Court Opinion

ID: 9719194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:45:38.260177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.109801
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(dissenting). The majority affirms the Milwaukee Board of Zoning Appeals' refusal to grant a zoning variance to Jan Shannon and Timothy Riordan for the operation of Community Based Residential Facilities on three properties owned by Shannon and Rior-dan. Certiorari review of the Board's refusal is limited to the following issues:
(1) whether the board kept within its jurisdiction;
(2) whether it proceeded on [a] correct theory of law;
(3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination in question.
Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd., 74 Wis. 2d 468, 475, 247 N.W.2d 98, 102 (1976). In analyzing whether the Board "might reasonably" make its determination, the "inquiry is limited to whether there is substantial evidence to support" that determination. See Van Ermen v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 84 Wis. 2d 57, 64, 267 N.W.2d 17, 20 (1978). I dissent because the Board's denial of the zoning variance was contrary to the overwhelming and non-disputed evidence that the variances were required before Shannon and Riordan could provide essential social services to persons who would live in the facilities, and was not based on any evidence *735before it that would support its findings.1
The zoning ordinance, sec. 295-14-1 of the Milwaukee Code of Ordinances, provides, as material to this case, that "community living arrangements . . . may not be located within 2,500 feet of each other . . .." It is based on sec. 62.23(7)(i)l, Stats., which provides, in pertinent part:
No community living arrangement may be established after March 28,1978, within 2,500 feet, or any lesser distance established by an ordinance of the city, of any other such facility. Agents of a facility may apply for an exception to this requirement, and such exceptions may be granted at the discretion of the city.
(Emphasis added.) The Board's rationale in rejecting the requested variances were identical:
First, the Board found that the "use requested is a community living arrangement which is within 2500 feet of another such facility."
Second, the Board "found that the use requested was not necessary for the public convenience at this location, since there is an existing community living arrangement within 2500 feet of the subject premises." [Emphasis added.]
Third, the Board "determined that the use requested would be an overintensification of the proposed use in this area, thereby having an adverse impact on the neighborhood" and the "abutting properties."
*736Fourth, the Board "determined that there was no showing that the use was consistent with the spirit, purpose and intent of the ordinance.” [Emphasis added.]
The only finding that does not rest on the variance-would-be-inconsistent-with-the-ordinance rationale is the Board's determination that the variances, if granted, would have "an adverse impact on the neighborhood" because of the alleged "overintensification." Neither the city, the trial court, nor the majority have pointed to any evidence in the record before the Board to support this conclusion; indeed, all of the evidence before the Board was to the contrary.
First, the City Plan Commission of the City of Milwaukee notified the Board by letters dated November 4, 1987, that the proposed uses for which the variances were sought "would not have an adverse impact on the abutting property and the adjacent neighborhood."
Second, the community's alderman, Marlene E. Johnson, notified the Board by letters dated December 3, 1987, that she had no objection to the Shannon and. Riordan requests, and wrote that she hoped they would "receive favorable consideration."
Third, fifty-one neighbors of the proposed Community Based Residential Facilities signed petitions affirming their lack of objection.
Fourth, a representative of Milwaukee's Building Inspection Department testified that he had inspected the properties, and found that Shannon and Riordan were "really reliable." Furthermore, he told the Board that Shannon was "very dedicated," having made helping those who would be served by the facilities "her life's work." He noted: "I would rather live next to this type of operation than I would a rooming house [for which a variance from sec. 295-14-1 of the Milwaukee Code of *737Ordinances would not be necessary] because you may find some of these same people living in rooming houses without any supervision, without any medication."
Fifth, the Board gave notice of the hearing to the neighbors of the proposed facilities, and no one appeared to oppose the variance.
Finally, there was substantial and undisputed evidence that the proposed facilities would fulfill a critical community need.
The Board is appropriately vested with broad discretion. But "[discretion is not synonymous with [raw] decision-making." McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1971).
The very purpose of a variance is to ameliorate the hardships created by the application of a zoning ordinance. State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 701, 207 N.W.2d 585, 587 (1973). The Board's rejection of the variance requests merely because the resulting use would not be consistent with the zoning ordinance ignores this truism, and violates sec. 62.23(7)(i)l, Stats., which, as we have seen, specifically permits exceptions to the 2,500-foot requirement.
The Board ignored the only evidence before it, evidence that clearly established not only a need for the facilities, but that there would be no "adverse impact on the neighborhood" and the "abutting properties." The Board thus did not exercise its judgment but, rather, imposed its will; it eschewed the required "process of reasoning" that "must depend on facts that are of record." See McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 277, 182 N.W.2d at 519. This was an abuse of discretion. See ibid.
The order of the circuit court should be vacated, and the cause remanded with directions to reverse the Board's decision denying the requested variances. See *738sec. 62.23(7)(e)10, Stats., ("The [circuit] court may reverse . . . the decision brought up for review.").

Consideration of the Board's actions in light of the appropriate standard of review as explicated in Snyder must be our initial inquiry. Since the Board's decisions cannot withstand even this limited scrutiny, the majority's excursion into constitutional analysis is not warranted.