Court Opinion

ID: 9806528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:11:12.130331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:08:02.184968
License: Public Domain

Sweeny, J.P., and DeGrasse, J.,
dissent in part in a memorandum by DeGrasse, J., as follows: The majority and I agree that substantial evidence supports respondent’s determination that petitioner violated Alcoholic Beverage Control Law §§ 99-d (1) and 110 (4), as well as Rules of the State Liquor Authority (9 NYCRR) § 53.1. I disagree, however, with the majority’s finding that the penalty of cancellation imposed by respondent is excessive. As noted by the Court of Appeals, “[T]he role of the courts in reviewing the penalty imposed by an administrative agency is extremely limited” (Matter of 17 Cameron St. Rest. Corp. v New York State Liq. Auth., 48 NY2d 509, 512 [1979]). Where the finding of guilt has been confirmed, the test is whether the punishment imposed is “so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all of the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). That test has not been met in this case.
Respondent sustained eight separate charges following a revocation hearing. Three of the sustained charges involved the submission of false material statements or the suppression of information in connection with petitioner’s original application and renewal application. The record does not support the majority’s conclusion, on the basis of a purported lack of willfulness on petitioner’s part, that the penalty of cancellation was unwarranted. Petitioner’s argument regarding its purported lack of willfulness is based on the assertion that it was unaware of its duty to disclose its financial obligations, place its license in safekeeping with respondent and otherwise comply with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and respondent’s rules. The majority apparently accepts this argument in reaching its conclusion. I reach a different conclusion because the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse applies in the context of CPLR article 78 proceedings (see Matter of Obiora v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 11 AD3d 755, 756 [2d Dept 2010] [landlord’s ignorance of the law held insufficient to show that a rent overcharge was not willful]; Matter of Rubin v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 29 AD3d 1089, 1091-1092 [3d Dept 2006] [ignorance of the law held insufficient as a basis for the abatement of penalties]). Matter of Farina v State Liq. Auth. (20 NY2d 484 [1967]), which the majority cites, is distinguishable because it involved an an*590nulment of a determination on the distinct ground that it “was arbitrary and capricious, being based upon conclusory reasons, unsupported by factual considerations” (id. at 493). Matter of La Trieste Rest. & Cabaret v New York State Liq. Auth. (228 AD2d 172 [1st Dept 1996]) and Matter of Vicky’s Grocery v New York State Liq. Auth. (213 AD2d 206 [1st Dept 1995]), which the majority also cites, are inapt because they do not implicate the purported ignorance of the law excuse proffered by petitioner in this proceeding.
It should also be noted that the penalty of cancellation imposed here does not carry the most severe consequences permitted by law. Upon sustaining the charges following the revocation hearing, respondent could have revoked, cancelled or suspended petitioner’s license (see 9 NYCRR 54.6 [a]; see also Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 17 [3]). “A licensee whose license has been revoked for cause must wait two years before applying for a new liquor license” (Matter of Braden Food & Drink, Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 72 AD3d 956, 957 [2d Dept 2010], citing Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 126 [5] [a]; [6]). However, where a license has been cancelled, the affected licensee may, theoretically, make an immediate application for a new license (72 AD3d at 957). I would confirm respondent’s determination.