Court Opinion

ID: 9631781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:49:55.922914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:01.150045
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice
(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
The majority finds that the statutory minimum attorney fee provision set forth in AS 23.30.145 is applicable in all controverted claims, and that the claims herein were not controverted so the provision did not apply.
While I concur in the holding regarding the applicability of the attorney fee provision, I do not agree that the subject claims were uncontroverted.
Appellee contends that it filed no notice of controversion and it agreed to pay compensation the day before the hearing on the question of compensation,1 thus this *843was not a controverted claim. Appellant, on the other hand, contends that in fact controversion occurred because of the lapse of almost six' months from the date of death until May 6, 1969, the date the employer sent a telegram to the Board notifying them that compensation would not be contested. Appellant further notes that no payment of compensation was forthcoming until after the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board dated June 17, 1969.2
This court has previously noted that the failure to comply with the statute concerning payment of claims for an extended period of time without reasonable explanation to the Workmen’s Compensation Board must be considered for the purposes of imposing penalties.3 It is an anomaly to hold now that the claims were not controverted where no payments were made from the date of the accident on December 26, 1968, of which appellees immediately received notice, until the order of the Board on June 17, 1969 — even though under law such payments must commence within 14 days after notice of the injury or death— and no indication was given to the Board as to the reason for such a delay.4 I would find as a matter of law that the failure to respond to the claims prior to May 6th constituted a controversion of the claim within the meaning of AS 23.30.-145(a).
A unilateral decision by the employer or its insurance carrier to delay payment in order to make further investigation into the case can only result in hardship to the injured workman and his family. Since the workman’s compensation system is a no fault system designed to facilitate payment and ameliorate the hardship which follows on the job injury and the loss of income, only those delays clearly required under the circumstances of a case should be permitted.
The Workmen’s Compensation Board is the proper body to decide the competing interests necessary to determine whether delays are necessary as asserted.5 If no attempt is made to obtain the Board’s consent to any delay, then the failure to pay must be taken as controversion in those cases where a substantial amount of time has elapsed without explanation.
The majority opinion takes the position that the delay in question was beyond the control of appellee and that the Board made such a finding. I respectfully disagree with this interpretation of the record. While it is apparent the Board accepted appellee’s unsupported allegation that it completed its investigation6 as soon as possible, the Board based its decision on the interpretation of AS 23.30.155(d) that controversion only occurred where the employer said it occurred. Such an interpretation leaves too little protection for the *844injured workman and too much to the procrastination of human beings. Every day can impose additional hardship and embarrassment to the claimant and his family who must pay their bills in spite of the injuries or explain why they can’t do so to creditors or unsympathetic computers.
In the average case the penalty provisions of AS 23.30.155(e) provide little additional protection to the claimant. Prompt payment in the beginning may avert the disaster that a later large sum payment [including penalty] can never rectify.
While the attorney fee is not payable to the claimant, it does permit him to secure legal counsel to aid in the presentation of his claim. Certainly the lapse of time without any indication by the employer of the reason for the delay can cause the attorney to expend considerable unnecessary effort to cover all the possible contingencies of the case. If the case is considered uncontroverted, the Board has discretion to award attorney’s fees for this effort out of the amount awarded to the claimant for his injuries. Thus, the delay can be doubly detrimental to the claimant.
The present result certainly cannot help to encourage attorneys to represent workmen’s compensation claimants. An attorney can only get paid the minimum fee for services rendered if he can convince the Workmen’s Compensation Board that his services had that value, or the requisite notice of controversy has been filed. If not, the attorney may be awarded proportionally less down to a token attorney fee. Why should an attorney undertake representation in this area of the law when he can set his own fees in all other areas of the law? Why should the claimant want one where delay may actually decrease his award ?
Unfortunately, in a large number of claims, no counsel represents the claimant now and they must turn to others without legal training to attempt to present their complaints for them. I view with disquiet this further inroad on the professional responsibilities of lawyers. I feel that the uneven position of a claimant unrepresented by legal counsel who must resolve legal decisions with his employer or his insurance carrier may work to circumvent the purposes of the compensation act.
I concur in the finding that the Board failed to consider the question of costs and that the case should be returned to the Workmen’s Compensation Board for that purpose. However, I would also instruct the Workmen’s Compensation Board to enter a judgment for the mandatory minimum attorney fee for a controverted case.

. The Workmen’s Compensation Board sent the following telegram:
Re Johannes Markestein, James Skel-lenger and Arthur Moen All Deceased against Pan American World Airways scheduled for hearings at Ketchikan on May Eight as local counsel for Pan American World Airways and its workmen’s compensation insurer Travelers Insurance Company we hereby advise you that the defendants are not contesting any of the three claims in question that employment of the above named defendants on the date of their fatl injuries is admissted and that coverage for the employer and jurisdiction under the Alaskan Compensation Law are conceded defendants further *843agree that awards in the respective cases may be made by your Board without need for formal hearings so far as defendants are concerned and upon the basis of whatever proof the Board itself may require for the issuance of a death award on matters of identity of dependents and extent of dependency the foregoing advices will be confirmed by counsel for defendants at Ketchikan on May eight copy of this telegram is being sent to attorney Elster Haile Hanna and Brophy 444 Market St San Francisco Oalif

.The transcript of the compensation hearing reveals that the insurance carrier was given notice of the claims together with proof thereof prior to the date of filing claims on February 10, 1969.

. Cf. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998, 1003-1004 (Alaska 1970).

. AS 23.30.155(d).

. AS 23.30.145 provides that the Board “advises that [when] a claim has been controverted.” Such a provision is unnecessary if a unilateral claim by the employer is sufficient to establish whether or not controversion has occurred.

. It is obvious that appellee had no problem ascertaining the facts concerning the accident. The six month delay was required by defendant to assess its legal position of whether California residents killed in Alaska could claim compensation under the Alaska act.