Court Opinion

ID: 9530274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:49.045728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:03.686168
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY, specially concurring: What occurred here is representative of judicial overreaction to our Rule 103(b) (58 Ill. 2d R. 103(b)). The statutory right of the plaintiff to refile within one year from the date of dismissal for want of prosecution (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 83, par. 24a) was nullified through dismissal under this rule before service could be accomplished. A chronology of the events by Mr. Justice Ryan justifies the comment that courts should appreciate that Rule 103(b) should be employed with judicial restraint. It should not be used as a vehicle to dispose of litigation. Mr. Justice Ryan notes that in passing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 103(b) the court may consider the overall time between the filing of the first complaint and the ultimate service of summons, but then carefully observes that the right created by section 24 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 83, par. 24a) cannot be abbreviated. It would seem the span of time between the filing of the first complaint and the service of summons in the second case is wholly immaterial. Even if the first complaint is dismissed for want of prosecution long after the statute of limitations has expired, the General Assembly in the exercise of its constitutional powers has granted plaintiff an absolute right to refile within one year from the date of dismissal (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 83, par. 24a). On a motion to dismiss the second suit under Rule 103(b), judicial attention must be limited to matters occurring subsequent to the filing of the second suit. This would seem apparent from the fact that the second action is filed by virtue of an extension of time in the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 83, par. 24a). It is important that this section of the statute be viewed in the light of a statute of limitations. Section 24, being a limitation law, is remedial. It should be liberally construed. Its purpose is well described in Roth v. Northern Assurance Co. (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 40, where plaintiff filed an action on fire insurance policies in the Federal district court. It was dismissed for want of prosecution and refiled in the circuit court under section 24. The policies contained a limitation requiring an action against the company to be commenced within 12 months from the date of the loss. The Federal court action was commenced within that period, but the State court action was not. In holding that the suit could be maintained, this court quoted with approval from Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. (7th Cir. 1942), 131 F.2d 134: “The act is remedial, reflecting a legislative intent to protect the party who brings the action in good faith from complete loss of relief on the merits merely because of procedural defect. Such remedial statutes should be liberally construed, so as to prevent destruction of the purpose of the legislation. [Citations.] In both common law non-suit and dismissal for want of jurisdiction the order is due to some defect in the procedure or proof which prevents a trial on the merits. The obvious purpose of the statute was to give a plaintiff an opportunity to try the merits ***.” 131 F.2d 134, 137. Roth v. Northern Assurance Co. (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 40, incorporated the language of Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co. (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 273: “Statutes of limitation, like other statutes, must be construed in the light of their objectives. The basic policy of such statutes is to afford a defendant a fair opportunity to investigate the circumstances upon which liability against him is predicated while the facts are accessible. That purpose has been fully served here. As observed by Mr. Justice Holmes in New York Central Railroad v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 342, ‘Of course an argument can be made on the other side, but when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of opinion that a liberal rule should be applied.’ ” 4 Ill. 2d 273, 289-90. Factor v. Carson, Pirie Scott & Co. (7th Cir. 1968), 393 F.2d 141, involved an interpretation of this statute on a refiling where the district court, in dismissing the second action, concluded that plaintiff had not shown good faith in claiming diversity of citizenship in the first action. The district court dismissed the complaint. In reversing, it was noted that the language of the statute was precise and complete — facts which required the rejection of any additional requirements a court might judicially impose. See In re Estate of Breault (1969), 113 Ill. App. 2d 356, 361, and the dissent in Franzese v. Trinko (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 152, 156, which are consistent with Roth and Factor. There is, however, a series of Illinois cases which treats a motion to dismiss the second suit under Rule 103(b) by evaluating and measuring all that occurred between the time of the filing of the first suit and service of summons in the second action refiled under section 24. Tidwell v. Smith (1965), 57 Ill. App. 2d 271, is the progenitor of such judicial requirements as “self-initiated delay” and “extreme, self-initiated delay” as the test on such a motion. Such language in varying terms has been employed in Franzese v. Trinko (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 152, 155, Kutnick v. Grant (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 37, 39, Sandman v. Marshall Field & Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 427, 431, Brown v. Burdick (1974), 16 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1074, Ray v. Bokorney (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 141, 145, and Quirino v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc. (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 148, 150. Some view section 24 as an aid to the diligent suitor only. Sandman v. Marshall Field & Co., Brown v. Burdick, and Quirino v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc. Obviously, a limitations statute does not involve diligence. Pyle v. Ferrell (1958), 12 Ill. 2d 547, 552; Matchett v. Rose (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 638, 651. A motion under Rule 103(b) directed to the second suit must be limited to that action only. Otherwise we would be violating the action of the General Assembly (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973,.ch. 83, par. 24a). These appellate court cases which would engraft judicial conditions upon this complete statute are, in my opinion, overruled by today’s decision. Typical are: Franzese v. Trinko (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 152; Tidwell v. Smith (1965), 57 Ill. App. 2d 271; Kutnick v. Grant (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 37; Sandman v. Marshall Field & Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 427; Brown v. Burdick (1974), 16 Ill. App. 3d 1071; Ray v. Bokorney (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 141; and Quirino v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc. (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 148.