Court Opinion

ID: 6737345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:19:31.498531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:50.208136
License: Public Domain

Bruce, J.
(dissenting). I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of the majority. The province of this court, as I understand it, is to construe the law, and not to administer it, nor to legislate. This court has no right to ignore the plain and unequivocal language of a valid legislative enactment.
The legislature of North Dakota has ordered (as it had a right to do, and with the wisdom of the enactment we are not concerned) that *235daily passenger trains shall be run on the branch as well as on the main lines of the railroads within the state, “provided, however, that if any railroad corporation shall make it appear to the Board of Bail-road Commissioners of this state that the business on any line of its road will not justify its operating both the passenger and freight train herein provided for, and said Board shall so order, such company may operate one mixed train on such line each way on every business day in the year for such time as said Board may direct.” Laws of 1907, chap. 200, Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 4789-4795. The statute expressly provides that such train shall be run and that the running of daily passenger trains shall be the uniform public policy of the state unless the Board of Railroad Commissioners (which is an administrative agency intrusted with the general supervision of railroad matters in North Dakota) shall order otherwise. But the majority of this court holds that it, and not the Board of Railroad Commissioners, may issue such order or grant such excuse. The statute expressly provides that such general policy of daily passenger trains shall prevail unless the railroad corporation “shall make it appear to the Board of Railroad Commissioners of this state that the business on any line of its road will not justify its operating both the passenger and freight train herein provided for.” The majority, however, holds that if a railroad company makes it appear, not to the Board of Railroad Commissioners, but to the district court, upon a trial de novo and upon evid.ence totally different from that produced before the commissioners, that such district court must grant the excuse. It holds in short that, where the legislature says that a matter shall be made to appear to the Board of Railroad Commissioners, it means that it shall be made to appear to the district court upon a trial de novo and upon totally different evidence.
Not only this, but it holds that in case the district court happens to be of the same opinion as the Board of Railroad Commissioners, an appeal even can be taken from its decision, and that if it shall be made to appear to the supreme court that such excuse from the- operation of daily passenger trains should be granted, the supreme court may grant the same. It holds in short that when the legislature provides that a fact or condition must be made to appear to the Board of Railroad Commissioners, it really means that this fact or condition must be made *236to appear to the supreme court. It would be hard, indeed, to find any other case where a clear legislative enactment has been so distorted and perverted.
The only excuse for the holding of the majority is that an act, which was passed in 1897, and ten years before the enactment of the statute now under consideration, provided for an ap^ „al from orders of the Board of Bailroad Commissioners issued under “the act.” The majority, however, absolutely ignores the fact that this prior act of 1897 nowhere made any provision for the running of passenger trains. It related almost entirely to the regulation of railroad rates and to the orders of the Board of Bailroad Commissioners in relation thereto. It made it the duty, it is true, of the Bailroad Commissioners to see that the railroads obeyed the laws of the state. It nowhere, however, provided that either the railroads or the Board of Bailroad Commissioners could overrule the positive mandates of a future act, nor can it be contended that when it provided for an appeal from orders regulating rates it tied the hands of subsequent legislatures, and prevented them from establishing a public policy of daily passenger trams, and vesting the responsibility of its carrying out in the discretion of the-Board of Bailroad Commissioners.
The provision of the act of 1897 (chapter 115) which relates to appeals, is expressly limited in its application. It (§ 32) provides that “any railroad, railroad corporation, or common carrier, subject to the provisions of this act, or any other person interested in the order made by the Commissioner of Bailroads, may appeal to the district court of the proper county in the judicial district of this state from which the complaint arose, and which is the subject and basis of the order made by the Commissioners of Bailroads regulating or fixing its tariffs or rales, fares, charges, or classification, or by any other order made by said Commissioners under the provisions of this act.” This limited clause, and in a statute which says nothing about the running of passenger trains and which is interested solely in tariff classifications and rates, and in the general details of railroad operation in relation thereto, is construed by the majority opinion to apply to a statute which is passed ten years later, which provides for a general policy of passenger service, and which provides that the only person or body which can grant an excuse from an observance of such policy is the Board of Bailroad *237Commissioners. See Robinson v. Sunderland [1899] 1 Q. B. 751, 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 330, 80 L. T. N. S. 262, 63 J. P. 341, 19 Cox, C. C. 245, 15 Times L. R. 195.
When the discretion of granting such an excuse is, by chapter 200 of the Laws of 1907, Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 4789-4795, vested exclusively in the Board of Bailroad Commissioners, and then only in case certain facts are made to appear to them, can it be said that it was the intention of the legislature that new evidence. should be introduced in the district court, and that that court should be vested with the power to hold that that mas made to appear to the Board of Commissioners, which did not in fact appear to them, and that in case of a holding of that court which was adverse to the railroad company an appeal could again be taken to this tribunal and that we could say the same thing ? Is it not clear that the general policy of the state, as announced by chapter 200 of the Laws of 1907, Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 4789 — 4795, was a policy of daily passenger .service, unless the Board of Bailroad Commissioners (which is an administrative branch of the government and which is intrusted with the duty of subserving the interests of all parties concerned) should be satisfied that the business of the branch line did not justify the expense, and that in that event an excuse should be granted for a limited time? Does this court, me may now ash, assume the power to fix the limits of that time? Is it not also clear that the writer and subscriber's to the majority opinion have confused the rights of the railway company which arise under statutes which regulate rates with those which arise under statutes which merely relate to the method of the operation of its lines ? Are they not influenced in their decision by a feeling that the operation of a passenger train on the line in question would be an unprofitable venture, and that the railway company should by some means be protected against loss ? Do they not absolutely ignore the fact that the railway, company has its remedies, and that, even if it had not, they have no right to themselves usurp legislative functions ? “There is,” says the Supreme Court of the United States in Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 54 L. ed. 472, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330, “a difference between the exertion of the legislative power to establish rates in such a manner as to confiscate the property of a public service corporation by fixing them below a remunerative standard and one compelling the corporation to render a *238service which it is essentially its duty to perform; aud an order directing a railroad company to run a regular passenger train over its line, instead of a mixed passenger and freight train, is not, even if such train is run at a loss, a deprivation of property without due process of law, or a taking of private property for public use without compensation; nor is such an order an unreasonable exercise of governmental control.”
The reason for this rule is that the charter of every railroad corporation must be deemed to have been granted upon the theory of public-service, and that the ro,ad will really serve the public. On no other theory, indeed, can the right of eminent domain, which is universally conceded to railroad companies, be justified. It lies also in the fact that the railroad corporation has a remedy against confiscation in the right and power to charge rates that will compensate it and guarantee to it a reasonable profit after meeting all of the requirements of the state in regard to service. Having this power to insist upon an adequate compensation, and to demand rates which will be commensurate to the duties imposed, it cannot complain if the public, for reasons of basic convenience or of public safety, demands passenger, rather than mixed, trains.
Independently of statute and under its charter, it is the duty of the railroad company to carry passengers, as well as freight. Having this duty, and even in the absence of a statute, it is its duty to furnish reasonable conveniences and a reasonably safe method of transportation for such passengers. “It cannot be said that the carrier of passengers in a car attached to a freight train is a suitable and proper operation of a railroad, as far as the carriage of passengers is concerned. The transportation of passengers on a freight train, or on a mixed train, is subordinate to the transportation of freight, a mere incident to the business of carrying freight. To furnish such cars as are necessary for the suitable and proper carriage of passengers involves the necessity of adopting that mode of carrying passengers which is best adapted to secure their safety and convenience. This can be accomplished better by operating a separate passenger train than by operating a mixed train.” People ex rel. Cantrel v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. 176 Ill. 512, 35 L.R.A. 656, 52 N. E. 292.
This must be universally conceded. In fact it needs no evidence to *239show that from the standpoint of public safety, to say nothing of speed or convenience, there is no parallel between a freight or mixed train and a strictly passenger train. Is not this the clear policy which is announced by the legislature ? It is a self-evident fact that the interests of the railway companies and of the public are one. We have adopted the theory of quasi public corporations. I'Ve have given to the railway companies extraordinary rights, such as eminent domain. They are also essentially businesses which are “clothed with a public interest,” which are to a greater or lesser extent monopolies, and which are, therefore, subject, even under the common law, to legislative control. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77.
On the other hand, the constitutional provisions which forbid a deprivation of property without due process of law and the general spirit of fair play in the community, as well as the economic fact that no man or corporation can, for a long period of time, be induced or compelled to operate at a loss, have given rise to the rule that they can in all cases insist upon a fair return for the capital which is reasonably invested and on the reasonably economical administration of their property, and that this right cannot be taken from them by the legislature. This rule, of course, implies that, though the public may impose duties upon the railway company, and may insist that its needs be reasonably served, yet that when these requirements impose an additional cost upon the corporation, it may reimburse itself in the form of added rates, so that the total result will be a reasonable profit on its enterprise. On this theory and as a last analysis, the public themselves pay for insisting upon added requirements or upon an obedience to the duties imposed in the first place by the charter of the company; for it is perfectly clear that every new expense which is imposed upon the railroad company, whether in the form of adequate service or in the form of taxes, is ultimately paid by the traveling and freight consuming public, as such expenses only tend to elevate the point which divides loss and profit, and to raise the point where a reasonable profit is exceeded and the public may insist upon a reduction of rates. Northern P. R. Co. v. Richland County, 28 N. D. 172, L.R.A. 1915A, 129, 148 N. W. 545. The Board of Railroad Commissioners, therefore, are intrusted with the duties of subserving the interests of both the railroad companies and of the public. Among those duties (and imposed by chapter 200 of the *240Laws of 1907, Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 4789 — 4795) is the duty to determine whether the business of a branch line really justifies the imposing upon the railway company, as well as upon the public, the increased cost of passenger service, or rather whether or not the loss is so apparent that they should excuse the railway company for a limited period of time from complying with the provisions of the general law, which require the running of such trains and the incurring of such expense. This is purely an administrative function, and is clearly made so by the act of 1907, and there is no justification nor excuse for attempting to limit that act by claiming that there is an appeal from the discretion of such Commission, which appeal is not provided for in the act in question, and which is sought to be based on the provisions of a statute which was passed ten years before and which has no connection whatever with the statute under consideration.
The plaintiff railway company is, as a matter of fact, entitled to but little consideration in this particular controversy, though of course, as the rule which is announced by the decision is far reaching, it and the general public are entitled to the fullest consideration of the questions involved. It at no time has complied with the provisions of the statute, and much of the confusion which is apparent in the record, and in the opinion of the majority, I believe is due to this fact. It has delayed for many years a decision in a matter which long ago should have been settled. The act of 1907 provides for a general policy of passenger service. It provides that passenger trains shall be run unless an excuse is granted, and then that that excuse shall only be “for such time as said Board may direct.” It presupposes the institution of that service in the first instance. I do not say that the railway company should necessarily have immediately instituted the service after the law became operative and applicable to it, but I do say that, if it did not do so, it should have immediately applied to the Board of Railroad Commissioners for the excuse. Instead of doing this, the railway company, however, has never attempted to comply with the statute, and it made no application to the Board of Railroad Commissioners- to be excused from such compliance until the road had been in operation for some years and until the Board of Railroad Commissioners had been compelled to issue an order requiring it to comply with the provisions of the statute. It now seeks to avoid the provisions of the statute which vests the exclusive discretion *241as to tlie granting of such permission or excuse in the Board of Bail-road Commissioners by appealing from the order which requires it to obey the law, and which necessarily must be valid unless, in the first instance, it- had obtained such excuse. It may be that such order is appealable, but on such appeal it can only he shown that the railway company was not actually within the state and subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, or that, as a matter of fact, the passenger train was in'operation, or that the Board of Bailroad Commissioners had, for some other reason, acted outside of its jurisdiction.
The railway company cannot, by appealing from such order, accomplish the same results as if it had appealed, and an appeal had been allowed by the statute, from the refusal of the Commissioners to grant the excuse. It, it is true, tried the two matters together, and the record is greatly confused, hut the fundamental fact still -remains that the only defense to the order was the alleged fact that the Board of Bailroad Commissioners did not grant the excuse and should have done so. But this decision was not reviewable in the district court, and is not reviewable here.
I fully agree with the conclusion of the majority that it was the intention of the legislature that it was the business of the branch line, and not of the railway company as a whole within the state, that should justify the operation of the passenger train. In other words, that it was this criterion that should be adopted by the Board of Bailroad Commissioners. The matter, however, with this general rule or criterion'as a guide, was left to their discretion. I should also add that there is serious doubt in my mind as to whether the evidence offered by the railway company was in any way competent and controlling. When I say that, in my opinion, it was the business of the branch line that should justify the incurring of the expense of the daily passenger service, I do not mean that in every instance a branch line should show a profit on the basis of its mileage, for in many instances a branch line is but a feeder, and though but a few miles in length may be the origin of hundreds of miles of long distance freight or passenger transportation, and become in this way the source of a large revenue, which is entirely disproportionate to its length. The proof of the railway company was defective in this respect. Instead of showing what the branch line really furnished in the way of business, it apportioned its receipts *242to the branch line on the basis of the mileage of that line. If this theory be adopted, I believe I am safe in saying that there is hardly a paying branch line in North Dakota. It must, however, be clear to all that a branch line, though short in its mileage, may open up a pocket of grain or of coal, or other freight or passenger traffic. That grain or coal is carried for a few miles over the branch line and then is carried for many hundreds of miles over the main line for which service the company is compensated. A branch line, in short, may be a feeder and the basis of a large revenue, not because of its mileage, but because it furnishes the material for hundreds and even thousands of miles of through transportation. There is hardly a carload of wheat, for instance, that stops at the end of the branch line and does not go on to Duluth or to Minneapolis, or even to Chicago. In any view of the case the Railroad Commissioners can hardly be said to have abused their discretion when they failed to grant the excuse upon the proof that was furnished. It can hardly be said that it must have satisfactorily appeared to them that the branch line was not a paying line. I am of the opinion that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.