Court Opinion

ID: 9407596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 17:01:00.771536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.039314
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                  ___________

                                       No. 21-1586
                                       __________

                                    DANTE BURTON,
                                             Appellant
                                          v.

                      RHU SGT. CLINGER; MARY ANDERSON,
                      PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE SPECIALIST
                                   __________

                    On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                                (D.C. No. 1-19-cv-00222)
                    Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo (by consent)
                                      __________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                  on March 6, 2023

                Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

                               (Opinion filed: July 7, 2023)
                                      ___________

                                        OPINION*
                                       ___________
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

    Summary judgment is appropriate only when no reasonable jury could find for the non-

moving party. Here, that standard was not met. So we will vacate and remand.

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
                                    I. BACKGROUND

   Dante Burton was an inmate in solitary confinement. He says that early one morning,

Sergeant John Clinger made a derogatory sexual comment to him. That remark caused him

to have suicidal thoughts. Burton told a guard that he was considering committing suicide

and needed to talk to “the psych,” Mary Beth Anderson. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 10. Just before

9 a.m., the guard relayed that information to Anderson. Anderson said she would see Bur-

ton once she was done with “PRC.” ¶ 12. (Though “PRC” is undefined, it likely refers to

the prison’s Program Review Committee.)

   Five hours later, the guard “found [Burton] hanging” in his cell. ¶ 21. Anderson had not

yet gone to see him. Burton was still breathing, so the guard took him to the medical ward.

There, Burton continued to harm himself by banging his head against the wall. Anderson

arrived about ninety minutes later. She explained “that PRC [had] not end[ed] until” that

afternoon. ¶ 24.

   About a year later, Burton sued. He brought a state-law sexual-harassment claim against

Clinger. And he sued Anderson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He says Anderson was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical need, thus violating his Eighth Amendment right against

cruel and unusual punishment.

   The District Court granted summary judgment for Anderson. It found no dispute over

whether Anderson was deliberately indifferent. Having granted summary judgment on the

only federal claim, it remanded the sexual-harassment claim to state court.

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   Burton appeals. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review a

grant of summary judgment de novo. Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch.

Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, Burton, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.

See Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

                       II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER

   To start, we identify the applicable deliberate-indifference test. Anderson says Burton

must show that she was deliberately indifferent to Burton’s risk of suicide specifically ra-

ther than his serious medical needs generally. Compare Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,

223–24 (3d Cir. 2017), with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). Not so. “While

… a particular vulnerability to suicide qualifies as a serious medical need, a vulnerability

to suicide is not the sole need on which [Burton’s] claim [is] focused. Rather, [Burton]

[seeks] to hold [Anderson] accountable for failing to meet [his] serious needs for mental

healthcare.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227 (citation omitted). The District Court correctly

recognized that Burton was advancing this “more general claim.” Id.

   The test for this claim requires that (1) Anderson was “deliberately indifferent to [Bur-

ton’s] medical needs,” and (2) “those needs were [objectively] serious.” Pearson v. Prison

Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). An

official is “deliberately indifferent” when she “knows of” and “recklessly disregard[s]” an
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“excessive risk to [the] inmate[’s] health.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37

(1994). Burton bears the burden of proving Anderson’s deliberate indifference.

   This case turns on Anderson’s alleged indifference. She concedes that Burton’s needs

were objectively serious and that she knew about them. And though she suggests that Bur-

ton did not suffer serious harm from her delay, such harm is not an element of a deliberate-

indifference claim. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on

other grounds as recognized in Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 319 n.7 (3d Cir. 2020). Her

main argument is that no reasonable jury could find her deliberately indifferent because

her demanding work schedule caused her delay.

   Yet a busy schedule is not enough. “We have … found deliberate indifference in situa-

tions where necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons.” Natale v.

Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “All that is needed [for Burton’s claim to survive summary judgment] is for the

surrounding circumstances to be sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the delay

… was motivated by non-medical factors.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537.

   Here, the evidence permits that finding. In his affidavit, Burton said Anderson told him

that she was “going to pull [him] out of [his] cell,” but “PRC did not end until” that after-

noon. ECF No. 48-1 at ¶ 18. He also said that the guard who contacted Anderson told him

that Anderson would come get him “when PRC was over.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 18. And he has doc-

uments to back that up. See ECF Nos. 41-4, 48-4. He also swore that the PRC meeting was

                                             4
held just “75 to 80 feet away from [his] cell,” so Anderson “could have easily left the PRC

meeting” to help him. ECF No. 48-1 at ¶¶ 22, 25.

   In her affidavit, Anderson vaguely countered that “[a]t that time” (seemingly referring

to the day of the incident), she “had multiple responsibilities including required attendance

at various committees and meetings, as well as meeting with inmates housed in different

units, that required [her] to be in different parts of the facility.” ECF No. 41-5 ¶ 4. That

explanation seems only to confirm that at least part of the delay was due to meetings, not

medicine.

   True, these meetings were “legitimate” parts of Anderson’s job. Dissent at 2–3. But an

official who fails to respond to an emergency is not immune from liability just because she

was doing other job duties. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583 (“A reasonable jury could find

that” a nurse’s adhering to the prison’s usual medical policy during an emergency “consti-

tuted the delay of medical treatment for non-medical reasons.”). So a reasonable jury could

conclude that she delayed care for a non-medical reason.

   Plus, Anderson knew that Burton had a history of self-harm, and there is no evidence

that Burton had ever cried wolf. Thus, “a factfinder could infer that [Anderson] knew that

the threat to [Burton’s] safety was imminent.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d

Cir. 1997). Despite this potentially imminent risk, there is no evidence that Anderson radi-

oed other personnel with instructions, as she said she usually did in situations like these.

ECF No. 41-5 ¶ 5.

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   “[B]ased on the circumstantial evidence offered by [Burton,] which demonstrates the

existence of an obvious risk, [Anderson’s] decision to consciously disregard that risk …,

and [Burton’s] resulting injuries[,] … we conclude that summary judgment was improper

as to [Anderson].” Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 748. So we will vacate the District Court’s grant

of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

   Finally, we will also vacate the District Court’s remand of the sexual-harassment claim.

It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim once it resolved the federal

claim. Because we have vacated its decision on the federal claim, we will give the District

Court the opportunity to reconsider exercising jurisdiction over Burton’s state-law claim.

See United States v. Omnicare, Inc., 903 F.3d 78, 94 (3d Cir. 2018).

                                              6
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
       In vacating the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, the Majority Opinion

applies the non-medical-reason test and concludes that a genuine dispute of material fact

exists. That dispute concerns Psychology Services Specialist Mary Anderson, whose
authority over suicidal inmate care was limited to assessing inmates and making referrals

and recommendations for follow-up care. Specifically, the triable question identified by

the Majority Opinion asks whether Anderson was deliberately indifferent for not leaving

her other prison job duties to attend immediately to Dante Burton’s request to see her.

       For the non-medical-reason test to apply, there must first be “no presumption that

the defendant acted properly.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 537 (3d
Cir. 2017). Such a presumption applies when a prison employee delays medical care for

a medical reason. See id. But prisons do more than provide medical services, and even

prison employees responsible for treating inmates’ mental health perform other important

job functions. Thus, the denial of medical care for attending to another legitimate job

function merits the same presumption, and the Supreme Court has said as much: “The

inquiry into [deliberate indifference] also would be an appropriate vehicle to consider

arguments regarding the realities of prison administration.” Helling v. McKinney,

509 U.S. 25, 37 (1993); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979) (“Prison

administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal

order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Such considerations are

peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in
the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have

exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their

                                              1
expert judgment in such matters.” (citations and quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the
specialized non-medical-reason test – as one of several methods for proving deliberate

indifference, see Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) – does not apply

when a prison employee delays medical care in the performance of another legitimate job
function. Rather, the non-medical-reason test applies only when the prison employee is

not conflicted between competing legitimate duties and delays care for a non-medical

reason. See, e.g., Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537 (concluding that a triable issue existed as to

whether a nurse who forced “a screaming patient to crawl to a wheelchair” was a delay

for a non-medical reason); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582–83

(3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that a triable issue existed as to whether a 72-hour delay in
providing insulin to a diabetic was for a non-medical reason); Durmer v. O’Carroll,

991 F.2d 64, 68–69 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that a triable issue existed as to whether a

doctor’s delay in prescribing physical therapy for a stroke victim was for a non-medical

reason).

       Without the applicability of the non-medical-reason test, a prison employee’s

mental state must be assessed more generally to determine whether the employee delayed

medical care due to “obduracy and wantonness.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319

(1986); see also Pearson, 850 F.3d at 539. Under that standard, the summary judgment

record in this case does not allow a reasonable jury to find that Anderson acted with
deliberate indifference. The choice she faced was between (a) responding to Burton’s

request within the scope of her job duties with respect to inmate care at a time when he

was otherwise under close watch and in protective care and (b) attending to other
undisputedly legitimate prison obligations. Anderson chose the latter, but the record does

not contain evidence that her decision to perform other legitimate job duties was obdurate

                                             2
and wanton: Burton was in restricted housing, he was under close watch, and Anderson
did not know that his condition was worsening. Thus, without sufficient evidence to

make a showing of obduracy and wantonness, the District Court correctly rejected

Burton’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim against Anderson. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). On that basis, I respectfully dissent and would affirm

the judgment of the District Court.

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