Court Opinion

ID: 9646287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:55:05.563366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:37.136306
License: Public Domain

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the reversal of this case and the reasoning on which it is based. I conclude that Woods’ production of the stolen device was sufficiently attenuated from any illegality that it was wholly independent and therefore admissible in evidence.
In determining whether a confession or evidence obtained after an illegal arrest is sufficiently attenuated from the arrest to permit its introduction, we consider whether Miranda-type warnings were given; the temporal proximity of the arrest and the production of the evidence; the presence of any intervening circumstance; and the purpose and flagrancy of any official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
Woods was arrested and given his warnings shortly after 1:00 a.m. He retrieved the stolen radar device at about 6:00 a.m., some five hours later. Temporal proximity, however, is not determinative alone. Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 788 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987). More important is the third factor, the presence of intervening circumstances during the time lapse that might have broken the causal connection between the arrest and the evidence. An intervening circumstance that may be sufficient to purge the taint of an illegal arrest may be either an appearance before a magistrate, termination of the illegal custody, consultation with counsel, or a volunteered statement not made in response to police interrogation. Bell v. State, supra, at 789. Here, the police summoned a magistrate to the scene, and he was present when Woods produced the stolen item. This was an intervening circumstance which further attenuated the act of producing the evidence from the arrest.
The final factor to be considered is the purpose and flagrancy of any illegal police conduct. Although the arrest here was warrantless, it was based on sufficient probable cause. The officers had unequivocal evidence that property taken in a vehicle burglary that occurred only fifteen minutes earlier was located in Woods’ home. When the officers arrived at the house, it was one o’clock in the morning. Woods and his brother, Preston, were the only persons in the house who were awake, and they were the two persons arrested. After obtaining consent to search the home, police officers gave Woods his warnings against self-incrimination. The police summoned a magistrate to the scene. There was no police misconduct. Thus, Woods’ arrest was with probable cause and without a “quality of purposefulness.” Self v. State, supra.
In summary, Woods was given Miranda-type warnings; nearly five hours elapsed between his arrest and the retrieval of the stolen radar detector; a magistrate was brought to him and was on the scene when the item was produced; and there was no police misconduct. Additionally, it appears that Woods decided to retrieve the stolen item to keep his mother and father from being arrested, rather than as a result of any illegality of his warrantless arrest. Woods himself testified that he led police to the item because he feared that his parents would be arrested. He stated that he did not want them jailed over something they had nothing to do with, and that he decided he should spare them by producing the stolen item.
For all these reasons, I find no causal connection between the warrantless arrest of Woods and his surrendering the stolen device. Woods’ act was not produced by the illegality of the arrest, but by other factors which operated on his own volition. *357Maixner v. State, 753 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Self v. State, supra.
Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980), cited by the majority, is inapposite. There, although there was a magistrate in the courthouse, the defendant was not in the presence of, nor did he converse with, the magistrate. Here, Woods was in the presence of the magistrate for an hour and a half or more, and he conversed freely with him about the charges which were being brought against him. Foster v. State, 677 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), also cited by the majority, is not in point at all.
The majority opinion states that the magistrate did not act in his official capacity and that he was summoned at the invitation of police officers. There is no support in the record for the first statement. The magistrate was there in his official capacity. As for being summoned by the police, that,does not taint the magistrate’s actions. Indeed, the law requires that the police summon a magistrate. Tex.Code Crim. ProcAnn. art. 14.06 (Vernon Supp.1991).
For the reasons stated, I would hold that Woods’ production of the stolen device was so attenuated from any illegality that it was of an independent origin and was admissible into evidence.