Court Opinion

ID: 9790718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:58:25.986029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.118281
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.
In my opinion the facts of the present case are not essentially different from those which were shown in the eases of Waldorf v. City of Alhambra, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 522 [45 Pac. (2d) 207], and Robertson v. City of Long Beach, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [66 Pac. (2d) 167]. In each of those cases the appeal challenged a determination of the trial court that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cause of action. The facts alleged in each complaint were substantially the same. An accident had occurred at night when an automobile collided with and overran a curb on the far side of an intersection at which point there was a “jog” or “offset” in the course of the street. It was held in each case that the facts alleged were not sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendant city under the Public Liability Act. (Stats. 1923, chap. 328, p. 675; Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 5619, p. 3052.) The reasoning of the court in the Waldorf case, which was quoted and relied upon in the Robertson case, is as follows: “Nor do we think that the city is chargeable with liability in failing to maintain barriers, lights or warning signs or notices at the point of ‘offset’ or ‘jog’ in the street. In al*260most every city of size in this state some streets are laid out and improved without uniformity as to width or direction, resulting in so-called ‘jogs’, ‘offsets’ or ‘goose-necks’, some ending at cross-streets and some even forming cul-de-sacs. We are convinced that the law does not require a municipality to maintain either barriers or warning devices at ‘jogs’ or ‘offsets’ of the construction, nature and appearance of that described in the complaint herein. To the prudent operator of a motor vehicle, acting within the scope of the law governing his own conduct in traversing a public street in the night-time, the pavement, curb, sidewalk and the parkway with the trees or poles therein constitute a barrier or warning sufficient to avert disaster and as readily visible to the alert driver as a sign informing him of the condition, there being nothing to conceal the real condition nor to deceive the operator of an approaching automobile while driving at a lawful rate of speed and with due caution. ” (6 Cal. App. (2d), pp. 526, 527 [45 Pac. (2d) 207, 209].)
The physical facts in the present ease come within this description of an ordinary street in any city. At the time the accident occurred, the course of Glenoaks Boulevard jogged to the right (instead of to the left as in the Waldorf and Robertson cases) at its intersection with Providencia Avenue, and beyond the intersection it is divided by the Pacific Electric’s unpaved right of way. The commencement of the right of way on the far side of Providencia Avenue was made plainly apparent by numerous poles and posts and by the dark surface which continued beyond the white concrete pavement. One large pole (16"xl6") which stood on the right of way beyond the end of the pavement and almost directly in the path of the automobile which Urban Goebel was driving, had been painted with aluminum paint and appeared “drab or dull gray.” On this pole was suspended a railway crossing wig-wag signal facing Providencia Avenue. Directly opposite, three posts marked the line between the pavement and right of way on the north side of the railroad track. One of these posts was painted white. Approximately in the center of the intersection and 25 feet above the street, a 600 candlepower street light was suspended. On the northwest corner of the intersection was *261a service station illuminated by lights totaling 1100 candlepower.
The four occupants of the car were riding in the front seat. The night was clear and the street was dry. Each of the two survivors of the accident lived two and one-half blocks from the scene and were well aware of the jog in the street. The driver of the automobile, who was killed, lived approximately a mile from the scene of the accident. In crossing the intersection the automobile swerved to the right, striking the end of a curb which formed the southern boundary of the right of way, and then, out of control, continued 232 feet, where it collided with a pole on the sidewalk.
The opinion of my associates distinguishes the two previous decisions upon the ground that “the curb referred to in the present action was not across the course which the automobile was traveling as it was in each of the two cases cited by appellant, but was parallel to said course and only a surface of some eight inches square was visible to the driver.” It is also said that “there was no curb, sidewalk, or parkway, or other barrier to warn him [the driver] of the changed condition in the highway”. This distinction overlooks the existence of physical conditions which constituted just as visible a warning to the oncoming motorist as did the “curb, sidewalk, and parkway” in the Waldorf case or the curb, sidewalk and empty lot in the Robertson ease. Certainly a group of posts and poles, some of which were painted a light color, at an intersection illuminated by a powerful street light, are as plainly visible as a concrete curb and sidewalk of approximately the same color as the street pavement.
The opinion of the District Court of Appeal which is now adopted by this court, suggests that the west end of the curb which marked the southern boundary of the right of way might be easily overlooked by a motorist approaching from the west. But this curb, although small in itself, was a part of the physical conditions which were made apparent by other objects plainly indicating that the street did not continue beyond them. There was, therefore, no dangerous or defective condition of streets within the meaning of the statute upon which the plaintiffs rely and, as I read the record, the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted by the trial judge.
*262For these reasons, according to my view of the case, the judgment should be reversed with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for the defendant.
Houser, J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
Rehearing denied. Edmonds, J., Shenk, J., and Houser, J., voted for a rehearing.