Court Opinion

ID: 9456827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:03:24.135292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:06.853069
License: Public Domain

TAMM, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the result. In essence the first count of the indictment charges the appellant, while in Maryland, with injuring Pauline Hawkins on account of her having testified against him in the District of Columbia. Since the appellant injured the complaining witness in Maryland, it is only there that he may be tried for inflicting such injury. Whatever the appellant’s reason or motive may be is irrelevant in determining proper venue. Thus, the first count of the indictment should be dismissed.
The second count of the indictment charges the appellant, while in Maryland, with endeavoring to intimidate a witness in a case then pending before the Grand Jury in the District of Columbia. This count charges appellant with only an attempt to influence the administration of justice. It is undisputed that the attempt here was begun and completed solely in Maryland. As a result, proper venue could lie only in Maryland and thus the second count of the indictment must also be dismissed.
At issue before us is whether the appellant could have been tried in the District of Columbia for the crimes charged in the indictment. This then leaves open for future decision the question of whether one may be tried in the District of Columbia under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1964) for actually “obstruct[ing] * * * the due administration of justice” in the District of Columbia by acts done outside the District of Columbia.1 Since the question is not for us to decide at this time, I will only mention a couple of cases to illustrate the problem. In Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 31 S.Ct. 558, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1911), a fraud case in which the defendant never set foot in the prosecuting state, Justice Holmes stated:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect * * *.
(Id. at 285, 31 S.Ct. at 560.) In United States v. Gross, 276 F.2d 816 (2nd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 831, 80 S.Ct. 1602, 4 L.Ed.2d 1525 (1960), the defendant was held to have been properly tried in the Southern District of New York where he had sent incomplete tax information from a place outside the Southern District. As can be seen, one could well argue that acts done in Maryland having a propelling influence on the administration of justice in the District of Columbia should be triable in the District of Columbia. The question, however, is not ripe for us to decide at this time.

. I call attention to this distinction since there appears to have been some confusion on the problem. The district judge’s memorandum opinion seems to indicate that she thought appellant was “charged with obstruction of justice.” (App. for Appellee at 15, 16, 17.) Counsel in their briefs make the same mistake. As I have mentioned, appellant was only charged with endeavoring to influence a witness.