Court Opinion

ID: 9702200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:00:28.712561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:32.346381
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
The members of the Court being equally divided on the issue of the timeliness of the filing of plaintiffs complaint against Harbor-side Healthcare Woods Edge t/a Harborside Nursing Home (Harborside), the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed in respect of that defendant.
The Court is unanimous that it was error to enter judgment dismissing the complaint against Somerset Medical Center (Somerset) and remands the matter to the trial court for further consideration.
I.
The facts are these. In February 1999, Eugene Burns was admitted to the Robert Wood Johnson Hospital in New Brunswick for treatment of an aneurysm. During a surgical procedure, a tracheotomy tube was inserted into Burns’ throat. Thereafter, he was unable to speak, but he could communicate by writing on a pad. Burns was treated at Robert Wood Johnson for approximately two months following his operation. On April 13, 1999, he was transferred to Harborside for rehabilitation. The medical order issued by Robert Wood Johnson directed that Burns should *278be suctioned1 every four hours. Harborside issued its own order on April 14, 1999, requiring healthcare personnel to “suction Q shift and PRN.” (Q means once per shift three shifts per day, and PRN means as needed).
Stephen Szczuvelek (plaintiff), a close friend of Burns, visited him at Harborside on April 15, 1999. During plaintiffs visit, Burns wrote him a note stating, “Steve, you have to get me out of here. They’re going to kill me. They left me in my own waste for three hours. They won’t suction me. Please get me out of here. And I need to be suctioned now.”
Plaintiff pressed the nurse’s call button to obtain help for Burns, but he did not receive a response. After waiting an hour, plaintiff left Burns’ room to seek help. He found a nurse, who took plaintiff to a conference room to speak with a social worker. After plaintiff gave Burns’ note to the nurse and the social worker, they assured him that someone would assist Burns.
Upon his return to Burns’ room, plaintiff asked the nurse on duty if she would suction Burns. The nurse responded, “I just did.” Burns then shook his head indicating that the nurse had not suctioned him. Plaintiff confronted the nurse, “Ma’am, I’ve been here almost two hours and you haven’t stepped foot in this room.” She responded, “it’s the doctor’s orders, he’s not to be suctioned.” Upon further prodding from plaintiff to suction Burns the nurse said, “I don’t have to take this crap,” and left the room. Plaintiff departed Harborside that evening concerned for Bums’ health and determined to find an alternative placement for him.
The following day, April 16, 1999, Burns was rushed to Somerset because he was unresponsive. Plaintiff visited Burns in the Somerset emergency room. He observed Burns’ poor medical condition and believed that Burns was dying. Burns seemed terrified and lapsed in and out of consciousness. A doctor told *279plaintiff that Bums would not survive an operation and that the hospital would make Burns “as comfortable as possible.”
While he was in the emergency room, a nurse informed plaintiff that Harborside had not suctioned Burns because there was a fire drill the prior evening. Later, the social worker at Harborside denied that any fire drill had occurred.
At some point a Somerset doctor asked plaintiff why Burns was not transferred to Robert Wood Johnson. Plaintiff indicated to the doctor that he had not participated in the decision to transfer Burns to Somerset. Apparently, the doctor was concerned because Burns had previously been treated at Robert Wood Johnson and his medical records were there.
On April 17, 1999, Burns suffered a heart attack brought on by respiratory complications and died a short while later. Burns was buried on April 20,1999.
Approximately three weeks after Burns’ funeral, plaintiff consulted with David Alperts, Esq. because he suspected that something went wrong with Burns’ medical care. Mr. Alperts directed plaintiff to obtain Burns’ medical records from Harborside and Somerset. Plaintiff obtained those records that evidenced that the medical care Bums received at Harborside had contributed to his death.
Approximately six months after the funeral, plaintiff contacted a state agency to file a complaint against Harborside and urged an investigation into the events of April 15,1999. The status of that complaint and investigation is unknown. On August 31, 2000, plaintiff consulted another attorney, Larry L. Leifer, Esq.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Harborside and Somerset on April 26, 2001, two years and nine days after Burns’ death. Plaintiff asserted in his complaint various claims pursuant to the Survivor Act, N.J.S.A 2A:15-3, including medical malpractice. Later, on June 24, 2001, plaintiff received a report from Dr. Warren D. Widmann, a medical expert, concluding that Burns had *280lapsed into a coma and died as a result of inadequate medical care by Harborside and Somerset.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 9, 2002, to allege a cause of action pursuant to the New Jersey Nursing Home Responsibilities and Rights of Residence Act, N.J.S.A 30:13 — 5(J), and the Nursing Home Reform Act, “42 U.S.C. 483.25 et seq.,” including provisions contained in 42 C.F.R. 488.410 and 42 C.F.R. 488.301.
Defendants Harborside and Somerset separately moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff filed his complaint beyond the two-year statute of limitations period. In opposition to the motions, plaintiff certified that approximately three weeks after Burns’ funeral he met with an attorney who instructed him to obtain the medical records from Harborside and Somerset. He did so and began to conceptualize that Burns’ death might have been caused by negligence at Harborside. Plaintiff certified that it was not until he consulted Larry Leifer, Esq., on August 31, 2000, in furtherance of his complaint against Harborside that he realized Somerset may also have been negligent. Plaintiff argued that his actions filed on April 26, 2001, were timely because it was not until three weeks after Bums’ funeral on April 20, 1999, that he contacted counsel and thereafter became aware or should have been aware of Harborside’s negligence, and even later for the negligence of Somerset. The trial court canvassed the ease law, noting that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff is aware or reasonably should be aware of facts of an injury through the fault of another. The court granted each defendant’s motion, but in the course of its letter opinion directly addressed only the circumstances involving Harborside and did not discuss the facts as they related to Somerset. The court concluded that based on Burns’ April 15 note to plaintiff and plaintiffs observations that same day, along with the cause of the decedent’s death (respiratory complications), plaintiff knew or should have known that Harborside’s actions or lack thereof were actionable at that time.
*281The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court and affirmed substantially for the reasons articulated in the trial court’s letter opinion of October 4, 2002.
II.
The statute of limitations sets forth the period of time within which a party may file a complaint. In the case of a medical malpractice claim, suit must be filed within two years of the accrual date, which generally is the date of the negligent act or omission. Martinez v. Cooper Hosp., 168 N.J. 45, 52, 747 A.2d 266 (2000). To avoid the harsh effects of a mechanical application of statute of limitations, we adopted the discovery rule first announced in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961). Ibid. “The discovery rule is essentially a rule of equity.” Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273, 300 A.2d 563 (1973). The rule “provides that in an appropriate case a cause of action will be held not to accrue until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a basis for an actionable claim.” Id. at 272, 300 A.2d 563.
It is not every belated discovery that will justify an application of the rule lifting the bar of the limitations statute. The interplay of the conflicting interests of the competing parties must be considered. The decision requires more than a simple factual determination; it should be made by a judge and by a judge conscious of the equitable nature of the issue before him [or her].
[Id. at 275, 300 A.2d 563.]
Thus, it is necessary to identify the equitable claims of each party and evaluate and weigh those claims in determining whether it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule. The crucial inquiry is “whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence that he or she was injured due to the fault of another. The standard is basically an objective one— whether plaintiff ‘knew or should have known’ of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running.” Martinez, supra, 163 N.J. at 52, 747 A.2d 266.
*282III.
We turn now to apply those principles to the parties’ contentions. Plaintiff contends that a fair application of the discovery rule results in a conclusion that the cause of action did not accrue until after he consulted with counsel, obtained the medical records, and realized Harborside may have been negligent in its treatment of Burns. Further, he contends that the misleading advice he received on April 15, 1999, by the nursing staff at Harborside that Burns was receiving respiratory care as often as permitted by the physician’s orders should toll the running of the statute of limitations until “June 24, 2001 or shortly thereafter, when he had the benefit of the report of Dr. Warren D. Widmann.” Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Widmann’s report provided the factual basis to conclude that Harborside and its staff had been negligent. Moreover, it was not until he received Dr. Widmann’s report that he had a factual basis to appreciate that Somerset may have been negligent for its failure to diagnose and properly treat Burns.
Harborside contends there is no justification to apply the discovery rule in this ease. Further, it argues that it is disingenuous of plaintiff to now argue that he did not have sufficient facts to file this lawsuit until he obtained Dr. Widmann’s report in June 2001 since he filed the complaint on April 26, 2001, prior to the receipt of that report.
Somerset also argues that this is not an appropriate case to apply the discovery rule because plaintiff observed a lack of suctioning of Burns on April 15, 1999, Burns’ death occurred on April 17, 1999, and plaintiff consulted with a lawyer within three weeks of the funeral, which evidenced his obvious concern.
Unlike the claim against Harborside, the trial court made no findings on the record that would indicate when a reasonable person in plaintiffs position should have been aware of Somerset’s role in contributing to the cause of Burns’ death. The court below failed to discuss the application of the discovery rule to Somerset *283and to determine when plaintiff should have reasonably known of facts supporting a cause of action against Somerset to start the running of the statute of limitation.
The application of the discovery rule may result in different dates for the accrual of a cause of action against different parties. As noted above, the discovery rule delays accrual of a cause of action “until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that [he or she] may have a basis for an actionable claim.” Lopez supra, 62 N.J. at 272, 300 A.2d 563.
Plaintiff certified that he did not have any knowledge of possible negligence by Somerset until he contacted Mr. Leifer on August 31, 2000. We note, however, that we have an incomplete record as the parties failed to submit to us a statement of material facts, which is required on the filing of a motion for summary judgment, that could have enabled us to decide this issue. Consequently, a remand is necessary for the trial court to determine the application of the discovery rule as to Somerset and when the cause of action arose against Somerset.
In summary, the members of the Court being equally divided, the judgment dismissing the complaint against Harborside is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to determine when the cause of action arose against Somerset.

 Suctioning involves the removal of trachea-bronchial secretion by using a catheter and a suctioning machine. The suctioning helps to stimulate the patient to cough up additional secretions.