Court Opinion

ID: 9645612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:29:55.174451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:31.658032
License: Public Domain

CHAPMAN,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would conclude the trial court properly ordered the change in the appraisal rolls to correct the inclusion of property that did not exist in the form described in the appraisal rolls. See Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(c)(3) (Vernon 1992).
The majority asserts that “form” means more than “appraised value.” It concludes that because the only change GTE sought on the face of the rolls was the appraised value, section 25.25(c)(3) does not provide GTE a remedy. I agree that “form” means more than appraised value. That is, a taxpayer cannot resort to section 25.25(c)(3) when his only complaint is a disagreement about the appraised value of the property. Nevertheless, I believe errors in “form” can affect the appraised value. In such circumstances, I would conclude section 25.25(c)(3) provides a taxpayer a remedy notwithstanding that the actual error in “form” does not appear on the face of the rolls.
The majority concludes that “form” of the property is limited to its identification as a type of property listed under section 25.02(a), such as real property, personal property, an improvement to real property, or some other physical description of the property in the appraisal roll, other than its appraised value or use. See Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 25.02(a) (Vernon 1992). I believe this narrow construction of section 25.25(c)(3) conflicts with our decision in Collin County Appraisal District v. Northeast Dallas Associates and with the legislative history of the statute.
In Northeast Dallas Associates, this Court, interpreting section 25.25(c)(3), stated:
The Texas Property Tax Code does not provide a definition or explanation of what is meant by “the inclusion of property that does not exist in the form or at the location described in the appraisal roll.” Although nonexistent property certainly is included by the language of section 25.25(c)(3), we are not inclined to limit the statutory language to mean only nonexistent property. “Form” is defined as the “shape and structure of something as distinguished from its substance.” The AmeRican HeRItage DICTIONARY 525 (2d ed.1985). And “form” refers “to the distinctive appearance of a thing to be determined by its visible lines.” Id. We believe the term “form” in section 25.25(c)(3) does not refer to the use of the property but to the physical description of the property, which would include boundaries, shape, or configuration of property.
Collin County Appraisal Dist. v. Northeast Dallas Assocs., 855 S.W.2d 843, 849 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) (emphasis added). Thus, this court has held that “form” as used in section 25.25(c)(3) refers to the “physical” description of the property. Further, “physical” description does not refer to whether property is “real,” “personal,” or an “improvement,” as the majority suggests. Rather, the physical description of the property refers to the boundaries, shape, configuration, and the like, of the property. Northeast Dallas Associates, 855 S.W.2d at 849. The Property Tax Code does not require the physical description of the property, as contemplated by Northeast Dallas Associates, to be included on the face of the appraisal rolls. *324See Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 25.03 (Vernon Supp.1995). Instead, the physical description of the property is found on the commercial worksheets. These worksheets determine the appraised value to be included in the rolls. Therefore, the physical description of the property is ultimately subsumed into an appraised value which does appear on the face of the rolls. Thus, I would conclude that under Northeast Dallas Associates, section 25.25(c)(3) provides a taxpayer a remedy when the physical description of the property on the commercial worksheets is incorrect causing an incorrect appraised value. This interpretation of section 25.25(c)(3) is consistent with the law requiring us to resolve all doubts in the law in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority. Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.1977).
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislative history of section 25.25(c)(3) is irrelevant. The majority’s rationale is premised on the fact that section 25.25(c)(3) does not give a taxpayer a remedy when the only change sought on the face of the appraisal rolls is the appraised value. The statutory amendment permitting a taxpayer to change the appraisal rolls was intended to provide taxpayers a remedy when a business had “gone out of business.” See Bill Analysis, Tex.S.B. 379, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989). However, whether a business is “in” or “out of’ business is not required to be included in the appraisal rolls. See Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 25.02(a) (Vernon 1992). Therefore, the mere fact that the form of the property sought to be changed is not literally in the rolls does not preclude relief.
The undisputed summary judgment evidence showed that the appraised value on the appraisal rolls is determined by the commercial worksheets. Therefore, an error on the commercial worksheets would result in an error on the rolls. The commercial worksheets described the improvements on the land as a three-story building in ninety-nine percent good condition. However, the property did not exist as such. In reality, the property was a two-story structurally unsound building. The reason for the poor condition of the property was that construction errors in laying the building’s foundation caused structural defects in the building. Thus, I would conclude the property did not exist in the form described in the commercial worksheets. Although these errors in the “form” of the property did not literally appear on the appraisal rolls, the appraised value on the rolls was transcribed from the worksheet. Therefore, the error did appear “on the rolls” by way of an incorrect appraised value. Specifically, the errors on the commercial worksheets caused the property to be appraised at $4,464,000 in 1988 and 1989 when in reality the value of the property in those years was only $554,464 and $277,232, respectively. I would conclude section 25.25(c)(3) authorized a change in the appraisal rolls under the facts of this case.
Alternatively, appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist. The trial court ordered the appraised value of GTE’s property reduced to $554,464 and $277,232 for the 1988 and 1989 tax years. Appellants assert they offered controverting summary judgment evidence that the value of GTE’s property was greater in those years. Appellants rely on evidence showing how it initially calculated the appraised value of GTE’s property for the 1988 and 1989 appraisal rolls. Appellants’ evidence shows only what the property would have been worth had its description been correct on the commercial worksheets. The undisputed summary judgment evidence, however, conclusively showed that the description of the property on the commercial worksheets was incorrect, resulting in an incorrect appraised value. Appellants’ evidence does not raise a fact issue with respect to the value of the property in 1988 and 1989 in its actual condition. Accordingly, I would overrule appellants’ first point of error.
In their second point of error, appellants contend the trial court erred in overruling their objections to certain affidavits GTE offered in support of its motion for summary judgment. Appellants assert the affidavits are irrelevant and are not, therefore, proper summary judgment evidence. See Tex.R.Crv.P. 166a(f). Appellants maintain we cannot consider the affidavits in our review. I have not considered the complained-of affi*325davits. Accordingly, I would overrule appellants’ second point of error and would affirm the trial court’s judgment. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.