Court Opinion

ID: 9647523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:38:56.477666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.435893
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
After having carefully read what the majority states on pages 2 and 3 of its majority opinion, and also taking into consideration what the record of appeal reflects, but further finding that this Court does not simply grant the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review in order for this Court to enter a simple order to be published, to the effect that the Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s motion to give late notice of appeal, which it granted, see King v. State, 634 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.App.1982), and thus should not have written on his case, I must not only register my dissent, but must exclaim, “Color me not only amazed, but do it in chartreuse.”
it is now written in stone that this Court will always jealously guard its jurisdiction, and, but as reflected by this Court’s past decisions, any court interfering or attempting to interfere with this Court’s jurisdiction, or altering, modifying, or changing, or attempting to alter, modify, or change this Court’s judgments, to put it quite bluntly, will obtain the wrath of this Court. When any court interferes with this Court’s jurisdiction or its judgments, this Court will act much like how a folklore demon might act. For example, see Curry v. Davis, (No. 69,-252, July 25, 1984, Unreported Per Curiam Opinion); Vance v. Hatten, 508 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Wilson v. Briggs, 171 Tex.Cr.App. 479, 351 S.W.2d 892, 894 (1961).
As the majority opinion clearly and correctly points out, appellant originally attempted to appeal his conviction to this Court. This Court, however, ordered the attempted appeal dismissed because the record of appeal did not contain any notice of appeal, either oral or written. On May 4, 1982, long after September 1, 1981, the mandate of this Court issued. For legal purposes, the appellant’s conviction became a final conviction. Thereafter, except for ministerial matters, neither the trial court nor any appellate court had the power or authority to take any action other than in obedience to the mandate of this Court. See Vance v. Hatten, supra, at 628, and Wilson v. Briggs, supra, at 894.
Furthermore, the law of this State expressly provides that “After final conviction in any felony case, the [application for post-conviction] writ must be made returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas at Austin, Texas.” Art. 11.07, V.A. C.C.P. The law further, but expressly, provides that the procedure outlined in Art. 11.07, supra, is the exclusive felony post-conviction remedy in the courts of this *768State, and governs all final felony convictions. Ex parte Brown, 662 S.W.2d 3 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Thus, once a felony conviction has become final, only this Court has jurisdiction to consider post-conviction matters that might pertain to the conviction, and only this Court has jurisdiction to grant post-conviction relief. Ex parte Ybarra, 629 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
In this instance, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals was clearly in error in entertaining and acting upon appellant’s motion to give late notice of appeal — because only this Court had jurisdiction to act upon that motion, which concerned a final felony conviction. Of course, the motion should have been processed pursuant to Art. 11.07, supra.
Art. 44.08(e), Y.A.C.C.P., which gives authority to a court of appeals to grant late notice of appeal, did not give any court of appeals jurisdiction to act on matters over which this Court has exclusive jurisdiction. It is only when a court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over the case in the first place that it may then act pursuant to Art. 44.08(e), supra. In this instance, the court of appeals never had jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal; this Court is the only court that ever had jurisdiction over that appeal. Thus, the court of appeals was without judicial authority or power to invoke the provisions of Art. 44.08(e), supra.
To the failure of a majority of this Court to simply grant the State’s petition and then enter an order directing the court of appeals to withdraw the opinions that it has handed down in this cause, by published order, and dismiss this cause from its docket, I dissent with all of the vigor at my command.