Court Opinion

ID: 9845303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:18:46.264466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:00.826601
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority correctly cites Canon 3(A)(3) of the Judicial Code of Ethics as requiring a judge to “be patient, dignified and courteous.”1 It also correctly states that a number of courts have held that abusive and offensive language on the part of a judge in the course of his official duties will constitute a violation of the canon.2
The majority then proceeds to stand the evidence on its head by concluding that “[t]he testimony before the Board was evenly divided at best and ambiguous at worst.” (Maj.Op., p. 231) Three witnesses, Norma Bennett, Jack Dolin, and Deputy Crabtree, heard Magistrate Pauley state “this shit will stop” with reference to the procedures utilized by the sheriffs department.
A fourth witness, Yvonne Dolin, a bonds-woman, contrary to the assertion of the majority, did not say the statement was not made but stated that she had not heard it. She testified that she was not in the courtroom at all times as she had gone to the jail in order to arrange a bail bond. Not unexpectedly, Magistrate Pauley and his secretary, Nadine Withrow, testified that the phrase was not used.
I find it incredible that the majority would characterize this evidence as close. Even more incredible is the attempt to resort to dictionary sophistry to demonstrate that the word “shit” means “nonsense” or “foolishness.” (Maj.Op., pp. 231-232)3
Furthermore, independent of the profanity issue, the record clearly reveals abusive conduct toward Deputy Crabtree which even the majority opinion cannot mask. The purpose of the canon is to give recognition to the fact that judges are the personal embodiment of the judicial process and should be able to avoid quarreling with and abusing those who appear before them. To hold otherwise not only demeans the office, but casts a cloud over the impartiality and effectiveness of the administration of justice.
Finally, I do not believe that the fact the person abused in this case was a deputy sheriff somehow exculpates the magistrate. I have no quarrel with the general proposition, advanced by the majority, that a court bailiff is subject to the control and supervision of the court to which he is assigned. However, I find nothing in the law that would indicate a bailiff is not protected by Canon 3. I would affirm the *238public reprimand recommended by the Hearing Board.

. Canon 3(A)(3) of the Judicial Code of Ethics provides: "A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and control."

. Aldrich v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 58 N.Y.2d 279, 460 N.Y.S.2d 915, 447 N.E.2d 1276 (1983); Roberts v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 33 Cal.3d 739, 190 Cal.Rptr. 910, 661 P.2d 1064 (1983); Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 33 Cal.3d 359, 188 Cal.Rptr. 880, 657 P.2d 372 (1983); Matter of Frankel, 414 Mich. 1109, 323 N.W.2d 911 (1982); In Re Horan, 85 N.J. 535, 428 A.2d 911 (1981); Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d 858 (Me.1981); Shilling v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 397, 434 N.Y.S.2d 909, 415 N.E.2d 900 (1980); Matter of Seraphim, 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291; Matter of Albano, 75 N.J. 509, 384 A.2d 144 (1978); Matter of Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 267 N.W.2d 914 (1978); Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal.3d 778, 119 Cal.Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209 (1975); Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 2643, 41 L.Ed.2d 235 (1974); In Re Glickfeld, 3 Cal.3d 891, 92 Cal.Rptr. 278, 479 P.2d 638 (1971). Other jurisdictions not cited by the majority are: In Re Crowell, 379 So.2d 107 (Fla.1979); In Re Broome, 245 Ga. 227, 264 S.E.2d 656 (1980); In Re Dwyer, 223 Kan. 72, 572 P.2d 898 (1977); In Re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn.1979).

.The majority’s conclusion that *‘[t]he mischar-acterization of the word in question [by the Hearing Board] undermines the conclusions of fact and law with which we are presented, as well as the ultimate recommendation of discipline” may be a fitting epitaph for its own opinion.