Court Opinion

ID: 9529388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:23.853423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:45.895531
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
I dissent.
In my view the theory under which the presumption stated in section 2235 of the Civil Code is applied in this case is unsound and I fear that the apparently unfair and inequitable results which it leads to here may be paralleled many times among honorable members of an honored' profession. I would apply the presumption only where it is shown, i.e., is at the least inferable from the circumstances, that the attorney obtained an “advantage” over the client as distinguished from the normal benefits of a fair transaction. (See Estate of Witt (1926), 198 Cal. 407, 419-422 [245 P. 197] ; Carlson v. Lantz (1929), 208 Cal. 134, 138-139 [280 P. 531].)
The declaration of the statute (Civ. Code, § 2235) is that “All transactions between a trustee and his beneficiary during the existence of the trust, or while the influence acquired by *155the trustee remains, by which he obtains any advantage from his beneficiary, are presumed to be entered into by the latter without sufficient consideration, and under undue influence.” The operation of the presumption is thus by its specific language made dependent upon the obtaining of an “advantage,” not the obtaining of a profit or benefit. Unless the words “advantage,” “profit,” and “benefit” are synonymous—or this court enlarges the meaning of “advantage” to make it synonymous with “profit” and ‘benefit”—I think the statute can have no operation in this case.
Webster’s New International Dictionary, second edition, defines “advantage” as meaning “1. The condition of being in advance or superior; superiority of state or position; . . . 4. That which is gained from superiority of state or position ...” To me, the definitions quoted, and the usage of that particular word, exclusively, in the statute suggest that the Legislature intended—if, as is hereinafter mentioned, it intended at all that this section should be applied to the relationship of attorney and client—that the “advantage” upon which the presumption would become operative in respect to the dealings between an attorney and his client should be something more than the mere benefit of a fair profit, i.e., something more than an enforceable promise to pay a fair consideration for services faithfully rendered.
Certainly the relationship of attorney and client, when established, becomes fiduciary in character, but nevertheless realism requires that we recognize that there are actual differences between the carrying on of the private practice of law, which presumptively is for the benefit of the lawyer in all cases as well as for the benefit of his clients in their respective cases, and the administration of a trust estate by the trustee who holds legal title to property and has the duty of managing it exclusively for the benefit of the cestuis que trust. Every act of the trustee, including the fixing of his compensation, is subject to authorization or approval by the court and he can be removed or replaced by the court. The meaning of “advantage” as applied to the act of one who is both historically and technically a trustee may well be different in scope or at least as to occasions of application from its proper meaning when applied to a lawyer practicing his profession.
Law is a profession, but to successfully practice law one must successfully engage in business—business conducted upon the lofty standards and conforming to the ethical principles *156of the profession, but nonetheless business engaged in for profit. The services of a competent lawyer fairly engaged and faithfully rendered should benefit and profit both lawyer and client. It is unfair to the fine men and women of the profession and it tends to open, not to close, the door to fraud, to hold that a presumption of unfairness, fraud and undue influence arises from a fair transaction merely because a lawyer gains the benefit of compensation for his services.
In this country with its traditions of private initiative and free enterprise it is contemplated that, as is only natural and just, every business transaction is entered into by each party for the purpose of benefiting himself, i.e., of obtaining a commodity or some form of wealth, whether it be goods or services or other benefit, which he wishes to receive in exchange for whatever he himself has to offer in return. Here the attorney, Bradner, on proper request, offered and gave his services in return for a stipulated payment to be made by defendants; each party was to obtain a benefit from the other. There is no contention that the contract was not understood or that it did not state correctly the terms the parties intended. Defendants received the full benefit of their bargain, and it was only when their affairs had prospered and Bradner began'to be compensated “more adequately”— as had been expressly contemplated when the contract was executed—that they sought to escape performance of their own obligations.
Under the circumstances which have been related, and in the total absence of a showing that the defendants did not freely and knowingly enter into the contract or that Bradner did not perform the services contemplated, I think the presumption of section 2235 should be held inapplicable, and the judgment reversed.
Shenk, Acting C. J., concurred.