Court Opinion

ID: 9688121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:31:56.885897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:07.631681
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 111. {dissenting). Because the majority fails to accord the required deference to the decision of the Lake District Board, I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that an owner of property located within a lake district is not required to show a change of circumstances in order to have that territory detached from the lake district. I *198respectfully dissent because the majority's ruling institutes a duplicative process that undermines a county board's previous determination that each individual property in the Lake District "will be benefited by the establishment" of such district. Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3). The term "benefited" has the same meaning in § 33.26(3), the lake district creation statute, and Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3), the statute governing detachment. In coming to an opposite conclusion, the majority both improperly interpreted § 33.33(3) and failed to avail itself of case precedent illustrating that the term "benefited," as it appears in both §§ 33.26(3) and 33.33(3), refers to each individual parcel within the lake district.
¶ 112. The majority begins its discussion of the relationship between the word "benefited" in Wis. Stat. §§ 33.26(3) and 33.33(3) by agreeing that the decision to detach is legislative. Majority op., ¶ 56. The majority then states that because the term "frontage" was not included in the lake district legislation but was included in earlier drafts of that legislation, a fair inference can be drawn that the detachment procedure for lake districts was intended to be a safeguard ensuring that a property owner is provided an individual decision regarding whether the owner's specific property is benefited by continued inclusion. Id., ¶ 57. The majority then concludes that the definition of benefit under § 33.26(3), which relates to whether property "will be benefited," is not the same as under § 33.33(3), which speaks to whether "territory is not benefited by continued inclusion in the district." Id., ¶ 58.
¶ 113. The majority needs to look no further than the statutes themselves to determine that "benefited" has the same meaning in both Wis. Stat. §§ 33.26(3) and 33.33(3). Because both statutes are in Subchapter IV of Chapter 33, the proper rule of statutory construction *199dictates that "benefited" should be attributed the same meaning unless the statutory context calls for a different meaning. Wilson v. Waukesha County, 157 Wis. 2d 790, 796, 460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting ascribing a different meaning to the word "malicious" that appeared multiple times in the same statute because the statutory structure did not call for different meanings). Here, the context does not call for a different meaning of the term "benefited."
¶ 114. In fact, the statutory context leads me to conclude that "benefited" must be defined the same way in both statutes in the same chapter. Wisconsin Stat. § 33.33(3) states, in relevant part: "Proposals for detachment shall be considered by the commissioners, and territory may be detached upon a finding that such territory is not benefited by continued inclusion in the district." (Emphasis added). The language, "not benefited by continued inclusion," indicates that the individual property that the owner is petitioning for detachment has already been determined by the county board to be benefited by inclusion in the lake district. The effect of the majority's decision is to allow members of a lake district to challenge a county board's determination that the owner's property was benefited by inclusion in the lake district by appealing to the Lake District Board without the need to show a change in circumstances. As the court of appeals noted, Donaldson's testimony during his hearing before the Lake District Board proves this point.
[LAKE DISTRICT BOARD]: [H]as anything changed since Rock County passed the resolution forming the lake district... or did they make a mistake back then when they formed this lake district?
MR. DONALDSON: I think they made a mistake back then because it was farm land when I bought it and I've *200owned if for a number of years and it's still farm land, but I don't intend to do anything else with it other than farm land.
[LAKE DISTRICT BOARD]: So there haven't been any changes in the conditions of the property since then?
MR. DONALDSON: No.
¶ 115. The court of appeals held, as did the Lake District Board, that without a showing of changed circumstances Donaldson is not entitled to detachment.1 I agree with them.
¶ 116. I find additional support for this conclusion in Wis. Stat. § 33.26(7), which establishes a 30-day window for a person "aggrieved by the action of the board" to petition the circuit court for review of the county board's action in including a particular property within the lake district's boundaries. The majority's approach eviscerates the legislature's intent to limit the time period that a property owner has to challenge such a decision by a county board. Chapter 33 also undercuts the majority's concern that property owners will be compelled to remain in lake districts in perpetuity, unless they can challenge the county board's determination that their property is benefited by inclusion in the lake district by way of Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3) without any showing of changed circumstances. Chapter 33 provides property owners with two reasonable options: An owner can make a timely petition, initially, under § 33.26(7), challenging a county board's decision to include the owner's property in a lake district, and an owner can also, later, petition for detachment if the *201owner is able to demonstrate changed circumstances under § 33.33(3). If shown, such circumstances would allow a lake district board to order detachment.
¶ 117. The majority acknowledges that application of Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Fox River Heights Sanitary District, 250 Wis. 145, 26 N.W.2d 661 (1947), leads to the conclusion that this case is subject to certiorari review. However, it fails to give deference to language in Fort Howard, as the court of appeals pointed out, illustrating that a finding that an entire district is "benefited" means that each individual property in the district has the potential to be benefited.
¶ 118. In Fort Howard, a property owner argued that its property should not be included in a sanitary district because its individual property was not benefited by inclusion. Id. at 152. Fort Howard asserted that in order to be included in the district, its property had to be immediately benefited by such inclusion. Id. Focusing on benefit to the property of the district as a whole, this court disagreed, concluding that when such property as a whole is benefited then each individual property within the district is benefited by inclusion in the district. Id. The fact that the individual property did not realize immediate benefits did not preclude the formation of the district. Id. The Fort Howard court stated:
If the town board finds that the property within the boundaries of the proposed district as a whole will be benefited then the district is to be organized. For example, if some parcel of land was included in the proposed district which lay out of the watershed and could not be served by the proposed improvement, manifestly a property so situated could not be benefited. If all the property within the boundaries of the proposed district is in the watershed and the proposed *202improvement may serve it, then the property of the district as a whole is benefited and the town board if it makes the other necessary finding may organize the district.
Id. (Emphasis added).
¶ 119. The court of appeals properly interpreted this directive from Fort Howard and commented: "Stated differently, a finding that a district as a whole is 'benefited' will stand unless some parcel in the district is not benefited by the inclusion." Donaldson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist, 2003 WI App 26, ¶ 15, 260 Wis. 2d 238, 659 N.W.2d 66.
¶ 120. Further affirmation for this interpretation of Fort Howard emerges from the court of appeals' statement that "[t]his reading of Fort Howard is further supported by the subsequent discussion of the particular facts in that case and the supreme court's conclusion: 'it appears from the undisputed evidence that the property of the plaintiff will be benefited.'" Id. The court of appeals pointed out that "[i]f benefit to the individual parcel at issue in Fort Howard was irrelevant, the supreme court would not have explained why the parcel was benefited." Id. The court of appeals went on to conclude that the text of Subchapter IV in Chapter 33 did not suggest that the term "benefited" had a different meaning prior to the time when the lake district was formed than it had after it was formed. Id., ¶ 21. Again, not requiring Donaldson to show a change in circumstances is contrary to the language and proper interpretation of the statutes at issue.
¶ 121. As mentioned above, the court of appeals' interpretation of the language "benefited" was correct. In upholding the Lake District Board's decision to deny Donaldson's petition, the court found persuasive the *203Board's argument "that Donaldson's opportunity to challenge whether his property was properly included in the District is governed by Wis. Stat. § 33.26, and because Donaldson failed to avail himself of that opportunity, he must now demonstrate a change in circumstances showing he is no longer 'benefited,' using the same definition of 'benefited' used by the county board when the Lake District was created." Id., ¶ 12. Unlike the majority, the court of appeals did not fail to give weight to the Board's decision when determining that the property included in the Lake District would potentially benefit by such inclusion.
¶ 122. The majority's decision ignores the legislative role of both the County Board and the Lake District Board. The majority concedes that certiorari review of a detachment decision does not allow it to substitute its judgment for the Lake District Board's determination. Majority op., ¶ 51. Yet, by not recognizing that the County Board's original finding that each property benefited by inclusion in the Lake District, by failing to apply the rules of certiorari review, correctly, and by failing to accord to the Lake District Board's decision the presumption of correctness, the majority has wandered from the correct analytical path into a thicket of error. While claiming to recognize the presumption, the majority only applies the presumption of correctness to the County Board's creation of the Lake District, see majority op., ¶ 53, n.13, even though the majority recognizes the decision of the Lake District Board on detachment to be a legislative one. Majority op., ¶¶ 4 and 56.
¶ 123. As the majority notes, "a court may not exercise legislative power." Majority op., ¶ 48 (quoting Fort Howard, 250 Wis. at 150). Yet the majority seems to ignore this directive by according the Lake District *204Board's decision little or no deference. The decision of the Board is a legislative determination. See Joint Sch. Dist v. State Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 790, 794 203 N.W.2d 1 (1973). When reviewed on appeal, the Board's decision should be reviewed to determine whether it exceeded its jurisdiction or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 795. A presumption of correctness must be afforded to a decision of a board such as the Lake District Board, if there is no violation of those factors.
¶ 124. More specifically, I agree with the majority (see majority op., ¶ 4) that the only factors a court may properly consider on review are as follows: (1) Whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether the board acted according to law; (3) whether the board's action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination in question. State ex rel. Mitchell Aero v. Bd. of Review, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 281-82, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976) (citing Dolphin v. Bd. of Review, 70 Wis. 2d 403, 408, 234 N.W.2d 277 (1975)).
¶ 125. The court of appeals properly recognized these principles of certiorari review. Donaldson, 260 Wis. 2d 238, ¶ 10. The court focused its analysis on the second prong, since the circuit court found that the Board acted contrary to law.2 The court reasoned that because the Lake District Board proceeded on the correct theory of law — a property owner who is part of a lake district must show a change in circumstances in order to successfully petition for detachment from that *205district — it did not have to address the remaining three factors. Id. I conclude that the Lake District Board was right in its assessment and provided sufficient support for its decision not to grant detachment.
¶ 126. The Board provided detailed reasons justifying its position that Donaldson's request for detachment should be denied. The Board stated the following, in relevant part:
First, both tracts were within the original boundary of the District approved by the Rock County Board of Supervisors Resolution 99-A-038.
Second, the Rock County Resolution included a finding that the property included in the District will be benefited by the establishment of the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District.
Third, no evidence has been provided to the commission indicating that there has been any change in the property inconsistent with the Board of Supervisors' findings that these tracts benefit from inclusion in the District.
Fourth, both tracts are within the Rock River watershed, and within the subwatershed areas that drain into the portions of the Rock River and Lake Koshkonong within the boundaries of the district.
Fifth, both tracts are located in near proximity to Lake Koshkonong and the portion of the Rock River within the District. ...
Sixth, although neither parcel is riparian both parcels are located in close proximity to public boat launch facilities. . ..
Seventh, the southernly tract has a direct view of the Rock River.
*206Eighth, the value of both tracts will be enhanced if the water quality and recreational value of Lake Kosh-konong and associated reaches of the Rock River within the District are improved and will be diminished if the Indianford dam were removed or if the water quality and recreational value of the lake and associated reaches of the Rock River were further degraded.
¶ 127. After detailing these considerations, the Lake District Board finally concluded that Donaldson's territory was benefited by its inclusion in the District. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the Board "exercised its will and not its judgment." Majority op., ¶ 102.3
*207¶ 128. While the majority provides what the Lake District Board could have used as an alternative analysis, that analysis is no more reasonable than the one applied by the Board. The Board need not look to every criteria it had established for a review of a petition for detachment. The majority admits that those factors are guidelines — not mandatory. The majority's inappropriate application of certiorari review is best exemplified by its own fact-finding that an increase in property value results from recreational use, not agricultural use. The majority fails to take into account the potential that land included in the Lake District will experience increases in its property value, not only because of the activities on that property, but also as a result of the activities occurring on other properties included in the Lake District.
¶ 129. For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 130. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley join this dissent.

 The circuit court, in its decision, determined that the decision of the Lake District Board was contrary to the statute and that no change of circumstances was required for detachment.

 I strongly disagree with the majority's characterization of the Board's decision-making process. The Board clearly exercised its judgment in applying the criteria set forth in Rock-Koshkonong Lake District Resolution 99-03, Section III. Section III states, in relevant part:
In its consideration of whether the subject property is benefited by continued inclusion in the District, the Board may consider:
A. The physical characteristics of the property.
B. Its use (recreational, commercial, residential, etc.).
C. Its relationship to the lake in terms of whether:
1. It is riparian;
2. It has private access rights to the lake;
3. Its proximity to public access to the lake;
4. It is within view of the lake; and
5. It is within the watershed or ground water table of the lake.
D. Whether the value of the property would be enhanced if the lake were to be reasonably clean, attractive and usable condition; or whether the value of the property would be diminished if the lake were to be in a degraded condition.
E. Whether detachment of the property will result in any "hole" or "island" in the boundaries of the District.
*207F. Whether circumstances surrounding the property's inclusion in the District have changed.
G. Any other factors relevant to whether the property is benefited by continued inclusion in the District.