Court Opinion

ID: 9370087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 19:02:22.299416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.263403
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/10/23 P. v. Crist CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096231

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. Nos. 21CF05622,
                                                                                  21CF05739, 21CM05737 )
           v.

 DERRICK DEON CRIST,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Derrick Deon Crist contends his three-year eight-month sentence
violates his plea agreement. We disagree and affirm.
                         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In three cases, defendant pled guilty to two felony offenses and five misdemeanor
offenses. On the plea form, defendant stated that he had not been induced to enter the
pleas “by any promise or representation of any kind, except” for the agreement that he
would receive a “terminal” sentence with no probation. In return, defendant agreed that
“[t]here m[ight] be factors in aggravation which [were] not plead [sic] or proved” and

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that he “m[ight] receive the upper term” sentence because he was “rejecting probation.”
The plea form advised that the maximum sentence as a result of defendant’s plea was
three years four months in county jail. The People concede this was not the correct
maximum sentence for the offenses to which defendant pled.
       Before accepting defendant’s pleas, the trial court confirmed that defendant had
initialed and signed the plea form. The court did not review the terms of the agreement
on the record but did ask defendant whether anyone had threatened him or promised him
anything in order to get him to plead. Defendant responded, “No.” The court then asked
about the proposed “terminal” sentence, to which the prosecutor responded that the plea
agreement was “open”1 and defendant preferred not to be placed on probation. No one
mentioned the maximum sentence defendant faced.
       At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to the
upper term of three years in county jail for vandalism and a consecutive term of eight
months in county jail for a separate act of vandalism. (Pen. Code, 2 §§ 594, 1170,
subd. (h)(1).) The court declined to suspend a concluding portion of the sentence, finding
mandatory supervision inappropriate in this case. (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5).) For the
misdemeanor offenses, the court sentenced defendant to four concurrent one-year terms
and one concurrent six-month term in county jail. Defendant did not object to his
sentence at the hearing. Again, no one mentioned the incorrect maximum sentence listed
on the plea form.
       Defendant timely appealed. In his request for a certificate of probable cause, filed
more than one month after his sentencing hearing, defendant for the first time raised the

1      “An open plea is one under which there is no promise about the nature or duration
of the defendant’s sentence.” (People v. Henderson (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 785, 788.)
2      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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issue that he “was sentenced to more time th[a]n the plea offer stipulated.” The trial
court granted the request.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends his three-year eight-month sentence violates his plea
agreement because it exceeds the three-year four-month maximum sentence listed on his
plea form. The People respond that (1) the parties did not agree on the duration of
defendant’s sentence, (2) the incorrect maximum sentence on the plea form was merely
an incorrect advisement about the consequences of the plea, (3) defendant forfeited his
right to claim the trial court misadvised him by not objecting at sentencing, and (4) the
error was harmless because the four-month difference between the stated and actual
maximum sentences would not have caused defendant to forego his plea. We agree with
the People that defendant and the prosecution did not agree on the duration of defendant’s
sentence. We conclude that the trial court misadvised defendant about the maximum
sentence he faced, but defendant forfeited his right to raise the issue on appeal when he
did not object at sentencing to the trial court imposing a sentence four months longer than
the advised maximum sentence.
                                             I
                                      Plea Agreement
       As an initial matter, the parties did not agree on the duration of defendant’s
sentence. “Because a ‘negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract,’ it is interpreted
according to general contract principles.” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930.)
“ ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) If contractual language is clear and
explicit, it governs. (Civ. Code, § 1638.)’ ” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759,
767.) “ ‘The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective
manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as
extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under

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which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject
matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties. (Civ. Code, §§ 1635-
1656; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1859-1861, 1864; [citations].)’ ” (Ibid.)
       Here, both the plea form defendant signed and defendant’s statement in the trial
court confirm that the prosecution made no promise about the duration of his sentence in
return for defendant’s plea. The separate section advising defendant about the maximum
sentence as a result of his plea is clearly phrased as an advisement: “I understand that I
may serve this maximum sentence as a result of my plea . . . .” (Italics added.) The
surrounding circumstances and subsequent actions of the parties support this
interpretation as well. After defendant pled, the prosecutor clarified for the trial court
that defendant’s desire for a “terminal” sentence without probation did not change the
open nature of the plea, which defendant did not dispute. Consistent with the
prosecutor’s statement, no one mentioned any agreed upon maximum sentence at the plea
hearing. Likewise, when the trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to a term four
months longer than the incorrect maximum sentence, defendant did not claim a term of
the plea agreement had been violated, which is consistent with the People’s position that
no such term had been agreed upon. We conclude defendant’s plea agreement did not
include any term regarding the duration of defendant’s sentence.
                                              II
                                      Advisement Error
       Defendant was, however, misadvised that he could receive a maximum sentence
of three years four months as a result of his no contest pleas to two counts of felony
vandalism, two counts of misdemeanor vandalism, two counts of misdemeanor resisting
arrest, and one count of misdemeanor trespassing. In fact, had the trial court sentenced
defendant to consecutive sentences for all seven offenses, the sentence would have
totaled eight years two months. (See §§ 594, subds. (a) & (b) [felony and misdemeanor
vandalism], 1170, subd. (h)(1) [punishment for felony vandalism], 148, subd. (a)(1)

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[misdemeanor resisting arrest], 602, subd. (m) [misdemeanor trespassing], 19
[punishment for misdemeanor trespassing], 1170.1, subd. (a) [consecutive sentencing for
felonies]; People v. Brown (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1434 [sentencing
misdemeanors consecutive to felonies].) This was in error, but defendant forfeited his
right to raise the issue on appeal by failing to object when the trial court imposed a
sentence that exceeded the maximum sentence listed on the plea form.
       “[B]ecause ‘advisement as to the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally
mandated,’ ‘the error is [forfeited] absent a timely objection.’ ” (People v. Villalobos
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 177, 182.) The forfeiture rule is particularly apt in such circumstances
because advisement errors are easily correctable if brought to the trial court’s attention at
or before sentencing. (People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 377-378; Villalobos, at
pp. 181-182, 186.) Here, the probation report filed before the sentencing hearing
recommended a three-year eight-month sentence, which exceeded the incorrect maximum
sentence on the plea form. The trial court then sentenced defendant to three years eight
months in county jail. Had defendant brought these discrepancies to the attention of the
trial court, the error in the plea form could have been corrected. In these circumstances,
we conclude defendant forfeited his right to challenge the advisement error.

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                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                           /s/
                                           ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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