Court Opinion

ID: 9574515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:05:39.424591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:40.059140
License: Public Domain

Bernes, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 (b) and 2 and the judgment, but I agree only with the judgment in Division 1 (a). While I also concur fully with the special concurrence of Judge Andrews as to Division 1 (a), I write separately to further highlight why I believe that the expert testimony concerning battered person syndrome was not admissible in this case.
First, appellant’s contention that introduction of the battered person syndrome evidence was sought to negate the mens rea element of her crimes is contravened by the proffered testimony of appellant’s expert, Dr. Marti Loring, who explained her proposed testimony as follows:
Some of what a woman with a Battered Person’s Syndrome and who maybe experiencing the wheel of control, the power and control, some of what a woman who’s experiencing that will do in terms of her behavior is simply not understandable to many people. That is to understand why a woman would actually participate in harming a child she loves or not leave during the time of terror to protect the child she loves is simply not understandable unless we talk about or I talk about as an expert the impact of the Battered Woman’s Syndrome of the incredible stress and panic that would make understandable her behavior that would in fact help to explain why in the context of that battering relationship her behavior may be the safest and the most protective at that time to keep her child alive.
*836Decided July 14, 2006 —
Reconsideration denied July 31, 2006
Steven H. Sadow, for appellant.
Herbert E. Franklin, Jr., District Attorney, John L. ODell, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
(Emphasis supplied.) Based on the proffer of the expert’s testimony, it is clear that the testimony would have the effect of doing exactly what appellant cannot do — in form and in substance, appellant was attempting to present evidence of battered person syndrome as part of a justification defense. Significantly, however, through the enactment of OCGA § 16-3-21 (d), the Georgia legislature has limited the use of expert testimony relating to family violence or child abuse as part of a justification defense to prosecutions for murder or manslaughter. See Graham v. State, 239 Ga. App. 429 (521 SE2d 249) (1999).
Second, the proffered testimony in this case demonstrates that Porter v. State, 243 Ga. App. 498, 503-504 (5) (532 SE2d 407) (2000) is inapposite. In Porter, the psychologist’s testimony explained that the defendant suffered from a psychological condition that prevented her from seeing and having awareness of the abuse to the child by her husband. We held that this expert testimony was admissible to support the defendant’s defense that she had no knowledge of the abuse. Id. Here, appellant does not contend that she had no knowledge of the abuse.