Court Opinion

ID: 9782777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:15:32.402176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:11.852747
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the trial court was correct in all respects and therefore respectfully dissent. I will not undertake a detailed summary of what I perceive to be the fallacies in the Majority’s analysis. It suffices to say that, other than on matters of boilerplate law, my views diverge significantly from those of the Majority on virtually all of the positions adopted in route to its conclusions, up to and including the conclusions themselves.
It is indeed a matter of boilerplate law that, in Indiana, employees do not have a legal right to be compensated for unused vacation time. Naugle v. Beech Grove City Sch., 864 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind.2007). Employees are, however, entitled to vacation pay up to the time of termination if there is no policy or agreement with the employer to the contrary. Indiana Heart Assocs., P.C. v. Bahamonde, 714 N.E.2d 309 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). The Majority concludes that the Union’s bylaws evince an intent to (1) permit employees to accrue vacation days from one year to the next, (2) regard the two weeks of paid vacation per year “as being in addition to the yearly compensation, not included within it”, and (3) confer upon employees a right to be paid for unused vacation time upon separation of employment. Op. at 129. These conclusions derive primarily from the interpretation of Sections 5.7 and 7.2 of the Union’s bylaws.
Section 7.2 provides that compensation for elected representatives will be determined by the business manager/secretary-treasurer and will include two weeks of paid vacation per year. Section 5.7, pertaining to the business manager/secretary-treasurer, provides that employees were entitled to receive a salary “during fifty-two weeks per year”, and that “[h]e or she shall also receive two weeks paid vacation per year.” Appellant’s Appendix at 8. The Majority notes that the bylaws do not state that an employee is not entitled to pay for unused vacation time upon separation and thereby concludes that they are so entitled. In addition, the Majority deems the use of the word “also” in Section 5.7 as conclusively establishing that the vacation is to be regarded as in addition to the fifty-two weeks of salary. Finally, the Majority concludes that the bylaws are silent as to non-elected union employees and therefore that Deborah Po-sey’s compensation in these matters is not addressed by the bylaws. I reach different conclusions as to each.
On the matter of Shofstall’s and Ed Posey’s claims, Sections 5.7 and 7.2, read in conjunction with each other, clearly provide that they are entitled to fifty-two weeks worth of pay and two weeks of paid vacation. Johnny Alderman, who replaced Shofstall as DC 91’s principal officer, interpreted that to mean that in a given employment year, the relevant individuals were entitled to be paid for fifty-two weeks at the appropriate weekly rate, and that they could take as much as two weeks of vacation during those fifty-two weeks and still receive their customary pay. When Shofstall and the Poseys appealed that determination to the DC 91 trial board and then the IUPAT pursuant to procedures set out in the IUPAT constitution, those decision-makers affirmed Alderman’s interpretation and denied the appellants’ *134claims. Indeed, Alderman’s interpretation, as affirmed by the relevant IUPAT and union reviewing bodies, seems to me to be the most logical one. In union matters such as this, this court has long observed a policy of judicial non-interference. This policy has been applied specifically in the area of the interpretation of union bylaws. We have explained it thus:
The right of a voluntary association to adopt its own internal rules and regulations is longstanding:
A voluntary association may, without direction and interference by the courts, for its government, adopt a constitution, by-laws, rules and regulations which will control as to all questions of discipline, or internal policy and management, and its right to interpret and administer the same is as sacred as the right to make them.
State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court of Marion County, 233 Ind. 235, 239, 117 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1954). These same standards apply to the internal governance of unions in Indiana. See id. at 554 (voluntary trade union); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Miller, 219 Ind. 389, 394, 38 N.E.2d 239, 241 (1941) (voluntary railroad union).
The right to adopt internal rules would be empty without the corresponding freedom to interpret them. So, “ ‘[a]s a general rule courts will not interfere to control the administration of the constitution and bylaws of such association, or to enforce rights springing therefrom.’ ” Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ind.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Givens, 233 Ind. at 238, 117 N.E.2d at 555). Only cases of “fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere” that involve a voluntary association will justify a court’s intrusion. Id.
Edwards v. Indiana State Teachers Ass’n, 749 N.E.2d 1220, 1225-26 (Ind.Ct.App.2001).
Alderman’s interpretation of the IUPAT constitution and union bylaws, affirmed by the DC 91 trial board and the IUPAT, may not fairly be characterized as constituting fraud or an abuse of civil or property rights, or involving some form of illegality. Neither does it contravene public policy, as the Majority holds. In fact, I find it eminently reasonable. It is the way most people would interpret a provision setting out a yearly salary and providing for a two-week, paid vacation. The term “also” surely cannot work such mischief as to stand the plain meaning of the relevant bylaws on its head.
As for Deborah Posey, I agree with the Union that there is no merit to the claim that the bylaws created, or at least recognized, a distinction between the Union’s elected officials and its employees. Simply put, she was subject to the bylaws’ employment provisions, just as Shofstall and Ed Posey were.
I would affirm the trial court in all respects.