Court Opinion

ID: 9449686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:19:31.350672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:56.532642
License: Public Domain

KILEY, Circuit Judge.
I concur.
Though concurring, I share with the District Court the deep concern expressed over the joining of numerous defendants, twenty-five in this case, in a single conspiracy covering a wide space of time and distant places. There is danger of prejudice in joining a substantive count in the same indictment with a conspiracy count in which numerous defendants are joined, especially when the conspiracy is connected by extremely tenuous” ties as here.1
The prejudice to Berling is not indicated here. No specific claim of error substantially affecting Berling’s rights is made on appeal. Presumably, therefore, it was recognized that the District Court took the necessary precautions to protect him from a “transference of guilt” from the unlawful joining of several conspiracies under Count One.
In this case there were sixty-nine witnesses testifying during the ten days’ taking of testimony. At first blush this seems overpowering, but, as to Count Two, the witness Overstreet’s testimony pertained principally to the guilt of Berling in aiding and abetting the crime to which Overstreet plead guilty. This fact aids the Government in sustaining Berling’s conviction, since its effect was to throw a special spotlight on the proof of Count Two. In addition there is the discrimination shown by the jury in returning the verdict.2 These facts militate against the notion of prejudice carrying over from the unlawful conspiracy count to the substantive count.
In the absence of any error in instruction, as in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), or in the absence of more than one substantive count charging defendants other than Berling with distinct substantive offenses, as in United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2 Cir., 1936), and because of the obvious care with which the District Court considered the question of prejudice with respect to Count Two, there is no basis in the record for reversing the conviction of Berling.
The mere claim of transference of guilt from the fatally defective Count One to Count Two is not sufficient. However, once error is shown the courts are not reluctant to presume that the error was prejudicial to a defendant’s substantial rights in a mass conspiracy trial.

. See the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., in Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 518, 80 S.Ct. 945, 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1960).

. The cases of six defendants were submitted to the jury. Four, including Berling were found guilty, and two were acquitted.