Court Opinion

ID: 9591934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:08:58.641661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.355351
License: Public Domain

HOUSER, J., Dissenting.
I dissent.
Undeniably, the facts are that for and during a period of several weeks next preceding the execution of the two contracts which form the basis of the instant action, the various provisions of such contracts not only were the subject of negotiations and were thoroughly considered by each of the parties thereto, but also that the said provisions constituted the subject matter of each of several serious discussions that occurred between able and experienced counsel who represented the respective parties. Everyone who in any way was connected with the matter was completely familiar with each and every detail of the original contract, as well as with each of the several provisions of the new contracts which thereafter were executed. No one was deceived nor was anyone misled by any representation which may have been made by defendant. The single circumstance that he may not have expressly divulged the fact that he had approximately $3,000 *458on deposit in a bank in no way operated to plaintiff’s disadvantage, nor did it constitute a factor in her determination to enter into either of the agreements. That item of defendant’s assets, considered in comparison with the total value of the properties and the other respective interests of the parties, was so small as to be regarded as insignificant and of no consequence as an inducement to the execution of the contracts. As a matter of record, in addition to the several advantages by which plaintiff benefited by reason of the provisions of the new contract, she received a cash consideration of $10,000. In such a situation, from a legal standpoint it was impossible that plaintiff could have been defrauded. In fact, the only ground (if any) upon which plaintiff’s case may be rested is the asserted fact based on her testimony to the effect that she was induced to enter into each of the contracts by reason of the alleged fraudulent promise of defendant that he would remarry her. Although perhaps unnecessary of corroboration, no substantial evidence may be found in the record to support her testimony in that regard. To the contrary, following the date when, according to her testimony, defendant had promised to remarry her, the undisputed evidence discloses the fact that each and every letter, communication, or documentary evidence of any kind refutes the testimony that was given by plaintiff in that respect. Not only were the parties treating one with the other “at arm’s length” but, practically, they were “at swords’ points”. At no time during the course of the negotiations when the respective attorneys were present was an asserted promise by defendant of remarriage to plaintiff even mentioned or hinted. Every scrap of evidence and every inference deducible from any source not only proclaim the unreliability of plaintiff’s testimony in that regard, but also demand (without practicability of successful denial) that such testimony be regarded as unequivocally impeached. To my mind, far from being considered as substantial evidence of a promise by defendant to remarry her, plaintiff’s testimony fails to provide even a “scintilla” of evidence in that regard. But conceding the possibility that such conviction may not be well founded, assuredly it is patent that plaintiff slept on such rights as at any time she may have possessed. As far as the record herein discloses, for two and one-half years plaintiff carefully guarded and safely kept her secret. To no one did she ever divulge the asserted fact of such a *459promise save possibly to her present attorneys who assumedly were informed thereof shortly preceding the commencement of the instant action. If her claim was genuine why was it not asserted at some time during the period when negotiations were pending, or at least within a reasonable time after it must have been apparent to plaintiff that defendant had no intention of ever marrying her? The authorities are numerous to the effect that although a plea of the statute of limitations may not be available to a defendant; nevertheless if an unreasonable delay in bringing an appropriate action has ensued the defendant may successfully set up such a plea as a defense. In my opinion, by her laches plaintiff has es-topped herself from the maintenance of the instant action.
The foregoing suggestions constitute my principal objections to the conclusion that has been reached in the prevailing opinion herein; but the fact that other objections have not been here set forth should not be considered as conclusive or even as an indication that there are not several other equally valid and sufficient reasons why the judgment should be reversed.
Kehearing denied.