Court Opinion

ID: 9682296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:04.246286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.518008
License: Public Domain

COHEN, Justice,
concurring.
I believe there is more to say concerning why an accused has no constitutional right to counsel in deciding whether to give a breath test, even though sec. 2(a), article 6701Z-5 provides that no test shall be given if the accused refuses.
The statutory provision that no test shall be given if the accused refuses is not constitutionally based; indeed, refusing to give a blood or breath sample is illegal under Texas law. Punishment is severe and mandatory. Thus, refusal to give a specimen, contrary to one’s implied consent, should not be encouraged by extending to the would-be refuser the assistance of counsel. An accused is not entitled to follow counsel’s advice to refuse to submit to fingerprinting, photographing or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to assume a stance, to walk or to make a particular gesture. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). These are all physical evidence. None is within the protection of the Fifth Amendment, because none is testimonial, and the same is true of breath and blood samples.
The Supreme Court of California was among the first to so hold. In People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal.2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal.Rptr. 393 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850, 88 S.Ct. 43, 19 L.Ed.2d 119 (1967), Chief Justice Roger Traynor held that evidence could be admitted showing that a defendant refused a chemical test. He wrote:
The sole rationale for the rule against comment on a failure to testify is that such a rule is a necessary protection for the exercise of the underlying privilege of remaining silent [citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) ]. A wrongful refusal to cooperate with law enforcement officers does not qualify for such protection. A refusal that might operate to suppress evidence of intoxication, which disappears rapidly with the passage of time, should not be encouraged as a device to escape prosecution.
421 P.2d at 403 (citations omitted). Sud-duth was decided only six months after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California. At least five state supreme courts had reached the conclusion of Schmerber and Sudduth years earlier, and more soon followed the same reasoning. State v. Durrant, 55 Del. 510, 188 A.2d 526 (1963); State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958); Alldredge v. State, 239 Ind. 256, 156 N.E.2d 888 (1959); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941); Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954). Decisions *396after Sudduth reaching the same conclusion include State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So.2d 285 (1968); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967); City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St.2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa.Super. 131, 324 A.2d 441 (1974); State v. Miller, 257 S.C. 213, 185 S.E.2d 359 (1971); City of Waukesha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis.2d 401, 164 N.W.2d 314 (1969).
These cases all hold that evidence of refusal to take a chemical test may be admitted in evidence without violating any right protected by the United States Constitution. They proceed on the theory that the refusal is wrongful, that the consent to extraction of a sample is given by the act of driving, and that no lawful choice is available to the driver at the time testing is sought. This reasoning would lead, as in Schmerber, to the conclusion that “no issue of counsel’s ability to assist petitioner in respect of any of the rights he did possess is presented.” 384 U.S. at 766, 86 S.Ct. at 1833.
Even those who advocate the right to counsel in these circumstances recognize the heavy weight of authority rejecting it. See, e.g., R. Irwin, 3 Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, secs. 32.03, 33.06 (3d ed. 1980 and Supp.1981). Irwin writes:
However, it must be noted that in the majority of jurisdictions governed by implied consent legislation which provides that a motorist is deemed to have consented to submit to a test by the very act of driving on public roads or within the State, it has been held that he has no right to the assistance of counsel before making a decision to decline because he has no legal right to refuse.
That the Texas Legislature did not intend to protect the refuser is demonstrated by the penalty imposed for refusing, suspension of the driver’s license for 90 days. Article 6701Z-5, sec. 2(f). The suspension is mandatory and is not excused by the fact that the refuser may have prevailed or never been prosecuted for the crime of driving while intoxicated.
It is inaccurate to refer to the provision in sec. 2(a) as a “right” to refuse. The statute says only that if a person under arrest refuses to give a specimen, “none shall be taken.” It does not mention a “right to refuse” or any other “right.” Any purported “right” so harshly penalized for its exercise is obviously very limited and entitled to little protection. Rather, the required abandonment of attempts at chemical testing merely expresses the legislature’s decision against state sanctioned police violence that would otherwise result when citizens refused to give a specimen of blood or breath. The statutory recognition of the driver’s de facto physical ability to conceal and destroy evidence by refusing to give a sample does not create a “right.” The driver merely has the physical power to do a wrongful act, which is not the same as a “right” to do so. Thus, in Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 71 Cal.Rptr. 123 (1968), the court held:
It is firmly established that Bush has no right to resist or refuse such a test [citing Schmerber v. California]. It is simply because such a person has the physical power to make the test impractical and dangerous to himself and those charged with administering it, that it is excused upon an indication of his unwillingness.
The court concluded:
The obvious reason for acquiescence in the refusal of such a test by a person who as a matter of law is “deemed to have given his consent” is to avoid the violence which would often attend forcible tests upon recalcitrant inebriates.
71 Cal.Rptr. at 124-25 (emphasis in original). See also Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971) (following Bush v. Bright); State v. Miller, 185 S.E.2d at 360 (“appellant urges that by the terms of [the implied consent law] he had the statutory right to refuse. ... [W]e do not so construe the statute, which simply opts against forcible testing.”) Decisions of courts throughout the *397nation following and rejecting the rule in Bush v. Bright are analyzed in Cohen, The Case for Admitting Evidence of Refusal to Take a Breath Test, 6 Texas Tech.L. Rev. 927, 932-36 (1975).
Another reason why the suspect should not be constitutionally entitled to counsel before deciding whether to give a specimen is that unlawfully refusing to give a sample destroys evidence, because alcohol is quickly removed from the body with the passage of time. The unlawful refusal thus “closely resembles ... flight, escape, or destruction of evidence.” Cohen, supra, at 944, cited with approval in Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (Roberts, J. dissenting). The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically referred to the human body’s elimination of alcohol, combined with the suspect’s wrongful refusal to provide a sample, as “destruction of evidence,” justifying a warrantless search. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835. While one may have the physical power to destroy evidence and may avoid prosecution by doing so, there should be no right to counsel’s advice in making the decision. The severe, mandatory sanction of license suspension for 90 days effectively “equates a refusal with guilt and expresses a strong policy to protect the public from the threat of drunk driving,....” People v. Paddock, 29 N.Y.2d 504, 272 N.E.2d 486, 487, 323 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977-78 (1971) (Jasen, J. concurring). It underscores the illegality of the refusal and the impropriety of surrounding with constitutional protections an act not constitutionally protected.