Court Opinion

ID: 9713014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:05:05.405964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.770116
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION.
Faulconer, J.
I would sustain appellee’s motion to dismiss or affirm on the ground that the transcript and assignment of errors was not filed in this court within 90 days of the entry of summary judgment. I am of the opinion that the granting of a summary judgment as authorized by Acts 1965, ch. 90, § 1, p. 126, § 2-2524, Burns’ 1966 Cum. Supp., is not a trial and, therefore, the filing of a motion for new trial is a nullity and does not extend the time for appeal.
*486Although this is a new question in this State, there is a statute and several decisions of our Supreme Court defining “trial.”
“The trial is a judicial examination of the issues, whether of law or of fact, in an action.” Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, § 371, p. 240, § 2-1901, Burns’ 1946, Repl. State ex rel. Talkington v. Hoffman, Judge (1947), 225 Ind. 475, 477, 76 N. E. 2d 252.
In holding that the ruling on a motion for a new trial in a criminal case is not a part of the trial of an accused, our Supreme Court in Joseph, Pierce v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 529, at page 540, 141 N. E. 2d 109, 114, defined a trial as “[t]he examination before a competent tribunal, according to the laws of the land, of the facts put in issue in a cause, for the purpose of determining such issue,” quoting from Bush v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 467, 473, 128 N. E. 443.
“A trial is an investigation under the direction and control of the state for the purpose of discovering the truth and establishing the facts upon which the sentence of the law may be pronounced.” Wyatt v. State of Indiana (1956), 235 Ind. 300, 303, 133 N. E. 2d 471, quoting from Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Collins (1924), 82 Ind. App. 41, 54, 142 N. E. 634.
Although one would believe at first blush that the above definitions would cover almost every conceivable action taken in a case, the decisions of our Supreme and Appellate Courts have not so held.
It has been decided in Indiana that there was no trial where judgment was rendered on default; State ex rel. Hobbs v. Claycombe, Judge, etc. et al. (1954), 233 Ind. 247, 249, 118 N. E. 2d 489; State ex rel. Lawson v. Stodola (1949), 226 Ind. 631, 632, 82 N. E. 2d 896; Fisk v. Baker (1874), 47 Ind. 534, 537; where judgment entered upon failure to plead over after .court sustains a demurrer; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis (1930), 202 Ind. 85, 89, 172 N. E. 309; Schneidt v. Schneidt (1919), 69 Ind. App. 666, 667, 122 *487N. E. 588; where there is a dismissal of the cause, Meier, etc. v. Soc. Sec. Adm. et al. (1958), 237 Ind. 421, 422, 146 N. E. 2d 239; and other situations not pertinent to the issue here.
The practice seems to be to accept the introduction of evidence as the beginning of a trial by the court. 22 I. L. E., Neio Trial, § 101, p. 77.
Since we have no decision on this issue in Indiana a review of other jurisdictions which have considered it, although not binding upon us, may prove helpful.
My research reveals that of those States which have decisions on this issue the majority have held that summary judgment is not a trial. Otteman v. Interstate Fire and Casualty Company (1960), 171 Neb. 148, 105 N. W. 2d 583; Counne v. Saffan (1956), Fla., 87 So. 2d 586; Healy v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. (1954), 158 Neb. 151, 62 N. W. 2d 543; Weisberg v. Perl (1954), Fla., 73 So. 2d 56, (Weisberg case overruled on issue not relevant here in Floyd v. State (1962), Fla., 139 So. 2d 873.) Collins v. Toombs (1946), 271 App. Div. 160, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 545; Wrobel v. Call et al. (1932), 142 Misc. Rep. 610, 255 N. Y. S. 258.
The only federal court decisions on point which have come to my attention also hold that summary judgment is not a trial. Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 8th Cir (1946), 157 F. 2d 582; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Goldstein, (E. D. N. Y. 1942), 43 F. Supp. 767.
These cases reason that the proceedings on summary judgment are for the determination of whether or not there is a genuine issue to be tried and that while summary judgment may dispose of all of the issues in the action the proceedings upon which it is based cannot be regarded as a trial, nor are the issues tried.
In jurisdictions which have considered this question only Nebraska appears to also have a statutory definition of a “trial.” Indeed, the Indiana and Nebraska statutes defining a, *488“trial” contain identical words.1 It also appears that the pertinent part of both summary judgment statutes are identical.
In this regard the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Otteman v. Interstate Fire and Casualty Company, supra, (1960), 171 Neb. 148, 105 N. W. 2d 583, at page 587, stated:
“Subsection 25-1333, R.R.S. 1943, contains language from which it appears that the Legislature in the enactment of the summary judgment act attempted to and at least inferentially did distinguish the summary judgment process from a trial. This section is as follows:
“ Tf on motion under sections 25-1330 to 25-1336 judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.’
“It is observable that the section twice by inference indicates that the portion of the action which may be disposed of by summary action is not done so by a trial and twice declares specifically that the portion which may not be so disposed of must be submitted at a trial.
“In the light of this the conclusion reached is that an exercise of the process prescribed by the summary judgment act is not a trial within the meaning of that term and a judgment in favor of a movant is not one rendered as the result of a trial.”
From a review of those decisions of our Supreme and Appellate Courts wherein they have determined what proceedings constituted a “trial” within the definition contained in our *489statute, I am of the opinion that we can, and should, adopt the conclusion reached by the majority of jurisdictions, that proceedings for summary judgment are not a “trial.”
Note. — Reported in 229 N. E. 2d 828.

. See: Section 25-1103, Revised Statutes of Nebraska (1943), (1964 Reissue.)