Court Opinion

ID: 9491718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:21:38.132324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:54.314995
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
It seems to me that the reality of what Judge Strayhorn said and did may be reached a bit more directly than along the path followed by the majority.
The majority opinion speaks of a “retrial in the interest of justice ... perhaps because the evidence is at the border line of legal sufficiency.” Ante at 487. In common parlance, I take this to be a reference to what follows a determination that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). In the briefs of the parties and in the district court’s opinion there is much discussion of the difference between a verdict that is against the weight of the evidence and one that is not supported by sufficient evidence. A verdict that is against the weight of the evidence may be followed by a retrial without violating the bar against double jeopardy. See, e.g., id. On the other hand, a verdict that is not supported by legally sufficient evidence operates as an acquittal and the principles of double jeopardy preclude a trial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
However, here the defendant argues that “the distinction between reversals based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence and those where a reviewing court disagrees with the trier of fact’s resolution of conflicting evidence and concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the evidence,... simply do not apply where, [as in the present case], the judicial entity which set aside the guilty verdict is the same judicial entity that made the initial finding of guilty.” Appel-lee’s Br. at 8-9 (internal quotations omitted). The defendant also attributes to the district court the view that the “distinction between reversals based on insufficiency and those based on weight is meaningless in situations where ... the trier of fact was the same entity as the person or court setting aside the conviction.” Id. at 9. And the district court seems to take this analysis one step farther when in its opinion it says, “To say that [Judge Strayhorn] granted a new trial because he personally weighed the evidence and was unconvinced is, therefore, the same as saying he acquitted the defendant.” Appellant’s Br., App. A (Dis. Ct. Mem. Op. at 10).
But it seems to me that if, as it appears, Judge Strayhorn’s decision was that his prior decision was against the weight of the evidence, then his decision on the defendant’s motion was to vacate and nullify his prior decision and, in effect, to decline to make a decision. That his prior decision may, on second thought, have appeared to have been against the weight of the evidence does not mean that it was unsupported by substantial evidence. From this perspective, Judge Strayhorn granted a new trial because he had withdrawn and vacated the decision that he had previously made. His stance in declining to decide was analogous to that of a hung jury.
Retrial after a jury fails to reach a verdict is not barred by considerations of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 323-25, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). Similarly, the failure or refusal of a judge at a bench trial to enter a decision presumably has no double jeopardy effect. Cf. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949). And the same result would follow when after a bench trial a judge vacates a decision already made. This is certainly the case if the defendant sought a new trial based on the setting aside of the decision reached in the first one. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Whether it would be equally the case *491if the court sua sponte vacated its own decision (assuming that this were authorized) need not be decided here. Judge Strayhorn was, after all, responding to a motion.
The district court, reviewing the arguments made to Judge Strayhorn, his review of the evidence and other related factors, stated: “We find clear from the record that the judge vacated the conviction because, in light of the evidence, he was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of petitioner’s guilt.” Appellant’s Br., App. A (Dis. Ct. Mem. Op. at 8). Significantly, the district court did not find that Judge Strayhorn vacated the conviction because no reasonable factfinder could have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of Rivera’s guilt; the district judge did not say that “acquittal was the only proper verdict.” Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211. Even if the district court’s reading of Judge Strayhorn’s record is correct, the judge’s after-acquired reasonable doubt serves only to vacate the prior decision, not to modify it into an acquittal. His doubt is not, as I have indicated, “the same as saying he acquitted the defendant.” See id. at 42 n. 17,102 S.Ct. 2211 (“disagreements among jurors or judges do not themselves create a reasonable doubt of guilt”). Hence, there is no double jeopardy here.