Court Opinion

ID: 9779159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:38:41.219385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:37.505107
License: Public Domain

KELTNER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority but disagree with part of the rationale behind the opinion.
As the majority notes, the facts in this case are surprisingly similar to the facts of *562a previous case decided by this court. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ). In this case, the plaintiff served Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center with interrogatories, requests for production of documents and requests for admissions, which among other things, sought the names and addresses of blood donors to the decedent that were known by the relator to have been infected by the AIDS virus. Second, the plaintiff requested names and addresses of any blood donor to the decedent whose AIDS status is unknown or not available. Third, the plaintiff requested information regarding other blood donors to the decedent, not known to be infected with the AIDS virus.
Contrary to the majority’s opinion, the relator did not refuse to answer the discovery request, but merely filed an objection to the various discovery requests claiming that the information was guarded from discovery by privilege because disclosure would violate the donors’ constitutional right to privacy. Additionally, the relator objected to the request on the social-policy grounds that if the donors’ identities are revealed, there would be an adverse effect on the voluntary blood supply, which is crucial to the health of our country.
The trial court conducted a hearing at which the relator presented evidence that if donor identities are not held strictly confidential, the voluntary blood system would suffer. Relator’s witness testified that the destruction of the voluntary blood system would lead to critical shortages in the blood supply which would materially effect the health of the nation. After the hearing and arguments of counsel, the trial court entered an order which required the relator to disclose the identity and location of donors of blood to the deceased that are known by the relator to have AIDS, or whose AIDS status is unknown or unavailable to Gulf Coast. Additionally, the trial court ordered that the relator produce information from any individual or entity known by it to “[know] the AIDS status of any of the donors donating blood to the decedent....”
The trial court refused to allow discovery into any information on donors who tested negative for the AIDS virus. Instead, the relator was required to supply, by identifying numbers, the test results and documents relating to those donors who tested negative. The court further ordered that these information documents be submitted to the court for an in-camera review before disclosure to the plaintiff’s lawyers.
In making the order, the trial court made it clear that it considered the blood donors to be persons with knowledge of relevant facts. Rule 166b(3) provides that the identity and location of persons with knowledge of relevant facts are not privileged under any of the privileges listed in rule 166b(3)(a-e).
In addition to allowing the discovery, the trial court invoked an extensive protective order which provides:
1. The names and locations of the donors and test results on their blood shall be sealed with the Court and a number shall be assigned to each donor for reference during discovery unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
2. Documents containing identities of the donors shall be filed with the Court and sealed. Only parties’ counsel will have access to these sealed documents.
3. The list of names of the donors shall be destroyed at the final disposition of the case, unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
4. Only the counsel of parties to this suit will have access to the names and locations of the above donors and blood test results. Plaintiffs are prohibited from disclosing the donors names or locations, either directly or indirectly, to third parties, without further order of this Court.
5. No party, their agents or representatives, shall directly or indirectly contact any “donor” identified through records produced under this Order nor undertake further discovery regarding such “donors” until permitted to do so by further order of this Court.
The relator’s primary contention is that the disclosure of the identity and location *563of the blood donors violates their constitutional right to privacy. The majority states that this court has concluded “[njeither the Federal Constitution nor our State Constitution expressly mentions any right of privacy.” Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d at 678. I disagree.
While neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Texas Constitution expressly mentions the right to privacy, it has been recognized as a necessary element of individual freedom. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875-77, 51 L.Ed.2d 64, 72-74 (1977). However, in a complex society, total right to privacy is unfeasible, particularly where disclosure of information is concerned. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
Nearly all legal scholars agree that the right to privacy is inherent in our constitution. However, substantial disagreement exists regarding the extent of the right. In the instant case, the blood donors have been protected by the court’s protective order. As a result, we cannot say that the trial court’s actions to date have impermis-sibly invaded the blood donor’s right to privacy.
I agree with the remaining portion of the majority’s opinion dealing with the relator’s claims regarding societal interest in public policy. In these matters, we must weigh the plaintiff’s right to the truth through discovery with society’s interest in a healthy blood supply. This case is presented to us in the form of a petition for writ of mandamus. Our power to review the trial court’s decision under this procedure is substantially restricted. We can only grant a writ of mandamus if we determine that the trial court has abused its discretion. Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex.1984).
As a result, we cannot anticipate the future discovery in this case nor anticipate any future orders of the trial court. Instead, we must restrict ourselves to the record before us and address only those matters that have been ruled on by the trial court.
I concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing limited discovery into the location and identity of blood donors to the decedent.