Court Opinion

ID: 9946527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 20:04:38.153894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.235509
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Feb 29 2024, 8:45 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
W. Edward Skees                                           Robert L. Barlow, II
New Albany, Indiana                                       Jenner Pattison & Sharpe
                                                          Madison, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Barbara Chitwood,                                         February 29, 2024
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-MF-2092
        v.                                                Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit
                                                          Court
John Guadagnoli,                                          The Honorable Donald J. Mote,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          39C01-0810-MF-699

                                  Opinion by Judge Riley.
                               Judges Brown and Foley concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024                            Page 1 of 12
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Defendant, Barbara Chitwood (Chitwood), appeals the trial court’s

      grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee-Plaintiff, John Guadagnoli

      (Guadagnoli), on Guadagnoli’s Complaint to Foreclose Default Judgment.

[2]   We reverse and remand.

      ISSUE
[3]   Chitwood presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as:

      Whether there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the entry of

      summary judgment.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   On July 10, 2006, Guadagnoli filed a Complaint against Chitwood in Jefferson

      Circuit Court in Cause 39C01-0607-CC-000387 (Cause 387). On September 21,

      2006, Guadagnoli filed a motion for default judgment, which was granted the

      same day, and which awarded Guadagnoli a judgment in the amount of

      $19,536.63, plus statutory interest and attorney fees. On June 16, 2008,

      Guadagnoli moved for proceedings supplemental, with a hearing held on July

      21, 2008. No further action was taken until January 22, 2020, when the parties

      appeared for a pre-trial conference, at which time the trial court set deadlines to

      submit discovery and dispositive motions. Chitwood served discovery requests

      on January 28, 2020, and Guadagnoli responded to the requests on February

      19, 2020. Counsel for Chitwood withdrew on December 1, 2021.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024      Page 2 of 12
[5]   On October 14, 2008, Guadagnoli filed his Complaint to foreclose default

      judgment in the current Cause 36C01-0810-MF-000699 (Cause 699), in which

      he requested the trial court to order his default judgment foreclosed against

      Chitwood, to enter judgment against Chitwood in the sum of $25,349.80, plus

      statutory interest, and to order Chitwood’s real estate sold in satisfaction of his

      default judgment, after satisfying any liens preceding the judgment. On

      October 31, 2008, Chitwood filed Chapter l3 bankruptcy. She subsequently

      moved to avoid the judgment lien and an Order in this regard was entered by

      the Bankruptcy Court on January l, 2011. She failed to pay her monthly

      obligations under her Chapter l3 bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy proceeding

      was subsequently dismissed.

[6]   On April 24, 2019, Guadagnoli filed a motion to re-establish judicial lien, due

      to the bankruptcy case having been dismissed by the United States Bankruptcy

      Court for the Southern District of Indiana on July 24, 2012. On June 6, 2022,

      Chitwood filed a motion to dismiss the current Cause 699, to which

      Guadagnoli responded on June 14, 2022. Approximately one month later and

      after conducting a hearing, on August 24, 2022, the trial court denied

      Chitwood’s motion to dismiss. In its order, the trial court concluded that

      because “the enforcement of a judgment lien is a separate and distinct action

      from the execution of money judgment via proceeding supplemental,”

      Guadagnoli, “properly filed his Complaint to Foreclose Default Judgment here,

      separate and distinct from [Cause 387].” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 10-11).

      Furthermore, because Guadagnoli’s “original default judgment was entered

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024       Page 3 of 12
      September 21, 2006,” his foreclosure action filed on October 14, 2008, was

      “well within the statute of limitations. [Guadagnoli’s] [C]omplaint is therefore

      timely.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11).

[7]   On March 17, 2023, Guadagnoli filed a motion for summary judgment,

      together with a memorandum in support and designation of evidence, arguing

      that the designated evidence established that no genuine issue of material fact

      existed, and that Guadagnoli is entitled to a decree of foreclosure against

      Chitwood. On April 21, 2023, Chitwood filed her response, memorandum in

      support, and designation of evidence. Chitwood contended that the entry of

      summary judgment was precluded because (1) Guadagnoli had no standing to

      bring the “mortgage foreclosure action”; 1 (2) no judgment lien exists because

      “the judgment [in Cause 387] was vacated by implication”; and (3) if “a valid

      judgment exists under [Cause 387], the time to enforce it has expired.”

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 16). On August 10, 2023, after a hearing, the trial

      court summarily granted Guadagnoli’s motion, and entered judgment in his

      favor.

[8]   Chitwood now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

      DISCUSSION AND DECISION
      I. Standard of Review

      1
          Chitwood has abandoned this argument on appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024      Page 4 of 12
[9]    Chitwood challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to

       Guadagnoli. “The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation

       about which there can be no factual dispute and which can be determined as a

       matter of law.” Lamb v. Mid Ind. Serv. Co., 19 N.E.3d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014). “The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a

       prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is

       entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mint Mgmt., LLC v. City of Richmond,

       69 N.E.3d 561, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Summary

       judgment is a “high bar” for the moving party to clear in Indiana. Hughley v.

       State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014). If “the moving party satisfies this

       burden through evidence designated to the trial court, the non-moving party

       may not rest on its pleadings, but must designate specific facts demonstrating

       the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Biedron v. Anonymous Physician 1, 106

       N.E.3d 1079, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Broadbent v. Fifth Third Bank,

       59 N.E.3d 305, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied), trans. denied. “A fact is

       material if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is

       genuine if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of

       the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable

       inferences.” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (citation and

       quotation marks omitted).

[10]   We review a court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo, applying

       the same standard as the trial court. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003. “In

       conducting our review, we consider only those matters that were designated to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024         Page 5 of 12
       the trial court during the summary judgment stage.” Lowrey v. SCI Funeral

       Servs., Inc., 163 N.E.3d 857, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. “In

       determining whether issues of material fact exist, we neither reweigh evidence

       nor judge witness credibility [but] accept as true those facts established by the

       designated evidence favoring the non-moving party.” Id. (citations omitted).

       “Any doubts as to any facts or inferences to be drawn from those facts must be

       resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” Denson v. Est. of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d

       535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). However, “[m]ere speculation is insufficient to

       create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.” Biedron,

       106 N.E.3d at 1089. In the summary judgment context, we are not bound by

       the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon, but they aid our review

       by providing the reasons for the trial court’s decision. Howard Cnty. Sheriff's

       Dep’t & Howard Cnty. 911 Commc’ns v. Duke, 172 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2021), trans. denied. The party that lost in the trial court bears the burden

       of persuading us that the trial court erred. Biedron, 106 N.E.3d at 1089.

[11]   Prior to turning to the merits of her contentions, we first must address

       Chitwood’s allegation that “Guadagnoli filed a motion for summary judgment

       in the underlying case without designating any evidence or supporting

       affidavits.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 14).

[12]   While Guadagnoli filed a designation of evidence together with his

       memorandum supporting the motion for summary judgment, no documents or

       affidavits were attached. “A party has the discretion to designate the material

       either in the summary judgment motion itself, in a separate filing, or in a brief

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024         Page 6 of 12
       in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and that

       party acts within its discretion as long as it informs the trial court of the specific

       material upon which it relies in support of its motion for summary judgment.”

       Riviera Plaza Investments, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 10 N.E.3d 541, 546 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2014). Guadagnoli’s memorandum referred to the default judgment

       and the order denying Chitwood’s motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Indiana Rule

       of Evidence 201(b)(5), “[a] court may judicially notice [....] records of a court of

       this state” and pursuant to Trial Rule 56(C), “[a]t the time of filing the motion

       [of summary judgment] or response, a party shall designate to the court all parts

       of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of

       judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the

       motion.” While the record does not seem to contain any explicit statement that

       the trial court took judicial notice of these specific records mentioned in

       Guadagnoli’s memorandum, it seems clear, from the grant of summary

       judgment to Guadagnoli, that this essentially occurred. See also Riviera Plaza

       Investments, LLC, 10 N.E.3d at 546 (where we recognized that a trial court can

       take judicial notice in the context of a request for summary judgment).

       II. Analysis

[13]   Without attacking the validity of the underlying default judgment, Chitwood

       first contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

       default judgment was set aside in Cause 387 and therefore cannot be used as the

       underlying judgment to support Guadagnoli’s Complaint to foreclose judgment.

       Pointing to the chronological case summary (CCS) in Cause 387, Chitwood
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024         Page 7 of 12
       maintains that “[t]he only explanation for the [c]ourt ordering discovery,

       dispositive motions, and responsive pleadings is [that] the default judgment

       under [Cause 387] was vacated.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 15).

[14]   The CCS in Cause 387 reflects that the trial court conducted a hearing on the

       motion for proceedings supplemental on July 21, 2008. These proceedings

       were stayed by the trial court by CCS entry of January 1, 2011, due to

       Chitwood’s bankruptcy filing, until July 24, 2012, when the bankruptcy case

       was dismissed. No action was undertaken in this Cause until January 22, 2020,

       when the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing in which it set the dates for

       discovery and dispositive motions. Contrary to Chitwood’s argument, the CCS

       does not indicate that the default judgment was set aside or that she had made

       any filings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60 to commence the vacating of the

       default judgment. As Chitwood’s argument amounts to mere speculation, her

       contention “is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat

       summary judgment.” Biedron, 106 N.E.3d at 1089.

[15]   In a related argument, Chitwood claims that Guadagnoli’s default judgment

       has expired. Focusing on Indiana Code § 34-55-9-2, Chitwood contends that

       since the default judgment was granted on September 21, 2006, and was not

       renewed within a ten-year period, the judgment expired on September 21, 2016.

[16]   Indiana Code section 34-55-9-2 provides that all final judgments for the

       recovery of money constitute a lien until the expiration of ten years after the

       judgment is issued. Although a judgment lien expires after ten years, a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024       Page 8 of 12
       judgment still exists for at least another ten years. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-12

       (judgment is considered satisfied after twenty years). Nevertheless, we have

       been careful to note that Indiana Code section 34-11-2-12 does not indicate “‘an

       intention to utterly destroy judgments after the lapse of 20 years.’” U.S. Bank

       Trust Nat’l Assoc. as Trustee of American Homeowner Preservation Trust Series 2015

       A+ v. Dugger, 193 N.E.3d 1015, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Lewis v. Rex

       Metal Craft, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 812, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Odell v.

       Green, 72 Ind. App. 65, 77, 122 N.E. 791, 791 (1919)).

[17]   Here, Guadagnoli’s default judgment was granted on September 21, 2006.

       Because the default judgment constituted the recovery of money, the judgment

       lien expired on September 21, 2016. However, because Chitwood filed

       bankruptcy proceedings on October 31, 2008, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) provided for

       an automatic stay, restraining creditors, like Guadagnoli, with an injunction

       from taking actions against Chitwood and the property. The bankruptcy

       proceeding was dismissed on July 24, 2012. Accordingly, as the proceedings

       were stayed for three years and nine months, Guadagnoli’s lien on Chitwood’s

       real property expired in June 2020. 2

       2
         In his appellate brief, Guadagnoli adopts the trial court’s application of Indiana Code section 34-55-9-2 in
       its order denying Chitwood’s motion to dismiss, by treating the ten-year lien timeline as a statute of
       limitations, which the trial court considered tolled by the filing of Guadagnoli’s motion to foreclose on
       October 14, 2008. However, as Guadagnoli did not provide us with supporting precedents or persuasive
       arguments and we did not find any in our research, we reject this novel interpretation of Indiana Code
       section 34-55-9-2 as a statute of limitations and follow the jurisprudence set by the appellate bench.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024                                Page 9 of 12
[18]   During the eleventh through twentieth years after judgment, no lien exists as to

       the debtor’s real estate. I.C. § 34-55-9-2(2); Lewis, 831 N.E.2d at 823 (Mathias,

       J., concurring); Borgman v. Aikens, 681 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

       However, with the permission of the trial court, execution against real estate

       may still issue, albeit without the benefit of a judgment lien. I.C. § 34-55-1-2;

       See, e.g., I.C. § 34-55-1-3(1) (one of three kinds of execution of judgments is

       execution against property of judgment debtor); Williams v. Lyddick, 62 N.E.2d

       88, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1945).

[19]   While a judgment may be renewed before the expiration of the lien, we are

       unaware of any requirement to renew. Rather, it has been noted that

       “[b]ecause of the confusing complexity of execution and proceedings

       supplemental, and the added uncertainty caused by the two attendant decade-

       long time periods, most sophisticated judgment creditors ‘renew’ their

       judgments shortly before the expiration of the first (and each successive) decade

       after judgment.” Lewis, 831 N.E.2d at 823 (Mathias, J., concurring). Such

       renewal actions may take place ad infinitum. Town of New Chicago v. First State

       Bank of Hobart, 169 N.E. 56, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 1929).

[20]   Here, while the judgment lien has expired, Guadagnoli’s default judgment

       against Chitwood has not. And, as the designated evidence does not reflect that

       Guadagnoli renewed the judgment prior to the expiration of the judgment lien,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024      Page 10 of 12
       he must obtain leave of the trial court in order to execute on the judgment. 3 See

       I.C. § 34-55-1-2(a); see also Borgman, 681 N.E.2d at 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)

       (citing the predecessor of Indiana Code section 34-55-1-2 and determining that

       where judgment creditors failed to seek renewal of judgment prior to the end of

       ten years after the entry of judgment, execution of the judgment could only be

       had by leave of the court), trans. denied. Accordingly, we reverse the entry of

       summary judgment in favor of Guadagnoli, and we remand to the trial court for

       further proceedings. 4

       CONCLUSION
[21]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that genuine issues of material fact exist which

       preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of Guadagnoli. Therefore,

       we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[22]   Reversed and remanded.

       3
        “A renewal complaint pleads the existing judgment, alleges liquidated, accrued interest, and seeks entry of a
       new judgment in the amount of the original judgment.” See I.C. § 34-55-1-6; Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc.,
       831 N.E. 2d 812, 823 n.13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Since Guadagnoli failed to designate evidence sufficient to
       establish a renewal, summary judgment would be inappropriate.
       4
         In her notice of appeal and in the conclusion of her appellate brief, Chitwood requests this court “to
       reverse, in its entirety, the trial court’s Order Denying Motion to Dismiss.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 16). Absent
       specific exceptions which are not present in this case, this court has jurisdiction only over final judgments and
       appeals from interlocutory orders, and “[g]enerally the denial of a motion to dismiss under T.R. 12(B)(6) is
       not in itself a final appealable order.” Ind. Appellate Rule 5; Sch. City of Gary v. Cont’l Elec. Co., Inc., 301
       N.E.2d 803, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973). To be a final appealable order, the order “must dispose of all issues to
       all parties, ending the particular case and leaving nothing for future determination.” Ramsey v. Moore, 959
       N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 2012). By denying Chitwood’s motion to dismiss, the trial court allowed this case to
       go forward, clearly not disposing of the issues.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024                               Page 11 of 12
Brown, J. and Foley, J. concur

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MF-2092| February 29, 2024   Page 12 of 12