Court Opinion

ID: 9545306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:09:54.671441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:32.063324
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting):
The Commission appears to have acted under the impression that the quoted statute makes it mandatory to impose the full penalty of disqualification for 51 weeks for any violation of the statute and that the worker cannot thereafter receive unemployment compensation until full restitution has been made; and that the Commission can exercise no discretion and has no alternative than to follow that mandate.
I acknowledge that the doctrine of stare decisis is important for the solidarity of the law and those relying thereon. Nevertheless, where there is judge-made law, which is not a rule of property on which rights are acquired, maintained or relied on, and which is found to be in error, that should not be a cause for compelling the perpetuation of error.1 And this is especially true where no rights of any kind have been acquired and none will be seriously adversely affected by rectifying the error. In my opinion this applies to the Decker case2 and it should be overruled.
A general rule of construction of statutes is that they should be so interpreted and applied as to harmonize with the purposes of the act of which they are a part. I do not see how that objective is accomplished by applying the section under scrutiny in an absolute and arbitrary manner. For example, if the statute is so applied, a worker who fails to report ever so small an amount, say $10, is penalized the same, as one who fails to report $100 or $1,000. Further, no distinction is made, whether violation has been single and small or large, numerous and continuous. Under that arbitrary view, the maximum penalty is mandated regardless of the amount, or the number of violations, or of the actual loss sustained by the State Unemployment Compensation Fund.
It is also readily seen that in some instances the imposition of a 51-week disqualification from receiving benefits and continued disqualification until the amount received (in this instance $1,217) has been repaid would work a great hardship upon a worker and his family, and such a policy generally applied would have the very same negative effects upon the economy that the Act was designed to guard against. It is therefore obvious that in some circumstances the arbitrary and unreasonable imposition of the maximum penalties has not only the potential for harshness and injustice, but it can defeat rather than carry out the purposes of the act.3
Correlated to what has been said above about the desirability and propriety of so construing a statute as to give effect to its intent and purpose, there is the further rule relating to construction of statutes which confer powers on a governmental entity: that they give not only the authority expressly granted, but that which is implied as reasonably necessary to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed upon such entities.4
*682It is an elemental concept of law that some exercise of discretion, when imposing statutory penalties, is necessary to achieve individualized justice.5 This is especially true when sanctions and penalties are applied by administrative agencies, when the power is conferred upon such agencies to investigate facts, weigh evidence and draw conclusions as a basis for legal actions. Due to the nature of the responsibilities imposed upon the Commission in administering and carrying out the purposes of the act, it is required to perform some functions of a judicial nature.6 Being thus invested with judicial powers, there should be necessarily implied therein the authority to exercise the judicial prerogative of acting in a reasonable and judicious manner7 in order to properly administer the act and accomplish its purposes.
Accordingly, it should not be considered as invariable and mandatory that the maximum penalties prescribed by the statute be imposed. But in exigent circumstances, where the imposition of such maximum penalties would result in an arbitrary and unreasonable injustice, as well as tending to defeat rather than carry out the purposes of the Act, the Commission should have the power to modify or suspend the imposition of such penalties, or the time and manner of reimbursement required, as the purposes of the Act and the interests of justice may require.
It is my opinion that the order made should be vacated and this case remanded to the Industrial Commission for further consideration and/or proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.

. See Salt Lake City v. Ind. Comm., 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657.

. Main opinion, footnote 5; and see also Wycoff v. Public Service Comm., 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962).

.See Sec. 35-4-2, U.C.A.1953.

. Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 24 (1920); See also Warren v. Marion County, 222 Or. 307, 353 P.2d 257 (1960) and Wimberley v. New Mexico State Police Board, 83 N.M. 757, 497 P.2d 968 (1972), stating that the authority of administrative agencies includes those implied powers necessary to exercise those powers expressly granted by statute.

. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970 Supp., Sec. 4.14, p. 211.

. Thompson v. Amis, 208 Kan. 658, 493 P.2d 1259, 1263 (1972); see statement in Baird, etc. v. State of Utah, etc., # 14984, October-, 1977.

. Analogous to the present situation is the discretionary power of a court to suspend the sentence of one convicted of a crime. At common law, this was recognized as one of the inherent powers of a court, Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 (1944) and authorities cited therein. Presently, Sec. 77-35-17, U.C.A.1953 permits a court to suspend the imposition or execution of a sentence “if it appears compatible with the public interest.”