Court Opinion

ID: 9557046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:08:52.00272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:23.398815
License: Public Domain

J-S43010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SERGIO BENSON                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 684 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 3, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0001891-2014

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                              FILED AUGUST 21, 2023

       Appellant, Sergio Benson, appeals from the March 3, 2022 order that

denied his petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. In addition, Appellant’s appointed

counsel, Stephen O’Hanlon, Esq. (“PCRA Counsel”), has filed a Motion to

Withdraw as Counsel and an accompanying Turner/Finley1 “no-merit” Brief.

After review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

       On November 19, 2013, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with

Murder and Possessing an Instrument of Crime (“PIC”) for the stabbing death

of Antonio Rivera (“Victim”). Police arrested Appellant after he was identified

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1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.3d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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on surveillance video stabbing Victim and gave an inculpatory statement to

police.

      On January 23, 2018, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to

Third-Degree Murder and PIC and the court sentenced him to an aggregate

sentence of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration.     Joshua M. Briskin, Esq. (“Plea

Counsel”) represented Appellant during the plea proceedings.         No appeal

followed.

      Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.     After the PCRA court

appointed counsel to represent Appellant, PCRA Counsel filed an amended

petition asserting that Plea Counsel had been ineffective.     Specifically, the

petition averred that Appellant requested that Plea Counsel file an appeal and

Plea Counsel failed to do so.

      On March 3, 2022, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant testified on his own behalf and was the only witness.        In sum,

Appellant testified that Plea Counsel informed Appellant that he had

communicated with the Philadelphia District Attorney’s (“DA”) Office to secure

a sentence of 10 to 20 years of imprisonment for Appellant.        Specifically,

Appellant testified that Plea Counsel asked him for an extra $10,000 on top of

his $20,000 retainer because he had set up a “clandestine meeting” with the

then-district attorney and a supervising assistant district attorney (“ADA”) and

had paid them off in return for the 10- to 20-year deal. N.T. PCRA Hearing,

3/3/22, at 19-20. Appellant further testified that at the plea hearing, Plea

Counsel recommended that he accept the plea offer of 20 to 40 years and said

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“don’t worry” about the inconsistency with the alleged agreed-upon term

because Plea Counsel would contact the DA’s office after the plea was entered

to “take care of it” by contacting the supervising ADA and/or filing for

reconsideration or an appeal. Id. at 17-18. Appellant explained that a week

after the plea hearing, Plea Counsel informed him that the supervising ADA

had been fired and “the deal is out the window.” Id. at 19. Finally, and most

relevant to our disposition here, Appellant testified that he asked Plea Counsel

to file an appeal and Plea Counsel failed to do so. Id. at 28.

      Notably, neither Appellant nor the Commonwealth called Plea Counsel

as a witness, even though the PCRA court had contacted Plea Counsel via

telephone at the start of the hearing to confirm his availability.

      At the end of the PCRA hearing, the PCRA court found Appellant’s

“testimony to be completely incredible” and denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Id. at 41.

      Appellant timely appealed. PCRA Counsel filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4)

statement of intent to withdraw. The PCRA court filed a “Notice of Compliance

With Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(A),” which relied on the court’s reasons

stated on the record at the conclusion of the PCRA hearing to support its

decision.

      In this Court, PCRA Counsel filed a Turner/Finley Brief, and raised the

following issue:

      The PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA Petition was not
      supported by the record and free from legal error because
      Appellant requested that a direct appeal be filed by Plea Counsel

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       [who] told Appellant what to say during the oral guilty plea
       colloquy and Appellant should have had a 10 to 20 year sentence
       that was agreed to by [Plea Counsel] and former district attorneys
       [].

Turner/Finley Br. at 3.          Plea Counsel also filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel.

       In response to Plea Counsel’s Turner/Finley Brief, Appellant filed a pro

se Brief for Appellant. In his brief, pro se Appellant raises various issues for

our review.2 Dispositive of the instant case is Appellant’s averment that PCRA

Counsel was ineffective. Appellant’s Br. at 6. Specifically, Appellant argues

that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to present Plea Counsel’s

testimony during Appellant’s PCRA hearing. Id.

       We    presume      that    counsel       has   rendered    effective     assistance.

Commonwealth v. Bickerstaff, 204 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2019). To

overcome this presumption, a petitioner must establish that: (1) the

underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel lacked a reasonable basis for

his   act   or   omission;     and    (3)      petitioner   suffered   actual    prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 390 (Pa. 2021).

       Appellant’s assertion—that PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing to

properly present evidence to prove Plea Counsel’s ineffectiveness—presents a

____________________________________________

2  Appellant asserts that PCRA Counsel failed to comply with the
Turner/Finley requirements, that he was denied his constitutional right to a
direct appeal, and that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
enter his guilty plea due to his impaired mental condition at the time of the
plea. Appellant’s Br. at 2.

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layered ineffectiveness claim. “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of

ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of

representation.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa.

2022). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry

is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in

fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective,

then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the

underlying issue.”    Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.

Super. 2010).

      Relevant here, our Supreme Court has held that “where there is an

unjustified failure to file a requested direct appeal, the conduct of counsel falls

beneath the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”

Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 572 (Pa. 1999) (footnote

omitted). This “denies the accused the assistance of counsel guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section

9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as the right to direct appeal under

Article V, Section 9[.]” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that this constitutes

prejudice and per se ineffectiveness for PCRA purposes. Id.

      Before a court will find ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to file a

direct appeal, however, Appellant must prove that he requested an appeal and

that counsel disregarded this request. Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d

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1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2001).          If proven, a defendant is entitled to

reinstatement of his appellate rights. Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 572.

      Finally,   where   an   appellant   raises   a   claim   of   PCRA   counsel

ineffectiveness for the first time on appeal, this Court has “the ability to grant

or deny relief on straightforward claims, as well as the power to remand to

the PCRA court for the development of the record.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at

403. We will remand “where there are material facts at issue concerning

claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is not plainly unavailable

as a matter of law[.]” Id. at 402 (citation and internal alteration omitted).

Additionally, we are mindful of the “general rule” that “a lawyer should not be

held ineffective without first having an opportunity to address the accusation

in some fashion.”    Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 895 (Pa.

2010), overruled on other grounds, Bradley, 261 A.3d 381.

      After careful review, we determine that remand is necessary for further

development of the record. Instantly, this Court’s analysis of Appellant’s claim

of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness must begin with a determination of whether

Appellant requested Plea Counsel to file a direct appeal. As explained above,

the PCRA court did not hear testimony from Plea Counsel during the PCRA

hearing.   Rather, PCRA Counsel only presented testimony from Appellant,

which the court found to be wholly incredible. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/3/22,

at 41; Opinion, 7/16/22, at 1.

      In light of Appellant’s new claim that PCRA Counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to call Plea Counsel as a witness during the PCRA hearing,

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we are unable to evaluate whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing

Appellant’s petition alleging Plea Counsel’s ineffectiveness. Since we cannot

analyze the PCRA Court’s disposal of Appellant’s original claim that Plea

Counsel was ineffective, we are likewise unable to review Appellant’s new

claim that PCRA Counsel was ineffective.

       For this reason, we vacate the order denying PCRA relief and remand to

the PCRA court for further development of the record. Specifically, the PCRA

Court should determine whether PCRA counsel should have called Plea Counsel

to testify during the PCRA hearing to ascertain if Plea Counsel was per se

ineffective.   Accordingly, we direct the PCRA court to appoint new PCRA

counsel for Appellant, hold a supplemental hearing, and conduct such further

proceedings as necessary to address Appellant’s layered claims of ineffective

assistance of both Plea Counsel and PCRA Counsel.3 PCRA Counsel’s petition

to withdraw as counsel is granted to allow him to be a potential witness upon

remand.

       Order vacated.        Petition to withdraw granted.   Case remanded.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

3 The PCRA court may, if necessary, allow Appellant’s new PCRA counsel to

file a supplemental PCRA petition to adequately address Plea Counsel and
PCRA Counsel’s effectiveness.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/2023

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