Court Opinion

ID: 9693467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:43:02.974576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:47.242635
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
As stated by the majority, appellant was acquitted of the instant charges on October 14, 1976. On November 4, 1976 the court entered an order revoking the October 14th finding of “not guilty” and directing that the cause be listed again for trial. No double jeopardy claim was asserted in response to the November 4th order. On November 22nd appellant entered a plea of guilt to all of these charges. No double jeopardy objection was asserted. After the acceptance of the plea and an extensive hearing, a sentence of one year probation was imposed. Again, a double jeopardy complaint was not claimed. It was not until after the probation sentence had been violated and appellant resentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months to 5 years did appellant first contend the protections of double jeopardy had been ignored.
The majority fails to recognize the procedural posture in which appellant asserted his petition to withdraw the guilty *20plea. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 321, a petition to withdraw a guilty plea following imposition of sentence must be filed within 10 days of sentencing. In the instant case, however, appellant’s sentencing occurred prior to the September 21, 1977 effective date of that rule.
Under our case law in such circumstances, the timeliness of a petition to withdraw a guilty plea is determined by a “due diligence” standard. Commonwealth v. Rosmon, 477 Pa. 540, 543 n.1, 384 A.2d 1221, 1223 n. 1 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bunch, 466 Pa. 22, 28 n. 6, 351 A.2d 284, 286 n. 6 (1976) . As the Superior Court correctly noted in the instant case, the Commonwealth did not assert appellant failed to exercise due diligence.
The second procedural requirement imposed upon appellant in his quest for relief is that when a petition to withdraw a guilty plea is filed subsequent to imposition of sentence, relief will be granted only where “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Rosmon, supra, 477 Pa. at 543 n. 1, 384 A.2d at 1223 n. 1; Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 301 A.2d 592 (1973). Involuntariness of a guilty plea would clearly qualify as a situation in which the granting of relief would be necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Rosmon, supra.
Appellant asserts that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was not appraised of his potential double jeopardy defense by either the judge at the guilty plea colloquy or his attorney prior to pleading guilty and thus any waiver of this defense was not “knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently made.” Commonwealth v. Sutton, 474 Pa. 582, 379 A.2d 107 (1977); Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 269 A.2d 709 (1970).
However, there are two fatal flaws in appellant’s contention that his plea was involuntary. First, this Court has never required a judge to specifically include in a guilty plea colloquy the statement that by pleading guilty a defendant waives his right to the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy or that a defendant has a right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. See generally Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974).
*21Secondly, it is well established that a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 485 Pa. 110, 401 A.2d 318 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rice, 456 Pa. 90, 318 A.2d 705 (1974); Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 447, 277 A.2d 818 (1971) and thus, by pleading guilty, appellant necessarily waived any objections based on double jeopardy. Our cases also require that the court, before accepting the plea must inform the defendant of the extent of this waiver in an on-the-record colloquy. There is no complaint that the instant colloquy was deficient in this respect. Thus, having been advised that the entry of the plea was a waiver of all defects, appellant cannot be heard to complain that his attention was not directed to a specific possible objection.
Appellant, however, in addition to filing a petition to withdraw his guilty plea, filed a PCHA petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of a potential double jeopardy defense. Once again, both the facts and law belie this argument.
This Court has consistently applied a two-step analysis in determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, we must determine whether the issue underlying the charge of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit. If the underlying issue is found to be of arguable merit, the inquiry shifts to a determination of whether the course chosen by counsel has some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interest. Commonwealth v. Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 417 A.2d 611 (1980); Commonwealth v. Sherard, 483 Pa. 183, 394 A.2d 971 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977); see also, Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of double jeopardy prior to the guilty plea proceeding. In order for this issue to be of arguable merit, appellant must have, in fact, been placed in jeopardy at the time the court entered its first order of “not guilty.” In a case tried before a jury, jeopardy does not attach until the jury has been impanelled and sworn; and in a non-jury case, *22jeopardy does not attach until the accused has been subjected to a charge and the court has begun to hear evidence. United States v. Pecora, 484 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Smith, 232 Pa.Super.Ct. 546, 334 A.2d 741 (1975); Commonwealth v. Culpepper, 221 Pa.Super.Ct. 472, 293 A.2d 122 (1972). When the instant case was called for trial on October 14, 1976, Judge Cirillo asked the Commonwealth to call its witnesses. When no witnesses were present and thus no evidence presented or testimony heard, Judge Cirillo found appellant “not guilty.” Clearly jeopardy had not attached, the issue of double jeopardy was not of arguable merit and, therefore, counsel was not ineffective.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the double jeopardy claim was of arguable merit, it. is clear that counsel for appellant had a reasonable basis for not raising this issue and this decision was designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Appellant’s counsel testified at the PCHA hearing concerning the basis upon which he decided not to raise the double jeopardy issue.
One of the things we did discuss was whether or not the finding of Judge Cirillo was in fact, a not guilty finding so as to bring up the question of double jeopardy. I indicated to him that my research of the law led me to the conclusion that since there was never actually a trial, there was never a jury impaneled, we never signed a waiver of a jury trial, and there was not in fact a trial, and although the words spoken might have been ‘not guilty’ in my opinion this did not constitute a finding of not guilty. And I felt that if we brought this defense up at the time of the trial, there would be no possibility of a plea bargain, and that the case would then go on to trial, and I felt that he would then have to face the consequences. Mr. Mitchell felt, since he had no record and didn’t want to take any chances of going to jail, that he would just plead guilty.
N.T./PCHA, July 20, 1977, pp. 26-27.
As this Court has repeatedly stated:
Our inquiry ceases and counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude *23that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interest. The test is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis. [Emphasis in original.]
Commonwealth v. Sherard, supra, 483 Pa. at 190-191, 394 A.2d 975; Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967); Commonwealth v. Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 19 n. 7, 417 A.2d 611, 614 n. 7 (1980).
Appellant’s claim must therefore fail because counsel was not ineffective in not raising the double jeopardy issue and, contrary to appellant’s assertion, counsel did discuss the merits of this potential defense. In my judgment, the order of the Superior Court should be affirmed.