Court Opinion

ID: 197460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2011-02-07 03:30:47+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:37.029612
License: Public Domain

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                        

No. 95-2060

                       NIMIA M. RAMOS,

                    Plaintiff, Appellant,

                             v.

                  MANUEL LUJAN, II, ET AL.,

                   Defendants, Appellees.

                                        

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

         [Hon. Justo Arenas, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

                                        

                           Before

                    Selya, Circuit Judge,
                 Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                  and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

                                        

Nimia M. Ramos Beauchamp on brief pro se.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Fidel A. Sevillano Del
Rio, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellees.

                                        

                        July 16, 1997
                                        

          Per Curiam.   Appellant  Ramos-Beauchamp  ("Ramos")

brought this  suit against  various officials  of her  former

employer, 
                     the 
                        Department 
                                   of the Interior, National Park Service

(collectively "DOI"), alleging discrimination on the basis of

her 
               gender 
                      and ethnicity (Hispanic).  Ramos claimed that while

she was  employed as a  park ranger, she  was subjected to  a

discriminator
                        ily hostile work environment, disparate treatment

in 
              the 
                  assignment of equipment, training, responsibilities and

discipline; and a retaliatory constructive discharge.   Ramos

initially 
                     submitted 
                              her 
                                  complaints to the DOI's office of equal

opportunity 
                       ("OEO").  The OEO found no support for most of the

charges, but did find disparate treatment in (1) a thirty-day

disciplinary 
                        suspension of Ramos's law enforcement commission,

and 
               (2) 
                   the 
                       provision of certain equipment.  The DOI undertook

remedial action; Ramos proceeded to district court. 

          Following a five-day bench trial, which was held by

consent 
                   of 
                      the parties before a magistrate judge, judgment was

entered for the defendant on all claims.  The court's factual

findings and  legal conclusions are  set forth  in a  26-page

opinion.

          Ramos 
                           timely 
                                  appealed, but failed to provide a trial

transcript.  Unable  thus to review the issues, including  an

evidentiary question which initially appeared substantial, we

directed Ramos to provide  the transcript or face  dismissal.

Citing  a  change   in  her   financial  circumstances,   she

                             -2-

successfully  sought  an  extension  of  time,  and  obtained

permission 
                      from 
                          the 
                              district court to proceed in forma pauperis

with 
                production 
                           of 
                             the 
                                 transcript at government expense.  After

further delays, the transcript was transmitted to this court.

          Ramos assigns as  error the court's exclusion  from

evidence of an  "administrative deposition" given by  another

Hispanic female  park  ranger, Mirta  Maltes.   The  excluded

"deposition," or sworn statement,  was taken in a  one-on-one

question 
                    and 
                       answer 
                              session conducted by the DOI's internal OEO

investigator.  

          Exclusion of  this  evidence, Ramos  contends,  was

contrary to the parties' "binding" joint pretrial memorandum,

as incorporated into the court's final case management order.

The final order twice referenced Maltes's statement.   Maltes

was listed, first,  as a witness for Ramos "by  deposition." 

Maltes's "sworn statement"  also was listed as a DOI  exhibit

which, by the terms of the order, was "received in evidence."

          Nonetheless, at trial  the DOI objected when  Ramos

proffered 
                     the 
                        Maltes 
                               statement during her case in chief.  After

some  wrangling, the  statement  was excluded  from  evidence

because, the magistrate held, it was hearsay and inadmissible

under any exception to the hearsay rule, including the  open-

ended exception in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).

          We need  not definitively  resolve the  evidentiary

question, however, since a close reading of the record  shows

                             -3-

that  regardless  of  whether  the  statement  was   properly

admissible 
                      or 
                        inadmissible, its exclusion did not prejudicially

affect Ramos's  "substantial rights," or  the outcome of  the

trial.  Lubanski v. Coleco Industries, Inc., 929 F.2d 42,  45

(1st Cir. 1991); see  also United States v. Legarda, 17  F.3d

496, 498 (1st  Cir.) (holding that an erroneous exclusion  of

evidence requires reversal only if it has a "substantial  and

injurious effect or influence" on the verdict), cert. denied,

513 U.S. 820 (1994).  

          The primary value of Maltes's statement was that it

corroborated  Ramos's  allegations  of  disparities  in   the

assignment of equipment, training, and responsibilities.  The

very same facts, however, were placed in evidence by  Ramos's

testimony. 
                       
                       Moreover, the disparities were not challenged, but

were conceded by  the DOI's witnesses.   The DOI's  witnesses

explained the uneven assignments as due to non-discriminatory

factors.  Their explanations were accepted as credible by the

magistrate. 
                        
                        Thus, 
                             the 
                                 outcome of the trial on these claims was

not  affected  by   the  exclusion  of  Maltes's   statement,

encompassing as it did little more than conceded facts. 

          As to  Ramos's  other  claims,  Maltes's  statement

contained no substantial supporting proof.  Maltes swore that

she had no  personal knowledge of  the facts surrounding  the

disciplinary 
                        suspension of Ramos's law enforcement commission.

The statement offered only one marginal fact in corroboration

                             -4-

of Ramos's  retaliation  claim (that  Ramos had  presented  a

doctor's 
                    note 
                         to 
                           excuse 
                                  an absence).1  And Maltes flatly denied

knowledge  of  any disparities  in  overtime  pay  and  shift

assignments.  Finally, while Maltes's statement  conclusorily

characterized
                         the atmosphere at work as "male chauvinist," she

also denied suffering any employment disadvantage due to  her

gender, 
                   thus 
                        providing no factual support for Ramos's claim of

a     discriminatorily     hostile     work     environment. 

          Ramos's 
                             other assignments of error, as we understand

them,2 fare no better.  We apprehend no error in the standard

used by  the court  to assess the  claim of "abusive  working

environment;" perceive no  prejudice in  the court's  alleged

misstatement 
                        of 
                          Maltes's 
                                   employment title; find no abuse in the

court's 
                   evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses; and no

basis for  the argument that the  court denied a "release  of

pertinent information in  agency files."  To the extent  that

Ramos 
                 means 
                       to 
                         challenge 
                                   the weight of the evidence, we observe

   1The statement recites Maltes's "belief" that Ramos had
encountered retaliation, but there is no recitation of a
factual basis for the "belief."  And, although Maltes stated
that she, too, feared retaliation, the only reason suggested
for her fear is that on one occasion she felt threatened by a
supervisor's "personal" animosity toward her. 

   2Although the transcript has been available for several
months, Ramos has not moved to supplement her brief with
record references.  

                             -5-

that this  was not  a "close" case.   There  is ample  record

evidence to support the court's factual findings.

          Affirmed.

                             -6-