Court Opinion

ID: 9724526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:00:19.350017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:02.097477
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
This is an appeal from the circuit court for the county of Kent by plaintiff from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 
The following is an agreed statement of facts stipulated to by the parties:
“On September 15, 1960, at approximately 7:35 a.m., the plaintiff Edward J. Ladner left the General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body Division Plant No. 2, at 2060 Voorheis, N.W., Grand Rapids, Michigan, where he had just completed work on the 11 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. shift. He walked out of the plant, through the gate and across Voorheis street to the plant parking lot. While walking towards his automobile in the plant parking lot, he was struck from behind by a 1959 automobile operated by the defendant Cora Vander Band and owned by the defendant John Vander Band. The defendant Cora Vander Band *324had just turned into the plant parking lot from Voorheis street, N. W., in order to park her car,prior to commencing work in the plant office.
“The parking lot where the accident occurred is owned by General Motors Corporation and is maintained by’ it for the use of its employees. Both the plaintiff and the defendant Cora Vander Band regularly parked in said parking lot while at work.
“The defendant Cora Vander Band was driving the automobile which was owned solely by her husband, John Vander Band, with the knowledge and consent of John Vander Band.
“The plaintiff, Edward J. Ladner, and the defendant Cora Vander Band were both employees of General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body Division, and were employed at the plant where the accident' occurred. At the time of the accident, the defendant Cora Vander Band was in the plant parking lot parking her car for the purpose of commencing work and the plaintiff, Edward J. Ladner, was in the plant parking lot going to his car for the .purpose of leaving work.
“The plaintiff, Edward J. Ladner, sustained injuries, especially to his left knee, for which he neither filed any claim nor received any benefits under the workmen’s compensation law.”
Plaintiff instituted suit on May 24, 1962, and on April 30, 1963, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment contending (1) plaintiff failed to state a claim; (2) that the rights of the plaintiff are governed by the workmen’s compensation act and that plaintiff is barred from suing defendants; (3) that plaintiff’s injuries occurred while going from work while on his employer’s premises by the alleged negligence of defendant Cora Vander Band who was going to work while on the employer’s premises, and were coemployees in the course of their employment, subject to workmen’s compensation laws of this State; (4) that there is no issue as- to any material *325fact and defendants are therefore entitled to a judgment of no cause for action as a matter of law; (5) that the accident occurred on private property, not on the public highways, and defendant John Vander Band as owner of the automobile operated by defendant Cora Vander Band is, therefore, entitled to a judgment of no cause for action as a matter of law.
We conclude that under the stipulated facts and pleadings in this case the trial court correctly held that plaintiff could not bring suit in tort against his coemployee, defendant Cora Vander Band. The facts and circumstances in this case would indicate both plaintiff and defendant Cora Vander Band were subject to the workmen’s compensation act.2
Unlike the situation in Brooks v. Fields, 375 Mich 667, all of the facts to bring into play the presumption of section 1 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act,3 are included in the pleadings and stipulation of facts. They were both on the premises of the employer. Plaintiff had just finished work on the 11 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. shift. Defendant Cora Vander Band was on the premises for the purpose of commencing work at 8 a.m. The accident occurred at 7:35 a.m. Both were employed at the same plant and both regularly parked in and used the employees’ parking lot where the accident occurred. Clearly, both were within the statutory “reasonable time” before or after working hours.
No material fact question remained to be proven or determined. It was a question of law, and under the rule of Sergeant v. Kennedy, 352 Mich 494, reaffirmed in Ayers v. Genter, 367 Mich 675, the court properly granted motion for summary judgment as to defendant Cora Vander Band.
*326Plaintiff further contends that the provisions of the ownership liability statute4 did not prohibit recovery against defendant John Vander Band, owner of the automobile which was operated upon private property with his express consent.
Defendant owner relies upon Kruutari v. Hageny, 75 F Supp 610, a decision of the United States district court for the western district of Michigan (decided in 1948) holding that the use of the words “public highways” in the title of the Michigan motor vehicle law and in several provisions of the act clearly indicates a legislative intendment that the act should apply only to motor vehicles operated on public highways. Subsequent to the decision in Kruutari the act there discussed was repealed by the legislature and a new code was adopted — PA 1949, No 300 (CLS 1961, § 257.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.1801 et seq.]).
It is not necessary for us to determine whether Judge Starr was right in Kruutari. He was dealing with a former title — a title which announced no provision, as now, for overall owner liability. Nothing in the present title or in the act limits application of the ownership liability section to motor vehicles “operated upon the public highways of this State.” The title of PA 1949, No 300, provides as follows (2A CLS 1961, p 90 [8 Stat Ann 1960 Rev, p 52]):
“An act to provide for the registration, titling, sale and transfer, and regulation of vehicles operated-upon the public highways of this State; to provide for the licensing of vehicle dealers and wreckers; to provide for the examination, licensing and control of operators and chauffeurs; to provide for the giving of proof of financial responsibility and security by owners and operators of vehicles; to provide for the imposition, levy and collection of specific *327taxes on vehicles, and the levy and collection of sales and nse taxes, license fees and permit fees; to provide for the regulation and nse of streets and highways; to provide penalties for violation of any of the provisions of this act; to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles and service of process on nonresidents; and to repeal all other acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith or contrary hereto.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It would appear from an analysis of the title that the intent of the legislature was not to limit the civil liability provisions to “public highways” or it would have so provided within the civil liability portion of the title.
Likewise, in analyzing the ownership liability provisions of the statute,5 again the legislature did not see fit to so limit the liability to “vehicles operated upon the public highways,” but provided as follows:
“Sec. 401. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of any of the provisions of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, his agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of such motor vehicle whether such negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the statutes of the State or in the failure to observe such ordinary care in such operation as the rules of the common law requires.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Had the legislature intended to limit ownership liability to “vehicles operated upon the public highways” it would have used language to carry out such intent.
*328We conclude, therefore, that the ownership liability statute is not restricted to the operation of motor vehicles upon public highways.
Summary judgment for the defendant operator is affirmed, with costs in her favor. Summary judgment for the defendant owner is reversed, with costs to plaintiff.
Dethmers, Souris, Smith, O’Hara, and Adams, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, 0. J.

 CL 1948, § 411.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.141 et seq.).

 CLS 1961, § 412.1 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.151).

 CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2101).

 CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2101).