Court Opinion

ID: 9628437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:20:29.128147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:05.960870
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that part of Part I of the majority opinion which reverses the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial and remands to the trial court to reconsider the motion for new trial based upon an independent evaluation of the evidence. Such was the outcome of our original opinion in this matter filed October 27, 1987. Under a proper analysis of the issues involved here it would still be the appropriate result, although the majority’s reversal and remand for a new trial now makes the issue essentially moot. I also concur in Part 111(A) regarding the applicable negligence standard in medical malpractice cases. However, as to Parts II and III(B), I respectfully dissent.
In Parts II and III(B), the Court today, after rehearing, reverses its original opinion in this matter. That earlier opinion unanimously held as to Part II that the failure to give the proximate cause instruction was not error because the jury found no negligence on the part of the defendant Dr. Richards, and thus the proximate cause issue was moot. The Court came to that conclusion even before our recent decision and opinion in Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 758 P.2d 704 (1988), which held that “the issue of the presence or absence of proximate cause does not come into play until and unless underlying negligence is found.” 114 Idaho at 549, 758 P.2d at 708. As to Part III(B), our earlier 1987 opinion correctly recognized that the question asked of Dr. Bjornson was proper cross examination which was not precluded by I.C. § 10-111. I believe the Court errs today when it reverses itself on those two issues.
I
The majority’s treatment of the “missing proximate cause instruction” in Part II is inconsistent both with our prior opinion in this matter, filed October 27,1987, and with our recently released unanimous opinion in Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 758 P.2d 704 (1988). Like Hick*665man, the jury in this case found no negligence on the part of Dr. Richards. The first question on the special verdict form reads as follows:
“ ‘We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows:
Answer: Yes_No X ”
In our original opinion in this matter, filed October 27, 1987, we held that the “missing proximate cause instruction” was not error, stating:
“The record reflects that at the jury instruction conference the parties and the court agreed upon an instruction defining proximate cause, but in the instructions actually read and submitted to the jury that instruction was omitted. The parties are in disagreement as to why the instruction defining proximate cause did not get submitted to the jury. The district court found that the instructions agreed on at the instruction conference were given to the appellants’ secretary for typing, and that in the typing process the instruction was lost by the appellants’ typist.
“While the appellants contest the district court’s finding of their typist’s responsibility for the loss of the instruction, we need not resolve that dispute in order to dispose of the issue. First, the jury, in its special verdict, did not find Dr. Richards negligent, and therefore the issue is essentially moot. The absence of a proximate cause definition does not constitute error where the jury found that no negligence existed on the part of Dr. Richards. It is essential that negligence exists before the proximate cause issue rises. Jones v. Robert E. Bayley Constr. Co., Inc., [36 Wash.App. 357] 674 P.2d 679, 683 (Wash.App.1984) (‘In this case, however, the jury determined by special verdict that Bayley was not negligent, so they did not reach the issue of proximate cause. The error was, therefore, harmless.’).” 115 Idaho at 633, 769 P.2d at 510 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, as our earlier opinion in this case pointed out, proximate cause has a common understanding. Professor Pros-ser states that it is not really necessary for courts to instruct on its definition and that attempts to define the concept have been confusing at best. As we stated in our October, 1987, opinion in this case:
“Whether or not the failure to define proximate cause in a jury instruction is error, much less reversible error, is questionable. See Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 Cal.L.R. 369 (1950). Several courts have held that the terms ‘cause’ and ‘proximate cause’ are of sufficiently common visage and understanding and that a jury may be fairly expected to understand them without a definitional instruction. Stoneburner v. Greyhound Corp., [232 Or. 567] 375 P.2d 812, 816 (Or.1962) (‘As a matter of caution, trial courts submit instructions on proximate cause, but such instructions are unnecessary where in the very nature of things the alleged acts of negligence, if true, necessarily formed a part of the efficient cause, and the law itself would draw that inference.’). See also Quigley v. School Dist. No. 45J3, [251 Or. 452] 446 P.2d 177 (Or.1968). We need not decide in this case that question, however, given the circumstances here where the jury concluded that Dr. Richards was not negligent. Under the circumstances of this case, appellants’ assignment of error regarding failure to give an instruction defining proximate cause is without merit.” 115 Idaho at 634, 769 P.2d at 511 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
The Court’s opinion today does not even attempt to explain why what was written in this case last year is incorrect.
Even more inexplicable is the majority’s reasoning in its cursory attempt to distinguish Hickman. In Hickman, this Court unanimously held that, where the jury finds no negligence, any error regarding a proximate cause instruction “is moot, be*666cause the issue of the presence or absence of proximate cause does not come into play until and unless some underlying negligence is found.” 114 Idaho at 549, 758 P.2d at 708. The Court’s opinion today acknowledges that “there is little difference between the error promulgated by an erroneous instruction and the error promulgated by utterly neglecting to give that same essential instruction to the jury altogether.” Ante at 657, 769 P.2d at 534. Having said that, Hickman should be the controlling authority.
*665“‘QUESTION NO. 1. Was there any negligence on the part of the Defendant James Richards which was a proximate cause of an aggravation of injuries to Leah Robertson?’
*666However, the majority attempts to distinguish Hickman, stating:
“This case is distinguishable from Hickman in that in the instant case Instruction No. 16, supra, which provided that guidance to the jury as to how it was to determine the presence or absence of negligence, specifically directed the jury to do so with reference to the requirements of the missing proximate cause instruction. Therefore, the missing instruction would have a direct influence on the determination of negligence in the first instance, which was not the case in Hickman, supra. Thus, the failure to include the essential proximate cause instruction requires the granting of a new trial.” 115 Idaho at 657, 769 P.2d at 534.
This attempt to distinguish the Hickman case is wrong for at least two reasons.
First, Instruction No. 16 was directed at the negligence of the “other health care providers,” and had nothing to do with the jury’s analysis of the defendant Dr. Richards’ alleged negligence. Instruction No. 16 states in full:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 16
“In regard to your determination of whether other health care providers were negligent, you will make that determination based upon these instructions, and in order to conclude that other health care providers were negligent, you must so find by a preponderance of the evidence as defined in these instructions.
“In regard to your determination of whether the negligence of other health care providers proximately caused injuries sustained by Plaintiff Leah Robertson, you will make that determination based upon these instructions, and in order to conclude that the negligence of other health care providers proximately caused injuries, you must so find based on the definition of proximate cause as contained in these instructions and by a preponderance of the evidence as contained in these instructions.” (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from reading Instruction No. 16 that it relates only to the jury’s “determination of whether [the] other health care providers were negligent.” It has nothing to do with the jury’s determination of the defendant Dr. Richards’ negligence. The instruction which told the jury how they were to analyze the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendant Dr. Richards was Instruction No. 15, which states:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 15
“The plaintiffs have the burden of proving each of the following propositions: “1. That the defendant Richards was negligent;
“2. That the negligence of defendant Richards was a proximate cause of injuries sustained by them;
“3. The nature and extent of the injuries, the elements of damage, and the amounts thereof.”
Instruction No. 15 in this case is practically identical to the instruction given in Hickman.1 Under Instruction No. 15 in Hickman, and under the practically identical *667instruction in this case, the jury’s deliberation was guided, setting out each of the steps necessary in order to find liability on the part of the defendant Dr. Richards. In both cases the instructions first required the jury to find that the defendant was negligent. Only after finding the defendant negligent was the jury to take the next step to determine whether “the negligence of the defendant [Hickman] [Richards] was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by [plaintiffs].” In Hickman we held that “an issue having to do with the semantics of the proximate cause instruction is moot, because the issue of the presence or absence of proximate cause does not come into play until and unless some underlying negligence is found.” 114 Idaho at 549, 758 P.2d at 708. The majority’s analysis in this case fails to recognize that the juries in both Hickman and this case were identically instructed that they must first determine the question of negligence before they addressed the question of proximate cause, as Hickman held. That sequence of analysis was further emphasized by the instructions in this case; e.g., Instruction No. 12, which the majority approves, reads as follows:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 12
“The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case have the burden of proving, by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all competent evidence, that at the time and place of the alleged incident in question, the defendant negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practiced in the community in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided as such standard then existed with respect to the class of health care provider to which the defendant belonged and in which he was functioning.
“In addition, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury and damage to the plaintiffs, and the amount thereof” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the instructions in this case and the instructions in Hickman are identical with regard to the jury’s analysis of whether the plaintiff has met his burden of proof. Hickman held that where the jury finds in the first step of its analysis that there was no negligence, the question of whether or not there was error in the second step of the analysis, i.e., the proximate cause instruction, is a moot issue.
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 16, which the majority concludes distinguishes this case from Hickman, does not sustain the majority’s argument. A careful reading of Instruction No. 16 clearly demonstrates that it had nothing to do with the jury’s analysis of the defendant Dr. Richards’ negligence, but was directed toward the negligence of the “other health care providers.” The jury never got to that part of the special verdict dealing with the negligence of the “other health care providers” because the jury found that Dr. Richards was not negligent. The failure of the majority to analyze Instruction No. 16 in its entirety, rather than merely looking at a small portion of it, leads it into error. Instruction No. 16 had nothing to do with the jury’s analysis of defendant Dr. Richards’ conduct. That was controlled entirely by Instruction No. 15 and the definition of negligence in Instruction No. 12, which the majority acknowledges was correct, ante at 658, 769 P.2d at 535. Therefore this case is indistinguishable from Hickman, based upon the identical Instructions No. 15 which were given in both cases. Accordingly, in my opinion, the majority errs in not concluding, as we did in Hickman, and as we did in our earlier opinion in this case, that there was no reversible error by the trial court’s inadvertent failure to give the instruction on the definition of proximate cause.
Secondly, the majority’s analysis fails to recognize the longstanding sequence of proof required in negligent tort cases. It is hornbook law, reflected in both the instant case and in Hickman, that a prima facie case involves distinct elements, and each element must be proven before the succeeding element is given consideration. The majority opinion, however, erroneously states that a new trial should be granted *668because “the missing [proximate cause] instruction would have a direct influence on the determination of negligence in the first instance.” Ante at 657, 769 P.2d at 534. This statement is clear legal error. The determination of negligence in the first instance has no connection whatsoever with, proximate cause. Negligence, as reflected in the instructions given here and in Hickman, involves a determination revolving around the reasonable man standard or, in the case of medical malpractice, “the applicable standard of health care practiced in the community.” It is only after the jury has determined that a defendant has acted contrary to the applicable standard that the proximate cause issue is reached. Proximate causation is not dealt with as part of the threshold negligence determination; rather, it is a separate issue in and of itself, demanding consideration only if and when the threshold negligence determination is made in the affirmative. Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, supra. Accordingly, the majority’s statement that the missing proximate cause instruction would have a direct influence on the determination of negligence in the first instance ignores the proper analysis applicable to negligent tort cases, eviscerates the clear legal distinction between the proximate causation and negligence elements of a tort claim, and conflicts sharply with the rationale in our Hickman case.
In sum, the majority’s cursory attempt at distinguishing Hickman is fatally flawed due to an erroneous reading of a portion of Instruction No. 16, and due to its failure to distinguish the separate concepts of negligence and proximate cause. Our original unanimous opinion in this matter correctly decided this issue. Accordingly, I dissent from Part II of the majority opinion.
II
I also dissent from Part 111(B) of the majority opinion. The majority reverses and remands for a new trial because defense counsel’s question on cross examination of Dr. Bjornson allegedly violated I.C. § 10-111. Ante at 659, 769 P.2d at 536. I.C. § 10-111 was enacted to prevent jury prejudice regarding the amount of the claim which that jury had to evaluate. I.C. § 10-111 has no application to any other case than the one. the jury is to decide. Nor does it have any effect on the cross examination of a witness to establish prejudice or bias. The proper scope of cross examination of a witness is determined by the Idaho Rules of Evidence, not by I.C. § 10-111. See I.R.E. 1102.
The purposes behind I.C. § 10-111 are specifically set out in that section. It states that “it is against the policy of the state of Idaho for the jurors [who are] required to make such determinations [general damages] to be informed of the particulars of allegations of damages in the pleadings on file with the court, by the arguments of counsel or otherwise, the dollar amount appraisal or evaluation of such damages being the exclusive province of the trier of fact....” The statute prevents the parties from telling the jury what the litigants think the ultimate dollar amount of the jury’s verdict should be in the case they are deciding. However, the question which Dr. Richards’ counsel asked Dr. Bjornson did not involve the “determinations” which “the jurors [were] required to make” in appellant’s lawsuit against Dr. Richards. Rather, it involved the amount which Dr. Bjornson had been sued for, which suit had been settled and was not before the jury. That cross examination was for the purpose of impeaching Dr. Bjornson’s testimony which was offered to prove that the cause of appellant’s injuries was attributable entirely to the negligence and fault of the defendant Dr. Richards. Dr. Richards’ counsel’s purpose in asking Dr. Bjornson the disputed question was not to disclose to the jury the amount of damages being sought from Dr. Richards (in fact, it gave no clue regarding the amount plaintiffs were seeking from Dr. Richards —it only contained information about plaintiffs’ now-settled claims against Dr. Bjorn-son); rather, counsel’s purpose was to counter and impeach the testimony of Dr. Bjornson that it was Dr. Richards’ negligence, not his own, which caused plaintiff her injuries.
*669At trial Dr. Bjornson testified that the original X-ray taken when the plaintiff was admitted to the emergency room disclosed the broken neck which he testified at trial he could observe in the X-ray from “ten paces away.” But there was testimony that the witness Dr. Bjornson had viewed that X-ray in the emergency room that same evening, yet he said nothing and took no action regarding the broken neck. Furthermore, the radiologist, Dr. Richardson, and presumably the neurologist, Dr. Am-ick, had examined the X-ray and neither apparently identified the broken neck which Dr. Bjornson testified that he could now see from “ten paces away.” Thus, Dr. Bjornson’s testimony at trial, to the effect that the fault was entirely Dr. Richards’ and not his own, was subject to serious question.
The right to cross examine Dr. Bjornson to display any bias or prejudice which might have resulted from a favorable settlement given to Dr. Bjornson, in exchange for his testimony against the defendant Dr. Richards, was critical to the defense. The majority opinion does not assert that it was error for Dr. Richards’ counsel to impeach Dr. Bjornson by pointing out that he too had been sued by the plaintiff in this case. The majority apparently acknowledges, and correctly so, that it was permissible to impeach Dr. Bjornson’s testimony by pointing out that he too had been sued but had settled prior to the trial. Rule 408, Idaho Rules of Evidence expressly permits that. I.R.E. 408 states that while evidence of compromises and settlements is not admissible to prove liability “[t]his rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness....” (Emphasis added.) Here, the evidence was being introduced not to prove Dr. Bjornson’s liability (that issue having been previously disposed of via an out-of-court settlement), but to impeach Dr. Bjomson’s credibility. Accordingly, under I.R.E. 408 the evidence elicited by this form of cross examination was admissible.
The slender reed upon which the majority reverses is not the fact that Dr. Richards’ counsel’s question on cross examination disclosed that Dr. Bjornson had been sued, but that the question also disclosed the amount for which he had been sued. However, the purpose behind I.C. § 10-111 is to prevent the jury from being informed of the amount claimed for general damages in the case which the jury is deciding. Nothing which Dr. Richards’ counsel stated informed the jury how much the plaintiff was seeking from Dr. Richards, the issue which they, the jurors, were to decide. Accordingly, the express purpose of the statute has not been violated.
Furthermore, I.C. § 10-111 itself contains an exception designed for cases such as this. The final sentence of that section states that “provided, this act shall not be construed to prohibit proof of damages or presentation of arguments which are legally relevant and proper in view of the record and issues before the court in any action for money damages.” The disputed cross examination of the witness Dr. Bjornson was “legally relevant” for impeachment purposes, and therefore even if it were covered by the first portion of I.C. § 10-111, which it is not, the last provision of I.C. § 10-111 would not exclude “proof of damages or presentation of arguments which are legally relevant” to the issue of impeachment of the witness Dr. Bjornson.
This exception in I.C. § 10-111 recognizes that the amount of damages sought can be disclosed to the jury if it is “legally relevant.” Under both our prior cases and the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the cross examination which occurred herd was “legally relevant,” and admissible. I.R.E. 607 states that “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party including the party calling him.” Additionally, I.R.E. 611(b) states that a party may be cross examined on matters affecting his credibility as a witness.
This Court’s cases, prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, also acknowledge that cross examination is proper
“not only as to all facts stated by a witness in his original examination, but as to other facts connected with them, directly or indirectly tending to explain, *670modify or qualify the inference resulting from the facts stated by the witness in his direct examination.” State v. Starry, 96 Idaho 148, 525 P.2d 343, 345 (1974), quoting Towne v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 58 Idaho 83, 91, 70 P.2d 364, 366 (1937).
More recently, in State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 691 P.2d 1266 (Ct.App.1984), our Court of Appeals reiterated that the purpose of cross examination is to weaken the testimony of the party examined.
Directly in point is Hall v. Bannock County, 81 Idaho 256, 340 P.2d 855 (1959). In Hall it was held that it would have been proper to permit a doctor witness to indicate whether he was a party in the original action, even though the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, did not allow the doctor to answer the question. This Court in Hall stated:
“Appellants’ first assignment claims error for the reason that the trial court sustained an objection to the following question addressed to Dr. O.F. Call under cross-examination:
‘Q. Doctor, in this regard at the time this action was commenced you were a party to the original action, is that right?’
“Appellants argue that the question was asked for the purpose of showing interest and bias on the part of the witness.” 81 Idaho at 261, 340 P.2d at 857.
This Court agreed with appellants’ contentions in this regard, stating:
“This Court has repeatedly held that the scope or extent of cross-examination tending to show interest or bias rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations omitted.] The answer sought only remotely tended to show bias. Although it would have been proper to permit the witness to answer the question we do not consider the ruling an abuse of discretion or prejudicial error.” 81 Idaho at 261, 340 P.2d at 857-858 (emphasis added).
In the present case the trial judge ultimately exercised his discretion and permitted Dr. Richards’ counsel to impeach the witness, Dr. Bjornson, by cross examining him regarding the fact that he had been sued for $5,000,000 as a defendant in the original action, and to argue that point to the jury. The majority opinion today seemingly overlooks the holding in the Hall case that “it would have been proper to permit the witness to answer the question” regarding his being sued in the same action. Neither does the Court acknowledge that whether such cross examination is allowed “rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Hall v. Bannock County, 81 Idaho at 261, 340 P.2d at 857. Where the trial court properly identifies the law and applies the law to the facts, then the trial court’s discretion has not been abused, even if this Court would disagree in the result, as was the case in Hall v. Bannock County, supra. In Avondale On Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 658 P.2d 992 (Ct.App.1983), the Court of Appeals describes the analysis an appellate court must make in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion. Nowhere in the majority opinion, however, is an abuse of discretion analysis made of the trial court’s decision which ultimately allowed the defense to use this cross examination of Dr. Bjornson. Rather, the majority opinion clings to an over-expansive interpretation of the first portion of I.C. § 10-111, ignoring the exception contained at the end thereof which permits the “presentation of arguments which are legally relevant and proper in view of the record and issues before the court_” Id.
There was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling, and under any test— be it this Court’s prior decisions, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, or I.C. § 10-111 — the cross examination of Dr. Bjornson which occurred in this case was a proper mode of impeachment for bias and prejudice.
Finally, even if I.C. § 10-111 applied to the question asked in this case, it would be contrary to the Rules of Evidence as they apply in this case, and it would have to yield to the superior authority of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 1102 states:
“Rule 1102. Effect on evidentiary statutes and rules. — Statutory provisions and rules governing the admissibility of *671evidence, to the extent they are eviden-tiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect.”
Even though I.C. § 10-111, when properly applied in this case, is not in conflict with the Rules of Evidence that apply to the instant issue, if it did conflict it would have been rendered “of no force or effect” due to the preemptive effect of I.R.E. 1102. The cross examination which occurred here was expressly authorized by I.R.E. 607 and 611(b).
Today’s opinion is a complete departure from our earlier opinion issued October 27, 1987, and from several prior decisions of this Court. That earlier opinion correctly held that there is no legal basis for reversing the decision of the trial court, except to remand the matter for the correct evaluation of the motion for new trial which the trial court erroneously evaluated, as set out in Part I of the majority opinion. This Court’s original October 27, 1987, opinion correctly decided the other issues in this case, and should be reaffirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.

. The Hickman instruction read:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 15
"The plaintiffs have the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
"1. That Defendant "Eagles” acted, or failed to act, in one of the ways claimed by the
plaintiffs, and that in so acting, or failing to act, the defendant was negligent;
"2. That the plaintiffs were injured;
“3. That the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of said injuries;
"4. The nature and extent of the injuries, the elements of damage and the amount thereof.”