Court Opinion

ID: 9678082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:10:12.830605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.523980
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine. On a plea of guilty appellant was sentenced to ten years in the Texas Department of Corrections and assessed a $10,000 fine. Subsequent to sentencing, appellant was placed on probation pursuant to Art. 42.12, Sec. 3e(a), V.A.C.C.P., hereinafter referred to as “shock probation.” The shock probation was later revoked. Appellant appealed, challenging the original grant of shock probation and alleging that the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant him shock probation, therefore entitling him to jail time credit for the time he was erroneously on probation. The Austin Court of Appeals, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, found that since appellant had filed a motion requesting release on shock probation, he was not without fault in his release, and not entitled to any jail time credit. See Stasey v. State, No. 3-83-109-CR, delivered September 14, 1983 (Tex.App.— Austin). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine the propriety of that holding. We reform and affirm.
On March 31, 1982, appellant pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine. On May 13, 1982, appellant’s counsel filed a motion for shock probation. Although the motion was filed 43 days after sentencing, the motion specifically requested that no hearing be held or probation granted until June 1, 1982, which would have been the 60th day after sentencing. The trial court granted appellant’s motion on May 27,1982, the 57th day after sentencing. Subsequently, on March 9, 1983, appellant’s probation was revoked. On March 14, 1983, appellant was released on an appeal bond.
On June 6, 1983, while this cause was pending on appeal but prior to the record being filed with the Court of Appeals, the trial court entered an order rescinding his order granting shock probation and granting appellant flat time for the time he was out on probation, to-wit: from May 27, 1982, to June 8, 1983. Appellant’s appeal bond was rescinded and appellant apparently was incarcerated.
On September 14, 1983, in an unpublished per curiam opinion the Third Court of Appeals held that appellant could not object to the revocation of probation since the trial judge was without jurisdiction to grant shock probation on May 27, 1983. The Court of Appeals further held: “Setting aside the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction” to enter the order of June 8, 1983, “ ‘order correcting sentence’ the court erred in giving appellant credit for the time he was erroneously released on shock probation.” Slip opinion, p. 2. The Court of Appeals then reformed the sentence to delete the improper grant of jail time credit from May 27, 1982, to June 8, 1983, except for the time from January 26, 1983, through March 24, 1983 — the time *707appellant was actually confined pending disposition of the motion to revoke.
Initially, appellant makes some unsupported assertions that Texas Department of Corrections is refusing to accept the appellant. Unsupported assertions in a brief present nothing for review. Ground of Error No. 2 is overruled.
Art. 42.12, Sec. 3e(a), supra, is the sole governing statute for the grant of shock probation. Sec. 3e(a) extends the jurisdiction of the trial court for 180 days from the date of execution of sentence. Specifically, Sec. 3e(a) states:
“Sec. 3e(a). For the purposes of this section, the jurisdiction of a court in which a sentence requiring confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections is imposed for conviction (of a felony) shall continue for 180 days from the date the execution of sentence actually begins. After the expiration of 60 days but prior to the expiration of 180 days from the date the execution of sentence actually begins, the judge of the court that imposed such sentence may on his own motion or on written motion of the defendant, suspend further execution of the sentence imposed and place the defendant on probation under the terms and conditions of this article, if in the opinion of the judge the defendant would not benefit from further incarceration in a penitentiary.”
In Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), this Court first thoroughly reviewed the shock probation law. This Court held that the grant of jurisdiction in 3e(a) was of a very limited nature. The defendant there was granted shock probation on the 126th day.1 This Court refused to construe the statute so as to apply the time limits to the mere filing of a motion. The statute specifically speaks to the granting of a motion; thus the fact that appellant’s attorney may have filed the motion prior to the trial court having jurisdiction to act is not controlling.
There can be no question that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in granting appellant’s motion for shock probation on the 57th day. Appellant alleges that said erroneous grant of shock probation was through no fault of his and he should not be penalized for the trial court’s error. Appellant rightfully points out that his request for shock probation was timely, and had the trial court adhered to his request that no action be taken until 60 days had elapsed, there would be no error from which to appeal. Under this Court’s “erroneous release” doctrine appellant claims he is entitled to jail-time credit for the entire time he was on probation.
This Court has long held that if a defendant through no fault of his own is erroneously released from incarceration he is entitled to flat time credit for the time he was erroneously out of custody. Ex parte Downe, 471 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Ex parte Tarleton, 582 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Cr.App.1979).
However, a corollary to this doctrine is the premise that if the defendant was a “moving factor” in his erroneous release he would not be entitled to credit. In Ex parte Moneyhun, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 19, 274 S.W.2d 546 (1955), this Court found that “when appellant’s attorney requested his release he became the moving factor and cannot now take advantage of a void order_” Id. at p. 547. Moneyhun, supra, however, was a release without any statutory authority. The principal of Mon-eyhun has been applied by this Court in situations similar to the appellant’s, where a motion for probation was filed and subsequently erroneously granted. See Ex parte Massie, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 568, 278 S.W.2d 851 (1955).
In Adams v. State, 610 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Cr.App.1981), a panel of this Court applied the foregoing principle to an erroneous grant of shock probation and held that since the defendant had requested shock *708probation he could not benefit from the erroneous grant of the relief requested. Adams, supra, does not indicate whether appellant’s motion requesting relief was proper. Likewise, in Tamez v. State, 620 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), a panel of this Court found that the granting of shock probation on the 126th day under the old law was void, but the defendant would receive no credit since he had filed a motion requesting release. , Again, the opinion does not indicate whether appellant’s motion timely requested release.
We believe that the foregoing rules penalize a defendant for asserting his statutory right to probation. A defendant should not be penalized if the relief he requests is proper and only through the improper actions of the trial court does the order become void. Thus, if a defendant, who is statutorily eligible for shock probation, requests that the trial court consider his motion within the statutorily defined time limits, and the trial court unilaterally, but erroneously, grants the probation, the defendant is entitled to credit for the time between premature release and the date jurisdiction to grant shock probation attaches. Thus, in the case sub judice appellant is not entitled to all the time he was on shock probation since he requested to be released on June 1, 1982, the day jurisdiction attached in the trial court. He is, however, entitled to the 7 days he was prematurely released from May 27, 1982, to June 2, 1982.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reformed, granting appellant jail time credit from May 27, 1982, through May 31, 1982. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

. As originally enacted the statute extended the trial court’s jurisdiction 120 days. In 1981 the legislature, by amendment, extended the trial court’s jurisdiction to grant a shock probation to 180 days from the date of execution of sentence.