Court Opinion

ID: 9906643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:24:07.987682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:18.991921
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued November 30, 2023

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                             NO. 01-22-00476-CV
                          ———————————
                      KEITH E. ROYSTON, Appellant
                                      V.
                        HARRIS COUNTY, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 133rd District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 2019-20543

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This appeal arises out of a workers’ compensation benefits dispute between

an injured employee, pro se appellant Keith E. Royston, and his self-insured

employer, appellee Harris County. The trial court rendered a final judgment for
Harris County. In two issues on appeal, Royston contends the trial court erred in

rendering judgment against him. We affirm.

                                     Background

      While at work on January 19, 2017, Royston, a deputy sheriff for Harris

County, slipped and fell down some stairs, injuring his left leg, left arm, and neck.

Royston had surgery on his left knee and received physical therapy. Some months

later, Royston underwent a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) to assess his

physical abilities. Royston claims that, while walking on the treadmill during the

FCE, he suffered a right calf strain and right knee effusion, and that he is eligible for

workers’ compensation benefits for these “follow-on injuries.”

      Harris County disputed that Royston’s compensable injury extended to and

included the right calf strain and right knee effusion. After Royston and Harris

County were unable to reach an agreement at a benefit review conference, the matter

was set for a contested case hearing with the Division of Workers’ Compensation

(DWC). At the contested case hearing, the parties stipulated that Royston had

sustained a compensable injury which extended to and included cervical strain and

injuries to the left side of his body: a left knee medial meniscus tear, left shoulder

strain, and left knee sprain. But there was no stipulation on the right calf strain and

right knee effusion. The hearing officer issued a Decision and Order, concluding:

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      • Royston’s compensable injury extended to and included the right calf
        strain and right knee effusion;1

      • Royston reached maximum medical improvement on November 7, 2017;

      • Royston’s impairment rating was one percent; and

      • Royston did not have disability resulting from the compensable injury
        from October 2, 2017 through October 17, 2017.

After a review by the DWC appeals panel, the hearing officer’s Decision and Order

became final.

      Both Royston and Harris County sought judicial review of some of the hearing

officer’s findings and conclusions. Their two appeals were assigned to different

Harris County courts under different cause numbers. Royston’s appeal—

challenging, among other things, whether he had reached maximum medical

improvement and his impairment rating—was assigned to the 133rd District Court

under Cause No. 2019-20543 (“20543 appeal”). Harris County’s appeal—

challenging the extent of the compensable injury, specifically, the right calf strain

and right knee effusion—was assigned to the 333rd District Court under Cause No.

2019-20700 (“20700 appeal”).

1
      The doctor designated by the DWC to determine the extent of Royston’s injury
      opined that compensable injury was a substantial factor in bringing about the
      conditions of a right calf strain and a right knee effusion because “the non-traumatic
      exercise of the right knee on the treadmill [at the FCE] resulted in substantial forces
      in the mechanism of injury” and “this stress translated to the right lower extremity.”
      The hearing officer found that the preponderance of the evidence was not contrary
      to the doctor’s determination.

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      The parties jointly moved to consolidate the two appeals. The judge of the

133rd District Court granted the motion, ordering that Royston’s 20543 appeal be

“consolidated into” Harris County’s 20700 appeal in the 333rd District Court. But

the appellate record does not reflect that the consolidation was achieved in the 333rd

District Court. Instead, sometime later, Harris County’s 20700 appeal was

transferred to the 133rd District Court, where the Royston’s 20543 appeal was still

pending.2 Pleadings, motions, and orders continued to be filed and entered under

both cause numbers.

      In the 20543 appeal, the parties filed competing dispositive motions.3 Royston

moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on his maximum medical improvement

and impairment rating. And Harris County filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction,

motion to dismiss, and motion for summary judgment. Harris County’s combined

motion asserted several arguments, including that:

      • To the extent Royston was attempting to raise issues beyond those decided
        in the contested case hearing, he had not exhausted his administrative
        remedies and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction. See TEX. LAB.

2
      The consolidation order did not include any instructions requiring transfer of the
      pleadings, motions, and orders from Cause No. 2019-20543 in the 133rd District
      Court to Cause No. 2019-20700 in the 333rd District Court.
3
      Although the parties seem to agree in their recitations of fact that they filed parallel
      motions seeking essentially the same relief in the 20700 appeal and that the trial
      court also rendered a judgment in that case, the 20700 appeal is not before us.
      Royston perfected an appeal only in the 20543 case. Consequently, it is the only
      case before us. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(a) (“An appeal is perfected when a written
      notice of appeal is filed with the trial court clerk.”), (d) (“The notice of appeal must:
      (1) identify the trial court and state the case’s trial court number and style . . . .”).
                                              4
         CODE § 410.302(b) (stating that trial de novo “is limited to issues decided
         by the appeals panel and on which judicial review is sought”).

      • To the extent Royston was seeking damages arising from common-law or
        statutory causes of action based on allegations of deception, fraud,
        misrepresentation, or breaches of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
        his claims were not viable because the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act
        provided his exclusive remedy.

      • Royston’s right calf strain and right knee effusion were not follow-on
        injuries from his compensable injury because (1) the alleged injuries were
        to body parts other than the original compensable body parts, (2) after all
        the treatment for the original claimed injury occurred, (3) was not during
        treatment for the compensable injury, and (4) did not occur at the worksite.

      After a hearing, the district court denied Royston’s motion for summary

judgment and granted Harris County’s combined plea to the jurisdiction, motion to

dismiss, and motion for summary judgment.4 The district court concluded that it did

4
      Royston filed his notice of appeal and requested the clerk’s record after the district
      court orally granted Harris County’s combined motion at the hearing but before the
      district court issued its final written order. Thus, the appellate record he requested
      and that was filed in this Court does not contain the final order. But Harris County
      has provided a copy in the appendix of its appellate brief, and the final order is
      publicly available on the Harris County District Clerk’s website. Generally,
      appellate courts may not consider documents outside the record on appeal even if
      they are included in an appendix to the appellate brief. Dauz v. Valdez, 571 S.W.3d
      795, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Appellate courts may,
      however, take judicial notice of facts outside the record to determine their
      jurisdiction. See Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex.
      2012). And we may do so sua sponte. See TEX. R. EVID. 201(c)(1); see also Graves
      v. Diehl, No. 01-00-00412-CV, 2006 WL 1699527, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston
      [1st Dist.] June 22, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Because the finality of a judgment
      affects this Court’s jurisdiction, we take judicial notice of the final order. See
      Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 n.12 (Tex. 2001) (appellate courts
      generally have jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments and certain
      appealable interlocutory orders); see also In re Lombana, 542 S.W.3d 699, 701 n.1
      (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding) (taking judicial notice of
      order that was publicly available on district clerk’s website).
                                            5
not have jurisdiction over Royston’s claims “except for the allegations related to

whether [he] has reached maximum medical improvement; if so, what is his correct

impairment rating and whether he has a disability as a result of his compensable

injury.” On those issues, the district court affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.

But on the extent of injury, the district court reversed the hearing officer’s decision,

concluding instead that Royston’s “compensable injury was not a substantial factor

in bringing about the conditions of a right calf strain and right knee effusion.”

Royston appealed.

                                  Briefing Waiver

      As an initial matter, we must determine whether Royston has presented

anything for our review. Although we liberally construe pro se briefs, we require all

litigants to comply with applicable procedural rules. See Mansfield State Bank v.

Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of

procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants

representing themselves. Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the

applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over

litigants represented by counsel.”).

      The rules of appellate procedure require a party’s brief to contain a “clear and

concise argument” for the party’s contentions and “appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see ERI Consulting Eng’rs,

                                           6
Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010) (“The Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure require adequate briefing.”). “This is not done by merely uttering brief

conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations.” Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v.

Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2002, pet. denied); see also Yoonessi v. D’Arcy, No. 05-07-00689-CV, 2008 WL

4981631, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 25, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (pro se

appellant bears burden of discussing his assertions of error).

      “A failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue or cite appropriate

authority waives a complaint on appeal.” Hooks v. Brenham Hous. Auth., No.

01-17-00602-CV, 2018 WL 6061307, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov.

20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting waiver cases); accord Izen v. Comm’n for

Law. Discipline, 322 S.W.3d 308, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet.

struck) (holding that party waived issue by failing to cite relevant legal authority to

support argument); Murchison v. State, 93 S.W.3d 239, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding that factual sufficiency point was waived

because “appellants’ argument, record citations, and authorities do not address” the

point).

      Here, Royston presents two issues: whether a new trial is required based on

(1) the district court’s “decision to GRANT [Harris County’s motion], while [Harris

County is] in violation[] of the [DWC’s] Order, DWC rules and [the] Texas Labor

                                           7
Code[]”; and (2) Harris County’s “failure to provide medical evidence from another

designated doctor for comparable medically [sic].” As we understand it, the

argument section of Royston’s brief consists of conclusory assertions, such as that:

      • The district court could not grant Harris County dispositive relief while it
        was “actively in violation” of the hearing officer’s Decision and Order and
        unspecified Texas Labor Code provisions and DWC rules;

      • Harris County’s jurisdictional and procedural arguments are “a
        continuation of [Harris County’s] violations of the Texas Labor Code;”

      • Harris County demonstrates “an aggressively blatant pattern of
        misbehavior and a total disregard of [his] compensable benefits;”

      • Harris County improperly denied workers’ compensation benefits in June,
        July, and August 2018;

      • Harris County’s failure to request that another doctor examine him after
        the designated doctor found that his compensable injury extended to a right
        calf strain and a right knee effusion means the extent of his compensable
        injury is undisputed; and

      • Harris County “engaged in deliberate and passive deception by
        interchanging [its] creative false narrative, the ‘added left knee sprain,’ by
        presenting the ‘left knee sprain’ to the [hearing officer] as an additional
        compensable injury for the left side, and yet, denying [his] compensable
        benefits for the right leg, by deceptively stating the disputed condition, left
        knee sprain has an [maximum medical improvement] and [impairment
        rating], and [he] is not eligible for benefits].”

      Although some of these assertions are accompanied by citations to the Texas

Labor Code, there is no explanation of how the cited Code provisions relate to

Royston’s argument or other substantive analysis addressing the standards for

dismissal or summary judgment or any of the grounds in Harris County’s motion as

the bases for the district court’s ruling against him. See Richardson v. Marsack, No.

                                          8
05-18-00087-CV, 2018 WL 4474762, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 19, 2018, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (appellate briefing rules “require appellants to state concisely their

complaints, to provide succinct, clear, and accurate arguments for why their

complaints have merit in law and fact, [and] to cite legal authority that is applicable

to their complaints . . . . The brief fails if we must speculate or guess about the

appellant’s contentions.”); see also Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851,854 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“We have no duty to brief appellant’s issue for [him]. Failure

to cite applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives an issue on

appeal.”).

      Because it would be inappropriate for this Court to speculate about Royston’s

substantive legal arguments, we find waiver due to inadequate briefing. See

Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (stating that “[i]t would be inappropriate for [appellate]

court to speculate as to what appellant may have intended to raise as an error by the

trial court on appeal” because doing so forces appellate court to “stray from [its] role

as a neutral adjudicator and become an advocate for appellant”). Consequently,

nothing is assigned for our review as to the trial court’s rulings. See Guimaraes v.

Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

Royston has therefore waived his two issues on appeal.

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                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                              Sarah Beth Landau
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Farris.

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