Court Opinion

ID: 9544987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:04:19.642617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:50.891531
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur. Inasmuch as many of those discharged from the penitentiary received certificates of discharge containing the same or similar language to that contained in Rupe’s certificate, I want to set forth my belief as to the effect of them and the effect of § 7-13-107, W.S.1977,1 pursuant to which the certificates were worded. Insofar as such section provided that the governor shall issue a certificate for discharge to convicts which shall restore “his rights the same as though a full pardon had been granted,” it was unconstitutional; and any recitation pursuant thereto contained in the form for a certificate of discharge which provides for a restoration of civil rights had no force or effect in law.
The power to pardon is in the governor, and only in the governor, as chief executive of the state. Art. 4, § 5, of the Wyoming Constitution reads in pertinent part:
“The governor shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment; but the legislature may by law regulate the manner in which the remission of fines, pardons, commutations and reprieves may be applied for. * * * ”
Section 7-13-107 did not leave the discretion to grant pardons in the governor. It did not “regulate the manner in which * * * pardons * * * may be applied for.” It amounted to a legislative grant of pardon. The legislature could not constitutionally do so.
“The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.” Art. 2, § 1, Wyoming Constitution.
The legislature has regulated the manner in which “pardons may be applied for.” See §§ 7-13-801 through 7-13-806, W.S. 1977. Such has been held to not limit the discretion of the governor in granting pardons. In re Moore, 4 Wyo. 98, 31 P. 980 (1893). Appellee was not pardoned pursuant to the provisions of these sections. The pardon allegedly arising from the certificate of discharge was without an exercise of discretion by the governor and was therefore invalid.
With respect to the dissent of Chief Justice Rose, I do not believe, as stated therein, that we have departed from our standard policy of dismissing appeals when the notice of appeal is not timely filed. Although an “order of continuance” is not in the record, I am persuaded that there is sufficient record reflection of the existence of an order setting the matter for hearing, and that such order is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P.,2 i.e., it was sufficient to indicate that the “determination” of appellant’s motions was “continued by order of the court.”
With reference to the existence of an order setting the matter for hearing, the majority opinion notes that there is no requirement that the order be in writing or labeled “continuance.” The record contains *1119a notice of setting which begins: “Pursuant to order made upon the Court’s own Motion * * * ” (emphasis added). The notice emanates from the office of the clerk of court. It is signed by her, and copies were directed to the attorneys for all of the parties. The order referred to in the notice is not in the record.
Many orders and rulings of the trial courts are made orally. The better practice is to either make such in writing or have them recorded as a part of a verbatim transcript of proceedings. However, there are other approved methods to establish that which occurred during the proceedings and progress of a case, e.g., Rules 4.0B and 4.04, W.R.A.P., relative to the state of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or the transcript is unavailable and when correction or modification of the record is necessary.3 The recitation of the existence of an order by the clerk of court, as here done in the notice of setting, is sufficient evidence of the fact of such order.
In Murry v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 26, 28 (1981), we noted the potential of an oral order, although its existence was not pertinent to the resolution of that case, and its existence was there evidenced by a statement of proceedings supplementing the record. It was said in an early case involving a criminal contempt of court:
“Undoubtedly, in judicial proceedings, an ‘order,’ as contradistinguished from a ‘judgment,’ is often defined as one reduced to writing, and entered in the records of the court; and such is the purport of many of the cases referred to by counsel for the defendant. But that is by no means saying that such only is an order. There must, in the nature of things, be an order of a court made before it is, or can be, written out in the records of the court by the clerk. When written out, the writing becomes a record of the order, and is evidence of it. Orders are almost daily given to the marshal concerning matters to be performed in the presence of the court, and they are as constantly executed before being written out. Indeed, many of them are never reduced to writing at all. Yet there can be no doubt of their validity. Now, the language of the statute in question is broad enough to include all valid oral orders. The natural, ordinary meaning of the word includes written, as well as unwritten, orders, and there is no reason in the policy of the law, or in the nature of things, for excluding unwritten orders. Indeed, the contrary is true. There is just as much reason and necessity for making it an offense to resist the execution of a lawful unwritten order, brought distinctly and authoritatively to the notice of the offending party, as for making it an offense to resist the execution of one in writing. * * * ” United States v. Terry, 9 Cir., 41 F. 771, 773-774 (1890).
And in a recent case:
<<* * * An (order of a court’ may be oral, as in Comm, of Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, (Appeal of Freedman), 552 F.2d 498 (CA 3,1977). It may be a paper, bearing the word ‘ORDER’, signed by a judge or other judicial officer. Or it may be a subpoena, writ of execution or other process.” In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 503 F.Supp. 9, 12 (1980).
“* * * An order of judgment is the decision of the court. It may be formulated in writing by the judge, or declared by *1120him orally. In the latter event the duty rests upon the clerk to write the substance upon his records. That was done in this case, and thereupon the order became entered as completely as if written out by the judge himself and signed by him. * * * ” Allen v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924, 926 (1902).
The fact of an existence of an oral order together with its import must be determined on a case by case basis. In this case, the recitation of the fact of the order by the clerk of court and the fact that it set a hearing on appellant’s motions for June 29, 1981, at 5:30 p. m. are without question. The integrity of the clerk’s recordation should be equal to that of a reporter’s transcript.
With reference to the second aspect of the issue, i.e., whether or not the order setting the motions for trial at a date beyond the initial 60 days allowed by Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P., is sufficient to continue the determination of the motions into the extended 30-day period, the purpose behind the entire time table is important. The time table itself, insofar as this case is concerned, is as follows:
1. Notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days from the entry of the judgment or final order appealed from per Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P., and such filing is jurisdictional per Rule 1.02, W.R.A.P.
2. The running of the time in which to file a notice of appeal is terminated if a timely motion for a new trial is filed (as here) per Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P.
3. The motion for a new trial shall be “determined” within 60 days after entry of the judgment unless “the determination is continued by order of the court” per Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P.
The purpose for setting a mandatory and jurisdictional time within which a notice of appeal must be filed is:
“* * * to set a definite point of time when litigation shall be at an end, unless within that time the prescribed application has been made; and if it has not, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of appellant’s demands. * * * ” Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 412,415,63 S.Ct. 1126,1128, 87 L.Ed. 1483 (1943).
The purpose in terminating the running of the time in which to file an appeal when a timely motion for a new trial has been filed is set forth in Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 98 S.Ct. 556, 562, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), reh. denied 434 U.S. 1089, 98 S.Ct. 1286, 55 L.Ed.2d 795 (1978):
“* * * The rationale behind the tolling principle of the Rule is the same as in traditional practice: ‘A timely petition for rehearing tolls the running of the [appeal] period because it operates to suspend the finality of the ... court’s judgment, pending the court’s further determination whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the parties.’ Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 266, 63 S.Ct. 233, 234, 87 L.Ed. 254 (1942) (emphasis supplied). * * * ”
The purpose in setting a time for determination of the motion for a new trial is the same as that for setting a time in which to file a notice of appeal.
Inasmuch as the purpose in terminating the time in which to file an appeal is to suspend the finality of the judgment, it would seem that an order setting a date for a hearing beyond the original 60-day limit, but within the authorized additional 30 days would be of equal notice and force to suspend the finality of the judgment until the hearing date “pending the court’s further determination whether the judgment should be modified” as would an order captioned “continuance.”
That such was taken to be so by the trial court and all of the parties is evidenced by the fact that the hearing was actually held at the time set, with the judge and all parties in attendance and participating, and with appellee making no objection to such hearing.4 See the majority opinion for an elaboration of this point.
*1121The language of Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P., does not specify any particular kind of an order to accomplish the continuation. It provides that the purpose of the order is to continue the “determination” of the matter. If the hearing on the motion for a new trial were held before the expiration of the initial 60 days, but the court had not completed its research or perhaps it had ordered briefs which were not yet due, the usual order continuing a hearing would not be proper. An order reflecting the fact of the hearing and that the matter was taken under advisement or an order setting time for briefs or some similar order should be sufficient to continue the “determination” and extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. An order setting a time for the hearing itself should also be sufficient for such purpose.
Generally, the proceedings and actions of the trial court are presumed to be regular and proper. O’Malley v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, reh. denied 43 Wyo. 350, 5 P.2d 276, 77 A.L.R. 582 (1931). I find nothing in this record to overcome that presumption. There was an order of the court setting a hearing on the motion for a new trial at a date beyond the initial 60-day limit contained in Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P. The order continued the “determination” of the motions. The notice of appeal was timely filed.
I submit the foregoing as additional grounds for the holding of the majority opinion.

. See majority opinion for provisions of § 7-13-107, W.S.1977, prior to May 1981 and see fn. 2 of that opinion for provisions thereof after May 1981.

. See fn. 1 of Chief Justice Rose’s dissenting opinion for content of Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P.

. Although I do not base my determination thereon, Rule 60(a), W.R.C.P., and Rule 37, W.R.Cr.P., are of interest. Rule 60(a), W.R. C.P., provides:
“ * * * Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the Supreme Court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.)
Rule 37, W.R.Cr.P., provides:
“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.” (Emphasis added.)

. Although Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P., then contained an additional provision relative to con*1121tinuation by stipulation, we said, in overruling a motion to dismiss for failure to file a timely notice of appeal, that “both court and counsel at the time of the hearing of the motion apparently proceeded as if the continuance was to be effective until the matter was resolved by the trial court.” Brasel & Sims Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., Wyo., 378 P.2d 501, 503 (1963).