Court Opinion

ID: 9607632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:00:57.687874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:48.764427
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I respectfully dissent. In County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Assn. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 564 [214 Cal.Rptr. 424, 699 P.2d 835], my colleagues held that, except in limited cases presenting an “imminent threat” to public health or safety, public employees now have a right to strike in this state. I dissented, observing that this holding was contrary to the federal rule and to the vast majority of cases in other states; indeed, until County Sanitation, it was well established in California that all public strikes were illegal. (Id. at p. 610 [dis. opn.].) The fact that at least nine California appellate decisions (cited in my dissent) had so ruled, and that no statutes were enacted to change that rule, indicated to me a legislative acquiescence therein. The majority held otherwise.
Now the majority holds that even if a strike was unlawful (posing the requisite “imminent threat” to public health or safety), affected public agencies are limited to their injunctive or administrative remedies and may not sue to recover the financial losses proximately caused by the strikers’ *820unlawful conduct. This decision is again contrary to accepted California law. (See Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 100, 111-114 [140 Cal.Rptr. 41] [hg. den.].) As the Court of Appeal observed in the present case, “It is established in California that public employee unions which engage in strikes are liable for the damages which are thereby proximately caused to a municipal employer.” Not anymore.
Pasadena’s principal theory for sustaining damage awards for unlawful public strikes was quite elementary, and quite irrefutable: An unlawful strike is no different than any other tort which proximately causes injury. In upholding a damage award against a striking union, we stated nearly 30 years ago that, “The law of this state imposes upon everyone the duty ‘to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his rights.’ (Civ. Code, § 1708.) There is a breach of such legal duty when one who performs an act not authorized by law infringes upon a right another is entitled to enjoy, or causes a substantial material loss to another. That breach constitutes the commission of a tort, under the laws of this state, for which an action in damages will lie. ... It is further established in this state that by an unlawful and unauthorized labor practice an employer who is damaged thereby may recover damages in a tort action.” (Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council (1958) 49 Cal.2d 595, 606 [320 P.2d 473].)
The majority disapproves Pasadena, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d 160. Do my colleagues also disapprove the general tort principles noted in Garmon, supra, 49 Cal.2d 595, and abrogate section 1708 of the Civil Code? Ironically, the majority claims that its “principal objection” to Pasadena relates to “the relative roles of the courts and the Legislature in establishing rules to govern labor-management relations.” (Ante, p. 815.) The majority explains that it is quite reluctant to tamper or interfere with legislative treatment of public strike issues. But the majority’s reliance upon principles of “judicial restraint” rings particularly hollow in light of its abrogation of the long-standing California rule, which had been acquiesced in by the Legislature, forbidding all public strikes. Where was the majority’s “restraint” in 1985, when it decided County Sanitation?
The fact remains that unlawful public strikes (which, by the majority’s own definition, pose “imminent threats” to public health or safety) can result in devastating financial injury to the affected municipality. To deprive public agencies of their right to recompense for such unlawful conduct, a right enjoyed by all other persons in the absence of statutory limitation, is *821not only unsound and shortsighted, but also constitutes unprecedented discrimination against California municipalities.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.