Court Opinion

ID: 9626685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:21:30.603533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:32.336428
License: Public Domain

Fox, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result in this case, but I would base our ruling on a different theory from that followed in the opinion. In my judgment, the conveyance executed by John C. Huddleston to Walter C. Price, Jr., trustee, dated *722October 1, 1941, was, in legal effect, a mortgage to secure the beneficiaries therein the sum of $15,500.00. Under the terms of the said instrument, the trustee was required to make sale of the property conveyed upon the death of John C. Huddleston, and pay certain sums of money to the beneficiaries aforesaid. The balance remaining in his hands, after satisfying the sums due the beneficiaries, was to be paid over to the heirs or devisees of John C. Hud-dleston. In these circumstances, I think the said conveyance should be treated as a mortgage. When we do this we have no difficulty in sustaining the lease here in question, when we consider the provisions of the conveyance that Huddleston had the “exclusive right during his lifetime to use, lease, develop, manage, improve or operate all of the property.” But for this provision, the general rule that a lessee of mortgaged property is subject to an existing mortgage would probably control. 36 Am. Jur. 830.
If we treat the interest of John C. Huddleston in the property involved as anything else than that of a mortgagor, we are met with the question of just what estate, if any, he had in said property. It is certain that his estate was, strictly speaking, not that of an ordinary life tenant, because he had parted with the legal title to the property, and only reserved certain rights to possession, rents and other controls during his lifetime, and the right in his heirs or devisees to any excess derived from the sale of the property by the trustee beyond the sum secured in the deed he executed. It is doubtful whether this created any specific estate in the property. In my opinion, his interest was that of a mortgagor because, upon his payment of the sums due the beneficiaries under the deed aforesaid, all of the claims of Price, trustee, were intended to end, and a required reconveyance of the property to Huddleston, or a valid release of the mortgage would, of course, make him the owner of the property in fee simple. In my opinion, Huddleston continued to be the equitable owner of the property until his death, subject to the deed he made to Price which I would treat as a mortgage.
*723The question of the right of a life tenant to execute a lease for a term which may extend beyond his death is mentioned in the opinion of this case. I do not want to be understood as questioning in any way the rule laid down in the cases of Shufflin v. House, 45 W. Va. 731, 31 S. E. 974; Jones v. Shufflin, 45 W. Va. 729, 31 S. E. 975; and Holden v. Boring, 52 W. Va. 37, 43 S. E. 86. In a case where a life tenant executes a lease, I think the lease ends at his death. I am not in accord with some courts that a life tenant may execute a lease which may expire within a reasonable period after his death. If we follow that view, we are met with the question of what is a reasonable time. It is well known that in some instances, leases are made for fifty years or even more, all depending on the character of business for which the property is leased, the amount of improvements necessary to develop the same for the purposes leased, and many other considerations. Except in cases of contingent remainder, a lessee of property can always secure the assent of the remainderman, and thus avoid the risk attendant upon the termination of a life estate. It is realized, of course, that to lease property advantageously, it is sometimes necessary to execute leases which may extend, and probably are cohtemplated to extend beyond the life of the life tenant; but difficulties arising from such situations are small compared with those which would arise if we adopt the rule that a life tenant may make a lease which extends for a reasonable time beyond his death. Nothing that we could do would lead to more uncertainty as to the rights of lessees and lessors, with respect to all types of property, than to establish such a rule. I do not understand that the opinion in this case does establish such a rule, but the question has been raised, and I think warrants some discussion.