Court Opinion

ID: 9729574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:43:09.547624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.727909
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The State’s final instruction No. 3, approved and given by the court, stated, “There is a presumption in the law that all persons are sane and intend the reasonable, foreseeable consequences of their acts.” A reasonable juror would understand this instruction to mean that although the facts do not warrant a logical inference or deduction of intent, the law supplies a presumption of intent that is every bit as good as a logical inference or deduction. That instruction on its face unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof on the element of intent from the State to the defendant. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). However, this obvious infirmity in an identical instruction was deemed rehabilitated when considered along with another instruction on intent, also present in this case, and overwhelming evidence of intent. Darby v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1049. I dissented on the point in that case. I remain convinced that the infirmity is not cured when considered along with that other instruction, which is quoted in Darby and which was also given by the trial court in this case. Furthermore, unlike the situation in Darby, the evidence of Corbin’s intent to kill is not overwhelming.