Court Opinion

ID: 9817667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 04:36:44.714609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:29.039672
License: Public Domain

Ladd, J.,
concurring in the opinion of the court, states:
“The separate deed of the husband, and the separate deed of the wife, are alike ineffectual to pass the homestead right. By the plain terms of the statute, neither can have any effect upon it. It seems to follow that the separate deeds of. both must be equally ineffectual. The statute created a‘ new and somewhat peculiar estate — an inchoate right in which the wife and minor children, as well as the husband, have an interest. It provides the exact mode in which that right may be released or conveyed.”
In Howell, Jewett & Co. v. McCrie, 36 Kan. 636, 14 Pac. 257, the very able, logical, and exhaustive opinion written by Simpson, O., is so illuminating that it is worthy of an extended quotation:
“The homestead feature of the laws has always been regarded with peculiar - favor by the courts of those states by which it has been enacted. It has been the theme of both forensic and judicial eloquence. It has been repeatedy declared in legislative halls and from the bench, that the policy of these laws is ‘liberal’ and ‘benevolent’; ‘their object a noble one’; that ‘they are an enlightening public policy;’ ‘their provisions the most beneficent.’ In the convention that framed the Constitution of the state there was no one subject that was more carefully considered and more thoroughly discussed than the homestead provision. At least twenty-five pages of the published debates of that body are devoted to the discussion of this subject. In the various stages and phases of that discussion, among the many opifiions and comments made on the section, as it was being perfected, and as finally adopted, the following expressions are selected as guides to the intention of its authors, to wit: ‘The wife’s right to the actual control of the homestead.’ ‘The guarantee of a home to every member of the family.' ‘A reckless or drunken husband should not have power to alienate the home of his family.’ ‘The protection of the family, and not the head of the family merely.’ ‘To give permanency and value to the homestead by making its alienation difficult.’ ‘To put it out of the power of the husband or the misfortunes of trade to take away the homestead.’ ‘A home for the family, that Shy-locks cannot reach.’ ‘The woman, the wife and mother, shall have control of the home.’ ‘There is no intention to exclude the woman, for that would destroy the object of a homestead.’ ‘Neither the hand of the law nor all the uncertainties of life can eject the family from possession of it.’ ‘Gives every mother and child in the state a home to which they may retirp and find shelter from the storms of life.’ This is the spirit in which the homestead prov'sion was conceived, and these are the reasons for its adoption, and it must be read in the light, and construed in the spirit of these declaratory statements of its framers.
“In the earliest adjudications of this court on questions arising under this homestead feature of our Constitution, the same or similar expressions are used. In Morris v. Ward, 5 Kan. 239, Mr. Justice Valentine says:
“ ‘The homestead was not intended for the play and sport of capricious husbands merely, nor can it be made liable for his weaknesses or misfortunes. It was not established for the benefit of the husband alone, but for the benefit of the family and of society ; to protect the family from destitution and society from the danger of her citizens becoming paupers.’
“In Helm v. Helm, 11 Kan. 19, Chief Justice Kingman says:
“ ‘The wife’s interest is an existing one. The occupation and enjoyment of the estate is secured to her against any act of her husband or of creditors without her consent. *279If her husband abandons her, that use remains to her and her family. With or without her husband, the law has set this property apart as her home.’
“These citations are sufficient to show that both the convention that framed the Constitution and the court whose prerogative it is to construe it. have unitedly declared its purposes and obiects to be for ‘the protection and maintenance of the wife and children against the neglect and improvidence of the husband and father.’
“This court, in the consideration of questions arising under this provision of the Constitution and the statutory enactments in aid thereof and supplemental thereto, must give them a liberal construction, so that the purposes intended by the laws shall the better be advanced and secured. (Thomp. H. & Ex. p. 8, and authorities there cited). These same considerations induce the courts to adopt a strict rule respecting their alienation, to the end that what is regarded so highly as to be embodied in the organic law as the most beneficent legislation and the most enlightened public policy, is not to be lightly regarded and easily-avoided by the parties for whose protection the legislation was adopted. Hence it is held that the homestead right can be barred only by complying strictly with the laws prescribing the mode of alienation. (Moore v. Titman, 33 Ill. 360; Kitchell v. Burgwin, 21 Id. 45; Connor v. McMurray. 84 Mass. 202; Greenough v. Turner, 77 Id. 332; Hoge v. Hollister, 2 Tenn. Ch. 606; Dickinson v. McLane, 57 N. H. 31.) To divest the homestead estate, the mode of conveyance prescribed by the law governing the alienation of such estates must be strictly pursued, is the rule generally adopted in all the states in which such laws have been enacted, held more strictly in some than in others, and yet in all there must be a literal compliance with the provisions of the statutes in this behalf.
“From all the adjudications upon this subject, the three following rules are deduced, and may fairly be considered as settled: (1) The object of the homestead law is to protect the family of the owner in the possession and enjoyment of the property. (2) That construction must be given such laws which will best advance and secure their object. (3) To divest the homestead .estate, thorp must he a literal compliance with the mode of alienation prescribed by the statute.”
The rules laid down in the foregoing commissioner’s opinion are fully supported by the Supreme Court of Kansas, which has held, in numerous decisions, to a strict rule of construction in favor of maintaining the integrity of the homestead:
“While W. and wife owned and occupied a homestead, she duly executed and acknowledged a power of attorney, appointing and authorizing him, as her lawful attorney, ‘to sign deeds and mortgages, notes, checks, releases, etc., to loan moneys, to sue and be sued, to collect rents, make contracts, giving and granting unto my said attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and any acts and things whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully and to all intents and purposes as I might or could do if present, with full power of substitution and ratification, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney or his substitutes shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.’ This power of attorney was duly recorded in the county where the homestead was situated. More than 21/2 years afterward, the power being still unrevoked, the husband obtained a loan and executed a mortgage to secure the payment of the same, which he signed for himself, and also signed as attorney in fact for his wife. In an action to foreclose the mortgage, it was contended by the wife that a conveyance of a homestead by virtue of a power of attorney is unauthorized, and, further, that the authority conferred by the power of attorney in this instance was too general and indefinite to authorize the execution of a mortgage upon the homestead. Held, that the power of attorney executed bv the wife was insufficient to express that joint consent which the Constitution and statutes of this state require in the alienation or incumbrance of a homestead.” Wallace v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 54 Kan. 442, 38 Pac. 489.
“A mortgage given upon the homestead without the joint consent of husband and wife is - void. The alienation of a homestead after it has once been established is such a personal privilege as cannot be delegated by either the husband or wife to the other. There has 'been a guard thrown not only around the wife, but also around the hus-bahd. The doctrine of unity between husband and wife has been solemnly declared in the Constitution, and the homestead cannot be alienated without their joint consent.” Locke v. Redmond. 6 Kan. App. 79. 49 Pac. 670.
In Morris v. Ward, 5 Kan. 239, it is held:
“A mortgage of the homestead executed by the husband alone, is void.”
In Dollman v. Harris, 5 Kan. 597, it is held:
“A mortgage of a homestead, executed ■by the wife alone is void, notwithstanding the legal title to the same may be in her and not in her husband.”
• How. then, can it be said that two void instruments, one executed» by the husband and the other by the wife, mortgaging the homestead, can have the effect to create a lien? They are'void for all purposes, wheth*280er considered separately or taken together. See Bird v. Logan et al., 85 Kan. 228, 10 Pac. 564; Berry v. Berry, 57 Kan. 691, 47 Pac. 887; Withers v. Love, 72 Kan. 140, 83 Pac. 204; Terrant v. Swain, 15 Kan. 146; Chambers v. Cox, 23 Kan. 393; Coughlin v. Coughlin, 26 Kan. 116; Warden v. Reser, 38 Kan. 86, 16 Pac. 60.
Probably the first record we have of a conveyance of real estate by an instrument under seal as evidence of the transaction is in the first part of the 32nd chapter of Jeremiah. These instruments under seal executed for the purpose of conveying title to real estate have become universally known as deeds.
In defining a deed, Bouvier, Law Dict, vol. 1, p. 811, says:
“Deed. — A written instrument under seal, containing a contract or agreement which has been delivered by the party to be bound and accepted by the obligee or cove-nantee. Co. Litt. 171; 2 Bla. Com. 295; Shepp. Touchst. 50.
“A writing containing a contract sealed and delivered to the party thereto, 3 Washb. R. P. 239.
“A writing under seal by which lands, tenements, or hereditaments are conveyed for an estate not less than a freehold. 21 Bla. Com. 294.
“A writing or instrument, written on paper or parchment, sealed and delivered, to prove and testify the agreement of the parties whose deed it is to the things contained in the deed. American Button-Hole Overseaming S. M. Co. v. Burlack, 35 W. Va. 647, 14 S. E. 319. See Baker v. Westcott, 73 Tex. 129, 11 S. W. 157.”
“Deed Poll. A deed which is made by one party only.”
Under this definition, the deed executed by Dan Hawkins at Muskogee was a deed poll. The deed executed by Beatrice Hawkins at Tulsa was a deed poll:
Bearing in mind that the statute says:
“No deed * * * relating to the homestead exempt by law * * * shall be valid unless in writing and subscribed by both husband and wife”
—it is clear to us that one of (he objects of the -statute was to prevent (he very thing which has occurred here. No one would contend, in the face of. the statute, that the deed of Dan Hawkins conveyed any title (o the homestead. All 'would agree that it is void. The same is true of the deed of Beatrice Hawkins. If the deed executed by the husband alone is void and the deed executed by the wife alone is void, how then can it be said that two void instruments create one valid instrument? To hold that these two deeds were sufficient to pass the title to the homestead would be to disregard the plain provisions of the statutes, and this we may not do.
The petition makes some reference to a tender of $1,100 by the plaintiffs to the defendants. Of this the defendants, on page 11 of their brief, say:
“There is no evidence of any tender of $1,100, or any other sum. We apprehend that the court will have no trouble in determining that no tender has ever been made the defendants in error.”
In view of this position taken by the defendants, it is unnecessary for us to pass on the question of a tender or defendants right to recover any sum paid the plaintiffs for this land. The defendants would not be entitled to a lien on the land for any money they had paid paintiffs for these deeds. The courts woud be powerless to decree the money so paid to be a lien on the land, for this would be doing indireetly what we have just held cannot be done directly. to wit. alienate the homestead without the deéd being subscribed by both husband and wife. If this were decreed to be a lien on the land, and the plaintiffs were unable to pay the money necessary to discharge the lien, the land, which constitutes the homestead, could be sold» to satisfy the lien. This is expressly prohibited by the Constitution and statutes hereinbefore quoted.
“A mortgage lien on a homestead cannot be created without the written consent of the wife. The husband alone, by his contract, cannot change the character or the priority of a mortgage lien on the homestead; neither can he alone restore it after loss, or re-create it, without the consent of the wife, in the exact manner prescribed by law. A husband whose homestead was incumbered by a mortgage lien made an agreement with the mortgagee to execute another mortgage for the benefit of. the creditor, who was to discharge his mortgage so that the new mortgage might become the first lien on the homestead, the money derived from the new mortgage to be paid to the creditor; and for the remainder due the creditor, a second mortgage was to be executed by the husband and wife on the homestead. The new mortgage was executed, the money received and paid to the creditor, whose mortgage was released, and discharged on the margin of the record thereof. The wife bad no knowledge of the agreement until after the new mortgage was executed and the discharge of the first was entered on the record. She refused to execute the mortgage for, the remainder due. The creditor brought an action to cancel the *281discharge, and to foreclose the original mortgage, praying the- court to declaré it a second lien on the homestead. Held, that the court has not the power to declare the original mortgage a lien on the homestead; such a lien can only be created by the written consent of the wife, in the manner prescribed by law. It is not within the equitable power of courts in this state to declare any indebtedness a lien on a homestead. The Constitution of the state prescribes the manner of its creation, and this must be strictly followed.” Jenkins v. Simmons et al., 37 Kan. 496, 15 Pac. 492.
A tender of the money is not a prerequisite to the plaintiffs’ right to have the deeds canceled. It may be they are unable to make the tender. If the court should hold a tender was necessary, and they could not make it, their poverty would defeat the Constitution and statute designed to protect the very class of persons who need its protection.
The deeds were absolutely void, and plaintiffs are entitled to have them canceled. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and this cause remanded, with instructions to the trial court to grant a new trial and proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.
HARRISON. C. J., amd KANE, JOHNSON, ELTING, KENNAMER, and NICHOLSON, J.T.. concur. PIT(TIFORT), V. ,C. J.. dissents.