Court Opinion

ID: 9397132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 16:09:14.175514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.651622
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BILAH AMOS ROSE-CALHOUN                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1648 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 31, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-23-CR-0002955-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                              FILED MAY 24, 2023

        Bilah Amos Rose-Calhoun appeals the judgment of sentence entered

following his conviction for persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control,

sell or transfer firearms.1 He maintains that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress. We affirm.

        We glean the following facts from the hearing on the motion to suppress.

Sergeant James Derwin McCaughan arrived at 110 West Baltimore Avenue

around 11:52 a.m. after a 911 call went out about a Black male with a black

tracksuit who had pointed a firearm “and then went into the apartment of 110

West Baltimore, specifically Apartment B.” N.T., Motion to Suppress,

11/30/21, at 8, 10. Sergeant McCaughan described the building as follows:

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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         So 110 West Baltimore Avenue is an apartment that it’s a
         two-story apartment, but it’s a row – so it’s a row, so it goes
         from like 110 all the way down to I believe it’s 122, it’s a
         row of apartment buildings. . . There’s a first floor and
         second floor. . . . A and B. So there’s a front door that leads
         you to, like, kind of like a little lobby landing, and then you
         go up the stairs to Apartment B, and then up the stairs to –
         I mean, to Apartment A, and then up to B. And then there’s
         stairs that go down to a – like a garage area and a laundry
         room, so it’s a laundry room, and then a garage beyond
         that.

Id. at 10-11.

      Sergeant McCaughan testified that after about 10 minutes of knocking

and ringing the doorbell, Rose-Calhoun’s mother, Venus Calhoun (“Mother”),

looked out from the second-floor window and asked what was going on. Id.

at 9. Sergeant McCaughan and Sergeant Christopher Schiazza explained “that

[the police] had received a call for a subject with a gun that went into that

building[.]” Id. at 9, 11. Mother came to the front door and told officers that

no one had entered her apartment, Apartment B. Id. at 11. When asked if

they could “check” the building “for firearms,” Mother and Rose-Calhoun’s

aunt, Kenya Wilson (“Aunt”), who lived in the first floor of the building and

had come to the door, said yes. Id. at 11, 12, 13, 27. While speaking with

Mother, Sergeant McCaughan saw Rose-Calhoun in the “laundry room area”

at the bottom of the steps. Id. at 12. Sergeant McCaughan asked what he

was doing, and Rose-Calhoun said he had just woken up and was doing

laundry. Id.

      Sergeant McCaughan began his search in the laundry room, searching

areas “where someone might hide a gun.” Id. at 13. He then went to the

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garage area and “opened up the lid to the trash can that was in the garage,

and I saw a bullet sitting on top.” Id. At this point, Mother asked if Sergeant

McCaughan needed a warrant to search. He responded that he did not since

she had given her consent. Id. However, believing that Mother might revoke

her consent, Sergeant McCaughan decided to get a search warrant and left

the premises. Id. at 14.

        Shortly afterward, Chief Rutherford, the chief of police, spoke with

Mother and Aunt and obtained their consent to search the property. Id. at

15.2 Chief Rutherford informed Sergeant McCaughan, who then returned to

the residence. Before conducting a second search, Sergeant McCaughan

explained Mother and Aunt’s rights regarding the search including “that they

didn’t have to consent, and again, that we were going to get a search warrant

if they did not consent.” Id. at 15,16. Both Mother and Aunt gave their consent

to search. Id. at 17. Sergeant McCaughan also recorded their consent via a

tape recorder. Id. at 16.

        After receiving consent to search, Sergeant McCaughan returned to the

garage and found a firearm in the same trash-can where he had initially found

the bullet. Id. at 17-18. Sergeant McCaughan also testified that he did not

ask Rose-Calhoun for consent because he did not live at the property. Id. at

27.

____________________________________________

2   Chief Rutherford’s first name is not included in the notes of testimony.

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      Mother testified that she lived at 110 West Baltimore Avenue. Id. at 50.

She testified that during her initial interaction with Sergeant McCaughan, he

explained that “he had got a call . . . that somebody came in and ran in our

apartment with a gun[.]” Id. at 51. She testified that she invited the police in

to look for a person and that when Sergeant McCaughan began looking in the

washing machines and boxes, she said, “[Y]ou are searching, you need to go

get a search warrant.” Id. at 52. She testified that Sergeant McCaughan

continued to search and when he found the bullet in the trash-can, he said,

“[O]h, now I’ve got to get a search warrant.” Id. at 54. She also testified that

she expected them to search her apartment. Id. at 56. Mother conceded that

she gave the officers consent to search the second time they arrived but said

that she was confused. Id. at 59.

      Aunt testified that she lived in Apartment A at 110 Baltimore Avenue.

Id. at 64. She testified that officers told her that “they got a call that a guy

and a girl was fighting, and the guy had a gun . . . and ran into the apartment

building, and went to Apartment B.” Id. at 65, 66. She testified that officers

asked if she had a lease to the apartment and she stated that she did. Id. at

67. She also testified that Sergeant McCaughan asked if he could “look” and

she said yes. Id. at 67, 68. She testified that when he asked if he could look,

she thought it meant that “he was looking for someone.” Id. at 68. She agreed

that when officers arrived the second time, she gave consent to search the

property. Id. at 70. While Aunt maintained that officers never said that they

were searching for a gun, she testified Sergeant McCaughan “said that the call

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. . . said that there was a -- the guy had a gun.” Id. Aunt also testified that

the laundry area is a shared area for both apartments. Id. at 66.

      The trial court denied the motion to suppress and concluded Rose-

Calhoun “failed to prove the consent given in this case by his mother and his

aunt” was not voluntary. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, filed

1/31/22, at 7. It determined that Mother and Aunt both testified that they

initially gave Sergeant McCaughan consent to search the residence and

Sergeant McCaughan stopped searching and left the premises when they

questioned the scope of his search. Id. The court also determined that Mother

and Aunt gave consent again when officers returned. Id.

      Rose-Calhoun proceeded by way of a stipulated bench trial and the court

found him guilty of the above-referenced offense. The court sentenced him to

72 to 144 months’ incarceration followed by one year of reporting probation.

Rose-Calhoun filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. This

timely appeal followed.

      Rose-Calhoun raises the following issue: “Whether the court below erred

in denying [Rose-Calhoun’s] motion to suppress evidence, where police

conducted a warrantless residential search without valid and complete consent

or any other applicable exception to the warrant requirement, in violation of

Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 8 and U.S. Const. Amend. IV, XIV?” Rose-Calhoun’s Br. at

4.

      When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we determine

“whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings and the

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legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings.”

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 24 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Lohr, 715 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa.Super. 1998)). Where the

Commonwealth prevailed on the motion, “we may consider only the evidence

of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains

uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1071

(Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted). “Our scope of review of suppression

rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence

elicited at trial.” Id. (citation omitted). Where the factual findings of the court

are supported by the record, we will only reverse the decision of the court if

there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings.

See id.

      Rose-Calhoun claims the court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

He argues that the officers “lacked unequivocal and specific authority to search

for a firearm within the home absent a warrant.” Rose-Calhoun’s Br. at 17. He

maintains his mother gave general consent but only expected police to search

for a person. See id. at 16. Thus, he argues that she did not give officers

consent to search her personal belongings. He claims that even if Mother gave

consent to search her personal belongings, she revoked her consent when she

confronted the police about obtaining a warrant. See id. at 17. He maintains

that officers failed to stop their search after the revocation of consent and

instead continued to search the home which led the police to find the bullet in

the trash-can. See id.

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      The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution both protect against unreasonable

searches and seizures, and bar warrantless searches of residences unless an

exception applies. See Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542, 546

(Pa.Super. 2019). “Warrantless entry and search of a house is constitutionally

permissible where an occupant with authority over the premises consents to

the entry and search.” Commonwealth v. Lehnerd, 273 A.3d 586, 590

(Pa.Super. 2022). “To be considered valid, the consent must be the product

of an essentially free and unrestrained choice—not the result of duress or

coercion, express or implied, or a will overbourne—under the totality of the

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1124

(Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted). When determining the scope

of consent, a court must consider what “a reasonable person would have

understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the

consent.” Commonwealth v. Fredrick, 230 A.3d 1263, 1267 (Pa.Super.

2020) (citation omitted). A person who gives consent may limit the scope of

the consent or revoke it entirely. See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 263

A.3d 1207, 1212 (Pa.Super. 2021); Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d

855, 868 (Pa. 2018).

      Rose-Calhoun’s arguments are meritless. Mother permissibly consented

to Sergeant McCaughan’s searching a common area for a firearm, and he did

not exceed the scope of that consent or fail to stop searching after she revoked

her consent. Sergeant McCaughan arrived at the location in response to a 911

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call. After arriving on location, he encountered Mother, a resident of the

building, who allowed him entry into the building. Sergeant McCaughan

explained why he was at the location and received consent from Mother to

search the premises. Though Rose-Calhoun argues that Mother believed that

police were searching for a person, we must consider what a reasonable

person would have understood from the exchange with Sergeant McCaughan.

See Fredrick, 230 A.3d at 1267. Sergeant McCaughan asked if he could

“check” for firearms, and a reasonable person would have understood that

their consent included a search in places where someone could hide a firearm.

Additionally, while Rose-Calhoun claims that Mother revoked her consent

before the initial search of the trash can, this claim is based on Mother’s

testimony. Considering “only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much

of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted[,]” Sergeant

McCaughan testified that it was after he found the bullet in the trash-can that

Mother inquired whether he needed a warrant and that he stopped his search.

See McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1071.

      Furthermore, even if there was something amiss with the first search,

both Mother and Aunt gave consent a second time, which resulted in the

search during which Sergeant McCaughan found the firearm in the trash-can.

The discovery of the gun was not the fruit of the allegedly poisonous first

search, but rather of the second search, undisputedly performed with consent.

The trial court committed no error by denying the motion to suppress.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/24/2023

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