Court Opinion

ID: 9390698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:04:54.277367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.284313
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0550-MR

STEVE WILSON                                                         APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 21-CI-00477

OLDHAM COUNTY FISCAL COURT;
BOB DYE; BRENT LIKINS; CHRIS
HAUNZ; DAVID VOEGELE; KEVIN
WOOSLEY; MICHAEL LOGSDON;
STEPHANIE HAWKINS; STEVE
GREENWELL; AND WAYNE THEISS                                           APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND ECKERLE,
JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Steve Wilson (“Wilson”), a taxpayer and resident of Oldham

County, filed a declaration of rights petition on September 28, 2021 objecting to

the process and decision of the Oldham County Fiscal Court (“Fiscal Court”) to
relocate and demolish part of the courthouse building in Oldham County. Naming

the individual members of the Fiscal Court in their official capacity, he asserted

that they had failed to conduct a mandatory public facilities review before the

demolition and construction began, in violation of both Kentucky Revised Statutes

(“KRS”) 100.324(4) and a local ordinance. The Oldham County circuit judge

recused himself from this matter, and it was referred to Judge Hickman of Shelby

County.

             The Fiscal Court and its individual members moved for dismissal, and

alternatively, for summary judgment. Their arguments were primarily addressed to

the jurisdiction of the court, due to lack of standing. The trial court entered an

opinion and order granting dismissal on counts one, two, and three and granting

summary judgment on count four. At the time of its ruling, the trial court noted the

demolition had already occurred and progressed such that the historic portion of

the courthouse had been lifted and relocated to be incorporated into the new

courthouse building, and that Wilson did lack standing. This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

              We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment – and motions

to dismiss – de novo “and any factual findings will be upheld if supported by

substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.” Bradley v. Commonwealth ex rel.

Cameron, 653 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Ky. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks

                                          -2-
omitted). “Whether a party has standing is a jurisdictional question of law that is

reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. B.H., 548 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky.

2018)).

             We begin, however, with an eye toward the Declaratory Judgment Act

(“the Act”) – specifically, KRS 418.045 – as the complaint alleged an action to

declare Wilson’s rights under the Act. This Court has discussed that “[t]he

condition precedent to a declaration of rights is the existence of an actual

controversy respecting a justiciable issue . . . .” Veith v. City of Louisville, 355

S.W.2d 295, 298 (Ky. 1962) (citation omitted). What constitutes “[j]usticiability

turns on evaluating both the appropriateness of the issues for decision [ ] and the

hardship of denying judicial relief[,]” or the impossibility of granting the same.

Combs v. Matthews, 364 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Ky. 1963) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); see also Revis v. Daugherty, 215 Ky. 823, 287 S.W. 28

(1926). A litigant must demonstrate an actual legal interest to establish

constitutional standing to seek judgment under the Act. See Bradley, 653 S.W.3d

at 877 (citation omitted).

             In Bradley, the Kentucky Supreme Court was faced with an action

filed by a taxpayer and resident objecting to the elimination of a circuit court

division by the legislature. Id. at 874. The plaintiff contended that she was a

candidate interested in seeking the very judicial office which had been eliminated.

                                          -3-
Id. at 878. Still, the Court held that she had not alleged a concrete and

particularized injury-in-fact sufficient to confer constitutional standing in her

individual capacity. Id.

             Prior to Bradley, the high Court had adopted the federal constitutional

standing doctrine in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130,

119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Bradley, 653 S.W.3d at 877 (citing Commonwealth

Cabinet for Health and Fam. Servs., Dep’t of Medicaid Servs. v. Sexton, by and

through Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Ky. 2018)).

Lujan, in summary, held that a party must demonstrate standing as defined by three

requirements: injury, causation, and redressability. See Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at

192. As for injury, Wilson must be able to articulate a right or claim personal to

him and not simply a grievance he shares in common with other taxpayers, i.e., a

generalized grievance. See Ward v. Westerfield, 653 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky. 2022).

             In Ward, the Kentucky Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to a

ballot initiative, presented by a taxpayer and resident as well as the Kentucky

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Id. at 50-51. The high Court again

found no standing present for those parties. Id. at 52. Citing Lujan, the Ward

Court emphasized that the party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing injury, causation, and redressability, and of establishing that the

alleged injury harmed them in a concrete and particularized manner. Id. at 51-52.

                                          -4-
“To have constitutional standing, a ‘plaintiff must have suffered an injury in

fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at

51 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136).

             Here, although the trial court’s decision was issued just prior to

Bradley and Ward, it is very much in keeping with those recent decisions and with

Sexton, upon which it relied. For those reasons, we affirm. The trial court held

that Wilson had not met his burden of establishing that the alleged deficiencies in

the review process conducted by the Fiscal Court harmed him in any concrete and

particularized manner. Instead, Wilson’s claims constitute non-justiciable

generalized grievances, because the harms he asserted were generally shared in

equal measure by all residents and taxpayers of Oldham County. On appeal,

Wilson contends that he has an interest in ensuring that his elected representatives

adhere to the law. However, this argument has clearly been rejected and found

insufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction.

             Wilson cites to Bluegrass Pipeline Company, LLC v. Kentuckians

United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc., 478 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Ky. App. 2015),

where we found that litigants did have standing to question whether the pipeline

company possessed the power of eminent domain. However, those litigants’

individual rights were at risk since the company was actively negotiating with

                                           -5-
landowners at the time of filing. Id. at 390. Without court clarification as to

whether the company had the right to negotiate or the right to simply take the

properties, the company would have an “unfair advantage during the negotiation

process.” Id.

                The case at bar is quite distinguishable from Bluegrass Pipeline

because, here, there is only a general complaint that actions have been taken

inconsistent with the statutes; however, there is no evidence that Wilson or anyone

else is at risk of harm or injury, even if that is true. Again, as set forth in Sexton,

when the asserted harm is a “generalized grievance” shared in substantially equal

measure by a large class of citizens, that harm alone does not warrant exercise of

jurisdiction.

                “[T]axpayers in Kentucky, on behalf of themselves, have been

permitted to sue government bodies or their agents to challenge the propriety of

city, county, or state tax or expenditure of public funds” as a matter of equity.

Overstreet v. Mayberry, 603 S.W.3d 244, 263 (Ky. 2020). In Overstreet, the

plaintiffs were members of the Kentucky Retirement System who brought claims

against trustees of the fund for alleged funding losses and breach of fiduciary

duties. Id. at 249-50. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that they

lacked standing as well. Id. at 249. Even taxpayer claims require a legally

cognizable injury for which the law provides a remedy, and the injury must still be

                                           -6-
particularized to the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Id. at 252. As

such, Wilson did not establish an injury.

             Additionally, the issue Wilson attempts to raise is not redressable.

This Court has explained that “[p]ublic wrongs or neglect or breach of public duty

cannot be redressed at a suit in the name of an individual . . . whose interest in the

right asserted does not differ from that of the public generally, or who suffers

injury in common with the public generally[.]” Wegener v. Wehrman, 312 Ky.

445, 227 S.W.2d 997, 998 (1950) (citation omitted).

             Similarly, while Wilson asserts that he has now expended some

personal funds to hire an expert or planner to provide a different design for the

courthouse, those expenditures do not create a right to relief or a substantial

concrete injury as Overstreet and Ward confirm. In Ward, the Court reiterated that

justiciability in the context of a taxpayer’s action still requires the taxpayer to

present an interest that is direct, pecuniary, and substantial. Ward, 653 S.W.3d at

56 (citation omitted). A generalized interest in the proper administration of the

law, which Wilson claims did not occur here, is simply not sufficient. Sexton, 566

S.W.3d at 197 (citation omitted).

             Further, redressability is a significant burden that Wilson cannot meet

in this case. While he argues that the courthouse construction is far from complete,

the fact is that the annex has been demolished; the historic courthouse has been

                                            -7-
lifted from its foundation and moved; and the design and construction is well under

way with approval from the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Project

Development Board, and the Fiscal Court, charged with the building of the new

courthouse. While Wilson complains that recommendations might have been

made to the Fiscal Court by the planning commission, and asserts that this review

was required under KRS 100.324, nothing this Court could order would alter the

reality of this situation. His attorney conceded that there were no damages in fact

being claimed, and the only relief being sought was “procedural,” i.e., for the

Fiscal Court to submit the plan to the planning and zoning commission. This

action was not filed until after the demolition and moving of the historical structure

had already occurred.

             Finally, that brings us to the defense of mootness, which serves as

additional grounds to uphold the trial court’s decision. As our courts have long

recognized, “[a] ‘moot case’ is one which seeks to get a judgment . . . upon some

matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect

upon a then existing controversy.” Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Ky.

2014) (emphasis in original) (citing Benton v. Clay, 192 Ky. 497, 233 S.W. 1041,

1042 (1921)). Wilson’s complaint essentially seeks to enjoin activities that have

already occurred, so it would have no legal effect for this Court to render an

advisory opinion. “[Q]uestions which may never arise or which are merely

                                         -8-
advisory, academic, hypothetical, incidental or remote, or which will not be

decisive of a present controversy” have been held to not present justiciable

controversies. Hughes v. Welch, 664 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Ky. App. 1984).

             While Wilson complains of a deficient procedural process, we are not

convinced he could prevail if he did possess standing. This Court has consistently

held that KRS 100.324(4) only requires the state, or in this case, the Fiscal Court,

to submit proposals for review to the planning commission. If it does apply,

KRS 100.324(4) requires a mandatory review, but only voluntary compliance by

the referring body. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140

S.W.3d 584, 590 (Ky. App. 2004). It is free to proceed with its proposal, even if

objections were presented. Id. The statute does not guarantee any right to be heard

to citizens nor mandate compliance with any planning commission proposal. Even

if Wilson could meet the burdens outlined above to establish standing, any future

relief would be barred as moot or speculative. The building is under construction;

the historic portion has already been moved; and the Fiscal Court was free to

proceed with its proposal.

             We are unable to envision any relief that could follow from a decision

favorable to Wilson. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling of the

Oldham Circuit Court.

                                         -9-
           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Randal A. Strobo           Carol S. Petitt
Clay A. Barkley            Kyle M. Vaughn
Julia D. Taylor            Ronnie W. Mills
Louisville, Kentucky       Peewee Valley, Kentucky

                         -10-