Court Opinion

ID: 9739297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:55.498092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.419477
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 112. (dissenting). I would affirm the decision of the
court of appeals.
¶ 113. The defendant in the present case was charged with and convicted of two batteries: aggravated battery and battery by a prisoner. Aggravated battery is a battery causing substantial bodily harm. It is a Class D felony under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(6). Battery by a prisoner is a battery (by a prisoner) causing bodily harm. It is a Class D felony under Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1).
¶ 114. In the present case, everyone agrees that the two offenses are not the same in law. The issue, then, is whether there is a clear legislative intent to prohibit multiple punishments. That is, does the legislature's express bar in Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) against multiple punishments for batteries of a less serious or equally serious type apply only to batteries created in Wis. Stat. § 940.19, or does it apply to batteries created in § 940.20 as well? The answer lies in legislative intent. "[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally per*197missible is no different from the question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed."1
¶ 115. On the basis of the language and legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) and the public policy underlying Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20, I conclude that the legislature clearly expressed its intent that § 939.66(2m) applies to batteries created in § 940.20 as well as batteries in § 940.19. Therefore, multiple pun*198ishments for aggravated battery, that is, a battery causing substantial bodily harm, a Class D felony under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2), and battery by a prisoner, that is, a battery causing bodily harm, a Class D felony under Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1), are prohibited.
¶ 116.1 examine first the applicable rules of statutory interpretation, and then in turn the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the legislative purpose.
¶ 117. The generally accepted rules for discerning legislative intent should apply in this case as they do in any other case. Legislative intent is legislative intent, regardless of the context in which it is examined. The four factors upon which the majority opinion relies represent a restatement of the traditional rules for discerning legislative intent.2
¶ 118. The majority suggests that it is bound by State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992), to apply a different, more expansive form of statutory construction in the present case.3 The majority's citation to Grayson, however, is inapplicable. In Grayson the accused urged that because the plain language of *199the statute was ambiguous, the court should apply the rule of lenity. The Grayson court concluded that the rule of lenity was not appropriately invoked when although the plain language of the statute was ambiguous, resorting to traditional rules of statutory interpretation enabled the court to discern a reasonable, common-sense interpretation of legislative intent.4 The Grayson case did not determine that multiplicity analysis requires some alternative rules of statutory construction.
II
¶ 119. The first place to look for legislative intent is in the language of the statute.5 In Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) the legislature expressly stated its intent to prohibit multiple punishments for certain batteries as follows: If an accused is convicted of battery, the *200accused may not be punished for a battery "which is a less serious or equally serious type of battery than the one charged."6 In Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20, the legislature labeled both offenses of which the defendant was convicted as batteries and established that both batteries are equally serious types of battery; both are class D felonies, each carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years.
¶ 120. It is rare that the plain language of a statute covers the fact situation in issue as clearly as it does in this case. According to the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), the legislature plainly intended not to permit conviction and punishment for both batteries. Indeed, the majority opinion concedes that based on the "plain language" of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), "one would normally conclude that the legislature intended that the defendant not be convicted of both crimes."7
¶ 121. Despite this conclusion, the majority decides that the statute is ambiguous by reading Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) in the context of other statutes and case law, much of which supports the literal reading of the statutory language and some of which supports alternative readings.8
*201¶ 122. I applaud the majority's decision to test the "plain meaning" of the statute in this way and do not dispute that there is some support for an alternative reading. Yet it should not get lost in the majority's discussion of ambiguity that the support for the literal reading of § 939.66(2m) greatly overwhelms any support for a contrary reading of the statute.
f-H HH 1 — I
¶ 123. The majority opinion then turns to the legislative history, the context, and the purpose of the statute to clarify the ambiguity it created.9 It is clear on examining these factors that the legislature did not intend the multiple punishments imposed in this case.
¶ 124. The majority opinion examines the 1985 proposed amendment to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.66 adopting subsection (2m). The majority concludes that the 1985 amendment does "not reveal[] an intent to apply Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) beyond § 940.19."10 I disagree.
¶ 125. In 1985, in response to State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985), the legislature considered an amendment to Wis. Stat. § 939.66 to bar multiple punishments for batteries. The Richards case involved only the first two of the three subsections of § 940.19. The Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of the proposed amendment noted that although "a *202number of different statutes" proscribe battery and that the potential penalties vary depending "on the circumstances surrounding the act, the actor, the victim and the harm suffered by the victim, the proposed amendment affects only "the first 2 levels of battery," referring to subsections (1) and (2) of Wis. Stat. § 940.19.11 That proposed amendment was not adopted, however.
¶ 126. The proposed amendment that was eventually adopted was silent in language and legislative history regarding any intent to limit the application of § 939.66(2m) to § 940.19.12 Obviously, a strong inference can be drawn that by not adopting the first proposed amendment with its limitation, the legislature refused to limit § 939.66(2m) to the first two subsections of § 940.19. Nonetheless, the majority opinion projects, without any supporting documentation or reasoning, that the defeated version and the adopted version "were anticipated to have the same narrow substantive effect."13
¶ 127. In 1994, additional amendments were proposed to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.66(2m) and 940.19.14 The Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of the bill that was put before the entire legislature expressly includes within the crime of "battery," those batteries committed under "special circumstances such as when the victim is a peace officer."15 Battery to a police officer was not then (and is not now) set forth in § 940.19. Rather, battery to a police officer is set forth in § 940.20, entitled "Battery: Special Circumstances." Why does the Legislative Ref*203erence Bureau's analysis of an amendment to § 939.66(2m) refer to battery against a police officer, if the proposed amendment to § 939.66(2m) does not affect § 940.20?
¶ 128. Furthermore, as the majority opinion carefully‘notes, two Legislative Council memoranda explaining the 1994 amendments included the texts of both Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20. Why does the Legislative Council, on two occasions, include the text of § 940.20, along with the text of § 940.19, if the proposed amendment to § 939.66(2m) affects only § 940.19, not § 940.20?
¶ 129. It is rare to get a clearer expression of legislative intent from legislative history. This legislative history unambiguously demonstrates that the legislature was advised that the 1994 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) affects batteries set forth in both Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20. Applying the approach courts take to the legislative process, we assume that the legislature read and understood the materials presented and adopted the amendment understanding that § 939.66(2m) affects batteries set forth in both §§ 940.19 and 940.20. The majority opinion, in contrast, shrugs off this conclusion, stating, "Nonetheless, we believe the stronger inference to be drawn from the legislative history is that the legislature intended to apply subsection (2m) only to § 940.19 and did not intend to prevent multiple cumulative punishments for a special circumstances battery."16
IV
¶ 130. Finally, the majority opinion turns to the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), that is, to the policy *204considerations underlying the statute, by exploring the nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of multiple punishments. The majority concludes that the legislature intended to impose multiple punishments because different interests are protected under Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 940.20(1), and that if the legislature concluded that the general battery statute adequately punished the conduct of battery in all circumstances it would not have created additional battery offenses beyond § 940.19. I disagree. The statutes do not support this conclusion.
¶ 131. The majority is correct that the legislature intended to increase the penalty for certain batteries depending on the "special circumstances" of the battery. The legislature's intent to increase the penalties applies, however, only to batteries inflicting "bodily injury," the first level of harm.
¶ 132. Battery committed without any "special circumstances" is a Class A misdemeanor subject to a penalty of nine months. In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1) makes it a Class D felony for a prisoner to commit a battery inflicting "bodily injury." Increased penalties for batteries committed under other "special circumstances" in § 940.20 similarly apply only to those batteries that inflict bodily injury, not to those that inflict more serious injuries.17 The legislature could have increased the penalty for batteries under these "special circumstances" that inflicted "substantial bodily *205injury" or "great bodily harm" or "substantial risk of great bodily harm," but it did not.18
¶ 133. Contrary to the majority opinion, I read these statutes to express a legislative purpose to deter batteries causing the least serious harm and committed under "special circumstances" by dramatically increasing the penalty for bodily injury from nine months (a Class A misdemeanor) to ten years (a Class D felony), not to create avenues for imposing multiple punishments for equally serious or less serious batteries. The legislature concluded that the significant prison penalties in Wis. Stat. § 940.19 for equally serious or more serious bodily injuries would be a sufficient deterrent under any circumstance.19
¶ 134. In sum, the majority opinion offers little, if any, trustworthy evidence clearly contradicting the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) in which the legislature barred multiple punishments for batteries that are less serious or equally serious.20
¶ 135. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
*206¶ 136. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983), instructs: "To determine whether or not the legislature intends multiple convictions ... we look to the language of the statute, the nature of the proscribed conduct, and the appropriateness of multiple punishments. We are also aided in our search for legislative intent by canons of statutory construction." (emphasis added). In keeping with traditional rules of statutory interpretation, a fourth factor, legislative history, appears in cases in which it was available.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 108, 110.

 "[B]eeause the legislature failed to expressly state the allowable unit of prosecution under sec. 948.22, Stats., this court must determine its intent as to that issue according to 'a common sense reading of the statutes' that will give effect to 'the object of the legislature' and produce a result that is 'reasonable and fair to offenders and society.' ... To determine legislative intent we will examine the four factors ...." State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 162, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992) (quoting State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 170-71, 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985)).

 For discussions of plain meaning and the rules of statutory interpretation in Wisconsin, see Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Soc'y, 2003 WI 87, 263 Wis. 2d 208, 665 N.W.2d 181; State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, 263 Wis. 2d 113; 665 N.W.2d 729 (Abraha-mson, C.J., concurring; Crooks, J., dissenting); Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656; State v, Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶¶ 38-40, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 508, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 The statute is quoted at ¶ 10 n.6 and ¶ 66 of the majority opinion.

 Majority op., ¶ 58.

 See majority op., ¶ 74. Apparently the majority opinion is using a rule of interpretation that counterbalances the plain meaning rule: When separate statutes are read together, rather than in isolation, a plain meaning statute may be rendered ambiguous. State v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 370-71, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993).
Almost every rule of interpretation can be countered by an opposing rule. For the lead article discussing the "thrust and parry" of contradictory rules of statutory interpretation, see *201Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).

 The court's usual statement is that if a statute is ambiguous, the court examines the history, context, subject matter and object of the statute to discern legislative intent. See Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 394, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980).

 Majority op., ¶ 82.

 Quoted at majority op., ¶ 81.

 See majority op., ¶ 80.

 See id., ¶ 82.

 See id., ¶ 84-89.

 Quoted at majority op., ¶ 88.

 Majority op., ¶ 90.

 See also Wis. Stat. §§ 940.201 (increased penalty for battery to a witness causing bodily harm), 940.203 (increased penalty for battery to a judge causing bodily harm), 940.205 (increased penalty for battery to a department of revenue employee causing bodily harm), 940.207 (increased penalty for battery to a department of commerce or a department of workforce development employee causing bodily harm).

 Compare Wis. Stat. § 940.195.

 See State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 141, 330 N.W.2d 564 (1983) ("The legislature apparently adopted sec. 939.66(1) because the penalty set by the legislature for the greater offense takes into account the fact that the defendant has also committed a lesser-included offense. Remington and Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 546.").

 The majority suggests that its decision in the present case is, at least in part, motivated by the bad acts committed by the defendant. See majority op., ¶ 110. When balancing competing arguments about the proper construction of the law it is essential that the defendant's blameworthiness not tip the balance.