Court Opinion

ID: 9647789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:50:36.754998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:32.544185
License: Public Domain

Lewis D. Jones, Special Chief Justice, dissenting. I dissent. The majority would puli every tooth out of the mouth of the State which says, “Executive sessions will be permitted only for the purpose of discussing or considering employment, appointment, promotion, demotion, disciplining, or resignation of any public officer of employee.” (Emphasis added) Ark. Stat. Anno. Section 12-2805. If the Board of Correction of the State of Arkansas or any other public agency is going to be permitted in executive session to delve into, discuss, and deliberate on items such as: 1. Heat stroke symptoms and policies of the prison relating to the recognition of and treatment of such symptoms; 2. Assignment procedures in connection with inmates relating to work detail; 3. Policies for re-evaluation of medical reports; 4. Procedures for interviewing transferred inmates; 5. Procedures dealing with transfer of information from officers at the Cummins unit to officers at the Tucker unit; 6. Work habits and propensities of deceased inmates; 7. Prison policies concerning meals, especially relating to inmates being transferred in early morning hours from one unit to the other; 8. General harassment; 9. Procedures for handling inmates who will not work; 10. The composition of hoe squads; 11. Procedures dealing with transfer runs and transfer vehicles; 12. Questions asked of Commissioner Hutto and Superintendent Lockhart concerning the death of the inmate involved; 13. The State Police investigation into the death of the inmate in question; 14. Certain medical questions; all under the umbrella of the fact that disciplinary procedures might be invoked, then there is nothing that can’t be handled in executive session and thereby removed from the public scrutiny. I think it is most significant that neither Correction Commissioner Teryl Hutto or Superintendent A. L. Lockhart, or any other employee requested an executive session or requested that the proceedings be made public, or made any request of any kind in connection with the proceedings before the Board of Correction; and after all under the theory of the majority case, it is their right the Court is so vigorously protecting. Ark. State Police v. Davidson, 253 Ark. 1090, 490 S.W. 2d 788 (1973). It should also be noted that there is nothing in the statute that requires that executive sessions be conducted in connection with the employment, appointment, promotion, demotion, disciplining, or resignation of a public officer; and it is obvious from the context of this meeting that the concern as to public inspection of the facts might well have been as much or more on the part of the Board members as on the part of any employee. I believe that the need for the public to know far outweighs any personal embarrassment which the members of the Board or the supervisors of the prison system may suffer as a result of public access to policy and procedure discussions. In the literal sense, every meeting of.the Board of Correction could deal with the discipline of some employee as a result of some act that is brought before the Board; and if followed to its logical conclusion, each meeting of the Board could be held substantially in secret under the ruling of the majority in this case. This Court has zealously in the past safeguarded the public’s right to know. Ark. Gazette v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W. 2d 350 (1975). In the Laman v. McCord case cited by the majority this Court very correctly held that a liberal interpretation should be given to the statute in order to effectuate its public policy provisions. This would necessarily require a narrow interpretation of the exceptions to the rule. Yet the majority now would swing wide the door to let the entire enforcement of the statute out through the exception. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W. 2d 753 (1968). The majority is very correct in saying that this case is almost unique in that a total transcript of the proceedings was available for perusal. Whereas in the ordinary secret meeting it is very difficult to ascertain the facts that actually were discussed if the conspiracy of silence is maintained. All the more reason to strictly adhere to the actual language of the statute. If the Legislature had desired to exempt the Board of Correction from the Freedom of Information Act, it could have very easily done so just as it changed the Act to permit the employees whose discipline is under question to attend the executive sessions; and in the absence of such amendatory legislation, I would adhere strictly to the Freedom of Information Act. Since I believe the lower court erred in ruling that the executive session was proper, it naturally follows that the contents of the “executive session” should have been made public. There is authority for having evidence reviewed in camera; however, to permit the secret transcript of a secret meeting to be introduced into evidence in secret, reviewed in secret by the trial court, and further reviewed in secret by the Appellate Court, is a dangerous precedent and smacks to my mind of Star Chamber proceedings. I would reverse the trial court and order that the contents of the “executive session” in question be made public.