Court Opinion

ID: 9679052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:39:22.994332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.899605
License: Public Domain

TEIGEN, Chief Justice
(concurring specially) .
I concur with the majority in their holding wherein they stated it was error for the court to refuse to admit in evidence the two assignments identified as Exhibits 3 and 4, but I do not agree that Section 31-08-02.1, N.D.C.C., required that they be admitted in evidence. The statute does not so state. The statute merely provides, as a rule of evidence, that where the genuineness of a writing is questioned, or where the identity of a writer is sought to be established by comparison of handwriting, that the handwriting of the person in question shall be competent evidence for the purpose of furnishing the standard. The statute itself does not provide that the questioned writing shall be admitted without foundation. In the instant case, a summary judgment proceeding wherein summary judgment was denied, the court determined that some material facts were found to exist without substantial controversy and which material facts were actually and in good faith controverted. The court found that the defendant signed the installment sales contracts; that the plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of this suit, was the owner of both of said contracts; that each of the purchasers under the installment sales contracts were in default; that demand had been made upon them and upon the defendant as the alleged guarantor but that the defendant had paid no part thereof and denied liability. Therefore, the court further found that the facts, which are actually and in good faith controverted, resolve the questions to be determined upon the trial which questions are as follows:
1. Did the defendant sign the installment sales contracts as owner or as agent for the plaintiff?
2. Was the defendant enticed by fraud and misrepresentation to enter into the installment sales contracts ?
3. Did the defendant sign the assignments of the installment sales contracts ?
When the case came on for trial the defendant was called for cross-examination and admitted his signature on Exhibits 1 and 2, which were the two installment sales contracts. He also admitted his signature on several other documents was genuine. These exhibits were offered and received in evidence. The two assignments were marked as Exhibits 3 and 4, and after defendant had denied that the signatures contained thereon were his, they were offered in evidence without further foundation.
The question with which we are concerned involves the admissibility of these exhibits in evidence. It is clear from the contents of these exhibits that they are assignments of the installment sales contracts received in evidence as Exhibits 1 and 2. They also contain the guaranty upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover. The assignments are a necessary element of the plaintiff’s claim.
As a general rule, both at common law and under the statutes of many jurisdictions before private writings or documents are receivable in evidence, their due and valid execution or their genuineness and authenticity must be established. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 733. But, although the rule requires proof of genuineness and authenticity before a document or private writing can be admitted in evidence, the objection to the absence of such proof may be overcome by submitting it for the purpose of determining its genuineness by comparison with a genuine signature which has been admitted.
*717In view of Section 31-08-02.1, N.D.C.C., the admission in evidence of the admitted handwritten signatures was mandatory as a standard of comparison in a case wherein the genuineness of a writing is questioned or the identity of the writer is sought to be established. After the admission in evidence of the admitted signatures the disputed writing could be admitted for the purpose of its being compared with the genuine. This was the holding of Young v. Wheby, 126 W.Va. 741, 30 S.E.2d 6, 154 A.L.R. 919, cited by the majority. There are several cases of similar import. In Castor v. Bernstein, 2 Cal.App. 703, 84 P. 244, the California court held that a disputed document was entitled to admission in evidence without proof by means other than a comparison by the jury with the genuine signature on an admitted document. The court reasoned that, whether the signature on the disputed document was genuine or not, was a question of fact to be determined by the jury and not by the judge and that the judge could not, by refusing to allow the disputed document to be submitted to the jury, preclude the party offering it from having the jury determine that question of fact.
In Armstrong v. Kline, 64 Cal.App.2d 704, 149 P.2d 445, the court held that certain disputed cancelled checks were admissible in evidence, even though the payee’s signature on the back of the checks was not shown to be genuine in view of the fact that the payee’s signature was in evidence on another instrument, since the jury could have used the known signature for the purpose of comparison.
In Bressler v. Bressler, 155 A.2d 255 (D.C.Mun.App.1959), the court discussing the question said it saw no merit to a contention that it was error to receive in evidence, documents purportedly signed by another without first requiring proof of the genuineness of the signature where the disputed documents were admitted in order to determine the question of the genuineness by comparison with genuine writings admitted in evidence.
In Oaks Fire Company v. Herbert, 389 Pa. 357, 132 A.2d 193, the Pennsylvania court held, that two receipts were admissible in evidence, although the signatures thereon were not properly authenticated, where there was a valid notarized assignment of mortgage in evidence bearing the signature of the one who purportedly executed the receipts. This case was tried to the court without a jury. The Supreme Court held that the trial court, acting in its capacity as a jury, had the power to compare the signatures on the receipts in question with the valid signature on the mortgage assignment and to determine, without the aid of expert testimony, the authenticity of the signatures on the receipts.
In Porter v. Rogers, 293 S.W. 577 (Tex.Civ.App.1927), it was held that, although as a general rule a written document is not admissible in evidence unless it is shown to have been executed by the party charged therewith, nevertheless, where there has been established by the evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the paper offered in evidence is what it purports to be, it then becomes a question of fact to be determined by the jury, and whether it is sufficient evidence to raise the issue as to whether the unsigned instrument was approved by the parties charged therewith or expresses the agreement made by them, the instrument is admissible in evidence as a circumstance tending to prove the contract or agreement.
Therefore, although it is the general rule that before a private writing may be received in evidence it is necessary to establish, preliminary to its admission, its execution; that nevertheless where there is reasonable probability established that the document is what it purports to be even though its execution is not established by evidence but is disputed and there is evidence of a genuine signature admitted with which the purported signature contained on the disputed document may be compared, the question becomes one for the finder of the facts and the document should go before it with the evidence impeaching its genuineness for its decision. This case being tried to the court *718without a jury, it was for the judge to make the comparison and Exhibits 3 and 4 should have been admitted in evidence for that purpose.
For the reasons set forth herein, I think that Syllabus number 3 of the majority opinion should read:
“Where assignor on installment sales contract brought action against the as-signee to recover on the guaranty contained in the assignment, it was error to refuse to admit the assignment into evidence on the ground that the assignee’s signature was not authenticated where other writings containing the assignee’s genuine signature were in evidence for comparison purposes.”