Court Opinion

ID: 9669726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:07:55.501283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:24.256432
License: Public Domain

McCormack, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion because in this case Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-20,104 (Reissue 1991) does place a 2-year time limit on bringing an action.
The allegations set out by the defendants-appellees in their brief are as follows:
1. In 1988 or 1989, Telenational Communications, Inc., distributed to its shareholders (of which Edmund Blankenau was one) the assets of the corporation.
2. On April 16, 1989, the Nebraska Secretary of State automatically dissolved Telenational because Telenational had not filed its corporate report and had not paid its annual occupation tax.
3. In 1990, the plaintiffs-appellants filed suit in Wisconsin against the appellees for allegedly taking the corporate assets without paying the creditors, such as the appellants. It is the May 4, 1990, judgment obtained in the Wisconsin action that *259the appellants are attempting to enforce in Nebraska, having filed the enforcement action in January 1994.
In the timeframe beginning with May 4, 1990, when the appellants obtained the Wisconsin judgment, until April 16, 1991, when the 2-year time limit under § 21-20,104 elapsed, the appellees escaped all liability because of the technicality of the Nebraska Secretary of State’s dissolving by a computer entry the corporate existence of Telenational on April 16, 1989, for nonpayment of its occupation tax.
My disagreement with the holding of this case begins with the fact that the Secretary of State’s computer routinely weeds out corporate entities by automatically dissolving those corporations which did not file their annual reports or pay their occupation taxes. I believe there should be a distinction as to the application of the 2-year time limit of § 21-20,104 in the case where a corporation is automatically dissolved by the Secretary of State for failing to file its annual report and failing to pay its occupation tax as opposed to the case where the corporation files articles of dissolution. If a corporation dissolves voluntarily, there is a statutory scheme for doing so, and one of the requirements is the notification of creditors, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2086(1) (Reissue 1991), so the creditors can proceed to collect any amounts due from the corporation. The 2-year limit seems to be reasonable in this type of situation, since the creditor knows what is taking place and can take steps to protect itself against the shareholders of the dissolving corporation who are preparing to take the assets.
Where a dissolution is the automatic process of the Secretary of State for failure to pay the occupation tax and failure to file the corporate report, however, no one but the corporation itself is advised of this dissolution, much less the hapless creditor. The creditor relies on the statute of limitations to bring his claim, which is 5 years for a written contract, 4 years for an unwritten contract, and 4 years for a tort. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-205, 25-206, and 25-207 (Reissue 1995). The creditor has no idea this time limit has been shortened to as little as 2 years because the Secretary of State’s computer has automatically dissolved the corporation for nonpayment of its occupation tax. *260This is a trap no creditor should have to encounter. In this case, I believe the appellants at least knew that Telenational was going out of business because of the fact that they and Telenational were engaged in litigation, and therefore, I concur with rather than dissent from the majority opinion. I would hold, however, that from the date of this opinion forward, the 2-year time limit stated in § 21-20,104 would not be a bar to making a claim against a corporation, its officers, or directors unless the corporation could show actual notice by the corporation to its creditors of the fact of its automatic dissolution.
Wright, J., joins in this concurrence.