Court Opinion

ID: 9664570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:21:35.648477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:59.914310
License: Public Domain

CORNYN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the court that the trial court erred in submitting this case to the jury on the substitute facilities doctrine. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the court’s conclusion that the doctrine can never be applied to the taking of private property. I would hold that the substitute facilities doctrine, applied to public and private entities alike, remains viable, but that Duchesne has not satisfactorily demonstrated the inapplicability of the market value approach to the facts of this case.
The United States Constitution requires that a condemnee receive “just compensation.” See U.S. Const, amend. V.1 This requirement cannot turn, as the court holds, on whether the condemnee is a public or private entity. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34,105 S.Ct. 451, 457, 83 L.Ed.2d 376 (1984).
Although the constitutional standard for just compensation is certainly met when a landowner of condemned property is placed in as good a financial position as if his property had not been taken, see United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510, 99 S.Ct. 1854, 1857, 60 L.Ed.2d 435 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has never construed this as a minimum constitutional requirement. To the contrary, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of just compensation has evolved into a rule that requires only the payment of fair market value for the condemned property, even when fair market value may not fully compensate the landowner for all economic losses. 441 U.S. at 511, 99 S.Ct. at 1857. Clearly there will be cases when, after accounting for depreciation of buildings on a tract of land, fair market value will not be sufficient to allow their replacement with new facilities. However, the Supreme Court has specifically held:
[Njontransferable values arising from the owner’s unique need for the property are not compensable and ... this divergence from full indemnification does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
441 U.S. at 514, 99 S.Ct. at 1851. The fair market value standard represents an attempt to achieve a workable rule that seeks a rough balance between the interests of the landowner and the interests of the taxpaying public. The standard therefore attempts to determine “What compensation is ‘just’ both to an owner whose property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill?” See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123, 70 S.Ct. 547, 549, 94 L.Ed. 707 (1950) (emphasis added); see also 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. at 512, 99 S.Ct. at 1857 (market value concept chosen to “strike a fair ‘balance between the public’s need and the claimant’s loss’ ”).
As a general rule, then, just compensation means the market value of the property on the date it was appropriated. See 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 29, 105 S.Ct. at 454. In State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 609, 89 S.W.2d 194, 197 (1936), we held that when only a part of the land is taken the “just compensation” to which the owner is entitled consists of two elements: 1) the market value of the part taken, and 2) the damage to the remainder due to the taking and construction of the improvement for which it was taken. 89 S.W.2d at 197. We recently reaffirmed the vitality of the Carpenter standard in State v. Windham, 837 *619S.W.2d 73 (Tex.1992); see also Uselton v. State, 499 S.W.2d 92, 97-98 (Tex.1973); City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex.1972); State v. Walker, 441 S.W.2d 168, 175 (Tex.1969); City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 329, 267 S.W.2d 808, 812 (1954). Deviation from the market value measure of just compensation is required only when determination of market value is impracticable or when its application would result in manifest injustice to the owner or to the public. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 29, 105 S.Ct. at 455.
Duchesne argues that its circumstances qualify under each of these exceptions to the market value standard and thus, the use of the substitute facilities doctrine is necessary. Under the first exception, Du-chesne argues that deviation from the market value measure is necessary since its property had “no market value.” As the court properly points out, the property in this case has a market value — one that can be calculated under the cost approach to determining market value advocated by the City, as opposed to the market data approach. Thus, I perceive of no reason why the market value standard cannot be successfully utilized in this case. Admittedly, application of that standard may result in less compensation than would be available under the substitute facilities doctrine, but that by itself does not compel a conclusion that the market value standard fails to meet constitutional requirements here.
Under the second exception, Duchesne argues that the application of the market value standard would result in manifest injustice. I disagree. Even though the City could have, it did not urge a right to pay for only the depreciated value of Du-chesne’s buildings. In fact, the City took the position at trial that it would pay for the undepreciated replacement cost of Du-chesne’s buildings.
But just as significantly, Duchesne does not have a right to compensation sufficient to rebuild its new facilities on a tract adjacent to its current campus at a cost of $12,055,470. Although alternative locations may not be as desirable for a multitude of reasons, the requirement of just compensation does not require that the con-demnee be allowed to unilaterally designate the tract of land upon which it will rebuild. To so hold would destroy any semblance of the balance the law seeks to achieve between public and private interests under these circumstances.
In summary, we are bound by a general rule of market value that balances the public’s need and the landowner’s loss in a workable manner, and in a way that achieves just compensation. However, I would not, as the court appears to do, close the door to the possibility that market value might not in all cases meet constitutional requirements; I would leave that door open. If we were presented with another case in which market value failed to satisfy constitutional standards of compensation, I would consider the application of the substitute facilities doctrine, regardless of whether the condemnee is a public or private entity. Accordingly, I concur in the court’s judgment.

. The Texas constitution’s analogue is article I, § 17, which provides: ”[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person_” Tex. Const. art. I, § 17.