Court Opinion

ID: 9946748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 14:00:41.849199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:35.160034
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10857    Document: 30-1     Date Filed: 03/01/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10857
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JUSTIN KELLY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00204-CEH-SPF-2
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10857

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Justin Kelly appeals his convictions for possession with in-
       tent to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl (Count 1), distribu-
       tion and possession with intent to distribute a mixture and sub-
       stance containing fentanyl resulting in death (Count 2), and posses-
       sion of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon (Count 8),
       as well as his sentence of life imprisonment. Kelly argues that the
       court erred when it denied his motion for judgment for acquittal
       for counts one and two because there was not sufficient evidence
       that he supplied the fentanyl that killed the victim or that the fen-
       tanyl was the “but for” cause of the victim’s death. He argues that
       the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal for
       count eight because there was not sufficient evidence that he con-
       structively possessed the firearm found in the storage unit. Addi-
       tionally, he argues that the court erred when it found that his prior
       Florida cocaine-based drug convictions were serious drug offenses,
       and therefore, erred in applying an enhancement under the Armed
       Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).
                                         I.
              We review de novo whether there was suﬃcient evidence to
       support a conviction. United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284
       (11th Cir. 2009). In reviewing the suﬃciency of the evidence, we
       view the record in the light most favorable to the government, re-
       solving all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. Id. The
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       23-10857               Opinion of the Court                         3

       evidence will be suﬃcient to support a conviction if “a reasonable
       trier of fact could ﬁnd that the evidence established guilt beyond a
       reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1284-85 (quotation marks omitted).
               The test for suﬃciency is the same, regardless of whether
       the evidence is direct or circumstantial, but where the government
       relied on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences must sup-
       port the conviction. United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 587 (11th
       Cir. 2015). We will assume that the jury resolved all questions of
       credibility in a manner supporting the verdict. Jiminez, 564 F.3d at
       1285. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis
       of innocence for a reasonable jury to ﬁnd guilt beyond a reasonable
       doubt. United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir.
       1985) (en banc). Instead, the jury is free to choose among alterna-
       tive, reasonable interpretations of the evidence. Id.
              The Supreme Court has held that, “where use of the drug
       distributed by the defendant is not an independently suﬃcient
       cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant can-
       not be liable under the penalty enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C.
       § 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or in-
       jury.” Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 218-19 (2014).
              “It is well settled that possession of contraband may be con-
       structive as well as actual and may be proven by circumstantial ev-
       idence.” United States v. Kincade, 714 F.2d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
       1983). To prove actual possession, the government must prove that
       the defendant had either physical possession of or personal domin-
       ion over the thing allegedly possessed. United States v. Derose, 74
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-10857

       F.3d 1177, 1185 (11th Cir. 1996). “Constructive possession exists
       when a defendant has ownership, dominion, or control over an ob-
       ject itself or dominion or control over the premises . . . in which
       the object is concealed.” United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909
       (11th Cir. 1998).
              Here, there was suﬃcient evidence to convict Kelly of
       counts 1, 2, and 8. First, there was suﬃcient evidence that Kelly’s
       fentanyl was the fentanyl that killed E.L. Kinney testiﬁed that Kelly
       was his only supplier of fentanyl, and that Kinney was E.L.’s only
       supplier of fentanyl. Kinney testiﬁed that E.L. purchased fentanyl
       from him on the night of his death, and later that night E.L. died
       from an overdose. Therefore, there were reasonable inferences
       that the jury could make that the fentanyl that killed E.L. was sup-
       plied by Kelly. Martin, 803 F.3d at 587.
              Second, there was suﬃcient evidence that the fentanyl sup-
       plied by Kelly was the but-for cause of E.L.’s death. There was ev-
       idence that E.L. was found with ooze coming out of his mouth
       which was consistent with a fentanyl overdose. Dr. Ignacio, a med-
       ical examiner who had done thousands of autopsies, testiﬁed that
       she determined that E.L. died from fentanyl toxicity. There was
       also evidence that E.L. had 2.5 nanograms of fentanyl in his body
       at the time of his death, which was enough fentanyl to kill some-
       one. Dr. Nelson, the chief medical examiner, also agreed with Dr.
       Ignacio’s determination that E.L. died from a fentanyl overdose.
       While Kelly argues that there is evidence that alcohol played a role
       in E.L.’s death, the jury did not need to ﬁnd that argument
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       23-10857               Opinion of the Court                        5

       compelling because of Dr. Ignacio and Dr. Nelson’s testimony that
       E.L. died from fentanyl toxicity. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d at 1545.
       Therefore, there was suﬃcient evidence for the jury to conclude
       that the fentanyl supplied by Kelly was the but-for cause of E.L.’s
       death.
              Third, there was suﬃcient evidence that Kelly possessed the
       ﬁrearm found in the storage unit. The storage unit that the ﬁrearm
       was found in was in Kelly’s name. Detective Collins testiﬁed that
       the keys that the police used to open the storage unit were obtained
       from Kelly on the night of his arrest. Mary Herron, manager of
       the storage facility, testiﬁed that in order to obtain a storage unit
       the person must give their name and driver’s license and that she
       would give that person a unique code to access the facility. There
       was evidence that Kelly signed the storage rental agreement for the
       unit that the ﬁrearm was found in. Therefore, there was evidence
       that the jury could have used to conclude that Kelly had dominion
       and control over the unit where the ﬁrearm was found, and thus,
       that he had constructive possession of the ﬁrearm. Leonard, 138
       F.3d at 909.
             Therefore, there was suﬃcient evidence to convict Kelly of
       counts 1, 2, and 8 and the district court did not err when it denied
       the motion for acquittal.
                                         II.
              We review whether a prior state conviction qualiﬁes as a se-
       rious drug oﬀense under the ACCA de novo. United States v. Smith,
       983 F.3d 1213, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 2020). We apply the categorical
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10857

       approach to determine whether a defendant’s prior state convic-
       tion qualiﬁes as a serious drug oﬀense under the ACCA. United
       States v. Jackson (Jackson II), 55 F.4th 846, 850 (11th Cir. 2022), petition
       for cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 2457 (2023). Under the categorical ap-
       proach, we consider the statutory deﬁnition of the state oﬀense ra-
       ther than the facts of the crime itself. Id. A state conviction quali-
       ﬁes only if the state statute under which the conviction occurred
       deﬁnes the oﬀense in the same way as, or more narrowly than, the
       ACCA’s deﬁnition of a serious drug oﬀense. Id.
              Florida’s controlled substances schedules included ioﬂupane
       until 2017. See 2017 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2017-110 (C.S.H.B. 505)
       (West). The federal controlled substance schedules also included
       ioﬂupane until 2015. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Removal
       of Ioﬂupane From Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act, 80 Fed.
       Reg. 54715-01 (Sep. 11, 2015).
              In Jackson I, we vacated and remanded a defendant’s
       ACCA-enhanced sentence, holding that the appellant’s cocaine-re-
       lated Fla. Stat. § 893.13 oﬀenses did not qualify as serious drug of-
       fenses under the ACCA. United States v. Jackson (Jackson I), 36 F.4th
       1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2022). We determined that the federal con-
       trolled substances schedules that deﬁned a serious drug oﬀense un-
       der the ACCA were those in eﬀect when the defendant committed
       his federal oﬀense and that those schedules did not cover ioﬂupane
       at the time he committed his federal oﬀense. Id. at 1299-1302.
       Since Florida’s deﬁnition in § 893.13 covered ioﬂupane when he
       was convicted of his prior cocaine-related oﬀenses, § 893.13’s
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       23-10857               Opinion of the Court                        7

       controlled-substance element was broader than the relevant ver-
       sion of the federal controlled substances schedules, and his prior
       cocaine-related convictions thus did not qualify as serious drug of-
       fenses. Id. at 1303-04.
               We then vacated our decision in Jackson I, and subsequently
       held that the appellant’s state conviction under § 893.13 qualiﬁed as
       a serious drug oﬀense. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 861-62. We held that
       the ACCA’s deﬁnition of a serious drug oﬀense incorporates the
       version of the federal controlled substances schedules in eﬀect
       when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug oﬀense.
       Id. at 854. We concluded that the appellant’s 1998 and 2004 Florida
       cocaine-related convictions qualiﬁed as serious drug oﬀenses be-
       cause Florida’s controlled substances schedules included ioﬂupane
       until 2017 and the federal controlled substance schedules also in-
       cluded ioﬂupane until 2015. Id. at 851 & nn.3-4. Thus, as of the
       time Jackson was convicted of the prior cocaine-based oﬀenses in
       1998 and 2004, Jackson’s state convictions under § 893.13 were de-
       ﬁned in the same way that the ACCA deﬁned a serious drug of-
       fense. Therefore, Jackson’s prior convictions qualiﬁed for the en-
       hancement under the ACCA.
              Similarly, Kelly’s prior Florida cocaine-based drug convic-
       tions all predated 2015—i.e. at a time that Florida’s cocaine-based
       crimes were deﬁned in the same way that the ACCA deﬁned a seri-
       ous drug oﬀense—and therefore qualify as serious drug oﬀenses for
       the ACCA enhancement. This issue is controlled by our decision
       in Jackson II. The prior-panel-precedent rule requires subsequent
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                23-10857

       panels to follow the precedent of the ﬁrst panel to address the rele-
       vant issue, unless and until the ﬁrst panel’s holding is overruled by
       us sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. Scott v. United States,
       890 F.3d 1239, 1257 (11th Cir. 2018). The granting of certiorari
       alone does not aﬀect our precedent. Schwab v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
       507 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007).
              Here, following Jackson II, the court did not err in determin-
       ing that Kelly’s state drug convictions were serious drug offenses
       and therefore did not err in applying the ACCA enhancement.

       AFFIRMED.