Court Opinion

ID: 9591818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:07:55.137815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:12.160963
License: Public Domain

*316Neff, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent and would instead affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.
I
The facts in this case are particularly disturbing. Defendant, an eleventh grade student at the time of this crime, and a group of his friends, decided, as they often did, to skip school and get drunk. They gathered at the home of one of the members of the group. As part of their fun, defendant and his friends decided to videotape their day. During the day, defendant and his friends forced a three-year-old girl and a one-year-old boy, who had the misfortune of living in the house, to engage in various activities of a sexual nature while the older boys videotaped them. Although an attempt was made to tape over and destroy the videotape, the mother of one of the victims eventually brought it to the authorities. Although the tape itself was broken, the authorities were able to cut out small pieces of the tape and splice the remaining portions back together. Defendant’s convictions arose out of his actions with respect to the children and out of the existence of the videotape.
II
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that his convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct must be reversed. Defendant was convicted on the theory that because the children were under thirteen, and sexual penetration occurred, he was guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct as an aider and abettor. Defendant argues, however, that because the children were too young to have committed any *317crime, he cannot be found guilty as an aider and abettor. I reluctantly agree.
A
In order to be convicted as an aider and abettor of a crime, it is not necessary that the principal in the underlying crime be convicted. See People v Mann, 395 Mich 472, 478; 236 NW2d 509 (1975). To support such a conviction, however, it is imperative that, at a minimum, some underlying crime have been perpetrated. Id. Thus, in order to sustain defendant’s convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, it must be determined whether the children committed the crime of first-degree criminal sexual conduct when forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature with one another.
B
Our Supreme Court has held that children under seven years of age are “incapable of negligence and of intentional tort or crime.” Burhans v Witbeck, 375 Mich 253, 255; 134 NW2d 225 (1965). The theoiy behind this holding rests on the belief that a child under seven years of age, in essence, lacks the capacity to form the requisite mens rea in order to commit a crime. See Baker v Alt, 374 Mich 492; 132 NW2d 614 (1965).
I emphasize that our Supreme Court held that a child under seven is incapable of committing a crime, rather than finding age to be a defense to a crime. Were age merely a defense, defendant’s convictions could stand because a defense is personal to the offender and an aider and abettor is not entitled to assert the principal’s defense. See, e.g., Vaden v State, *318768 P2d 1102, 1106 (Alas, 1989). In other words, that the principal has a defense does not alter the fact that a crime was committed.
The term “incapable,” however, is defined as “not having a necessary capacity or power of performance.” The Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition (1984), p 671. Thus, it must follow that when a child under seven years of age performs some deed that would otherwise be considered a crime, no crime has been committed because the child lacks the power or capacity to commit it.1
It follows that because the children could not commit the crime of first-degree criminal sexual conduct because of their ages, defendant’s convictions as an aider and abettor of those crimes cannot stand and should be reversed. In all other respects, I concur in the majority opinion.

 Another panel of this Court reached the same conclusion, albeit in dicta, in the recent case of In re Hildebrant, 216 Mich App 384, 387-388; 548 NW2d 715 (1996).