Court Opinion

ID: 9579581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:28.051594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:36.457530
License: Public Domain

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The fighting issue here is which parent, David Kleist or Adriana Mendez, should be awarded the physical care of their five year old daughter, Juliana.
I would award the physical care of Juliana to her father, David, for several reasons, which follow. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals decision, which gave David physical care, and reverse the district court judgment as to that issue and related visitation and child support.
I. Custody considerations. In child custody cases, the first and governing consideration is the best interest of the child. Iowa RApp.P. 14(f)(15). Iowa Code section 598.41 lists nine factors for courts to weigh in deciding what is in the best interest of the child. Furthermore, courts consider factors we out*279lined in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Iowa 1974), before making difficult primary care decisions.
I agree with the trial court’s award of joint custody of the child to both parents. See Iowa Code § 598.41(2). However, it is significant to note that at the trial level, Adriana opposed joint custody and wanted sole custody of Juliana for herself. See id. § 598.41(3)(g).
II. Trial court’s award of physical care. The next question we must ask is who shall be the primary physical caretaker of Juliana?
On this difficult issue, the trial court stated:
The Court ... finds that [Adriana] should be awarded the primary physical care of Juliana.... This Court’s decision to award primary physical care to Adriana is not the result of any perceived deficiencies in David’s ability to parent. It is obvious from the evidence that David is an excellent parent with much to offer Juliana. However, I share Dr. Fredericks’ [an investigator’s] view that Juliana’s best interests will be served if she is placed in the primary physical care of her mother. I share Dr. Fredericks’ view that the placement of primary care with Adriana will enhance the overall access and contribution of both parents to this child and the child to her parents. It appears to this Court, as it did to Dr. Fredericks, that Adriana Mendez would be much less effective in the [non-custodial] role of visited parent than in the role of primary caretaker. This is because of her parenting style and to some extent her deep-seated beliefs about the role of a mother.
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court relied on a report of the investigator, Dr. Marilee Fredericks, that stated:
[T]he physical care arrangement that would be most disruptive of Juliana’s parent/ehild relationship would be placement of that care with Mr. Kleist. This is because, despite my opinion that Ms. Mendez can fulfill the role of primary caretaking parent, I doubt her ability to serve as an effective parent in the visited parent com text. This is partly due to her ingrained/deep-seated doubts that a mother can fulfill the mothering role outside of the caretaking context and partly due to her parenting style which relies heavily on ongoing interactions and small continuous nurturing and guidance activities which are integrated with those interactions.
(Emphasis added.)
Adriana, the mother, is of Cuban heritage, is a United States citizen and has been in this country for 34 years. She claims an ethnic view that she cannot properly function as a mother to Juliana unless she has the physical care of Juliana.
In substance, the investigator, Dr. Freder-icks, and the trial court honored that ethnic belief and thus awarded the physical care of Juliana to the mother, Adriana. The award was made supposedly in the best interest of the child, Juliana, because otherwise Adriana might not be able to effectively contribute emotional support to the child as a “visited parent,” i.e., a parent that the child would visit.
I believe that was an impermissible consideration. I agree with the court of appeals decision on this issue: “We respect the cultural differences of the litigants before us, but we cannot let a parent’s cultural beliefs put him or her in a superior position when we assess the custody issue.”
Also, a parent’s “cultural disposition” is not one of the factors listed in Iowa Code section 598.41 to be considered when deciding what is in the best interest of the child.
III. Adriana’s unwillingness to be an emotionally-supportive, noncustodial parent. In essence, Adriana asserts that she will not play an emotionally-supportive role in Juliana’s life if she does not get her way by being awarded physical care of Juliana. An analogy to Adriana’s assertion can be drawn to the parent who refuses to pay monetary support for the child unless the parent is awarded physical care or desired visitation with the child. We have said the noncustodial parent nevertheless owes monetary support to the child despite the personal disappointment of not being the primary caretaker. The same principle should apply to Adriana here who *280indicates she will withdraw emotional support for the child unless she is awarded physical care. In sum, it is no more valid to allow the cultural background and conditional emotional support of Adriana to be considered regarding an award of physical care than to excuse a noncustodial parent from paying court-ordered monetary support.
Here, both the trial court and Dr. Freder-icks penalized and precluded David from being the physical caretaker because they believed he was mature enough to be able to function as a noncustodial parent, whereas Adriana was not so capable and mature.
IV. Reintroduction of the “tender years” presumption. We have abandoned any presumption in favor of the mother having physical care of a small child. In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Iowa 1974). I believe the trial court’s award of physical care to Adriana, based on her purported inability to be a “visited parent,” improperly reintroduces the “tender years” presumption through cultural rationalizations. In addition, David’s testimony and the other record supports the court of appeals finding that if physical care is granted in favor of David, Juliana will be assured exposure to the cultural values of both her father and mother. Cf. Lambert v. Everist, 418 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1988) (father awarded primary physical care of daughter in part because the father viewed his daughter’s exposure to other cultures and lifestyles as positive, whereas mother wished to limit daughter’s exposure to only mother’s lifestyle).
We should not adopt, in substance, a rule that the more pliable parent should have that trait held against him or her on custody and physical care matters.
V. Other cases involving personal beliefs. In at least two eases, we decided not to reward a parent who obstinately refused to allow visitation or custody to the parent who did not physically possess the child. Cf. In re Marriage of Quirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Iowa 1993) (holding wife, who wil-fully sought to deprive noncustodial father from decreed visitation rights, was no longer deserving of physical care of the child). Just as we did not reward the mother who sought to cut off all ties of the father from his child in Quirkr-Edwards, Adriana should not be rewarded with physical care solely on one of her purported cultural dispositions.
Also, in Amro v. Iowa District Court, 429 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1988), we did not reward a father who had strong cultural beliefs and wanted a panel of Islamic scholars rather than a court to decide a custody dispute over his son. Id. at 137-38.
The trial court’s award of physical care based in part on Adriana’s cultural disposition sets bad precedent with untold, unfortunate ramifications. Every parent desiring physical care could assert a like-claim.
VI.Relevant evidence concerning the physical care award. After putting aside the mentioned impermissible consideration concerning Adriana’s ethnic beliefs, other relevant factors bearing on the award of physical care must be considered.
The record shows, and the trial court stated, that David is an excellent father and has much to offer Juliana. He consistently cared for Juliana while the parties lived together and has apparently never acted aggressively in front of her.
In contrast, the record reflects Adriana has exhibited violent tendencies in the past. Dr. Fredericks testified at trial:
One of the concerns that Mr. Kleist has had is about her volatility — [Adriana]’s volatility, the potential for perhaps angry outbursts, the potential for perhaps intimidating or hurting Juliana in some way. When you apply the norms, that is a cultural feature.... [P]erhaps Hispanic women are normally volatile....
Dr. Fredericks then testified: “I’m no expert on [Adriana’s] culture.” This testimony is consistent with well-documented instances of angry, violent outbursts by Adriana in front of Juliana within the home.
Adriana’s actions have allegedly been so extreme at times that David filed domestic abuse charges against her in November 1992. In his petition, filed under Iowa Code chapter 236, David alleged he was in “imminent danger of physical harm if a protective order to vacate homestead is not issued in this case.” The record does not show this charge *281was tried. Although Adriana vigorously denied allegations of domestic abuse, she admits she has a tendency to over-react and claims this is due to cultural differences and divergent family values.
According to Adriana, “[b]ehavior considered abusive in this country ... is socially acceptable in Hispanic culture as a means to ah’ grievances and channel pent-up anger.” In addition, Adriana admits she must engage in “various meditation techniques to curb [her] in-born propensity to be carried away with her emotions.” Dr. Fredericks also concluded Adriana had tendencies toward suspiciousness, hostility, irritability, feeling mistreated and angry and resentful.
Adriana’s volatility should not be rewarded.
As before stated, there is no evidence in the record to suggest David exhibits any of the negative character traits exhibited by Adriana.
The personality profile tests administered by Dr. Fredericks to Adriana revealed: “Her responses are consistent with a tendency toward suspiciousness, toward feeling mistreated and angry and resentful, and a tendency to be hostile, irritable, and easily hurt.”
I do not feel it would be in Juliana’s best interest for Adriana’s characteristics to be perpetuated in Juliana by making Adriana the primary caretaker.
VII. Juliana’s characteristics. At the time of trial, testimony revealed Juliana’s social and emotional development was above age expectancy. She was also characterized by the trial court, however, as being a “demanding and controlling little girl.” These latter character traits are generally more consistent with Adriana’s disposition than David’s. I feel primary physical custody with Adriana would only exacerbate Juliana’s demanding and controlling character traits and would not be in Juliana’s best interest.
VIII. Conclusion. In summary, I agree with the court of appeals that stated:
Juliana’s interest will be better served in David’s primary care. David has the maturity and understanding to foster her relationship with Adriana despite Adriana’s professed resistance to being a noncustodial parent. In David’s custody, Juliana will be assured exposure to the cultural values of both her father and mother.
I would affirm the court of appeals decision as to the physical care, property division, and all other issues. The district court’s judgment would be reversed accordingly.
All justices concur except McGIVERIN, C.J., joined by LARSON, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ.