Court Opinion

ID: 9377900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 00:02:15.281238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:17.834940
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/23 P. v. Sepulveda CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079278

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FVI21001662)

 GILBERT ALLAN SEPULVEDA,                                                OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Shannon L. Faherty

and Miriam Ivy Morton, Judges. Affirmed.

         Savannah Montanez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Defendant and appellant, Gilbert Allan Sepulveda, pled guilty to two counts of

forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1),

counts 7 & 8).1 The court sentenced defendant to 20 years of imprisonment.

       After counsel from Appellate Defenders, Inc., filed a notice of appeal on behalf of

defendant, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under

the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967)

386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the case and identifying four potentially

arguable issues: (1) whether defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled

guilty; (2) whether the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement;

(3) whether the trial court properly imposed the upper term on each count; and

(4) whether the trial court properly imposed a criminal protective order. We affirm.

                             I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

       On April 27, 2021, officers were dispatched to a residence regarding a sex crime

with a child. Officers met with the victims’ mother, who explained that she had been

dating defendant for five years. Victim #1 told her mother that defendant sexually

abused her; her sister, victim #2; and her brother, victim #3.

       Victim #1 reported that defendant forced her to orally copulate him approximately

20 times. Victim #2 did not feel comfortable speaking to officers or forensic

interviewers. Victim #3 reported that defendant made him perform oral copulation on

       1    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

       2    The parties stipulated that the police reports would provide the factual basis for
the plea.

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victims #1 and #2. Defendant also compelled victim #3 to perform oral copulation on

defendant. Victim #3 witnessed victims #2 and #3 perform oral sex on defendant several

times.

         On June 11, 2021, the People charged defendant by felony complaint with six

counts of oral copulation with a child under 10 years of age (§ 288.7, subd. (b), counts 1-

6). On May 10, 2022, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pled guilty to two

added counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a person under 14 years of age (§ 288,

subd. (b)(1), counts 7 & 8).

         Defendant signed and initialed the plea form reflecting he would be pleading

guilty to two counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14, for

which he would be sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. Defendant initialed

provisions reflecting he understood his rights and waived those rights; that no one had

used any form of violence, threats, menace, duress, or undue influence in inducing him to

enter the plea; and that he had had sufficient time to consult with his attorney regarding

the plea. Defense counsel signed the plea form reflecting he had personally explained the

contents of the form to defendant, observed defendant sign the declaration, and concurred

in the plea.

         In response to the court’s questions in open court, defendant indicated that the plea

form contained his signature and initials; he acknowledged he had reviewed the form

with his attorney prior to signing it; he understood everything on the form; he was not

under any threat in signing the form; and, as a result of his plea, he understood the court

would sentence him to 20 years of imprisonment. Defense counsel informed the court he

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had gone over the plea form with defendant, that he was satisfied defendant understood

everything on the form, and that he joined in defendant’s waivers.

       The court found: “After directly examining the defendant, the Court finds that the

defendant has read and understands the defendant’s declaration and plea form; that the

defendant understands the nature of the charges to which he’s pleading, all consequences

and punishments for the offenses to which he is pleading, [and] each of his constitutional

rights. [¶] The Court further finds that the defendant has knowingly, intelligently, freely,

and voluntarily waived each of his constitutional rights. [¶] . . . [¶] Court further finds

the defendant has personally and orally entered this plea in open court; the plea was

entered freely, and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently by the defendant; and there is

a factual basis which the Court will accept and confirm.”

       After taking the plea, defendant spoke to the court against defense counsel’s

advice: “I would like to say that there was evidence on my phone that I believe would

help me out with this. And at the beginning of my case two months in, I was told that the

phone was lost.” The court interrupted: “All right. I’m gonna have you stop because

here’s the problem, you’re either taking this—absolutely, knowingly, and willingly

taking this plea or you’re telling me that you’re not entering this plea willingly because

you think something else needs to be done on your case. Do you think something else

needs to be done on your case?” Defendant responded, “No.”

                                             4
       In return for defendant’s plea, on the People’s motion, the court struck the

remaining counts. On June 10, 2022, the court sentenced defendant to 20 years of

imprisonment, consisting of two, consecutive terms of 10 years on each count. The court

issued a criminal protective order barring defendant from having contact with the victims.

       Defendant’s notice of appeal challenges both the validity of his plea and the

sentence. Defendant requested a certificate of probable cause contending he signed the

plea agreement while under duress and his attorney “failed to perform due diligence as

required, presenting a so-called ‘deal’ to sign, one that no reasonable, well-informed

individual would ever consider nor agree to.” Defendant maintained he “was subject to

undue influence by way of my attorney and thus signed the above-referenced ‘deal’ plea

agreement. [¶] It is my strong conviction and belief that said plea agreement was

presented to, and signed by me as a result, a byproduct of ineffective assistance of

counsel. [¶] In consideration of the above, I hereby and herewith declare my plea

agreement unsigned, null and void ab initio.” The court granted defendant’s request for a

certificate of probable cause.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

       We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which

he has not done. Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we

have independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no arguable issues.

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                                 III. DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                    McKINSTER
                                                                Acting P. J.
We concur:

CODRINGTON
                       J.

SLOUGH
                       J.

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