Court Opinion

ID: 9522160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:44.832939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:20.960996
License: Public Domain

Reiber, C J.,
¶ 71. dissenting in part, and concurring in part. I concur with Part I of the majority’s opinion, but I agree with Justice Johnson that Fiore was not entitled to summary judgment in his favor and that a remand is appropriate. I write separately because I believe that whether Fiore reasonably relied exclusively on the Phase I environmental site assessment is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact if Fiore is to benefit from the diligent-landowner affirmative defense. In my view, a fact-finder must decide whether Fiore reasonably relied on this assessment, and whether on all of the facts Fiore has satisfied the requirements of 10 V.S.A. § 6615(e). I therefore dissent.
¶ 72. To be entitled to the diligent-landowner defense, Fiore needed to establish “by a preponderance of the evidence that after making diligent and appropriate investigation of the facility, he . . . had no knowledge or reason to know that said release or threatened release was located on the facility.” 10 V.S.A. § 6615(e). Fiore argued below that these requirements were satisfied as a matter of law because, prior to purchasing the property, he was shown a Phase I report prepared by Griffin International, Inc. The report, which was prepared at the behest of the seller, concluded that the property presented no significantly environmentally hazardous conditions and recommended no further investigative work. Fiore argued that he reasonably relied on the report’s conclusions. “If professional engineers could not detect the presence of the dry cleaning chemicals,” Fiore argued, “then obviously [he] should not be expected to have detected those chemicals.”
¶ 73. Fiore also claimed that he had no specialized knowledge of dry cleaning or the chemicals involved in that business; he had not observed anything on the property suggestive of contamination; there were no obvious indicators of recent dry cleaning on the property; and he had purchased the property for slightly less than *343its appraised value. Fiore provided an opinion from an expert that the Phase I report “purported” to have been completed in accordance with standard practice guidelines, and that a layperson reviewing the Phase I assessment would have reasonably concluded that he had conducted an appropriate inquiry “necessary to qualify for the innocent landowner defense.”
¶ 74. The State opposed Fiore’s motion, relying heavily on Fiore’s lawsuit against Griffin, and Fiore’s allegations in that litigation that the Phase I assessment had been negligently prepared. According to the State, Fiore presented no evidence or legal support for the proposition that a buyer’s subjective reliance on a Phase I report prepared by a seller constituted a diligent and appropriate investigation of a former dry-cleaning facility, without regard to whether the assessment itself was a diligent and appropriate investigation. The State maintained that Fiore was not entitled to rely blindly on any Phase I investigation report and thereby avoid liability, particularly given Fiore’s allegations in related litigation that the report did not comply with standard practice guidelines. The State argued that, at a minimum, these allegations demonstrated a material question of fact as to whether there had been a diligent and appropriate investigation in this case.
¶ 75. The State also asserted that a reasonable investigation would have revealed the presence of contaminants. It presented evidence that its environmental consultant had been able to enter a crawl space beneath the building. The consultant located a variety of pipes, determined that several were connected to tanks beneath the building, and observed two abandoned storage tanks that were later found to be contaminated with hazardous material commonly used in dry-cleaning operations. The State added that while Fiore asserted that the purchase price was close to the appraised value of the property, he provided no admissible evidence to support this contention. Additional filings by both parties followed.
¶76. I believe the State presented sufficient evidence to show the existence of a genuine factual dispute as to whether Fiore reasonably relied on the Phase I report, and whether his investigation was diligent and appropriate under the circumstances. As recounted above, Fiore claimed only that he was “shown” a report prepared at the request of the seller. The report identified the property as a “closed site on the Vermont Hazardous Waste Site *344list,” and indicated that it had been used as a dry-cleaning business for almost thirty years. The report referred to the disposal of dry-cleaning waste, stating that the “[djocumentation of the proper disposal of dry cleaning wastes was reviewed previously and documented in the previous Phase I report.” Fiore did not assert that he had sought, been shown, or reviewed this related Phase I report, although he alleges in related litigation against Griffin that this statement — that the previous assessment had documented proper disposal of dry-cleaning waste — was false. As discussed above, the parties concede that the Phase I report was negligently conducted. Ante, ¶ 65.
¶ 77. Because this was a summary judgment proceeding, we must give the State “the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences.” Doe v. Forrest, 2004 VT 37, ¶ 9, 176 Vt. 476, 853 A.2d 48. Thus, one could argue that information about the property’s past use and its placement on a hazardous waste-site fist might have prompted Fiore to undertake a more thorough evaluation of the property. Similarly, one might argue that a diligent and reasonable investigation would have uncovered the two underground storage tanks on the property, which were accessible via a crawl space under the building. Ultimately, these are questions that a fact-finder must resolve. As noted above, I am not persuaded that a landowner’s reliance on a Phase I report, which is later determined to be negligently prepared, must be excluded from this analysis. Cf. ante, ¶ 57. The apparent reliability of the Griffin report, and Fiore’s alleged reliance on it, are relevant factors that must be evaluated by a fact-finder, and the weight to be given such evidence is exclusively for the trier to determine.
¶ 78. The problem is that the majority inappropriately acts as the fact-finder here, weighing the evidence and concluding that the statutory requirements are satisfied. Ante, ¶ 37. In reaching its conclusion, it relies in part on a finding that there was nothing in the record to suggest that a thorough visual inspection by Fiore should have turned up evidence of contamination. Ante, ¶ 38. But, as noted above, the State presented evidence that its inspection of the property revealed two abandoned storage tanks that contained hazardous material. The majority also finds that Fiore purchased the property at close to its appraised value. Ante, ¶ 43. It states that the property had been recently appraised, as uncontaminated, at $127,000. Id. There is no admissible evidence to this effect in the record, however, as the State pointed out below.
*345¶ 79. As we have often repeated, “[s]ummary judgment is not a substitute for a determination on the merits, so long as evidence has been presented which creates an issue of material fact, no matter what view the court may take of the relative weight of that evidence.” Vt. Envtl. Bd. v. Chickering, 155 Vt. 308, 319, 583 A.2d 607, 613-14 (1990). As Justice Johnson observes, a landowner’s entitlement to the benefit of the diligent-owner defense is an inherently fact-specific query, and one that is generally inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment. Ante, ¶ 68 (citing cases to this effect). Reasonable minds could disagree over whether Fiore made a diligent and appropriate investigation under the totality of the circumstances here. I would thus reverse the trial court’s summary judgment decision, and remand this case for resolution of outstanding factual questions.