Court Opinion

ID: 9624732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:15:23.041676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:53.813578
License: Public Domain

PETERS, P. J.
I dissent.
The majority opinion fully and fairly states the facts. I agree with everything said in that opinion except what is said on the issue of damages. On that issue the majority hold that there was a failure of proof. I disagree.
I agree that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove all elements of her ease, and that she had the burden of proving, with reasonable certainty, the damages suffered by her. It is also undoubtedly true that neither plaintiff nor her witnesses testified as to any lasting after effects caused by the assault. But it does not follow that there was a failure of proof. Suppose the plaintiff had testified that three years after the assault there were no discernible aftereffects. Would that mean that she could recover no damages at all? Would that mean that there had been a failure of proof on the issue of damages? Of course not.
The jury was informed of the facts of the case. The plaintiff testified that after the assault she was too shocked to report it. The jury knew that the plaintiff was a delicate, sickly woman who had been sexually assaulted by a pullman porter. The plaintiff testified in detail as to her physical condition before and at the time of the assault. The jury did not have to be told that a forceable rape is, under such circumstances, a revolting and humiliating experience. The jury observed the plaintiff during the trial. This was itself evidence. The jury could tell whether she was or was not a woman of fine sensibilities. The jury, composed of mature men and women, could properly determine for themselves the effect of the assault upon such a woman. The trial judge also saw and observed the plaintiff. He denied a motion for a new trial. He, too, must be presumed to have determined that the rape of this plaintiff was a revolting experience. Under these circumstances, to hold that there is no evidence of damage, or that the verdict is unsupported,, is to substitute the views of two appellate justices on a factual issue for the find*13ings of the jury and trial judge. That is contrary to well-settled principles.
I would affirm the judgment in all respects.
A petition for a rehearing was denied September 14, 1956. Peters, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.