Court Opinion

ID: 9775366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:55:32.2878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.427202
License: Public Domain

STONE, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe the jury’s verdict on negligence and proximate cause is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and manifestly unjust, I respectfully dissent.
*324Failure To Properly Sound Whistle
Billy Meacham sustained permanent catastrophic injuries when the van in which he was riding was struck by a train at the Maplewood Drive railroad crossing. The undisputed evidence established that Louisiana law required a prolonged or repeated sounding of the train’s whistle for three hundred yards before the Maplewood crossing. There is little probative evidence, and certainly not a preponderance of evidence, that the train continuously or repeatedly sounded its whistle for three hundred yards prior to entering the Maplewood crossing and crashing into the van. Eight witnesses—none of whom had any stake in the outcome of this litigation—testified that either the train did not sound its whistle, or did not sound its whistle continuously for three hundred yards before entering the Maplewood crossing.
The two cable company employees, Alway and Lugo, both testified that the whistle did not repeatedly or continuously sound prior to the impact. Alway heard a whistle, followed fifteen to twenty seconds later by a second whistle, which lasted only three to five seconds before the impact. Similarly, Lugo testified that there was a ten to fifteen second silence between the first and second whistle, and that the whistle was not continuously sounded as it approached the Maplewood crossing.
Sandra Robbins and Brenda Wells, both of whom are hearing impaired, testified that they are able to hear train whistles despite their hearing impairments. Robbins testified that she heard only one short whistle. Her estimate of the length of the whistle varied from two to twenty seconds. More importantly, Robbins testified that the period of silence following the initial whistle until the collision was longer than the length of time the whistle sounded. Wells heard only a very quick whistle immediately before the sound of the impact. Under either woman’s testimony, there was no repeated or prolonged sounding of the whistle before the train entered the Maplewood crossing. This same conclusion is reached when the testimony of Michael Henry is considered. Henry testified that the train did not repeatedly or continuously sound its whistle for fifteen seconds prior to the Maplewood crossing.
Betty Eden testified that she heard no whistle until one or two seconds before the collision, while her husband Eugene and Richard Silvey both testified that they heard no whistle before they heard the sound of the crash. Again, despite differences in their testimony, these witnesses all established that there was no repeated or prolonged sounding of the train whistle as it approached the Maplewood crossing.
The only witness who testified differently was the train’s conductor, Robert Jimmer-son, who shared responsibility with the engineer for sounding the whistle. Jimmerson never testified that the engineer did in fact properly sound the whistle. Rather, Jim-merson testified that he recalled the engineer as a competent engineer who performed his duties according to the rules. This meager testimony does not, in my opinion, rise to the level of probative evidence.
Louisiana law and railroad company policy required repeated and prolonged sounding of the whistle in order to warn motorists of an approaching train. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence presented is that because the train crew failed to sound the whistle in the manner required, Meacham and the van driver, David Toth, failed to receive warning of the train’s approach, proximately causing the collision and resulting injuries. The jury’s verdict to the contrary is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
I am mindful that appellate courts are not to act as a second jury, merely substituting their opinion for that of the jury. Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.1988). Nonetheless, when the factual sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, appellate courts are required to “consider and weigh all of the evidence in the case and to set aside the verdict and remand the cause for a new trial, if it thus concludes that the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as. to be manifestly unjust— this, regardless of whether record contains some ‘evidence of probative force’ in support *325of the verdict....” In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, (1951).
The majority points out inconsistencies in the testimony presented by Meacham, which is proper in a factual sufficiency review. But in doing so, and in reaching its conclusion that the jury’s verdict is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, the majority falls short in two regards. First, the inconsistencies noted by the majority are not relevant to the question of whether the train failed to properly sound its whistle. As noted above, despite differences in testimony, the various witnesses consistently testified to one controlling fact— there was no repeated and prolonged whistle sounding for three hundred yards before the train entered the Maplewood crossing.
Second, the majority discredits the testimony presented by Meacham’s witnesses because they were “preoccupied” or not predisposed to “attentiveness for train whistles.” Yet the majority rejects the notion that it can consider that not a single disinterested witness testified that the train properly sounded its whistle. Factual sufficiency review means that we review all testimony, with all its shortcomings, to determine whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Surely it does not mean that the appellate court points out the shortcomings of the losing party’s evidence, but puts on blinders to the deficiencies of the victorious party’s evidence.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial.