Court Opinion

ID: 9735943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:37:22.066604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:02.911664
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent insofar as the majority opinion reverses the visitation restrictions.
We are not here merely concerned with a situation in which the custodial parent does not wish the children exposed to religious practices different from those of the custodial parent. Many of the cases cited in the majority opinion concern exactly that situation. For example, in Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash.2d 810, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971), the trial court determined it would be detrimental to the children to have them exposed to conflicting religious beliefs and concluded that the best interests of the children would be served by having them raised in the religious beliefs of the parent having custody and therefore prohibited the noncustodial parent from taking the children with him to church when the children were visiting him. The only affirmative evidence of detriment to the children, according to the decision, was the speculation by the parents that the 6-year-old child showed confusion when asked why he attended two churches. So, too, in Robertson v. Robertson, 19 Wash.App. 425, 575 P.2d 1092 (1978), the only evidence of detriment to the children was confusion caused by attending two churches.
In Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 418 N.E.2d 606 (1981), there was no evidence of detriment, other than confusion, to the children and the noncustodial parent who took the children to a church different from that in which they were being raised did not depreciate or lessen the children because of their religious beliefs although he believed the religion was in error. Nor is this case similar to that of Szakal v. Szakal, 212 N.J.Super. 136, 514 A.2d 81 (1986), in which the New Jersey Court refused to require the noncustodial parent, when the children were with him, to enforce the dietary and other religious practices of the custodial parent.
Although the majority contends that it does not intimate that expert medical or psychological testimony is required to sustain the showing of physical or emotional harm to the children resulting from the parents’ conflicting religious beliefs, it demeans the testimony in this case as “general testimony of a parent, ... that the children are ‘confused’ or ‘upset’ by the duality of their parents’ religious beliefs ...” I do not agree that this accurately characterizes *468the testimony of the parties or the actual holding of the trial court.
Here, the mother testified:
“Now he has been telling them he no longer believes in the Catholic church, the Catholic church believes in cannibalism. Chris and one of his friends were up there for awhile this year, and this other boy had told his mother too that the Catholic church and Lutheran church taught false doctrine.”
She further testified in response to a question of whether the father appeared to be motivated by his religious teachings as follows:
“I think so. Everything is based on that. I understand that he called the school last Monday and talked to Bradley, called him out of class and told him that he was just upset, he wasn’t believing in Jesus Christ, and all that stuff. It upsets the boys, and they do practice religion. Bradley was embarrassed. The secretary was there, superintendent and principal. He thought they could hear everything he was saying to him.”
Finally, in response as to whether or not he had ever had any reaction from the boys as to his new religious views, the father testified that there had been some reaction, that there had been some standoffishness.
Thus, contrary to what most of the cases cited in the majority opinion reflect, and what we might expect, i.e., that the restriction placed upon the religious practices by the trial court was solely for the purpose of protecting the children from emotional trauma, here the restriction was intended to preserve the father-son relationship. Thus the trial court found:
“That the religion of the family has been that of Roman Catholic, but recently the father-defendant has changed church attendance to a different church. The father has at times attempted to press his new faith upon the children, thus causing them stress. That for the defendant to continue this course of action may cause damage to the relationship of him to his children. The children presently actively practice their religion.”
The trial judge, in his opinion delivered from the bench, stated in his findings: “Now, because of the concerns that we’ve all voiced and that the children have, in deed [sic], voiced, and the fact that this religious conflict between the parents disturbs the children, and the fact that they are in a divorce situation and something like that is even more aggravated, and the fact that I feel this religious dispute will eventually destroy the father and child relationship if it’s allowed to go unchecked,..."
We have said more times than should be necessary that we will reverse a finding by the trial court only if it is clearly erroneous and that a finding is clearly erroneous only when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Despite our pious platitudes that we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, that the issue is not whether we would have reached the same decision, and that the trier of fact is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, there is in these cases, which are admittedly difficult, a continuing pattern, intentional or otherwise, in which we, as an appellate court, do just that. But it is particularly in this type of case, where the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the parents, listen to their testimony, and judge their credibility not only as witnesses but as parents, that we should be the most reluctant to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Employing these standards of review, I cannot conclude that the findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous with respect to the restrictions on visitation.
This case is similar to one which the majority cites but attempts to distinguish, Andros v. Andros, 396 N.W.2d 917 (Minn.App.1986), in which the Minnesota Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court which scheduled visitation with the noncustodial parent to preclude him from taking the children to his church. The Minnesota court, in rejecting the appel*469lant’s contention that the modification of visitation violated his constitutional rights, stated at page 924 of the reported opinion:
“Appellant urges the court to apply a ‘compelling state interest’ standard to the modification of visitation where controversy centers around the children’s religious upbringing. We decline to do so. The court’s modification of visitation affects neither appellant’s religious beliefs, nor his right to practice his religion. The court’s ruling simply repeats the law, a legal custodian has the right to determine the minor children’s religious training.
“We hold that the court’s decision does not affect appellant’s constitutional right to freedom of religion. Although appellant’s wish to involve the children in his religious activities is now subject to respondent’s consent while they are minors, appellant is, and always has been, free to practice his religious beliefs as he sees fit.”
I would affirm the entire judgment.