Court Opinion

ID: 9769186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:37:17.885438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:57.278211
License: Public Domain

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The story before us evokes the adage, “there’s no fool like an old fool”. Apt though the saying may be, I notice as I grow older I find myself less amused by its smugness. I do not mean to impugn Mayo McBride’s capacity to contract or conduct his affairs; even those much younger do not always use their best judgment when dealing with matters of the heart.
When the McBrides married in 1978, Mayo was 84 years old and Linda 17. Four years after their marriage, Linda moved out of Mayo’s house and began a lesbian relationship with a woman in Orange Coun*694ty. Mayo and Linda each filed for divorce in Tyler and Orange Counties, respectively.
Mayo, wanting very much to remain married to Linda, convinced her not to divorce him and joined in a settlement agreement that the Tyler County court incorporated into its agreed judgment. In exchange for Linda’s promise to remain married, Mayo agreed to give her a new car purchased with his separate property and to convey his ancestral home to her as a gift. He agreed to give her $500 monthly from his separate property. Linda’s only obligation was to visit him each month to receive her check.
Mayo also agreed to provide in his will that, upon his death, all the community property would be Linda’s sole property.' Linda agreed that should she again file for divorce she would forfeit all interest in the community estate.
She likely thought she would not have long to wait, but Mayo fooled her. The old boy was a survivor, heartier than she realized. Linda tired of waiting for his property, and sued for divorce and to void the settlement agreement.
The majority contends that the Tyler judgment is void and the agreement unenforceable, because the Tyler trial court was without jurisdiction to divide the community estate since no divorce was granted. However, the items awarded to Linda under the agreement were stated as gifts from Mayo, which contradicts the notion that the agreement was a division of community property. Further, the Tyler judgment merely incorporated a settlement agreement entered into by the parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 11 makes enforceable a signed agreement made in open court, filed with the papers of the case, and entered of record.
Even assuming arguendo that the judgment would be void, the majority is incorrect is reversing the trial court on that basis. Whether that judgment is void, or merely voidable, once the time for an appeal had passed, a bill of review is Linda’s exclusive remedy to challenge the Tyler judgment. Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex.1985); Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(f). She has never properly challenged the Tyler court’s judgment. Accordingly, the Tyler judgment remains a valid, enforceable judgement.
The parties entered into this settlement agreement voluntarily. The agreement expressly states that the parties understood that the contract altered their present and future property rights. Both parties were represented by counsel. In fact, Mayo’s attorneys advised him not to enter into the agreement, because it was not a good settlement as to him. “It is generally recognized that parties dealing at arms length have a wide discretion as to the terms of the contract into which they may wish to enter.” Bass v. Bass, 790 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no writ). Article I, § 16 of the Texas Constitution makes clear the sanctity that the right to contract, and the concomitant obligation to perform, have always been accorded in our jurisprudence. Whenever possible, courts should give effect to voluntary agreements freely made between the parties. Johnson v. Swain, 787 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex.1989) (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Texas Electric Services, 614 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
Additionally, though Linda McBride seeks to void the Tyler judgment to avoid the consequences of her own breach, she has never offered to return the substantial benefits she has derived from it. Equitably she is barred by judicial estoppel from attempting to void the agreement and judgment. This is a case of estoppel by election, and should be affirmed on the principle that a person will not be permitted to accept the beneficial part of a transaction and to repudiate the disadvantageous part. San Antonio Savings v. Palmer, 780 S.W.2d 803, 809 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
The settlement agreement between Mayo and Linda is enforceable, and the Tyler judgment incorporating it remains valid. The law requires the parties be bound by terms for which they voluntarily contracted, and from which Linda has unquestionably benefited. I would affirm the judg*695ment of the trial court and, thus, respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues.