Court Opinion

ID: 9627257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:40:56.597353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:44.165560
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR RE-HEARING.
*255OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The petition for a rehearing earnestly urges the court’s error in holding:
“ * * * Nowhere therein [in plaintiffs’ petition] is it stated in clear and concise language that plaintiffs are the owners of the water rights in question, and it must necessarily follow that plaintiffs rely upon the law in effect during the years of 1907 and 1908 to show their ownership of water rights.
* * * Ns *
“The record herein discloses no rights of plaintiffs, either pleaded or proved, and they have not shown themselves entitled to an injunction.”
Careful consideration emphasizes the limitation of these statements to the petition and simultaneously discloses that the turning point of the case was the lack of proof rather than of pleading.
Plaintiffs now insist that (a) paragraphs 9 and 21 of their original petition allege sufficient ownership of water rights by describing the lands and thereafter stating that the water rights were “appurtenant to the above described lands” and (b) their “Replies to Answers and Answers to Cross Petition” should be considered as a part of the pleadings and that these clearly alleged ownership of the water rights.
We consider first the allegations of the petition. It sought an injunction to restrain the water officials *256from denying certain water to plaintiffs, but ultimately it requested a determination of the rights to the water. Thus, it was in effect a suit to quiet title and must be governed by the rules applicable to such actions.
“A suit to ascertain, determine, and decree the extent and priority of a water right and appropriation is held to partake of the nature of an action to quiet title to real estate. * * * ” 44 Am.Jur. Quieting Title § 9.
And see Gutheil Park Inv. Co. v. Town of Montclair, 32 Colo. 420, 76 P. 1050, discussing the suit regarding irrigation water rights which was held by the court to have some of the characteristics of a bill to quiet title and some of the characteristics of an injunction. See also Allen v. Magill, 96 Or. 610, 189 P. 986, 190 P. 726, a suit to enjoin the diversion of water, wherein an analogy was drawn between such an action and a suit to quiet title. 2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d ed., p. 1330, states:
“ * * * a suit to quiet title to a water right for irrigation purposes, and to determine the right to divert the waters from a stream for such purposes, is in the nature of an action to quiet title to real estate. * * * ”
In Durell v. Abbott, 6 Wyo. 265, 44 P. 647, we discussed the criteria for a petition in an action to quiet title under § 2985 et seq., R.S. 1887 (now § 3-7001 et seq., W.C.S.1945), approving as sufficient a petition alleging, inter alia, that plaintiffs were in possession of certain described real property, that they claimed title in fee to said premises, and that defendant had no estate, right, title, or interest whatsoever in said land. Although the petition set out was not designated as the minimum requirement of pleadings in suits of that nature, we think that it is. Under such standards the direct allegations of plaintiffs’ petition in the present *257case fell short of stating in clear and concise language any ownership of water rights.
The legal effect of the reservations of water rights at the time the deeds to the lands were issued to plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and the claimed use of water by plaintiffs at various times require no elaboration since our views were adequately presented in the original opinion.
We turn then to plaintiffs’ contention that the allegations of their “Replies to Answers and Answers to Cross Petition” should be considered in the light of § 3-1705, W.C.S.1945, as curing any defects in the petition. That is a matter of some doubt. Our decision was based upon the merits of the respective rights of the plaintiffs and defendants — without relation to the rights of the interveners — and no authorities have been cited to justify the supplementing of a petition against one party by statements contained in reply or answer to cross-petition directed to other parties. In any event, our decision was not predicated upon the failure of plaintiffs’ pleading but rather upon insufficient proof of any right to relief.
Rehearing Denied.