Court Opinion

ID: 9657228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:17:49.800681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:42.346435
License: Public Domain

GARTZKE, P.J.
(concurring).
I conclude that the trial court properly held that the notes are relevant because they tend to show the complainant had a motive to falsify her accusation and to show she had knowledge of sexual matters. I disagree with the holdings by the trial court and the majority that the notes are not evidence of sexual conduct within the meaning of sec. 972.11(2)(a), Stats. I conclude the notes are such evidence and to exclude them from evidence would deprive defendant of his constitutional right of confron*492tation and that in this particular case, that right overrides the state’s policy of exclusion. Consequently, sec. 972.11 is unconstitutional in its application to the defendant. I therefore agree that the order admitting the notes in evidence should be affirmed.
Our review of a trial court’s ruling on relevancy is limited to whether the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 345, 340 N.W.2d 498, 503 (1983). Defendant offers the notes for two reasons. First, he contends that the notes are admissible to show that his daughter has fabricated the three alleged assaults to retaliate for his threatening to disclose to her mother the fact that she had written them. Second, he contends that the notes are admissible to show that his eleven-year-old daughter was knowledgeable about sexual matters.
The trial court held that the notes were admissible for the reasons defendant relies upon. The state argues that the notes are inadmissible under sec. 972.11(2), Stats., but makes no contention that the notes are irrelevant. It is well, however, that we emphasize the relevancy in view of the reasons why defendant wants the jury to read them.
Evidence tending to show a complaining witness has a motive to falsify a charge of sexual assault is relevant. The credibility of a witness is always relevant when the facts are in dispute. A criminal defendant on cross-examination has the right to bring out the motives of the state’s witnesses. State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 446-48, 247 N.W.2d 80, 92-93 (1976). Evidence that a witness has a motive to lie is therefore admissible, subject to limitations imposed on its use and the discretion of the trial court. State v. Williamson, 84 Wis. 2d *493370, 383, 267 N.W.2d 337, 343 (1978); Penister v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 94, 102-03, 246 N.W.2d 115, 120 (1976).
Accordingly, evidence of prior sexual conduct is relevant if it tends to show that the complainant has a motive to falsely accuse a defendant of a sexual assault. See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981) (defendant entitled to show that complainant had been previously charged with prostitution and that her claim he raped her was motivated by a desire to avoid further prosecution); Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1985) (father entitled to show his thirteen-year-old daughter wanted to punish him because he terminated her sexual relationship with her brother); State v. Jalo, 557 P.2d 1359,1360 (Cr. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant entitled to testify that ten-year-old falsely accused him because he had learned of her sexual conduct with others and had told her he would inform her parent). See also Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal to a Second Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986) (evidence of complainant’s prior sexual conduct which provides motive to fabricate charge is “highly probative” as to complainant’s veracity); and Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 85 Wis. L. Rev. 1219,1244 (1985) (evidence of prior sexual conduct relevant if it exposes complainant’s motive to falsely accuse defendant of sexual assault).
Evidence of a child’s prior sexual conduct may be relevant to the child’s knowledge about sexual contact and therefore to the question whether the contact occurred. The evidence tends to counter a natural inference that the charged assault occurred because a child complainant is not expected to know about sexual matters. 85 Wis. L. Rev. at 1234, and cases at n. 55. The *494value of such evidence has been questioned. See, e.g., People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Mich. 1982) (evidence has low probative value except for young and inexperienced child and other evidence may suffice); Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d at 400-401 n. 10 (evidence may be relevant under limited circumstances).
Since the notes are relevant, the question is whether they are inadmissible under Wisconsin’s Rape Shield statute, sec. 972.11, Stats. That statute applies because defendant is accused of a crime under sec. 940.225, Stats., sexual assault.
Section 972.11(2)(b), Stats., provides in relevant part:
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225, any evidence concerning the complaining witness’s prior sexual conduct or opinions of the witness’s prior sexual conduct and reputation as to prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the jury, except the following, subject to s. 971.31(11):
1. Evidence of the complaining witness’s past conduct with the defendant.
2. Evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury suffered.
3. Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the complaining witness.
(c) Notwithstanding s. 901.06 [pertaining to limited admissibility], the limitation on the admission of evidence of or reference to the prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness in . par. (b) applies regardless of the purpose of the admission or *495reference unless the admission is expressly permitted under par. (b)l, 2 or 3.
The first note, beginning “Dear Spiencer,” is an explicit statement of a past desire for sexual intercourse. The second note, the “kissing license,” is at least a sexual fantasy and perhaps a proposal for a sexual encounter short of intercourse.
Each note fails to qualify under any of the three exceptions listed in sec. 972.11(2)(b)l, 2 and 3, Stats. Neither note is evidence of the daughter’s past conduct with the defendant, neither is proposed to be used in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injuries suffered, and neither is proposed evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault.
The question is then whether these notes constitute evidence concerning the daughter’s “prior sexual conduct.” The answer turns on the definition of “sexual conduct” in sec. 972.11(2)(a), Stats., which provides:
“[S]exual conduct” means any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of the complaining witness, including but not limited to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement and life-style.
The elements of “sexual conduct” so defined are (1) conduct or behavior (2) relating to (3) sexual activities (4) of the complaining witness.1
*496It is easier to work from the elements by ignoring their numerical sequence. There is no disputing the fact that the fourth element is met: defendant’s daughter wrote the notes and she is the complaining witness.
When fixing the meaning of remaining statutory elements of “sexual conduct,” care must be taken to give effect, if possible, to every word. Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp. v. DNR, 84 Wis. 2d 32, 44, 268 N.W.2d 153, 158 (1978). The meaning of “conduct or behavior” must therefore differ from that of “sexual activity.” We are, of course, to give the words their ordinary and common meaning, and we use a recognized dictionary for that purpose. Id.
The second statutory element is “sexual activities.” “Activities” describes a broad range of human functions. Merriam-Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1976) defines “activity” not only as a “physical motion or exercise of force” but also as a “process (as searching, desiring, learning or writing) that actually or potentially *497involves mental function.” This is consistent with everyday speech. People commonly refer to “physical activities” and “mental activities.” The only modification or limitation on “activities” in sec. 972.11(2) (a), Stats., is that they must be sexual, and no dictionary is necessary to understand that word. I find irresistible the conclusion that “sexual activities” as used in sec. 972.11(2) (a) includes an individual’s sexual mental activity, such as sexual desire or fantasy, as well as physical acts or motions such as touching or sexual intercourse.
I turn next to the first element of the definition: “conduct or behavior.” According to Merriam-Webster, so far as is pertinent, “conduct” is “behavior in a particular situation or relation or on a specified occasion.” According to the same authority, “behavior” has various definitions, including “anything that an organism does that involves action and response to stimulation (2): the response of an individual... to the whole range of factors constituting its environment.”
The second element, “relating to” is far broader than “is” which usually connotes an equivalence. According to Merriam-Webster’s Third International Dictionary, the verb “relate” in its pertinent sense means “to be in relationship: have reference .... ” Use of the verb “relate” is another indication that “conduct or behavior” is different from “sexual activities.”
Since the statute distinguishes between “conduct or behavior” and “sexual activity” and requires the former only to “relate” to the latter, I conclude that “conduct or behavior,” for purposes of the definition, need not be sexual. Writing, speaking, and describing are therefore forms of conduct or behavior, within the meaning of the statute. Such conduct or behavior is sexual conduct if it relates to sexual activities, including sexual desires or *498fantasies. Again, the conduct or behavior may be solitary as well as that between two persons.
I therefore conclude that “sexual conduct,” for purposes of sec. 972.11(2) (a), Stats., includes a complainant’s statements, written or oral, describing or expressing the complainant’s sexual desires or fantasies.
I reach this conclusion on the basis of the usual and ordinary meaning of the words used in sec. 972.11(2) (a), Stats. For that reason, I have not employed the rules of statutory construction, those are to be applied only to ambiguous statutes and not to create ambiguities. State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. WCCJ, 73 Wis. 2d 237, 241, 243 N.W.2d 485, 487 (1976). Hence, the rule of construction which requires us to avoid a constitutional objection, State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 165, 388 N.W.2d 565, 570 (1986), is inapplicable.
I return to the notes at issue and summarize my conclusions. Defendant’s daughter, the complainant, wrote the notes. Each note expresses a sexual desire or fantasy. A sexual desire or sexual fantasy is a sexual activity. I conclude that each note is evidence of “conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of the complainant” within the meaning of sec. 972.11(2) (a), Stats. Each note therefore constitutes evidence of “prior sexual conduct” of the complainant. Because neither note comes within an exception to the general exclusion, each is inadmissible in evidence by virtue of sec. 972.11(2) (b).
An examination of the constitutionality of the statutory exclusion from evidence, as applied to this particular defendant, is necessary.
Every defendant has a sixth amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The *499sixth amendment is applicable to the states. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).
The primary right secured by the confrontation clause is the opportunity to test the truth of testimony by cross-examination. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. This includes cross-examination “directed to revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.” Id. The right of confrontation must, however, be balanced against the state’s interest in prohibiting the use of evidence for purposes of cross-examination. If confrontation is paramount to the state’s policy, then a statute prohibiting the use of the evidence is unconstitutional. Id. at 320.
Because a constitutional right is involved, the court of appeals should determine whether the state’s interest in its rule of evidence is paramount to defendant’s right to confront the witness with the notes. The historical facts are undisputed. Under such circumstances an appellate court has a duty to determine whether a “constitutional fact” exists. See e.g., State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715-16, 345 N.W.2d 457, 465 (1984) (if the historical facts are undisputed, voluntariness of confession independently reviewed by appellate court), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, Woods v. Clusen, 605 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Wis. 1985), aff’d, 794 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1986). Although the task before us involves a balancing, it is one involving conflicting policies and rights. An appellate court ought to be able to perform that function as well as a trial court, if, as here, the facts are established.
Defendant’s right to use the notes his daughter made far outweighs the state’s interest in its “prior sexual conduct” evidentiary rule. Defendant is accused of *500three counts of first-degree sexual assault, sec. 940.225(1), Stats., a Class B felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding twenty years on each count. The evidence has substantial probative force, even “highly probative” force. Galvin, supra. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant’s daughter, an eleven-year-old girl, could fear that her mother would be distraught and angry and likely to take corrective and possibly punitive measures on learning her child wrote the notes. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant’s daughter would be strongly motivated to distract her mother’s concern from correction and perhaps punishment to sympathy, and might invent an outrageous wrong to create that sympathy.2
Consequently, unless some other method exists by which the forcefulness of the probative value of the notes could be brought to the attention of the jury through some substituted evidence, the exclusionary rule embraced in sec. 972.11(2), Stats., is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant, because it violates his right to confront her with the evidence.
My conclusion regarding the constitutionality of sec. 972.11(2), Stats., is limited to its application to defendant. I do not conclude that sec. 972.11(2) is unconstitutional on its face or under all circumstances.3
*501Other courts have reached conclusions similar to mine. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the state’s policy to protect a sex crime complainant must be subordinated to a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. State v. Jalo, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). In Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 187-88 (Mass. 1981), the Massachusetts supreme judicial court concluded the state’s rape shield statute exclusionary rule must give way to the constitutionally-based right to effective cross-examination. The case was remanded for the trial court to exclude specific evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct insofar as was possible without infringing the defendant’s right to show bias. In Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), the court reversed and remanded for a hearing on whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and whether alternative means existed for proving bias or motive or to challenge credibility.4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the state’s rape shield law was unconstitutional to the extent it prohibited the admission of evidence properly attacking the credibility of the defendant’s thirteen-year-old daughter.
I therefore join the majority opinion only as to the result it reaches on the admissibility of the evidence at issue. I respectfully but emphatically disagree with the *502majority’s reasoning and the precedent it establishes, which, in my view, unnecessarily and disastrously affects the scope of Wisconsin’s Rape Shield Statute.

 None of the cases relied upon by the majority is useful. None of the jurisdictions in which those cases were decided has a definition of “sexual conduct” similar to that in sec. 972.11(2)(a), Stats. Neither People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 1982), nor People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 128 (Mich. 1984), assists us, since the Michigan statute, sec. MSA 188. Sec. 28.788(1) et seq., excludes evidence of the victim's "sexual conduct" without defining the term. *496State v. Smith, 263 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. App. 1980), involves North Carolina Rule 412(a), which defines “sexual behavior” as “sexual activity of the complainant other than the sexual act which is at issue in the indictment on trial” and does not distinguish between “conduct or behavior” on the one hand, and “sexual activities” on the other. State v. Durham, 327 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. App. 1985), is unhelpful for the same reason. Snider v. State, 412 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 1980), rests on Ind. Code sec. 35-1-32.5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), where victim’s past sexual conduct is inadmissible but not defined. Bobo v. State, 589 S.W.2d 5 (Ark. 1979), relies on Ark. Crim. Code sec. 41-1810.3, stating “ ‘sexual conduct’ means deviate sexual activity, sexual contact, or sexual intercourse.” Section 41-1801 defines narrowly each of these terms. State v. Zaehringer, 280 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979), applied Iowa Rule of Evidence 412(d), which defines “past sexual behavior” as “sexual behavior other than sexual behavior with respect to which sexual abuse is alleged.”

 That the jury in the first trial could not reach a unanimous conclusion supports the possibility that at least some jurors were influenced by the notes.

 Nor have I found it necessary to narrow Wisconsin’s Rape Shield Statute to save its constitutionality. The legislature adopted an extraordinarily broad statute. When declaring that all evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct (with three exceptions) is never probative, the legislature assumed the risk of the statute’s unconstitutional application under some circumstances. At least one other jurisdiction has found a remedy for the problem. See Fed. Rule of *501Evid. Rule 412(b)(1) (evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior is inadmissible unless it “is constitutionally required to be admitted.”) Other jurisdictions have saved Rape Shield Statutes from the partial destruction imposed by this majority. They did so as I would: by finding the statutes unconstitutional only in application as to a particular defendant.

 Because it is the nature of the notes which makes them admissible, I would not remand for such finding.