Court Opinion

ID: 9734599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:38:49.520372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:49.324204
License: Public Domain

TOM Glaze, Jucourt indicates dissenting. I must dissent. The majority court indicates Robert A. Robbins’s mother, Bobbye Jeanne Robbins, has no standing to intervene as next friend, and on this point the majority court is correct because the appellant has been found competent to represent himself and to waive his right to appeal. See Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988). Accordingly, Mrs. Robbins is not a party to this litigation and clearly has no standing to appeal and raise any issues or arguments on appellant’s behalf. Even so, the majority, without any citation of authority, allows Mrs. Robbins to argue (1) whether Mr. Robbins was competent to waive his right to appeal and postconviction remedies, (2) whether the Franz decision should be overruled, (3) whether a mandatory review in death-penalty cases should be imposed, and (4) whether Mr. Robbins should be appointed an attorney ad litem. Because Mrs. Robbins’s petition must be dismissed, leaving no one to argue the foregoing issues, the majority court is clearly wrong in its considering and deciding these issues. If this court wishes to require mandatory review in death-penalty cases, it should do so by promulgating a court rule, which it has authority to do. Instead, the majority court is reviewing the issues in this case by eviscerating its appellate rules and well-established precedent. The majority opinion seems to suggest that the Franz decision permits this court to consider any issues it chooses to reach in a death-penalty case. Not so. In Franz, the Rev. Louis J. Franz petitioned this court to proceed on behalf of Ronald Gene Simmons and asked the court to stay Simmons’s execution and to make appeals mandatory in death cases. Simmons made an appearance and filed a response, stating among other things that he sought no relief except to be left alone to waive his right of appeal. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). Simmons further answered, stating that he had been declared competent and that he had made an informed choice of death over life. Citing Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 211m 548 S.W.2d 106, 115 cert, denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977), he claimed no mandatory appeals were required under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We affirmed the Collins holding in Franz. Franz, 296 Ark. at 188, 754 S.W.2d at 842. Here, unlike in Franz, the defendant (Robert A. Robbins) has made no appearance and has offered no arguments. Instead, Mr. Robbins obviously relies on the record which reflects he has given a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a direct appeal and appointment of postconviction counsel. The language in our statute and court rules only contemplates a review when death-penalty defendants choose to exercise their right to appeal. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-113(a); Ark. R. App. P.—Crim. 14 (1999); Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3 (h) (1999). As the Attorney General makes clear, Mr. Robbins’s access to court has in no way been impeded, but he has initiated no appeal. In fact, this court has previously reviewed this matter and assured itself that the proof demonstrated Mr. Robbins knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal. See State v. Robbins, 335 Ark. 380, 985 S.W.2d 293 (1998). In conclusion, this proceeding, as the majority court conducts it, is a curious one, indeed, since Mr. Robbins has not appeared or responded in it and Mrs. Robbins’s request to intervene has been properly rejected. No one is left in this case to seek the relief the majority so readily grants. The majority unhesitatingly proceeds to consider and decide issues no one has the standing to raise. This simply is not sound jurisprudence. Again, if the majority feels stróngly that appellate reviews should be mandated in death-penalty cases, it should do so by rule, not by adopting such a procedure or rule in a proceeding that rightfully should be dismissed. Today’s opinion is purely advisory and conflicts with this court’s Franz decision. At this time, for the reasons given above, I believe Franz is controlling and that the court should dismiss Mrs. Robbins’s petition and this proceeding. Corbin and Smith, JJ., join this dissent.