Court Opinion

ID: 9897412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:14.478183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.855776
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                            May 01 2023, 8:42 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

APPELLANT, PRO SE                                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ty Evans                                                  Theodore E. Rokita
Michigan City, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
                                                          Jesse R. Drum
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ty Evans,                                                 May 1, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-PC-220
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable James K. Snyder,
Appellee-Respondent.                                      Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D28-2010-PC-31796

                                     Opinion by Judge Pyle

                            Judges Robb and Weissmann concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                Page 1 of 20
      Statement of the Case
[1]   It is axiomatic that an habitual offender adjudication must be based on proof

      that a defendant has accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions,

      meaning that the commission, conviction, and sentencing on the first felony

      preceded the commission, conviction, and sentence on the second felony. A

      post-conviction petitioner who challenges his habitual offender determination

      must demonstrate that he was not an habitual offender under the habitual

      offender statute and that his various convictions did not in fact occur in the

      required order.

[2]   Ty Evans (“Evans”), pro se, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his

      successive petition for post-conviction relief. Evans argues that the post-

      conviction court erred by denying him post-conviction relief on his motion to

      withdraw his guilty plea to the habitual offender allegation pursuant to

      INDIANA CODE § 35-35-1-4(c). Specifically, he argues that he was entitled to

      post-conviction relief because the dates of the two felony convictions underlying

      his habitual offender adjudication were not in the proper sequence as required

      by the habitual offender statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8. The post-

      conviction court denied relief on Evans’ successive post-conviction petition,

      finding that Evans had not pleaded guilty. The post-conviction court also

      concluded that Evans had not otherwise shown that he was entitled to post-

      conviction relief because he had failed to show that there was an improper

      sequencing on the two predicate felonies underlying his habitual offender

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023              Page 2 of 20
      adjudication. Concluding that the post-conviction court erred by denying post-

      conviction relief to Evans, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment.

[3]   We reverse and remand.

      Issue
               Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying relief to Evans
               on his successive post-conviction petition.

      Facts
[4]   The detailed facts of Evans’ underlying offenses can be read in this Court’s

      October 2006 opinion from Evans’ direct appeal. See Evans v. State, 855 N.E.2d

      378, 381-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

[5]   In May 2005, the State charged Evans with Class A felony attempted murder,

      Class B felony aggravated battery, Class B felony criminal confinement, and

      Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The State also alleged that

      Evans was an habitual offender, which was based on the allegations that Evans

      had two prior unrelated felony convictions. Specifically, the State alleged that

      Evans had underlying convictions for a 1995 federal conviction for uttering a

      counterfeit obligation as well as a 1999 Kentucky conviction for escape.1 The

      1
        Initially, in the habitual offender allegation, the State also alleged that Evans had three other underlying
      convictions for a 1980 Illinois burglary conviction and 1983 Florida convictions for burglary and uttering a
      forged check. The State withdrew the use of those three convictions prior to the habitual offender
      proceeding.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                       Page 3 of 20
      trial court held a three-day jury trial in December 2005, and the jury found

      Evans guilty as charged.

[6]   The trial court then removed the jury from the courtroom for a recess before the

      habitual offender phase of the proceeding. For the habitual offender

      proceeding, the State had two exhibits containing court documents relating to

      the two prior felony convictions contained in the habitual offender allegation.

      Specifically, Exhibit 52 contained documents relating to Evans’ 1995 federal

      conviction for uttering a counterfeit obligation, and Exhibit 51 contained court

      documents relating to his 1999 Kentucky escape conviction. Exhibit 51

      included a certified copy of the following documents that had been filed in

      Evans’ Kentucky cause, Cause 98CR595: (1) the grand jury indictment; (2) a

      uniform citation; (3) a waiver of further proceedings and guilty plea; and (4) a

      judgment order on the guilty plea and final sentencing. The grand jury

      indictment, which does not contain a file stamp but is dated June 1, 1998 (“the

      1998 Kentucky indictment”), contains a charge of escape and alleges that Evans

      had committed the escape offense on November 14, 1997.2 The waiver of

      further proceedings and guilty plea document indicates that Evans pled “guilty

      as charged in [the escape count] of the indictment[.]” (DA Ex. Vol. 2 at 45)

      (modified from all upper case to lower case letters). The judgment order

      2
          The grand jury indictment also contains a second charge alleging Evans to be a persistent felony offender.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                       Page 4 of 20
      provides that Evans pled guilty to escape and was sentenced on March 26,

      1999.

[7]   As Evans was being fingerprinted and the parties were reviewing the

      preliminary habitual offender instructions, Evans’ counsel informed the trial

      court that he would like to question Evans under oath. The trial court swore

      Evans in, and Evans then stated that he wanted to admit to the two prior felony

      convictions set forth in the habitual offender allegation. The State pointed out

      that Evans needed to waive his jury trial right, and the State then questioned

      Evans to establish the waiver of that right. The State also asked Evans if he was

      “willing to admit to the Court that [he] ha[d] these two prior convictions and

      that [he was], in fact, a[n] habitual offender[,]” and Evans responded, “That’s

      correct.” (DA Tr. Vol. 4 at 208). Thereafter, the trial court asked Evans if he

      was “admitting” that he was the “one in the same Ty Evans” that had the 1995

      federal conviction for uttering a counterfeit obligation and the 1999 Kentucky

      escape conviction, and Evans responded, “That’s correct.” (DA Tr. Vol. 4 at

      208, 209). The trial court stated that it was “satisfied” and instructed the State

      that it “want[ed] [the State] to still offer [its] exhibits.” (DA Tr. Vol. 4 at 208,

      209). The trial court admitted Exhibits 51 and 52 without objection. Then, the

      trial court pronounced the adjudication as follows: “At this time, Mr. Evans

      having admitted that he is one in the same Ty Evans who has the two prior

      felony convictions that are charged in the habitual offender . . . amended

      information, the Court is at this time going to adjudicate the defendant a[n]

      habitual offender.” (DA Tr. Vol. 4 at 211-12).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                Page 5 of 20
[8]    The trial court then brought the jury back into the courtroom. The trial court

       informed the jury that the State had filed an habitual offender allegation against

       Evans and that he had been “entitled to have the jury hear whether or not he

       was, in fact, a[n] habitual offender, that being that he had at least two prior

       unrelated felony convictions.” (DA Tr. Vol. 4 at 214). The trial court then told

       the jury that, “rather than have the jury hear that, Mr. Evans [had] admit[ted]

       that he was one in the same Ty Evans that ha[d] the habitual offender[,] [s]o the

       Court was able to do the habitual offender adjudication without [the jury’s]

       services.” (DA Tr. Vol. 4 at 215).

[9]    When sentencing Evans, the trial court merged Evans’ Class B felony

       aggravated battery and Class B felony criminal confinement convictions into his

       Class A felony attempted murder conviction due to double jeopardy concerns.

       The trial court imposed a forty (40) year sentence for Evans’ Class A felony

       attempted murder conviction and enhanced it by thirty (30) years for his

       habitual offender adjudication. The trial court also imposed a one (1) year

       sentence for Evans’ resisting law enforcement conviction and ordered it to be

       served consecutively to his attempted murder conviction, resulting in an

       aggregate sentence of seventy-one (71) years.

[10]   Evans then filed a direct appeal and argued that the prosecutor had committed

       prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and that the trial court had

       abused its discretion by denying his motions for mistrial and to continue the

       sentencing hearing. In the Appellant’s Appendix submitted as part of Evans’

       direct appeal, the chronological case summary indicates that the disposition on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023              Page 6 of 20
       Evans’ habitual offender allegation was entered via a “GP” and that the trial

       court “f[ound] that [Evans] admit[ted] his [g]uilt” during the habitual offender

       proceeding. (DA App. Vol. 1 at 11, 37). In the recitation of facts in our

       opinion in Evans’ direct appeal, a panel of this Court stated that “Evans

       admitted to being a[n] habitual offender.” Evans, 855 N.E.2d at 383.3 Our

       Court affirmed Evans’ convictions and sentence. See Evans, 855 N.E.2d at 380-

       88.

[11]   Thereafter, Evans filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He raised two

       claims: (1) a challenge to the version of an audio recording that the State had

       played at trial; and (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-

       conviction court, after determining that Evans could not raise a freestanding

       claim of error and that he had failed to meet his burden of showing that he had

       received ineffective assistance of counsel, denied Evans’ petition for post-

       conviction relief. On appeal, this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s

       judgment. See Evans v. State, No 49A04-1112-PC-697 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 8,

       2012), trans. denied.

[12]   On September 9, 2020, Evans filed, with this Court, a petition seeking

       permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. See Docket,

       Evans v. State, 20A-SP-1719 (Petition for Permission to File Successive Petition

       for Post-Conviction Relief). In his petition, Evans alleged that although he had

       3
        We recognize that, on appeal, there was no issue or challenge to whether Evans had admitted to the
       habitual offender allegation.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                  Page 7 of 20
pled guilty to the habitual offender allegation, he did not qualify for the habitual

offender enhancement under INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8 because the two

underlying offenses were not in the proper chronological order. He stated that

he sought to file a successive post-conviction petition so he could move to

withdraw his guilty plea under INDIANA CODE § 35-35-1-4(c)4 because the dates

of the two felony convictions underlying his habitual offender adjudication

were not in the proper sequence as required by INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8.

Evans alleged that the commission of the Kentucky escape offense had occurred

in 1994, which was before the 1995 commission of the federal uttering a

counterfeit obligation offense, but that he had been convicted and sentenced on

the Kentucky escape offense in 1999, which was after his 1995 conviction and

sentence on his federal uttering a counterfeit obligation offense. Evans attached

4
    INDIANA CODE § 35-35-1-4(c) provides as follows:
          (c) After being sentenced following a plea of guilty, or guilty but mentally ill at the time of
          the crime, the convicted person may not as a matter of right withdraw the plea. However,
          upon motion of the convicted person, the court shall vacate the judgment and allow the
          withdrawal whenever the convicted person proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a
          manifest injustice. A motion to vacate judgment and withdraw the plea made under this
          subsection shall be treated by the court as a petition for postconviction relief under the
          Indiana Rules of Procedure for Postconviction Remedies. For purposes of this
          section, withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever:
                   (1) the convicted person was denied the effective assistance of counsel;
                   (2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the convicted person;
                   (3) the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made;
                   (4) the prosecuting attorney failed to abide by the terms of a plea agreement; or
                   (5) the plea and judgment of conviction are void or voidable for any other reason.
          The motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw the plea need not allege, and it need not
          be proved, that the convicted person is innocent of the crime charged or that he has a valid
          defense.
IND. CODE § 35-35-1-4(c).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                          Page 8 of 20
       a certified copy of an order that had been filed in his Kentucky escape cause on

       June 29, 1998 (“the June 1998 order”). Specifically, the June 1998 order

       amended the 1998 Kentucky indictment to correct a scrivener’s error and

       provided that the escape offense had occurred on or about November 7, 1994.

       As previously noted, the original grand jury indictment, which was dated June

       1, 1998, had provided that the Kentucky escape offense had occurred on

       November 14, 1997. Thereafter, on September 25, 2020, our Court determined

       that Evans had “established a reasonable probability that he is entitled to post-

       conviction relief” and authorized Evans to file a successive petition for post-

       conviction relief. See Docket, Evans v. State, 20A-SP-1719 (Sept. 25, 2020 Order).

[13]   In October 2020, Evans filed a pro se successive petition for post-conviction

       relief in which he sought to withdraw his guilty plea under INDIANA CODE §

       35-35-1-4(c). The case proceeded by affidavit.

[14]   In May 2021, Evans filed a motion to obtain certified copies of his guilty plea

       hearing, sentencing hearing, and exhibits at trial. The post-conviction court

       granted Evans’ motion and indicated that it would arrange for the transfer of

       Evans’ direct appeal record for use in the post-conviction proceeding by

       affidavit.

[15]   In June 2021, Evans filed an affidavit in which he averred that at the time that

       he had admitted to being an habitual offender, the trial court had not informed

       him that the commission dates of the underlying habitual offender offenses

       were relevant. He also averred that, in February 2014, after he had worked on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023            Page 9 of 20
       a habeas corpus petition, he had obtained a copy of the June 1998 order

       amending the 1998 Kentucky indictment and that the order showed that the

       commission date of his Kentucky escape offense was 1994 and not 1997.

       Additionally, Evans averred that he had researched how to present his habitual

       offender issue to the trial court and that, in 2019, discovered that he could raise

       the issue via a motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a successive petition for

       post-conviction relief. Evans also filed exhibits to support his post-conviction

       petition. Specifically, Evans filed a certified copy of the June 1998 order

       amending the 1998 Kentucky indictment to correct the commission date of the

       escape offense contained in that indictment to the commission date of

       November 7, 1994. He also filed a certified copy of the sentencing order from

       his Kentucky escape cause, which showed that he had pleaded guilty to escape

       and had been sentenced in 1999. Additionally, Evans filed a copy of the docket

       from his 1995 federal uttering a counterfeit obligation cause and portions of the

       transcript from his habitual offender proceeding and his sentencing hearing in

       this current cause.

[16]   In October 2021, the State filed an affidavit from a paralegal who worked in the

       Marion County Prosecutor’s Office (“the paralegal’s affidavit”). In the

       affidavit, the paralegal averred as follows:

               1. I am employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office as a
               paralegal for the Post-Conviction Relief Unit. One of my duties
               is to retrieve court files for previous convictions. I was instructed
               to try to locate and obtain copies of the court file from Kentucky
               with case number 98-CR-595.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023              Page 10 of 20
               2. I requested a copy of the case file on January 14, 2021 via
               email per instruction from the Fayette County Clerk in
               Kentucky.

               3. I received a copy of the case file at the end of May 2021. Due
               to office closure during COVID-19, the exact date of reception is
               unknown.

               4. The Deputy Prosecutor on the case requested that I
               specifically try and locate the transcript for the guilty plea hearing
               that was on March 26, 1999.

       (App. Vol. 4 at 3). Attached to the paralegal’s affidavit was a Kentucky case

       file for cause 98-CR-595 (“the Kentucky case file”), which included over 180

       pages of pleadings and orders. The Kentucky case file did not contain a

       certification from the Kentucky trial court. Nor did it contain a transcript from

       Evans’ March 26, 1999 guilty plea hearing. Additionally, the Kentucky case

       file did not contain a chronological case summary or the June 1998 order

       amending the 1998 Kentucky indictment. In some of the documents in the

       Kentucky case file, the commission date of Evans’ Kentucky escape offense was

       listed as either 1997 or 1998.5

[17]   In November 2021, Evans filed an objection to and a motion to strike the

       State’s submission of the Kentucky case file. Evans argued that the post-

       5
         For example, in a June 1999 pro se motion to correct sentence, Evans referred to the date of commission of
       his Kentucky escape offense as November 14, 1997; in a September 2002 motion filed by Evans’ attorney, his
       counsel referred to the date of commission of the Kentucky escape offense as November 14, 1997; in an
       October 2002 order, the trial court referred to Evans escaping from a Kentucky detention center in 1997; and
       in a December 2012 pro se motion and a January 2013 pro se stipulation to a probation violation, Evans
       referred to his escape as occurring in 1998. These pleadings and order all pre-date the February 2014 date on
       which Evans avers that he had become aware of and had obtained the June 1998 order.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                  Page 11 of 20
conviction court should strike the State’s evidence because “there [wa]s no

certification of authenticity as required by Ind. Code § 34-39-4-3.”6 (App. Vol.

6 at 11). Specifically, Evans alleged that the Kentucky case file had “no

certification . . . from any Kentucky judge, clerk, or other custodian of records

and was “an incomplete compilation” of records. (App. Vol. 6 at 12). Evans

further argued that the paralegal’s affidavit was not a valid substitute for the

certification by a Kentucky records custodian. Evans also alleged that the

Kentucky court records attached to the paralegal’s affidavit were “an

incomplete compilation of all the records retained by Kentucky authorities on

Case No 98-CR-595” and consisted mainly of post-conviction filings. (App.

Vol. 6 at 12). Additionally, Evans argued that the State’s evidence did not

comply with Trial Rule 44 or Indiana Evidence Rule 902.

6
    INDIANA CODE § 34-39-4-3 provides as follows:
         (a) The records and judicial proceedings of the several courts of record of or within the United
         States or the territories of the United States shall be admitted in Indiana courts as evidence
         when authenticated by attestation or certificate of the clerk or prothonotary, with the seal of the
         court annexed, together with the seal of the chief justice or one (1) or more of the judges, or the
         presiding magistrate of the court, that:
           (1) the person who signed the attestation or certificate was, at the time of subscribing it, the
           clerk or prothonotary of the court; and
           (2) the attestation is in due form of law.
         (b) Records and judicial proceedings that have been authenticated as described in subsection (a)
         shall have full faith and credit given to them in any court in Indiana as by law or usage they
         have in the courts in which they originated.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                          Page 12 of 20
[18]   Thereafter, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

       law. The post-conviction court did not rule on Evans’ objection and motion to

       strike the State’s submission of the Kentucky case file.

[19]   In January 2022, the post-conviction court issued an order denying Evans’

       successive petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court adopted

       verbatim the State’s proposed findings and conclusions, including the State’s

       typographical errors in numbering. The post-conviction court also stamped the

       name of the magistrate on the signature line, which listed the title of “Judge”

       under the signature line. (App. Vol. 2 at 21).

[20]   In its order denying relief, the trial court found that the State had submitted the

       paralegal’s affidavit and “a certified copy of the complete file maintained by the

       Fayette County Clerk for 98CR595.” (App. Vol. 2 at 15). When ruling on

       Evans’ post-conviction claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty

       plea under INDIANA CODE § 35-35-1-4(c) because the dates of the two felony

       convictions underlying his habitual offender adjudication were not in the proper

       sequence as required by INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8, the post-conviction court

       stated that it had “reache[d] the inevitable and somewhat obvious conclusion

       that Evans simply did not plead guilty” and that Evans’ motion to withdraw his

       guilty plea was therefore “improper and unavailable[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 17).

[21]   The post-conviction court then proceeded to address the merits of Evans’ claim

       that his habitual offender adjudication was not valid because it was not in the

       proper sequence as required by INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8. The post-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023            Page 13 of 20
conviction court first discussed the preponderance of the evidence standard of

review and then stated that “the standard is necessarily imprecise and

dependent on the circumstances of a particular case, so that in some cases a

proponent’s evidence must overcome opposing presumptions as well as

opposing evidence which is to say that that [sic] more persuasive evidence may

be required in some cases than in others.” (App. Vol. 2 at 18). The post-

conviction court stated that “[i]n evaluating [Evans’] issue, the Court ha[d]

reviewed the transcript of the original trial, Evans’s PCR Exhibit A [the June

1998 order], Evans’s PCR Exhibit D [Evans’ affidavit] and the State’s PCR

Exhibits.” (App. Vol. 2 at 18). The post-conviction court expressed “strong

reservations about Evans’s PCR evidentiary submissions,” most notably Evans’

submission of Exhibit A, which was the certified copy of the June 1998 order.

(App. Vol. 2 at 18). Specifically, the post-conviction court noted that “[i]n his

PCR submission, Evans submitted Exhibit A, which purports to be an

‘Amended Indictment’ for 98CR595, which shows the date of commission of

the escape as November 7, 1994. Evan’s [sic] only explanation for the source of

the document is that he ‘obtained’ it in 2014.” (App. Vol. 2 at 18-19). The

post-conviction court commented that the June 1998 order had not been

contained in the Kentucky case file submitted by the State and also noted that

some of the documents in the Kentucky case file had listed the commission date

of Evans’ Kentucky escape offense as either 1997 or 1998. The post-conviction

court stated that it would “not speculate as to the provenance of the purported

‘Amended Indictment’ submitted as Petitioner’s PCR exhibit A,” and

ultimately concluded, “based upon [the court’s] review of the entirety of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023            Page 14 of 20
       PCR evidence, that Ty Evans failed to establish his case by a preponderance of

       the evidence.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20).

[22]   Evans now appeals.

       Decision
[23]   Evans argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief on his

       successive post-conviction petition. At the outset, we note that Evans has

       chosen to proceed pro se. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the

       same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus, pro se litigants are bound to follow the

       established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences

       of their failure to do so. Id.

[24]   “In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing

       his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623,

       632 (Ind. 2021), reh’g denied. “Where, as here, the petitioner is appealing from a

       negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he must establish that the

       evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion

       contrary to the post-conviction court’s decision. Id. (cleaned up). “We review

       the post-conviction court’s factual findings under a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard

       but do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions.” Stephenson v.

       State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied, cert. denied.

[25]   Our Court granted Evans permission to file a successive petition for post-

       conviction relief so that he could raise a claim to withdraw his guilty plea under
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023              Page 15 of 20
       INDIANA CODE § 35-35-1-4(c) based on his argument that the dates of the two

       felony convictions underlying his habitual offender adjudication were not in the

       proper sequence as required by INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8. The post-

       conviction court denied post-conviction relief to Evans based on its conclusion

       that Evans had not admitted or pled guilty to the habitual offender allegation.

[26]   We need not, however, delve into the post-conviction court’s determination

       about whether Evans had admitted to the habitual offender allegation because

       “[w]e have considered possible defects in habitual offender proofs as

       ‘fundamental error’ such that they may be raised [in a post-conviction

       proceeding] notwithstanding failure to do so on direct appeal.” Weatherford v.

       State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993), reh’g denied. See also Williams v. State,

       525 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 n. 1 (Ind. 1988) (“Where the record of the habitual

       offender proceeding clearly shows inadequate proof with regard to the

       chronological sequence of the underlying felonies, however, we consider such

       error to be fundamental.”), reh’g denied.

[27]   Here, the heart of this appeal and Evans’ post-conviction argument is that he

       did not qualify for the habitual offender enhancement under INDIANA CODE §

       35-50-2-8 because the two underlying or predicate offenses were not in the

       proper chronological order. Thus, we will focus on that issue.

[28]   “In an habitual offender proceeding, the State must prove that the defendant

       was convicted and sentenced for two prior unrelated felonies[,] . . . [and] [t]he

       State must prove that the commission, conviction and sentencing on the first

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023             Page 16 of 20
       felony preceded the commission of the second felony.” Williams, 525 N.E.2d at

       1241. See also Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.7 Proof that

       “commission/conviction/sentence for each of the offenses occurred seriatim” is

       required. Weatherford, 619 N.E.2d at 917.

[29]   “A [post-conviction] petitioner challenging an habitual offender determination

       may not prevail simply by putting the State to its proof as though the case were

       being tried or appealed in the first instance[;]” instead, “it is the petitioner’s

       burden to demonstrate that the various convictions did not in fact occur in the

       required order.” Bryant v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

       Thus, Evans was required to “demonstrate that he was not an habitual offender

       under the laws of the state” and that his “various convictions did not in fact

       occur in the required order.” See Weatherford, 619 N.E.2d at 918. Our Courts

       will grant relief where “the evidence has demonstrated that the

       commission/conviction/sentencing were not in the proper order.” See id. at

       917.

[30]   Here, in support of Evans’ assertion that the predicate offenses underlying his

       habitual offender adjudication were not in the required statutory order, he had

       7 In 2005, when Evans committed the offenses charged in his underlying criminal case, the habitual offender
       statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8(a), provided that the State could seek to have a person sentenced as an
       habitual offender if the person had accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions. As set forth by
       INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8(a) (2005), a person accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions if: “(1)
       the second prior unrelated felony conviction was committed after sentencing for the first prior unrelated
       felony conviction; and (2) the offense for which the state seeks to have the person sentenced as a habitual
       offender was committed after sentencing for the second prior unrelated felony conviction.” (Format altered).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023                                  Page 17 of 20
       the post-conviction court consider his direct appeal record, and he submitted an

       affidavit and various documents. Most notably, Evans submitted a certified

       copy of the June 1998 order amending the 1998 Kentucky indictment to correct

       the commission date of the escape offense contained in that indictment, which

       originally listed the commission date as November 14, 1997, to the commission

       date of November 7, 1994. As this June 1998 order was certified by the

       Kentucky court, it was entitled to full faith and credit.

[31]   The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that “[f]ull

       Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and

       judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. “Full faith

       and credit means that the judgment of a state court should have the same credit,

       validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the

       state where it was pronounced.” Gardner v. Pierce, 838 N.E.2d 546, 550 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2005) (cleaned up). “Indiana has codified this notion at Indiana Code

       section 34-39-4-3, which establishes that records and judicial proceedings from

       courts in other states ‘shall have full faith and credit given to them in any court

       in Indiana as by law or usage they have in the courts in which they originated.’”

       Id. “Full faith and credit commands deference to the judgments of foreign

       courts, and the judgment of a sister state, regular and complete upon its face, is

       prima facie valid.” Id. (cleaned up).

[32]   The post-conviction court, however, disregarded the June 1998 order,

       expressing “strong reservations about Evans’s PCR evidentiary submissions,”

       most notably Evans’ submission of the June 1998 order. (App. Vol. 2 at 18).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023             Page 18 of 20
       The post-conviction court commented that the June 1998 order had not been

       contained in the Kentucky case file submitted by the State and stated that it

       would “not speculate as to the provenance of the purported ‘Amended

       Indictment’ submitted as Petitioner’s PCR exhibit A[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20).

[33]   It is unclear how or why the June 1998 order was not contained in the State’s

       submission of the Kentucky case file. As previously mentioned, the Kentucky

       case file also did not include a chronological case summary. Nor is it clear how

       or why the June 1998 order was not included in the State’s Exhibit 51 that it

       introduced during the habitual offender proceeding in 2005. Nonetheless, the

       June 1998 order submitted by Evans in this post-conviction proceeding contains

       a certification from the Kentucky clerk of court to “certify” that the “order

       amending indictment filed June 29, 1998 in the case of 98-CR-595,

       Commonwealth vs. Evans, Ty[,]” was a “full, true and correct copy[.]” (App.

       Vol. 3 at 8) (modified from all upper case to lower case letters).

[34]   The June 1998 order indicates that the commission date of Evans’ Kentucky

       escape offense occurred on November 7, 1994, which was prior to the

       commission of Evans’ 1995 federal conviction for uttering a counterfeit

       obligation. However, Evans was convicted and sentenced on his 1995 federal

       conviction prior to being convicted and sentenced on his Kentucky escape

       offense. In other words, the post-conviction evidence submitted by Evans

       shows that he: committed the Kentucky escape offense in 1994; committed and

       was convicted and sentenced in 1995 for the federal uttering a counterfeit

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023           Page 19 of 20
       obligation offense; and was convicted and sentenced in 1999 for the Kentucky

       escape offense.

[35]   Because Evans demonstrated that he was not an habitual offender under the

       laws of the state and that his two convictions did not in fact occur in the

       required order, we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of relief to Evans

       and remand to the court with instructions to issue an amended abstract of

       judgment consistent with this opinion. See, e.g., Williams, 525 N.E.2d at 1241

       (reversing an habitual offender determination where “the prior convictions

       clearly did not occur within the requisite statutory sequence”); Bryant, 760

       N.E.2d at 1145-46 (reversing an habitual offender adjudication where the

       petitioner had met his post-conviction burden by demonstrating that “the

       factual basis for the habitual offender determination was erroneous” and had

       therefore shown that “the underlying convictions for the habitual offender

       enhancement [we]re out of sequence”).

[36]   Reversed and remanded.

       Robb, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023            Page 20 of 20