Court Opinion

ID: 9677097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:43:22.207072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:50.676515
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
dissenting.
I suppose that there is a jury instruction from the 19th century allowing the jury to decide whether, if the defendant is convicted, he should be hanged. But in the long-running effort to get death sentencing right — an effort that in the end might turn out to be futile — the justice system adapts, one hopes, by constant improvement. The outdated version of the verdict mechanics instruction — by which the jury was told how to proceed in its determinations— described the process of considering aggravating factors while neglecting to mention mitigating factors. The instruction is presumed by law to be prejudicial, a presumption that the state does not rebut.
*548The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new penalty-phase trial. I respectfully dissent.
Clear error occurred in this case when Instruction 10 used an outdated version of MAI-CR 313.48A, the verdict mechanics instruction. Rule 28.02(c); State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 912 (Mo. banc 2001) (“[wjhenever there is an MAI-CR instruction or verdict form applicable under the law and Notes on Use, the MAI-CR instruction or verdict form shall be given or used to the exclusion of any other instruction or verdict form.”)
As the rule requires, this Court must determine the error’s prejudicial effect. Rule 28.02(f). As the majority notes, because an incorrect instruction was given in this case, the burden is on the state to show that prejudice did not occur. See State v. Livingston, 801 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Mo. banc 1990) (citing State v. Graves, 588 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. banc 1979)) (so long as a timely objection is made to the incorrect instructions, the error is “presumptively prejudicial unless the contrary is clearly determined”). In contrast, the Court’s earlier cases upholding this version of MAI-CR 413.48A did so when it was the defendant who had the burden of showing that prejudice occurred. See, e.g., Storey, 40 S.W.3d at 913; see also State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 176 (Mo. banc 2002) (holding Storey was correctly decided); State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 770 (Mo. banc 2002) (same).1
Although Rule 28.03 requires only that an objection be made before the jury begins deliberations to preserve error, a counsel’s failure to object at the time the instruction first is given may be considered in determining prejudice. Livingston, 801 S.W.2d at 349. The reason given for considering this is that “when the court gives the text instruction and the deviation consists of failure to modify it and the defect is not readily apparent to alert counsel preparing to argue the case, there is very little likelihood the jury will be confused or misled.” Id. (citing Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 71-72 (Mo. banc 1984)). But in this case, Anderson’s attorney twice objected to Instruction 10 at the instruction conference. She specifically stated that “the mitigating step as it’s written in the statute” was not included. The fact that the defect in the instruction was objected to at the instruction conference indicates that the defect was readily apparent and, therefore, weighs in favor of a finding of prejudice.
Further, as the majority acknowledges, the purpose of a verdict mechanics instruction is to summarize the process that a capital jury is to follow. Verdict mechanics instructions are rare, but the MAI-CR requires them to be used in every death penalty case, undoubtedly in recognition for the greater need for “reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment.” Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 430 (Mo. banc 2002) (citations omitted).2 A verdict mechanics instruction puts into one single instruction each possi*549ble alternative the jury could find and specifies what punishment then should be assigned for the particular alternative, even though many of these alternatives do appear in individual, separate instructions given to the jury.3 Here, the outdated version of MAI-CR 313.48A that was used contained none of the alternatives concerning mitigation but did contain all of the other alternatives, including those related to aggravation.
“The purpose of verdict-directing instructions is to make clear to the jury the essential fact issues they are to decide.” Hooper v. Conrad, 364 Mo. 176, 260 S.W.2d 496, 500 (1953). This Court has held that a verdict-directing instruction that purports to cover the whole case but that leaves out one of the defendant’s defenses constitutes prejudicial error, regardless of whether the defense is covered in another instruction. State v. Winn, 324 S.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Mo.1959) (a verdict-directing instruction that excluded the idea of self-defense was reversible error); see also State v. Pruett, 425 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Mo.1968) (citing several of this Court’s cases as holding that “[tjhere is no question that a verdict-directing instruction which purports to cover the whole case and ignores a defense supported by the evidence is erroneous and constitutes reversible error”) (emphasis added).
In this case, the verdict mechanics instruction acted like a verdict-directing instruction, setting out each possible alternative that the jury could find and the corresponding punishment. There were other instructions provided to the jury that referenced how the jury was to apply the mitigating evidence. But leaving out the alternatives that related to mitigation essentially amounted to leaving out one of the defendant’s defenses during the punishment phase, which this Court has held to be prejudicial error in a verdict-directing instruction. Where, as in this case, this Court has approved a pattern-MAI-CR verdict mechanics instruction that contains explicit language as to the alternatives the jury should consider — and defense counsel correctly objects to omission of required language — the trial court’s refusal to include each of the relevant alternatives is prejudicial error.
There was significant mitigation evidence for Anderson. The failure to refer to mitigation evidence in the verdict mechanics instruction was prejudicial error. Testimony from Anderson’s immediate family showed that he was elated about the birth of his daughter and was very protec*550tive of her. The state’s own witnesses testified about Anderson’s joy in learning he would become a father and his commitment to being a part of his child’s life. Witnesses indicated that Anderson’s motive for killing the Rainwaters was that he became really upset when he learned that they were trying to keep him from seeing his daughter and that they hated him and his daughter because he is black. Numerous relatives and friends, their parents, and former basketball teammates and coaches testified that they all were shocked and surprised by the killings because they were so out of character for Anderson. That the killings were out of character for him was emphasized further by the Potosi Correctional Center warden’s testimony that not only had Anderson adjusted well to Potosi, but he also had earned his way into the honor dormitory.
The substantial mitigating evidence in favor of Anderson is especially strong in contrast to the previous decisions by this Court finding no prejudice in giving this former MAI-CR instruction. In all three of these prior decisions, the defendant killed someone who had done nothing wrong to him specifically, except in one case in which his ex-wife had child support deducted from his pay check.4
The issue raised in this appeal is emblematic of problems that have been identified with the administration of the death penalty. The provisions of Missouri’s capital sentencing statute, adopted in 1977, are based on Model Penal Code provisions promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1962.5 Compare sections 565.006 to 565.014, RSMo Supp.1977, with Model Penal Code section 210.6 (1962).6 The institute recently decided to withdraw from the Model Penal Code its recommendations for the administration of capital punishment, stating it was doing so because of “the current intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment.” See American Law Institute, Message from ALI Director Lance Liebman, online at http://www.ali.Org/_ news/10232009.htm (all Internet materials *551accessed Feb. 25, 2010, and available in the clerk of Courts case file). Among other problems, the report the institute commissioned to study capital punishment highlighted the arbitrariness and discrimination that occurs as a result of jurors’ confusion regarding their instructions, including the concept of mitigating evidence and the relevant standards that are to be applied to mitigating evidence. Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Report to the ALI Concerning Capital Punishment 31-34 (2008), online at http://www.ali.org/ doe/Capital%20Punishment_web.pdf.
Although some modifications have been made since Missouri adopted the Model Penal Code recommendations in 1977, Missouri’s capital punishment statute continues to follow the Model Penal Code considerably. Here, even though this Court saw fit to enact a new MAI-CR verdict mechanics instruction to inform the jury about how to weigh mitigating evidence, the outdated instruction, containing no reference to mitigating evidence, was given to Anderson’s jury. Yet mitigating evidence is a source of major confusion for capital juries, as stated in the institute’s report.
If Missouri is going to continue to sentence defendants to capital punishment under a statute that continues to be based on the now-abandoned Model Penal Code framework, the least that the courts can do is to ensure that all procedural safeguards are in place. Rather than assuming that the instruction was “good enough” because it was used in previous cases, I would find prejudicial error, reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new penalty phase trial.
Although I do not think we need to determine whether the punishment was proportional to the crime because I believe the case should be remanded, I do concur with the part of Judge Breckenridge’s opinion regarding proportionality review. When considering whether a death sentence is proportional, it is, as Judge Breckenridge notes, this Court’s responsibility under section 565.035.3 to look at cases in which life imprisonment was imposed as well as cases in which the death penalty was imposed.

. Similarly, this Court previously has held that no error occurred where non-MAI-CR instructions were given prior to the passage of the MAI-CR, even though error would have existed if the instructions were not given after its passage. See, e.g., State v. Price, 513 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Mo.1974) (no error where the MAI-CR was not yet in effect and the instruction given followed "the law [as it] stood at the time of the trial”); State v. Martin, 511 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo.1974) (same).

. As the majority recognizes, the purpose of updating MAI-CR 3d 313.48A was to instruct the jurors better about what they were supposed to do. Therefore, one rationally can conclude that the prior version did not inform the jury fully of its responsibilities.

. Specifically, in the current version of MAI-CR 313.48A the jurors are informed that if they unanimously decide the defendant should be put to death, the verdict form must be completed by the foreperson with specific statutory aggravating circumstances that were found beyond a reasonable doubt. If, however, the jury unanimously finds that the facts or circumstances in mitigation outweigh those in aggravation, the defendant must be punished by imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole. Similarly, if the jurors unanimously decide that the evidence and instructions of law show that the defendant also should be punished by imprisonment for life, the verdict form should be signed accordingly. Further, if the jury is unable to find unanimously at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or that facts and circumstances in aggravation of punishment warrant the sentence of death, the punishment must be imprisonment for life. Finally, if the jury does find unanimously the presence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and that the facts and circumstances in aggravation of punishment warrant the sentence of death, but the jury is unable to find unanimously that the facts or circumstances in mitigation outweigh the facts and circumstances in aggravation and there is no agreement on punishment, then this must be indicated on the verdict form. In this case, the jury is informed that the court itself will fix the defendant’s punishment at death or at imprisonment for life.

. See Storey, 40 S.W.3d at 903, and Storey's brief at 13-16 filed in Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116 (Mo. banc 2005) (finding no prejudice where the defendant killed his next-door neighbor after receiving a dissolution petition from his wife and the mitigating evidence showed that the defendant had suffered abuse as a child and may have had a psychological disorder); Cole, 71 S.W.3d at 168, and Cole's brief at 15-16 filed in Cole v. State, 152 S.W.3d 267 (Mo. banc 2004) (finding no prejudice where the defendant stabbed his ex-wife and her male friend after discovering that child support had been deducted from his paycheck and the mitigating evidence showed that defendant "was dependable, a good father, son, and brother, good at sports, a hard worker, and he attended church regularly"); Tisius, 92 S.W.3d at 758-59, and Tisius's brief at 69 filed in the same (finding no prejudice where the defendant shot and killed two unarmed officers while trying to help his friend escape from jail and the mitigating evidence showed he never had been in serious trouble before, was only 19 years old when he committed the murders, had been rejected by his father and accepted responsibility for his actions).

. "The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law. The Institute (made up of 4000 lawyers, judges, and law professors of the highest qualifications) drafts, discusses, revises, and publishes Restatements of the Law, model statutes, and principles of law that are enormously influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal scholarship and education." American Law Institute, online at http://www.ali.org/ index.cfm? fuseaction=about.overview.

. The two major differences were Missouri’s 1977 statute contains additional aggravating factors and requires this Court's mandatory review of any death sentence.