Court Opinion

ID: 9819225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:27.133503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.530466
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SLATER, dissenting: Rather than conducting a meaningful analysis and application of constitutional guidelines, the majority declares, based solely on the statute’s exemption of advertising vehicles, that the statute regulates speech on the basis of content without a compelling state interest. I find that such a mechanical approach trivializes the first amendment and must disagree with the majority’s conclusion. In setting out the two-tiered system of constitutional scrutiny, the majority refers briefly to Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 622, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445, for the principle that the most exacting scrutiny must apply to regulations that suppress, disadvantage or impose differential burdens on speech because of its content. However, the majority fails to address a critical distinction highlighted by the Court, which is that not all regulations distinguishing between speakers warrant strict scrutiny. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 622, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445. Instead, it is only if the speaker-based law reflects a governmental preference or aversion to the content of the speech that the law is subject to strict scrutiny under the first amendment. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 622, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445. In Turner Broadcasting, cable television operators brought actions challenging the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (47 U.S.C. § 521 et seq. (1992 Supp.)) which required cable systems to carry local broadcast stations. Rather than reaching a hasty conclusion that the must-carry provisions were unconstitutional simply because the provisions treated different speakers differently, the Court instead recognized the difficulty in determining content neutrality and returned to the guiding principle set forth in Ward that the primary inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 642, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 517, 114 S. Ct. at 2459, citing Ward, 491 U.S. 781, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746. “The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” (Emphasis added.) Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 675, 109 S. Ct. at 2754. If the manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it contains, then clearly the regulation is content-based. By contrast, if the overriding purpose in enacting a law is unrelated to the content of the expression, the law in most instances will be deemed content neutral. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 622, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445. Acknowledging that the must-carry provisions distinguished between speakers, the Turner Court nonetheless could not justify application of the most exacting level of first amendment scrutiny because there was no evidence that the must-carry provisions threatened free expression or created the potential for censorship or manipulation. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 622, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445. Instead, the Court found that “the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the constitutionality of [the provisions] is the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech.” Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 530, 114 S. Ct. at 2469. Under the intermediate level of scrutiny, a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if “it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672, 680, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (1968). In determining content neutrality of the instant statute, the essential question is whether the legislature preferred commercial speech over noncommercial speech based on the content or the viewpoint expressed by the different speakers. The answer is a resounding no. There is no reason to believe that the regulation is biased in favor of any particular point of view, nor is there evidence of legislative intent to suppress unpopular ideas or to manipulate the public debate in any way. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 622, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445. The legislature adopted the statute to prevent the excessive volume emitted from so-called “boom box cars” in order to promote traffic safety (vehicular and pedestrian) and to limit undue noise pollution, which are legitimate, substantial government interests. None of these interests is related to the content of the expression, nor is there any danger of government censorship, manipulation or suppression of free expression. I disagree with the majority that the exemption for advertising vehicles is sufficient to transform the statute into a content-based regulation and thereby trigger strict scrutiny. There is no evidence that the statute was designed to favor commercial speech or that it was enacted because of the legislature’s aversion with the content of amplified noncommercial expression. The legislature may have rationally concluded that advertising vehicles do not present the same dangers to the public peace and safety and decided to exempt them from the statute. The exemption for advertising vehicles is merely incidental to the manifest purpose of the statute and does not undermine the constitutionality of the regulatory scheme nor does it change the character of the statute as a proper time, place and manner regulation. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). So long as the law is not a subtle means of exercising a content preference, a law that distinguishes between speakers is not automatically presumed invalid under the first amendment. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. 622, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445. The argument that the very basis of the statute was to prohibit (or limit) noncommercial speech in favor of commercial speech must fail. There simply is no evidence of legislative intent to that effect and such a mechanical interpretation of the statute would denigrate the “high purposes of the First Amendment.” Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 569, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 854, 101 S. Ct. at 2924 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). “The essential concern embodied in the First Amendment is that government not impose its viewpoint on the public or select the topics on which public debate is permissible.” Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 553, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 843, 101 S. Ct. at 2916 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The majority’s hasty treatment of Turner Broadcasting resulted in a misinterpretation of the appropriate standard of review. Had the majority applied the intermediate level of scrutiny as indicated by the Turner Court, it would have undoubtedly reached a different result. With due respect, I also must disagree with the majority’s claim that Discovery Network speaks to the point of conflict in the instant case. Discovery Network struck down a city ordinance that categorically and completely banned the distribution of commercial publications through newsracks located on public property based on the city’s failure to provide a neutral justification for the ordinance. As an example of “neutral justification,” the Court in Discovery Network cited to its decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), which upheld an ordinance imposing particular zoning regulations on adult movie theaters. The Renton Court recognized that the ordinance did not fall neatly into the “content-based” or “content-neutral” category in that the ordinance treated theaters that specialized in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters. Nonetheless, the ordinance was upheld because it was justified not by an interest in suppressing adult films, but by the city’s concern for the “secondary effects” of such theaters on the surrounding neighborhood. Similarly, the justification for the instant statute is not an interest in suppressing free expression but rather an interest in limiting the “secondary effects” of such uninhibited expression (i.e., limiting the earsplitting noises emitted from “boom box cars”). And, according to Renton, even though the instant statute may not fit neatly into either the “content-based” or “content-neutral” category, the statute should be upheld if it can be justified by neutral interests in preserving the peace and tranquility of our state. The ordinance in Discovery Network failed constitutional muster because it was a “categorical,” “sweeping,” and complete ban. Neither of these descriptions fits the statute at issue here. More importantly, I believe the majority here ignored the Court’s admonition that the holding in Discovery Network was narrow. “As should be clear from the above discussion, we do not reach the question whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a community might be able to justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial [speech].” Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 115, 113 S. Ct. at 1516. Clearly, the Court did not reach the issue raised in the instant case. Instead, the implication is that, under certain facts and circumstances, a statute that distinguishes between commercial and noncommercial speech may withstand constitutional muster. Finally, I believe that the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied because the statute promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 679, 109 S. Ct. at 2757, citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985). The statute targets the problem of excessive noise from “boom box cars” and eliminates that problem without at the same time banning or significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same problems. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 n.7, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 681 n.7, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 n.7. In conclusion, even though the sound amplification statute distinguishes among speakers, I believe that it is a content-neutral regulation representing a proper exercise of the state’s police power to provide for the relative peace, tranquility ánd safety of all its citizens. Consequently, I would uphold the statute.