Court Opinion

ID: 9898497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:06.132353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:19.434356
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       JUNE 13, 2023
                                                               In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                              WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

JON GRANBOIS,                                 )
                                              )        No. 38886-7-III
                     Appellant,               )
                                              )
       v.                                     )
                                              )
ANDREA COVIELLO,                              )        UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                              )
                     Respondent.              )

       STAAB, J. — Jon Granbois petitioned for and was granted a one-year domestic

violence protection order (DVPO) against Andrea Coviello. The DVPO was granted due

to an incident that occurred in September 2020 in which Coviello was locked out of their

home following an argument. At the time, Coviello and Granbois were in a long-term

romantic relationship. Coviello admitted to damaging the home by breaking a window

and spraying water into it during the incident.

       A year later, when the DVPO was about to expire, Granbois brought a petition to

renew it. Around the same time, Coviello brought a motion to disqualify Granbois’

counsel due to an alleged relationship between the two. In response, Granbois brought a

motion to strike the pleading and for sanctions due to it being improperly filed. Granbois

also brought a motion for contempt for alleged violations of the underlying DVPO by
No. 38886-7-III
Granbois v. Coviello

Coviello. The court granted the motion to strike but declined to award sanctions and

denied the rest of the motions, including the request to renew the DVPO.

       Granbois now appeals. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

with respect to any of the issues that Granbois raises and affirm. We deny attorney fees

on appeal.

                                    BACKGROUND

       On October 30, 2020, the superior court issued a one-year DVPO protecting

Granbois from Coviello. The events giving rise to the DVPO occurred on the evening of

September 23, 2020 and ran into the early morning hours of September 24, 2020.

Granbois and Coviello were living together at the time, but in the process of ending their

long-term relationship. The parties dispute the events leading up to the incident and what

occurred during the incident.

       The parties agree that on the evening of September 23, 2020, an argument ensued.

At some point, Coviello was locked out of the home her and Granbois shared at the time.

The parties agree that while Coviello was locked out of the home she caused damage to it

by breaking a window, banging on the door with either a rock or a statue, and spraying

water onto and into the home. Other aspects of the incident are disputed. On September

24, 2020, Granbois petitioned for a DVPO which was ultimately granted for a period of

one year.

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       About a year later, in October 2021, Granbois petitioned for renewal of the DVPO

and moved for contempt sanctions against Coviello. Granbois alleged that Coviello

continued to stalk and harass him after the DVPO was granted and that she would

continue to do so if the DVPO was not renewed. In support of his request for relief,

Granbois asserted that Coviello had violated the original DVPO shortly after it was

issued, by driving by his home, shopping at his place of work, and calling him.

       Coviello responded to Granbois’ motion and also brought a motion to disqualify

Granbois’ counsel alleging that there was a romantic relationship between Granbois and

his attorney. Granbois responded to Coviello’s motion and then brought a motion to

strike and for sanctions because it was improperly filed.

       A superior court commissioner considered all of the pending motions on January

14, 2022. The motion to disqualify was not granted or argued because it was improperly

filed via email. The motion to strike was granted but the court declined to award

sanctions, noting that while improperly filed, both parties had emailed filings or

attachments to the court throughout the litigation.

       Granbois’ motion for contempt was also denied. The court noted that all of the

allegations giving rise to the motion for contempt were over a year old and at that point

there was “nothing to do for the court to enforce [sic] Ms. Coviello to get into compliance

with the order.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 375.

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       Turning to Granbois’ motion to renew the DVPO, the court allowed Coviello to

argue first and last because she had the burden of proving that there would be no

resumption of domestic violence if the DVPO were to lapse. Former RCW 26.50.060(3)

(2021). During the hearing, the court briefly questioned Coviello about counseling she

had sought since the incident, but denied Granbois’ attorney’s request to cross-examine

Coviello.

       Ultimately, the court declined to renew the DVPO. The court noted that Coviello

had sought counseling, that there was no indication that the parties were going to have

any further contact with each other, and that Coviello had since moved across the state to

Tacoma. Consequently, the court found that Coviello had proven by a preponderance of

the evidence that there would be no resumption of domestic violence once the DVPO

lapsed.

       Following the court’s ruling, Granbois’ counsel requested a stay and reissuance of

the DVPO in order to give him an opportunity to appeal the ruling. The court asked what

legal authority Granbois had to support that request, and none was provided. The court

denied the request.

       Granbois then brought a timely motion to revise the commissioner’s ruling. The

motion to revise the commissioner’s ruling was denied. The court entered an order on

Granbois’ motion for revision reflecting the court’s rulings.

       Granbois then filed this timely appeal.

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                                        ANALYSIS

1.     MOOTNESS

       Coviello contends that the case is moot because by the time a decision is issued by

this court, it will be over a year since the DVPO renewal was denied. Thus, for over a

year, no DVPO will have been in place. We disagree.

       “A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief.” Orwick v. City

of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). Coviello seems to argue that,

because no DVPO has been in place for a year, and no domestic violence has resumed,

the matter is now moot.

       Effective relief can be granted to Granbois if this court decides that the decision of

the lower court to deny Granbois’ DVPO renewal request was error. If we decide in

Granbois’ favor, the DVPO could be renewed for “another fixed time period” or a

permanent order could be entered. Former RCW 26.50.060(3) (2021) recodified at RCW

7.105.405(8) (2022). Below and on appeal, Granbois requests that the DVPO be renewed

for a period of ten years. Thus, the matter is not moot.

2.     RENEWAL OF DVPO

       Granbois contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his request

for a renewed DVPO against Coviello. Granbois puts forth numerous arguments and

urges us to find that the court erred in various ways in denying his DVPO renewal. We

conclude that the superior court commissioner did not abuse their discretion.

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       The trial court has discretion when it comes to petitions for DVPOs. Hecker v.

Cortinas, 110 Wn. App. 865, 869, 43 P.3d 50 (2002). This court will not disturb a lower

court’s ruling to grant or deny a DVPO absent a clear abuse of discretion. Juarez v.

Juarez, 195 Wn. App. 880, 890, 382 P.3d 13 (2016). A judge abuses her discretion when

her decision is based on untenable ground or untenable reasons. Id.

       Procedural Issues

       Granbois raises numerous procedural issues; all of them without merit.

       Granbois first argues that we should apply the restructured law on domestic

violence protection orders that became effective while this appeal was pending. Effective

July 1, 2022, the legislature recodified its chapter pertaining to civil protection orders.

The code pertaining to DVPOs was previously found at chapter 26.50 RCW (Domestic

Violence Protection). The code governing DVPOs is now found at chapter 7.105 RCW

(Civil Protection Order). Chapter 26.50 RCW was effective when this case was decided.

       “It is well settled that, in the absence of legislative expression to the contrary, a

law is presumed to apply prospectively only.” State v. Malone, 9 Wn. App. 122, 131,

511 P.2d 67 (1973). Granbois cites to no authority demonstrating a legislative intent for

the new statutory scheme governing DVPOs to apply retroactively. Thus, we decline his

invitation to apply Chapter 7.105 RCW to the current case.

       Granbois contends that the court on revision erroneously analyzed the

commissioner’s ruling for an abuse of discretion instead of a de novo standard. A

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superior court judge’s review of a commissioner’s ruling on revision is de novo. State v.

Wicker, 105 Wn. App. 428, 432-33, 20 P.3d 1007 (2001). The record shows that the

court cited and applied the correct standard on revision. The court wrote in her order on

petitioner’s motion for revision that “[o]n a revision motion, the Superior Court reviews a

Commissioner’s ruling de novo based on the evidence and issues presented to the

Commissioner.” CP at 397.

       Granbois next argues that the court erred when it realigned the parties by referring

to Granbois as the respondent and Coviello as the petitioner during the hearing. He also

alleges that the parties were impermissibly realigned when the commissioner allowed

Coviello to have the first and last word. We disagree.

       Granbois argues that the parties were realigned because the commissioner referred

to Coviello as the petitioner and Granbois as the respondent. The record shows that the

commissioner misspoke at the hearing on the DVPO renewal and reversed the roles of the

parties. However, the commissioner simultaneously corrected herself. This does not

amount to realignment of the parties and Granbois’ argument is without merit or support

from the record.

       Next, Granbois argues that the parties were impermissibly realigned because the

commissioner allowed Coviello to argue first and last even though Granbois was the

petitioner. The court stated that, because Coviello had the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that she would not resume acts of domestic violence

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against Granbois, Coviello would argue first and have final rebuttal. Former RCW

26.50.060(3) (2021). Granbois argues that this was “procedurally improper” but provides

no further argument or citation to authority. Thus, we should decline to address this

argument. See RAP 10.3(a); State v. Stubbs, 144 Wn. App. 644, 652, 184 P.3d 660

(2008) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to

allow for our meaningful review.”), rev’d on other grounds by 170 Wn.2d 117, 240 P.3d

143 (2010).

       Granbois also argues that the court erred when it did not allow him to cross-

examine Coviello. Here, both attorneys stated at the outset that they did not intend to

have the parties testify on the motion to renew the DVPO. After hearing argument from

her counsel, the court decided to briefly question Coviello about counseling she had

sought. Granbois’ counsel then indicated that she wanted to cross-examine Coviello, and

the court stated that it was not allowing cross examination.

       “We leave the decision whether to allow cross-examination in domestic violence

protection order hearings to the sound discretion of a commissioner or trial court judge

subject to the normal provision for review or revision.” Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491,

497, 387 P.3d 680 (2017). The court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to

allow cross-examination of Coviello following the court’s questions as that decision was

well within the court’s discretion. Thus, Granbois’ argument fails.

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       Granbois makes two additional procedural arguments without adequate analysis or

citation to authority. First, he contends that the court erred by failing to review related

Walla Walla Superior Court Cause No. 20-2-00549-36. Granbois does not cite any rule

of law or applicable case demonstrating that this was error. Second, Granbois contends

that the lower court erred when it denied revision by not requiring or adopting written

findings. We decline to address these issues as they are inadequately briefed. See RAP

10.3(a); Stubbs, 144 Wn. App. at 652 (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned

argument is insufficient to allow for our meaningful review.”), rev’d on other grounds by

170 Wn.2d 117, 240 P.3d 143 (2010).

       Denial of the DVPO

       Turning to the substantive issues, Granbois argues that the court abused its

discretion when it found by a preponderance of the evidence that Coviello was unlikely to

resume acts of domestic violence against Granbois and thus denied his request to renew

the DVPO against Coviello. We disagree.

       Former RCW 26.50.060(3) states that “[t]he court shall grant the petition for

renewal unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the

respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner . . . when the

order expires.”

       Granbois claims that the commissioner failed to apply former RCW 26.50.130

(2019). This statute provides unweighted factors to be considered by the court in

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deciding whether “there has been a substantial change in circumstances” sufficient to

warrant modification or termination of a DVPO. Former RCW 26.50.130(3)(c).

However, as the superior court pointed out in revision, this statute does not apply to a

petition for renewal of a one-year DVPO. Instead, the statute provides:

       The court may not terminate an order for protection that is permanent or
       issued for a fixed period exceeding two years upon a motion of the
       respondent unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the
       evidence that there has been a substantial change in circumstances such that
       the respondent is not likely to resume acts of domestic violence against the
       petitioner or those persons protected by the protection order if the order is
       terminated. In a motion by the respondent for termination of an order for
       protection that is permanent or issued for a fixed period exceeding two
       years, the petitioner bears no burden of proving that he or she has a current
       reasonable fear of imminent harm by the respondent.

Former RCW 26.50.130(3)(a).

       Here, the DVPO was issued for only one year and the respondent, Coviello, was

not moving to terminate the order. Instead, former RCW 26.50.060(3) (2021), the

statute governing DVPO renewals, is applicable.

       Next, Granbois argues that the commissioner erred by revising and minimizing

Coviello’s past acts of domestic violence giving rise to the initial DVPO. Granbois’

argument is completely unfounded and unsupported by the record.

       In his briefing, Granbois states that the court erred by minimizing Coviello’s past

acts of domestic violence “in stating, ‘I do find the respondent in the past has gotten

angry and has damaged property of Mr. Granbois . . . [but] most of the bad acts that are

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being alleged by the respondent [sic] do not meet the definition of domestic violence.’”

Appellant’s Br. at 53.

       This statement in Granbois’ brief is not an accurate reflection of the record.

Instead, the quote combines two statements of the commissioner that are pages apart in

the transcript. The complete quote from the commissioner is actually: “I do find that the

respondent in the past has gotten angry and has damaged property of Mr. Granbois. I’m

not going to relitigate the initial domestic violence protection order.” CP at 389

(emphasis added). Granbois notably omits the second sentence of the trial court’s

statement in his briefing.

       The second part of the quote in Granbois’ briefing suffers from the same problems

as the first. The complete quote reads: “So, based on that and based on the fact that most

of the bad acts that are being alleged by the respondent [sic] do not meet the definition of

domestic violence. I find that the respondent has met their burden.” CP at 391-92. It is

clear from the context that the court was referencing the more recent acts of alleged

domestic violence Granbois claims Coviello committed, not the acts giving rise to the

original DVPO.

       Granbois’ other arguments pertain to Coviello’s alleged stalking and harassment

of him. Coviello refutes these claims. Granbois also points to declarations he submitted

to the court below regarding Coviello’s behavior. In essence, Granbois urges us to

reweigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion than the trial court. We decline

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to do so. “It invades the province of the trial court for an appellate court to find

compelling that which the trial court found unpersuasive.” Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto

Plaza, Inc., 153 Wn. App. 710, 717, 225 P.3d 266 (2009). This court defers to the trial

court’s determinations on the weight of the evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting

testimony. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).

       There was clearly conflicting evidence in this case and the trial court weighed the

evidence and decided that Coviello had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

she was unlikely to resume acts of domestic violence against Granbois despite Granbois’

claims that she continued to stalk and harass him and despite his supportive declarations.

This was not an abuse of discretion and we will not reweigh the evidence to come to a

different conclusion.

       The court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant the DVPO renewal

request.

3.     REQUEST TO STAY DENIAL ORDER

       Granbois contends that the court abused its discretion when it did not grant his

motion to stay the denial of the DVPO renewal pending further proceedings. Again, we

disagree.

       At the DVPO renewal hearing, Granbois requested a stay and reissuance of the

DVPO “in order to provide opportunity for [Granbois] to pursue revision and any

appeal.” CP at 392. The court asked what legal authority Granbois had to support that

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request, and his counsel provided none. The court ultimately denied the request for a

stay. Granbois renewed his stay request on revision and the court again denied the

request for a stay noting that counsel had provided no authority to support the request.

       Now, Granbois cites generally to CR 62 but it is unclear what portion of the rule

Granbois contends applies to his stay request. Granbois also cites RAP 8.1(b)(3) which

states that matters may be stayed at the court’s discretion. The rule further states that

“[t]he party seeking such relief should use the motion procedure provided in Title 17 [of

these rules].” RAP 8.1(b)(3).

       The lower court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Granbois’ request to

stay the denial of the DVPO because Granbois cited no authority to support his request.

On appeal, he claims that the trial court’s authority derives from the rules of appellate

procedure, but fails to demonstrate how these rule apply to the superior court.

       The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Granbois’ request for a stay

of the DVPO denial pending appeal.

4.     DENIAL OF MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

       Granbois argues that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for

contempt and declined to defer the matter for special prosecution.

       “Punishment for contempt of court is within the sound discretion of the judge so

ruling. Unless there is abuse of a trial court’s exercise of discretion, it will not be

disturbed on appeal.” Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wn.2d 626, 630, 585 P.2d 130 (1978)

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(quoting State v. Caffrey, 70 Wn.2d 120, 122-23, 422 P.2d 307 (1966)). RCW 7.21.020

states that “[a] judge . . . may impose a sanction for contempt of court.” Former RCW

26.50.110(3) states that “[a] violation of [a DVPO] shall also constitute contempt of

court.”

          Here, the court reviewed the motion for contempt and found that “the credible

allegations of violation of the no-contact order are at a minimum a year old.” CP at 375.

The year-old allegations of the violations of the protection order included Coviello

driving down Granbois’ street, contacting him by phone, and going to his place of work.

          The court ultimately declined to find Coviello in contempt and declined to impose

sanctions as Granbois requested in his contempt motion. The court reasoned that the

contempt allegations were stale and there was nothing for the court to do in order to get

Coviello into compliance with the underlying DVPO because she had been compliant

with it for over a year. The court was well within its discretion to decline to find

Coviello in contempt or order sanctions against her.

          Granbois also argues that the court should have referred the matter for special

criminal prosecution. RCW 7.21.040(2)(c) states that a “request that the prosecuting

attorney or the city attorney commence an action under this section may be made by a

judge.” (Emphasis added). Again, the court was under no obligation to refer the matter

for special prosecution, and it was not an abuse of discretion for it to decline to do so.

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       The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Granbois’ motion for

contempt.

5.     DENIAL OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

       Granbois argues that the court abused its discretion when it declined to order

sanctions against Coviello for failing to properly file her motion to disqualify.

       CR 5(d)(2) states that if “a party fails to file any other pleading or paper under this

rule, the court upon 5 days’ notice of motion for sanctions may dismiss the action or

strike the pleading or other paper and grant judgment against the defaulting party for

costs and terms including a reasonable attorney fee.” (emphasis added).

       Here, Coviello failed to properly file her motion to disqualify Granbois’ counsel.

In response, Granbois bought a motion to strike and for sanctions. Counsel for Coviello

stated that he mistakenly thought that the court was accepting emailed filings and that is

why he failed to file the motion with the clerk’s office. At the hearing, the court clarified

that it was accepting bench copies via email but that motions still needed to be filed with

the clerk’s office. The court then granted the motion to strike but declined to impose

sanctions. The court noted that there had been a number of emails from both parties in

the matter, with multiple attachments, but that the court was only going to consider what

had been properly filed.

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       Again, the court was under no obligation to impose sanctions under CR 5(d)(2).

The court noted that both parties had sent attachments via email and decided against

imposing sanctions on Coviello. This was not an abuse of discretion.

6.     ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

       Both parties request attorney fees on appeal.

       Granbois contends that he paid costs related to this appeal which he argues should

have been waived by statute. He cites generally to former RCW 26.50.030(4), 26.50.040,

and 26.50.060. These statutes waive the filing fee in superior court for DVPO and

preclude a public agency from charging for service of process and certified copies. See

RCW 26.50.030(4) and .040. These statutes do not apply to the costs Granbois incurred

in pursuing his appeal.

       Under former RCW 26.50.060(1)(g) and RAP 18.1, we have discretion to require

the respondent of a DVPO action to pay the petitioner’s costs and attorney fees. Aiken,

187 Wn.2d at 506. Since Granbois did not prevail below or on appeal, we exercise our

discretion and decline his request for costs and fees.

       Coviello also requests fees under chapter 26.50 RCW generally or alternatively

arguing that Granbois’ appeal is frivolous under RAP 18.9. We decline Coviello’s

request for fees as well. We do not find Granbois’ appeal to be frivolous and Coviello

does not cite authority authorizing an award of fees to the respondent of a DVPO under

the circumstances in this case.

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      Affirmed.

      A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                            _________________________________
                                                    Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________
      Fearing, C.J.

_________________________________
      Lawrence-Berrey, J.

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