Court Opinion

ID: 9670484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:21:31.343223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.996329
License: Public Domain

MAYFIELD, Justice.
I dissent. The basic statutory provision concerning the homestead exemption is found in Code of 1940, Tit. 7, § 625. The exemption is granted both to a living resident of this state and to his surviving widow and minor children.
Although the precise factual situation, in the case at bar, has not been previously presented to this court; prior interpretations of the homestead exemption statute by this court are, in my opinion, determinative of the present question.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that the exemption statute applies only to “debts contracted” and has no application to judgments based on tort, or liability in the nature of tort, such as decrees for alimony or separate maintenance. Horan v. Horan, 259 Ala. 117, 65 So.2d 486; Crabtree v. Kirby, 225 Ala. 20, 142 So. 32; Erlenbach v. Cox, 206 Ala. 298, 89 So. 465; Schuessler v. Dudley, 80 Ala. 547, 2 So. 526, 60 Am.Rep. 124. The cases cited in the majority opinion hold that a husband’s homestead exemption cannot prevail against a decree for alimony. The determinative point in each of the above cases is the nature of the alimony claim and not the status or identity of the person seeking the exemption. These cases are separate authority for the well-established principle that alimony is not a “debt contracted” within the meaning of the Constitution of 1901, and the statutes by which the legislature gave life to the constitutional provision. In Rogers v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 259, 110 So. 140, this court stated that as related to' exemptions, a demand for alimony previously decreed is in tort and not ex contractu.
No distinction between the exemption granted to an individual and that granted to his surviving widow and minor children is found in the Constitution of 1901, Sections 205 and 206; which provisions relate to the nature of the debts from which the homestead is exempt. Nor is such a distinction found in the basic statutory provisions, Title 7, Section 625, supra.
My understanding of the majority opinion is that it seeks the existence of such a distinction in two subsequent Code sections, Code of 1940, Title 7, Sections 661 and 662. Clearly, these sections are primarily concerned with the operation of the exemption benefit and not with the nature of the debts from which the homestead is exempt. These provisions and Section 625, must be considered in pari materia, and so considered they do not alter the rule as to which type of debt the exemption applies or does not apply.
The case of Erlenbach v. Cox, supra, clearly disposes of the contention that the legislature, by enacting sections 4196 and 4197 of the Code of Alabama 1907, enlarged the homestead exemption to make it proof against tort judgments. These sections of the Code were brought forward without any material change to the Code of 1940. This court’s holding in the Erlenbach case is consistent with the position that these two Code sections did not alter the settled principle that the homestead exemption applies only to “debts contracted”. In *133the Erlenbach case, this court decided that a recorded judgment in a tort action against a husband was superior to a claim of homestead exemptions by the widow. The present case involves the accrued claim for separate maintenance decreed to the first wife against the deceased, and the adversary claim of the surviving widow for homestead exemption from the deceased’s estate. I think it clear that the pivotal point in the Erlenbach case was the principle that the exemption statute is applicable only to debts contracted. It is my further opinion that the question of recording of the judgment so as to establish a lien prior to the husband-debtor’s death was not involved or necessary to a proper decision in the Erlenbach case. The first paragraph of that opinion stating that a lien has been established was merely descriptive of the action, and that the portion of paragraph six of that opinion in so far as it dealt with liens, was merely dicta. I am unable from my reading of this opinion to find justification for speculation that a contrary result would have been reached if the judgment had not been recorded so as to establish a lien on the property in question prior to the husband’s death. It is my opinion that a claim against an estate arising out of a decree for past due alimony or support and maintenance decreed the first wife is, under our present laws, superior to a claim for homestead exemption, whether the claim be made by the husband-debtor or his surviving second wife. I regard the nature of the debt as determinative of the issue and not whether a lien on the property of the deceased debtor-husband was perfected prior to his death. While we must recognize that the exemption statute should be liberally construed, this does not mean that we can, by 'judicial construction, extend privileges not intended or contemplated by the legislature. It is my opinion that the claim of the first wife for the support and maintenance of herself and her minor child should prevail against the claim of the surviving second wife for homestead exemption. An extension of the present exemption beyond “debts contracted” is a matter properly for the consideration of our legislative body.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the decree of the trial court should have been affirmed and respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which pertains to the merits of the instant case.
SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.