Court Opinion

ID: 9897370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:44.124853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:10.688707
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Jun 14 2023, 9:24 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Eric S. Pavlack                                            James L. Hough
Colin E. Flora                                             Alyssa Stamatakos
Pavlack Law, LLC                                           Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Hammond, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR
                                                           COMMISSIONER, INDIANA
                                                           DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AS
                                                           ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INDIANA
                                                           PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND
                                                           A. Richard M. Blaiklock
                                                           Wade D. Fulford
                                                           Michael D. Heavilon
                                                           Lewis Wagner, LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
                                                           INDIANA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION
                                                           Angela M. Smith
                                                           Matthew M. Schappa
                                                           John D. French
                                                           Hall Render Killian Heath &
                                                           Lyman
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                             Page 1 of 24
Linda Gierek and Stephen                                   June 14, 2023
Gierek, on behalf of themselves                            Court of Appeals Case No.
and all others similarly situated,                         22A-CT-1225
Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                     Interlocutory Appeal from the
                                                           Elkhart Superior Court
and                                                        The Honorable Stephen R.
                                                           Bowers, Judge
K.W., G.S., L.P., L.W., S.B.,
S.J., C.D., S.S., E.M., P.H.,                              Trial Court Cause Nos.
                                                           20D02-1911-CT-243 consolidated
C.M., A.S., and M.S.,                                      with 20D05-2002-CT-25
Intervenors-Plaintiffs,

        v.

Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2,
and Anonymous 3,
Appellees-Defendants,

and

Amy L. Beard, Commissioner
of the Indiana Department of
Insurance as Administrator of
the Indiana Patient’s
Compensation Fund,
Intervenor-Defendant
_____________________________

Amy L. Beard, Commissioner
of the Indiana Department of
Insurance as Administrator of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                      Page 2 of 24
the Indiana Patient’s
Compensation Fund,
Counter/Cross-Plaintiff,

        v.

Linda Gierek and Stephen
Gierek, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Appellants-Counterdefendants,

and

K.W., G.S., L.P., L.W., S.B.,
S.J., C.D., S.S., E.M., P.H.,
C.M., A.S., and M.S.,
Counterdefendants,

Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2,
and Anonymous 3,
Appellees-Cross-claim Defendants

_____________________________

Cheyanne Bennett, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

        v.

Anonymous Healthcare
Provider 1, Anonymous
Healthcare Provider 2,
Anonymous Healthcare
Provider 3, Anonymous
Healthcare Provider 4, and John
Doe 1,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023   Page 3 of 24
Defendants,

and

Amy L. Beard, Commissioner
of the Indiana Department of
Insurance as Administrator of
the Indiana Patient’s
Compensation Fund,
Intervenor-Defendant

_____________________________

Amy L. Beard, Commissioner
of the Indiana Department of
Insurance as Administrator of
the Indiana Patient’s
Compensation Fund,
Counter/Cross-Plaintiff,

        v.

Cheyanne Bennett, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Counterdefendants,

and

Anonymous Healthcare
Provider 1, Anonymous
Healthcare Provider 2,
Anonymous Healthcare
Provider 3, Anonymous
Healthcare Provider 4, and John
Doe 1,
Cross-Defendants

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023   Page 4 of 24
                                       Opinion by Judge Crone
                                  Judges Robb and Kenworthy concur.

      Crone, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Linda Gierek and over a thousand other patients who underwent surgical

      procedures at a hospital operated by Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, and

      Anonymous 3 (the Hospital) were informed by the Hospital that one of its

      technicians had failed to complete a step in the procedure for sterilizing certain

      surgical instruments and that, as a result, the patients may have been exposed to

      infectious diseases. Linda and her husband Stephen filed a class-action

      complaint with the trial court and a proposed class-action complaint with the

      commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance (DOI) asserting claims

      against the Hospital for negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence,

      and, in the alternative, medical malpractice. The Giereks also filed motions

      requesting the certification of two classes, one for the Hospital’s patients and

      one for the patients’ spouses. Additional plaintiffs were permitted to intervene

      in the Giereks’ action, which was consolidated with a later-filed class action

      brought by Cheyanne Bennett, who filed her own motion for class certification.

      Where appropriate, we refer to the Giereks and Bennett collectively as

      Plaintiffs.

[2]   The Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF) intervened and filed a motion

      for partial summary judgment asserting that the Indiana Medical Malpractice

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023         Page 5 of 24
      Act (MMA) does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs filed statements in

      support of the PCF’s motion. The Hospital filed a cross-motion for partial

      summary judgment asserting that the MMA does apply to Plaintiffs’ claims.

      The trial court entered an order denying the PCF’s motion for partial summary

      judgment and granting the Hospital’s cross-motion for partial summary

      judgment, ruling that the MMA applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. The court also

      denied Plaintiffs’ motions for class certification on the basis that it did not have

      subject matter jurisdiction to grant them as a preliminary determination under

      the MMA.

[3]   In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s rulings are

      erroneous. We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the MMA

      applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. We also hold that the trial court erred in

      concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant Plaintiffs’

      motions to certify a class as a preliminary determination under the MMA.

      Consequently, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further

      proceedings.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023           Page 6 of 24
      Facts and Procedural History 1
[4]   The relevant facts are undisputed. Linda had surgery at the Hospital in June

      2019. In November 2019, the Hospital sent letters to 1,181 of its surgical

      patients, including Linda, that read in pertinent part as follows:

              We are writing to you today because you had a surgical
              procedure at [the Hospital] between April and September 2019.
              During this time, one of our seven surgical instrument
              sterilization technicians did not complete one step in a multistep
              sterilization process with certain surgical instruments. The
              surgical instruments in question were still treated with our usual
              chemical disinfection and machine sterilization processes which
              include a wide margin of safety; however, such instruments may
              or may not have been completely sterile. While we believe the
              risk is extremely low, out of the utmost caution, we want to
              notify you that it is possible that this action may have exposed
              you to infections such as the hepatitis C virus, hepatitis B virus
              and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). To be very
              conservative, we want to offer patients free lab testing services to
              verify the absence or presence of any of these viruses.

      Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 131. The surgical instruments at issue contained

      straw-like tubes called lumens, which the technician failed to clean out with a

      brush as required by step six of the nine-step sterilization process.

      1
        We held oral argument in the magnificent nineteenth-century St. Joseph Circuit Court courtroom on May
      11, 2023. We thank the Honorable John E. Broden and his staff for their assistance and hospitality, and we
      thank counsel for their capable advocacy. We also extend our appreciation to the St. Joseph County Bar
      Association for its involvement with the post-argument continuing legal education program.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                               Page 7 of 24
[5]   Later that month, Linda filed both a class-action complaint against the Hospital

      in the trial court under cause number 20D02-1911-CT-243 (Cause 243) and a

      proposed class-action complaint against the Hospital with the DOI

      commissioner. She then filed with the trial court a motion requesting

      certification of a proposed class composed of patients to whom the Hospital had

      sent a similar letter or to whom the Hospital had not sent such a letter but who

      underwent surgery or other procedures that involved the use of surgical

      instruments between April and September 2019 (Proposed Class 1).

[6]   In February 2020, Linda filed a four-count amended class-action complaint,

      which added Stephen as both a plaintiff and a representative of a second

      proposed class of persons who are or were married to members of Proposed

      Class 1 after the latter underwent surgery (Proposed Class 2). Count 1, asserted

      on behalf of Proposed Class 1, is captioned as a claim of negligent infliction of

      emotional distress. Count 1 alleges that the Hospital had “a professional and

      legal duty to perform [surgical] procedures in a safe, sterile, reasonable, and

      professional manner” and that the Hospital breached that duty by “using

      surgical instruments that may not have been properly sterilized[,]” which

      “constituted direct physical impacts” to the plaintiffs. Id. at 158-59. As “a direct

      and proximate result” of those breaches, the plaintiffs “were potentially exposed

      to innumerable infectious diseases, including potential incurable and fatal

      diseases[,]” and they “each suffered extreme and serious emotional distress and

      trauma as the result of” the Hospital’s “negligent conduct[.]” Id. at 159.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023          Page 8 of 24
[7]    Count 2, asserted on behalf of Proposed Class 1, is captioned as a claim of

       negligence based on the Hospital’s use of “surgical instruments that may not

       have been properly sterilized.” Id. at 160.

[8]    Count 3, which purports to be asserted only on behalf of Proposed Class 1, is

       captioned as a medical malpractice claim, pleaded in the alternative to the

       negligence claims. Count 3 alleges that the Hospital’s use of “surgical

       instruments that were not properly sterilized … failed to meet the applicable

       standard of medical care”; that, “[a]s a direct and proximate result of” the

       malpractice, members of Proposed Class 1 “suffered and will continue to suffer

       extreme emotional distress and will incur medical testing and other expenses”;

       and that, as spouses of those members, the members of Proposed Class 2 were

       “potentially exposed to the same innumerable infectious diseases” and

       “suffered extreme and serious emotional distress and trauma, and have/will

       incur medical testing and other expenses as the result of” the Hospital’s

       negligent conduct. Id. at 161.

[9]    Finally, Count 4, asserted on behalf of Proposed Class 2, is captioned as a

       negligence claim and alleges that the Hospital’s aforementioned breaches of its

       “professional and legal duty” caused the aforementioned injuries to the

       members of Proposed Class 2. Id. at 162.

[10]   In March 2020, additional individual plaintiffs were permitted to intervene in

       the Giereks’ action. Later that month, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 42(D), the

       Giereks and the Hospital filed a joint motion to consolidate the Giereks’ action

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023         Page 9 of 24
       with a later-filed class action brought by Bennett under cause number 20D05-

       2002-CT-25. The trial court consolidated the actions under Cause 243, and the

       PCF was permitted to intervene.2 In April 2020, the Giereks filed a

       supplemental motion requesting certification of Proposed Class 2. Bennett later

       filed her own motion for class certification.

[11]   In May 2020, the PCF filed a counterclaim and a cross-claim requesting a

       judgment declaring that the Giereks’ claims “arise out of ordinary negligence

       under common law, and therefore, the MMA does not apply to said claims.”

       Appellants’ App. Vol. 3 at 117. The Hospital and the PCF filed a joint motion

       to stay class certification proceedings pending a ruling on the MMA issue,

       which the trial court granted in August 2020.

[12]   In March 2021, the PCF filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting

       that the MMA does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs filed statements in

       support of the PCF’s motion. Later that month, the Hospital filed a cross-

       motion for partial summary judgment asserting that the MMA does apply to

       Plaintiffs’ claims. In April 2022, after a hearing, the trial court entered an order

       denying the PCF’s motion and granting the Hospital’s cross-motion, concluding

       that the MMA applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. The court also denied Plaintiffs’

       motions for class certification on the basis that it did not have subject matter

       2
         The PCF was created for the purpose of paying, up to statutory limits, amounts in excess of the liability
       limits established for health care providers under the MMA. Ind. Code §§ 34-18-6-1, 34-18-14-3, 34-18-15-3.
       The PCF “is financed by the surcharges collected from providers throughout the state” and is administered
       by the DOI commissioner. Atterholt v. Herbst, 902 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 2009); Ind. Code § 34-18-6-1.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                              Page 10 of 24
       jurisdiction to grant them as a preliminary determination under the MMA. The

       Giereks sought and received permission to bring this discretionary interlocutory

       appeal of the trial court’s order pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14 and filed

       a notice of appeal. Bennett filed a notice of joinder in the Giereks’ appellate

       brief. 3 The intervenor plaintiffs in the Giereks’ action filed a notice of non-

       participation in this appeal. The PCF does not appeal the trial court’s ruling on

       the MMA issue and asks us to affirm the court’s ruling on the class-certification

       issue.

       Discussion and Decision

       Section 1 – The MMA applies to Plaintiffs’ claims.
[13]   We first consider whether the trial court erred in concluding that the MMA

       applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. We stand in the trial court’s shoes and review its

       ruling de novo. Doe v. Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 194 N.E.3d 1197, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2022), trans. denied (2023). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated

       evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

       3
         See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(G) (“In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases
       consolidated for appeal, each party may file a separate brief, more than one party may join in any single brief,
       or a party may adopt by reference any part of any brief of any party.”). Bennett did not file her own motions
       for bringing a discretionary interlocutory appeal or a notice of appeal, nor did she join in the Giereks’ notice
       of appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 9(C) (“If two (2) or more persons are entitled to appeal from a single
       judgment or order, they may proceed jointly by filing a joint Notice of Appeal. The joined parties may,
       thereafter, proceed on appeal as a single appellant.”). Because the Hospital does not argue that the trial
       court’s order should be summarily affirmed as to Bennett on this basis, we do not address this matter further.
       The Giereks have included Bennett’s complaint and other filings in their appellants’ appendix, and the
       Hospital states that Bennett, as did the Giereks, “alleged medical negligence arising from the failure to
       properly sterilize instruments and the use of those instruments in her surgery.” Appellees’ Br. at 13. To the
       extent that Bennett might have alleged different/additional facts and/or legal theories below, it is not our
       task to raise them on Bennett’s behalf in this appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                                 Page 11 of 24
       and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.

       (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). “Further, ‘[w]hether a case is one of medical

       malpractice as defined by the MMA is a question [of law] for the court,’ making

       the issue particularly suited for determination on summary judgment.” Id. (first

       alteration in Doe) (quoting Rossner v. Take Care Health Sys., LLC, 172 N.E.3d

       1248, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied).

[14]   “Because we review a summary judgment ruling de novo, a trial court’s

       findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale for the court’s judgment

       and facilitate appellate review but are not binding on this court.” S&C Fin. Grp.,

       LLC v. Khan, 172 N.E.3d 280, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

       “Additionally, we are not constrained by the claims and arguments presented to

       the trial court, and we may affirm a summary judgment ruling on any theory

       supported by the designated evidence.” Id. Cross-motions for summary

       judgment do not alter our standard of review, as we consider each motion

       separately to determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

       of law. Flannagan v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, 184 N.E.3d 691, 696 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2022). “[T]he party that lost in the trial court has the burden of persuading

       us that the trial court erred.” Solomon v. Lindsey, 163 N.E.3d 302, 307 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020).

[15]   “In interpreting statutes, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to

       the intent of the legislature. Where the intent is clearly expressed by the

       language of the legislation, we may not construe the statute to mean something

       other than what it plainly states on its face.” Bova v. Roig, 604 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023         Page 12 of 24
       Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). “When the General Assembly has defined a

       statutory term, we are bound by its definition.” WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs.,

       178 N.E.3d 1187, 1191 (Ind. 2022). We give “undefined ‘words their plain

       meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole.’” Id. (quoting

       ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)).

       “[I]t is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to

       recognize what it does say. A court may not read into a statute that which is not

       the expressed intent of the legislature.” Rush v. Elkhart Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 698

       N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[16]   “The MMA, which is applicable to acts of malpractice occurring after June 30,

       1975, set up a system under which health care providers meeting qualifications

       set forth in the act … would enjoy certain benefits, including a limitation on

       liability.” In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ind. 2007) (citation omitted). The

       MMA applies to a patient who has a claim “for bodily injury or death on

       account of malpractice[.]” Ind. Code § 34-18-8-1. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs

       were “patients” of the Hospital and that the Hospital is a “health care provider”

       for purposes of the MMA. See Ind. Code §§ 34-18-2-22 (defining “patient” as

       “an individual who receives or should have received health care from a health

       care provider, under a contract, express or implied, and includes a person

       having a claim of any kind, whether derivative or otherwise, as a result of

       alleged malpractice on the part of a health care provider”), 34-18-2-14(1)

       (defining “health care provider” in pertinent part as “a limited liability company

       [or a] corporation … licensed or legally authorized by this state to provide

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023          Page 13 of 24
       health care or professional services as a … hospital”). 4 The MMA does not

       define “bodily injury,” but whether Plaintiffs suffered bodily injury is not at

       issue here. 5

[17]   “Malpractice” is “a tort or breach of contract based on health care or

       professional services that were provided, or that should have been provided, by

       a health care provider, to a patient.” Ind. Code § 34-18-2-18 (emphasis added).

       A “tort” is “a legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or

       omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.” Ind. Code § 34-18-

       2-28. “Health care” is “an act or treatment performed or furnished, or that

       should have been performed or furnished, by a health care provider for, to, or

       on behalf of a patient during the patient’s medical care, treatment, or

       confinement.” Ind. Code § 34-18-2-13. The MMA does not define the term

       “professional services.”

[18]   The Plaintiffs’ complaints allege that the Hospital committed tortious conduct.

       The contested issue here is whether that conduct was malpractice, i.e., whether

       that conduct was either “health care” or “professional services” that were

       provided, or should have been provided, by the Hospital to Plaintiffs. Ind. Code

       § 34-18-2-18. To determine whether the MMA is applicable, courts look to the

       4
        According to the Giereks’ amended complaint, both Anonymous 1 and Anonymous 2 are Indiana
       nonprofit corporations, and Anonymous 3 is an Indiana limited liability company. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at
       144.
       5
        As the Giereks’ amended complaint suggests, a “physical impact” is required for the plaintiff to recover
       emotional-distress damages on a negligence-based claim. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d
       368, 379 (Ind. 2022).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                             Page 14 of 24
substance of a claim, not its label. Robertson v. Anonymous Clinic, 63 N.E.3d 349,

359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017). As indicated above, the substance

of Plaintiffs’ claims is that the Hospital owed Plaintiffs a duty to perform

surgical procedures with sterile instruments; that the Hospital breached that

duty by performing surgical procedures with instruments that may not have

been properly sterilized, which may have exposed Plaintiffs to infectious

diseases; and that the Hospital’s breach proximately caused them to suffer

emotional distress. Without question, a surgical procedure is the very essence of

“health care” as defined by the MMA: “an act or treatment performed or

furnished … by a health care provider … to … a patient during the patient’s

medical care [or] treatment[.]” Ind. Code § 34-18-2-13. Because the alleged torts

are based on health care that was provided by the Hospital to Plaintiffs, the

MMA clearly applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary

are unconvincing because they rely on either inapplicable premises-liability

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023        Page 15 of 24
       cases or language that does not appear in the MMA. 6 Accordingly, we affirm

       the trial court’s ruling on this issue.

       Section 2 – A trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to
       grant a motion for class certification as a preliminary
       determination under the MMA.
[19]   We now consider Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in concluding

       that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant a motion for class

       certification as a preliminary determination under the MMA. Generally

       speaking, “[t]he MMA grants authority over medical malpractice actions first to

       a medical review panel, which must render an opinion on a claimant’s

       proposed complaint before the claimant can sue a health-care provider in

       court.” Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 376 (Ind. 2022).

       See Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4 (providing that, with certain exceptions not relevant

       here, “an action against a health care provider may not be commenced in a

       6
        See, e.g., Appellants’ Br. at 27 (asserting that MMA does not apply when tortious conduct is “within the
       understanding of laymen” and that using unsterile surgical instruments is “a textbook example” thereof). The
       MMA contains no “laymen’s understanding” exception, and our supreme court has observed that “not all
       medical malpractice cases are so technical that they require expert testimony[.]” Harris v. Raymond, 715
       N.E.2d 388, 394 (Ind. 1999); see also Syfu v. Quinn, 826 N.E.2d 699, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing several
       medical malpractice cases in which courts “held that expert testimony [was] not required” to establish that
       defendant’s conduct fell below applicable standard of care). In its order, the trial court correctly observed that
              [n]early any step in the provision of health care can be broken down far enough that a lay
              person could perform it. For example, few would argue that if a surgeon amputates the right leg
              when it is the left leg that should have been removed, the patient’s claim would fall under the
              [MMA]. If the surgeon delegates to a staff member the task of marking the correct leg for
              amputation, and the surgeon removes the wrong leg, the patient’s claim would still sound in
              medical malpractice, even though advanced medical training and skill is not required to know
              the difference between right and left.
       Appealed Order at 13.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                                   Page 16 of 24
       court in Indiana before (1) the claimant’s proposed complaint has been

       presented to a medical review panel …; and (2) an opinion is given by the

       panel”).

[20]   Nonetheless, as happened in this case, “a claimant may commence an action in

       court for malpractice at the same time the claimant’s proposed complaint is

       being considered by a medical review panel” if the “complaint filed in court

       [does] not contain any information that would allow a third party to identify the

       defendant[.]” Ind. Code § 34-18-8-7(a). Pursuant to this statute, the “claimant is

       prohibited from pursuing the action [and the] court is prohibited from taking

       any action except setting a date for trial, an action under IC 34-18-8-8 [the filing

       of a Trial Rule 41(E) motion to dismiss by the DOI commissioner], or an action

       under IC 34-18-11 [the filing of a motion for preliminary determination]; until

       IC 34-18-8-4 has been satisfied.” Id.

[21]   As Section 34-18-8-7(a) indicates, the MMA “does give a trial court limited

       authority to assert jurisdiction over threshold issues while a proposed complaint

       is pending before the medical review panel.” Lorenz v. Anonymous Physician #1,

       51 N.E.3d 391, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-1

       provides,

               (a) A court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
               parties to a proposed complaint filed with the commissioner
               under this article may, upon the filing of a copy of the proposed
               complaint and a written motion under this chapter, do one (1) or
               both of the following:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023         Page 17 of 24
                        (1) preliminarily determine an affirmative defense or issue
                        of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under
                        the Indiana Rules of Procedure; or

                        (2) compel discovery in accordance with the Indiana Rules
                        of Procedure.

               (b) The court has no jurisdiction to rule preliminarily upon any
               affirmative defense or issue of law or fact reserved for written
               opinion by the medical review panel under IC 34-18-10-22(b)(1),
               IC 34-18-10-22(b)(2), and IC 34-18-10-22(b)(4).

               (c) The court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion filed under
               this chapter only during that time after a proposed complaint is
               filed with the commissioner under this article but before the
               medical review panel gives the panel’s written opinion under IC
               34-18-10-22.

               (d) The failure of any party to move for a preliminary
               determination or to compel discovery under this chapter before
               the medical review panel gives the panel’s written opinion under
               IC 34-18-10-22 does not constitute the waiver of any affirmative
               defense or issue of law or fact.

[22]   Indiana Code Section 34-18-10-22(b) states,

               (b) After reviewing all evidence and after any examination of the
               panel by counsel representing either party, the panel shall, within
               thirty (30) days, give one (1) or more of the following expert
               opinions, which must be in writing and signed by the panelists:

                        (1) The evidence supports the conclusion that the
                        defendant or defendants failed to comply with the
                        appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023            Page 18 of 24
                         (2) The evidence does not support the conclusion that the
                         defendant or defendants failed to meet the applicable
                         standard of care as charged in the complaint.

                         (3) There is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert
                         opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court
                         or jury.

                         (4) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor of
                         the resultant damages. If so, whether the plaintiff suffered:

                                  (A) any disability and the extent and duration of the
                                  disability; and

                                  (B) any permanent impairment and the percentage
                                  of the impairment.

[23]   The preeminent case outlining the parameters of a trial court’s jurisdiction

       under Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-1 (formerly Section 16-9.5-10-1) is Griffith

       v. Jones, 602 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. 1992). 7 Patient Jon Jones died after a femoral

       angiography performed by Dr. Griffith, and Jon had not been “advised that

       there was a risk of death associated with the procedure.” Id. at 108. The

       personal representative of Jon’s estate, Carol Jones, filed a proposed complaint

       with the DOI requesting the convening of a medical review panel and alleging

       “that Dr. Griffith failed to obtain the informed consent of Jon Jones.” Id. at

       109. Carol then filed a motion for preliminary determination with the trial court

       7
        Indiana Code Section 16-9.5-10-1 is substantially similar in all relevant respects to Indiana Code Section 34-
       18-11-1, which was enacted in 1998.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                                Page 19 of 24
       requesting that it order the medical review panel “to find that there were

       material issues of fact not requiring expert opinion bearing on liability for

       consideration by the court or jury as regards the issue of informed consent[,]”

       construe the term “factor” as used in what is now Indiana Code Section 34-18-

       10-22(b)(4), and “enter partial summary judgment in her favor on the issue of

       informed consent.” Id. The trial court denied the motion for partial summary

       judgment but otherwise granted Carol’s motion for preliminary determination.

[24]   On transfer, our supreme court determined sua sponte that “the trial court

       exceeded its authority to preliminarily determine the law in this case.” Id. at

       110. The court stated,

               In view of the fact that the legislature clearly intended for the
               medical review panel to function in an informal manner in
               rendering its expert medical opinion, we believe that the
               legislature did not simultaneously intend to empower trial courts
               to dictate to the medical review panel concerning either the
               content of the panel’s opinion or the manner in which the panel
               arrives at its opinion, or the matters that the panel may consider
               in arriving at its opinion. In other words, the grant of power to
               the trial court to preliminarily determine matters is to be
               narrowly construed.

               A narrow construction of this grant of power leads to the
               conclusion that the legislature specifically limited a trial court’s
               power on motions for a preliminary determination to two
               functions, both governed by the Indiana Trial Rules. First, the
               court can determine either affirmative defenses or issues of law or
               fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Trial
               Rules and, secondly, it may compel discovery in accordance with
               the Indiana Trial Rules. Therefore, we must turn to the Indiana
               Trial Rules to further define the courts’ power. Our review of the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023         Page 20 of 24
               rules reveals that Trial Rule 8(C) contains a listing of affirmative
               defenses, Trial Rule 12(B) and (C) sets forth a listing of matters
               which can be preliminarily determined by motion, and Trial
               Rules 26 through 37, inclusively, contain the discovery rules. We
               hold that Ind. Code § 16-9.5-10-1 specifically limits the power of
               the trial courts of this State to preliminarily determining
               affirmative defenses under Trial Rules, deciding issues of law or
               fact that may be preliminarily determined under Trial Rule
               12(D), and compelling discovery pursuant to Trial Rules 26
               through 37, inclusively.

               We further hold that the trial courts of this State do not have
               jurisdiction to instruct the medical review panel concerning
               definitions of terms and phrases used in the Medical Malpractice
               Act, the evidence that it may consider in reaching its opinion, or
               the form or substance of its opinion. In other words, the medical
               review panels should be allowed to operate in the informal
               manner contemplated by the legislature ….

       Id. at 110-11.

[25]   In the appealed order in this case, the trial court cited Griffith in concluding that

       it “[did] not have jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings to decide whether

       to grant … Plaintiffs’ request for class certification.” Appealed Order at 16. And

       both the Hospital and the PCF rely primarily on Griffith in arguing that the trial

       court properly denied Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary determination of class

       certification, which is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 23. See Ind. Trial Rule

       23(A) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative

       parties on behalf of all only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

       members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the

       class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023           Page 21 of 24
       claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and

       adequately protect the interests of the class.”), -(B) (listing other criteria for

       maintenance of class action).

[26]   Plaintiffs point out, however, that “Rule 23 is related to one of the Rule 12(B)

       provisions” mentioned in Griffith, which may be determined as a preliminary

       matter pursuant to Trial Rule 12(D). Appellants’ Br. at 54. See Ind. Trial Rule

       12(D) (“Whether made in a pleading or by motion, the defenses specifically

       enumerated (1) to (8) in subdivision (B) of this rule … shall, upon application of

       any party or by order of court, be determined before trial unless substantial

       justice requires the court to defer hearing until trial.”); Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)

       (“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading … shall be

       asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required; except that … the

       following defenses may be made by motion: … (7) Failure to join a party

       needed for just adjudication under Rule 19”); Ind. Trial Rule 19(D) (“This rule

       is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.”). In short, “Rule 12(B)(7) directly

       incorporates Rule 19[,]” which in turn directly incorporates Rule 23. 8

       Appellants’ Br. at 54. Moreover, Plaintiffs observe that a class action is a

       8
         Trial Rule 19(D) is entitled “Exception of Class Actions,” and the Hospital argues that this phrase
       “excludes class actions from the purview of this rule.” Appellees’ Br. at 44. In response, Plaintiffs note that
       courts interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on which Indiana’s Rules of Trial Procedure are
       based, have held that the two rules should be harmonized such that the joinder provisions of Rule 19 do not
       conflict with the class-action provisions of Rule 23, such as by “deferr[ing] ruling on joinder issues pending a
       decision on class certification.” Bartle v. TD Ameritrade Holdings Corp., No. 20-cv-00166, 2020 WL 9211182, at
       *2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2020); see Davis ex rel. Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 747 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 n.1 (Ind. Ct.
       App. 2001) (recognizing that “federal rules and case law are helpful in interpreting Indiana Trial Rules”),
       trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                                 Page 22 of 24
       “species” of “traditional joinder” that “merely enables” a court “to adjudicate

       claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits. And like

       traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the

       rules of decision unchanged.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

       559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010). Finally, we note that Trial Rule 23(C) specifically

       states that the determination of whether an action is to be maintained as a class

       action should be made “[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of”

       the action.

[27]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the issue of whether to certify a

       proposed class is a matter that may be preliminarily determined by motion per

       Trial Rule 12(D) and -(B)(7). As long as an order granting a motion for class

       certification does not “instruct the medical review panel concerning … the

       evidence that it may consider in reaching its opinion, or the form or substance

       of its opinion[,]” Griffith, 602 N.E.2d at 111, it would not exceed the scope of

       the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Indiana Code Section 34-18-

       11-1. 9 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on this issue and remand

       for a full consideration of Plaintiffs’ motions for class certification. Because the

       trial court has not yet addressed the merits of the motions, and because the

       9
         In Ling v. Webb, 834 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), another panel of this Court, in addressing a
       statute-of-limitations issue, stated that “plaintiffs … who wish to proceed in a medical malpractice class
       action may file the proposed complaint with the trial court and request a preliminary determination of class
       certification, at the same time that such complaint is being considered by the medical review panel.”
       Plaintiffs latch onto this statement and urge us to follow Ling. We decline to do so because of the different
       procedural posture and case analysis in Ling.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023                                Page 23 of 24
       factual and procedural posture of this case may shift at any moment, we refrain

       from offering any guidance on the logistics of shepherding a class action

       through the review panel process. See Harris v. Jones, 143 N.E.3d 1012, 1018 n.4

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“A cardinal principle of the judicial function is that courts

       should not issue advisory opinions but instead should decide cases only on the

       specific facts of the particular case and not on hypothetical situations.”).

[28]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

       Robb, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1225 | June 14, 2023         Page 24 of 24