Court Opinion

ID: 9906140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 05:05:03.449321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:06.691112
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF PORT HURON,                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     November 30, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 363272
                                                                     St. Clair Circuit Court
PAUL HARRY CHURCHILL and ANNETTE                                     LC No. 21-001801-CE
SANDRA CHURCHILL,

               Defendants-Appellants.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendants, Paul and Annette Churchill, appeal as of right the trial court order granting
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) to plaintiff, the Charter Township of Port Huron.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

        The Churchills own property in Port Huron Township. Around 2013, they began to raise
animals on the property for their own consumption so that they could avoid antibiotics. Initially,
they only raised chickens, however, by 2018, they had chickens, ducks, turkeys, pigs, goats,
rabbits, and a llama. They also gradually added structures to their property to care for and shelter
their animals. At first, the Township of Port Huron did not object to the Churchills raising animals
on the property; however, as the number of animals increased, the number of complaints regarding
nuisances such as noxious odors and “floating feathers” also increased. According to a zoning
administrator, the Township did not immediately pursue an action against the Churchills because
the applicable zoning ordinance was “kind of vague.” The ordinance, however, was amended.
Thereafter, a code enforcement employee wrote a municipal citation alleging three violations of
the ordinance: (1) failure to obtain building permits for detached structures used in connection
with keeping animals on the property, (2) failure to maintain the property in sanitary conditions
vis-à-vis the stockpiling of manure, and (3) maintaining animals on the property in excess of the
numbers permitted under the ordinance.

                                                -1-
        The citation was issued solely to Paul, who challenged it in the district court. Relevant to
the issues raised in the current appeal, Paul argued that the local ordinance was preempted by the
Right to Farm Act (RTFA), MCL 286.471 et seq., and he presented evidence in support of that
position. “According to the plain language of the RTFA, a farm or farming operation cannot be
found to be a nuisance if it is commercial in nature and conforms to the [Generally Accepted
Agricultural Management Practices (GAAMPs)].” Charter Twp of Shelby v Papesh, 267 Mich
App 92, 101; 704 NW2d 92 (2005). “Whether a farm conforms to the GAAMPs is decided
according to policies adopted by the Michigan Commission of Agriculture.” Id. “[A] local
ordinance is preempted when it purports to extend or revise the RTFA or GAAMPs.” Id. at 106,
citing MCL 286.474(6). Thus, the Township ordinance would be preempted by the RTFA if the
Churchills’ property was a farm or farming operation that was commercial in nature and that
conformed to the GAAMPs. But if the property was not a farm or farming operation, or if it did
not conform to the GAAMPs, then the ordinance would control. In this case, following an
evidentiary hearing the district court found that the RTFA defense was not applicable because the
Churchills’ farm did not conform to the applicable GAAMP.

        Paul appealed to the circuit court, which remanded to the district court to make necessary
factual findings regarding the “time element” of the RTFA defense. The “time element” was
important because the key factual dispute was whether the property was “commercial in nature”
prior to the implementation of the 2014 GAAMPs. If the district court found that the farm was
commercial in nature before the implementation of the 2014 GAAMPs, then the ordinance would
be preempted, but if the court found that the farm did not have a commercial nature after the
implementation of the 2014 GAAMPs, then the ordinance would control. On remand, the district
court found that the commercial nature began “no earlier than 2015” and that the operation did not
comply with the 2014 site selection GAAMP.

         Paul again appealed to the circuit court, arguing that the district court clearly erred by
finding that he began selling farm products no earlier than 2015; in support, he noted that the
district court found him to be “100% credible,” and he directed the circuit court to his testimony
that he probably began selling animal products in 2013. The circuit court determined that the
district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, so it affirmed. Paul applied for leave
to appeal in this Court, but the application was denied.1 Likewise, our Supreme Court denied his
application for leave to appeal.2

        Despite the finding that the Churchills’ property was in violation of the ordinance, Paul
and Annette continued to maintain animals and structures in violation of the ordinance. Therefore,
the Township brought a claim for abatement of nuisance. In their answer, the Churchills raised
the RTFA and the doctrine of latches as defenses. The Township responded that res judicata and
collateral estoppel barred the RTFA defense and denied that latches was applicable. Subsequently,
the Township moved for summary disposition, asserting that there was no dispute that the
ordinance was being violated by the Churchills and arguing that res judicata precluded the

1
 Twp of Port Huron v Churchill, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 18,
2020 (Docket No. 354211).
2
    Twp of Port Huron v Churchill, 507 Mich 932 (2021).

                                                -2-
Churchills from raising the RTFA as an affirmative defense. The Township further argued that
latches was inapplicable because each day that the Churchills violated the ordinance was a new
violation. Moreover, the Township contended the Churchills did not change their position based
upon the Township ignoring their conduct; instead, the Township tried to work with the Churchills
before amending their ordinance and, after it was amended, they sought to encourage compliance
through code enforcement efforts. In its reply brief, the Township argued that collateral estoppel
also precluded the Churchills from raising the RTFA as an affirmative defense.

        In response, the Churchills argued that res judicata—i.e., claim preclusion—did not bar
their defense under the RTFA because affirmative defenses are not claims, because newly-located
evidence and witnesses supported Paul’s testimony that he started selling farm products in 2013,
and because they never had an opportunity to argue that the RTFA was a defense to an abatement
action, which is a claim that could not have been brought in the district court proceedings. They
also asserted that regardless of whether res judicata applied to Paul it did not preclude Annette
from raising a RTFA defense because she was not in privity with Paul during the prior action.
Finally, they argued that latches barred the Township’s abatement action because the ordinance
was passed in 2015 and, between 2015 and 2022, the Township did not take any action to enforce
the ordinance against Annette. They asserted that Annette was prejudiced because she had made
various improvements to the property without any interference by the Township.

        Following oral argument, the trial court determined that the RTFA defense was barred by
res judicata and collateral estoppel, that Annette was in privity with Paul, and that the doctrine of
latches did not bar the abatement action. This appeal follows.

                                 II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        The Churchills argue that the trial court erred by granting Port Huron summary disposition
based upon the court’s determination that res judicata barred their affirmative defense under the
RTFA. They also argue that res judicata does not apply to Annette because she was not in privity
with Paul during the prior action. We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for
summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App
362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). Likewise, we review de novo whether the doctrine of res judicata
bars a claim, Duncan v Michigan, 300 Mich App 176, 194; 832 NW2d 761 (2013), or whether the
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars litigation of an issue, Radwan v Ameriprise Ins Co, 327 Mich
App 159, 164; 933 NW2d 385 (2018).

                                          B. ANALYSIS

         Michigan generally recognizes two preclusion doctrines: res judicata and collateral
estoppel. Res judicata precludes relitigation of claims, whereas collateral estoppel prevents
relitigation of issues. Allen Park Retirees Ass’n, Inc v City of Allen Park, 329 Mich App 430, 444-

                                                -3-
445; 942 NW2d 618 (2019) (citations omitted).3 “The preclusion doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estopped serve an important function in resolving disputes by imposing a state of finality
to litigation where the same parties have previously had a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate
their claims.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the trial court determined
that the Churchills RTFA defense was barred by both doctrines.

                                           1. PRIVITY

        We first address the Churchills argument that Annette was not in privity with Paul during
the prior action. Annette was not named as a party in the earlier action. As a result, neither res
judicata nor collateral estoppel will preclude her from raising a defense under the RTFA unless
she was in privity with Paul during the prior action. See People v Zitka, 335 Mich App 324, 344;
966 NW2d 786 (2020) (“Under either doctrine, the proponent must demonstrate the existence of
privity in connection with the earlier action.”).

        On appeal, the Churchills contend that there is a lack of privity because, under the common
law, a husband and a wife are generally not in privity with each other. In support, they cite
decisions from Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Illinois, and Vermont. See Hickman v SW Dairy
Supplies, Inc, 194 Neb 17, 26; 230 NW2d 99, 105 (1975) (generally no privity between a husband
and wife “where the action concerns their separate property, rights, or interests not derived from
each other.”); Stamp v Franklin, 144 NY 607, 611; 39 NE 634, 634 (1895) (“Husband and wife
are for most purposes distinct persons at law, and an adjudication in an action to which a wife is a
party alone, without her husband, neither binds him in a subsequent action, to which he is a party,
nor can he avail himself of the benefit of the adjudication on the ground merely that he was the
husband.”); Wolff v Du Puis, 233 Or 317, 321; 378 P2d 707 (Or 1963), overruled in part by Bahler
v Fletcher, 257 Or 1; 474 P2d 329 (1970) (“[I]t appears to be well settled that the husband and
wife are not necessarily in privity”); Blair v Bartelmay, 151 Ill App 3d 17, 21; 502 NE2d 859
(1986) (stating that privity between the parties is not created solely by the parties being husband
and wife); and Gilman v Gilman, 115 Vt 49, 51; 51 A2d 46, 47 (1947) (noting that multiple cases
“show that there is no privity between a husband and a wife in” cases where they are enforcing
independent rights). Noticeably, the Churchills fail to cite to any Michigan caselaw addressing
privity between a husband and a wife. Moreover, they misapprehend the basis upon which the
trial court found them to be in privity. The trial court did not find them in privity because they
were married. Rather, the court found them in privity based upon their joint interest in the animals
and farm operations that are at issue in the current case and that were at issue in the prior action.

3
  The United States Supreme Court has formally recognized a third preclusion doctrine known as
“defense” preclusion, see Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc v Marcel Fashions Group, Inc, ___ US
___, ___; 140 S Ct 1589, 1595; 206 L Ed 2d 893 (2020), but the parties do not argue for or against
the adoption of defense preclusion. Rather, the Township contends that the RTFA defense is
barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, and the Churchills only argue that claim
preclusion does not bar their defense. We, therefore, leave for another day the matter of defense
preclusion.

                                                -4-
         Looking to Michigan caselaw, it is clear that Annette and Paul are in privity with each other
with respect to the animals and farm operations. “To be in privity is to be so identified in interest
with another party that the first litigant represents the same legal right that the later litigant is trying
to assert.” Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 122; 680 NW2d 386 (2004). “The outer limit of the
doctrine traditionally requires both a substantial identity of interests and a working functional
relationship in which the interests of the nonparty are presented and protected by the party in the
litigation.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, it is uncontroverted that both
Annette and Paul have a property interest in the animals and in the farm operation. Indeed, Annette
argues on appeal that a finding of privity would deprive her of “a cognizable property interest”
without due process of law. Because Paul and Annette have the same interest in the property and
farming operation at issue, and because Paul and Annette have a working functional relationship
that allowed Paul to present and protect Annette’s interests in the earlier litigation, the trial court
did not err by finding them to be in privity.

        Next, the Churchills contend that a finding that Annette is in privity with Paul would result
in a deprivation of her due process rights. We disagree. In Postal Telegraph Cable Co v City of
Newport, 247 US 464, 476; 38 S Ct 566; 62 L Ed 1215 (1918), the United States Supreme Court
noted that it would violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution if a state
gave “conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a party nor in privity with
a party therein.” (Emphasis added). Indeed, Michigan courts have recognized that “a litigant need
not always have been a party to a judgment in order to be bound by it.’ ” Beyer v Verizon North
Inc, 270 Mich App 424, 431; 715 NW2d 328 (2006), quoting Richards v Jefferson Co, Ala, 517
US 793, 798; 116 S Ct 1761; 135 L Ed 2d 76 (1996). “The most notable exception to the general
rule occurs when it can be said that there is ‘privity’ between a party to the second case and a party
who is bound by an earlier judgment.” Beyer, 270 Mich App at 431 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). In light of the above authority, we conclude that because Paul and Annette are in privity
with each other, there is no due-process violation.

                                    2. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

         We next address the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On appeal, the Churchills only
challenge the trial court’s determination that res judicata precluded their RTFA defense. Because
the trial court also precluded their defense based upon collateral estoppel, even if this Court were
to conclude that the trial court erred by applying res judicata, any error would be harmless. Stated
differently, because there are two independent grounds to preclude the Churchills from raising the
RTFA in the present action, and because they have only challenged one of those grounds, they
cannot prevail on appeal.

         Moreover, even if the Churchills had challenged the trial court’s determination that their
RTFA defense was barred by collateral estoppel, reversal is not warranted. “Collateral estoppel
bars relitigation of an issue in a new action arising between the same parties or their privies when
the earlier proceedings resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue in question was actually
and necessarily determined in that prior proceedings.” Bryan v JP Morgan Chase Bank, 304 Mich
App 708, 715; 848 NW2d 482 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The doctrine bars
relitigation of issues when the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues in an
earlier action.” Id. at 716 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A decision is final when all
appeals have been exhausted or when the time available for an appeal has passed.” Id. at 715-716

                                                    -5-
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In general, for collateral estoppel to apply, three elements
must be satisfied: “(1) a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the same parties must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there must be mutuality of estoppel.” Monat v State Farm
Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 683-684; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (quotation marks, citation, alteration, and
footnote omitted). Mutuality of estopped exists “if the one taking advantage of the earlier
adjudication would have been bound by it, had it gone against him.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

         In the prior action, the district court found that the Churchills’ farming operation began no
earlier than 2015. As a result, the 2014 GAAMPs applied. The property did not conform to the
2014 GAAMP on site selection, so the ordinance was not preempted by the RTFA. The issue of
whether the RTFA defense applied and so preempted the local ordinance was, therefore, actually
litigated in the prior action. Moreover, it resulted in a valid and final judgment given that the
matter was fully litigated in the district court, was appealed to the circuit court, was remanded to
the district court for additional findings, was again appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed
the district court. Thereafter, both this Court and our Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Next,
the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the RTFA defense during the prior action.
In the prior action, the parties were the Township and Paul Churchill. Annette and Paul, both of
whom jointly own and operate their farming operation, are privies, as is explained above. Finally,
there is mutuality of estoppel because, had the Township lost in the prior action, they would not
be free to bring a second lawsuit again asserting that the Churchills were operating their farming
operation in violation of the ordinance. In sum, on this record, the trial court did not err by
determining the Churchills were precluded from relitigating the issue of whether the RTFA
preempted the local ordinance.

      Because the RTFA defense is precluded by collateral estoppel, there is no need to consider
whether it is also precluded by res judicata.

                                          III. LATCHES

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        The Churchills contend that the trial court erred by determining that their doctrine of
latches defense was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Twp of Fraser v Haney, 509
Mich 18; 983 NW2d 309 (2022). A trial court’s decision regarding the application of the doctrine
of latches is reviewed de novo, but any factual findings supporting the court’s decision are
reviewed for clear error. Papesh, 267 Mich App at 108.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

     As explained by this Court in Yankee Springs Twp v Fox, 264 Mich App 604, 611-612; 692
NW2d 728 (2004),

       The doctrine of laches is concerned with unreasonable delay that results in
       circumstances that would render inequitable any grant of relief to the dilatory
       plaintiff. The application of the doctrine of laches requires the passage of time

                                                 -6-
       combined with a change in condition that would make it inequitable to enforce the
       claim against the defendant. Laches does not apply unless the delay of one party
       has resulted in prejudice to the other party. It is the effect, rather than the fact, of
       the passage of time that may trigger the defense of laches. The defendant has the
       burden of proving that the plaintiff's lack of due diligence resulted in some
       prejudice to the defendant. [Quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis
       added).]

        In this case, the Churchills cannot establish that the Township’s delay in bringing the
abatement action is unreasonable. In the proceedings below, the Churchills suggested that the
delay as to Annette was unreasonable because the ordinance was amended in 2015 and the
abatement action was not brought until September 2021. They complain that as a result, for half
a decade, Annette was prejudiced by the delay because she made improvements to the property
and increased the number of animals. However, the Township sought enforcement of the
ordinance prior to September 2021. Specifically, in 2018, the Township sought compliance with
the ordinance by bringing a code enforcement action in the district court. Although that action
was brought solely against Paul, as explained above, Annette is in privity with him based upon
their shared interest in the animals and farming operation. Litigation in the 2018 action was
resolved in 2021. Thereafter, based upon the Churchills’ continued failure to comply with the
ordinance, the abatement action was initiated in September 2021. On these facts, there is no
unreasonable delay in bringing the abatement action. Both Annette and Paul were aware that the
ordinance precluded them from operating their farming operation in the manner that they desired.
Their decision to continue to do so notwithstanding the ordinance’s existence was not due to any
delay by the Township, but rather upon their belief that the ordinance was preempted by the RTFA.

        Although the Churchills were unable to establish their latches defense, the trial court’s
decision to foreclose it based upon Haney was misplaced. In Haney, the Supreme Court
specifically addressed the statute of limitations defense, not a latches defense. Haney, 509 Mich
at 20. The Court concluded that the statute of limitations did not bar the Township of Fraser’s
action because the harm at issue was one that “occurred every day on which defendants maintain
hogs on their property.” Id. at 21. In this case, there is a new harm each day that the Churchills
maintain animals on their property in violation of the ordinance. However, because latches turns
on whether there was prejudice caused by delay, the analysis in Haney is inapposite. Nevertheless,
because the undisputed facts do not support a latches defense in this case, reversal and remand for
further proceedings is not necessary. See Gleason v Mich Dep’t of Transp, 256 Mich App 1, 3;
662 NW2d 822 (2003) (“A trial court’s ruling may be upheld on appeal where the right result
issued, albeit for the wrong reason.”).

       Affirmed. The Township may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                               /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly

                                                 -7-