Court Opinion

ID: 9881864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 15:01:07.142298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:20.037264
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1752   Document: 18     Page: 1   Filed: 10/04/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                COLIN S. WATANABE,
                     Petitioner

                            v.

            DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                       2023-1752
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. SF-0752-21-0264-I-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: October 4, 2023
                ______________________

    COLIN S. WATANABE, Honolulu, HI, pro se.

     IOANA C. MEYER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

     Before LOURIE, PROST, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1752    Document: 18      Page: 2     Filed: 10/04/2023

 2                                           WATANABE v. ARMY

 PER CURIAM.
      Former Department of the Army (“the Army”) em-
 ployee Colin Watanabe appeals a decision of the Merit Sys-
 tems Protection Board (“the Board”) sustaining his removal
 for conduct unbecoming a supervisor. Watanabe v. Dep’t of
 the Army, No. SF-0752-21-0264-I-1, 2021 WL 5994229
 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 17, 2021) (“Decision”), Pet. Br. 4–28. For the
 following reasons, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     Watanabe was employed by the Army as a Supervisory
 General Engineer, GS-0801-14, at Schofield Barracks,
 Honolulu, Hawaii. Id. at 6. In August 2020, the Army be-
 gan investigating allegations that he had improperly used
 his position of authority to encourage hiring specific appli-
 cants and that he had improperly used government prop-
 erty for personal storage. Id. at 8. In February 2021, the
 Army removed Watanabe for conduct unbecoming a super-
 visor based on charges of unfair personnel practices and
 misuse of government property. Id. at 6–7. Watanabe ap-
 pealed his removal to the Board and requested a hearing.
 Id. The case was assigned to an administrative judge (“an
 AJ”) of the Board. Id. at 6.
     One of the charges reviewed by the AJ involved
 Watanabe and his subordinates’ actions during the hiring
 of S.P., the son-in-law of Schofield Barracks’ Deputy Direc-
 tor. Id. at 8–11. The Army investigator interviewed Ca-
 dina, a member of the S.P. hiring panel. Id. at 9–10.
 Cadina’s direct supervisor was Akeo, and Akeo’s direct su-
 pervisor was Watanabe. Id. at 9. Cadina initially told the
 investigator that Akeo did not pressure the panel to select
 S.P. Id. at 10. Cadina later went back and told the inves-
 tigator that “Akeo had told him to hire S.P. to please the
 boss,” and absent that pressure, S.P. would not have been
 hired. Id.
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 WATANABE v. ARMY                                            3

      At the hearing, Cadina admitted to initially lying to the
 investigator about S.P.’s hiring. Id. He explained that
 Akeo was outside the room during his initial interview with
 the investigator and that he was afraid Akeo would retali-
 ate against him if he told the truth. Id. Cadina testified
 that, after the interview, Watanabe waved Cadina into his
 office and repeatedly thanked him for “what you’re doing
 for [Akeo],” which Cadina understood as Watanabe thank-
 ing him for lying to the investigator. Id. Cadina memori-
 alized this conversation with Watanabe and provided it to
 the investigator. Id.
      Watanabe testified to the event differently. Id. at 11.
 In his retelling, he explained that he called Cadina into his
 office because he was concerned that Cadina seemed like
 he was in a “fragile state.” Id. Watanabe testified that
 Cadina told him that “‘[Akeo] owes me big time,’ and that
 he was going to call the investigator and ‘tell the truth.’”
 Id. Watanabe testified that he responded by thanking Ca-
 dina for telling the truth. Id. The AJ evaluated both par-
 ties’ testimony and found Cadina to be more credible
 despite initially lying to the investigator. Id.
      The AJ reviewed an additional charge of improper hir-
 ing practices and a charge of misuse of government prop-
 erty. Id. at 8–9, 12–15. For the improper hiring practices
 charge, two witnesses testified that Watanabe pressured
 one of them to promote a subordinate. Id. at 8–9. And for
 the misuse of government property charge, witnesses tes-
 tified that Watanabe requested key access to various loca-
 tions, had a freezer turned on in an unused facility, was
 storing large quantities of personal food in these locations,
 and abandoned his car on the property. Id. at 12–14. The
 investigator inspected each location and found the personal
 items stored there. Id. at 13. The AJ found the testimony
 of each witness more credible than Watanabe’s and held
 that the Army proved all three charges by preponderant
 evidence. Id. at 11, 15. The AJ thus issued an Initial De-
 cision affirming Watanabe’s removal by the Army.
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 4                                           WATANABE v. ARMY

 Watanabe filed a petition for review of the Initial Decision
 by the full Board, which was denied on February 9, 2023.
 The AJ’s Initial Decision accordingly became the Final De-
 cision of the Board. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). Watanabe
 timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(9).
                         DISCUSSION
     A Board decision may only be set aside if it is “(1) arbi-
 trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
 in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”            5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c). The petitioner “bears the burden of establishing
 error in the Board’s decision.” Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans
 Affs., 142 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
      Watanabe makes two arguments on appeal: (1) that
 the AJ applied the wrong law when it assessed witness
 credibility; and (2) that the AJ incorrectly found a witness’s
 testimony more credible than his own because the AJ “ig-
 nored the fact that the Agency witness admitted to lying in
 an official investigation.” Pet. Br. at 2. To support his ar-
 guments, Watanabe cites the portions of the decision and
 his petition for review discussing the witness Cadina. Id.
 (citing Pet. Br. at 10, 44).
     We first address the argument that the AJ applied the
 wrong law when assessing witness credibility. When mak-
 ing credibility determinations an AJ should consider:
     (1) [t]he witness’s opportunity and capacity to ob-
     serve the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s
     character; (3) any prior inconsistent statement by
     the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias;
     (5) the contradiction of the witness’s version of
     events by other evidence or its consistency with
     other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of
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 WATANABE v. ARMY                                          5

    the witness’s version of events; and (7) the wit-
    ness’s demeanor.
 Hillen v. Dep’t of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (M.S.P.B.
 1987). The AJ did exactly that when it found Cadina’s tes-
 timony more credible than Watanabe’s.
      The AJ considered that “both men had the same oppor-
 tunity and capacity to observe their conversation” but
 found that Cadina’s version of events was more plausible
 considering his concern over lying to the investigator. Pet.
 Br. at 11. The AJ further found that “Cadina’s testimony
 was also consistent with the earlier memorandum he pro-
 vided [to the investigator]” and that “his demeanor was
 candid and forthright” regarding the pressure he felt from
 Akeo and Watanabe to “cover-up” for Akeo. Id. And finally,
 the AJ found that “Cadina was an unbiased witness, as he
 had nothing to gain by admitting to an investigator, and to
 the Board, that he had lied to an investigator.” Id. (citing
 Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458). Comparatively, the AJ found
 that Watanabe’s testimony was “biased, self-serving, and
 implausible.” Id. The AJ therefore applied the correct law
 by considering the Hillen factors when evaluating the cred-
 ibility of Cadina’s and Watanabe’s testimony.
      We next address the argument that the AJ incorrectly
 found Cadina’s testimony more credible than Watanabe’s.
 “To the extent that the petitioner’s claim is based upon a
 challenge to the presiding official’s credibility determina-
 tions, we reiterate our previous holdings that these deter-
 minations are virtually unreviewable.” Hambsch v. Dep’t
 of Treasury, 796 F.2d 430, 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (collecting
 cases). Having found that the AJ applied the correct legal
 standard, Watanabe failed to establish any error with the
 decision; we therefore find nothing to justify rejecting the
 AJ’s determinations as to witness credibility. We therefore
 affirm the Board’s decision.
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 6                                          WATANABE v. ARMY

                       CONCLUSION
      We have considered Watanabe’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm.
                       AFFIRMED
                          COSTS
 No costs.