Court Opinion

ID: 9957772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 14:04:08.707655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:38.097189
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                   McNULTY LOFTS CONDOMINIUM
                        ASSOCIATION, INC.,

                               Appellant,

                                   v.

                     WRH McNULTY GARAGE, LLC,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D23-536

                              April 5, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; Thomas M. Ramsberger, Judge.

Michael J. Labbee and Tyler A. Hayden of Phillips, Hayden & Labbee,
LLP, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.

Marie Tomassi and Charles M. Harris, Jr., of Trenam, Kemker, Scharf,
Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

MORRIS, Judge.
     McNulty Lofts Condominium Association, Inc. (McNulty), appeals
from a nonfinal order granting WRH McNulty Garage, LLC's (WRH)
motion for summary judgment in WRH's ejectment action, which had the
effect of determining the right to WRH's immediate possession of
property. Because we conclude that there exists a disputed issue of
material fact related to the boundary line at issue, we reverse.
                              BACKGROUND
     This case involves a thirteen-story building in St. Petersburg. WRH
owns a public parking garage in the building while McNulty and the
condominium association members own residential condominiums in the
building. The developer of the building built the seven-floor parking
garage first, followed by the construction of eighty-five residential
condominiums situated above the parking garage.
     On December 13, 2005, the developer recorded a Declaration of
Protective Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (Declaration). In that
document, the developer divided the public parking garage, which is
located on floors one through six of the building, from the residential
condominiums and their common elements (including parking spaces),
which were located on floors six through thirteen. The dispute in this
case centers on the precise location of the dividing boundary line on the
sixth floor between the public parking garage and the condominium
property.
     The original Declaration contained legal descriptions detailing the
metes and bounds of both the public parking garage and the
condominium property. In April 2006, the Declaration was amended to
reflect a new metes-and-bounds description; a survey of the building was
also attached. Subsequently, a new survey was prepared, leading to the
Declaration being amended a second time in May 2006. Finally, in
September 2014, the Declaration was amended a third time for the
purpose of recognizing certain portions of the commercial property (e.g.,
the building roof and exterior walls and surfaces of the building that

                                      2
surrounded the condominium property) that had not been originally
transferred to McNulty and its members by the developer.
     On some unknown date, the developer's contractor constructed a
gate on the sixth floor which separates the parking area for McNulty and
its members from the commercial parking spaces in the public portion of
the garage. An elevator lobby was also constructed solely for the use of
McNulty and its members.
     WRH purchased the public garage in April 2018. In February
2022, WRH filed its ejectment action against McNulty. The basis for the
action was WRH's claim that the gate was encroaching on its property
and depriving it of the use of several parking spaces. WRH claimed that
McNulty refused to move the gate and refused to compensate WRH for
the use of the parking spaces. However, in its complaint, WRH did not
allege who installed the gate or the date of installation.
     In response, McNulty denied that the gate was encroaching on
WRH's property. McNulty also raised several affirmative defenses,
including failure to state a cause of action, estoppel, adverse
possession/prescriptive easement, and boundary by agreement or by
acquiescence.
     Thereafter, WRH filed a motion for summary judgment. In that
motion, WRH argued that at some time after the third amendment to the
Declaration was recorded, McNulty "redesigned its parking area and
installed an access gate and elevator lobby on the shared sixth floor of
the parking garage." WRH claimed that the third amendment to the
Declaration and the condominium plat and survey revealed that the gate
and elevator lobby encroached on WRH's property and prevented WRH
from using several of its parking spaces. WRH sought an order requiring
McNulty to move the gate as well as the elevator lobby.

                                      3
     In support of its summary judgment motion, WRH relied on the
affidavit of its executive vice president, John Withers. Withers' affidavit
was based on his "personal knowledge and the documents, records, and
communications made and maintained in the regular course of WRH's
business operations." While Withers attested that the access gate was
installed at some unknown date after 2005, he did not attest as to who
installed the gate. He asserted that he personally inspected the location
and that based on his review of the third amendment to the Declaration
and the condominium plat, "it appears that the access gate and the
adjacent elevator lobby encroach on WRH [p]roperty."
     McNulty filed its response to the motion, arguing that there were
several disputed issues of material fact, such as the precise location of
the boundary line and the identity of the party who installed the gate and
elevator lobby. In support of its response, McNulty relied on the affidavit
of Gary Engle, an investor of a corporate entity related to the original
developer of the property. He asserted that both the original developer
and its related corporate entities had been dissolved and were no longer
registered in Florida. He stated that his affidavit was based on his
personal knowledge as a former investor in the related corporate entity.
Engle asserted that the developer intended for the elevator lobby and the
adjacent gate and fence to designate the boundary line between the
residential condominium property and the commercial property. Engle
also asserted that the developer intended for the elevator lobby and the
adjacent gate and fence as well as the parking spaces north of the gate
and fence to be for the exclusive use of the condominium residents.
     McNulty also relied on the affidavit of its current board president
who asserted that "[a]t all times material to this case, the lobby of the
south elevator, the adjacent security gate, and the two adjacent parking

                                      4
spaces have been and are the delineation line between the sixth (6th)
floor parking garage for the residential condominium property and the
commercial property." She also asserted that "[a]t all times material to
this case," those same areas as well as "all parking spaces north of the
security gate and fence have been used exclusively by the Residential
Condominium." Finally, she asserted that McNulty had always been
responsible for and performed routine maintenance and cleaning of not
only the security gate and fence, but also "the two adjacent parking
spaces in conjunction with all spaces north of the security gate."
     As a further basis for denying the motion for summary judgment,
McNulty argued that its affirmative defenses were supported by the
affidavits and were unrefuted, thereby precluding entry of summary
judgment.
     At the summary judgment hearing, WRH argued that the boundary
lines were set forth in the Declaration and amendments thereto and that
the gate clearly encroached upon its property. WRH also contended that
summary judgment was appropriate because a recorded legal instrument
renders the affirmative defenses of boundary by acquiescence/agreement
and equitable estoppel inapplicable.
     McNulty maintained that there was a dispute about the boundary
line. McNulty pointed to the affidavits it filed, arguing that they reflected
that when the building was developed, the boundary line was intended to
be in the location of the gate. McNulty also argued that the gate had
been treated as the boundary line for almost twenty years.
     Ultimately, the trial court granted WRH's motion for summary
judgment. The trial court concluded that "[t]he evidence admitted by the

                                       5
Court1 does not present sufficient disagreement for submission of this
case to a jury" and that there was "no genuine issue of material fact."
      The trial court rejected McNulty's affirmative defenses. In doing so,
the trial court pointed to the Declaration and the amendments thereto as
"establishing ownership of [WRH's] Property and the boundary line." The
trial court found that WRH "provided recorded legal instruments
establishing the identical, unchanged, and unambiguous boundary line
since 2005, and it was not disputed in any meaningful manner by
[McNulty]." The trial court also concluded that McNulty "failed to provide
sufficient evidence" rebutting the recorded legal instruments, explaining
that McNulty's "affidavits of individuals affiliated with" McNulty "did not
provide sufficient disagreement such that it would require submission to
a jury."
      The trial court concluded that WRH was entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law and ordered McNulty to remove the gate2 within a specified
period of time. The order provided that if McNulty failed to do so, WRH
could remove the gate itself and then seek remuneration from McNulty

      1 The evidence that was admitted and considered by the trial court

consisted of the affidavits filed in support of WRH's motion and
McNulty's response and the exhibits attached to those affidavits. The
exhibits consisted of property appraiser information sheets, a building
permit for the original developer, the Declaration and amendments
thereto, the legal description of the property, the condominium plat and
survey containing a diagram showing the parking lot and location of the
elevator lobby and gate, warranty deeds, correspondence between WRH
and McNulty, and property tax assessments.
      2 WRH's motion for summary judgment referenced both the gate

and the elevator lobby. But at the summary judgment hearing, WRH
confined its arguments to the location of the gate, though McNulty made
arguments concerning both the gate and elevator lobby. The trial court's
order only addresses the gate.

                                     6
for the costs of doing so as well as damages incurred due to WRH's
inability to use the parking spaces from the time it had provided notice to
McNulty of the encroachment. The order also granted a writ of
possession to WRH.
                                ANALYSIS
     We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Volusia
County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla.
2000). "A movant is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable
finder of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." G & G In-
Between Bridge Club Corp. v. Palm Plaza Assocs., 356 So. 3d 292, 297
(Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986)). "We view the facts in the light most favorable to [the
nonmoving party] and may not weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations." Id. Where there exists a disputed issue of material
fact, a trial court may not enter a summary judgment. See HSBC Mortg.
Corp. (USA) v. Mullan, 159 So. 3d 250, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
     McNulty contends that there is a disputed issue of material fact
related to the location of the boundary line based on the Declaration and
its subsequent amendments and the condominium plat and survey.
McNulty argues that the documents contain an internal inconsistency.
In arguing for affirmance of the trial court's order, WRH also points to
the Declaration, the third amendment, and the condominium plat and
survey.
     There is an internal inconsistency in the recorded legal instruments
relied on by Withers and by the trial court.3 Attached to the Declaration

     3 McNulty conceded at oral argument that it did not address the

internal inconsistency in its opposition to WRH's motion for summary
judgment and that its supporting affidavits likewise did not address the
                                     7
was the condominium plat and survey, and it is undisputed that the
depiction of the sixth floor reflects that the elevator lobby on that floor
appears to lie outside of the boundaries of McNulty's property. However,
the Declaration defines "Condominium Elevators" in relevant part as
      two (2) certain elevators, intended for use by Residential Unit
      Owners in the Residential Condominium . . . the first of which
      is located on the south end of the building . . . and runs from
      the ground floor through the Residential Condominium
      Parking Floors (a portion of the sixth (6th) and the entire
      seventh (7th) floors of the Building).
That definition also provides that "[t]he Condominium Elevators and the
spaces in which they operate are a part of the Residential Condominium,
pursuant to the terms of the Residential Declaration." None of the
amendments to the Declaration modified that definition. Thus when
looking at the definition of "Condominium Elevators" in the Declaration
and the condominium plat and survey together, there is an internal
inconsistency related to the location of the boundary line. While the plat
and survey suggest that the elevator lobby is encroaching on WRH's
property, the definition of "Condominium Elevators" suggests that the

issue. However, McNulty contended that it raised the issue in its motion
for reconsideration before the trial court, a point that WRH did not
refute. McNulty argues that this sufficiently preserved the issue for
appeal. Cf. Waksman Enters., Inc. v. Oregon Props., Inc., 862 So. 2d 35,
42 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (noting that appellee properly conceded that
where appellant raised an issue for the first time in his motion for
rehearing in a summary judgment proceeding, "the point was properly
presented to the trial court . . . and thus preserved for appellate review").
While WRH noted in its brief that McNulty's affidavits failed to address
the alleged internal inconsistency, the issue was raised only as part of
WRH's argument that McNulty failed to present sufficient evidence to
rebut the location of the boundary line as reflected in the recorded legal
instruments. WRH does not argue that McNulty failed to adequately
preserve the internal inconsistency issue for appeal.
                                      8
relevant elevator "and the space in which it operates" is part of McNulty's
property.
     The inconsistency is reflected on the face of those documents, and
there is no dispute that they are recorded legal instruments. The
documents were admitted and considered by the trial court. The
inconsistency is itself evidence that there is uncertainty about boundary
lines between WRH's and McNulty's properties. WRH's counsel asserted
at oral argument that because the only matter in dispute was the
location of the gate (presumably because the trial court's order only
addressed the location and removal of the gate), the elevator lobby was
irrelevant. To the extent that WRH argues that this court should ignore
the inconsistency because it involves the elevator lobby rather than the
gate, we disagree. If a document and its attachments are internally
inconsistent, they cannot be said to be unambiguous as the trial court
concluded. The ambiguity concerning ownership of the property on
which the elevator lobby sits calls into question whether the boundary
lines set forth in the plat and survey are correct. Consequently, there
was a disputed issue of material fact concerning the relevant boundary
line, and the trial court should not have granted summary judgment.
See Bogatov v. City of Hallandale Beach, 192 So. 3d 600, 602 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2016) ("In Florida, evidence of inconsistency in testimony and
documentary evidence itself creates a disputed issue of fact for the jury,
which may not be resolved by the trial court adversely to the nonmoving
party [on motion for summary judgment]." (alteration in original) (quoting
Gardner v. Holifield, 639 So. 2d 652, 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994))); S & T
Anchorage, Inc. v. Lewis, 575 So. 2d 696, 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
(reversing summary judgment on the basis that a disputed issue of
material fact existed where a declaration of covenants contained

                                     9
ambiguous and conflicting provisions relating to the vesting of property
rights). Due to our resolution of this issue, it is unnecessary to address
McNulty's other arguments.4
     Reversed and remanded.

LUCAS and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

     4 McNulty's second and third arguments related to the identity of

the person or entity that installed the gate and whether there were
disputed issues of material fact related to two of its affirmative defenses.
                                     10