Court Opinion

ID: 9381178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 00:00:31.197618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.510761
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40507        Document: 00516683850             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/21/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                      No. 22-40507                     March 21, 2023
                                     ____________
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
   Thomas H. Clay,                                                           Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   State Classification Department of TDCJ; Chief of the
   SCC Transfer Department; Bryan Collier, Executive
   Director; Lanette Linthicum, TDCJ Health Services Medical
   Director; Ernestine Julye, Medical Facility Director; Paul Reilly,
   P.A.; TDCJ Administrative Employees; Correctional
   Unit Officers,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:22-CV-21
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40507      Document: 00516683850            Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                      No. 22-40507

          Thomas H. Clay, Texas prisoner # 1124123, moves to appeal in forma
   pauperis (IFP) from the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his 42
   U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He seeks to contest the district court’s finding that
   he was barred from proceeding IFP in the district court by the three-strikes
   provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and by an order issued in a previously filed
   civil case precluding him from future filings until he paid the full filing fee for
   that complaint. See Clay v. Zeon, No. 4:14-CV-57 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014).
          Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner may not proceed IFP in an appeal of
   a judgment in a civil action if he has, on three or more prior occasions, while
   incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed as frivolous or
   malicious or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
   unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. § 1915(g). A
   prisoner with three strikes is entitled to proceed with his action or appeal only
   if he is “in imminent danger at the time that he seeks to file his suit in district
   court or seeks to proceed with his appeal or files a motion to proceed IFP.”
   Baños v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir. 1998).
          Clay first alleges that he is not subject to the § 1915(g) bar because his
   prior dismissals did not qualify as countable strikes. Yet Clay provides no
   explanation as to why the three-strike bar should not apply. And, critically,
   we have already held both before and after Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 290-
   91 (5th Cir. 2017), that Clay has three strikes for purposes of § 1915(g). Clay
   v. UTMBH CMC Estelle Unit Med. Emps., 752 F. App’x 195, 195 (5th Cir.
   2019); Clay v. Stephens, 597 F. App’x 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2015). Finally, Clay’s
   suggestion that § 1915(g) violates his right to access the courts is unavailing.
   See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997).
          Additionally, Clay asserts that the district court wrongly decided that
   he was barred from proceeding on an IFP basis pursuant to a preclusion order
   in the Southern District of Texas. See Clay v. Zeon, No. H-14-0057, 2014 WL

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Case: 22-40507        Document: 00516683850         Page: 3    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-40507

   4168354, at *5-6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014). We have previously upheld a
   district court’s enforcement of sanctions imposed by other federal district
   courts. See Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1998). Here,
   Clay does not dispute that he has not paid the filing fee due in the Southern
   District of Texas, nor is there any indication that the preclusion order was
   modified or rescinded, or that his § 1983 suit is excepted from the order. And
   Clay has a long history of frivolous and repetitive pleadings. Accordingly, the
   district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to enforce the preclusion
   order. See Gelabert v. Lynaugh, 894 F.2d 746, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1990).
          Finally, Clay argues that the § 1915(g) bar should not apply because he
   is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. He contends that he has
   developed an antibiotic-resistant staph infection that has not been properly
   treated and has caused his health to worsen. Clay also asserts that he is
   housed in a cell in which he cannot use his wheelchair and that his wheelchair
   is occasionally confiscated, meaning that he is forced to walk and stand. He
   further contends that his food has been contaminated and that “toxic
   powder” has been “bombarded” into his cell. Moreover, he complains of
   other aspects of his medical care, states that his cell is at times flooded, and
   alleges that door slamming in his unit has caused him to suffer post-traumatic
   stress disorder.
          These allegations are not sufficient to establish that Clay was under
   imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time that he sought to
   appeal IFP. See § 1915(g); Baños, 144 F.3d at 884-85. In other words, Clay
   may not show imminent danger based on events that do not implicate specific
   ongoing harm at the relevant time—when he filed his motion to proceed IFP
   on appeal. See Choyce v. Dominguez, 160 F.3d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1998).
   Clay’s § 1983 complaint involves acts and decisions made while he was
   imprisoned in the Polunsky Unit. At the time Clay filed his appeal and sought
   leave to proceed IFP, however, he was imprisoned in the Michael Unit. Clay

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Case: 22-40507      Document: 00516683850           Page: 4    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-40507

   has not plausibly alleged that his experience in the Polunsky Unit is
   connected in any way to his experience in the Michael Unit, nor has he
   otherwise offered any facts or evidence to support that the imminent-danger
   exception applies. Instead, he presents speculative, vague, and conclusory
   allegations that do not demonstrate that he faced a danger of a particular
   serious physical injury. See Baños, 144 F.3d at 884-85.
          Given the foregoing, Clay’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is
   DENIED. For the same reasons, his appeal from the district court’s
   dismissal of his suit without prejudice as barred § 1915(g) and the order of
   preclusion is frivolous and is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2; Baugh
   v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 n.24 (5th Cir. 1997).
          Because Clay continues to file frivolous pleadings and previously was
   warned that future frivolous or repetitive filings would subject him to further
   sanctions, he is ORDERED to pay a monetary sanction in the amount of
   $100 payable to the clerk of this court. Clay is BARRED from filing any
   pleading in this court or in any court subject to its jurisdiction until the
   sanction is paid unless he first obtains leave of the court in which he seeks to
   file a pleading. Further, he again is WARNED that any future frivolous,
   repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings will invite the imposition of additional
   sanctions, which might include dismissal, further monetary sanctions, and
   restrictions on his ability to file pleadings in this court and any court subject
   to this court’s jurisdiction. Clay should review any pending matters and move
   to dismiss any that are frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive.
          IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS
   FRIVOLOUS; SANCTION IMPOSED; SANCTION WARNING
   ISSUED.

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