Court Opinion

ID: 9679203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:44:06.289374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.268215
License: Public Domain

LOREZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I submit that the Amadors pass the new test construed by the supreme court in Bossley and that their cause of action falls within the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) waiver of government immunity. Moreover, San Antonio State Hospital’s (“SASH”) sovereign immunity was waived because the Amadors’ injuries were caused by a condition or use of tangible property. See Tex Civ. Pbac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.21 (Vernon 1997).
The present case is distinguishable from the supreme court’s decision in Bossley and this court’s prior decision in Koehler based on geographical, temporal, and causal factual distinctions. See Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 541, 142 L.Ed.2d 450 (1998)- (requiring plaintiffs injuries be closely related “geographically, temporally, and causally” to the misuse of tangible personal property); San Antonio State Hospital v. Koehler, 981 S.W.2d 32, 34 (TexApp. — San Antonio 1998, no pet.). The majority states that although Cindy Amador’s unsupervised exit through the unlocked doors was part of the sequence of events that ended in her rape, the use and condition of the doors was too attenuated from the harm to be said to have caused it. I disagree. I submit that the injuries to the Amadors occurred shortly after, and in close proximity to, the instances of negligent misuse of tangible personal property which caused them.
In Bossley, a mental health patient escaped through unlocked doors and subsequently committed suicide. See Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 341. The supreme court points out several intervening causes which occurred between the misuse of tangible property and Roger Bossley’s death. See id. at 340. Roger surprised the state employee, pushed her aside, and fled out the door. See id. After fleeing the hospital, Roger ran a half mile to the interstate highway where he attempted to obtain a ride hitchhiking on both sides of the freeway, and when he was about to be apprehended by hospital personnel and the police, he leapt in front of an oncoming *258truck and was killed. See id. at 341. The supreme court held that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible. See id. Likewise, the unlocked doors permitted Roger’s escape but did not cause his death. See id. Although Roger’s escape through the unlocked doors was part of a sequence of events that ended in his suicide, the use and condition of the doors were too attenuated from Roger’s death to be said to have caused it. See id. Thus, Roger’s death was distant geographically, temporally, and causally from the open doors at the hospital. See id.
Similarly, in Koehler, a mental patient escaped the hospital grounds by exiting through a gaping hole in the fence that surrounded the facility. See Koehler, 981 S.W.2d at 34. Koehler left with a male companion who took her to a boarding house and subsequently threatened her with a butcher knife and eventually raped her. See id. After three days, Koehler returned to the hospital and later reported to her mother that she had been raped at a distant boarding house. See id. This court held that under the supreme court’s analysis, causation was even more remote than it was in Bossley. See id. at 35. Because the rape occurred at a significant distance — both geographically and temporally — from the fence, the hole in the fence was not the proximate cause of Koehler’s injuries. See id.
The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Bossley and Koehler. Cindy Amador’s sexual assault was directly related to her release outside on the hospital grounds. Cindy’s injuries were immediate and contiguous after hospital personnel misused the patient entrance and exit doors and let her out on the grounds. Moreover, there was no intervening cause as was pointed out in Bossley and Koehler. The supreme court’s requirement that plaintiffs injuries must be immediate and directly related “geographically, temporally, and causally” to the misuse of tangible property appears to be an essential element to waive sovereign immunity of a government entity. See Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343. Since the Amadors’ injuries were immediate and “geographically, temporally, and causally” related to the hospital staffs misuse of SASH’s entrance and exit doors, the Amadors’ cause of action falls within the TTCA waiver of government immunity. Because I would find that SASH’s sovereign immunity was waived, I respectfully dissent.