Court Opinion

ID: 9949195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 01:00:32.474839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:42.621976
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10491       Document: 54-1        Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/08/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                            ____________                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                              No. 23-10491
                                                                          FILED
                                                                      March 8, 2024
                            ____________
                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
Marvin Jackson,                                                           Clerk

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                  versus

World Wrestling Entertainment, Incorporated,

                                         Defendant—Appellee.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Northern District of Texas4
                         USDC No. 4:23-CV-172
               ______________________________

Before Stewart, Clement, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
      Marvin Jackson alleges that he was injured at a World Wrestling
Entertainment event that he attended with his nephew. All tickets required
the buyer to accept various terms and conditions—including an arbitration
agreement. Buyers were advised that entering the event would constitute
acceptance of the arbitration agreement.
      The district court rejected Jackson’s argument that he is somehow not
bound to arbitrate just because he didn’t purchase the ticket himself, but
instead received the ticket as a gift from his nephew. We agree with the
Case: 23-10491        Document: 54-1         Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/08/2024

                                  No. 23-10491

district court. An individual who permits a third party to present a ticket for
admittance to an event on his behalf is bound by the terms and conditions
governing the use of that ticket. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                      ***
       In April 2022, Jackson and his nephew, Ashton Mott, attended
WrestleMania 38, an event hosted by WWE at AT&T Stadium in Arlington,
Texas. Mott purchased the tickets for himself and Jackson on SeatGeek.com
as a surprise gift for Jackson’s birthday.
       To purchase a ticket to the event, SeatGeek.com users were required
to agree to the AT&T Stadium COVID waiver—which included an
arbitration agreement. This waiver stated, in bold print, that entering the
event pursuant to the purchased tickets constitutes consent to arbitrate.
       After completing the purchase, ticket purchasers received a
confirmation email, which also prominently stated that use of the tickets
would constitute acceptance of the arbitration agreement.
       To access tickets, users were required to download either the
SeatGeek app or the Dallas Cowboys app. Accessing the tickets through
either app prompted a Know Before You Go notification, which again
included a COVID waiver containing the arbitration agreement.
       After purchasing the tickets, Mott stored them on his phone and
presented both his own ticket and Jackson’s ticket to the attendant when he
and Jackson entered the stadium.
       Jackson’s seat was next to the stage.           Jackson alleges that a
pyrotechnics blast at the beginning of the performance caused him to lose
most of his hearing in his left ear. He sued WWE in Texas state court,
alleging that WWE’s negligence caused his hearing loss.

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                                  No. 23-10491

       WWE removed the case to federal court, and then moved to compel
arbitration. The district court granted WWE’s motion to compel, holding
that Mott acted as Jackson’s agent, and that Jackson’s use of the ticket
charged him with notice of its terms and bound him to the arbitration
agreement.
       Jackson appealed, arguing solely that Mott did not have either actual
or apparent authority to act on Jackson’s behalf under Texas agency law, and
that the arbitration agreement is therefore unenforceable against Jackson. See
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (noting that
“courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern
the formation of contracts” when determining whether parties have agreed
to arbitrate).
       We agree with the district court that Jackson is bound to arbitrate.
       The relevant facts in this case concerning the existence of an agency
relationship are undisputed, as Jackson acknowledges. This appeal therefore
presents only a question of law, which we review de novo. See Am. Int’l
Trading Corp. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 835 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1987).
       “[N]onparties may be bound to an arbitration clause when the rules
of law or equity would bind them to the contract generally.” Taylor Morrison
of Tex., Inc. v. Ha, 660 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam) (internal
quotation omitted). One way of binding a non-signatory to an arbitration
agreement is through the application of traditional agency principles. Jody
James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Tex. 2018).
       Although Mott was not acting subject to Jackson’s authorization or
control when he purchased the tickets as a surprise gift, he did act as
Jackson’s agent when Jackson allowed him to present the ticket on his behalf
for admittance to the stadium. See, e.g., Cmty. Health Sys. Pro. Servs. Corp. v.
Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 691 (Tex. 2017) (noting that an agency relationship

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                                 No. 23-10491

is created when the agent “consent[s] to act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control” and the principal “authoriz[es] . . . the
agent to act on his behalf”).
       Accepting the arbitration agreement—a required condition for
Jackson to enter the event—was well within Mott’s implied authority as
Jackson’s agent to gain his entry into the stadium. See, e.g., Cameron Int’l
Corp. v. Martinez, 662 S.W.3d 373, 377 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (“Every
agency carries with it, or includes in it, as an incident, all the powers which
are necessary or proper, or usual, as means to effectuate the purpose for
which it was created.”) (quoting Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 460, 464 (1886)).
Event attendees routinely purchase and present tickets on behalf of family
and friends, and in doing so, accept the required terms and conditions.
Moreover, the purchase terms and order confirmation email made clear that
use of the ticket constituted acceptance of the arbitration agreement.
Accordingly, Mott and Jackson had ample notice that using the ticket to enter
the stadium would bind them both to the arbitration agreement. See, e.g.,
Grissom v. Watson, 704 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Tex. 1986) (“As a general rule, it is
universally recognized that notice to the agent is notice to the principal.”)
(internal quotation omitted).
       The arbitration agreement is therefore enforceable against Jackson.
Accordingly, we affirm the order compelling arbitration.

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