Court Opinion

ID: 9894402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 18:04:18.747735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:42.176407
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/1/23 P. v. Olivares CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                     B324827

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BA205131)
          v.

 FRANCISCO OLIVARES,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
      Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Pithey, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Steven Matthews and Gary Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       In 2002, a jury convicted defendant and appellant
Francisco Olivares of attempted willful, premeditated, and
deliberate murder. Olivares now appeals from an order denying
his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95.1
The trial court concluded Olivares did not make a prima facie
showing of eligibility for resentencing. We agree and affirm the
trial court order denying Olivares’s petition.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying offense
       The following facts are taken from Olivares’s petition for
resentencing.2
       “On July 5, 2000, Ricardo Aguilar was at the home of his
friends, Michael and Carlos Moreno, on McBride Street in Los
Angeles. Ricardo was helping his friend put a new battery in his
friend’s mother’s car. Michael came inside with a panicked look
and stated [‘]the guys from Ford are outside.[’] Ford Maravilla
and Marianna Maravilla, which is the gang Michael is associated
with, are rival gangs.

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
      Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this opinion.

2     The statement of facts in Olivares’s petition was based on
“the Appellate Court’s rendition of the facts,” “supplemented by
the reporter’s transcript” from the underlying trial, and “special
references.” We have omitted the petition’s citations to the
reporter’s transcript.

                                 2
       “At around 3:00 p.m., Ricardo went outside to move the car
out of the driveway, but the keys were stuck in the ignition.
Ricardo went inside to ask his friend for help with the keys. As
they were walking back to the car, a black truck drove up to
Ricardo and his friend. The person in the passenger’s seat asked
‘where are you from?’ Ricardo said ‘nowhere’ and started running
toward the house. Shots were fired from the truck and everyone
ducked for cover.
       “After the shooting, Ricardo laid face down with blood
coming from his head. He was shot and hit by the bullets. They
called 911 and Ricardo was transported to the hospital. He spent
15 days in the hospital recovering.”
The Underlying Proceedings
       In March 2001, the People filed a two-count information
charging Rafael Madrigal, Jr., and Olivares with attempted
murder. The information alleged the attempted murder was
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, and
that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction
of, and in association with a criminal street gang. As to Olivares,
the information alleged a principal personally used and
intentionally discharged a firearm, which proximately caused
great bodily injury to Aguilar, within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (e)(1), and section 12022.5,
former subdivision (a)(1).3 The People proceeded on the theory
that Madrigal was the shooter and Olivares was the driver.
       The jury found Olivares guilty of attempted murder
(§§ 664; 187, subd. (a)) and found true each allegation charged.

3    As to Madrigal, the information alleged firearm
enhancements based on his personal use. (§§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c), & (d); 12022.5, former subd. (a)(1).)

                                 3
The trial court sentenced Olivares to a state prison term of life
for attempted murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement.
Olivares’s petition for resentencing
       In February 2022, Olivares filed a petition for resentencing.
He contended the jury was instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and that it subsequently
convicted him under that theory.
       At Olivares’s request, the court appointed counsel.
Olivares then filed a second petition, arguing that he was eligible
for resentencing because “he was not the actual shooter, he did
not have the specific mental state to kill, was not a major
participant and did not act with reckless indifference to human
life.” Olivares asserted the prosecutors argued a theory of
imputed malice to the jury and “there was no evidence . . . that
[Olivares] knew or should have known,” as the driver, that
Madrigal “was armed or was going to use a firearm.”
       In its response, the People argued Olivares failed to make a
prima facie showing of eligibility because the jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Olivares’s reply brief asserted the jury was indirectly instructed
on imputed malice because the court told jurors they could draw
reasonable and logical inferences; Olivares was not a principal
because he was not the shooter; the natural and probable
consequences doctrine was argued by the prosecutor in her
closing argument; the jury may have imputed malice to Olivares
because he and Madrigal were both gang members and Madrigal
had the requisite specific intent; and the evidence against
Olivares regarding his intent was circumstantial.

                                 4
       The trial court held a hearing in September 2022. After
considering the parties’ briefing, portions of the reporter’s
transcript, and argument, the court found Olivares was ineligible
for relief as a matter of law because he was charged and
convicted “as a direct aider and abettor with specific intent” and
not under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 and Section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
limited the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842–843 (Gentile).) The bill amended section 188 by adding
the requirement that, except as stated in section 189,
subdivision (e), “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 775) expanded Senate Bill 1437’s mandate, in part,
by eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine as
a means of finding a defendant guilty of attempted murder.
However, a principal in a murder or attempted murder, including
an aider or abettor, can still be criminally liable if found to
personally possess malice aforethought, whether express or
implied. (People v. Silva (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640.)
       Senate Bills 1437 and 775 created a procedure, now
codified at section 1172.6, to allow a person convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter under the former law to seek

                                5
resentencing if the person could no longer be convicted under
amended section 188. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant starts the
procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that,
among other things, he or she could not presently be convicted of
murder under the current law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) In relevant part, the statute requires the court, “[a]fter
the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings,” to “hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an
order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting
forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II.     Prima Facie Stage and Standard of Review
        At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) “While the trial court may look at the record
of conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry
under subdivision (c) is limited.” (Ibid.) Courts may not reject
the petitioner’s allegations “ ‘on credibility grounds’ ” or engage in
“ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (Id. at pp. 971–972.) Rather, “[t]he record should be
consulted at the prima facie stage only to determine ‘readily
ascertainable facts,’ such as the crime of conviction and findings
on enhancements.” (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798,
815; see, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 54–56

                                  6
[considering jury instructions and verdicts to determine whether
defendant made prima facie showing of eligibility]; People v.
Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 (Ervin) [considering
sentencing enhancements, jury instructions, closing arguments,
and verdicts at prima facie stage].) The trial court’s denial of a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage “ ‘is a purely legal
conclusion,’ ” which we review de novo. (Ervin, at p. 101.)
III. Olivares is Ineligible for Relief Under Section 1172.6
      Because He Was Not Convicted of Attempted Murder
      Under the Natural and Probable Consequences
      Doctrine
      Senate Bill 775 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for attempted murder liability.
However, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.”
(People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).)
      “Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and
the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31
Cal.4th 613, 623 (Lee).) Specific intent crimes, including
attempted murder, require an accomplice to “ ‘ “share the specific
intent of the perpetrator . . . .” ’ ” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1111, 1118 (McCoy); People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 576, 590 [“the direct aider and abettor must have the
same mental state as the actual perpetrator of the charged
crime”].) Therefore, “to be guilty of attempted murder as an aider
and abettor, a person must give aid or encouragement with
knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the
purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of
the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of

                                7
attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.”
(Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 624; McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 1118.)
        Accordingly, Olivares was only eligible for relief if he
established the jury could have convicted him of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
and not as a direct aider and abettor. (People v. Montes (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 1001, 1007 (Montes); Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548.)
        A.     The record of conviction conclusively
               establishes the jury convicted Olivares of
               attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor
        The People charged Olivares with attempting to murder
Ricardo Aguilera “unlawfully and with malice aforethought.”
This was the only crime charged.
        CALJIC No. 1.11 instructed the jury that the term
“defendant” referred to both Olivares and Madrigal. The trial
court further instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.00, which
explained that “principals” of a crime are equally guilty and
include direct perpetrators as well as “[t]hose who aid and abet
the . . . [attempted commission] of the crime.” CALJIC No. 3.01
instructed that to convict Olivares of aiding and abetting
attempted murder, the jury had to find that he aided the
commission of the crime “1. With knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] 2. With the intent or purpose
of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of
the crime, and [¶] 3. By act or advice, [or, by failing to act in a
situation where a person has a legal duty to act,] aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates the commission of the [act or] crime.”

                                 8
       As to “the crime,” CALJIC No. 8.66 provided the law on
attempted murder: “In order to prove attempted murder, each of
the following elements must be proved[:] [¶] 1. A direct but
ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another
human being; and [¶] 2. The person committing the act harbored
express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill
unlawfully another human being.” The instruction reiterated
that the “acts of a person who intends to kill another person will
constitute an attempt where those acts clearly indicate a certain,
unambiguous intent to kill.” CALJIC No. 17.00 informed the jury
that it had to determine separately whether Olivares and
Madrigal were guilty of attempted murder. The jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
any other theory of imputed malice.
       During closing argument, the prosecutor made clear that
both Madrigal and Olivares were charged with attempted
murder, which required the intent to kill, and the evidence
reflected both were guilty of that crime. Specifically, the
prosecutor stated, “I think there is no question that the suspects
who committed this particular drive-by shooting intended to kill
Ricardo Aguilera.” The prosecutor contended that the
defendants’ casing of the location of the shooting beforehand,
Madrigal asking Aguilar where he was from, and Madrigal
pointing a gun at him and “fir[ing] at least four to five different
shots at him” demonstrated both defendants intended to kill.
The prosecutor further argued Olivares “was actually in
charge . . . of what was going to happen because he drove by—he
could have left at that point but he came back” and “actually
stopped the car to allow the shooter a chance to shoot . . . at his
victim.” The prosecutor did not mention the natural and

                                9
probable consequences doctrine in her closing argument as a
basis for liability. She also reminded the jury that it was
required to decide separately whether each defendant was guilty.
      After the trial court instructed the jury, and after hearing
closing arguments, the jury found Olivares guilty of the
attempted murder of Aguilera as charged in Count 2. We
presume the jury understood and followed the court’s instructions
in reaching this verdict. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th
834, 852 (Sanchez).) The record of conviction therefore reflects
that the jury convicted Olivares of attempted murder as a direct
aider and abettor who shared the direct perpetrator’s intent to
kill.
      B.     The record of conviction does not permit the
             conclusion that the jury imputed malice to
             Olivares as an aider and abettor of assault
      Olivares argues that even if the jury did not convict him of
attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences
theory, relief is available to him if he was convicted under “any
theory” in which the jury imputed malice to him based solely on
his participation in the attempted murder. We disagree.4

4     Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to
have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶]

                                10
       By its plain terms, section 1172.6, subdivision (a) allows
only individuals “convicted of . . . attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” to avail themselves
of the statute’s resentencing procedures. The catch-all phrase in
the statute making relief available to a person convicted “under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime” applies only to persons
convicted of felony murder or murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
However, even assuming Olivares would be eligible for
resentencing if he was convicted of attempted murder under
another theory of imputed malice, his arguments fail because the
record establishes no such theory was available in this case.
       Olivares maintains that under the instructions given, the
jury could have convicted him as an aider and abettor of
attempted murder even if he only intended to aid an assault. Not
so. The record of conviction leaves no room for the possibility
that the jury found Olivares intended to aid and abet a crime
other than attempted murder.
       People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198 (Cortes) is
instructive. In 2005, Cortes drove past a liquor store with three
male passengers. (Id. at p. 200.) After Cortes slowed to a stop,
four or five gunshots were fired from the car, killing one person
and missing another. (Ibid.) The prosecution argued Cortes was

(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.”

                                11
either the actual shooter or an aider and abettor. (Ibid.) A jury
convicted Cortes of first degree murder and premeditated
attempted murder. (Id. at pp. 199–200.) The trial court
subsequently denied Cortes’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing at the prima face stage. (Id. at p. 203.) On appeal,
Cortes argued that although the jury was not instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, “the prosecutor’s
closing arguments were ‘equally applicable to appellant having
the knowledge and intent to aid and abet in an assault with a
firearm the natural and probable consequence of which was his
confederate’s commission of the murder and attempted murder.’ ”
(Ibid.)
       The appellate court rejected the argument, finding that
“the prosecution did not argue at any point during trial, including
closing argument, that a crime other than murder or attempted
murder was committed, and no other crime was charged or at
issue throughout the trial. In particular, the prosecution did not
allege that Cortes aided and abetted an assault with a deadly
weapon, and therefore we find no merit in Cortes’s suggestion
that the jury may have, without instruction, relied on such a
charge.” (Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 205.) Further, the
prosecutor’s passing reference to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine in closing argument was insufficient to
find the jury did not follow the court’s instructions when
“[n]othing in the charges, the instructions, or the balance of the
trial permitted the jury to find Cortes guilty on a theory other
than direct aiding and abetting . . . .” (Id. at pp. 205–206.)
       The record of conviction in Olivares’s case reflects
circumstances similar to those in Cortes. Here, the prosecution
argued Olivares was a direct aider and abettor of attempted

                                12
murder. The jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The prosecutor did not charge Olivares or
Madrigal with any crime other than attempted murder or argue
during closing argument that either defendant committed a crime
other than attempted murder. (Cf. Montes, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 1007 [petitioner could make § 1172.6 prima
facie showing where prosecutor argued in closing that “a
reasonable person in appellant’s shoes would know that an
assault may lead to an attempted murder”].) The prosecutor here
did not even make a cursory reference to the natural and
probable consequences doctrine in closing argument, as the
prosecutor did in Cortes.
       We therefore reject Olivares’s argument that because
CALJIC No. 3.01 referred to aiding and abetting the “commission
of a crime,” instead of the “commission of murder,” there was a
possibility the jury could have convicted Olivares of attempted
murder based on the conclusion that he intended only to commit
some lesser, or different crime. Nothing in the record indicates
the jury relied on “some other unidentified and uncharged crime,
contrary to the trial court’s instructions” to convict Olivares
without finding he acted with express malice. (Cortes, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) Rather, the jury instructions properly
reflected the law: “when guilt [for attempted murder] does not
depend on the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . .
the aider and abettor must know and share the murderous intent
of the actual perpetrator.” (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)
       Olivares’s reliance on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
972 (Langi) and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257
(Maldonado) for a different result is misplaced. Both cases
concerned implied malice crimes. (Langi, at p. 983 [second

                                13
degree implied malice murder]; Maldonado, at pp. 1262–1263
[first degree lying-in-wait murder].) The Langi and Maldonado
courts reasoned that because the instructions for the underlying
crimes did not require the intent to kill, the aiding and abetting
jury instructions left open the possibility that the juries convicted
the appellants for intending to aid the perpetrators’ intentional
acts, which did not necessarily require that the appellants
personally acted with the requisite implied malice. (Langi, at
p. 983; Maldonado, at pp. 1263, 1266, 1267.)
       Here, CALJIC No. 8.66 required the jury to find the direct
perpetrator, Madrigal, acted with the intent to kill. To convict
Olivares of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor, the
jury had to conclude under CALJIC No. 3.01 that Olivares knew
of Madrigal’s intent to kill, and that Olivares aided Madrigal’s
commission of the crime with the purpose of killing. Thus, in
contrast to Langi and Maldonado, the general aiding and
abetting instruction in this case did not create any possibility the
jury might convict Olivares without finding that he acted with
the requisite intent to kill. (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)
       C.    Neither the jury instructions on the sentencing
             enhancements nor the prosecutor’s closing
             argument suggested the jury could find
             Olivares guilty based on imputed malice
       As we understand his arguments, Olivares contends the
jury instructions on the willful, premeditated, and deliberate
allegation (§ 664, subd. (a))5 and the gang enhancement (§ 186.22,

5     Section 664, subdivision (a) imposes life with the possibility
of parole as the punishment for attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder.

                                 14
subd. (b)),6 when combined with the aiding and abetting
instruction, allowed the jury to potentially convict him of
attempted murder based on imputed malice. This argument is
unavailing because it ignores the language of each instruction
and, further, would have required the jury to flagrantly disregard
the court’s other instructions to reach the result Olivares
suggests.
       The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.67 on
the allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated. On appeal, Olivares asserts that the
instruction, when combined with CALJIC No. 3.01 on aiding and
abetting, allowed the jury to find the allegation true as to
Olivares even if it also concluded that only Madrigal acted with
“a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation . . . .”
       Even if the jury did not find Olivares personally acted with
premeditation and deliberation for purposes of the section 664,
subdivision (a) allegation, Olivares still fails to establish that
such jury findings would have any bearing on the conviction for
attempted murder. CALJIC No. 8.67 expressly informed the
jury: “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder, you
must determine whether this allegation is true or not true.”
(Italics added; People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879–880
[“the jury does not decide the truth of the penalty premeditation
allegation until it first has reached a verdict on the substantive
offense of attempted murder. . . . once the jury finds that an aider

6    Section 186.22, subdivision (b) “prescribe[s] sentence
enhancements or alternate penalties of varying length” for
persons who commit crimes for the benefit of a gang. (People v.
Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 962.)

                                15
and abettor . . . has committed an attempted murder, it
separately determines whether the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated”].)
       Similarly, the prosecutor in closing argument informed the
jury it had to reach a decision on attempted murder before
moving on to consider whether the attempted murder was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated. There is no factual or legal basis to
speculate that the jury failed to follow the jury instructions for
determining Olivares’s guilt as to the primary offense,
disregarded the preliminary portion of CALJIC No. 8.67, and
used its findings on the willful, deliberate, and premeditated
allegation to conclude Olivares was guilty of attempted murder
without concluding he shared Madrigal’s intent to kill.
       Likewise, Olivares argues a portion of the jury instruction
on the gang enhancement allowed the jury to conclude it “could
find the gang allegation true as to appellant if he intended to
assist ‘in any criminal conduct by gang members,’ not specifically
murder.” This argument not only misreads and mischaracterizes
the instruction, it also does not explain how any findings on the
enhancement would have any bearing on the attempted murder
conviction.
       The trial court instructed the jury that if it found the
defendants guilty of the charged crimes, it needed to determine
whether they also violated section 186.22, subdivision (b). The
instruction further indicated that to establish a violation, the
People were required to prove: “1. The defendant is guilty of the
underlying crime. [¶] 2. The defendant committed said crime for
the benefit of . . . a Criminal Street Gang. [¶] 3. The defendant
acted with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members.” (Italics added.) The jury

                                16
could not reach the language Olivares challenges regarding the
“specific intent to . . . assist in any criminal conduct” without first
concluding Olivares was guilty of the “underlying crime,”
attempted murder.
      The jury was unequivocally instructed that it must first
decide whether Olivares was guilty of the underlying crime,
attempted murder, before considering the enhancements.
Nothing in the record of conviction indicates the jury may have
collapsed its findings on Olivares’s attempted murder charge and
the enhancements in such a way that it could avoid concluding
Olivares intended to aid and abet Aguilera’s killing, and thus
acted with express malice. We presume the jurors understood
and followed the court’s instructions and found Olivares guilty of
attempted murder—and therefore that he intended to kill—
before finding the section 664, subdivision (a) and section 186.22,
subdivision (b) allegations true. (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 852.)
      Finally, Olivares argues the jury could have imputed
malice to him based on the prosecutor’s statement in closing
argument that Madrigal’s and Olivares’s gang membership was
“very telling and supportive of the identifications that were made
of them, which is basically the evidence that . . . strongly shows
that the defendants are guilty.” Olivares does not elaborate on
how this remark could have led the jury to impute malice. The
prosecutor’s reference to evidence of gang membership to
corroborate eyewitness identifications of Olivares was unrelated
to the malice requirements for attempted murder. Moreover, the
prosecutor unequivocally stated that the gang membership
evidence did not permit the jury to find “guilt by association” and
that she was “not asking [the jury] to find Mr. Madrigal or Mr.

                                  17
Olivares guilty just because they’re gang members.” Instead, the
prosecutor asked the jury “to find them guilty because the
evidence proves that they’re guilty and that the gang evidence
actually supports all of the other evidence that we have provided
in this case.” The jury could not have understood the prosecutor’s
statements as directing it to convict Olivares of attempted
murder solely because he was a gang member.
       Olivares cannot establish he was convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
any other theory of imputed malice. His petition fails to make a
prima facie showing of his eligibility for resentencing under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law.

                               18
                       DISPOSITION
    The trial court order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                              ADAMS, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

                         19