Court Opinion

ID: 9883015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 00:00:33.507869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:44.964563
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50036        Document: 00516921601             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                      October 5, 2023
                                      No. 23-50036
                                     ____________                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk
   Alberto Martinez,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   University of Texas at Austin,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:20-CV-1175
                     ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         The district court found that Alberto Martinez failed to establish a
   prima facie case of retaliation and granted summary judgment in favor of
   University of Texas at Austin (UT). Because Martinez adequately alleged a
   causal link between his protected activity and UT’s adverse actions, we
   reverse and remand for further proceedings.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-50036         Document: 00516921601              Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                          No. 23-50036

                                                I.
          Martinez, who is Hispanic, is a tenured professor in UT’s History
   Department. In spring 2018, he informed the History Department by e-mail
   that there was “discrimination” and “marginalization” of Hispanic
   employees within the Department. In response, the department chair,
   Jacqueline Jones, appointed Martinez to head a newly created “Equity
   Committee.” The committee was tasked with creating “a plan of action to
   help fix inequities” and “review[ing] equity broadly to include not just
   Hispanics, but other minorities, gender, and any colleagues who fe[lt]
   disenfranchised.”
          As part of his work on the committee, Martinez created a salary report
   in October 2018 (the October report). Though the report generally dealt with
   the issue of “pay compression,”1 it expressly noted that in certain instances
   minority professors were not compensated the same as other professors.
   Specifically, the report stated that “no minorities . . . have served in the
   categories of service compensated by the [History] Department,” and that
   several minority professors were being paid less than their co-workers, even
   though those minority professors had more scholarly publications. He
   circulated the report among his colleagues and supervisors. According to
   Martinez, “some white administrators became angered or very annoyed by
   [his] report,” including Jones.
          Martinez alleges Jones thereafter subjected him to several retaliatory
   acts: (1) on October 19, 2018, Jones told another faculty member that she
   was going to disband the Equity Committee (though she never did);
   (2) between November 2018 and January 2019 Jones created new
   subcommittees for the Equity Committee, unilaterally appointed members to

          _____________________
          1
              The report defines pay compression as “inequities in salaries.”

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   those subcommittees, and delegated many of Martinez’s responsibilities to
   those subcommittees; (3) in January 2019, Jones filed a report with the Office
   of Inclusion and Equity against Martinez alleging that he engaged in an
   inappropriate relationship with a graduate student; (4) in March 2019, Jones
   told the Title IX liaison about the alleged inappropriate relationship, which
   caused the liaison to open an investigation; (5) later in March, Jones accused
   Martinez of making “disparaging” and “denigrating” statements about
   female co-workers; (6) in April 2019, Jones filed another report against
   Martinez alleging that he made anti-Semitic remarks; (7) in May 2019, Jones
   chose not to renew Martinez’s research fellowship; (8) in September 2019,
   Jones removed Martinez from the Equity Committee; and (9) in October
   2019, Martinez did not receive a teaching award because of rumors about the
   inappropriate relationship and anti-Semitic remarks.
           Martinez filed an EEOC charge on December 9, 2019. The charge
   discussed each of the retaliatory actions above except the loss of Martinez’s
   research fellowship and the Title IX investigation. The EEOC issued
   Martinez a right-to-sue letter on August 27, 2020, and he filed his lawsuit in
   November 2020. In his second-amended complaint, Martinez alleged a
   single Title VII retaliation claim.2
           After discovery, UT moved for summary judgment, which the district
   court granted. First, the court found that Martinez failed to exhaust his
   administrative remedies as to Jones’s alleged retaliatory actions except for
   her accusation that Martinez made “disparaging” remarks about female co-
   workers, her reporting of Martinez’s alleged anti-Semitic remarks, and her
   removal of Martinez from the Equity Committee.

           _____________________
           2
            Martinez asserted a Title VII discrimination claim in his original complaint, but
   he did not pursue that claim in his second-amended complaint or on appeal.

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          The court then analyzed Martinez’s prima facie case for retaliation
   based on those three actions. It determined that Martinez’s e-mails in spring
   2018 constituted a protected act, but that his creation of the October report
   did not. Next, it concluded that Jones’s reporting of Martinez’s alleged anti-
   Semitic remarks and removal of Martinez from the Equity Committee were
   materially adverse acts, but Jones’s accusation that Martinez made
   “disparaging” remarks about female co-workers was not. Regardless, in the
   end, the court found that Martinez’s claim failed because he established no
   causal link between the spring 2018 e-mails and Jones’s adverse acts. It
   therefore granted summary judgment without addressing UT’s proffered
   non-retaliatory reasons for Jones’s actions or the question of pretext.
                                           II.
          We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
   standards as the district court. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v.
   Axon Pressure Prod. Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 2020). Summary
   judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material
   fact exists ‘if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict
   for the nonmoving party.’” Ahders v. SEI Priv. Tr. Co., 982 F.3d 312, 315
   (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477
   (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). “We construe all facts and inferences in the
   light most favorable to the nonmov[ant] . . . .” Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278,
   284 (5th Cir. 2005).
          We first address the exhaustion issue and then discuss Martinez’s
   prima facie case.

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                                           A.
          Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust
   administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
   Jennings v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2021). We “interpret[]
   what is properly embraced in a review of a Title[] VII claim somewhat
   broadly, not solely by the scope of the administrative charge itself, but by the
   scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow
   out of the charge of [retaliation].” Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands,
   Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1970)). A plaintiff must file his charge
   “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
   occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).3
          The district court calculated the exhaustion period based on
   Martinez’s EEOC complaint filed on December 9, 2019. Accordingly, it
   found that it could only consider acts of retaliation that occurred after
   February 12, 2019. Martinez counters that he filed a complaint with the
   Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division and the EEOC on
   September 27, 2019, such that we should consider acts of retaliation that
   occurred after November 30, 2018. But the September 27 complaint is not
   in the record,4 and the district court did not consider it. We therefore do not
   consider Martinez’s argument on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2)
   (“If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
   unsupported by the evidence . . . the appellant must include in the record a
          _____________________
          3
             The three-hundred-day time frame applies because Martinez filed charges of
   discrimination with both the Austin Equal Employment/Fair Housing Office and the
   EEOC on December 9, 2019. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (explaining that the time
   period is three hundred days from when “the person aggrieved has initially instituted
   proceedings with a State or local agency”).
          4
            Martinez filed a motion to supplement the record pursuant to Federal Rule of
   Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2), which this court denied.

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   transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.”). The
   district court did not err by only considering materially adverse acts that
   occurred after February 12, 2019.
          The district court also determined that Martinez did not exhaust his
   administrative remedies as to the loss of his fellowship, the loss of the
   teaching award, and the Title IX investigation. We agree. Martinez did not
   mention the loss of the teaching fellowship and the loss of the teaching award
   in his EEOC charge, and an investigation into those acts could not
   “reasonably be expected to grow” out of what he included in the charge.
   Jennings, 11 F.4th at 342. Martinez similarly did not mention the Title IX
   investigation in his EEOC charge or his district court complaint. And “[a]
   claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in
   response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the
   court.” Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th
   Cir. 2005).
          In sum, the only retaliatory acts we consider as support for Martinez’s
   prima facie case are (1) Jones’s accusation that Martinez made
   “disparaging” and “denigrating” statements about female co-workers;
   (2) Jones’s filing of the report against Martinez alleging that he made anti-
   Semitic remarks; and (3) Jones’s removal of Martinez from the Equity
   Committee.
                                         B.
          A Title VII retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence is
   analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Saketkoo
   v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 2020). Under
   that framework, the plaintiff “carries the initial burden of establishing a
   prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. (quoting Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc.,
   339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003)). “If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie

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   case, then the employer has the burden of production to provide ‘a
   legitimate, non-[retaliatory] reason’ for the adverse employment action.” Id.
   (quoting Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir.
   2020)). “If the employer meets this burden, then the plaintiff has the burden
   to prove that the proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (quoting Brown, 969
   F.3d at 577).
          As the district court decided the case at McDonnell Douglas step one,
   Martinez’s prima facie burden, we likewise focus our attention there. To
   establish a prima facie retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) he
   engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) he suffered a materially
   adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected
   activity and the adverse action.’” Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766–67
   (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 784 F.3d
   263, 269 (5th Cir. 2015)).
                                        1.
          The district court found that Martinez engaged in protected activity
   when he complained of discrimination in the spring 2018 e-mails, but he did
   not when he published the salary report. We agree with the former finding,
   but not the latter.
          Protected activity under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “can
   consist of either: (1) ‘oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful employment
   practice by this subchapter’ or (2) ‘mak[ing] a charge, testif[ying],
   assist[ing], or participat[ing] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
   or hearing under this subchapter.’” E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d
   235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The first is known
   as the “opposition clause,” and the second is known as the “participation
   clause.” Id. The district court rightly found that Martinez’s creation of the
   salary report was not a protected activity under the participation clause

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   because it was an internal investigation. See id. at 239 n.2 (noting “every
   Court of Appeals . . . squarely has held that participation in an internal
   employer investigation not connected with a formal EEOC proceeding does
   not qualify as protected activity under the participation clause”).
          But the district court erred in failing to consider whether that action
   was a protected activity under the opposition clause. In Rite Way, we held
   that “solicited complaints . . . constitute ‘opposition’” under Title VII’s
   anti-retaliation provision. Id. at 240 (citing Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of
   Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–80 (2009)). Here UT’s
   creation of the Equity Committee was akin to soliciting complaints, as in Rite
   Way and Crawford. When Jones, as History Department chair, put Martinez
   in charge of the committee, she tasked him with creating “a plan of action to
   help fix inequities” and “review[ing] equity broadly . . . .” Plainly, Martinez
   developed the October report within that context, as the notes on the report
   indicate that its purpose was to substantiate inequities in minority faculty
   compensation. Cf. Wallace v. Performance Contractors, Inc., 57 F.4th 209, 224
   (5th Cir. 2023) (“[S]tating one’s belief that discrimination has occurred
   virtually always constitutes opposition.”). Unless Jones’s creation of the
   Equity Committee was intended to be empty window dressing, a natural
   outgrowth of empaneling the committee was its identifying perceived
   discrimination and proposing solutions. See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 279. If the
   committee’s activities were not protected, “prudent employees would have
   a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against themselves or
   against others.” Id. (noting the “primary objective” of Title VII is “avoiding
   harm to employees”).
          UT counters that the October report “did not oppose an unlawful
   employment practice” because it “merely focused on ‘pay compression,’ an
   issue that impacted all UT Austin faculty and is not specific to minorities.”
   But UT’s argument is undermined by two things. First, the salary report was

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   created in the context of the Equity Committee, whose express purpose was
   to “identify inequities” and “review equity broadly to include not just
   Hispanics, but other minorities, gender, and any colleagues who fe[lt]
   disenfranchised.”      Second, the report expressly noted that “no
   minorities . . . have served in the categories of service compensated by the
   [History] Department,” and that several minority professors were being paid
   less than their co-workers, even though those minority professors had more
   scholarly publications. Those statements are enough to constitute opposition
   under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. See Wallace, 57 F.4th at 224.
   Thus, a reasonable jury could find that Martinez’s creation of the October
   report was a protected activity.
                                          2.
          Now, to assess the three alleged retaliatory acts that were properly
   exhausted. The district court found that Jones’s accusation that Martinez
   made disparaging remarks about female co-workers was not a materially
   adverse action, but it found the allegations of anti-Semitic remarks and
   Martinez’s removal from the Equity Committee were. We agree.
          A materially adverse action is one that “might have dissuaded a
   reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
   Hudson v. Lincare, Inc., 58 F.4th 222, 231 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Burlington
   N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). “[A]n employment
   decision tends to be ‘materially adverse’ when it changes ‘job title, grade,
   hours, salary, or benefits’ or effects a ‘diminution in prestige or change in
   standing among . . . co-workers.’” Id. (quoting Stewart v. Miss. Transp.
   Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2009)). But mere “petty slights” or
   “minor annoyances” do not rise to the level of a materially adverse action.
   See White, 548 U.S. at 68.

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          Jones accused Martinez of making disparaging remarks about female
   co-workers in a private meeting and through e-mail. Accordingly, those
   accusations could not affect Martinez’s “prestige” or “change his standing
   among co-workers.” Contrarily, a reasonable juror could find that Jones’s
   filing the report alleging anti-Semitic remarks and her removing Martinez
   from the Equity Committee would affect his standing among co-workers and
   might have dissuaded him from making a charge of discrimination. Cf.
   Velikonja v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 122, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that a
   “reasonable jury could find that the prospect of . . . an investigation could
   dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of
   discrimination”).
                                        3.
          The district court held that Martinez’s claim failed because he did not
   establish a causal link between his protected activity and Jones’s retaliatory
   acts. Focusing on Martinez’s spring 2018 e-mails, the court found that
   “nearly a year passed” between the e-mails and Jones’s first retaliatory act—
   her report of his alleged anti-Semitic remarks in April 2019. It further found
   Martinez provided limited evidence regarding Jones’s retaliatory motive.
   We disagree with the district court’s conclusion.
          We begin by noting that “the standard for satisfying the [prima facie]
   causation element is much less stringent than a but for causation standard.”
   Ackel, 339 F.3d at 385 (quoting Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187,
   191 (5th Cir. 2001)). To demonstrate causation at the prima facie stage, “a
   plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s decision ‘was based in part
   on knowledge of the employee’s protected activity.’” Lyons v. Katy Indep.
   Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Medina v. Ramsey Steel
   Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001)). When causation is based on “mere
   temporal proximity,” that proximity must be “very close.” Id. (quoting

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   Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). But when other
   evidence of a causal link is presented, consideration of the time between the
   protected activity and the adverse action is only “part of the analysis.”
   Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 44 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that
   fourteen-month delay between a protected activity and a termination will not
   necessarily preclude a finding of causation when the plaintiff can adduce
   other evidence suggesting a causal relationship).
           By analyzing only the spring 2018 e-mails as protected activity, the
   district court found there was “no temporal proximity giving rise to a causal
   link.” However, when the October report is considered as a protected
   activity, the lapse between the protected activity and the materially adverse
   action shrinks from “nearly one year” to six months. Cf. Raggs v. Miss. Power
   & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that five
   months between a protected activity and an adverse act might establish
   causation when coupled with other evidence of retaliation).
           And, importantly, Martinez has provided other evidence of a causal
   link between the October report and Jones’s retaliatory acts. Immediately
   after Martinez circulated the October report, Jones made a comment about
   disbanding the Equity Committee.5               She then restructured the Equity
   Committee by creating subcommittees, which Martinez alleges diluted his
   responsibilities.     Eventually, Martinez was removed from the Equity
   Committee altogether. That progression is enough for a reasonable juror to

           _____________________
           5
             Though many of these acts, as unexhausted, could not properly establish the
   “materially adverse” element of Martinez’s prima facie case, see supra II.A., they may
   nonetheless serve as evidence suggesting a causal link between Martinez’s protected
   activity and Jones’s exhausted retaliatory acts. See Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586
   F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009) (“This court has repeatedly approved of the introduction of
   previous conduct to illuminate currently actionable issues in discrimination and
   harassment cases.”).

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   find a causal link between the October report and Jones’s retaliatory acts at
   the prima facie stage, particularly coupled with the fact that the Office of
   Inclusion and Equity determined that Martinez likely did not make the anti-
   Semitic remarks Jones alleged. Accordingly, Martinez has met the “less
   stringent standard” to establish causation, see Ackel, 339 F.3d at 385, and he
   has therefore established a prima facie case of retaliation.
                                        III.
          The district court erred in granting summary judgment for UT.
   Martinez has established a prima facie case of retaliation. The court did not
   consider UT’s proffered non-retaliatory reasons for the alleged retaliatory
   actions or reach the question of pretext. We decline to do so in the first
   instance on appeal. The district court’s summary judgment is therefore
   reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
   opinion.
                                          REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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