Court Opinion

ID: 9819324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:22:43.050751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:34.374702
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that the trial court should be affirmed in the imposition of sentences for defendant’s armed robbery and two attempt (first degree murder) convictions. Defendant’s claim that his sentence was excessive is waived for failure to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. People v. Economy, 291 Ill. App. 3d 212, 683 N.E.2d 919 (1997). I disagree that defendant is, in this appeal, eligible for day-for-day good-time credit. The majority finds that the defendant’s argument that Public Act 89 — 404 violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution is well-taken. In the posture of this case, the constitutionality of Public Act 89 — 404 should not be addressed. The truth-in-sentencing provisions set forth in section 3 — 6— 3(a)(2)(ii) of the Code are self-executing. 730 ILCS 5/3 — 6—3(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996). The majority suggests that section 5 — 4—1 of the Code imposes a requirement on the trial judge to state at the sentencing hearing what good-time provision applies under section 3 — 6—3. This suggestion is a bootstrap attempt to validate the majority’s determination that Public Act 89 — 404 is unconstitutional. Section 5 — 4—l(c—2) provides that the trial “judge shall state on the record in open court the approximate period of time the defendant will serve in custody according to the *** regulations for early release found in Section 3 — 6—3.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 4—l(c—2) (West 1996). But section 5 — 4—l(e—2) also provides: “This statement is intended solely to inform the public, has no legal effect on the defendant’s actual release, and may not be relied on by the defendant on appeal.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 4—l(c—2) (West 1996). The purpose of the legislation appears to be a required admonishment to the public and not to the defendant. Supreme Court Rule 402 does not require the trial court to admonish a defendant as to what good-time credit he may receive under the provisions of article 6 of the Code. 730 ILCS 5/3 — 6—3 (West 1996). Section 5 — 4—l(c—2) makes it clear that “ ‘[t]he actual period of prison time served is determined by the statutes of Illinois as applied *** by the Illinois Department of Corrections and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 — 4—l(c—2) (West 1996). With this background, I suggest the constitutionality of Public Act 89 — 404 is not an appropriate issue to be raised by defendant in this direct appeal. Defendant entered a guilty plea and the State dismissed other charges. This issue was not raised at sentencing or included in defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence. The last sentence of Rule 604(d) is quite specific: “Upon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to reconsider the sentence or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall he deemed waived.” (Emphasis added.) 145 111. 2d R. 604(d). The supreme court’s language ought to be followed. The issue is waived. In People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454, 539 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (1989), the supreme court stated a constitutional issue may be raised at any time. In People v. Starnes, 273 Ill. App. 3d 911, 913-14, 653 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1995), the appellate court distinguished Bryant, finding that Bryant “prohibits waiver of a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute under which a defendant is convicted.” The Starnes court then found that pursuant to the reasoning in People v. Sales, 195 Ill. App. 3d 160, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (1990), waiver does apply to constitutional attacks on a collateral statute. As the State argues, the truth-in-sentencing provisions are collateral to the statutes under which defendant was convicted and sentenced. As pointed out heretofore, chapter III of the Code concerns the Department of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3 — 1—1 through 3 — 15—13 (West 1996). Section 3 — 6—3 is self-executing. The credit for time served issue under article 6 of the Code is not an issue to be properly addressed in direct appeal in this case. Section 3 — 6— 3(a)(2)(ii) provides that a prisoner serving a sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder “shall receive no more than 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/3 — 6—3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1995). Determining credit for time served is the responsibility of the Department of Corrections, not the trial court. For the reasons stated above, it is not necessary to address the State’s argument concerning reenactment of the legislation in Public Acts 89 — 428 and 89 — 462, or Public Act 89 — 656 (Pub. Act 89 — 656, § 15, eff. January 1, 1997 (1996 111. Laws 3500-01)). As in Watford, the issue of constitutionality is not properly before this court. The trial court’s orders should be affirmed in their entirety.