Court Opinion

ID: 9531211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:41.164345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:22.251295
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing when a defendant files a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. IND.CODE 35-85-1-4(b) does not expressly provide or require that the trial court conduct a hearing on a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 1.0. 35-85-1-4(b) provides:
After entry of a plea of guilty ... but before imposition of sentence, the court may allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea of guilty ... for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea. The motion to withdraw the plea of guilty ... under this subsection shall be in writing and verified. The motion shall state facts in support of the relief demanded, and the state may file counter-affidavits in opposition to the motion. The ruling of the court on the motion shall be reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. However the court shall allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty ... whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice.
The majority concludes that a defendant cannot meet his burden of presenting specific facts to establish that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice unless the trial court allows him to present evidence at a hearing. I disagree. Not only may a defendant present specific facts to support his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the written, verified motion itself, but he is required to do so. See I.C. 85-85-1-4). The defendant may also provide the court with written sworn statements to support his motion. Hewitt v. State (1980), Ind.App., 403 N.E.2d 882, 884. However, the trial court is not required to believe the defendant's claims. Id. In addition, the fact that IC. 35-85-1-4(b) provides that the State may file counter-affidavits in opposition to a defendant's motion further supports the position that a hearing is not mandatory and that the trial court may consider written submissions.
*1167Likewise, case law does not expressly or necessarily imply that the trial court must conduct a hearing before denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In fact, we have previously upheld trial court decisions denying motions to withdraw guilty pleas where the trial court did not conduct a hearing in cireumstances strikingly similar to the ones here. See eg. Smith v. State (1992), Ind.App., 596 N.E.2d 257, 259 (defendant filed a verified motion to withdraw his guilty plea at the sentencing hearing; the court denied the motion and then sentenced defendant); Davis v. State (1992), Ind.App., 580 N.E.2d 990, trans. denied; Hewitt, at 884.
Even in reviewing cases in which the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we have stated that "[al court may deny a motion for withdrawal of plea after the guilty plea hearing, if it finds that the plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis and was freely, knowingly, and voluntarily entered." Bewley v. State (1991), Ind.App., 572 N.E.2d 541, 544, trans. denied. In order to determine whether there is a factual basis to support the plea and that the plea was freely and voluntarily entered, the court is required to review the guilty plea transcript only. Id. at 544-45, Thus, a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea is not only not statutorily required, but it would also not be helpful.
Our duty on appeal is to examine the entire transcript on the plea of guilty to determine if there is evidence of probative value to support the trial court's factual determinations, and thus, its denial of the motion. See Watson v. State (1988), Ind., 526 N.E.2d 701, 702; Hewitt, at 884. Therefore, a hearing on the motion to withdraw a guilty plea would not aid in appellate review.
We may affirm as long as the record supports the trial court's explicit or implicit findings that (1) there was a factual basis to support the defendant's guilty plea, and (2) the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his plea. See Howift, at 885. We will reverse the trial court's decision only for an abuse of discretion. I.C. 35-85-1-4(b).
The record supports a finding by the trial court that there was an adequate factual basis to support Fletcher's plea and that Fletcher voluntarily and intelligently pled guilty.1 See Hewift, at 885. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Fletcher's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because a hearing was not required nor would it have added anything to the trial court's review or appellate review.
I would affirm the trial court.

. After the trial judge questioned Fletcher to determine that he previously had been advised of his rights and had voluntarily and freely waived them, he expressed his displeasure with Fletcher's request for a hearing by ordering him to "Shut up and get out of here." This comment falls in the category of those described in Love v. State (1987), Ind.App., 514 N.E.2d 339, 344, as remarks that "would have been better left unsaid." As in Love, though, no prejudice is shown because the judge's statement occurred after the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Td.