Court Opinion

ID: 9497835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:01:22.988539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:27.007049
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
John Wesley Jones is entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing to pursue his claim that when he was tried and sentenced to death for murder, his lawyer, who was also representing a key prosecution witness, had a conflict of interest that adversely affected his defense. The witness testified that when Jones killed his son with a shotgun blast, “[h]e walked away like he shot a dog.” J.A. 20. This unchallenged statement told the jury that Jones was coldblooded, heartless, and without feeling. It was powerful testimony in a case where the prosecution was seeking the death penalty based in part on the argument that Jones showed no remorse. Jones’s lawyer did nothing to impeach this witness (his client in an unrelated case), even though there is a reasonable inference that she made statements helpful to Jones in her pretrial conversations with the shared lawyer. There is a decent chance, I believe, that Jones can prove — if he is granted an evidentiary hearing — that his lawyer pulled his punches in cross-examining the witness due to the conflict of interest. With such a showing, Jones could establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and obtain a writ of habeas corpus. Because the majority denies Jones the evi-dentiary hearing, and I would grant it, I respectfully dissent from part IV of the court’s opinion. I otherwise concur.
I.
When John Wesley Jones was tried for murder in North Carolina state court, his *271lead lawyer, Louis Foy, was also representing a key prosecution witness, Joyce Hill, in her unrelated divorce case. Foy, who was court appointed, did not inform Jones of the conflict. In an affidavit filed in connection with Jones’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) in state court, Foy said that he “felt that [his] representation of Ms. Hill would be to Mr. Jones’ advantage in that it gave [Foy] the opportunity to discuss with Ms. Hill the events which she had witnessed.” J.A. 417. This, Foy thought, “would enable [him] to be better prepared to cross examine Ms. Hill and bring out evidence favorable to Mr. Jones.” Id. (emphasis added). Things did not turn out that way. As noted above, Hill testified on direct examination that after Jones killed the victim, “[h]e walked away like he shot a dog.” J.A. 20. This testimony “shocked” Foy because it was “so unexpected, based on [his prior] conversations with Ms. Hill.” J.A. 417-18. According to Foy, Hill’s damaging and unexpected testimony about Jones’s demean- or made him leery, and he limited the scope of his cross-examination. He made no attempt to impeach Hill — who was also his client — by cross-examining her about her prior statements that might have been favorable to Jones.
In his state MAR Jones alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that “Foy had a serious conflict of interest in representing both John Wesley Jones and Ms. Hill and then in attempting to cross-examine Ms. Hill.” J.A. 408. The MIAR court denied Jones’s request for an evidentiary hearing, yet found that Jones (1) “failed to produce any information favorable to [him] within the knowledge of Ms. Hill which should have been elicited [on] cross-examination” and (2) “failed to show” that Foy was laboring under a conflict of interest. J.A. 429-30. The court then held that Jones did not prove ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is established by showing “[1] that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “[2] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”). The North Garolina Supreme Court denied Jones’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
II.
The MAR court reached its decision without applying Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), which sets forth the standard for determining ineffective assistance in a conflict of interest situation. As the majority states: “Under Cuyler, prejudice is presumed, and a petitioner is entitled to relief, if he shows that his counsel labored (1) under an actual conflict of interest that (2) adversely affected the representation.” Ante at 267 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708). A lawyer labors under an actual conflict with his client when “their interests diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.” Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642, 652 (4th Cir.1998) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
A.
Jones has shown that Foy had an actual conflict of interest. “[C]ourts have generally adopted a prima facie prophylactic rule which prohibits attorneys from simultaneously representing clients with adverse interests, even in unrelated matters.” Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1, 3 (1990) (emphasis added). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct reflect this approach and provide *272that “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest ... [unless, among other things,] each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.7(b) (2003). Foy was obligated to do his best to defend Jones against the charge of murder, yet Foy needed to remain loyal to and maintain good relations with Hill, who was also his client, albeit in another case. This was an intolerable situation because it was against Foy’s interest to conduct a rigorous cross-examination of Hill, and it was against Hill’s interest to have her veracity as a witness discredited. Jones, on the other hand, was entitled to a lawyer who could decide how to cross-examine Hill without worrying about whether she would be offended. Foy, in short, was “actively representing] conflicting interests.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708).
B.
Jones contends that he has also shown that Foy’s conflict adversely affected his cross-examination of Hill. Foy admits, in his affidavit, that (1) he believed his attorney-client relationship with Hill “would enable [him] to ... bring out evidence favorable to Mr. Jones” when he cross-examined Hill; (2) before Hill testified, he had “the opportunity to discuss with [her] the events which she had witnessed;” (3) he was “shocked” and “completely taken aback,” however, when Hill testified on direct that Jones “walked way [from the killing] like he shot a dog;” and (4) “[tjhis was so unexpected [by Foy], based on [his prior] conversations with Ms. Hill” that it “affected the scope of [his] cross examination.” J.A. 417-18; see also J.A. 20. These statements by Foy are undisputed. It is also undisputed that Foy did not attack Hill’s credibility or attempt to impeach her with her prior statements. According to Jones, this demonstrates that Hill’s pretrial conversations with Foy were inconsistent with her trial testimony and that this inconsistency affected Foy’s cross-examination. Foy’s affidavit supports the reasonable inference that he was shocked because Hill’s statements were inconsistent and that Foy did not confront her with the inconsistencies because she was also his client. But, as the majority notes, Foy has not disclosed the content of his pretrial conversations with Hill, and he has not explicitly stated that Hill’s statements were inconsistent. Ante at 269. Thus, it is also possible to infer that the content of Hill’s direct testimony, apart from any previous conversations between Foy and Hill, is what affected Foy’s decision to limit cross-examination. Because the present record could support either of these competing inferences, Jones has not established that Foy’s conflict adversely affected his performance. This brings me to the issue of a hearing and my disagreement with the majority.
The MAR court failed to apply Cuyler and in the process denied Jones’s request for an evidentiary hearing, which would have been necessary for the proper application of Cuyler. The district court also denied Jones’s request for a hearing. Jones’s claim is that after Hill testified on direct that he had “walked away like he shot a dog,” Foy declined to attack her credibility out of divided loyalty. Jones has established that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. First, he has satisfied Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963): “the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing” because the MAR court denied Jones an evidentiary hearing. Second, although the majority disagrees, Jones has gone far *273enough in alleging “facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.” Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 681 (4th Cir.2002) (citation omitted).
The majority holds that “absent factual allegations — not mere inferences — that Hill made inconsistent statements to Foy with which he could have impeached her, Jones is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” Ante at 269. In other words, an evidentiary hearing is not required when some allegations stating the claim are based on inference (or inferential facts). This, I respectfully suggest, cannot be the rule. See Black’s Law Dictionary 629 (8th ed.1999) (defining “inferential fact” as “[a] fact established by conclusion drawn from other evidence rather than from direct testimony or evidence; a fact derived logically from other facts”). The majority acknowledges that Foy admits in his affidavit that his pretrial conversations with Hill were the basis for his shock and surprise when he heard her testimony. The direct declarations in Foy’s affidavit thus allow the further allegation, based on reasonable inference, that certain of Hill’s prior statements were inconsistent with her trial testimony that Jones “walked away like he shot a dog.” This allegation, if true, would show that Foy’s conflict of interest had an adverse effect on his performance at trial, that is, the conflict prevented him from attacking Hill’s credibility. But the majority denies a hearing because this allegation is based on an inference drawn from facts stated in Foy’s affidavit. The effect of this decision is that a petitioner cannot obtain a hearing unless he already has direct factual support for each allegation he wishes to prove at the hearing. I am not aware of any case that supports this conclusion. In fact, courts have consistently held that when the facts available reasonably support competing inferences, a factual dispute exists and an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve it. See, e.g., Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1318 (9th Cir.1994) (“[The Petitioner] is not entitled to an. evidentiary hearing merely because he suggests a basis for bias, he must raise at least an inference of prejudice.”); Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 935 (11th Cir.1986) (“[T]here are conflicting inferences that must be resolved in an evidentiary hearing.”). This approach makes sense because the very purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to resolve factual disputes that arise when affidavits or other proffered evidence reasonably support competing conclusions.
The majority also contends that Jones is not entitled to a hearing because he “presents only conclusory and speculative allegations as support for his [hearing] request.” Ante at 269-70. I agree that conclusory and speculative allegations do not trigger the right to a hearing, but Jones’s allegations are not conclusory or speculative; they are supported either di-. rectly by Foy’s affidavit or by reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the affidavit. They are not at all like the habeas petitioner’s allegations in Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490 (7th Cir.1995), a case relied on by the majority. The petitioner in Enoch proffered no evidence whatsoever about how his defense lawyer’s representation of a prosecution witness in an unrelated matter four years earlier might have adversely affected, him. The court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because the petitioner had not alleged that his lawyer had “learned particular information from his representation of [the former client] that was relevant to [the petitioner’s] case.” Id. at 1497. Because Foy has already admitted in his affidavit that Hill discussed with him “the events she had witnessed” regarding Jones’s case, J.A. 418, Jones has met Enoch’s standard for an evidentiary *274hearing. Enoch therefore does not support the denial of a hearing in this case. Moreover, Enoch involved an instance of successive representation where it is more difficult to establish a conflict than it is in the case of concurrent representation. Enoch, 70 F.3d at 1496.
Even though Jones has not alleged the precise content of Hill’s pretrial statements to Foy, Jones “has certainly put forth all someone in his position could without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.” Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969, 975 (7th Cir.2004). Without a hearing in the MAR court, Jones did not have the means to compel Foy to reveal the details of his relevant conversations with his other client, Hill, because North Carolina’s post-conviction procedure does not provide for compulsory process unless an evidentiary hearing is granted. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-1411 et seq. In any event, the factual support Jones was able to muster for his allegations is impressive. We cannot expect Foy to have volunteered in his affidavit “that Hill’s trial testimony was inconsistent with prior statements she had made to [him]” or “that Foy’s representation of and concern for Hill were the reason he did not cross-examine her more rigorously.” See ante at 269-70. (If Foy had made those statements, a hearing would not be necessary; Jones would be entitled to immediate relief on the merits.) The natural reluctance of defense trial counsel to cooperate with habeas counsel in an ineffective assistance claim is well known. Trial counsel is understandably hesitant to “help[ ] a former client publicly criticize his reputation;” indeed, a successful claim may draw the attention of the disciplinary body that polices lawyer conduct. Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 1, 27-28 (2002). This problem is particularly acute in Cuyler claims because it may be necessary to question the lawyer to determine how a particular conflict affected his representation. Often, the only way to get the full story is through an evidentiary hearing where the lawyer is subpoenaed to testify.
A lawyer’s concurrent representation of a defendant and a key prosecution witness in a criminal case can present a serious conflict of interest, even though the lawyer is representing the witness in an unrelated case. If the conflict of interest adversely affects the lawyer’s performance by limiting his cross-examination to avoid impeaching his witness-client, the defendant has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Cuyler. When a defendant (or petitioner) like Jones has alleged such an adverse effect based on all the facts he can reasonably obtain without an evidentiary hearing, and the allegations of inferential fact cannot be resolved without examining additional evidence, he is entitled to the hearing. See Porter, 805 F.2d at 935. Jones has more than met this standard, and he should be granted a hearing.