Court Opinion

ID: 9946877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 17:11:35.206322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:42.371911
License: Public Domain

J-A03015-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 CARL WILLIAM SMITH                    :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1416 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 1, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0014030-2018

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 CARL WILLIAM SMITH                    :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1417 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 1, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0006401-2018

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 CARL WILLIAM SMITH, IV                :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1418 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 1, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0006402-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
J-A03015-24

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                          FILED: March 1, 2024

        Carl William Smith, IV appeals from the order dismissing his Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. In this Court, he asks us to remand

the matter to the PCRA court for development of his claims that PCRA counsel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Since Appellant has established

that remand is warranted pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d

381 (Pa. 2021), we vacate the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and

remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

        This Court detailed the factual history underpinning the above-captioned

cases    on   direct   appeal,   which   we    need   not   recount   here.   See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 253 A.3d 267, 2021 WL 1328568, at *1

(Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision).         Suffice it to say, “Appellant

was charged with twenty-four counts of sex-related offenses involving his

young nieces by marriage, S.M. and her younger sister, K.M.            Another six

charges arose from Appellant’s sexual misconduct with his childhood friend’s

young daughter, K.W.”       Id. At the conclusion of a consolidated jury trial,

Appellant was convicted of rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse with a person less than sixteen years of age, and unlawful contact

with a minor as to S.M., indecent assault without consent with respect to K.M.,

and rape of a child and unlawful contact with a minor regarding K.W. The trial

court imposed an aggregate term of imprisonment of forty and one-half years

to eighty-one years.

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J-A03015-24

      On direct appeal to this Court, Appellant challenged the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence, the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial

premised upon a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Finding no merit to any of these

claims, we affirmed Appellant’s judgments of sentence. On September 27,

2021, our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.

      On April 19, 2022, Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA petition.

The PCRA court appointed Charles Pass, Esquire, who filed a motion to

withdraw and no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213

(Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). The PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing and advised

him that he was no longer entitled to counsel.        Appellant pro se filed a

response asking the PCRA court to reconsider its Rule 907 notice, detailing the

purported merits of the claims he wished to raise, and asking for new counsel

and to appeal the court’s decision if it still intended to dismiss his PCRA

petition.   The court denied Appellant’s motion to reconsider, dismissed his

PCRA petition, and appointed Corrie Woods, Esquire, to represent Appellant in

the event of an appeal.

      Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal at each of the above-listed trial

court docket numbers. This Court consolidated the matters sua sponte. The

PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Appellant

complied, raising for the first time the ineffectiveness of Attorney Pass

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pursuant to Bradley. In response, the PCRA court issued a statement in lieu

of opinion, noting that while Appellant properly raised his claims of ineffective

assistance of PCRA counsel in his Rule 1925(b) statement, the court could

provide no analysis of their merits because they had not been addressed in

the PCRA court.

      Seeking a remand to challenge the effective assistance of PCRA counsel,

Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration:

      1. Can [Appellant] make out a claim that initial PCRA counsel was
         ineffective in failing to investigate and present a claim that trial
         counsel was ineffective in his advice to [Appellant] in
         connection with the Commonwealth’s guilty plea offers on
         remand?

      2. Can [Appellant] make out a claim that initial PCRA counsel was
         ineffective in failing to investigate and present a claim that trial
         counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit significant evidence to
         impeach S.M.’s credibility on remand?

      3. Can [Appellant] make out a claim that initial PCRA counsel was
         ineffective in failing to investigate and present a claim that trial
         counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit the introduction of
         K.M.’s messages contradicting her claims of abuse on remand?

Appellant’s brief at 4.

      We begin with the legal principles guiding our review. As with all appeals

from PCRA orders, “our standard of review permits us to consider only whether

the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and

whether it is free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Pridgen, 305 A.3d

97, 101 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). Appellant has invoked Bradley to

request a remand to the PCRA court to litigate his claims that Attorney Pass

                                       -4-
J-A03015-24

was ineffective in his stewardship of Appellant’s PCRA petition. In Bradley,

our Supreme Court “h[e]ld that a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court

denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of

PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on

appeal.” 261 A.3d at 401 (cleaned up).

       Here, the PCRA court did not formally grant Attorney Pass leave to

withdraw, despite telling Appellant in its Rule 907 notice that he was no longer

entitled to counsel. Moreover, in light of the procedural history that followed,

which we detailed hereinabove, we conclude that Appellant properly raised his

claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel at the first opportunity to do

so, i.e., in his Rule 1925(b) statement, which was filed by new counsel,

Attorney Woods.

       While Appellant properly raised these claims, this Court recently

reiterated that “Bradley did not guarantee a PCRA petitioner substantive

review of claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, nor did it create an

absolute right to remand for development of those claims.”1 Commonwealth

v. Lawrence, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 WL 221021, at *2 (Pa.Super. Jan. 22,

2024).     Rather, when this Court is presented with Bradley claims, we

____________________________________________

1 Additionally, we recently clarified that “to demonstrate the propriety of a
remand[,]” an appellant must “explain. . . to this Court how further
development of the factual record would satisfy all three prongs of [the
ineffectiveness] test as to each of prior PCRA counsel’s alleged failings.”
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 WL 221021, at *3
(Pa.Super. Jan. 22, 2024). Although Appellant’s brief predated our issuance
of Lawrence, Appellant has complied with this standard.

                                           -5-
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determine whether remand is appropriate pursuant to the following

guidelines:

      In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
      advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to
      provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s
      ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue
      concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is
      not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be
      afforded.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1002 (Pa. 2022) (cleaned up).

      In his brief, Appellant sets forth that there are material facts at issue

and that, in reviewing all three prongs of the ineffectiveness test for each

layered claim of ineffectiveness levied against Attorney Pass, relief is not

unavailable as a matter of law. See Appellant’s brief at 13-31. Thus, we

conclude that Appellant has “provide[d] more than mere boilerplate assertions

of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness” and instead has demonstrated that “there

are   material   facts   at   issue   concerning   claims   challenging   counsel’s

stewardship[.]” Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1002 (cleaned up). Since “relief is not

plainly unavailable as a matter of law,” we agree with Appellant that remand

is warranted in this case. Id. (cleaned up).

      Based on the foregoing, we vacate the order dismissing Appellant’s

PCRA petition and remand for the PCRA court to consider the within claims of

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel.

                                        -6-
J-A03015-24

      Order vacated.   Case remanded with instructions.   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

 3/1/2024

                                -7-