Court Opinion

ID: 9492447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:41:32.02851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:18.720885
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse Mayfield’s conviction and remand for a new trial. The district court neutralized the erroneous admission of the confidential informant’s statements with a limiting instruction. Mayfield forfeited any claim of error under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Gilbert and Mayfield did apparently seek to point the finger at each other during the trial, but their defenses did not qualify as mutually exclusive under Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). Most importantly, however, if any error did occur in trying Gilbert and Mayfield together, the overwhelming individualized evidence against Mayfield renders that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would affirm the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial.
I
The confidential informant’s statement was hearsay and had the potential to prejudice Mayfield. Recognizing this danger, the district court properly sanitized the statement through a limiting instruction:
*908[Y]ou are instructed that you’re not to consider the information the informant said about Mayfield for the truth of the matter, but you’re only to consider it as it gave the officer the reason to conduct the search at that particular time.
Reliance on the jury is a central tenet of our criminal justice system, and the law is clear that we assume the jury’s ability to follow limiting instructions. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899-900 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933). The majority simply bypasses this principle when relying on the hearsay testimony to grant a new trial.
II
Although a pretrial motion raised the Bruton concern regarding Gilbert’s confession, Mayfield conceded during argument on his motion for a new trial that Gilbert’s statement, as introduced, was properly redacted. Mayfield waived the right to contest this issue on appeal. United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc); United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that the defendant waived any claim of error in the failure to give a jury instruction by saying he did not believe the instruction was necessary).
Furthermore, Mayfield did not object to the admission of Gilbert’s statement at trial or renew his request for a limiting instruction. Under these circumstances, we review the failure to give a limiting instruction for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Because of his failure to object, Mayfield must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the lack of a limiting instruction. Id. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. He makes no attempt to do so.
Because any Bruton error was not properly preserved for appeal, we do not consider the possibility of error when asking whether the cumulative effect of many errors at trial prejudiced Mayfield. See United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 n. 21 (9th Cir.1988) (citing United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir.1980)). Relying on an unpreserved claim of error to conclude that Mayfield should have a new trial takes the panel majority’s opinion out of the realm of the suspect into the realm of simply wrong.
Ill
Finally, although the majority believes Gilbert and Mayfield presented mutually exclusive defenses, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Zafiro to hold that they did not. In Zafiro, each of two defendants claimed that a box full of drugs belonged to the other, seeking acquittal by placing the blame elsewhere. 506 U.S. at 536, 113 S.Ct. 933. Citing jury instructions closely comparable to those that the district court gave in this case, the Court held that any possibility of prejudice was cured. Id. at 541, 113 S.Ct. 933.
The majority attempts to limit Zafiro by distinguishing between “conflicting” and “mutually exclusive” defenses. Ante at 903. However, the Supreme Court understood that some conflicting defenses could rise to the level of being mutually exclusive, clearly identifying our opinion in United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir.1991), as a rare example of irreconcilable defenses. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. 933; see also United States v. Gillam, 167 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir.1999) (referring to the “extraordinary record” at issue in Tootick). In Tootick, the victim had been injured in a violent assault, and only the two co-defendants were implicated. 952 F.2d at 1081. Each sought to place blame on the other. Id. In Zafiro and the case at bench, by contrast, the core of the defenses was each individual’s lack of culpability. Gilbert argued that he was merely present in the apartment where the drugs were found. May-field argued that he was not there and that the drugs were not his, either. The jury could have accepted both defenses.
*909Conclusion
The evidence was overwhelming with regard to Mayfield’s guilt. Three officers testified that he was present in the apartment, at the table with the drugs. May-field was apprehended just after stepping outside the door and had nearly $2,000 in cash in his pockets. Mayfield had keys to the apartment. Apart from any claimed trial errors, this testimony presents an open-and-shut case of possession with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). If there was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I respectfully dissent.