Court Opinion

ID: 9699926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:57:38.872815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:42:47.427349
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
{dissenting). While operating his truck in a southerly direction on US-23 in Bay county, plaintiff ran into the rear of a vehicle owned by defendant and operated by its employee. As a result plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries and his motor vehicle was badly damaged. He instituted this action for damages on the theory that the negligence of defendant’s employee was a proximate cause of the accident, and the jury returned a verdict in his favor.
Section 402 of the Michigan vehicle code* (CLS 1956, § 257.402 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2102]) provides in part as follows:
“In any action, in any court in this State when it is shown by competent evidence, that a vehicle travel-, ing in a certain direction, overtook' and struck the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, or lawfully standing upon any highway within this State, the driver or operator of such first mentioned vehicle shall be deemed prima facie guilty of negligence. This section shall apply, in appropriate cases, to the owner of such first mentioned vehicle and to the employer of its driver or operator.”
On the trial of the case plaintiff testified at some length with reference to the manner in which the accident happened and the operation of the vehicles in*279volved therein. Other proofs were received as to the occurence. It was, of course, within the province of the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony of the witnesses. Apparently the trial judge concluded that the proofs offered were credible and charged the jury as follows:
“If a motor vehicle traveling in a certain direction overtakes and strikes the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or lawfully standing upon any highway and there is an absence of evidence as to the facts and circumstances surrounding such collision, the driver of the motor vehicle striking the other vehicle in the rear end is deemed prima facie guilty of negligence in so doing, that is, the law presumes that he was guilty of negligence in so doing in the absence of evidence explaining the necessity therefor or rebutting such presumption of negligence.
“Now in this case we have evidence as to the facts and circumstances surrounding this collision. Therefore, you will not indulge or apply that presumption, rather, you are to determine from a consideration of all the evidence whether or not the plaintiff was guil- . ty of contributory negligence by reason of his vehicle striking the rear end of the defendant’s vehicle.”
Mr. Justice Souris has written for reversal and the granting of a new trial on the ground that the excerpt above quoted from the charge was an erroneous statement of the law, and prejudicial to defendant. With that conclusion we are unable to agree. It will be noted that the statute in question creates merely a rebuttable presumption. It has been repeatedly recognized by this Court in prior decisions that under factual situations analogous to that in the case at bar such a presumption may not be given the force of evidence, or weighed against evidence, and that the issue involved must be determined on the *280basis of proofs. Such was the result in the instant case.
In Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich 410, 414, 415, it was said:
“It is now quite generally held by the courts that a rebuttable or prima facie presumption has no weight as evidence. It serves, to establish a prima facie case, but if challenged by rebutting evidence, the presumption cannot be weighed against the evidence. Supporting evidence must be introduced, and it then becomes a question of weighing the actual evidence introduced, without giving any evidential force to the presumption itself. In 1 Elliott on Evidence, § 91, p 114, it is said:
“ ‘It (the presumption) may be directly rebutted by such evidence, or it may be shown thereby that it was never applicable to the particular facts, for it will be found that presumptions are usually very general in their nature, and lose their force and application when the specific facts of the case are shown;’
“ — and further (§ 93, pp 116,117):
“ ‘A presumption operates to relieve the party in whose favor it operates from going forward in argument or evidence, and serves the purpose of a prima facie case until the other party has gone forward with his evidence, but, in itself, it is not evidence, and involves no rule as to the weight of evidence necessary to meet it. * * * It is sometimes said that the presumption will tip the scale when the evidence is balanced. But, in truth, nothing tips the scale but evidence, and a presumption, being a legal rule or a legal conclusion, is not evidence. * * * It is not probative matter, which may be a basis of inference and weighed and compared with other matter of a probative nature.’
“See, also, 4 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2491; 2 Best’s Principles of Evidence (Am Ed), §§ 298, 299; note in 33 LRA NS 1085; Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898), Appendix B, p 551. A discus*281sion of this subject will also be found in Baker v. Delano, 191 Mich 204, at p 208.”
It is significant to note that the Court in its opinion further called attention to the distinction between mere circumstantial evidence having slight tendency to rebut the presumption and direct, positive, and credible proof. In the case at bar the testimony offered by plaintiff was not circumstantial in character, nor was it incredible. It is significant in this respect that the jury in reaching its verdict in plaintiff’s favor quite obviously accepted his version of the facts involved in the accident, and from the facts to which the witnesses had testified drew inferences supporting the verdict returned.
In Patt v. Dilley, 273 Mich 601, defendant ran into the rear of an automobile which had stopped to permit a tire to be changed. As a result of the impact plaintiff was severely injured. In charging the jury the trial court called attention to the statute creating prima facie guilt of negligence on the part of the operator of a motor vehicle running into the rear of another vehicle standing on the highway or proceeding in the same direction as the latter vehicle. The following language was used (pp 605, 606):
“ ‘Now the meaning of that, that he shall be deemed prima facie guilty of negligence, is that the collision itself is evidence of negligence on the part of such a driver. But that may be refuted, it may be rebutted by other evidence introduced or offered in the case, and it is only evidence of negligence.’ ”
In holding that the charge was erroneous, it was said (p 606):
“The prima facie presumption could not be considered by the jury as any evidence of negligence because the facts appeared and the presumption could not be weighed or considered at all against the facts. Hanna v. McClave, 271 Mich 133.”
*282The case of Linabery v. LaVasseur, 359 Mich 122, decided February 26, 1960, presented issues of fact and of law analogous to those involved in the case at bar. There defendant driver ran into the rear of an automobile owned by one of the plaintiffs, and operated by the other. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. Among other claims advanced by appellants in support of their contention that the case should be reversed was the failure of the trial judge to grant a request to charge that the fact that defendants’ driver ran into the rear of plaintiffs’ vehicle made him prima facie guilty of negligence. In rejecting such claim, and in discussing the case of Corbin v. Yellow Cab Co., 349 Mich 434, it was said (p 126) :
“In Corbin, as distinguished from the instant case, plaintiff had good reason to stop, for a train and lineup of cars ahead of her, she saw defendant approaching behind her, signalled her intention of stopping, and came to a stop slowly. In that case this Court, in finding, under the evidence or paucity thereof in that case, no error in the trial court’s instruction similar to that here requested by plaintiffs, nonetheless said concerning the presumption here in question (p 440), that ‘It is the rule that in the absence of evidence, the presumption applies.’ There was no absence of such evidence at bar. On the contrary, there was evidence that the plaintiff either slowed down or stopped suddenly, for no apparent reason, without giving any signal of her intent so to do. Here there was evidence which, as said in the case of Patt v. Dilley, 273 Mich 601, caused the presumption to disappear. As held in that case, under such circumstances, the giving of an instruction, as plaintiffs requested, would have been error.”
Among decisions supporting the general proposition that a rebuttable or prima facie presumption may not be given weight as evidence, and cannot be weighed against evidence, are Madyck v. Shelley, 283 *283Mich 396 (1938 US AvR 134, 1 CCH Av 748); Blodgett v. Snobble, 295 Mich 374; In re Kanera’s Estate, 334 Mich 461; Hooker v. Tucker, 335 Mich 429; and Straith v. Straith, 355 Mich 267.
Under the factual situation presented here, it is apparent that there was credible testimony before the jury, which the verdict returned indicated the jury believed, with reference to the manner in which the accident happened and the operation of the motor vehicles involved. We are not confronted by a situation in which the proofs were merely circumstantial or of such nature as to raise a serious question as to their credibility. The trial judge charged the jury in the light of the situation before him and in accordance with the principle of law recognized in prior decisions of this Court. In so doing he was not in error. The questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury to determine on the basis of the proofs, without giving force and effect to the prima facie presumption created by the statute.
We find no reversible error in the case and the judgment should be affirmed, with costs to appellee.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.

 PA- 1949, No 300, as amended (CLS 1956, § 257.1 et seq., as amended [Slat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 9.1801 et seq.)).