Court Opinion

ID: 9382641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 15:02:49.71616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.532010
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                      TIMOTHY C., JUDY C., Appellants,

                                         v.

                    NATALIE S., JAMES S., L.S., Appellees.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 22-0099
                                FILED 3-28-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             No. JS20875
           The Honorable Lauren R. Guyton, Judge, Pro Tempore

                       VACATED AND REMANDED

                                    COUNSEL

Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen, P.C., Phoenix
By Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen
Counsel for Appellants

Denise Lynn Carroll Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
By Denise Lynn Carroll
Counsel for Appellee Natalie S.
               TIMOTHY C., JUDY C. v. NATALIE S., et al.
                       Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1            Timothy C. and Judy C. (“Guardians”) appeal the superior
court’s denial of their petition to terminate Natalie S.’s (“Mother”) and
James S.’s (“Father”),1 (collectively “Parents”) parental rights. Because the
superior court predicated its decision on incorrect legal principles under
the abandonment and length-of-felony-sentence grounds, we vacate the
order denying the termination of Mother’s parental rights as to those two
grounds and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            In    2016,    L.S.   was   born     substance-exposed      to
methamphetamine. Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) initiated
a dependency and eventually placed the child in a kinship placement with
Guardians. Mother participated in services, and in March 2017, the court
returned L.S. to Parents’ custody. Over the next year, while L.S. lived with
Parents, L.S. kept in close contact with Guardians. They visited with L.S.
about four times a week, spent various weekends with her, and eventually
kept her for weeks at a time.

¶3            By May 2018, Mother had relapsed on methamphetamine,
and Parents were engaging in domestic violence; Father therefore placed
L.S. with Guardians with Mother’s consent. Since that time, Mother has
had no contact with L.S. and has provided no support for her. L.S. believes
Judy C. is her mother and does not know about or recognize Mother, even
after Guardians showed the child Mother’s photograph. In February 2019,
the superior court appointed Guardians as L.S.’s permanent guardians with
Parents’ consent.

1       Father consented to the relinquishment of his parental rights and has
not filed a brief in this appeal.

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¶4           In April 2019, Mother was arrested and the following month,
was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for possessing
methamphetamine for sale. Concurrently with that sentence, Mother
served time for forgery and drug paraphernalia convictions. Shortly after
her arrest, Mother placed Timothy C. and L.S. on her visitation list and
sought contact with Guardians through her family members.2 L.S.’s
maternal grandmother agreed to relay Mother’s address to Guardians.

¶5            In January 2020, the prison issued Mother a tablet with email
capability, and soon afterwards, disallowed in-person visits due to Covid.
Around April, Mother received her first letter from Guardians (and with it
their address) and over the next few years, she sent them a few letters or
postcards. That July, Mother began a prison program that allowed her to
work full time and live on her employer’s premises.

¶6           Meanwhile, Guardians submitted paperwork that allowed
them to exchange emails with Mother via the prison tablet. After the prison
approved Guardians’ paperwork in September 2020, they regularly
exchanged emails with Mother about L.S., often attaching pictures of the
child.

¶7            Sometime between December 2020 and early 2021, the prison
approved Guardians and L.S. to have telephone calls and video visits with
Mother. The parties dispute whether Mother ever affirmatively asked to
speak to L.S. The exhibits show that Mother often expressed her desire for
and excitement about eventually getting to know L.S., but Guardians, not
Mother, initiated the few discussions they had about phone or video
contact. Even during these discussions, Mother never affirmatively asked
to speak to L.S. The parties agreed, however, that not all their
communications were in evidence.

¶8            In May 2021, Guardians petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights based on the relinquishment of his rights, see Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(7), and Mother’s parental rights
based on abandonment, neglect, and length of felony sentence, see A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(1)-(2), (B)(4). That same month, Father signed an agreement
relinquishing his parental rights upon L.S.’s adoption and consenting to

2      The parties disputed whether Mother already had Guardians’
contact information at this time. Regardless, both L.S.’s maternal
grandmother and Timothy C. testified that several members of Mother’s
family had Guardians’ contact information.

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                         Decision of the Court

Guardians’ adoption of L.S. About three months later, Mother emailed
Guardians asking for in-person visits with L.S. After a trial, the superior
court denied Guardians’ termination petition. Guardians appealed. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-
2101(A)(1).

                                DISCUSSION

¶9            A parent’s right to custody and control of her own child,
while fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196
Ariz. 246, 248-49, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). Termination of a parental relationship
may be warranted when the State proves one statutory ground under A.R.S.
§ 8-533 by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 249, ¶ 12. “Clear and
convincing” means the grounds for termination are “highly probable or
reasonably certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284-85, ¶ 25 (2005).
The court must also find that termination is in the child’s best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 288, ¶ 41.

¶10            This court “will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact
unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm
a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). This court does not reweigh
the evidence, but “look[s] only to determine if there is evidence to sustain
the court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47,
¶ 8 (App. 2004). “An abuse of discretion is discretion manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons.” Englert v. Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 27, ¶ 14 (App.
2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A trial court abuses
its discretion when it misapplies the law or predicates its decision on
incorrect legal principles.” State v. Jackson, 208 Ariz. 56, 59, ¶ 12 (App. 2004).

I.     Neglect

¶11              Guardians argue the superior court abused its discretion by
denying their termination petition under the neglect ground. When a
parent neglects her child, the superior court may terminate her parental
rights. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Neglect means “[t]he inability or unwillingness
of a parent . . . to provide [her] child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter
or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes substantial risk of
harm to the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25).

¶12           The superior court found that Guardians failed to prove this
ground because Mother granted them a voluntary guardianship to ensure
the child’s needs would be met. Specifically, the court found that Mother

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                       Decision of the Court

“made the conscious decision to leave the child in the care of family
members who could parent in her stead.” Guardians challenge this finding,
asserting that Father arranged the guardianship, not Mother. Who
originally arranged the guardianship is irrelevant, however, because
Mother consciously gave her consent by signing the guardianship
application.

¶13           Regardless, Guardians failed to argue or present evidence
that, considering the guardianship, Mother’s inability, or unwillingness to
meet L.S.’s needs caused a substantial risk of harm to L.S.’s health or
welfare.

II.    Abandonment

¶14           Guardians next argue the superior court abused its discretion
by misapplying the facts to the law because the substantial weight of the
evidence supports a finding that Mother abandoned L.S. A parent may
forfeit her parental rights if she abandons her child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1).
Abandonment occurs when the parent fails to “provide reasonable support
and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal
supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). Abandonment is measured by a parent’s
conduct, not her subjective intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249-50, ¶ 18. The
court must consider whether the parent “has provided reasonable support,
maintained regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parent-child
relationship.” Id. “Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with
the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima
facie evidence of abandonment.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). A parent must make
more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child. Id.

¶15            As an initial matter, the evidence is undisputed that for about
a year before Mother was incarcerated, she had no contact with L.S. and
paid no support. From May 2018 through 2019 Mother was homeless and
abusing drugs, and made no effort to contact Guardians or L.S. Regarding
this year, the superior court found that because of Mother’s homelessness,
she “could not have a meaningful relationship with her child” but had
“consented to the guardianship of her child prior to going into custody.”
But L.S. was not under a guardianship for most of the year; Mother only
consented to it a few months before her current incarceration. Guardians
contend the court improperly excused Mother’s inaction due to her
homelessness and the consensual guardianship, arguing a voluntary
guardianship cannot act as a defense to abandonment.

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                       Decision of the Court

¶16            Although homelessness and a voluntary guardianship are
relevant factors to consider, the focus of the court’s analysis should be on
the parent and her efforts to assume the myriad responsibilities of
parenting. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1) (Abandonment “means the failure of a
parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with
the child, including providing normal supervision.”) (emphasis added). It
is a fact-intensive inquiry. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 20 (“What
constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision
varies from case to case.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nonetheless, the parent’s efforts to support, communicate, and maintain a
relationship with the child must be more than minimal. Id. at ¶ 21. And
“when circumstances prevent the . . . [parent] from exercising traditional
methods of bonding with [her] child, [she] must act persistently to establish
the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert [her] legal
rights to the extent necessary.” Id. at ¶ 22.

¶17            In sum, although a voluntary guardianship is one factor to
consider, it also does not automatically prevent a court from concluding a
parent has abandoned a child. See A.R.S. § 8-533(A)-(B)(1) (no express
limitation preventing legal guardians from filing a termination petition).

¶18           Guardians also assert that the substantial weight of the
evidence supports a finding that Mother abandoned L.S. after she was
incarcerated because she provided the child “no money, no clothes, no
health care, no shelter, no care, no more than one or two cards, no gifts, no
letters, and no parental input or guidance,” and had not seen or spoken to
L.S. since May 2018.

¶19            We need not address this argument, however, because the
court impliedly found that Mother had abandoned L.S. over four years by
“fail[ing] to maintain a normal parental relationship” with her. See Trimble
Cattle Co. v. Henry & Horne, 122 Ariz. 44, 46 (App. 1979) (This court must
“assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support the
judgment.”). Still, the court denied the termination petition because it also
found that Mother had just cause for failing to maintain a relationship with
her child. See Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 1 (App. 2013) (A
guardian “who has persistently and substantially restricted [a] . . . parent’s
interaction with their child may not prove abandonment based on evidence
that the other has had only limited involvement with the child.”).

¶20          Guardians assert that no reasonable evidence supports this
finding and the court improperly placed Mother’s duty to maintain the

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                        Decision of the Court

parental relationship on them. They further contend that all the law
requires is “that they not interfere with Mother’s access” to the child.

¶21           The superior court applied incorrect legal principles.
Although the court found Mother “had just cause,” for failing to maintain
a relationship with L.S., it did not reference the Calvin B. standard in the
order or expressly analyze whether Guardians acted persistently and
substantially to restrict Mother’s access to the child.

¶22            Instead, the superior court found that Guardians did “nothing
. . . to attempt to foster a relationship between the child and Mother,” and
at times, “delayed any contact with Mother, citing unfamiliarity with the
system at the prison.” The superior court also faulted Guardians for not
asking maternal grandmother, with whom they had contact, about
facilitating prison communication between Mother and L.S. But inaction
and delay alone do not necessarily amount to “persistent and substantial”
restriction, and the court’s order did not analyze the issue further. Cf. Calvin
B., 232 Ariz. at 297, ¶¶ 21-24 (child’s mother refused to allow father
parenting time in violation of court order).

¶23           Also concerning is the court’s reliance on a phone call
between Mother and Timothy C. The court found that during the call,
Mother “expresse[d] her desire to . . . rebuild [her] relationship” with L.S.,
and Timothy C. warned that Father may want to get full custody, so he
wanted to “protect [her] interests, too.” The court’s finding implies that
Timothy C. sought to discourage Mother’s attempts to have contact with
L.S. by raising the issue of Father’s potential reaction.

¶24            The court’s finding is inconsistent with the record. During the
phone call, Mother did not ask for video visits. Timothy C. spontaneously
raised the topic. Mother replied she was “off on Saturdays . . . if we could
ever get [L.S.] to wanna see me.” Timothy C. replied that L.S. “just hasn’t
seen you for a long, long time and probably has the same nervousness”
Mother had. Mother acknowledged, “It’s gonna be a process I’m gonna
have to take at [L.S.’s] pace when I get out[,] . . . but that is still a few years
away.”

¶25           The conversation then turned to Mother’s employment plans
upon her release, and eventually, to Father, his new marriage, and his
recent visit with L.S. Timothy C. then explained, “when [Father and his
new wife are] here, they seem to have . . . a special interest in [L.S.]. But
when they leave and go away, it’s not very often they [call] to check up on
her or anything like that. But I thought they were gonna make a run at

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getting custody of her. With him being married and all that now, and
[having] somebody . . . who can take care of [L.S.], I wanted to protect your
interests too.” He shared his worry that Father may “take advantage of
[Mother’s] situation” and that it would “be so easy . . . for him to try to take
custody of [L.S.].” Mother agreed, and the phone call ended. Thus, the
conversation about Father’s interest in L.S. did not directly follow Mother’s
expressed desire to “get [L.S.] to wanna see me,” and it was unclear what
Timothy C. was referring to.

¶26           Because the superior court’s order does not express or apply
the correct legal principle for a finding of “just cause,” and on this record,
no reasonable evidence supports such a finding, we vacate the order
finding the abandonment ground was not proven.

III.   Length of Felony Sentence

¶27           Guardians argue the superior court erred under the length-
of-sentence ground by finding that they were required to make “reasonable
and diligent efforts to provide reunification services and maintain the
familial bond while [Mother] was incarcerated.” They contend this
requirement is not expressly required by A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), and any
constitutional duty to provide services is applicable only when the State
seeks termination.

¶28           In its order, the superior court applied Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 582, ¶ 21 (2021), which holds that when DCS seeks to
terminate parental rights under the length-of-sentence ground, it has a
constitutional duty to make reasonable efforts to “initiate measures
designed to address an incarcerated parent’s desire to maintain a parent-
child relationship.” The duty is triggered when the incarcerated parent
requests services, such as visitation, and applies only if providing the
services or visitation does not endanger the child. Id. However, Jessie D.’s
holding specifically applies to situations in which the State is a petitioner;
it does not apply to a private petitioner.

¶29          Mother argues the superior court cited Jessie D. only to
highlight Guardians’ “failure to provide contact with the child” and to liken
its “requirement to the placement [in State-initiated cases] who can’t deny
any contact with the parent and then claim that the factors for Michael J.
apply.” See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251-52, ¶ 29. But Mother cites no
authority to support her proposition that Guardians had any duty to
provide contact between L.S. and Mother. Moreover, the superior court did

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not expressly find that Guardians denied contact between Mother and L.S.
At most, it found that they delayed contact.

¶30           We therefore reject Mother’s attempt to parse the court’s
order. The court specifically found that Guardians “have not made
reasonable and diligent efforts to provide reunification services and
maintain the familial bond while the parent was incarcerated.” It therefore
erred in finding Guardians had a duty to “maintain the familial bond while
[Mother] was incarcerated.” The court’s misapplication of Jessie D. to this
case directly affected its analysis of the Michael J. factors. See 196 Ariz. at
251-52, ¶ 29. For these reasons, we vacate the court’s order denying
termination under the length-of-sentence ground.

                               CONCLUSION

¶31          We vacate the superior court’s order denying termination
under the abandonment and length-of-sentence grounds and remand for
proceedings consistent with this decision.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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