Court Opinion

ID: 9548732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:02.370949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:22.371204
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. This cause is being reversed only because the trial court gave an instruction to the jury on unavoidable accident. An unavoidable accident is an occurrence which, under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen, anticipated or avoided in the exercise of ordinary care by the parties thereto. Town & Country Securities Co. v. Place, 79 Ariz. 122, 285 P.2d 165. An instruction embodying the concept of an unavoidable accident is but *232a reiteration of the legal principle that negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary-care; meaning, that if the accident out of which the injuries arose could not have been foreseen or anticipated by the use of ordinary care, it is one without fault and hence an occurrence for which there is no liability in damages.
In City of Phoenix v. Camfield, 97 Ariz. 316, 400 P.2d 115, quoted by the majority, we said, “* * * it is always error to give an instruction on unavoidable accident, * * This is because the ordinary instructions on negligence and proximate cause are sufficient to advise the jury of the plaintiff’s burden to establish the defendant’s fault, negligence. But an unavoidable accident instruction may be confusing to the jury in some circumstances because it may not be understood that the court essentially is talking about two sides of the same coin. The jury may seek to attach some peculiar significance to the words “inevitable” or “unavoidable”.
We also said, in City of Phoenix v. Camfield, supra, that “ * * * a plaintiff must show prejudice in the giving of such an instruction”; and we have held, dependent upon the particular circumstances, that the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident was prejudicial (see e. g. Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P.2d 220) and that it was not prejudicial (see e. g. Beliak v. Plants, 84 Ariz. 211, 326 P.2d 36).
Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, the sole authority cited by the majority to support a reversal was a case in which plaintiff was a passenger in a taxicab which collided with another vehicle in making a turn. There was both a complex factual situation and numerous legal principles to be applied by the jury in arriving at a verdict. There was no suggestion that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Hence, Butigan was a case in which one of the drivers of the two vehicles or both must have been at fault or the accident could not have occurred and the plaintiff should have recovered in some amount. I have no difficulty agreeing with the majority that the jury must have been confused.
The instant case, as presented to the jury, was neither factually nor in point of law difficult of resolution and there is no reason for the jury to have been confused. The accident occurred on a clear morning, in a residential area, on a two-lane street with little traffic. The defendant’s truck was proceeding westerly within the speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour. Plaintiff’s five-year-old son ran suddenly across the south lane of traffic and into the path of the truck. The injured boy was first seen as he was running in the south lane of traffic toward defendant’s lane to the north. The defendant driver testified:
“Q Where was the child when you first saw him?
*233“A He was to my left.
“A * * * But I would say he was through the parked area and into the southern lane.
“Q Was he running when you first saw him?
“A He was.
“Q Did you — tell me whether or not you applied your brakes immediately upon seeing the child.
“A The instant.
“Q Did he continue running up until the time of the impact?
“A He did.
“A He ran directly in front of my automobile.”
As pointed out by the majority, the only other purported eye witness was severely discredited, having stated once that he saw and once that he did not see the actual accident.
The jury could have found that the defendant was negligent but also the jury could have found from the common experiences of mankind with children and animals that this child darted in front of the vehicle and the driver could not avoid hitting him. In so finding, it could return a defendant’s verdict in the belief that the accident was one which could not have been foreseen or anticipated in the exercise of ordinary care by the defendant.
I can find no reasonable basis for reversal of this case on the ground that the instruction could possibly have confused the jury.