Court Opinion

ID: 9526677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:22:17.609647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:07.203174
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of Parson’s conviction for carrying an unlicensed handgun in a vehicle. However, unlike the majority, I find the evidence insufficient to support the conviction for possession of heroin.
*874Criminal possession of contraband may be established by proof of actual or constructive possession. Watt v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 412 N.E.2d 90. Constructive possession requires a showing of intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the material in question. Thomas v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 1, 291 N.E.2d 557. Proof of a possessory interest in the premises in which the item is found is adequate to establish the ability to maintain control and dominion over the substance. Watt, 412 N.E.2d at 98. Intent, on the other hand, may be proved by evidence of accused’s knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance. It may be inferred from exclusive possession of the premises. However, where possession is not exclusive, mere presence is insufficient and there must be buttressing evidence of additional circumstances which provide the indicia of knowledge. Additional factors present in nonexclusive possession situations which have been held sufficient to link the accused with the substance in question include: Thomas, (defendant seated near table where narcotics were found in open view); Ledcke v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 382, 296 N.E.2d 412 (drugs in manufacturing setting and defendant’s attempted flight); Griffin v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 205, 285 N.E.2d 644 (defendant admitted owning narcotics); Wait, (close proximity of defendant’s clothing to contraband); Hutcherson v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 877, reh. den. (1978) 382 N.E.2d 983 (defendants attempted flight); Mills v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 379 N.E.2d 1023 (incriminating paraphernalia linked to defendant); Moss v. State, (1975) 165 Ind.App. 502, 333 N.E.2d 141, 335 N.E.2d 633 (furtive gestures).
The search of Parson’s residence revealed 2.96 grams of heroin hidden beneath the exterior siding at the rear of the house. Parson did not have exclusive possession of the house. Nor did he have exclusive possession of the exterior of the dwelling. While the evidence of joint occupancy supports the inference Parson was in control of the house and its exterior, it does not support an inference he had knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Greely v. State, (1973) 158 Ind.App. 212, 301 N.E.2d 850. Additional indicia of knowledge is necessary but not found in this record.
The majority correctly asserts the accused’s knowledge of the presence and nature of the narcotics may be inferred in a manufacturing situation even where the accused is not a tenant of the premises. Ledcke. It is nevertheless mistaken in concluding the small packets of mix retrieved with the heroin supports such an inference. As Judge Buchanan stated in Watt, the inference is premised on the notion illegal manufacturing activity is so obvious and visible as to support the presumption an occupant of the house had the requisite knowledge. 412 N.E.2d at 99. Absent the clearly visible nature of an illegal manufacturing setting, it is unreasonable to assume a meagre seven grams of mix secreted in small tinfoil packets hidden beneath the sideboarding with the narcotics is a manufacturing situation. Therefore, I disagree with the majority in its determination the small quantity of heroin mix constituted evidence sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession. Had voluminous quantities of the mix been discovered, or if the mix had been found in plain view on the premises, it is possible the evidence would warrant a different conclusion.
I further disagree the presence of Parson’s dog in the backyard tends to connect him with the narcotics. The majority places great emphasis on the so-called reluctance of the officers to remove the dog without Parson’s assistance from its position within the fence at the rear of the residence. A careful examination of the record, however, reveals no testimony concerning the dog’s temperament or its propensity to limit accessibility to the area where the drugs were discovered. Admittedly, one of the officers referred to the dog as a “big guard dog . . . about the size of a Shepard [sic] .. . . ” That same officer, it should be noted, also characterized the dog as being merely an “overgrown poodle.”
Moreover, no evidence was adduced at trial concerning the proximity of the dog to *875the narcotics. Both, of course, were found at the rear of the premises. The mere presence of a dog in the backyard, however, is insufficient to link Parson with the narcotics. Further, the dog was not continuously in the backyard during Parson’s absence. It was at the kennel at least a portion of the time. Consequently, any inference Parson placed the dog at the rear of the house to prevent outsiders from gaining access to the drugs is premised on pure suspicion and speculation.
Finally, Parson was returning from an overnight trip to St. Louis when the search was executed. The search commenced immediately upon his arrival; thus he had not even the slightest opportunity to approach the house. This inability to reach the residence after an absence of nearly 24 hours rendered such search analagous to one done in his absence. While Parson had been away he claims his brother returned the dog from the kennel at about 4 p. m. and therefore had unfettered access to the premises. Although this assertion was uncorroborated, it was also uncontradicted. Police officers did maintain surveillance outside the residence between 3 p. m. and 8 p. m.; however, contrary to the majority’s statement, not a single officer testified as to what transpired at the house during this time. In Pier v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 209, this court unequivocally held an accused’s absence from the premises, coupled with possible access of others, precludes a conviction of knowing possession of contraband.
I conclude the state failed to introduce sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could reasonably infer Parson knowingly possessed the heroin. The evidence admittedly raises an aura of suspicion of guilt, but such evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Dunn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 142, 293 N.E.2d 32. Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion affirming Parson’s conviction for possession of heroin.