Court Opinion

ID: 9791827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:18:37.647344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.778568
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority that the phrase, “on account of labor performed,” appearing in an endorsement on the back of paychecks signed and cashed by the plaintiff, should be strictly construed; furthermore, that the endorsement signed by the plaintiff is not clearly an accord and satisfaction precluding his claim for salary while incapacitated by on-the-job injuries. Therefore, on the basis of the finding of the trial court respecting the custom and practice in the industry concerning compensation for time loss from on-the-job injuries, I concur in the conclusion of the majority that the judgment of the trial court on plaintiff’s third cause should be reversed.. Furthermore, I agree with the majority in affirmance of the judgment of the trial court denying and dismissing plaintiff’s second cause.
However, I cannot agree with the majority’s review and disposition of the plaintiff’s first cause.
For some time now, in our appellate process, cases tried to a jury have been handled somewhat differently from those tried to the court, ie., trial judge. With reference to the latter cases a rule has been applied distinguishing, technically at least, between findings of fact and conclusions of law. This dichotomy as to findings of fact and conclusions of law (implemented by a requirement that the trial court make and enter (a) findings of fact and (b) conclusions of law) has been described as a necessary one, justified on the ground that the appellate court can*603not or should not be required to search the evidentiary record from stem to stern, and then be required to weigh or evaluate the evidentiary factual pattern and to describe the result by making and entering, in effect, appellate court findings of fact. We have said resoundingly that evaluating the evidence, making and entering findings of fact, is exclusively the prerogative of the trial court. We have further attempted to limit the appellate function by discarding the rule that findings of fact entered by the trial court will be accepted as verities if supported by a clear preponderance of the evidence, or even if supported in lesser degree by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, we have enunciated and applied a rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are to be accepted as verities if supported by substantial evidence. At first blush, and abstractly, these variants of our rule of appellate procedure may seem clear, logical and convincing. However, curiously enough, it is less than crystal clear what subjective, objective, or other standards of measurement are available and appropriate to determine the quantum of evidence requisite to satisfy the three rule variants. Upon close analysis, the record relative to concrete applications of our rule of appellate procedure is not so clear, and not so seemingly logical and convincing. We have held that the trial judge’s written memorandum opinions or stenographic transcriptions of oral opinions may be resorted to, to clarify and to give meaning to findings of fact which otherwise, in our judgment, might not be clear. Rutter v. Rutter (1962), 59 Wn. (2d) 781, 370 P. (2d) 862; Hodges v. Gronvold (1959), 54 Wn. (2d) 478, 341 P. (2d) 857; Guerin v. Thompson (1959), 53 Wn. (2d) 515, 335 P. (2d) 36; Miller Lbr. Co. v. Holden (1954), 45 Wn. (2d) 237, 273 P. (2d) 786; Wentz v. T. E. Connolly, Inc. (1954), 45 Wn. (2d) 127, 273 P. (2d) 485; Bowman v. Webster (1953), 42 Wn. (2d) 129, 253 P. (2d) 934; Payne v. Vinecore (1952), 40 Wn. (2d) 746, 246 P. (2d) 448; Mertens v. Mertens (1951), 38 Wn. (2d) 55, 227 P. (2d) 724. We have held on occasion that findings of fact, described and entered as such by the trial judge, may *604be treated as conclusions of law (Fain v. Nelson (1960), 57 Wn. (2d) 217, 356 P. (2d) 302; Kane v. Klos (1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 778, 314 P. (2d) 672; Grove v. Payne (1955), 47 Wn. (2d) 461, 288 P. (2d) 242; McClendon v. Callahan (1955), 46 Wn. (2d) 733, 284 P. (2d) 323; Miller Lbr. Co. v. Holden, supra; Wygal v. Kilwein (1952), 41 Wn. (2d) 281, 248 P. (2d) 893), and conversely (Hoke v. Stevens-Norton, Inc. (1962), 60 Wn. (2d) 775, 375 P. (2d) 743; Coolidge v. Pierce Cy. (1902), 28 Wash. 95, 68 Pac. 391).
With the foregoing in mind, it seems to me that the disposition by the majority opinion of appellant’s first cause suggests some reconsideration of this appellate rule dichotomy relative to findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as reconsideration of the cases applying and relying upon this dichotomy in terms of appellate case review and disposition.
Reference will now be made to some of the language of the majority opinion relative to disposition of plaintiff’s first cause, and some analysis of this language and the reasoning involved will be attempted. The majority opinion cites Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co. (1955), 46 Wn. (2d) 408, 281 P. (2d) 832, for the proposition that it is a question of fact whether a contract of employment is for a fixed or an indefinite term. Thereupon, in the first sentence of the following paragraph, the majority opinion reads:
“The facts and circumstances presented in the instant case lend themselves to conflicting inferences upon the intended duration of the employment.”
This sentence emphasizes facts and circumstances; no distinction is suggested and no differentiation is made as between facts and circumstances. Albeit the sentence then refers to “inferences” — conflicting ones — based upon or apparently arising from previously mentioned facts and circumstances. It is not clear whether these inferences are (1) interpretations of the facts and circumstances, (2) value judgments, (3) hunches, (4) psychological or other emotive reactions, or (5) something closely akin to legal *605conclusions; that is, at least something different, more or less, from so-called simple, unvarnished evidentiary facts. The conflicting inferences are said to be related to “the intended duration of the employment.” This, it seems to me, injects another factor, namely, intent. But it is not clear whether intent is determined by subjective or objective standards, whether intent is a state of mind from the standpoint of medical psychiatry or psychology, or a legal concept or conclusion related to evidentiary facts in the record, having some bearing upon the thought processes of the plaintiff or the defendant. The succeeding sentence of that particular paragraph states that the trial court did not make an ultimate finding of fact upon this issue. With this collocation of words, a modifier (adjective in nature) is injected as another factor in the picture. This suggests some differentiation between facts and ultimate facts, without providing the reader with an explanation, elaboration, or justification of the suggested distinction. The next succeeding paragraph states,
“Resort to the trial court’s oral decision does not clarify the factual pattern upon which the trial court decided this phase of the case.”
The majority thus decline any help from the trial court’s oral decision, but stick to the proposition that the trial court’s decision, without labeling the decision a conclusion of law, should be supported by an actual or a factual pattern. In the next sentence, the majority state:
“The findings of fact as entered neither support nor contradict the trial court’s conclusion of law in this respect.”
Without opening Pandora’s box and getting into such questions as: what are facts? what are conclusions? what are findings of fact? and what are conclusions of law? — 1 the above-quoted statement by the majority is of course orthodox, but again general in nature and only reasonably con*606vincing. Citing Stringfellow v. Stringfellow (1960), (56 Wn. (2d) 957, 350 P. (2d) 1003, 353 P. (2d) 671), the paragraph concludes:
“The function of ultimate fact finding is exclusively vested in the trial court. The power of this court is appellate only.”
The majority opinion then remands the case to the trial court for the entry of a finding of fact relative to and determinative of the intended duration of the employment of the plaintiff-contractor.
It seems to me the point has been reached that consideration should be given to revision of the rules on appeal to the end that our review of cases tried to the courts, i.e., the trial judges, will be handled in the same manner as cases tried to a jury. The rules evolved, and as annotated in our cases, are sufficiently unclear in meaning and application that I have serious doubts if even appellate convenience is facilitated.
As to appellate convenience and assistance in saving time unnecessarily spent in reading lengthy records in hundreds of cases appealed, a simple rule will serve adequately: namely, that counsel, in appellate briefs and argument, be required to indicate clearly by reference to pages and lines those parts of the statement of facts (evidentiary record) which support the contentions of the parties on appeal.
An orderly appellate procedure and a more accurate and informative description of it would be more likely by a change to a simple rule, provision, or modus operandi comparable to that applicable in cases tried to a jury. Thus, the decision-making function and the final judgment entered by a trial judge would be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence; or, if the evidence is clearly in conflict or, described another way, if the evidence is reasonably and rationally believable and convincing, and the result or judgment reached by the trial judge does not shock the conscience of the judges of the appellate court.
In the instant case, I think that the trial judge in his *607decision-making function has indicated clearly that (a) from his evaluation of the evidentiary pattern before him, and (b) in his judgment, the contract of employment was one for an indefinite rather than a definite term. The only time reference in the letter offering employment in Alaska to the plaintiff is a sentence which reads:
“This project will last about two years and possibly longer.”
The phrase, “about two years and possibly longer,” is certainly a general rather than a specific reference to time or to duration. This language, such as it is, is a reference, generally speaking, to the project, its time, or duration. The reference is not to plaintiff’s period of employment. The language of this letter of employment, coupled with other substantial evidence in the record, supports the decision of the trial judge that the plaintiff’s term of employment was indefinite.
Realistically, it seems to me the trial court has evaluated the evidence, and therefrom has decided that the legal result to be attributed to the conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding their conduct added up to a contract, not for the duration of the construction project, but terminable as was done by the defendant. In one sense this is a legal conclusion or a conclusion of law reached by the trial court. Remanding the case will not change the mind of the trial court as to the legal effect to be attributed to the actions and relationships of the parties. Realistically, the suggestion that the trial court make or enter a finding of fact as to the “intended duration of the contract” most likely will produce some statement labeled a “finding of fact,” which in turn will be said to support the legal conclusion previously reached by the trial court in disposing of this facet of the controversy. On this aspect of the appeal I would affirm the trial court. Since appellant, as I view the matter, has prevailed only in part, and not too substantially, I would leave each side to its own costs.

Fuller: Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Natural L. F. 68 (1958); Nagel: On the Fusion of Fact and Value, 3 Natural L. F. 77 (1958); Morris: Law and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303 (1942); Isaacs: The Law and the Facts, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1922).