Court Opinion

ID: 9679037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:38:51.311792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.784487
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in affirmance). I agree with Division 1 (6 Mich App 317, 320) that the trial judge erred in denying plaintiff the right to cross-examine Dr. Klucka. When Dr. Klucka was called to the stand the trial judge and counsel engaged in pertinent colloquy:
“Mr. Oursten [plaintiff’s counsel]: Incidentally, for the record, I am calling Dr. Klucka as an adverse witness under cross-examination, under the statute.
“Mr. Dice [defendant’s counsel]: I object to that. He is not a party to this suit.
“The Court: Well, I sustain the objection, and I ask that be stricken. I think that remark was improper. Tou have a witness called by you and as to what transpires hereafter, this was an unfair thing for you to say. This is your witness and you called him. Is this correct?
*311“Mr. Gursten: Under the statute for cross-examination.
“The Court: Under what statute! He isn’t a party to this ease. You can’t call him under the statute for cross-examination.
“Mr. Gursten: I intend to show he was an agent.
“Mr. Dice: I object.
“The Court: This is very improper. If you are going to try to indicate — if you are trying to establish him as an adverse witness, then you may only do so by examination. At this point he is your witness and you are bound by his testimony as of now.”
Later on the trial judge ruled:
“[The Court]: What you established throughout the entire testimony is that this Dr. Klucka is a doctor or physician attending your client for many years, and it was Dr. Klucka who suggested, or asked, or retained, or whatever else he did, that Dr. Hurd perform the operation. It is just the reverse of what you say. * * *
“[The Court]: I rule he is not an adverse witness in accordance with your citation.”
The objection of defense counsel should have been overruled. That Dr. Klucka was not a party had no bearing. He was called as a witness who, at the time of the happening of the transaction “out of which the action arose”, was an employee or agent of the opposite party, that party being the defendant Hurd. The quoted announcement of plaintiff’s counsel was sufficient to justify employment by him of the statute and rule of court (revised judicature act, PA 1961, No 236, § 2161; GUB 1963, 507.4) provided there was some showing of the relationship between defendant and witness which the rule and the statute require. There was such showing.
The record shows that Dr. Klucka was the referring doctor and that defendant Hurd was the surgeon *312to whom the referral was made. Having accepted the referral, Dr. Hurd was in charge of the operation. That operation was the “transaction” contemplated by the aforesaid statute and rule. Being thus in charge, he was entitled to engage and supervise such assistance as to him was deemed requisite to the task undertaken. Had he called in say, there being an emergency, some nurse, midwife, overhead rigger, or even a piano mover to hold the forceps or surgeon’s hook under his direction, I apprehend no one would deny that the assistant thus called was Dr. Hurd’s employee or agent for the purpose of performing the operation.
I perceive no difference under the statute and court rule that Dr. Hurd engaged Dr. Klucka to perform such assistance. Dr. Klucka doubtless would perform better than lay assistance, but that conclusion makes for no new or different legal relationship.
There can be little factual doubt about the status of Dr. Klucka when he was called to the stand. Dr. Hurd’s operative report, made immediately after the operation, lists himself as the operating surgeon and Dr. Klucka as his operating assistant. Next Dr. Morgan’s operative report, made two days later, lists himself as the operating surgeon, Dr. Klucka as the referring doctor, and Dr. Hurd as his, Dr. Morgan’s, operating assistant. These reports alone were amply sufficient to justify the right of cross-examination of Dr. Klucka which plaintiff decided to invoke.
The error referred to was both crucial and prejudicial. When the burden bearer is compelled to make his case or defense in whole or in part by calling adversely interested or hostile witnesses, he should not be restricted in cross-examination when he does make the requisite showing of agency or employment. My vote accordingly is to affirm re*313versal by Division 1, to which I add only the following :
I do not care to commit my signature to any ruling that Dr. Youngstrom was or was not qualified to testify to the opinion plaintiff’s counsel expected to obtain from him. I prefer to wait for the doctor’s complete testimony before judging the admissibility of such an opinion. Every witness, whether acting mendaciously or honestly, is entitled to the “full liberty of explanation” and the right to change, alter, or contradict testimony previously given by him (Stoudt v. Shepherd [1889], 73 Mich 588, 592; Erickson v. Milwaukee Lake Shore & W. R. Co. [1892], 93 Mich 414, 418). The trial judge in this instance should have received the proposed-testimony by separate record if, as seems to have been the case, he was of opinion that Dr. Youngstrom had irreversibly committed himself as an incompetent expert witness. For details of what seems to have been hastily improvident judicial action, see the connected transcript appearing in Justice O’Hara’s opinion, pp 306-308, ante.
As told above, I vote to affirm. Plaintiff should have costs of both appellate courts.
Kelly, J. concurred with Black, J.