Court Opinion

ID: 9845437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:21:54.416676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:07.679442
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from Part I of the court’s opinion, which holds that reversible error did not occur in denying the defendant access to a portion of the victim’s letter to the district attorney. In my view the excluded portion of the letter was no less relevant for discovery purposes under Crim.P. 16 than the parts which were disclosed and, for this reason, I believe the trial court erred in denying disclosure of the letter in its entirety. The proper procedure is to remand for an evidentiary hearing on whether the court’s discovery ruling constituted harmless or prejudicial error.
*932The prosecutor in this case did not suppress evidence favorable to the defense and thereby implicate a due process claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Nor does the case in its present posture involve prosecu-torial tolerance of perjured testimony, as was present in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Rather, the prosecutor in this case disclosed the victim’s letter to the court for an in camera review. It was the court which denied discovery to the defendant because it believed the excised portion of the letter was neither relevant nor exculpatory. In so doing the court applied an unduly restrictive standard of disclosure to a defendant.
Crim.P. 16(a)(l)(I), Part I, requires the prosecution to disclose to defense counsel the relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call at trial. A witness’ statement need not relate directly to the critical elements of the crime in question nor be expressly exculpatory to qualify for discovery under Crim.P. 16. Often, impeachment evidence will play as large a role in determining the outcome of a trial as evidence which is either substantive or exculpatory in character. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967). In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), the United States Supreme Court rejected the government’s suggestion that records of electronic surveillance should be screened in camera by the trial judge to determine their arguable connection with the government’s case before ordering their disclosure to an accused, and cogently observed:
“An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral person or event, the identity of a caller or the individual on the other end of a telephone, or even the manner of speaking or using words may have special significance to one who knows the more intimate facts of an accused’s life. And yet that information may be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstance. Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in our view the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court to identify those records which might have contributed to the Government’s case.” 394 U.S. at 182, 89 S.Ct. at 971, 22 L.Ed.2d at 192.
The lesson of Alderman is that in some cases only defense counsel can determine what is material and helpful to the defendant’s case. People v. Smith, 185 Colo. 369, 524 P.2d 607 (1974). It is not for us in this case to speculate whether and in what manner defense counsel might have used the portion of the statement relating to the witness’ pregnancy to impeach her credibility. It is sufficient to point out that if the excised statement regarding the witness’ pregnancy was indeed false, defense counsel arguably might have used the false statement to impeach the witness’ credibility at trial.
“It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in [her] proper setting and put the weight of [her] testimony and [her] credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.... To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial.” Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 219, 75 L.Ed. 624, 628 (1931).
See also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968); People v. Page, Colo., 625 P.2d 369 (1981). If the statement was true, the defendant nevertheless might be able to demonstrate how such information would have led to the discovery of evidence bearing on the substantive elements of the offense or on the witness’ credibility. See Giles v. Maryland, supra.
*933Where, as here, the case turned on the credibility of witnesses and the defendant was deprived of any opportunity whatever to review the excised portion of the letter until the People filed their brief with this court, the record simply is inadequate to evaluate whether the defendant was prejudiced by the denial of pretrial discovery of the entire contents of the witness’ letter. The proper procedure under these circumstances is to remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the denial of discovery constituted harmless error. If the trial court finds that the failure to order discovery of the omitted portion of the letter had no likely effect on the outcome of the trial, as evaluated in the context of the entire record, then the trial court should deny the motion for a new trial and the case should be recertified to this court for resolution of the propriety of that ruling. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 355 (1976). “On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.” Id. If the court finds that the error was not harmless, then it should order a new trial. See People v. Shaver, Colo., 630 P.2d 600 (1981); Huguley v. People, 195 Colo. 259, 577 P.2d 746 (1978); Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419, 444 P.2d 263 (1968).
Accordingly, I would remand the case to the trial court in order to enable it to make requisite findings of fact on the discovery issue raised on this appeal.