Court Opinion

ID: 9959121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 19:00:48.212153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:28.442434
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13866    Document: 20-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13866
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JOEL HERNANDEZ,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
        ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                                  Respondents-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cv-01234-SDM-CPT
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                22-13866

                               ____________________

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Joel Hernandez, a Florida state prisoner, is serving two
        consecutive life sentences for capital sexual battery under Fla. Stat.
        § 794.011(2)(a) (2008). Hernandez, pro se, appeals the district
        court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas
        corpus.
               On appeal, Hernandez argues that he was denied eﬀective
        assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed to object to
        the prosecutor’s alleged improper closing arguments to the jury. In
        post-conviction proceedings, the state courts determined that
        objection, even if made, lacked merit and Hernandez’s trial
        counsel’s performance was not deﬁcient in not objecting. After
        review, we conclude that the state courts’ decision was not contrary
        to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
        federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
        in light of the evidence presented to the state court. See 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254(d). Thus, we aﬃrm the district court’s denial of
        Hernandez’s § 2254 petition.
                          I.    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        A.     Information and Sentences
             On October 24, 2013, the State of Florida filed a third
        amended felony information charging Hernandez with two counts
        of capital sexual battery under Fla. Stat. § 794.011(2)(a).
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        22-13866               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Specifically, the information alleged that Hernandez, while over
        the age of 18, committed sexual battery against a minor victim
        under the age of 12. After a three-day jury trial in 2014, Hernandez
        was convicted of the charged crimes and sentenced to two
        consecutive terms of life imprisonment.
        B.    Trial Evidence
               During the trial, the State presented seven witnesses: (1) the
        child victim, Hernandez’s stepdaughter; (2) the child victim’s
        father; (3) the child victim’s mother; (4) the road patrol corporal
        with the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office who responded to the
        father’s sex offense call; (5) the nurse practitioner who examined
        the child victim; (6) the child victim’s cousin, as a similar fact
        witness; and (7) the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office detective who
        investigated the alleged sex offense.
               The State introduced testimony that Hernandez was the
        child victim’s live-in stepfather and that he placed his penis in the
        child victim’s anus multiple times when she was under the age of
        12. The child victim testified that Hernandez would offer her
        money or would promise her sleepovers with her friends in
        exchange for sexual favors. The child victim’s father testified that
        the child victim told him that Hernandez was “raping her before
        for a long time” and that she was afraid to tell anyone because
        Hernandez had threatened her. The child victim’s mother testified
        that the child victim told her that Hernandez entered her room,
        that the child victim complained of bleeding from her anus, and
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13866

        that the child victim once handed her a bottle of eye drops filled
        with personal lubricant.
               The child victim’s cousin testified that, when she was a
        minor, Hernandez attempted to convince her to engage in sexual
        acts with him by offering her money. The cousin also testified that
        Hernandez touched her bottom and asked her to go into another
        room with him, pinned her to a bed and kissed her neck, and pulled
        his penis out while they were watching a movie.
        C.    Closing Arguments and Direct Appeal
               The prosecutor’s rebuttal closing arguments are the focus of
        this appeal. Therein, the prosecutor likened the trial to a “crucible”
        for the child victim, stating:
                     There is a word, crucible. Crucible is a severe
              or certain test or trial[,] and I don’t mean trial in a
              legal sense, but a trial is really a crucible. It is a
              process[,] it is a difficult process. It is a long process
              and it is intended to sort of grind slowly, and
              eventually to come up with a result through the
              difficulty of a child having come into court and testify
              in front of the guy that was her father, right? Who
              essentially was acting as her father, testify in front of
              him about what he did to her when she was a little
              girl.
                     And I mean, that is difficult. That is a crucible
              that she has had to go through along with all the other
              interviews and examinations and all the rest that has
              occurred. So cross-examination is a crucible. It is
              when the Defense gets up. They get to ask questions.
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        22-13866               Opinion of the Court                          5

              They get to make accusations. So it is through this
              crucible that we get the truth, right?
                     ....
                      [The child victim] testified in this case, and you
              had the opportunity to see her as she went through
              this crucible of testifying about unspeakable things in
              front of strangers, all of us, in front of all of us about
              things including by the way her step-father who did
              this to her. So she had to get up on the witness stand
              and tell you in a public forum about things--
               The prosecutor also asked the jury to imagine the courage it
        took for the child victim to disclose her sexual abuse, stating:
                    The Defendant’s crimes were hidden in plain
              sight. [The child victim]’s mother didn’t see it
              because she wasn’t looking.
                    And I want [to] just throw this out there, you
              know, the defense says well, [the child victim] saw
              what happened with [the child victim’s cousin] . . . .
              But stop and think what the lesson of [the child
              victim’s cousin] case was to a child like [the child
              victim].
                    The lesson was, I submit that your mom might
              not believe you. And the defendant, the guy who did
              this may end up living in the house with you and you
              may have to see him again. So imagine the courage
              it must have taken for her to disclose this even to her
              brothers.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13866

        Hernandez’s trial counsel did not object to these rebuttal closing
        arguments as golden rule arguments.
                As noted above, the jury convicted Hernandez. Hernandez
        appealed his capital sexual battery convictions to Florida’s Court of
        Appeals. On February 17, 2016, the Florida appellate court
        affirmed Hernandez’s convictions and sentences. Hernandez v.
        State, 186 So. 3d 1031 (Fla. Ct. App. 2016).
        D.     Post-Conviction 3.850 Motion and Appeal
               On July 5, 2016, Hernandez, pro se, filed a motion for post-
        conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in
        the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida
        in and for Pasco County (the “3.850 State Court”). On December
        1, 2016, Hernandez, pro se, filed a timely second amended Rule
        3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. Hernandez’s 3.850 motion
        raised four claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
                First, Hernandez claimed that counsel’s “failure to object to
        the prosecutor’s improper ‘golden rule’ argument was deficient
        performance which amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.”
        (Font altered).      Second, Hernandez claimed “out-of-court
        statements elicited by the prosecutor violated defendant’s right to
        confrontation, and counsel’s failure to object allowed the violation
        of the defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause to go
        unchallenged.” (Font altered). Third, Hernandez asserted that
        counsel’s failure “to object on grounds of hearsay” constituted
        deficient performance. Finally, Hernandez asserted that counsel
        failed to adequately investigate his case before trial.
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        22-13866               Opinion of the Court                         7

                On December 27, 2016, the 3.850 State Court denied
        Hernandez’s motion for post-conviction relief. As relevant to this
        appeal, the 3.850 State Court stated that under Florida law, the
        State is prohibited from (1) making the golden rule argument “that
        invite[s] the jurors to place themselves in the victim’s position
        during the crime and imagine the victim’s suffering,” Mosley v. State,
        46 So. 3d 510, 520 (Fla. 2009), and (2) also “from creating an
        imaginary first-person script depicting the victim’s suffering or
        death,” Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 849 (Fla. 2012).
               Ultimately, the 3.850 State Court determined that the
        prosecutor’s closing arguments were not prohibited because
        (1) “the prosecutor’s statements did not invite the jury to put
        themselves in the victim’s position during the crime” and (2) “the
        prosecutor’s comments did not create an imaginary script for the
        victim at all, let alone one depicting her suffering.” Instead, the
        prosecutor’s comments pertained to the difficultly the child victim
        went through in testifying at trial and the courage it took to
        disclose what had happened to her.
              Therefore, the 3.850 State Court found that trial counsel’s
        performance was not deficient because the prosecutor’s comments
        were not golden rule arguments and an objection on that ground
        could not have properly been sustained. See Schoenwetter v. State,
        46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (holding that trial counsel’s
        performance cannot be deemed deficient for failing to raise a
        meritless objection). Finding that Hernandez could not meet the
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13866

        deficient performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, the 3.850
        State Court declined to address prejudice.
              Hernandez appealed. On December 15, 2017, the Florida
        Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the denial of his Rule 3.850
        motion. Hernandez v. State, 241 So. 3d 115 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).
        E.     Federal § 2254 Proceedings
               On June 27, 2018, Hernandez filed an amended 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States
        District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Ground one
        alleged all grounds from Hernandez’s direct appeal and ground
        two alleged all grounds from Hernandez’s 3.850 motion for post-
        conviction relief. Hernandez alleged, inter alia, that his trial
        counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to object to the
        prosecutor’s alleged golden rule arguments during rebuttal closing
        arguments. In response, the State argued that Hernandez’s
        petition should be denied for various reasons.
                In his reply, Hernandez reiterated his arguments about the
        golden rule and asserted that the district court should give no
        deference to the Florida Court of Appeals’ denial of his ineffective
        trial counsel claims because the denial was not adjudicated on the
        merits by Florida’s highest state court.
              On February 28, 2019, the district court denied Hernandez’s
        § 2254 petition. Relevant to this appeal, the district court
        concluded that (1) Hernandez’s ineffective trial counsel claims
        were adjudicated on the merits in state court and (2) the trial record
        showed the prosecutor’s statements were not golden rule
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        22-13866               Opinion of the Court                         9

        arguments, “as the post-conviction court determined by examining
        the statements in context, and by applying Florida law.”
        Therefore, Hernandez’s claims necessarily failed because trial
        counsel did not perform deficiently.
                Although the 3.850 State Court did not rule on prejudice, the
        district court determined that Hernandez could not establish
        prejudice. The district court found that the prosecutor’s
        statements did not prejudice Hernandez because: (1) they “were
        very limited in scope”; (2) they “were not improper golden rule
        arguments under the law”; and (3) “the evidence of Hernandez’s
        sexual abuse of the child victim was very strong.” The district
        court observed that the offense: (1) was not an isolated incident; (2)
        occurred repeatedly “over a two or so year period of time”; and (3)
        was corroborated by evidence of Hernandez’s sexual abuse of the
        child victim’s cousin. The district court found that “[t]here is no
        reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
        the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
               In denying Hernandez’s § 2254 petition, the district court
        concluded that Hernandez failed to meet his burden of proving
        that the state courts unreasonably applied federal law in Strickland,
        or unreasonably determined the facts in rejecting his claims.
               This Court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on
        only this issue: “Did Hernandez’s trial counsel provide ineffective
        assistance of counsel, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                     22-13866

        (1984), by failing to object to the state’s allegedly improper ‘golden
        rule’ argument during closing arguments?”1
                           II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
                In reviewing the district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition,
        we review de novo questions of law and mixed questions of law and
        fact, and we review findings of fact for clear error. Raleigh v. Sec’y,
        Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 948 (11th Cir. 2016). “We review
        de novo the district court’s decision about whether the state court
        acted contrary to clearly established federal law, unreasonably
        applied federal law, or made an unreasonable determination of
        fact.” Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir.
        2010) (quotation marks omitted).
                                  III.    DISCUSSION
        A.     28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
               Under § 2254(d), federal courts may grant habeas relief on
        claims previously adjudicated on the merits in state court only if
        the state court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an
        unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
        determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or
        (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

        1 We do not address Hernandez’s argument regarding improper witness

        bolstering because it falls outside the scope of the COA. See Murray v. United
        States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “in an appeal
        brought by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review is limited to
        the issues specified in the COA”).
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        22-13866                    Opinion of the Court                                 11

        the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
        28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 2
               Section 2254(d) “imposes a highly deferential standard for
        evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court
        decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Hardy v. Cross, 565
        U.S. 65, 66 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). The standard is
        “doubly deferential” when evaluating the performance prong of a
        claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under § 2254(d)(1).
        Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009); Jenkins v. Comm’r,
        Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 1248, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020). “The
        question is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s
        determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but
        whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially
        higher threshold.” Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123 (quotation marks
        omitted).
               For ineffective counsel claims, a § 2254 petitioner must
        demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
        violated because (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient,

        2 Under § 2254(d), we evaluate the highest state court decision that evaluated

        the claim on the merits. Marshall v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285
        (11th Cir. 2016). Here, the highest state court decision, the Florida Court of
        Appeals’ affirmance of the 3.850 State Court’s denial of Rule 3.850 motion,
        does not give reasons for its summary affirmance. See Hernandez, 241 So. 3d
        at 115. Therefore, we must “look through” the Florida appellate court’s
        decision to the 3.850 State Court’s opinion and presume that the Florida Court
        of Appeals’ decision adopted the same reasoning. See Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S.
        ----, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-13866

        meaning that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
        and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, meaning
        that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
        errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
        Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 697 (1984).
        Because the petitioner must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, a
        court need not address one prong, if the other is not satisfied. Id.
        at 697.
        B.    Deficient Performance Prong
               To show deficient performance, the petitioner must
        demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance fell below an
        objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
        “[C]ounsel should be strongly presumed to have rendered
        adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
        exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Cullen v. Pinholster,
        563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). Counsel's
        performance is deficient only if it falls below the wide range of
        competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases. See Strickland,
        466 U.S. at 690. The burden is on the defendant to prove “that
        counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing
        professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound
        strategy.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). “[A]ny
        deficiencies of counsel in failing to raise or adequately pursue
        [meritless issues] cannot constitute ineffective assistance of
        counsel.” Owen v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 915 (11th
        Cir. 2009).
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        22-13866               Opinion of the Court                         13

               Here, there is an additional layer of deference. “[A]lthough
        the issue of ineffective assistance—even when based on counsel’s
        failure to raise a state law claim—is one of constitutional
        dimension, we must defer to the state’s construction of its own law
        when the validity of the claim that . . . counsel failed to raise turns
        on state law.” Pinkney v. Sec’y, DOC, 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir.
        2017) (quotation marks omitted).
               A review of the record supports the 3.850 State Court’s
        conclusion that Hernandez failed to show that his trial counsel’s
        performance was deficient under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S.
        at 687-88. Florida law prohibits arguments at trial that violate the
        golden rule. Bailey v. State, 998 So. 2d 545, 555 (Fla. 2008). Under
        Florida law, golden rule arguments are ones that “invite the jurors
        to place themselves in the victim’s position during the crime and
        imagine the victim’s suffering.” Mosley, 46 So. 3d at 520.
                Applying Florida law, the 3.850 State Court concluded that
        the State’s rebuttal closing arguments were not golden rule
        arguments and were not improper nor legally objectionable. The
        3.850 State Court determined that the prosecutor’s remarks
        concerned the difficultly the child victim went through in testifying
        at trial and the courage it took to disclose what had happened to
        her. The prosecutor did not suggest that the jurors place
        themselves in the child victim’s position and imagine what she
        experienced during the crime. See id.
              Accordingly, the 3.850 State Court found that
        (1) Hernandez’s argument that the prosecutor improperly
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        14                    Opinion of the Court                22-13866

        advanced golden rule arguments during closing arguments was
        meritless, (2) counsel’s objection would not have been meritorious,
        and (3) thus, trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective under
        Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 690; Owen, 568 F.3d at
        915; Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating
        counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious
        objection). And the Florida appellate court summarily affirmed.
        See Hernandez, 241 So. 3d at 115; see also supra note 2.
              In this appeal, Hernandez has not carried his burden to show
        that the Florida state courts’ decision was contrary to, or an
        unreasonable application of, established federal law.
                              IV.   CONCLUSION
             For the reasons stated above, we aﬃrm the denial of
        Hernandez’s § 2254 petition.
              AFFIRMED.