Court Opinion

ID: 9748649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:08:55.105759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:37.956609
License: Public Domain

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice, dissenting. 12|I respectfully dissent. Gilcrease was denied his constitutional right to confrontation when the circuit court refused to permit examination of witness Albert Reed for bias. The State openly argued and presented testimony from Reed that he was unbiased because he had “no deal” with the State and testified only to “square the balance sheet.” Gilcrease credibly argued to the circuit court that Reed believed that by belatedly testifying against Gilcrease, Reed might yet receive the reduced sentence he lost when he violated his plea agreement. The circuit court erred in denying Gilcrease the opportunity to cross-examine Reed for bias based on his subjective belief that he might salvage his plea agreement. The State negotiated a deal with Reed prior to the trial of accomplice Cameron Williams. The State informed Reed that if he would testify against Williams and Gil-crease, his criminal charges would be reduced from capital to first-degree murder, and the State would recommend a single sixty-year sentence to be served on the two convictions for first-degree murder. Reed agreed and testified at trial against Williams, but on February 19, 2008, at a pretrial hearing in the Gilcrease case, Reed announced he would not testify against Gilcrease. In that same hearing, the circuit court found the plea agreement breached, refused to allow Reed to withdraw his guilty pleas, and imposed two life sentences on the capital murder charges. However, Reed called the prosecution three days later, apparently recognizing the folly of his actions, and said he would testify against Gilcrease. Reed was a critical witness. He was the only witness to the kidnapping, the transport |22to Hindman Park, and the murders of Monte and Sean. Prior to trial, the prosecutor stated, “We cannot go forward without Mr. Reed.” Reed was the witness that provided the crucial information convicting Gilcrease. Reed testified to the following critical facts: 1. Gilcrease was the person who introduced the idea of killing Monte and Sean Johnson; 2. Gilcrease ordered Monte and Sean to remove their clothes; 3. Gilcrease bound Monte and Sean with duct tape and ordered them outside; 4. Gilcrease ordered Monte and Sean into the trunk of a car; 5. Gilcrease ordered Reed to drive Monte and Sean to Hindman Park; 6. Gilcrease followed Reed as he drove Monte and Sean to their deaths; 7. At the park, Gilcrease stated, “It’s got to be done”; 8. Gilcrease shot Monte Johnson as he attempted to flee; and 9. Once Monte was on the ground, Gil-crease walked to him and fired multiple rounds into Monte’s body. Through Reed’s testimony, Williams’s role was reduced to being present, holding a gun on Monte and Sean while Gilcrease duct taped them, and shooting Sean at the park. Gilcrease was left as the planner and primary actor in the kidnapping and murders. Reed provided the only direct evidence of these critical facts. Reed’s testimony may well be true, but Gilcrease had a right that the jury know of the possible bias before judging Reed’s testimony. Reed was presented to the jury as a man who had nothing to lose or gain by testifying, a man who only testified because he wanted to atone for his wrongs. The prosecution told l^the jury in opening statement that Reed, although a criminal, had done all he could do to set things right. To reinforce this assertion of Reed’s credibility, the prosecution told the jury that trial and sentencing were in the past for Reed, a done deal, that he had nothing to gain or lose by testifying “because his life for the most part is over. He’s serving two life sentences in the Arkansas Department of Correction because he pled guilty.” The jury was also told that Reed had “stepped up” and “taken responsibility.” The prosecution also told the jury that there were “no deals ... none.” Reed was presented to the jury as a man who had openly acknowledged his crimes, accepted a just punishment, and who only testified to try and make things right. The jury was told that Gilcrease’s “problem” in the trial was that “Albert Reed stands to lose and gain nothing, that he’s doing as much as any man can do in his situation.” Reed was asked if he had any reason to lie against Gilcrease, and Reed responded, “No.” Reed testified that he was testifying “so the families of Sean and Monte would know the truth about how they died.” Further examination of Reed by the State reveals the extent to which the State emphasized Reed’s believability because he had no hope of a deal with the State: Q: I want to be clear that you have no deal with this judge, do you? A: No sir, I mean, no ma’am. Q: He sentenced you to two life sentences. A. Two life sentences. Q: Right. And he’s never said that he’s ever going to change that? I24A: Haven’t said that. Q: You knew that coming in? A: I knew that coming in. When you talked — I mean, you have an attorney, right? <o Yes. í> Did your attorney make it clear to you that— <© Made it clear to me. t> —the judge never said he was going to change it? <© Made it clear to me. t> [[Image here]] Q: You knew that when you came in today? A: I knowed that. Q: I mean, it be great if he did— A: Yeah. Q: You know there is no promise. A: No promise. No deal. Q: Right now you’ve been sentenced and you’re done. You know that don’t you? A: Yes. [[Image here]] 1 afiQ: Do you have any reason to lie against this guy here? R: No. [[Image here]] Q: Is there anything out there? R: No. While Reed’s hope that the circuit court might reinstate his plea agreement may seem quite unlikely, to a man who was facing two life sentences, it was likely the only hope he had. “The test is the expectation of the witness and not the actuality of a promise.” Klimas v. State, 259 Ark. 301, 305-06, 534 S.W.2d 202, 205 (1976) (citing State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960)); see also Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 438, 652 S.W.2d 16, 18 (1983). To deny Gilcrease the opportunity to cross-examine Reed on the issue was to deny him the right to confrontation provided by both the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 2, § 10 of the Arkansas Constitution guarantee the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The right of confrontation provides two types of protection for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him and the opportunity to conduct effective cross-examination. Ridling v. State, 348 Ark. 213, 221, 72 S.W.3d 466, 470 (2002) (quoting Bowden v. State, 301 Ark. 303, 308, 783 S.W.2d 842, 844 (1990)). “Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). The partiality of a witness is always relevant and subject to exploration at trial. Id. The denial of the right of effective cross-examination is a “constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968) (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966))); see also Watson v. State, 818 Ark. 603, 606, 887 S.W.2d 518, 519 (1994) (quoting Klimas v. State, 259 Ark. 301, 306, 534 S.W.2d 202, 205 (1976)) (citing Davis, supra); Swinford v. State, 85 Ark.App. 326, 331, 154 S.W.3d 262, 265 (2004). Reasonable limits may be placed on the right to cross-examine based on concerns such as “harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is only marginally relevant.” Bowden v. State, 301 Ark. 303, 309, 783 S.W.2d 842, 844 (1990) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). None of these factors, nor any other factors, are present in this case that would justify limiting cross-examination on Reed’s expectations of the resurrection of his plea agreement, no matter how unlikely that might be. Gil-crease had a right to full cross-examination in order to show bias. Henderson, 279 Ark. at 488, 652 S.W.2d at 18. “This is especially true in the case of an accomplice since his testimony is the direct evidentia-ry link between the defendant and the crime.” Id., 652 S.W.2d at 18. As noted, in this case, Reed provided the only direct evidence of the critical facts. The testimony elicited from Reed was that he had no deal and had no hope of a reduction in sentence. He agreed with the prosecutor that he would like a reduction, but that in no way revealed to the jury his hope that his plea | ^agreement might be honored after the fact. It is quite reasonable to assume that Reed believed keeping quiet about his hope, and assuring in his testimony that there was no deal, was something he needed to do to bolster his credibility and increase the likelihood of his success. The circuit court errantly excluded evidence of bias in the most crucial witness in the case. The exclusion of evidence of bias or possible prejudice by an accomplice is sufficient cause to reverse. Henderson, 279 Ark. at 440, 652 S.W.2d at 19. Gil-crease made no proffer, but “[a] proffer was not necessary.” Id., 652 S.W.2d at 19. Justice and the credibility of our criminal law requires that this case be reversed and remanded.