Court Opinion

ID: 9586407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:10:11.988698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:01.428481
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceeding. However, I do not concur in the court’s analysis of the trial court’s judgment. The trial court found that there was a substantial change of condition, “due to” the move from the Gwinnett County area to Louisville, Kentucky, and that as a result, the relationship between the boy and his mother was destroyed. That is, the trial court found the change in condition “is” the destruction. It made no other finding that the change of residence adversely affected the child. In contemplating a custodial change, a trial court must exercise its discretion to determine whether a change of custody is in the best interests of the child, OCGA § 19-9-3, but it must be guided by the established legal principles.
Before a change can be made in custody which has already been determined and established, the court “ ‘must affirmatively find . . . that the original custodian is no longer able or suited to retain custody or that conditions surrounding the child have so changed that modification of the original judgment would have the effect of promoting his welfare. [Cit.]’ ” Ormandy v. Odom, 217 Ga. App. 780, 781 (1) (459 SE2d 439) (1995). That is because the award of custody “vests the custodial parent with a prima facie right” to maintain it. (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. To change custody, there must be evidence and a finding that new and material conditions affect the welfare of the child. Arp v. Hammonds, 200 Ga. App. 715, 716 (409 SE2d 275) (1991).
The court made no finding that the father is no longer able or suited to retain custody. In fact, it found that both parents are fit and proper, and it retained the father as the primary physical custodian, but it was conditioned on the residence being within a ten-mile radius of the county where the mother lived. So there is no negative *307reflection in the court’s findings or solution with respect to the father’s ability or suitability for custody.
The court’s finding that the mother is a recovering alcoholic and currently sober implies, because of the evidence supporting that finding, that the mother has made progress since the divorce and is thus stronger healthwise, a factor which the legislature expressly intends to be considered in custody disputes. OCGA §§ 19-9-1 (a) and 19-9-3 (a) (which are applicable in this case because it was filed before July 1, 1995). Ga. L. 1995, p. 863, §§ 5 and 6. Thus it appears that the court considered this fact as one of the bases for its finding that she is fit and proper to have custody. But that does not displace the favor which the court should show to the parent with the prima facie right of continued custody. Ormandy, supra, citing Triplett v. Elder, 234 Ga. 243 (215 SE2d 247) (1975). There is good reason for it here, as the father has been the child’s custodian since at least October 1992, when he was two and one-half years old, and apparently his primary caretaker even before that time due to the mother’s disease of alcoholism.
The improvement in the mother’s health was not found to be the, or a, substantial change of condition affecting the father’s right to maintain custody. What the court did find, insofar as the move affected the child, was that the boy’s relationship with his mother was compromised because he was so far away. With respect to the agreed-upon custody order which was in place, the relocation interfered only with her visitation with him. No other negative impact on the child’s welfare was found which would support removing the child from the father’s custody. The court did not find that the move constituted a change for the worse in the child’s environment or upbringing, except for its impact on the exercise of the mother’s visitation. By itself, a move to another state is not a change of condition which would authorize modification. Mercer v. Foster, 210 Ga. 546, 548 (3) (81 SE2d 458) (1954); Ormandy, supra, and the cases cited therein. The parties were not awarded joint custody in the original decree, so the father was not prohibited from moving with the child to Kentucky. See the cases cited in Carr v. Carr, 207 Ga. App. 611, 612 (429 SE2d 95) (1993), cert. vacated, 263 Ga. 451 (435 SE2d 44) (1993). See also Moore v. Wiggins, 230 Ga. 51, 55 (1) (195 SE2d 404) (1973); Hirsh v. Dobb, 224 Ga. 130, 134 (3) (b) (160 SE2d 386) (1968).
Although the father offered to revise visitation to accommodate the change in place of residence, the court apparently did not regard that as an adequate solution. Nor is there any indication that it considered imposing on the father any or all of the expense of the mother’s visitation, as a solution to the problem of distance, with an alternative to the midweek visit. The change affected visitation; based on the findings of the court, the new location did not affect the *308child’s welfare, except with respect to the access of the child and the mother to each other. Conditioning continued custody on a return of residence of the father and child to the locale of the mother’s residence contravenes the principles upon which change of custody must be based. That is not to say the change of residence, which affected visitation, does not warrant a change in visitation or the arrangements therefor so as to serve the welfare and best interests of the child, who otherwise would be deprived of continuing frequent time with his mother. The move to Kentucky affected visitation; it did not adversely affect the child’s best interests and welfare with respect to his father’s custody.
Decided June 18, 1996
Reconsideration denied July 12, 1996.
Jeffrey B. Bogart, Glenda L. Sullivan, Susan A. Hurst, for appellant.
Mary B. James, for appellee.