Court Opinion

ID: 994760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:27:43.491097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:18.572717
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MARILYN D. THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                               No. 96-2733
TECHNICAL RESOURCES,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.
(CA-95-769-JFM)

Submitted: October 31, 1997

Decided: April 20, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Abbey G. Hairston, Adrian V. Nelson, II, ALEXANDER, BEAR-
DEN, HAIRSTON & MARKS, L.L.P., Silver Spring, Maryland, for
Appellant. William J. Carter, Thomas L. McCally, CARR, GOOD-
SON, LEE & WARNER, P.C., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Marilyn D. Thomas appeals from the district court orders granting
summary judgment to her former employer, Technical Resources, Inc.
(TRI), on her action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (West 1994
& Supp. 1997), and denying her motion for reconsideration. We
affirm.

Thomas's complaint alleged discriminatory discharge based on her
race, wrongful breach of an implied employment contract, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of TRI on September 10, 1996. On
September 26, 1996, Thomas filed a motion to extend time to file a
motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and a Rule
59(e) motion. On October 4, 1996, the district court granted Thomas's
motion to extend time. The district court denied Thomas's motion for
reconsideration on October 23, 1996, and on November 25, 1996,
Thomas appealed the district court's order granting summary judg-
ment and denying her motion for reconsideration.

To the extent that Thomas appeals the district court's order entered
on September 10, 1996, her appeal is untimely. Thomas's Rule 59(e)
motion for reconsideration was not timely filed. A motion for recon-
sideration must be "filed no later than 10 days after entry of judg-
ment," and a district court judge may not extend the time to file a
Rule 59(e) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). There-
fore, the appeal period from the September 10 order was not tolled by
the filing of the motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4); Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978).

To the extent that Thomas appeals the district court's order denying
her Rule 59(e) motion, we affirm the district court's order because the
motion was not timely filed. Even if we were to construe the motion
as a reconsideration motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), we find that

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the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Thomas failed to establish mistake, newly discovered evidence, or
fraud. Further, to prevail on a claim of discriminatory discharge,
Thomas must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2)
she was qualified for the job and that her job performance was satis-
factory; (3) in spite of her qualifications, she was fired; and (4) the
position remained open to similarly qualified applicants after her dis-
missal. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir.
1989). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
defendants to produce evidence that shows some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for their actions. See Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the defendants meet
this burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the reason proffered by the defendants was false and that race was the
real reason for the adverse action. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993).

Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses
that Thomas failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Thomas failed to establish that her job performance was satisfactory.
TRI received complaints about Thomas, investigated them, and deter-
mined that Thomas's conduct was unacceptable. Thomas claims that
she received several satisfactory job performance evaluations prior to
the investigation. However, "[p]revious satisfactory job performance
cannot be used by an employee to insulate [herself] from dismissal
once performance becomes unacceptable." See Ransome v. Bowling,
851 F. Supp. 204, 208 (D. Md. 1993), aff'd, 21 F.3d 423 (4th Cir.
1994). Thus, Thomas fails to establish that she was discharged
because of her race.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We grant
Thomas's unopposed motion to amend or supplement requested
relief. Because we affirm the district court's orders, the relief
requested is not warranted. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess.

AFFIRMED

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