Court Opinion

ID: 9790431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:46.33474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:31.905891
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the Court’s statement regarding the facts of this case and the duty of this Court to set aside personal opinions of guilt or innocence in ruling upon whether the Appellant has been afforded the rights set forth by constitutional and statutory mandates. In addition, I concur in the results reached by the Court in this ease but disagree with the Court’s application of the law to the facts presented. ■>
The Court determines the Appellant’s right to protection from compelled self-incrimination and right to have counsel present at custodial interrogations pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was violated and this violation is the causation of the reversal and remand for new trial. The Court fails to make the distinction as to the rights afforded under the Federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment, and when those rights are activated in the prosecution process. The facts reveal the interrogation at issue in this case occurred after Appellant’s initial appearance, and after he requested and received court appointed counsel. In addition, his attorney had an agreement with the District Attorney’s office that Appellant would not be questioned without his attorney being present. Prior to being transported to Rogers County Appellant asked to see his attorney but when the attorney could not be contacted he was removed without being allowed that opportunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with this same type of problem in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). The parties in that case had also sought to address the factual issues through application of Fifth Amendment principles. The Court stated:
[tjhere is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, a doctrine designed to secure the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (citation omitted). It is equally unnecessary to evaluate the ruling of the District Court that William’s self-incriminating statements were, indeed, involuntarily made, (citation omitted) For it is clear that the judgment before us must in any event be affirmed upon the ground that Williams was deprived of a different constitutional right — the right to the assistance of counsel.
Id. 430 U.S. at 398, 97 S.Ct. at 1239.
This right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment attaches at the time that judi*1070cial proceedings have been initiated against a person. Id. The standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver of this Sixth Amendment right is “that it was incumbent upon the State to prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023.” Id., 430 U.S. at 405, 97 S.Ct. at 1242. The Court in Brewer held that under the facts of the case the defendant did not waive his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendant in Brewer, like Appellant herein, had been arraigned on the charge, and requested and received appointment of an attorney.
The U.S. Supreme Court further defined the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). The Court applied the decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and held that confessions obtained from the defendants at police-initiated interrogations, after they had requested at their arraignment that counsel be appointed for them but before they had the opportunity to consult with counsel, should be suppressed as having been obtained in violation of their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and any waiver of that right for the police interrogation was invalid. Id. 475 U.S. at 636, 106 S.Ct. at 1411.
Thus, the question of whether a confession was made knowingly and voluntarily is not relevant under the present facts of a police initiated interrogation after the Appellant was initially arraigned and exercised his right to counsel. The [initial appearance] signals “the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings” and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment. U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-188, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2296-2298, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). The issue of the advice of rights, coupled with a knowing and voluntary waiver, is controlling in the application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only when a defendant has not exercised his right to counsel. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988).
Prior to the taking of the invalid video taped confession on June 8, 1984, the police investigators had secured two separate valid confessions on June 3 and 4, and Appellant took the officers to the location of the body in Rogers County. However, the validity of the prior confessions cannot justify the Sixth Amendment violations, nor can those confessions dilute the impact of the video taped confession to harmless error. While it might be popular to attempt to disregard or justify a violation of Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights under the Federal Constitution or rights granted under Article 2, § 20, of the Oklahoma Constitution; based on the factual context of this case, the luxury of popularity has never been afforded to those vested with the responsibility of enforcement of constitutional rights conferred upon all citizens of this great republic. Therefore, the only decision available to this Court is to vacate the previous judgment and sentence and remand the case for a new trial.