Court Opinion

ID: 9862360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:07:56.117182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:11.116062
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Willie Lindsey, was charged by indictment with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1996)) and one count of unlawful possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 1996)). Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Kankakee County, defendant was found guilty of the charged offenses and later sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for periods of 10 years and 4 years, respectively. Direct appeal was taken to the appellate court. There defendant argued, for the first time, that his appearances in the trial court via closed-circuit television at the time of arraignment and jury waiver violated his constitutional and statutory right to be present. The appellate court rejected defendant’s arguments and affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. 309 Ill. App. 3d 1031. We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. BACKGROUND On October 8, 1997, at about 9 p.m., Kankakee police officers executed a search warrant at the home of defendant’s girlfriend, Nikeya Hairston. In the course of the search, police recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Both Hairston and defendant were present during the search and both were arrested. The record shows that, on October 9, 1997, an information containing the charges against defendant was filed with the court and a copy furnished to defendant. A hearing was held, at which time defendant was advised of the minimum and maximum penalties, the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel. The court, at defendant’s request, appointed the public defender’s office to represent defendant. It is unclear from the record whether defendant appeared in person or by closed-circuit television for this hearing. On October 17, 1997, the grand jury returned a bill of indictment against defendant and on October 23, 1997, defendant was arraigned. At the arraignment, defendant was represented by counsel, who was present in the courtroom. Defendant, however, appeared via closed-circuit television from the jail. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of the indictment, waived its formal reading, requested statutory discovery, and demanded a jury trial. Immediately following arraignment, the court held a hearing on defendant’s bond-reduction motion. Defendant testified via closed-circuit television in support of the motion. After hearing the testimony, the court denied the motion and defendant remained in custody. The record shows that, between arraignment and trial, the circuit court conducted eight pretrial hearings regarding defendant’s case. Defendant was not physically present in the courtroom at any of these hearings. Instead, defendant “appeared” at the hearings via closed-circuit television from a room within the county jail. Defense counsel, however, appeared in the courtroom. Defendant and counsel had no opportunity for immediate communication with each other, unless it was done through the closed-circuit system, which meant that the judge and other attorneys could hear their conversation. To speak privately with defendant, defense counsel had to leave the courtroom and contact defendant by telephone. The record does not disclose whether separate, secure telephone lines were set aside for this purpose. One of the pretrial hearings occurred on February 4, 1998. Although the case had been set for trial on that date, the State moved for a continuance because certain witnesses were unavailable. After the court granted the continuance, defendant, who was present via closed-circuit television, asked to speak to his attorney. The case was recessed so that defense counsel could telephone defendant. When the case was recalled, the court was advised by counsel that defendant wanted to waive his right to a jury trial. The court, speaking to defendant across the closed-circuit system, admonished defendant regarding his right to a jury trial. Finding that defendant understood his right to trial by jury and was voluntarily giving up that right, the court accepted defendant’s jury waiver. A jury waiver form was then signed by defendant at the jail and later transmitted to the court. After the jury waiver was accepted, the court inquired about possible stipulations. Defense counsel conferred publicly with defendant across the closed-circuit system. The following colloquy took place: “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge I think — Mr. Lindsey the Judge is asking you about the lab. DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Yeah. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Since our defense does not involve saying that this is not — that the materials were found [szc] were not — I believe it’s alleged to be cocaine, but rather they were not our materials, do you have any objection to stipulating that what the substance of the police [szc] found was in fact cocaine? DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Well, your Honor, I have a— THE COURT: Do you understand your lawyer’s— DEFENDANT LINDSEY: That report right here. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, but it makes a difference in scheduling if they need to bring the lab personnel down here to testify that they tested the materials and it tested positive for the presence of cocaine. If we agree that testing was done and it returned as positive for cocaine, then they don’t need to bring in those lab personnel down here. DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Right. Well according to these documents they tested it already. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, but what I’m asking you is if you will agree and will enter into what is called a stipulation for the Court and for the record we say, Judge, we don’t dispute that they tested it and it tested positive for cocaine. In other words, rather than having the lab person who tested it come down here and testify as to the test performed and the results of those tests that it was positive for cocaine, that would just be introduced to the Court by way of agreement. THE COURT: It shortens up the trial if you’re not fighting about whether or not it was cocaine Mr. Lindsey. Do you understand that? DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Yes.” Defendant agreed to stipulate to the lab evidence and the trial date was continued to February 9, 1998. On that date, the State requested another continuance because fingerprint evidence was not yet available. Before granting the motion, the court discussed the possibility of proceeding to the trial, with the fingerprint evidence to be presented at a later date. This colloquy followed: “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Lindsey, do you understand what the judge is asking about? It would be a bifurcated proceeding. We’d start today. They would put on any evidence except evidence relating to fingerprints that might or might not have been found on these baggies. Do you understand? DEFENDANT *** LINDSEY: Yes, sir. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So we’d be starting without the results of whether there is any fingerprints on there. Do you have any objection to that? THE COURT: You want to talk to him privately? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sure, Judge. THE COURT: Why don’t you go to the phone, Mr. Lindsey You and your lawyer can confer privately on that. DEFENDANT *** LINDSEY: Okay” Counsel then left the courtroom to telephone defendant. When court reconvened, defense counsel informed the court that defendant would not proceed to trial without knowing all of the evidence against him. The court granted the continuance over defendant’s objection and a new trial date was set. Defendant’s bench trial commenced on April 10, 1998. Defendant appeared in court with counsel for his trial. The State presented evidence linking defendant to the drugs and drug paraphernalia recovered from Hairston’s home. After hearing all of the evidence, the circuit court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver and possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver. Defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Defendant appealed and, for the first time, challenged his closed-circuit television appearances at arraignment and jury waiver. Defendant argued that arraignment and jury waiver are “critical stages” of the criminal proceedings against him and that, in the absence of an express waiver, he had a constitutional right to be physically present at these hearings. Defendant also maintained that his statutory right to be present in the trial court at the time of his arraignment and jury waiver was violated. Section 113 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) provides: “Before any person is tried for the commission of an offense he shall be called into open court, informed of the charge against him, and called upon to plead thereto. If the defendant so requests the formal charge shall be read to him before he is required to plead.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/113 — 1 (West 1998). Similarly, section 103 — 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Every person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless (i) understanding^ waived by defendant in open court ***.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/103 — 6 (West 1998). Defendant argued that his appearances via closed-circuit television at the time of his arraignment and jury waiver did not satisfy the statutory requirement that he be present in “open court” at these proceedings. Finally, defendant maintained that the circuit court had no authority to hold any pretrial proceedings via closed-circuit television because the court had not adopted rules regarding the use of closed-circuit television, as required by section 106D — 1 of the Code. Section 106D — 1 provides: “When a defendant’s personal appearance is not required by the Constitution of the United States or Illinois Constitution, the court may allow the defendant to personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding by way of closed circuit television when: (a) the court has authorized the use of closed circuit television and has by rule or order set out the type of proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit television; and (b) the defendant is incarcerated; and (c) the Director of Corrections, sheriff or other authority has certified that facilities are available for this purpose.” 725 ILCS 5/106D — 1 (West 1998). The appellate court rejected defendant’s claims, finding that the alleged errors were procedurally defaulted because defendant failed to object to his closed-circuit television appearances at the time of the hearings and failed to allege the error in a post-trial motion. After reviewing the claims for plain error, the appellate court concluded that the procedural default should not be excused because the evidence was not closely balanced and defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35. Additionally, the appellate court found no statutory violations. The court assumed that the circuit court had complied with its statutory duty to promulgate rules concerning the use of closed-circuit television because defendant had not presented any clear evidence to the contrary. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1036. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences.1 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1036. We granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. ANALYSIS Before this court, defendant maintains that his closed-circuit television appearance at his arraignment and jury waiver violated his constitutional right to be present in court at every “critical stage” of the proceedings against him (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8), causing his right to counsel to be impaired. Defendant also maintains that his statutory right to be present in open court at his arraignment (725 ILCS 5/113 — 1 (West 1998)) and jury waiver hearing (725 ILCS 5/103 — 6 (West 1998)) was violated because he was not physically present in court for these hearings. Finally, defendant maintains that the trial court was not authorized to conduct hearings via closed-circuit television because the court failed to adopt rules regulating the use of closed-circuit television, as required by state law. 725 ILCS 5/106D — 1 (West 1998). Defendant contends that his claims regarding the validity of his arraignment and jury waiver should be reviewed substantively because he never expressly waived the right to be physically present at these hearings. In the alternative, defendant asks that the error be considered as plain error. The State asks this court to affirm the appellate court’s judgment, finding that the errors alleged by defendant have been procedurally defaulted and that the plain error doctrine does not apply. As the State correctly points out, defendant never objected to his appearances via closed-circuit television or requested to be physically present in the courtroom. Further, defendant did not allege this error in his post-trial motion. Thus, it is clear that defendant has failed to properly preserve the alleged errors for review. People v. Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d 461, 491 (2000) (to preserve an issue for review a defendant must both object at trial and specifically include the objection in a post-trial motion); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 225 (2000); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides that “notice may be taken of ‘[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance’ which affects ‘substantial rights’ though such was not ‘brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17 (1995), quoting 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Thus, errors affecting substantial rights, or plain errors, may be reviewed pursuant to Rule 615(a), even when those errors have not been objected to during trial or presented in a post-trial motion. In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358, 362-63 (2001). “[T]o determine whether a purported error is ‘plain’ requires a substantive look at it. But if, in the end, the error is found not to rise to the level of a plain error as contemplated by Rule 615(a), the procedural default must be honored.” Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 17. In criminal cases, the plain error rule may be invoked in two limited circumstances: “(1) where the evidence is closely balanced; or (2) when the errors are of such magnitude that defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.” People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2000), citing People v. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363 (1996). In the case at bar, defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence or claim that the evidence of his guilt was closely balanced. Rather, defendant contends that he was denied due process because he was not physically present in the courtroom during his arraignment and jury waiver. Thus, our review is restricted to considering whether the second limited circumstance justifying application of the plain error doctrine is present. Furthermore, we shall consider only whether defendant’s appearance via closed-circuit television at the arraignment and jury waiver proceedings constitutes error since defendant argues that it is at these critical stages that his right to be present attached. A. Constitutional Violation Defendant’s first claim is that his appearance via closed-circuit television for his arraignment and jury waiver violated his federal and state constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of trial. We disagree. The right to be present is not an express right under the United States Constitution, but is implied, arising from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amend. XIV § 1; Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486, 490, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484 (1985); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 78 L. Ed. 674, 678, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1934). Article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution grants criminal defendants the express right “to appear and defend in person and by counsel.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. Accordingly, both the federal constitution and our state constitution afford criminal defendants the general right to be present, not only at trial, but at all critical stages of the proceedings, from arraignment to sentencing. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 356, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058 (1970); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998); People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 80-83 (1990); People v. Martine, 106 Ill. 2d 429, 439 (1985). Defendant argues that he had a right to be physically present at his arraignment and jury waiver because they are “critical” stages of the proceedings against him. This court and the United States Supreme Court have long recognized that arraignment is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 77 L. Ed. 158, 164, 53 S. Ct. 55, 59 (1932); People v. Hessenauer, 45 Ill. 2d 63, 67-68 (1970). Arraignment is the first step in the criminal prosecution and, as such, “far from a mere formalism.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 418, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1972). Due to the significance of arraignment, a defendant’s right to counsel attaches at this time. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1977); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961); Powell, 287 U.S. at 57, 77 L. Ed. at 164, 53 S. Ct. at 59-60. Although this court is unaware of any case which defines a jury waiver as a “critical stage” of the proceedings, it has been recognized that any proceeding where a defendant asserts or waives constitutional rights may be deemed “critical.” People v. Young, 201 Ill. App. 3d 521, 533 (1990). Moreover, this court held in People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283 (1999), that a written jury waiver is insufficient to prove a valid waiver of the right to trial by jury. We stated, “We have never found a valid jury waiver where the defendant was not present in open court when a jury waiver, written or otherwise, was at least discussed.” Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285. Because we found it necessary in Scott for a defendant to acknowledge “in open court” his knowing and understanding waiver of his right to trial by jury, the proceeding is “critical,” at least to the extent that defendant’s constitutional right to be present attaches. Finding that arraignment and jury waiver are “critical” stages of trial does not end our inquiry, however. The right to be present, even at a critical stage of the proceedings, is not absolute. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 90 S. Ct. at 1060-61 (defendant may waive the right to be present at trial by consent or, as in that case, by misconduct); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 78 L. Ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1934); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1981); Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 80. In Stincer, the United States Supreme Court explained the scope of a defendant’s right of presence under the federal constitution: “The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due process right ‘to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relationship, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.’ [Citation.] Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed ‘when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow’ [citation], due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be present ‘to the extent a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence’ [citation]. Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would, contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” (Emphasis added.) Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 647, 107 S. Ct. at 2667. The right to be present, as guaranteed by our state constitution, was defined in Bean. In Bean, we said: “[The right to be present] is a lesser right the observance of which is a means to securing the substantial rights of a defendant. Thus a defendant is not denied a constitutional right every time he is not present during his trial, but only when his absence results in a denial of an underlying substantial right, in other words, a constitutional right; and it is only in such a case that plain error is committed. [Citations.] Some of these substantial rights are the right to confront witnesses, the right to present a defense, and the right to an impartial jury.” Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 81. Based on Stincer and Bean, we conclude that, even where a defendant has the general right to be present because the proceeding is a “critical” stage, a defendant’s absence is not a per se constitutional violation. Rather, a defendant’s absence from such a proceeding will violate his constitutional rights only if the record demonstrates that defendant’s absence caused the proceeding to be unfair or if his absence resulted in a denial of an underlying substantial right.2 As stated in Bean, a defendant cannot rely on “broad principles [which are] not adapted to the specifics of this case.” Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 84. Rather, “[w]hether the benefit [of defendant’s presence] would have been ‘but a shadow’ because the fairness of the trial was not affected by the defendant’s absence from a portion of his trial ‘must be determined in the light of the whole record.’ ” Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 84 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07, 115, 78 L. Ed. at 678, 683, 54 S. Ct. at 332, 336, and Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 490-91, 105 S. Ct. at 1484-85). In the case at bar, defendant “appeared” and was represented by counsel at both the arraignment and jury waiver. He contends, however, that his appearance was defective and his right to counsel impaired because he was not physically present in court, by counsel’s side. However, we find that the record does not demonstrate that defendant’s physical absence from the courtroom contributed to the unfairness of the proceedings or caused him to be denied any underlying constitutional right. While defendant was not physically present in the courtroom for his arraignment and jury waiver, neither was he entirely absent from these proceedings. Defendant participated in the proceedings through audio-visual transmission. The record indicates that the closed-circuit system provided defendant with the ability to hear and see the proceedings taking place in the courtroom and, at the same time, allowed the judge and other persons in the courtroom to hear and see defendant. The record demonstrates that defendant was able to interact with the court with relative ease. It also appears from the record that defendant was aware of the nature and significance of the proceedings and the overall solemnity of the proceedings was preserved. It is true that, at arraignment, counsel waived formal reading of the indictment. However, defendant does not contend that he was unaware of the charges against him and the record shows that defendant had already received a copy of the information at a preliminary hearing and had consulted with counsel prior to arraignment. Furthermore, at the arraignment, counsel simply entered a not-guilty plea and demanded trial. When accepting the plea, the court did not need to assess defendant’s demeanor. Defendant’s ability to defend against the charges was unaffected by his physical absence from the courtroom during the arraignment. As for the jury waiver hearing, it was defendant who initiated the proceeding after he had consulted with counsel by telephone. Defendant was then called upon to address the court and state his intention to waive trial by jury. His voluntary and knowing waiver was clearly conveyed. Defendant does not contend otherwise. Nor does defendant demonstrate how his right to a fair and just hearing was thwarted by his absence from the courtroom. Finding no inherent unfairness stemming from the fact that defendant was not physically present in the courtroom when he waived trial by jury, we conclude that defendant was not denied due process simply because he waived his right to a jury trial via closed-circuit television. Moreover, the record does not establish that defendant’s underlying constitutional rights were violated by the fact that he was not physically present at his arraignment and jury waiver. Defendant’s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses was not implicated because there were no witnesses to confront at the proceedings. We acknowledge that defendant’s absence from the courtroom had some impact on defendant’s access to counsel. Because defendant and his attorney appeared at separate locations during the arraignment and jury waiver, defendant’s ability to communicate freely with counsel was impaired — communication through the closed-circuit system could not be done privately and, to speak privately, counsel was required to leave the courtroom to contact defendant by telephone. See People v. Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1044 (2000) (defendant’s inability to consult freely with counsel contributed to the unconstitutionality of defendant’s closed-circuit television appearance when entering a guilty plea). Nevertheless, we cannot say that, in the context of the arraignment and jury waiver involved here, defendant’s right to counsel was so impaired by his physical absence from the courtroom that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. As noted above, at the arraignment, counsel merely entered defendant’s not-guilty plea. The fact that defendant was not physically present in the courtroom, by counsel’s side, had no prejudicial effect on defendant’s plea. We note, too, that prior to waiving trial by jury, defendant had the opportunity to consult privately with counsel. We conclude that the record does not support a finding that, as a result of his physical absence from the courtroom, defendant was denied adequate representation with regard to his arraignment and jury waiver. In sum, we hold that defendant’s appearances via closed-circuit television at arraignment and jury waiver did not render those proceedings unconstitutional. To show a constitutional violation of the right to be present, there must be evidence that defendant’s due process rights were violated by his absence from the courtroom, i.e., that defendant’s physical absence from the proceedings caused the proceedings to be unfair or that his physical absence from the proceedings resulted in the denial of an underlying constitutional right. There has been no such showing on this record. Consequently, we find no constitutional violation.3  We note that our holding today is in line with the holdings of other state supreme courts which have considered the matter. See Commonwealth v. Ingram, 46 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2001) (properly functioning video arraignment is the constitutional equivalent of in-court arraignment if the video procedure is properly safeguarded and no specific constitutional right has been violated); Larose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough County Correction Administration, 142 N.H. 364, 702 A.2d 326 (1997) (conducting arraignment and bail hearings via teleconferencing system does not violate due process); State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio 3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995) (arraignment via closed-circuit television is constitutionally adequate when the procedure is functionally equivalent to live, in-person arraignment); In re Rule 3.160(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 528 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1988) (appearance at arraignment by audio-visual device approved because due process does not require the personal presence of a defendant in a courtroom when, through mechanical means, defendant can see and hear the judge and the judge can see and hear the defendant); Commonwealth v. Terenbieniec, 268 Pa. Super. 511, 408 A.2d 1120 (1979) (no unconstitutional prejudice inherent in appellant’s arraignment via closed-circuit television). B. Statutory Violation We next consider whether defendant’s closed-circuit television appearances at arraignment and jury waiver violated defendant’s statutory rights. Illinois law provides that “[bjefore any person is tried for the commission of an offense he shall be called into open court, informed of the charge against him, and called upon to plead thereto.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/113 — 1 (West 1998). In addition, “[ejvery person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless (i) understandingly waived by defendant in open court ***.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/103 — 6 (West 1998). Defendant argues in favor of a strict construction of the “open court” language contained in these statutes. He contends that the legislature, by requiring the pretrial proceeding to take place in “open court,” intended that defendant be physically present in the courtroom and that the presence requirement may not be satisfied by a closed-circuit television appearance. As support, defendant relies on Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 915 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990), in which the court held that Rules 10 and 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a defendant with a right of presence that is broader than the constitutional right. Rule 10 provides that “Arraignment shall be conducted in open court,” and Rule 43, entitled “Presence of the Defendant,” provides that “defendant shall be present at the arraignment.” The court held that the plain language of the rules requires a defendant’s physical presence at arraignment and that an appearance via closed-circuit television is not an authorized substitute for physical presence. However, the strict construction of the rules by the Valenzuela-Gonzalez court was premised on the fact that Congress had not spoken on whether closed-circuit television could satisfy the presence requirement. Absent legislative authority, the Valenzuela-Gonzalez court did not feel “free to ignore the clear instructions of Rules 10 and 43.” Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at 1281. In contrast, the Illinois legislature has expressed a willingness to allow closed-circuit television appearances as a substitute for in-court appearances. In section 106D — 1(a) of the Code, it states that “[w]hen a defendant’s personal appearance is not required by the Constitution of the United States or Illinois Constitution, the court may allow the defendant to personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding by way of closed circuit television when: (a) the court has authorized the use of closed-circuit television and has by rule or order set out the type of proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit television ***.” 725 ILCS 5/106D — 1(a) (West 1998). Thus, a strict construction of the “open court” language found in sections 103 — 6 and 113 — 1 as excluding closed-circuit television appearances is not warranted. Construing the provisions of sections 103 — 6 and 113 — 1 in pari materia with section 106D — 1, we discern the legislature’s intent to interpret the “open court” language broadly to include appearances by closed-circuit television. See In re Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 171-72 (1995) (Revenue Act and section 16 are in pari materia and may be construed together to determine the intent of the legislature). Consequently, we find that defendant’s appearance by closed-circuit television at his arraignment and jury waiver satisfied the statutory requirement that he “be called into open court” for arraignment and waive his right to trial by jury “in open court.” Parenthetically, even if it had been error to conduct defendant’s arraignment by closed-circuit television, defendant would not have been able to demonstrate plain error. Section 113 — 6 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/113 — 6 (West 1998)) provides that “[n]either a failure to arraign nor an irregularity in the arraignment shall affect the validity of any proceeding in the cause if the defendant pleads to the charge or proceeds to trial without objecting to such failure or irregularity.” Thus, any “irregularity” of conducting defendant’s arraignment by closed-circuit television would have been waived once defendant proceeded to trial without objection. C. Circuit Court’s Violation of Section 106D — 1 As a final argument, defendant contends that the circuit court of Kankakee County, where the proceedings in this case took place, had no authority to conduct any pretrial or post-trial proceedings by closed-circuit television because the court failed to fulfill its statutory duty to set out, by rule or order, the type of proceedings that could be conducted by closed-circuit television. As noted earlier, section 106D — 1(a) of the Code provides that a court “may allow the defendant to personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding by way of closed circuit television when *** the court has authorized the use of closed circuit television and has by rule or order set out the type of proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit television ***.” 725 ILCS 5/106D — 1(a) (West 1998). The appellate court found that the record failed to disclose whether the circuit court complied with its statutory duty to promulgate rules or orders concerning the use of closed-circuit television. See 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1035. However, defendant asks that this court take judicial notice of the published Uniform Rules of Practice for the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, which he has appended to his brief on appeal, as evidence that the circuit court failed to fulfill its duty. We agree that it is appropriate to take judicial notice of the circuit court’s published rules. See Murdy v. Edgar, 103 Ill. 2d 384, 394 (1984) (courts may take judicial notice of matters which are commonly known). Further, we agree that the rules do not evidence the court’s compliance with the statutory directive. The State offers no argument on the subject. Thus, we must assume that defendant is correct and that the circuit court has failed to fulfill its statutory duty to formally authorize the use of closed-circuit television by setting forth rules or orders as to the types of proceedings that may be conducted by closed-circuit television. We are disturbed by the circuit court’s laxity and caution that courts must discharge their responsibility to promulgate rules as required by section 106D — 1 of the Code. Nevertheless, we are constrained by the procedural posture of this case to find that the error does not require reversal. There is no plain error. Defendant was not deprived of a substantial right because of the circuit court’s failure to adopt rules. CONCLUSION Under the facts presented, defendant’s appearance via closed-circuit television at his arraignment and jury waiver did not violate his federal or state constitutional right to be present or impair his right to be represented by counsel. The record fails to show that defendant’s physical absence from the proceedings violated due process or denied him substantial rights. Further, we find that the statutory right to be present in “open court” at arraignment and jury waiver does not afford defendant any broader rights than the federal and state constitutions. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. Affirmed.  In his direct appeal, defendant also presented an argument concerning his entitlement to a monetary credit for 218 days of presentence custody. The appellate court granted defendant $1,090 credit against his drug assessment fee. The amount of monetary credit is not at issue in the appeal before this court.   In Baker v. City of Blaine, 221 F.3d 1108, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1999), and Wootton v. Lambert, No. 01 — 35511 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion), a slightly different approach was taken. The arraignments in those cases were held not to be a “critical stage” under the attendant circumstances.   It has also been held that, “even improper exclusion of a defendant from a ‘critical’ portion of the trial does not automatically require reversal, if in the particular case the defendant’s absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1976), citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39-40, 45 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6, 95 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1975). We do not consider here whether defendant’s appearanee was harmless error because we find no constitutional violation occurred.