Court Opinion

ID: 9395890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 19:01:00.70626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:12.603134
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to revision before publication.

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
              FOR THE    ARMED FORCES
                    _______________

                  UNITED STATES
                      Appellee

                            v.

           Cameron M. MAYS, Private
           United States Army, Appellant

                    No. 23-0001
              Crim. App. No. 20200623

  Argued April 18, 2023—Decided May 18, 2023

Military Judges: Theresa L. Raymond (arraignment)
           and William C. Ramsey (trial)

For Appellant: Captain Andrew R. Britt (argued);
Major Bryan A. Osterhage and Jonathan F. Potter,
Esq. (on brief).

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew T. Grady
(argued); Colonel Christopher B. Burgess, Lieuten-
ant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, and Major Kalin
P. Schlueter (on brief).

Judge MAGGS delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Judge OHLSON, Judge SPARKS,
Judge HARDY, and Judge JOHNSON joined.
               _______________
             United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                     Opinion of the Court

       Judge MAGGS delivered the opinion of the Court.
    A military judge sitting as a general court-martial
found Appellant guilty of numerous offenses. 1 Before this
Court, Appellant contests the legal sufficiency of the evi-
dence for finding him guilty, contrary to his pleas, of two
specifications of attempted indecent viewing in violation of
Article 80, UCMJ. As defined in Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 920c(a)(1) (2018), the offense of indecent view-
ing consists of “knowingly and wrongfully view[ing] the pri-
vate area of another person, without that other person’s
consent and under circumstances in which that other per-
son has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Appellant
contends that he cannot be guilty of attempted indecent
viewing because there was no evidence that he attempted
to view the private areas of the named victims. He asserts
that even drawing every reasonable inference in the Gov-
ernment’s favor, the evidence at most shows that he at-
tempted to view visual images of their private areas as pro-
duced by his cell phone camera and that merely viewing
visual images does not violate Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ.
The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals
(ACCA) rejected this argument and concluded that the ev-
idence was legally sufficient. United States v. Mays, No.

   1  Consistent with his pleas, the military judge found Appel-
lant guilty of one specification of false official statement, one
specification of wrongful use of a controlled substance, one spec-
ification of wrongful possession of a controlled substance, one
specification of wrongful introduction of a controlled substance,
one specification of larceny, and one specification of assault upon
a person in the execution of law enforcement duties, in violation
of Articles 107, 112a, 121, 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 907, 912a, 921, 928 (2018). The military
judge also found Appellant guilty, contrary to his pleas, of two
specifications of attempted indecent viewing, one specification of
insubordinate conduct toward a noncommissioned officer, one
specification of sexual assault, one specification of assault upon
a commissioned officer, and one specification of assault upon a
noncommissioned officer, in violation of Articles 80, 91, and 120,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 891, 920 (2018), and Article 128,
UCMJ.

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            United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                    Opinion of the Court

ARMY 20200623, 2022 CCA LEXIS 525, at *8, 2022 WL
4232596, at *3 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2022) (summary
disposition) (unpublished). For the reasons explained be-
low, we affirm the decision of the ACCA.
                       I. Background
    Specification 1 of Charge III alleged a violation of Arti-
cle 80, UCMJ, in that Appellant “did, at or near Kandahar,
Afghanistan, on or about 8 November 2018, attempt to
wrongfully and knowingly view the private area of Special-
ist (E-4) [J.S.], without his consent, and under circum-
stances in which Specialist (E-4) [J.S.] had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.” Providing relevant evidence for this
specification, a witness testified at trial that, on November
8, 2018, he observed Appellant standing next to a shower
stall in which Specialist J.S. was showering. The witness
further testified that he saw Appellant holding a cell phone
over the shower stall wall. Appellant fled the bathroom
area when the witness confronted him.
    Specification 2 of Charge III alleged a violation of Arti-
cle 80, UCMJ, in that Appellant “did, at or near Kandahar,
Afghanistan, on or about 9 November 2018, attempt to
wrongfully and knowingly view the private area of Special-
ist (E-4) [S.N.J.], without his consent, and under circum-
stances in which Specialist (E-4) [S.N.J.] had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.” Providing evidence relevant to this
specification, Specialist S.N.J. testified that on November
9, 2018, he saw a cell phone being held over the shower
stall in which he was showering. Another witness identi-
fied Appellant as standing outside of the shower stall.
   No witness could discern exactly what was displayed on
the cell phone screen while Appellant was holding it over
the shower stalls or what Appellant could see on the screen.
One described the display as merely a “gray and bluish
blur.” Although a forensic examination of the phone did not
uncover any images or videos taken in the showers, it re-
vealed that the phone had suffered water damage.
   The military judge found Appellant guilty of attempted
indecent viewing. On appeal, Appellant argued that the

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           United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                   Opinion of the Court

evidence was legally insufficient because attempting to
view a visual image of a person’s private area on a cell
phone screen is different from attempting to view the per-
son’s private area. Mays, 2022 CCA LEXIS 525, at *7, 2022
WL 4232596, at *3. The ACCA rejected this argument, rea-
soning: “Appellant’s acts facilitated the viewing of the na-
ked individual in the shower stall through the camera lens
of the cellphone, regardless of whether he was also captur-
ing a photograph or recording, or merely using the camera
and screen as a technologically advanced mirror.” Id. at *8,
2022 WL 4232596, at *3.
    We granted review of the following issue: “Whether the
offense of indecent viewing under Article 120c, UCMJ, in-
cludes viewing a visual image of the private area of another
person.”
                 II. Standards of Review
    Questions about the meaning of statutes, including the
meaning of the UCMJ’s punitive articles, are questions of
law that this Court reviews de novo. United States v. Ben-
nitt, 72 M.J. 266, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2013). This Court also re-
views de novo the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port a finding that an appellant is guilty of an offense.
United States v. Wilson, 76 M.J. 4, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017). The
evidence is legally sufficient for finding an accused guilty
of an offense if “any rational factfinder . . . could have
found all essential elements of the offense beyond a reason-
able doubt.” United States v. Nicola, 78 M.J. 223, 226
(C.A.A.F. 2019) (citing United States v. Webb, 38 M.J. 62,
69 (C.M.A. 1993)). In determining whether the evidence
was legally sufficient, this Court must “draw every reason-
able inference from the evidence of record in favor of the
prosecution.” United States v. Blocker, 32 M.J. 281, 284
(C.M.A. 1991).
                      III. Discussion
    Article 80(a), UCMJ, defines an “attempt to commit” an
offense as “[a]n act, done with specific intent to commit
[that] offense . . . amounting to more than mere preparation
and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission.”

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           United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                   Opinion of the Court

Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ, establishes the offense of “inde-
cent viewing,” by stating:
      Any person subject to this chapter who, without
      legal justification or lawful authorization—
          (1) knowingly and wrongfully views the pri-
      vate area of another person, without that other
      person’s consent and under circumstances in
      which that other person has a reasonable expecta-
      tion of privacy;
          ....
      is guilty of an offense under this section and shall
      be punished as a court-martial shall direct.
Article 120c(d)(2), UCMJ, defines “private area” as the “na-
ked or underwear-clad genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female
areola or nipple.”
    The Government argues that the evidence in this case
was legally sufficient to establish every element of the two
specifications of attempted indecent viewing. The Govern-
ment asserts that Appellant did an “act with the specific
intent to commit the offense of indecent viewing” when “he
attempted to view in real time through the camera function
on his cell phone the private area of soldiers while they
showered.” The Government further argues that this act
“amounted to more than mere preparation” and “tended to
bring about the commission of the offense of indecent view-
ing” because “Appellant likely would have viewed the pri-
vate area of the victims” if he had not been observed or in-
terrupted. Finally, the Government asserts that the
victims did not consent to the viewing and the victims had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their shower stalls.
    We agree with the Government’s analysis. Drawing
“every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in
favor of the prosecution,” Blocker, 32 M.J. at 284, we agree
that a “rational factfinder . . . could have found all essen-
tial elements of the offense[s at issue] beyond a reasonable
doubt,” Nicola, 78 M.J. at 226, for the reasons that the Gov-
ernment has stated.

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            United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                    Opinion of the Court

   Appellant disagrees. He asserts that viewing a private
area through the medium of a cell phone is not enough to
violate Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ. He reasons that a person
is not viewing the object itself when a person points the
camera lens of a cell phone at an object and then views the
camera screen. Instead, the person is viewing a visual im-
age of the object that the cell phone has reproduced onto its
screen. Appellant contends that viewing a visual image of
the private area of a person is not an offense under Article
120c(a)(1), UCMJ.
    In support of this position, Appellant makes four re-
lated arguments. First, Appellant asserts that the plain
language of Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ, requires the accused
to view the victim’s “private area,” not merely a visual im-
age of the victim’s private area. Citing a typical dictionary
definition, he explains that the act of viewing is the act of
“seeing or looking at something.” (Emphasis added.) He
contends that “Congress inserted private area as the object
of that viewing, but specifically did not include a visual im-
age of the private area or incorporate visual image into the
definition of private area.” (Emphasis omitted.)
    We cannot agree with Appellant’s assertion that, in or-
dinary English usage, an attempted viewing of an object
can be accomplished only by attempting to view the object
itself and not by attempting to view a contemporaneously
produced visual image of the object, as Appellant did in this
case. Indeed, we need not look beyond the field of military
justice to find clear counterexamples that contradict Appel-
lant’s position. For instance, Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 804(d)(2) provides: “The accused’s absence [when
a child accuser testifies] will be conditional upon his being
able to view the witness’ testimony from a remote location.”
In this sentence, the term “view the witness’ testimony”
must include viewing a contemporaneously produced video
display of the testimony because directly viewing the wit-
ness’s testimony would be impossible from a remote loca-
tion. Other rules similarly use the term “view” in ways that
must include viewing contemporaneously produced visual

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            United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                    Opinion of the Court

images. 2 This Court also has used the term “view” in the
same way in its opinions. For instance, in one opinion, the
Court stated: “But for his stepdaughter’s refusal to lift her
shirt, [the accused] would have ‘view[ed]’ his stepdaugh-
ter’s breasts using the webcam.” United States v. King, 71
M.J. 50, 52 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (second alteration in original).
In this sentence, the referenced viewing would be the view-
ing of a contemporaneously produced visual image. Other
cases provide similar illustrations. 3 Given these counterex-
amples, we cannot accept Appellant’s argument that the
term “view,” in ordinary usage, has the limited meaning
that he asserts.
    Appellant’s second argument is that the “broader
statutory context of Article 120c, UCMJ,” supports the
conclusion that viewing a visual image of an object cannot
be the basis of an Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ, violation. He
observes that Article 120c(a)(2), UCMJ, makes it an offense
to “photograph[], videotape[], film[], or record[]” the private
area of another person. He asserts that “an interpretation
of private area that implicitly included a visual image of a
private area” would render Article 120c(a)(2), UCMJ,
superfluous.

   2   See, e.g., R.C.M. 405(j)(6) (“The convening authority
may . . . permit contemporaneous closed-circuit video . . . trans-
mission to permit viewing . . . by an accused removed [from the
proceedings for disruptive conduct] or by spectators when the fa-
cilities are inadequate to accommodate a reasonable number of
spectators.”); R.C.M. 806(c) (“[T]he military judge may . . . per-
mit contemporaneous closed-circuit video . . . transmission to
permit viewing . . . by an accused removed under R.C.M. 804 or
by spectators when courtroom facilities are inadequate to accom-
modate a reasonable number of spectators.”); R.C.M. 914A(a)(3)
(“Sufficient monitors shall be placed in the courtroom to allow
viewing and hearing of the testimony by the military judge, the
accused, the members, the court reporter, and the public.”).
   3 See, e.g., United States v. Bench, 82 M.J. 388, 394 (C.A.A.F.
2022) (“Appellant cites no precedent from any court holding that
the Sixth Amendment confrontation right requires a child testi-
fying remotely to be aware that the defendant is viewing their
testimony.”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 580 (2023).

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           United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                   Opinion of the Court

   We disagree. It is true that some conduct might violate
both Article 120c(a)(1) and 120c(a)(2), UCMJ, such as sim-
ultaneously viewing and recording the private area of an-
other person. Even so, neither provision is redundant be-
cause some conduct violates either Article 120c(a)(1) or
120c(a)(2), but not both. For example, viewing but not re-
cording a private area violates Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ,
but not Article 120c(a)(2), UCMJ, while recording a private
area without viewing either the private area or a contem-
poraneously produced visual image of the private area vio-
lates Articles 120c(a)(2), UCMJ, but not Article 120c(a)(1),
UCMJ.
    Third, Appellant argues that the Government’s position
is inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme of the
UCMJ. He notes that in Article 117a(b)(3), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 917a(b)(3) (2018), Congress specifically defined
the term “intimate visual image” as “ ‘a visual image that
depicts a private area of a person.’ ” In Appellant’s view,
“Congress’s inclusion of a separate definition of intimate
visual image in Article 117a, UCMJ, demonstrates that
Congress identifies a cognizable difference between the pri-
vate area and a visual image of the private area.” As fur-
ther evidence that Congress has identified this difference,
Appellant points to Article 120b(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 920b(c) which expressly prohibits exposing one’s private
area to a child “by any means, including via communication
technology.” Article 120b(c), (h)(5)(B), UCMJ.
    We acknowledge that a distinction can be drawn be-
tween the private area of a person and a visual image of
the private area of person. But that is not the question in
this case. The question in this case is whether the meaning
of the term “viewing” in Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ, is broad
enough to cover both viewing the private area and viewing
a contemporaneously produced visual image of the private
area of a person. For the reasons explained above, we have
concluded that it is.
    Finally, Appellant argues that he should prevail under
the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity generally holds that
“criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, and any

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           United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                   Opinion of the Court

ambiguity resolved in favor of the accused.” United States
v. Thomas, 65 M.J. 132, 135 n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2007). Appellant
contends that because it is not clear that Congress in-
tended to include the viewing of a visual image, this Court
should resolve the issue in his favor.
   We find the rule of lenity inapplicable in this case. The
Supreme Court has explained that the rule of lenity applies
only in cases of significant ambiguity, stating:
      The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity,
      however, is not sufficient to warrant application
      of that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to
      some degree. Cf. Smith, [508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993)]
      (“The mere possibility of articulating a narrower
      construction . . . does not by itself make the rule of
      lenity applicable”). “ ‘The rule of lenity applies
      only if, “after seizing everything from which aid
      can be derived,” . . . we can make “no more than a
      guess as to what Congress intended.” ’ ” United
      States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (quoting
      Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995), in turn
      quoting Smith, supra, at 239, and Ladner v.
      United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)). To
      invoke the rule, we must conclude that there is a
      “ ‘ “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” ’ in the
      statute.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
      619, n. 17 (1994) (quoting Chapman v. United
      States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)).
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39
(1998) (second and third alterations in original). For the
reasons explained above, we see no substantial ambiguity
about whether an accused can violate Article 120c(a)(1),
UCMJ, by viewing a contemporaneously produced visual
image of the private area of a person.
   One last point requires attention. Although we hold
that the evidence was legally sufficient for the military
judge to find Appellant guilty of the two specifications of
attempted indecent viewing in this case, we do not hold or
imply that any viewing of images of another person’s pri-
vate parts violates Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ. We leave the
question of whether Article 120c(a)(1), UCMJ, prohibits

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           United States v. Mays, No. 23-0001/AR
                   Opinion of the Court

viewing a visual image that is not contemporaneously pro-
duced for another case.
                     IV. Conclusion
   The decision of the United States Army Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals is affirmed.

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