Court Opinion

ID: 9677333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:49:31.415058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:55.725972
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

MILLER, Judge.
This appeal arose from a bond forfeiture. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the State, and the surety, John Burns, appealed.1 In the court of appeals, appellant raised nine points of error which the court overruled, and the judgment was affirmed. Burns v. State, 814 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991). This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review on the two grounds presented therein, to-wit: (1) “whether the court of appeals used the proper standard of review by failing to review the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant[,]” and (2) “whether a bond may be forfeited due to a principal’s failure to appear in court on a certain date absent proof of notice to the principal that he is to appear in court on that date when the principal has previously been ordered to appear at a date after the date on which the judgment nisi issued.”
On original submission, we found a substantial material fact regarding notice was presented which defeated summary judgment, and we therefore sustained appellant’s second ground for review. Alvarez & Burns v. State, at p. 883.2 In its motion for rehearing, the State presents three reasons why this Court erred in finding a substantial ma*887terial fact was presented which defeated summary judgment. The State alleges the opinion omits a material fact, omits and improperly recites the law applicable to summary judgment cases, and improperly applies the law to the facts.
In order to address the State’s contentions we must first articulate the appropriate standard of review in a summary judgment case. Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure addresses summary judgment, so we find it useful to consult decisions from our sister court on this standard. The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to provide a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved and that no genuine issue of fact remains. Gaines v. Hamman, 358 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex.1962). The issue in a summary judgment proceeding, therefore, is whether there is a genuine issue of fact in the case. Id at 562. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no such fact question and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Company, Inc, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, the court takes as true the evidence favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 548-49. Every reasonable inference from the evidence must be indulged in favor of the non-movant, and any doubts resolved in its favor. Id. at 549. See also Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.1984); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979). Hence, the applicable standard of review is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Gaines v. Hamman, 358 S.W.2d at 562.3
We now review the elements of the State’s cause of action in a bond forfeiture from which this summary judgment action arose. Bond forfeiture, although in the nature of a civil proceeding,4 is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 22.02 directs the manner of taking a forfeiture and provides in pertinent part:
The name of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door, and if the defendant does not appear within a reasonable time after such call is made, judgment shall be entered that the State of Texas recover of the defendant the amount of money in which he is bound, and of his sureties, if any, the amount of money in which they are respectively bound, which judgment shall state that the same will be made final, unless good cause be shown why the defendant did not appear.
It is well-settled that the State’s proof in a bond forfeiture proceeding consists of the bond and the judicial declaration of the forfeiture of the bond, which is the judgment nisi. Tocher v. State, 517 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). The judgment nisi is prima facie proof that the statutory requirements of Art. 22.02 have been satisfied. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to affirmatively show otherwise. Id Indeed, “[t]he court will presume that the judgment nisi was taken in accordance with the statutory requirements, unless it affirmatively appear otherwise.” Id, citing Thompson v. State, 31 Tex. 166 (1868). In moving for summary judgment in an appearance bond forfeiture case, the State must therefore establish as a matter of law that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to any of the elements of the State’s cause of action, which are proved by the bond and the judgment nisi. Deckard v. State, 615 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (panel opinion).
With this review in mind, we now address the merits of the State’s motion for rehearing which raises an issue regarding its burden of proof in this case. In its motion, the State argues inter alia that in our opinion on original submission we improperly assigned the burden of proof in a summary judgment ac*888tion on a bond forfeiture. In that opinion we stated:
Therefore, the fact issues which must be proven in a motion for summary judgment on a bond forfeiture are: (1) a valid bond executed by the surety (Article 17.08(5)); (2) failure of a defendant bound by bail to appear in a court in which his case is pending when his personal appearance is required under the Code (Article 22.01); (3) the name of the defendant shall have been called distinctly at the courthouse door (Article 22.02); and (4) no valid reason for the principal not appearing (Article 22.13).
Alvarez & Burns, at p. 881; see also Burns, 814 S.W.2d at 770. The State contends this fourth issue is not a fact which it must prove in a bond forfeiture proceeding. A plain reading of Art. 22.02, along with the Tocher decision, reveals the State is correct.
Article 22.02 directs that the defendant’s name be called “distinctly” at the courthouse door. The defendant is given a “reasonable time after such call is made” in which to appeal’. Upon his failure to do so, “judgment shall be entered” for the State on the bond forfeiture. Art. 22.02 (emphasis supplied). Thus, to be entitled to forfeiture of a bond the State need only show (1) a valid bond; (2) that the defendant’s name was distinctly called at the courthouse door; and (3) the defendant failed to appear within a reasonable time of that call. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate that the burden of proof on the second and third prongs is satisfied by the judgment nisi.
Article 22.02 further provides that this judgment will be made final unless “good cause be shown why the defendant did not appear.” This proviso operates like an affirmative defense in that the defendant admits he failed to appear but asserts he has good cause which excuses his failure to do so. This burden is appropriately placed on the defendant.
The court of appeals, relying upon Lopez v. State, 678 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, no pet.), recognized that there are only four fact issues in a motion for summary judgment on a bond forfeiture. See Burns, 814 S.W.2d at 770. Those issues, per Art. 22.02, are: whether there is a valid bond; whether the' principal’s name was called at the courthouse door; whether the principal failed to appear; and whether the principal had a valid reason for not appearing. While there are four fact issues under Art. 22.02, the State bears only the burden of proof on three of them. As the State points out in its motion for rehearing, this Court “inexplicably” stated these issues as the State’s burden of proof in our opinion on original submission. See Alvarez & Burns, at p. 881-82. We therefore sustain the State’s ground for rehearing on this burden of proof issue.
In his second ground for review in his petition, appellant contended the State failed to establish as a matter of law that the principal had notice of the court setting and “that the summary judgment evidence created a substantial and genuine issue of material fact concerning notice to the principal, thus precluding summary judgment.” On original submission we agreed with appellant and concluded “the amended affidavits of the principal’s attorney and the affidavit of the surety which present evidence that the principal did not receive notice of the setting raises (sic) material facts reflecting the contradiction and inconsistency of the principal’s lack of notice to defeat summary judgment.” Id, at p. 883. In its motion for rehearing, the State argues that we misapplied the law to the facts. The State asserts that the dispositive issue before this Court is whether the appellant, as non-movant, presented summary judgment evidence on every element of his defense, viz: his failure to appear was due to an uncontrollable circumstance pursuant to Art. 22.13, V.AC.C.P.5 We disagree with the State’s argument.
*889In spite of statements in the court of appeals’ opinion6 and this Court’s opinion on original submission,7 appellant has not raised or argued an “uncontrollable circumstance” affirmative defense under Art. 22.13. The record reveals that citation issued on April 15, 1988, on the bond forfeiture. See Art. 22.10. Appellant filed an answer8 generally-denying the allegations and providing a laundry list of defenses, including “[appellant] is entitled to be exonerated under the provisions of Article 22.13 T.C.C.P.” The State then filed its motion for summary judgment. Appellant filed his reply in response to this motion asserting “the State’s entire motion for summary judgment boils down to the allegation ... that it is entitled to summary judgment ‘as matter (sic) of law by virtue of the fact that no good cause exists for the Defendan^Principal’s failure to appear.’ ” Appellant then asserts in his response that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the State’s entitlement to summary judgment, including lack of notice to appear. Nowhere in his response (as opposed to his answer) does appellant assert he is entitled to exoneration of liability on the bond forfeiture via Art. 22.13.
In his brief in the court of appeals appellant contended, inter alia, that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a fact issue existed concerning notice to the principal to appear. Again, appellant did not argue he was entitled to exoneration pursuant to Art. 22.13.9 In his petition for discretionary review before this Court, appellant contended lack of notice was a fact issue in this case but not under Art. 22.13. Thus, the affirmative defense of an uncontrollable circumstance was not an issue before either the court of appeals or this Court, and any statements addressing that issue are dicta.
The issue presented here is whether there is a material fact issue regarding notice which would preclude summary judgment. The State presented the bond and the judgment nisi to the trial court, thus making a prima facie case for the bond forfeiture. Appellant presented evidence concerning a lack of notice to appear and providing good cause for his failure to appear. See Art. 22.02. On original submission we held the evidence raised a material fact issue and the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment. In reviewing that holding on this motion for rehearing, we conclude our decision was correct.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted only to the extent that we corrected our statement of the State’s burden of proof in a *890bond forfeiture case. See pp. 881-82, supra. The other grounds are denied.
McCORMICK, P.J., and OVERSTREET, J., concur in result.

. The principal in this cause, Pedro Alvarez, is not a party to this appeal.

. Finding merit in appellant's second ground for review, we did not address his first ground for review. Id. at p. 884.

. In his first ground for review in his petition, appellant contended the court of appeals utilized an incorrect standard of review and viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the mov-ant, rather than the non-movant. Given our disposition of this motion for rehearing, we express no opinion on the merits of this ground for review, but only note that this is the proper ' standard to apply.

. See Art. 22.10, V.A.C.C.P.

. Article 22.13, V.A.C.C.P., provides an exclusive list of causes which will exonerate the principal and his surety from liability upon the forfeiture taken. Allegedly germane to this cause is section (3) which provides:
The sickness of the principal or some uncontrollable circumstance which prevented his appearance at court, and it must, in every such case, be shown that his failure to appear arose from no fault on his part. The causes men*889tioned in this subdivision shall not be deemed sufficient to exonerate the principal and his sureties, is any, unless such principal appear before final judgment on the bond to answer the accusation against him, or show sufficient cause for not so appearing.
Pursuant to the express terms of Art. 22.13, to controvert the State's prima facie proof, appellant must show (1) that some uncontrollable circumstance prevented the principal's appearance at court, (2) that the principal’s failure to appear arose from no fault on his part, and (3) that the principal appeared before final judgment on the bond to answer the accusation against him (or had sufficient cause for not so appearing).
In the motion for rehearing, the State asserts pursuant to Art. 22.13 that we omitted the fact that the record is wholly void of any evidence that, after forfeiture, the principal appeared prior to judgment in the forfeiture case. Hence the State argues that even though there may have been a lack of notice to appear, appellant has failed to meet his burden of proof on this affirmative defense by not presenting any evidence that, in the 23 months between forfeiture and judgment, he had been returned to custody in Harris County. See Fernandez v. State, 516 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

. See Bums, 814 S.W.2d at 770.

. See Alvarez & Bums, at p. 882.

. Specifically, appellant filed an original answer and two amended answers.

. Appellant’s only argument mentioning Art. 22.13 is in a constitutional challenge. Appellant’s point of error states:
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because if no actual notice is required, TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 17.09 (Vernon 1977), TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 22.13 (Vernon 1989), and the bond are void as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, sec’s, (sic) 13 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.