Court Opinion

ID: 9702865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:28:15.285166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:42.381672
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
President Judge LEADBETTER.
Respectfully, I dissent. Because I think that the ZHB applied and common pleas sustained an erroneous, overly restrictive interpretation of the ordinance to deny Verizon’s request to locate a telecommunications (cell) tower in the rural zoning district, I would reverse.
The proper interpretation of a zoning ordinance is an issue of law over which our review is plenary. A & L. Inv. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of McKeesport, 829 A.2d 775 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). In general, as the majority states, a ZHB’s interpretation of its ordinance is entitled to great weight and deference. City of Hope v. Sadsbury Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 890 A.2d 1137, 1143 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). This principle is especially applicable where the ZHB has afforded the applicant a permissive rather than restrictive interpretation. See Smith v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Huntingdon Borough, 734 A.2d 55 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). However, a restrictive interpretation is limited by the general principle that a zoning ordinance, which by nature conflicts with the broad common law rights of a landowner, should be construed in a manner that affords a landowner the benefit of the broadest scope of use that a reasonable interpretation may afford. See Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, Section 603.1, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10603.1. E.g., Appeal of Rolling Green Golf Club, 374 Pa. 450, 97 A.2d 523 (1953); Burgoon v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Charlestown Twp., 2 Pa.Cmwlth. 238, 277 A.2d 837, 841 (1971) (recognizing that a term describing a permitted use, such as “educational,” carries both a permitted and a restrictive component within the interpretation of its meaning and stating that “the permissive nature of the phrase must be taken in its ‘broadest sense.’ ”).
In the present case, the ordinance contains a general provision, at Section 304.5, that opens the door, in any zoning district, to ZHB approval of a use similar or compatible to the uses expressly permitted. Section 304.5 of the ordinance, provides:
When a specific use is neither permitted nor prohibited in the schedule of district regulations, the Zoning Hearing Board shall make a determination, as an Administrative Review, as to the similarity or compatibility of the use in question to the permitted uses in the district, basing the decision on the overall intent stipulated for the district.
The majority points to the language in this “savings provision” calling for the similarity or compatibility of the use to be determined based on “the overall intent stipulated for the district.” Such reliance ignores well-established case law holding that ordinance provisions calling for implementation of, or consistency with, statements of general intent cannot serve to undermine provisions in an ordinance that more specifically permit a use. See Phillips v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Montour Twp., 776 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). Consequently, while Section 304.5 directs that similarity or compatibility determinations should be based on the overall intent *440stipulated for the district, this analysis should not override a more specific comparison between what the ordinance permits and the proposed use. In other words, if a radio or electric tower is permitted in the R-l District, then a similar structure, such as a cell tower, cannot be held under the guise of incompatibility to be prohibited.
Listed among the “permitted uses” in the R-l District appears: “Public structures owned or operated by the Municipality or a Municipal Authority organized by the Municipality.” Zoning Ordinance, § 402.1F. I believe that this provision opens the door to the erection of an emergency radio dispatch tower in the R-l District. However, in interpreting whether the proposed cell tower qualifies as similar to that which is explicitly permitted as a “public structure,” the majority agrees with both common pleas and the ZHB that Verizon’s cell tower does not qualify as a permitted structure because Verizon is not a municipality or a municipal authority. This analysis misplaces the focus on the nature of the entity using the structure rather than on the nature of the structure itself and the uses to which a tall tower may be devoted, such as the transmission of power or sound frequency. The focus on the nature of the entity using the structure results in an overly restrictive interpretation.
The only proper focus is on the similarity between the cell tower and the type of structures that may be erected to facilitate a public use.1 See Polay v. Bd. of Supervisors of West Vincent Twp., 752 A.2d 434, 436 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). Insofar as a municipality or municipal authority may erect a radio/emergency dispatch tower in the R-l District, Verizon seeks to erect a structure for a use sufficiently similar to qualify under ordinance Section 304.5. See, e.g. Pearson v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Newlin Twp., 765 A.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) (ruling that 150 foot cell tower and associated equipment is a “radio transmitter.”).
In addition, Section 519 of the ordinance provides:
For the purposes of this Ordinance, public utilities exemptions to district requirements shall extend only to accessory support and maintenance structures and buildings not requiring human occupancy. Such uses and structures including fences shall be located no closer than ten (10) feet to any lot line or road right-of-way line. Principal utility structures (e.g. sewage treatment plants, electrical power plants, etc.) shall be permitted in any district but shall comply in all respects with the requirements for a principal use of the district in which it will be located.
I cannot construe this provision as opening the door in every zoning district to only principal utility structures. Such a construction is illogical insofar as it would permit placing a power plant in any zoning district but not allow in the same district the accessory towers necessary for transmission of power from the generating plant. Rather, I view this provision as requiring that principal utility structures comply in all respects to the requirements for principal uses in the district in which they will be located, but the accessory and maintenance structures are exempt from *441district requirements such as setbacks. Inasmuch as Section 519 provides in every zoning district for structures such as electrical generating facilities and the associated transmission lines, the question becomes whether the proposed cell tower is sufficiently similar or compatible to such transmission fines so as to fall within the permission afforded under Section 304.5 to locate such similar or compatible structures in the R-l District. I believe it strains credulity to conclude that high power transmission fines and cell towers are dissimilar.
Indeed, an objecting neighbor based her case against the cell tower on its similarity to electric transmission towers. A real estate appraiser, Larry Foote, testifying on behalf of intervenor, Adafine Atkins, noted the similarity between towers that accommodate electrical fines and the proposed cell tower. Foote testified that in his efforts to assess the probable impact of the tower on real estate values and unable to find a residential property with a cell tower in close proximity similar to the instant circumstances, he “looked for another similar structure and located large steel electrical towers and found some of those by residential properties.” Notes of Testimony, January 27, 2005 at 149. Foote then based his comparative value analysis on the properties near the electrical towers. While Mr. Foote’s testimony certainly cannot determine our legal interpretation of the ordinance, a common sense interpretation compels my agreement with his assessment as to the similarity between electrical towers and cell towers.
In allowing via Section 304.5 uses similar to those explicitly permitted, and in then allowing utility structures in all districts, as well as municipal structures in the R-l District, the ordinance implicitly permits cell towers in every district, including the R-l District at issue here.
Accordingly, I would reverse.

. The majority opines that the "similar to” inquiry must encompass a determination that the tower’s use serves the public. While I conclude that the only crucial determination is whether the activity on the site is similar to an activity permitted under the ordinance, I nevertheless do not agree that the provision of cell phone service advances only private business interests. Cell phones provide an element of public benefit in the same manner as land line telephone service.