Court Opinion

ID: 9570747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:51.810515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:56.410787
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with my colleagues that the addition of the amended supplemental information charging defendant as a fourth offender did not improperly coerce or induce him to plead guilty to the supplemental information charging him as a second offender.
The majority admits that "Pro forma, McMiller would seem in point”, but then concludes that the holding in McMiller is not to be applied retroactively, citing People v McGreevy, 52 Mich App 52; 216 NW2d 623 (1974).
In my opinion, McGreevy is distinguishable on its facts and is thus inapplicable. In McGreevy, a guilty plea to a lesser offense had been set aside, the defendant was recharged with the greater offense and again pled guilty to the lesser offense. In the instant case, after his guilty plea was set aside, not only was defendant recharged with the *642original offense and its corresponding supplemental information, but the prosecutor also brought additional charges against the defendant in the form of an amended supplemental information. Thus, upon remand from his successful appeal, defendant was faced with an additional charge that had never been presented at the original proceedings.
I believe that the holding in McGreevy should be confined to its facts. In support of this position, see my opinion in People v Goins, 54 Mich App 456; 221 NW2d 187 (1974), in which the Court distinguished McGreevy and concluded that McMiller applied retroactively to the defendant’s case. I would likewise apply McMiller here.
I would reverse defendant’s conviction on the supplemental information and remand for a new trial.