Court Opinion

ID: 9612335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:07:20.819462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:20.680643
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that a defendant in a criminal case may not voluntarily introduce demonstrative evidence of a physical characteristic or condition unless he also takes the stand as a witness and subjects himself to cross-examination. On the other hand, the majority specifically holds that the State can compel the defendant to present the same evidence. According to the majority, then, if the State introduces demonstrative evidence of a physical characteristic or condition, the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination are not implicated; if the defendant introduces the same evidence, his rights are not only implicated, they are waived. I respectfully dissent.
The majority reasons that the defendant must submit himself to cross-examination because this demonstrative evidence is testimonial and “a prosecutor might be expected to want to cross-examine the defendant.” With all respect to the majority, a prosecutor might be expected to want to cross-examine the defendant in every criminal trial. That desire, however, does not outweigh a defendant’s right to refuse to testify.
Courts have repeatedly held that evidence demonstrating a defendant’s physical characteristics or condition, such as voice exemplars, fingerprints, handwriting exemplars, tattoos, scars, blood, breath alcohol content, sobriety tests captured on video, and DNA results, can be compelled by the State precisely because it is not testimonial.1 Consequently, it does not *906impinge on the defendant’s right to refuse to testify.2 Such evidence does not morph into testimonial evidence just because it is introduced by the defendant instead of the State.

. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5, 7, 93 S.Ct. 764, 767, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1929-30, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (voice exemplars admissible); Gassaway v. State, 957 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 175-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (audio and visual recordings admissible); Holder v. State, 837 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref’d) (compelling defendant to model items of clothing or otherwise demonstrate his physique before jury held constitutional); Burnett v. State, 784 S.W.2d 510, 511-13 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, pet. ref'd) (requiring defendant to repeat in front of jury words purportedly uttered by robber did not violate privilege against self-incrimination); Laird v. State, 650 S.W.2d *906198, 202 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1983, pet. ref'd) (requiring defendant to smile or otherwise open his mouth to let the jury view the status of his teeth not a violation of defendant’s right against self-incrimination).

. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-65, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1831-33, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1969)(op. on reh’g) (constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects only testimonial communications).