Court Opinion

ID: 9892988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 18:03:45.740776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:55.224391
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/25/23 P. v. Miller CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A165690
 v.
 CORT PATTERSON MILLER,                                                 (Mendocino County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 21CR01615)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Cort Miller left threatening voicemails for his ex-girlfriend,
J.B., after being served with an expired temporary restraining order (TRO)
limiting his contact with her and their young son. A jury convicted Miller of
felony counts of criminal threats and possession of a firearm by a felon and a
misdemeanor count of violating a domestic violence restraining order. The
trial court sentenced him to two years in prison.
         On appeal, Miller claims that the criminal-threats conviction must be
reversed because the jury was not instructed on the lesser included offense of
attempted criminal threats. He also claims, and the Attorney General
concedes, that the conviction for violating a domestic violence restraining
order cannot stand because the TRO had expired. Finally, Miller raises

                                                               1
claims related to sentencing under Penal Code section 654, which prohibits
multiple punishments for the same conduct.1
      We reject Miller’s claim of instructional error, but we agree with the
parties that insufficient evidence supports the conviction for violating a
domestic violence restraining order. As a result, we need not reach Miller’s
sentencing claims. We therefore reverse the misdemeanor conviction,
remand for resentencing, and otherwise affirm.
                                    I.
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                               BACKGROUND
      Miller and J.B. dated for about six years, from 2015 to February 2021.
They lived in Covelo, a small town “[w]here everyone knows everyone.” Their
son was born in 2017, and J.B. also had a teenage daughter. J.B. testified
that her relationship with Miller was “toxic” from the beginning, and he
became “very abusive” toward her.
      At the time of the charged incident in May 2021, a tribal court was
handling a child visitation dispute between Miller and J.B. On April 28, J.B.
obtained a TRO against Miller from the tribal court, which barred him from
all contact with her and their son except as necessary for court-ordered
visitation. The TRO, which was introduced into evidence, stated it expired at
the end of a hearing scheduled for May 5.
      On the morning of May 7, 2021, while J.B. was at a local store with her
daughter, the tribal police notified J.B. that they had served the TRO on
Miller. J.B. testified that she “felt better and safe.” Twenty to thirty minutes
later, however, around 10:00 a.m., Miller called her cell phone as she was
leaving the store and left a voicemail message when she did not answer. In

      1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                       2
the message, which was played for the jury, Miller stated: “Alright, ya dumb
fat bitch[,] watch every fucking person[,] man[,] anybody involved in your
fucking family[, J.B.], me and them are going to personally talk when I see
them from now on, you wanna serve me paperwork like that, you dumb cunt?
Alright. All’s fair in love and war. And my—I play a little different. I’ll give
you a reason to have one of those. I put that on baby’s life.”
      J.B. testified that after hearing the voicemail, she “didn’t feel safe,
especially being out with [her] daughter at the store.” As a result, J.B.
“immediately went to the tribal police office” to report that Miller had
violated the TRO. As she was arriving there, Miller called her again and left
another voicemail message. In that message, which was also played for the
jury, Miller stated: “I hope you never go into town cause these bitches are
gonna beat the shit out of you[,] bitch. I can’t wait. It’s what you get.
Wanna take my kid away from me, bitch? This town is unsafe for you, plain
and simple. You wanna try and pull some stupid ass hoe games like you said
you’d never play? But that’s what you’re playing right now, [J.B.]. Then fine
then, we can play stupid ass hoe games too. And I’ll show you what it’s like
to play on my side of the fence. You are not safe in this fucking town. I put
money up.”
      Around 10:30 a.m., the tribal police reported the TRO violation to the
Mendocino County Sheriff’s Department. Later that afternoon, a sheriff’s
deputy arrived at J.B.’s home to interview her. The deputy soon left,
however, because another officer had located Miller near J.B.’s home.
      The sheriff’s deputy proceeded to Miller’s location. Miller had been
pulled over while driving a car with two other passengers. Although Miller
claimed the car was his, it was not registered to him. As a result, he was
arrested, and the car was towed. Paperwork related to the tribal court case

                                        3
was on the driver’s seat and a loaded shotgun was in the trunk.2 The
shotgun was not registered to any of the car’s occupants. Miller, who had a
prior felony conviction, denied the firearm was his.
      In November 2021, Miller was charged with felony counts of criminal
threats and possession of a firearm by a felon and a misdemeanor count of
violating a domestic violence order.3 The jury convicted him of all three
counts. In July 2022, the trial court sentenced him to two years in prison,
composed of the lower term of 16 months for criminal threats, a consecutive
term of 8 months for unlawful possession of a firearm, and a concurrent one-
year term for the misdemeanor.
                                      II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      A.    The Trial Court Did Not Have a Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct the
            Jury on Attempted Criminal Threats.
      Miller claims the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on
attempted criminal threats, a lesser included offense of criminal threats. We
are not persuaded.
      We independently review claims of instructional error. (People v.
Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 295.) Even where, as here, a defendant does
not request an instruction on a lesser included offense, a trial court must give

      2 A photograph of a packet of papers on the driver’s seat was admitted

into evidence. The photograph showed only the first page, a notice to appear
at a May 25, 2021 hearing, and the packet itself was excluded for lack of
foundation.
      3 The charges were brought under sections 422 (criminal threats),

29800, subdivision (a)(1) (unlawful firearm possession), and 273.6,
subdivision (a) (violation of domestic violence restraining order). Miller was
originally charged with a second count of violating a domestic violence
restraining order based on a separate incident, but that count was later
dismissed at the prosecution’s request.

                                       4
the instruction “ ‘ “ ‘when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of
the elements of the charged offense were present.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “For the duty
to instruct on a lesser included offense to arise, there must be ‘ “substantial
evidence” ’ ” to support the lesser offense. (People v. Millbrook (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.) “In this context, substantial evidence is
evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude ‘ “that the lesser
offense, but not the greater, was committed.” ’ ” (People v. Medina (2007)
41 Cal.4th 685, 700.) In deciding whether substantial evidence of a lesser
included offense exists, we do “ ‘not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, a
task for the jury’ ” (Millbrook, at p. 1137), or rely on speculation. (People v.
Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1169.)
      The elements of criminal threats under section 422 are: “(1) that the
defendant ‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which [would] result in
death or great bodily injury to another person,’ (2) that the defendant made
the threat ‘with the specific intent that the statement . . . [was] to be taken as
a threat, even if there [was] no intent of actually carrying it out,’ (3) that the
threat—which may be ‘made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic
communication device’—was ‘on its face and under the circumstances in
which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an
immediate prospect of execution of the threat,’ (4) that the threat actually
caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for [their] own safety or
for [their] immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the threatened person’s
fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the circumstances.” (People v. Toledo (2001)
26 Cal.4th 221, 227–228.)
      Attempted criminal threats is a lesser included offense of criminal
threats. (People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 514.) The lesser offense

                                         5
“encompasses situations where a defendant intends to commit a criminal
threat ‘but is thwarted from completing the crime by some fortuity or
unanticipated event.’ ” (Id. at p. 515.) One example is when a defendant,
“ ‘acting with the requisite intent, makes a sufficient threat that is received
and understood by the threatened person, but, for whatever reason, the
threat does not actually cause the threatened person to be in sustained fear
for [their] safety even though, under the circumstances, that person
reasonably could have been placed in such fear.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Miller claims that “[t]here was substantial evidence from which the
jury could have found that [J.B.] did not suffer actual or reasonable
‘sustained fear,’ ” meaning it could have convicted him of only attempted
criminal threats. He emphasizes that he did not make the threats in person,
and J.B. went to the police station right after receiving the first one; that
there was no evidence he was violent toward her after they broke up; and
that she voluntarily had contact with him after the incident. Miller also
argues that J.B.’s credibility was compromised in various respects.
      Miller fails to identify substantial evidence that he committed only
attempted criminal threats. To begin with, one element of attempted
criminal threats is that “the intended threat under the circumstances was
sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.” (People v.
Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525.) Thus, to the extent Miller claims that
J.B. could not have reasonably experienced sustained fear, that would
establish that he did not commit a crime at all, not that he was guilty of only
the lesser included offense.
      Miller’s arguments about J.B.’s credibility are also unavailing. (See
People v. Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137.) Of course, if there
was substantial evidence that Miller committed criminal threats, there was

                                        6
substantial evidence that he committed attempted criminal threats. (See
People v. Ngo (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 126, 156 [“ ‘ “as an abstract proposition,
every completed crime necessarily involves an attempt to commit it” ’ ”].) But
when determining whether an instruction on a lesser included offense is
required, the question is not whether the jury could have disregarded
evidence establishing the greater offense’s additional elements. Here, that
means that the fact that the jury could have disbelieved J.B.’s testimony that
she was actually afraid does not establish that an instruction on attempted
criminal threats was required.
      Rather, the relevant question is whether there was substantial
evidence that even though J.B. could have reasonably felt sustained fear as a
result of a threat, she was not actually afraid. J.B. unequivocally testified
that she felt fear upon hearing the first voicemail and still feared Miller at
the time of trial. Even if there was other evidence that might call the
credibility of this testimony into question and entitle the jury to disregard it,
there was no substantial evidence that she was not afraid. Therefore, this
claim fails.
      B.       No Substantial Evidence Supports Miller’s Conviction for
               Violating a Domestic Violence Restraining Order.
      Miller also claims that his misdemeanor conviction must be reversed
because the TRO had already expired when he was served with it. We accept
the Attorney General’s concession that insufficient evidence supports the
conviction.
      When determining whether a conviction lacks sufficient evidence, “ ‘we
review the whole record to determine whether . . . [there is] substantial
evidence to support the verdict . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying
this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

                                        7
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’ ” (People v.
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
      Section 273.6, subdivision (a), prohibits “[a]ny intentional and knowing
violation of a protective order” issued under a specified statute. Of course,
the protective order must be in effect for it to be violated. Here, although J.B.
testified that she thought another TRO issued later, the only TRO admitted
into evidence expired two days before Miller was served with it. As a result,
there was no substantial evidence that Miller violated a valid TRO, and his
misdemeanor conviction must be reversed.
                                       III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The conviction for violating a domestic violence restraining order is
reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

                                        8
                                           _________________________
                                           Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Getty, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Solano, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

People v. Miller A165690

                                       9