Court Opinion

ID: 9755867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:56:52.551462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:12.419161
License: Public Domain

*626Opinion of the Court by
Justice CUNNINGHAM.
The Commonwealth appeals from an opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court. The defendant in that case, Ronald D. Marr, was indicted on one count of manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, one count of trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in the first degree while in possession of a firearm, one count of illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia while in possession of a firearm, and one count of illegal possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) while in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, the Jefferson Circuit Court suppressed certain evidence seized following a pat-down search of Marr. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. This Court granted discretionary review.
The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Officer Bailey, a Louisville police officer, who testified to the following facts. In April 2001, police received an anonymous tip that methamphetamine was being sold from a body shop in Louisville. The tip included a description of the seller as an older “biker looking” man. Based on this information, officers began surveillance of the body shop. They observed people coming into the shop for short periods of time who did not appear to be bringing in cars for body work. The police concluded that these brief visits were consistent with drug activity.
To further the investigation, the police pulled over one vehicle leaving the business. The individual in the vehicle possessed two pounds of marijuana. Fearing that this arrest would compromise their undercover surveillance of the body shop, the police decided to enter the business and speak with the owner.
Upon their arrival, the police announced themselves to the shop owner and informed him that they were conducting a narcotics investigation. The officers heard a noise from the back of the business and inquired whether anyone else was present. Officer Bailey testified that the shop owner seemed nervous as he replied that no one else was present.
Nonetheless, Officer Bailey called for the person in the back to come out. Marr, who is an older, bearded, “biker looking” man, emerged. Officer Bailey testified that Marr also appeared nervous. Based on these circumstances, Officer Bailey performed a pat-down search of Marr. During this pat-down search, the officer felt “hitters” used to ingest drugs, and two small, plastic bags of methamphetamine. The officer also found a large amount of cash. Following the pat-down, the officers received verbal and written consent from Marr to search his residence. At the residence, they found weapons, additional methamphetamine, and a methamphetamine lab.
Following the suppression hearing, the trial court concluded that Officer Bailey lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Marr was engaged in criminal activity to justify the pat-down search. The trial court further suppressed the evidence seized from Marr’s residence, determining that the improper pat-down search vitiated Marr’s consent to search the residence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
When reviewing a trial court’s judgment with respect to a suppression hearing, the court’s findings of facts are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78. The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 *627S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky.1998). In this case, it should be noted that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was uncontro-verted, and therefore, we assume that these are the facts upon which the trial court based its judgment.
A police officer may, for his protection, conduct a pat-down search of a person when that officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1885, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In determining whether the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, the reviewing court must examine the totality of the circumstances to see whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis for the suspicion. While a “mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
Marr relies heavily on those cases involving anonymous tips, particularly the seminal case of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). The Supreme Court in J.L. explained that “reasonable suspicion ... requires that a tip be rehable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. at 1379. Judged against this standard, the anonymous tip in J.L.— which stated simply that a male wearing a certain shirt at a bus station was carrying a gun — was insufficient to justify an investigatory stop.
When the circumstances in this case are examined in their totality, the present situation becomes readily distinguishable from J.L. Officers conducted surveillance of the body shop prior to Marr being frisked, and noticed a traffic pattern consistent with illegal drug activity. They arrested one visitor to the body shop and found illegal drugs. The police are permitted to take into account their surroundings — and whether a particular location has a reputation for being a “known drug” area — when forming a reasonable and ar-ticulable suspicion. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (legitimate Terry stop based on suspect’s suspicious behavior coupled with his presence in notorious “crack house”). Likewise, Officer Bailey’s suspicion of Marr was legitimately raised once it became objectively probable that drugs were being trafficked from the body shop.
In J.L. it was particularly noted that the defendant made “no threatening or otherwise unusual movements.” 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S.Ct. at 1377. The nervous behavior of both Marr and the body shop owner raised the officer’s suspicion in this case. “Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.” Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky.2003). It was also reasonable for the officer to conclude that the body shop owner had lied when he told him no one was present in the back room. Cf. Adkins, 96 S.W.3d at 787 (where fact that suspect gave a false name and address was legitimate factor in forming officer’s suspicion).
Marr incorrectly argues that the anonymous tip formed the sole basis of Officer Bailey’s suspicion. Rather, the anonymous tip in this case was suitably corroborated by the fact that the described “biker looking” man was present at the named body shop; that the traffic flow to and from the shop suggested drug activity; *628that the owner of the shop appeared nervous upon the officers’ lawful entrance; that the owner concealed Marr’s presence in the back room; and that Marr himself appeared nervous. Officers are permitted to “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them[.]” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51. Whether the tip provided basis to believe criminal activity was afoot or not, the additional factors listed above clearly allowed the officer the reasonable basis to do a pat-down search for his own safety at that point. The confluence of facts and the suspicion of drug activity in this building made the situation inherently dangerous. Accordingly, the officer was justified in conducting the minimally invasive pat-down search of Marr. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky.1999) (“Whether a seizure is reasonable requires a review of the totality of the circumstances, taking into consideration the level of police intrusion into the private matters of citizens and balancing it against the justification for such action.”).
Based upon the foregoing, the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court, is reversed.
All sitting. MINTON, NOBLE, SCOTT, JJ., concur. ABRAMSON, J., dissents by separate opinion in which LAMBERT, C.J. and SCHRODER, J., join.