Court Opinion

ID: 9519641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:21:07.364858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:34.830043
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, JUSTICE
(dissenting).
The sole issue is whether a commander of an American Legion post, an unpaid executive officer of an incorporated association, is an “employee” when he attends a district Legion convention, merely because, like other delegates who may not be executive officers, he is allotted a modest expense allowance during such attendance. The governing language of Minn. St. 176.011, subd. 9,1 is not “clear and unambiguous” that such an officer is an employee, but, I submit, quite the contrary.
*86The purpose of enumerating certain classes of persons as included within the definition of “employee,” it seems, was to make clear that as a matter of policy they should not he excluded even though performing service for hire. Thus, “an executive officer of a corporation” was enumerated because of the prior holdings in such cases as Donaldson v. William H. B. Donaldson Co. 176 Minn. 422, 223 N. W. 772, which had held that paid executive officers were not covered employees because they do not come within the ordinarily associated meaning of “workman” or “employee” for whose benefit the legislation was primarily enacted. We have squarely held that “ ‘an executive officer of a corporation’ may be included within the definition of ‘employee,’ but [Minn. St. 176.011, subd. 9(6)] still contemplates that such an officer shall perform services for hire, just as in the case of any other employee covered by the act.” Holm v. H & S Asphalt Co. 283 Minn. 330, 331, 167 N. W. (2d) 743, 744.
We need not discuss the legislative purpose in enumerating various classes of public officers as being included within the definition of employees. It is noteworthy, however, that where the legislature intended to include “a voluntary uncompensated worker” of certain state institutions or the civil defense program it expressly so stated. The statute’s own internal evidence of legislative intent is that in all other cases the definition contemplates that an individual is not an employee unless paid for performing service.
The critical issue in the instant case, therefore, is whether the mere reimbursement to an officer of a voluntary, nonprofit *87organization for his expenses incurred away from home as a convention delegate is “wages” or “compensation” for services performed. Under any usual understanding of those terms, it is not.
Cosgriff v. Duluth Firemen’s Relief Assn. 238 Minn. 233, 46 N. W. (2d) 250, seemingly assumed, but did not squarely decide, that the reimbursement for expense was a “daily allotment or wage.” 233 Minn. 240, 46 N. W. (2d) 254. Cosgriff, as a trustee of the Duluth Firemen’s Relief Association, was engaged in an activity intimately associated with his regular occupation as an employee of the Duluth Fire Department, whereas the decedent legionnaire’s activity as a post commander or convention delegate was wholly unrelated to his regular private occupation. Although these considerations may not wholly distinguish the two cases, I would not perpetuate the rule of Cosgriff, much less extend it beyond its own facts.2

 Minn. St. 176.011, subd. 9, in part provides: “ ‘Employee’ means any person who performs services for another for hire; and includes the following:
“(1) an alien;
“(2) a minor;
“(3) a sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, marshal, policeman, fireman, a county highway engineer, and a peace officer * * *;
“(4) a county assessor and supervisor of assessments;
*86“(5) an elected or appointed official of the state * * *;
“(6) an executive officer of a corporation;
“(7) a voluntary uncompensated worker, other than an inmate, rendering services in state institutions * * * shall be employees within the meaning of this subdivision. * * *;
“(8) a voluntary uncompensated worker engaged in peace time in the civil defense program when ordered to training or other duty by the state or any political subdivision thereof, shall be employees.” (Italics supplied.)

 It is of some interest to note that the expense allowance to Cosgriff in 1948 was $10 per day, plus railroad expenses, whereas the decedent legionnaire, almost 20 years later, was paid only $7.50 per day, suggesting a possibility that Cosgriff’s expense allowance may have exceeded his actual expenses. Expense allowances in excess of actual expenses, of course, might constitute wages or compensation.