Court Opinion

ID: 9704599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:40:58.425071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:03.328478
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I would concur in the result the majority reaches on the first and second counts plaintiff asserts. However, my opinion differs from the majority on the third count regarding the existence of an express warranty, and so I feel some comment is in order.
Plaintiff contends that the trial judge erred when he held that the sign which read "USED CARS 1 YEAR WARRANTY” did not create an express warranty. The applicable section of the Uniform Commercial Code, MCLA 440.2313; MSA 19.2313, provides:
"(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
"(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.”
Defendant contends that there was no evidence that plaintiff relied on the sign to his detriment. The record shows that plaintiff did take note of the *606sign on his first visit to defendant’s premises, but there was no discussion about warranty during the negotiations. The question is, therefore, whether under these facts, the sign became "part of the basis of the bargain” so as to create an express warranty.
It should be noted that the predecessor to this section of the Uniform Commercial Code, § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, CL 1948, §440.12; MSA 19.252, provided:
"Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon.”
While it is apparent that the Uniform Commercial Code does not expressly provide for reliance on the part of the purchaser as did the Uniform Sales Act, it has been argued that the "basis of the bargain” test is equivalent thereto, and effects little change in Michigan law. Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Recent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 Mich L Rev 1430, 1433. It must be observed, however, that the Official UCC Comment ¶ 3, regarding MCLA 440.2313, states:
"In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact.”
While it is no doubt true that a statement ordinar*607ily amounting to a warranty cannot be a part of the "basis of the bargain” if the plaintiff is totally unaware of the statement, Kepling v Schlueter Mfg Co, 378 F2d 5, 7 (CA 6, 1967), the record in the instant case clearly shows that plaintiff was aware of the statement on defendant’s sign. Since I can find nothing in this record which a trial court could reasonably construe as being clear affirmative proof of any fact which would take such a statement out of the agreement, I would hold that the statement on defendant’s sign, "USED CARS 1 YEAR WARRANTY” did become a part of the "basis of the bargain” and was therefore an express warranty under MCLA 440.2313; MSA 19.2313. See Hawkins Construction Co v Matthews Co, Inc, 190 Neb 546; 209 NW2d 643 (1973).
The trial judge was concerned about the meaning of the sign on defendant’s premises. He apparr eritly reasoned that since warranties come in different shapes and sizes, and since the sign did not specify what was warranted, and on what specific terms, he could only construe the sign as an invitation to do business. I must disagree with the learned trial judge. In the law of contracts any ambiguity in a written contract is construed against the draftsman. In the case at bar, defendant made a statement on a sign which was ambiguous, and which was not clarified during the negotiations for the sale of the used automobile. I do not think it fair that defendant profit from any ambiguity in the statement. Rather, I think that defendant should be held to a construction which a purchaser of a used automobile would reasonably hold. I hold, therefore, that the statement, "USED CARS 1 YEAR WARRANTY”, absent explanations to the purchaser clearly indicating otherwise, *608means that the seller warrants that used automobiles which he sells will be suitable for transportation under normal use for a period of one year. I note that defendant in this case offered to repair plaintiffs car for a 25% discount on parts and labor. While defendant may have intended to clarify the meaning of his warranty, his failure to inform the purchaser prior to the purchase that those were the terms of his warranty rendered such statements ineffective for that purpose. If a purchaser is not informed otherwise, I think that the purchaser of a used automobile under a "warranty” which specifies a particular length of time should be able reasonably to rely on a belief that seller warrants that the automobile will function effectively as transportation for the stated period or that defects therein which render the automobile inoperative will be repaired at seller’s cost.
It must next be determined whether the seller effectively disclaimed the warranty by the language on the reverse side of the purchase order agreement. MCLA 440.2316; MSA 19.2316 provides:
"(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.”
In the case at bar defendant used clear words to create an express warranty. Defendant also used clear words in uniform small print on the reverse side of the purchase order agreement to disclaim that warranty. Since there is no reasonable con*609struction by which these terms may be understood as consistent with each other, I hold that thé words of negation or limitation were inoperative.
I concur in the measure of damages the majority would employ.