Court Opinion

ID: 9686411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:46:22.070289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:18.751675
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
On rehearing—application of appellant denied. Application of appellee denied— opinion extended.
Appellee on rehearing insists that our reversal in the original opinion of that portion of the trial court’s decree directing sale of the jointly owned real property for division and payment of various mortgage indebtedness is incorrect. In support of her contention she presents the cases of Owens v. Owens, 201 So.2d 396, 281 Ala. 239; Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, 226 So.2d 308, 284 Ala. 524. Appellee further contends that the case of Bernhard v. Bernhard, 278 Ala. 240, 177 So.2d 565, is distinguished by Owens v. Owens, supra, and has no application to the instant case.
We agree that the rule of Bernhard is distinguishable from Owens and Killings-worth and is not applicable to this case on the facts.
We think that the decisions in Owens and Killingsworth are misinterpreted by appellee. We further are of the opinion they have no application to the instant case because the rule applied there is distinguishable on the facts from the instant case.
Bernhard does not apply here because the parties there were joint tenants with right of survivorship. The parties here are merely joint tenants, each owning an undivided one-half interest of the whole.
An examination of Owens and Killingsworth will disclose that the parties sought the assistance of the court in effecting a property settlement, payment of costs, attorney fees and adjusting various equities arising out of the marriage relationship. In addition, the properties involved were houses and lots which clearly could not be divided or equities therein adjusted without a sale thereof. The decree of the court was necessary to adjust those equities. Clearly a court of equity in a divorce case has power to use any reasonable means to effect a just property settlement and adjust the equities between the parties. Such is the rule stated by the Supreme Court in Owens and Killingsworth.
 In the instant case the court by its decree found it unnecessary from the evidence to adjust any equities between the parties. There was no transfer of properties between the parties and no decree for alimony or support. Though there were in the bill and cross-bill various claims of one against the other as to rights in property and monies the court decreed that these were unsupported by sufficient evidence, and the decree specifically stated that it left the parties, as to such claims, exactly where it found them.
The aspect of the bill of complaint of appellee seeking sale and division did not claim a need for sale to adjust equities or for effecting a property settlement, but stated only that the sale was requested because the property could not otherwise be equitably divided.
The decree of the court stated that the sale was being ordered only because it found from the evidence that the property could not be equitably divided in kind.
Since the aspect of the bill for sale and division sought sale only because the property could not be otherwise divided, and the decree of the court ordered sale only because it found the property could not *39otherwise be divided, we think the issue was brought squarely within the provisions of Title 47, Section 186 of the Alabama Code.
We do not believe the intent of Owens and Killingsworth is to extend the powers of a court of equity to order land sold for division beyond that granted in Title 47, Section 186 merely because it is requested as one aspect of a bill for divorce. We think in such a case there must be present in the pleading and proof a showing of necessity for such sale due to need for settlement of property rights, adjustment of equities or payment of alimony in gross, support or attorney fees.
We attempted to make our ruling on this point clear by the second paragraph on page 859 of our original opinion. We further stated that our reversal of that part of the decree directing the sale and division was because there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the property could not be equitably divided in kind.
Application of appellant denied. Application of appellee denied. Opinion extended.