Court Opinion

ID: 9725694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:01:00.661191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:18.296941
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court properly allowed Cave to testify as to what Dr. Saquib told her about the diagnostic tests and the cause of her pain. However, I part ways with the determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Cave's motion to strike Dr. Kern's videotaped testimony regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the passive treatment and nerve conduction study that Dr. Saquib ordered.
To recover damages for medical expenses, the plaintiff must prove that the expenses were both reasonable and necessary. Burge v. Teter, 808 N.E.2d 124, 132 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). This burden has been traditionally met through the admission of expert testimony. Id. As set forth in Indiana Evidence Rule 413:
Statements of charges for medical, hospital or other health care expenses for diagnosis or treatment occasioned by an injury are admissible into evidence. Such statements shall constitute prima facie evidence that the charges are reasonable.
In essence, the above rule provides a simpler method of proving the medical expenses when there is no substantial issue that they are reasonable and caused by the tort. Burge, 808 N.E.2d at 132. However, this court has also determined that if there is a dispute, the party opposing the medical expenses may offer evidence to the contrary, including expert opinion. Id.
In this case, Dr. Kern testified during his deposition that the passive care Cave received-including traction, manipulation, and heat and ice therapy-was not reasonable or medically necessary beyond four weeks after the accident because Cave's MRI seans of the low neck and back were normal. Appellant's App. p. 68-69, 73-74, 76. Additionally, Dr. Kern did not state that he did not believe in the treatment in question or that the treatments themselves were inappropriate or ineffective, and he did not criticize chiropractic care in general. In fact, Dr. Kern made it clear that passive care is not inappropriate in and of itself, opining that after four to six weeks after the injury, such care would be redundant. Id. at 81-82. Dr. Kern testified that there was no documentation in the records that nerve conduction studies were indicated because Cave had no weakness, loss of reflex, or severe sensation changes and because nerve conduction tests are not valuable for diagnosing. Appellant's App. p. 67-68. Indeed, Dr. Kern was rendering his opinion, based upon his review of Cave's records and his own experience practicing medicine, that passive treatment given more than a month after an accident was not helpful.
*1164It is apparent that Sibbing-through Dr. Kern's export testimony-was seeking an opportunity to lay a foundation for his argument that some of Cave's treatment was not reasonable or necessary. In other words, the evidence sought to challenge the particular course of treatment chosen by Cave's medical care providers to treat the injuries that resulted from Sibbing's negligence. Thus, contrary to the majority's view, I do not believe that this court's holding in Whitaker v. Kruse, 495 N.E.2d 223 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), precludes a defendant from calling an expert witness to render an opinion as to whether all of a plaintiff's treatment was reasonable or necessary under the cireumstances.
Finally, I would note that because the trial court granted Cave's motion to strike Dr. Kern's testimony, Sibbing was effectively precluded from challenging the reasonableness and necessity of some of Cave's treatment. Moreover, because Sib-bing is not arguing that Cave's medical care providers in any way aggravated her injuries, I cannot agree with the majority's proposition that the admission of Dr. Kern's testimony would place Cave " 'in the unenviable position of second-guessing his physicians in order to determine whether the doctor properly diagnosed the injury and chose the correct treatment." Op. at 1161 (quoting Whitaker, 495 N.E.2d at 226).
In short, I do not believe that Evidence Rule 413 precluded the admission of Dr. Kern's opinion testimony that Cave's physical findings did not warrant the passive treatment and nerve conduction study that Dr. Saquib had ordered. For these reasons, I believe that the trial court erred in granting Cave's motion to strike.