Court Opinion

ID: 5579236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-11 01:34:00.227245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:36:02.325708
License: Public Domain

Lumpkin, J.,
dissenting. I am unable to concur in the decision in this case. By the Civil Code, § 3318, it is required that, to render a reservation of title effectual against third persons, the contract must be in writing and properly attested. To hold that a delivery under a sale of personalty could be made by the seller to the purchaser, with an agreement on the part of the latter to go to another town and execute a note and obtain a surety thereon, and that a day’s interval could elapse, and the seller could still retain title as against a third party acting in good faith and without notice, would be to destroy the very purpose of the statute. This is not the case of a seller who does not make a complete .delivery. He made delivery, not for examination, or the like, or on any agreement that the buyer should hold as a bailee until execution of the written contract, but in pursuance of the contract of sale. The seller merely delivered the property to the purchaser and trusted to the latter to execute and return a proper written contract. If the decision should be rested on the theory of a parol agreement that title should not pass, it would be in the teeth of the statute. If it should be rested on the idea of allowing the purchaser 'a reasonable time to execute and return the note, what is a reasonable time? Does each case stand on its own facts? Suppose the desired security were out of the way, would the title be in suspense till his return, or a reasonable time to seek to procure his signature ? Or if the purchaser should be taken sick, would he have a reasonable time to get well? and in the meantime would the public take the chances, in ease of buying the property? The fact that no security was in fact obtained in this case makes no difference. The purchaser was allowed time in which to endeavor to obtain one. *550Under the old law, title could be reserved by parol, though the property was delivered to the purchaser. The great frauds and dangers accruing against a purchaser from one clothed with the apparent title caused the enactment of the law embodied in the section of the code above cited. To hold it subject to parol agreements, or the lapse of a reasonable time after delivery, would soon destroy the purpose of the law. The statute is clear, simple, and imperative. If, instead of following it, a seller delivers possession to the purchaser and allows the latter to carry the property away, on a promise to execute and return a contract later, he takes the chances. His plain right is not to deliver the property until the statutory contract is executed. Whether the reasoning in Harp v. Patapsco Guano Co., 99 Ga. 752 (27 S. E. 181), was absolutely necessary to the decision or not, it is strong, sound, and not easily answered. See also Brundage v. Camp, 21 Ill. 330.
The analogy sought to be drawn between this case and those involving* sales for cash is not good. The present case rests on a mandatory statute. Where a statute requires a contract to be reduced to writing and executed in a certain way, a parol agreement to do it in that way is not a compliance with the statute. Without our statute, the decision of the majority of the court would be right. With such statute, I think the decision is wrong. An unexecuted writing is no compliance with the statute.