Court Opinion

ID: 9699466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:25:54.44717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:50.829988
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. This case is controlled by State v. Kettlewell, 149 Vt. 331, 544 A.2d 591 (1987), a case in which the State argued that the tip of an identified informant gave a state policeman reasonable suspicion to search a travel trailer controlled by defendant and containing marijuana and two Mexicans. We reversed defendant’s conviction because the content of the tip was insufficient for the policeman to ‘“reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 335, 544 A.2d at 594 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1981)). The State’s theory was that the tip was sufficient for the officer to have reasonable suspicion that the Mexicans were illegal aliens. We concluded, however, that the tip was equivocal — “I did not know whether they were legal or not” — and was conclusory because no reason was stated for the informant’s suspicion. Id. at 337, 544 A.2d at 595. Because the requirements of Kettlewell, and the numerous United States Supreme Court decisions on which it is based, require that we hold that the stop of defendant’s car in this ease was unjustified, I dissent.
The entire relevant content of the informant’s tip in this case was that the defendant “was possibly intoxicated.” If anything, this tip is weaker than that found inadequate in Kettlewell. It is wholly conclusory, lacking any supporting observations of defendant’s conduct. It is, at best, equivocal, expressed in language that would apply to any driver on the road. Although it is difficult to find cases that are identical to this one, I note that courts have generally found inadequate justifications for searches and/or stops based on possibilities, with no supporting information showing the commission of a crime. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 965 P.2d 231, 233 (Mont. 1998) (probable cause lacking where named informant reported a “possible drunk driver”); Graf v. Dep’t of Commerce & Regulation, 508 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (S.D. 1993) (anonymous tip that driver was “possibly” intoxicated insufficient to justify the stop); Garcia v. State, 894 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (no reasonable suspicion to stop where defendant was observed driving a truck away from a house which a federal officer reported was “possibly a storage point for narcotics”); see also Safford v. Department of Fire, 627 So. 2d 707, 709-10 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (no reasonable and articulable suspicion where female caller, claiming to be fireman’s wife, made statements from which fire chief concluded fireman was “possibly intoxicated”).
Except for a footnote in response to this dissent, the majority ignores the requirement that the tip have sufficient content to raise a reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime, instead detailing why, based on our recent decisions, the informant’s statement was reliable because the informant gave his name and was able to describe defendant’s vehicle and route of travel. I agree that the State has established reliability, but find this discussion beside the point. The reliability of the informant cannot make up for an inadequate statement on which to base a stop.
Indeed, I think the majority’s reliance on informant tip cases is now producing an improper distortion in our law. I cannot believe the majority would uphold a stop by a police officer who testified *601that he or she made the stop based on a belief that the operator was possibly intoxicated, and offered no specific observations to support the eonclusory opinion. I think we would label such an opinion a speculative hunch and unanimously find that there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the stop. Today, we are upholding a stop based on exactly the same information when it comes from an informant. Impliedly, the majority is saying that an informant can say anything, and the statement will be sufficient justification for a stop as long as it somehow names the person to be stopped. In oral argument, the State carried this theory to its logical limit by claiming it would be sufficient if a reliable, named informant stated only “Stop [defendant] for DUI!” In our zeal to recognize a role for informants and to combat DUI, we have taken the unprecedented step of eliminating a main part of the Terry stop requirements where informants are involved.
Finally, I emphasize that I would be more likely to accept the majority position if I thought this approach necessary to combat DUI. In fact, the record before us demonstrates to the contrary. The State obtained an affidavit from the informant that shows he is a former bartender and recognized numerous signs of intoxication in defendant. If the police dispatcher had only asked the informant to clarify his opinion and describe the observations behind the opinion, this case would probably not be here on appeal. Rather than adopting an unprecedented and unwarranted relaxation of constitutional requirements to justify a stop, we should be sending the message that police departments need to tighten procedures to obtain the information necessary to properly support a stop.
I dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Johnson joins in this dissent.