Court Opinion

ID: 9766008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:28:38.076802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:18.320979
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Presiding Judge
(concurring).
The court’s qualification to appellant’s bills of exception reads:
“Each of the Defendant’s foregoing Formal Bills of exception is qualified to the extent that any matter, facts, or conclusions of the Defendant set forth in each of the bills which are at variance from the facts shown in the official record in this case, as prepared by the court clerk and the court reporter, are not certified by me as true but are certified by me as being the contentions of the Defendant; and each of the bills as so qualified is approved and certified only insofar as it correctly states the matters as *172they appear in the full and complete statement of facts in Question and Answer form and the official transcript both of which are filed in this case.”
The qualification to Ormond Moore’s bill reads:
“The foregoing Bill of Exceptions was presented to me in due time and was approved and ordered filed, subject to the following qualifications:
“The Court does not certify to the truthfulness of the contents therein but he does certify that they are only contentions of the Defendant.”
Comparison of the qualification to appellant’s formal bills with the qualification of Ormond Moore’s bill manifests that if the latter “constituted no action at all,” the same is true as to the qualification to appellant’s bills.
If the court’s qualification, or attempted qualification, of Ormond Moore’s formal bill requires that such bill be treated as approved, the same is true as to appellant’s formal bills of exception and there was nothing for the appellant to except to, or to agree or disagree with.
The Moore bill was treated by the majority as approved by the trial judge without qualification. Such holding was dicta. The result reached in the case before us demonstrates that the holding was wrong.
Appellant’s formal bills of exception cannot be considered because the trial judge refused to approve them as filed and the appellant did not agree to his reasons, but excepted to his qualification. Art. 760d, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. and cases cited under Note 3.
This appeal was properly disposed of on original submission, for which reason I concur in the overruling of appellant’s motion for rehearing.