Court Opinion

ID: 9838817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 13:03:39.596166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:02.619279
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                      In the Interest of K.B., a child.

                       HEART OF ADOPTIONS, INC.,

                                 Petitioner,

                                      v.

              DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

                                Respondent.

                              No. 2D22-2496

                            September 8, 2023

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough
County; Miriam V. Valkenburg, Judge.

Barbara T. Ginn of Jeanne T. Tate, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.

Mary Soorus of Children's Legal Services, Tampa, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.
      Heart of Adoptions, Inc., appeals an order denying its petition to
change the placement of K.B. We conclude that the order is not a final
appealable order, but we have issued an order converting the appeal to a
petition for writ of certiorari and conclude that the trial court did not
depart from the essential requirements of the law.
                                      I.
     On October 8, 2020, the Department of Children and Families (the
Department) placed the child in out-of-home care in the custody of
licensed foster parent, E.W. It filed a petition for adjudication of
dependency nine days later. After the biological mother, C.B., entered
her consent to the petition for adjudication of dependency on February
10, 2021, the court adjudicated the child dependent as to the mother. At
a status conference in October 2021, the foster parent indicated her
interest in adopting the child.
     The Department filed a new case plan with a stated goal of adoption
after the expiration of the original reunification case plan. The child's
guardian ad litem, K.S., wanted to adopt the child, so she recused herself
from the case and retained the Heart of Adoptions adoption agency,
which petitioned to intervene and to transfer placement of the child to
K.S. on December 17, 2021. Along with the petition, Heart of Adoptions
filed a consent to adoption signed by the biological mother. In the
consent, the biological mother
     agree[d] to relinquish all rights to, and custody of, the child to
     the Adoption Entity with the understanding that the child will
     be placed with a person or persons whose full identities are
     unknown to me and do further consent to adoption by said
     person or persons, if a [c]ourt of competent jurisdiction
     should approve. The full names of the person or persons who
     will adopt said child are unknown to me, but known to the
     Adoption Entity to whom this consent is given.
     On February 3, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Heart
of Adoption's petition to intervene and to transfer placement of the
child. No transcript appears in the record, but according to
notations on the case summary, the court orally granted the
motion to intervene and denied the motion to change placement
without prejudice. A subsequent hearing on the motion for change

                                      2
of placement was held on February 28, 2022. The court minutes
reflect no objections to the intervention. However, the child's foster
parent objected to the change of placement.
     A hearing was set for May 5, 2022, but it was canceled. The final
evidentiary hearing on the motion for change of placement did not take
place until May 31, 2022. The court heard testimony from the child in
camera, as well as from the prospective adoptive mother, the case
manager, and the foster parent. The court noted the date that the
motion was filed, as well as the prior hearings. Counsel for Heart of
Adoptions did not object to the delay.
     On July 18, 2022, the court entered a written order granting the
motion to intervene but denying the motion for change of placement.
The court found, after considering all the statutory factors, see §
63.082(6)(e), Fla. Stat. (2021), that the prospective adoptive parents were
qualified to adopt the child but that the adoption by those parents was
not in the child's best interests. The court noted that the child was
bonded to her foster parent, who wished to adopt her, her foster parent's
extended family, and her foster sister, who was also being adopted by the
foster parent. The court also noted that the prospective adoptive parents
were given multiple directives not to visit the child, yet they appeared
unannounced at the foster home. The prospective adoptive mother
admitted as much at the hearing. The court reiterated that the case
manager testified that it opposed changing the child's placement.
                                     II.
                                     A.
     Heart of Adoptions maintains that the order granting the motion to
intervene but denying the motion for change of placement is a final,
appealable order. An order is considered "final" when judicial labor has

                                     3
ended. M.M. v. Fla. Dep't. of Child. & Fams., 189 So. 3d 134, 137 (Fla.
2016). Had the trial court denied the motion to intervene as well as the
change of placement request, then judicial labor would have ended as to
Heart of Adoptions. See, e.g., Adoption Miracles, LLC v. S.C.W. (In re
S.N.W.), 912 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (concluding that an
order that denied intervention and set aside the biological mother's
consent to adoption was a final order). However, the trial court's order
granted the motion to intervene by Heart of Adoptions while denying the
change of placement for the child. Unlike in S.C.W. in which the
Adoption Miracles agency was denied the opportunity to intervene and
the trial court revoked the consent upon which Adoption Miracles' status
as a party was based, id. at 369, in this case the consent to the adoption
is still valid and enforceable and cannot be withdrawn unless "the court
finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress," see § 63.082(4)(b).
     Regardless of where the child is placed during the pendency of the
Department's termination of parental rights action, Heart of Adoptions
would be required to file a separate action in order to achieve permanent
placement of the child with a prospective adoptive parent it represents.
Because the consent remains valid, Heart of Adoptions could later file a
petition to terminate parental rights pending adoption. See §§ 63.087(4),
.089. Heart of Adoptions could also file a petition for adoption on behalf
of the prospective adoptive parents who retained its services after
resolution of the Department's petition for termination of parental rights.
See § 39.812(5), Fla. Stat. (2021) (permitting prospective adoptive
parents to file a petition for adoption after the judgment terminating
parental rights becomes final). In the meantime, Heart of Adoptions is
afforded its rights as an intervenor in this case—the ongoing termination
of parental rights action brought by the Department—even though the

                                     4
temporary placement determination at issue in this appeal was not
decided in its favor. While the trial court declined to place the child with
the prospective adoptive parents because it determined that adoption by
them would not be in the best interest of the child, the trial court did
find the prospective adoptive parents qualified. See § 63.082(6)(d) ("If . . .
the court determines that the prospective adoptive parents are properly
qualified to adopt the minor child and that the adoption is in the best
interests of the minor child, the court shall promptly order the transfer of
custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive parents, under the
supervision of the adoption entity." (emphasis added)). The denial of the
transfer was for temporary placement, which by its nature depends on
the facts as they exist at the time of the request, and Heart of Adoptions
remains an intervenor with the ability to revisit that determination by
way of reconsideration if the circumstances meaningfully change during
the course of the proceedings.
      Furthermore, Heart of Adoptions has the ability to advance another
couple to adopt the child based on the consent provided by the biological
mother because it was not conditioned on placement of the child with a
specific adoptive home. See generally C.D.F. v. D.R., 351 So. 3d 1208,
1212 n.5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ("[T]he legislature . . . explicitly permits an
adoption entity to intervene in the dependency case where a parent
executes a consent for adoption."). Contrary to Heart of Adoptions'
assertion, there is nothing in chapter 63 to indicate that it would need to
file another motion to intervene, given that the biological mother's
consent to adoption remains valid and did not name the specific
prospective adoptive parent to whom the court declined to transfer
placement of the child. See § 63.082(6)(b) ("Upon execution of the
consent of the parent, the adoption entity shall be permitted to intervene

                                      5
in the dependency case as a party in interest and must provide the court
that acquired jurisdiction over the minor, pursuant to the shelter order
or dependency petition filed by the department, a copy of the preliminary
home study of the prospective adoptive parents and any other evidence of
the suitability of the placement."); cf. In re Adoption of K.A.G., 152 So. 3d
1271, 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (explaining that the father's consent
"was conditioned on the trial court granting Grandmother's petition to
adopt Child" and concluding that the consent would be deemed
withdrawn if the trial court found that adoption by the Grandmother is
not in the best interests of the child).
      Because judicial labor as to Heart of Adoptions, which remains a
party, has not ended, the order denying the change of placement is not a
final order.
                                       B.
      However, the order is reviewable as a petition for certiorari. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) ("If a party seeks an improper remedy,
the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought
. . . ."). Certiorari jurisdiction requires that the party seeking relief
demonstrate "that an interlocutory order creates material harm
irreparable by postjudgment appeal." Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers
Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Upon
such a showing, the court then "has power to determine whether the
order departs from the essential requirements of the law." Id.
      The loss of custody of the child from the filing of the motion for
change of placement is the loss of a right to which Heart of Adoptions is
statutorily entitled upon the demonstration of the prospective parents'
qualification and determination that transfer of custody is in the best
interest of the child. See § 63.082(6)(d) ("If after consideration of all

                                       6
relevant factors, including those set forth in paragraph (e), the court
determines that the prospective adoptive parents are properly qualified to
adopt the minor child and that the adoption is in the best interests of the
minor child, the court shall promptly order the transfer of custody of the
minor child to the prospective adoptive parents, under the supervision of
the adoption entity." (emphasis added)). The right of a prospective
adoptive parent to obtain custody over the child pending adoption is a
right that may only be exercised during the pendency of the termination
of parental rights proceedings. In this way, it is analogous to the denial
of defense of self or others immunity under section 776.032, Florida
Statutes (2021), which is also reviewable by certiorari. See Jefferson v.
State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (finding certiorari
jurisdiction where the petitioner argued the ruling deprived him of a
proper hearing on his claim to immunity from prosecution). Like a
petitioner improperly deprived of immunity from prosecution—relief to
which he was entitled by statute but which he could only enjoy before
being tried—"relief by direct appeal" after a final judgment "would be no
relief at all" to a prospective adoptive parent improperly deprived of
custody to which she was statutorily entitled during the pendency of the
termination of parental rights proceedings. See id. (quoting Pearlstein v.
Malunney, 500 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)); Montanez v. State,
24 So. 3d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[B]ecause of the nature and
purpose of a claim of immunity from suit, an appeal after final judgment
would not be an adequate remedy; a party can not [sic] be reimmunized
from suit after-the-fact." (quoting Vermette v. Ludwig, 707 So. 2d 742,
744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997))).
     Denial of the motion for change of placement is also analogous to
an order granting a motion to add a claim for punitive damages, which,

                                     7
before the recent addition to the list of nonfinal appealable orders in
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G), was reviewable by
certiorari. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla.
1995). Certiorari jurisdiction over orders on motions to add claims for
punitive damages was appropriate because "a plenary appeal cannot
restore a defendant's statutory right under section 768.72 to be free of
punitive damages allegations in a complaint until there is a reasonable
showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant." Id.
Here, similarly, an appeal after the culmination of the proceedings to
terminate the biological mother's parental rights will not restore the
potential adoptive parents' right to obtain custody over the child prior to
termination. See generally § 63.082(6)(a) (providing that the consent to
adoption remains "valid, binding, and enforceable" prior to termination of
parental rights pursuant to chapter 39).
     Furthermore, the inability of Heart of Adoptions to secure the
temporary placement of the child with the prospective adoptive parents
could affect their ability to adopt the child as a consequence of its
positional effect on the various parties vying for the right to adopt the
child. Obtaining custody of the child during the pendency of the
termination of parental rights proceeding would make it more difficult for
the foster parents—who also expressed interest in adopting the child—to
petition for adoption because section 63.087(4)(b) provides that
     [t]he petition [seeking to terminate parental rights pending
     adoption] may be filed by a parent or person having physical
     custody of the minor. The petition may be filed by an
     adoption entity only if a parent or person having physical or
     legal custody who has executed a consent to adoption
     pursuant to s. 63.082 also consents in writing to the adoption
     entity filing the petition.

                                      8
(Emphasis added). If the foster parents lost custody of the child because
the court granted the prospective adoptive parents' motion to change
placement, then the foster parents would need to hire their own adoption
agency in order to file their own petition. The foster parents would also
need to secure their own consent to adoption if they wanted to file their
own petition, which might be difficult to procure because the
Department's termination of parental rights petition suggests that the
location of the biological mother is unknown.
      Because Heart of Adoptions would suffer material, irreparable harm
from an improper denial of its petition to transfer placement and that
harm could not be remedied on appeal following final judgment,
certiorari jurisdiction lies. However, to be entitled to certiorari relief,
Heart of Adoptions must also establish that the trial court departed from
the essential requirements of the law by declining to change the child's
placement.
                                      III.
      A departure from the essential requirements of the law is more
than simple legal error. Dodgen v. Grijalva, 331 So. 3d 679, 684 (Fla.
2021). It involves "a violation of a clearly established principle of law
resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos,
843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003).
                                       A.
      Heart of Adoptions argues that the trial court failed to hold the
hearing and enter an order on the motion for change of placement within
the time required under section 63.082(6)(c). That section provides the
following:
      Absent good cause or mutual agreement of the parties, the
      final hearing on the motion to intervene and the change of
      placement of the child must be held within 30 days after the

                                       9
     filing of the motion, and a written final order shall be filed
     within 15 days after the hearing.

§ 63.082(6)(c) (emphasis added).
     Neither the evidentiary hearing nor the written order was timely.
However, Heart of Adoptions failed to preserve the timeliness issue below.
During the hearing on the change of placement, when the court
recounted the date on which the motion to intervene and for change of
placement was filed, counsel for Heart of Adoptions did not object or
otherwise mention the substantial delay.
     Generally, it is not appropriate for an appellate court to consider an
issue raised for the first time on appeal. See Bair v. City of Clearwater,
196 So. 3d 577, 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Unpreserved issues are
reviewed for fundamental error. See Terant v. Beltway Cap., LLC, 147
So. 3d 1103, 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). A fundamental error is one that
"involves an egregious deprivation of a constitutional right," id., or one
that "goes to the foundation of the case or . . . the merits of the cause of
action," Schroeder v. MTGLQ Invs., L.P., 290 So. 3d 93, 97 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020) (quoting Yau v. IWDWarriors, Corp., 144 So. 3d 557, 560 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014)). No such error occurred here. The court held an initial
hearing forty-eight days after Heart of Adoptions filed its motion to
intervene and for change of placement. At that point, the child had
already been sheltered with the foster parents for approximately fifteen
months. The court orally granted the motion to intervene but denied the
motion for change of placement without prejudice pending the
evidentiary hearing. This delay did not amount to a fundamental error
that is "basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a
denial of due process." See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993).
The entry of the written order forty-eight days after the evidentiary

                                     10
hearing similarly did not "go[] to the foundation of the case or . . . to the
merits of the cause of action." See Millen v. Millen, 122 So. 3d 496, 498
(Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (citing Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla.
1970)).
      Because Heart of Adoptions failed to preserve the issue of the
timeliness of the proceedings below and because the deviations from the
statutory time constraints do not amount to fundamental error, the trial
court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law by failing
to strictly adhere to the time requirements set forth in section
63.082(6)(c).
                                      B.
      Heart of Adoptions also contends that the trial court failed to give
proper weight to the biological mother's fundamental liberty interest to
direct the care, custody, and management of her child. "[I]n Florida, an
individual's 'fundamental liberty interest in parenting . . . is specifically
protected by our [state constitutional] privacy provision.' " D.M.T. v.
T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 335 (Fla. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996)). "Although parents
have a fundamental right to raise their children, and section 63.082(6)(e)
provides the parents with the statutory right to select a prospective
adoptive parent or parents for the child, that right is not absolute."
Guardian Ad Litem Program v. Campbell, 348 So. 3d 1177, 1181–82 (Fla.
5th DCA 2022) (quoting E.Q. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 208 So. 3d
1258, 1260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)). The parents' selection of the
prospective adoptive parent is one of eight statutory factors that the trial
court must consider in its determination. See § 63.082(6)(e)8 (directing
the trial court to "consider and weigh all relevant factors including . . .

                                      11
[t]he right of the parent to determine an appropriate placement for the
child").
      Parents' fundamental liberty interest in parenting their children is
protected by the federal constitution as well as article I, section 23 of the
Florida Constitution. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1275. However, "a parent's
ability to participate in a placement process is purely statutory in nature
and is secondary to the court's duty to determine the best interests of the
child." J.G. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 270 So. 3d 523, 525 (Fla. 5th DCA
2019).
      [W]hen considering a motion to transfer custody of a
      dependent child who is under the supervision of the
      Department, the trial court must consider the wishes of the
      natural parent or parents, if their parental rights have not
      been terminated, and weigh those wishes with the other seven
      factors articulated in section 63.082(6)(e), along with "all
      relevant factors."
Campbell, 348 So. 3d at 1182 (emphasis in original) (quoting §
63.082(6)(e)).
      There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court failed
to give due consideration to the fact that the biological mother executed
the consent in favor of Heart of Adoptions as one consideration among all
of the factors set forth in section 63.082(6)(e). The written consent that
she signed does not list the prospective adoptive parents. Instead, it
explicitly relinquishes her right to choose the adoptive parents,
consenting to adoption by parents whose identities were admittedly
"unknown to" her. In other words, the biological mother's exercise of her
statutory right to determine an ultimate placement was by proxy,
delegating the choice of a specific adoptive home to the adoption agency.
The selection of a particular adoption agency itself could, depending on
the circumstances, be considered one manner in which a parent

                                     12
exercises her "right . . . to determine an appropriate placement for the
child." See § 63.082(6)(e)8. However, what weight, if any, the trial court
should give to that selection when the parent has waived the right to
select a specific parental home by relinquishing it to a third party is not
elucidated by Heart of Adoption's argument.
      The trial court weighed this statutory factor along with the others.
It did not depart from the essential requirements of the law by failing to
give appropriate weight to the biological mother's interest in directing the
care, custody, and management of her child when determining that the
change of placement was not in the child's best interest.
                                     C.
      Relying on S.C.W., as well as W.K. v. Department of Children &
Families, 230 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), which relies on language
in a footnote in the S.C.W. opinion, Heart of Adoptions argues that in
applying the section 63.082(6)(e) factors, the trial court improperly
compared the current placement with the prospective adoptive parents
and determined that placement with the foster parents was "better" than
placement with the prospective adoptive parents. This argument,
however, misapprehends the court's order. Rather, after weighing the
requisite statutory factors, the court determined that a change in
placement was not in the child's best interests and properly denied the
change in placement on that basis.
      Section 63.082(6)(e) sets forth the factors that the trial court must
consider "[i]n determining whether the best interests of the child are
served by transferring the custody of the minor child to the prospective
adoptive parent selected by the parent or adoption entity," requiring the
trial court to

                                     13
      consider and weigh all relevant factors, including, but not
      limited to:

            1. The permanency offered;

            2. The established bonded relationship between the
      child and the current caregiver in any potential adoptive
      home in which the child has been residing;

            3. The stability of the potential adoptive home in which
      the child has been residing as well as the desirability of
      maintaining continuity of placement;

            4. The importance of maintaining sibling relationships,
      if possible;

            5. The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if
      the court deems the child to be of sufficient maturity,
      understanding, and experience to express a preference;

           6. Whether a petition for termination of parental rights
      has been filed pursuant to s. 39.806(1)(f), (g), or (h);

            7. What is best for the child; and

           8. The right of the parent to determine an appropriate
      placement for the child.

§ 63.082(6)(e).
      The trial court did that in this case. And it properly addressed
each of the eight statutory factors. Among other things, the trial court
considered the significant bond that the child had formed in the two
years she has resided with her foster mother, who also wants to adopt
her and whom she refers to as "mommy." The child also refers to the
foster mother's family members as her own "sister," "grandparents," and
"cousins." See E.Q., 208 So. 3d at 1261 (noting that the children had
resided in a stable placement with their pre-adoptive foster parents with
whom they had bonded, calling them "mommy" and "papi"). The child

                                     14
informed the court that she wanted to live with her mommy, and the
court noted that case management and the child's attorney ad litem also
believed that the child should stay with her foster mother as opposed to
changing placement. The court indicated that "the child appears to be
happy, safe, cared for, and provided for in her current placement, with a
caregiver she considers a mother." Against that, the court found that the
prospective adoptive parents are near-total strangers to the child and
that her current placement "is the only family that [the child] knows and
recognizes." Thus, although finding—albeit with some reluctance—that
the birth mother's choice of placement weighed in favor of transferring
custody of the child to the prospective adoptive parents, the court
ultimately concluded not merely that the status quo was "better" but that
"removing the child from [her current placement] to place her in an
unfamiliar home, with individuals that she does not know or remember,
would be extremely detrimental to her mental and emotional wellbeing."
     In short, the trial court did exactly as the statute directed. We
therefore conclude that it did not err—let alone depart from the essential
requirements of the law—by denying Heart of Adoption's motion to
change placement.
     Petition denied.

LaROSE and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
ATKINSON, J., Concurs with opinion.

ATKINSON, Judge, Concurring.
     I fully join the majority opinion. I also write separately to address
confusion regarding language in a recorded opinion of this court that
became the subject of the parties' arguments in this appeal.

                                    15
       Heart of Adoptions argues that the trial court improperly
determined that placement with the foster parents was better than
placement with the prospective adoptive parents. However, this
argument is based on an incorrect assertion that the applicable statute
does not allow the court to compare the home of the prospective adoptive
parent seeking the transfer with any other potential adoptive home. The
language of the statute does not support such a categorical prohibition;
to the contrary, the statute requires the court to assess aspects of any
potential adoptive home in which the child is currently residing when
determining whether to transfer the child to the home of the prospective
adoptive parent selected by the biological parent or adoption agency.
       Section 63.082(6)(e) includes an inexhaustive list of factors upon
which the trial court must base its determination of "whether the best
interests of the child are served by transferring the custody of the minor
child to the prospective adoptive parent selected by the parent or
adoption entity." See § 63.082(6)(e) (emphasis added). The trial court
must
       consider and weigh all relevant factors, including, but not
       limited to:

            1. The permanency offered;

             2. The established bonded relationship between the
       child and the current caregiver in any potential adoptive home
       in which the child has been residing;

             3. The stability of the potential adoptive home in which
       the child has been residing as well as the desirability of
       maintaining continuity of placement;

             4. The importance of maintaining sibling relationships,
       if possible;

                                     16
           5. The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if
     the court deems the child to be of sufficient maturity,
     understanding, and experience to express a preference;

          6. Whether a petition for termination of parental rights
     has been filed pursuant to s. 39.806(1)(f), (g), or (h);

           7. What is best for the child; and

          8. The right of the parent to determine an appropriate
     placement for the child.

§ 63.082(6)(e) (emphasis added). The requirement that the trial court
consider both "[t]he established bonded relationship between the child
and the current caregiver in any potential adoptive home in which the
child has been residing" and "[t]he stability of the potential adoptive
home in which the child has been residing" as well as "the desirability of
maintaining continuity of placement"—in addition to the potential to
disrupt permanency and sibling relationships that might rely on
continuity of placement—make it inescapable that a current placement
would be "weigh[ed]" against placement in the home of the adoptive
parental home to which the adoption agency is seeking a transfer. See
id. In other words, the language of the statute requires the court to
assess whether transfer to the prospective adoptive parents is the best
choice in light of the child's current placement, making a comparison an
appropriate part of the court's best-interest analysis.
     Heart of Adoptions misplaces reliance upon Adoption Miracles, LLC
v. S.C.W. (In re S.N.W.), 912 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), as well as
W.K. v. Department of Children & Families, 230 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA
2017), which relies on language in a footnote in the S.C.W. opinion, to
argue that the trial court improperly compared the child's placement
with her foster family to the placement with the prospective adoptive

                                     17
parents. Heart of Adoptions contends that those cases support a
conclusion that the trial court is not permitted to determine whether the
change of placement "is the best choice . . . in light of other alternatives."
See W.K., 230 So. 3d at 908 (quoting S.C.W., 912 So. 2d at 373 n.4).
However, such a proposition is based on a reading of nonbinding dicta in
this court's S.C.W. opinion, and the conclusion the Fourth District
derived is in derogation of the language of the applicable statute.
      In S.C.W., this court indicated that in determining whether to grant
an adoption agency's motion to intervene and to transfer the child to the
custody of the prospective adoptive parents pursuant to section 63.082,
a trial court is "prevented from comparing the birth parents' choice of
prospective adoptive parents with other potential placements that the
court or the Department might choose for the child." S.C.W., 912 So. 2d
at 373 n.4. However, the court relied on section 39.810, Florida Statutes
(2004), which provided that the court consider the manifest best
interests of the child and that "[t]his consideration shall not include a
comparison between the attributes of the parents and those of any
persons providing a present or potential placement for the child." See id.
(emphasis added) (quoting § 39.810). That inapplicable clause describes
the standard that a court must utilize "[i]n a hearing on a petition for
termination of parental rights," see § 39.810—not a motion to intervene
and transfer custody under section 63.082, the terms of which, as
explained above, compel a comparative analysis between the child's
current placement in a prospective adoptive home and the home of the
prospective adoptive parents to which the adoption agency seeks to
transfer the child.
      It is not necessary for this court to assess whether the language in
S.C.W. supports the conclusion reached by Heart of Adoptions and the

                                     18
Fourth District that section 63.082 prohibits a trial court from drawing a
comparison between the prospective adoptive home and an existing
placement in another prospective adoptive home. That is because we are
not bound by the S.C.W. court's interpretation of section 63.082(6)
because it is dicta, a "statement of law in a judicial opinion that is not a
holding." Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 541, 547 (Fla. 2020); accord
Parrish v. State, 331 So. 3d 161, 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) ("[A] remark
made in pronouncing an opinion and which concerns some rule,
principle or application of law not necessarily involved in the case or
essential to its determination is obiter dictum, pure and simple." (quoting
Bunn v. Bunn, 311 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975))). In S.C.W., the
trial court did not determine whether the transfer of custody was
appropriate; it had no reason to do so because it denied the adoption
agency's motion to intervene after setting aside the birth mother's
consent. As such, in reviewing and reversing that order, the issue of a
transfer of custody to a prospective adoptive parent under section
63.082(6) was not before this court, rendering any pronouncement
regarding comparison of placements as it relates to a transfer of custody
inessential to the case's holding and therefore nonbinding dicta. See
S.C.W., 912 So. 2d at 373 n.4. Moreover, because the reversal in S.C.W.
was premised solely on the erroneousness of the setting aside of the birth
mother's consent, the discussion of the " 'best interest' determination"
itself was not related to the court's ultimate disposition and was likewise
dicta. See id.
     The Fifth District's opinion in Guardian Ad Litem Program v.
Campbell, 348 So. 3d 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022), cited by the
Department, distinguished what it believed to be S.C.W.'s interpretation

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of section 63.082(6) by explaining that S.C.W. had relied upon a prior
version of that statute that did not include the "weighing" language:
            In determining whether the best interests of the child
      will be served by transferring the custody of the minor child
      to the prospective adoptive parent selected by the parent, the
      court shall consider the rights of the parent to determine an
      appropriate placement for the child, the permanency offered,
      the child's bonding with any potential adoptive home that the
      child has been residing in, and the importance of maintaining
      sibling relationships, if possible.
Campbell, 348 So. 3d at 1181 n.2, 1182 n.4 (quoting § 63.082(6)(e), Fla.
Stat. (2015)). The court in Campbell draws a distinction between the two
versions of section 63.082(6), explaining that the former version of the
statute contained a nonexhaustive list of factors whereas the new version
requires that the court consider and weigh all relevant factors.
Campbell, 348 So. 3d at 1182 ("The current version of section 63.082(6)
is clear that when considering a motion to transfer custody of a
dependent child who is under the supervision of the Department, the
trial court must consider the wishes of the natural parent or parents, if
their parental rights have not been terminated, and weigh those wishes
with the other seven factors articulated in section 63.082(6)(e), along
with 'all relevant factors.' " (quoting § 63.082(6)(e))).
      The distinction identified by the Fifth District in Campbell is not
compelling. Both the prior and current versions of the statute contain
materially similar language that references an alternative adoptive home
and requires the trial court to assess the child's placement in each home.
Compare § 63.082(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2004) ("In determining whether the
best interest of the child will be served by transferring the custody of the
minor child to the prospective adoptive parent selected by the birth
parent, the court shall give consideration to the rights of the birth parent
to determine an appropriate placement for the child, the permanency

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offered, the child's bonding with any potential adoptive home that the
child has been residing in, and the importance of maintaining sibling
relationships, if possible."), with § 63.082(6)(e), Fla. Stat. (2016) ("In
determining whether the best interests of the child are served by
transferring the custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive
parent selected by the parent or adoption entity, the court shall consider
and weigh all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: . . . [t]he
established bonded relationship between the child and the current
caregiver in any potential adoptive home in which the child has been
residing . . . [and] [t]he stability of the potential adoptive home in which
the child has been residing as well as the desirability of maintaining
continuity of placement . . . ."). Under either version, the court is
required to consider the child's current placement in its determination as
to whether transfer of the child to the prospective adoptive parent is in
the child's best interests. As explained in the majority opinion, the trial
court did just that, properly addressing each of the statutory factors—
including those that bear upon the advantages of the child's current
placement in the potential adoptive home in which the child has been
residing.
       The Fourth District's W.K. opinion quotes this court's S.C.W.
opinion for the proposition that the "best-interest" determination is
confined to an analysis merely of the appropriateness of the parents'
choice of adoptive parents and whether it protects the well-being of the
child and may not include an evaluation of whether the parent's choice is
the best one "in light of other alternatives." See W.K., 230 So. 3d at 908.
Regardless of whether the Fourth District's proposition is justifiably
based on a reasonable interpretation of the dicta in S.C.W. construing

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section 63.082, it is faulty because it is not in accord with the language
of the statute itself.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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