Court Opinion

ID: 9897335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:18.457071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.167774
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   Jul 21 2023, 8:26 am

                                                                                       CLERK
                                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                        and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Mark K. Leeman                                              Theodore E. Rokita
      Logansport, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
                                                                  Alexandria Sons
                                                                  Deputy Attorney General
                                                                  Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                   IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Patrick Hinton,                                             July 21, 2023
      Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                  23A-CR-107
              v.                                                  Appeal from the Cass Superior
                                                                  Court
      State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable James
      Appellee-Plaintiff                                          Muehlhausen, Judge
                                                                  Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                  09D01-2108-F6-223

                                        Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                      Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   Patrick Hinton appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony possession of

      methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.

      Hinton raises two issues for our review, but we need only address the following

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023                                Page 1 of 9
      dispositive issue: whether the State’s seizure of evidence from Hinton’s

      backyard without a warrant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to

      the United States Constitution. We reverse Hinton’s convictions.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Around 3:00 a.m. on August 18, 2021, the Logansport Police Department

      received a phone call from Patricia Sanchez. Sanchez stated that she was

      having “some issues” with getting her belongings out of a house at 1417 Smead

      Street. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. Hinton lived at that house with the owner of the house,

      Carol Zook. Sanchez reported that Hinton had stated that, if Sanchez showed

      up at the house, “he was going to shoot at her or something along those lines.”

      Id. at 13. Sanchez added that Zook “wanted to have [Hinton] kicked out, but

      [Zook] was fearful” of acting on that. Id.

[3]   The Logansport Police Department dispatched Officers Branson Eber and

      Joseph Flory to the residence “to make contact with [Hinton] and . . . to check

      on [Zook] to make sure she was doing okay.” Id. The two officers arrived

      shortly thereafter. Officer Flory approached the front door of the house, while

      Officer Eber walked down a public alley adjacent to the west side of the house

      and around to the back.

[4]   As Officer Eber approached the backyard of the residence, he observed Hinton

      sitting in a chair about sixty feet from the property line into the backyard.

      Officer Eber shined his flashlight toward Hinton, and Hinton “stood up,”

      “dropped an item on the ground,” and said, “who the f**k [is] that[?]” Id. at 81.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023           Page 2 of 9
      Officer Eber “wasn’t sure” what the object was that Hinton had dropped. Id. at

      27. Hinton then approached Officer Eber with “his hand behind his back” and

      asked the officer to “[s]how me your badge.” Id. at 81. Officer Eber shined the

      flashlight on himself to confirm for Hinton that he was an officer.

[5]   Meanwhile, Officer Flory approached the front door of the residence by way of

      a paved path. However, before he had a chance to knock on the door, Officer

      Eber radioed that he had made contact with Hinton in the backyard. Officer

      Flory also heard voices in the backyard; in particular, “somebody was yelling

      and it wasn’t Officer Eber.” Id. at 109. Officer Flory then proceeded toward the

      backyard around the eastern side of the house.

[6]   Officer Flory arrived in the backyard as Officer Eber had himself illuminated.

      Officer Flory thought that Hinton seemed “erratic . . . as if he was intoxicated,”

      but, once Hinton knew “[the officers] were the police,” he “calm[ed] down.” Id.

      at 110-11. The officers then informed Hinton that they were there “to conduct a

      welfare check on Ms. Zook.” Id. at 111. Hinton was “cooperative” and “fine”

      at that point, and he escorted the officers back around the east side of the house

      to the front door. Id.

[7]   Back at the front, Hinton “knock[ed] and yell[ed]” for Zook, who came to the

      front door but did not exit the house. Id. The officers were quickly satisfied that

      Zook “was okay.” Id. at 112. Officer Flory then engaged Hinton in

      conversation while Officer Eber went back around the east side of the house

      and into the backyard where he had originally seen Hinton sitting. Officer Eber

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023           Page 3 of 9
      would later testify that he went into the backyard “to make sure that

      there . . . wasn’t a weapon” lying in the yard. Id. at 83. Instead of finding a

      weapon, Officer Eber found “a glass smoking device containing white crystal

      residue which was burnt on the bottom and right next to it an orange Bic

      lighter.” Id. at 90. The officers then arrested Hinton.

[8]   The State charged Hinton with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine

      and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Thereafter, Hinton

      moved to suppress Officer Eber’s seizure of the items from the backyard on the

      ground that the officer’s entry into the backyard without a warrant violated

      Hinton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

      and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied

      Hinton’s motion after a hearing. At his ensuing jury trial, Hinton objected to

      the admission of the same evidence on the same grounds, which the trial court

      overruled. In overruling Hinton’s objection, the court stated that it believed that

      Officer Eber’s entry into the backyard was justified by exigent circumstances

      and the plain-view doctrine. The jury then found Hinton guilty as charged, and

      the trial court sentenced him accordingly. This appeal ensued.

      Standard of Review
[9]   On appeal, Hinton argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it

      admitted into evidence the glass smoking pipe, with its white crystal residue,

      which was seized from Hinton’s backyard without a warrant. We generally

      assess claims relating to admitting or excluding evidence for abuse of discretion.

      Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). However, where, as here, a
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023            Page 4 of 9
       challenge to an evidentiary ruling is based on the constitutionality of the search

       or seizure of evidence, the issue on appeal is a question of law that we review de

       novo. Id.

       The officer’s entry into Hinton’s backyard without a warrant
       violated Hinton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
[10]   There is no dispute in this appeal that Officer Eber entered into Hinton’s

       backyard, an area protected by the Fourth Amendment, without a warrant. The

       Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures

       and “generally requires warrants” for those searches and seizures. Id. at 991

       (quotation marks omitted). A warrantless search or seizure is per se

       unreasonable, and in such circumstances the State bears the burden to show

       that one of the “well-delineated exceptions” to the Fourth Amendment’s

       warrant requirement applies. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[11]   The trial court concluded that exigent circumstances justified Officer Eber’s

       warrantless entry into Hinton’s backyard. The State does not defend that

       conclusion on appeal, and rightfully so. For the exigent-circumstances

       exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to apply, the

       totality of the circumstances must demonstrate “an emergency that justified

       acting without a warrant.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 180 (Ind. 2021)

       (quotation marks omitted). The purpose of this exception to the warrant

       requirement is to avoid a scenario where an officer’s “delay [in] acting to obtain

       a warrant would, in all likelihood, permanently frustrate an important police

       objective, such as to prevent the destruction of evidence relating to criminal

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023          Page 5 of 9
       activity or to secure an arrest before a suspect can commit further serious

       harm.” United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 805 (1st Cir. 1988), abrogated on

       other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011).

[12]   There was no emergency here. Officer Eber and the trial court expressed

       concern that a firearm might have been lying in Hinton’s backyard and could be

       accessed by a child or other person. But, even if so, there was no one near the

       premises, and it was around three o’clock in the morning. There was no reason

       that Officer Eber could not have monitored the scene while seeking a warrant.

       Thus, Officer Eber’s entry into Hinton’s backyard was not justified by exigent

       circumstances.

[13]   The trial court also concluded that Officer Eber’s entry onto the property was

       justified under the plain-view doctrine. The State likewise argues on appeal that

       the plain-view doctrine justified Officer Eber’s entry onto the property. The

       plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows

       an officer to seize an object without a warrant if (1) the officer is lawfully in a

       position from which to view the object, (2) the incriminating character of the

       object is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to

       the object. Combs, 168 N.E.3d at 991 (quoting Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239,

       245 (Ind. 2002)). This exception “stands for the premise that objects which are

       in plain view of an officer who rightfully occupies a particular location can be

       seized without a warrant and are admissible as evidence.” Id. at 991-92 (quoting

       Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied).

       Seizures under this exception are “scrupulously subjected to Fourth

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023             Page 6 of 9
       Amendment inquiry.” Id. at 992 (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 66,

       (1992)). We need not discuss the first or third prongs of the plain-view inquiry

       here.

[14]   The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the second prong of the plain-view

       doctrine “requires that law enforcement officials have probable cause to believe

       the evidence will prove useful in solving a crime. As a plurality of the Supreme

       Court explained in Texas v. Brown, this does not mean that the officer must

       ‘know’ that the item is evidence of criminal behavior.” Taylor v. State, 659

       N.E.2d 535, 538-39 (citing, inter alia, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983)). Probable cause,

       in turn, “requires only that the information available to the officer would lead a

       person of reasonable caution to believe the items could be useful as evidence of

       a crime.” Id. at 539.

[15]   The State asserts that Officer Eber had probable cause to believe that the

       incriminating nature of the object dropped by Hinton was immediately

       apparent because the officers had been called to the scene “due to a threat of

       gun violence”; because the dropped object had a “reflective nature”; and

       because Hinton initially appeared to be acting in an “erratic” or aggressive

       manner. Appellee’s Br. at 10-11. We cannot agree that, at the time Officer Eber

       was in the public alley, where he had a right to be when he observed Hinton

       drop the object, the circumstances before him demonstrated probable cause to

       believe the object would prove useful in solving a crime.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023          Page 7 of 9
[16]   Officer Eber went to Hinton’s residence on a wellness check for Zook, not on

       the report of a criminal offense. While he was standing in the public alley

       adjacent to the residence, Officer Eber observed Hinton drop an object some

       sixty feet away at 3:00 a.m. The object reflected the light of the officer’s

       flashlight. Officer Eber acknowledged that he “wasn’t sure” what the object was

       that Hinton had dropped. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 27. And, while Hinton was perhaps

       aggressive before the officers confirmed that they were law enforcement

       officers, once they had done so Hinton was “cooperative” and “fine.” Id. at

       111. The officers then confirmed that Zook was okay, dispelling the reason for

       the officers being at the residence.

[17]   It was only at this time that Officer Eber returned to the backyard, entered onto

       it, and searched for the dropped object. And while an officer’s subjective beliefs

       are not part of a Fourth Amendment analysis, we do note that Officer Eber did

       not express concern that he had observed Hinton drop something that might be

       useful in solving a crime; he stated instead that he was concerned that a firearm

       might be lying in the open for anyone to access.

[18]   In sum, nothing in the record demonstrates probable cause that Officer Eber

       had plainly viewed evidence of a crime prior to his entry onto Hinton’s

       property. And, by that time, the Fourth Amendment violation was established.

       As there is no dispute that Hinton’s convictions cannot be affirmed without the

       illegally seized evidence, we reverse his convictions.

[19]   Reversed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023               Page 8 of 9
Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023   Page 9 of 9