Court Opinion

ID: 9793538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:49:39.917568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:58.495555
License: Public Domain

*281HENRIOD, Justice
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur in the result as to the deed claimed to be a forgery and as to the deed claimed to be a mortgage. As to the so-called “Hempstead” deed, I dissent, and believe that title to the so-called “West 40” acres should be quieted in plaintiff. It respectfully is suggested by the writer that the reasons assigned by the main opinion as to the “Hemp-stead” deed, do not justify the conclusion that there was no conveyance to Hempstead. A valid warranty deed was executed and placed on public record. There is no evidence that it was never delivered, and the presumption that a recorded deed was delivered establishes that fact. The main opinion states as a factor in arriving at its conclusion, that there was no evidence that Hempstead exercised any dominion over the property. That is no reason for declaring a recorded deed as something other than it appears to be, to wit, no deed at all. It is pointed out that there was also no evidence that Hempstead did not exercise any dominion over the property. Here again, a presumption establishes that he did exercise dominion over the property, since it is presumed that the record owner has possession and all other muniments of title, including complete control thereof. The fact that the grantor recorded the deed pointed out in the majority opinion as some evidence to destroy the sanctity of a recorded instrument can prove absolutely nothing as to execution and delivery of the deed or ownership of the property, and again the presumption of ownership operates in favor of Hempstead. The facts that Mrs. Thomas paid the taxes for many years, or that her husband redeemed the property from tax sale in her name, or that the property was assessed in her name, have no bearing on the question of title or ownership, since this court has already stated that another presumption operates in favor of Hempstead, — that it is presumed that taxes are paid for the benefit of the record owner, irrespective of the personality of the payor.1 That Mrs. Thomas subsequently *282purchased the property from one who had acquired it by tax deed, has no significance in this case, since, having given Hempstead a warranty deed, and the taxes being delinquent, any title acquired subsequently by her inured to the benefit of and became vested in Hempstead by virtue of the fundamental principle that a warranty deed passes after-acquired title.2 The same reasoning applies to Mrs. Thomas’ ultimate perfection of a water application which would not only pass by virtue of the warranty, but which even should not be considered in this case, since it would not appear in an abstract of title, and is therefore undiscoverable as a practical matter, and whose perfection under any conceivable theory, could not possibly affect the fee title. The fact that Mrs. Thomas attempted to convey to Tracy and again to Utah Savings after her deed to Hempstead, mentioned in the main opinion, has no significance, since such attempted transfers, as against an unattacked, recorded prior deed, amount only to interloper transactions.
The majority opinion says in effect that these circumstances, in the aggregate, make it
“unconscionable [in the highest degree] to now- allow Hempstead or his successor, Northcrest, to assert title and have the property.” '
The quoted language sounds like a defense in equity based on unconscionability, but such defense was not asserted by defendants, who claimed only by adverse possession or that there never had been a conveyance to Hempstead, which latter fact the trial court found, and upon which the award to defendants was based. The quoted language is, in truth, a gratuity indulged by the main opinion in aid of but not the basis for, the decree, and the inconsistency of the quoted language quickly is pointed up when later in the opinion it is admitted that
“the trial court was right in his conclusion that Lucie never actually conveyed ownership of the property to Hempstead.” (Emphasis added.)
*283The main opinion also makes the point that plaintiff never offered to “repay to defendants the sums paid by their mother for taxes and redemptions”. There was no duty to make such offer, since, if title had been quieted in plaintiff, the repayment of such taxes and redemptions would have been required as a matter of course, as held by the decisions of this court.3
The writer believes that it was not
“noteworthy that the plaintiff itself regarded the Hempstead deed as merely a cloud on the title”,
as stated in the majority opinion. What the plaintiff thinks about a public record can have no impact on the record itself. The fact that the plaintiffs obtained a deed from the widow of the record owner for $25, and amended its complaint to include Hempstead’s administrator as a defendant, as pointed out in the opinion, has no probative value in attacking a public record which is presumed to be correct until overcome by most persuasive evidence showing fraud, mistake and the like by clear and unmistakable evidence.
The writer respectfully suggests that as to the “West 40”, the main opinion admits every rule and principle mentioned in this dissent, only to make an exception to and qualify each by gratuitous language amounting to an opinion on facts dehors the record that binds us.

 Anson v. Ellison, 104 Utah 576, 140 P. 2d 653.

Thompson on Seal Property, Perm. Ed., § 2610.

Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Hallock, 41 Utah 378, 126 P. 394; Bolognese v. Anderson, 87 Utah 456, 49 P. 2d 1034.