Court Opinion

ID: 9850808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:13.201381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:43.841173
License: Public Domain

*48Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
Under the particular facts of this case a hearing was required before the imposition of the extreme sanction of default, there being no definitive sanction order outlining the basis for the court’s action. I therefore agree with the majority that such sanction must be reversed and this case remanded for a hearing. However, I believe it is possible that the evidence in the record could authorize the trial court, following a proper hearing, to determine that GM’s conduct was wilful and that default sanctions are appropriate. To the extent that the majority suggests otherwise, I must respectfully disagree. I concur fully in Division 2, upholding the trial court’s ruling that the 14 documents at issue are not subject to a claim of privilege.
“[A] very broad discretion is granted judges in applying sanctions against disobedient parties in order to assure compliance with the orders of the courts. By OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) (C), the courts are specifically granted the discretion to dismiss complaints or render default judgments against disobedient parties. This applies to the disobeying of an order to produce. Historically, it has been the policy of the Georgia appellate courts to refuse to interfere with a trial court’s exercise of its discretion in absence of abuse. This policy is applicable to a trial judge’s exercise of the broad discretionary powers authorized under the discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hernandez v. State of Ga., 200 Ga. App. 368, 369 (408 SE2d 160) (1991).
Trial judges, through their direct involvement with the case, the parties, and the attorneys, and their familiarity with the actions of the parties in the conduct of discovery in similar cases that are properly brought to their attention, are in the best position to evaluate the parties’ conduct and to determine the appropriate level of sanctions.
This Court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and may interfere with such exercise only where the trial court has abused its discretion in controlling the conduct of discovery or the enforcement of its orders. “The standard for review of an order dismissing a[n] [answer] for [defendant’s] failure to respond to discovery is abuse of discretion.” Fisher v. Bd. of Commrs. &c., 200 Ga. App. 353, 354 (2) (c) (408 SE2d 120) (1991). The issue here is, did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking defendant’s answer as a discovery sanction under the facts of this case?
In its order sanctioning GM, the trial court did not make express findings of fact regarding GM’s wilfulness, and did not discuss what facts it relied upon in imposing its sanctions. We do not know, therefore, on what facts the trial court relied in sanctioning GM. The requirement that wilfulness be shown before the imposition of the drastic sanction of dismissal and default is well established. See Joel *49v. Duet Holdings, 181 Ga. App. 705, 707 (353 SE2d 548) (1987). Here, however, a finding of wilfulness by the trial court is implicit in its order. “[T]his court will not presume the trial court committed error where that fact does not affirmatively appear. The judge is presumed to know the law, not the opposite.” Whiteley v. State, 188 Ga. App. 129, 130-131 (1) (372 SE2d 296) (1988). See Windom v. State, 187 Ga. App. 18 (369 SE2d 311) (1988) (“implicit in any ruling by a trial court is that [the judge] has made the necessary finding of admissibility before admitting such evidence”). Id. at 19 (2). While the trial court should include a specific finding of wilfulness in its sanction, its failure to do so does not necessarily require reversal.
Generally, the trial court should hold a hearing upon a motion to impose default sanctions for discovery abuses, thereby giving the parties the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence concerning such motion. Such hearing provides an opportunity to create a record of the evidence considered by the trial court. The trial court can thereafter issue its ruling with appropriate findings. Loftin v. Gulf Contracting Co., 224 Ga. App, 210, 215 (480 SE2d 604) (1997) (vacating sanctions because appellant was not allowed a meaningful opportunity to explain his actions at a hearing).
We have, however, recognized that this general rule is subject to exceptions. The requirement of a hearing “serves no purpose where the trial court can otherwise determine wilfulness on the part of the party against whom the sanctions are sought.” (Footnote omitted.) Schrembs v. Atlanta Classic Cars, 261 Ga. 182, 183 (402 SE2d 723) (1991). Under such circumstance, the trial court has the option of determining wilfulness and sanctioning a party without a hearing. See Oliff v. Smith, 214 Ga. App. 358 (447 SE2d 707) (1994); Johnson v. Lomas Mtg. USA, 201 Ga. App. 562 (411 SE2d 731) (1991).
However, where the trial court makes a determination of wilfulness and sanctions a party without conducting a hearing, it is essential that the order imposing sanctions outline the basis for the court’s action, as there is otherwise no way of determining whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling.
Here, the trial court has not included in its order the facts upon which it relies. Absent such information in the sanction order or a transcript of a hearing on the motion, this Court is unable to apply the applicable standard of review in this matter. The credibility and weighing of evidence are matters which are peculiarly within the province of the factfinder, the trial judge in this matter. On appeal, the appellate tribunal does not determine the credibility or preponderance of evidence. See Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 215 (244 SE2d 864) (1978). “The finder of fact, in this case the [state] court judge, is the final arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. The judge’s findings of fact will not be dis*50turbed on appeal as long as there is any evidence to support those findings” Hughes v. Cobb County, 264 Ga. 128, 130 (1) (441 SE2d 406) (1994). “[T]he [trial] court hears the evidence and is the finder of fact. An appellate court does not find the facts, but reviews the facts found by others” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Public Svc. Comm. v. Southern Bell, 254 Ga. 244, 247 (327 SE2d 726) (1985). The question is, does an appellate court have the authority to make a finding of fact, where the finder of fact has failed to do so? The answer is clearly no under the above authority. The appellate court cannot make a finding of fact for the same reason that it cannot substitute its judgment thereon for that of the trial judge; that being, that such right is reserved to the trial judge.
Decided March 14, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 4, 1997
Before Judge Prather.
King & Spalding, Griffin B. Bell, Chilton D. Varner, Robert D. Hays, Jr., Sara E. Barton, Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella, Roy E. Barnes, for appellant.
Butler, Wooten, Overby, Pearson, Fryhofer & Daughtery, James E. Butler, Jr., Albert M. Pearson III, Peter J. Daughtery, Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild, James E. Humes II, for appellees.
Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Richard B. North, Jr., Cook, Noell, Tolley & Wiggins, J. Vincent Cook, Flournoy & Gentry, Matthew C. Flournoy, Franklin, Taulbee, Rushing, Bunce & Brogdon, W. M. Brogdon, Jr., amici curiae.
The majority engages in the making of findings of fact here, as the trial court did not do so, and the holding of the majority necessarily rests upon a factual finding as to the evidence in the case. If it did not do so, the majority could not have concluded that the evidence authorized the imposition of sanctions by the trial court, but not those imposed.
Unlike the majority, I would not limit the authority of the trial court to act upon this matter on remand.