Court Opinion

ID: 9518374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:51:27.867317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:46.303400
License: Public Domain

*615M. S. Coleman, J.
(concurrence in part; dissent in part). I endorse Justice Williams’ conclusion in response to the first issue "that plaintiffs have not sustained their burden” as required by Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139; 215 NW2d 179 (1974), and Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425; 86 NW2d 166 (1957).
The response to the second issue does not receive my endorsement. It is said that present and proposed practices with regard to mobile homes is "tantamount to exclusion” and "that in the light of the availability of land in Grand Blanc Township such virtual exclusion is unreasonable and without justification”. The opinion concludes that the zoning system "unlawfully and unreasonably discriminates and therefore is invalid”.
It would be most unwise for this Court to assume the responsibility of determining what percentage of land in any governmental unit— whether Grand Blanc Township or the City of Detroit — must be zoned for mobile homes. It is particularly unwise for us to tell the township board where the added acreage for mobile homes should be located.1
One is necessarily led to question whether the same rationale would then have to apply to apartment buildings, condominiums and untold numbers of other land uses. To compound the problem, in each instance, this Court might be called upon to establish what percentage of any given usage would or would not be tantamount to exclusion. *616The prospect of this Court becoming a super zoning commission is rendered more than probable.
In this case the trial judge found as fact that 23 acres of Grand Blanc Township are actually now used for mobile-home parks, and rezoning has provided for enlargement of those parks. Importantly, however, the existing zoning ordinance provides for mobile homes and the township board has approved a land use plan providing 300 acres of land for mobile-home parks. It is important to note, as did the trial judge, that this is not a situation where the governmental institution has sought to deny all mobile-home parks within its community. Compare Roman Catholic Archbishop of Detroit v Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich 389; 53 NW2d 308 (1952).
After extensive testimony, the trial judge rendered an opinion which made factual findings and drew legal conclusions. Compare Quigley v Dexter Twp, 390 Mich 707; 213 NW2d 166 (1973). For his standard of review, the trial judge cited language from Brae Burn which was quoted with approval in Kropf. It was said that:
"[T]he ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity, Hammond v B. H. Building Inspector, 331 Mich 551 [50 NW2d 155 (1951)], and it is the burden of the party attacking to prove affirmatively that the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon the owner's use of his property. Janesick v City of Detroit, 337 Mich 549 [60 NW2d 452 (1953)]. This is not to say, of course, that a local body may with impunity abrogate constitutional restraint. The point is that we require more than a debatable question. We require more than a fair difference of opinion. It must appear that the clause attacked is an arbitrary fiat, a whimsical ipse dixit, and that there is no room for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning its reasonableness.”
*617The trial judge determined "that the plaintiffs have not carried or met their burden”. The court found "no indication that the action taken by the township authorities is arbitrary or unreasonable and that the zoning ordinance is an unreasonable and arbitrary restriction upon the owner’s use of his property”.
It is generally said that we review these cases de novo. However, as in so many other situations, we give great weight to the findings and conclusions of the trial judge. After all, he or she had the most immediate and constant opportunity to observe and react to the evidence. We properly regard such opportunity as important. See Christine Building Co v City of Troy, 367 Mich 508; 116 NW2d 816 (1962), and Kropf.
It is profitable to review frequently the following philosophy found in Brae Burn and repeated in Kropf:
"In view of the frequency with which zoning cases are now appearing before this Court, we deem it expedient to point out again, in terms not susceptible of misconstruction, a fundamental principle: this Court does not sit as a super-zoning commission. Our laws have wisely committed to the people of a community themselves the determination of their municipal destiny * * * . With the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the determination we are not concerned. The people of the community, through their appropriate legislative body, and not the courts, govern its growth and its life. Let us state the proposition as clearly as may be: It is not our function to approve the ordinance before us as to wisdom or desirability. For alleged abuses involving such factors the remedy is the ballot box, not the courts. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the duty and responsibility in the premises.”
I agree with the trial judge, who said that *618respect "for those persons charged with the responsibility of determining the zoning within their community” required him to abstain from interceding "absent of showing that there has been an unreasonable and arbitrary action taken by those same authorities”.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial judge’s finding that the plaintiffs have not "maintained their burden as required and a judgment for thq defendant may enter”.
Swainson and Lindemer, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Also, I cannot say that mobile-home owners or legitimate businesses are excluded from the township or that plaintiff has a constitutional right to place a mobile-home park on his property. Neither can I find that plaintiffs’ property is, in effect, being taken without compensation. They paid $350 per acre. It is now worth $1500 per acre. The fact that they cannot quadruple the present value of the land has no constitutional or statutory implication under these circumstances.