Court Opinion

ID: 9750055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:16:02.561334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:02.223260
License: Public Domain

KELLEHER, J.,
dissenting.
I would affirm the decision of the arbitration panel. I believe that the decision of the majority of the members of the panel draws its essence from the collective-bargaining agreement and is based upon a passably plausible interpretation of that agreement and, therefore, should be upheld.
This court has repeatedly stated:
“It is a well-established proposition that our judicial authority to overturn an arbitrator’s award is limited. Absent a manifest disregard of a contractual provision or a completely irrational result, the award will be upheld. An arbitrator has the inherent power to fashion an appropriate remedy as long as the award draws its essence from the contract and is based upon a ‘passably plausible’ interpretation of the contract.” City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Lodge No. 4, 545 A.2d 499, 503 (R.I.1988).
A review of the decision authored by the arbitration panel reveals that the panel did not disregard any contractual provision, nor did it reach a completely irrational result. In addressing the question of whether a lump-sum sick-leave payment made to Rathbun should have been included in his base pay for pension-calculation purposes, the majority of the members of the panel immediately identified the contractual provisions that might provide guidance in determining the dispute. The identified provisions, article X, sections 2(b) and 2(d), and article XVIII, section 1(b)(2),3 as the majority of the members of the panel noted, do not, however, provide an express solution to the issue in dispute.
The majority of the members of the panel observed that accumulated and unused sick leave was not specifically enumerated in article XVIII, section 1(b)(2), as an element included in an officer’s base pay for purposes of pension calculations. However, the majority of the members of the panel indicated that numerous other negotiated benefits also absent from article XVIII, section 1(b)(2), were considered and included in an officer’s base pay for purposes of calculating pension benefits. Furthermore they noted that sick-leave payments made to individual officers during the course of a given year, pursuant to article X, section 2(b), were considered by the town to be part of that particular officer's base pay. Unable to find any significant difference between a sick-leave payment that is made at a year’s end and a lump-sum payment for sick leave accumulated over an officer’s career, the majority of the members of the panel found that the town violated the collective-bargaining agreement by not including accumulated and unused sick-leave benefits in calculating Rath-bun’s base pay for pension purposes.
The majority of the members of the panel, faced with an issue not specifically addressed by the agreement, fashioned a remedy based upon their interpretation of the contract. My colleagues have reached the conclusion that the arbitrators “rewrote the contract when they included Rathbun’s 120-day lump-sum sick-leave payment in his base pay for calculating his pension benefits.” They indicate that treating “distinct sick-leave benefits the same (included in base pay) for pension-calculation purposes is to rewrite the contract.” This is clearly not the case. Neither section 2(b) nor section 2(d) of article X expressly provides that either type of sick-leave benefit shall be included in base pay, nor does either section expressly provide for inclusion of the payment in the calculation of pension benefits. The only relevant difference between the two involves time of payment. Thus “that which is not written *149cannot be rewritten.” Hence any determination of this issue would necessarily require the panel to invoke its expertise so as to glean the essence of the agreement as it pertains to the calculation of pension benefits. In light of these observations, I believe that the decision of the majority of the members of the panel was based on a passably plausible interpretation of the agreement.
This court has stated that “judicial reversal of an arbitrator’s award solely on the ground of a reviewing court’s disagreement with his construction of the contract is prohibited.” Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State, 475 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I.1984). There being no specific directive in the agreement concerning the particular issue at bar, it seems that the members of the majority have run afoul of the above-mentioned principle. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

. These provisions are reproduced in the text of the majority opinion.