Court Opinion

ID: 9961458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 19:04:22.147948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:46.735887
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (3d) 210330

                                 Opinion filed April 18, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF             )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                              )     of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                             )     Will County, Illinois,
            Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                             )     Appeal Nos. 3-21-0330 & 3-21-0331
            v.                               )     cons.
                                             )     Circuit Nos. 12-CF-5 & 12-CF-627
      JEVON D. LESLEY,                       )
                                             )     Honorable
            Defendant-Appellant.             )     Carmen J. Goodman,
                                             )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justices Hettel and Peterson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                OPINION

¶1          In this consolidated appeal, petitioner, Jevon D. Lesley, appeals from the circuit court’s

     order denying his combined petition for a certificate of innocence (COI) pursuant to section 2-702

     of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)). For the following reasons,

     we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

¶2                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶3          We summarize the facts relevant to this appeal, turning first to the underlying criminal

     cases against petitioner and then discussing the COI proceedings.
¶4                                        A. Criminal Proceedings

¶5          On January 19, 2012, in case No. 12-CF-5, petitioner was charged, along with a

     codefendant, in a three-count indictment. Counts I and II alleged that, on January 1, 2012,

     petitioner committed the offenses of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), Class 4

     felonies, in that he knowingly carried on or about his person two uncased, loaded, and immediately

     accessible firearms not on his own land or in his own abode or fixed place of business in violation

     of section 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-

     1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) (West 2012)). Count III of the indictment, for unlawful possession of a

     controlled substance, is irrelevant to our analysis as it was only against the codefendant.

¶6          On April 5, 2012 (while on bond in case No. 12-CF-5), petitioner was charged in a two-

     count indictment in case No. 12-CF-627. Count I alleged that, on March 17, 2012, petitioner

     committed the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member, a Class 2

     felony, in that petitioner, a street gang member, knowingly carried on his person a firearm and

     firearm ammunition not inside his own abode or fixed place of business and had not been issued a

     currently valid firearm owner’s identification card in violation of section 24-1.8(a)(1) of the

     Criminal Code (id. § 24-1.8(a)(1)). Count II alleged that, on March 17, 2012, petitioner committed

     the offense of AUUW, a Class 4 felony, in that petitioner knowingly carried on or about his person

     an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm not on his own land or in his own abode

     or fixed place of business in violation of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the Criminal Code (id.

     § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)).

¶7          On August 9, 2012, petitioner pled guilty in a combined plea agreement for both cases

     pursuant to which he pled guilty to one count of AUUW in each case and the remaining charges

     were nol-prossed. Specifically, in case No. 12-CF-5, petitioner pled guilty to count I for AUUW;

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       in exchange, count II for AUUW was nol-prossed. In case No. 12-CF-627, petitioner pled guilty

       to count II for AUUW; in exchange, count I for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang

       member was nol-prossed. The circuit court sentenced petitioner to consecutive one-year sentences

       with credit for time served in custody.

¶8            Subsequently, in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, and People v. Mosley, 2015 IL

       115872, our supreme court held that the subsections of the AUUW statute pursuant to which

       petitioner was charged and pled guilty were unconstitutional. However, the constitutionality of the

       nol-prossed charge (in case No. 12-CF-627) of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang

       member was upheld in People v. Villareal, 2023 IL 127318.

¶9            On September 30, 2019, petitioner filed, as a self-represented litigant, a petition for relief

       from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)),

       requesting that his AUUW convictions in both cases be vacated as unconstitutional and void

       ab initio. Following the October 11, 2019, hearing on the petition where the State agreed that the

       convictions should be vacated, the circuit court entered an order vacating the convictions as

       unconstitutional and void ab initio.

¶ 10                                             B. COI Proceedings

¶ 11          On March 19, 2021, petitioner filed, as a self-represented litigant, a combined petition for

       a COI in both cases pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code. Petitioner alleged that, in each case, he

       had been convicted of a felony, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and had served his

       sentence. He further alleged that the convictions had been vacated as unconstitutional and that he

       had not by his own conduct voluntarily caused or brought about the convictions. In support,

       petitioner attached the portions of the indictments that included the AUUW charges to which he

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       pled guilty, the judgment and sentencing order in each case, his section 2-1401 petition, and the

       docket entries reflecting the vacated convictions.

¶ 12          The State objected to the petition on two grounds. First, the State opposed the COI on the

       basis that petitioner failed to demonstrate his innocence of all charges in the indictment, including

       the nol-prossed charge for the constitutionally valid offense of unlawful possession of a firearm

       by a street gang member. Second, the State argued that petitioner’s guilty pleas precluded his

       ability to establish that he did not voluntarily cause or bring about his conviction. According to the

       State, the pleas in both cases “were taken together so should be considered as a whole,” and by

       pleading guilty in exchange for the benefit of dismissal of the higher-class felony, petitioner

       brought about his own conviction.

¶ 13          On July 28, 2021, following argument, the circuit court denied the petition for a COI.

       Noting that, by pleading guilty to one count, petitioner received the benefit of the dismissal of the

       other count, the court reasoned, “So you received a benefit. Now you want to go back because you

       received this particular benefit and basically sue the State. Because a certificate is not an avenue

       for the defendant who receives [a] benefit.” The court concluded that, under the particular

       circumstances, petitioner failed to prove the allegations set forth in his petition by a preponderance

       of the evidence and thus denied petitioner’s request for a COI.

¶ 14          Petitioner filed separate timely notices of appeal in both cases; we later granted petitioner’s

       unopposed motion to consolidate the appeals. Thereafter, on April 6, 2022, we also granted

       petitioner’s unopposed motion to stay the appeal pending the supreme court’s review of People v.

       Washington, 2021 IL App (1st) 163024, appeal allowed, No. 127952 (Ill. Mar. 30, 2022). On July

       18, 2023, the supreme court issued its decision in Washington, holding that a guilty plea does not

       categorically bar the ability to obtain a COI under section 2-702. People v. Washington, 2023 IL

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       127952. We subsequently granted petitioner’s unopposed motion to vacate the stay, and briefing

       and oral argument ensued.

¶ 15                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16          On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition because he

       established all requisite elements for issuance of a COI. See 735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020). The

       State disputes that petitioner satisfied subsections (g)(3) and (g)(4) of the statute, requiring,

       respectively, that “the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or

       information” (id. § 2-702(g)(3)), and that “the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct

       voluntarily cause or bring about his or her conviction” (id.§ 2-702(g)(4)). For the reasons set forth

       below, we hold that petitioner met his burden under the COI statute in case No. 12-CF-5 but failed

       to meet his burden in case No. 12-CF-627. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and

       remand for issuance of a COI in case No. 12-CF-5.

¶ 17          Initially, we note the split in authority regarding the appropriate standard—abuse of

       discretion or manifest weight of the evidence—to be applied in reviewing a ruling on a petition for

       a COI. See Washington, 2023 IL 127952, ¶ 47 (collecting cases). Where the issue involves a

       question of statutory interpretation, however, de novo review is appropriate. See People v.

       McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶ 13; accord People v. Hilton, 2023 IL App (1st) 220843,

       ¶ 15 (collecting cases and noting that, “while the review of the denial of a COI generally proceeds

       under an abuse of discretion standard, the issue here involves the interpretation of statutory section

       2-702 of the Code, and, thus, our review is de novo”). Here, the parties’ arguments require us to

       interpret the COI statute. Therefore, we apply the de novo standard of review. See People v. Brown,

       2022 IL App (4th) 220171, ¶ 11. To the extent our resolution of whether petitioner satisfied

       subsection (g)(4) extends beyond statutory interpretation, we note that the result would be the same

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       under any standard of review. We review the circuit court’s judgment, not its reasoning, and we

       may affirm the judgment on any basis in the record. Id. ¶ 9.

¶ 18          Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s

       intent, which is best indicated by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People

       v. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53. We must consider the statute as a whole and cannot depart from

       the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or

       conditions that the legislature did not express. Hilton, 2023 IL App (1st) 220843, ¶ 16. We may

       consider “the purpose of the statute, the problems to be remedied, and the consequences of

       interpreting the statute one way or another.” Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53. We presume that the

       legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Id.

¶ 19          With these principles in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.

¶ 20                                           A. Subsection (g)(3)

¶ 21          With respect to whether petitioner met his burden under subsection (g)(3), the central issue

       is whether petitioner was required to establish his innocence of the nol-prossed charges in addition

       to his innocence of the offenses for which he was incarcerated. According to petitioner, he was

       only required to show his innocence of the offenses for which he was incarcerated (the

       unconstitutional AUUW offenses), not the charges nol-prossed pursuant to the plea agreement (the

       unconstitutional AUUW charge and the valid unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang

       member charge).

¶ 22          The State counters that the plain language of subsection (g)(3) required petitioner to prove

       his innocence of all offenses charged in the indictment. And, according to the State, because this

       was a combined plea agreement, failure to show innocence of the valid, nol-prossed charge for

       unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member in case No. 12-CF-627 precluded a COI

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       in both cases. Petitioner maintains that the State forfeited the latter portion of the argument by

       failing to raise it in the circuit court. However, the record belies this contention. In objecting to the

       COI petition and arguing that petitioner was required to demonstrate his innocence of the nol-

       prossed charges, the State argued that “these pleas were taken together so should be considered as

       a whole.” We thus address the merits of the argument.

¶ 23           To place the parties’ positions in context, we outline the relevant portions of the COI

       statute. The title of the COI statute is “Petition for a certificate of innocence that the petitioner was

       innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated” (emphasis added) (735 ILCS 5/2-

       702 (West 2020)), and its purpose—to provide the wrongly incarcerated with an avenue to obtain

       relief in the Court of Claims—is detailed as follows:

               “The General Assembly finds and declares that innocent persons who have been wrongly

               convicted of crimes in Illinois and subsequently imprisoned have been frustrated in seeking

               legal redress due to a variety of substantive and technical obstacles in the law and that such

               persons should have an available avenue to obtain a finding of innocence so that they may

               obtain relief through a petition in the Court of Claims. The General Assembly further finds

               misleading the current legal nomenclature which compels an innocent person to seek a

               pardon for being wrongfully incarcerated. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the

               court, in exercising its discretion as permitted by law regarding the weight and

               admissibility of evidence submitted pursuant to this Section, shall, in the interest of justice,

               give due consideration to difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time, the death or

               unavailability of witnesses, the destruction of evidence or other factors not caused by such

               persons or those acting on their behalf.” Id. § 2-702(a).

¶ 24           The statute identifies who may petition for a COI:

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              “Any person convicted and subsequently imprisoned for one or more felonies by the State

              of Illinois which he or she did not commit may, under the conditions hereinafter provided,

              file a petition for certificate of innocence in the circuit court of the county in which the

              person was convicted. The petition shall request a certificate of innocence finding that the

              petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated.” (Emphasis

              added.) Id. § 2-702(b).

¶ 25          The supporting material that must be attached to the COI petition includes documentation

       demonstrating that the petitioner’s

              “judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or information

              dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either he or she was found not guilty at the new

              trial or he or she was not retried and the indictment or information dismissed; or the statute,

              or application thereof, on which the indictment or information was based violated the

              Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois.” Id. § 2-702(c)(2).

       In addition, the petition

              “shall state facts in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that the petitioner is likely

              to succeed at trial in proving that the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the

              indictment or information or his or her acts or omissions charged in the indictment or

              information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State of Illinois, and

              the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his or her

              conviction.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 2-702(d).

       In any hearing on a request for a COI, “the court may take judicial notice of prior sworn testimony

       or evidence admitted in the criminal proceedings related to the convictions which resulted in the

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       alleged wrongful incarceration, if the petitioner was either represented by counsel at such prior

       proceedings or the right to counsel was knowingly waived.” Id. § 2-702(f).

¶ 26           Subsection (g) sets forth four elements that a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of

       the evidence to obtain a COI:

                       “(1) the petitioner was convicted of one or more felonies by the State of Illinois and

               subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the

               sentence;

                       (2)(A) the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or

               information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either the petitioner was found not

               guilty at the new trial or the petitioner was not retried and the indictment or information

               dismissed; or (B) the statute, or application thereof, on which the indictment or information

               was based violated the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois;

                       (3) the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or

               information or his or her acts or omissions charged in the indictment or information did not

               constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State;[ 1] and

                       (4) the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about

               his or her conviction.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 2-702(g).

¶ 27           If the court finds that a petitioner is entitled to judgment, the court “shall enter a certificate

       of innocence finding that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was

       incarcerated.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 2-702(h). Finally, subsection (i) states that the petition

               1
                Petitioner does not rely upon the second part of subsection (g)(3)—that the “acts or omissions
       charged in the indictment or information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State.” 735
       ILCS 5/2-702(g)(3) (West 2020). Thus, we frame our discussion around the first part of subsection (g)(3)—
       that the petitioner is “innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information.” Id.
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       must be filed within two years after “the dismissal of an indictment or information or acquittal.”

       (Emphasis added.) Id. § 2-702(i).

¶ 28          Relying on the title of the statute and the subsections that reference “all offenses for which

       [the petitioner] was incarcerated,” petitioner argues that he was not required to demonstrate his

       innocence of the nol-prossed charges. In response, relying on the statutory subsections that

       reference “the offenses charged in the indictment,” the State argues that the legislature intended

       that a petitioner must establish his innocence of all charged offenses, even charges nol-prossed

       pursuant to a plea agreement. In reviewing the plain language of section 2-702 and applying

       principles of statutory construction, we agree with the State, as have other courts squarely

       presented with the issue. See Brown, 2022 IL App (4th) 220171, ¶ 29; People v. Warner, 2022 IL

       App (1st) 210260, ¶ 42.

¶ 29          By including certain language in one section of a statute but omitting the language in

       another section of the same statute, the legislature is presumed to have acted purposely and

       intended different meanings and results. Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶ 25. While the

       statutory title and subsections (b) and (h) use the phrase “offenses for which [the petitioner] was

       incarcerated,” the title of a statutory section is not controlling (see Brown, 2022 IL App (4th)

       220171, ¶ 15), and subsections (b) and (h) relate to who may petition for a COI and the remedies

       in the event a COI is awarded (see Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶ 26). In contrast,

       subsections (d) and (g), using the phrase “offenses charged in the indictment,” set forth the specific

       pleading and burden requirements that must be met to obtain a COI. Id. ¶ 27; Brown, 2022 IL App

       (4th) 220171, ¶ 24. Namely, a petitioner must plead specific facts in the petition demonstrating

       innocence of the “offenses charged in the indictment” (735 ILCS 5/2-702(d) (West 2020)), and

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       meet the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, innocence of the “offenses

       charged in the indictment” (id. § 2-702(g)(3)). Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶ 28.

¶ 30          In discerning the legislative intent underlying this distinct language, the court in Warner

       explained, “If the legislature had intended that a petitioner was required to allege and show only

       that they were innocent of the ‘offenses for which he or she was incarcerated,’ subsections (d) and

       (g)(3) would contain the same language as found in subsections (b) and (h).” Id. Instead, the

       legislature included the phrase “offenses charged in the indictment,” reflecting its intent that a

       petitioner must allege and prove innocence of all offenses charged in the indictment. Id. The court

       in Brown agreed.

              “The plain meaning of that language [in subsections (d) and (g)(3)] is that petitioners must

              demonstrate their innocence of all charged offenses, not just the ones for which they were

              convicted and incarcerated. Although other subsections of the statute use different

              language, such subsections do not specify the pleading and burden requirements for

              obtaining a certificate of innocence.” Brown, 2022 IL App (4th) 220171, ¶ 24.

       Noting that this interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent—to provide the wrongly

       incarcerated with an avenue to obtain relief in the Court of Claims—and avoids absurd results, the

       court in Brown further observed that “[w]e doubt the legislature envisioned compensating people

       who could have been lawfully imprisoned for more serious offenses but who happened to plead

       guilty to a lesser offense that was later recognized to be void ab initio.” Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 31          Accordingly, in both Brown and Warner, where the petitioners pled guilty to later vacated

       AUUW offenses in exchange for the dismissal of other charges, the courts held that the petitioners

       were not entitled to a COI given their failure to prove their innocence of valid dismissed charges.

       See Brown, 2022 IL App (4th) 220171, ¶¶ 3-6, 29; Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶¶ 2-6, 28;

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       see also Hilton, 2023 IL App (1st) 220843, ¶¶ 45-46 (reaffirming the foregoing principles after an

       extensive review of the relevant jurisprudence and holding that the petitioner was required to prove

       his innocence of all charges in the indictment, including two constitutionally valid charges of

       AUUW that the State nol-prossed after his AUUW conviction was vacated pursuant to Aguilar).

¶ 32          Moreover, as noted in Warner, the holding that a petitioner must establish innocence of all

       charged offenses is consistent with our supreme court’s decision in Palmer and with prior appellate

       decisions interpreting subsection (g)(3) in different procedural contexts. Warner, 2022 IL App

       (1st) 210260, ¶ 29 (citing Palmer, 2021 IL 125621; People v. Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984;

       People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (1st) 190435). In Palmer, the petitioner sought a COI after his first

       degree murder conviction was vacated based upon newly discovered forensic evidence. Palmer,

       2021 IL 125621, ¶¶ 34, 37. The supreme court rejected the State’s argument that the petitioner was

       required to prove himself innocent of being an accomplice to the murder—a theory that was never

       charged. Id. ¶ 68. Considering the plain language of the statute, the court reasoned that, because

       the word “offenses” in subsection (g)(3) is modified by the phrase “charged in the indictment or

       information” (735 ILCS 5/2-702(g)(3)(West 2018)), the legislature intended that “a petitioner

       establish his or her innocence of the offense on the factual basis charged in the indictment or

       information.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 64.

¶ 33          Both Smith and Moore likewise relied upon the plain language of the COI statute in holding

       that subsection (g)(3) requires a petitioner to show innocence of the offenses charged in the

       indictment. In Smith, the petitioner’s merged unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF)

       conviction was vacated on appeal under the one-act, one-crime doctrine, where the UUWF

       conviction and the petitioner’s armed habitual criminal (AHC) conviction stemmed from the same

       physical act of unlawfully possessing the same firearm. Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984, ¶ 3.

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       Subsequently, however, the AHC conviction was also vacated after one of the felonies predicating

       the AHC conviction (an AUUW conviction) was deemed unconstitutional pursuant to Aguilar. Id.

       ¶ 4. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the COI award on grounds that the

       petitioner had been found guilty of the constitutionally valid UUWF charges, in addition to the

       vacated AHC conviction, and therefore failed to show that he was innocent of the offenses charged

       in the indictment, as required by subsection (g)(3). Id. ¶¶ 21-23. In doing so, the court rejected the

       petitioner’s reliance upon subsections (b) and (h) for the proposition that a petitioner must only

       show innocence of the offenses for which a petitioner was incarcerated. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. While

       recognizing that the petitioner served more time than he would have had he been sentenced only

       on the valid charges, the court noted its inability to rewrite the statute to warrant an award of a

       COI. Id. ¶ 29.

¶ 34          Similar reasoning was employed in Moore, where the court held that the plain language of

       section 2-702 does not authorize a COI when the petitioner was properly incarcerated for one

       conviction though improperly incarcerated for another conviction. Moore, 2020 IL App (1st)

       190435, ¶ 35. Following trial in Moore, the petitioner was convicted of four offenses, including

       AHC; however, the AHC conviction was later vacated after one of the predicate felonies (an

       AUUW conviction) was deemed unconstitutional pursuant to Aguilar. Id. ¶ 1. In reversing the

       award of a COI for the AHC conviction, the court held that the plain language of section 2-702

       “does not permit the issuance of a COI unless the petitioner is deemed innocent of all charges in

       the indictment for which the petitioner was convicted.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 3. The court

       recognized that the petitioner spent more time in prison than he should have given the lengthier

       sentence for AHC but noted that, while the petitioner may have remedies beyond section 2-702,

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       the plain language of the statute precluded a COI, and the court could not “drastically rewrite the

       language to find a result we prefer.” Id. ¶¶ 41-42.

¶ 35          Notwithstanding the body of case law discussed above, petitioner urges that we instead be

       guided by dicta set forth by the court in Smith and this court’s decision in McClinton. Regarding

       Smith, following the holding discussed above—that the guilty finding at the criminal trial as to

       certain charges precluded the petitioner’s ability to demonstrate his innocence of the offenses

       charged in the indictment as required by subsection (g)(3)—the court proceeded to reject “the

       State’s suggestion, when questioned by the panel, that to be eligible for a COI, a petitioner might

       have the burden of affirmatively demonstrating his innocence even on charges that were nol-

       prossed by the State.” Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984, ¶ 25. Petitioner relies upon this language

       in Smith to the exclusion of the court’s holding.

¶ 36          Indeed, this obiter dicta in Smith has been expressly disavowed on several grounds. See

       Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶¶ 36-38; accord Hilton, 2023 IL App (1st) 220843, ¶¶ 36-44.

       First, section 2-702 “does not contain any language or any indication that the petitioner’s burden

       of pleading and proving innocence applies only to the charges in the indictment or information on

       which the State has an ability to obtain a finding of guilty.” Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260,

       ¶ 37. Second, the Smith dicta conflicts with prior holdings that, where a guilty finding had been

       reversed on direct appeal for insufficiency of the evidence, the COI petitioner was still required to

       establish innocence as to the charged offense. Id. (citing People v. Terrell, 2022 IL App (1st)

       192184, ¶ 40; People v. Dumas, 2013 IL App (2d) 120561, ¶ 18). And third, since subsections (d)

       and (g)(3) do not state that a petitioner is relieved of the burden to plead and establish innocence

       of any nol-prossed charges, to hold otherwise would be akin to improperly reading into the statute

       an unexpressed limitation. Id. ¶ 38. We agree, as the plain language of the COI statute is that

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       petitioners must demonstrate their innocence of the charged offenses; there is no exception in the

       statute for nol-prossed charges. Accordingly, we too disagree with the dicta in Smith.

¶ 37          With respect to this court’s decision in McClinton, petitioner’s reliance on the case is

       misplaced. In McClinton, the petitioner was found guilty of AUUW following trial, but her

       conviction was subsequently vacated pursuant to Aguilar. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648,

       ¶¶ 5-6. Although the petitioner was charged with other offenses (bringing a firearm into a penal

       institution and bringing cannabis into a penal institution), the State nol-prossed these charges. Id.

       ¶ 6. The trial court denied the petition for a COI on the basis that a declaration as to the statute’s

       unconstitutionality did not mean that the petitioner was innocent. Id. ¶ 7.

¶ 38          The appellate court reversed, rejecting the State’s argument that the petitioner failed to

       prove that she did not voluntarily cause or bring about her conviction. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. The court held

       that the petitioner met the requirements of the COI statute, including that “her acts charged in the

       indictment of which she was convicted and for which she was incarcerated did not constitute a

       felony or misdemeanor against the state because the charge was based on a statute later held

       unconstitutional,” and that the petitioner did not “intentionally cause or bring about her conviction”

       because the statute that criminalized her actions was void ab initio. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. The court did not

       consider the nol-prossed charges in the analysis and noted, in its discussion of section 2-702, that

       subsection (b) “states the limits of which offenses we consider in evaluating whether McClinton

       is entitled to a certificate of innocence” and thus, “[t]he only crime at issue in the instant case is

       the unconstitutional AUUW conviction.” Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 39          McClinton is not determinative here, as the disputed issue as framed in McClinton only

       involved subsection (g)(4)—whether the petitioner voluntarily caused or brought about her

       conviction, not subsection (g)(3). Nothing in McClinton purported to resolve whether a petitioner

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       must prove innocence of charges that were nol-prossed as part of a plea agreement. See Brown,

       2022 IL App (4th) 220171, ¶ 26 (“[T]he disputed issue on appeal in McClinton concerned statutory

       element four: whether McClinton brought about her own conviction. [Citation.] That issue is

       distinct from our analysis of element three. Thus, we do not find McClinton instructive as to

       whether defendants here must prove their innocence of charges that were nol-prossed as part of

       their plea agreements.”); accord Hilton, 2023 IL App (1st) 220843, ¶ 45 (McClinton was

       “completely distinguishable” because it focused on subsection (g)(4), not subsection (g)(3)).

¶ 40          Finally, petitioner argues that it would be inconsistent with basic tort law to require a

       petitioner to establish innocence of dismissed charges for which he was not incarcerated and for

       which he does not seek relief. However, as the State observes, a valid dismissed charge is relevant

       to the issue of whether the petitioner was injured. Regardless, as indicated earlier, we simply are

       not free to read an exception for dismissed charges into the statutory requirement that a petitioner

       must demonstrate his innocence of the offenses charged in the indictment. See Terrell, 2022 IL

       App (1st) 192184, ¶ 40 (COI statutory scheme did not permit court to engraft a petitioner’s

       “presumption of innocence” in determining whether statutory prerequisites satisfied).

¶ 41          Accordingly, the plain language of section 2-702 requires a petitioner to demonstrate his

       innocence of the offenses charged in the indictment, including charges nol-prossed pursuant to a

       plea agreement, and not just the offenses for which the petitioner was incarcerated. Thus, in case

       No. 12-CF-5, where both charged offenses against petitioner were for violations of a portion of

       the AUUW statute later held unconstitutional, petitioner met his burden of demonstrating

       innocence of the offenses charged in the indictment (and that the acts charged did not constitute a

       felony or misdemeanor against the State (see McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶ 21)), as

       required by subsection (g)(3). However, in case No. 12-CF-627, while one of the charged offenses

                                                       16
       was for violation of a portion of the AUUW statute later held unconstitutional, the other charged

       offense was for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member—the constitutionality

       of which was later upheld. Petitioner never attempted to meet his burden of demonstrating

       innocence of this valid nol-prossed charge. Where petitioner did not allege anything with respect

       to his innocence of this charge, petitioner did not meet his burden under subsection (g)(3) in case

       No. 12-CF-627. See Brown, 2022 IL App (4th) 220171, ¶ 29 (“Because defendants made no

       attempt to demonstrate their innocence of all charged offenses, the trial court properly denied their

       petitions for [COI].”); Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶ 44 (“[P]etitioner provided allegations

       to support his innocence only as to the two [unconstitutional] AUUW counts ***. He did not

       provide the circuit court with any pleading, evidence, or even argument as to his innocence as to

       the other six charges in the information.”).

¶ 42          Contrary to the State’s position, however, failure to show innocence of the valid, nol-

       prossed charge for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member in case No. 12-CF-

       627 did not preclude a COI in case No. 12-CF-5. The State maintains that the plea agreement was

       a “package agreement” whereby petitioner’s combined plea to the two void offenses secured a

       lower total sentence than the mandatory minimum for the valid charge of unlawful possession of

       a firearm by a street gang member. As such, the State contends that “offenses charged in the

       indictment” as used in subsections (d) and (g)(3) necessarily refers to the offenses charged in both

       cases. However, the State’s argument finds no support in the plain language of section 2-702.

¶ 43          As petitioner observes, subsection (g)(3) refers to “the indictment,” not any indictment.

       Since “the” is a restrictive term (see Sibenaller v. Milschewski, 379 Ill. App. 3d 717, 722 (2008)),

       its use in subsection (g)(3) reflects that the only indictment to be considered is the indictment that

       charged the now-vacated conviction. Moreover, a combined plea agreement does not, and cannot,

                                                        17
       have the effect of creating a combined indictment for separate offenses. See 725 ILCS 5/111-4(a)

       (West 2022) (“Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information or

       complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or

       misdemeanors or both, are based on the same act or on 2 or more acts which are part of the same

       comprehensive transaction.”).

¶ 44          We further observe that requiring a petitioner to demonstrate his innocence of nol-prossed

       charges stemming from separate indictments resolved in a combined plea agreement would lead

       to scenarios that the legislature could not have intended. Indeed, nothing in section 2-702 supports

       expanding the innocence proof to combined pleas that might take place before different judges, in

       separate courtrooms, on different days, or even in different counties. We thus decline to read the

       statute in the manner suggested by the State.

¶ 45          In sum, petitioner failed to meet his burden under subsection (g)(3) of demonstrating

       innocence of the nol-prossed offense charged in the indictment in case No. 12-CF-627 (unlawful

       possession of a firearm by a street gang member) and therefore was not entitled to a COI in that

       case. However, petitioner met this burden in case No. 12-CF-5. Accordingly, with respect to

       whether petitioner was entitled to a COI in that case No. 12-CF-5, we must turn to the second issue

       on appeal—whether petitioner met his burden under subsection (g)(4) of the COI statute.

¶ 46                                          B. Subsection (g)(4)

¶ 47          Petitioner also was required to establish that he did not voluntarily cause or bring about his

       conviction under subsection (g)(4). Petitioner argues that, given our supreme court’s holding in

       Washington, the circuit court’s decision should be reversed outright since it relied upon the fact

       that petitioner pled guilty in denying the COI. The State responds that the particular circumstances

       of this case—where petitioner pled guilty to the AUUW Class 2 felonies in exchange for the

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       dismissal of another AUUW charge and the valid Class 2 felony of unlawful possession of a

       firearm by a street gang member—which carried a higher sentence—demonstrate that petitioner

       voluntarily caused or brought about his conviction. We disagree.

¶ 48          Initially, we have already rejected the State’s argument that we must consider both cases

       in determining whether petitioner satisfied subsection (g)(3). The only case at issue for purposes

       of determining whether petitioner satisfied subsection (g)(4) is case No. 12-CF-5, where both

       charges against petitioner were unconstitutional AUUW offenses. Moreover, the State’s argument

       is not persuasive under the rationale set forth in Washington and this court’s decision in McClinton.

¶ 49          In Washington, our supreme court held that a guilty plea does not categorically preclude a

       COI. Washington, 2023 IL 127952, ¶ 62. Rather, voluntariness, for purposes of establishing the

       statutory requirement that a petitioner did not by his own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about

       his conviction, is “to be determined on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the

       circumstances.” Id. In Washington, the unrebutted evidence established that detectives coerced the

       petitioner’s confession through abusive conduct. Id. ¶ 57. After the petitioner’s codefendant was

       sentenced to 75 years’ imprisonment, the petitioner chose to accept a plea offer with a 25-year

       sentence to have a life to salvage after his release. Id. ¶ 59. Under those facts, the court held that

       the petitioner could not be found to have voluntarily caused or brought about his conviction. Id.

       ¶¶ 60-62.

¶ 50          While the alleged facts in the case sub judice are entirely distinct from Washington, the

       circumstances here lead to the same holding. That is, petitioner was convicted under a statute later

       held unconstitutional. His conduct in pleading guilty to charges based on an unconstitutional

       statute cannot be said to have voluntarily caused or brought about this conviction. Indeed, in

       McClinton, this court considered similar circumstances in rejecting the argument that the petitioner

                                                        19
       voluntarily caused or brought about her conviction under the unconstitutional AUUW statute. See

       McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶¶ 20-22.

              “When a statute is held to be facially unconstitutional, as is the situation in this case, the

              statute is said to be void ab initio or void from the beginning. [Citation.] If the AUUW

              statute is void from the beginning, McClinton’s conduct *** would not have voluntarily

              brought about a conviction under a statute that was ‘constitutionally infirm from the

              moment of its enactment.’ ” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 30).

       See also Washington, 2023 IL 127952, ¶ 44 (citing this portion of McClinton as support for the

       legislative intent to broadly construe the COI statute for petitioners who did not voluntarily cause

       or bring about their convictions so as to provide an available avenue to obtain a finding of

       innocence). The fact that petitioner pled guilty to the offense later held unconstitutional, rather

       than being found guilty at trial as in McClinton, does not change the analysis. The point is that, in

       either case, the statute that criminalized the conduct was void and so the conduct was not criminal

       at the time. See McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶ 21. Accordingly, here, petitioner cannot

       be held to have caused or brought about his conviction by pleading guilty to an unconstitutional

       offense.

¶ 51          The State maintains that the rationale in McClinton does not apply here because the facts

       to which petitioner stipulated when he pled guilty demonstrate that he could have been convicted

       of different, valid AUUW offenses. The argument amounts to speculation about offenses that were

       never charged. Uncharged theories of culpability were at the heart of the argument rejected by our

       supreme court in Palmer, where it was held that the petitioner was not required to prove himself

       innocent of the uncharged accomplice theory. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 68. Here, petitioner was

       charged and pled guilty to a portion of the AUUW statute later held unconstitutional. Under these

                                                        20
       circumstances, he cannot be said to have voluntarily caused or brought about his conviction. See

       McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶¶ 20-22. Accordingly, petitioner met his burden under

       subsection (g)(4) in case No. 12-CF-5 and is entitled to a COI in that case.

¶ 52                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 53          In sum, we hold that petitioner met his burden under the COI statute in case No. 12-CF-5

       but failed to meet his burden in case No. 12-CF-627. Thus, the circuit court erred in denying the

       COI petition in case No. 12-CF-5 but did not err in denying the petition in case No. 12-CF-627.

       Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and vacated in

       part, and the cause is remanded for issuance of a COI in case No. 12-CF-5.

¶ 54          Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

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                         People v. Lesley, 2024 IL App (3d) 210330

Decision Under Review:       Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, Nos. 12-CF-5, 12-
                             CF-627; the Hon. Carmen J. Goodman, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                    Joel A. Flaxman and Kenneth N. Flaxman, of Law Offices of
for                          Kenneth N. Flaxman, PC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                    Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Laura Bialon, of State’s
for                          Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Ottawa, for the
Appellee:                    People.

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