Court Opinion

ID: 9670686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:24:13.231831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:05.938699
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(concurring in result).
I agree with the result but decline to rest my agreement solely on the doctrine of the last antecedent. Citing this doctrine as the only basis for the decision is an unnecessarily narrow ground on which to limit recovery by Rogers. Harsh and otherwise unjustified results in subsequent cases could be mandated by sole reliance on the doctrine in this case. There is South Dakota case law on both the derivative nature of consortium claims and the policy reasons for uninsured motorist statutes which provides much clearer and defensible grounds for the decision to limit recovery from Rogers’ own insurer.
Under South Dakota law, a cause of action for loss of spousal consortium is derivative in nature. Selchert v. Lien, 371 N.W.2d 791, 794 (S.D.1985); Wilson v. Hasvold, 86 S.D. 286, 293, 194 N.W.2d 251, 255 (1972). “As such, its validity depends on the validity of the main claim.” Budahl v. Gordon & David Assoc., 287 N.W.2d 489, 493 (S.D.1980) (citing Bitsos v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 350 F.Supp. 850 (D.S.D.1972)). Here, the tort-feasor’s insurer paid LeEtta $50,000 in damages as compensation for the injuries she sustained in the accident. When LeEtta received compensation equal to the full extent of her underinsured motorist coverage, she was no longer entitled to any additional damages from Allied based on this coverage. Given the derivative nature of consortium claims, Doug may not demand separate recovery from Allied for damages resulting from LeEtta’s bodily injuries, when LeEtta herself has extinguished eligibility for further recovery.
The plain language of the policy supports this conclusion. The “each person” limit of $50,000 contained in the underinsured motorist portion of the policy applies to “all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one accident.” As a maximum cap on recovery, the higher “each accident” limit of $100,000 applies to “all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one accident.” Both limits require damages “for bodily injury.” Neither party contends that Doug’s loss of consortium constitutes bodily injury to himself. Consequently, in order to qualify as damages “for bodily injury,” as required by the policy, the loss of consortium damages which Doug seeks can only be for bodily injury sustained by one person— LeEtta. Since the $50,000 per person limit for bodily injury to LeEtta has already been satisfied by contributions from the tort-fea-sor’s insurer, the Rogers have received compensation equal to the full limits of their policy and are not entitled to any additional sums from Allied..
Cases from other jurisdictions, considering identical or similar policy language, have also confined consortium claimants to the same “per person” policy limits applied to their injured family members. Sicoli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (husband’s loss of consortium was not bodily injury, so where wife’s damages exhausted the limit in under-insured motorist policy “for all damages due to bodily injury to one person,” further recovery by husband was barred under the terms of the policy); Redcross v. Aetna Carsualty and Surety Co., 146 A.D.2d 125, 539 N.Y.S.2d 146, 146-47 (1989) (“per person” liability limit “for all damages for bodily inju*619ry sustained by any one person in any one accident” included derivative claims for care and loss of services arising out of the bodily injury of that one person); Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Karlet, 189 W.Va. 79, 428 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1998) (where policy provided coverage for “all damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person as a result of one accident,” children claiming loss of parental consortium were not to be treated as separate injured persons subject to separate “per person” and “per occurrence” liability limits); see also Weekley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 537 So.2d 477, 480 (Ala.1989); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 524 A.2d 641, 645 (Conn.1987); Mackoul v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 402 So.2d 1259, 1260 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981), appeal denied, 412 So.2d 467 (Fla.1982); Creamer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 161 Ill.App.3d 223, 112 Ill.Dec. 748, 749-750, 514 N.E.2d 214, 215-16 (1987); Gillchrest v. Brown, 532 A.2d 692, 693 (Maine 1987); Santos v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Casualty Co., 408 Mass. 70, 556 N.E.2d 983 (1990); Bain v. Gleason, 223 Mont. 442, 726 P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (1986); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pogorilich, 605 A.2d 1318, 1320-21 (R.I.1992); McGovern v. Williams, 741 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex.1987); Miller v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 58 Wash. App. 870, 795 P.2d 703, 706 (1990), appeal denied, 115 Wash.2d 1012, 797 P.2d 513 (1990); Richie v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 140 Wis.2d 51, 409 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Ct.App.1987), appeal denied, 140 Wis.2d 873, 416 N.W.2d 66 (1987).
Finally, limiting Doug’s recovery to the amount set forth in the “per person” limitation is consistent with the rationale behind underinsured motorist coverage. “The purpose of the uninsured motorist statutes is to provide the same insurance protection to the insured party who is injured by an uninsured or unknown motorist that would have been available to him had he been injured as a result of the negligence of a motorist covered by the minimum amount of liability insurance.” Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 26, 29 (S.D.1978) (emphasis in original). Essentially then, uninsured motorist coverage compensates the insured party for the difference between the required amount of liability insurance and the amount, if any, that can be recovered from the underinsured tort-feasor. In this case, the tort-feasor was not an underinsured motorist, because he maintained liability insurance equal to the underinsured limits of the Rogers’ policy. If this Court permitted Doug to recover separately from Allied for his loss of consortium damages, the Rogers would receive double recovery — once from the tort-feasor and once from their own insurer. Double recovery exceeds the clear objective of uninsured motorist statutes, and I will not condone it.
In light of South Dakota ease law concerning the derivative nature of consortium claims and the underlying purpose of under-insured motorist insurance, as well as the weight of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, I concur in the result.