Court Opinion

ID: 9445989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:43:14.561073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:28.958854
License: Public Domain

DUFFY, Chief Judge
(concurring).
Irvin was not accorded due process of law in the trial which resulted in his conviction and death sentence. In my judgment, he did not receive a fair trial because some of the jury had pre-conceived opinions as to defendant’s guilt, and also because of the conduct of the prosecuting attorney. “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942.
More than half of the jurors who sat in the case had pre-conceived ideas that defendant was ’ guilty of the offense charged. Some testified on the voir dire that it would take evidence to change that opinion. Defendant exhausted his twenty peremptory challenges. His motion for a continuance had been denied.
I realize that a prolonged effort was made to obtain an impartial jury. 431 prospective jurors were questioned. 269 were successfully challenged for cause. Nevertheless, the jury, as finally constituted, in my opinion, was not impartial. Probably it was as impartial as could be found in Gibson County on that date, but that was not sufficient to insure due process.
Another reason for the failure of due process was that the prosecuting attorney also acted as a witness on the trial. Mr. Wever participated in examining prospective jurors, interposed objections to testimony, and otherwise participated in the trial. He then took the stand as a witness and testified concerning a confession made to him. Over objection, he made the closing argument to the jury *555and commented on the evidence including his own testimony. Such conduct was in violation of Canon 19 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Such conduct was offensive to the rights of a defendant to a fair and impartial trial.
In spite of my belief that there was failure to accord defendant due process in his trial, I am convinced for the reasons stated in Judge Schnackenberg’s opinion, that defendant is in no position to maintain a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court. By his escape from custody after he had been convicted and sentenced, he elected to embark upon a course of conduct which, under Indiana law, was a waiver of his right to appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. In deference to the authorities cited in Judge Schnackenberg’s opinion, I must agree defendant did not exhaust his available state remedies, and the District Court correctly dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.