Court Opinion

ID: 9759740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:26:38.839453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:04.398245
License: Public Domain

Kenison, C.J.,
dissenting in part: The majority states that planning boards do not have statutory authority “to require an applicant for a site approval to grant to the city an easement for the purposes of widening an existing street.” Leda Lanes Realty, Inc. v. Nashua, 112 N.H. 244, 293 A.2d 320 (1972), is not authority for the court’s decision. In that case we held only that a planning board was without authority to declare a blanket moratorium on the development of nonresidential tracts where the planning of street changes had not been completed. 2 E. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 11-3, at 11 n.27 (Supp. 1976). Subsequent to Leda Lanes, the legislature passed a statute authorizing municipalities to adopt interim zoning ordinances. Laws 1973, ch. 534; RSA ch. 36-C (Supp. 1975); see 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d § 5.21 (1976); 1 N. Williams, American Land Planning Law ch. 30 (1974); Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1970). In this case there is no blanket moratorium of development. The board is merely conditioning approval of the nonsubdivision site plan upon the plaintiff’s grant of an easement to the city for the purpose of widening the street abutting the plaintiff’s property.
*238It is well established that a planning board may condition approval of subdivision plans upon the developer’s dedication of land for the construction of streets within the development and the widening of streets abutting the plat. 3 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 19.32 (1968); D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law § 138 (1971). We have held that, under RSA 36:19 and :22, the planning board has the authority to condition approval of a subdivision plan upon the landowner’s improvement of existing roads and dedication of land to improve access. KBW, Inc. v. Bennington, 115 N.H. 392, 342 A.2d 653 (1975). This case does not involve a subdivision. The question presented, therefore, is whether the power to condition subdivision proposals extends to nonsubdivision site plans. The majority gives no reason why the board lacks such authority. Indeed RSA 36:19-a specifically extends to the board the authority to approve or disapprove “site plans” whether or not they involve subdivisions. If the board has the power to disapprove a site plan outright, it certainly has the authority to place conditions upon the approval. The existence of such authority under our statute seems clear. Leda Lanes Realty, Inc. v. Nashua, 112 N.H. at 247, 293 A.2d at 322. The power of a municipal body to deny a nonsubdivision building permit unless the landowner dedicates a portion of land for the purpose of allowing the city to widen an abutting street is not unique to New Hampshire. See People v. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 378, 63 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1967); Southern Pacific Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966). I express no opinion as to whether the board could properly exercise its authority in this case. I dissent only to the extent that the majority denies the board’s statutory authority.