Court Opinion

ID: 2963958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:59.83821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:43.634775
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1796

                                   ROBERT J. NOWD,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                   ROBERT RUBIN, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Edward L. Hoban for appellant.
             _______________
             Lori J. Holik, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Donald
             _____________                                              ______
        K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
        ________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                  February 12, 1996
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   After  securing an  advantageous
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   
                          _____________

          pretrial settlement  of his age discrimination  claim against the

          Secretary  of  the  United  States Department  of  the  Treasury,

          plaintiff  Robert J.  Nowd, a  Special Agent  with the  Bureau of

          Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, unsuccessfully sought an  attorney

          fee  award under  both the  Age Discrimination in  Employment Act

          ("ADEA"), 29  U.S.C.    621  et seq.,  and  the Equal  Access  to
                                       __ ____

          Justice Act  ("EAJA"), 28  U.S.C.   2412(b),  then initiated  the

          present  appeal.  We vacate  the district court  order and remand

          for further proceedings. 

                                     DISCUSSION 
                                     DISCUSSION 
                                     __________

                    The district court, relying  on Lewis v. Federal Prison
                                                    _____    ______________

          Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d  1277 (11th Cir. 1992), held  that neither
          ____________

          the ADEA  nor  the EAJA  authorizes an  attorney fee  award to  a

          federal employee who prevails against the United States in an age

          discrimination in  employment action.   Nowd faults  the district

          court  ruling in  two respects.   First,  he contends  that Lewis
                                                                      _____

          misconstrued the ADEA attorney fee  provision.  Second, he argues

          that the Lewis reasoning  does not extend to the  dissimilar EAJA
                   _____

          attorney fee provision.1 

          A.   The ADEA
          A.   The ADEA
               ________

                    Congress  enacted  the ADEA  in  1967  to enable  legal

          recourse   by  private   sector   employees   subjected  to   age

          discrimination in  the workplace, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
                                            ___ _________    ____
                              
          ____________________

               1We review the challenged statutory interpretations de novo.
                                                                   __ ____
          See Riva v. Commonwealth  of Mass., 61 F.3d 1003,  1007 (1st Cir.
          ___ ____    ______________________
          1995).

                                          2

          575, 577-81 (1978),  by providing that  "the court[s] shall  have

          jurisdiction  to grant such legal  or equitable relief  as may be
                                 ____ _____  __ _________ ______  __ ___ __

          appropriate to  effectuate the purposes of  [the ADEA], including
          ___________

          without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement

          or  promotion." 29 U.S.C.   626(b) (emphasis added); see also id.
                                                               ___ ____ ___

             626(c)(1) ("Any person aggrieved  may bring a  civil action in

          any court  . .  .  for such  legal or  equitable  relief as  will
                                 ____  _____ __  _________  ______ __  ____

          effectuate  the purposes  of  this  chapter.") (emphasis  added).
          __________  ___ ________  __  ____  _______

          ADEA   626(b) expressly incorporated particular provisions of the

          Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), including FLSA   216(b)  which

          states that "[t]he court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment
                                         _____

          awarded  to  the  plaintiff  or plaintiffs,  allow  a  reasonable

          attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant."  29  U.S.C.   216(b)

          (emphasis added).  

                    It was not  until 1974,  see id.    633a, that  certain
                                             ___ ___

          federal government employees became  entitled to protection under

          the ADEA.  Lewis, 953  F.2d at 1281.  Moreover, Congress  did not
                     _____

          explicitly extend the  FLSA attorney fee provision,  viz., FLSA  

          216(b), to public sector  employees, as it had done  earlier with

          respect to  private sector employees.   Id.   Finally, subsection
                                                  __

          633a(f) flatly states  that any  ADEA claim brought  by a  public

          sector employee under new section 633a is neither affected by nor

          subject  to "any provision  of . .  . [the ADEA],  other than the

          provisions  of section  631(b) of  this title [pertaining  to age

          limits] and the provisions of this section [633a]."   29 U.S.C.  

          633a(f); see also Lewis, 953 F.2d at 1281.  
                   ___ ____ _____

                                          3

                                          4

                    Nowd  nonetheless  argues   that  subsection   633a(c),

          authorizing "such  legal or  equitable relief as  will effectuate

          the purposes of [the ADEA],"  should be read to empower an  award

          of attorney fees against the United States.  We do not agree.  

               For  one  thing,  the  explicit  restriction  set  forth  in

          subsection  633a(f)  at the  time  that  section 633a  (including

          subsection 633a(c))  was enacted,  plainly provides that  section

          633a is a self-contained provision applicable exclusively to ADEA

          claims against public sector employers.  Lewis, 953 F.2d at 1281-
                                                   _____

          82;  see Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981) (holding
               ___ ______    ________

          that  federal employees  do  not have  the  right to  jury  trial

          available  to private sector ADEA claimants).   Second, under the

          so-called  "American Rule," parties in litigation ordinarily bear

          their own attorney fees.  See BTZ, Inc. v. Great Northern Nekoosa
                                    ___ _________    ______________________

          Corp.,  47  F.3d 463,  465 (1st  Cir.  1995); Committee  on Civic
          _____                                         ___________________

          Rights of the  Friends of Newburyport  Waterfront v. Romney,  518
          _________________________________________________    ______

          F.2d 71, 72 (1st Cir. 1975).  Exceptions normally obtain only for

          fee shifting awards expressly  authorized by statute. Id. (citing
                              _________                         ___

          Alyeska  Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
          ___________________________    ____________________

          (1975)).   Third, the availability vel non of attorney fees under
                                             ___ ___

          section  633a  directly  implicates  the  doctrine  of  sovereign

          immunity.  See United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754,  761 (1st Cir.
                     ___ _____________    ____

          1994) (citing  Ruckelshaus  v. Sierra  Club,  463 U.S.  680,  685
                         ___________     ____________

          (1983)).   Absent an express  and unequivocal waiver,  the United
                               _______      ___________

          States is immune from suit.  Id. at 761-62; see  also Lehman, 453
                                       ___            ___  ____ ______

          U.S. at 160-61.  Waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly

                                          5

          construed in favor of the United States and "must not be enlarged

          beyond  such  boundaries  as  [the  statute's]  language  plainly

          requires."  Horn, 29 F.3d at 762 (citing  United States v. Nordic
                      ____                          _____________    ______

          Village, Inc., 503 U.S.  30, 33-34 (1992)); cf. Lehman,  453 U.S.
          _____________                               __  ______

          at 160-61 (limiting right to jury trial under ADEA).  

                    The   generalized   language   in  subsection   633a(c)

          (authorizing "such  legal or equitable relief  as will effectuate

          the purposes of  [the ADEA]") is insufficient to  overcome either

          the  American Rule  or  sovereign immunity.    Whatever else  the

          Congress may  have intended  to  accomplish by  its enactment  of

          subsection 633a(c), it made no  express reference to attorney fee
                                          _______

          awards  against  the  United  States.    Furthermore,  the  broad

          language in subsection  633a(c) relied  on by Nowd     "legal  or

          equitable  relief"      cannot  be deemed  an  express  statutory

          authorization of  attorney fee  awards against the  United States

          without  ignoring  Congress'  explicit incorporation  of  FLSA   

          216(b)  which specifically  provided for  attorney fee  awards in

          private  sector  cases,  notwithstanding  the  presence   of  the
                                   _______________  ___  ________   __  ___

          identical  phrase "legal or equitable relief" in ADEA   626(b) at
          _________  ______

          the time FLSA   216(b) was incorporated.  

                    Were  we to  construe  the phrase  "legal or  equitable

          relief" as  encompassing attorney  fee awards against  the United

          States, Congress'  explicit incorporation  of FLSA    216(b) into

          the  private  sector ADEA  scheme would  be  reduced to  an empty

          exercise  and no effect  would be given to  ADEA   633a(f), which

          expressly confines  the  federal-employee ADEA  claims  procedure

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          within a self-contained scheme and defines the remedial limits of

          federal government  liability under  the ADEA.   See  Lehman, 453
                                                           ___  ______

          U.S. at 168; see also  Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S.  522,
                       ___ ____  _________    _____________

          525  (1987) ("'[W]here Congress  includes particular  language in

          one section of a statute  but omits it in another section  of the

          same   Act,  it   is  generally   presumed  that   Congress  acts

          intentionally and purposely in the disparate  . . . exclusion.'")

          (citations omitted); State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian
                               _____________________    ___________________

          Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 702 (1st  Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 298
          _____                                _____ ______

          (1994).  Accordingly,  we affirm the  district court ruling  that

          the ADEA  itself does not  authorize attorney fee  awards against

          the United States. 

          B.  The EAJA
          B.  The EAJA
              ________

                    Alternatively, Nowd contends that  he is entitled to an

          attorney fee award  against the  United States by  virtue of  the

          EAJA,  which   provides,  in   part,  that   "[u]nless  expressly
                                                                  _________

          prohibited  by statute,  a court  may  award reasonable  fees and
          __________                        ___

          expenses of attorneys . . .  to the prevailing party in any civil
                                                                  ___

          action brought .  . . against  the United States."   28 U.S.C.   

          2412(b) (emphasis added).   The EAJA provides  for awards against

          the United States  "to the same extent that any other party would

          be liable under . . . the terms of any statute which specifically
                                                         _____ ____________

          provides for such an award."  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, EAJA  
          ________ ___ ____ __ _____    ___

          2412(b) permits an attorney  fee award against the United  States

          where a private litigant would  be amenable to a fee award  under

          the  statute establishing the  particular cause of  action.  Id.;
                                                                       ___

                                          7

          see  also H.R.  Rep. No.  1418,  96th Cong.,  2d Sess.  8 (1980),
          ___  ____

          reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 4984, 4987.  
          _________ __

                    As  noted above,  see  supra p.  3, the  ADEA expressly
                                      ___  _____

          imports various remedial provisions from the FLSA, including FLSA

             216(b), which permits  attorney fee awards  in actions against

          private sector employers.  See 29 U.S.C.   626(b).  Consequently,
                                     ___

          a prevailing ADEA claimant  is entitled to a  reasonable attorney

          fee  award  against  a private  sector  employer.    Thus, it  is
                                 _______

          entirely  consistent  with the  EAJA's  purpose  that the  United

          States,  qua  employer, assume  responsibility  on  a "completely
                   ___

          equal  footing"  with  private  sector  employers  in  regard  to

          attorney fee  awards under  the ADEA.   See H.R.  Rep. No.  1418,
                                                  ___

          reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.  at 4987 (citing Natural Resources
          _________ __                                    _________________

          Defense  Council  v.  E.P.A.,  484 F.2d  1331  (1st  Cir. 1973)).
          ________________      ______

          Further,  in keeping with the  proviso to EAJA    2412(b), ADEA  

          633a(c) cannot be said    by its silence, cf. supra  Section A   
                                                    ___ _____

          to "expressly prohibit[]" attorney  fee awards against the United

          States.  See 29 U.S.C.   633a(c).  We therefore conclude that the
                   ___

          EAJA   empowers  the   district   courts,  in   their  reasonable

          discretion, to award prevailing  ADEA claimants attorney fees and

          expenses against the United States.  

          C.   The Nowd Application
          C.   The Nowd Application
               ____________________

                    The United States nonetheless contends that Nowd is not

          entitled  to an attorney fee award under  the EAJA, since the fee

          application  is  deficient.   See, e.g.,  Grendel's Den,  Inc. v.
                                        ___  ____   ____________________

          Larkin, 749  F.2d  945, 952  (1st  Cir. 1984)  (noting  potential
          ______

                                          8

          adverse   consequences   of   counsel's   failure   to   maintain

          contemporaneous  time records).  As the district court has yet to

          decide whether to exercise its discretion in this case, it should

          be afforded an  opportunity to consider  the Nowd application  in

          the first instance.  See Foster  v. Mydas Assocs., Inc., 943 F.2d
                               ___ ______     ___________________

          139,  144-45 (1st  Cir. 1991)  (noting that determination  of fee

          award  by  appellate court  in first  instance would  usurp trial

          court  function); see also Grendel's  Den, Inc., 749  F.2d at 952
                            ___ ____ ____________________

          (noting  that absence  of contemporaneous  time records  does not

          invariably result  in total disallowance of  fee application, but
                                _____ ____________

          instead may  warrant only a "substantial  reduction").  Moreover,

          it  appears that  Nowd did  not have  an adequate  opportunity to

          respond to the contention that the fee application was deficient.

          The  record reveals that  the district  court disallowed  the fee

          application,  on other  grounds,  two days  after the  government
                                            ___ ____

          first opposed it as deficient in form.   As Nowd  should be given

          an opportunity  to  respond, or  amend  the fee  application,  we

          remand to  the district court for  further proceedings consistent

          with this opinion.  

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    In sum, we  hold that the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.    633a, does

          not  mandate an award of  attorney fees and  expenses against the

          United  States  for the  benefit  of a  prevailing  public sector

          employee, but  that the  EAJA, 28  U.S.C.    2412(b), nonetheless

          permits  a  discretionary award  of  attorney  fees and  expenses

          against  the United States for  the benefit of  a prevailing ADEA

                                          9

          claimant.

                    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court
                    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court
                    _______________________________________________________

          order  and remand  for further  proceedings consistent  with this
          order  and remand  for further  proceedings consistent  with this
          _________________________________________________________________

          opinion.  
          opinion.  
          _______

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