Court Opinion

ID: 9683230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:25:11.126321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.522579
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. In my opinion, the trial court erred in accepting the jury verdicts of two convictions for one offense. The court instructed the jury on two counts of aggravated robbery as defined by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2102 (l)(a) and (b) (Repl. 1977) which reads as follows: (1) A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery as defined in section 2103 (§ 41-2103) and he: (a) is armed with a deadly weapon, or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed; or (b) inflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another person. ■ The court also instructed the jury pursuant to the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-701 and § 41-1501 (Repl. 1977) as they related to attempted capital murder. The court’s Instruction No. 9 reads as follows: Rowe is charged with the offense of attempted capital murder. A person commits the offense of capital murder if he commits robbery and in the course of and in the furherance of the felony, he causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. To sustain the charge of attempted capital murder the State must prove the following things beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That Rowe intended to commit the offense of capital murder. Second: That Rowe purposely engaged in conduct that was a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of capital murder, and Third: That Rowe’s conduct was strongly corroborative of the criminal purpose. “Purpose.” A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct when it is his conscious object to engage in the conduct. The court did not indicate whether the jury should consider the acts of the appellant as one offense or as separate and distinct offenses. It seems plain to me that all of the elements of aggravated robbery as given in the court’s instruction are included in the instruction on attempted capital murder. I agree with the appellant that the court erred in permitting the jury to assess multiple sentences for one offense. I do not contend that he could not have been properly tried on each charge but insist that he could be convicted of only one. The sentences as handed down are prohibited by the double jeopardy provisions of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. The United States Supreme Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy consists of three guarantees: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. In the case before us, there was only one single continuous uninterrupted brief episode. The United States Supreme Court recently restated the prohibition against multiple punishment for the same offense in the case of Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1980). In Vitale the test applied was whether each of the distinct statutory provisions defining the two offenses requires proof of a fact that the other does not. In my opinion, the attempt to commit capital murder required proof which was not required to prove aggravated robbery; however, all elements of proof of aggravated robbery were necessary to prove attempt to commit capital murder. In Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s conviction for felony murder based on a killing in the course of an armed robbery barred a subsequent prosecution against the same defendant for robbery. The purpose of enacting Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-105 (Repl. 1977) was to clarify the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 2 § 8 of the Arkansas Constitution as they related to double jeopardy. I am not sure the legislation was as effective as it was intended. I agree with appellant that the conviction for both aggravated robbery and attempted capital murder is prohibited by § 41-105 (1)(2) which states: (1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (e) the conduct constitutes an offense defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses. From a commonsense interpretation of the above statute it appears to me that it is nothing but an honest effort to prevent double jeopardy as defined by the state and national constitutions. Since I believe the appellant was guilty of conduct which constituted a continuing course of conduct which was uninterrupted until it was completed, he cannot be sentenced twice for the same offense.