Court Opinion

ID: 9583419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:38:25.39051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:00.524574
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully in the affirmance of the judgment in Case Number S98A0994. With regard to the dismissal of Case Number S98A1065,1 must concur reluctantly, because OCGA § 5-7-1, as presently worded, does not authorize the State to appeal from the denial of its motion to recuse the trial judge in a criminal case. Because I perceive this to be a serious omission in the statute, I write separately to encourage the General Assembly to consider amending OCGA § 5-7-1 so as to permit the State to seek an appeal under these circumstances.
As the majority holds, the State has no right, even with the permission of the appropriate appellate court, to appeal in a criminal case other than in the five instances currently enumerated in OCGA § 5-7-1. State v. Smith, 268 Ga. 75 (485 SE2d 491) (1997); Berky v. State, 266 Ga. 28 (463 SE2d 891) (1995). Although an appeal from the denial of the State’s motion to recuse is not one of those enumerated instances, such an appeal was heard by this Court in State v. Fleming, 245 Ga. 700 (267 SE2d 207) (1980). However, the issue of jurisdiction was not addressed in Fleming and, therefore, that decision is not authority for the proposition that the State can appeal from the denial of its motion to recuse in a criminal case. See Griffin v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Ga. 130, 131 (91 SE2d 10) (1956).
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the denial of a motion by the prosecution to recuse a trial judge can be crucial to the ultimate disposition of a criminal case. A trial court who is alleged to harbor prejudice against the State or in favor of the defendant is certainly no less of a potential impediment to the administration of justice in a criminal proceeding than is any of the five rulings which presently are designated as appealable in OCGA § 5-7-1. The State’s motion for recusal will not invariably be meritorious, just as the grant of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence or to dismiss an indictment is not always erroneous. Thus, every trial judge who is the subject of the State’s unsuccessful motion should not necessarily be recused from presiding over a criminal case. Unlike the grant of a motion to suppress or the dismissal of an indictment, however, every *887denial of the State’s recusal motion is currently insulated from appellate review.
Decided October 5, 1998.
Lee Sexton & Associates, Lee Sexton, Montgomery & McDonald, Colin E. McDonald, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, David B. Hornsby, Gregory R. Sturtevant, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.
At least one other jurisdiction has recognized the importance of allowing the State to appeal from an adverse ruling on its motion to recuse in a criminal case. The statutes of Louisiana permit the State to appeal from such a ruling. LSA - C.Cr.P. arts. 684, 912 (B) (6). I encourage the General Assembly to follow the example of our sister state of Louisiana and to amend OCGA § 5-7-1 so as to permit the State to bring an appeal from the denial of its motion to recuse in a criminal case.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this opinion.