Court Opinion

ID: 9541021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:21:44.816162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:15.231505
License: Public Domain

Felton, J.,
dissenting. I agree with the statement that one who does an act which ordinarily or naturally produces a tres*77pass is liable therefor whether he does the actual trespassing or not, but I do not agree that one who undertakes to sell a timber lease by transferring it is guilty of a trespass upon a third party by orally misrepresenting a boundary line when the lease contains a perfect description of the lands upon which the timber lay. The case here is the same as if the transferor of the lease had owned the land and had executed a deed or a lease in which the land involved was accurately described. The rule enunciated by the majority is the rule in cases where the transaction is accomplished by writing or conveyances which by their terms include lands or property not owned by the grantor. All apparently applicable Georgia cases are those where the description in the written conveyance includes a third person’s property. The foreign cases cited are either similar to the Georgia cases or are cases where the sale is an oral sale and the rule in such cases is the same as the cases involving written instruments. In Burch v. King, 14 Ga. App. 153 (supra), the court said: “The execution of the conveyance amounts to an assertion of the maker’s right to use the property, and is equivalent to counseling and directing the grantee or lessee to commit the trespass.” That is true because when one undertakes to convey property by a writing or otherwise, the purchaser has a right to presume that he gets a good title to what is conveyed by the instrument, and his using the property or selling it is a natural and probable consequence of its being included in the written conveyance. The same applies to property orally sold and pointed out. I think the rule is different when the written conveyance does not include the property not owned by the seller for the reason that the purchaser is bound to know that he is only legally entitled to what is contained in the writing and no more, no matter what representations, statements or agreements have been made even before the execution of the instrument and his using, selling or dealing with more than is included in his written instrument is not the natural and probable consequence of the seller’s fraud or misrepresentation. The buyer’s knowledge of the law and his duty to abide by his conveyance insulates the seller from liabilities for injuries brought about by the buyer even if the buyer’s actions are induced by the seller’s misrepresentations. The buyer cannot take advantage of his own negligence and *78breach of duty and a third person to whom he sells cannot do so. For the rule that the rights of parties are based solely upon the descriptions in deeds see Taylor v. Board of Trustees of Glenlock Public School, 185 Ga. 61 (194 S. E. 169). It seems to me that the majority ruling in this case is strongly against public policy and opens the doors to fraud and collusion.