Court Opinion

ID: 9950580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:08:17.816895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:30.425655
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                                                   RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024
                                                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                 2022-SC-0551-MR

DUSTIN BELL                                                            APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
                             NO. 20-CR-00060

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                   AFFIRMING

      Dustin Bell was convicted by a Garrard County jury of murder and first-

degree assault. He received a total sentence of life imprisonment and appeals

to this Court as a matter of right. 1 Bell argues the trial court erred by: (1)

failing to instruct the jury on defense in protection of another; (2) admitting

recorded jailhouse phone calls which contained hearsay; and (3) denying his

motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s key witness had a seizure

during cross-examination. We affirm.

      For several years, Bell, Samantha Denny, and Rodney Meade were

friends. Bell and Denny began dating in December 2019 and were engaged to

      1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b)
be married in February 2020. 2 They lived together at Bell’s residence.

Sometime on July 21 or 22, 2020, Bell and Denny had an argument because

she did not want him looking through her cellphone. During the argument,

Bell broke the cellphone which angered Denny, so she left. She eventually

went to stay at Meade’s residence. 3

      Initially, Bell did not know where Denny went and actively tried to find

her. He messaged Meade on social media inquiring about Denny’s

whereabouts. Meade intimated he knew about the fight and that Denny was

“done” with Bell. While Meade denied being with Denny, Bell told Meade that

he suspected they were involved romantically. Bell also stated he knew Denny

had been at Meade’s residence.

      On the morning of July 24, 2020, Bell went to Meade’s residence to look

for Denny. Because the door was locked, Bell used a card to slide the door

open—a trick he claimed Meade had previously showed him. Meade was in his

downstairs bedroom. Bell asked about Denny. At the time, Denny was hiding

under the pool table in Meade’s basement. Bell and Meade continued talking

without argument for over an hour and eventually went outside to Meade’s

mailbox where they continued talking. When they returned to the house,

Denny was in the kitchen. She began yelling at Bell and asked him what he

wanted. Bell stated that he wanted her to come home with him. Denny told

      2 Bell often referred to Denny as his wife, but it does not appear from the record

they were actually married at any time relevant to this case.
      3 Meade shared the residence with his father, who owned the property and often

stayed overnight in West Virginia during the week for work.

                                           2
Bell she did not want to go with him and asked him to leave. She also

demanded that Meade ask Bell to leave. It is unclear whether Meade told Bell

to leave, but he did tell Denny that she did not have to leave with Bell.

      Bell did not leave. Meade grabbed a knife off the kitchen counter.

Denny testified Meade simply grabbed the knife and stood his ground while

Bell claimed Meade moved towards him. Denny got between the two men with

Meade to her back and Bell in front of her. Bell stated that Denny was going

with him. Meade again told Denny she did not have to leave and further stated

he was not going to fight with Bell. Suddenly, Bell pulled out his handgun. As

he shot at Meade, Denny took a protective stance. The bullet hit three of

Denny’s fingers before striking Meade in the hip.

      Denny did not know she had been shot and began fighting Bell. Meade

told them he had been shot and fell to the floor. Denny told Meade she would

get help and told him not to worry about her. Bell and Denny then left the

house, leaving Meade behind. Once they were in Bell’s car, Denny realized she

had been shot in the right hand. On the way to the hospital, Bell’s car broke

down and they waited for a tow truck. The tow truck took them to a garage

where Bell’s mother and brother picked them up. On the way to the hospital,

Denny demanded to get out of the vehicle and began walking. Bell walked with

her to the hospital but could not go inside because of COVID-19 regulations.

      In the meantime, Meade’s body was discovered by his brother Brad who

called 911 although he knew Meade was already dead. Police discovered a

single bullet casing and a knife at the scene. Officers then went to Bell’s

                                        3
residence to execute a search warrant and recovered Bell’s firearm from his

vehicle.

      Hospital personnel reported Denny’s gunshot wound to law enforcement.

Police officers made contact with Bell in the parking lot of the emergency room.

Bell told the officers he had picked Denny up at her friend’s house and that she

was already injured when he arrived. He also claimed Denny would lie to get

him in trouble. Bell admitted at trial that he lied to the officers. The police

took Bell to the station for further questioning. 4 He initially repeated his

fabricated story that Denny was already injured when he came to pick her up

before eventually claiming self-defense. Again, Bell admitted at trial that he

lied to the police during this interview prior to telling them the truth about the

necessity for self-defense.

      4 The portion of the Commonwealth’s statement of the case describing Bell’s

recorded interview contains a general citation to the video record between 10:50:30-
02:50:45 without any subsequent pinpoint citations. The use of “id.” without further
specifying information is not appropriate in this situation. Kentucky Rules of
Appellate Procedure (RAP) 31(E)(4) requires “[e]ach reference in a brief to a segment of
the designated official recording shall set forth the letters ‘VR’ and the month, day,
year, hour, and minute (or second if necessary) at which the reference begins as
recorded.” Similarly, RAP 32(A)(3) requires a statement of the case to contain “ample
references to the specific location in the record supporting each of the statements
contained in the summary.” (Emphasis added). The foregoing rules pertain to appellee
briefs as well as appellant’s briefs. RAP 32(B)(3) (“A counterstatement of the case
[must] . . . set[] forth the matters the appellee considers essential to a fair and
adequate statement of the case in accordance with the requirements for appellant’s
statement of the case.”). Kentucky appellate courts “will not sift through a voluminous
record to try to ascertain facts when a party has failed to comply with its obligation
under [our rules of procedure] . . . to provide specific references to the record.”
Commonwealth v. Roth, 567 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Parker v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647, 676 (Ky. 2009)). We again implore appellate
practitioners to scrupulously comply with the applicable rules to avoid the imposition
of sanctions up to and including dismissal. Id. at 596.

                                           4
      Bell was indicted on charges of murder, first-degree burglary, and first-

degree assault. He testified in his own defense at trial variously claiming

Denny had swatted his gun causing it to accidentally discharge and that he

intentionally shot Meade in self-defense. At the conclusion of the evidence, the

trial court granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the burglary charge. Bell

was convicted of murder and first-degree assault. The trial court imposed a

total sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with the jury’s

recommendation. This appeal followed.

      Bell first argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on

defense in protection of another. He concedes this alleged error is unpreserved

and requests palpable error review under RCr 5 10.26. We decline to review for

palpable error because Bell’s failure to comply with RCr 9.54(2) forecloses

appellate review.

      RCr 10.26 generally authorizes an appellate court to review an

unpreserved error as follows:

      A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may
      be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
      appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
      preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
      determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.

Palpable error review is generally available to remedy an incorrectly stated

instruction that was given to the jury. Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d

340, 346 (Ky. 2013). However, RCr 9.54(2) specifically provides

      5 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                         5
      [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
      instruction unless the party’s position has been fairly and
      adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered instruction or
      by motion, or unless the party makes objection before the court
      instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which the party
      objects and the ground or grounds of the objection.

(Emphasis added). In Martin, we interpreted RCr 9.54(2) to impose an

affirmative duty “on the parties to make their instructional preferences known

to the trial judge.” 409 S.W.3d at 345. When a party’s claim of error “is that a

particular instruction should have been given but was not or that it should not

have been given but was given,” the failure to comply with RCr 9.54(2) bars

“appellate review unless the issue was fairly and adequately presented to the

trial court for its initial consideration.” Id. at 346. The reason for this rule is

“that the decision to request a specific instruction or to oppose the giving of a

specific instruction is often a matter of individual preference and trial strategy.”

Id. at 345. We cannot “expect the trial judge to anticipate a party’s strategic

preferences and act upon them sua sponte.” Id. at 346. Similarly, “[t]he trial

judge cannot be expected to distinguish a neglectful omission from a deliberate

choice.” Id.

      Here, Bell did not specifically request an instruction on the defense of

protection of another or otherwise make his desire for such an instruction

known to the trial court. The defenses of self-protection and protection of

another are distinct and governed by separate statutes. Compare KRS 503.050

(self-protection) with KRS 503.070 (protection of another); see also 1 Cooper &

Cetrulo, Kentucky Jury Instructions §§ 11.07-11.07A (2023). Additionally, Bell

                                          6
indicated to the court that the first self-defense instruction was “fine.” 6 Thus,

his claim that this instruction misstated the law is barred as invited error.

Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 680 S.W.3d 911, 930 (Ky. 2023) (“By expressly

agreeing to the jury instructions . . . [the defendant] waived his ability to now

challenge those instructions on appeal.”). Because we conclude Bell failed to

comply with RCr 9.54(2), we decline to address his entitlement to an

instruction on defense in protection of another.

      Bell next argues the trial court erred by admitting recorded jailhouse

phone calls containing hearsay. We disagree.

      The Commonwealth called a former employee of the Lincoln County

Regional Jail to lay the foundation for introduction of four recorded phone

calls. Two of the calls were between Bell and his mother while the other two

were between Bell and Denny. After the foundation was laid, Bell objected on

hearsay grounds pertaining to Denny’s side of the conversation. Without

articulating a specific ground for admission, the Commonwealth responded

that the trial court could give an admonition. The trial court agreed and

instructed the jury that

      statements made by the defendant are always admissible. There
      will be some other information that’s being conveyed by the other
      individuals he’s talking to. Those statements are not being
      introduced for their truth. Somebody else could be saying
      something else within those statements and it is not to be
      considered by you as true. Those are hearsay. Only ones made by
      the defendant can be considered by you as evidence in this case.

      6 This instruction was labeled as Instruction No. 3.

                                          7
The recordings were then played for the jury. The gist of the conversations

between Bell and his mother involved Bell’s request for her to marshal Denny’s

support for his defense, including his desire for Denny to swear in an affidavit

that she pushed the gun because that was “the only way it’s going to seal my . .

. freedom.”

        In her conversations with Bell, Denny described the extent of her

injuries. Bell apologized and told her he did not mean to shoot anyone. He

also expressed his hope the jury would rule in his favor on his claim of self-

defense. Denny derided the notion of Bell asserting self-defense and exclaimed,

“It’s not self-defense,” and “You godd--n murdered him.” She told Bell she

hated him because of the physical and mental trauma she experienced. Denny

further exhorted Bell to tell the truth, to which he responded, “What do you

want me to have, life?” After the recordings were played for the jury, the trial

court admitted them into evidence and reiterated its prior admonition that the

jury should refrain from considering any statements apart from those made by

Bell.

        KRE 7 802 provides “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by

these rules or by rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.” Hearsay is defined

as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”

KRE 801(c). A statement is defined as (1) “[a]n oral or written assertion;” or (2)

        7 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                         8
the “[n]onverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an

assertion.” KRE 801(a). While the Rules of Evidence do not define an

assertion, we have interpreted the term to mean “a statement or expression of a

fact, condition or opinion.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Ky.

2012). “Thus, not all out-of-court utterances are hearsay.” Id. at 125.

      Specifically, KRE 801A(b)(1) exempts a party’s admissions from the scope

of the hearsay rule “even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the

statement is offered against a party and is . . . [t]he party’s own statement, in

either an individual or a representative capacity[.]” In contrast to a statement

against interest under KRE 804(b)(3) 8, a party admission under KRE 801A(b)(1)

“does not at all depend upon the making of a statement that is against the

party’s interest when made.” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law

Handbook § 8.15[1] (2022). The rationale underlying this hearsay exception is

that a party “cannot complain of lack of opportunity to cross-examine himself

before his assertion is admitted against him.” Id. (quoting 4 Wigmore, Evidence

in Trials at Common Law § 1048 (Chadbourn rev. 1972)). In this context, a

      8 When a declarant is unavailable as a witness, KRE 804(b)(3) provides for the

introduction of
             [a] statement which was at the time of its making so far
             contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary
             interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
             criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
             declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
             declarant’s position would not have made the statement
             unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
             expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible
             unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
             trustworthiness of the statement.

                                            9
party’s admissions (sometimes termed “evidentiary admissions”) are “merely

evidence, subject to rebuttal and contradiction like all other evidence[.]” Id. at

§ 8.15[3][a]. Thus, unlike a judicial admission, an evidentiary admission is not

conclusive. Id. (citing Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021,

1024 (Ky. 1941)).

         Bell does not challenge the use of his recorded admissions. Instead, he

argues Denny’s side of the conversation amounted to inadmissible hearsay.

However, this Court has held out-of-court statements used to provide context

to a party’s admissions on a recording do not constitute hearsay because the

statements are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Turner v.

Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Ky. 2008). Further, to the extent

Denny’s statements were not “reasonably required to place any of [Bell’s]

statements into context[,]” any inadmissible portions of the recording are

subject to harmless error analysis. Id.

         In the present appeal, the trial court recognized Denny’s statements were

not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted and twice admonished the

jury not to consider them as evidence. We indulge a strong presumption that a

jury will “follow an admonition to disregard evidence and the admonition thus

cures any error.” Dillon v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Ky. 2015)

(quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003)).

However, this presumption is not absolute. Id. The presumption does not

apply:

                                          10
      [1] when the question was asked without a factual basis and was
      ‘inflammatory’ or ‘highly prejudicial’[; or]

      [2] when there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be
      unable to follow the court’s admonition and there is a strong
      likelihood that the effect of the inadmissible evidence would be
      devastating to the defendant.

Id. at 18-19 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky.

2003).

         Contrary to Bell’s argument 9, we neither perceive an overwhelming

possibility that the jury would be unable to follow the trial court’s admonition,

nor do we discern a strong likelihood that Denny’s statements were devastating

to the defense. Bell asserts it would be “difficult for the jury to disregard

[Denny’s] dismissive view of [Bell’s] self-defense claim and her emotional

statement that he ‘godd[-][-]n murdered’ [Meade].” He further claims Denny’s

statements improperly allowed the jury to hear additional gruesome details

about her injuries. However, in considering the efficacy of admonitions, this

Court has recognized, “[p]eople disregard what they know or what they think

they know all the time.” Bartley v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 714, 736 (Ky.

2013).

      In the context of this personal phone call, Denny’s statements regarding

Bell’s claim of self-defense evince a layman’s understanding of the concept

based on her first-hand observations as a victim and eyewitness rather than

      9 Bell has not argued the Commonwealth lacked a factual basis to introduce

Denny’s statements. Thus, the first exception to the curative admonition rule is
inapplicable.

                                          11
the expression of a legal opinion arising from specialized knowledge. 10 Thus,

the present circumstances are distinguishable from those where this Court has

held a police detective’s improper opinion testimony that the defendant’s

“conduct did not match the stereo-typical conduct of an innocent person acting

in self-defense” was devastating to the defense. Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391

S.W.3d 762, 777 (Ky. 2013). Moreover, as discussed in further detail below, if

an admonition is sufficient to cure an improper opinion concerning a

defendant’s guilt of murder, then we fail to perceive why an admonition would

not be equally sufficient to remedy an improper opinion on a claim of self-

defense. See Kinser v. Commonwealth, 741 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Ky. 1987).

      Regarding Denny’s statement that Bell murdered Meade, we have held an

admonition was sufficient to cure a detective’s improper testimony that he

“knew enough about the case to think that [the three defendants] had possibly

committed this murder.” Id. Although Denny’s statement was admittedly

stronger than that in Kinser, she also lacked the cloak of authority and

expertise which colored the detective’s statement in that case. Further,

because of the admonition, the present appeal is distinguishable from our

      10 While Bell has not made any claim Denny’s statements were testimonial for

purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis, we note testimonial statements are
generally made “under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). Examples of testimonial statements
include “affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Id. at 51 (citation omitted). We do not
find any basis in the present record to indicate the statements contained in this
personal phone call were testimonial in nature.

                                          12
decision in Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761, 764-65 (Ky. 1982),

wherein we held the use of a lay witness’s opinion on the issue of the

defendant’s guilt amounted to reversible error. We cannot conclude Denny’s

statement was so flagrant as to be devastating or otherwise overcome the jury’s

ability to follow the trial court’s admonition.

      Further, Denny’s statements describing her injuries were sufficiently

similar to her trial testimony as to be merely cumulative. These statements

could hardly be considered devastating to the defense when the jury was

already aware of the extent of Denny’s injuries. Upon consideration of the

recorded phone calls in light of the trial court’s admonition, we conclude that

reversal is unwarranted.

      For his final contention of error, Bell asserts he was entitled to a mistrial

after Denny had a seizure on the stand during cross-examination. We

disagree.

      This Court has long held “[a] mistrial is an extreme remedy and should

be resorted to only when there appears in the record a manifest necessity.”

Stieritz v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 353, 368 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Cardine v.

Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 641, 647 (Ky. 2009)). For a manifest necessity to

exist, “the harmful event must be of such magnitude that a litigant would be

denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be removed in

no other way.” Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Ky. 2002). We

review the denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion. Id. at 863.

                                         13
      In considering the prejudicial effect of a witness’s conduct at trial, our

predecessor Court observed the “frequent occurrence in homicide cases [where]

the next of kin or other close relatives, under the stress of testifying, or when

confronted with personal belongings of the deceased, become emotionally

upset, cry, and lose their composure.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d

788, 789 (Ky. 1955). Because “[t]hese are matters that cannot be anticipated

and cannot be prevented by denying such persons the right to be present in the

courtroom[,]” it is the duty of the trial court, upon a proper request, “to

admonish the jury concerning such disturbance.” Id. The same rule pertains

to medical incidents in the courtroom. See United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d

1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting the trial court is in the best position to

determine the prejudicial effect, if any, resulting from a witness’s seizure

during cross-examination). Further, when a witness’s conduct does not rise to

the level of impropriety, it is within the discretion of the trial court “to allow the

proceedings to continue.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 925 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Ky.

1996), overruled on other grounds by Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S.W.3d 6, 14

(Ky. 2001). Ultimately, “[t]he trial judge [is] in the best position to determine

whether any remedial action [is] necessary to preserve decorum and ensure a

fair trial.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 890 (Ky.

1992)).

      In the present matter, Denny testified on direct examination without

incident. At the conclusion of direct examination, the trial court informed the

parties it was time to break for lunch. The Commonwealth requested the court

                                         14
to allow Denny to complete her testimony without interruption. Defense

counsel anticipated cross-examination would last 15-20 minutes. The trial

court agreed to permit Denny to finish her testimony. Approximately seven

minutes into the cross-examination, Denny became upset and tearful. Denny

continued to answer questions when defense counsel asked if Bell was the love

of her life. Denny responded, “He still is.” Defense counsel then asked, “So

[Bell] waited with you because he cared about you?” At this point Denny

became visibly distressed, leaning her head back. The Commonwealth objected

to the question, which the trial court overruled. Denny then slumped from the

witness chair onto the floor. The trial court inquired whether she was alright.

The Commonwealth came to Denny’s aid and informed the court she was

having an epileptic seizure. Other individuals also assisted Denny. After a

couple of minutes, Denny regained her composure, sat back up and said, “I

want to hurry up and go home and go to sleep.” She continued to sit in the

witness chair for a few more minutes. Denny did not require medical

intervention.

      At this point, Bell requested a mistrial arguing the seizure would affect

the jury’s view of Denny to his prejudice. The trial court stated it was less

concerned about the prejudicial impact of the seizure than it was about Bell’s

right to conduct a full cross-examination. The trial court allowed Denny to

continue testifying with the caveat that it needed “to see what she could do

from here on out.” Denny informed the trial court that she was ready to

resume questioning. The remaining cross-examination lasted approximately

                                        15
two minutes. Denny answered every question asked of her. Following her

testimony, the Commonwealth requested that Denny be excused. Bell agreed

and did not request any further relief.

      Under the reasoning of Jackson and Mills, we cannot conclude the trial

court abused its discretion by denying Bell’s motion for mistrial. Further, we

cannot conclude the denial of a mistrial implicated Bell’s right of confrontation.

See Davenport v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 763, 767-68 (Ky. 2005) (“[T]he

right to cross-examination is not absolute and the trial court retains the

discretion to set limitations on the scope and subject: ‘[T]he Confrontation

Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-

examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the

defense might wish.’” (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679

(1986)). We have held “the Confrontation Clause is not implicated by a witness

claiming memory loss if he or she takes the stand at trial and is subject to

cross-examination.” McAtee v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608, 619 (Ky.

2013). The reasoning of McAtee applies with equal force to the present appeal.

      Here, the disturbance in the courtroom was a medical situation, not an

impropriety. After the trial court denied his motion for a mistrial, Bell did not

request an admonition or otherwise articulate his belief that an admonition

would be ineffective. Bell completed his cross-examination and agreed to

excuse Denny without her being subject to recall. These circumstances simply

do not amount to the manifest necessity for a mistrial as identified by our

precedents. See Stieritz, 671 S.W.3d at 368.

                                          16
      Having carefully reviewed the record, briefs, and the law, we perceive no

error. Accordingly, the judgment of the Garrard Circuit Court is affirmed.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Steven J. Buck
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Sarah N. Christensen
Assistant Solicitor General

Rachel Ann Wright
Assistant Solicitor General

                                       17