Court Opinion

ID: 9943106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:10:48.121286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:04.852684
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Percy, 2024-Ohio-664.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                             No. 112861
                 v.                              :

SURFIN PERCY,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 22, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-18-630140-A

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Kristen Hatcher, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Allison S. Breneman, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

                Appellant Surfin Percy (“appellant”) brings this appeal challenging the

imposition of consecutive sentences by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas. After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.
                            I. Factual and Procedural History

                This court previously reviewed appellant’s direct appeal from his

convictions and sentence arising from his sexual abuse of his daughter. State v.

Percy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109502, 2021-Ohio-1876 (“Percy I”). The opinion set

forth the procedural history of the case as follows:

       Percy pleaded guilty to two counts of rape, one count of gross sexual
       imposition, and one count of child endangering. The charges were filed
       after B.P., a minor child, revealed that Percy had raped and assaulted
       her on multiple occasions.

       At sentencing, the state asked the court to order consecutive sentences
       on the two rape convictions, to be served concurrently with the
       sentences on the gross sexual imposition and child endangering counts.
       (Tr. 25.) Defense counsel asked for the two rape convictions to be
       served concurrently with each other and with the sentences imposed
       on the other convictions, but acknowledged that Percy’s sentence was
       ultimately within the court’s discretion. (Tr. 25.)

       The court sentenced Percy to 60 months on the gross sexual imposition
       conviction, eight years on the child endangering conviction, and 11
       years on each of the rape convictions. The court ordered the 11-year
       prison terms on the two rape convictions to be served consecutively to
       each other but concurrently with the child endangering and gross
       sexual imposition convictions, for an aggregate 22-year prison
       sentence. * * *

Id. at ¶ 3-5.

                In Percy I, appellant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in

imposing consecutive sentences in this matter. Upon review of the sentencing

transcript, we determined that the trial court had not made one of the findings under

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to support the imposition of consecutive sentences:

       The trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to
       protect the public and to punish Percy. The court also found that
       consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of
       Percy’s conduct and to the danger he poses to the public. However, the
       trial court failed to make the third finding.

       The third finding may be one of three alternatives. Because Percy had
       no prior criminal history and was not under supervision when the
       alleged crimes occurred, the only possible alternative was a finding
       under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). As previously stated, that section
       provides:

       At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
       more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
       multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the
       courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s
       conduct.

       R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). “The statute requires the trial court to find both
       that (1) the offenses were committed as one or more courses of conduct,
       and (2) the harm caused was so great or unusual that a single prison
       term is not an adequate reflection on the seriousness of the conduct.”
       State v. McKinney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106377, 2019-Ohio-1118,
       ¶ 60.

       Although the court found that the “danger that was imposed” on the
       victim “was so great that it warranted consecutive sentences[,]” the
       court failed to also find that the offenses were committed as one or
       more courses of conduct as required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b).
       Therefore, the trial court failed to make the third finding required for
       the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Id. at ¶ 12-14.

               We remanded the matter to the trial court for “the limited purpose of

addressing the consecutive-sentence requirements set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).”

Id. at ¶ 28.

               On remand, the trial court held a limited resentencing hearing and

stated as follows:
      Each rape will be sentenced consecutively. And the Court makes the
      following findings with reference to this sentence: The Court finds that
      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
      crimes; the Court finds that consecutive sentences are not
      disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct; the Court
      finds that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect — to punish
      the offender; and the Court finds that consecutive sentences are not
      disproportionate to the danger the offender poses to the public and to
      his family.

      The Court further finds that at least two of the multiple offenses were
      committed as part of one or more courses of conduct and the harm
      caused by two or more multiple offenses so committed were so great or
      unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as
      part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness
      of the offender’s conduct.

      In arriving at the necessity to impose consecutive sentences[,] the
      Court further finds that the danger that was imposed to this young
      person was so great that it warranted consecutive sentences.

            Appellant then filed the instant appeal, raising one assignment of error

for our review:

      The trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences.

                              II. Law and Analysis

            In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

erred by failing to support the statutory findings made at the resentencing hearing,

in particular the finding that the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or

more courses of conduct.

            The state notes that facts were placed on the record at the original

sentencing hearing, including statements by the prosecutor, the victim, and her

mother, that fully support the imposition of consecutive sentences.
             This court has held that the proper remedy for correcting an error

during the imposition of consecutive sentences is not a de novo hearing; rather, it is

a limited remand for the purpose of determining whether consecutive sentences

should be imposed and to make those findings, if warranted. State v. Matthews, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102217, 2015-Ohio-4072, ¶ 18, citing State v. Frost, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 100498, 2014-Ohio-2645, ¶ 10.

              As discussed in Percy I, consecutive sentences may be imposed if the

trial court makes the findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). A trial court is not required

to recite the statutory language verbatim, nor is it required to state its reasons to

support its findings “‘“provided that the necessary findings can be found in the

record and are incorporated in the sentencing entry.”’” State v. Saxon, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 111493, 2023-Ohio-306, at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Sheline, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 106649, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 176, quoting State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio

St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37. If the findings are made, our review

of consecutive sentences is limited to whether the record clearly and convincingly

does not support the findings. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).

             It is clear from the record that on remand at the limited resentencing

hearing, the trial court made all of the required statutory findings, and appellant

does not argue otherwise. As noted above, the court was not required to state any

further reasoning or support its findings. Consequently, our only consideration is

whether the record clearly and convincingly supports the findings. Appellant makes
no argument on this point, and our independent review of the record does not lead

us to the conclusion that the record does not support the findings.

                                 III. Conclusion

              The trial court made the required statutory findings for the imposition

of consecutive sentences. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR