Court Opinion

ID: 9579162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:52:06.831637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:30.617185
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MARTINEZ
dissenting:
The majority holds that the court of appeals erred by applying a substantial compliance standard to the notice provisions of section 24-10-109(3), 7 C.R.S. (1997). See maj. op. at 1040. The majority further determines that section 24-10-109(3) “mandates more than substantial compliance,” id. at 1043, and that the respondent did not satisfy this standard. See id. at 1043. Because I believe that an injured person satisfies section 24-10-109(3) by substantially complying with its notice requirements, and that the respondent did so here, I respectfully dissent.
I.
This case involves personal injuries sustained by the respondent, Travis Nyland, after he was struck by an RTD bus. On March 23, 1993, the bus hit Nyland while he was attempting to cross the intersection at 11th Avenue and Peoria Street in Aurora, Colorado. As a result, Nyland received a head injury and was knocked unconscious. In addition, his right ankle was broken and his left heel was “crushed,” injuries which required him to undergo surgery1 and wear knee-length casts on both legs.
As the majority opinion notes, Nyland retained an attorney who subsequently sent five letters to the RTD claims department (“Department”) before the 180-day period for filing written notice had elapsed. See maj. op. at 1039; 24-10-109(1). These letters were sent to Armonde Hainesworth, a claims adjuster who worked for the Department. In the first of these letters, sent on April 5, 1993, Nyland’s attorney informed Hainesworth that the attorney would “be representing [Nyland] with regard to both the liability and PIP issues.” Shortly thereafter, on April 30, 1993, Hainesworth sent the attorney a letter requesting.his “assistance” in the investigation of Nyland’s claim. As a part of this assistance, Hainesworth *1048asked the attorney to “please forward your theory of liability for ■ my Risk Manager’s review.”
On December 15, 1993, Nyland’s attorney sent Hainesworth an “Amended Notice of Claim,” which Hainesworth forwarded to the attorney representing RTD. On December 30, 1994, Nyland commenced this negligence action in Denver District Court, and RTD filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Nyland’s notice to RTD’s attorney was untimely filed. See 24-10-109(1). RTD alleged that the letters to Hainesworth failed to comply with the requirement of section 24-10-109(3) that notice “be filed with the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity.”
In his deposition testimony, Hainesworth testified that, as part of his “general functions” as a claims adjuster, he investigates both an injured party’s PIP claims and personal injury liability claims. Hainesworth also testified that, in this particular case, he acted only ás a “PIP adjuster,” and that his Risk Manager, David Beacom, operated as the personal injury adjuster. Hainesworth offered no explanation as to why he was only responsible for Nyland’s PIP claims in this particular case, and neither his testimony nor other parts of the record indicate that Ny-land’s attorney was aware of his limited function.
The trial court denied RTD’s motion, determining that the letters sent by Nyland to Hainesworth “substantially complied” with the notice requirement of section 24-10-109(3). The court found that Nyland’s attorney informed Hainesworth in the first letter that he was representing Nyland with respect to both PIP and liability issues, and that the letters sent to Hainesworth “specifically referred to the plaintiffs employment, work hours, and hourly pay, such that the amount of lost wages might be estimated.” The court also found that RTD was not prejudiced by the fact that the letters were sent to Hainesworth, instead of the RTD governing board (“Board”) or its attorney, because “[i]n addition to having information about [Nyland’s] injuries and lost wages, RTD apparently has located and obtained a statement from the only known passenger-witness.”
In affirming the trial court’s order denying RTD’s motion to dismiss, the court of appeals determined that “a claimant need only substantially comply with the 24-10-109(3) requirement that notice be sent to the public entity’s governing body or legal counsel.” Nyland v. Brock, 937 P.2d 806, 809 (Colo. App.1996). The court of appeals further held that the letters sent to Hainesworth constituted substantial compliance because they fulfilled the purposes of section 24-10-109(3):
Here, the record reveals no inability on the part of RTD to investigate and defend the action brought by [Nyland]. In fact, as the trial court found, the record establishes that RTD actively investigated [Ny-land’s] claims. Not only did the claims adjuster seek the help of [Nyland’s] attorney in its investigation, he requested that the attorney complete RTD accident report forms and provide the legal theory upon which he relied to RTD’s risk manager.
Based on the scope of the investigation conducted by the claims adjuster, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that RTD suffered no prejudice.... Further, RTD has not shown that it would have investigated any differently nor made any different fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability even if [Nyland] had given notice to RTD’s governing body or its legal counsel.
937 P.2d at 809-10.
II.
' In determining that the letters sent to Hainesworth did not satisfy section 24-10-109(3), the majority opinion holds that “the plain language of section 24-10-109(3) mandates more than substantial compliance by its terms.” Maj. op. at 1043. Although it does not do so expressly, the majority opinion thus effectively holds that section 24^10-109(3), like section 24-10-109(1), is subject to a strict compliance standard. We have never held there to exist a standard of compliance that is less than “strict,” yet “more *1049than substantial.”2 Rather, strict compliance is the appropriate standard whenever substantial compliance is insufficient. See Woodsmall v. Regional Tmnsp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63, 67 (Colo.1990) (“Compliance ... may be absolute or strict, on the one hand, or somewhat less than absolute but nonetheless substantial, on the other.”); see also East Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. District Court, 842 P.2d 233, 236 (because substantial compliance standard does not apply to 180-day notice requirement of subsection (1), appropriate standard is strict compliance).3
In my view, the majority’s application of a strict compliance standard is inconsistent with our decision in Regional Transportation District v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996), which held that the “strict compliance” standard applies only to section 24-10-109(1). As the majority concedes, in Lopez we relied on rules of statutory construction and the legislative history of section 24-10-109 to determine “that the language in subsection (1) stating that ‘[cjompliance with the provisions of this section shall be a jurisdictional prerequisite,’ must be the result of a drafting error.” 916 P.2d at 1194 (second emphasis added); see maj. op. at 1042. We therefore concluded that “the word ‘section’ [in subsection (1) ] should read ‘subsection,’ ” and that the strict compliance standard mandated by the legislature’s use of the phrase “jurisdictional prerequisite” in subsection (1) applies only to that subsection. Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1194-95. When the legislature intended other subsections of section 24-10-109 to be subject to a striet compliance standard, we noted that it included language to that effect. See id. at 1194 (“If the ‘jurisdictional prerequisite’ language of subsection (1) is read to apply to all of section 24-10-109, there would be no reason for the reiteration of the ‘forever barred’ language in subsection (5)”). Thus, although the plaintiff in Lopéz failed to strictly comply with the provisions of section 24-10-109(6), we determined that the plaintiffs claim should not have been dismissed because there was no evidence that the plaintiff did not substantially comply with that provision. See Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1196 (dismissal unwarranted because plaintiffs failure to strictly comply with section 24-10-109(6) did not prejudice RTD or preclude it from evaluating plaintiffs claim).
Despite this unambiguous holding in Lopez, the majority effectively holds that section 24-10-109(3) is subject to a strict compliance standard and “disapprove^] of any reading of our decision in Lopez ... to reach subsection (3)”. Maj. op. at 1043. Given, however, that subsection (3) contains no language indicating that its notice provisions are a jurisdictional prerequisite, or that a failure to comply “forever bars” the claim, application of a strict compliance standard to that subsection is in direct conflict with Lopez and vitiates our reasoning in that case. By applying a strict compliance standard to subsection (3), even though that subsection contains no language imposing such a requirement, the majority effectively overrules Lopez and holds that the “jurisdictional prerequisite” language in subsection (1) applies both to that subsection and subsection (3). This tacit rejection of Lopez injects uncertainty into the proper construction of other notice provisions contained in section 24-10-109. By the majority’s reasoning, all notice *1050provisions in section 24-10-109 that use the term “shall,” followed by “definite and certain” language are subject to strict compliance. Maj. op. at 1041. However, we have never held this to be the case. See Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1196 (applying substantial compliance standard to subsection (6));4 Woods-mall, 800 P.2d at 69 (applying substantial compliance standard to subsection (2)); see also East Lakewood, 842 P.2d at 236 (use of term “shall” in subsection (1), together with fact that compliance with its provisions is jurisdictional prerequisite, requires application of strict compliance standard).
The majority opinion concludes that those subsections of section 24-10-109 which are not jurisdictional requirements should be treated as “statutory notice requirements,” and that a statutory notice requirement “gives rise to an affirmative defense that must be timely raised by the defendant.” Maj. op. at 1043. I see nothing in Lopez or in the language of section 24-10-109 that creates the majority’s distinction between “jurisdictional requirements” and “affirmative defenses.” Nor do I find anything in the arguments of the parties that raise this distinction. In my view, section 24-10-109 concerns jurisdictional matters, and we must apply our precedent to require only substantial compliance with the provisions of subsection (3).
I therefore dissent from the majority’s holding that the notice provisions of section 24-10-109(3) require “more than substantial compliance.” I would affirm the court of appeals’ holding that a plaintiff satisfies the notice requirements of section 24-10-109(3) if he or she substantially complies with those provisions.
III.
An injured plaintiff substantially complies with the notice requirement contained in sec.tion 24-10-109 if the plaintiffs good-faith efforts at notification satisfy the legislative purposes of the statute. See Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67. Substantial compliance is attained when the plaintiff makes a “good faith effort to satisfy the notice requirements,” and any errors or omissions do not prejudice the public entity by adversely affecting its ability to defend against the claim. Id. at 68-69. A public entity is not prejudiced by a plaintiffs failure to strictly comply as long as the plaintiffs error does not prevent the public entity from investigating and remedying any dangerous conditions, making adequate fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability, or preparing a defense to the claim. See id. at 68. A public entity moving for dismissal on the ground that an injured plaintiff failed to substantially comply with a notice requirement of section 24-10-109 bears the burden of proving no substantial compliance. See Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 69.5
In my view, although no actual notice was received by the RTD Board or its attorney within the 180-day time period, the purposes of section 24-10-109(3) were satisfied by the letters sent to the Department. The letters sent' by Nyland to Hainesworth not only permitted RTD to investigate the claims inasmuch as they were sent to a branch of RTD whose function is to investigate claims, but the record indicates that the Department did, in fact, actively investigate those claims.6 In addition, the letters permitted RTD to make adequate fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability and to prepare a de*1051fense. The April 30 letter from Hainesworth indicates that Hainesworth was aware of the possibility of legal action, while the numerous letters from Nyland’s attorney provided detailed information concerning the extent of Nyland’s medical claims.
Most importantly, the record supports the trial court’s finding that RTD was not prejudiced by Nyland’s failure to notify the Board or its attorney. The trial court found that the letters to Hainesworth informed RTD of Nyland’s “injuries and lost wages,” and that RTD had “located and obtained a statement from the only known passenger-witness” to the incident. This finding is supported by the record, which shows that only one passenger was riding the bus that struck Nyland and that RTD obtained a tape-recorded statement from this witness shortly after the accident. Consequently, nothing in the record indicates that RTD’s ability to defend against the claim was adversely affected by Nyland’s failure to strictly comply with the notice provisions of section 24-10-109(3). See Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1194 (prejudice occurs when, due to plaintiffs error, evidence is lost or entity is not able to “remedy a potentially dangerous situation promptly”). I therefore would hold that the court of appeals correctly determined that RTD failed to meet its burden of proving that Nyland failed to substantially comply with the notice provisions of section 24-10-109(3).
IV.
The majority’s application of a strict compliance standard to the notice provisions of section 24-10-109(3) is inconsistent with our decision in Lopez. Under a substantial compliance standard, the letters sent by the respondent to RTD’s claims adjuster complied with the requirement in section 24-10-109(3) that notice be filed with “the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity.” I therefore respectfully dissent, and would affirm the opinion of the court of appeals.
VOLLACK, C.J., and BENDER, J., join in this dissent.

. The surgery on Nyland’s legs included the placement of two metal pins.

. Such a holding would be anomalous. The term, "strict," is defined as "inflexibly maintained or adhered to ... exact, precise." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1167 (1989). "Substantial” is defined as "being largely but not wholly that which is specified.” Id. at 1176. Thus, where a notice provision requires more than substantial compliance, nothing less than absolute, or strict, compliance satisfies the statutory mandate.

. As we reasoned in Woodsmall, the plain language of the statutory notice requirements of section 24-10-109, even when unambiguous, does not necessarily resolve the question of whether a court should employ a strict or substantial compliance standard. See 800 P.2d at 67. "Compliance” with these requirements, "without further modification, connotes an element of degree.” Id. Thus, while it is true that section 24-10-109(3) requires delivery of notice to the governing body of the entity or its attorney, this language, by itself, is not determinative on the question of what degree of compliance the legislature requires. To the contrary, in determining whether a plaintiff's efforts satisfy the notice requirements of section 24-10-109, we "impose[] a degree of compliance consistent with the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation under consideration.” Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67.

. In Lopez, the claimant failed to strictly comply with the requirement of subsection (6) that, once notice is filed pursuant to subsection (1), the claimant may not bring an action until the public entity has denied the claim or ninety days have passed, whichever occurs first. 916 P.2d at 1192-93. Thus, even though subsection (6) uses the term "shall” in connection with "definite and certain" language, maj. op. at 1041, we nevertheless applied a substantial compliance standard to that provision. See Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1196.

. This burden is practical and logical when the issue is substantial compliance. Because this issue involves considerations of whether the entity adequately investigated the claim and had the opportunity to prepare for legal action, as well as considerations of whether the plaintiffs errors prejudiced the entity, the entity is in a better position to obtain and present evidence than the injured plaintiff. Accordingly, I agree with the court of appeals that the burden lies with the entity to prove that the plaintiff did not substantially comply with the notice provisions of section 24-10-109(3). See Brock, 937 P.2d at 809-10.

.Indeed, as the court of appeals noted below, Hainesworth even sought the assistance of Ny-Iand’s attorney in investigating the claim, and requested the “legal theory” upon which the claim was based.