Court Opinion

ID: 9394597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 20:07:29.547929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.104660
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-1634.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO                                  :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
                                               :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                         Plaintiff-Appellee    :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
                                               :
-vs-                                           :
                                               :       Case No. 2022CA00123
GEIONTAE WILLIAMS                              :
                                               :
                     Defendant-Appellant       :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                           Criminal appeal from the Stark County
                                                   Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022-
                                                   CR-0844

JUDGMENT:                                          Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                            May 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                             For Defendant-Appellant
KYLE STONE                                         BERNARD HUNT
Prosecuting Attorney                               2395 McGinty Road N.W.
BY: LISA A NEMES                                   North Canton, OH 44720
Assistant Prosecutor
110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510
Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                     2

Gwin, P.J.

      {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Geiontae Williams [“Williams”] appeals his convictions

and sentences after a jury trial in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.

                                 Facts and Procedural History

      {¶2}   On May 25, 2022, Williams was indicted on the charges of Felonious

Assault, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)(D)(1)(a) and

Aggravated Riot, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2917.02(B)(2). The

events in this case occurred at the Ohio Department of Youth Services [“DYS”], Indian

River Juvenile Correction Facility in Massillon, Stark County, Ohio, on October 17, 2022.

      {¶3}   The series of events was preceded by a group of youths hanging out in the

gym under the supervision of Lori Paxos, a corrections officer at the facility. Paxos

testified that while the youths were in the gym, she suspected "something was off” due to

youths huddling, rather than playing basketball, and she "got the vibe that something

wasn't right." 1T. at 132-33. One of the youths in the gym at that time was J.C., who was

unfamiliar with the other youths in the group, so he was standing with Paxos. Id. at 137.

Paxos testified, a "group of fellows that are in the same gang'' were huddling around and

staring at J.C., who was not a gang member. She stated she told him to watch his back.

      {¶4}   Around 5:30 p.m., J.D., approached Paxos and requested to use the

restroom. Just before J.D. asked to use the restroom, A.W., another youth, had a

conversation with him and made a hand motion. 1T. at 159. At first, Paxos told J.D. "no"

because the group just had the opportunity to use the restroom before they came in to

the room. Id. at 145-146. Ms. Paxos relented, however, because J.D. was adamant that

he really needed to use the restroom. Id. at 146. Ms. Paxos contacted another staff
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                       3

member to escort J.D. to the restroom. Id. This required Ms. Paxos to partially turn her

back to unlock the door, while still attempting to keep her eyes on the youths in the room.

Id.

       {¶5}   During this time, Williams and two other youths, A.W. and C.D., were

interacting by looking at each other. 1T. at 156, 158, 186-187. Williams gave a hand

"gang sign. 1T. at 157, 159, 171. De.T. took a swing at J.C. in an attempt to strike him

from behind. Id. at 146, 187. J.R. and Da.T. then jumped into the affray and began

assaulting J.C. Id.

       {¶6}   Ms. Paxos called a “signal 5” immediately because she needed assistance

to break up the fight. A signal 5 means "assistance is needed" and requires that the

"youths are immediately supposed to be out of their chair, up against the wall, facing

towards the wall to secure them for safety as well." Id. at 158. When Da.T. joined the

attack, Ms. Paxos realized they had lost control. Id. at 160. With three youths attacking

the one, Ms. Paxos escalated her request for help and called "an 88." Id. at 147, 160. A

“signal 88” indicates an emergency requiring assistance from everyone in the building,

including administration, lunch staff, and maintenance staff. Id. at 143. The door to the

room was open for more staff to come in and assist. Id. at 160. Ms. Paxos focused her

efforts on breaking up the three youths attacking J.C.

       {¶7}   A.W. was not facing the wall, but instead moving toward the door. Williams

also was moving across the room rather than staying in place with his face against the

wall. Id. at 160. Williams and A.W. were looking at each other and moving, and then left

the room. Id. 160-161. After A.W. left the room, he attacked a youth in the next room.

Id. at 188. Upon leaving the room, Williams went straight toward N.G., who was talking
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                      4

on the phone with his mother. Williams attacked N.G. and continued to assault him after

picking up a staff chair. Id. at 162. Quiana Good, a corrections officer responded to the

signal and attempted to stop Williams from attacking N.G. Id. at 178. After the incident,

Ms. Paxos observed Williams "laughing in his room," and "doing gang beats on his door."

Id.

      {¶8}   De.T. testified regarding the attack on J.C. 1T. at 104. He stated the attack

was a personal issue and occurred because J.C. was "talking too much," including while

they were playing basketball. Id. at 104-05, 109-10. De.T. testified Williams did not know

anything about the reason for the attack on J.C. 1T. at 111.

      {¶9}   In October 2021, then fifteen-year old N.G. was confined to the Indian River

facility in the Alpha Unit. N.G. testified that he had been talking on the phone with his

mother, and the next thing he recalled was waking up in the hospital about two hours

later. 1T. at 116. When Williams attacked N.G., he knocked him unconscious.

      {¶10} N.G. was released back to Indian River that night. Following the incident,

he had to stay on bed rest for "like a day." Id. at 120. He had to get approximately four

stitches in his chin. N.G. had to attend speech therapy for a couple months due to

stuttering, but he was still able to communicate and attend school classes. Id. at 117,

119, 123-24. N.G. was put on recreation restriction, meaning he could not do things such

as playing basketball or going to the gym. A week following the incident, he had a CAT

scan due to frequent headaches. The CAT scan showed he had a concussion. N.G. has

no permanent injuries from the incident. 1T. at 124.

      {¶11} Shawn Anders the security threat group coordinator and gang specialist at

the Indian River facility testified regarding the relevant youths and their alleged gang
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                        5

affiliations. He testified that he had knowledge and experience related to hand signals,

and the signal Williams displayed was a gang hand signal. 1T. at 185, 187. Anders

further testified he was familiar with “gang beats,” which are a distinct beat that gang

members use to disassociate themselves from other youth. Id. at 188. Anders further

testified that Williams is a gang member. Id. at 185. De.T. was not a gang member at the

time of the incident. Id. at 184. N.G. and J.C. were not associated with any gangs. 1T.

at 182; 187.

       {¶12} The jury was shown a video of the events as they transpired on October 17,

2022. State’s Exhibit 1.

       {¶13} Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Williams guilty of

aggravated riot, and guilty of assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree, as a lesser

included offense of felonious assault.

       {¶14} The trial judge sentenced Williams to thirty-six months incarceration on the

charge of Aggravated Riot, to be served consecutive with Williams’ sentence in Stark

County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 0134, and thirty-days incarceration

on the charge of Assault, to be served concurrently with the sentence for Aggravated Riot.

                                      Assignments of Error

       {¶15} Williams raises five Assignments of Error,

       {¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF

THE DEFENDANT BY PERMITTING IRRELEVANT BUT HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL

TESTIMONY REGARDING GANG AFFILIATION TO BE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL.

       {¶17} “II.   THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS

RIGHTS AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S REQUEST
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                          6

FOR A MISTRIAL BASED UPON A WITNESS'S TESTIMONY OF GANG EVIDENCE

THAT WAS EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

       {¶18} “III. THE TRIAL ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO THE

MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR AGGRAVATED RIOT AND RAN THAT SENTENCE

CONSECUTIVE TO THE SENTENCE HE IS CURRENTLY SERVING.

       {¶19} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE

PROCESS OF LAW, AS HIS CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED RIOT WAS NOT

SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

       {¶20} “V.    APPELLANT' S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED RIOT WAS

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

                                                 I.

       {¶21} In his First Assignment of Error, Williams contends that evidence that

Williams and other youths were affiliated with gangs was irrelevant and unfairly

prejudicial.

                                 Standard of Appellate Review

       {¶22} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the

rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d

1056 (1991).    “However, we review de novo evidentiary rulings that implicate the

Confrontation Clause. United States v. Henderson, 626 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2010).”

State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶97.

       {¶23} We note that any error will be deemed harmless if it did not affect the

accused’s “substantial rights.” Before constitutional error can be considered harmless, we
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                             7

must be able to “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Chapman v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

       Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court violated Williams’ right to a

fair trial by allowing the state to present evidence of his gang affiliation, as well as the

gang affiliation of some of the other youths

                                      “Other acts” evidence

       {¶24} In State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d

1278, ¶ 20, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth a three-part analysis for determining the

admissibility of other-acts evidence: to be admissible, (1) the evidence must be relevant,

Evid.R. 401, (2) the evidence cannot be presented to prove a person’s character to show

conduct in conformity therewith but must instead be presented for a legitimate other

purpose, Evid.R. 404(B), and (3) the probative value of the evidence cannot be

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Evid.R. 403. The admissibility

of other-acts evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) is a question of law. State v. Hartman,

161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, ¶ 22. The court is precluded from

admitting improper character evidence under Evid.R. 404(B), but it has discretion to allow

other-acts evidence that is admissible for a permissible purpose. Hartman at ¶ 22, citing

Williams at ¶ 17.

                                    Gang affiliation evidence

       {¶25} Trial courts must treat evidence of gang affiliation with care since most

jurors are likely to look unfavorably upon a defendant’s membership in a street gang.

United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 219 n. 4. (6th Cir. 1996). The Ohio Supreme

Court has held that evidence of a defendant's gang affiliation is admissible pursuant to
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                       8

Ohio Evidence Rule 404(B) to show motive. State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-

Ohio-4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶170.              This is particularly the case where “the

interrelationship between people is a central issue.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gibbs,

182 F.3d 408, 430 (6th Cir. 1999)). Evidence of gang affiliation has also been held

admissible to establish the defendant’s opportunity to commit a crime. United States v.

Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 221(6th Cir. 1996).          The evidence is admissible subject to

balancing the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to

Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence. See Jobson, 102 F.3d at 221–23, 854 N.E.2d 150

                                           Williams’ case

       {¶26} Williams was convicted of Aggravated Riot. R.C. 2917.02 provides, in

relevant part,

                 (A) No person shall participate with four or more others in a course

       of disorderly conduct in violation of section 2917.11 of the Revised Code:

                                                 ***

                 (2) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of any

       offense of violence;

       R.C. 2917.11 Disorderly conduct provides,

                 (A) No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or

       alarm to another by doing any of the following:

                 (1) Engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property,

       or in violent or turbulent behavior;
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                      9

             (2) Making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance,

      gesture, or display or communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive

      language to any person;

             (3) Insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances

      in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response;

             (4) Hindering or preventing the movement of persons on a public

      street, road, highway, or right-of-way, or to, from, within, or upon public or

      private property, so as to interfere with the rights of others, and by any act

      that serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender;

             (5) Creating a condition that is physically offensive to persons or that

      presents a risk of physical harm to persons or property, by any act that

      serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender.

      {¶27} Importantly, R.C. 2917.031 provides,

             For the purposes of prosecuting violations of sections 2917.02 and

      2917.03 of the Revised Code, the state is not required to allege or prove

      that the offender expressly agreed with four or more others to commit any

      act that constitutes a violation of either section prior to or while committing

      those acts.

      {¶28} Williams maintains that because no express agreement is required, the

state could have proven its case without gang affiliation evidence. While that may be

true, we find nothing in either statute that prohibits the state from introducing evidence

that the individuals did in fact agree to engage in the prohibited conduct in order to
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                         10

establish the “participate with four or more others in a course of disorderly conduct”

element of aggravated riot.

       {¶29} The state introduced the gang evidence for a purpose independent of

Williams’ character or propensity to commit a crime. The gang affiliation evidence was

admissible to show that it was more likely than not Williams’ attack on N.G. was not a

random act; rather it occurred in conjunction with the attack on J.C. and the attack on the

unnamed third party. The affiliations of the individuals involved, timing of the attacks, and

that the individuals who were attacked were not gang affiliated, were central to proving

the interrelationship of the party’s and the motive for the attacks.

       {¶30} Nor can it be said that the evidence of gang affiliation was unfairly prejudicial

to Williams. In State v. Crotts, the Ohio Supreme Court explained,

              As a legal term, “prejudice” is simply “[d]amage or detriment to one’s

       legal rights or claims.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.1999) 1218. Thus, it

       is fair to say that all relevant evidence is prejudicial. That is, evidence that

       tends to disprove a party’s rendition of the facts necessarily harms that

       party’s case. Accordingly, the rules of evidence do not attempt to bar all

       prejudicial evidence—to do so would make reaching any result extremely

       difficult. Rather, only evidence that is unfairly prejudicial is excludable.

              “‘Exclusion on the basis of unfair prejudice involves more than a

       balance of mere prejudice. If unfair prejudice simply meant prejudice,

       anything adverse to a litigant’s case would be excludable under Rule 403.

       Emphasis must be placed on the word “unfair.” Unfair prejudice is that

       quality of evidence which might result in an improper basis for a jury
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                      11

      decision.   Consequently, if the evidence arouses the jury’s emotional

      sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish,

      the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial. Usually, although not always,

      unfairly prejudicial evidence appeals to the jury’s emotions rather than

      intellect.’” Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172,

      743 N.E.2d 890, quoting Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence (2000) 85–87,

      Section 403.3.

104 Ohio St.3d 432, 2004-Ohio-6550, 820 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 23-24. In the case at bar, the

context of the evidence was to establish the participation element of the crime of

aggravated riot, not to suggest that Williams was guilty based upon his character.

      {¶31} We therefore find that evidence of gang affiliation was relevant and

probative of the issues in the case and the probative value of the evidence was not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Williams.

      {¶32} Williams’ First Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                II.

      {¶33} Prior to the start of trial, the trial judge acknowledged there is obviously

some level of prejudice inherent in arguing that Williams is in a gang, but found the least

prejudicial way of presenting the relevant information would be to allow evidence that

the youths are in a gang, but omit any specific reference to the specific gang name.

1 T . a t 99-100. However, during the testimony of Shawn Anders, in response to a

question by the prosecutor the following exchange occurred:

             Q: Okay. And how about this fellow next to him?

             A: [J.D.].
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                               12

               Q: Okay. Does he have any sort of gang affiliation?

               A: At this time the -- of this incident, he was a passive member of the

       Heartless Felons.

1T. at 183. Defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial was overruled by the trial judge;

however, the judge did order the answer stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it.

1T. at 184.

       {¶34} In his Second Assignment of Error, Williams contends the trial court erred

in denying his motion for a mistrial.

                       STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW – MISTRIAL

       {¶35} “Mistrials need to be declared only when the ends of justice so require and

a fair trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1

(1991). The standard of review for evaluating a trial court's decision to grant or deny a

mistrial is abuse of discretion. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).

In reviewing a claim that a mistrial should have been granted, the Ohio Supreme Court

has noted “[t]his court has instead adopted an approach which grants great deference to

the trial court's discretion in this area, in recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the

best position to determine whether the situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration

of a mistrial.” State v. Shaffer, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2003-CA-0108, 2004-Ohio-3717,

¶18 quoting State v. Widner [68 Ohio St.2d 188, 429 N.E.2d 1065(1981). See, also,

Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 687, 69 S.Ct. 834, 836, 93 L.Ed. 974(1949).

       {¶36} An abuse of discretion can be found where the reasons given by the court

for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice, or

where the judgment reaches an end or purpose not justified by reason and the evidence.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                       13

Tennant v. Gallick, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26827, 2014-Ohio-477, ¶35; In re Guardianship

of S.H., 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0066–M, 2013–Ohio–4380, ¶ 9; State v. Firouzmandi,

5th Dist. Licking No. 2006–CA–41, 2006–Ohio–5823, ¶54.

       Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

denying Williams’ motion for a mistrial

       {¶37} In the case at bar, the improper answer was inadvertent and only occurred

on one occasion during the trial. The trial judge admonished the jury to disregard it.

“Juries are presumed to follow their instructions.” Zafiro v. United States 506 U.S. 534,

540, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317(1993). “A presumption always exists that the jury

has followed the instructions given to it by the trial court,” Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio St.3d

186, 187, 559 N.E.2d 1313(1990), at paragraph four of the syllabus, rehearing denied, 54

Ohio St.3d 716, 562 N.E.2d 163.

       {¶38} Looking at the answer in the larger context of the entire trial, we find it did

not prejudicially affect Williams’ substantial due process rights. The mention of the gang

name was isolated, and not intentional. The state did not highlight the improper

information in further questioning of any witness or in its argument to the jury. The trial

court’s admonishment to the jury was swift and unequivocal.

       {¶39} We find Williams was not denied his right to due process and fair trial under

the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article

I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. Further, we find beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the inadvertent mention of the gang name did not contribute to Williams’

conviction. See, State v. Aeschilmann, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013 CA 00192, 2014-Ohio-

4462, ¶95-96. Therefore, error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                       14

       {¶40} Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by overruling

Williams’ motion for a mistrial.

       {¶41} Williams’ Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶42} In his Third Assignment of Error, Williams contends the trial court erred

when it imposed the maximum, consecutive sentences. Williams maintains his sentences

are contrary to law because the trial court did not consider his age when determining the

length of his sentence.

                                   Standard of Appellate Review

       {¶43} In accordance with R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), Williams is entitled to appeal as of

right the maximum sentence imposed on his conviction.

       {¶44} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. 2953.08(F) to

review the entire trial-court record, including any oral or written statements and

presentence-investigation reports. R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) through (4). We review felony

sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146

Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶22; State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark

No. 2015CA00004, 2015-Ohio-4049, ¶31. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either

increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we

clearly and convincingly find that either the record does not support the sentencing court’s

findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See, also, State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209,

2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                       15

       Issue for Appellate Review: Whether Williams’ sentence was imposed based

on impermissible considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that are

contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12

                    R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, and Maximum Sentences

       {¶45} A trial court’s imposition of a maximum prison term for a felony conviction is

not contrary to law as long as the sentence is within the statutory range for the offense,

and the court considers both the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in

R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. State

v. Keith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103413 and 103414, 2016-Ohio-5234, ¶ 10, 16; State

v. Taylor, 5th Dist. Richland No. 17CA29, 2017-Ohio-8996, ¶16. “[N]either R.C. 2929.11

nor 2929.12 requires [the] court to make any specific factual findings on the record.” State

v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20, citing State v.

Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31, and State v. Arnett,

88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).

       {¶46} In State v. Bryant, the Court clarified,

              The narrow holding in Jones [163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729,

       169 N.E.3d 649] is that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate

       court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is

       not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. See Jones

       at ¶ 31, 39. Nothing about that holding should be construed as prohibiting

       appellate review of a sentence when the claim is that the sentence was

       improperly   imposed     based    on   impermissible    considerations—i.e.,

       considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                        16

       2929.12. Indeed, in Jones, this court made clear that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)

       permits appellate courts to reverse or modify sentencing decisions that are

       “‘otherwise contrary to law.’” Jones at ¶ 32, quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

       This court also recognized that “otherwise contrary to law” means “‘in

       violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’” Id. at ¶ 34 quoting

       Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed. 1990). Accordingly, when a trial court

       imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations that are extraneous

       to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence is

       contrary to law. Claims that raise these types of issues are therefore

       reviewable.

168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶22.

       {¶47} In the case at bar, the trial court considered the pre-sentence investigation

report and the statements from Williams’ attorney and the state’s attorney. The trial judge

was informed that Williams has been incarcerated since he was 15 years old. Sent. T. at

4. At the time of sentencing Williams was 18 years old. Id. The trial judge further noted

that he had sentenced Williams in Case Number 2022 CR 0134 to an indefinite term of 3

to 4.5 years. Sent. T. at 7. The trial judge noted the previous case involved Williams in

an unrelated incident attacking a corrections officer while in the Indian River facility. Id.

at 7-8. The judge further reviewed the violent and repeated attack Williams made on his

victim, hitting him several times with a chair. Id. at 8. The attack continued even after the

victim had collapsed to the floor. Id. at 8-9.

       {¶48} It is clear from the record that the trial judge was aware of and considered

Williams’ youth when deciding his sentence. The trial court considered that even while
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                          17

incarcerated by the Department of Youth Services, Williams committed two violent attacks

on not only other prisoners, but also the correction officer.

       {¶49} We conclude that the trial court did not commit error when it sentenced

Williams. Upon review, we find that the trial court’s sentencing on the charges complies

with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. While Williams may disagree with the

weight given to these factors by the trial judge, Williams’ sentence was within the

applicable statutory range and therefore, we have no basis for concluding that it is

contrary to law. Williams has not demonstrated that the trial court imposed the sentence

based on impermissible considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that

are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

                                     Consecutive Sentences

       {¶50} R.C. 2929.14(C)(2) provides that consecutive sentences are mandatory in

this case,

              (2) If an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential

       detention facility violates section 2917.02, 2917.03 [Aggravated Riot], or

       2921.35 of the Revised Code or division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2921.34 of

       the Revised Code, if an offender who is under detention at a detention

       facility commits a felony violation of section 2923.131 of the Revised Code,

       or if an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential

       detention facility or is under detention at a detention facility commits another

       felony while the offender is an escapee in violation of division (A)(1) or (2)

       of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code, any prison term imposed upon the

       offender for one of those violations shall be served by the offender
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                       18

       consecutively to the prison term or term of imprisonment the offender was

       serving when the offender committed that offense and to any other prison

       term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

Emphasis added.

       {¶51} Upon review, we find that the trial court’s sentencing on the charges

complies with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. Because the record contains

clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s findings we have no basis for

concluding that it is contrary to law.

       {¶52} Williams’ Third Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                IV.

       {¶53} In his Fourth Assignment of Error, Williams argues that there is insufficient

evidence to support his conviction for aggravated riot.

                Standard of Appellate Review– Sufficiency of the Evidence.

       {¶54} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in

conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of

a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570

U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92,

136 S.Ct. 616, 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of the evidence

involves a question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 150 Ohio

St.3d 409, 2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30. “This naturally entails a review of the

elements of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.”             State v.

Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶13.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                        19

       {¶55} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not

ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional

amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4,

684 N.E.2d 668 (1997); Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio St.3d 474,

2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiency we do

not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether, ‘if believed,

[the evidence] would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001),

quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus; Walker 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶31. We will

not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could

not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d

70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421,

430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-

5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74.

       Issue for Appellate Review: Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind

that Williams was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated riot

       {¶56} Williams was convicted of Aggravated Riot. R.C. 2917.02 provides, in

relevant part,
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                     20

            (A) No person shall participate with four or more others in a course

     of disorderly conduct in violation of section 2917.11 of the Revised Code:

                                             ***

            (2) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of any

     offense of violence;

     {¶57} R.C. 2917.11 Disorderly conduct provides,

            (A) No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or

     alarm to another by doing any of the following:

            (1) Engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property,

     or in violent or turbulent behavior;

            (2) Making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance,

     gesture, or display or communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive

     language to any person;

            (3) Insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances

     in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response;

            (4) Hindering or preventing the movement of persons on a public

     street, road, highway, or right-of-way, or to, from, within, or upon public or

     private property, so as to interfere with the rights of others, and by any act

     that serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender;

            (5) Creating a condition that is physically offensive to persons or that

     presents a risk of physical harm to persons or property, by any act that

     serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender.

     {¶58} Importantly, R.C. 2917.031 provides,
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                      21

             For the purposes of prosecuting violations of sections 2917.02 and

      2917.03 of the Revised Code, the state is not required to allege or prove

      that the offender expressly agreed with four or more others to commit any

      act that constitutes a violation of either section prior to or while committing

      those acts.

      {¶59} The state presented evidence that this was a coordinated gang attack.

Signals were exchanged, the victims were non-gang members and the disruption caused

was massive. Williams does not deny assaulting N.G.

      {¶60} A.W., J.R., C.D., Da.T. and J.P. were fellow gang members in the room

with Williams. De.T. and J.D. were either passive or aspiring members. 1T. at 183-

185. A.W. spoke to J.D. and made a gesture just before J.D. distracted Ms. Paxos

with the request to use the restroom. Id. at 159. Williams interacted with A.W. and

C.D. and then gave the gang signal.          1T. at 156-158, 186-187.        De.T. began

assaulting the youth in the day room, and J.R. and Da.T. joined in the attack. Id. at

146, 187. A.W. and Williams disregarded the procedures for youths to follow when

a signal is called, and they slipped out the door to carry out their respective attacks

on other victims. Id. at 160-161. Williams beat his victim unconscious. Id.at 188.

Williams acknowledged his actions as a member of the gang with gang beats from

his room. Id. at 178. The jury viewed the video evidence that shows those who were

"participating" from those who instead chose to back away from the fighting and

comply with the signals from the corrections officer.

      {¶61} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we

conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                        22

Williams participated with four or more others in a course of disorderly conduct in violation

of section 2917.11 of the Revised Code with purpose to commit or facilitate the

commission of any offense of violence. We hold, therefore, that the state met its burden

of production regarding each element of the crime and, accordingly, there was enough

evidence to support Williams conviction for aggravated riot.

       {¶62} Williams’ Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                V.

       {¶63} In his Fifth Assignment of Error, Williams maintains that his conviction for

aggravated riot is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                      Standard of Appellate Review – Manifest Weight.

       {¶64} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a

manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the

evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,

678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as

stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v.

Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).

       {¶65} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.

State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541(1997), State v.

Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶83. When a court of

appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the

weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with

the fact finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d

541, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652(1982)
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                          23

(quotation marks omitted); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865

N.E.2d 1244, ¶25, citing Thompkins.

       {¶66} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may

not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be

reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist.

1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.

       Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost their way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new

trial ordered.

       {¶67} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon

the entire record in this matter we find Williams’ conviction is not against the sufficiency

or the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury appears to have fairly

and impartially decided the matters before them. The jury heard the witnesses, evaluated

the evidence, and was convinced of Williams’ guilt.

       {¶68} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable

inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, we

cannot reach the conclusion that the trier of facts lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice. We do not find the jury erred when it found Williams guilty. Taken
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                         24

as a whole, the testimony and record contain ample evidence of Williams participation in

and responsibility for all the alleged crimes. The fact that the jury chose to believe the

testimony of the state’s witnesses does not, in and of itself, render his convictions against

the manifest weight of the evidence. On a full review of the record we cannot say that

the jury clearly lost its way or created a manifest injustice by choosing to believe the

testimony of the state’s witnesses. The jury saw the video showing the events in real-

time as they unfolded. The state presented testimony and evidence from which the jury

could have found all the essential elements of the offenses proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.

         {¶69} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that

there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the

crimes for which Williams was convicted.

         {¶70} Williams’’ Fifth Assignments of Error is overruled.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123                                                25

      {¶71} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By Gwin, P.J.,

Baldwin, J., and

King, J., concur