Court Opinion

ID: 9847125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:54:28.492122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:01.444021
License: Public Domain

*195Gregory, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of appellant’s conviction for committing a lewd act on a child.
The victim, a thirteen-year-old-boy, testified that while he was at appellant’s home, appellant showed him a pornographic video and various sexual devices. The victim’s thirteen-year-old cousin was also present during the viewing of the video and testified to the same events.
Later that same night, the victim returned to appellant’s home at appellant’s request. While sitting on the couch next to the victim, appellant fondled the boy’s penis through his pants. When the victim rebuffed him, appellant again attempted to touch the boy’s genital area. The victim then fled from appellant’s home.
Appellant offered the testimony of two character witnesses regarding his good behavior with children. Appellant also testified on his own behalf. During cross-examination, the solicitor asked if appellant had been arrested in 1969 for rape. Appellant answered, “Yes, but it was dismissed the same day.” Appellant admitted showing the pornographic video to the boys.
Appellant contends he was unfairly prejudiced by elicitation of his testimony on cross-examination regarding the rape charge. The State argues that since appellant placed his character in issue, the rape charge, though not subject to a conviction, was admissible impeachment evidence.
I reject the State’s argument. When the accused offers evidence of his good character regarding specific character traits relevant to the crime charged, the solicitor has the right to cross-examine him as to particular bad acts or conduct. State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 468, 224 S.E. (2d) 881 (1976); State v. Gibert, 196 S.C. 306, 13 S.E. (2d) 451 (1941). The State is restricted, however, to showing bad character only for the traits initially focused on by the accused. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 820 (1989); see also Rule 404(a)(1), Federal Rules of Evidence. Here, appellant offered evidence of good character in regard to his treatment of children, a particular trait relevant to the nature of the charges against him. The evidence admitted regarding an unspecified rape charge was not evidence tending to rebut appellant’s good treatment of children.
*196I find the trial judge erred in allowing evidence of the rape charge for impeachment purposes. I conclude, however, that its admission did not deprive appellant of a fair trial.
Appellant admitted showing the pornographic video to the boys and clearly, as to this charge, any error in the admission of the rape charge evidence was harmless. See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E. (2d) 581 (1989) (when guilt is conclusively proven, conviction will not be set aside for insubstantial error). As to the lewd act denied by appellant, we find admission of the evidence regarding the rape charge nonprejudicial in view of the evidence also before the jury that the charge was dismissed the same day appellant was arrested. This information nullified any harmful impact that could have resulted from the evidence of appellant’s arrest. The erroneous admission of impeaching evidence that has no meaningful impact on the defendant’s credibility or character is not reversible error. Cf. Duncan v. State, 281 S.C. 435, 315 S.E. (2d) 809 (1984); see generally 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1722 (1958); see also State v. Bellamy, 296 S.C. 478, 374 S.E. (2d) 180 (1988) (conviction will not be reversed for nonprejudicial error in the admission of evidence).
I would dispose of appellant’s remaining exceptions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 and affirm both his convictions.