Court Opinion

ID: 9585283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:58:34.73923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:46.129981
License: Public Domain

Clarke, Justice,
concurring specially.
I am able to concur in the judgment because the majority opinion is narrow in its application. I believe OCGA § 9-3-71 serves a valid purpose and is grounded on a rational foundation which can withstand a constitutional attack.
My understanding of the majority reasoning is that a statute of limitations may not bar a cause of action before the cause of action accrues. That is to say that in a tort case all of the elements of the tort must exist prior to the running of the statute of limitations. One of the essential elements of a tort is an injury. We have held that a cause of action accrues, however, before all or even the greater part of the damage has been sustained and that any appreciable and actual harm establishes a cause of action upon which suit may be brought. Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804 (273 SE2d 16) (1980). It may be argued that the failed tubal ligation surgery was an appreciable injury, but this argument lacks validity because the appellee underwent the original operation by consent. The consent of the appellee was in fact a contract, and a claim for expenses of that surgery would sound in contract rather than in tort.
It is the result of the alleged negligence which gives rise to a tort action. In this case, the result is the pregnancy complained of. Until *60the pregnancy occurred, there was no injury or damage and hence no cause of action. While a cause of action may be abolished prior to its existence by a statute of repose such as OCGA § 9-3-51, I believe a legislative effort to extinguish it by means of a statute of limitations runs afoul of our holding in Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470 (298 SE2d 484) (1983).