Court Opinion

ID: 9429775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:27:50.628821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:21.519309
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
I agree with Justice White that application to this case of the mode of analysis embodied in the decisions of the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), compels the conclusion that the exclusionary rule should apply in civil deportation proceedings. Ante, at 1052-1054. However, I continue to believe that that mode of analysis fails to reflect the constitutionally mandated character of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, ante, at 931-938 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Janis, supra, at 460 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). In my view, a sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceedings evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is that there is no other way to achieve “the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people — all potential victims of unlawful government conduct — that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining *1061popular trust in government.” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 357 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).