Court Opinion

ID: 2965108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:32.102158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.572640
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

        No. 97-1660

                               CELIA SANTIAGO, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                 CANON U.S.A., INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                   ____________________

                           Pieras*, Senior District Judge,
                                    _____________________

                           and DiClerico**, District Judge.
                                            ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Alice Net Carlo for appellants.
             _______________
             Richard H. Silberberg, with whom Robert G. Manson, Dorsey &
             _____________________            ________________  ________
        Whitney LLP, Jaime E. Toro-Monserrate and McConnell Valdes were on
        ___________  ________________________     ________________
        brief for appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                  February 20, 1998
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

              *Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

              **Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                    CYR, Senior Circuit  Judge.     Professional Microfilm,
                    CYR, Senior Circuit  Judge. 
                         _____________________

          Inc. ( Professional )  and Celia Santiago, its  president, appeal

          from  a district court judgment dismissing their complaint alleg-

          ing  that Canon U.S.A.,  Inc. ( Canon )  (i) violated  the Puerto

          Rico Dealer Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10,   278 et seq., by termi-
                                                         __ ____

          nating its  dealership agreement with  Professional, (ii) contra-

          vened Santiago's rights under P.R.  Constitution art. II,   1, by

          discriminating against  Professional  on  account  of  Santiago s

          gender and, (iii)  inflicted mental anguish  on Santiago and  her

          husband, see  P.R. Civil Code Article  1802.  We affirm  the dis-
                   ___

          trict court judgment.

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    Santiago is  the president  of Professional  Microfilm,

          Inc., a San Juan company which has retailed micrographic products

          for over  25 years.  She and her  husband are its sole sharehold-

          ers.   Since 1984,  Professional has contracted  with Canon  as a

          nonexclusive distributor of micrographic products in Puerto Rico.

          Santiago took over  its management and operation  from her father

          in 1989.  The following  year, Professional entered into a nonex-

          clusive  distributorship  agreement with  Canon  relating to  the

          Canofile  250, an innovative  optical disk filing  product.  Over

          the  next three  years Canon  initiated  various adverse  actions

          against Professional and  Santiago, culminating in 1993  with its

          designation  of  Systronics,  Inc.  as  its  second  nonexclusive

                                          2

          Canofile 250 distributor.1

                    Professional,  Santiago, and  her  husband filed  their

          federal complaint against Canon in  August 1993.  Count 1 alleged

          that Canon conducted a "pattern of intentional and discriminatory

          conduct impairing the [Canofile 250] dealership" contrary to P.R.

          Constitution art. II,    1, which broadly  prohibits gender-based

          discrimination.   Count 2 charged that the Systronics designation

          constituted an unjustified "impairment" of Professional s  nonex-

          clusive Canon distributorship, contrary to the Puerto Rico Dealer

          Act.  Count 3 asserted that   abusive conduct and acts of harass-

          ment"  by Canon caused  Santiago "mental suffering,  anxiety, an-

          guish,  and humiliation,"  contrary to  P.R.  Civil Code  Article

          1802.

                    After Canon moved to dismiss the complaint, see Fed. R.
                                                                ___

          Civ. P. 12(b)(6),2 and the parties submitted documents beyond the

          pleadings,  the motion was converted to one for summary judgment.
                              
          ____________________

              1The  complaint also alleges that Canon (1) "interfered" with
          Professional's "principal retail client" in  order to "discredit"
          Professional;   (2)    through   its     representatives,    used
          unidentified "derogatory epithets" against Santiago, "denigrating
          her dignity as a woman"; (3) deliberately delayed its delivery of
          the Canofile  250 to  Professional until  November 1991,  thereby
          preventing Professional  from an  earlier entry  into the  retail
          market;  (4)  provided  Professional  with  incomplete  technical
          information  and  product  enhancements  in connection  with  the
          Canofile  250, thereby  "adversely affect[ing]  plaintiff's (sic)
          sales  efforts";   (5)   withheld  purchase   orders  placed   by
          Professional, and  falsely alleged that Professional  had serious
          credit  problems; and  (6)  refused, in  March  1993, to  provide
          Professional with 24 Canofile 250s previously ordered.

              2Alternatively, Canon  unsuccessfully sought to  transfer the
          case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
          of  New  York  pursuant  to the  forum-selection  clause  in  its
          dealership agreements.  See 28 U.S.C.   1404(a).
                                  ___

                                          3

          See Fed. R. Civ. P.  12(b), (c).  A magistrate  judge recommended
          ___

          that summary judgment  be entered for Canon on  all claims, since

          the  Canofile 250 contract expressly stated that the Professional

          dealership  was to  be "nonexclusive;"  the  parol evidence  rule

          barred  extrinsic evidence to  the contrary; and,  therefore, the

          designation  of Systronics as  a second Canofile  250 distributor

          could have  effected no  wrongful "impairment"  under the  Dealer

          Act.

                    Plaintiffs objected to  the report and  recommendation,

          see P.R.  Local R. 510.2, on  the ground that the  parol evidence
          ___

          rule does  not apply  to alleged Dealer  Act violations  and that

          Canon  made  oral  assurances that  its  Canofile  250 dealership

          agreement with  Professional would remain  exclusive.  Plaintiffs

          further complained that  the magistrate judge failed  to consider

          their gender-discrimination and mental-anguish claims.

                    The district court endorsed  the report and recommenda-

          tion relating  to the  Dealer Act  claim, citing  our intervening

          decision  in  Borschow  Hosp.  &  Med.  Supplies,  Inc.  v. Cesar
                        _________________________________________     _____

          Castillo,  Inc.,  96  F.3d  10,   16  (1st  Cir.  1996)  (holding
          _______________

          nonexclusivity provision  in dealership agreement  dispositive of

          Dealer  Act claim),  and dismissed the  gender-discrimination and

          mental-anguish claims on three grounds.   First, since Canon  had

          not  impaired  its dealership relationship with Professional, its

          designation  of  Systronics could  not  have been  an  adverse or

          discriminatory  act.  Second,  the Puerto Rico  Supreme Court has

          yet to recognize a private cause of action for gender discrimina-

                                          4

          tion under P.R. Constitution art.  II,   1.  Finally,  the  broad

          assertions  that Canon  engaged in a  pattern   of discriminatory

          conduct,  see supra  note  1,  were not  causally  linked to  its
                    ___ _____

          decision  to designate Systronics  as a second  Canofile 250 dis-

          tributor in Puerto Rico.

                    In their motion  for reconsideration, see Fed.  R. Civ.
                                                          ___

          P.  59(e), plaintiffs  contended, inter  alia,  that even  if our
                                            _____  ____

          Borschow decision did foreclose a Dealer Act claim, the "pattern"
          ________

          of discriminatory actions  engaged in by  Canon before and  after

          its designation of Systronics as  a second distributor (e.g., use
                                                                  ____

          of derogatory sexual epithets) constituted discrete "impairments"

          sufficient to  serve as  independent bases  for their Dealer  Act

          claim.  The district court denied the  motion for reconsideration

          on the ground  that the issue  had not been  preserved either  in

          plaintiffs   opposition to the dispositive motions filed by Canon

          or in their objections to the report and recommendation submitted

          by the magistrate judge.  Plaintiffs now appeal from the district

          court  order dismissing  their complaint and  from its  denial of

          their motion for reconsideration.

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   The Dealer Act Claim
          A.   The Dealer Act Claim
               ____________________

                    Although plaintiffs acknowledge their failure to  raise

          in timely fashion    as an independent basis for their Dealer Act

          claim     the  contention  that  Canon engaged  in  a pattern  of

          discriminatory  conduct  both  before  and  after the  Systronics

                                          5

          designation, they argue  that their waiver should  be excused be-

          cause the magistrate judge expressly recognized such a pattern of

          conduct in the  report and recommendation, and the district court

          therefore  had an independent  duty to  scrutinize the  record de
                                                                         __

          novo before adopting  the report and recommendation,  even absent
          ____

          specific objection under Local Rule 510.2.  We disagree.

                    The district court  is under no obligation  to discover

          or articulate new legal theories for a party challenging a report

          and recommendation  issued by  a  magistrate judge.3   Borden  v.
                                                                 ______

          Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987)
          __________________________________

          ( Appellant  was entitled  to a  de novo  review by  the district
                                           __ ____

          court of the [magistrate s] recommendations to which he objected,

          however he was  not entitled to a  de novo review of  an argument
                                             __ ____

          never raised. )  (citation omitted).   Given  proper notice,  see
                                                                        ___

          Magistrate's Report, at 10  ("Failure to comply with  [P.R. Local

          R.  510.2]  precludes  further  appellate  review."),  a  party s

          failure to  assert a  specific objection to  a report  and recom-

          mendation irretrievably waives  any right to  review by the  dis-

          trict court and the court of appeals.  See Henley Drilling Co. v.
                                                 ___ ___________________

          McGee,  36  F.3d  143,  150-51  (1st  Cir.  1994);  28  U.S.C.   
          _____

          636(b)(1).  Finally, a Rule  59(e) motion is " aimed at reconsid-
                              
          ____________________

              3There is no  record indication that the magistrate judge was
          ever alerted to the legal theory belatedly asserted by plaintiffs
          in their  motion for  reconsideration before the  district court.
          Instead, the  magistrate judge mentioned a pattern  of conduct by
          Canon   merely   as    background   in   describing   plaintiffs 
          constitutional and  mental-anguish claims.  In  the ensuing legal
          analysis,  however,  the  magistrate  judge  neither  stated  nor
          implied  an awareness  that  plaintiffs were  claiming that  such
          conduct had any bearing on their Dealer Act claim.

                                          6

          eration, not  initial consideration, "  and  may  not be  used to

          argue a  new legal theory." FDIC  v. World Univ., Inc.,  978 F.2d
                                      ____     _________________

          10,  16 (1st  Cir. 1992)  (citation omitted).4    Accordingly, we

          affirm  the summary  judgment ruling  dismissing  the Dealer  Act

          claim.

          B.   The Gender-Discrimination and Mental-Anguish Claims
          B.   The Gender-Discrimination and Mental-Anguish Claims
               ___________________________________________________

                    Plaintiffs challenge the  summary judgment ruling which

          dismissed their  gender-discrimination and  mental-anguish claims

          as  merely  incidental   to their Dealer  Act claim.   Plaintiffs

          insist  that they  consistently  maintained  throughout the  pro-

          ceedings below that all of  Canon s adverse actions    not merely

          its Systronics designation    evidenced gender discrimination and

          contributed  to their  mental anguish.   See  supra note  1.   As
                                                   ___  _____

          plaintiffs  view it, even  though Canon retained  the contractual

          right to designate Systronics  as a second distributor,  it could

          not exercise that or any other right purely for gender-based rea-

          sons  without  violating P.R.  Constitution  art.  II,    1,  and

          tortiously inflicting mental anguish upon plaintiffs.

                    The  magistrate judge and  the district judge converted

          the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment without

          objection by plaintiffs.   See Fayetteville Investors  v. Commer-
                                     ___ ______________________     _______

          cial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1473 (4th Cir. 1991) (conver-
          ___________________

          sion  challenges waivable);  Jones  v.  Automobile  Ins.  Co.  Of
                                       _____      _________________________

          Hartford,  917 F.2d  1528, 1533  n.4  (11th   Cir. 1990)  (same);
          ________
                              
          ____________________

              4  We note, as well, no plain  error.  See Douglass v. United
                                                     ___ ________    ______
          Servs.  Auto. Ass'n,  79 F.3d 1415,  1423-24 (5th  Cir. 1996) (en
          ___________________
          banc). 

                                          7

          Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 390 n.9 (5th Cir.
          ______________________    ______

          1985) (same).5  Nor do plaintiffs challenge the conversion on ap-

          peal, see Brief  for Appellants at 25, 30  (referring to  summary
                ___

          judgment ); Nieves  v. University of  P.R., 7 F.3d 270,  279 (1st
                      ______     ___________________

          Cir. 1993) (conversion  waivable on appeal); Wright  v. Holbrook,
                                                       ______     ________

          794 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1986) (same).

                    The summary judgment  rulings on the gender-discrimina-

          tion  and mental-anguish claims  are therefore reviewed  de novo,
                                                                   __ ____

          with all reasonable  inferences to be  drawn favorably to  plain-

          tiffs, the nonmoving parties.  EEOC v. Green, 76 F.3d 19, 23 (1st
                                         ____    _____
                              
          ____________________

              5The original  Canon motion  sought to dismiss  the complaint
          only for failure to state a claim.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
                                              ___
          Canon attached  pertinent  dealership  agreements,  see  Shaw  v.
                                                              ___  ____
          Digital  Equip. Corp.,  82 F.3d  1194, 1219-20  (1st   Cir. 1996)
          _____________________
          (noting  that  written documents  integral  to  complaint    like
          contracts    are not  considered  matters outside  the pleadings 
          requiring  Rule  12(b)  conversion), and  an  affidavit  relating
          exclusively  to  its  alternative  motion for  change  of  venue.
          Although the  parties are  entitled to  reasonable  notice of  an
          impending conversion, as  well as an opportunity  to  present all
          material made pertinent to that motion by  Rule 56,  Fed. R. Civ.
          P.  12(b); Berkovitz v. Home Box  Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 29-30
                     _________    ______________________
          (1st  Cir.  1996),  the   record  clearly  discloses  that  these
          plaintiffs   invited  the   conversion.  See   Chaparro-Febus  v.
                       _______                     ___   ______________
          International  Longshoremen Ass n,  983 F.2d  325, 332  (1st Cir.
          _________________________________
          1992) (notice  of impending conversion need not  be express).  In
          their  two succeeding opposition motions, for example, plaintiffs
          attached  Santiago s  sworn  statement,  which  reiterated  their
                                _____  _________
          assertions that Canon had engaged  in a pattern of discriminatory
          conduct  violative of  P.R. Constitution  art. II,    1  and P.R.
          Civil Code  Article 1802.   See Fed. R.  Civ. P. 56(e);  David v.
                                      ___                          _____
          City and County of  Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th  Cir. 1996)
          __________________________
          (nonmovants  submission of materials outside the pleadings waives
          their  objection to  conversion), cert.  denied, 118  S. Ct.  157
                                            _____  ______
          (1997);  Grove v.  Mead Sch. Dist.  No. 354, 753  F.2d 1528, 1533
                   _____     ________________________
          (9th Cir. 1985) (same).  Counting their surreply, plaintiffs  had
          more than  two months  to assemble  their Rule  56 proffer.   See
                                                                        ___
          Rodriguez  v. Fullerton  Tires Corp., 115  F.3d 81,  83 (1st Cir.
          _________     ______________________
          1997)  (finding  two  months  adequate to  prepare  materials  in
          anticipation  of  possible conversion,  or  move  for Rule  56(f)
          extension).  See infra note 10.
                       ___ _____

                                          8

          Cir. 1996).  Summary judgment  was in order unless plaintiffs ad-

          duced  evidence sufficient to establish each element essential to

          their claim  as to  which  they would  have borne  the burden  at

          trial.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v.  Catrett, 477
                  ___                        _____________     _______

          U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Nieves, 7 F.3d at 279. 
                                ______

                    Although  Canon  acknowledges that  the  district court

          relied in  error  upon an  inadequate  ground in  dismissing  the

          constitutional claim, see  supra Section I, we may  affirm on any
                                ___  _____

          ground supported by the  record, Levy v. FDIC, 7  F.3d 1054, 1056
                                           ____    ____

          (1st Cir.  1993).  Even  assuming their constitutional  claim for

          gender  discrimination  were cognizable  under Puerto  Rico law,6

          plaintiffs  Rule 56  proffer generated no trialworthy issue as to

          whether a  gender-based animus motivated  Canon s so-called  pat-

          tern  of conduct.

                    Summary  judgment  may  be warranted  even  as  to such

          elusive  elements as a  defendant s motive or  intent where   the

          non-moving  party  rests  merely  upon  conclusory   allegations,

          improbable inferences, and  unsupported speculation. " DeNovellis
                                                                 __________

          v. Shalala,  124 F.3d 298,  306 (1st Cir. 1997)  (citations omit-
             _______

          ted); see  Pilgrim v.  Trustees of Tufts  College, 118  F.3d 864,
                ___  _______     __________________________

          870-71 (1st Cir. 1997); Smith  v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d
                                  _____     ______________________

          11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994); Velazquez v. Chardon, 736  F.2d 831, 833-
                                  _________    _______

                              
          ____________________

              6Cf., e.g., Arroyo v. Rattan Specialties, Inc., 117 P.R. Dec.
               ___  ____  ______    ________________________
          35,  64-65 (1986) (noting  that enunciated  constitutional rights
          operate  ex proprio  vigore,  permitting individuals  to sue  for
                   __ _______  ______
          violations). But see Carlton v. Worcester Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1, 3
                       ___ ___ _______    __________________
          (1st Cir. 1991) (party who invokes federal diversity jurisdiction
          cannot expect federal court to blaze new trails in state law).

                                          9

          34 (1st Cir.  1984).  A plaintiff [claiming  discrimination]  may

          not prevail  simply by asserting  an inequity and tacking  on the

          self-serving conclusion  that the  defendant was  motivated by  a

          discriminatory animus.    Coyne v.  City of Somerville, 972  F.2d
                                    _____     __________________

          440, 444 (1st  Cir. 1992) (quoting Correa-Martinez  v. Arrillaga-
                                             _______________     __________

          Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1990)).
          ________

                    The only  smoking  gun  allegation in the  complaint is

          that  unidentified  Canon  representatives   uttered  unspecified

           derogatory epithets denigrating [Santiago s]  dignity as a woman

          and as  a human being.    That bare allegation,  parroted without

          elaboration in  a Rule  56 proffer, see  supra note  5, disclosed
                                              ___  _____

          neither  the  substance and  context  of the  epithets,7  nor the

          identity and  capacity  of the  person(s) employing  them.8   See
                                                                        ___
                              
          ____________________

              7See Speen v.  Crown Clothing Corp.,  102 F.3d 625,  636 (1st
               ___ _____     ____________________
          Cir. 1996) (  [I]solated or ambiguous remarks, tending to suggest
          animus based on age,  are insufficient, standing alone, to  prove
          an employer's discriminatory intent.  ) (citation omitted), cert.
                                                                      _____
          denied, 117 S. Ct. 2457 (1997); Lehman  v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
          ______                          ______     ______________________
          Am.,  74  F.3d  323,  329  (1st  Cir.  1996)  (same);  Alexis  v.
          ___                                                    ______
          McDonald s Restaurants of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 348 (1st Cir.
          _____________________________________
          1995) (suggesting that remarks should be  [v]iewed in context  to
          determine if animated by discriminatory intent); see also Woodman
                                                           ___ ____ _______
          v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094 (1st Cir.  1995) (noting
             _________________
          that proponent must show that hearsay statements  concern matters
          within the scope of  [declarant s] agency or employment ) (citing
          Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D)).

              8The identity of the speaker often is crucial to ascertaining
          not only intent but any causal connection between the  remark and
          the alleged adverse  action directed against the plaintiff.  See,
                                                                       ___
          e.g.,  Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 (1st Cir.
          ____   ___________    _______________
          1996) (noting that it is  appropriate to discount "stray  remarks
          in  the workplace  . .  . ,  statements by  nondecisionmakers, or
          statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the  decisional process
          itself") (citation omitted); Betkerur  v. Aultman Hosp. Ass n, 78
                                       ________     ___________________
          F.3d  1079,  1095 (6th  Cir. 1996)  ( [T]he lower  court properly
          discounted    the   discriminatory    remarks    .    .   .    by
          non-decisionmakers. ).

                                          10

          Jones v.  Merchants Nat'l Bank &   Trust Co.  of Indianapolis, 42
          _____     ___________________________________________________

          F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 1994) ("'The object of [Fed. R. Civ. P.

          56(e)] is not  to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint

          or  answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit. ") (cita-

          tion omitted).

                    At summary  judgment, the district  court cannot accept

          on faith conclusory assessments by claimants that unspecified and

          unattributed epithets  were  derogatory   and  denigrating,   let

          alone  demonstrated discriminatory intent.  See Pilgrim, 118 F.3d
                                                      ___ _______

          at 871 (noting  that plaintiff s  [subjective] perception  is not

          evidence   of discriminatory intent,  hence  not enough  to with-

          stand summary judgment ); Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 53 (noting
                                    _______________

          that, even at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, plaintiff may not  rest on

          'subjective  characterizations  )  (citation omitted);  see  also
                                                                  ___  ____

          Douglass v.  United Servs. Auto.  Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415,  1430 (5th
          ________     __________________________

          Cir.  1996)  (en banc)  ( It  is  .  .  . well  settled  that  an

          employee's  subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employ-

          ment action as  a result of discrimination, without  more, is not

          enough to survive a summary judgment motion, in the face of proof

          showing an adequate nondiscriminatory reason. ).9

                    The counterproffer from Canon  makes the uncontroverted

          representation  that  Professional  remains its  sole  authorized
                                              _______ ___  ____  __________

          micrographic products distributor  in Puerto Rico.   Thus, before

                              
          ____________________

              9Nor did  the plaintiffs  proffer competent Rule  56 evidence
          supporting  their allegation,  based  on information  and belief,
                                                   ___________  ___ ______
          that Santiago was  the only woman  heading a Canon  dealership in
          the United States. 

                                          11

          the alleged  pattern of conduct  by Canon could be  attributed to

          gender  discrimination, one rationally would need to question not

          only  why Canon  retained Professional  as its  sole  Puerto Rico

          dealer in  micrographic  products, and  one  of two  Puerto  Rico

          dealers in  Canon optical disk  filing products, but also  why it

          entered into the  October 1990 Canofile 250  dealership agreement

          with Santiago  in the  first place.   In  our judgment, based  on
                         __ ___  _____ _____

          these conflicting proffers the trier  of fact could not find that

          the  facially  nondiscriminatory  conduct  engaged  in  by  Canon
               ________  _________________

          actually was motivated by gender discrimination except by resort-
                                                          ______ __ _______

          ing to rank speculation.10
          ___ __ ____ ___________

                    Finally, the Rule 56 proffer on the mental-anguish tort

          claim  under  P.R.  Civil  Code  Article  1802 fares  no  better.

          Plaintiffs  were required to establish that in   some appreciable

          measure the[ir] health,  welfare and happiness . .  . were really

          affected,   Ruiz-Rodriguez v. Colberg-Comas, 882 F.2d 15, 17 (1st
                      ______________    _____________
                              
          ____________________

              10Plaintiffs further contend that the district court erred in
          denying  them  an  opportunity   to  undertake  discovery  before
          granting summary judgment.  We review only for manifest  abuse of
          discretion.   See Mills v. State  of Maine, 118 F.3d  37, 50 (1st
                        ___ _____    _______________
          Cir. 1997).  We find  none.  First, plaintiffs neither filed  the
          motion  for  continuance nor  the  supporting  affidavit required
          under Rule  56(f).  See Springfield Terminal  Ry. Co. v. Canadian
                              ___ _____________________________    ________
          Pac.  Ltd., __ F.3d __, __ (1st  Cir. 1997) [No. 97-1783, 1997 WL
          __________
          775553,  at *7  (1st Cir.  Dec. 22,  1997)] ( Rule  56(f) of  the
          Federal Rules  of   Civil  Procedure  specifically calls  upon  a
          litigant who  feels prejudiced  by too  precipitate a demand  for
          summary  judgment  to file  a  timely  affidavit with  the  court
          asserting the  need for  further  discovery.   As we  have  held,
          failure to  resort to such first aid  will ordinarily bar belated
          aid. ).   Second, notwithstanding  plaintiffs  plain  waiver, the
          crucial  deficiencies in  their Rule  56 proffer  simply are  not
          attributable to  a need  for further discovery,  especially since
          plaintiffs  presumably knew  which Canon  representatives uttered
          sex-based epithets, as well as their substance and context.

                                          12

          Cir. 1989) (quoting  Moa v. Commonwealth, 100  P.R.R. 572, 585-86
                               ___    ____________

          (1972)), and they experienced   deep moral suffering and anguish,

          and [not merely] a passing  affliction,   de Jesus v. Eastern Air
                                                    ________    ___________

          Lines,  Inc.,  708  F.  Supp.  470,  472  (D.P.R.  1989)  (citing
          ____________

          Hernandez v. Fournier, 80 D.P.R. 94, 104 (1957)).  These showings
          _________    ________

          turn  upon an evaluation  of: (1) the  severity of the pain  suf-

          fered;  (2) its  duration;  and  (3)  its  mental  consequences. 

          Lopez-Nieves v.  Marrero-Vergel, 939  F. Supp.  124, 126  (D.P.R.
          ____________     ______________

          1996).11

                    Plaintiffs offered only their conclusory assertion that

          Santiago and her husband  have been exposed to  mental suffering,

          anxiety, anguish and humiliation,  with no independent corrobora-

          tion, cf.  Cruz v. Molina,  788 F.  Supp. 122, 129  (D.P.R. 1992)
                ___  ____    ______

          (court sitting as  trier of fact rejected  plaintiff s uncorrobo-

          rated testimony of mental anguish,  where he was not a physician,

          nor  had he  consulted a  physician); supra  note 11.   Moreover,
                                                _____

          since  any emotional  injury  to  plaintiffs presumably  resulted

          primarily  from the  alleged use of  sex-based epithets  by Canon

           representatives,  and  plaintiffs offered no  competent evidence

          as to the substance of  the epithets, a rational factfinder would

          have no  evidentiary basis  for determining  whether the  alleged

          remarks were  likely to have  caused Santiago or her  husband the

          type of  deep moral suffering and anguish  required under Article
                              
          ____________________

              11Since plaintiffs cited no cases defining the mental-anguish
          standard, and  filed no reply brief  challenging Canon s citation
          to  these district  court  decisions, we  simply assume,  without
          deciding,  that  the  cited  decisions  describe  the  applicable
          commonwealth standard.  

                                          13

          1802.  See DeNovellis, 124 F.3d at 306 (nonmovant cannot   rest[]
                 ___ __________

          merely upon  conclusory allegations,  improbable inferences,  and

          unsupported speculation. ") (citation omitted).

                    Affirmed.
                    Affirmed.
                    ________

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