Court Opinion

ID: 9915159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 18:07:19.685953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:43.240740
License: Public Domain

J-A22031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  WILLIAM SELEMBO AND JEANNIE                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  SELEMBO                                      :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                       Appellees               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  JAMES MARIANI AND ANNE MARIANI               :
                                               :
                       Appellants              :       No. 504 WDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2023
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County
                     Civil Division at No(s): 10163 CD 2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED: JANUARY 4, 2024

       Appellants, James Mariani (“Father”) and Anne Mariani (“Adoptive

Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”),1 appeal from the order entered in the

Indiana County Court of Common Pleas, which granted partial physical

custody of J.W.M. (born in December of 2006), H.K.M. (born in September of

2008), and C.R.M. (born in April of 2011) (“Children”) to Appellees, William

Selembo and Jeannie Selembo (“Maternal Grandparents”).2 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Biological mother died in July 2014.
                                     Adoptive Mother married Father in July
2015, and she adopted the children on May 30, 2018.

2 Although this appeal involves a custody action, we will use the parties’ names

in the caption “as they appeared on the record of the trial court at the time
the appeal was taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(1). Notably, “upon application of a
party and for cause shown, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       In its opinion, the trial court set forth some of the relevant facts and

procedural history of this case as follows:

          [Maternal Grandparents] filed a Complaint for Custody on
          February 4, 2021.         In their Complaint, [Maternal
          Grandparents] seek partial physical custody pursuant to 23
          Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). On February 9, 2021, the Parties were
          ordered by the [c]ourt to communicate with each other to
          attempt to resolve the issues raised in the Complaint, prior
          to scheduling Mediation. On March 8, 2021, [Maternal
          Grandparents] filed a Motion for Mediation.

          On May 7, 2021, [Parents] filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing
          that [Maternal Grandparents] did not have standing to bring
          a complaint for custody and that any court intervention
          would infringe upon [Parents’] right to raise the Minor
          Children. On July 19, 2021, the [c]ourt found that [Maternal
          Grandparents] had standing in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A.
          § 5325(1) and the Motion to Dismiss was denied. The
          Parties attended Mediation on July 27, 2021, and no
          resolution was reached.      The action was subsequently
          scheduled for Trial on February 9, 2022, and February 10,
          2022. Trial was continued for exactly one month due to
          illness.

          On February 22, 2022, a Consent Order was entered upon
          agreement of the Parties.           Said Order stayed the
          proceedings and continued the Trial to provide the Parties
          an opportunity to work together in good faith to resolve the
          custody issue. The Order stated that the Parties shall work
          together to restore the prior familial relationship between
          [Maternal Grandparents] and the Minor Children.
          Additionally, neither Party could move for lifting of the stay
          or rescheduling of trial for ninety (90) days from the date of
          the Order.

____________________________________________

use the initials of the parties in the caption based upon the sensitive nature
of the facts included in the case record and the best interest of the child.”
Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(2). See also Pa.R.A.P. 907(a). The parties have not applied
to this Court for the use of initials in the caption. Nevertheless, we will use
the children’s initials or refer to them collectively as “Children.”

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         On May 24, 2022, [Maternal Grandparents] filed a Motion
         for Lift of Stay and to Schedule Custody Trial, averring that
         [Parents] did not engage in good faith to repair the
         relationship between [Maternal Grandparents] and the
         Minor Children. A Pre-Trial Conference was scheduled for
         July 15, 2022. On June 27, 2022, [Maternal Grandparents]
         filed a Motion for Custody Evaluation, citing that an
         evaluation would be helpful to the [c]ourt at Trial and that
         [Parents] were not working in good faith to reach a
         resolution. On July 15, 2022, the [c]ourt granted [Maternal
         Grandparents’] Motion for a Child Custody Evaluation,
         appointing Dr. Carolyn Menta as the evaluator. The Custody
         Evaluation Report was obtained by the Parties on November
         14, 2022 and a Pre-Trial Conference was scheduled for
         January 13, 2023 and a final Status Conference scheduled
         for February 16, 2023. Trial was scheduled for March 8,
         2023 and March 9, 2023. The Parties were ordered to file
         their position on the custody factors to be addressed and
         their Pre-Trial Statements ten (10) days prior to the final
         Status Conference.

         [Maternal Grandparents] are seeking to retain physical
         custody of the Minor Children, specifically having periods of
         partial physical custody to ensure stability and continuity in
         the Minor Children’s lives and to provide the Minor Children
         with community of family. [Parents] oppose [Maternal
         Grandparents’] position, stating that a [c]ourt Order is not
         in the best interest of the Minor Children.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/29/23, at 2-3).

      The court held a custody trial on March 8-9, 2023. During trial, the

court heard testimony from, inter alia, each of the Children, Dr. Carolyn

Menta, Psy. D., Maternal Grandparents, and Parents. On March 29, 2023, the

court granted Parents sole legal custody and primary physical custody of

Children. The court awarded Maternal Grandparents partial physical custody

of Children for four (4) hours each month, at a date and time to be agreed

upon by the parties.       If the parties could not agree, then Maternal

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Grandparents’ periods of custody would be the third Saturday of each month

from 1:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m., beginning in June of 2023. The court also

ordered Parents to share Children’s extracurricular activities schedule with

Maternal Grandparents so that Maternal Grandparents could attend Children’s

activities if they chose to do so. On April 24, 2023, Parents filed a timely

notice of appeal along with a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

      Parents raise four issues for our review:

         Did the trial court err in finding that [Maternal
         Grandparents] had standing under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1)
         in violation of [Parents’] fundamental right to parent their
         children?

         Did the trial court commit an error of law by finding 23
         Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1) constitutional as applied to [P]arents?

         Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an
         error of law by misapplying evidence and/or testimony to
         the custody factors or finding factors in favor of [Maternal
         Grandparents] contrary to the custody factors under 23
         Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) and (c)(1)?

         Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an
         error of law by failing to consider whether specific
         benchmarks should be met in the court-ordered family
         counseling before visits begin between the children and
         [Maternal Grandparents] in contradiction to the evidence,
         testimony, and/or expert report of Dr. Carolyn Menta,
         Psy.D.?

(Parents’ Brief at 7-8).

      Our scope and standard of review in custody matters are as follows:

         In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest
         type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must

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         accept findings of the trial court that are supported by
         competent evidence of record, as our role does not include
         making independent factual determinations. In addition,
         with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the
         evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who
         viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we
         are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences
         from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the
         trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
         evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the
         trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are
         unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial
         court.

         With any child custody case, the paramount concern is the
         best interests of the child. This standard requires a case-
         by-case assessment of all the factors that may legitimately
         affect the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-
         being of the child.

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 334 (Pa.Super. 2013).

      In their first and second issues, Parents assert that Adoptive Mother is

Children’s legal mother. Parents argue that childrearing decisions belong to

parents and not to the courts. Parents maintain that Maternal Grandparents

have not alleged abuse, neglect, or unfitness by Parents. Rather, Maternal

Grandparents have only asserted that their visitation with Children did not

occur as often as they wanted. Parents emphasize that it was their choice as

parents to decide how often Children visit with Maternal Grandparents.

Parents acknowledge that 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325 grants grandparents standing

where a parent is deceased.        Nevertheless, Parents claim there is no

compelling reason for the statute to treat fit adoptive parents and fit widowed

parents differently than fit biological parents, which includes the right to

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decide with whom their children associate. Parents insist that Section 5325(1)

unlawfully infringes on their fundamental right to parent.

      Parents acknowledge that pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5326, after an

adoption takes place, grandparents lose all rights to pursue custody, except

when the adoption occurs by a stepparent, grandparent, or great-

grandparent. Parents argue, however, that once Adoptive Mother adopted

Children, Children were akin to her biological children “in the eyes of the law.”

(Parents’ Brief at 18).    Parents complain that the exception under Section

5326 “severely limits and infringes upon prospective adoptive parents’ rights

and obligations as a parent.” (Id. at 17). Parents insist that the statutory

language “is contradictory and makes certain adoptive parents second-class

citizens.”   (Id.)   Parents complain that simply because Adoptive Mother is

considered a “stepparent” she has fewer legal rights than other adoptive

parents such as an adoptive aunt or uncle.

      Parents admit that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the

bonds between children and their grandparents.           Nevertheless, Parents

maintain that the statute granting grandparents any rights in this situation is

not narrowly tailored. Parents insist that “[b]y limiting grandparents’ standing

only when the adopting parent is a stepparent or grandparent is not narrowly

tailored to achieve this interest. If this was the true compelling interest, then

grandparents would have standing anytime a grandchild is adopted, but the

state legislature has severely limited that.” (Id. at 19). Parents conclude

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that the statutes granting Maternal Grandparents standing in this case are

unconstitutional, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      Parents’ challenge to Maternal Grandparents’ standing is a question of

law. S.G. v. J.M.G., 186 A.3d 995, 997 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 649

P. 645, 197 A.3d 1177 (2018). Therefore, our standard of review is de novo,

and our scope of review is plenary.      Id.   Similarly, “as challenges to the

constitutionality of statutes present pure questions of law, our standard of

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”          Pennsylvania

Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 640 Pa. 55, 86,

161 A.3d 911, 929 (2017). “As with any constitutional challenge to legislation,

the challenger bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that the statute

clearly, plainly, and palpably violates the Constitution.” Id. (internal citation

and quotation marks omitted).

      The Domestic Relations Code grants standing to seek partial physical

custody and supervised physical custody, in pertinent part, as follows:

         § 5325. Standing for partial physical custody and
         supervised physical custody

         In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating
         to standing for any form of physical custody or legal
         custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may file an
         action under this chapter for partial physical custody or
         supervised physical custody in the following situations:

         (1) where the parent of the child is deceased, a parent or
         grandparent of the deceased parent may file an action under
         this section;

         (2) where the relationship with the child began either with

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        the consent of a parent of the child or under a court order
        and where the parents of the child:

        (i) have commenced a proceeding for custody; and

        (ii) do not agree as to whether the grandparents or great-
        grandparents should have custody under this section; or

        (3) when the child has, for a period of at least 12
        consecutive months, resided with the grandparent or great-
        grandparent, excluding brief temporary absences of the
        child from the home, and is removed from the home by the
        parents, an action must be filed within six months after the
        removal of the child from the home.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325.

     Regarding the effect of adoption, the Domestic Relations Code further

provides:

        Any rights to seek physical custody or legal custody rights
        and any custody rights that have been granted under
        section 5324 (relating to standing for any form of physical
        custody or legal custody) or 5325 (relating to standing for
        partial physical custody and supervised physical custody) to
        a grandparent or great-grandparent prior to the adoption of
        the child by an individual other than a stepparent,
        grandparent or great-grandparent shall be automatically
        terminated upon such adoption.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5326 (emphasis added). In other words:

        [W]hen a stepparent adopts a child…, grandparents and
        great-grandparents retain their right to seek physical or
        legal custody of the child, as well as retain any custody
        rights already awarded to them.          Such rights are
        automatically terminated, however, when the child is
        adopted by an individual other than a stepparent,
        grandparent or great-grandparent.

In re Adoption of M.E.L., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 298 A.3d 118, 122 n.2 (2023)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

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       Instantly, the trial court determined that Maternal Grandparents had

standing in this case, explaining:

          This [c]ourt recognizes that Grandparents are given special
          treatment in the child custody laws of Pennsylvania. That
          special treatment is set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324 [3] and
          23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325. The natural birth parents to the Minor
          Children are [Father] and [Biological Mother]. [Biological
          Mother] passed away on July 5th, 2014.            [M]aternal
          Grandparents are the parents of the natural birth mother,
          and are seeking visitation of the Minor Children pursuant to
          23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). [F]ather remarried and is now
          married to…[A]doptive Mother[.]          [Adoptive Mother]
          adopted the Minor Children on May 30, 2018. As noted
          above, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1) provides that “(1) where the
          parent of the child is deceased, a parent or grandparent of
          the deceased parent may file an action under this section.”
          … The subsequent adoption of the Minor Child[ren] by
          stepparent, [Adoptive Mother], does not preclude [Maternal
          Grandparents] from pursuing custody. Pursuant to 23
          Pa.C.S.A. § 5326, a grandparent’s standing is cut off only if
          the child is adopted by third parties who are not the
          stepparents or grandparents of the child. This [c]ourt finds
          that [Maternal Grandparents] have standing to seek partial
          physical custody and/or supervised physical custody in
          accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1).

(Trial Court Opinion at 7-8).

       We agree with the court’s analysis.       Section 5325 makes clear that

grandparents have standing to pursue partial physical custody or supervised

physical custody where the parent of the child is deceased. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5325(1).     Further, Maternal Grandparents retained their right to pursue

custody even after Adoptive Mother’s adoption of Children because such

____________________________________________

3 Section 5324 also grants grandparents standing to pursue custody under
certain circumstances not present in this case. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(3).

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adoption was a stepparent adoption.            See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5326; In re

Adoption of M.E.L., supra.

      Regarding Parents’ constitutionality claims, we initially note that when

a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute in a case where the

Commonwealth is not a party, the challenging party “is required to notify the

State Attorney General Office so that the Attorney General has the opportunity

to be heard on the issue.” In re J.Y., 754 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal

denied, 564 Pa. 712, 764 A.2d 1070 (2000).             See also Pa.R.C.P. 235

(requiring notice to Attorney General in any proceeding in which Act of

Assembly is alleged to be unconstitutional where Commonwealth is not party

to case); Pa.R.A.P. 521(a) (explaining that it shall be duty of party who draws

into question constitutionality of any statute in any matter in appellate court

to which Commonwealth is not party upon filing of record, or as soon

thereafter as question is raised in appellate court, to give immediate notice to

Attorney General of Pennsylvania of existence of question, together with copy

of pleadings or other portion of record raising issue, and to file proof of service

of such notice). “Failure to do so…results in waiver of the claim.” In re J.Y.,

supra.

      Notice to the Attorney General is necessary only in facial challenges,

and not as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of a statute. Kepple v.

Fairman Drilling Co., 532 Pa. 304, 615 A.2d 1298 (1992). Nevertheless, a

litigant’s characterization of an argument as being facial or “as applied” is not

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controlling.   See Potts v. Step by Step, Inc., 26 A.3d 1115 (Pa.Super.

2011).   “A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a claim

alleging that a statute suffers an ‘ineluctable constitutional deficiency.’”

Commonwealth v. Hairston, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 249 A.3d 1046, 1054 n.5

(2021), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 598, 211 L.Ed.2d 371 (2021).

“By contrast, an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is

one asserting that the statute, even though it may generally operate

constitutionally, is unconstitutional in a [party’s] particular circumstances.”

Id.

      Instantly, we must discern the nature of Parents’ constitutional claims.

Parents complain that Section 5325(1) treats a fit adoptive and widowed

parent differently than it treats fit biological parents. (See Parents’ Brief at

15-16). Parents further allege that the exception set forth in Section 5326

“severely limits and infringes upon prospective adoptive parents’ rights and

obligations as a parent.” (Id. at 17). Read together, Parents essentially argue

that these statutes on their face treat a fit, married adoptive and widowed

couple differently than other fit parents concerning the fundamental right to

parent their children.   Thus, we construe Parents’ arguments as a facial

challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5325(1) and 5326. See Hairston,

supra. Parents did not, however, provide proper notice of their constitutional

arguments to the Attorney General’s Office. Thus, Parents have waived their

constitutional claims. See In re J.Y., supra.

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      In their third issue, Parents argue that the trial court found certain

custody factors to favor Maternal Grandparents contradictory to the evidence

and testimony presented at trial. Parents claim the court erroneously found

factor one (which party will permit more frequent and continuing contact) to

favor Maternal Grandparents. Parents insist they have consistently included

Maternal Grandparents in events and special occasions, even in the midst of

the COVID-19 pandemic.        By contrast, Parents complain that Maternal

Grandparents did not invite Parents to gatherings but then later lamented that

Parents were “missed” from events they were never invited to. Regarding the

seventh factor (the well-reasoned preference of Children), Parents assert the

court found this factor did not favor either party.     Nevertheless, Parents

emphasize that Children testified that they are currently involved in numerous

activities and Children did not want court-ordered visitation with Maternal

Grandparents.    Rather, Children testified they wanted to visit Maternal

Grandparents on their own terms.

      Parents also challenge the court’s finding on factor eight (attempts of

one party to turn Children against the other party) to favor Maternal

Grandparents.   Parents maintain the court relied on a conversation where

Children asked for a pool, and Father said they could not afford a pool because

of the litigation. Although Father admits this statement demonstrated “a lack

of judgment on his part” (see Parents’ Brief at 28), Parents contend the court

improperly relied on this statement to weigh this factor in favor of Maternal

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Grandparents. Parents further insist the court improperly evaluated factor

thirteen (the level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and

ability of the parties to cooperate) in favor of Maternal Grandparents. Parents

proclaim that Maternal Grandparents are also to blame for the level of conflict

between the parties. Parents suggest that they have attempted to restore the

relationship, but Maternal Grandparents have allowed the conflict to continue.

       Additionally, Parents maintain the court erred in finding the parent-child

relationship would not be affected by an award of custody to Maternal

Grandparents. Parents posit that Maternal Grandparents have consistently

undermined Parents’ authority. Parents submit that Maternal Grandparents

question Parents’ decisions regarding Children, and doing so creates a rift in

the parent-child relationship. Finally, Parents complain the court improperly

found that awarding Maternal Grandparents partial custody would serve

Children’s best interests. Parents insist that family counseling is necessary

and will be helpful in resuming Children’s visits with Maternal Grandparents. 4

Parents claim that Maternal Grandparents have taken actions in the past that

did not serve Children’s best interests.           Under the totality of all custody

factors, Parents conclude that court-ordered visitation is not in Children’s best

interests, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

       The Child Custody Act provides:

          § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody
____________________________________________

4 Parents elaborate on this claim in their fourth issue on appeal.

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       (a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court
       shall determine the best interest of the child by considering
       all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those
       factors which affect the safety of the child, including the
       following:

                (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and
                permit frequent and continuing contact between
                the child and another party.

                (2) The present and past abuse committed by a
                party or member of the party’s household, whether
                there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an
                abused party and which party can better provide
                adequate physical safeguards and supervision of
                the child.

                (2.1) The information set forth in section
                5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child abuse
                and involvement with protective services).

                (3) The parental duties performed by each party
                on behalf of the child.

                (4) The need for stability and continuity in the
                child’s education, family life and community life.

                (5)   The availability of extended family.

                (6)   The child’s sibling relationships.

                (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child,
                based on the child’s maturity and judgment.

                (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child
                against the other parent, except in cases of
                domestic violence where reasonable safety
                measures are necessary to protect the child from
                harm.

                (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a
                loving, stable,  consistent   and  nurturing

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              relationship with the child adequate for the child’s
              emotional needs.

              (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the
              daily   physical,   emotional,     developmental,
              educational and special needs of the child.

              (11) The proximity of the residences of the
              parties.

              (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child
              or ability to make appropriate child-care
              arrangements.

              (13) The level of conflict between the parties and
              the willingness and ability of the parties to
              cooperate with one another. A party’s effort to
              protect a child from abuse by another party is not
              evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate
              with that party.

              (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a
              party or member of a party’s household.

              (15) The mental and physical condition of a party
              or member of a party’s household.

              (16) Any other relevant factor.

                              *     *      *

       (c) Grandparents and great-grandparents.—

              (1) In ordering partial physical custody or
              supervised physical custody to a party who has
              standing under section 5325(1) or (2) (relating to
              standing for partial physical custody and
              supervised physical custody), the court shall
              consider the following:

              (i)    the amount of personal contact between the
              child and the party prior to the filing of the action;

              (ii)   whether the award interferes with any

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                  parent-child relationship; and

                  (iii) whether the award is in the best interest of
                  the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), (c)(1).

      This Court has explained:

         [I]n the recent past, grandparents have assumed increased
         roles in their grandchildren’s lives and our cumulative
         experience demonstrates the many potential benefits of
         strong inter-generational ties. Thus: While acknowledging
         the general benefits of these relationships, we cannot
         conclude that such a benefit always accrues in cases where
         grandparents force their way into grandchildren’s lives
         through the courts, contrary to the decision of a fit parent.
         In contrast, however, we refuse to close our minds to the
         possibility that in some instances a court may overturn even
         the decision of a fit parent to exclude a grandparent from a
         grandchild’s life, especially where the grandparent’s child is
         deceased and the grandparent relationship is longstanding
         and significant to the grandchild.

                                   *     *      *

         Except under unusual circumstances, no child should be cut
         off entirely from one side of [his or her] family. [V]isits with
         a grandparent are often a precious part of a child’s
         experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the
         grandchild from the relationship with his grandparents
         which he cannot derive from any other relationship. If
         animosities continue between the parties, and result in
         adverse [e]ffects on [the child] …, a visitation order may be
         revised, even to the extent of retracting visitation.

K.T. v. L.S., 118 A.3d 1136, 1161 (Pa.Super. 2015) (internal citations,

quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Thus, Pennsylvania has a “strong

public policy favoring grandparent involvement in a child’s life.” Id. at 1164.

The statutory presumption favoring an award of custody to parents over third-

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parties is inapplicable where grandparents are seeking only partial physical

custody.    Id. at 1159 (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b) and explaining

presumption in cases concerning primary physical custody).

       Instantly, the trial court analyzed each of the custody factors under

Section 5328(a) in making its decision. Regarding the first custody factor, the

court explained that for the majority of Children’s lives, they spent

considerable time with Maternal Grandparents. When biological mother died,

Maternal Grandmother assumed the role of mother so that Father could work.

Maternal Grandmother woke up at 4:30 a.m. to help Children get ready for

school, and she helped with meals.

       Around late 2020, disagreements arose among the parties, and Father

and Adoptive Mother essentially ceased Children’s contact with Maternal

Grandparents. The court did not accept Parents’ position that if there was no

custody case, then they would permit Children to see Maternal Grandparents

similar to the contact that had existed previously. Parents’ decision to restrict

contact between Children and Maternal Grandparents during the pendency of

the custody action directly contradicts that position. Thus, the court found

this factor favored Maternal Grandparents. (See Trial Court Opinion at 9-11).

       The court found the second factor as neutral where no past or present

abuse has taken place. (See id. at 11). The parties stipulated that the third

custody factor was neutral, and the court agreed that it was neutral. (Id. at

12).   The court further found factor four was neutral, stating: “While the

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[c]ourt recognizes that the Minor Children spend the majority of their lives

with [Parents], it is clear that both parties are dedicated to providing stability

and continuity in the Minor Children’s lives.” (Id. at 13). The court also found

the fifth custody factor as neutral, as Children have extended family on both

Father’s side and Maternal Grandparents’ side of the family. (Id.) The parties

stipulated that the sixth custody factor was neutral, and the court agreed.

(Id. at 13-14).

      With respect to factor seven, the court noted that J.W.M. had positive

things to say about his Maternal Grandparents and spending time with them.

H.K.M. and C.R.M. had negative things to say about Maternal Grandparents,

specifically concerning the pending custody action. H.K.M. and C.R.M. further

indicated that they did not want to be forced by a court order to visit with

Maternal Grandparents. Nevertheless, the court found that H.K.M. and C.R.M.

seemed to be influenced by Father and Adoptive Mother.           Specifically, the

court stated: “The statements made by the children were all similar to not

only their siblings’ testimony, but to that of Father and Adoptive Mother. Thus,

it is difficult to determine if the Minor Children’s opinions are entirely well-

reasoned, specifically in regard to [H.K.M.] and [C.R.M.]” (Id. at 15). The

court found factor eight to favor Maternal Grandparents, where Children seem

to have been heavily influenced by Parents in their perceptions of Maternal

Grandparents. Notably, the court found that “[Parents] have likely aided in

the Minor Children’s negative feelings towards [Maternal Grandparents].” (Id.

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at 15-16).5

       The court found factor nine neutral, as both parties are able and willing

to maintain a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with

Children.    (Trial Court Opinion at 16-17).       The court also found factor ten

neutral, as both parties can attend to and intend to support Children’s present

and future physical, emotional, developmental, educational, and special

needs. (Id. at 17). The parties stipulated that factor eleven was neutral, and

the court agreed given that the parties live approximately 20 minutes from

each other. (Id. at 18). The parties also stipulated to factor twelve being

neutral, as both parties can make appropriate child-care arrangements. (Id.)

       The court decided factor thirteen favored Maternal Grandparents. There

is a very high level of conflict between the parties, and the court found the

animosity towards Maternal Grandparents is misplaced. (Id. at 18-21). The

parties stipulated that factor fourteen was neutral, as there were no

allegations of drug or alcohol abuse by either party. (Id. at 21). Regarding

factor fifteen, the court found that no testimony was provided to demonstrate

a concern surrounding the care of Children based on the mental or physical

condition of a party. (Id.)

____________________________________________

5 Dr. Menta specifically testified that Children have been heavily influenced by

Parents’ views in this case. Dr. Menta described Parents as having shared too
much information with Children. Dr. Menta agreed that “indoctrination” is an
appropriate word to describe Parents’ influence over Children in this case.
(See N.T. Trial, 3/8/23, at 122, 141, 145-46).

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      The court considered Dr. Menta’s custody evaluation as it related to

factor sixteen.   The court agreed with Dr. Menta’s recommendation for

Maternal Grandparents to have unsupervised partial physical custody of

Children once a month for a period of four hours.           Dr. Menta further

recommended participation in family counseling. The court emphasized that

Children will never have the opportunity to form a life-long bond with their

Biological Mother, and the benefits of having a relationship with Maternal

Grandparents will help Children build a loving memory of their late mother.

(Id. at 22).

      In addition to the sixteen custody factors, the court considered the three

factors under Section 5328(c). The court decided: (1) Maternal Grandparents

had maintained consistent contact with Children prior to the Parents’

restriction of such contact following the 2020 holiday season; (2) an award of

custody to Maternal Grandparents will not interfere with the existing

parent/child relationships, as Maternal Grandparents are seeking only

minimal, monthly visitation with Children; and (3) an award of partial physical

custody to Maternal Grandparents serves Children’s best interests. (Id. at

23-25).

      Our review of the record demonstrates that the court carefully

considered all relevant factors when making its decision to award Maternal

Grandparents partial physical custody for four hours once a month. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), (c)(1). Parents essentially invite this Court to reweigh

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the factors in their favor, which we will not do.      See M.J.M., supra.     We

emphasize Dr. Menta’s expert opinion that periods of partial physical custody

with Maternal Grandparents will serve Children’s best interests. (See N.T.,

3/8/23, at 143). On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s

custody decision. See id. Therefore, Parents’ third issue on appeal merits no

relief.

          In their fourth issue, Parents argue that the court did not order family

counseling to begin before Children resume visitation with Maternal

Grandparents.       Despite expert testimony which favors having some family

counseling prior to beginning visits, Parents assert that the court failed to

institute such benchmarks.        Parents insist that Children should not begin

visitation with Maternal Grandparents prior to the start of counseling in light

of the anger and conflict among the parties. Parents conclude the court erred

by failing to require specific benchmarks to be met in family counseling prior

to Children beginning visitation with Maternal Grandparents, and this Court

must grant relief. We disagree.

          Preliminarily, we observe:

             As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist
             at all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be
             dismissed as moot. An issue can become moot during the
             pendency of an appeal due to an intervening change in the
             facts of the case or due to an intervening change in the
             applicable law. In that case, an opinion of this Court is
             rendered advisory in nature. An issue before a court is moot
             if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order
             that has any legal force or effect. …

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                                 *     *      *

        [T]his Court will decide questions that otherwise have been
        rendered moot when one or more of the following
        exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case
        involves a question of great public importance, 2) the
        question presented is capable of repetition and apt to elude
        appellate review, or 3) a party to the controversy will suffer
        some detriment due to the decision of the trial court.

In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

     “The concept of mootness focuses on a change that has occurred during

the length of the legal proceedings.” In re Cain, 527 Pa. 260, 263, 590 A.2d

291, 292 (1991). “If an event occurs that renders impossible the grant of the

requested relief, the issue is moot and the appeal is subject to dismissal.”

Delaware River Preservation Co., Inc. v. Miskin, 923 A.2d 1177, 1183

n.3 (Pa.Super. 2007). Importantly, “mootness, however it may have come

about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to

remedy, even if we were disposed to do so. We are not in the business of

pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect

were right or wrong.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18, 118 S.Ct. 978,

988, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998).

     Instantly, following the court’s custody order, Parents filed a petition

seeking to stay the trial court’s order pending appeal.     The court denied

Parents’ requested relief on May 18, 2023. Parents did not seek a stay of the

court’s order in this Court. Therefore, assuming the parties have complied

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with the court’s March 29, 2023 order, Maternal Grandparents have already

begun exercising their periods of partial physical custody since June 2023. As

such, this issue is moot, because even if Parents’ issue had merit, we cannot

undo the periods of partial custody that have already occurred and order

certain “benchmarks” to occur first. See id.; Delaware River Preservation

Co., Inc., supra. Parents allege no exceptions to the mootness doctrine, and

we do not see any of the exceptions as applicable to this particular issue. See

In re D.A., supra.

      Moreover, even if the issue presented is not moot, it would not entitle

Parents to relief. Here, the court stated:

         In summary, this [c]ourt finds that it is in the Minor
         Children’s best interest to maintain a relationship with
         [Maternal Grandparents]. However, due to the level of
         anger that the Minor Children currently harbor towards
         [Maternal Grandparents], the [c]ourt finds that an
         immediate transition into partial custody/visitation with
         [Maternal Grandparents] is not appropriate without some
         support by professional counselors. The [c]ourt finds that
         counseling prior to the implementation of periods of partial
         physical custody will help to diffuse that anger and aid in the
         transition.

         An appropriate Order will be entered.

(Trial Court Opinion at 27).    In the order granting Maternal Grandparents

partial physical custody, the court directed:

         That within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, Maternal
         Grandparents and Parents shall contact Jennifer Hinkle-
         Stanley, MS, or Bethanne Petrlak, LMT and schedule Family
         Counseling to include [Maternal] Grandparents, Parents,
         and the Minor Children.       The purpose of the Family
         Counseling is to address communication skills between all

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         parties, the implementation of reasonable and necessary
         boundaries, and the anger issue as depicted by the Minor
         Children relating to the filing of the Custody Action. Counsel
         for the parties shall communicate with one another to
         determine which counselor is most able to address these
         issues in the immediate future and shall select the
         counselor. Costs relating to the Counseling shall be shared
         ½ by the Parents and ½ by the Maternal Grandparents.

(Order, filed 3/29/23, at ¶ 5).

      Notably, the court entered its order on March 29, 2023. The court did

not order Maternal Grandparents to begin their periods of partial physical

custody until the third Saturday of June 2023, unless the parties mutually

agreed on a different date of the month.      (See Order at ¶ 6).     The court

contemplated that the parties could schedule family counseling in early April

2023, and they would have over two months to undergo family counseling

sessions prior to Maternal Grandparents’ ability to exercise their partial

physical custody rights. The court’s order was directly in line with the court’s

opinion that family counseling would benefit all parties involved. Parents cite

no law that the court was required to set specific “benchmarks” before

visitation would begin, and Parents do not specify on appeal what those

“benchmarks” would be. Further, Dr. Menta opined that therapy could happen

at the same time as visitation and was not a necessary precursor to beginning

Maternal Grandparents’ periods of partial custody. (See N.T., 3/8/23, at 164,

171). Thus, even if Parents’ fourth issue was not moot, we would see no error

with the court’s order. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

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FILED: 1/4/2024

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