Court Opinion

ID: 91466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:03:22+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:33.936248
License: Public Domain

115 U.S. 465 (1885)
LEONARD
v.
OZARK LAND COMPANY.
LEONARD
v.
CHATFIELD, Trustee.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted November 16, 1885.
Decided November 23, 1885.
ORIGINAL MOTIONS MADE IN CASES PENDING IN THIS COURT ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.
*466 Mr. T.W. Brown for the motion.
Mr. John B. Jones opposing.
*467 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the language above reported, he continued:
*468 The injunction ordered by the final decree was not vacated by the appeal. Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 297; Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 161. It is true that in some of the Slaughter-House Cases the appeal was from a decree making perpetual a preliminary injunction which had been granted at an earlier stage of the case, but the fact of the preliminary injunction had nothing to do with the decision, which was "that neither an injunction nor a decree dissolving an injunction is reversed or nullified by an appeal or writ of error before the cause is heard in this court." This doctrine, in the general language here stated, was distinctly reaffirmed in Hovey v. McDonald, and it clearly refers to the injunction contained in the decree appealed from, without reference to whether that injunction was in perpetuation of a former order to the same effect, or was then for the first time granted. The injunction, therefore, which was granted by the final decree in this case, is in full force, notwithstanding the appeal.
Construing the injunction as granted in connection with the averments in the bill, the prayer for relief, and the findings in the decree, we think it restrains the appellees from removing the staves manufactured from timber cut on the land, as well as the timber in its unmanufactured state, and the order made by the judge when he allowed the appeal is in reality nothing more than notice to the appellant that such was the effect of his decree. It was not, and was not intended to be, an enlargement of the original scope of the injunction, but, under the circumstances, a justifiable precaution against a possible misunderstanding by the appellant of the extent and effect of the decree appealed from.
This court no doubt has the power to modify an injunction granted by a decree below in advance of a final hearing of an appeal on its merits. An application to that effect was made to us at the October Term, 1878, in the case of the Sandusky Tool Co. v. Comstock [not reported], and finding that such a practice, if permitted, would oftentimes involve an examination of the whole case, and necessarily take much time, we promulgated the present Equity Rule 93, which is as follows:
"When an appeal from a final decree in an equity suit, *469 granting or dissolving an injunction, is allowed by a justice or judge who took part in the decision of the cause, he may, in his discretion, at the time of such allowance, make an order suspending or modifying an injunction during the pendency of the appeal, upon such terms as to bond or otherwise, as he may consider proper for the security of the rights of the opposite party."
Here the judge who heard the case allowed the appeal, and instead of suspending or modifying the injunction, he took occasion to give special notice that it was to continue in force, and if the facts are correctly stated in his opinion, it was quite proper he should do so.
The motion is denied.