Court Opinion

ID: 9488017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:33:55.121946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:38.278121
License: Public Domain

ELLIS, District Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the result:
While I concur completely with the result reached and the essential reasoning of Judge Williams’ thorough and insightful opinion, I write separately only to note one small portion of the opinion with which I disagree. Specifically, I do not agree with that portion of . the majority opinion stating that Speed’s “actions before, sentencing could not be taken into account as substantial assistance” in ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 35(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. Although Fourth Circuit precedent can be read to support, if not mandate, this view, see United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 211, 215-16 (4th Cir.1994), and United States v. Francois, 889 F.2d 1341, 1345 (4th Cir.1989), I believe this is not a practical, fair, or compelled interpretation of the Rule.
As a practical matter, a defendant’s cooperation often does not easily separate out into distinct and independent acts of assistance. ' Typically, cooperation is best viewed not as isolated instances of conduct divided along a time line, but rather as an overall, continuous course of conduct in which each instance builds upon the previous instances of cooperation. Accurate assessment of a defendant’s cooperation requires examining the complete course of conduct. Given this, it generally makes no sense, for example, to consider a defendant’s post-sentencing testimony against a co-conspirator in a vacuum, ignoring the nature and extent of information provided earlier that led to the co-conspirator’s arrest.
A rigid line of demarcation between pre-sentencing and post-sentencing conduct also raises problems of fairness to a cooperating defendant. Because courts must consider the “significance and usefulness”1 of a defendant’s assistance in determining the appropriate sentence reduction, excluding pre-sen-tence cooperation from a court’s consideration under Rule 35(b) is unjust and places unwarranted significance on the arbitrary date of sentencing. It also may create inappropriate incentives. For example, a defendant eager for a sentence reduction may well withhold all of his information until after sentencing ih order to ensure that he enjoys the full benefit of his cooperation. Alternatively, sentencing judges may be encouraged to grant lengthy continuance motions in order not to prejudice a defendant whose assistance prior to sentencing has not yet risen to the “substantial” level.2 Lengthy delays in sentencing may lead to a regrettable and unwelcome appearance of judicial participation in coercing additional information *648from a defendant.3 Yet, without such continuances, a defendant could find himself in the hapless position of having provided less than substantial assistance both before and after sentencing, despite an overall record of cooperation that crosses the “substantial assistance” threshold.
Nor is the rigid temporal division of cooperation in the majority opinion compelled by the Rule’s language. Although Rule 35(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., states that the court “may reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant’s subsequent, substantial assistance,” (emphasis added), nothing in the Rule precludes courts from also taking into account prior assistance that, when added to subsequent assistance, amounts to “substantial assistance”. In short, while some amount of post-sentencing assistance is required to trigger the possibility of a Rule 35(b) reduction, once triggered, the sentencing judge should be free to consider the full range and extent of a defendant’s cooperation, including the cooperation rendered prior to sentencing.
Similarly, I am not convinced that the Fourth Circuit precedent cited in the majority opinion controls this narrow issue. Francois is certainly not controlling, for that case involved a defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 35(b) on the ground that the government maintained too much discretion over whether to bring the motion. 889 F.2d at 1345. In rejecting this claim, the Fourth Circuit panel simply noted in dicta that “Rule 35(b) provides for ‘subsequent, substantial assistance,’ which is assistance that has occurred within one year after the imposition of sentence.” Id. (emphasis in original). This broad observation, without more, does not compel the view expressed in the majority opinion to the effect that district courts, in ruling on Rule 35(b) motions, may not consider assistance rendered prior to sentencing.
Although Martin is more troublesome, it too is distinguishable. In Martin, the government brought a motion under Rule 35(b) in an attempt to reward a defendant whose assistance before sentencing had been substantial, but who was unable to provide any additional assistance after sentencing. 25 F.3d at 215. On these facts, the panel concluded that Rule 35(b) “grants the sentencing judge the authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence only for substantial assistance rendered subsequent to sentencing.” Id. (emphasis in original). This conclusion is understandable in light of the factual issue presented there. As noted, I agree that a threshold requirement of Rule 35(b) is that there be at least some post-sentencing assistance, a condition absent in Martin.4 But neither Martin nor Francois is controlling on the precise issue here, namely, whether a district court confronted with a Rule 35(b) motion that is supported by some post-sentencing assistance is precluded from also considering in its ruling cooperation that occurred prior to sentencing.
It is also worth noting in this regard that the First Circuit has explicitly recognized that a court may consider the full extent of a defendant’s assistance in ruling on a Rule *64935(b) motion. United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d 55 (1st Cir.1991). Confronted with the question whether, at sentencing, the government may postpone its decision to bring a substantial assistance motion until the defendant’s cooperation is complete, the court in Drown acknowledged that U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b) contain distinct “temporal boundaries.” Id. at 59 (stating that § 5K1.1 “was designed to recognize, and in an appropriate case to reward, assistance rendered prior to sentencing,” while Rule 35(b) “was designed to recognize and reward subsequent cooperation”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the First Circuit in Drown concluded, as did this circuit in Martin, that the government may not make “a unilateral decision ... to reserve judgment on a defendant’s presen-tence assistance in order to secure his post-sentence assistance.” Id. Having reached this conclusion, however, the court in Drown nevertheless was careful to add in a footnote, “[t]his is not to say that, on a Rule 35(b) motion for sentence reduction, the court may not assay the totality of a defendant’s cooperation.” Id. at 59 n. 7. Thus, while cognizant and respectful of the distinct functions and timing of the two substantial assistance provisions, the First Circuit panel made clear its view, albeit in dicta, that the temporal division is not so rigid as to preclude a district court from considering the entire record of a defendant’s assistance on a Rule 35(b) motion. This sound conclusion, as noted earlier, is wholly consistent with the Rule’s purpose and not in conflict with its language.
In the event that the Fourth Circuit squarely addresses this issue in the future and holds that the Rule’s language precludes district courts from considering pre-sentenc-ing assistance in ruling on Rule 35(b) motions, then the Rule’s language should be changed to alter this result.

. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a)(1); see also Fed. R.Crim.P. 35(b) (directing courts to reduce a sentence “in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 994]”).

. I am personally aware of several such instances, including one in which the sentencing date has been postponed for almost three years.

. For instance, juries may understandably view with skepticism testimony from a cooperating defendant in a co-defendant’s trial when they learn that the testifying defendant's sentencing awaits the completion of his testimony.

. Furthermore, I agree with the conclusion in Martin that the government may not defer its decision whether to bring a § 5K1.1 motion on behalf of a defendant whose assistance as of sentencing has been substantial. 25 F.3d at 216. In that event, it is plainly a violation of due process to delay a decision on a substantial decision motion until after sentencing. Id. (Although the Martin panel went on to find that the government had modified the plea agreement to require it to bring a substantial assistance motion, id. at 217, that finding was not a prerequisite to the court’s conclusion that a due process violation had occurred. Id. at 216). Provisions in plea agreements that require a defendant’s assistance to be both substantial and complete before the government will bring such a motion therefore may run afoul of Martin in those instances where a defendant's cooperation, though not yet complete, has already crossed the Rule's "substantial” threshold. Of course, some unfairness may result even there in that the extent of the court's departure at the § 5K1.1 stage would not reflect the defendant's future cooperation.
Here, however, I speak only of those instances where a defendant’s pre-sentencing assistance, though significant, is not yet "substantial.” In those circumstances, it seems altogether unjust and somewhat arbitraiy to omit the pre-sentenc-ing assistance from a court’s consideration during subsequent Rule 35(b) proceedings.