Court Opinion

ID: 9859375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:22:39.495899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:44:11.721905
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring in part.
The Court allows recovery for personal injuries to a fire inspector who, while inspecting a shopping mall for fire-code infractions, slips and falls in the mall’s parking lot. In so doing, the Court properly declines to broaden further the firefighters’ rule. However, it takes pains to express its continued allegiance to the rule.
The Court, as is its prerogative, never agreed with the view that the firefighters’ rule violates “a fundamental tenent of our jurisprudence ...: the right of redress for those injured as a result of the wrongdoing of others.” Mahoney v. Carus Chem. Co., 102 N.J. 564, 591, 510 A.2d 4 (1986) (Handler, J., dissenting). That view, however, ought not, at this juncture, be treated dismissively. The firefighters’ rule and its values have been superseded. The public policy of the State is now expressed by L.1993, c. 366 (Jan. 5, 1994). That enactment grants firefighters, police officers, and emergency service personnel the right to seek recovery for injuries, diseases, and death, except when such losses are caused by a co-worker or an employer.
The Court could take advantage of this change of policy reflected by the statute, which now abolishes the rule. This legislative mandate constitutes a clarion expression of the State’s public policy. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Carp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (observing that public policy can be expressed by legislation). It is confirmation that the values undergirding the firefighters’ rule “have become moribund and have been replaced by a different set of values.” See Renz v. Penn Central Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 456, 435 A.2d 540 (1981).
*96In light of the injustice and confusion, the quirks and inconsistencies that attend the firefighters’ rule, the doctrine, which no longer reflects the common consent of the community, ought not to be continued. The spirit of the common law calls for a reassessment of the reasons that originally supported the firefighters’ rule. The legislative judgment is that those reasons no longer comport with a sound public policy. Renz, supra, 87 N.J. at 455, 435 A.2d 540. That legislation could be a powerful catalyst for the Court to exert “[t]he creativity and the flexibility of the common law ... [to] devise standards defining duty, proximate cause, and comparative negligence that suitably address all the circumstances that surround an officer who must respond to an emergency on behalf of a private citizen.” Rosa v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 122 N.J. 66, 85, 583 A.2d 1129 (1991) (Handler, J., dissenting).
The new legislation provides a statutory cause of action for accidental injuries occurring on or after January 5, 1994. It does not seem right that now, simply as a matter of judicial preference, injured police officers and firefighters should continue to be denied their right to seek recovery because of this Court’s refusal to abandon a “bizarre doctrine.” Id. at 81, 583 A.2d 1129 (Handler, J., dissenting). See generally Joseph Scholz, Rosa v. Dunkin’ Donuts: The Fireman’s Rule Revisited, 44 Rutgers L.Rev. 405, 425 (1992) (arguing that Rosa “left the rule in a state of doctrinal confusion"). That is especially so given the fact that the judicially-created firefighters’ rule itself is “ultimately one of public policy.” Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 273, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
Justice HANDLER, concurs in part.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN—7.
Opposed—none.