Court Opinion

ID: 9726453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:51:14.074951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.500183
License: Public Domain

*72Lesinski, C. J.
(dissenting). On August 1, 1969, defendant Gary Wayne Sepulvado was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of assault with intent to murder, MCLA § 780.53 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.-278). Following sentencing, he appeals claiming that the plea was improperly accepted because the trial court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The majority affirms the conviction upon the plea of guilty.
Upon the authority of Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 US 238 (89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274), applicable in the instant case, I find the trial court’s failure to advise the defendant of his right against, compulsory self-incrimination and his right to confront one’s accusers constituted reversible error. See, also, People v. Ferguson (1970), 383 Mich 645, affirming, by an equally divided court (Justice T. G. Kavanagh not sitting), People v. Ferguson (1968), 13 Mich App 362 (opinion by Levin, J; T. G. Kavanagh, J., concurring); People v. Taylor (1970), 383 Mich 338 (concurring opinion of Justices Black and Dethmers; dissenting opinions of Justices Adams, T. G. Kavanagh and T. M. Kavanagh) ; and People v. Jaworski (1970), 25 Mich App 540 (dissent by Lesinski, C. J.).
The bare assertion of trial counsel that he advised defendant of his “constitutional rights” does not satisfy the specificity requirement of Boykin because we cannot infer from such an assertion that counsel in fact advised defendant of the rights enumerated above. This conclusion is based on my experience as a private practitioner and my examination of the appellate records of numerous guilty pleas. I can take judicial notice of the fact that before Boykin, neither trial attorneys nor trial judges, as a matter of course, specifically advised *73defendants of tlieir right to be confronted by their accusers. While occasional mention was made of the right against compulsory self-incrimination, it is clear that the only right generally discussed was the right to trial by jury. The apparent reason for the above situation was that most attorneys regarded the former two rights as “trial rights” to be enforced only when circumstances warranted their invocation. Boykin clearly makes continuation of this situation intolerable.
I would reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.