Court Opinion

ID: 9825449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:01:19.450716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:50.139746
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The brief, on application for rehearing, in the main stresses again the question originally pressed upon our attention. These we have duly reconsidered, and the conclusion reached that the treatment thereof in the original opinion is sufficient, and as to which we rest content with the discussion found therein.
Reference is made to the supplemental brief filed by one of defendant’s counsel after submission of the cause, and we may with due propriety express our accord with his associate counsel, that it contains an able presentation of the defendant’s case from the standpoint of argument of the facts and a general résumé of the trial. And it may be added that its careful consideration was not neglected prior to the preparation of the opinion in the cause. And, mindful of our duty and the responsibility resting upon us in cases of this character, these facts have again been reviewed.
But since the passage of the Act of 1915 (Gen. Acts 1915, p. 594. section 10336, Code 1923), it has not been the policy of this court to enter into a detailed discussion of the facts (Caples v. Young, 206 Ala. 282, 89 So. 460; Griswold v. Duke, 224 Ala. 402, 140 So. 427); nor would it here serve any useful purpose. We have considered, therefore, the general treatment of the facts in the original opinion sufficient, and we see no occasion for their further discussion here.
It is further insisted that defendant was denied due process of law in that his counsel proved incompetent upon the trial (present counsel having been employed subsequent to conviction), and we are cited in support thereof the recent case of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 57, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527. But the two cases are so widely different as to render the Powell Case inapplicable here. There the holding was that the due process of law clause of the Federal Constitution had been violated in that the defendant had been “denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial.” No such situation is here presented. As noted in the original opinion, the two attorneys who participated in the trial of this defendant and employed for that purpose, and not under appointment of the court as in the Powell Case, were the same attorneys who had on a previous occasion represented de*370fendant and secured a mistrial of his cause. Indeed, it is not insisted there was any lack of consultation and preparation for trial, but the argument rests upon the theory that a careful scrutiny of the record discloses a failure in some instances to reserve exceptions where exception should have been reserved, or to interpose objection, or to offering a certain class of witnesses in support of defendant’s alibi theory and good character. Perhaps some of these criticisms, viewed in the light of calm reflection, may be conceded as well taken, while others are of more doubtful character and leave room for a difference of opinion. But, however that may be, there is nothing in the Powell Case that indicates the principle therein enunciated was intended to be given so wide a scope and of so far-reaching a consequence as to embrace a search of the record fbr errors of attorneys, with the result that the trial of the skill or competency of the attorney becomes of equal dignity with the trial of the defendant as to his guilt. Indeed, the Powell Case, as previously noted, is rested only upon the theory that the defendant was “denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial,” and we do not conceive further discussion is necessary to demonstrate the argument of its applicability to the present case is wholly untenable.
In the original opinion we considered the statement of the assistant solicitor to which exception was reserved. But it is urged that the assistant solicitor, during the trial, made disparaging side remarks to defendant’s counsel, or at least to one of them, and asked some questions of witnesses calculated to prejudice defendant’s case, and that, although in many instances no objections were interposed, and no exceptions were reserved thereto, yet, reviewing the whole ease, a new trial should have been granted, under the authority of Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Blackwell, 221 Ala. 225, 128 So. 389.
This insistence was likewise duly considered by the court in consultation, but a discussion deemed unnecessary. And we think that only a casual reading of the Blackwell Case will disclose that it furnishes no ground for a new trial here, and so clearly does it appear to our minds that the two cases are not analogous that we consider it unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the points of differentiation.
True there were some unfortunate colloquies between the assistant solicitor and defendant’s counsel, and some objectionable remarks interposed, all of which may well be disapproved. But it is difficult to perceive that the jury did not correctly regard all of this as aside from the issue and valued these remarks at their true worth. Many of the questions, which defendant now criticizes, were asked on cross-examination of defendant’s witnesses, including defendant himself, wherein there is much latitude of discretion allowed the court. Mitchell v. Birmingham News, 223 Ala. 568, 137 So. 422.
There is no occasion here to examine the different criticisms in this regard, as for the most part no objections were interposed, and in some instances the questions were withdrawn. Some of those criticized were clearly unobjectionable. Illustrative are questions propounded to some of defendant’s witnesses as to whether or not they had contributed to the expense of his trial, a matter proper for inquiry to test the interest of the witness. But we need not further pursue the discussion. We can see nothing in these criticisms, viewed singly or collectively, that would call for the granting of a new trial.
Upon original consideration of the cause we discussed Chose questions which we deemed of first importance, and considered such treatment of the case sufficient for all purposes. Out of deference to the earnest insistence of counsel on this application, we have again reviewed the case and elaborated upon matters previously considered, but not discussed in the opinion.
We are still of the view no error to reverse appears, and that the judgment should stand affirmed. The application is therefore denied.
Application overruled.
ANDERSON, O. J., and THOMAS, BOULDIN, BROWN, FOSTER, and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.