Court Opinion

ID: 9953035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 14:08:26.085068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:36.971417
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1745-22

KIMBERLY A. ZACK,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES
CORPORATION,

          Defendant-Respondent,

and

MOROLAKE ESI,

     Defendant.
__________________________

                   Argued March 11, 2024 – Decided March 21, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk, and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2613-20.

                   Anthony Santos Almeida argued the cause for appellant
                   (Poulos LoPiccolo, PC, attorneys; Anthony Santos
                   Almeida, of counsel and on the briefs).
            John T. McDonald argued the cause for respondent
            (Reed Smith, LLP, attorneys; John T. McDonald and
            Saranne E. Weimer, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Kimberly A. Zack appeals from a January 9, 2023 order granting

summary judgment to defendant Integra Lifesciences Corporation (Integra). We

affirm.

      Plaintiff is a White woman who was employed as a manager at Integra in

its New Jersey location. On June 14, 2020, during the protests of police violence

following the murder of George Floyd, plaintiff posted statistics from a

government website on her Facebook account showing police killed more

Whites than Blacks. This sparked a discussion in the comments from many

individuals, including some who worked for Integra.

      In the comments, plaintiff stated that "it's so frustrating . . . [w]hat

everyone fails to realize is that if you're home on the couch doing what you're

supposed to be doing you won't ever be one of those numbers no matter what

your race, religion, or political affiliation!" She also said, "regardless of what

bucket you['re] in[,] if you were on the right side of the law[,] you wouldn't be

on the list in the first place . . . . [T]his hate will continue as long as everyone

keeps making it about skin color."

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      One of plaintiff's direct reports, a Black scientist at Integra, commented

on the thread following plaintiff's post, stating it was "insensitive . . . comparing

the 'current situation' to the statistics of those shot to death by police." Another

Black employee at Integra was also offended by the post and sent it to an Integra

manager, Tyhesha Tidwell, who is also Black. Tidwell is a Senior Manager at

Integra's Boston, Massachusetts location.        She wrote the following in the

Facebook comments:

                   This entire conversation is painful, layered[,] and
             complex. Lives lost cannot simply be reduced to
             numbers. To couch it in just 'doing what you were
             supposed to do' or being on the 'right side of the law'
             misses the point. If you truly want to engage in honest
             dialogue, you have many on your timeline who would
             probably help you see past the [W]hite privilege and
             [W]hite fragility on display in most of these comments.

      The reporting employee told Tidwell this was not the first time plaintiff

posted racially insensitive material on Facebook. Tidwell testified at deposition

that "[plaintiff] has a habit of saying racially insensitive things. She has posted

them on Facebook before." Tidwell testified she would have a problem with the

post if a Black person had made it "because as someone who understands math,

this is not the best way to represent information, and this, especially at this time,

was very incendiary." She had not reported any of plaintiff's prior posts to

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Integra, but she sent the June 14, 2020 post and ensuing comment thread to

Integra's human resources department.

       The matter was investigated by Morolake Esi, Integra's Head of Human

Resources, Global Operations and Quality, and Lisa Evoli, Vice President of

Human Resources. Evoli reviewed the post and comments, and determined

plaintiff violated Integra's policies and expectations. The investigation also

revealed plaintiff was already on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), for,

among other things, unprofessional behavior, and had recently received a "Does

Not Meet Expectations" review on her evaluation—in part for behavioral issues.

After reviewing the Facebook post and plaintiff's history with Integra, Esi and

Evoli concluded plaintiff's violation warranted termination. Evoli terminated

plaintiff.

       Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging:   reverse racial discrimination in

violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) against Integra;

reverse racial discrimination under the LAD against Esi; common law wrongful

discharge (a Pierce claim)1 based on the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution and the New Jersey State Constitution; and violation of the New

Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA) based on interference with plaintiff's

1
    Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980).
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employment. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. On

April 5, 2021, the court dismissed the CRA claim, but denied the motion

regarding the remaining claims pending discovery.

        Plaintiff amended her complaint, adding a count against Integra for

violation of the LAD under a "cat's paw"/accommodating discriminatory views

theory.2 Following discovery, defendants again moved for summary judgment

on all counts. Plaintiff conceded the dismissal of her claims against Esi, leaving

the LAD, Pierce, and cat's paw claims asserted against Integra for adjudication.

        On January 9, 2023, the motion judge granted summary judgment to

Integra, dismissing all the remaining counts.            He concluded plaintiff's

termination was not the result of discrimination because her post violated

Integra's company policy. There was no dispute about the contents of her post,

but "[w]hat [she posted] doesn't show is the relative percentages of what [the]

numbers [of persons shot] are to the population of those groups. And it is no

surprise . . . that there would be an adverse reaction to that post." For plaintiff's

reverse discrimination claim to survive summary judgment, she had to show

Integra was the unusual employer who had a history of discriminating against

Whites. The judge concluded the incident here was "singular" and there was

2
    We discuss the "cat's paw" theory of liability in detail in Section III.B.
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"no evidence of any ongoing pattern . . . that [W]hites have been set upon by

[Integra]."

                                        I.

      A party is entitled to summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

4:46-2; Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1995).

"The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda

Pharm., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540). We review a

grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard that governed the

trial court's decision. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).

                                        II.

      Plaintiff argues the reverse discrimination claim should not have been

dismissed because the LAD must be interpreted liberally. She asserts that our

law, which requires a plaintiff alleging reverse discrimination to show their

employer is the "unusual employer who discriminates against the majority,"

Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 551 (1990), is an overly

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restrictive standard. Plaintiff urges us to abandon the unusual employer standard

and follow the Third Circuit, which has held that as regards Title VII claims,

"the prima facie case in terms of 'background circumstances' and the uniqueness

of the particular employer is both problematic and unnecessary." Iadimarco v.

Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999).

      To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the LAD, a

plaintiff must show: 1) they are a member of a protected class; 2) they applied

for or held a position for which they were objectively qualified; 3) they were

either not hired or terminated by the employer; and 4) the employer sought to,

or did fill the position with a similarly-qualified or less-qualified person. Bergen

Com. Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 210 (1999) (quoting Erickson, 117 N.J. at

550). In employment discrimination cases, our courts have adopted the burden-

shifting framework created by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973), which requires:

            (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient
            evidence to constitute a prima facie case of
            discrimination; (2) the defendant must then show a
            legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision;
            and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity
            to show that defendant's stated reason was merely a
            pretext or discriminatory in its application.

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            [Henry v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 331
            (2010) (quoting Dixon v. Rutgers, 110 N.J. 432, 442
            (1988)).]

      In Erickson, our Supreme Court stated:

            In reverse discrimination cases, the rationale
            supporting     the     rebuttable   presumption       of
            discrimination embodied in the prima facie elements
            does not apply. Thus, when a complainant is not a
            member of the minority, courts have generally modified
            the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard to
            require the plaintiff to show that [they have] been
            victimized by an "unusual employer who discriminates
            against the majority." Indeed, when a complainant is a
            member of the majority and not representative of
            persons usually discriminated against in the work place,
            discrimination directed against that person is
            "unusual."

            [117 N.J. at 551-52 (citations omitted).]

      In Iadimarco, the Third Circuit held that modifying McDonnell Douglas

to include consideration of an employer's background circumstances presented

a more onerous burden to White plaintiffs in Title VII claims. 190 F.3d at 159.

However, our Supreme Court has stated: "Although [there is] . . . a need to

harmonize the LAD with Title VII in order to assure a reasonable degree of

symmetry and uniformity in the law, 'we have not hesitated to depart from the

[McDonnell Douglas] methodology if a rigid application of its standards is

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inappropriate under the circumstances.'" Bergen Com. Bank, 157 N.J. at 212

(quoting Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 107 (1990)).

      As an intermediate appellate court, we lack the authority to overturn

Erickson. More importantly, Erickson was decided one year after Iadimarco,

and our Supreme Court implicitly elected not to adopt the Third Circuit's

approach in that case. We are bound by Erickson and its sound reasoning, which

has remained unaltered for over three decades. See Flizack v. Good News Home

for Women, Inc., 346 N.J. Super. 150, 158 (App. Div. 2001); Oakley v.

Wianecki, 345 N.J. Super. 194, 201-02 (App. Div. 2001).              The rule in

Erickson—that discrimination against a member of the majority is unusual and

therefore requires consideration of the background circumstances to understand

whether the employer discriminates against Whites—is critical to discerning

whether there was discrimination here.

      The record is devoid of evidence of minority employees making posts like

plaintiff's and not being terminated for the violation. Moreover, plaintiff failed

to show Integra was the unusual employer who targets members of the majority.

The only evidence she cites is Integra's African American Affinity Group

(IAAAG), which Tidwell headed, and a message released by Integra's Executive

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                                         9
Leadership Team (ELT) on June 22, 2020, titled "ELT Reflections on

Juneteenth." In it, Integra stated:

            The [ELT] met with members of the [IAAAG] last
            Friday and used this forum to listen, learn and discuss
            ways we can advance our culture of diversity and
            inclusion. As we reflected upon our conversation, one
            thing is clear: while we have made advancements in
            diversity and inclusion, there is still a lot of work to be
            done. . . . In the coming weeks, we will work closely
            with the IAAAG to establish specific actions to address
            the issues discussed.

Plaintiff notes Evoli signed the ELT statement.

      None of this evidence established Integra discriminates against Whites.

Rather, these initiatives are in accord with the LAD, and demonstrate Integra

values diversity and promotes an inclusive work environment.

                                        III.

      Plaintiff argues summary judgment was improperly granted because there

were disputed issues of material fact, including whether:          1) she violated

Integra's social media policy; 2) Tidwell violated the same policy; 3) Integra

selectively enforced its policy based on plaintiff's race; 4) plaintiff and Tidwell

are "similarly situated comparators"; 5) Tidwell wanted plaintiff terminated and

"took the steps necessary to effect that termination"; and 6) Evoli "placated

the . . . cat's paw, . . . [i.e.;] Tidwell." Plaintiff also asserts the motion judge

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misapplied the summary judgment standard when he found no evidence of an

ongoing pattern of reverse discrimination because a single incident can qualify

as evidence of discrimination. She claims the judge impermissibly weighed the

evidence and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in her favor on these

points.

      Plaintiff argues the evidence showed Integra treated her and Tidwell

disparately. She asserts she is similarly situated to Tidwell because she is also

a manager and subject to the same Integra social media policy. Yet Tidwell was

not terminated for using racially charged terms like "[W]hite privilege" and

"[W]hite fragility" in her Facebook post. Plaintiff also points to private text

messages between Tidwell and other Black employees that negatively

referenced plaintiff and her Facebook post as proof Integra is the unusual

employer who engages in reverse discrimination.

                                       A.

      We reject the argument that a singular incident of alleged discrimination

was enough to prove a discrimination claim. In Erickson, the Court denied a

male plaintiff's reverse sex discrimination claim, which was based on a "singular

incident of replacing" him with a female as "insufficient to demonstrate [the

company was] the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

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117 N.J. at 552. The Court held the plaintiff proffered "no evidence [his

employer] engaged in a pattern of sex discrimination that favored women over

men." Id. at 553.

      None of the facts that plaintiff claims are in dispute would have thwarted

summary judgment in favor of Integra. Plaintiff and Tidwell were not similarly

situated. "A determination of whether employees are similarly situated takes

into account factors such as an employee's job responsibilities, the supervisors

and decision-makers, and the nature of the misconduct at issue." Wright v.

Providence Care Ctr., LLC, 822 F. App'x. 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2020). See also Peper

v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 84-45 (1978); Jason v. Showboat

Hotel & Casino, 329 N.J. Super. 295, 305 (App. Div. 2000). Tidwell and

plaintiff had different job titles and supervisors. They worked in different states.

      Further, plaintiff engaged in misconduct, Tidwell did not. "To be deemed

similarly situated[,] the individuals with whom a plaintiff seeks to be compared

must have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or

mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's

treatment of them for it." Mosca v. Cole, 384 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (D.N.J.

2005) (quoting Bullock v. Child.'s Hosp., 71 F. Supp. 2d 482, 489 (E.D. Pa.

1999)).

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      Plaintiff presented no evidence Tidwell's use of the terms "[W]hite

privilege" and "[W]hite fragility" were actionable and violated Integra's

workplace policies. She only offered her opinion that she viewed Tidwell's

comment as equally "inappropriate" as her own, and that Integra treated both

women differently. However, there were differentiating and mitigating factors

at play; plaintiff was under a PIP, and Tidwell had no disciplinary history.

      Moreover, plaintiff's claim her post was not about race is belied by the

fact the statistics were broken down by race, and her post was made at a time of

national discussion about race and police violence.        Therefore, plaintiff's

comments that "if you're home on the couch doing what you're supposed to be

doing you won't ever be one of those numbers" and "if you were on the right

side of the law" were inappropriate because they minimized the moment in an

insensitive manner as evidenced by the adverse reaction of several Black

employees. Tidwell's response expressed that plaintiff's statements were hurtful

and sought to initiate a discussion to explain why. Unlike plaintiff's statements,

no one, inside or outside of Integra, complained about Tidwell's comment.

      Notwithstanding their dissimilarities, even if plaintiff and Tidwell had the

same disciplinary history, Integra was not obligated to treat their conduct in a

similar fashion. "Where two individuals have violated the conduct policy in

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different ways, an employer has the discretion to conclude that one was guilty

of a more serious infraction than the other, and to treat the cases accordingly."

Ewell v. NBA Props., 94 F. Supp. 3d 612, 627 (D.N.J. 2015). For these reasons,

we reject plaintiff's claims the judge was required to decide whether there was

a violation of Integra's social media policy and if the company selectively

enforced its policy.

                                       B.

      Plaintiff argues the motion judge erred when he dismissed the cat's paw

claim because Tidwell's comment on plaintiff's Facebook post and her private

communications showed Tidwell held discriminatory views, which then

influenced Evoli's decision to terminate plaintiff. She points to the fact Tidwell

sent Evoli an email titled "Action Required," which contained a breakdown of

and commentary on the Facebook post.

      Tidwell's email said: "I wanted to make you aware of a situation that

occurred today, and I believe that action is needed. At 1:00AM this morning, I

was sent the following post by an Integra employee who used to work . . . for

the person who posted this on Facebook." She then provided screenshots of the

Facebook post and comments, and added:

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                  In response, I was told that this entire post was
            deleted within [fifteen to thirty] minutes of my
            comment.

                   At this point, I just feel that it is important that
            [Black] colleagues at Integra and elsewhere feel
            supported and safe by those in authority over our work
            lives. Although not angry, this is deeply disturbing to
            me, and I am hoping that you can let me know what[,]
            if anything[,] can be done. Employees should not have
            to fear that our leadership is tone deaf to this moment
            and this movement.

                   Forgive me for the long email. Please let me
            know if I can provide any other information. I fear that
            if we let these microaggressions remain unchecked,
            nothing will change. And what I know for sure is that
            after what we have experienced in the last few weeks in
            our country, nothing should stay the same.

      "The cat's paw theory of liability applies to 'a situation in which a biased

subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker

as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.'"

Meade v. Twp. of Livingston, 249 N.J. 310, 334 (2021) (quoting Marshall v.

Rawlings Co., LLC, 854 F.3d 368, 377 (6th Cir. 2017). Liability exists under

this theory "only if a non-decisionmaker's [discriminatory] act proximately

caused the firing." Crosbie v. Highmark, Inc., 47 F.4th 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2022).

Proximate cause does not exist when the employer does not rely on the allegedly

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biased act in taking the ultimate adverse action. Jones v. SEPTA, 796 F.3d 323,

331 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011).

      Our de novo review of the record reveals no evidence of bias on Tidwell's

part. Rather, her email to Evoli attached plaintiff's postings and the comment

thread, and relayed the fact plaintiff's actions made Black employees feel unsafe.

Tidwell's private texts were revealed during discovery, and neither Esi nor Evoli

had them when they were conducting the investigation or when the decision to

terminate plaintiff was made. Esi and Evoli investigated the case based on the

objective evidence and Evoli made the termination decision based on the

investigation. The cat's paw theory did not apply here.

                                       IV.

      Plaintiff argues the decision to terminate her was merely a pretext for the

reverse discrimination because Evoli conducted a "sham investigation" that did

not comport with Integra's investigation policies. She asserts the pretext was

evidenced by the fact her termination was unprecedented, she received a good

final performance review, and Integra's social media policy did not require

termination in the event of a violation.

      We do not reach this argument because plaintiff failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination to trigger the burden shifting analysis and

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consideration of pretext under McDonnell Douglas. See Crisitello v. St. Theresa

Sch., 255 N.J. 200, 231 (2023) (Pierre-Louis, J., concurring) (stating the burden

shifting begins "[o]nce a prima facie case of discrimination is established").

                                       V.

       Plaintiff urges us to abrogate our holding in McVey v. AtlantiCare

Medical System Inc., claiming it is internally inconsistent because we held state

action was required to assert a claim for wrongful discharge based on a violation

of the First Amendment right to free speech yet held "constitutional rights can

be enforced against private entities." 472 N.J. Super. 278, 288 n.5 (App. Div.

2022). She further asserts McVey "failed to substantively distinguish between

the Fourth Amendment privacy rights implicated within the Hennessey[3]

opinion with the First Amendment freedom of speech rights before it" and

ignored that Hennessey held a Pierce claim could be sustained under the New

Jersey Constitution's free speech provision.

       Our Supreme Court has held that wrongful discharge cases "must balance

the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public." Pierce, 84 N.J. at

71. "Employees have an interest in knowing they will not be discharged for

exercising their legal rights," while "[e]mployers have an interest in knowing

3
    Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81 (1992).
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                                       17
they can run their businesses as they see fit as long as their conduct is consistent

with public policy," and "[t]he public has an interest in employment stability

and in discouraging frivolous lawsuits by dissatisfied employees." Ibid.

      Our courts are "mindful that judicial intervention in the private

employment context has a limited purpose. Anti-discrimination laws do not

permit courts to make personnel decisions for employers. They simply require

that an employer's personnel decisions be based on criteria other than those

proscribed by law." Peper, 77 N.J. at 87.

      In McVey, the plaintiff was terminated by an employer who operated a

private hospital and health system for posting on Facebook "that she found the

phrase 'Black Lives Matter' to be 'racist,' believed the Black Lives Matter

movement 'causes segregation,' and asserted that Black citizens were 'killing

themselves.'"    472 N.J. Super. at 281. The trial court dismissed McVey's

complaint for wrongful discharge because the First Amendment and Article I,

Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution did not bar a private employer from

terminating her. Id. at 281-82.

      On appeal, McVey acknowledged she did not have an absolute

constitutional right to free speech in a private employment setting under

Hennessey.      Id. at 288.   Her free speech rights, however, outweighed her

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employer's right "to promote an inclusive, non-divisive environment for its

clients and employees." Ibid.

      We affirmed and rejected McVey's argument that she had the

constitutional right to make her remarks under the United States Constitution.

Ibid. We held "constitutional rights can be violated only if there is state action"

and in McVey's case there was no state action because she worked for a private

employer. Id. at 288-89. We did not need to distinguish between the First

Amendment right raised by McVey and the Fourth Amendment right in

Hennessey, because Hennessey did not turn on the Fourth Amendment. 129 N.J.

at 95. Indeed, Hennessey held the Fourth Amendment is not implicated where

there is no state action. Ibid.

      Instead, Hennessey addressed and rejected a Pierce claim based on the

right to privacy under the New Jersey Constitution. Ibid. The Court held a

private employer did not violate an employee's constitutional right to privacy by

mandating random urine screens for drugs and was not liable for wrongful

discharge by subsequently terminating the employee where the employee failed

the drug screen. Id. at 94-96, 107. This was because the employee worked and

supervised others at an oil refinery, and public safety in the operation of the

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                                       19
refinery outweighed his right to privacy under the New Jersey Constitution. Id.

at 104-07.

      We likewise rejected McVey's Pierce argument, noting Hennessey held

"more is needed than simply the breach of public policy affecting a single

person's rights to constitute the breach of a 'clear mandate' of public policy that

Pierce requires." McVey, 472 N.J. Super. at 287 (quoting Hennessey 129 N.J.

at 99).      Further, we noted although Hennessey found the New Jersey

Constitution "'may' constitute public policy, it did not do so in that case." Ibid.

We found "[n]o New Jersey court has held that a private entity that encroaches

upon a private individual's constitutional rights to free speech has violated a

clear mandate of public policy within the intendment of the Pierce and

Hennessey paradigm." Id. at 289. "[T]he majority of courts . . . in other

jurisdictions have precluded a private employee's Pierce claim based on a private

employer's alleged infringement of free speech." Ibid.

      McVey's free speech rights did not outweigh her employer's business

interests because her racist remarks were not protected speech within the context

in which they were made. Id. at 290. We found even if her remarks were

adjudged under a lower standard and considered "to be merely insensitive, we

would still hold under Hennessey that [her employer] properly terminated her

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employment" because McVey's "interest in publicly posting her remarks was

minimal." Ibid. Rather than posting her remarks privately, she did so publicly

and "prominently identified" her title and employer. Ibid. McVey was aware

of her employer's social media policy, which prohibited comments like the ones

she posted and yet she "posted her remarks at the height of the [George] Floyd

protest[s]" exposing her employer "to the possibility of unwanted and adverse

publicity and criticism." Id. at 291. Under the circumstances, McVey's "slight

interest in publicly making her position on the Black Lives Matter movement

known" did not outweigh her employer's "strong interest in protecting and

fostering" diversity or show the employer "violate[d] a clear mandate of public

policy when it terminated McVey's employment." Ibid.

      The facts here are quite similar. Even if we considered plaintiff's postings

to be "merely insensitive," she made these remarks publicly and doubled down

on them, notwithstanding Integra's social media policy. Plaintiff was identified

as a member of Integra, and like McVey, her comments occurred at a time of

national racial strife. Her comments brought that strife into Integra's work

environment, undermining its diversity and inclusion practices and exposed

Integra to possible unwanted public criticism. In these circumstances, plaintiff's

posting and statements were neither constructive nor had a valid business

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purpose.   Therefore, her "slight" interest in free speech did not outweigh

Integra's strong interest in ensuring a productive and inclusive work

environment and the ability to assure partners, clients, and the public it did not

share or endorse plaintiff's views. Thus, even if the motion judge had reached

the Pierce claim, it would not survive summary judgment.

      Finally, as regards the right to free speech under the United States

Constitution, McVey was not internally inconsistent because we noted the

limited exceptions to state action where constitutional rights could be enforced

against private entities involved "political expressions at privately-owned-and-

operated shopping malls and defamation." Id. at 288 n.5 (citation omitted)

(quoting Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 265 (1998)).

Those exceptions did not apply in McVey's case, and they do not apply here.

      Affirmed.

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