Court Opinion

ID: 9400777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:07:13.474397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.792836
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1003-MR

DAVID RANDOLPH BEDELL                                                APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
             ACTION NOS. 89-CR-001528 AND 90-CR-000767

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND LAMBERT,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: David Randolph Bedell (“Appellant”), pro se,

appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on July 23, 2019,

denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing. Appellant argues that the

circuit court erred in failing to properly apply Owens v. Commonwealth, 512

S.W.3d 1 (Ky. App. 2017), to conclude that post-conviction DNA testing was
warranted. He also contends that the court erred in failing to appoint counsel.

After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal.

                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                On August 5, 1989, Appellant abducted, raped, and killed a woman in

Jefferson County, Kentucky. A Jefferson County grand jury indicted Appellant on

various charges of murder, rape, and kidnapping. Appellant confessed to the

crimes, though he maintained that the victim’s death was accidental. The matter

proceeded to a jury trial, where Appellant was convicted on charges of murder,

rape in the first degree, kidnapping, wanton endangerment in the first degree, and

unlawful imprisonment in the first degree.1 Appellant was sentenced to life in

prison without the possibility of parole for 25 years on the murder conviction, with

concurrent sentences on the other charges. He appealed the judgment to the

Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction on April 22, 1993. 2

                On October 10, 2017, Appellant, pro se, filed a petition for post-

conviction DNA testing of his hair samples and penile swabs. He asserted that

these DNA samples had not been previously tested by the Commonwealth nor

defense counsel, and would demonstrate that he was innocent of the charged

1
 Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 507.020; KRS 510.040; KRS 509.040; KRS 508.060; and
KRS 509.020.
2
    Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993).

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offenses. The Commonwealth filed a responsive pleading arguing against the

motion. On July 23, 2019, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion,

and this appeal followed.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The circuit court’s decision whether to order post-conviction DNA

testing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Owens, 512 S.W.3d at 6. An abuse of

discretion occurs if the trial court’s ruling is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Discretion allows a court “to make a decision – of its

choosing – that falls within a range of permissible decisions.” Miller v. Eldridge,

146 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Ky. 2004) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation

omitted) (emphasis in original).

                            ARGUMENTS IN ANALYSIS

             Appellant, pro se, argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court committed

reversible error in denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing. He asserts

that the circuit court improperly failed to apply an element of Owens, supra,

thereby violating various provisions of the Kentucky Constitution and the 14th

Amendment to the United States Constitution. After directing our attention to

KRS 422.285, which allows for persons convicted of certain offenses to request

DNA testing, Appellant argues that the circuit court failed to make an express

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finding of the evidence to be considered per the third element of Owens. That

evidence was a penile swab and hairs collected by the Commonwealth in

preparation for trial. While acknowledging that witness testimony coupled with

his confession resulted in the guilty verdict, he contends that DNA testing of the

samples would impeach his confession requiring the judgment to be dismissed.

Appellant also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to provide him with

legal counsel to prosecute the motion for DNA testing. Finally, Appellant states

that he cannot demonstrate that the order on appeal is preserved for appellate

review. Therefore, he requests a review for palpable error. He seeks an opinion

reversing the order on appeal, and remanding the matter for the appointment of

counsel and further proceedings.3

               KRS 422.285 sets out the requirements for seeking post-conviction

DNA testing. To support post-conviction DNA testing, the petitioner must make

sufficient factual averments to support the request (KRS 422.285(2)); have been

convicted of certain offenses (KRS 422.285(1)(a)); be incarcerated or subject to

correctional supervision (KRS 422.285(5)(f) and (6)(f)); and, demonstrate that the

evidence must be available to be tested and not have been previously subjected to

3
  Though Appellant did not comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(4)
requiring a statement of preservation, we believe the matter is properly preserved for appellate
review. As it is clear from the record that the issue of post-conviction DNA testing was raised
below, and per Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010), we will ignore the
procedural deficiency and proceed with the review on the merits.

                                               -4-
DNA testing (KRS 422.285(5)(b)-(c), (6)(b)-(c)). In Owens, supra, a panel of this

Court addressed the application of these factors.

             The Commonwealth acknowledges that Appellant met most of the

preliminary requirements set out in KRS 422.285. That is, Appellant met the

offense requirement, he is incarcerated, and the evidence is believed to be available

in an unopened box of evidence stored at the courthouse. Having demonstrated

these elements of KRS 422.285, the salient question is whether the evidence

Appellant seeks to have tested would have made any difference at trial. See KRS

422.285(2) requiring the petitioner to make “sufficient factual averments to support

the request[.]” A panel of this Court held in Owens that,

             [i]f the petition meets the requirements of the statute, and
             if the petitioner is among that class of persons intended to
             be granted this statutory right, and if the evidence the
             petitioner seeks to have tested otherwise qualifies for
             testing, the trial court is ready to move on to the more
             substantive part of the analysis – judging whether the
             evidence the petitioner seeks would have made any
             difference at trial.

Owens, 512 S.W.3d at 10.

             Having closely examined the record and the law, we do not conclude

that DNA testing of the penile swabs and hair samples at issue “would have made

any difference at trial” per Owens. The burden was on Appellant to make

sufficient factual averments to support the DNA request. KRS 422.285(2). He has

not met this burden. Appellant broadly argues “that his penile swab, in comparison

                                         -5-
with the vaginal swab and smear, along within [sic] unexamined hairs, would

prove his innocence to this charged offense.” Even if the penile swab failed to

show the victim’s DNA, and whatever the outcome of the DNA testing on hair

samples, the import of the DNA results would be purely speculative as it relates to

Appellant’s guilt or innocence. A trial court may properly exclude DNA testing

“that at best could produce mere speculation.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 357

S.W.3d 462, 469 (Ky. 2010), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 24, 2011).

             Appellant confessed to raping the victim, and the confession was

bolstered by other evidence at trial including the testimony of a second abduction

victim who was able to escape from Appellant. Appellant offers no suggestion as

to how the results of DNA testing he requests would have enured to his benefit at

trial or otherwise affected the outcome of the proceeding. Rather, Appellant makes

conclusory claims that DNA testing would supplant or otherwise impeach his taped

confession, thus requiring reversal of the order on appeal or a reduced sentence.

We are not persuaded by this line of reasoning. The panel in Owens determined

that the ultimate question is whether there is “a reasonable probability that the

DNA evidence the petitioner seeks would have made a difference had it been

available at or before trial[.]” Owens, 512 S.W.3d at 7. In examining this

question, the court is required to determine if there is a reasonable probability that

the DNA evidence would prove favorable to the movant. Id. at 10. We find no

                                          -6-
basis for concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the DNA evidence

Appellant seeks would have made a difference had it been available at or before

trial. Accordingly, we do not find that the Jefferson Circuit Court’s ruling was

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. English,

supra.

             Appellant also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to appoint

counsel to prosecute the DNA request. We disagree. KRS 422.285(2) provides

that the court shall appoint counsel if the movant makes a request for counsel

accompanied by a supporting affidavit containing “sufficient factual averments to

support the request[.]” Because Appellant’s factual averments were insufficient to

support the request, he was not entitled to appointed counsel. The Jefferson Circuit

Court properly so ruled.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to post-conviction

DNA testing per KRS 422.285 and Owens, and was not entitled to appointed

counsel. For these reasons, we affirm the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:            BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

David Randolph Bedell, pro se    Daniel Cameron
Burgin, Kentucky                 Attorney General of Kentucky

                                 Kristin L. Condor
                                 Assistant Attorney General
                                 Frankfort, Kentucky

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