Court Opinion

ID: 9369974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 15:04:34.272364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.131249
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals

                                 NO. 2021-CA-1294-MR

CHRISTOPHER CAMERON, JR.                                                     APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 13-CI-00210

EMILY SMITH                                                                    APPELLEE

                                        OPINION
                                       AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Christopher Cameron, Jr. (“Father”), pro se,

appeals the Greenup Circuit Court order denying his motion for visitation1 with his

three minor children (the “children”).

1
 The motion was officially titled, “Motion to Establish Reunification Plan with Minor Children”
but detailed a plan to start visitation; therefore, we will refer to it as such.
                    I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                 In 2013, Father and appellee Emily Smith (“Mother”) dissolved their

marriage. The dissolution decree granted them joint custody of the children and

designated Mother as primary residential parent. The decree further provided that

Father would receive visitation/timesharing according to Schedule B of the

Greenup County Visitation Guidelines.2 After years of tension between Mother

and Father and Father continuously attempting to modify his child support

payments to Mother, the event that spurred this litigation occurred.

                 In 2018, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services3 filed a lien on

Father’s bank account for past-due child support, which froze his account. Father

learned of the freeze while on a camping trip with the children and went into a

frenzy in front of the children, threatening to kill Mother. Mother then filed a

motion for immediate relief to suspend Father’s visitation. In her affidavit, Mother

stated that Father had told the children that “it was ‘D-Day’ and he had a loaded

gun in the car.” Further, she testified that Father had told her to sleep with one eye

open and said he was going to shoot her, then told the children “that they should

2
    Usually, he had the children twice a week and every other weekend.
3
 The Cabinet for Health and Family Services was not involved in this action aside from its
administration of child support payments.

                                                -2-
call [Mother] to say goodbye because he was going to jail, and [she] was going to

heaven.”

              Additionally, Mother stated in her affidavit that Father used one of the

children “as a hostage” – refusing to let her participate in a basketball tournament –

to try to force Mother to sign paperwork stating he did not owe child support

arrearages. On another occasion, Mother testified that Father grabbed her during a

child drop-off and told her he would kill her. Mother explained that the children

were “terrified” of Father and the youngest child repeatedly asked whether they

would have to see him again and whether he would bring them back to her. In a

separate matter,4 an emergency protective order was put in place against Father.

              Following a hearing on Mother’s motion, in late-October 2018, the

circuit court entered an agreed order suspending Father’s visitation/timesharing

and contact with the children. Further, the order stated that the children would

attend counseling; that Father would attend counseling for his anger and parenting

issues; and that Father could not contact Mother or the children.

              A month and a half later, in December 2018, Father moved to

reinstate visitation; or in the alternative, to allow telephone communication. Father

4
 Additionally, Father was charged with terroristic threatening due to his actions toward Mother.
One of Father’s bond conditions in that case was to stay away from, and have no contact with,
Mother or the children.

                                              -3-
argued that he had attended five5 counseling sessions and felt he should have

visitation again. However, Mother noted that the children had been in counseling

for only a short time and still needed to work through the traumatic events that had

occurred. The circuit court ordered that Father could have telephone contact with

the children only upon recommendation of the children’s counselor (“Counselor

Nichols”). Counselor Nichols never recommended such contact.

               This pattern continued for the next couple of years: Father would

move to alter his visitation every few weeks; Mother would argue that the children

were not yet ready; and the circuit court would request that Father submit

documentation showing his counseling progress. Father would fail to submit such

documentation and the circuit court would deny his motion.

               Eventually, Father moved the circuit court to appoint a Friend of the

Court (“FOC”) and recommended Honorable Kristin Francis. The circuit court

then appointed Honorable Kristin Francis as FOC (“FOC Francis”) to interview the

parties and children and provide a report to the circuit court.

               At the end of May 2019, FOC Francis submitted her report on behalf

of the children. In preparation, FOC Francis had reviewed the record, interviewed

Counselor Nichols, attempted to contact Father’s counselor multiple times, and

5
  The first letter from Father’s counselor stated he had been seen for five appointments; however,
the second letter stated the counselor had seen him on four occasions.

                                               -4-
interviewed the children. The report stated that Counselor Nichols, however, had

contacted Father’s counselor and the counselors spoke extensively about Father’s

progress. Father’s counselor told Counselor Nichols that Father’s sessions focused

on “what he c[ould] do to get his kids back” not his anger issues. Counselor

Nichols noted that she believed Father needed to address his anger issues,

specifically when intoxicated.

             Further, Counselor Nichols emphasized the children’s “tremendous

fear of their father.” As such, Counselor Nichols did not believe it was safe for the

children to visit with Father until he had fully addressed his anger issues with his

counselor. At that point, she did not believe he had done so.

             During the interview with Father, he told FOC Francis that the

contentious relationship with Mother “boiled down to money” and he confirmed

that he had made comments about hurting Mother in front of the children, which he

regretted. He admitted that he was a “high intensity person” who let himself get

overly emotional in front of his children. However, FOC Francis did note that he

seemed distraught that he could not see the children and he stated he would do

whatever was necessary to be able to see them.

             When FOC Francis interviewed the children, they recounted the

events from the 2018 camping trip. They explained that Father first got angry

because one of the children wanted to attend basketball practice. They noted that

                                         -5-
Father began throwing things, including a glass of wine, and made multiple

comments about killing Mother. The oldest child also stated that she overhead

Father say, “I can’t wait to see the way [Mother’s] eyes pop out of her head when I

choke her.” They further noted that during the camping trip, Father continued to

drink alcohol and became angrier, then got in his car to drive away and told the

children that he had a loaded gun and was going to go find Mother to kill her.

             Ultimately, the children made it clear to FOC Francis that they did not

have any desire to visit with Father after the camping trip. They each reported

being terrified of seeing him because they feared he would be angry with them for

not wanting to see him. They stated that there was no scenario in which they

would want to see Father.

             Following FOC Francis’s report, Father continued to violate the

circuit court’s orders and contacted Mother, incessantly. Further, he failed to pay

for the children’s counseling sessions, per the court’s orders. Father admitted that

he had violated the orders, and the circuit court found him in contempt. The circuit

court sentenced Father to 60 days of incarceration, suspended so long as Father

paid the counseling fees and did not contact Mother or the children.

             Father then moved for production of the children’s counseling records

and for a status conference. Mother noted that the “guardian ad litem/friend of the

                                         -6-
court”6 had been appointed to review such documents and had already reported her

findings to the court. The circuit court overruled Father’s motion and ordered the

“Guardian Ad-litem” to file a report on the status of counseling. Additionally,

Father was to file a report on the status of his counseling.

              FOC Francis then supplemented her report with an update on the

children’s counseling. FOC Francis explained that the children had been seen

multiple times, with sessions ending in May 2019. Counselor Nichols had reported

that the children did very well during their sessions, and they had ceased sessions

because they were “secure and comfortable” with Mother. At that time, Counselor

Nichols had not been updated on Father’s counseling progress. FOC Francis again

attempted to contact Father’s counselor – multiple times – but was unsuccessful.

              When FOC Francis spoke with Father on his progress, he mentioned

that he did not believe he needed to continue counseling. FOC Francis informed

him that Counselor Nichols had spoken with his counselor and concluded that he

needed to continue his counseling sessions. At that point, Father noted that he had

not been to counseling in “a couple of months.”

              Then again, in late 2019, Mother moved for contempt of Father and

for his incarceration. Father had shown up to two of the children’s ballgames,

6
 After using both terms, Mother’s counsel used “guardian ad litem” throughout the response.
This is noted because Father later argues that such misidentification of FOC Francis was an
“abuse of discretion.”

                                             -7-
despite the circuit court’s June 2019 order stating “absolutely no contact with

[Mother] or [the children] . . .” and Father previously being found in contempt for

contacting Mother. These incidents triggered the youngest child’s anxiety, which

led to reinstatement of his counseling sessions. In October 2019, the circuit court

found Father had violated the June 2019 order on three separate occasions when he

attended the children’s ballgames and contacted one of the children. Therefore, the

circuit court set aside the incarceration suspension and sentenced Father to 60 days

in the Greenup County Detention Center.

             In late October 2019, Father’s attorney withdrew, citing that he could

be of no further assistance to Father and that there were no matters pending for

which Father needed representation.

             Throughout 2019 and 2020, the pattern continued, with Father filing

back-to-back-to-back motions with the circuit court for visitation. The circuit

court denied each of them, however, because Father failed to submit

documentation of his counseling progress, as requested. Finally, in October 2020,

Father began counseling in Washington, D.C., and his counselor noted in a letter

that he had attended six appointments. Upon the recommendation of the

counselor, Father completed a four-hour virtual anger management class in January

2021 and a four-hour virtual co-parenting class in February 2021. Additionally, he

completed a psychological evaluation in March 2021.

                                         -8-
               In June 2021, Father filed a motion to establish a reunification plan

with the children and attached a letter from his counselor noting his attendance and

progress; certificates of completion from his two online courses; the psychological

evaluation report; reference letters from a neighbor, a life coach, and a family

friend; and affidavits from Father’s mother and brother. Specifically, the motion

requested that the circuit court amend the October 2018 order, which had modified

Father’s visitation rights, to “create a clear path toward reunification with [the]

children.”

               Further, the motion claimed that the record was “missing key facts

and details that could have dramatically altered the direction of this case and the

Court’s impression of [Father].”7 Finally, Father insisted that he was ignorant

when he “hastily” signed the October 2018 agreed order “under intense duress,

under bad legal counsel and under the assumption his children were going to testify

against him in open Court.”

7
  These “missing facts” included Father’s insistence that he had apologized to his children on the
evening of the 2018 camping trip, “[y]et for some unknown reason, the two adults who actually
saw what happened [that night] were never called to testify . . . .” Additionally, Father claimed
his previous attorney was largely the reason for his troubles. He claimed the attorney told Father
he could attend his children’s sporting events following the no contact order and that the attorney
failed to inform him of the cease-and-desist letter following his first appearance at a game.
Further, Father claimed there was a conspiracy to “hide” these facts from the circuit court.
Father concluded that the attorney’s actions created the “impression” that he had no respect for
the court’s orders, the cease-and-desist letter, Mother, or his children, not that he, in fact, had no
respect for them. Father claimed that his former attorney “told [Father] to commit [contempt].”

                                                 -9-
                 Father then proposed a three-phase therapeutic reunification plan.

Phase One incorporated supervised Skype calls and eventual supervised visits of

increasing length, all while continuing counseling. Phase Two then incorporated

longer, unsupervised visits and Phase Three added mediation to determine a future

parenting schedule, and rights and responsibilities moving forward. The parties

would not move on from Phase One until Father provided status updates to the

circuit court and it ordered advancement to Phase Two.

                 In response, Mother emphasized that Father had downplayed his role

in the situation, blaming his shortcomings on his previous attorney and failing to

acknowledge that he had engaged in acts of violence and terroristic threatening.

The children had residual effects of the trauma and had no desire to communicate

with Father. Mother added that the company with which Father completed his

online courses recommended eight hours for each of the courses, not eight hours

total. Therefore, Mother concluded that Father attempted the “bare minimum” to

check off some boxes. Finally, Mother objected to the admission of the remaining

attachments because they were uncertified and there had not been an opportunity

for cross examination.8

                 In September 2021, the circuit court heard Father’s motion for

visitation. Present were Mother, represented by counsel; Father, pro se; Counselor

8
    This Court did not consider these documents in this Opinion.

                                                -10-
Nichols; FOC Francis; Lawrence Craft, Father’s friend; and Gail Cameron,

Father’s mother. Father testified that he had three sessions with his counselor over

the course of three years, with his last session six months prior to the hearing.

Further, he testified that he renewed his faith, stopped drinking as regularly, and

promised that he was a changed man.

             Mother testified that the children were more relaxed without

visitation, and each could act more like “normal children.” Further, she testified

that the oldest child had blocked Father on her phone. Mother noted that the

youngest was much calmer now but still occasionally fixated on whether the house

doors were locked, if he was triggered. Mother also emphasized that the children

had no desire to see Father and that they never talked about him.

             Counselor Nichols testified that the two older children met with her

only a couple of times because they were able to get to a stable place quickly. The

youngest child, however, took longer to process that summer’s events, then had

restarted counseling once Father unexpectedly showed up at his game the next

year. Counselor Nichols further testified that she did not think Father’s counseling

had been sufficient because it had not specifically addressed his anger. She still

had concerns about the children restarting visitation with Father. She emphasized

that the long-term work Father needed to complete before reuniting with the

children could not have been completed in three sessions over three years. She

                                         -11-
explained that until those standards were met, she could not recommend

reunification.

               FOC Francis then testified as FOC.9 Further, FOC Francis stated that

she had interviewed the children multiple times since 2019 and reviewed the

counseling records. FOC Francis recommended that the children not have contact

with Father. She noted that the children had “come into [her] office and expressed

a fear that [Father] will hurt [Mother] that exceeded anything I have seen in a very

long time. [The youngest child] really lives with that fear.” She was adamant that

the children did not want to see Father. FOC Francis applauded Father’s ability to

get “over” the events from 2018, but made it clear that the children still had not.

               Lawrence Craft testified as to Father’s character, but noted that he had

not been in contact with Father since Father moved to Washington, D.C. several

years earlier. Finally, Gail Cameron testified that she had not seen the children

since August 2018, but she believed that her son had changed.

               In October 2021, the circuit court overruled Father’s motion for

visitation because despite a few statements and “certificates of completion,” Father

failed to provide proof that there had been any change in his behavior by way of

9
  The circuit court and FOC Francis clearly stated that she was “appointed as Friend of the Court,
as opposed to Guardian ad litem” and that she had submitted her reports in that capacity, but she
would testify, if asked, because she had spoken with the children since she submitted her initial
reports. Further, FOC Francis testified that she was “not the guardian ad litem, [she was] not
representing them in that particular way, but [she had] formed a relationship with the children
and they don’t want this.”

                                              -12-
professional testimony or other evidence to verify his position. The circuit court

reminded the parties that it had stopped contact due to Father’s “outrageous

behavior and the harm that it was doing to the children.” Absent evidence that

such behaviors had changed, the circuit court would not reinstate visitation at that

time.

             Additionally, the circuit court emphasized that the children still did

not want contact with Father – noting the oldest child had blocked him from her

phone. The testimony provided that the children had not yet gotten over Father

terrorizing them and threatening to kill Mother. As such, the circuit court found by

clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to the children to

reintroduce Father into their lives “at that time.” Further, the circuit court noted

Counselor Nichols’s concerns about the children being around Father and FOC

Francis’s recommendation that the no contact order remain in place.

             Father appeals the circuit court’s October 2021 order denying his

motion for visitation.

                          II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

             This Court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision regarding

visitation unless the “determination constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion or

was clearly erroneous in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Ryan v.

Ryan, 473 S.W.3d 637, 639 (Ky. App. 2015) (citing Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d

                                         -13-
521, 525 (Ky. App. 2000)). “The test is not whether we would have decided the

issue differently, but whether the findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous

or an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky.

1982)).

                                         III.   ANALYSIS

                 Father claims that the circuit court abused its discretion regarding

multiple findings: (A) that it de facto terminated his parental rights without due

process; (B) that it did not make a reasonable effort to reunify the children with

him; (C) that FOC Francis did not comply with her statutory obligations as a

Friend of the Court; (D) that Counselor Nichols did not provide a clear plan of

care; (E) that the circuit court adopted erroneous facts; and (F) that the circuit court

failed to prepare an adequate “Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law” under

CR10 52.01.

         A.      De facto Termination of Parental Rights

                 First, Father argues that the circuit court de facto terminated his

parental rights without due process. Father acknowledges that he voluntarily

suspended his visitation/timesharing schedule in the October 2018 agreed order;

10
     Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.

                                                -14-
however, he argues that the failure of the October 2021 order to establish a

reunification plan permanently terminated his parental rights.11 We disagree.

                As stated, “the family court has broad discretion” to modify

timesharing. Layman v. Bohanon, 599 S.W.3d 423, 431 (Ky. 2020) (citation

omitted). Therefore, the question before this Court is whether the circuit court

abused that discretion when it denied Father’s motion for visitation, “in light of the

facts and circumstances of the case.” Drury, 32 S.W.3d at 525.

                Generally, the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained that it has two

options when determining whether to modify visitation: it could (1) modify

visitation if it found that would be in the best interest of the children; or (2) it could

restrict timesharing if it found the children’s “physical, mental, moral or emotional

health was seriously endangered.” Layman, 599 S.W.3d at 431 (citing KRS12

403.320(3)); see also Moore v. Moore, 626 S.W.3d 535, 538 (Ky. 2021) (citing

KRS 403.320(3)).

                However, this Court has clarified that the analysis shifts slightly when

“a prior order . . . denied visitation.” McNeeley v. McNeeley, 45 S.W.3d 876, 877

(Ky. App. 2001). In those cases, “the presumption of entitlement to visitation is no

11
   Father summarizes the history of the case and the resulting string of orders. Further, he takes
issue with nearly all of them, claiming each is contradictory and unfair. However, importantly,
those orders are not on appeal. Therefore, our focus remains on the October 2021 order before
this Court, which denied Father’s motion for visitation.
12
     Kentucky Revised Statute.

                                               -15-
longer a factor[,]” and “the standard for modification is not serious endangerment;

rather, the best interests of the children governs.” Id. at 877-78 (citing Hornback v.

Hornback, 636 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky. App. 1982)).

             Here, the circuit court had previously denied Father’s motions for

visitation (on multiple occasions); therefore, there was no longer a presumption of

entitlement to visitation and the best interests of the children governed. The circuit

court followed that standard and conducted a best interest analysis, which found –

based, in part, on Mother, Counselor Nichols, and FOC Francis’s testimonies – that

the children had not yet gotten over Father terrorizing them and threatening to kill

Mother. As such, the circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that it

would be detrimental to the children to reintroduce Father into their lives “at that

time.” Further, the circuit court found that Father had not provided adequate

evidence that he had overcome the issues that resulted in the agreed order.

             Counselor Nichols and FOC Francis did not mince words when they

proclaimed that they did not recommend the children be around Father. Further,

the oldest child’s decision to block Father on her personal phone weighed heavily

on the circuit court. The circuit court’s reliance on such evidence in maintaining

the current visitation schedule – again, “at this time,” not permanently – was

supported by sufficient evidence and not an abuse of discretion.

                                         -16-
               Additionally, Father argues that the circuit court “circumvented the

clear statutory processes” to involuntarily terminate his parental rights. He argues

the circuit court’s failure to adhere to KRS 625.050-KRS 625.090 when

terminating his rights deprived him of due process. As Mother noted, however,

termination of parental rights under those statutes is a completely separate cause of

action – one which we do not find here, not even “de facto.” As such, the circuit

court’s avoidance of statutes that did not apply was not an abuse of discretion.

       B.      Reasonable Efforts to Reunify

               Father next argues that the circuit court did not make a “reasonable

effort” to reunify Father with the children. Importantly, however, the circuit court

had no duty to do so. Despite Father’s acknowledgement of that reality, he

essentially argues that it is unfair for parents in dependency, neglect, and abuse

actions13 to have greater opportunities to reunify with their children than he did.

Although we are sensitive to Father’s desire to reunify, we cannot ascribe duties to

the circuit court from statutes under which this action was not brought.

Unfortunately, perceived lack of fairness is not a legal cause of action.

13
   Father also notes that the Family First Prevention Act – another piece of legislation irrelevant
to this case – references “reasonable efforts.”

                                               -17-
      C.     Friend of the Court Duties

             Third, Father argues that FOC Francis did not comply with her

statutory obligations as Friend of the Court because (1) she did not complete a

thorough investigation; and (2) she acted in the capacity of a guardian ad litem and

Friend of the Court. It is unclear exactly what Father is claiming, but he states that

because FOC Francis is an officer of the court, Father applied “the ‘abuse of

discretion’ standard of review to [FOC Francis’s] investigation and

recommendations.” He therefore concludes that because “[FOC Francis] abused

her discretion,” the circuit court did as well.

             Importantly, however, appellate standards of review apply to the order

on appeal, i.e., the order this Court is reviewing. Therefore, here, this Court uses

the applicable standard of review to analyze the October 2021 order. Father’s

standard for his own “review” of a third-party’s report is irrelevant and does not

transfer to the circuit court. Further, if Father took issue with FOC Francis’s

reports, he needed to address those with the circuit court years ago, when she

submitted them. This Court may only review such claims; we cannot make the

initial determinations regarding them. Drury, 32 S.W.3d at 526 (“Since the issue

was not raised in the proceeding below prior to the filing of the notice of appeal,

we conclude that it is not properly presented on appeal.”).

                                          -18-
             Nevertheless, here, FOC Francis interviewed the children, their

counselor, Mother and Father, and reviewed the counseling records and case

history. Further, she provided detailed reports describing the family dynamics, the

events that led to those issues, and the children’s progress during counseling. The

circuit court did not abuse its discretion by relying, in part, on the work product for

which it had appointed her.

             Second, the record is clear that FOC Francis understood the capacity

under which the circuit court appointed her. During the 2021 hearing, the circuit

court and FOC Francis clearly acknowledged that she was “appointed as Friend of

the Court, as opposed to Guardian ad litem” and that she had submitted her reports

in that capacity. She agreed to testify, if asked, because she had spoken with the

children since she had submitted her initial reports. Neither party objected.

Further, FOC Francis testified that she was “not the guardian ad litem, [she was]

not representing them in that particular way, but [she had] formed a relationship

with the children” and testified as to that relationship.

             There is substantial evidence that FOC Francis and the circuit court

were aware of FOC Francis’s capacity, despite a single motion and order from

years earlier that used “guardian ad litem” instead of “friend of the court.” FOC

Francis clearly understood that she was serving as FOC and had submitted her

reports and testified as such. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

                                          -19-
         D.     Counselor Nichols’s Plan of Care

                Fourth, Father claims that Counselor Nichols did not provide a clear

plan of care. He argues that 201 KAR14 36:040(4), the Code of Ethics for Licensed

Professional Counselors, compelled Counselor Nichols to devise a counseling plan

for the children. And further, that her failure to do so “led the [circuit] court to

abuse its discretion.”

                Again, that issue was never raised with the circuit court and is not

properly before this Court. Drury, 32 S.W.3d at 526. Father never questioned

whether Counselor Nichols had developed a plan for the children or whether she

had violated her code of ethics in the circuit court.15 But even if he had tried, the

circuit court was not the appropriate venue to initiate such action. The appropriate

administrative process requires submission of a complaint under 201 KAR 36:050.

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

         E.     Erroneous Facts

                Although Father claims that the circuit court adopted erroneous facts,

facts are not “clearly erroneous if supported by substantial evidence.” Ehret v.

Ehret, 601 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Ky. App. 2020) (citing Janakakis-Kostun v.

14
     Kentucky Administrative Regulation.
15
  Further, the circuit court was evaluating Father’s adherence to a counseling program to
determine whether his anger management and parenting issues had been mitigated. At that point,
whether and how much the children attended counseling was irrelevant to when Father could
restart visitation.

                                            -20-
Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (Ky. App. 1999)). “Substantial evidence is that

evidence, when taken alone or in the light of all the evidence, has sufficient

probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.” Id.

             Therefore, the question before this Court is whether the circuit court’s

findings of fact were supported by evidence of sufficient probative value.

Specifically, Father takes issue with two such “adoptions” of erroneous fact: (1)

the circuit court’s alleged renaming of Father’s motion; and (2) the circuit court’s

statement that Father had not provided proof by way of professional testimony or

other evidence to verify his position as “a changed man.” We will focus on those.

             First, Father claims that the circuit court referred to his motion as

“[Father’s] Motion to Start Visitation or Contact with the Parties’ Children”

instead of “Motion to Establish Reunification Plan with Minor Children,” which

Father took to mean that the circuit court did not make a “fair decision.” We

disagree.

             The circuit court’s title, although modified, relayed the correct

request: that Father was asking the court to begin visitation or begin contact with

the children. Father’s motion, as discussed, laid out a plan to start video calls,

supervised visits, and unsupervised visits with the children; i.e., start

visitation/contact with the children. There was substantial evidence that Father

was requesting visitation/contact with the children in his motion. As such, the

                                          -21-
circuit court’s decision to refer to the motion in that capacity, but without using

Father’s chosen terms, was reasonable and does not constitute reversible error.

             Second, Father argues that the attachments to his motion detailed the

therapeutic steps he took to address his anger and parenting and provided evidence

of his position. Again, we disagree. The circuit court’s October 2021 order

specifically took issue with Father’s failure to present professional testimony to

verify his “changes.” The only professionals who testified at the hearing were

Counselor Nichols and FOC Francis. Neither of them recommended that visitation

resume at that point.

             Father simply called a friend of his and his mother to testify. That

was hardly the professional credibility that the circuit court sought. Further, the

attachments to Father’s motion contained informal letters from therapists and

references and printed “certificates of completion,” none of which were certified

nor taken under penalty of perjury. Again, there was substantial evidence that

Father did not present “professional testimony” at the hearing (or in his motion);

therefore, the circuit court did not err when it stated as much.

      F.     Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law under CR 52.01

             Lastly, Father argues that the circuit court abused its discretion

because it labeled its October 2021 order, “ORDER” and did not title it “Finding of

Facts and Conclusions of Law.” Additionally, Father argues that the order failed to

                                         -22-
make the findings “highly specific,” as required by Hicks v. Halsey, 402 S.W.3d

79, 84 (Ky. App. 2013). However, Father does acknowledge that the circuit court

“appeared to make several findings in its [ORDER] but they were not labeled as

‘Findings of Fact.’” Finally, he argues that the court made no “Conclusions of

Law.”

             First, CR 52.01 does not contain title requirements. The rule simply

requires that the circuit court “find the facts specifically and state separately its

conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment[.]” CR 52.01. It

does not state that those sections must be labeled a certain way, nor that the

judgment must contain a certain title. Further, it states that “[i]f an opinion or

memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and

conclusions of law appear therein.” I.e., the form of judgment (and therefore the

title) does not matter as much as the content.

             As for Father’s reliance on Hicks, as Mother points out, this was not a

custody action. This was a motion for visitation. As such, the standard under

Hicks is irrelevant. Hicks determined whether the aunt was a de facto custodian for

custody purposes, under KRS 403.270(2). Hicks, 402 S.W.3d at 80-81. The

Kentucky Supreme Court has clarified, however, that “a modification of visitation

or timesharing is governed by KRS 403.320, rather than the standard for an initial

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custody determination as set forth in KRS 403.270.” Layman, 599 S.W.3d at 431.

As such, a case detailing a KRS 403.270 analysis is not persuasive.

             Here, Father concedes that the circuit court provided findings of fact

(although not labeled as such, which again, was not required), which we discussed

at length in Section A, above. Therefore, the only question that remains is whether

the circuit court’s order contained conclusions of law. In Anderson v. Johnson,

350 S.W.3d 453, 458-59 (Ky. 2011), the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that in a

KRS 403.320 analysis, the circuit court’s determination as to whether the

modification was in the child’s best interest was a conclusion of law. Here, the

circuit court clearly stated in its October 2021 order that visitation with Father was

not in the best interest of the children at that time, based on the testimony and

recommendations of Counselor Nichols and FOC Francis and the general

unwillingness of the children to interact with Father. Therefore, the circuit court’s

October 2021 order properly contained findings of fact and conclusions of law, and

the circuit court did not violate CR 52.01.

                                  CONCLUSION

             The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father’s

motion for visitation. As such, this Court AFFIRMS the October 2021 order of the

Greenup Circuit Court.

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           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Christopher Cameron, Jr., pro se     Sharon E. Rowsey
Washington, D.C.                     Ashland, Kentucky

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