Court Opinion

ID: 9662103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:59:34.509567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:36.853647
License: Public Domain

Knutson, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority in this case. While I have no quarrel with the discussion relating to the nature of the right to hunt on land of another, it seems to me that in the application of the rule in the opinion of the majority they have ignored both the nature of a banking corporation and the essential characteristics of the right here involved as applied to such corporation. At the outset, it must be clear that the right to hunt and take wild animals has many attributes which distinguish it from the right to take coal, wood, oil, or other minerals from the land of another. While all these rights are designated in law as profits a prendre, they still have some vital differences which go to the very nature of the right itself. A profit a prendre, as recognized in the majority opinion, is a right exercised by one man in the soil of another, accompanied with participation m the profits of the land, or a right to talce a part of the soil or produce of the land. It must follow that, if there is no right to participate in the profits of the soil or a right to take a part of the soil or produce of the land, there can be no profit a prendre.
The majority state that a corporation acts through its officers or its agents — and that is true in most cases — but it is not, and cannot be, true in this state when dealing with the right to hunt.
I think it needs no citation of authorities to establish that under our laws no one may hunt without a license. The license to hunt is personal to the licensee. No one, corporate or otherwise, may exercise the right through a license granted to an agent. Nor may a corporation receive the benefits of game taken by its officers or agents in any other way. Wild game may not be sold. It may not be possessed beyond the limits provided by law. There is, therefore, no conceivable way in which a banking corporation may participate in the profits or produce of the land under this kind of right, and I think it must *511follow therefrom that banking corporations cannot own such a profit a prendre. Where a profit a prendre involves the right to remove wood or coal or to mine minerals, there is no legal obstacle to prevent a corporation from enjoying the benefits of the right so conferred. It is not necessary that the corporation actually exercise its right to participate in the profits of the soil, but it is enough that it has the legal capacity to exercise its right if it chooses to do so. The distinction between that kind of a profit a prendre and the kind we have here is that here the corporation never will have the legal capacity to exercise its claimed right.
In dealing with a right so onerous as this, I think that the right should be strictly construed and should not be extended beyond the limits of the grant. It should also be possible to determine the limits of the grant from the instrument creating it, or at least it should be possible to determine by fair implication therefrom what its limits are. In Restatement, Property, § 450, comment m, we find the following statement of this rule:
“Some degree of definiteness in the scope or extent of an interest is essential to its recognition as a property interest. * * * In order that privileges of use may be recognized as easement2 there must be some degree of definiteness in the privileged use. When a use has not the degree of definiteness necessary to the creation of an easement, the privilege to make it can be nothing more than a license.”
It has been uniformly held by the authorities which have passed on the question that the right to hunt on the premises of another should be strictly construed and may not be extended beyond the grant.3 The owner may not permit others to use it.4
*512In Bingham v. Salene, 15 Ore. 208, 215, 14 P. 523, 526, 3 A. S. R. 152, frequently cited, the court said:
“* * * While ‘the supposed odiousness of this right,’ as Lord Campbell said,5 ‘cannot influence our decision,’ the fact, at least, admonishes ns that no intendments or presumption are to be indulged in in the construction of the grant not warranted by the plain import of its terms and provisions. A grant of this description is construed strictly.”
If the corporation may not hunt through its officers or agents; may not receive or possess that taken by its agents; may not receive the proceeds from a sale thereof; or may not permit others to use the right to hunt, what right did it have? The majority seem to proceed on the theory that it still had an interest in the land which it could sell or assign. But I think it is axiomatic that it could not sell or assign more than it had. Nor could it, by assignment, enlarge or create a right which it did not have. If it had nothing, it could assign nothing.
There is a clear distinction between this case and cases such as Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corp. 207 Minn. 126, 290 N. W. 222, and St. Helen Shooting Club v. Mogle, 234 Mich. 60, 207 N. W. 915. In those cases the corporation was organized for the express purpose of providing hunting for its members. The ownership of the right to hunt has been upheld, but there, the corporation holds the right for the use of others. It stands largely in the position of a trustee. The members are the actual owners of the right and may take the game not for the use of the corporation but for their own use. If we are to follow the doctrine that the right to hunt is a profit a prendre, it must follow that those who have a right to participate in the profits are the actual owners of the right itself. This fact is recognized in the Minnesota Valley Gun Club case where we said (207 Minn. 130, 290 N. W. 225) :
*513“With, respect to the question of the ability of the members of plaintiff corporation to exercise the right given by the assignment, we think, under the facts, that many provisions establish that the contracting parties intended that the beneficial enjoyment should be exercised by the group actually composing the club. Flory’s close association with it was known to Yardeen. Imperfect draftsmanship stifled accurate expression, but there are sufficient factors to establish the intent of the parties. Under the assignment the members can enjoy the profit.”
There can be no claim here that the reservation by the bank created a right for the benefit of others. The claim apparently is that the officers of the bank may exercise the right for the bank.
In cases such as Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corp. supra, it is also possible to determine, at least by implication, some limits to the use of the right. It is limited to use by its members. Here, the majority fail to point to any limit. They simply say that the corporation acts through its officers and agents, but in so acting they act for the ultimate benefit of stockholders. How the stockholders can get any benefit out of the exercise by the officers of the right to shoot a wild duck is something I am unable to see. Certainly the officers who shoot the duck have no more right to appropriate it to their own use than they have to the bank’s money or any of its other property without accounting to the stockholders therefor.
Apparently the trial court had little confidence in its finding that the bank acquired a valid right by its reservation which was assigned to Dahl, for it sought to bolster its decision by holding that Dahl acquired the right in several other inconsistent ways also. The majority apparently evade this issue by holding that it is unnecessary to pass on it. I think that it should be disposed of. In the first place, the bank either did or did not acquire exclusive rights to hunt by its reservation. These rights have been acquired by Dahl, whatever they were, by the assignments. If the reservation was valid, neither plaintiff nor the Federal Land Bank had any further right to convey, and Dahl then needs no help from any other source. If, and only if, the reservation created no right, the question arises *514whether Dahl has acquired the rights he claims to have from some other source.
The trial court held that Dahl acquired the right to hunt by payment, or credit upon the contract from Federal Land Bank, to plaintiff of the sum of $1,000. This holding is untenable for several reasons. In the first place, it is completely contrary to all the evidence in the case. The evidence shows, without dispute, that when the Federal Land Bank discovered that Dahl claimed to have a right to hunt on this land it did everything it could to get him to release whatever rights he had. Failing in this, it paid plaintiff $1,000 in order that it might be relieved of liability to plaintiff for not being able to deliver clear title. In consideration for the amount he received, plaintiff accepted responsibility for clearing the title or accepting it as it was if it should be determined that Dahl had acquired the exclusive right to hunt under the original reservation to the bank. There is not one word of evidence to sustain a finding that anyone intended to grant or create a right in Dahl, by virtue of this payment, that he did not already have. Dahl parted with no consideration for any grant by plaintiff or the Federal Land Bank, and certainly they cannot be said to have done anything at this point which would cause Dahl to believe that he was being granted anything by them. Their entire dealings were hostile to each other. There never was any meeting of the minds that the Federal Land Bank or plaintiff should convey to Dahl any interest by virtue of this payment. How we can hold that the parties intended by this payment to create an interest in the land in favor of Dahl and at the same time hold that Dahl acquired the same right by virtue of his assignment from the bank is something I am unable to follow. Dahl, during all this time, claimed that he already owned the right to hunt and at that time asked for no help from either plaintiff or the Federal Land Bank. Surely, it cannot be held that by accepting a deed subject to easements of record plaintiff validated easements which were in fact invalid for the benefit of a third party not in privity with the contracting parties. It is not uncommon in the field of conveyancing for a grantor to relieve himself of liability to his *515grantee by providing that the grantee takes subject to such easements as appear of record. If an invalid easement happens to cloud the title, such language can hardly have the effect of curing a defect existing in such easement or of transforming a bad easement into a good one. The best that can be said here is that plaintiff accepted the title subject to such legal rights as Dahl had. If he had none, the exception created none. If he had a legal right, plaintiff relieved his grantor of liability on account thereof. The same is true of the subsequent mortgages. Even if it could be said that plaintiff mistakenly believed that Dahl had a valid right, such belief would not create a right in Dahl which he did not already own.
There is another and probably more cogent reason why this finding is untenable. Profits a prendre from the earliest times 'have been considered to be interests in land that are within the statute of frauds.6 A profit a prendre can be created only by a properly executed writing7 or by prescription.8 It cannot be created by a parol agreement.9 Where, then, is there any instrument in writing creating or intending to create any rights in Dahl by virtue of the payment of $1,000 by the Federal Land Bank to plaintiff? If there is no writing, what evidence is there that the case is taken out of the statute of frauds ?
The trial court, in addition to holding that Dahl acquired rights by virtue of the reservation to the banking corporation and, if not, that he acquired rights by virtue of the payment of $1,000 by the Federal Land Bank to plaintiff, then apparently went on to hold that, if neither of these two would stand up, he had still acquired a right by prescription by exercising the right for a period of 18 years without objection by plaintiff. This, too, is not supported by the *516evidence and is untenable. The trial court apparently also held that plaintiff was barred by laches. The doctrine of laches ordinarily has no application where the rights of the parties are governed by a statute of limitations.10 We apprehend that the trial court’s finding, insofar as it relates to the statute of limitations, in essence amounts to a finding that defendant has acquired a right to hunt by prescription.
There is some question whether a profit a prendre in gross can be acquired by prescription. It is doubtful whether it could be so acquired under the law in England. See, Bailey v. Stephens, 12 C. B. N. S. 91. However, I will assume for the purpose of this decision that such interest could be acquired by prescription.
The term “prescription” is used to denote acquisition of an incorporeal hereditament and is comparable to the term “adverse possession” with respect to the acquisition of title to land. While the statute of limitations probably does not apply to the acquisition of an interest in land by prescription, by analogy it is applicable insofar as the time required for the acquisition of such right is concerned. The same rules apply to the acquisition of a prescriptive right as to the acquisition of title by adverse possession, with such differences as naturally are inherent in the application of the rules to the type of interest involved.11 The same rules also apply to the acquisition of a profit a prendre by prescription as to the acquisition of an easement.
Before a prescriptive right can be acquired, there must be a claim of right coupled with a use.
“* * * A mere claim of right, unaccompanied by any acts showing an exercise of the right, or at least an intention to exercise it in the future, is insufficient to show user or intended user.” Simons v. Munch, 115 Minn. 360, 372, 132 N. W. 321, 326.
Where a claimant needs the use of an easement, or can make use of it, only at periodic times, the use of the claimed right during such times as is possible to use it, even though not constant, is sufficient *517to be adverse. Swan v. Munch, 65 Minn. 500, 67 N. W. 1022, 35 L. R. A. 743. The rule is stated in Restatement, Property, § 459, comment 6, as follows:
“To satisfy the requirement that the use be continuous it is not necessary that it be constant. A use may be continuous though there are periods of time more or less extended between the specific acts of use. Many easements, such as rights of way and rights of hunting or fishing, which are periodical or only occasional in use may be acquired by prescription. The requirement means that there be no break in the essential attitude of mind required for adverse use rather than that the use be constant.”
The use must be continuous however, as qualified by the above statements, and uninterrupted. The owner of the servient estate must have knowledge of it and acquiesce in its use. 28 C. J. S., Easements, § 12, reads as follows:
* * in order for a user to ripen 'into a prescriptive right it must not only be under a claim of right, as stated * * * but must also he with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement, as such acquiescence is the foundation of the right by prescription, and anything which disproves acquiescence rebuts the presumption of a grant.” (Italics supplied.)
The rule is stated in Merrick v. Schleuder, 179 Minn. 228, 230, 228 N. W. 755, 756, as follows:
“* * * Without any excursion into the wilderness of authority on the subject, it is sufficient to refer to the rule, well established in this state in accord with the weight of authority elsewhere, that 'where the claimant has shown an open, visible, continuous and unmolested use’ for the required period inconsistent with the owner’s right and under circumstances from which may he inferred his knowledge and acquiescence, the use will be presumed to be under claim of right and adverse so as to place upon the owner the burden of rebutting this presumption by showing that the use was permissive.” (Italics supplied.)
*518A prescriptive right may not be acquired where the owner of the servient estate denies the right to use it.12 The rule is stated in 28 C. J. S., Easements, § 13, as follows;
“* * * An easement cannot arise by prescription if the owner of the servient estate has habitually broken and interrupted the use at will or denied the right and threatened to put an end to the use and enjoyment of it, for it cannot be said that the owner has acquiesced in a right which has been exercised against his protest.”
Substantially the same rule is stated in 17 Am. Jur., Easements, § 60, as follows:
“One of the essentials to an easement of prescription is that the use and enjoyment must be continuous and uninterrupted. If the use of a way is interrupted, prescription is annihilated and must begin again, and any unambiguous act by the owner, such as closing the way at night or erecting gates or bars, which evinces his intention to exclude the public from its uninterrupted use destroys the prescriptive right. The correct rule as to continuity of user and what shall constitute such continuity can be stated only with reference to the nature and character of the right claimed. A failure to use an easement when not needed does not disprove a continuity of use shown by using it when needed. The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use. It must be without objection on the part of the owner of the land and under such cir*519cumstances as to exclude the presumption of voluntary abandonment on the part of the person claiming the easement.” (Italics supplied.)
To prevent a right by prescription from being acquired it is not necessary for the owner of the land to commence an action in court, but it is enough if he does some act to manifest his objections to the use. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339.
In Brayden v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 172 Mass. 225, 51 N. E. 1081, the court said:
“* * * A landowner in order to prevent that result [acquiring a right by prescription] is not required to battle successfully for his rights; it is enough if he asserts them to the other party by an overt act, which, if the easement existed, would be, a cause of action. Such an assertion interrupts the would be dominant owner’s impression of acquiescence and the growth in his mind of a fixed association of ideas, or, if the principle of prescription be attributed solely to the acquiescence of the servient owner, it shows that the acquiescence was not a fact.”
There is some conflict in the authorities as to whether a mere oral protest is sufficient or if some overt act is necessary to negate acquiescence.13
A void grant of a claimed right is admissible to show the extent of the right claimed. Washburn v. Cutter, 17 Minn. 335 (361); Murphy v. Doyle, 37 Minn. 113, 33 N. W. 220.
Tested by these rules, what have we in this case? The quitclaim deed from the Fergus Falls National Bank and Trust Company to Bergerud, recorded in December 1933, shows that the bank claimed the right to hunt on the premises. The assignment by the bank to inland and Dahl was not recorded until August 12, 1942, and the assignment by the heirs of Ulland to Dahl, until April 14, 1951. As far as appears from the record, no one other than the assignees had actual knowledge of such assignments, at least until the date of recording. The record fails to show any attempt to assert the right *520to hunt on the premises until 1939. At that time plaintiff had placed a lock on the gate through which defendant must enter the premises. Defendant sawed the lock off, claiming a right to enter. Surely up to that time there was no evidence of acquiescence by the landowner. It does appear that after the farm was sold to plaintiff the Federal Land Bank wrote Ulland in 1938 seeking to procure a release, which was refused, so it is reasonable to assume that from 1938 plaintiff’s predecessor in interest knew that the Fergus Falls National Bank and Trust Company claimed the right to hunt as set forth in its reservation. The reservation to the bank being void, the bank could not acquire a prescriptive right, since it could not make use of such right. There is evidence that from 1939 on plaintiff recognized and acquiesced in defendant’s right to hunt under the mistaken belief that he had such right by virtue of the deed to the bank. We are therefore confronted with a situation where the only evidence of an initial attempt to assert any right by defendant occurred in 1939. At that time plaintiff did what he could to keep defendant off. This action was brought in 1951. The statute had not run at that time. Under these circumstances, the evidence falls short of that required to establish a prescriptive right.
I think that the rule should be that a right to hunt on the premises of another may not be granted to or reserved by a corporation except in those cases where the right is granted to the corporation for the use and benefit of individuals who can make use of it and where the limits of the use may be fairly determined from the instrument creating the right or by fair implication therefrom. It is my opinion that the evidence in this case fails to establish a valid profit a prendre, either by the' reservation contained in the original deed to the Fergus Falls bank or by prescription or otherwise, and that the decision of the trial court should be reversed.

 Restatement treats both ordinary easements and profits a prendre as easements.

 Bingham v. Salene, 15 Ore. 208, 14 P. 523, 3 A. S. R. 152; Isherwood v. Salene, 61 Ore. 572, 123 P. 49, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 299, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 542; 24 Am. Jur., Game and Game Laws, § 7.

 Bingham v. Salene, 15 Ore. 208, 14 P. 523, 3 A. S. R. 152; Salene v. Isherwood, 55 Ore. 263, 106 P. 18; Isherwood v. Salene, 61 Ore. 572, 123 P. 49, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 299, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 542; Boyd v. Colgan, 126 Kan. 497, 268 P. 794; Anderson v. Gipson (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W. (2d) 948; *512Council v. Sanderlin, 183 N. C. 253, 111 S. E. 365, 32 A. L. R. 1527; 24 Am. Jur., Game and Game Laws, § 7; 38 C. J. S., Game, § 4.

 See, Ewart v. Graham, 7 H. L. Cas. 331.

 28 C. J. S., Easements, § 3f; Webber v. Lee [1881] 9 Q. B. D. 315, 51 L. J. Q. B. 485; Annotation, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 545; Bingham v. Salene, 15 Ore. 208, 14 P. 523, 3 A. S. R. 152.

 Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corp. 207 Minn. 126, 290 N. W. 222.

 28 C. J. S., Easements, § 3f.

 Taylor v. Millard, 118 N. Y. 244, 23 N. E. 376, 6 L. R. A. 667; Council v. Sanderlin, 183 N. C. 253, 111 S. E. 365, 32 A. L. R. 1527.

 Vadnais v. State, 224 Minn. 439, 28 N. W. (2d) 694; Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N. W. (2d) 570.

 Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14 N. W. (2d) 482.

 Stacey v. Miller, 14 Mo. 478, 55 Am. D. 112; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339; see, Wooldridge v. Coughlin, 46 W. Va. 345, 33 S. E. 233; Washburn, Easements and Servitudes (4 ed.) c. 1, § 4, p. 180; 1 Thompson, Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 418; 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3 ed.) § 1200; 2 American Law of Property, § 8.58; Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743, 5 A. L. R. 1320; Powell v. Bagg, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 441. 69 Am. D. 262.

 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. Law 605; Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743, 5 A. L. R. 1320; Annotation, 5 A. L. R. 1325; 1 Thompson, Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 443.