Court Opinion

ID: 9732259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:13:33.907219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:18.135856
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RIZZI, specially concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I disagree with the conclusion and reasoning of the majority that the issue of the State excluding blacks from the jury solely because of their race is waived simply because no objection is made during the voir dire. I believe that the Batson waiver issue in this case should be decided on the same basis that it was decided in People v. Andrews, which is presently pending before the Illinois Supreme Court (People v. Andrews (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 394, 526 N.E.2d 628, appeal allowed (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 560). In Andrews we stated: “A criminal trial is more than merely a means of meting justice. The trial is also an avenue for fulfilling the notion deeply rooted in the common law that justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. For a civilization founded upon principles of ordered liberty to continue to survive with its principles intact, its members must share the conviction that they are governed equitably. That necessity underlies the Equal Protection Clause upon which Batson v. Kentucky is based. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), 448 U.S. 555, 594, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2837 (Brennan, J., concurring). Plainly, the appearance of justice is not fulfilled if the trial court acquiesces in, condones or fails to preclude attempts by the prosecuting attorney to exclude blacks from the jury solely because they are black. The trial court cannot sit idly by in such instances and become an accomplice to racial discrimination in the courtroom. Rather, it must insure that justice prevails and that the appearance of justice is demonstrated in the trial that is taking place before those in attendance. Moreover, those citizens who are selected as jurors in a criminal case are expected to judge the defendant solely on the basis of his acts and not on the basis of his race. The selected jurors can hardly be expected to accomplish this task if they see that they, themselves, were selected by the State not on the basis of their individual qualities, but as members of a particular race. Thus, in order to maintain the appearance of justice and the integrity of our judicial process, and in order to keep itself from being an accomplice to racial discrimination, the trial court sua sponte must promptly and in no uncertain terms stop any racial discrimination committed in its presence. This is required whether or not the defendant makes a timely objection. We therefore find the State’s waiver argument untenable. We see no difference in considering the issue in this case than we would in considering any other plain error violation of constitutional dimension.” 172 Ill. App. 3d at 402-03, 526 N.E.2d at 634. The underpinning of the Andrews holding is the recognition that while it is the prosecutor or the attorney for the defendant who exercises peremptory challenges, it is the trial judge, acting in a judicial capacity, who actually excuses the prospective jurors. (Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (5th Cir. 1988), 860 F.2d 1308, reh’g granted January 23, 1989, (holding that race-based peremptory chailenges are now banned from Federal civil cases).) Since the trial judge is so intimately involved in the process of excluding prospective jurors when peremptory challenges are exercised, it is judicially irresponsible for a judge not to stop any racial discrimination which is attempted through the use of peremptory challenges. (See generally People v. Payne (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d. 1034, 1038-40, rev’d (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (for a discussion of the role of the court itself when racial discrimination occurs in the courtroom).) Irresponsible judicial conduct in the trial of cases must be halted in no uncertain terms, not overlooked or condoned by resort to waiver arguments. Thus, I believe that if there was racial discrimination used in the selection of the jury in this case, the error of the trial judge in not sua sponte stopping the racial discrimination should be reviewed whether or not the defendant objected during the voir dire or raised the error in his post-trial motion. Accordingly, I do not agree with the conclusion and reasoning of the majority that the issue of the State excluding blacks from the jury solely because of their race is waived simply because no objection is made during the voir dire. The majority’s conclusion and reasoning that the issue must be brought “to the trial court’s attention” (184 Ill. App. 3d at 465) to preserve the error for review is skewed because it must be presumed that the trial judge is paying attention to what is going on in his courtroom, and it is his duty to sua sponte stop racial discrimination committed in his presence. ADDENDUM After my specially concurring opinion was circulated to my colleagues, the majority opinion was redrafted to respond to my specially concurring opinion. In its response, the majority states: “Preliminarily, we nowhere conclude or reason in this opinion that ‘the issue of the State excluding blacks from the jury solely because of their race is waived simply because no objection is made during the voir dire.’ ” (184 Ill. App. 3d at 465.) I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of its own opinion. In my judgment, the majority opinion plainly stands and will be cited for the proposition that the issue of the State excluding blacks from the jury solely because of their race is waived if no objection is made during the voir dire. The statements to support its conclusion leaves no room for doubt. The majority states: “We also note the supreme court’s recognition in Evans that Batson requires only a ‘timely objection’ to the State’s use of peremptory challenges. Finally, we note the court’s observation in Evans that ‘[w]e do not believe that an objection occurring after the jury is sworn can be deemed timely.’ (Emphasis added.) [(Evans, 125 Ill. 2d at 61-62.)] In view of the facts of Evans and the language of the supreme court therein, we believe that it can reasonably be construed as requiring only a timely objection during the voir dire to preserve a Batson claim for appeal.” (184 Ill. App. 3d at 465.) Thus, what the majority says in response to my special concurring opinion is irreconcilable with what the majority says in the text of its opinion. In addition, the majority states: “More importantly, while we would like to agree with Justice Rizzi that this court’s opinion in People v. Andrews (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 394, 526 N.E.2d 628, appeal allowed (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 560, controls the disposition of defendant’s Batson claim, we do not see how we, as a subordinate court of review, may ignore our supreme court’s holding in Evans that Batson requires a defendant to make a timely objection to the State’s use of peremptory challenges.” (184 Ill. App. 3d at 465.) I believe that by relying upon and attempting to distinguish Evans in alternative breaths, the majority belies credibility. Moreover, contrary to what the majority says, if the majority would like to agree that this court’s opinion in Andrews controls the disposition of defendant’s Batson claim, it can and should do so. I do not believe that either Evans or Enoch addressed or even tangentially discussed the conclusion or ratio decidendi in Andrews, to wit: “Thus, in order to maintain the appearance of justice and the integrity of our judicial process, and in order to keep itself from being an accomplice to racial discrimination, the trial court sua sponte must promptly and in no uncertain terms stop any racial discrimination committed in its presence. This is required whether or not the defendant makes a timely objection.” (Andrews, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 402-03, 526 N.E.2d at 634.) For this reason, I do not find either Evans or Enoch applicable. The difference that I have with the majority in this case presents a very important question to our trial judges. If the majority is correct, in effect, a trial judge may sit back and watch racial discrimination occur in his presence without committing error so long as no objection is raised by the parties; on review the inaction of the trial judge will be condoned by resorting to the doctrine of waiver because no objection was made. In my opinion, such a result is a clear example of compounded egregiousness. Moreover, I believe that the question of the role of the trial court itself when it reasonably appears that peremptory challenges are being used to effect racial discrimination must be faced candidly and squarely by reviewing courts. Up until now, except for what is stated in Andrews and the appellate court opinion in Payne, the silence by reviewing courts in Illinois has been deafening. I believe that in our type of government there are certain acts to which a trial judge can never be a participant in any way whatsoever. I do not pretend to be able to delineate all of those acts. However, I do know without reservation that one of those acts is racial discrimination in the courtroom. I also believe that when a trial judge allows the exclusion of people from participating as jurors solely because of their race, the trial judge’s complicity in the acts resulting in exclusion of the potential jurors makes him an accomplice to racial discrimination in the courtroom. Thus, the trial judge’s error transcends any consideration of waiver by any party. It follows that the doctrine of waiver has no place when the alleged error relates to whether potential jurors were excluded from jury service solely because of their race. In my opinion, for the reasons stated herein, a trial judge has an affirmative duty in any kind of case to sua sponte stop any racial discrimination committed in his courtroom. The parties to the suit can neither accede to nor waive such a transgression. In the present case, if there was racial discrimination used in the selection of the jury, the trial judge had an affirmative duty to sua sponte stop the racial discrimination, and if he did not, the trial judge’s error should be noticed and reviewed whether or not the defendant objected during the voir dire. To even consider the doctrine of waiver under such circumstances erodes the legal as well as the moral value of our righteous outrage when instances of racial discrimination occur in our courtrooms. Accordingly, I agree with the result reached by the majority but only on the basis stated herein.