Court Opinion

ID: 9411894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 14:06:01.156268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:16.553780
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0411-MR

ELIJAH AMBURGEY                                                       APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 19-CR-00322

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Elijah Amburgey (“Amburgey”) appeals the Franklin

Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

                                      FACTS

             In 2019, Amburgey shot and killed Xavier Cochrum after a marijuana

transaction disintegrated. He was indicted on charges of murder, assault in the first
degree, and wanton endangerment in the first degree.1 Following plea

negotiations, Amburgey entered a plea to manslaughter in the second degree and

assault in the second degree. The wanton endangerment charge was dismissed.

Per the terms of the plea agreement, he was to serve concurrent sentences totaling

ten (10) years’ imprisonment.

              During the entry of the plea, the trial court conducted a colloquy with

Amburgey to ensure his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Following

the trial court’s acceptance of the plea, Amburgey’s counsel requested that he be

released on home incarceration pending sentencing. The trial court requested that

counsel make the request in writing.

              Counsel filed a written motion, alleging that Amburgey would not

have entered the plea without having been promised that he would be released on

home incarceration until sentencing. The Commonwealth responded in writing,

agreeing that it had promised not to object to the motion, but pointing out that it

had no authority to ensure that Amburgey was released on home incarceration and

that it was up to the trial court to make that determination. At the hearing on the

motion, the trial court pointed out that the written plea agreement did not include

that term. Further, the trial court forwarded, the court was not a party to the

1
 Two other men were present for the ill-fated transaction. Ezavion Peyton was shot by
Amburgey who also shot in the direction of Patrick Greenlee.

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agreement and had not assented to imposing home incarceration. The trial court

later issued a written order denying the release.

                Following the denial of the motion for home incarceration, Amburgey

filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied. He appeals that

determination.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                The standard of review on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is well-

established.

                [T]he proper yardstick for our review in this case is a
                determination of whether the trial court abused its
                discretion in denying Greene’s motion. The Pridham
                Court itself recognized that the decision whether to grant
                a pre-judgment motion to withdraw a voluntary guilty
                plea is left to the trial court’s “sound discretion.” To be
                sure, the text of RCr[2] 8.10 itself declares that the trial
                court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.
                At its heart, a motion to withdraw a voluntarily entered
                guilty plea is an appeal to the discretion of the trial court.
                Greene suggests that because his situation involves a
                non-collateral, constitutional issue (ineffective assistance
                of counsel), we should conduct his suggested de novo
                review. But we see no reason to depart from what
                appears to be a well-established policy of keeping the
                decision to grant or deny voluntary guilty pleas within
                the trial court’s prerogative. So we will not disturb the
                denial of Greene’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
                absent a determination that the trial court’s ruling was

2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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                “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal
                principles.”[3]

Greene v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 626, 630 (Ky. 2015) (some footnotes

omitted) (citing Pridham v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 867 (Ky. 2012)).

                                        ANALYSIS

                The question before us is a simple one, i.e., did the trial court abuse its

discretion in denying Amburgey’s motion to withdraw his plea. We find it did not.

                RCr 8.10 provides, in part, “At any time before judgment the court

may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea

of not guilty substituted.” Note that the trial court may permit the plea to be

withdrawn. The use of this term makes it quite clear that the trial court maintains

the discretion to determine whether to grant or deny the motion to withdraw the

plea. “At its heart, a motion to withdraw a voluntarily entered guilty plea is an

appeal to the discretion of the trial court.” Greene, 475 S.W.3d at 630.

                We agree with the trial court that Amburgey’s plea was voluntarily,

intelligently, and knowingly entered. The trial court questioned Amburgey at

length about the entry of the plea. The court found he voluntarily agreed to the

plea, understood what he was waiving by pleading guilty, and understood the

parameters of the agreement. We find no fault with this finding.

3
    Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999).

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              After the plea was entered, counsel immediately asked that the

sentencing be delayed for sixty (60) days because the parties had agreed Amburgey

would be released on home incarceration pending sentencing. The trial court

reminded counsel that it was not bound by any agreement between the parties. The

court requested a written motion be filed but declined to release Amburgey on

home incarceration that day. When counsel pressed, the trial court expressed he

had concerns about granting Amburgey home incarceration and reiterated that a

motion needed to be filed.

              After the motion was filed, a hearing was held. Counsel argued that

release on home incarceration was a part of the plea but did not appear in the plea

paperwork. The trial court reminded counsel that only the court has the authority

to impose home incarceration, that the Commonwealth had not objected to the

motion, and that the court was not a party to any negotiations between the defense

and prosecution. The court then denied the motion to place Amburgey on home

incarceration pending sentencing. Such determination was completely within the

discretion of the trial court.

              Amburgey was only entitled to absolutely withdraw his guilty plea if

the trial court refused to accept the agreement reached between the parties. The

trial court accepted the plea agreement and all written terms.

              RCr 8.10 requires that “upon the determination of a trial
              court that it will not follow the plea agreement made

                                         -5-
             between the prosecutor and the defendant, the defendant
             has a right to withdraw the guilty plea without prejudice
             to the right of either party to go forward from that point.”
             Haight v. Commonwealth, 938 S.W.2d 243, 251 (Ky.
             1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d 319
             (Ky. 1992)).

Covington v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Ky. 2009).

             While the parties may have discussed releasing Amburgey on home

incarceration pending sentencing during negotiations, that term was not included in

the written plea agreement presented to the court. It was only after the trial court

assented to the written agreement that the term of home incarceration was raised by

Amburgey’s counsel.

             It should be noted that once the court denied the motion, conflict

counsel was appointed to Amburgey to file the motion to withdraw the plea. Such

was proper. See Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.3d 204, 210-11 (Ky. App.

2017). In the motion, conflict counsel acknowledged there was nothing contained

within the written motion to enter a guilty plea concerning Amburgey being

released on home incarceration prior to sentencing.

             No hearing was requested on the motion to withdraw the plea, even

when conflict counsel was specifically asked by the trial court if he was requesting

a hearing. Most importantly, the motion never alleged that the entry of the plea

was involuntary, rather stating only that Amburgey “believed” that if he entered

the plea the court would release him on “bond” pending sentencing. This is simply

                                         -6-
not sufficient for a suggestion that the plea was entered involuntarily. Further,

when considered after the thorough colloquy engaged in by the trial court at the

time of the entry of the plea, there was no reason for the court to suspect that the

plea was involuntary, meaning a hearing was unnecessary.

             Appellant moved the court to withdraw his guilty plea
             pursuant to RCr 8.10. Criminal Rule (RCr) 8.10 provides
             that, “[a]t any time before judgment the court may permit
             the plea of guilty . . . to be withdrawn and a plea of not
             guilty substituted.” Though an RCr 8.10 motion is
             generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, a
             defendant is entitled to a hearing on such a motion
             whenever it is alleged that the plea was entered
             involuntarily. Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d
             8, 10 (Ky. 2002); Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d
             482, 486 (Ky. 2001); see also Brady v. United States, 397
             U.S. 742, 749, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747
             (1970).

Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 566 (Ky. 2006).

             The trial court denied the motion after reviewing the entry of the plea

and the arguments of the parties. The court had complete discretion whether to

allow the plea to be withdrawn as judgment had yet to be imposed.

             If, however, the trial court determines the plea was
             voluntary, it may deny the motion to withdraw and
             enforce the plea. Id. The trial court is in the best position
             to determine if there was any “reluctance,
             misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to
             plead guilty,” Bronk [v. Commonwealth], 58 S.W.3d
             [482], 487, and “solemn declarations in open court carry
             a strong presumption of verity,” Blackledge v. Allison,
             431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977).

                                          -7-
Porter v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 382, 386 (Ky. 2011).

As the trial court had questioned Amburgey about the voluntariness of his plea and

ensured that he understood the written agreement presented to the court at the time

of the entry of the guilty plea, it was not an abuse of discretion to overrule the

motion to withdraw the plea.

                                   CONCLUSION

             The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Amburgey’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea after considering the record and finding the plea

was voluntary. The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Julia K. Pearson                           Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Mark D. Barry
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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