Court Opinion

ID: 9854576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:09:23.287282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:09.651478
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(concurring).
I agree that the case should be remanded to the superior court with instructions to vacate the 36-year sentence which was imposed and to resentence appellant.
In dissenting in Bear v. State1 I explained my belief that under article IV, section 2 of the Alaska constitution this court is empowered to review the merits of a criminal sentence, the term of which is within the statutory limitations imposed by the legislature.2 Adhering to the views which I expressed in Bear, I am of the opinion this court has the jurisdiction to review the 36-year sentence which the trial judge, in the exercise of his sentencing discretion, considered appropriate in the case at bar. I reiterate my belief that sentencing is a discretionary judicial function and that it is the province of the judiciary itself, not the executive branch of our government, to correct abuses of such discretion.3
Study of the entire record has convinced me that the sentence appellant received is excessive. Further, at no point in the record does it appear that the trial judge ascertained if there was a factual basis for the entry of the guilty pleas.4 In other words, the record reflects that the trial judge was completely uninformed as to the circumstances surrounding the making, issuing, and acceptances of the eight separate checks which totalled $1,384.35. Left unexplained is the fact that only one of the checks was dated July 9, 1966, the date upon which the government alleged the eight separate offenses occurred. The record also contains some rather inconclusive and conflicting references to alcohol, appellant’s intoxication, and the role that alcohol played in the events which are purported to have occurred on July 9, 1966.
Additionally, I am of the view that appellant’s prior criminal record does not *823furnish justification for the remarkably long sentence which he received. Nothing in regard to the nature of these particular check offenses, the surrounding circumstances, or appellant’s past history warranted depriving this 46-year-old human being of his liberty for a period of 36 years. What is involved here is an offense against property in the total amount of $1,384.35. Here we are not concerned with homicide or physical harm or injury to another person.
In my view, this case dramatically indicates a certain pathology in sentencing and, by comparison, reflects the existence of wide disparity in sentencing. Equally forcefully demonstrated is the need for this court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction in review of judicial sentencing in order to attempt to develop appropriate sentencing standards, and to insure that justice is obtained through adherence to the constitutional mandate which requires that the administration of criminal justice in Alaska be based upon the “principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public.” 5
I do not think that attainment of these goals can be advanced by viewing Alaska’s felony statutes as providing for indeterminate sentencing.6 Nor do I believe that this court should abdicate its review responsibilities because of the fact that every felony prisoner is eligible for parole on the very first day of his incarceration regardless of the length of sentence imposed.7 It is obvious that determination of an appropriate sentence involves the judicious balancing of many and ofttimes competing factors. Just as apparent to me is the observation that primacy cannot be ascribed to any particular factor. Yet in reviewing this record in light of the type of offenses which were involved, what information we do have as to the surrounding circumstances, and appellant’s prior life history, I am not convinced that the length of the sentence imposed was appropriate. It does not convincingly appear to me that the principle of public protection requires appellant’s potential incarceration for 36 years. Admittedly, appellant’s three prior violations of the law and other information concerning his life indicate that a substantial term of imprisonment is warranted in order to insure the public protection and to assist in the attempt to reform appellant. What is lacking here is any indication that we are dealing with a professional or dangerously depraved criminal. In my view, if the present sentence were to remain unaltered, any possibility of appellant’s reformation would be brutally negated.
I concur in Chief Justice NES-BETT’S view concerning the cruel and unusual punishment aspects of this appeal.

. 439 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1968).

. In the course of my dissent I cited and relied upon the following precedents of this court: Egelak v. State, 438 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1968); Thompson v. State, 426 P.2d 995, 999 (Alaska 1967); Battese v. State, 426 P.2d 606, 611 (Alaska 1967); State v. Pete, 420 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1966).

. Bear v. State, 439 P.2d 432, 440 n. 32 (Alaska 1968).

. Knaub v. State, 443 P.2d 44, 51 n. 21 (Alaska 1968); Thompson v. State, 426 P.2d 995, 997 (Alaska 1967).

. Alaska Const, art. I, § 12.

. Indeterminate sentences were authorized by SLA 1964, eh. 43, § 3 and were subsequently abolished by virtue of the provision of SLA 1965, ch. 68, §, 2.

. It should be noted that the trial judge’s modification of his original sentence to fix appellant’s eligibility for parole came after appellant had filed a post-eonviction motion to reduce the sentence. Ap-pellee, in its brief, states that in so doing,
the trial judge went further and provided that the defendant should be eligible for parole in five years, thus at once mitigating the harshness of that sentence and placing the responsibility on the appellant to demonstrate that he can return to normal society.