Court Opinion

ID: 9865463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 17:58:52.673612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:22.532612
License: Public Domain

On. Rehearing.
Davis, J.
On December 15, 1931, at the June Term, 1931, of this Court, we affirmed the judgment in this ease. Rehearing has been granted and the cause re-argued before the Court en banc.
By the petition for rehearing filed, counsel for plaintiffs in error suggest that in disposing of the case as we did on its original consideration that the Court erroneously construed Section 6307 C. G. L., 4345 R. G. S., contrary to its legal intent, in violation of settled principles for interpreting statutes, and without giving due consideration to the public interest intended to be protected by that enactment.
By the petition for rehearing it is asserted that this Court has “whittled down to a mere rule of evidence” what plaintiffs in error assert is “an important statutory liability;” that we have substituted “a rebuttable presumption” for the equivalent of “actual authority created by *126the statute;” that “in place of a rule of substantive law” we have set up “a rule of procedural law.”
The argument thereupon made is that because the statute provides that a person doing fo'r a surety company any of the described statutory acts shall be “deemed” as acting as “agent for said company,” the surety company must be held statutorily liable through the mere act of Raie, its agent, in actually signing and delivering the bond, whether actually authorized thereunto or not, and notwithstanding any and all known limitations on his agency brought to the knowledge of the obligee.
But the statute in terms is not so broad and inclusive as plaintiffs in error’s petition for rehearing suggests.
Such a statute as this does not undertake to conclusively fix the scope and extent of the authority of those who become statutory agents under its terms, as between the company and third person. The United States Supreme Court so indicated in Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Hilton-Green, 241 U. S. 613, 60 L. Ed. 1202, 36 Sup. Ct. 676. And what the United States Supreme Court said in the last cited case cannot be disregarded on the ground that it is mere “dictum” as plaintiffs in error contend.
A ruling in a case fully considered and decided by an appellate cohrt is not dictum merely because it was not necessary, on account of one conclusion reached upon one question, to consider another question the decision of which would have controlled the judgment.
Two oh more questions properly arising in a case under the pleadings and proof may be determined, even though either one would dispose of the entire case upon its merits, and neither holding is a dictum, so long as it is properly raised, considered, and determined. Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558, 151 S. W. 1014, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 782; King v. Pauly, 159 Cal. 549, 115 Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1912-C *1271244; McFarland v. Bush, 94 Tenn. 538, 29 S. W. 899, 45 A. S. R. 760, 27 L. R. A. 662.
The recognition of judicial declarations as being “obiter dicta” in special instances is a part of the doctrine of “stare decisis.” The doctrine of “stare decisis” would not in any event be applicable to the authorities relied on in this case, because of the fact that we are not bound by the rulings of Federal Courts, even the Supreme Court of the United States, in construing the language of our own statutes.
But, at the same time, State Courts of last resort must of necessity recognize that in the domain of insurance contracts and surety bond agreements, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cohstruing state statutes, especially our own, are highly persuasive if not controlling. So many controversies arising in connection with insurance and the business of suretyship for hire have been litigated in the Federal courts, that the very best reasoned and most authoritative cases on these subjects are most often to be found in the reported decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the other Federal Appellate Courts.
Section 6307 C. G. L., 4345 R. G. S., does not require us, as petitioners insist, to “deem,” “consider” and “regard” Raie in the transaction involved in this case, as the agent of the surety company in the execution and delivery of the bond in suit. The statute in terms does not go that far. It merely provides that every person who shall so far represent any surety company as to do certain specified acts, shall be “deemed to -be acting as agent for said company, ’ ’—not that he shall be ‘! deemed to be acting as agent for said company to' do any and every act he may undertake to do in his assumed character as such” regardless of other principles of the general law of agency which may be applicable. This is the universal rule even in cases where there is an actual, and not an imputed, agency shown and *128relied on to fix liability under the maxim “qid facit per alimn, qid facit per se.”
We agree with the statement contained in plaintiffs in error’s petition for a rehearing that what the statute con- . templates is that, when a foreign surety company authorizes an agent to deliver bonds for it, or to receive applications for bonds to be executed by it, and such agent receives an application for a bond to be executed by the company, and thereafter delivers a bond apparently executed by the company, one who' accepts the bond i/n good faith is protected against a subsequent claim that the agent who executed it in behalf of the company, was not in fact technically and formally authorized to execute it.
But as we have pointed out, in the opinion heretofore filed, this statement of the law is limited in its application to tho'se cases only, where the fact that the agent was not technically and formally authorized to act, is not affirmatively shown to have been previously made known to the party who deals with him in the contrary belief that he is in fact technically and formally qualified to act, in the particulars in which he does act.
We have further held, and still hold now, that parties dealing with a statutory agent, are not bound to inquire as to limitations on his authority to do the things he purports to do with authority. But we have not gone so far as to hold that the effect of our statute is to' deprive the surety company of the benefit of establishing by evidence known limitations placed by it on its agent’s authority, which persons dealing with such agent have ignored or undertaken to deliberately disregard, at their peril.
The relationship, or status, of agency is not only prima facie, but conclusively, fixed by the statute. But the scope and extent of the authority of such agents as between the company and third persons is not so conclusively fixed by the statute itself as to fasten irrebuttable liability on the *129company for any bond or agreement the agent may sign, from the mere fact that he does sign it. Where there are known limitations, which the opposite party knows, or should know, will leave the attempted acts of a statutory agent of an insurance or surety company wholly unauthorized in a particular instance, such known limitation on the agent’s authority must be recognized in judicial proceedings.
We are unable to read into the statute more than its language imports. The precise language is, that a person acting for the surety company in the statutory particulars, “shall be deemed to be acting as agent for said company.” This is not the equivalent of saying that he shall be deemed to be acting as agent for the company in any particular transaction before the court. Agency may exist in many cases, but exist without powers to the scope and extent claimed. This is true where statutory agency is relied on, as well as where real agency is shown. The outstanding purpose of our statute was to fortify the state’s ability to regulate the transaction of business by surety companies in this state. It has a particular bearing on matters of taxation as applied to surety companies. For this reason the statute fixes in law the status of agency vel non, but does not go so far as to fix in every case the scope and extent of the statutory agent’s powers in particular matters, involving transactions between the company and third persons. Such is the way the Supreme Court of the United States has construed the statute, and such is our own construction of it, as we have heretofore indicated.
Other matters are presented by the petition and have had our careful consideration.
The Circuit Judge in deciding the case both as to questions o'f law and fact, obviously made it plain that he intended to find against the plaintiff in error on every conceivable legal hypothesis which was or which could have *130been, urged to support a recovery by her. Therefore this is not a case where we should reverse the judgment for a new trial because it was arrived at through the application of a principle of law not legally applicable or controlling in the case, which was the practice suggested as proper in Barry v. Walker, 103 Fla. 533, 137 So. Rep. 711, and cases cited.
The finding of the Circuit Judge was against the plaintiff in error, not only on the question of the right of an agent to execute a bond under seal without being thereunto authorized under seal, but on the merits of the case as presented on every alternative theory. In our previous opinion we attached no importance to the Court’s findings against plaintiff on the theory of the agent’s lack of a sealed instrument giving him power to execute a bond under seal, because of our view as to the legal effect of the particular statute relating to surety company agency hereinbefore referred to.
But we do attach importance to the trial judge’s express finding that the circumstances so put the plaintiff in error on inquiry, as to bring home to her, and her representatives, the agent’s want of express or implied authority in the first instance to execute the particular bond sued on.
All concede that Raie when first called on stated that he was not authorized to execute the kind of bond that was later executed. This being so,. the obligee should have ascertained whether the needed authority was in fact thereafter given to Raie, for if not given, the bond (in the absence of ratification) does not bind the surety company.
The trial- judge sat in this case as a trier of the facts, inasmuch as a jury trial had been expressly waived by the parties, as the recohd shows. Upon writ of error in jury .cases, we have stated the rule to be.:
“In passing upon an assignment based upon the ruling of the trial court in denying a motion for a new trial, which questions the sufficiency of the evidence to' *131sustain the verdict, the guiding principle for an appellate court is not what it may think the jury ought to have done, or what such court may think it would have done had it been sitting as a jury in the case, but whether as reasonable men the jury could have found such verdict from the evidence adduced. If this question can be answered in the affirmative, the action of the trial eoiirt upon such motion should not be disturbed.”*
In this ease, where the trial judge decided the case against the plaintiff in error on the facts, and the sufficiency of the Circuit Judge’s finding of facts is questioned on the ground of an alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judge’s verdict, the guiding principle for an appellate court is not what we think the Circuit Judge sitting as a jury ought to have done, or what we would have done sitting as a jury in the trial o'f the ease, but whether as a reasonable man the trial judge sitting as a trier of the facts, could have found such a verdict as he did find, from the evidence adduced.
The evidence shows that after the bond was applied for meetings of the interested parties were held every day from Monday, September 28th, through Monday, October 5, 1925, except Sunday, and that the delay in closing the transaction was caused by the inability to secure the bond; that Mrs. Parsons and Mr. Wyatt, her attorney, went to the office of one Vanderpool and there discussed with him the question of securing a surety bond, and that Mr. Vanderpool stated that he did not have authority to write such a bond, but that a Mr. Raie did have such authority and that it would have to be through Raie that a bond be pro'cured; that Mrs. Parsons was anxious to return to New York and that she was requested to stay over a day of two longer because Raie, the agent of the National Surety Company, was communicating with his home office in New York, en*132deavoring to get authority to issue the bond that Mrs. Parsons demanded; that it was explained explicitly both to Mrs. Parsons and Mr. Wyatt, her attorney, that the agent Raie was at that time without authority to write the bond in question, but was endeavoring to get special authority from New York to execute it.
The evidence further shows that the last conference attended by Wyatt and Mrs. Parsons was held in the office of Mr. Reed, an attorney, at 4:00 o’clock on Saturday afternoon, October 3, 1925. At that conference it was again explained to Mrs. Parsons and Mr. Wyatt that the agent Raie had not yet received authority to execute the bond, but was expecting it at any moment and had been endeavoring to communicate with the National Surety Company on the long distance telephone in order to be assured of his power to execute the bond. The transaction was closed and the bond executed October 5, 1925. The delay in closing the transaction was admittedly due to the act o'f all the parties in waiting for Raie to obtain authority to executed the bond, and indeed this seems to be an undisputed fact in the ease.
The bond itself was not a printed stock form of bond devised by the Surety Company and turned over to Raie as part of the paraphernalia of his agency. On the contrary, it was a bond specially drawn up by the attorneys representing Mrs. Parsons. It was not an ordinary kind of bond, but was a bond of the most unusual character and conditions. As prepared, it was drawn by Mrs. Parson’s attorney to be signed by an attorney in fact for the National Surety Company. When executed it was signed by Raie as attorney in fact, but not accompanied by any proof of a power of attorney authorizing him to execute it.
Raie testified that just before the bond was executed by him that he was called to Vanderpool & Company’s office where he was informed that it was absolutely essential, in *133o'rder to have the sale of real estate go through, that the bond be signed forthwith; that he thereupon left word at his office in Fort Lauderdale that if he should receive a wire from the National Surety Company during the day that it should be sent to him in care of Vanderpool & Company’s office in Miami; that afterwards he went to Vanderpool & Company’s office in Miami and inquired if there was a telegram for him there and was told that there was not; that afterwards he met Vanderpool coming down from his office and that Mr. Vanderpool informed him that if they were going to secure the business at all the bond had to be signed that day; that Vanderpool had a twenty per cent, commission involved in the signing of the bond and had done everything he could to try 'to hold the different parties concerned in the real estate deal until authority could be procured to execute for them the bond which Mrs. Parsons demanded; that at Vanderpool’s insistence he said that he would go ahead and execute the bond, and went on upstairs and did execute it without ever having heard from the home office of the National Surety Company giving him authority so to do.
Plaintiff, to rebut Raie’s testimony, attempted to prove by the witness Vanderpool that just before the bond was signed and delivered, that agent Raie, purporting to represent the surety company, showed him a telegram from the surety company which gave Raie authority to use his own discretion and go ahead and issue the bond, and that after the production of such telegram that Raie then and there laid the bond on witness’s desk, signed it, put the company’s seal on it and that it was then taken over to be delivered to the representatives of Mrs. Parsons.
Plaintiff in error contends that Raie’s conduct in executing the bond after several days delay, supposedly due to his awaiting approval of the home office of the National Surety Company of New York, amounted to a false repre*134sentation that he had secured approval of his company when in fact he did sign and deliver the bond.
But whether there was such conduct as amounted to a false representation, and if so, whether or not obligee relied upon the same, involved the determination by the Circuit Judge of a disputed question of fact which would have necessarily been submitted to a jury to determine had a jury been present.* This issue of fact the Circuit Judge decided adversely to plaintiff in error, and there is substantial legal evidence to support his findings.
The surety company by its evidence sharply contradicted the testimony of the witness Vanderpool concerning the alleged telegram authorizing the bond to be signed by Raie. The Circuit Judge evidently believed that no such telegram was ever sent or purported to have been exhibited as Vanderpool testified to. It is plain from the evidence that if Vanderpool ever informed the representatives of Mrs. Parsons that such a telegram had been shown to him, which he would likely have done at the time, that no one representing Mrs.' Parsons demanded the right to inspect the alleged telegram nor made any inquiry to confirm its existence. On the contrary, the inference is strong that Mrs.'Parsons’ representatives were perfectly satisfied with being furnished a bond signed with the signature of Raie purporting to act as agent of the National Surety Company without any further evidence of his authority to sign it.
The specific finding of the Circuit Judge is that the circumstances surrounding the negotiations for the bond, as well as those surrounding its execution and delivery, were such as put plaintiffs and those acting 'for plaintiffs, upon inquiry as to the nature and extent of the agent’s *135authority, which inquiry they failed to pursue, else they would have found that the agent’s authority in the particular instance did not exist.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, we cannot say that error in the findings of fact by the Circuit Judge has been shown to such an extent as to authorize us to conclude the verdict of the Circuit Judge is wrong and that it should have been rendered for the plaintiffs instead of the defendant surety company. The court found against plaintiffs in error on every premise. The findings of fact by the trial Judge we have heretofore affirmed as having been arrived at by him by the application of properly applicable and controlling principles of law which led to the court’s decision in favor of the defendant surety company on the merits of the case as shown by the evidence.
A most careful reconsideration of the ease in all its aspects, and with the aid of the able briefs which have been furnished us by counsel for the plaintiffs in error, has failed to convince us that our previous affirmance of the judgment was wrong, and it must therefore be adhered to on this rehearing.
Reaffirmed on rehearing.
Buford, C. J. and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell and Brown, J.J., concur.

See third headnote in A. C. L. R. R. Co. vs. Levy, 68 Fla. 234, 67 Sou. Rep 47.

For the rule to this effect see 21 R C. L. 820, which is cited with approval by this Court in Watkins vs. Sims, 81 Fla. 730 (734); 88 Sou. Rep. 764. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. See Miller vs. Chase, 88 Fla. 500, 102 Sou. Rep. 553.