Court Opinion

ID: 9663355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:35:52.425673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:48.276425
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). I concur in Justice Archer’s result which would adopt Professor Larson’s quasi-course of employment test to determine whether plaintiff’s injuries, sustained in an automobile accident en route to a doctor’s appointment for the treatment of prior compensable injuries, are themselves compensable under the Workers’ *689Disability Compensation Act.11 write separately to acknowledge that the difficulty of expressing coherent principles is at the maximum in applying the range of consequences causation analysis to the quasi-course of employment question. In the context of this case, the analysis requires recognition of that aspect of the Larson analysis involving the "claimant’s own conduct as an independent intervening cause.” 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 13.11, p 3-502.
The wcab in this case made no finding on the question whether plaintiff’s automobile accident was caused by intentional conduct which might be regarded as expressly or impliedly prohibited by her employer. The board did remark that it found plaintiff’s description of the accident "somewhat bizarre.” From the testimony taken before the hearing referee, it appears that the accident occurred while plaintiff was driving west on the north side of Eight Mile Road where it intersects with Woodward Avenue, and divides the cities of Detroit and Ferndale. Ferndale Police Officer Stephen LaRowe testified that at this point Eight Mile Road passes under Woodward Avenue. Plaintiff was not on the portion of Eight Mile Road which passes under Woodward Avenue, but rather was driving on the surface portion of Eight Mile Road which intersects Woodward Avenue. Plaintiff’s vehicle struck a cement barricade and fell a distance of twenty-five feet into the portion of Eight Mile Road which passes under Woodward Avenue. Officer LaRowe could not recall whether it appeared that plaintiff had been drinking, but he testified that he had indicated on his police report that plaintiff had been drinking. From the record before us, it is not at all clear how *690plaintiff’s role in the accident should be characterized, or whether she engaged in "intentional conduct which may be regarded as expressly or impliedly prohibited by [her] employer.” Id., § 13.11(d), p 3-543. To allow this Court to perform its reviewing function, the wcab " 'should indicate the testimony adopted, the standard followed and the reasoning it used in reaching its conclusion.’ ” DeGeer v DeGeer Farm Equipment Co, 391 Mich 96, 101; 214 NW2d 794 (1974). This Court cannot discharge its responsibilities unless the wcab makes findings as to crucial facts. Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206, 213-214; 267 NW2d 923 (1978). I would remand to the wcab.

 I agree that it may be inferred from the board’s factual findings that plaintiff’s trip to the doctor was reasonable or necessary.