Court Opinion

ID: 9754994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:20:20.541787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.319875
License: Public Domain

Justice LEE,
dissenting:
T 36 As the court today indicates, the statutory term "mineral deposits" is sometimes used narrowly to refer to solid mineral ores and sometimes used broadly to encompass oil and gas reserves. The question presented in this case is which of these two meanings to ascribe to that term as it appears in the eminent domain statute, Utah Code section 78B-6-501(6). I respectfully dissent from the court's resolution of that question on the basis of a "canon" of narrow construction of eminent domain provisions. Instead of falling back on that canon, I would decide which meaning of "mineral deposits" is reasonably conveyed by the term as it appears in this particular statute, and would hold that the term in that context encompasses oil and gas and not just solid ore.
T37 In my view, we should not interpret eminent domain statutes "narrowly" with a thumb on the seale in favor of private property owners or "liberally" in favor of the condemning authority (as courts have also sometimes suggested). We should interpret them fairly and reasonably in an attempt to find the precise balance of these competing interests that was adopted by the legislature. When courts resort too hastily to substantive canons, they run the risk of substituting their own policy views for the balance struck by the legislature. It seems to me that the majority's canon does just that. I respectfully dissent from the use of the canon and would find that the statutory text here favors the condemning authority by authorizing the construction of roads to facilitate the mining of oil and gas.
I
1838 As the majority indicates, this court and others have sometimes indicated an inclination to read eminent domain statutes narrowly.1 Although this principle often *872flies under the banner of a "canon," it is not the kind of canon we ordinarily employ in ascertaining statutory meaning. By "canon," we usually have reference to the kinds of "tools that guide our construction of statutes in accordance with common, ordinary usage and understanding of language." Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 19, 248 P.3d 465. Such linguistic canons are often uncontroversial, since they aid in the judicial attempt to assign meaning to statutory terms in a predictable fashion that respects reasonable reliance interests of the parties regulated by statute and likewise validates legislators' expectations of the import of their legislative text.
139 The "canon" embraced by the majority is not of this ilk. There is no reason to expect that the common, ordinary usage of language regarding the eminent domain power is typically exaggerated, necessitating a "narrow" construction to determine its true meaning. Presumably, the legislature meant what it said when it prescribed the terms of the eminent domain authority to build roads to access "mineral deposits." If so, we undermine the reasonable reliance interests of the parties regulated by the statute if we read it narrowly, just as we also invalidate legislative intent on the matter.
[ 40 I recognize that this and other courts have sometimes "canonized" other principles of construction that have nothing to do with identifying ordinary usage or meaning. Such canons are substantive, in that they seek to advance values or principles exogenous to the goal of identifying legislative intent.2 Courts ought to tread lightly in canonizing these sorts of principles, as they threaten to impinge on the policymaking domain of the legislature.
{41 I do not mean to suggest that all substantive canons are inappropriate. Such canons are least problematic when they advance policies that emanate from some other source of positive law like the Constitution. When courts narrowly construe federal statutes that impinge on traditional state fune-tions,3 for example, they protect values inherent in constitutional principles of federalism. In such cases, courts are advancing the values or principles canonized in the Constitution, not in the mind or heart of the judiciary. Courts are also on solid ground when they embrace substantive canons that claim a long, unbroken pedigree. When we construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubts4 or to favor criminal defendants, for example, we are embracing substantive canons embraced long and wide by courts everywhere. Such canons may be justified on the ground that the legislature acts in full knowledge of them, so we may properly assume that it took these canons into account in adopting the statutory language it chose.5
42 The canon embraced by the majority is not such a canon. Though "this rule of strict construction [is] supported by our pree-edent," supra ¶16, our cases also identify a counter-canon. In Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., this court stated that "it is generally agreed that where the right of eminent domain is *873granted for a particular purpose, then the statute must be given a liberal construction in furtherance of such purpose." 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172, 175 (1918) (emphasis added). See also Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 Utah 545, 31 P.2d 624, 627 (1934) (requiring courts to construe mining statutes "with as much liberality as its language may permit in order to carry out the purpose which the legislative power had in mind"). In Monetaire Mining, we suggested that "[the importance of encouraging the mining industry of this state must be kept in view," and that a "reasonable, fair, just, broad, and liberal view should be taken by the court" in interpreting eminent domain statutes. 174 P. at 176 (quoting Douglass v. Byrnes, 59 F. 29, 32 (D.Nev.1893)).
148 The "liberal construction" canon endorsed in Monetaire Mining and Utah Copper has never been overruled and has been cited in other jurisdictions.6 Without a single mention of this established precedent, the court did an about-face years later, holding that eminent domain statutes should be "strictly construed." Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1950). Bertagnoli, which is relied upon by the majority, completely ignores Monetaire Mining and Utah Copper and fails to cite a single Utah authority for its counter-canon. Thus, Bertagnoli was not a recognition of a longstanding substantive canon endorsed by extensive precedent; it was simply a judicial rebalancing of the interests the court had evaluated differently just years earlier.
44 The majority responds by suggesting that the Monetaire Mining rule "does not apply to ambiguous eminent domain statutes," but instead "applies only when a statute 'clear[ly] and explicit/ly] ... grants the right of eminent domain for [a particular] purpose." Supra ¶16 n. 14. Thus, according to the court, "these two rules are designed to resolve entirely distinct issues," and do not "conflict with one another." Id. This strikes me as untenable. It seems to me the majority has adopted an arbitrary interpretive regime-one in which we broadly construe unambiguous eminent domain statutes, while narrowly construing ambiguous ones. But the notion of broad construction of unambiguous language makes no sense to me. The rule of lenity prescribes the narrow construction of ambiguous penal laws against the state, but we would never broaden unambiguous penal laws, throwing an extra couple of months onto a conviet's sentence for good measure. If the language is clear, express, and unambiguous, there is no reason to resort to a broad or narrow construction.7
45 Nor is it correct to suggest that the Monetaire Mining rule applied only where a statute is clear and express. In Utah Copper, the court was faced with the question whether a natural "gulch" was a "ditch, flume, aqueduct, or tunnel ... within the meaning of the [eminent domain] statute." 31 P.2d at 627. Though the parties presented a number of "[clases and authorities" in favor of and against this construction, the Utah Copper court held that "we do not find it necessary to enter into a discussion concerning the meaning of those terms or to take sides in that controversy; for, so far as the present point is concerned, the case may be decided without reference to any of those terms." Id. We then declared that an eminent domain statute "must be construed, wherein it may require construction ... with as much liberality as its language may permit." Id. Thus, the Utah Copper court found the statute to be clear only after resorting to its broadening eanon of construction, not vice versa.
146 Rather than creating a unified interpretive regime, it seems to me that the rule in Monetaire Mining and the one announced in Bertagnoli are precisely at odds with each *874other. They are not canons at all, but self-canceling "thrust-and-parry" rules employed to advance judicial (and not necessarily legislative) policy preferences.8
T47 Even assuming that the rule of strict construction in Bertagnoli is now settled, I think it important to clarify what it settled. Cases like Monetaire Mining recognize that "the object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established; and it can never be assumed, that the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created." Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 547, 9 L.Ed. 773 (1837). Under this rationale, courts have held that "IwJhile the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget, that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation." Id. at 548. The Bertagnoli court balanced these interests differently, concluding that strict construction of eminent domain statutes is required because eminent domain operates "in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property." 215 P.2d at 628.
148 The choice between the Monetaire Mining and Bertagnoli canons is purely a matter of policy-of whether to favor communitarian governmental interests on the one hand or private property interests on the other. That choice falls squarely in the legislative domain. We have no proper say in the matter, except to interpret and apply the balance of these interests as codified by the legislature.9
[ 49 Thus, it strikes me as incongruous to foreclose the parties' "public policy arguments" in light of our "eminent domain canon of interpretation." See supra ¶ 32. This canon, like so many other so-called "substantive canons," is nothing but policy.10 Absent any legislative or constitutional directive, we have concluded that we will resolve cases in favor of a particular party based exclusively on our own policy rationale. Ultimately, it seems to me that the court is telling the parties that we won't listen to their policy concerns because we favor our own.
50 The point is not that Monetaire Mining had it right and Bertagnoli got it wrong. Both are wrong in that they arrogate to the courts the power to weigh competing policy interests and to select winners and losers. This is a legislative and not a judicial function.
51 In any event, the canon of interpretation employed by the majority is ultimately incoherent when applied to a case like this one, where the interests of two private property holders are at issue. The court justifies its strict construction canon by noting that "'[tlhe right of eminent domain, being in derogation of the right of individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property'" See supra note 13 (emphases added) (quoting Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 627). This rationale seems to juxta*875pose the interests of the "individual" or private property owner against those of the state actor.11 But even if the land ownership of KFJ Ranch Partnership is the type of "individual property ownership" that the majority's canon of construction was designed to protect, Marion Energy Corporation likewise has a property interest in its oil and gas leases. Neither the statute nor our constitution provides a basis for preferring one of these corporate property interests over the other.12
II
52 In my view, the fact that reasonable arguments can be made on both sides of a statutory question cannot be enough to justify our reservation of judgment as to "whether the Legislature intended for the term to encompass oil and gas deposits." Supra ¶ 25. That is the question of interpretation presented for our review, and it is our responsibility to decide it even if we deem it a close call. If reasonable arguments on both sides were enough for us to find ambiguity, most all of our statutory cases would become a free-for-all, in which the statutory text is no longer the guide and the court may " 'seek guidanee'" not just from substantive canons of construction but also "'from legislative history and relevant policy considerations.'" Supra ¶ 15 (quoting Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 167 (Utah 1996) (Durham, J., dissenting)). We ought to be wary of seeking such "guidance," as it treads dangerously close to (if not crossing) the line that separates our limited role of interpreter from the legislative role of policymaker. But at a minimum, it seems to me that before we look to such sources of "guidance" it is our duty to determine the best interpretation of the statutory text in light of its surrounding linguistic and legal context.13 I certainly would not look past the text at the mere sight of alternative arguments cutting in opposite directions. Olsen v. Fagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 13, 248 P.3d 465 ("The fact that the statutory language may be susceptible of multiple meanings does not render it ambiguous. ...").
153 Granted, the meaning of the term "mineral deposits" is " largely contextual.'" Supra ¶ 19 (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2004 UT 98, ¶ 32, 104 P.3d 1208). But in my view the relevant context cannot be limited to the acknowledgment of reasonable, competing arguments from the structure of the statute or from alternative uses of the statutory terminology in parallel provisions. The relevant context is broader, encompassing the linguistic and structural considerations examined by the majority as well as practical implications that the court dismisses under the misplaced notion that they do not constitute an "absurd result." Supra ¶ 30. I read these relevant contextual cues *876to dictate a construction of "mineral deposits" that includes oil and gas reserves.
A
154 I agree with the majority that the phrase "mineral deposits" in Utah Code seetion 78B-6-501(6)(a) is susceptible of two alternative interpretations-one that excludes oil and gas and one that does not. Each interpretation coincides with a definition commonly found in dictionaries. First, a "mineral" may be defined as "[al naturally occurring, homogeneous inorganic solid substance having a definite chemical composition and characteristic erystalline structure, color, and hardness." 14 This is a scientific definition used to classify as "minerals" those solid, inorganic substances that share a common crystalline structure-a definition that would exclude oil and gas.
T55 Second, a "mineral" may also be defined as "[al subsurface material that is explored for, mined, and exploited for its useful properties and commercial value.15 This second definition is consistent with the legal use of the terms "mineral interest," and "mining," both of which may include the notion of oil and gas. The second definition refers not to the material state of the substance extracted, but to its economic purpose or value. While the first definition is employed to denote a scientific classification, the second is used in connection with mining or property rights.
T 56 The question presented in this case is which of these two definitions to impute to the term "mineral deposits" in the eminent domain statute. Neither definition is inherently "narrow" or "broad." They are simply contextual. Our role in this case is to decide which one is reasonably conveyed by the language, structure, and context of the eminent domain statute.
157 I believe that a reasonable person familiar with the linguistic and legal context of the statute would understand the statutory term "mineral deposits" to be used in its mining or property rights sense, not in its scientific classification sense. The statute is, after all, a property rights provision. It accords an owner of mineral deposits the right to condemn land to build a road to access those deposits In this context, a party acquiring a valuable mineral right would reasonably understand his right to include the statutory right of condemnation, regardless of whether the resource is in solid, erystalline form or in the form of liquid oil or natural gas.16
*8771 58 In a contract setting, most courts hold that a contractual "conveyance or reservation of the 'minerals' will include oil, gas and petroleum products, unless a contrary intent is manifested on the face of the instrument."17 This court articulated that view over a century ago, stating that "[the term 'minerals' in a grant includes prima facie every substance that can be got underneath the surface of the earth for profit." Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab Cnty. 33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 56 (1907) (internal quotation marks omitted).18
T 59 Thus, when a party acquires a mineral right, it reasonably understands that its rights extend to all valuable natural resources under the ground in question. The seller of such a right would hardly be heard to contend that oil and gas reserves were not conveyed because they are not solid, erystal-line substances and thus do not satisfy the scientific definition of "mineral."
T60 Because the eminent domain statute effectively allocates property rights in mineral deposits, the statutory term should be interpreted the same way it would be in a contract. This court has previously said as much, indicating that "where we find the terms 'mines and minerals' used in grants or in reservations, in instruments of conveyance, in statutes or Constitutions, under the modern construction, the former is not limited to mere subterranean excavations or workings, nor is the latter limited to the metals or metalliferous deposits." Id. at 56 {(emphasis added).
61 The mining or property rights notion of "mineral" is confirmed by the language of the eminent domain statute. Under the statute, land may be condemned to build a road to "facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) (2008). The statute is aimed at facilitating the extraction of minerals for commercial purposes. And it refers to a number of processes by which "subsurface material" is "exploited for its useful properties and commercial value."19 Given this context, I think that the trade usage of mineral-the one that encompasses the notion of oil and gas-is unambiguously conveyed by this statute.20
B
T 62 I also find the structure of the eminent domain statute instructive. As I read the subsections of section 501(6), it seems apparent that subsection (a) addresses condemnation for the purpose of accessing various natural resources while subsections (b) through (f) deal with condemnation for the purpose of storage and transportation. These two sets of provisions use different terminology to refer to the types of natural resources to be accessed, stored, or transported, but I see no reason to read subsec*878tion (a)s general reference to "mineral deposits" to exclude oil and gas reserves.
T 63 Under subsection (a), eminent domain may be exercised for the construction of "roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a). In context, it seems to me that the reference to "mineral deposits" is broadening, not limiting. The provision expressly authorizes condemnation for roads for "the working of mines, quarries, [and] coal mines." Surely that would encompass the kind of solid ore that the majority deems "mineral deposits" to be aimed at. So it seems to me that "mineral deposits, including minerals in solution," reasonably would be understood in context to extend beyond solid ore to include liquid oil and gas reserves.
T64 For me, the statutory scheme thus confirms that the legislature was using "mineral deposits" in its mining or property rights sense, not by way of limitation to a particular scientific classification based on the state of the mineral's matter. In fact, the statutory context seems to eschew any limitation based on a mineral's material state. We know that "minerals in solution" are included, so at least some forms of liquid resources are covered by the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a). And I assume that even the majority would deem tar sand to be covered, as it is in solid form and thus presumably counts as a mineral even under the definition based on scientific classification.
T65 Ultimately, then, the statute cannot reasonably be read to foreclose condemnation in this case simply on the material state of the natural resource in question. If some liquid resources are covered (as the "minerals in solution" provision indicates), then it would seem arbitrary to exclude a liquid resource like oil. And if tar sand counts, any exclusion of oil is even more arbitrary. It makes much more sense in context to treat "mineral deposits" to encompass any valuable natural resource under the ground, regardless of how it might be scientifically classified based on its material state.
T 66 It is true, as KFJ and the majority note, that subsection (d) makes express reference to oil and gas in authorizing the use of eminent domain to build "gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs." Supra ¶ 21 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(d)). But I cannot see how this express reference to oil and gas is any indication that "the Legislature did not intend for oil and gas to be provided for in subsection 6(a)." Supra ¶ 21. Rather than limiting the expanding term "mineral deposits," it seems to me that the specific reference to gas, oil, and coal in subsection (d) simply limits the kinds of pipelines, tanks, and reservoirs that may be the proper subject of the power of eminent domain under that provision. I see no inconsistency, and no reason to read the specific reference to oil and gas in subsection (d) to imply their exelusion in subsection (a).21
C
167 The statute's adoption of the mining or property rights notion of "mineral" is *879further confirmed by another structural feature of the eminent domain statute. KFJ has not explained-and I cannot imagine-a rationale for the legislature to authorize eminent domain for the transportation and storage of oil and gas reserves without a parallel authorization to facilitate access to such resources. Without some statutory indication to the contrary, it seems to me unreasonable to assume that the legislature would have endorsed the condemnation of land to build "pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including ... for the underground storage of natural gas," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(d), without also endorsing the condemnation of land to build a road to those pipelines and stores. In fact, as KFJ conceded at oral argument, it would be impossible to build a pipeline to an oil or gas reserve without also constructing a road in the process.
T 68 The majority suggests a possible explanation for this supposed dichotomy: "[The Legislature could reasonably have intended to require parties to use means less intrusive than building a permanent road to transport oil and gas across private property-such as ... condemning a smaller portion of land to build pipelines." Supra ¶ 30. But if condemnation of land for a pipeline is permitted, there is no reason to expect that the construction of the pipeline would involve the condemnation of "a smaller portion of land" than that required to build a road. I would think that the opposite would ordinarily be the case, particularly given that most any pipeline would presumably require the construction of a road (not just for construction but also for access and maintenance). If so, it makes little sense to presume that the legislature would endorse condemnation for oil and gas pipelines but not roads.
T 69 The majority's response to this is its conclusion that this result is not "so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation could not have intended it." Supra ¶ 30 (quoting State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 13, 165 P.3d 1206). But this conclusion conflates two separate rules of construction related to absurdity. We have, at times, relied on the so-called "absurdity" doctrine in cases where we consider whether to reject the otherwise "plain meaning" of statutory text. State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 13, 165 P.3d 1206.22 But the question in such cases is whether the practical implications of the plain text (not a text with two interpretations) are so absurd and ridiculous that we are convinced that the legislature could not have meant what it said.
T70 At other times, where a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, we have used the absurd result of one interpretation as evidence that the other interpretation ought to control.23 We have even gone so far as to characterize this approach as a "related but separate canon of statutory interpretation" to the absurdity doctrine addressed above. Rather than implicating the notion of "absurdity," this second approach is better understood to suggest that where two interpretations present themselves, we consider the practical consequences of each in evaluating which one more reasonably would be understood by a person familiar with the statute in its legal and linguistic context. Olsen, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 20. The circumstances of this case, where two reasonable interpretations present themselves, implicate this second approach. The unusual statutory scheme that would allow leaseholders to seek condemnation for the transportation and *880storage of oil and gas in pipelines and tanks, but not to build a road to access those same reserves, favors a contrary interpretation of this statute.
T71 If subsection (a) said "solid mineral ores" instead of "mineral deposits," then the text would not be capable of two reasonable interpretations. If the statute said that, I would agree that the legislative judgment to forbid condemnation for roads to oil and gas reserves while allowing it for oil and gas pipelines would not be "so absurd" that the legislature could not have intended it.
T72 But that is not the question in this case. Instead, as the majority acknowledges, the question is the proper meaning of the general, ambiguous term "mineral deposits"-a term that is "largely contextual" and could reasonably be understood to include or exclude oil and gas reserves. In such a case, the practical implications of either reading are not just relevant to the extent they tell us whether a certain outcome is "so absurd that the legislative body ... could not have intended it."
T73 The question is not whether one construction or the other reaches the extreme level of absurdity, but whether one is a more reasonable explanation of the legislative scheme in light of the practical realities at stake. And we have said that where two meanings are plausible or linguistically permissible in a given context, and one interpretation leads to an absurd result, then we favor the other interpretation. See supra ¶ 70 n. 24. To me, it seems more consistent with the social, linguistic, and legal conventions implicated by this case to conclude that the legislature would have intended to authorize both roads and pipelines for oil and gas reserves.
III
74 I see no need to resort to a canon of construction where the ambiguity in the statutory text can be resolved with traditional tools of construction. Because the legal and linguistic context of the eminent domain statute points persuasively to a mining or trade definition of "mineral rights" that encompasses oil and gas, I would reverse.

. See, e.g., Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (1950) ("'The right of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property."); see also Salt Lake Cnty. v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1345 (Utah 1979) ("Statutes conferring the power of condemnation under the right of eminent do*872main are strictly construed.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 968 (1966) (Callister, J., dissenting), rev'd on reh'g, 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966).

. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L.Rev. 109, 110 (2010) ("[It is generally recognized that substantive canons advance policies independent of those expressed in the statute.").

. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) ("If Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

. See Ex Parte Randolph, 20 F.Cas. 242, 254 (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (C.C.D.Va.1833) (No. 11,558) ("If the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for the legislature requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly assailed.").

. Barrett, supra note 2, at 159 ('To the extent that these canons are well-established, they are conventions with which the interpretive community of lawyers is conversant."); John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 Colum. L.Rev. 399, 406 (2010) ("[A substantive] canon might nonetheless reflect a deeply embedded Anglo-American legal tradition ...-a convention against which Congress may have legislated from the beginning of the Republic.").

. See, e.g., Freeman Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119 F.2d 16, 19-20 (10th Cir. 1941) ("A statute granting the right of eminent domain for a particular purpose must be liberally construed in furtherance of such purpose." (citing Monetaire Mining, 174 P. at 175)); State ex rel. Standard Slag Co. v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, 62 Nev. 113, 143 P.2d 467, 469 (1943) (same).

. Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127, 202 P. 377, 379-80 (1921) ("We must be guided by the law as it is.... When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.").

. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About how Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vamp. L.Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950) (warning of the risk of arbitrariness in the face of various "opposing canons" characterized as "thrust" and "parry" moves by the court).

. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) ("We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions."); see also Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, ¶ 34, 212 P.3d 547 ("Our inquiry is not what the legislature should do, but rather what the legislature has done.").

. James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 Calif. L.Rev. 1199, 1205 (2010) ("Substantive canons are grounded not in judgments about the conventional ' understanding of language, but in an array of judicially generated policy concerns."); Barrett, supra note 2, at 17 ("Substantive canons ... can challenge legislative supremacy insofar as their purpose is to promote policies external to a statute."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vamp. L.Rev. 593, 595-96 (1992) (''The substantive canons do reflect some overall tendency or slant in the Court's interpretation of statutes. That is, unlike the linguistic canons or the referential canons, the substantive canons are not policy neutral. They represent value choices by the Court.").

. Presumably, the Bertagnoli canon of strict construction was born of a presumption against the vast, incorporeal government and in favor of the personalized, sympathetic individual. If so, that merely underscores the impropriety of this canon, for such favoritism has no home in the judiciary. In this case, in any event, it is simply incoherent as it operates not against the government but to favor one private property holder and against another.

. "Although Marion and the Trust have property interests at issue in this case," the majority asserts that "only KFJ faces the possibility of being permanently deprived of its property" and that "protection of private property owners against such unauthorized condemnations is the very purpose for which the rule of strict construction announced in Bertagnoli was created." See supra note 16. Both of these propositions may be true, but I do not see how the latter follows from the former. A deprivation of property is a deprivation of property, and I see nothing in the Bertagnoli rule that meaningfully distinguishes between temporary and permanent deprivations. If an ambiguous eminent domain statute allowed for only the rerporary condemnation of private property, I assume that the majority would still resolve these ambiguities against the party seeking condemnation. Uitimately, there is no property protection rationale that supports the invocation of a strict-construction canon in this case. Instead, the canon ends up favoring one type of property ownership over another. That strikes me as even more troubling-and more arbitrary-than the canon as applied in Bertagnoli.

. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L.Rev. 527, 537 (1947) ("When we talk of statutory construction we have in mind cases in which there is a fair contest between two readings, neither of which comes without respectable title deeds. A problem in statutory construction can seriously bother courts only when there is a contest between probabilities of meaning.").

. American Heritage Dictionary or the English Language 1118 (4th ed. 2009); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1084 (9th ed. 2009) (defining mineral as "1. Any natural inorganic matter that has a definite chemical composition and specific physical properties that give it value," most of which "are crystalline solids"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1487 (3d ed. 1981) (defining mineral as "la; a solid homogenous crystalline chemical element or compound ... that results from the inorganic processes of nature and that has a characteristic crystal structure and chemical composition or range of compositions"); Am Geological Inst., Dictionary or Mining, Mineral, and Rerated Terms 347 (2d ed. 1997) (defining mineral as "(a) A naturally occurring inorganic element or compound having an orderly internal structure and characteristic chemical composition, crystal form, and physical properties").

. Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 14, at 1084; see also American Heritage Dictionary or the English Language supra note 14 at 1118 (defining mineral as "2. Any of various natural substances, such as: ... {aln organic derivative, such as coal or petroleum ... that is extracted or obtained from the ground ... and used in economic activities"); Webster's Third New Internationar Dictionary, supra note 14 at 1487 (defining mineral as "b: any of various naturally occurring homogenous or apparently homogeneous and usu. but not necessarily solid substances (as ore, coal, ... petroleum, water, natural gas, ...) obtained for man's use usu. from the ground"); Am. Geological Inst, supra note 14 at 347 (defining mineral as "(d) any natural resource extracted from the earth for human use; e.g., ores, salts, coal, or petroleum"); 9 Oxford English Dictionary 806 (2d ed. 1989) (defining mineral as "L.a. Any substance which is obtained by mining; a product of the bowels of the earth").

. See Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 14 at 1084 (defining mineral interest as "Oil & gas. The right to search for, develop, and remove minerals from land or to receive a royalty based on the production of minerals. Mineral interests are granted by an oil-and-gas lease."); see also Vintah Oil Ass'n v. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 853 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1993) ("Although the property is the subject of patented oil shale mining claims, it has not been used for mining and no minerals have been extracted therefrom." (emphases added)); Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 137 (Utah 1992) (characterizing oil and gas rights as "mineral interests"); Cowling *877v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, Dep't of Natural Resources, 830 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah 1992); Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 14 at 1084 (defining mining as "[the process of extracting ore or minerals from the ground; the working of a mine. This term also encompasses oil and gas drilling.").

. Richard W. Hemingway, This Law or Oil and Gas § 1.1, at 1 (3d ed. 1991); see also id § 1.2, at 8 ("A conveyance or reservation of 'minerals' or 'oil, gas and other minerals' will generally include substances having a special value apart from the land itself, whose removal will not substantially interfere with surface usage, and which are traditionally not associated with surface ownership."); Wall v. Shell Oil Co., 209 Cal.App.2d 504, 25 Cal.Rptr. 908, 915 (Dist.Ct.App.1962) ("We believe that the court was correct in applying the majority rule in the United States that a broad transfer of the mineral estate includes gas and oil, unless the contrary intent appears...."); Ky. W. Va. Gas Company v. Browning, 521 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Ky.1975); Weaver v. Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N.W. 818, 819 (1909); Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger, 19 Ohio App.2d 135, 250 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1969).

. See also W. Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452, 454 (1955).

. See supra ¶ 55.

. Cf. Burke v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 679, 34 S.Ct. 907, 58 L.Ed. 1527 (1914) ("[Als-suming that, when subjected to a strictly scientific test, petroleum is not a mineral, we think that is not the test contemplated by the statute. It was dealing with a practical subject in a practical way, and we think it used the words 'mineral lands,' and intended that they should be applied, in their ordinary and popular sense. In that sense, as before indicated, they embrace lands chiefly valuable for petroleum.").

. The majority's approach ultimately boils down to the proposition that the legislature could have been clearer if it had intended to include oil and gas in the term "mineral deposits." Our statutory precedents are riddled with similar assertions. See e.g., State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ¶ 12, 150 P.3d 540 ("Had that been the Legislature's intent, however, it easily could have said so...."); Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 17, 54 P.3d 1177 ("Had the legislature intended to exclude business entities that engage in both retail and wholesale selling ..., it could have specified that dealer means only those business entities that engage exclusively in the business of retailing. It did not do so."). I find such conclusions unhelpful. It may well be that if the legislature had meant to say "x," it could have said so more explicitly. But that almost never advances the ball analytically. In any case that warrants our careful attention, it will most always be true that the legislature could have spoken more precisely if it had anticipated the precise question before the court. But of course the legislature cannot in fact anticipate all issues that might arise in the future, which is the main reason we judges have jobs. So I acknowledge that the legislature could have said "mineral deposits, including oil and gas." But it also might have said "mines, quarries, coal mines, or solid ore deposits." It said neither, and it helps us not at all to imagine an easier case in which the legislature spoke more clearly.

. See also Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242 ("An equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute.'" (quoting Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996))).

. Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 73, 210 P.3d 263 ("When statutory language plausibly presents the court with two alternative readings, we prefer the reading that avoids absurd results." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ¶ 12, 992 P.2d 986 ('Where we are faced with two alternative readings, and we have no reliable sources that clearly fix the legislative purpose, we look to the consequences of those readings to determine the meaning to be given the statute.... In other words, we interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences."); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 n. 39 (Utah 1991) ("When dealing with unclear statutes, this court renders interpretations that will avoid absurd consequences." (internal quotation marks omitted)).