Court Opinion

ID: 9712405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:12.264246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.934448
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Spaulding, J.:
Since we have granted appellant a new trial due to a conflict of interest of counsel, I do not believe we should pass on the search and seizure claims advanced by appellant.
The majority alternatively hold that appellant’s failure to obtain a pre-trial suppression hearing is a procedural waiver barring review of the claim that the two search warrants were issued in violation of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and, on the *347merits, the warrants were constitutionally issued. Neither holding is necessary to our decision.
As appellant failed to raise the Aguilar claims in the court below, they are not properly before the Court in this appeal. Chaniewicz v. Chaniewicz, 214 Pa. Superior Ct. 294, 257 A. 2d 605 (1969). Moreover, even if appellant’s waiver precludes relief on these claims in this appeal, it does not prevent him from moving to suppress the seized evidence prior to his forthcoming trial.*
In my view, appellant’s failure to request a suppression hearing has deprived the Commonwealth of the opportunity to demonstrate on the record the existence and content of oral testimony given by Officer Herr to the issuing authority. I cannot agree with the majority that we may merely assume, without such evidence on the record, that oral testimony establishing probable cause was presented to the justice of the peace.
Moreover, whether the warrants can meet the Aguilar requirements on the basis of the sworn affidavits alone presents a substantial question. As a pretrial suppression hearing will afford the Commonwealth the opportunity to present evidence which may obviate the necessity for determination of this issue, I believe consideration of the merits of the Aguilar claim should be deferred.
*348Accordingly, I concur in the result and join only that portion of the opinion of the Court relating to conflict of interest.
Hoffman, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

 A procedural waiver of the opportunity to obtain suppression prior to a first trial does not foreclose the opportunity to suppress if after conviction a new trial is granted on other grounds. The purpose of the waiver requirement, to prevent delay and confusion at trial, is not served when retrial, and a consequent second opportunity for pretrial consideration, is necessary. Under Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), explained in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A. 2d 530 (1967), a bypass of state procedure for litigation of a federal constitution claim may bar consideration of the federal claim only if enforcement of the waiver requirement is necessary for advancement of a substantial state policy.