Court Opinion

ID: 9774132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:09:37.081958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:02.646269
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
Appellee has filed a motion for rehearing, in which he says :
“In its opinion, this Court has held that on the date of final separation of the parties, Appellee was guilty of- misconduct that was sufficient to erase any condonation by Appellant of prior misconduct. The testimony upon which this holding was made is set out in the opinion, and is to be found in the statement of facts at pages 4 and 5. Ap-pellee readily admits that if such testimony is believed and accepted as true the conclusion drawn from it by this Court is accurate, and supported by the authorities cited. Barta v. Barta [Tex.Civ.App.], 283 S.W. 201, Austin; Redwine v. Redwine [Tex.Civ.App.], 198 S.W.2d 472, Amarillo.
“This evidence is uncorroborated,, however, and is completely unsupported except by the testimony of Appellant. The trial judge did not accept such testimony as credible and found' the facts to the contrary.”
Appellee sat in the courtroom and heard appellant testify. He did not deny her version of the separation. This 'raises, a strong inference that he could not deny it. Furthermore appellee partially verified the incident by this testimony:
“Q. You heard her testify this, morning you accused her of going out with other men when you would come in from these trips; just start in the ‘ minute you walked in doing that. Do, you deny doing that? A. Yes.
“Q. You didn’t do that? A. No, I would not say I started in accusing her the minute I walked in the door.
*242“Q. But the course of the week-end, you did accuse her? A. At various times, I probably have. I will not say every week-end, as explained here. I don’t believe that and she doesn’t either.
"Q. But several times that is so? A. That’s right.
“Q. And you did have a jealous nature, as you say, and you have demonstrated that in the form of a temper; is that right? A. I have a temper, I guess, just like you or anyone else has one. .
“Q. And on those occasions you have said’ pretty mean things about her and to her; isn’t that right? A. Yes,
I am'not going to deny that I have said things that I wish I had not. Yes. .

‘•‘Q. Nevertheless, on this occasion when she left you, you did immediately start asking her why she was not home the night before when you called; is that right? A. Yes, I did.
“Q. You didn’t give her a chance to explain either, did you? A. I don’t recall whether I did or not. .
“Q. And that conversation kept up like that until you got home; is that right? A. I don’t have too good a memory of what went on. I remember ■ when we got to the house and she left, I was so astounded I didn’t know what was going on.
“Q. She walked on right down the street? A. That’s right.”
We adhere to our ruling that the finding of the trial court in this regard is against the weight of the evidence.
Appellee makes the following statement in his argument in support of this motion:
“After considering the opinion of this Court and the result of its deci-
sion, appellee has arrived at the conclusion that they constitute a reflection on either the good faith or the ability of the trial judge.”
We .have final fact jurisdiction conferred by Section 6, Art. 5, of the Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St. In exercising this jurisdiction it is our duty to':
“consider and weigh all of the evidence in the case and to set aside the verdict and remand the cause for a new trial, if it thus concludes that the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust — this, regardless of whether ’ the record contains some ‘evidence of probative force’ in support of the verdict. ' See cases cited, supra. The evidence supporting the verdict is to .be weighed along with the other evidence in the case, including, that ' which is contrary to the verdict.” In re King’s Estate (King v. King), ISO Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661.
This we have done, nothing less nothing more. Unless we abandon our jurisdiction in this respect we could not do less than we have done. We feel certain that the trial court does not share in appellee’s unfounded conclusion.
Appellee ha's ' an. alternative prayer in which he asks that we render judgment of divorce for appellant and reverse the cause' as to other issues.
Appellee states that on the trial he “refrained from making any attack on his wife and her faults and shortcomings, other than those that were immediately involved in their domestic difficulty.”
We construe this as intimating the case was not fully developed. A remand is proper under such circumstances.
The motion is overruled.