Court Opinion

ID: 9863417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:10:58.484717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:29.898042
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON, dissenting in part: I must respectfully dissent in part, because I believe that we should grant defendant’s request on this appeal to reverse his conviction on count IV of the indictment. Count IV charged defendant with aggravated criminal sexual assault: “In that he committed an act of sexual penetration upon [the victim], to wit: Anthony McNeal forced the intrusion of [the victim’s] finger into [the victim’s] vagina by the use of force or threat of force and Anthony McNeal displayed, threatened to use, or used a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, or any object fashioned or utilized in such a manner as to lead the victim under the circumstances to believe it to be a dangerous weapon, to wit: Anthony McNeal displayed a knife, in violation of chapter 720, act 5, section 12 — 14(A)(1).” Aggravated criminal sexual assault occurs when a defendant “commits criminal sexual assault” and there also exists one of the listed aggravating circumstances, such as the display or threat to use a knife. 720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1) (West 2004). Criminal sexual assault requires “an act of sexual penetration.” 720 ILCS 5/12 — 13(a) (West 2004). Sexual penetration is defined by statute, as follows: “ ‘Sexual penetration’ means [1] any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or [2] any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person or of any animal or object into the sex organ or anus of another person ***.” 720 ILCS 5/12 — 12 (f) (West 2004). The statute provides two means for penetration to occur: (1) by “contact”; or (2) by “intrusion.” Neither provision applies to the conduct described in count IV of the indictment. First, the “contact” provision does not apply to the conduct described in count IV because a finger is certainly not a “sex organ, mouth or anus,” and a finger is also not “an object.” 720 ILCS 5/12 — 12(f) (West 2004). Our supreme court has held that “the word ‘object’ in the ‘contact’ clause of the statutory definition of sexual penetration was not intended to include parts of the body.” Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 350. Thus, the “contact” provision does not apply to the conduct described in count IV Second, the “intrusion” provision does not apply either. The statute is very clear that, in order for sexual penetration to occur by the “intrusion” of a finger, it must be the finger of “one person” into the sex organ or anus of “another person.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12 — 12(f) (West 2004). Thus, the “intrusion” provision does not apply either. Since neither the “contact” nor the “intrusion” provision applies, the conduct described in count IV cannot be sexual penetration. Thus, even if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the conduct charged in count IV it would not prove aggravated criminal sexual assault. Simply put, the described conduct does not constitute the charged offense. Defendant has not raised this issue, either in the trial court or on this appeal. In his appellate brief, he states specifically that “[n]o issue is raised challenging the charging instrument.” On appeal, defendant does challenge the jury instruction on sexual penetration, but with a slightly different argument. In his appellate brief, defendant claims that “the definition used by the trial court— i.e. that ‘any contact’ between a body part and a sex organ constitutes ‘sexual penetration’ for the purposes of proving sexual assault was invalid.” Defendant argues that “where the alleged penetration of a sex organ is made with a body part, the State is required to prove an ‘intrusion’ by that body part, not merely contact.” In its appellate brief, the State admits that the instruction was “incorrect,” but argues that the error does not rise to the level of plain error. In essence, defendant is arguing on appeal that the State was required to prove that the victim’s finger intruded into her vagina, instead of simply making contact with her vagina. Defendant is not arguing that even an intrusion was not penetration as defined by the statute. Thus, the question for us on appeal is whether we should affirm a conviction for conduct that does not constitute the charged offense when defendant’s counsel has not raised the issue. In People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311 (2010), our supreme court held that “a reviewing court does not lack authority to address unbriefed issues and may do so in the appropriate case, i.e., when a clear and obvious error exists in the trial court proceedings.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 325. Our supreme court observed that it had previously held that “under Supreme Court Rules 341(e)(7) and 366(a)(5), a reviewing court may sometimes raise and consider unbriefed issues in order to provide ‘for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent.’ ” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 325, quoting Hux v. Roben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). Supreme Court Rule 366 provides that “[i]n all appeals the reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just, *** (5) enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been given or made.” 155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5). In Givens, our supreme court provided an example of where it was appropriate for an appellate court to raise an unbriefed issue, sua sponte. The Givens court stated that the appellate court in People v. Rodriguez, 336 Ill. App. 3d 1 (2002), had appropriately exercised its discretion to review an unbriefed issue. In Givens, our supreme court observed that the appellate court in Rodriguez was “compelled in the interest of justice to sua sponte address the trial court’s ‘obvious error’ in convicting defendant of four separate counts of first degree murder involving a single murder.” Givens, 237 111. 2d at 328, quoting Rodriguez, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 12. By contrast, our supreme court found that the facts before it in Givens did not warrant sua sponte review because there may have been no error at all and, even if there was an error, it certainly was not an obvious one. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 326-27. In Givens, the appellate court had held sua sponte that the trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress on the ground that the person consenting to a search lacked the authority to consent. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 315-16. Our supreme court found that the appellate court misapplied precedent in holding that there was any error, much less an obvious one. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 326-27. Our supreme court observed that “[t]he appellate court managed to quote the key language from [prior cases], despite the fact that its applicability to the present case seems to have been lost on the appellate court.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 327. Our supreme court further observed that “the State filed a petition for rehearing that raised points and cited authority that legitimately called into question the correctness of the appellate court’s holding.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 327. The appellate court denied the State’s petition “without any modification and without addressing the points raised.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 328. Our facts are closer to the facts in Rodriguez than to the facts in Givens. As in Rodriguez, defendant was found guilty on a count that was not warranted by the charged offense. As in Rodriguez, our reasoning is based on clear precedent, namely, our supreme court’s holding in Maggette. See Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 350. Thus, I would find, based on Givens and Rodriguez, that there was an obvious error based on clear precedent that warrants our review. I would review this issue and reverse on this ground. However, there exists another, wholly independent ground for reversing the conviction on count IV As an additional ground, I would find that the instructional error, which was argued by defendant on appeal and conceded as error by the State, rose to the level of plain error and that this plain error constitutes a separate and independent ground for reversal. The evidence was closely balanced on the issue of whether the victim’s finger intruded into her vagina. The victim, who was not a native English speaker, testified that she “had to put finger into my own vagina.” By contrast, defendant provided a very detailed statement to the police which described the conduct slightly differently. In his first statement, he stated ambiguously that he told the victim to “touch herself,” and that she did. However, in his second statement, he stated more specifically that he instructed her “to touch her clitoris,” which obviously is not inside her vagina. Thus, the State’s own evidence is conflicted on the issue of whether the victim’s finger actually intruded into her own vagina. Due to this conflict in evidence, I would find that the evidence on this particular count, even as it is described in the indictment, was closely balanced. The majority concluded that the evidence was not closely balanced, but did not specifically analyze whether the evidence was closely balanced for this particular count. As a result, it is not clear to me whether we really disagree on this point. In light of the conceded error and the fact that the evidence was closely balanced on the very point of law about which the error concerned, I would reverse the conviction on count IV I would then remand for proceedings consistent with the law discussed here.