Court Opinion

ID: 9952784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 19:03:22.219244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:20.715041
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Ortega CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

            IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085777
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 15CR-00728)
                    v.

    FIDEL ORTEGA, JUNIOR,                                                                 OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Jennifer O.
Trimble, Judge.
         Vicki Hightower, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and Franson, J.
       Defendant Fidel Ortega, Junior pled no contest pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement to manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed
the stipulated sentence of 15 years in prison. The sentence included prior prison term
enhancements for offenses that were not sexually violent offenses. In 2023, the court
resentenced defendant pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1 invalidating sentences
that included prior prison term enhancements imposed for offenses that were not sexually
violent offenses. The court imposed the stipulated sentence with the exception of the
prior prison term enhancements for an aggregate term of 13 years. Defendant appealed.
       Defendant’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, identifying no error and asking the court to determine whether
there were any arguable issues on appeal. Defendant was afforded an opportunity to
submit a supplemental brief but failed to do so in the time allotted. We have conducted
an independent review of the record and find no error. We affirm.
                              PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       On August 31, 2015, the Merced County District Attorney filed a complaint
deemed an information charging defendant with the murder of Daniel Dorsie Dowen
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 2). As to both counts, the information alleged that defendant had served two prior
prison terms for offenses that were not sexually violent offenses (§ 667.5, former
subd. (b)). As to count 1, the information alleged defendant used a deadly weapon
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to count 2, the information alleged defendant inflicted great
bodily injury in commission of the offense (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
       On November 30, 2015, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled
no contest to manslaughter on count 1 (§ 192, subd. (a)) and count 2 as charged; he also
admitted use of a deadly weapon on count 1, and having suffered two prior prison terms.

1      All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

                                             2.
The plea agreement stipulated that the trial court would sentence defendant to the
aggregate term of 15 years as follows: on count 1, 11 years (the upper term), plus a
one-year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), plus
two 1-year prior prison term enhancements; and on count 2, one year (one-third the
middle term), consecutive to the sentence on count 1.
       On the same date, the trial court imposed the stipulated sentence and awarded
defendant 290 days of actual custody credits and 43 days of good conduct credits.
       On February 17, 2023, defendant was resentenced pursuant to section 1172.75.
The trial court struck the two previously imposed prior prison term enhancements and
imposed the remainder of the original sentence.
       On February 21, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
                                FACTUAL SUMMARY2
       On or about February 13, 2015, in Merced County, defendant stabbed Dowen,
killing him. Defendant then stabbed N.N., who survived.
                                      DISCUSSION
       As noted above, defendant’s counsel filed a Wende brief identifying no basis for
relief and asking that we review the record to determine whether there were any arguable
issues on appeal. Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we conclude that there is
no arguable issue on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–443.)
       We note that defendant was sentenced to an upper-term sentence although he did
not admit and a jury did not find true any circumstances in aggravation, nor did the trial
court find that circumstances in aggravation of the offenses justified a sentence exceeding
the middle term. However, because the trial court did not have discretion to impose the
lower, middle, or upper term under the negotiated plea agreement, the sentence did not

2      On November 30, 2015, defendant admitted a factual basis for his plea. Our
factual summary is based on that admitted factual basis.

                                             3.
violate section 1170, subdivision (b) as modified by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567).
       Senate Bill 567 is retroactive to cases not yet final on appeal pursuant to
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (see People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032,
1038–1039 [remanding for resentencing under another ameliorative amendment to
section 1170 by Senate Bill 567]), and defendant’s sentence is not yet final on appeal.
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), such that it now provides, “[t]he court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)3 On the other hand, section 1192.5, subdivision (b),
provides, in relevant part, that when a “plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in
open court and is approved by the court, … the court may not proceed as to the plea
other than as specified in the plea.” (§ 1192.5, subd. (b), italics added.) “ ‘ “ ‘A plea
agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which
the court consents to be bound.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 700−701.)
While the plea bargain does not divest the trial court of its inherent sentencing discretion,
“ ‘ “a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the
limits of that bargain.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 701; see § 1192.5, subd. (b).) Thus, when the
defendant and the prosecutor agree that a specified sentence will be imposed, the court
does not exercise discretion within a range of otherwise permissible sentences, but rather
imposes the agreed-upon sentence. (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 49.)

3      A trial court is permitted to rely upon a certified record of conviction to determine
prior criminality for purposes of sentencing without submitting the prior conviction to a
jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)

                                              4.
       In People v. Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, review granted December 14,
2022, S277314, the defendant had been sentenced to an upper term sentence pursuant to a
stipulated plea agreement without consideration of factors in aggravation or in mitigation.
(Id. at pp. 1055, 1058.) The defendant argued that the Court of Appeal was required to
reduce her sentence to a middle term sentence in order to comply with Senate Bill 567.
(Id. at p. 1056.) The Mitchell court concluded that Senate Bill 567’s amendments to
section 1170 did not apply to a sentence imposed pursuant to a stipulated plea agreement
“as the trial court lacks discretion to select the sentence in the first place.” (Mitchell, at
p. 1058.)
       This court considered the same issue in People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
330, review granted April 26, 2023, S278690, and reached the same outcome as Mitchell,
based on similar reasoning. We explained that when a trial court “impose[s] a stipulated
sentence pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,” the court’s discretion is “limited to
approving or rejecting the bargain. The court [does] not exercise discretion to select
between the lower, middle, or upper term based on any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.” (Sallee, at p. 338.) “Thus, section 1170, subdivision (b), which governs
the court’s exercise of discretion with regard to a sentencing triad, does not apply.”
(Ibid.) Here, we reach the same conclusion for the same reasons.
       For the same reasons articulated in Sallee and Mitchell, we conclude in this case
the trial court did not exercise triad discretion when it imposed the stipulated sentence set
out in the negotiated plea agreement and therefore the amendments to section 1170
brought about by Senate Bill 567 are not applicable. (See People v. Sallee, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 340.)
       We further note that on June 7, 2023, defendant’s appellate counsel sent a Fares4
letter to the trial court, requesting recalculation of custody credits. The trial court issued

4      People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954.

                                               5.
an amended abstract of judgment on June 21, 2023, reflecting that defendant was
awarded the custody credits he requested. The modified credit award appears to be
correct.
       In sum, we find no arguable issues on appeal.
                                    DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                           6.