Court Opinion

ID: 9846907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:50:17.753255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:57.004973
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(dissenting) :
It is my conclusion that appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus alleges more than that “he plead guilty because of his appointed counsel’s advice that were he so to plead, he would receive a sentence of not to exceed three years,” as is stated in the majority opinion. His petition states:
“I did receive, as my couníí’Z, a Mr. Thomas Church, who did advise me to plead guilty to the charge of forgery. I did plead guilty to this charge on my counoiler’s word of honor that I would receive a sentaitccd term not to exceed 3 (three) years * * * I was sentenced to a term not to exceed 14 (fourteen) years.”
It is to be kept in mind in evaluating the sufficiency of this petition that the appellant prepared it himself, and further that at the time of the consideration of his petition by the lower court, appellant was unrepresented by counsel. See Austin v. State, 91 Idaho 404, 422 P.2d 71 (1966). In Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127, 376 P.2d 704, 706, this court stated:
“Even though the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is generally considered discretionary with the court, it should be liberally granted. The following statement from 24 Cal.Jur.2d, p. 543, Habeas Corpus § 77, is explanatory of the test to be applied:
“ ‘As an extraordinary remedy, the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to the rules of technical pleading nor its swift relief hindered by captious objections or fine spun theories of procedure, and a petition therefore will not be scrutinized with technical nicety. And with respect to the numerous applications made in propria persona, a court cannot impose on prisoners unlearned in the law the same high standards of the legal art that might be imposed on members of the legal profession.’ ”
Had the instant petition contained an allegation that appellant’s appointed counsel told him that an arrangement had been worked out with the prosecution or the court that a lesser sentence was to be imposed, which arrangement was not fulfilled, under the following cases an evidentiary hearing would have been required to determine whether the plea of guilty had been voluntarily entered. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 486, 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962); McDonald v. Kropp, 373 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1967); Trotter v. United States, 359 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1966); Scott v. United States, 349 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1965); Ward v. Page, 238 F.Supp. 431 (Okl.1965); Thompson v. State, 412 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1966) and 426 P.2d 995 (1967) (this latter opinion discussing appeal following evidentiary hearing); People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal.2d 422, 154 P.2d 657 (Cal.1944); People v. Sharp, 157 Cal.App.2d 205, 320 P.2d 589 (1958); Roberts v. People, 158 Colo. 76, 404 P.2d 848 (Colo.1965); In re Ellis, 383 P.2d 706 (Okl.Crim.App.1963).
It is recognized that the petition in the instant cause does not set forth any direct allegation of an agreement or arrangement being worked out between appellant’s counsel and the prosecuting authorities or the court, but when it is alleged that the appellant’s counsel gave his “word of honor that I would receive a sent anead term not to exceed 3 (three) years,” sufficient doubt is raised as to voluntariness of this plea that *108it is incumbent the cause be remanded for proceedings under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. 19-4901 et seq. See Higheagle v. State, 91 Idaho 921, 435 P.2d 261 (1967).
Recent opinions recognizing increased liberality of construction of petitions similar to the one before the court are: Anders v. Turner, 379 F.2d 46 (4th Cir.1967); Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1967); and Commonwealth v. Stokes, 426 Pa. 265, 232 A.2d 193 (1967).
The case of Burge v. State, 90 Idaho 473, 413 P.2d 451, was decided in 1966, prior to enactment of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. In that case it is to be noted also that the alleged statements asserted to affect the voluntariness of the plea of guilty admittedly were made by persons without official status or connection with court or with law enforcement agencies.
It is my conclusion that the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded to proceed in conformity with the provisions of I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., including appointment of counsel to assist petitioner in preparation of an amended petition and further proceedings in conformity with that statute.