Court Opinion

ID: 9598541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:09:45.675477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:41.932373
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring). I concur in the result. A. An interlocutory appeal was properly granted. Judge Wood treated a docketing statement as an application for an interlocutory appeal. State v. Garcia, 91 N.M. 131, 571 P.2d 123 (Ct.App.1977). I agree. By this process of construing § 39-3-3(A)(3), N.M. S.A.1978, and Rule 203 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for Criminal Cases, we take the view that the Supreme Court follows a policy of construing rules liberally, to the end that cases on appeal may be determined on the merits where it can be done without impeding or confusing administration or perpetrating an injustice. Olguin v. State, 90 N.M. 303, 563 P.2d 97 (1977). I concur in this procedural device and in any similar device used in every criminal case wherein a defendant suffers because of the fault of an attorney. Defendants in a criminal case are entitled to the protection of the law. Their attorneys are not whenever the statutes and rules of procedure are not followed. B. The trial court erred in declaring a mistrial. The prosecutor asked the defendant this question on cross-examination. Isn’t it true that on that evening your sister accused you of raping her friend? Based on this question the trial court granted a mistrial. The ruling was erroneous. The question as to the scope of the cross-examination has been ruled upon by the Supreme Court on many occasions. The cross-examination of a witness should be limited to those facts and circumstances connected with the matters inquired of in the direct examination, except as to those tending to discredit or impeach the witness. It is not confined to the identical details testified to in chief, but extends to its entire subject matter, and to all matters that may modify, supplement, contradict, rebut or make clearer the facts testified to in chief by the witness on direct examination. It is much safer to resolve the doubts in favor of the cross-examiner than to risk excluding testimony that should be admitted. State v. Wilcoxson, 51 N.M. 501, 188 P.2d 611 (1948); State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968); State v. Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (Ct.App.1969). The State’s question was not improper or prejudicial. It was within the realm of permissible questions on cross-examination. The defendant could have answered the question “yes” or “no.” His answer would have been “no” because he claimed an alibi. The State would then have the right to attack the credibility of the defendant and impeach his testimony. For the purpose of impeachment, evidence is not barred because it is hearsay. Weiland v. Vigil, 90 N.M. 148, 560 P.2d 939 (Ct.App.1977). The propriety of a mistrial is to be determined by whether there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial order, or by whether the ends of public justice would be defeated by carrying this trial to its final verdict. State v. Dunn, 93 N.M. 239, 599 P.2d 392 (Ct.App.1979). A question asked on cross-examination of a witness cannot trespass on this rule of law. The question only calls for a ruling over objection as to whether the question was relevant or permissible. The trial court erred in declaring a mistrial. On this ground, defendant is subject to a third trial. Defendant’s motion for dismissal of the charges on grounds of double jeopardy was properly denied because it was not an issue in the case. To allow double jeopardy as an issue in this appeal raises serious questions on whether defendant should be discharged. To discuss this issue would require an extensive discussion of the facts and application of the doctrine of double jeopardy. There is no doubt that the prosecutor sought “a more favorable opportunity to convict” defendant when the question was asked. The State concedes that the question was improper. On September 29, 1979, in State v. Quintana, 93 N.M. 644, 603 P.2d 1101, Judge Wood said that “overreaching” which bars retrial requires bad faith conduct “which seeks for the prosecutor a more favorable opportunity to convict.” In the first trial, there were constant references to defendant’s sister as well as a wrongful accusation made by the prosecutor in closing arguments. In case No. 3608, the court said: We view the closing remarks of the prosecutor together with some of the questionable questioning at trial, to have been made in bad faith. A serious question arises whether the reference to defendant’s sister in the second trial was made in good faith. Furthermore, in the first trial, the prosecutor acted in bad faith. Did this fact preclude the initiation of the second trial irrespective of whether it was intended to provoke a mistrial? It would appear so, but this question was not raised in the first and second trials. Reluctantly, I have decided not to answer these difficult double jeopardy problems. To me, the question asked on cross-examination was permissible. The trial court erred in granting a mistrial and defendant is subject to a third trial. Defendant has been charged with a serious criminal offense. He must be tried until, absent reversible error, he is found guilty or not guilty.