Court Opinion

ID: 9909176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 17:13:10.141325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:10.808706
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                       Washington State
                                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Division Two

                                                                                      December 12, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 M.R., an individual,                                               No. 56781-4-II

                               Respondent,

         v.

 STATE OF WASHINGTON; YAKIMA                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a public
 corporation; CODY BUTLER, an individual;

                               Petitioners.

        CRUSER, J. — In 2019 MR sued the State of Washington, Yakima Valley Community

College, and Cody Butler (collectively the State) for a variety of claims arising from sexual abuse

she alleged that she experienced in 2000 when she was 17 years old and from 2001 to 2003 when

she was 18 years old or older. The State moved for summary judgment based on the statute of

limitations. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment after concluding that the

childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.340, applied to all of MR’s claims,

including those based on acts that occurred after MR turned 18.

        The trial court certified the issue of whether RCW 4.16.340 applies to claims based on

sexual abuse that began when MR was under 18 and continued after she turned 18 for immediate

review under RAP 2.3(b)(4). A commissioner of this court granted discretionary review of the

certified issue.
No. 56781-4-II

       The State also argues that if the summary judgment order is reversed, then (1) the common

law discovery rule does not apply to MR’s claims based on the alleged acts that occurred after she

turned 18 because she failed to make further diligent inquiry to ascertain the scope of the actual

harm, and (2) MR’s remaining claim of child sexual abuse fails because she fails to establish

causation.

       We hold that the plain language of RCW 4.16.340 demonstrates that the childhood sexual

abuse statute of limitations applies only to claims based on acts of childhood sexual abuse

occurring before the plaintiff turns 18. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment order and

remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

                                              FACTS1

                                       I.      BACKGROUND

       In the summer of 2000, just before starting her senior year in high school, 17-year-old MR

participated in a club basketball tournament with hopes of being recruited to play college

basketball. While at the gym, the club director introduced MR to Cody Butler, an assistant

women’s basketball coach from Yakima Valley Community College (YVCC).

       The club director and Butler began to make comments about MR’s body, including her

abs, buttocks, and chest. After the director commented about MR’s abdominal muscles, Butler put

his hand on MR’s stomach and “trace[d] his hand down the line of the V on [her] stomach to the

top of [her] public [sic] area, the top of [her] basketball shorts.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 53.

1
  Because we are addressing a summary judgment motion, we recount the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, MR. Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909, 922,
296 P.3d 860 (2013).

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No. 56781-4-II

       MR did not consent to Butler touching her, and she found the men’s comments and the

touching uncomfortable and confusing. But because the men acted as if their behavior was normal

and she wanted a basketball scholarship, she tolerated it.

       MR turned 18 in October 2000. In 2001, sometime before her high school graduation,

Butler invited MR to visit the YVCC campus.

       During this visit, MR attended practice, and Butler commented about the other players’

appearances. These comments included comments about the other players’ “ass[es]” and “tits.” Id.

at 126. She had some physical contact with Butler during practice, and he placed his hand on the

small of her back while she was on the sideline to make her feel more comfortable. At the time,

this contact did not make MR feel uncomfortable.

       Butler also gave one of the team members some money and told her to “make sure that

[MR] had a good time that night.” Id. at 124. The team member used Butler’s money to buy alcohol

and took MR to a party at the “baseball house.” Id. Because MR wanted to impress the basketball

team, she did not feel like she could say no, and she drank until she blacked out. The next day

Butler noticed that she was hungover and joked about it with the other team member, stating that

they had shown MR a really good time and that she would certainly now choose to come to YVCC.

       MR did not feel uncomfortable during this visit. But she later came to believe that Butler’s

contact with her and encouraging her to drink was inappropriate.

       Butler offered MR a basketball scholarship a week after her visit to YVCC. MR accepted

the offer and arrived at the school in August 2001. MR attended YVCC and was a member of the

basketball team until 2003. During this time, Butler spent time alone with MR, and, according to

MR, treated her differently from the other players by giving her special privileges.

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No. 56781-4-II

       According to MR, Butler would frequently engage in unwanted and inappropriate physical

contact with her by pressing his erect penis into her during training and by pulling her into his lap

while he had an erect penis. MR stated that she was uncomfortable with this contact, but because

she was inexperienced she believed that this was “how college coaches act.” Id. at 57.

       Butler would also ask MR to give him neck massages, and he would give her massages in

his office. At one point, the YVCC athletic director walked in on them in Butler’s office while

Butler was giving MR a neck massage at 9:00 PM. Butler would also take MR out to eat and take

her to his house to eat, watch television, and practice yoga. He also provided her with alcohol on

several occasions.

       Butler’s behavior made MR uncomfortable, and she started to skip practice to avoid him.

But she never complained about his behavior to anyone while at YVCC because she “had no idea

that it was wrong,” and she believed that he loved her. Id. at 130.

       MR’s teammates, however, observed that MR’s relationship with Butler was inappropriate

and believed that Butler and MR were in an intimate relationship. Some of MR’s teammates told

her that her relationship with Butler was wrong and complained to the athletic director. One of

MR’s teammates also told her “that what [Butler] was doing was inappropriate” after walking in

on MR and Butler in his office. Id. at 65. But MR “didn’t want to listen to her,” and their friendship

ended. Id.

       Apparently in response to the complaint, a team meeting was held. During this meeting,

without first warning MR, Butler announced that he was not sleeping with MR. MR was

“[m]ortified” by this announcement, and she believed that her relationship with Butler had

damaged her relationship with the other team members. Id. at 62.

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No. 56781-4-II

       In 2003, MR accepted a basketball scholarship at a four-year university in Montana. In

2004, MR visited Butler in Nevada. During this visit, they drank together and had sexual

intercourse at least twice.

       After leaving YVCC, MR became drug and alcohol addicted, she suffered from an eating

disorder, and she ended up homeless and in an abusive relationship. She was eventually

incarcerated in 2009.

       After her release from prison in 2012, MR earned her master’s degree, married, had three

children, and worked full time. MR asserted that during this time she attempted to “numb[ ]

[herself] to forget about the dark chapter of [her] life.” Id. at 192. And she asserted that a series of

life stressors prevented her from being mentally or physically capable of seeking the help she knew

she needed.

                                           II.     LAWSUIT

       In October 2018, MR became aware that the FBI was investigating the director of the

basketball club she had attended in 2001 “for sexual misconduct with a former basketball player.”

Id. This news caused her to think about what had happened between her and Butler in a new light.

       “It was at this time in 2018 that [she] started thinking about [what had happened to her]

with a clearer head space because [she] was no longer in a cycle of sex, drugs, eating disorders,

and alcohol abuse.” Id. at 193. She began to realize what had happened to her and started the

process of learning how she had been affected and how her experiences had harmed her. In early

2019, MR started therapy, and she began to understand how Butler’s abuse had affected her in

ways she had never before considered.

                                                   5
No. 56781-4-II

       In May 2019, MR filed suit against the State. MR alleged negligence, sexual

discrimination, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against the State of

Washington, Yakima Valley Community College, and Butler and outrage and assault claims

against Butler in his individual capacity. Her initial claims were based on her contacts with Butler

from 2001 through 2003. She later amended her claims to include the touching incident that

occurred in 2000, when she was 17 years old.

                                  III.    SUMMARY JUDGMENT

       The State moved for summary judgment. Regarding the claims related to the incidents that

occurred between 2001 and 2003, they argued that the two- and three-year statutes of limitations,

RCW 4.16.080(2) and RCW 4.16.100(1), barred these claims and that the common law discovery

rule did not apply. Regarding MR’s claims based on the 2000 incident, they argued that MR failed

to establish questions of fact as to whether Butler was acting as an agent for YVCC, whether the

incident was a “reportable offense,” or whether the incident was a proximate cause of any damages

or injuries. CP at 44.

       In support of its argument that MR had failed to demonstrate that the 2000 incident was a

proximate cause of any damages or injury, the State filed a partial transcript of the deposition of

Phoebe Mulligan, a social worker who had conducted a forensic psychological evaluation of MR.

During this deposition, the State’s counsel asked Mulligan if the 2000 incident caused MR’s

anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder. Mulligan responded that she did not know. Counsel also

asked Mulligan if the 2000 incident had caused MR’s depression, eating disorder, or substance

abuse. Mulligan responded that it did not.

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No. 56781-4-II

       MR responded that the common law discovery rule applied to the incidents that occurred

after she turned 18 and that RCW 4.16.340, the childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations,

applied to the incident that occurred when she was 17 and to any claim or cause of action “where

the gravamen of the action” was the childhood sexual abuse. Id. at 228. Among the several exhibits

that MR filed in support of her opposition to summary judgment was a declaration from Mulligan.

       Mulligan disputed the State’s characterization of her deposition testimony as establishing

that the 2000 incident was not a proximate cause of any damages or injuries because Mulligan was

unable to say that the 2000 “grooming behavior” was the cause of any specific harm. Id. at 197.

       Mulligan stated that when a child or young person is exposed to “a prolonged period of

adverse traumatic events, in multiple forms, [they] typically react negatively to the entire

prolonged period of adverse traumatic events.” Id. at 198. They also perceive that “all trauma-

producing events are . . . one continuous negative experience.” Id. Mulligan further stated that it

was “generally understood in mental health that the negative effects of trauma-producing events

are cumulative” and that “each event contribut[es] additional harm or damage.” Id. at 198-99. She

asserted that to understand the impact of the sexual abuse on MR, all of the events, including “the

grooming that eventually allowed the sexual abuse to materialize” must be considered.” Id. at 199.

       Mulligan then opined that MR was more probably than not “significantly impacted by [the]

four continuous years of sexual abuse, including the sexual abuse when she was seventeen years

old.” Id. at 200. She further opined that no single incident caused the damages, and that “[i]t is not

possible to parse out which specific trauma-producing events caused which specific ailment that

M.R. now suffers from.” Id.

                                                  7
No. 56781-4-II

        The trial court denied the State’s summary judgment motion after concluding that RCW

4.16.340 applied to all claims because all of the claims were based on “a series of events by the

same alleged perpetrator” that began before MR was 18 and the expert witnesses had stated that it

was “impossible to segregate the harm.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. at 36. The court stated that because

this was “a continuous series of events,” it was “prudent to apply the childhood sex abuse statute

of limitations to the events.” Id. But the court noted that if the childhood sex abuse statute did not

apply, it would “be ruling the other way” because MR did not establish the reasonable diligence

that was required under the common law discovery rule. Id. at 37.

                                  IV.         DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

        The trial court granted the State’s subsequent request for certification of the summary

judgment order for immediate review under RAP 2.3(b)(4). Our commissioner granted the motion

for discretionary review of the statute of limitations issue under RAP 2.3(b)(4), which permits

review of the controlling question of law certified by the trial court.

                                               ANALYSIS

                                         I.      RCW 4.16.340

        The issue the commissioner accepted for discretionary review is whether RCW 4.16.340’s

statute of limitations applies to MR’s claims based on allegations of adult sexual abuse when these

acts are part of a continuing pattern of abuse that started when she was under 18. There is no case

law addressing the application of RCW 4.16.340 when some of the acts of sexual abuse occurred

when the plaintiff was under 18 and other acts occurred after the plaintiff turned 18. Thus, this

issue is an issue of first impression.

                                                    8
No. 56781-4-II

        The State argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that RCW 4.16.340’s statute

of limitations applied to all of MR’s claims. They contend that the plain language of RCW 4.16.340

establishes that the child sexual abuse statute of limitations applies only to acts that occur before

the plaintiff turns 18 even if the later “abuse was a continuation of sexual abuse that began when

[the plaintiff] was a minor.” State’s Br. at 21.

        MR argues that the plain language of RCW 4.16.340 does not limit the application of the

statute to claims for acts that occurred when the plaintiff was under 18. MR contends that “[t]he

only limitation [the statute] imposes is that the ‘injury’ for which recovery is sought must be caused

by childhood sexual abuse” and, apparently, that “Butler’s subsequent, continuing sexual abuse

after she turned 18” amounts to an “injury” caused by childhood sexual abuse. Br. of Resp’t at 2

(emphasis omitted), 35.

        We agree with the State.

A.      LEGAL PRINCIPLES

        The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law that this court reviews de novo. Dep’t of

Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Our goal when

interpreting a statute is to “ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent.” Id. If the meaning of

the statute is plain on its face, we “must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of

legislative intent.” Id. at 9-10. We discern a statute’s plain meaning from the ordinary meaning of

the language in the context of related statutory provisions, the entire statute, and related statutes.

Id. at 9-12.

                                                   9
No. 56781-4-II

       If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation after reviewing the

plain meaning, it is ambiguous. Id. at 12. If a statute is ambiguous, this court may “resort to aids

[of] construction, including legislative history.” Id.

B.     CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS

       RCW 4.16.340 establishes the statute of limitations for claims based on acts of childhood

sexual abuse. The statute provides:

               (1) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by
       any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood
       sexual abuse shall be commenced within the later of the following periods:
               (a) Within three years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or
       condition;
               (b) Within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably
       should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act; or
               (c) Within three years of the time the victim discovered that the act caused
       the injury for which the claim is brought:
               PROVIDED, That the time limit for commencement of an action under this
       section is tolled for a child until the child reaches the age of eighteen years.

              (2) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual
       abuse or exploitation incidents caused the injury complained of, but may compute
       the date of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same
       perpetrator which is part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse or
       exploitation.

       ....

              (4) For purposes of this section, “child” means a person under the age of
       eighteen years.

               (5) As used in this section, “childhood sexual abuse” means any act
       committed by the defendant against a complainant who was less than eighteen years
       of age at the time of the act and which act would have been a violation of chapter
       9A.44 RCW or RCW 9.68A.040 or prior laws of similar effect at the time the act
       was committed.

RCW 4.16.340.

                                                  10
No. 56781-4-II

       As part of its most recent amendment to RCW 4.16.340 in 1991, which added subsection

(1)(c) to the statute, the legislature made the following intent findings:

               The legislature finds that:
               (1) Childhood sexual abuse is a pervasive problem that affects the safety
       and well-being of many of our citizens.
               (2) Childhood sexual abuse is a traumatic experience for the victim causing
       long-lasting damage.
               (3) The victim of childhood sexual abuse may repress the memory of the
       abuse or be unable to connect the abuse to any injury until after the statute of
       limitations has run.
               (4) The victim of childhood sexual abuse may be unable to understand or
       make the connection between childhood sexual abuse and emotional harm or
       damage until many years after the abuse occurs.
               (5) Even though victims may be aware of injuries related to the childhood
       sexual abuse, more serious injuries may be discovered many years later.
               (6) The legislature enacted RCW 4.16.340 to clarify the application of the
       discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases. At that time the legislature intended
       to reverse the Washington supreme court decision in Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d
       72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986).
               It is still the legislature’s intention that Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d 72, 727
       P.2d 226 (1986) be reversed, as well as the line of cases that state that discovery of
       any injury whatsoever caused by an act of childhood sexual abuse commences the
       statute of limitations. The legislature intends that the earlier discovery of less
       serious injuries should not affect the statute of limitations for injuries that are
       discovered later.

LAWS OF 1991, Ch. 212 § 1.

C.     ANALYSIS

       RCW 4.16.340(1) states that it applies to “injur[ies] suffered as a result of childhood sexual

abuse.” The statute defines “childhood sexual abuse” as “any act committed by the defendant

against a complainant who was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the act.” RCW

4.16.340(5). This language shows that the sexual abuse at issue must be an “act” committed against

a plaintiff before the plaintiff turned 18. Nothing in this language suggests that the statute also

applies to any acts that occurred after the plaintiff reaches the age of 18.

                                                  11
No. 56781-4-II

       RCW 4.16.340(1) permits a plaintiff to seek relief for all injuries that are the result of an

act of childhood sexual abuse, regardless of when those injuries occurred. But this does not extend

the statute of limitation on claims arising from later acts of sexual abuse that occurred when the

plaintiff was an adult.

       MR contends that “[t]he only limitation [the statute] imposes is that the ‘injury’ for which

recovery is sought must be caused by childhood sexual abuse” and that “Butler’s sexual abuse of

M.R. after she turned 18” qualifies as an “injury” caused by the childhood sexual abuse because

the 2000 incident facilitated the later abuse. Br. of Resp’t at 2 (emphasis omitted), 36. But even

though an act of grooming may facilitate later abusive acts, the grooming does not cause the

subsequent abusive act. The later act is an independent intentional act. Accordingly, this argument

is not persuasive.

       MR also filed a statement of additional authorities (SAA) referring this court to Wolf v.

State, ___ Wn.3d ___, 534 P.3d 822 (2023). MR asserts that Wolf demonstrates that “recoverable

injuries under RCW 4.16.340 can have multiple causes,” and argues that Butler’s “abuse” and

“conduct” in 2000 “caused his continuing sexual abuse of [MR] past age 18.” SAA at 1. But as we

discuss above, MR’s assertion that the 2000 abuse caused the later abuse is not persuasive. And

Wolf is not helpful here because it does not address a continuing course of conduct occurring over

a time period during which the plaintiff was both a minor and an adult.

       The only part of RCW 4.16.340 that could potentially be read to extend the statute to acts

of sexual abuse committed against the plaintiff after the plaintiff turned 18 is subsection (2). As

stated above, that subsection provides:

       The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse or
       exploitation incidents caused the injury complained of, but may compute the date

                                                12
No. 56781-4-II

         of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same perpetrator which
         is part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse or exploitation.

RCW 4.16.340(2).

         Although this subsection acknowledges that sexual abuse can occur as a series of acts

taking place over a period of time, it addresses how to compute the date of discovery under such

circumstances. It does not state that every act that occurs during the course of the common scheme

or plan of sexual abuse that occurs after the plaintiff turns 18 qualifies as an act of childhood sexual

abuse.

         Had the legislature intended this result, it could have used similar language regarding an

ongoing “common scheme or plan of sexual abuse or exploitation” in its definition of “childhood

sexual abuse” rather than limiting the meaning of that term to “any act committed by the defendant

against a complainant who was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the act.” RCW

4.16.340(2), (5) (emphasis added).2 The legislature certainly knew how to use language that would

encompass multiple acts in a common scheme or plan, but it chose not to do so when defining the

scope of “childhood sexual abuse” to which the more generous statute of limitations applies.

         The conclusion that RCW 4.16.340 does not apply to acts committed after the plaintiff

turns 18 that occur during the course of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse is also consistent

with the legislature’s 1991 intent statement. The intent statement is specific to childhood sexual

abuse; it does not mention the inclusion of any acts that might occur as part of a common scheme

or plan of sexual abuse or exploitation that continues into adulthood. This suggests that the

2
 There are no cases applying this subsection in the context of continuing sexual abuse that took
place over a span of time during which the plaintiff was both under and over 18 years of age.

                                                  13
No. 56781-4-II

legislature did not intend the special statute of limitations to apply outside of the context of acts

committed while the plaintiff was under 18.

       Additionally, the legislature’s intent statement demonstrates that RCW 4.16.340 was

intended to address the risks that a young person may not understand that they were abused or that

a young person would not be able to connect a specific act of abuse to the resulting injury. These

risks diminish as the person ages. And in enacting RCW 4.16.340, the legislature made a policy

decision to draw the line regarding when this risk was sufficiently reduced to justify imposing the

adult statute of limitations at 18 years of age. Interpreting RCW 4.16.340 to apply to acts that

occurred when the plaintiff was 18 or older usurps the legislature’s policy decision.

       We hold that the plain language of RCW 4.16.340 demonstrates that the childhood sexual

abuse statute of limitations applies only to claims based on acts of childhood sexual abuse

occurring before the plaintiff turns 18.3 Accordingly, the trial court erred when it concluded that

RCW 4.16.340’s statute of limitations applied to the claims arising out of the alleged acts of abuse

that occurred after MR turned 18.

       We reverse the summary judgment order, and remand for further proceedings.

                                    II.     ADDITIONAL ISSUES

       In addition to the statute of limitations issue addressed above, the State argues that (1) the

common law discovery rule does not apply to MR’s claims based on the alleged acts that occurred

after she turned 18 because she failed to make further diligent inquiry to ascertain the scope of the

3
 That is not to say that MR cannot argue to the jury that she is entitled to all damages proximately
caused by the act that occurred before she turned 18. And this proximate cause inquiry must be
understood in the context of the entire course of conduct, including those incidents that occurred
after MR turned 18.

                                                 14
No. 56781-4-II

actual harm, and (2) MR’s remaining claim of child sexual abuse fails because she fails to establish

causation. We do not reach these issues.

        Our commissioner granted discretionary review of the issue certified by the trial court

regarding whether the statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.340 applied to all of MR’s allegations of

sexual abuse under RAP 2.3(b)(4). The State’s additional arguments fall outside the order granting

discretionary review. Because the commissioner did not grant discretionary review on any

additional issues, we do not reach them. RAP 2.3(e); Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 159

Wn. App. 939, 959 n.7, 247 P.3d 18 (2011) (holding that the appellate court may specify the issue

or issues as to which discretionary review is granted).

        We reverse the summary judgment order and remand to the trial court for further

proceedings.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                     CRUSER, J.
 We concur:

 GLASGOW, C.J.

 PRICE, J.

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