Court Opinion

ID: 9915827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 19:00:40.39765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:45.631862
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40559    Document: 00517024849        Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/08/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                   FILED
                                                                        January 8, 2024
                                No. 22-40559                             Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                   Clerk

   Amber Ford; Regan Kimbrough; Donald Newsome,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                     versus

   Anderson County, Texas; Taket Holdings, L.L.C.; Adam
   Corley; Timothy Green; Greg Taylor; Robin Jones;
   Jonathan Strong; Jessica Carpenter; Alicia Wilson;
   Matthew Wickersham; Travis Wesson; Dakota Hughes;
   Todd Choate,

                                          Defendants—Appellees.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 6:19-CV-384
                 ______________________________

   Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         On June 15, 2018, pretrial detainee Rhonda Newsome died in
   Anderson County Jail due to complications from Addison’s disease.
   Newsome’s family members filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
   Anderson County, Sheriff Greg Taylor, Dr. Adam Corley, Nurse Timothy
   Green, and several jailers. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated
   Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee by failing to
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                                     No. 22-40559

   treat her chronic illness, resulting in a preventable death. The district court
   granted summary judgment for all Defendants and dismissed Plaintiffs’
   lawsuit with prejudice. After reviewing the record, we find that Plaintiffs
   have established genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether several
   Defendants violated Newsome’s clearly established constitutional rights. We
   accordingly REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
   Defendants Timothy Green, Todd Choate, Jonathan Strong, Robin Jones,
   Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and Dakota Hughes, but we
   AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants
   Alicia Wilson, Travis Wesson, and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C. We AFFIRM
   IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Adam Corley
   as related to Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim against him, but we REVERSE the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to
   Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory claim. We also AFFIRM IN PART the district
   court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants Anderson County and
   Greg Taylor, but we VACATE the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’
   motion for leave to file a third amended complaint and REMAND with
   instructions to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to include
   additional supervisory and municipal liability claims. Finally, we AFFIRM
   the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.
                                          I.
                                          A.
          This case involves the death of pretrial detainee Rhonda Newsome
   while in the custody of Anderson County Jail. Newsome had a history of
   several chronic conditions, including Addison’s disease, an uncommon
   illness that occurs when the adrenal glands do not produce enough of certain
   hormones. If left untreated, Addison’s disease can accelerate into an
   “Addisonian crisis,” which requires immediate medical intervention. Early

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   indicators of an Addisonian crisis may include severe weakness, pain in the
   lower back or legs, abdominal pain, vomiting, and low blood pressure.
   Addison’s disease requires lifelong treatment, which is primarily
   accomplished through administering steroid medications. When Addison’s
   disease patients are unmedicated for even brief periods of time, they can be
   at a high risk of experiencing an Addisonian crisis.
           During Newsome’s detainment, Anderson County contracted with
   Dr. Adam Corley, a private physician who provided medical care for
   detainees. Dr. Corley held the title of medical director of the jail. The County
   also employed Timothy Green, a registered nurse who worked at the jail part-
   time.
           Anderson County Jail’s health services plan states that medical care is
   to be provided to detainees twenty-four hours a day, and detainees are to be
   medically screened upon admission. Detainees with chronic illnesses are to
   undergo a medical assessment, and the jail physician is tasked with instituting
   a treatment regimen.
                                         B.
           Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Rhonda
   Newsome, age fifty, was arrested on March 9, 2018, following a domestic
   disturbance in which she allegedly chased her adult daughter with a pair of
   scissors. Newsome was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly
   weapon. After being treated at Palestine Regional Medical Center for back
   issues, Newsome was taken to Anderson County Jail on March 10, 2018, for
   pretrial detention.
           According to her jail intake form, Newsome suffered from several
   medical conditions, including Addison’s disease, fibromyalgia, seizures, joint
   or disc disease, spinal stenosis, and osteoarthritis. The form also indicates
   that Newsome was taking ten prescription medications at the time.

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         On March 11, Nurse Green examined Newsome. According to
   Green’s deposition testimony, Green and Newsome discussed her medical
   history and medications, and Green instituted a verbal treatment plan to
   “continue the medications that [Newsome] was on.” Green stated that this
   verbal treatment plan involved asking the jail staff to monitor Newsome and
   notifying Dr. Corley of any changes in her condition.
         During the months of March, April, and May, Newsome had periodic
   medical issues. On April 4, Newsome accidentally took an extra dose of blood
   pressure medication. Nurse Green treated her with a liter of saline solution,
   placed her on medical observation with repeated blood pressure readings,
   and reexamined her the next day. Green noted in Newsome’s medical
   activity log on April 5 that he would “attempt to obtain medical records.”
         On April 16 and April 18, Newsome complained of acid reflux, and
   jailers provided her with over-the-counter medication. On April 20, Nurse
   Green personally examined Newsome again and noted low blood pressure
   and bilateral leg swelling. Newsome was placed on medical observation, in
   which jailers logged her actions every fifteen minutes. Nurse Green further
   indicated that he would draw blood and report lab results to Dr. Corley, but
   it is disputed whether this blood draw occurred.
         On May 11, about two months into Newsome’s detention, Dr. Corley
   personally examined Newsome for the first and only time at the jail. Dr.
   Corley’s notes indicate that Newsome was in “no distress” during the
   examination, and that her “chief complaint” was gas. Dr. Corley
   acknowledged that Newsome suffered from Addison’s disease, and he made
   a note to follow up on medical records requests.
         Plaintiffs allege that Newsome was never prescribed or systematically
   provided with steroids—the primary treatment for Addison’s disease—

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   during her ninety-seven-day detention. They also allege that Newsome did
   not have her blood drawn for monitoring until June 15, the day of her death.
           On the evening of June 14, Newsome began vomiting and
   experiencing pain in her stomach and right flank area. After she complained
   to jail staff, Nurse Green visited the jail around midnight to personally
   examine her. 1 Green claims that he consulted with Dr. Corley by phone, and
   that per Dr. Corley’s instructions he administered one liter of saline and fifty
   milligrams of Phenergan for nausea treatment. Green testified that Newsome
   complained of “some mild nausea and some vomiting,” but that she had
   stable vital signs and appeared alert and oriented. Green also claims that he
   asked Newsome if she wanted to go to the hospital, but Newsome declined.
           After Green purportedly treated Newsome late on June 14, Newsome
   was placed on medical observation and jail staff were instructed to move her
   into a holding cell where she could be observed through the night. Video
   footage indicates that jail staff checked on Newsome thirty-one times during
   the seventeen-hour period between midnight on June 14 and her death in the
   afternoon of June 15.
           Plaintiffs have presented affidavit evidence from other detainees in
   nearby cells on the night of June 14 through June 15 indicating that during
   this seventeen-hour period, Newsome was in grave distress from a severe
   Addisonian crisis. Detainee Edward Jimenez, who was in a cell adjacent to
   Newsome’s cell, testified that Newsome repeatedly cried and screamed

           _____________________
           1
               Plaintiffs claim that there is a factual dispute regarding whether Nurse Green
   made this midnight visit to Newsome. We express no view on whether Plaintiffs have
   presented sufficient evidence to support a justifiable inference that Nurse Green fabricated
   this visit. Even if we accepted as true Green’s claim that he treated Newsome that night,
   we would still hold that the district court erred in granting him summary judgment due to
   the events that transpired on June 15.

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   during the night, repeating phrases such as “help-help,” “I’m hurting bad,”
   “please help,” “Lord help me,” “take me to the hospital,” and “I need a
   doctor.” Jimenez reports being unable to sleep due to the noise. He also
   claims that nearby jailers appeared to be ignoring Newsome’s cries and pleas
   for help.
            Detainee Ashley Lyons, who was in a cell adjacent to Newsome’s cell
   on June 15, testified that she repeatedly heard Newsome groaning and saying
   that she needed to go to the hospital. Lyons reports that Newsome’s cries for
   help were loud enough to wake her up on several occasions.
            Detainee Charles Patrick Sweet, who was near Newsome’s holding
   cell, testified that during the middle of the night he heard “a female voice
   coming from the processing area repeatedly crying out loudly that she needed
   [a] doctor and that she needed to go to the hospital.”
            Around 1:30 a.m. on June 15, A’rhonda Kelli Schuckers, an inmate
   and trustee at Anderson County Jail, assisted in removing Newsome from her
   cell for a shower. Newsome was unable to walk on her own; she had to be
   supported on both sides by a trustee and a jailer. While cleaning Newsome’s
   cell during the shower, Schuckers noticed that Newsome had vomited a black
   substance into a cup. After Newsome returned to her cell, Jailer-Defendant
   Robin Jones took Newsome’s blood pressure and yelled out that it was
   80/40.
            At approximately 7:40 a.m. on June 15, Nurse Green examined
   Newsome. Newsome’s medical activity log indicates that she was nauseated,
   “had thrown up brown colored fluid but was still able to tolerate water,” and
   was complaining of “right flank area pain.” Green drew a blood sample and
   gave Newsome Phenergan and Tylenol #4. Green claims that he asked
   Newsome if she wanted to go to the hospital, and that she declined. Green’s
   notes indicate that upon receiving the results of Newsome’s blood work, Dr.

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   Corley might order a CT scan and send Newsome to the hospital for further
   evaluation. Following this visit, Green took Newsome’s blood sample to
   Palestine Regional Medical Center for testing.
          The parties dispute whether Nurse Green learned of Newsome’s
   blood test results that morning, or later that afternoon when Newsome was
   found unresponsive. The test results indicate that Newsome’s blood urea
   nitrogen level was critically high, and her potassium level was critically low.
   The blood work report’s notation indicates that lab technician Wesley Wood
   called Nurse Green at approximately 10:40 a.m. on June 15 and reported a
   “critical value,” which indicates a medical emergency that requires
   immediate attention. The report further indicates that Nurse Green “read
   back” the critical value to confirm understanding. However, Wood could not
   recall in his deposition—taken over two years later—what values he read to
   Green. Green, on the other hand, has repeatedly testified that he does not
   recall being informed of any critical values on the morning of June 15. He
   states that had he received the critical values that morning, he would have
   immediately called Dr. Corley.
          Plaintiffs highlight that shortly after this call discussing lab results,
   Nurse Green called Jail Captain Todd Choate. Throughout the day on June
   15, Choate undertook efforts to call the district attorney’s office and obtain a
   personal recognizance bond (“PR bond”) for Newsome. Choate explained
   in his deposition that he requests PR bonds “[a]nytime that [jail staff] believe
   someone is going to go to the hospital.” He also acknowledged that this
   practice exists because of staffing issues; when a detainee is admitted to the
   hospital under a PR bond, the jail does not need staff to sit at the hospital
   with the detainee. This plan to secure a PR bond for Newsome had been
   discussed with Sheriff Greg Taylor, the undisputed policymaker at Anderson
   County Jail during Newsome’s detainment. Furthermore, in an affidavit,
   former jailer Jacob P. Mobley testified that Nurse Green confided to him that

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   Sheriff Taylor had limited Green’s ability to send people to the hospital due
   to cost concerns. The request for a PR bond was canceled when Newsome
   was finally taken to the hospital in the afternoon.
          At approximately 4:20 p.m. on June 15, Jailer-Defendants Jessica
   Carpenter, Matthew Wickersham, and Dakota Hughes assisted Newsome to
   the toilet. On the way to the toilet, Newsome grabbed the wall, fell, and
   vomited, and Carpenter retrieved a wheelchair for her. Wickersham told
   Newsome to let the jailers know when she was finished using the toilet, and
   he left the cell door open a crack. At around 5:00 p.m., Jailer-Defendant
   Wickersham checked on Newsome and found her unresponsive. As multiple
   Jailer Defendants began to locate emergency equipment, Wickersham called
   Nurse Green, who instructed him to notify emergency medical services
   (“EMS”). Green testified that he learned about Newsome’s critical blood
   work results around the same time that Newsome was found unresponsive.
          After Wickersham called Nurse Green, Carpenter wheeled Newsome
   into the processing area. Newsome was laid onto a mat, and Jailer-
   Defendants Alicia Wilson, Hughes, and Carpenter left to retrieve a
   defibrillator. Two Anderson County deputies took turns providing chest
   compressions to Newsome until EMS arrived.
          Newsome was pronounced dead at the hospital at 5:37 p.m.
   Newsome’s autopsy indicates that she died of “[c]omplications of Addison’s
   disease, hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, obesity, and
   pulmonary emphysema.”
                                         C.
          Plaintiffs-Appellants in this action are Amber Ford (Newsome’s
   daughter), Regan Kimbrough (Newsome’s son), and Donald Newsome
   (Newsome’s father). Plaintiffs filed their first complaint in federal court on
   August 21, 2019. Defendants-Appellees are Anderson County, Texas; Greg

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   Taylor, the Sheriff of Anderson County during the relevant period; jailers
   Robin Jones, Jonathan Strong, Jessica Carpenter, Alicia Wilson, Matthew
   Wickersham, Travis Wesson, Dakota Hughes, and Todd Choate
   (collectively, the “Jailer Defendants”); Nurse Timothy Green; Dr. Adam
   Corley; and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C., a medical services company formed
   by Dr. Corley and Nurse Green. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983, and they claim that Defendants violated Newsome’s Fourteenth
   Amendment due process rights as a pretrial detainee.
           Plaintiffs sought leave to file a third amended complaint on January
   13, 2021. They intended to add as a defendant Lieutenant Tia Pierson,
   another jailer who is alleged to have been aware of Newsome’s critical
   condition. The proposed third amended complaint would also include
   allegations about a policy of delaying medical treatment to seek detainees’
   release on PR bonds.
           On May 5, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for all
   Defendants except for Anderson County, finding that these individual
   Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court first
   addressed the claims against Sheriff Taylor, who was not personally involved
   in Newsome’s treatment, but who was alleged to have: (1) failed to train or
   supervise his staff; (2) implemented a policy prohibiting jail staff below the
   rank of sergeant from contacting EMS without permission from superiors;
   and (3) implemented a policy requiring staff to secure PR bonds when
   detainees needed hospitalization. 2 The district court found that Plaintiffs’

           _____________________
           2
            The policy regarding PR bonds was not properly raised before the district court
   because it was not alleged in the operative second amended complaint. See Jackson v.
   Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2021). The district court nevertheless determined
   that even if the claim had been properly raised, Plaintiffs’ evidence did not show that this
   policy contributed to Newsome’s death or was implemented with deliberate indifference.

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   evidence was insufficient to show that Sheriff Taylor acted with the requisite
   level of deliberate indifference to establish a constitutional violation.
           Turning to the Jailer Defendants, the district court found that each
   jailer lacked subjective knowledge of Newsome’s dire medical situation, and
   that their responses to Newsome’s medical issues were reasonable. The
   district court then addressed the Defendants responsible for Newsome’s
   medical treatment. The district court found that, at best, Plaintiffs had shown
   that additional or different treatment may have prevented Newsome’s death,
   but that they had not shown that Dr. Corley exhibited “deliberate
   indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” 3 The district court
   similarly found that Nurse Green’s actions, even if negligent, did not rise to
   the level of deliberate indifference required to find a constitutional violation.
   The district court also granted summary judgment for TAKET Holdings,
   L.L.C., because the company was not contracted with Anderson County at
   the time of Newsome’s detainment and death. 4
           On July 29, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for
   Anderson County, the last remaining Defendant in the case. The district
   court first found, as a threshold matter, that the municipality could not be
   held liable when there was no finding of an underlying constitutional violation
   committed by an individual defendant, citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
   U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Then, addressing the two alleged policies of prohibiting
   jailers from calling EMS without approval and delaying hospitalization to
   request PR bonds, the district court found that there was insufficient

           _____________________
           3
             As a threshold issue, the district court concluded that Dr. Corley was entitled to
   assert qualified immunity. Plaintiffs do not contest this determination on appeal.
           4
            On appeal, Plaintiffs do not contest the grant of summary judgment for TAKET
   Holdings, L.L.C. We accordingly AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment for this Defendant.

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   evidence that these policies existed or contributed to Newsome’s death. The
   district court issued a final judgment in favor of Defendants on July 29, 2022.
          Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was
   denied as moot when the district court granted summary judgment for all
   individual Defendants. In its order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider
   the granting of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the district
   court clarified that there was insufficient evidence of the alleged PR bond
   policy, and that granting Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended
   complaint would have been futile.
                                          II.
                                          A.
          We first address the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
   each individual Defendant. This court reviews grants of summary judgment
   de novo. Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co., 41 F.4th 493, 502 (5th Cir. 2022).
   Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is “no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact
   is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
   verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
   242, 248 (1986). The court views all evidence and draws all justifiable
   inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Moore, 41 F.4th at 502.
          “A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment
   burden of proof.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). To
   overcome an official’s qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must establish:
   “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
   the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”
   Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
   U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours

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   of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
   understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton,
   483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Although this does not mean that “a case directly
   on point” is required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
   constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. The salient
   question is whether the state of the law gives the official “fair warning” that
   his or her conduct is unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
   (2002).
           “The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee are found in the
   procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
   Amendment.” Est. of Henson v. Wichita County, 795 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir.
   2015). For claims related to the medical treatment of a pretrial detainee, this
   court will find a constitutional violation where an officer: (1) subjectively
   knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee; and (2) responded
   to that risk with “deliberate indifference.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 206–
   07 (5th Cir. 2021). 5
           We have described deliberate indifference as “an extremely high
   standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th

           _____________________
           5
             The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical
   needs, while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a pretrial
   detainee’s medical needs. Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019). Because there
   is “no significant distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted inmates concerning
   basic human needs such as medical care,” Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir.
   2001), case law related to a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to medical care can clearly
   establish a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care for the
   purposes of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 951–52 (5th Cir.
   2022) (finding that a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care was
   clearly established by Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006), an Eighth Amendment
   case); Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Eighth Amendment cases,
   including Easter, to find that a pretrial detainee’s right to medical care was clearly
   established).

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   Cir. 2001). A detainee can establish a jail official’s deliberate indifference by
   showing that the official “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
   intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that
   would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” See
   Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). Deliberate indifference
   can also be shown where a jail official knows that a detainee faces “a
   substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
   reasonable measures to abate it.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847
   (1994). On the other hand, “[u]nsuccessful medical treatment, acts of
   negligence,   or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate
   indifference.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).
                                          B.
          We begin with Defendant Adam Corley. It is undisputed that Dr.
   Corley’s first and only significant personal interaction with Newsome was on
   May 11, when he addressed her complaints of gas. During this interaction,
   Dr. Corley was aware that Newsome had Addison’s disease, and he may have
   reviewed her medical activity log to find that Newsome had experienced low
   blood pressure and leg swelling on April 20. Based on this interaction,
   whether Dr. Corley committed a constitutional violation hinges on: (1)
   whether Dr. Corley’s knowledge that Newsome had Addison’s disease
   constituted subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm; and
   (2) whether Dr. Corley’s failure to provide any follow-up treatment or
   monitoring until the date of Newsome’s death constituted deliberate
   indifference. We find that both questions can be answered in the affirmative.
          Plaintiffs have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
   whether Dr. Corley had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
   harm to Newsome. It is undisputed that Dr. Corley subjectively knew that
   Newsome had Addison’s disease, and it is undisputed that Dr. Corley had

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   basic knowledge about Addison’s disease. A reasonable jury could therefore
   find that Dr. Corley subjectively knew that Newsome suffered from a chronic
   illness that could become life-threatening if left untreated. This should
   suffice to establish Dr. Corley’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
   serious harm. 6
           Plaintiffs have also presented a genuine dispute of material fact
   regarding whether Dr. Corley’s failure to treat or monitor Newsome’s
   Addison’s disease constituted deliberate indifference. Had Dr. Corley simply
   mistreated Newsome’s Addison’s disease or made negligent treatment
   decisions, that would not constitute deliberate indifference. See Gobert, 463
   F.3d at 346. But Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Dr. Corley did not
   monitor or treat Newsome’s Addison’s disease whatsoever. 7 Accordingly,

           _____________________
           6
              We note that a patient does not need to be experiencing an acute medical crisis
   requiring emergency intervention to be facing a substantial risk of serious harm—suffering
   from a known chronic issue that requires ongoing or long-term treatment may also suffice.
   See, e.g., Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a sufficient
   risk of harm for a deliberate indifference claim where jail medical staff were on notice that
   an inmate had ulcers that required diligent day-to-day treatment); Delaughter v. Woodall,
   909 F.3d 130, 138–41 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that an inmate in need of a hip replacement
   and reconstructive surgery stated a deliberate indifference claim that should have survived
   a summary judgment challenge); Dauzat v. Carter, 670 F. App’x 297, 298 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (affirming that a prisoner with a “serious medical need for physical therapy” stated a valid
   deliberate indifference claim).
           7
             While Dr. Corley did treat Newsome’s immediate symptom of gas with anti-gas
   medication, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that he did not treat Newsome for
   Addison’s disease. Responding to a serious medical issue with such a cursory level of care
   may still constitute deliberate indifference. See Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 206, 210
   (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that a nearly two-hour delay in calling an ambulance could
   constitute deliberate indifference, even though a defendant had administered first aid);
   Ledesma v. Swartz, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746 at *1 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that treating
   complaints of a broken jaw with only over-the-counter pain medication and a liquid diet
   could constitute deliberate indifference); see also Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789 (11th
   Cir. 1989) (“When the need for treatment is obvious, medical care which is so cursory as
   to amount to no treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference.”).

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   Plaintiffs have presented a factual dispute regarding whether Dr. Corley
   responded to Newsome’s potentially life-threatening illness with deliberate
   indifference by failing to provide any treatment.
          Dr. Corley counters Plaintiffs’ allegation of deliberate indifference by
   referencing the well-established principle that questions regarding proper
   diagnosis and treatment are “classic example[s] of . . . matter[s] for medical
   judgment,” and not bases for finding a constitutional violation. See Estelle v.
   Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107–08 (1976). But treating Addison’s disease is not
   particularly complex—as Plaintiffs point out, typical treatment involves
   administering common steroids such as hydrocortisone. A reasonable jury
   could conclude that failing to provide steroid medications to an Addison’s
   disease patient is not a legitimate exercise of “medical judgment.” See
   Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 138 (reversing summary judgment for a defendant
   where it was “not clear” that the cancellation of the plaintiff’s surgery and a
   medical center’s refusal to accept the plaintiff as a patient were “medical-
   judgment decisions”).
          In summary, Plaintiffs have presented facts indicating that Dr. Corley:
   (1) subjectively knew that Newsome had Addison’s disease—a potentially
   fatal but eminently treatable condition; and (2) did nothing to treat this
   chronic illness. A jury considering these facts could find that Dr. Corley
   violated Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
          Dr. Corley has invoked qualified immunity. Under our case law,
   Plaintiffs must show that Newsome’s rights “were clearly established at the
   time of the violation.” Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2021). In
   Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d at 465, we held that the law is clearly established
   that a prisoner’s rights are violated if “a prison official ‘refuse[s] to treat him,
   ignore[s] his complaints, intentionally treat[s] him incorrectly, or engage[s]
   in any similar conduct that . . . clearly evince[s] a wanton disregard for any

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   serious medical needs.’” (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). And in Sims v.
   Griffin, 35 F.4th at 951, we reiterated that Easter illustrates circumstances
   where a detainee “can show [that] his clearly established rights . . . were
   violated.” In Easter, the plaintiff prisoner had chronic heart problems and
   visited the prison infirmary complaining of severe chest pain. Easter, 467
   F.3d at 461. The prison nurse, who knew of the prisoner’s heart problems,
   denied the prisoner’s request for medicine after learning that the prison
   pharmacy was closed. Id. at 461, 463–64. We held that the nurse was not
   entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because her
   actions may have violated the prisoner’s clearly established constitutional
   rights. Id. at 465.
           Like the nurse in Easter, Dr. Corley knew that an inmate had a serious
   medical condition but failed to treat her for that condition. We recognize that
   the prisoner in Easter was denied treatment during an acute period, while Dr.
   Corley denied Newsome ongoing, day-to-day treatment for her known
   chronic condition—Addison’s disease. But our case law clearly establishes
   that refusal to treat in both types of circumstances is a violation of an inmate’s
   constitutional rights. In Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d at 260, a
   paraplegic inmate developed decubitus ulcers (bed sores) while
   incarcerated. 8 The inmate’s doctor provided mandatory medical orders to
   the jail’s medical staff. Id. The medical staff knew that the inmate had a
   serious ailment but “did not provide the prescribed treatments, seek
   alternative placement for [the inmate], or monitor the progression of his

           _____________________
           8
             While Plaintiffs themselves do not cite to Lawson, in a qualified immunity inquiry
   “we needn’t limit our analysis to the cases cited by Plaintiffs.” See Joseph ex rel. Est. of
   Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 338 (5th Cir. 2020); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
   (1994) (“A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should . . . use its
   ‘full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents.’” (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468
   U.S. 183, 192 n.9 (1984))).

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   wounds.” Id. at 261. We determined that the medical staff’s refusal to
   provide the inmate with ongoing treatment, “despite their actual knowledge
   of the seriousness of [the inmate’s] condition,” could constitute deliberate
   indifference. Id. at 263. 9
           We also note that several of our sister circuits have found that failing
   to provide treatment for a chronic illness may constitute deliberate
   indifference. In Egebergh v. Nicholson, 272 F.3d 925, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2001),
   the Seventh Circuit held that a jury could find that two jail officials were
   deliberately indifferent for failing to provide a diabetic detainee with a
   morning insulin shot. In Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir.
   1999), the Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for a
   deputy sheriff who was accused of denying diabetes medication to an inmate.
   The Sixth Circuit and Fourth Circuit have held that jail officials could be held

           _____________________
           9
              Several of our unpublished opinions are also worth highlighting. This court’s
   unpublished opinions cannot clearly establish the law for the purposes of qualified
   immunity, but they nevertheless may “aptly illustrate[] the established right.” Cooper v.
   Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 525 n.8 (5th Cir. 2016). Of particular relevance is this court’s decision
   in Dauzat v. Carter, 670 F. App’x at 298, where we affirmed that a prisoner stated a valid
   deliberate indifference claim in alleging that a doctor ignored his “serious medical need for
   physical therapy” by only providing a wellness program conducted by inmates. We further
   held that the prisoner’s constitutional rights were clearly established by Easter and Lawson.
   Here, we similarly hold that Newsome’s right to not be denied, by deliberate indifference,
   treatment for her chronic condition was clearly established by Easter and Lawson.
             Furthermore, in several other unpublished opinions, we have recognized that an
   official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs when he or she
   delays treatment or provides only cursory care. See, e.g., Loosier v. Unknown Med. Dr., 435
   F. App’x 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference
   claim where a doctor knew that the prisoner had injured his neck but “chose not to provide
   him any treatment or medication for his injury”); Ledesma, 1997 WL 811746, at *1 (finding
   that an inmate stated a deliberate indifference claim where a doctor treated complaints of a
   broken jaw with nothing more than Motrin and a liquid diet); Vasquez v. Dretke, 226 F.
   App’x 338, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference claim
   where dentists knew that the prisoner needed dentures but refused to provide care).

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   liable for overseeing medical systems that denied treatment to inmates with
   chronic conditions. See Young ex rel. Est. of Young v. Martin, 51 F. App’x 509,
   515 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a jail director was not entitled to qualified
   immunity for implementing a policy that provided minimal care to inmates
   with chronic illnesses); Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 360–61 (4th Cir.
   2019) (finding that a chief physician could be held liable for implementing
   policies that denied treatment to inmates with the hepatitis C virus).
          Considering the foregoing authorities, we find that Dr. Corley’s
   alleged failure to provide any treatment to a detainee with a chronic illness
   that can become life-threatening if left untreated may have violated
   Newsome’s clearly established constitutional rights. A jury may ultimately
   find that the absence in the record of Newsome affirmatively requesting
   Addison’s disease medication weighs against Plaintiffs’ case, or they may
   find that Newsome’s medication list—which contained a long list of
   medications but not steroid medications—ultimately did not provide Dr.
   Corley with clear enough notice that Newsome was not being treated for
   Addison’s disease. However, construing the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, a
   jury could also reasonably conclude that a patient with untreated Addison’s
   disease presents a serious, obvious risk that is in line with our prior cases
   finding deliberate indifference for failing to provide medical care. We find
   that these factual issues regarding Dr. Corley’s notice of the risk facing
   Newsome and his actions following his encounter with Newsome preclude
   summary judgment.
          We briefly note that Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint appears to
   plead a supervisory claim against Dr. Corley. However, as Dr. Corley
   correctly points out, Plaintiffs have abandoned their supervisory claim
   against him by failing to raise the issue on appeal. See United States v. Ogle,
   415 F.3d 382, 383 (5th Cir. 2005). We accordingly AFFIRM IN PART the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to

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   Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim, but we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory
   deliberate indifference claim.
                                           C.
             We next address Defendant Timothy Green. In opposing Nurse
   Green’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs centered on Nurse
   Green’s conduct on June 14 and June 15, the dates on which Newsome
   exhibited symptoms of an acute Addisonian crisis. We find that Plaintiffs
   have presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that
   Nurse Green’s actions on June 15, the day of Newsome’s death, constituted
   a violation of Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
             To establish that Nurse Green subjectively knew of a substantial risk
   of serious harm to Newsome, Plaintiffs have presented evidence indicating
   that the results of Newsome’s blood work put Nurse Green on notice that
   Newsome needed emergency care. In his deposition, lab technician Wesley
   Wood acknowledged that a lab report of Newsome’s blood work indicates
   that: (1) Newsome’s blood work revealed “critical values”; (2) Wood called
   Nurse Green on the morning of June 15 to notify him of these results; and (3)
   Nurse Green “understood those results and read them back.” We find that
   the call that occurred between Wood and Nurse Green around 10:40 a.m. on
   June 15 establishes a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Nurse
   Green’s subjective knowledge that Newsome was at risk of an Addisonian
   crisis.
             Additionally, Plaintiffs have presented evidence indicating that Nurse
   Green’s response to this information was deliberately indifferent, not merely
   negligent or inadequate. Immediately after getting off the phone with Wood,
   Nurse Green called Jail Captain Todd Choate, who worked on June 15 to
   release Newsome via a PR bond. The affidavit of former jailer Jacob Mobley

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   suggests that Nurse Green deliberately delayed sending Newsome to the
   hospital due to restrictions placed upon him by Sheriff Taylor.
          Viewing this evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, a reasonable jury could
   determine that on the morning of June 15, Nurse Green: (1) knew that
   Newsome had vomited “brown colored fluid” and was in a serious enough
   condition to warrant blood work and potential hospitalization; (2) received
   lab results indicating that Newsome was in a critical condition and needed
   emergency care; and (3) delayed sending Newsome to the hospital due to
   restrictions from Sheriff Taylor. These factual conclusions could support a
   finding that Nurse Green violated Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment
   rights as a pretrial detainee by responding to a substantial risk of serious harm
   to Newsome with deliberate indifference.
          Turning to the second prong of our qualified immunity inquiry, we
   find that Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were clearly established
   at the time of Nurse Green’s alleged constitutional violation. There is ample
   case law in this circuit indicating that denying or unreasonably delaying
   medical treatment to someone in need of immediate medical assistance
   constitutes deliberate indifference. We again reference Easter, where we
   found that a nurse’s refusal to provide any treatment to a prisoner in need of
   medication could constitute a clearly established violation of the prisoner’s
   constitutional rights. Easter, 467 F.3d at 464–65.
          Additionally, in Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d at 210, this court held that
   the plaintiffs had stated a deliberate indifference claim sufficient to survive a
   motion for summary judgment when there was a one-hour and forty-two-
   minute delay in calling an ambulance for a heat stroke victim who was
   unconscious and vomiting. Even though a defendant at the court-ordered
   boot camp had administered first aid, id. at 206, the extensive delay in calling
   an ambulance rose to the level of deliberate indifference, id. at 210.

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          Here, there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
   Nurse Green learned of Newsome’s critical blood work results and failed to
   act on this information for over six hours until Newsome’s death. A jury
   could conclude that Nurse Green’s failure to act in light of this critical
   information was a total refusal of care to a patient known to be suffering from
   chronic, serious medical issues, as in Easter. Alternatively, a jury could
   conclude that Nurse Green’s failure to act for over six hours when presented
   with indications of a medical emergency constituted deliberate indifference
   like the delay alleged in Austin.
          We conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact over when
   Nurse Green knew of the critical values, and thus whether he acted with
   deliberate indifference. We further conclude that under Easter and Austin,
   Nurse Green was on notice that deliberate indifference to a detainee’s serious
   medical needs is a Fourteenth Amendment violation. We accordingly
   REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Nurse Green.
                                           D.
          We next address the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
   Jailer-Defendants Jonathan Strong, Robin Jones, Matthew Wickersham,
   Jessica Carpenter, Dakota Hughes, Todd Choate, Alicia Wilson, and Travis
   Wesson.
          1.      Jailer-Defendants Jonathan Strong and Robin Jones
          Jailer-Defendant Jonathan Strong was working during the night of
   June 14 through June 15, and he used a wheelchair to place Newsome into a
   holding cell near midnight for medical observation. Jailer-Defendant Robin
   Jones was also working during the night of June 14 through June 15, and she
   took Newsome’s blood pressure around 2:00 a.m. Plaintiffs have presented
   evidence that during that evening, Newsome: (1) repeatedly cried out that
   she needed to go to the hospital; (2) vomited a black or brown substance in

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                                     No. 22-40559

   her cell; (3) had a blood pressure reading of 80/40, which was measured by
   Jailer-Defendant Jones; and (4) was unable to ambulate without assistance.
          In granting summary judgment in favor of the Jailer Defendants, the
   district court primarily relied on two unpublished cases that it considered
   substantially similar to the present case: Trevino v. Hinz, 751 F. App’x 551
   (5th Cir. 2018), and Rombach v. Culpepper, No. 20-30554, 2021 WL 2944809
   (5th Cir. July 13, 2021). In Trevino, an arrestee died after she surreptitiously
   ingested methamphetamine during a traffic stop. Trevino, 751 F. App’x at
   552. While the arrestee was sitting on the curb waiting for an officer to
   complete paperwork, the arrestee started vomiting, shaking, and dry heaving.
   Id. The arrestee claimed to be having a seizure, but the officers on the scene
   thought that she was faking her symptoms to avoid jail. Id. at 552–53. Once it
   became clear to the officers that the distress was genuine, they called an
   ambulance. Id. at 553. This court found that the officers did not act with
   deliberate indifference when initially failing to take the arrestee’s symptoms
   seriously, since they were not unreasonable in initially believing that the
   arrestee’s “ambiguous” symptoms did not require immediate medical
   attention. Id. at 556.
          In Rombach, the plaintiffs provided evidence that the decedent
   detainee told a group of jailers that he needed to go to the hospital because he
   was vomiting and going through drug withdrawal. Rombach, 2021 WL
   2944809, at *5. One guard allegedly told the detainee that he would have to
   suffer through his symptoms, while another guard provided the detainee with
   castor oil for his constipation. Id. A few days later, the detainee passed away
   due to a perforated duodenal ulcer (stomach ulcer). Id. at *1. This court
   found that the jailers were not deliberately indifferent because, among other
   things: the detainee had written in his medical information sheet that he did
   not regularly take drugs; the detainee later told the officers that “he was fine”

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   when they followed up with him about his withdrawal symptoms; and no jail
   personnel were aware of the detainee’s undiscovered ulcer issue. Id. at *6.
          This case is materially distinguishable from Trevino and Rombach.
   Perhaps most significantly, Newsome was on medical observation at the jail.
   Unlike the officers in Trevino, the Jailer Defendants had no reason to believe
   that Newsome’s pleas for help or symptoms were not genuine; because she
   was placed on medical observation, the jailers were on notice that Newsome
   might be at risk of experiencing a medical emergency. Furthermore, Trevino
   involved a delay in care where the officers had reason to believe that there
   was not an emergency health situation; once they realized that there was a
   genuine emergency, they sought help. Here, there were many reasons to
   think that there was an emergency health situation—Newsome’s pleas for
   help, that she was on medical observation, and her alarming symptoms.
   Despite these indicators, Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones did not seek
   emergency medical assistance.
          Furthermore, viewing the evidence in their favor, Plaintiffs’ case is
   distinguishable from that of the plaintiffs in Rombach. In Rombach, the
   decedent told his jailers that he was experiencing withdrawal from heroin,
   and the warden had testified that a nearby hospital “routinely explained to
   the jail facility . . . that there is no real treatment of withdrawal symptoms and
   it is sufficient for the jail to observe the inmate in withdrawal and provide
   plenty of hydration, aspirin, and malox-type [sic] products to assist the
   inmate.” Rombach, 2021 WL 2944809, at *1. Here, Newsome’s pleas for
   help, vomiting of a black or brown substance, inability to ambulate without
   assistance, and medical observation status present distinguishable facts
   indicating that hospitalization was necessary.
          Plaintiffs argue that Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, presents a more
   comparable fact pattern. In Sims, a pretrial detainee who may have ingested

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   a bag full of drugs cried out for medical attention over the course of several
   hours, and he vomited a “dark black liquid” that he smeared all over the floor
   and his face. Id. at 948. The jailers consciously decided to not call EMS, and
   one guard made disparaging comments about the detainee’s condition. Id.
   After hours of vomiting black liquid and crying out with no response from
   jailers, the detainee died. Id. This court determined that the guards’ refusal
   of care was comparable to the nurse’s refusal of care in Easter v. Powell, 467
   F.3d at 465, which was cited as the case law that clearly established the
   detainee’s constitutional rights. Sims, 35 F.4th at 951–52.
           Plaintiffs are correct that there are some significant similarities
   between Sims and the present case. Like the detainee in Sims, Newsome died
   a slow, seemingly preventable death. She vomited a dark substance, and
   evidence indicates that she cried out for help and begged to go to the hospital.
   Granted, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of the Jailer Defendants
   directly admitting that they were subjectively aware of Newsome’s cries or
   her dark-colored vomit. Nevertheless, at this summary judgment stage, we
   find that Plaintiffs have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
   whether Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones heard Newsome’s cries and saw
   the dark-colored vomit. If a jury concludes that Strong and Jones heard these
   repeated cries for help and did nothing to assist Newsome, they could
   reasonably find that this conduct constituted deliberate indifference because
   they “refused to treat [her], ignored [her] complaints,” and evinced “a
   wanton disregard for [her] serious medical needs.” Easter, 467 F.3d at 465
   (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756).
           We also find that Newsome’s constitutional rights were clearly
   established by Easter. 10 Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, like the nurse
           _____________________
           10
            Our conclusion is bolstered by a line of prior cases in which we found that officials
   may have exhibited deliberate indifference by ignoring or providing only a cursory response

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   in Easter, Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones ignored an inmate’s complaints
   and refused to provide any medical assistance. See id. at 461. Furthermore,
   because Newsome was on medical observation, a reasonable jury could infer
   that Strong and Jones knew that Newsome faced a substantial risk of serious
   harm if they were unresponsive to her medical needs.
           While Plaintiffs have failed to provide a direct admission from Jailer-
   Defendants Strong and Jones that they heard Newsome’s cries for help, we
   agree with Plaintiffs that they have raised legitimate “fact issues as to each
   jailer’s knowledge of [Newsome’s] emergency condition in the . . . hours
   prior to her death.” Because of these disputed fact issues, we REVERSE
   the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Jailer-Defendants
   Jonathan Strong and Robin Jones.
    2.     Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and
                                      Dakota Hughes
           Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and
   Dakota Hughes all assisted Newsome to the toilet in her cell on June 15.
   Plaintiffs have presented evidence that during this trip to the toilet,
   Newsome was unable to walk, collapsed, and vomited upon collapsing.
   Despite these signs of a medical emergency, Wickersham, Carpenter, and
   Hughes did not seek medical assistance or closely monitor Newsome.

           _____________________
   to medical complaints. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Grayson, 557 F. App’x 341, 342, 346–47 (5th
   Cir. 2014) (finding deliberate indifference where a nurse responded to complaints of
   nausea, vomiting, and severe abdominal pain with nausea medicine and an enema); Galvan
   v. Calhoun County, 719 F. App’x 372, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that an inmate stated
   a deliberate indifference claim where prison officials responded to his complaints of
   excruciating stomach pain by providing Pepto-Bismol and a home remedy); Harris v.
   Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159–60 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate
   indifference claim where prison officials ignored his repeated complaints of excruciating
   pain after his jaw broke); Ledesma, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746, at *1.

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   Instead, they left her alone on the toilet for about thirty minutes, where
   Newsome experienced her final moments of consciousness.
            While Wickersham, Carpenter, and Hughes lacked the benefit of
   hindsight when they assisted Newsome to the toilet, the fact that Newsome
   would be found unresponsive thirty minutes later raises factual issues
   regarding what kind of condition Newsome was in at the time. Based on the
   evidence that Plaintiffs have presented, a reasonable jury could conclude that
   Newsome’s collapse and vomiting episode indicated that she faced a
   substantial risk of serious harm, and that Jailer-Defendants Wickersham,
   Carpenter, and Hughes’s failure to monitor Newsome or provide immediate
   medical assistance constituted deliberate indifference.
            We find that Newsome’s rights were clearly established, especially
   considering the parallels between the present case and Austin v. Johnson, in
   which boot-camp personnel potentially exhibited deliberate indifference in
   their delay to call an ambulance after the plaintiff collapsed and vomited.
   Austin, 328 F.3d at 210. 11 Because fact issues exist regarding Newsome’s
   medical condition during her collapse, and because the Jailer Defendants
   responded to Newsome’s potentially serious condition by failing to seek
   immediate medical assistance, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment for Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica
   Carpenter, and Dakota Hughes.

            _____________________
            11
              In addition to Austin, several of our prior cases support our conclusion that a jail
   official exhibits deliberate indifference by failing to provide care when an inmate faces a
   serious medical emergency. See, e.g., Loosier, 435 F. App’x at 306; Perez v. Anderson, 350 F.
   App’x 959, 962–63 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference
   claim by alleging that jail officials failed to provide him with pain relief or x-rays until several
   months after an attack by other prisoners); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir.
   1961) (holding that a pretrial detainee with dislocated and fractured vertebrae stated a valid
   claim for relief where officials provided him with no medical attention).

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                         3.     Jail Captain Todd Choate
          Plaintiffs argue that “[b]ecause a jury could conclude [Captain]
   Choate improperly denied and delayed emergency medical care for
   Newsome for non-medical reasons, fact issues exist as to whether Choate was
   deliberately indifferent to Newsome’s serious medical needs.” Their
   argument has merit. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Nurse Green
   contacted Captain Choate shortly after receiving Newsome’s blood work
   results. It is also undisputed that Captain Choate attempted to secure
   Newsome’s release via a PR bond on June 15. When asked in his deposition
   what the purpose of his call to the district attorney on June 15 was, Choate
   replied that “[a]nytime that we believe someone is going to go to the hospital,
   we will call the DA’s office, [to] see if they will entertain a PR bond.” Choate
   also suggested that Anderson County Jail seeks these PR bond releases due
   to staffing concerns—a non-medical reason.
          Defendants offer an alternative explanation for Captain Choate’s
   actions. Relying on Choate’s affidavit, they claim that Choate believed that
   Newsome may have been suffering from a stomach bug, and that Choate
   seeks releases on PR bonds for detainees who “ha[ve] a history of medical
   issues and [are] not feeling well.”
          As Plaintiffs point out, Captain Choate’s “stomach bug” explanation
   is contradicted by his deposition testimony, which indicates that Choate
   knew that Newsome needed hospitalization. A jury could conclude that
   Choate indeed knew that Newsome needed to go to the hospital and that she
   had a “history of medical issues,” and thus that he had subjective knowledge
   that she faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Furthermore, a jury could
   find that delaying the provision of emergency medical care for a detainee in
   need of hospitalization to secure her release on a PR bond was a “refus[al] to
   treat” Newsome or a “wanton disregard for [her] serious medical needs”

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   that would constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756
   (quoting Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238). While a jury may ultimately credit the
   explanation contained in Captain Choate’s affidavit, we find that Plaintiffs
   have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Choate
   subjectively knew of Newsome’s critical condition and responded with
   deliberate indifference.
           Furthermore, as discussed in our analysis of Nurse Green’s potential
   liability, it is clearly established that delaying care for a detainee in need of
   emergency medical intervention may constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
   violation. A jury could conclude that Captain Choate’s failure to order
   emergency medical care for a detainee in need of hospitalization constituted
   a refusal of care, see Easter, 467 F.3d at 465, or that he exhibited deliberate
   indifference by delaying emergency medical care for over six hours, see
   Austin, 328 F.3d at 210. 12
           Because Plaintiffs have submitted evidence establishing genuine
   disputes of material fact regarding Choate’s liability, we REVERSE the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment for Jail Captain Todd Choate.

           _____________________
           12
              Additionally, as we noted in Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 138 n.7, “We have previously
   suggested that a non-medical reason for delay in treatment constitutes deliberate
   indifference, and several of our sister circuits have held so explicitly.” See Thibodeaux v.
   Thomas, 548 F. App’x 174, 175 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that a claimant stated a colorable
   Eighth Amendment claim where prison officials allegedly delayed a surgery by sending him
   to the wrong facility and failing to file appropriate paperwork); Reed v. Cameron, 380 F.
   App’x 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations raise an inference that prison
   officials were deliberately indifferent to his suffering and delayed medical care for non-
   medical reasons.”); Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004)
   (“When prison officials are aware of a prisoner’s obvious and serious need for medical
   treatment and delay medical treatment of that condition for non-medical reasons, their
   conduct in causing the delay creates the constitutional infirmity.”).

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                     4.      Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson
          Plaintiffs allege that Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson denied
   Newsome’s request to see a doctor for “severe stomach pain” on June 12,
   three days before Newsome’s death. Even accepting this allegation as true,
   we find that Plaintiffs have presented insufficient evidence for a jury to
   conclude that Wilson’s singular denial of a request to see a doctor amounted
   to deliberate indifference. “[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred
   merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial
   risk of serious harm.” Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th
   Cir. 2001). To prevail under a deliberate indifference theory, a plaintiff must
   show that the defendant official “was aware of facts from which an inference
   of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn,” and that “the official
   actually drew that inference.” Id. at 458–59.
          Plaintiffs have alleged that Jailer-Defendant Wilson denied
   Newsome’s request to see a doctor, but they have not supported this
   allegation with sufficient evidentiary detail to allow a jury to conclude that
   Wilson was subjectively aware that Newsome faced a substantial risk of
   serious harm at that moment. A singular denial of a request to see a doctor—
   absent more details that would unambiguously indicate a medical crisis—
   does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Rombach, 2021 WL 2944809,
   at *5. Because Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to establish that Jailer-
   Defendant Wilson exhibited deliberate indifference, we AFFIRM the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment for Alicia Wilson.
                     5.     Jailer-Defendant Travis Wesson
          On appeal, Plaintiffs’ only allegation against Jailer-Defendant Travis
   Wesson is that he failed to adequately aid the other jailers after Newsome was
   found unresponsive. Wesson was asked to assist in an emergency situation
   that he seemingly had no knowledge of, and his alleged failure to

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   meaningfully contribute while other jailers offered assistance does not
   constitute deliberate indifference. Moreover, because Newsome was already
   unresponsive when Wesson arrived, there is insufficient evidence to
   conclude that Wesson’s actions “result[ed] in substantial harm.” See
   Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). We accordingly
   AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Travis
   Wesson.
                                        III.
          In arguing that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
   for Defendants Greg Taylor and Anderson County, Plaintiffs primarily
   reference the alleged policy of attempting to secure PR bonds when detainees
   require hospitalization. However, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding this PR
   bond policy are not contained in the operative second amended complaint.
   Instead, these allegations were raised for the first time in response to
   Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and thus they were not
   properly raised before the district court. See Jackson, 3 F.4th at 188 (“[A]
   claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in
   response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the
   court.” (quoting Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113
   (5th Cir. 2005))). Plaintiffs attempted to add allegations related to the PR
   bond policy by filing a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, but
   the district court denied this motion as moot, and alternatively denied it as
   futile. Because the alleged PR bond policy is central to Plaintiffs’ claims
   against Defendants Greg Taylor and Anderson County, we address the
   district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended
   complaint before turning to the grants of summary judgment for these
   Defendants.

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          A district court’s decision to deny a motion for leave to amend
   pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,
   332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003). When a denial of a motion for leave to
   amend a complaint is based on the futility of the amendment, the court
   applies “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule
   12(b)(6).” Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226,
   229 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873
   (5th Cir. 2000)). The question therefore is whether in the light most
   favorable to Plaintiffs the amended complaint states any valid claim for relief.
   See Stripling, 234 F.3d at 873.
          Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint makes two substantive
   additions to their pleadings: (1) it adds Lieutenant Tia Pierson as a Jailer
   Defendant; and (2) it adds allegations of the purported PR bond policy.
          We first address Plaintiffs’ attempt to add Lieutenant Pierson as a
   defendant, which faces a statute of limitations issue. In Texas, the statute of
   limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is two years. Shelby v. City of El Paso,
   577 F. App’x 327, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2014). Newsome died on June 15, 2018,
   so a § 1983 claim related to this incident became untimely in June 2020.
   Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a third amended complaint on
   January 13, 2021.
          When a plaintiff adds a defendant after the limitations period has run,
   Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the plaintiff to
   relate the claims filed against the new defendant back to the date of the
   original filing. Winzer v. Kaufman County, 916 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 2019).
   But Rule 15(c) is intended to correct a mistake concerning the identity of a
   defendant; it does not permit adding a new defendant when the plaintiff did
   not originally know of that defendant’s identity. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs
   sought to add Lieutenant Pierson as a new defendant based on facts that they

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   learned during discovery. This is not a case of “a mistake concerning the
   proper party’s identity,” and thus the claim against Pierson is time-barred.
   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
          Even if Plaintiffs’ claim against Pierson was not time-barred, we
   would still find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   determining that adding Pierson as a defendant would be futile. The only
   non-conclusory information related to Pierson in Plaintiffs’ proposed third
   amended complaint is a brief allegation that on June 15, Pierson exchanged
   text messages with Nurse Green. Even accepting these facts as true, these
   allegations do not “properly set[] forth a claim of a deprivation of rights,
   privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
   States caused by persons acting under color of state law.” Ariyan, 29 F.4th
   at 229 (quoting S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Ct. of State of La.,
   252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs’ claim against Pierson would not
   survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and thus the district court did not
   abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs leave to amend to add Pierson as a
   defendant.
          Turning to Plaintiffs’ proposed claims of municipal liability against
   Anderson County and supervisory liability against Sheriff Taylor, we find
   that the district court abused its discretion in determining that pleading these
   claims would be futile.
          We begin with Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim against Anderson
   County. To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
   must show: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker
   can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
   constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).”
   Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 680 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
   Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). Generally, a

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   plaintiff must show that the policy was implemented with “deliberate
   indifference” to the “known or obvious consequences” that a constitutional
   violation would result. 13 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th
   Cir. 2018) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
   397, 407 (1997)). Proving deliberate indifference in a municipal liability
   action generally requires showing that a policy caused a pattern of
   constitutional violations, and proving deliberate indifference based on a
   single incident requires showing that the injury suffered was a “highly
   predictable” consequence of the policy. See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d
   536, 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2010).
           Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint properly pleads a
   municipal liability claim against Anderson County for its alleged policy of
   requesting PR bonds for detainees requiring hospitalization. The district
   court abused its discretion in deciding that Plaintiffs’ evidence of the PR
   bond policy was so inadequate that it would be futile for Plaintiffs to amend
   their complaint. Jail Captain Choate admitted that Anderson County Jail
   seeks PR bonds “[a]nytime that [jail staff] believe someone is going to go to
   the hospital.” Furthermore, Choate admitted that this practice was carried

           _____________________
           13
               On appeal, Plaintiffs claim that they have pleaded facts that raise a “conditions-
   of-confinement” theory of liability. Under this theory of liability, a plaintiff challenges the
   “general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.” Sanchez v.
   Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d
   633, 644 (5th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff challenging a condition of confinement is “relieved
   from the burden of demonstrating a municipal entity’s or individual jail official’s actual
   intent to punish.” Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). Because
   Plaintiffs never raised a conditions-of-confinement theory of liability below, we cannot say
   that the district court erred in failing to consider it. We leave the door open for Plaintiffs to
   raise this theory of liability on remand, and for the district court to address the viability of
   this theory in the first instance. See Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1991)
   (“As a court for review of errors, we are not to decide facts or make legal conclusions in
   the first instance. Our task is to review the actions of a trial court for claimed errors.”).

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   out due to jail staffing concerns, and Nurse Green allegedly admitted that his
   ability to send detainees to the hospital was curtailed by Sheriff Taylor.
   Sheriff Taylor also admitted to participating in the process of coordinating a
   PR bond for Newsome. Because Plaintiffs have presented evidence that this
   policy existed, that Sheriff Taylor seemingly knew of the policy, and that the
   delay caused by the policy contributed to Newsome’s death, Plaintiffs’
   attempt to state a municipal liability claim against Anderson County should
   not have been considered futile.
          Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint states
   that the PR bond policy applied “anytime an inmate/detainee was
   experiencing a serious medical need,” including “emergency situations such
   as Rhonda Newsome’s.” Plaintiffs have not pleaded a pattern of prior
   constitutional violations, as is typically required to establish that a municipal
   policy was implemented with deliberate indifference. However, given our
   prior cases indicating that a delay in medical care to a critically ill detainee
   can constitute deliberate indifference, see, e.g., Austin, 328 F.3d at 210, we
   find that a constitutional violation would be a “highly predictable”
   consequence of a policy that purposefully delays emergency care to detainees
   requiring hospitalization.
          We note that at this stage in the litigation, we decline to determine
   whether Plaintiffs’ evidence of the alleged PR bond policy is sufficient to
   overcome a motion for summary judgment. For Plaintiffs to establish that
   this policy was implemented with deliberate indifference and prevail on their
   municipal liability claim based on a single incident, they will have to show
   that the PR bond policy indeed was a blanket practice that applied even to
   emergency situations. Alternatively, they could establish deliberate
   indifference by showing a pattern of prior constitutional violations. At this
   juncture, however, Plaintiffs simply need to plead allegations that are
   sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ariyan, 29 F.4th at

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   229. They have done so. Because Plaintiffs have presented evidence
   indicating that their allegations related to the PR bond policy are not the
   products of pure speculation, we find that the district court abused its
   discretion in denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to properly plead these
   allegations against Anderson County.
          A similar analysis applies to Plaintiffs’ proposed supervisory liability
   claim against Sheriff Taylor. See Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just., 114 F.3d
   539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting “the close relationship between the elements
   of municipal liability and an individual supervisor’s liability”). Liability
   under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not cognizable in actions brought
   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President
   Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002). “Rather, a plaintiff must show
   either [that] the supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional
   violation or that there is a ‘sufficient causal connection’ between the
   supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.” Brown v. Taylor, 911
   F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689
   (5th Cir. 2003)). Liability may be found where “supervisory officials
   implement a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of
   constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional
   violation.’” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting
   Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir. 1985)).
   Furthermore, “[i]n order to establish supervisor liability for constitutional
   violations committed by subordinate employees, plaintiffs must show that
   the supervisor act[ed], or fail[ed] to act, with deliberate indifference to
   violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.”
   Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep’t
   of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008)).
          Based on the evidence of the alleged PR bond policy outlined above,
   Plaintiffs can plead a colorable supervisory liability claim against Sheriff

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   Taylor, who is the undisputed policymaker in this case. Plaintiffs’ proposed
   third amended complaint contains allegations that Sheriff Taylor
   implemented the policy of delaying care for detainees with serious medical
   needs, and that he was personally involved in Newsome’s delay of care on
   the date of her death. While we decline at this stage to address whether
   Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence for their supervisory liability
   claim to survive a summary judgment challenge, we find that Plaintiffs, at the
   very least, have shown that amending their pleadings would not be futile.
          Furthermore, we find that Plaintiffs’ allegations against Sheriff Taylor
   are sufficient to overcome his defense of qualified immunity at the motion to
   dismiss stage. Newsome had a clearly established right to not be denied, by
   deliberate indifference, attention to her serious medical needs under the
   Fourteenth Amendment. See Austin, 328 F.3d at 210; Easter, 467 F.3d at
   464–65. Additionally, “[t]his court has interpreted ‘clearly established law’
   on the subject of policy promulgation to require ‘an intentional choice’”
   where it is “obvious that the likely consequences . . . will be a deprivation of
   civil rights.” Brown, 623 F.3d at 257 (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973
   F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)). Because our prior case law makes clear to a
   reasonable officer that a delay in medical care may constitute a Fourteenth
   Amendment violation, and because an unconstitutional delay in care is a
   highly predictable consequence of Sheriff Taylor’s alleged policy of delaying
   medical care for critically ill detainees, we find that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are
   sufficient to overcome Taylor’s qualified immunity defense at the motion to
   dismiss stage.
                                   *        *         *
          In summary, we find that the district court abused its discretion in
   determining that granting Plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint
   would be futile. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that

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   Anderson County Jail seeks PR bonds for detainees who may need
   hospitalization. Whether Plaintiffs’ municipal and supervisory liability
   claims related to this alleged PR bond policy would survive a summary
   judgment challenge is a question we decline to answer at this time; we simply
   hold that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to
   dismiss. On the other hand, we find that the district court did not abuse its
   discretion in determining that adding Lieutenant Tia Pierson as a defendant
   would be futile. We accordingly VACATE the district court’s denial of
   Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, and
   REMAND with instructions to permit the addition of municipal and
   supervisory claims related to the alleged PR bond policy.
                                         IV.
          Having addressed Plaintiffs’ unpled claims relating to the alleged PR
   bond policy, we turn to the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
   Sheriff Taylor in his supervisory capacity. In their second amended
   complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Taylor failed to adequately train jail
   staff and implemented a policy prohibiting lower-ranking jail staff from
   contacting EMS. On appeal, the only claim that Plaintiffs specifically raise
   against Sheriff Taylor in his individual capacity is their allegation that Taylor
   implemented the PR bond policy. We find that Plaintiffs’ fleeting reference
   to other “associated policies” is insufficient to preserve their failure-to-train
   claim and permission-to-contact-EMS policy claim against Sheriff Taylor.
   Because Plaintiffs did not “address the district court’s analysis and explain
   how it erred” by granting summary judgment for Sheriff Taylor on these
   issues, we consider these claims abandoned on appeal due to inadequate
   briefing. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (quoting Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021)).

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          Thus, while Plaintiffs should be permitted to properly plead their PR
   bond policy claim against Sheriff Taylor, the supervisory claims against
   Sheriff Taylor that were pleaded in their second amended complaint have
   been abandoned on appeal. We accordingly AFFIRM IN PART the district
   court’s grant of summary judgment for Sheriff Taylor for the supervisory
   claims pleaded in the operative second amended complaint.
                                         V.
          We reach a similar conclusion in addressing the district court’s grant
   of summary judgment for Anderson County in its municipal capacity. To
   hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a
   deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law is inflicted
   pursuant to “official policy,” which may include “duly promulgated policy
   statements, ordinances or regulations,” or “a persistent, widespread practice
   of [municipal] officials or employees, which . . . is so common and well-
   settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”
   Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
   Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)).
          On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that, in addition to the PR bond policy,
   Anderson County had other “policies restricting hospitalization and thereby
   delaying critical care,” including the permission-to-contact-EMS policy, as
   well as a policy of delaying immediate medical care by calling medical staff to
   ask for instructions. While we agree with Plaintiffs that they should be
   permitted to properly plead their PR bond policy claim against Anderson
   County, we find unavailing Plaintiffs’ other policy-based claims.
          Regarding the permission-to-contact-EMS policy, the only evidence
   that Plaintiffs have provided of such a policy existing is a single statement
   from Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson, who testified that she lacked the
   independent authority to call 911 because she “wasn’t a sergeant, just a

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   regular jailer.” The district court did not err in determining that this
   statement was insufficient evidence of a municipal policy, especially
   considering consistent testimony from other Defendants that no such policy
   existed. Moreover, even if we were convinced that such a policy existed,
   Plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown that this policy was a “moving force”
   behind the violation of Newsome’s constitutional rights. See Piotrowski, 237
   F.3d at 578. While Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the Jailer
   Defendants may have ignored Newsome’s cries for help or failed to provide
   emergency medical assistance, they have not presented enough evidence that
   a Jailer Defendant sought to assist Newsome but was delayed in doing so by
   a policy preventing him or her from contacting EMS to create a genuine
   dispute of material fact.
          Plaintiffs’ claim that Anderson County had a policy of seeking
   instructions from medical staff before administering emergency aid fares no
   better. For starters, Jailer-Defendant Matthew Wickersham did not exhibit
   deliberate indifference by deciding to call Nurse Green for instructions after
   finding Newsome unresponsive in her cell, and we do not hold municipalities
   liable under § 1983 absent an underlying violation of the Constitution or
   federal law. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 799; Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d
   458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because [Plaintiff] has alleged no constitutional
   injury attributable to the [o]fficers, [Plaintiff] has failed to state a claim that a
   [c]ity policy was the moving force behind a violation of his constitutional
   rights.”). Moreover, Plaintiffs have provided insufficient evidence for a
   reasonable jury to determine that Wickersham’s decision to call Nurse Green
   for instructions reflected “official policy” or “a persistent, widespread
   practice” of Anderson County.
          The only alleged municipal policy that Plaintiffs sufficiently pressed
   on appeal is the PR bond policy. The municipal policies alleged in Plaintiffs’
   second amended complaint, on the other hand, are either unsupported by

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   Plaintiffs’ evidence or abandoned on appeal for inadequate briefing. See
   Hallam, 42 F.4th at 327. Therefore, while we will permit Plaintiffs to plead
   their PR bond policy claim against Anderson County, we AFFIRM IN
   PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Anderson County
   for the municipal claims pleaded in the operative second amended complaint.
                                        VI.
          In addition to contesting the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment for Defendants on appeal, Plaintiffs also raise on appeal the issue
   of Defendants’ alleged spoliation of electronic data. Specifically, Plaintiffs
   highlight that a series of text messages between Nurse Green, Captain
   Choate, and Lieutenant Pierson sent on June 15 are unavailable. Plaintiffs
   moved for discovery sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e),
   which the district court addressed and denied in its order granting summary
   judgment for the individual Defendants.
          A trial court’s decision on a motion for sanctions for spoliation of
   evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d
   707, 713 (5th Cir. 2015). This court permits an adverse inference or sanctions
   against the spoliator only upon a showing of “bad faith” or “bad conduct.”
   Id. (quoting Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir.
   2005)). A party seeking an adverse inference—i.e., a presumption that “the
   lost information was unfavorable to the [spoliating] party”—must establish
   that “the [spoliating] party acted with the intent to deprive another party of
   the information’s use in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
          Because the Texas Rangers conducted an investigation following
   Newsome’s death, it may be reasonable to conclude that Defendants had a
   duty to preserve electronically stored information. It also seems likely that
   the text messages at issue contained information related to Newsome.
   Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are unable to effectively rebut Defendants’

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   explanation that they purchased new phones and, as a result, lost access to
   these text messages. While it may be true that Defendants intended to
   “frustrate future discovery by destroying incriminating evidence,” we find
   that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Plaintiffs
   have failed to present evidence of bad faith sufficient to warrant spoliation
   sanctions. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for
   sanctions.
                                         VII.
          We conclude by addressing Defendants’ evidentiary objections that
   are preserved on appeal. “Properly preserved evidentiary objections are
   reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704,
   716 (5th Cir. 2011).
          Defendant Timothy Green objects to Plaintiffs’ citations to recorded
   interviews conducted by a Texas Ranger, as well as a transcript of those
   interviews. We need not rely on these interviews, however, because the
   record contains deposition excerpts from the Ranger’s interviewees that
   corroborate the pertinent information contained in the Ranger’s interviews.
   Because our conclusions would be the same regardless of the admissibility of
   these interviews, we need not address the merits of Defendant Green’s
   evidentiary objections. See United States v. Wells, 525 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir.
   1976) (declining to decide whether the district court erred in admitting
   testimony, noting that “inasmuch as the testimony was merely cumulative
   and in light of the record taken as a whole, any error was harmless”); Weaver
   v. U.S. Coast Guard, 53 F.3d 1282, 1995 WL 295978, at *2 (5th Cir. 1995)
   (declining to determine whether certain statements were hearsay where
   admission of these statements would have no bearing on the case’s ultimate
   disposition); East v. Walgreen Co., 860 F. App’x 367, 369 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021)

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   (declining to address a hearsay issue where the admission of a contested
   statement would not affect the outcome of summary judgment).
           Defendant Green also objects to a chart created by Plaintiffs’ counsel
   that purports to reflect Green’s telephone calls. We need not rely on this
   chart, however, because Plaintiffs have provided the underlying phone
   records. We leave it to the district court to determine in the first instance
   whether Plaintiffs’ evidentiary aids are appropriate. We also need not rely on
   an order issued by the Texas Board of Nursing suspending Defendant
   Green’s nursing license, which Green objects to on hearsay and
   authentication grounds, since the facts contained in this order are cumulative
   of information contained elsewhere in the record. 14
           Defendant Green and Defendant Adam Corley both preserve their
   objections to Plaintiffs’ use of sworn expert reports, but we find these
   objections unpersuasive. Defendant Green argues that the expert reports
   were outside the scope of the district court’s discovery order, which limited
   discovery to the issue of qualified immunity. But the district court’s
   discovery order made no mention of prohibiting expert disclosure, and
   Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity
   because they help explain the substantial risk that Addison’s disease patients
   face when their condition is left untreated. The district court’s several cites
   to the expert reports in its order granting summary judgment for the

           _____________________
           14
              We also note that we do not deem the Texas Board of Nursing’s conclusions of
   law that Defendant Green violated state regulations relevant to our analysis of Green’s
   alleged violation of Newsome’s constitutional rights. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 194 (“Officials
   sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their
   conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.”); Gagne v. City of Galveston,
   805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[A]llegations about the breach of a statute or regulation
   are simply irrelevant to the question of an official’s eligibility for qualified immunity in a
   suit over the deprivation of a constitutional right.”).

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   individual Defendants bolsters Plaintiffs’ argument that their inclusion of
   expert reports did not violate the district court’s discovery order.
          Defendants Green and Corley also object to the expert reports as
   containing hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. Defendants’ broad hearsay
   objections are arguably too “loosely formulated and imprecise” to be
   considered preserved on appeal, since Defendants did not point the district
   court to the portions of the extensive expert reports that they find
   objectionable. See United States v. Lewis, 796 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (quoting United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878, 885 (5th Cir. 1998)).
   Furthermore, evidence may be considered on summary judgment provided
   “[its] contents can be presented in admissible form at trial,” Patel v. Tex. Tech
   Univ., 941 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 2019), and Plaintiffs have properly
   submitted sworn declarations from their experts pursuant to Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) indicating that Plaintiffs intend to rely on their
   experts’ testimony at trial. Defendants have made no effort to specify which
   portions of the experts’ reports fall outside the scope of permissible expert
   testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
          Finally, in a one-sentence footnote, Anderson County and the Jailer
   Defendants attempt to reassert their objections to Plaintiffs’ affidavit
   evidence. The district court overruled these objections in its order granting
   summary judgment for the individual Defendants, finding that personal
   knowledge could be inferred from each affidavit itself. See DIRECTV, Inc. v.
   Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Defendants undertook
   no effort to address the district court’s analysis and explain how it abused its
   discretion in overruling Defendants’ evidentiary objections, we consider
   these objections forfeited on appeal. See Hallam, 42 F.4th at 327.

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Case: 22-40559     Document: 00517024849            Page: 44      Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                     No. 22-40559

                                        VIII.
          For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment for Defendants Timothy Green, Todd Choate, Jonathan
   Strong, Robin Jones, Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and Dakota
   Hughes. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
   Defendants Alicia Wilson, Travis Wesson, and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C.
   We AFFIRM IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment
   for Defendant Adam Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim against
   him, but we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
   Dr. Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory claim. We also AFFIRM
   IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants
   Anderson County and Greg Taylor for the claims alleged in Plaintiffs’ second
   amended complaint, and we VACATE the district court’s denial of
   Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint and REMAND
   with instructions to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to include
   additional supervisory and municipal liability claims based on the alleged
   policy of delaying treatment to obtain PR bonds. Finally, we AFFIRM the
   district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.

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