Court Opinion

ID: 9694277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:34:34.319245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:58.621598
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge.
This appeal is from the judgment entered on a verdict following a jury trial. A verdict was entered in favor of appellee, Michael S. Hutchison, Jr. (Michael), and against all appellants. The jury awarded the amount of $519,000.00 in compensatory damages, the sum of $311,564.11 as delay damages, and punitive damages in the amount of $50,000.00 against Fr. Francis Luddy (Luddy) and $1,000,000.00 against St. Therese’s Catholic Church (St. Therese), Bishop James Hogan (Bishop Hogan) and the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown (the Diocese).1 Following the denial of post-trial Motions, judgment was entered on the verdict, and this appeal timely followed.2
Appellants raise a number of issues, to-wit:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing Michael to proceed under the theory set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 for negligent hiring, supervision and retention of Luddy by appellants.
*422(2) Whether the trial court erred in allowing Michael to proceed on a theory of a pattern, practice or custom of appellants to ignore or to fail to investigate and remedy allegations of molestation.
(3) Whether St. Therese knew of Luddy’s pedophilic disposition and failed to warn potential victims.
(4) The admissibility of the failure of appellants to report molestation incidents to the authorities.
(5) Whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of sexual molestation committed by other members of the clergy against other victims, by Luddy against other victims and by Luddy against Michael.
(6) The propriety of the injection of the defense of comparative negligence against Michael.
(7) Whether the jury instruction and jury interrogatory on causation were sufficient to enable the jury to decide if Michael consented to the acts in question in order to obtain money.
(8) Whether the verdict form was erroneous because it requested the jury to itemize elements of Michael’s damages.
(9) & (10) Whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive damages against all appellants.
We vacate the judgment entered on the damage awards against St. Therese, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese and discharge them from liability.
This unfortunate situation had its genesis in a series of sexual molestations of Michael which began when he was ten or eleven years old and which lasted until he was seventeen years of age by Luddy when the latter served as a parish priest.3 St. Therese was located within the jurisdiction of the Diocese, and Bishop Hogan served as the Bishop of the Diocese at the time of the incidents in question. However, at *423the time of the two incidents which survive the bar of the statute of limitations, Luddy was serving at St. Mary’s Church in Windber, Pennsylvania.4
Appellants first assert that the trial court should not have permitted Michael to proceed under the theory set forth in Restatement (Second) Torts § 317 for the negligent hiring, supervision and retention of Luddy by appellants. Section 317 states:
Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
(Underlined emphasis supplied). However, the theory set forth under Section 317 is inapplicable to the facts at hand. At no time within the applicable limitations period5 did Luddy commit, upon any premises in the possession of St. Therese, Bishop Hogan or the Diocese, the acts of which Michael now complains. Instead, these encounters occurred at the Townhouse Motel in Altoona. We feel confident in saying that the Townhouse Motel is not a premise which was in the possession of St. Therese, Bishop Hogan or the Diocese. Motels and hotels are not establishments which would be typically pos*424sessed by these appellants to fulfill religious or priestly functions or to further the purposes of the Roman Catholic Church.
Section 317 does impose liability upon the Master for acts of the servant committed outside the scope of the servant’s employment. No .doubt exists that Luddy, while engaging in these acts of sexual molestation, was acting outside the scope of his priestly duties. The activity of which Michael now complains is wholly inconsistent with the role of one who is received into the Holy Orders as an ordained priest of the Roman Catholic Church. Michael testified that he ran away from his home in Ohio. When he returned to Altoona, where he had previously lived with his family, he sought out Luddy, who was his Godfather, because he needed money, which he received, at least on one occasion, in exchange for sexual favors to Luddy. That such nefarious conduct falls outside the scope of Luddy’s employment as an ordained servant of the Roman Catholic Church is a conclusion which may be readily derived from a mere application of common sense.6
However, while Section 317 does apply to impose liability upon the master for acts of the servant committed outside the scope of the latter’s employment, the occurrence of such acts here fails to meet the initial threshold of Section 317(a)(i).
Judgment against St. Therese, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese vacated. St. Therese, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese are discharged from liability.7 Jurisdiction relinquished.
*425TAMILIA, J., concurs in the result.
FORD ELLIOTT, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. St. Therese, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese will be collectively referred to as “appellants”.

. Luddy is not a party to this appeal. He filed a separate appeal to this court which is docketed at No. 1452 Pittsburgh, 1994. On September 21, 1994, this court entered an Order consolidating the instant appeal with that filed by Luddy for the purpose of argument but ordered separate briefing. On September 7, 1995, this court entered an Order severing the two appeals.

. Michael agrees that only two such incidents survive the bar of the statute of limitations — one which occurred in early 1983 when Michael was fifteen years of age and and the other which took place late in 1984 when he was seventeen years old.

. St. Maiy’s Church was not a party-defendant in this action.

. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524.

. The dissent states that we have not considered the language following the emphasized text of Restatement (Second) Torts § 317(a)(i). See pp. 421-422 of Majority Memorandum. Our response is that although Luddy may have been privileged to enter a room at the Townhouse Motel for the purpose of providing pastoral care and guidance to a troubled person seeking such care and guidance, he certainly was not privileged to enter the motel room as a servant of either the Diocese, St. Therese or Bishop Hogan for the purpose of engaging in sexual misconduct or other such improper behavior.

. In light of our disposition, we need not address the other issues raised, as they all flow from appellants' defense to their liability for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of Luddy.