Court Opinion

ID: 9909908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 16:05:46.178183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:17.005637
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                                            RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2023
                                                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0411-MR

CHASE ALLEN SIMMONS                                                  APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
V.              HONORABLE JAMES A. WETHINGTON, JUDGE
                            NO. 19-CR-01377

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      A jury of the Daviess Circuit Court found Appellant Chase Simmons

guilty of two counts of murder and one count of assault in the second degree.

The jury recommended consecutive sentences of thirty years on each of the

murder convictions, together with a concurrent sentence of five years on the

second-degree assault conviction, for a total sentence of sixty years. The trial

court sentenced Simmons in accordance with that recommendation. Simmons

now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).

Following a careful review, we affirm.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On May 31, 2019, high school sophomore Bailey Eubanks threw an end-

of-the-school-year party in a barn at her mother’s home in Whitesville.
Eubanks and her friends spread news of the party via social media, resulting in

as many as one hundred people attending.

      On the same evening, Appellant Chase Simmons, then seventeen years

old, and his friend Andrew Pierce smoked marijuana together in Owensboro.

Around 11:30 p.m., Pierce and Simmons left in Pierce’s car to head to the

party. Simmons, who was wearing a black zip-up hoodie and black pants,

called his friend Savannah Helm and told her he had learned Jasper “Rex”

Brown was at the party. Helm testified there was bad blood between Simmons

and Brown because Simmons believed Brown had robbed one of his friends.

      When Pierce and Simmons arrived at the party around midnight,

Simmons asked Pierce to wait in the car. A few minutes later, numerous

gunshots rang out. One witness testified the shooter was a white male dressed

in black. Another testified the shooter was wearing a black hoodie and had

white hands, while a third witness told police the shooter was Black. 1 Three

teenage boys—Brown, Amarius “Mari” Winstead, and Tyler Glover—were shot.

Brown and Winstead died soon after, while Glover had surgery and survived

without long-term injuries.

      Simmons returned to Pierce’s car soon after the shootings and told him

to “go, go, go!” While Pierce did not recall seeing Simmons with a gun on the

way to the party, he testified he saw Simmons holding a Glock on the ride back

to Owensboro.

      1 Simmons is Caucasian.

                                       2
      While returning to Owensboro, Simmons called Helm via FaceTime and

told her he had killed Brown. Helm’s friends could hear the conversation

because the call was played over the car’s speakers. One of those friends

thought Simmons sounded “messed up” during the call. Another recalled

Simmons texting Helm that evening, saying he was on acid. Helm testified she

observed during the call that Simmons was wearing a black zip-up hoodie.

      Simmons told Pierce he did not want to go back home and ultimately

directed Pierce to the St. Anthony trailer park where April Rednour lived.

Pierce testified that when they arrived at Rednour’s residence Simmons put a

Glock in a baggie on the counter, though Rednour did not see Simmons with

any type of weapon.

      Rednour did recall that Simmons was “tripping acid” and that he said

something about shooting someone. Rednour described Simmons as hyper,

energized, intense, and “bouncing off the walls.” She explained that he and

Pierce were talking to one another, and that the energy was that of two teenage

boys interacting. Rednour eventually directed Simmons, Pierce, and

Simmons’s brother Andrew, who had arrived in the meantime with a rifle, to

leave. A few days later Simmons returned to Rednour’s residence to pick up a

backpack he’d left behind. Rednour gave Simmons the keys to her shed where

the backpack was but did not go with him to retrieve it.

      On June 6, 2019, police arrested Simmons and seized a backpack which

contained, among other items, a cellphone. Analysis of the cellphone

confirmed Helm’s testimony regarding Simmons’s calls to her and placed

                                       3
Simmons at both the party and Rednour’s residence. The phone also included

photos of Simmons with a handgun with a clear clip and other firearms.

      On June 7, 2019, police went to the trailer park where Rednour lives

after receiving an anonymous tip. There, under a shed close to Rednour’s

trailer but not belonging to her, they located a baggie containing a Glock with a

clear clip. Ballistics analysis later linked the Glock with shell casings found at

the scene of the shootings and identified it as the gun used in those crimes.

However no fingerprints were found on the gun or baggie, and Simmons could

not be included as a contributor to the partial DNA profiles of three people

found on the weapon.

      A grand jury indicted Simmons on two counts of murder and one count

of second-degree assault. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced over

Simmons’s objection four of the photos found on his cellphone. Two of the

photos showed Simmons posing for the camera with a handgun with a clear

clip, along with other weapons. In one of the photos the gun was in Simmons’s

pocket, and in the other he held the gun in his hand. The remaining two

photos showed only firearms, including a handgun with a clear clip. The trial

court excluded other photographs from trial, including a photograph of

Simmons with a marijuana-leaf themed blanket.

      Simmons also requested a voluntary intoxication instruction, which the

trial court declined to give. The jury ultimately convicted Simmons of two

counts of murder and one count of second-degree assault. The trial court

imposed the sixty-year sentence recommended by the jury.

                                        4
                                     ANALYSIS

      Simmons raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the cellphone

photographs of him with firearms were properly authenticated; (2) whether

those photos were admissible under KRE 2 404(b); and (3) whether the trial

court erred in denying his request for a voluntary intoxication instruction. We

review each issue in turn, providing additional facts as necessary.

      I.    The Cellphone Photographs Of Simmons With Firearms Were
            Properly Authenticated.

      Simmons first argues that the trial court erred in admitting the firearms

photos retrieved from his cellphone because those photos were not properly

authenticated. More particularly, Simmons contends the photos were not

authenticated because the Commonwealth could not say when the photos were

taken, whether they were taken with the phone or downloaded from another

source, or if they contained metadata. Simmons preserved this argument by

raising these objections during an in-chambers hearing regarding the photos.

KRE 103(a)(1). We therefore consider whether the trial court’s admission of the

photographs was an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134

S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2004). That is, we ask “whether the trial judge’s decision

was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      KRE 901 requires evidence to be authenticated by proof “sufficient to

support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”

      2 Kentucky Rule of Evidence.

                                        5
KRE 901(a). The Rule sets forth some forms such proof may take, including

testimony of a witness with knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to

be,” “[c]omparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens

which have been authenticated,” and “[a]ppearance, contents, substance,

internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with

circumstances.” KRE 901(b)(1), (3), & (4). To satisfy KRE 901, “a party seeking

to introduce an item of tangible evidence need not satisfy an ‘absolute’

identification requirement, and evidence is admissible if the offering party’s

evidence reasonably identifies the item.” Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d

76, 80 (Ky. 2000).

      We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the

photographs as properly authenticated. At trial the Commonwealth presented

proof that police discovered a Glock with a clear clip beneath a shed near

Rednour’s property. The Commonwealth further presented ballistics proof

linking that same clear-clip Glock with shell casings found at the scene of the

shootings and identifying it as the murder weapon. The Commonwealth thus

sought to introduce the photographs from Simmons’s cellphone of him with a

clear-clip firearm to establish that the murder weapon was his.

       The proof at trial was sufficient to authenticate the photographs for that

purpose, i.e., to support a finding that the photographs were in fact what the

Commonwealth claimed—images of Simmons with the gun used in the

shootings. First, Simmons’s mother was a person with knowledge who testified

that he was in the photos. This was sufficient to support a finding that the

                                        6
person in the photos was Simmons. KRE 901(b)(1). Second, the jury was

shown photographs of the Glock with a clear clip found beneath the shed and

confirmed by ballistics analysis to be the murder weapon. As finder of fact, the

jury could compare that weapon with the gun in the cellphone photographs to

determine whether they were the same firearm. KRE 901(b)(3). In addition,

the clear clip shared by both the murder weapon and the gun in the cellphone

photographs was sufficiently distinctive to support a finding that the gun in the

photograph was the murder weapon. KRE 901(b)(4). The proof at trial was

thus sufficient to support a finding that the evidence was what the

Commonwealth claimed, i.e., photos of Simmons with the murder weapon.

      Finally, we disagree with Simmons’s contention that proper

authentication required the Commonwealth to prove when the photos were

taken, how they ended up on his phone, or whether metadata existed. None of

those showings were required to establish what the Commonwealth sought to

prove, i.e., that Simmons was in possession of the murder weapon before or at

the time of the killings. Simmons’s cellphone was seized by law enforcement

shortly after the shootings, and thus it was clear the photographs were taken

before or near in time to the crimes. Any further detail regarding when the

photographs were taken was not necessary to establish what the

Commonwealth sought to show, i.e., that Simmons had been in possession of

the murder weapon. Nor was it necessary to show how the photographs came

to be on Simmons’s phone, or that metadata existed for the photographs, to

                                       7
make that showing. As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

determination that the photographs were properly authenticated.

      II.   The Cellphone Photographs Were Admissible Under KRE
            404(b).

      Simmons also argues admission of the cellphone photographs violated

KRE 404(b). Simmons’s particular arguments are that the photos were not

relevant because it could not be determined when they were taken, whether

they were taken by him, or if they included the actual weapon used in the

crimes. Simmons also contends the photos were also not relevant insofar as

they included additional weapons besides the single Glock used in the crimes.

Simmons further asserts the photos were not probative and were substantially

prejudicial. Simmons objected both before and during trial to admission of the

photographs under KRE 404(b), and thus his objection is preserved. KRE

103(d).

      KRE 404(b) governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts. It provides that such evidence is “not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”

However, the Rule also provides two circumstances in which evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible. First, such evidence may be

admissible if “offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident.” KRE 404(b)(1). Second, such evidence may also be

admissible if it is “so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to

                                         8
the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without

serious adverse effect on the offering party.” KRE 404(b)(2).

      In determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts under KRE 404(b), a trial court must consider the three factors of

relevance, probativeness, and prejudice set forth in Bell v. Commonwealth, 875

S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994). That is, the trial court must consider 1) whether the

proffered evidence is relevant for some purpose other than to prove the

defendant’s criminal disposition, 2) whether evidence of the other crime, wrong,

or act is sufficiently probative of its commission by the defendant, and

3) whether the potential prejudice from admission of the proffered evidence

substantially outweighs its probative value. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889-91. In

considering these factors, the trial court “must apply [KRE 404(b)] cautiously,

with an eye towards eliminating evidence which is relevant only as proof of an

accused’s propensity to commit a certain type of crime.” Id. at 889. We review

a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under KRE 404(b) for abuse of

discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007).

      Here, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

the cellphone photographs admissible under KRE 404(b). First, as to the Bell

factor of relevance, the photographs were relevant to establishing Simmons’s

identity as the shooter and his opportunity to commit the crimes. Simmons’s

theory of the case was that the shootings were not perpetrated by him but

rather by someone else. This theory thus placed the identity of the shooter at

issue in the trial. The photographs depicted Simmons with a firearm similar to

                                        9
that identified by ballistics as the murder weapon. Moreover, both the murder

weapon and the gun in the photographs had a distinctive clear clip. As such,

the photographs were relevant to establish both Simmons’s identity as the

shooter and his opportunity to commit the shootings. See Thurman v.

Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 888, 898 (Ky. 1998) (holding that evidence

defendant was in possession of firearm similar to murder weapon “was relevant

evidence.”).

      The relevance of the photographs was not undermined by the absence of

proof of when they were taken, particularly given that the cellphone was seized

near the time of the murders. Nor was the relevance of the evidence dependent

on how the photographs came to be on Simmons’s phone or where related

metadata was. Finally, it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to

establish with certainty that the firearm in the photographs was the same

weapon used in the murders. The murder weapon and the firearm in the

photographs were sufficiently similar that a reasonable jury could conclude

they were the same gun. That determination was for the jury, and Simmons of

course was free to point out the lack of definite proof that the gun in the

photographs was the murder weapon. Ultimately, however, the photographs

were relevant to prove identity and opportunity and thus were relevant for

permissible purposes under KRE 404(b).

      The second Bell factor requires a trial court to consider whether the

evidence is sufficiently probative of the defendant’s commission of the other

alleged crimes, wrongs, and acts, i.e., whether “the jury could reasonably

                                        10
conclude that the act[s] occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Davis

v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 724-25 (Ky. 2004). The photographs at

issue were retrieved from Simmons’s cellphone and his mother testified that it

was him in the pictures. This evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable

conclusion that Simmons appeared in the photographs. Thus the

probativeness factor of Bell was also satisfied.

      Finally, we do not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

determination that the prejudicial effect of the photographs did not

substantially outweigh their probative value. This factor requires the trial

court to ask whether “the tendency of the evidence [is] so strongly to lead the

jury into improper character inferences that that tendency ‘substantially

outweigh[s] [the evidence’s] probative value’ with regard to its proper uses.”

Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 457 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Bell, 875

S.W.2d at 890). The cellphone photographs were highly probative of

Simmons’s identity as the shooter and his opportunity to commit the crimes,

given that they showed him with a firearm with a distinctive clear clip similar

to the murder weapon. Admittedly, the photographs were also prejudicial, not

only because they showed Simmons with a firearm similar to the murder

weapon but also with a variety of other firearms as well. Nonetheless, there

was nothing particularly shocking about the photographs, which ultimately

were little more than mundane photographs of the defendant showing his

guns. As such, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the prejudicial

effect of the photographs did not substantially outweigh their probative value.

                                        11
There was no abuse of discretion in the admission of the photographs under

KRE 404(b).

      III.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining
              Simmons’s Request For A Voluntary Intoxication Instruction.

      Finally, Simmons argues that the trial court erred in declining to give a

voluntary intoxication instruction. Simmons notes that the trial court

discussed jury instructions with counsel “informally” and off the record, a

practice we have observed with increasing frequency. We advise trial courts

that discussions with counsel regarding the crafting of jury instructions should

take place on the record. Absent such a record, we are often left to speculate

as to the parties’ arguments and the trial court’s reasoning in reaching a final

set of instructions.

      Nonetheless, because the Commonwealth acknowledges that Simmons

requested a voluntary intoxication instruction and because the trial court made

reference to that request in the course of other recorded portions of the trial,

we will treat the issue as preserved. See Brafman v. Commonwealth, 612

S.W.3d 850, 857 (Ky. 2020). We therefore review the trial court’s denial of

Simmons’s request for a voluntary intoxication instruction for abuse of

discretion and harmless error. Id.

      Voluntary intoxication is a defense to crimes whose elements include the

forming of a specific intent, i.e., specific-intent crimes. KRS 501.080(1).

However, a voluntary intoxication instruction is warranted only if the proof is

sufficient to support a reasonable finding that the voluntary intoxication

completely prevented the defendant from forming the requisite intent. McGuire
                                        12
v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky. 1994) (“Intoxication, whether

voluntary or involuntary, is a defense to an intentional crime if the effect of the

intoxication is to completely negate the element of intent . . . .”) (emphasis

added). Mere evidence that the defendant was intoxicated is not sufficient to

warrant such an instruction. King v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d 919, 923

(Ky. 2017). That is, mere proof of “‘impairment of judgment and/or physical

control that commonly leads intoxicated persons to do things they would not

ordinarily do’” does not, without more, suffice for the giving of a voluntary

intoxication instruction. Hargroves v. Commonwealth, 615 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky.

2021) (quoting Conyers v. Commonwealth, 530 S.W.3d 413, 432 (Ky. 2017)).

Rather, the proof must be reasonably sufficient “to prove that the defendant

was so [intoxicated] that he did not know what he was doing.” Harris v.

Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Fredline v.

Commonwealth, 241 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2007) (emphasis added)).

      We have recently spoken to considerations relevant to a trial court’s

determination of whether to provide a voluntary intoxication instruction:

            A criminal defendant has a basic constitutional right to
      present a defense, and this entitles the defendant to jury
      instructions that give effect to a defendant’s theory of the case.
      From this right, a duty is correspondingly imposed on the trial
      court to instruct on the whole law of the case. Indeed, “a trial
      court is required to instruct the jury on affirmative defenses and
      lesser-included offenses if the evidence would permit a juror
      reasonably to conclude that the defense exists or that the
      defendant was not guilty.”

             While instructing the jury in a particular way is a
      discretionary function of the trial court, a trial court must be
      especially inclined to give instructions that go to the defendant’s
      state of mind, such as mistake or intoxication. “Intoxication . . . is
                                         13
      a defense to an intentional crime if the effect of the intoxication is
      to completely negate the element of intent; it causes the
      defendant’s mental state to equate with insanity. Voluntary
      intoxication negate[s] specific intent.”

Brafman, 612 S.W.3d at 858 (citations omitted). We have also noted that it is

well-established a voluntary intoxication instruction “is to be rejected if the

evidence does not warrant it.” Harris, 313 S.W.3d at 50.

      The charges at issue here, murder and second-degree assault, are both

specific-intent crimes. Murder generally requires a specific intent to cause the

death of another person. KRS 3 507.020. Thus, if the proof is sufficient to

support a reasonable finding that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication

completely prevented him from forming an intent to cause the death of another

person, he is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction. Similarly, second-

degree assault generally requires a specific intent to cause serious physical

injury, or to cause physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument. KRS 508.020(1)(a), (b). Thus, if the proof is sufficient to support a

reasonable finding that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication completely

prevented him from forming an intent to cause serious physical injury or

physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, he is

entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction. 4

      3 Kentucky Revised Statute.

      4 A wanton state of mind, rather than specific intent, may also suffice to support

a conviction for murder or second-degree assault. See KRS 507.020(1)(b) & KRS
508.020(1)(c). Voluntary intoxication of course is not a defense to crimes requiring only
a wanton or reckless state of mind. McGuire, 885 S.W.2d at 934 (“Voluntary intoxication
does not negate culpability for a crime requiring a culpable mental state of wantonness
or recklessness . . . .”).
                                           14
      Here, Simmons asserts a voluntary intoxication instruction was

warranted because 1) Pierce testified Simmons smoked marijuana before the

shootings, 2) two witnesses testified Simmons was tripping on acid that

evening, 3) Rednour described Simmons as energetic, intense, and “bouncing

off the walls,” and 4) one of Helm’s friends stated Simmons sounded “messed

up” during his FaceTime call with Helm after the shootings. This proof could

certainly support a reasonable conclusion that Simmons was under the

influence of multiple drugs at the time of the shootings, but it falls short of the

necessary showing that he was so intoxicated he did not know what he was

doing. Absent such proof, there could be no reasonable finding that Simmons’s

voluntary intoxication rendered him unable to form the intent necessary to

commit the crimes of murder and second-degree assault.

      Moreover, other proof at trial flatly contradicts any suggestion Simmons

was so intoxicated as to be unable to form an intent to kill or injure. For

example, immediately after the shootings Simmons had the mental capacity to

decide not to go home, to decide upon Rednour’s residence in Owensboro as an

alternative destination, and to give Pierce physical directions to the St. Anthony

trailer park where Rednour lived. See Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827,

868 (Ky. 2004) (noting defendant’s ability to locate a residence was not the

action “of a man so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing”).

Additional proof further demonstrating that Simmons had mental control and

was aware of his actions include 1) his direction to Pierce to stay in the car

when they arrived at the party, 2) his quick return to the car after the

                                        15
shootings, 3) his order to Pierce to “go” when he jumped back in the car, and 4)

his confession to Helm shortly after the shootings that he had killed Brown.

See Harris, 313 S.W.3d at 51 (holding that defendant’s memory of and boasting

about killing shortly after committing the crime did not “permit a finding that

at the time of the offense [he] was so intoxicated that he did not know what he

was doing”). Finally, while Rednour described Simmons as energetic and

“bouncing off the walls,” she also further clarified that Simmons was

interacting with Pierce at the time and that his energetic demeanor was typical

of interactions between teenage boys.

      Thus, while the proof at trial showed that Simmons was intoxicated and

excitable, it did not show that his intoxication rose to a level such that he did

not know what he was doing or could not form an intent to commit the crimes

charged. As such, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial

of Simmons’s request for a voluntary intoxication instruction. See Hargroves,

615 S.W.3d at 9 (“[W]hile [defendant] may have consumed alcohol, the proof

does not show he was so drunk he did not know what he was doing. Therefore,

we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by declining to instruct

jurors on voluntary intoxication.”).

                                  CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Daviess Circuit Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

                                        16
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kayla D. Deatherage
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders
Assistant Attorney General

                               17