Court Opinion

ID: 4058734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 09:16:58.26411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:20.954156
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                    01-15-00250-CR
                                                                         FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                 HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                              6/30/2015 11:11:29 PM
                                                                              CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                             CLERK

                              NO. 01-15-00250-CR
                                                                  FILED IN
                                                           1st COURT OF APPEALS
______________________________________________________________________________
                                                               HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                           6/30/2015 11:11:29 PM
                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS          CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                                    Clerk

                 FOR THE FIRST SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

                           OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

          _________________________________________________________

                       EX PARTE JULIO GIALITO ARUIZU

          _________________________________________________________

                           BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

______________________________________________________________________________
                                 ____________

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

                                                   Lance Nguyen
                                                   State Bar No. 24010266
                                                   3303 Main Street, #303
                                                   Houston, TX 77002
                                                   Lancehac2@gmail.com
                                                   Tel: (281)650-0702;
                                                        (281) 999-5111
                                                   Fax: (281) 786-3379
                                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
                        IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

         Pursuant to the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, Appellant herewith
states that the corrected names of Appellee and her counsel to this appeal are:

NAME OF PARTY:                                        NAME AND ADDRESS OF COUNSEL:
Julio Gialito Aruizu, Appellant                       1. Lance Nguyen
                                                         State Bar No. 24010266
                                                         3303 Main Street, #303
                                                         Houston, TX 77002
                                                         Lancehac2@gmail.com
                                                         Tel: (281) 650-0702;
                                                              (281) 999-5111
                                                         Fax: (281) 786-3379

The State of Texas, Appellee                          1. Devon Anderson
                                                         Harris County District Attorney
                                                         1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
                                                         Houston, TX 77002
                                                         Tel: (713) 755-5846

                                   RECORD REFERENCES

For purposes of convenience, citations to the appellate record will be in this form:

       1. Citations to the Reporter’s Record, volume, page number, and line, respectively:

“R.R.(volume), p. ____, ln. ____.”

       2. Citations to the Clerk’s Record and page number, respectively: “C.R. p. ____.”

       3. Citations to the Exhibit number and page, respectively: “Exh.# ____, p. ____.”

                                                 ii
                                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

NAMES OF PARTIES ……………………….……………………………….....…........… ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ………………....……………………………………………....... iii-iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ………....…………………………………………………......v-vi

          Cases …………………………………………………………………......................v-vi

          Statutes ………...............……………………………………..…….…………........ vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE …………………………………………………………..... 2

ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF FACT …………………………………………………………………. 2-3

STANDARD OF REVIEW ……………………………………………………………….. 3-4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ….……………………….……………………………...... 4-5

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ...............…................................................................ 5-15

Actual Innocence claim(s):

I.        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S APPLICATION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT IS INNOCENT.

          A.        Appellant's Herrera-type claim of innocence is supported by the record.
          B.        Alternatively, Appellant's Schlup-type claim of innocence is supported by the

record coupled with trial counsel’s deficient performance.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:

II.       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S APPLICATION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS EVEN THOUGH TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

                                                                 iii
         A.        Trial counsel’s representation was deficient because he completely abdicated his

duty to investigate the case, did not assert any available defenses, and rendered incompetent

advice to Appellant; and

         B.        Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Applicant because it is

“reasonably probable” that Applicant would have decided to go to trial instead of pleading

"Guilty."

PRAYER ………....................……………………………………….....…......................... 15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................ 16

                                                             iv
                                           INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

                                                           Cases

U.S. Supreme Court Case:

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 314 (1995) ...................................................................... 4, 7, 8,

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) ................................................................ 4

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) ......................................................... 10

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ..................................................... 9, 13

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ....................................................... 8, 9

Federal Court of Appeals:

Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985) ........................................ 11

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Cases:

Ex parte Scott, 190 S.W.3d 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) ...................................... 3, 5, 9

Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) ........................... 5

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) ........................... 9

Kober v. State, 988 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) .............................. 13

Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) ......................... 13

Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) ........................ 3, 5, 7

McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 501 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) ...................... 10

State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) .

                                                                           ..................... 5

Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 77-771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ..................... 9

                                                              v
Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) ..................... 9

Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) ................................ 12

Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) ...................... 11

Ex Parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ................................ 9

Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) ....................... 9

Butler v. State, 716 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) ............................... 10, 12

Ex parte Dunham, 650 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ...................... 10

Ex parte Ybarra, 629 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) ................................. 11, 12

Passmore v. State, 617 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) ...................... 9

Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 514-15 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) ..................... 8, 10

Ex parte Burns, 601 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) .................................. 13

Texas Court of Appeals Cases:

Salazar v. State, 361 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2011, no pet. h.) .....… 4, 13, 14

Ex parte Romero, 351 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet. h.) ........... 4

Menefee v. State, 175 S.W.3d 500 (Tex.App. – Beaumont 2005, no pet. h.) ..... 10

Ex Parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) .......................... 5, 6, 7

Melancon v. State, 66 S.W.3d 375 (Tex.App. – Houston [14 Dist.] 2000) ..... 11

Ramirez v. State, 987 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App. — Austin 1999) ............... 10

                                           Statutes and Rules

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §12.21, §22.01 (a)(1), (b) (Vernon 2010) …..… 14

                                                     vi
                                    NO. 01-15-00250-CR

______________________________________________________________________________

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                     FOR THE FIRST SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

                                 OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

            _________________________________________________________

                           EX PARTE JULIO GIALITO ARUIZU

            _________________________________________________________

                  ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT

                        AT LAW NO. 7, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

                            TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 1943590

            _________________________________________________________

                                 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

                                 JULIO GIALITO ARUIZU

            _________________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW, Appellant, Julio Gialito Aruizu, Applicant (for habeas corpus relief) in the trial
court and respectively submits his brief in this appeal.
                                 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

       On February 03, 2015, the trial court – County Criminal Court at Law #7 – held a hearing

on Appellant’s Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Appellant’s request for habeas relief was

based on 1. actual innocence claims (Herrera-type and Schlup-type) and 2. ineffective assistance

of counsel. The trial court took evidence by Affidavits and exhibits. Appellant’s three

Affidavits previously filed with the trial court were judicially noticed. The State's Exhibits #A-

F, attached to its filed pleading was admitted into evidence. The trial court denied the

application for habeas corpus relief immediately after the hearing. Appellant timely appealed

that ruling and any related Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

                                     ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s Application for Writ of Habeas

Corpus when the record supports Appellant's actually innocence under either a Herrera-type and

Schlup-type claim?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s Application for Writ of Habeas

Corpus when the record demonstrates that trial counsel performed below the reasonable standard

of care and Appellant was thereby prejudiced, by pleading guilty and foregoing a jury trial?

                                    STATEMENT OF FACT

       On or about May 04, 2002, Appellant was arrested by local police. State's EXH. A. The

charged offense was for assault - family member. Id.

       Appellant retained Manuel Barrera as trial counsel. Id.. On July 17, 2002, Appellant

pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 days Harris County Jail, 2 days credit. Id.

                                                2
       Appellant hired the undersigned counsel on or about February 18, 2014, to investigate the

factual events and case representation related to May 2004 (sic). C.R. p. 41. The writ was

subsequently filed after the undersigned counsel's investigation into the 2002 case.

       On June 25, 2014, the trial court ordered previous trial counsel to file responses to an

Order Designating Issues and Filing Affidavit. State's EXH. F. Previous trial counsel did not

file a responsive Affidavit until September 09, 2014. State's EXH. B. A subpoena was issued

and served on previous trial counsel to appear on September 10, 2014. State's EXH. E.

       On February 03, 2015, the trial court conducted its hearing on this writ. The trial court

summarily denied the writ.

       This appeal followed.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       The Applicant for a writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel must

show that there is a "reasonable probability," one sufficient to undermine confidence in the

result, that the outcome would have been difference but for his trial counsel's deficient

performance. Ex parte Scott, 190 S.W.3d 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).

       A Herrera-type actual innocence claim must be supported by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted the applicant in light of the new

evidence. Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).

       On the other hand, in a Schlup-type actual innocence claim is a procedural-type claim

where an applicant must prove that, in light of newly discovered evidence, the constitutional

error (e.g., trial counsel's deficient performance) "probably" resulted in a conviction of one who

was actually innocent. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209. (parenthetical added)

                                                3
        In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a habeas corpus application, the record evidence is

reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and that ruling must be upheld

absent an abuse of discretion. The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference

to any guiding rules or principles, or in other words, whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or

unreasonably. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside of the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Id.; See also, e.g., Ex parte Romero, 351 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2011, no pet. h.); Salazar v. State, 361 S.W.3d 99, 102(Tex. App. - Eastland 2011,

no pet. h.).

                                 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Order denying habeas corpus relief.

        A trial judge has discretion in ruling whether to grant an application for habeas corpus

relief. However, the record of the habeas hearing demonstrates that Appellant had presented

sufficient proof for habeas relief pursuant to Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 314 (1995) and Herrera

v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). In particular, the combined Affidavits of Juana Maria Lerma

(the Complainant in the trial court), Edgar Lerma (eye witness), and Julio Gialito Aruizu

(Applicant) are direct, clear, and corroborative of the facts and events forming the basis for the

underlying criminal offense. See, generally, C.R. p. 29-42 (Affidavits). The overall effect of the

three affidavits demonstrates Applicant's actual innocence of the charged crime.

        Additionally, previous trial counsel rendered deficient performance in representing

Applicant as follows: trial counsel did not investigate any aspect of the case, did not attempt to

contact or interview the Complainant and eye witness to the facts and alleged criminal event, did

not formulate or discuss any defense theories or alternatives to Applicant; in sum, the record

shows that the only affirmative act of trial counsel was to advise Applicant that "[Applicant] had

                                                  4
a good job, it was a good judge, and if [Applicant] wanted to defend the case or go to trial that

[Applicant] would be in court many times, and that [Applicant's] boss would probably get mad

and fire [Applicant]." Id. at 40. Based on the foregoing shortcomings and misguided advice of

trial counsel, Applicant pleaded "Guilty" to the charged offense.

                                           ARGUMENT

Actual Innocence claim(s):

I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S APPLICATION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT IS INNOCENT.

       Claims of actual innocence are cognizable on habeas relief. Ex parte Elizondo, 947
S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 885
S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Claims of actual innocence are categorized as Herrera-type

or Schlup-type claims. Ex parte Scott, 190 S.W.3d 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Ex parte

Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314

(1995)).

       These two types of actual innocence claims may be raised in a collateral attack on a

conviction. Ex Parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). A bare innocence

claim, or Herrera-type claim, "involves a substantive claim in which applicant asserts his bare

claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence." Ex parte Franklin, at 675

(Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d
808 (1995); Elizondo, at 208). The other actual innocence claim, a Schlup-type claim, "is a

procedural claim in which applicant's claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but

is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial." Ibid. (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314, 115
S. Ct. 851) (emphasis added).

                                                  5
A.     Appellant's Herrera-type claim of innocence is supported by the record.

       A Herrera-type claim is a free-standing, bare (actual) innocence claim. Ex Parte Tuley,

109 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). This type of claim "involves a substantive claim in

which (the) Applicant assert his bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered

evidence." Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 208. Relief based on this "newly discovered evidence" is

established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 209 . That is, no reasonable juror would

have convicted the Applicant in light of the new evidence. Id. To determine whether a habeas

Applicant has reached this level of proof, the convicting court weights the evidence of

Applicant's guilt against the new evidence of innocence. Id. at 207.

       In this case, Applicant presented the Affidavits of the Juana Maria Lerma (the

Complainant in the trial court) and Edgar Lerma (eye witness), as well as him own Affidavit of

facts. See, generally, C.R. p. 29-42. Although most of the facts contained in the Affidavits are

important and support Applicant's claim of actual innocence, recitation of those facts in their

entirety would be impractical. The most important facts from the three Affidavits are as follows:

Juana Lerma admitted that this is the first time she has told another person (in 2014) that she lied

about her report to the police in 2002, that Juana Lerma was mad at Applicant because another

woman had called the house telephone, that Applicant never assaulted or hurt her, that the

eyewitness Edgar Lerma could hear and see the events unfold between Juana Lerma and

Applicant, that Edgar Lerma heard only Juana Lerma yell at Applicant, that Edgar Lerma did not

see or hear any assault take place in 2002. Applicant's Affidavit, although arguably can be

biased, is credible when read and understood within the entire context of the Affidavits of Juana

Lerma and Edgar Lerma.

                                                 6
       Taken as a whole, the three Affidavits are clear, direct, corroborative, and credible new

evidence that Applicant did not assault Juana Lerma. See, generally, Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at

207-09; See also, Ex Parte Tuley,109 S.W.3d 388 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (citing Elizondo).

B.     Alternatively, Appellant's Schlup-type claim of innocence is supported by the record

coupled with trial counsel’s deficient performance.

       An applicant is also entitled to relief if his claim of actual innocence is coupled with

another claim of constitutional trial error, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or suppression

of exculpatory evidence. An applicant has less of a burden of proof, namely the establishment of

“sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his [conviction] would be a

miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298 (1995); 30 L. Ed. 2d at 828-829. If the habeas court is convinced that new facts exist

raising doubt about the defendant’s guilt, which are sufficient “to undermine confidence in the

result of the trial without the assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional error, [the

defendant’s] threshold showing of innocence would justify a review of the merits of the

constitutional claims.” Id. at 829. Texas has adopted this standard for Schlup-type claims. E.g.,

Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The actual innocence claim in

Schlup v. Delo did not by itself provide a basis for relief. Rather, “his claim depend[ed]

critically on the validity of his Strickland (and Brady claims).” Schlup, supra, 130 L.Ed.2d at

828. (Parenthetical brackets added). This sort of actual innocence claim “is ‘not itself a

constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have

his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.’” Id., quoting Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).

                                                  7
       If there were no question about the fairness of the criminal trial, a Herrera-type claim

would have to fail unless the federal habeas court is itself convinced that those new facts

unquestionably establishes innocence. On the other hand, if the habeas court were merely

convinced that those new facts raised sufficient doubt of guilt to undermine confidence in the

result of the trial without the assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional error, a

threshold showing of innocence would justify a review of the merits of the constitutional claims.

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-17.

       In sum, a Schlup-type claim requires a lesser burden of proof than a Herrera-type claim.

A Schlup-type claim is, in essence, a Herrera-type claim coupled with an independent trial-

counsel deficient performance claim, without the required showing of prejudice.

       [The discussion of newly discovered evidence and actual innocence contained in Part

I(A) is incorporated as if fully set for herein. Coupled with the ineffective assistance claim

contained in Part II(A), infra, Applicant submits his Schup-type claim].

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:

II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S APPLICATION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS EVEN THOUGH TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

       Effective assistance of counsel is essential to a fair trial. United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648 (1984). An accused’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is derived from four

sources: the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the “right

to be heard” provision of Article I, §10 of the Texas Constitution, and the Due Course of Law

provision of Article I, §19 of the Texas Constitution. See, Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507,

514-15 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980).

                                                  8
         In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the US Supreme Court set out the

standard for determining when a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel. The

Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for determining whether counsel is ineffective: (1)

counsel committed an error or omission not justifiable as reasonable trial strategy; and (2) the

error prejudiced the defendant. Id.; Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App.

1986) (adopting Strickland’s two-prong test). In order to show that counsel was ineffective, an

Applicant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and also that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 672. Specifically, an Applicant must show that

there is a "reasonable probability," one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that

the outcome would have been different but for his trial counsel's deficient performance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Ex parte Scott, 190 S.W.3d 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006);

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).

         The effectiveness of trial counsel’s assistance is gauged by the totality of his

representation. See e.g., Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Ex

Parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Passmore v. State, 617 S.W.2d 682,

686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s

conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.” Cronic. 466 U.S. at

698 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). To establish ineffectiveness,

counsel’s representation must be shown to have fallen below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, supra; Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 77-771 (Tex.Crim.App.

1994).

         An applicant must also overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct "might be

considered sound trial strategy." Murray v. Carrier, supra. However, there are some

                                                   9
omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on the basis of, reasonable

trial strategy. Ramirez v. State, 987 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App. — Austin 1999); Menefee v.

State, 175 S.W.3d 500 (Tex.App. – Beaumont 2005, no pet. h.)(there can be no reasonable trial

strategy for allowing client to plead “true” to an “untrue” enhancement). “[A]bdication of a

basic threshold responsibility . . . is the antithesis of a considered strategy.” Ex parte

Dunham, 650 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) (emphasis added). In some instances,

ineffectiveness can be shown “even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently

egregious and prejudicial.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added).

A.     Trial counsel’s representation was deficient because he completely abdicated his duty to
investigate the case, did not assert any available defenses, and rendered incompetent advice to
Appellant.
       1. Failure to Adequately Investigate Facts of the Case.

       Defense counsel has the responsibility to conduct a prompt investigation of the

circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of

guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the

possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. ‘The duty to investigate exists

regardless of the accused’s information or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or

his stated desire to plead guilty.’ . . . [R]egardless of complications in a given case, counsel is

charged with making an independent investigation of the facts of the case, . . . eschewing

wholesale reliance in the veracity of his client’s version of the facts[.] Ex parte Duffy, 607
S.W.2d 507, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); Butler v.

State, 716 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Trial counsel has a duty to make a reasonable

investigation into the facts of the case or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigation unnecessary. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 501 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).

                                                  10
This duty includes a responsibility to seek out and interview potential witnesses. Ex parte

Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). As the United States Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals has recognized, defense counsel must “at a minimum…interview potential witnesses

and . . . make an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Nealy v.

Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).

       “The obvious corollary to that rule is that once counsel has investigated the facts and

developed a defensive theory, counsel has the obligation to present sufficient available evidence

in support of that defensive theory.” Melancon v. State, 66 S.W.3d 375 (Tex.App. – Houston

[14 Dist.] 2000) (citing State v. Thomas, 768 S.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Tex.App. – Houston (14th

Dist.) 1989, no pet.). “An attorney has a professional duty to present all available testimony and

other evidence to support the defense of his client." Id.; See also, Ex parte Ybarra, 629 S.W.2d
943 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (ineffective for failing to conduct any investigation and prejudiced by

being ill-prepared for cross-examination or advancing a defense).

       Applicant's affidavit states that he informed trial counsel about the facts and

circumstances of the charged offense. C.R. p. 40. Applicant informed trial counsel about Juana

Lerma and Edgar Lerma being present at the crime scene. Trial counsel was never asked

Applicant about how counsel could contact either Juana Lerma or Edgar Lerma. Applicant lived

at home with both Juana Lerma and Edgar Lerma throughout the underlying criminal case - they

could have been easily located. Id.

       The Affidavits of Juana Lerma and Edgar Lerma state that no one from trial counsel's

office or anyone for the defense ever contacted or attempted to contact either one of them. C.R.

p. 29-30, 36.

                                                11
       As for trial counsel's so-called strategy regarding any factual investigation in the

underlying case, trial counsel's Affidavit response (State's EXH. B) to each question of the

court's Order Designating Issues (State's EXH. F) is, "I cannot (respond) because I do not have

any present recollection of the case because it has been so long ago, nor do I have defense file to

recall what attempts I made because I have since relocated my office and no longer know where

my 2002 file may be." States EXH. B. Appellate counsel would like to suggest that trial counsel

has no present recollection of the case and cannot recall any investigative attempts because there

is nothing to recall or remember in the first place.

       2. Failure to Assert an Available Defenses.

       The purpose of the constitutionally-imposed duty to investigate the facts of the case is to

determine whether a viable defense is available to the accused. Butler v. State, 716 S.W.2d 48,

54 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (lack of investigation “ineffective if not incompetent, where the result

is that any viable defense available to the accused is not advanced.”) (quoting Ex parte Lilly,

656 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983)); Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Crim.App.

1992) (court concluded “without hesitation” counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an

instruction on available defense of necessity); Ex parte Ybarra, 629 S.W.2d 943

(Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (ineffective for failing to conduct any investigation and prejudiced by

being ill-prepared for cross-examination or advancing a defense).

       Applicant's Affidavit states that trial counsel did not discuss any possible or potential

defenses or options with Applicant (except for Applicant to plead "Guilty"). C.R. p, 40. Trial

counsel did not discuss any trial strategies with Applicant. Id.

       3, Involuntary Plea due to Ineffective Assistance.

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       Guilty pleas entered as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel are involuntary. Ex

parte Burns, 601 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). The test for challenges to the

voluntariness of a plea based on ineffective assistance is “(1) whether counsel’s advice was

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and, if not, (2) whether

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [Defendant] would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530,

536 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); E.g., Kober v. State,

988 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).

       As has been discussed from II(A),(B) above, trial counsel did not discuss any legal

matters with Applicant. From the entirety of the appellate record, the only instance of trial

counsel's advice to Applicant was trial counsel's negative-reinforcement reasons on why

Applicant should plead "Guilty" - "[You have] a good job, it [is] a good judge, and if [you] want

to defend the case or go to trial that [you] would be in court many times, and [your] boss would

probably get mad and fire [you]." C.R. p. 40.

       "At that point, I thought that nothing could be done about the case, and I decided to plead

"Guilty." Id.

B.     Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Applicant because it is “reasonably

probable” that Applicant would have decided to go to trial instead of pleading "Guilty."

       To establish prejudice in the context of an involuntary guilty plea resulting from

ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for his counsel’s deficient representation (errors or omissions), he would not

have pleaded guilty but would have instead insisted on going to trial. E.g., Salazar v. State, 361

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S.W.3d 99, 102(Tex. App. - Eastland 2011, no pet. h.) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466.

U.S. 668, 698 (1984)).

       Because trial counsel did not investigate into any factual matters of this case nor discuss

any strategic trial matters with Applicant, Applicant was in no position to intelligently evaluate

any aspect of a potential jury trial. Instead, Applicant was completely ignorant of all trial

matters. In that position of ignorance, Applicant felt his case had only one possible option - for

him to plead "Guilty." On July 17, 2002, Applicant pleaded "Guilty" to Assault of Family

Member.

       Now, Appellant has an intelligent and informed understanding of his former case.

Appellant would have insisted on going to jury trial had former trial counsel adequately

performed his professional duties. C.R. p. 40-41.

       The risk factors to Appellant for insisting on going to jury trial were low. Appellant had

no adverse prior criminal history. Appellant had family ties in the community and a stable work

history.   The most severe criminal punishment Appellant would have faced from a guilty

verdict was one year in county jail and up to a $4,000 fine, or both. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§12.21, §22.01 (a)(1), (b) (Vernon 2010). Additionally, “[Appellant] would have been a good

candidate for deferred adjudication (or straight probation) if convicted at trial.” Cf., Salazar v.

State, 361 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2011, no pet. h.). (parenthetical added) (in

finding prejudice was shown, court pointed out that maximum punishment for underlying guilty

plea was 180 days to two years in a state jail facility and a fine up to $10,000 if convicted at trial;

family members lived in the United States; enjoyed legal resident status, even though only for a

short while, however, defendant had long presence in the United States.

                                                  14
       In contrast, Appellant gave up a chance for a jury trial and possible acquittal for a

"Guilty" plea; and, a chance for probation to versus fifteen (15) days confinement in jail.

Appellant now has a conviction with an affirmative finding of family violence. State's EXH. A

                                             PRAYER

       FOR THESE REASONS, Appellant requests this Court reverse the trial court’s judgment

order denying Appellant’s application for habeas corpus relief and render that the application is

granted, and a new trial granted. Alternatively, Appellant requests this Court reverse the trial

court and remand for the trial court to render a judgment consistent with this court’s opinion.

Appellant requests oral argument. Appellant prays for all other and further relief to which he

may be entitled.

                                                      Respectfully submitted,

                                                      _/s/Lance Nguyen_______________
                                                      Lance Nguyen
                                                      State Bar No. 24010266
                                                      3303 Main Street, #303
                                                      Houston, TX 77002
                                                      Lancehac2@gmail.com
                                                      Tel: (281) 650-0702; (281) 999-5111
                                                      Fax: (281) 786-3379
                                                      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

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                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I certify that a copy of the foregoing brief was forwarded to the Harris County District

Attorney’s Office via E-file service and fax, on June 31, 2015.

                                                     _/s/Lance Nguyen_______________
                                                     Lance Nguyen

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