Court Opinion

ID: 9544679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:59:14.798786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:25.657899
License: Public Domain

*332CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
Because of my doubts as to the correctness of the rule espoused in the opinion of Justice Wade, and the perplexities attendant upon the allocation of rights in underground waters, I desire to express some ideas on this subject which are not touched upon therein.
The difficulty with his opinion is that it appears to be grounded upon the assumption of an absolute right in a prior user of underground water to have not only the water, but also to have the pressure and the means of diversion preserved inviolate.
It seems to me that it is always an illusion to regard any right as absolute. A right may be so assertable under some circumstances, but not under others. All rights in property, and personal liberties, or even the right to life itself are subject to limitations, or to forfeiture under certain conditions.
Because our state is comparatively dry and arid, from the earliest times it has been the policy of our law to encourage in every possible way the discovery and development of water and the broadest and most continuous application to useful purposes. There is no resource more ’vitally affecting the public interest than the waters of our state. It is clearly established by both statute and decisional law that all water resources, including underground water diffused in the soil, belong to the public,1 and the rights to use it are appropriable by private individuals only to the extent and under conditions prescribed by law.2 Inasmuch as these rights are assured and protected by the authority of the state, it is both logical and necessary that they be deemed to be held subject to such conditions and limitations as are established by law for the general good.
It is because of the foregoing that I doubt the wisdom of seeking solutions to problems such as the instant ones in such a generality as a rule that a prior user has the absolute right not only to the water, but to have preserved to him the pressure and the means of diversion under all circumstances. Such a rule may seem easy for the court to apply to rid itself of immediate problems, but it is far from easy in practical operation. More important, it does not serve the fundamental purpose of our water law of providing for the fullest conservation and the highest development of water by making it available to all users in the most convenient and economical way. The rule is impractical because in some instances it would produce these bad effects: (1) it would compel wasteful exposures at and mear the surface and/or wasteful drainage from the basin; (2) the foregoing would result be*333cause in some instances it would be too expensive for later users to pay the cost of lifting their own water and also to bear the expense of maintaining pressure for all prior appropriators; and (3) the problem of administering the allocation of the costs of doing so would be insuperable.
Reference to the decisions of this court will reveal that it has in the past reasonably and properly adjusted the rules of law to meet problems as they arose pertaining to the use of water. When contention first arose as to rights in underground waters the view was entertained that water was part of the soil, and that the ownership of it was absolute in the property owner. An early decision on underground water, Sullivan v. Northern Spy Min. Co.,3 held that one discovering and improving percolating waters on public land by such act acquired the permanent right to use such water, which became an easement against a later owner who acquired the land from the government. But the court stated by way of dictum that percolating waters were not to be treated the same as other waters after the land becomes privately owned because they then belong to the landowner, and further: “this right of an appropriator is, of course, subject to the rule of law which will permit the owner to sink an adjoining well on his own premises, although he should thereby dry up that of the first appropriator.” This rule of absolute ownership of percolating waters by the landowner was applied in holding that when he commenced the use of a well on his own land, he had a right to it even against adjoining owners who had wells prior in time.4
The impracticability and unfairness of permitting a later well digger to take the water from an earlier one was realized and the court used its good sense and ingenuity in dealing with the problem by departing from the ancient idea of absolute ownership with the land by requiring a reasonable and beneficial use of water.5 Thereafter a rule known as “correlative rights,” was applied. It is clearly stated in Horne v. Utah Oil Refining:6
“ * * * where the water is put to a beneficial use, each party in the arte-sian district, if the water is necessary for his use, is entitled to a proportionate share according to his surface area as compared with the whole.”
*334The doctrine that rights to use underground waters must he correlative to the surface area owned and reasonable use in connection therewith prevailed until the Wrathall v. Johnson 7 and Justesen v. Olsen 8 cases in 1935, in which the court announced that although the 1903 water filing act had not theretofore been construed as-applicable to underground water, such water in defined underground artesian basins or channels were public waters and subject to that act. But it was implied that other waters diffused in the soil and not so classified were still not appropriable under the act.
The two cases just referred to made sug--gestions for legislative changes. Pursuant thereto the legislature made these amendments and additions:
Sec. 100-1-1, R.S.U.1933 (now 73-1-1, U.C.A.1953) was amended to read: “All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.”
Sec. 100-3-1, R.S.U.1933 (now 73-3-1, U.C.A.1953) was amended to read: “Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water * * * shall be recognized except [upon] application * * * to the state engineer * * *."
In Riordan v. Westwood 9 it was held that underground water had always been public water and the earlier cases holding there was absolute ownership in the owner of the land were wrong.
The effect of the view represented by the majority opinion is that the pendulum of the law relating to underground waters has by a somewhat tortuous process swung from the pristine view that the landowner had absolute right to the waters in his soil to the opposite extreme that the prior user has absolute and inviolable rights in the water. I subscribe to neither of these extremes, but believe the principles upon which a fair and practicable method of allocating and administering rights in underground waters is to be found somewhere in between them.
The difficulty with preserving to the prior user the absolute right to water and also to the pressure and means of diversion is that projecting its application to basins where there are a great number of users reveals that it does not work to serve the necessary purpose of maximum development and use of water. The evidence indicates and it is a well-known and observable fact, that *335when the water table of an underground basin is maintained at a high enough level to sustain pressure in flowing wells in the higher areas, there will be water above and near the surface in the lower areas forming ponds, marshes and swamps. This results in wasteful losses from surface evaporation and from consumption by water-loving plants, tules, reeds and rushes, indigenous to such areas, which are of little or no value. There is often further wastage from drainage of the basin by streams or by leakage and seepage out of it.
Under a rule of absolute right to water and pressure, there are other difficulties to be encountered in allocating all the usable water to users. This can best he explained by an example suggested by counsel: suppose a given district, such as the Milford district, covers an underground water basin of about 90 square miles, and that it has about 125 wells pumping which annually withdraw about 40,000 acre feet, lowering the water table about 40 feet. The priorities of the 125 wells would, of course, be at scattered dates. Suppose further that there is still unappropriated water in the basin. Each new appropriator would have the effect of causing some additional reduction in the water table, and each would have to pay tribute to that extent to each of 125 prior appropriators. Furthermore, as additional well owners were added, it would become increasingly more complicated and difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine just whose well caused the water table to drop, and how much; and likewise whether it impaired the flow of others, and to what extent. The administrative problems relating to the determination of costs of maintaining pressure for prior users, and allocation against later users, would be insuperable. In addition thereto the cost imposed upon the initiator of a new well might be prohibitive, so that even where there was unused water in the basin it would not be put to use. The various difficulties just discussed make it apparent that it is quite impractical to insure to prior appropriators not only the amount of water they claim, but also the right to have the same pressure maintained as when they made the original appropriation.
In any approach to determination of rights in underground water it is necessary to get rid of any illusions about the quantity of water available and to face the fact that no water is created by simply driving pump wells deeper and deeper and pursuing the water level down in the basin. The water is replenished only from surface sources. Primarily it must come from precipitation, but it may also flow or drain into the basin from- other areas. The replenishment provides only so much water in any year’s water cycle. This is aptly referred to as the “average annual recharge.”
The underground basin may be likened to any surface lake or reservoir. If the users take more than the recharge, the result is *336that they have to compete with each other in pursuing the water table down by digging deeper and deeper wells to pump it away from each other. It is obvious that this becomes a vicious circle of competition, ever more burdensome and expensive and without any advantage except a temporary one to the user with the deepest well, until someone digs below him, or to the one with the most money and determination to grab the water away from others. This would result finally in pursuing the lake, reservoir or water table down to its bottom, where there would be available only the amount of the annual recharge anyway. The sensible and practical thing is to have a determination made of what the annual recharge of the basin is, based on a study of a sufficient cycle of years, and so allocate the withdrawal of water as to prevent wasteful evaporation or drainage and to keep it from going below some reasonable level which would keep down the difficulty and expense to users in obtaining their water. This would correlate with recognition of rights and allowance of withdrawals on the basis of priority in the same general pattern as is followed with respect to rights in surface waters. Well owners would be allowed to draw the water down to the level which would be the most practical and economical for all users.
In approaching the desired objective the users may have to vary their means of diversion or to put forth such effort as the State Engineer may determine to be reasonably necessary to get their water. In a surface reservoir, for instance, while the various water users are entitled to their water, no particular user is entitled to a vested right in a full reservoir. All must cooperate reasonably so that all the water may be used. Only by so managing the underground water table can the Engineer obtain the highest potential of the water in the basin. It seems a good deal more practical and reasonable for each to be required to extend some cooperation than to permit some prior user or users to insist upon pressure under all circumstances in a “dog in the manger” way so as to make it impractical and perhaps impossible for later users to get the benefit of unappropriated water.
It is appreciated that such supervision and management of water in á basin would present difficulties and perhaps could not be accomplished to perfection. Nevertheless, if the purpose of our water law of obtaining the fullest and best use of water is to be accomplished, these difficulties must be faced up to and dealt with by the best means at our command. The legislature has recognized the technical difficulties inherent in the allocation of waters and has given the State Engineer, who is best qualified for the task, the duty of general administrative supervision of waters of the state *337and the measurement, appropriation, apportionment and distribution thereof.10
In fairness I must concede that the language of Sec. 73-3-23, U.C.A.1953: “ * * * In all cases replacement shall be at the sole cost and expense of the applicant” may reasonably be given the meaning espoused by the majority opinion. But that is only half of the sentence; it continues, “* * * and subject to such rules and regulations as the state engineer may prescribe.” However, the preceding language, which provides the foundation for “replacement” states, that “the right of replacement is hereby granted to any junior appropriator whose appropriation may diminish the quantity or injuriously affect the quality of [prior] appropriated underground water. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) Thus granting the junior appropriator the right of replacement does not necessarily make it mandatory that he maintain pressure and means of diversion under all circumstances. I do not regard the case of Hanson v. Salt Lake City 11 referred to in the main opinion as so holding. The court was much concerned about the difficulties involved in giving Hanson, a senior appropriator, absolute right to water and pressure, and he was refused redress against the city for interference with the flow of his well. I agree that this was based partly on the fact that he had not established the right to as much water and pressure as he claimed and that he was actually getting adequate water by means of a pump. A reservation was expressed as to whether a prior appropriator could use waters inefficiently and deprive others of them. My interpretation of that case is that the prior appropriator gets the right to use the water and to such means of diversion as is reasonably efficient and does not cause undue waste of water.
It is of vital significance, insofar as the authority of the Hanson case is concerned, that Justices Wolfe and Latimer in concurring opinions pointed out that prior appropriators of underground water should not be deemed to get an absolute right to pressure, but only to the water; and that the means of diversion must be reasonable and consistent with the state of development of water in the area and not inimical to the overall purpose of putting all of the usable water in the basin to use. In a special concurrence in the result, Chief Justice Pratt in different words concurred with that conclusion saying, “The rule as to reasonable and economical use of water applies as well to methods of diversion as it does to the application of the water to the land itself.” These observations were made in apprehension of the very problems that have arisen in this case. As I view it they are not inconsistent with the statute and are in conformity with the basic objective *338which must necessarily underlie our water law.
Where uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a statute it should be interpreted in the light of its background and purpose as a guide to giving it proper application.12 Consideration of those factors leads me to the conclusion that the most logical and practical application of the statute would be to leave the detail of such administration to the State Engineer as is indicated by the statutes giving him the broad supervisory powers hereinabove referred to, with any arbitrary action subject to correction by the courts.
Our statutes set forth a method by which the court can, if it so desires, acquire additional data and information necessary to make such determination. Sec. 73-4-1, U.C.A.1953, provides:
“ * * * In any suit involving water rights the court may order an investigation and survey by the state engineer of all the water rights on the source or system involved.”
and with respect to the duties of the Engineer :
“ * * * After full consideration of the statements of claims, * * * surveys, records, and files, and * * * examination. of the river system or water source involved, * * * the state engineer shall formulate a report and a proposed determination of all rights to the use of the water of such river system or water source [and] shall distribute the waters from the natural streams or other natural sources in accordance with the proposed determination. * * * ” 1953 Comp. § 73-4-11.
It may well be that the decree ordering defendants Andrews and Current Creek to replace water in the wells of Fowkes would be correct even under the doctrine espoused in this opinion. However, the decree does not appear to be based thereon, but rather to be grounded upon the rule that prior users have an absolute right to pressure and means of diversion as well as to the amount of appropriated water. As hereinabove indicated, I think that rule is neither susceptible of practical application nor in conformity with the purpose and intent of our statutes. It should be subject to such “rules and regulations as the state engineer may prescribe”13 as necessary to the accomplishment of the fundamental objective of water regulation as herein expressed. I would therefore remand the three subject actions to the district court to consider whether the decree entered is in conformity with the views herein expressed, and to either affirm or modify the decree accordingly.

. Sec. 73-1-1, U.S.A.1953; Riordan v. Westwood, 115 Utah 215, 203 P.2d 922.

. Sec. 73-3-1, U.C.A.1953.

. 11 Utah 438, 40 P. 709, 710, 30 L.R.A. 186.

. Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 P. 244, 70 Am.St. Rep. 810; Willow Creek Irrigation Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah 248, 60 P. 943, 51 L.R.A. 280, 81 Am.St.Rep. 687.

. Herriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719; Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 P. 867.

. 59 Utah 279, statement quoted made on rehearing at page 305, 202 P. 815, 825, 31 A.L.R. 883.

. 86 Utah 50, 40 P.2d 755.

. 86 Utah 158, 40 P.2d 802.

. Footnote 1, supra.

. Sec. 73-2-1, U.C.A.1953, et seq.; Sec. 73-4-1 et seq.

. 115 Utah 404, 405, 205 P.2d 255, 265.

. See Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381.

. From Sec. 73-3-23, U.C.A.1953.