Court Opinion

ID: 9929866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 16:04:10.463505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:57:37.690211
License: Public Domain

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   CHRISTOPHER AMBROSE v. KAREN AMBROSE
                 (AC 45424)
                Bright, C. J., and Alvord and DiPentima, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The plaintiff in error, C, the former attorney for the defendant in the underly-
    ing dissolution action, filed a writ of error challenging the order of the
    first defendant in error, M, a Superior Court judge, disbarring her from
    the practice of law. C had filed a motion to disqualify the second defen-
    dant in error, A, a Superior Court judge, from the underlying action on
    the ground of bias, and a hearing was held on the motion to disqualify.
    At the hearing, M asked C to indicate specific parts of the transcripts
    of the dissolution proceedings that explained her claims of bias. C stated
    that the record in its totality would show that A was biased against
    women who claim abuse, individuals with disabilities, and anyone not
    of the Jewish faith. In support of these claims, C provided only examples
    of A’s rulings adverse to her client. M denied the motion to disqualify,
    reasoning that the claims of bias were unsupported and frivolous and
    finding that C had blatantly lied and made utterly empty claims. M
    further stated in his disqualification ruling that a hearing would be held
    on whether to act against C, and, if action was warranted, what action
    to take. At the disciplinary hearing, C made certain disparaging remarks
    against M. Subsequently, M issued a memorandum of decision disbarring
    C from the practice of law on the basis that she violated various Rules
    of Professional Conduct. Held:
1. C could not prevail on her claim that M violated her constitutional right
    to due process regarding the disciplinary hearing by failing to give her
    adequate notice and by limiting the hearing to the issue of sanctions:
    although M’s procedure was unusual in that he made findings as to C’s
    conduct in his ruling on the motion to disqualify A and then ordered a
    separate hearing on whether he should take action against C based on
    those findings, the disqualification ruling, which contained the notice
    for the disciplinary hearing, clearly stated that the disciplinary hearing
    would address the findings made in the disqualification ruling and ade-
    quately notified C of the parameters of the hearing, and it was sufficiently
    clear that the hearing was limited to the issue of whether the court
    would act, and, if so, what action to take against C for her conduct
    during the hearing on the motion to disqualify, leaving open the possibil-
    ity, however slight, that, following the disciplinary hearing, C would be
    found not to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct; moreover,
    M did not unfairly limit the disciplinary hearing to the imposition of
    sanctions, C was provided with the opportunity to be heard prior to her
    disbarment, the transcripts having clearly shown that C had a meaningful
    opportunity to be heard at both hearings and to explain her claims of
    bias, and, although C was not under oath at either hearing, as an officer
    of the court, she had an obligation to tell the truth and to not make
    frivolous claims; furthermore, although M reminded C at the start of
    the disciplinary hearing that the purpose of that hearing was to give
    her a chance to be heard on the issue of whether he should act upon
    the findings he had made as to her conduct at the disqualification hearing,
    he allowed her the opportunity to challenge those findings and to explain
    why there was a good faith basis for her conduct before determining
    that she had violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. C could not prevail on her claim that the sanction of disbarment for
    her conduct in connection with the motion to disqualify constituted
    impermissible punishment for her exercise of her first amendment right
    to free speech; C was afforded a sufficient opportunity to be heard and
    she directed this court to no law, nor was this court aware of any,
    providing either that she was entitled to additional process because
    her misconduct involved speech or that a different standard for the
    imposition of sanctions for attorney misconduct should apply when the
    misconduct involved speech.
3. C could not prevail on her claim that M’s findings that she had violated
    the Rules of Professional Conduct were not factually supported by
     clear and convincing evidence, the record having contained sufficient
     evidence to support the decision under the requisite standard of proof:
     M’s findings that C’s allegations made in connection with the motion
     to disqualify were frivolous and intentionally inaccurate were supported
     by clear and convincing evidence, the transcript of the hearing on the
     motion to disqualify having shown that M admonished C not to say things
     for which she could not provide support and gave her opportunities to
     withdraw or temper her statements; moreover, instances cited in the
     disciplinary order, and apparent in the court file, provided clear and
     convincing evidence that C had failed to make reasonable efforts to
     expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her own client, and
     M also found that C’s arguments in furtherance of her allegations of
     judicial bias had the corrupt motive to cloud the truth for the perceived
     benefit of her client and that she acted with reckless disregard for the
     truth; furthermore, the transcript from the hearing on the motion to
     disqualify supported the findings that C disrupted proceedings and preju-
     diced the system of justice by hurling baseless accusations, harassing
     parties, and using the system of justice to punish a party opponent and
     legal professionals.
4. C could not prevail on her claim that disbarment was an excessive penalty
     because it was disproportionate in light of the conduct involved and
     her lack of disciplinary history; M’s sanction of disbarment was not an
     abuse of his discretion, as C did not demonstrate that M acted arbitrarily
     in imposing the penalty of disbarment, but, rather, the disciplinary order
     demonstrated a careful consideration of the nature of the misconduct
     in light of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and this court
     deferred to M’s determination of the appropriate sanction.
     Argued September 19, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

                             Procedural History

  Writ of error from an order of the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Fairfield, Regional Family Trial
Docket, Moukawsher, J., disbarring the plaintiff in error
from the practice of law, brought to this court.
Affirmed.
  Nickola J. Cunha, self-represented, the appellant,
with whom, on the brief, were Norman A. Pattis and
Christopher T. DeMatteo (plaintiff in error).
  Robert J. Deichert, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellees (defendants in error).
                          Opinion

   DiPENTIMA, J. The primary issue in this writ of error
challenging the disbarment of an attorney is whether
her due process rights were violated by the procedure
used by the first defendant in error, Hon. Thomas G.
Moukawsher. The plaintiff in error, Nickola J. Cunha,
who is the former attorney for a party in the underlying
dissolution action, challenges in this writ of error the
order of Judge Moukawsher disbarring her from the
practice of law. Cunha claims that Judge Moukawsher
(1) violated her constitutional right to due process by
failing to give her adequate notice of a disciplinary
hearing and by deciding that misconduct had occurred
without an independent hearing on the issue, (2) vio-
lated her first amendment right to free speech by dis-
barring her for the arguments she made in connection
with a motion to disqualify, (3) erred in finding that
she had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
because those findings were not factually supported
by clear and convincing evidence and (4) imposed an
excessive penalty by disbarring her from the practice
of law.1 We conclude that no constitutional violation
occurred, the findings of violations of Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct were supported by clear and convincing
evidence and there was no abuse of discretion in order-
ing Cunha disbarred. Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.
   The record discloses the following relevant facts and
procedural history. In 2019, the plaintiff, Christopher
Ambrose, commenced a dissolution action against the
defendant, Karen Ambrose, who was represented by
Cunha. Trial in the dissolution action began in March,
2021. As explained by the second defendant in error,
Hon. Gerard I. Adelman, judge trial referee, in the April
26, 2022 memorandum of decision dissolving the mar-
riage and explaining the delay in doing so, ‘‘the defen-
dant began to simply not appear for the trial and [Cunha]
began to make derogatory comments about the court
and its proceedings. Accordingly, the court referred
the complaints to the Regional Family Trial Docket’s
presiding judge, [Moukawsher, J.], for a hearing.’’
   At a November 22, 2021 hearing concerning the
referred matters, Judge Moukawsher noted that there
was no pending motion to disqualify to decide. After the
defendant, through Cunha, filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Adelman from the proceedings on the ground of
bias, on December 1, 2021, a hearing was held on the
motion to disqualify. At that hearing, Judge Moukawsher
asked Cunha to indicate specific parts of the transcripts
of the dissolution proceedings that explained her claims
of bias. Cunha stated that the record in its totality would
show that Judge Adelman was biased against women
who claim abuse, individuals with disabilities, and any-
one not of the Jewish faith. In support of these claims,
she provided only examples of Judge Adelman’s rulings
adverse to her client. Judge Moukawsher repeatedly
requested that Cunha provide evidence to support her
claims of bias rather than simply relying on the issuance
of adverse rulings and stated at one point, ‘‘You’re a
lawyer. You know I need to have evidence. You can’t
just assert things.’’ Judge Moukawsher further stated
at one point that, ‘‘it can’t be just simply you don’t like
his rulings . . . .’’
   In a December 10, 2021 memorandum of decision
(disqualification ruling), Judge Moukawsher denied the
motion to disqualify, reasoning that the claims of bias
were unsupported and noted that the motion was
‘‘entirely unsupported and frivolous. No reasonable per-
son would question [Judge Adelman’s] impartiality
under these circumstances.’’ Judge Moukawsher found
that Cunha had ‘‘blatantly lied’’ and made ‘‘utterly empty
claims.’’ Judge Moukawsher stated that, ‘‘[b]ased upon
what has occurred on the record in connection with
the latest motion to disqualify Judge Adelman, on Janu-
ary 10, 2022, at 10 a.m. the court will hold a hearing on
whether to act against Attorney Cunha, and, if action
is warranted, what action to take.’’ Judge Moukawsher
noted that the matter was of ‘‘the utmost seriousness’’
and advised Cunha to be represented by counsel at the
hearing. Judge Moukawsher further stated that ‘‘[t]he
clerk will send a copy of this ruling to the chief disciplin-
ary counsel. The court would welcome participation by
any appropriate disciplinary entity to appear as a friend
of the court for the upcoming hearing.’’
   At the start of the January 10, 2022 disciplinary hear-
ing, Judge Moukawsher, stated: ‘‘As the record will
reflect, the court denied the motion to disqualify Judge
Adelman and made conclusions that Attorney Cunha
had substantially misrepresented on matters of fact to
the court. And so the conclusions, in terms of Attorney
Cunha, what she said and did have already been made.
And the purpose of this is to consider potential disci-
pline for Attorney Cunha with respect to what the court
has already concluded.’’ In response, Cunha, represent-
ing herself, stated that Judge Moukawsher’s findings in
the disqualification ruling regarding her conduct were
clearly erroneous and noted that she found ‘‘these pro-
ceedings to be intentionally harassing and intimidation
and an attempt by Your Honor solely to shut me down
for the corruption that I have raised before this court.’’
Cunha further stated that the disqualification ruling ‘‘is
a joke, and it is pathetic, and you should be ashamed
of yourself for subjecting myself to that type of rhetoric.
Frankly, Judge, I am ashamed to even be sitting before
you with the type of conduct that you engaged in. You
have engaged in material misrepresentation; you have
lied to the public. You have done so solely to put me
in a poor light . . . .’’ Judge Moukawsher reminded
Cunha that ‘‘what I am dealing with today are the mis-
statements and false claims that you made before me’’
and that he was giving her ‘‘the opportunity before I
determine what action should be taken against you to
tell me any reasons in support of why I shouldn’t take
any action to you, or against you, or that I should take
some lesser action against you. And I was going to
suggest that you might tell me some of your professional
background, that might be a basis for it, that you might
describe why you, in good faith, believed the things
that you asserted. You could name the documents you
examined, you could name the people you spoke with,
you could explain the reliability of these things.’’ Cunha
argued that Judge Moukawsher’s findings in the disqual-
ification ruling were clearly erroneous and questioned
whether she would be allowed to engage in cross-exami-
nation of him as to those findings. Judge Moukawsher
stated, ‘‘I am trying to give you a chance to be heard
on what I have ordered. I have concluded, already from
the record, from what you said to me in court, that you
misrepresented to me material matters,’’ and further
explained that ‘‘[t]he question is what I’m going to do
about it. I’m going to give you one more chance to
address the various penalties I might impose before I’m
concluding that you’re not going to respond to your
opportunity to be heard.’’ Cunha stated that Judge Mou-
kawsher ‘‘should disqualify [himself] because [he] could
not be the accuser, the trier of fact, the finder and the
executioner,’’ and suggested that Judge Moukawsher
was ‘‘prejudiced in what it is that you have opined in
this matter.’’ Counsel for the plaintiff in the dissolution
proceedings was given a chance to be heard over Cun-
ha’s objection. When Judge Moukawsher gave the disci-
plinary counsel an opportunity to be heard, Cunha
objected, stating that he ‘‘seems to think nothing of to
allow an attorney to speak on the record absent an
appearance. We have due process in this country. What
is so difficult for this court to comprehend? You are
not the law maker.’’ The court instructed Cunha to
‘‘stop,’’ and Cunha responded, ‘‘I am frustrated, Judge,
with your lack of acknowledgement of what your posi-
tion is as a judge. You are not the legislature. There
is something called the separations of power.’’ Judge
Moukawsher asked Cunha to ‘‘stop speaking,’’ at which
point Cunha stated, ‘‘I will obey, Your Honor, would
you like me to bow’’; Judge Moukawsher responded
that Cunha was ‘‘bounding criminal contempt of court’’
because she was ‘‘abusing the court’’ and ‘‘not providing
any useful information.’’ The disciplinary counsel address-
ed Judge Moukawsher, listing in detail the rule viola-
tions and misconduct the evidence supported for a sanc-
tion of disbarment. Following that, Cunha stated that
she never made a material misrepresentation to Judge
Moukawsher and attempted to provide support for the
claims of bias raised in the motion to disqualify. She
urged Judge Moukawsher ‘‘to reconsider the findings’’
and reasoned that ‘‘they were entered by mistake.’’ She
further asked Judge Moukawsher ‘‘again to please
reconsider’’ and listen to testimony of ‘‘March 31, 2021,
April 1st, May 25th and 27th, June 2nd and 3rd, July 20th
and, as Your Honor knows, October 20th and November
9th, all in 2021. I believe that those dates support, with-
out a doubt, the claims that I’ve made and should be
listened to before Your Honor were to consider anything
else. I believe Your Honor, unfortunately, was put in a
predicament, like myself, and you acted on responses
that I gave in a theoretical broad scope, which I under-
stand why you would, and I did retract that day and I
believe you need to take that into consideration because
it’s very important. Because I acknowledge on that day
that these proceedings needed to be reined back in and
I needed to accept responsibility that I allowed them
to go awry and it wasn’t okay and I needed to refocus
the court’s attention, which is exactly what I did. So, I
ask the court to please consider that.’’ The court
responded, ‘‘I will consider everything you just said,
I’ve written it down carefully and I can assure you
that I am no happier about being in this position than
anybody else is too. It’s a very unfortunate position for
all of us to have to deal with.’’
   On January 25, 2022, Judge Moukawsher issued a
memorandum of decision disbarring Cunha from the
practice of law on the basis that she violated rules 3.1,
3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 8.2, 8.4 (3) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (disciplinary order). In so doing,
Judge Moukawsher stated that ‘‘[d]isbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conduct as egregious as Ms.
Cunha’s’’ and noted that her conduct ‘‘not only involved
a fraud on the court, but a scurrilous assault on the
integrity of a judge. The offense was aggravated by its
context and by Ms. Cunha’s behavior at the hearing
on potential punishment’’ wherein ‘‘she mocked and
disregarded the court’s authority. She will not be given
a chance to do it again.’’ Judge Moukawsher ordered
Cunha permanently disbarred unless reinstated. Cunha,
through counsel, filed a writ of error from the January
25, 2022 disciplinary order barring her from the practice
of law.2 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
                             I
   Cunha first claims that Judge Moukawsher violated
her constitutional right to due process regarding the
January 10, 2022 disciplinary hearing by (a) failing to
give her adequate notice and (b) limiting it to the issue
of sanctions.3 Although we acknowledge that Judge
Moukawsher’s procedure was unusual in that he made
findings as to Cunha’s conduct in his ruling on the
motion to disqualify Judge Adelman and then ordered
a separate hearing on whether he should take action
against Cunha based on those findings, we conclude
that under the circumstances in the present case this
procedure did not violate Cunha’s due process rights.
  ‘‘Because a license to practice law is a vested property
interest and disciplinary proceedings are ‘adversary
proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature,’ an attorney sub-
ject to discipline is entitled to due process of law. . . .
Due process is inherently fact-bound because due pro-
cess is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands. . . . The constitu-
tional requirement of procedural due process thus
invokes a balancing process that cannot take place in
a factual vacuum. . . . Accordingly, [t]he determina-
tion of the particular process that is due depends on
the nature of the proceeding and the interests at stake.
. . . In attorney disciplinary proceedings, two interests
are of paramount importance. On the one hand, we must
not tie the hands of . . . trial courts with procedural
requirements so strict that it becomes virtually impossi-
ble to discipline an attorney for any but the most obvi-
ous, egregious and public misconduct. On the other
hand, we must ensure that attorneys subject to disci-
plinary action are afforded the full measure of proce-
dural due process required under the constitution so
that we do not unjustly deprive them of their reputation
and livelihood.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 19–20,
835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S.
Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004). ‘‘At [its] core, the
due process [clause] of the . . . federal [constitution]
require[s] that one subject to a significant deprivation
of liberty or property must be accorded adequate notice
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. . . . As a
procedural matter, before imposing . . . sanctions, the
court must afford . . . a proper hearing on the . . .
[proposed] sanctions. . . . There must be fair notice
and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. . . .
[B]efore [discipline may be imposed], [an] attorney [is]
entitled to notice of charges, fair hearing and [an] appeal
to court for [a] determination of whether [s]he was
deprived of due process . . . . These requirements
apply to the imposition of sanctions.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v.
McWeeny, 260 Conn. 296, 318, 796 A.2d 516 (2002). The
question of whether Cunha was deprived of her due
process rights is a question of law subject to our plenary
review. See Mikucka v. St. Lucian’s Residence, Inc.,
183 Conn. App. 147, 160–61, 191 A.3d 1083 (2018).
                            A
   Cunha first argues that the notice of the disqualifica-
tion hearing violated her right to due process because
it failed to notify her adequately of the misconduct for
which she would be disciplined and that the disciplinary
hearing was limited to the issue of sanctions. Cunha
misreads the record. The notice clearly stated that the
hearing would address the findings made in the disquali-
fication ruling and adequately notified Cunha of the
parameters of the hearing.
   In the disqualification ruling, which contained the
notice for the disciplinary hearing, Judge Moukawsher
found that Cunha had lied and made baseless allega-
tions against Judge Adelman; he made no conclusions
that she had violated any specific Rules of Professional
Conduct.4 Rather, following the sections of the disquali-
fication ruling concerning the denial of the motion to
disqualify, there was a section entitled in bold letters:
‘‘The court will hold a hearing to consider whether
to discipline Attorney Cunha.’’ Below that title, Judge
Moukawsher rhetorically queried, ‘‘[c]an a court stand
idly by when it realizes a lawyer has blatantly lied to
it, when the lawyer has made astounding and utterly
empty claims against a judge based upon his race, and
unsupported claims about his alleged biases against the
disabled and women who allege abuse,’’ and then, citing
Practice Book § 2-45, stated that ‘‘[t]he rules say the
court can’t turn a blind eye to this. Indeed, for matters
relating to courtroom conduct, judges have primary
jurisdiction over lawyers who do not meet their obliga-
tions as officers of the court.’’ He then stated that,
‘‘[b]ased upon what has occurred on the record in con-
nection with the latest motion to disqualify Judge Adel-
man, on January 10, 2022, at 10 a.m., the court will hold
a hearing on whether to act against Attorney Cunha,
and, if action is warranted, what action to take. Attorney
Cunha should have no illusions. The matter is of the
utmost seriousness. She would be well advised to be
represented at the hearing by an attorney.’’ Accordingly,
the disqualification ruling was sufficiently clear that the
January 10, 2022 hearing was limited to the issue of
whether the court would ‘‘act,’’ and if so, what action
to take against Cunha for her conduct during the hearing
on the motion to disqualify, leaving open the possibility,
however slight, that following the disciplinary hearing
Cunha would be found not to have violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct.5
                            B
   Cunha’s second due process argument is that Judge
Moukawsher unfairly limited the January 10, 2022 hear-
ing to the issue of what, if any, sanction to impose
and precluded her from challenging the findings of the
disqualification ruling. After a review of the transcript
from that hearing, we conclude that the court did not
limit unfairly the January 10, 2022 disciplinary hearing
to the imposition of sanctions.
   In its disqualification ruling, Judge Moukawsher
found that Cunha had ‘‘made astounding and utterly
empty claims against a judge based upon his race, and
unsupported claims about his alleged biases against the
disabled and women who allege abuse’’ and had ‘‘lied
to a judge emphatically, repeatedly, and with ample
warning that the judge would check for the truth.’’ A
court has inherent authority pursuant to Practice Book
§ 2-44 to discipline attorneys, including disbarment, for
just cause.6 A court may exercise this inherent authority
to discipline attorneys in a manner that ‘‘may be sum-
mary, and without complaint or hearing’’ when the
attorney conduct at issue occurs in the presence of the
court. Practice Book § 2-45.7 In the present case, the
court did not follow any specific procedure set out by
our rules of practice or as established by case law.
‘‘[D]ue process, [however] unlike some legal rules, is not
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances. . . . [Rather] [d]ue
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protec-
tions as the particular situation demands.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Mottolese, supra,
267 Conn. 20. The procedure followed by Judge Mou-
kawsher to discipline Cunha, however unprecedented,
must comply with due process. See, e.g., In the Matter
of Presnick, 19 Conn. App. 340, 349, 563 A.2d 299 (as
long as there is no denial of due process, court may
for good cause discipline attorneys who practice before
it), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 801, 567 A.2d 833 (1989).
    Notwithstanding the unprecedented procedure taken
by Judge Moukawsher in this matter, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Cunha
was not unconstitutionally deprived of her opportunity
to be heard prior to her disbarment. It is clear from the
transcripts that Cunha had a meaningful opportunity
to be heard at both hearings and to explain her claims
of bias. At the hearing on the motion to disqualify, Judge
Moukawsher heard Cunha describe the rulings of Judge
Adelman that were unfavorable to her client, directed
her away from tangential commentary and gave her
ample opportunity to provide supporting evidence.
Judge Moukawsher repeatedly asked Cunha to clarify
her arguments regarding each claim of bias. Cunha
stated that she believed ‘‘wholeheartedly’’ that Judge
Adelman was involved in a racketeering scheme with
legal professionals of the Jewish faith. In response to
the racketeering claim, Judge Moukawsher gave Cunha
sufficient opportunity to be heard and stated, ‘‘that’s,
as you know, a very serious thing to say, so give me
the evidence and I’ll consider it.’’ Cunha claimed to
have a list of cases that supported her racketeering
claim but, when pressed, could not produce it. Judge
Moukawsher reminded her, ‘‘if you’re not prepared to
back the thing up, don’t say it because I cannot keep
saying—I keep saying, well, what’s the evidence and
something else gets said and I have to say what’s the
evidence.’’ Judge Moukawsher gave Cunha sufficient
opportunity to be heard on her other claims of bias
against women alleging abuse and individuals with disa-
bilities and repeatedly asked Cunha to provide support
for the claims. Despite Judge Moukawsher’s frequent
reminder to Cunha not to state claims she could not
support, Cunha persisted in her claims of bias, stating,
‘‘I do believe that there’s outright bias here without a
doubt. I believe that the record reflects that.’’ Cunha
also stated that exhibit 71, admitted in the dissolution
action, would demonstrate that a multidisciplinary
panel concluded that the plaintiff in the dissolution
proceeding sexually assaulted his children, and Judge
Moukawsher asked her multiple questions about the
document, giving her the opportunity to withdraw her
statements. Later in the disqualification ruling, Judge
Moukawsher characterized those statements as lies.
   At the beginning of the disciplinary hearing, instead of
proceeding to argue her claim that Judge Moukawsher’s
findings in the disqualification ruling were clearly erro-
neous or explaining why her conduct did not violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Cunha asserted that
Judge Moukawsher was ‘‘intentionally harassing’’ her,
that the disqualification ruling was ‘‘a joke,’’ that he
had ‘‘lied to the public,’’ asked what was ‘‘so difficult
for this court to comprehend’’ regarding the right to due
process, and questioned whether Judge Moukawsher
‘‘would . . . like [her] to bow . . . .’’ She did so
despite Judge Moukawsher’s suggestion that she
describe ‘‘why you, in good faith, believed the things
that you asserted. You could name the documents you
examined, you could name the people you spoke with,
you could explain the reliability of these things.’’ Rather
than follow Judge Moukawsher’s suggestion, Cunha
continued to interrupt the court and asked whether she
would have the opportunity to cross-examine Judge
Moukawsher, as her accuser. The court attempted to
stop her repeated interruptions and to refocus Cunha
on the issues at hand before finally informing her that
she should stop speaking as she was ‘‘bounding criminal
contempt of court . . . .’’
   In the disqualification ruling, Judge Moukawsher
gave Cunha notice that disciplinary counsel may partici-
pate in the disciplinary hearing by stating that ‘‘[t]he
clerk will send a copy of this ruling to the chief disciplin-
ary counsel. The court would welcome participation by
any appropriate disciplinary entity to appear as a friend
of the court for the upcoming hearing.’’ At the disciplin-
ary hearing, disciplinary counsel, further confirming
that the hearing was not limited to the issue of the
appropriate sanction, stated, ‘‘I believe the court can
find, by clear and convincing evidence, several viola-
tions of the Rules of Professional Conduct’’ and argued
that Judge Moukawsher should find that Cunha had
committed misconduct by violating several specific
Rules of Professional Conduct and should disbar her
as a sanction for that misconduct. Judge Moukawsher
then addressed Cunha, stating that ‘‘[a] lot of time has
gone by since you last spoke. And I’m hoping that during
that time period you considered whether you should
make some statement that might address the substance
of any action I might take against you with respect to the
findings I’ve made, again, advising you, in the strictest
terms, to address what is actually before me. I’ll give
you a last opportunity to do so.’’
  Cunha then addressed whether she engaged in any
misconduct. For example, she stated, ‘‘I have never,
ever made a misrepresentation to a court, or anyone
else, knowingly, or intentionally, I stand by that princi-
ple.’’ The court and Cunha then engaged in a lengthy
exchange about whether her statements about the
alleged sexual abuse were true. During that discussion,
Judge Moukawsher stated: ‘‘It was a very specific state-
ment about what I’d find in the [Department of Children
and Families’ (department)] report. And I found the
opposite. So, if you’d like to address that, that’s the
narrow thing that we were having an extended discus-
sion on, because I basically told you your credibility is
on the line with this. I’m going to go and look at this
exhibit and if it says what you say I’ll credit it. If it says
the opposite, then you’ve got something to answer for.
And now, you’re here to answer for it because it did
say [the] opposite of what you represented to me. Now,
if you’d like to address that, you may.’’ Later, Cunha
argued that Judge Moukawsher misconstrued or misun-
derstood her statements about the Jewish faith. She
also argued that transcripts from other hearings support
statements she made at the disqualification hearing.
   Although Cunha was not under oath at either hearing,
as an officer of the court, she had an obligation to
tell the truth and to not make frivolous claims. See
Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234
Conn. 539, 554–55, 663 A.2d 317 (1995) (as officers of
court, attorneys are continually accountable to court
for manner in which they exercise that privilege); see
also Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (lawyer shall
not knowingly make false statement of fact to tribunal);
Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 (3) (‘‘[i]t is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [e]ngage in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tation’’).
   In its disqualification ruling, Judge Moukawsher
found that there was no basis for Cunha’s representa-
tions before it that Judge Adelman was biased against
persons not of the Jewish faith, women who allege
abuse and individuals with disabilities, and that exhibit
71 made clear that neither the department nor a multi-
disciplinary panel concluded that the plaintiff in the
dissolution action had abused his children. These repre-
sentations, which Judge Moukawsher characterized in
the disqualification ruling as blatant lies, and the claims
of bias, which he characterized as ‘‘utterly empty claims
against a judge,’’ occurred before the court, and there
was no contested factual issue as to what Cunha had
said at the hearing on the motion to disqualify. See In
the Matter of Presnick, supra, 19 Conn. App. 351 (‘‘[t]he
right to a hearing is limited to cases in which a hearing
would assist the court in its decision, usually because
there is a contested factual issue to be resolved’’).
Although it is true that Judge Moukawsher reminded
Cunha at the start of the disciplinary hearing that the
purpose of that hearing was to give her a chance to be
heard on the issue of whether he should act upon the
findings he had made as to her conduct at the disqualifi-
cation hearing, he allowed her the opportunity to chal-
lenge those findings and to explain why there was a
good faith basis for her conduct before determining that
she had violated several of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Accordingly, we reject this claim.
   For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Cunha
cannot prevail on her due process claims that, regarding
the disciplinary hearing, Judge Moukawsher failed to
give her adequate notice and improperly limited that
hearing to the issue of sanctions. We find no such viola-
tions of due process.
                            II
  Cunha next claims that the sanction of disbarment
for her conduct made in connection with the motion
to disqualify constituted impermissible punishment for
her exercise of her first amendment right to free speech.
Our established law leads us to conclude otherwise.
   ‘‘The [f]irst [a]mendment, applicable to the [s]tates
through the [due process clause of the] [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment, provides that Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech. The hallmark of
the protection of free speech is to allow free trade in
ideas—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of
people might find distasteful or discomforting. . . .
Thus, the [f]irst [a]mendment ordinarily denies [the gov-
ernment] the power to prohibit dissemination of social,
economic and political doctrine [that] a vast majority
of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with
evil consequence. . . . The [f]irst [a]mendment affords
protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well
as to actual speech. . . . The protections afforded by
the [f]irst [a]mendment, however, are not absolute, and
we have long recognized that the government may regu-
late certain categories of expression consistent with
the [c]onstitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332, 351–52, 246 A.3d 429
(2020), cert. denied,      U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2467, 209 L.
Ed. 2d 529 (2021). ‘‘Whether the trial court’s sanctions
constitute an impermissible restriction on the [plain-
tiff’s] speech presents a question of law, over which
our review is plenary. . . . [A]n appellate court is com-
pelled to examine for [itself] the . . . statements [at]
issue and the circumstances under which they [were]
made to [determine] whether . . . they . . . are of a
character [that] the principles of the [f]irst [a]mendment
. . . protect.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
352.
   Cunha argues that her ‘‘speech should not have been
subject to discipline as it did not pose an imminent and
likely threat to the administration of judicial proceed-
ings.’’ Her argument is misplaced. That standard only
applies to extrajudicial speech by a party to litigation;
the speech at issue in the present case was made in
the presence of the court by an attorney. See id., 359.
Thus, the question of whether the content of Cunha’s
arguments subjected her to discipline is answered by
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Judge Moukawsh-
er’s conclusion that Cunha violated the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct primarily was based on the finding that
Cunha had lied and made misrepresentations during
the hearing on the motion to disqualify. Cunha does not
claim that those lies and misrepresentations constituted
protected speech, nor does she specifically claim that
any one of Judge Moukawsher’s seven findings of viola-
tions of the Rules of Professional Conduct constituted
a violation of her right to free speech.8 Rather, she
contends that the ‘‘court reasoned that lies and misrep-
resentations are not protected speech in the courtroom.
It is certainly not being argued here that they should
be. What is being argued is that the constitutional guar-
antees of free speech require greater consideration in
sanctioning attorney conduct than were provided by
the trial court.’’ She argues that Judge Moukawsher
should have permitted her ‘‘to refute [the] findings of
misconduct. That is doubly important considering that
the conduct at issue was speech. Such a lack of consid-
eration could sanction or otherwise chill what may be
controversial but meritorious arguments.’’ Cunha also
argues that Judge Moukawsher ‘‘did not narrowly tailor
[his] sanctions in consideration of the conduct being
attorney speech. The trial court could have imposed a
fine, reprimand or suspension or made a referral to the
grievance committee. Instead, it chose the most severe
penalty to an attorney. It disbarred Ms. Cunha from the
practice of law. It did so without regard to the potential
chilling effects on advocacy that a swift disbarment for
an argument could have on the legal profession.’’ What
we glean from this argument as stated is that Judge
Moukawsher violated Cunha’s right to free speech by
(1) sanctioning her for misconduct without first con-
ducting a hearing regarding whether misconduct had
occurred and (2) not giving her a less severe sanction
because of free speech concerns.
   Neither of these arguments merit extensive discus-
sion. We have addressed the first argument in our analy-
sis of Cunha’s due process claim in part I B of this
opinion in which we concluded that she was afforded
a sufficient opportunity to be heard. As to the second
argument, Cunha has directed us to no law, nor are we
aware of any, providing either that she is entitled to
additional process because her misconduct involved
speech or that a different standard than that described
in part IV of this opinion for the imposition of sanctions
for attorney misconduct should apply when the miscon-
duct involves speech. For the foregoing reasons, Cunha
cannot prevail on the arguments she presents to this
court implicating the first amendment.
                           III
  Cunha next claims that Judge Moukawsher’s findings
that she had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
were not factually supported by clear and convincing
evidence. We disagree as the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the decision under the requisite
standard of proof.
   We begin with the applicable standard of review.
‘‘[W]here the factual basis of the court’s decision is
challenged we must determine whether the facts set
out in the memorandum of decision are supported by
the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and
the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous. . . . We also must determine whether
those facts correctly found are, as a matter of law,
sufficient to support the judgment. . . . Although we
give great deference to the findings of the trial court
because of its function to weigh and interpret the evi-
dence before it and to pass upon the credibility of wit-
nesses . . . we will not uphold a factual determination
if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. . . . Additionally, because
the applicable standard of proof for determining
whether an attorney has violated the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct is clear and convincing evidence . . .
we must consider whether the trial court’s decision was
based on clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v.
Mottolese, supra, 267 Conn. 37–38.
   Judge Moukawsher reasoned that Cunha had violated
rules 3.1, 3.3 and 8.4 (3) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct because she ‘‘intentionally and persistently
misrepresented the facts to the court’’ in order ‘‘to con-
tinue to pursue a false narrative about sexual abuse
conclusions . . . .’’ See Rules of Professional Conduct
3.1 (lawyer shall not assert issue unless there exists
basis in law and fact that is not frivolous); Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.3 (lawyer shall not knowingly
make false statement of law or fact to tribunal); Rules
of Professional Conduct 8.4 (3) (it is professional mis-
conduct for lawyer to engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).
   Judge Moukawsher stated that Cunha also claimed
at the disqualification hearing that department records
contained in exhibit 71 would reveal abuse by the plain-
tiff of his children, despite the fact that exhibit 71
reveals that the department stated that he did not pose
any risk to the health, safety or well-being of the chil-
dren.9 Cunha’s argument that Judge Moukawsher’s find-
ings were not supported in the record by clear and
convincing evidence because her inaccurate represen-
tations were not made intentionally but rather were a
result of poorly constructed arguments is belied by the
transcript of the hearing on the motion to disqualify
during which Judge Moukawsher admonished Cunha
not to say things for which she could not provide sup-
port and gave her opportunities to withdraw or temper
her statements.10 On the basis of our review of the
record, we conclude that Judge Moukawsher’s findings
that Cunha’s allegations made in connection with the
motion to disqualify were frivolous and intentionally
inaccurate were supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence.
   Concerning rule 3.2 of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which provides that a lawyer shall make reason-
able efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client, Judge Moukawsher found that
Cunha’s ‘‘attack on Judge Adelman’’ and misrepresenta-
tions regarding exhibit 71 were ‘‘part of a tactic of
stalling and diverting’’ the case. Cunha contends that
there was no clear and convincing evidence that she
made her filings to delay the case rather than in zealous
strategic representation of her client. To the contrary,
instances cited in the disciplinary order, and apparent
in the court file, provide clear and convincing evidence
that Cunha had failed to make reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her
own client.
   Regarding rule 8.2 of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which prohibits lawyers from making a statement
concerning the integrity of a judge that either the lawyer
knows to be false or makes with reckless disregard as
to its truth or falsity, Cunha argues that there was not
clear and convincing evidence that she knowingly lied
during court proceedings instead of ‘‘just making a poor,
unprepared argument.’’ Even if we were to assume,
without deciding, that there was not clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Cunha had made the statements inten-
tionally, Judge Moukawsher also found that Cunha’s
arguments in furtherance of her allegations of judicial
bias had the corrupt motive ‘‘to cloud the truth for the
perceived benefit of her client,’’ or in other words, she
acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Cunha
makes no argument that the record fails to establish
that she acted with reckless disregard. See Rules of
Professional Conduct § 8.2 (a) (‘‘[a] lawyer shall not
make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concern-
ing the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudica-
tory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for
election or appointment to judicial or legal office’’).
   Concerning rule 3.5 of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal, Cunha argues that the
record demonstrates that she argued aggressively but
does not show that she used profane language or inter-
rupted the court proceedings. The broad language of
the rule prohibits ‘‘conduct intended to disrupt a tribu-
nal’’ and does not limit such conduct either to the use
of profanity or to the interruption of proceedings. Rules
of Professional Conduct § 3.5 (4). The transcript from
the hearing on the motion to disqualify supports the
findings that Cunha disrupted proceedings and preju-
diced the system of justice by ‘‘hurling baseless accusa-
tions,’’ harassing parties, and using the system of justice
to punish a party opponent and legal professionals.
Judge Moukawsher’s findings are rooted in (1) the
nature of Cunha’s claims of bias against Judge Adelman,
which required a referral to Judge Moukawsher, and
(2) her arguments during the hearing on the motion
to disqualify, which included unsupported claims of
racketeering between Judge Adelman and legal profes-
sionals and factually incorrect claims that exhibit 71
would show certain inappropriate behavior on the part
of the plaintiff in the dissolution action. The record
provides clear and convincing evidence that Cunha had
disrupted the dissolution proceedings by her arguments
concerning the motion to disqualify.
   Regarding rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, which provides that it is professional miscon-
duct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice, Judge Moukawsher
used the same reasoning as he used for finding a viola-
tion of rule 3.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and stated that Cunha disrupted proceedings and preju-
diced the system of justice by using the judicial system
to punish a party opponent and legal professionals.
Cunha argues that she filed her motions in zealous and
strategic advocacy of her client and not to stall the
dissolution proceedings. Although this argument does
not directly address the basis for the finding of a viola-
tion of rule 8.4 (4), as with rule 3.5, there is clear and
convincing evidence in the record of the hearing on the
motion to disqualify that she prejudiced the system of
justice by using it to punish a party opponent and legal
professionals.
   For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court’s
findings of violations of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
                             IV
  Cunha last claims that disbarment was an excessive
penalty because it was disproportionate in light of the
conduct involved and her lack of disciplinary history.
We are not persuaded.
    Practice Book § 2-44 provides in relevant part that
‘‘[t]he Superior Court may, for just cause . . . disbar
attorneys . . . .’’ If a court in the exercise of its discre-
tion disciplines an attorney, ‘‘it does so not to mete out
punishment to an offender, but [so] that the administra-
tion of justice may be safeguarded and the courts and
the public protected from the misconduct or unfitness
of those who are licensed to perform the important
functions of the legal profession. . . . The trial court
has inherent judicial power, derived from judicial
responsibility for the administration of justice, to exer-
cise sound discretion to determine what sanction to
impose in light of the entire record before it. . . .
   ‘‘The American Bar Association has promulgated
standards for the imposition of sanctions. . . . [A]fter
a finding of misconduct, a court should consider: (1)
the nature of the duty violated; (2) the attorney’s mental
state; (3) the potential or actual injury stemming from
the attorney’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of
aggravating or mitigation factors. . . . The aggravating
factors referenced in the standards include (a) prior
disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e)
bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of
the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evi-
dence, false statements, or other deceptive practices
during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowl-
edge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of
victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
[and] (j) indifference to making restitution. . . . The
mitigation factors include: (a) absence of a prior disci-
plinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely
good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify conse-
quences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward pro-
ceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g)
character or reputation; (h) physical or mental disability
or impairment; (i) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (j)
interim rehabilitation; (k) imposition of other penalties
or sanctions; (l) remorse; [and] (m) remoteness of prior
offenses.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted). Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 150
Conn. App. 472, 487–88, 91 A.3d 932, cert. denied, 314
Conn. 931, 102 A.3d 83 (2014).
   The disciplinary order states that ‘‘[d]isbarment is
the appropriate penalty for conduct as egregious as
[Cunha’s].’’ It further states that there were aggravating
factors, including that Cunha ‘‘has been disrupting this
case for a long time with bogus motions, duplicate pro-
ceedings, baseless attacks on the lawyers and judges
and experts. She didn’t just lose her temper one day
and do things she has regretted. She has systematically
tried to use the justice system against itself’’ in order
to frustrate and discredit it. (Footnote omitted.) Judge
Moukawsher additionally noted that, during the disci-
plinary hearing, Cunha, an experienced lawyer, ‘‘berated
the court, mocked it, and mocked the proceedings.’’ Judge
Moukawsher noted that ‘‘[t]hings might be different if
there were substantial mitigating factors here. But there
aren’t. There is only [that Cunha] has not been disci-
plined before, but that is by no means enough to offset
the seriousness of her wrongdoing.’’
  In support of her position that Judge Moukawsher
abused his discretion in imposing the sanction of disbar-
ment for her misconduct, Cunha highlights other cases
that she alleges involve ‘‘similar cases of misconduct’’
wherein a lesser penalty was imposed. Cunha, however,
has not demonstrated that Judge Moukawsher acted
arbitrarily in imposing the penalty of disbarment. Rather,
the disciplinary order demonstrates a careful consider-
ation of the nature of the misconduct in light of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, we
defer to Judge Moukawsher’s determination of the
appropriate sanction.11 See Disciplinary Counsel v.
Serafinowicz, 160 Conn. App. 92, 102, 123 A.3d 1279,
cert. denied, 319 Conn. 953, 125 A.3d 531 (2015). On
the basis of our review of the record, we cannot con-
clude that Judge Moukawsher’s sanction of disbarment
was an abuse of his discretion.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     Cunha also claims for the first time in her appellate reply brief that,
following Judge Moukawsher’s order disbarring her, he continued to enter
further orders that constitute ‘‘ex post facto orders and directly violate the
guaranteed protections of due process.’’ We decline to review this claim
because Cunha raised it for the first time on appeal in her appellate reply
brief. See State v. Griffin, 217 Conn. App. 358, 375 n.9, 288 A.3d 653 (‘‘it is
well established that we do not entertain arguments raised for the first time
in a reply brief’’), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 917, 290 A.3d 799 (2023).
   2
     Although counsel filed the writ of error and Cunha’s principal brief,
Cunha subsequently filed her own appearance, personally filed her reply
brief, and personally argued her claims to this court.
   3
     Cunha claims a violation of her federal and state rights to due process.
We confine our analysis of Cunha’s claim to the federal constitution because
she did not provide an independent analysis of her claim under the state
constitution in accordance with State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610
A.2d 1225 (1992). See id. (defendant must provide independent analysis
under particular provision of state constitution).
   4
     We do not suggest that this is a requirement for due process. See Briggs
v. McWeeny, supra, 260 Conn. 319–20 (in order for notice of hearing on
attorney misconduct to satisfy due process standards it must apprise attor-
ney of transactions that form basis of allegations of misconduct and need
not refer to specific sections of Code of Professional Responsibility); see
also id., 319 n.16 (Code of Professional Responsibility was repealed on
October 1, 1986, at the same time that the current Rules of Professional
Conduct, as approved by the judges of the Superior Court, became effective).
   5
     Cunha also argues that because the disciplinary order stated that she
had ‘‘a tactic of stalling and diverting [the underlying dissolution] case,’’ the
notice violated her right of due process because it was limited to speech
and conduct before Judge Moukawsher. The record does not support this
argument. In fact, Cunha was on notice that her conduct in delaying the
dissolution proceedings would be addressed in the disciplinary hearing
because such conduct had been included in the disqualification ruling, which
served as the notice for the January 10, 2022 hearing. Specifically, in the
disqualification ruling, Judge Moukawsher stated that Cunha had ‘‘clogged
the docket, delayed the trial, and cost the parties a fortune by repeatedly
hurling baseless personal accusations against lawyers, judges, the guardian
[ad litem], and many others. Rather than get the case tried and appeal if
she doesn’t like the result, Attorney Cunha has made every problem in
the case worse. Indeed, her behavior has become the biggest problem in
the case.’’
   6
     Practice Book § 2-44 provides: ‘‘The Superior Court may, for just cause,
suspend or disbar attorneys and may, for just cause, punish or restrain any
person engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.’’
   7
     Practice Book § 2-45 provides: ‘‘If such cause occurs in the actual pres-
ence of the court, the order may be summary, and without complaint or
hearing; but a record shall be made of such order, reciting the ground
thereof. Without limiting the inherent powers of the court, if attorney miscon-
duct occurs in the actual presence of the court, the Statewide Grievance
Committee and the grievance panels shall defer to the court if the court
chooses to exercise its jurisdiction.’’
   8
     Judge Moukawsher found Cunha had violated rule 3.1 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (lawyer shall not assert frivolous claims), rule 3.2 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct (lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation), rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (lawyer
shall not knowingly make false statement of law or fact to tribunal), rule
3.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (lawyer is prohibited from engaging
in conduct intended to disrupt tribunal), rule 8.2 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct (lawyer shall not knowingly or with reckless disregard make state-
ment concerning integrity of judge), rule 8.4 (3) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct (lawyer shall not engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tation) and rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to administration of justice).
   9
     Cunha does not contest on appeal Judge Moukawsher’s finding that
exhibit 71 did not demonstrate what she had claimed it did.
   10
      For example, at the hearing on the motion to disqualify the following
colloquy occurred:
   ‘‘[Attorney Cunha]: But they are complaining of sexual assault. It has been
established that the complaints have been substantiated by a multidiscipli-
nary taskforce team who—who recommended those children not be with
their father. And, because of the lies presented to the court by the guardian
ad litem and Attorney Aldrich manipulating the facts, Judge Adelman has
ignored the real evidence. And—
                                        ***
   ‘‘The Court: [I]f I look at that [department] document, within that docu-
ment there are the conclusions of a multidisciplinary taskforce that Christo-
pher Ambrose has sexually assaulted his children repeatedly and that—and
that the taskforce recommends that he—that they be taken away from him.
Is that what—
   ‘‘[Attorney Cunha]: Yes. Yes. And you will also find that the legal depart-
ment for [the department] recommends that [the department] file a take
into custody matter with the juvenile court.
                                        ***
   ‘‘The Court: —the [department]—the [department] report—
   ‘‘[Attorney Cunha]: Yes.
   ‘‘The Court: —will quote this taskforce saying that—that the father com-
mitted sexual assault against the children and should be—and they shouldn’t
be allowed with him. That’s what I’ll find in there; right?
   ‘‘[Attorney Cunha]: Yes. Absolutely.’’
                                        ***
   ‘‘[Attorney Cunha]: It’s exhibit number 71.
   ‘‘The Court: 71. Okay. I’ll look at that. And you want me to conclude from
that that was a matter you brought to the court’s attention, that it has a
clear conclusion, essentially, that the children are in immediate danger—
   ‘‘[Attorney Cunha]: Yes.’’
   11
      The defendants in error argue, citing footnote 51 in Burton v. Mottolese,
supra, 267 Conn. 57, that this court may note postdisbarment events to
illustrate the correctness of the court’s disciplinary order. We do not read
the footnote in Burton so broadly, and, under the circumstances of this
case, we decline to consider Cunha’s postdisbarment conduct.