Court Opinion

ID: 9655826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:23:12.91521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:22.346215
License: Public Domain

*548Dethmers, J.
This is an appeal, upon leave granted, from Court of Appeals’ denial of application for delayed appeal from an order of the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit denying defendant’s motion for appointment of appellate counsel and free transcript for appeal purposes.
On May 11, 1964, defendant was convicted, by a judge sitting without a jury, in the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit, of the misdemeanor of receiving and concealing stolen property under the value of $100.  This is an offense cognizable by a justice of the peace. The maximum permissible sentence is 90 days in jail or $100 fine or both. He was sentenced to 90 days in the Detroit house of correction and served the sentence.
It is urged by the people that because defendant completed service of his sentence this appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the case has become moot. For this the following authorities are cited: People v. Leavitt, 41 Mich 470; City of Ishpeming v. Maroney, 49 Mich 226; Pittsburgh Plate Class Co. v. Charles Klein Co., 177 Mich 399; Howe v. Doyle, 187 Mich 655; Thomas v. Montcalm Circuit Judge, 228 Mich 44; Sullivan v. Michigan State Board of Dentistry, 268 Mich 427; Horowitz v. Rott, 235 Mich 369; People v. Pyrros, 323 Mich 329; Johnson v. City of Muskegon Heights, 330 Mich 631; McCarthy v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 294 Mich 368.
At the time of the alleged commission of the misdemeanor and his conviction thereof, defendant was on parole from a previous sentence on a 1962 felony conviction. After the May 11, 1964, misdemeanor conviction, defendant was found guilty by the parole board of parole violation and, after service of his *54990-day misdemeanor sentence, was remanded to State prison as a parole violator and is still there as provided by law, serving the remainder of his sentence for the 1962 felony conviction.
There is question as to how the matter of the reasons for his parole revocation, set forth in defendant’s appendix, came into the record in this case. However, the people’s appendix contains material which equally goes into the matter. Prom all that appears in the appendices it is evident that either defendant’s misdemeanor conviction automatically brought about a finding by the parole board of parole violation or that, at least, that conviction was an element and factor in the parole violations charged against defendant and considered by the board in making its finding of parole violation. Accordingly, we consider the above cases cited by the people with respect to mootness inapt. Defendant’s present incarceration may well be considered a consequence, in part at least, of this misdemeanor conviction. More to the point is United States v. Morgan, 346 US 502 (74 S Ct 247, 98 L ed 248), in which the United States Supreme Court said (pp 512, 513):
“Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties. * * * As the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists, * * * respondent is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that this conviction was invalid.”
See, also, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 US 236 (83 S Ct 373, 9 L ed 2d 285); United States, ex rel. Harton, v. Wilkins (CA 2), 342 F2d 529; Williams v. United States (CA 7), 332 F2d 36; United States v. Cariola (CA 3), 323 F2d 180; Williams v. United States (CA 7), 310 F2d 696; United States v. Moore (CA 7), 166 F2d 102; United States v, Steese (CA *5503), 144 F2d 439; United States, ex rel. Oddo, v. Fay (DC, NY), 236 F Supp 242; Janiec v. State of New Jersey, 85 NJ Super 68 (203 A2d 727); Bojinoff v. People, 299 NY 145 (85 NE2d 909). Because of the parole revocation and present resultant imprisonment, we cannot hold this case moot.
Defendant was not represented by counsel at the misdemeanor trial. Since trial defendant has said that he did not waive his right to trial by jury and the record does not clearly disclose that he did. Other claims of reversible error with respect to the trial and conviction are suggested. None of these, however, are before us for determination now. Bather, it is the subsequent occurrences which are the subject of this appeal. We turn now to these.
Defendant’s brief states the question involved in this appeal as follows:
“Is an indigent misdemeanant entitled as a matter of right to have counsel appointed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction?”
Despite defendant’s wording of this question, it will be noted that there is involved not only appointment of appellate counsel but also furnishing to defendant of a free copy of portions of transcript and record essential to preparation of postconviction motions and appeal.
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12 (76 S Ct 585, 100 L ed 891, 55 ALR2d 1055), indigent defendants were convicted of armed robbery, which was undoubtedly, as in Michigan, a felony. It was held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution required furnishing defendants, at public expense, with the portions of the transcript of trial necessary for taking and presenting an appeal.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (83 S Ct 792, 9 L ed 2d 799, 93 ALR2d 733), an indigent *551defendant convicted of a noncapital felony was denied appointment of trial counsel. The court held that defendant’s trial and conviction without being accorded the fundamental right of assistance of counsel violated the 14th Amendment.
In Douglas v. California, 372 US 353 (83 S Ct 814, 9 L ed 2d 811), indigent defendants were convicted of 13 felonies. Denial of their requests for appointment of counsel to prosecute an appeal was held to amount to discrimination between the rich and the poor, in violation of the 14th Amendment.
In Patterson v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 US 776 (83 S Ct 1103, 10 L ed 2d 137), defendant had been denied court-appointed counsel because the Maryland statute provided for this only in capital or “serious” cases and the trial court said this one was neither. He was convicted of carrying concealed weapons and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The United States Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded for reconsideration in the light of Gideon v. Wainwright, supra.
Similar are the cases of Lane v. Brown, 372 US 477 (83 S Ct 768, 9 L ed 2d 892), involving a conviction for murder, and Draper v. Washington, 372 US 487 (83 S Ct 774, 9 L ed 2d 899), in which the indigent defendants were convicted of robbery.
These United States Supreme Court decisions, all involving felonies, may not necessarily be controlling of the question in the instant case relating to a misdemeanor.
The Federal criminal justice act, 18 USCA, § 3006A(b), provides that “In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense, and appears without counsel” (emphasis supplied) defendant shall be advised by the -commissioner or *552court that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to obtain counsel.
In the opinions of certain Federal courts of appeal cases language appears indicating that statutory denomination of the offense as a felony or fixing of a serious penalty or the offense being a serious one are not prerequisites to the constitutional right to counsel at public expense and apprisal of defendant of his rights thereto. These do not appear to give heed to the “petty offense” provision of the above Federal statute. For example :
In Evans v. Rives (CA DC), 126 F2d 633, 638, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia said:
“It is further suggested by the District of Columbia that the constitutional guaranty of the right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal case does not apply except in the event of ‘serious offenses.’ No such differentiation is made in the wording of the guaranty itself, and we are cited to no authority, and know of none, making this distinction. The purpose of the guaranty is to give assurance against deprivation of life or liberty except strictly according to law. The petitioner would be as effectively deprived of his liberty by a sentence to a year in jail for the crime of nonsupport of a minor child as by a sentence to a year in jail for any other crime, however serious. And so far as the right to the assistance of counsel is concerned, the Constitution draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short period and such loss for a long one.”
In Harvey v. Mississippi (CA 5), 340 F2d 263, 271, defendant was convicted, on plea of guilty, of the misdemeanor of possession of whiskey and sentenced to a 90-day jail term and to pay $500 fine. The fifth circuit court of appeals, after quot*553ing the above quotation from the Evans v. Rives Case, went on to say:
“While the rule as thus stated has never been expressly extended to misdemeanor charges in State tribunals, it has been argued that such a principle is implicit in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 US 335 (83 S Ct 792, 9 L ed 2d 799, 93 ALR2d 733). Be this as it may, the reasoning in Evans along with other recent right-to-counsel decisions persuades us that we should apply that rule in the present case. See Hamilton v. Alabama, supra,1 White v. State of Maryland, supra.2 The failure of notice to Harvey of his right to the assistance of counsel invalidated his guilty plea and rendered his conviction and incarceration constitutionally improper. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the entry of judgment ordering the release of the appellant from custody on the present conviction and sentence.”
In McDonald v. Moore (CA 5), 353 F2d 106, 110, defendant was convicted, on plea of guilty, of the misdemeanor of possession and sale of intoxicating liquor and sentenced to pay a fine of $250 or serve 6 months in county jail. The court of appeals, fifth circuit, reversed the district court’s denial of habeas corpus, and, after again quoting the above language from Evans v. Rives, supra, continued:
“In approving the above quotation this court has, we think, rejected the ‘serious offense’ rule. We also think that Gideon has repudiated the Betts v. Brady3 ad hoc special circumstance rule of ‘an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.’ We are without any authority authorizing the announcement of a petty offense rule. We are not, fortunately, precluded from following precedent. *554In the Harvey Case the facts were so similar to those in the case before ns as to permit, and probably to require that our decision be the same as was there announced. There it was held that the failure to notify the appellant of his right to the assistance of counsel rendered the plea of guilty and the judgment of conviction and sentence constitutionally invalid. We make the same holding as to the appellant here.”
Among State court of last resort opinions of similar import are:
State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz 123, 131 (392 P2d 784). In that case defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of attempting to assist the escape from county jail of a prisoner held on felony charges. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. He had been denied court-appointed counsel at trial, but was granted appellate counsel. A court rule in that State required appointment of counsel in felony cases. The court said, however, that “Gideon” requires appointment of counsel in cases of “a misdemeanor which falls in the category of a ‘serious offense,’ ” and said, further, that this case was a serious one in which the sentence could be up to 2 years’ imprisonment.
Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind 294 (98 NE2d 250). In Indiana the Constitution provides for the right to counsel for accused and since it makes no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, the court held that the right must apply also to misdemeanors, saying that otherwise the legislature could defeat the constitutional provisions and right to counsel by merely denominating offenses as misdemeanors. In this case the offense was child neglect and the sentence for 180 days. Defendant was not given counsel at trial. Reversed on that account.
*555People v. Witenski, 15 NY2d 392 (259 NYS2d 413, 207 NE2d 358). Defendants were convicted of stealing apples of a value of about $2 in an orchard. They received a 30-day jail sentence plus fine of $25 which none could pay. Hence, they were required to serve 55 days in jail. Although there was a statutory involvement not present in Michigan, the court held that there was a right to appointed counsel in every criminal case “large or small.” Because the justice of the peace, upon their arraignment, only told defendants that they had a right to be represented by counsel but failed to state that they had a right to have counsel appointed for them if they were unable to procure same, the conviction was reversed on that account for violation of “fundamental rights.”
Hunter v. State (Okla), 288 P2d 425. Defendant was convicted of drunk driving, a misdemeanor, and fined $125. The court held 'that defendant had a right to appointed counsel because the State’s Constitution, in providing therefor, made no distinction in that regard between felonies and misdemeanors.
State, ex rel. Barth, v. Burke, 24 Wis 2d 82 (128 NW2d 422). Defendant was convicted, on plea of guilty, of 19 counts of issuing worthless checks, all misdemeanors. After defendant told the trial court that he owned certain property, that court. determined that he was not indigent and accepted his guilty plea. He was sentenced to 4 years’ probation and, upon violation thereof, to 5 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court held that the finding of nonindigency was arbitrary and, hence, for failure to appoint or offer to appoint counsel, reversed the conviction with new trial.
Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 1, § 20, provides that, “In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right * * * to have the assistance *556of counsel for his defense; to have an appeal as a matter of right; and in courts of record, when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal.”
GCB 1963, 785.4,  provides:
“(1) * * * immediately upon sentencing, the court shall advise the defendant in open court that he is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to appellate review of his conviction and that, if defendant is financially unable to provide counsel to perfect such appeal, the court will appoint counsel for him and will furnish counsel with such portions of the trial transcript counsel requires to prepare postconviction motions and to perfect an appeal. * * *
“(2) Delayed Appeal. In all other criminal cases, application for leave to take delayed appeal may be filed pursuant to the provisions of Mule 806. Upon defendant’s request, if defendant is indigent, the trial court in which defendant was convicted shall appoint counsel for him and shall furnish such portions of the trial transcript counsel so appointed requires to prepare delayed motions for postconviction proceedings in the trial court and to prepare an application for leave to take delayed appeal.”
No distinction is made between felonies and misdemeanors or types or seriousness of crimes in the above quoted language from the Constitution of Michigan and the Michigan court rule relating to the rights of criminal appeal.
The following definitions appear in the Michigan statutes:
“The term ‘felony’ when used in this act, shall be construed to mean an offense for which the offender, on conviction, may be punished by death, *557or by imprisonment in state prison.” CL 1948, § 750.7 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.197).
“When any act or omission, not a felony, is punishable according to law, by a fine, penalty or forfeiture, and imprisonment, or by such fine, penalty or forfeiture, or imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, such act or .omission shall be deemed a misdemeanor.” CL 1948, § 750.8 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.198).
The only distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, insofar as these definitions are concerned, appears to be whether imprisonment is to be in State prison or the county jail.
CL 1948, § 750.504 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.772), provides:
“A person convicted of a crime declared in this or any other act of the state of Michigan to be a misdemeanor, for which no other punishment is specially prescribed by any statute in force at the time of the conviction and sentence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 90 days or by a fine of not more than 100 dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
CLS 1961, § 774.1 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1192), empowers justices of the peace to try all criminal charges punishable by fine not exceeding $100 or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 3 months or both such fine and imprisonment. The justice of the peace is empowered to impose these sentences. These are referred to as criminal offenses cognizable by a justice of the peace. Whether or not thus cognizable is made dependent on the permissible maximum penalty and not on whether the statute has denominated the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.
CL 1948 and CLS 1961, §§ 766.2-766.15 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev §§ 28.920-28.933), inclusive, relate to *558offenses not cognizable by a justice of the peace. In these it is provided that the justice of the peace may issue a warrant, after arrest conduct an examination of the accused and either discharge him or bind him over for trial in circuit court, depending on whether it' shall appear to the justice of the peace that a crime not cognizable by him has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed it. The subsequent proceedings occur in the circuit court or other court of comparable level having jurisdiction thereof.
There are instances in the Michigan statutory law in which offenses are named misdemeanors and for' which the maximum penalty fixed exceeds $100 fine or 3 months’ imprisonment or both. For example : Certain violations of rules and regulations of the public utilities commission are termed “misdemeanors” (CL 1948, § 460.55 [Stat Ann §22.5]) and the penalties fixed at not less then $10 nor more than $1,000 or imprisonment in county jail for not more than 6 months, or both. In People v. Causley, 299 Mich 340, after discussion of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, this Court speaks of People v. Lamb, 153 Mich 675, in which, so the Court said, the crime of extortion there involved was a misdemeanor punishable by not more than one year in county jail or $250 fine' or. both. See, also, In re Moynahan, 255 Mich 497, in which this Court refers to the offense therein involved, possession of narcotics, as a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment limited to one year. See, also, in'that connection, In re Spencer, 252 Mich 48. This gives rise to the term, used in criminal' law circles, “circuit court misdemeanors”. That is to say, the statute labels the offense a misdemeanor, but,- by fixing the maximum penalty, renders the offense one not cognizable by a justice of the peace *559and, hence, one in which the limit of his power is to bind over to circuit court. When so bound over the procedure is the same as for felonies. Defendant’s need for legal assistance of counsel then may-well be as great as in felony cases. The name “felony” or “misdemeanor” can make small difference as relates to his constitutional right to such assistance. We entertain no doubt that as to such circuit court misdemeanor cases the rule and constitutional requirements are the same as relates to felonies. To hold otherwise would mean, as said in Bolkovac v. State, supra, that the legislature could defeat constitutional rights by the simple device of labelling offenses as misdemeanors.
In the instant case, however, the offense was one cognizable by a justice of the peace. It might be urged that the apparent distinction made in 18 TJSCA, § 3006A(b), supra, between a felony or misdemeanor, on the one hand, and a “petty offense” has application, should be adopted by this Court, and applied here. Scarcely can it be said, however, that a permissible maximum sentence of 3 months’ imprisonment or $100 fine or both leaves the offense one to be regarded as so petty as not entitling the indigent accused to the assistance of counsel. His liberty is involved and in jeopardy in such case. For this the constitutional right is designed’ to insure equality of treatment and chances for acquittal between the rich who can afford to hire counsel and the poor who cannot.
In behalf of the people it is protested, however, that holding for defendant’s contentions in this criminal case would result in a vast wave of pleas of not guilty in cases of clear guilt, with demands for free counsel, in traffic violations of city and village ordinances, of such proportions as to paralyze judicial proceeding's in justice of the peace or magistrate courts. Note may be taken with interest, *560although not controlling of the case at bar, of the following:
“As before said, the violations of the village ordinances are not considered criminal offenses. Mixer v. Supervisors, 26 Mich 422; People v. Jackson, 8 Mich 110; Jackson v. People, 8 Mich 262.” Village of Vicksburg v. Briggs, 85 Mich 502, 508.
“The term ‘criminal cases,’ used in the laws, refers to none but prosecutions under the State laws. In Jackson v. People, 8 Mich 262, and People v. Jackson, 8 Mich 110, we held that cases under city ordinances could not be brought into this Court by writ of error, or exceptions, but must come up on certiorari. They resemble criminal cases only in being penal proceedings, but no offense is a crime which does not violate the law of the land.” Mixer v. Supervisors of Manistee County, 26 Mich 422, 424.
“Violations of village ordinances are not regarded as criminal offenses.” 1 Gillespie’s Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure, § 2, p 5.
Reversed and remanded to recorder’s court for appointment, upon finding of indigency, of appellate counsel for defendant and furnishing of all portions of the transcript and record essential in preparation of postconviction motions and appeal.
Adams, J., concurred with Dethmers, J.

 368 US 52 (82 S Ct 157, 7 L ed 2d 114).

 373 US 59 (83 S Ct 1050, 10 L ed 2d 193).

 316 US 455 (62 S Ct 1252, 86 L ed 1595).