Court Opinion

ID: 9948410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 22:11:45.545695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:40.394455
License: Public Domain

03/06/2024
                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT KNOXVILLE
                                      November 1, 2023 Session

    CHAQUANA P. WILLIAMS v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATIONS,
                              LLC

                      Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County
                             No. 22C849 Kyle E. Hedrick, Judge
                          ___________________________________

                                 No. E2023-00702-COA-R3-CV
                             ___________________________________

Appellant filed a premises liability claim against the defendant store after she fell at its
entrance. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and
                                    Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.
GOLDIN, and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

C. Mark Warren, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Chaquana P. Williams.

Sean W. Martin and Courtney G. Harton, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Dollar
General Corporations, LLC.

                                     MEMORADUM OPINION1

                           I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          The following facts are taken from the undisputed facts in the record. On January
1
    Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

          This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
          or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
          would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall
          be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be
          cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
15, 2022, Plaintiff/Appellant Chaquana P. Williams (“Appellant”) visited a Dollar General
Store in Chattanooga. The store is owned and operated by Defendant/Appellee Dollar
General Corporations, LLC (“Appellee”). It was raining on January 15, 2022, prior to
Appellant’s visit to the store. Appellant knew that it was raining outside. A mat was placed
at the entrance of the store, along with a wet floor sign. Appellant “entered the store,
shuffled her feet across the mat, and fell.” The store’s general manager dry-mopped the
area approximately seven minutes prior to Appellant’s fall. Other store employees and
another customer all walked past the mat at the store entrance in the two minutes prior to
the fall.

       On August 16, 2022, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee in the Hamilton
County Circuit Court (“the trial court”), asserting that she was injured due to a dangerous
condition at Appellee’s store. Appellant then filed an amended complaint on September
12, 2022. The amended complaint is the operative complaint for purposes of this appeal.
This complaint alleged that Appellant fell “[a]fter she walked across a rain-soaked rug,
[and] her foot slipped when she stepped on the floor[.]” Appellant further alleged that
Appellee was negligent in failing to replace the rain-soaked rug with a dry rug. The fall
caused her to break her hip, which resulted in over $100,000.00 in medical bills. Appellant
sought total damages of $250,000.00.

       Appellee filed an answer denying liability on September 27, 2022. In particular,
Appellee argued, inter alia, that it did not have notice of the allegedly dangerous condition,
that Appellant’s own negligence caused her injuries, that it exercised all reasonable care
required under the circumstances, and that no act or omission by Appellee was the
proximate cause of Appellant’s injuries.

       On November 21, 2022, Appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Appellant “did not slip stepping off a ‘rain-soaked’ rug as alleged in her Complaint.
Instead, [Appellant] failed to appreciate the wet floor sign placed at the entrance and
tripped over her own feet while shuffling across the mat.” Thus, Appellee argued that
Appellant could not establish that there was a dangerous condition, that Appellee had
notice of a dangerous condition, or that Appellee breached its duty of care.

       Attached to the motion was a flash drive purporting to contain two videos: (1) an
unedited surveillance video preserved from the day of the visit; and (2) a video containing
“[e]xcerpts” of the surveillance video. Appellee also attached the affidavit of the store’s
assistant manager, Jasmine Clabough, that the floor mat was new, that she dry-mopped the
floor approximately seven minutes before the incident, that she walked over the relevant
area less than two minutes before the incident and did not observe water on the floor or
that the mat was wet, and that no other customers fell near the store entrance after
Appellant’s fall. On the same day, Appellee filed a memorandum in support of its motion
for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed material facts.

                                            -2-
        Appellant responded in opposition to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on
February 22, 2023. Citing her own affidavit, Appellant alleged that she was wearing a pair
of “slides” at the time of the incident and that her “left slide stepped on the edge of the mat.
She felt her slide hydroplane which caused her to lose her balance.” According to
Appellant, she only noticed the wet floor sign as she was falling. Appellant also argued
that it was “obvious” from the surveillance video that the mat at the store entrance was
water-logged, as the video shows customers tracking water into the store.2 Appellant
further alleged that the mat had a “water dam border” and that Appellant’s “slide stepped
on the ‘water dam’ releasing the retained water.” Finally, Appellant noted that Ms.
Clabough admitted that a water-logged mat should be “replaced with a dry rug as needed.”
In support of her response, Appellant filed Appellee’s interrogatory response concerning
the floor mat, Appellant’s affidavit, Ms. Clabough’s deposition, a flash drive purporting to
contain the full surveillance video, “screen shots” from the full surveillance footage, and
information about the brand of floor mat utilized in the store. On the same day, Appellant
responded to Appellee’s statement of undisputed material facts. Appellant did not dispute
any of Appellee’s proffered facts, nor did she submit her own undisputed facts for purposes
of summary judgment.

        On February 27, 2023, Appellant filed a supplemental response to the motion for
summary judgment. Therein, she clarified that her claim did not involve Appellant
“slipp[ing] on the floor after stepping off of the mat,” but instead alleged that “the mat
itself cause her to slip because of it being water-logged.” She therefore asserted that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the mat should have been replaced in
this case.

       Appellee filed a supplemental brief in support of its motion for summary judgment
on March 1, 2023. Therein, Appellee objected to the claim that Appellant’s injury was
caused by stepping on the mat, as her complaint had previously stated that she slipped when
she stepped on the floor. Appellee argued, however, that Appellant’s claim under this new
theory should fail, citing (1) Ms. Clabough’s testimony that the mat was not water-logged
and did not need to be replaced;3 and (2) surveillance footage of forty-seven other
customers traversing the mat without incident. As Appellee explained:

       2
          Appellant also cited the deposition testimony of Ms. Clabough that she could see customers
tracking water into the store on the surveillance video prior to Appellant’s fall.
        3
          Ms. Clabough’s deposition contains the following exchange:

               Q.      So it’s your testimony that the rug in the video should not have been
                       replaced because it was waterlogged?
               A.      No. I think it was in working condition.
               Q.      And it was not waterlogged?
               A.      No, it was not.
                                                 -3-
       [Appellant] submitted no evidence that [Appellee’s] mat was improperly
       maintained. [Appellant] submitted no evidence of any substance, other than
       a light rain, which caused the mat to be “waterlogged.” [Appellant] submitted
       no evidence demonstrating how a light rain caused a mat capable of holding
       two and one-half gallons of water to become “waterlogged” and thereby
       create a dangerous condition. [Appellant] submitted no evidence as to the
       time that the mat became “waterlogged” (i.e. the time that the dangerous
       condition occurred). [Appellant’s] “proof” that the mat was “waterlogged”
       amounts to pure speculation.

Appellee therefore asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment.

        The trial court entered an order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment
on March 1, 2023. Therein, the trial court noted that Appellant’s new theory of liability
was not set forth in either her complaint or amended complaint. The trial court also
explained that it viewed the six-minute excerpted version of the surveillance footage
prepared by Appellee twice, as the longer version of the footage “could not be viewed by
the Court due to some technical glitch (most likely this Court’s technological
incompetence). After the six-minute video played, the Court offered for [Appellant] to
show any sections she desired. [Appellant] declined.” After viewing this footage, the trial
court concluded that “[t]he fall . . . clearly occurred on the mat. That is to say, [Appellant]
lost her footing on the mat prior to her feet having an opportunity to slide on the floor.” So
the trial court framed the relevant question as what was Appellee required to do to exercise
reasonable care with regard to the mat.

       The trial court then noted that Appellant submitted no expert proof to show that the
mat was defectively designed, manufactured, or used by Appellee, or even that it becomes
slippery when saturated with water. Rather, the trial court noted that the manufacturer states
that the rug can hold over 1.5 gallons of water. The trial court further noted that the
surveillance video undisputedly shows forty-seven individuals using the mat without
incident with “no splashing on the mat or any evidence to suggest that the mat was in any
way compromised.” The trial court concluded as follows: “There is no question of fact.
The mat was new. The mat was appropriate for indoor use. There is no evidence the mat
was too wet for use or that [Appellee] should have changed out the mat.”

       On March 24, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to amend the trial court’s ruling
pursuant to Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Therein, Appellant
asserted that the trial court erred in failing to consider the full surveillance video and instead
considering, over Appellant’s objection, only a six-minute excerpted video that was “never
filed as evidence in support of [Appellee’s] Motion for Summary Judgment.” Appellant
therefore refiled the full surveillance video in a playable format, as well as the affidavit of

                                              -4-
an expert engineer who watched the video.4 Appellant asserted that the trial court should
consider this proof because she had no notice until the day of oral argument that the trial
court had not watched the full surveillance video.

        Appellee responded in opposition to Appellant’s Rule 59.04 motion on April 14,
2023. Therein, Appellee asserted that the excerpted video was the first exhibit to Appellee’s
motion for summary judgment. Appellee further asserted that because Appellant declined
the trial court’s offer for Appellant to play additional parts of the video at the summary
judgment hearing, she waived any objection to the trial court’s decision to view only the
condensed video. Appellee also argued that the trial court should not consider the newly
obtained evidence because Appellant made no effort to obtain this evidence in initially
responding to the motion for summary judgment and had not explained why this evidence
was not available prior to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

       The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to alter or amend by order of April 19,
2023, finding that Appellant failed to meet her burden to show she was entitled to Rule
59.04 relief. This appeal followed.

                                        II. ISSUES PRESENTED

       Appellant raises the following issue for review, as taken from her appellate brief:
“Whether the trial court erred in not finding that there existed a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether [Appellee] had actual or constructive notice of water on its premises
before [Appellant] slipped.”

                                     III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A party is entitled to summary judgment only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. When the party moving for summary
judgment does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it “may satisfy its burden of production
either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or
(2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage
is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.” Rye v. Women’s Care
Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, the non-moving party
may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleadings. Id. at 265. Instead, the non-
moving party must respond with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of
material fact to be resolved at trial. Id. A fact is material “if it must be decided in order to

        4
         The expert’s affidavit asserted that it was his expert opinion, inter alia, that the mat was in fact
water-logged and should have been replaced.
                                                   -5-
resolve the substantive claim or defense at which the motion is directed.” Byrd v. Hall, 847
S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted), holding modified by Hannan v. Alltel
Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), holding modified by Rye, 477 S.W.3d 235. A
“genuine issue” exists if “a reasonable jury could legitimately resolve that fact in favor of
one side or the other.” Id. “Summary [j]udgment is only appropriate when the facts and the
legal conclusions drawn from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion.” Brooks
Cotton Co. v. Williams, 381 S.W.3d 414, 418–19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Landry v. S. Cumberland Amoco, No. E2009-01354-COA-R3-CV,
2010 WL 845390, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 10, 2010)).

       We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, with no
presumption of correctness. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250 (citing Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618,
622 (Tenn. 1997); Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosp., 325 S.W.3d 98, 103
(Tenn. 2010)). As part of our review, we must “take the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party, and discard all countervailing evidence.” Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211.

                                        IV. ANALYSIS

        Although Appellant raises only a single issue in this appeal, her argument is divided
into three headings. The first and second arguments deal with the trial court’s treatment of
the surveillance video. In particular, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to
view the full surveillance video as it was relevant evidence. Appellant further asserts that
the full video should have been the only video evidence relied upon under the “best
evidence rule.”

        As an initial matter, we note that it is questionable whether Appellant’s evidentiary
arguments were properly raised on appeal. Here, as discussed above, Appellant’s
designated issue involves only whether the trial court erred in not finding genuine issues
of material fact as to the question of actual or constructive notice. No evidentiary questions
are designated as issues. “We consider an issue waived where it is argued in the brief but
not designated as an issue.” Childress v. Union Realty Co., 97 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2002). In another case, we have held that an appellant waived consideration of
evidentiary issues based on the following designated issue: “[w]hether the trial court erred
in granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and related evidentiary rulings.”
Cartwright v. Jackson Cap. Partners, Ltd. P’ship, 478 S.W.3d 596, 615 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2015) (holding that the vague issue regarding “evidentiary issues” was not sufficient to
raise the alleged evidentiary errors on appeal). Of course, the issue in this case provides far
less notice that evidentiary rulings are at issue, as none are mentioned.

        Regardless, Appellant’s argument as to the applicability of the “best evidence rule”
fails because Appellant has not shown that she made a contemporaneous objection to the
excerpted video on this basis in the trial court. In this case, no transcript or statement of the
                                              -6-
evidence exists from the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Cf. State v. Banks,
271 S.W.3d 90, 169–70 (Tenn. 2008) (“It is the burden of the Appellant to prepare a full
and complete record for appellate review.” (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b)). Although
Appellant asserted, in her motion to alter or amend, that she did object to the consideration
of the excerpted video at the summary judgment hearing, the only challenge discussed in
this motion was the false claim that the excerpted video was not submitted as proof in
support of the motion for summary judgment.5 So then, it does not appear that Appellant
made a best evidence objection in the trial court. Any argument that only the full video
should have been considered under that rule is therefore waived. See State v. Norwood,
No. E2004-00361-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 35245, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2005)
(“We cannot conclude from this exchange that the defendant made a ‘best evidence’
objection, as she has on appeal. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that no contemporaneous
objection was made, thus waiving the claim.” (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a), Advisory
Commission Cmts. (“The last sentence of this rule is a statement of the accepted principle
that a party is not entitled to relief if the party invited error, waived an error, or failed to
take whatever steps were reasonably available to cure an error.”))).

       Still, Appellant asserts that even if the excerpted surveillance footage was properly
considered by the trial court, it was an error for the trial court not to view the full seventy-
eight-minute surveillance footage that had been submitted by the parties. According to
Appellant, a “technical glitch” is insufficient to excuse the failure to consider all relevant
evidence.

       Although Appellant frames this issue as a matter involving the exclusion of relevant
evidence, that is not what actually occurred here. Instead, the trial court informed the
parties that due to technical issues, it could not view the unedited video prior to hearing.
Appellant does not appear to deny that there were technical issues that prevented the trial
court from viewing the original video prior to the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment.

      In the context of summary judgment, if the party without the burden of proof makes
a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the burden of production shifts and
the non-moving party must come forward with specific evidence showing that there is a
genuine dispute of fact. See Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265. It is obvious that a non-moving party
does not meet this burden when he or she relies on evidence in a format that the trial court
cannot access.

      Moreover, the record reflects that the trial court informed the parties that it had not
watched the full video and provided Appellant with an opportunity to play the unedited

       5
          In her brief, Appellant appears to concede that Appellee “submitted [the edited copy of the
surveillance video] as evidence” in the trial court.
                                                -7-
version of the tape; Appellant declined the trial court’s invitation.6 Rule 36(a) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “[n]othing in this rule shall be
construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to
take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of
an error.” This means that “we generally only correct prejudicial errors that were not the
result of a parties’ own mistake.” Richardson v. Richardson, No. M2020-00179-COA-R3-
CV, 2021 WL 4240831, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2021) (citing Tenn. R. App. P.
36). And it often comes into play when the trial court offers some curative action that the
aggrieved party declines. See, e.g., State v. Hickman, No. E2021-00662-CCA-R3-CD,
2022 WL 13693116, at *25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2022) (holding that a defendant
was not entitled to relief when the trial court made an error in overruling an objection, but
the defendant did not ask for a mistrial and declined the trial court’s offer of a curative
instruction), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2023); State v. Brown, No. W2018-02128-
CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 6256868, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2020) (holding that an
issue was waived where the defendant declined the trial court’s offer to order an officer to
return to court).

       Here, the trial court gave Appellant the opportunity to play any or all of the
surveillance footage that she deemed relevant to the summary judgment question.
Appellant did not take this opportunity to play the full video, nor does the record reflect
that she sought a continuance in order to provide the court with a viewable copy of the full
surveillance footage.7 Because Appellant failed to take the corrective actions available to
her before summary judgment was granted, she is not entitled to relief on appeal.8

       We therefore turn to Appellant’s last argument: whether Appellee “had actual and
constructive notice of the rain-soaked rug.” In this section of Appellant’s brief, she cites
the law surrounding premises liability, with a focus on the question of actual or constructive
notice. Appellant then cites several facts that she asserts establish that Appellee “had actual
and/or constructive notice that customers walked across the rug and tracked water on its
floor.” Appellant then poses the following rhetorical questions that she asserts indicate

        6
           Because no transcript or statement of the evidence exists as to this hearing, we conclusively
presume that the trial court’s findings as to what occurred at this hearing are correct. See In re M.L.D., 182
S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Moreover, Appellant concedes in her reply brief that the trial court
informed the parties “that he had a ‘technical glitch’ and did not have a chance to review the video evidence
before hearing oral argument.”
        7
           Moreover, while Appellant’s brief on appeal cites specific portions of the surveillance footage
that were omitted from the excerpted video and argues that they “evidenc[e] [Appellee’s actual knowledge
of the rain-soaked rug[,]” Appellant’s response to the motion for summary judgment does not actually
reference the full video in its argument, but only “screen shots” of the video footage. There is no suggestion
that the trial court did not consider these screen shots before granting Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment. And, as discussed infra, the trial court’s ruling did not rest on the question of notice.
        8
          Appellant did attempt to correct the issue by filing a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s
judgment. Appellant does not, however, appeal the trial court’s denial of that motion in this appeal. As
such, that ruling is not before this Court.
                                                    -8-
material facts in dispute:

        1. Whether the defendant had actual notice of the water-logged rug?
        2. Whether the defendant had constructive notice of the water-logged rug?
        3. Whether the defendant was negligent in not replacing the water-logged
           rug with a dry one?
        Respectfully, Appellant’s argument is not at all responsive to the trial court’s ruling
in this case. Here, Appellee’s motion for summary judgment included several grounds for
dismissal, including that there was no dangerous condition, that Appellee did not have
notice of a dangerous condition, and that Appellee did not breach the standard of care. But
the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Appellee was not based on a lack of
actual or constructive notice; instead, the trial court ruled that Appellant failed to produce
evidence that the mat was too wet for use or that Appellee should have changed out the
mat. Clearly, this ruling goes to the alleged dangerousness of the mat or Appellee’s alleged
breach of duty, rather than notice. In fact, notice is not mentioned once in the trial
court’s order.

       We have repeatedly held that an appellant’s failure to craft a more-than-skeletal
argument that is actually responsive to the trial court’s ruling may result in waiver on
appeal.9 See McNeill v. Blount Mem’l Hosp. Inc., No. E2022-00209-COA-R3-CV, 2022
WL 16955177, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2022) (holding that an argument was subject
to waiver when the appellant’s “brief contain[ed] no argument that addresse[d] the actual
basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment”); Payne v. Bradley, No. M2019-
01453-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 754860, at *7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2021) (holding
that the appellant’s argument was waived where appellant provided “only a skeletal
argument actually addressing the very foundation of the trial court’s ruling against her”

        9
            In her reply brief, Appellant does state as follows:

        As admitted by the Appellee, “the only evidence offered to demonstrate a dangerous
        condition was the wet footprints tracked in by customers, who were observed by the former
        store manager to be caused primarily by customers who failed to wipe their feet before
        stepping off [Appellee’s] mat.”

                   Exactly.

                Whether or not wet footprints tracked in by customers after they walked across a
        waterlogged mat caused a defective condition on its premises, is a genuine issue of material
        fact and it should be decided by a jury. Those wet footprints evidenced a waterlogged mat
        that should have been replaced with a dry mat.

(Record citation omitted). However, reply briefs are not generally a vehicle to correct deficiencies in initial
briefs. Augustin v. Bradley Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 598 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019). And
Appellant cites no caselaw in support of this argument in her reply brief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A)
(requiring the appellant’s argument to be supported by citations to authorities).
                                                      -9-
and therefore had “not properly appealed the dispositive issue in this appeal”); Augustin,
598 S.W.3d at 226–27 (“Appellant’s initial brief contains no properly supported argument
responsive to the trial court’s dispositive ruling in this case. This failure would generally
result in a waiver on appeal.”). Because Appellant has failed to address the actual basis of
the trial court’s ruling, her argument on appeal is likewise subject to waiver.10 We therefore
affirm the decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment to Appellee.11

                                            IV. CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the Hamilton County Circuit Court is affirmed, and this cause is
remanded to the trial court for all further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent
with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant Chaquana P. Williams, for
which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                             S/ J. Steven Stafford
                                                             J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

        10
            We further note that a series of rhetorical questions, without more, does not constitute appropriate
argument. See Skytop Meadow Cmty. Ass’n v. Paige, 177 A.3d 377, 384 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (holding
that an argument was waived when the party’s brief “pose[d] a litany of rhetorical and hypothetical
questions, along with undeveloped arguments that invite this Court to rule in their favor”). Arguments
cannot be asserted on appeal “in perfunctory fashion, without substance, support, or explanation.” State v.
Bargo, No. E1999-00156-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1586466, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2000).
         11
            Because Appellant has waived consideration of the ultimate issue of whether summary judgment
was proper in this case, even if this Court were to assume, arguendo, that the trial court erred in not
considering the full surveillance video, it appears that this purported error would be harmless. See In re
Est. of Smallman, 398 S.W.3d 134, 152 (Tenn. 2013) (“Errors in the admission of evidence are harmful
and call for reversal when[,] considering the whole record, error involving a substantial right more probably
than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
                                                    - 10 -