Court Opinion

ID: 9567596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:56:00.808048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:42.267155
License: Public Domain

Acting Justice FEW
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Jasper County has the power to construct a marine shipping terminal on the Savannah River. I also agree that under normal circumstances this action would not conflict with State law, and therefore would not be preempted. Under the specific facts of this case, however, I believe that the County’s ordinance is in conflict with the Ports Authority’s enabling legislation in two important respects. First, the ordinance interferes with and hinders specific action being taken by the Ports Authority to acquire the Proposed Site. Second, it creates problems of interstate relations with the State of Georgia, the current owner of the Proposed Site. In these two ways, the County ordinance creates significant obstacles to the ability of the Ports Authority to fulfill the objectives set forth in the Ports Authority’s enabling legislation, and it hinders the accomplishment of the purpose of that legislation. Therefore, the County ordinance is preempted. See State v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 186, 525 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2000). To this extent, I respectfully dissent. I would grant an injunction prohibiting the implementation of Jasper County’s ordinance so long as the Ports Authority is actively pursuing efforts to condemn the Proposed Site and build a marine terminal there.
The County ordinance interferes with and hinders the Ports Authority’s efforts to acquire the Proposed Site. The Ports Authority has unanimously adopted a resolution to undertake efforts to acquire, and if necessary condemn, the Proposed Site. Pursuant to that resolution, the Ports Authority has exercised its responsibility to have the property appraised as required in South Carolina Code § 28-2-70, and it has initi*406ated this lawsuit. Jasper County has also initiated efforts to condemn the Proposed Site, and has actually filed a condemnation action. When two governmental entities attempt to condemn the same property, there is an obvious conflict between those efforts. As the majority makes clear, the Ports Authority’s condemnation power is superior to that of Jasper County. Therefore, the simple fact that Jasper County is trying to condemn the same property interferes with and hinders the efforts of the Ports Authority to acquire it.
In addition, there are specific ways in which Jasper County’s condemnation efforts conflict with the efforts of the Ports Authority. For example, the Ports Authority has attempted to exercise its condemnation power by first initiating negotiations with the State of Georgia to purchase the Proposed Site. The Ports Authority has said it wants to file a condemnation action only if the negotiations fail. The existence of Jasper County’s condemnation proceeding has very real potential to make these negotiation efforts impractical, if not impossible. In the face of this competing action by Jasper County, the Ports Authority will have to change its approach, and initiate its own condemnation action as a first resort, instead of as a last resort. Therefore, the County ordinance authorizing the Jasper County condemnation is interfering with the Ports Authority’s ability to accomplish its goal in the manner it chooses. This interference is a significant obstacle to the fulfillment of the objectives of Ports Authority’s enabling act.
The County’s ordinance also poses potential problems of interstate relations because the ordinance seeks to condemn property owned by the State of Georgia. The issue regarding these problems is not whether there really is a potential problem. Rather, the issue is whether the Ports Authority, as the arm of State government with irrefutable authority to handle interstate relations regarding the harbor and lower end of the River,12 reasonably believes there is a potential problem. It is not for this Court, and it is certainly not for Jasper County, to say that the Ports Authority is incorrect in its assessment as to what the issues and potential problems are in this State’s relations with Georgia on the subject of a port on the Savannah River. Interstate relations are, at least in this *407instance, an executive branch issue. In any instance, interstate relations should be handled on the State level; Counties should play no role in affecting relations between the States. The Ports Authority’s determination that Jasper County’s ordinance interferes with interstate relations regarding the Savannah River requires a finding that the ordinance is an obstacle to accomplishing the purposes and objectives of the Ports Authority’s enabling act.
The first potential problem of interstate relations pointed out by the Ports Authority is that an ongoing dispute between two governmental entities in South Carolina as to which has the power to condemn the property puts both of them at a negotiating disadvantage with the State of Georgia.
Next, the Ports Authority points out that Jasper County has already failed in one effort to condemn this same property, and the record in this case reveals several potential problems with the current condemnation. In particular, the question arises from the record in this case as to whether the proposed condemnation is for public use, given the manner in which the County proposes to construct and operate the terminal. The existence of a competing condemnation proceeding with such significant potential defects has the potential to be a major distraction to the Ports Authority’s efforts to acquire the property, and an advantage to the State of Georgia.
Even more importantly, the Ports Authority points out that the ongoing litigation between the County and Georgia is a significant obstacle to the efforts of South Carolina to negotiate a compact with the State of Georgia on all issues regarding the Savannah River, from its headwaters in the Northwestern corner of our State, to the coast, including, but certainly not limited to, the development and operation of a port. The Ports Authority has publicly stated that it wants to try to negotiate a resolution of these issues with Georgia, rather than to litigate them.
Finally, the existence of the Jasper County condemnation, and the danger of further litigation, give rise to the possibility that the State could be brought into a lawsuit in the federal courts of Georgia.
Turning to the applicable law, the federal courts, and this Court, have recognized three separate ways in which federal *408law preempts state or local law. Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining, 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S.Ct. 2518, 2523, 81 L.Ed.2d 399 (1984); State v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 186, 525 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2000). The majority has adopted this approach to determining whether State law preempts local law. Under the third of these preemption categories, sometimes referred to as “implied conflict preemption,” local law is preempted “when the [local] law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [State law].’ ” Michigan Canners & Freezers, 467 U.S. at 469, 104 S.Ct. at 2523 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)). As stated by this Court, under this third category, local law is preempted “... to the extent ... the [local] law hinders the accomplishment of the [State] law’s purpose.” 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. at 186, 525 S.E.2d at 877.
Two of the purposes of the Ports Authority’s enabling act are to allow the Ports Authority to purchase or condemn land for the construction and operation of port and shipping facilities,13 and to manage interstate relations with Georgia regarding a port on the Savannah River.14 Jasper County’s condemnation ordinance hinders the accomplishment of these purposes by interfering with the actions of the Ports Authority as described above. The ordinance is therefore preempted.
The next question is whether or not it is appropriate for this Court to use its injunctive power. I believe that it is.
*409The majority makes clear that the Ports Authority’s condemnation power is superior to that of Jasper County. It should follow that the Ports Authority can exercise that power in the-manner it chooses. Once a governmental entity decides to exercise its lawful authority to do anything, it is within the discretion of that governmental entity to decide how it wants to accomplish the task. The Ports Authority could choose to initiate its own condemnation action, and by doing so, stop the pending action by Jasper County. However, the Ports Authority has stated it does not choose to immediately initiate a condemnation proceeding, but rather prefers to exercise its condemnation power by first attempting to negotiate a solution with Georgia.
This course of action has numerous obvious advantages over immediate litigation, including the possibility of avoiding litigation altogether. In addition, it is consistent with sound public policy, and is contemplated by statutory provisions regarding condemnation. See, e.g., South Carolina Code § 28-2-70.
As explained above, however, the existence of the action by Jasper County interferes with the Ports Authority’s ability to pursue its statutory authority to negotiate before filing a lawsuit. Therefore, I believe it is not enough merely to declare the superiority of the Ports Authority’s condemnation authority. Going no farther than this would require the Ports Authority to take a course of action it does not deem to be advisable, immediate litigation, in order to exercise its condemnation power. Rather, the only way the Ports Authority can exercise the superior power the majority of this Court recognizes it has, in the manner the Ports Authority should be allowed to choose, is for this Court to stop Jasper County’s condemnation action by issuing an injunction.

. See footnote 3.

: South Carolina Code §§ 54-3-130(2); 54-3-140(2); and 54-3-150.

. While the purpose to "manage interstate relations” is not explicitly stated in the enabling act, it is clearly implied. With regard to ports, the State acts through the Ports Authority. See generally South Carolina Code § 54-3-110. In some sections specifically, such as in section 54-3-130(8), and generally in others, the Ports Authority is given the responsibility of developing port facilities on the Savannah River. The introductory paragraph to section 54-3-130, which sets forth the "purposes,” states that the specifically listed "purposes” are "intended to broaden and not to restrict any other powers....” Therefore, if the State is going to develop port facilities on that River, the Ports Authority is the entity that must manage relations with Georgia, to the extent that is necessary.