Court Opinion

ID: 9720750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:40:47.72958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.996135
License: Public Domain

SATHRE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I regret that I am unable to agree with the result arrived at in the majority opinion.
The facts in the case, as established by the record, are substantially as follows :
On- November 19, 1957, the plaintiff bought a new 1958 Ford automobile from the defendant and made a cash down payment of $1,250. In addition to this payment, the plaintiff turned in, as part-payment of the purchase price, his 1953 Ford for which the defendant allowed $1,312. *695The defendant furnished the plaintiff with the usual dealer’s 1,000- and 2,000-mile inspection coupons and the usual dealer’s warranty by which the defendant, as dealer and seller, warranted the automobile in each part to be free from defects in material and workmanship for ninety days, with normal use. At the time of the sale of the car, the plaintiff was assured by the defendant that this car would give him “the best service on the road.” Prior to and at the time of the sale of the car in question to the plaintiff, the defendant had advertised this model car extensively in the newspapers. These advertisements announced that the new Ford car had been “Proved and Approved” around the world. One of these ads, which appeared in “The Bismarck Tribune” with the name of the defendant and which is an exhibit in this case, said, among other things: “Here’s a car * * * so nigged it proved its mettle in a road test around the entire world! Ford’s new Interceptor V-8 engine took the mighty Himalayas and our own rugged Rockies without a puff.” The plaintiff took the car and started for home, but the car stopped before he got home and he was unable to start it. The car was towed into McClusky. The plaintiff made a telephone call to the Universal Motor Company and advised Mr. McCarney, the manager, of the situation. At the garage in McClusky the battery was charged and the plaintiff was able to get the car to his home in Goodrich, North Dakota. The next morning, he again had trouble in starting the car and called Mr. McCarney. McCarney told him to bring the car to Bismarck. Plaintiff then got the car started and drove a short distance when the motor stopped again, whereupon he again called Mr. McCarney of the motor company. That evening, a representative of the defendant corporation brought a part for the engine and told the plaintiff to get someone to install it, as he did not have time to do it. The following day, November 28, 1957, the car still wouldn’t work and plaintiff called Mr. McCarney again. McCarney advised him to bring the car to Bismarck. Plaintiff, in attempting to drive the car to Bismarck, drove as far as Wilton, about twenty-five miles from Bismarck, when the car again stalled. After another call to Mr. McCarney, an employee was sent out with a wrecker for the purpose of towing the car to Bismarck. The car was repaired in Bismarck, but it still did not work properly. The engine always missed and the car vibrated. There was a loud knock in the motor. The plaintiff had trouble with the car every time he used it. After several more telephone calls by the plaintiff, the Universal Motor Company sent a wrecker and took the car to the garage in Bismarck.
On December 15, the plaintiff Knecht asked the defendant company to install a new motor, but it refused to do so. The plaintiff was told that “we will fix it up regardless of what is wrong.” On the same day,'while the car was in defendant’s possession, the plaintiff served upon defendant notice of rescission of the contract of purchase and demanded a refund of the purchase price. Plaintiff thereupon brought action for rescission of the sale of the automobile and for a refund of the amount he paid of the purchase price.
The defendant Universal Motor Company answered, alleging that the sale was made pursuant to the express warranty in writing by which the defendant’s obligation was especially limited “to replacement without charge to the purchaser of such parts as shall be returned to the dealer and shall be acknowledged by the dealer to be defective,” and that the defendant Universal Motor Company did fully replace and repair any and all defects in said automobile in accordance with their warranty. The case was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant has appealed from this judgment and demands a trial de novo.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that there was a breach of warranty of quality and fitness which the law implies and that the same is sufficient ground for rescission of contract of sale and for recovery of the purchase price paid by plaintiff.
*696The defendant, however, contends that the specific express warranty controls, and that the plaintiff is bound thereby.
Section 51-01-16 of the North Dakota Century Code is as follows:
“Subject to the provisions of this chapter and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
“1. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, whether he is the grower or manufacturer or not, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for that purpose; * * *»
The majority opinion cites the case of Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996, 1001, as controlling in the instant case. The facts in that case, as I read them, do not parallel the facts in the instant case. That case involved the purchase and sale of a threshing machine. Hocking purchased the threshing machine just before the 1921 threshing season. After finishing threshing, Hocking, the defendant in that case, paid the installment due at that time and then stored the machine until the threshing season of 1922. After the threshing season of 1922, he told the agent of the machine company that he would return the machinery, giving as a reason that it did not work properly and did not save the grain. He had complained to the agent, and experts were sent out to make proper adjustment of the working parts of the machine. As pointed out, he used the threshing machinery to thresh his grain in 4921, and then stored it and used it to thresh his grain in the fall of 1922. After using the machinery for two successive threshing seasons and making the payments due, and more than a year after he bought the machinery, he attempted to rescind the sale. I quote from the opinion: “It is true that he had some correspondence relating to certain pulleys on the separator, but nothing was said by the defendant therein [the purchaser] from which Wood [the agent] could infer that the machine was unsatisfactory or that the defendant wanted to rescind. Quite the contrary was the case.”
The facts in the instant case are wholly different. The car involved here stopped' and could not be started by the plaintiff.' when he first drove it out of defendant’s garage. It stopped eighteen miles from his. home; in fact, he never was able to complete a single trip in it without having it repaired or towed to a garage for repairs.. When plaintiff returned the car, the speedometer had registered 1,280 miles and more than half of that mileage had been made by towing the car to garages for repair.
The defendant relies on the written warranty, set out in the majority opinion,, which provides that it is in lieu of all warranties, express or implied, and contitutes &. contract between the parties.
I cannot subscribe to the theory that the-express warranty relied on by defendant has the effect of overriding subsection 6 of Section 51-01-16, North Dakota Century Code, which is as follows:
“6. An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied under this chapter unless inconsistent therewith.”
When the plaintiff drove the automobile-away from defendant’s garage, he of course-expected that it would perform properly, and' it certainly cannot legitimately be held that such expectation on the part of the plaintiff was inconsistent with the dealer’s warranty. The purpose of the plaintiff in purchasing the automobile was to use it and drive it on-the highways — not to have it towed repeatedly to garages for repair.
In the case of Cretors v. Troyer, 63 N.D. 231, 247 N.W. 558, 559, this court held *697under Section 6002a15, 1925 Supp. (Sec. 15 Uniform Sales Act) now Section 51-01-16 NDCC.
“Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the .goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies upon the seller’s skill or judgment (whether he be grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for that purpose.”
In the case of State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., Iowa, 110 N.W.2d 449, the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa had under consideration issues practically identical with the issues in the instant case. One Lester J. Bahl purchased from the defendant Anderson-Weber Inc. a new Mercury automobile ■which was delivered to him on December 29, 1956. The purchase of the car was accompanied by a signed order of the pur•chaser, on a form prepared by the local ■dealer, describing the car and the conditions incident to the purchase. On the back there is a so called manufacturer’s warranty. Paragraph 7, as it appears on the 'back of the order provides as follows:
“It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or implied, made by either the dealer or the manufacturer on the motor vehicle, chassis or parts furnished hereunder except as follows: * *
Then follows the manufacturer’s warranty which is identical with the manufacturer’s warranty in the instant case.
It appears from the facts in the case that ■on January 8, 1957, the speedometer having registered 305 to 306 miles, while Bahl was driving 30 to 35 miles per hour going up a slight incline, there was a flash of flame against the windshield. The driver pulled over to the side of the road and jumped from the car. The car rolled 100 to 150 feet and stopped in a ditch, and for all practical purposes the car was destroyed. The plaintiff, Bahl, and the insurance company brought action against the dealer and manufacturer for breach of warranty. The case was tried to the court and a jury, and testimony was adduced by both parties.
At the close of plaintiff’s testimony, and again at the close of all the evidence each defendant moved for a directed verdict on several grounds. The trial court sustained both motions on all grounds urged.
The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the decision of the trial court. In its opinion the court cited with approval several cases from Iowa, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Tennessee to the effect that implied warranties are applicable in cases of this nature.
In a more recent case, Appleman v. Fabert Motors, Inc., 30 Ill.App.2d 424, 174 N.E.2d 892, 896 it is stated:
“The purchaser of a new automobile has the reasonable right to expect an automobile completely new in every respect and part, properly constructed and regulated, to provide safe, trouble free and dependable transportation.”
The undisputed facts in the instant case show that the plaintiff had trouble with the car every time he attempted to drive it. It stopped and he had to have it towed to a garage, or otherwise have it repaired. The defendant, Universal, finally told the plaintiff to bring the car to Bismarck, and he attempted to do so, but it stalled and it was towed to Bismarck by a wrecker. Plaintiff then requested defendant to put a new motor in the car but the request was refused. Defendant stated, however that “we will fix it up whatever is wrong” or words to that effect. Plaintiff, however had become dissatisfied with the situation and the several ‘‘fix it ups” that had failed and left the car with the defendant and brought this action for rescission of the sale. I cannot agree that the implied warranty of quality and fitness by the seller under Section 51-01-16, C.C. was waived by the plaintiff when he signed the order and the waiver contained therein.
*698Plaintiff, the purchaser, when he signed the purchase order, relied on, and had a right to rely on, the seller’s representations and statements as to the qualities and fitness of the car for the purpose for which it was purchased. Cretors v. Troyer, supra.
The order of purchase of the car is the language of the seller, and in case of any question as to its meaning it should be given the construction most favorable to the buyer. When the buyer signed the purchase order it cannot be assumed that he thereby waived the implied warranty that the car was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended to be used.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.