Court Opinion

ID: 9670465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:21:16.06636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.854320
License: Public Domain

SNYDER, J.
¶ 23. (dissenting). This is a grandparent visitation case. The primary issue on appeal is not whether the circuit court appropriately preserved the *527"meaningful" relationship between the children and the grandparents; rather it is whether the court exceeded its statutory authority to grant visitation by crafting the equivalent of a physical placement order that included parent-like decision-making power. Under Wis. Stat. § 54.56(2), a circuit court has the authority to "grant reasonable visitation privileges" to grandparents. Because the statute expressly authorizes reasonable visitation, but not physical placement, I dissent.
¶ 24. The majority demonstrates the tension that exists between the concepts of "visitation" and "physical placement." Without citation to any authoritative source, the majority makes the following conclusions, "[t]here is no difference" between visitation and physical placement when it comes to the quantity of time that the children spend with a grandparent. Majority op., ¶ 12. The majority then concedes that it cannot say that "visitation and physical placement are exactly the same thing," and that "qualitatively, the two concepts are different." Majority op., ¶ 14. But, claims the majority, "as to the quantitative amount of placement and what that placement consists of, they are not different." Majority op., ¶ 14.
¶ 25. Here, the circuit court ordered the father to allow his two sons to stay with their maternal grandparents for the second weekend of each month, the last Wednesday of each month, and one week each summer. Having removed the children from their only surviving parent's home, the circuit court then granted the grandparents the "responsibility of making the decisions in caring for the children," and the right to take the children across state lines after notifying the father. Having determined that the quantity of time spent with the grandparents was not determinative, the majority *528then remands for clarification of the level of authority and decision making power the court intended to provide the grandparents.
¶ 26. I cannot join in the majority's conclusion because the statute and the case law do not support it. The difference between "visitation" and "physical placement" has been addressed extensively in a case cited by the majority. In Lubinski v. Lubinski, 2008 WI App 151, 314 Wis. 2d 395, 761 N.W.2d 676, a stepmother sought an injunction to enforce a placement schedule of her husband's minor son while the husband was deployed with the military. Id.,\ 3. The family court granted the injunction. Id., ¶ 4. We reversed, holding that "physical placement bestows rights associated with legal custody, and [the stepmother] has no claim to physical placement or legal custody in this case." Id., ¶ 6. The Lubinski court began its analysis with a discussion of " 'physical placement' versus 'visitation' under the statutes." Id., ¶ 7.
¶ 27. The Lubinski court first tackled the concepts in the context of divorce proceedings under the auspices of Wis. Stat. ch. 767, and concluded that, "while physical placement encompasses the act of having a child physically present with the parent, it also grants that parent rights consistent with legal custody." Id., ¶ 8. The court then went on to explain the use of the terms in non-parent circumstances:
On the other hand, non-parents may petition for reasonable visitation rights (as opposed to legal custody or physical placement) with children who are in the custody of fit parents. While the statutes do not define "visitation," the dictionary defines visitation as "[a]n act of visiting. . .: VISIT," and "visit" is defined as "[t]o go or come to see" or "[t]o stay with as a guest." Visitation, then, does not incorporate the rights associated with *529legal custody or physical placement. Instead, it allows certain people who have established parent-child relationships with children to maintain contact with those children following actions affecting the family unit, when such contact is in the best interest of the child.
Id., ¶ 9 (citations omitted) (emphases added).
¶ 28. The closest analogy in Wisconsin case law comes from F.R. v. T.B., 225 Wis. 2d 628, 593 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1999). In F.R., the circuit court ordered frequent visitation with the grandparents, including weekend overnight visits, vacation time, and "during any period of time when [the child] was not in school, in an organized activity, or with his father." Id. at 635. There, we concluded that the visitation order was "expansive," and although "the trial court may have approached the limits of its discretionary authority . . . it did not exceed them." Id. at 646, 648. The majority draws on this language for support of its conclusion. However, the analogy becomes less perfect as the details of the order are examined. A close look at F.R. discloses that a significant portion of the time the child would be with the grandparent occurred when the father was at work. Id. at 647. Thus, the visitation order did not substantially interfere with the parent's time with his son; rather, it "pre-selected" the grandparent as the child's afterschool caregiver. Id. Also, the father retained the right to determine what afterschool activities his son would join. Id. And further, the father had the ability to "elect to be with his son" during the week if he was off work. Id. at 647 n.5. In other words, much of the "expansive" visitation order allowed the grandparent to be with the child at times when the child would otherwise be with a third-party caregiver. The order also retained decision-making authority in the parent, *530and incorporated flexibility to allow the parent to be with his son when his work schedule changed. Id. at 647.
¶ 29. Wisconsin Stat. § 54.56(2) allows grandparents to petition for reasonable visitation rights. Lubinski distinguishes visitation rights from custody or physical placement. F.R. teaches that visitation must not unreasonably interfere with a parent's ability to care for and spend time with his or her child.
¶ 30. Although the majority embraces a qualitative difference between visitation and physical placement, it rejects any distinction in quantity of time spent outside the custodial home. That is where we part ways. The quality and quantity of time afforded to the Ricks by the circuit court coalesce into something indistinguishable from physical placement. A visitation order that mimics a physical placement order cannot be condoned under the statute. The court's order grants extensive physical placement and control of the children away from the custodial oversight of the father. Thus, the court exceeded its statutory authority to grant "reasonable visitation" under Wis. Stat. § 54.56(2).