Court Opinion

ID: 9608712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:16:22.321679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:43.796791
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice
(dissenting).
We respectfully disagree with the majority opinion.
Since the Commission found that the fall was solely the result of the epileptic condition, the only question before this court is whether Valerio’s resulting death from subdural hemorrhage of the skull “arose out of the employment with the Apache Powder Company.”
We believe that the concrete floor upon which Valerio worked was itself an environmental factor, and it obviously is just as much an identifiable incident of the employment as is a machine, a work bench, an open shaft, a staircase or a ladder; the employment required the worker to use the concrete floor, and the floor, not the idiopathic disease, caused the trauma, resulting in a fractured skull, brain injuries and *193death. Therefore, his death arose out of his employment.
We realize that the courts in other jurisdictions seem about evenly divided on the question whether a traumatic injury suffered by a body striking the floor or ground is compensable where the fall was induced by the employee’s idiopathic condition. However, it appears that the modern trend is definitely in favor of allowing compensation.
The injury which actually produced death in the instant case was the damage to the skull of the employee caused by his body falling to the concrete floor, where his employment caused him to be at that time. There was no evidence indicating whether his alleged epileptic condition caused the fall or whether the fall caused the epilepsy. In either event, we do not believe that his dependents should be deprived of compensation.
It is well settled that an injury suffered from a fall on the employer’s premises, in the course of employment, from a height or on or against some object, arises out of the employment and is compensable, even though the fall was caused by an idiopathic condition of the employee. National Automobile & C. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 75 Cal.App.2d 677, 171 P.2d 594; Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 1, p. 158.
It then seems that there is no reasonable basis for denying compensation where the fall is to the floor. What difference can it make that the employee’s head struck a concrete floor, rather than some object a few inches above or below the level of the floor? It seems to us that the distance an employee’s body falls until it comes in contact with the floor or some object should be entitled to no consideration.
The majority opinion holds that the mere furnishing of a floor, however hard, does not create a greater or different risk from the hazards to which all mankind is daily exposed. We believe this is well answered in Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 A. 599, 601, wherein that court said:
“ * * * The risk may be no different in degree or kind than those to which he may be exposed outside of his employment. The injury is compensable, not because of the extent or particular character of the hazard, but because it exists as one of the conditions of the employment. * * * ”
See also Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 41 Cal.2d 676, 263 P.2d 4.
We believe that the Sears case cited in the majority opinion was erroneously decided in the first instance and should be overruled.
The award should be set aside.
WINDES, J., concurs in the dissent.