Court Opinion

ID: 9779348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:47:47.648391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:25.613777
License: Public Domain

DIAL, Justice,
joined by TIJERINA, Justice,
concurring.
Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, which was granted, said appellee was entitled to judgment as .a matter of law because the evidence established the absence of appellant’s homestead right and, thus, the absence of a duty “to advise [appellant] of the extension and renewal of a valid pre-existing debt_” Appellee is correct in its contention of a lack of a homestead defense to a claim based on the February 1976 note to which appellant was a party, because any homestead right is inferior to a lien derived from improvements to the homestead. But this does not eliminate the duty of the bank to give the three months written notice of acceleration according to the terms of the February 1976 note. Before appellant’s interest in the property can be extinguished, she is entitled to three months written notice to give her the opportunity to satisfy the debt. Her right to continue her possessory interest in the property derives not from its homestead character, but from the lack of notice prior to the attempted foreclosure. She must have notice and be made a party prior to any successful foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien. San Antonio Real Estate, Building & Loan Association v. Stewart, 27 Tex.Civ.App. 229, 65 S.W. 665, 667 (writ ref’d). Cf. Fenimore v. Gonzales County Savings & Loan Association, 650 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (Notice under TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5810).
I concur in the result that permits appel-lee to remain in possession until such time as the bank gives her appropriate notice and meets all other requisites for foreclosure on the original note.