Court Opinion

ID: 9439303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:30:28.861073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:17.710851
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The Steel Joist Institute (“Institute”) begins its “Statement of the Case” in its brief as follows:
The Steel Joist Institute challenges the portions of the Safety Standards for Steel Erection that mandate the design of steel joints. The regulations are to be codified at 29 C.F.R. [§] 1926.757(a)(l)(iii) ...; section 757(a)(3) ...; and section 757(a)(8) ... (collectively, “the Regulations”).
Petitioner’s Br. at 1. In presenting a summary of its argument, the Institute closely repeats the first sentence of its Statement of the Case and adds:
The regulations should be set aside for two reasons. First, OSHA does not have statutory authority to specify the design of buildings’ structural elements. Second, the regulations are not supported by substantial evidence.
Id. at 6. The Institute then contends that in attempting to improve the safety of steel erection, OSHA has “reached back to assert its statutory authority over the design of the product being assembled by steel erectors” but that “the Act does not contemplate OSHA designing steel joists” “because Congress has clearly expressed its intent that OSHA’s jurisdiction only extends as far as working conditions at the place of employment.” Id. Finally, the Institute argues that sections 1926.757(a)(1) and (8) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 7.
Accordingly, there is no basis on which the court can conclude that the Institute has waived its challenge to OSHA’s statutory authority to promulgate section 1926.757(a)(3). See Opinion at 2. The Institute raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether OSHA exceeded its authority in promulgating provisions of a regulation that in its view dictate the design of steel joists, and (2) whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support sections (a)(1) and (a)(8) of the regulation. See id. at xiii. Because these are separately presented issues, there is no basis on which to conclude that the Institute waived its general challenge to OSHA’s statutory authority specifically as to section 1926.757(a)(3) while preserving the same statutory challenge as to sections (a)(1) and (a)(8).
On the merits, the Institute’s challenge to OSHA’s authority to promulgate these three provisions of the regulation is merit-less. The court’s analysis of OSHA’s authority is no less applicable to section 1926.757(a)(3) than to sections 1926.757(a)(1) and (8). In holding that OSHA did not exceed its congressionally delegated authority in promulgating sections 1926.757(a)(1) and (8), the court makes three relevant observations: (1) OSHA’s authority to regulate safety characteristics of tools and materials used at a worksite is well established; (2) the final rule expressly exempts employers in the fabricated structural metal industry from the standard; and (3) “[rijotwithstanding the infelicitous phrasing of section 1926.757(a)(8), which purports to direct how joists ‘shall be fabricated,’ OSHA has *1170made it clear that the challenged provisions are not enforceable, or intended to be enforced, against joist manufacturers.” Opinion at 3-5. Similar to the phraseology of section 1926.757(a)(8), section 1926.757(a)(3) provides that “the joist shall be designed with sufficient strength,” but has as its purpose “to allow one employee to release the hoisting cable without the need for erection bridging.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.757(a)(3) (emphasis added). In other words, the activity being regulated by OSHA under section 1926.757(a)(3) is, again, at the work site, and not in the manufacturing facility. Nor is there any suggestion that the language or effect of section 1926.757(a)(3) regarding “design[ ]” is different in any material way from section 1926.757(a)(8)’s statement about “fabrication].” Under the circumstances, there is no basis to hold that OSHA lacked authority to promulgate section 1926.757(a)(3) much less sections 1926.757(a)(1) and (8).
Accordingly, because there was substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole to support sections 1926.757(a)(1) and (8), see Opinion at 5-6, I concur in denying the petition.