Court Opinion

ID: 9808964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:56:37.890922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:36.145614
License: Public Domain

Glabk, C. J.,
dissenting. The prisoner was convicted of a most revolting crime, but this Court felt compelled to grant a new trial upon a technical ground that could hardly be conceived to have affected the verdict. State v. Parker, 132 N. C., 1014. Again convicted, the prisoner again asks a *214new trial upon the purely technical ground that the Judge in his charge to the jury did not tell them that certain evidence was offered as corroborative and not as substantive testimony, though the Solicitor had so stated when the testimony was offered, and the Judge stated in the presence of the jury that he admitted it only as corroborative and not substantive testimony, and in his charge to the jury told them that the State relied on such evidence as corroborative of the testimony of the prosecutrix. Every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the proceedings below, and appellate courts should not be astute to find reasons for a new trial. It should plainly appear that the appellant was prejudiced by the alleged error, and that but for such error in all reasonable probability the conviction would not have occurred. There have been decisions, it is true, of recent origin that the Judge in his charge to the jury should single out the corroborative testimony and tell the jury that it is corroborative and not substantive, but certainly failure to do so should not be held reversible error unless tire attention of the Court- was called to it by a prayer to so instruct, especially when, as in this case, the Judge and Solicitor both stated, when the evidence was introduced, that it was merely corroborative, and the Judge in his charge to the jury stated that the State relied upon such evidence as corroborative of the evidence of the prosecutrix. By virtue of an amendment to Hule 27 this Court will henceforward hold it not reversible error to fail to repeat in the charge that the evidence is merely corroborative when it is so stated on its admission, unless specifically prayed to so charge. The rule heretofore held is not a vested right, and a failure to observe it should not, in the absence of all other ground of exception, authorize us to set aside this second time the solemn verdict and judgment of the trial court.
Besides, no exception of this kind was taken at the time or appeared in the case as first settled by the Judge. Finally *215yielding to the importunity of counsel for tbe prisoner, the Judge admitted an amendment, saying, after a lapse of months, “I cannot say with certainty whether I did so or not,” i. e., charge that the evidence was to be considered as corroborative only. As he could not recollect, he certainly could not authorize an amendment that he did not so charge. If it was error, and even prejudical error, to fail to charge upon the corroborative evidence more explicitly, such failure should have positively and affirmatively appeared, and the failure of the Judge merely to recollect, after a great lapse of time, “whether I did so (charge) or not,” should not be taken as proof that he did not. A tidal is too solemn and expensive a matter to have a conviction, especially a second conviction, set aside because the Judge could not recollect whether a certain phrase, which would not have affected, the verdict in all human probability, was positively and certainly used by him.
In State v. Powell, 106 N. C., 635, it was held that, while the Court should instruct the jury that corroborative evidence should not be considered in any other light, yet unless it affirmatively appeared that this was not done, it will be presumed that it was. This was reiterated and re-affirmed. State v. Brabham, 108 N. C., 796; Byrd v. Hudson, 113 N. C., 211. Here no exception for failure to so charge was made till after the ease on appeal had been settled. It should have been called to the attention of the Court by a prayer to charge. Even if an exception for failure to so charge had been set out in the prisoner’s case on appeal, the recollection of the Judge would have been fresh. But if the mere fact that after the lapse of months he cannot recollect positively “whether he did so chargv or not” should be allowed hereafter, as in this case, as valid ground for a new trial, few verdicts, especially in State cases, will stand. It is too much to expect trial Judges to carry such details in their memories.