Court Opinion

ID: 9794149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:00:23.069631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:33.805292
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
concurring in result.
The court dismisses that part of Larry Wright’s [Wright or defendant] appeal which presses the breach-of-contract issues addressed in the March 31, 1993 judgment. *1355Today’s pronouncement allows Wright to continue his appeal against the postjudgment counsel-fee award allowed by the April 21, 1993 nisi prius order. While I concur in this result, I write separately to correct the notion that the March 31 record entry,1 which is signed by the judge and affords Tommy Keel [Keel or plaintiff] the relief sought, cannot qualify as a judgment solely because it is memorialized on a form titled “court minute”. This misconception was rejected in Manning v. State ex rel. Dept, of Public Safety.2 I also write to explain that had the counsel-fee plea been rested on contract rather than prevailing-party status, it would have presented a prejudgment, instead of postjudgment, issue. Since the record does not indicate the terms, if any there were, of a promise-based obligation among the parties, I will assume — as did the court — that the counsel-fee award is based on statute3 and hence resolves a postjudgment issue.4

I

THE ANATOMY OP LITIGATION
On October 13, 1992 Keel brought a breach-of-contract action against Larry Wright and others. The trial judge scheduled a pre-trial conference on February 24, 1993. Wright failed to appear; the conference was re-scheduled for March 3, 1993. When Wright again failed to appear, default judgment was entered against him. An evi-dentiary hearing, scheduled to determine damages, took place on March 31, 1993. Judgment was then entered for Keel’s damages, but the amount of the counsel-fee award was not determined. A second memorial of the same judgment — prepared by Keel’s counsel at the court’s direction — contains the very same terms as the March 31 memorialization. Signed by .the judge, it was entered on April 7, 1998. Although the earlier (March 31) memorial directed that a copy of the judgment be mailed to 0. William Davis [defendant’s counsel], Davis maintains he does not recall receiving notice of the judgment until April 19, 1998 when he procured a copy from the court clerk’s office.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court — by a judge-signed order entered on April 21, 1993 — set the amount of Keel’s counsel-fee award at $1,750.00 and directed plaintiff’s counsel to prepare an order of the court’s finding. The counsel-prepared order was filed on June 16, 1993.
Wright’s appeal, brought to challenge both the breach-of-contract ruling and the coun- ' sel-fee award, came here on May 21, 1993— more than thirty days after Wright received notice of Keel’s breach-of-contract judgment, i.e., April 19, 1993, but within thirty days of the postjudgment counsel-fee award’s filing.
II
AN INSTRUMENT’S MEANING AND EFFECT DEPEND UPON ITS CONTENT AND SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN UPON ITS FORM OR TITLE5
Judgments,6 orders7 and minutes8 are facially distinguishable instruments. Recog*1356nizable by their content, appearance and substance, each of these writings has a distinct legal identity and objective.9 Before October 1, 1993, judgment was secured by the filing of a memorial that met the 12 O.S.1991 § 2f10 recordation criteria (the judge’s full signature and a clear indication of the relief afforded). After October 1, 1993, a judgment, to be recordable, must substantially meet not only the § 24 criteria but also the requirements of 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.3.11 The filing of a recordable memorial triggers the 12 O.S.1991 § 990A12 countdown for commencing an appeal.13
The substance of the March 31 entry is that of a judgment and not that of a minute.,14 If the four corners had yielded no more than an unsigned or initialed memorandum of the courtroom events, my conclusion would be different. Because the earlier court-prepared (March 31) memorial precludes all further inquiry into the breach-of-contract issues joined by the pleadings,15 the March 31 entry, and not the later April 7 memorial, is the filed judgment in this case.16 The former may not be transmuted into a minute either by its preprinted “court minute” label or by the judge’s directive that plaintiff’s counsel prepare a journal entry. The later April 7 journal entry simply does not extend appeal time.
Although Manning holds that the law will not tolerate more than one record entry of the same appealable event,17 we there saved from dismissal a tardy appeal to protect the appellant from a confusing instruction from a *1357trial judge who told counsel for the prevailing party to prepare a second memorial of the same judgment. While I agree that Wright’s appeal is untimely, I do so for a different reason. It is my view that the appeal was brought more than thirty days from April 19 — the day Wright first acquired notice of the earlier (March 31) record entry’s filing.
Ill
THERE CAN BE BUT ONE AUTHENTIC MEMORIAL OF A JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER
This court stands committed to the principle that in the judgment roll of a case there can he only one authentic memorial of a judgment,18 When confronted with two instruments that memorialize the same ruling, the court will deem the earlier entry to control over the later, even if the later should contain some matter not included in the former. This is the Aishman doctrine.19 It protects the inviolability of the earlier-recorded memorial that stands unvacated. Its teaching is that a nisi prius judge may not, without resort to modification or vacation process,20 “paper over” an earlier memorial. Absent orderly vacation process, the later memorial of the same ruling will be regarded as a nullity on the face of the judgment roll. The law cannot tolerate more than one record entry of the same ruling.21
IV
A PREVAILING PARTY’S POST-JUDGMENT PLEA FOR A COUNSEL-FEE AWARD IS SEPARATE FROM A CLAIM ON THE MERITS
Where, in a breach-of-contract action, a litigant presses a statutory plea for counsel-fee award qua prevailing party in the case, its demand presents a postjudgment issue.22 Not so if the plea should rest upon a contract clause of the agreement in suit.
The trial court’s inquiry into Keel’s § 93623 counsel-fee plea — an inquiry which could not he commenced until some party had emerged as having “prevailed” — was resolved by the April 21, 1993 order that set the award at $1,750.00. This order, which is separately appealable, was timely brought for our review within thirty days of its nisi prius filing.24
V
SUMMARY
The court errs today when it holds that the breach-of-contract judgment was effected by the later (April 7) rather than the earlier (March 31) memorial. According to the court’s pronouncement, the earlier memorial is an “adjudicatory minute entry.” Minutes cannot accurately be called either “adjudicatory” or “adjudicative”. The former term (“adjudicatory”) simply denotes “matters to be decided.”25 “Adjudicative”, on the other hand, means that which pertains to adjudication.26 Minutes are nothing more or less *1358pretentious than mnemonic aids posted on the district court’s appearance docket, its chronological index of events in an action. The appearance docket may not be used as evidence of what was adjudicated?27 The proof of an adjudication is made by the judgment roll, of which the appearance docket is not a part.28
The time to appeal from the March 31 breach-of-eontract judgment was triggered April 19. The only reason I accept April 19 as the appealable event is because it is the temporal point at which Wright’s counsel learned of the earlier memorial’s filing.29 I hence recede from today’s opinion but join in the disposition of this appeal.

. For the law governing the appeal from the March 31 entry, see infra note 12.

. Manning v. State ex rel. Dept, of Public Safety, Okl., 876 P.2d 667 (1994).

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 936 are: "In any civil action to recover on ... [a] contract which is the subject to [sic] the action, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” [Emphasis added.]

. See Rule 1.10, Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases.

. Sellers v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., Okl., 687 P.2d 116, 118 (1984); Horizons, Inc. v. KEO Leasing Co„ Okl., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., 655 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1983); Knell v. Bumes, Old., 645 P.2d 471, 473 (1982); Boose v. Hanlin, Okl., 346 P.2d 932, 935 (1959).

. “A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.” 12 O.S.1991 §681. [Emphasis supplied.] See Hurley v. Hurley, 191 Okl. 194, 127 P.2d 147, 150 (1942).

. An order is a "direction of a court or judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment.” [Emphasis supplied.] 12 O.S.1991 § 1116.

. Minutes are no more than abbreviated memo-randa of what takes place in court. State v. Larkin, 11 Nev. 314, 321 (1876); Gregory v. *1356Frothingham, 1 Nev. 253, 260 (1865). Never a fit substitute for the judge's recordable memorialized entry, minutes are by definition an incomplete reflection of the court's ruling. Elliott v. City of Guthrie, Okl., 725 P.2d 861, 863 n. 10 (1986); Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, Okl., 720 P.2d 721, 723 n. 5 (1986); Miller v. Miller, Okl., 664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1983); Wetsel v. Independent School District 1-1, Old., 670 P.2d 986, 993 (1983); McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Okl., 626 P.2d 1332, 1335 n. 1 (1981).

. The term "minute order” has no legal meaning. This oxymoron crept into courthouse parlance when, because of county budgetary constraints that eliminated the availability of some courtroom deputies, judges began writing and signing short, recordable orders at the bench. Oklahoma is not the only state to be plagued by oxymorons. See, e.g., Woodland v. Woodland, 147 N.W.2d 590, 601 (N.D.1967), for an instrument dubbed a “judgment order.”

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 24, are: “Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases ... shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file:”
* * * * ⅜ *
"2. All instruments filed in the case that bear the signature of the judge and specify clearly the relief granted or order made.” [Emphasis supplied.]

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1993 § 696.3, effective October 1, 1993, are:
"A. Judgments, decrees and appealable orders that are filed with the clerk of the court shall contain:
1.A caption setting forth the name of the court, the names and designation of the parties, the file number of the case and the title of the instrument;
2. A statement of the disposition of the action, proceeding, or motion, including a statement of the relief awarded to a party or parties and the liabilities and obligations imposed on the other party or parties;
3. The signature and title of the court; ...."

. The appeal from the March 31, 1993 judgment is governed by the law in effect when judgment was entered. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 990A [repealed by 1993 Okla.Sess.Laws Ch. 351 § 18, effective October 1, 1993 (codified at 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 990A)] provided in pertinent part:
"An appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from the date the final order or judgment is filed." [Emphasis supplied.]

. The judge-signed memorial — filed March 31, 1993 — describes in full the relief granted and meets all the recordation criteria for a record entry under the statutory regime in effect when the judgment was entered.

. The judge’s full signature and a clear indication of the relief afforded are the essential prerequisites for a memorial’s entry upon the judgment roll as a "recordable” instrument. 12 O.S.1991 § 24; Martin v. Lib. Nat. Bank & Trust, Okl., 839 P.2d 179, 180 (1992). For the terms of § 24, see supra note 10.

. Hurley, supra note 6, 127 P.2d at 150; Wells v. Shriver, 81 Okl. 108, 197 P. 460 (1921).

. See 12 O.S.1991 § 990A, supra note 12, which provides that the filed judgment triggers appeal time.

. Manning, supra note 2 at 672.

. Aishman v. Taylor, Okl., 516 P.2d 244, 245 (1973). “A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.” 12 O.S.1991 § 681.

. See Aishman, supra note 18.

. The terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 1031 et seq. authorize the district court to vacate or modify its judgment (within prescribed times and on due notice given to all affected parties).

. For a general discussion of the potential mischief a system of multiple record entries may generate, see Mansell v. City of Lawton, Okl., 877 P.2d 1120, 1127-28 (1994) (Opala, J„ concurring in result).

. White v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 445, 451-52, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 1166, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982). See also Oliver's Sports Center, Inc. v. Nat. Standard Ins., Okl., 615 P.2d 291, 295 (1980) (Opala, J., concurring).

. For the terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 936, see supra note 3.

. P & H Oil Field Serv. v. Spectra Energy, Okl., 823 P.2d 365, 367 (1991).

. See Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 n. 48 (1967).

. State v. Freeman, Okl., 440 P.2d 744, 757 (1968); Communist Party of U.S. v. Sub.Act. Cont.Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 110, 81 S.Ct. 1357, 1418, 6 L.Ed.2d 625 (1961).

. Miller v. Miller, Okl., 664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1983).

. Elliott, supra note at 863; see also Mansell, supra note 21 at 1125-26.

. See McCullough, supra note 8 at 1334.