Court Opinion

ID: 9721869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:11:27.489902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.025027
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON
(dissenting). I dissent because I conclude that the circuit court’s order enjoining the Town of Fitchburg “from conducting any sec. 60.81, Stats., incorporation referendum” does not dispose of the entire matter in litigation as to the Town and it is therefore not a final order appealable as of right under sec. 808.03 (1), Stats.1
In the proceeding before the circuit court the Town had an interest in two issues: the outcome of the chapter 66 incorporation proceeding and the availability of sec. 60.81, Stats., as a separate means of incorporation. The order settles with finality only the issue of the Town’s ability to proceed under sec. 60.81. Settlement of one of two issues does not meet the requirement of finality under sec. 808.03(1). Finality in sec. 808.03(1) relates not to the final resolution of an issue but to the final resolution of the entire matter in litigation between one or more parties. Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp., 97 Wis.2d 379, 396, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980).
The Town properly concedes in its brief that its interest in the chapter 66 proceeding has not been finally determined by the injunction. The brief states: “It must be conceded that the town’s rights and interests in the ch. 66 incorporation proceeding have not been finally determined by the trial court’s order. These rights will not be resolved until the ch. 66 proceedings are *658concluded.” Appellants’ Brief on Appeal, p. 14.2 I therefore cannot join the majority opinion which concludes *659that “the trial court’s order enjoining the Town from conducting a sec. 60.81 referendum terminated the only matter in litigation with respect to the Town.”3
The Town attempted to overcome the fact that after the order it continued as a party to the chapter 66 proceeding by arguing that it was involved in the proceeding in two separate and distinct capacities: (1) As the governmental unit, and (2) as the representative of the 2,100 petitioners who initiated the sec. 60.81 incorporation effort. The Town argued that the order disposed of the entire matter in litigation as to the Town in its representative capacity and the order was therefore final and appealable under sec. 808.03(1), Stats. The record does not substantiate this claim and both the majority and dissent reject it. Both the majority and dissent treat the Town as a party in its governmental capacity.
Accordingly, I would hold that there is no final order appealable of right and I would dismiss the appeal.4

 Sec. 808.03 (1), Stats., provides that a final order is one “which disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties, whether rendered in an action or special proceeding.”
I agree with the majority opinion that the order denying the Town’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is not appealable of right. Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp., 97 Wis.2d 379, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980).

 The portion of the Town’s brief dealing with the issue of ap-pealability states:
“Upon the order of the trial court, the town, over its objections, was allegedly made a party to the ch. 66 lawsuit. While it could have done so, the town had not sought to be a party to that proceeding. It is clear that the only reason the city sought to have the town made a party was so that it could obtain an order against the town and its officers and agents to enjoin the sec. 60.81 referendum. The city’s motion to make the town a party stated that the town’s scheduling of the June 3rd 60.81 referendum ‘forms the basis for the need to add the Town of Fitchburg as a party in this proceeding. . . .’ (R 10-3) The city never asserted that the town should be made a party so that it (the town) could protect its own interests in the ch. 66 proceeding.
“In any event, the town is now an ostensible party to the lawsuit in two separate and distinct capacities: (1) as protecting its own rights and interests in incorporation under the ch. 66 procedure, and (2) as standing in the shoes of the 2,100 persons attempting to follow the sec. 60.81 incorporation route.
“It must be conceded that the town’s rights and interests in the ch. 66 incorporation proceeding have not been finally determined by the trial court’s order. Those rights will not be resolved until the ch. 66 proceedings are concluded.
“However, the town is involved as a party here in a separate and distinct capacity. It is standing in the place of the 2,100 petitioners who initiated the sec. 60.81 incorporation effort. The town scheduled the sec. 60.81 referendum on behalf of, and at the instance of, the 2,100 petitioners. In fact, under sec. 60.81(2), the town was required to provide for the referendum upon receipt of the petitions. The town in scheduling the referendum was not acting on its own behalf. It was simply attempting to do what the statute and the 2,100 petitioners required it to do. The actions of the town enjoined by the trial court were the actions it sought to take in this representative capacity.
“When the trial court decided that there could never be any referendum under the sec. 60.81 procedure, it completely decided the rights of the 2,100 petitioners even though the ch. 66 proceeding remains. The order disposed of the only matter in litigation as to the town in its capacity as a representative of the 2,100 petitioners. Accordingly, the test of finality is met as to one or more of the parties.”

 The majority opinion is unfortunately too sweeping. It not only holds against the Town as to the sec. 60.81 proceeding (see dicta note 3 of the majority opinion) but also may be construed as holding that the Town can no longer participate as a party in the chapter 66 proceeding in circuit court or in any appeal or review thereof since the “Town’s presence as a party to the continuing Chapter 66 proceeding is nominal only” and the only matter in litigation with respect to the Town has now been terminated.

 This court does not review the court of appeal’s discretion in refusing to hear an appeal under sec. 808.03(2), Stats. State ex rel. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 77 n. 2, 288 N.W.2d 114 (1980).