Court Opinion

ID: 9895356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 20:13:01.201842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:11.232695
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                                          FILED
State of West Virginia,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent                                                       November 6, 2023
                                                                                       released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                                   EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
vs.) No. 22-0210 (Putnam County 19-F-140)                                          SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                        OF WEST VIRGINIA

Leslie G.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION
        Petitioner Leslie G. 1 intercepted e-mails and cell phone text messages of J. M., her
youngest child’s father, for several months in 2018. Following a 2021 jury trial in Putnam County,
she was convicted of one count of interception of electronic communications, a felony under West
Virginia Code § 62-1D-3 (2007). In this appeal, Petitioner asks for a new trial and claims that the
trial court’s response to a jury question during deliberations—where it defined the statutory term
“tortious act”—was overly broad and prejudicial. Petitioner also argues that she has been denied
her constitutional right to a complete trial transcript to adequately prepare an appeal because
several sidebars conducted during jury selection were not transcribed. The State responds that a
new trial is unnecessary because the trial court’s response to the jury question fairly described the
term, and she fails to make a showing of prejudice attributable to the missing portions of the
transcript. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the State and affirm the conviction. 2

                               I. Factual and Procedural History

        Petitioner and the victim, J. M., cohabitated and have a child together. By all accounts,
their relationship was toxic; they obtained domestic violence protective orders against each other
at various times. After J. M. and Petitioner were no longer living together, he suspected that
Petitioner was accessing his e-mails and cell phone text messages and using this information for
various reasons including interfering with his employment search. He reported the matter to law
enforcement and in November 2019, a grand jury indicted Petitioner on one count of interception
of electronic communications.

       At the trial held in June 2021, J. M. testified that when he was living with Petitioner, he
purchased a cell phone on her plan. And when he bought a tablet to go back to school, Petitioner

       1
        Consistent with our long-standing practice, we use initials to protect the identities of those
involved in this case. See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
       2
          Petitioner is represented by counsel, Christopher W. Maidona and Zoe A. Shavers. The
State is represented by Michael R. Williams, Principal Deputy Solicitor General.
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set up an iCloud account using his tablet. J. M. said that he was not computer savvy at the time,
but later learned that everything on his devices was shared to the iCloud account where Petitioner
accessed it. J. M. said that he never gave Petitioner permission to access his personal information,
even when they were together.

        The lead investigator in the case, Trooper C. J. Eastridge with the West Virginia State
Police, testified that he obtained a search warrant that led to the seizure of Petitioner’s cell phone.
He gave it to Roger Dale Mosley, a technician employed by the West Virginia State Police Digital
Forensics Lab, who performed a data extraction on the cell phone. Trooper Eastridge determined
that Petitioner accessed a variety of J. M.’s electronic communications including e-mails and text
messages from January 2018 to October 2018, and then saved this information on her cell phone.

        Trooper Eastridge testified that Petitioner intercepted J. M.’s e-mail conversations with his
attorney, the child’s guardian ad litem, the victim’s advocate at the Putnam County Courthouse,
and J. M.’s potential employers. Trooper Eastridge said that his investigation revealed that
Petitioner created a fake e-mail account, using a different name, and e-mailed J. M.’s potential
employers. He cited a specific example where Petitioner used this fake account to e-mail a
potential employer about J. M.’s application to work as a gym manager. The subject line of this
e-mail read “Applicant information [J. M.]”, and the first three sentences of the e-mail read, “I
worked with this individual at his previous employer, Planet Fitness. He was terminated . . . due
to his own misconduct. He is applying to other facilities stating Planet Fitness asked him to do
things he was uncomfortable with. This is simply untrue and being addressed.” Trooper Eastridge
said that this prospective employer later e-mailed J. M., and said, in part, “I sincerely apologize
but we will not be able to conduct today’s call. We will let you know once we’re able to
reschedule. Thank you.” Trooper Eastridge said that he confirmed with J. M. that he was not
called to work there.

        Petitioner testified that before their baby was born, J. M. gave her permission to access
everything on his cell phone and that he never withdrew that consent even after they broke up.
Petitioner admitted that she continued to monitor his e-mails and text messages, claiming that “was
the agreement.” Petitioner also admitted that she collaborated with J. M.’s mother to create the
fake e-mail account from which e-mails were sent to J. M.’s potential employers.

       When instructing the jury on the elements of the crime, the trial court said, in part, that

       [i]nterception of electronic communication occurs when any person intentionally
       intercepts, attempts to intercept or procures any other person to intercept any
       electronic communication or intentionally uses the contents of any intercepted
       electronic communication. . . . It is lawful for a person to intercept an electronic
       communication where one of the parties to the communication [has] given prior
       consent to the interception unless a communication is intercepted for the purpose
       of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the [C]onstitution or laws
       of the [U]nited [S]tates or the [C]onstitution o[r] the laws of this State. . . .

       During deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note reading, “Can the court inform the jury
the legal definition of a tortious act in WV?” Following the jury’s question, the trial court

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conferred with counsel about how to respond. Petitioner’s counsel suggested the court say, “A
tort is a civil wrong that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm resulting in legal liability for the
person who commits the tortious acts and for which the claimant suffers damages.” The trial court
rejected this proposed answer, reasoning “that definition injected a bunch of words that would
almost have to be defined themselves again[.]” The trial court provided a typed answer to the jury
which stated, “Tortious is an adjective of the word ‘tort.’ Tortious means constituting a tort. A
tort is an act that brings harm to someone; an act that infringes on the rights of others.”

       The jury found Petitioner guilty. She filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the trial court’s definition of “tortious
act” was overly broad and prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion. 3

       In February 2022, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to five years in the penitentiary and
fined her $1,000. But it suspended the sentence and ordered that Petitioner be placed on home
confinement for five years. This appeal followed.

                                      II. Standard of Review

       We are called upon to consider two assignments of error that have specific standards of
review that will be discussed below. But as a general matter, this Court has held that

               the ruling of a trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new
               trial is entitled to great respect and weight, the trial court’s ruling
               will be reversed on appeal when it is clear that the trial court has
               acted under some misapprehension of the law or the evidence.[4]

       With this deferential standard to guide us, we examine the issues presented in this appeal.

                                           III. Discussion

       West Virginia Code § 62-1D-3(a)(1) and its federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)
(2018), prohibit the intentional interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communications. While
both statutes set forth the privilege of consent, prior consent is not a defense when “the

       3
         Petitioner also filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the West Virginia
Rules of Criminal Procedure. While neither posttrial motion is included in the appendix record
before this Court, Petitioner argued at the hearing on the motions that she was entitled to an
acquittal because there was insufficient evidence of interception of the electronic communications.
She has abandoned that claim on appeal.
       4
         State v. Hughes, 225 W. Va. 218, 223, 691 S.E.2d 813, 818 (2010) (citing Syl. Pt. 4, in
part, Sanders v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 159 W. Va. 621, 225 S.E.2d 218 (1976)).

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communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this State.”5

        There is no dispute that the trial court’s jury instruction tracked the language of West
Virginia Code § 62-1D-3. This case involves the narrow question of whether the trial court
committed reversible error when it responded to the jury’s request for the definition of tortious act
by instructing it that, “Tortious is an adjective of the word ‘tort.’ Tortious means constituting a
tort. A tort is an act that bring harm to someone; an act that infringes on the rights of others.”

        Petitioner argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial court’s response to the
jury’s question was overly broad and prejudicial. She claims that this response erroneously
included acts that may have been harmful or embarrassing without being tortious. The State
responds that the trial court’s definition fairly described the term in a way to not confuse the jury.
And to the extent the trial court’s response was error, the State says it would be harmless error
because the remaining instruction properly advised the jury of the elements of the crime and the
evidence establishing Petitioner’s guilt was substantial. This Court has held that a “trial court has
discretion in determining how best to respond to a jury question. We will review any such response
for an abuse of discretion.” 6

         In State v. Davis, this Court directed trial judges to respond to a question from a deliberating
jury in a “plain, clear manner so as to enlighten rather than confuse them.” 7 When responding to
the jury’s question in this case, the trial court’s definition of “tortious” as “constituting a tort” is
consistent with the definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary. 8 And when defining tort as “an
act that bring harm to someone; an act that infringes on the rights of others[,]” the trial court was
careful to avoid a definition that used words that “would almost have to be defined themselves
again,” which is why it declined the definition offered by Petitioner’s counsel. We conclude that
the trial court’s explanation of “tortious act” fairly explained the term to the jury within the context
of West Virginia Code § 62-1D-3(e), without creating additional confusion. 9 We see no abuse of
discretion.

        5
         W. Va. Code § 61-1D-3(e) (emphasis added). The federal wiretap statute uses similar
language. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person
not acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
or of any State[.]”) (emphasis added).
        6
            State v. Davis, 220 W. Va. 590, 593, 648 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2007).
        7
            Id. at 595, 648 S.E.2d at 359 (quoting Smith v. State, 596 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. 2004)).
        8
            Black’s Law Dictionary 1527 (8th ed. 2007).
        9
        See United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[t]he carve-out within §
2511(2)(d), which renders inadmissible consented recordings made for the purpose of perpetrating
                                                   4
        Petitioner also argues that she has been deprived of her constitutional right to a complete
transcript and that she is prejudiced, per se, by the inability to identify potential issues within the
missing portions of the record at trial. Petitioner cites fourteen instances where sidebars took place
during jury selection that were not transcribed. She claims that because the transcript is
incomplete, she is entitled to a new trial. 10 The State responds that enough information may be
gleaned from the transcribed portions of jury selection to conclude there was no substantial issue
discussed in any sidebar. And even though not transcribed, most of the sidebars resulted in the
excusing of jurors either for cause or for hardship. While this Court has held that “all proceedings
in the criminal trial are required to be reported,” we have further held that “the failure to report all
of the proceedings may not in all instances constitute reversible error.” 11 “Omissions from a trial
transcript warrant a new trial only if the missing portion of the transcript specifically prejudices a
defendant’s appeal.” 12

        Applying that standard to this case, Petitioner fails to make a specific showing of prejudice
attributable to the absence of that portion of the transcript. She cannot simply assert that the
missing portions of jury selection might reveal the existence of error warranting reversal. Rather,
she must identify possible appellate issues which, if meritorious, would otherwise warrant a new
trial. The circumstances surrounding the missing portions of the transcript of the jury selection
process in this case fall short of those in cases to which she cites, including State v. Yates, 13 where
the transcript lacked nearly two hours of the trial, including crucial portions of the victim’s
testimony. Although serious errors can occur during jury selection, it would be pure conjecture
for this Court to set aside Petitioner’s conviction based on that possibility, especially when
Petitioner did not allege any error arising from jury selection in her post-trial motions. The

‘criminal’ or ‘tortious’ acts, is to be construed narrowly. It is confined to instances where the
recording party intends to use the recording to harm or injure a recorded party, such as to
blackmail, threaten, or publicly embarrass the recorded party.”) (emphasis added).
       10
           See Syl. Pt. 2, State x rel. Kisner v. Fox, 165 W. Va. 123, 267 S.E.2d 451 (1980) (“The
failure of the State to provide a transcript of a criminal proceeding for the purpose of appeal, absent
extraordinary dereliction on the part of the State; will not result in the release of the defendant;
however, the defendant will have the option of appealing on the basis of a reconstructed record or
of receiving a new trial.”).
       11
            Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v. Bolling, 162 W. Va. 103, 246 S.E.2d 631 (1978).
       12
            Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Graham, 208 W. Va. 463, 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000).
       13
            821 S.E.2d 650, 652 (N.C. App. 2018).

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possibility that a Batson-type error, 14 or anything resembling it, occurred without defense counsel
making note of it is too unlikely to merit reversal. 15

                                            IV. Conclusion

       For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Circuit Court of Putnam County’s sentencing
order entered February 22, 2022.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

ISSUED: November 6, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn, deeming herself disqualified, did not participate in this decision.
Judge Jeffrey D. Cramer, sitting by temporary assignment.

       14
          Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding Equal Protection Clause forbids
prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race).
       15
            Petitioner’s appellate attorney, Mr. Maidona, also represented her at trial.

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