Court Opinion

ID: 9714161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:32:19.892888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.489031
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
At the outset of this opinion I bring into focus the following statements from the opinion to which I dissent:
*414“The alleged theft and delivery occurred in the early morning (6:00 a.m,, March 20, 1958) before the' normal work routine in the scrap yard began (also 1 hour before plaintiff’s time to commence work for defendant). * * * The 2 bags of scrap were loaded in a truck driven to a neighboring scrap dealer and thrown over his fence before his place of business opened.”
“It is plaintiff’s contention that he was an innocent foil. He claims he was unaware that the bags contained stolen scrap.”
“In support of his position, he testified as to minimal schooling in the deep South as explaining his apparent naivete.”
“The essential thrust of plaintiff’s case is that ho was framed.”
“The completely disinterested witness Robbins overheard plaintiff confess.”
“Messrs. Kramer and Orloff had many Negro employees, never exhibited any animus toward them as a race.”
Reference is made in the opinion to the testimony of Michael Sparks. To show how defendant happened to inform Sparks concerning the plaintiff, we-quote from Sparks’ testimony as follows:
“On June 24,1958,1 hired him (plaintiff) through' the recommendation of his father-in-law, and when I went to make out the rest of the papers for him I asked him for his previous employment and he told me Kramer-Orloff.
“Q. I see.
“A. So I called Kramer-Orloff and asked, for— well, for a reference. * * *
“Q. What did he say?
“A. He said he couldn’t give no reference; that he fired him because he was stealing from the premises, and that is all he could give me.”
*415I am in accord with the following quotes from my Brother’s opinion, which clearly show that the trial court was justified in labeling this litigation .as a most unusual trial:
“Every material allegation of fact in the case is controverted. All of the relevant testimony is in direct and sharp conflict. * * *
“Without detailing more testimony, it can be said that the record is replete with point-blank contradictions and outright charges and countercharges of per jury, and bad faith, some spontaneously shouted from the courtroom, some in response to examination.”
I disagree with the conclusion that the trial judge in determining a motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence must weigh all evidence, must count the number of witnesses for plaintiff and defendant, must accept as the truth all the testimony irrespective as to how absurd or preposterous it may be, on the grounds that the credibility is solely for the jury and, if it is good enough for the jury, it must be good enough for the judge.
Neither can I subscribe to my Brother’s statement that: “To whatever extent the trial court or this Court might be disinclined to believe plaintiff’s witnesses, we — neither of us — may substitute our standards of credence for the constitutionally guaranteed jury determination thereof.”
In 2 MLP, Appeals, § 340, p 231, it is said:
“In determining whether the trial judge correctly ruled on a motion for new trial, the Supreme Court will bring to the support of his decision all reasonable presumptions which arise from his superior opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses. It is presumed that the trial court correctly measured the credibility and the mental capacity *416of the witnesses, and that the trial court reached a correct conclusion in determining whether a verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence.” (Citing cases.)
. This Court in Jaeger v. Mitchell, 277 Mich 464, in the year 1936, made it clear that in determining-motions for new trial we expected the trial judge-to take advantage of “his superior opportunity to-determine the credibility of the witnesses.” In that case we said (pp 466,- 467):
“Mandamus will lie to compel a trial judge to-vacate an order improperly made, granting a new trial. The general rule in this regard, however, precludes us from interfering with the exercise of discretion by the trial judge unless there is a flagrant abuse thereof. In People, ex rel. Shimer, v. Branch Circuit Judge, 17 Mich 67, it was held:
“ ‘We are of opinion * * * there was something upon which the circuit judge was called upon to exercise his judgment; and that being so, the' question whether a new trial should be granted is one addressed to his discretion, and the Supreme Court has no authority to review his conclusion, and compel him by mandamus to rescind his order/ (Citing numerous cases.) * * *
“It is equally well settled that the Supreme Court will intervene to correct a gross and palpable abuse of discretion. Detroit Tug & Wrecking Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 75 Mich 360.”
What has previously been said was forcibly reiterated in the recent case of Alder v. Flint City Coach Lines, Inc. (1961), 364 Mich 29. Three of our present Justices spoke in this case, Justice Souris, quoting from Hoskin-Morainville Paper Co. v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 268 Mich 443, 449, stating (p 30):
“ ‘The question of reviewing the discretion of trial courts in granting or refusing new trials is a most delicate one. The rule in this State is that the *417judge has a wide discretion in either granting or refusing a new trial, either upon his own motion or that of the parties.’ ”
Justice Carr stated (p 38):
“This Court has repeatedly held that a trial judge, in passing on a motion for a new trial, is vested with a large discretion. The wisdom of such rule is obvious. The judge has the advantage of seeing the witnesses on the stand, of listening to their testimony, of noting the attitude of the jury to various matters that may arise during the trial, and is in far better position than, is an appellate court to-pass on questions of possible prejudice, sympathy, and matters generally that occur in the course of a trial but which do not appear of record. In commenting on the discretion of the trial court, it was said in Graeger v. Hager, 275 Mich 363, 368:
“ ‘This court will not interfere unless the abuse of that discretion is palpable. (Citing several prior decisions.)’ ”
Justice Black spelled it out as follows (pp 39-41):
“Plaintiff has failed to persuade that the trial judge’s order for new trial constituted an abuse of discretion. The judge was ‘there.’ We were not. He knew and knows, better than we may hope to know by reading (distinguished from watching and listening) the adduced medical testimony, whether this case should be retried. We have noted before, on many variant occasions, that a trial judge is in much better position to judge questions like this since our sole means of information is limited to the comparatively inferior worth of printed — no, ‘dehydrated’ — pages.
“ ‘The hesitant word and the averted glance stand on a parity, on the printed page before us, with the positive assertion and the forthright expression. Not so in the mind and conscience of the nisi prius judge.’ * * *
*418“ ‘The rule as to when this Court will interfere with the action of the trial court in disposing of motions for new trials was so clearly stated by Justice Carpenter in Hintz v. Michigan Central B. Co., 132 Mich 305, that it is not necessary to restate it here.’ ”
Justice Talbot Smith also forcibly spoke on the question of “abuse of discretion” in Spalding v. Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384:
“In view of the frequency with which cases are reaching- this Court assailing the exercise of a trial court’s discretion as an abuse thereof, we deem it pertinent to make certain observations with respect thereto in the interests of saving expense to the litigants and avoiding delay in reaching final adjudication on the merits. Where, as here, the exercise of discretion turns upon a factual determination made by the trier of the facts, an abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in judicial opinion between the trial and appellate courts. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. In order to have an ‘abuse’ in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.”
The opinion states: “The grant of the motion was an exercise of judicial discretion. The legal test to be applied is whether such action was an abuse of that discretion.”
I agree with my Brother as to his determination of the main issue before us on this appeal, but I disagree with him on his conclusion. The trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in *419determining-that the motion for , new trial should he granted.
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
Carr, C. J., and Dethmers, J., concurred with Kelly, J.