Court Opinion

ID: 9412813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 17:09:23.634707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.701485
License: Public Domain

J-S18045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  XAVIER BRASWELL                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3091 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 10, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0008185-2016

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED AUGUST 1, 2023

       Appellant, Xavier Braswell, appeals from the order entered in the Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which denied his first petition filed

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546,

following an evidentiary hearing. After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was

arrested in connection with the murder of Shelton Merritt, and represented by

counsel, he proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a mistrial on November

3, 2017, when the jury failed to render a unanimous verdict.           On May 14,

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2018, Appellant, represented by counsel,1 appeared for a jury retrial. The

trial court summarized the testimony presented at the retrial as follows:

             At about 11:45 p.m., on July 24, 2016, [Appellant], his
       cousin Alex Rice (“Rice”), his friend Robert Renfro (“Renfro”),
       Rice’s sister Shadele Rice (“Shadele”), and a woman identified as
       “Lee Lee” entered the River Deck club on 417 North Columbus
       Boulevard in Philadelphia. Around the same time, a separate
       group of people including the decedent Shelton Merritt (“the
       decedent”), his friends Zachary Gorczynski (“Gorczynski”) and
       Jonathan Jones (known as “Jalil”), and two other males arrived at
       the River Deck club. The latter group was not permitted to enter
       because two of its members were wearing T-shirts, so they
       continued to stand outside in line. N.T., 5/14/18, at 117-20; N.T.,
       5/15/18, at 179-89.
             Inside the club, Renfro became involved in a fight and was
       kicked at and punched by multiple people. After the fight, Renfro
       told [Appellant] that he had been assaulted and pointed out the
       group of people who had done it. Soon after, Shadele approached
       Renfro and told him that Rice was involved in a fight outside the
       club. On his way out, Renfro observed [Appellant] in a fight with
       the same group of people with whom he had fought. Outside the
       club, Renfro saw the decedent and numerous other people
       assaulting Rice, with one individual hitting Rice with a bottle,
       which caused him to fall to the ground. N.T., 5/14/18, at 120;
       N.T., 5/15/18, at 112-21.
              After the altercation with Rice, the decedent and his friends
       left the club and walked towards their car, a Ford Explorer SUV
       parked on the north side of Callowhill Street, near the intersection
       of Christopher Columbus Boulevard and about two blocks away
       from the River Deck. The group got into the vehicle, with the
       decedent seated in the back row. Shortly thereafter, [Appellant],
       Rice, and Renfro approached the vehicle.          Rice and Renfro
       approached the driver’s side, where they confronted Jones.
       [Appellant] approached the passenger’s side of the vehicle, and
       Gorczynski exited the front passenger’s seat to speak with him.
       [Appellant] asked Gorczynski to identify the person who had

____________________________________________

1 At the jury retrial, Appellant was represented by Joseph Green, II, Esquire,

who was lead defense counsel, and W. Fred Harrison, Esquire, who was co-
counsel.

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     knocked out Rice, then drew a 9-millimeter semi-automatic
     handgun and pointed it at Gorczynki. [Appellant] pulled the
     trigger but the gun failed to fire. Gorczynski ran and told the group
     in the SUV that [Appellant] had a gun. The group exited the SUV,
     but the decedent, who was seated in the back row, was unable to
     escape the vehicle. [Appellant] fired nine times into the SUV,
     fatally shooting the decedent. N.T., 5/14/18, at 123-30; N.T.,
     5/16/18, at 229, 239; N.T., 5/17/18, at 238-39.
           After the shooting, [Appellant] fled towards a nearby
     parking lot, pursued by Gorczynski and others. There, Gorczynski
     observed [Appellant] throw an object into the water. The object
     was never recovered. N.T., 5/14/18, at 123-30; N.T., 5/16/18,
     at 229, 239; N.T., 5/17/18, at 238-39.
            At 11:45 p.m., Philadelphia Police Sergeant David DeCrosta
     responded to a priority radio call reporting gunshots. Upon
     arriving at the scene, he discovered the decedent lying with his
     torso outside of the SUV and his legs inside. Sergeant DeCrosta
     observed that the decedent had suffered a gunshot wound to the
     head and was bleeding heavily. He immediately placed the
     decedent into his patrol car and drove to Hahnemann University
     Hospital, where the decedent was pronounced dead at 12:07 a.m.
     N.T., 5/16/18, at 7-18.
           Dr. Lindsay Simon, Associate Medical Examiner for the City
     of Philadelphia, performed the autopsy of the decedent. Dr.
     Simon concluded that the decedent had suffered one gunshot
     wound to the top of his head, five gunshot wounds to the back,
     and one gunshot wound to the right side of his neck. All of the
     gunshots were fired from an indeterminate range. The decedent
     also suffered abrasions on his arm caused by broken glass, as well
     as abrasions on his neck, right thigh, and the front of his right
     knee. There were no visible defensive wounds. Dr. Simon
     determined that the manner of death was homicide caused by
     multiple gunshot wounds. N.T., 5/14/18, at 63-95.
           Around 11:45 p.m., Lieutenant Sean Dandridge of the
     Philadelphia Police Department arrived at the River Deck club in
     response to the fight, and he held a brief conversation with the
     manager outside the club. Lieutenant Dandridge then heard eight
     or nine shots in rapid succession. He got into his patrol vehicle
     and drove to a nearby parking lot where an unknown Latino male
     on a dirt bike stopped him, pointed towards [Appellant], and
     shouted, “He just shot my boy.” Lieutenant Dandridge spotted
     [Appellant] running. [Appellant] ignored Lieutenant Dandridge’s

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     commands to get on the ground for eight to ten seconds before
     complying. While Lieutenant Dandridge waited for backup to
     arrive, six males ran up from behind him, converged on
     [Appellant], and began punching and kicking him. Approximately
     thirty seconds later, more police cars arrived, and the other males
     fled.   Lieutenant Dandridge and the other officers detained
     [Appellant], as well as Rice and Renfro, who were nearby, and
     transported them to the homicide unit at the Police Administration
     Building. N.T., 5/17/18, at 147-56.
           At the homicide unit, Detective James Pitts interviewed
     Renfro, who identified [Appellant] as the shooter. Detectives
     Scally and Peterman interviewed Rice, who told them that
     [Appellant] was the only person standing by the SUV during the
     shooting. N.T., 5/15/18, at 145-48; N.T., 5/16/18, at 139-57.
           In the early morning on July 25, 2016, [several officers,
     including] Officer Clyde Frasier of the Crime Scene Unit, arrived
     on the scene. Officer Frasier observed and photographed nine 9-
     millimeter fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”), as well as two bullet
     projectile fragments, blood stains, and shattered glass on the
     sidewalk near the SUV. Officer Frasier submitted the FCCs and
     projectiles to the Firearms Identification Unit. Ballistician Norman
     DeFields received the ballistic evidence and identified all nine FCCs
     as 9-millimeters, including eight Hornady Critical Defense Bullets,
     an expanding hollow-point type of bullet designed to create more
     damage. Officer DeFields determined that the ballistic evidence
     was consistent with someone shooting into the SUV. N.T.,
     5/17/18, at 9-44, 238-52.
            At trial, Renfro testified that he saw [Appellant] shooting
     into the SUV. Rice testified that he did not remember going into
     the River Deck club because he was drunk, and that he only
     remembered being assaulted outside, passing by the SUV, then
     hearing gunshots and running towards the club. He testified that
     he did not see [Appellant] at the SUV, but at the intersection of
     Callowhill and Christopher Columbus streets during the shooting.
     He testified that he did not remember giving a statement to the
     police. Rice’s testimony was impeached at trial by his police
     statement, as well as a video recording of his interview with
     detectives. N.T., 5/15/18, at 133-35; N.T., 5/16/18, at 132-88.
           At trial, [Appellant] presented the testimony of Police
     Officers Patrick Greider and Gregory Neal, who came into contact
     with Jones shortly after the incident. [Appellant] also called to the
     stand independent firearm and forensic consultant Frederick

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      Wentling, who testified that the more a gun is fired, the more
      gunshot residue it causes, and forensic scientist, Hung Le, who
      tested [Appellant’s] clothing and did not find any gunshot residue.
      Additionally, [Appellant] presented the testimony of Fatimot
      Adekanmbi, a member of the DNA laboratory within the City of
      Philadelphia’s Criminalistics Unit, who examined [Appellant’s]
      clothes and did not find the decedent’s DNA. N.T., 5/18/18, at 6-
      13, 26-28, 51, 98-103, 114-19.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/6/18, at 2-5.

      At the conclusion of all evidence, on May 21, 2018, the jury convicted

Appellant of first-degree murder and related firearm offenses.                   See 18

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6108, and 907(a). On May 21, 2018, the trial court

imposed the mandatory term of life in prison for first-degree murder, as well

as a concurrent aggregate term of one year to two years in prison for the

firearm offenses. Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions, which the trial

court denied.

      Appellant filed a timely direct appeal to this Court presenting the

following sole issue: “Did the trial court cause structural error by repeatedly

interjecting its comments during witness testimony and chastising defense

counsel   in    front   of   the   jury,   [and]   deny   Appellant   a   fair    trial?”

Commonwealth v. Braswell, No. 1893 EDA 2018, at *2 (Pa.Super. filed

9/11/19) (unpublished memorandum). This Court found the issue to be

waived and, in the alternative, found no merit to the claim.                 See id.

Accordingly, we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See id. On March

4, 2020, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of

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appeal, and Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the

United States Supreme Court.

       On or about May 28, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA

petition,2 and after Appellant filed a supplemental pro se PCRA petition, the

PCRA court appointed counsel, who sought to withdraw.            Appellant then

retained private counsel, who filed a supplemental PCRA petition on behalf of

Appellant on November 30, 2021.

       On March 15, 2022, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its

intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing; however, Appellant filed

a response, and a supplemental response, in opposition thereto. On July 17,

2022, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, and on August 11, 2022,

the parties filed post-hearing briefs. On August 13, 2022, Appellant filed a

motion for a supplemental PCRA hearing, which the trial court granted, and

on September 9, 2022, the PCRA court held a supplemental evidentiary

hearing.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 2, 2020, ninety days

after our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal
and the time to file a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court
expired. See U.S. Supreme Court Rule 13 (effective January 1, 1990) (stating
that a petition for writ of certiorari to review a judgment of sentence is deemed
timely when it is filed within 90 days). Thereafter, Appellant filed his PCRA
petition on May 28, 2021, which is within one year of when his judgment of
sentence became final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Accordingly,
Appellant’s first PCRA petition was timely filed.

                                           -6-
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      By order entered on November 10, 2022, the PCRA court denied

Appellant’s PCRA petition. The PCRA court filed an opinion in support of its

order on November 14, 2022. This timely, counseled appeal followed on

November 30, 2022. The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement, and consequently, no such statement was filed.

      On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

Questions Presented” (verbatim):

      I.     Whether the PCRA court erred in finding trial counsel was
             not ineffective where trial counsel did not interview and call
             two alibi witnesses?
      II.    Whether the PCRA court erred in finding trial counsel was
             not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress or
             otherwise exclude the prior statements and testimony of
             Robert Renfro and Alex Rice which were coerced by police
             with promises that they would not be charged with murder
             if they gave statements shifting blame for the murder to
             [Appellant]?
      III.   Whether the PCRA court erred in finding that trial counsel
             was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
             closing argument, which relied on a series of false
             misrepresentations in an effort to explain why there was no
             physical evidence implicating [Appellant] in the murder?
      IV.    Whether Appellant was convicted based on the knowing use
             of false testimony by the prosecution team?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (unnecessary bold and capitalization omitted).

      Initially, we note our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief

is limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and

whether that decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn,

597 Pa. 648, 952 A.2d 640, 652 (2008). “We must accord great deference to

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the findings of the PCRA court, and such findings will not be disturbed unless

they have no support in the record.” Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d

247, 249 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

      As relevant here, a PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he

proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence

resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). In reviewing Appellant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, we are mindful that, since there is a presumption

counsel provided effective representation, the defendant bears the burden of

proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282

(2010).

      To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish

“(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of

conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to

effectuate his [client’s] interests; and (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness,

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different.” Id. at 291 (citations omitted).

            We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim
      in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong
      that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the
      applicable facts and circumstances of the case. [C]ounsel cannot
      be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

                                     -8-
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 635 Pa. 665, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (2016)

(citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d

409, 419 (2009) (“A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test

requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”) (citation omitted)).   “A

claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, could

establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707

(Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      Regarding the reasonable basis prong of the ineffective assistance of

counsel test, our Supreme Court has relevantly stated the following:

      When assessing whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his
      act or omission, the question is not whether there were other
      courses of action that counsel could have taken, but whether
      counsel’s decision had any basis reasonably designed to effectuate
      his client’s interest….[T]his cannot be a hindsight evaluation of
      counsel’s performance, but requires an examination of “whether
      counsel made an informed choice, which at the time the decision
      was made reasonably could have been considered to advance and
      protect [the] defendant’s interests.” Our evaluation of counsel’s
      performance is “highly deferential.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 636 Pa. 105, 141 A.3d 440, 463 (2016)

(citations and quotations omitted).

      Further,

             To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that
      there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
      unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
      been different. [A] reasonable probability is a probability that is
      sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
      proceeding.

                                      -9-
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Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (2014) (citations,

quotation marks, and quotations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Gribble,

580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 472 (2004) (“[A] defendant [raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is,

that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it could have

reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.”)

(quotation omitted)).

       In his first issue, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to personally interview3 and call two potential alibi witnesses, Demetrius Tilley

(“Tilley”) and Kyle Lloyd (“Lloyd”), to testify at trial. Appellant contends that,

if called to testify, “[e]ach man [would have] confirmed that Appellant [was]

with him on the date and time of the shooting.”           Appellant’s brief at 15.

Specifically, Appellant avers the two men would have testified they were

standing with Appellant outside of the River Deck club at the time the shooting

began, and Appellant did not have a gun. Id. at 15-16. The Commonwealth

contends Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim fails because he voluntarily waived

the right to call additional witnesses at trial. After a careful review, we agree.

____________________________________________

3 Appellant admits that, at the direction of trial counsel, the defense’s private

investigator interviewed Tilley and Lloyd prior to trial; however, he contends
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to personally interview the two men.
Appellant’s Brief at 15.

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       At Appellant’s jury trial, the following exchange occurred on-the-record

between the trial court and Appellant at the conclusion of all evidence and

before the attorneys’ closing statements:

            THE COURT: Have you made a decision as to whether or not
       you wish to testify?
              [APPELLANT]: No. Not yet, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Okay. Well, the other things that I’m going to
       do is when you come back [from lunch] I’m going to ask you
       whether or not anyone forced you, promised you anything in order
       for you to make your decision.
            Before we take our lunch recess, do you have any questions
       about the right to testify, about your right to testify for me?
              [APPELLANT]: No, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: Are there any witnesses that you wanted
       your attorneys to call that they have not called?
              [APPELLANT]: No.
            THE COURT: All right. So, they’ve presented the case,
       the defense that you’ve asked them to present?
              [APPELLANT]: Yes.

N.T., 5/18/18, at 152 (emphasis added).4

       In Commonwealth v. Mallory, 596 Pa. 172, 941 A.2d 686 (2008), our

Supreme Court held:

       [A]n on-the-record colloquy is a useful procedural tool whenever
       the waiver of any significant right is at issue, constitutional or
       otherwise, e.g., waiver of a trial, waiver of the right to counsel,
       waiver of the right to call witnesses, waiver of the right to
       cross-examine witnesses, waiver of rules-based speedy trial time
       limits, etc.

____________________________________________

4 When the trial court returned from the lunch recess, Appellant waived his

right to testify.

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Mallory, supra, 941 A.2d at 697 (emphasis added).

      Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Paddy, 569 Pa. 47, 800 A.2d 294

(2002), our Supreme Court recognized that “a defendant who makes a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision concerning trial strategy will not

later be heard to complain that trial counsel was ineffective on the basis of

that decision.”   Paddy, supra, 800 A.2d at 316. To hold otherwise, the

Supreme Court indicated, “would allow a defendant to build into his case a

ready-made ineffectiveness claim to be raised in the event of an adverse

verdict.” Id. In Paddy, the defendant complained of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness for failing to call alibi witnesses, in response to which our

Supreme Court held that “this ineffectiveness claim fails for the fundamental

reason that Paddy agreed at trial to his attorney’s decision not to call the

witnesses in question.” Paddy, supra, 800 A.2d at 315.

      Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 649 Pa. 293, 196 A.3d

130 (2018), our Supreme Court was asked to determine whether an

appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present a witness at trial

to impeach another witness’s trial testimony. In concluding the appellant was

not entitled to relief on the ineffectiveness claim, our Supreme Court noted

the following colloquy occurred during the appellant’s trial:

      The Court: Now, sir, are there any witnesses that you wanted to
      call or anything that you discussed with [trial counsel] that is not
      going to happen at this trial? And I know that there's a few
      witnesses that are going to be called, and why don't we just state
      for the record who those are.

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J-S18045-23

      [Trial Counsel]: Judge, I intend to call Police Officer Kevin Fant, F-
      A-N-T, and Detective Gregory Rodden, R-O-D-D-E-N, who was the
      assigned detective in this case. And we may call the crime scene
      detective who did the crime scene, Detective David Baker and
      Detective George Fetters. Detective Fetters has not yet arrived.
      We've only interviewed Detective Baker.
      The Court: Okay. So those are all the police witnesses. Were there
      any other names that you gave to [trial counsel] for the trial
      portion of this case, not the penalty phase, that you expected to
      testify and whose names just did not hear mentioned?
      [Brown]: Negative.
      The Court: All right. And are you satisfied with the representation
      that you have received from your counsel.
      [Brown]: Yes.

Brown, supra, 196 A.3d at 173–74 (citation to record omitted).

      Applying the reasoning of Mallory and Paddy, our Supreme Court held:

            Brown asserts that trial counsel should have presented
      another witness, Akines-Harris, to impeach Anderson’s
      credibility.
                                   ***
             As the record reflects, Brown participated in a colloquy at
      which he was advised of all of the witnesses his trial counsel
      intended to call in his defense, and he expressly acknowledged
      that after consulting with trial counsel, there were no other
      witnesses he wanted to testify on his behalf. As Brown voluntarily
      agreed that he did not want to call any other witnesses, he cannot
      now complain about trial counsel’s failure to call Akines-Harris to
      testify.

Brown, supra, 196 A.3d at 174.

      In the case sub judice, similar to as occurred in Brown, Appellant

participated in a colloquy at trial in which he specifically confirmed there were

no other witnesses he wanted his trial attorneys to call, and the defense

presented the case, which Appellant wanted them to present. N.T., 5/18/18,

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at 152.    Since Appellant voluntarily agreed he was satisfied with the case

presented by his attorneys, and there were no other witnesses he wanted his

attorneys to call, he cannot now complain about his attorneys’ failure to

investigate further and call Tilley or Lloyd to testify. Thus, Appellant is not

entitled   to   relief   on   this   claim.   See     Brown,    supra.   See   also

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 762 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa.Super. 2000) (in

rejecting claim trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and call

additional witnesses at trial, the court held the appellant voluntarily waived

his right to call witnesses at trial during a colloquy, so he could not later claim

ineffective assistance or purport he was coerced by counsel).

      In his next issue, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to file a motion seeking to suppress or otherwise exclude Renfro’s and Rice’s

prior statements, as well as their testimony. Appellant avers the “testimony

and statements of Renfro and Rice were tainted by police misconduct including

promises of immunity from prosecution if they were willing to shift the blame

to Appellant.”     Appellant’s Brief at 24.       Intertwined within this argument,

Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure the jury was

aware that detectives allegedly coerced Renfro’s and Rice’s statements, which

implicated Appellant.

      In concluding Appellant is not entitled to relief, the PCRA court relevantly

indicated the following:

             [Appellant] alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for
      failing to insist that the jury be informed that Renfro’s and Rice’s

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      testimony [and statements] were corrupted by police promises.
      This claim [is meritless] as the jury was informed of the police’s
      alleged promises to Renfro and Rice on cross-examination. Trial
      counsel conducted an extensive cross-examination of Renfro
      wherein he questioned Renfro about his statement to the police
      following the shooting and the circumstances surrounding his
      statements. Trial counsel questioned Renfro about his prior
      testimony at the preliminary hearing when he stated that police
      told him he would not be charged if he cooperated. At trial, Rice
      claimed that he did not remember his statement to the police
      despite being shown his signed statement and a videotape of the
      interview. Detective Timothy Scally was called to testify regarding
      Rice’s statement, and he testified that no promises or threats were
      made to Rice to coerce his statement. The [trial] court also
      provided a jury instruction regarding witness credibility informing
      the jurors that they “may consider whether the witness had any
      potential bias or interest and whether the witness testified for the
      prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case.” N.T.,
      5/16/18, at 37-40, 50-51, 152-53; N.T., 5/17/18, at 85; N.T.,
      5/21/18, at 15.
             In his [next] claim, [Appellant] assert[s] that trial counsel
      was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress or exclude
      the statements of Renfro and Rice based on the alleged police
      coercion….The statements [of Renfro and Rice] were properly
      admitted at trial as a prior consistent statement for Renfro and a
      prior inconsistent statement for Rice, who claimed that he did not
      remember ever giving a statement to the police. Trial counsel
      cannot be found to be ineffective for failing to raise a baseless or
      frivolous claim. Since a motion to suppress or exclude would have
      been frivolous, trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to file it.
      [Appellant’s] ineffectiveness claim lacks arguable merit.
             Even if this claim had arguable merit, it would still fail as
      [Appellant] has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable
      probability that the result of the proceedings would have been
      different if Renfro’s and Rice’s statements [and testimony] were
      suppressed or excluded….[Appellant] was…identified as the
      shooter by Gorczynski and Jonathon Jones (“Jones”) at trial.

PCRA Court Opinion, filed 11/14/22, at 24-25.

      We agree with the PCRA court’s sound reasoning. Regarding Appellant’s

claim trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure the jury was aware of

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alleged police coercion as it relates to Renfro and Rice, the record is clear the

jury heard the circumstances surrounding Renfro’s and Rice’s statements.

Simply put, trial counsel extensively cross-examined Renfro and Rice about

their police statements,5 thus there is no merit to the underlying

ineffectiveness claim. See Johnson, supra (holding trial counsel cannot be

ineffective if underlying claim is meritless).

       Moreover, as it relates to Appellant’s claim trial counsel was ineffective

in seeking to suppress or exclude the statements and testimony of Renfro and

Rice based on alleged police coercion, we agree with the PCRA court there is

____________________________________________

5 At trial, Renfro testified on direct examination by the Commonwealth that

Appellant was the shooter. On cross-examination, trial counsel asked Renfro
whether the police told him that if he cooperated with the Commonwealth he
would not be charged, and Renfro answered, “I don’t recall.” N.T., 5/16/18,
at 37. Accordingly, trial counsel confronted Renfro with his preliminary
hearing testimony in which Renfro testified the police told him that, if he
cooperated, he would not be charged. Id. at 38-39. Renfro acknowledged he
testified in such a manner at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 39-40. Renfro
also admitted during cross-examination that he cooperated with the police
because he didn’t want to be charged with a murder. Id.
       At trial, Rice testified on direct examination by the Commonwealth that
he remembered hearing gunshots at the time in question, but he didn’t
remember anything else about the shooting. Id. at 137. He testified on direct
that he did not remember talking to homicide detectives or making a
statement, let alone a statement that incriminated Appellant. Id. at 138-39.
When the Commonwealth confronted him with his police statement, which was
inconsistent with his trial testimony, Rice testified he did not remember
making the statement. Id. at 138-60. On cross-examination, trial counsel
asked Rice about the shooting, and Rice indicated he had no memory of where
Appellant was located during the shooting. Id. at 201. The Commonwealth
then presented the testimony of Detective Scally, who testified he did not
promise Rice anything or threaten him to give a statement. N.T., 5/17/18, at
85.

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no merit to the underlying claim.    Simply put, Appellant did not meet his

burden of demonstrating Renfro and Rice were “coerced” by the police, and

there was no basis for trial counsel to seek exclusion of their statements or

testimony on this basis. See id.

      Additionally, we agree with the trial court that, assuming, arguendo,

there is arguable merit to Appellant’s claim, he failed to demonstrate

prejudice. Given the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, including the

eyewitness testimony of Gorczynski and Jones, who identified Appellant as the

shooter, Appellant has not demonstrated that “but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Spotz,

supra, 84 A.3d at 311-12 (citations, quotation marks, and quotations

omitted).

      In his next issue, Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to object to statements made by the prosecutor during closing

argument. Appellant avers the prosecutor improperly made false statements

to explain why there was no physical evidence implicating Appellant in the

murder. He concludes these false statements were highly prejudicial.

      We analyze Appellant’s underlying claim with the following relevant legal

precepts in mind:

            In accord with the long-standing principle that a “prosecutor
      must be free to present his or her arguments with logical force
      and vigor,” this Court has permitted prosecutorial advocacy “as
      long as there is a reasonable basis in the record for the
      [prosecutor’s] comments.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 581
      Pa. 154, 864 A.2d 460, 516–17 (2004). Prosecutorial comments

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       based on the evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom are not
       objectionable, nor are comments that merely constitute oratorical
       flair. Furthermore, the prosecution must be permitted to respond
       to defense counsel’s arguments. Id. Any challenged prosecutorial
       comment must not be viewed in isolation, but rather must be
       considered in the context in which it was offered. Robinson,
       supra, 864 A.2d at 517.
             It is improper for a prosecutor to offer his or her personal
       opinion as to the guilt of the accused or the credibility of any
       testimony. Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d
       102, 112 (2004). However, it is well within the bounds of proper
       advocacy for the prosecutor to summarize the facts of the case
       and then ask the jury to find the accused guilty based on those
       facts. See id.
            The standard by which the court considers allegations of
       improper prosecutorial comments is a stringent one:
              Comments by a prosecutor constitute reversible error
              only where their unavoidable effect is to prejudice the
              jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility
              toward the defendant such that they could not weigh
              the evidence objectively and render a fair verdict.

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111, 1146-47 (2011)

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

       In the case sub judice, Appellant avers the prosecutor misrepresented

the evidence when “she stated that Appellant obtained a gun from his blue

Acura, which was parked in the club’s parking lot.” Appellant’s Brief at 28.

Appellant also avers the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence when she

“told the jury that Appellant threw the gun into the river.”6 Id.

____________________________________________

6 We note with disapproval that Appellant has not set forth the place in the

certified record where the prosecutor made the statements, which he is now
challenging. However, the PCRA court has set forth specific page numbers in
its opinion, and, thus, we shall refer to the relevant passages appearing at
those cited page numbers in our analysis.

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      Regarding the first challenged statement, in context, the prosecutor

indicated the following:

             The Defendant—the video stops at 11:32. That’s as much
      video as we had from the organization, the club, 11:32.
             If I do my math right…that should be 13 minutes away from
      11:45. But if I messed it up, you all can do the math.
             So, the Defendant had 13 minutes to go from the club to his
      car to get the gun. And that’s where the gun was, he wasn’t
      partying with the gun on his waist. The gun was in the car. He
      went to the car, and he got that gun because his car, that little
      blue Acura, was parked in the lot. That same lot that he went to,
      to try to run back to, to get away from.

N.T., 5/18/18, at 240-41.

      Regarding the second challenged statement, in context, the prosecutor

indicated the following:

           Let’s deal with—let’s deal with the chase for a minute before
      we go to identification.
            Zack [Gorczynski] said he chased the Defendant down
      Callowhill, across Delaware, Columbus Avenue and saw him toss
      a gun.
              Now, the cops said, “We looked for the gun, but we couldn’t
      find it. If it was a little to the left, we could have missed it. A
      little to the right, we could have missed it. We got on our hands
      and our knees, on August 8th, and we tried to find it, but we
      couldn’t find it.”
            We know he had a gun because he is the only person ever,
      ever, ever, ever, ever that any of the witnesses said that they saw
      shooting.
            We know Officer Frasier searched that area thoroughly for a
      gun; up the street, under cars, around and so on and so forth.
      And we also know that the river is right there. Right there
      (indicating).
           And the testimony of Gorczynski was that the Defendant
      threw that gun away even before he got to [Lieutenant]
      Dandridge, before he got to Dandridge.

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Id. at 226-27.

      In analyzing these passages, and concluding Appellant was not entitled

to relief on his ineffectiveness claim, the PCRA court indicated the following:

            [Appellant] has failed to show that trial counsel was
      ineffective because the statements made by the prosecutor were
      not improper and did not violate any constitutionally or statutorily
      protected right. The comments made by the prosecutor during
      closing argument were supported by or were fair inferences from
      the evidence presented at trial. The prosecutor’s remarks were
      also fair responses to comments made by trial counsel during
      closing argument.
             The prosecutor’s comment about [Appellant] retrieving a
      gun from his car before the shooting was proper as it is based
      upon a reasonable inference from the evidence presented at trial.
      The prosecutor’s comment is based on the amount of time
      between when [Appellant] left the club and when the shooting
      occurred. Surveillance video from the River Deck club showed
      [Appellant] leaving the club at approximately 11:32 p.m. A police
      radio call reported gunshots fired at about 11:45 p.m. Renfro also
      provided testimony that [Appellant] did not have a gun at the club
      prior to the shooting, and Renfro did not know where [Appellant]
      was between leaving the club and the shooting. The prosecutor’s
      comment was a fair inference from the evidence presented that
      [Appellant] retrieved a gun from his car before the shooting. N.T.,
      5/15/18, at 196-98; N.T., 5/16/18, at 7-8, 101, 104-05; N.T.,
      5/18/18, at 241.
                                   ***
            The prosecutor’s references to [Appellant] throwing a gun
      into the river were permissible because they were based on
      evidence introduced at trial. Although the Philadelphia Police
      Marine Unit conducted a search of the river and failed to find a
      gun, the prosecutor’s references were supported by Gorczynski’s
      testimony. At trial, Gorczynski stated that he saw [Appellant]
      throw a gun into the river as he was chasing him. The prosecutor’s
      references were also a fair response to trial counsel’s closing
      argument in which he stated that Gorczynski’s testimony that he
      saw [Appellant] throw the gun in the river should not be credited.
      N.T., 5/14/18, at 129, 185; N.T., 5/18/18, at 187-88, 226-27.

                                     - 20 -
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                                        ***
              [Appellant] has also failed to establish that the prosecutor’s
       comments prejudiced him. None of the prosecutor’s statements
       during closing argument violated any of [Appellant’s]
       constitutional or statutory rights. The prosecutor’s statements
       were not so prejudicial that they caused the jury to form a bias or
       hostility toward [Appellant] that would make them incapable of
       weighing the evidence and rendering a verdict in a fair manner.
       Additionally, the [trial] court instructed the jury repeatedly that
       the questions and arguments of counsel are not to be considered
       evidence. Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.
       See Commonwealth v. Aikens, 641 Pa. 351, 168 A.3d 137, 143
       (2017); N.T., 5/14/18, at 26, 30-31; N.T., 5/18/18, at 167. As
       the prosecutor’s comments were not improper and did not
       prejudice [Appellant], trial counsel was not ineffective for failing
       to object.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 22-24 (citation omitted).

       We agree with the PCRA court’s sound reasoning. Simply put, the

prosecutor’s statements were based on fair and reasonable inferences arising

from the testimony and evidence presented during trial, as well as a fair

response     to   the   defense’s    closing   argument.7   See   Chmiel,   supra.

Accordingly, there was no basis for trial counsel to object. Id. Moreover, as

the PCRA court indicated, the trial court’s jury instruction, which indicated the

____________________________________________

7 For example, during closing argument, defense counsel suggested Appellant

did not have a gun during the time of the shooting since the River Deck club
pats people down for weapons before they enter the club, and Appellant had
just exited the club before the shooting occurred. N.T., 5/18/18, at 183. Also,
during closing argument, defense counsel pointed to Gorczynski’s testimony
that Appellant dropped the gun in the water by the parking lot, and defense
counsel indicated, “We know that ain’t so.” Id. at 187. The prosecutor was
permitted to make arguments during closing, which were a fair response to
the defense arguments and supported by the record. See Chmiel, supra.

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attorneys’ arguments are not evidence, cured any potential prejudice. See

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 576 Pa. 299, 839 A.2d 226, 244 (2003) (holding

a trial court’s instruction that a prosecutor’s comments do not constitute

evidence removed any prejudice, as the jury is presumed to follow the court’s

instructions; counsel was not ineffective for failing to object). Thus, Appellant

is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Ali,

supra.

       In his final issue, Appellant claims he has “new evidence” that the

prosecutor permitted false testimony against Appellant at trial. Specifically,

he contends he has discovered “Detective Pitts has been charged with two

counts of felony perjury.”8 Appellant’s Brief at 30.      He reasons that Pitts’

misconduct in an unrelated case is evidence that Pitts must have “engaged in

objective police misconduct designed to corrupt [Appellant’s] trial by offering

immunity to a person in exchange for testimony shifting the blame to another

person.” Id.

       Initially, we note that a claim of after-discovered evidence is cognizable

under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).

       To obtain relief based upon newly-discovered evidence under the
       PCRA, [the petitioner] must establish that: (1) the evidence has
       been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained at
       or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is
____________________________________________

8 Appellant does not explain when he learned of the charges against Detective

Pitts in the unrelated case. However, the PCRA court notes Detective Pitts
was charged on March 3, 2022, which was during the pendency of Appellant’s
instant PCRA petition.

                                          - 22 -
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      not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach
      credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.

Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586, 595–96

(2007).

      The standard on PCRA review is whether “the new evidence ‘would have

changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.’” Commonwealth

v. Soto, 983 A.2d 212, 216 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(2)(vi)). Where, as here, the claim is based on the improprieties of an

investigating police officer, the petitioner must demonstrate a nexus between

the improprieties and the petitioner’s claim for relief. See Commonwealth

v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532 (Pa.Super. 2012).

      In rejecting Appellant’s claim of after-discovered evidence, the PCRA

court relevantly indicated the following:

            [Appellant] raised [an] issue alleging misconduct by
      Detective James Pitts, who conducted Renfro’s police
      interview….This claim amounts to an after-discovered evidence
      claim.
                                  ***
             On March 3, 2022, Detective Pitts was charged with two
      counts of felony perjury. Detective Pitts is alleged to have
      physically assaulted a defendant in another case to obtain a
      confession and later lied about the interaction during his
      testimony at [the defendant’s] trial. Although Detective Pitts
      conducted Renfro’s interview, [Appellant] has not presented any
      factual averments which show any misconduct by Detective Pitts
      in this case. [Appellant] has not alleged with any specificity any
      actions taken by Detective Pitts which would amount to
      misconduct. Renfro’s interview was recorded, and the video does
      not show any inappropriate conduct by the police throughout the
      interview. Renfro’s testimony at trial was consistent with his
      statement to the police, and Renfro has never alleged that there

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     was any misconduct by any of the detectives involved in his
     interview.
           [Appellant] is not entitled to relief based on Detective Pitts’
     alleged misconduct in an unrelated case. At most, [Appellant’s]
     claim of misconduct by Detective Pitts could only be used to
     impeach the credibility of Renfro. See Commonwealth v.
     Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1123 (Pa.Super. 2018) (filing of
     criminal charges against detectives in an unrelated matter does
     not meet the after-discovered evidence test since such evidence
     would be used solely to impeach).
            Even without Renfro’s testimony, a different verdict is not
     likely if a new trial were granted in this case. As [Appellant] has
     failed to establish that the evidence would not be solely used to
     impeach the credibility of a witness, and that there is no
     reasonable probability that the introduction of the evidence would
     result in a different verdict, [Appellant’s] after-discovered
     evidence claim concerning Detective Pitts fails.

PCRA Court Opinion, filed 11/14/22, at 25-27.

     We agree with the PCRA court’s sound reasoning. Absent proof that

Detective Pitts committed misconduct in Appellant’s case, the evidence of his

misconduct in an unrelated case could only be used for impeachment purposes

if Appellant were granted a new trial. Washington, supra. Also, given

overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, including          the eyewitness

identification testimony of Gorczynski and Jones, Appellant has failed to

demonstrate this “new evidence” would likely compel a different verdict. Id.

Thus, Appellant cannot satisfy the after-discovered evidence test. See

Johnson, supra.

     For all of the aforementioned reasons, we affirm.

     Affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/1/2023

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