State
            Correctional Institution. That same day, [Appellee]
            filed three [post-sentence] motions. The first was a
            Motion for Bail Pending Appeal, which was ultimately
            denied following a hearing. The second and third, filed
            together as Post Sentence-Motions Filed on Behalf of
            [Appellee], included the instant Motion Alleging
            Verdict was Against the Weight of the Evidence and
            Motion Alleging Verdict was Against the Sufficiency of
            the Evidence. Oral argument on the instant Motions
            occurred on February 2, 2022, after which we Ordered
            the parties to submit briefs.       [Appellee] timely
            submitted his brief on February 11, 2022. The
            Commonwealth untimely submitted their brief on
            March 11, 2022, nine (9) days after their deadline set
            by Order of Court dated February 2, 2022.

            On April 6, 2022, [Appellee] filed a Motion Requesting
            Order of Court Granting Court Extension of Time,

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            requesting that we grant ourselves an additional thirty
            (30) days to render a decision for good cause[….] We
            found good cause to have been shown because we had
            only twenty-four (24) weekdays to render a decision
            following the filing of the Commonwealth’s brief,
            which was not sufficient time due to the nature of the
            Court’s calendar. Therefore, we granted the Motion,
            extending our deadline to May 14, 2022.

Trial court opinion, 5/13/22 at 2-3 (footnotes, internal citations, and emphasis

omitted).

      On May 13, 2022, the trial court entered an opinion and order granting

Appellee’s post-sentence motions.     Within this opinion and order, the trial

court found the weight and sufficiency of the evidence did not support

Appellee’s convictions for IDSI and indecent assault. Therefore, the trial court

vacated the jury’s verdict with prejudice. See id.

      The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on May 20, 2022. On

May 25, 2022, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b). The Commonwealth filed its timely Rule 1925(b) statement on June

13, 2022. On June 15, 2022, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion,

incorporating the analysis in the opinion authored in support of its May 13,

2022 order granting Appellee’s post-sentence motions.

      Thereafter, on July 21, 2022, Appellee filed a motion seeking to either

quash the Commonwealth’s appeal or find the issues waived due to the

Commonwealth’s purported failure to comply with Rule 1925(b). On August

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2, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a response.         On September 29, 2022,

Appellee’s motion to quash was denied by per curiam order of this Court.

      On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues for our

review:

            1.    Whether the trial court erred when it granted
                  [Appellee’s] post-sentence motions on the basis
                  that the Commonwealth failed to present
                  sufficient evidence at trial to warrant the jury’s
                  verdict of guilty to one count each of [IDSI] and
                  indecent assault of a person less than 13 years
                  of age?

            2.    Whether the trial court erred when it granted
                  [Appellee’s] post-sentence motions on the basis
                  that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of
                  the evidence?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

      Prior to addressing the merits of the Commonwealth’s claims, we must

first address Appellee’s contention that the May 13, 2022 order is

unappealable because it risks subjecting him to retrial in violation of double

jeopardy principles. Appellee’s brief at 7-9.

      It is well settled that “the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following

a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is based upon an egregiously

erroneous foundation.”    Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 318 (2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The same is not true when a

trial court grants a motion for discharge after the jury has convicted. The

difference is the latter scenario does not involve an acquittal, and thus no

retrial will occur. Thus, a ruling in favor of the Commonwealth on appeal

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merely restores the jury’s verdict. See id. at 330, n.9 (stating, “[i]f a court

grants a motion to acquit after the jury has convicted, there is no double

jeopardy barrier to an appeal by the government from the court’s acquittal,

because reversal would result in reinstatement of the jury verdict of guilt, not

a new trial.”). This Court has recognized that “[t]he law in Pennsylvania is

consistent with the federal decisions.” Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660

A.2d 90, 94 (Pa.Super. 1995) (en banc), affirmed, 683 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1996).

      Appellee’s argument that the May 13, 2022 order is not appealable is

confusing; the bulk of his argument discusses the “critical distinction between

challenges to the weight of the evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence.”

Appellee’s Brief at 7. Appellee quotes caselaw holding that claims “challenging

the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the

double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution[.]” Id. at 7-8; Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751

(Pa. 2000). Appellee misapprehends the relevance of these observations. The

quoted portion of Widmer merely discusses what happens if an appellate

court determines and/or agrees with a trial court that the evidence was

insufficient to convict. In that case, retrial is barred. But here the question

is simply whether the trial court was correct that the jury’s verdict is

unsupported by sufficient evidence. Because Appellee was not acquitted, the

order is appealable. We now turn to the Commonwealth’s claims on appeal,

which can be divided into three distinct subsections.

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                                     I.

     The Commonwealth first argues that in assessing the sufficiency of the

evidence, the trial court improperly engaged in a sua sponte examination of

the legal issues discussed in Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888 (Pa.

1975) and its progeny. Commonwealth’s brief at 15. The Commonwealth

avers that Appellee’s post-sentence motions did not in any way challenge that

aspect of the Commonwealth’s case. Id.

     In the instant matter, the trial court’s sufficiency analysis focused

primarily on three cases:   Devlin, supra; Commonwealth v. Groff, 548

A.2d 1237 (Pa.Super. 1988); and Commonwealth v. Jette, 818 A.2d 533

(Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 833 A.2d 141 (Pa. 2003). Devlin involved

a victim who “had the mental ability of a first or second grade child and the

emotional stability of an even younger child.” Devlin, 333 A.2d at 889. In

Devlin, the victim stated that Devlin had sexually assaulted him on one

occasion but could not place the date. Other evidence suggested that if the

act occurred it would have been over a fourteen-month period. The Devlin

court held that Devlin’s due process rights were violated and ordered

discharge.

     Groff involved a seven-year-old child testifying to multiple sexual

crimes that all occurred “on only one occasion.” Groff, 548 A.2d at 1239.

Applying Devlin, the Groff Court held that the Commonwealth “should …

come forward with any evidence which indicates when the alleged crime is

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most likely to have taken place.”    Id. at 1241.   The Groff Court further

concluded that Groff’s due process rights were not violated because the

Commonwealth presented other evidence narrowing the timeframe down to a

three-month period.

      Finally, in Jette, the appellant was convicted of, inter alia, one count

of IDSI. The victim, who was eight-years old at the time of the incidents,

testified to a continuing course of sexual abuse, detailing “four of the worst

incidents, [and] describing generally when they occurred by month and

generally what time of the year.” Jette, 818 A.2d at 535. The Jette Court

affirmed the convictions, concluding that the Commonwealth “must be

afforded broad latitude when attempting to fix the date of offenses which

involve a continuous course of criminal conduct.”    Id., quoting Groff, 548

A.2d at 1242.

      Here, the trial court found that “the Commonwealth failed to meet its

burden to prove a continuing course of conduct in a case involving the abuse

of a young child pursuant to [Jette].”    Trial court opinion, 5/13/22 at 1.

Alternatively, “even if the Commonwealth had proven a continuing course of

conduct,” the trial court concluded that the Commonwealth was not entitled

to “‘the broad leeway’ afforded to them in setting the approximate time and

place[.]” Id. Finally, “even if the Commonwealth had proceeded at trial under

a theory pursuant to [Groff],” the trial court determined that the

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Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to provide corroborating evidence.

Id.

      Following our careful review, we agree with the Commonwealth’s

contention that the trial court erred by engaging in a sua sponte examination

of legal issues that were not raised by Appellee. We begin our analysis of this

issue by quoting Appellee’s post-sentence motion for relief:

            6.    [Appellee] alleges that the verdict was against
                  the sufficiency of the evidence.

            7.    The law related to said claim is as follows:

                  a) It is appropriate for the trial court to
                     determine if the evidence presented at trial
                     was sufficient to support the verdict.
                     Commonwealth v. Martin, [101 A. 3d 706
                     (Pa. 2019)].

                  b) The court must review the evidence in the
                     aggregate in order to determine the
                     propriety of the Defendant's motion. In
                     Interest of J.B., [189 A.3d 390 (Pa.
                     2013)].

Post-Sentence Motions, 12/15/21, at unnumbered 2-3 (citation formatting

amended).

      Appellee’s motion then cited a series of facts in paragraph eight, all of

which may fairly be summarized as attacking the plausibility of J.K.’s

testimony. The motion concluded:

            9.    Applying the law and facts, as set forth above,
                  warrant[s] relief for [Appellee]. It is clearly
                  evident that the evidence against the defendant
                  was “tenuous,” “vague,” and “uncertain[,]”
                  Commonwealth v. Talbert, [129 A.3d 536

                                     -8-
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                  (Pa.Super. 2015)], and [the verdict] was so
                  contrary to the evidence as to sho[ck] one’s
                  sense of justice. Commonwealth v. Morales,
                  [91 A.2d 80 (Pa. 2014)]. It is imperative that
                  the [c]ourt enter a directed verdict or one of
                  aquital [sic] so that right may be given another
                  opportunity to prevail. Commonwealth v.
                  Antidormi, [84 A.3d 736 (Pa.Super. 2014)].
                  To fail to do such would be to deny justice.
                  Commonwealth v. Green, [204 A.3d 469
                  (Pa.Super.     2019)];     Commonwealth       v.
                  Williams, [176 A.3d 298 (Pa.Super. 2017)];
                  Commonwealth v. Miller, [172 A.3d 632
                  (Pa.Super. 2017)].

Post-Sentence Motions, 12/15/21, at unnumbered 6 (citation formatting

amended).

      While styled as a sufficiency claim, both the facts cited in support of

Appellee’s claim and the law in support largely attack the weight of the

evidence.   An argument that goes purely to weight, even if styled as

sufficiency, necessarily fails. See Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666,

672 (Pa. 1999) (stating, “[a]lthough [the] appellant phrases this as a

sufficiency argument, the challenge goes to the weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, [the] appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must

fail.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000). That Appellee’s

complaints went to the weight is evident from the citations in the ninth

paragraph of his post-sentence motions.      The complete sentence Appellee

cited from Talbert states, “[i]n order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge

to the weight of the evidence, ‘the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and

uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.’” Talbert, 129

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A.3d at 546 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Antidormi citation discusses

the relief applicable to a successful weight challenge, a retrial, whereas the

remedy for a successful challenge on sufficiency grounds is discharge.

      Even though Appellee raised, at best, only a generic sufficiency of

evidence claim without reference to any element(s) of the crime, the trial

court’s analysis had almost nothing to do with whether the evidence would

enable a rational fact-finder to convict. The “Devlin claim” explored by the

trial court does have a connection to a general sufficiency of the evidence

challenge in that both are grounded in due process. However, their

commonality ends there, as Devlin is about the fundamental right to present

a defense.

      The United States Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307 (1979), that the Due Process Clause as incorporated by the Fourteenth

Amendment requires that all convictions be supported by “sufficient proof —

defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable

doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Id. at 316. We follow

that approach, as stated in Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139 (Pa.

2012):

             First, our standard of review, like the Jackson
             standard, recognizes the proper regard an appellate
             court must give to the fact-finder’s evaluation of all of
             the evidence received at trial and, therefore, requires
             scrutiny of the totality of that evidence in the light
             most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict
             winner, and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor
             of the Commonwealth.            Further, our Court’s

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              determination of the ultimate question of evidentiary
              sufficiency parallels the central inquiry under the
              Jackson standard, namely, whether any rational trier
              of fact could have found the essential elements of the
              crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 1164 (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

      The Jackson decision protects due process in a particular way: it

operates as a check on the quality of the government’s evidence in proving

the crimes. Separately, due process requires that the Commonwealth give

fair notice in the charging instrument.        “In criminal … matters, the United

States Supreme Court has discerned a due process requirement that alleged

misconduct must be identified with particularity in the essential notice

conferred.”    In re R.M., 790 A.2d 300, 305 (Pa. 2002).            The criminal

information “sets the stage for trial and what the Commonwealth intends to

prove.”   Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549, 563 (Pa. 2020). This

implicates basic due process protections. “No principle of procedural due

process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and

a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired,

are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding

in all courts, state or federal.” Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).

These due process protections are linked to the due process protections

encompassed by a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. The charging document

puts the defendant on notice of what the Commonwealth intends to prove,

and, in turn, the evidence presented at trial must be of sufficient quality to

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enable a rational fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth has proved

the crimes specified within the information beyond a reasonable doubt.

      The trial court addressed the fact that the criminal information

encompassed a nine-month period of time and opined that this “shifted the

burden” to the defense. “It is ... beyond cavil that it is the Commonwealth’s

burden to prove guilt, rather than the defendant’s duty to establish

innocence.”   Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 453 A.2d 927, 929 n.2 (Pa.

1982). The Devlin Court recognized that, under the circumstances of a

particular case, a defendant’s due process right to present a defense may be

violated, but that does not shift the burden to the defendant. Devlin, 333

A.2d at 891 (stating, “[t]he State Constitution is violated where the defendant

is substantially denied an opportunity to present a defense.”) (citation

omitted); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)

(stating, “[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation

Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”)

(citation omitted). The trial court’s belief that the Commonwealth “shifted

tactics” midtrial is more accurately described as a potential due process

violation relating to the validity of “variances” between the information and

the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295

U.S. 78, 82 (1935) (stating, “[t]he true inquiry … is not whether there has

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been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to

‘affect the substantial rights’ of the accused.”).

      Instantly, we agree with the Commonwealth that the issues raised by

Appellee in his post-sentence motion cannot be interpreted as a claim that he

was denied an opportunity to present a defense. Moreover, our assessment

that the legal theory explored in Devlin and its progeny is a distinct due

process claim is corroborated by the fact those cases suggested that a

defendant must preserve and raise that specific issue. The Devlin opinion

makes clear that the appellant therein explicitly cited the inability to raise a

defense, not that the evidence was insufficient to convict: “At the close of the

Commonwealth’s case, the defense demurred to the prosecution’s evidence

on the ground that the Commonwealth had not fixed the date of the crime

with sufficient particularity, and thus the charge was impossible to defend.”

Devlin, 333 A.2d at 890.

      Likewise, in Jette, the appellant therein clearly raised that specific

theory: “Jette does not argue that the Commonwealth failed to prove any

element of the crimes of which he was convicted. Instead, [the a]ppellant

argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because

the victim’s testimony was not sufficiently specific regarding the dates of the

incidents of abuse.” Jette, 818 A.2d at 534. It also bears noting that the

Devlin Court emphasized that the due process inquiry must be analyzed with

reference to the specific facts of the case. Devlin, 333 A.2d at 892 (stating,

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“[h]ere, as elsewhere, ‘[t]he pattern of due process is picked out in the facts

and circumstances of each case.’” (citation omitted)). The Commonwealth’s

contention that the trial court exceeded its authority thus has substantial

force, as the trial court determined sua sponte that Appellee’s due process

rights were violated under the facts of the case without the benefit of

adversarial positions by the parties.

       The trial court attempted to answer whether the convictions for two

counts could stand, accepting that J.K.’s testimony was sufficient to meet the

elements of the charged crimes for a subset of the entire timeframe charged.

We need only determine that Appellee did not make that claim. Instead, he

claimed that J.K. was not credible in total. Thus, whether a “variance” was

justifiable under these circumstances or whether Appellee’s ability to offer a

defense was hampered were issues not raised by Appellee. Accordingly, we

agree with the Commonwealth’s first argument that the trial court improperly

addressed issues that were not raised in Appellee’s post-sentence motions.

                                         II.

      The Commonwealth next contends that the trial court erred in granting

Appellee’s post-sentence motions on the basis that the Commonwealth failed

to present sufficient evidence to support Appellee’s convictions for IDSI and

indecent assault. Commonwealth’s brief at 12, 25.

            In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
            determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and
            all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in
            the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as

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              verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of
              the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.           As an
              appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence
              and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
              finder. Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder
              unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
              as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn
              from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citations

omitted), appeal denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010).

        A person will be found guilty of IDSI “when the person engages in

deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years of

age.”    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b).    “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as

“[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus…. The term also includes penetration,

however slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a foreign object

for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement

procedures.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.

        Additionally, “[a] person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has

indecent contact with the complainant … for the purpose of arousing sexual

desire in the person or the complainant and … the complainant is less than 13

years of age[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). Indecent contact is defined as

“[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the

purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3101.

        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

the verdict winner, we find there was ample evidence to sustain Appellee’s

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convictions for IDSI and indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years

of age.   At trial, the Commonwealth called three witnesses:         J.K.; J.K.’s

mother, E.A.; and Detective David Rush. The record reflects that J.K., who

was fifteen-years old at the time of trial, testified that Appellee would make

her perform oral sex on him, “[u]sually in the computer room.”         Notes of

testimony, 8/31/21 at 72-75.      J.K. testified that Appellee began sexually

abusing her “a couple days into it in the first week” after she and her family

moved into his home during the 2013 school year. Id. J.K. was between

seven and eight-years old when these incidents took place. Id. at 25, 91.

J.K. further testified that no one else was present in the room when these

incidents took place, but the other residents of the household would

“[s]ometimes … be upstairs and sometimes they would be in the outside of

the house in the back yard.” Id. at 73, 75. J.K. also stated that the incidents

“would usually be in the daytime.” Id. at 76.

      On cross-examination, J.K. agreed that in a videotaped statement she

said that the abuse happened every day, but clarified that “[i]t happened

every other day because sometimes it would be like breaks.” Id. at 114. J.K.

testified that the abuse continued until she “said ‘no’ the one time and then

we moved out shortly after.” Id. at 74. J.K. further testified that she disclosed

the abuse to her two sisters a few years after leaving Appellee’s residence.

Id. at 123. J.K. and her sisters then told E.A., who subsequently contacted

the authorities and an investigation commenced. Id. at 81.

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      This Court has long recognized that the testimony of the complainant

standing alone is sufficient to convict. “[A] solitary witness’s testimony may

establish every element of a crime, assuming that it speaks to each element,

directly and/or by rational inference.”    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180

A.3d 474, 479 (Pa.Super. 2018) (emphasis in original), appeal denied, 205

A.3d 315 (Pa. 2019).     Here, the record reflects that J.K.’s testimony that

Appellee’s genitals made contact with her mouth is sufficient to meet the

elements of IDSI. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 714

(Pa.Super. 2003) (stating, “[b]ecause there was oral contact with the

[a]ppellant’s genitalia and the victim’s mouth, we find the evidence is

sufficient to establish penetration however slight.”).      Likewise, the same

testimony meets the definition of indecent assault under Section 3126(a)(7),

as it was undisputed that J.K. was under 13 at the time of these crimes.

Accordingly, J.K.’s testimony that she and Appellee had oral sex on multiple

occasions, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to establish both crimes.

      The trial court concluded that J.K.’s testimony presented a “conundrum”

because she stated, when confronted with a prior statement, that the abuse

occurred every day, that it occurred every other day.        Trial court opinion,

5/13/22 at 23-26. The trial court determined that this was extremely unlikely

when measured against Appellee’s stipulated work records.          Id.   The core

problem with the trial court’s analysis is that it appeared to consider the jury’s

ability to weigh evidence as constituting an all-or-nothing proposition. The

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“conundrum” presented by J.K.’s testimony that the abuse occurred every

other day and the stipulation to Appellee’s work records is resolvable by

concluding that a rational fact-finder could reject parts of J.K.’s testimony

while accepting others. The jury could credit J.K.’s testimony that Appellee

serially abused her, but not at the frequency claimed. The jury was not

required to fully credit J.K.’s testimony in all respects for the conviction to be

valid. The jury could have, for example, rationally concluded that J.K. was so

traumatized by multiple incidents of abuse that she recalled it happening more

often than it did.

      The jury was not required to fully credit that aspect of J.K.’s testimony

to uphold this conviction. A rational fact-finder could conclude that Appellee

repeatedly abused J.K. while simultaneously concluding that it did not occur

as often as J.K. stated.

      The United States Supreme Court has held that “[s]ufficiency review

essentially addresses whether the government’s case was so lacking that it

should not have even been submitted to the jury.” Musacchio v. United

States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). If a jury “was convinced, … the only question under Jackson is

whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of

bare rationality.”   Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012).            We

conclude that it does not in the case sub judice, and therefore reverse the

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trial court’s order discharging Appellee on the basis there was insufficient

evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict.

                                      III.

      In its final claim, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused

its discretion in granting Appellee’s post-sentence motion on the basis that

the jury’s verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth’s brief at 30.      The Commonwealth contends that the trial

court’s analysis indicates that it improperly attempted to function as the

thirteenth juror in this case by disregarding the jury’s judgment and

substituting its own for that of the fact-finder. Id. at 32. For the following

reasons, we agree.

      This Court has recognized that “[a]n allegation that the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.”

Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted),

cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051 (2010).

            [W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
            below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
            underlying question of whether the verdict is against
            the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
            is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
            its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

            Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to
            hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate
            court will give the gravest consideration to the

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            findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
            reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
            is against the weight of the evidence.

            ....

            This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
            the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
            new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
            evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
            trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
            term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
            wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
            conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not
            exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
            the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
            foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
            personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
            Discretion is abused where the course pursued
            represents not merely an error of judgment, but
            where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
            where the law is not applied or where the record
            shows that the action is a result of partiality,
            prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and

emphasis omitted).

      Upon review, we disagree with the trial court’s assessment that this

matter was one of the exceedingly rare cases in which a jury’s verdict should

be vacated on weight-of-the-evidence grounds. As discussed, our Supreme

Court has recognized that “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting

or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or

was not against the weight of the evidence….” Id. (citation omitted). “[A]

true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists

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to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 643 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation

omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2018). The primary focus of

such a challenge is whether “the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in

favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of justice.”

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted),

cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 (2014).

      Here, the jury heard testimony from multiple Commonwealth witnesses

that Appellee sexually abused J.K. The jury clearly found the testimony and

evidence presented at trial credible and elected not to believe Appellee’s

version of the events. The trial court’s opinion vigorously discusses alternative

theories to explain J.K.’s inconsistent testimony, in an attempt to explain why

it believes the verdict in this matter was a “shock to the conscience.” See

trial court opinion, 5/13/22, at 35, 38-44. In doing so, we find that the trial

court plainly exceeded the limits of judicial discretion and invaded the

exclusive domain of the jury by substituting its own credibility determination

for that of the fact-finder. See Clay, supra.

      Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s May 13, 2022 order

granting Appellee’s post-sentence motions and discharging him from custody,

and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order

reinstating the jury’s guilty verdict and re-committing Appellee to serve the

balance of his sentence.

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      Order reversed.      Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judge McLaughlin joins the Opinion.

      P.J.E. Bender files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/12/2023

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