Court Opinion

ID: 9778561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:12:25.421713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:11.614927
License: Public Domain

STEINFELD, Judge
(dissenting).
Apparently because of my indelible recollection of a government which, to the everlasting shame of its citizens, embarked on a program of genocide and experimentation with human bodies I have been more troubled in reaching a decision in this case than in any other. My sympathies and emotions are torn between a compassion to aid an ailing young man and a duty to fully protect unfortunate members of society.
The opinion of the majority is predicated upon the authority of an equity court to speak for one who cannot speak for himself. However, it is my opinion that in considering such right in this instance we must first look to the power and authority vested in the committee, the appellee herein. KRS 387.060 and KRS 387.230 do nothing more than give the committee the power to take custody of the incompetent and the possession, care and management of his property. Courts have restricted the activities of the committee to that which is for the best interest of the incompetent. Harding’s Adm’r v. Harding’s Ex’r., 140 Ky. 277, 130 S.W. 1098 (1910); Miller v. Keown, 176 Ky. 117, 195 S.W. 430 (1912) and 3 A.L.R. 3d 18. The authority and duty have been to protect and maintain the ward, to secure that to which he is entitled and preserve that which he has. Ramsey’s Ex’r v. Ramsey, 243 Ky. 202, 47 S.W.2d 1059 (1932); Aaronson v. State of New York, 34 Misc.2d *150827, 229 N.Y.S.2d 550, 557 (1962) and Young v. State, 32 Misc.2d 965, 225 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1962). The wishes of the members of the family or the desires of the guardian to be helpful to the apparent objects of the ward’s bounty have not been a criterion. “A curator or guardian, cannot dispose of his ward’s property by donation, even though authorized to do so by the court on advice, of a family meeting, unless a gift by the guardian is authorized by statute.” 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 81, p. 191.
Two Kentucky cases decided many years ago reveal judicial policy. In W. T. Sistrunk & Co. v. Navarra’s Committee, 268 Ky. 753, 105 S.W.2d 1039 (1937), this court held that a committee was without right to continue a business which the incompetent had operated prior to his having been declared a person of unsound mind. More analogous is Baker v. Thomas, 272 Ky. 605, 114 S.W.2d 1113 (1938), in which a man and woman had lived together out of wedlock. Two children were born to them. After the man was adjudged incompetent, his committee, acting for him, together with his paramour, instituted proceedings to adopt the two children. In rejecting the application and refusing to speak for the incompetent the opinion stated:
“The statute does not contemplate that the committee of a lunatic may exercise any other power than to have the possession, care, and management of the lunatic’s or incompetent’s estate. No authority is given by any statute to which our attention has been called, or that we have been by careful research able to locate, giving the committee of a lunatic or an incompetent authority to petition any court for the adoption of a person or persons as heirs capable of the inheritance of his or her estate.”
The same result was reached in In re Bourgeois, 144 La. 501, 80 So. 673 (1919), in which the husband of an incompetent wife sought to change the beneficiary of her insurance policy so that her children would receive the proceeds. Grady v. Dashiell, 24 Wash.2d 272, 163 P.2d 922 (1945), stands for the proposition that a loan to the ward’s adult insolvent son made at a time when it was thought that the ward was incurably insane constituted an improper depletion of the ward’s estate.
The majority opinion is predicated upon the finding of the circuit court that there will be psychological benefits to the ward but points out that the incompetent has the mentality of a six-year-old child. It is common knowledge beyond dispute that the loss of a close relative or a friend to a six-year-old child is not of major impact. Opinions concerning psychological trauma are at best most nebulous. Furthermore, there are no guarantees that the transplant will become a surgical success, it being well known that body rejection of transplanted organs is frequent. The life of the incompetent is not in danger, but the surgical procedure advocated creates some peril.
It is written in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), that “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.” The ability to fully understand and consent is a prerequisite to the donation of a part of the human body. Cf. Bonner v. Moran, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 126 F.2d 121, 139 A.L.R. 1366 (1941), in which a fifteen-year-old infant’s consent to removal of a skin patch for the benefit of another was held legally ineffective.
Unquestionably the attitudes and attempts of the committee and members of the family of the two young men whose critical problems now confront us are commendable, natural and beyond reproach. However, they refer us to nothing indicating that they are privileged to authorize the removal of one of the kidneys of the incompetent for the purpose of donation, and they cite no statutory or other authority vesting such right in the courts. The proof shows that less compatible donors are available and *151that the kidney of a cadaver could be used, although the odds of operational success are not as great in such case as they would be with the fully compatible donor brother.
I am unwilling to hold that the gates should be open to permit the removal of an organ from an incompetent for transplant, at least until such time as it is conclusively demonstrated that it will be of significant benefit to the incompetent. The evidence here does not rise to that pinnacle. To hold that committees, guardians or courts have such awesome power even in the persuasive case before us, could establish legal precedent, the dire result of which we cannot fathom. Regretfully I must say no.
NEIKIRK and PALMORE, JJ., join with me in this dissent.