Court Opinion

ID: 9469699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:46:57.762842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:31.181252
License: Public Domain

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The singular infirmity in this case is the utter disregard by the Government of its duty not to subject the appellant to criminal prosecution when it could have readily known of his innocence. Typifying this attitude is the course the Government admittedly pursued under the first count of the indictment. The second count is likewise groundless for the same reason: the Government’s evidence on its face failing ab initio to prove a crime.
The prosecution sought and obtained an indictment against the appellant in two counts. The first charged him with “knowingly and wilfully [having] in his control, custody and possession a metal plate” or plates depicting a Federal Reserve Note and charging that the appellant “did intend said plates to be used and did intend to suffer them to be used to forge and counterfeit an obligation of the United States.” The second count charged Molovinsky and one Edward L. Sparrow with conspiring to forge $20.00 Federal Reserve Notes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1976).
I
The statute underlying the first count, see id. § 374 reads in relevant part as follows:
Whoever, having control, custody, or possession of any plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, from which *249has been printed, or which may be prepared by direction of the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of printing, any obligation or other security of the United States, uses such plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, or knowingly suffers the same to be used for the purpose of printing any such or similar obligation or other security, or any part thereof, except as may be printed for the use of the United States by order of the proper officer thereof; .... (emphasis added).
At practically all stages of this case, the Government knew or could have easily known, as it later conceded, that the plates possessed by the appellant were “magic props,” not counterfeiting plates, and were used by the appellant in his occupation as a professional magician. It was for this very reason that the Government voluntarily, though only eventually, dismissed the first count.1 The prosecutor had fallen for the magic.
But the appellant suffered hurt and harm from this gullibility. Although he was arrested on the ninth day of May, 1980 on this charge and the indictment was returned on May 20,1980, still, not until July 28,1980— the first day of trial — did the Government dismiss the first count. Concededly, it did so because the plates were not unlawfully possessed by the appellant. The conduct prohibited by the terms of the statute does not embrace the possession of innocent magic props. The Government’s attempt to apply the statute to such a possession infringes on appellant’s ordinary freedom to own such props without being arraigned as a counterfeiter. Further, the obligations of the Government to the grand jury, as well as to the District Court, were breached. As the Chief Justice of the United States recently emphasized:
The devastating consequences to an accused from the very fact of such an indictment is a matter which responsible prosecutors must weigh carefully.2
II
The keynote infirmity appears again in the conviction of the appellant of the criminal conspiracy.3 Of course, the appellant acted with and to the same end as, his friend Sparrow; indeed, they did so by agreement. True, too, the pair spoke of it as a “conspiracy.” But an agreement and joint conduct — even if termed by the two a conspiracy — without more, is not criminal or a crime. A conspiracy to counterfeit requires the agreement of two or more persons to make a Government security with intent to defraud. On the facts of this case the Government simply has not proved the existence of an unlawful agreement. At most, appellant and Sparrow agreed only to consider the possibility of counterfeiting Federal Reserve Notes or to inquire as to the procurability of materials for counterfeiting. Since an agreement to consider or explore the commission of an act which would be an offense against the United States is not itself unlawful, no crime can be found.
Because I believe that there is no unlawful agreement it is unnecessary to consider the question of appellant’s subsequent conduct. But even if, for the purpose of argument, I assume the existence of an agreement, no criminality is to be found in the conduct of the appellant. His was a series of inquiries and explanations, none of them pursued with positive action in any degree whatsoever. The articles, wares, services or *250advice were the subject only of conversations by the appellant; they were never ordered or possessed by, or reserved for, him. Indeed, the totality of them would not have enabled him to counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes. These questionings, whether considered separately or as an entirety, were simply hypothetical and had never been actuated for a moment before or at the time of appellant’s arrest. Hence he was not taken into custody on substantive hypotheses.
However, if his conduct manifested preparations and thus are treated as actualities, still no case was made for arrest, for, concededly, the utilization of all or any portion of them together, even including a printing press, would not provide a means of counterfeiting. Confessedly Molovinsky and his associate Sparrow each owned magic plates. But plates adaptable to counterfeiting — the very integral and essential tools of the crime — were never had by the appellant. Nevertheless, the possession of fake plates has been accorded an implication in the present prosecution as possible evidence of guilt. Thus the infirmity which dictated dismissal of the first count has infected the second.
The absence of any criminality in the conduct of Molovinsky is emphatically evinced in his demeanor. His actions and aims were not kept secret, but rather almost publicly proclaimed. They were frequently and fully revealed in eight of the instances listed in the majority opinion as evidencing crime — those when and where he inquired about methods, means and materials. Surely this is not behavior incident to a crime demanding secrecy for successful perpetration as does counterfeiting. Molovinsky’s fault was stupidity not criminality.
It cannot be successfully argued that the inquiries by Molovinsky and Sparrow were overt acts towards execution of a criminal conspiracy, since there was no crime in being or in actuality. Simply put, the Government has failed to adduce evidence adequate to prove even a semblance of a criminal conspiracy. To me, the determination of the Government to prosecute was unwarranted, the utter sparsity of the evidence confirming this conclusion. For these reasons appellant’s imprisonment deeply concerns me. I would reverse the conviction.

. Incidentally, Sparrow had a pair of magic plates like Molovinsky’s as the Government knew, and he had a magician’s $5.00 bill, but he was not prosecuted for possession of either of them.

. United States v. MacDonald, -U.S. -, -n.12, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1503 n.12, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982).

. 18 U.S.C. § 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.