Court Opinion

ID: 9740708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:40:38.442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.878286
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the Majority. I write separately to emphasize the specific factual context of this case; that is, waiver of right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing.
A criminal defendant's right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing is provided by statute. IND.CODE § 835-38-2-3(e) (1998); Bradford v. State (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 1353, 1354. However, the statute does not define the requirements for a valid waiver of this right in a probation revocation hearing, which is otherwise in the nature of a civil proceeding. Isaac v. State (1992), Ind., 605 N.E.2d 144, 147, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2373, 124 LEd.2d 278. In the context of right to counsel, courts have analogized a probation revocation hearing to a sentencing hearing, in which a defendant stands to lose certain rights guaranteed by state law. See Guojardo v. State (1989), Ind.App., 544 N.E.2d 174, 176. Accordingly, a probationer who waives his statutory right to counsel and chooses to proceed pro se at a revocation hearing is entitled to be fully advised regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Because the instant record is devoid of any such advisement, I concur in the Majority's view that reversal is warranted.