Court Opinion

ID: 9769069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:13:28.233476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:40.267044
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                            No. 04-22-00225-CV

                                             Donald GENTLES,
                                                 Appellant

                                                       v.

      Felipe GONZALEZ, Jr., Sean Clark, Haleigh Kidd, Marcos Perez, and Brenda Marin,
                                        Appellees

                    From the 454th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas
                                 Trial Court No. 20-10-26710-CV
                           Honorable Daniel J. Kindred, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:      Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting:         Irene Rios, Justice
                 Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                 Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1

Delivered and Filed: August 23, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Appellant Donald Gentles, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed suit against the five

appellees, who are all employed as Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) correctional

officers (“the appellees”). 2 Gentles appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his negligence claims

under section 101.106(f) of the Texas Tort Claims Act. In his first issue, appellant argues the trial

court erred when it failed to rule on his motion for default judgment. In his second and third issues,

1
  The Honorable Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) of the Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of
the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
2
  Gentles also sued “Unknown Correctional Officers, TDCJ”.
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appellant argues the trial court erred when it dismissed his suit. In his fourth issue, appellant argues

the trial court erred when it did not accept amended pleadings filed after the dismissal was granted.

We affirm.

                                            BACKGROUND

        Gentles sustained injuries when he slipped and fell on a wet floor after a sanitation crew

cleaned his prison unit in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Gentles claims the appellees were

negligent when they instructed him to return to his cell but failed to warn him that the floor was

wet.

        On October 8, 2020, Gentles filed suit against the appellees. On November 24, 2020, the

appellees filed their answer. On January 19, 2021, Gentles filed a motion for default judgment.

        On June 29, 2021, the appellees filed a motion to dismiss under section 101.106(f) of the

Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f). On

March 17, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the appellees’ motion to dismiss and signed an

order granting the motion to dismiss. Gentles appeals.

                           FAILURE TO RULE ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT

        In his first issue, Gentles argues the trial court erred by not timely ruling on his motion for

default judgment. Gentles contends he is entitled to a default judgment because the appellees did

not timely file their answer.

        “A trial court is required to consider and rule on a pending motion for default judgment

within a reasonable time.” Nkansah v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 05-17-00281-CV, 2018 WL

2749765, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also In re

Gonzalez, No. 04-18-00799-CV, 2018 WL 6624388, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 19,

2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“A trial court is required to consider and rule on a motion

within a reasonable time.”). Whether the trial court acted within a reasonable period of time

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depends on the circumstances of the case. Davis v. West, 433 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

       Once a facially valid answer is filed—even if the answer is filed after the due date—the

trial court may not render a no-answer default judgment. Cedillo v. Mann, No. 04-20-00278-CV,

2021 WL 3518540, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also

Davis v. Jefferies, 764 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1989) (“A default judgment may not be rendered

after the defendant has filed an answer.” (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 239)). Any complaint regarding

the trial court’s failure to rule on a motion for default judgment is rendered moot when the

defendant files an answer. See Nkansah, 2018 WL 2749765, at *3.

       The appellees filed their answer on November 24, 2020. Gentles did not file his motion

for default judgment until January 19, 2021—nearly two months after the appellees filed their

answer. Therefore, when Gentles filed his motion for default judgment, it was moot, and the trial

court had no duty to rule on the motion. See In re Amir-Sharif, No. 08-12-00080-CV, 2012 WL

1484197, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 27, 2012, orig. proceeding). Further, the trial court

would have erred if it granted the motion for default judgment because the appellees had an answer

on file when Gentles filed his motion. See Cedillo, 2021 WL 3518540, at *1.

       Accordingly, Gentles’s first issue is overruled.

                       DISMISSAL UNDER THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT

       In his second issue, Gentles—who pursues this appeal pro se—argues the trial court did

not follow the law and was biased when it granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss. However,

Gentles does not point us to anything in the record that supports his claim of prejudice other than

the trial court’s dismissal of the suit. In his third issue, it appears Gentles argues the appellees

acted outside the scope of their employment when they instructed him to return to his cell. We

construe Gentles’s second and third issues as arguments that the trial court erred when it dismissed

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his suit under section 101.106(f) of the TTCA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 101.106(f).

       We conduct a de novo review of an order dismissing a suit against a governmental

employee pursuant to section 101.106(f). Rivera v. Garcia, 589 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2019, no pet.).

       After the enactment of the TTCA, “plaintiffs often sought to avoid the Act’s damages cap

or other strictures by suing governmental employees, since claims against [the employees] were

not always subject to the Act.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 656

(Tex. 2008). “To prevent such circumvention, and to protect governmental employees, the

[l]egislature created an election-of-remedies provision.” Id.

       Section 101.106(f) of the TTCA provides:

       If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within
       the general scope of that employee’s employment and if it could have been brought
       under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against
       the employee in the employee’s official capacity only. On the employee’s motion,
       the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended
       pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant
       on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f)

       “The election-of-remedies provision in section 101.106(f) of the [TTCA] requires courts

to grant a motion to dismiss a lawsuit against a governmental employee sued in an ‘official

capacity’ but allows the governmental unit to be substituted for the employee.” Garza v. Harrison,

574 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Tex. 2019). “[A] governmental employee is sued in an official capacity

when the suit (1) is based on conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment[,]

and (2) could have been brought under the Act against the governmental unit.” Id. at 394 (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). “By adopting section 101.106(f), the [l]egislature has

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effectively mandated that only a governmental unit can be sued for a governmental employee’s

work-related tortious conduct.” Id. at 393–94.

1. Scope of Employment

       “Scope of employment” is defined in the TTCA as “the performance for a governmental

unit of the duties of an employee’s office or employment and includes being in or about the

performance of a task lawfully assigned to an employee by competent authority.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(5). “The scope-of-employment inquiry under section 101.106(f)

focuses on whether the employee was doing his job, not the quality of the job performance.”

Garza, 574 S.W.3d at 394. “Even if work is performed wrongly or negligently, the inquiry is

satisfied if, when viewed objectively, a connection exists between the employee’s job duties and

the alleged tortious conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “The scope-

of-employment analysis, therefore, remains fundamentally objective: Is there a connection

between the employee’s job duties and the alleged tortious conduct?” Laverie v. Wetherbe,

517 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. 2017).

       It is undisputed that appellees were all employees of TDCJ, a governmental unit, when

Gentles sustained his injuries. Gentles argues the appellees are liable for negligently instructing

him to return to his cell even though the floor appeared to be wet from the sanitation. Here, the

appellees were performing their employment duties when they carried out a directive to sanitize

the prison unit in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See id. (holding an official acts within the

scope of his employment if he is discharging the duties generally assigned to him). The appellees,

who were all correctional officers, were also carrying out their employment duties when they

instructed Gentles to return to his cell after the sanitation process was completed. Cf. Donohue v.

Dominguez, 486 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (“An employee’s act

is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not

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intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.” (quoting Alexander v. Walker,

435 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. 2014))). It does not matter if the appellees were negligent when they

instructed Gentles to return to his cell so long as their actions, viewed objectively, are related to

their employment duties. Here, because appellees’ actions served TDCJ purposes, it is clear their

allegedly tortious conduct is connected to their employment duties. Thus, the appellees acted

within the scope of their employment when the allegedly tortious conduct occurred.

2. Whether the Claim “Could Have Been Brought” Against TDCJ

       “[I]f a state employee is alleged to have committed negligence or other wrongful conduct

in the general scope of employment, then the suit is subject to section 101.106(f) because it could

have been brought against the state agency.” Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Franka v. Velasquez,

332 S.W.3d 367, 381 (Tex. 2011)). “Properly construed, section 101.106(f)’s two conditions are

met in almost every negligence suit against a government employee: he acted within the general

scope of his employment and suit could have been brought under the Act—that is, his claim is in

tort and not under another statute that independently waives immunity.” Franka, 332 S.W.3d at

381; see also Rivera, 589 S.W.3d at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“‘Could have been

brought’ applies to all claims in tort and not under another statute that independently waives

immunity, even where the [TTCA] does not waive immunity” for the tort claims). “In such cases,

the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee’s official capacity only, and the

plaintiff must promptly dismiss the employee and sue the government instead.”               Franka,

332 S.W.3d at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Because the alleged tortious actions Gentles complains about were committed within the

appellees’ scope of employment, the suit could have been brought against TDCJ under the TTCA.

See Anderson v. Bessman, 365 S.W.3d 119, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

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(“Given that the pleadings allege acts within the course and scope of the administrators’

employment, the faculty members’ suit could have been brought under the [TTCA] against [the

governmental unit].”).

3. Dismissal of the Suit Was Proper

         Section 101.106(f) provides: “On the employee’s motion, the suit against the employee

shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and

naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is

filed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f).

         Here, the appellees filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to section 101.106(f) on June 29,

2021. Thus, the trial court was required to dismiss the suit unless Gentles amended his pleadings

by dismissing the appellees and naming TDCJ as the defendant on or before July 29, 2021. The

record reflects that the trial court initially held a hearing on the appellees’ motion to dismiss on

January 20, 2022. At this hearing, Gentles complained he had not received notice of the appellees’

motion to dismiss.3 Because of the lack of notice, the trial court gave Gentles an additional thirty

days to amend his pleadings. 4 Assuming without deciding the trial court could extend the deadline

under these circumstances, the new deadline to file amended pleadings was February 21, 2022. 5

         On March 17, 2022, the trial court held a second hearing on the appellees’ motion to

dismiss. The trial court asked Gentles whether he amended his pleadings. Gentles responded he

put his amended pleadings “in the mail this morning” but admitted they were not filed or mailed

3
  The reporter’s record of the January 20, 2022 hearing is not before us. However, at the March 17, 2022 hearing, the
trial court recounted what occurred at the January 20, 2022 hearing.
4
  We need not determine whether it was proper for the trial court to give Gentles an additional thirty days because the
issue has not been raised by the parties and it is not dispositive of this appeal.
5
  Because the thirtieth day following January 20, 2022 was Saturday, February 19, 2022, Gentles was required to file
his amended pleadings on “the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 4.

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on or before February 21, 2022. 6 The amended pleadings were not filed until March 25, 2022, and

did not dismiss the appellees from the suit.

        Section 101.106(f) required the trial court to dismiss the suit unless Gentles timely

amended his pleadings to dismiss the appellees from the suit and name TDCJ as defendant. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f). Because Gentles did not amend his pleadings

within the requisite time, we hold the trial court did not err when it dismissed the suit.

        Accordingly, Gentles’s second and third issues are overruled.

                             AMENDED PETITION FILED AFTER DISMISSAL

        In his fourth issue, Gentles argues the trial court erred when it did not apply the mailbox

rule to his amended pleadings. Assuming arguendo the mailbox rule applied to Gentles’s amended

pleadings, the outcome of his appeal remains unchanged.

        The mailbox rule provides: “If any document is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United

States mail in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and is deposited in the mail

on or before the last day for filing same, the same, if received by the clerk not more than ten days

tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 5. At the latest,

Gentles was required to file his amended pleadings on or before February 21, 2022. By his own

admission, Gentles did not mail the amended pleadings until March 17, 2022. Thus, the mailbox

rule does not save the suit from dismissal under section 101.106(f).

        Accordingly, Gentles’s fourth issue is overruled.

                                                CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the suit.

                                                        Irene Rios, Justice

6
 Gentles argued he was unable to mail the amended pleadings because the prison went on “institutional lockdown for
two weeks.” However, Gentles admitted the lockdown did not start until February 23, 2022—two days after his
amended pleadings were due.

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