Court Opinion

ID: 9827135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:12:24.842974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:24.003140
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant has presented to this court a vigorous motion for a rehearing, especially complaining of our action in overruling its first assignment of error, in which it is charged that the 'trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of negligence arising out of the failure to ring the bell at a public crossing; the contention being that the plaintiff’s petition did not charge the defendant with failure to ring the bell. And, in addition to the quotation from the petition set out in our former opinion, appellant quotes from the petition the following statement therein;
“That on failing to blow the whistle upon approaching the public crossing as required by law, and upon their failure to stop the said train, defendant had been damaged in the sum of $500.”
It is quite evident that the term “defendant” was used in the quotation referred to inadvertently, and that the pleader intended to refer to the plaintiff. In fact, appellant makes no point upon the word “defendant,” but contends that the quotation shows that the plaintiff was not complaining of the defendant’s failure to ring the bell, but only of the failure to blow the whistle and stop the train. The petition prays for damages in the sum of $500, and for general relief.
[7] The motion for rehearing also calls attention to. the fact that we were mistaken in saying that the defendant’s answer did not contain a géneral demurrer. But it is immaterial that the answer contained such demurrer, because the record does not show that it was called to the attention of and ruled upon by the trial court; and therefore appellant is in the same condition as it would be if the answer did not contain such de*194murrer. When a litigant fails to invoke a ruling of the trial court upon his demurrers and exceptions to his adversary’s pleading, he thereby waives the same.
We do not think that the additional quotation from the plaintiff’s petition contained in the motion for rehearing constitutes any reason for changing our holding. We also copy as follows from the motion for rehearing:
“This court says in its opinion: 'If the defendant had rung the bell, that plaintiff would have heard the' same, carries with it the implication or inference that the defendant did not ring the bell.’ It may be that such inference or implication is contained in that language, but it is not sufficient under the statute of this state to allege an issue by inference or implication. The positive law on the question is in the following plain and unambiguous language: ‘The petition shall set forth clearly * * * and fully a clear statement of the cause of action and such other allegations pertinent to the cause as the plaintiff may deem necessary to sustain his suit.’
In reply to that part of the motion, we refer to the long list of authorities collated in volume 6, p. 315, Encyclopedic Digest of Texas Reports, and also to rule 17 prescribed by the Supreme Court (94 Tex. 670, 142 S. W. xviii), which reads as follows:
“General exceptions shall point out the particular instrument in the pleadings, to wit: The original petition or answer, or the respective supplements to either; and in passing upon such general exception every reasonable intendment arising upon the pleading excepted to shall be indulged in favor of its sufficiency.”
We therefore adhere to our former ruling upon that subject. Nor are we prepared to change our ruling to the effect that, if the court should not have submitted to the jury the question of ringing the bell, it is immaterial that it did so, inasmuch as the jury found in favor of the plaintiff upon the other issues submitted.
Appellant contends that our decision upon that point is in conflict with the decision of the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals in Ft. Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Wilkinson, 152 S. W. 203. We do not agree with that contention. The Wilkinson Case was submitted to the jury upon a general charge, instructing them, if they found that the defendant was guilty of negligence in either of several particulars, to find for the plaintiff; and one of the grounds of negligence therein submitted was not charged in the plaintiff’s petition. The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff, without stating upon which ground of negligence the verdict was based; and therefore it was impossible for the court to say that, it was not based upon the ground not alleged in the plaintiff’s petition, for which reason the court reversed the judgment, notwithstanding rule 62a (149 S. W. x) which was considered by the court. We indorse that decision, but we have no doubt, if that cáse had been submitted upon special issues, as was this case, and the jury had found that the defendant was guilty of negligence in any of the particulars charged in the plaintiff’s petition, the ruling of that court would have been quite different, and in harmony with the ruling of this court in this case. That is one of the advantages which may result from the trial of cases upon special issues.
All of the matters presented in the motion have received due consideration, and our conclusion is that it should be overruled.
Overruled.