Court Opinion

ID: 9949085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 19:03:00.940446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:36.748913
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 P. v. Villery CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B323185

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. TA060012)
           v.

 HENRY LOYD VILLERY,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Reversed.

     Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                    ——————————
      Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, we
review this appeal from an order denying a petition for
resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170, recently
recodified as Penal Code section 1172.1.1 We reverse.
                         BACKGROUND
       On August 16, 2001, the People charged appellant by
amended information with two counts of attempted willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder in violation of sections 664
and 187, subdivision (a); one count of shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle in violation of section 246; two counts of
discharging a firearm with gross negligence in violation of section
246.3; and one count of first degree burglary in violation of
section 459. The amended information also alleged, as to several
of the counts, that appellant personally used a firearm,
personally discharged a firearm, and inflicted great bodily injury
within the meaning of sections 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and
(d); section 12022, subdivision (a)(1); and 12022.7, subdivision (a).
       On August 27, 2001, Villery entered a plea of no contest to
one count of attempted murder and to the allegation that he
personally discharged a firearm in connection with the attempted
murder. He also pled no contest to first degree burglary and to
the allegation that he personally used a firearm in connection
with the first degree burglary. Based on the plea, the trial court
found appellant guilty of the substantive counts and found the
enhancement allegations true. The trial court sentenced Villery
to 31 years four months in prison: the upper term of nine years
for the attempted murder plus 20 years for the section 12022.53,

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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subdivision (c) enhancement; one-third the mid-term (16 months)
consecutive for the burglary plus one year for the section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1) enhancement. The remaining counts and
allegations were dismissed.
       On April 10, 2017, the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) wrote to the court and advised it that the
one-year term imposed for the firearm enhancement attached to
the first degree burglary count should have been one-third the
middle term of imprisonment, that is, four months. On April 28,
2017, in response to CDCR’s letter, the trial court amended the
sentencing minute order nunc pro tunc to reduce the one-year
term for the enhancement on the burglary to four months. The
court ordered preparation of an amended abstract, but the record
does not show that an amended abstract was ever filed.
       In July 2021, Villery was allowed to review his central
prison file in preparation for a parole hearing and he discovered
two letters concerning error in his sentencing. In August 2021,
he contacted Calipatria Prison Correctional Case Records and
asked if his sentence had been corrected. According to Villery,
they told him it had not been corrected.
       In September 2021, Villery contracted a serious case of
COVID and was hospitalized. He returned to his usual prison
housing in October 2021. That same month his housing unit was
placed on medical quarantine due to a COVID outbreak. The
quarantine was lifted on December 10, 2021.
       On January 10, 2022, Villery moved the trial court to
correct his sentence, explaining that the prison had informed him
it did not have a record of the sentence ever being corrected.

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       On July 22, 2022, without appointing counsel the trial
court considered the motion in Villery’s absence and noted the
sentence had been previously corrected and a certified copy of the
amended abstract had been sent to CDCR. It denied the motion
for resentencing and ordered the clerk to “resend” the amended
abstract of judgment to CDCR. Instead, on August 19, 2022, the
clerk issued a first “amended” abstract of judgment reflecting the
corrected sentence. On August 5, 2022, Villery filed a timely
notice of appeal from the denial of his request for resentencing.
       We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. On
March 29, 2023, counsel filed a no-issue brief pursuant to People
v. Delgadillo. Counsel advised us she had told appellant he may
file his own supplemental brief within 30 days. Counsel sent
appellant transcripts of the record on appeal as well as a copy of
the brief.
       On March 30, 2023, this court sent appellant a notice that a
brief raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised
appellant he had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental
brief or letter stating any grounds for appeal he believes we
should consider. We also advised appellant that if he did not file
a supplemental brief, the appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
       Appellant filed a supplemental brief. He contends CDCR
never received the original amended abstract from April 28, 2017.
Appellant acknowledges that, in response to his motion, the court
issued an amended abstract correcting the sentencing error.
Nevertheless, appellant contends the amended abstract is void
because nunc pro tunc orders cannot be used to correct judicial
error.

                                4
       We asked appellant’s counsel and the Attorney General to
supply supplemental briefing on whether the use of a nunc pro
tunc order in this circumstance was proper. We have received
and reviewed counsel’s briefing.
       Villery is correct that the nunc pro tunc order in this case is
void. “[C]ourts have inherent authority to correct clerical errors
in a sentence at any time. . . . This nunc pro tunc authority,
however, is limited to true clerical errors.” (People v. Kim (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 117, 123–124.) The distinction between clerical
error and judicial error is “ ‘ “whether the error was made in
rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment
rendered.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 124; Sannmann v. Department of Justice
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 676, 683.) When a trial court issues a nunc
pro tunc order changing a sentence that was the result of judicial
error, the order is void “because it was an act in excess of
jurisdiction.” (Kim, at p. 124.)
       The trial court’s original act of “correcting” the sentence by
a nunc pro tunc order was void. Thus, no effective action has
been taken on CDCR’s recommendation. We note that in 2019,
when the trial court received the CDCR letter, the court could
only correct the original sentence pursuant to the provisions of
former section 1170.2 That section requires that when acting on
a request by CDCR to recall and correct a sentence, the trial
court must set a hearing, give notice to the defendant, and

2     Effective January 1, 2022, the recall and resentencing
provisions of former section 1170 were revised and moved to
former section 1170.03. (Stats. 2021, ch.719, § 3.1.) Effective
June 30, 2022, the provisions of former section 1170.03 were
revised and renumbered as section 1172.1. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 9.)

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appoint counsel on defendant’s behalf. It also gives the
resentencing court jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the
sentence, not just the portion subject to recall. (Former §§ 1170,
subd. (d)(1), 1170.03, subd. (a)(1), (7) & (8).) The trial court did
none of this.
       The trial court’s attempt to correct Villery’s sentence shows
the trial court recognized that the sentence should have been
corrected. Accordingly, we remand this matter for a resentencing
hearing pursuant to section 1172.1. The provisions of this section
apply “regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed
after a trial or a plea agreement.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3).)
       Appellant’s second contention is that he never admitted
the enhancement allegations. Instead he stated “no contest”
when the trial court asked him whether he admitted or denied
the allegations. This, he contends, renders his sentence
unauthorized by law.
       Appellant did not raise this issue in the trial court and we
decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. Were we to do
so, we would reject the contention. In California the legal effect
of a no contest plea is the “same as that of a plea of guilty for all
purposes.” (§ 1016; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229,
1374–1375.)

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                          DISPOSITION
      The order is reversed and this matter is remanded for a
resentencing hearing in accordance with section 1172.1.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             WILEY, J.

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