Court Opinion

ID: 9943988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:52:05.060997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:54:51.420472
License: Public Domain

Because I believe that the majority misinterprets and misconstrues Art. 42.03, Section 2(a), V.A.C.C.P., erroneously applies to this cause the equal protection clauses of the respective constitutions, and fails to discuss certain subjects that will surely confront this overworked Court in the near future, I am compelled to dissent.
The question that is before this Court is whether Art.42.03, Section 2, V.A.C.C.P., or some other law, can be invoked and applied in order to give jail credit to Tyrant Anthony Green, applicant, for the period of time that he spent in a Dallas County juvenile detention center before he was transferred to a criminal district court to stand trial as an adult.
The record reflects that Green has received jail credit for all of the time when he was confined in the Dallas County Jail awaiting trial as an adult. The record further reflects that Green was confined in a Dallas County juvenile detention center from January 14, 1983, until March 21, 1983, before he was ordered by the Juvenile Court of Dallas County to be transferred to a criminal district court of Dallas County to stand trial as an adult.
Art. 42.03, Sec. 2, supra, expressly provides:
 In all criminal cases the judge of the court in which the defendant was convicted shall give the defendant credit on his sentence for the time that the defendant has spent in jail in said cause, from the time of his arrest and confinement until his sentence by the trial court. [Emphasis Added.]
It should be obvious to anyone that Art. 42.03, Section 2(a), supra, is clearly worded. Under the statute, a defendant is to be given jail credit only for each day he spends in jail solely on account of a charge or charges pending against him in a particular cause. A juvenile who is detained in a *Page 558 
juvenile detention facility, however, does not stand accused or charged with anything until a petition to adjudicate him a delinquent or to transfer him to district court to stand trial as an adult is filed, and it is only in the instance of transfer that a formal criminal charge or accusation is later filed against him.
The language of the statute which is important here is the phrase, ". . . for the time that the defendant has spent in jail in said cause." Because of the express wording of Art. 42.03, Section 2(a), supra, I am unable to agree with the majority opinion that "the cause" for which Green was detained in the juvenile detention center is one and the same "causes" for which he is presently confined in the Department of Corrections. See and compare Ex parte Crossley, 586 S.W.2d 545
(Tex.Cr.App. 1979), for a further discussion of the meaning of the phrase "in the cause."
It is obvious to me that when Green was detained in the juvenile detention center he was only detained in order for the Juvenile Court of Dallas County to make the determination of what disposition should be made of him. Thus, "the cause" for which Green was being detained by the juvenile authorities is not "the same causes" for which he was prosecuted and convicted.
If Art. 42.03, Section 2(a), supra, did not expressly limit itself to the granting of jail credit for the time a defendant has spent "in jail in said cause" I might agree with the majority opinion. However, the great State of Texas, contrary to some of our sister States, has not seen fit to statutorily grant a defendant credit for the period of time that he might have spent in a juvenile detention center. See and compare Escobedo v. Oleisky, 339 N.W.2d 263 (Minn.Sup.Ct. 1983), where the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed its state's statute that provides that a defendant is entitled to jail credit "for all the time spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral incident for which sentence is imposed." Unquestionably, now that the Legislature is in session, it should amend Art. 42.03, Section 2(a), supra, to read as the Minnesota statute does. Then, but only then, will it be permissible and lawful for this Court to grant juveniles who are tried as adults credit for the period of time that they might have spent in a juvenile detention center.
The majority opinion states: "We do not think that in enacting Article 42.03, § 2(a) the Legislature intended that an individual initially detained as a juvenile and later certified an adult, then prosecuted and sentenced accordingly, should be treated any differently than one who is initially detained as an adult." In light of the express wording of Article 42.03, Section 2(a), supra, how one can implicitly state that Green is being deprived of equal protection under our laws by being denied credit on his sentences for the period of time he spent in a juvenile detention center is beyond my comprehension. To make the analogy that the majority opinion does causes me to exclaim, "Color me amazed."
It should be clear as crystal to anyone that all juveniles who are tried as adults in our criminal justice system are treated equally, and from the moment of transfer they are guaranteed all of the rights that an adult is entitled to receive.
I also observe that the majority opinion does not state whether what it holds today in Green's case is to be applied retroactively or whether it will have only prospective application to inmates similarly situated.
I predict that if the majority opinion is to be applied retroactively this overworked Court will soon be blessed with a torrent of applications for post-conviction relief from juveniles who were tried as adults seeking recomputation of their time. I also believe that it will be virtually impossible for the authorities to make such recomputations. Therefore, I strongly urge the majority of this Court to consider making its opinion only applicable from this day forward to those persons who have been confined in juvenile detention centers prior to their trials as adults, rather than to implicitly hold that its decision is to be applied retroactively. See and compare Pruett v. Texas, *Page 559 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), and Pruett v. Texas,470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1973), where the mighty Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply its decision awarding jail credit to prisoners who had their cases on appeal retroactively.
I also observe that the majority opinion fails to take into consideration, in granting Green credit on his sentence, the aspect of "good time" credit. This is simply another reason why the majority opinion should not be approved by the members of this Court.
For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
WHITE, J., joins.