Court Opinion

ID: 9852118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:24:48.785765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:22.798188
License: Public Domain

McCLINTOCK, Justice,
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.
The legal principle basic to the majority’s ' disposition of this appeal is expressed in this sentence:
“ * * * We hold with the majority of courts that receipt into evidence in a joint trial of one coactor’s declaration implicating another coactor, under the exception to the hearsay rule that a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay, does not violate the other coactor’s constitutional right of confrontation.”
I construe Bruton1 and subsequent decisions 2, of the United States Supreme Court *1336and federal circuit courts as recognizing that postarrest confessions or statements of one accused of crime are not admissible against others charged with complicity in that crime. Prior to Bruton it was thought that in a joint trial of the accused participants the statement of one could properly be received in evidence against the declar-ant and that an admonition to the jury to consider the statement only as against the declarant was a sufficient substitute for codefendant’s constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examination.3 Bruton eliminated that notion but did not expressly or by necessary implication outlaw the use of statements of one coaetor made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a crime.4 Decisions pertinent to the latter situation indicate that such statements may be received without admonition of the jury or other qualification, provided only that a conspiracy or concert of action is proved by competent evidence other than the statement itself. While the statement of the majority that “there is a world of difference between a defendant’s post-conspiracy statement implicating another and a statement implicating another made during the progress of a crime jointly committed,” is probably correct, I would suggest that the difference lies not in the impact that one or the other statement may have upon the jury,5 but in recognition of a longstanding and unquestioned rule of evidence that admissions of an agent in the course of the execution of the agency are admissible as admissions of the principal. While I have personal difficulty with the concept justifying denial of a constitutional right on such a basis,6 I accept the principle of law to be as stated by the majority and suggest only that since we are considering a rule of evidence that has the effect of denying the constitutionally-guaranteed right of confrontation, we should be completely satisfied as to its application to the facts of this case before we hold it determinative of the appeal.
My fellow justices are in agreement as to the admissibility of statements in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy and differ only in their application to this case, with the majority concluding as a matter of indisputable fact and law that “Jevne was the agent of Jasch” and that there was an “established association between defendant and his codefendant” so that a “conspiracy was present.” My Brother Rose rejects this appellate finding as not sustained by the evidence and with considerable logic construes the trial judge’s action as a finding to the contrary. I believe the majority’s finding of conspiracy is justifiable only if the undenied fact that Moore ordered marijuana from Jasch, paying him therefor, and received delivery of a package containing marijuana from Jevne 7 can be said to per*1337mit no conclusion except the existence of a conspiracy.
Such a broad conclusion troubles me and my concern is compounded by the fact that at no place in the complaint, testimony, colloquies concerning the receipt or exclusion of testimony, requests for instructions, instructions, comments on those given, and the arguments upon motions in the trial court as well as in the briefs and arguments submitted to this court, is the word “conspiracy” ever mentioned. It appears to me that a majority of this court adopt an entirely new concept of the case, never presented or argued in the court below or here, set themselves up as original triers of the fact and from those findings reach a conclusion never approached in the trial court.
As I read the authorities, it is generally held that the questions whether a conspiracy existed and whether the statement was made during the course and in furtherance thereof are preliminary questions of fact to be decided by either the trial judge or the jury before the statement is to be considered as admissible. There has been considerable conflict as to who should decide this question of admissibility and under what guidelines.8 In the latest decision of the Federal Supreme Court which I have found dealing with the admissibility of such statements, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3104, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), I find this pertinent footnote:
“As a preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury. [Citations omitted] Whether the standard has been satisfied is a question of admissibility of evidence to be decided by the trial judge.”
The effect of Bruton is considered by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Brawley, 1 Cal.3d 277, 82 Cal.Rptr. 161, 461 P.2d 361 (1969). This decision was issued prior to that of the United States Supreme Court in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), but has this to say about varying ways of trying the preliminary question of admissibility of the statement (82 Cal.Rptr. at 168, 461 P.2d at 368):
“ * * * The procedure followed in at least some of the federal courts is that the trial court alone determines the admissibility of the statements; if the trial court finds that independent of the statements there is prima facie proof of the conspiracy and that the statements were made during the conspiracy and in furtherance thereof and admits the statements, the jury need not be instructed that it also must make certain findings before it may consider the evidence against an asserted conspirator other than the declarant. [Citations omitted] Thus the California procedure contains more safeguards for a defendant than the foregoing federal procedure, and if the federal procedure does not violate the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment a fortiori neither does the California procedure.”9
It is significant to me that none of the decisions which I have been able to find places the determination of the question in the appellate court, thereby permitting that court to dispose of the appeal on a basis never considered in the trial court. Reverting to Bruton, I note the reference therein to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), in this language (391 U.S. at 128-129, 88 S.Ct. at 1624):
*1338“ * * * We there held that a defendant is constitutionally entitled at least to have the trial judge first determine whether a confession was made voluntarily before submitting it to the jury for an assessment of its credibility. More specifically, we expressly rejected the proposition that a jury, when determining the confessor’s guilt, could be relied upon to ignore his confession of guilt should it find the confession involuntary. * * * ”
To me Jackson clearly emphasizes the importance of the preliminary determination by the trial judge of the voluntary nature of the confession. It was concerned with a New York procedure which permitted the trial judge to
“make a preliminary determination regarding a confession offered by the prosecution and exclude it if in no circumstances could the confession be deemed voluntary.” 378 U.S. at 377, 84 S.Ct. at 1781,
but if the evidence presented a fair question as to its voluntariness,
“or where reasonable men could differ over the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, the judge ‘must receive the confession and leave to the jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate determination of its voluntary character and also its truthfulness.’ ” 378 U.S. at 377, 84 S.Ct. at 1781.
The following statement I consider to be most pertinent to the case at bar:
“ * * * Where pure factual considerations are an important ingredient, which is true in the usual case, appellate review in this Court is, as a practical matter, an inadequate substitute for a full and reliable determination of the voluntariness issue in the trial court and the trial court’s determination, pro tanto, takes on an increasing finality. The procedures used in the trial court to arrive at its conclusions on the coercion issue progressively take on added significance as the actual measure of the protection afforded a defendant under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the use of involuntary confessions. These procedures must, therefore, be fully adequate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession, including the resolution óf disputed facts upon which the voluntariness issue may depend. * * *” 378 U.S. at 390-391, 84 S.Ct. at 1788.
By footnote appended at the close of the foregoing statement the court indicated that it was not concerned with the allocation of the determination of the issue as between the trial judge, another judge or another jury, and left the states free to “allocate functions between judge and jury as they see fit.” 378 U.S. at 391, 84 S.Ct. at 1789. But as I construe the opinion, the defendant was “entitled to a reliable resolution of these evidentiary conflicts” id. at 392, 84 S.Ct. at 1789, and
“ * * * Jackson’s trial did not comport with constitutional standards and he is entitled to a determination of the volun-tariness of his confession in the state courts in accordance with valid state procedures * * 378 U.S. at 393, 84 S.Ct. at 1789.
The significant pertinence of this case to our problem is that the Supreme Court did not attempt to read the record and make independent determination that the confession was voluntarily made. This was a factual question which it left to be decided in either a new proceeding held for that purpose alone or by grant of a new trial, the choice of alternatives being left to the state court. I find nothing in the opinion indicating that it should be decided by the Court of Appeals of the state of New York or any other appellate court of that state.
As was said in Bruton concerning the danger of permitting evidence to go to the jury under an admonition to ignore it as to one or more of the defendants ( 391 U.S. at 135-136, 88 S.Ct. at 1627):
“ * * * It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to disregard such information. Nevertheless, as was recognized in Jackson v. Denno, supra, there are some con*1339texts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. * * * Such a context is presented here, where the- powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. * * . * The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed. Pointer v. Texas, supra [380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923].”
Jevne’s statement was not offered or received with any notion that it was consistent with the rule permitting hearsay under certain circumstances. This court, as well as others, has evinced a continuing reluctance to dispose of a case upon theories or arguments not presented in the trial court. It has shown a similar indisposition to take over fact-finding functions, continually holding that the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are for the trier of the fact. It is therefore my opinion that the question of admissibility of the statement depended upon the factual answer to the factual question whether the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy to violate the controlled-substances law. I therefore dissent from the affirmance of the conviction and would remand the cause for a new trial under proper procedures for the determination of the admissibility of the statement.

. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970); Migliore v. United States, 409 F.2d 786 (5 Cir. 1969), reh. denied, cert. *1336denied 396 U.S. 975, 90 S.Ct. 449, 24 L.Ed.2d 444; et al.

. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1956).

. “We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence, * * *. There is not before us, therefore, any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause.” 391 U.S. at 128, n. 3, 88 S.Ct. at 1623.

. Bruton was admittedly concerned with a postarrest confession while Dutton v. Evans, supra, n. 2, involved a response by an alleged participant in the crime to a third person, after arrest, and outside the presence of the defendant. I therefore do not consider the principle set forth in Bruton as applicable only to formal confessions.

. See People v. Brawley, 1 Cal.3d 277, 82 Cal. Rptr. 161, 461 P.2d 361, 367 (1969) for citation to more authoritative criticisms of the princi-pie.

. The majority refer to Jevne as a “long-time friend” of Jasch’s. The actual testimony, not given until both the State and Jasch had rested their cases and Jasch was being examined by Jevne’s attorney in connection with the case in chief of that defendant, was that Jasch had known Jevne since the 7th or 8th grade and in answer to the question, “Is he a friend of yours?” said, “Yes, he is.” (Emphasis added) The duration of the friendship is not shown. The majority also refer to the fact that Jasch and Jevne were in the same bar when the deal was made between Jasch and Moore, and that Jevne left the bar a few minutes before Jasch and Moore did. Mere association is not sufficient evidence of complicity. Glover v. United States, 306 F.2d 594 (10 Cir. 1962); Panci v. United States, 256 F.2d 308 (5 Cir. 1958); Ong *1337Way Jong v. United States, 245 F.2d 392 (9 Cir. 1957). I think there is strong basis for questioning the majority’s statement that: “The established association between defendant and his codefendant made the statement admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule; conspiracy was present.”

. See lengthy discussion of the alternative procedures in 40 Harv.L.Rev. 392, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence.

. Under other California decisions it appears that the question whether the conspiracy had been proved was one to be decided by the jury. People v. Brawley, supra n. 6, 82 Cal.Rptr. at 166-167, 461 P.2d at 366-367.