Court Opinion

ID: 7818784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:46:16.111591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:40.772535
License: Public Domain

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice, dissenting. I do not agree that the preponderance of the testimony was on the side of the appellee; to the contrary, because of the inconsistencies and conflicts in the testimony of appellee McCarty and his witness, T. H. Cockrell, I consider a preponderance of the creditable evidence to preponderate in favor of appellant. The question is whether the notice was delivered to McCarty on October 6 or October 7, 1969. Mr. McCarty was very positive that Mr. Slaten talked to him on October 7 at the car lot on Main Street — not the 6th — and he testified that he told Slaten when apprised that his principal did not want to buy the lot “Mr. Slaten, how can you do that? I’ve lost my renter and you agreed to buy the lot. How can you do that? On top of that your time has expired. Your 30 days was up Saturday”.1 He could not remember what he did on the 6th, “I don’t know. If I could recall it, I would tell you but I simply do not have that much recall.” McCarty also said that Slaten did not ask for an extension on the 7 th, which would seem a logical thing for Slaten to do, if indeed the notice was being delivered a day late. Appellee testified that the delivery of the no dee was made in the midafternoon, “I met Mr. Slaten coming out [from appellee’s office] and he said, ‘I left a paper on your desk.’ ”. He stated that he talked with Slaten for about five minutes. Subsequently however, he testified that when he went over to the car lot, Slaten was driving off. Also, during his testimony on cross-examination appellee stated he didn’t remember testifying that he told Slaten “Anyway your 30 days was up Saturday”, though the statement had been made on direct examination. Finally, McCarty testified that the notice was delivered to his Main Street lot, a fact subsequently disputed by the testimony of his employee, T. H. Cockrell. Cockrell testified that, at the time in question (6th and 7th of October), he worked on a car lot located on Highway 65, which was also owned by McCarty. He said that the letter for McCarty (giving notice) was brought to him at this location in the morning, and he gave it to McCarty that afternoon. Cockrell testified that the letter was not delivered to the Main Street lot but rather at the car lot on the highway; in fact, he stated that McCarty did not even operate a lot on Main Street at that time. Cockrell reiterated over and over that the notice was not delivered to the Main Street address. As stated, these inconsistencies and contradictions, in my view, clearly destroy the value of the testimony offered on behalf of appellee for they establish that the memories of McCarty and Cockrell, to say the least, cannot be depended upon. Despite the provision in the contract giving appellant the right to withdraw his offer and have his $5,000 refunded on October 6, McCarty insisted that this was not actually the agreement; that the purpose of the October 6 date was simply to permit appellant’s attorney to examine the abstract. He stoutly contended that the agreement was for an absolute sale, this despite the fact that he has been in business for 40 years, and was aware that the provision was contained in the agreement. If he held such a belief, it would logically appear that appellee would have instituted suit against appellant for specific performance; instead of that, he was satisfied to take the $5,000. Of course, the fact that equity abhors a forfeiture is so well recognized as to really need no citation of authority. The general view is set out in 50 C.J.S. Equity § 57 p. 895: “Both because penalties and forfeitures are usually harsh and oppressive, and because ordinarily they can be enforced at law, courts of equity generally refuse to aid in their enforcement, even though the case may be one in which no equitable relief would be given to the defaulting party against the forfeiture. This has been at times declared to be an absolute and inflexible rule without any exceptions. Other cases have stated the rule with some qualification, indicating a strong leaning against, and a reluctance to enforce, a forfeiture but still not denying that it might be done in extreme cases where the remedy at law was plainly inadequate, or where the right is so clear as to permit no denial, although, as has been pointed out in some instances, and as appears on examination of the circumstances involved, frequently authorities indicating that a court of equity recognizes the right to enforce a forfeiture do not mean that the enforcement will be affirmatively decreed in such a court, but merely that the court will not lend its aid in such cases to relieve against enforcement.” Of course, we have numerous cases to the same effect. To summarize, I think, for the reasons stated, that the weight of the evidence is on the side of appellant. Be that as it may, we certainly have a hotly contested issue — and, even under appellee’s theory, appellant could not have been more than a day late. The right to a forfeiture is certainly not, in this case, “So clear as to permit no denial”, and I would accordingly reverse the decree and find for appellant. Byrd, J., joins in this dissent.  It is not clear why the witness said the time was up on Saturday, which was October 4, since neither side presently contends other than that the date was the 6th or the 7th.