Court Opinion

ID: 9491398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:13:14.332965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:43.232067
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This is another case where Dinah Washington’s1 sage advice — ‘What a diffrence a *715day makes ... twenty-four little hours”— should be recalled. See Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153 (7th Cir.1996). Today, the court holds that this major CERCLA suit, filed on September 19 rather than September 18 of 1996, cannot proceed. Although the majority opinion presents a thorough analysis of the law governing this sticky issue, I disagree with the conclusion reached, and for that reason I dissent.
I would hold that this suit was filed within the 6-year statute of limitations provided for under CERCLA § 113(g)(2)(B). But Navis-tar insists that a little bit of work on the site prior to September 19,1990, amounted to the “initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action.” See CERCLA § 113(g)(2)(B). But “the remedial action” referred to in the statute cannot be initiated until the EPA provides written approval of the final design for that action. Here, written approval was given on September 20, 1990. Nothing that happened before that date, in my view, triggered the ticking of the statute of limitations clock.
This interpretation of the statute has an ease of application that would serve to advance the purposes of the statute of limitations, particularly in the complicated context of CERCLA suits. If actions cannot trigger the statute of limitations until formal written approval has issued, there will be no need for parties to haggle over the presence and nature of preapproval activity at a hazardous waste site. But that will be the result of today’s opinion. Parties will now invest time, energy, and money in what is ultimately an issue peripheral to the real question — liability. The resulting distraction will undermine CERCLA’s primary purposes: To provide a safe and efficient means of cleaning hazardous waste sites as quickly as possible, and to recover from those responsible the money spent to pay for that cleanup. See, e.g., Sidney S. Arst v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ., Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir.1994).
This interpretation of § 113(g)(2)(a) also has the advantage of providing the greatest possible protection to the public. Tying the statute of limitations to the date of written approval of the remedial design plan provides a concrete basis upon which federal, state, and private parties can rely in determining when the statute of limitations will bar a claim. It will also be easy for district courts to apply the rule. District judges will not have to engage in a complex weighing of factors to determine whether particular actions advanced the purpose of the remediation, and they will not have to guess what was in the minds of the actors on site when certain actions were taken. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. Dinah Washington was not the first artist to record "What a Difference a Day Makes.” Billboard magazine reports that it was first recorded by The Dorsey Brothers in 1934. Ms. Washing*715ton’s summer of 1959 rendition, however, is regarded as a classic, of 1959 rendition, however. is regarded as a classic.