Court Opinion

ID: 9853500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:37.851079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:50.183317
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SHEA,
dissenting:
I would reverse the summary judgment- and send this case back for trial. In reaching their decision, the majority has concluded as a matter of law that' the words “Lease is extended to December 1, 1974 . . .” mean that only the term portion of the lease was extended and the year-to-year tenancy provision was not also extended. I cannot accept their reasoning that the lease was unconditionally terminated on December 1, 1974. It has effectively precluded the Nevala family from presenting evidence on an issue vital to their future as a ranching family. They have been foreclosed from asserting any right to purchase land on which they have worked for many years.
The original lease contained a provision which allowed a year-to-year tenancy at the expiration of the specific term of years provided for in the lease. The first lease was in effect from December 1, 1964 until 15 days after the calves were delivered in 1971. There is no direct evidence as to when the calves were delivered in 1971, but presumably they were delivered in the spring of 1971. From that time on, under the first lease, the Nevala family was holding under the year-to-year provisions of the lease. But in the same year, October 4, 1971, David McKay and the Nevala family again signed the original lease (which contained the provisions for a year-to-year tenancy) by stating the “Lease is extended to December 1, 1974 . . .” The parties specified the term of years as being from October 4, 1971 to December 1, 1974.
By the terms of the extension, the tenancy for years terminated *335on December 1, 1974. At this point however, the Nevala family was not holdover tenants as the majority has concluded. Rather, they were then holding the land as year-to-year tenants under the provisions of the 1964 lease which was signed again on October 4, 1971. The parties moreover, clearly regarded themselves as being in a valid landlord tenant relationship, and even the majority has recognized this.
Pursuant to the original lease agreement calling for an accounting, the parties settled their accounts in 1975 and it also appears they did so in 1976 and 1977. This conduct, together with their conduct relating to the right of first purchase held by the Nevala family, demonstrates the parties considered themselves to be in a valid landlord-tenant relationship and the Nevala family had a valid and enforceable right of first purchase.
On Friday, September 26, 1975 (while the Nevala family was only holdover tenants, according to the majority), David J. McKay offered to sell the Carl Thisted Ranch at $90 per acre to the Nevala family. The Nevalas agreed to make the financial arrangements by the next Monday. However, on Monday morning, September 29, 1977, McKay called Raymond Nevala and told him the deal was off and that he was keeping the ranch. McKay’s desire to keep the ranch however, was only short lived. The same day he entered into a package deal with a team of real estate speculators and signed an agreement to sell the ranch involved here and two other ranches for $1.2 million. The sequence of these events suggests the appearance of a better deal cost the Nevala family their option to purchase.
During oral argument counsel for McKay was asked why McKay made the offer to sell to the Nevalas on Friday, September 26, 1977, if he did not consider the Nevalas had the right of first refusal. The answer was that David McKay is such a “nice guy”. He may indeed be a “nice guy”, but I am not convinced this character attribute is what impelled him to offer the ranch to the Nevala family. In any event, it appears this character attribute suddenly evaporated over the weekend, for the following Monday morning *336he called the Nevalas to tell them the deal was off, only to turn around and make an agreement to sell to real estate speculators.
It is clear the lease extension language interpreted by the majority, is subject also to a contrary interpretation that is just as reasonable, and perhaps more just. In any event the Nevala family should have been given the opportunity, along with David McKay, to testify to what the language means. Accordingly, the summary judgment should be reversed.