Court Opinion

ID: 9365757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 22:05:07.287889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.497827
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 180241-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                        NOTICE
 Decision filed 01/24/23. The
                                                                             This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-18-0241
                                                                             Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                             not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                        limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                             under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Saline County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 16-CF-327
                                                )
BRIAN T. BURNS,                                 )     Honorable
                                                )     Walden E. Morris,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Where there was no meritorious issue that (1) the State proved defendant guilty
               beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) defense counsel was ineffective, (3) the trial court
               erred in admitting evidence, and (4) the court abused its discretion in sentencing
               defendant, we grant defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to withdraw
               and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶2       Following a jury trial, defendant, Brian T. Burns, was found guilty of attempted aggravated

kidnapping, solicitation to commit aggravated kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit aggravated

kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment for solicitation. Defendant

appealed.

¶3       Defendant’s appointed attorney, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), filed

a motion to withdraw as counsel, arguing that this appeal presents no arguably meritorious issues.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). OSAD has notified defendant of its motion. This

                                                  1
court provided defendant with ample opportunity to file a response, and he has done so. After

reviewing the record and considering OSAD’s motion, the supporting memorandum, and

defendant’s response, we agree that this appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit.

Therefore, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶4                                   BACKGROUND

¶5     In the summer of 2016, defendant was housed in the Saline County Detention Center,

charged with murdering his wife. At that time, he began discussing with a cellmate, Mark

Stricklin, a plan to have then State’s Attorney Mark Henshaw kidnapped and held until he agreed

to drop the murder charge against defendant.

¶6     Stricklin testified that defendant first discussed having his stepsons hurt because they were

suing him for the wrongful death of their mother. Defendant asked Stricklin whether he knew

anybody who could do the job. Later, defendant mentioned having Henshaw kidnapped. At that

point, Stricklin contacted his lawyer, who relayed the message to someone in law enforcement.

¶7     Stricklin agreed to wear a wire and recorded several conversations with defendant. The

pair also communicated in letters, which defendant would write in Stricklin’s presence. They

communicated in this way to avoid having their other cellmates overhear. The conversations and

letters were often in code. For example, defendant referred to the kidnapping of Henshaw as a

“roofing job.”

¶8     Stricklin told defendant that he would contact a friend who could do the job, but in reality

the “friend” was Detective David Blazier. Stricklin and defendant called Blazier from the jail to

discuss details of the kidnapping plot. On cross-examination, Stricklin admitted that he was facing

charges of predatory sexual assault and, while he had not been promised anything specific in

exchange for his testimony, he hoped to receive favorable treatment.

                                                2
¶9     Throughout the conversations, defendant expressed concern that he would be connected to

the kidnapping plot. Defendant wanted Henshaw to be told that his patients and coworkers were

the ones who hired the kidnapper, believing the charges against defendant to be false. Defendant

worried that he would “never get out of prison,” and he did not want to be another Drew Peterson.

Defendant asked Stricklin repeatedly whether Stricklin thought the kidnapper could pull off the

job and whether the risk of getting caught was too high. At one point, defendant became suspicious

and frisked Stricklin for a wire.

¶ 10   Defense counsel argued that defendant was merely fantasizing or speaking hypothetically.

Counsel maintained that Stricklin was the driving force behind the alleged plot, hoping to obtain

some leverage to procure more favorable treatment on his own charges. The defense further

emphasized that the plot had no chance of success and that Henshaw was never actually in danger.

¶ 11   The jury found defendant guilty. A presentence investigation report showed that, prior to

the murder charge, defendant had no criminal history. The defense emphasized that defendant had

been a local doctor, a church deacon, and a Sunday school teacher. The trial court sentenced him

to 20 years’ imprisonment, finding that the crime’s inherent seriousness outweighed defendant’s

lack of criminal history. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 12                                   ANALYSIS

¶ 13   OSAD contends that it can make no good-faith argument for reversing defendant’s

conviction or sentence. We agree.

¶ 14   OSAD first contends that there is no reasonably meritorious contention that the State failed

to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant challenges on appeal the

sufficiency of the evidence, we will reverse the conviction only if, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the State, no “ ‘rational trier of fact could have found the essential

                                                3
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278

(2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The trier of fact is responsible

for determining witness credibility. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211 (2004).

¶ 15    Defendant was charged with three inchoate offenses, the predicate for which was

aggravated kidnapping. Kidnapping occurs when a person knowingly and secretly confines

another against his or her will or by force or threat of imminent force carries another from one

place to another with the intent to secretly confine him or her against his or her will. 720 ILCS

5/10-1(a) (West 2018); People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 104 (2002). Kidnapping may be

aggravated where, inter alia, the kidnapper attempts to ransom. 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(1) (West

2018). “Ransom” includes “money, benefit, or other valuable thing or concession.” Id. § 10-2(a).

¶ 16    Here, the defense did not deny that defendant had the conversations that Stricklin testified

about and recorded. The only real issue at trial was whether defendant was serious about having

Henshaw kidnapped or was either fantasizing or going along with a conversation that Stricklin

initiated. To this point, Stricklin testified that defendant first raised the idea of kidnapping

Henshaw. After a lull of about a month, defendant raised the issue again. The pair made detailed

arrangements for the proposed crime. Blazier testified that defendant gave him the go-ahead to

carry out the plot.

¶ 17    Moreover, Stricklin testified that defendant was extremely concerned about his role in the

plot being discovered and took elaborate precautions to avoid it. From this, the jury could

reasonably conclude that defendant viewed the discussions as more than just fantasizing or

exploring hypothetical scenarios, and really intended to have Henshaw kidnapped.

¶ 18    It is true that the primary evidence against defendant came from Stricklin, a jailhouse

informant. Stricklin himself was not beyond reproach. He had a criminal history and was facing

                                                 4
serious charges, providing him with a motive to aid law enforcement in the hope of receiving

favorable treatment on his own charges. Although the testimony of a jailhouse informant should

be viewed cautiously, the credibility of a such an informant, as with any other witness, is a question

for the jury. People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 55 (citing People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193,

210 (1998)). The testimony of jailhouse informants is not to be viewed as inherently unbelievable.

Id. Moreover, Stricklin’s testimony was corroborated by Blazier and to some extent by defendant

himself in the recorded conversations. There is no question that if the jury believed Stricklin and

Blazier, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant solicited a kidnapping.

¶ 19   OSAD next contends that there is no nonfrivolous argument that secretly recording

defendant’s conversations with Stricklin and Blazier violated his fifth or sixth amendment rights.

Under the fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V), suspects must be told that they have a right

to counsel before a custodial police interrogation to effectuate that amendment’s prohibition

against being coerced into being a witness against oneself. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

471-72 (1966). However, that requirement does not apply to covert recordings by cellmates.

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1990) (essential ingredients of a police-dominated

atmosphere and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone

whom he believes to be a fellow inmate). Thus, defendant’s fifth amendment right to counsel was

not infringed here.

¶ 20   The broader sixth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VI) right to counsel may be infringed

where law enforcement agents, through a confidential informant, surreptitiously record the

conversations of a defendant after he has been indicted. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,

206 (1964). However, the Massiah rule does not apply to offenses other than the one for which

the defendant has been indicted. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 166-67 (2001) (sixth amendment

                                                  5
right is offense specific; it cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach

until a prosecution is commenced). Here, defendant was in custody for the murder of his wife.

The recordings related to a clearly distinct offense occurring after the initial murder. Thus, the

secret recordings did not violate defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel.

¶ 21    OSAD next contends that there is no meritorious argument that defense counsel was

ineffective. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defendant. People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 24 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984)).

¶ 22    OSAD observes that the jury was allowed to hear—without objection—evidence that

defendant also discussed having his sons in Texas kidnapped to dissuade them from pursuing a

civil suit against him. Generally, evidence of other crimes, threats, or bad acts is not admissible to

show the defendant’s character or propensity to commit crime or wrongful acts. People v. Knight,

309 Ill. App. 3d 224, 227 (1999). Such evidence may, however, be admissible if relevant for some

other purpose. Id.

¶ 23    Even if counsel could have successfully objected to this evidence, the failure to do so did

not establish his ineffectiveness. OSAD speculates that counsel may have had a strategic reason

for failing to object. See People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344 (2007) (decisions regarding “ ‘what

matters to object to and when to object’ ” are matters of trial strategy (quoting People v.

Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 327 (1997))). In any event, however, in light of the other evidence

detailed above, defendant was not prejudiced. See People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 74 (1997)

(“[I]f the ineffective-assistance claim can be disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not

suffer prejudice, a court need not decide whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally

                                                   6
deficient.”). The evidence included clear and consistent testimony by Stricklin and Detective

Blazier, as well as the letters defendant wrote and his recorded calls. In light of this evidence,

there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not heard

evidence that he also discussed having his stepsons kidnapped.

¶ 24   OSAD further contends that there is no arguably meritorious contention that the trial court

reversibly erred in its evidentiary rulings. OSAD lists three possible issues that defendant could

conceivably raise.

¶ 25   OSAD first notes that the court overruled a defense objection to admitting defendant’s

handwritten letters. Counsel argued that the letters were irrelevant and that the State failed to lay

a proper foundation.

¶ 26   Evidentiary rulings are within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed

absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). Here, the letters

went to the heart of the offense for which defendant was on trial. Thus, as OSAD contends, they

could hardly have been more relevant. Moreover, the State laid a proper foundation as Stricklin

testified that defendant wrote the letters in his presence. The “requirement of authentication or

identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support

a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Ill. R. Evid. 901(a) (eff. Sept.

17, 2019). Such evidence may include testimony by a witness with knowledge that the evidence

is what it is claimed to be. Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (eff. Sept. 17, 2019). Thus, Stricklin’s testimony

was sufficient to satisfy the relatively minimal foundational requirement.

¶ 27   OSAD next observes that defense counsel wanted to show that Stricklin’s pending charges

involved the sexual assault of a minor (rather than an adult). Generally, a witness may not be

impeached with evidence of arrests or pending indictments to show his bad character. People v.

                                                  7
Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 475 (1985). However, showing bias, interest, or motive to testify is also

an accepted method of impeachment. Id. With this method of impeachment, “ ‘the fact that a

witness has been arrested or charged with a crime may be shown or inquired into where it would

reasonably tend to show that his testimony might be influenced by interest, bias or a motive to

testify falsely.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting People v. Mason, 28 Ill. 2d 396, 401 (1963)).

Thus, counsel achieved the goal of the impeachment by showing that Stricklin was facing serious

charges. He admitted that he was motivated to implicate defendant in the hope of receiving

favorable treatment on his own charges. The precise nature of those charges was irrelevant. Thus,

the trial court did not err.

¶ 28    In any event, counsel did accomplish much the same thing when he asked Stricklin, “You

pled not guilty of what you’re accused of, as it relates to the children, right?” Stricklin responded

in the affirmative, and the State did not object.

¶ 29    In its third point under this issue, OSAD contends that it cannot meritoriously argue that

the trial court erred by allowing the State to show that defendant was facing charges for the murder

of his wife. As noted, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible merely to show a defendant’s

character or propensity to commit crimes. Knight, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 227. However, such

evidence is relevant if offered for some other purpose, such as motive. Id. Here, the motive for

defendant’s plot to kidnap Henshaw was to persuade him to drop the pending murder charge. Thus,

evidence of that charge was highly relevant to motive. Indeed, the State’s evidence of a plot to

kidnap the state’s attorney would have made little sense without knowledge that defendant had

been charged with murder. Thus, the court properly allowed the evidence.

¶ 30    OSAD finally concludes that no meritorious contention exists that the trial court erred in

sentencing defendant. The trial court must base its sentencing determination on the particular

                                                    8
circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor,

general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. People v. Fern, 189 Ill.

2d 48, 53 (1999). We presumptively defer to the trial court’s sentencing decision because the trial

judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider

these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on the “cold” record. Id. Accordingly, we

may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we might have weighed

the factors differently. Id. at 53-54. We will not disturb a sentence within the statutory range

unless it is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate

to the nature of the offense.” Id. at 54.

¶ 31   Here, solicitation was a Class X felony by virtue of the underlying crime—aggravated

kidnapping—being a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/8-1(c), 10-2(a)(1) (West 2018). Class X felonies

are ordinarily punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2018).

Defendant’s 20-year sentence—slightly above the midpoint of that range—was certainly severe.

Defendant had no prior convictions, was a doctor in the community, and was involved in his

church. However, a “defendant’s lack of a prior record is not necessarily the most persuasive

consideration at sentencing; the seriousness of the crime has been called the most important factor

to be considered in imposing sentence.” People v. Brown, 250 Ill. App. 3d 767, 774 (1993). Here,

the crime was undoubtedly serious, involving a plot to kidnap a sitting state’s attorney. Thus, the

crime threatened the integrity of the justice system itself. In light of the extraordinary seriousness

of the crime, the sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 32   In his response, defendant states his belief that numerous meritorious issues exist, but

specifically identifies only two. He first argues that the court erred by denying a motion for change

of venue. However, no such motion, either oral or written, appears in the record, and defendant

                                                  9
does not specify the basis for any such motion. He notes the obvious fact that the victim was the

Saline County State’s Attorney and was likely known to courthouse personnel, but does not

provide any specific facts to show that the case should have been moved to another county or that

any specific judge should have recused himself.

¶ 33    Whether to grant a change of venue is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be

reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Fort, 248 Ill. App. 3d 301, 309 (1993). A

trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden of overcoming this presumption rests on

the party making the charge of prejudice. People v. Faria, 402 Ill. App. 3d 475, 482 (2010).

Allegations of judicial bias or prejudice must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in

terms of the trial judge’s specific reaction to the events taking place. Id. The trial judge is in the

best position to decide whether he or she is prejudiced against the defendant. People v. Kliner,

185 Ill. 2d 81, 169 (1998). The trial judge’s decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of

discretion. Id. A judge’s possible acquaintance with a victim is not specifically listed as a basis

for disqualification in the Code of Judicial Conduct. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 2.11 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023).

And, as noted, defendant lists no specific statements or actions by the trial judge showing that a

personal relationship with the victim affected the outcome of the trial.

¶ 34    Defendant’s second issue is that defense counsel was ineffective. Defendant contends that

counsel met with him only twice and failed to call any of the witnesses defendant suggested. As

to the first point, assuming the truth of defendant’s allegations, he does not explain how he was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to meet with him more extensively. The case was not particularly

complex, turning on the testimony of two witnesses, authenticated letters defendant wrote, and

recorded conversations. The failure to allege prejudice thus defeats this claim. See Griffin, 178

Ill. 2d at 74.

                                                 10
¶ 35   As to the second point, defendant fails to name any of the proposed witnesses or to describe

what their testimony might have been. Decisions about whether to call certain witnesses are also

strategic ones left to counsel’s discretion.   People v. Watson, 2022 IL App (5th) 190427,

¶ 50; People v. Hotwagner, 2015 IL App (5th) 130525, ¶ 48. In the absence of specifics about

how the witnesses’ testimony might have affected the outcome, we cannot say that counsel was

ineffective.

¶ 36                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 37   As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 38   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

                                               11