Court Opinion

ID: 9412797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 17:09:14.498754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:31.608090
License: Public Domain

J-A12038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 HEATHER SHARPLES                            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                             :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                             :
              v.                             :
                                             :
                                             :
 JAMES P. SHARPLES                           :
                                             :
                    Appellant                :     No. 2894 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
                             2018-01294-CU

 HEATHER SHARPLES                            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                             :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                             :
              v.                             :
                                             :
                                             :
 JAMES P. SHARPLES                           :
                                             :
                                             :     No. 3028 EDA 2022
 APPEAL OF: DIANE REESER AND                 :
 DOUGLAS REESER                              :

             Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
                             2018-01294-CU

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 1, 2023

      James   P.   Sharples     (“Father”)   and    Diane   and   Douglas   Reeser

(“Grandparents”) appeal from the modified custody order entered on October

20, 2022, following a three-day trial. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

      Father and Heather Sharples (“Mother”) have one daughter (“Child”),

who was born in 2008. Mother filed a complaint for custody in 2018, which
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resulted in a stipulated custody order giving the parents equally shared legal

and physical custody of Child. Grandparents, who are Father’s parents,1

petitioned to intervene. The court granted them standing and, in October

2019, granted them physical custody of Child twice a year. The parties entered

another stipulated custody agreement in March 2020,2 which modified

Grandparents’ custodial time to one week in the summer and one long

weekend in the winter, to be exercised during Father’s custodial time. The

order provided that if Grandparents chose to exercise their summer week

during one of Mother’s custodial weeks, Father would have to cede custody to

Mother during the preceding week.

       Father filed an emergency petition for a custody evaluation in February

2021, citing concerns about both Mother’s and Child’s mental health. Following

an evidentiary hearing, the court ordered a custody evaluation and

psychological assessment of all parties by a forensic psychologist, Dr. Dawn

Sheehan. Father thereafter filed an emergency petition for primary custody.

After more conciliation conferences, the court entered a September 2021

temporary custody order, followed by an October 2021 modified custody

order. The court granted Father primary physical custody and reduced

Mother’s award to partial physical custody for three hours every Tuesday

evening and for the duration of alternating weekends. The order specified that
____________________________________________

1 Paternal Grandfather is Father’s stepfather. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion

(“1925(a) Op.”), 1/9/23, at 2 n.1.

2 The court adopted the stipulation as an order in April 2020.

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“[d]uring Mother’s overnights, Child shall have her phone and may call

someone to assist in leaving the house for the purpose of diffusing the

situation when the conflict escalates. Mother shall permit Child to leave.”

Custody Order, 10/28/21, at ¶ 7(d). The order directed Mother to continue

individual therapy and Child to continue therapy with a court-ordered

counselor. It further stated family therapy could begin at the recommendation

of Mother’s therapist. It altered Grandparents’ custody slightly, providing that

they could choose their week of summer custody. It stated that if they chose

a long weekend in the winter during Mother’s custody time, Father must

provide Mother with makeup time from his schedule within 30 days.

       Father and Mother both filed petitions to modify custody in the spring of

2022. The court entered an order in May 2022 stating the October 2021

custody order would remain in effect. It did modify the order to the extent

that the new order allowed Child’s counselor to choose to expand Child’s

individual therapy to include one or more family members, rather than

allowing for family therapy to commence upon the recommendation of

Mother’s therapist.3

       Father demanded a trial, and the court held hearings from September

20 to 22, 2022. It heard the testimony of Mother, Mother’s fiancé, Father, and

Grandmother, and interviewed Child in camera. The court also considered the

expert testimony of Dr. Sheehan, the results of the court-ordered custody
____________________________________________

3 By separate order, the court also granted a petition Father had filed to enjoin

Mother from making disparaging remarks.

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evaluation, dated October 2021, and the testimony of Child’s court-ordered

counselor, Jennifer Krumenacker (“Counselor Krumenacker”).

       The court issued a modified custody order – the order under appeal –

on October 20, 2022.4 It eliminated Mother’s custodial weekends. However, it

retained Mother’s custody times on Tuesdays evenings from 5 to 8 p.m., and

stated Child “shall not be permitted to refuse to attend or terminate Mother’s

custodial time, nor request early departure or late arrival, without Mother’s

express consent.” Final Order for Custody, 10/20/22, at ¶ 3(i).5 The court

modified Grandparents’ custodial time such that, rather than any specific

amount or scheduled time, Grandparents could exercise custody “[s]olely

during Father’s custodial time as may be agreed between Grandparents and

Father[.]” Id. at ¶ 11(a). Grandparents were not permitted to request custody

“during any part of Mother’s custodial time.” Id. at ¶ 11(b).

       The court ordered Child to continue individual therapy with Counselor

Krumenacker, Mother to continue individual therapy with her own therapist,

and Father to begin individual co-parenting therapy. It also directed Mother

and Child to participate together in reunification therapy with a different

therapist. Paragraph 12 of the order prohibited Father and Grandparents from

giving or lending Child any motorized vehicles, electronics, jewelry, or more

____________________________________________

4 The order was filed on October 17, 2022, but notice was sent to the parties

on October 20, 2022. See Pa.R.C.P. 236.

5 The court also gave Mother custody for a few hours on most holidays, and

for 12 hours on Mother’s Day.

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than $100 of cash or cash equivalents, without Mother’s express written

consent. It also forbade the parties from disclosing to Child when Mother

withheld her consent for any gift. By separate order, the court appointed a

Parenting Coordinator for a 12-month term. See Pa.R.C.P. 1915.11-1(a).

     Father and Grandparents moved for reconsideration, which the court

denied. Father and Grandparents each filed a notice of appeal. This Court

consolidated the appeals.

     Father presents the following issues:

     1. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse
     its discretion by inappropriately applying the factors pursuant to
     23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a) contrary [to] the weight of the evidence
     presented at trial, in particular, factors 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15?

     2. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse
     its discretion by disregarding the opinions of Jenny A.
     Krumenacker (Minor Child’s court-mandated treating therapist),
     Dr. Dawn Sheehan (court-appointed psychologist), and Mother’s
     own testimony all of whom concluded that it would be in the best
     interest of [Child] to have a break in custody with Mother,
     particularly after Mother failed to present any contrary expert
     testimony at trial?

     3. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse
     its discretion by disregarding the opinions of Jenny A.
     Krumenacker and Dr. Dawn Sheehan that reunification therapy or
     joint/family counseling was not recommended between Minor
     Child and Mother until both parties made progress with their
     individual therapy efforts?

     4. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse
     its discretion by not allowing Minor Child to adequately express
     her feelings, thoughts, and concerns regarding her relationship
     with Mother?

     5. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse
     its discretion by removing the provision contained in the October
     28, 2021 Order providing [Child] the ability to terminate visitation

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      with Mother during high-conflict situations, despite expert and
      witness testimony supporting a continued need for this provision
      in Minor Child’s best interest?

      6. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse
      its discretion by assuming facts not of record and, sua sponte,
      implementing spending restrictions (by both item and price) on
      Father despite no party asking for such relief and no evidence or
      testimony at trial to justify the same?

      7. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse
      its discretion by failing to incorporate adequate provisions
      regarding Father’s ability to vacation or plan extracurricular
      activities with [Child] pursuant to Paragraphs 3(a)(i) & (ii) of the
      October 17, 2022 Order?

Father’s Br. at 4-5 (suggested answers omitted). Grandparents raise the

following issues:

      1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
      its discretion by exceeding its adjudicatory authority under
      Section 5323 of the Pennsylvania Child Custody Act by restricting
      Grandparents’ ability to make gifts or loans to the Child where:

         a. The evidence did not support a conclusion that such gifts
         caused or would cause an ongoing risk of harm to the Child,
         and the trial court made no finding of ongoing risk of harm
         or need for safety conditions as required by Section 5323(e)
         of the Child Custody Act.

         b. Absent evidence of harm to the Child, the spending
         restrictions are an extraordinary invasion into the privacy of
         the Grandparents’ home and relationship with the Child.

      2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, abused its
      discretion, and/or violated the Grandparents’ right to due process
      by restricting their right to make gifts or loans to the Child where:

         a. Mother did not request such relief from the Court;
         Grandparents were given no notice that spending
         restrictions might be imposed on them; and Grandparents
         had no warning that they needed to offer evidence about
         financial matters ordinarily irrelevant in child custody cases.

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         b. The denial of due process resulted in a factual error that
         the Child’s Father and Grandparents indulge her more than
         Mother; and cause the Child to be too focused on material
         possessions.

      3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
      its discretion by modifying paragraph 5 of the order of October 28,
      2021 relating to vacations, without delineating its reasons
      pursuant to Section 5323(d) of the Child Custody Act, denying the
      Child the ability to join her Grandparents for an annual seven-day
      seashore vacation in a rental property, which has been a family
      tradition for more than a decade.

Grandparents’ Br. at 19-21 (answers below omitted). We have reordered the

issues raised by both parties in our discussion below, for ease of disposition.

      “In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type and our

standard is abuse of discretion.” D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa.Super.

2014) (quoting J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa.Super. 2011)). We will

“accept the factual findings of the trial court that are supported by competent

evidence of record[.]” S.S. v. K.F., 189 A.3d 1093, 1098 (Pa.Super. 2018).

“[W]ith regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must

defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-

hand.” D.K., 102 A.3d at 478 (quoting J.R.M., 33 A.3d at 650). We may

reverse the court’s custody decision only if it “involve[s] an error of law, or

[is] unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.” Id.

(quoting J.R.M., 33 A.3d at 650).

      A trial court must determine custody based on the best interest of the

child. T.M. v. H.M., 210 A.3d 283, 288 (Pa.Super. 2019). A non-exhaustive

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list of 16 factors for the court to consider when making a custody decision is

statutorily prescribed:

      § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody

      (a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
      determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
      factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
      affect the safety of the child, including the following:

         (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
         frequent and continuing contact between the child and
         another party.

         (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
         member of the party’s household, whether there is a
         continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
         which party can better provide adequate physical
         safeguards and supervision of the child.

         (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating
         to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
         protective services).

         (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
         of the child.

         (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's
         education, family life and community life.

         (5) The availability of extended family.

         (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

         (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
         child’s maturity and judgment.

         (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
         other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
         reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
         child from harm.

         (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
         consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
         adequate for the child’s emotional needs.

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         (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
         physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
         needs of the child.

         (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

         (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
         to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

         (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
         willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
         another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
         another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
         cooperate with that party.

         (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

         (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

         (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). The court has discretion to determine the relative

weight to give each factor. T.M., 210 A.3d at 289.

      When determining whether to award custody to a grandparent with

standing, the court must consider the foregoing factors in conjunction with

three additional factors:

      (i) the amount of personal contact between the child and the party
      prior to the filing of the action;

      (ii) whether the      award    interferes   with   any   parent-child
      relationship; and

      (iii) whether the award is in the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1). Grandparents bear the burden of demonstrating

that their exercise of custody is in the child’s best interest and not to the

detriment of the parent-child relationship. D.R.L. v. K.L.C., 216 A.3d 276,

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279 (Pa.Super. 2019). There is a presumption that custody will be awarded to

a parent over a nonparent, and that presumption may only be rebutted by

clear and convincing evidence. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327.

                        I. Mother’s Partial Custody

      Father first argues the court abused its discretion in failing to grant him

sole custody after weighing the custody factors, and takes issue with the

weight the court assigned to factors 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15. Father argues

the court erred in not giving more weight to factor 2 (present and past abuse

by a party and continued risk of harm), and factor 4 (need for stability and

continuity). Father asserts that Child does not have safety or stability when in

Mother’s care. He claims Child suffers from skin and eyebrow picking,

depression, and anxiety due to conflict when in Mother’s custody. He cites a

portion of the custody evaluation stating that the Mother-Child relationship is

“highly maladaptive and chaotic,” and Counselor Krumenacker’s testimony

that the relationship is “toxic and chaotic.” Father’s Br. at 13, 15-16 (quoting

Comprehensive Custody Evaluation (“Evaluation”), 10/19/21, at 73, and N.T.,

9/20/22, at 41).

      Father further argues that the court abused its discretion when weighing

factor 7, Child’s preference. Father asserts that the court should have weighed

the Child’s preference more heavily, pointing out that the previous trial judge,

Dr. Sheehan, and Counselor Krumenacker all described Child as bright,

mature, and respectful. Id. at 19. Father claims that the court’s findings that

Child is self-centered, undisciplined, entitled, and overindulged are against the

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weight of the evidence. Father relatedly argues the court’s questioning of Child

in camera demonstrated bias against Child and that the court did not foster

an environment where Child could express her true feelings and concerns. Id.

at 37.6

       According to Father, the court also abused its discretion when weighing

factor 8 (one parent’s attempts to turn the child against the other parent).

Father argues the evidence demonstrated that Father attempted to encourage

Child to engage with Mother during her custody periods, whereas Mother made

false accusations against him to third parties. Id. at 21-23.

       Regarding factor 9 (maintaining a loving, stable, consistent and

nurturing relationship with the child), Father asserts that the Evaluation shows

that Mother does not provide a stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship

____________________________________________

6 Father offers the following as examples of the court’s inappropriate
questioning:

          •   “You said you don't have any interaction with [Mother] when
              you are there so how is your relationship stressing you out
              when you are not interacting with her?”

          •   “But you sit in your room by choice, correct?”

          •   “You do have friends in the neighborhood you could go visit,
              correct?”

          •   “Would you like to fix the relationship with your mom?”

          •   “Did you ever try talking to your mom?”

          •   “Do you report back to your dad about what happens at your
              mom’s house?”

Father’s Br. at 38-39 (citations to N.T., 9/22/22, at 53-56 omitted)

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with Child. Id. at 23. Similarly, regarding factor 10 (meeting daily needs),

Father claims that the record supports a conclusion that Mother cannot

currently provide for Child’s daily needs. He maintains that Dr. Sheehan

testified that extended periods of time with Mother produce “adverse

childhood experiences” which have long-term negative consequences. Id. at

25-26 (quoting Evaluation at 73).

      As for factor 15 (parent’s mental and physical condition), Father asserts

that Mother suffers from anxiety, complex PTSD, substance abuse (cocaine,

alcohol, marijuana), and is promiscuous. Id. at 26. Father claims Mother

testified she does not take her prescribed medications, and that Dr. Sheehan

opined that Mother cannot regulate her emotions without her medications and

requires further individual therapy before she can address her relationship

with Child. Id. at 26-27.

      More generally, Father argues that the court abused its discretion in not

granting him sole custody because he claims Dr. Sheehan and Counselor

Krumenacker agreed that a complete break in Mother’s custody was

warranted. Id. at 16-17 (citing R.882a (Evaluation at 78) and N.T., 9/20/22,

at 41). He contends that Mother did not present any evidence to contradict

their opinions on these points, and the court abused its discretion in

disregarding the uncontradicted testimony. Id. at 28, 32-33. Father argues

the court erred in dismissing Counselor Krumenacker’s opinion on the grounds

that she is not an expert. Father argues she has a master’s degree and a

license, possesses knowledge beyond the average lay person, and was

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appointed Child’s counselor by the court and ordered to remain involved. Id.

at 29-31 (citing Pa.R.E. 702). Father claims Mother even agreed a break was

warranted. Id. at 29 (citing N.T., 9/21/22, at 83-84).

      We find Father is due no relief on this issue. First, while Mother testified

that she agreed with Counselor Krumenacker’s recommendation that some

break in custody was warranted, she also stated she believed she and Child

were already taking the break during the month preceding trial. Mother stated

she did not agree with formally taking away custody indefinitely, which she

anticipated would only spur further litigation. N.T., 9/21/22, at 79, 83-84,

142. The court also considered that, because Child had not seen Mother for

the month preceding the hearing, Child had already had a “break” in custody.

1925(a) Op. at 3-4, 8.

      Next, while Father relies heavily on the expert opinion of Dr. Sheehan,

the court explained that it took the Evaluation and Dr. Sheehan’s testimony

with a grain of salt, considering that the Evaluation “was produced nearly one

year ago and is somewhat stale.” Memorandum in Support of Custody Order

(“Trial Ct. Mem.”), 10/20/22, at 2 n.1. The court further found that the

Evaluation had “diminished value” in helping it assess the current state of the

parties and their relationships because Father had allowed Child to read it,

which, the court found, altered and exacerbated the conflict between Child

and Mother. See id.; 1925(a) Op. at 6 (citing Father’s Pet. to Modify, 3/8/22,

at ¶ 7).

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       Nevertheless, while it did not wholly accept Dr. Sheehan’s opinions, the

court “agree[d] with Dr. Sheehan’s conclusion that the reports of conflict

between Mother and [Child], Mother’s maladaptive tendencies and the degree

of [Child]’s emotional distress should bear significant weight.” Trial Ct. Mem.

at 12. It acknowledged that “Mother appears to suffer from anxiety, trauma-

related symptoms and maladaptive tendencies that negatively impact her

insight, judgment, coping skills and parenting skills.” Id. at 11.

       At the same time, the court observed that the negative incidents

between Child and Mother described in the Evaluation had not required any

intervention by protective services. Id. at 4. It also observed that the

Evaluation stated Child’s behavioral issues are not caused solely by her

relationship with Mother, but also by stress due to “peer issues,” custody

litigation, and Grandparents’ intervention in the custody case. Id. at 11. It

further observed that the Evaluation did not actually recommend a break in

Mother’s custody. Rather, the court noted, it stated that a partial custody

schedule would remain appropriate “so long as Mother engages in appropriate

treatment recommendations and Child remains in counseling.” 1925(a) Op. at

8-9 (quoting Evaluation at 77).7 The court noted that Mother is currently

participating in individual therapy and was ordered to continue doing so. Id.

at 9. Father’s argument that the court failed to give proper consideration and

weight to Dr. Sheehan’s expert opinion holds no water.
____________________________________________

7 The page of the Evaluation cited by Father does not address a break in
custody. See R.882a (Evaluation at 78).

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      In contrast, the court did not find Counselor Krumenacker’s testimony

to be credible and that it found her to be biased against Mother. Trial Ct. Mem.

at 3; 1925(a) Op. at 9 n.6. It recounted two times when Counselor

Krumenacker testified that Mother had behaved inappropriately, which

contradicted or over embellished Child’s testimony. Trial Ct. Mem. at 3-4. It

also considered that Counselor Krumenacker tells Child Mother “needs more

work,” which the court found “perpetuate[s] a negative narrative about

Mother.” Id. at 4; see also 1925(a) Op. at 6-7. The court also acknowledged

that Father did not offer Counselor Krumenacker as an expert witness.

1925(a) Op. at 9 n.6.

      We defer to the court’s credibility finding regarding Counsellor

Krumenacker and the weight it assigned her testimony. We find no merit to

Father’s argument that the court committed an error of law when stating that

Counselor Krumenacker was not an expert witness, as Father did not offer her

as one. See N.T., 9/20/22, at 39 (counsel objecting to a question posed to

Counselor Krumenacker on grounds that “she’s not here as an expert”).

      In addition to considering Dr. Sheehan’s opinion, the court found it

would not be in Child’s best interests to grant Father sole custody because

doing so would place Child “in the echo chamber of Father and Grandparents’

disparaging comments regarding Mother.” Trial Ct. Mem. at 9. The court was

“not convinced that Father’s over-indulgence of [Child], coupled with his

undermining of her relationship with Mother, is substantially better than the

conflict[ed] relationship [Child] has with her Mother.” Id. While the court did

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not specifically mention the evidence Father claims proves that he encourages

contact with Mother or that Mother has tried to turn Child against him, the

court placed great weight on the fact that Father let Child read the Evaluation8

and Child’s own testimony that Father and Grandparents make negative

statements about Mother. Id. at 8. It also found that “Father and

Grandparents have increased the level of conflict by empowering [Child] to

demand to be picked up when she does not get her way with Mother and

disparaging Mother.” Id. at 10.

       Regarding Child’s preference for custody with Father, the court

acknowledged this preference and noted Child’s intelligence. Id. at 6.

However, it also found Child was “self-centered, which is not atypical for a

teenager, undisciplined, entitled, and overindulged.” Id. It considered her

preference for staying with Father in light of the fact that Child “generally only

needs to ask for something in order to receive it and she is rarely disciplined,”

which it viewed in contrast with Mother’s home, where she must share a

bathroom and common living areas. Id. It also considered Child’s preference

for Father in view of Father’s allowing her to read the Evaluation, which

____________________________________________

8 The Evaluation stated that “no party should discuss any matters related to

the legal or evaluative process of this case with the child.” 1925(a) Op. at 5
(quoting Evaluation at 78). Dr. Sheehan testified that she was concerned that
Father allowed Child to read the Evaluation. Id. (quoting N.T., 9/21/22, at 17-
18). The court found Father did not testify credibly when he stated he had
only allowed Child to read a few sentences of the Evaluation from the
computer screen while she looked over his shoulder. Id. at 6.

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“provided a narrative to avoid the more mundane trappings of Mother’s home”

and reinforced Father’s negative statements about Mother. Id. at 7, 8.

       The court’s findings have a basis in the record, and we defer to the trial

court’s credibility determinations and the weight it assigned to the various

factors. The court considered the evidence on which Father relies. It simply

did not give it the weight that Father would have liked. Overall, given the

court’s sustainable findings, we do not conclude that the court’s decision to

deny a complete break in Mother’s custody and allow Mother to retain three

hours of custody a week9 to be unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.

       In addition, we find no merit to Father’s argument that the court abused

its discretion when conducting the in camera interview of Child. While any

questioning by an authority may be intimidating to a 14-year old child, the

transcript shows that the court asked Child objective, impartial questions

about her perceptions of and interactions with both Mother and Father. It also

gave Child multiple opportunities to provide supplemental information. See

N.T., 9/22/22, at 3-57.

       Father further argues that the court erred in not including in the custody

order any language, such as was included in the October 2021 order, that

would give Child the ability to terminate visitation with Mother during high-

conflict situations. Father’s Br. at 40-42.

____________________________________________

9 With additional time on holidays.

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      We find no merit to this argument. The previous order stated that,

“[d]uring Mother’s overnights, Child shall have her phone and may call

someone to assist in leaving the house for the purpose of diffusing the

situation when the conflict escalates. Mother shall permit child to leave.”

Custody Order, 10/28/21, at ¶ 7(d). However, this language by its terms

applies only to overnight visits, and the instant order does not include any

overnights with Mother.

      Moreover, while the instant order states Child “shall not be permitted to

refuse to attend or terminate Mother’s custodial time, nor request early

departure or late arrival, without Mother’s express consent,” Final Order for

Custody, 10/20/22, at ¶ 3(i), this provision does not expressly address

emergency situations. Rather, it serves as a counterbalance to the court’s

finding that Child regularly uses her ability to terminate visits as leverage and

was intended to prevent any further conflict between the parties. See 1925(a)

Op. at 12 (“The trial court was and remains unwilling to provide Child with a

cudgel that can be used whenever it appears that Mother may deny her

undivided attention, a request, demand, or threaten discipline. Creating or

permitting such a dynamic is not in the best interests of Child”). Importantly,

the order provides for Child to contact the non-custodial parent, and vice-

versa. See Order, 10/20/22, at ¶ 10(a)-(c). The order is not unreasonable or

an abuse of discretion.

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                           II. Reunification Therapy

         Father contends that the court abused its discretion in ordering Child

and Mother to participate in reunification therapy. According to Father, both

Counselor Krumenacker and Dr. Sheehan recommended against joint or

family therapy until Mother made more progress in her own therapy and

reunification therapy was recommended by the individual therapists. Father’s

Br. at 33 (citing N.T., 9/20/22, at 38; N.T., 9/21/22, at 12; Evaluation at 78).

Father cites Counselor Krumenacker’s testimony that reunification therapy will

not work until Mother understands why her relationship with Child is not

working. Id. at 34 (citing N.T., 9/20/22, at 45, 62-63). He also cites a portion

of the Evaluation stating Dr. Sheehan’s belief that “joint/family counseling

would be counterproductive for both Mother and Child.” Id. (citing Evaluation

at 73). Father argues that the court erred in disregarding the expert testimony

and cherry-picking a portion of the Evaluation to justify its decision, while

simultaneously claiming Dr. Sheehan’s opinion in the Evaluation was stale. Id.

at 35.

         In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court explained that it ordered

reunification therapy because the Evaluation states that Heather Goldner

Kinsey, JD, LMFT, who mediated a session between Mother and Child in August

2021, recommended reunification therapy to Dr. Sheehan. 1925(a) Op. at 10

& 10 n.7.; see also Evaluation at 56. The court also observed that while Dr.

Sheehan was opposed to joint counseling at the time she authored the

Evaluation, Dr. Sheehan did not expressly testify she was opposed to

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reunification therapy at the time of trial. 1925(a) Op. at 10.10 The court also

considered that Child testified in camera that she does not know much about

Mother. Id. at 10-11 (citing N.T., 9/22/22, at 19).

       The decision to require reunification therapy does not involve an error

of law and is not unreasonable. There is support in the record for the court’s

decision to order the therapy, even if does not prove to be immediately

effective.

               III. Father’s/Grandparents’ Vacation Custody

       Father argues that by allowing Mother to exercise custody every

Tuesday night, the court has interfered with Father’s ability to plan a week-

long vacation with Child to take place on a calendar week, and in particular,

an annual shore vacation with Grandparents. Father’s Br. at 51-52.

       Grandparents similarly argue that eliminating their dedicated week of

custody time is not in Child’s best interest and that the court failed to delineate

its reasons for doing so. Grandparents’ Br. at 84-93. They point out that no

party petitioned the court to modify the provisions regarding their exercise of

custody. They also claim the court committed an error of law in concluding

that Section 5328(a) is not applicable to their request for custody. Id. at 89

(quoting 1925(a) Op. at 22).
____________________________________________

10 Father cites Dr. Sheehan’s testimony that at the time she authored the
Evaluation, she recommended Mother “needed pretty intensive therapy to
address her issues before she could have a healthy relationship with her
daughter[.]” N.T., 9/21/22, at 12. Dr. Sheehan testified she had not received
any further information that could put her in the position to alter her previous
recommendation. Id. at 12-13.

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      We find Father is due no relief. As the trial court pointed out, Father has

custody of Child roughly 98% of the time, which provides him “more than an

adequate amount of time to take a vacation.” 1925(a) Op. at 4, 14. Indeed,

nothing in the custody order prevents Father from taking Child on vacation

from Wednesday morning through Tuesday morning. The court did not abuse

its discretion.

      Regarding Grandparents, the court found that their intervention in the

custody matter for purposes of their annual vacation “is a source of stress” for

Child. Trial Ct. Mem. at 5, 12; see also 1925(a) Op. at 24 (citing N.T.,

9/20/22, at 174). The court observed that in the past, Grandparents’ requests

to exercise custodial time during Mother’s time have resulted in conflict. Trial

Ct. Mem. at 13. The court recounted that Dr. Sheehan recommended that if

Mother’s custody remains limited, Grandparents can negotiate their custody

time with Father; the court also found that Grandparents “have unfettered

access to [Child] during Father’s custodial time.” Id.; 1925(a) Op. at 5 n.5

(citing Evaluation at 78).

      Given these findings, which are supported by the record, we see no

abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that Mother may exercise

custody every Tuesday night, at the expense of Grandparents’ ideal weekend-

to-weekend shore vacation. The court found that Grandparents have unlimited

access to Child during the 98% of the time that Father exercises custody, and

that scheduling Grandparents’ custody as a separate week was an

unnecessary source of conflict. Its decision to remove that source of conflict

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was not unreasonable. Grandparents can take Child on a nearly week-long

vacation, from Tuesday night to the following Tuesday afternoon, or can take

a vacation during the calendar week if they return Child to Mother for her visit

on Tuesday evening.

        The court did err in stating the factors under Section 5328(a) are not

relevant when determining Grandparents’ custody. Those custody factors are

to be considered in conjunction with the factors specific to grandparents under

Section 5328(c). See D.R.L., 216 A.3d at 280.

        Nonetheless, we do not find the error warrants reversal in this case, as

none of the factors of Section 5328(a) would render the court’s decision an

abuse of discretion. Grandparents have not carried their burden to prove their

calendar-week-long exercise of custody is in Child’s best interest and not to

the detriment of the parent-child relationship, and we therefore affirm the

court’s decision to relegate their custody time to that which Father shares with

them.

                          IV. Spending Restrictions

        Both Father and Grandparents contest the court’s decision to limit their

spending on Child, and the court’s authority to do so. Father asserts that the

court’s conclusion that he provides Child with a lavish lifestyle and buys Child’s

affection is not supported by the record and disregards the evidence of the

actual reasons for the poor relationship between Child and Mother, which

Father asserts are “Mother’s inability to effectively convey . . . love, attention,

and affection.” Father’s Br. at 45.

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      Father also argues that the spending restriction is impractical and

unworkable. See id. at 48-50. For example, Father queries whether he can

contribute more than $100 per month to Child’s education fund without

Mother’s approval, and what he will tell Child regarding her birthday gifts, for

example, as the order prohibits him from disclosing when Mother has withheld

consent for a given purchase. He also points out that he would have to involve

the court in every purchase to which Mother does not consent, and that Mother

does not need to give any reason for withholding consent. Father also stresses

that Mother did not request a cap on spending, and that the spending issue

was not central to the custody issue.

      Grandparents argue the trial court did not have authority to impose a

spending restriction because it did not find there was a risk of safety or harm

to Child. Grandparents’ Br. at 45-46 (citing Section 5323(e)). According to

Grandparents, the best-interest standard does not grant the court unlimited

power, and due process prohibits the court from micromanaging child-rearing

decisions. Id. at 48-49 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000)).

They further contend the court lacked authority to restrict spending sua

sponte, and quote Mother’s testimony that she does not feel the need to

compete with Grandparents’ spending. Id. at 55-56 (quoting N.T., 9/21/22,

at 153).

      Grandparents also argue the record does not support the trial court’s

decision. They assert Child does not receive excessive gifts, and that she

testified that Father and Grandparents occasionally refuse when she asks for

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something. They point out Child did not testify as to how frequently she asks

for something, or how extravagant her requests are. Grandparents echo

Father’s argument that the order is broad and vague, and question whether

they can lend Child their car for a trip to the grocery store, and what they

would be allowed to tell Child if, for example, Mother did not give consent to

buy Child a graphing calculator for school. Id. at 65-66.

      Grandparents also argue the court’s imposition of a spending restriction

deprived them of procedural due process. They assert that because no party

petitioned the court to intervene on this issue, Grandparents had no notice

that it would be decided by the court. They claim that although their spending

is mentioned in passing in the 78-page Evaluation, it is not among the

“Relevant   Findings   and   Impressions,”   the   custody   factors,   or   the

recommendations. Id. at 69-70. They argue that parties’ spending is typically

only evaluated in custody cases where there is poverty, relocation, or

attempts to influence a child’s testimony – none of which was present here.

      They further claim that because they did not know they needed to

present evidence on this issue, they had no opportunity to be heard.

Grandparents assert that had they had proper notice, they would have

presented evidence to rebut the factual conclusions the trial court drew solely

from Child’s in camera testimony, such as the respective sizes of the parties’

homes, the cost of the treehouse, which Grandparents claim Grandfather built

himself, or the dress Child wore to court, which Grandparents claim was from

a sales rack at Macy’s and purchased by Father. Id. at 73-74. Regarding any

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assertions of overindulgence of the Child on their part, Grandparents assert

they would have presented rebuttal evidence of their house rules for Child,

including chores and discipline.

       The trial court found that Grandparents have no substantive due process

rights in relation to custody of Child. 1925(a) Op. at 15-16. It found that

Grandparents were not deprived of procedural due process because they had

notice of the trial and an opportunity to be heard and call witnesses. Id. at

16. It stated Grandparents had “notice that their spending on Child may be at

issue based on the [Evaluation].” Id. at 17.11

       Factually, the court found “[Child] is very oriented towards the material”

and that Grandparents “overindulge [Child] with material benefits,” based on

Child’s in camera statements to the court. Trial Ct. Mem. at 5, 6. It recounted,

       At Father’s house [Child] enjoys her own bedroom, bathroom, a
       basement set up as an art studio and a “she shed” in a living-
       quarters over the garage. She generally only needs to ask for
       something in order to receive it and she is rarely disciplined. The
       same is true of Grandparents’ home, which is larger than her
       Father’s home and includes a treehouse. Grandparents do not
       discipline [Child], and she generally need only ask for something
       to receive it. During her interview with the Court, [Child] made a
       point of informing the Court that her Grandmother bought her the
       new dress she was wearing the night before, because she “didn’t
       have anything to wear to court.” Mother does not provide this level
       of material indulgence to [Child].

____________________________________________

11  The court also found Grandparents waived their due process claims by
failing to make specific allegations to support their due process argument in
their Rule 1925(b) statement. However, as Grandparents raised the issue in
their motion for reconsideration, and the court addressed its merits in its Rule
1925(a) opinion, we find waiver inappropriate.

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Id. at 6-7. The court similarly recalled Child’s in camera statement that she

need only ask Father for something to receive it. 1925(a) Op. at 13.

      In addition to Child’s in camera statements, the court made factual

findings on this issue, based on the Evaluation and Grandmother’s testimony:

  •   Friends of Grandparents informed Dr. Sheehan “Child is a bit

      overindulged at times by her grandparents, but that this is not

      excessive.”

  •   Mother told Dr. Sheehan, “[A]s long as I was spending money, [Child]

      was fine. As soon as I said no, she rejects, refuses to participate, or take

      pictures; then she calls [Grandparents] and they attack me.”

  •   Grandmother testified that “maybe, we’re Switzerland. We are the ones

      that say for breakfast if you want a piece of chocolate, that’s fine. It’s

      that kind of comfort where she just feels safe always,” and told Dr.

      Sheehan that Child “likes to have undivided attention at times.”

  •   Grandfather told Dr. Sheehan that “we decide what to do in life based

      on [Child].”

  •   Dr. Sheehan concluded that Grandfather is preoccupied with Child and

      that Child sees Grandmother as a mother figure.

Id. at 17-19.

      From these findings, the court concluded that imposing a spending

restriction on Father and Grandparents would be in Child’s best interest. It

relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s statement in Colonna v.

Colonna, 855 A.2d 648, 651 n.5 (Pa. 2004), that “the temptation for the well-

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off parent to buy the affection of the children, and the tendency of the children

to favor the parent who provides them with a more attractive lifestyle are

factors that do not serve the best interests of the children.” Id. at 19.

       We find the trial court abused its discretion in restricting Father’s and

Grandparents’ spending. The parties had insufficient notice that the court

would be entertaining a cap, and the imposition of a cap was unreasonable.12

       Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard “at a

meaningful time in a meaningful manner.” Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578,

580 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Notice is required to ensure “that

each party is provided adequate opportunity to prepare and thereafter

properly advocate its position, ultimately exposing all relevant factors from

which the finder of fact may make an informed judgment.” Id. (citation

omitted). Where facts are at issue, due process almost always “requires an

opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d

451, 463 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “[A]bsent adequate notice or

opportunity to prepare, neither [this Court] nor the trial court can assume that

the parties have either sufficiently exposed the relevant facts or properly

argued their significance.” Id. at 464 (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

12 Because we reverse on this basis, we need not address whether the court

otherwise had authority, in a custody dispute, to impose spending restrictions
on the parties where the child’s safety was not at issue.

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      No one petitioned the court to impose a spending restriction or argued

for one at trial. When asked whether she was bothered by Grandparents’

expenditures, Mother testified,

      Maybe in the beginning because I felt like I had to compete, but
      I’ve accepted that – again, like I said, I can’t control them. I can't
      control what other people have. You know, I'm just going to
      provide what I can provide. If [Child] can't accept that, that's
      something that we can work on. But I'm happy with what I have
      because money doesn't buy love or happiness.

N.T., 9/21/22, at 153. Nor did any witness recommend a spending restriction,

and the portions of the Evaluation on which the trial court relies were

insufficient to put the parties on notice that the court might impose a spending

restriction. See Everett, 889 A.2d at 580-82 (finding Mother was deprived

due process when court modified custody even though Mother was not served

with meaningful notice of the hearing and Father’s request for custody was on

third page of his contempt petition).

      Furthermore, there was inadequate support in the record for the

restriction.   The   only   evidence   regarding   Father’s   and   Grandparents’

expenditures came from Child’s in camera interview. But even her testimony

did not address the amount of money Father or Grandparents spend on her.

Child was not subject to cross-examination. The record does not support a

finding that Child is “spoiled.”

      Moreover, even if Child’s testimony was sufficient to support a

conclusion that it would be in Child’s best interest if Father and Grandparents

spent less money on her, the resolution imposed by the court was not

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reasonable. The record resoundingly supports the conclusion that creating

conflict between the parties is not in Child’s best interest. This was even part

of the court’s rationale in forbidding Father and Grandparents from attempting

to negotiate vacation time with Mother. Yet the court gave Mother exclusive

control over Grandparents’ and Father’s ability to spend more than $100 on

Child. This is not a reasonable directive. The likelihood of ensuing conflict is

high, and the preexisting conflict will likely be exacerbated by requiring Father

and Grandparents to ask Mother’s permission for expenditures over $100. For

the foregoing reasons, we vacate this portion of the order.

      Order vacated as to paragraph 12. Order affirmed in all other respects.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/1/2023

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