Court Opinion

ID: 9735141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:03:36.485632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:55.689013
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. It is well settled that an indictment procured through prosecutorial misconduct is subject to dismissal. (Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (1988), 487 U.S. 250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 228, 108 S. Ct. 2369; People v. Rodgers (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 283; People v. Linzy (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 106; People v. Lawson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 449.) This case presents a situation where defendant was the victim of prosecutorial misconduct and was substantially prejudiced as a result of that misconduct. The totality of the circumstances evidences that defendant was a victim of prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, when defendant’s age and limited education are coupled with the 28-hour period of unlawful detention and the repeated misrepresentations that defendant was merely a witness, the fundamental fairness of the grand jury proceedings was clearly undermined. “[T]he grand jury is an integral part .of the court and not the tool of the prosecutor and neither the prosecutor nor the grand jury is vested with power to proceed without regard to due process.” People v. Sears (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 14, 36. The police and prosecutors detained defendant for approximately 28 hours without probable cause. Defendant’s parents voluntarily brought defendant to the police station at approximately 9 a.m. on August 20, 1984. The police officers assured each parent that their son would be allowed to return home after questioning. Soon thereafter, defendant’s father left the police station when a police officer encouraged him to go to work. At approximately 1:30 p.m., defendant’s mother asked a police officer and an assistant State’s Attorney if she could take her son home. Her request was denied. Several times during the afternoon, defendant’s juvenile officer asked if defendant could return home. Each of his requests was denied. At approximately 7 p.m., the defendant’s mother again asked if she could take her son home. Her request was again denied. The police officer informed her that, although her son was not under arrest, he had to stay overnight in order to testify before the grand jury the following day. Defendant was transferred to the criminal courts building the following morning. Defendant’s sister arrived at approximately 9:30 a.m. She was informed that defendant would be allowed to return home after testifying before the grand jury. Defendant’s juvenile officer arrived later in the morning and was also informed that defendant would be allowed to return home. At approximately 1 p.m., Assistant State’s Attorney Romano interviewed defendant after advising him of his Miranda rights. At approximately 2 p.m., defendant appeared before the grand jury. Prior to his grand jury appearance, defendant was not formally arrested or charged with any offense. Nevertheless, it is manifest that defendant was placed in the custody of the police. First, Detective Henry Sigler testified before the grand jury that defendant was placed in police custody. Furthermore, on several occasions defendant’s mother and juvenile officer asked if defendant could leave, and each time their requests were denied. In light of this evidence, the circuit court determined that defendant was detained against the wishes of his parents for approximately 28 hours. The factual findings of the circuit court will not be overturned on review unless manifestly erroneous. (People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 525, 532.) Here, the great weight of the evidence supports the circuit court’s determination. The State asserts that defendant elected to remain in police custody for 28 hours voluntarily, and any reasonable person in defendant’s position would have believed that he was free to leave at any time. (See People v. Wipfler (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 158 (the test is what the reasonable person would believe if he were in the defendant’s position).) In making this assertion, the State ignores the testimony of Detective Sigler. The State also ignores the unrebutted testimony of defendant’s mother and juvenile officer, who asked if they could take defendant home, but were not permitted to do so. The State contends that their testimony lacked credibility, because defendant’s mother and juvenile officer were unable to name any of the police officers or officials involved. This contention is without merit. As Justice Campbell of the appellate court emphasized in dissent, “It is not reasonable to expect the mother, the sister and the youth counselor to identify any of the police personnel or others when there was no reason for them to know their names and when they fully expected the minor to be released shortly.” (164 Ill. App. 3d at 731 (Campbell, J., dissenting).) More significantly, it defies logic and reason to assume that a 15-year-old minor would remain in the hands of the police, for 28 hours, unless he was not free to leave. Moreover, during the 28-hour period of unlawful detention, defendant, his mother, his father, his sister and his juvenile officer were all told repeatedly that defendant was merely a “witness.” Defendant was never told that he was a suspect or a target for indictment. Citing United States v. Washington (1977), 431 U.S. 181, 52 L. Ed. 2d 238, 97 S. Ct. 1814, the majority holds that the State was under no obligation to reveal a witness’ target status. In Washington, respondent moved to quash his indictment, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Although respondent was suspected of committing a theft, he was brought before the grand jury as a witness, not as a suspect, to testify about the theft. Respondent was given a series of warnings, but was not specifically told that he might be indicted. Respondent relayed his version of the facts surrounding the theft, but the grand jury chose not to believe his testimony and elected to indict him. The United States Supreme Court held that the indictment was valid, as the prosecutor was under no obligation to reveal a witness’ target status. 431 U.S. at 189, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 246, 97 S. Ct. at 1819-20. However, Washington is distinguishable from the instant case. First, in Washington, respondent attained the age of majority, but in the instant case, defendant was a 15-year-old minor with a limited education. Furthermore, in Washington, respondent did not allege governmental misconduct, but in the instant case, the evidence supports the defendant’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. During the 28-hour period that defendant was in police custody and not permitted to leave, he was told repeatedly that he was a witness and would be allowed to return home after testifying before the grand jury. At the beginning of the grand jury proceedings, Romano stated that the instant cause was “John Doe for information,” and asked the grand jury to pay attention because the State would be seeking charges. The circuit court found that the prosecutor affirmatively misrepresented the status of the defendant, because he knowingly sought to indict him even though he brought defendant before the grand jury as a witness. The factual findings of the circuit court will not be overturned on review unless manifestly erroneous. (People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 525, 532.) The circuit court’s finding that the prosecutor misrepresented defendant’s status was not erroneous. Although Assistant State’s Attorney Romano did not become involved in the case until approximately three hours before the commencement of the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor’s office knew throughout the entire period that defendant was more than a mere witness. Defendant would not have been detained overnight, against his parents’ wishes, if he was only a -witness. Moreover, at the grand jury proceedings, five witnesses, including defendant, testified about the homicide on the “el” platform. Defendant was the only witness to receive Miranda warnings before testifying. Under the facts of this case, defendant would not have been advised of his Miranda rights unless the State knew that it would be seeking an indictment against him. Although Washington does not require that a prosecutor reveal a witness’ target status, it does not stand for the proposition that a prosecutor can affirmatively misrepresent that status. After the 28-hour period of unlawful detention, defendant was brought before the grand jury to testify. However, defendant was not issued a subpoena pursuant to section 112 — 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 112-4(b)). While a subpoena would not have been necessary if defendant chose to testify voluntarily, defendant did not appear before the grand jury voluntarily. The testimony is unrebutted that defendant was not permitted to leave the police station because he was required to testify the following day. The testimony is also unrebutted that defendant was told that he would be permitted to go home after testifying. Common sense suggests that, under these circumstances, the 15-year-old minor testified so that he would finally be permitted to go home. The 28-hour period of unlawful detention and the repeated misrepresentations that defendant was merely a witness reveals the extent of prosecutorial misconduct in this case. Without the benefit of counsel, defendant incriminated himself before the grand jury. The prosecutor abused the entire grand jury process by employing the grand jury as an inquisitional body to extract a confession from defendant. While the majority, in a very narrow sense, is correct in characterizing the grand jury as an inquisitional body (United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S. 338, 343-45, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 568-69, 94 S. Ct. 613, 617-18), its scope as inquisitor “reflects its special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement.” (414 U.S. at 343-45, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 568-69, 94 S. Ct. 617-18.) Our system of jurisprudence is a just, accusatorial system, not an unjust, inquisitorial one. Rogers v. Richmond (1961), 365 U.S. 534, 541, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760, 766, 81 S. Ct. 735, 739. As I would find that defendant was a victim of prosecutorial misconduct, the next question is whether defendant was substantially prejudiced as a result of the misconduct. (Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (1988), 487 U.S. 250, 254, 101 L. Ed. 2d 228, 237, 108 S. Ct. 2369,. 2373.) I would find that defendant was substantially prejudiced. The majority asserts that defendant’s right to a fair trial was not prejudiced since a motion to suppress the evidence served as an available remedy. It is axiomatic that -where a defendant’s fourth, fifth and sixth amendment' rights have been infringed, suppression is an available remedy. That, however, is not the question in this case. The question is whether defendant’s indictment was procured through prosecutorial misconduct. If so, dismissal is the appropriate remedy. (People v. Linzy (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 106, 110.) To hold otherwise, as the majority does here, would relegate dismissal to a meaningless, toothless remedy. By adopting the majority’s reasoning, whenever an indictment is procured through prosecutorial misconduct, suppression of the evidence adduced at the grand jury proceeding would be an available remedy, because the prosecutorial misconduct would invariably involve a fourth, fifth or sixth amendment right. It is important that dismissal remains a meaningful remedy to guard against overzealous prosecution during the grand jury phase of the proceeding. The majority also asserts that defendant could not have been prejudiced because the testimony of four other grand jury witnesses supported the indictment. The majority cites People v. Rodgers (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 283, and People v. Whitlow (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 322, for the proposition that there need only be some evidence in support of the indictment. These cases are inapposite, because the issues presented were whether there was any evidence to support the indictment. The circuit court has authority to dismiss the indictment if there is no supporting evidence, but cannot dismiss an indictment if there is some supporting evidence. Rogers, 92 Ill. 2d at 290; Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d at 331. Where there has been allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the standard of review is not whether there is some evidence in support of the indictment. To adopt such a standard would pervert all notions of justice, because an indictment would stand as long as there is some supporting evidence, no matter how egregious the prosecutorial misconduct may be. The purpose of judicial review in such a situation is to protect the defendant from overzealous prosecution, and to ensure that the prosecutor fulfills his role as a legal advisor to the grand jury and does not serve in a capacity that unduly influences the grand jury. (2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure §15.5, at 321-22, 326-28 (1984).) To achieve this end, the reviewing court must determine whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256-57,101 L. Ed. 2d at 238-39, 108 S.Ct. at 2375. In the instant case, five witnesses (defendant and four other youths) testified that G.C. initiated contact with Harris, instigated the chase across the subway platform, and caused Harris to fall onto the third rail of the train tracks. They further testified that defendant participated in the chase. Defendant admitted that he participated in the chase with the intent of injuring Harris. Defendant was substantially prejudiced because his admission of his conduct as well as his thoughts influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict. Furthermore, G.C. and defendant were the only persons indicted; none of the other persons who participated in the chase were indicted. The State emphasizes that the misconduct did not prejudice defendant, because he received the standard Miranda warnings before speaking with Romano and again before testifying. The question, however, is not whether defendant received and then waived his Miranda rights, but whether defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) It cannot reasonably be said that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Defendant was unlawfully detained for over 27 hours before receiving the initial Miranda warnings, and was told repeatedly that he was merely a witness and would be permitted to return home after testifying before the grand jury. Furthermore, neither defendant’s mother, father, sister nor juvenile officer were present when he received the Miranda warnings. The Miranda warnings did not diminish the prejudice caused by the prosecutorial misconduct. At least one grand juror recognized the impropriety of the proceedings: “A JUROR: Why didn’t you want a lawyer? Why did you refuse a lawyer? Why did you refuse the help of a lawyer? THE WITNESS: Why? A JUROR: Why didn’t you want legal — when he asked you if you wanted a lawyer, why did you say no? THE WITNESS: Because I didn’t know if I needed a lawyer or not. * * * A JUROR: Do [s-ic] your sister know you are here? THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am. A JUROR: She is here with you? THE WITNESS: No ma’am. She had to go to work. A JUROR: Did she talk to the State’s Attorney or anyone downtown when the police brought you down? THE WITNESS: My mother and father brought me to the police station. A JUROR: Your mother and father brought you down here? THE WITNESS: Yes. A JUROR: Did they talk to the police? THE WITNESS: They talked to the police.” Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was substantially prejudiced as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct. I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.