Court Opinion

ID: 9383309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 14:00:36.638623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:44.911539
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11342
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        LIVER GRUEZO,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20327-KMM-3
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11342

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Defendant Liver Gruezo appeals his convictions and
        135-month sentence for (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to
        distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel
        subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46
        U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(b) (Count 1) and (2) possession
        with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while
        on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in
        violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(a) (Count 2).
              On appeal, Gruezo argues that (1) the district court did not
        have jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
        (“MDLEA”), (2) the MDLEA is unconstitutional, and (3) the district
        court erred when it did not apply the minor-role reduction to
        decrease his offense level by two levels. After careful review of the
        record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm Gruezo’s convictions and
        sentence.
                              I.     BACKGROUND
                On June 2, 2021, a federal grand jury charged Gruezo and
        two codefendants—Wilmar Estupinan Padilla and Yiminson
        Caicedo Vallecilla—with the drug crimes in Counts 1 and 2.
        Initially, Gruezo pled not guilty.
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        22-11342               Opinion of the Court                         3

        A.    Motion to Dismiss
                On November 3, 2021, Gruezo moved to dismiss the
        indictment for lack of jurisdiction under the MDLEA. Gruezo’s
        motion asserted that the Coast Guard failed to make all the
        necessary inquiries about the vessel’s nationality, as required by the
        MDLEA. Gruezo requested an evidentiary hearing and proffered
        that, if granted an evidentiary hearing, he would testify to material
        facts demonstrating that the district court did not have jurisdiction.
              On December 8, 2021, a magistrate judge held an
        evidentiary hearing on Gruezo’s motion to dismiss. At that
        hearing, the government called U.S. Coast Guard Petty Officer
        Diego Rivera, who testified to the following events.
                On May 5, 2021, Rivera’s team intercepted a vessel. Gruezo,
        Estupinan, and Caicedo were all onboard the vessel. The team
        noticed that the vessel did not have (1) markings indicating its
        country of origin, (2) registration documents, (3) a country’s flag,
        or (4) any other indicia of nationality.
               Rivera, who spoke Spanish, acted as an interpreter. Rivera
        asked right-of-visit questions to determine the vessel’s nationality.
        As Rivera did so, another officer transcribed the responses in a
        document called a Victor Report. Rivera testified that the purpose
        of a Victor Report is to determine the nationality of a vessel and to
        establish jurisdiction. The Victor Report here stated there were no
        registration documents on the vessel and no registration number
        on the vessel’s hull.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court               22-11342

              During Rivera’s questioning, Estupinan stated that he was
        the master of the vessel. Rivera asked Estupinan if he claimed a
        nationality for the vessel, and Estupinan responded “no.” Rivera
        then asked whether the vessel had a nationality, and Estupinan
        responded “no.” Both Gruezo and Caicedo remained silent during
        Rivera’s questioning and did not interject at any point to claim
        nationality of the vessel.
              Rivera’s team reported the information to the Coast Guard
        Command Center, which directed them to treat the boat as
        without nationality and indicated that the team had the authority
        to conduct law enforcement boarding.
               On cross-examination, Rivera testified that his team wrote
        another report that day called the Alpha Report. Rivera explained
        that the purpose of the Alpha Report was broader and typically
        described “the whole construction of the vessel, where we’re at,
        [and] what we are observing.” The Alpha Report here listed the
        nationality of the vessel as Colombian. Rivera testified that this
        was inaccurate and likely caused by a transcription error or an
        “honest mistake.” Rivera explained that (1) the team’s original
        reports, which were written with a grease pen on the vessel, were
        later rewritten to improve legibility, and (2) the version of the
        Alpha Report introduced by the defense was the rewritten version,
        as evidenced by the fact it was not written in grease pen.
               Following the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge
        issued a report recommending that the district court deny Gruezo’s
        motion to dismiss (“R&R”). First, the magistrate judge found that
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        22-11342               Opinion of the Court                       5

        Estupinan had not made a claim of Colombian nationality for the
        vessel. The magistrate judge explained that (1) although Rivera’s
        testimony conflicted with the Alpha Report, that Report was
        created under unclear circumstances and (2) the magistrate judge
        “afford[ed] little weight to the Alpha Report, recognizing its
        potential for impeachment, but credit[ed] . . . Rivera’s testimony.”
                Second, the magistrate judge found that (1) under
        § 70502(d)(1)(B), an officer is required to ask about either
        nationality or registry of the vessel, and (2) Rivera had provided
        credible testimony that when he asked the vessel’s master whether
        he claimed nationality for it, Estupinan replied “no.” The
        magistrate judge concluded that the vessel was appropriately
        deemed stateless and was subject to the jurisdiction of the United
        States.
             Gruezo objected to the R&R. The district court overruled
        Gruezo’s objections, adopted the R&R, and denied Gruezo’s
        motion to dismiss.
        B.    Guilty Plea
               On January 26, 2022, Gruezo pled guilty to both counts in
        the indictment, without the benefit of a written plea agreement.
        Gruezo signed a factual proffer recounting the following specific
        events that he stipulated the government could prove beyond a
        reasonable doubt.
               On May 5, 2021, while on patrol in the eastern Pacific Ocean,
        a U.S. Marine Patrol Aircraft detected a low-profile vessel north of
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11342

        Darwin Island, Ecuador, in international waters. Coast Guard
        officers intercepted the vessel and observed (1) no vessel name,
        (2) no registration number, (3) no markings on the vessel, and
        (4) no other indicia of nationality.
              Once on board, the officers asked the master of the vessel
        whether he claimed a nationality for it, and the master of the vessel
        did not do so. “Based on the master’s failure to make a claim of
        nationality, the Coast Guard authorized the treatment of the vessel
        as one without nationality and conducted a full law enforcement
        boarding.”
               In doing so, the officers opened a hatch in the vessel and
        observed packages consistent with contraband. After removing the
        packages, officers conducted a field test of the packages’ contents
        for narcotics. The test returned positive for cocaine, weighing
        approximately 1,390 kilograms, which the defendants were
        knowingly transporting. Gruezo conspired with Estupinan and
        Caicedo, as well as people in Colombia, to possess with intent to
        distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel
        that was without nationality in international waters.
               The magistrate judge presided over Gruezo’s change of plea
        hearing and recommended that the district court accept Gruezo’s
        guilty plea. Gruezo did not object to this recommendation, and
        the district court adopted it and accepted Gruezo’s guilty plea.
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        22-11342                Opinion of the Court                         7

        C.     Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and Gruezo’s
               Objections
               The probation officer prepared a PSR, which described the
        offense conduct consistent with the factual proffer. The PSR also
        provided information from interviews of Estupinan, Caicedo, and
        Gruezo.
               The PSR recommended an adjusted offense level of 33,
        consisting of (1) a base offense level of 38, (2) a two-level reduction
        under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(18) because Gruezo met the criteria set
        forth in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(1)–(5), and (3) a three-level reduction
        for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b).
              With no criminal history points, Gruezo’s criminal history
        category was I. Gruezo’s advisory guidelines range was 135 to 168
        months’ imprisonment. As to both counts, Gruezo’s statutory
        minimum term of imprisonment was 10 years and his statutory
        maximum was life imprisonment. See 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a); 21
        U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii).
               Gruezo objected to the PSR and moved for a downward
        variance. In his objections, Gruezo argued that he should receive
        a two-level reduction because he was a minor participant in the
        criminal activity. Gruezo emphasized that the PSR had identified
        several uncharged individuals who were directly involved in the
        commission of the drug scheme. Gruezo contended that those
        individuals, as well as Estupinan, played a much larger role in the
        planning and execution of the scheme than he had. Gruezo argued
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                22-11342

        that he had merely served as a crewman on the drug boat and was
        involved in the scheme only for a brief period. In his motion for a
        downward variance, Gruezo requested a total sentence of
        “around” 70 months.
        D.    Gruezo’s Sentencing
               At sentencing, Gruezo reiterated his objection, emphasizing
        the roles of the other individuals involved and how his conduct, in
        comparison, was lesser and thus warranted a minor-role reduction.
        Citing United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en
        banc), the district court explained that a minor-role reduction was
        not appropriate:
                     [Gruezo] is being charged in an indictment
              involving himself and two others. He is not being
              charged with some larger conspiracy, so he’s only
              being charged in connection with his conduct and his
              relationship to the two other individuals that are
              involved in that conspiracy, and not some larger
              conspiracy.
                     So I believe pursuant to United States vs. De
              Varon, that the probation officer has correctly
              calculated the guidelines, and the Court will deny the
              motion for an adjustment for either a minor or a
              minimal role in the offense. Okay?
               The district court sentenced Gruezo to 135 months’
        imprisonment as to each count, to be served concurrently,
        followed by two years of supervised release. Gruezo renewed all
        his objections, written and oral.
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        22-11342                Opinion of the Court                          9

               Gruezo timely appealed.
                               II.    JURISDICTION
               On appeal, Gruezo argues that the district court did not have
        jurisdiction under the MDLEA. First, we provide an overview of
        MDLEA jurisdiction and our standard of review. Second, we
        explain why jurisdiction exists and Gruezo’s arguments fail.
        A.     MDLEA Jurisdiction
               The MDLEA makes it a crime to possess with intent
        distribute a controlled substance or conspire to do so “[w]hile on
        board a covered vessel.” 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a). A vessel is covered
        by the MDLEA if it is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United
        States.” Id. § 70503(e)(1). As relevant here, a vessel is “subject to
        the jurisdiction of the United States” if it is “a vessel without
        nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A).
               Under the MDLEA, one definition of “a vessel without
        nationality” is “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
        charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized
        to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a
        claim of nationality or registry for that vessel.” Id. § 70502(d)(1)(B).
               The government bears the burden of establishing that the
        statutory requirements of MDLEA jurisdiction are met. United
        States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 588 (11th Cir. 2020).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11342

        B.     Standard of Review
               We review de novo a district court’s subject matter
        jurisdiction even when it is raised for the first time on appeal.
        United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016); see
        also Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 587 (explaining that “the
        MDLEA’s jurisdictional requirement goes to the subject-matter
        jurisdiction of the courts”). We review for clear error the district
        court’s factual findings relevant to jurisdiction. Iguaran, 821 F.3d
        at 1336. While parties may not stipulate to jurisdiction, they may
        “stipulate to facts that bear on [this Court’s] jurisdictional inquiry.”
        Id. at 1337 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). “A court’s
        task is to determine whether the stipulated facts give rise to
        jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
        C.     The District Court Had Jurisdiction under the MDLEA
               Here, Gruezo stipulated that the vessel had “no indicia of
        nationality visible” and that when the master of the vessel was
        asked “do you claim a nationality for the vessel and does this vessel
        have a nationality,” the master “made no claim of nationality for
        the [vessel].” (Quotation marks omitted.) That alone is sufficient
        for this Court to affirm the determination that the vessel was
        subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 46 U.S.C.
        § 70502(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B).
               In any event, we address Gruezo’s three arguments about
        jurisdiction, all of which are unpersuasive.
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        22-11342               Opinion of the Court                        11

                First, Gruezo argues that the magistrate judge erred when it
        relied on his and Caicedo’s silence as evidence that the vessel lacked
        nationality. That argument evinces a misunderstanding of the
        magistrate judge’s R&R. In its “evidence presented” section, the
        magistrate judge wrote: “[Gruezo] and Caicedo were also present
        during the questioning and did not say anything nor did they
        dispute Estupinan’s claim that the vessel did not have nationality.”
        In its analysis, however, the magistrate judge did not mention, rely
        on, or assign weight to Gruezo’s and Caicedo’s silence in finding
        that the vessel was one without nationality. Instead, the magistrate
        judge focused entirely on Estupinan’s actions, and the discrepancy
        between the Alpha Report and the Victor Report. Accordingly, the
        magistrate judge did not err in this respect.
                Second, Gruezo argues that Rivera could not resolve the
        conflicts between the Alpha Report and the Victor Report because
        his testimony was “rambling and rife with uncertainties.” But the
        district court found that Rivera’s testimony was credible, and this
        Court “accord[s] great deference to a district court’s credibility
        determinations.” United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1227
        (11th Cir. 2015). “[W]e will not reverse a district court’s factual
        finding concerning credibility unless the finding is contrary to the
        laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that
        no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” Id. (quotation marks
        omitted). Rivera gave a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy
        between the two Reports, and his testimony was not so improbable
        that no reasonable factfinder could credit and accept it.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-11342

               Third, Gruezo argues that the magistrate judge erred in
        concluding that § 70502(d)(1)(B) did not require the Coast Guard
        to ask the master to make a claim of both nationality and registry
        for the vessel. We are unpersuaded.
              The plain text of § 70502(d)(1)(B) uses the word “or” to
        connect “nationality” and “registry,” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B),
        and “or” is “almost always disjunctive,” United States v. Woods,
        571 U.S. 31, 45, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 (2013). Of course, “statutory
        context can overcome the ordinary, disjunctive meaning of ‘or.’”
        Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 1134,
        1141 (2018). But, here, context favors the ordinary disjunctive
        meaning of “or.”
               To begin with, the MDLEA treats the terms “nationality”
        and “registry” as interchangeable throughout § 70502. For
        example, § 70502(e) jointly defines “[a] claim of nationality or
        registry” to “include[] only”:
              (1) possession on board the vessel and production of
                  documents evidencing the vessel’s nationality as
                  provided in article 5 of the 1958 Convention on
                  the High Seas;
              (2) flying its nation’s ensign or flag; or
              (3) a verbal claim of nationality or registry by the
                  master or individual in charge of the vessel.
        46 U.S.C. § 70502(e). The interchangeability and equivalency of
        these two terms in the MDLEA is further evidenced by
        § 70502(d)(1)(C), where the rejection of a master’s claim of registry
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        22-11342                Opinion of the Court                         13

        is premised on the named country’s failure to confirm nationality.
        See id. § 70502(d)(1)(C).
               In addition, this Court previously has read the terms to be
        disjunctive. In Iguaran, for example, this Court noted that “the
        term vessel without nationality includes a vessel aboard which the
        master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the
        United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United
        States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that
        vessel.” 821 F.3d at 1337 (emphasis added) (quotation marks
        omitted). Immediately after setting forth that definition, this Court
        explained that, under that definition, if the defendants “failed, on
        request of the United States officials who apprehended them, to
        make a claim of nationality, their vessel was without nationality
        and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. (emphases
        added) (quotation marks omitted). In other words, the master’s
        failure to claim nationality was sufficient for the vessel to be subject
        to the jurisdiction of the United States under the MDLEA.
               Accordingly, Estupinan’s failure to claim nationality when
        asked by the Coast Guard is sufficient to show the vessel was
        without nationality and subject to the jurisdiction of the United
        States. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B).
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        14                           Opinion of the Court                 22-11342

                    III.   CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MDLEA
               Next, Gruezo argues the MDLEA is unconstitutional for
        three reasons: (1) it is overly vague; (2) it violates his Miranda1
        rights because it does not require law enforcement to inform the
        master of the vessel of the consequences of failing to make a claim
        of nationality or registry; and (3) due process prohibits the
        prosecution of foreign nationals who (i) do not have “minimum
        contacts” with the United States and (ii) committed offenses that
        do not have a “nexus” to the United States.
               We review de novo the constitutionality of a criminal
        statute. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010).
        A.        Vagueness
               Gruezo argues that the MDLEA is overly vague and
        ambiguous because it does not require the Coast Guard to explain
        what it means to “make a claim of nationality or registry for the
        vessel.”
                This challenge is unpersuasive, as the text of § 70502(d)(1)(B)
        is sufficiently clear to give ordinary people notice that, without a
        claim of nationality or registry for the vessel upon request, the
        vessel will be considered stateless for purposes of jurisdiction under
        the MDLEA. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B).

        1   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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        22-11342               Opinion of the Court                       15

               In addition, this Court repeatedly has rejected constitutional
        vagueness challenges to the jurisdictional provisions in the
        MDLEA’s predecessors. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d
        1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a
        jurisdictional provision of the MDLEA’s predecessor statute
        because “[t]hose embarking on voyages with holds laden with illicit
        narcotics, conduct which is contrary to the laws of all reasonably
        developed legal systems, do so with the awareness of the risk that
        their government may consent to enforcement of the United
        States’ laws against the vessel” (quotation marks omitted)); United
        States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1384 (11th Cir. 1982)
        (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a jurisdictional provision of the
        MDLEA’s predecessor statute and explaining that even though the
        phrase “vessel without nationality” was undefined in the statute, it
        “obviously encompasse[d] vessels not operating under the flag and
        authority of any sovereign nation”).
        B.    Miranda
               Gruezo contends that the MDLEA violates his Miranda
        rights because it does not require law enforcement to inform the
        master of the vessel of the consequences of failing to make a claim
        of nationality or registry.
               To the extent Gruezo asserts that § 70502(d)(1)(B) is
        unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case, his claim is
        waived by his guilty plea. See United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d
        1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A valid guilty plea renders irrelevant—
        and thereby prevents a defendant from appealing—the
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-11342

        constitutionality of case-related government conduct that takes
        place before the plea is entered.” (cleaned up)).
               To the extent Gruezo asserts that § 70502(d)(1)(B) is facially
        unconstitutional, our prior precedent forecloses his facial
        challenge. “This [C]ircuit has long recognized that the Coast
        Guard’s routine stop, boarding[,] and inspection of an American
        vessel on the high seas does not normally rise to the level of
        custodial detention thus requiring Miranda warnings.” United
        States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 302–03 (11th Cir. 1988). This Court
        in Rioseco, for example, concluded that the defendant was not in
        custody for Miranda purposes when five Coast Guard officers,
        having probable cause, boarded the vessel and ordered the crew
        members to remain in a particular area of the vessel. Id. at 303. It
        determined that an ordinary man would not believe that he was in
        custody because (1) the officers did not tell the defendant he was in
        custody or under arrest and (2) the officers’ conduct “was simply
        routine procedure in a usual boarding action.” Id.
        C.    Due Process Clause
              Gruezo also challenges the constitutionality of the MDLEA
        under the Due Process Clause. “The Due Process Clause prohibits
        the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant when
        it would be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.” United States v.
        Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks
        omitted). A defendant challenging the facial validity of a statute
        must show that “no set of circumstances exists under which the
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        22-11342                Opinion of the Court                         17

        [statute] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
        745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987).
                Congress enacted the MDLEA to define and punish felonies
        committed on the high seas. United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d
        802, 805 (11th Cir. 2014). This Court in Campbell held that “the
        conduct proscribed by the [MDLEA] need not have a nexus to the
        United States because universal and protective principles support
        its extraterritorial reach.” Id. at 810. We explained that, given that
        trafficking drugs is “condemned universally by law-abiding
        nations,” it is not “fundamentally unfair” to punish those who
        traffic drugs on the high seas. Id. (quotation marks omitted). We
        further determined that the prosecution of a foreign national for
        “drug trafficking aboard [a] stateless vessel[] on the high seas” is not
        prohibited by the Due Process Clause, as the MDLEA “provides
        clear notice that all nations prohibit” such conduct. Id. at 812; see
        also Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 587 (“[T]his Court has held that
        the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not prohibit the
        trial and conviction of aliens captured on the high seas while drug
        trafficking because the MDLEA provides clear notice that all
        nations prohibit and condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless
        vessels on the high seas.”).
              Here, Gruezo fails to show that the absence of a “minimum
        contacts” or “nexus” requirement in the MDLEA violates the Due
        Process Clause. He points to no precedent from this Court or the
        Supreme Court applying the “minimum contacts” standard to the
        MDLEA, and his “nexus” argument is foreclosed by our precedent.
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        18                       Opinion of the Court             22-11342

        Therefore, Gruezo’s MDLEA convictions do not violate the Due
        Process Clause.
                       IV.      MINOR-ROLE REDUCTION
               Lastly, Gruezo argues that the district court erred by
        declining to reduce his offense level by two levels under U.S.S.G.
        § 3B1.2 because he was only a minor participant in the criminal
        activity.
               We review for clear error a district court’s determination of
        a defendant’s role. De Varon, 175 F.3d at 937. The district court
        has “considerable discretion in making this fact-intensive
        determination.” United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274, 1277–78
        (11th Cir. 2002). As long as the district “court’s decision is
        supported by the record and does not involve a misapplication of
        the law,” the “choice between two permissible views of the
        evidence as to the defendant’s role in the offense will rarely
        constitute clear error.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d
        1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
               Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines directs the
        sentencing court to decrease a defendant’s offense level by two
        levels “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal
        activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. A minor participant is one “who is less
        culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but
        whose role could not be described as minimal.” Id. cmt. 5. The
        defendant “bears the burden of proving a mitigation role in the
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        22-11342               Opinion of the Court                      19

        offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” De Varon, 175 F.3d
        at 939.
               Here, Gruezo argues that he was entitled to a minor-role
        reduction because Estupinan and several uncharged individuals
        were directly involved in the planning and execution of the drug
        scheme, while he worked only as a crewman for a brief period.
        Gruezo criticizes the district court for (1) focusing on a
        hypothetical “sub-conspiracy” that included only the crew
        members of the vessel and (2) never acknowledging the existence
        of other participants in the conspiracy.
               Gruezo’s argument is directly foreclosed by our binding
        precedent. In De Varon, we “unambiguously held that a
        defendant’s role in the offense may not be determined on the basis
        of criminal conduct for which the defendant was not held
        accountable at sentencing.” 175 F.3d at 941. Gruezo was charged
        in an indictment that involved two other people and did not
        involve some larger, unspecified conspiracy. United States v.
        Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 591 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Only those participants
        who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the
        defendant may be considered.” (quotation marks omitted)).
        Gruezo may not prove he is entitled to a minor-role reduction by
        pointing to a broader criminal scheme in which he was a minor
        participant but for which he was not charged.
                Further, as to Estupinan, Gruezo has not shown that the
        district court clearly erred in denying him a minor-role reduction.
        Gruezo’s involvement—as a crewmember of a vessel that was
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        smuggling a large quantity of drugs—was still serious and
        important enough to warrant the denial of a minor-role reduction
        under § 3B1.2. Gruezo knowingly participated in the illegal
        transportation of a large quantity of cocaine, he and his
        transportation role were important to that scheme, and he was
        held accountable for that conduct only. Cabezas-Montano, 949
        F.3d at 607 (considering these same factors in affirming the denial
        of a minor-role reduction); see also United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d
        717, 732 (11th Cir. 2019) (same).
              We conclude that the district court did not err, clearly or
        otherwise, in finding that Gruezo did not qualify for a minor-role
        reduction.
                               V.     CONCLUSION
              For all these reasons, we affirm Gruezo’s convictions and
        sentence.
              AFFIRMED.