Court Opinion

ID: 9847908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:40.152613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:45.625068
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The State contends we have “misconstrued” our authority to “address issues not enumerated as error. . . .” The United States Supreme Court has stated the general rule many times: “ Tn exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157, 160.” Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717, 718 (82 SC 1287, 8 LE2d 798); accord Rogers v. United States, 422 U. S. 35, 41 (95 SC 2091, 45 LE2d 1); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217, 222 (52 SC 315, 76 LE 715); United States v. Tenn. &c. R. Co., 176 U. S. 242 (20 SC 370, 44 LE 452).
We consider the facts of the case at the bar to be exceptional and to seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of these judicial proceedings, e.g., when the State calls defendant’s counsel to prove the competency of his client, which has been gleaned from his representation of his client, which provides the basis for his opinion that his client is competent to stand trial in violation of a state statute. The prosecutor established that defendant’s counsel had “consulted with her with regard to her case . . .” and then elicited defendant’s counsel’s expertise in the field of sanity and competence, and his opinion that “she understands what she is charged with and she understands the circumstances surrounding her arrest . . . what happened that day . . . she knows where we are and what is going on here.” We cannot visualize a more devastating presentation to a jury on an issue of competency, or one more prejudicial, than to have the defendant’s counsel swear to a jury that he is an expert, he has consulted with the defendant on this case, and that she is fully competent. Defendant’s counsel effectively eliminated any doubt as to the *481competency of his client. This may have been a correct assessment, but it was in direct violation of our Code, OCGA § 24-9-25.
Decided September 17, 1986
Rehearing denied October 8, 1986
Cliff L. Jolliff, for appellant.
Bruce L. Udolf, District Attorney, William M. Brownell, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162 (95 SC 896, 43 LE2d 103), where the defendant had committed some “irrational acts” and a pretrial psychiatric report said defendant “had difficulty in participating,” and “a difficult time relating,” the court found that it would have been “the better practice to order an immediate examination. . . .” Id. at 177. They summarized “[t]he import of [their] decision” to be that “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial, are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required. . . .” Id. at 180. Here, the defendant was irrational — even bizarre, at the time of the offenses alleged, and irrational actions and statements continued at the time of trial. The testimony of her husband established a 20-year history of hospitalization in mental hospitals, that she was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, and her “delusions seem to have more possession of her, dominate her activities and thinking, more gradually through the years,” provided sufficient indicia of the necessity of a current hearing of defendant’s competence.
We find no waiver by defendant not raising this issue at trial, because at the time she required counsel the most, her competency hearing, the court deprived her of her counsel to use his testimony against her, and as the Supreme Court concluded: “[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial.” Drope, supra at 176.

Motion for rehearing denied.