Court Opinion

ID: 9681520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:51:59.569946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.307105
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin, joined by Justices Brewster and Smith,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority opinion holds that Art. 2168a, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. Statt. of Texas, is not applicable to the present proceedings. In this, I think the majority is in error. The majority applies Art. 2168a and our corresponding Rule 254 only to bring about a postponement of a trial of a cause, and not to postpone any preliminary or ancillary proceeding. This conclusion is arrived at by considering only the language of that portion of the *465Article and Rule which provides that the court shall “continue such cause,” and “any party applying for such continuance,” and like wording wherein the word “continuance” is used. This wording is only a part of the enactment, and I believe all of the wording of such enactments should be considered in determining the meaning which the Legislature had in mind in enacting the law.
It is to be noted that in Rule 254, Vernon’s Ann. Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas, the word “trial” occurs only one time. That language is “* * * and that the presence of party or attorney is necessary to a fair and proper trial of the cause.” The opening sentence of the Rule sets forth the nature of the actions to which it is applicable. It reads in part: “In all civil actons pending in any court of this State at any time the legislature is in session * * * for a continuance of such cause * * * that any party * * * or any attorney for any party to such cause * * *. Where a party to any cause is a member of the legislature * * * the court shall continue the cause * * (Emphasis added) This Rule was one of the original rules promulgated by this Court, and adopted by the Legislature and became effective September 1, 1941.
In 1949 the Legislature by Acts, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 569, p. 1111, Sec. 1, enacted what is now Art. 2168a, and which deals with the same general subject matter as Rule 254. It is to be noted that nowhere in said Act is the word “trial” used. The beginning of this Act reads: “In all suits, either civil or criminal, or in matters of probate * * and uses the word “cause” throughout. Nowhere is the word “trial” use in Art. 2168a. The emergency clause, Sec. 2 of the Act, in part states: “The fact that Rule No. 254 * * * has superseded, in so far as civil actions are concerned, * * (Emphasis added)
In the case of National Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Texas 315, 167 S.W. 2d 1021, 1023, the Court of Civil Appeals had certified to this Court certain questions arising in the trial of the plea of privilege hearing below. One of these questions was whether or not the petition filed by plaintiff below was a “suit” within the contemplation of Subsection 28 of Art. 1995, prescribing venue in suits on policies of life insurance. This Court held it was a “suit”, and defined a suit as follows:
“* * * A ‘suit’ is ‘any proceeding in a court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy in a court of justice which the law affords him.’ Watson Co. v. Cobb Grain Co., Texas *466Com. App., 292 S.W. 174, 176, quoting the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. Ed. 481. It is the prosecution of some demand in a court of justice. Ex Parte Towles et al., 48 Texas 413, 433.”
Surely it cannot be contended that Respondent Johnson is not seeking to pursue in a court of justice a remedy afforded him by law — to wit, that of preserving the testimony of a witness to be used in an action against the Relator.
In discussing a proceeding to preserve testimony, it was held in the case of Gonzales v. Rodriguez, 1952, Texas Civ. App., 250 S.W. 2d 253, 255, no writ history, that an election contest is such a suit as to make Rule 187 (preservation of testimony) available. Tht Court recognized that an “election contest” is not an ordinary “civil suit.” The contention was there made that for Rule 187 to be applicable the cause must be a “civil suit.” That Court says:
“* * * The question here is whether or not the provisions of Rule 187, supra, (Texas Rules of Civil Procedure) are broad enough to permit the taking of depositions in a prospective election contest.
“Rule 2, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part as follows:
‘These rules shall govern the procedure in the justice, county, district, and appellate courts of the State of Texas in all actions of a civil nature, with such exceptions as may be hereinafter stated/
“This is a general provision of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and states their application. It will be noted that the rules are not to be applied only to ‘civil suits’ but are to be applied in all ‘actions of a civil nature,’ which would include all proceedings of a civil nature and only exclude criminal cases. Therefore, we see no reason why Rule 187, supra, should not be applied to election contests as well as all other proceedings of a civil nature.
“This is a question of first instance in this State and we find no Texas authorities in point. It has been held in other jurisdictions that depositions may be taken in a disbarment proceeding under statutes which are apparently very similar to our Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 American Jur., p. 703, Sec. 11; State ex rel. Kehoe v. McRae, 49 Fla. 389, 38 So. 605; State v. Mosher, *467128 Iowa 82, 103 N. W. 105. The contention of appellees that Rule 187 has no application to election contests is overruled.”
By the same reasoning we think that Rule 2, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure also makes the present proceeding one in which Rule 254, as amended by Art. 2168a, Acts, Leg., 1949, supra, is applicable.
The case of Lambert v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n., 1938, Texas Civ. App., 121 S.W. 2d 406, no writ history, states that a proceesing to perpetuate testimony is not of itself an independent suit, but merely a method of taking depositions in aid of and incidental to an anticipated suit. Again, the Court says this proceeding is merely ancillary to the main suit to be filed later. Similar reasoning will be found in the cases of Equitable Trust Co. v. Jackson, 129 Texas 2, 101 S.W. 2d 552; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas v. State ex rel Cobb, 135 Texas 25, 137 S.W. 2d 993; B. F. Avery & Sons Plow Co. v. Mayfield, 1937, Texas Civ. App., 111 S.W. 2d 1134, writ dismissed, w.o.j.; State of Arizona v. State of California, 1933, 392 U.S. 341, 54 S. Ct. 735, 78 L. Ed. 1298.
This proceeding is certainly a “proceeding in a civil suit or action,” and although some of the authorities hold it is “ancillary or incidental” to the suit later to be filed, I think it is within the meaning of Rule 254, and Art. 2168a of a “civil suit” and a “cause” which Relator is entitled to have postponed until 30 days after the adjournment of the present legislative session, as prayed for by him. By “ancillary” is meant “aiding, attendant upon, describing a proceeding attendant upon or which aids another proceeding considered as principal.” Black, Law Dictionary, 4-th Ed. Webster’s, New International Dictionary, 2nd. Ed., defines “ancillary” pertaining to legal matters, as “designating or pertaining to a * * * proceeding that is subordinate to, or in aid of another primary or principal proceeding * * In other words, it is a part of a principal proceeding. In our case the proceeding here is in aid of a future suit to be filed, and is a “suit” within the meaning of Art. 2168a. If it is a part of, or in aid of a suit, it is the first step or proceeding in the suit.
I would, hold that Relator,, as Lieutenant-Governor, is a “member of the Legislature” as those words are used in Rule 254 and Art. 2168a. It is true he is an official, whose office is created by Sec. 16 of Art. IV of the State Constitution. This Article is entitled “Executive Department,” and unquestionably *468Relator is an officer of such Executive Department. At the same time, and by that Article of the Constitution, it is provided that the Lieutenant-Governor, by virtue of his office, is president of the Senate, and when the Senate is in Committee of the Whole, he shall have a right to debate and vote on all questions; also he shall give the casting vote when the Senate is equally divided. Sec. 17 of Art. IV provides that the Lieutenant-Governor, while he acts as president of the Senate, shall receive for his services the same compensation and mileage as allowed to members of the Senate and no more. It is to be noted that neither Art. 2168a nor Rule 254 limit their application to “members of the Legislative Department,” but provide for relief to “members of the Legislative.” I believe these enactments include Relator as Lieutenant-Governor within their terms.
The reasons for postponing causes in which members of the Legislature are parties or attorneys is discussed in detail in the case of Mora v. Ferguson, 145 Texas 498, 199 S.W. 2d 759. These reasons are to encourage and make possible effective work of the Legislature by preventing the members thereof from having their interest and attention diverted during sessions resulting from worry about any court proceedings. The same reasoning applies to protecting the Lieutenant-Governor from having to attend proceedings of the nature herein involved during legislative sessions. Surely it will not be disputed that it is very essential that Relator be present at the taking of these depositions in order that his rights may be protected. His presence is essential if his attorney is to conduct intelligently and effectively Relator’s side of this cause. Situations will arise on the hearing that Relator’s counsel will need to consult with Relator in order to properly develop the cause. If Relator is forced to be present at the hearing during the session of the Legislature, the Legislature must suffer by virtue of his absence. If Relator is forced by the pressure of his legislative duties to be absent from the taking of this deposition, then his rights must suffer. Art. 2168a and the cases construing it show that it was to remedy this dilemma that the Legislature passed Art. 2168a. Further, to hold that Art. 2168a is not applicable to these proceedings is to nullify the provision of this Article and the reasons for its passage.
I do not believe the judicial branch of our government should be a party to the creation of such confusion, or to aid in the obstruction of the Legislature in its deliberations. I believe we should give effect to the language of the legislative enactment, and to the prior reasoning of this Court in applying this Iegis*469lation, and afford Relator the relief sought by mandamus requiring this proceding to be postponed as provided by Art. 2168a.
Relator raises the question of the sufficiency of the statement filed by respondent Johnson to appraise him of the cause of action against him; also Relator filed a plea of privilege to have the taking of the deposition moved to the county of Relator’s residence. I believe these matters are not before us in this proceeding, but I believe the trial court should act upon the above pleas prior to the taking of the deposition herein. In my opinion, Guthrie v. Speck, Texas Civ. App., 53 S.W. 2d 319, 320, no writ history, would require a holding that the present statement amounts to no more than a mere “fishing expedition.”
Opinion delivered May 4, 1955.
ON REHEARING