Court Opinion

ID: 9868730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:53:43.886229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:20.459262
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION POE REHEARING.
In making our former answer to the questions propounded by the Court of Civil Appeals we assumed that the railroads operated by the appellant extended beyond Center to the north, and, upon that assumption, we based our conclusion. We were mistaken as to that fact; the two railroads by connecting with each other reach from Beaumont to Center and terminate at the latter place, the appellant operating no road beyond Center, therefore, we grant the motion for a rehearing and will re-examine the question.
This action was brought under articles 4565 and 4566 of the Revised Statutes, which are copied in our former opinion. In the case of Railroad Commission v. Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co., 90 Texas, 340, this court held that in a proceeding under those articles of the statute it was not necessary for the railroad company to show that the rate attacked was confiscatory, but that the issue was whether or not, under all the facts and circumstances, the rate was unreasonable and unjust, and, in answer to the second question propounded in that case, the court said: “In actions of this character the courts will determine the question of reasonableness and justice of any matter by the same rules as if it were an issue in other classes of suits, except as to the conclusive character of the evidence.” (90 Texas, 355; Weld v. Neville, 96 Texas, 404.) If articles 4565 and 4566 had not been enacted by the Legislature the courts would have no authority to revise rates made by -the Railroad Commission, but in the exercise of their equity" powers the courts could enjoin such rates if found to be confiscatory; that is, violative of the Constitution of this State or the Hnited States. Those articles conferred authority upon the courts to examine into the reasonableness and justice of such rates and in the exercise of that jurisdiction the courts will try the questions as if they arose in any other proceeding. Article 4566 places the citizen in such an action as this upon the same footing as it does the railroad corporations and re*354quires of such citizen who may be a shipper upon the railroad to make just as clear and conclusive proof of the unreasonableness or injustice of the rates as is required of a railroad company.
It is true that by article 4566 the railroad company, or shipper, who attacks the rate or order of the Commission, has the burden to show by “clear and satisfactory evidence” that the raté or order, etc., attacked in the proceeding is unjust and unreasonable in its effect upon such carrier or person. The question presented to us is, if the facts alleged in the applicant’s petition shall be established by “clear and satisfactory evidence,” would a jury be authorized to find a verdict that such rates, charges, etc., were unreasonable and unjust to the appellant? In passing upon the question we must consider the allegations in the petition as facts proved by “clear, satisfactory and uncontroverted evidence.” It is a matter of common knowledge that lumber is one of the principal articles of transportation on the railroads and a chief source of income. • It being true that the revenue derived from hauling lumber over the appellant’s road does not yield sufficient revenue to pay for the costs of transporting it, not including interest on investment, taxes or other expenses, thére could be no reasonable doubt that such rate applied to lumber would be unreasonable and unjust to that railroad.
. It does not follow that a railroad company might select an unimportant article and attack the rate prescribed for that as being unreasonable because it would not pay for the transportation of such article alone. Public carriers must of necessity carry many things which of themselves would not compensate them for the carriage.
The trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer to plaintiffs petition.
Opinion filed March 10, 1909.