Court Opinion

ID: 9481260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:12:26.451965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:10.756948
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I do not agree with the majority opinion’s reasoning, I concur in its judgment to the extent that it concludes that Thomas is not entitled to credit for the entire two year-3 month period he served in state prison following the imposition of the initial federal sentence. I dissent in part because the majority opinion fails to give Thomas credit for the three month period he should have been in federal custody in 1964 for the purpose of having a diagnostic study conducted.
When a federal court issues an order directing an officer to commit a federal prisoner to the custody of the Attorney General for a diagnostic study, or otherwise, the officer’s failure to act in accordance with that order cannot be “charged up against the prisoner.” See Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir.1937). We held in Smith that
the prisoner is entitled to serve his time promptly if such is the judgment imposed, and he must be deemed to be serving it from the date he is ordered to serve it and is in the custody of the marshal under the commitment, if, without his fault, the marshal neglects to place him in proper custody.
Id. The Smith court credited the defendant’s federal sentence with the entire time served in state prison because the marshal, in contravention of the federal commitment order, prematurely turned him over to the state authorities.
Here, the district court’s sentencing order stated that
“[i]t is adjudged that the defendant hereby is committed to the custody of the Attorney General ... for imprisonment for the maximum period prescribed by law for a study ..., the results of such study to be furnished this court within three months whereupon the sentence of imprisonment herein imposed shall be subject to modification in accordance with Title 18, U.S.Code, section 4208(b).”
While the district court’s order does not explicitly set forth the time at which the marshal shall commit Thomas to the Attorney General’s custody, I think the court’s intent is clear beyond dispute. The delivery was to be made at the earliest time the marshal could implement the necessary physical arrangements. I find it difficult *1370to believe that, given a choice, a district judge would direct that a diagnostic study not be conducted until several years after he has asked for it, or that he would ordinarily want to delay imposing a sentence for an undetermined number of years while the defendant serves a state sentence. Given the numerous criminal cases confronting a district judge and the difficulty of recalling all of the significant events that occur during a trial, it is far more likely that a district judge would order that the diagnostic study be conducted at the earliest possible date following initial sentencing so that he could impose a final sentence within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the plea or trial.1
Moreover, the language of the district court order appears to require the Attorney General, or his authorized representative, to furnish the results of the study within 90 days of the date on which the order was issued. The order does not state that the study may be conducted within 90 days of whenever Thomas is actually delivered to the Attorney General. Rather,- it states that the results shall be furnished to the court within 3 months. An ordinary reading of such an order would lead one to conclude that the results shall be furnished within 3 months of the date the order was issued.2
If I am correct, the marshall erred in returning Thomas to the state authorities rather than in committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for the period required to conduct the study. The marshal’s error cannot override the district court’s order to the detriment of the defendant. See Smith, supra.
Thus, Thomas is entitled to credit for the three month period he should have been in federal custody in 1964 while a diagnostic study was being prepared. Such a holding would grant him credit for the period prior to his scheduled return to federal court for final sentencing. However, following such final sentencing a final order of commitment would have issued and under applicable law the marshal would have been required to return Thomas to the custody of the state. Thus, he is not entitled to credit for any portion of the time he was serving his state sentence other than the three months that should have served as the study period. Accordingly, Thomas’s mandatory release date should be January 19, 1991, rather than April 19, 1991.
This conclusion is not in derogation of any State interest. The State surrendered Thomas to federal authorities for sentencing proceedings, which included determination of a final sentence. As the majority notes, the results of the diagnostic study are necessary to transform a “wholly tentative” sentence into a final one. Moreover, no case law in this circuit undermines this conclusion. Neither Gunton nor Lat-ios, for example, addresses the questions presented by this case — whether the district court had completed its sentencing proceedings and whether the district court intended to return Thomas to the state authorities prior to final sentencing.
In light of the foregoing, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority judgment.

. The order quoted above appears to be a form order rather than one tailored especially to the circumstances of Thomas's case.

. Similarly, the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. section 4208 appears to mandate that the diagnostic study be conducted within 90 days of the date on which the trial court enters the tentative sentence. Section 4208 provides that "[t]he results of the study ... shall be furnished to the court within three months unless the court grants time, not to exceed an additional three months, for further study.” Any concern that this reading of the statute may shorten the actual time available for conducting the study is alleviated by the fact that the court may extend the period for study for up to three additional months.