Court Opinion

ID: 9587649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:43.630793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:57.320292
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing appellant argues that this court “has erroneously applied OCGA § 24-3-2 in allowing the admission of hearsay testimony to explain conduct which was not relevant to any issue in the case”; and “has overlooked and failed to consider the fact that hearsay testimony, allegedly admitted to explain conduct under OCGA § 24-3-2, was admitted for all purposes.” Appellant’s conclusion that OCGA § 24-3-2 prohibited admission of the statements of Vainer Jean Baptiste through Stout’s testimony is unwarranted, as hearsay evidence is governed by OCGA § 24-3-1. Stout’s testimony concerning his conversation with Baptiste was admissible as original evidence under OCGA § 24-3-2, not to prove whether Baptiste went to Haiti and obtained the endorsements of the payees on the checks, but to show why Stout acted in the manner in which he did.
The Supreme Court in Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865 (294 SE2d 482) (1982), citing Greenleaf, Evidence (5th ed. 1850), distinguished the hearsay exception found in OCGA § 24-3-1 and explained the purpose of OCGA § 24-3-2, stating: “ ‘it does not follow, because the writing or words in question are those of a third person, not under oath, that therefore they are to be considered as hearsay. On the contrary, it happens in many cases, that the very fact in controversy is, whether such things were written, or spoken, and not whether they were true. . . .’ Id. at p. 127. Greenleaf then wrote: ‘Thus, where the question is, whether the party acted prudently, wisely or in good faith, the information, on which he acted, whether true or false, is original and material evidence. . . . This doctrine applies to all other communications, wherever the fact that such communication was *168made, and not its truth or falsity, is the point in controversy.’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. 127 to 129. ... In addition, it appears that [OCGA § 24-3-2] should be understood not as an exception to the rule against hearsay but as an explanation of what is not hearsay. Green, Ga. Law of Evidence, § 288 (1957).” (Indention omitted.) 249 Ga. at 866-867.
Decided October 14, 1988 —
Rehearing denied November 7, 1988
Sutton, Reddick, Hackel & Hackel, Berrien L. Sutton, for appellants.
Robertson & Bobbitt, Morris S. Robertson, for appellee.
Stout’s testimony that Baptiste represented himself to be acting on behalf of appellants when he deposited the checks in his account was relevant to explain Stout’s subsequent conduct in pursuing an investigation into the matter, not as to whether Baptiste’s statements were true or false. Since this conduct was material to the issue of whether C & S acted in good faith, the testimony was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2. Athena Prods, v. Geographies, 168 Ga. App. 828 (2) (310 SE2d 547) (1983).

Motion for rehearing denied.