Court Opinion

ID: 9699315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:19:12.096228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:48.695774
License: Public Domain

MADDOX, Justice
(dissenting).
Although I can admit that this is a close case, I believe the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in this particular case.
This is a negligence action and I realize that, as a general proposition, issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible to summary adjudication. See Committee Comments, ARCP, Rule 56. Nevertheless, a motion for summary judgment may be granted, even in a negligence action, when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show two things: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 292 Ala. 147, 290 So.2d 636 (1974).
What was presented ? The evidence submitted on the motion for summary judgment and the evidence presented in opposition to it shows that the plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall in defendant’s store. She testified, on deposition, as follows:
“Q. All right. Tell me how it happened that you fell there in the Montgomery Fair store.
“A. Well, I walked in the store and Fran stopped to register her silver. And I walked on up through the China Department, and Fran came on and joined me. And she said come let me show you the china pattern that I picked out. And I walked past these round tables, and there were some shelves up at the top of the round tables with some dishes on them. And a couple, a man and a lady came, and they stopped to look at those dishes. And it blocked my going through, and I waited a while for them to move on to let me through and they didn’t. So I turned around and walked between the tables to go to Fran. And as I was walking between the tables I tripped on something and just fell at an angle.
“Q. What did you trip on, Mrs. Fol-mar?
*693“A. I don’t know.
“Q. Did you see anything ?
“A. No.
“Q. Did you see anything at any time on the floor, either before or after you fell?
“A. The minute I fell I was just in excruciating pain, it broke my shoulder, and my hip.
“Q. Did you feel anything touch any portion of your body, either your foot or your leg or your knee or any portion of your body as you walked between the tables?
“A. Well, if anything it was my foot. [Emphasis added.]
sjc * * * H< ‡
“Q. At the time you fell were you going between some small tables that were stacked up quite high with china that was on sale?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And when you say you turned to go between those tables, are you referring to some small tables that had china on sale stacked up on top there ?
“A. Yes.
“Q. All right. Now, if your foot tripped on anything, would it be fair to state that it was something in the aisle between those tables?

“A. I would think so.

“Q. Now, did you see anything in the aisle between those tables ?
"A. No.
“Q. Did you feel any portion of your body come into contact with any of those tables themselves as you walked between them?

“A. I might have. Something made be fall.

“Q. But you don’t know what it was?
“A. No,
[Emphasis added.]
He * * * *
“Q. Yes, ma’am. Now, Mrs. Folmar, in your lawsuit that you filed against the Montgomery Fair you have charged them with negligently causing you to be injured. What do you say they did that caused you to be injured?
“A. Well, I say that I fell — I tripped on something and fell.
“Q. And that is as specific as you can be?
“A. Yes.
“Q. You don’t know what it was or how it happened, but basically you are saying you went in there uninjured and came out injured?
“A. Yes, I surely did.
“Q. And for that reason you charge them with negligence ?
“A. Yes.”
[Emphasis added.]
Viewing the evidence most favorably to Mrs. Folmar, as this Court is required to do, I find that these facts are presented:
1. Mrs. Folmar tripped on something and fell in the department store.
2. She fell while attempting to pass between tables which were covered with table cloths and ladened with china.
3. She did not know what caused her to trip.
4. The aisle where she fell contained no foreign objects or substances.
Mrs. Folmar filed a supplementary affidavit, on September 7, 1973, which read as follows:
“ ‘My name is Mary B. Folmar. I am the plaintiff in Civil Action No. 30576. *694At the time I gave my deposition on September 23, 1973 [sic, 1972], I had not returned to the Montgomery Fair since the accident. Since then I have gone back and have seen the tables which appear to me to be the ones I was passing between at the time I tripped. These tables were covered with a long table cloth at that time and I did not notice the legs of the tables. I have since noticed that some of these round tables have legs which angle out from the bottom of the table to the floor so that the legs extend out beyond the edge of the table. If there was .nothing else on the floor between the tables or under the long table cloths to trip me when I passed between them — and I did trip on something — it could only have been the leg of the table. The pictures which I have initialled [sic] and are attached to this show the tables and how the legs stick out into the aisle beyond the top of the tables.’ ”
Mrs. Folmar also filed three photographs as exhibits to her affidavit. The photographs were of round tables, some of which had flared legs that extended beyond the edge of the table itself. The other tables had straight legs.
Plaintiff Folmar contends that the evidence shows that she tripped on something which made her fall as she was walking between the tables; that it would be fair to state it was something in the aisle between the tables; that in view of the type of table involved, and in view of the store employee’s statement that nothing else was on the floor, it can logically and reasonably be inferred that she tripped on the table leg. Plaintiff’s counsel argues that since she did trip on something when she passed between the tables, and if there was nothing else on the floor or under the long table cloth to trip her, “then it could only have been the legs of the table on which she tripped.” I disagree.
Plaintiff Folmar relies on First National Bank of Mobile v. Ambrose, 270 Ala. 371, 119 So.2d 18 (1960). In Ambrose, plaintiff tripped over a metal cigarette disposal stand which had flared legs. The plaintiff there knew what caused her to trip. The trial court denied, in Ambrose, the defendant’s request for an affirmative charge, and a jury verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in refusing the affirmative charge in that case, but the facts and circumstances presented in that case are materially different, especially the evidence of causation.
Summary judgment in a negligence action is sometimes appropriate. See Herbert v. Regency Apartments, 292 Ala. 417 295 So.2d 404 (1974). Previously, this Court, applying the scintilla evidence rule, has also found that a negligence action can be taken from a jury, if a jury verdict could only be based upon pure speculation and conjecture. Colonial Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Collins, 280 Ala. 373, 194 So.2d 532 (1967); McDowell and McDowell, Inc. v. Barnett, 277 Ala. 302, 169 So.2d 324 (1964); Southern Ry. v. Woodstock Mills, 230 Ala. 494, 161 So. 519 (1935); Continental Casualty Co. v. Paul, 209 Ala. 166, 95 So. 814 (1923); St. Louis & S.F. RR. v. Dorman, 205 Ala. 609, 89 So. 70 (1921). It is axiomatic that the mere happening of an accident raises no presumption of negligence.
In Griffin Lumber Co. v. Harper, 247 Ala. 616, 25 So.2d 505 (1946), this Court reversed the trial court for refusing to give the affirmative charge requested by the defendants in that case. In Griffin Lumber, this Court followed the rule as laid down in the case of Southern Ry. v. Dickson, 211 Ala. 481, 100 So. 665, 669 (1924), as follows:
“ ‘Proof which goes no further than to show an injury could have occurred in an alleged way, does not warrant the conclusion that it did so occur, where from the same proof the injury can with equal probability be attributed to some other cause.’
“But a nice discrimination must be exercised in the application of this princi*695pie. As a theory of causation, a conjecture is simply an explanation consistent with known facts or conditions, but not deducible from them as a reasonable inference. There may be two or more plausible explanations as to how an event happened or what produced it; yet, if the evidence is without selective application to any one of them, they remain conjectures only. On the other hand, if there is evidence which points to any one theory of causation, indicating a logical sequence of cause and effect, then there is a judicial basis for such a determination, notwithstanding the existence of other plausible theories with or without support in the evidence.”
The fact that stands out in my mind is this. Plaintiff has not shown, by direct or circumstantial evidence, what caused her to trip. If she cannot show what caused her fall, how can a jury make such a finding? I do not think it can. Plaintiff says that she has shown that there were tables covered with table cloths which hid the legs from view. Some of the tables had straight legs. Some had flared legs. The pictures submitted with the affidavit do not show that these tables are unusual tables. They appear to be standard tables to me.
I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that the proof points to plaintiffs theory of causation, indicating a logical sequence of cause and effect. The proof here requires an inference that the “something” causing plaintiff to trip was a table leg (since plaintiff says that the leg was covered, we also have to infer it was, in fact, a table leg). If we infer that it was a table leg, we have to infer it was a flared table leg. That requires the type of speculation and conjecture which this Court said a jury verdict cannot be based upon in McClinton v. McGlinton, 258 Ala. 542, 63 So.2d 594 (1953).
I also fail to see how it could be negligent to display items of merchandise on tables like those we have pictures of in this case. The facts of this case are distinguishable from First National Bank v. Ambrose, 270 Ala. 371, 119 So.2d 18 (1960), a case relied on heavily by plaintiff.
The majority and I do not disagree on the rule that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in a negligence case. I thoroughly agree with that general principle of law. See my original opinion in Ray and Plough v. Midfield Park, 293 Ala. 609, 308 So.2d 686 (1974), and my special concurrence in Watwood v. Dawson Bridge Co., 293 Ala. 578, 307 So.2d 692 (1975). I thought summary judgment was inappropriate in both those cases because the movant in both cases had not eliminated every genuine issue of a material fact. I do think summary judgment was appropriate here, however, as I have attempted to show.