Court Opinion

ID: 9848304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:16:20.275632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:12.152519
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
Being of the view that the issues in this cause were correctly decided below, I most respectfully dissent. Prior to July 7, 1970, the particular area of Myrtle Beach was zoned as “single family residential” by the City of Myrtle Beach. On that date, the city amended its zoning ordinance, over the objection of at least some of the appellants in this proceeding, so as to permit condominiums in the area. It is true that Forest Dunes Subdivision has developed basically, but not exclusively, as a single family residence neighborhood, there having been some violations of the zoning ordinance. It is clearly inferable that it so developed because of the zoning ordinance rather than because of anything contained in the restrictive covenants.
As I see it, the appellants, in essence, are asking the Court to do what the city has declined to. do: to-wit: keep the area zoned for “single family residence” purposes. They correctly concede that the phrase “for residential purposes only” does not limit the use of these lots to single family dwellings, because such phrase has been almost universally interpreted to designate the character of the use and not the *79quantity, and that such phrase alone would not ordinarily limit the number of units on a lot so long as they are used as residences. 26 C. J. S. Deeds § 164(3) (c), p. 1121; 14 A. L. R. (2d) 1403.
Appellants argue, however, that the proposed use of the lots is not residential in character, but commercial, and that the use of the word “residence” in the singular, rather than the plural, in two places in the restrictions has the effect of limiting the use of the lots to “single family residential use”. No in point authority is cited for either of these contentions.
With the possible exception of Nance v. Waldrop, 258 S. C. 69, 187 S. E. (2d) 226, which I conceive to be clearly distinguishable factually, none of the authorities cited in the majority opinion are, I think, in point or supportive of the result reached. In my view, there is nothing in the restrictions that can soundly be construed as precluding the construction of an apartment building in the area, or limiting the size thereof.
Although condominiums were not known in South Carolina at the time the restrictions were written, apartment buildings certainly were. It seems clear to me that the proposed condominium is not nearly so commercial in its characteristics as would be an apartment building of the same size. Had the developer intended or contemplated restricting the lots to use for the purpose of “single family residences” or to either prohibit or limit the size of apartment buildings, it would have been relatively simple to so expressly state. The construction placed upon a contract by the parties themselves is, of course, entitled to weight, but the development of the area as primarily one of single family residences perforce the zoning ordinance of the City of Myrtle Beach throws no light whatever on the intention of the parties.
*80The weight of well reasoned authority is in accord with the following language from 26 C. J. S. Deeds § 163, p. 1102:
“The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms, even to accomplish what it may he thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at the time when the restriction was written.’1 (Emphasis added.) See Forest Land Co. v. Black, 216 S. C. 255, 57 S. E. (2d) 420.
It is still the settled rule in this jurisdiction that restrictions as to the use of real estate should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of free use of the property, subject, however, to the provision that this rule of strict construction should not be applied so as to defeat the plain and obvious purpose of the instrument. It follows, of course, that where the language of the restrictions is equally capable of two or more different constructions that construction will be adopted which least restricts the use of the property. McDonald v. Welborn, 220 S. C. 10, 66 S. E. (2d) 327; Maxwell v. Smith, 228 S. C. 182, 89 S. E. (2d) 280; Cothran v. Stroman, 246 S. C. 42, 142 S. E. (2d) 368; Baltz, Inc. v. R. V. Chandler & Co., 248 S. C. 484, 151 S. E. (2d) 441; Edwards v. Surratt, 228 S. C. 512, 90 S. E. (2d) 906. Neither the appellants nor the majority opinion point to any language in the restrictions expressing a “plain and obvious purpose” to restrict the use of lots in the area to “single family residences only”, and no such plain and obvious purpose being reflected in the restrictions, there is no occasion for us to refrain from applying the rule of strict construction.
In conclusion, the proposed condominium is basically and fundamentally residential in nature and there is, I submit, nothing in the record to indicate that it has o.r will come to have such commercial aspects as constitute a violation *81of the restriction that the property be used for “residential purposes only”. Certainly, the provision of certain minimal facilities for the joint use of the various owners of the condominium units does not make the project a commercial o,ne. Estimated cost of the individual two and three bedroom units ranges from sixty thousand dollars to one hundred thousand dollars per unit. There is no evidence in the record that the rental of any of these units is contemplated. While some rentals will no doubt occur, the very cost of the units suggests the likelihood that any rentals will be minimal.
Brailsford, J., concurs.