Court Opinion

ID: 9795404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:28:22.299348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:54.134114
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ
dissenting:
The majority holds that the search warrant issued in this case authorizing a no-knock search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this result, the majority reasons that the absence of probable cause in the affidavit for a particular apartment is insignificant, perhaps because they believe the affidavit may be supplemented by information in the search warrant form submitted to the judge. After approving a no-knock search based on a deficient affidavit, the majority holds that powerful and complex computer equipment may be seized because it is included in the term "written or printed material" particularly described in the warrant.
In my view, the failure of the affidavit here to provide probable cause to search a specific apartment created the grave and unacceptable risk that uninvolved innocent persons, who live in the apartment building indicated in the affidavit, would be mistakenly subjected to a no-knock search. In addition, even when the information in the search warrant form, which was presented to the judge for possible signature, is improperly considered together with the affidavit, there is no probable cause to believe that incriminating evi*156dence may be found in the particular apartment specified in the warrant. Finally, the seizure of computers as "written or printed material" violates privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, there are three critical areas where I disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion.
First, we have always required that a magistrate find probable cause to search a particular apartment within the four corners of the supporting affidavit before issuing a warrant. The affidavit in this case simply does not state probable cause to search a specific and identifiable apartment. This deficient affidavit cannot be supplemented with an apartment number and a description of the exteri- or of the apartment that inexplicably appears in the search warrant issued by the magistrate, as the majority appears to permit.
Second, the majority believes that reliance upon the deficient affidavit is not unreasonable and satisfies the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, perhaps because they permit that affidavit to be supplemented by the information in the search warrant form that was submitted to the judge. However, even if the information in the search warrant is improperly considered together with the deficient affidavit, that combined information fails to provide probable cause to believe that the particular apartment specified is the apartment of the defendant, where it was likely that incriminating evidence would be found.
Third, because computers are different from writings, both in degree and in kind, I believe that a warrant authorizing the seizure of computers should state so specifically. Both the seizure of a computer and the search of a computer's data are separate and serious intrusions of individual privacy. Therefore, a warrant permitting the seizure of computers mus' include measures to direct the subsequent search of the computer's data in a manner designed to protect intermingled information that is not properly the subject of the search,
Because I do not agree with the majority in these critical areas, I respectfully dissent.
L.
The People appeal the trial court's ruling to suppress certain items found at the apartment home of Michael Gall, the defendant. In a no-knock search of the defendant's residence, numerous items, including documents, writings, various desktop computer components, and five laptop computers, were seized. Gall moved to suppress items removed from his residence, arguing that the supporting affidavit failed to articulate probable cause for the search and that the items seized were beyond the scope of the search warrant.
The majority has set forth the information in the affidavit in detail and I do not repeat it here. There is an abundance of information implicating Gall. In addition, Gall's residence is specifically implicated as a place where Gall kept firearms, including at least one that would have been illegal for him to possess. The only reference in the affidavit related to computers is to a five-page computer printout that contained the address of one of the supervisors, references to some of the weapons, and many very disturbing remarks. However, the affidavit states that investigators found this printout in "a paperwork box belonging to" Byron Dorethy, a co-worker of Gall's, and that the printout appeared to be directed at Gall rather than produced by him.
The affidavit contains a statement that the "Lalffiant feels that sufficient probable cause has been presented to the court for the issuance of a search warrant for 664 Tantra Drive." The affidavit also contains a description of the Tantra Drive location given by the officer who visited the residence. No such statement or description is given about the apartment building where the search was ultimately conducted.
The only information in the body of the affidavit about Gall's apartment is a statement that the affiant had been advised by another officer that Gall resided at 8161 Madison, and that this information had been obtained from the telephone book. The body of the affidavit does not indicate that the Madison location is an apartment building, which apartment in the building was Gall's, or how such information was obtained.
*157In the bottom margin of each page, in a smaller font than the body of the affidavit, the language "Search Warrant: 3161 Madison N802," appears without any explanation. We have before us no information regarding who put that information on the affidavit, when they may have done so, or where the information was obtained.
In the suppression hearing, the same judge who had earlier issued the warrant found that the affidavit was insufficient precisely because it did not include the description of the address as an apartment complex and the specific apartment number. This judge explained that "[blecause the affidavit does not link apartment N802 to the alleged crimes, an issuing judge could not make an independent determination that probable cause existed to search the property listed on the face of the warrant." The judge further explained that the affidavit was deficient because it failed to identify the particular apartment in such a way as to assure that "an officer executing the warrant could with reasonable effort ascertain and identify that apartment as the correct place to search." The judge also commented that "it was fortuitous that the correct apartment was searched."
In a subsequent hearing, the trial court addressed the seizure of the computers1 found at Gall's residence. The trial court did so at the request of the People so that this subsequent issue could be addressed on appeal if the trial court's determination of no probable cause was reversed. At this hearing, the trial court indicated that the computers were not mentioned as items to be seized by the search warrant, there was no nexus between the laptop computers and suspected criminal conduct, the computers were not subject to the warrant as writings, and there was no evidence presented to support the notion that the computers contained any information relevant to the erimes suspected in the search warrant. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the computers must also be suppressed on the additional ground that there was no probable cause to associate the five laptops with any alleged eriminal activity.
IL.
As a threshold matter, I observe that there is no question that the affidavit shows that there is probable cause to believe that illegal firearms may be found in Gall's residence. However, the question before us is different: whether the affidavit shows probable cause to support the search warrant issued for apartment N302 at 3161 Madison. Accordingly, I begin my analysis with a discussion of the established principle that probable cause for the specific place to be searched must be established within the four corners of the affidavit. To determine whether the affidavit demonstrates probable cause, I do not initially analyze the information contained in the unsigned and unsworn search warrant form presented to the judge. Thus, I conclude that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause to search the specific apartment authorized in the warrant. However, I next consider the information in the unsigned warrant together with the affidavit because I believe that the majority may have improperly relied on the unsigned warrant. I conclude that even with the information in the warrant, probable cause is still not established to search that specific apartment, N302.
A.
A search warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause, "supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. When a reviewing court examines a search warrant after the fact to determine if it was valid, that court must assess whether the affidavit provided a "substantial basis" for the conclusion that probable cause existed. Illinois v. *158Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also People v. Randolph, 4 P.8d 477, 481 (Colo.2000). The United States Supreme Court requires that probable cause for a search warrant must be established by information in the affidavit. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 LEd.2d 530 (1984)("IIlf sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause, the warrant was nevertheless valid."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 LEd.2d 1067 (1976)(rejecting petitioner's contention that police should be permitted to supplement information contained in an affidavit for a search warrant). We have consistently interpreted this requirement to mean that, in determining probable cause, a magistrate is limited to the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit. See Randolph, 4 P.3d at 481; People v. Meraz, 961 P.2d 481, 483 (Colo.1998). This does not mean that courts should read affidavits in a hypertechnical manner, but rather, they should use logic to determine whether or not probable cause is established. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
Fourth Amendment analysis leads to the clear conclusion that an unsigned search warrant, presented to a judge for signature, may not be used to establish probable cause, but instead may only issue "on [an] affidavit sworn to or affirmed before the judge." § 16-3-302, 6 CRS. (2000). Allowing search warrant forms, which are not signed or sworn by the affiant, to support inadequate affidavits creates a broad exception for deficient affidavits contrary to the requirements in the Colorado Constitution that "no warrant ... shall issue ... without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing." Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. The unsigned warrant in this case was not attached to, or incorporated by reference in, the affidavit, and thus is not verified by the affiant. See People v. Campbell, 678 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Colo.App.1983)(documents attached to and incorporated by reference in an affidavit fall within the four corners of the affidavit). Simply put, the information that appears in the warrant form cannot be relied upon because the source of the information is completely unknown.
The four corners of the affidavit must supply probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence could be found in a particular place. To do so here, the affidavit must establish a basis for believing that 8161 Madison Avenue N302 is Gall's home. Although the affidavit provides enough information to cause a neutral magistrate to reasonably believe that illegal firearms could be found at Gall's residence, it does not provide the kind of specific and detailed information that would allow the magistrate to determine where Gall's residence was located. While the affidavit states that the affiant personally spoke with another officer who had discovered that Gall lived at 8161 Madison in Boulder, it does not specify an apartment number or even indicate that the address given is an apartment building. The only detail that potentially evidences the apartment number is the inclusion of "Search Warrant: 3161 Madison N302" in the bottom margin on each page of the affidavit There is no other information provided that suggests a specific apartment should be searched.
Apartment dwellers are entitled to the same constitutional protections against unlawful searches and seizures as persons living in single family homes. People v. Arnold, 181 Colo. 432, 434, 509 P.2d 1248, 1249 (1973); see also People v. Avery, 173 Colo. 315, 319, 478 P.2d 310, 312 (1970). The affidavit examined in Arnold related that an informant told police officers that the defendants were in possession of illicit drugs, that the informant had observed specific drugs at 2018 Ogden, and that the defendants lived in two particular apartments; the manager's apartment, and apartment No. 3 at 2018 Ogden. Arnold, 181 Colo. at 484, 509 P.2d at 1249. In Arnold, we suppressed the evidence seized in the searches, holding that although the affidavit related that the informant observed marijuana and "speed" somewhere in the building at 2018 Ogden, the affidavit failed to give any specific indication as to where in that multiple-occupaney structure the drugs were located. Thus, the affidavit failed to relate sufficient facts from which the issuing magistrate could find prob*159able cause to believe that the drugs were located within each of the defendant's apartments. Id. at 485, 509 P.2d at 1250. An affidavit that merely provides probable cause to search an apartment in an apartment house will not suffice as support for a warrant to search a particular unit. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seigure A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.7(d), at 386 (8d ed. 1996 & Supp.2001).
In this case, the affidavit did not identify 8161 Madison as an apartment building, and it also failed to specifically state which apartment was Gall's. The inclusion of "Search Warrant: 8161 Madison N802" in the margin of the affidavit is of no assistance. There is nothing in the affidavit explaining who put this information in the margin or when it may have been put there. This marginal information does not appear in the body of the affidavit and can hardly be regarded as verified by the affiant. Moreover, this apartment number in the margin is not associated in any way with Gall. Thus, because the four corners of the affidavit did not reveal that 8161 Madison is an apartment building, nor that N302 is a specific apartment within that building, a neutral magistrate could not have had sufficient facts to establish probable cause to issue a search warrant for that particular apartment. Accordingly, I must conclude that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause to support the search warrant issued for apartment N302.
B.
The majority appears to rely upon the unsigned search warrant to determine that probable cause existed to search apartment N302. However, even when we improperly consider the information in the unsigned warrant, that information, together with the information in the affidavit, does not demonstrate probable cause to search apartment N302. The warrant viewed in conjunction with the affidavit does not provide any basis to believe that Gall's apartment is number N302. The warrant merely describes the apartment building and the exterior of apartment N802. It does not associate Gall with that specific apartment. In addition, the source of information in the warrant is not revealed. The unsigned warrant and affidavit cannot establish probable cause to search apartment N302 without any information connecting Gall to apartment N8302.
The majority concludes that, despite the deficient affidavit, the exclusion of evidence discovered in reliance on the search warrant in this case was improper. In reaching this conclusion, the majority apparently relies upon the unsigned search warrant together with the affidavit, and looks to the good faith exception as detailed in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). Claiming minor error, the majority holds that the warrant was not so deficient, nor was there any suggestion of misbehavior by the police or magistrate, such that the exclusionary rule should have been invoked. Thus, the majority holds that under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the search performed pursuant to the warrant here was constitutional.
Under the good faith doctrine, the exclusionary sanction should not be applied unless an affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in its existence is unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405. I do not believe this case falls under the good faith exception to the exelu-sionary rule. For the reasons outlined above, I believe that the affidavit lacked any indicia of probable cause to the extent that official belief in its existence was unreasonable. In my view, even when improperly relying upon information in the unsigned search warrant, it is unreasonable to believe that probable cause existed. Thus, the good faith exception does not allow the unreasonable search and seizure here. While the application of the exelusionary rule may lead to the undesirable result of losing evidence that may tend to show guilt in a serious and disturbing case, I believe we are bound to apply the law and affirm the trial court's suppression of the evidence.
TIL
After deciding that the search of apartment N802 was constitutional, the majority holds that the language in the warrant authorizing the search of "written or printed material" is sufficiently particular to include com*160puters. The majority's conclusion is based on its determination that a computer is essentially a storage device for writings. Thus, the majority allows the seizure of computers when search warrants only authorize the seizure of writings.2
In my view, the warrant here was insufficient to justify the seizure or search of the computers in this case because the warrant sought writings, not computers. Computers are far more complex and versatile than mere writings and their purpose is significantly different from just a container storing writings. As such, the warrant authorizing the seizure of writings was not sufficiently particularized to include computers. We require a warrant to particularly describe the things to be seized in order to avoid the harm to privacy inherent in the seizure of items that are not the subject of a search. This purpose is not served if computers are seized when writings are sought. Finally, when the objects to be seized are intermingled with other objects that are not the subject of a search, special measures are required to protect the unrelated material. Therefore, I believe that the search and seizure of a computer must be specifically authorized in the search warrant and that such a warrant must include measures to direct the subsequent search of a computer's data.
A.
A search warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent general searches. People v. Staton, 924 P.2d 127, 131 (Colo.1996)(citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). Another purpose is to prevent the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. People v. Hart, 718 P.2d 538, 540 (Colo.1986). In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must specify the items to be seized with sufficient particularity, so that nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. People v. Lindholm, 197 Colo. 270, 274, 591 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1979).
The question of whether evidence seized is within the seope of the warrant ultimately turns on the substance of the items seized, not the label attached to the item. United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir.1994)(emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit in Hill considered whether check stubs were properly seized under a warrant seeking cash disbursement journals, and found that both items served the same purpose, because they both maintained a running account balance and traced the disposition of cash out of that account. Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the check stubs were the functional equivalent of the cash disbursement journals, and were therefore properly seized under the warrants.3
In determining whether a warrant is too general, or has properly met the particularity requirement, the nature of the property to be seized must be considered. Lindholm, 197 Colo. at 275, 591 P.2d at 1035. Here, the nature of the property seized under this warrant is particularly important, since computers, by their unique nature, raise special privacy concerns. Because computers process personal information and effects, they require heightened protection under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches or seizures. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 75, 80-83 (1994). "[Clomputers also raise particularity concerns because of their versatility." *161United States v. Hunter, 13 F.Supp.2d 574, 583 (D.Vt.1998). The Tenth Circuit has ree-ognized that the storage capacity of computers requires a special approach to searches of computer files. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273-77 (10th Cir.1999)(police exceeded scope of search warrant for computer files related to drug transactions when officer found child pornography files and continued search without obtaining additional search warrant). In order to explain why the nature of computers requires such a spe-clalized approach, I generally discuss computers and then consider how they differ from writings and containers of writings.
B.
In this discussion, I describe some of the many functions and uses of a computer. I also explain that a computer stores or accesses data, and utilizes programs to process and present that data in a useable fashion.
Probably the most common function of a computer is its use as a word processor. Generally speaking, word processing programs assemble data that, when printed, may be considered a document of one form or another. When a user intentionally saves such a document, the computer stores information that it can gather and process to reproduce the document. Thus, in this limited sense, a computer is similar to a container, in that it has the capacity to reproduce writings from information that it has stored.
However, other aspects of word processing programs are very different from just a container in which writings are intentionally stored. For example, word processing programs also generally provide for retention of deleted documents. Most word processing programs use some form of a recycle bin, into which documents are transferred when deleted. Thus, a computer is also like a wastebasket of discarded material. In order to attempt to permanently delete such doeu-ments, the recycle bin must be emptied. However, even emptying the recycle bin may not actually delete the document or file because the information may still remain on the computer's hard drive.
The intentional deletion of a file does not permanently erase the file See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Smoking Guns and Spinning Disks, 11 No. 8 Computer Law. 1, *5 (Aug.1994). Instead, the computer internally marks the file as not needed, and clears space for storage of other files. Id. The erasure of information only occurs when the computer overwrites the file with another file. Id. Even then, fragments of information may be retrievable if the entire file is not overwritten. Id. at *5-6. Furthermore, word processing programs may have saved portions or versions of documents regardless of whether the user intentionally saves the final version.
Thus, in general, a file or document may not be removed from the hard drive of a computer until it is reformatted. However, even then, it may be possible to partially recover documents or files removed from a hard drive, depending on how the drive was reformatted. Further, the potential for deleted material to be stored on a hard drive, with or without intentional saving by the user, is not limited to word processing documents, but applies to other programs and functions of a computer as well. See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir.1999)(discussing government's use of specialized utility program to search previously deleted images on computer); United States v. Scott-Emuakpor, No. 1:99-CR-188, 2000 WL 288448, at *3, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at "6 (W.D.Mich.2000){noting that computer analyst was able to restore previously deleted files from computer during search of its contents pursuant to search warrant); Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 526 Pa. 555, 587 A.2d 1353, 1354-57 (1991)(warrant authorizing seizure of computer sufficient to search contents, including deleted materials on hard drive).
A computer may also function as a transmitter of electronic mail, or e-mail. E-mail transmissions, which combine aspects of correspondence and recorded phone conversations, present special privacy issues. See David J. Loundy, E-Law4: Computer Information Systems Law and System Operator Liability, 21 Seattle Univ. LR. 1075, 1079-80 (1998) [hereinafter In addition to e*162mail capabilities, most computers in use today have internet access. Internet use raises complex issues due to the magnitude of information available, and the ability to download such information onto a computer, as well as the storage within the computer's memory of the sites a user visited on the internet.
Computers serve these various functions by using programs to access databases and assemble information in a useful presentation. A database is a horizontally structured and vertically integrated collection of information or data. See Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in Cyberspace, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 6, 151 (2000). Programs are also collections of information, but the information is organized as instructions to the computer. Programs and databases are the information that computers store, although computers may access other computers for programs or for databases. See id. at Databases contain a vast array of information that is not organized in a particularly useful manner. Programs are used to organize, sort, process, modify, and display information in various useful presentations. See id.; see generally State Court Adm'r v. Background Info. Servs., 994 P.2d 420 (Colo.1999)(discussing complexities of state-wide database of court records and potential privacy issues raised with releasing bulk data, even when protected information is deleted from database). If documents are actually produced from a database, they may differ, both in form and in the nature of information they contain, from any document a user may have intentionally stored.
Computers may also be part of a network, which is essentially an extension of the data contained in each individual computer system. A network is a series of computers, usually linked via telephone or data wires, most often used to access resources from another computer,. See E-Law4, supra, at 1077-79. Networked computers may also share programs. Networks expand the range of a computer's use, to include sending e-mail, direct communications between machines, transferring or sharing files, and downloading files. Id. at 1077-80. Moreover, any computer could be a server for other computers on a network.
Finally, the physical appearance of a computer, or its central processing unit (CPU), does not reveal the manner in which it is used. For example, the majority indicates that two desktop computers, along with five laptop computers, were seized during the execution of the search warrant here. However, the record suggests that a desktop computer with two CPU's was seized during the execution of the search warrant. The outward appearance of various components does not reveal how they were employed. In this way, a computer is unlike a physical container, where the types of objects held inside may be apparent. Instead, a computer's outward appearance provides no information regarding the extent of what may be stored inside or otherwise accessible through the computer.
Having generally discussed the complex nature of computers and commented on their multitude of functions and uses, I next consider how computers differ from mere writings and containers.
C.
A writing is limited in nature to something that has already been produced. A writing is "Itlhe expression of ideas by letters visible to the eye. The giving of an outward and objective form to a contract, will, etc., by means of letters or marks placed upon paper, parchment, or other material substance." Black's Law Dictionary 1609 (6th ed.1990). A computer is fundamentally different from a writing, or a container of writings, because of its capacity to hold a vast array of information in many different forms, to sort, process, and transfer information in a database, to provide a means for communication via e-mail, and to connect any given user to the internet. A computer may be comprised of a wide variety of personal information, including but not limited to word processing documents, financial records, business records, electronic mail, internet access paths, and previously deleted materials. Because of these differences, the seizure of a computer raises many issues beyond those that might pertain to mere writings.
*163For example, seizing a computer may intrude into the privacy interests of individuals other than the intended subjects due to email transmissions to and from a particular computer. Similarly, when a networked computer is subject to a search, it may be possible to examine interactions with computers that are networked to the one being searched. Moreover, the use of a computer to access the internet also raises issues regarding a potential search of that computer, as the hard drive stores information about the internet sites that have been visited by the user. Therefore, the search of a computer could implicate the privacy concerns of many people who did not use a specific computer physically, but in fact used such computer electronically. Furthermore, the seizure of a networked computer may disrupt all or part of a network and interfere with many other users.
Aside from the clear differences between a writing and a computer, the analogy that the majority applies, considering computers as simply containers of writings, is not warranted by container law. As the majority notes, containers likely to hold items described in a search warrant may be seized and searched pursuant to a valid search warrant, so long as the containers are of the type within which the items named in the warrant might reasonably be found. In re D.F.L., 931 P.2d 448, 452 (Colo.1997). Despite the complex nature of computers, the majority applies the container rule to computers, reasoning that the container rule has already been expanded to include items of an intangible nature, such as phone numbers on a pager, or a recording on a cassette tape.
The cases cited by the majority that apply container analysis to pagers and cassette tapes do not, in my opinion, provide support for the further expansion of container analysis to computers. See eg., United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958-60 (6th Cir.1990)(seizure of the defendant's telephone number from another person's pager valid); United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 655 (9th Cir.1984)(a microcassette is "by its very nature a device for recording information," and was properly seized as a record); United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382-83 (10th Cir.1986)(cassette tape seized as record).
While these cases support the notion that pagers and cassette tapes may be analyzed under container law, it does not follow that this reasoning should apply to computers, since both a pager and a cassette tape are functionally different from a computer. Unlike a computer, both a pager and a cassette tape contain a finite amount of information of a limited type that is apparent from the nature of the device.
The majority also cites United States v. Musson, 650 F.Supp. 525 (D.Colo.1986), to support its view that a computer is the functional equivalent of a writing. In Musson, the seizure of computer diskettes, which occurred in 1982, was approved under a warrant authorizing the seizure of "any records or writings of whatsoever nature showing any business or financial transactions." Id. at 581. Only computer diskettes were seized and searched in Musson, not entire computers. Moreover, computer diskettes produced in 1982, or earlier, were of very limited capacity and bear little resemblance to modern high-powered computers or even to modern computer disks. The rationale in Musson, which was based on the specific detail in the warrant, compared computer diskettes to cassette tapes. I do not find Musson useful to a consideration of the issues raised by the full-scale seizure of a computer.
The majority also looks for support in a line of cases holding that seizure of containers believed to hold items sought in a search warrant may be removed from the premises in order to later search the contents. These cases have approved such seizures where searching the contents on the premises may be impractical due to the volume of materials seized, or the extensive time potentially required to search through the contents, or when a search of the contents at the site is impossible due to resistance of individuals present at a search. See eg., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir 1987) 4; United States v. Johnson, 709 *164F.2d 515 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Abrahams, 493 F.Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y.1980). Generally, these cases do not dispense with the requirement that a warrant state the particular things to be seized. Rather, they concern the subsequent search of things described with particularity in the warrant, or clearly within the purview of the warrant, and properly seized.
Nonetheless, the majority contends that this analysis has been extended to cases concerning the seizure of computers, citing to Upham, 168 F.3d 532, United States v. Schandl, 947 F.2d 462 (11th Cir.1991), ScottEmuakpor, 2000 WL 288443, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, United States v. Hunter, 13 F.Supp.2d 574 (D.Vt.1998), and United States v. Sissler, No. 1:90-CR-12, 1991 WL 239000, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465 (W.D.Mich. 1991). With the exception of Sissler, these cases do not support the proposition that a seizure of computers for a later search off site is authorized by a search warrant that does not specifically include computers. Instead, these cases maintain that seizure of a computer may be required under some circumstances in order to facilitate the search of its contents when a warrant specifically authorizes the search and seizure of a computer. See generally Upham, 168 F.8d 582 (warrant authorizing search and seizure of computer software, hardware, disks, and drives sufficient to allow seizure of specified items, where search on premises of computer, including previously deleted materials, not feasible); Schandl, 947 F.2d 462 (warrant authorizing search and seizure of computer disks, memory storage devices, and mainframe sufficient for seizure of items specified, since search on premises would have been more disruptive than removing items from premises for more thorough, subsequent search); Scoit-Emuakpor, 2000 WL 288448, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118 (ander warrant seeking records, including all computer files, computer hard drives and disks were lawfully seized within the scope of the warrant, since police could not search for files without looking through hard drives and disks); Hunter, 13 F.Supp.2d 574 (warrant authorizing search and seizure of all computers, all computer storage devices, and all computer software systems, was not sufficiently particularized to allow seizure of computers, but good faith exception applied to save execution of the warrant because it was sufficiently limited to overcome the broad language of the warrant).
In contrast, Sissler does support the majority's view. See Sissler, 1991 WL 239000, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465. In Stissler, the district court concluded that computer disks and a computer were properly seized during the execution of a warrant looking for "records of drug transactions, records of assets purchased with the proceeds of marijuana transactions, and records identifying marijuana customers and suppliers." Id., 1991 WL 239000 at *1, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465 at *7. The district court further justified the seizure under considerations of practicality. Id., 1991 WL 239000 at "4, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465 at *12.
I would not follow Sissler. First, it is only one decision, authored by a district court judge in Michigan, with no precedential value. Second, the reasoning in Sissler is limited in that it simply states the proposition that it adopts, with little analysis. Finally, in my view, Sissler simply does not take into account the nature of computers.
Accordingly, because of the vast array of materials, the processing functions, and the immeasurable scope of information contained in computers, a computer is much, much more than merely a container of documents or writings. Therefore, the search warrant in this case authorizing the search and seizure of writings is not sufficiently particular*165ized to include computers. A "writing" is simply not particular enough to warrant a reasonable person to conclude that it includes a computer because a writing and a computer are two fundamentally different things, both in degree and in kind. It is unreasonable to conclude that a computer is the "functional equivalent" of a writing. The Fourth Amendment serves to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S, Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. Moreover, Fourth Amendment analysis regarding the search and seizure of computers must be approached cautiously and narrowly because of the important privacy concerns inherent in the nature of computers, and because the technology in this area is rapidly growing and changing. Here, the seizure of the defendant's computers under the search warrant at issue was unreasonable.
D.
The majority suggests that the computers may be seized as writings, without taking into account the complexity of computers, because issues regarding the search of the computers' contents need not be addressed in this case. Here, the police obtained a subsequent search warrant prior to actually searching the contents of the seized computers. However, under the majority's analysis, the computers may be seized as writings based on an interest in examining the content of those writings.5 The logical implication of the majority's approach is that the contents of a computer may be explored. Therefore, by analogizing a computer to a container of writings, the majority has taken a perilous step supporting an argument that a computer may be both seized and searched under a general warrant authorizing only the search and seizure of "writings."
Because a computer is not analogous to a container, the seizure of a computer should not be analyzed under the container rule. In fact, the law review article cited by the majority supports this position, specifically arguing that application of container law to computers is improper because it simplifies and inappropriately fails to recognize the distinctions between a mere container and a computer. See Winick, supra, at 88-89. In this article, Winick argues that courts should apply a special doctrine that has been developed by at least two jurisdictions, addressing the "intermingled document" problem, to computers. Id. at 104.
The intermingled document problem arises when documents subject to lawful search or seizure are intermingled with other private documents not subject to search or seizure. Id. The intermingled document problem has been addressed with respect to large volumes of materials only, not computers. However, the reasoning adopted to address this problem, specifically that the government can avoid violating the Fourth Amendment by sealing and holding documents pending a magistrate's approval of a further search, should be extended to computer searches. See Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595-97 (government can avoid violating Fourth Amendment rights by sealing documents pending issuance of search warrant detailing further search); Shilling, 826 F.2d at 1369 (regarding file cabinets, government should adopt the procedure outlined in Tamura and re*166quire subsequent search warrant). Although Tamura and Shilling were not decided with respect to computers, both of these cases involved large volumes of materials, and recognized that searches authorized by warrants nonetheless raise serious Fourth Amendment issues without special limitations. Therefore, these cases, along with Winiek's article, provide guidance for handling the unique and important issues raised with respect to searches and seizures involving computers.
More recent cases have addressed the unique problems that are raised by searches of computers, and have suggested that limitations on such searches are both possible and necessary. For example, searches may be limited to avoid searching files not included in the warrant by "observing files types and titles listed in the directory, doing a key word search for relevant terms, or reading portions of each file stored in the memory." Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276; see also United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (10th Cir.2000)(agreeing with Carey that limitations on scope of computer searches are proper under certain cireumstances); Winick, supra, at 107.
With regard to computers, I would conclude that the particularity requirement should be more rigorous in order to protect against unreasonable governmental intrusion. Thus, I would require a search warrant seeking to seize computers or computer equipment to specify that it covers such items. Moreover, because of the inherently personal and highly complex nature of computers, I also believe that the warrant must include measures to direct the subsequent search of a computer. Thus, a warrant could specifically direct the search of the computer's contents or it could require a more specific search warrant prior to any such search. Winick, supra, at 108 112; see also Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir.1997)(separate warrant required for search of contents of computer files where computer seized pursuant to search warrant). This requirement of a separate search warrant uses the intermingled documents doctrine as a model, in that it limits the scope of the search of a computer's contents to that which is specifically indicated in the additional warrant, thereby avoiding a general search, which is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
IV.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant may not issue unless probable cause is stated within the four corners of an affidavit. Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of information in an unsigned, un-sworn search warrant to show probable cause. The affidavit in this case did not provide sufficient evidence for a magistrate to determine that there was probable cause to search any specific apartment. Furthermore, even if the information in the warrant is improperly considered along with the affidavit, there was no showing that the apartment specified was the one where it was likely that incriminating evidence might be found. Consequently, the search warrant did not properly issue, and the search here was unreasonable. I would affirm the trial court's suppression order because the evidence found pursuant to the search warrant was the product of an unconstitutional search.
Additionally, if the affidavit contained additional information and sufficiently supported the search warrant, I would hold that the computers seized under the warrant should be suppressed. The search warrant here specified that searching officers could seize any written or printed materials, not computers. The language in the search warrant here is not sufficiently particular to include the wholesale seizure of computers, which are much more complex and versatile than mere writings. Computers should not be included within the concept of writings and should not be regarded as merely containers of writings. Instead, an affidavit in support of a warrant for the seizure of computers should clearly specify that it is requesting the seizure of computers. Moreover, a search warrant authorizing the seizure of computers should specify whether a search of the computers' data is also authorized or whether a second warrant is necessary. In order to properly protect privacy concerns inherent in the complex nature of computers, authorization to search a computer's data should direct that search so as to avoid intru*167sion into intermingled information that is not the subject of the search. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's suppression of the computers seized.
HOBBS and BENDER, JJ., join in the dissent.

. The oral ruling by the trial court on this issue specifically addressed the five laptop computers seized during the execution of the search warrant because the defendant did not move to suppress the desktop computer components in this case. Thus, only the five laptops seized are at issue here. However, the analysis of the issues involved applies equally to both laptop and desktop computers.

. The complete language in the search warrant is:
Any and all written or printed material which provides instructions or examples concerning the production or use of any firearms, ammunition, and [elxplosive or [incendiary devices or parts. Any and all written or printed material which shows an intent to do physical harm or physical damage against any person or building. Any documents or materials that show the occupier or possessor of the premises and vehicle.

. One judge dissented, arguing that check stubs are not the functional equivalent of cash disbursement journals, and that the interpretation that they were, improperly expanded the scope of the search warrant in violation of the particularity requirement. Id. at 991-92 (Politz, C.J., dissenting).

. In Shilling, the Fourth Circuit noted its relue-tance to allow removal of file cabinets from the *164premises subject to a search warrant, stating "we cannot easily condone the wholesale removal of file cabinets and documents not covered by the warrant." Shilling, 826 F.2d at 1369. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit noted its approval of the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1982), suggesting that when documents are so intermingled that sorting on site is not feasible, Fourth Amendment violations can be avoided by sealing the documents and obtaining an additional search warrant. Shilling, 826 F.2d at 1369. The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that there were legitimate practical concerns that prompted the removal of the file cabinets, and the seizure was not based on an intent to engage in a fishing expedition. Id. at 1369-70. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the documents had been lawfully seized. Id.

. I agree with the majority that the question of whether a seizure was proper is one of objective reasonableness, and is not based on the subjective intent of an officer executing a warrant. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). I do not, however, agree with the majority's reading of the record. The majority credits the seizure of the computers in this case to the "unchallenged" testimony of the searching officer and suggests that the officer's subjective knowledge that correspondence and internet searches regarding bomb materials may be found on Gall's computers prompted the seizure of the computers. In fact, the record indicates that the same officer testified that he thought it was unusual that Gall had five laptops, and sought guidance from his superiors regarding whether to seize the laptops. This testimony suggests that the searching officer suspected the laptops were stolen instead of believing that the computers were subject to seizure under the language of the search warrant. Moreover, if the computers were seized because the officer thought they were writings, then it is unclear why the police found it necessary to obtain a subsequent search warrant for the contents. Instead, if the police believed that the computers could be seized as writings, it seems likely they would have thought they could then "look" at the writings by searching the contents of the computers.