Court Opinion

ID: 9632609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:20:15.636981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:19.692058
License: Public Domain

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge:
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 seeking a declaration of the constitutional invalidity of a Connecticut statute which makes it a criminal offense for a person to “carry or display a red flag or any other emblem as a symbol calculated to, or which may, incite people to disorders or breaches of the law.”1 Since the constitutional validity of a state statute was at issue, a three-judge federal district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.
We first consider the problem of whether this case is properly before this court in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669; Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696; Samuels v. Machell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 and Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (February 23, 1971). After a careful reading of these opinions, we conclude that they are not controlling since there are no criminal prosecutions pending against the plaintiffs Anderson and Nutter, or the class they represent. The opinion by Mr. Justice Black in Younger draws its own line: “We express no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun.” 401 U.S. at 41, 91 S.Ct. at 749. All of the other Justices state, in a variety of ways, that the Younger and Boyle decisions establish only “the proper policy to be followed by a federal court when asked to intervene * * * in a criminal prosecution which is contemporaneously pending in a state court.” (emphasis added). [Concurrence of Justices Stewart and Harlan in Younger, 401 U.S. at 55, 91 S.Ct. at 757].
The next question which arises, given the absence of any presently pending prosecutions, is whether the plaintiffs have presented a justiciable “case or controversy” within the definition of Article III of the Constitution. The two leading Supreme Court decisions in this regard are Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961), and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). In Poe, a declaratory judgment action challenging Connecticut’s birth control laws, the Court found a case or controversy lacking where the state had “an undeviating policy of nullification” of any attempts at the law’s enforcement. More recently in Epperson, however, the Court struck down the Arkansas antievolution statute where there was no evidence to indicate its recent enforcement.
In the present case, there have been several arrests for violations of the red-flag statute in recent months. Various defendants and other law enforcement officials have otherwise indicated their intention to enforce the statute so long as it remains in force. A recent three-judge court has considered the case or *103controversy requirement m a slightly different context. In Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F.Supp. 1297 (D.Colo.1970), the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment as to the Colorado abortion statute, although there was no allegation that plaintiffs ever had or planned to violate this statute or had themselves been threatened with prosecution. The Court commented:
While the many Supreme Court decisions which both defendants and plaintiffs have cited may not be entirely reconcilable, we can discern several considerations which the court has taken into account in judging whether there exists a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. While there need not be a threat of immediate prosecution, it should nevertheless not appear that the state maintains a policy of non-prosecution which might render any decision unnecessary and even inappropriate. * * Furthermore, there should not be any substantial question concerning the scope or meaning of the statute in question or the manner of its enforcement lest a decision prior to prosecution for specific acts take on an abstract or hypothetical character. * * Finally the Supreme Court has taken into account the possible harm which could befall a plaintiff forced to run the risk of prosecution in order to state his claim, [citations omitted] 320 F.Supp. at 1300
 In these circumstances we are of the view that the plaintiffs ought not be forced to violate a law affecting their First Amendment rights and subject themselves to criminal prosecution in order to place the issue before a judicial forum. Forced exposure to criminal sanctions in order to test the validity of statutory limitations of First Amendment rights is irreparable injury of sufficient dimension to justify federal declaratory relief. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 92, 91 S.Ct. 674, 681, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
We turn now to the merits of the plaintiffs’ contentions. There is no question that the public display of a flag is “symbolic speech” and is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed, 1117 (1931).2 Moreover, this is not a situation like, for example, the draft card burning cases where elements of speech must be balanced against a legitimate government interest unrelated to expression, since the display of a flag such as is involved here is solely for the purpose of the communication of ideas. [Cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)]. The constitutional question before this court would be the same if the statute prohibited speech “which may incite people to disorders or breaches of the law” rather than the display of a flag or emblem. [See, generally, Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970)].
As the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly, no provision of our Constitution is entitled to a more preferred position than is the First Amendment, for it provides the cornerstone for a viable system of democratic government. One of the Court’s most eloquent statements of this principle is contained in Mr. Justice Douglas’ opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949):
Accordingly, a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite disputes. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconditions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute * * * *104is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyanee, or unrest. * * * There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political groups. The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of these grounds may not stand.
The state, of course, has a valid interest in preventing disturbance and controlling public order, but in carrying out these responsibilities its regulation must be drawn with sufficient specificity so that persons seeking to exercise their First Amendment rights, as well as those attempting to enforce the regulation, will know definitely what is being prohibited. The rule against overbreadth demands that the regulation be framed to cover only that conduct which is constitutionally subject to control and not embrace conduct protected under the First Amendment. Failure to meet this standard means that the regulation is void on its face, regardless of the validity of particular applications.
The Supreme Court decision most clearly on point is Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551, 85 S.Ct. 453, 462, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965), where the Court invalidated a Louisiana breach of the peace statute, which prohibited congregating with others “with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned,” on the grounds that it was “unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope.” Likewise in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), the Court found a similar breach of the peace statute constitutionally invalid because of the most “general and indefinite characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application.” [Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951)].
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1963) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, etc., 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967), teach that only advocacy of action rather than advocacy of ideas may be restricted. Whether it is possible to draft a sufficiently narrow flag control statute to pass constitutional muster is a question we need not decide today. (See Barber v. Kinsella, 277 F.Supp. 72 (D.C.1967)). The statute now in effect which will expire October 1 (see n. 1) is not sufficiently narrow and we must find it invalid.
Since we find the Connecticut statute to be unconstitutional, there would appear to be no need for continued injunctive relief as we have no reason to believe that the Connecticut authorities will now continue its enforcement. The temporary restraining order issued by Judge Blumenfeld is therefore dissolved.

. Connecticut General Statutes § 53-7:
Any person who carries or displays a red flag or any other emblem as a symbol calculated to, or which may, incite people to disorders or breaches of the law, shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months or both.
This section has been repealed effective October 1, 1971.

. We do not have in this case any question of misuse of a flag or emblem which a statute purports to protect.