Court Opinion

ID: 9390047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 19:02:56.200401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:31.286704
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/26/23 P. v. Martinez CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,                                                  A161995

 v.                                                           (San Mateo County
 PEDRO FRANCISCO                                               Super. Ct. No. 19NF009837A)
 GALVAN MARTINEZ,
      Defendant and
 Appellant.

         Pedro Francisco Galvan Martinez (Galvan)1 was convicted of rape,
forcible oral copulation, false imprisonment by violence and making criminal
threats after an incident he claimed was a consensual sexual encounter with
a coworker, Karla Doe. He contends his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to impeach Doe with expert testimony or
evidence on the correct translation of certain Spanish words used in texts; the
jury instructions unfairly emphasized Doe’s testimony, lightened the
prosecution’s burden of proof, and violated Galvan’s constitutional right to
equal protection; and resentencing is required due to post-sentencing

         Pursuant to his expressed preference, appellant was referred to at
         1

trial as “Galvan.” We will do the same in this opinion.

                                                               1
statutory amendments affecting the imposition of upper terms. We will
affirm the convictions. We agree with Galvan, however, that remand for
resentencing is required.
                                BACKGROUND
         Galvan and Doe were coworkers on a construction job at the San
Francisco Airport Grand Hyatt Hotel, working a 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. shift. They
met when Doe began to work for their employer, Webcor, on May 30, 2019.2
There were only a few women in the workplace: Alejandra Perez worked on
the morning shift and a second woman joined the evening shift subsequent to
Doe. Galvan’s brother-in-law, Rene Ortega, was the foreman on the evening
shift.
         Doe had moved back to San Francisco (her birthplace) from Mexico in
February 2019 and lived with her two daughters and her mother; many of
her maternal relatives lived in California. She had been widowed in 2013
and in May 2019 had been in a relationship with her boyfriend for over a
year. Galvan had also moved to the United States from Mexico in 2012. He
married his current wife in 2012 and had three children with her.3

        Unless otherwise specified, dates referred to in this opinion are in the
         2

year 2019.
       Galvan, Doe and several other witnesses were assisted at trial by
         3

Spanish-speaking interpreters.

                                        2
                                       I.
                      The Prosecution’s Case at Trial
      A. Doe and Galvan Meet at Work.
         1. Doe’s testimony
      Doe was excited about getting the job at the airport hotel because she
needed medical insurance for her family, especially one of her daughters, who
had an on-going problem with her arm. Doe needed to work 430 hours before
she would receive health benefits. At the time of the incident underlying this
case, she was short 33 hours.
      Doe testified that she worked with Galvan from the second day on,
sometimes with other people and sometimes just the two of them. Galvan
decided how work groups were formed; although he was not the foreman,
everyone followed what he said.
      When Doe started the job, Galvan was courteous, respectful and
friendly, but after a time he began to make comments she did not like. One
example was Galvan saying, referring to Doe, that he “couldn’t believe
that . . . being that he was so good looking that he could be in a hotel with
somebody that he liked and that nothing else was happening.” Doe testified,
“it was like he was trying to pick up on me, but then when he could see it, it
wasn’t like that. Then he would say[,] ‘Oh, I am just joking.’ ” One time,
Galvan told Doe to look at something on his phone that turned out to be a
photo of him coming out of the shower. She told him, “don’t step over the
line,” and not to bother her. Another time, after others got off a crowded
elevator, Galvan remained close to Doe and “went like he was going to give
me a kiss.” She got very angry and told him to “avoid having problems for
yourself and for me, too.” She told Alejandra Perez about this incident but
did not report it to the company because she thought she could reject Galvan

                                        3
without there being problems. Also, there was “a lot of harmony between co-
workers” at the job and she “didn’t want them to think that because a woman
arrived on the job that . . . this would be gossip and problems.”
         2. Coworkers’ testimony
      Alejandra Perez testified that Galvan did not like it when Doe spoke or
worked with other “workmates.” On an occasion when Perez asked Galvan
why Doe was not at work, Galvan “was bothered” and said Doe had gone to
Los Angeles to be with her boyfriend. When Perez told Doe that Galvan had
seemed upset about this, Doe said “he was crazy.” Doe told Perez about an
incident in which Galvan tried to kiss her in an elevator and she pushed him,
and an incident when he tried to kiss her while they were on “other floors.”
Doe never told Perez she wanted to have a relationship with Galvan or was
attracted to him.
      Prior to July 26, Doe had texted Perez saying Galvan was harassing
her. Perez told Doe not to pay attention and “men are like that,” and
suggested that they talk to someone “higher up” so Doe could change from the
evening shift to the morning shift, when Perez worked. Perez testified that
Doe considered reporting the harassment to her “boss” but did not think he
would believe her because he was Galvan’s brother-in-law.
      Two coworkers on the evening shift, Juan Zuniga and Cornelio
Valencia, testified that Galvan and Doe always worked together. Zuniga
testified that Galvan did not “specifically” have authority to assign Doe to
work with him, but he would tell her they were going to be working together;
Valencia had seen Galvan assign Doe to work with him and testified that
Galvan would sometimes assign workers their tasks when the foreman was
not there. Neither Zuniga nor Valencia had the impression that Galvan and
Doe were in a relationship.

                                       4
      B. Galvan and Doe’s text messages
      Doe communicated with Galvan through text messages both for work
purposes and outside of work. Records of these text messages showed, for
example, a work-related message from Galvan to Doe on June 25, and on
June 30 there were both texts and phone calls in which Galvan asked Doe to
come and jump his car because the battery had died.
      A lengthy series of messages between Galvan and Doe, documented in
Exhibit 3 at trial, is the basis of one of Galvan’s claims on appeal. On Friday
July 19, Doe received a text from Galvan at 10:03 p.m., as she was about to
drive home, saying “Mama Lucha, can you set aside a slice of cake for me and
then have a nice weekend.” She responded, “[O]f course I will. Same to you.”
Doe testified that her mother and daughter had birthdays that weekend and
explained that “Mama Lucha” is a term used in Mexico “in a loving way to
refer to a woman that is raising her children on her own. [¶] . . . [¶] It is like
playing around. It is not affection. It is not affectionate or offensive. It is
neutral.”
      The texts continued with Galvan saying, “ ‘We stayed back here to
down some brewskies or beers’ ” and Doe replying that she had already
gotten home. Galvan texted, “ ‘Just one more, and I’m leaving, Get some
rest. I love you.’ ” Another message from him said, “ ‘I know you do, too, but
you don’t say it,’ ” followed by “ ‘Silence speaks volumes.’ ” Another, after
30 minutes, said, “ ‘Hello,’ ” then, “ ‘Are you there?’ ” Twenty minutes later,
Galvan texted, “ ‘Aren’t you going to say anything?’ ” and then, “ ‘Do you love
me? Asking.’ ” Doe replied, “No.” He responded with three emojis with sad
faces and asked, “ ‘What do you feel?’ ” She replied, “ ‘You don’t either[,]’ ”
which she testified meant, “ ‘I don’t love you, and you don’t love me either.’ ”

                                         5
He said, “ ‘I do,’ ” and she told him not to lie, then asked if he was still at
work.
        Doe testified that she never had a romantic relationship with Galvan
and “didn’t give much importance” to the text messages saying he loved her
and “I know you do too” because “he felt that he was kind of a ladies man,
and I felt like it didn’t effect [sic] me, and because . . . at that time I thought
that whatever anybody would offer you, you could just reject it. [¶] You could
just tell them no, and that you would not be in any type of risk.”
        There followed a conversation in which Doe said she was happy Galvan
was going to “sing and brighten other peoples’ day,” because he had said he
was going to sing with his band, then expressed surprise when he said he was
going to work instead. He asked if she wanted to work, which she did
because she was trying to accumulate the hours necessary to obtain her
health benefits. He said he would help her, and when she said she did not
want to cause any problems, he said he had already talked to the supervisor.
He then texted that she had not replied when he asked what she felt and she
replied, “ ‘Gratitude and admiration. You are a very good person.’ ” Doe
testified that she felt gratitude that he was helping her get work the next day
and that he was patient in helping her learn at work, and admiration because
he was “a very good worker.”
        Galvan asked, “ ‘What else,’ ” and then, “ ‘What is there in that little
chest of yours?’ ” She replied, “ ‘[n]othing more’ ” and asked him, “ ‘And
you?’ ” He said, “ ‘Everything,’ and then a sad emoji,” and when she asked
what that meant he said, “ ‘You move me completely, woman.’ ” She told him
not to lie. Galvan said, “ ‘I see you, and I love being with you,’ ” and “
‘Haven’t you noticed,’ ” and she told him, “ ‘[You’re] a real ladies’ man,’ ” and,
“ ‘You’re very flirtatious.’ ” Galvan said, “ ‘[j]ust with you’ ” and told her, “ ‘I

                                          6
want to feel more, but you don’t let it happen,’ ” and she replied, “ ‘You
already know I’m old-fashioned.’ ” Asked at trial what she meant by this,
Doe testified that she had previously told Galvan she was a widow, had never
considered cheating on her husband and was now in a new relationship, and
her text meant she was “not willing to do things that hurt other people.”
      Galvan texted, “ ‘Then I shouldn’t expect anything with you,’ ” and she
responded, “ ‘Are you not interested in my friendship?’ ” He said, “ ‘[o]f
course’ ” and she replied, “ ‘I’m happy’ ” and tried to change the subject by
asking about lunch for work the next day. Ignoring her attempt, Galvan told
her, “ ‘And it is the best thing that has happened to me, and you’re an
excellent woman, and I have already told you that.’ ” She felt he was
“fighting to see if he could get together with me” and, trying to ignore his
comment, pursued her questions about lunch. Galvan texted, “ ‘But in my
chest, there is something that wants to come out every time I’m near you.’ ”
Doe responded that she felt the same as him but testified at trial that this
was a mistake; she meant to be responding to Galvan’s prior message by
saying she felt the same regarding “the admiration that I had told him that I
had for him in the past.” Doe thought she was “putting up a barrier, that
nobody was going to be able to force me to do anything, so you could say that
his comment was personal, but . . . mine was work-related.” She had
previously told Galvan and other coworkers that she was grateful for having
co-workers who were “so good and so patient.” Doe conceded on cross
examination that the messages themselves did not make clear that she was
only talking about work.
      In further texts, Galvan told Doe he felt fortunate; she told him he was
fortunate for his family and he said was referring to her. He asked what she
was afraid of, and she said she would have a “bad conscience” if she were to

                                        7
do “something bad” and did not think she “could ever misbehave.” Galvan
told her, “ ‘you make me weak in the knees’ ” and, “ ‘I like to have you near
me,’ ” then sent an emoji sending a kiss and wrote, “ ‘I know that is not okay,
but what can I do?’ ” Doe told him she thought it would pass; she explained
at trial that she wanted to let him know “he was never going to have
anything with me.” She then told Galvan she was “not like most women,”
which she testified was a reference to his having told her “women would offer
themselves to him.” Galvan said this was why he liked her.
      At 12:33 a.m., Galvan texted, “ ‘What I know is that you feel the same
as me, but you don’t dare tell me.’ ” Doe responded, “ ‘I know that you are a
great person in many aspects, and you think that no one can resist you.’ ”
Doe testified that she said this because Galvan “constantly” commented that
“women would offer themselves to him.” He had previously told her he had a
relationship outside his marriage with a woman in Modesto.
      Galvan told Doe he thought they had something in common that made
them attractive to each other and she asked what he thought this was; she
testified that she asked this “jokingly.” He replied that she was “ ‘very
special and shy, but the heart doesn’t understand.’ ” She told him he should
value and respect his wife more, and her boyfriend also did not “deserve me
to fail him.” When Doe repeated that Galvan would “ ‘get over it,’ ” he asked,
“ ‘Was that a resounding no,’ ” and she told him “ ‘Yes, it was a resounding
no.’ ” She also told him, “ ‘Aside from respecting my partner, I also need to
respect myself.’ ” An hour and a half later, he texted “ ‘Are you asleep
already?’ ” She did not respond.
      The next morning, Saturday July 20, Galvan texted that he did not
want to go to work, which Doe testified meant she could not go either because
“according to him, he had done me the favor of saying that I could go in to

                                       8
work.” Galvan asked if she was upset about not working and she told him it
was not a problem, and he should enjoy his family. She then texted, “ ‘I need
to tell you something very important. It is not necessary that it be to your
birthday or some other date. You deserve the best in the world for being a
good son, a good father a good husband, a good family member, and a good
friend.’ ” Doe testified that people send “gratitude chains” on WhatsApp, to
“ ‘[t]hank the people . . . that are still living,’ ” and she also sent messages like
this to her daughters, her mother, two female friends and a nephew.
      Galvan thanked Doe for the message and reiterated that she was a
great woman; she replied, “ ‘May God continue to bless you’ ” and he said, “ ‘It
is too bad that I met you too late.’ ” Doe wrote, “ ‘Thank you, super-
intelligent and hard working person. You don’t expect blessings to fall from
the sky. You work for them always.’ ” She also asked, “why is it a shame if
you have a very valuable wife and your treasures,” meaning his children.
There followed a lengthy conversation in which Galvan told Doe about
serious problems in his marriage and she made supportive comments. At one
point she told him, “it is not easy to have a good looking husband.” Doe
testified that he had told her his wife was “very insecure and jealous” and her
text was saying that “when a woman is jealous, it becomes more
complicated.”
      At the end of this conversation, they wished each other a good weekend
and Doe texted, “T-Q-[M].” Asked what this means, Doe testified, “I love you
a lot, but in Spanish it is not love you. It is like I appreciate—I hold you in

                                         9
esteem.” The prosecutor asked, “So did you mean that in a romantic sense?”
and she said “No.”4
      Galvan responded to the text with “ ‘I send you a big hug’ ”; she said,
“ ‘Same to you’ ”; he said, “ ‘See you on Monday, Mama Lucha’ ”; and she
replied, “ ‘See you Monday, Superman.’ ” Doe testified that she called Galvan
Superman “in relation to” him calling her Mama Lucha, which she likened to
“[s]uper mom.” She denied defense counsel’s suggestion that calling Galvan
“Superman” implied they had a physical relationship and testified that she
knew he was helping his mother, sister and brother financially and was
referring to that in response to him “cheering me on for being Mama Lucha.”
      On Monday July 22, Doe texted Galvan that she had forgotten to tell
him she had his knife, which he had left when they were “covering the
carpet” the prior Friday, and she would bring it to him. She returned the
knife to him that day. Doe testified that this was a red knife with his name
etched on it, not the one used in the attack.
      On July 23, Galvan sent Doe a picture that she said was of a job they
had done in which she did not cover the left side of a cabinet because she did
not have enough of the necessary tape. She testified that Galvan had
previously advised her to pay attention to details and finish a job perfectly.
      On July 25, Galvan told her he was going to be spending the night at a
hotel and asked “in the form of a joke” if she was interested in joining him.
She said she was not.

      4   Doe testified that in a text she sent to Perez that included, “ ‘I love
you a lot,’ ” she did not mean she loved Perez in a romantic sense. Similarly,
Perez was asked about a text in which she told Doe, “ ‘I love you, friend,’ ”
and testified that she did not mean this in a romantic way but as love “like
sisters.”

                                       10
      C. The assault
          1. Doe’s testimony
      On the morning of July 26, Galvan texted Doe asking where she was
going to “ ‘invite [him] to have breakfast.’ ” She responded, “ ‘Let’s go to
mass,’ ” and he agreed, then said he had a doctor’s appointment. At work
that day, Doe thought she had lost her phone and tried unsuccessfully to find
it; it turned out Galvan had hidden it as a joke, and Doe got very angry. She
called Perez to tell her about the incident and talk about changing to the
morning shift. At some point, as Doe and Galvan were leaving a room they
had been working in, Galvan suddenly gave her a kiss, touching just a little
part of her lip, then “before [she] could get upset” told her he loved her like a
sister. Doe thought “from there on” he was not going to be making “loving-
type comments” toward her.
      That evening, after realizing they had run out of caulk needed to finish
a job they had started, Galvan told Doe that they were going to be locking
doors to the hotel rooms, beginning on the 12th floor and working their way
down.5 They took the elevator to the 12th floor and began locking doors, each
moving from the center to opposite sides of the hotel. Doe finished her side,
went down the emergency stairs and continued on the 11th floor and then the
10th floor. As she went to close a door, Galvan grabbed her hand “as if he
was playing to scare me.” He told her they would go in the same direction,
each locking doors on opposite sides of the hallway, and added that they
should go into the rooms to see if the morning shift workers had left caulking

      5 At 7:49 p.m. Doe texted Galvan that she had her knife. She testified
that Galvan had said he lost his knife and asked if she had hers as he was
walking away to ask other coworkers if they had seen it, and that this was
before they went to the 12th floor.

                                        11
in the rooms. There were no lights in the rooms, but they had flashlights on
their helmets.
      On the ninth floor, Galvan stopped in a doorway and asked “ ‘Would
you like a cup of coffee—’ or ‘—a cup of sugar?’ ” Doe testified that this is
“kind of like a saying in Mexico.” Galvan gestured for Doe to come in and she
went into the bathroom. When she turned around, he was in front of her. He
said, “ ‘Do you think you can get me out of the way in order to . . . leave?’ ”
She told him to stop “playing around” and said they should look for the
caulking. He tried to kiss her and told her not to scream because no one
would hear her; she knew her co-workers were all on different floors. Galvan
threatened her with his knife, bringing it close to her and telling her “what
would it look like if the knife were to go across my . . . neck.”6
      Doe was scared. Galvan took off her safety vest, which had her phone
and her knife in pockets, and threw it on the floor. Doe was leaning against
the sink. He lifted her blouse and started licking her breasts, then pulled
down her pants and undergarments and licked her vulva. He then turned
her toward the wall and pushed her forward, causing her forehead to hit the
mirror frame. Galvan penetrated her vagina with his penis. He also
penetrated her anus, but she did not know if that was with his penis. He
ejaculated in her vagina. He then told her he was going downstairs and she
should not go down for 10 or 20 minutes.
      Doe locked the safety lock on the room door and called Perez, who told
her to call 911; Doe had not thought to do so “as if I didn’t really believe what
was happening”; she was confused, frightened, and angry. She called 911

      6 Doe acknowledged on cross examination that in several interviews
she told the detective that she felt the knife touch her neck, then for the first
time on October 8 she told him the knife did not touch her.

                                        12
and while on the phone heard Galvan in the hallway, saying her name and
trying to open the door to the room. When she heard him, Doe picked up her
knife, which had fallen out of the pocket of her vest. She had previously
picked up the yellow knife that Galvan threatened her with and wrapped it in
her vest, then thrown the vest in the sink.
      Galvan was with two other coworkers, who also told Doe to open the
door, and the three came in after the foreman told them to “open the door any
way they could.” Doe told Galvan to leave and he did, then came back, telling
the others that he and Doe were in a relationship as she yelled at him that he
was lying and called him an asshole. Galvan told her, “ ‘Nobody is going to
believe you.’ ”
      Doe gave the knife Galvan threatened her with to the police who
arrived at the scene.
         2. Coworkers’ testimony
      Perez testified that she and Doe had been texting throughout the day
on July 26 and, among other things, discussed the incident with Galvan
hiding Doe’s phone and going to Perez’s foreman about changing Doe’s shift.
When Perez asked how it was going with Galvan, Doe said she had put him
“in his place with her,” there was “not going to be anything” and he
“maintained a certain distance.”
      Sometime after Perez got home from work, Doe called, “hysterical” and
crying, and said, “ ‘This asshole just raped me . . . put a knife up to my
throat.’ ” Doe said Galvan told her to stay quiet because no one was going to
believe her, then left, and she locked herself in. She did not know what floor
she was on. Doe wanted Perez to call the police, but Perez told her to call so

                                       13
the police could track her phone number and find her. Perez called Ortega
and a “superintendent,” and people went to look for Doe.7
      Zuniga testified that on July 26, Galvan was in charge after the
supervisor left at around 6 p.m. About 9 p.m., Ortega called and told Zuniga
to have everyone stop work and look for Doe because something had
happened to her. Five or ten minutes before, Galvan had called, saying he
could not find Doe and asking if Zuniga had seen her.
      Zuniga started looking for Doe with coworker Federico. Zuniga called
Galvan to see if he knew where she was, and Galvan said she was in a room
on the ninth floor. Zuniga and Federico found Galvan outside the room,
trying to talk to Doe; he said Doe had had “a nervous breakdown or
something like that.” The door was locked with the safety latch and, after
Ortega told Zuniga to “do whatever was necessary” to see whether Doe was
okay, they pushed the door and broke the lock. Doe was in the bathroom.
Zuniga and Valencia, who had also come into the room,8 testified that Doe
was “nervous” (or “really nervous”). She said Galvan had raped her and
wanted him out of the room; Galvan denied the accusation and the two

      7  Perez did not know that Doe had been texting with Galvan for at
least a week before July 26 or that she told Galvan she loved him; Doe had
only said Galvan “would send her some messages.” Perez was surprised that
Doe would have said she loved Galvan, call him Superman or tell him he was
the best thing to happen to her, but was not surprised Doe would tell Galvan
he “deserve[d] the best of the world for being a good son, father, husband,
relative and friend” because Doe “is of that style.”
      8 Valencia testified that when he got to the ninth floor, he saw Galvan
in the hallway, Galvan said Doe had had a “nervous fit,” they walked to
where Zuniga and Federico were trying to open the door to a room, and
Galvan pushed the door open, breaking the lock.

                                     14
started arguing. Valencia testified that before Doe started yelling at Galvan,
Galvan told her to “ ‘[t]ell them we had a relationship for a long time.’ ”
      Zuniga stayed with Doe while Galvan and the others left the room.
Valencia testified that Federico told him Doe had said Galvan used a knife on
her, and that Galvan said Doe “ ‘wants to destroy my family, but she and I
have a relationship.’ ” The police arrived and initially threw Zuniga on the
ground when he opened the door to the room, trying to handcuff him until
coworkers yelled that he had not done anything. Valencia testified that he
told Galvan to tell the police he was the suspect, and Galvan surrendered
himself.9
            3. Police Response
      A police dispatcher received Doe’s 911 call at 9:06 p.m. on July 26,
2019. A recording of the call was played for the jury.
      Officers responded at about 9:15 p.m. to the ninth floor of the Hyatt,
where construction workers in the hallway pointed them to a door. After the
officers announced themselves and began to detain Zuniga, Officer Wilson Ng
went inside and found Doe on the bathroom floor, crying and appearing to be
“in distress.” She responded to him in Spanish and he called for an
interpreter. Ng noticed a box cutter next to Doe and asked if that was the
weapon used against her, but she “waved no with her hand.” When Spanish-
speaking Officer Fernando Leiva arrived, Doe told them that after directing
her to check the bathroom for supplies, Galvan came from behind and tried to
kiss her, she pushed away and he appeared very angry, pulled out a

      9 At some point Galvan gave Valencia a knife, saying, “ ‘Take the knife.
I’m going to be arrested.’ ” Valencia put the knife in his tool bag at the end of
the workday; he did not give it to the police because it was just a work tool
and he did not realize it would become important.

                                       15
boxcutter knife and “put it towards her chest,” then pulled up her shirt,
pulled down her pants and underwear, turned her around and sexually
assaulted her. Doe said she bumped her forehead when Galvan pushed her
against the wall during the assault. Ng took into evidence a silver and yellow
box cutter that Doe had taken from her pocket and handed to Officer Leiva.
The box cutter on the floor was left at the scene and later taken into evidence.
Officer Leiva testified that Doe was crying during the interview and, in the
ambulance to the hospital, was scared and “still pretty upset.”
      D. After the assault
           1. Doe’s physical injuries
      Doe was taken to the hospital, where she reported neck pain and pain
in the right lower quadrant. The examining physician documented a
hematoma on Doe’s head and spinal tenderness at the back of her neck, and
the chart documented that Doe was teary-eyed.
      Doe was then taken to the Keller Center, where sexual assault nurse
examiner Kelly Charnas examined and took photographs of her. Shown
these photographs, Doe testified that the bump on her forehead was from
hitting the frame,10 bruises on her arms were where Galvan held her, and a
bruise on her stomach and bruises on her buttocks were where Galvan
pressed her against the sink. She did not know whether a bruise on her
upper back had been there before the assault.
      Charnas testified that Doe told her the assailant held a utility knife
“near” her neck and told her, “ ‘If you scream, it doesn’t matter. No one will

      10 Perez testified that she did not see any injury on Doe’s forehead at
work on July 26. Doe’s daughter testified that Doe did not have a lump on
her forehead before she went to work on July 26; she noticed the lump and
Doe’s bruises when Doe returned home.

                                        16
hear you.’ ” Doe said he grabbed her shoulders, held her and pushed her into
a mirror frame, causing her to hit her head. In response to the nurse’s
questions, Doe said that his penis and finger went into her anus, he kissed
her vagina area, mouth and breast, he licked her breast, and he ejaculated in
her vaginal area. Doe was tearful at times during the exam and interview.
She had bruises on her lower legs that she said were from work, a vaginal
abrasion, a circular abrasion with some swelling and tenderness in the
middle of her forehead that she said was not there before the assault, and
bruising on her upper arms, shoulder, abdomen and buttocks, and an area of
redness and swelling on the inside of her right upper gum. Charnas
acknowledged that she did not know the cause of Doe’s bruises
independently; she documents bruises a patient was not aware of or knows
were not there before the assault and does not document those the patient
says preexisted the assault.
      Geri Archibald, a nurse practitioner, forensic examiner and the clinical
coordinator at the Keller Center, testified as the prosecution’s expert in the
conduct of forensic medical examination and analysis of injury, including
mechanism of injury. She testified that Doe’s vaginal abrasion could be
consistent with consensual or nonconsensual intercourse, as well as with a
finger in the vagina, and that the forehead injury could have been caused as
Doe described or by almost any object in the room. She also testified that the
color of bruises is not a reliable indicator of their age and that nurses at the
Keller Center are trained to document injuries without trying to date them.
         2. Forensic evidence and interviews
      Galvan’s DNA was found in sperm on swabs taken from Doe’s vagina,
cervix, anus, and perianus, and on cuttings from her underwear and
pantyliner. Laboratory analysis of those samples also detected DNA from a

                                       17
third person from which no conclusions could be drawn, including the sex of
the contributor. No DNA was found on the blade of the yellow and silver box
cutter; the handle was not tested.
      San Mateo Sheriff’s Office Sergeant Patrick Carey interviewed Doe at
the Keller Center at around 4:30 or 5 a.m. on July 27. Doe was “emotionally
distraught,” cried “extensively” during the interview and was “very hesitant”
to talk about the incident. In follow up interviews on August 6 and October 8
she was again emotionally distraught, crying and at times trembling.
      Beginning on July 27, 2019, there were searches on Doe’s phone for
home security cameras, home security doors, registered sex offenders in San
Francisco, rights of sexual assault victims and “safest cities where sexual
assaults occur in California.” Her phone’s search history prior to the assault
showed no such searches, nor searches related to sexual assaults, police
investigations, worker’s compensation claims, civil lawsuits or anything
related to Galvan.
         3. Doe’s Post-Assault Condition and Conduct
      Doe had been seeing a psychologist and a psychiatrist since the assault.
She testified that she had not been able to “overcome the trauma”: She felt
“very afraid” when she went out and when her daughter went out. After the
assault, she changed the lock on the door of her home, blocked the window on
the door with wood and installed cameras for security. At the time of trial,
Doe had not returned to work and was receiving workers’ compensation. In
addition to the attorney who helped her with workers’ compensation, she had
spoken with an attorney about the assault and about concerns that Galvan

                                      18
and other workers had been using drugs on the job.11 She discussed suing
Webcor with this attorney, but no lawsuit had been filed.12 She planned to
sue Galvan.
       When nurse practitioner Archibald saw Doe for a follow up visit on
September 3, 2019, Doe described having persistent posterior neck pain and
headaches she felt might be related to stress, and said she was still feeling
anxious and emotional and was seeing a therapist.
       Doe’s daughter testified that after the assault Doe put up security
cameras, changed the lock on the front door and covered the window in the
door with wood. Doe’s behavior changed after the assault: Her daughter
described her as “destroyed” and testified that Doe “can’t even get out of bed,”
has suicidal thoughts, and gets extremely nervous when the daughter goes
out.

       11Doe testified that she was worried about workers using drugs on the
job because Galvan had said he would take cocaine every Friday and said
other workers were also using drugs. Galvan had said he was not concerned
about losing his job because the only drug testing was upon arrival at work,
he was a hard worker and his brother-in-law was the foreman. Doe testified
that she had deleted from her phone a photograph Galvan sent her showing
marble of the type used for the hotel sinks with a line of white powder he said
was cocaine and a “rolled-up bill to one side.”
       12Perez was asked on cross examination about a text she sent Doe on
August 2, 2019, saying, “You can sue the company, friend, and you’re not
going to get a little bit of money out of them. If not, at least a million out of
hand.” Perez testified that she said this because it was what workmates had
been telling her, she did not know anything about it, and Doe never talked to
her about intending to sue the company.

                                       19
                                      II.
                           Defense Case at Trial
      A. Galvan’s testimony
      Galvan testified that Ortega was responsible for assigning work but
would leave early and leave it to Galvan and Ismael, another foreman, to
carry out assignments. When Doe started the job, Ortega assigned her to
work with Galvan so Galvan could train her. Galvan testified that there was
“a very big connection between the two of us” and within a week “we were
already kissing each other.” The first time they kissed, they were working on
all fours covering carpeting, each had a lollypop, and when they crossed, she
put her lollypop in his mouth, he put his in hers, and then they kissed. His
relationship with Doe progressed from “just kisses and touching over our
clothing” to “private parts.” Doe never said she did not want this; she said
she liked it and liked being with him. Prior to July 26, Galvan had touched
Doe’s vagina several times and they had masturbated each other.
      Galvan testified that although he was married, he was having affairs
with a woman from Modesto and a woman near Santa Rosa. His relationship
with his wife was “fractured” and whenever they had fights, he would go to a
motel. He testified that Doe “knew everything about me” and they talked
about “the deepest secrets that I was never, ever going to tell anyone,” but
also that their relationship was “just sex” and they had affection for each
other, but he did not love her and “she wanted the same thing from me.”
Asked why he told Doe he loved her, Galvan testified, “Because she also said
the same thing to me.”
      Galvan testified that on July 19, he was using the yellow knife that was
now in evidence while he and Doe were working with rolls of carpet. They
started to kiss, and she said she wanted to have sex. According to Galvan,

                                      20
Doe got on all fours and suggested he get on top.13 They had not had sex
before. Galvan testified that he did not want to have sex with her that day
because he had a lot of work to do. Valencia showed up and stayed to work
with Doe, and Galvan went to the first floor to do other things. The following
Monday, Doe told Galvan she had his knife, which he had not realized was
missing, and she returned it to him. According to Galvan, he had had a red
knife but lost it before Doe started work.
      On July 23 Galvan and Doe went into a room with cabinets and
masturbated each other. He sent her the photo on page 32 of exhibit 3 “as a
memory of what happened there.”14
      On July 25, Galvan told Doe he was going to stay overnight in the Bay
Area because of an appointment the next day.15 When he asked if she
wanted to come to the hotel with him, she said “ ‘[n]o’ ” and “ ‘[w]hat am I
going to tell my daughters and mom. I have to tell them when I’m working
overtime.’ ” On the morning of July 26, he asked about breakfast because she
knew he was in the area.
      At work on July 26, Doe dropped her phone without noticing and
Galvan put it on top of a box, then as a joke said he did not know where it
was when she began to look for it. During the lunch break, he saw Doe
asking other coworkers about her phone and told her “ ‘[m]aybe it’s on top of
a box back there where we were just working.’ ” She said, “ ‘You have no—’ ”

      13   Doe testified that she did not do this.
      14 Doe testified that nothing sexual happened in the room with the
cabinets.
      15 He lived about an hour and a half away from the work site, or up to

three or four hours with heavy traffic.

                                         21
and made a gesture as if she was going to hit him. She was “[n]ot necessarily
upset or angry.”
      After the break, Galvan noticed his utility knife was missing. He went
to look for it and, as he was asking coworkers about it, Doe texted that she
had her knife. Zuniga offered Galvan his knife and Galvan took it.16 Later,
he found an old utility knife in an area where tools and materials were kept
and took that as well.
      Galvan described closing the doors to hotel rooms much as Doe had,
although he denied ever telling Doe to look for caulking inside the rooms. He
testified that as they descended the stairs to the ninth floor, they kissed.
They began closing doors on the ninth floor hallway and at some point Doe
came to him and asked, “ ‘Hey, neighbor, do you have a cup of sugar?’ ” He
responded, “ ‘Hey, neighbor, you mean like in the TV program Chespirito?’ ”
She put her arms around his shoulders and neck and kissed him again, and
they went into one of the rooms, kissing and undressing as they went.
      In the bathroom, she leaned back against the sink. They continued
kissing and he “went down her neck,” touched and sucked her breasts as she

      16 Zuniga testified that he did not remember whether Galvan asked to
borrow a knife and that the first time he heard the idea that he had loaned
Galvan a knife was at trial. He testified that Galvan had asked whether
Zuniga had seen his boxcutter, saying he had forgotten it in the bathroom but
could not find it when he went back.
      The defense’s private investigator testified that when he asked Zuniga
whether he remembered loaning Galvan a box cutter on the night of July 26,
Zuniga said he did not remember but, “ ‘I’m pretty sure I didn’t because I had
mine,’ ” but also said, “ ‘Maybe yes. Maybe no. . . . I’m about fifty-fifty.’ ”

                                       22
took off her top and unbuttoned her pants, and orally copulated her.17 She
turned around with her forearms over the sink, waist bent at a 90-degree
angle and rear end extended toward him. He performed oral sex “on the part
behind” and noticed a bruise on her left buttocks and upper thigh. He put his
penis in her vagina, she told him to ejaculate inside her because she was
“ ‘taking the pills,’ ”18 and he did so. This was the first time they had sexual
intercourse. Galvan testified that everything was consensual and that Doe
never hit her forehead. He testified that Doe’s vest was on the sink and his
was on the floor, with Zuniga’s knife “inside the vest” and the knife he had
found on the tool cart in the outside pocket. The knife shown on the floor of
the bathroom in photographs was Doe’s.
      Galvan told Doe he was going to leave first to make sure no one was
around. She asked him what room they were in and as he stood in the hall,
she closed the door. He finished closing doors on the hallway, then went back
and heard Doe “whining,” crying and talking to someone. He knocked and
asked if she was okay, and when she did not answer, he attempted to open
the door with his card but the “upper lock was on.” Galvan thought Doe
might have gotten a phone call about her daughter or a family member being

      17  Asked if this was the first time he had seen Doe’s breasts, Galvan
testified that around the second week she was at work, Doe showed him her
breasts during a conversation in which she told him she had had surgery in
Mexico to remove cysts from one of her breasts, and that she has a scar going
down from her right nipple that was “pretty obvious.” Doe denied ever telling
Galvan about having surgery on her breast or showing him a surgery scar.
She had never had cysts but had breast enlargement surgery on both breasts
and had visible scarring that was “[n]ot very” prominent.
      18 The nurse who conducted Doe’s sexual assault examination testified
that they discussed emergency contraception because Doe was not taking
preventative birth control.

                                       23
ill. He kept knocking and asking if she was okay, then heard her say, “ ‘His
name is Francisco. He wants to come in.’ ” He thought, “[W]hat the fuck . . . .
Obviously, she’s accusing me.” Through the door he asked what she was
doing and begged her to open the door, in disbelief over what was happening.
      Scared and confused, Galvan walked down the stairs to the first floor
and saw Zuniga outside. He remembered he had Zuniga’s knife and gave it
back to him. He had no idea at this point that he would be accused of using
the knife on Doe. He asked if Zuniga had seen Doe, thinking that if she was
playing a trick on him, she might have come down in the elevator. Zuniga
said no and Galvan went back to the ninth floor, at which point Ortega
called, asking if everything was okay and where Doe was. Galvan said Doe
was locked in a room on the ninth floor, crying.
      Zuniga came into the hallway and asked where Doe was, and Galvan
said she was in the room. As they knocked on the door, asking Doe to open it,
other coworkers gathered. Galvan pushed with all his strength and opened
the locked door. Doe was in the bathroom, in a “fetal position.” Galvan asked
why she was “ ‘doing all this’ ” and she said, “ ‘Shut up. You raped me.
[Zuniga,] he raped me. This dumbass raped me. Get him out of here.’ ”
Galvan tried to explain to Zuniga that he and Doe had a relationship, had
had sex in the room, and she was lying, but everyone was listening to Doe,
not him.
      Galvan left and, as he did, heard Doe saying he had “ ‘fondled’ ” her
with a knife and remembered that he had the knife he had found. Galvan
saw that the police were arriving “with their rifles.” He went to where
Valencia and others were standing and gave Valencia the knife, telling him
that Doe was crazy and was saying he had raped her and “fondled her with a
knife.” Galvan then went back to the hallway and told a police officer that

                                      24
Doe was lying and they had a relationship. Everyone else was saying, “ ‘it’s
him,’ ” and the officer arrested him. Someone said, “ ‘Search him. He has a
knife in his vest.’ ” An officer searched him and said he was clean. Asked if
he knew at the time of his arrest that Doe had his knife, Galvan replied, “I
didn’t know that she had my knife until my brain started to put everything
together again. And that’s when I felt she had the knife.”
      Galvan testified that Exhibit 3, the WhatsApp messages between him
and Doe found on her phone, was missing three weeks of messages from
June 4 to 25, which he said she erased. He testified that they had texted “[a]
lot” during that period. Galvan testified that messages from July 2 to 17
were also missing. Although he did not remember exactly when, Galvan was
sure there were texts from him asking how Doe felt about what was going on
between them and from her saying she was “comfortable” and “okay with it”
but had a “guilty conscience” because he had a wife and she had a boyfriend.
On his own phone, Galvan erased messages from lovers so his wife would not
see them but kept a few work-related ones.
      B. Rene Ortega’s testimony
      Ortega testified that it was his job to set up crews and assign people to
projects, and he sometimes assigned Galvan and Doe to work together.
Galvan did not have authority to assign Doe to work with him. Ortega was at
the jobsite from 4 a.m. to 6 p.m. until about two weeks before July 26, when
his ending time was changed to 4:30 p.m. The foreman Ismael was on site
from 2 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. Ortega would not expect Galvan to send
photographs of work that needed to be corrected to other workers because it
was not his job to supervise others, but Ortega did not know whether Galvan
had sent such photographs.

                                      25
      Ortega had never observed female coworkers seeming uncomfortable
around Galvan, Doe never reported complaints about him and Ortega never
suspected Doe was having problems with Galvan at work. He did not know
whether Doe and Galvan communicated outside of work. Galvan never told
Ortega about having relationships outside his marriage and Ortega’s sister
never told him she suspected Galvan of doing so. In Ortega’s opinion, Galvan
was not “the type of guy who would commit rape.”19
      C. Galvan’s Wife’s Testimony
      Galvan’s wife suspected something was going on at work around
May 30 through July 2019 because Galvan “was different.” She learned
“[a]fter the fact” that he admitted cheating on her with Doe and three other
women. Asked about marital problems, she testified that Galvan was upset
because of something hurtful she said that was not in fact true but caused
him to think she had cheated on him. She testified that it was not Galvan’s
character to commit rape, explaining that he had never forced her to do
anything she did not want to do and “would never hurt his children” or a
woman “that way.”
      D. Galvan’s cell phone data
      A digital evidence investigator testified that data extracted from
Galvan’s phone showed 100 calls with Doe in the period from June 14 to
July 27. There were approximately 130 text message records between
June 26 and July 26, some of which could have been duplicates. The bulk of
the messages were between July 23 and July 26. He did not find any deleted
messages in the evidence he examined but testified that he was not able to

      19 Ortega never saw Galvan use drugs at work or heard rumors that he
did so. If he had learned Galvan was doing this, Galvan would have been
terminated regardless of their personal relationship.

                                      26
conduct a full examination for deleted messages with the information that
was available to him.
      E. Expert testimony
         1. Doe’s Injuries
      Forensic pathologist Katherine Raven, the defense expert on the
mechanism and detection of injury, testified that although it is very difficult
to accurately age a bruise, changes in color give a “good idea” whether a
bruise is fresh or older. Based on the photographs of Doe’s bruises, and
assuming they were taken within six hours of the alleged rape, Raven
testified that most of the bruises were older or too small to draw conclusions
from, while two small ones near the buttocks and one on the upper right arm
appeared “a little more fresh.” The forehead injury was very small and the
photo showed swelling but no hematoma. This appeared to be a focal injury,
from hitting something about a half centimeter in size rather than hitting a
broad surface. It could have been caused by hitting a corner of the empty
mirror frame. It also could have been caused by Doe hitting herself with the
blunt handle of a utility knife. The “defect” in Doe’s mouth looked more like a
chronic ulcer than an impact injury. The small bruise on Doe’s abdomen
could have been caused by coming into contact with a small piece of debris
such as construction material.
         2. Doe’s Potential Civil Claims
      Attorney Katherine Moore testified as an expert witness in civil law
related to premises liability and third-party claims. Moore testified that
based on the facts Doe described, Doe would have potential causes of action
against Galvan for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. She would potentially
have the same causes of action against Webcor based on an argument that

                                       27
Webcor knew of Galvan’s propensities but did not fire him, thereby setting up
a potentially dangerous condition for Doe, working a mostly male-dominated
evening shift in a hotel with no lighting and no supervisor on duty. The
advantage of suing Webcor would be to potentially collect a judgment against
the “deep pocket” large corporation. A criminal conviction against Galvan
would establish liability in a civil lawsuit against him; it would not establish
liability in a suit against Webcor, but it would be persuasive evidence.
                                        III.
                              Procedural History
      Galvan was charged by information filed on September 17, 2019, with
forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2))20 (count 1); forcible oral
copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)) (count 2); false imprisonment by violence
(§ 236) (count 3); and criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)) (count 4). An
enhancement for use of a deadly weapon in commission of a specified sexual
offense (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)) was alleged for counts 1 and 4.
      After a jury trial, Galvan was found guilty of the charged offenses and
the enhancement allegations were found true. At sentencing on February 5,
2021, the court struck the deadly weapon enhancement with respect to
count 4 and sentenced Galvan to a prison term of 18 years, imposing the
upper term of eight years on count 1, the upper term of 10 years for the
enhancement on that count, and concurrent middle terms of six years on
count 2 and two years on count 4. The court stayed sentence on count 3
pursuant to section 654.
      Galvan filed a timely notice of appeal.

      20All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.

                                        28
                                DISCUSSION
                                       I.
      Galvan Has Not Demonstrated Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
      Galvan argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his
attorney failed to impeach Doe’s testimony regarding the meaning of certain
Spanish words used in the texts they exchanged. The contention focuses on
the word “querer,” the infinitive form from which “te quiero” is conjugated.
Galvan texted Doe, “te quiero” and Doe used the shorthand “TQM” (“te quiero
mucho”). Doe testified that TQM means “I love you a lot” but that in Spanish
“it is not love you. It is like I appreciate—I hold you in esteem,” and that she
did not mean it in a romantic sense. She distinguished “te quiero” from “te
amo,” which she indicated referred to “deeply love,” but acknowledged that
when Galvan used “quiero” in the texts, he meant “love.”
      Galvan argues his attorney should have impeached Doe with expert
testimony or other evidence that the “correct” meaning and translation of
“querer” is “to love or to want in a desiring way.” In his view, Doe’s testimony
that “querer” means “to appreciate” or “to esteem” rather than “to love” was
erroneous and self-serving, and counsel’s failure to present evidence to
counter it left Doe as the sole source of translation of words she used in text
messages that served to impeach her claim of unconsented sex. Galvan
argues that there was no physical evidence of forcible sex and the
prosecution’s attempt to corroborate Doe’s testimony with evidence of her
distress, such as Perez’s testimony about Doe’s call to her and the recording
of Doe’s call to 911, was countered by the defense theory that Doe and Perez
contrived the incident to enable Doe to sue Webcor. In Galvan’s view, the
prosecution’s case was undermined by Doe’s texts with Galvan, which could
“unmistakably” be interpreted as flirtatious, and Doe’s efforts to portray

                                       29
herself as having no desire or affection for Galvan called her credibility into
question. If defense counsel had presented a linguistic expert to testify to the
definition and/or colloquial use of “querer,” or even dictionary definitions of
the term, Galvan argues, the outcome of the case would have been different.
      A.    Governing principles
      “When challenging a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance, the
defendant must demonstrate counsel’s inadequacy. To satisfy this burden,
the defendant must first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice,
i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “ ‘ “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” [Citations].’ [Citation].” (People v.
Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 624.)
      “When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court
defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption
counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. It
is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
      B. Analysis
      As earlier described, Doe testified that the letters “T-Q-M” she texted to
Galvan mean “I love you a lot,” but that in Spanish “it is not love you. It is

                                        30
like I appreciate—I hold you in esteem.” She testified that “quiero” has
“different contexts” and “a lot of conjectures,” and contrasted it with “te amo,”
saying “[i]n order to say ‘I love you,’ it is te amo, t-e-a-m-o, not te quiero,” and
it could be the same as in a friendship as it is with a couple. Doe testified
that when she used “quiero” in messages to Galvan, she did not mean it in a
romantic way, as was the case when she used it in a text to Perez. She
recognized that when Galvan told her “te quiero,” he meant he loved her, not
he appreciated her—as reflected in the fact that when he asked if she loved
him, she said “no.”
      Doe acknowledged there were other words she could have used to show
appreciate but chose to use “love,” and testified that she “should have put
down I hold you in esteem.” She testified that she now understood it
appeared unprofessional to tell a co-worker, “I love you,” but at the time she
did not understand this. She acknowledged that Galvan’s wife would be
“pretty upset” if she saw the message from Doe telling Galvan, “I love you,”
but testified that if his wife “read the messages where I was telling him to
forget about what his wife had said to him, she would understand that it was
not an amorous conversation.”
      Galvan offers excerpts from Spanish-English dictionaries to
demonstrate the correct meaning of “querer.”21 The New Cuyas Dictionary
translates “querer” as “to will; to desire, wish; to endeavor, attempt; to accept
(a challenge in certain games); to love.” (New Cuyas Dict. (1966) p. 452.) The
same dictionary translates “amar” as “to love.” (Id. at p. 32.) The Collins
Spanish-English Dictionary translates “querer” with indications of its

      21 We granted Galvan’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the
dictionary definitions and on-line translations he submitted.

                                         31
different senses, including: “1 (a una persona) (= amar) to love; (= apreciar)
to like” and “2 (= desear) . . . to want.” (Collins Spanish English Dict. (4th ed.
2002) p. 473 (Collins).) Other meanings and usages described or illustrated
in Collins include “I didn’t mean to hurt you” and “I’d like two kilos of
potatoes, please.”22 (Ibid.)
      It is apparent from these definitions that there is no singular
translation of “querer.” Galvan agrees the term “has a plethora of uses and
connotations” and is “highly contextual,” yet his argument appears to be built
on the premise that there is a sharp distinction between the “correct”
translation of “querer”—which he states is “to love” or “to want in a desiring
way”—and Doe’s incorrect testimony that it can mean “to appreciate” or “to
esteem.” Galvan asserts that while “querer” “can be used to denote general
liking or likeability when used with reference to a third person or thing,
when spoken directly at someone it signifies want, need, and desire for; that
is, ‘love’ in its appetitive and/or needful aspects.”23

      22 These entries read, “3 (= tener intención de) (+ INFIN) no quería
hacerte daño I didn’t mean to hurt you” and “4 (pidiendo algo) quería dos
kilos de patatas, por favor I’d like two kilos of potatoes, please.” (Collins,
supra, at p. 473.)
      23  The People offer excerpts from two websites to show that Doe’s
distinction between colloquial uses of “te quiero” and “te amo” was accurate.
While we draw no conclusion about the accuracy of Doe’s testimony, we
observe that the fundamental point in both excerpts is that “te amo” is seen
as more serious, romantic and intimate while “te quiero” is more casual. (Te
Amo vs. Te Quiero: Differences in “I Love You” in Spanish
 [as of April 24, 2023]; Te Quiero vs. Te
Amo  [as of April 24,
2023].)

                                         32
      To the extent Galvan is arguing that “te quiero,” as used in texts
between him and Doe, necessarily connotes “want, need, and desire for,” the
sources of translation he relies on do not support the argument. Collins, for
example, indicates “querer” can mean “to love” in the sense of the Spanish
“amar” but also “to like,” and gives examples including both a romantic sense
(“I’m madly in love with her”) and a non-romantic one (“he is well liked at the
office”). The examples Collins provides for the meaning “to want” (referring
to the Spanish “desear”) do not suggest “want” in a sexual sense but rather

       Galvan sees the first of these websites as confirming his description of
“querer” as “signif[ying] appetitive desire” while “amar” “reflects affection.”
We do not agree. The site explains that querer is “[l]iterally translated to, ‘I
want you,’ ” but says it is “most appropriate for expressing love to family,
close friends or significant others.” (Te Amo vs. Te Quiero: Differences in “I
Love You” in Spanish  [as of April 24, 2023].) As
two of the three examples of appropriate use involve platonic forms of love,
the literal translation does not appear to carry the same meaning as “I want
you” does in English. The People’s other source makes this point, stating, “te
quiero” “literally means ‘I want you’ but its most common meaning is ‘I love
you’ and is considered an appropriate way to express platonic love.” (Te
Quiero vs. Te Amo  [as of
April 24, 2023].) Other websites directly state that “te quiero” generally does
not mean “I want you” in the physical sense. (Te Quiero vs Te Amo: What’s
the Difference?  [as of
April 24, 2023] [“querer also means ‘to want’, but not in the sense of desire, as
in ‘I want you.’ . . . [I]t means ‘I care about you’ or ‘I love you’ ”]; Te Quiero vs
Te Amo: Don’t Say the Wrong ‘I Love You’ in Spanish
 [as of April 24, 2023] [“Querer is rarely used to say ‘I
want you’ in a romantic sense”]; ‘Te Quiero’ vs ‘Te Amo’ in
Spanish/Differences and Examples
 [as of April
24, 2023] [“ ‘te quiero’ is rarely used as a synonym of ‘I want you’ . . . because
‘querer’ expresses feelings and affection, while ‘I want you’ may be
understood as a physical desire”].)

                                         33
include “which one do you want?” “she does what she wants,” “he wants to be
an engineer” and “I don’t want you to go.”
      Galvan takes issue with Doe’s testimony that “querer” means
appreciation or esteem. At least as to appreciation, however, Galvan’s own
authorities suggest Doe was not wrong: One of the meanings Collins lists for
“querer” is “(= apreciar) to like.” (Collins, supra, at p. 473.) Apreciar is the
infinitive form of “aprecio,” which Galvan says is the Spanish word meaning
appreciation. Collins defines “apreciar” as “to be fond of/like,” “to value,” “to
appreciate.” (Collins,

[as of April 24, 2023].)24
      In any event, Doe’s testimony about the meaning of “te quiero” did not
call for rebuttal by expert testimony. It is clear from Doe’s testimony as a
whole that she was attempting to address the multiple meanings and
connotations of “te quiero,” to distinguish “I love you” in a deeper sense from
a more casual one, and to dissociate her use of the term “quiero” from any
romantic connotation it could carry. She testified that “te quiero” has
“different contexts” and “a lot of conjectures,” and that she did not mean it in
a romantic sense in her texts with Galvan, just as when she used it in texts
with Perez. But she acknowledged that the phrase could mean “I love you” in
a romantic sense and that Galvan used it this way in his texts to her: She
understood that when he told her, “te quiero,” he meant he “love versus
appreciation.” Doe made it clear she was explaining her subjective meaning

      24 Doe acknowledged she could have used words other than “quiero” to
express appreciation for Galvan and testified that she should have said, “I
hold you in esteem” instead.

                                        34
and intention when, in response to defense counsel asking if she was saying
that “when [Galvan] tells you ‘I love you,’ using the word ‘quiero,’ that means
love, but when you say it back to him, that does not mean love,” Doe
responded, “I know that when I say it what it means.”25 The jury could not
have understood Doe as testifying that “te quiero” never means “I love you”
and only means appreciation or esteem, or as purporting to provide a
definitive definition as opposed to explaining the meaning she intended.
What Doe subjectively meant by saying “te quiero” to Galvan is not a point
expert testimony could have addressed.
      Nor is it apparent that an expert witness would have bolstered
Galvan’s case. The various meanings of “querer” and nuances of its use
appear to leave significant room for subjective differences in understanding
and usage, and raise considerable doubt that there is a definitive, objective
definition an expert could have provided. And Doe acknowledged the range
of potential meanings.
      Moreover, even if Doe’s testimony that she meant to be expressing
appreciation and esteem for Galvan was based on an erroneous translation of
“te quiero,” we fail to see how expert testimony that “querer” can mean
romantic love and cannot mean appreciation or esteem could have altered the
jury’s assessment of Doe’s credibility or outcome of the case. As we have said,
Doe acknowledged that the term can mean romantic love. If it cannot mean

      25 Defense counsel followed up by asking, “So I see what you are telling
us then is even though you said, ‘I love you,’ you didn’t actually mean it,” and
Doe replied, “Correct.” Asked how she expected Galvan to know this, Doe
referred to the texts she had sent Galvan in their discussion about the
problems between him and his wife and said, “If I were to want to have a
relationship with him myself, I wouldn’t have tried to mediate for him to
have a better relationship with his wife.”

                                      35
appreciation or esteem, evidence to that effect might have suggested a reason
for the jury to question Doe’s credibility. But defense counsel repeatedly
challenged her credibility both with respect to the texts and in general.
Defense counsel thoroughly cross examined Doe about the meaning of her
texts, emphasizing messages that suggested she was flirting with Galvan or
seemed to imply they had a romantic or sexual relationship or Doe was
holding open the possibility of one. Defense counsel questioned why Doe
continued or initiated conversations with Galvan if he was bothering her.
Counsel questioned Doe’s credibility generally, for example by pointing to
inconsistencies in her various statements to the police, and attacked it
directly by advancing the theory that she falsely accused Galvan of rape in
order to create a claim for which she could sue Webcor.
      The jury could not have failed to recognize the affection and familiarity
reflected in the text messages. Indeed, the prosecutor spent considerable
time proactively having Doe explain in a neutral manner texts she sent that
appeared “flirty” or failed to shut down Galvan’s provocative ones—which, of
course, served to highlight their romantic or sexual connotations and Doe’s
efforts to minimize those connotations.26 In short, the jury had ample basis

      26  For example, in response to texts from Galvan saying she was the
“best thing that has happened to me,” and “in my chest, there is something
that wants to come out every time I’m near you,” Doe said she felt the same
as him. She testified at trial that this was a mistake and explained how she
meant to be responding to a prior message by saying she felt the same
regarding “the admiration that I had told him that I had for him in the past.”
When Galvan said he thought he and Doe had something in common that
“makes us attractive to each other” and “makes us feel this,” Doe responded,
“ ‘Well, what do you think it is,’ ” but testified that she said this “jokingly.”
She testified that her comment to Galvan, in their conversation about
problems in his marriage, that “having a handsome husband is not easy” was

                                       36
for doubting Doe’s credibility, but believed her at least with respect to the
assault she described. There is no reasonable probability expert testimony on
the meaning of “querer” would have altered its assessment.
                                 II.
       The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury with
                         CALCRIM No. 1190.
      Galvan next contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 1190 in addition to CALCRIM No. 301. CALCRIM No. 301
instructs, “[t]he testimony of only one witness can prove any fact. Before you
conclude that the testimony of one witness proves a fact, you should carefully
review all the evidence.” CALCRIM No. 1190 states, “Conviction of a sexual
assault crime may be based on the testimony of a complaining witness alone.”
Galvan argues that giving these instructions together unfairly emphasized
Doe’s testimony and lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof by
commenting on the weight to give her testimony.27
      This argument has been rejected by the California Supreme Court with
respect to earlier versions of the instructions Galvan challenges, CALJIC
No. 2.27 (the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 301) and CALJIC No. 10.60 (the
predecessor to CALCRIM No. 1190). (People v. Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th
693 (Gammage).) At the time Gammage was decided, CALJIC No. 2.27
stated, “ ‘Testimony as to any particular fact which you believe given by one
witness is sufficient for the proof of that fact. However, before finding any

simply referring to “ ‘when a woman is jealous, it becomes more
complicated.’ ”
      27  The People acknowledge that Galvan’s failure to object to the
instructions in the trial court does not preclude him from raising it here.
(People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 630, fn. 13; § 1259 [appellate court
may review instruction despite absence of objection below “if the substantial
rights of the defendant were affected thereby”].)

                                       37
fact required to be established by the prosecution to be proved solely by the
testimony of such a single witness, you should carefully review all the
testimony upon which the proof of such fact depends.’ ” (Gammage, at p. 696,
quoting former CALJIC No. 2.27 (4th ed. 1986 rev.), italics omitted.) CALJIC
No. 10.60, at that time, provided, “ ‘It is not essential to a conviction of a
charge of rape that the testimony of the witness with whom sexual
intercourse is alleged to have been committed be corroborated by other
evidence.’ ” (Gammage, at pp. 696-697, quoting former CALJIC No. 10.21
(4th ed. 1970 rev.), which became CALJIC No. 10.60 (5th ed.).)
      As Gammage explained, California law used to require that juries in
sexual assault cases be instructed to view the complaining witness’s
testimony with caution, explaining that such charges are “ ‘ “easily made and,
once made, difficult to defend against, even if the person accused is
innocent.” ’ ” (Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 695, quoting People v. Rincon-
Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 871.) Rincon-Pineda held this instruction had
“ ‘outworn its usefulness’ ” and “ ‘perform[ed] no just function’ ” (Gammage, at
p. 695, quoting Rincon-Pineda, at pp. 877, 883), in part because the low rate
of successful prosecutions for such offenses showed defendants were not
“subject to capricious conviction.” (Rincon-Pineda, at pp. 879-882.) Rincon-
Pineda held the cautionary instruction should no longer be given and instead
mandated a jury instruction that is equivalent to CALJIC No. 2.27 and
CALCRIM No. 301. (Rincon-Pineda, at p. 885.)
      Gammage rejected the argument that instructing the jury with both
CALJIC No. 2.27 and CALJIC No. 10.60 “unconstitutionally ‘creates a
preferential credibility standard for the complaining witness.’ ” (Gammage,
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 700.) The court explained: “Although the two
instructions overlap to some extent, each has a different focus. CALJIC

                                        38
No 2.27 focuses on how the jury should evaluate a fact (or at least a fact
required to be established by the prosecution) proved solely by the testimony
of a single witness. It is given with other instructions advising the jury how
to engage in the fact-finding process. CALJIC No. 10.60, on the other hand,
declares a substantive rule of law, that the testimony of the complaining
witness need not be corroborated. It is given with other instructions on the
legal elements of the charged crimes.
      “Because of this difference in focus of the instructions, we disagree with
defendant . . . that, in combination, the instructions create a preferential
credibility standard for the complaining witness, or somehow suggest that
that witness is entitled to a special deference. The one instruction merely
suggests careful review when a fact depends on the testimony of one witness.
The other tells the jury there is no legal corroboration requirement. Neither
eviscerates or modifies the other. . . . ‘There was no singling out of the
testimony of the prosecuting witness with a view of giving it undue
prominence before the jury.’ [Citation]. Nor do the instructions ‘dilute[] the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.’ [Citation]. The instructions in
combination are no less correct, and no less fair to both sides, than either is
individually.” (Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 700-701.)
      Galvan argues that Gammage’s reasoning does not apply to CALCRIM
No. 1190 because of a “critical difference in . . . phrasing.” CALJIC No. 10.60
informed the jury that the complaining witness’s testimony did not need to be
“corroborated by other evidence,” which is the language Gammage relied on
in concluding CALJIC No. 10.60 focused on the legal elements of the crime
rather than the fact-finding process that was the focus of CALJIC No. 2.27.
Because CALCRIM No. 1190 “says nothing about corroboration,” according to
Galvan, it “has nothing to do with ‘the legal elements of the charged crimes.’ ”

                                        39
      We disagree. There is no substantive difference between the
instruction that a complaining witness’s testimony need not be “corroborated
by other evidence” (CALJIC No. 10.60) and the instruction that a conviction
in a sexual assault case “may be based on the testimony of a complaining
witness alone.” (CALCRIM No. 1190.)28 Both convey the legal principle that
evidence beyond the complaining witness’s testimony is not required. Like
CALJIC No. 10.60, CALCRIM No. 1190 is given “with other instructions on
the legal elements of the charged crimes,” while CALCRIM No. 301, like
CALJIC No. 2.27, is given with other instructions on “how to engage in
the fact-finding process.” (Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 701, 700.)29

      28 Galvan argues in his reply brief that there is a “further distinction
which was not raised in Gammage at all” in that CALJIC No. 10.60 and
CALCRIM No. 1190 use the word “conviction,” and that the People’s failure
to answer this argument should be taken as a concession of its merit. Galvan
does not further explain his point; he simply cites to pages of his opening
brief. Those pages address the significance of the fact that the word
“corroboration” does not appear in CALCRIM No. 1190, an argument the
People’s brief does address (albeit unsatisfactorily, in Galvan’s view). We fail
to see what point Galvan believes the People have conceded.
      29 CALCRIM No. 301 was given immediately after an instruction that
neither party is required to call all witnesses who might have information or
present all evidence that might be relevant (CALCRIM No. 300) and was
followed by instructions not to resolve a conflict in the evidence by counting
the number of witnesses who agree or disagree or to disregard a witness’s
testimony without reason or due to bias (CALCRIM No. 302), instructions on
how to evaluate expert witnesses’ testimony (CALCRIM No. 332), how to
evaluate the opinions of witnesses who did not testify as experts (CALCRIM
No. 333), how to evaluate character testimony, including that the defendant
was not predisposed to commit rape (CALCRIM No. 350), and how to
evaluate evidence of the defendant’s out-of-court statements (CALCRIM
Nos. 358, 359, 362).
     The trial court then instructed on the elements of the two charged
sexual offenses, rape and oral copulation, followed by CALCRIM No. 1190.

                                      40
Galvan’s contention that CALCRIM No. 1190 rephrased the general
instruction provided by CALCRIM No. 301 and applied it exclusively to the
prosecution’s main witness, thereby signaling that her testimony “did not
need to be scrutinized as closely as other evidence,” is not persuasive.
      Galvan urges that the historical underpinnings of Gammage’s analysis
no longer justify its conclusion. He points to the reasoning of Justice Mosk’s
concurring opinion in Gammage, which argued that because juries were no
longer instructed to view a complaining witness’s testimony with caution,
there was no longer a need to instruct that corroboration of a complaining
witness’s testimony is not necessary. (Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 703,
conc. opinion of Mosk, J.) Noting that prosecutions for sexual offenses were
no longer less successful than those for other major crimes (which had been
the justification for requiring the cautionary instruction), Justice Mosk
questioned the assumption that jurors still harbored the misconception that
the testimony of the victim in a sexual offense case had to be corroborated
and warned that the no-corroboration instruction could be harmful because it
could be understood to favor the complaining witness’s testimony and
disfavor that of defense witnesses. (Id. at pp. 703-705.) Galvan argues that
more recent statistics show “prosecutors no longer continue to face special
difficulty obtaining convictions” in sexual offense cases, making it

The next instructions informed the jury that if it concluded the prosecution
had proven one of the sexual offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, it was
permitted, but not required, to conclude he was disposed to and did commit
the other (CALCRIM No. 1191B), and that it was permitted to consider
evidence that Doe engaged in consensual sexual acts with Galvan prior to the
charged offenses solely to help decide whether she consented to the charged
acts (CALCRIM No. 1194).
      The instructions then moved on to the elements of the non-sexual
offenses.

                                       41
unnecessary to provide an instruction as a counterweight to the long since
discredited corroboration rule.
      Gammage recognized that at the time it was decided in 1975 “ ‘the
historical imbalance between victim and accused in sexual assault
prosecutions’ ha[d] been partially redressed” (Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at
p. 701, quoting Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 222,
conc. opn. of Arabian, J.)) but nevertheless held “there remains a continuing
vitality in instructing juries that there is no legal requirement of
corroboration. Further, even if we were to assume, which we do not, that all
juries are aware of the no-corroboration requirement, or would glean it from
CALJIC No. 2.27 [now CALCRIM No. 301] itself, no harm is done in
reminding juries of the rule. [¶] The jury is instructed that the prosecution
must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This places a heavy burden
of persuasion on a complaining witness whose testimony is uncorroborated.
CALJIC No. 10.60 [now CALCRIM No. 1190] does not affect this instruction
but, . . . when all the instructions are given, ‘a balance is struck which
protects the rights of both the defendant and the complaining witness.’ ”
(Gammage, at p. 701, quoting People v. Hollis (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1521,
1526.) We are bound to follow Gammage. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
      Galvan also points to cases from other jurisdictions that have reached
the opposite conclusion to Gammage. (E.g., Gutierrez v. State (Fla. 2015)
177 So.3d 226, 229-230, 231-232 [no-corroboration instruction is improper
comment on testimony, presents “impermissible risk that the jury will
conclude it need not subject the victim’s testimony to the same tests for
credibility and weight applicable to other witnesses” and lends “an extra
element of weight to the victim’s testimony”]; State v. Stukes (S.C. 2016)

                                       42
787 S.E.2d 480, 499 [“By addressing the veracity of a victim’s testimony in its
instructions, the trial court emphasizes the weight of that evidence in the
eyes of the jury” and “invites the jury to believe the victim”].)
      Other jurisdictions have reached conclusions consistent with
Gammage. (E.g., Gaxiola v. State (Nev. 2005) 119 P.3d 1225, 1232 [“A ‘no
corroboration’ instruction does not tell the jury to give a victim’s testimony
greater weight, it simply informs the jury that corroboration is not required
by law”]; Pitts v. State (Miss. 2020) 291 So.3d 751, 758-759 [no-corroboration
instruction correct statement of law and not improper comment on weight of
evidence].)
      This split in authority (see State v. Kraai (Iowa 2022) 969 N.W.2d 487,
493-495 [collecting conflicting cases]), however interesting, does not affect our
duty to adhere to Gammage.30
      Galvan’s equal protection argument is also unavailing. Galvan argues
that his constitutional right to equal protection was violated by instructing
the jury that conviction could be based on Doe’s testimony alone without also
instructing that acquittal could be based on Galvan’s testimony alone. He
maintains that he was subjected to disparate treatment because he and Doe

      30 Taking umbrage at the People’s comment that he “tellingly” started
his argument with citation to out-of-state authority, Galvan states that he
referred to out-of-state cases “in the absence of any published case squarely
on point on the facts.” Gammage, of course, is on point. The distinction
Galvan relies on to argue Gammage is not controlling is that CALJIC
No. 10.60 explicitly referred to “corroboration” and CALCRIM No. 1190 does
not. But the out-of-state cases Galvan relies on addressed instructions
expressly using the term “corroboration,” just like Gammage. Galvan’s
discussion of these cases thus appears to be no more than an attempt to
convince us that Gammage was wrongly decided.

                                        43
were both witnesses at trial but CALJIC No. 1190 in effect told the jury that
Doe’s testimony was to be given extra weight.
      Although Gammage did not expressly refer to equal protection, it
implicitly rejected an equal protection challenge like Galvan’s in disagreeing
with the contention that CALJIC No. 10.60, combined with CALJIC No. 2.27,
“unconstitutionally ‘creates a preferential credibility standard for the
complaining witness.’ ” (Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 700.) The Supreme
Court’s conclusion necessarily eliminates the foundation of Galvan’s equal
protection claim—that the instructions directed the jury to give extra
credence to Doe’s testimony over Galvan’s. Galvan again attempts to
distinguish Gammage by arguing that the absence of the word “corroborated”
in CALCRIM No. 1190 renders inapplicable the distinction that Gammage
relied on in finding that CALJIC No. 10.60 focused on a legal standard rather
than just reiterating the fact-finding guidance provided by CALJIC No. 2.27,
and therefore did not give preferential weight to a complaining witness’s
testimony. As we have said, we see CALCRIM No. 1190 as substantively
equivalent to CALJIC No. 10.60 notwithstanding the change in wording.
Gammage is controlling.
                                      III.
                 A Remand for Resentencing Is Necessary
      A. Senate Bill No. 567
      As earlier noted, Galvan was sentenced to the upper term of eight years
on count 1 and the upper term of 10 years on the enhancement for use of a
deadly weapon in commission of that offense. At the time of sentencing,
section 1170, subdivision (b), gave the trial courts broad discretion to decide
which of the three terms specified for an offense would best serve the
interests of justice. (See § 1170, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 29,

                                       44
§ 14.) Subsequently, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 1170, subdivision (b) in a number of respects, one of which was to
make the middle term of imprisonment the presumptive sentence. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Under the amended statute, “[w]hen
a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2).” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) “A trial court may impose an upper
term sentence only where there are aggravating circumstances in the crime
and the defendant has either stipulated to the facts underlying those
circumstances or they have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(2).)” (People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500.)
The sentencing court can also rely on certified records of conviction without
having to submit the prior convictions to the jury. (Ibid.; § 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
      The parties agree that the Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
amendments apply retroactively to this case as an ameliorative change in the
law applicable to all nonfinal convictions on appeal. (People v. Superior
Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308; People v. Flores (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
1032, 1039.) They further agree that Galvan did not stipulate to any of the
aggravating factors the trial court cited in imposing the upper term sentences
and that none of these factors were found true beyond a reasonable doubt by
the jury. We concur.
      B. Remand for Resentencing Is Required.
      The parties disagree as to the need for resentencing. The People
maintain remand is unnecessary because any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Galvan contends the error that occurred here can never be
found harmless. Neither of these positions is correct.

                                       45
      The People rely on the principle that “ ‘[i]f a reviewing court concludes,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single
aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury,’ the error [in
failing to submit the circumstance to the jury] is harmless.” (People v. Flores,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 500, quoting People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th
825, 839 (Sandoval).)
      This test, by which Sandoval applied harmless error review under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 to denial of the right to a jury trial
on aggravating circumstances that expose a defendant to an elevated
sentence, does not fully address the issue under the amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). The Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amendments
“chang[ed] the framework within which the trial court exercises its discretion
by specifying a legislatively determined presumptive sentence. This means
we must ask both whether we can be certain the jury would have found
beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstances relied on by the
court and whether the trial court would have exercised its discretion in the
same way if it had been aware of the statutory presumption in favor of the
middle term. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 463, 466-467,
fns. 10 & 11 [Lopez].)” (People v. Wandrey (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 962, 982,
review granted Sept. 28, 2022, S275942.)
      “ ‘ “[D]efendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the
exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A
court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have
been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant's
record.” [Citation.]’ (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391;

                                       46
see People v. Marquez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 797, 803 [‘an erroneous
understanding by the trial court of its discretionary power is not a true
exercise of discretion’].) Therefore, where a trial court cannot have acted
with ‘ “ ‘informed discretion,’ ” ’ ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for
resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would
have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.” [Citations.]’ (Gutierrez, at p. 1391.)” (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467; People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1353,
review granted March 15, 2023. S278266 (Ross).)
      Under the amended 1170, subdivision (b), we can find harmless error if
we can “ ‘conclude beyond reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the aggravating factors on which the trial
court relied in exercising its discretion to select the upper term.’ ” (People v.
Ross, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1354, italics added, quoting Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11.) In that situation, “ ‘the defendant has not
suffered prejudice from the court’s reliance on factors not found true by a jury
in selecting the upper term.’ ” (Ross, at p. 1354.) If we can only conclude that
the jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt one, or some, of
the factors the trial court relied upon, we can find the error harmless only if
we can find it reasonably probable (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836) that the trial court “ ‘would nevertheless have exercised its discretion to
select the upper term if it had recognized that it could permissibly rely on
only a single one of the aggravating factors, a few of the aggravating factors,
or none of the aggravating factors, rather than all of the factors on which it
previously relied.’ ” (Ross, at pp. 1354-1355, quoting Lopez, at p 467, fn. 11.)
      Here, we cannot confidently say the jury would have found any of the
aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court relied on

                                        47
four factors. First, the court found that Doe was particularly vulnerable (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3))31 in that she was “one of only two women
that were working in a predominantly male construction site,” she was
“isolated on an elevated floor” of a hotel that was under construction, without
active power, “alone in the dark with [Galvan] in a place where her co-
workers were far away and could not hear her,” and Galvan was aware of this
and, according to Doe, pointed it out to her, threatening her with a knife and
telling her “not to scream because there was no one to hear her.” Second, the
court found that the circumstances of the offense demonstrated planning,
sophistication and professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)) in that Galvan “chose a
location wherein he isolated the victim from potential help” after having
“spent a great deal of time on a job site building a relationship of trust with
her.” Third, the court found Galvan was “in a position of trust and confidence
vis-a-vis [Doe] at the time of the offense” (rule 4.421(a)(11)), having spent “a
great deal of time prior to the offense[] engaged in building a social
relationship with her designed to engender trust and affection from her with
the exchange of various text messages and telephone calls[,] often under
circumstances where she was attempting to rebut him.” Finally, the court
found the offense involved violent conduct indicating a “serious danger to
society” (rule 4.421, subd. (b)(1)), which in the court’s view was exacerbated
by “the utter lack of remorse that [Galvan] has displayed throughout this
process.” The court commented that at sentencing and at times during his
testimony at trial, when discussing something Doe had said or how she said
it, Galvan would “raise his voice and change the pitch to emulate her in that

      31   Further references to rules will be to the California Rules of Court.

                                        48
mocking way,” and that he said things that were “disparaging” of her in his
statement to the court.32
      Sandoval cautioned that, “to the extent a potential aggravating
circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or
subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with
confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would
have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.”
(Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840.) All the aggravating factors the court
relied on here are of this nature, requiring “an imprecise quantitative or
comparative evaluation of the facts.” (Ibid.)33

      32 The court noted that although there was evidence that the offenses
involved “great violence and threat of great bodily harm” (rule 4.421(a)(1))
and use of a weapon (rule 4.421(a)(2)), it would not rely on these as
aggravating circumstances because use of force was an element of the offense
and use of a deadly weapon was an element of the enhancement. The court
found a single mitigating circumstance, that Galvan had no prior criminal
record.
      33  Contrary to the People’s characterization, this case is not just like
People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758. The People rely on Wilson to argue
the jury had a stark choice—to believe Doe or to believe Galvan—and having
chosen to believe Doe, necessarily would have found the aggravating
circumstances true. As a factual matter, the Wilson court referred to a “stark
choice” on a very different record. There, victim described facts indisputably
demonstrating her vulnerability: She testified that the defendant raped her
after driving her to an isolated place with her six-month-old baby in the car,
while her other children and boyfriend were being held at gunpoint at the
defendant’s house and her boyfriend’s brother, whom the defendant had
already shot, was being tortured by the defendant’s confederates. (Id. at
p. 813.) The defendant’s only evidence was his pretrial statement to the
police denying the rape; there was no other evidence suggesting the victim
testified untruthfully, and her credibility was supported by evidence that the
defendant had sexually assaulted his previous fiancée more than once. (Ibid.)
Here, Galvan presented considerable evidence and argument challenging
Doe’s credibility. While the jury ultimately accepted Doe’s version of the

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      Remand for resentencing is required.34 On remand, the People may
elect to proceed under the amended section 1170, subdivision (b), by proving
the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury (or to
the court, if Galvan waives his right to a jury trial), or the People may accept
resentencing on the record as it stands. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 468.)35

forcible sexual assault, it could have done so without believing every aspect of
her testimony, including some of the facts underlying the aggravating factors.
Moreover, since Wilson applied the Sandoval test for harmless error, for the
reasons we have explained, it does not fully resolve the issues under the
amended section 1170.
      34 This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to address Galvan’s
contention that remand is always required for this kind of error.
      35  Galvan appears to suggest there is no authority for allowing the
People the option of electing to prove the aggravating circumstances to a jury.
He asserts that if the People are seeking a “non-bifurcated ‘trial by the jury’
on aggravating factors, then the only way to avoid violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause would be for the entire judgment” to be reversed, because
Galvan “knows of no authority for retrial of a part of the charge.” Galvan
cites Sealfon v. U.S. (1948) 332 U.S. 575 for the proposition that a “prior
verdict of acquittal ‘operates to conclude those matters in issue which have
been determined by a previous verdict, even though the offenses be
different.’ ” Sealfon held that a defendant who had been acquitted of
conspiracy to commit an offense could not thereafter be convicted of the
substantive offense under principles of res judicata; a double jeopardy claim
had been abandoned. (Id. at pp. 578-580.) After examining the records of the
two trials, the Court concluded that the issues necessary to conviction in the
second trial had been determined in favor of the defendant in the first: The
trial on the substantive offense “was a second attempt to prove the agreement
which at each trial was crucial to the prosecution's case and which was
necessarily adjudicated in the former trial to be non-existent.” (Id. at p. 580.)
       We fail to see how Sealfon bears on the question in the present case.
Galvan has not been acquitted of anything; his claim of error with respect to
the aggravating circumstances is that the issues have never been submitted
to a jury.

                                       50
                                DISPOSITION
      The convictions are affirmed, the sentence is vacated and the matter
remanded. With respect to count 1 and the accompanying enhancement, the
People may elect to proceed under the amended section 1170, subdivision (b),
by proving the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt to
a jury (or to the court if Galvan waives his right to a jury trial) or may accept
resentencing on the record as it stands. After the People make this election
and the court conducts any necessary further proceedings, the court is
directed to resentence Galvan in accordance with currently applicable
sentencing laws.

                                       51
                                           STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MARKMAN, J. *

People v. Galvan Martinez (A161995)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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