Court Opinion

ID: 9900399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:12.033138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.965874
License: Public Domain

No. 374                July 19, 2023                   149

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

  SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION
 LOCAL 503, OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES UNION,
                   Respondent,
                        v.
            UNIVERSITY OF OREGON,
                    Petitioner.
            Employment Relations Board
                UP01417; A177809

  Argued and submitted April 5, 2023.
   Daniel L. Rowan argued the cause for petitioner. Also on
the briefs was CDR Labor Law, LLC.
   Katelyn S. Oldham argued the cause for respondent. Also
on the brief was Oldham Law Office, LLC.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  KAMINS, J.
  Affirmed.
150          Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

         KAMINS, J.
         This case concerns the interplay between an employ-
ee’s right to informational privacy under the University of
Oregon’s (the University’s) Faculty Records Policy (FRP)
and a union’s right to obtain information about the working
conditions of the employees it represents under the Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA), ORS 243.650
to 243.806.
         This is the second time this case is before us. In
our first opinion, we reversed and remanded an order of
Employment Relations Board (ERB) requiring the University
to provide Service Employees International Union Local 503
(the Union) access to certain information it had requested.
Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O, 312 Or
App 377, 494 P3d 993 (2021) (SEIU I). On remand, ERB was
tasked with balancing the University’s confidentiality inter-
est in the information against the Union’s need for the infor-
mation. Id. at 385-86.
         On remand, ERB concluded that the Union’s interest
in some of the information it had requested outweighed the
University’s confidentiality interest and that, by “redacting,
and thereby withholding from [the Union], objective, fac-
tual information, including statements by bargaining unit
employees concerning workplace complaints” in response to
the Union’s request for information, the University violated
its duty to bargain in good faith with the Union under ORS
243.672(1)(e).1
         The University again seeks judicial review. In
a single assignment of error, the University argues that
“ERB erred in holding that the University’s response to the
     1
        ORS 243.672(1)(e) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a pub-
lic employer to “[r]efuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the exclusive
representative.”
     On remand, ERB also concluded that the University violated ORS 243.672
(1)(e), because (1) it “failed to establish that it pursued a good-faith accommodation
to reconcile the conflict between the parties’ interests” and (2) “the University’s
communications with the Union regarding the nature of the redacted material
were inconsistent with its duty to bargain in good faith.” Because we affirm on
the basis that ERB did not err in concluding that the University violated ORS
243.672(1)(e) by “redacting, and thereby withholding from the Union, objective,
factual information, including statements by bargaining unit employees concern-
ing workplace complaints,” we do not reach those other two conclusions.
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                            151

Union’s information request violated the duty to bargain in
good faith under ORS 243.672(1)(e).” For the reasons below,
we affirm.
             I. INFORMATION REQUESTS
             UNDER PECBA AND THE FRP
         To properly frame the issues on appeal, prior to
turning to the historical facts and our analysis, we briefly
discuss information requests under PECBA generally and
the University’s FRP. That is because, as explained further
below, the Union requested certain information pursuant to
PECBA, and the University, relying on the FRP, declined to
produce that information.
A.   An Overview of Information Requests Under PECBA
         Under PECBA, “ ‘[i]t is well-settled that a public
employer’s obligation to collectively bargain in good faith
under ORS 243.672(1)(e) includes the duty to provide an
exclusive representative with requested information that
has some probable or potential relevance to a grievance or
other contractual matter.’ ” SEIU I, 312 Or App at 380-81
(quoting Service Employees International Union Local 503,
Oregon Public Employees Union v. University of Oregon, Case
No. UP-014-17 at 15, 27 PECBR 668 (2018)). That interpreta-
tion of PECBA is consistent with the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) on which PECBA was modeled. Detroit Edison Co.
v. N. L. R. B., 440 US 301, 303, 99 S Ct 1123, 59 L Ed 2d
333 (1979) (“The duty to bargain collectively, imposed upon
an employer by § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act,
includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by
a labor union for the proper performance of its duties as
the employees’ bargaining representative.” (Footnote omit-
ted.)); AFSCME Council 75 v. City of Lebanon, 360 Or 809,
816, 824, 388 P3d 1028 (2017) (noting that “the legislature
largely modeled” PECBA after the NLRA, and in enacting
PECBA, “the legislature extended to public employees in
Oregon the same benefits and protections that federal law
had long afforded to employees in the private sector under”
the NLRA). The consistency in interpretation is no accident;
in the 1970s, ERB adopted “the National Labor Relations
152      Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

Board’s * * * construction * * * [of] the [NLRA] as applied to
the [PECBA’s] corollary [statutory subsection]—namely, an
employer’s duty to bargain in good faith includes the duty
to furnish information necessary to allow a labor organiza-
tion to intelligently evaluate and pursue a pending griev-
ance.” American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees Council 75, Local 189 v. City of Portland, Case
No. UP-046-08 at 2, 26 PECBR 796 (2016) (citing Oregon
State Employes Association v. Children’s Services Division,
Department of Human Resources, State of Oregon, Case No.
C-32-76, 2 PECBR 900 (1976)).
         Once a party requests information under PECBA
and makes an initial showing of relevance, ERB considers the
“totality of circumstances” to determine the scope and tim-
ing of the required disclosure of information. That inquiry is
guided by the four factors ERB identified in Oregon School
Employees Association, Chapter 68 v. Colton School District
53, Case No. C-124-81, 6 PECBR 5027, 5031 (1982) (Colton)—
namely, “(1) the reason given for the request, (2) the ease or
difficulty with which information could have been produced,
(3) the type of information requested, and (4) the history of
the parties’ labor-management relations.” SEIU I, 312 Or
App at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
         Regarding the first Colton factor—the reason for the
request—ERB has explained that “[a] request for informa-
tion relating to a pending grievance ordinarily will require
a quicker and more specific response than a request for
information that concerns the administration of a collective
bargaining agreement generally.” Colton, 6 PECBR at 5031.
The first factor “includes but is not necessarily limited to
the requesting party’s explanation of the information’s rel-
evance.” SEIU I, 312 Or App at 385. Regarding the second
Colton factor—the ease or difficulty with which information
could have been produced—ERB has explained that “[w]here
the material requested already is compiled and printed, a
quick response is to be expected,” but “[w]here the informa-
tion must be gathered or be translated into a form usable to
the requesting party, the responding party has a reasonable
time in which to provide the data.” Colton, 6 PECBR at 5302.
The third Colton factor—the type of information requested—
includes consideration of whether the requested information
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                                               153

is confidential or otherwise sensitive. SEIU I, 312 Or App
at 382. The fourth Colton factor—the history of the parties’
labor-management relations—includes consideration of, for
example, whether “there has been a pattern of numerous
requests or of apparent ‘fish-and-grieve’ expeditions” or “a
pattern of unreasonable delays in responding to legitimate
requests for information.” Colton, 6 PECBR at 5302.
         The primary issue on appeal concerns the third
Colton factor because, as explained further below, the
University’s FRP provides that certain information is confi-
dential, including information of the sort that the Union has
requested in this case. In assessing the third Colton factor,
when confidentiality is put at issue by a party responding
to a request, that party “must prove both a legitimate and
substantial confidentiality interest, and that it pursued a
good-faith accommodation to reconcile the conflict.” SEIU I,
312 Or App at 381 (emphasis added).
         Ultimately, if the parties’ efforts to reach an accom-
modation to reconcile the conflict are not fruitful, to determine
whether the responding party must produce the information
notwithstanding its confidential nature, ERB “balances a
labor organization’s need for information against any legiti-
mate and substantial confidentiality interest established by
the employer.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That
approach by ERB is, too, consistent with how information
requests are analyzed by federal courts and the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) under the NLRA when con-
fidentiality is raised. Piedmont Gardens, 362 NLRB 1135,
1135 (2015) (noting that, “[u]nder Detroit Edison, [440 US
301,] the Board balances the union’s need for requested
information against any legitimate and substantial confi-
dentiality interests established by the employer”). That body
of case law reflects that confidentiality concerns of employ-
ers must be given their due, but in pursuit of the important
purposes underlying the nation’s labor laws, such concerns
are sometimes outweighed by the needs of a union.2 Compare
    2
      In AFSCME Council 75, our Supreme Court recognized the similarities in
the purposes of PECBA and the NLRA:
        “In addition to their nearly identical provisions relating to unfair labor
    practices, PECBA and the NLRA both express policies of promoting collec-
    tive bargaining and protecting employees’ organizational rights. The NLRA,
154          Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

Detroit Edison, 440 US at 318-20 (determining employer
“in resisting an unconsented-to disclosure” of the results of
“psychological aptitude testing” did not violate the “statu-
tory obligation to bargain in good faith,” and taking judicial
notice of “the sensitivity of any human being to disclosure
of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic
competence”), with Midwest Div.-MMC, LLC v. Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., 867 F3d 1288, 1300-02 (DC Cir 2017) (con-
cluding that a hospital committed unfair labor practice by
refusing to disclose “information about allegations investi-
gated by the [hospital’s peer review committee]” because the
“information could have substantial relevance to the Union’s
representation of affected employees” and that interest out-
weighed the hospital’s confidentiality interest as provided
by state statute prohibiting disclosure).
         That body of case law also provides guidance on
what type of information is confidential. Under the NLRA,
the NLRB has identified certain types of information that
may give rise to an employer’s legitimate and substantial
confidentiality interest, including “that which would reveal,
contrary to promises or reasonable expectations, highly
personal information, such as individual medical records
or psychological test results; that which would reveal sub-
stantial proprietary information, such as trade secrets; that
which could reasonably be expected to lead to harassment
or retaliation, such as the identity of witnesses; and that

    for example, declares that it is the policy of the United States to reduce the
    causes of industrial strife by encouraging collective bargaining and protect-
    ing employees’ exercise of ‘full freedom of association, self-organization, and
    designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of nego-
    tiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
    protection.’ 29 USC § 151. Similarly, the 1973 Legislative Assembly declared
    it to be the policy of Oregon that ‘[t]he people of this state have a fundamen-
    tal interest in the development of harmonious and cooperative relationships
    between government and its employees.’ ORS 243.656(1). The Oregon leg-
    islature also declared that the purposes of PECBA are to ‘obligate public
    employers, public employees and their representatives to enter into collec-
    tive negotiations with willingness to resolve grievances and disputes relat-
    ing to employment relations’ and to promote improved employer-employee
    relations ‘by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public
    employees to join organizations of their own choice, and to be represented
    by such organizations in their employment relations with public employers.’
    ORS 243.656(5).”
360 Or at 818.
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                                                  155

which is traditionally privileged, such as memoranda pre-
pared for pending lawsuits.” N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 347
NLRB 210, 211 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, laws that limit disclosure of certain types of
information can give rise to a legitimate and substantial
confidentiality interest. Midwest Div.-MMC, LLC, 867 F3d
at 1300 (discussing privilege created by Kansas statute and
noting “[s]tate-law privileges present a valid basis for claim-
ing confidentiality”); Olean Gen. Hosp., 363 NLRB 561, 566
(2015) (recognizing confidentiality interest created by New
York statute).
B.       The University’s Confidentiality Interest Under the FRP
         The University’s FRP “outlines certain matters
pertaining to faculty records,” including confidentiality and
restrictions on access. It is under the FRP that the University
withheld certain information from the Union, asserting that
the information was confidential. The FRP was promulgated
by the University pursuant to authority granted to it under
former ORS 351.065, renumbered as ORS 352.226,3 and was
formerly codified as an administrative rule.
         Under the FRP, all “personal records” are “confi-
dential.” “Personal records” is defined in the FRP to broadly
include all records “containing information concerning an
academic staff member,” other than “Salary Information,”

     ORS 352.226 provides:
     3

        “(1) A governing board as defined in ORS 352.029 may, for the public uni-
   versity under its control, adopt standards and specific orders by or through
   the president of each public university governing access to personnel records
   of the public university or office, department or activity that are less than 25
   years old.
        “(2) Standards adopted under subsection (1) of this section shall require
   that personnel records be subjected to restrictions on access unless upon a
   finding by the president of the public university that the public interest in
   maintaining individual rights to privacy in an adequate educational environ-
   ment would not suffer by disclosure of such records. Access to such records
   may be limited to designated classes of information or persons, or to stated
   times and conditions, or to both, but cannot be limited for records more than
   25 years old.”
Additionally, ORS 352.087(1)(m) provides that a public university may:
        “Establish policies for the organization, administration and development
   of the university which, to the extent set forth in those policies, shall have the
   force of law and may be enforced through university procedures that include
   an opportunity for appeal and in any court of competent jurisdiction.”
156         Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

“Records of Academic Achievement,” and “Directory
Information.” 4
         Further, under the FRP, with some exceptions not
relevant here, “personal records” may not be released to any
“person or agency without the faculty member’s written con-
sent, unless upon receipt of a valid subpoena or other court
order or process or as required by valid state or federal laws,
rules, regulations, or orders.”
       II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
         The University is a public employer as that term
is defined by PECBA, ORS 243.650(20). The Union is a
labor organization as that term is defined by PECBA, ORS
243.650(13). The Union and the University are parties to a
collective bargaining agreement. The Union is the “exclusive
representative” of all bargaining unit employees, meaning
that it has “the right to be the collective bargaining agent of
all employees” in the bargaining unit. ORS 243.650(8).
         Employees working at the University and repre-
sented by the Union had complaints about the conduct of
their manager, D, who was not a part of the bargaining
unit. The employees raised those complaints to their union
steward (the Steward) who in turn raised those complaints
with a human resources manager at the University (the
HR Manager)—including complaints that behaviors in the
employees’ department were “causing employees to feel
bullied, disrespected, or sabotaged.” As a result, the HR
Manager interviewed various University employees, includ-
ing D and those represented by the Union, and produced a
   4
     The FRP further specifies:
   “Personal records include but are not limited to: Information kept by the
   University, college, or school, department or division concerning a specifically
   identifiable faculty member and furnished by the staff member or by others
   at the University’s, college’s or school’s, department’s or division’s, or at the
   staff member’s request. Personal records include but are not limited to: infor-
   mation as to discipline, counseling, membership activity, other behavioral
   records, professional preparation and experience, professional performance
   (e.g., assignment and work-load, quality of teaching—including records tab-
   ulated from students’ classroom survey evaluations—research, and service
   to the institution), personnel data relating to such matters as promotions,
   tenure, leaves, retirement credits and the like, and professional activities
   external to the institution, including but not limited to, awards, recognition,
   research activity, or travel.”
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                                                157

“Staff Interview Report,” in which the HR Manager sum-
marized what he had learned and made recommendations
as to what should be done about it.
         After writing the report, the HR Manager met with
the Steward and told the Steward that he had written a
report about his interviews, that the report noted problems
with D’s managerial style, and that nothing in the report was
damaging to bargaining unit employees.5 After the Steward
learned of the report, he requested that the University pro-
vide the Union with a copy. The University provided the
Union with a version in which all information concerning
the manager, D, had been redacted, including the bargain-
ing unit employees’ statements regarding D. When the
Union requested an unredacted copy, the University took
the position that the redacted portions of the report were
covered by the FRP and that the University could not dis-
close the records without D’s consent.6
         Subsequently, the parties attempted to negotiate
the terms of a nondisclosure agreement that would allow
the Union access to the unredacted report. When they could
not reach an agreement, the Union filed an unfair labor
practice complaint against the University.
         In resolving the Union’s unfair labor practice claim,
ERB initially concluded that the University’s response to
the Union’s request for the report violated ORS 243.672(1)(e).
Regarding confidentiality, ERB held that, notwithstanding
the FRP, the University had failed to prove a legitimate and
substantial confidentiality interest in the redacted informa-
tion, reasoning, in essence, that “although the redacted infor-
mation is covered by the FRP—that is, confidential under
the FRP—[the University] did not establish a legitimate
    5
      We note that the report contains negative discussion of two bargaining unit
employees, stating that they “actively contribute to a toxic work environment,”
and that one in particular is “incredibly snide to his peers both verbally and
through email” and makes “openly hostile comments.” Thus, the HR Manager’s
representation that nothing in the report was “damaging to bargaining unit
employees” appears to be inaccurate.
    6
      The University’s position regarding confidentiality led the Steward to
inquire, “Surely it is not the University’s position that the Union is not entitled
to information about possible mistreatment of employees it represents that is
garnered by management from those very same employees. Is it?”
158      Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

and substantial confidentiality interest in the information,
because the FRP expressly allows for the release of confi-
dential information if required by ‘valid * * * state law,’
PECBA is a valid state law, and PECBA as interpreted by
ERB required [the University] to disclose the information.”
SEIU I, 312 Or App at 384.
         The University sought judicial review. On judi-
cial review, we reversed and remanded. We noted that,
for the purposes of judicial review, with one exception, the
University did not contest that the first, second, and fourth
Colton factors—i.e., the reason given for the request, the
ease or difficulty with which information could have been
produced, and the history of the parties’ labor-management
relations, respectively—weighed in favor of disclosure: The
Union gave a valid reason for requesting the unredacted
report, it would be easy for the University to produce it, and
there was nothing in the history of the parties’ labor man-
agement relations to suggest that the Union was requesting
the report for impermissible purposes. Id. at 382. Regarding
the exception, with regard to the first Colton factor, we
explained that the University argued that “ERB conflated
that factor with the low threshold test for relevance” rather
than “truly considering the ‘reason given for the request’
in assessing the totality of circumstances.” Id. at 385. We
explained that ERB on remand must consider the “the rea-
son given for the request,” which “includes but is not neces-
sarily limited to the requesting party’s explanation of the
information’s relevance.” Id.
          Regarding the third Colton factor—the factor con-
cerning confidentiality—we explained that ERB’s analysis
was flawed, because it “relied on improper circular rea-
soning to conclude that [the University] did not establish
a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest in the
redacted information, which in turn led ERB to an errone-
ous ultimate conclusion that SEIU’s need for the unredacted
report outweighed [the University’s] (nonexistent) confiden-
tiality interest.” Id. at 384. We remanded to ERB, directing
ERB, on remand, to “assess the third Colton factor in its
own right—including determining whether [the University]
established a legitimate and substantial confidentiality
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                                   159

interest in the redacted information—without reference
to [an] ultimate conclusion that the totality of the circum-
stances weighs in favor of disclosure under PECBA.” Id. at
385 (emphasis in original).
         On remand, ERB again concluded that the
University’s response to the Union’s request for the report
violated ORS 243.672(1)(e).
         Regarding the first Colton factor, ERB determined
that that factor weighed in favor of disclosure. Specifically,
ERB determined that the reason for the Steward’s request
was “self-evident from its context: the Report is directly
related to the steward’s investigation of the employee com-
plaints that prompted the Report.” ERB highlighted that
the HR Manager had described the report as identifying
“problems with the supervisor’s managerial style,” which
prompted the Steward to ask for a copy of the report.
        Regarding the second and fourth Colton factors,
ERB determined that those factors mitigated in favor of
disclosure:
   “The second and fourth Colton factors are not in dispute: the
   University could easily produce an unredacted copy of the
   Report, and the history of the parties’ labor-management
   relations did not indicate improper ‘fishing expeditions,’ a
   pattern of numerous requests, or other factors that would
   weigh against the University’s obligation to provide a
   response to the Union’s request.”
        Regarding the third Colton factor—which we
understand to be the factor most at issue on appeal—ERB
concluded that the report qualified “as a confidential ‘per-
sonal record’ ” under the FRP and “recognize[d] that the
University has an interest in protecting faculty privacy and
upholding the Faculty Records Policy.” Nevertheless, it com-
mented that:
   “the University has defined as ‘confidential’ nearly all infor-
   mation about a faculty member, without regard to whether
   the information is actually private or sensitive. Further,
   the University provides the same, high level of protection
   to all information about faculty, regardless of how private
   or sensitive the information actually is.
160       Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

       “The University contends that the extensive redactions
   of the Report were justified because the supervisor felt that
   some of the employees’ statements about him are unflatter-
   ing and lack proper context. Although we sympathize with
   the supervisor’s desire to avoid disclosure of subordinates’
   negative or critical statements about his conduct in the
   workplace, a supervisor’s conduct in the workplace is not a
   private matter. Rather, a supervisor’s conduct in the work-
   place could violate a contract or other legal obligation, and
   therefore, is subject to examination. That is true under the
   circumstances of this case, where the supervisor conduct at
   issue is treatment of subordinate employees, and the party
   seeking to examine the supervisor’s conduct is the employ-
   ees’ exclusive representative.”

(Footnote omitted.) ERB further noted that the “redacted
material may be divided into two categories: 1) the HR
manager’s purely subjective, evaluative opinions and recom-
mendations based on what he heard from employees, and
2) the summaries of the bargaining unit employees’ state-
ments about the workplace issues under investigation, and
any other objective, factual information.” It then determined
that the FRP gave the University a “legitimate” confidenti-
ality interest, but “questioned” whether the “University has
established that it has a substantial confidentiality interest
in the summaries of the bargaining unit employees’ state-
ments about the workplace issues under investigation, or
other objective, factual information,” noting that, typically,
an “employer’s confidentiality interest in subjective state-
ments made by bargaining unit employees is not akin to
the employer’s confidentiality interest in subjective, evalua-
tive statements made by the employer.” (Emphasis in ERB’s
order on remand.)
         But in its analysis, ERB ultimately “assume[d] that
the University has met its burden to establish that its confi-
dentiality interest is both legitimate and substantial.” With
regard to “purely subjective, evaluative statements,” ERB
held that “the University’s legitimate and substantial con-
fidentiality interest outweighs the Union’s interest in dis-
closure,” and that the University’s “redaction of the purely
subjective, evaluative statements was consistent with the
duty to bargain in good faith.” In so holding, it noted that
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                           161

“disclosure of the HR manager’s purely subjective, evalua-
tive statements would not serve the purpose of the Union’s
request.”
        It then determined that the “Union’s interest in
the summaries of the bargaining unit employees’ state-
ments, and any other objective, factual information in the
Report, is much stronger” and would “serve the purpose of
the Union’s request—to investigate a potential grievance.”
Thus, regarding “objective, factual information, including
statements by bargaining unit employees concerning work-
place complaints,” ERB concluded that the Union’s interest
outweighed the University’s confidentiality interest, and,
therefore, the University violated (1)(e) by “redacting, and
thereby withholding from the Union,” that information.
        The University now seeks judicial review, contend-
ing that ERB erred when it determined that the University
committed an unfair labor practice by “redacting, and
thereby withholding from [the Union], objective, factual
information, including statements by bargaining unit
employees concerning workplace complaints.”
             III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
         “We review ERB’s orders for substantial evidence
and errors of law, and to determine whether its analysis
comports with substantial reason.” Oregon Tech AAUP v.
Oregon Institute of Technology, 314 Or App 595, 597, 500 P3d
55 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 504 (2022). Under the substan-
tial evidence standard, “[d]isputed findings are reviewed to
determine whether they are supported by the evidentiary
record and whether a reasonable person, viewing the record
as a whole, could make those findings.” Haidar v. PSRB, 324
Or App 129, 132, 524 P3d 986 (2023); see ORS 183.482(8)(c)
(“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact
when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a rea-
sonable person to make that finding.”). “Substantial reason
requires us to review the reasoning that led ERB from those
facts to its conclusions and evaluate whether that reason-
ing reflects a correct interpretation of the law.” Clackamas
County Employees’ Assn. v. Clackamas County, 308 Or App
146, 149, 480 P3d 993 (2020).
162       Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

                       IV. ANALYSIS
         As noted, on appeal, the University challenges
ERB’s determination that the University committed an
unfair labor practice by “redacting, and thereby withhold-
ing from [the Union], objective, factual information, includ-
ing statements by bargaining unit employees concerning
workplace complaints.” The University contends that ERB
did not “appropriately weigh the confidentiality of informa-
tion under the FRP.”
         In advancing that argument on appeal, the
University makes a few principal contentions. Primarily, we
understand the University to argue that ERB’s order was
legally erroneous, because it improperly interpreted the
FRP. In the University’s view, ERB erred because it improp-
erly “parsed the redacted information into two categories”—
subjective information and objective information—and “then
assigned those categories different levels of confidentiality,”
but the FRP does not “divide ‘personal records’ into different
categories with different levels of protection.” Specifically,
pointing to ERB’s statement at a “supervisor’s conduct in
the workplace is not a private matter,” the University con-
tends that ERB effectively disregarded the dictates of the
FRP in favor of its own policy views that “conflict[ ] with the
legislative intent regarding the confidentiality of faculty
records and the terms of the FRP itself.” As the University
sees it, a “supervisor’s conduct in the workplace is a pri-
vate matter if the supervisor is covered by the University’s
FRP.” (Emphasis in the University’s brief.) At bottom, the
University contends that because ERB “incorrectly grafted
into the FRP different levels of confidentiality protection
based on different types of information (objective vs subjec-
tive),” ERB “did not and cannot show that [D’s] confidential-
ity interest was outweighed by the Union’s interests.”
         The University’s arguments that ERB did not
appropriately weigh the confidentiality of information under
the FRP are not persuasive. As we understand ERB’s order,
it did not “graft into the FRP different levels of confidential-
ity protection,” as the University contends, but it ultimately
assumed the University had established a “legitimate and
substantial” confidentiality interest in the entirety of the
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                             163

redacted information in the report. It then determined
that the “disclosure of the HR manager’s purely subjec-
tive, evaluative statements would not serve the purpose of
the Union’s request (to investigate potential contract viola-
tions),” so the “the University’s legitimate and substantial
confidentiality interest outweighs the Union’s interest in
disclosure.” On the other hand, regarding the “the summa-
ries of the bargaining unit employees’ statements about the
workplace issues under investigation, and any other objec-
tive, factual information,” ERB determined that “the dis-
closure of the bargaining unit employees’ statements and
the other factual information would serve the purpose of the
Union’s request—to investigate a potential grievance”—the
Union has a statutory “duty to investigate potential griev-
ances,” and the Union’s interest outweighed the University’s
interest. We note that that approach by ERB—recognizing
a general interest in confidentiality—is consistent with the
approach taken by the NLRB in evaluating some claims
of privilege based on statutes that prohibit disclosure of
information but carve out exceptions for when disclosure is
required by other statutes. See, e.g., Olean Gen. Hosp., 363
NLRB at 567 (recognizing employer had a “general confi-
dentiality interest” in documents pursuant to state statute
and weighing, on the one hand, “the state’s general policy
against disclosure, which expressly contemplates that cov-
ered documents * * * nonetheless may have to be disclosed
under other statutory requirements,” against union’s “clear
need for the requested information,” on the other).
        But even if the University is correct that ERB
ascribed more confidentiality weight to some types of infor-
mation than to other types of information, its contention
that ERB erred in that analysis would not be persuasive,
because ERB’s analysis (and the University’s obligations
under PECBA) should be informed by the provision in the
FRP permitting the University to produce confidential infor-
mation as “required by valid state or federal laws, rules, reg-
ulations, or orders.” As explained above, in SEIU I, we rec-
ognized that that provision of the FRP does not mean that
the University lacks a confidentiality interest in material
covered by the FRP merely because PECBA is a law that
may require disclosure. SEIU I, 312 Or App at 384; see also
164          Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

N. L. R. B. v. US Postal Serv., 660 F3d 65, 72 (1st Cir 2011)
(holding the “fact that information may be disclosed ‘as
required by law’ does not itself defeat all expectations of
privacy, nor does it create an expectation that the informa-
tion will be disclosed automatically whenever it is relevant
to a union”). Nevertheless, that particular provision of the
FRP, which is an exception to the FRP’s general bar on dis-
closing confidential information, has meaning—namely,
it means that the University’s privilege to withhold infor-
mation afforded by the FRP is not absolute; instead, that
privilege is qualified by the competing obligations imposed
on the University through other statutory schemes, such
as PECBA. Thus, PECBA might require the University to
disclose material in which the University has a legitimate
and substantial confidentiality interest where the Union’s
interest in disclosure outweighs the University’s interest
in confidentiality. Cf., e.g., Kaleida Health, Inc., 356 NLRB
1373, 1379 (2011) (protection from disclosure of certain med-
ical information under New York statute providing that the
information shall not be subject to disclosure “except as
hereinafter provided or as provided by any other provision of
law” was “not absolute” and union’s need for the information
superseded “the general policy against disclosure” under
the statute); Olean Gen. Hosp., 363 NLRB at 567 (same).
         As explained above, in determining whether, under
the “totality of the circumstances,” PECBA requires dis-
closure of information, ERB must consider the “nature of
the information.” In our view, with regard to confidential
information, consideration of “the nature of the information”
can fairly encompass consideration of what the information
actually is and whether it is sensitive and private—at least
in circumstances where a confidentiality policy operates as
broadly as the FRP. Indeed, in some circumstances, to ade-
quately protect an employee’s right to privacy as protected
by the FRP, ERB must do so, because the contents of per-
sonnel records are by no means uniform.7 See N. L. R. B. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 763 F2d 887, 891 (7th Cir 1985) (“While we rec-
ognize that employee personnel files often contain sensitive
    7
      On appeal, the University takes the position that it is “not the University’s
confidentiality right, it is the confidentiality/privacy right of a person covered by
the [FRP] that must be protected.”
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                                  165

information, the contents of such records are by no means
uniform. Some information contained in personnel files may
be completely innocuous while other information could be of
the most personal and sensitive nature.” (Internal citation
omitted.)); see also, e.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
720 F2d 789, 791 (3d Cir 1983) (determining “absence and tar-
diness records are confidential” where “many of the reasons
given in the absence and tardiness records are of a highly
personal nature” including that “one Company employee
suffered from diarrhea for two days, and was absent for an
additional five days because in ‘treating for hemroids [sic] [,
the employee] used too hot of water and too much epsom
salts, [and] burnt the skin.’ ” (Brackets in original.)).
         Put another way, in determining whether disclo-
sure is required under PECBA, we do not think that ERB
is required to treat all confidential information as equally
confidential. Rather, in order to properly balance the union’s
need for the information against the employer’s confidential-
ity interest, it must consider and evaluate the content of the
confidential information.
          Further, as noted, the University contends that
ERB erred in drawing a distinction between “subjective”
information and “objective” information. As the University
sees it, “a record may contain objective information showing
that a person has a medical diagnosis that qualifies as a
disability for ADA purposes” and it “cannot be the law that
such information about a medical diagnosis is entitled to
less privacy protection merely because it is an objective find-
ing, rather than subjective opinion.”
         But the distinction drawn by ERB in this case relates
specifically to a report detailing workplace complaints about
a supervisor, which, as we understand it, does not contain
a medical diagnosis. Although the University may have a
point in different circumstances, in the context of the infor-
mation request in this case, we conclude that ERB’s dis-
tinction between the employer’s thoughts and impressions
about a manager (i.e., “the HR manager’s purely subjective,
evaluative opinions and recommendations based on what
he heard from employees”) and statements by employees
about workplace complaints (i.e., “the summaries of the
166          Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

bargaining unit employees’ statements about the workplace
issues under investigation, and any other objective, factual
information”), is not legal error. That distinction—between
“objective” and “subjective” information—is consistent with
ERB precedent, cf., e.g., Colton, 6 PECBR at 5031 (“There
is no obligation to produce purely subjective, as opposed to
objective, information; that is, an explanation of a party’s
reasoning versus a description of the action the party took
and the reason then expressed for the action.”); consistent
with treatment of other qualified privileges in Oregon,
Meyer v. Oregon Lottery, 292 Or App 647, 664, 426 P3d 89
(2018) (noting “factual work product is subject to a qualified
protection because it is discoverable upon a showing of sub-
stantial need and undue hardship, whereas opinion work
product—‘the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party’—is never discoverable”); and consistent with com-
mon law privileges in which keeping certain information
confidential is imperative, see In re Subpoena Served Upon
Comptroller of Currency, & Sec’y of Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 967 F2d 630, 635 (DC Cir 1992) (“The bank
examination privilege, like the deliberative process privi-
lege, shields from discovery only agency opinions or recom-
mendations; it does not protect purely factual material.”).
         We highlight, however, that in other cases—such
as where there is an assertion that an information request
would encompass “information showing that a person has
a medical diagnosis that qualifies as a disability for ADA
purposes” or other, highly sensitive information—the dis-
tinction drawn by ERB in this case between “objective” and
“subjective” information would paint with too broad a brush;
it could encompass information that is both highly sensitive
and, in many circumstances, entirely irrelevant.8

     8
       We also note that the University did not submit an unredacted copy of the
report for in camera review during the evidentiary hearing in this case. For that
reason, as ERB noted in its original order, it was difficult to determine the nature
of the redacted information. A better practice for accurately assessing confidenti-
ality interests as weighed against a union’s need for information might be for the
employer to provide the information for in camera review (which the University
ultimately did during the original remedy phase of this case after it was ordered
to do so by ERB to resolve any disputes between the Union and the University
regarding redactions).
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                             167

        Finally, the University contends that “ERB’s weigh-
ing of the confidentiality interest suggests there must be
another step where the University looks to whether the
information is ‘actually’ private to determine whether it is
confidential under the policy.” We disagree. What it does
suggest is that, in determining whether PECBA requires
disclosure—which includes consideration of the employer’s
confidentiality interest with regard to information that is
undisputedly confidential—ERB can consider what the
information actually is, and the University should as well.
         In the end, however, we also believe it important
to mention that we share some of the University’s concerns
with aspects of ERB’s analysis. As noted, the FRP is a pol-
icy promulgated by the University pursuant to authority
granted by the Oregon Legislative Assembly under former
ORS 351.065, renumbered as ORS 352.226, in recognition
of the legislature’s policy that there is a “public interest in
maintaining individual rights to privacy” in an educational
environment. ORS 352.226(2). That policy is not ERB’s
to question. If it were the case that ERB gave “confiden-
tial information under the FRP virtually no weight”—as
the University contends—that would be reversible error.
Further, given ERB’s statements critical of the breadth of
the FRP—e.g., that “a supervisor’s conduct in the workplace
is not a private matter”—we understand why the University
makes the arguments that it does on appeal. Nevertheless,
as we understand ERB’s order, its ultimate legal analysis
rested on the conclusion that, assuming the University had
established a substantial confidentiality interest in all of
the information protected by the FRP, the Union’s interest
in some of that information outweighed the University’s sub-
stantial confidentiality interest.
        Having addressed what we understand to be the
University’s primary arguments—viz., those relating to
the contention that ERB’s analysis misapplied the FRP in
various ways—we address three of the other arguments it
makes.
        First, the University takes issue with ERB’s treat-
ment of the Union’s reason for the request—i.e., the first
Colton factor. In the University’s view, ERB’s analysis is
168         Service Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. U of O

not supported by substantial reason, because the Union
“said it needed the information to investigate a potential
age discrimination claim,” but the “report did not discuss
age discrimination at all,” and, therefore, ERB did not have
an accurate understanding of “the Union’s interest in the
information.” As noted, ERB determined that the reason
for the Union requesting the report was “self-evident from
its context: the Report is directly related to the steward’s
investigation of the employee complaints that prompted the
Report.” Although the Union did mention age discrimina-
tion, substantial evidence supports a determination that the
Union’s reason for its request was broader than to just inves-
tigate age discrimination, and we reject this contention by
the University.9
         Second, citing ERB’s statement in Colton, 6 PECBR
at 5031, that “[t]here is no obligation to produce confidential
information; for example, personnel information protected
by statute or notes made during negotiations or grievance
investigations,” the University argues that “ERB’s failure
to distinguish the employees’ statements in the redacted
sections of the report from grievance notes is legal error,
because an agency must explain a departure from prior
precedent.” The University’s reliance on ERB’s statement in
Colton that notes from grievance investigations are confi-
dential and, therefore, there is no obligation to produce such
notes is inapt. As noted above, ERB has recognized that, in
some circumstances, there can be a duty for an employer to
produce confidential information, and that duty is also rec-
ognized by the FRP.
         Third, the University contends that if ERB had con-
ducted “the balancing test with an accurate understanding
of the confidentiality interest, it would have concluded that
the legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest must
prevail over the Union’s more nebulous and abstract inter-
est, based on the facts of this case.” As noted, the Union is
the “exclusive representative” of bargaining unit employees.
     9
       For example, when negotiating a nondisclosure agreement, the University’s
lawyer had drafted a provision stating that the Union sought information related
to “alleged age discrimination,” and the Union’s lawyer revised the language to
reflect that the Union was seeking information related to “alleged violations of
the [collective bargaining agreement].”
Cite as 327 Or App 149 (2023)                                               169

As such, it “has the right to be the collective bargaining
agent of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.”
ORS 243.650(8). We disagree that a union’s interest is “neb-
ulous” or “abstract” where—for purposes of investigating a
possible violation of a collective bargaining agreement—it
seeks to obtain statements made by union-represented
employees to management in the context of a work environ-
ment where some employees felt “bullied, disrespected, or
sabotaged,” and expressed workplace complaints regarding
a supervisor.
         In sum, we conclude that ERB did not err in con-
cluding that the Union’s interest outweighed the University’s
interest and that, by “redacting, and thereby withholding
from [the Union], objective, factual information, including
statements by bargaining unit employees concerning work-
place complaints” in response to the Union’s request for
information, the University violated its duty to bargain in
good faith with the Union under ORS 243.672(1)(e). ERB’s
conclusion is not legally erroneous and is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and reason.10
           Affirmed.

    10
       In our analysis above, we discuss ERB’s application of the first and third
Colton factors, which are the factors most relevant to the issues on appeal. As
noted above, the second and fourth Colton factors were not in dispute before ERB
and militated toward disclosure, because “the University could easily produce an
unredacted copy of the Report, and the history of the parties’ labor-management
relations did not indicate improper ‘fishing expeditions,’ a pattern of numerous
requests, or other factors that would weigh against the University’s obligation to
provide a response to the Union’s request.”