Court Opinion

ID: 9768396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:00:58.665926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:40.480543
License: Public Domain

ENOCH, Justice,
dissenting, joined by GONZALEZ, Justice.
Texas Revised Civil Statute article 6701d, section 107C(j) provides that “[u]se or nonuse of a safety belt is not admissible evidence in a civil trial.” Today, the Court acknowledges that the legislature actually said “[u]se or nonuse of a safety belt is not admissible in a civil trial,” but concludes that the legislature did not really mean to say “[u]se or nonuse of a safety belt is not admissible in a civil trial.” Rather, the Court holds that the legislature really meant to say that only nonuse of a safety belt is not admissible in a civil trial. I respectfully dissent.
The Court announces that “[ajlthough the bare words of subsection (j), viewed in isolation, facially appear to advance Bridge-stone/Firestone’s argument, we decline to foster an interpretation so obviously contrary to the legislature’s intent.” 878 S.W.2d at 134. The Court then declares that “[sjubsection (j) was included in section 107C in order to make clear that the sole legal sanction for the failure to wear a seat belt is the criminal penalty provided by the statute and that the failure could not be used against the injured person in a civil trial.” This reasoning is devoid of support for neither section 107C(j), nor section 107C(j) read in context with section 107C, even remotely suggests this conclusion. In determining to avoid a result it considers unacceptable, the Court abandons long established rules of statutory construction and simply rewrites the legislation.
“If language in a statute is unambiguous, this court must seek the intent of the legislature as found in the plain and common meaning of the words and terms used.” Sorokolit v. Rhodes, — S.W.2d -, - (Tex.1994); See also, Coil v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1983) (citations omitted) *136(“[i]f the disputed statute is clear and unambiguous!!,] extrinsic aids and rules of statutory construction are inappropriate, and the statute should be given its common everyday meaning”); Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Municipal Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993); Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.1990); Republic-Bank Dallas, N.A v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985). Today, the Court ignores the plain and common meaning of the language used in section 107C(j) and concludes that “use or nonuse of a safety belt” really means only “nonuse of a safety belt.”
The Court attempts to justify its revision of the statute with exalted phrases such as “[w]ords in a vacuum mean nothing,” and “[o]nly in the context of the remainder of the statute can the true meaning of a single provision be made clear.” 878 S.W.2d at 133. But understandably, the Court provides absolutely no principled explanation of how section 107C(j), when read in the context of the mandatory seat belt law created by section 107C, was intended to preclude only evidence of nonuse of seat belts in a civil trial. 878 S.W.2d at 134. Section 107C provides civil penalties for persons who fail to use a seat belt while operating or riding in the front seat of a passenger car. Further, subsection (i) of section 107C directs the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation to “develop and implement an educational, program to encourage the wearing of safety belts.” Subsection (j), of course, provides that the use or nonuse of a seat belt is not admissible evidence in a civil trial. Upon what basis does this Court conclude that the preclusion of evidence of use of a seat belt is “so obviously contrary to the legislature’s intent” when read in the context of section 107C? 878 S.W.2d at 134. The Court does not explain because there is no principled explanation.
In addition, there is no logical basis for the Court’s conclusion that “[sjubseetion (j) was included in section 107C in order to make clear that the sole legal sanction for the failure to wear a seat belt is the criminal penalty provided by the statute and that the failure could not be used against the injured person in a civil trial.” 878 S.W.2d at 134. Because there is no logical basis for the Court’s conclusion, it is not surprising that the Court does not even attempt to provide a logical basis.
Further, the Court’s approach in this case is in absolute contradiction to the approach it took in Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.1993). In the Smith case, we addressed section 2.02 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code which establishes a cause of action against providers of alcohol under certain limited circumstances:
(b) Providing, selling, or serving an alcoholic beverage may be made the basis of a statutory cause of action under this chapter ... upon proof that:
(1) at the time the provision occurred it was apparent to the provider that the individual being sold, served, or provided with an alcoholic beverage was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger to himself and others ....
Tex.Alco.Bev.Code § 2.02 (emphasis added). Sewell became intoxicated at a bar owned by Smith and was severely injured on his way home in a one-car accident. We recognized that, historically, an individual who voluntarily became intoxicated was precluded from suing a tavern owner for his own injuries. 858 S.W.2d at 352. However, we concluded that the plain language of Chapter 2 provided a cause of action for an intoxicated party. Id. at 355.
Finally, the Court supports its decision with the statement that if the legislature did intend to preclude evidence of use of seat belts, “it seems unlikely that it would utilize a subsection of a traffic statute to effect such a change.” 878 S.W.2d at 134. A troubling aspect of this reasoning is that much of the penal law in this state would disappear under today’s expressed rationale. If courts are free to rewrite legislation simply because they think the legislature should have placed the statute somewhere else within the statutory framework, many laws would be subject to judicial revision. See E.g. TexHealth & Safety Code Ann. § 481.079 (Vernon 1992) (criminalizing possession and distribution of certain drugs although criminal conduct customarily defined in Penal Code).
*137It is obvious that the Court simply does not agree with the result created by section 107C(j) as it is written. However, as we stated in Simmons v. Arnim, 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66 (1920):
Courts must take statutes as they find them. More than that, they should be willing to take them as they find them. They should search out carefully the in-tendment of a statute, giving full effect to all of its terms. But they must find its intent in its language, and not elsewhere. ... They are not responsible for omissions in legislation. They are responsible for a true and fair interpretation of the written law. It must be an interpretation which expresses only the will of the makers of the law, not forced nor strained, but simply such as the words of the law in their plain sense fairly sanction and will clearly sustain.
See also RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985); Taylor v. Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Comm’n of the City of Lubbock, 616 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex.1981).
I recognize that it is reasonable for the Court to view the result of section 107C(j) as written to be unexpected, and I agree that the legislature may not have intended to abolish claims against seat belt manufacturers for injuries caused by defective seat belts. However, unless application of a legislative enactment produces an absurd result, I do not agree that we should simply rewrite a provision in order to achieve what we perceive to be the true intent of the legislature. At one time the majority of this Court was in accord. Not only did the majority hold so in Smith, supra, but later we were unanimous in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.1993). There, we applied the statutory guidelines for calculating child support as written even though the result was arguably inconsistent with the overriding intent of the legislation. Within two weeks of the issuance of that opinion, the legislature changed the statutory language to achieve its intended result. See 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 766, § 9, 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 2989.
Here too, the legislature could, as I have no doubt they would, change this statute. I note that numerous states have mandatory seat belt legislation and only three use language concerning the admissibility of evidence as broad-sweeping as section 107C(j). See Minn.Stat. § 169.685(4); Okla.Stat. tit. 47, § 12-420; Mont.Code Ann. § 61-13-106.1 It would not be difficult for the legislature to amend the statute to merely preserve the status quo regarding the consequences of safety belt use or nonuse, and thus preserve a cause of action for crashworthiness and prohibit the seat belt defense. For example, Hawaii’s statute provides:
This section shall not be deemed to change existing laws, rules, or procedures pertaining to a trial of a civil action for damages for personal injuries or death sustained in a motor vehicle accident.
Haw.Rev.Stat. § 291 — 11.6(d). Further, if the legislature chooses to abolish only the seat belt defense, it could draft a statute similar to that used in Kansas:
Evidence of failure of any person to use a safety belt shall not be admissible in any action for the purpose of determining any aspect of comparative negligence or mitigation of damages.
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 8-2504(c). See also Me. RevStatAnN. tit. 29, § 1368-A. Other states have created “crashworthiness exceptions” to their safety belt preclusion statutes. See, e.g., Md.Transp.Code § 22 — 412.3(h)(3)(i).
It is the Texas legislature’s prerogative to choose any of the above described options, or none at all — certainly it has not chosen any thus far. Section 107C(j) is clear and unambiguous. We have no authority to rewrite it.
Accordingly, the Court also errs in failing to address the validity of the statute under the Open Courts Provision.

. None of these states have addressed the issue presented by this case.