Court Opinion

ID: 9667009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:32:37.40657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:34.039302
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge.
The appellant was indicted for the unlawful sale of Marihuana to J. D. Burchett. The jury found the appellant guilty as charged, and the trial court fixed punishment at four and one-half years imprisonment.
J. D. Burchett testified that he was an employee of the Alabama ABC Board, working in the Alcohol and Drug Division. He testified that on November 14, 1974, he had been sent to Mobile, Alabama, to work as an undercover agent with the police in the city of Mobile. He testified that on November 14, 1974, he went to the Burger King Restaurant located at the corner of Government and Common Streets, and there met the appellant, John Grover Reynolds. He testified that he accompanied the appellant to the Montauk Apartments on Montauk Avenue . and entered Apartment A-9. He stated that on this occasion he was accompanied by an informer also, by the name of Michael Norton. He stated that upon entering the apartment he asked the appellant where the stuff was, that appellant said it was down the hall in a bedroom, that he was seated, and in a few minutes the appellant returned with a brown paper bag, and sat it down in front of him. He said the appellant told him that inside the brown bag were two smaller bags which contained Marihuana, and that the price would be $300.00. He testified that he then paid the appellant and left the apartment. He stated that he took the brown paper bag containing the two smaller bags of green vegetable material, which he believed to be Marihuana, to the ABC Field Office at 1052 Dauphin Street in Mobile. He said that after going in this office, he turned over the brown paper bag to Sergeant Don Gill of the Narcotics Division of the Mobile Police Department.
Sergeant Don Gill testified that on November 14, 1974, he saw ABC Agent J. D. Burchett in the Burger King at Government and Common Streets. He said he saw him leave in an automobile, and that *511he trailed him to the Montauk Apartments on Montauk Avenue. He stated that at about 8:56 p. m. Mr. Burchett met him at the ABC Field Office, that he received a brown paper bag, containing two smaller bags of a green vegetable material, that he placed his initials on the brown bag and sealed it up on November 14, 1974. Sergeant Gill further testified that the next morning, November 15, 1974, at 9:28 a. m., he delivered this brown paper bag to Miss Alilee Pillman at the State Toxicology Office in Mobile.
Miss Alilee Pillman testified that she was an employee of the Criminal Laboratory Office of the State Department of Toxicology in Mobile. She testified that part of her duties was to make various chemical tests for this department, and that she had been trained under Dr. Rehling. She testified that she received a brown paper bag on November 15, 1974, at 9:28 a. m., from Mobile Police Sergeant Don Gill. She testified that she opened the bag and examined the contents, that it contained two smaller paper bags. She stated that each of these smaller bags contained Marihuana, a total of 798.4 grams, or 27.5 ounces, that this was a little over a pound and a half. The two bags of Marihuana, which had been in her possession, were then admitted into evidence.
The appellant’s motion to exclude the State’s evidence was then overruled. The appellant presented the testimony of several character witnesses, each of whom testified that appellant’s general character and reputation for truth, on November 14, 1974, was good.
The appellant, John Grover Reynolds, testified that he was an employee of the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company, and had first met an individual named Michael Norton when the two of them worked at Ingalls Shipyards. He testified that just prior to November 14, 1974, he had several telephone calls from one Michael Norton and had agreed to meet him at the Burger King on the corner of Government and Common Streets that evening. He testified that he did so, and then later was accompanied by Mike Norton and Mr. Burchett when he went to Apartment A-9, at the Montauk Apartments, that this apartment belonged to Carl Nelson. He testified that he did not know there was any Marihuana on the premises, that Carl Nelson had made the arrangements with Mike Norton concerning the Marihuana, and that Carl Nelson walked down the hall and brought the Marihuana back into the room and just handed it to him.
On cross-examination, the appellant stated that Mike Norton had made the arrangements with Carl Nelson concerning the Marihuana, and that he simply took the man over to Carl Nelson’s apartment. He admitted, on cross-examination, however, that he knew that a sale was taking place, and that the price was $150.00 a pound for two bags which were then put in a brown paper bag.
I
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer which challenged the indictment on the basis that the same did not properly identify the unlawful substance allegedly sold by the appellant in violation of law. The demurrer further stated that the indictment referred to the substance as “marijuana,” when the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act1 refers to the substance as “marihuana,” hence the item charged in the indictment is not among the substances listed in the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
The Alabama Supreme Court in Boswell v. State, 290 Ala. 349, 276 So.2d 592, determined that the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act satisfies the *512constitutional requirement of having a single subject, and further that the Legislature could include Marihuana with so-called “hard drugs,” that such was a reasonable classification. See also Sawyer v. State, 50 Ala.App. 490, 280 So.2d 196; Kenny v. State, 51 Ala.App. 35, 282 So.2d 387, cert. denied 291 Ala. 786, 282 So.2d 392.
Moreover, recently this Court in Peppers v. State, 53 Ala.App. 695, 304 So.2d 39, cert. denied 293 Ala. 770, 304 So.2d 43, and Haynes v. State, 54 Ala.App. 714, 312 So.2d 406, cert. denied 294 Ala. 758, 312 So.2d 414, determined such an indictment to be legally sufficient.
II
The appellant next contends that his plea of entrapment should have been sustained by the trial court. In light of the testimony in this cause, we are of the opinion that there was no room for the operation of the defense of entrapment. Johnson v. State, 36 Ala.App. 634, 61 So.2d 867; Miller v. State, 53 Ala.App. 213, 298 So.2d 633, cert. denied 292 Ala. 741, 298 So.2d 639; Peppers v. State, 53 Ala.App. 695, 304 So.2d 39, cert. denied 293 Ala. 770, 304 So.2d 43.
III
During the district attorney’s closing argument, the following occurred [R. pp. 52-53]:
“MR. HUGHES: He said he wasn’t in the business of selling marijuana, but it’s hard to tell that he wasn’t in the business when he’s sitting there taking $300.-00 from the guy—
“MR. HOLLOWAY: Now, Judge, I’m going to object to the Assistant District Attorney’s stating ‘It’s hard to tell that he wasn’t in the business.’ and holding up this bag of marijuana, as improper argument.
“MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I don’t know—
“THE COURT: On what grounds, Willis?
“MR. HOLLOWAY: That it’s improper argument seeking to impassion and prejudice the jury; and the other grounds would be alleging crimes not included in the indictment.
“THE COURT: Just confine it to what he’s charged with, Mr. Hughes; confine it to ‘that he did sell marijuana.’
“MR. HUGHES: All right, Judge—
“MR. HOLLOWAY: Judge, could I have a ruling on that last objection ?
“THE COURT: Overrule the objection.
* * * * * *
“MR. HUGHES: This (a fine Up to $25,000.00) isn’t going to cut out this sort of thing in Mobile County, but it might cut John Grover Reynolds out of doing it in Mobile County.
“MR. HOLLOWAY: Judge, now I’m going to object to that, where the Assistant District Attorney stated, and I quote, ‘that this may not cut this out in Mobile County, but it will stop John Grover Reynolds from doing it in Mobile County,’ as being improper argument.
“THE COURT: Confine it to this one case, Mr. Hughes; let’s try him on this one charge now. I’m going to sustain the objection. He is only charged with one offense.
“MR. HOLLOWAY: Judge, I would move for a mistrial.
“THE COURT: Motion denied.”
The appellant asserts the above rulings to be erroneous. As may be seen, the district attorney, when he held up the bag of marihuana, made the statement, “It’s hard to tell that he wasn’t in the business,” was pointing out matters of evidence and *513arguing their legitimate inferences. Such was properly within the scope of the evidence, and the trial court’s ruling in this respect was proper. Barnett v. State, 52 Ala.App. 260, 291 So.2d 353, and authorities therein cited.
Further, in light of the trial judge’s instructions, shown above, as indicating to the district attorney to confine his argument to the case at hand, the trial court properly overruled the appellant’s objection and motion for a mistrial.
Clearly, this ruling is correct. We believe that these instructions covered the alleged prejudicial argument so that error to reversal is not here shown. George v. State, 54 Ala.App. 90, 304 So.2d 908; West v. State, 54 Ala.App. 647, 312 So.2d 45, cert. denied 294 Ala. 78, 312 So.2d 52; Barnett v. State, supra, and authorities therein cited.
IV
At the conclusion of the trial court’s oral charge, the appellant announced, “No exceptions.” The trial judge then gave six of the written requested charges. The remaining refused charges were either covered by the trial court’s oral charge and the given charges, or were abstract, not properly predicated on the evidence in this case, were misleading, or were incorrect statements of the applicable legal principles; hence, their refusals were proper. Title 7, Section 273, Code of Alabama 1940.
We have carefully examined this record and find same to be free from error. The judgment of the trial court is due to be and the same is hereby
Affirmed.
All the Judges concur.

. Title 22, Section 258 (25)-258(60), Code of Alabama 1940, as amended 1971.