Court Opinion

ID: 9909820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 15:00:40.05182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:10.418359
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10396   Document: 19-1    Date Filed: 12/14/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10396
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       KENNETH GRAHAM,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       WAYNE LUKE,
       Investigator,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee,

       SHERIFF NICK NORTON, et al.,

                                                          Defendants.
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10396

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 7:20-cv-00006-HL
                          ____________________

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Kenneth Graham, proceeding pro se, appeals the grant of
       summary judgment in his civil suit against a police investigator,
       Wayne Luke, after Graham was arrested on an outstanding
       warrant that Luke had obtained. On appeal, Graham ﬁrst asserts
       that the district court improperly concluded that qualiﬁed
       immunity shielded Luke because, Graham asserts, Luke acted with
       actual malice and because no probable cause existed to support the
       warrant that led to Graham being arrested, photographed,
       ﬁngerprinted, strip searched, placed in a holding cell, and detained
       for ten days. Second, Graham argues that the district court erred
       by concluding that oﬃcial immunity shielded Luke from state-law
       liability because, Graham says, Luke acted with malice and without
       probable cause. Finally, Graham contends that the district court
       erred by granting summary judgment to Luke on Graham’s
       intentional-inﬂiction-of-emotional-distress claim. After careful
       review, we aﬃrm.
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       23-10396               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                         I
              After a customer handed store clerk Michelle Kilgore a
       counterfeit check, police sent Inspector Wayne Luke to investigate.
       The check was made out to Kenneth Anthony Graham. Luke put
       that name into the police database and found Graham’s driver’s
       license photo. He showed it to Kilgore who confirmed that
       Graham was the individual who presented the fraudulent check.
               On this basis, Luke obtained a warrant for Graham’s arrest.
       Several months later, another officer encountered Graham during
       a traffic incident and, after running his license number, arrested
       him pursuant to the warrant. The officer strip-searched,
       photographed, and booked Graham before detaining him for 10
       days.
              Graham filed suit against Luke, alleging a Fourth
       Amendment unlawful-search-and-seizure claim, an unlawful-
       pretrial-detention claim under federal law, a federal false-arrest
       claim, a state-law intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim
       and, later, federal and state malicious-prosecution claims.
       Wielding official- and qualified-immunity defenses against both
       federal- and state-law claims, Luke secured summary judgment.
                                        II
              On appeal, we must determine (1) whether Luke was
       entitled to qualified immunity on Graham’s Fourth Amendment
       and federal malicious-prosecution claims, (2) whether Luke was
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                     23-10396

       entitled to official immunity on Graham’s state-law claims, and (3)
       whether the district court erred by concluding that Graham failed
       to establish his intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.1
                                             A
              We ﬁrst consider whether qualiﬁed immunity shielded Luke
       from Fourth Amendment liability. We conclude that it did. Section
       1983 provides a cause of action for private citizens against persons
       acting under color of state law for violating their constitutional
       rights and other federal laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. An oﬃcial who
       is sued under § 1983 may seek summary judgment on the ground
       that he is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity. Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394
       F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). To receive qualiﬁed immunity,
       Luke didn’t even need to have actual probable cause, “but [rather]
       only ‘arguable probable cause,’”—“i.e., the facts and circumstances
       must be such that the oﬃcer reasonably could have believed that
       probable cause existed.” Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1236 (11th
       Cir. 2023).
              What distinguishes actual from “arguable” probable cause?
       “Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances known
       to the oﬃcers could persuade a reasonable oﬃcer that there is a

       1 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all the evidence

       and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Graham. Fish v. Brown, 838
       F.3d 1153, 1156–57 (11th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
       movant shows that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
       movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We
       also review de novo “a probable cause determination.” United States v.
       Lebowtiz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1010 (11th Cir. 2012).
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       23-10396               Opinion of the Court                         5

       ‘substantial chance of criminal activity’ by the person who is
       arrested.” Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1334 (11th Cir.
       2023) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)).
       In this Circuit, probable cause requires “only a probability or
       substantial chance” of criminal activity and “does not require
       anything close to conclusive proof . . . or even a ﬁnding made by a
       preponderance of the evidence.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276,
       1286 (11th Cir. 2019). It need only be “reasonable to conclude from
       the totality of the circumstances that a crime was committed.”
       Henley v. Millsap, No. 21-12231, 2022 WL 3654846, at *2 (11th Cir.
       Aug. 25, 2022) “Arguable probable cause,” not surprisingly, is an
       even lower threshold.        Arguable probable cause exists if “a
       reasonable oﬃcer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time
       of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the
       arrests.” See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 68.
              Luke had actual probable cause to ﬂag Graham for arrest.
       Id. Luke performed a database search that revealed Graham’s
       license, spoke with the store clerk who received the fraudulent
       check, showed her Graham’s photograph, and received a positive
       identiﬁcation for Graham. Although Graham argues that Luke
       could easily have determined that Graham was not the individual
       who presented the fraudulent check by reviewing video footage
       from the store, he never requested that footage—nor has he
       pointed to anything in the record that would have similar
       exonerating value. Because the totality of the circumstances
       presented an adequate basis to conclude that a crime had occurred,
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10396

       Luke was not required to sift through conﬂicting evidence. See
       Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019)
               As to Graham’s related malicious-prosecution claim, the
       district court did not err by determining that the claim failed as a
       matter of law. There is both a Georgia-law and common-law
       standard for malicious prosecution; both standards require that the
       prosecution be “with malice and without probable cause.” Compare
       Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285, with Renton v. Watson, 739 S.E.2d 19, 23 (Ga.
       Ct. App. 2013). Graham does not point to, nor does the record
       reveal, any evidence that Luke acted with malice. Graham cannot
       establish his malicious-prosecution claim because he cannot show
       that prosecution occurred without probable cause and with malice.
            Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing
       Graham’s Fourth Amendment and malicious-prosecution claims.
                                         B
               We next consider Graham’s state-law claims. To begin, his
       state-law malicious-prosecution claim warrants summary
       judgment based on oﬃcial immunity. Under Georgia law, oﬃcial
       immunity “protects an oﬃcer from personal liability arising from
       his performance of ‘oﬃcial functions’ as long as the oﬃcer did not
       act with ‘actual malice’ or ‘actual intent to cause injury.’” Gates v.
       Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1304 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ga. Const.
       art. I, § 2, para. IX(d)). Oﬃcial immunity “applies to an oﬃcer’s
       discretionary actions taken within the scope of [his] oﬃcial
       authority.” Id. at 1304 (quotation marks and citation omitted). An
       oﬃcer acts within his discretionary authority when investigating a
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       23-10396                Opinion of the Court                            7

       case, obtaining warrants, and executing those warrants. Marshall v.
       Browning, 712 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
             To establish a claim for malicious prosecution under
       Georgia law, “a plaintiﬀ must show that the defendant acted both
       without probable cause and maliciously.” Stephens v. Zimmerman,
       774 S.E.2d 811, 815 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Cobb,
       573 S.E.2d 417, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (alteration adopted)).
       Malice may be inferred by a total lack of probable cause. Id.
              In the context of oﬃcial immunity, actual malice requires a
       deliberate intention to do wrong. Bateast v. DeKalb Cnty., 572 S.E.2d
       756, 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). Ill will alone cannot establish actual
       malice. Stephens, 774 S.E.2d at 816. A deliberate intention to do
       wrong means the intent to cause the harm suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ.
       Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E. 2d. 54, 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). Moreover,
       an actual intent to cause injury requires an actual intent to harm
       the plaintiﬀ, not merely an intent to do the act purportedly
       resulting in the claimed injury. Kidd v. Coates, 518 S.E.2d 124, 125
       (Ga. 1999).
              Graham presented no evidence to show that Luke acted
       with actual malice or any deliberate intention to do wrong. As
       already explained, actual probable cause existed for Luke to seek an
       arrest warrant for Graham. Huebner, 935 F.3d at 1188; Rankin v.
       Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998). The existence of actual
       probable cause defeats Graham’s claims of malicious prosecution
       and false arrest. Stephens, 774 S.E.2d. at 815; see Adams v. Carlisle, 630
       S.E.2d 529, 535 (2006) (speciﬁcally addressing the false arrest
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                23-10396

       prong). Although Graham argues that Luke misstated the
       information in the arrest aﬃdavit and “knew” that Graham did not
       commit the charged crimes, he did not present any evidence
       showing that Luke intended to cause him harm. Murphy, 647 S.E.
       2d. at 60; Kidd, 518 S.E.2d at 125.
              In short, because Graham didn’t show that Luke acted with
       actual malice and without probable cause, the district court did not
       err by concluding that Luke was entitled to oﬃcial immunity on
       these claims.
                                        C
              Lastly, we consider whether the district court erred in
       granting summary judgment to Luke as to Graham’s intentional-
       inﬂiction-of-emotional-distress claim. We conclude that it didn’t.
               A Georgia intentional-inﬂiction-of-emotional-distress
       plaintiﬀ must show that: “(1) the conduct giving rise to the claim
       was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and
       outrageous; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the
       emotional distress was severe.” Mayorga v. Benton, 875 S.E.2d 908,
       913 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). The conduct must be “so extreme in
       degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and
       whether the claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness is a
       question of law. Id. Additionally, “[t]o demonstrate that the
       emotional distress [he] suﬀered was severe, a plaintiﬀ must show,
       at the very least, that physical and/or mental manifestations of that
       distress required him to seek medical or psychological treatment.”
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       23-10396               Opinion of the Court                         9

       Howerton v. Harbin Clinic, LLC, 333 776 S.E.2d 288, 301 (Ga. Ct. App.
       2015).
              The district court did not erroneously conclude that even
       though Graham was ﬁngerprinted, strip searched, photographed,
       booked, and detained for 10 days, this conduct does not rise to the
       requisite level of outrageousness to establish an intentional-
       inﬂiction-of-emotional-distress claim. Mayorga, 875 S.E.2d at 913.
       Moreover, Graham conceded in his deposition that the stress and
       embarrassment that he suﬀered because of his arrest had not
       manifested into a physical form, nor had he sought any
       psychological or medical treatment, as required. Howerton, 776
       S.E.2d at 301. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that
       Luke was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Graham’s
       intentional-inﬂiction-of-emotional-distress claim.
           In sum, the district court correctly determined that
       summary judgment was proper as to Graham’s state-law claims.
                                  *       *     *
             For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in
       granting summary judgment in favor of Luke against Graham’s
       Fourth Amendment claim, his federal and state malicious-
       prosecution claims, and his state-law intentional-inﬂiction-of
       emotional-distress-claim.
             AFFIRMED.