Court Opinion

ID: 9577471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:35:18.175385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:39.434309
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice
(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that it was error for the superior court to direct a verdict against Bachner-Northwest, on the issue of Rich’s contributory negligence.
As this court observed in Roach v. Benson, 503 P.2d 1392, 1393 (Alaska 1972):
Contributory negligence has been defined as conduct of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection and which is a legal cause contributing to the harm suffered by plaintiff. . . . Plaintiff is required to conform his conduct to that of the reasonably prudent man, and a failure to do so is contributory negligence, (footnote omitted)
Thus, in that case, we held that a finding of contributory negligence was clearly erroneous where our review of the record failed to reveal any unreasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.
*450The authorities make it abundantly clear that the principle question in cases presenting issues of contributory negligence is not whether the plaintiff exposed himself to a risk of harm, but whether his conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances.
The late Dean William Prosser wrote:
[Contributory negligence, in general, is governed by the same tests and rules as the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff is required to conform to the same broad standard of conduct, that of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances. The unreasonableness of the risks which he incurs is judged by the same process of weighing the importance of the interest he is seeking to advance against the probability, and probable gravity, of the anticipated harm to himself, (footnote omitted) 1
Accordingly, it has been held that before a workman can be deemed contributorily negligent for failing to follow a safer alternative course of action, it must be shown that the alternative is, in itself, reasonable. Galloway v. Employers Mutual of Wausau, 286 So.2d 676, 684 (La.App.1974) 2 As stated in 57 Am.Jur.2d, Negligence § 344 at p. 747:
One is not always chargeable with negligence even though he does not adopt the safest and best course to avoid injury, since the inquiry is not whether the plaintiff actually chose the least safe of the avoidable courses, but whether he failed to exercise that degree of care required of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. (footnotes omitted)
A similar statement is found in 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 122 at pp. 76-77:
One is not guilty of negligence in pursuing a course of conduct that an ordinarily prudent person would choose under the same or similar circumstances, although there was open to him a safer course, or even a course which was absolutely safe, (footnotes omitted)
Turning to the facts in this case, I fail to see how a jury could reasonably find Rich guilty of contributory negligence.
As I view the record, there was overwhelming evidence that Rich’s habit of “walking” the scaffold was the customary, approved and required method among tapers of using a rolling scaffold. Bachner-Northwest’s own foreman admitted that painters and tapers customarily use the “walking” method of locomotion.
P. G. Hupperton, the Richs’ safety expert, while acknowledging that there was a safer method of “taping” from a scaffold, stated that “walking” was the customary method. He also explained why the practice was necessary. According to Hupper-ton, a taper will cover the area he can reach from any one position in 30 to 90 seconds. To continue with his work, he must then move the scaffold.
Bob Maxim, a fellow taper, agreed that “walking” the scaffold was the customary method of locomotion used by tapers. His estimate of the time between moves differed somewhat from that of Hupperton; according to Maxim, relocation would be required only every 10 to 20 minutes. However, he added: “[T]he production would be next to nothing if you couldn’t move it from up above. . . .”
Ben Humphries, the business agent for Rich’s union, with 14 years of actual experience in taping, testified that rolling scaffolding is used to expedite the work and that the typical method of locomotion used by tapers is to use “pressure against the ceiling or the wall to propel himself along”. He further confirmed Hupper-ton’s testimony that a taper can work in a given location for only “a very brief period. . . It would only take a few seconds to tape it.” Moreover, according *451to Humphries a taper must work continuously :
You must keep a wet . . . either painting or taping, you keep a wet surface, you know, a continuity, a nice wet surface. It makes better joints in a continuous operation.
In addition to the foregoing, Humphries gave the following answer when questioned by Mr. Luce, one of appellees’ attorneys:
MR. LUCE: Mr. Humphries, would your men be able to keep their jobs if they insisted . . . utilizing a rolling scaffold, on getting down and moving it by hand each time that they wanted to move the scaffold?
MR. HUMPHRIES: No, they wouldn’t keep their job. Production is the name of the game in construction work.
One more factor, in evaluating the reasonableness of Rich’s conduct, is the fact that the scaffold was not equipped with a ladder for mounting and dismounting from the stage or working surface which was approximately six feet above the ground. Safety Code Regulation 318-79 provides:
Where the distance from the ground to the lower platform of a pole scaffold is more than five (S) feet, access to the platform in the form of a runway or ladder shall be provided.
Given the foregoing, I am of the opinion that reasonable people could reach but one conclusion in this case: that Rich was performing his work in the manner of a reasonable and prudent person, by utilizing the walking method of locomotion. Faced with the limited alternatives that were available to him, a workman in the position of Rich could not reasonably be expected to dismount from a six foot scaffold, having no ladder, every time he completed a few minutes of taping work, unlock the wheels, move the scaffold, relock the wheels, then remount the scaffold for another few minutes of work. In short, to expect him to utilize the suggested alternative form of locomotion is unreasonable under the circumstances.
It is important to note that there is no evidence that Rich ever “walked” his scaffold carelessly or in anything but the usual and customary manner.
Bachner-Northwest argues that, there was no evidence that Rich had to perform his work in the manner that he apparently did, and points to the fact that under his union agreement he had the right to leave any job where unsafe equipment or practices were utilized. It is suggested that Rich could have insisted that the job be done differently. I find such an argument unpersuasive.
Almost every human endeavor carries some risk of harm to the actor or others. And, almost any type of conduct could be altered to reduce the risks involved. But the fact that a plaintiff engages in conduct that carries a greater risk of harm than some alternative form of conduct does not necessarily mean that he or she is acting without due regard for his or her own safety. This would seem to be particularly true where, as in this case, such conduct conforms to the customary practice of a particular trade, which apparently involves no undue risk for the workman if performed with proper equipment. To expect a workman in that situation to demand that the work be done differently or to expect him to leave the job merely because his union contract might permit him to do so, is expecting too much.
In summary, the majority, while presumably applying a “reasonable man” standard, seems to envision that rather remarkable fellow, the “reasonable man”, as he was described by A. P. Herbert, who wrote:
He is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities which we demand of the good citizen. . . . He is one who invariably looks where he is going, and is careful to examine the immediate foreground before he executes a leap or a bound; who neither stargazes nor is lost in meditation when approaching trapdoors or the margin of a dock; who never mounts a moving *452omnibus and does not alight from any car while the train is in motion . . . and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog before administering a caress; . . . who never drives his ball until those in front of him have definitely vacated the putting-green which is his own objective; who never from one year’s end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife, his neighbors, his servants, his ox, or his ass; . who never swears, gambles or loses his temper; who uses nothing except in moderation, and even while he flogs his child is meditating only on the golden mean.3
It seems to me that we should perhaps expect a little less under the circumstances shown by the record in this case.
In all other respects I concur.

. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 65, pp. 418-419 (4th ed.).

. See also Chaney v. Brupbacher, 242 So.2d 627 (La.App.1970).

. A. P. Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law, pp. 11-16 (1930). It is perhaps also worthwhile to note Herbert’s further observation that: “In all that mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable woman.” Id. at 16. These quotations also appear in Prosser, The Law of Torts § 32 at pp. 150-161, note 21 (4th ed.).