Court Opinion

ID: 9752089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:34:22.340041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:06.712158
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
Upon review of the evidence before us, I am convinced that Trooper Thomas Kambic had “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect, or probably cause to believe,” that appellee Jack A. Whitmyer was not driving his vehicle at a safe speed, thereby, violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361.
In reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, we are limited primarily to questions of law and are bound by the suppression court’s findings of fact if those facts are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 376 Pa.Super. 536, 542, 546 A.2d 654, 657 (1988), allocatur denied, 521 Pa. 617, 557 A.2d 721 (1989); Commonwealth v. White, 358 Pa.Super. 120, 123, 516 A.2d 1211, 1212 (1986). In determining whether those findings are supported by the record, we consider only the evidence of appellee and so much of the evidence of appellant which remains uncontradicted. Elliott, 376 Pa.Superior Ct. at 543, 546 A.2d at 657; White, 358 Pa.Superior Ct. at 123, 516 A.2d at 1212.
With those rules in mind, we must determine whether Trooper Kambic had articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect appellant was violating § 3361 of the Motor Vehicle Code. See Opinion of the Majority, p. 9; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (“Whenever a police officer ... has *406articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of [the Motor Vehicle Code], he may stop a vehicle____”); Elliott, 376 Pa.Superior Ct. at 545, 546 A.2d at 658 (“a police officer may stop a motor vehicle if he or she reasonably believes that a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code is being violated.”). The majority has concluded that the trooper did not have reasonable grounds to suspect appellee was traveling at an unsafe speed. However, I am convinced that the majority and the lower court are incorrect.
Instantly Trooper Kambic testified that he stopped appellee to cite him for a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §.3361, Driving vehicle at safe speed, which provides:
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed greater than will permit a driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.
Trooper Kambic stated that he followed appellant for two-tenths of a mile at seventy (70) miles per hour in a fifty-five (55) miles per hour zone, before appellant exited the highway. Further, the officer testified that appellant entered the highway in an “erratic” manner. He also testified that the traffic on the highway was medium to heavy at the time. I believe such evidence clearly raises articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect appellant was violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361.
In reaching my decision I considered 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a) which provides:
(a) General Rule.—Except when a special hazard exists that requires lower speed for compliance with section 3361 (relating to driving vehicle at safe speed), the limits *407specified in this subsection or established under this subchapter shall be maximum lawful speeds and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in excess of the following maximum limits:
(1) 35 miles per hour in any urban district.
(2) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Any other maximum speed limit established under
this subchapter.
Trooper Kambic testified that appellee was traveling at approximately seventy miles per hour. Logically, if the legislature has established fifty-five miles per hour as the maximum lawful speed, appellee’s traveling at seventy miles per hour cannot be considered safe. Cf., Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 F.Supp. 759 (D.C.1983), affirmed 727 F.2d 1100 (Under Pennsylvania law, traveling in excess of the 55 mile per hour speed limit is negligence per se).
In addition, I considered the decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Vishneski, 380 Pa.Super. 495, 552 A.2d 297 (1989), appeal denied 524 Pa. 620, 571 A.2d 382 (1989), wherein, we affirmed the conviction of a driver for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361. In that case, the officer testified that the driver was traveling 84.5 miles per hour. He described Route 202 North as a limited access highway with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. He further explained that the section of Route 202 North between the Paoli Pike on-ramp and the Route 322 exit is three lanes wide and is approximately one-tenth of a mile in distance. Upon reviewing the facts, we stated:
... It is apparent from the record that appellant’s speed was unreasonable given the conditions of the highway. Appellant was traveling at 84.5 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zoned area where traffic must merge and exit while competing with the northbound flow of traffic. In addition, we note that appellant was entering and exiting the northbound highway at a high rate of speed within a distance of one-tenth mile. The potential for hazards and conditions rendering traveling at a speed of *40884.5 miles per hour unreasonable is clearly supported by the evidence.
Vishneski, 380 Pa.Superior Ct. at 503, 552 A.2d at 301.1
The similarity between the facts of Vishneski, supra, and the case sub judice are remarkable. I cannot envision that in one case, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, while in the other substantially similar evidence is not even sufficient to raise “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect” a violation of the same statute. Certainly, the evidence before us is sufficient to meet the lesser standard. Whether the evidence once fully developed at trial would be sufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense is irrelevant to our present inquiry. Accord, Commonwealth v. Fisher, 294 Pa.Super. 486, 490, 440 A.2d 570, 572 (1982).
In sum, I conclude that Trooper Kambic reasonably believed appellant was in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code and had probable cause to stop appellee for the violation. Therefore, I find that the lower court erred in suppressing all evidence gathered as a result of the stop and I would reverse and remand for trial, Cf., Commonwealth v. Triplett, 387 Pa.Super. 378, 382, 564 A.2d 227, 230 (1989); Elliott, supra.

. I note that there was no evidence of hazardous weather conditions before the Vishneski Court.