Court Opinion

ID: 9367954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 17:00:31.292572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.678627
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5067     Document: 010110807205          Date Filed: 02/02/2023      Page: 1
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                              February 2, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                               Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                   Clerk of Court
  GARRICK DON THOMPSON,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                             No. 22-5067
                                                    (D.C. No. 4:21-CV-00491-GFK-CDL)
  RICK WHITTEN,                                                  (N.D. Okla.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

        Garrick Thompson, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a certificate

 of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his federal habeas

 petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as untimely. For the reasons explained below, we deny

 Thompson’s request and dismiss this matter.

        Thompson is serving a 35-year prison sentence on his Oklahoma convictions for

 assault and battery with a deadly weapon, robbery with a firearm, and first-degree

 burglary. In November 2011, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed.
 R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
        1
          We liberally construe Thompson’s pro se pleadings, but we will not act as his
 advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
Appellate Case: 22-5067      Document: 010110807205         Date Filed: 02/02/2023      Page: 2

 his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Nearly a decade after his unsuccessful

 direct appeal, Thompson sought postconviction relief in state court. Relying on McGirt v.

 Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), he argued that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to

 prosecute him because he is an enrolled member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and his

 crimes took place on the Creek Reservation. See id. at 2478 (holding Creek Reservation

 remains “Indian country” for purposes of Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, because

 Congress never disestablished it; as a result, “[o]nly the federal government, not the

 State, may prosecute Indians for major crimes committed” there). The state district court

 denied relief, and the OCCA affirmed, citing its recent precedent holding that McGirt

 does not apply retroactively on collateral review to convictions that became final before

 its announcement, like Thompson’s did. See State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d

 686, 688 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021), cert. denied, Parish v. Oklahoma, 142 S. Ct. 757

 (2022).

        Thompson then turned to federal court, filing the underlying § 2254 petition in

 November 2021 to challenge the jurisdictional basis of his convictions. The State moved

 to dismiss the petition as untimely because Thompson filed it more than one year after his

 convictions became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The district court granted the

 motion, dismissed the petition, and declined to issue a COA.

        Thompson now requests a COA from this court, seeking to challenge the district

 court’s order dismissing his federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To

 obtain a COA, Thompson must “show[], at least, that jurists of reason would find it

 debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right

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Appellate Case: 22-5067      Document: 010110807205          Date Filed: 02/02/2023      Page: 3

 and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in

 its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). If we conclude that

 reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s procedural ruling, we need not

 address the constitutional question. Id. at 485.

        Thompson argues that reasonable jurists could debate whether his petition was

 timely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes a one-

 year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. See § 2244(d)(1).

 Ordinarily, that limitations period begins to run when the state-court judgment becomes

 final “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

 review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). But AEDPA delays this start date if (1) state action created an

 unlawful impediment to filing the petition, (2) the petitioner asserts a constitutional right

 newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral

 review, or (3) the factual predicate for the claim could not previously have been

 discovered through due diligence. § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D). Here, the district court concluded

 that Thompson’s one-year clock began to run from the date of final judgment in February

 2012, when the 90-day window for seeking certiorari review at the United States

 Supreme Court expired following his direct appeal to the OCCA, and therefore lapsed

 one year later. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. In reaching this conclusion, the district court rejected

 Thompson’s suggestion that § 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D) applied to delay the limitations

 period based on either a newly recognized constitutional right or a diligently discovered

 factual predicate.

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        On appeal, Thompson again invokes § 2244(d)(1)(D), which runs the one-year

 limitations period from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

 presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” In support,

 Thompson asserts the OCCA’s August 2021 ruling in Matloff, that McGirt has no

 retroactive effect, created a new “factual predicate” under § 2244(d)(1)(D) because the

 OCCA relied on it to dispose of his request for state postconviction relief. In his view,

 “Matloff is wrong,” and he had one year from the date of the decision to challenge it.

 Aplt. Br. 8. But Thompson’s habeas petition challenges the jurisdictional basis of his

 convictions, not the OCCA’s decision in Matloff—a case unrelated to his own that had no

 legal effect on his convictions. See § 2254(a) (specifying that federal courts may entertain

 § 2254 petition “only on the ground that [petitioner] is in custody in violation of the

 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). And Thompson’s petition alleges

 just two facts that together constitute the factual predicate for his claim: (1) he is a

 member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and (2) his crimes occurred in Indian country.

 Because both these facts were available to Thompson through due diligence before his

 judgment became final, he cannot benefit from § 2244(d)(1)(D).

        Even if we liberally construe Thompson’s argument that McGirt applies

 retroactively (and Matloff erred in holding otherwise) as invoking § 2244(d)(1)(C), his

 argument fails. That provision restarts the one-year clock on “the date on which the

 constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

 has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

 cases on collateral review.” § 2244(d)(1)(C). But contrary to Thompson’s assertion,

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Appellate Case: 22-5067     Document: 010110807205          Date Filed: 02/02/2023     Page: 5

 “McGirt announced no new constitutional right”; it merely “resolved a question of

 ‘statutory interpretation,’” determining that Congress had not disestablished the Creek

 Reservation. Pacheco v. El Habti, 48 F.4th 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting McGirt,

 140 S. Ct. at 2474); see also Owens v. Whitten, No. 22-5106, 2022 WL 17972141, at *1

 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 2022) (noting this court’s recent caselaw “make[s] clear” that “the

 one-year limitations period set out in § 2244(d)(1)(A), rather than the ones set out in

 § 2244(d)(1)(C) and/or (D), applies to McGirt-based challenges to the validity of state

 convictions”).

        Thus, Thompson fails to show that reasonable jurists could debate the district

 court’s procedural ruling that his petition was time-barred. We therefore deny his COA

 request and dismiss this appeal. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. As a final matter, we grant

 Thompson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Nancy L. Moritz
                                               Circuit Judge

                                              5