Court Opinion

ID: 9551285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:50:45.637002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:27.718191
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the result reached. I dissent on the failure to overrule State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct.App.1969) and its progeny. See dissent in the following opinions: State v. Sanchez, 82 N.M. 585, 484 P.2d 1295 (Ct.App.1971); State v. Sluder, 82 N.M. 755, 487 P.2d 183 (Ct. App.1971); State v. Lee, 83 N.M. 522, 494 P.2d 184 (Ct.App.1972); State v. Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397, 503 P.2d 1175 (Ct.App.1972); State v. Gunzelman, 84 N.M. 451, 504 P.2d 1084 (1972); State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 453, 504 P.2d 1086 (Ct.App.1972), and special concurrence in State v. Ramirez, 84 N.M. 166, 500 P.2d 451 (Ct.App.1972). In my opinion, the confusion which surrounds instructions in criminal cases on “criminal intent” still exists. The failure to instruct on the meaning of “criminal intent” should not be considered jurisdictional in any case where the jury is instructed in the language of the criminal statute. To do so opens the door to reversal. For one example, “specific intent” is not an essential element of second degree murder. State v. Tapia, 81 N.M. 274, 466 P.2d 551 (1970). It is essential in first degree murder. State v. Smith, 26 N.M. 482, 194 P. 869 (1921). As long as this rule exists, a defendant will never tender an instruction on “criminal intent.” If by oversight, the court fails to give one, a reversal follows. “Criminal intent” should be a matter of argument to the jury based upon the evidence and the statute. No reasonable contention can be made that the language used in an instruction to define “criminal intent” has any bearing on a defendant’s constitutional rights. This problem may be solved if and when the Supreme Court adopts uniform jury instructions in criminal cases.