Court Opinion

ID: 9444746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:10:37.203416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:59.345187
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, District Judge
(dissenting).
Although the stipulation in Sec. 2(b) of the bill of lading does not specifically mention who shall file written notice of claim it is apparent such must be done by the claimant or “one acting in his behalf” ;1 and, to receive the writing in question as filed on the appellant’s behalf is absolute fiction. Understandably, the courts have been liberal in searching for “substantial compliance”. Nonetheless, the written notice, although permissibly informal in character, must be lodged by the holder of the claim. The instant written acknowledgment in no way pretended to be a filed claim. This defect could be overlooked if the potential claimant had authored the writing thus placing with the carrier a permanent record of a definite claim, although future. However, a liberal construction of the writing in question cannot cure the appellant’s omission.
The only visible support for the majority ruling is the Hopper case, a maverick decision both on its facts and law.2 Although the Hopper decision creates a patent conflict in the law at the court of appeals level,3 the unbroken line of acceptable authority denies appellant’s right to now sue.4 As pointedly recognized in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackie, *642the fact the carrier has actual knowledge of the loss is totally irrelevant; the aggrieved. party must make written claim within the stipulated time.5
Generally, the equities are with the appellant; however, they are not such as to justify a “making of poor law”. Appellant’s own inaction leaves much to be desired. In absolute affront to the 9 month limitation contained in the bill of lading, appellant failed to file in his own behalf any semblance of a written claim for damages until the institution of this court action some 19 months after the loss and after the time he was apprised of his claim.
A clearly defined and long recognized legal principle, a standing bulwark against claimant discrimination, should not be vitiated by the single stroke of a judicial pen merely because certain harshness of fact inheres in a lone case.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

. See Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Virginian Ry. Co., 1944, 126 W.Va. 626, 29 S.E.2d 471, 474; and, Delphi Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 6 Cir., 1951, 188 F.2d 343, 345.

. Hopper Paper Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 7 Cir., 1949, 178 F.2d 179.

. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 1 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 675; and, Delphi Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., footnote 1, supra. Cf. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackie, 9 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 641.

. Ibid. Also, cf. Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 1916, 241 U.S. 190, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948.

. Footnote 3, supra, 195 F.2d at page 642.