Court Opinion

ID: 9460137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:42:45.230896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:29.954444
License: Public Domain

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree that the sentences in the Hartford and Bowdoin eases must be reversed as determined by the majority. With deference, however, I do not agree that the sentence in the Newton case can be affirmed. I would also vacate that sentence.
These three cases of violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq. came on for sentencing before the same trial judge on the same day. The majority placed its holding reversing Hartford and Bowdoin on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by pursuing a rigid policy of imposing the maximum sentence for narcotic violations.1 The court made this determination by relying on the trial court’s comments during the sentencing. 1 think that by the very nature of things, if we find that the trial court in cases number one and two demonstrated that it was following a uniform policy of meting out maximum sentences for drug violators, it must necessarily follow that this policy embraced as well case number three, a drug violator’s case in which the convicted person was sentenced on the same day.
Moreover, I cannot believe that the only time an abuse of sentencing discretion may be shown is when the judge’s statements indicate that he had a predetermined sentencing policy. There is room for proof of circumstances demonstrating abuse of discretion between revealing admissions by the judge and the line where the sentencing discretion of the court will not be reviewed by an appellate court.
I think this general proposition is bolstered by the following circumstances that existed in the Newton case: (1) Newton is a first offender in a drug conviction not involving an addicting narcotic; (2) the type of controlled substance, hashish, and the amount involved, 1.7 grams, are recognized by Congress as not falling within the same class as hard narcotics such as heroin; (3) Newton’s situation invites consideration of rehabilitation through the Youth Correction Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4209 and § 5010; (4) there was a substantial showing that Newton is substantially rehabilitated as evidenced by activities within his church, and as related by his minister; (5) the trial court imposed the maximum punishment. When these factors are compared to the matching circumstances of Hartford and Bowdoin and the trial court’s improper sentencing disposition in those two eases, it seems clear to me that this defendant was likewise treated in a manner that cannot be condoned.
In Hartford and Bowdoin, to be sure, the trial judge’s own comments announced his refusal to consider individual circumstances but an intention to apply a mechanical policy of giving a maximum sentence for drug offenders. By judicially noticing the comments made in those two cases, the trial judge’s statement in this case indicating that he believed there was nq such thing as “rehabilitation . . for people who push drugs” is no longer isolated verbiage, but, instead, highlights the trial court’s predisposition in all drug cases.
*658On this point, the en banc decision by the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit in Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8 Cir. 1973), is particularly persuasive. The defendant in that ease had refused induction into the military. The court vacated his sentence on the finding that the sentencing judge had a predisposition, established by his sentences in previous cases, to impose the same harsh sentence in selective service cases.
. Restricting consideration to sentences in the Eastern Division of Missouri, we understand the statements of the government attorney indicate that the sentencing judge sentenced eight violators who refused induction to maximum prison terms, although one sentence permitted possible early parole under Section 4208(a). Clearly, the judge’s policy in the St. Louis (Eastern) Division called for five-year sentences for all young men convicted of refusing induction into the military.
The situation here is similar. The cases of Hartford and Bowdoin substantiate a predetermined policy by the judge to impose the maximum sentence possible in violations of the Controlled Substance Act.2
The majority, here, relies on the court’s stated consideration of the pre-sentence report and the testimony by Newton’s father and minister to rebut this charge of predisposition on the part of the trial court, but the district judge in Woosley had also indicated that he examined the probation report and the letters submitted by the defendant. I do not think the sentencing judge’s stated consideration of materials relevant to his sentencing here negates the showing of such a mechanical approach to sentencing, which the majority found present in the other two cases disposed of at the same time.
The Supreme Court pointed out in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949):
Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence. Id. at 248.
The court, in these cases, by focusing on the crime, ignored this rehabilitative process.
Furthermore, with deference to the views of the majority, I am of the opinion that the trial court sharply and prejudicially curtailed Newton’s right of allocution. Rule 32(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 now codifies the holding in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961), and Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962), providing, under the former Rule 32, that the defendant should personally be allowed to speak in his own behalf before sentencing,4 In this case, Newton’s allocution opportunity was severely limited by the district court. The judge allowed Newton’s father and minister to make statements, but then the court proceeded to restrict Newton himself:
MR. TURNER:
Would you tell The Court at this time very briefly in your own words how you got involved in hashish, marijuana.
*659THE COURT:
If he has already told this to the probation officer I do not see any need to go into it again. Hasn’t this information already been furnished?
MR. TURNER:
May I then sum up very quickly what I would like for him to say to The Court?
THE COURT:
Yes, if Mr. Newton wishes to add anything that has not been given to the probation officer, I would be glad to hear it.
Newton then continued to explain about his rehabilitation through the Church and the counseling of young people. He never, however, ventured into an explanation of how he became involved in drugs in the first place.
The court cannot instruct a defendant not to refer to matters covered by the pre-sentence report in his right to allo-cution. The language of the Supreme Court in Green, supra, is instructive:
The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304.
Further, it is clear that the use of the word “cocaine” in the pre-sentence report impaled Newton beyond help in the mind of the sentencing judge.5
The manner in which Newton’s right of allocution was restricted when the trial court told him he would not listen to anything that appeared in the probation officer’s report clearly impinged upon his ability to explain not only his relationship to the disposition by him of 1.7 grams of hashish (which the trial court mistakenly spoke of as “marijuana”) but also possibly impinged upon his ability to explain to the trial court, assuming the court had not otherwise a predetermined view as to the- sentence to be meted out, his relationship to what appears to have been an “involve [ment] to some extent with cocaine.”
This curtailment of Newton’s right of allocution is made even more serious because of the fact that it appears that any possibility of the trial court’s making an exception to its standard procedure of giving a maximum sentence to a drug offender was gone completely when the court said, “He has admitted it, I will hear nothing further.”
*660It appears that Newton's counsel was attempting to preserve a Fifth Amendment right for his client in the sense that he was protesting against the court’s using an admission given under such circumstances from being considered in fixing sentence when he said, “I understand the court is not considering his having admitted to having used cocaine in imposing sentence.” The court clearly overruled such proposition by saying, “I am considering it, it reflects on his character, it reflects on his ability to cope with society and it should reflect on his sentence.”
This use of an admission made to a probation officer without the benefit of warning as to his Fifth Amendment rights and after counsel had objected to its being utilized as an ingredient for the court to consider in fixing the sentence, seems to be in direct conflict with the principle announced by this court in Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901 (5 Cir. 1972). In that case the court said:
“The transcript shows that the trial judge pressed petitioner to answer questions regarding a completely unrelated offense with which he was not charged. The petitioner declined to answer, partly because it ‘would require a bit of explanation on the matter and I had rather refrain from doing it, if I may’. It is apparent from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the petitioner’s lack of ‘cooperation’ irked the trial judge and induced him to impose the maximum sentence for the crime, five years.”
Bertrand makes it plain that it is a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights for him to be compelled to answer questions from the bench as to other unrelated crimes. It is to be borne in mind here that no charge was ever made against Newton for whatever connection' he had with cocaine.
Furthermore, the court’s asking defendant if it was not true that he had admitted his involvement with the cocaine and later utilizing this admission to aid him in affixing the sentence seems to run contrary to this Court’s decision in Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
Although each of the grounds above, independently, undermine the judge’s sentencing procedure, they stand with a further factor so to infect the sentencing process with irregularities that I am convinced that Newton’s sentence should be vacated.6 Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4209 the district court had the discretion to sentence Newton under the Federal Youth Correction Act but declined that sentencing alternative. That refusal of itself is, of course, not an abuse of discretion.7 However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971), noted that under some sets of circumstances the district court should reconsider its failure to sentence under section 4209.
. In the absence of aggravating circumstances or any explanation by the Judge at sentencing, we are constrained to express our sense of *661perplexity and concern over the seeming severity of the three-year prison sentence for an offense involving less than $100.00. This is especially so in light of the good reputation the youthful appellant bears among his neighbors, co-workers, and employer, the absence of any previous criminal experience, and the probation officer’s recommendation that he be granted probation. The disparity between the crime and the punishment is baffling. Certainly it appears that section 4209 could have been appropriately applied or a lighter sentence given. Id. at 498.
Although such decisions have to be determined on an individual basis, the situation here seems substantially like that referred above (if we assume that the trial court cannot focus solely on the nature of the offense but on the individual defendant). Newton is a first offender with no prior criminal experience. Although his conviction is for selling, the record reveals that he was not “dealing” but selling a small quantity to a friend. The substance involved is hashish, not a hard, addicting narcotic. The defendant has been working by himself and through his church in counseling young persons in his home community against the use of drugs. His minister confirmed the strong commitment Newton had made to his church and religion. The minister spoke for the congregation in supporting a sincere belief in Newton’s rehabilitation.
I do not, of course, intend to suggest that this Court should direct that the trial court give a lighter sentence. I mention these circumstances only as an added consideration which has convinced me that the present sentence should be set aside and upon resentencing the trial court should give consideration to a more promising rehabilitative sentencing alternative, which Congress had in mind in enacting the Youth Correction Act.
I would vacate the sentence on Mike Newton as well as those of the other two defendants and remand to the district court.

. The majority words the reversal in Hartford to condemn the use of the Federal Youth Correction Act for retributive sentencing. But it is clear that the court was reversing the improper manner in which the trial court imposed, by choosing whatever mode — the Y.C.A. or the adult statutory penalty — would allow it its policy of maximum sentences for drug violators.

. See United States v. Charles, 460 F.2d 1093, 1094 — 1095 (6th Cir. 1972) (imposing maximum sentences in selective service cases); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971) (imposing maximum sentences in selective service cases); United States v. McCoy, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 429 F.2d 739, 742-743 (1970) (policy of sentencing life -imprisonment for armed robbery).

. The text of the Rule reads:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant, and shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf, and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.

. Moore suggests that this right flows from the inherent powers of the sentencing court and is not dependent upon the allocution provision of Rule 32(a) (1). 8 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 32.05.

. The dialogue at the sentencing hearing-states :
THE COUET:
There are over five hundred fifty thousand addicts walking the streets, most of them young people. This man not only has been involved with marijuana, he lias been involved with cocaine.
ME. TUENEE:
Your Honor, there is no charge involving this young man with cocaine.
THE COUET:
This man has told the probation officer that he was involved to some extent with cocáine. Isn’t that not correct?
THE DEFENDANT:
That was the first time that I was but I had just become involved under the encouragement of friends.
THE COUET:
Under the encouragement of friends you became involved in cocaine which is one of the most dangerous substances the world has ever known.
It is the judgment of The Court, Mike Newton, that you be committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative to be imprisoned for a period of five years or until you are otherwise discharged by due course of law, together witli a special parole term of two years upon your release from confinement.
Custody is remanded to the United States Marshal.
i*{ # Sfi
ME. TUENEE:
I understand The Court is not considering his having admitted to having used cocaine in imposing sentence.
THE COUET:
I am considering it. it reflects on his character. It reflects on his ability to cope with society and it should reflect on his sentence. He has admitted it. I will hear nothing further. Custody is remanded to the United States Marshal.

. Cf., United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1970) (“. . . tlie error here, unlike Hill, was not simply an admission of formal requirements of Rule 32(a), nor does it stand alone. Rather, it occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances which so infect the sentencing process^with material irregularities, confusion, false assumptions and misinformation that the sentence must be vacated as the product of a denial of due process.”).

. If the defendant were under 22 years of age and therefore falling directly under 18 U.S.C.A. § 5010, some courts including this court have held that the court would have had specifically to express reasons for not sentencing under subdivision (b) or (c). United States v. Schenker, 5th Cir., 486 F.2d 318 [1973]; United States v. Coefield, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 476 F.2d 1152 (1973) (en banc); Williams v. United States, 476 F.2d 970 (3rd Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a Seventh Circuit case which held to the contrary. United States v. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d 849 (1973), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1091, 94 S.Ct. 721, 38 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973).