Court Opinion

ID: 9666253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:08:59.93965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:27.553077
License: Public Domain

On Petitions to Rehear.
We have been presented with a petition to rehear by *390both, complainants, Loftis and wife, and the defendant, The Stuyvesant Insurance Company of New York.
Complainants insist we should have allowed interest on the judgment of $2800.00 rendered in this Court against The Stuyvesant Insurance Company of New York in favor of the complainants from and after December 7, 1960.
We think we must grant the petition. The writer of the original opinion inadvertently overlooked this matter.
It is shown in the record the house was totally destroyed by fire on September 28, 1960. Defendant was notified within a few days of the fire. The defendant placed the claim with the General Adjustment Bureau for investigation and adjustment on October 7, 1960. G. S. Gaillord, Jr., an insurance adjuster, undertook to adjust the claim with complainants. As stated in the original opinion, his efforts failed and this suit resulted.
The policy provides the amount of loss shall be payable sixty days after proof of loss is received by the Company and the loss is ascertained by agreement between the insured and the Company or by filing an award with the Company.
Defendant did not insist upon the filing of proofs of loss. All the proof in the record shows the house was totally destroyed by fire and that the policy was a valued policy under our statute.
Wherefore, we think the amount of the policy was payable sixty days after claim was assigned to the Adjustment Bureau for investigation and settlement as insisted by complainant.
*391T.C.A. sec. 47-1607 provides:
“All bonds, notes, bills of exchange, and liquidated and settled accounts, signed by tbe debtor, shall bear interest from the time they become due, unless it is expressed that interest is not to accrue until a specific time therein mentioned.” .
“Under this section courts are compelled to allow interest in all cases which come within its terms.” Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Jordan, et al., 28 Tenn.App. 11, 184 S.W.(2d) 721; Nickey Bros. v. Lonsdal Mfg. Co., 149 Tenn. 391, 258 S.W. 776.
In the case of Peoples Bank and Trust Company v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 156 Tenn. 517, 3 S.W.(2d) 163, our Supreme Court said:
“A policy of life insurance falls within this section and bears interest from the time it becomes due and payable. The allowance of interest is imperative. Knights of Pythias v. Allen, 104 Tenn. 623, 58 S.W. 241. Fire insurance policies, accident insurance policies, and other insurance contracts proper would come under this section of the Code.”
T.C.A. sec. 47-1608 provides:
“The time from which interest may be computed shall be the day when the debt is payable, unless another day is fixed by the contract itself.”
Accordingly, interest will be allowed on the judgment of $2800.00 against the defendant from December 7, 1960, to the date hereof.
Defendant in its petition to rehear again insists the Chancellor was not in error in holding the replacement *392of the house exonerated the defendant from any liability under the insurance policy. We considered this matter in our original opinion and gave our reasons for holding otherwise.
Likewise, we considered all other matters complained of in defendant’s petition to rehear.
“A petition for a rehearing which points out no material matter of law or fact overlooked, but merely reargues matters already considered and determined, should be denied.” Myrick v. Johnson, 25 Tenn.App. 483, 160 S.W.(2d) 185.
‘ ‘ The office of a petition to rehear is to call attention of the court to matters overlooked, not to those things which the counsel supposes were improperly decided after full consideration.” Louisville & N. Railroad Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 125 Tenn. 658, 148 S.W. 671.
Defendant’s petition is denied at its cost.
Petition to Rehear of Complainants granted.
Petition to Rehear of Defendant is denied.