Court Opinion

ID: 9575100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:11:36.085429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:58.357850
License: Public Domain

Duff, J., with whom Baker, J.,
joins, dissenting.
I would affirm the conviction of attempted capital murder for two reasons: First, on the record before us I find no conflict in the evidence on any essential element of the crime charged. Thus, the requested instruction on simple assault, was properly denied. Second, the record does not show that the defendant presented the *532trial court with the same argument he advances on appeal. Thus, he has not preserved the issue for appellate consideration.
The majority asserts that the evidence is “reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that Martin’s words and feints with the knife were intended to intimidate and immobilize Kiniry in order to enable Martin to escape.” I disagree. Martin was fleeing from Kiniry, who did not have his gun drawn. For an unknown reason, Martin stopped his flight and, with knife poised, waited for the officer to come around the van. When Kiniry rounded the corner of the vehicle, Martin said, “Come get some of this shit. Fm going to kill you.” At this point, the record shows that Kiniry and Martin were about two feet apart. What the majority characterizes as “feints” with the knife, the record shows to be two swings or swipes at Kiniry’s throat, so close that the officer could feel the wind from the blade as it passed him. He testified that he avoided being cut only by bending backward on the van. This testimony stands uncontradicted in the record.
After the first swing at his throat, Kiniry attempted to draw his weapon, but experienced difficulty because his shirt in some manner became tangled with the holster. As the trial court observed, the officer’s testimony was equivocal as to whether he had drawn his gun at that time or was still struggling to remove it from its holster. Nevertheless, “the evidence clearly established that it was there for Martin to be aware of, that is that the police officer was making use of his weapon in an effort to protect himself, and at that point Martin elected to flee rather than to continue with the . . . overt but ineffectual act.”
One’s intent can be determined in two ways: by an actual statement of intent or by reasonable inference from the defendant’s acts. Rare is the case where the trier of fact has the luxury of being able to determine intent from a defendant’s own words. This, however, is such a case. Before swinging at Kiniry’s throat with the knife, Martin stated his intent in these unequivocal words: “Fm going to kill you.” He then proceeded to attempt to do just that. Considering that Martin himself stopped his flight in order to confront Kiniry, that he told Kiniry what he intended to do, then took appropriate steps to accomplish his intent, and that he began to flee again only when it was apparent that Kiniry was about to use his weapon, I find it unreasonable and unrealistic to conclude that Martin’s intent was anything other than what he *533said it was. In short, only a strained reading of this record provides a conflict in the evidence of intent or in the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. Thus, no basis in the evidence supported the tendered instruction on assault.
In Guss v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 13, 225 S.E.2d 196 (1976), a case strongly analogous to the case at bar, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s refusal, on a charge of robbery, to instruct the jury on simple assault. The Court in Guss observed, “All the evidence showed that the defendant struck and beat [the victim] and that he took the victim’s wallet concomitant with the striking and beating.” Id. at 15, 225 S.E.2d at 197.
In Cortner v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 557, 281 S.E.2d 908 (1981), where the defendant was charged with abduction for pecuniary benefit, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on simple abduction where the evidence showed that the defendant and his accomplice removed money from a pharmacy cash register, used the victim as a shield to get away from the police, and threatened to “blow him away” if not permitted to leave. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the greater charge and stated, “The trial court correctly refused [the lesser] instruction because there was no evidence to support the lesser charge.” Id. at 562, 281 S.E.2d at 910-11.
The defendant argues that his intent was placed in issue by his not guilty plea. Thus, he contends an assault instruction should have been given. Under this theory, any defendant who pleads not guilty to a charge (thus all defendants in a jury trial) would be entitled to instructions on every lesser-included offense, irrespective of the evidence presented. Such a theory is clearly contrary to Virginia law. Otherwise, the defendants in Cortner and Guss would have been entitled to lesser-included instructions.
Furthermore, the record before us does show that the argument now presented was not made in the trial court. Pursuant to Rule 5A:18, a defendant must timely object with specificity in order to preserve his claim for appeal. An objection to an instruction was insufficient which stated only, “Defendant objected and excepted to the action in giving instruction No. 2 offered by the Commonwealth, and to the refusal to give instruction F offered by defendant.” Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269, 273, 77 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1953). The Court held that the trial judge must be in*534formed of the “precise points of objection in the minds of counsel.” Id.
An appellant has the responsibility to present to the appellate court so much of the record as is necessary for a full consideration of the alleged error. Justis v. Young, 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 (1961). In Woods v. R. D. Hunt & Son, Inc., 207 Va. 281, 148 S.E.2d 779 (1966), the Supreme Court observed:
We have often said that on appeal the judgment of the court below is presumed to be correct and that the onus is upon the appellant to provide us with a sufficient record from which we can decide whether the trial court erred as alleged. A failure to furnish a sufficient record will result in an affirmance of the judgment appealed from.
Id. at 287, 148 S.E.2d at 783.
At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the transcript in the record states that the court and counsel “considered instructions to which there are no objections or exceptions.” Nothing in the record shows what arguments Martin presented as to why he was entitled to an assault instruction under the evidence. Following the guilty verdict, the record reflects that defense counsel asked the court “to consider granting Mr. Martin a new trial on the basis of the court’s failure to offer the jury the assault instruction.” The transcript does not contain any argument on the motion at that time. A transcriber’s note simply states that argument was had and the motion was denied. Subsequently, the defendant filed a written motion to set aside the verdict. The record contains the full argument made on that motion on October 31, 1989, eighteen days after trial.
The majority properly concludes that the primary purpose of Rule 5A:18 is to alert the trial judge to possible error so that he or she may consider the matter and take corrective action necessary to avoid unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials. Implicit in such a purpose is the requirement that the basis for the action requested be stated at a time when the judge can take corrective action. The record does not show that such was done in this case. Certainly the motion made following the guilty verdict was untimely, as the record shows the jury had by then been excused. *535Similarly, the argument made eighteen days later, even though accepted by the trial court, was untimely and did not satisfy Rule 5A:18. The court at that time could take no immediate corrective action other than to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, the very actions that Rule 5A:18 was designed to prevent.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that “[b]y tendering the assault instruction, Martin fully alerted the trial judge . . . that simple assault is a lesser included offense . . . and there was sufficient evidence to include it.” Offering the instruction was merely Martin’s bald assertion that sufficient evidence existed. The tendered instruction said nothing about the basis or reasons in support thereof. The record shows no analysis of the evidence and draws no distinctions from Virginia authorities such as Cortner and Guss. In short, we do not know the nature or extent of the argument presented, if any. As far as this record shows, the defendant tendered the assault instruction, waited to see the jury’s verdict and only presented the full argument now made on appeal some eighteen days thereafter. In my view, this state of the record does not satisfy Rule 5A:18.
For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s view of the case and would affirm the conviction.