Court Opinion

ID: 9588351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:33:18.929668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:51.387595
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree that no evidence shows that the negligence of DOT and Dykes caused Michael Layfield’s injuries and because the trial court and this court can decide this case on summary judgment only by assuming the role reserved for juries in this State, I must respectfully dissent.
Our consideration of this appeal must start from the proposition that the routine issues of negligence cases are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, see, e.g., Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748 (2) (b) (493 SE2d 403) (1997), and summary judgment should not be granted in negligence cases unless the nonexistence of liability is plain, palpable, and indisputable. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 237 Ga. 235, 237 (227 SE2d 336) (1976). This is not such a case.
Further, we must not forget that when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Layfield is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and courts must construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom in Layfield’s favor. Moore v. Goldome Credit Corp., 187 Ga. App. 594, 595-596 (370 SE2d 843) (1988). Any doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against DOT and Dykes as the movants for summary judgment. Kelly v. Vargo, 261 Ga. 422, 423 (1) (405 SE2d 36) (1991). Most importantly, courts cannot resolve the facts or reconcile the issues when deciding a case on motion for summary judgment. Fletcher v. Amax, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 692, 695 (288 SE2d 49) (1981).
Here the evidence shows that even though the road was improperly constructed without sufficient superelevation for drainage, no accidents caused by accumulation of water were reported on this stretch of the road from the time it was constructed in 1949 until DOT *812and Dykes started the repairs to the road in 2001. Then, within the span of two weeks, two incidents occurred in heavy rainstorms that resulted in cars leaving the roadway at the same low point in a curve, proceeding on the same path, and hitting the same tree. After the first wreck, the driver and an EMT stated that the roadway was holding water. During the period between the wrecks, an attorney visited the site of the collisions during another heavy rain and noted that the rain was not draining from the road and that the rain was accumulating on the road surface to a depth of one and a half inches.
This evidence, coupled with the testimony of Layfield’s expert that the defective condition of the road caused Layfield’s car to hydroplane and leave the road, is sufficient to create a jury issue on whether DOT and Dykes caused Layfield’s injuries. Although the majority raises several reasons why the expert’s opinion should not be credited, judging the credibility of a witness is a role for the jury. In addition, we cannot disregard the highly persuasive evidence that whatever caused both vehicles to leave the road did so at the same place so that both vehicles left the road and struck the exact same tree.
Although Dykes argues that it should not be held liable because DOT ultimately accepted its work, the record shows that the work was not accepted until after the road in this area was resurfaced. Therefore, at the time of the accident it cannot be concluded reasonably that this particular work was acceptable to the DOT.
Also, whether the condition of Layfield’s tires or his possible inattention played some role in the accident is not properly considered on causation. Even if Layfield’s tires were defective and he was inattentive, such issues raise the defense of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense on which the defendants, not Layfield, would have the burden of proof, and, in any event, under the facts in this appeal, are not capable of summary adjudication. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., supra, 237 Ga. at 238.
Although, as the majority points out, Layfield’s expert perhaps could have done a more thorough job and answered the many questions the majority poses, one must ask what the purpose of all this analysis would be.8 Ultimately, the burden on Layfield will be to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence, not to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.9 Thus, the question before us is whether *813the evidence presented was sufficient to show that it was more likely than not that the negligence of DOT and Dykes caused the wreck. Given the absence of accidents from 1949, the witnesses’ testimony that water was accumulating on the roadway, the expert’s testimony, the fact that both cars left the road at the same low point where water was accumulating, and the fact that both cars proceeded on the same trajectory until they hit the same tree, I am satisfied that Layfield met her burden. This evidence establishes more than the mere possibility that the water on the road caused the wreck. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
Decided February 1, 2005
Reconsideration denied March l, 2005
Vansant, Corriere & McClure, Alfred N. Corriere, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Reagan W. Dean, Assistant Attorney General, Finley & Buckley, Timothy J. Buckley III, Kelly R. Castellow, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Judge Adams joins in this dissent.

 I cannot agree that any expert could determine, from accident reconstruction or otherwise, whether an animal darted from the woods or in what activities Michael might or might not have been engaged before the accident. Nor am I convinced that all the questions raised must be answered before Layfield’s case could survive summary judgment.

 At this point the burden on Layfield is to “point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue. OCGA§ 9-11-56 (e).” Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991).