Court Opinion

ID: 9476432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:56:06.665591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:19.267851
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The admissibility of Griffin’s confession turns on the interpretation of what the officers said to him and what he said to them: did he effectively invoke his right to counsel? Because I think he did and because I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of what was said or with its construction of Edwards v. Arizona,1 or Connecticut v. Barrett,21 respectfully dissent.
After the police began their interrogation of Griffin but before he confessed, Griffin asked to speak to a lawyer. Some of the officers testified that he requested “a” lawyer; others testified that he requested “his” lawyer. Griffin then telephoned Tom Jennings, whom he thought to be “his” lawyer, and they talked for 5-10 minutes. Jennings telephoned back shortly thereafter, and talked with Griffin for a couple of minutes. After the second call, the officers asked Griffin what had happened, and he responded that Jennings would not represent him. The officers then asked him if he wanted another attorney, and Griffin replied that he did not want one at that time.
Griffin was then advised of his right to appointed counsel. At that point, Detective Kent, who apparently had reason to believe that Griffin might be less reluctant to speak with him than to talk with the other officers, began a conversation with Griffin. He testified:
The only thing I told him, sir, was when I first got into the room, I said: Jeffery, I said, you know what you have done, and I know what you have done. I said, we need to sit down and talk about it, get it out in the open. He said at that time he liked the way I talked to him and started going into it.
Kent also testified that he explained to Griffin all of his rights under Miranda, including the right to court-appointed counsel, and that Griffin understood and waived his rights. Kent then elicited a confession.
The district court found that Griffin had “invoked his right to counsel and his request for a specific attorney was honored. When this attorney declined to represent Griffin, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to have further representation at that time.” Presumably because the waiver theory is an inadequate basis for affirmance, my brothers find instead that Griffin’s request was an “unambiguous limited request and cannot be interpreted as an invocation of his general right to counsel (emphasis added).”
Under Edwards, as construed by the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Bradshaw,3 if *866the right to counsel is invoked, the court first looks to see who initiated a subsequent conversation. If the police initiated the conversation, the analysis is over; the prophylactic Edwards rule has been violated. Only if the suspect initiated the conversation can the waiver issue arise.4 While the concurring opinion in Edwards rejected the two-step analysis, calling for a single assessment of the totality of the circumstances on the question of waiver, with the issue of who initiated the conversation being only an important consideration,5 the dissent also accepted the two-step analysis, so a majority of the Court took that view of Edwards.6 Moreover, as the plurality opinion in Bradshaw noted, the Edwards court stated that a “necessary” fact in finding waiver is that the accused reopened the dialogue with the police.7 Later, in Solem v. Stumes,8 the Court expressly stated that, under Edwards, a waiver of the previously invoked right to counsel is acceptable only if the suspect initiates the subsequent conversation. The Solem Court also described the Edwards doctrine as a per se rule.9 In United States v. Webb,10 this circuit followed the Court in stating that waiver of the right to counsel after it has been invoked does not satisfy Edwards if the police initiated the subsequent discussion.
It is thus apparent why my brothers do not review the finding on which the district court opinion was based and instead make a new fact finding. If Griffin invoked his right to counsel, the confession is inadmissible because Detective Kent, not Griffin, initiated the interrogation that elicited the confession. The majority therefore accepts the government’s contention that Griffin invoked only a “partial right” to counsel: he asked only for the right to speak to Jennings, so, when Jennings declined to represent him, he no longer sought a lawyer.
As my brothers note, the Supreme Court has recognized a partial invocation of the right to counsel in Barrett.11 In that case, thé suspect said he would speak to police but would give no written confession in the absence of counsel.12 The court allowed the oral confession on the basis that the suspect asked for counsel’s advice regarding only written statements.13
Unlike the situation in Barrett, Griffin did not accompany his request for counsel with “affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities.” 14 The Court in Barrett emphasized that we must not narrowly interpret a defendant’s remarks about desiring counsel, saying:
We do not denigrate the “settled approach to questions of waiver [that] requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant’s request for counsel,” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. [625],-, 106 S.Ct. 1404, [1409], 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), when we observe that this approach does little to aid respondent’s cause. Interpretation is only required where the defendant’s words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are ambiguous.15
Unlike Barrett’s request, which was unambiguous, Griffin’s statement, if it was *867not a general invocation of the right to counsel, was at worse ambiguous. If I were the fact-finder, I would think it more likely that Griffin was interested in obtaining the quality of legal services that Jennings would provide rather than the personal services of Jennings and no one else. Griffin’s later statement that he did not want to speak to another attorney at that particular time did not remove the ambiguity.
Unlike my brothers, I think Kent was indeed “badgering” Griffin within the meaning of Edwards and thus violating its prophylactic purpose. It is true that the badger intentionally cloaked his hostile intent, but he nevertheless initiated the conversation. Kent sought to evade at least one interpretation of Griffin’s request, and was successful. The antiseptic effect of Edwards, as interpreted in Barrett, was destroyed.
Therefore, although I do not differ with the majority ruling on the other issues, I respectfully dissent.

. 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

. — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987).

. 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).

. Id. at 1044-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2834-35 (plurality opinion).

. Id. at 1047-51, 103 S.Ct. at 2835-38 (Powell, J., concurring).

. Id. at 1054 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 2840 n. 2 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).

. Id. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. at 2834 (plurality opinion) (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 n. 9).

. 465 U.S. 638, 646, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1343, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984).

. Id. at 647, 104 S.Ct. at 1343.

. 755 F.2d 382, 388 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed.2d 846 (1987).

. 107 S.Ct. at 832.

. Id. at 830.

. Id. at 832.

. Id.

. Id.