Court Opinion

ID: 9735674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:27:24.205264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.829919
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The first case cited by the majority, Smith v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 579, 388 N.E.2d 484, 485, to support the contention of the appellant is of no help in the instant case. In Smith the trial court refused to reread the testimony of certain witnesses to the jury.
Citing the statute 1.C. § 34-1-21-6, this Court held the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to reread the testimony of certain witnesses. This by no means is a statement that it is reversible error to reread testimony to the witnesses.
In Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188, 1197, Justice DeBruler, after citing the statute, specifically stated:
"We construe this statute to provide that the judge must, on the jury's request, have read to them any properly admitted testimony or documentary - evidence. This holding is compatible with the A.B. A's Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury, § 5.2(a) at p. 134 (Approved Draft 1968), the comments to which note that this is the usual practice."
I think the language of the statute is clear and that Justice DeBruler's interpretation of the statute in Ortiz is correct. I see nothing in either the statute or any case law placing any limitation upon the trial judge as to the amount of evidence that can be resubmitted under the statute. Although we might hold in a given case that the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to reread certain testimony, I see no authority for the proposition that he commits reversible error in following the statute and rereading testimony to the jury.
I would, therefore, affirm the trial court on this point.
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.