Court Opinion

ID: 9677571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:55:34.300084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:25.523306
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant was not denied the right to a speedy trial. The test for determining whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial involves four parts: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the defendant has suffered prejudice because of the delay. Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972); People v Hill, 402 Mich 272, 283; 262 NW2d 641 (1978); People v Metzler, 193 Mich App 541, 546; 484 NW2d 695 (1992).
In this case, twenty-four months elapsed between defendant’s arrest and the ultimate dismissal of the impaired-driving charge by the district court. I agree with the majority that the time that elapsed between defendant’s arrest and the initial dismissal should be attributed to the prosecution. United States v Colombo, 852 F2d 19, 24 (CA 1, 1988).
*114I disagree, however, with the majority’s position that the time period between indictments should not be counted against the prosecution. While I recognize established precedent to the contrary, given the instant facts, the prosecution should be charged with the delay during that period. It is clear from the district court record that the prosecution had no intention of allowing defendant to avoid prosecution. Thus, it was only a matter of time before the charge would be reinstated. Accordingly, defendant was not "in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation.” United States v MacDonald, 456 US 1, 8-9; 102 S Ct 1497; 71 L Ed 2d 696 (1982). In such instances, prosecutors should not be allowed to avoid the application of a speedy-trial analysis. See People v Lowenstein, 118 Mich App 475; 325 NW2d 462 (1982) (this Court implicitly considered such time in determining the length of delay under a speedy-trial analysis). See also United States v Loud Hawk, 474 US 302, 317-323; 106 S Ct 648; 88 L Ed 2d 640 (1986) (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Accordingly, I would find that the delay in this case covered the entire twenty-four-month period from arrest to the final dismissal. Therefore, prejudice to defendant is presumed. Metzler, supra at 546.
I also take issue with the prosecution’s assertion that it may commence as many prosecutions against the defendant for the same offense as it sees fit until jeopardy attaches. Although that assertion may be correct in theory, the repeated dismissal and reinstitution of the same charges could be evidence of bad faith on the part of the prosecution, and, thus, a violation of due process. See MacDonald, supra at 7.
I would also find the second factor, the reason for the delay, in defendant’s favor. As the majority *115notes, defendant was responsible for 6V2 months of the delay, or slightly more than one-fourth of the total delay. Thus, almost three-fourths of the delay was attributable to the prosecution either as a result of docket congestion or the prosecution’s lack of preparation, including its failure to produce its own witnesses. Although the prosecution is entitled to a reasonable length of time in order to prepare for trial and to obtain the presence of its witnesses, People v Wallace, 33 Mich App 182, 184; 189 NW2d 861 (1971), it has failed to adequately explain the reasons for the delays in this case. Furthermore, because this is a relatively simple case, delay by the prosecution is less tolerated. Lowenstein, supra at 490.
With regard to the third factor, defendant states in his brief that he promptly demanded a speedy trial each time the impaired-driving charge was filed. However, the limited record before us, including counsel’s initial written appearance, is silent in this regard. The record is clear, however, that defendant opposed the prosecution’s motion for adjournment heard on November 19, 1990, and he advised the district court that he was ready to proceed to trial. Accordingly, I would find that defendant timely asserted his right to a speedy trial. People v Collins, 388 Mich 680, 692; 202 NW2d 769 (1972).
With regard to the fourth factor, actual prejudice to the defendant, I agree with defendant that the passage of an inordinate amount of time before proceeding to trial can result in prejudice to one’s defense. Defendant has asserted that he experienced difficulty after time with subpoenaing one witness and that he was ultimately unable to produce the witness. Thus, I would find this factor in favor of defendant.
Accordingly, on balance, I would find, as did the *116district and circuit courts, that the prosecution has failed to rebut the presumption that defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial. A twenty-four-month delay, almost three-fourths of which was attributed to the prosecution, cannot be justified in cases as simple as this case. Therefore, I would hold that defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. I would affirm.