Court Opinion

ID: 9720279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:24:07.394579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:15.178219
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I agree with the lead opinion that the statement in this case is properly admissible under the present sense impression exception to the general ban on hearsay evidence. I write separately, *241however, because I disagree that the present sense impression exception requires corroborative evidence of the underlying event as a prerequisite to admissibility. In my view, the reliability of the evidence is demonstrated by the contemporaneity between the event and the out-of-court statement. Therefore, I would reject any artificial imposition of additional requirements to the admissibility of evidence other than the requirements found in the evidentiary rule itself. The majority’s imposition of an extrinsic corroboration requirement confuses the admissibility of the evidence with the weight to be given to the evidence, which is properly a determination for the trier of fact. More fundamentally, it reveals a distrust of the factfinder at odds with the philosophy underlying the rules to promote the discovery of truth by admitting all relevant evidence. MRE 102.
Relying on People v Burton,1 the lead opinion states that, because the present sense impression exception and the excited utterance exception are “analytically” similar, the “independent evidence requirements are similarly analogous.” Ante at 238. I continue to believe that Burton was erroneously decided, and the excited utterance exception requires no independent corroborative evidence. However, even if Burton is not reconsidered, it is unnecessary to impose a corresponding requirement on the present sense impression exception. Application of the narrowly drawn contemporaneity requirement for present sense impressions offers adequate assurances of reliability.
Under MRE 104(a), preliminary factual questions of admissibility are determined by the trial court utiliz*242ing a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.2 In making a preliminary determination of admissibility, the trial judge may consider all available evidence, including otherwise inadmissible evidence.3 Furthermore, pursuant to MRE 1101(b)(1), the rules of evidence do not apply to determinations of preliminary fact under Rule 104(a). The role of the Rule 104(a) determination is not to determine the defendant’s guilt; rather, the purpose is merely to determine whether the preliminary fact has been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
MRE 803(1), which is identical to its federal counterpart, states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.
I agree with the lead opinion regarding the elements required for a statement to be admissible as a present sense impression.4 However, in stark contrast to the explicit language contained in MRE 801(d)(2)(E) and *243804(b)(3), the requirement of extrinsic corroboration is clearly and conspicuously absent from the language of the rule itself or the requisite elements. The contested statement made by the victim to the emergency dispatch operator, which on its face purports to have been contemporaneously made in conjunction with an assault, is itself evidence that the assault occurred.
The lead opinion errs in holding that the statement “requires independent evidence that the assault occurred before it may be admitted as a present sense impression.” Under the majority view, other corroborating evidence of the existence of the perceived event is an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of the evidence, not simply the weight properly given to it.5
Professor McCormick, in discussing the parameters of the present sense impression exception, discredited the requirement of a corroboration requirement and observed:
The suggestion has been made that corroboration by an “equally percipient” witness should be a further requirement for admitting statements of present sense impression into evidence. The proposal represents a significant departure from the general pattern of exceptions to the hearsay rule. *244The only instance in which a requirement of corroboration is found is where a statement against penal interest by a third person — a third-party confession — is offered by way of exculpation of an accused person. . . . The present sense impression exception presents no such need. Its underlying rationale offers sufficient assurances of reliability without the additional requirement of corroboration, and neither the Federal Rule nor the decisions have required it.6
Likewise, Professor Weinstein states that extrinsic corroboration is not a requirement for the admissibility of present sense impression evidence; the presence of corroborative evidence “is a factor the court may consider in determining whether a statement not exactly contemporaneous qualifies for admission.” 7
The case cited by the lead opinion, People v Brown,8 which involved an unidentified declarant, required corroborative evidence in order to “assure the court that the statements sought to be admitted were made spontaneously .and contemporaneously with the events described.”9 The court also stated that “when statements are admitted under the present sense exception without the assurance of reliability *245that excitement affords, it is reasonable and prudent to require some additional indicia of reliability.”10 The opinion fails to acknowledge that excitement is not an element of the present sense impression exception; rather, it is an element of the excited utterance exception. If excitement were the only measuring stick of reliability, then all the hearsay exceptions, save the excited utterance exception, would be rendered unreliable. Each exception to the general ban on hearsay has its ,own characteristics and underlying rationale that lends sufficient assurances of reliability; no one exception, or element within the exception, stands as the exclusive index of reliability.
One commentator, discussing the justification of imposing an extrinsic corroboration requirement on the present sense impression exception, noted:
The present sense impression exception is a means to admissibility under the Federal Rules, and not a test of credibility. Credibility of these types of exclamations obviously affected the development of the various categories of exceptions, but now we have a categorical approach to ensure judicial economy concerning questions of admissibility. There is no theoretically sound reason for 803(1) to have an additional corroboration requirement. Proper care that the requirements of 803(1) are met, coupled with the guarantees built into other sections of the Rules, would ensure that the present sense impression does not become ovferly “capacious.” ... If a statement comes within the exception, and does not offend the other rules, it should be admitted. . . . [Tjhese rules possess sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness within their contours such that an additional requirement of extrinsic corroboration is unnecessary. Casting the present sense impression exception aside *246by adding an additional element for admission has not been appropriately justified.!11
There are three competing viewpoints on the necessity of corroboration: the first group rejects a corroboration requirement,12 the second group finds that corroboration is a factor tending to assure trustworthiness,13 and the third group requires strict corroboration.14 Some jurisdictions that take the intermediate view of corroborative evidence as a reliability factor *247do not bar the admission of evidence on the’basis of a lack of corroboration.15
Admittedly, there is a divergence of opinion about the requirement of corroborating evidence as a prerequisite to the admissibility of present sense impressions. This Court has held that the Michigan Rules of Evidence are a codification of the rules of evidence; any common-law variances of the evidentiary rules have been superseded by the Michigan Rules of Evidence.16 Furthermore, at the time the Michigan Rules of Evidence were adopted, this Court was presumed to have had knowledge of the variance of opinion regarding extrinsic corroboration and chose not to require a corroboration requirement.17
Certainly, corroborative evidence enhances the weight and reliability of an out-of-court statement. In addition, the trier of fact will have the benefit of an additional witness concerning the events surrounding the statement. However, while the existence of corroborative evidence may add more weight and reliability to the out-of-court statement, the converse does not hold true: A lack of corroborative evidence does not render the statement unreliable. Neither the plain *248language of the evidentiary rule nor the relevant treatises militate in favor of requiring corroboration as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. The availability of extrinsic corroborative evidence is relevant to the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence. Moreover, the consequence of such an unfounded and unnecessary requirement is that many trustworthy statements would be excluded simply out of adherence to a formula premised on an unfounded distrust18 of the finder of fact.19
*249Because I would hold that the evidence in this case was properly admitted under the present sense impression exception to the general ban on hearsay evidence, and that no extrinsic corroborative evidence was required, I concur with the majority.
Weaver and Taylor, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.

 433 Mich 268; 445 NW2d 133 (1989).

 Bourjaily v United States, 483 US 171, 175; 107 S Ct 2775; 97 L Ed 2d 144 (1987) (“We are therefore guided by our prior decisions regarding admissibility determinations that hinge on preliminary factual questions. We have traditionally required that these matters be established by a preponderance of proof. . . . Thus, the evidentiary standard is unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive issues, be it a criminal case ... or a civil case. . . . The preponderance standard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration”).

 MRE 104(a) states that “[i]n making its determination [the court] is not bound by the Rules of Evidence except those with respect to privileges.”

 Ante at 236. See also Passannante, Res gestae, The present sense impression exception and extrinsic corroboration under federal Rule of *243Evidence 803(1) and its state counterparts, 17 Fordham Urb L J 89, 99 (1989).

 Justice Bkickley’s attempt to elevate an extrinsic evidence requirement to the status of a “rule” is premised on the holding in Glasser v United States, 315 US 60; 62 S Ct 457; 86 L Ed 680 (1942). It should be noted that Glasser predated the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, Bourjaily explicitly held that the holding in Glasser was superseded by the enactment of Rule 104(a). “We think that the Rule is sufficiently clear that to the extent that it is inconsistent with petitioner’s interpretation of Glasser and Nixon, the Rule prevails.” Bourjaily, n 2 supra at 178-179. See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683; 94 S Ct 3090; 41 L Ed 2d 1039 (1974).

 2 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), § 272, pp 214-215.

 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 803(1)[01], p 803-92. Likewise, Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure (interim ed), § 6752, pp 270-271, also states that extrinsic corroboration is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of evidence under the present sense impression exception. “Moreover the evidence establishing that the declarant actually made a statement describing or explaining an event or condition while perceiving the event or immediately thereafter may consist solely of the statement itself considered in light of surrounding circumstances, although hesitancy has been shown by courts in admitting such statements without more when the identity of the declarant is unknown.” (Emphasis added.) See also the Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 803(1) (“If the witness is not the declarant, he may be examined as to the circumstances as an aid in evaluating the statement”).

 80 NY2d 729; 610 NE2d 369 (1993).

 Id. at 737.

 Id. at 736.

 Passannante, n 4 supra at 115-116.

 See United, States v Mejia-Velez, 855 F Supp 607 (ED NY, 1994); State v Jones, 311 Md 23; 532 A2d 169 (1987); United States v Obayagbona, 627 F Supp 329 (ED NY, 1985); United States v Medico, 557 F2d 309 (CA 2, 1977); State v Flesher, 286 NW2d 215 (Iowa, 1979); Commonwealth v Coleman, 458 Pa 112; 326 A2d 387 (1974).

 See United States v Blakey, 607 F2d 779 (CA 7, 1979), overruled in part on other grounds, Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805; 110 S Ct 3139; 111 L Ed 2d 638 (1990); Robinson v Shapiro, 484 F Supp 91 (SD NY, 1980), judgment affirmed and modified on other grounds by 646 F2d 734 (CA 2, 1981); United States v Narciso, 446 F Supp 252 (ED Mich, 1977); MCA, Inc v Wilson, 425 F Supp 443 (SD NY, 1976), judgment affirmed and modified on other grounds by 677 F2d 180 (CA 2, 1981); State v Phillips, 194 W Va 569; 461 SE2d 75 (1995).
Among jurisdictions that look at corroboration as a factor tending to enhance reliability, there is a divergence regarding what must be corroborated. In Blakey, the court held that “[i]t is not necessary that the witnesses be in the same position to observe as the declarant; it is only necessary that the witnesses be able to corroborate the declarant’s statement.” Id. at 785. In this case, in addition to the dispatch operator hearing the statement, the statement was recorded; therefore, there is no' doubt that the statements at issue in this case were actually made.

 See People v Watson, 100 AD2d 452; 474 NYS2d 978 (1984) In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F2d 238 (CA 3, 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574; 106 S Ct 1348; 89 L Ed 2d 538 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pfeiffer v School Bd for Marion Center Area School Dist, 917 F2d 779 (CA 3, 1990). While In re Japanese Electronic Products cites Weinstein for the proposition that the present sense impression exception requires corroboration, there is no requirement in the treatise. See 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 803(1)[01], p 803-92. The other case cited in the opinion, Houston Oxygen Co v Davis, 139 Tex 1; 161 SW2d 474 (1942), predated the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

 See State v Phillips, n 13 supra at 579. “Thus, we find that it is within the discretion of a trial court to consider corroborating evidence ‘in determining whether a statement not exactly contemporaneous qualifies for admission.’ ... By adopting this corroboration element, we do not mean to suggest that a separate showing of trustworthiness is required for a statement to be admissible. A descriptive statement made by a percipient declarant contemporaneous with an event is sufficient to justify admissibility.”

 People v Kreiner, 415 Mich 372; 329 NW2d 716 (1982). See also People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 502, n 12; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).

 Where this Court chose to deviate from the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence and impose an independent corroboration requirement, it did not hesitate to do so. Compare MRE 801(d)(2)(E) to FRE 801(d)(2)(E).

 Empirical studies refute the notion that jurors are incapable of distinguishing the relative strengths and weaknesses of hearsay evidence. See Kovera, Jurors’ perceptions of eyewitness and hearsay evidence, 76 Minn L R 703, 719-722 (1992); Miene, Juror decision making and the evaluation of hearsay evidence, 76 Minn L R 683, 693-699 (1992); Rakos, Researching the hearsay rule: Emerging findings, general issues, and future directions, 76 Minn L R 655, 664 (1992). One commentator noted:
In sum, the “trustworthiness problem” with hearsay, the “danger of overvaluation,” and the “four traditional hearsay risks” are all expressions of the same premise: There are problems in evaluating hearsay a jury cannot or will not comprehend, even after closing argument highlights those difficulties. To claim that such problems exist means one can think of a hearsay statement that jurors would mishandle for a reason they could not appreciate, even if it were explained to them. This reflects an eighteenth-century class arrogance sorely out of place in today’s society. [Milich, Hearsay anti-monies: The case for abolishing the rule and starting over, 71 Or L R 723, 771-772 (1992).]

 While I agree with Justice Brickley that some of the evidentiary rules operate to preclude the admission of otherwise competent and trustworthy statements, post at 253, n 3, his statement fails to acknowledge that the other rules, codified in the Michigan Rules of Evidence, were formulated out of concerns different from those present in this case. Those concerns are embodied in the language of the rule itself and the subsequent advisory committee notes. Here, there is no contention that present sense impressions, or any other hearsay exception, are on their face unduly untrustworthy, prejudicial, or inflammatory. If the drafters of the evidentiary rules had considered them to be so, then present sense impressions would undoubtedly be limited or precluded as well. The effort by my colleague to impose by judicial fiat an extrinsic evidence requirement on hearsay exceptions in direct contravention of the clear and unambiguous language of MRE 104(a) is based primarily on distrust of the factfinder and the trial court judge, rather than any deficit in the rule itself.
*249Requiring an extrinsic evidence requirement would mean that a trial court could not consider hearsay statements at all in determining preliminary questions of admissibility. Taken to its logical conclusion, the effect of this requirement would rob the hearsay exceptions of most, if not all of their utility. For example, one wonders what sort of extrinsic proofs would be necessary in order to admit a statement under MRE 803(8) (public records and reports), MRE 803(11) (records of religious organizations), or MRE 803(16) (statements in ancient documents).