Court Opinion

ID: 9634295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:14.99342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:00.422607
License: Public Domain

RUIZ, Associate Judge,
concurring:
Although I agree that the majority correctly limits its opinion to the holding that the certificate and underlying evidence were insufficient to support a contempt conviction, I write separately to address further important procedural safeguards, that, had they been observed in this case, probably would have avoided the unfortunate consequence of Mr. Brooks’s having served his ten-day sentence on a fatally defective conviction without benefit of meaningful appellate review. As the majority and Judge Pryor’s dissent point out, we strictly scrutinize summary contempt adjudications. Unless the trial court’s hand is stayed, however, even close appellate scrutiny can come too late, as in this case. Two requests for stay, one at the trial court level and one before this court, were both denied and thus not sufficient to ensure timely review of a summary contempt conviction that we hold today to have been improperly adjudicated summarily, insufficient as a matter of law and unsupported by the evidence. It is in the context of this reality and with the hope of averting similar cases in the future, that I write to explain why the summary contempt proceedings in this case were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to provide fundamental safeguards generally known to be required by due process.
The Supreme Court “ha[s] stated time and again” that even summary proceedings against an alleged contemnor must meet certain minimum due process standards. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502, 92 S.Ct. 582, 586, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)) quoted in Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2703, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974). This court has always maintained that the Constitution requires notice and a hearing even where summary contempt is an appropriate measure. McCormick v. United States, 635 A.2d 347, 349 (D.C.1993) (“Although due process rights are significantly compromised by summary contempt proceedings, some traditional rights are never surrendered; for example, in a summary contempt proceeding, ‘reasonable notice of a charge and an opportunity to be heard in defense before punishment is imposed are “basic in our system of jurisprudence” ’, especially when one’s liberty is at stake.”) (citations omitted).1 In this constru-*229tional light, it is apparent that the procedures used to obtain Mr. Brooks’s conviction were deficient.
Mr. Brooks “first learned that he was charged with criminal contempt of court when the trial judge found him guilty of that offense.” Swisher v. United States, 572 A.2d 85, 86 (D.C.1990); Williams v. United States, 551 A.2d 1353, 1354 (D.C.1989) (per curiam) (reversing contempt conviction where judge first mentioned “criminal contempt” at the end of the proceedings finding him guilty). At the time that the trial judge apparently decided to hold Mr. Brooks in contempt, the judge called Mr. Brooks into the room, recalled his case, and commenced to recite findings of fact. The trial judge did not notify.Mr. Brooks that he was being charged with contempt, or give him time to formulate a response. Nor was Mr. Brooks given an opportunity either to deny the conduct or offer an explanation to mitigate his culpability. Mr. Brooks, who did not have an attorney, was not alerted at any stage of the contempt proceedings to his right to have an attorney nor offered the services of an attorney to advise him. After holding Mr. Brooks in contempt, the trial judge failed to advise him of his right to appeal. I am convinced that this truncated procedure not only violated the Constitution, but also contributed significantly to the trial court’s hasty determination that we find today to be erroneous.

1. The Right to Notice and Allocution

Notice of a charge, always deemed a constitutional right, is “ ‘essential in view of the heightened potential for abuse posed by the contempt power.’ ” McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 349 (quoting Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 500, 94 S.Ct. at 2704). Notice enables one charged with an offense to equip himself with any available argument or information that will mitigate his culpability, either by persuading the court to recharacterize its recollection of the charged acts, or to change its understanding of the defendant’s state of mind in committing them. See Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 93.2 The right to allocute is similarly viewed as “a fundamental one[,] which implicates the due process clause.” Warrick v. United States, 551 A.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C.1988) ('Warrick II). The importance of bringing forth relevant information about a defendant’s character or background prior to his receiving a sentence, particularly where that sentence is jail, is substantial. “In cases like this, where the intention with which acts of contempt have been committed must necessarily and properly have an important bearing on the degree of guilt and the penalty which should be imposed, the court can not exclude evidence in mitigation.” Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 538, 45 S.Ct. 390, 395, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).
The judge found Mr. Brooks guilty of contempt and instantly sentenced him to ten days in jail — never inquiring about his background, his criminal record, his family or work obligations, or any of the myriad other faetoi’s relevant to the decision whether to impose jail time. See Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 93 (“Although Swisher was only nineteen years old at the time, had no prior criminal record, and was gainfully employed, the judge gave no apparent consideration to ordering work release or a ‘weekend’ type of sentence which might protect Swisher’s job.”). Indeed, as the court learned through subsequent motions submitted in Mr. Brooks’s case, one of which the judge treated and granted as Mr. Brooks’s motion to modify sentence, mitigating personal and family *230circumstances existed that should have been fully aired prior to the imposition of a ten-day sentence in a summary proceeding.
The court never informed Mr. Brooks that he could appeal his conviction to this court, and that he was entitled to an attorney in doing so. But see D.C.Code § 11-721 (1995) (granting appeal as of right from all final orders and judgments of the Superior Court); D.C.Code §§ 11-2601 -03 (1995) (providing for the appointment of counsel); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94, 105 S.Ct. 830, 834-35, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), cited in Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1957 n. 4, 1059-61 (D.C.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 1740, 100 L.Ed.2d 203 (1988); see also Super. Ct.Crim. R. 32(c)(3). This failure appears from the record to have led to at least a four-day delay in securing the assistance of counsel to move the trial court to reconsider its ruling and then to prosecute this appeal.3 It cannot be doubted that even if summary contempt proceedings are necessitated by circumstances, the Constitution requires more process than was given to Mr. Brooks. McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 349-50.

2. The Right to Counsel

Criminal contempt, of which Mr. Brooks was convicted, “is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1481, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968) (citing Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610, 34 S.Ct. 693, 695, 58 L.Ed. 1115 (1914)). Whether obtained by summary or nonsummary procedures, a conviction for criminal contempt is “indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for [its] impact on the individual defendant is the same.” Bloom, supra, 391 U.S. at 201, 88 S.Ct. at 1482. Contempt is “a crime in every fundamental respect,” id., and is accorded a wide variety of procedural safeguards, including the right to a jury where the punishment is a period of incarceration exceeding six months. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974); Bloom, supra, 391 U.S. at 201, 88 S.Ct. at 1481-82. Were we not reversing Mr. Brooks’s conviction on insufficiency grounds, it would compromise his employability, his ability to testify credibly as a witness in any future proceeding,4 and could be considered by a trial court in enhancing a future sentence if Mr. Brooks were ever again to encounter the criminal justice system. See Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275, 1278 n. 4 (D.C.1994). Despite the seriousness of these consequences, this court has in the past upheld summary contempt convictions obtained in the absence of counsel. See, e.g., In re Gates, 248 A.2d 671, 677 (D.C.1968). It generally was held that “[w]hen contempt is committed in the presence of the court[,] there is no right to the assistance of counsel before punishment is imposed.” In re Ellis, 264 A.2d 300, 305 (D.C.1970) (citations omitted).5
*231Subsequent jurisprudence on the issue, however, requires that these early statements be reconsidered. In 1972, the Supreme Court announced a new rule, that “no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the assistance of coun-sel_ The denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail sentence.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2013, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (quoting Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Or. 94, 458 P.2d 414, 418 (1969)) (addressing the Sixth Amendment claim of petitioner who had been unrepresented at trial and jailed for 90 days for committing a misdemeanor). Although recognizing the additional burden that it was placing on the states in the administration of justice, id. at 42, 92 S.Ct. at 2014 (Burger, C.J., concurring), the Court held that absent a valid waiver, “counsel must be provided before any indigent may be sentenced to prison, even where the crime is petty and the prison term brief.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).6
Later, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), the Court clarified its ruling, and limited the application of Argersinger to those situations where a defendant is actually incarcerated and not merely exposed to jail time. Petitioner Scott sought the benefit of the Argersinger prohibition on jail time for unrepresented defendants because he was statutorily threatened with incarceration as an authorized penalty, even though he received only a $50 fine. Id. at 368, 99 S.Ct. at 1159. Recognizing the difficulty of “constitutional line drawing,” id. at 372, 99 S.Ct. at 1161, the Court stated that “the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment — is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the fine defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.” Id. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1162. By its ruling, the Court permitted the states to tailor the demands of Argersinger to the exigencies of their particular criminal justice systems — and where appropriate, to avoid the constitutional requirement that defense counsel be appointed by committing the government not to seek or the courts not to impose incarceration as punishment in a particular case. See id. at 373-74, 99 S.Ct. at 1162.
The right to appointed counsel depends exclusively on the deprivation of liberty and thus applies even where the proceeding in question is purely a civil one. See Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at 25, 101 S.Ct. at 2158-59. This protection extends to contempt proceed*232ings, which are considered civil if meant to coerce a prospective act, and. criminal if meant to punish a past one.7 See Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir.1983) (multiple state citations omitted) (noting that incarceration to enforce civil contempt creates a right to counsel at'a hearing); see also, e.g., Dube v. Lopes, 40 Conn.Supp. 111, 481 A.2d 1293, 1295 (1984); People v. Lucero, 196 Colo. 276, 584 P.2d 1208, 1214 (1978); Rudd v. Rudd, 45 A.D.2d 22, 356 N.Y.S.2d 136, 138 (N.Y.App.Div.1974); Commonwealth v. Tirado, 487 Pa. 362, 409 A.2d 392, 396 (1979). A number of federal circuits have had occasion to apply the Argersinger rule in the area of civil contempt, where the right to counsel had previously been in question. See, e.g., United States v. Bobart Travel Agency, Inc., 699 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.1983) (recognizing the right under Argersinger to counsel for contemnor attempting to assert a questionable Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155 (8th Cir.1977) (reversing conviction of unrepresented contemnor who refused to produce records summoned by the Internal Revenue Service); In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir.1975) (announcing the “right to the effective assistance of counsel in a civil contempt proceeding”) (citation omitted); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir.1973) (indicating that “[t]here can be no doubt that Kilgo was entitled to counsel at the civil contempt hearing”) (citing United States v. Sun Rung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir.1972)).8
Courts that address the constitutional source of the right to counsel in proceedings which result in incarceration have recognized either a Sixth Amendment basis, or a Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment due process entitlement incorporating that Sixth Amendment protection.9 The right to the presence of counsel, as a due-process matter, derives from and also lends substance to the recognized right to a hearing prior to the imposition of punishment. “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.” Powell, supra, 287 U.S. at 68-69, 53 S.Ct. at 64. Representation by an attorney is considered to be a right implied in the guarantee of having an opportunity to defend oneself at a hearing, and is often regarded as a right both basic and essential. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (citing Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15, 58 S.Ct. 773, 774-75, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1938); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 54 S.Ct. 330, 336, *23378 L.Ed. 674 (1934); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 418, 17 S.Ct. 841, 845, 42 L.Ed. 215 (1897)) (additional citations omitted). The benefits of legal counsel are legion in the case of an inexperienced litigant such as Mr. Brooks. “That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
The application by state and federal courts of a rule requiring counsel in contempt proceedings resulting in incarceration comports with this court’s long-standing jurisprudence requiring that putative out-of-court contemnors be represented by counsel prior to being incarcerated. Thompson v. Thompson, 559 A.2d 311, 314 (D.C.1989) (citing Matter of Wiggins, 359 A.2d 579, 581 & n. 5 (D.C.1976) (citing cases)); see also Jennings v. United States, 354 A.2d 855, 857 (D.C.1976) (Mack, J., concurring) (“One charged with civil contempt must be given adequate notice of the charge and an opportunity to be heard with counsel.”). Applying the Argersinger principle to civil and non-summary criminal contempt reflects a recognition that “any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter.” Argersinger, supra, 407 U.S. at 41, 92 S.Ct. at 2014 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result). As the Supreme Court held in Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at 25, 101 S.Ct. at 2158, “it is the defendant’s interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments i’ight to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel” where an individual is incarcerated as a result of a court proceeding.10
The question presented, then, is whether summary contempt proceedings are exempt from the evolving jurisprudence, derived from Argersinger, that due process requires the assistance of counsel in a proceeding that results in actual incarceration.
Some courts had determined even prior to Argersinger that as a due process matter, summary contempt could require that counsel be appointed prior to the imposition of a jail sentence. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir.1965) (holding that counsel should have been appointed where witness who had waived counsel in his own prosecution refused to testify against a former codefendant); cf. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960) (upholding contempt conviction obtained at hearing in camera in part because counsel was present and con-temnor was not deprived of “effective legal assistance”). Few courts have squarely addressed the summary contempt issue since the Argersinger decision. Of those courts that have reached the matter, some, such as those in New Jersey, have failed to state a clear mandate on the issue. See, e.g., State v. Gale, 226 N.J.Super. 699, 545 A.2d 279, 282 (Law Div.1988) (holding that defendant who admittedly perjured himself before the court was entitled to counsel prior to incurring penalty of imprisonment for summary contempt); In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, 423-25, 427, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) (encouraging careful balancing of due process rights where “imprisonment may be warranted” and noting that certification to another judge with appointment of counsel should occur unless “there is no other way to continue” the proceeding); see id. 570 A.2d at 423 (rejecting the application of Argersinger to contempt proceeding initially resulting in incarceration “where the party is an experienced trial attorney” and jail sentence had been vacated by appellate court). Other states, in the absence of more direct Supreme Court guidance, have rejected the applicability of Argersinger to the summary contempt context. See, e.g., Saunders v. State, 319 So.2d 118, 125 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975); Skolnick v. State, 180 Ind.App. 253, *234388 N.E.2d 1156, 1164 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 1085, 63 L.Ed.2d 323 (1980); State v. Case, 100 N.M. 173, 667 P.2d 978, 982-83 (Ct.App.1983).
Of particular relevance to us, two nearby jurisdictions have followed the Argersinger rule in the summary contempt context. In Commonwealth v. Crawford, 466 Pa. 269, 352 A.2d 52 (1976), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the question whether a witness who refused to testify at a trial before a judge who warned him that sanctions would summarily be imposed if the refusal persisted could be held in contempt and sentenced to six months of incarceration without having had the benefit of counsel at the proceeding. Relying on its earlier decision in Commomvealth v. Abrams, 461 Pa. 327, 336 A.2d 308 (1975), where another direct contemnor had been summarily sentenced to six months in prison, the court held that where an individual is not informed of his right to counsel and does not knowingly and intelligently waive that right, Argersinger states that the proceedings culminating in incarceration necessarily violate due process and the conviction “cannot stand.” Crawford, supra, 352 A.2d at 52.
Similarly, in Pitts v. State, 421 A.2d 901 (Del.1980), the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the contempt conviction of a witness who was summarily sentenced to two consecutive sentences of five months’ imprisonment for refusing repeated directives from the trial court to answer questions put to him by the government, where the witness disclaimed knowledge of the subject matter despite having previously testified substantively in the same case. The Delaware court concluded, first, that the trial court did not err in holding a summary contempt hearing, but second, that on the facts of that case, the failure to appoint counsel required reversal of the conviction. Id. at 906.
This court has explicitly reserved the question whether to adopt the reasoning of Crawford regarding summary contempt. Thompson v. Thompson, supra, 559 A.2d at 314 n. 6. In Thompson v. Thompson, we confirmed the right to counsel of an out-of-court con-temnor in a criminal contempt proceeding arising from a violation of a civil protection order. Because the due process right to counsel is based on a liberty interest that is just as compromised in a summary contempt proceeding as in a proceeding involving non-summary contempt, the same constitutional safeguard applies where the alleged contempt occurred in court, so long as the adjudication of contempt can and does result in incarceration.
“A defendant’s actual incarceration in a jail, as a result of a proceeding at which he was unrepresented by counsel and did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, is fundamentally unfair.” Rutherford, supra, 464 A.2d at 235. In analyzing the applicability of Argersinger to Mr. Brooks’s case, we should take into account that although imprisonment for summary contempt may often be of a short duration, “imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or ‘petty’ matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.” Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970). In view of this reality, and the broad language of Argersinger, its application to earlier nonsummary contempt eases in our court as well as in the various federal circuits in the context of civil contempt where the contemnor is incarcerated, id. at 314-15 (citations omitted), I perceive no compelling reasons to withhold the protection of counsel from defendants in summary contempt proceedings that actually result in the contemnor’s incarceration.11
*235Under Argersinger v. Hamlin, therefore, no contemnor may be sentenced to incarceration, whether as a result of a summary or nonsummary proceeding, if he was not represented by counsel. This rule does not extend to summary contempt proceedings resulting in punishment other than incarceration, see, e.g., In re (W. Edward) Thompson, 454 A.2d 1324, 1328 (D.C.1982); In re (Raymond B.) Thompson, 419 A.2d 993, 995 (D.C.1980), and would leave undisturbed existing jurisprudence regarding the adequacy of the procedure where a contemnor is sentenced to jail after a summary hearing occurring within a larger proceeding in which counsel already was present for the purposes of that larger proceeding. See, e.g., Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 93 (reversing in part on right-to-cóunsel grounds even where counsel was technically present); Irby v. United States, 342 A.2d 33, 41 (D.C.1975) (affirming conviction where counsel was present for underlying case). This clarification of the reach of the Argersinger rule to summary contempt proceedings, thus, would reach only that small class of cases in which persons appearing in court without an attorney are sent to jail for criminal contempt because extraordinary circumstances require that the judge proceed summarily.
It is a fact that trial judges at times must operate under real pressure from unruly, disruptive, or uncooperative litigants and lawyers who add to the court’s already heavy caseloads. As Judge Pryor’s dissent points out, the courts’ traditional contempt power, and particularly the ability to conduct summary contempt proceedings, is a necessary and valuable tool to address disruptive or disrespectful behavior that threatens the court’s ability to maintain the dignity and flow of judicial proceedings. As the Supreme Court stated in Cooke, supra, the reason for the distinction between the procedural safeguards required of nonsummary contempt proceedings and the absence of such procedural safeguards in summary contempt proceedings for contempt in open court is “the danger that, unless such an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public ... is not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will follow.” 267 U.S. at 536, 45 S.Ct. at 394-95. Thus, elimination of the contem-nor’s procedural safeguards has been the price paid to accomplish the important goal of preserving the court’s public authority. If, however, due process requires the assistance of counsel in summary contempt proceedings resulting in incarceration, the court must in some way be able to maintain order in situations requiring immediate action, including incarceration, to preserve the authority of the court. Thus, it is important to recognize the need for constitutionally sound procedures that a court might follow in a situation presenting a real disruption to the administration of justice.
The Delaware Supreme Court, in its opinion in Pitts,. supra, indicated that it was hesitant to announce “a blanket constitutional ruling that Argersinger applies in every case of summary contempt regardless of how aggravated the circumstances,” although it did “not think the United States Supreme Court would depart from the Argersinger requirement on the facts of this case.” 421 A.2d at 906. The unresolved area, the court indicated, is whether a “hypothetical disorderly and violent defendant” creating an “emergency such as conduct physically threatening to people and property in the courtroom [or] other exigency unduly interfering with trial proceedings” could not be incarcerated until counsel had been appointed. Id. Even assuming that we were faced with such an emergency situation in this case, which we are not, there appears to be no reason to depart from the traditional procedure whereby a trial court, or any law-enforcement officer, who witnesses an offense may preventively detain an individual until a further determination on the merits may be obtained — in the case of a direct contemnor, a short recess pending a Rule 42(b) hearing with counsel or certification to another judge. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1669-70, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (limiting post-arrest detention pending judicial present*236ment to 48 hours). Although summary punishment is well-established as appropriate for litigants whose culpability no additional information could mitigate, courts already have at their disposal means to take disruptive con-temnors into immediate custody when legal proceedings are actively being obstructed. Longer detention without counsel for alleged direct contemnors than that accorded ordinary criminal defendants is incompatible with the justification underlying summary contempt, which is the immediate, in-court restoration of order.
Failure to observe the constitutional mandate requiring counsel prior to a conviction leading to incarceration results in a reversal of the conviction. Crawford, supra, 352 A.2d at 52. This court and others have indicated that once the right to counsel has been established, a contempt conviction will be reversed even where the contemnor had.counsel but was unable to consult or be represented meaningfully by that counsel at critical points in the proceedings where the contempt issued. Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 93; see also Di Bella, supra, 518 F.2d at 959. In Swisher, we noted that where Swisher’s counsel was present but Swisher was -not permitted to consult with him, “[l]ack of notice and of an opportunity to consult with counsel [was] intrinsically prejudicial.” Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 93. Mr. Brooks should have been appointed counsel, given notice of the charged offense, and provided an opportunity to defend or explain his conduct, all of which would likely have had a material effect on the outcome of the proceedings.

. It has never been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they. *229together with a legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. The words of Webster, so often quoted, that by "the law of the land" is intended "a law which hears before it condemns,” have been repeated in varying forms of expression in a multitude of decisions. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389, 18 S.Ct. 383, 387, 42 L.Ed. 780, the necessity of due notice and an opportunity' of being heard is described as among the "immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.”
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).

. This court has observed that in the context of criminal contempt generally, "the very seriousness of the charge requires that the defendant understand the possible consequences of the proceeding so that he may defend himself appropriately.” Williams, supra, 551 A.2d at 1354.

.Counsel for Mr. Brooks moved the trial court, pursuant to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 8(a) and Horton v. United States, 591 A.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C.1991), for a stay of the sentence pending appeal. The government, at oral argument before this court, cited a stay as the appropriate relief available to the jailed con-temnor against whom the judge erred in proceeding summarily. However, in this case, the trial court declined to grant a stay, even though Mr. Brooks had already served seven days of his ten-day sentence and there was no longer any threat to the court’s calendar. More significantly, the government, which now directs our attention to the availability of a stay pending appeal, opposed in writing the grant of a stay in Mr. Brooks’s case.
Mr. Brooks's request to this court for a stay was also opposed and denied, and was therefore similarly unavailing. Thus, I am unpersuaded, based on the facts of this case, that the opportunity to request a stay is an adequate safeguard against an improper summary contempt adjudication.

. D.C.Code § 14-305 (1995).

. The language in Gates and Ellis is dicta with respect to the precise issue presented by Mr. Brooks’ case, whether counsel is required in a proceeding that results in incarceration, as that issue was neither the subject of judicial analysis nor required by the circumstances presented to the court in those cases. Umana v. Swidler & Berlin Chartered, 669 A.2d 717, 720 & n. 9 (D.C.1995). In Ellis, supra, a summary contempt case, the court merely recited language from Gates in response to the appellant's argument that he was denied the assistance of counsel of his own choosing in the contempt proceeding. Mr. Ellis was not unrepresented; the court had appointed counsel for the contemnor, and, as the *231court noted, "both appointed counsel and appellant were afforded an opportunity to speak.” 264 A.2d at 305. Although the attorney held in contempt in Gates was not himself represented by an attorney during the contempt hearing, it is unclear from the opinion in Gates whether the appellant was incarcerated as a result of two contempt convictions for which the court imposed on the attorney two fifty dollar fines, which, if not paid, would result in ten days in jail with respect to each. During the course of the judge's interaction with appellant, the judge repeatedly emphasizes the fine, not incarceration. On appeal, this court did not address whether incarceration' — if such was the result — made any difference to the right to counsel. Gates relied on Cooke, supra, in which the Supreme Court held that because the contemptuous conduct did not occur in the presence of the court, due process required notice of the charges, a reasonable opportunity to present a defense, assistance of counsel and the right to call witnesses or give testimony to defend against the charges or in mitigation of punishment. 267 U.S. at 536-37,. 45 S.Ct. at 395. The continuing validity of the discussion in Cooke with respect to the absence of similar due process requirements in summary contempt proceedings is discussed infra in the context of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), and later cases.

. The right to counsel is distinct from the constitutional right to a jury, which the Supreme Court has held is limited to serious offenses, i.e., those resulting in incarceration of six months or more. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1453, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The Court has explicitly rejected "the premise that since prosecution for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.” Argersinger, supra, 407 U.S. at 30-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2009. The Court is "by no means convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or more.” Id. at 33, 92 S.Ct. at 2010.

. Where the civil contemnor can free himself of the punishment by performing a particular act, he is deemed to have purged himself of the contempt. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-43, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498-99, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); Jennings v. United States, 354 A.2d 855, 856 (D.C.1976). Contempt is considered criminal where a fixed punishment is imposed for an act already committed. Gompers v. Bucks Stove, supra, 221 U.S. at 442-43, 31 S.Ct. at 498.

. It has been suggested that the application of Argersinger to incarceration for civil contempt is uncontroversial. For example, in rejecting in-junctive relief to a petitioner evading child-support obligations and seeking counsel to represent him at a contempt hearing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted the decision in Argersinger that had been announced since the initiation of the contempt proceedings, and stated that "[t]he state trial judge, now cognizant of Argersinger, will most assuredly know that if a lawyer is not appointed for [the petitioner's] representation, [the petitioner] cannot be confined even if found to have been contemptuous.” Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir.1973). I submit that the proposition that there is an entitlement to counsel prior to adjudication resulting in incarceration is even less controversial in the case of criminal contempt — even summary contempt — proceedings than in civil contempt because, in addition to incarceration, criminal contempt results in a conviction and cannot be purged by the contem-nor.

. See, e.g., Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061, 106 S.Ct. 805, 88 L.Ed.2d 781 (1986); Ridgway v. Baker, supra, 720 F.2d at 1413; United States v. Johnson, 659 F.2d 415, 416-17 (4th Cir.1981); Anderson, supra, 553 F.2d at 1156; Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 539 (Alaska 1974); Emerick v. Emerick, 28 Conn.App. 794, 613 A.2d 1351, 1353 (1992); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md.347, 464 A.2d 228, 234, 237 (1983); Hickland v. Hickland, 56 A.D.2d 978, 393 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195 (N.Y.App.Div.1977); Darbonne v. Darbonne, 85 Misc.2d 267, 379 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351-52 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Hendrick, 220 Pa.Super. 225, 283 A.2d 722, 723-24 (1971); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash.2d 252, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975); Ferris v. Maass, 75 Wis.2d 542, 249 N.W.2d 789, 791 (1977).

. This view of the rights enjoyed by putative contemnors comports with the Supreme Court's statement that the "[p]rocedural safeguards for criminal contempt do not derive from the Sixth Amendment,” but from generally-accepted principles of due process and the belief that “ 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” Levine v. United. States, 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 1042, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954)) (holding that although contempt hearing in camera would have violated right to a public trial, counsel had made no request to open the proceedings).

. No principle can be articulated whereby a due process rule confirming a right to counsel prior to incarceration would apply to civil contempt— where the contemnor himself can obtain his release at any time by compliance with a court order, and where no conviction results from the proceeding — and would not apply in the criminal context of Mr. Brooks’s case, where once the order of contempt is entered, it is final, and the contemnor’s options are essentially limited to the service of his sentence and an eventual appeal. The exclusion of summary contempt from a categorical constitutional rule such as that announced in Argersinger strains logic and, where the trial judge decides in the first instance under which rule to proceed, defies both reason and justice. ”[T]he burden of imprisonment is just as *235great, regardless of what we call the order that imposed it." Di Bella, supra, 518 F.2d at 959.