Court Opinion

ID: 9606400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:29.601291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:27.146414
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent with respect to Division 1, although I concur in Divisions 3 and 4.
1. As to Division 1, there are three reasons why a new trial is not necessary.
First. At oral argument the parties indicated that a hearing had been set before the trial court on Dykes’ motion to correct the record, pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-41 (f), with respect to the two exhibits. The hearing was held thereafter and a supplemental record and transcript thereof has now been filed.
The motion to correct the record sought to have the record reflect that the two exhibits, which were invoices of September 23, 1982 and December 3, 1982 sent by Dykes to Spicewood, were admitted in evidence. The court found that they were not in fact ruled admitted but that there had been a great deal of testimony about each one. It declined to grant the motion. It stated, however, that it had directed counsel at the end of the case to go over the documents and be sure that those to be sent to the jury comprised all of the proper ones. Dykes’ attorney spoke up to confirm this. It is undisputed that appellant Spicewood participated and registered no objection to these two documents being sent out.
In my opinion, Spicewood waived formal judicial admission of the documents in permitting the jury to deliberate with them in hand, without registering any objection until after trial. Analogous is Chieffe v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., 168 Ga. App. 384 (2) (309 SE2d 167) (1983), where no objection was made during trial. The point is, there is no ruling by the trial court in this regard for us to review.
Second. The record shows that there was a great deal of testimony about these documents and their contents, and the figure which was awarded to Dykes against Spicewood, $63,379.63, was testified to repeatedly as the net amount due. So the documents were cumulative in this respect. See Crosswell v. Arten Constr. Co., 152 Ga. App. 162, 165 (2)-166 (262 SE2d 522) (1979); McArthur v. Roadway Express, 109 Ga. App. 30, 31 (1) (135 SE2d 67) (1964). The jury awarded this amount but permitted prejudgment interest only on $58,756.85, apparently denying prejudgment interest on the amount Ferro had requested from Dykes for extra work. Ferro’s invoices were in the record. Thus it does not appear that the evidence on which the prejudgment interest was based was not submitted to the jury other than by the two exhibits. The date from which prejudgment interest was to run, August 11,1982, was demonstrably not derived from these exhibits, because it does not appear on them, so they were not its source.
*401Decided December 4, 1987
Rehearing denied December 18, 1987
Neil L. Heimanson, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Carpenter, Stephen Gibbs, for appellees.
Third. Spicewood has shown no harm. The fact which the majority points out was impermissibly derived by the jury from the exhibits, i.e., the amount for Ferro’s extra work, redounded to Spicewood’s benefit rather than to its prejudice. Instead of awarding prejudgment interest on the whole amount due, the jury limited it to a smaller amount, in Spicewood’s favor. “Appellant must show harm as well as error to prevail.” Pope v. Propst, 179 Ga. App. 211, 217 (10) (345 SE2d 880) (1986).
2. With respect to enumerations of error numbers 2, 3 and 5, insofar as they go beyond the question dealt with above, I find no reversible error.