Court Opinion

ID: 9927177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:05:19.028575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.659065
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0618-MR

LAWRENCE MILLER, JR.                                                  APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE JAMES W. CRAFT, II, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 15-CI-00023

BRITTANY BUNCH,
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF AUTUMN RAINE BUNCH AND
BRITTANY BUNCH                                                         APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                REVERSING AND
                                 REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: This matter concerns the distribution of settlement proceeds

paid as a result of the parties’ compromise of claims asserted in a wrongful death

action. The action was filed against Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc.,

following delivery of the parties’ stillborn child. This case has already had a

journey through our appellate system prior to this appeal. After our review, we
reverse the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with the

decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Miller v. Bunch, 657 S.W.3d 890

(Ky. 2022).

                With certain exceptions, the provisions of KRS1 411.137 and KRS

391.033 (collectively known as Mandy Jo’s Law) preclude a parent from

recovering damages from an action for the wrongful death of his or her child or

from inheriting any part of the child’s estate if that parent has “willfully abandoned

the care and maintenance of his or her child.” As part of proceedings conducted to

determine the proper distribution of the settlement proceeds recovered as a result

of the parties’ wrongful death action, Brittany Bunch, mother of Autumn Raine

Bunch (the stillborn child), argued that Lawrence Miller, Jr., the child’s father, had

willfully abandoned the child. Bunch contended that as a consequence, Miller was

precluded by the provisions of Mandy Jo’s Law from participating in the

settlement proceeds. After an evidentiary hearing, the Letcher Circuit Court found

that Miller had indeed willfully abandoned Autumn Raine Bunch. The court

agreed that Mandy Jo’s Law precluded Miller from participating in the settlement

proceeds and entered a judgment to that effect.

                On appeal, a panel of this Court also agreed that the provisions of

Mandy Jo’s Law applied. We concluded that the circuit court’s finding that Miller

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -2-
had willfully abandoned Autumn was supported by substantial evidence and

affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court of Kentucky then granted

discretionary review.

             Upon its review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed. It

reasoned that the General Assembly had passed Mandy Jo’s Law because “[i]t

believed, as a matter of public policy, that parents who forego participation in their

child’s upbringing should be prevented from enriching themselves in the event that

the child predeceases them.” Miller v. Bunch, 657 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Ky. 2022).

With this purpose in mind, the Court considered -- as a matter of first impression --

whether the plain language of Mandy Jo’s Law “evinces Legislative intent to

preclude recovery by an abandoning parent when the child in question is stillborn.”

Id.

             After examining the language of the statute, a majority of the Court

concluded that the legislature did not intend that the provision would apply in that

circumstance. It analyzed the facts and the law as follows:

                    First, neither of the exceptions to Mandy Jo’s Law
             could ever apply to a stillborn child. The first exception,
             that “[t]he abandoning parent had resumed the care and
             maintenance [of the child] at least one (1) year prior to
             the death of the child,” to state the obvious, could not
             apply to a stillborn child because the child would not yet
             be conceived one year prior to its death. The second
             exception, that “[t]he parent had been deprived of the
             custody of his or her child under an order of a court of
             competent jurisdiction” likewise could not apply to a

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stillborn child because our courts do not enter custody
orders for children until they are born.

       Furthermore, while our case law regarding Mandy
Jo’s Law is extremely scant, the definition of “willful
abandonment,” is not applicable to a stillborn child.
Moreover, our precedent regarding what constitutes “care
and maintenance” is not applicable to a stillborn child.
Neither “willful abandonment,” nor “care and
maintenance” are [sic] defined by statute. However, in
the twenty-two years since the passage of Mandy Jo’s
Law, our appellate system has developed a definition of
abandonment, as well as a test for determining whether a
parent has abandoned the care and maintenance of his or
her child. “Abandonment” for the purposes of Mandy
Jo’s Law means the neglect and refusal to perform
natural and legal obligations to care and support,
withholding of parental care, presence, opportunity to
display voluntary affection and neglect to lend support
and maintenance . . . It means also the failure to fulfill
responsibility of care, training and guidance during the
child’s formative years.

       As previously noted, as the statutes are currently
written, no “legal obligations to care and support,” i.e.,
child support and custody orders can be issued until a
child is born. And how might a parent provide
“presence” and “voluntary affection” to a child still in the
womb? Finally, fulfilling the “responsibility, training
and guidance during the child’s formative years” is by its
very wording only applicable to a child in his or her
formative years. Certainly, one can provide financial and
emotional support to the child’s mother and perhaps
indirectly benefit the child. But, looking at the current
definition of abandonment, that definition can only
apply to a child that has been born and is living
separately from his or her mother.

      In that vein, the facts previously considered by our
courts to determine whether there has been willful

                            -4-
abandonment cannot be applied to a case involving a
stillborn child. Whether a parent has abandoned his or
her child is consistently stated to be a highly fact-specific
inquiry that must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Though no fact is dispositive, those facts previously
considered by our courts include: payment of child
support; a [sic] involvement in the child’s education;
spending time with the child; knowledge of basic facts
about the child such as favorite foods, names of child
care providers, or diaper size; seeking formal or informal
visitation rights; or providing funds to help provide the
child with food, shelter, clothing, or any other necessities
of life.

        From a practical perspective, what factors could a
trial court consider in a case involving a stillborn? By
necessity, just as the circuit court did in this case, a trial
court could only consider what the alleged abandoning
parent did for the child while he or she was still in utero.
This, in turn, requires looking at what the abandoning
parent did for the other parent. Indeed, in its opinion and
order in this case, the circuit court faults Mr. Miller for
“willfully [abandoning] Ms. Bunch” no less than three
times. It further found that he “offered no support,
financial or otherwise, to Ms. Bunch”; that he “neglected
and refused to offer care and support to Ms. Bunch and
Autumn”; that he “did not visit Ms. Bunch to offer her
support”; and that he “contributed nothing to the care and
maintenance of Ms. Bunch and her unborn child.”

       Again, we acknowledge that by supporting and
caring for the mother one provides at least some support
and care for the child; to suggest otherwise would be
disingenuous. But the Legislature’s sole purpose in
passing Mandy Jo’s Law was to prevent a parent who has
abandoned his or her child from benefitting financially
from that child’s untimely death. Accordingly, the
dispositive inquiry under Mandy Jo’s Law is whether a
parent abandoned the child, not the mother. This, in
turn, necessitates that the alleged abandoning parent has

                             -5-
             had a meaningful opportunity to be part of a child’s life
             once the child is a living being separate from his or her
             mother.

                    Consequently, without clear expression from our
             General Assembly, this Court cannot use Mandy Jo’s
             Law to find willful abandonment of a child based solely
             on the nature of the relationship between the parents
             during the mother’s pregnancy. This is particularly so in
             a case such as the one at bar wherein even Ms. Bunch
             acknowledged that Mr. Miller may not have been
             Autumn’s father. It smacks of injustice to require a man
             who did not know for certain that the child was his until
             well after her death to provide financial and emotional
             support to the child’s mother during her pregnancy. It
             also unfairly presumes that, had Autumn lived post-birth,
             Mr. Miller would not have sought custody rights once his
             paternity was confirmed.

Miller v. Bunch, 657 S.W.3d 890, 896-98 (Ky. 2022) (citations omitted) (emphases

added).

             The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the circuit court’s judgment.

It specifically ordered that the circuit court’s findings of fact and conclusions of

law be vacated and that a judgment be entered consistent with its decision. The

matter was then remanded to the circuit court for entry of that judgment.

             Upon remand, the circuit court’s judgment and order were entered on

March 13, 2023. The judgment recited that the matter had been remanded

following the determination of the Supreme Court of Kentucky that “Mandy Jo’s

Law does not pertain in this matter and [Lawrence Miller] did not abandon his

child . . . .” The circuit court acknowledged that its initial findings of fact,

                                           -6-
conclusions of law, and judgment were to be vacated and that a new judgment

consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky was to be entered.

The circuit court’s judgment provided that the settlement proceeds “shall be

divided between [Brittany Bunch, the child’s mother] and [Lawrence Miller].”

             However, by its subsequent order entered on May 10, 2023, the circuit

court vacated its own judgment of March 13, 2023. The circuit court granted the

motion of Brittany Bunch to alter, amend, or vacate. It concluded that its finding

that the stillborn child, “would, if born alive, have suffered a disability so profound

as to preclude her from gainful employment was now the “Law of the Case” that

would preclude any wrongful death recovery.” It provided further that its finding

that “the behavior of [Lawrence Miller] from the time he learned that [Brittany

Bunch] was pregnant until the funeral of Autumn Raine Bunch, had destroyed the

value of any consortium claim that [he] might have had. . . .” And it determined

that finding to be the “Law of the Case.” The circuit court then held that, as a

consequence, Lawrence Miller “is entitled to no part of the settlement proceeds

which were previously awarded to [Brittany Bunch] by this Court.” The court

ordered that a judgment in favor of Brittany Bunch be entered and that Lawrence

Miller “take nothing.” This appeal followed.

             On appeal, Miller argues that the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided

-- as a matter of law -- that he did not abandon his stillborn child and that he and

                                          -7-
the child’s mother are identically situated with respect to the wrongful death claims

and the resulting settlement proceeds. He contends that the judgment of the

Letcher Circuit Court must be reversed as inconsistent with the decision and orders

of the Supreme Court.

             In response, Brittany Bunch argues that the circuit court’s findings of

fact were “affirmed as supported by substantial evidence by both the Court of

Appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court.” She contends that the circuit court’s

finding that Miller’s “behavior upon learning that Ms. Bunch was pregnant had

destroyed any value which his potential loss of consortium claim might have

otherwise had” governs the distribution of the proceeds and prevents Miller from

participating in the settlement. We disagree.

             The Supreme Court of Kentucky recounted the testimony of the

parties and of others concerning Miller’s actions upon his learning that Bunch was

pregnant. It rejected as a matter of law the trial court’s determination that a finding

of abandonment of a child pursuant to the provisions of Mandy Jo’s Law could be

predicated on the nature of the relationship between the parents during the

mother’s pregnancy. Consequently, it specifically rejected the trial court’s finding

that Miller had abandoned his stillborn child, and it ordered that finding vacated.

The circuit court’s judgment (along with the previous opinion of this Court

                                          -8-
affirming) was reversed by the Kentucky Supreme Court, and the matter was

remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with its decision.

             The judgment of the circuit court entered on May 10, 2023, directly

contradicts the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Its original ruling was

reversed by the Supreme Court, and despite its most current ruling in the appeal

now before us, it is not the law of the case. It is a nullity having no force or

precedential value. The judgment of the Letcher Circuit Court was not affirmed

upon any basis; its findings of fact and conclusions of law were categorically

vacated. The language of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision unequivocally

indicates that the Court determined that the matter had been absolutely wrongly

decided by the circuit court and that judgment must be entered in favor of Miller.

             Consequently, the matter is again remanded for entry of a judgment

consistent with the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Miller v. Bunch,

657 S.W.3d 890 (Ky. 2022).

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -9-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Kevin W. Johnson         Steven M. O’Brien III
Hazard, Kentucky         Lexington, Kentucky

                         Daniel F. Dotson
                         Whitesburg, Kentucky

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