Court Opinion

ID: 9631638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:45:18.588256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:58.096007
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
dissenting.
The majority rejects the Board’s conclusion that Oregon Laws 1990, chapter 2, section 54, is “clear, unambiguous and susceptible on its face to only one reasonable reading.” The majority’s conclusion that the statute is ambiguous leads it to explore legislative history, and that history leads it to adopt an interpretation of the statute which, in my view, is contrary to its terms. The majority *73orders the Board to direct employer to compensate claimant for his increased scheduled permanent partial disability at $145 per degree, the rate in effect when he was injured in 1989, rather than $305 per degree, the rate in effect in June, 1990, when the additional permanent partial disability was ordered. I respectfully dissent.
The majority mistakes complexity for ambiguity. The statute manifests the legislature’s intention with sufficient clarity that a resort to legislative history is not appropriate. See McKean-Coffman v. Employment Div., 312 Or 543, 549, 824 P2d 410 (1992); Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or 475, 632 P2d 782 (1981).
Or Laws 1990, ch 2, § 54, provides:
“(1) Except for amendments to ORS 656.027, 656.211, 656.214(2) and 656.790, this 1990 Act becomes operative July 1, 1990, and notwithstanding ORS 656.202, this 1990 Act applies to all claims existing or arising on and after July 1, 1990, regardless of date of injury, except as specifically provided in this section.
“(2) Any matter regarding a claim which is in litigation before the Hearings Division, the board, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under this chapter, and regarding which matter a request for hearing was filed before May 1, 1990, and a hearing was convened before July 1, 1990, shall be determined pursuant to the law in.effect before July 1, 1990.
“(3) Amendments by this 1990 Act to ORS 656.214(5), the amendments to ORS 656.268(4), (5), (6), (7) and (8), ORS 656.283(7), 656.295, 656.319, 656.325, 656.382 and 656.726 shall apply to all claims which become medically stationary after July 1, 1990.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 55 provides:
‘ ‘This Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect on its passage.”
Subsection (1) of section 54 is divided into two clauses. The first is the “operative date” clause (“Except for amendments to ORS 656.027, 656.211, 656.214(2) and 656.790, this 1990 Act becomes operative July 1, 1990 * * *.”). The second is the “applicability” clause (“and notwithstanding ORS 656.202, this 1990 Act applies to all claims *74existing or arising on and after July 1,1990, regardless of date of injury, exceptas specifically provided in this section”). The purpose of the operative date clause is to make the 1990 Act operative on July 1, 1990, except for amendments to four specified statutes, including one to ORS 656.214(2) that raised the rate for each degree of scheduled disability from $145 to $305. As a result of the exception of ORS 656.214(2), the rate increase amendment became effective on May 7, 1990, by operation of the emergency clause section 55.
The applicability clause describes the claims to which the 1990 Act applies. It was necessary because, without it, the 1990 Act would be governed by ORS 656.202, which provides that, except as otherwise provided by law, claims are governed by the law in effect on the date of injury. The applicability clause expressly changes that rule with respect to the 1990 Act and declares that the new law
“applies to all claims existing or arising on and after July 1, 1990, regardless of the date of injury, except as specifically provided in this section.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The operative date clause and the applicability clause address different topics, perform distinct functions and cannot be grammatically or logically blended. The majority errs in holding that the operative date clause can be read to modify the entirety of subsection (1). That construction defeats the legislature’s separation of the two clauses. As a result, the majority concludes that the increased payment amendment to ORS 656.214(2), which is excepted from the coverage of the operative date clause, is governed by the “date of injury” rule in ORS 656.202(2), because that rule is excepted from the coverage of the applicability clause (“and notwithstanding ORS 656.202”). However, ORS 656.214(2) is not excepted from the coverage of the applicability clause, and that clause applies by its literal terms “to all claims existing * * * on * * * July 1, 1990, regardless of the date of injury.” (Emphasis supplied.) This claim meets that description.
The majority’s blending of the two clauses does not result in a plausible statutory construction. The operative date clause excepts four statutes, not just one, from the coverage of that clause. The other three statutes, ORS 656.027, ORS 656.211 and ORS 656.790, address administrative topics and have nothing to do with an individual claim. *75The Board concluded that construing those sections to be subject to ORS 656.202 would be “tantamount to rewriting the legislation,” and I agree.
The majority turns to legislative history to discern legislative intent, but the history displays far greater ambiguity than the statute itself.
The majority quotes statements on May 4 and 7, 1990, by Representative Mannix, and a May 7, 1990, statement by Senator Kitzhaber. An examination of each discloses that they are internally inconsistent.
A portion of the May 4,1990, statement by Mannix is quoted in the majority opinion. The complete statement by Mannix was addressed by the Board in its order. He stated:
“I have been advised that there is some — there isn’t a change here — changes that — except for admendments to [ORS 656J.027, [ORS 656].211, [ORS 656].214(2), and [ORS 6561.790: Those provisions are things which the group—Mahonia Hall group wanted to go into effect immediately — includes the Industrial Advisory Council to go into effect immediately. They’re also using, as an operative date standard that’s in .21, excuse me, that’s in [ORS 6561.202 — the date of injury as the operative date for those provisions. That — in other words, we’re following the standard for that provision and then you jump into, after that exception, the Act becomes operative July 1 and it applies to all claims existing or arising on or after July 1, regardless of date of injury. We have the exception for litigation and then we have the exception for, and I’ll call claims processing-—where medically stationary date is the provision; that is, you’ve got an open claim, it becomes medically stationary after July first — then those new laws will kick in. * * * And believe it or not that explanation reflects something that is actually simpler than it was in the original bill.
“You’re going to have three factors: effective date immediately, the administrative procedures, as far as the advisory counsel goes, and the provisions in regard to [ORS 656].027, [ORS 6561211, [ORS 656].214 sub (2) and [ORS 6561790. And then, as of July first, it’ll apply to all claims, with one more exception, and that is, if there are some claims that are not yet medically stationary, and those will kick in when they become medically stationary after July first. ’ ’ Minutes, Joint Interim Special Committee (SB 1197). Tape 19A (May 4, 1990). (Emphasis supplied.)
*76As the Board points out, the first three sentences by Mannix support the Board’s construction of section 54(1). In his fourth sentence, Mannix used the term “operative date” twice to suggest that the four statutes excepted from the coverage of the operative date clause are governed by the “date of injury” standard in ORS 656.202. The majority suggests that Mannix “merely misspoke” in using the term “operative date.” There is more here than erroneous terminology. Mannix’s comment confuses the effect of the operative date clause with that of the applicability clause. The majority finds that Mannix employed his misstatement consistently, but that is inaccurate. His last two sentences contradict the passage relied on by the majority, revert to the construction that he offered in his first three sentences and support the interpretation adopted by the Board. Mannix said that “administrative procedures” and “the provisions with regard to .027, .211, .214(2) and .790” (emphasis supplied) would take effect “immediately.” That clearly indicates that, according to Mannix, the rate increase amendment in ORS 656.214(2) would take effect “immediately,” i.e., on May 7, 1990. His final sentence (“then, as of July 1, it will apply to all claims * * *”) confirms that the legislation would apply to all claims and, in the words of the statute under consideration, that meant “all claims existing or arising on and after July 1, 1990, regardless of date of injury, except as specifically provided in this section.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Mannix’s May 7, 1990, statement contains similar conflicting signals. His third and fourth sentences are significant:
“The law will be effect on passage, but only four sections are effective immediately and they’re subject to the standards of 656.202. Those four sections are 656.027, .211, .214(2) and .790.”
The Board examined the statement and commented:
“That suggests, as SAIF argues, that another ‘applicability date’ may have been intended. However, it remains unclear if that is what was meant and, if so, why two of those four sections should be excluded from the operation of a statute (ORS 656.202) which would have no bearing upon their applicability.”
*77I agree. The “date of injury” rule in ORS 656.202 is logically unrelated to the administrative amendments excepted from the operative date clause.
Mannix then said: “We will let those cases proceed under the standards in which [sic] they were tried, so that you, again, will not be creating more work for lawyers.” The majority concludes that that indicates that the new rate enacted in ORS 656.214(2) was to be “subject to the date of injury rule of ORS 656.202 and that the remainder of the amendments generally will be ‘operative’ July 1.” 114 Or App at 70. The majority makes an unwarranted leap of faith because the words of the bill that Mannix purported to describe provided that the bill would apply to “all claims existing or arising on or after July 1,1990, regardless of date of injury, except as specifically provided in this section,” (emphasis supplied) and that it would apply “notwithstanding ORS 656.202.” Mannix’s statement that the new act would be subject to the date of injury rule in ORS 656.202 contravenes each of the legislature’s two clear signals that the act would apply “notwithstanding 656.202” to claims existing on July 1, 1990, “regardless of date of injury.” Those statutory provisions defeat, or at the least conflict with, any suggestion that the 1990 Act was to apply only to injuries occurring on and after May 7, 1990.
The May 7, 1990, statement by Kitzhaber, 114 Or App at 70-71, is similarly ambiguous and inconsistent with the terms of section 54(1). The first sentence recites part of the applicability clause, stressing that the act becomes operative on July 1, 1990, “for all claims existing or arising on or after that date, regardless of the date of injury,” subject to stated exceptions. However, his last sentence contradicts that, suggesting that the amendment to ORS 656.214(2) would “go into effect upon passage of the Bill and will apply to injuries which occur after the effective date of this Act.” I agree with the Board that the latter statement contradicts his earlier statement, the first quoted statement by Mannix and the unambiguous language of the applicability clause of section 54(1). I cannot understand how the majority derives a clear legislative intention from testimony that is internally inconsistent and contrary to the clear terms of the legislation under consideration.
*78Finally, the majority suggests that its construction “harmonizes” all of section 54.1 disagree. Sections 54(2) and (3) state exceptions to the applicability clause of subsection (1), in correlation with its final clause (“except as specifically provided in this section”). Subsection (2) declares that claim litigation in progress with two procedural characteristics (request for hearing filed before May 1, 1990, and hearing convened before July 1,1990) “shall be determined pursuant to the law in effect before July 1,1990.” (Emphasis supplied.) The majority disregards the significance of the italicized words, stating:
“Whether or not ‘the law in effect before July 1,’ referred to in that subsection, was intended to include the amendments that became effective May 7, our reading of subsection 54(1) consistently applies the law in effect on the date of injury for cases in litigation and for determining the rate of compensation for all other awards of scheduled disability, whether made before, on or after May 7.” 114 Or App at 72.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the legislature’s phrase, “the law in effect before July 1,” is not synonymous with “the law in effect on the date of injury.” If the legislature had wanted the “date of injury rule” in ORS 656.202 to control in pending litigation, it could have said so by citing that statute, by requiring application of the law in effect “before May 7,1990,” or by words to that effect. It did not do so.
The “law in effect before July 1, 1990,” necessarily includes those amendments made effective on May 7, such as the amendment to ORS 656.214(2). That phrase indicates that the legislature intended the greater PPD rate to apply to pending litigation, even though it was not the “law on the date of injury. ’ ’ That is consistent with the purpose of subsection (2) to save the parties the expense and frustration of applying the 1990 amendments, including changes in claim procedures and proof requirements, see, e.g., Or Laws 1990, ch 2, §§ 3, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22 and 40, to certain claims in litigation or on appeal. Applying the new PPD rate to those claims would not change the hearing ground rules or proof requirements or disrupt parties’ discovery activities or litigation strategy.
*79Subsection (3) limits the application of several amendments to “all claims which become medically stationary, after July 1, 1990.” The amendments alter the procedures or criteria for certain medical determinations. As with subsection (2), the legislature’s purpose in altering the applicability date for those amendments was to avoid the unfairness of applying new procedures and criteria to claims for which the underlying injury had become medically stationery on or before July 1,1990.
Subsections (1), (2) and (3), taken together, manifest a legislative intention to apply the 1990 amendments to existing claims, “notwithstanding ORS 656.202” and “regardless of the date of injury,” but not to allow that to disrupt pending litigation. The majority violates that intention by preserving the date of injury rule for awards of scheduled disability for pre-May 7,1990, injuries to an extent not necessary to protect parties from after-the-fact changes in the standards governing their pending claims. That does not harmonize the subsections and violates the traditional rule that exceptions to statutory requirements are narrowly construed. Morrison v. School Dist. No. 48, 53 Or App 148, 152, 631 P2d 784, rev den 291 Or 893, 642 P2d 309 (1981). The Board’s construction produces consistency between sections 54(1), (2) and (3), and must be preferred for that reason.
We are bound to apply the clear terms of the statute, regardless of competing inferences that may be developed through an exploration of legislative history. The Board correctly held that the amendment to ORS 656.214(2) applied to this claim, because it existed on July 1, 1990. The Board should be affirmed as to the rate of compensation that it ordered.1
I dissent.
Buttler, Rossman and Riggs, JJ., join in this dissent.

 Respondent Herron has cross-petitioned for review of the Board’s award of attorney fees. Because I would affirm the Board, on the petition for review, I would address the merits of the cross-petition.