Court Opinion

ID: 9685329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:31:02.767074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:23.781211
License: Public Domain

BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In April 1991, this court held, inter alia, that, as part of the Uniform School Law of 1986, the repealer of Miss.Code Ann. § 37-7-611 (the repealer) was properly submitted by Mississippi for preclearance, as required by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. We therefore granted.summary judgment that the repealer is enforceable. Dupree v. Mabus, 776 F.Supp. 290 (Dupree I). Only that portion of the judgment was appealed; and the Supreme Court remanded this case for further consideration in light of Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2096, 114 L.Ed.2d 691 (1991). The sole issue before us is whether the State identified the repealer with specificity, thus properly submitting it for preclearance. Relying on Clark, the majority concludes that the State did not sufficiently do so. I disagree, and thus respectfully dissent.
I.
The plaintiffs, residents and registered voters of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and members of the Board of Trustees of its school district, filed this action in February 1990 against the State of Mississippi and its Governor1 and Attorney General, alleging that several statutes had not received the requisite § 5 preclearance and are therefore unenforceable. Hattiesburg is located in Lamar and Forrest Counties; their Boards of Education and Trustees intervened as defendants.
The Act provides that certain jurisdictions may not implement any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964” without first obtaining approval from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, alternatively, from the United States Attorney General (USAG), that the proposed change does not, or will not, have a discriminatory purpose or effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
The plaintiffs challenged three laws that affect the composition of municipal and county school districts: (1) the 1977 amendment to Miss.Code Ann. § 21-1-59, Ch. 379, 1977 Miss.Laws 543; (2) the 1978 revision of that amendment, Ch. 312, 1978 Miss.Laws 418; and (3) the repealer of § 37-7-611—§ 47 of the 1986 Uniform School Law, Ch. 492, 1986 Miss.Laws 687. The amendments and the repealer have the same effect—municipal school districts no longer automatically expand to the same extent as the municipal annexations, resulting in a class of city voters who do not reside in the city school system but may vote for the city governing body; that body in turn elects the municipal school board. 776 F.Supp. at 299-300, 304 n. 8.
This court held in Dupress I that the creation of this class constitutes at least an indirect change in voting, covered by § 5 of the Act. 776 F.Supp. at 299-300. Upon so holding, it examined whether the challenged laws had been precleared. See id., at 293-96, 300-04. It held that the 1977 and 1978 amendments to § 21-1-59 had not been precleared and, accordingly, are not enforceable. Conversely, it concluded that the USAG precleared the Uniform School Law of 1986 in *1319its entirety, including the repealer, and therefore held that the repealer is enforceable. Id., at 303-04.
II.
Plaintiffs contend, and the majority agrees, that Clark compels the conclusion that the State did not adequately identify the repeal-er. As stated, I respectfully disagree. Clark and its precursor, McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 79 L.Ed.2d 271 (1984), both involve a State’s failure to submit a specifically identifiable preelearanee request and are therefore factually distinguishable from this case.
Clark involved a challenge under § 5 to the validity of Louisiana’s multimember, at-large electoral scheme for certain judicial positions. In response to a July 1987 amended complaint concerning Louisiana’s failure to submit several statutory and constitutional voting changes for preelearanee, it submitted all of its unprecleared voting changes. The USAG granted preclearance for some, but objected to others. Louisiana asked the USAG to reconsider his objections and continued with plans to hold elections in the fall of 1990.
In October 1990, the three-judge court grouped into one category those districts where Louisiana had obtained preelearanee for later-created judgeships, but not the earner created judgeships in issue.2 The district court, despite the USAG’s objections, held that the USAG’s preclearance of later, related voting changes resulted in preclearance of the earlier, unprecleared judgeships.3
The Supreme Court disagreed. It stated that the district court’s ruling was inconsistent with the presumption established in McCain, that the USAG reviews “current changes in election practices effected by the submitted legislation, not prior unprecleared changes reenacted in the amended legislation”. Clark, 500 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2104. The Court emphasized that in order to minimize the administrative burden on the USAG, the.State “must identify with specificity each change that it wishes the Attorney General to consider”; it also repeated that “any ambiguity in the scope of the preelearanee request must be resolved against the submitting authority”. Id. Accordingly, the Court did not alter the standard for § 5 preelearanee requirements; rather, it reiterated the principles stated in McCain, and emphasized the need to maintain “the efficacy of administrative preclearance under § 5”. Clark, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2102.
In McCain, discussed at length in Dupree I, 776 F.Supp. at 302-03, the district court provided two alternatives to support its conclusion that the USAG preeleared a 1966 Act. It reasoned that because the State submitted the 1966 Act in response to a request by the USAG for additional information, the 1966 Act was part of the preclearance submission. Alternatively, it reasoned that because a 1971 Act retained or incorporated the 1966 Act, lack of objection to the 1971 submission resulted in preclearance of the 1966 Act.
The Supreme Court reversed and set forth three general principles: first, it stated that the submission, not subsequent responses, defines the scope of the request; second, it reiterated that ambiguity is resolved against the submitting authority; and third, it clarified that the submission of a current change does not encompass prior unprecleared *1320changes. McCain, 465 U.S. at 251, 257, 104 S.Ct. at 1046-47, 1050.
Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of the district court’s reasoning in McCain, the district court in Clark applied similar reasoning:
When the Attorney General approves the new act, he not only approves the amended portion but necessarily approves the older, reenacted part, which forms part of the new act. Thus, when an act provides for a certain number of judicial positions, approval of that act must include all of the judicial positions necessary to reach that number.
Clark v. Roemer, 751 F.Supp. 586, 593 (M.D.La.1990) (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court again rejected this reasoning: “The District Court’s explanation for its holding replicates the precise factual and legal errors we identified in McCain ____ A submission’s description of the change from one number of judges to another in a particular judicial district does not, by itself, constitute a submission to the Attorney General of the prior voting changes incorporated in the newly amended statute”. Clark, 500 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2104.
Unlike McCain, Mississippi submitted the repealer as part of its initial submission; therefore, the repealer defined the scope of that part of the request. Moreover, Mississippi specifically identified the repealer as a current change; unlike McCain and Clark, it was not a prior, uncleared change presumably encompassed by the submission of a current change.4
Finally, the submission was neither ambiguous nor vague.5 The title of the submitted law, the Uniform School Law of 1986, indicates a massive reorganization of various laws. The cover memorandum submitted by the State explained the comprehensive nature of the submission and stated that the law was submitted “in its entirety”. The memorandum specifically advised the USAG that “[f|or the sake of brevity, the submission will only set forth the particular sections which deal primarily with voting rights even though the complete act is submitted for review ”. (Emphasis added.) Dupree I, 776 F.Supp. at 294-95.
Section 37-7-611, enacted in 1926, was repealed in 1986 by § 47 of the Uniform School Law. As stated, § 37-7-611 provided for a municipal school district to expand automatically into territory annexed by the city.6 Although § 47 of the Uniform School Law, the repealer, was not discussed in the cover letter, which explained 13 sections of the Uniform School Law and their effect on voting, it was specifically identified in the booklet that accompanied the submission. The booklet *1321compared each section of the Uniform School Law with prior law, together with providing an underlined version of the Uniform School Law, reflecting new language as well as deletions of prior language. Id. The booklet’s introductory note explained that “[b]y comparing each section of [the Uniform School Law] and the current practice, the changes to current law are easily identified”. As discussed, § 47 of the Uniform School Law provided for the repeal of 23 sections, including the above described § 37-7-611. The booklet stated that these 23 sections “which provide for the creation and operation of municipal separate school districts, are hereby repealed”. Dupree I, 776 F.Supp. at 295 (emphasis added).
In addition, § 52 of the Uniform School Law amended § 37-7-103 and provided a single procedure in place of the prior, several school districting procedures. It was specifically discussed in both the cover memorandum accompanying the submission (it was one of the 13 specifically identified sections) and in the booklet. See Dupree I, 776 F.Supp. at 295-96. In describing this new uniform procedure under amended § 37-7-103, the cover memorandum stated in part:
... [T]he school board with the consent of the school board of the district involved may add to such school district any part of the school district adjoining same or may detach territory from such school district and annex the same to an adjoining district.
Dupree I, 776 F.Supp. at 295.
Accordingly, the submission specifically identified both the repealer and the replacement. And, as should have been clear to the USAG, through review of the identified sections, a new, single procedure was replacing, inter alia, the prior procedure for municipal separate school districts, one of which was their automatic expansion into annexed areas. Therefore, what more should—not could—have been done? Again, McCain and Clark must be considered.
In Clark, the Court stated that adherence to the district courts’ rationale in McCain and Clark would “upset[] th[e] ordering of responsibilities under § 5”. 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2104. It stressed that it is the responsibility of covered jurisdictions to submit unprecleared changes for review; to conclude that preelearance of a current change includes unidentified prior unprecleared changes “would add to the Attorney General’s already redoubtable obligations the additional duty to research each submission to ensure that all earlier unsubmitted changes had been brought to light”. Id. The Court “reaffirmed] McCain in rejecting this vision of § 5”, because “[s]uch a rule would diminish covered jurisdictions’ responsibilities for self-monitoring under § 5 and would create incentives for them to forgo the submission process altogether.” Id.7
Here, however, the submission of the repealer meets the requisite level of specificity; it did not impose an administrative burden of the same quality and magnitude as that at issue in Clark—far from it. As discussed, Mississippi specifically identified the submitted change. The State did not impose upon the USAG the added responsibility of conducting independent research to locate an unprecleared prior or related change not identified in the submission. The booklet specifically identifying the repealer accompanied the cover memorandum. No doubt, the State could have been more helpful by including the text of the repealed statute; however, the regulations then in effect did not require covered jurisdictions to submit a copy of the prior law being amended or repealed. 28 C.F.R. § 51.25 (1986).8 See 776 F.Supp. at 300. And, no doubt, it could have been even more helpful by describing how the § 37-7-611 automatic municipal school district expansion procedure repealed by § 47 of the Uniform School Law was one of the procedures replaced by the procedure established by § 52 of that law. See 776 *1322F.Supp. at 302-03.9 The test, however, is not whether the State was as helpful as, with 20-20 hindsight, it could have been, but whether it put the US AG on notice that the repealer was submitted for preclearance. I would hold, as this court did in Dupree I, that the State satisfied that test.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The Governor was dismissed from the action. 776 F.Supp. at 296-97.

. In a second category, the district court grouped unprecleared judgeships subject to valid objections by the USAG. Despite its conclusion that these unprecleared judgeships violated § 5, the court refused to enjoin the elections. The Supreme Court held that the court erred hy not enjoining elections held for judgeships to which' the USAG had valid § 5 objections. Clark, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2101. The Court's analysis concerning this second category is not relevant to the issue before this court.

. The following is an example of the district court’s reasoning:
Louisiana submitted and obtained approval for Divisions E (created in 1966, precleared in 1986), G (created and precleared in 1976), H (created and precleared in 1978), and I (created and precleared in 1982). Division F was not submitted for approval when it was created in 1973; rather, it was submitted and objected to in 1978---- [However,] because the legislation creating Divisions G, H, and I added to the number of prior judgeships in Caddo Parish, including Division F, approval of the legislation constituted approval of Division F.
Clark, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2100.

. By contrast, in Dupree I, this court held that Mississippi failed as a matter of law to put the USAG on notice that the 1977 amendment was submitted for preclearance. Using language similar to that later used by the Supreme Court in Clark, we concluded that defendants’ contention that approval of the 1978 amendment cured the failure to submit the 1977 amendment for preclearance was specifically rejected by the'Supreme Court in McCain and therefore without merit. 776 F.Supp. at 303.

. The United States asserts that the USAG's response letter of August 29, 1986, stating that he did “not interpose any objection to the voting changes occasioned by [the Uniform School Law] as identified in your July 22, 1986, letter”, indicates that the USAG only precleared the 13 changes identified in the cover memorandum, not the repealer identified in the accompanying materials. In Dupree I, we fully considered and rejected this interpretation. 776 F.Supp. at 303. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority's reliance on the State's resubmission subsequent to receipt of the USAG’s response letter. The USAG's letter specifically mentioned only those 13 changes discussed in the cover memorandum and thus understandably caused the State to question whether the USAG precleared the remainder of the Act. By contrast, the State's submission letter specifically advised that "the complete act is submitted for review”.

.The section stated in part:
Where the corporate limits of any municipality which constitutes a municipal separate school district, either with or without added territory, are extended so as to include the whole or any part of an existing adjacent school district in the county school system or municipal separate school district, then such adjacent school district, or such part thereof as is included within the corporate limits of the municipality by reason of the extension thereof, shall thereby automatically be merged with and become a part of such municipal separate school district.
Miss.Code Ann. § 37-7-611 (1972).

. See note 4, supra, concerning this court reaching this same result in Dupree I.

. The current regulation requires "[a] copy of any ordinance, enactment, order, or regulation embodying the voting practice that is proposed *1322to be repealed, amended, or otherwise changed”. 28 C.F.R. § 51.27 (1992).

. The plaintiffs complain that the State did not advise the USAG that § 52 was the sole method for such districting. But, as discussed in Dupree I, 776 F.Supp. at 303, the entire, uniform law was submitted.