Court Opinion

ID: 9391013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 21:03:50.097643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.796344
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/3/23; certified for publication 4/28/23 (order attached)

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                               FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION TWO

 WEST PUEBLO PARTNERS, LLC,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.                                                        A164022
 STONE BREWING CO., LLC,
                                                           (Napa County Super. Ct.
         Defendant and Appellant.                           No. 21CV000498)

        After a commercial tenant did not pay rent for several months during
the pandemic, its landlord sued for unlawful detainer. The tenant argued it
was excused from paying rent because COVID-19 regulations and business
interruptions triggered a force majeure provision found in its lease. The trial
court disagreed and granted the landlord’s motion for summary judgment.
The trial court found that the force majeure provision only excused
performance if the claiming party was unable to meet its obligations due to
factors outside its control; but, because the tenant admitted during discovery
it had the financial resources to pay rent during the period of the COVID-19
regulations but simply refused to do so, it could not invoke the force majeure
provision.

                                                    1
      We affirm the judgment. The trial court correctly interpreted the force
majeure provision here not to apply where the tenant had the ability to meet
its contractual obligations but chose not to perform due to financial
constraints. The tenant’s remaining arguments on appeal are unpersuasive.
                               BACKGROUND
                                        I.
                                     Facts
      The landlord, West Pueblo Partners, LLC (West Pueblo), is a four-
member limited liability company that holds a single asset: the Borreo
building (the building), located in downtown Napa. The tenant, Stone
Brewing Co., LLC (Stone), is a large beer brewing and retail corporation that,
among other things, operates restaurants known as “brewpubs.”
      Beginning in 2015, Stone began negotiating a lease (the lease) with
West Pueblo to use the building for one of its new brewpubs. The lease was
executed in May 2016, and provided that West Pueblo would deliver the
building with certain improvements and that Stone would pay a base rent of
$38,000 that would increase over the lease’s 20-year term. The lease further
provided that, absent special permission, “the Premises shall be used for a
full service restaurant and brewery to include the sale of malt beverages for
both on and off premise consumption events as well as the sale of [Stone’s]
merchandise . . . .”
      Among the provisions the parties negotiated in the lease was a force
majeure provision. That provision states as follows: “FORCE MAJEURE.
If either Party is delayed, interrupted or prevented from performing any of its
obligations under this Lease, and such delay, interruption or prevention is
due to fire, act of God, governmental act or failure to act, labor dispute,
unavailability of materials or any cause outside the reasonable control of that

                                        2
Party, then the time for performance of the affected obligations of the Party
shall be extended for a period equivalent to the period of such delay,
interruption or prevention.”
      Stone took possession of the building in January 2018. 1 When COVID-
19 emerged in early 2020, California and local governments imposed severe
restrictions on Napa restaurants and businesses. From March 20, 2020, to
May 18, 2020, Stone could not offer any on-premises dining. From July 8,
2020, to September 2, 2020, it could not offer indoor dining. From September
3, 2020, to October 19, 2020, it was required to limit indoor dining to 25
percent capacity. That limitation was loosened to 50 percent from October
20, 2020, to November 15, 2020, but regulations were again tightened to
prohibit indoor dining from November 17, 2020, to December 15, 2020. From
December 16, 2020, to January 24, 2021, Stone was banned from offering on-
premises dining yet again. Those restrictions were then loosened to prohibit
only indoor dining from January 25, 2021, to March 2, 2021.
      According to Stone, these restrictions were “devastat[ing]” to its
operating profits. As Stone explained in a letter that requested a rent
reduction from West Pueblo: “As a result of the forced closure, we were faced
with the business decision to lay off vast majority of our team members in
order to minimize the financial losses we started to experience on day 1 of the
imposed closure. With no known endpoint, we made the decision to continue
to operate the business with a skeleton crew, not only as a service to the
Napa community by offering donations to first responders and hospitals, but

      1 Stone’s possession of the building was delayed in part because of
delays in renovation occasioned by the 2018 Camp Fire affecting Northern
California; Stone contends that these events are relevant to interpreting the
force majeure provision and we discuss them in further detail below.

                                       3
also with the hope that we could retain a certain number of the management
team through these uncertain times.”
      During the first year of the pandemic in 2020, Stone argues that its
monthly rent payments became unsustainable based on the negative impact
COVID-19 regulations had upon its business generally. Stone initially asked
West Pueblo for rent relief, and later withheld rent for June and July 2020,
contending it was entitled to do so under the lease’s force majeure provision.
Stone paid full rent through November 2020, but again withheld rent for the
months of December 2020, January 2021, February 2021, and March 2021
based on the force majeure provision. Stone’s failure to pay rent for these
four months—December 2020 through March 2021—gave rise to this
litigation. West Pueblo ultimately issued a “Five-Day Notice to Pay Rent or
Surrender Possession” on March 23, 2021. Stone did not pay, and West
Pueblo filed an unlawful detainer action against Stone on April 6, 2021.
                                       II.
                      Motion for Summary Judgment
      The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. West
Pueblo’s motion argued that Stone’s force majeure defense fails as a matter of
law because the undisputed facts showed that the COVID-19 government
restrictions did not delay, interrupt, or prevent Stone from paying its rent.
To the contrary, Stone conceded during litigation that it had the ability to
pay rent for the building, and West Pueblo argued that a mere increase in
expense or difficulty does not excuse a party’s obligation to perform under the
force majeure provision.
      On October 20, 2021, the trial court granted West Pueblo’s motion for
summary judgment, denied Stone’s motion for summary judgment, and

                                       4
denied various motions filed by Stone concerning allegedly improper
discovery conduct by West Pueblo.
      In granting West Pueblo’s motion, the trial court held that the force
majeure provision was unambiguous: “In line with [West Pueblo’s] position
in the case, the court finds this plain language unambiguously means exactly
what it says—that . . . the [force majeure] provision would apply to excuse
Stone’s obligation only if the pandemic delayed, interrupted or prevented
Stone’s payment of rent.” Applying that interpretation of the lease, the court
held that the force majeure provision “did not apply because Stone always
maintained the ready ability to make the rental payments and simply made a
financial decision not to” pay rent. (Italics added.)
      The trial court concluded that there was no triable issue of material
fact as to Stone’s ability to pay rent based on certain admissions Stone made
during discovery: “Stone[] repeated[ly] admi[tted] that it nevertheless had
the financial resources to pay rent to [West Pueblo] from December 2020 to
March 2021.” In ruling against Stone, the trial court explained: “Stone’s
presentation of evidence reflecting that the [force majeure] events had a
degree of negative financial impact on its business, where it admits it never
lost the ability to pay rent, is simply insufficient to show a triable issue of fact
as to delay, interruption or prevention of rent payments.”
      Stone timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                          I.
                               Legal Standards
      Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,

                                         5
subd. (c).) A defendant seeking summary judgment “bears the burden of
persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant meets this burden by showing that
plaintiff “has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish” an
essential element of his claim. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25
Cal.4th 763, 768.)
      We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, which means we
“decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute
warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” (Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.) In deciding whether a material issue
of fact exists for trial, we “consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers,
except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by
the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence[.]”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
      When interpreting a contract, a court seeks to ascertain the mutual
intent of the parties solely from the written contract so long as possible. (Civ.
Code, § 1638.) The court considers the contract as a whole and interprets the
language in context, rather than in isolation. (Civ. Code, § 1641.) And where
the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity, the
plain meaning governs. (Civ. Code, § 1638.) In this same vein, the court
“should avoid an interpretation which will make the contract unusual,
extraordinary, harsh, unjust or inequitable [citations], or which would result
in an absurdity . . . .” (Harris v. Klure (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 574, 578.)
      But, “ ‘Where the meaning of the words used in a contract is disputed,
the trial court must provisionally receive any proffered extrinsic evidence
which is relevant to show whether the contract is reasonably susceptible of a

                                        6
particular meaning. [Citations.] Indeed, it is reversible error for a trial court
to refuse to consider such extrinsic evidence on the basis of the trial court’s
own conclusion that the language of the contract appears to be clear and
unambiguous on its face. Even if a contract appears unambiguous on its face,
a latent ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence which reveals more
than one possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet
reasonably susceptible. [Citations.]’ ” (Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114
Cal.App.4th 1343, 1351 (Wolf), as modified on denial of rehg. Feb. 19, 2004.)
      “The interpretation of a contract involves ‘a two-step process: “First the
court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence
concerning the parties’ intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the
language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged by a party. If
in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is ‘reasonably
susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then
admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the contract. [Citation.]”
[Citation.] The trial court’s determination of whether an ambiguity exists is
a question of law, subject to independent review on appeal. [Citation.]’ ”
(Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
                                     II.
  There is No Triable Issue of Fact as to Whether the Force Majeure
              Provision Excused Stone’s Rent Payments.
      Stone argues the trial court erred in concluding it did not create a
triable issue of material fact as to whether it was excused from performing its
obligation to pay rent for the December 2020 through March 2021 period at
issue due an erroneous interpretation of the force majeure provision. In
Stone’s view, the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated government closures
were force majeure events that excused or deferred its obligation to pay rent.

                                        7
      Stone offers three arguments in support of its position. First, Stone
argues the ordinary definitions of “delayed,” “interrupted,” or “prevented” are
not synonymous with “unable to pay,” and that under its interpretation of
these words, it was excused from performing under the lease because of the
pandemic’s impact on its business. Second, Stone argues that cases which
have interpreted similar force majeure provisions have not imposed an
“inability to pay” standard, but have found that a force majeure provision
applied to delay the payment of rent where a force majeure event interfered
with a party’s operations or revenue. Third, Stone contends that extrinsic
evidence demonstrates the parties understood the force majeure provision to
encompass unforeseen events that make “performance [more] difficult and
expensive than the parties originally contemplated.” Stone points to the
parties’ course of dealing involving construction delays occasioned by the
Camp Fire and to the negotiation history of the force majeure opinion. We
are unpersuaded by these arguments.
      A. Plain Meaning of the Force Majeure Provision
      We begin our analysis with the language of the force majeure provision
itself. This provision states in pertinent part: “If either Party is delayed,
interrupted or prevented from performing any of its obligations under this
lease, and such delay, interruption or prevention is due to [a force majeure
event], then the time for performance of the affected obligations of the Party
shall be extended for a period equivalent to the period of such delay,
interruption or prevention.”
      As the trial court noted, “There is no dispute that the COVID-19
pandemic qualified as a [force majeure] event potentially implicating the
[force majeure] provision of the lease.” The only question then, is whether
Stone’s performance of its obligation to pay rent was “delayed, interrupted, or

                                        8
prevented” by the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure orders.
During discovery, Stone admitted in responses to requests for admission that
even though the brewpub operated at a loss, it was able to “and had the
financial resources to pay rent to [West Pueblo]” for the months it withheld
rent under the force majeure provision. Further, although the brewpub
operated at a loss, Stone’s requests for admission responses admitted that it
generated an overall profit in January and February 2021. 2
      Stone argues however, that the terms “delayed, interrupted, or
prevented” under the force majeure provision each have a distinct and
ordinary meaning and cannot simply all mean “unable to pay” in a literal
sense as the trial court held. For example, Stone points to the Oxford
English Dictionary’s definition of “delay” as “to hold back or slow down (a
person or thing)” and “interrupt” as “to break the continuity of (something) in
time.” At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court agreed with Stone
that “[d]elayed and interrupted don’t mean unable, inability” and that “[t]hey
have their own unique meaning that is not ambiguous.” However, even
applying that definition, the trial court determined that Stone was not
delayed or interrupted in its ability to pay rent by its COVID-related
financial difficulties. The trial court contrasted Stone’s financial hardship
with an interruption in the ability to make timely payment, such as a delay

      2 Stone’s opening brief made no mention of these admissions. Its reply
brief argued in a footnote that, prior to the subject motion, it amended its
responses to deny that it made an overall profit in January or February 2021.
Any argument that we cannot rely on Stone’s prior admissions is waived as
Stone failed to raise it in its opening brief. Even assuming it was not waived,
Stone failed to seek leave to withdraw or amend its prior admissions
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300. These matters are
thus deemed “conclusively established” against Stone. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2033.410, subd. (a).)

                                       9
in receiving a line of credit or the post office’s failure to deliver a mailed check
on time. We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. The plain meaning of the
force majeure provision does not support an interpretation that ties a party’s
obligation to pay rent to its profitability or revenue stream instead of a delay
or interruption caused by the force majeure event itself.
      As our high court has held, where a contract contains a force majeure
provision, the “mere increase in expense does not excuse the performance
unless there exists ‘extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or
loss involved.’ ” (Butler v. Nepple (1960) 54 Cal.2d 589, 599.) This standard
derives from the doctrines of impossibility and impracticability, which are
common law defenses to contract performance. (See Oosten v. Hay Haulers
Dairy Employee & Helpers Union (1955) 45 Cal.2d 784, 788.) Although a
force majeure provision is often included in a contract to specify which
qualifying events will trigger its application, the qualifying event must have
still caused a party’s timely performance under the contract to “become
impossible or unreasonably expensive.” (Watson Laboratories, Inc. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2001) 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1110, quoting
Oosten, at p. 789.)
      As applied here, Stone’s ability to pay rent must have been “delayed,
interrupted, or prevented” by COVID-19 because timely performance would
have either been impossible or was made impracticable due to extreme and
unreasonable difficulty. There is no triable issue of fact as to this issue
because Stone admitted that it had the financial resources to pay rent to
West Pueblo for the subject months, even though the brewpub (a small
component of Stone’s overall business) was operating at a loss. The mere fact
that Stone was generating less revenue during this time period did not
render its performance impossible or impracticable, and the force majeure

                                        10
event therefore did not impair Stone’s ability to pay its rent. Stone merely
argues that the force majeure event made it more costly to do so.
      Based on the plain meaning of the force majeure provision and the
undisputed material facts in this case, the COVID-19 and the related closure
orders did not delay, interrupt, or prevent Stone’s timely performance under
the lease.
      B. Case Authorities Do Not Favor Stone’s Interpretation of the Force
         Majeure Provision.
      We now turn to Stone’s next argument, that caselaw favors its
interpretation of the force majeure provision. We preliminarily observe that
these cases are out-of-state decisions and supply persuasive authority only to
the extent we find their reasoning convincing. (See LG Chem, Ltd. v.
Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348, 371.)
      Stone primarily relies upon In re Hitz Restaurant Group (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2020) 616 B.R. 374 (Hitz), which it characterizes as the “most analogous
case” with the facts there “[being] nearly identical.” In that case, as a result
of COVID-19 business closure orders made in Illinois, the tenant, Hitz,
argued that “rent is excused by the lease’s force majeure clause,” which
provided relief if a triggering event “prevented or delayed, retarded or
hindered” Hitz from performing an obligation. (Id. at pp. 376–377.) The
court concluded that the pandemic could be said to have caused the post-
bankruptcy petition (ongoing) failure to pay—at least in part—because, even
had the restaurant re-opened, government restrictions would have prevented
it from generating sufficient business to cover its rent obligation. (Id. at
pp. 377–378 [“the [government] order was unquestionably the proximate
cause of Debtor’s inability to pay rent, at least in part, because it prevented
Debtor from operating normally and restricted its business to take-out,
curbside pick-up, and delivery”].)

                                       11
      We find Hitz distinguishable on its facts. Hitz involved a special
purpose entity that ran a single restaurant that had already been placed into
bankruptcy at the time of the litigation. (Hitz, supra, 616 B.R. at p. 376.)
There was thus no dispute as to the “Debtor’s inability to pay rent,” which
the court acknowledged. (Id. at p. 377, italics added.) Because the ability to
pay rent was not disputed, the decision itself includes few facts, but a review
of the docket 3 illustrates the circumstances of the debtor precluded it from
paying rent altogether: the entirety of the debtor’s assets consisted of $6,000
in inventory at the restaurant, and $100 in cash; the debtor could not operate
the restaurant and already owed over $60,000 in rent. Here, Stone is a large
beer brewing and retail corporation with multiple operations, and more
importantly, admitted that it maintained the ability to pay rent during the
disputed months. 4
      The other cases Stone relies on are similar; each involves a trial court’s
factual finding that a tenant was rendered unable to pay rent by the COVID-
19 pandemic and thus was excused from timely payment by a lease’s force
majeure clause. (Morgan Street Partners, LLC v. Chicago Climbing Gym Co.
LLC, (N.D.Ill. Mar. 1, 2022) No. 20-CV-4468, 2022 WL 602893; 1600 Walnut
Corp. v. Cole Haan Co. Store (E.D.Pa. 2021) 530 F.Supp.3d 555.) These cases
turn not on the contested interpretation of a force majeure clause but rather
on the particular facts presented by each case. In Morgan Street Partners,
the court found that the tenants had “offered uncontroverted evidence that

      3We grant West Pueblo’s unopposed request to judicially notice the
docket of Hitz pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d)(2).
      4We also observe but do not rely upon the fact that the holding of Hitz
has also been questioned as an “outlier” decision. (See 55 Oak Street LLC v.
RDR Enterprises, Inc. (Me. 2022) 275 A.3d 316, 324, fn. 9 [“The approach
taken in Hitz is an outlier and has not been followed elsewhere”].)

                                       12
the pandemic—and the government orders—[were] the sole reason they could
not pay rent to Plaintiff.” (Morgan Street Partners, at p. *5, italics added.)
And in 1600 Walnut Corp., the court found that the government’s “COVID-19
orders closing and restricting retail businesses are the most obvious
proximate cause of [the tenant’s] non-performance.” (Id. at pp. 558–559.)
Here, by contrast, Stone made binding admissions that despite pandemic
orders it had the ability to pay rent during the subject period. Thus, the
“cause” of its nonpayment was not its inability to pay rent timely but its
decision not to make payment.
      A recent California case is more persuasive. In SVAP III Poway
Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882, a
fitness center was unable to operate intermittently due to COVID-19 closure
orders. (Id. at p. 886.) In opposition to summary judgment in the landlord’s
breach of contract action, the fitness center argued that the force majeure
provision in the lease temporarily excused its obligation to pay rent. (Id. at
p. 888.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment to the landlord. (Ibid.) Although the force majeure
provision in that case included an exclusion for any “failures to perform . . .
which can be cured by the payment of money,” the Fourth District
independently held that there was also no evidence “that the pandemic and
resulting government orders hindered Fitness’s ability to pay rent.” (Id. at
pp. 892–893.) With respect to impossibility and impracticability, the court
similarly held that, “Nothing about the pandemic or resulting closure orders
has made Fitness’s performance of its obligations to SVAP—paying rent—
impossible.” (Id. at p. 893.) Indeed, “Governmental acts that merely make
performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive do not suffice to
excuse a contractual obligation.” (Id. at p. 895.) We agree.

                                       13
      C. Since the Force Majeure Provision is Unambiguous, We Need Not
         Consider Extrinsic Evidence to Aid Interpretation.
      As Wolf sets out, a court in interpreting a contract provisionally
receives credible extrinsic evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to
determine whether the contract language is reasonably susceptible to a
party’s interpretation. (Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) Stone
proffers extrinsic evidence in support of its interpretation of the lease’s force
majeure provision. This evidence does not alter our conclusion that the
provision is unambiguous and is not reasonably susceptible to Stone’s
interpretation.
      For instance, with respect to Stone’s evidence about the parties’ course
of dealing surrounding the Camp Fire, we conclude that this extrinsic
evidence sheds little light on the application of the force majeure clause to the
parties’ rent dispute. 5 To elaborate, West Pueblo was obliged by the lease to
complete certain renovations and deliver the building to Stone by a specified
date; if delivery was delayed; Stone’s rent would be abated two days for each
day of delay. At the time of the Camp Fire, Stone summarizes, West Pueblo’s
“construction team was preparing [the building] for Stone’s approaching
tenancy. But the Camp Fire had created smoky air . . . while [West Pueblo]
and its workers were free to continue working—the government had not
prohibited outdoor work—the air quality made that work more difficult.”
Stone states that it did not hold West Pueblo accountable for delays in
construction during this time because it recognized the Camp Fire as a force
majeure event that “delayed, interrupted, or prevented” construction work.

      5 Various portions of the parties’ briefs, including their discussion of
how the force majeure provision applied to the Camp Fire, are sealed. As a
result, although we have considered the specific facts detailed in the briefs,
we discuss them only generally in this opinion.

                                        14
Stone argues that the parties agreed to postpone West Pueblo’s obligations
there “even though there was no evidence that [West Pueblo] was, in fact,
unable to perform.”
      First, we note that although Stone argues that the parties had agreed
to apply the force majeure provision to the delay in construction caused by the
Camp Fire, West Pueblo disputes that it in fact discussed the applicability of
the force majeure provision to the Camp Fire with Stone in any detail at that
time. To what extent the parties agreed to apply the force majeure provision
to that event remains questionable.
      In any event, as the trial court stated, it is undisputed that the words
“delayed” and “interrupted” do not mean “unable to,” and so the issue is not
whether West Pueblo would have been able to continue construction if it was
determined to do so. Along these lines, Stone argues that “[h]ad it offered its
construction workers $1,000 per hour, there is little doubt [West Pueblo]
could have enticed them to complete the job on time.” This reasoning would
obviate the doctrine of impracticality, as any performance obligation short of
an impossible one could be satisfied at sufficient expense. This is not the
standard; rather, the Camp Fire created impracticable construction
conditions because it made the continuation of such work unreasonably
difficult and hazardous for the workers. By contrast, as discussed above, the
COVID-19 closure orders did not directly cause a delay or interruption in
Stone’s ability to pay rent; rather, Stone admitted it had the ability to pay
rent at all relevant times, and indeed its business made a profit during two of
the disputed months. Stone’s ability to pay rent was therefore not made
impracticable and is not comparable to the impracticability of continuing
construction work during the hazardous Camp Fire.

                                       15
      In sum, Stone has failed to raise a triable issue of fact that it was
delayed, interrupted, or prevented from paying rent due to COVID-19 and
the related closure orders.

                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. West Pueblo shall recover its costs on
appeal.

                                       16
                                          _________________________
                                          Van Aken, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Miller, J.

West Pueblo Partners, LLC v. Stone Brewing Co., LLC (A164022)

      * Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                     17
Filed 4/28/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION TWO

 WEST PUEBLO PARTNERS, LLC,
                                             A164022
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.                                          (Napa County Super. Ct.
                                              No. 21CV000498)
 STONE BREWING CO., LLC,
         Defendant and Appellant.          ORDER CERTIFYING
                                           OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

       The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on April 3, 2023, was
not certified for publication. For good cause, request for publication is
granted.
       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1120 and 8.1105, the
opinion in the above-entitled matter is ordered certified for publication in
the Official Reports.

Dated: __________________                  ____________________________
                                           Stewart, P.J.

                                       1
Trial Court:                              Napa County Superior Court

Trial Judge:                              Hon. Victoria D. Wood

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant:    BraunHagey & Borden
Stone Brewing Co., LLC                    Matthew Borden
                                          Kory J. DeClark

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent:   Munger, Tolles & Olson
West Pueblo Partners, LLC                 Jacob M. Rosen
                                          Ted G. Dane
                                          Garth T. Vincent
                                          Stephen A. Hylas

                                     2