Court Opinion

ID: 9767463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:20:15.532206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.292691
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority concedes that the only evidence which favors the appellant’s theory of recovery is the testimony of Trooper Guzman that the point of collision was in the south bound (appellant’s) lane. The same trooper also concluded from his total investigation that appellant’s truck was in the wrong lane immediately before the collision.
The issue before this court is whether the testimony of Trooper Guzman constitutes evidence of sufficient probative force to allow reasonable minds to infer negligence on the part of appellee’s driver.
An instructed verdict is proper when the evidence fails to raise an issue of fact as to one or more fact propositions which must be established for the opponent to be entitled to judgment. Ottis v. Haas, 569 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). To avoid an instructed verdict, appellant is required to introduce evidence on specific elements of his cause of action so as to raise a fact issue on those elements. Rodriguez v. Reeves, 730 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Here, through a wrongful death action, appellant attempted to establish negligence.
Specific acts of negligence must be proved. O’Neill v. Craig, 493 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919, 94 S.Ct. 1418, 39 L.Ed.2d 474 (1975). Negligence is never presumed; the mere happening of an accident is no evidence at all of negligence. Wells v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 140 Tex. 2, 164 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1942). Further, the occurrence of a collision is not of itself evidence of negligence. Farriell v. Davis, 606 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1980, no writ).
In a landmark case, the Supreme Court held, “it is the duty of the trial court to instruct a verdict, though there be slight testimony, if its probative force be so weak that it only raises a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to be established.” Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S.W. 1059, 1063 (1898).
In the case before us, the testimony of Trooper Guzman concerning the point of impact amounts to less than a scintilla of evidence in support of appellant’s claim of negligence; it is the legal equivalent of no evidence. Cf. Kralik v. Martin, 659 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (where sufficient evidence was presented regarding road conditions and the decedent’s manner of driving immediately preceeding the accident). The majority would hold that the jury is free to conclude negligence from the point of impact. I cannot agree with such a holding.
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to a denial of appellee’s motion for instructed verdict, I find no *733error in the trial court’s ruling. The judgment should be affirmed.
I concur with the majority in its denial of sanctions against appellant in favor of ap-pellee.