Court Opinion

ID: 9943847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 14:54:32.645425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:03.393414
License: Public Domain

I join in the majority opinion which I have signed but write separately to express some of the concerns that remain following our opinion in County of Los Angeles v.Navarro (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 246 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905] (Navarro) and the Fifth Appellate District's decision in County of Fresno v. Sanchez (2005)135 Cal.App.4th 15 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 192] (Sanchez). Although the Legislature responded to Navarro by enacting Family Code section 7648.4 (see Sanchez, at pp. 17, 19), the present case suggests further legislative consideration may be appropriate.
In Navarro, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 246, we were presented with the legal straightjacket in which the County of Los Angeles had dressed Mr. Navarro after genetic testing had conclusively proved that he was not the father of two boys. The county had earlier obtained a default judgment against him that had legally established paternity, albeit without testing. Several years after the entry of the default judgment, San Bernardino County filed a separate paternity action against him involving the same children. In the second action, paternity tests were utilized and established that Mr. Navarro was not the boys' father. San Bernardino County responsibly dismissed its lawsuit. Remarkably, the County of Los Angeles refused Mr. Navarro's request to set aside the earlier default judgment which, as the San Bernardino litigation had demonstrated, was factually without merit. The trial court applied existing law and refused to vacate the county's judgment.
We reversed, relying in part on the Legislature's policy pronouncement from the Child Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000: "`The efficient and fair enforcement of child support orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those orders and respect for the administration of justice. . . . Thousands of individuals each year are mistakenly identified as being liable for child *Page 260 
support actions. As a result of that action, the ability to earn a living is severely impaired, assets are seized, and family relationships are often destroyed. It is the moral,legal, and ethical obligation of all enforcement agencies
to take prompt action to recognize those cases where a person is mistakenly identified as a support obligor in order to minimize the harm and correct any injustice to thatperson.' (Stats. 1999, ch. 653, § 1, italics added.)" (Navarro, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 249.)
The issue before us deals not with the setting aside of a factually unsupportable default paternity judgment; here, the trial court properly set aside the judgment against appellant after genetic testing proved that he was not the father. Appellant takes the next logical step and asks that the county be ordered to reimburse him for the monies he previously paid to the county.1
The majority concludes, as do I, that reimbursement is barred by the express language of Family Code section 7648.4 (section 7648.4). That statute is part of a "comprehensive scheme" for providing relief from the types of unfortunate default judgments present in this case. (Sanchez, supra,135 Cal.App.4th p. 17.) In words that are unmistakable, the Legislature has provided that the "previously established father has no right of reimbursement for any amount of support paid prior to the granting of the motion." (§ 7648.4.) When the words of a statute are clear, we do not alter or amend them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute. Instead, we must give effect to the statute's plain meaning. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego CommunityCollege Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698
[170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856]; see also In re Marriage of Wilcox
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 492, 499 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 315].)
This case, nevertheless, calls into play whether reimbursement from a public agency ought to be governed by the same prohibition as reimbursement from a child's mother when the assumed father is later genetically determined not to be a parent. Notwithstanding the clarity of the legislative language, there is some indication that the drafters were concerned primarily, perhaps exclusively, with reimbursement from a parent. When section 7648.4 was in the form of Assembly Bill No. 252, a report on the bill compared it *Page 261 
with the circulating Senate version: "AB 252 includes an express statement that there is no right to reimbursement of child support already paid, an issue as to which SB 1030 is silent. The potential for a previously established fatherto seek reimbursement from the mother could be financiallydevastating to a child." (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 252 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 4, 2003, p. 9, italics added.) An earlier Assembly Committee report on Senate Bill No. 1030 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) provided additional detail: "Silence on Reimbursement Right: SB 1030, as introduced, included provisions permitting a previously established father to seek reimbursement from the mother of child support already paid. These provisions have been amended out of the bill and it now is silent on the issue of reimbursement. This silence leaves it unclear as to whether reimbursement might be sought. AB 252, by contrast, expressly states that there is no right to reimbursement. Given the devastating financial effect that an order for reimbursement could have on a child, AB 252's express statement barring an action for reimbursement appears to be warranted." (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1030 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 21, 2003, pp. 7-8.)
Although the earlier version of Senate Bill No. 1030 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) allowed reimbursement from the mother only, the ban against repayment was absolute in Assembly Bill No. 252 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) and as enacted as section 7648.4. Nevertheless, the warning contained in the last sentence of the Assembly Report — referring to the devastating effect a reimbursement order could have on a child — would appear not to apply to reimbursement of funds paid to the public agency.
In the case of the assumed father who is later adjudged not to be a parent, there may very well be no "guilty" parties. The mother and assumed father may have honestly felt that parentage existed and the county or other public agency properly discharged its duty to collect child support from the assumed father. Nevertheless when "the type of mistake" (Sanchez,supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 17) that is present here does occur, as between the public agency and the once assumed father, fairness may dictate full or partial reimbursement from the public agency without imposing any financial hardship on the mother or child. Although the language used by the Legislature in enacting section 7648.4 precludes an interpretation that authorizes reimbursement from public agencies, if that is not what the Legislature meant, it always has the opportunity to correct the misimpression. Permitting reimbursement under these situations would actually further the legislative mandate of the Child Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000 which, as noted, exhorts all enforcement *Page 262 
agencies to "correct any injustice" — not merely to cease perpetuating injustice — to those mistakenly identified as support obligors.
Appellant's petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 25, 2007, S154945. Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Moreno, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
1 As in Navarro, the County of Los Angeles in the present case first obtained a default judgment against appellant without the benefit of genetic testing. Five years later DNA testing revealed that appellant was not the father. As in Navarro, the county opposed the setting aside of the default judgment, and the court refused to vacate it. Later, the parties agreed that the county would seek no future child support payments in light of the genetic test results. Two years later, appellant renewed his motion to vacate the judgment and sought reimbursement for monies already paid to the county. On this occasion, the county did not object to the setting aside of the judgment but did oppose any reimbursement. *Page 263