Court Opinion

ID: 9740476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:36:19.436177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.455274
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Appellants, Marjory and Francis Schaub, filed suit on behalf of their minor sons, Paul and Charles, for injuries sustained by Paul and Charles and medical expenses incurred as a result of the collision between a fire truck owned by the city of Aberdeen (City) and driven by Terry Ellingson and a vehicle occupied by Paul and Charles.*
City and Ellingson filed motions to dismiss based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, submitting a brief in support of their motions. Appellants’ brief in opposition to the motions to dismiss presented matters outside their amended complaint. After hearing argument on the motions, the trial court filed a memorandum decision announcing that it was treating the motions as motions for summary judgment and that it was granting summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity.
Appellants contend that it was improper for the trial court to convert the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment without providing them notice and opportunity to present material in opposition. We agree.
SDCL 15-6-12(b) provides in part:
If, on a motion ... to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in § 15-6-56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by § 15-6-56.
We held in Olson v. Molko, 86 S.D. 365, 195 N.W.2d 812 (1972), that since summary judgment is an extreme remedy, a trial court’s noncompliance with SDCL 15-6-12(b) precludes granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court should not have entered summary judgment against appellants.
City and Ellingson contend, however, that appellants suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial court’s action in that “the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, would be the same, regardless of anything else that any party could have conceivably represented to the court.” We disagree.
Appellants concede on appeal that in providing fire protection City is engaged in a governmental rather than a proprietary function. Appellants acknowledge that pursuant to Conway v. Humbert, 82 S.D. 317, 145 N.W.2d 524 (1966), the doctrine of governmental immunity bars their suit against City. Appellants contend, however, that governmental immunity does not bar their claim against Ellingson.
*111The amended complaint states that at the time the collision occurred Ellingson was operating the fire truck in the scope of his employment as an employee for City. Appellants allege that Ellingson failed to keep the fire truck under control, failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to give appropriate warning of the presence and operation of the fire truck, and failed to operate the fire truck in a manner which was reasonably prudent under the circumstances.
Subsequent to the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in this case, we addressed the issue of sovereign or governmental immunity as it relates to a governmental employee in Kruger v. Wilson, 325 N.W.2d 851 (S.D.1982), and in National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D.1982). See also, Kringen v. Shea, 333 N.W.2d 445 (S.D.1983); Smith v. Greek, 328 N.W.2d 261 (S.D.1982). In Leir, we stated:
Whether immunity is available to a governmental employee depends upon the nature of the function exercised by the employee. Sioux Falls Const. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, [297 N.W.2d 454 (S.D.1980)]; Walters v. City of Carthage, 36 S.D. 11, 153 N.W. 881 (1915); State v. Ruth, 9 S.D. 84, 68 N.W. 189 (1896); see 72 Am.Jur.2d States § 115 (1974). Immunity extends to an employee who,while acting within the scope of his employment, exercises a discretionary function. Sioux Falls Const. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, supra. In reviewing the discretionary versus ministerial dichotomy, we have held that a state employee who “fails to perform a merely ministerial duty, is liable for the proximate results of his failure to any person to whom he owes performance of such duty.” State v. Ruth, 9 S.D. at 90, 68 N.W. at 190. See, Conway v. Humbert, supra; Walters v. City of Carthage, supra.
325 N.W.2d at 848.
We have looked to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D (1979), for guidance in determining whether a function is discretionary or ministerial. See Kruger, supra; Leir, supra; City of Sioux Falls, supra. Comment (h) to § 895D lists the driving of a vehicle as an example of acts held to be ministerial under ordinary circumstances. See also, James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980); Kruger, supra. The comment notes, however, that under particular fact circumstances, each of the examples listed may be held to involve the exercise of a discretionary decision.
Newson v. City of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.App.1980), involved an immunity issue similar to the one presented in this case. The Missouri court stated:
The liability the petition asserts against the defendant Waits has to do with the operation of a fire truck into an intersection in a negligent manner and also the faitee to use adequate warning devices in the circumstances. These allegations do not, as a matter of law, describe either conduct “required to [be] perform[ed] in a prescribed manner” — and therefore ministerial — or conduct which inherently “requires] the exercise of reason in the adaptation of means to an end” — and therefore discretionary. That remains for the proof.
606 S.W.2d at 491.
Although it may very well be difficult to conceive of cases in which the operation of a fire truck would constitute a discretionary act, that is a matter to be considered by the trial court in the first instance.
That portion of the summary judgment in favor of City is affirmed. That portion in favor of Ellingson is reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
DUNN and MORGAN, J., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs specially.
FOSHEIM, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

 Defendant Moerke is not a party to this appeal. The trial court entered the requisite determination of finality under SDCL 15-6-54(b).