Court Opinion

ID: 9627634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:49:14.45518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:01.129594
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur except as to issue two; the trial court’s refusal of a jury instruction requiring proof of “serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” I believe Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), requires, upon proper request, such a submission.
In Crane, the United States Supreme Court determined “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” Crane, 534 U.S. at 413,122 S.Ct. 867. The Court vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Crane, 534 U.S. at 415, 122 S.Ct. 867. Clearly concluding that the Crane majority was requiring a lack-of-control determination by the fact-finder, Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Crane dissenters, objected in part because they thought it would be too difficult to instruct a jury as the majority was requiring.1 Crane, 534 U.S. at 423, 122 S.Ct. 867.
Subsequently, jurisdictions have reached varying conclusions in applying Crane to challenges to SVP statutes.2 As the majority does here, some jurisdictions have concluded a jury necessarily finds a defendant lacks the requisite control when the State links the individual’s mental disorder and dangerousness. See In re Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 568 S.E.2d 338, 349 (2002) (“Inherent within the mental abnormality prong of the Act is a lack of control determination.... ”); In re Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002)(concluding proof of the nexus between the individual’s mental disorder and dangerousness “necessarily and implicitly involves proof that the person’s mental disorder involves serious difficulty for the person to control his or her behavior”).
But at least one jurisdiction has concluded, to be constitutional under Crane, jury instructions must require that the “degree” to which a person cannot control his or her behavior is “serious difficulty.” Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002). To comply with Crane, the Missouri Supreme Court mandated the instruction defining mental abnormality should read: “As used in this instruction, ‘mental abnormality’ means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.” Id.
Another jurisdiction has remanded a case for a “lack of control” determination without mandating specific language to be used by the trial court. In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002). And, yet another jurisdiction, while determining Crane does not require a specific jury instruction, also concluded jurors would not understand the link between the individual’s mental disorder and a serious difficulty in controlling behavior without additional instructions. In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 59 P.3d 779, 788 (2002). In Leon, the Arizona Supreme *508Court, thus, directed trial judges to instruct juries in future SVP proceedings as follows:
The State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person has a mental disorder that makes it highly probable that the person will engage in future acts of sexual violence. A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is not a sufficient ground to determine an individual is a sexually violent person. An individual’s dangerousness must be caused by a mental disorder which, in turn, causes the person to have serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior.

Id.

I agree with the Missouri and New Jersey Supreme Courts and with Justices Scalia and Thomas that Crane requires the fact finder in an SVP commitment proceeding to determine whether the individual has “serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior.” As Crane has mandated that constitutional due process requires such a determination in commitment proceedings, state laws or rules of procedure are superseded by this directive. U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby....”).
Although appellant does not argue that our State procedures and case law would require submission of his instruction, both the State and the majority address that issue and, thus, compel me to do likewise.
I am convinced the trial court here should have allowed Almaguer his instruction under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 277 requires the trial court, “whenever feasible” to submit the cause on broad-form questions. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 277. Here, under the trial court’s use of broad form submission, the State maintains both that the volitional control issue was included in the question asking the jury to determine if the appellant has a behavioral abnormality and that the jury’s “yes” answer to this question demonstrates the jury found Almaguer has difficulty controlling his behavior.
Rule 277 also requires the trial court to “submit such instructions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 277.3 While a trial court has considerable discretion in submitting broad-form jury questions, the questions must properly submit the controlling fact issues for the jury’s determination. See Interstate Northborough Partnership v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 224-25 (Tex.2001); Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.1995)(“If an issue is properly pleaded and is supported by some evidence, a litigant is entitled to have controlling questions submitted to the jury.”). A trial court reversibly errs when it denies a party proper submission of a valid theory of recovery or a vital defensive issue raised by the pleadings and evidence. Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex.1992).
Noting that trial judges must provide jury instructions explaining the applicable law in terms the jury can readily understand, the Arizona Supreme Court found the reasoning of the Laxton dissent persuasive: “ ‘Although the words of [Wisconsin’s SVP statute] might be interpreted by lawyers and judges to include a link between the mental disorder and a serious difficulty in controlling behavior, the jury instructions based directly on the language *509of [Wisconsin’s SVP statute] do not set forth this link for non-lawyers.’ ” In re Leon G., 59 P.3d at 788 (quoting Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 798). The Arizona Supreme Court further reasoned:
Given the important interests involved in SVP proceedings for both the state and the individual, no question should arise as to whether the jury understands the importance of finding that a mental disorder, rather than a voluntary decision to engage in repetitive criminal behavior, renders a person dangerous within the meaning of the SVP statute.
In re Leon G., 59 P.3d at 788. I agree.
Here, whether Almaguer has a serious difficulty in controlling his behavior is a controlling fact issue under Crane. Thus, the trial court reversibly erred in not submitting Almaguer’s volitional control instruction to the jury. Perez, 842 S.W.2d at 631; Commercial Bank of Texas, N.A. v. Luce, 92 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.).
I would sustain issue two, and reverse and remand for a new trial.

. Justice Scalia wrote: "Today’s opinion says that the Constitution requires the addition of a third finding: (3) that the subject suffers from an inability to control behavior-not utter inability, ante, at 870, and not even inability in a particular constant degree, but rather inability in a degree that will vary ‘in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself,’ ante, at 870.” Crane, 534 U.S. at 423, 122 S.Ct. 867.

. See Peter C. Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003).

. The Texas Supreme Court observed that broad form submission under Rule 277 is not absolute and suggested that broad-form submission may not be feasible when the governing law is unsettled. Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 455 n. 6 (Tex.1992).