Court Opinion

ID: 9745365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:51:22.585013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:59.303743
License: Public Domain

MALLANO, J.,* Concurring.
While I concur in the result, I do not agree with part II of Justice Nott’s opinion holding that appellant’s proposed paid advertisement containing the Ten Commandments contravenes the establishment clause of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution. The opinion relies on Stone v. Graham (1980) 449 U.S. 39 [101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199] (Stone), in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public classroom in the state.
Stone applied the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745] (Lemon) for determining whether a challenged state statute is permissible under the establishment clause of the United States Constitution: “ ‘First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” ’ ” (Stone v. Graham, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 40 [101 S.Ct. at p. 193], citing Lemon). I believe that all three parts of the Lemon test have been met by appellant.
Stone, in discussing the first principle of Lemon— that the statute have a secular purpose—held that it did not, stating that “The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature.” (Stone v. Graham, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 41 [101 S.Ct’at p. 194].) It went on to explain: “This is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.” (Id. at p. 42 [101 S.Ct. at p. 194].) Here, unlike the situation in Stone, the Ten Commandments were to appear in a paid advertisement along with 39 others, including ones purchased by ESP Psychics, a *284palm reader, Freemasons and Coca-Cola. Allowing such advertisements was clearly for a secular purpose, to obtain advertising revenue, and, as well, avoided any entanglement with religion. Widmar v. Vincent (1981) 454 U.S. 263 [102 S.Ct. 269; 70 L.Ed.2d 440] (Widmar) is supportive as to both the first principle of Lemon, and the third—the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. There the Supreme Court was contending with a policy of a state university, which made its facilities generally available for the activities of registered student groups, prohibiting use of the facilities to a registered student group desiring to use them for religious worship and religious discussion. In concluding that the first and third parts of the Lemon test would be satisfied if the policy of the university allowed, rather than prohibited, such a use, the Supreme Court stated: “[A]n open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with religion.” (Widmar, supra, at pp. 271-272 [102 S.Ct. at p. 275], fn. omitted.)
Regarding the second part of the Lemon test—that the statute’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion— Justice Nott’s opinion states that “the posting of the Ten Commandments on the school baseball field would give the impression that the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 277.) I disagree. In holding that the second principle of the Lemon test was met, the Supreme Court in Widmar stated that “. . .an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices.” (Widmar, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 274 [102 S.Ct. at p. 276].) Here, appellant’s sign was to be one among 40, some of which, as has been noted, advertised ESP Psychics, a palm reader, Freemasonry and Coca-Cola. No reasonable person attending a high school baseball game observing appellant’s proposed advertisement among the others would view its display as the school’s endorsement of the Ten Commandments, any more than he or she would conclude that the school was giving its imprimatur to ESP Psychics, a palm reader, Freemasonry or Coca-Cola. Given the setting, it would be- viewed simply as a paid advertisement by appellant’s family.1 Accordingly, I conclude that the establishment clause would not be contravened here.
*285With respect to part III of Justice Nott’s opinion regarding appellant’s free exercise and free speech rights, whether the baseball field here is a nonpublic form or a limited public forum, I believe respondents were entitled to refuse religious advertisements. In Rosenberger, supra, 515 U.S. at page 829 [115 S.Ct. at page 2517], the Supreme Court stated, apropos of a limited public forum, “The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,’ [citations].” I believe it was reasonable for respondents to decline religious advertisements in general at a high school baseball field. It also follows that respondents were entitled to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which they found themselves by discontinuing all advertising.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 1, 1999. Kennard, J., and Brown, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819 [115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700] (Rosenberger) involving the University of Virginia’s withholding authorization for payments on behalf of petitioners for the sole reason that their student paper “ ‘primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.’ ” (Id. at pp. 822-823 [115 S.Ct. at p. 2513].) In holding that the making of such payments would not contravene the establishment clause, the Supreme Court states: “[T]here is no real likelihood that the [private] speech in question is being either endorsed or coerced by the State . . . .” (Id. at pp. 841-842 [115 S.Ct. at p. 2523].)