Court Opinion

ID: 9380575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 16:07:21.342633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.280862
License: Public Domain

J-A28042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RODNEY WILLIAM GARY                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2635 EDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 13, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-23-CR-0001201-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                             FILED MARCH 20, 2023

       Rodney William Gary (“Gary”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after he pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated assault by vehicle

while driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving under the influence,

possession of a controlled substance, and related offenses.1 Gary’s counsel

(“Counsel”) has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), and

petitioned to withdraw. We deny Counsel’s petition.

       We summarize the factual history of this appeal from the affidavit of

probable cause, which the parties incorporated into the record of Gary’s nolo

contendere pleas.       See Criminal Complaint, Affidavit of Probable Cause,

12/30/17, at 1; see also N.T., 10/29/19, at 15-16 (memorializing the parties’
____________________________________________

1See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3735.1(a), 3802(d)(1)(i); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16);
see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3732.1(a), 3742(a), 3742.1(a), 3736(a), 3714(c),
3745(a), 3361, 3744.
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stipulations to the affidavit of probable cause, the results of all chemical

testing, and Gary’s driving history as stating the factual bases for Gary’s

pleas). In the morning of December 30, 2017, Upper Darby Police Officer

James Friel received a dispatch about a vehicle striking a pedestrian, and was

among the officers to respond.     When Officer Friel arrived at the accident

scene, he observed a man on the ground with open wounds and possible

broken bones. One witness reported that the driver had struck two stop signs

and then hit the pedestrian, after which the driver stopped, briefly got out of

his vehicle, and then drove away from the scene. The witness identified the

vehicle as a white Dodge Durango and gave officers its license plate number.

The witness described the driver as a black male. A second witness stated

that he was walking toward the accident scene when he heard people yelling

to stop a vehicle, and he took pictures of the driver and the vehicle’s license

plate. See Criminal Complaint, Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/30/17, at 1.

      Officer Friel patrolled the area and later found the Dodge Durango

double-parked by a building. He saw a man later identified as Gary, in a green

jacket walking away from the vehicle.         Upon seeing the officer, Gary

immediately went into the building. Officer Friel and another officer entered

the building and found Gary. The officer brought Gary outside where one of

the witnesses from the accident scene identified him. A woman told police

that she saw Gary discard a pink bottle inside the building. An officer returned

to the building and recovered a bottle containing six pills, which later chemical

testing identified as alprazolam (“Xanax”).     Police investigated the Dodge

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Durango and noticed the smell of burnt marijuana inside the vehicle. Officers

contacted the Durango’s registered owner, who told them she had double-

parked the vehicle to go to an appointment while Gary remained in the car.

Police took Gary into custody, and he consented to a blood test. See id.

        The Commonwealth charged Gary with numerous offenses related to the

hitting the pedestrian while DUI and his possession of Xanax. On October 29,

2019, Gary, who was represented by different counsel at the time (“prior

counsel”), entered nolo contendere pleas.      The trial court accepted Gary’s

pleas    and   deferred   sentencing.    Following   continuances   and   status

conferences during the COVID-19 emergency, Gary’s prior counsel filed a

motion to withdraw from representation.         The trial court granted prior

counsel’s motion and appointed current Counsel.

        Gary, through Counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his nolo contendere

pleas and asserted his innocence. See Motion to Withdraw Nolo Contendere

Pleas, 5/27/21, at 2. Gary denied driving the vehicle at the time it struck the

pedestrian and argued that the eyewitness identifications were unreliable.

See id.     He further asserted the Commonwealth could not prove that he

possessed the bottle the police recovered in the building. See id. Following

a hearing, the trial court denied Gary’s motion to withdraw his pleas in July

2021, and held a sentencing hearing on August 13, 2021.         The trial court

imposed an aggregate sentence of four to eight years of imprisonment. Gary

timely filed a post-sentence motion again requesting to withdraw his nolo

contendere pleas. The trial court denied Gary’s post-sentence motion. Gary

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timely appealed, and Counsel filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) statement of intent

to file an Anders brief. The trial court determined that no further explanation

of Gary’s conviction and sentence was necessary and did not prepare a Rule

1925(a) opinion. As noted above, Counsel has filed an Anders brief and a

petition to withdraw from representation.

      When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to

withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super.

2010). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and

wishes to withdraw from representation, he must do the following:

      (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
      making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
      determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring
      to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which
      does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the
      brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new
      counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems
      worthy of this Court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(internal citation omitted). In Santiago, our Supreme Court addressed the

second requirement of Anders, i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and

required that the brief:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
      counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
      counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling

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      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.        “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders]

requirements, it is then this Court's duty to conduct its own review of the trial

court's proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the

appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Edwards, 906 A.2d at 1228 (citation

omitted).

      Here, Counsel avers in his petition to withdraw that he conducted a

thorough and conscientious review of the record and applicable case law, and

thereafter determined that there are no meritorious grounds to support Gary’s

appeal. Counsel further avers that he mailed Gary copies of the petition and

the Anders brief, as well as correspondence explaining Gary’s rights to retain

private counsel or proceed pro se and raise any additional arguments he

believes are meritorious. Counsel’s Anders brief includes a summary of the

facts and procedural history of the case, a list of issues that could arguably

support Gary’s appeal, and Counsel’s analysis of why the issues lack merit.

We conclude Counsel has complied with the technical requirements of the

Anders procedure. Accordingly, we will conduct an independent review to

determine whether Gary’s appeal is wholly frivolous.

      Counsel identifies the following issue for review:

      Whether [trial court] erred as a matter of law and abused its
      discretion, in denying [Gary’s motion to withdraw] his nolo
      contendere plea, which was filed by [Gary] prior to sentencing.

Anders Brief at 2.

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     The following principles govern our review.    The right to withdraw a

guilty or nolo contendere plea is not absolute.     See Commonwealth v.

Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291 (Pa. 2015); see also Commonwealth

v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 114 & n.1 (Pa. 2019) (noting that the same

standards apply to pre-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea or a nolo

contendere plea).   The trial court must construe a pre-sentence motion to

withdraw a plea “liberally in favor of the accused” and “any demonstration by

a defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless

withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.”         See

Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292 (internal citation omitted). The trial court

may exercise its discretion when considering whether an assertion of

innocence constitutes a fair and just reason for a pre-sentence withdrawal of

a plea.   See Norton, 201 A.3d at 120.      A defendant’s bare assertion of

innocence will not establish a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea per se.

See id.    The trial court may consider the credibility or plausibility of a

defendant’s assertion of innocence when assessing whether the defendant has

offered a colorable claim that the withdrawal of the plea would promote

fairness and justice. See id. at 120-21.

     An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion. Thus,

     [w]hen a trial court comes to a conclusion through the exercise of
     its discretion, there is a heavy burden on the appellant to show
     that this discretion has been abused. An appellant cannot meet
     this burden by simply persuading an appellate court that it may
     have reached a different conclusion than that reached by the trial

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      court; rather, to overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must
      demonstrate that the trial court actually abused its discretionary
      power. An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a mere
      error of judgment, but rather exists where the trial court has
      reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or
      where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the
      result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Absent an abuse of
      that discretion, an appellate court should not disturb a trial court's
      ruling.

Id. at 120 (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

      In the case sub judice, our review of the record reveals that the trial

court did not enter findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning its denial

of Gary’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas either

on the record at the hearing, in a separate order, or in a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

As emphasized by our Supreme Court, an appellate court’s role is to review

the trial court’s exercise of discretion when denying a pre-sentence motion to

withdraw a plea. See id. The absence of a trial court opinion, under the

circumstances of this appeal, impedes proper appellate review, and we decline

to consider Counsel’s independent assessment that this appeal is frivolous

without the benefit of the trial court’s discussion of its findings of fact,

determinations of credibility, and conclusions of law.

      Accordingly, we deny Counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation

and direct the trial court to prepare a supplemental opinion within forty-five

days of this decision addressing its denial of Gary’s pre-sentence motion to

withdraw. This Court shall thereafter set a new briefing schedule during which

Counsel shall file an advocate’s brief or a new petition to withdraw and an

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Anders brief,2 and the Commonwealth may file a supplemental appellee’s

brief.

         Petition to withdraw denied with instructions.     Panel jurisdiction

retained.

____________________________________________

2 We add that while Counsel extensively discussed the Commonwealth’s
evidence against Gary, including references to a preliminary hearing
transcript, the certified record does not indicate that the preliminary hearing
transcripts were admitted as evidence in connection with Gary’s pleas or his
motion to withdraw his pleas. Moreover, the certified record does not contain
a copy of that transcript or any other evidence the Commonwealth used to
establish a factual basis for the pleas aside from the affidavit of probable
cause. Counsel shall ensure that the record includes all information necessary
for this Court to render a decision upon issuance of the trial court’s
supplemental opinion.

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