Court Opinion

ID: 9856553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:50:20.792465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:13.163654
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice (dissenting). I am unable to agree with the construction placed by the majority upon the Labor Dispute Disqualification section of the New Mexico Unemployment Compensation Law. § 59-9-5(d) N.M.S.A.1953. The construction of that statute which I believe to be «correct would require a decision for the company without reaching the other issues dealt with by the majority. I will accordingly confine my comments to that issue. The court below found that the claimants were employees of the company and members of a labor union. Failing to reach a mutually satisfactory collective bargaining agreement with the company on economic issues, the union and the employees struck the company’s place of business. All of the claimants participated in the strike. Union members who struck the company comprised about twenty percent of the company’s total work force. However, under the construction I would place upon the cited statute, this fact is irrelevant. The Commission contends that “stoppage of work,” as that term is used in § 59-9-5(d), refers not to the claimant’s work, but to a stoppage or curtailment of the employer’s operation. The question is one of first impression in this state. The majority has opted for the Commission’s interpretation, but in my opinion the phrase refers to a cessation of work by the employees as a result of a labor dispute, viz. a strike. I would concede that the statute is awkwardly worded. By parsing the sentence in differing ways and substituting words for phrases, proponents of the two contending theories can endlessly argue that the theory which they espouse is the more reasonable, as the parties have done in their briefs. For example, one could point out that in § 59-9-5 the word “work” is used in each subsection. In the earlier ones the word clearly refers to the employee, and it would be anomolous to apply a different meaning to the work in subsection (d). I eschew this argument as the basis for my opinion, although I agree with the reasoning of the majority in Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 193 Okla. 36, 141 P.2d 69 (1943). I do not think the statute, however inartfully worded, is that opaque. I premise my opinion on rather simple and well-settled rules of statutory construction and grammar. This court in its opinion in In re Goldsworthy’s Estate, 45 N.M. 406, 115 P.2d 627 (1941), quoting from Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 408 (2 ed. 1904), said: “Statutes as well as other writings are to be read and understood primarily according to their grammatical sense, unless it is apparent that the author intended something different. In other words, it is presumed that the writer intended to be understood according to the grammatical purport of the language he has employed to express his meaning.” The court then proceeded to define the doctrine of the last antecedent by quoting from 59 C.J. Statutes § 583 (1932) as follows : “By what is known as the doctrine of the ‘last antecedent,’ relative and qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.” See also Hughes v. Samedan Oil Corporation, 166 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1948). Applying these rules to the statute before us, we observe that a “labor dispute” and not a “stoppage of work” must exist at the factory, establishment or other premises. I agree with the reasoning of the special concurring opinion of Justice Davison in Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., supra. Justice Davison stated the definition of the last antecedent rule, quoting from a prior Oklahoma case, to be: “A limiting clause in a statute is generally to be restrained to the last antecedent, unless the subject-matter requires a different construction.” Certainly there is nothing about the subject matter here which requires a different construction. He then continued: The last antecedent in the statute before us is the “labor dispute,” not the “stoppage of work”. A labor dispute may exist at the factory without a “shutdown”. Of course, if a labor dispute does result in a shutdown or stoppage of operations at the plant or factory it may result in a stoppage of work for individuals not involved in the labor dispute. Individuals not so involved are the subject of consideration by the legislature in the statutory provisions immediately succeeding the above-quoted language. It is thus my opinion that the thing which must exist at the factory is, under the terms of the statute, the labor dispute, not the stoppage of work; that when the labor dispute exists at the factory resulting in a stoppage of work by the individual he is disqualified to receive benefits if he is a participant in the labor dispute and not working by reason of his own voluntary desire, regardless of whether the factory stops or does not stop operating. My opinion is bolstered by other considerations, though I reach the above conclusion without their aid. I note the statement of policy which the Legislature included in the Act in § 59-9-2 N.M.S.A. 1953.1 I cannot read the phrase “through no fault of their own” as meaning or implying evil or wrongdoing or that an employee’s work stoppage was subject to censure. Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., supra. In ordinary parlance it would mean unemployment due to the employee’s own volition or at his decision or election. Considering the phrase in § 59-9-2 in that light, it is clear to me that the very purpose of the Act is to provide compensation for those who are involuntarily unemployed. That certainly does not include strikers. As the majority has pointed out, the conclusion that they have reached is supported by a majority of cases which have passed upon the issue. Most of these cases trace their way back to Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan Unemployment C. Com’n, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944). That case appears to rely heavily on the English National Insurance Act of 1911 and on cases construing it. Bearing in mind that we are now in the year 1976 and that the issue presented is one of first impression in New Mexico, no reason has been suggested to me as to why we should now adopt a construction placed upon a statute of a foreign country by authorities charged with its administration not long after the turn of the century. In fact I am not at all sure why the Michigan court in Lawrence Banking Co. even addressed the problem which confronts us. The claimants there were not at any material time unemployed because of a labor dispute so far as I can determine from the opinion. To the contrary, they were unemployed because they had been discharged and replaced by others. The strike for all practical purposes, only lasted about fifteen minutes. I further observe that two strong dissents were filed in Lawrence Banking Co. with which I generally agree. Much is said in the briefs about whether or not a governmental policy of neutrality exists in relation to strikes, a subject touched upon by the majority in its discussion of Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947). Since I do not predicate my opinion upon the existence or non-existence of such a policy, I express no opinion as to its existence. I will content myself with saying that if it does not exist, it should. Still bearing in mind that we are confronted with an issue of first impression and that we are free to adopt an interpretation of the statute which now best suits our situation, I find it interesting that in more modern times several states have refused to adopt “stoppage of work” language, or have eliminated that language after state courts have allowed unemployment compensation to be paid to strikers. In New York and California “stoppage of work” language is absent and strikers are generally ineligible for benefits. For example, see Cal.Unep.Ins. § 1262 (West 1972) ; N.Y. Labor Law § 592 (McKinney 1965) (seven week waiting period); Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 8-73-109 (1974). There are about fifteen such states. The Texas statute reads “claimant’s work stoppage.” Vernon’s Tex.Stat. art. 5221b-3 (1971). Two cases decided in the 1950’s in Arizona held that stoppage of work referred to the employer’s business. Sakrison v. Pierce, supra; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P.2d 707 (1950). Soon thereafter in 1952 the Arizona Legislature deleted “stoppage of work” and disqualified those employees involved in a labor dispute. Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 23-777 (1971). Michigan also changed its statute after the courts interpreted stoppage of work as the employer’s operation. Lawrence Banking Co. v. Michigan Unemployment C. Com’n, supra, and Mich.Comp. Laws Ann. § 421.29 (1967). For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. OMAN, J., concurs.  . Declaration of state public policy. As a guide to interpretation and application of this act [59-9-1 to 59-9-29], the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this state requires the enactment of this measure, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own”, (emphasis added)