Court Opinion

ID: 9951674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 18:03:02.374516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.640879
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 P. v. Williams CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                               B324074

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                       (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. BA131114)
           v.

 NORMAN WILLIAMS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
      Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      Norman Williams, who with codefendant Omar Walker was
convicted in 1997 of (among other crimes) murder, appeals from
the superior court’s order following an evidentiary hearing
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 Williams argues substantial evidence did not
support the court’s finding he could still be convicted of murder
as a major participant in an underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

     A.      A Jury Convicts Williams of First Degree Murder, and
             We Affirm
       One evening in November 1995, Williams and Walker
entered a restaurant owned by Joseph Beharry. Beharry was
upstairs in a loft area watching a basketball game and smoking
marijuana with Anthony Samuels and Robert Cross. Timothy
Hinds, who worked and lived in the restaurant, was dressing in
the loft. The restaurant had recently closed, and Anthony Brock
was downstairs cleaning up. The staircase leading to the loft
from the restaurant was L-shaped, with a landing in the middle.
       Williams and Walker entered the restaurant, walked up to
the loft, and pointed their guns at the men there.2 Walker went

1    Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2   There were some discrepancies in the testimony of
Samuels, Cross, Hinds, and Brock at trial (which occurred almost

                               2
back downstairs and brought Brock to the loft at gunpoint.
Williams told the men to get down. Cross heard Williams and
Walker say they were going to rob the men; they also argued with
Beharry as if they knew him. Williams searched the men, found
and took a gun from Samuels, and took money and personal
possessions from the other men. Williams told Walker to go
downstairs to get something to use to tie up the men. Walker
returned with aprons and cords, and he and Williams tied up the
men in the loft.
      Meanwhile, Williams demanded thousands of dollars from
Beharry and became increasingly angry. Cross heard Williams
say that he “wanted all the money and all the weed” and that “he
was going to kill everybody.” Samuels and Brock also said
Williams threatened to kill them. Brock said Williams was doing
most of the talking and appeared to be “in charge.” Beharry
called Williams by his name and told Williams he had $5,000 at
his house. Williams said, “‘Don’t call my name. Don’t call my
name. I need more than that.’” He asked Beharry, “‘Where is the
weed at?’” and searched the loft. Williams also told Beharry, “‘If I
find anything more in your pocket, I am going to kill you.’”
Williams kicked Beharry “worse than a dog” in his ribs, chest,

two years after the murder). None of the discrepancies, however,
undermines the evidence supporting the superior court’s finding
Williams was an active participant in the robbery and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Letner and
Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 161-162 [“‘[w]e resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial
evidence’”]; People v. Coelho (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 705, 706
[“discrepancies in testimony, if any; . . . cannot be considered by
us if, as in the instant case, there is substantial evidence to
support the findings of the trier of fact”].)

                                  3
and face. Williams also kicked Samuels and said he was going to
kill him because Williams (who is Jamaican) believed Samuels
was “‘going around talking about Jamaicans this and Jamaicans
that.’”
       Beharry told Williams and Walker there was a lot of money
in the cash register downstairs, and both men left the loft.
Beharry managed to free himself and followed Williams and
Walker. As Beharry walked downstairs, Williams asked
Beharry, “‘Where you going? Go back upstairs.’” Samuels heard
feet shuffling on the stairs and a gun shot. Brock heard Beharry
wrestling with someone on the landing and more than two
gunshots. Beharry called out, “‘You guys come help me. Come
help me. Come help me.’” Samuels managed to free himself, but
when he reached the top of the stairs he heard another gun shot
and ran to find a hiding place. As he passed a window that
looked into the restaurant he saw Williams and Walker run out
the front door. Only coins remained in the cash register.
       Beharry walked back upstairs holding the railing and said,
“‘Those guys shot me in my belly.’” Beharry was shot three times
and died from his wounds. Walker also suffered a gunshot
wound to his thigh. A police officer investigating the scene found
three .45 caliber bullet casings and bullet fragments indicating
shots fired in different directions, both above and below the
landing.
       The People charged Williams with five counts of robbery
(§ 211) and one count of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and
alleged Williams committed murder while he was engaged in the
commission of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The People also
alleged Williams personally used a firearm in the commission of
murder and robbery. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)

                                 4
       The trial court instructed the jury on felony murder and
direct aiding and abetting. The court also instructed the jurors
that they could find Williams guilty of murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine if they found Williams aided
and abetted Walker in committing robbery and the murder was a
natural and probable consequence of the robbery.
       The jury convicted Williams of first degree murder and
robbery as charged and found true the felony-murder and firearm
allegations. The trial court sentenced Williams to a term of life
in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder
conviction, plus a total of 23 years for the robbery counts and the
firearm enhancements. We affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Williams et al. (May 12, 1999, B118216) [nonpub. opn.]
(Williams I).)

      B.    The Superior Court Denies Williams’s Petition for
            Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
      In March 2021 Williams filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. Williams
alleged the People proceeded against him under a theory of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, that he was convicted of first or second degree murder
under one of those theories, and that he could not now be
convicted of first or second degree murder because of legislative
changes to sections 188 and 189. The superior court appointed
counsel to represent Williams, and the People conceded the court
should issue an order to show cause and schedule an evidentiary
hearing.

                                 5
            1.      Walker and Williams Testify at the Evidentiary
                    Hearing
       The court held an evidentiary hearing on July 28, 2022.
Williams and Walker testified. Like Williams, Walker was
convicted of murdering Beharry and sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole, but the Governor commuted his
sentence, and he was granted parole. Walker testified that on
the day of the murder he arranged to buy 40 pounds of marijuana
from Beharry, from whom he had bought marijuana “numerous
times.” Walker said that Beharry told him to come to the
restaurant at closing time and that Walker told Beharry he
would bring Williams, who was Walker’s “partner” and planned
to buy half the marijuana. Walker said he went to the restaurant
armed with a gun. He said that Williams did not have a gun,
but that Williams knew Walker was armed. Walker testified,
“You have to bring a weapon with you in that type of lifestyle
because . . . I was going to buy $40,000 worth [of marijuana]” and
“don’t want nobody to rob me.”3 Walker said he expected Beharry
and anyone with him might also be armed because, “[i]n that line
of business, don’t nobody trust each other.” Even before going
into the restaurant, Walker said, he knew there was a potential
for violence.
       Walker stated that, after he and Williams arrived at the
restaurant, Beharry waved him and Williams up to the loft where
there were several other men. Walker said that because Samuels
“started to put his hand underneath his shirt,” which signaled he

3     Walker explained that the street value of the marijuana he
planned to buy was $40,000 to $60,000, but that it would cost him
about $8,500 or $9,000 to buy it from Beharry. He said he had
$3,500 with him that night.

                                6
was reaching for a weapon, Walker pulled out his gun and told
Samuels not to move. Walker told Williams to search everyone in
the loft, and Williams found Samuels’s gun. Walker accused
Beharry of trying to set him up, and Williams suggested “in that
moment” that he and Walker rob the others. (Walker later
testified it was his idea to rob Beharry and the other men.)
Walker said Williams held the others at gunpoint while Walker
went downstairs to get Brock, also at gunpoint, along with some
aprons to use to tie up the others.
       Walker testified he kicked Beharry and Samuels while they
were tied up “because they were . . . shouting expletives.” Walker
said that Williams also yelled profanities, but that Williams did
not threaten to kill anyone. The prosecutor asked Walker about
his statement to the parole board that Williams had threatened
to kill the men in the loft. Walker reiterated he did not
remember Williams threatening to kill anyone. Walker said he
told the men that he and Williams were not going to kill them
and that they were “just trying to get what [they] trying to get
and leave.”
       Walker said Williams left the loft after they robbed the
men. Walker stated that he followed Williams and that, about
halfway down the stairs, Beharry got free from his restraints and
rushed toward Walker. Walker and Beharry “got into a struggle”
over Walker’s gun, and the gun fired three times, striking both
Walker and Beharry. Walker said he knew Beharry was hit
because Beharry said (in Patois),4 “‘Imma get shot. Imma get

4    Patois is “the national language of Jamaica.” (U.S. v.
Brown (C.D.Cal., Feb. 5, 2018, No. 2:17-CR-00047(A)-CAS)
2018 WL 739268, p. 12.) It is “an English-based creole language

                                7
shot.’” Walker stated that, when Beharry was shot, Williams was
at the bottom of the stairs on his way out of the restaurant and
was not involved in the struggle with Beharry. Walker testified
he left the restaurant with Williams. At his parole hearing,
Walker took responsibility for shooting Beharry.
       On cross-examination the prosecutor asked whether the
executive order commuting Walker’s sentence stated Williams
“shot and killed the victim.” Walker conceded that the order
stated that, but said that “a lot of the stuff they had in there was
not correct.” The prosecutor also asked Walker why he told the
parole board “we shot” Beharry after Beharry ran toward Walker
and Williams. Walker admitted he did not know whether
Williams had also fired his gun, but he said the bullet that killed
Beharry was from a .45 caliber weapon like the one Walker had
that night. The prosecutor also asked Walker about his
statement to detectives after his arrest that Williams tied up the
men and made them “plead for their lives.” Walker said he lied
to detectives because he was scared.
       Williams also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He said
he had known Walker for more than four years before the murder
and did not know him to be violent. Williams and Walker had
bought and sold drugs together more than 10 times, and Williams
had bought drugs from Beharry multiple times. Williams said he
had over $10,000 with him when he went to the restaurant. He
denied having a weapon when he entered the restaurant but said
he knew Walker was armed. Williams said that he and Walker
intended to buy marijuana from Beharry, but that the plan

with West African influences.” (Brown v. Thomas (M.D.Fla.,
Mar. 24, 2022, No. 3:20-CV-726-BJD-MCR) 2022 WL 874357,
p. 1, fn. 2.)

                                 8
“spontaneously” and “instantly” changed after Walker drew his
weapon. Williams said that in that moment he and Walker just
wanted to protect themselves. Williams said Walker motioned to
him to search the men in the loft, and he found a .38 caliber gun
on Samuels. Williams admitted pointing the gun at people, but
he said he did not threaten to kill anyone. Williams said he did
not find any other weapons and at that time he did not take
anything else from the men. He said Walker told him to go
downstairs to get Brock, and Williams put Samuels’s gun in his
pocket and brought Brock upstairs with the gun still in his
pocket. Williams said he tied up the men with an apron Hinds
was wearing and telephone cords Williams found in the loft.
       Williams also said they asked Beharry where the “weed”
was, and Beharry told them they came too early; Beharry seemed
irritated Walker had a gun. Williams said Walker kicked
Beharry and told Williams to search the men again and take
anything of value. Williams denied kicking Beharry or hitting
anyone. Williams stated that, after he searched the others and
took what money he could find, he searched the loft for the
marijuana. When he did not find any, he told Walker, “‘Let’s go,’”
and went downstairs.
       Williams said that he was in the middle of the restaurant,
about 12 feet in front of Walker, when he heard a gunshot, but
that he did not see a struggle. Williams said he did not turn
around, and instead ran out of the restaurant, jumped in his car,
and picked up Walker as Walker ran out of the restaurant.
Williams testified he did not intend to rob or kill anyone in the
restaurant. He also said he “was just following [Walker’s] lead”
in robbing the men.

                                9
      On cross-examination, Williams testified he heard
“rumbling” behind him as he was leaving the restaurant and
someone said, “‘Come help me.’” Williams stated, “I looked back,
but no one [was] behind me. Then I heard a shot and I run out
the door.” Williams said he did not offer help to anyone.

            2.      The Superior Court Denies Williams’s Petition
       The superior court stated it reviewed the clerk’s transcript
and the reporter’s transcript from Williams’s trial, which the
People submitted. The court ruled Williams was ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6 because the People proved beyond a
reasonable doubt Williams could still be convicted for murder as
a major participant in a robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to life.5 The court first found Walker and Williams
were not credible witnesses. The court stated Walker was
motivated to help his friend without doing harm to himself. The
court found that Walker and Williams had “selective memory”
and that Walker’s testimony differed from what he told the
parole board. The court also found Walker’s and Williams’s
testimony was inconsistent with the trial testimony of Samuels,
Cross, Hinds, and Brock, none of whom, unlike Walker and
Williams, had reason to mislead the court. The court observed
that, although the testimony at trial was not entirely consistent,

5       The superior court also found the People proved beyond a
reasonable doubt Williams was a direct aider and abettor who
acted with intent to kill. We do not address aider and abettor
liability because we conclude substantial evidence supported the
court’s finding Williams could be convicted of murder as a major
participant in the robbery who acted with a reckless indifference
for life.

                                10
the witnesses generally identified Williams as the “one giving the
orders” and “the one making all the threats and beating up
people.”
       The court stated it was not crediting “the whole gist” of
Walker and Williams’s story, which was that they planned to buy
40 pounds of marijuana and that, “because one person had his
hand near his waist, . . . Walker decided to change suddenly from
making a lucrative drug deal to an armed robbery.” The court
found more “logical” the version of the story described at trial,
which was that Walker and Williams went to the restaurant
intending to rob Beharry. Among other evidence, the court
concluded that no one found 40 pounds of marijuana at the
restaurant because “there was never any deal to sell 40 pounds of
marijuana.”
       Regarding whether Williams was a major participant in the
robbery, the court found: (1) Williams “was the leader of the plan
to rob” Beharry; (2) Williams was armed, but even if he wasn’t
when he entered the restaurant, he subsequently armed himself;
(3) Williams was aware of the danger posed by the armed robbery
because he expected some “resistance” from a known drug dealer;
(4) Williams was present at the killing and was in a position to
facilitate or prevent the murder; (5) Williams was one of two
shooters, and “his words and actions led to the shooting of
[Beharry] and probably encouraged [Walker]”; and (6) Williams
made no effort to help Beharry.
       Regarding whether Williams’s conduct reflected reckless
indifference to human life, the court found: (1) Williams brought
a gun to the robbery and knew Walker had a gun; (2) Williams
was present at the murder; (3) Williams had an opportunity to
restrain Walker, even under Williams’s version of events, and he

                               11
could have aided Beharry after he was shot; (4) the duration of
the robbery made it more likely someone would be killed;
(5) there was no evidence Williams knew Walker had a
propensity for violence; and (6) Williams made no effort to
minimize the risk of violence, and increased the risk of violence
by threatening to kill hostages, beating up Beharry, choosing to
commit robbery when a number of people were present, and
choosing to commit robbery at a location known for selling drugs.
The court concluded all but one of the factors (the fifth) weighed
in favor of finding Williams acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The court denied Williams’s petition, and Williams
timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

      A.     Section 1172.6
      Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 448; People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843) and significantly
narrowing the felony-murder exception to the malice requirement
for murder (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
in section 189, subdivision (e). That provision requires the People

                                12
to prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s culpability: The
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); the
defendant, though not the actual killer, with the intent to kill
assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
the defendant was a major participant in a felony listed in section
189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,” the
felony-murder special-circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)).
(See Curiel, at p. 448; Strong, at p. 708.)
       Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if he or
she could not now be convicted of murder because of the changes
the Legislature made effective 2019 to the definitions of the
crime. (See People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450;
People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; People v. Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) If a section 1172.6 petition contains
all the required information, the court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner, if requested. (Lewis, at pp. 962-963; see
§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (3).) The prosecutor must then file a
response to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       Where, as here, the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.

                                13
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing the court may consider
evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the prosecutor may
also offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.; see People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853-854.)
       On appeal from an order denying a petition under
section 1172.6, we review the superior court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
245, 270; People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.)6
“In reviewing the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence,
we . . . examine the entire record in the light most favorable to
the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding

6      Citing People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, Williams
argues we should independently review the superior court’s
findings of fact because they were based “only on documentary
evidence.” But Williams and Walker testified at the evidentiary
hearing, and the court considered their testimony in making its
findings. Moreover, Vivar applied an independent standard of
review to findings made in connection with a motion under
section 1473.7, not section 1172.6. (See Vivar, at pp. 527 & 528,
fn. 7 [“Nothing we say here disturbs a familiar postulate: when
reviewing a ruling under the substantial evidence standard, ‘an
appellate court should defer to the factual determinations made
by the trial court,’ regardless of ‘whether the trial court’s ruling[s
are based] on oral testimony or declarations.’”]; People v. Mitchell
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 590-591 [rejecting the petitioner’s
argument based on Vivar that an independent standard of review
applies to fact findings under section 1172.6 when there is no live
testimony].)

                                 14
[the necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . While the
trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility,
all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400, 414, internal quotation marks omitted; see Montanez,
at pp. 270-271; Guiffreda, at p. 125.) “‘“Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence.”’” (People v. Navarro (2021)
12 Cal.5th 285, 339; see People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57;
Montanez, at p. 271.)

      B.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Superior Court’s
            Finding Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Williams Is Not
            Entitled to Relief Under Section 1172.6

             1.     Applicable Law
      Section 189, subdivision (e)(3), provides that a participant
in one of the felonies listed in section 189, subdivision (a) (which
includes robbery), may be liable for murder if the prosecution
proves he or she “was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,” within
the meaning of section 190.2, the special circumstances statute.
(People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448; People v. Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; see § 190.2, subds. (a), (d).) The
Supreme Court in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) “clarified the
meaning of the special circumstances statute” (In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676) and identified “a nonexhaustive list of

                                 15
considerations” relevant to determining whether a defendant was
culpable for murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) (see
Strong, at pp. 706-707; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
970, 986).
       Among the factors that “may play a role in determining
whether a defendant’s culpability is sufficient” for a finding he or
she was a major participant under section 190.2, subdivision (d),
are: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by
the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at
the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803,
fn. omitted; see People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 105-106;
People v. Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 591.) “No one of
these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in determining the
ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation ‘in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation]
was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major.’” (Banks,
at p. 803; see Cody, at p. 106.)
       “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death

                                16
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, “‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.”’” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; see People
v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 106.) “Awareness of no more
than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any armed crime is
insufficient; only knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death’
satisfies the constitutional minimum.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 808; see Scoggins, at p. 677.)
       “In addition to the Banks and Clark factors, a defendant’s
youthful age must be considered” in determining whether the
defendant had a reckless indifference for human life. (People v.
Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1088, fn. 7; see People v.
Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 987 [“‘a defendant’s youth is
a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life’”].) In making that
determination, “‘[w]e analyze the totality of the circumstances’ in
a manner that largely overlaps with our ‘major participant’
discussion.” (People v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 106; see
In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 676-677; In re Moore (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 434, 455.) “Although we state these two
requirements separately, they often overlap” because “the greater
the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more
likely that he [or she] acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 [internal quotations
omitted]; Cody, at p. 106; see People v. Montanez, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 268.)

                                 17
            2.      Substantial Evidence Supported the Superior
                    Court’s Finding Williams Was an Active
                    Participant in the Robbery
       Williams argues substantial evidence did not support the
superior court’s finding he was an active participant in the
robbery. But it did.
       First, Williams played a significant role in planning and
leading the criminal enterprise that led to the armed robbery and
Beharry’s death. Upon arriving in the loft, Williams pointed his
gun at the men and told them to get down on the ground. He was
“in charge,” did “most of the talking,” took the lead in searching
and robbing the victims, grabbed Samuels’s gun, told Walker to
go downstairs to get something to tie up the victims, and
demanded money from Beharry. Even if Williams did not
“singlehandedly plan[ ] the robbery” (In re Bennett (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1019), he was instrumental in carrying it
out.
       Williams cites an excerpt from our opinion in Williams I
that stated, “It appeared to Brock that Walker was in charge.”
The superior court did not err in declining to consider this
statement at the evidentiary hearing. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)
[the court may “consider the procedural history of the case recited
in any prior appellate opinion”]; People v. Arnold (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 376, 392 [“The specificity of this provision
‘indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should not rely
on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions
when a section [1172.6] petition reaches the stage of a
full-fledged evidentiary hearing.’”]; People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“the factual summary in an appellate
opinion is not evidence that may be considered at an evidentiary

                                18
hearing to determine a petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing”];
cf. People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 [“when an
appellate opinion is admitted at an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, without objection, it is substantial evidence that
the trial court can consider,” and by failing to object, the
petitioner can forfeit “any objection to such consideration”].)
In any event, Brock testified that it was Williams who told him
“to cooperate” and “to get on the ground” and that Williams
suggested to Walker that he search the men.
       Second, Williams admittedly was armed and used a gun
during the robbery. Third, while there is no evidence Williams
knew of Walker’s propensity for violence based on past
experience, Williams admitted knowing Walker was armed, from
which the superior court could reasonably infer Williams also
knew that buying 40 pounds of marijuana from a known drug
dealer could involve danger. Williams also testified Walker was
the one who kicked Beharry and others, which meant Williams
knew something about Walker’s propensity for violence well
before Beharry was shot.
       Fourth, Williams admittedly was present at the scene of
the murder and may have been a shooter. Indeed, Beharry said
“those guys” shot him, Walker told the parole board that “we”
shot Beharry, and the forensics evidence was consistent with the
scenario that two guns were fired. At a minimum, Williams’s
actions facilitated the murder by creating a credible threat of
death throughout the robbery. Williams held the hostages at gun
point, repeatedly threatened to kill them, kicked and beat
Beharry and Samuels, and tied up the hostages or directed
Walker to tie them up. Williams also had opportunities to
prevent Beharry’s murder by, for example, leaving (or suggesting

                                19
to Walker that they leave) the restaurant after failing to find
money or drugs. (See People v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
p. 114 [defendant who participated in the victim’s beating before
his strangulation had an opportunity to stop the killing].) Even
under Williams’s version of events, he did nothing to prevent the
murder, such as leaving the restaurant after the supposed drug
deal proved unsuccessful rather than holding five hostages at
gunpoint. And after Beharry was shot, Williams admittedly did
nothing to help him. Substantial evidence amply supported the
superior court’s finding Williams was a major participant in the
robbery. (See People v. Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088
[defendant was a major participant where he voluntarily
participated in a robbery that led to murder, was armed, knew
the dangers posed by robbing a drug dealer, was present at the
scene of the botched robbery and shooting, and made no effort to
minimize the risk of violence during the robbery]; People v.
Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 591 [defendant was a major
participant where he helped plan a robbery, pointed a gun at the
victim but did not fire it, split the stolen money, and “was a full
partner in crime”].)
       Williams argues that his role in the robbery did not
contribute to Beharry’s death and that “there is no evidence that
he had ‘any intention of participating in or facilitating a
murder.’” (See Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 798.)
That might be true in Williams’s version of events, but not in the
version the jury and the superior court believed. Three different
witnesses with no motivation to lie said that Williams threatened
to kill them and that he backed up his threats with violence by
severely beating Beharry and kicking Samuels. While the killing
may have occurred during a struggle, that does not diminish

                                20
Williams’s significant involvement in the robbery. Consistent
with the purpose of the “‘major participant’ element” to “reflect
‘the defendant’s individual responsibility for the loss of life, not
just his or her vicarious responsibility for the underlying crime,’”
Williams had significant individual responsibility for Beharry’s
death. (People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219, 238, italics
omitted.)

            3.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Superior
                   Court’s Finding Williams Acted with Reckless
                   Indifference to Human Life
      As discussed, the factors for determining whether a
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life overlap
to some degree with the factors for determining whether the
defendant was a major participant. Indeed, the superior court’s
“factual finding that [the defendant] was a major participant in
the underlying felony is—itself—supportive of the court’s
additional factual finding that [the defendant] acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (People v. Cody, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 113; see In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 677.) The overlapping factors here were that Williams used a
gun in committing the robbery, that he was physically present at
the robbery and murder, that he did not attempt to aid Beharry,
that there was little to no evidence Williams knew of Walker’s
history of or propensity for violence (a factor weighing against a
finding of reckless indifference to human life), and that Williams
made no effort to minimize the risk of violence during the
robbery. (See Scoggins, at p. 677 [listing the factors].) All but
one of these factors weigh in favor of finding Williams acted with
reckless indifference to human life.

                                21
       The evidence regarding the other factors, including the
number of weapons used in the crime, the duration of the crime,
and Williams’s opportunity to “restrain the crime” (In re
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677) similarly supported the
superior court’s finding Williams acted with reckless indifference
to human life. The crime involved three guns: the gun Williams
brought with him (caliber unknown), the gun Williams took from
Samuels (a .38 caliber), and the gun Walker brought with him
(a .45 caliber). Unlike in Clark, where there was only one gun at
the scene of the killing, the defendant did not carry that gun, and
the gun was loaded with only one bullet, here Williams had two
guns, pointed one of them at the victims, and threatened to kill
them. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Williams’s use of
a firearm, even if Walker killed Beharry, supported the court’s
finding Williams had a reckless indifference to human life. (See
ibid.)
       Regarding the duration of the robbery, Samuels testified it
lasted 20 to 30 minutes, Brock said 30 minutes, and Cross said
“less than 10” minutes. However long within that range the
robbery lasted, it involved multiple interactions with victims who
were bound and had guns pointed at them, which created
“‘a greater window of opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly
culminating in murder.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620; see
People v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 114 [evidence the
defendant “spent more than a fleeting amount of time” searching
the property supported the court’s finding the defendant acted
with reckless indifference to life]; People v. Montanez, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 283 [evidence the victims were bound and
held at gunpoint for 25 minutes supported the court’s finding the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life]; cf. In re

                                22
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 680 [duration of the crime did not
indicate reckless indifference to human life where the defendant
did not detain the victims and the interaction lasted no more
than five minutes]; People v. Madrigal, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 250 [attack and robbery lasting 39 seconds were not over such
a “‘prolonged period’” that it would have created a greater
opportunity for violence]; People v. Guiffreda, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 128 [assault and robbery lasting “mere
minutes” did not create a greater opportunity for violence].)
        Williams argues he did not have an opportunity to prevent
Beharry’s murder because the shooting was “spontaneous.”
Williams’s presence and proximity to the killing (which he
admitted was approximately 12 feet), however, “provide[d] an
opportunity to act as a restraining influence.” (People v. Bradley
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1033.) Moreover, while Williams
may not have intended that he and Walker would use their
firearms, “the evidence concerning the manner in which they
carried out the robbery is sufficiently weighty to support” the
superior court’s finding Williams “acted in reckless disregard for
human life.” (People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077,
1090; see id. at pp. 1089-1090 [defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life where he and his accomplice pushed
their way into a drug dealer’s apartment, and the defendant
made the person who answered the door lie face down at
gunpoint, while the defendant’s accomplice shot the drug dealer
in a bedroom after a brief struggle].) Had Williams wanted to
avoid violence, he would not have walked into the loft
brandishing a gun and held five men at gunpoint. (See
ibid. [circumstances “strongly suggest[ed] confronting people
. . . was part of the plan”].) As soon as Williams and Walker

                                23
encountered multiple potential victims that complicated their
plan to rob Beharry, they could have called it off. Instead, they
escalated the violence.
       More generally, Williams argues the evidence showed no
more than a “‘garden-variety armed robbery, where death might
be possible but not probable.’” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 802.) Indeed, the Supreme Court in Clark stated there must
be something “in the plan that one can point to that elevated the
risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed
robbery” to show reckless indifference for human life. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 623.) The Supreme Court in Clark also
stated “garden-variety armed robbery” was a “robbery in which
the only factor supporting reckless indifference to human life is
the fact of the use of a gun.” (Id. at p. 617, fn. 74.) As discussed,
there was much more to the armed robbery here. Williams tied
up the victims, kicked and beat them, and repeatedly threatened
to kill them, all while two guns were pointed at them. And courts
have held that targeting a known drug dealer in his or her home
(and the loft was a private area analogous to a home; it even had
a shower) is inherently dangerous. (See People v. Bascomb,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1090 [“‘the planned, armed robbery of
a known drug dealer at his residence’” carried a significant risk of
violence]; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1013
[a home invasion robbery of a drug dealer is “a crime with a
particularly high risk of violence”].)
       Finally, Williams argues the superior court, in considering
whether Williams acted with reckless indifference to human life,
erred in failing to consider Williams’s relative youth. Williams,
who was 23 years old at the time of the murder, did not argue in
the superior court his youth affected his perception of the risk

                                 24
involved in armed robbery. In response to the People’s forfeiture
argument, Williams argues that cases decided since his
evidentiary hearing have “made clear that youth is relevant to
[the] reckless indifference analysis” and that the law now
requires the superior court to take youth into account.
       That’s not quite what happened. As stated, Williams’s
evidentiary hearing occurred on July 28, 2022. In November
2021, eight months before Williams’s evidentiary hearing, this
court in People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 970 held
“‘a defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in determining whether
the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.’”
(Id. at p. 987.) In In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434, decided
earlier that year, the court vacated a robbery-murder special-
circumstance finding, concluding that, even if the Clark factors
supported a finding of reckless indifference to human life for an
adult, a 16-year-old boy “lacked ‘“the experience, perspective, and
judgment”’ to adequately appreciate the risk of death posed by
his criminal activities.” (Moore, at p. 454.)7
       We need not decide whether Williams forfeited his youth-
factor argument because any error by the superior court in failing
to consider Williams’s relative youth was harmless under People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (See People v. Pittman,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 417-418 [applying the Watson

7      In People v. Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, decided five
months after Williams’s evidentiary hearing, the court held that,
“[i]n addition to the Banks and Clark factors, a defendant’s
youthful age must be considered” (Jones, at p. 1088, fn. 7, italics
added) when determining whether a defendant “was a major
participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life
based on the totality of the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1091.)

                                25
harmless error standard to the superior court’s failure to consider
the petitioner’s age in determining whether he acted with
reckless indifference to human life]; People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489 & fn. 8 [same]; see also People v. Epps
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 [Watson standard applies to the denial of
a right that “is purely a creature of state statutory law”].)
       “The cases discussing the role of youth in relation to
criminal culpability stress two areas: youthful offenders’ relative
impulsivity and their vulnerability to peer pressure. [Citation.]
Transient rashness, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences are hallmarks of an immature brain.” (People
v. Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 418, internal quotation
marks omitted; see People v. Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 489.) The court in Oliver held these factors were not present
where the 23-year-old defendant “actively participated” in a plan
to buy a large amount of cocaine from a dealer whom his
accomplice shot after the drug deal. (Oliver, at pp. 470-471, 489.)
There was “no evidence that [the defendant] planned the crime,
supplied a weapon, or carried a weapon” (id. at p. 483), but his
accomplice told him before the drug deal he planned to kill the
victim “if he was alone” (id. at p. 470). The court in In re Harper
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450 similarly concluded a 16-year-old’s
youth did not diminish his culpability for murder where an older
accomplice killed the manager of a store they robbed together.
(Id. at pp. 454-455.) The court held the juvenile’s conduct during
the robbery (including giving the actual killer’s shotgun to him as
they entered the store, telling another accomplice where she
could find knives in the store—which she used to slit the
manager’s throat before the other accomplice shot him—and
taking merchandise from the store), as well as his statements

                                26
during and after the robbery that reflected his indifference to
whether the victim lived or died, all showed “he did not act like
an immature, naïve, or impulsive adolescent.” (Id. at p. 472.)
       In contrast, the court in Pittman held a 21-year-old’s youth
might have affected his culpability for felony murder where the
underlying crime occurred by “happenstance,” and the defendant
armed himself with a chisel “spontaneous[ly].” (Pittman, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.) And this court in People v. Ramirez,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 970 held a 15-year-old’s “age may well
have affected his calculation of the risk of death posed by using
[a] firearm in [a] carjacking, as well as his willingness to abandon
the crime.” (Id. at p. 991.) In Ramirez we observed that the
actual shooter planned the carjacking, brought and fired the gun,
and insisted the defendant approach the car. (Id. at p. 988.)
After the crime the defendant told a detective he feared
retribution from the shooter’s gang if he did not participate in the
carjacking. (Ibid.)
       This case is closer to Oliver and Harper than Pittman and
Ramirez. There was scant evidence Williams’s criminal behavior
was motivated by impulse or vulnerability to peer pressure. This
was a planned, armed robbery in which Williams was “in charge”
and not merely taking direction from an older accomplice
(Williams is two years older than Walker). Williams threatened
to kill his hostages multiple times and severely beat Beharry,
displaying indifference to whether Beharry lived or died. Under
these circumstances it is not reasonably probable the superior
court would have granted Williams’s petition had the court
considered that Williams was 23 years old at the time of the

                                27
crime. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; People v.
Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489, fn. 8.)8

                         DISPOSITION

     The superior court’s order denying Williams’s petition
under section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                             SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                  FEUER, J.

                  MARTINEZ, J.

8      Williams contends the superior court violated his right to
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying his
petition arbitrarily. Because we conclude substantial evidence
supported the superior court’s findings Williams was a major
participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to
human life, the superior court’s denial of Williams’s petition did
not violate due process.

                                28