Court Opinion

ID: 9913142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:44.387494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:29.845240
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 P. v. Cripe CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080593

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCN426118)

 ERIC RANDALL CRIPE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sim von Kalinowski, Judge. Affirmed.
         Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                         MEMORANDUM OPINION1
      Eric Randall Cripe appeals from a judgment of conviction for, among

other charges, a Watson2 driving under the influence (DUI) murder. He
contends the trial court prejudicially erred in an evidentiary ruling and
committed sentencing error. We reject both contentions and affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                        I.
                      Evidence of the Watson DUI Murder
      At 3:27 p.m. on August 22, 2021, Cripe drove his truck on State Route
79, a two-lane highway, in Temecula. Two motorists traveling behind Cripe
saw him repeatedly “veer[ing]” and “swerving in and out of his lane,” over the
double yellow lines and into the opposing lane. According to the motorists,
Cripe drove like that for nearly eight miles before he “[l]ost control” of his
truck. At that point, he drove into the right dirt shoulder, overcorrected with
“a hard left,” and shot across the double-yellow lines into the opposing lane.
This time he drove into the path of five motorcyclists, killing 34-year-old
Matthew Mylerberg. Cripe’s impaired driving and the fatal collision were
recorded by a motorist’s dashboard camera.
      Earlier that day, Mylerberg had rode his motorcycle up to Idyllwild
with four friends. It had been “a beautiful day” and Mylerberg persuaded his
friends to take the longer scenic road on Route 79 home, telling them: “Let’s
go the nice, easier way back home. I want to enjoy it.” After having lunch,
the group got back on Route 79 and had been riding for about 15 minutes

1    We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

2     People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson).

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when Cripe drove his truck into their path. Mylerberg was struck and
thrown off his motorcycle to the side of the road. He died at the scene despite
attempts of life-saving measures by his friends and paramedics who
responded minutes later.
      Cripe stayed in the driver’s seat of his truck, “just staring straight
ahead” and “nonemotional . . . for somebody who just got in a crash” when
CHP Officer James Pillman arrived at the scene. It was approximately
4:08 p.m. Officer Pillman immediately smelled an odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from Cripe’s truck and his breath. When he asked Cripe “if
he was okay,” Cripe responded, “I know I just killed a man.” His speech was
“very slow and slurred.”
      Cripe told Officer Pillman he had drunk “one large gulp of vodka at
8:00 a.m. that morning.” But when asked, he did not explain what one large
gulp of vodka meant. Cripe declined to step out of his truck to perform field
sobriety tests; he said he wanted “the Breathalyzer.” Cripe then blew into a
PAS (preliminary alcohol screening) device, which estimated Cripe’s blood
alcohol content (BAC) to be 0.206 percent at 4:18 p.m. and 0.211 percent at

4:20 p.m.3 At this point, Officer Pillman placed Cripe under arrest. As he
stepped out of his truck, Cripe “was swaying a little bit.” Officer Pillman had
to grab his arm and help him to the patrol car; had he not, Cripe would have

3     Cripe stipulated to the PAS results and that “Officer Pillman conducted
a PAS test with [Cripe] using a device that was properly calibrated, accurate,
and in full working order. The testing, as well as the device itself, were in
compliance with all applicable California laws and regulations.”

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fallen. At the Ramona CHP Station, Cripe took a chemical breath test. His

BAC was 0.17 percent at 6:07 p.m. and 0.17 percent at 6:09 p.m.4
      A criminalist testified that a man with Cripe’s weight and breath test
results would have a BAC between a 0.18 and 0.24 percent at the time of
driving (3:27 p.m.) if he had reached peak alcohol concentration. This would
be the equivalent of six to nine standard drinks circulating in the man’s

system.5 If peak alcohol concentration had not been reached, the man would
have a BAC between 0.15 to 0.22 percent, that is the equivalent of five to
eight standard drinks in the man’s system. For both scenarios, the
criminalist believed the result would “more likely [be] toward the middle of
the range[s] than the extremes of [the] range[s].”
      Cripe’s cell phone was recovered from his truck at the scene of the fatal
collision. On it was a 1:29 p.m. text message sent to a group of recipients
that said: “Fucked up baby. See you soon.”
      Cripe had been arrested in Nevada for DUI in 2000 and was convicted
of DUI in Los Angeles in 2007. Cripe had completed an approximately 8-
month California-licensed DUI program in February 2010; the program
educated participants on “the dangers” of driving under the influence. He
had also completed an approximately 4-month Youthful Drug and Alcohol
Deterrence Program in August 2009. This program consisted of a coroner’s
morgue class, a trauma hospital visit, and a drug and alcohol awareness class

4     Cripe also stipulated to the results of the chemical breath test, and that
they were obtained with a breath test machine “that was properly calibrated,
accurate, and in full working order” and the testing and machine “were in
compliance with all applicable California laws and regulations.”

5     Here, “standard” is a 12-ounce beer, 5-ounce wine, or 1.5 ounce of 80
proof vodka.

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to address the dangers of driving while under the influence. In early 2021,
Cripe declined to drive for his former employer on two occasions, telling his
employer he could not drive because he still had alcohol in his system.
      The jury found Cripe guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a); count 1); gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen.
Code, § 191.5, subd. (a); count 2); driving under the influence of alcohol
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 3); and driving with a
measurable blood alcohol of 0.08 percent or more causing injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (b); count 4). The jury also found true that Cripe personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon Mylerberg in the commission of counts 2, 3
and 4 (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), and 12022.7, subd. (a) [counts 3 and
4 only]); and as to counts 3 and 4, he had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15
percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23578).
                                        II.
                Evidence of the Earlier Hit-and-Run Collision
      Less than six hours before he killed Mylerberg, at approximately
10:00 a.m., Cripe crashed his pickup truck into another motorist and left the
scene. Dalton Maxfeldt was driving his vehicle on East Valley Parkway in
Escondido. As Maxfeldt slowed down for a red light at the intersection of
North Midway Drive, Cripe made a right-hand turn from North Midway
Drive onto East Valley Parkway. Cripe then drove over the raised center
median, into opposing traffic and crashed head-on into Maxfeldt. The impact
“totaled” Maxfeldt’s vehicle. Cripe got out of his truck, seemingly
“unbalanced” and “out of it.” He went over to his tailgate and “was kind of
holding himself up.” Maxfeldt tried talking to Cripe but Cripe “wasn’t
making a lot of sense.” As Maxfeldt was on the phone with 911, Cripe took
off in his truck without exchanging information with Maxfeldt. Cripe,

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however, left his front license plate, which had fallen off, at the scene. The
hit-and-run collision had also been recorded by a surveillance camera of a
nearby business.
      Cripe was charged in this case with misdemeanor hit-and-run driving
(Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 5). Before trial, he moved to sever this
count from the counts arising from the fatal collision (Pen. Code, § 954),
asserting the danger of prejudice greatly outweighed any interest in the
efficiency of a joint trial. He further argued evidence of the hit-and-run

charge was barred by Evidence Code6 sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352.
His theory of prejudice under section 352 was that the jury would
impermissibly draw from evidence he was intoxicated at the time of the fatal
collision to conclude he was also intoxicated at the time of the hit-and-run
collision. At the hearing on the severance motion, defense counsel reiterated
the defense’s “primary concern with allowing this jury to hear evidence of the
hit-and-run in the morning . . . is that we’re inviting this jury to speculate
about [Cripe] being under the influence at the time” of the hit-and-run
collision, which is not an element of the charge. In other words, “evidence
[would be] used from the second incident to prove the first, rather than the
first to prove the second.” (Italics added.)

      The trial court denied the motion to sever.7 It found the evidence of
the hit-and-run and the fatal collision was cross-admissible “[b]oth ways.”
The hit-and-run collision was admissible to show Cripe’s implied malice on
the second degree murder charge (count 1) and gross negligence on the

6     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

7     Cripe does not claim any error in the trial court’s denial of the
severance motion.

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vehicular manslaughter charge (count 2). That is, Cripe’s admission at the
fatal collision that he consumed alcohol at 8:00 a.m., his driving pattern and
physical presentation (“holding himself up by the pickup truck”) in the hit-
and-run tended to show Cripe knew that day that driving under the influence
was dangerous to human life. The court found the fatal collision was cross-
admissible to identify Cripe as the perpetrator of the hit-and-run (count 5),
noting that the cell phone seized from Cripe at the scene of the fatal collision
contained photographs of Maxfeldt’s totaled vehicle and cell phone data
generally placed Cripe in the locations of both collisions.
      After the trial court denied the severance motion, Cripe proposed he
would plead guilty to the hit-and-run charge so as to make the evidence no
longer relevant at trial. The court responded that a plea to count 5 would not
eliminate the relevance and admissibility of the hit-and-run collision to show
implied malice and gross negligence under section 1101, subdivision (b). The
court then conducted a section 352 analysis and found the “high probative
value” of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
undue prejudice, considering in particular that the hit-and-run was captured
on video, it occurred the same day “[v]ery close in time,” and was “certainly
not as offensive as the charged conduct.” The court clarified a guilty plea to
count 5 would not change its evidentiary ruling. Cripe then entered a guilty
plea to count 5.
      On the third day of evidence, the trial court ruled it would not be
instructing the jury that evidence of the hit-and-run collision would be
restricted to the limited purposes of showing implied malice and gross
negligence. The court found substantial evidence had been presented from
which the jury could conclude “this [w]as one continuous event of [Cripe]
being under the influence that day, as opposed to two separate events.” In

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particular, the court noted Cripe’s admission he started drinking at 8:00 a.m.
the day of both collisions, Maxfeldt’s testimony that suggested Cripe was
intoxicated at the time of the hit-and-run collision, and the criminalist’s
testimony on the BAC levels. She had opined a man with Cripe’s weight and
breath results of 0.17/0.17 at 6:07/6:09 p.m., assuming there was no
additional drinking after 10:00 a.m. and full absorption, would have a BAC
between a 0.23 and 0.38 percent at 10:00 a.m., the equivalent of 8 to 14
standard drinks. If the alcohol had not fully absorbed, the BAC range
decreases to 0.21 to 0.35 percent, the equivalent of 7 to 13 standard drinks.
As before, the criminalist believed the result was “more likely” in the middle
than the extremes. There was no objection by the defense to this testimony.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
 Any Error in Admitting Evidence of the Hit & Run Collision Was Harmless
      Cripe contends that “in light of [his] plea” to count 5, the trial court
prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of the hit-and-run collision. He
argues evidence of the hit-and-run collision was not admissible under section
1101, subdivision (b), because it “did not tend to ‘logically, naturally and by
reasonable inference’ prove implied malice or gross negligence,” and even if
there was some relevance to those issues, the evidence should have been
excluded as cumulative to the prosecution’s other evidence on Cripe’s mental
state under section 352. Although doubtful of the claim, we will assume
without deciding the court’s admission of the hit-and-run collision evidence
was erroneous, but conclude any such error was harmless.
      We do not disturb a trial court’s erroneous exercise of discretion unless
it “resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999)
20 Cal.4th 1, 9−10.) A trial court’s error under state law in the admission or

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exclusion of evidence is reviewed for prejudice under Watson harmless error
test. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People v. McNeal (2009) 46
Cal.4th 1183, 1203.) Under that test, the trial court’s evidentiary ruling may
be reversed only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People
v. Watson, at p. 836.)
      A second degree DUI murder under Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290,
requires proof of implied malice⎯that “the defendant deliberately performed
an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, knowing that
the conduct endangers the life of another, but acting with conscious disregard
for that risk of life. (Id. at pp. 296, 300.) Implied malice requires that the
accused actually appreciated the risk involved. (Id. at pp. 296−297.)” (People
v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) California courts “have relied on
some or all of the following factors in upholding [Watson DUI murder]
convictions: (1) blood-alcohol level above the 0.08 percent legal limit; (2) a
predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while
intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving.” (Autry, at p. 358 [cataloging
cases which have upheld “drunk driving murder convictions”].) All four
factors were firmly established in this case, even without the hit-and-run
evidence.
      Cripe stipulated his BAC was 0.206 and 0.211 percent when he blew
into the PAS device and that his BAC was 0.17 and 0.17 percent when he
later took the chemical breath test results. He also did not challenge the
criminalist’s testimony that his BAC at the time of driving in the fatal
collision was between 0.18 and 0.24 percent at peak absorption, or between
0.15 and 0.22 percent if not fully absorbed. He admitted he started drinking
vodka at 8:00 a.m. and said in a 1:29 p.m. text that day he was “Fucked up.”

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He knew the hazards of driving while intoxicated because, at minimum, he
had previously completed a total of 12 months of DUI-related programs that
educated him on the dangers of driving under the influence. Further, he
acknowledged to his former employer in early 2021 that he should not drive
when he had alcohol in his system. Despite that knowledge, and with a
dangerously high BAC, he drove impaired on a two-lane highway. Two
motorists testified he repeatedly swerved in and out of his lane and crossed
over the double yellow lines into opposing traffic for some distance before he
lost control and killed Mylerberg. Further still, his highly dangerous driving
was recorded by a dashboard camera for the jury to see.
      On the record before us, we have little difficulty concluding there is no
reasonable probability that Cripe would have obtained a more favorable
result absent the hit-and-run evidence. Cripe’s attempts to argue otherwise
are not persuasive. He asserts evidence of the hit-and-run collision “allowed
the jury to speculate that [Cripe] was highly intoxicated at the time of the
morning accident and continued to drive in that intoxicated state all day
until the fatal accident in the afternoon.” But the jury could have concluded
Cripe’s prior state of intoxication simply from his admission that he began
drinking at 8:00 a.m. and his text message at 1:29 p.m. that he was “Fucked
up.” We also disagree with Cripe’s contention that the prosecution’s “other
evidence” of his knowledge and intent was “far less compelling.” We do not
need to repeat our discussion regarding the strength of the evidence of
Cripe’s knowledge of the hazards of driving under the influence. Finally,
Cripe argues his 2021 acknowledgments to his employer that he should not
drive after drinking actually showed he “affirmatively acted to avoid conduct
which would endanger others.” The argument is without merit. If anything,
it proves too much. If he knew how to affirmatively avoid endangering

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others, then his actions on the day in question say, “ ‘I know my conduct is
dangerous to others, but I don’t care if someone is hurt or killed.’ ” (People v.
Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 987−988.) That is implied malice. (Ibid.)

      In sum, Cripe fails to establish he was prejudiced by any error.8
                                       II.
                              No Sentencing Error
      In a separate proceeding, the jury found true aggravating sentencing
factors, including that Cripe committed an offense that involved great
violence or other acts disclosing a high degree of viciousness and/or
callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)) and engaged in violent
conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(1)). The jury found the circumstance that the victim was
particularly vulnerable to be not true (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (a)(3)).
The trial court sentenced Cripe to 15 years to life on count 1 and a concurrent
6-month sentence on count 5. The court sentenced Cripe to the upper term of
10 years on count 2, but stayed the punishment pursuant to Penal Code
section 654; and dismissed counts 3 and 4 and the associated enhancements
because they were lesser included offenses of count 2.
      Cripe contends the trial court improperly imposed the upper term on
count 2 based in part on the dual use of facts which constitute an element of
the crime of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, i.e., driving
while intoxicated and knowing such conduct is dangerous to human life. (See
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350 [a sentencing court may not “use a
fact constituting an element of the offense either to aggravate or to enhance a

8    We do not address any asserted prejudice as to the other counts
because Cripe has not.

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sentence”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(h) [“A fact that is an element of the
crime on which punishment is being imposed may not be used to impose a
particular term.”].)
      We disagree. The trial court pointed to these facts not as facts in
aggravation but as a reason for rejecting Cripe’s contention that his
alcoholism was a mitigating factor. The court explained: “[A]lthough the
[c]ourt recognizes that alcoholism is a disease that can be difficult to control,
the evidence shows that the defendant was fully aware of the dangerousness
of driving while intoxicated. He made a conscious decision to drive and then
continued driving even after the first collision. [¶] So irrespective of the

alcoholism his culpability is not reduced.”9 We find no sentencing error here.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                            DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

9     In his opening brief on appeal, Cripe also claimed the upper term
sentence on count 2 was not authorized because he lacked notice of the
aggravating factors. Cripe withdrew this claim after the Attorney General
correctly pointed out that the operative information did in fact plead the
aggravating factors which the jury determined to be true.

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