Court Opinion

ID: 9702999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:36:36.400841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.789427
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[1-4,7,8] Based on the currently accepted analysis of the meaning of a prima facie case, correctly set forth by the majority, I join it in affirming Common Pleas’ dismissal of all criminal charges against appellee Wojdak. I also join in its affirmance of the dismissal of the counts against appellee Lynch charging him with bribery in official and political matters, attempted theft by extortion and speculating or wagering on official action or information (attempted and actual) and official oppression.
Moreover, although I agree with the majority that the Commonwealth established as to appellee Lynch a prima facie case of conspiracy to commit theft by deception I am troubled by its holding that the Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing must present evidence which if accepted as true would warrant a judge in allowing the case to go to the jury. Majority opinion at 7-8 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Scolio v. Hess, 149 Pa.Superior Ct. 371, 27 A.2d 705 [1942]). I believe the proper function of a preliminary hearing is for the Commonwealth to establish “sufficient probable cause that the accused has committed the offense.” See Commonwealth v. Prado, 481 Pa. 485, 393 A.2d 8 (1978). It is apparent from examination of Pa.R.Crim.P. 141 that the purpose of the preliminary hearing is to provide the opportunity for the accused to confront witnesses against him, introduce his own witnesses and, for the first time, challenge the Commonwealth’s assertion that there is “probable cause” to justify holding him for trial. Moreover, it is unreasonable to require the Commonwealth to present a case sufficient to survive a demurrer at trial at a preliminary *390hearing which must be held three to ten days after preliminary arraignment. Pa.R.Crim.P. 140.
On the majority’s analysis, however, I do not believe the Commonwealth has established “probable cause” on the charges against appellee Wojdak or on the charges related to bribery, extortion, or speculating or wagering on official action or information against appellee Lynch. However, I am not prepared to concede that presentation of only the evidence now before us would necessarily withstand a demurrer, although I realize that is the traditional verbal standard for determining whether a prima facie case has been made out.
Finally, I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that affirms the dismissal of the charge of attempt to commit theft by deception against appellee Lynch.
Consistent with its definition of what constitutes a prima facie case, the majority holds that the Commonwealth’s evidence, viewed in its most favorable light, fails to show an effort to convey to Dr. Goldenberg false information about his son’s admission and that at best the evidence showed no more than an inquiry as to the feasibility of delaying the notification. Majority opinion at 1001. This analysis of the evidence omits an inference, permissible under all the circumstances of this case, that appellee Lynch contacted appellee Wojdak and asked him to try to get the school to delay sending an acceptance letter to Dr. Goldenberg’s son.1
I believe that evidence of such conduct established “probable cause,” as that term is defined by the majority, on the attempt charge under Section 901 of our Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 901, because appellee Lynch’s communication with Biener and his efforts to delay the acceptance letter are, when viewed on the whole record, “substantial step[s] toward the commission of the crime” of theft by deception.
*391In a prosecution for attempt to commit theft by deception under 18 Pa.C.S. § 39222 1 would not, as the majority does, adopt the requirement for attempt to commit theft by false pretenses described in the comment to the Model Penal Code § 501, at p. 63 (tentative draft 10, 1958). Under that standard an actor has not completed an attempt to commit theft by false pretenses unless “the actor has gone so far as to convey all or part of a [culpable] message to his contemplated victim.” An absolute requirement that the actor actually convey the culpable message to the contemplated victim is inconsistent with the definition of attempt in Section 501 of the Model Penal Code and Section 901 of the Crimes Code.
One of the purposes of Section 501 of the Model Penal Code and Section 901 of our Crimes Code is to extend the law of criminal attempts “by drawing the line between attempt and non-criminal preparation further away from *392the final act.” Comment, Model Penal Code, Article 5, supra, at 25.
In furtherance of that purpose, Section 901 of our Crimes Code defines attempt in terms of engaging in conduct which constitutes a “substantial step” towards commission of a crime.3
As Superior Court correctly stated in Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 273 Pa.Superior Ct. 586, 589-90, 417 A.2d 1203, 1205 (1980):
With the adoption of the Crimes Code, however, the legislature devised a new test for attempt. Thus, in Section 901(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a), an attempt is defined as follows:
“A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.”
See: Commonwealth v. Howard, 248 Pa.Super. 246, 375 A.2d 79 (1977). The substantial step test broadens the scope of attempt liability by concentrating on the acts the defendant has done and does not any longer focus on the acts remaining to be done before actual commission of the crime. See: Toll, Pennsylvania Crimes Code Annotated, 217 (1974); White, The Inchoate Crimes Provisions of the New Pennsylvania Penal Code, 35 Pitt.L.Rev. 235, 237-42 (1973).
In the instant case a jury could infer that appellee Lynch’s efforts to delay the acceptance letter were an attempt to *393create the false impression that he and Biener were responsible for Goldenberg’s son’s admission and that Goldenberg was obligated to pay them for their services.
I would therefore find probable cause to hold appellee Lynch on the charge of attempt to commit theft by deception.

. See majority opinion at 1002. The majority correctly concludes, “there is no evidence from which to infer that Wojdak knew Lynch’s objective in seeking the delay or that the reason for his assisting was inspired by a criminal motive.”

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a) which defines the offense of theft by deception provides:
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by deception. A person deceives if he intentionally:
(1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;
(2) prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction; or
(3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
That provision of the Crimes Code replaced 18 P.S. § 4836 which provides that:
Whoever, by any false pretense, obtains the signature of any person to any written instrument, or obtains from any other person any chattel, money, or valuable security, with intent to cheat and defraud any person of the same, or being an officer, manager, agent, employe of or in any way interested in any person, by false pretense, knowingly and with intent to defraud, procures, obtains, or aids, assists, or abets in obtaining from any other person, any chattels, moneys, or valuable securities for such person of which he is an officer, manager, agent, employe or in which he is in any way interested, is guilty of a felony, ....

. Section 501 of the Model Penal Code defines criminal attempt as:
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
Section 901(a) similarly defines criminal attempt:
(a) Definition of attempt.—A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.