Court Opinion

ID: 9658974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:24:34.826769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:02.580250
License: Public Domain

*168JON P. WILCOX, J.
¶ 50. (concurring). I concur with the majority. However, I write separately to underscore the constitutional framework that governs this review.
¶ 51. This case involves far more than the limits that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution place on the State's authority to punish speech. It also implicates the constitutional guarantees of due process and the right to a jury trial.
¶ 52. The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a criminal defendant "against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged."1 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Closely tied to this guarantee is the right to a jury trial, embodied in the Jury Clauses of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution2 and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.3 In combination, *169these constitutional protections ensure a criminal defendant the right to be free from conviction unless a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she violated every element of the alleged offense. "Thus, although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he [or she] may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
¶ 53. This right would ring hollow if courts were permitted to uphold convictions based on jury instructions that fail to set forth all the elements of the particular crime at issue. Courts instruct juries to decide cases based on the law set forth in the jury instructions. See, e.g., Wis JI — Criminal 100 (Opening Instructions) ("[Y]ou must base your verdict on the law I give you in these instructions."). As this court has explained, "[p]roper jury instruction is a crucial component of the fact-finding process. The jury must determine guilt or guiltlessness in light of the jury charge, and the validity of that determination is dependent upon the correctness, and completeness of the instructions given." State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 290, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997) (citation omitted). If a court fails to instruct the jury regarding a key element of the crime at issue, the court effectively removes that element from the jury's consideration. As to that element, then, the jury is precluded from deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 293. Accordingly, to uphold a conviction under such circumstances would be tantamount to directing a verdict in favor of the State on the omitted element: the court, not the jury, is *170deciding guilt. Pursuant to the Due Process and Jury Clauses, such a result is strictly forbidden.
¶ 54. To be sure, error injury instructions — even constitutional error — can be harmless. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278-81. Harmless error analysis, however, looks to the basis on which the jury rested its verdict. Id. at 279.
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered. . .was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never rendered — no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be — would violate the jury-trial guarantee.

Id.

¶ 55. As explained above, where jury instructions are devoid of explanation regarding an element of an alleged offense, the instructions effectively preclude the jury from rendering a verdict on that element. In such circumstances, there can be no jury verdict on that particular element and, therefore, harmless error analysis — which analyzes cases in terms of the jury verdict — is inapplicable. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 293; see also State v. Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 870, 893A, 532 N.W.2d 423 (1995) ("When a jury does not make a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on an element of the crime, a court cannot conclude that a deficient jury instruction with regard to that element is harmless error."). Accordingly, jury instructions that fail to set forth all the requisite elements of the charged offense always are grounds for reversal. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 293; accord Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 *171("Although most constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error analysis, some will always invalidate the conviction.").
¶ 56. In the present case, Perkins was convicted for violating Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2) for allegedly threatening a judge. As the majority explains, pursuant to the First Amendment and Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the State may not convict a person for uttering threatening words unless that speech is a constitutionally unprotected "true threat." Majority op. at ¶ 17.4 Thus, a key element to Perkins' alleged offense is that the speech at issue was a true threat.
¶ 57. However, the circuit court did not instruct the jury that, prior to returning a guilty verdict, it must find that Perkins' speech was a true threat. That is, the court failed to instruct the jury regarding a key element to Perkins' alleged offense. The jury consequently was entirely precluded from considering that element. Thus, Perkins' conviction does not rest upon a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated every element of the alleged offense.
¶ 58. Indeed, Perkins may be guilty of violating § 940.203(2). The record seems to contain sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. However, it is not the province of this court to hypothesize a guilty verdict that, although possibly supported by the record, a jury never rendered. In light of the constitutionally deficient jury instructions at issue, if this court were to uphold Perkins' conviction, it in effect would be upholding a directed verdict in favor of the State on the issue *172of whether Perkins uttered a true threat. To do so would violate Perkins' constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial. For this reason, this court cannot uphold Perkins' conviction and must remand this case for a new trial.5
¶ 59. I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins this concurrence.

 The Due Process Clause provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

 The Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects this constitutional guarantee against infringement by the states. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

 The Jury Clause of Article I, Section 7 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions [by indictment, or information,] the accused shall enjoy the right. . .to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed." See also Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) (1997 — 98) (codifying the right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings).
*169All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.

 The court further discusses this issue in two companion cases to the present case, also released today. See State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶¶ 22-24, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712; State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶ 31, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725.

 As noted above, a court can determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict and, therefore, dismiss a case as a matter of law. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993); see also majority op. at ¶¶ 47-48. However, such disposition would not be appropriate in the case at hand. Taking into account the substantial evidence which may support a jury finding that Perkins' speech was a true threat, this court must remand this case for a new trial. See majority op. at ¶¶ 48-49.