Court Opinion

ID: 9741409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:55:14.40149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.938370
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KUEHN, specially concurring: I write to address several of the observations expressed by our esteemed colleague in his dissent from today’s decision. It is important to understand that the detention required to issue John Sanders (Sanders) a speeding citation became unlawful long before any reason to conduct pat-down searches might have reasonably developed. The speeding ticket was written, and the reason for any further detention was over, before anyone even thought of conducting a pat-down search. When Officer Lowe (Lowe) obtained identification from the defendant, a passenger, and proceeded to run a criminal history check on him, he exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. See People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 802 N.E.2d 219 (2003) (warrant checks conducted on a passenger’s identification changed the fundamental nature of a minor traffic stop and exceeded the scope of the initial detention in violation of the fourth amendment). After conducting a probe into the criminality of the traffic offender’s passengers, Lowe wrote up Sanders’ speeding ticket. At that point, no further detention was necessary or warranted in order to fulfill the lawful reason for detention. However, Lowe again veered from the business at hand. Instead of giving Sanders his ticket and sending him on his way, Lowe asked for permission to conduct a search of the vehicle. His request further prolonged the detention beyond the legal detention authorized by the probable cause that Sanders’ heavy foot had provided. See People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003). Simply put, had the officers afforded the captive threesome their fourth amendment rights, there would have been no need whatsoever to frisk for weapons. Our colleague writes, “I believe that a pat-down of the three men was objectively reasonable and was warranted under all existing precedent.” 353 Ill. App. 3d at 672. He no doubt feels that the circumstances facing Lowe and Illinois State Trooper Boyles (Boyles) would cause most other law enforcement officers to feel endangered. Conversely, he must believe that Lowe and Boyles were both unreasonable to think otherwise. Whether an officer possesses safety concerns sufficient to warrant a pat-down search is a circumstance measured by the facts known to the officer at the time. The question is whether the officer can articulate facts which would lead someone to reasonably suspect that a detainee might be armed and dangerous. The dissent answers this question affirmatively because of the officers’ knowledge of their detainees’ criminal histories. With all due respect, I can think of no case that permits the search of someone’s person because of familiarity with his or her past misconduct. The suspicion must arise from current observations in the conduct or behavior of the detainee, not the detainee’s mere status as someone who possesses a past criminal tendency. In an effort to heighten the objectively reasonable police officer’s fear factor, the dissent tells us that “darkness” was “quickly approaching” at 4 p.m. on November 8, 2002. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 672. That may have been the case on the streets of Juneau, Alaska, but on the byways of Saline County, Illinois, where this stop occurred, there was probably close to an hour of daylight remaining by the time that Lowe finished writing Sanders his speeding ticket. Both officers were able to observe all of their detainees’ behavior in God’s good sunlight. And their observations revealed nothing that gave rise to any fear or suspicion of danger, reasonable or otherwise. This is not a conclusion that I reach from the facts that the arresting officers presented. This was the officers’ testimony — their collective belief based upon their observations at the time of the stop. More importantly, both officers plainly testified that the pat-down searches were nothing more than routine procedure before conducting a consent search of the vehicle. They apparently do it all the time as a matter of protocol. Our colleague suggests that routine pat-down searches are constitutionally permissible. He thinks that the noninvasive nature of a pat-down search makes it “permissible as a matter of routine” (353 Ill. App. 3d at 672) rather than a matter requiring just cause. He then writes: “Following a prescribed routine with every suspect who is removed from a vehicle during a traffic stop is a prudent, sensible course of action for a police officer to follow. Such a procedure is not invasive and helps guarantee the safety of the police officers serving and protecting the rest of us. We should support basic routine safety precautions on the part of those officers, so that they and we can be assured that they will return safely to their homes and families at the end of their shifts.” 353 Ill. App. 3d at 672. We do support police conduct designed to ensure officer safety. That support is provided in a manner consistent with the privacy rights of our citizenry. If there is reason to feel endangered, to suspect harm, the constitution permits a pat-down search for weapons. However, the constitution does not allow pat-down searches of traffic offenders as an unvarying or habitual method of police procedure. Nor should it. Perhaps our colleague has never found himself in a situation where he had to submit to a pat-down search. Anyone who has ever experienced a trained officer’s attempt to detect concealed weapons through a thorough search of the outer clothing would not consider it noninvasive. Pat-down searches, while less intrusive than strip searches, constitute a substantial invasion of personal privacy. Our colleague might well note where Boyles’ hands were when he discovered the contraband in this case. There is nothing “sensible,” much less constitutional, about “[following a prescribed routine” (353 Ill. App. 3d at 672) that requires every traffic offender to spread-eagle for a weapons search. Indeed, it is decidedly unreasonable to think that officers should grope the underarms, upper thighs, and crotch of every person, male and female, whom they stop for speeding. Because I believe that the promise of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures protects people from having their bodies routinely probed during traffic stops, I specially concur. I specially concur.