Court Opinion

ID: 9748179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:54:11.446303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:32.473399
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.,
concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part:
While I concur with the majority on the other issues, I must dissent as to this Court’s approval of the Laurel Family Court’s “automatic continuation” of a contested finding of “voluntary underemployment” without addressing Appellant’s evidence concerning his two-year effort at economic betterment.44 I dissent because such approval leaves this important area of family law without appropriate guidance or restraints, which is especially important now given the majority’s implicit holding that direct or indirect child support avoidance is no longer a predicate to a finding of voluntary underemployment.
Appellant, Roy Howard, and Appellee, Sondra Howard (now Stewart), were married in Laurel County on September 11, 2004; had a child, Zachary, on March 2, 2005; separated on August 18, 2005; and were divorced on August 11, 2006. Roy has resided with his mother in Fayette County, Kentucky, since their separation in August 2005. Sondra remains in the *449marital home near Corbin, in Laurel County, near the Whitley' County prison where she and Roy used to work together.
Whatever the reason, Roy did quit his job at the Whitley County federal prison during the pendency of their divorce. And although he continued thereafter to remain employed — working forty hours a week— his earnings plummeted from approximately $47,000 per year in 2005 to approximately $17,000 in 2006. In the dissolution action, the Laurel Family Court found Roy to be “voluntarily underemployed” and set his child support based on his previous 2005 earnings as a prison guard. Still working every week, by 2007, Roy had obtained better employment, increasing his earnings to approximately $21,000 per year.
Thereafter, by motion and affidavit, dated November 19, 2007, Roy sought to modify his child support obligations based on his continuing effort to better his employment and earnings in the intervening two years between the separation and the motion, noting he had continued to work forty hours per week since leaving his job at the prison, and had even changed jobs to increase his hourly earnings from $9 to $11 per hour. Roy supplied documentation that his average monthly income had increased from approximately $1,436.58 per month in 2006 to over $1,700 per month in 2007, although Roy has only a high school education, with no additional educational or technical training.45
His affidavit attached to his motion also asserted that he had applied at FMC in Lexington as a correctional officer and as a community correctional officer with the Division of Community Corrections for the Lexington/Fayette Urban County Government but had been denied employment at both due to health problems, including serious back pain for which he had undergone surgery at Central Baptist Hospital. However, without analyzing the evidence in light of KRS 403.212(2)(d), the court denied the motion, finding, “[t]he Respondent has not presented any new issues since the court determined [initially that] he was voluntarily underemployed.” (Emphasis added.) As a result, Roy’s child support obligation of $789.25 per month constitutes 41 percent of his gross monthly income and almost 55 percent of his net monthly income. This, even though Sondra’s income from her continued prison employment more than doubles his.
My dissent from the majority on this issue is not about the family court’s initial finding of “underemployment” — it is about its failure to analyze Roy’s subsequent effort at economic betterment and the consequent absence of any guidance to the bar and family courts as to how one can extract his- or herself from such a designation.46
Although we should — under the abuse of discretion standard — generally defer to a family court’s initial finding that a party is “voluntarily underemployed,” I feel compelled to point out the unfairness in expecting a pending divorcee to maintain employment at the same location as the spouse — or the ex-spouse-to-be. If he makes a decision to leave, he risks — especially in this economy — being characterized as “underemployed”; but, if he stays, his emotional turmoil and the consequen*450tial danger of confrontation increases. Thus, I pause to remind family courts of the tenuous balance they must strike in these circumstances when a noncustodial parent’s employment changes, thereby reducing his or her income. See Rohloff v. Rohloff, 161 Mich.App. 766, 411 N.W.2d 484 (1987) (“On the one hand, the courts must not unduly interfere with the personal lives and career choices of individuals merely because they have been involved in a divorce. On the other hand, because there has been a divorce, the courts are thrust into the middle of the parties’ personal lives in order to protect the interests of the minor children who are also unwilling participants in the divorce.”).
Simply put, I disagree with the majority’s contention that the threshold standard for modification was not reached here; and, thus, the family court was not required to consider anew whether Howard remained voluntarily underemployed. Based on the majority’s holding, I fear once a person is found to be “voluntarily underemployed,” he or she will remain so, unless and until, he or she returns to the income level previously enjoyed.47 And that plainly is not the standard envisioned by KRS 403.212(2)(d).
Although KRS 403.212(2)(d) has been amended to allow a court to deem a parent underemployed without an explicit finding that the parent intended to avoid or reduce his or her child support obligation, the Kentucky Legislature did not aim for vol-untariness to equate to Dante’s conception of purgatory. Given our concept of due process, it couldn’t.48 In recognition of such restrictions and the interrelated, explicit wording of KRS 403.212(2)(d) and 403.211(2), I would hold that substantive evidence sufficient to support a continued finding of direct or indirect child support avoidance must exist. Specifically, KRS 403.211(2) reads:
At the time of initial establishment of a child support order, whether temporary or permanent, or in any proceeding to modify a support order, the child support guidelines in KRS 403.212 shall serve as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or modification of the amount of child support. Courts may deviate from the guidelines where their application would be unjust or inappropriate. Any deviation shall be accompanied by a written finding or specific finding on the record by the court, specifying the reason for the deviation.
(Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, upon the filing of an appropriate motion and affidavit, a family court must consider anew whether a person remains voluntarily underemployed. I believe evidence sufficient to compel such a renewed analysis exists here.49
In this case, the family court’s willful ignoring of Roy’s facts amid its assertion that there were no new issues presented constituted an arbitrary finding of continued voluntary underemployment. As a result, the family court abused its discretion. Artrip v. Noe, 311 S.W.3d 229, 232 (Ky. *4512010) (“[T]his Court reviews child support matters under an abuse of discretion standard, ie., whether the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles....”).
Moreover, in my opinion, Goldsmith v. Bennett-Goldsmith, 227 S.W.3d 459 (Ky.App.2007), does not justify the family court’s approach here, as the failure to produce sufficient evidence cannot be analogized to a court’s ignoring sufficient evidence as was actually before it. In Goldsmith, the Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s denial of modification because the obligor offered no explanation regarding how he had divested himself of rental properties, which had provided his income in previous years. Id. at 462. Conversely, here, the family court refused to consider substantial facts that it may otherwise have found to be a change, ie., Howard’s evidence showing he had always maintained employment, earning escalating salaries by switching jobs when available that arguably conformed to his educational and occupational qualifications once he left the prison, Sondra, and Laurel County.
Therefore, because the majority has issued a blanket approval of the family court’s assertion here that “no new issues were presented,” I must dissent on this issue.
CUNNINGHAM and NOBLE, JJ., join.

. During the divorce, Appellant (then-Respondent) contended that he and Appellee (Petitioner in the dissolution action) had agreed that since both worked as prison guards at the Whitley County, Kentucky, federal prison — and continuing to do so during their divorce would be hard on them — that he would leave his job there. Appellee, however, disputed any agreement, asserting that she would have never made such an agreement as it would have reduced the child support to which she was entitled. Ultimately, the family court found Appellant quit voluntarily and was, thus, "voluntarily underemployed.”

. KRS 403.212(2)(d) requires that a finding of potential income for one "voluntarily underemployed,” "shall be determined based upon employment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor’s ... recent work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing job opportunities and e'arnings levels in the community.”

. The majority’s decision confirms that such designations are now "unhinged” from any direct or indirect child support avoidance.

.Specifically, under this decision, I cannot help but wonder what evidence of continued employment history would constitute a sufficient evidentiary showing of a change in circumstances. Just what, exactly, must a person do to show that he or she is no longer underemployed? And with this new economy, how does he do it?

. Even Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution acknowledges that "[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.”

. In so holding, I acknowledge it is the trial court’s prerogative to make appropriate findings from such evidence. Our review is under an abuse of discretion standard only.