Court Opinion

ID: 9926740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 17:00:46.386211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:59.963364
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6043     Document: 010110989902      Date Filed: 01/25/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       January 25, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  DR. TINSLEY ARIANA TAYLOR M.
  SARAMOSING,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-6043
                                                   (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-01152-PRW)
  KEVIN CORBETT, as Cabinet Secretary                       (W.D. Okla.)
  of the Oklahoma State Department of
  Health; KEITH REED, in his capacity as
  Interim Commissioner of the Oklahoma
  State Department of Health; KELLY
  BAKER, “Baker,” Deputy Registrar of
  Vital Records, Oklahoma State Health
  Department; TIM TIPTON, in his capacity
  of Commissioner of Public Safety of the
  Oklahoma Department of Public Safety,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6043     Document: 010110989902        Date Filed: 01/25/2024    Page: 2

       Dr. Tinsley Ariana Taylor Makayla Saramosing appeals from the district

 court’s dismissal without prejudice of her civil rights complaint for lack of Article III

 standing. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.1

                                    BACKGROUND

       Dr. Saramosing is “a female who is transgender and has medically and socially

 transitioned.” R. at 21. She was born and still lives in Oklahoma. R. at 19. She has

 “had both legal name and gender marker changes made to her driver’s license,

 passport, birth certificate and social security card.” R. at 21.

       Bringing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other federal laws,

 Dr. Saramosing sued officials from Oklahoma’s Department of Health and

 Department of Public Safety, in their official capacities. She alleged that Oklahoma

 requires transgender individuals to undergo permanent medical transitions before

 they can obtain amended Oklahoma birth certificates, and that Oklahoma notates

 changes to names or gender on amended birth certificates. She challenged those

 requirements as unconstitutional and discriminatory. As relief, she requested:

 (1) temporary and permanent injunctive relief precluding Oklahoma from “requiring

 hormones, surgery or anything that might otherwise permanently sterilize an

       1
          “A dismissal of the complaint is ordinarily a non-final, nonappealable order
 (since amendment would generally be available), while a dismissal of the entire
 action is ordinarily final.” Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 449 (10th Cir.
 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “an order is not necessarily devoid of
 finality simply because it speaks in terms of dismissal of a complaint.” Id. The
 district court’s dismissal “practically disposed” of the entire action and thus was a
 final decision. Id. at 450.
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 individual who is transgender, nonbinary, gender-fluid, etc., as a part of its

 requirements for a legal gender marker and name change(s) on any individual’s

 government documents,” R. at 109; (2) temporary and permanent injunctive relief

 requiring Oklahoma “to immediately and permanently remove the notations of the

 amendments to the Plaintiff’s name and gender marker changes, as well as those of

 others who are transgender/non-binary, gender non-conforming, gender fluid, etc.,

 which are presently located at the bottom of her/their birth certificate(s),” R. at 110;

 (3) temporary and permanent injunctive relief precluding Oklahoma (a) from refusing

 to amend “birth/death certificates/drivers’ licenses” of transgender individuals, and

 (b) from making “notations of any amendments to the birth/death certificates of

 individuals who are transgender/non-binary, gender fluid, gender non-confirming,

 etc.,” R. at 111; (4) that the district court strike down the Oklahoma statute requiring

 notations of amendments “insofar as it pertains to the adding of notations of

 amendments regarding the names and gender changes to birth and death certificates

 of individuals who are transgender/non-binary/gender-fluid/gender non-conforming,”

 R. at 112; (5) that the district court order the removal of gender/sex identifiers in

 state and federal government documents for individuals who desire such relief;

 (6) costs and fees; and (7) “any and all legal and equitable financial and other

 relief . . . as the judge of this Court deems just and proper,” including compensatory

 damages, R. at 112-13.

       The defendants moved to dismiss for several reasons, including lack of

 Article III standing. The district court held that Dr. Saramosing had not adequately

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Appellate Case: 23-6043    Document: 010110989902         Date Filed: 01/25/2024     Page: 4

 pleaded standing for the claims she asserted and relief she requested. First, it held

 that she could not rest her claims on harm suffered by other persons. Second, it held

 it could not redress her for any past harms she alleged, because past harm is

 compensated by money damages, but the court could not award money damages

 against defendants in their official capacities. And third, it held that her allegations

 of present and future harm from the notations on her amended birth certificate were

 speculative and insufficient to show an imminent and concrete injury in fact.

       Dr. Saramosing appeals.

                                      DISCUSSION

 I.    Legal Standards

       “[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the

 case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). It is Dr. Saramosing’s burden to establish her standing.

 See id. at 561. We review a plaintiff’s Article III standing de novo. See Benham v.

 Ozark Materials River Rock, LLC, 885 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018).

       Standing has three elements: (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) that “fairly can be

 traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and has not resulted from the

 independent action of some third party not before the court,” and (3) that is likely to

 be redressed by a favorable decision. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.

 Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993) (internal

 quotation marks omitted). “[A]t the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege

 facts demonstrating each element [of standing],” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.

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 330, 338 (2016) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted), and “a plaintiff must

 demonstrate standing for each claim [s]he seeks to press and for each form of relief

 that is sought,” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (internal

 quotation marks omitted).

        Because Dr. Saramosing proceeds pro se, we construe her filings liberally, but

 she must comply with the same rules as other litigants. See Garrett v. Selby Connor

 Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). We do not act as her “attorney

 in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id.

 II.    Analysis

        The district court did not err in concluding that Dr. Saramosing’s first

 amended complaint (the Complaint) failed to establish her Article III standing to

 pursue this litigation.2

        The Complaint indicates that Dr. Saramosing already has medically

 transitioned and received an amended birth certificate. Thus, any injury to her from

 Oklahoma’s alleged policy of requiring permanent medical transitions before

 amending vital records took place in the past. Past harm is compensable only by

 monetary damages. See Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1498 (10th Cir.

        2
          To the extent that the Complaint invoked harms to others, Dr. Saramosing
 cannot represent anyone other than herself because she is not an attorney. See Fymbo
 v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A litigant
 may bring [her] own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the claims of
 others.”). But “[t]his analysis is clearly rooted in principles of prudential, rather than
 Article III, standing.” VR Acquisitions, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty., 853 F.3d 1142, 1146
 (10th Cir. 2017).

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 1995). But the Complaint names state officials in their official capacities as the

 defendants, and a plaintiff cannot sue state officials in their official capacities for

 money damages under § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

 71 (1989) (holding that States and their officials sued in their official capacities are

 not “persons” under § 1983).3 With neither injunctive relief nor money damages

 available to redress past harms in this action, Dr. Saramosing has failed to establish

 the redressability element of standing for those claims.

        The Complaint also alleges present and future harm from having to show an

 amended birth certificate with notations, postulating what might happen if

 Dr. Saramosing had to produce her birth certificate because she wished to get married

 overseas, wished to attend a conservative private university and participate in team

 sports, or was required to serve time in jail or prison. But the Complaint speaks in

 hypotheticals; it fails to establish an “injury in fact” for standing purposes because it

 does not contain sufficient facts to show any of those events were likely to happen

 imminently.4

        3
         Before the district court, Dr. Saramosing withdrew her request for money
 damages (except for costs) in light of the defendants’ Eleventh Amendment
 arguments. The Complaint also named other federal statutes, but Dr. Saramosing has
 not argued that money damages would be available under any of those statutes.
        4
         On appeal, Dr. Saramosing avers that after filing the Complaint, she married
 overseas and sought admission to a private university, and she discusses other
 post-Complaint events. But standing is evaluated as of the time an action begins.
 See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2013).
 Accordingly, events that occurred after she filed the Complaint do not establish
 standing to proceed in this action. For that reason, we deny Dr. Saramosing’s motion
 to supplement the record on appeal with new supporting evidence.
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       The Supreme Court recently reminded:

       Under Article III, federal courts do not adjudicate hypothetical or abstract
       disputes. Federal courts do not possess a roving commission to publicly
       opine on every legal question. Federal courts do not exercise general legal
       oversight of the Legislative and Executive Branches, or of private entities.
       And federal courts do not issue advisory opinions.

 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423-24 (2021). Allegations must be

 sufficiently “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or

 hypothetical” to support standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks

 omitted). “A concrete injury must be de facto; that is, it must actually exist. When

 we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of

 the term—real, and not abstract.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 340 (citation and internal

 quotation marks omitted). “Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic

 concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged

 injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly

 impending.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). In short,

 speculation about potential future events does not support Article III standing to seek

 injunctive relief. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409-10 (2013);

 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1990); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983).

       Finally, Dr. Saramosing asserts that the district judge was biased against her

 because of his conservative political beliefs and lack of experience with the

 transgender community. Particularly, she states that “[i]n their written responses,

 Defendants repeatedly misgendered & deadnamed Plaintiff, and they also used

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 anti-transgender slurs,” but the district judge “at no time rebuked Defendants’ actions

 even when Plaintiff directly protested, thus displaying prejudicial bias.” Aplt.

 Opening Br. at 2. But she does not provide any record cites. In the course of our

 review of the record, we saw nothing to demonstrate bias or prejudice on the part of

 the district court. To the extent her argument is based on the judge’s adverse ruling,

 that is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.

 540, 555 (1994).

       Dr. Saramosing’s district-court and appellate filings are replete with passionate

 arguments. It is well-established, however, that “[s]tanding is not measured by the

 intensity of a party’s commitment, fervor, or aggression in pursuit of its alleged right

 and remedy. Nor is the perceived importance of the asserted right a substitute for

 constitutional standing.” Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998)

 (citations omitted). The Complaint fails to show a concrete, imminent,

 non-speculative injury to Dr. Saramosing that is redressable by the court. It therefore

 fails to establish Dr. Saramosing’s Article III standing to pursue this litigation.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Dr. Saramosing’s motion to

 supplement the record on appeal with new evidence.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                              Circuit Judge

                                             8