Court Opinion

ID: 9850432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:57:13.868439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.130198
License: Public Domain

MARTIN, Chief Judge.
The State of North Carolina applied for writ of certiorari to review an order of the trial court expunging six separate charged offenses from the record of petitioner. A unanimous panel of this Court allowed the petition by order dated 18 May 2004. Upon review, we reverse the order of the trial court.
On 18 July 2002, petitioner filed six “Requests and Reports Convictions/Expunctions Dismissals and Discharge” in the Anson County District Court, seeking expungement of six separate criminal *273charges pursuant to section 15A-146 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Specifically, petitioner sought to expunge the following: (1) an arrest and charge of DWI on 31 December 1994; (2) charges for two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon on 9 February 1995; (3) an arrest and charge of DWI and no insurance on 17 October 1997; (4) an arrest and charge of expired registration card/tag on 12 June 1999; and (5) an arrest and charge of expired registration card/tag and expired inspection sticker on 20 May 2000. Petitioner verified that each of the charges had ultimately been dismissed. The State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) and the Office of Administrative Courts also certified that petitioner did not have a felony record and had received no previous expungement.
The matter came before the trial court on 14 November 2002. Upon reviewing the petition, arguments by counsel, as well as a written objection by the respondent State, the trial court entered an order granting expungement of all six charges. The State failed to timely appeal the order of the trial court. On 18 May 2004, this Court entered an order allowing the State’s petition for writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing the order of expungement.
We review the present case to address the narrow issue of whether section 15A-146 allows the expungement of multiple charges which neither arose from the same facts and circumstances nor were consolidated for judgment. We hold it does not and therefore reverse the order of the trial court.
Section 15A-146 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides for the expunction of records when charges are dismissed or there are findings of not guilty as follows:
(a) If any person is charged with a crime, either a misdemeanor or a felony, or was charged with an infraction under G.S. 18B-302(i) prior to December 1, 1999, and the charge is dismissed, or a finding of not guilty or not responsible is entered, that person may apply to the court of the county where the charge was brought for an order to expunge from all official records any entries relating to his apprehension or trial. The court shall hold a hearing on the application and, upon finding that the person had not previously received an expungement under this section, G.S. 15A-145, or G.S. 90-96, and that the person had not previously been convicted of any felony under the laws of the United States, this State, or any other state, the court shall order the expunction. No person as to whom such an order has been entered shall be *274held thereafter under any provision of any law to be guilty of perjury, or to be guilty of otherwise giving a false statement or response to any inquiry made for any purpose, by reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge any expunged entries concerning apprehension or trial.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-146(a) (2003). “G.S. § 16A-146 authorizes the court, in certain instances, to order expunction from all official records of entries relating to the arrest or trial of a person seeking the order.” State v. Jacobs, 128 N.C. App. 559, 569, 495 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1998). Pursuant to section 15A-146, a person charged with a crime which is later dismissed, or who is found to be not guilty or not responsible, may apply for an order of expungement for that charge. “The purpose of the statute is to clear the public record of entries so that a person who is entitled to expunction may omit reference to the charges to potential employers and others, and so that a records check for prior arrests and convictions will not disclose the expunged entries.” Id. Notably, expungement is only available where the trial court finds that the person has not previously received an expungement. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-146(a).
In the present case, the trial court concluded that section 15A-146 was intended “to provide for an expungement of all arrests and dismissal records even if multiple charges arose at different times.” We disagree.
The instant case is one of statutory construction. It is well established that “where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.” Union Carbide Corp. v. Offerman, 351 N.C. 310, 314, 526 S.E.2d 167, 170 (2000). Such statutory construction is vital to “ensure accomplishment of the legislative intent.” Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098, 143 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1999). The Court must first look to the words chosen by the legislature, and “if they are clear and unambiguous within the context of the statute, they are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998).
The plain language of section 15A-146 does not allow for the expungements of multiple unrelated offenses occurring over a number of years. On the contrary, the plain language of the statute *275expressly prohibits more than one expunction. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-146(a) (allowing expunction only after a finding that no previous expunction has been entered). Such prohibition demonstrates the legislative intent to limit the expunction of records, allowing individuals to avail themselves of a court-ordered expunction on only one occasion. The trial court’s interpretation of the statute would allow an individual who has numerous unrelated charges over a number of years to wait for an appropriate time to obtain a single expunction for unlimited numbers of arrests and charges occurring over the course of many years. If the legislature wished to provide for the expungement of multiple offenses occurring over a number of years, there would be no reason to limit expunction to a one-time event. The trial court’s interpretation to the contrary contravenes the rules of statutory construction by rendering meaningless the statute’s express limitation. See Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981) (stating that, “It is well established that a statute must be considered as a whole and construed, if possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered useless or redundant. It is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere sur-plusage”). We note that whether section 15A-146 permits the one-time expunction of multiple related charges arising from a single occurrence or which have been consolidated for trial is an issue not directly before us, and we therefore do not address it.
Because we conclude that section 15A-146 does not permit the expunction of multiple unrelated offenses occurring over a number of years, we hold the trial court erred in entering an order expunging six separate charged offenses from the record of petitioner. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court.
Reversed.
Judge LEVINSON concurs.
Judge TYSON dissents.