Court Opinion

ID: 9524257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:51:05.51748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:11.277001
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
1. Under Minn.Stat. § 357.09, subds. 1(3), 8 (1986), sheriffs may collect fees calculated as a percentage of any “collection on execution after levy.” When the parties settle after levy but before adjudication of exemption claims asserted by the debtors, is the sheriff entitled to compute fees from the amount of the settlement? The trial court held that he is, following the practice endorsed by attorney general opinions dating back to 1915. I agree, and would therefore reverse the court of appeals.
2. The majority rests on construction of the word “collection,” which it finds under common usage to mean payment in some form to the creditor following levy. I have no real quarrel with that analysis, but question whether it is our role to impose this new construction under these circumstances.
Though no Minnesota appellate court has addressed the question, four attorney general opinions from 1915 through 1944 ruled the sheriffs fee should be computed on the amount realized by the judgment creditor on settlement with the debtor after levy but before sale. See, e.g., Op. Atfy Gen. 224 (Oct. 30,1944). This court traditionally affords these opinions careful consideration and weight, particularly when they are long-standing. Governmental Research Bureau v. St. Louis County, 258 Minn. 350, 357, 104 N.W.2d 411, 416 (1960). Calculations of fees on the settlement amount has apparently been standard practice for at least 70 years; public officials have reasonably relied on this policy.
The legislature itself must have been aware of the attorney general opinions and *85the policy they express, yet it failed to alter or clarify the statute despite numerous opportunities. The statute has been amended 13 times since 1913, and the language “collection on execution after levy” has remained unchanged. See Minn.Stat. § 5762, subd. 5 (1913). If the legislature has not seen fit to modify longstanding construction of the statute, amendment by judicial decision now seems unwarranted.
3. Nor am I convinced that the policy reasons supporting the attorney general opinions have evaporated over time. The rationale for those decisions was a concern that judgment creditors and debtors might settle just before sale and “defeat the sheriff from reaping the fruits of his official action.” Op.Att’y Gen. 148 (Jan. 30, 1915). The majority notes that sheriffs formerly depended on these fees for their livelihood, but are now paid a salary which vitiates their dependence on fee income. Since 1965, however, sheriffs have been required to pay all fees over to the county. See Minn.Stat. § 387.20, subd. 5 (1986). I fail to understand why we should be any less concerned that the county — rather than the individual officer — might lose the “fruits” of its official action.
The majority seems to say that the sheriff, hence the county, really does nothing for the judgment creditor unless he actually delivers funds. I think this ignores the service provided when a creditor uses the sheriffs office to commence levy activities and thereby gains leverage for settlement. Limiting the fee calculation to funds actually received undervalues the county’s effort. That was true in 1915 when the fee went to the officer, and it remains true today when the feé goes into public funds.
4. In my view, the legislature is the proper body to alter the long-held understanding of this statute.