Court Opinion

ID: 9587347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:21:17.132049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:34.759241
License: Public Domain

*325BENHAM, Justice,
concurring specially.
I join the main opinion’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction and, in so doing, agree that appellant did not meet her burden of proving ineffective assistance of trial counsel stemming from trial counsel’s failure to ensure the attendance of the out-of-state witness who did not show up at trial. However, I cannot endorse the rationale employed in the main opinion to reach that conclusion because the main opinion ignores the law of proffer and unnecessarily muddies the waters with regard to the use of affidavits,4 and because I take issue with the main opinion’s assertion that an attorney’s testimony regarding the attorney’s understanding of the content of a witness’s testimony is hearsay.
The main opinion concludes appellant failed to present evidence establishing there was a reasonable probability that the result of her trial would have been different had her trial counsel ensured the attendance of the missing witness because she did not present the contents of the uncalled witness’s testimony through that witness’s testimony or “a legally recognizable substitute for the uncalled witness’s testimony.” I, on the other hand, believe appellant, following the directive this Court set out in Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, 265 Ga. 614 (458 SE2d 623) (1995), presented evidence of the contents of the testimony of the uncalled witness pursuant to the law of proffer, but did not establish that the result of the trial would have been different had the witness testified at trial.
In Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, supra, we set out the burden of proof required of a defendant who asserted trial counsel performed defi-ciently by failing to call a witness at trial, and the method by which the defendant was required to attempt to carry the burden. After establishing trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to call a witness, the defendant had to make “an affirmative showing that specifically demonstrates how counsel’s failure would have affected the outcome of [defendant’s] case.” Id. at 615. We required the defendant “ ‘to make any proffer of the uncalled witness’s testimony ... to show there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different.’ [Cit.]” Id.
Aproffer is the presentation of the testimony itself or a summary by counsel of the missing witness’s testimony. Goger, Daniel’s Georgia Handbook on Criminal Evidence, § 1-20 (2005 ed.). “[T]he proponent [of a proffer] must tell the judge what the tenor of the evidence *326would be and why the evidence is logically relevant.” McCormick on Evidence, Vol. 1, § 51, p. 218 (5th ed. 1999). “[A]ll that is required [of an offer of proof] is presentation of the pertinent facts on the record, a task that can be accomplished by counsel simply stating the facts on the record.” Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence, § 3.5, p. 32 (2nd ed. 2002). Aproffer may be made by having the missing witness testify at the post-trial hearing or by submitting the affidavit of the missing witness at the post-trial hearing (Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 807 (2) (b) (439 SE2d 911) (1994)), or by counsel summarizing what counsel expected the missing witness’s testimony to be. See Cain v. State, 277 Ga. 309 (4) (588 SE2d 707) (2003). It is an exercise of a trial court’s discretion to decide whether, under the circumstances, a proffer will be allowed. See Castell v. State, 252 Ga. 418 (2) (314 SE2d 210) (1984) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing proffer where proffering attorney refused to answer questions concerning the witness’s absence and whether the witness was a material witness).
At the hearing on the motion for new trial in the case at bar, trial counsel informed the trial court that the missing witness had been expected to testify about the victim’s abuse of appellant while they lived in Louisiana, as well as the victim’s physical abuse of the witness. Trial counsel stated his belief the missing witness’s testimony would have been helpful to the battered person defense he was presenting, but acknowledged he had no “hard evidence” the testimony would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. There was neither objection voiced by the State nor concern raised by the trial court with regard to the receipt of trial counsel’s summary of his expectation of the missing witness’s testimony and its relevancy to the defense he was presenting on appellant’s behalf.
The main opinion effectively prohibits a trial court from exercising its discretion to permit trial counsel to summarize the expected testimony of a missing witness on the ground that trial counsel’s summary constitutes impermissible hearsay because trial counsel is seeking “to establish the truth of that uncalled witness’s testimony.” Maj. op. p. 322.1 disagree. At the hearing on the motion for new trial where alleged ineffective assistance of counsel was the issue, appellant was not required to prove that she and the missing witness were physically abused by the victim in Louisiana; rather, she was required to show she had a witness who would have supported her battered person defense by testifying about physical abuse inflicted by the victim and that, but for the witness’s failure to testify, brought about by trial counsel’s failure to take steps to ensure the witness’s attendance, the outcome of her trial would have been different. Through the presentation of trial counsel’s summary of the testimony expected of the missing witness, appellant is not trying to establish the truth of the uncalled witness’s testimony, but only making a *327proffer in an attempt to make “an affirmative showing that specifically demonstrates how counsel’s failure [to call the witness] would have affected the outcome of [appellant’s] case.” Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, supra at 615.
Decided March 13, 2006.
Edwin J. Wilson, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, John S. Melvin, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Julie A. Adams, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
In conclusion, I believe the law of proffer still has a place in post-trial proceedings in which a defendant alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a particular witness, establishes deficient performance in that regard, and makes the required proffer of the uncalled witness’s testimony to show there is a reasonable probability the results of the trial would have been different had the witness testified. I believe appellant made an appropriate proffer through trial counsel’s summary of the testimony he had expected the missing witness to give and trial counsel’s explanation of the relevancy of that expected testimony to the defense being presented. However, in light of the testimony of the expert on battered person syndrome and the two lay witnesses who described the victim’s abuse of appellant while the couple lived in Georgia, I believe appellant did not show a reasonable probability that the missing witness’s testimony would have resulted in a verdict other than guilty. Accordingly, I conclude appellant did not meet her burden of proving that trial counsel’s performance was so deficient as to require reversal of the judgment of conviction, and I agree with the main opinion that appellant’s conviction must be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley and Justice Hines join this special concurrence.

 In a footnote, the majority presents a lengthy analysis on the use of affidavits in connection with motions for new trial despite the fact that no affidavit was used in the case at bar.