Court Opinion

ID: 9534188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:24.947761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:32.306392
License: Public Domain

D. E. Holbrook, P. J.
(dissenting). Absent a showing of manifest injustice, this Court cannot consider claims of error based on an alleged erroneous instruction where there was no objection at trial. See GCR 1963, 516.2, People v Spaulding, 42 Mich App 492; 202 NW2d 450 (1972), lv den 388 Mich 809 (1972), People v Peace, 48 Mich App 79; 210 NW2d 116 (1973). Because there was no manifest injustice herein, this writer must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
*626"Now, we come to the defendant’s defense in this case. He has interposed the defense of self-defense and I shall charge you with regard to that. First of all, when one may avail himself of it. — A justification of the offense charged against the defendant, he has interposed a plea of self-defense, and under certain circumstances this is a good defense. To make the plea available it must appear that the respondent, or the accused was without fault on his part — why? If he himself was the aggressor, in the conflict — brought it upon, brought it on by word or deed, he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense as an excuse for the killing unless he was at that time in immediate danger, danger of losing his own life or suffering some grievous bodily injury, and that there was no retreat open to him and his only safety lay in committing the act which caused the death of the now deceased. Some defense in proper cases is the right of every person, that [sic] it will not justify the taking of human life unless the jurors shall be satisfied from the testimony, first that the defendant was not the aggressor, by that meaning the other party bringing on the conflict by word or deed, that is, that he was without fault and, second, that there existed at the time of the fatal shooting in his mind a present and impending necessity to take the life of another, in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm. Third, that there must have been no way open whereby he could have retreated as it appeared to him at the time to a place of safety and thus avoided the conflict.
"Unless you find that all three of these facts are established in this case, then the plea of self-defense fails.
"Now, the burden of proof is not upon the defendant to offer or interpose his defense, the burden of proof is not upon him to satisfy your minds beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense; on the contrary, the burden of proof does not shift from the prosecution. The prosecution therefore has the burden of satisfying your minds that it was not done in self-defense—
"I charge you that the evidence at this point should be carefully considered and weighed by the jury, so, for the reason if he did, in fact, act in self-defense at the *627time of the alleged killing, then you are not to punish him for such an act.
"The evidence to this question of self-defense ought to be carefully considered by the jury for another reason and that is, to regard, for the ends of justice and the peace and welfare of society demands it to the end that a party charged with a crime may not use a plea of self-defense as a means to defeat the ends of justice and as a shield to protect them from criminal responsibility.
"If such criminal responsibility you find exists in this case, in all cases, even where the defense is made the burden is upon the People to show that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and to show such facts and circumstances as convinces the jurors that the killing was not done in self-defense. It is for you, members of the jury to say whether this respondent was assaulted in the manner claimed. The law gives to every person the right to protect himself from unlawful assault and an assault is an offer to do violence, having the present availability to carry the intention into effect. Where an assault is made, the right to exist, — not to exist, — resist, but to resist, must be proportionate to the danger feared or apprehended. It is not every assault that would justify a person in resisting by using a deadly weapon.
"If, however, the person assailed honestly believes his life to be in danger or that he may suffer serious bodily harm, he has the right to resist, even to the taking of the life of his assailant. The person assailed is to be judged by the circumstances, — if I have not said this already, — as they honestly appear to him at the time. There can be no self-defense by a person until he is assailed by another.
"Let me clarify that. Assaulted by another. An offer to do violence to his person, having the ability to carry it into effect. It is for you to say from all of the evidence in this cause, whether the respondent honestly believed he was in danger of losing his life, or in danger of great bodily harm and that it was necessary for him to fire the fatal shot in order to save himself from such apparent and threatened danger, although you may not be satisfied that the respondent in committing the act acted in self-defense, still if the testimony in this case *628creates in your mind a reasonable doubt, as to whether or not the act was done in self-defense, the respondent is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and it would be your duty to acquit him.
"I charge you that it is not necessary to be convinced that the danger should have been actual or real, or that the danger should have been impending and immediately enough follow the actions and the conduct of the respondent, are to be judged from the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time.”
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct sua sponte that an aggressor’s communicated withdrawal from a confrontation revives his right to self-defense. There was no request for such an instruction and no objection to the instruction as given. These cited instructions given by the trial court herein were drawn nearly verbatim from 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 906, Form #404, p 1283. The majority admits that the trial judge could not be faulted and that Michigan law did not clearly require at the time of trial such an instruction as demanded now on appeal.
Furthermore, this writer feels that People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 218 NW2d 136 (1974), relied upon so heavily by the majority, is not applicable to this case. The trial court in Townes gave the following instruction:
" 'Now the Defense in this case, members of the Jury, is a defense of self-defense, and I charge you, members of the Jury, first an aggressor is not necessarily a person who strikes the first blow in a personal encounter, or makes the first demonstration indicating an intent to strike. But if a person with a malice and hatred in his heart towards such a person seeks to provoke a difficulty either by acts or words with the intent to induce such other person to strike the first blow, or to make the demonstration in order to form a pretext to take his life, then the Defendant could not *629avail himself of the right of self-defense.’ ” Townes, at 584.
The Supreme Court found error because:
"The self-defense instruction was premised on the incorrect assumption that there had been some evidence introduced at trial from which the jury could reasonably infer that appellant was the 'aggressor’ in the fatal confrontation with Burnett. The court apparently focused on appellant’s conduct with respect to Odom McMillion and erroneously assumed that if appellant was at fault in provoking a disturbance in the tire store, he could then be held legally accountable as an aggressor for any response to his conduct, whether by McMillion or any other person. This was error. Appellant may only be held legally accountable as an aggressor for responsive conduct by another that is reasonably attributable to appellant’s own conduct. See Cartwright v State, 14 Tex Ct App R 486, 498-499, 502 (1883). In the present case there was no evidence that would support the inferences created by the self-defense instruction that Burnett’s actions were a legally reasonable response to appellant’s conduct and therefore, that appellant was an 'aggressor’ with respect to Burnett.” Townes, at 591-592.
This is different error than that asserted herein and, therefore, Townes is not controlling. The Court in Townes emphasized that the error was a factual one, that the instructions were erroneously based upon a finding that the initial disturbance was such as to make defendant therein an aggressor. This is not so in the instant case. The facts are such that defendant could have been found to have been an aggressor at the time of the homicide herein. This writer cannot conclude that the instructions given in this case removed the question of self-defense from the jury as in People v Townes.
The instant case involves even a clearer distin-guishment of Townes than that presented by Judge V. J. Brennan’s well-written dissent in Peo*630ple v Smith, 67 Mich App 145, 157-160; 240 NW2d 475 (1976), lv den, 397 Mich 821 (1976).1 The instructions herein were given in accordance with Michigan law, were not clearly erroneous and did not preclude the jury from considering defendant’s claim of self-defense. There was no manifest injustice. Defendant’s failure to seek clarification at trial should bar appellate review.
This writer votes to affirm.

 Judge Brennan noted in Smith as follows:
"Unlike Townes, the jury was not instructed that if they should find that the defendant was the aggressor in bringing on the difficulty at the gas station that the defense of self-defense would be unavailable to him. Clearly, the trial judge gave the question of self-defense to the jury as a question of fact for them to decide. I do not believe that the defendant was prejudiced, because the instructions were adequate and the testimony of complainant was undisputed that defendant drew his gun first. Clearly, the trial judge intended to instruct the jury that in making their determination of who the aggressor was, they should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including those facts at the beginning of the incident. This was not error. In any event, the jury considered defendant’s contention of self-defense and found him guilty. The defendant did not object to the instructions as given and I find no manifest injustice. I would not disturb the jury’s finding.” Smith, at 160.