Court Opinion

ID: 9555868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 15:11:45.065501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:54.476867
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                        2023 WY 80

                                                                APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                       August 15, 2023

 LEON VAN BUREN FREER,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),

 v.                                                         S-22-0267

 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                    Appeal from the District Court of Converse County
                         The Honorable F. Scott Peasley, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A.
      Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General;
      Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John J. Woykovsky, Senior
      Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Woykovsky.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before
final publication in the permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] After a jury trial, Leon Van Buren Freer was convicted on twenty-one counts related
to sexual abuse against his daughter AF. Mr. Freer challenges his convictions, arguing the
district court abused its discretion when it admitted a sexually explicit photograph of Mrs.
Freer (AF’s mother) and a pornographic father–daughter incest video under W.R.E. 404(b).
Mr. Freer also argues the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting
testimony from AF and Mrs. Freer about uncharged bad acts in violation of the district
court’s W.R.E. 404(b) order, which deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.

                                            ISSUES

[¶2]   We rephrase the issues as:

           1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting a
              sexually explicit photograph of Mrs. Freer and a pornographic
              father–daughter incest video under W.R.E. 404(b).

           2. Whether the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct
              by eliciting W.R.E. 404(b) testimony from AF and Mrs. Freer
              resulting in prejudicial error.

                                             FACTS

[¶3] AF was born in 2006 and lived with her parents and two brothers. In March 2021,
AF reported to the Department of Family Services (DFS) that Mr. Freer had sexually
abused her. Lieutenant Benjamin Peech from the Converse County Sheriff’s Office
investigated the report, interviewed AF, Mr. Freer, and Mrs. Freer, and eventually seized
several items from Mr. Freer, including a cell phone and various other electronic devices.

[¶4] In its fifth and final amended information, the State charged Mr. Freer with twenty-
seven counts including sexual abuse of a minor, sexual exploitation of a child,
manufacturing child pornography, and voyeurism.

[¶5] Mr. Freer filed a demand for written notice of the State’s intent to use W.R.E. 404(b)
evidence. The State filed two 404(b) notices prior to trial. It first sought to introduce
evidence that Mr. Freer’s cell phone contained adult, age-difficult, 1 and incest
pornography, and a log of six specific internet searches from the time of the charged
offenses. In the same notice, the State sought to introduce evidence of DFS’ involvement
with the family, which included information on DFS’ prior contacts and AF’s home

1
  Detective Peech testified age-difficult pornography is when the subject in the photograph appears
extremely young, but their age cannot be positively identified.

                                                1
environment. The State also provided notice the charged crimes represented only a portion
of the sexual abuse against AF. Because the total number of instances of abuse allegedly
ranged between 100 and 230, the State explained that AF’s testimony may contain
statements related to uncharged misconduct. In the second notice, the State sought to
introduce sexually explicit photographs Mr. Freer took with Mrs. Freer in 2012, images of
Mr. Freer’s penis, and instances of Mr. Freer masturbating using the same devices he was
alleged to have shown to AF. Mr. Freer sought to exclude the State’s 404(b) evidence.

[¶6] The district court held a hearing to address the parties’ 404(b) contentions. The
court issued a written order several days later. In the order, the court performed a full
Gleason analysis and determined the evidence related to adult pornography and some
internet searches would be excluded. It also held some of Mr. Freer’s internet searches,
the age-difficult and incest pornography found on Mr. Freer’s phone, the sexually explicit
photographs and videos of Mr. Freer and Mrs. Freer, and the evidence concerning DFS’
investigation could be introduced at trial, subject to other evidentiary objections. The court
reserved ruling on any other evidence the State had of Mr. Freer’s uncharged bad acts
against AF and stated “no such evidence shall be introduced without the court’s prior
permission.”

[¶7] The district court held a four-day jury trial in May 2022. The State first called AF.
She testified Mr. Freer created the rules in the home and handed out the punishments. His
punishments included various forms of physical and mental abuse. Mr. Freer treated her
two brothers differently and regularly referred to her using a variety of profane language.
She then testified in detail to repeated instances of sexual abuse between 2019 and 2021,
which included breast fondling, digital penetration, and other sexual acts. She testified in
one instance Mr. Freer had her remove her shirt and proceeded to lift her breast while
supposedly measuring her for a bra. She also described an instance where Mr. Freer was
fondling and dry humping her when Mrs. Freer came home from work and saw them. She
further testified that at one point she asked Mr. Freer if she was still a virgin, he affirmed,
proceeded to spread her labia open with his fingers, took a picture, and showed it to her.

[¶8] The State elicited testimony from six other witnesses, including Detective Peech
who testified about his investigation and extracting images and videos from Mr. Freer’s
electronic devices. Mrs. Freer testified about the punishments Mr. Freer imposed on AF,
witnessing Mr. Freer’s hands on AF’s breasts when he was measuring her for a bra, and
witnessing Mr. Freer on top of AF between her legs. The State also admitted several
exhibits including photographs Mr. Freer took of AF’s vagina, a similar sexually explicit
photograph of Mrs. Freer, and a video depicting father–daughter incest pornography. After
it rested, the State moved to dismiss six counts. The defense called Mr. Freer’s mother and
Mr. Freer. The State recalled Detective Peech in rebuttal. Additional trial facts are
discussed below where necessary to our legal analysis.

                                              2
[¶9] The jury returned a guilty verdict on the remaining twenty-one counts. The district
court sentenced Mr. Freer to three consecutive sets of concurrent prison terms totaling 20
to 30 years on seven counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree; 10 to 15 years
on ten counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree; and 6 to 10 years on one
count of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree, two counts of sexual exploitation of a
child, and one count of voyeurism. 2

[¶10] Mr. Freer timely appealed.

                                            DISCUSSION

I.    The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a sexually explicit
photograph of Mrs. Freer and a pornographic father–daughter incest video under
W.R.E. 404(b).

[¶11] Mr. Freer filed a demand for written notice of the State’s intent to use 404(b)
evidence. We treat such a demand as an objection and therefore review the district court’s
admission of 404(b) evidence for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. State, 2022 WY 119,
¶ 11, 517 P.3d 583, 588 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Barrett v. State, 2022 WY 64, ¶ 41, 509 P.3d
940, 948 (Wyo. 2022)). “Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial
court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy,
competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Klingbeil v. State,
2021 WY 89, ¶ 32, 492 P.3d 279, 286 (Wyo. 2021)). “We will not disturb the trial court’s
determination of the admissibility of evidence unless the court clearly abused its discretion.
We need only determine whether the court could have reasonably concluded as it did.” Id.
(citations omitted). Mr. Freer has the burden to show an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 15, 517
P.3d at 589 (citation omitted).

[¶12] W.R.E. 404(b) states:

                Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
                wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
                person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
                It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
                proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
                knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,
                provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
                a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
                trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good

2
 The sentence for voyeurism was 2 to 4 years, to run concurrent with the sentences for one count of sexual
abuse of a minor and two counts of sexual exploitation of a child.

                                                    3
                cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
                intends to introduce at trial.

[¶13] We have stated “[a] core principle of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) is that the
defendant in a criminal case should not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor
because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the particular crime charged.”
Olson v. State, 2023 WY 11, ¶ 13, 523 P.3d 910, 913–14 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Jackson v.
State, 2021 WY 92, ¶ 10, 492 P.3d 911, 915 (Wyo. 2021)). “To guard against the misuse
of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, also known as uncharged misconduct evidence, we have a
well-established and familiar procedure that must be followed if the State wishes to use
such evidence at trial.” Id.

                When a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of the
                State’s intent to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence, the
                State must identify the evidence. The district court then must
                hold a hearing in which the State offers a relevant and proper
                purpose for admissibility under Rule 404(b) and explains why
                the evidence is more probative than unfairly prejudicial. In that
                hearing, the district court must then conduct an exacting
                analysis of the Gleason factors:

                (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the
                evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of the
                evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential
                for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must
                instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be
                considered only for the proper purpose for which it was
                admitted. [3]

3
  Under Gleason, the district court considers the following five factors to determine the probative value of
the evidence:

                1. How clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad act?

                2. Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the
                prior bad acts evidence?

                3. Is other evidence available?

                4. Is the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?

                5. How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior
                bad act?

                                                     4
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 22, 476 P.3d 224, 233 (Wyo. 2020)); see
also Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 27, 57 P.3d 332, 342 (Wyo. 2002) (discussing the
procedures to admit evidence under W.R.E. 404(b)).

[¶14] This Court does not apply the Gleason analysis anew on appeal. Barrett, ¶ 48, 509
P.3d at 950 (citation omitted). We instead “determine whether the district court abused its
discretion in considering the factors.” Id. (citation omitted). “As long as there is a
legitimate basis for the district court’s decision, we will not disturb it on appeal.” Id.
(citation omitted); see also Gleason, ¶ 30, 57 P.3d at 343 (“While the trial court need not
make an express finding on every factor . . . , the record must contain sufficient findings to
support the trial court’s conclusions.”).

[¶15] Here, the district court carefully followed the procedures for admitting evidence
under W.R.E. 404(b). After the State filed its W.R.E. 404(b) notices, the court held a
hearing and later produced a written order thoroughly analyzing the Gleason factors for
each category of evidence the State sought to introduce. The court excluded some of the

Barrett, ¶ 46, 509 P.3d at 950 (quoting Mayhew v. State, 2019 WY 38, ¶ 26, 438 P.3d 617, 623 (Wyo.
2019)). The district court then weighs the following six factors against the probative value of the evidence:

                1. The reprehensible nature of the prior bad act. The more reprehensible
                the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant
                for the prior act.

                2. The sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad act.
                Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act if
                the victim was especially vulnerable.

                3. The similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad act. The
                more similar the acts, the greater is the likelihood that the jury will draw
                the improper inference that if the defendant did it once, he probably did it
                again.

                4. The comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad act.
                When the prior act is a more serious offense than the charged crime, the
                introduction of that act will tend to place the defendant in a different and
                unfavorable light.

                5. The comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and
                forbidden inferences. Evidence of the prior bad act may be much more
                probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference permitted
                by Rule 404(b).

                6. Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction. The jury may be tempted
                to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped punishment for the prior
                bad act.

Id. (quoting Mayhew, ¶ 26, 438 P.3d at 623–24).

                                                     5
State’s evidence, found other evidence to be proper for introduction at trial, and reserved
its ruling on the remaining W.R.E. 404(b) evidence. Mr. Freer now challenges two of the
court’s W.R.E. 404(b) rulings admitting certain evidence at trial—a sexually explicit
photograph of Mrs. Freer and a pornographic father–daughter incest video. We review the
rulings in turn.

   a. The sexually explicit photograph of Mrs. Freer.

[¶16] The State introduced into evidence a 2012 photograph depicting an image of Mr.
Freer’s fingers spreading Mrs. Freer’s labia open and exposing her vagina. The State
asserted the sexually explicit photograph demonstrated Mr. Freer’s motive and intent
because it was similar to a photograph he took of his daughter’s genitals. Mr. Freer first
contends the photograph fails to show Mr. Freer’s motive and intent to have sexual contact
with his daughter, citing Johnson v. State, 872 P.2d 93, 97 (Wyo. 1994), and thus it was
not offered for a proper purpose. This Court explained in Johnson the distinction between
motive and intent:

              In common usage intent and “motive” are not infrequently
              regarded as one and the same thing. In law there is a distinction
              between them. “Motive” is the moving power which impels to
              action for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a
              particular means to effect such result. “Motive” is that which
              incites or stimulates a person to do an act.

Johnson, 872 P.2d at 97. We have also generally defined motive as “that which leads or
tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act.” Anderson, ¶ 22, 517 P.3d at 590 (quoting
Barrett, ¶ 49, 509 P.3d at 951). Mr. Freer seems to misunderstand the district court’s reason
for allowing the picture, which is its similarity to the picture he took of AF. The
circumstantial inference is that Mr. Freer intended to take a sexually explicit photograph
of his daughter similar to the sexually explicit photograph he took of his wife, which is
evidence of Mr. Freer’s motive—a sexual interest in his daughter—and his intent to take a
photograph to “effect such result.” Johnson, 872 P.2d at 97. Given this inference, the
district court legitimately concluded the photograph was offered for the proper purposes of
motive and intent. Id.

[¶17] Mr. Freer also argues the photograph, taken in 2012, is too remote to be relevant to
his alleged acts in 2019. “We have declined to set an arbitrary time line for the
admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence.” Barrett, ¶ 57, 509 P.3d at 952 (collecting cases).
Rather, the district court has discretion to decide whether other bad acts evidence is too
remote to have evidentiary value. Id. (citing Winters v. State, 2019 WY 76, ¶ 85, 446 P.3d
191, 218 (Wyo. 2019)). “The question is ‘one of reasonableness’ considering ‘the context
in which the evidence was introduced and the theory supporting its admissibility.’” Id.
(quoting Winters, ¶ 85, 446 P.3d at 218).

                                             6
[¶18] The district court acknowledged the remoteness of the photograph lessened its
probative value but ultimately allowed the photograph to be introduced at trial after
analyzing its relevancy and potential for unfair prejudice. Mrs. Freer testified that Mr.
Freer had an interest in taking sexual photographs of her for his use. During this point in
her testimony, the State introduced the sexually explicit photograph of her genitals. At
closing, the State compared that photograph with the similar photograph of AF and
discussed Mr. Freer’s use of such photographs for sexual arousal. The State thus used the
sexually explicit photograph of Mrs. Freer consistent with its theory of intent and motive.
See id. (quoting Winters, ¶ 85, 446 P.3d at 218). The district court reasonably concluded
the photograph was relevant and therefore provided a legitimate basis when it admitted the
photograph of Mrs. Freer under W.R.E. 404(b). It did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
See Anderson, ¶ 11, 517 P.3d at 588.

   b. The pornographic father–daughter incest video.

[¶19] The video—which law enforcement extracted from Mr. Freer’s phone—shows
actors depicted as underage and engaged in an incestuous relationship with an older man
who purported to be their father. Mr. Freer concedes the video was offered for the proper
purpose of motive and intent and is relevant. He instead argues the video was unfairly
prejudicial and cumulative.

[¶20] Mr. Freer relies on the district court’s statements at trial to assert the court revisited
the admissibility of the incest video and the video’s ultimate admission was unfairly
prejudicial. During the trial, the State offered and the district court admitted the video into
evidence. The State published certain clips from the video to the jury. On the next day of
trial, the court determined it would only allow the video to be used as a demonstrative
exhibit and stated the idea of the jury watching the video again was an “oversaturation and
unduly prejudicial.” The district court also acknowledged it had already allowed the State
to admit hours of other W.R.E. 404(b) evidence through Detective Peech and considered
revisiting its W.R.E. 404(b) order. Despite these statements, and after hearing further
arguments from the parties, the district court ultimately concluded it would stand by its
reasoning in the W.R.E. 404(b) order. The court kept the entire video in evidence and
provided a limiting instruction at Mr. Freer’s request.

[¶21] In addition to pointing out the district court’s own statements at trial, Mr. Freer
seems to ask this Court to reapply the Gleason factors in his favor to conclude the father–
daughter incest video was unfairly prejudicial. As noted above, we do not perform the
Gleason analysis “anew on appeal.” Anderson, ¶ 15, 517 P.3d at 589 (citing Barrett, ¶ 48,
509 P.3d at 950). We focus on how the district court analyzed the factors. Id. (citation
omitted).

[¶22] In its W.R.E. 404(b) order, the district court found “the pornography depicting
incestuous relations . . . might enhance the natural development of the facts. Specifically,

                                               7
to show the Defendant’s course of conduct in viewing . . . incestuous pornography might
help to explain the Defendant’s course of conduct with the alleged victim—his daughter.”
The court further stated:

              Concerning the incestuous pornography, the charged crimes fit
              this category; the Defendant is the minor’s victim’s father.
              This specific type of pornography . . . depicting sexual
              encounters between adults and juveniles of the same relation,
              the court finds sheds light on the Defendant’s desire to engage
              in such a relationship and serves as evidence of the Defendant’s
              motive to commit the underlying acts—engaging in sexual
              intercourse or other sexual behavior with his daughter.

It then found the incest pornography was relevant and not unduly cumulative. The court
reasoned that “there is no other evidence available other what is being proffered by the
State . . . . [T]he court cannot see that any of this evidence would be cumulative.”

[¶23] The court also noted all the evidence before it had a high chance of unfair prejudice.
However, after balancing the Gleason factors, the court reasoned the video was not unfairly
prejudicial because: the video did not show the victim, it was no more graphic or disturbing
than what Mr. Freer was charged with, and Mr. Freer had no convictions based on the
video’s content or any similar bad acts. The court therefore provided a legitimate basis to
admit the incest video under W.R.E. 404(b) and did not abuse its discretion. See Anderson,
¶ 11, 517 P.3d at 588.

II.   Mr. Freer fails to show he was prejudiced by the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct.

[¶24] Mr. Freer did not raise a prosecutorial misconduct objection to the district court.
Accordingly, we review for plain error. King v. State, 2023 WY 36, ¶ 33, 527 P.3d 1229,
1242 (Wyo. 2023) (citation omitted). To establish plain error, Mr. Freer “must show (1)
the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; (2) a violation of a clear and
unequivocal rule of law; and (3) he was denied a substantial right resulting in material
prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted). Both parties agree the first prong of the plain error
analysis is met. Mr. Freer must therefore show a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule
of law and prejudice. Id. (citation omitted).

[¶25] This Court has defined prosecutorial misconduct as “[a] prosecutor’s improper or
illegal act (or failure to act), esp[ecially] involving an attempt to persuade the jury to
wrongly convict a defendant or assess an unjustified punishment.” Id. ¶ 16, 527 P.3d at
1238 (citation omitted). Prosecutorial misconduct is more than evidentiary error. Id.
(quoting McGinn v. State, 2015 WY 140, ¶ 50, 361 P.3d 295, 306 (Wyo. 2015) (Fox, J.,
concurring)). Such claims are intended “to address gross prosecutorial improprieties that

                                             8
have deprived a criminal defendant of his or her right to a fair trial.” Meece v. State, 2023
WY 60, ¶ 17, 530 P.3d 597, 600 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting King, ¶ 16, 527 P.3d at 1238).

[¶26] Mr. Freer alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony from
AF and Mrs. Freer regarding uncharged bad acts of physical and mental abuse Mr. Freer
imposed on AF, which violated the district court’s W.R.E. 404(b) order. In Bogard, this
Court stated it is “misconduct for a prosecutor to ignore a trial court’s W.R.E. 404(b) order
and, thus, knowingly bring inadmissible evidence to the jury’s attention.” Bogard v. State,
2019 WY 96, ¶ 51, 449 P.3d 315, 327 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶
27, 74 P.3d 699, 711 (Wyo. 2003)). Under our plain error standard, Mr. Freer must
therefore show the prosecutor clearly and knowingly violated the district court’s 404(b)
order when he elicited testimony from AF and Mrs. Freer, and that the violation(s) deprived
Mr. Freer of a fair trial. See id. ¶¶ 21, 51, 84, 449 P.3d at 321, 327, 335–36 (concluding
the prosecutor’s violations of the district court’s 404(b) order, among other misconduct,
denied Mr. Bogard his right to a fair trial). It is unclear from the record whether the
prosecutor knowingly violated the district court’s order. However, the record makes clear
that even if the prosecutor crossed the line, his conduct did not deprive Mr. Freer of a fair
trial.

[¶27] In its W.R.E. 404(b) order, the district court held, in part:

              (h) Evidence of other uncharged bad acts by the Defendant
              against the alleged victim will be reserved until the time of
              trial, but no such evidence shall be introduced without the
              court’s prior permission.

              (i) For such evidence that is specifically excluded, counsel
              shall take appropriate steps to ensure witnesses do not testify
              or infer to such evidence.

(emphasis in original).

[¶28] The State contends the prosecutor did not violate the 404(b) order when he elicited
testimony about Mr. Freer’s physical and mental abuse of AF because, when read in its
entirety, the order only required court permission to introduce uncharged bad acts similar
in nature to the charged crimes—i.e., sexual abuse. It is true, the court indicated in the
“Facts” and “Discussion” sections of the order that it planned to prohibit the prosecution
from introducing W.R.E 404(b) evidence “similar in nature to the charged crimes” without
the court’s prior permission. Yet, the language of the “Order” broadly stated no “other
uncharged bad acts” by Mr. Freer are to be introduced at trial without the court’s prior
permission.

                                              9
[¶29] During AF’s testimony, in addition to questions about sexual abuse, the prosecutor
also inquired about the “roles” her parents played in their family dynamics. AF testified
Mr. Freer “handed out the punishments” because he was the one who created all the rules.
She stated the types of punishments included, “[s]lapping, punching, getting whipped with
a belt, getting beaten with a metal broomstick, not bring able to eat, not being able to use
the bathroom, being locked outside, having more chores, not being able to sleep, going
without water.” She affirmed that Mr. Freer referred to himself as an authority figure in
the home by calling himself “king shit.” She also explained that she received 97 percent
of the punishments, that Mr. Freer treated her two brothers differently, and that Mr. Freer
regularly referred to her using a variety of profane language.

[¶30] The prosecutor asked Mrs. Freer similar questions. She testified to the chores she
and AF did around the house and that Mr. Freer did not treat the children equally. She
affirmed Mr. Freer was the disciplinarian in the house and stated when AF was in trouble
he would “grab her by the hair, throw her to the floor, and he slapped her across the face
where there was a handprint. She had several bruises.” She also testified to the profane
language Mr. Freer would regularly use to refer to AF.

[¶31] Because the State charged Mr. Freer, in part, with first degree sexual abuse of a
minor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-314(a)(iii), the prosecutor was required to prove Mr.
Freer committed his acts while he “occupie[d] a position of authority in relation to the
victim.” The State asserts this testimony related to Mr. Freer’s position of authority—
evidence seemingly outside the scope of W.R.E. 404(b). Yet, the State concedes some of
the testimony constituted uncharged bad acts under W.R.E. 404(b). 4 Thus, considering the
challenged testimony in the full context of the order’s explicit limitations and the nature of
the testimony itself in relation to the charged crimes, we are unable to confidently
determine whether the prosecutor knowingly violated the order. We can, however,
confidently conclude Mr. Freer cannot show how the alleged prosecutorial misconduct
denied him a fair trial.

[¶32] Whether we review alleged prosecutorial misconduct under harmless error or plain
error, we focus on whether the misconduct affected the accused’s substantial right to a fair
trial. Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, ¶ 65, 401 P.3d 834, 856 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting McGinn,
¶ 13, 361 P.3d at 299); see also Bogard, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d at 321 (“[O]ur ultimate focus and
attention is on whether the alleged error affected Mr. Bogard’s substantial right to a fair
trial.” (citations omitted)). Mr. Freer therefore “must show prejudice under ‘circumstances
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense
of fair play.’” 5 Klingbeil, ¶ 43, 492 P.3d at 289 (quoting McGinn, ¶ 13, 361 P.3d at 299).

4
 Mr. Freer also assumes W.R.E. 404(b) applies to the challenged testimony with minimal explanation.
5
 Mr. Freer argues the burden should be on the State to show harmless error when the prosecutor below
directly disobeyed a court order. In Leners, we addressed and rejected the invitation to shift the burden
under a plain error analysis. Leners v. State, 2021 WY 67, ¶ 25, 486 P.3d 1013, 1019 (Wyo. 2021).

                                                   10
We review the entire record to analyze whether Mr. Freer was prejudiced. King, ¶ 52, 527
P.3d at 1247 (citation omitted). In doing so, we assess the following factors: “1) the
severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 2) the significance of the misconduct to the
central issues in the case; 3) the strength of the State’s evidence; 4) the use of cautionary
instructions or other curative measures; and 5) the extent to which the defense invited the
misconduct.” Id. ¶ 53, 527 P.3d at 1247 (citation omitted). The strength of the State’s case
is the most important factor. Id.

[¶33] Assessing the first and second factors against the record in this case, we find the
prosecutor’s alleged misconduct was neither severe nor pervasive or significant to the
central issues in the case. AF only briefly, and generally, addressed the physical and mental
abuse Mr. Freer imposed on her before discussing the incidents of sexual abuse at issue in
detail. Mrs. Freer likewise only briefly discussed Mr. Freer’s physical and mental abuse
against AF. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel addressed this testimony during
closing arguments.

[¶34] In contrast, and considering the third factor, the State’s evidence against Mr. Freer
was strong. AF described in detail Mr. Freer’s acts as they related to each count of sexual
abuse, supra ¶ 7. 6 Mrs. Freer corroborated portions of AF’s testimony. She testified to
witnessing Mr. Freer’s hands on AF’s breasts when he was measuring her for a bra and
observing Mr. Freer draped over AF while standing between her legs with his hands up by
her shoulders and touching their pelvic regions against each other.

[¶35] The prosecutor also presented testimony from Detective Peech who discussed
retrieving multiple search histories, images, and videos from Mr. Freer’s phone and
computer, which included strikingly similar photographs of AF’s and Mrs. Freer’s vaginas.
Douglas Kelley, a forensic analyst with the Wyoming State Crime Lab, testified to
analyzing the finger ridges in the photographs of AF’s vagina and identified Mr. Freer’s
left middle finger as one of the fingers in the photographs. Lastly, Jennifer Brammeier,
another forensic analyst, testified to a paternity test which confirmed Mr. Freer as AF’s
biological father; Officer Keri McNare identified AF’s right buttocks in a photograph taken
from Mr. Freer’s phone; and, Dr. Casey Starks testified to a medical exam he performed
on AF and identified her vagina in the photographs taken from Mr. Freer’s phone.

[¶36] Considering the fourth and fifth factors, we note Mr. Freer did not object to the
alleged prosecutorial misconduct below and the jury was not specifically instructed about
the physical and mental abuse testimony. After carefully considering each factor, we

6
 Mr. Freer denied only portions of AF’s testimony and offered up various explanations for his conduct.
For instance, when his wife found him dry humping AF, Mr. Freer testified he was merely responding to
questions AF had asked him about sex and explained it was “purely educational.” Mr. Freer admitted taking
photographs of AF’s vagina. He explained AF felt she had torn something and was feeling pain, asked if
she was still a virgin, and he thought he could help her by taking a photograph and showing it to her.

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conclude Mr. Freer has failed to demonstrate the alleged prosecutorial misconduct denied
him his substantial right to a fair trial.

                                     CONCLUSION

[¶37] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the sexually explicit
photograph of Mrs. Freer or the pornographic father–daughter incest video under W.R.E.
404(b). Mr. Freer failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s alleged
misconduct.

[¶38] Affirmed.

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