Court Opinion

ID: 9363733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 16:00:20.441426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:33.697502
License: Public Domain

21-2079
United States v. Van Der End

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

      At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 17th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.

          PRESENT:Amalya L. Kearse,
                  Rosemary S. Pooler,
                  Steven J. Menashi,
                          Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                   Appellee,
             v.                                                               No. 21-2079-cr
STEFAN VAN DER END, aka STEFAN VAN DAM EASEL,
                   Defendant-Appellant,
RICHARD DOW, GER PLAGIO SUAREZ,
                   Defendants. *
____________________________________________

*   The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
For Appellee:                          Amanda Houle, Karl Metzner, Assistant
                                       United    States    Attorneys,   for   Damian
                                       Williams, United States Attorney for the
                                       Southern District of New York, New York,
                                       NY.

For Defendant-Appellant:               Stefan Van Der End, pro se, White Deer, PA.

      Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Sullivan, J.).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,           IT   IS    HEREBY       ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order entered by the district court is
AFFIRMED.

      Appellant Stefan Van Der End, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion. The district
court ruled that, even if Van Der End had established extraordinary and
compelling reasons justifying release, the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
weighed against reducing his sentence. Van Der End is currently serving his 300-
month sentence for cocaine trafficking. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

      A district court may, in an exercise of its discretion, reduce an inmate’s term
of imprisonment by granting a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)—
the “compassionate release” provision—if (1) the inmate has exhausted
administrative remedies, (2) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor a sentence
reduction, and (3) the inmate’s circumstances are extraordinary and compelling
“such that, in light of these § 3553(a) factors, a sentence reduction is justified …
and would not simply constitute second-guessing of the sentence previously
imposed.” United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2021). We have emphasized
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons are necessary—but not sufficient—for
a defendant to obtain relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th
371, 374 (2d Cir. 2021). We review the denial of such a motion for abuse of
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discretion and will affirm unless the district court’s ruling was based on a legal or
factual error or cannot otherwise “be located within the range of permissible
decisions.” Keitt, 21 F.4th at 71 (quoting United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 122
(2d Cir. 2021)).

      The district court denied Van Der End compassionate release on the basis of
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. “[W]hen a district court denies a defendant’s
motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in sole reliance on the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, it need not determine whether the defendant has shown extraordinary and
compelling reasons that might (in other circumstances) justify a sentence
reduction.” Keitt, 21 F.4th at 69. In its analysis, the district court emphasized the
seriousness of the offense, the significant quantity of drugs Van Der End
personally transported, and his prior conviction in Europe for a nearly identical
offense for which he was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.

      The district court acted within the bounds of its discretion, and Van Der
End’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, he claims that the district
court failed properly to consider his supplemental brief, in which he argued that
the conditions of his confinement—both prior to his conviction and after his
conviction—constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his
release. Second, he argues that the district court overlooked a sentencing disparity
between his sentence and that of a co-defendant. We disagree and therefore affirm.

      The contention that the district court failed to consider Van Der End’s
supplemental brief is meritless. The district court found the brief’s primary
argument unpersuasive, determining that the conditions of Van Der End’s
confinement both on the ship and while incarcerated did not affect the district
court’s “conclusion that a sentence of 25 years is appropriate given the staggering
amount of drugs involved and the potential harm that those drugs represent.”
United States v. Van Der End, No. 16-CR-453, 2021 WL 3374531, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
3, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[w]e have time and
time again made it clear that we do not insist that the district court address every
argument the defendant has made.” United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 112 (2d

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Cir. 2010). We accordingly find Van Der End’s argument regarding inadequate
consideration of his supplemental brief unpersuasive.

      Moreover, while “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct” is a factor courts must consider under § 3553(a)(6), “the weight to be
afforded any § 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the
sentencing judge and is beyond our review, as long as the sentence ultimately
imposed is reasonable.” United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that § 3553(a)(6) concerns
“nationwide sentencing disparities” and does not require a district court to
address disparities among codefendants. United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 236
(2d Cir. 2008). Even so, the district court noted that the apparent disparity here
was justified based on the characteristics of the defendants and their differing
criminal histories. That Van Der End received a higher sentence than one of his co-
defendants neither compels granting his compassionate release motion nor
justifies disturbing the district court’s decision on his motion.

                                       *        *    *
      We have considered Van Der End’s remaining arguments, which we
conclude are without merit. We AFFIRM the order of the district court.

                                           FOR THE COURT:
                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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