Court Opinion

ID: 9585393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:59:50.993877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:51.367170
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice.
The State of Idaho appeals a district court order suppressing evidence obtained by the State as a result of the arrest of David Bradley in his Pocatello, Idaho, apartment on January 9, 1981. We affirm the district court order.
Bradley for some time had been under surveillance by the Idaho State Bureau of Narcotics on suspicion of drug trafficking. During the course of the investigation, Ed Rankin, a narcotics investigator, made a record check with the State of Oregon regarding Bradley. On January 1, 1981, he received a teletype from Oregon stating that there was a bench warrant issued in that state for Bradley’s arrest for the felony of driving while his license was suspended. Eight days later on January 9, 1981, Officer Rankin and a second officer, Kim Peiper, went to Bradley’s apartment for the stated purpose, as .they would later contend, of determining whether he was the David Bradley wanted in Oregon. The officers had no Idaho arrest warrant and had not applied for one, nor did they have a copy of the Oregon warrant; all they possessed was the copy of the aforesaid teletype message.
Rankin knocked on Bradley’s door and identified himself as a police officer. On conflicting evidence the trial court found that the officers entered Bradley’s apartment without written or oral consent.1 Once inside Bradley’s apartment, the officers ran an NCIC check on Bradley and then placed him under arrest for the re*359ported Oregon traffic offense. Bradley was then given his Miranda rights.
During the course of the arrest inside Bradley's apartment, Officer Rankin observed next to the kitchen sink a plate containing green vegetable matter which was later identified as marijuana. Bradley subsequently made inculpatory statements regarding the location of other contraband on the premises; he was then taken to the Bannock County Jail and booked.
The investigators then sought a warrant to search Bradley’s apartment which was supported by recitation of the contraband observed by the officers and the inculpatory statements made by Bradley at the time of his arrest. The warrant was issued; in executing it the officers seized additional contraband, and they then obtained an Idaho warrant for Bradley’s arrest on a complaint charging possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Bradley, already incarcerated on the basis of the Oregon teletype message, was readily arrested on the Idaho warrant. Oregon not only declined to extradite Bradley, but did not furnish the Idaho authorities with a certified copy of the Oregon warrant.
Suppression was sought upon alleged violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho. The prosecutor urged upon the trial judge that the entry was lawful under the provisions of I.C. § 19-4514.
The district court judge, the Honorable Arthur P. Oliver, in his written order stated: “It is one thing to permit the warrant-less arrest of the defendant in a public place, but quite another to enter the defendant’s residence, absent exigent circumstances, without a warrant and without consent.” R., p. 89. Because the intrusion into defendant’s home was invalid, the court held that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable. The court further held that the inculpatory statements made by Bradley subsequent to his arrest following unlawful entry were tainted and could not properly be used as a basis for obtaining the search warrant, precluding utilization of the evidence obtained as a result of the ensuing search.
The State contends that Idaho peace officers may lawfully enter into a person’s dwelling, without his consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances, for the purpose of making an arrest on the basis of mere knowledge of an outstanding felony warrant from another state. We do not agree.
The United States Supreme Court in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 577,100 S.Ct. 1371, 1375, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 645 (1980), held unconstitutional New York statutes which authorized police officers to enter private residences without warrants and, if necessary, with force, in order to make routine felony arrests. In Payton, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits “the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest,” Id. at 577, 100 S.Ct. at 1375, approving therein the language of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
“ ‘To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is clearly present.' ”
Id. at 588-89, 100 S.Ct. at 1381 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (1978), cert. denied, sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 283, 58 L.Ed.2d 259).
The State contends that the entry into Bradley’s apartment does not fall within the gambit of this rule because the officers possessed knowledge of an outstanding Oregon warrant for' Bradley’s arrest. The State argues that “once a judicial officer’s determination of probable cause has been interposed between the zealous officer and the citizen, and a bench warrant has been issued, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu*360tion have been met.” State’s Brief, p. 12. The State sees no reason that the “judicial officer” need be an Idaho judge or magistrate.
However, it is a well-established principle of law that a warrant from one state has no force or validity outside the boundaries of that state. Street v. Cherba, 662 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.1981); State v. Everett, 110 Ariz. 429, 520 P.2d 301 (1974), cert. denied, .419 U.S. 880, 95 S.Ct. 144, 42 L.Ed.2d 120 (1974); People v. Coto, 199 Colo. 508, 611 P.2d 969 (1980). See Am. Jur.2d Arrest § 66 (1969) and cases cited at note 18 therein.
People v. Coto is virtually identical. In that ease, Colorado officers from the Organized Crime Strike Force were investigating a Michael Coto. The officers learned that a warrant had been issued in Florida for a Michael Coto’s arrest. The officers went to the Coto residence, without a Colorado arrest warrant, but with knowledge of the Florida warrant, and entered the Coto residence absent consent or exigent circumstances. While in the Coto residence, the officers discovered a small quantity of marijuana and several large bales of the type used to transport marijuana. A search warrant was then procured by one of the officers. A subsequent search resulted in the seizure of two hundred pounds of marijuana. Thereafter, charges were filed against Coto for the unlawful possession of a dangerous drug with intent to dispense. The Colorado Supreme Court held that:
“In this case, the Florida warrant, relied upon by the prosecution, has no effect in this state except to provide the probable cause needed to make an arrest of the defendant____ Although probable cause may be sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, ... it is not sufficient under Payton v. New York, supra and People v. Moreno, supra, [176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971) ] to justify a warrantless entry into the defendants’ premises in the absence of exigent circumstances extant and therefore the officers had no authority to enter the premises.
“Accordingly, since the officers were not legitimately on the premises, the contraband discovered in a closet in plain view must be suppressed. In addition, evidence seized pursuant to the resulting search warrant, which was issued on the basis of the illegal entry, must be suppressed.”
611 P.2d at 970-71 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Similarly, an arrest warrant issued in Oregon will not authorize police officers to cross a private Idaho threshold. There being no consent and no' exigent circumstances,2 the entry was no more lawful than the Coto entry.
To support its contention that a police officer may lawfully make an arrest on the basis of transmitted information of an outstanding arrest warrant, the State cites Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Weeks v. Estelle, 509 F.2d 760 (5th Cir.1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872, 96 S.Ct. 139, 46 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); United States v. McCray, 468 F.2d 446 (10th Cir.1972); Bandy v. Willingham, 398 F.2d 333 (10th Cir.1968) cert. denied 393 U.S. 1006, 89 S.Ct. 497, 21 L.Ed.2d 470 (1968); State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 577 P.2d 1135 (1978); State v. Deschamps, 94 Idaho 612, 495 P.2d 18 (1971) cert. denied 405 U.S. 1040, 92 S.Ct. 1310, 31 L.Ed.2d 581 (1972); and State v. Polson, 81 Idaho 147, 339 P.2d 510 (1959). None of these authorities purport to stand for the proposition that a warrant is not required to invade the sanctity and privacy extant in a person’s dwelling. On the contrary, each case involves situations where transmitted information was said to afford probable cause for the stop and arrest of persons traveling in automobiles.
*361The State additionally contends that the warrantless entry into Bradley’s residence and his ensuing, arrest was sanctioned by I.C. § 19-4514, which provides in part that:
“(1) The arrest of a person may be lawfully made by a peace officer without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged with a felony by the courts of another state; ____” (Emphasis added.)
Prior to Payton the State’s argument might have been seen as having some validity. Since Payton the statute, while it might support a warrantless arrest in a public place, will not support a warrantless entry into a defendant’s private residence in order to make an arrest.
I.C. § 19-4513 enacted at the same time as I.C. § 19-4514, provides the procedure for obtaining an Idaho warrant to arrest a person who stands charged with a felony in another state:
“(1) Any judge or magistrate of the state of Idaho shall issue a warrant directing any peace officer to arrest the person named in said warrant ... provided that:
“(a) A peace officer of this state shall submit an affidavit that the person named in the warrant has absented himself from a sister state having been charged with a felony, together with a certified copy of the complaint and warrant of arrest issued by a court of record in a sister state to the court in support of issuance of the warrant;
The district court properly applied the controlling Idaho statutes, and in a manner comporting with the holding of Payton.3 The entry into the defendant’s residence was in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and equally in violation of Art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Accordingly, the order appealed from is
Affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.
DONALDSON, C.J., and HUNTLEY, J., concur.

. Both Bradley and Ella Robinson, a friend of Bradley's who was in his apartment at the time of the arrest, testified that Bradley stated to the officers that he would come outside and talk to them but that the officers pushed their way past Bradley and into the apartment. Officers Rankin and Peiper, however, testified that Bradley backed away and stepped aside from the door, allowing the officers to enter the premises. The trial court found that, "[t]he state's evidence, at best, shows only an acquiescence on the part of the defendant and not consent.” R., p. 91.

. The State makes no contention that there were exigent circumstances. The State had eight days in which to have obtained an Idaho warrant for Bradley’s arrest pursuant to I.C. § 19-4513.

. Given our holding in this case, we need not address defendant's allegation that the suppression order should be upheld because his arrest on the Oregon felony driving while suspended charge was merely a pretext for discovering evidence to support another charge.