Court Opinion

ID: 9960130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:00:47.619884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:12.756324
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                            FILED
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
                                                                            APR 15 2024
NANNETTE G. HUMMEL,                              No.   21-16548          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

              Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 2:16-cv-04381-JJT

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MARICOPA COUNTY ADULT
PROBATION DEPARTMENT;
MICHAEL CIMINO, Chief Probation
Officer, Adult Probation Department,
Superior Court of Arizona in and for
Maricopa County, in his official capacity,

              Defendants-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Arizona
                    John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 15, 2024**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, AND N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

      Nannette Hummel appeals from the district court’s judgment following a

bench trial addressing her Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) reasonable

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
accommodation claim alleged against her former employer. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s findings of fact for

clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302

F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hummel’s

untimely requests for leave to amend to add damages claims and a new defendant.

Hummel did not establish good cause, in particular diligence, in seeking

amendment. See Johnson v Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th

Cir. 1992) (setting forth the clear abuse of discretion standard of review and the

standard for amending after the scheduling order deadline).

      Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing defense counsel to

impeach Hummel with undisclosed documents. Consistent with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), the district court limited the use of the documents

to impeachment. See Gribben v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 1166, 1171-72

(9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining that

“impeachment evidence does not have to be revealed in pretrial disclosures”).

      Contrary to Hummel’s argument, the lower summary judgment standards for

reasonable accommodation did not apply during the bench trial. Snapp v. United

Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 2018). The district court was not

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required to accept the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cause

determination as proof of reasonable accommodation at trial. Rather, Hummel had

to establish “the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled

[her] to perform the essential functions of an available job.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

      The district court did not clearly err by finding that Hummel’s request for

extended or additional leave with an uncertain return date after she had been absent

for seven months was unreasonable. Her employer had reason to believe that she

would not have been physically capable of working as a probation officer by her

requested return date and that the absence would last indefinitely. See Dark v.

Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “recovery time of

unspecified duration may not be reasonable accommodation”). The ADA did not

require that Hummel’s employer “exempt [her] from performing essential

functions” or “reallocate essential functions to other employees.” Id. at 1089.1

      In any event, reinstatement was not an available remedy in light of the

district court’s well-supported finding that Hummel’s former employer would fire

her for a lawful reason after her reinstatement. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner

      1
      We do not consider the undue hardship defense, which was waived by
Appellee on appeal.
                                           3
Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1995) (holding that “after-acquired evidence of

the employee’s wrongdoing” generally precludes the remedy of reinstatement if the

employer “would have terminated, and will terminate” the plaintiff for a lawful

reason).

      Hummel’s pending motion for a copy of a deposition (Dkt. Entry No. 28) is

DENIED as moot.

      AFFIRMED.

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