Court Opinion

ID: 9864582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 14:06:54.809823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:36.732816
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13406

            CUMMINGS PROPERTIES, LLC   vs.   DARRYL C. HINES.

       Middlesex.         May 3, 2023. - September 25, 2023.

 Present:     Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                             & Georges, JJ.

Real Property, Lease. Contract, Lease of real estate, Rent
     acceleration clause, Provision for liquidated damages.
     Damages, Liquidated damages, Mitigation. Guaranty.
     Penalty.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
January 6, 2020.

    The case was heard by Christopher K. Barry-Smith, J.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     Joseph B. Simons for the defendant.
     Joseph P. Mingolla for the plaintiff.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     John Pagliaro & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal
Foundation.
     Charles L. Solomont & Andrew M. Buttaro for NPS LLC.
     Thomas Bhisitkul & Michael Riley for Real Estate Bar
Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another.
                                                                      2

     BUDD, C.J.     For over a century, Massachusetts courts have

recognized and enforced liquidated damages clauses.1    Although it

is true that these clauses potentially can result in an

unwarranted penalty for a party committing a breach and a

windfall for the party not committing a breach, it long has been

the rule that "parties are to be held to their words . . .

except in exceptional cases."     Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 74

(1900).     As discussed infra, we recognize that liquidated

damages clauses do not always match the actual damages resulting

from a contract breach.     However, we are careful to distinguish

between clauses that are true penalties and those that, although

imprecise, were reasonable predictions of damages at the time

the contract was entered into by willing parties.     In this case,

we ultimately find the latter.

     The defendant, Darryl C. Hines, contends that the

liquidated damages clause in a commercial lease is unenforceable

where the landlord, Cummings Properties, LLC (Cummings), was

able to relet the property after Hines's company defaulted on

the rent.    Because we conclude that Hines failed to meet his

burden in proving that the amount provided for in the clause was

     1 If there occurs a breach of a contract, a liquidated
damages clause entitles the party not committing the breach to
collect from the party committing the breach an amount
corresponding to what the parties predicted the breach would
cost the party that did not commit the breach. See generally 24
R.A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 65.1 (4th ed. 2018).
                                                                   3

an unreasonable forecast of damages at the time the lease was

signed, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court in favor of

Cummings.2

     Background and procedural posture.    We recite the

undisputed facts as found by the trial judge,3 supplementing them

where necessary with undisputed evidence in the record and

leaving some details for later discussion.    See Miramar Park

Ass'n v. Dennis, 480 Mass. 366, 369 (2018).

     On April 15, 2016, Cummings entered into a five-year lease

with Massachusetts Constable's Office, Inc. (MCO), a service of

process company, of which Hines was founder, sole officer, and

director.    Hines signed as guarantor, "personally and

unconditionally guarantee[ing] the prompt payment of rent by

[MCO] and the performance by [MCO] of all financial and

nonfinancial obligations arising out of [the] lease."

     The lease provided that in the event that MCO failed to pay

the rent due ($1,364.50 per month), after a ten-day grace period

and notice to MCO, Cummings would have the right to terminate

the lease and the "entire balance of rent due . . . immediately

     2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by New England
Legal Foundation; the Real Estate Bar Association for
Massachusetts, Inc., and the Abstract Club; and NPS LLC.

     3 We accept the trial judge's findings of fact unless they
clearly are erroneous. See Anastos v. Sable, 443 Mass. 146, 149
(2004).
                                                                    4

[would] become due and payable as liquidated damages, since both

parties agree that such amount is a reasonable estimate of the

actual damages likely to result from such breach."

    Less than one month after the lease agreement took effect,

MCO lost a lucrative contract it had secured with the Department

of Revenue (DOR).   The next month, MCO failed to pay its rent.

Cummings sent a notice of default and, after ten days, commenced

summary process proceedings in the District Court.   One year

after MCO had vacated the premises, Cummings secured a four-year

lease with a new tenant.

    Cummings later filed a complaint in the Superior Court

seeking to enforce Hines's obligations as guarantor of the

lease.   After a bench trial, the trial judge concluded that the

liquidated damages provision was enforceable.   The judge further

found that Hines was "sufficiently sophisticated" to have

understood that by signing as personal guarantor, he would be

liable if MCO failed to meet its obligations.   Consequently, the

judge found in favor of Cummings, awarding it $68,650.24, the

balance owed under the liquidated damages clause after

subtracting any payments already made by MCO.   The Appeals Court

reversed, concluding that because the liquidated damages

provision did not account for the possibility that Cummings

could relet the premises and collect rent from a new tenant in

mitigation of the breach, it was an unenforceable penalty.
                                                                     5

Cummings Props., LLC v. Hines, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 33-34, 37

(2022).   We granted Cummings's application for further appellate

review.

    Discussion.    Hines argues that in these circumstances the

clause operates as an impermissible penalty.    He also contends

that he was an unsophisticated party who should not be required

to fulfill his end of the original agreement.    As explained

infra, we are not persuaded by either argument.

    1.    Enforceability of liquidated damages clauses.   "[T]he

general rule of our law is freedom of contract . . . [and] it is

in the public interest to accord individuals broad powers to

order their affairs through legally enforceable agreements"

(quotations and citations omitted).   Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v.

Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 320 (1996).    This is so

even where, as here, the enforcement of the contract appears to

produce harsh results.   See, e.g., NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 451

Mass. 417, 422 (2008).

    So it is with liquidated damages clauses.      "It has long

been the rule in Massachusetts that a contract provision that

clearly and reasonably establishes liquidated damages should be

enforced, so long as it is not so disproportionate to

anticipated damages as to constitute a penalty."    TAL Fin. Corp.

v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 446 Mass 422, 431 (2006), citing Kaplan

v. Gray, 215 Mass. 269, 270-273 (1913).
                                                                       6

       Generally, jurisdictions test the enforceability of a

liquidated damages clause in one of two ways:      by analyzing the

circumstances at the time the contract was formed, known as the

"single look" approach, or by considering the circumstances at

the time of the breach, i.e., the "second look" approach.       See

Kelly v. Marx, 428 Mass. 877, 879 (1999).    This court has

adopted the single look approach.    Id. at 880.

       We recognize that the second look approach allows for an

after-the-fact adjustment to avoid a windfall for the party not

committing the breach "by assessing the reasonableness . . .

against the actual damages resulting from the breach."        Id. at

879.   However, as we explained when we opted to follow the

single-look approach, of the two, it "most accurately matches

the expectations of the parties, who negotiated a liquidated

damage amount that was fair to each side based on their unique

concerns and circumstances surrounding the agreement, and their

individual estimate of damages in event of a breach."      Id. at

880.   By assigning a specific value to a contract breach ahead

of time, a liquidated damages clause has the potential to

promote certainty, resolve disputes efficiently, and,

notwithstanding the instant case, avoid litigation.     See

Cummings Props., LLC v. National Communications Corp., 449 Mass.

490, 496 (2007) (Cummings Props.).    See also 24 R.A. Lord,

Williston on Contracts § 65.17 (4th ed. 2018) ("The more popular
                                                                    7

view is that the reasonableness of a liquidated damages clause

should be determined as of the time the contract was executed,

not with the benefit of hindsight").

     In contrast, the second look approach encourages an

aggrieved party to bring suit and attempt to show evidence of

damage due to a contract breach.   That is, under the second-look

approach, "the 'parties must fully litigate (at great expense

and delay) that which they sought not to litigate.'"4   Kelly, 428

Mass. at 881, citing Watson v. Ingram, 124 Wash. 2d 845, 851-852

(1994).   See Note, "Keep the Change!":   A Critique of the No

Actual Injury Defense to Liquidated Damages, 65 Wash. L. Rev.

977, 991 (1990).   For this reason, we have "squarely rejected

the 'second look' approach."   TAL Fin. Corp., 446 Mass. at 431.

     2.   Application of the single look approach.   Under the

single look approach, a liquidated damages clause will be

enforced if (1) the actual damages resulting from a breach were

difficult to ascertain at the time the contract was signed; and

(2) the sum agreed on as liquidated damages represents a

"reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the event

     4 Indeed, as Justice Spina aptly pointed out when he sat on
the Appeals Court, the "'second look' reveals nothing that the
parties had not contemplated" when they entered their contract.
Kelly, 428 Mass. at 880-881, quoting Kelly v. Marx, 44 Mass.
App. Ct. 825, 833 (1998) (Spina, J., dissenting).
                                                                    8

of a breach."   NPS, LLC, 451 Mass. at 420, quoting Cummings

Props., 449 Mass. at 494.

     As the party seeking to invalidate the liquidated damages

provision, Hines had the burden to prove either that (1) damages

resulting from a contract breach were easily ascertainable at

the time the contract was signed, or (2) the "damages to which

[MCO] agreed are disproportionate to a reasonable estimate of

those actual damages likely to result from a breach."    Cummings

Props., 449 Mass. at 494-495.   Hines failed to prove either.

     With regard to the first prong, although Hines asserted

that Cummings, a high-volume commercial landlord, was likely to

relet the premises on default and that any damages resulting

from the default thus would not have been difficult to

ascertain, he failed to present evidence to support these

claims.5   In the absence of such evidence, the trial judge

concluded that there was no way to predict when a breach might

occur, whether or when a new tenant would be secured, what the

new rent might be, and what costs Cummings would incur in the

meantime, and that damages therefore were indeed difficult to

ascertain.   See Cummings Props., 449 Mass. at 496; Kelly, 428

     5 In contrast, Cummings called an employee to the stand who
testified that due to market forces and other factors, the
company had no reliable method for predicting how long it would
take to relet a vacant office space. The employee further
testified that multiple units in the same office building where
MCO had rented space had been empty for as long as twelve years.
                                                                     9

Mass. at 881-882.    Cf. 275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River

Int'l, LLC, 465 Mass. 16, 25-26 (2013).

     As for the second prong, we previously have held that

where, as here, the liquidated damages amount provided for in

the lease represents the agreed-on rental value of the property

at the time of the breach and decreases during the term of the

lease, it is a "reasonable anticipation of damages that might

accrue from the nonpayment of rent."    NPS, LLC, 451 Mass. at

422, quoting Cummings Props., 449 Mass. at 496-497.

Correspondingly, where the tenant "is required to pay no more

than the total amount [it] would have paid had [the tenant]

performed [its] obligations under the agreement[, t]he sum

provided for . . . bears a reasonable relationship to the

anticipated actual damages resulting from a breach."    NPS, LLC,

supra.    See Panagakos v. Collins, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 697, 702-703

(2011).

     Contrary to the holding of the Appeals Court, we never have

required that the amount of a liquidated damages clause take

into account any future rents collected from a new tenant to be

enforceable.6

     6 Relying on TAL Fin. Corp., 446 Mass. 422 (TAL), the
Appeals Court concluded that the liquidated damages clause was
an unenforceable penalty because it did not account for rent
that Cummings collected from the new tenant during the original
lease term. Cummings Props., LLC, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 33-34.
                                                                  10

    Even though Hines failed to meet his burden to demonstrate

that the liquidated damages provision amounted to a penalty, he

nevertheless contends that the sum should be decreased by the

amount Cummings collected by reletting the space.   This position

does not comport with our case law.   As discussed supra, in our

view, the single look approach aligns with the purpose of a

liquidated damages clause, i.e., to provide certainty for

parties at the time the contract is formed.

    "When parties agree in advance to a sum certain that
    represents a reasonable estimate of potential damages, they
    exchange the opportunity to determine actual damages after
    a breach, including possible mitigation, for the peace of
    mind and certainty of result afforded by a liquidated
    damages clause. In such circumstances, to consider whether
    a plaintiff has mitigated its damages not only is
    illogical, but also defeats the purpose of liquidated
    damages provisions." (Quotation and citations omitted.)

NPS, LLC, 451 Mass. at 423.   As we already have determined that

the liquidated damages clause does not amount to a penalty, it

is enforceable according to the terms of the contract regardless

of when, if ever, Cummings was able to relet the premises.

However, in TAL we determined that the amount set by the
liquidated damages clause "b[ore] no rational relation to the
parties' expectation of the true value of the leased items" at
the time the contract was signed. TAL, 446 Mass. at 433. The
clause also provided a separate source of damages in addition to
the lessor's "independent ability to collect all future monthly
payments [from the lessee] still due under the lease." Id. at
432-433. In contrast, here, as discussed supra, the amount set
by the liquidated damages clause was a reasonable estimate of
damages that could occur from a breach at the time the contract
was formed.
                                                                 11

     Hines has not persuaded us to abandon our method of

applying the single look approach.7   We remain convinced that

where a contract is unambiguous and freely entered into, it is

preferable for parties to bargain with one another as they see

fit, rather than to have courts step in to decide whether and

how to restructure a contract because certain contingencies were

not accounted for by one of the parties.   See NPS, LLC, 451

Mass. at 420 ("we look to the circumstances at the time of

contract formation; we do not take a 'second look'").   Cf. Le

     7 Many jurisdictions similarly have determined that under
the single look approach, actual damages are not material in
evaluating the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause.
See, e.g., Old Colony Constr., LLC v. Southington, 316 Conn.
202, 222 (2015); Proulx v. 1400 Pa. Ave., SE, LLC, 199 A.3d 667,
673-674 (D.C. 2019). This is so even where enforcing the clause
resulted in the party that did not commit the breach receiving
more than it would have under the original contract. See, e.g.,
Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100-101 (Tenn. 1999);
Stein Eriksen Lodge Owners Ass'n v. MX Techs. Inc., 2022 UT App
30, ¶¶ 57-59.

     Conversely, some jurisdictions, despite espousing single
look principles, have adopted exceptions to the analysis that
alter it significantly. See, e.g., General Elec. Capital Corp.
v. Nucor Drilling, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d. 1375, 1381 (M.D. Ga.
2008) (mitigation required under Georgia law to enforce
liquidated damages clause); Fortune Bridge Co. v. Department of
Transp., 242 Ga. 531, 532 (1978) (liquidated damages clauses
presumed unenforceable in close cases); 172 Van Duzer Realty
Corp. v. Globe Alumni Student Assistance Ass'n, 24 N.Y.3d 528,
536-537 (2014) (remanding judgment enforcing liquidated damages
clause for consideration of actual damages); Frank Nero Auto
Lease, Inc. v. Townsend, 64 Ohio App. 2d 65, 71 (1979)
(mitigation required to enforce liquidated damages clause).
                                                                    12

Fort Enters., Inc. v. Lantern 18, LLC, 491 Mass. 144, 153-154

(2023).

     3.     Sophistication.   "A contractual liquidated damages

provision is entitled to a presumption of validity, especially

where . . . it was negotiated between two sophisticated

parties."    Nantasket Beachfront Condominiums, LLC v. Hull Redev.

Auth., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 469 (2015).      See Cummings Props.,

449 Mass. at 495-496.     Hines claims that he was not a

sophisticated party, thus, the liquidated damages clause is not

enforceable against him.      This argument fails.

     As an initial matter, Hines's contention that one's level

of sophistication in business matters is a question of law

rather than fact is incorrect.8     See Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank

Nat'l Ass'n, 465 Mass. 775, 788 (2013), citing O'Connor v.

Redstone, 452 Mass. 537, 550 (2008) (judge's determinations that

plaintiffs were "reasonably sophisticated" and "knew what they

were doing" were based on "weigh[ing of] the evidence" and

"credibility assessments" properly left to trier of fact).        See

also Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New

Formalism, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 497 n.21, 520 (2010) (collecting

cases from other jurisdictions addressing sophistication as

     8 Hines's position also is contradicted by the basis for his
argument that he lacked the requisite sophistication, which is
entirely grounded in his view of the facts.
                                                                   13

question of fact).   Cf. Sparrow v. Demonico, 461 Mass. 322, 327-

328 (2012) (determining competency to contract is question of

fact).

    At trial, Hines alleged that his previous lease for office

space was an informal arrangement and that he did not have

experience negotiating a lease with a large commercial landlord.

He also pointed to the fact that he was not represented by an

attorney, and that he did not read the lease carefully before

signing it on behalf of MCO and as personal guarantor.   However,

there was also undisputed evidence that Hines started at least

two businesses and, at some point, converted MCO from a for-

profit to a not-for-profit company, all of which required the

filing of the appropriate corporate forms.   In addition to MCO,

where he held a number of officer positions simultaneously and

had up to ten employees, Hines also ran a company that provided

tax preparation services.   Further, MCO's move to Woburn was the

result of Hines having negotiated a contract for MCO to provide

services to the DOR.

    Based on these facts, the judge reasoned that Hines

"demonstrate[d] some facility for business management and

planning," and that the process of entering into a government

contract with the DOR likely required the "same skills [that]

are relevant to negotiating commercial leases."   The judge thus

determined that although Hines was not a "highly sophisticated
                                                                   14

business person," he was "sufficiently sophisticated to be held

to the provisions of the contract he signed" (emphasis in the

original).9   See H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington St., LLC,

489 Mass. 1, 13 (2022), citing Commissioner of Revenue v.

Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 302 (2009) (judge's findings of

fact reviewed for clear error).

     Conclusion.   As Hines has failed to meet his burden to show

that the liquidated damages clause is unenforceable, we affirm

the judgment of the Superior Court.

                                      Judgment affirmed.

     9 Although Hines argues that his ventures were more informal
than they otherwise might appear, we cannot say that the judge
committed clear error in relying on them. Moreover, Hines's
claim that he did not read the lease agreement does not alter
our analysis. See Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 680 (2007)
("failure to read the agreement 'word-for-word' makes no
difference"); Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 372 (1955)
(generally, "the court should exhibit no greater interest in
protecting a plaintiff's rights than he himself has shown").
Similarly, that Hines is not an attorney, and was not
represented by one, does not mean that he is unsophisticated for
the purposes of enforcing the terms of the lease. Cf. NPS, LLC,
451 Mass. at 420 (sophistication, like reasonableness, "depends
on the circumstances of each case").