Court Opinion

ID: 9894652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 17:04:04.738674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:24.415098
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/2/23 Mark E. v. Superior Court CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 MARK E. et al.,
           Petitioners,
 v.
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF                                                  A168455
 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
                                                                        (Contra Costa County
           Respondent;
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. J21-00561)
 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES BUREAU,
           Real Party in Interest.

         Mark E. (Father) and R.A. (Mother) petition this court for
extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating Father’s
reunification services and setting a selection-and-implementation hearing for
their young son. They argue that the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it declined to extend reunification services for Father beyond the
statutory limit for providing such services. We disagree and therefore deny
the petitions.

                                                               1
                                       I.
                             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                                  BACKGROUND
         The minor came to the attention of real party in interest Contra Costa
County Children and Family Services Bureau (the Bureau) when he was born
in December 2021. Both he and Mother tested positive for amphetamine and
THC, and Mother expressed interest in possibly relinquishing the baby for
adoption. The parents had been homeless until around the time the minor
was born, when they secured a hotel room provided by a homeless-assistance
organization. The Bureau in late December 2021 filed a juvenile dependency
petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300)1 alleging that both parents had serious
substance-abuse problems that impaired their ability to care for the infant.
The minor was ordered detained, and he was placed in a foster home.
         The Bureau reported that Mother’s parental rights had been
terminated for eight other children (seven half-siblings and one full sibling).
Father had six older children, the older four of whom he reported he helped
raise. His parental rights were terminated as to at least one of the younger
two children. The Bureau first recommended that neither parent receive
reunification services based on previous termination of reunification services
and the termination of parental rights as to older siblings and half-siblings.
(§ 361,5, subd. (b)(10) & (11).) The Bureau later recommended that services
be granted to Father based on his efforts to achieve sobriety and care for his
child.
         At a jurisdictional hearing held in April 2022, the juvenile court
sustained allegations that the minor was a child described by section 300,
subdivision (b) (failure to protect) based on allegations about Mother’s serious

         1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                          2
substance abuse. The court also sustained allegations that the minor was
described by section 300, subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling), based on
allegations that both Mother and Father failed to reunify with the minor’s
older siblings. At a dispositional hearing also held in April, the juvenile court
adjudged the child a dependent minor and placed him in out-of-home care.
The court ordered reunification services for Father but bypassed them as to
Mother.
      Father entered an in-patient treatment program in July 2022 but had
left by the time a status-review report was filed in October because he tested
positive for an opiate. When the social worker contacted a services
organization in October regarding Father’s housing search, Father’s case
manager reported he had not heard from Father since July. Father did
participate in eight sessions of dyadic play therapy between June and
September to support his attachment to his son, and the baby appeared to
make progress in feeling comfortable in Father’s care. An assessment
revealed that Father had ongoing auditory and visual hallucinations as well
as nightmares. He was prescribed medication but stated he did not always
take some of them.
      The Bureau in October 2022 recommended that Father’s reunification
services be terminated and that the juvenile court schedule a selection-and-
implementation hearing under section 366.26. The Bureau considered
Father’s compliance with his case plan to be “minimal[]” because he “ha[d]
stumbled and ha[d] not been able to demonstrate changed behavior over time
in the areas of sobriety, sustained and appropriate housing, insight into the
reason [his son] was removed, and transparent mental health treatment and
support.” The Bureau acknowledged that Father had “taken initial steps to
improve his circumstances” and that he was currently living in a sober living

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environment with programs to support his sobriety. The Bureau was
concerned, though, that Father would try to co-parent the minor with
Mother, who still faced her own struggles. At the time of the filing of the
October 2022 status report, Mother was pregnant, and Father believed he
was the father. After Mother gave birth to another boy in late October 2022,
the baby was placed in the same foster home as the minor. A separate
proceeding was opened for the younger brother.
      Father continued to attend dyadic play therapy designed to support the
attachment between him and the minor. Father was an active participant,
and the minor turned to Father for comfort and engagement. But the foster
parent reported that the minor tended to emotionally shut down and be less
engaged for a day or so after visits with Father. And the minor’s pediatrician
reported that the minor’s emotional health and well-being suffered after
visits with Father.
      Father reported that he was sober. He participated in individual and
group therapy and also attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
      A six-month review hearing scheduled for early December 2022 was
continued until mid-February 2023. By the time of the February hearing,
Father was still living at the sober-living facility and had not secured
permanent housing that would accommodate him, the minor, and the minor’s
baby brother. The Bureau continued to recommend the termination of
reunification services because of Father’s slow progress and continued
mental-health issues. The Bureau also was concerned about Father’s ability
to meet the minor’s needs and whether he would allow Mother to directly
access the child. The Bureau also noted that Father had exhausted the
reunification time period for a child under three years old and had received
additional services only because of delays in proceedings. The social worker

                                       4
testified at a contested review hearing on two separate days in February
2023, and the matter was continued until mid April.
      Father tested negative for drugs in February and March. As of early
April, Father was reportedly eager to complete his recovery program and was
frustrated when it was explained he still had to complete about two months
of counseling in order to finish. A program therapist was concerned about
Father’s defensiveness and overall attitude but also reported that Father had
gained some insight into areas he needed to work on. Father continued to be
an active participant in dyadic play therapy with his son.
      Following a brief hearing on April 13, the matter was again continued,
this time until late June. When the matter was called on June 22 there was
insufficient time for witnesses to testify, so the matter was again continued,
this time until late July. At the July hearing, the juvenile court ordered six
months of reunification services to both parents in the separate proceeding
regarding the minor’s younger brother. As for the minor’s case, the matter
was continued until August 10.
      The juvenile court on August 10 called the matter as a “continued
hearing on the 18-month review.” Father’s counsel objected to the
termination of reunification services. The juvenile court acknowledged that
Father “ha[d] been plugging along” but stated that he had exhausted the
amount of time he had available to reunify with the minor and did not have
the present ability to care for the minor in his home. The court found that a
return to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
minor and that reasonable services had been offered. The court further found
there was not a substantial probability of return to parental custody if
further services were provided. The court terminated Father’s reunification
services and scheduled a selection-and-implementation hearing.

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                                       II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
further reunification services because extraordinary circumstances
warranted a continuation of services. We are not persuaded.
      We note at the outset that the Bureau never recommended that
Father’s services be extended at any time throughout the reunification
period, which was extended considerably as a result, not of court orders, but
of repeated continuances. Because the minor was under three years old when
he was removed from his parents, the juvenile court was to provide six, and
no more than 12, months of reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
Before the first review hearing—originally scheduled to take place when the
minor was over six months old—the Bureau recommended that services be
terminated. The court never affirmatively extended the six-month
reunification period. It simply never ruled on the Bureau’s request to
terminate services until after repeated continuances pushed the hearing out
more than 18 months. (See Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th
836, 847 [“vagaries” of when a review hearing is set “are of no moment to the
child when it comes to deciding how much longer he or she must wait for a
stable, permanent placement”].)
      Thus, the August 2023 hearing—held 20 months after the minor was
detained and 16 months after the disposition hearing—was the 18-month
review hearing. At an 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court shall
order the return of the child to the parent’s physical custody unless the court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the return would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) Father does not challenge the

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juvenile court’s finding that returning the minor to him would create a risk of
detriment.
      Section 366.22, subdivision (b), provides that a juvenile court may
continue the case for up to six months after the 18-month review hearing if
the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests
of the child would be met by additional reunification services and the parent
is making “significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential
substance abuse treatment program,” or the parent was a minor parent or
nonminor dependent parent at the time of the initial hearing and is making
significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home, or the parent
recently was discharged from incarceration. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) Again,
Father does not contend that he meets the statute’s criteria. But even if he
did, “[t]he court shall continue the case only if it finds that there is a
substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody
of their parent . . . and safely maintained in the home within the extended
period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the
parent” and the court makes certain findings. (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(1)–(3).)
      Perhaps acknowledging that the foregoing statutory criteria do not
apply here, Father argues that the juvenile court should have sua sponte
continued the hearing under section 352, notwithstanding the prolonged
reunification period from which he had benefitted. That statute provides
that the juvenile court may continue any hearing “beyond the time limit
within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held” so long as the
continuance is not contrary to the minor’s interest. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) The
statute is “an ‘ “emergency escape valve” ’ ” long recognized by California
courts that is “available to all parents in exceptional situations in which the
court determines that extending services and continuing reunification efforts

                                         7
beyond 18 months is not contrary to the child’s interests.” (Michael G. v.
Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632.) “[A] juvenile court may invoke
section 352 to extend family reunification services beyond [statutory] limits if
there are ‘extraordinary circumstances which militate[] in favor of’ such an
extension.” (In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 762.) Even assuming that
Father has not forfeited this issue by failing below to request a continuance
under section 352, he simply has not demonstrated that this is the type of
exceptional situation that warranted continuing the matter so that he could
receive additional services.
      We recognize that the “lack of affordable housing [may] constitute[] an
‘external force over which [a parent] ha[s] no control’ that warrant[s] an
extension of reunification services beyond the statutory limits.” (In re D.N.
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 764.) But the juvenile court said that Father’s
lack of housing was only part of its concern and that it was also concerned
“that [F]ather had mentioned things, such as if he was unable to work for
several months, or unable to move for several months because of needing
surgery—and I understand that that may no longer be necessary now—but
that the plan was just, essentially, to have the children in a crib. And so that
was one of my concerns with requesting the parents do a little bit more in the
way of classes. And I know that that has—is something that [Father] has
been looking into, or trying to do. However, it also appears that he is not able
to really explain what he has learned in his classes to the social worker.” The
court further noted that both the minor and his younger brother were
experiencing irritated bowels after eating food Father sometimes brought to
visits, “and so that’s even with some of the additional supports that [Father]
has been provided.” In his petition, Father focuses on all the indisputably
positive steps he made during the reunification period and claims that

                                       8
securing housing was the only thing standing in the way of reunification with
the minor. Given the other evidence, including that highlighted by the
juvenile court, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in declining
to extend the reunification period.
      Mother argues, and the Bureau disputes, that she has standing to
challenge the termination of Father’s reunification services since it will affect
whether her parental rights may be terminated. Assuming without deciding
that she has standing, we do not find her arguments to be persuasive. She
contends that the juvenile court “misunderstood the breadth of its discretion
under section 352.” The court likely did not specifically explain such
discretion since it was not asked to extend the reunification period under the
statute. But the court cited In re D.N. supra, 56 Cal.App.741, which applied
section 352 (D.N. at p. 756), an indication the court was aware of this
discretion. The court nonetheless stated that “there are very specific
parameters that the law requires in order to extend [reunification] services to
24 months, and those standards simply just have not been met here, and I
think that there is an awareness on all parties of that at this time.” In other
words, the court was aware of its discretion but did not consider this to be a
situation where extraordinary circumstances were present that would
support extending additional services.
      Like Father, Mother also stresses the progress Father made during the
reunification period, efforts that the juvenile court praised. But deferring to
the juvenile court’s factual findings, we cannot conclude that the court
abused its discretion when it terminated services and scheduled a selection-
and-implementation hearing.

                                         9
                                       III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The petitions for extraordinary writ review are denied. The request to
stay the selection-and-implementation hearing scheduled for December 7,
2023, is denied as moot.
      This opinion shall become final within three court days after it is filed.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

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                                            _________________________
                                            Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Margulies, J.

_________________________
Getty, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Solano, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Mark E. v. Superior Court A168455

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