Court Opinion

ID: 9450769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:57:19.986757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:26.713388
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming of a Dyer Act violation, 18 U.S.C. § 2312. On this appeal from the conviction he assigns as error the admission of evidence claimed to have been obtained through unlawful searches and seizures and the reception into evidence of particular, prejudicial testimony regarding appellant’s prior bad acts.
On the night of November 20-21, 1962, a 1962 Chevrolet Impala two-door sedan was stolen from in front of the home of its owner in Ashland, Kentucky. About one week later, on November 27, 1962, appellant, accompanied by a hitchhiker, Russell McMartin, drove the stolen automobile into Cheyenne, Wyoming. The two men proceeded to the Frontier Hotel, where McMartin registered for a double room. That evening, McMartin went to the local police station and told some officers there that he suspected the automobile appellant was driving was stolen. He had an Ohio certificate of title with him he had taken from appellant that purported to establish appellant’s ownership to the automobile, and he asked the officers to examine the certificate to determine whether it was in order. McMartin then stated that appellant had attempted to sell the automobile at a very low price in three or four towns in Nebraska but that all prospective buyers had requested to see appellant’s identification, which he had not produced. He also stated that appellant had suggested that he transfer the title to McMartin, who could sell the automobile because he did have identification, for which trouble McMartin would be generously paid. The officers examined the certificate of title and decided it had been “manipulated.”
The officers, accompanied by McMartin, then set out to find appellant, and while looking for him they observed the automobile parked at a service station. At that time they made no search but did note the automobile to be a two-tone 1962 *293Chevrolet two-door sedan with Alabama license plates. Appellant was soon found sleeping in the hotel room, into which McMartin admitted the officers with his key. After identifying themselves, the officers showed appellant the Ohio certificate, which he stated was the title to the automobile he was driving. The officers then conducted a perfunctory search of appellant and the room. Finding that appellant had neither money nor identification, they arrested him and took him to the police station where he was held for vagrancy and investigation of car theft. The automobile was towed to the police station to be held until it could be checked out. The officers had no warrant for the arrest and search.
On the next day Robert Gustafson, Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, questioned appellant at the Cheyenne police station. The interrogation yielded little of value and Gustafson then entered and examined the automobile, which was being stored by the Cheyenne Police, and ascertained its license and vehicle identification numbers. Using the vehicle identification number so obtained, Gustafson sent inquiries to the F.B.I. office in Ohio and to Alabama and was able to determine that the automobile was stolen. Gustafson thereafter, on December 1, 1962, made a cellophane tape impression of the identification number and removed the license plate; both the impression and the plate were introduced as evidence against appellant. A federal warrant for appellant’s arrest was obtained on November 31, 1962, two days after the initial examination of the automobile. No search warrant was ever obtained.
The F.B.I. investigation that resulted from Gustafson’s findings produced most of the evidence used in the trial. Copies of registration papers from the State of Alabama were introduced to show appellant had obtained the papers so he could use them to procure the Ohio title certificate after he had altered the vehicle identification number on them to match that of the stolen automobile. There was also evidence, in the form of testimony and two unnegotiated checks, showing that appellant had attempted to sell the automobile in Nebraska for a low price. In addition, the government was able to show that Frank Myland, the transferor listed on the Ohio certificate, had never owned a motor vehicle in the State of Ohio.
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence and a full hearing was held by the trial court during which each of the state and federal police officers testified as to his participation in the events leading to appellant’s arrest and the several searches. The motion was denied.
This record reveals to us a complete and continuing disregard by police officers, both state and federal, of the constitutional protections afforded appellant in regard to arrest, search and seizure. While the information furnished to the Wyoming police might well have served as probable cause for a federal arrest for a violation of the Dyer Act, it is difficult to visualize a justification for appellant’s arrest and incarceration as a vagrant. Under Wyoming law a vagrant is defined as a person without any visible means of support and living an immoral or worthless life. 3 Wyo.Stat. § 6-221. Since the offense is a misdemeanor, an arrest without warrant is not justified unless the offense is committed' in the presence of the officer or the elements of the offense are apparent by observation. See State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231. P. 683. The purported arrest for “investigation” is unknown to the law of Wyoming. But we need not decide the lawfulness of the arrest for, even assuming, arguendo, that the original arrest was lawful it would not justify a search of an automobile remote in location. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777. Nor can federal officers rely upon a state arrest for justification in conducting their own search as incident to the state arrest. Sirimarco v. United States, 10 Cir., 315 F.2d 699, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807, 83 S.Ct. 1696, 10 L.Ed.2d 1032.
*294The searches by F.B.I. Agent Gustafson, both without warrant, were clearly unlawful. On November 28 he wrote down the license and vehicle identification numbers of the automobile; although he could easily observe the license number he had to enter the car to see the identification number. There can be no questioning that visual observations may constitute the fruits of an unreasonable search and seizure and be inadmissible on that ground, Williams v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 41, 263 F.2d 487, 489, and Gustafson’s illegal entry into the car condemns the information gathered by virtue of such illegal entry, including material garnered as a result of the unreasonable search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. In the case at bar the inadmissible evidence encompasses not only the identification number obtained by Gustafson in the illegal search but also all subsequent information acquired because of the search, “the fruit of the poisonous tree,” which includes the results of the F.B.I. investigation. See Staples v. United States, 5 Cir., 320 F.2d 817. And certain it is that the cellophane tape impression and thé license plate, acquired at the second search on December 1, should not have been admitted.
The government, however, contends that since no objection was made to this evidence and since appellant’s motion to suppress under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e), heard prior to the trial, did not detail this evidence, appellant has waived any constitutional claim he may have had and that the issue is not before the court. To support this ground for affirmance the government cites Williams v. United States, 10 Cir., 323 F.2d 90, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906, 84 S.Ct. 659, 11 L.Ed.2d 605, where an F.B.I. agent had made a warrantless search, also while the defendants were confined in jail. This court there held that the issue was not before it because there was no motion to suppress and the objection to the disputed evidence was based upon incorrect grounds. Appellant here did make a timely motion to suppress evidence and, while the motion was general, the hearing was full and revealed the activities of federal officers. The constitutional violation was adequately protested.
 The government also contends that appellant has no standing to object to the search of the automobile since he had no right of ownership in it. Such a construction of the Fourth Amendment would totally negate the effect of the Weeks-McNabb1 exclusionary rule in regard to automobiles. Federal officers could search cars at will and, of all defendants prosecuted for automobile theft, only those who actually owned the automobiles could raise Fourth Amendment objections successfully. Moreover, the proof of ownership would be sufficient to quash the prosecution for theft of the automobile. These constitutional rights belong to the guilty as well as the innocent. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153. The sole prerequisite to a defendant’s raising the Fourth Amendment issue is that he claim a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched or seized property. See Williams v. United States, 10 Cir., 323 F.2d 90, 94-95. Appellant certainly claimed a possessory interest in the car, and his lack of ownership was not established until after the search.
Appellant’s further contention that he was prejudiced by testimony concerning his prior criminal record and activities need not be specifically considered. Such testimony was largely volunteered by the witnesses and need not recur. Responsibility for the careful examination of witnesses lies with the District Attorney, and ultimate control of the trial so as to avoid prejudice to the accused is the duty of the court.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial with instructions to suppress all evidence *295obtained by the federal searches and attributable to such searches.

. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819.