Court Opinion

ID: 9915195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 20:02:30.905932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:18.487765
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/4/24 Esposti v. Peters CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 GLORIA J. ESPOSTI, as TRUSTEE, etc.,

      Cross-complainant and Respondent,                                G061701

                     v.                                                (Super. Ct. No. 30‑2020-01157517)

 JACQUELINE M. PETERS,                                                 OPINION

      Cross-defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Theodore R.
Howard, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Morris & Stone and Aaron P. Morris for Cross-defendant and Appellant.
                   The Law Office of Jim Kurkhill and Jim Kurkhill for Cross-complainant
and Respondent.

                                             *               *               *
                                    INTRODUCTION
              Jacqueline M. Peters appeals from an order granting in part and denying in
part her special motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the
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anti-SLAPP statute) to strike allegations and causes of action from a cross-complaint
brought by Gloria J. Esposti, Trustee of the Gloria J. Esposti 1995 Revocable Trust
(Esposti). Peters moved to strike 20 paragraphs and the entirety of the first and fourth
causes of action of the cross-complaint. The trial court granted the motion as to two
paragraphs and any claims arising out of those paragraphs and denied the rest of the
motion. Esposti does not challenge the court’s decision to strike the two paragraphs from
the cross-complaint. We conclude the trial court’s order is not erroneous and therefore
affirm.

                    ALLEGATIONS OF THE CROSS-COMPLAINT
              The property at 700 Begonia, units A and B, in Corona del Mar is a
two-unit condominium development called the Begonia Townhomes (the Townhomes).
Esposti owns unit A, and Peters owns and resides in unit B. The Townhomes are subject
to a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R’s). The
Townhomes homeowners association (the HOA) is an unincorporated association of the
owners of the Townhomes.
              Esposti and Peters are in a dispute over responsibility for exterior repairs
and maintenance. Peters contends that under the CC&R’s Esposti is responsible for
making the exterior repairs and maintenance. Esposti contends that under the CC&R’s

              1
                “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.)
Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.
We refer to section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) as section 425.16(b)(1) and section 425.16,
subdivision (e) as section 425.16(e). We refer to the special motion authorized by section
425.16(b)(1) as an anti-SLAPP motion.

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the cost of exterior maintenance and repair is the responsibility of the HOA, “to be
funded equally by each owner.”
              Peters sued Esposti. Peters’ first amended complaint against Esposti asserts
causes of action for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, breach of the CC&R’s, nuisance,
and negligence. In paragraph 9 of the complaint, Peters alleged: “While the [CC&R’s]
assume[] and reference[] all the traditional aspects of a homeowners association, such as
a Board of Directors, Association Rules, and the Association itself, and speaks in terms
of the Association being tasked with enforcement of the Declaration, in reality there is no
Association. The contemplated Association does not exist.”
              Esposti filed a cross-complaint against Peters (the Cross-complaint) which
asserted causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the CC&R’s, declaratory
relief, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The gist of the dispute is alleged in
paragraphs 2 through 4 of the Cross-complaint, as follows: “2. Peters caused Esposti to
solely incur $92,200.00 in common area repair and maintenance costs that should be
borne by the homeowners’ association, which in turn are to be assessed equally by both
owners. In early 2019, Peters claimed that certain windows and the wood siding adjacent
to Esposti’s unit have caused damages to Peter’s unit. Though the windows and siding
are part of the common area and are the Association’s sole responsibility to repair and
maintain, Peters demanded that Esposti pay for these common area repairs herself. [¶] 3.
Esposti began seeking bids for the recommended exterior repairs to split 50-50 as per the
CC&Rs. At the same time, Esposti responded to Peters’ demand by advising Peters that
the exterior walls of the condominium, including the windows and siding, are part of the
common area and are the responsibility of the homeowners’ association to repair and
maintain and that the costs of exterior repairs are to be split evenly. Esposti further
explained that each unit owner was individually responsible for their separate interest,
which is comprised of the airspace in each unit. [¶] 4. Peters wrote back, disagreeing

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with Esposti’s position, claiming that the best way to resolve their dispute was for Esposti
to sell her unit to Peters.”
               Paragraph 5 of the Cross-complaint alleges that in order to “weaponize City
codes against Esposti” Peters notified the City of Newport Beach in January 2021 that a
garage at Esposti’s unit was not on the original plans. Paragraph 6 alleges that in April
2021, Peters made a complaint to the City of Newport Beach concerning the replacement
of windows and an exterior door on Esposti’s unit.
               Paragraph 7 of the Cross-complaint alleges: “Peters recently amended her
complaint alleging an unspecified $400,000 in damages, never having once discussed
these alleged damages with Esposti, and never having provided any updated repair
estimates to Esposti to the claimed damage Peters suffered to her unit.”
               Paragraph 8 of the Cross-complaint alleges: “In [both] her original
Complaint and First Amended Complaint, Peters has alleged that ‘in reality, there is no
Association’—a claim that is patently false. . . . The Association legally exists but is
prevented from properly functioning because Peters refuses to engage or
communicate with Esposti. Instead of working with Esposti in furtherance of the
CC&R’s, Peters had ceased all communication with Esposti since April 2019.”
The Cross-complaint further alleges that Peters communicates only through her
attorney, which prevents “any semblance of an operating association” and
“subvert[s] the essential role of the association.” Paragraph 9 alleges: “Since
2019, Peters has continuously acted in her self-interest [sic] to the detriment of the
Association and Esposti, both of whom are owed a fiduciary duty from Peters.”
               Paragraphs 10 through 20 of the Cross-complaint allege: (1) counsel
for Esposti and Peters communicated regarding resolving the dispute informally or
through arbitration; (2) Peters’ counsel claimed there was a binding arbitration
agreement; (3) this arbitration agreement provided that the cost of arbitration shall
be borne as decided by the arbitrator; (4) Esposti was not bound by the arbitration

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agreement because she had not signed it and it was not part of the HOA’s
governing documents; (5) the CC&R’s included a prevailing party attorney fees
provision; (6) Esposti’s counsel communicated to Peters’ counsel that Esposti
would agree voluntarily to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement if
Peters agreed to include a prevailing party attorney fees provision; (7) Peters
refused this request and filed her complaint; (8) after Peters filed her complaint, the
parties met several times to discuss mediation; and (9) Peters’ counsel sent
Esposti’s counsel an e-mail stating that Peters was not interested in mediation. The
Cross-complaint alleges at paragraph 20 that, as a consequence, Peters had violated
Civil Code section 5950 and, therefore, the court should deny Peters’ request for
attorney fees alleged in her complaint.

                               THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
              Peters brought an anti-SLAPP motion by which she moved to strike
paragraphs 1 and 2, 4 through 21, the first cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty) and
fourth cause of action (intentional infliction of emotional distress) of the Cross-complaint
in their entirety. Esposti agreed that paragraphs 5 and 6 should be stricken because they
referred to Peters’ interactions with the City of Newport Beach, which would be a
protected activity, but otherwise opposed the motion.
              The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to paragraphs 5 and 6
“and any claims in the [Cross-complaint] to the extent based thereon.” The court denied
the motion in all other respects. The court found: (1) paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of the
Cross-complaint do not involve protected activity; (2) paragraphs 7 through 9 refer to
protected activity but only to provide context for Esposti’s claims rather than as a basis of
liability; (3) paragraphs 10 through 20 refer to protected activity but only as a basis for
denying Peters attorney fees under Civil Code section 5960; and (4) the first and fourth
causes of action did not arise out of protected activity.

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                                        DISCUSSION
I. Summary of anti-SLAPP Law and Standard of Review
              “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be
subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
(§ 425.16(b)(1).) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability
for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a
procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral), italics omitted.)
              Anti-SLAPP motions are resolved through a two-step analysis. (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) At the first step, the defendant must establish that the
challenged allegations or claims arise out of activity protected under section 425.16.
(Ibid.; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1061 (Park).) If the defendant meets this burden, then, at the second step, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the claims have at least “‘minimal merit’” (Park, at
p. 1061) by making “a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment” (Baral, at pp. 384-385, 396).
              “We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion under the
de novo standard and, in so doing, conduct the same two-step process to determine
whether as a matter of law the defendant met its burden of showing the challenged claim
arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether the plaintiff met its burden of showing
probability of success.” (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo
World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42 (Newport Harbor).)

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II. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting in Part and Denying in Part Peters’
    anti-SLAPP Motion

               A. The First Step of the anti-SLAPP Analysis
               “At the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all
allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) After identifying the allegations of protected activity, the
defendant must demonstrate the activity alleged falls within one of the four categories
                                    2
described in section 425.16(e). (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6
Cal.5th 610, 620.) In addition to the pleadings, the court may consider declarations and
other evidence presented to determine what conduct is being challenged, but not to assess
the merit of the claims. (Joslin v. Third Laguna Hills Mutual (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 366,
371.)
               A claim arises from protected activity within the meaning of section
425.16(b)(1) if the activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. (Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1062; City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78-79.) “Critically,
‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act
in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’” (Park, at p. 1063.) “In short, in
ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged
claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form
the basis for liability.” (Ibid.)

               2
                 The four categories are: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing
made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16(e).)

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               B. Specific Allegations
               With respect to each of the challenged paragraphs of the Cross-complaint,
we conclude:
               Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of the Cross-complaint are factual allegations and do
not include allegations of protected activity.
               Paragraph 7 of the Cross-complaint alleges that Peters amended her
complaint to allege “an unspecified $400,000 in damages” without discussing those
damages with Esposti and providing updated repair estimates. Amending a complaint is
protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16(e)(1).) But paragraph 7 does
not purport to state a claim arising out of protected activity; instead, paragraph 7 serves as
context for or an example of Peters’ allegedly tortious conduct. (See Newport Harbor,
supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 46.) As Esposti argues, she has no claim arising out of
amending the complaint; rather, she argues that “Peters has a separate and independent
obligation to address her purported damages to Esposti apart from the claims she is
making in the lawsuit.”
               Paragraph 8 of the Cross-complaint refers to Peters having alleged in her
complaint that there was no HOA. Although making allegations in a complaint is
protected activity (§ 425.16(e)(1)), the reference in paragraph 8 to Peters’ allegations
merely provides context for and evidence of the dispute between the parties. (See
Newport Harbor, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 46.) Esposti’s claim arises out of
allegations that Peters denied the existence of the HOA and refused to cooperate with
Esposti in operating it, which is not protected activity. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1063.)
               Paragraph 9 of the Cross-complaint is a factual allegation and does not
allege protected activity.
               Paragraphs 10 through 20 of the Cross-complaint allege prelitigation and
postlitigation communications regarding arbitration and mediation. We do not decide

                                                 8
whether the activities alleged in paragraphs 10 through 20 are protected because we
conclude those activities do not underlie or form the basis for any of Esposti’s claims.
Under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.),
a homeowners association or a member of a homeowners association may not file an
enforcement action unless “the parties have endeavored to submit their dispute to
alternative dispute resolution pursuant to this article.” (Civ. Code, § 5930, subd. (a).)
The allegations in paragraphs 10 through 20 were thus necessary to satisfy a prerequisite
to bringing an action to enforce the CC&R’s. In addition, “[i]n an enforcement action in
which attorney’s fees and costs may be awarded, the court, in determining the amount of
the award, may consider whether a party’s refusal to participate in alternative dispute
resolution before commencement of the action was reasonable.” (Civ. Code, § 5960.)
Paragraphs 10 through 20 are alleged as a basis to deny Peters’ request for attorney fees
under Civil Code section 5960, not as the basis for any claim asserted in the
Cross-complaint. Paragraph 21 of the Cross-complaint recites the forms of relief
requested by Esposti and does not allege protected activity.

              C. First and Fourth Causes of Action
              1. Treatment of Mixed Causes of Action
              Peters argues the first and fourth causes of action of the Cross-complaint
should have been stricken in their entirety because they incorporate by reference the
specific allegations to which her anti-SLAPP motion was directed. The trial court
ordered that only paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Cross-complaint and any claims based on
those two paragraphs be stricken. Although paragraphs 5 and 6 are incorporated by
reference into the first and fourth causes of action, striking paragraphs 5 and 6 does not
mean the first and fourth causes of action also must be stricken. The Cross-complaint
includes many allegations of unprotected activities that are alleged to support Esposti’s
breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action.

                                              9
The trial court was correct to deny Peters’ request to strike the first and fourth causes of
action.
              With so-called “‘mixed causes of action,’” that is, causes of action based on
allegations of both protected and unprotected activity (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 381-
382; see Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (Bonni)), the
focus of analysis shifts from evaluating the cause of action as a whole to evaluating
individual claims so that the court can determine whether a claim, rather than a cause of
action, constitutes a “proper subject of a special motion to strike . . . .” (Baral, at p. 382;
id. at p. 395.) For purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, a claim refers to a set of facts
allegedly giving rise to relief. (Baral, at pp. 382, 395.) A “cause of action” differs from
a claim: A cause of action means the separate counts as pleaded by the plaintiffs.
(Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 148, fn. 4.) “A single cause of action can
incorporate more than one claim; at the same time, a single claim can sometimes form the
basis for more than one cause of action.” (Ibid.)
              The focus therefore is not on the “gravamen” of a cause of action as a
whole, but on whether each claim within the causes of action arises from activity
protected by section 425.16. This means the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion
directed to a mixed cause of action is not necessarily an all-or-nothing proposition.
“When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity,
the unprotected activity is disregarded at [the first] stage.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 396.) If an anti-SLAPP motion is granted with respect to claims arising out of
protected activity, any claims arising out of allegations of unprotected activity would
remain.
              In Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995, the California Supreme Court explained
how Baral’s claim-by-claim approach made the gravamen approach obsolete even when,
as in the present case, an anti-SLAPP motion is directed to entire causes of action:
“Since Baral, most Courts of Appeal have taken a claim-by-claim approach to the anti-

                                              10
SLAPP analysis, rather than attempting to evaluate a cause of action as a whole.
[Citations.] . . . Here, in a motion filed before Baral was issued, the [defendants] moved
to strike the entire retaliation cause of action. [Plaintiff] contends that because the
motion aimed at the entire cause of action, we should consider whether the gravamen of
the entire cause of action was based on protected or unprotected activity. [¶] We reject
the contention: Our holding in Baral applies even though the [defendants] sought to
strike the entire cause of action, rather than merely parts of it. If we were instead to adopt
[the plaintiff]’s proposed gravamen approach, we would again risk saddling courts with
an obligation to settle intractable, almost metaphysical problems about the ‘essence’ of a
cause of action that encompasses multiple claims. [Citation.] The attempt to reduce a
multifaceted cause of action into a singular ‘essence’ would predictably yield
overinclusive and underinclusive results that would impair significant legislative policies.
Striking a cause of action that rests in part on unprotected activity constrains a plaintiff’s
ability to seek relief without advancing the anti-SLAPP’s goals of shielding protected
activity, which would have been fully served by striking from the complaint only the
allegations of protected activity. Conversely, refusing to strike any part of a cause of
action that rests in part on protected activity defeats the legislative goal of protecting
defendants from meritless claims based on such conduct.” (Bonni, at pp. 1010-1011.)

              2. Claims Arising Out of Paragraphs 5 and 6
              Here, the allegations of protected activity in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
Cross-complaint are not coextensive with Esposti’s first and fourth cause of action, which
also arise out of allegations of unprotected activity. Put another way, “without the
allegations of protected activity, the [first and fourth] causes of action state claims for
relief arising out of the allegations of unprotected activity.” (Newport Harbor, supra, 23
Cal.App.5th at p. 48.) Thus, only the claims for relief arising specifically out of the
allegations of paragraphs 5 and 6 are subject to a motion to strike. The trial court

                                              11
correctly applied the law by concluding that only claims arising out of paragraphs 5 and 6
be stricken. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1010-1011.) All the other claims presented
by the Cross-complaint remain because they do not arise out of protected activity.

                                     DISPOSITION
              The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.

                                                SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOODING, J.

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