Court Opinion

ID: 9950562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:02:16.917472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:24.856438
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2081     Document: 010111015763       Date Filed: 03/14/2024        Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 14, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  ROY BROWN,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-2081
                                                    (D.C. No. 2:21-CV-01043-JB-JFR)
  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE                                 (D. N.M.)
  OF NEW MEXICO; MAJOR HORTON,
  Warden,

        Respondents - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before EID, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Roy Brown, a New Mexico state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate

 of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his petition for

 habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny a COA.

                                            I.

       Much of the background of Mr. Brown’s conviction is set out in State v.

 Brown, No. A-1-CA-37337, 2020 WL 2104815 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020)

 (unpublished). The underlying events occurred the night of June 15–16, 2016, in

       *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
 case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
 persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2081    Document: 010111015763       Date Filed: 03/14/2024      Page: 2

 Roosevelt County, New Mexico. Law enforcement officers were called to a

 residence where a victim reported being physically and sexually assaulted before

 escaping to a neighbor’s to call for help. She gave a description of her attacker, and

 officers found Mr. Brown outside the victim’s residence, barefoot and wearing a tank

 top and boxer shorts. He matched the general description given by the victim and

 had scratches on his body consistent with her report of scratching her attacker.

       Officers arrested Mr. Brown on the scene. Following a criminal investigation,

 he was indicted and then convicted by a jury of two counts of criminal sexual

 penetration; aggravated battery; aggravated burglary; and resisting, evading or

 obstructing an officer. The trial court sentenced him to 44 years’ imprisonment. On

 direct appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed and the New Mexico

 Supreme Court denied certiorari. His state habeas application was summarily

 dismissed and the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to review that dismissal.

       Mr. Brown filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

 § 2254 raising three issues: (1) “Sufficiency of DNA Evidence,” R. vol. I at 23–25;

 (2) “Newly Discovered Evidence,” id. at 26–27; and (3) “Ineffective Assistance of

 Counsel,” id. at 28–29. A United States Magistrate Judge determined no evidentiary

 hearing was warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and entered proposed findings and

 a recommended disposition (the PFRD). R. vol. II at 501–24. The PFRD

 recommended the district court deny Mr. Brown’s petition and deny a COA. The

 district court reviewed the PFRD de novo; overruled Mr. Brown’s objections to it;

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 adopted the PFRD in its entirety; denied Mr. Brown’s petition; and denied a COA.

 R. vol. II at 539–52. Mr. Brown then filed the application for a COA now before us.

                                            II.

       To appeal the dismissal of his § 2254 petition, Mr. Brown must obtain a COA.

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To do so, he “must demonstrate that reasonable

 jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims

 debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “The COA

 determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas

 petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

 322, 336 (2003).

       Our analysis of a request for a COA accounts for the deferential treatment

 afforded state court decisions by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

 (AEDPA). Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004). When a claim has

 been adjudicated on the merits in a state court, a federal court may grant habeas relief

 only if the petitioner establishes the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or

 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on an

 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

 court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).1

       1
         Because Mr. Brown proceeds pro se, his filings “are . . . construed liberally
 and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
 Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court will not act as
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       Mr. Brown’s COA application recites all three claims raised in his § 2254

 petition but presents arguments only as to the issues addressed below. Other issues

 that were included in his petition and resolved at the district court but not included in

 the COA application are waived. See Tran v. Trs. of State Colls. in Colo., 355 F.3d

 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed

 abandoned or waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

       A. First Claim—Sufficiency of DNA Evidence

       Mr. Brown first contests the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the DNA

 evidence. Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), evidence is

 sufficient to sustain a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most

 favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

 elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

       As detailed by the district court, extensive trial evidence supported the jury’s

 conviction. The victim testified she awakened to find herself being smothered,

 forcibly raped, and hit with a liquor bottle. Officers found Mr. Brown just outside

 her residence. The victim identified Mr. Brown as her attacker.2 A nurse examiner

 testified the victim’s injuries were consistent with forcible penetration. The

 his advocate or “take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing
 arguments and searching the record.” Id.
        2
          The PFRD described the evidence as showing “[t]he victim positively
 identified [Mr. Brown] as her attacker.” R. vol. II at 514. Mr. Brown objected to the
 PFRD’s reliance on the victim’s identification, and the district court overruled his
 objection. Other than vague attacks on the victim’s credibility, he does not argue any
 error related to her identification in his COA application, see Aplt. Br. at 4–5, and
 has therefore waived any further challenge related to it. See Tran, 355 F.3d at 1266.
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 prosecution’s forensic scientist testified that the victim’s DNA was found on

 Mr. Brown’s penis, hands, fingernails, and boxer shorts and that he was the major

 contributor of male DNA found on the victim’s hand. The victim’s DNA was also

 found on a Bacardi liquor bottle recovered from her bathroom, where she testified to

 hiding the bottle used to attack her, and video evidence showed Mr. Brown

 purchasing such a bottle earlier on the evening of the attack.

       The district court found the evidence supporting Mr. Brown’s convictions

 “compelling” and sufficient to support his convictions under the Jackson standard,

 noting a habeas court presumes the jury resolved any conflicts in the evidence in

 favor of the prosecution. See R. vol. II at 514 (citing Matthews v. Workman,

 577 F.3d 1175, 1184 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also id. at 515 n.6.3

       In his COA application, Mr. Brown criticizes various aspects of the evidence

 and argues the DNA evidence was “conflicting” and “should have exonerated [him].”

 Aplt. Br. at 4. His arguments include: that no male DNA was recovered from a swab

 of the victim’s mouth, although she described being forced to perform oral sex on her

 attacker; that vaginal swabs from the victim showed DNA of other males but not

 Mr. Brown’s; that the liquor bottle did not have his fingerprints or DNA on it; that

 the victim was allegedly dishonest about having had other sexual partners; and that

 documents were not admitted to corroborate the forensic expert’s testimony that her

       3
         The district court concluded Mr. Brown had not exhausted a sufficiency-of-
 the-evidence claim on direct appeal or in state habeas proceedings but addressed the
 claim without requiring further exhaustion because it found Mr. Brown had not raised
 a colorable constitutional claim on this basis. We agree.
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 test results were confirmed by other analysts. His arguments, at most, point to

 alleged gaps or conflicts in the evidence or competing inferences the jury might have

 drawn. These arguments do not show that the inculpatory evidence on which the jury

 relied was insufficient. See Matthews, 577 F.3d at 1184.

        We do not find the district court’s conclusion that the evidence—including the

 DNA evidence—was sufficient to support Mr. Brown’s convictions under the

 Jackson standard to be either reasonably debatable or wrong.

        B. Second Claim—Newly Discovered Evidence

        The second claim in Mr. Brown’s § 2254 petition alleged newly discovered

 evidence, raising criminal proceedings against an investigating officer who testified

 at his trial and alleging the same officer was not certified for the taser device he used

 while arresting Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown’s COA application vaguely references “proof

 of corruption from one of the prosecution[’]s key witness[es],” but makes no

 argument as to how the district court erred in rejecting this claim. See Aplt. Br. at 4.

 Absent argument of error, any claim for relief on this basis is waived. See Tran, 355

 F.3d at 1266; Eizember v. Trammell, 803 F.3d 1129, 1145 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[It is]

 settled law that insufficient briefing . . . will serve to waive an issue in this court even

 if it was fairly presented and preserved in the district court.”).

        C. Third Claim—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        In his habeas petition, Mr. Brown argued five grounds of alleged ineffective

 assistance of counsel, but his COA application includes only two. Neither warrants

 relief, and the other grounds are waived. See Tran, 355 F.3d at 1266.

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               1. Discovery Materials

        Mr. Brown argued in his § 2254 petition that his counsel denied him access to

 discovery materials, and in his COA application he maintains he lacks “sufficient

 discovery material” and “is still . . . collecting further material which was not

 presented at trial.” Aplt. Br. at 5. The district court rejected this claim, noting

 Mr. Brown had not identified how any allegedly missing materials affected his

 constitutional rights. Similarly lacking, the conclusory argument in his COA

 application does not indicate what materials he claims are missing or how they might

 affect his constitutional rights. The district court’s denial of relief on this claim is

 not reasonably debatable or wrong.

        Mr. Brown further argues in his COA application that “tests performed on the

 [victim]” after the attack contradict trial testimony indicating her injuries were

 consistent with forcible penetration. See Aplt. Br. at 5. He asserts the prosecution

 had materials related to such tests that he was not allowed to review, and he argues

 the “tests” show the trial testimony was unreliable. However, Mr. Brown made no

 argument related to such “tests” at the district court. Any claim on this basis is

 therefore waived. See Robert v. Austin, 72 F.4th 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2023)

 (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, arguments raised for the first time on appeal

 are waived. This is true whether the newly raised argument is a bald-faced new issue

 or a new theory on appeal that falls under the same general category as an argument

 presented [at the district court].” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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               2. Alleged Miranda violation

        In his COA application, Mr. Brown argues his trial counsel was ineffective in

 failing to challenge an “illegal interrogation” in which he was “never Mirandized.”

 Aplt. Br. at 5. The PFRD rejected this argument because an audio recording of

 Mr. Brown’s interview with law enforcement clearly includes an advisement of his

 rights. Mr. Brown did not object to that finding in the district court. Under this

 court’s firm waiver rule he has therefore waived any appellate review of this claim.

 See United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A]

 party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both

 timely and specific to preserve an issue . . . for appellate review.”).4

                                            III.

        For the foregoing reasons, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss

 this matter. Mr. Brown’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees is

 granted.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Joel M. Carson III
                                              Circuit Judge

        4
          No exception to the firm waiver rule applies. We make exceptions if a pro se
 party “has not been informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences
 of failing to object.” Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir.
 2005). Here, the PFRD advised Mr. Brown he must file objections within fourteen
 days to preserve appellate review.
         We may also make an exception in the “interests of justice.” Id. That analysis
 “is similar to reviewing for plain error.” Id. at 1120. As the district court correctly
 found, the interview began with an advisement of Mr. Brown’s rights. There is no
 plain error.
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