Court Opinion

ID: 9829309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:11:22.341032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:59.751401
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon a further consideration of this ease, at least a majority of the court conclude that we erred in affirming the judgment below.
Forfeiture is a harsh ,remedy, and is not favored either in’ equity or in law. Courts are reluctant to declare and enforce a forfeiture if, by reasonable interpretation, it can be avoided. Forfeitures are enforced only where there is clearest evidence that such was meant by the stipulation of the parties. *1706 R. C. L. p. 906, § 291. Before forfeiture can occur, there must be no question but that the parties intended to provide for it in the contract under which it is attempted to be enforced.
Believing, as expressed in the original opinion, that appellant was not liable for the rental provided for under the contract of lease between Sewell, and the appellee, and that the failure of appellant to pay one-half of such rental did not give rise to a ground of forfeiture of contract between appellant and appellee, we conclude that the only ground for rescission of such contract would be the failure of appellant to do the things contracted to be done. The jury found that the defendant below did not abandon the lease, and the question of abandonment is out of the case. They further found that the defendant began, within five days from the date of the assignment, actual operations for the development of the property, and that the lease did not produce enough oil over and above the reasonable cost of operation thereof to drill other wells.
The majority have concluded that appellant should not be charged with any negligence in the operation of the wells while they were in the hands of the receiver, especially since such negligence was not pleaded, nor was any request made for the submission of such issue. That, as a receiver is' but a means of controlling and operating the property by the court itself, and since it is not shown in the evidence that appellant connived at or participated in any acts of claimed negligence on the part of the receiver, or the employes of the receiver, that the appellant should not be chargeable with such claimed negligence. The majority are further of the opinion that any negligence in the operation of the lease while Mr. Lynch was in active charge thereof does not afford ground for rescission or forfeiture, but at most would afford an action for damages. That, since it was apparent that Lynch was not operating the lease so that it would be profitable to appellee and appellant, appellant took steps to relieve Lynch of his duties, and that it appears from the testimony that appellant exercised reasonable diligence in cleaning out the wells at the beginning of the operations and in putting on the pump all of the wells which, in the exercise of rea-sonable prudence and judgment, appeared to be producing wells or capable of being made producing wells, and exercised reasonable diligence in the operation of the wells thereafter.
Eor the reasons stated in the original opinion, the writer is inclined to believe that the appellant is in a measure responsible for any negligence shown by the receiver or those in his employment, and he is further of the opinion that the appellant is distinctly responsible for any negligence in the operation of thé lease while Lynch was in charge thereof. But he may be mistaken in these conclusions, and, in deference to the judgment of the majority, the judgment affirming the judgment below is set aside, and the judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded.