Court Opinion

ID: 9486509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:50:36.044273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:45.762973
License: Public Domain

BEEZER, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court.
If Frazer’s appointed trial attorney threatened to render ineffective assistance of counsel in the event that Frazer did not plead guilty, then I would presume prejudice. If prejudice is presumed then there is no need to determine whether the attorney’s conduct affected the trial’s outcome. Frazer pleads such a case and he is entitled to an evidentia-ry hearing.
Frazer also claims to be the victim of a racially explicit verbal assault from his attorney. He claims that this establishes an “irreconcilable conflict” between attorney and client which prevented an adequate defense. The question whether an alleged racial slur, by itself, violates the Sixth Amendment is not properly resolved by the presumed prejudice standard.
There are three possible standards under which we determine whether an ineffective assistance claim constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation. A fourth standard is applied when the defendant claims an “irreconcilable conflict” with the attorney and seeks substitution of counsel. Under this fourth standard, the denial of substitution may violate the Sixth Amendment.
I
Since the standard varies depending on the nature of petitioner’s proof and the district court’s findings of fact, I discuss the several standards.
A
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel comprises two correlative rights: the right to counsel of reasonable competence, and the right to counsel’s undivided loyalty. Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir.1988). Where ineffective assistance of counsel is claimed, the claim is evaluated under the standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This standard is usually expressed as requiring two elements: the defendant in a criminal case must (1) show that counsel’s actions were “outside” the range of professional conduct, and (2) that but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Scrutiny under the first element is highly deferential, because there is a “strong presumption” that an attorney’s conduct was professionally competent. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Scrutiny under the second element requires the petitioner to show a probability of prejudice— that the error undermined confidence in the trial’s outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
B
Some errors by counsel are so egregious, however, that a second standard applies in such cases. Under this second standard, the defendant need not demonstrate that the error affected the reliability of the trial’s outcome. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046-47, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir.1991). Instead, a per se presumption of prejudice arises. The presumption applies when the error involves actual or constructive denial of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings or where counsel fails to subject the government’s case to adversarial testing. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 702, 104 S.Ct. at 2072 (“Actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.”) Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 744 n. 2 (9th Cir.1990) (lack of adversarial testing gives rise to per se presumption). See, e.g., Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1074 (holding that lawyer who informed jury that no reasonable doubt exists “utterly failed” to subject prosecution’s case to adversarial testing and, therefore, counsel provided ineffective assistance). We have applied the per se presumption “very sparingly” and only on those occasions when, either through denial of counsel or lack of adversarial testing, there has been an “actual breakdown in the adversarial process” during a critical *787stage in the criminal proceedings. Toomey, 898 F.2d at 744 n. 2.
C
A third standard applies when the attorney’s undivided loyalty is questioned by a conflict of interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Under the Cuyler standard, an alleged conflict of interest is subjected to a “similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice” than the per se presumption. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel (1) “actively represented conflicting interests” and (2) the “actual conflict of interest affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350, 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 1718). To meet the second element, a client must plead and prove that the conflict had an adverse effect on counsel’s conduct or caused some lapse in counsel’s representation that is contrary to the chent’s interest. See United States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir.1992) (defendant must show that conflict “affected his lawyer’s performance” before prejudice may be presumed); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 287 (6th Cir.1985) (defendant must show that conflict caused “some lapse in representation contrary to the defendant’s interests”) (quoting Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1086 (3rd Cir.1983)).
The showing of some adverse consequence is not the same as prejudice but is necessary before prejudice can be presumed. Prejudice requires a probability that the outcome of trial would have been different. In contrast, an adverse consequence requires a likelihood that counsel’s performance somehow would have been different. See Miskinis, 966 F.2d at 1268; Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476, 480 n. 3 (6th Cir.1987). To establish that a conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance, the defendant must show that the conflict “likely” affected counsel’s conduct of particular aspects of the trial or counsel’s advocacy on behalf of the defendant. Miskinis, 966 F.2d at 1268. This showing of some adverse consequence is necessary because an attorney may harbor a conflict but nevertheless provide exemplary representation. Without a showing that the alleged conflict had some adverse effect on the attorney’s performance, it will not be presumed that the conflict caused prejudice to the outcome of trial.
D
A fourth standard applies when there is an “irreconcilable conflict” between the attorney and the defendant. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.1970). Under the Brown standard, it must be determined whether the trial court’s denial of substitution of counsel in itself constituted a denial of counsel. Three elements are considered: (1) whether the motion to substitute was timely; (2) whether the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint was adequate, and (3) whether the conflict between defendant and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1986). Prejudice is only shown upon meeting all three elements.
A distinction must be made between an “irreconcilable conflict” and errors in representation by counsel. See Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 832 (9th Cir.1982) (noting that the line between “irreconcilable conflict” cases and “ineffective assistance of counsel” cases is “sometimes unclear”). When an “irreconcilable conflict” is alleged, the claimed error rests heavily on the fact that the defendant lost confidence in his attorney, and that the trial court denied the defendant’s request to substitute counsel. See id. at 831. The claimed error does not necessarily rest on any alleged ineffective representation by counsel. Thus, when the defendant claims that a “irreconcilable conflict” exists, the standard under Brown applies. Under Brown, the failure on a timely basis to move for substitution in the trial court will be fatal to the claim on appeal. See United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir.1991) (trial court properly denied “untimely motion” for substitution of counsel). In contrast, when the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim rests on the attorney’s ineffective representation, the defendant’s claim does not depend on *788whether the plaintiff moved for substitution at trial.
II
I acknowledge the differences between the aforementioned standards. If Frazer can prove that his attorney conditionally refused to provide adequate legal representation, it is proper to apply the per se presumption under Cronic. If Frazer can prove only a conflict of interest, I would not apply the per se presumption. When a conflict of interest is alleged, it is proper to apply the “limited presumption” standard in Cuyler.
I also believe that the racial slur, if proved, does not require the application of the per se presumption under Cronic.
A
The alleged threat by Frazer’s counsel that he would be an ineffective lawyer if Frazer did not plead guilty, if true, constitutes a constructive denial of counsel. Once Frazer’s court appointed attorney threatened to provide substandard performance, the attorney ceased to function as defense counsel. By threatening to join the state in its prosecution, Frazer’s counsel did not adequately represent Frazer’s best interests. “[A]n attorney who adopts and acts upon a belief that his client should be convicted ‘fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as the government’s adversary.’” Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625 (10th Cir.1988) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666, 104 S.Ct. at 2051). Counsel in such a situation “ ‘represents’ the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.” Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d at 629 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975))). By failing to function as the state’s adversary, an attorney constructively denies counsel to his client.
The alleged threat by Frazer’s attorney occurred during a “critical stage” in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, the per se presumption of prejudice would apply if the alleged threat is proven true. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075. (prejudice presumed where constructive denial of counsel occurs during “critical stage of the criminal proceedings”). An attorney’s advice to his client as to whether he should plead guilty or go to trial is undoubtedly made at a “critical stage” in the criminal proceedings.
B
The alleged threat to provide ineffective legal assistance, if true, also constituted a conflict of interest. A “conflict of interest” typically involves joint representation of multiple defendants. However, a “conflict of interest” also arises when the client’s interests collide with his attorney’s interests. See United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075; United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (7th Cir.1986). When viewed as a conflict of interest between Frazer and his counsel, the alleged threat should be evaluated under the “limited” presumption of Cuyler.
Under the “limited presumption” standard articulated in Cuyler, Frazer must first plead and demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest existed between the trial attorney and client. See United States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d at 1268. Assuming that the alleged threat to withhold effective assistance is true, Frazer easily meets this first threshold. We have held that an attorney who joins the state in the effort to attain a conviction labors under a conflict of interest. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075. In this case, the threat, if true, turned Frazer’s counsel into a potential adversary and he ceased being a zealous advocate of Frazer’s interests. Counsel’s position necessarily conflicted with the defendant’s interests. Compare Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 455 (9th Cir.1991) (no actual conflict shown because alleged conflict was based on speculation that attorney might have called husband as a witness).
Frazer must also show that the alleged conflict “likely” had an adverse impact on counsel’s conduct of the case in his representation of Frazer. If Frazer’s allegations are true, Frazer meets this second threshold. Counsel’s alleged threat, if true, improperly forced Frazer to choose between his right to trial and his right to counsel, and consequently infringed both rights. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d *789115, 120-21 (3rd Cir.1977). Such a “choice” cannot be said to constitute a voluntary waiver of either right by Frazer. If the allegations are true, Frazer has demonstrated that a conflict of interest adversely affected his attorney’s performance. He would be entitled to relief.
C
The issue of the alleged racial epithet cannot be properly posed as follows: “To countenance the type of overt racially charged threat alleged in this case would be to deviate from our national goal of ending racism.” Supra, at 784. No one asks us to condone the racial slur and none of us do.
Rather, the question we address is whether the racially charged verbal assault constitutes evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
The alleged threat alone, if true, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. This conclusion is compelled whether the alleged threat is viewed as a constructive denial of counsel or as a conflict of interest. In either case, a presumption of prejudice arises, because the alleged threat, if true, indicates that counsel adopted and acted on the belief that the defendant should be convicted. The proof of the racial epithet and insult adds nothing to the analysis.
I believe application of the “irreconcilable conflict” standard announced in Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d at 1170, is the appropriate measure of whether a verbal assault (apart from a threat to provide substandard performance) violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under Brown, the trial court’s denial of substitute counsel violates the Sixth Amendment if the defendant shows: (1) that he moved for substitution, (2) that the district court held an inadequate hearing, and (3) that the conflict between Frazer and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d at 789. If a defendant demonstrates these three factors, the denial of the defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel constitutes a denial of assistance of counsel.
I agree with the conclusion that calling one’s client a “stupid nigger son of a bitch” is tantamount to a “total lack of communication” preventing an adequate defense. All communications between an attorney and client following such an outburst would be strained. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1979) (where attorney-client relationship is “stormy one with quarrels, bad language, threats and counter-threats,” a “lack of communication” exists that requires court to grant substitution of counsel upon defendant’s timely motion).
It is improper to conclude, however, that there was a “irreconcilable conflict” without addressing the other two factors necessary under Brown. A defendant must also show he timely moved to substitute his counsel, and that the court held an inadequate hearing on the motion. See id. at 1260-61 (“[Wjhere the request for change of counsel comes during the trial, or on the eve of trial, the Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, refuse to delay the trial to obtain new counsel and therefore may reject the request.”) This rule balances the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel against society’s interest in the prompt administration of justice. Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d at 831. Also, because personal conflicts between attorney and client usually take place outside the record, the rule requires a petitioner to point to evidence in the record establishing an objection to the conflict.
Frazer alleges that he sought new counsel immediately after the alleged verbal assault and before trial. He claims that his motion was denied without a hearing by the district court. Those allegations, if true, would satisfy the other two factors in the Brown standard.