Court Opinion

ID: 9672502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:56:01.226553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:16.644085
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The essence of any general definition of “fair market value” is the “willing-seller willing-buyer” concept; that is, “the price the property will bring when offered for sale by one who desires to sell, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who desires to buy, but is under no necessity of buying.” City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex.1972); City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808, 815 (1954); State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 202 (Comm.App.1936); Black’s Law Dictionary (Rev. Fourth Ed.1968) 716.
At common law when used in cases of theft:
“The word ‘value’ is ... slightly variable in meaning; but, ordinarily, for the purposes of this inquiry, it signifies the sum at which the like goods are, at the time, commonly bought and sold in the market. * * * * Any evidence from which the jury can infer the value of a stolen chattel is competent; as what the *307owner testifies of its value to him, the opinions of witnesses acquainted with the value of like property, what such property has brought at actual sales, etc.”
2 Bish.Crim.Prac. § 751, quoted and applied in Martinez v. The State, 16 Tex.App. 122 (1884).
The majority derives from Senters v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 423, 291 S.W.2d 739 (1956), that market value of stolen personal property is the amount it “would sell for in cash, giving a reasonable time for selling it,” the Court citing only Saddler v. State, 20 Tex.App. 195 (1886), and Branch’s Ann. P.C. § 2489. Id., 291 S.W.2d at 740. However, Saddler merely finds “no error” in the charge as given on the strength of language in Martinez v. The State, supra, at 128, which makes no mention of “reasonable time,” cf. ante; while Mr. Branch iterated that thought, the cases he refers to do not hold there is a “reasonable time” ingredient either, viz: Saddler, supra; Keipp v. State, 51 Tex.Cr.R. 417, 103 S.W. 392 (1907); Williams v. State, 63 Tex.Cr.R. 507, 140 S.W. 447 (1911); neither do subsequent decisions cited in 5 Branch’s (2d Ed. 1956), § 2676, at 124.1
The majority grievously errs in constructing from abstractions and speculation a literal “reasonable time criteria [sic].” At 305. In all the years since Saddler, and after Mr. Branch first reported that notion, this Court has not overtly used or included it in any analysis to determine fair market value in theft cases, and even though Senters was decided in 1956, the Court has never squarely addressed its headnote 2. See Shepard’s Texas Citations. Some courts of appeals have mentioned Senters, but none focuses on its “reasonable time” aspect. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 712 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1986), affirmed Scott v. State, 741 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Hall v. State, 730 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987), PDR refused; Hilson v. State, 751 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1988), no PDR history.
Moreover, while the majority recognizes that the legislative definition of “value” in § 31.08(a)(1) is “a standard long established by case law,” at 305, it is significant that the Legislature has not included any such “reasonable time” formulation.
Under these circumstances, to suggest that there must be a “reasonable time” inquiry in determining “fair market value” for purposes of fixing punishment for a general theft offense is not reasonably supportable.
Furthermore, where a merchant is offering merchandise for sale at retail there is no principled basis to introduce any such “reasonable time” factor. Certainly not in this context.
The indictment alleged the two typewriters were “of the value of at least $750,” and the factfinder is given to understand that “value” means “the fair market value of the property ... at the time and place of the offense.” Article 31.08(a)(1); see McCormick & Blackwell, Texas Criminal Forms and Trial Manual, § 101.01, 8 Texas Practice 539.
Valeta Gart, southwest territorial manager, personnel manager for Montgomery Ward & Co., testified that on the day and at the place of this offense she was working as store manager, that she was aware of the value of the typewriters in question, that the fair market value of each in Dallas County was $479.99 and the fact they may have been on sale that day did not have “anything to do with that value.” (SF 24-26). That value, she iterated on cross examination, was established by “our buyers” in the Chicago office “when they order it;” agreeing it is the value assigned “for *308accounting and inventory purposes,” she still adhered to her opinion:
Q. If that property was on sale on that day, would that change your opinion as to what the fair market value was of those typewriters?
A. I’m not sure how you define fair market value. $479,99 is the -price that the buyers determine is a fair market price for that merchandise.
Id., at 26-29
On redirect Gart further explained a company policy that if a customer brought in an advertisement that a certain item is being sold at a lower price the store manager may lower the price to that customer. However, she added: “I do not recall ever giving any money back to a customer on a Smith Corona typewriter because it’s been advertised at a lower price.” {Id., 29).
After Gart was excused the parties stipulated that if recalled she would testify on the day of the offense the “on-sale” price of each typewriter was $359.99. Other than the fact that the date was December 14, the record does not show any circumstances relative to the change in price.
The factfinder, here the trial court, would be authorized to convict upon finding them to be of the value alleged, but be obliged to acquit if it had a reasonable doubt as to whether the property in question is of the value of $750 or more. McCormick & Blackwell, Texas Criminal Forms and Trial Manual § 101.01, 8 Texas Practice 542.2
Thus, as this case demonstrates, a retailer prices an item at an amount believed to be fair market value, and retail sales made at that price evinces that it is indeed a fair market value. That subsequently the same retailer tentatively places the same item on sale at a lower price does not ipso facto reduce its fair market value. See Oliver v. State, 613 S.W.2d 270, 274-275 (Tex.Cr. App.1981).
For those reasons — without any regard to or consideration of so called “reasonable time criteria” — I concur in the judgment of the Court.
MILLER and MALONEY, JJ., join.

. For the Court, Judge Woodley undoubtedly used the Saddler “reasonable time” cite to fortify evidentiary observations that market value is not determined by what “an eager buyer would be willing to pay” or what "a seller who obtained it as an unredeemed pledge might be willing to take ... were he anxious or under necessity to sell.” Senters, supra, 291 S.W.2d at 740. The Court thus believed, as I do, that a "willing-seller willing-buyer” concept presupposes "reasonable time for selling” lapsed, or at least is taken into consideration by the respective parties.

. In rendering judgment for the trial court, the judge made oral findings on this point, viz:
"Common rule of commerce that though often price coincidentally matches that of value on numerous occasions, one in the ordinary course of legitimate business can purchase an item retailed at less than the true market value of the product. I find that to be the case here. I find that the State has satisfied its burden of proof with regard to the value [and] I find [the evidence] sufficient to show that the value of the items in question exceeded the statutory basement of $750.00. Mr. Keeton, I find you guilty as charged."