Court Opinion

ID: 9737762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:34:00.896178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:01.155458
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). While I agree with the Chief Justice that 1987 PA 28 violates Michigan’s constitutional requirement of separation of powers,1 I write separately to register my strong view that the enactment also contravenes the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee.
i
In 1985, this Court unanimously held in Chambers v General Motors Corp, 422 Mich 636, 651; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), that § 354 of 1981 PA 203, which became effective March 31, 1982, "clearly and unambiguously” permitted coordination, after its effective date, of certain employer-financed benefits, regardless of the date of injury.
A subsequent Legislature passed 1987 PA 28, which amended § 3542 by reenacting the section’s original language verbatim and adding four new subsections, MCL 418.354(17)-(20); MSA 17.237(354)(17)-(20). These amendments were made effective *565May 14, 1987. Section 354(17) expressly states the purpose of the legislation:
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v White Pine Copper Division, 422 Mich 636 (1985) is declared to have been erroneously rendered insofar as it interprets this section, it having been and being the legislative intention not to coordinate payments under this section resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982. It is the purpose of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and curative amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose. [Emphasis added.]
Section 354(19) provides that any coordination prior to the act’s effective date "shall be considered to be an underpayment of compensation benefits, and the amounts withheld pursuant to coordination shall be reimbursed with interest . . . .”
Thus, the 1987 amendment of § 354 was enacted not only for the declared purpose of reversing this Court’s decision in Chambers, supra, but also to impose retroactively upon employers a substantial increase in liability for compensable periods prior to the act’s effective date.
n
It is fundamental that this Court, not the 1987 Legislature, is entrusted by the constitution with the power to determine the meaning of the 1981 statute. Webster v Rotary Electric Steel Co, 321 Mich 526, 531; 33 NW2d 69 (1948) (the proper construction of a statute is a judicial function); Bankers Trust Co of Detroit v Russell, 263 Mich 677; 249 NW 27 (1933) (the Legislature may not exercise judicial power by construing a statute). In the past, we have declared:
*566"It is too elementary to justify us in referring to authority on the question, that a legislative body is not permitted under any circumstances to declare what its intention was on a former occasion so as to affect past transactions. ... Its members have no more right to construe one of its enactments retroactively than has any private individual.” [Presque Isle Twp Bd of Ed v Presque Isle Co Bd of Ed, 364 Mich 605, 612; 111 NW2d 853 (1961) (quoting Northern Trust Co v Snyder, 113 Wis 516, 530; 89 NW 460 [1902]).]
Article 3, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution provides: "The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”
This Court has said: " 'To declare what the law shall be is legislative; to declare what it is or has been is judicial.’ ” In re Manufacturer’s Freight Forwarding Co, 294 Mich 57, 63; 292 NW 678 (1940) (quoting In re Application of Consolidated Freight Co, 265 Mich 340, 343; 251 NW 431 [1933] [Potter, J., dissenting]). The Legislature, by enacting 1987 PA 28, not only declared what the law "shall be,” but purported to declare what the intent of a prior Legislature "was.”
Like other members of this Court, I am "troubled” by the Legislature’s wording of § 354(17). I would go a step further, however, and state what should be obvious: the declaration by the 1987 Legislature concerning the intent of the 1981 Legislature is a nullity.
hi
Many years ago another court explained why *567the policy against retroactivity is a fundamental principle of justice which limits legislative power:
Our constitutions do not admit the power assumed by the Roman prince; and the principle we are considering is now to be regarded as sacred. It is not pretended that we have any express constitutional provision on the subject; nor have we any for numerous other rights dear alike to freedom and to justice. An ex post facto law, in the strict technical sense of the term, is usually understood to apply to criminal cases, and this is its meaning, when used in the constitution of the United States; yet laws impairing previously acquired civil rights are equally within the reason of that prohibition, and equally to be condemned. . . . [T]here is no distinction in principle, nor any recognized in practice, between a law punishing a person criminally, for a past innocent act, or punishing him civilly by divesting him of a lawfully acquired right. The distinction consists only in the degree of the oppression .... [Dash v Van Kleeck, 7 Johns 477, 505-506 (NY, 1811). Emphasis in original.]
The fundamental distrust of retroactive laws has found expression in our rules of statutory interpretation which favor prospective application. DeMars, Retrospectivity and retroactivity of civil legislation reconsidered, 10 Ohio N U L R 253, 259 (1983). Moreover, because "[Retroactive legislation has always been looked upon with disfavor . . . even its constitutionality has been conditioned upon a rationality requirement beyond that applied to other legislation.” Bowen v Georgetown Univ Hosp, 488 US 204, 223; 109 S Ct 468; 102 L Ed 2d 493 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring, emphasis added, citations omitted).
As the majority concedes, the retroactive aspects of 1987 PA 28 are different from those which were found constitutional by the United States Supreme *568Court in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v R A Gray & Co, 467 US 717; 104 S Ct 2709; 81 L Ed 2d 601 (1984), and Usery v Turner Elkhorn Mining Co, 428 US 1; 96 S Ct 2882; 49 L Ed 2d 752 (1976). The differences are materially significant. Legislation scrutinized in those cases does not compare to the enactment here which was deliberately designed to disrupt retroactively past transactions completed in reliance upon this Court’s specific holding in Chambers that all workers’ compensation payments were subject to § 354 coordination regardless of the date of injury.
In R A Gray & Co, the retroactive application of the legislation was restricted to a short five-month period preceding the statute’s effective date. This retroactivity, according to the Court, was necessary in order to provide Congress time to legislate without a governmental agency suffering severe economic consequences resulting from employers withdrawing from multiemployer pension plans. In affirming the constitutionality of the legislation, the Court explicitly noted that,
the enactment of retroactive statutes "confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation ... is a customary congressional practice.” We are loathe to reject such a common practice when conducting the limited judicial review accorded economic legislation .... [467 US 731. Emphasis added, citation omitted.]
Moreover, the Court cautioned that,
retroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects. "It does not follow . . . that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The retroactive aspects of legislation, as *569well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justiñcations for the latter may not suffice for the former.” [Id. at 730. Emphasis added.]
In Usery, Congress enacted legislation requiring, inter alia, coal mine operators to compensate employees for black lung disease contracted during employment which had been terminated long before the effective date of the statute. In finding that the retroactive aspect of the legislation passed constitutional muster, the Supreme Court stated:
To be sure, insofar as the Act requires compensation for disabilities bred during employment terminated before the date of enactment, the Act has some retrospective effect—although, as we have noted, the Act imposed no liability on operators until 1974. . . . [0]ur cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. . . . This is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts. [428 US 15-16. Emphasis added.]
Justification for such retroactive legislation can be found in the fact that black lung disease develops over a long period of time and its symptoms, in many instances, do not become apparent until after termination of employment. Usery, supra at 7-8. No analogous justification appears in this case to justify undoing completed transactions.
More fundamentally, neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court had affirmatively spoken on the issue of a coal mine operator’s responsibility for black lung disease prior to enactment of the legislation considered in Usery. There the Supreme Court specifically recognized that the aggrieved party’s reliance upon the prior state of *570the law is a factor in determining whether retroactive application of a statute can be legitimate. 428 US 17. It is one thing, however, to "rely” on the absence of law, and quite another to rely on an affirmative statement of the law as enacted by the Legislature and construed by the state’s court of last resort.
It should be stressed that, prior to the majority’s decision today, this Court never recognized or sanctioned a legislative attempt to overrule retroactively a decision of this Court.3 Nor has the United States Supreme Court given consideration to the effect of retroactive legislation upon conduct occurring after judicial interpretation but before the "overruling” legislation was enacted. However, one commentator noted the implications when he wrote, "Prima facie, this would seem to form a distinct problem, since such conduct would apparently be patterned after the first judicial interpretation and therefore unjustly undercut by the legislation . . . .” Slawson, Constitutional and legislative considerations in retroactive lawmaking, 48 Cal LR 216, 249 (1960). Where a particular individual can "prove he had in fact relied on the interim state of the law to his detriment ... it seems clear that he should be entitled to relief.” Id.
The reliance by appellants on our decision in Franks was substantial. It appears that their increased liability by virtue of the majority’s decision today, without reference to its effect upon other employers, will exceed $22 million. I do not agree with the majority’s position that the reliance *571interest of appellants is inconsequential because it was not reduced to judgment. Such an assertion ignores the fact that appellants had no reason to seek a judgment. As we ruled in Franks, supra, the 1981 statute permitted employers to coordinate benefits without institution of any type of proceedings. 422 Mich 661.4
*572I agree with the majority that "[t]he Legislature possesses the authority to enact workers’ compensation laws that ' "increase the burden on the employer for disability or expenses occurring or continuing after the date of enactment of the amendatory statute, even though the accident which gave rise to the disability or expenses had occurred prior to that time.” ’ ” Ante, p 531 (quoting Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578, 592; 99 NW2d 490 [1959] [emphasis added]). Unlike the majority, however, I would emphasize the word "after.” Our past cases have limited the retroactive effect of such legislation by applying a change in benefit levels to those payments due after the effective date of an enactment. See Lahti, supra (amendment eliminating twenty-four-month limit on employer’s liability for medical care could be retroactively applied to the extent that employers required to provide extended medical care to worker after the amendment’s effective date notwithstanding that the injury occurred before the effective date), McAvoy v H B Sherman Co, 401 Mich 419; 258 NW2d 414 (1977) (the statute prohibiting a stay of seventy percent of benefits pending appeal of the referee’s decision awarding compensation only applies to those benefits accruing after the statute’s effective date), Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1; 345 NW2d 184 (1984) (under statute increasing interest on workers’ compensation award, where benefit payment is made after the effective date of the statute, interest is to be computed at twelve percent from the date the *573payment was due), Franks, supra (statute permitting coordination of benefits is prospectively coordinated after the effective date of the enactment regardless of when the employee was injured).
The majority concedes that the appellants’ "reliance on the preexisting state of the law should be considered” in determining whether retroactive legislation is constitutional. Ante, p 530. However, the majority then asserts that appellants’ reliance was not reasonable because the preexisting law was in "a state of flux.” Ante, p 531. I disagree. After the Legislature enacts a statute which, according to this Court, "clearly and unambiguously” permits coordination of benefits without regard to date of injury, the law is not in a "state of flux.” Given that this Court has never before recognized legislation purporting to overrule retroactively a decision by this Court interpreting the enactment of a prior Legislature, it could hardly be said that these appellants were on notice that the law might be changed in such a manner. Under the majority’s analysis, the appellants apparently had no right to rely upon either the 1981 legislation or this Court’s decision in Franks. Presumably, if the majority’s analysis were correct, no employer or employee in this state would have the right to rely now upon 1987 PA 28 since the Legislature may change it retrospectively in its entirety tomorrow, next week, or next year.
As a matter of common sense, a citizen’s reliance upon a statute as a statement of the law reasonably increases once the state’s highest court interprets and declares what the statute means. To be sure, an individual can have no legitimate expectation that such a statute will not be subsequently changed prospectively; yet, it has been considered reasonable, at least until the majority’s decision today, to expect that a statute will not be *574altered so as to reopen and significantly alter past transactions which have been completed in reliance upon the statute and its interpretation by the Court.
To dismiss, as the majority does, the argument of, appellants that they justifiably relied on this Court’s ruling in Chambers with the shibboleth that one may not expect that a socioeconomic law will not be retroactively changed, is to ignore the bounds of reason and fairness. As pointed out by Sutherland,
Analysis of the practical considerations influencing the question whether a retroactive application of a new law is fair and just should afford more meaningful standards of judgment than either catchpenny phrases or the ambivalent concept of "vested.” . . .
One of the fundamental considerations of fairness recognized in every legal system is that settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect to substantial interests ought not be defeated. [2 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 41.05, pp 365-366.]
Taking the majority’s analysis to its logical conclusion would permit the Legislature to overrule decades-old decisions of this Court and impose retroactive liability for completed transactions conducted in accordance with those decisions, subject only to the nebulous requirement that the legislation is supported by any "legitimate legislative purpose.” In order to protect this Court’s status as the final arbiter of what the law is, and to secure the guarantee of due process, I would hold that the Legislature may not retroactively undo past transactions completed in reliance upon a decision of this Court.
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 Const 1963, art 3, § 2 and art 4, § 1.

 1987 PA 28.

 Of course, no question is raised concerning the Legislature’s power to enact legislation which may have the effect prospectively of overruling a decision of this Court. See, e.g., Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531; 377 NW2d 300 (1985) (enactment intended to overrule Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978) (has prospective effect).

 To be sure, this Court has, on occasion, upheld the validity of retroactive legislation. However, a distinction must be drawn between legislation that modifies benefits and liabilities prospectively based on prior conduct, and that which alters completed transactions. We recognized the distinction in Franks. While construing the original version of § 354, the Court said,
We . . . disagree with the board’s assumption that application of the coordination of benefits provision of § 354 to workers’ compensation payments for compensable periods after the effective date of the statute would constitute retrospective application simply because the liability is based upon an injury that occurred prior thereto. As the board accurately observed . . . "it is not contended that compensation benefits should be retroactively coordinated or reduced. Rather it is argued that the benefits of all disabled workers should be prospectively coordinated after the effective date of the enactment regardless of when they were injured.” [422 Mich 652-653. First emphasis added, later emphasis in original, citation omitted.]
In contrast to a statute like original § 354 which prospectively altered benefit levels based on a past injury, this Court noted that §358 of 1980 PA 357 appeared to be "purely” retroactive. That section provided:
Net weekly benefits payable under section 351, 361, or lump sum benefits under section 835, shall be reduced by 100% of the amount of benefits paid or payable to the injured employee under the Michigan employment security act, Act No. 1 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936, as amended, being sections 421.1 to 421.67a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, for identical periods of time and chargeable to the same employer.
In determining whether § 354 was intended to operate retroactively, we said:
Although a statute is not regarded as operating retrospectively merely because it relates to an antecedent event, as we have already observed, application of the provisions of § 358 to impose a disability, in the form of a setoff, upon the amount of *572workers’ compensation time periods prior to the effective date of the legislation in question, is purely retroactive. [422 Mich 671. Emphasis added.]
This Court held that because § 358 was not merely procedural or remedial, and since it affected the substantive right of workers to receipt of payments existing prior to the statute’s effective date, the statute was not to be applied retrospectively. 422 Mich 673.