Court Opinion

ID: 9463071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:57:31.437072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:55.474698
License: Public Domain

TRASK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The history of this dispute and the elaborate and lengthy proceedings taken to assure its equitable settlement seem to me to require its resolution at this time without further litigation. I would therefore decide it without remand.
A brief chronology of the case is helpful. It discloses that in March of 1971, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) was notified by some employees of Basic Vegetable Products, Inc. (Basic) that there were employment discrimination problems at the cannery plant. An investigation was thereupon launched and continued over a period of months, resulting in a class action complaint asserting illegal-employment discrimination and civil rights violations being filed in this case in March 1972. Prior thereto, on January 27,1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had filed a Commissioner’s charge encompassing the same general allegations. A stay of the complaint was entered by stipulation between litigants and the agency to permit EEOC to make an investigation with its personnel and facilities.
At the conclusion of a lengthy investigation, EEOC, Basic, the unions involved, along with representatives of MALDEF and the California Rural Legal Assistance and attorneys for the plaintiff class, began more than six months of negotiations. These negotiations ultimately resulted in a settlement agreement in September 1973, which was presented to the district court for approval on November 28, 1973.
This document, representing an in-depth analysis of payroll, personnel, including racial and ethnic mix, job classification and *838promotion, was a complete study of Basic’s employment practices as they had to do with any conceivable discrimination. After this document was produced as a distillate of the give-and-take of employer, minority groups, government agency policy representatives and labor leaders, it was taken by the attorneys for MALDEF and the California Rural Legal Assistance to their clients in a two-day meeting, at which they explained its meaning and effect both in English and in Spanish. Thereafter, they sent to all named plaintiffs a written copy of the Conciliation & Settlement Agreement, as it was called.
Elaborate care was taken to see that all members of the class received notice of the agreement and of the hearing to consider its approval or disapproval. By order of court on November 28, 1973, Basic was required to send individual notices to all members of the class who were presently employed, had been employed within the past year, or who had charges pending before the Commission against either Basic or the Union. A total of 2698 personal mailings were sent out. Copies were posted on the main bulletin board and in the operating departments of each of its plants.1 Finally, Basic published the notice in both English and Spanish in newspapers of general circulation in Solano and Monterey counties. The hearing was set for January 28, 1974, 30 days after all notice requirements were to have been complied with. A notice of a hearing for court approval of the agreement was given by mailing and publication on December 28, 1973, and a hearing was held in court one month later, at which time the settlement was approved. Notice of appeal was filed by two class members on February 27, 1974.
The majority opinion first considers the nature of this type of class action and the general procedures thought to be advisable in settlement of Title VII Class Actions. It then directs its attention to the application of those general notions to the particulars of this case. It finds that the record does not disclose clearly that proper protection was given to dissidents in this case, resting its decision not upon any particular deficiency of the settlement agreement but largely upon the fact “that the record reveals no reasoned response to numerous objections to the settlement.”
Of those objections the first mentioned is the matter of “potential conflicts between members of the class.” The example cited is the conflict between seasonal migratory workers and full time employees of Basic. The majority opinion, after stating the problem, somewhat inconclusively observes, “Perhaps the asserted conflict is non-existent or of little consequence; but the present record does not permit us to know.”
I would add that the objection, if it exists, was never properly brought before the court prior to or during the hearing. The notice of hearing, which was mailed, posted and published, provided that any member of the class could appear at the hearing and show to the court why the settlement should not be approved. It further provided that no person should be heard at the hearing unless notice of intention to appear and all grounds for the objections, with supporting papers, had been filed with the court on or before January 18, 1974, and proof of service on four of the named counsel in the proceedings was demonstrated. The petitions here were mailed with no proof of service and contained conclusory statements2 with no supporting grounds of *839any kind.
Yet the court at the hearing permitted Ms. Loya to speak as well as Mr. Gutierrez. Mr. Ruben Rayas, described as a spokesman for the so-called dissident group, was also permitted to speak although he had not submitted his name and was not a representative plaintiff or a member of the class. His remarks bore no relevance to the conclusory objections on the petition. He complained about the inadequacy of Mr. Mendelson, attorney for MALDEF, and asked for more time because the people did not understand the settlement agreement.3
In short, the objections asserted as to the “potential conflicts between members of the class” appear to be afterthoughts urged now by newly-employed counsel, which were never urged upon the trial court and apparently never brought before those charged with developing an agreement to reconcile the differences among the parties.
Similarly most if not all of the other objections suggested by the majority opinion were never brought to the attention of the trial court before, at, or after the hearing held to consider the approval of the agreement. There was therefore no occasion for the trial court to consider them or to give to them any “reasoned response.”
The format of the hearing was an orderly one designed to develop any problems in the proposed settlement being submitted to the court for approval. The district court judge indicated that he had read the petitions of certain objectors but was uncertain as to their meaning. He then called upon each of the attorneys of record to state his position with respect to the settlement. Except for one slight modification which had been agreed upon, all attorneys spoke favorably of the proposed settlement, including attorney Zugschwerdt from the Regional Council’s Office in Washington.
The court heard from several individuals and then stated:
“I will make a finding, a tentative finding that this is an appropriate class as has been defined in the settlement agreement; all the terms of the order previously submitted having been complied with; that all protests have been duly noted; and that the proposed settlement is fair and equitable, with the understanding that the individuals who have personally filed with the E.E.O.C. prior to the filing of the amended complaint are entitled to individual settlement of their claims.” R.T. at 16.
The court continued reading the general terms of the agreement from the summary contained in the notice and continued by quoting from other terms not contained in the summary but in the agreement. The court concluded:
“Gentlemen, I think this is a good settlement of the existing problem and it is a good plan for future conduct of this business and it will prevent any further problems of this nature arising.
“So if you will present to me the modified form of judgment, I will be prepared to entertain it.” R.T. at 19-20.
*840A few others from the audience asked to speak in opposition and were permitted to do so. When Ms. Loya referred to a provision by which a woman could replace a man who had more seniority, the court took pains to explain:
“THE COURT: Well, this whole agreement is trying to create a balance. It is designed over the period of time in the future that this will solve the problem.
“It is not a bit unusual in civil rights cases to try to overcome a class discrimination by this method of training, incentive pay and preference. This is what it is designed to do. To overcome the problems that the class and the individual members of the class have complained about.” R.T. at 23-24.4
I do not find that the hearing on the approval of the settlement lacked “reasoned responses.” To every objection raised at the hearing the court gave explanations or responses. The discussion disclosed an understanding of the proposed agreement and a desire to explain it to those who obviously did not understand it.
Also of concern to the majority is the fact that of the nine representative plaintiffs, five opposed the settlement. Their opposition was first expressed when a petition was filed with the court on January 18, 1974 (the last day for filing objections) which included the names of five of the representative plaintiffs. Two of the five withdrew their objections later in open hearing. (R.T. at 4-5).5
Finally the majority is concerned about the effect of the proposed settlement on employees not members of the class — “presumably all Anglo males.” None of them are shown as objectors. It is difficult to believe that over the protracted period of discussion, negotiation, and hearing and the comprehensive posting and publication, the Anglo male employees would not have known of the problem or taken an interest in the settlement if it appeared to be prejudicial to their interests. Furthermore, I would assume that the EEOC, as a neutral agency, would not knowingly permit discrimination, direct or inverse, against an unrepresented group and that Basic would have the same view.
It appears clear that the policy of both state and national governments with respect to the resolution of discrimination in employment practices is to obtain it by conference, conciliation and settlement and not by extended litigation. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 846 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1684, 48 L.Ed.2d 187 (1976); Air Line Stewards, etc., Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.1972). In Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1969) the court said:
*841“Thus it is quite apparent that the basic philosophy of these statutory provisions is that voluntary compliance is preferable to court action and that efforts should be made to resolve these employment rights by conciliation both before and after court action.”
Here, it appears that a massive amount of time, effort and talent have gone into a conciliation agreement with the positions of all sides represented. No real substantive or even procedural issues have been clearly joined. Because the problems which concern the majority of the panel (if, in fact, they are problems) were never presented to the trial court at the time and place set for hearing objections, I would affirm the action of the district court and bring this case to a conclusion.

. For instance, the affidavit of posting at the King City plant shows that posting was made on December 28, 1973, on bulletin boards at the following locations: Main Cafeteria; Laboratory; Storeroom; Maintenance Shop; OFP Cafeteria; Shipping, Case and Label area; Garlic Mill area; Onion Mill area; F & S Office; P & S Cafeteria; Garlic Seed; Garlic Field Maintenance Shop; and Personnel Office (Main Bulletin Board).

. “1. The Fund is inadequate to compensate the people.
“2. Minorities, as well as women, should be entitled to incentive pay.
“3. The percentage of minorities projected for the training programs is much too low.
“4. Testing procedures are discriminatory.
“5. Future employees are denied any options.
*839“6. The mechanism for conciliation under the agreement is weak and costly in time and money.”
C.T. at 169.

. The court attempted to explain the effect of the agreement, saying:
“Mr. Rayas, I am sure that you understand that this agreement only settles the grievances up to the date it is signed. It sets up a program to try to avoid future problems that arise in the future. But if in the future any discrimination exists against any of these members of this class, they have a right to come in and initiate further action.
“What this does is settle the problems up to this point, provides individual settlement for those who filed complaints, and sets up a program that will hopefully prevent probelms [sic] from arising in the future.
“So if it turns out that the problems are not resolved, you are not barred from again coming in.
“MR. RAYAS: We understand that. But I think that most of the people would like to have the time to be able to at least be able to ratify or sanction this. Like I say, I think they’re being pulled into something they know nothing about. The ones that do understand a little bit are very much against it.
“THE COURT: Thank you.” R.T. at 33-34.

. That the court was clearly correct is established by a reading of the provision in the agreement to which reference was made. Section VII 2(e) provides:
“Until such time as 20% of High Bracket Jobs at a plant are held by Females, at least every other High Bracket Job Vacancy or new opening at the plant will be offered, in order of Plant seniority, to all qualified Female bidders who have the experience and skill necessary to perform the High Bracket Job, before any male, regardless of his seniority, is permitted to bid for the High Bracket Job or before any male is hired to fill the Vacancy or opening.” (Emphasis supplied).

. Of the total class comprising some 2,700 members only 116 were objectors by way of signing a petition. They were given a chance to speak at the hearing. Only Ms. Dimas said anything. Her statements at the hearing were more in the nature of questions which the court undertook to explain rather than objections. Only two of the 2,700 joined in the appeal and neither was a representative plaintiff in the action. Thus, approximately 4 percent constituted the “dissidents" insofar as the record shows. R.T. at 15. This compares with 20 percent of objectors in an approved settlement which was approved in Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900, 95 S.Ct. 184, 42 L.Ed.2d 146 (1974). The court said there, “The drafters of Rule 23 chose as a means of protecting the class the requirement that the district court approve the settlement. They did not require rejection of a settlement on objection of a given part of the class.” 494 F.2d at 803.