Court Opinion

ID: 9497172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:45:06.191609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:02.603268
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
with whom RIPPLE, ROVNER, and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges, join in dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc.
The majority’s opinion has incorrectly resolved and unjustifiably reframed both the Eighth Amendment standard for deliberate indifference as well as the Rule 50 standard to set aside a jury verdict.
With regard to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, the majority opinion highlights a major gap in the case law. Particularly, what is required to prove the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard? The Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 n. 3, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) did not address this issue. On page 526-27, the majority asks a plethora of questions which go to this issue, i.e., the overall threat of violence at the prison. Perhaps the dearth of case law on this point is due in part to the general knowledge that prisons are dangerous places where rape and assault occur frequently and therefore threats, such as the one in this case, must be handled with more caution than exhibited by Rausch. See Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15601-02 (2004) (“The purpose of this chapter is to: (1) establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States. (6) increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape.”) (“Congress makes the following findings: (2) Insufficient research has been conducted and insufficient data reported on the extent of prison rape.... Many inmates have suffered repeated assaults. (13) The high incidence of sexual assault within prisons involves actual and potential violations of the United States Constitution.”). Centraba Prison’s policy, to move prisoners first and disciphne them later for baseless requests, is further proof of the objective danger. Again, evidence of the prison’s policy does not hold Rausch liable for mere negligence; rather, it reflects the understood environment in the prison, as accepted by prison officials, guards, and administrators, that threats of violence have a high probability of leading to attacks. Riccardo, therefore, proved that the asserted danger was objectively serious.
Under the more specific inquiry of Farmer’s subjective prong, the prison official must “deliberately disregard” a potential harm by being “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [also] drawing] the inference.” Id. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. This seems to me to create two questions: (1) what facts were presented to Rausch, and (2) did he accept them as true or did his actions evince his intent to purposefully ignore those apparent facts? Once again, the inquiry is a particularized one, focused on the officer’s knowledge. Without repeating what I have already set out in my dissent, the jury was presented with evidence that Ric-cardo told Rausch he did not want to be celled with Garcia because he was in fear *537of an attack. “A prisoner normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir.1991). Therefore, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the first part of this inquiry is satisfied.
Accepting the majority’s point that Ric-cardo’s mere “say-so” is not enough to establish Eighth Amendment liability, there were plenty of “objective indicators” to support the jury’s finding that Rausch’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference. The jury heard evidence that Rausch put the two men in front of each other to determine whether a problem existed. It is this act, which the majority uses to exonerate Rausch from liability. However, it is this very act which evinces Rausch’s deliberate indifference as found by the jury and reiterated by the district court. What is more, this court has already defined such action as unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 349 (reasoning that the scienter requirement is satisfied when a prison guard, “[s]uspect[s] something is true but shut[s][his] eyes for fear of what [he] will learn” or “[goes] out of [his] way to avoid acquiring unwelcomed knowledge”). The jury found that no reasonable guard would think that asking Ric-cardo to admit fear of Garcia with Garcia present, would illicit an honest response. Again, it is this act that crosses the line. Recognizing that these specific actions were inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment would not create per se liability for prison officials. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision not to rehear this case en banc.