Court Opinion

ID: 9644434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:56:19.464534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.596764
License: Public Domain

*34OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DIES, Chief Justice.
On September 28,1988, a majority of this court issued an opinion reversing Appellant’s conviction. In that opinion, we held that the introduction of $7,000.00 in cash found in a purse in Appellant’s car was erroneous. The State filed its motion for rehearing on October 13, 1988, raising for the first time three matters it had not urged in its original brief filed over five years prior to its motion for rehearing.
First, the State argues that Appellant’s point of error concerning the introduction of the money in evidence was not properly briefed and, therefore, presents nothing for review. Secondly, the State argues that Appellant did not preserve the error complained of by timely, specific objection in the trial court. Thirdly, the State argues that if the trial court erred in admitting the money in evidence, such error was harmless in light of the other evidence of Appellant’s guilt. The primary purpose of a motion for rehearing in its usual context is to request this court to reconsider its original opinion on the grounds initially presented in the movant’s original brief. See Gambill v. State, 692 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). In its per curiam opinion denying Appellant’s motion for rehearing in Gambill, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated the following:
“The rules do not authorize a movant for rehearing unilaterally and gratuitously to introduce for the first time in a motion for rehearing a new ground for review, albeit one that may have been determined by the court of appeals. Belatedly to present new grounds in such piecemeal fashion is inimical to rights of an opposing party and valid interests of this Court in orderly procedure and judicial economy.”
692 S.W.2d at 107.
Once Appellant had filed her original brief in this case, the State had every opportunity to raise such matters in its brief, but failed to do so. Appellants are not allowed to raise for the first time on motion for rehearing new grounds for reversal of a conviction, and we see no reason why the rules should be less stringent when it is the State which wishes to propose new grounds for affirmance of a conviction. Therefore, the above-mentioned grounds for rehearing are denied.
The State also argues that this court should have applied the test set out in TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 403 in evaluating the admissibility of evidence in question rather than the test set out in Mann v. State, 718 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 1633, 95 L.Ed.2d 206 (1987). The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence did not become effective until September 1, 1986; therefore, the State’s argument is without merit.
The State further argues that the opinion of the majority of this court ignored the fact that this case involves the joint trial of Appellant and her husband, Lloyd Dale Martin. The State argues that, as to Lloyd Martin, the probative value of the cash found in the car was greater since he was not found to have any methamphetamine in his immediate possession while the drug was found in June Martin’s purse which she held in her lap. With this argument, we cannot agree.
During the guilt phase of the trial no evidence was admitted to sufficiently link either Appellant or her husband to the money found in their car. Therefore, the money was no more admissible against Lloyd Martin than it was against June Martin. See Arnott v. State, 498 S.W.2d 166, 177 (Tex.Crim.App.1973). The probative worth of the money was very slight because no such connection between the Martins and the money was shown. As stated in our opinion on remand, we believe the potential for prejudicial impact of such evidence was extremely high. Therefore, at the guilt phase of the trial, the money was erroneously admitted into evidence as against either of the defendants. As a result, contrary to the State’s argument, June Martha Martin did not fail to preserve such error by not requesting an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the money to Lloyd Martin only. For the fore*35going reasons; hearing is denied. the State’s motion for re-
Motion for rehearing denied.