Court Opinion

ID: 9636334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:24:35.712241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:44.386868
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, J.,
with whom GODFREY, J., joins, concurring.
The 1981 enactment does not make clear the temporal application of an amendment to the Workers’ Compensation Act, P.L. 1981, ch. 483 (amending- 39 M.R.S.A. § 54 (Supp.1982-1983)). Because the workers’ compensation scheme is a creation of the Legislature, the Legislature itself, rather than this Court, is uniquely equipped to discern the impact of its action and to insure the accomplishment of its purposes. See American Mutual Insurance Co. v. Murray, 420 A.2d 251, 252 (Me.1980); Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Me.1980). Although the reasons for the enactment of chapter 483 are clear, I cannot determine the exact impact of today’s decision.
We have previously discussed the complex problems surrounding the concept of “retroactivity.” E.g., Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 941-44 (Me.1982). I agree with the Court that in this case St. Regis argues for what amounts to a retroactive application of chapter 483 to Terry. I reach that conclusion, however, only because we have previously held that the ambiguous language of section 54 does not prescribe separate effective dates for each escalation of the compensation ceiling. Bernard v. Cives Corp., 395 A.2d 1141, 1147 (Me.1978). We said in Bernard that the Legislature had on occasion used “plain and unequivocal” language to describe the application of an amendment. Id. (“This Act shall only apply to injuries occurring after its effective date.”) (quoting P.L.1971, ch. 225, § 5). Unfortunately, the Legislature chose no such “clear and unequivocal” treatment of the amendment at issue in the present case.