Court Opinion

ID: 9632844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:26:10.849798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:23.269509
License: Public Domain

OBERT L. BRowI'~i, Justice, concurring. As an initial matter, I agree that the summary judgment should be affirmed because Delanno failed to offer any proof of fraudulent concealment so as to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). That is the test under Rule 56(c)(2). Because of the failure to present any proof of fraudulent concealment, it is not necessary to discuss the failure to discover fraud by the exercise of reasonable diligence. First, the diligence discussion is obiter dictum, but, secondly, I agree with Delanno that whether its diligence was “reasonable” raises a fact question. See Hickson v. Saig, 3009 Ark. 231, 828 S.W.2d 840 (1992). When the State contacted Delanno in the Spring of 2001 and advised that taxes were owed on the sale, Gail Delanno called the law firm and was assured that the State was wrong, in effect, because the firm had a tax-clearance letter in its file. Was this reasonable diligence on Delanno’s part? That to me is a jury issue. Accordingly, I would not rely on “reasonable diligence” as a basis for affirming summary judgment. For these reasons, I concur. Corbin, J., joins this concurrence. Imber, J., not participating.