Court Opinion

ID: 9448322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:31:25.793229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:22.786126
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
1. In the majority opinion, the court states defendant’s contention that “ * * the court erred in denying various motions, for mistrial and to poll the jury, based upon prejudicial newspaper publicity.” Following its discussion of this contention, the court concludes:
“The motions for mistrial during void dire and later, and the motion to poll the jury after the Bronge incident, were addressed to the court’s discretion. * * * Under the ‘special facts’ of this case, however, we conclude that the rulings failed to provide adequate precautionary measures in aid of defendant’s right to a fair trial.”
Inasmuch as the court does not hold nor even discuss an abuse of discretion by the district court, it would seem that this court’s conclusion from the “special facts” is irrelevant.
If, however, this court, is going to review the relevant rulings of the district court on the subject of newspaper publicity, absent a finding of abuse of discretion by that court, the following remarks are directed to that purpose.
2. Defendant had a constitutional right to a fair trial. That trial was, of course, not to be conducted in a vacuum *142in society. It was to be conducted in an environment embracing certain immutable circumstances. It was to be held in a community where there was a free press, which published newspapers for the benefit of the community and the country which recognizes and guarantees the constitutional rights of both the defendant on trial and the press.
Obviously the owner of a newspaper does not create news; it gathers and publishes news. Some persons are more newsworthy than others, dependent upon their activities in life.1 Therefore a metropolitan newspaper would be expected to give little or no attention in its news columns to a court trial of an obscure citizen, who, by his past life and the litigation in which he is engaged, is not newsworthy, while just the opposite result might occur if the circumstances were to the contrary. We gather from the record before us that defendant, based upon his prior experiences, was considered by the Chicago newspapers to be newsworthy. It follows that the newspapers had a right to publish as news any facts pertaining to him, subject to legal redress in libel actions for any abuse in that regard.
Another immutable fact is that a court has a right to conduct a public trial of a criminal case in the community where the defendant resides, even though the public character of the trial makes the proceedings therein accessible and subject to report and comment in newspapers, and over the television and radio.2
It is the duty of the trial court under such circumstances to proceed with the trial, and to take proper steps to the end that the activities of news media do not interfere with defendant’s receiving a fair trial. The question before us is whether the district court performed its duty properly in this respect in this case.
The jurors who heard this case were selected through a screening process which lawyers call the voir dire examination, extending over a period of three days, during which the judge twice ordered them not to read any newspaper, or listen to radio or television, reference to the trial. Indeed, as prospective jurors were being interrogated about reading newspaper articles mentioning defendant, one remarked that the judge had asked them not to read newspapers.
On September 13,1960, during the voir dire examination, defendant made a motion for a mistrial based on newspaper articles of September 12 and 13, because of “adverse publicity * * * in the Chicago daily newspapers * * *
A similar motion was made on the following day when, at the suggestion of defense counsel, the court referred to the fact that he had ordered the jurors not to read the newspapers and that he assumed that the prospective jurors had followed his direction. The court thereupon asked of the jurors:
“I ask each and every one of you, have you followed my direction in that regard?”
A Mrs. Langfeld answered that, while riding on a train, she saw a headline (evidently referring to defendant) on a newspaper held by another passenger. Responding to the court’s inquiry as to whether she could still give defendant a fair and impartial trial and consider the case only on the evidence and the law, the juror answered in the affirmative.
No other juror stated that any newspaper reference to defendant had been seen.
Defendant’s renewed motion for a mistrial was denied.
In his final instructions, the court impressed upon the jury again what he had already orally instructed them during the trial about their duty not to read newspaper articles or listen to anything said *143over the radio or television about the ease.3
Mr. Justice Holmes long ago noted in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, at 251, 31 S.Ct. 2, 6, 54 L.Ed. 1021:
“ * * » jf the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a presumption that they exist, it will be hard to maintain jury trials under the conditions of the present day. * * *»
We said, in United States v. Sorcey, 7 Cir., 151 F.2d 899, 903, certiorari denied, 327 U.S. 794, 66 S.Ct. 821, 90 L.Ed. 1021:
“ * * * we must not permit the integrity of the jury to be assailed by mere suspicion and surmise; it is presumed that the jury will be true to their oath and conscientiously observe the instructions of the court, * * * »
In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242, 77 S.Ct. 294, 300, 1 L.Ed.2d 278, the court said:
“ * * * Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court’s instructions where those instructions are clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little sense. Based on faith that the jury will endeavor to follow the court’s instructions, our system of jury trial has produced one of the most valuable and practical mechanisms in human experience for dispensing substantial justice.”
In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, at 95, 75 S.Ct. 158, 165, 99 L.Ed. 101, the court said :
« * * * Our theosy of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions. * * * ”
We cannot ignore the admonitions of these cases and seize upon suspicion and surmise or the mere opportunity for prejudice as a basis for overturning the verdict of a jury, whose members swore to tiy the case according to the law and the evidence, and who were selected by counsel for both sides after a three-day voir dire examination. The weakness of defendant’s attack upon this verdict is underscored by its ill-advised reliance on Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250, where there was no preliminary admonition to jurors not to read the newspapers, and, during the trial, two newspapers got before a substantial number of the jurors. One reported that defendant had a record of two previous felony convictions, and that he admitted practicing medicine with a $25 diploma he received through the mail. The other repmrted that he acted as a physician and prescribed restricted drugs, and that he once served a term in the Oklahoma penitentiary for forgeiy. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Marshall, at 312, 79 S.Ct. at 1173:
“ * * * We have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character which the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence. * * * ” (Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar the contrasting fact is that there is no affirmative evidence that any juror was exposed to any of the alleged prejudicial newspaper publicity. We have no right to find such exposure in the face of the admonitions of the court and our judicially well-grounded unwillingness to impeach the integrity of the members of a jury by mere suspicion and surmise.
Judge KILEY has cited three times Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, a 1959 decision by the Court of Appeals *144of the District of Columbia. He comes to the conclusion therefrom that in the case at bar the trial judge “should have, by the careful examination of each juror, out of the presence of the others, determined the effect of the articles on those who had read them and whether they had discussed the articles with others.” However, there was a clear factual basis in Coppedge to distinguish it from the case at bar. In that case between the third day of the trial and the beginning of the fourth day thereof, two Washington newspapers published accounts of the trial, including statements made in court, out of the presence of the jury, to the effect that one Clarence Thompkins, a prosecution witness, was distinctly afraid of defendant and refused to testify against him, and that Thompkins saw defendant unmercifully beat, pistol whip and knock the teeth out of Thompkins’ brother. The prosecutor told the court that he thought Thompkins had a reasonable basis for his fear because defendant was a very vicious criminal.
Before the trial resumed, one newspaper account said that defendant was serving a prison term for assault with a deadly weapon on Thompkins’ brother.
When the trial resumed, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, presenting these articles to the court and requesting the court to interrogate the jurors. The court then asked the members of the jury whether any of them had read either of the articles. Four of the regular jurors and one of the alternate jurors raised their hands. The court then told the jury that the articles must not affect their decision and asked if any who had raised his hand thought that he could not bring in a verdict after considering only the evidence and the court’s instructions. No juror indicated by raising of hand that he could not bring in such a verdict.
The court then denied the motion for a mistrial. However, the reviewing court pointed out “prior to the foregoing occurrences the court had not admonished the jurors against reading newspaper articles or listening to broadcast accounts relating to the trial.” It mentioned that the admonition of the trial court to the jury that they not discuss the case with anyone and to keep an open mind did not mention newspaper or newspaper articíes,
The court of appeals also noted that the trial court made no reference to the matter m hls finaI instructions to the jury,
It held that the inquiry made of the jurors by the court concerning their reading of the newspaper articles was not adequate for the protection of the defendant and significantly said that the court knew which of the regular jurors had read the newspaper articles, but no individual inquiry was addressed to these persons as to the possible influence of the article upon each of them. There was no admonition that jurors who had read the articles must not reveal their purport to the remaining jurors. The reviewing court concluded its reasoning upon this point by saying, 272 F.2d at 508,
“ * * * jn view of the nature of the articles the court should have made a careful, individual examination of each of the jurors involved, out of the presence of the remaining jurors, as to the possible effect of the articles. (Italics supplied.)
with the soundness of that holding we have no disagreement, but the court there was confronted with facts fundamentally opposite to those before us in this case, There four jurors admitted that they had read the prejudicial newspaper articles, Here there is no proof, and no contention that there is any proof, that any of the jurors read any of the alleged prejudicial newspaper articles. On the facts the two cases are as different as black and white, Hence the use of Coppedge as authority for the statement that the trial judge in the case at kar should have carefully examined “each juror, out of the presence of the others”, to say the least, is baseless. Further, the suggestion that such individual interviews would have tended to overcome reluctance to speak out implies a belief in the existence of an unusual shyness or an actual feeling of *145guilt on the part of the jurors in this case, when nothing indicates anything but that they were performing their duties with a feeling of responsibility and pride as American citizens.
3. In proving its case, the government introduced defendant’s income tax returns for the years immediately preceding the taxable years involved in the indictment, that is to say for 1940 through 1955, and a summary thereof, showing that for those years he reported a total income of $1,155,584.17 from sources identified only as “miscellaneous” or “various”, or from sources identified by name which were shown to be proceeds from gambling. The returns showed other income from identified sources amounting to $14,200.
Testimony introduced tended to show that in 1949 agent Ned Klein interviewed defendant, his attorney Eugene Bernstein and one Guzik, in the attorney’s office, and that Guzik told the agent that the income reported under the heading “Guzik and Accardo” in the 1946 return and as “Miscellaneous” in the 1947 return was money won on wagers in sporting events and that there were no records of these transactions.
Agent Arthur W. Hill testified that in 1959 he interviewed attorney Bernstein in reference to an item of $20,000 in reported income on defendant’s 1953 return and was told that there was no record thereof and that said return was filed prior to the time that notification to keep adequate records was received, as noted below.
In February 1954, defendant was notified by a registered mail letter that a determination had been made by the Internal Revenue Service that such records as the taxpayer kept had been deemed inadequate by the Service and that the taxpayer was required to keep detailed records of gross amounts received, dates, nature of the transactions and similar details as to deductions.
On October 5, 1955, by letter defendant was requested to give to the district director of internal revenue records supporting the items of income and deductions reported in defendant’s 1954 return. Attorney Bernstein then gave the agent a document purporting to show that such an item, as reflected in the summary aforesaid, of “Mise. Income * * * 20,000.00”, represented horse-race winnings.
The government’s theory was that defendant’s purported employment by Premium was in name only and hence that the deductions claimed for automobile business expenses for 1956, 1957 and 1958 were false; and that defendant thus sought to convey to the Internal Revenue Service the false impression that he was devoting his time and effort to the sale and promotion of beer products, and by this means to interfere with the Service’s investigation and determination of his true tax liability. According to the government’s theory, the motive for defendant’s falsification was to establish records to support income and deductions appearing on his 1954 income tax return, as requested by the Service on October 5,1955.
The evidence offered by the government and admitted, as above referred to, was clearly relevant and no error occurred in that respect. Nothing was said in Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 63 S.Ct. 364, 87 L.Ed. 418, which is inconsistent with the admission of this evidence. In fact, its language clearly supports an affirmance herein. For instance, the court said, at 499, 63 S.Ct. at 368:
“ * * * we would think affirmative willful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as * * * covering up sources of income, * * * and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal, If the tax-evasion motive plays any part in such conduct the offense may be made out even though the conduct may also serve other purposes such as concealment of other crime.”
Judge KILEY recognizes the distinction between the willfulness or bad faith element involved in the deliberate making of a false statement and the making *146of an honest mistake of judgment. The law entrusted to the jury the function of deciding which factor motivated defendant. This was a question of fact, The answer is evident in the verdict, which was approved by the district court,
4. The failure of the government to produce at the trial copies of the W-2 forms which had been attached to defendant’s returns filed for the years in question is not ground for setting aside-the verdict and reversing the judgment below. Evidence showed that, according to government procedure, the W-2 form is removed from the return during the initial processing and forwarded to a processing center in Kansas City, Missouri, where, after a period of time, it is destroyed. The W-2 forms for the years in question would have been destroyed by the time of the trial below. Whether these forms were physically present at the trial is immaterial, because of the fact that they originally accompanied the returns and there was proof at the trial that they reflected the amount of money paid each year to defendant and the amount deducted therefrom for withholding and social security taxes. If they could have been, and were, produced at the trial, their purpose would have been the same as other evidence introduced by the defense for the purpose of proving the contention that defendant was employed as a salesman by Premium Beer Sales. As such it would have been mere y cumu a ive.
The full significance of the missing W-2 forms was established before the jury by other testimony, including that of Marguerite Mahoney, Premium’s bookkeeper, who actually prepared these forms for defendant. In the course of her testimony she said, in effect, that she did not know of any services he performed for Premium.
For the same reasons, the court did not err jn refusing to receive in evidence defendant’s copies of these W-2 forms,
5. For the purpose of proving that defendant rendered no sales or promotional services to Premium, the govemment produced numerous witnesses who, according to the evidence submitted, were in positions to have known if such services had been rendered. They testified to the effect that they knew of none, Numerically they consisted of twenty-five persons, according to the government, or twenty-two persons, according to the defense.
Two of these witnesses were Cutinelli an(j Smetana. Judge KILEY relies upon the action of the district court in not granting a motion of defense counsel f0r the production of an alleged statement by Cutinelli and in refusing to permit defendant to prove that two alleged statements (one by Cutinelli and one by Smetana), not found by the government, were really in existence. He cites 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (b) and (e).4
Eyen if it be admitted argumdo tbat ^ CutineIli and gmetana ora] teflti_ m was inadmigsible; the error in ad_ ^ tbat evidence wag barmless be_ cauge ^ fact intended to be d thereby hag been fuUy ghown by other evidence, overwhelming in its nature, which is admittedly competent. This principle is well-established. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1915 (c).
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. Judge KILEX recognizes that defendant had “publicity value.”

. It is significant that defendant’s counsel made no motion for a change of venue on the ground of pretrial publicity in regard to defendant. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181-194, 72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872.

. “Blembers of the jury, you will recall at the beginning of this trial I instructed and ordered you to refrain from talking with anybody about this ease. I also instructed you not to permit anyone to speak with you about it. I also directed and ordered you not to read any articles about the case that might be printed in the newspapers concerning it, and from listening to anything that might be said over the radio or television about it. I assume that as jurors you have complied with the orders of the Court in this regard.”

. Examination of the trial court transcript reveals that that court painstakingly investigated and made a ruling upon these points and that not less than 33 pages of proceedings are devoted to this matter of Cutinelli and Smetana.