Court Opinion

ID: 9727053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:18:33.015508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.175071
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CALVO, dissenting: I cannot subscribe to the majority opinion, which ignores the clear and unambiguous language of the policy provision in question and, essentially, rewrites the parties’ agreement for them to reflect what the majority believes the insurer meant, but did not say, when it drafted the policy. I believe a sophisticated corporate entity, such as the defendant, should be capable of drafting a policy which accurately reflects its intentions and should not receive the aid of this court in avoiding a clear contractual commitment. If the provisions of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, if the words of a policy can reasonably be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, then there is no need for construction, the provisions will be applied as written, and the parties will be bound to the agreement they made. (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 495; United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 1, 4; Dora Township v. Indiana Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 376, 378.) In the absence of ambiguity, the intention of the parties at the time the contract was entered into must be ascertained by the language utilized in the contract itself. Lenzi v. Morkin (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 290, 293. The policy, issued in Massachusetts, limits coverage for bodily injury to $10,000 per person, but, where an accident occurs in another State, and the other State has “[a] financial responsibility or similar law specifying limits of liability for bodily injury or property damage higher than the limits *** purchased, [the] policy will provide the higher specified limits.” I perceive no ambiguity. Indiana, the State where the accident occurred, has “a financial responsibility law *** specifying limits of liability [$25,000] *** higher than the limits *** purchased [$10,000].” The policy unequivocally states, under those circumstances, the policy “will provide the higher specified limits.” Defendant could have restricted its liability by merely requiring that the financial responsibility law be “applicable to the accident.” It did not do so. We must not inject terms and conditions different from those agreed upon by the parties. Lentin v. Continental Assurance Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 158,162-63. I am aware that all the provisions of an insurance contract, rather than an isolated part, should be read together to interpret it and to determine whether an ambiguity exists; however, in applying the rules of interpretation, the words in the policy should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the court should not search for an ambiguity where there is none. (Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d at 5.) Here, the policy provision can be applied as written, in keeping with the “plain and ordinary” meaning of the words defendant employed. It does not conflict with any other provisions of the policy. It should be applied in accordance with the language defendant used. Even assuming, arguendo, the provision is subject to different interpretations, such ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the insured, and against the insurance company that drafted the contract of insurance. (Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d at 4; Dora Township, 78 Ill. 2d at 379; Kirk v. Financial Security Life Insurance Co. (1978), 75 Ill. 2d 367, 371.) The majority discerns ambiguity where there is none, then resolves that ambiguity in favor of the insurance company, all the while purporting to ascertain and enforce the intention of “the parties” as expressed in the agreement. It is, no doubt, because of the difficulty inherent in ascertaining the “intention of the parties” — usually, as here, an insured who probably never thought much about the actual application of the provision when the policy was purchased, and an insurance company that wants to limit its coverage to the extent possible — that the rule developed resolving ambiguities in favor of the insured, the party who, in most instances, does not have the opportunity to participate in the drafting process. The majority fails to explain why this rule of construction is inoperative in this case. Because I find no ambiguity, I see no need for further construction of the policy provision in an attempt to ascertain “the parties’ ” intent. Even if there were ambiguity, I would resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.