Court Opinion

ID: 9586179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:03.397134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:57.015642
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, as I find that the trial court erred in holding the separation agreement vague, inconsistent, and so full of omissions as to render the agreement null and void as a matter of law.
As the majority correctly notes, separation agreements not ratified by a court are governed by the general principles of contracts. See Dalton v. Dalton, 164 N.C. App. 584, 586, 596 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2004). Although this Court has noted that, to be enforceable, separation agreements must have mutuality of agreement as to the material terms specified directly or by implication, see Rosen v. Rosen, 105 N.C. App. 326, 328, 413 S.E.2d 6, 7 (1992), our Supreme Court has held that “[w]here . . . the parties have attempted to put in writing an agreement fixing the rights and duties owing to each other, courts will not deny relief because of vagueness and uncertainty in the language used, if the intent of the parties can be ascertained.” Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 379, 126 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962). Our courts, in determining the intent of the parties, look first to the language of the agreement. See Walton v. City of Raleigh, 342 N.C. 879, 881, 467 S.E.2d 410, 411 (1996) (“[i]f the plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the words of the contract”). If a term is ambiguous, parol evidence may be admitted to explain the term. See Vestal v. Vestal, 49 N.C. App. 263, 266-67, 271 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1980) (“[although parol evidence may not be allowed to vary, add to, or contradict an integrated written instrument, ... an ambiguous term may be explained or construed'with the aid of parol evidence). A closer examination of the contested provisions of the agreement is therefore warranted to determine if the intent of the parties can be ascertained from the plain language, or if parol evidence could properly be admitted to explain ambiguous terms.
*55The majority first finds the paragraph entitled “Child Support” to be defective, as it requires payment of the full amount of support, $900.00, on a monthly basis until the youngest child is 20 years old. Although an age difference of eight years exists between the children, thus resulting in continued payments of the full $900.00 for ten years after the eldest child reaches majority, such an age difference does not render the paragraph ambiguous. While parents have a legal obligation to support their children and cannot by contract relieve themselves of that obligation, see Thomas v. Thomas, 248 N.C. 269, 274-75, 103 S.E.2d 371, 375 (1958), “a parent can by contract assume an obligation to his child greater than the law otherwise imposes, and by contract bind himself to support his child after emancipation and past majority.” Shaffner v. Shaffner, 36 N.C. App. 586, 588, 244 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1978). In Goodyear v. Goodyear, a provision of the separation agreement included payments of $400.00 monthly by the father to the mother for benefit of their two children. Goodyear, 257 N.C. at 376, 126 S.E.2d at 114-15. Such payments were required to be made subsequent to the date of the eldest child’s twenty-first birthday. Id. at 378, 126 S.E.2d at 116. Our Supreme Court found this contract term to be enforceable, holding that the contract term required a monthly payment of $400.00, rather than a monthly payment of $200.00 per child. Id. at 378, 126 S.E.2d at 117. Here, similarly, the parties agreed to a lump sum payment for the benefit of the two children which would continue into the eldest child’s majority by their plain language. Such a term, although providing for support beyond the requirements of law, is nonetheless enforceable on its face.
The majority next notes the provision concerning “Hospital, Medical and Dental Insurance” is unclear as to when the coverage ends. The language of the provision states that coverage will continue “until said minor children reach age of 21 if not in college or the age of 23 if minor children are attending college.” Here, the plain language again reveals the intent of the parties. Unlike the child support provision, which specifies that support is to end for both children at a fixed point in time, the insurance provision refers to coverage ending for each of the minor children as soon as they reach the age of twenty-one or twenty-three, depending on their educational status. Thus, the plain language of this-agreement creates no ambiguity as to when the insurance coverage ends.
The majority next addresses the “Payment of Medical and Dental Expenses of Minor Children” provision, finding that it is unclear as to duration. Although the paragraph does not include a specific termi*56nation, the plain language requires payment of the “expenses of the minor children.” Thus it can be inferred that the payments of these expenses are to be made for each child until that child reaches the age of majority.
The majority next addresses the paragraph regarding “Military Benefits,” finding it void as it establishes a different time table for benefits than the “Child Support” paragraph. The “Military Benefits” paragraph states that the “minor children shall receive all benefits to which they are entitled to as military dependents so long as they shall be entitled to receive said benefits under the prevailing laws[.]” Although this provision does provide a different termination period than the provision for child support, payment of health insurance, and payment of other medical expenses, each section refers to separate benefits, and therefore differing schedules for duration of the distinct benefits should not render the provisions void.
The majority next finds that the provision entitled “Life Insurance” is unclear as to whether defendant is responsible for one or both policies, as he is to “name the Wife as the sole beneficiary on these policies[.]” The paragraph is clear as to who is responsible for maintaining premiums on the respective policies: the wife is responsible for the policies held through Metropolitan Life Insurance and the husband is responsible for those held through MCI Life Insurance. Further, the paragraph is clear that the husband “shall name the Wife as the sole beneficiary[.]” The evidence of record fails to show, however, who is the actual policy holder for the three life insurance policies on defendant’s life, and thus who is the proper party to designate the beneficiary. Therefore, parol evidence should properly be considered to clarify this ambiguity. See Vestal, 49 N.C. App. at 266-67, 271 S.E.2d at 309.
The majority next addresses the “Retirement” paragraph, finding the section unclear as to when the payments of the military pension and retirement pay are to begin, and as to their duration. Here the plain language of the paragraph is sufficient to create a definite obligation between the parties, specifying an exact percentage of defendant’s military retirement to be received by plaintiff. The paragraph also states that payments are to be made by the fifth of each month. Further, evidence presented to the trial court indicated that defendant, already retired, began paying plaintiff a portion of the retirement benefits as soon as the separation agreement was effective. Our Supreme Court has held that:
*57A contract . . . encompasses not only its express provisions but also all such implied provisions as are necessary to effect the intention of the parties unless express terms prevent such inclusion. “The court will be prepared to imply a term if there arises from the language of the contract itself, and the circumstances under which it is entered into, an inference that the parties must have intended the stipulation in question.”
“If it can be plainly seen from all the provisions of the instrument taken together that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the parties when making their contract or is necessary to carry their intention into effect, the law will imply the obligation and enforce it.”
Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 410, 200 S.E.2d 622, 624-25 (1973) (citations omitted). Thus, a term can be implied from the language and circumstances that the parties intended the payment of retirement benefits to begin upon certification of the separation agreement.
Although the paragraph does not specify a duration of the military retirement benefits, duration of such benefits would be governed by the requirements of the retirement and pension plans. Therefore, admission of parol evidence as to the retirement and pension benefit plans would be appropriate to clarify this ambiguity. See Vestal, 49 N.C. App. at 266-67, 271 S.E.2d at 309.
The majority next addresses the second paragraph entitled “Military Benefits,” finding that the paragraph does not make clear whether the benefit terminates on plaintiff or defendant’s remarriage or death. The plain language of the, agreement indicates that the benefits in question are those of the military dependant. Thus the provision that such benefits shall be received by “the Wife” until “remarriage or death which ever comes first” clearly refers to the wife’s remarriage or death, as she is the dependant in question.
The majority finally addresses the paragraph entitled “Alimony,” finding that the section fails to establish when alimony payments will begin, as the section provides for a graduated schedule that requires defendant to provide $200.00 monthly to plaintiff after the support to the oldest minor child ends, and an additional $300.00 monthly to plaintiff when the support to the youngest minor child ends. As discussed supra, the agreement does not provide for a staggered termination of child support. “A contract must be considered as a whole, *58considering each clause and word with reference to other provisions and giving effect to each if possible by any reasonable construction.” Development Enterprises v. Ortiz, 86 N.C. App. 191, 194, 356 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1987). Here, the “Alimony” provision can be reasonably construed to provide a payment of $500.00 to plaintiff only upon termination of child support when the youngest minor child reaches the age of twenty, and to provide no alimony payments to plaintiff prior to that time. As the intent of the parties can be inferred from the language of the agreement, the provision is enforceable.
As the intent of the parties can be determined by the plain language of the separation agreement, and any ambiguities creating questions of fact may properly be resolved with the use of parol evidence, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim on the grounds the separation agreement was vague and unenforceable. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.