Court Opinion

ID: 9579755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:17.075236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:44.899796
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I agree with Justice Brickley’s conclusion that the defendant is immune from liability for accidents that are allegedly caused by its failure to properly repair, maintain, or construct concrete bridge abutments or guardrails that are beyond the shoulder of a state trunk line. I write separately because I do not agree that the highway exception encompasses accidents arising out of any installation that "directly and integrally affect[sj safe vehicular travel on this improved portion.” Ante at 158.
By statute, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function, except activities that fall within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. See MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107); Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). The outcome of this case hinges on the highway exception found in MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).1
Under the highway exception, the state’s duly to *172maintain and repair the highway and its liability for failure to do so are restricted to the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel”:2
The duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. [MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).]
The difficulty is that the phrase "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” draws no obvious line. We know, because the statute tells us, that it does not include sidewalks and crosswalks, which are for pedestrian travel. *173However, the contrast between the improved portion and "any other installation outside of the improved portion” is not helpful because, in this context, the word "outside” does not seem to denote a spatial relationship. "Crosswalks,” one example of an "installation outside of the improved portion,” are not physically outside the highway, but are instead part of the pavement3 and are shared with vehicular traffic.
It seems to be generally agreed that the improved portion includes the paved surface as well as bicycle paths that are part of the paved portion. See Gregg v Dep’t of State Hwys, 435 Mich 307, 316; 458 NW2d 619 (1990). On the other hand, it does not include bicycle paths that are detached from, but parallel to, the traveled portion of the roadway. Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 331; 408 NW2d 783 (1987).
It also seems to be agreed that, as a general rule, the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” does not include installations outside the edges of the roadway. The limiting sentence was the subject of this Court’s decision in Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990).4 In that case, we held that governmental agencies are immune *174from liability for failing to install lighting next to a freeway because "the physical structure of the lights falls outside the traveled or paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” Id. at 633. In a companion case, we held that a hedge growing on private property that allegedly interfered with a driver’s vision was not part of the improved portion of the highway. Id. at 635.
I cannot agree, however, with Justice Brickley’s statement that the highway exception includes "some installations, even those physically located beyond the traveled or paved portion of a highway, that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on this improved portion.” Ante at 158. The test is less helpful than the statute itself. I am now persuaded that the test is so imprecise that it would foster litigation with no clear countervailing benefit. Governmental agencies attempting to avoid liability by fulfilling their duty cannot know with certainty what it is that they are required to do. Injured persons seeking advice regarding litigation could not be given reasonable evaluation of the parameters of the government’s responsibility, and trial judges would be left without standards to determine the question of the scope of the duty to maintain. In the end, the phrase would mean that governmental agencies will be liable whenever this Court, at the end of a long and expensive road of appellate litigation, deems it reasonable.
Although the language of the statute is far from clear, I think the best course for this Court is clear. We should reaffirm the precedents of this Court that construed the exception after its adop*175tion and say that the state (and counties) may be liable under the highway exception only when it falls to repair and maintain5 the paved surface of the roadway, including objects on and structures supporting that surface, or traffic signs or traffic signals necessary for safe vehicular travel.
Of course, given this clarification, it will not follow that all variations of the above-listed defects will come within the exception. Because the issue is not squarely presented in the case before us, we cannot say with certainty that there can be any liability for given signs and signals.6 However, traffic signs and traffic signals in general are improvements that are designed for vehicular travel, as opposed to pedestrian traffic, and are essential to safe and efficient vehicular travel. Moreover, there is textual support for the conclusion that governmental agencies may be liable for failing to repair or maintain signs and signals. By the early eighties, it was established that "the duty to maintain a highway in reasonable repair encompasses the maintenance of traffic signs.” Salvati v Dep’t of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708, 715; 330 NW2d 64 (1982).7 In 1986, the Legislature narrowed liability *176under the highway exception by excluding trees and utility poles from the definition of "highway” as that term is used in the highway exception. MCL 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e). Before the amendment, this section had stated merely that "[t]he term 'highway’ shall not be deemed' to include alleys.”8 Because, at that time, governmental units could be liable for failing to repair and maintain traffic lights and signs, and because the Legislature restricted liability without mentioning signs and traffic lights, it is reasonable to infer9 that it intended that governmental units should be liable for failing to repair and maintain signs and signals.
In this case, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The plaintiff’s claim is barred by governmental immunity because he does not *177allege a failure to repair and maintain the paved surface of the roadway or a traffic sign or signal.

 Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any high.way shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it ■is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by *172reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. The liability, procedure and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be as provided in section 21 of chapter IV of Act No. 283 of the Public Acts of 1909, as amended, being section 224.21 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. The duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. No action shall be brought against the state under this section except for injury or loss suffered on or after July 1, 1965. Any judgment against the state based on a claim arising under this section from acts or omissions of the state transportation department shall be payable only from restricted funds appropriated to the state transportation department or funds provided by its insurer.

 The duty to maintain and repair sidewalks and crosswalks falls on local governments, including cities, villages, and townships. See Mason v Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs, 447 Mich 130, 136, n 6; 523 NW2d 791 (1994).

 See Mason, n 2 supra, p 136, n 5.

 In Scheurman, the plaintiff’s decedent was killed attempting to cross Eight Mile Road in the City of Detroit after dark. The plaintiff sued the Department of Transportation, alleging negligence on the ground that it had failed to keep the road in a condition safe and fit for public travel. More specifically, it had not installed streetlights on that portion of Eight Mile Road.
In a companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Ed Comm’rs, the plaintiff sued the Wayne County Road Commission on the grounds that it had failed to keep the road reasonably safe for travel because it failed to trim or remove a hedge that grew on private property. The plaintiff had been riding her bicycle westbound on Schoolcraft Road toward the intersection with Columbia Street. The trafile light turned green, and she proceeded into the intersection. At the same time, a van traveling northbound on Columbia Street approached the intersection. It was a T-type intersection that forced him to turn. As the *174van began to turn east on Schoolcraft, it struck the plaintiff. The driver claimed that he, too, had the green light. The visibility of both drivers, however, had been obstructed by a six-foot hedge growing on the southeast corner of the intersection.

 We have held that this duty includes the duty to repair defects in design or construction. See Peters v Dep’t of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50; 252 NW2d 799 (1977).

 In this regard, see Mason, n 2 supra, holding that governmental agencies cannot be liable for failing to install signs that do not warn of danger to vehicular trafile.

 In Salvati, Justice Coleman, joined by Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Ryan, summarized the duty as follows:
A governing unit may incur liability under the broad concept of "trafiic sign maintenance” in the following ways: for failing to properly maintain a sign placed on the roadway, O’Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19; 106 NW2d 538 (1960); for failing to erect any sign or warning device at a point of hazard, Bonneville v Alpena, 158 Mich 279; 122 NW 618 (1909); Mullins v Wayne County, 16 Mich App 365; 168 NW2d 246 (1969); for positioning an improper system of signs on the roadway, National Bank of Detroit v Dep’t of State Highways, 51 Mich App 415; 215 NW2d *176599 (1974); or for placing a sign which inadequately informs approaching motorists of a hazard, Lynes v St Joseph County Road Comm, 29 Mich App 51; 185 NW2d 111 (1970). While the highway authority has discretion in the erection of traffic control signs, MCL 257.608; MSA 9.2308, this discretion may not be capitalized upon to shield the authority from liability for highway defects, see Mullins, supra, 381, nor should compliance with standard manual specifications similarly act wholly to absolve the highway authority from liability. However, National Bank of Detroit, supra, suggests that compliance with traffic manual standards is a factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of the state’s actions at the time of the accident. [415 Mich 715.]
Justice Levin, joined by Justices Kavanagh and Williams, would have found a duty at least as expansive. See id. at 721.

 Cf. Dettloff v Royal Oak, 178 Mich App 319; 443 NW2d 410 (1989) (affirming dismissal of the case on the ground of governmental immunity where the plaintiff alleged that she had slipped and fallen in an alley).

 We concede that tho inference is, at best, approximate. The Legislature’s failure to exclude signs or lights from the definition of a highway does not necessarily show that it intended to include them. The necessary votes may not have been available for either proposal. Cognizant of the difficulties presented by the limited information available to us, we remain convinced that this is the most reasonable interpretation of what occurred.