Court Opinion

ID: 9725179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:33:50.039912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:11.902658
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
Prior to the amendment of sec. 40.53 (1), Stats., by ch. 648, Laws of 1961,1 this statute required that *154school boards operating public elementary or high schools provide transportation to and from school for all pupils residing in the district two or more miles from the nearest public school they might attend, subject to the exception contained in sec. 40.55. Sec. 40.55 provides that secs. 40.53, 40.54, and 40.56 shall not apply to pupils who reside in cities, except that, if a city determines to furnish transportation on an optional basis, the same state aid shall be allowed as is provided by sec. 40.56. Because of the adoption of ch. 648, certain pupils attending approximately 500 nonpublic schools will be entitled to free transportation to and from the nearest public school they are entitled to attend.
*155The new enactment presents a question of statutory interpretation as to whether the phrase “on regular routes approved for the public school bus,” in the law as amended, relates back to the word “transportation” or whether it refers to the immediate antecedent phrase having to do with the residence requirement. To interpret the statute as requiring actual residence on the bus routes would lead to the absurd result that public school pupils who, prior to the passage of ch. 648, had walked to the bus routes, or had been transported there by their parents, would no longer be entitled to free bus transportation to and from school. It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that an absurd result is to be avoided if possible. Wisconsin Valley Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 606, 615, 101 N. W. (2d) 798; Connell v. Luck (1953), 264 Wis. 282, 284, 285, 58 N. W. (2d) 633. Therefore, we construe the statutory phrase “on regular routes approved for the public school bus” as not requiring actual residence on the routes themselves of either the public or nonpublic school pupils who are to be entitled to free transportation under the amended statute. This interpretation also obviates the necessity of passing upon a denial-of-equal-protection-of-the-laws argument advanced by respondent.
In addition to the denial-of-equal-protection-of-the-laws contention thus resolved, respondent advances further reasons why ch. 648 should be held invalid as violating various provisions of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions. However, we find it unnecessary to consider any of these except that which asserts that this enactment violates that clause of sec. 18, art. I, Wisconsin constitution,2 which pro*156vides: “. . . nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”
We construe “religious societies” to be synonymous with religious organizations, and, under the stipulated facts, practically all of the nonpublic schools, whose pupils are to be transported under the attacked act, are operated by religious organizations. Furthermore, at the time of the adoption of our constitution in 1848, the word “seminaries” was synonymous with academies or schools. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board (1890), 76 Wis. 177, 215, 44 N. W. 967. Other courts have held that the term “seminary” includes primary and secondary schools. County of Hennepin v. Grace (1881), 27 Minn. 503, 8 N. W. 761; Sisters of Mercy v. Hooksett (1945), 93 N. H. 301, 42 Atl. (2d) 222. Therefore, inasmuch as some religious instruction is given in all of the approximately 500 nonpublic schools operated by religious organizations or sectarian groups, certain of whose pupils are to be transported under the act, these parochial schools constitute “religious seminaries” within the meaning of sec. 18, art. I, Wisconsin constitution.
Because 60 percent of these approximately 500 parochial schools located without the boundaries of cities are situated within distances which do not exceed one-half mile from public schools, it is fair to assume that a considerable number of pupils attending these schools will be afforded transportation under the new act if its validity is upheld. Those parochial schools, which now pay part or all of the cost of transportation of their pupils out of their school funds, stand to benefit financially by the operation of the new act. Others stand to gain through increased enrollment. Such an increase of enrollment is a benefit to these parochial schools. Judd v. *157Board of Education (1938), 278 N. Y. 200, 212, 15 N. E. (2d) 576, 118 A. L. R. 789; Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. (1949), 33 Wash. (2d) 699, 708, 207 Pac. (2d) 198. We quote with approval this statement of the New York court of appeals in the Judd Case (p. 212):
“Free transportation of pupils induces attendance at the school. The purpose of the transportation is to promote the interests of the private school or religious or sectarian institution that controls and directs it. ‘It helps build up, strengthen, and make successful the schools as organizations’ (State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 187, writ of error dismissed, February 15, 1938). Without pupils there could be no school. It is illogical to say that the furnishing of transportation is not an aid to the institution while the employment of teachers and furnishing of books, accommodations, and other facilities are such an aid.”
Therefore, the crucial question is whether the benefits which parochial schools would receive under the act are of a category to constitute a violation of sec. 18, art. I, Wisconsin constitution.
It must be conceded that there are benefits to religious organizations and parochial schools resulting from the expenditures of public funds which are not a violation of this constitutional prohibition. Examples are the providing of police and fire protection, the supplying of water and sewerage services on a basis whereby all the cost of the system or service is not charged to the users, and the building or improving of public sidewalks and streets. However, all of these public services and facilities are provided to the public, or to property, generally on a basis whereby no classification is made as to religious organizations or schools. It is this which distinguishes these benefits from those sought to be conferred by the instant act. Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out this line of demarcation in his penetrating dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education (1947), 330 U. S. *1581, 25, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711, 168 A. L. R. 1392, in these words:
“A policeman protects a Catholic, of course — but not because he is a Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our society. The fireman protects the church school— but not because it a church school; it is because it is property, part of the assets of our society. Neither the fireman nor the policeman has to ask before he renders aid, ‘Is this man or building identified with the Catholic Church?’ ”
Professor Philip B. Kurland in his article, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 University of Chicago Law Review (1961), 1, draws this same line of demarcation, as did Mr. Justice Jackson, in considering the freedom of religion and establishment of religion clauses of the First amendment to the United States constitution. Kurland states his conclusion thus (p. 96) :
“The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept: That government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.”
It is apparent from the stipulated facts that while ch. 648 is so worded as to provide transportation to private schools generally, the private schools which stand to benefit from the act are the parochial schools. This is because of the 10 private schools in the state furnishing grade and high school education, five are located in cities in which the providing of public transportation is optional and the other five have most of their pupils in residence at their schools. Thus, the benefit conferred is in reality one confined to those religious groups which operate parochial schools.
There are, however, other valid statutes which benefit religious organizations, rather than the pubíic generally. *159Perhaps the most-prominent example is the exemption from taxation of religious organization or parochial school property in sec. 70.11 (4), Stats. While the constitutionality of this and analogous provisions, under sec. 18, art. I, Wisconsin constitution, is not before us, we deem it important to point out the distinction from the instant situation. This distinction is that the exemption afforded by sec. 70.11 (4) is not expressly or effectually restricted to religious organizations, as many other nonprofit organizations benefit from it. Thus, this tax exemption does not transcend the religious-classification prohibition.
We have also given consideration to whether the benefits, conferred by ch. 648 upon parochial schools, differ in kind from the situation where parochial school pupils are permitted to attend certain specialized courses in the public schools. For example, it has been brought to our attention that pupils of certain parochial schools attend manual-training and domestic-science classes in the public schools. These parochial schools benefit in that they are saved the expense of providing the specialized equipment required for such courses, and of securing teachers trained to teach the same. However, let us assume but not decide that permitting children, who satisfy the age and residence requirements, to secure part of their education in the public schools, even though at the same time they may be in attendance at parochial schools, does not violate sec. 18, art. I, Wisconsin constitution. On this hypothesis it might be argued that permitting parochial school children to take advantage of transportation by public school bus, is a use of public school facilities equivalent to attendance at manual-training and domestic-science classes in the public schools. However, the essential difference, from a constitutional standpoint, is that riding school buses is not an educational objective of the state in itself, but merely an instrumentality to bring the pupils to the public schools where they will secure a public education. *160Under ch. 648, parochial school children are not to be transported to the public schools for the purpose of receiving any public instruction; rather, such transportation is merely a convenience to assist them in attending a parochial school.
One further argument needs mentioning on the issue of whether ch. 648 would benefit parochial schools in a manner prohibited by sec. 18, art. I of the Wisconsin constitution. This is that the providing of transportation to parochial school pupils entails no more expenditure of public funds than would be required if these pupils were to attend public schools. However, this same argument would sustain the use of public funds to pay salaries of parochial school teachers or other direct operating expenses of such schools. Considering the objective sought by the framers of our state constitution in including the provisions of sec. 18, art. I, we are certain that the determination of whether religious schools receive a prohibited benefit from public funds is not dependent on whether the overall cost to the public treasury would be less or greater by reason of the operation of such schools than would be the case if all the pupils thereof were to attend public schools.
The legislature, in enacting ch. 648, entitled it, “An Act to amend 40.53 (1) and 40.56 (3) of the statutes, relating to the safety and welfare of all school pupils in the state.” The attorney general argues that this act is sustainable on the basis that the transportation of parochial school pupils would promote their health and welfare. It could also be argued with equal plausibility that a direct grant in aid of public funds to parochial schools promotes the general welfare of the pupils of such schools because it aids in their education. In passing on the constitutionality of legislation as to whether it violates the particular prohibition of sec. 18, art. I, Wisconsin constitution, courts are not foreclosed by a legislative declaration that the act is in furtherance of some facet of the promotion of the public welfare valid' in itself, if the *161effect of the questioned act would in fact violate such prohibition had there been no legislative declaration of its purpose included in the title or body of the act. We are cognizant that a California intermediate appellate court, in Bowker v. Baker (1946), 73 Cal. App. (2d) 653, 167 Pac. (2d) 256, upheld the validity of an act, which provided transportation at public expense to parochial school pupils, on the ground that it promoted the welfare of the children. This was held in spite of a prohibition in the California constitution similar to the one contained in sec. 18, art. I of our own constitution. Nevertheless, we do not find this California decision persuasive, or one which this court should follow.
A number of state courts have considered the validity, under state constitutional provisions, of statutes providing for the transportation of parochial school students at public expense. Six states have voided such acts on the ground that public expenditures to support any religious institution are invalid. State v. Brown (1934), 36 Del. (6 Harr.) 181, 172 Atl. 835, writ of error dismissed on other grounds (1938), 39 Del. (9 Harr.) 187, 197 Atl. 478; Judd v. Board of Education (N. Y.), supra; Gurney v. Ferguson (1941), 190 Okla. 254, 122 Pac. (2d) 1002, certiorari denied (1942), 317 U. S. 588, 63 Sup. Ct. 34, 87 L. Ed. 481; Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. (Wash.), supra; McVey v. Hawkins (1953), 364 Mo. 44, 258 S. W. (2d) 927; Matthews v. Quinton (Alaska 1961), 362 Pac. (2d) 932. One of these states, New York, subsequently amended its constitution to authorize such transportation. See Board of Education v. Allen (1959), 17 Misc. (2d) 1080, 192 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 186 (N. Y. Const, sec. 4, art. XI).
Only one reported state opinion, Bowker Case, supra, has held such a statute to be for the benefit of the nonpublic school pupils and not in violation of state constitutional prohibitions similar to those contained in sec. 18, art. I of the Wisconsin constitution. Four states have upheld the *162constitutionality of nonpublic school pupil transportation acts, but did not consider constitutional prohibitions analogous to sec. 18, art. I, or statutes analogous to ch. 648. Snyder v. Newtown (1960), 147 Conn. 374, 161 Atl. (2d) 770, appeal dismissed (1961), 365 U. S. 299, 81 Sup. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. (2d) 689; Nichols v. Henry (1945), 301 Ky. 434, 191 S. W. (2d) 930; Adams v. St. Mary’s County (1942), 180 Md. 550, 26 Atl. (2d) 377; Everson v. Board of Education (1945), 133 N. J. L. 350, 44 Atl. (2d) 333, affirmed (1947), 330 U. S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711, 168 A. L. R. 1392. Three states have invalidated such transportation systems on other than constitutional grounds. Squires v. Augusta (1959), 155 Me. 151, 153 Atl. (2d) 80; School Dist. v. Houghton (1956), 387 Pa. 236, 128 Atl. (2d) 58; Quinn v. School Comm. (1955), 332 Mass. 410, 125 N. E. (2d) 410.
The most-recent case passing on the constitutionality of a state statute providing for the transportation of parochial school pupils by public school buses is that of the Alaska supreme court in Matthews v. Quinton, supra, decided in 1961. The statute before the court had been enacted while Alaska was still a territory, and the applicable provision of the constitution of the territory provided:
“. . . nor shall any public money be appropriated by the territory or any municipal corporation therein for the support or benefit of any sectarian, denominational, or private school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the government; . . . and all laws passed, or attempted to be passed, by such legislature in said territory inconsistent with the provisions of this section . . . shall be null and void.”
We deem this constitutional prohibition to be no more stringent in its prohibition than the last clause of sec. 18, art. I of our own state constitution.
In an exhaustive opinion, the Alaska court reviewed the other decisions which have dealt with the constitutionality *163of statutes providing for transportation of parochial school pupils. It conceded that there was a division of authority, but, in spite of a strong dissent, concluded that the cases invalidating such statutes, because of state constitutional prohibitions, were the more persuasive. This view coincides with our own conclusion after carefully reading both lines of cases.
Most of the statutes ruled upon, in the opinions of other courts, provided for the transportation of parochial school pupils directly to the schools attended by them. Ch. 648 does not do this, but only provides for their transportation to the nearest public school which they would be entitled to attend. We do not deem that this difference in any way affects the constitutional issue.
On this aspect of the case, the decision of the Washington court in Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., supra, is pertinent. Washington first passed a law for the transportation of private school pupils which was interpreted in Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. (1943), 17 Wash. (2d) 61, 135 Pac. (2d) 79, 146 A. L. R. 612, as authorizing such transportation to and from sectarian schools, and was held to be invalid under a prohibition in the Washington constitution similar to that of sec. 18, art. I, Wisconsin constitution. After this decision, the Washington legislature passed a new statute which provided: “All children attending school in accordance with the laws relating to compulsory attendance in the state of Washington shall be entitled to use the transportation facilities provided by the school district in which they reside.” Plaintiffs in the Visser Case, parents of children attending a private religious school, instituted an action for mandamus to compel defendant school district and its board of school directors to permit plaintiffs’ children to use the district’s transportation facilities, which transported pupils to the public school. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs’ children rendered themselves available for *164transportation along the route regularly established by the district for transportation of pupils and that the district had ample transportation facilities available for transporting plaintiffs’ children. The court held, in spite of the fact that the transportation to be provided under the statute represented at least in part a legislative concern for the safety of children, that the Mitchell Case was controlling and that the law violated the prohibition of the state constitution that “no public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” The opinion further pointed out, in answer to the argument that the law was an exercise of the police power for the benefit of the children to be transported to private religious schools, that the police power may not be exercised in contravention of plain and unambiguous inhibitions of a constitution.
In the instant case, the attorney general urges that this court should adopt the construction of sec. 18, art. I of our constitution which the United States supreme court, by a five-to-four decision in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, placed upon the provisions relating to religion contained in the First amendment to the United States constitution. A sufficient answer to this argument is found in this statement appearing in the Washington court’s opinion in the Visser Case (33 Wash. (2d) 711):
“Although the decisions of the United States supreme court are entitled to the highest consideration as they bear on related questions before this court, we must, in light of the clear provisions of our state constitution and our decisions thereunder, respectfully disagree with those portions of the Everson majority opinion which might be construed, in the abstract, as stating that transportation, furnished at public expense, to children attending religious schools, is not in support of such schools. While the degree of support necessary to constitute an establishment of religion under the first amendment to the federal constitution is foreclosed *165from consideration by reason of the decision in the Everson Case, supra, we are constrained to hold that the Washington constitution, although based upon the same precepts, is a clear denial of the rights herein asserted by appellants.”
A prior opinion of this court, on the effect of sec. 18, art. I of our constitution, is in strict agreement with this conclusion of the Visser Case. In State ex rel. Weiss, supra, this court 3 stated (p. 207):
“Wisconsin, as one of the later states admitted into the Union, having before it the experience of others, and probably in view of its heterogeneous population, . . . has, in her organic law, probably furnished a more-complete bar to any preference for, or discrimination against, any religious sect, organization, or society than any other state in the Union.”
Thus, we deem that the First amendment provision, which prohibits laws “respecting an establishment of religion,” lends itself to more flexibility of interpretation than the provision contained in the last clause of sec. 18, art. I of the Wisconsin constitution.4 Furthermore, as pointed out in Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of the Wisconsin School Bus Law, 1962 Wisconsin Law Review, 500, the weight of authority since the Everson Case is clearly against the constitutionality of providing publicly financed transportation and related aids to nonpublic school children.
For reasons previously stated herein, we conclude that ch. 648, Laws of 1961, is in direct violation of that portion *166of sec. 18, art. I of the Wisconsin constitution, which prohibits the expenditure of any public funds “for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”
By the Court. — Petition dismissed.

 Ch. 648, Laws of 1961, reads:
“Section 1. 40.53 (1) of the statutes is amended to read:
“40.53 (1) Schoolchildren. Except as provided in sec. 40.55, the school boards of all school districts . . . shall provide transportation only to and from the public school which they are entitled to attend, for all pupils, attending public and nonpublic schools, residing in the district, on regular routes approved for the public school bus and two miles or more from the nearest public school they may attend within said district. Such school boards may provide transportation for teachers to and from school subject to the same controls and limitations as are provided by this section for the transportation of pupils. In districts operating high schools, the board may also provide transportation for nonresident public high school pupils residing two miles or more from the school within areas served by the school by bus routes approved by the county school committee and the state superintendent. If the district operating the high school does not provide transportation for nonresident high school pupils, the municipality in which the nonresident pupils reside shall arrange for such transportation and such municipality shall make claim to the county clerk for the cost of transportation so provided in the manner specified in sec. 40.56 (2). The annual or special school meeting of any school district ... , or if no such meeting is held, then the school board of any such district may authorize the transportation of all or any part of the pupils of such school district to and from the public school within the district which they are entitled to attend, but if such transportation is furnished to less than all of the pupils there shall be reasonable uniformity in the minimum distance that pupils will be transported. The board of any public elementary school district which has suspended school shall provide transportation to and from school for all elementary pupils residing therein, and two miles or more from the nearest district *154school which they may attend, or two miles or more from any other district school which in the opinion of the state department of public instruction it is more feasible for them to attend.
“Section 2. 40.56 (3) of the statutes is amended to read:
“40.56 (3) School districts and municipalities which furnish transportation to and from a public school as provided in sec. 40.53 are entitled to receive state aid on account of such transportation at the rate of $24 per school year per pupil transported to and from school whose residence is at least two miles and not more than five miles by the nearest traveled route from the public school . . . which they are entitled to attend and $36 per school year per pupil transported to and from school whose residence is more than five miles by the nearest traveled route from the public school attended. Such aids shall be reduced, proportionately, in the case of pupils transported for less than a full school year because of nonenrollment. Transportation aid to any district . . . shall not exceed the actual cost of transportation to the district or municipality. No state aid of any kind shall be provided to any district which after July 1, 1949, charges any part of the cost of the transportation furnished under sec. 40.53 against the pupils transported, their parents or guardians, nor shall any state aid of any kind be provided to any district which fails to transport all of the pupils attending the district’s school and whose transportation is required under sec. 40.53. Such aids shall not be contingent upon the pupils attending public school.
“Section 3. This act shall take effect July 1, 1962.”
(The italicized words indicate those words which were inserted into secs. 40.53 (1) and 40.56 (3), Stats., for the first time by ch. 648, Laws of 1961. The ellipses indicate deletions.)

 Article I. Section 18. “The right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by *156law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”

 The statement appears in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Cassoday, but it is on a subject expressly reserved for his consideration in the court’s opinion by Mr. Justice Lyon, and thus represents the opinion of the court.

 This conclusion is supported by the decisions of the United States supreme court. For a thorough review of these decisions interpreting the freedom of religion and establishment of religion clauses of the First amendment, see Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 University of Chicago Law Review (1961), 1.