Court Opinion

ID: 9473358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:27:40.909176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:29.083612
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur fully in Judge Ferguson’s opinion.
California’s antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act, Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code §§ 16700-60 (West 1964 & Supp.1985), follows the model of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The congruity of the statutes led us to invoke res judicata and to hold, in earlier precedent, that where a plaintiff sustains an adverse judgment in a suit on the Cartwright Act in state court, he may not rely on the Sherman Act to relitigate the case in federal court. Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Board of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.1983). The holding in Derish and its underlying rationale now seem inconsistent with the holding in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985); cf, Burger, C.J., concurring.
In practical terms, the rule set forth in Marrese may be an almost automatic rule permitting federal antitrust actions notwithstanding previous state court judgments, except where issue preclusion or collateral estoppel applies. Marrese directs us to consult state res judicata rules in the context of a prior judgment without *1440jurisdiction. As state courts, generally, will have no occasion to address the specific question of the preclusive effect of a prior state judgment on a federal claim committed exclusively to the federal courts, we are remitted to. the more general principle that prior jurisdictional competency is a requirement for the application of res judicata. This is a rule of near universal application. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(l)(c). Under this analysis, it appears that a federal antitrust action would not be foreclosed by a prior state court adjudication of the matter. The Marrese case controls here.