Court Opinion

ID: 9692634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:59:06.712948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:35.790118
License: Public Domain

Grant, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. Laissez-faire may be an acceptable doctrine in some theories of government regulation, but I do not think the Nebraska Constitution permits that approach to setting rates for telecommunications companies in Nebraska.
I feel that 1986 Neb. Laws, L.B. 835, codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 86-801 et seq. (Reissue 1987), violates Neb. Const. art. IV, § 20, which provides:
There shall be a Public Service Commission .... The powers and duties of such commission shall include the regulation of rates, service and general control of *291common carriers as the Legislature may provide by law. But, in the absence of specific legislation, the commission shall exercise the powers and perform the duties enumerated in this provision.
A portion of § 86-803 provides: “Telecommunications companies shall not, however, be subject to any rate regulation by the commission and shall not be subject to provisions as to rates and charges prescribed in Chapter 75, articles 1 and 6.” I believe that provision renders the whole of L.B. 835 unconstitutional.
The history of the adoption of Neb. Const. art. IV, § 20, is set out in State ex rel. State Railway Commission v. Ramsey, 151 Neb. 333, 37 N.W.2d 502 (1949). Included in that history is the court’s conclusion:
The language finally adopted [in the Nebraska Constitution] positively provides that the powers of the commission shall include the regulation of all the enumerated matters with the right of the Legislature to control the manner in which the commission shall perform its independent constitutional duties, or to enter the field itself to the extent of “specific legislation.” The conclusion is logical, if not inescapable, that the Legislature would not have proposed, and the people would not knowingly have approved, an addition to the Constitution creating a commission with power only to regulate and control common carriers to the extent and for the time provided or permitted by the Legislature----
151 Neb. at 343, 37 N.W.2d at 508.
In construing the meaning of “general” and “specific” as used in Neb. Const. art. IV, § 20, the Ramsey court stated: “It was not intended by the use of these words to authorize unlimited, broad, general legislation in reference to the control and regulation of common carriers.” 151 Neb. at 344, 37 N.W.2d at 509.
In my judgment, L.B. 835 constitutes unlimited, broad, general legislation in purporting to free telecommunications companies from any rate regulation.
The Ramsey opinion referred to State, ex rel. Missouri P. R. Co., v. Clarke, 98 Neb. 566, 153 N.W. 623 (1915). In that case, *292the Legislature, by statute (commonly called the “Two-cent Fare Act”), had fixed a maximum rate of 2 cents per mile for railroad passenger rates and then, 21 days later, had enacted a statute granting the Legislature the power “to fix all necessary rates, charges and regulation to govern and regulate the freight and passenger tariffs of railway companies ...” Rev. Stat. § 6109 (1913). The relator contended the later statute authorized the commission to raise the rates beyond 2 cents. The Clarke court held to the contrary, stating: “The general power of the state railway commission, as applied to passenger traffic, is limited to rates below the maximum fixed by the two-cent fare law.” 98 Neb. at 571, 153 N.W. at 625. In my opinion, this holding determines that “specific legislation,” in this area of the law, is the setting of rates and not the outlawing of rate regulation.
I construe the Ramsey and Clarke cases to mean that if the Legislature preempts the rate field by setting specific rates, it has enacted the “specific legislation” referred to in article IV, § 20. In my judgment, the authority to set a specific rate does not extend the authority of the Legislature to say “no one shall regulate rates.” In their Constitution, the people of the State of Nebraska have expressed their decision that either the Legislature or the commission shall regulate the rates of common carriers. I do not believe that constitutional directive can be thwarted by legislative action abolishing rate regulations as to specific common carriers.
In enacting §§ 86-801 et seq., the Legislature has attempted to repeal Neb. Const. art. IV, § 20. I do not believe the Legislature can do that. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that §§ 86-801 to 86-811 are unconstitutional as violating Neb. Const, art. IV, § 20.
Boslaugh . J., j oins in this dissent.