Court Opinion

ID: 9914799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 15:00:50.076899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:36.117823
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10508    Document: 58-1     Date Filed: 01/03/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10508
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MARCOS CAMPOS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20237-RAR-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10508     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 01/03/2024    Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10508

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              In this case, the district court issued an order extending the
       time during which appellant Marcos Campos remained committed
       to the Attorney General’s custody. In its order, the district court
       determined that there was a substantial probability that if Campos
       remained committed for an extended time, he would attain the ca-
       pacity to permit the criminal proceedings against him to move for-
       ward. Campos filed an interlocutory appeal. While the appeal was
       pending, the director of the facility where Campos was committed
       determined that he had attained the capacity to permit the criminal
       proceedings to move forward, and he was released from the Attor-
       ney General’s custody. The government then moved to dismiss the
       appeal as moot. We GRANT the government’s motion.
                                        I.
              Campos was charged with one count of receipt of child por-
       nography and one count of possession of child pornography. After
       his arrest, he was released on bond.
              While awaiting trial, Campos requested a competency de-
       termination. After three psychological evaluations showed that
       Campos was not competent to proceed to trial, the district court
       found that Campos was “presently suffering from a mental disease
       or defect that render[ed] him unable to understand the nature and
       consequences of the proceedings against him and unable to assist
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       23-10508                   Opinion of the Court                        3

       properly in his defense.” Doc. 49 at 2. 1 The court then ordered
       Campos committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a
       period not to exceed four months for treatment and a determina-
       tion whether there was a substantial probability that he would at-
       tain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward. See
       18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1); see also United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d
       1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that when a district court
       finds a defendant incompetent to stand trial, “he must be commit-
       ted to the Attorney General for hospitalization until it can be de-
       termined whether a probability exists that the defendant will regain
       the capacity to be tried”).
               Campos was treated and evaluated at the Federal Medical
       Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”). Shortly before
       the end of the four-month commitment period, the government
       filed a motion to extend the period of Campos’s commitment. See
       18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2) (permitting defendant to remain in custody
       for an “additional reasonable period of time” if the court finds
       “there is a substantial probability that within such additional period
       of time [the defendant] will attain the capacity to permit the pro-
       ceedings to go forward”). The psychologists evaluating Campos
       opined that “with intensive intervention” there was “a substantial
       probability that [Campos’s] competency related skills could im-
       prove” if he remained in custody and continued to receive treat-
       ment for an additional 120 days. Doc. 61-2 at 20–21.

       1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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       4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10508

              Campos moved for his immediate release from custody. He
       argued that the period of his commitment had expired and should
       not be extended because the government failed to establish a sub-
       stantial probability that he would attain competency if he remained
       committed for an additional 120 days.
              The magistrate judge entered an order granting Campos’s
       motion for immediate release and denying the government’s mo-
       tion. The magistrate judge found that the government failed to es-
       tablish by a substantial probability that Campos could be restored
       to competency if he remained committed for an additional 120
       days. Based on the magistrate judge’s order, Campos was released
       from FMC Butner.
              The government objected to the magistrate judge’s order.
       The district court concluded that the magistrate judge had “clearly
       erred in finding . . . no substantial probability” that Campos would
       attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward if his
       commitment was extended by 120 days. Doc. 72 at 4. The district
       court set aside the magistrate judge’s order, granted the govern-
       ment’s motion to extend Campos’s treatment period, and denied
       Campos’s motion for immediate release. The district court ordered
       Campos back into the Attorney General’s custody.
             Campos filed this interlocutory appeal, asking this Court to
       reverse the district court’s order extending the period of his com-
       mitment. While the appeal was pending, Campos returned to the
       Attorney General’s custody and was treated and evaluated at FMC
       Butner for an additional 120-day period. During this period, the
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       23-10508                Opinion of the Court                           5

       facility director concluded that Campos’s condition had sufficiently
       improved so that his trial could proceed and issued a Certificate of
       Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e).
       Campos then was released from FMC Butner, and the proceedings
       in district court have continued.
              The government has moved to dismiss Campos’s appeal, ar-
       guing that it is moot. Campos has filed a notice of non-opposition
       to the motion.
                                          II.
                Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of fed-
       eral courts to the consideration of “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S.
       Const. art. III, § 2. “The doctrine of mootness derives directly from
       the case or controversy limitation because an action that is moot
       cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.” Soliman
       v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (in-
       ternal quotation marks omitted). “A case is moot when the issues
       presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable
       interest in the outcome.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal quota-
       tion marks omitted). “[I]f events that occur subsequent to the filing
       of . . . an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the . . . ap-
       pellant meaningful relief, then the [appeal] is moot and must be
       dismissed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any decision
       on the merits of a moot case or issue would be an impermissible
       advisory opinion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
              Although appellate jurisdiction existed when Campos filed
       his notice of appeal, the appeal has become moot. While the appeal
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       6                           Opinion of the Court                        23-10508

       was pending, Campos was taken back into the Attorney General’s
       custody and returned to FMC Butner for a second 120-day period
       of treatment and evaluation. During this period, the facility direc-
       tor certified that Campos’s competence had been restored, and
       Campos was released from custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e). Be-
       cause Campos’s extended period of confinement has concluded,
       we cannot grant him any meaningful relief in this appeal from the
       order committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for
       an additional 120 days. We thus conclude that we no longer have
       jurisdiction over this appeal. 2
               DISMISSED AS MOOT.

       2 We note that the district court has not yet decided whether Campos is com-

       petent to stand trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e) (explaining that after a facility di-
       rector issues a certification, the district court must “hold a hearing . . . to de-
       termine the competency of the defendant”). Nothing in our opinion today ad-
       dresses the issue of Campos’s competence to stand trial. Instead, we merely
       decide that Campos’s appeal from the order extending the period of his com-
       mitment is moot.