Court Opinion

ID: 9787356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:15:10.881558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.179920
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
dissenting.
Because I agree with defendant, David Carlson, that the evidence does not support his conviction for theft under § 18-4-401(1)(a), C.R.S.2002, I disagree with part II(B) and (C) of the majority opinion and respectfully dissent.
This case arose out of defendant's 1992 sale of a used 1974 Mercedes Benz to the victim for $5,450. After taking a test drive, the victim paid defendant $1,100 as a down payment and signed a promissory note for the balance. The car's title listed a third party as lienholder. After the sale, the vice-tim began experiencing mechanical trouble with the car, failed to make payments on the promissory note, and hid the car in a rented barn so that it would not be repossessed.
Defendant was charged with and convicted of theft based on his alleged misrepresentation of the mileage of the car.
*421I. Intent
Defendant argues that the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential element that he intended permanently to deprive the victim of the use or benefit of a thing of value. I agree.
I conclude that as a matter of law a defendant cannot commit the crime of theft when, during a purchase, the victim receives an item worth more than the money the defendant receives. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that a theft convietion may be sustained in cireumstances where proof of intent permanently to deprive a victim of the use or benefit of a thing of value relies solely on testimony that, but for the defendant's misrepresentations, the vice-tim would not have completed the transaction, from which the victim nonetheless received some value.
A person commits theft when he or she "knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization, or by threat or deception" and "(intends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value." Section 18-4-401(1)(a). "A defendant has the requisite intent to commit the crime of theft if his [or her] intended use of another's money is inconsistent with the owner's use and benefit." People v. Erickson, 695 P.2d 804, 805 (Colo.App.1984).
When determining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts consider whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support the conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Christian, 682 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Colo.1981).
Here, the evidence most favorable to the prosecution established that defendant sold the victim a used car for $5,450. Defendant told the victim that the car had been driven 75,000 miles and was owned by his elderly father, who rarely drove the car. The victim testified that he would not have purchased the car had he known that it had been driven 133,000 miles, The victim gave defendant $1,100 as a down payment on the car. In return, defendant applied the down payment toward the purchase price, and the victim and his wife signed a promissory note for the remaining balance. Defendant transferred title of the car to the victim, subject to a lien held by a third party in the amount of $4,450. The prosecution also presented evidence that someone had tampered with the car's odometer.
I conclude for several reasons this evidence was factually and legally insufficient to establish defendant committed the crime of theft under § 18-4-401(1)(a).
First, the information alleged that an expert in the valuation of used cars believed that such a car which had been driven 125,-000 miles was worth $3,500. However, at trial the prosecution presented no evidence of the value of the car. Instead, an automobile appraiser testified for the defense that if the car had been driven 135,000 miles, it was worth approximately $6,500 at the time of the sale and had probably increased in value about ten percent since that time. Another witness testified the car was eventually resold for $6,000.
Second, despite the victim's testimony that he would not have purchased the car had he known it had been driven 183,000 miles, there was no evidence that the victim knew the value of the car if driven 75,000 miles or if driven 133,000 miles.
Third, the prosecution did not proceed at trial on the theory that the thing of value was the difference between the value of the car if driven 75,000 miles ($5,000 to $6,500) as allegedly represented to the victim, and the value of the car if driven 138,000 miles ($3,500), the actual mileage according to the prosecution. Rather, the prosecution argued that the victim's $1,100 down payment constituted the thing of value. However, in my view, the evidence considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution established that the vietim received a car worth $6,000 to $6,500, paid defendant $1,100 as a down payment, and was liable for a lien in the amount of $4,450. There was no evidence that the purchase price was the $1,100 down payment, plus both the amount of the promissory note and the third-party lien, which would have *422totaled $9,990: The victim testified only that the total purchase price was $5,450.
Fourth, even though the car did not have the mileage the victim expected, he received use or benefit from his down payment because it was applied to the purchase price. Therefore, defendant did not use the thing of value, the down payment, inconsistently with the victim's use or benefit. See § 18-4-401(1)(a); People v. Erickson, supra.
Further, there was no evidence that defendant obtained or exercised control over the down payment without authorization. Instead, the undisputed evidence showed that the victim gave defendant the $1,100 down payment. See People v. Gracey, 940 P.2d 1050 (Colo.App.1996)(defining "without authorization"). Similarly, there was no evidence that defendant employed any threats.
Even if there were evidence of defendant's deception, still, as discussed above, there was no evidence that defendant intended to deprive the victim permanently of the use or benefit of his down payment, because the victim received a car of greater value in return. Even if the amount of the lien were considered, the evidence at most showed that the victim paid $1,100 and was responsible for a lien of $4,450, with a total "cost" of $5,550 for a car worth between $6,000 and $6,500,
Under these cireumstances, it is not reasonable to conclude that defendant committed theft by obtaining control of the victim's $1,100 where the asserted deception is that, but for defendant's misrepresentations, the victim would not have purchased the car. The majority's interpretation disregards the actual fair market value of the car the victim received. Even if the victim would not have purchased the car had defendant not misrepresented the car's mileage, the victim still could resell the car for approximately $6,000, some $450 more than he paid for it.
This result is different in kind from the more typical theft in which the victim buys something, but receives in return nothing or an item of little or no value.
Here, by contrast, even if we assume that defendant misrepresented the mileage on the car, he cannot be said to have deprived the victim of "the use or benefit" of his $1,100, because the victim received a car in return worth that amount or substantially more, even considering the lien on the car. Thus, I would conclude defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal.
II. Debtor-Creditor Relationship
Defendant next contends that the evidence established a debtor-creditor relationship and as such he can not be subjected to criminal prosecution for his conduct. I agree that a theft prosecution was not proper here.
There may be a eriminal prosecution for theft where a debtor-creditor relationship exists, but only if the defendant intended permanently to deprive the victim of the use or benefit of something of value. See People v. Collie, 995 P.2d 765, Ti4A-T5 (Colo. App.1999)(defendant engaged in a consistent pattern of negotiating contracts, obtaining initial payments, performing minimal work, and then demanding additional payment without performing any additional work); see also People v. Stewart, 789 P.2d 854 (Colo.1987)(defendant's depletion of bank account was evidence of his intent permanently to deprive the victim of the value of its products). However, I have already conelud-ed that evidence of such intent was lacking here.
People v. Rotello, 454 P.2d 765 (Colo.1988), provides a better analogy. There the supreme court held that the defendant-lessee's failure to pay a percentage of his gross profits to the county-lessor as mandated by his lease was not felony theft from the county. The money owed by the defendant to the county did not constitute "anything of value of another" under the theft statute, because "no money collected by [the defendant] became [the county's] property until it was transferred by [the defendant] in payment of the obligation." People v. Rotello, supra, 754 P.2d at 767 (quoting People v. Treat, 198 Colo. 570, 577, 568 P.2d 478, 477 (1977)); see also People v. McClure, 186 Colo. 274, 526 P.2d 1328 (1974)(evidence established debtor-creditor relationship rather than theft where there was no evidence of intent to deprive and no evidence defendant exercised unau*423thorized control over money given to him for a travel package).
In my view, a broad reading of the theft statute to allow eriminal prosecution under the cireumstances here would render meaningless the specific intent permanently to deprive another person of the use or benefit of a thing of value required under § 18-4-401(1)(a). See Dover Elevator Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App.1998)(words and phrases should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the result is absurd); see also People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986)(courts should avoid statutory constructions that defeat the clear intent of the General Assembly). Such a broad interpretation would allow criminal prosecution of theft where a customer is dissatisfied with a purchase, even if he or she received the merchandise and the alleged thief credited the payment towards the purchase price.
This conclusion is supported by the overall statutory scheme of the eriminal code, which defines separate fraud and motor vehicle offenses for this type of conduct. See People v. Triantos, 55 P.3d 181, 184 (Colo.2002)(courts must construe each provision of a comprehensive statutory scheme to effectuate the overall legislative intent). In $ 18-5-101, et seq., C.R.8.2002, the General Assembly has defined numerous offenses involving fraud, such as forgery, simulation or impersonation, fraud in obtaining property or services, fraudulent and deceptive sales and business practices, offenses related to the Uniform Commercial Code, unauthorized use of financial transaction devices, and equity skimming of a motor vehicle. See, eg., §§ 18-5-102, 18-5-110, 18-5-301, 18-5-808, C.R.S.2002. Thus, the General Assembly is well aware of the wide range of fraudulent conduct, not all of which is theft.
In addition, the Certificate of Title Act makes it unlawful for any person to use or install any device that "causes an odometer to register any mileage other than the true mileage driven." Section 42-6-202(1), C.R.S. 2002. It is further unlawful for "any person or the person's agent to disconnect, reset, or alter the odometer of any motor vehicle with the intent to change the number of miles
indicated thereon." - Section 42-6-202(2), C.R.98.2002.
Here, where the evidence did not establish defendant committed the crime of theft, I conclude there was either a civil debtor-creditor relationship as in People v. Rotello, swpra, or, at most, a basis for eriminal prosecution for an offense involving fraud or odometer tampering. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of conviction.