Court Opinion

ID: 9398540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:11:06.794227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.338609
License: Public Domain

J-S03021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ALLEN LEE DAVEY                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1834 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-45-CR-0001257-2019

BEFORE:       BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                               FILED MAY 31, 2023

        Allen Lee Davey (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, following his guilty plea

to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child1 (IDSI).        Appellant

challenges his designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under

Subchapter H of the Pennsylvania Sex Offender Registration and Notification

Act2 (SORNA II). He argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support an

SVP finding, because the Commonwealth’s expert relied on “junk science;”

and (2) pursuant to Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020),

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1   18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b). The Commonwealth has not filed a brief.

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 to 9799.42 (Subchapter H); 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10
to 9799.75 (SORNA II).
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lifetime    registration   under    SORNA      II   is   unconstitutional   because   “it

permanently brands a person an SVP for life, and thus[ ] denies [them]

‘inherent and indefeasible rights’ of acquiring and possession [sic] of property

and reputation.” See Appellant’s Brief at 4, 6. We affirm.

                           I. Facts & Procedural History

       In March of 2019, R.C., then 15 years old, reported that her stepfather,

Appellant, had been sexually assaulting her since she was six years old.

Affidavit of Probable Cause, Police Criminal Complaint, 4/30/19, at 1.

Appellant was charged with numerous offenses.

       On September 24, 2021, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of

IDSI. The written plea colloquy stated the factual basis for the offense as

follows:3

       Between August 8, 2011 and August 8, 2016,[4] in the County of
       Monroe, Stroud Township, [Appellant] engaged in deviate sexual
____________________________________________

3 The certified record does not include the transcript for the plea hearing.
Upon informal inquiry by this panel, the trial court explained there was no
request for a copy of this particular transcript — a fact corroborated by the
trial docket. We remind counsel that the appellant bears the burden “to
ensure that the record contains what is necessary to effectuate appellate
review[.]” See Commonwealth v. Spotti, 94 A.3d 367, 381 (Pa. Super.
2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).

4  We observe the dates of Appellant’s conduct fell both before and after
December 20, 2012, the effective date of SORNA I. This Court has held “that
when an appellant’s offenses straddle the effective dates of [SORNA I], he is
entitled to the lower reporting requirements of Subchapter I, absent a specific
finding of when the offenses related to the convictions actually occurred.”
Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 526, 530 (Pa. Super. 2019). See also
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 249 A.3d 1190, 1193 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       intercourse with a complainant who was less than 13 years of age,
       to wit: R.C.

Guilty Plea Colloquy & Plea, 9/24/21, at 1. The trial court directed that the

Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB) conduct an evaluation as to

whether Appellant satisfied the criteria to be an SVP.

       On June 17, 2022, the trial court conducted a combined SVP and

sentencing hearing.       First, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of

SOAB member Mary Muscari, Ph.D.                Relevant to Appellant’s arguments on

appeal, she stated she has a master’s degree in criminology and a doctoral

degree in psychiatric nursing, but not any degrees in psychiatry or psychology.

N.T. at 9, 12. Nevertheless, Appellant did not object to her qualification as an

expert. Id. at 15. Dr. Muscari reviewed in detail each of the 15 statutory

factors for an SVP determination, as well as the detailed facts of this case.

Id. at 22-31. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). She opined Appellant met

____________________________________________

(generally, Subchapter H applies to an offender who committed a sexually
violent offense after December 20, 2012, the date SORNA I became effective,
while Subchapter I applies to an individual who committed a sexually violent
offense between April 22, 1996, and December 20, 2012).

       As we discuss infra, at the SVP hearing, the trial court found Appellant
was an SVP under Section 9799.23, which falls under Subchapter H, and the
written “Notification of Megan’s Law Sex Offender Registration Duties,”
provided to Appellant and signed by him, similarly stated he was to register
under Subchapter H.        N.T. SVP Hearing/Sentencing, 6/17/22, at 95;
Notification of Megan’s Law Sex Offender Registration Duties, 6/20/22, at 1.
Nevertheless, Appellant has raised no challenge regarding which subchapter
properly applies to him.

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the criteria for having a pedophilia disorder, pursuant to the “DSM-5,” which

“is a diagnostic and statistical manual . . . developed by the American

Psychiatric Association . . . for making psychiatric diagnoses.” N.T. at 30, 32-

33. Dr. Muscari further described the DSM-5 as “a compilation of opinions

and research by . . . experts,” and it is “considered as an evidence-based

manual” and is “well accepted.”      Id. at 33.   Finally, Dr. Muscari opined

Appellant was likely to reoffend and met the criteria to be an SVP. Id. at 36,

38.

      Next, Appellant presented an expert witness, Dean Dickson, a licensed

psychologist and former member of the SOAB. See N.T. at 54-55. He opined

the methodology of an SVP assessment, including the 15 statutory factors,

are not scientific and “really not psychologic[al, where, for] example, there is

no term in the DSM for sexual predators.” N.T. at 61, 62. See also id. at 62

(“[W]hat we have in these reports is a lack of science.”). Mr. Dickson further

opined Dr. Muscari should have considered “actuarial data, appropriate

research, and a description of [Appellant’s] behavior outside the affidavit of

probable cause.” Id. at 73.

      Nevertheless, Mr. Dickson agreed that Appellant met “the diagnostic

criteria for pedophilia.” N.T. at 67. However, he pointed out that Dr. Muscari

did not “discuss what kind of pedophile he is,” nor how various classifications

of pedophiles “differ in re-offense potential.” Id. at 66-67. With respect to

sex offender recidivism generally, Mr. Dickson testified “the science [has]

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changed,” and now there is “a voluminous amount of research that

showed . . . sex offenders recidivate at a very low rate,” but the current

SORNA II statutes are based on the former “false data.” Id. at 69, 70. At

this juncture, the Commonwealth objected that Mr. Dickson was addressing

policy and other issues not relevant to the inquiry of whether Appellant met

the criteria for an SVP. Id. at 70. The trial court agreed, reasoning it must

consider Appellant’s individual assessment only, and “not whether the statute

is . . . good or . . . bad,” nor whether the legislature considered the right

factors. Id. at 71. Mr. Dickson then testified he utilized “the Static-99, which

is an instrument . . . universally used to assess sex offender risk and

recidivism,” and determined Appellant had “a score of minus one” and was

not likely to reoffend. Id. at 64, 66.

      Finally, Mr. Dickson opined that under the methodology he applied,

Appellant did not meet the criteria of an SVP.        N.T. at 74.    On cross-

examination, however, he acknowledged that while he objected to “the format

[of the statute] and the lack of looking at the science that [the field has]

accumulated,” the SVP criteria was prescribed by statute. Id. at 75.        Mr.

Dickson affirmed that he believed Appellant met the criteria for pedophilia,

and further agreed that based on the legal, statutory definition of an SVP,

Appellant met the criteria for having predatory behavior. Id. at 76-77.

      The trial court found, based on the “uncontradicted” opinions of both

parties’ experts, that Appellant met the statutory criteria for an SVP. N.T. at

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78. The court thus declared Appellant was subject to lifetime registration as

“set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 9799.23,”5 and additionally was a “Tier 3

offender.”6 Id. at 95. The court proceeded immediately to sentencing and

imposed a term of 15 to 40 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 78, 94.

        Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied. He

then took this timely appeal and complied with the trial court’s order to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

                                 II. Questions Presented

        Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

        [1.] Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at the “SVP”
        hearing to determine that [A]ppellant is a sexually violent
        predator.

        [2.] Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by holding
        that [A]ppellant is a sexually violent predator on a standard of
        proof less than clear and convincing evidence. . . .

        [3.] Whether lifetime registration under [SORNA II] violates Pa.
        Const., Art. I, § 1 . . . in that it permanently brands a person an
        SVP for life, and thus, denies a citizen of our Commonwealth
        “inherent and indefeasible rights” of acquiring and possession of
        property and reputation.

        [4.] Whether the failure of the . . . SOAB to consider scientific
        evidence relative to their findings that a person is a sexually
        violent predator is a violation of U.S. Constitution’s due process
        clause under the Fourteenth Amendment[.]

____________________________________________

5   As stated above, Section 9799.23 falls within Subchapter H.

6 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.14(d)(4) (IDSI is a Tier III sexual offense),
9799.15(a)(3) (Tier III sexual offender shall register for life).

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Appellant’s Brief at 4.

             III. Standard of Review & Relevant Principles

      We first set forth the relevant principles governing our review.

      In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court,
      must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and
      convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP]. As with any
      sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and
      reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court’s determination of
      SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and
      convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been
      satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation omitted).

      This Court has stated:

      It is well-settled that an SVP order is a non-punitive collateral
      consequence of the criminal sentence. “[T]he imposition of SVP
      status is a component of the judgment of sentence even though
      the ultimate collateral consequences are non-punitive.”

Commonwealth v. Woeber, 174 A.3d 1096, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citation & emphasis omitted).

      Furthermore, we note:

      [An SVP] is defined as a person who has been convicted of a
      sexually violent offense . . . and who [has] a mental abnormality
      or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in
      predatory sexually violent offenses.

      In order to show that the offender suffers from a mental
      abnormality or personality disorder, the evidence must show that
      the defendant suffers from a congenital or acquired condition that
      affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a
      manner that predisposes that person to the commission of
      criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace

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       to the health and safety of other persons. Moreover, there must
       be a showing that the defendant’s conduct was predatory. . . .

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189-90 (citation omitted & paragraph break

added).

       When performing an SVP assessment, a mental health
       professional must consider the following 15 factors: whether the
       instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the defendant
       exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense; the nature
       of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the defendant’s
       relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s); whether the
       instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the
       defendant during the commission of the offense; the victim(s)’
       mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal record;
       whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s); whether
       the defendant participated in available programs for sexual
       offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of illegal
       drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness,
       mental     disability,  or    mental     abnormality;    behavioral
       characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and any
       other factor reasonably related to the defendant’s risk of
       reoffending.

Id. at 190, citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4).7

    IV. Sufficiency Challenge – Science Supporting SVP Assessment

       In his first issue, Appellant asserts the evidence was insufficient to

support his SVP designation, because the SOAB member’s assessment “was

done in a non-scientific method comprising [of] ‘junk science.’” Appellant’s

Brief at 6.    Appellant contends that because Dr. Muscari did not hold any

____________________________________________

7 Appellant cites Section 9799.58 for the statutory factors for an SVP
determination. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. That statute, however, falls under
Subchapter I. The applicable statute is instead Section 9799.24(b).

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degrees in psychology or psychiatry, she was unqualified to offer an opinion

as to whether he manifested a disorder such as pedophilia, nor on what is

predatory behavior.      Id. at 9.    Appellant asserts, “The present statute[,]

enabling the SOAB to be comprised of psychologists [sic], criminologists, and

psychiatrists [sic] [,] does not afford . . . due process if . . . the court . . . does

not hear evidence from those absolutely qualified and licensed in such areas

to do so.” Id. at 15. Furthermore, Appellant asserts “Dr. Muscari admitted

that she does not utilize a scientific method” when conducting an SVP

assessment, and avers this practice “is alarming because one can be deemed

an SVP on non-scientific methodology.” Id. at 10-11.

      Finally,   Appellant     argues    for   reversal    of    the   decisions    in

Commonwealth v. Conklin, 897 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 2006) (“[W]e hold that, in

order to carry its burden of proving that an offender is an SVP, the

Commonwealth is not obliged to provide a clinical diagnosis by a licensed

psychiatrist or psychologist; the opinion of a qualifying criminal justice expert

suffices.[ ]”), and Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372 (Pa. 2005)

(“Because the legislature provided the framework for assessing whether an

offender is an SVP, expert testimony tracking that framework, by definition,

should be deemed generally accepted in the community of professionals who

conduct SVP assessments. The testimony of a credentialed psychologist or

psychiatrist conducting an SVP assessment which follows the statutory

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formula for an assessment cannot be deemed ‘novel science’ and therefore no

Frye[8] hearing is necessary.”). We conclude no relief is due.

       First, we note “this Court is bound by existing precedent and continues

to follow controlling precedent unless it is overturned by our Supreme Court.”

Alston, 212 A.3d at 529 n.4, citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 205 A.3d

1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2019). Both Dengler and Conklin remain good law

in Pennsylvania; thus, we are without authority to reverse or disturb those

decisions.   As noted above, Conklin held “there is nothing in the [then-in

effect Megan’s Law] to support [an] argument that only a licensed psychiatrist

or psychologist may testify to an expert opinion concerning those aspects of

SVP status involving the offender’s mental abnormality or personality

disorder.”    Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1176.           Dengler stated, “Because the

legislature provided the framework for assessing whether an offender is an

SVP, expert testimony tracking that framework, by definition, should be

deemed generally accepted in the community of professionals who conduct

SVP assessments.”        Dengler, 890 A.2d at 383.       Accordingly, Appellant’s

arguments — that Dr. Muscari lacked the proper credentials in psychology or

psychiatry and the current statutory framework for SVP assessment wrongly

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8 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923). See Dengler, 890
A.2d at 381 (Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “described the Frye standard
as follows: ‘Admissibility of the [scientific] evidence depends upon the general
acceptance of its validity by those scientists active in the field to which the
evidence belongs.’”).

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allows “junk science” — are without merit. See Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1178;

Dengler, 890 A.2d at 383.

      Additionally, Appellant’s premise, that Dr. Muscari “admitted that she

does not utilize a scientific method,” is not supported by the record.       See

Appellant’s Brief at 10.    At the hearing, she clearly stated “the DSM is a

diagnostic and statistical manual,” is “an evidence-based manual,” and “is well

accepted.”    N.T. at 32-33.    Indeed, Appellant’s own expert witness, Mr.

Dickson, acknowledged the DSM was science-based. Id. at 59 (testifying,

“[Dr. Muscari] referenced specifically the DSM. That’s the only science that is

in the SVP assessment.”).

      In any event, while Appellant purports to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence, his argument is that the trial court should not have credited the

Commonwealth’s witness, but instead the testimony of his own expert

witness. Such a claim goes to the weight of the evidence:

      [An SOAB] report or opinion that the individual has an abnormality
      indicating the likelihood of predatory sexually violent offenses is
      itself evidence. Also, while a defendant is surely entitled to
      challenge such evidence by contesting its credibility or reliability
      before the SVP court, such efforts affect the weight, not the
      sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s case. Accordingly, they do not
      affect our sufficiency analysis.

See Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(citations omitted).

      Furthermore, Appellant wholly overlooks the trial court’s discussion that

while Mr. Dickson would urge for legislative changes to SORNA II, the issue of

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policy was not before the court. Instead, the narrow question was whether

Appellant met the criteria, as set forth in the current statutory framework, for

an SVP. N.T. at 71, 78. Finally, Appellant ignores that both parties’ experts

agreed he had a pedophilia disorder and met the criteria for an SVP under

SORNA II. See id. at 30, 38, 74; Trial Ct. Op., 9/7/22, at 3. We conclude no

relief is due on this challenge to the SVP designation.

                      V. Sufficiency Challenge – Torsilieri

       In his next issue, Appellant relies on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s

opinion in Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, as well as the Chester County Court of

Common Pleas’ subsequent decision on remand (discussed infra). He avers

lifetime registration as an SVP and Tier III offender “[e]ssentially brand[s]”

an individual to be a leper, and thus violates Article I, Section 1 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, as it permanently denies an individual the right to

their reputation.9 Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant states he “incorporates . .

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9See Pa. Const. Art. I, § 1 (“All men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”).

       We note that while Appellant briefly referred to the Torsilieri decision
at the SVP and sentencing hearing, he did not raise any of the arguments now
presented on appeal. See N.T. at 79-80 (Appellant’s counsel stating, “I do
have some digression on the SVP ruling, I reserve that for post-sentence
motions. But many of the arguments that I will advance in regards to that,
just to preserve the record . . . it’s cited in [Torsilieri].”).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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. all of the arguments advanced by the” Chester County court, which held on

remand that “SORNA is punitive in nature, offends results in a criminal

sentence in excess of the statutory maximums[,] violates Federal and State

proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment[, and therefore breaches

the separation of powers doctrine.” Id. at 25. We conclude no relief is due.

       Preliminarily, we observe the greater part of Appellant’s argument goes

to his SVP registration requirements, while he merely makes passing

reference to his Tier III requirements. See Appellant’s Brief at 22-29. We

address his SVP finding first, and conclude no relief is due pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Manzano, 237 A.3d 1175 (Pa. Super. 2020).

       In Manzano, the defendant, determined to be an SVP, argued

“Subchapter H is unconstitutional because it . . . creates an irrebuttable

presumption of dangerousness in violation of the right to reputation protected

by the Pennsylvania Constitution[ and] violates separation of powers

principles.” Manzano, 237 A.3d at 1179. This Court denied relief, noting the

Torsilieri, which was issued while the Manzano appeal was pending: (1)

“addressed the constitutionality of the provisions of Revised Subchapter H that

____________________________________________

      Generally, “issues not properly raised and preserved before the trial
court ‘are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’”
Commonwealth v. Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192, 1196 (Pa. 2022), citing, inter
alia, Pa. R.A.P. 302(a). However, our Supreme Court has held that a
challenge — to the constitutionality of lifetime registration requirements under
Subchapter H— implicates the legality of a sentence and thus cannot be
waived. Thorne, 276 A.3d at 1197.

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are not applicable to SVPs,” (2) while positively referring to the holding in

Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. 2020) (Butler II), that the

“registration, notification, and counseling requirements applicable to SVPs do

not constitute criminal punishment and therefore [the] SVP designation

procedure is constitutionally permissible.”10      Manzano, 237 A.3d at 1180.

The Manzano Court then reasoned the defendant “fail[ed] to articulate what

registration requirements, if any, he is subject to in . . . Subchapter H that fall

outside of those requirements specifically applicable to SVPs, which [Butler

II] has already declared are constitutional.” Id. at 1182. Pursuant to Butler

II and Manzano, Appellant’s present reliance on Torsilieri, concerning his

SVP designation and registration requirements, are meritless.

       Next, with respect to Appellant’s registration requirements as a Tier III

offender, we conclude no relief is due. In Torsilieri, the defendant challenged

his Tier III reporting requirements

       as violating his due process rights under the Pennsylvania
       Constitution[ and] challenged the presumption in SORNA II that
       all sex offenders are dangerous and pose a high risk of recidivism,
____________________________________________

10 In its opinion, the trial court reasoned Appellant was not entitled to relief
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020). Trial
Ct. Op. at 3.

      However, as the trial court noted, Lacombe addressed Subchapter I.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 3; Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626-67 (“We hold Subchapter
I does not constitute criminal punishment, and the ex post facto claims
forwarded by [the defendants] necessarily fail.”). That decision is thus not
applicable to this appeal, where Appellant was directed to comply with
Subchapter H.

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      necessitating registration and notification procedures to protect
      the public from recidivist sex offenders. . . .

Manzano, 237 A.3d at 1181. On appeal, our Supreme Court acknowledged

the defendant posed “colorable constitutional challenges” to Subchapter H,

but “decided it was unable to conclude[,] based upon the record before it[,]

whether the defendant had sufficiently undermined the validity of the

legislative findings supporting . . . Subchapter H’s registration and notification

provisions, especially in light of the Commonwealth’s contradictory scientific

evidence produced on appeal.” Id. The Torsilieri Court thus “remanded to

allow the parties to address whether a consensus has developed to call into

question the relevant legislative policy decisions impacting sex offenders’

constitutional rights.” Id. at 1181.

      In the case sub judice, Appellant has not presented any meaningful

argument as to his tier-based registration. His three passing references to

Tier III are, in sum: (1) “Essentially branded a ‘[leper]’ [sic] the Tier III

registration requirements of SORNA deny permanently a citizen of our

Commonwealth ‘indefeasible rights’ of acquiring and possessing property and

reputation;” (2) in the Torsilieri post-remand opinion, the trial court

considered “the burdensome requirements of [T]ier III lifetime registration;”

(3) “[Appellant] avers that . . . SORNA as applied by the courts . . . denies . . .

procedural and substantive due process to litigants who have committed Tier

III SORNA offenses.” Appellant’s Brief at 22, 23, 26 (emphases added). The

sum of these statements, without more, are not persuasive. See Elliott, 249

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A.3d at 1195 (“[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are

sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with

pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal

authorities.”). Finally, this Court has held “[w]e will not venture beyond our

Supreme Court's holding in Torsilieri,” which did not reach a conclusion on

the constitutionality of Subchapter H. Commonwealth v. Wolf, 276 A.3d

805, 814 (Pa. Super. 2022). In light of all the foregoing, we conclude no relief

is due.

                               VI. Conclusion

      As we decline to grant relief on Appellant’s sufficiency and constitutional

challenges to his SVP and Tier III registration requirements under Subchapter

H, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      Judge Bowes Concurs in the Result.

      Judge Sullivan Concurs in the Result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2023

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