Court Opinion

ID: 9596962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:54:34.492943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:41.395914
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from Division 6 of the majority opinion. Error is enumerated because of remarks made by the trial judge in the presence of the jury respecting the apparent conflicts in testimony of witnesses, and the importance of this particular testimony.
An agent for the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Peters, was testifying for the state, and was being cross examined by defense counsel. Specifically he was asked if the defendant at any time indicated that defendant knew that illegal marijuana was on his *296premises, or in his possession and he replied the witness did not so indicate; and further he did not recall that it was even reported to witness that defendant had so indicated.
Then the trial judge took over the examination of the witness as follows: "the court: Wait just a minute. Were you with Sheriff Cannon when you all approached the residence? the witness: Yes, I believe I was. the court: Were you with them at the time Sheriff Cannon first approached Mr. Patterson? the witness: No, sir I wasn’t, the court: You were not there? the witness: I was — I was near Sheriff Cannon but it might clarify this point but it’s a operating procedure that I have being with the G.B.I. when I’m in an area such as this and the Sheriff is the — local. . . the court: Well, the question that’s in my mind I’m sure it’s in the jury’s mind, you just heard Sheriff Marly Cannon say that he told Mr. Patterson he come there to search for marijuana and Mr. Patterson said, the dam stuffs been growing in my field for ten years I’m trying to get rid of it right now, did you hear that and if not can you make any explanation as to why you. . . The witness: The only way that I could say I didn’t hear it, I was explaining is that obviously Sheriff Cannon knew Mr. Patterson and as a matter of procedure we let the sheriff talk with the people that he knew in a lot of instances a local person might would tell the Sheriff something that he knew that he wouldn’t tell me or wouldn’t tell a stranger he didn’t know. So you know I would stand back and let the sheriff make the initial conversation, handle it and then go from there but I don’t recall this particular conversation.. . Mr. Horn: Your Honor with all due respect to the Court I object' to the Court’s comparing testimony in its question. Mr. Peter’s... the court: Wait just a minute I don’t understand. Mr. Horn: I object to the Courf s question in that regard that you compare testimony with one witness and another witness. the court: I don’t mean to be comparing testimony Mr. Horn I’m trying — I would think that my question would benefit your client, if it benefited anybody. But one witness has testified to something that this witness apparently didn’t hear and his statement was that he approached the residence with the Sheriff and I wondered why he didn’t hear it if it was said.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The witness answered that often-times the sheriff *297heard statements from defendants that GBI agents did not hear, and prompt objection was made to the trial court’s questions by defendant’s counsel.
The trial judge, inadvertently no doubt, went too far. The jury could not have failed to learn what point in the trial the trial judge considered to be the most important, which was why the witness did not hear the sheriffs testimony, to the effect that defendant told him "the dam stuffs been growing in my field for ten years” and that the judge considered this a very important incriminating admission by defendant.
The jury may not have given great credence to the sheriffs testimony on this point, and may not have considered this as the principal point in the case, prior to the statement by the trial judge. But here their attention was directed straight to this phase of the case, and it was thereafter cloaked with the utmost importance by the jury-
It is not the function of the trial judge to point out to the jury what he considers to be the most important phase of the testimony by stating that this question is in the judge’s mind and he is sure the same question is in the jury’s mind. Here he unwittingly caused the jury to believe that the answer to this question would in effect decide the case. The trial judge let the jury know he gave credence to the sheriffs testimony and that he could not understand how the GBI agent could have failed to hear the sheriffs testimony; and that if the GBI agent did not hear the sheriffs testimony, "can you make any explanation as to why you. . .” The sentence was not finished, but it was quite clear that the trial judge felt the GBI agent owed and had the duty of making an explanation of his testimony, and asked him if he could make such explanation.
See the following authorities which leave it beyond doubt that the trial judge committed reversible error in this conduct: Pound v. State, 43 Ga. 89, 90 (7); Jefferson v. State, 80 Ga. 16 (5 SE 293); Hubbard v. State, 108 Ga. 786 (33 SE 814); Jenkins v. State, 123 Ga. 523 (51 SE 598); Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 419-420 (47 SE2d 54); Faust v. State, 222 Ga. 27, 28 (1), 29 (2) (148 SE2d 430).
The trial judge occupies a high and exalted position *298in the minds of the jurors. They know that counsel for the opposing parties are naturally prejudiced in favor of their clients, and the one to whom the jurors may turn for guidance, from a completely fair and impartial source is the presiding judge. Therefore, each word that falls from his lips is often given the' rapt attention and consideration of the jury, perhaps more than the trial judge realizes.
The trial judge in this case was a skilled and aggressive advocate before ascending the superior court bench. He is one of the outstanding and most able judges in Georgia. He would never consciously seek to influence the jury toward one side or the other. Nevertheless, in this case, it was the function of the prosecuting attorney to bring out the questions the trial judge propounded; and the inadvertence of the trial judge in his action does not cure the error.
It has been many times held by the Appellate Courts of Georgia that the trial judge commits error, if in the presence of the jury, he compliments or disparages the testimony of a witness. See Pound v. State, 43 Ga. 89, 90 (7), supra; Jefferson v. State, 80 Ga. 16 (2), supra.
I am authorized to state that Judge Stolz concurs in this dissent.