Court Opinion

ID: 9386403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:03:59.738053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.060775
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                MICHAEL D. TOTH and LINAWATI TOTH,
                             Petitioners,

                                      v.

        EUGENE W. TOTH, MARIE TOTH, and BRYAN E. TOTH,
                     derivatively on behalf of
            LEARNING SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
                          Respondents.

                               No. 4D22-2628

                               [April 12, 2023]

   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; G. Joseph Curley, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 2021CA003506AI.

   John R. Hart, Dean A. Morande, and Alexandra D. Blye of Carlton
Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, for petitioners.

  Stuart N. Kaplan and Thomas J. Ali of The Law Offices of Stuart N.
Kaplan, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for respondents.

GERBER, J.

   The petitioners, who are the plaintiffs in an earlier-filed Pennsylvania
action, seek certiorari review of the circuit court’s order denying their
renewed motion to stay the respondents’ later-filed Florida action. The
petitioners argue the circuit court’s order departed from the essential
requirements of law because the respondents’ later-filed Florida action
seeks relief which, if granted, would conflict with trial court orders already
entered in the petitioners’ favor in their earlier-filed Pennsylvania action,
thereby causing them irreparable harm.

   We agree with the petitioners’ argument, and therefore grant their
petition for writ of certiorari. In the following two sections, we will provide
the applicable law and our reasoning.
                              Applicable Law

   The denial of a motion to stay an action pending resolution of a related
case is subject to certiorari review. REWJB Gas Invs. v. Land O’Sun Realty,
Ltd., 645 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). That is because
“exposure to a potential inconsistent ruling on the same issue by another
court constitutes irreparable harm.” Inphynet Contracting Servs., Inc. v.
Matthews, 196 So. 3d 449, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); see also Bared & Co.
v. McGuire, 670 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (the two
indispensable ingredients to common law certiorari when sought to review
pretrial orders of the circuit courts are: “(1) irreparable injury to the
petitioner that cannot be corrected on final appeal[,] (2) caused by a
departure from the essential requirements of law”).

   As a matter of comity, a Florida court has discretion to stay “a
proceeding pending before it on the grounds that a case involving the same
subject matter and parties is pending in the court of another state.”
Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 417 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
“Absent extraordinary circumstances, a trial court abuses its discretion
when it fails to respect the principle of priority.” Perelman v. Estate of
Perelman, 124 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citation omitted).
“This does not mean that a trial court must always stay proceedings when
prior proceedings involving the same issues and parties are pending before
a court in another state, but only that ordinarily this should be the result.”
Id. (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). The exceptional
circumstances which may support denying a stay include, for example,
time-sensitive cases involving child custody, visitation, and support, or
probate issues. See, e.g., Maraj v. Maraj, 642 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994) (child custody, visitation, and support); Parker v. Estate of
Bealer, 890 So. 2d 508, 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (probate).

   “In applying the principle of priority, the pivotal question is whether the
second-filed action is sufficiently similar in parties and issues as to be
unnecessarily duplicative of the prior-filed proceeding.” Inphynet, 196 So.
3d at 464 (citation omitted).

   However, the principle of priority does not “require an absolute identity
of parties between the two actions” to justify entering a stay. Id. at 464-
65 (citations omitted). Nor does the principle of priority require that
causes of action be identical to justify a stay of the second-filed action.
Fedorov v. Citizens State Bank, 24 So. 3d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
Rather, “it is sufficient that the two actions involve a single set of facts and
that resolution of the [earlier-filed] case will resolve many of the issues

                                       2
involved in the subsequently filed case.” Id. (citation, other brackets, and
quotation marks omitted).

                              Our Reasoning

   Applying the foregoing law to the instant case, we conclude the Florida
court departed from the essential requirements of law, causing irreparable
harm to the petitioners, when it denied their renewed motion to stay the
respondents’ later-filed Florida action.

    The parties in both the petitioners’ earlier-filed Pennsylvania action and
the respondents’ later-filed Florida action are virtually the same. The
petitioners are the plaintiffs in the Pennsylvania action and the defendants
in the Florida action. The respondents are the defendants in the
Pennsylvania action and the plaintiffs in the Florida action. The only
difference is that, in the Pennsylvania action, the respondents are named
as defendants in their individual capacities, while in the Florida action,
the respondents brought their action derivatively on behalf of a limited
liability company (“the LLC”) which is at the center of the parties’ dispute.

   However, we do not consider this difference to be material, because the
operative issue at the core of both actions is whether the petitioners or the
respondents are entitled to control the LLC. This issue already has been
heavily litigated in the petitioners’ earlier-filed Pennsylvania action, and
the respondents are seeking to re-litigate this issue in their later-filed
Florida action. For example:

   •   In the earlier-filed Pennsylvania action, the court already has
       entered summary judgment orders finding that a 2012 operating
       agreement espoused by the petitioners is controlling, while an
       alleged operating agreement espoused by the respondents is void ab
       initio. Notwithstanding those orders, the respondents’ later-filed
       Florida action requests the Florida court to declare that the alleged
       2021 operating agreement is controlling.

   •   In the earlier-filed Pennsylvania action, the court already has
       entered an order holding that because the members are irretrievably
       deadlocked, the LLC is to be dissolved, for which the court already
       has appointed a liquidating trustee.          Likewise, when the
       respondents appealed that dissolution order, the Pennsylvania court
       appointed a custodian to preserve the LLC’s assets and protect its
       rights. Notwithstanding those orders, the respondents’ later-filed
       Florida action requests the Florida court to appoint a receiver to

                                      3
      perform the same function already being performed by the
      Pennsylvania-appointed custodian.

   The respondents have argued their later-filed Florida action was
necessary to preserve their objection to the Pennsylvania court’s
jurisdiction. However, the Pennsylvania court already has entered an
order determining it has personal jurisdiction over the respondents. The
respondents’ route for seeking relief from that order was through the
Pennsylvania appellate process, not through the later-filed Florida action.

                                  Conclusion

   In sum, the relief which the respondents seek in the later-filed Florida
action, if granted, would conflict with one or more orders already entered
in the earlier-filed Pennsylvania action, the existence of which would
constitute irreparable harm to the petitioners. Thus, the Florida circuit
court departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying the
petitioners’ renewed motion to stay the later-filed Florida action. The
circuit court should have entered an order staying the later-filed Florida
action until a final judgment is entered and any appeals are exhausted in
the earlier-filed Pennsylvania action. See Inphynet, 196 So. 3d at 464
(“Principles of comity between sovereigns suggest that a court of one state
should stay a proceeding pending before it on grounds that a prior-filed
case involving substantially the same subject matter and parties is
pending in another state’s courts.”) (citation omitted).

   Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and
quash the circuit court’s order denying the petitioners’ renewed motion for
stay. On remand, we direct the circuit court to enter an order granting the
petitioners’ renewed motion for stay, which order shall provide that the
later-filed Florida action shall remain stayed until a final judgment is
entered and any appeals are exhausted in the earlier-filed Pennsylvania
action.

   Petition granted; remanded with directions.

CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                           *          *          *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                      4