Court Opinion

ID: 9730874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:26:54.022861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:10.349706
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
concurring.
When the legislature amended IC 35-1-47-2 concerning appeals by the state in criminal actions it apparently followed the lead of State v. Tindell (1980), Ind., 399 N.E.2d 746. Unfortunately in doing so it failed to recognize the subjective nature of the court’s evaluation when it decided that “[t]he ultimate effect of this order [to suppress] is to preclude further prosecution.”
*585Obviously, and as appellant before us argues, granting the motion to suppress does not legally preclude the state from proceeding with the prosecution, although without the suppressed evidence it may have virtually no chance to prosecute successfully.
On the other hand, it clearly appears to have not been the legislature’s intent under subparagraph (5) of the statute to permit appeals by the state of any suppression order with the result that when the state loses an appeal it may decide to continue the prosecution anyway on the evidence still available.
Accordingly, I believe we must accept the state’s assertion in taking such an appeal that the ultimate effect of the order of suppression is to prevent further prosecution. The state is then entitled to the appeal. The formal assertion by the state, however, should constitute a judicial admission for purposes of the prosecution in question and if the appeal is lost the state should then be precluded or estopped from further prosecution in the cause.
On this basis I concur with the majority.