Court Opinion

ID: 9568973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:08.957613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:31.568556
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because it is well settled in this state that a trial judge must charge a defendant’s sole defense, even if no request is made, and failure to do so constitutes reversible error. The majority’s holding stands in direct conflict with an unbroken line of case law pre-dating this court’s decision in Glaze v. State, 2 Ga. App. 704 (58 SE 1126) (1907). In Glaze, the court set forth the principles which have guided Georgia courts for nearly 90 years as follows: “It seems to have been uniformly held by the Supreme Court that the omission to submit the controlling issue in the case to the jury was such an error as demanded the grant of a new trial. And such issue must be submitted with such appropriate instructions as will not only call the attention of the jury to the existence of the issue, but the charge of the court must contain such clear, apt, and definite exposition of the specific principles of law applicable to the case as will enable the jury to deal with the real issue in the case and properly decide it. And this is true whether a specific request be made or not. Where there is only one defense on which a party relies, to fail to instruct the jury as to this defense so specifically that the jury will be not only required to pass upon it, but will be able to do so intelligently under pertinent rules of law and evidence, virtually withdraws that defense, and is, in effect, to direct a verdict.” Id. at 708-709. See also Pearson v. State, 216 Ga. App. 333 (454 SE2d 205) (1995); Animashaun v. State, 207 Ga. App. 156 (2) (427 SE2d 532) (1993); Wells v. State, 200 Ga. App. 104 (1) (407 SE2d 86) (1991); Anglin v. *681State, 182 Ga. App. 635 (2) (356 SE2d 564) (1987). The majority’s reliance on Young v. State, 226 Ga. 553 (176 SE2d 52) (1970), and Micheli v. State, 222 Ga. 361 (149 SE2d 803) (1966), is misplaced because there is no indication in either case that identity was the sole defense. And, we cannot assume that because no other defense was mentioned in those opinions that identity was the sole defense in either case.
Decided March 14, 1996.
Lane & Crowe, Robert L. Crowe, Clyde M. Urquhart, for appellant.
Identification was Hubbard’s sole defense. Although he did not submit a charge thereon, he reserved his right to object to the court’s charge prior to the jury’s deliberations. In any event, we must “consider and review erroneous charges where there has been a substantial error in the charge which was harmful as a matter of law, regardless of whether objection was made hereunder or not.” OCGA § 5-5-24 (c).
While the evidence, viewed in a light to support the verdict, showed that the victim and the perpetrator stood face-to-face for several seconds, the record also revealed that the victim was unable to positively identify Hubbard in the initial photographic lineup. The court charged the jury on credibility and reasonable doubt, but neither of these individual charges nor the charge in its entirety adequately covered the law pertaining to identification as set forth in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, 2d ed., p. 39. Hubbard correctly points out in his brief that there are several factors which the jury may consider in assessing the reliability of an identification. These factors are set forth in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions as follows: the opportunity of the witness to view the alleged perpetrator at the time of the alleged incident; the witness’ degree of attention toward the alleged perpetrator at the time of the alleged incident; the level of certainty shown by the witness about his identification; the possibility of mistaken identity; whether the witness’ identification may have been influenced by factors other than the view the witness claimed to have; and whether the witness, on any prior occasion, did not identify the defendant as the alleged perpetrator.
The trial court’s omission was harmful as a matter of law, requiring the reversal of Hubbard’s conviction and a new trial. Conner v. State, 160 Ga. App. 202 (6) (286 SE2d 441) (1981); Anglin, supra. We may intellectualize away the error, but the harm remains. I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Blackburn and Judge Smith join in this dissent.
*682Glenn Thomas, Jr., District Attorney, George C. Turner, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.