Court Opinion

ID: 9905033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 18:03:31.156277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:25.738371
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 P. v. Cunningham CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B324592

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. TA138500)
                   v.

EUGENE EVERETTE
CUNNINGHAM,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from the order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.
      Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
       Defendant and appellant Eugene Everette Cunningham
appeals from the summary denial of his petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Former section 1170.95
was renumbered and recodified as section 1172.6 with no change
in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to
former section 1170.95 only by its new designation
(section 1172.6).
       Defendant contends the court prejudicially erred in failing
to grant his request for appointed counsel who could have
presented argument demonstrating that he lacked the intent to
kill as required under current law. He says a reversal is
therefore warranted to allow for the appointment of counsel, full
briefing and a hearing on his petition.
       We conclude any error in declining to appoint counsel was
harmless and affirm.
          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       In August 2015, defendant, an admitted member of the
Carver Park Compton Crips gang, fired several gunshots at a
passing car in which members of a rival gang were riding.
       Defendant was charged with two counts of premeditated
attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 1 &
2), one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 5)
and one count of a being a felon in possession of a firearm
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6). Personal firearm use allegations
were alleged as to counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022.52, subds. (b) & (c))
and gang allegations were alleged as to all counts. It was alleged
defendant had suffered a prior felony conviction for attempted
burglary. Counts 3 and 4 (shooting at an inhabited dwelling)
were dismissed before trial pursuant to section 1385.

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       Defendant testified at trial and said that in August 2015,
Carver Park had been in a feud with a rival gang called Athens
Miller Bloods for almost a year. Defendant admitted he was
carrying a .357-caliber handgun on the day of the shooting. He
said that, as he was leaving a basketball game at a neighborhood
park, a car passed him. An Athens Miller gang member was
hanging out one of the car’s windows, appeared to be “clutching”
a gun and yelled out the Athens Miller name. Defendant
believed the Athens Miller gang member was going to shoot so he
fired his gun four times at the car.
       The jury found defendant guilty of shooting at an occupied
vehicle, two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter (as a
lesser charge of attempted murder) and possession of a firearm
by a felon. The jury also found true the gang and personal
firearm use allegations. Defendant was acquitted on the
two counts of attempted murder.
       The court imposed a life sentence on count 5 (shooting at an
occupied vehicle) with a 15-year minimum parole eligibility based
on the gang finding (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(4)(B)), plus
five years for the prior felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
The court imposed and stayed sentence on the remaining counts,
including both counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter.
       In 2018, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction. (People
v. Cunningham (Mar. 20, 2018, B280495) [nonpub. opn.].) We
granted a limited remand, in light of the passage of Senate
Bill 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), during the pendency of that
appeal, to allow the trial court the opportunity to exercise its
newly granted discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm use
enhancements and to correct an error in the abstract of judgment
regarding count 6. (People v. Cunningham, supra, B280495.) At

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a hearing on June 26, 2018, the trial court ordered correction of
the abstract of judgment, elected not to strike or dismiss the
firearm use allegations and did not resentence defendant.
        In 2022, after the passage of Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), defendant
filed, in propria persona, a form petition requesting resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 in which he stated under oath that he
had been charged with and convicted of “murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter” (boldface and underscore omitted) and
could not now be so convicted under the law as amended by
Senate Bill 1437. Defendant requested the appointment of
counsel.
        The petition was assigned to the Honorable Kelvin D. Filer,
the judge who presided over defendant’s jury trial in 2016. The
court did not appoint counsel for defendant and did not order
briefing.
        The court summarily denied defendant’s petition without a
hearing, explaining that defendant was “not entitled to relief as a
matter of law for the following reasons: [¶] [Defendant] was
convicted of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter as
lesser charges to the charge of attempted murder, and the court
file reflects that [defendant] was the actual shooter and was not
convicted under a theory of aiding and abetting. [¶] [Defendant]
was the sole defendant in the case. There are no jury
instructions for aiding and abetting or natural and probable
consequences. [¶] [Defendant] testified in his own defense and
admitted being the shooter. [¶] The appellate opinion confirming
[defendant’s] conviction reflects that [defendant] was the actual
shooter.”

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        This appeal followed. We grant defendant’s request for
judicial notice of our opinion in his direct appeal (case No.
B280495), and grant the People’s request for judicial notice of the
record in that appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
        We independently review the denial of a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) Our review of the record here
demonstrates that if the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
request for the appointment of counsel, the error was harmless
because defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
        Section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3) provides in relevant part
that upon receipt of a petition that complies with the
requirements of subdivision (b)(1), “the court shall appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner.” In People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 962–963 (Lewis), the Supreme Court resolved a
split in the Courts of Appeal and concluded the statutory scheme
specifies only one prima facie review and petitioners who file a
facially compliant petition are entitled to the appointment of
counsel to assist them in demonstrating prima facia eligibility for
relief.
        Lewis held the denial of counsel under section 1172.6,
subdivision (b)(3) is “state law error only, tested for prejudice
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 957–958.) A defendant must show a reasonable
probability that but for the trial court’s error, he would have
obtained a more favorable result. (Id. at p. 974.) More
specifically, he must demonstrate that had he been afforded his
statutory right to counsel, it is reasonably probable his petition

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would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary
hearing. (Ibid.) Defendant cannot demonstrate that here.
       Defendant was not convicted of a crime enumerated in
section 1172.6, subdivision (a). Section 1172.6 provides an
opportunity for sentencing relief only to those individuals
convicted of felony murder, murder or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory of
imputed malice, and manslaughter. Defendant was convicted of
shooting at an occupied vehicle and attempted voluntary
manslaughter, neither of which falls within the scope of the
statute.
       Defendant argues that attempted voluntary manslaughter
is so similar to attempted murder that it is not unreasonable to
construe section 1172.6 as also applying to attempted voluntary
manslaughter. The Legislature passed Senate Bill 775
specifically adding the crimes of manslaughter and attempted
murder to the list of offenses for which relief is available. They
could have also added attempted manslaughter but did not do so.
It is not our role to add words to the statutory language and we
decline to do so. (People v. Chambless (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 773,
783 [“In construing any particular provision of a statute, we do
not insert words into it as such would ‘violate the cardinal rule
that courts may not add provisions to a statute’ ” (italics
omitted)].)
       Even if we were to construe section 1172.6 as applying to
attempted voluntary manslaughter, we would affirm, because the
record of conviction unequivocally demonstrates defendant was
not charged or tried as an accomplice or aider and abettor, but as
the actual shooter who acted alone with the intent to kill. The
jury was not instructed with the natural and probable

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consequences doctrine or other theory of imputed malice. The
jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 604 which told them that
in order to find defendant guilty of attempted voluntary
manslaughter, they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
acted with the intent to kill. The jury also found true the
allegation that defendant personally used and discharged a
firearm in the commission of the offenses. The petition was
properly denied. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 59
[petition properly denied at prima facie stage where record of
conviction conclusively established “with no factfinding, weighing
of evidence, or credibility determinations” that the defendant was
the actual killer].)
                           DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant and appellant Eugene
Everette Cunningham’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                              GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        VIRAMONTES, J.

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