Court Opinion

ID: 9720964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:45:36.302277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.538465
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case because in my opinion the facts do not *474support appellant’s conviction. While there is no doubt that defendant committed the act of killing his wife, defendant’s sanity at the time of the killing is significantly less clear. In my opinion, the evidence cannot reasonably support the jury’s finding that defendant was sane when the murder was committed.
Although I do not advocate a departure from the well-established rule that the jury or the trial court sitting without a jury has the duty and the function of fact-finder, I am conscious of the ultimate responsibility of this court to set aside a verdict where, under the evidence contained in the record, the jury could not reasonably find the accused sane. See, State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 193 N.W.2d 802 (1972), citing the standard set forth in State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490, certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 817, 87 S.Ct. 39, 17 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966).
Defendant had the burden to prove insanity only by a preponderance of the evidence. See, State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976). Defendant sustained that burden. The overwhelming weight of the evidence proved that defendant did know the nature of his act but did not know that it was morally wrong. In Bott, supra, we explained that the word “wrong” within the meaning of Minn.St. 611.026 does not refer to a violation of statute but is used in the moral sense. The testimony of the state’s two experts, one of whom substantially questioned the accuracy of his own opinion on the issue of wrongfulness, blurred that distinction.
Drs. Rymer and Philander, who did not personally examine the defendant, emphasized the facts that defendant called the police and admitted to the killing as supporting their conclusion that he knew the act was wrong. While this evidence indicates that defendant knew it was legally wrong, other evidence, in particular his lack of remorse, his intent to protect the decedent, and the conclusions of the experts who examined defendant unequivocally compels the finding that he did not know it was morally wrong.
By more than a fair preponderance of the evidence defendant proved, primarily through the defense experts, that he was legally insane. The jury was not bound, of course, to accept the experts’ opinions. It acted, however, subject to the standard of reasonableness. If the jury chooses to reject the expert testimony, as it did here, then its decision must be reasonably based on the evidence as a whole. I conclude that it was not.
The non-expert evidence also does not support the jury’s verdict. After a marriage of 33 years, which was not sexually consummated, to an unusually dependent woman, and a job of several decades from which he was transferred, he uncharacteristically displayed signs of a serious mental and emotional disturbance to his supervisors and his medical doctor. The killing itself was committed in a strikingly dispassionate manner with a bizarre sexual aftermath, which defendant denies or has forgotten. The act was totally contrary to the nature of the man, who, but for the killing, was an exemplary husband and employee.
This court has set aside the fact-finder’s verdict of sanity where the evidence so compels in order to best fulfill the intent of Minn.St. 611.026. See, State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972). The instant case requires a similar disposition. The judgment of guilty should be vacated with directions to enter a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity and for proceedings in the district court for commitment pursuant to Minn.St. 631.19.