Court Opinion

ID: 9945735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:05:48.945925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.066739
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                    JACOLBY JARMON ROBERSON,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-2931

                           [February 28, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Lawrence M. Mirman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
562022CF000208A.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Elijah Giuliano and Christine
C. Geraghty, Assistant Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Paul Patti, III, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KUNTZ, J.

   Jacolby Roberson was convicted of aggravated stalking by credible
threat and of aggravated stalking by violation of an injunction. He raises
ten issues on appeal and with one exception we affirm without comment.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to allow the circuit court to
amend the written sentence to conform to the oral pronouncement of his
sentence.

   Relying on Atmore v. State, 242 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018),
Roberson argues the circuit court impermissibly sentenced him on count
one to 10 years as a Prison Releasee Reoffender and a Habitual Felony
Offender. He argues that his 10-year sentence as a Prison Releasee
Reoffender is an illegal sentence, as it exceeds the five-year maximum
sentence for a third-degree felony such as aggravated stalking. The
State responds that his sentence was properly constructed.

   In Atmore, 242 So. 3d at 1202, the trial judge sentenced the defendant
to 10 years in prison and did not indicate “whether the [Prison Releasee
Reoffender] portion of the sentence was only for five years,” which was the
maximum permissible sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender
statute for a third-degree felony. The written sentence did not provide any
clarity. Id. The Second District explained that “[a] trial court may impose
a single sentence pursuant to both the [Prison Releasee Reoffender] and
habitual felony offender (HFO) statutes[,] but the HFO portion of the
sentence must be longer than the PRR portion of the sentence.” Id. (citing
§ 775.082(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015)). Unable to determine whether the trial
court complied with the statutory requirements, the Second District
reversed for the imposition of a new sentence. Id. at 1203.

   Unlike in Atmore, we conclude the circuit court understood that it
needed to divide the portion of the sentence designated as Prison Releasee
Reoffender from the habitual felony offender sentence. The circuit court
stated as much at the oral pronouncement of the sentence. So, we reject
Roberson’s argument that we must reverse for the imposition of a new
sentence. However, we agree with Roberson that the circuit court’s written
sentence is inconsistent on this issue with the oral pronouncement.
Therefore, we reverse in part and remand with instructions to amend the
written sentencing order to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

CONNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                           *         *        *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                    2