Court Opinion

ID: 9853514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:47.516168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:50.581027
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Chief Justice
(concurring with comment).
I agree with the main opinion and with the statement that the writ of habeas corpus has been used to inquire into matters other than the lawfulness of the restraint. That so-called broadening of the function of the writ was and is chiefly a means used by the federal courts to release criminals, and I am unalterably opposed to any such use of the writ.
*1177A case in point is that of Salt Lake City y. Piepenburg.1 Mr. Piepenburg was found guilty of showing a pornographic movie. His conviction has been affirmed by the courts of last resort of this state, and his trial has been determined to have been fairly conducted. Now he brings a writ of habeas corpus in the inferior federal court where he alleges that he did not have a fair trial in the city court. The federal judge set aside the lawful order of imprisonment of the state court and released the defendant pending a trial on the merits to see if he thinks the defendant is guilty or if he had a fair state trial.
Such use of the writ is an abomination in the sight of the law. It ignores the time-honored principle of law that where a matter has been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the person, that decision is binding on all other courts under the doctrine of res judicata.
If the warden is mistreating prisoners, other writs are available, such as mandate or prohibition whereby the conduct of the officer can be corrected. Certainly the release of the felon is not the proper remedy to cure any alleged improprieties on the part of the warden.
The trial court properly denied the writ.2

. Utah, 571 P.2d 1299 (1977).

. See Rammell v. Smith, Utah, 560 P.2d 1108 (1977); Schad v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345, 496 P.2d 263 (1972); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 400 P.2d 968 (1968).