Court Opinion

ID: 9538036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:28:48.745791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:22.434767
License: Public Domain

Green, J.
(dissenting)—Dennis Pryor's plea of guilty resulted from a plea bargain dismissing one count of indecent liberties against a 4-year-old child and three of five counts of indecent liberties against an 8-year-old. As part of the bargain, the prosecutor agreed to recommend a sentence within the standard range of 26 to 34 months. In the *124presentence report, the corrections officers recommended the court impose an exceptional sentence and suggested a minimum of 60 months. The court followed these recommendations by imposing an exceptional sentence and exceeded the minimum recommendation in the report by fixing the sentence at 120 months for each count to run concurrently. In doing so, the court considered the following aggravating factors: (1) progressively predatory behavior toward minor females; (2) abuse of a position of trust; (3) particular vulnerability of the victim; and (4) deliberate cruelty. In my view, each of these factors is justified by the record and as a matter of law. As a consequence, I find no abuse of discretion by the court in sentencing Mr. Pryor to a term of 120 months. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from my brethren and would affirm the exceptional sentence.
I disagree with the majority conclusion the trial judge erred in considering the progressively predatory behavior of Mr. Pryor toward minor females as a factor in imposing an exceptional sentence. The corrections officers' presentence report states: "He is a predator who when released into society, seeks out his prey (young females), including a mentally retarded victim, for his deviant sexual pleasures. The age of his victims [14, 12, 10, 8] continues to become younger, with each incident." In my view this recommendation was properly adopted by the trial court and considered as a factor in determining whether to impose the exceptional sentence. While it may be argued under State v. Hartley, 41 Wn. App. 669, 705 P.2d 821, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1028 (1985) and other cases cited by the majority that this predatory conduct standing alone would not be sufficient to support an exceptional sentence, it is a factor, which in the circumstances presented, is so closely intertwined with the other factors—vulnerability and position of trust—that it should be considered as a factor in determining the sentence. The conduct signifies more than the mathematical addition of offenses—it carries the message *125of preying on younger and younger children that will likely occur in the future. Thus, I find no error.
I must also disagree with my brethren's conclusions that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed an exceptional sentence and fixed it at 120 months. Even though the prosecution did not request an exceptional sentence, the court may nevertheless impose a sentence outside the standard range if it finds "substantial and compelling reasons" to do so. RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986). Such is the case here. In fact, the presentence recommendation was that the court impose an exceptional sentence and recommended a minimum of 60 months—no maximum was recommended. The court imposed 120 months, the maximum provided by statute. I cannot conclude that no reasonable person would impose such a sentence based upon the factors present in this case, State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wn.2d 525, 531, 723 P.2d 1123 (1986), and this defendant's prior history. Consequently, I would affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
Review granted at 114 Wn.2d 1001 (1990).