Court Opinion

ID: 9650254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:27:49.073463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:19.297080
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge:
This case comes before us on a Commonwealth appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Trial Division, granting defendant-appellee’s motion in arrest of judgment.
*227Appellee was convicted, in a non-jury trial, of recklessly endangering another person, criminal conspiracy, possession of an instrument of crime, simple assault, aggravated assault, and robbery. A motion for a new trial and/or arrest of judgment was filed. The court arrested judgment because of retrospective doubts as to the accuracy of the identification of appellee by the complaining witness. It is not disputed that the complainant’s testimony, if believed, was sufficient to support the verdict. This conclusion defeats a motion in arrest of judgment, for the question to be answered in deciding such a motion, as stated in Commonwealth v. Froelich, 458 Pa. 104, 106, 326 A.2d 364, 365 (1974) is as follows:
“[Whether] accepting all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which, if believed the jury could property have based its verdict; it would be nonetheless insufficient in law to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellee is guilty of the crime charged.”
The Supreme Court made clear in Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 369 A.2d 1266, 1269 (1977) that the same standard applies to a non-jury trial and reversed a trial court who had failed to apply it:
“ . . . [A]n examination of the trial court’s opinion in support of granting the motion in arrest of judgment reveals that the trial court, in passing on that motion, engaged in a weighing of the evidence, rather than determining the absence or presence of that quantum of evidence necessary to establish some proof of the elements of the crimes ... In view of the fact that the initial verdict was guilty, it is apparent that the trial court re-evaluated Ostroff’s credibility and the weight to be assigned thereto. As such, the trial court did not follow the standard articulated above for considering a motion in arrest of judgment, but rather weighed the evidence.
Meadows controls the instant cáse and dictates a reversal of the trial court’s order arresting judgment.
However, appellee also filed a motion for a new trial which was not passed upon by the court below.
*228“Although the assertion that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is not a proper consideration in passing on a motion in arrest of judgment, a criminal defendant may be given a new trial on that ground, and this is true, even where the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. (Citation omitted.)” Commonwealth v. Meadows, supra, 471 Pa. at 1270. The granting of a new trial is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, Commonwealth v. Vogel, 458 Pa. 200, 321 A.2d 633 (1974), and is not foreclosed by the decision on the arrest of judgment alone.
Accordingly, the order arresting judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for disposition of the motion for a new trial.
HESTER, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which PRICE, J., joins.
HOFFMAN and SPAETH, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.