Court Opinion

ID: 9588679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:51.243238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:11.923846
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
“Every person is liable for torts committed by his servant, by his command, or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business, whether the same be by negligence or voluntary. [OCGA § 51-2-2.] It matters not that the employee is a public officer, and is employed because he is such officer. If the officer is employed by the master to perform certain acts for the master, and if in the prosecution and within the scope of the master’s business such officer commits a tort, the master is liable. . . .” Massachusetts Cotton Mills v. Hawkins, 164 Ga. 594, 596 (1), 597 (139 SE 52).
To determine the capacity in which the police officer was acting in the case sub judice, the following test, also quoted in the majority opinion, must be applied: “ ‘[W]hether the relationship of the parties under the contract for performance is that of master and servant or that of employer and independent contractor lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, *187manner and method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity with the contract. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Spell v. Port City Adhesives, 183 Ga. App. 816, 817 (1) (360 SE2d 63). In the case sub judice, there is ample evidence that appellee assumed control over the time, manner and method of executing the work done by the police officer. The officer testified that he arrived at the school at the time required by appellee and that he remained there until told by appellee’s agent that he could go. Appellee’s agent told the officer “what to do, how to do it, and where to do it.” No clearer testimony could be given in support of the proposition that the officer was a servant of appellee. The evidence was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of appellee. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In Glenmar Cinestate v. Farrell, 223 Va. 728 (292 SE2d 366), the officer was given no directions by the purported employer and, indeed, the officer testified he would have ignored any attempt by the purported employer to give him instructions regarding his method of directing traffic. The office also determined the proper location for traffic control. The purported employer did not set the hours of employment or even know the time the officer was to arrive. The facts in that case, could not have authorized a finding that a master-servant relationship existed under any state of the law.
The majority has been misguided by the Virginia case of Glenmar Cinestate v. Farrell, supra. This case should be distinguished on both the facts and the law.
The decision in Glenmar Cinestate v. Farrell, supra, is predicated upon a Virginia test which makes “the right to control,” the sole determinate of whether a relationship is that of master and servant or of employer and independent contractor. The fact of actual control is not a factor in the Virginia test. See Glenmar Cinestate v. Farrell, supra at 292 SE2d 366, 369. Under Virginia law the private sector employer’s lack of the right to control the method used by the officer in directing traffic compels a conclusion that the officer is an independent contractor and thus results in Virginia cases such as that relied upon by the majority.
I agree with the majority that directing traffic upon a public thoroughfare is a police function and that a private sector employer of an officer has no right to control the method the officer uses to accomplish this task. However, under the above-quoted Georgia test a question remains as to whether the private sector employer has actually assumed control of the time, manner or method by which the officer directs traffic. As there is evidence in the case sub judice that appellee actually assumed such control of the officer’s work, there is evidence, under Georgia law, of a master and servant relationship between appellee and the officer.
*188Decided March 17, 1989
Rehearing denied March 31, 1989
Johnson & Ward, William C. Lanham, Clark H. McGehee, for appellant (case no. 77524).
Norton, Pennington, Goetz, Cronkrite & Prior, Charles M. Goetz, Benning M. Grice, Jr., Warren C. Grice, for appellant (case no. 77525).
Saveli & Williams, William E. Turnipseed, for appellee.
I must acknowledge that there is authority under Georgia law for utilizing the same test applied by the Virginia court. See Atlanta Braves v. Leslie, 190 Ga. App. 49 (2) (378 SE2d 133). Other cases have utilized the test quoted both by the majority and this dissent. See for example White Repair &c. Co. v. Oviedo, 188 Ga. App. 672, 673 (1) (373 SE2d 784). In my view, the better rule of law is stated in those cases which recognize that an employer often exercises actual control over an employee which exceeds any contractual or legal “right” to control and that when he does so a master-servant relationship exists. Therefore, I would utilize the broader test most recently stated in White Repair &c. Co. v. Oviedo, supra.
Additionally, I should note that in my view the Georgia cases including those cited by the majority, such as Pounds v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 142 Ga. 415 (83 SE 96), and Exposition Cotton Mills v. Sanders, 143 Ga. 593, 595 (85 SE 747), provide no support for the grant of summary judgment to appellee. Pounds is distinguishable on the facts since the officer accused of a wrongful killing was not performing any service for, or by direction of the defendant, at the time of the homicide. Exposition Cotton Mills v. Sanders, supra, if relevant to the case sub judice, supports this dissent rather than the majority opinion.
In my view, the superior court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee and against appellants. I would reverse.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.