Court Opinion

ID: 9787005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:08:04.309021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.122672
License: Public Domain

CORRIGAN, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues.
The ordinance at issue is a practical and responsible attempt by the City of Stockton (Stockton) to address problems it, and many other cities face on a daily basis. The ordinance speaks to a narrow, pressing and quite real local concern. Street commerce in drugs and sex forces innocent people to share their neighborhoods with pimps, prostitutes, and drug dealers who use their streets as a bazaar for illegal transactions.
Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides, “[a] county or city may make and enforce within it limits all local, police, sanitary, and *1077other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” Article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution, commonly referred to as the “home rule” doctrine, “reserves to charter cities the right to adopt and enforce ordinances that conflict with general state laws, provided the subject of the regulation is a ‘municipal affair’ rather than one of ‘statewide concern.’ [Citation.]” (Horton v. City of Oakland (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 580, 584-585 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 371] (Horton).) “[W]hen local government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised control, . . . California courts will presume, absent a clear indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is not preempted by state statute.” (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 136 P.3d 821].)
In deciding whether a local ordinance enacted by a charter city, like Stockton, is valid, we apply the following analysis: “ ‘First, a court must determine whether there is a genuine conflict between a state statute and a municipal ordinance. [Citations.] Only after concluding there is an actual conflict should a court proceed with the second question; i.e., does the local legislation impact a municipal or statewide concern?’ [Citation.] Courts should avoid making unnecessary choices between competing claims of municipal and state governments ‘by carefully insuring that the purported conflict is in fact a genuine one, unresolvable short of choosing between one enactment and the other.’ [Citation.] In other words, the preemption question begins with an inquiry into the existence of a conflict. If there is no conflict, the home rule doctrine is not brought into play.” (Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 585.)
The majority relies on the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11000 et seq.) in reaching its conclusion that Stockton’s ordinance is preempted because of a conflict. It views the UCSA as so comprehensive in nature “as to manifest the Legislature’s intent to preclude local regulation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1071.) The majority’s reasoning, if accepted, requires preemption on an all-encompassing basis.
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the overall structure of the UCSA “manifests a clear intent” to limit the penalty of vehicle forfeiture to “very serious drug crimes involving the manufacture, sale, or possession for sale of’ drugs. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072.) The Legislature has authorized a state prison sentence of up to three years for the simple possession of even a small amount of certain drugs. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350; Pen. Code, § 18.) It is difficult to conclude that the Legislature intended to deprive a person of freedom for simple possession, but intended to protect an automobile from forfeiture in only very serious cases of drug manufacture and sale.
*1078Certainly the Legislature has not said that was its intent and no legislative history1 has been cited to support that conclusion. Unlike the majority, I do not discern a conflict between the UCSA and Stockton’s ordinance.
In fact, “the [UCSA] is silent with regard to vehicles used by drug buyers.” (Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 586, fn. omitted.) Stockton has included these vehicles in its nuisance abatement program in an attempt to alleviate the concerns of its residents. Thus, rather than creating a conflict, Stockton’s ordinance covers an area undisturbed by the UCSA.
Also, Stockton’s ordinance does not conflict with provisions of the Vehicle Code. The majority relies on Vehicle Code section 21, which states, “Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and uniform throughout the State and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly authorized herein.” The majority next refers to Vehicle Code section 22659.5, which authorizes a city to “adopt an ordinance establishing a five-year pilot program that implements procedures for declaring any motor vehicle a public nuisance” used in soliciting prostitution. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 1073, italics omitted.) The majority concludes that because Vehicle Code section 22659.5 covers nuisance abatement of vehicles used in soliciting prostitution and “does not allow for forfeiture of the vehicle,” Stockton’s ordinance is preempted under the provisions of Vehicle Code section 21. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1074.)
I disagree. The provisions of Vehicle Code section 22659.5 merely authorize “an optional and limited pilot program.” (Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 591.) Vehicle Code section 22659.5 “does not preclude local governments from enacting other provisions if they decide not to adopt the proffered pilot program.” (Horton, at p. 589.) Like the Oakland ordinance in Horton, *1079Stockton’s ordinance “was not enacted pursuant to section 22659.5, [therefore] it is not constrained by the procedural requirements of that statute.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Thus, Stockton’s ordinance does not conflict with state law. The ordinance does not interfere with the operation of state law as it is not “inimical” to its provisions in the relevant sense, and it “does not prohibit what the statute commands or command what it prohibits.” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 902 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534].)
This court has counseled that we should carefully ensure “that the purported conflict is in fact a genuine one, unresolvable short of choosing between one enactment and the other.” (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 17 [283 Cal.Rptr. 569, 812 P.2d 916].) Contrary to the majority, I would hold that there is no conflict between state law and Stockton’s ordinance.
In addition, assuming there is a conflict with state law, because Stockton is a charter city, it argues that its ordinance addresses a municipal affair: nuisance abatement. Stockton urges that the ordinance’s forfeiture provisions are necessary to reduce the urban blight and traffic caused by prostitution and drug dealing. The majority summarily rejects this argument holding that although traffic congestion is a harm associated with these crimes, illicit commercial activities such as prostitution and drug trafficking are matters of statewide concern. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1076.)
The majority quotes our opinion in Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1139, for the rule that when a local government regulates an area in which it traditionally exercised control, courts will presume that the regulation is not preempted by state statute, absent the Legislature’s clear intention to preempt. (Id. at p. 1149; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 1069.) The majority fails to follow this rule. It cannot be said that when the Legislature enacted the UCSA and Vehicle Code, it intended to invalidate local nuisance ordinances targeting the urban blight created by drug trafficking and prostitution.
The majority also relies on American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 104 P.3d 813] (American Financial), where we concluded that a statutory scheme that regulated predatory lending practices preempted an Oakland ordinance that purported to regulate predatory lending practices in the Oakland home mortgage market. In that case, we found it significant that “the Legislature was not suddenly entering an area previously governed by municipalities,” but instead was addressing a subject matter that historically has been regulated “at the state, not the municipal, level.” (Id. at p. 1255.)
*1080Here, by contrast, Stockton passed an ordinance aimed at nuisance abatement, a traditionally local police power.2 (People v. Johnson (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 1, 6 [277 P.2d 45] [“[a] city has the power to pass general police regulations to prevent nuisances”]; see also The City of Oakland v. Williams (1940) 15 Cal.2d 542, 549 [103 P.2d 168] [cities “possess the necessary police power, both under constitutional grant and under their respective charters, to abate nuisances”].) In acknowledging what constitutes a “nuisance,” the Civil Code defines the term broadly as including “[a]nything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances,” or anything that is “indecent or offensive ... so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,” or anything that “unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any . . . public park, square, street, or highway . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3479, italics added; see also Civ. Code, § 3480 [“[a] public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal”].) Therefore, the traditionally local nature of nuisance regulation distinguishes this case from the situation presented in American Financial, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1239.
The majority does not address the compelling problem of urban blight for the poor and elderly, which is immediate, significant, and certainly a local concern. The aged homeowner who must shut herself inside while drug transactions are conducted in her front yard, and the parents who must walk their children to school while commercial sex acts are performed in cars parked at the curb pay a heavy and very local price. Not all Californians confront these problems, but those who do have a pressing and localized need for protection.
It should not be the case that local governments require the permission of the state to protect their own citizens from nuisances that profoundly affect their quality of life and the quiet enjoyment of their own property.
*1081Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.3
Baxter, J., and Chin, J., concurred.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied October 10, 2007. Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Corrigan, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 In Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at page 588, the court rejected an argument that it should “retroactively infer . . . preemptive intent from recent legislative activity” based on the Legislature’s passage of Assembly Bill No. 662 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.). That bill amended Health and Safety Code section 11469 et seq. “to include forfeitures under the criminal profiteering statute. The bill also declared the Legislature’s intent that forfeiture law be exclusive of any local ordinance or regulation, declaring the subject a matter of statewide concern.” (Horton, at p. 588.) The Governor vetoed Assembly Bill No. 662 explaining, “ ‘[i]t is not appropriate for the State to take away the tools from Oakland, Sacramento, and other cities considering the adoption of similar ordinances without a more careful analysis of the amount of discretion which should be left to cities to craft their own remedies in response to local conditions.’ ” (Horton, at p. 588.) The court concluded, “Thus the bill’s statement that ‘[t]he provisions of this section are a clarification and declaration of existing law’ is far from definitive. A ‘clear indication’ is one which needs no further elucidation. The Legislature’s perceived need to ‘clarify’ demonstrates that the statute as drafted fails to provide the clear indication required to preempt by implication.” {Ibid.)

 The majority relies on In re Lane (1962) 58 Cal.2d 99 [22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897], in support of its conclusion that the UCSA thoroughly “occupies the field of penalizing crimes involving controlled substances.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1071.) Lane is distinguishable. It involved a statewide statutory scheme providing comprehensive criminal proscriptions against specified sexual conduct. Lane held void a local ordinance that appears quaint nearly 50 years later, which purported to criminalize sexual intercourse between unmarried persons.
This case involves a completely different situation. Here, Stockton’s ordinance attempts to address the problems caused by drug dealing and prostitution, activities the city understandably views as public nuisances. (Civ. Code, §§ 3479, 3480, 3491.)

I believe the distinctions drawn in Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, are sound and should be adopted. Horton specifically left open the due process question raised by ordinances that impose a reduced burden of proof and the authorization of a one-year timeframe before requiring notice and providing an opportunity for challenging the forfeiture. These procedural provisions are worthy of careful scrutiny.