Court Opinion

ID: 9548739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:06.030405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:22.847815
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent from Part I of the majority opinion because it incorrectly analyzes the requisite constitutional minimum contacts necessary to establish jurisdiction in Idaho courts. Regarding Part II, even if the Idaho district court did have jurisdiction over the defendant Roberts & Sons, the additional effort required by Beco to haul the topsoil through the muddy terrain was not “extra work” under the subcontract. There are several provisions of the subcon*713tract which prohibit payment of additional sums beyond that contracted to be paid by Roberts under the subcontract. The jurisdictional question is analyzed first.
I
As the majority properly recognizes, the defendant is the focal point in jurisdictional inquiries. Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987). It is the activities of the defendant, not the plaintiff, that determine minimum contacts. The Court’s opinion does not perform an adequate minimum contacts analysis. Realizing that the contacts in the instant case do not meet the minimums discussed in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), the majority excuses the deficiency simply by stating:
“While the relationship here was not as enduring nor as complex as that of Rudzewicz with Burger King Corp. (20-year franchise), it was certainly more involved than that which obtained in McGee v. International Life, [355 U.S. 220] 78 S.Ct. 199 [2 L.Ed.2d 223] (1957) (a single, mailed life insurance renewal letter), cited repeatedly in Burger King.” Ante at 708, 760 P.2d at 1124.
The minimum contacts test was extended to its outer limits in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a Contact, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 375, 378 (1981). In McGee the Court upheld an assertion of jurisdiction by a California state court over a Texas insurance company whose contact with the state was the solicitation and execution of an insurance contract with a California resident. The life insurance company had solicited the re-insurance contract from the petitioner’s son and then refused to pay a claim under the policy. In rendering its decision, the United States Supreme Court focused upon four factors: (1) the insurance company solicited the insurance contract which was delivered to and accepted by a California resident; (2) the insured mailed the policy premiums from California until his death; (3) California residents would be at a “severe disadvantage” if forced to pursue their claims in a distant forum, effectively rendering the insurance company judgment proof; and (4) California had a manifest interest in providing its residents with an effective means of redress when an insurance company refused to pay its claims. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 223, 78 S.Ct. at 201. Since McGee represents the high water mark in confirming state court jurisdiction over foreign defendants, should any of these four factors be missing the minimum contacts necessary for jurisdiction cannot be found.
The majority opinion has already established that the first factor is not met. At page 705, 760 P.2d at page 1121, ante, the opinion states, “At trial, testimony did not establish definitively whether Anderson initiated the contact with Doyle Beck.” Further, the colloquy reported at page 708, 760 P.2d at page 1124 notes that neither party can remember who initiated the contact. Thus, on the first McGee factor alone, a finding of minimum contacts cannot be made.
McGee cannot be read in isolation, however; six months later it was followed by Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). The Hanson court carefully noted that the defendant in McGee had a “substantial connection” with the forum. Id. at 252, 78 S.Ct. at 1239, emphasis added. Hanson stressed the McGee defendant’s initial solicitation of the plaintiff within the forum, as well as California’s statutorily expressed “manifest interest” in the subject matter of the suit (a narrowly-drawn long arm statute dealing with insurance companies soliciting business in California, discussed infra). It was the combination of these factors, along with the contract, that formed an adequate jurisdictional foundation. As noted above, it was not established at trial that Roberts & Sons initially solicited Beco. Since this solicitation factor is missing in this case, there is no jurisdiction in Idaho courts, based on McGee and Hanson.
*714Our guidance is not limited to McGee and Hanson, however. Preceding both cases was International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). And subsequent to McGee and Hanson, the court has announced a myriad of other benchmark cases. Chronologically, these include Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra; and, most recently, Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, supra. When all these cases are combined, a sequential three-step jurisdictional test emerges. In order for jurisdiction to be constitutionally asserted over a non-resident defendant:
1. the non-resident must have acted in an affirmative manner to “purposefully avail[ ] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”;1 (emphasis supplied);
2. the defendant’s in-state activities must constitute a substantial connection with the forum when the suit arises out of transactions conducted outside the forum; and,
3. the assertion of jurisdiction must not offend the due process “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 2
This three-step test places paramount importance on the relationship “among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,”3 and guarantees the protection of a non-resident’s due process rights. Each step must be independently satisfied before proceeding to the next. Factors relevant to the fairness or reasonableness of a jurisdictional assertion should not be considered until the “purposeful availment” and “arising out of” requirements are met. To do otherwise results in a deprivation of due process.4
Minimum contacts analysis requires that a non-resident purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of a forum before becoming subject to its jurisdiction. This is the first step of the analysis, and application of the test “cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.”5 Each case requires an ad hoc analysis of the jurisdictional facts.6
Establishing contractual relations is by definition voluntary, and might therefore be labeled purposeful activity. Such activity alone, however, does not satisfy the requirement.7 Rather, additional factors must indicate a defendant’s intent to associate itself with the forum. These factors include foreseeability, consent, the contractual terms, and the defendant’s behavior relevant to the contract. Each factor will be analyzed in turn.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “ ‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process *715Clause.”8 Although foreseeability of consequences may not be determinative, a defendant’s reasonable expectations of amenability to suit are relevant in determining the purposeful nature of its acts. “[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567.
In Burger King, it was the defendant’s refusal to make the contract’s required payments and the defendant’s continued use of trade marks and confidential business information that caused foreseeable injuries to the plaintiff.9 In the instant case, however, no such factors are present. Roberts & Sons did not refuse to make payments under the contract; in fact, it paid Beco for every cubic yard of landscape barrow it loaded, hauled and dumped. Further, as both parties have testified, Beco’s hauling problems were not foreseeable. Neither Roberts & Sons nor Beco, when they examined the premises in Arizona, foresaw that apparently dry land could be saturated with water underneath, which resulted in the mud that ultimately caused Beco’s alleged damages. Certainly, Roberts & Sons could not reasonably foresee itself being haled into an Idaho court, when all performance under the contract was to be in, and was in fact, accomplished in Arizona.
Next, regarding the consent factor, a defendant may reasonably anticipate amenability to suit in a forum by consenting to a particular forum’s jurisdiction. Express consent may result from designation of an in-state agent to receive service of process. Such express consent is not found in the instant action.10 However, constructive consent may, under certain circumstances, be given through state jurisdictional statutes. This is particularly appropriate when the state has expressed its interest in the subject matter of the suit through a narrowly-drawn special jurisdictional statute. When a defendant acts within a state which has such a special statute, such as a special statute relating to a foreign insurance company’s soliciting business in a state, it may establish constructive consent to jurisdiction.11 The United States Supreme Court re-emphasized the importance of special jurisdictional statutes in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 214-216, 97 S.Ct. at 2585-2586, and Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 98, 98 S.Ct. at 1700.
The statute involved in the instant action is neither narrowly drawn, nor is it a special jurisdictional statute. It is a broad based general long arm statute, addressing no industry in particular, as did the California statute in McGee. The majority recognizes this when it says, “The question is whether the conduct of Roberts & Sons falls within the terms of this very broadly worded statute.” Ante at 707, 760 P.2d at 1123. Thus, there is nothing in this record to suggest that Roberts & Sons consented to Idaho court jurisdiction, either expressly or through state jurisdictional statutes.
Another factor in “purposeful availment” analysis is the contract’s choice-of-law provisions. A choice-of-law provision indicates the parties’ preference for application of a particular body of substantive law. A defendant who voluntarily chooses a particular jurisdiction’s laws cannot later claim that it has not manifested an intent to avail itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of that state.
*716In the instant case, the governing law was to be that of the State of Arizona. The last paragraph of the original contract between Roberts & Sons and the State of Arizona reads: “IT IS ALSO UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this contract is subject to A.R.S. § 28-1824, § 28-1825, § 28-1826, together with all other limitations pursuant to the applicable laws of the State of Arizona relating to public contracts and expenditures.” The parties to the subcontract also selected Arizona law. Article I of the subcontract states:
“Article I. Performance of work. The Subcontractor shall ... perform all labor required for the completion of the said work in accordance with all provisions of the original contract ... all of which are hereby made a part of this agreement____”
The provisions of the original contract were incorporated into the subcontract. Accordingly, defendant Roberts & Sons (and the plaintiff Beco) chose Arizona law as the governing law, too. This factor points to jurisdiction in Arizona — not in Idaho.
A final factor to be considered in the “purposeful availment” analysis is the defendant’s behavior relevant to the contract, i.e., its solicitation and performance of the contract. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). As noted above, evidence regarding solicitation in the instant case is inconclusive. Evidence regarding performance shows that all the work was to be performed in the State of Arizona. In toto, the evidence points to jurisdiction in Arizona, but not in Idaho.
In summary, the threshold test of a minimum contacts analysis, “purposeful availment,” is not met. None of the above factors show that Roberts & Sons acted in an affirmative manner to “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum [State of Idaho].” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239-1240.
“This ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts____” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 473-75, 105 S.Ct. at 2183 (citations omitted).
The instant case most closely resembles an “attenuated” contact. The entire subcontract was to be fully performed in Arizona and within forty working days; the franchise contract in Burger King, conversely, contemplated a twenty-year relationship. The defendant in Burger King deliberately reached beyond Michigan for the purchase of a long term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from affiliation with a nationwide organization. This twenty-year relationship envisioned continuing and wide reaching contacts with the plaintiff Burger King. 471 U.S. at 479-80, 105 S.Ct. at 2186. The subcontract between Beco and Roberts & Sons, on the other hand, anticipated a forty working day relationship in Arizona and nothing else. Neither does the evidence show that Roberts & Sons deliberately reached into Idaho to gain substantial benefits; the evidence regarding solicitation is inconclusive.
Roberts & Sons did not deliberately “reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state [Idaho].” Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 70 S.Ct. 927, 929, 94 L.Ed. 1154 (1950). Even McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra, the high water mark case of jurisdictional analysis, required a more “substantial connection” with the forum than occurred in this case. 78 S.Ct. at 201. Borrowing from the factors specifically enumerated in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S.Ct. at 1033, Roberts & Sons does not do business in Idaho; it has no office, agents, employees, or property in Idaho; and it has not been shown that Roberts & Sons advertises or otherwise solicits business in Idaho. On the basis of these facts, the exertion of personal jurisdiction over Roberts & Sons by the Idaho district court exceeds the limits of due process. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, Roberts & Sons.
*717ii
Proper resolution of the jurisdictional issue would render all other issues raised by the parties moot. Nevertheless, I also dissent from Part II of the majority opinion, the “extra work” issue in this case. The genesis of this “extra work” issue is Article XIV of the subcontract itself. A contract’s meaning, its legal effect, and whether it is ambiguous are all questions of law. Barr Development, Inc. v. Utah Mortgage Loan Corp., 106 Idaho 46, 675 P.2d 25 (1983); Laight v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 108 Idaho 211, 697 P.2d 1225 (Ct.App.1985). Accordingly, we are not bound by the district court’s decision regarding “extra work.” Clark v. St. Paul Property & Liability Ins. Companies, 102 Idaho 756, 639 P.2d 454 (1981). No ambiguity issue was raised, and we can exercise free review as we interpret the contract. Shipley v. Cook, 109 Idaho 537, 708 P.2d 942 (Ct.App.1985).
Beco, not Roberts, selected the subcontract used in the instant action which, in pertinent part, reads:
“Article XIV. Claims for Extra Work or Damages.
“The Contractor will pay for extra work performed and materials furnished by the Subcontractor, under written authorization by the Principal’s [State of Arizona Highway Department] engineer, ... as and when it is paid therefor by the Principal. Any claim of the Subcontractor for extra work and/or materials not so authorized, or for damages of any nature whatsoever, shall be deemed waived by Subcontractor unless written notice thereof is given the Contractor mthin ten days after the date of its origin.
“It is distinctly understood and agreed by Subcontractor that this agreement is made for the consideration herein named, and that the Subcontractor has, by examination, satisfied himself as to the nature and location of the work, the character, quantity and kind of materials to be encountered, the character, kind and quantity of equipment needed during the prosecution of the work, the location, conditions and other matters which can in any manner affect the work under this agreement. No verbal agreement with any agent either before or after the execution of this agreement shall affect or modify any of the terms or obligations herein contained and this contract shall be conclusively considered as containing and expressing all of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties hereto. No changes, amendments or modifications of such terms or conditions shall be valid or of any effect unless reduced to writing and signed by the parties hereto.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, Beco assumed risks like the one spawning the instant action; i.e., Beco assumed the risk of muddy conditions at the jobsite. By the express terms of the subcontract, Beco “distinctly understood and agreed ... that this agreement is made for the consideration herein named [$2.00 per cubic yard of landscape barrow loaded, hauled and dumped], and that [Beco] has, by examination, satisfied [it]self as to the nature and location of the work, the character, quantity and kind of materials to be encountered, [and] ... the location, conditions and other matters which can in any manner affect the work under this agreement.” Included in “the nature ... of the work, ... the location, conditions and other matters” were the muddy conditions of the jobsite.
Further demonstrating that Beco assumed the risk of muddy conditions are other provisions in the subcontract. The $2.00 per cubic yard payment stated in the subcontract was full compensation for doing all work contemplated in the agreement, for all loss and damage arising out of the nature of the work, and for all risks connected with the work. As stated in Article XV of the subcontract:
“Article XV. Basis and Scope of Payment.
“Payment will be made to the Subcontractor for work actually performed and completed, as measured and certified to by the Principal’s engineer, at the unit prices hereinafter specified, which shall be accepted by the Subcontractor as full compensation for furnishing all material *718and for doing all work contemplated and embraced in this agreement; also for all loss and damage arising out of the nature of the work aforesaid, and for all risks of every description connected with the said work; also for all expense incurred by the Subcontractor by or in consequence of the suspension or discontinuance of the work.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, in yet another subcontract provision, Beco, in its chosen contract, agreed to accept $2.00 per cubic yard of barrow loaded, hauled and dumped as full compensation: (1) for doing all work contemplated by the agreement; (2) for all loss or damage arising out of the nature of the work; and (3) for all loss resulting from the action of the elements or from any unforeseen difficulties or obstructions encountered in the prosecution of the work. It expressly acknowledged such in the third paragraph of Article XIX, providing:
“In consideration of the promises, covenants and agreements of the Subcontractor herein contained and the full, faithful and prompt performance of this agreement and the plans and specifications constituting a part thereof, the Contractor agrees to pay to Subcontractor and Subcontractor .agrees to receive and accept as full compensation for doing all work and furnishing all materials, supplies, etc., contemplated and embraced in this agreement, also for all loss or damage arising out of the nature of the work aforesaid, or from the action of the elements, or from any unforeseen difficulties or obstructions which may arise or be encountered in the prosecution of the work until its acceptance by the Principal, and for all risks of every description connected with the work; also for all expenses incurred by or in consequence of the suspension or discontinuance of the work, and for well and faithfully completing the work and the whole thereof, in the manner and according to the terms of this agreement and the requirements of the Contractor and instructions of the engineers in charge of said work, payment at the following unit prices: [$2.00 per cubic yard of #803 landscape barrow loaded, hauled and dumped].” (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, under the express terms of the subcontract which it selected, Beco assumed the risk of encountering mud on the jobsite. Beco contends, however, that it should be paid for the additional expense of hauling the topsoil with its equipment through the mud under Article XIV of the contract, which states that “[t]he Contractor will pay for extra work performed ... by the Subcontractor____”
The task of moving the topsoil on its equipment through the mud was not “extra work,” but was “additional work” necessary to accomplish that which it had contracted to do. Idaho case law has delineated the distinction between the terms. In Cutler v. Giessler, 107 Idaho 637, 691 P.2d 1252 (Ct.App.1984), the following concise explanation is given:
“The distinction between extra and addition work was explained by our Supreme Court in Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1977), where the Supreme Court said that ‘extra’ work arises outside and entirely independent of the contract, while ‘additional’ work is something necessarily required in the performance of the contract and without which the contract could not be carried out.” 107 Idaho at 639, 691 P.2d at 1254.
Beco characterized its claim as one for “extra work” when, in fact, it was for additional, but unforeseen work in performing its contract. The subcontract does not permit Beco to recover for additional unforeseen work in performing its contract. In moving its trucks through the mud in the process of . hauling topsoil Beco was merely performing its obligation included in the original subcontract. Accordingly, Beco’s claim is one for “additional work” or effort expended in the performance of its subcontract obligation without which the subcontract could not have been performed. When the subcontract was made, both parties contemplated that Beco’s trucks would have to travel from the source of the topsoil to the site where the topsoil was to be dumped. Said travel was required by the subcontract which stated *719that Beco’s duties include “loading, hauling and dumping” landscape barrow. To fulfill its obligation under its subcontract, Beco had to drive its trucks loaded with the topsoil from the material source site to the location where the materials would be used. That is what it had contracted to do. The contract provided that payment of $2.00 per yard for landscape materials delivered at the destination point was
“full compensation for doing all work and furnishing all materials, supplies, etc., contemplated and embraced in this agreement, [and] also for all loss or damage arising out of the nature of the work aforesaid, or from the action of the elements, or from any unforeseen difficulties or obstructions which may arise or be encountered in the prosecution of the work ... and for all risks of every description connected with the work____” (Emphasis added.)
The contract further provided that “the subcontractor has, by examination, satisfied himself as to the nature and location of the work, the character, quantity and kind of materials to be encountered, the character, kind and quantity of equipment needed during the prosecution of the work, and the location, conditions and other matters which can in any manner affect the work under this agreement.” (Emphasis added.) By its very terms the subcontract precludes additional compensation for any additional expense incurred by Beco in getting his trucks and equipment through the muddy spots in order to deliver the topsoil from the material source to the site of construction.
Further, under Article XIV of the subcontract, payments for “extra work” must be authorized by the “Principal’s [State of Arizona Highway Department] engineer,” and the contractor will pay the subcontractor for “extra work” only “as and when it is paid therefor by the Principal [State of Arizona Highway Department].” These are two distinct prerequisites to the subcontractor’s receipt of an “extra work” payment. First, regarding the authorization requirement, the Standard Specifications of the State of Arizona, Department of Transportation, Highway Division, state that in order for extra work to be paid for it must
“be set forth on a supplemental agreement form, which will specify the work to be done and the basis for compensation____
“Upon receipt of an approved supplemental agreement, the contractor shall proceed with the ordered work; however, he shall proceed with the work before the receipt of an approved supplemental agreement if so ordered in writing by the Engineer.” State of Arizona, Dept. of Transportation, Highways Division Standard Specifications §§ 104.03, 109.04 (1982 ed.).
At a minimum, “extra work” required written authorization from the State of Arizona’s engineer. In plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1, however, the State of Arizona responded to Roberts & Sons’ notice concerning the mud as follows:
“Dear Sir:
“Your letter is not clear as to the location or what alleged problem exists. Assuming that you are referring to a mud condition for your haul vehicles, this is to be expected whenever it rains.
“This is not extra work as defined as Standard Specifications Subsection 104.-02, and there will be no payment as called for under Standard Specification Subsection 104.03.”
Thus, there was no authorization by the principal’s engineer concerning “extra work.”
Neither was the second prerequisite met. Under the express terms of the subcontract chosen by Beco, Roberts & Sons must pay Beco for “extra work” only “as and when it is paid therefor by [Arizona].” Roberts & Sons received no “extra work” payment from Arizona, and therefore under Beco’s subcontract no extra work payment to Beco was required.
Finally, Article XIV of the subcontract states that extra work claims “shall be deemed waived by Subcontractor unless written notice thereof is given the Contractor within ten days after the date of its origin.” According to Beco Corporation’s *720Daily Record, its trucks “kept getting stuck” beginning on December 15, 1983. Accordingly, Beco should have given Roberts & Sons written notice of its extra work claim by December 25, 1983. The record does not disclose any timely notice. In fact, the uncontroverted evidence shows written notice was not given until months later. Obviously, by then the 10-day notice period had expired, and Beco’s claim was deemed waived.12
In sum, there are at least four reasons for denying Beco’s “extra work” claim. First, Beco expressly assumed the risk of muddy terrain. Second, movement of its equipment through the mud was simply “additional work,” not “extra work.” Third, the State of Arizona’s denial of any claim that the muddy conditions fostered “extra work” precluded Beco’s claim against Roberts. And fourth, Beco’s claim is deemed waived because it failed to give timely written notice.
Ill
The foregoing analysis points out the quandary in which Roberts & Sons finds itself as a result of today’s decision. It is faced, in Idaho, with a court decision that the additional expense to which Beco was put in order to move the topsoil as the result of the muddy conditions was “extra work” under the subcontract provisions for which it must pay additional compensation, but is faced with a denial of any additional compensation from the State of Arizona on the basis that the additional expense caused by the muddy conditions was not “extra work” within the meaning of the subcontract provisions. While it is possible that Roberts & Sons may be able to obtain a reversal of the denial of additional compensation by the Arizona Department of Transportation by litigation in Arizona, conflicting results in the two states are obvious and probable. If Beco’s claim had been required to be brought in Arizona courts, Roberts & Sons could have impleaded the State of Arizona Highway Department, and consistent decisions reached. If Beco’s additional effort was in fact “extra work” within the meaning of the subcontract provisions, then absent a waiver caused by failure to give timely written notice, Beco’s claim against Roberts & Sons would have caused liability to flow through Roberts to the Arizona Department of Highways by virtue of a third party claim. However, here Roberts & Sons is faced with conflicting and contrary decisions. For purposes of its obligation to Beco, the additional effort was “extra work” for which the Idaho courts have held Roberts & Sons liable. However, for purposes of obtaining additional compensation from the State of Arizona for that “extra work,” Roberts & Sons has been denied any additional compensation. These conflicting results point out why the Idaho courts should not have exercised jurisdiction over the defendant Roberts & Sons because of a lack of minimum contacts to satisfy due process. The prospects of conflicting decisions in these two states only enhance the lack of “fair play and substantial justice” which the due process clause guarantees.
*721For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred in failing to grant Roberts & Sons’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, under the contract provisions, Roberts & Sons was not liable to Beco for any additional compensation under the subcontract, and the trial court should have granted Roberts & Sons’ motions, either for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240. Accord, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216, 97 S.Ct. at 2586; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 94, 98 S.Ct. at 1698; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567; Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 329, 100 S.Ct. at 577; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 473-75, 105 S.Ct. at 2183; and Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. at 109, 107 S.Ct. at 1031.

. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940).

. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204, 97 S.Ct. at 2579.

. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 475-77, 105 S.Ct. at 2184.

. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160.

. Schwilling v. Horne, 105 Idaho 294, 298, 669 P.2d 183, 187 (1983).

. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 477-79, 105 S.Ct. at 2185.

. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566.

. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 479-480, 105 S.Ct. at 2186.

. At one time, Roberts & Sons had a business office, a foreign corporation registration, and a registered agent in Idaho. All such connections had been severed, however, for more than a year prior to the time when the parties entered the subcontract in the instant case.

.Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 252-53, 78 S.Ct. at 1240 (discussing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.). In McGee, California had enacted a special statute that subjected foreign insurance companies to jurisdiction. 355 U.S. at 221, 78 S.Ct. at 200. The existence of the statute . provided reasonable notice to foreign insurance companies that the state had a special interest in the field of insurance, and that soliciting business within the state would render them amenable to California’s jurisdiction.

. Regarding the 10-day notice provision, defendant testified:
"Q. Mr. Fuller talks about written notice. In Article 14 of the contract, Ed, I find this provision: ‘Any claim of the subcontractor for extra work and/or materials not so authorized or for damages of any nature whatsoever shall be deemed waived by the subcontractor unless written notice thereof is given to the contractor within ten days after the date of origin.’ Did you ever receive any such written notice?
“A. No."
Likewise, plaintiff also testified:
"Q. [By Mr. L. Webb] There’s a provision in that subcontract that requires you to give notice in writing within ten days of the origin of any extra work. Did you ever give any notice in writing within ten days of the origin of any of that extra work?
"A. [By Mr. Doyle Beck] Well, I would consider the work orders we had given them and had them sign would be written notice. We give them all kinds of verbal notice.
"Q. The only claim or notice of claim however that you ever served on them was the summary which is in evidence as Exhibit 9?
"A. I believe so, yes.
"Q. And that, of course, is dated February 14, 1984?
"A. Okay.”