Court Opinion

ID: 9676982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:39:54.598243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:52.837826
License: Public Domain

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge, concurring. I agree with Judge Gruber’s opinion in all respects. I write separately only to state my concern with the increasing tendency of appellants in workers’ compensation cases to argue for reversal on the ground that the Commission has arbitrarily disregarded evidence favorable to the party with the burden of proof. | fiAppellant’s sufficiency argument is based on a line of cases by our court stating that the Commission cannot “arbitrarily disregard” evidence. Certainly, this is true. The Commission cannot disbelieve the testimony of a witness for an irrational or whimsical reason; for example, it cannot decide a case on the rationale that witnesses with names beginning in vowels are never credible, or that foreign-born doctors always offer more accurate medical opinions, or that back injuries are never work-related.1 Arbitrary disregard of evidence is also demonstrated where the Commission affirmatively states that there is “no evidence” for a proposition when such evidence has in fact been presented in the proceeding. See Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487, 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001). Just as certainly, however, the prohibition on arbitrary decision-making has sometimes been seen as an opportunity for the appellate court to weigh evidence not relied upon by the Commission against the evidence that the Commission chose to believe. This view is mistaken. Under the substantial-evidence standard that we are statutorily bound to employ, we may not even consider evidence that the Commission did not rely upon, much less weigh it against evidence that the Commission found credible, unless the appellant has 17demonstrated that the Commission ignored that evidence for a reason that was truly arbitrary in the sense of those mentioned in the examples given above. See, e.g., Woodall v. Hunnicutt Construction, 340 Ark. 377, 12 S.W.3d 630 (2000); Maupin v. Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office, 90 Ark.App. 1, 203 S.W.3d 668 (2005); K II Construction Company v. Crabtree, 78 Ark.App. 222, 79 S.W.3d 414 (2002); Hardin v. Southern Compress Co., 34 Ark.App. 208, 810 S.W.2d 501 (1991). To do so, the appellant bears the heavy burden of proving that the Commission’s action was a willful and unreasoned one, made without consideration, and with a disregard of the facts or circumstances of the case. Beverly Enterprises-Arkansas, Inc. v. Arkansas Health Services, 308 Ark. 221, 824 S.W.2d 363 (1992). Proving that mere error has occurred is not sufficient to meet this test. Woodyard v. Arkansas Diversified Insurance Co., 268 Ark. 94, 594 S.W.2d 13 (1980); Bryant v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 55 Ark.App. 125, 931 S.W.2d 795 (1996). The questions of substantial evidence and arbitrary action are therefore different ones, judged by different standards, and, although it is for the courts to say whether there has been an arbitrary or unwarranted agency action, considerable judicial restraint should be observed in finding such an abuse. See Russellville Water Co. v. Public Service Commission, 270 Ark. 584, 606 S.W.2d 552 (1980). Nothing is involved in this case but a question of credibility. Dr. Lipke said that appellant reached maximum medical improvement and released him for work subject only |sto his recovery from seizure disorders that were not related to his com-pensable injury. Later, at the request of appellant’s attorney, Dr. Lipke removed appellant from work status pending additional testing without specifying the reason for appellant’s inability to work. The Commission, as finder of fact, was required to consider these two somewhat inconsistent acts and determine whether appellant was unable to work because of his compensable injury. There is nothing before us to show that the Commission’s determination of this issue was a willful and unreasoned one, made without consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case.  . In order for an administrative action to be invalid as arbitrary, the action must either lack any rational basis, or hinge on a finding of fact based on erroneous view of the law. Pine Bluff for Safe Disposal v. Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission, 354 Ark. 563, 127 S.W.3d 509 (2003); Arkansas Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board v. Oudin, 348 Ark. 48, 69 S.W.3d 855 (2002). An arbitrary act is thus an illegal or unreasoned act; an act is not arbitrary simply because the reviewing court would have acted differently. Woodyard v. Arkansas Diversified Insurance Co., 268 Ark. 94, 594 S.W.2d 13 (1980).