Court Opinion

ID: 9690727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:38:13.702773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:33.407431
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
This case again brings home the risks inherent in canned guilty pleas. Unlike most cases in which the defendant waives a record, in this case the court reporter has provided a verbatim transcription of the proceeding.
Although the majority correctly points out that “[a]n appellate court will affirm the trial court’s judgment under article 1.15 if the State introduced evidence that embraces every essential element of the offense charged and that is sufficient to *221establish the defendant’s guilt,”1 here, the State introduced no evidence until the punishment phase. Even then, the State offered no evidence of the elements of the offense charged and no evidence of a judicial confession by Appellant, nor did the State ask the judge to take judicial notice of a judicial confession.
The printed boilerplate language of a six-page document provides the following language:
In open court we join and approve the waiver of jury trial pursuant to Art. 1.13, Code of Criminal Procedure and the stipulations of evidence pursuant to Art. 1.15, Code of Criminal Procedure. We further agree and consent to the admission of guilt of any unadjudicated offense under Sec. 12.45, Texas Penal Code. It is agreed that the Court may take judicial notice of this document and the Court takes judicial notice of same.
The subtitle of this portion of the six-page document is APPLICATION FOR COMMUNITY SUPERVISION. The admonishments, plea agreement, waiver of all rights to appeal, waivers of other rights, and the judicial confession were file marked Jan. 12, 2007 at 10:57. The reporter’s record does not reflect any reference to the judicial confession. Nothing in the record tells us whether the judicial confession existed at the time of the plea. We do not know whether the judicial confession and other waivers were executed or filed before or after the hearing at which the court accepted Appellant’s plea.
Had the State offered Appellant’s judicial confession into evidence, there would be no question whether the constitutional and statutory due process requirements were met.2 As the record stands, it is unclear whether the document referred to in the judicial notice portion of the boilerplate language is the document containing the application for community supervision or the entire document containing the plea agreement, waivers, and judicial confession. What is clear from the record is that no one offered stipulations or the judicial confession into evidence or asked the trial court to take judicial notice of a judicial confession. Nor did the trial court announce that it was aware of the existence of a judicial confession.
Were there no reporter’s record, we would presume procedural regularity.3 As the record stands, we have only the trial court’s reference to “these papers,” but no explanation of what “these papers” are. We cannot make presumptions that are contradicted by the record before us.
At first glance, it would seem that we could hold that the documents in the clerk’s record state what they state and that Appellant is bound by that language. But the record shows that Appellant was not bound by the language. For example, the boilerplate language states that the defendant waived the making of a PSI, yet the agreed plea bargain recommendation is “Open Plea with PSI,” and the trial judge recessed the plea hearing so that a PSI could be completed. Included in the boilerplate language is the statement, “I give up and waive any and all rights of appeal in this case,” yet a document not bearing a filemark informs Appellant of his right to appeal. And, indeed, this case is before us because Appellant appealed. Additionally, Appellant also waived the making of a record, yet the court reporter did make a record. The waivers also include such language as, “If I am proceed-*222mg by felony information, I give up and waive my right to indictment by a grand jury,” and “I give up and waive all rights given to me by law; whether of form, substance, or procedure under Art. 1.14, Code of Criminal Procedure,” yet clearly, Appellant did not waive his right to a grand jury indictment because the clerk’s record contains the indictment.
Due process does not preclude written admonishments and written judicial confessions. But when the admonitions and waivers are as broad as they are in this case, they become meaningless. We cannot say with assurance that they existed when the court accepted Appellant’s plea or that they were intelligible, and nothing in the record assures us that the State sustained its burden of introducing evidence to prove each element of the offense charged.
On March 9, 2007, the court reconvened, and both Appellant and the complainant testified. But neither testified to the elements of the offense. At that hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty of sexual assault and assessed punishment. Again, there was no reference to a judicial confession.
The State had only to ask that the judicial confession be admitted into evidence or that the trial court take judicial notice of the judicial confession. But the record shows that neither step occurred. Consequently, I would hold the evidence insufficient to support Appellant’s guilty plea, reverse the conviction, and remand the case to the trial court. Because the majority does not, I must respectfully dissent.
EXHIBIT “A”
*223[[Image here]]

. Majority op. at 219.

. See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (op. on reh’g).

.Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 679 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).