Court Opinion

ID: 9393269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 19:01:14.731693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.946310
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                               T.C. Memo. 2023-56

                              SUSAN D. RODGERS,
                                  Petitioner

                                           v.

               COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                           Respondent

                                     —————

Docket No. 18079-17.                                             Filed May 9, 2023.

                                     —————

Susan D. Rodgers, pro se.

Zachary T. King, for respondent.

         MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

       GALE, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner’s
federal income tax for the taxable year 2015 of $3,473. The issue for
decision is whether $7,824 of income that petitioner concedes receiving,
but which she did not report on her 2015 federal income tax return,
should be characterized as interest that is includible in her gross income
pursuant to section 61(a)(4) 1 or instead as child support that is not
includible in her gross income pursuant to section 71(c).

                              FINDINGS OF FACT

      Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The
Stipulations of Facts and the Stipulated Exhibits are incorporated

        1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal

Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, all regulation references
are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant
times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

                                 Served 05/09/23
                                            2

[*2] herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Alabama when she
timely filed her Petition for redetermination.

       Respondent issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner in which he
determined a deficiency in her federal income tax due of $3,473 for the
2015 taxable year.      The deficiency resulted from respondent’s
determination that petitioner had failed to report on her 2015 federal
income tax return that she had received $7,824 of interest income from
the State of Alabama, which had reported the payment of that amount
to respondent on Form 1099–INT, Interest Income.

       Petitioner conceded at trial that she received the amount shown
on the Form 1099–INT. She explained that, with respect to other
taxable years, she had received child support payments through the
State of Alabama from funds collected from her former spouse, but she
had not previously received a Form 1099 indicating that any portion of
those funds represented taxable income.

       During 2011 and 2012, petitioner and her former spouse were
engaged in litigation in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama
(state court), concerning the termination of her former spouse’s child
support obligation. In the course of that litigation, the state court
entered an order on September 27, 2011, which stated in pertinent part:

        [I]t is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED by
        the Court as follows:

               1. THAT the Plaintiff’s[2] current child support
        obligation is hereby terminated.

              2. THAT the Plaintiff is in arrears in the sum of
        $18,000.00.

              3. THAT a judgment is hereby awarded against the
        Plaintiff in favor of the Defendant in the amount of
        $18,000.00 representing child support arrearages.

       On April 13, 2012, the state court entered an order amending its
order of September 27, 2011, which stated in pertinent part:

         2 In the order, “Plaintiff” refers to petitioner’s former spouse, and “Defendant”

refers to petitioner.
                                    3

[*3]   [P]aragraphs #2 and #3 of the Order of Court dated
       September 27, 2011 are hereby amended to read as follows:

             “2. THAT the Plaintiff is in arrears in the sum of
       $5,361.89 excluding interest as of October 30, 2011.”

             “3. THAT the Defendant is awarded a judgment
       against the Plaintiff in the amount of $16,044.37
       ($5,361.89 - principal and $10,682.48 - interest)
       representing the total child support arrears as of
       October 30, 2011; said amount includes all prior
       judgments.”

               It is further ORDERED by the Court that all other
       provisions of the said Order of Court that are not
       specifically amended herein shall remain in full force and
       effect.

       A copy of the State of Alabama Child Support Enforcement
Division Court Order Payment Summary (Payment Summary) for
petitioner’s account reflects a series of payments commencing on
April 23, 2012 (i.e., shortly after the state court amended its order), and
ending on May 14, 2014, that are identified with the code “CS NA AR.”
Those payments total $5,361.89, matching the amount of the arrearage
principal determined in the state court’s order, as amended. All other
payments posted on and after May 14, 2014, are identified with the code
“CP INT,” with “INT” presumably meaning “interest.” The payments
marked “CP INT” and posted during 2015 total $7,859.27—slightly more
than the amount of unreported interest that respondent determined in
the notice of deficiency, and less than the total amount of interest
included in the judgment that the state court awarded to petitioner.

                                OPINION

       The Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are
generally entitled to a presumption of correctness, and the taxpayer
bears the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
                                          4

[*4] As noted, petitioner conceded at trial that she received the
unreported $7,824 underlying respondent’s deficiency determination. 3
She disputes only whether respondent correctly determined that the
amount at issue should be characterized as taxable interest rather than
nontaxable child support. The preponderance of the evidence favors
respondent’s position, and we will accordingly sustain his deficiency
determination. 4

       A taxpayer’s gross income generally encompasses all income from
whatever source derived, specifically including interest. § 61(a)(4). For
divorced or separated taxpayers, alimony or separate maintenance
payments were generally also includible in the recipient’s gross income
during the year at issue (and were deductible from the payer’s gross
income). §§ 71(a), 215(a). 5 This general rule is inapplicable, however,
for payments in an amount fixed by the terms of a divorce or separation
instrument that were made or treated as made to support the payer’s
children. § 71(c). Consequently, such child support payments were not
includible in the gross income of the recipient (and were not deductible
by the payer). See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q&A-15. Interest
paid on a child support arrearage is, however, includible in the
recipient’s gross income under section 61(a)(4).            Fankhanel v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-403, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 809, 815
(finding, contrary to the taxpayer’s position that “she never received any
interest at all on child support debt,” that she had received interest on
child support arrearages), aff’d per curiam without published opinion,

       3  In view of petitioner’s concession, we need not decide whether petitioner has
satisfied the preconditions under section 6201(d) to impose a burden on respondent to
produce, in addition to the information return reporting the $7,824 payment,
reasonable and probative information concerning the deficiency. Moreover, even if
respondent did have such a burden, it would be satisfied by the Payment Summary,
which corroborates the amount that was reported on the Form 1099–INT that
respondent received. See Shankar v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. 140, 146–47 (2014);
Richardson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-143, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1446, 1447.
       4 Because we conclude that the weight of the evidence favors respondent, we
need not decide whether the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section
7491(a). Shifting the burden of proof could affect the outcome only in the event of an
evidentiary tie or a failure of proof, neither of which is present here. See Geiger v.
Commissioner, 279 F. App’x 834, 835 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2006-271;
Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-
340.
        5 Congress repealed sections 71 and 215 with respect to divorce or separation

instruments executed or modified after December 31, 2018. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11051, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089. That repeal does not affect
this case.
                                    5

[*5] 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Aames v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 189, 192–93 (1990) (explaining that because interest compensates
for delay in the receipt of funds, interest awarded in a judgment is
generally taxable regardless of how the judgment principal is, or is not,
taxed).

       The proper characterization of a payment (or a portion thereof) as
alimony, child support, or interest for federal tax purposes is governed
by federal law. See Henry v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 455, 458 (1981). To
determine whether a taxpayer has received interest payments with
respect to child support arrearages, we have previously considered the
following types of evidence: (1) a taxpayer’s admission that she received
payments in connection with child support arrearages; (2) state court
child support payment records; and (3) the existence of a state court
order directing the payment of interest on arrearages. See Fankhanel,
76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 815.

       The evidence in this case strongly supports the conclusion that
petitioner received interest as reported to respondent by the State of
Alabama. First, as we have noted, petitioner does not dispute that she
received the amount reported on Form 1099–INT in connection with a
child support arrearage. Nor does she dispute that her former spouse
failed to timely make child support payments that he was obligated to
make, thus depriving her of the use of the money owed. Second, the
state court’s order, as amended, specifically directed the payment of
child support and interest in particular amounts. That disposition is
consistent with Alabama law, under which interest on a past due child
support obligation accrues by statute and must be included in any
judgment fixing the amount of child support arrearages, even if the
party seeking payment has not requested an interest award. See T.L.D.
v. C.G., 849 So. 2d 200, 203–04 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Walker v. Walker,
828 So. 2d 943, 945 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). Finally, the amounts set forth
in the Payment Summary are consistent with the amounts of principal
and interest determined in the state court’s order, as amended, and with
the amount of interest reported to respondent on Form 1099–INT.

       Petitioner has not directed our attention to sufficient evidence to
persuade us that she did not receive interest income in connection with
the child support arrearage. At trial, petitioner referred to certain
county child support payment records indicating that, at some point
before the issuance of the state court’s order, as amended, the amount
of the arrearage principal may have been larger than the amount that
the state court ultimately determined. Although petitioner testified
                                   6

[*6] that she raised this issue with the state court by letter, she
admitted upon questioning by the Court and cross-examination by
respondent’s counsel that the state court had not taken any action based
upon her letter, that she did not appeal the state court’s judgment, and
that she was not aware of any other order of the state court or any state
appellate court modifying the judgment. Moreover, even if we assume
that petitioner is correct that the state court understated the amount of
the arrearage principal, any increase in the principal would have served
only to increase the amount of interest due to petitioner. The county
payment records on which petitioner relies thus give no indication that
any portion of the amount reported on Form 1099–INT should be treated
as child support principal rather than as interest.

       We are therefore persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence
that petitioner received interest on past due child support during 2015,
as determined in the notice of deficiency, and we so find. The interest
must be included in petitioner’s gross income for the year at issue
pursuant to section 61(a)(4). We will accordingly sustain respondent’s
deficiency determination.

      To reflect the foregoing,

      Decision will be entered for respondent.