Court Opinion

ID: 9407868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 17:09:18.013593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.524411
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOHN M. SCHEPPARD                          :   No. 2261 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 12, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-52-CR-0000026-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                  FILED JULY 10, 2023

        The Commonwealth appeals from the August 12, 2022 Judgment of

Sentence entered in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas following

Appellee John Scheppard’s guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”)

– Highest Rate of Alcohol.1 The Commonwealth argues that the sentence is

illegal because the trial court failed to classify Appellee’s acceptance of

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) for a 2013 DUI charge as a

“prior offense” for purposes of sentencing on the current offense. Based upon

our recent decisions in Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 A.3d 214 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (en banc), appeal granted, 294 A.3d 300 (Pa. 2023), and

Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), we

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1   75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
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vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with

this decision.2

       In February 2016, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with two counts

of Driving Under the Influence.3 On April 28, 2016, Appellee entered into a

negotiated plea agreement to Driving Under the Influence—Highest Rate of

Alcohol. The plea agreement did not indicate whether it was a first or second

DUI offense. Appellee, however, did not appear at his June 2016 sentencing.

       Following his eventual arrest in July 2022, the court held a sentencing

hearing on August 12, 2022, at which the Commonwealth argued that

Appellee should be sentenced for the DUI as a second offense based upon

Appellee’s prior acceptance of ARD for the 2013 DUI. It acknowledged the

then-precedential decision in Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959

(Pa. Super. 2020), which forbid the classification of ARD as a prior offense,

but argued that Chichkin was wrongly decided.

       That same day, the trial court applied Chichkin and sentenced Appellee

as a first-time offender. The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence

of 72 hours to 6 months of incarceration, with credit for 3 days of time served,

and a fine of $1,000, instead of the mandatory minimum sentence for a second

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2 The Supreme Court held the Petition for Allowance of Appeal filed in
Commonwealth v. Moroz, 520 MAL 2022 (Pa. April 17, 2023), pending its
decision in Richards.

375 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) (DUI-General Impairment), 3802(c) (DUI-Highest
Rate of Alcohol). The Commonwealth classified these charges as second
offenses.

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offense of 90 days and a fine of $1,500.4 The court ordered Appellee to be

released on parole.

        On September 7, 2022, the Commonwealth filed its Notice of Appeal

and its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal,

reiterating its disagreement with Chichkin. On October 4, 2022, this Court

filed its en banc Opinions in Richards, 284 A.3d at 220, and Moroz, 284 A.3d

at 233, overruling Chichkin. On November 8, 2022, the trial court filed its

Rule 1925(b) Opinion, in which it recognized that this Court, in Moroz, had

overruled Chichkin after Appellee’s sentencing and noted that it would

“accept the instant case on remand as may be directed by the Superior

Court.”5

        Before this Court, the Commonwealth presents the following question:

        Whether the sentence imposed is an illegal sentence, when
        [Appellee’s] acceptance of ARD for DUI should qualify as a prior
        offense for the purposes of the DUI sentencing enhancement
        provisions at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3803, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804, and 75
        Pa.C.S.A. § 3806, contrary to the holding of Commonwealth v.
        Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

        In challenging the legality of the sentence, the Commonwealth presents

a pure question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and

____________________________________________

4 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c). The court imposed additional costs and conditions not
relevant to this appeal.

5   Tr. Ct. Op., 11/8/22, at 3.

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our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Stoops, 290 A.3d 721,

723 (Pa. Super. 2023).

       The question of whether to consider acceptance of ARD as a “prior

offense” for purposes of the enhanced sentencing scheme under Section 3804

of the Vehicle Code is an issue that has repeatedly come before this Court and

is currently pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.          Section 3804

provides for enhanced mandatory minimum sentences for second and

subsequent DUI offenses. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804. Section 3806 defines “prior

offense” for purposes of Section 3804 sentencing to include “acceptance of

[ARD] or other form of preliminary disposition before the sentencing on the

present violation for any of the following: (1) an offense under section 3802

(relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance)[,]”

where the prior offense occurred “within 10 years prior to the date of the

offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a)(1),

(b)(1)(i).

       In 2020, this Court in Chichkin concluded that the classification of ARD

acceptance as a prior offense for purposes Section 3804 sentencing violated

due process.6 In 2022, however, an en banc panel of this Court overruled
____________________________________________

6 The Chichkin panel opined that “prior acceptances of ARD do not constitute
convictions cloaked in all the constitutional safeguards[.]” Chichkin, 232
A.3d at 968 (internal quotation marks omitted).        The Chichkin court
reasoned, therefore, that the prior acceptance of ARD was “a fact that,
pursuant to Alleyne[ v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013)],
Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)] and their progeny, must be
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Chichkin in Richards and Moroz, holding “that the portion of Section

3806(a), which equates prior acceptance of ARD to a prior conviction for

purposes of imposing a Section 3804 mandatory minimum sentence, passes

constitutional muster” as it satisfied the “prior conviction” exception to

Apprendi and Alleyne. Richards, 284 A.3d at 220; Moroz, 284 A.3d at

233.

       Applying    Richards       and    Moroz,   this   Court   more   recently   in

Commonwealth v. Hummel, 292 A.3d 1137 (Pa. Super. 2023), vacated a

sentence based upon the trial court’s failure to classify a defendant’s prior

acceptance of ARD as a prior offense for purposes of Section 3804, while

noting that the trial court had properly followed Chichkin at the time of

sentencing. Although we recognized that Richards and Moroz were pending

before the Supreme Court, we reiterated that “appellate courts apply the law

in effect at the time of decision and the parties will be entitled to the benefit

of changes in the law occurring before the judgment of sentence is final.”7 Id.

at 1138. We, therefore, vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence and

remanded for resentencing in light of Richards and Moroz.
____________________________________________

presented to the fact finder and determined beyond a reasonable doubt before
a trial court may impose a mandatory minimum sentence under Section
3804.” Chichkin, 232 A.3d at 968 (internal quotation marks and footnote
omitted).
7 We additionally observed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was unable
to resolve the question of whether acceptance of ARD may be classified as a
prior offense for purposes of sentencing when the Court divided evenly in
February 2023 in Commonwealth v. Verbeck, 290 A.3d 260, 261 (Pa.
2023).

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      The reasoning in Hummel is directly applicable to the instant case,

which mirrors the relevant factual and procedural history of Hummel.

Accordingly, as in Hummel, we vacate Appellee’s judgment of sentence and

remand for resentencing consistent with this decision.

      Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2023

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