Court Opinion

ID: 9719110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:42:41.305067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.634010
License: Public Domain

EAKIN, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 While my esteemed colleagues offer a persuasive position, I am compelled to dissent.
¶ 2 An expert witness must possess “more expertise than is within the ordinary range of training, knowledge, intelligence, or experience.” Flanagan v. Labe, 547 Pa. 254, 690 A.2d 183, 185 (1997).
In order for expert testimony to be admissible, the party seeking to offer that testimony must provide an adequate foundation for doing so. A party does not lay an adequate foundation for expert testimony simply by presenting the testimony of its witness that he or she believes a particular proposition to be true based upon his or her own personal views and observations. This is especially true where the party opposing the admission of such testimony adduces evidence to establish that the data and studies used to support the reliability of the expert’s testimony have been criticized. Moreover, the scientific principles upon which the expert’s opinion relies cannot be based solely upon the views of a small segment of the relevant scientific community.
*745McKenzie v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 674 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 547 Pa. 733, 689 A.2d 237 (1997).
¶ 3 The Frye test10 provides, “[admissibility of the evidence depends upon the general acceptance of its validity by those scientists active in the field to which the evidence belongs.” Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1977) (emphasis in original). The Frye test is used to assure the quality of expert scientific evidence prior to admission, so as not to mislead jurors with untrustworthy evidence. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1317 (Pa.Super.1997), aff'd., 564 Pa. 3, 764 A.2d 1 (2000). Both the theory and technique underlying novel scientific evidence must be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 552 Pa. 149, 713 A.2d 1117, 1119 (1998).
¶ 4 The Gradys sought to present the testimony of Charles S. Beroes, Ph.D., an Associate Professor Emeritus of Chemical Engineering at the University of Pittsburgh, whose expertise is in the area of fire retardation. Dr. Beroes submitted a lengthy report describing his research, investigation, testing and document review, and opined:
• Frito-Lay failed to warn Mr. Grady of the danger of lacerating portions of his digestive tract when he ingested the Doritos;
• Frito-Lay failed to conduct appropriate safety tests regarding such danger;
• Frito-Lay failed to manufacture the product in question with uniform characteristics, such as hardness and compressive strength;
• Frito-Lay failed to warn consumers of the risk that its product could break teeth and cause other mouth injuries;
• Frito-Lay stated (in discovery) its consumers assumed the risk of such dangers but failed to identify such risk on its packaging;
• The Frito-Lay product in question was not fit for the purpose for which it was intended (safe consumption);
• The Frito-Lay product was negligently manufactured and designed, and was a dangerously defective product;
• Frito-Lay’s negligence and the inherent dangerousness of its product caused the injuries suffered by Mr. Grady.
Dr. Beroes based his opinions about the dangers of these chips on his testing of physical characteristics of Doritos; he sought to measure their compressive strength, and reviewed medical literature on corn chip tears of the esophagus. In its motion in limine, Frito-Lay challenged the methodology of Dr. Beroes.
¶ 5 Dr. Beroes pressed the pointed tips of the chips from two bags of Doritos (one dry, one moistened with saliva) into a Styrofoam pad on a platform gram balance, to measure the force necessary to crush the chip. The trial court was particularly critical of Dr. Beroes’ methodology, finding it “smacked of a high school science fair project and did not bear any relationship to the reality of the mastication and con*746sumption of foodstuffs.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/00, at 3. Characterizing Dr. Beroes’ methods as “akin to junk science,” the court concluded such methodology “was not based upon scientific data, or utilizing a methodology that was generally accepted in the community of scientists who evaluate food safety.” Id. The court also determined Dr. Beroes was not qualified to render a medical opinion as to causation.
¶ 6 The majority concludes compressive strength studies and the scientific principles involved in them are not novel. Assuming this is true in the abstract, I cannot say the trial court erred when it rejected Dr. Beroes’ methods. There is no reason in the record to believe this product was normally tested in such a rudimentary manner. Whether Dr. Be-roes used an accepted method of measuring compressive strength or not, the record has no evidence regarding the validity of his methods or conclusions. Not surprisingly, Frito-Lay’s expert, Dr. Martin Okos, criticizes the validity of the report. There simply are too many questions unanswered; the absence of such answers cause me to be unable to criticize the court’s conclusions.
¶ 7 The Gradys complain this is because the trial court failed to hold a Frye hearing to test the validity of the report after argument in chambers; the trial court on the record stated only that Dr. Beroes’ testimony does not meet the Frye test and that Dr. Beroes was giving testimony outside his area of expertise.11
¶ 8 For expert testimony to be admissible, the party proffering that testimony must provide an adequate foundation for doing so. McKenzie, at 1171. Self-serving assertions in this regard simply are not conclusive. See Blum, at 1323. The Gra-dys had the “burden of proving that their experts’ reasoning and methodology — let alone their conclusions — were generally accepted by the relevant scientific communities.” Id., at 1321. I see nothing in the record to suggest the Gradys were prepared to meet this burden. By time of trial, discovery was over. If the parties’ experts were deposed, their testimony was not made part of the record. Dr. Beroes’ own. report did not attempt to lay a foundation as to the general acceptance of his methods in the engineering community. Even now, in their brief to this Court, I see no suggestion the Gradys have any evidence to support the foundation necessary for admission of Dr. Beroes’ testimony-
¶ 9 Assuming arguendo that this opinion would pass the Frye test, Dr. Beroes’ report still fails to address the vital question of how his methods and conclusions translate to the human body. For example, would it matter to the conclusion how fast or thoroughly one chews? Does it matter which teeth are used? Do teeth differ from a thumb on the Styrofoam block? How rapidly does saliva affect the chip? Apart from the parties’ briefs and argument on Frito-Lay’s motion in limine, there is little of record about whether Dr. Beroes’ proposed testimony would pass muster under Frye.
¶ 10 We are not told how the compressive strength of Doritos as measured on a Styrofoam pad is relevant to the compressive strength of Doritos when chewed and then applied to human tissue in the eso-phagous. While perhaps more than a science fair project, the manifest differences between this methodology and basic masti*747cation cry out for more than is found here. Dr. Beroes’ analysis makes a leap of logic in this and other questions, and the trier of fact cannot be expected to fill in the gaps.
¶ 11 The trial court determined Dr. De-lerme’s opinion was not freestanding, but rather was dependent on Dr. Beroes’ opinion; since that opinion was excluded, the court held Dr. Delerme’s opinion must also be excluded. The court also determined Dr. Delerme’s opinion was outside his realm of expertise.
¶ 12 Although Dr. Delerme does rely on the conclusions of Dr. Beroes, that is not the sole basis of his conclusions; he also relies on Grady’s medical records, certain medical literature and information provided by Frito-Lay. To that extent, Dr. De-lerme’s report is self-supporting; exclusion of Dr. Beroes’ report would not be enough, on its own, to exclude Dr. Delerme’s report.
¶ 13 The trial court found Dr. Delerme was operating out of his area of expertise. The standard for admission of expert testimony is a liberal one: the proffered expert may testify so long as he has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge in the area in question. Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 541 Pa. 474, 664 A.2d 525, 528 (1995). It is the trier of fact’s role to determine the weight to be given such testimony. Id. In reviewing this determination, we are governed by an abuse of discretion standard. McKenzie, at 1171 n. 3. Whether this Court would have allowed Dr. Delerme’s testimony on the basis of his medical expertise is of no moment.
¶ 14 “[Ejxperts in one area of medicine may be found to be qualified to address other areas of specialization where the specialties overlap in practice, or where the specialist has had experience in a selected field of medicine.” Chanthavong v. Tran, 452 Pa.Super. 378, 682 A.2d 334, 338 (1996). The trial court was persuaded Dr. Delerme’s expertise was in a different area of the human body than that involved in Mr. Grady’s injury — in other words, the ear, nose, neck and larynx are too far away from the point of the tear, where the esophagus enters the stomach. Simply because the path of the chip passed from one to the other does not make these areas of the body subject to the same medical considerations. Since the record contains no evidence connecting the physiology of these areas, I cannot conclude the trial court’s decision amounts to an abuse of discretion.12
¶ 15 Accordingly, I offer this respectful dissent.

. The majority quotes Travelers Property & Casualty Co. v. General Electric Co., 150 F.Supp.2d 360, 364 (D.C.Conn.2001) which relies upon Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). However, in the eight years since Daubert was decided, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not held that its more relaxed standard supersedes or modifies the Frye test in Pennsylvania. See Pa.R.E. 702, Comment — 1998; Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 564 Pa. 3, 764 A.2d 1 (2000).

. The better course would have been, to hold a Frye hearing. Instead, the trial court’s opinion and the record reflect the parties acquiesced to argument regarding the motions in limine filed by the defendants. Neither party has presented the lack of a Frye hearing as an issue on appeal.

. The Gradys also contend the trial court erred in entering a compulsory nonsuit since a judge of coordinate jurisdiction entered a prior order denying a motion for summary judgment which challenged the same experts. In their post trial motion to remove the non-suit, the Gradys did recount the fact of the summary judgment motion and its denial, but did not contend the entry of nonsuit was precluded by that earlier ruling. Accordingly, they failed to preserve the issue and I would find it is waived. Kraus v. Taylor, 710 A.2d 1142, 1146 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal dismissed, 560 Pa. 220, 743 A.2d 451 (2000); Brown v. Philadelphia Tribune Co., 447 Pa.Super. 52, 668 A.2d 159, 162 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 621, 675 A.2d 1241 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 864, 117 S.Ct. 173, 136 L.Ed.2d 114 (1996). Since the Gradys did not raise the issue, we do not have the benefit of the trial court’s reasoning on the question.