Court Opinion

ID: 9739901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:23:17.616613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.614817
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RIZZI, specially concurring: The majority concludes that the trial court’s “denial of the motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous” because evidence admitted at trial was obtained by the police in violation of the fourth amendment and defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the majority also concludes that defendant’s conviction should be affirmed because “[we believe] any violation of his fourth amendment rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (169 Ill. App. 3d at 493.) I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that there was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. In my opinion, if evidence is obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, and is sufficiently probative to be admitted into evidence at trial, the wrongful admission of the evidence should rarely be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It certainly would not be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, set forth the harmless error rule regarding constitutional violations. The Court stated that some constitutional errors may be so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the constitution, be considered harmless error. However, before a Federal constitutional error is declared to be harmless, the court must find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (386 U.S. at 22-24, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 709-11, 87 S. Ct. at 827-28.) The crucial question, according to the Chapman Court, is whether a reasonable possibility exists that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction. Thus, if a constitutional error is one that will “affect substantial rights” of a defendant, that constitutional error should not be deemed harmless. 386 U.S. at 22-24, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 709-11, 87 S. Ct. at 827-28. The majority states that the trial court’s failure to find some prior legal justification for the police officer’s visual examination of the evidence seized compelled it to conclude that the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous. Clearly, if the trial court’s actions were manifestly erroneous, the question of whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to defendant’s conviction must be answered in the affirmative. Here, but for the warrantless arrest of defendant and the subsequent search and seizure of the car, the State lacked sufficient evidence to sustain its case. Thus, the majority’s conclusion, based on the majority’s own premise, is untenable. The asserted error would not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, it is my opinion that the majority did not need to address the harmless error issue. I believe that the police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant and that the car was,in plain view at the relevant time. To determine if a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest, it must be shown that the facts and circumstances within his or her knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense. (People v. Gutierrez (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 774, 782, 483 N.E.2d 944, 949.) Thus, whether probable cause exists depends on the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. The probable cause determination must be based on probabilities measured by the practical considerations of everyday life and not be unduly restricted by technical rules and regulations. (People v. Sanchez (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 240, 248, 437 N.E.2d 744, 751.) Once a trial court has denied a motion to quash an arrest for lack of probable cause, a reviewing court should not disturb that court’s ruling unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Calderon (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1036, 407 N.E.2d 840, 844. In the present case, I do not believe that the trial court’s determination of the probable cause issue was manifestly erroneous. The facts are that within a two-week period, abandoned cars had been stripped or found in close proximity to defendant’s garage. There appeared to be a trail of an oil substance leading from these cars into or near, or in the direction of, defendant’s garage. While this area and defendant’s garage were under surveillance, the police officers saw defendant’s car pass very close to them; close enough for them to observe the license plate number. When they entered the license number into their computer, the computer check disclosed that the car was registered to a person who lived in Evanston. The police officers observed defendant’s car pull into the alley in front of defendant’s garage and then go into the garage. The door was then closed. The police officers drove up to the garage door and heard a clanking sound. As the police officers exited their car and approached the door, defendant came out and made some motion as if to go past them. It was then that defendant was stopped and physically detained on the apron that led to the garage. As stated earlier, police officers do not have to have actual knowledge of a crime; only probable cause or reasonable grounds for believing that a crime is being committed. Here, the police officers had an area under surveillance where a chop-shop-type operation was suspected. They saw a car at 5 in the morning that was registered to someone who did not live anywhere near the area. The police officers saw the car driven into a garage which they had under surveillance. When the door opened, the police officers were able to see lug nuts on the floor, the car hoisted on milk crates and two wheels that had been removed. Based on these facts, it would be absurd to conclude that the police officers did not have a right to make an investigation. Based upon their initial investigation, coupled with their knowledge of the other factors that existed, the police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. This analysis takes into account the fact that defendant was arrested in a public place. In the past, this court has held that a warrantless arrest of a defendant on the porch within the curtilage of his home involves no governmental intrusion on his expectation of privacy as would violate the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Jones (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 615, 622, 456 N.E.2d 926, 932-33.) Moreover, a person standing in the open doorway of his place of residence is deemed to be in a “public place” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Santana (1976), 427 U.S. 38, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 96 S. Ct. 2406. It logically follows that if a porch to a home is deemed a public place for Fourth Amendment purposes, so would be an apron to a garage. Clearly, as the apron was outside of the garage in unobstructed view, defendant’s expectation of privacy was the same as he would have in a public place, and his warrantless arrest was valid as long as improper police conduct, deception or coercion did not facilitate the arrest. People v. Graves (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 727, 730, 482 N.E.2d 223, 225. Here, the trial court’s finding evinces that defendant was not coerced or deceived into exiting the garage onto its apron. The police were conducting a proper investigation when defendant opened the garage door and by his own volition stepped out onto the apron leading to the garage. Therefore, I believe that the trial court correctly determined that the warrantless arrest of defendant was valid. Since I believe that the police officers possessed probable cause to arrest defendant, I shall address the issue as to the search and seizure of the car. The law is clear that a police officer may seize an item in plain view without a warrant if (1) he views the object from a place where he has a right to be and (2) the facts and circumstances known to him at the time he acts give rise to a reasonable belief that the item seized constitutes evidence of criminal activity. United States v. Cooks (7th Cir. 1974), 493 F.2d 668, 670. In this case, the police were conducting a surveillance of defendant’s garage and the surrounding area. When defendant opened the garage door and stepped out, the car, with its lug nuts missing, its body hoisted on milk crates, and its two tires on the ground, was in the immediate visual range of the investigating police officers. Since the car and its equipment were unquestionably in plain view, the officers had the right to walk in, look at the steering column and even look at the trunk lock to confirm their suspicions. Thus, I believe that there was a valid search and seizure, not violative of the mandate of Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034. I concur with the result reached by the majority for the reasons that I have stated, and not for the reasons stated by the majority.