Court Opinion

ID: 9568647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:06:07.364809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:53:43.670647
License: Public Domain

FABE, Justice,
with whom RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with all aspects of the court’s opinion except for Part IV.C, which concerns the superior court’s division of real property given to Michael by his parents. Although Michael admits that these parcels are marital property, he argues that the superior court erred in dividing them equally between the parties. In my view, the superior court’s equal division of this property was proper and supported by the facts, and there is no necessity for a remand for further findings.
We have held that under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), “[p]roperty available for distribution includes all property acquired during marriage, whether title is joint or separate.” Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 224 (Alaska 1986). Michael received the real property at issue from his parents during the course of the marriage, and it was thus available for distribution. The law presumes that a fifty-fifty division of marital property is equitable. Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42, 53 (Alaska 1996); Jones v. Jones, 666 P.2d 1031,1034 (Alaska 1983).
The majority faults the trial court for failing to make specific findings regarding its consideration of the source of the real property acquired from Michael’s parents. In Carlson, we held that the trial court “always should consider the property’s source when determining what assets are available for distribution.” Carlson, 722 P.2d at 224 (emphasis added). Here, however, there was no question that the assets were available for distribution; Michael conceded this point. The Carlson court further emphasized that the need to consider the property’s source is greater “in a marriage of short duration.” Id. In the case before us, Michael and Barbara were married for forty years, and they held the disputed property jointly for twenty-two years.
We have stated that the trial court’s findings “need not be extensive” as long as they provide “a clear indication of the factors which the superior court considered important in exercising its discretion.” Bird v. Starkey, 914 P.2d 1246, 1249 n. 4 (Alaska 1996). A trial judge’s decision should not be overturned merely because of the judge’s failure to “tally the statutory factors” if the trial court has made “a sound decision and no reason exists ... to overturn it.” Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987).
The trial court in this case was clearly aware of the source of the various parcels of real property in this marital estate and decided on an equal division of the property acquired during the parties’ forty-year marriage. I cannot agree that this decision should be remanded due to inadequate findings. I would therefore affirm the superior court’s equal division of the marital property received from Michael’s parents.