Court Opinion

ID: 9655185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:02:11.693458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:15.584274
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
My writing separately is to address in-tendment of Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 81(b)(2), to examine mixed notions leading the majority to its rationes decidendi, see Maj. at 584-588, against an analysis of germane decisions, and then come to a rational conclusion in the premises.
Tex.R.App.Pro. 81(b)(2) provides:
“If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, UNLESS the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” 1
Our formulation of language in the “unless clause” of Rule 81(b)(2) was taken practically verbatim from that in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963), as the Supreme Court first isolated and then iterated it in fashioning the rule in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), for determining when “a federal constitutional error can be held harmless.” Id., at 24-26, 87 S.Ct., at 828-829, 17 L.Ed.2d, at 710-711.2
*590To be emphasized at the outset are that our Rule 81(b)(2) is not restricted to assaying “federal constitutional error,” nor is it all inclusive; at trial level some “errors” of commission or omission will require reversal either because harm is too speculative to measure or on account of mandatory statute, while other errors may be subject to a specially provided standard of review.3
Here, of course, we deal with straightforward application of Rule 81(b)(2) to found errors in admitting evidence of extraneous offenses, so decisions ruling on faults other than trial errors of a kindred kind are not too helpful.4 Let us go back then to the genesis of the “harmless-constitutional-error rule,” namely, Fahy v. Connecticut.
The concern in Fahy is whether erroneous admission of evidence of fruits of an illegal search and seizure may be, as the state court concluded it was, harmless error. Pretermitting the question of whether such error “can ever be subject to the normal rules of ‘harmless’ error under the federal standard of what constitutes harmless error,” and without identifying a standard, the Supreme Court preliminarily stated its ultimate finding and summarized its methodology, viz:
“... We find that the erroneous submission of this unconstitutionally obtained evidence at this petitioner’s trial was prejudicial; therefore, the error was not harmless, and the conviction must be reversed. We are not concerned, here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of. The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. To decide this, it is necessary to review the facts of the case and the evidence adduced at trial.”
Id., at 86-87, 84 S.Ct., at 230.5
Fahy begat Chapman v. California, supra. There the prosecutor “took full ad*591vantage of his right under the State Constitution to comment on [accuseds’] failure to testify, filling his argument to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of their guilt resulting therefrom;” also the trial court charged the jury that “it could draw adverse inferences from petitioners’ failure to testify.” Id., at 19, 87 S.Ct., at 825, 17 L.Ed.2d, at 707-708.
For purposes of fashioning “a harmless-constitutional-error rule,” the Supreme Court equated, for example, “highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, [which] though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial;” it noticed similarity in both the federal and California statutory rules, but that California courts had emphasized a court’s view of “overwhelming evidence.” However, the Supreme Court expressed its preference for the approach taken by it “in deciding what was harmless error” in Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, viz:
“The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”
Chapman, at 22-23, 87 S.Ct., at 827, 17 L.Ed.2d, at 710. Then discussing implications of Fahy the Supreme Court pointedly observed: “An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as harmless.” Id., at 23-24, 87 S.Ct., at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d, at 710. Further, it made clear that the burden to show such was harmless falls on “the beneficiary of that error;” adhering to “the meaning of our Fahy Case,” the Supreme Court concluded its formulation of the new rule with the holding set out in note 2, ante, at 589-590.
In quickly applying its holding the Supreme Court believed content, tenor and extent of the comments “impressed the jury that from the failure of petitioners to testify, to all intents of purposes, the inferences from the facts in evidence had to be drawn in favor of the State;” that though there was a reasonably strong “circumstantial web of evidence,” without “the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts.”
“Under these circumstances, it is completely impossible for us to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor’s comments and the trial judge’s instruction did not contribute to petitioners’ convictions. Such a machine-gun repetition of denial of constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners’ version of the evidence worthless, can no more be considered harmless than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced confession. Petitioners are entitled to a trial free of unconstitutional inferences.”
Id., at 25-26, 87 S.Ct., at 829,17 L.Ed.2d, at 711.6
*592Two years after Chapman v. California and its followings collected in note 6, ante, the Supreme Court decided Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), with an opinion the majority here says “arguably departed from its condemnation of the correct result test” and looked instead for “overwhelming evidence of guilt.” Slip opinion at 586. Of course, in writing the opinion Justice Douglas stoutly rejected that argument, viz:
“We do not depart from Chapman; nor do we dilute it by inference. We reaffirm it. We do not suggest that, if evidence bearing on all the ingredients of the crime is tendered, the use of cumulative evidence, though tainted, is ‘harmless error.’ Our decision is based on the evidence in this record. The case against Harrington was not woven from circumstantial evidence.”
Id., at 254, 89 S.Ct., at 1728-1729, 23 L.Ed.2d, at 288. Those disclaimers invite examination, particularly since the majority reads Sckneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), and Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972), to subscribe to a so called “overwhelming evidence” exercise. But read Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, at 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, at 686-687 (1986), for “correct inquiry” and five factors “included” in harm analysis for Davis v. Alaska error.
Essential facts of the case are the following: Harrington and three codefendants were tried together for attempted robbery and felony murder; confessions of each codefendant were admitted in evidence with limiting instructions to consider each confession only against the confessor; one codefendant testified adversely to Harrington and was crossexamined by his attorney; the other two did not testify. Thus constitutional error was violation of the Bruton rule.7
After reviewing the evidence adduced and concluding “on these special facts” that lack of opportunity to crossexamine the two confessors constituted “harmless error under the rule of Chapman,” Justice Douglas reprised that the testifying code-fendant, as had victims of attempted robbery, placed Harrington in the store with a gun at the time of the murder; in his own statement Harrington had admitted he was present. The two nontestifying confessors placed him at the scene of the crime but did not put a gun in his hand; their evidence was characterized by Justice Douglas as “cumulative.” Id., at 251-254, 89 S.Ct., at 1727-1729, 23 L.Ed.2d, at 286-287.
Rather than attempting to imagine that a single juror might have accepted the two confessions and remained in doubt and unconvinced of guilt, because judges “do not know the jurors who sat,” the Court took a more judicious approach, viz:
“... Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury. We admonished in Chapman ... against giving too much emphasis to ‘overwhelming evidence’ of guilt, stating that constitutional errors affecting the substantial rights of the aggrieved party could not be considered to be harmless. By that test we cannot impute reversible weight to the two confessions.”
Id., at 254, 89 S.Ct., at 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d, at 288. That is to do just what the Court did in Fahy and Chapman: examine the character, quality and effect of tainted evidence *593(or impermissible comments) against other evidence adduced at trial to determine whether the tainted material might have so influenced the jury that there is a reasonable probability it contributed to the conviction. Fahy, at 86-87, 84 S.Ct., at 230; Chapman, at 23-24, 26, 87 S.Ct., at 828-829, 17 L.Ed.2d, at 710-711.8
Read in those lights, Fahy, Chapman and Harrington and indeed Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, refute the notion that the Supreme Court ever started a “trend” toward a true single “overwhelming evidence of guilt” standard for assaying harmless error, as identified by the majority opinion at 30, n. 16, and at 35. Certainly, the Supreme Court discerned no such trend last year when it came to review Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), to determine whether it was harmless error to introduce psychiatric testimony obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel, id., at 254, 108 S.Ct., at 1796, 100 L.Ed.2d, at 290, and to examine that decision of singular significance to our own jurisprudence I now turn.
In finding the Estelle v. Smith error harmless the majority in Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), introduced its analysis with the observation that “Dr. Grigson’s testimony was not the only evidence offered by the State during the punishment phase of the trial,” id, at 93. It then proceeded to summarize all testimony presented by the State on punishment and to editorialize the offense; it alluded to testimony of Dr. Grigson only in noting testimony of a psychologist was “very similar” to his “conclusions about appellant;” that the State bolstered his testimony in argument was not mentioned. Ibid.; cf. dissenting opinion, at 95-96. Following the analysis made in Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the majority found the constitutional error harmless, viz:
“We conclude that the properly admitted evidence was such that the minds of an average jury would have found the State’s case sufficient on the issue of the ‘probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society’ even if Dr. Grigson’s testimony had not been admitted."
Id., at 93. And in n. 5, at 93-94, it distinguished denial of effective counsel on account of conflicting interests in that: “The error in the present case, while just as improper, related only to Dr. Grigson’s testimony, rather than to the proceeding as a whole.”
The Supreme Court found that methodology fatally deficient because it addresses the wrong question, viz:
"... The question, however, is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the State has proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Chapman, 396 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, [at 828] 17 L.Ed.2d 705.”
Id., at 258, 108 S.Ct., at 1798, 100 L.Ed.2d, at 295.
Reminiscent of Fahy, Justice O’Connor recounted evidence presented, id., at 258-259, 108 S.Ct., at 1798-1799, 100 L.Ed.2d, at 295-296, and examined “the impact of this evidence [from Dr. Grigson] upon the other evidence adduced.” Fahy, 375 U.S. at 87, 84 S.Ct., at 231.9
*594As with the “constitutionally forbidden comments” in Chapman, and whether to “impute reversible weight to the two confessions” in Harrington, after pointing out that “the finding of future dangerousness was critical to the death sentence,” and that “Dr. Grigson was the only psychiatrist to testify on this issue, and the prosecution placed significant weight on his powerful and unequivocal testimony,” the Court concluded:
“... Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we find it impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Grig-son’s expert testimony on the issue of Satterwhite’s future dangerousness did not influence the sentencing jury"
Id., at 260, 108 S.Ct., at 1799, 100 L.Ed., at 296.
Where there is error in proceedings below, the intendment of Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 81(b)(2) is to mandate reversal unless it can be held “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” In context of error in admitting evidence, as in the instant cause, the beneficiary is required “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman, at 24, 87 S.Ct., at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d, at 711. And before that error can be held harmless, an appellate court “must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ibid.
Germane decisions reviewed ante not only lay down the rules but also demonstrate the methodology for analyzing facts of, and evidence adduced in, a given case in order to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that an error in admitting evidence (or allowing prosecutorial comment) made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. Since formulated in Fahy, restated and explicated in Chapman and perpetuated in Harrington, followed by repetitive precedential construction and application, rules and methodology have developed into an identifiable narrow body of appellate law, most recently updated in Satter-white. They are certainly much more definitive and protective against inadmissible evidence than the basic tenet grasped by the majority at 587, “considerations” suggested at 587-588, and whether the State tried “to taint the trial process,” at 588.
Adapting settled methodology to resolve our Rule 81(b)(2) formulation, the ultimate inquiry may be simply stated: Is it impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the extraneous offenses did not influence the jury adversely to appellant on the issue of guilt or punishment? Satterwhite and Chapman.
Evidence that may have influenced a jury surely contributes to its verdict. Every piece and sheaf of evidence is submitted for whatever consideration a jury may give it, unless restricted by a limiting instruction. Therefore, our first step is to separate and collect on one side evidence erroneously admitted (“tainted”), and on the other that remaining evidence presented by the prosecution. Our next step is to examine the character and quality of the “tainted” evidence as it relates to the other, not for relative volume but its effect on the “untainted” evidence.10 We also look to its effect on conduct of the defense and to any other adverse ramifications. That done, we then make “an intelligent judgment about whether the erroneous admission of [“tainted” evidence] might have affected [an average rational] jury.” Satterwhite v. Texas, supra, 486 U.S. at 258, 108 S.Ct. at 1798, 100 L.Ed.2d at 295. Compare Van Arsdall, supra.
In the instant cause our ultimate concern is with “tainted” evidence of two extraneous offenses. That kind of evidence is “inherently prejudicial, tends to confuse the issues in the case, and forces the accused to defend himself against charges which he had not been notified would be *595brought against him.” Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, at 100 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Over related objections from appellant, the trial court admitted that evidence apparently on a theory that they are “res gestae” of the primary offense, and thus the trial court did not give any restrictive instruction limiting consideration of them by the jury-
Furthermore, the principal prosecution witness was Valerie Rencher, fifteen year old girlfriend of Curtis Harris, appellant’s brother, whose testimony and attitude were scrutinized by this Court in Harris v. State, 645 S.W.2d 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). There we examined in detail the testimony of Rencher and other evidence, including “a ‘deal’ with the State that in exchange for her testimony the State would recommend she receive no more than a ten year sentence if she were tried as an adult,” to find that “the trial court erred in failing to submit to the jury the question of whether Rencher was an accomplice witness.” Id., at 454-458. Substantially the same testimony and evidence, including documentary formalization of that “deal,” were introduced to the jury in the instant cause. Accordingly, the trial court gave the jury the usual instructions for determining whether Rencher was an accomplice witness and, if so, for considering her testimony. Since her testimony “formed virtually the State’s entire case against appellant,” id., at 457, her status as an accomplice witness was a central issue at trial.11
Essentially the theory of the prosecution was that appellant was criminally responsible as a conspirator and that Rencher was not an accomplice, but if the jury believed she was then her testimony had been corroborated.12 Thus another issue was raised. Let us review testimony describing the two extraneous offenses and attendant circumstances in juxtaposition with related evidence, principally testimony from Rencher, and prosecution argument linking circumstances of the extraneous offenses to guilt of appellant.
As to the extraneous offense first in time, Sally Looper testified that on December 11, 1978, around seven o’clock in the evening, she watched James Manuel, nicknamed “Dirty Red,” who she knew as a former schoolmate, together with a black man, who she did not know or otherwise identify, walk in front of her car, cross a street, approach a convenience store, get in a Ford Torino belonging to a male neighbor of hers who was then inside a telephone booth; the motor of the Torino was already running, and without contacting him “they just took off in the car.” She identified State’s Exhibit 20 as a photograph of the “yellow orange car.” Looper reported the incident to the police and received a five hundred dollar reward for her information.13
*596After preliminary felicitous remarks, an assistant district attorney told the jury that he would “just briefly go over a few key pieces of evidence and I ask the jury to keep in mind these things[.] [L]et me touch on some of what I consider to be elements of this case.” He began immediately with the testimony of Sally Looper, ante, at 595, including, viz:
“... There was another black male with Dirty Red and she doesn’t know who it was, she didn’t get good look at him.... But I submit to you that this is a very critical piece of evidence because Sally Looper puts Dirty Red, James Manuel with that Ford Torino.”
That and other “key pieces of evidence” identified, he argued, were corroborative of some related particular in Rencher’s testimony. In closing argument for the State the district attorney rejected the notion advanced by counsel for appellant that Loop-er was lying because she got five hundred dollars, emphasizing her clear identification of James “Dirty Red” Manuel.14
Concerning the second extraneous offense, Barbara Gilmore King testified that she was alone working at a U-Totem store in Waller when three black men came in “a little after eleven o’clock” on the night of December 11, 1978; in court, one male she identified from a photograph as Manuel was carrying a shotgun that appeared to be the same shown in a photograph of the shotgun belonging to deceased, and another male she testified she “believed” to be appellant. Two of them approached the checkout counter, one stood across the counter, another moved behind the counter next to her; appellant remained by the front door. They left in a few minutes.15
First assistant district attorney recalled that King “put James Manuel in that U-Totem, with two other black males. And points to this defendant in the courtroom and says that looks like him.” Rhetorically, he added:
“... I don’t think there is any doubt in your mind that those three black males were together that night. Curtis Harris, Danny Harris and James Manuel.”
In response to the argument of counsel for appellant that King said “she could not identify Danny Harris as being in there, but they’re wanting you to say we’ve got this woman that says Danny Harris was there,” the district attorney conceded King said, “I can’t be sure, can’t be positive ... [b]ut I think he’s the one, his eyes are the same. Words to that effect. It was James *597Manuel who she was sure of and there was a third black male down there, but you didn’t hear her say there was a black female in there ... no, just those three.” However, he added:
“... Valerie told you she stayed out in the truck, while they left that truck with the shotgun, they parked behind the U-Totem down there, about eleven o’clock that night, Barbara Gilmore says they were in there about eleven fifteen to eleven thirty. About the same time.”
Manifestly the prosecution valued highly the two extraneous offenses and circumstances surrounding them: the facts that the Ford Torino had been stolen by “Dirty Red” Manuel and appellant early in the evening and, after killing the deceased, that they and Curtis Harris ranged as far as Waller to commit aggravated robbery of King and return to Bryan later that night.
The facts attending the first extraneous offense were themselves “incriminating,” thereby “forging another link between the accused and the offense charged.” The second one as well forged more connecting links. Fahy, supra, at n. 5, ante.
We cannot determine from the general verdict whether the jury believed and found Rencher to be an accomplice, but having reviewed the evidence in this cause, in my judgment it is impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that evidence of two extraneous offenses bracketing the primary offense did not influence the jury in finding a verdict of guilty and in making affirmative answers to special issues, particularly number two. The majority opines at 38 that “probable impact” on the jury of erroneously admitted evidence was “minimal,” but if it served to “influence” the jury, those errors cannot be harmless.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. All emphasis here and throughout is mine unless otherwise noted.

. "... There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that *590the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. We, therefore, adhere to the meaning of our Fahy Case when we hold, as we now do, that before federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, at 1797, 100 L.Ed.2d 284, at 294 (1988); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); Sorrell v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 505, 169 S.W. 299, at 303 (1914); an example of the first kind is denial of proper request for jury shuffle pursuant to Article 35.11, V.A.C.C.P., e.g., Stark v. State, 657 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), of the latter, error in jury charge under Article 36.19. V.A.C.C.P., e.g., Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, at 171 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); see Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, at 537, 553 (Tex.Cr.App.1987, 1988).

. The majority looks for lessons in a general conspiracy case the Supreme Court deemed important "for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts,” namely, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, at 752, 66 S.Ct. 1239, at 1241, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).
Given a "variance in proof,” the question was whether the conviction was "prejudicial" to petitioners. Id., at 756, 66 S.Ct., at 1243. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), had held a similar variance is not fatal, based on an understanding of § 269 of the Judicial Code, providing that an appellate court render judgment "without regard to technical errors, defects or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Id., at 757, 66 S.Ct., at 1244. That section became 28 U.S.C. § 2111, and a shorter version also appears in Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 52(a).
Kotteakos is inapposite. It does not even purport to discuss testing constitutional error. Every statement alluded to and quoted in the majority opinion, at 585, 586-587, comes from that part of the decision finding Berger not controlling. Id., at 757-766, 66 S.Ct., at 1244-1248. None of it was utilized in Fahy v. Connecticut, see 375 U.S. at 86, 84 S.Ct., at 230, and the rule was used in Chapman v. California only to contrast "small errors or defects" unlikely to change result of trial. 386 U.S., at 22, 87 S.Ct. at 827, 17 L.Ed.2d., at 709.

.At first blush the underscored statements may seem to be at odds, but the caution is that sufficiency of evidence is not a relevant factor in an analysis to determine “the effect of this [forbidden] evidence upon the other evidence adduced at trial and upon the conduct of the defense” (and concomitantly its influence on the factfinder). Id., at 87, 84 S.Ct. at 231.
Thus in making its review, and finding admission of the illegally obtained evidence in this particular case was clearly prejudicial, Supreme Court noted that the erroneously admitted tangible evidence was "itself incriminating," that it bolstered certain incriminating testimony of an investigating peace officer as to presence of *591defendant near the crime scene and finding similar tangible evidence in his possession, making the testimony "far more damaging than it otherwise would have been.” Id., at 88-89, 84 S.Ct., at 231. Moreover, the tangible evidence based an opinion of yet another peace officer matching it with manifestations of the offense, thereby "forging another link between the accused and the crime charged,” the prejudicial effect being obvious. Id., at 89, 84 S.Ct., at 231. Also, accused was precluded by trial court from pursuing a challenge of admissibility of certain admissions and a later confession made by him following his arrest because of the state of exclusionary rule at the time, but "he should have had a chance to show his admissions were induced by being confronted with the illegally obtained evidence.” Id., at 91, 84 S.Ct., at 232. Finally, the Supreme Court considered “the cumulative effect of this evidence upon the conduct of the defense at trial,” in that he was moved to take the stand, admit the acts, and then contend those acts were not condemned by the statute. Ibid.

. Fast on the heels of Chapman v. California came several similar brief decisions involving claims of erroneous admission of evidence or comment on failure to testify which without additional edification either vacated or reversed the judgment below, viz: Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 88 S.Ct. 1133, 20 L.Ed.2d 81 (1968); Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 88 S.Ct. 1229, 20 L.Ed.2d 154 (1968); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); see also Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616, 88 S.Ct. 2258, 20 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1968) (Justice Marshall dissenting).
Others dealt with jury instructions, e.g., Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 *592L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), and Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). See also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), and Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). While adhering to the Chapman standard, in cases of this kind the Supreme Court conducts an analysis without regard to the erroneous instruction on an element to determine whether the jury was precluded from considering that element and the facts necessarily found by the jury establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Pope v. Illinois, supra, at 502-503, 107 S.Ct., at 1922, 95 L.Ed.2d, at 447.

. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (denial of rights under Confrontation Clause of Sixth Amendment made applicable to states through Due Process Clause of Fourteenth by Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)).

. Schneble v. Florida, supra, like Harrington, is a Bruton violation, and at 430-432, 92 S.Ct., at 1059-1060, for the majority (Chief) Justice Rehnquist closely tracks the analysis previously made by Justice Douglas in Harrington. Three months later and also following Harrington, in Milton v. Wainwright, supra, Chief Justice Burger, obviously distressed by yet another collateral attack on a fourteen year old conviction, gave Milton such short shrift that Justice Stewart and three others protested his turning the back of the Supreme Court on a forty year old landmark constitutional precedent "(u]nder the guise of finding ‘harmless error.’ ” Id., at 378, 92 S.Ct., at 2178, 33 L.Ed.2d, at 7.

. Earlier the Court had agreed that "the Sixth Amendment notice requirement set out in Estelle v. Smith was not met[,]” id., at 254, 108 S.Ct., at 1796, 100 L.Ed.2d, at 292-293; Justice Marshall directly noted effects such violation could have "upon the conduct of the defense," Fahy, ibid, and was convinced that allowing the testimony "may never be considered harmless *594error,” Satterwhite, at 263-264, 108 S.Ct., at 1801-1802, 100 L.Ed.2d, at 299-300.

. In conducting this examination, while we can assume that the latter is sufficient to sustain the verdict, nevertheless it may have some inherent weakness — for example, testimony from an immunized or accomplice witness — that in fairness should be taken into consideration.

. “Testimony of an accomplice witness is untrustworthy and should be received and viewed with caution." Eckert v. State, 623 S.W.2d 359, at 361 (1981). "Because such a witness is usually deemed to be corrupt, his testimony is always looked upon with suspicion." Holladay v. State, 709 S.W.2d 194, at 196 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).

. Rencher raised a pivotal question on conspiracy by her testimony that before the victim was attacked, she heard appellant whisper to his brother, ‘“We’re going to drive this man,’ or something to that effect.” (76 S.F. 98). She put it in a larger context viz:
"Appellant and Manuel came out from behind the car and approached Rencher and Curtis Harris, appellant in the lead. Manuel, stopping near the car’s left door, said to appellant, 'Man, my arm is still out of place.’ Appellant walked up to Curtis Harris and Rencher. With Rencher standing between the two of them appellant whispered, “We’re going to drive this man.' (sic).”
Harris v. State, supra, at 455. Intendment or precise meaning of that latter remark was the subject of speculation during trial (77 S.F. 175-177) (Rencher did not know what that meant at the time — "he didn’t give any indication that he wanted his brother to hurt that man” that she knew — and was "only guessing that [she knows] what that meant now”), and in argument (82 S.F. 93), and is still being interpreted in briefs of the parties.
That after the first lick Rencher was “getting ready to ... get in the truck” (76 S.F. 103) when she told Curtis Harris not to hit the victim any more suggests that she took the remark in a vernacular familiar to her to mean, "We’re going to drive this [pickup truck], man.”

.On the evening of December 11, 1978 at approximately 7:00 p.m., appellant and Manuel arrived at the Harris residence in a "gold” Ford Torino being driven by appellant. Among others present was Rencher; testifying as an alleged accomplice witness, she identified the *596Ford Torino as the vehicle pictured in State’s Exhibit 20. Rencher recounted the illfated odyssey appellant, James Manuel, Curtis Harris and she then began in the Ford Torino, moved to the killing on Sandy Point Road, continued in the GMC pickup of deceased to Waller and back to Bryan where it ended for her and Curtis Harris at the Harris house. See Harris v. State, supra, at 454-456, a "comprehensive factual recitation” adopted by the majority in its opinion at 572.
Brazos County Sheriff Bobby Yeager investigated the primary offense and at the scene inspected the damaged "mustard colored Ford To-rino" portrayed in State's Exhibit 20.

. Given the facts that Looper could not say whether Manuel or the black male got behind the wheel and drove the Ford Torino away, and that when it arrived shortly thereafter at the Harris residence appellant was driving, the jury could reasonably infer that appellant was the party who actually acquired and exercised control over the Torino.

. Although the trial court excluded testimony of Looper that she was robbed, Rencher had already told the jury that as they were preparing to leave the scene of the primary offense in the GMC pickup, Manuel had acquired the wallet of deceased and when he got in the pickup he said, "[T]his man had keys [sic, probably "kids”], but he’s broke.” While appellant was driving away Manuel declared that “we needed some money;” on the floorboard was a gun case from which Manuel removed a shotgun. After they went to the Harris house where appellant and Curtis Harris changed clothes, the quartet headed toward Houston. Along about Navasota Manuel tossed out drivers license of deceased and other items later recovered. When they got to Waller appellant drove the pickup about a block off the highway and pulled up behind the convenience store; leaving the motor running, they left the pickup with the shotgun and entered the store. In about five minutes they returned to the pickup, and appellant drove to the highway, turned toward Bryan and fled away at speeds of “maybe ninety" miles per hour.
Back in Bryan, near the Harris house appellant stopped the pickup in some woods and “they started throwing away a lot of stuff they had got and they split up the money.” Rencher received an unspecified amount.