Court Opinion

ID: 9828780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:43:59.955124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.061013
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant complains of the conclusions-reached on original hearing, that- this case is distinguishable on the facts from the decisions cited in support of his assignments and particularly the decision of our Supreme Court in Drake v. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co., 99 Tex. 240, 89 S.W. 407,. 408, and without pointing out the distinguishing facts.
We quote the following from the opinion-, in the Drake case:
“Plaintiff was a member of a • section, gang in the service of defendant under the-immediate superintendence of a foreman. On the day when plaintiff was hurt the-men were engaged in loading flat cars-with steel rails, in doing which some of them stood on the ground and placed the-rails upon skids, one end of which rested; on the car, and pushed them along the-skids until they reached the edge of the-car, when they were received by two other-employés, standing on the car, and put in. place. In thus placing the rails, they were-lifted or pulled by means of rail hooks,, which were simple tools with a crook at one end, a handle at the other, and a stem about 20 inches long; the crooked end being inserted in the bolt holes in the rails. Plaintiff had been working on the ground, until just before the accident, when he was ordered by the foreman to go upon, the car and assist another in handling the-rails. A rail hook had already been placed upon the car, and plaintiff took and -used, it in his work. After he had handled in-, the manner stated from three to five rails,., the hook, because it was worn and was too small and not sufficiently curved, slipped from the hole in a rail as plaintiff was-pulling upon it, whereby he was caused to-*697lose his balance and fall from the car, and suffer the injuries of which he complains. He had had previous experience in thus handling rails and in the use of such hooks, but it does not appear that he knew of the presence of any defective ones. He testified that he did not notice the defective condition of the hook until he had fallen, when he examined ft, and at once saw that it zoos in the condition stated. He was ordered by the foreman, when he went upon the car and continually zvhile doing the work, to 'hurry up and get the rails ■out of the zvay/ and he says that he had no occasion to examine the hook — -‘had to pick it up as I came’ — and thought it safe. [Italics ours.] He admits, however, that he had to see the. hook in inserting it in the bolt holes. He did not select the particular hook, but found it upon the car, where one was usually put for use when such work was being done, and he states that ‘nobody knew anything about the hooks until he was on the car; he never climbed on the car with the hook; he found it up there.’ This statement will be sufficient to indicate the questions of fact and law to be passed upon. * * *
“In the cases of Gulf, W. T. & P. R. Co. v. Smith [37 Tex.Civ.App. 188], 83 S.W. 719, Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Scott (Tex.Civ.App.) 62 S.W. 1077, and many others that could be cited, it appeared that the plaintiff either actually knew of the condition of the implement of which he complained, or that he had such opportunities of knowing as to conclusively show that he ought to have known. [Italics ours.] Each case necessarily depends on its own facts, when the question is whether or not there is evidence to go to the jury, and a decision of the question upon one state of facts is usually of little help in a different case.”
The court there held that the issues of defendant’s negligence and assumed risk were for determination by the jury.
We believe the words italicized by us clearly distinguish that case from the instant case. Although, as shown by the testimony of plaintiff in this case, copied in our original opinion, he did not examine the crow-bar when he first picked it up, he knew of the alleged defect in it before he undertook to use it on the occasion it slipped from the spike and caused him to fall. And such knowledgei on his part at the time brings the case within the decisions in Gulf, W. T. & P. R. Co. v. Smith, 37 Tex.Civ.App. 188, 83 S.W. 719, and Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 62 S.W. 1077, cited in the Drake case and recognized as announcing a correct rule when it appears that the “plaintiff either actually knew of the condition of the implement of which he complained, or that he had such opportunities of knowing as to conclusively show that he ought to have known.”
Other authorities cited in appellant’s brief include the following:
29 Tex.Jur. p. 314: “As we have already said, simple hand tools do not require periodic inspection, at least where they are continuously in the employee’s custody. However, as we have also seen, an employee is not obliged to examine a hand tool furnished for his use, the doctrine of assumption of risk being applicable only to such defects as are obvious.”
29 Tex.Jur. p. 152, announces it to be the duty of the master to furnish to the servant physical appliances reasonably safe for his use and the duty of warning employees generally of dangers where this duty exists. The following is a quotation from the opinion of the Supreme Court, in Galveston H. & H. R. Co. v. Hodnett, 106 Tex. 190, 163 S.W. 13, 15: “As most generally illustrated, assumption of the risk is the voluntary exposure of the servant, without remonstrance, to the ordinary hazards of the particular use of machinery or appliafices, claimed by him to be defective or unfit, but of which condition and its dangers he knows, or must necessarily have acquired knowledge in the ordinary pursuit of his own duties. [Missouri, K. & T.] Railway Co. v. Hannig, 91 Tex. 347, 43 S.W. 508.”
Winnsboro Cotton Oil Co. v. Carson, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W. 1002, 1007, was a suit by Carson for loss of a thumb, resulting from contact with the cogwheel of machinery, while engaged in the duties of his employment. In the - opinion the foregoing announcement by the Supreme Court in the Hodnett case was quoted, followed by this conclusion:
“The proximate cause of appellee’s injury was the defective box head, which, again waiving the issue of vice principal, it was not his duty to keep in repair, and appellee’s emdence not only tends to show, but the jury found, that he was without knowledge in that respect. [Italics ours.] Further, ‘there is on the servant no duty of inspection,’ and he may in the pursuit of his work 'assume that the master has *698done his duty and provided for him a safe place to work.’ American Machinery Co. v. Haley, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W. 83, and cases cited. Accordingly we conclude that the issue of assumed risk was properly referred to the jury.”
Peck v. Peck, 99 Tex. 10, 87 S.W. 248, opinion by Supreme Court, was a suit for damages resulting from an injury sustained while in defendant’s employment, in which this was said:
“There is practically no conflict in the testimony. The plaintiff was hurt, while operating an elevator in defendant’s furniture establishment, by having his arm caught between an iron bar across the side of the elevator and a block of wood fastened inside the shaft. The negligence is claimed to have consisted in having the block in such a position, or in allowing it to project so near the side of the elevator. The building was several stories high, and the block was fastened to a joist just under the second floor, where the elevator shaft passed through, and was about 22 inches long, 2 inches thick and projected from the joist 4 inches, and to within about 2 inches of the body of the elevator. The elevator was open on that side, having only an iron bar as a guard across it. The cables by which it was controlled were outside of and between it and the side of the shaft, and one of them, to hold it steadily in position, passed through the hole in the center of the block. Plaintiff was returning with the elevator from the top of the building, and, in order to regulate its movement, extended his hand outside and caught hold of this cable, when his elbow came in contact with the block, and was caught by the descending crossbar and injured. The evidence leaves no doubt that the block thus projecting so near to the elevator was a clumsy contrivance for the purpose for which it was intended, and the use of it was negligence, even if there was a necessity for anything to hold the cable at that point. Nothing of the kind was at the other floors or upon the other cable. The chief contention is that plaintiff knew or ought to have known of its presence and of the danger it caused, and therefore assumed the risk or was guilty of negligence in exposing himself as he did. That he did not know of the fact the evidence is direct, and this court could only sustain the contention by holding, as matter of law, that the facts admit of no rational opinion but that he ought to have known it. [Italics ours.] The evidence shows, and plaintiff admits, that the block could have been seen by him from the elevator at any time when it passed that place, going up or down, had he looked for it, and that he had passed up and down many times each day for years, but it also shows that neither he nor defendant nor another employé, all of whom had used the elevator in the same way and for a long time, had ever seen it before this accident. * * * [Italics ours.]
“It is conceded that it was no part of plaintiff’s duty to inspect or see to the condition of the elevator and its attachments.”
The conclusion reached was in effect that whether or not plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury was'for the jury, and citing and quoting the announcement above shown in Missouri, K. & T. Railway Co. v. Hannig, 91 Tex. 347, 350, 43 S.W. 508, as a correct statement of the rule of assumed risk.
Beaumont S. L. & W. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 123 Tex. 580, 72 S.W.2d 899, 901, was a suit for damages for injuries to plaintiff while employed by the defendant. His clothing was caught on a protruding nail in a shaft while an engine was in operation for pumping water into a tank. We quote the following from the opinion:
“Defendant in error had been employed • at this station for about six and a half , years and had operated the engine many times. He was a telegraph operator by trade and not a trained or experienced mechanic. Repairs necessary to be made on the pump and engine were made by plaintiff in error’s water service repairman. Defendant in error testified that at the time of his injury he did not know that the links extended farther out from the shaft when the engine was in gear, and did not know that, there were nails in the pins holding the links together. * * * [Italics ours.]
“Defendant in error was inexperienced in that he had never had any character of training that taught him about machinery or how to operate it. He was told not to oil the engine while it was running, but he was not warned of the particular, peculiar, and obscure danger in the combination of the flaring links and the protruding nails. In view of these facts, it is our opinion that there was evidence sufficient to warrant the submission to the jury of the issue of negligence in failing to warn defendant in error of the dangers that *699might be encountered from the revolving clutch.”
Then follows a general discussion of duties of the master to the servant with citation of numerous decisions.
In 29 Tex.Jur. p. 381, it is said that minors and inexperienced workmen are entitled in many instances to recover where recovery by an adult, experienced workman would not be sustainable.
In 29 Tex.Jur. p. 164, this is said: “But the law recognizes that a minor has not an adult’s faculty for appreciating danger, and does not charge him with knowledge thereof unless it plainly appears that his injury resulted from a danger that was clearly perceptible by his immature faculties. In other words, assumption of risk is not a good defense where a minor has suffered injury if he did not know 'the extent of the danger or have sufficient discretion to weigh it. Hence the question whether he assumed -the risk is almost-always one of fact.”
As a general rule, appellate courts do not review at length the many decisions cited by the losing party in the case, in order to distinguish them or the .facts involved, because so to do unduly extends the opinion. For that reason we did not so do in our original opinion, but in view of the very earnest complaint of our failure in that respect, we have' discussed practically all the authorities cited by appellant, and have found in them no reason to change the conclusions expressed in our original opinion.
And in answer to the point stressed by appellant that because of his minority it was the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether he knew of the risk incident to working with the crow-bar, we deem it proper to refer to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 62 S.W. 1077, cited with implied approval in the Drake case, in which it was held that Scott, the plaintiff, assumed the risk of his injury, for which he sought a recovery, although he was a minor, 19½ years of age, when injured. At the time of his injury, he was working on a gravel decked bridge, nipping ties to which rails were being spiked. The work was done by putting a crow-bar under the end of a tie and raising it up to the rail against which it was held while two other men spiked the rail to it. While pressing down on the crow-bar, it slipped loose from its hold under the tie and plaintiff fell over the edge of the bridge to the bed of the creek below, about 30 feet, and was injured. It appeared that he had worked as a section hand on the railroad and was familiar with the work of nipping ties. In the opinion this was said: "The claw bar used by the plaintiff was furnished by defendant. It was worn at the end so that the hold on the tie would slip more easily than if the edges and points had been sharp and unworn, but plaintiff knew of the worn' condition of the claw bar when he was using it. * * * [Italics ours.] He knew that the work was dangerous, and that,, if his claw bar slipped, he would be apt to fall over the edge of the bridge to the bed of the creek below. * * * The case is a plain one of the assumption of risk. The plaintiff, although a minor, appeared to be fully atoare of the dangerous character of. the work, and was not so lacking in experience as not to be able to understand it.” (Italics ours.) In support of that holding, the court cited Texas & P. Railway Co. v. French, 86 Tex. 96, 23 S.W. 642; Galveston, H. & S. A. Railway Co. v. Lempe, 59 Tex. 19, 22.
Accordingly, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.