Court Opinion

ID: 9486077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:37:16.643602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:31.050597
License: Public Domain

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Appellate judges are not factfinders. United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 525 (7th Cir.1989) (citing Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, 1530, 89 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)). My colleagues today have nonetheless assumed that role and declared Unterreiner the loser of what essentially is a swearing match, his memory too flawed in their estimation to merit credence. I must respectfully dissent because the majority’s decision denies Unter-reiner the reasonable inferences to which he is entitled on a motion for summary judgment and because I believe it sows confusion *1214as to the personal knowledge requirement of Fed.R.Evid. 602.1
A plaintiffs failure to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of his termination may be excused if he can show that his employer failed to post (and keep posted) a conspicuous notice of his rights under the ADEA. Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 581 F.2d 1287, 1289 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959, 101 S.Ct. 1418, 67 L.Ed.2d 383 (1981). When the employer attests that it posted the requisite notice, however, the plaintiffs averment that he did not see or does not recall reading the notice will not' suffice to avoid summary judgment, because it “is not the same as an averment that the notice was not in fact conspicuously posted.” Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983); accord Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 745 F.2d 407, 412 (7th Cir.1984). I share Judge Cudahy’s doubts about whether Posey was correctly decided. See Posey, 702 F.2d at 106-07 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Hearsay aside, an individual can only recount what he recalls, and he can only recall what he has seen. Thus, when Posey stated that he had frequently looked at his employer’s bulletin board and that “he never saw and does not recall ever reading [an ADEA notice],” 702 F.2d at 105, I would have thought that enough to create an issue of fact as to whether his employer had posted such a notice. See Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir.1991) (“Perhaps, as suggested by the dissent in Posey, the court did not give Posey the benefit of reasonable inferences, as it should have.”); Poff v. General Elec. Co., No. 89-3320, 1990 WL 18911 *2-3, 1990 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 2043, at *7-8 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 27, 1990).
Nonetheless, accepting Posey as the law of the circuit, I believe the majority takes an unwarranted step beyond Posey today, for unlike Posey, Unterreiner did not merely state that he “could not recall reading” an EEOC notice on the bulletin board at Volkswagen’s Lincolnshire facility. Instead, Un-terreiner asserted unequivocally that on the four or five occasions he looked at the board, no notice was posted. Unterreiner Aff. ¶¶ 15,16, 22. In my view, this was enough to satisfy Posey. Unterreiner was in no position to challenge more directly the Personnel Manager’s assertion that he posted an EEOC notice in 1984 (Wulfram Aff. ¶ 8), because only that individual knows first-hand whether he actually did so. Instead, Unterreiner— like any other employee — could say only whether, on the occasions he looked at the bulletin board, such a notice was present. Unterreiner said not, without qualification. Another employee (who visited the facility less often than Unterreiner) asserted that he did see a notice posted on the board. Penz-kofer Aff. ¶ 5. That creates a tie for summary judgment purposes, and as on the diamond, a tie goes to the runner — here, Unter-reiner. Perhaps Unterreiner could have recruited other employees to offer affidavits confirming his own recollection of things, but that would only have affected the quantity of the evidence on his side, not the quality. The number of witnesses for each party is not dispositive at trial, let alone on summary judgment. See 1 Federal Criminal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit 3.28 (1980); 3 Edward J. Devitt, Charles B. Blackmar & Michael A. Wolff, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (Civil) § 73.01, at 50 (1987).
The majority circumvents the manifest conflict between the affidavits only by discounting Unterreiner’s affidavit as contradictory and incredible. In particular, the majority finds the affidavit inconsistent with Unterreiner’s deposition testimony. But the central assertion of Unterreiner’s affidavit— that no EEOC notice was posted when he looked at the bulletin board — does not contradict anything in his deposition. Indeed, strikingly absent from the deposition is any inquiry whatsoever into whether or not Un-terreiner recalled seeing an EEOC notice.2 *1215Instead, Volkswagenls counsel asked Unter-reiner only whether he could recall seeing four types of notices: job postings, marriage announcements, retirement notices, and ear leasing opportunities. Unterreiner Dep. at 148, 342-43. Unterreiner did recall seeing a car leasing notice once, but not any of the other three notices. Id. at 342-43. The, inquiry ended with this exchange:
Q: Do you recall anything else on that bulletin board that you might have seen?
A: No, I don’t.
Q: So you said you don’t really remember what was posted on that bulletin board?
A: I didn’t look at it that often.
Id. at 343. Unterreiner’s final answer is not explicitly a “yes” or a “no,” but in light of his answer to the previous question, I grant that it may be construed as a “no.”
But Unterreiner’s concession that he was unable to remember what was on the board does not render his subsequent affidavit contradictory. Indeed, Unterreiner’s affidavit candidly repeats that but for one or more notices regarding automobile leasing or sales, “he does not recall other kinds of notices that may have been posted.” Unterreiner Aff. ¶ 15. What Unterreiner adds is that having seen a copy of the EEOC notice that Volkswagen claims to have posted on the bulletin board, he knows that such a notice was not posted on the occasions he looked at the board. Id. ¶¶ 16, 22. This assertion certainly is not precluded by his deposition testimony, given that Volkswagen never asked Un-terreiner about his ability to recall seeing an EEOC notice. Moreover, given the imperfections of human memory, Unterreiner could conceivably recall not seeing a particular kind of notice without being able to remember what notices he did see. A jury might find this disparity suspect, but it is not so far-fetched that we may simply rule it out as a matter of law. See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 954-55 (11th Cir.1986).3 I must also point out that the record before us contains absolutely no evidence regarding the notices that Unterreiner could not recall; consequently, we do not know whether Un-terreiner’s inability to remember them is explained by a fault in his memory or the possibility that no such hótiees were posted on the occasions he viewed the bulletin board.
The majority has therefore denied Unter-reiner’s affidavit the credence it is due on summary judgment. The fact that Unter-reiner does not recall other notices does not render his memory as to the EEOC notice inherently untrustworthy. We have before us only the transcript of a deposition in which Unterreiner’s recollection of the EEOC notice was never explored and conflicting affidavits that are equally self-serving. We should not be deciding who is telling the truth on this cold record. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[Sjummary judgment is not a procedure for resolving a swearing contest.” Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir.1992); see also Cameron v. Frances Slocum Bank & Trust Co., 824 F.2d 570, 575 (7th Cir.1987) (“On summary judgment, a court can neither make a choice between competing inferences nor make a credibility determination.”)
The majority also suggests that Unterreiner’s affidavit may not meet the personal knowledge requirement of Fed.R.Evid. 602, because Unterreiner “only walked past [the bulletin board] a few times and remembered only some car leasing information but no other notices.” Op. at 1211. That dictum misapprehends the rule. Rule 602 reflects the axiom that a witness may testify only to matters within his personal knowledge. See Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 *1216F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir.1991) (en bane). This of course includes what the witness has seen. 3 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 260, at 39 (1979). Unterreiner’s affidavit carefully recites the number and circumstances of the occasions on which he viewed the bulletin board, confirms that he knows what an EEOC notice looks like, and states without qualification that saw no such notice on the board. Un-terreiner Aff. ¶¶ 12-16, 22. The affidavit thus includes specific facts from which we may conclude that Unterreiner has the personal knowledge that Rule 602 requires. See Davis v. City of Chicago, 841 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir.1988).4 The fact that Unterreiner’s memory is not exhaustive does not render him incompetent to testify about what he does remember. See O’Shea v. Jewel Tea Co., 233 F.2d 530, 534 (7th Cir.1956); United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826, 830-31 (8th Cir.1986). See also United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 143 (2d Cir.) (“The result of a witness’s observations need not be positive or absolutely certain to make his testimony admissible, and lack of certainty is a matter to be argued to the jury rather than a reason for excluding the evidence.”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. —, —, —, 113 S.Ct. 139, 140, 663, 121 L.Ed.2d 92, 92, 588 (1992).
Rule 602 may come into play if the witness remembers nothing, as the majority points out. Op. at 1211. But the very authority that the majority cites for this proposition acknowledges the distinction between a faulty memory and none at all:
While present recollection is a necessary component of personal knowledge, there is no reason why witness memory must be any more certain or complete than perception. Thus, memory gaps and doubts caused by the lapse of time go to the weight to be given the testimony. So long as the witness has some recollection, a jury could reasonably give the testimony some weight and this aspect of the personal knowledge requirement is satisfied. If, however, the witness may have based testimony on hearsay or fantasy rather than recalled matters based on perception, a personal knowledge problem exists.
27 Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6023, at 205-06 (1990) (footnotes omitted). Unterreiner’s memory may have been incomplete, but it cannot be described as blank.
By effectively importing a “keen memory” requirement into Rule 602, the majority has transformed questions of credibility into questions of admissibility. Professors Wright and Gold have aptly identified the concerns which counsel against such a construction of the rule:
First is a concern for the probative value of evidence that might be lost to a more demanding personal knowledge requirement. Given the deficiencies of human perception and memory, it would be a rare witness who could truthfully testify without admitting to some significant problem concerning perception or recollection. Second, given the pervasiveness of perception and memory problems, a more demanding personal knowledge requirement could cause significant expense and delay in the conduct of trials. The testimony of each witness would be interrupted more frequently by objections and multiple witnesses might have to testify to establish matters now proven to a tolerable degree of reliability by the testimony of a single witness. Third, and most important, Rules 601 and 602 reveal an inclination to classify problems concerning the reliability of testimony as issues of witness credibility. Those rules further reflect the belief that questions concerning the credibility of witnesses should be decided by the jury and[ ] not the judge. Implicit in this belief is a rejection of the common law’s assumption that juries cannot accurately evaluate the credibility of certain witnesses and inevitably would be led away from the truth by their testimony.
Wright & Gold § 6022, at 195-96 (footnotes omitted). These concerns are, of course, all the more weighty on summary judgment, *1217when a judge has not had occasion to assess the witnesses’ credibility first hand.
As in Posey, the majority today offers employees little guidance as to how they might survive summary judgment on the question of notice. Instead, the court’s decision will encourage litigants to wage credibility battles on summary judgment and to invoke Rule 602 against any witness whose mind is not a steel trap. Neither Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 nor Fed.R.Evid. 602 were intended as vehicles for summary judgment by impeachment. We may think that Unter-reiner’s recollection is selective, unreliable, or even fabricated, and a jury might agree.5 But a jury would render such an assessment having looked Unterreiner and the other witnesses in the eye — something no judge or jury has had the opportunity to do here.

. I have no quarrel with the majority’s resolution of the equitable estoppel and equitable tolling issues. Op. at 1212-1213. My disagreement is limited to the question of notice, on which I believe Unterreiner was entitled to a trial.

. The record on appeal does not include a complete copy of the deposition transcript, but the portions included make no mention of the EEOC notice, and at oral argument, Volkswagen’s counsel conceded that Unterreiner was not asked whether he ever saw an EEOC notice.

. Many employees might be unable to recall whether there were “for sale” or marriage announcements posted on the cafeteria bulletin board. However, if shown a copy of a sufficiently distinctive notice and asked whether that notice was posted, they are more likely to give a definitive answer. An EEOC notice is relatively distinctive: a recent picture of the bulletin board at Volkswagen’s Lincolnshire facility reveals it to be the largest notice on the board, and the notice bears a caption admonishing that "Equal Employment Opportunity is ... THE LAW” in lettering that occupies the top third of the poster. Wulfram Aff. Exs. D, E; see also Edgeworth v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 673 F.Supp. 922, 927 (N.D.Ill.1987) (reprinting notice in reduced form).

. If any affidavit is deficient in this respect, it is that of Volkswagen’s Mid-West Zone Service Manager, who baldly asserted that a notice was posted (Lang Aff. ¶ 5) without offering any facts confirming that this was a matter within his personal knowledge. See Davis, 841 F.2d at 189.

. The ADEA provides that "a person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact” in an age discrimination action. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2).