Court Opinion

ID: 9567206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:50:33.983517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:24.842612
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(specially concurring in part and dissenting in part):
While I agree with much of the majority opinion, particularly in the first two sections, I am compelled to specially concur in the first two parts and dissent as to the third section.
I agree that a fair construction of the appropriate Arizona statutes grants the grand jury the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum for corporate records. Where I disagree with the majority is in the conditions which must be met before this power of the grand jury may be exerted: certain procedural aspects of when and how the subpoenas may be issued are discussed infra. I also agree with the majority that the courts should not and may not unduly interfere or hamper grand jury investigations. Records such as those in the instant case must be inspected under conditions where experts can properly carry out their functions.
My problem arises because I read the majority opinion to say that there are no limits on whose records the Attorney General or the grand jury can take and peruse and that the Attorney General need not consult with the grand jury in any way before issuing a subpoena duces tecum. There are, however, limits on the power of the Attorney General to issue subpoenas pursuant to A.R.S. § 21-427(C), and the Superior Court has the authority to hold the grand jury and the Attorney General within these limits. The limits are mandated by the State Grand Jury Statute passed by the Arizona Legislature and by Article 2, §§ 4 and 8 of the Arizona Constitution as well as by previous ruling of this Court.
When the Legislature passed a bill authorizing a statewide grand jury, I am sure it did not mean that the Attorney General could act as if the statute were a direct authorization for that office to grab the business records of any corporation it saw fit to investigate. Nor, indeed, would the Arizona Constitution allow such summary and arbitrary action on the part of the State. In a well reasoned 1966 opinion (see Wales v. Tax Commission, infra) this Court set down guidelines for grand jury investigations which the majority opinion ignores.
STATUTORY LIMITS
In 1975 the Arizona Legislature passed a state grand jury bill, now 7 A.R.S. §§ 21-421 et seq., granting such grand juries the authority to investigate the offenses listed in § 21-422(B), including securities and land fraud and other crimes of statewide importance. This statute makes it clear that while the Attorney General of Arizona is responsible for requesting that a grand jury be convened, § 21—421(B), and for presentation of evidence to the grand jury, § 21-424, and for prosecuting all indictments returned by the grand jury, § 21—427(B), the Attorney General is in many ways the servant of the Grand Jury. Section 21—427(A) states that “[t]he attorney general or his designee, shall attend the state grand jury in the manner prescribed by § 21-408” which states in part:
“§ 21—408 Attendance of prosecuting attorney
A. The county attorney or other prosecuting officer shall attend the grand jurors when requested by them, and may do so although not requested for the purpose of examining witnesses, in their presence, or of giving the grand jurors legal advice regarding any matter cognizable by them. He shall also, when requested by them, draft indictments and cause process to issue for the attendance of witnesses and other evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
And § 21—427(C) states that “[t]he attorney general or his designee shall have authority to issue subpoenas for witnesses statewide for the grand jury in accordance with the *267provisions of title 13, article 2, chapter 7” (emphasis added) which states in part:
“§ 13—1821 Subpoena; issuance; duty of clerk
******
B. The subpoena may be signed and issued:
1. By a magistrate before whom a complaint is laid for witnesses, either on behalf of the state or defendant.
2. By the county attorney for witnesses for the prosecution, or for such other witnesses as the grand jury upon an investigation pending before it may direct, or for witnesses on an indictment or information to appear before the court in which the indictment or information is to be tried.
3. By the clerk of the court in which an indictment or information is to be tried.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The above statutory provisions make it clear that while the Attorney General has an important role, it is the grand jury that is the decision making body.1
The very fact that the Legislature passed the grand jury bill indicates that the Legislators intended to interpose the citizen members of the grand jury between the government prosecutor and the individual suspected of wrongdoing. Some states have statutes allowing the Attorney General to investigate on his own, e. g. Ark.Stats. §§ 43-801—43-803 (1964). That our Legislature did not choose that path shows that they wished the grand jury to play its traditional role as a shield, protecting the innocent from ill-founded prosecution and harassment.2
For the foregoing reasons I find that the Legislature intended the Attorney General to consult with the grand jury before instituting an investigation by issuing a subpoena duces tecum such as the one here. If the Attorney General has good reason to investigate a crime he must communicate with the grand jury so that body can authorize an investigation. Then when a subpoena is issued pursuant to A.R.S. § 21-427 there will truly be a grand jury investigation as contemplated by the State Grand Jury Statute; the grand jury can act as a check on potential abuse.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
Not only is the Attorney General required to act through—not independently of—the grand jury but due process and fairness require that the board and even awesome powers of the grand jury must not be summoned unless there is some reason on record to justify involving an individual citizen or a corporation in an investigation. •As this Court stated in Wales v. Tax Commission, 100 Ariz. 181, 183-84, 412 P.2d 472, 474 (1966):
“As stated, the response suggests that the Pima County Grand Jury is presently investigating certain named individuals. The function of a grand jury is to investigate criminal offenses, not the conduct of individuals. Rule 92, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. It is not permitted to speculate that some person might have committed an offense and, therefore, to investigate individuals to determine what, if any, offenses may possibly have been committed by them.
*268‘Investigations [by grand juries] for purely speculative purposes are odious and oppressive and should not be tolerated by law. Before they may be instituted, there must be knowledge or information that a crime has been committed. There is no power to institute or prosecute an inquiry on chance or speculation that some crime may be discovered. Matter of Morse, 42 Misc. 664, 87 N.Y.S. 721.’ Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 504, 106 A.L.R. 1373. (Emphasis supplied.)
Such investigations are plainly tyrannical, lending themselves to abuses for politically or maliciously inspired purposes. They are beyond the scope of the inquisitorial powers of a grand jury and are not to be allowed.”
Two provisions of our State Constitution underlie the requirement that grand jury investigations be instituted only upon some sort of reasonable basis. The first pertinent provision, Article 2, § 4 states:
“§ 4 Due process of law
Section 4. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
It is unchallenged that at least some due process requirements apply to grand jury proceedings. E. g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906); People v. DiPonio, 48 Mich.App. 128, 210 N.W.2d 105 (1973). Conceding that the grand jury’s function is to investigate and that therefore it must have wide latitude, still due process in Arizona requires at a minimum that there be some reason for instituting an investigation in the first place. Nationwide news media focus on land fraud, for example, is not a constitutionally sufficient reason to investigate, a particular Arizona land sales corporation. The grand jury must have before it some indication of criminal fraud and some indication of that particular corporation’s possible connection with the crime. Such a prerequisite is not only mandated by the constitutional provision but will also in no way hamper the grand jury’s investigative function.
The second pertinent constitutional provision states:
“§ 8 Right to privacy
Section 8. No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”
A subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury, such as the one in this case, can be a very great intrusion. Such an intrusion is authorized by law only in the circumstances described above: when the grand jury has some indication that a crime has been committed.
I am fully aware that this particular opinion deals with a subpoena duces tecum served on a corporation, not upon an individual person. I am also fully aware that the federal courts, particularly in the grand jury context, have ruled that many federal constitutional rights do not apply to corporations. E. g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946) (self incrimination).
Such rulings may be both logical and just when it is merely the corporation’s property which is at stake, for example when the criminal penalty is a fine. But when individual persons are subject to incarceration, then it is a cruel and unjust fiction to talk about the corporation not having a constitutional right; for it is a person who may have to go to prison. This State is free to provide an individual with greater protection under our State Constitution than do federal courts under the Federal Constitution. E. g. Lanier v. State, 486 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1971); Bunnell v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 592, 119 Cal.Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086 (1975); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976). See, Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Company, 80 Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964); Dean v. Crisp, 536 P.2d 961 (Okl.Cr.1975); General Electric Company v. Thrifty Sales, 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956); Cf. Turley v. State, 48 Ariz. 61, 59 P.2d 312 (1936). The Supreme Court of South Dakota stated in a recent search and seizure opinion:
“Admittedly the language of Article VI, § 11 is almost identical to that found in the Fourth Amendment; however, we *269have the right to construe our state constitutional provision in accordance with what we conceive to be its plain meaning. We find that logic and a sound regard for the purposes of the protection afforded by S.D. Const., Art. VI, § 11 warrant a higher standard of protection for the individual in this instance than the United States Supreme Court found necessary under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674-675 (S. D.1976) (footnote omitted). That court’s reasoning applies here. It defies logic to assume that our Constitution provides protection only if the individual is not an officer or employee of a corporation. Since individuals may be held to account for any crimes found by the grand jury in its investigation of corporate wrong doing, the individuals must receive the protections accorded to everyone under our Constitution.
JUDICIAL CONTROL
The Legislature passed a state grand jury act which by its own terms provides restrictions upon the scope and authority of the grand jury and of its prosecutor, the Attorney General. In fact, the act has even been criticized as too restrictive of the grand jury’s powers.3 1975 Ariz. State L.J. 841. The subject matter jurisdiction of the grand jury is limited, for example, A.R.S. § 21-422(B). There would be no reason to include such a restriction if Superior Courts do not have the power to quash a subpoena issued pursuant to an investigation which is not within the proper subject matter jurisdiction. Surely the Legislature did not contemplate that the grand jury waste its time and a citizen be harassed with an illegal investigation simply because there is no remedy until after an indictment issues. In addition, the constitutional protections discussed supra are always amenable to enforcement by the courts of Arizona. Thus, I am convinced that certain minimal protections provided by the statute and by our Constitution are enforceable in Superior Court by a motion to quash a subpoena.
A 1973 decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado is compelling on this issue. Gher v. District Court, 183 Colo. 316, 516 P.2d 643 (1973). The decision involved a grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued for voluminous records of a school district. The prosecutor’s brief alleged that the purpose of the subpoena was to elicit information which “might establish the commission of a crime.” The court found that even if the stated purpose were genuine, the breadth of the subpoena required close judicial scrutiny. The court then found that the record reflected absolutely no legal criminal investigatory purpose and ordered the subpoena quashed. I will quote the court’s reasoning because it represents a sound historical and logical analysis of the power of the courts to curb abuse of grand jury power:
“A grand jury may not, in the absence of enabling legislation, act in civil matters or exercise its authority to harass another governmental body for political or civil purposes. No statutory authority exists in Colorado which permits a grand jury to extend its investigatory jurisdiction into a civil or political annexation dispute by the hollow assertion that the inquiry has criminal overtones.
A grand jury has historically functioned not only as an accusatory body, but also as an investigatory body. In carrying out its investigative function, the grand jury serves as a buffer between the state and its citizens by screening accusation of criminal activity to determine whether the evidence is so insubstantial that charges should not be brought. (Citations omitted.) Admittedly, the grand jury has broad investigatory powers, but only in matters which relate to possible criminal activity.
We have no intention of restricting the broad powers of the grand jury or to *270grant standing to every witness to suppress evidence that has been properly subpoenaed for the grand jury. (Citations omitted.) However, when a grand jury subpoena is being used for purposes apart from an effort to ferret out criminal activity or other statutorily authorized purposes, the courts must intervene to prevent a gross abuse of the judicial process. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906); In re Schofield, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 106 A.L.R. 1373 (1936).” 516 P.2d at 644-45.
The Third Circuit has consistently upheld the power of courts to supervise grand jury subpoenas. The guidelines were set in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973). The court in Schofield discussed and listed a large body of cases recognizing defenses to grand jury subpoenas duces tecum. In a detailed analysis the court set down requirements which must be met before a district court will enforce a grand jury subpoena for documents and records. The burden of showing regularity was put upon the government because it controls all the relevant information. The government is required to show in a sworn affidavit that (1) the grand jury has jurisdiction to investigate the matter, (2) the subpoenaed material is relevant to that proper investigation, and (3) the absence of a paramount, unrelated purpose. Accord, U.S. v. Gurule, 437 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1970). Here I must strongly disagree with the majority: the burden must be on the government when a witness challenges a subpoena duces tecum on the basis that the grand jury is totally without jurisdiction or that the subpoena is without a proper investigatory basis. The burden cannot rationally be on the witness. If he alleges that the investigation has absolutely no basis, he cannot put his whole life before the court in order to show that there is no crime to be investigated. A reasonable solution is for the government, when challenged, to provide a sworn affidavit as to jurisdiction and relevance to a proper investigation.
The Schofield court believed that their rule represents a proper balance between the needs of the grand jury and the privacy needs of individual. Judge Seitz said in concurrence: “It seems to me that such a minimal requirement is almost indispensible if citizens are to be afforded minimum protection against the possible arbitrary exercise of power by a prosecutor through the use of the grand jury machinery.” 486 F.2d at 94. I strongly agree. Judge Seitz also stressed (as did the same court in a later opinion, Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992, 96 S.Ct. 2203, 48 L.Ed.2d 816) that the court review of the subpoena was not to be an adversary hearing. This aspect is important so as to avoid the “mini trial” feared in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973).
Arizona has a history of judicial control of grand jury abuse. E. g. State v. Good, 10 Ariz.App. 556, 460 P.2d 662 (1969); State v. Von Reeden, 9 Ariz.App. 190, 450 P.2d 702 (1969); Corbin v. Broadman, 6 Ariz. App. 436, 433 P.2d 289 (1967). It is in keeping with this tradition that I urge Arizona to follow Colorado in the Gher decision.
In order for the courts to be able to review the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and the instigation of an investigation, the reasons underlying the action should appear in the record. The transcript of the grand jury proceedings will show whether the prosecutor presented some sort of information to the grand jury which led the grand jury to authorize an investigation or whether the grand jury independently provided a proper basis for the investigation. If either situation exists, the prosecutor can easily give a sworn affidavit to the court that a proper purpose for investigation exists and a motion to quash a subpoena will be denied. If there is no proper purpose for the investigation, the court can quash the subpoena, thereby halting an illegal and unconstitutional invasion of privacy-
*271CONCLUSION
The Legislature in enacting the Grand Jury Act and the Constitution of the State of Arizona placed restrictions on the grand jury and upon the prosecutor. The discussion,4 supra, of these restrictions may be summarized by a single requirement: a grand jury investigation may be instituted only when the grand jury has some reason to believe that a crime has been committed. A subpoena duces tecum can issue only under such circumstances. The courts of Arizona have the power to enforce this requirement, for otherwise the tyranny which Justice Struckmeyer feared in the Wales decision, quoted supra, will prevail.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
CAMERON, C. J., concurs.

. In an analogous situation, the D.C. Circuit discussed the illegality of the United States Attorney issuing a grand jury subpoena for its own purposes. Durbin v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 415, 221 F.2d 520 (1954). In ordering an indictment dismissed due to improper use of a subpoena, the court reasoned:
“ ‘The Constitution of the United States, the statutes, the traditions of our law, the deep rooted preferences of our people speak clearly. They recognize the primary and nearly exclusive role of the Grand Jury as the agency of compulsory disclosure.’ They do not recognize the United States Attorney’s office as a proper substitute for the grand jury room and they do not recognize the use of a grand jury subpoena, a process of the District Court, as a compulsory administrative process of the United States Attorney’s office.” (footnotes omitted.) 221 F.2d at 522.

 Numerous critics have advocated abolition of the grand jury because of well-documented abuse. See, e. g., Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 Ore.L.Rev. 101 (1931). I wish to emphasize, however, that I am speaking hypothetically and imply no wrong-doing on the part of the current Attorney General or anyone in his office.

. The proposed act was modeled after the New Jersey State Grand Jury Act, N.J.Stat.Ann. §§ 2A:73A-1 et seq. (1976). The changes made by the Arizona Legislature in passing the bill were generally restrictive. For example, Arizona is one of only two states (of six states) which limits the kinds of crimes which the grand jury can investigate. See generally, 1975 Ariz. State L.J. 841. See also discussion, supra, of the attorney general’s powers.

. My discussion presents only general guidelines for judicial supervision of the procedural aspects of grand jury investigations because it seems wisest to decide these issues on a case by case basis rather than try to conjure up hypothetical situations.