Court Opinion

ID: 9527617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:31:59.182065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:59.148871
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: Because of the majority’s extremely liberal application of the plain error principle, I must respectfully dissent. We have only recently reaffirmed the heretofore generally accepted understanding that failure to object to erroneous trial proceedings constitutes a waiver of the error. The plain error doctrine is an exception to this general rule and is not meant to be a general saving clause to preserve all errors that may appear in the record, whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court. (People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16.) This exception was carved out of the waiver doctrine as a matter of grace so that the court of review could take notice of errors appearing on the record which deprived the accused of a substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial. (People v. Burson (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370-71.) In a sense, any trial error impinges upon a litigant’s right to a fair trial. However, the deprivation which has heretofore commanded the court’s attention under the plain error exception has been of such a serious nature as to be spoken of in the context of due process. Thus, in Burson, this court, in discussing the waiver rule, stated: “However, this is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power, and it will not operate to deprive an accused of his constitutional rights of due process.” (11 Ill. 2d 360, 370.) This court has also held the plain error exception applicable in criminal cases where the evidence is closely balanced. (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill 2d 280, 283.) Until a recent liberalization of the plain error exception by the appellate courts of this State, and by the majority of the court in this case, plain error was applied in only a limited number of cases and for the limited purpose of ameliorating the hardship occasioned by an unyielding adherence to the waiver doctrine. Recently, plain error has been urged in a vast number of cases both in this court and in our appellate courts. The frequency of this occurrence can, to a great degree, be explained by the fact that in most criminal appeals the defendant is represented by counsel that did not represent him in the trial court. In reviewing the record, if appellate counsel finds error that was not preserved by objection in the trial court, he can only seek review of that error under the plain error exception. We cannot fault appellate counsel for urging plain error in these circumstances. Indeed, it is his duty to his client to do so. Considering the recent liberal interpretation of plain error in this State, it is doubtful if he could, in the face of such a record, file an Andersmotion and brief informing the court that there are no meritorious issues to review. (See Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396.) However, the fact thpt the courts of review are being constantly requested to consider unobjected-to trial error as plain error does not require that our heretofore limited application of the exception be expanded. Just as the appellate advocate may consider it his duty to represent his client by urging plain error, I consider it our duty to define, with some exactitude, the boundaries of the exception. This we have heretofore done. I see no reason for expanding these limits. Unless we adhere to the previously limited application of the plain error exception, the courts of review in this State will be asked to consider every unobjected-to trial error which the appellate advocate may uncover in combing through the record. Inasmuch as a trial judge is not conversant with the defendant’s trial counsel’s trial plan, he cannot, in the absence of an objection, safely involve himself in every situation that may appear to constitute error. It is not at all unusual for a defense attorney to intentionally permit a prosecutor to conduct objectionable cross-examination and thereby open the door for a very helpful redirect examination. It is the obligation of counsel to present objections to procedures and to the admissibility of evidence. (ABA Standards, The Function of the Trial Judge, sec. 5.7 (1972).) The commentary to this standard states at page 71: “This standard is intended to admonish the trial judge to exercise self-restraint and fairness in permitting counsel for the prosecution and for the defense to perform their duties. Within appropriate limits they should be free from judicial interference.” Admittedly, the cross-examination set out in the majority opinion was erroneous, but in the absence of an objection the trial judge could not have safely terminated it. This cross-examination certainly opened the door for redirect examination concerning other conversations that may have taken place between the prosecutor and the defendant’s wife, or some explanation by the wife for her refusal to answer, which would not otherwise have been admissible. So far as the trial judge would have known, defense counsel might have wanted to pursue redirect examination which such cross-examination made proper. The opinion seems to hold that since the error was raised in the post-trial motion it was properly preserved although not objected to at the trial. To be properly preserved, the error must be objected to at the trial and raised in the post-trial motion. The purpose of requiring the objection at the trial is to permit the trial court to prevent error or to correct it so that the defendant may receive a fair trial and so that it will not be necessary to grant a new trial. If the defendant does not raise the error until the post-trial motion, the error can only be corrected by the same sacrifice of judicial economy that would be involved by raising the issue for the first time on review; that is, by the granting of a new trial. Also, by permitting the defendant to silently allow error to enter the record and then to raise the issue in a post-trial motion is, to a degree, permitting him to insure himself against an unsuccessful trial. Such a procedure permits the defendant to allow erroneous evidence to be admitted, unobjected to, knowing that he is creating an issue which he can later raise as a ground for a new trial should he be convicted. I do not think that the decisions of this court should encourage such tactics. Permitting them to succeed is not playing fair with the trial judge and permits the defendant to gain the advantage of obtaining a reversal of his conviction based upon his own failure to act. (See Dean v. Keith’s & Ralph’s Tavern, Inc. (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 970, 972.) I would hold that the defendant has waived the error now complained of by failing to object thereto during the trial. MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.