Court Opinion

ID: 9884628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:04:00.059393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:39.848350
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Ward, dissenting: The opinion of the majority is plausible but, in my view, nothing more. A holding that an abandonment of our rule of contributory negligence and the adoption of an alternative, such as a rule of comparative negligence, if found to be desirable, should be effected only by legislation is not, I believe, an adequate response to the important questions presented through this appeal. It is appropriate to outline the background of our rule in presenting the considerations which require my disagreement. It is commonly said that the doctrine that contributory negligence of a plaintiff operates as a complete bar to recovery had its origin in the English case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, which was decided in 1809. The defendant had left a pole projecting across part of the highway, and thereafter the plaintiff “riding violently” did not see the pole and rode against it. The plaintiff was thrown from his horse and injured. Lord Ellenborough speaking for the court declared: “A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right. In cases of persons riding upon what is considered to be the wrong side of the road, that would not authorize another purposely to ride up against them. One person being in fault will not dispense with another’s using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.” The rule of Butterfield found ready acceptance in the United States. The historical explanation offered for the generally uncritical adoption of the rule is that courts were desirous of protecting young industries, which were' beginning to develop, from what could have been the overwhelming burden of successfully pressed negligence claims. See, Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence ; A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 135, 143 (1958) ; Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 189, 198 (1950). Our State in Aurora Branch Railroad Co. v. Grimes (1852), 13 Ill. 585, 587, adopted the rule of Butterfield v. Forrester, stating that there must be “no want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff” to enable him to recover and also added that the plaintiff must demonstrate such freedom from fault in this regard. However, six years later, in Galena and Chicago Union Railroad Co. v. Jacobs (1858), 20 Ill. 478, this court rejected a demand for the application of the Butterfield rule and adopted what has been described as a type of comparative negligence. The new concept was developed in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Baches (1870), 55 Ill. 379; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Hammer (1874), 72 Ill. 347; Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Evans (1878), 88 Ill. 63; Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Co. v. Moran (1883), 13 Ill. App. 72. The doctrine was formed through these cases that the plaintiff’s negligence would not bar his recovering if it was “slight,” while the negligence of the defendant was “gross” in comparison. There was no attempt to divide or apportion the damages under this rule, and if it was applied the plaintiff was entitled to full recovery. See appellate court opinion, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439. Despite nominal and conceptual difficulties in the “slight” versus “gross” rule, such as whether there might be a “grossest gross” and a “slightest slight” (Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 512), the rule was in general our law until clearly abandoned by this court in Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, and City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163. See also, Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358. Our “comparative negligence” rule proved difficult to apply and apparently an attitude of protectionism persisted toward growing industries and this court returned to the rule that a plaintiff’s failure to have exercised due care would bar recovery. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 485 (1953) ; Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 Ill. L. Rev. 36, 51 (1944); Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151 (1946); and Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 189, 308 (1950). However, I believe that of disinterested legal opinion, apart from courts following precedents which stem from another time, the better view prefers comparative negligence to the harsh rule of contributory negligence. A typical statement of the objection to the barring rule can be found in Prosser, The Law of Torts, (3rd ed. 1964) at page 443, where it is said: “The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is readily apparent. It places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of the defendant has played no less a part in causing the damage; the plaintiff’s deviation from the community standard of conduct may even be relatively slight, and the defendant’s more extreme; the injured man is in all probability, for the very reason of his injury, the less able of the two to bear the financial burden of his loss; and the answer of the law to all this is that the defendant goes scott free of all liability, and the plaintiff bears it all.” Another is that of Dean Leon Green in Illinois Negligence Law, 39 Ill. L. Rev. 36, where he said: “In Butterfield v. Forrester, the English court introduced the harshest doctrine known to the common law of the nineteenth century— the doctrine of contributory negligence. It is harsh because it throws the entire loss on the injured party, however slight his negligent conduct, and at the same time relieves the negligent defendant altogether, however much he may have contributed to the injury.” This harshness of the rule was always apparent to thoughtful observers, and as industry became more secure and other circumstances in society which contributed to the acceptance of the rule changed, courts and legislatures began to except certain situations from the strict operation of the barring rule of contributory negligence. In Illinois, as the appellate court in the opinion below pointed out, the enactment of the Safety Appliances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, chap. 114, par. 152), the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, chap. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, chap. 48, par. 172.35 et seq.), and the Scaffold Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, chap. 48, par. 60 et seq.), the development of the willful and wanton misconduct concept, and the attractive nuisance doctrine all represent efforts to avoid the effects of the contributory negligence rule. There has been firmer action elsewhere to replace the contributory negligence bar with rules of comparative negligence. England, the home of Butterfield v. Forrester, has adopted a rule of comparative negligence. So, too, have Canada, New Zealand and most of the European States. While the United States, as an exception to modern legal thought generally, has preserved in general the rule that contributory negligence will completely bar recovery, there have been important inroads. The Federal Employer’s Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 53), of course, provides for the apportionment of damages if contributory fault is present. At least eight States: Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. 1956 § 1454), Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. 1962, §§ 27-1730.1— 2), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. 1955, § 331.045), Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. 1964, § 25 — 1151), South Dakota (S.D. Code i960 Supp., § 47.304.1, amended by chap. 149 [1964] Laws of S.D., 182), Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 1958, § 94-703), Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Act 1965 Supp., chap. 14, § 156), and Tennessee (it appears judicially) have adopted in one form or another a rule of comparative negligence. I believe that apportioning damages through a comparative negligence rule is a logical and just method of distributing responsibility according to fault and I would have this court adopt such a method. While I believe that respect should be accorded the majority’s argument that a far-reaching change in our law should be accomplished through the legislature, such respect should not preclude this court from assuming what is to me a judicial responsibility. Too, I do not think that this argument of the majority can realistically be invoked here. The plaintiff-appellant declares, without contradiction being offered, that since 1937 there have been nine attempts in our legislature to enact legislation to change our contributory negligence rule and that with a single exception none reached the floor of either House. The prospect of securing through legislation a rule better styled to achieve fair dispositions in negligence cases does not appear to be bright. The references in our statutes to our rule of contributory negligence do not, I believe, represent an expression by the legislature that it has approved the rule as such. These statutes indicate to me only a legislative awareness of the rule or a design to avoid the harsh result of its operation. I do not know of a legislative declaration that it is to be the rule of this State that a plaintiff to whom any want of care whatever attaches be barred from recovering. Too, it must be remembered in evaluating the validity of the majority’s holding that the various positions Illinois has taken on the question of contributory negligence have been taken by actions of this court and not by legislative action. It can be argued that the legislature’s inaction in this area is attributable to its feeling that it is more appropriate, considering the history of the question in Illinois, for the judiciary to act. It must be observed that, under circumstances resembling in importance those before us, this court has not been as finical, as I believe it is today, concerning the legislative alternative to judicial action. In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, at 623, we said: “The argument that the abolition of privity and negligence in this type of case should come from the legislature is well answered by a paraphrase of our reply in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, ‘The doctrine of school immunity [privity and negligence] was created by this court alone. Having found that doctrine to be unsound and unjust under present conditions, we consider that we have not only the power, but the duty, to abolish that immunity [doctrine], “We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can likewise open thém.” ’ 18 Ill.2d 11, 25.” Too, in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill.2d 11, at 26, we commented that: “when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” I would apply our reasoning in Molitor to this case. I am unpersuaded by the argument that there are practical considerations which dictate a retention of the contributory negligence rule. We are told that the adoption of comparative negligence would increase litigation and court congestion, encourage negligent driving and cause insurance rates to be raised. The reply to such “practical” argument is that the dominating questions before our court are whether the old rule contended for is one often of harshness and unfairness and whether the rule proposed for adoption would better serve to attain more just dispositions in negligence cases. The so-called practical considerations advanced must properly be considered as subordinate to the primary concern for more just judicial dispositions of these cases. Secondly, and persuasively, the evidence assembled of life under a comparative negligence form fails to confirm the fears expressed by the defendant and the amicus. See Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 135, 162 (1958); Bress, Comparative Negligence, 43 A.B.A. J 127, 130 (1957) ; Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 726 (1960) ; and Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas Before and After Surgery, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89, 108 (1959). It is plain that a problem of high significance to the people of this State is here involved. It is equally plain to me that its importance merits this court’s engaging the problem rather than avoiding it, as I believe the majority does, by declaring that it is a matter for legislative solution. I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court to the extent it holds that we should substitute a form of comparative negligence for our present rule. Mr. Justice Schaefer joins in this dissent.