Court Opinion

ID: 9398513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:01:55.900482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.142687
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13561   Document: 31-1       Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 1 of 26

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-13561
                         ____________________

        CLYDE ANTHONY,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        STATE OF GEORGIA, et al.,

                                                              Defendants,

        GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-13561       Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 05/31/2023      Page: 2 of 26

        2                        Opinion of the Court                    21-13561

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Georgia
                       D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-05303-SDG
                             ____________________

        Before BRANCH and GRANT, Circuit Judges, and HINKLE,∗ District
        Judge.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               Clyde Anthony appeals the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of
        Public Safety (“Department”). In this civil appeal, Anthony argues
        that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out
        a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the
        Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his
        alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to
        promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave.
        Anthony also raises a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that
        the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges
        is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
        (“EEOC”) because it lacked authenticity, was hearsay, and was
        potentially an expert witness report with improper legal
        conclusions. We conclude that the district court properly granted

        ∗ Honorable Robert L. Hinkle, United States District Judge for the Northern
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561       Document: 31-1       Date Filed: 05/31/2023      Page: 3 of 26

        21-13561                 Opinion of the Court                           3

        summary judgment on both claims, although we affirm the grant
        of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different
        reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, we
        conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
        to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. Accordingly, we
        affirm the judgment of the district court.
                                    I.     Background
               A. Facts 1
                Clyde Anthony, a black male, is a former state trooper who
        was employed by the Department as a member of the Georgia
        State Patrol. In August 2017, Anthony held the rank of trooper first
        class and was a member of Troop C. On August 5, 2017, Anthony
        contacted several fellow troopers to secure a ride to work that
        morning. He claimed that he needed a ride because his car had a
        flat tire. However, one of Anthony’s superior officers, Assistant
        Troop Commander Lieutenant T.J. Jackson, received a report that
        Anthony needed transportation because he might have been
        intoxicated and unable to drive to work. Upon further
        investigation, Jackson was told that “several other people” had
        heard that Anthony was possibly drunk.

        1 At summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to
        Anthony. See Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 723 F.3d 1287, 1294
        (11th Cir. 2013).
USCA11 Case: 21-13561         Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 05/31/2023         Page: 4 of 26

        4                          Opinion of the Court                      21-13561

               Trooper First Class Colby Johnston was sent to pick
        Anthony up. Johnston reported that there was an odor of alcohol
        on Anthony. When they arrived at headquarters, Jackson
        performed two alco-sensor tests on Anthony to determine whether
        he was impaired. 2 These tests took place at approximately 12:40
        pm. According to those tests, Anthony’s blood alcohol level was
        .016 and .014, respectively. Because the results of the alco-sensor
        tests and the odor established a reasonable suspicion of alcohol use,
        approximately one and a half hours after the second alco-sensor
        test, Anthony was given a breath test at a testing facility. According
        to that test, Anthony’s blood alcohol level was .000, indicating no
        presence of alcohol.
               Following the testing, Anthony was taken back to his home,
        where he called Troop C Commander Captain Nikki Renfroe.
        Renfroe informed Anthony that he would be placed on
        administrative leave pending an investigation. The investigation
        was a troop-level one conducted by Renfroe. At the end of the
        investigation, Renfroe recommended that Anthony remain on
        administrative leave, that he be required to undergo a “fitness for
        duty evaluation specific to alcohol dependency,” and that he
        receive professional counseling sessions. Renfroe sent her
        recommendation to Commanding Officer Major Tommy

        2 The alco-sensor test is a preliminary breath test utilized out in the field to
        determine if someone suspected of alcohol use needs to undergo a more
        extensive breath test at a testing facility.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561        Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 05/31/2023        Page: 5 of 26

        21-13561                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        Waldrop, who agreed with her recommendation and approved it
        for implementation.3 While on administrative leave, Anthony
        received full pay and benefits. Anthony’s administrative leave
        lasted nearly six months.
               As part of the investigation, Renfroe monitored Anthony’s
        social media accounts while he was on administrative leave. At
        some point during September 2017, Renfroe saw a video posted on
        Anthony’s Facebook profile where he was marketing an at-home
        breathalyzer device. Concerned that Anthony was marketing an
        alcohol-related device and that his marketing of the device might
        implicate the Department’s policy against secondary
        employment, 4 Renfroe forwarded the video link to Waldrop, and

        3 At the time of the incident, Waldrop was the Commanding Officer Major of
        the Georgia State Patrol. He was appointed to that position by the Georgia
        Commissioner of Public Safety. When asked about why he approved
        Renfroe’s recommendation to keep Anthony on administrative leave and
        require him to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation and counseling, Waldrop
        responded, “Because my job is to support the captains to make their troops
        run smoothly. And [Renfroe] conducted the investigation through her troop,
        through her subordinates. And that was the information that she gave me.
        My job is to support her in the information that she gives me.” While Waldrop
        approved Renfroe’s recommendation regarding Anthony’s discipline, there is
        no evidence he made the initial decision to place Anthony on administrative
        leave or participated in the troop-level investigation into Anthony’s suspected
        alcohol use.
        4 The exact terms of the Department’s policy against secondary employment
        are unclear from the record. As best as we can discern, the Department
        typically allows employees to engage in secondary employment, pending
USCA11 Case: 21-13561          Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 05/31/2023          Page: 6 of 26

        6                           Opinion of the Court                        21-13561

        the matter was referred to Internal Affairs for further investigation.
        The investigation into Anthony’s Facebook post closed with no
        disciplinary action taken against Anthony.
              On November 16, 2017, during his administrative leave,
        Anthony voluntarily applied for family medical leave, indicating he
        was “under doctor’s care for stress.” Anthony’s request was
        approved, and he was removed from administrative leave and
        placed on family medical leave. Anthony’s doctor later cleared him
        for work, and he was returned to administrative leave on
        December 1, 2017, so that he could complete the imposed fitness
        for duty evaluation and attend counseling. Anthony later
        completed the counseling and evaluation, and he returned to duty
        on February 1, 2018. Anthony was not demoted, and he received

        approval. However, once employees are placed on administrative leave, they
        are forbidden from participating in secondary employment opportunities
        related to their roles as law enforcement officers (e.g., security guards).
                Considering the Facebook post appeared to show Anthony marketing
        a breathalyzer device, which is commonly used by law enforcement, Renfroe’s
        concern seemed to be that Anthony’s involvement with selling the device
        might be police-adjacent employment that violated the Department’s policy.
        Anthony understood the policy and was adamant he did not hold a second job
        while on administrative leave, and he testified at his deposition that he did not
        seek approval before marketing the device because “[i]t’s not a job. . . . I didn’t
        interview. I didn’t turn in any Social Security numbers, and it’s not
        guaranteed.”
USCA11 Case: 21-13561        Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 05/31/2023       Page: 7 of 26

        21-13561                  Opinion of the Court                             7

        no change in pay as a result of the investigations into the August 5,
        2017 alcohol incident and the September 18, 2017 Facebook post. 5
               Anthony was deposed during the lawsuit’s discovery phase.
        As part of his testimony, Anthony identified Corporal John
        McMillan, a white male and member of Troop D, as a comparator
        who was treated more favorably than Anthony. McMillan’s
        situation is as follows. On September 11, 2015, several fellow
        officers detected an odor of alcohol on McMillan when he showed
        up at the scene of a crash. McMillan registered a .019 blood alcohol
        level on an alco-sensor test, and he admitted he had consumed
        alcohol while on duty. McMillan was placed on administrative
        leave with pay, which lasted for approximately three months.
        Troop D Commander Captain Dennis Dixon conducted the
        investigation into McMillan’s suspected alcohol use. Following his
        investigation, Dixon recommended that McMillan be demoted
        from corporal to dispatcher, a civilian position, with a
        corresponding drop in salary. 6

        5 The concurrence incorrectly asserts that Anthony “ultimately was
        exonerated.” While Anthony was ultimately reinstated and never received a
        reduction in pay, he was required to undergo a “fitness for duty evaluation
        specific to alcohol dependency” and receive professional counseling sessions.
        Because these requirements were conditions of his reinstatement, it is
        incorrect to assert that he “ultimately was exonerated.”
        6 As the commanding officer of the Georgia State Patrol, Waldrop approved
        Dixon’s recommendation for McMillan’s ultimate discipline. But, like with
USCA11 Case: 21-13561       Document: 31-1       Date Filed: 05/31/2023      Page: 8 of 26

        8                       Opinion of the Court                   21-13561

                At some point during Anthony’s administrative leave, one
        of his supervisors, Corporal Chad Harris, instructed Anthony “not
        to have any involvement with any Departmental matters” while he
        was on administrative leave. Anthony was interested in applying
        for a promotion to corporal, but because of this comment, and
        without seeking any clarification, Anthony opted not to take the
        corporal exam required to receive the promotion.7
               B. Procedural History
                On March 9, 2020, Anthony filed a second amended
        complaint against his former employer, the Department, alleging
        that it discriminated against him because of his race in violation of
        Title VII. He alleged that he was placed on administrative leave
        from August 5, 2017, through January 29, 2018, following an
        investigation into his violation of the substance abuse policy and
        that white employees who “violate[d] the substance abuse policy
        were not placed on administrative leave of this duration.” He
        alleged that the duration of his administrative leave was
        lengthened by (1) the investigation into his Facebook post that was
        eventually “swept under the rug,” (2) his “medical treatment for
        stress caused by [the Department] placing him on administrative
        leave,” and (3) the Department’s requirement that he undergo a

        Anthony, there is no evidence Waldrop participated in the troop-level
        investigation into McMillan, which was conducted by Dixon.
        7 There was no regulation in place that precluded Anthony from taking the
        corporal exam while on administrative leave.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023      Page: 9 of 26

        21-13561                Opinion of the Court                         9

        fitness for duty evaluation and counseling. Anthony also alleged
        that black “employees are discriminated [against] on the basis of
        race in regards to promotions,” and that he was denied a
        promotion to corporal because of his race.
                 Following discovery, the Department moved for summary
        judgment, arguing that Anthony could not make a prima facie case
        of discrimination related to the investigation. Specifically, it argued
        that the period of time an employee is on administrative leave is
        dependent on a “number of factors” and that there is “no one-size-
        fits-all approach.” The Department pointed to Anthony’s medical
        leave and the investigation into the Facebook post as reasons his
        administrative leave was lengthened. It argued it had a legitimate,
        nondiscriminatory reason for placing Anthony on administrative
        leave, as it had reasonable suspicion to believe that he reported for
        duty with alcohol in his system. It also contended that Anthony
        was unable to identify any similarly situated white employees,
        arguing that McMillan was not a proper comparator because he
        was demoted, while Anthony was not. The Department also
        asserted that Anthony could not make a prima facie case based on
        the Department’s failure to promote him because he failed to take
        the corporal exam while on administrative leave, which is a
        prerequisite to being promoted to corporal.
              Anthony responded to the Department’s motion for
        summary judgment. In regard to the investigation claim, Anthony
        argued that McMillan was similarly situated to him because both
        were employed as state troopers and both were investigated for
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 10 of 26

        10                     Opinion of the Court               21-13561

        reporting to work under the influence of alcohol. He also
        emphasized that “[t]he discrimination lies in the manner that the
        two investigations were handled differently.” And for the failure-
        to-promote claim, Anthony contended that he was denied access
        to a promotion because Corporal Chad Harris, a supervisor,
        instructed Anthony “not to have any involvement with any
        Departmental matters” while he was on administrative leave.
        Thus, he argued he had “no reason to defy his supervisor by
        investigating if he was able to take the exam during” his
        administrative leave.
                 In support of his arguments, Anthony attached an excerpt
        he claimed was from his EEOC file. This document was titled
        “Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety,” and it
        offered a conclusion that race was a significant factor in
        determining when a trooper would be promoted to supervisor by
        the Department, a “fact” the document asserted was “corroborated
        by . . . data analytics.” The document did not list an author or any
        other identifiers.
                The Department replied to Anthony’s response. It argued
        once again that Anthony failed to establish a prima facie case of
        discrimination related to its alcohol investigation of him and that
        McMillan was not a proper comparator because he “held a different
        rank, reported to different supervisors, admitted to having alcohol
        in his system, and faced much more severe repercussions.” It also
        argued that Anthony failed to establish a prima facie case on his
        failure-to-promote claim because there was no rule precluding him
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 11 of 26

        21-13561               Opinion of the Court                      11

        from taking the Corporal Exam while on administrative leave.
        Finally, the Department argued that the document allegedly from
        the EEOC was inadmissible because it (1) was hearsay, (2) was
        unauthenticated, (3) sought to introduce improper expert
        testimony without a qualified expert, and (4) improperly reached
        the ultimate issue that the Department’s promotional practices
        were based on race.
               In a report and recommendation (“R&R”), the magistrate
        judge recommended that the Department’s motion for summary
        judgment be granted. For the claim related to the alcohol
        investigation, the magistrate judge determined that Anthony did
        not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race
        because, while McMillan was similarly situated to Anthony, the
        Department did not treat McMillan more favorably, as McMillan
        was demoted and Anthony was not. For the failure-to-promote
        claim, the magistrate judge determined that Anthony did not
        establish a prima facie case because he did not offer any evidence
        that Corporal Harris’s instruction was based on race. Finally, the
        magistrate judge declined to consider the alleged EEOC document,
        pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2), because it was
        unauthenticated, contained improper legal conclusions, and failed
        to show that the unidentified author was qualified as an expert.
              Anthony objected to the R&R on three grounds. First,
        Anthony argued that the magistrate judge incorrectly concluded
        that McMillan was not treated more favorably. Second, Anthony
        argued that Corporal Harris’s instruction denied him the
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 12 of 26

        12                     Opinion of the Court               21-13561

        opportunity of taking the corporal exam, an opportunity provided
        to white employees. Finally, Anthony argued that the magistrate
        judge improperly failed to consider unauthenticated portions of the
        alleged EEOC document related to Anthony’s claims.
                The district court adopted the R&R in its entirety and
        granted the motion for summary judgment. In its de novo review
        of the issues to which Anthony objected, the district court
        concluded Anthony could not establish a prima facie case of race
        discrimination based on his alcohol investigation claim, as Anthony
        was similarly situated to McMillan but not treated less favorably
        because McMillan was demoted and his salary was reduced
        following his administrative leave, while Anthony was not
        demoted and his salary was not reduced. The district court also
        concluded that Anthony could not make a prima facie case on his
        failure-to-promote claim, as he failed to show he was “due
        consideration for the corporal position” because he did not take the
        exam and he presented no evidence to show that Corporal Harris
        gave him incorrect information because of his race. Finally, the
        district court concluded that the magistrate judge properly
        declined to consider the alleged EEOC document because Anthony
        did not authenticate it and failed to explain why it would be
        admissible despite containing hearsay, legal opinions, and expert
        conclusions.
              Following the entry of a final judgment, Anthony timely
        appealed.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023      Page: 13 of 26

        21-13561               Opinion of the Court                        13

                                  II.     Discussion
           A. Whether the district court erred in granting summary
              judgment to the Department as to Anthony’s Title VII
              discrimination claims
             Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for
        employers
              to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
              or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
              with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
              or privileges or employment, because of such
              individual’s race . . . .
        42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Anthony contends the Department
        violated Title VII and racially discriminated against him in (1) the
        Department’s investigation of his alleged alcohol use during work
        hours and (2) the Department’s failure to promote Anthony to
        corporal while he was on administrative leave. Anthony contends
        that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the
        Department as to each of these issues.
               This Court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment. Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
        723 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is
        appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
        as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
        matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether the
        movant has met this burden, courts must view the evidence in the
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 14 of 26

        14                     Opinion of the Court                21-13561

        light most favorable to the non-movant. Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd., 723
        F.3d at 1294. Nonetheless, “unsubstantiated assertions alone are
        not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”
        Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987).
              1. The Department’s investigation into Anthony
               Anthony argues that he and McMillan were similarly
        situated and that he was discriminated against on the basis of race
        when he was treated differently than McMillan during their
        respective investigations. Specifically, Anthony argues that he was
        discriminated against because McMillan’s administrative leave was
        shorter than Anthony’s and because McMillan was not required to
        undergo a fitness for duty exam or substance abuse counseling.
                In an attempt to avoid the issue he faced below, where his
        claim was unsuccessful because the district court concluded his
        discipline was actually more favorable than McMillan’s, Anthony
        on appeal attempts to impose artificial divisions on his
        discrimination claim. As he makes clear in his initial brief, Anthony
        argues he was similarly situated to McMillan and is asserting
        alleged discrimination for the “investigation stage—the only stage
        that [he] is contesting as discriminatory in this case.” While we
        need not decide whether it is legally permissible to divide the
        “similarly situated” framework into distinct stages of an employer’s
USCA11 Case: 21-13561         Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 05/31/2023         Page: 15 of 26

        21-13561                   Opinion of the Court                                15

        investigatory process,8 because Anthony loses even if we do so, in
        accordance with his argument, we need only evaluate whether
        Anthony was similarly situated to and treated differently from
        McMillan in the so-called “investigation stage.”
              Under Title VII, a claimant may show discrimination
        through circumstantial evidence by satisfying the burden-shifting
        framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
        Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Lewis v. City of
        Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
        Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of

        8 We note that Anthony’s desire to implement divisions into the “similarly
        situated” framework seemingly contradicts the very purpose behind the
        comparator analysis. As we have stated, “discrimination is a comparative
        concept—it requires an assessment of whether ‘like’ (or instead different)
        people or things are being treated ‘differently.’” Lewis v. City of Union City,
        918 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In the typical Title VII
        discrimination scenario, a plaintiff looks at the entirety of an investigation and
        disciplinary process and alleges disparate treatment by pointing to every
        aspect in which they were treated differently in comparison to a “similarly
        situated” individual. But here, because Anthony’s chosen comparator
        McMillan was treated more favorably than Anthony at the end of their
        respective alcohol investigations, Anthony desires to fragment the “similarly
        situated” framework into divisions and argues that the final discipline is wholly
        irrelevant to his discrimination claim. In doing so, he is asking us to ignore
        the positive ultimate outcome he received and focus solely on the length of
        his and McMillan’s investigations, the only part of the process in which
        Anthony was treated differently in a negative way. Thus, Anthony does not
        seek for us to evaluate his discrimination claim through all differences in
        comparison to McMillan, as Lewis suggests, but instead asks us to pick and
        choose.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 16 of 26

        16                     Opinion of the Court                21-13561

        establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing,
        among other things, that his employer treated similarly situated
        employees outside his class more favorably. Id. at 1220–21.
               To prove that an employer treated a similarly situated
        individual outside the employee’s protected class more favorably,
        the employee must show that he and his proffered comparator
        were similarly situated in “all material respects.” Id. at 1224.
        Generally, a “similarly situated” comparator is an employee who
        “engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the
        plaintiff,” was “subject to the same employment policy, guideline,
        or rule,” had the “same supervisor as the plaintiff,” and “share[d]
        the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history.” Id. at 1227–28.
        Ultimately, “a plaintiff and h[is] comparators must be sufficiently
        similar, in an objective sense, that they ‘cannot reasonably be
        distinguished.’” Id. at 1228 (quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv.,
        Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 231 (2015)).
               Here, the district court did not err in finding that Anthony
        did not establish a prima facie case for race discrimination under
        the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, we disagree with
        the district court’s finding that McMillan, the comparator, was
        similarly situated to Anthony at the investigation stage.
               The only similarities between Anthony and McMillan are
        that they both were state troopers and they both were investigated
USCA11 Case: 21-13561       Document: 31-1       Date Filed: 05/31/2023       Page: 17 of 26

        21-13561                 Opinion of the Court                           17

        for showing up to work intoxicated.9 However, the similarities
        end there. First, McMillan and Anthony held different ranks at the
        time of their respective incidents. Second, McMillan admitted to
        drinking and, thus, was not subject to any further testing. Third,
        Anthony points to no evidence that McMillan was suspected of
        violating other Department policies, while Anthony was suspected
        of and investigated for his alleged violation of the Department’s
        secondary employment policy. Fourth, Anthony voluntarily took
        family medical leave during his administrative leave, thus
        extending his administrative leave duration. Finally, their
        investigations were conducted by different supervisors—
        McMillan’s investigation was conducted by Troop D Captain
        Commander Dixon while Anthony’s was conducted by Troop C
        Commander Captain Renfroe.10 Anthony presents no evidence
        that McMillan, a member of Troop D, was supervised by Captain
        Renfroe, the Troop C supervisor who conducted Anthony’s
        investigation. Nor does Anthony present any evidence that Major
        Waldrop, the only person who supervised both Anthony and
        McMillan, was involved in any way in either investigation. Thus,

        9 McMillan, like Anthony, was investigated for being under the influence of
        alcohol at work, and both were subjected to alco-sensor tests and placed on
        administrative leave pending the outcome of an internal investigation.
        10 Anthony was a member of Troop C, while McMillan was a member of
        Troop D.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561        Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 05/31/2023        Page: 18 of 26

        18                        Opinion of the Court                      21-13561

        McMillan was not “similarly situated” to Anthony in “all material
        respects.” 11 See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227–28.
                Anthony emphasizes that Waldrop implemented both
        Anthony’s and McMillan’s final discipline, and, thus, argues that
        Anthony had the same supervisor as McMillan. But Anthony does
        not allege that he was similarly situated to McMillan in the
        discipline stage. 12 Instead, Anthony argues that the alleged
        discriminatory treatment took place during the investigation stage,
        arguing that both he and McMillan “should have received the same
        treatment during” their respective alcohol investigations. Since
        Waldrop did not participate in either investigation,13 Anthony’s
        reliance on Waldrop as the individual who ultimately implemented
        both Anthony and McMillan’s discipline—which occurred at the
        discipline stage that Anthony himself has argued must be carved
        out from our analysis—is irrelevant to our analysis of whether
        Anthony and McMillan were similarly situated during the
        investigation stage.

        11 Because Anthony has failed to identify a proper comparator, we need not
        explore whether McMillan was treated more favorably.
        12 In fact, Anthony does not challenge the district court’s finding that he was
        actually treated more favorably than McMillan at the “discipline stage.”
        13 We also note that while Waldrop did make the initial decision to place
        McMillan on administrative leave, there is no evidence he made the initial
        decision to place Anthony on administrative leave.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561        Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 05/31/2023        Page: 19 of 26

        21-13561                  Opinion of the Court                              19

               Anthony failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII
        race discrimination.14 Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment on the alcohol investigation issue in favor of
        the Department. 15
               2. The Department’s failure to promote Anthony
                Anthony argues that he was denied an opportunity to sit for
        the corporal exam because “his then supervisor told him not to get
        involved with any [Department] matters while he was on
        administrative leave.” Thus, he argues that a juror could find a
        racially discriminatory intent from this instruction, which, he
        argues, was misleading. 16

        14 Anthony emphasized in his brief and at oral argument that he was unable
        to continue his secondary employment as a security guard at a church while
        he was on administrative leave, which Anthony estimated cost him $30,000 to
        $40,000 in secondary income. This argument goes more towards the damages
        Anthony allegedly suffered if he were able to prove his Title VII race
        discrimination claim, but it does not change our analysis of his prima facie
        case.
        15 Although we are affirming on different grounds, “we may affirm the district
        court as long as the judgment entered is correct on any legal ground regardless
        of the grounds addressed, adopted or rejected by the district court.” Ochran
        v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).
        16 Harris instructed Anthony “not to have any involvement with any
        Departmental matters” while he was on administrative leave. Notably, Harris
        did not tell Anthony he could not sit for the corporal exam, and Anthony did
        not ask Harris to clarify his instruction.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023     Page: 20 of 26

        20                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13561

               To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination based
        on a failure-to-promote theory, a plaintiff must show that he
        (1) belonged to a protected class; (2) was qualified for and applied
        for a position that the employer was seeking to fill, (3) was rejected
        despite his qualifications, and (4) that “the position was filled with
        an individual outside the protected class.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep.
        Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2005). The burden of proving
        “that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
        remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Springer v. Convergys
        Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007).
                Here, the district court did not err in finding that Anthony
        did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination due to the
        Department’s failure to promote him, because he was not qualified
        for the corporal position as he did not complete the written exam
        required for promotion. See Vessels, 408 F.3d at 768. Anthony
        contends that he did not take the exam because of Corporal
        Harris’s comment. But he presents no evidence that this
        instruction was made with discriminatory intent, so Anthony has
        failed to establish that race discrimination was the real reason for
        Corporal Harris’s directive. Because Anthony has failed to produce
        any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on his
        failure-to-promote claim for race discrimination, we affirm the
        district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
        Department.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023     Page: 21 of 26

        21-13561                Opinion of the Court                        21

           B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to
              consider as evidence the document Anthony claims is from
              the EEOC
               Anthony argues the district court erred in refusing to admit
        the document allegedly from the EEOC that he sought to
        introduce in support of his failure-to-promote claim. Specifically,
        he contends that the document need not be authenticated at the
        summary judgment stage because it was capable of being
        authenticated at trial and that the hearsay in the document is
        admissible at summary judgment because the declarant is available
        to testify at trial. In the alternative, even if the document was
        inadmissible, Anthony argues that, at trial, he can testify that he
        received the document from the EEOC.
               This Court “review[s] a ruling on the admissibility of
        evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator
        Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). A party may object to
        the admissibility of evidence presented at the summary judgment
        stage if the evidence cannot be presented “in a form that would be
        admissible” at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
               When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one
        of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is
        deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground. Sapuppo
        v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).
        Issues not raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited and will not
        be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances. United States v.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023       Page: 22 of 26

        22                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13561

        Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 143
        S. Ct. 95 (2022). Extraordinary circumstances include whether
               (1) the issue involves a pure question of law and
               refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of
               justice; (2) the party lacked an opportunity to raise the
               issue at the district court level; (3) the interest of
               substantial justice is at stake; (4) the proper resolution
               is beyond any doubt: or (5) the issue presents
               significant questions of general impact or of great
               public concern.
        Id.
               Here, Anthony has forfeited any arguments as to the district
        court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was
        inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an
        unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of
        these grounds in his opening brief, instead arguing only that the
        document would not be subject to exclusion on the grounds of lack
        of authentication and hearsay.
                Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant
        consideration, because a refusal to consider the issue would not
        result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial
        justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the
        issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of
        great public concern. See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. Because
        Anthony failed to challenge properly on appeal two of the grounds
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 23 of 26

        21-13561               Opinion of the Court                       23

        on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to
        have abandoned any challenge on these grounds, and we affirm as
        to this issue. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
                                  III.   Conclusion
               Because Anthony failed to establish a prima facie case of race
        discrimination on his alcohol investigation and failure-to-promote
        claims, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
        And because Anthony failed to challenge two of the district court’s
        grounds for refusing to admit the purported EEOC document, we
        also affirm as to the evidentiary issue.
              AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 24 of 26

        21-13561                HINKLE, J., Concurring                     1

        HINKLE, District Judge, Concurring:
             I agree that the district court properly granted summary
        judgment, but I get there by a different route.
               The plaintiff Clyde Anthony, a state trooper, drank alcohol
        on a Friday night, had a flat tire the next morning, and called other
        troopers for a ride to work. This and other circumstances,
        including social-media posts seen by another employee, caused an
        assistant troop commander to believe—reasonably—that Mr.
        Anthony might have been impaired. Initial tests showed a blood-
        alcohol level of .014 or .016, below the .02 that is a firing offense
        but more than a trooper should have in his system while working.
        Mr. Anthony was placed on administrative leave with pay while an
        investigation was conducted not just of his condition on this one
        morning but of his use of alcohol more generally. Mr. Anthony
        denied any wrongdoing and ultimately was exonerated. He
        returned to his position.
               Nothing about these circumstances suggests race had
        anything to do with it. Mr. Anthony asserts, though, that a trooper
        of a different race—in the jargon of employment-discrimination
        cases, a “comparator”—was treated more favorably.
               The alleged comparator, John McMillan, was also a state
        trooper. He was at work on a different day with a blood-alcohol
        level of .019. He, too, was placed on administrative leave and
        investigated. He admitted drinking on the job and was demoted to
        an unsworn position.
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 25 of 26

        2                   HINKLE, J., Concurring          21-13561

                Nothing about the different treatment of Mr. Anthony and
        Mr. McMillan suggests race had anything to do with it. The
        exonerated trooper—Mr. Anthony—kept his job. The guilty
        trooper—Mr. McMillan—was demoted. The obvious reason for
        the different treatment was that one was innocent, the other guilty.
               To be sure, Mr. Anthony also complains that his
        investigation took longer than Mr. McMillan’s. That seems
        unsurprising; one might reasonably expect it to take longer to
        investigate a contested charge than an admitted charge. Moreover,
        Mr. Anthony sought medical leave during the investigation.
        Because of the medical issues and alcohol use, he was reasonably
        required to submit to a fitness-for-duty evaluation before his
        return. The record includes no evidence that race had anything to
        do with the medical leave or fitness-for-duty evaluation. On those
        issues, Mr. McMillan is not a comparator—he was not required to
        undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation, but he did not have the same
        medical issues and was not put back to work as a trooper.
               The bottom line: the district court properly granted
        summary judgment because nothing in the record would support
        a finding that race was a reason for Mr. Anthony’s treatment. I
        would affirm on that basis. The majority is correct that Mr.
        McMillan is not a proper comparator on the length-of-investigation
        and fitness-for-duty issues. But on the question whether Mr.
        Anthony could properly be placed on leave and investigated, Mr.
        McMillan is very much a proper comparator. Mr. Anthony loses on
USCA11 Case: 21-13561     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023   Page: 26 of 26

        21-13561                HINKLE, J., Concurring                   3

        this issue not because Mr. McMillan was different, but because he
        was the same—and his treatment was the same.
               The difference in this analysis and the majority’s makes no
        difference in the outcome. But on different facts, the different
        analysis would produce different results. Had Mr. Anthony been
        demoted while Mr. McMillan kept his job, this case would properly
        go to trial. Had Mr. Anthony been placed on leave while Mr.
        McMillan was allowed to keep working, this case would properly
        go to trial. Much ink can be—indeed has been—spilled over how
        to identify a proper comparator, but in the end, the most important
        question is simply this: on any given set of facts, could a jury
        reasonably conclude that race was a motivating factor in the
        decision at issue? Here, the answer is no.