Court Opinion

ID: 9682660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:18:55.596707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:36.566669
License: Public Domain

In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                         Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                          No. 07-23-00036-CR

                                    RAY SALAZAR, APPELLANT

                                                     V.

                               THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                             On Appeal from the 299th District Court
                                     Travis County, Texas
               Trial Court No. D-1-DC-16-900145, Honorable Karen Sage, Presiding

                                           August 23, 2023
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        Appellant, Ray Salazar, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from

the trial court’s order denying his second motion for DNA testing filed pursuant to chapter

64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.1 By four issues, he contends (1) the trial court

erred in denying his motion because he met the requirements of chapter 64 and his

        1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should
a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, this
appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court . TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
motion and affidavit establish his innocence; (2) he established by a preponderance of

the evidence there was a reasonable probability he would not have been convicted if

exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing; (3) the laboratory used by

the State was cited for faulty testing practices; and (4) identity was an issue in the case

and complete DNA testing, as opposed to only touch DNA, would show undoubtedly he

was not the donor of the DNA found on the victim. We affirm.

                                       BACKGROUND

       Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant was convicted of sexual assault in 2018,

double enhanced, and sentenced to thirty years’ confinement. Despite Appellant’s claim

of innocence, the victim of the assault identified him as the attacker and provided the

address where the incident occurred.

       In March 2019, he filed a motion for forensic DNA testing which the trial court

denied. He filed a second motion in March 2022 requesting testing of the previously

analyzed materials. He also sought appointment of counsel. The motion was supported

by his affidavit. No hearing was held on the motion.         The motion and request for

appointment of counsel were denied.

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for post-conviction DNA testing

under a bifurcated standard of review. Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002). We thus “afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of issues of

historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility and demeanor,

while we review de novo other application-of-law-to-fact issues. Id. (citing Guzman v.
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State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). But “when the trial record and the

convicted person’s affidavit are the only sources of information supporting the motion, the

trial court is in no better position than an appellate court in making the determination, and

accordingly, appellate courts review the issues de novo.” Aekins v. State, No. 03-16-

00598-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4724, at *16–17 (Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 2017, pet.

ref’d) (citing Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining that

because no witnesses were called during hearing on request for DNA testing, appellate

court should conduct review de novo)).

                                     APPLICABLE LAW

       Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs motions for forensic

DNA testing. To obtain post-conviction DNA testing, a convicted person must establish

all the requirements of chapter 64. Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010). Previously tested DNA may be submitted for retesting if it was tested “at a

laboratory that ceased conducting DNA testing after an audit by the Texas Forensic

Science Commission revealed the laboratory engaged in faulty testing practices; and

during the period identified in the audit as involving faulty testing practices.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(b)(2)(B). The affidavit in support of a motion for DNA testing

must contain statements of fact in support of the motion. Art. 64.01(a-1).

                                         ANALYSIS

ISSUES ONE, TWO, AND FOUR

       Appellant’s issues are grounded on his assertion identity was an issue in his case.

The trial court, however, in Finding of Fact Number One found Appellant “failed to
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establish that identity was an issue in his case.”2 Appellant’s motion and affidavit do

nothing more than recite statutes, case law, and conclusory assertions. He includes a list

of materials, some of which were previously tested. There was no hearing on the motion,

hence no witnesses. The only support for the motion is Appellant’s affidavit which does

not provide any factual statements supporting his innocence or that further testing would

show he would not have been convicted. Chapter 64 requires more than bare statements

before we can find a trial court errs in denying a motion for DNA testing. See Padilla v.

State, Nos. 03-12-00299-00301-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7481, at *17 (Tex. App.—

Austin June 20, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Dinkins

v. State, 84 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). See also Auston v. State, No. 03-

20-00061-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 6599, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 11, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting general, conclusory assertions in

the motion are insufficient). Issues one, two, and four are overruled.

ISSUE THREE—FAULTY TESTING PRACTICES

        Appellant contends he is entitled to retesting because the material was held

temporarily at the Austin Police Department laboratory, which was closed for faulty testing

practices, before it was tested by the Texas Department of Public Safety laboratory.

Relying on Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), the State argues

the issue is not preserved for review because it was not raised in Appellant’s motion or

affidavit to allow the trial court an opportunity to rule on that argument. We disagree.

         2 The State posits the items in the rape kit Appellant seeks to test would not determine the identity

of the person who committed the offense or exculpate Appellant. The most probative sources for DNA had
previously been tested.
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       Although not raised in his motion, by his affidavit, which was before the trial court,

Appellant references an article in the Austin American Statesman dated January 22,

2017, which reported faulty testing practices that resulted in closure of the Austin Police

Department’s laboratory in June 2016. The biological material from Appellant’s case was

then transported to the Texas Department of Public Safety laboratory.

       Article 64.01(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii) provides for previously tested materials to be retested

if those materials were tested “at a laboratory that ceased conducting DNA testing after

an audit by the Texas Forensic Science Commission revealed the laboratory engaged in

faulty testing procedures; and during the period identified in the audit as involving faulty

testing practices.” Here, the record shows the laboratory which was closed for faulty

testing procedures did not test any materials from Appellant’s case. (Emphasis added).

Rather, the Austin Police Department laboratory served only as a temporary repository

for the materials before they were transported to the DPS laboratory. As such, Appellant’s

factual scenario does not fall within the statute. The trial court did not err in finding

Appellant failed to satisfy the requirements for securing DNA testing. Issue three is

overruled.

                                 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

       Article 64.01(c) requires the trial court to appoint counsel if the person informs the

court he intends to submit a motion under chapter 64, the court finds reasonable grounds

for a motion to be filed, and the court finds the person is indigent. Here, the trial court did

not find reasonable grounds supporting Appellant’s motion. Thus, appointment of counsel

was not required.

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                         REFORMATION OF UNDERLYING JUDGMENT

       This Court has the power to modify a judgment of the court below to make the

record speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P.

43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Appellate courts

have the power to reform whatever the trial court could have corrected by a judgment

nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary to correct the judgment appears in the

record. Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).

       A review of the clerk’s record reflects a clerical error in the summary portion of the

judgment which prompted Appellant to claim his sentence was void in his attempt for relief

via a writ of habeas corpus. The face of the judgment reflects he was charged with a

second degree felony which is punishable by two to twenty years, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

section 12.33, yet the judgment reflects a sentence of thirty years. Appellant’s indictment

for sexual assault included two felony enhancements. The record from the plea hearing

shows Appellant entered pleas of true to both enhancement paragraphs and the trial court

found each enhancement paragraph to be true.           Thus, the summary portion of the

judgment for “Plea to 1st Enhancement Paragraph” and “Plea to 2nd Enhancement

Habitual Paragraph” should both reflect a plea of “True.” The summary portion of the

judgment for “Findings on 1st Enhancement Paragraph” and “Findings on 2nd

Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” should both reflect findings of “True.”

       The trial court is ordered to prepare and file a Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc reflecting

this reformation, and the trial court clerk is ordered to provide a copy of that judgment to

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

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                                                CONCLUSION

        The trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for forensic DNA testing and for

appointment of counsel is affirmed.3

                                                                     Alex Yarbrough
                                                                         Justice

Do not publish.

        3 We note the trial court’s order is not a stand-alone order.       It is combined with the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the document is entitled “Order” and recites “On this 17th
day of November, 2022, came on to be considered Applicant’s second motion for post-conviction DNA
testing” and the State’s response thereto . . . . Immediately after the trial court’s findings and conclusions,
the order recites “Applicant’s motion for forensic DNA testing is hereby DENIED.” In State v. Castillo, No.
07-22-00195-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 4080, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 13, 2023, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication), this Court, in applying precedent from the Third Court of Appeals,
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction for failing to provide a written order. The State had attempted
to appeal the dismissal of Count I of the indictment. The trial court’s purported order granting dismissal of
Count I was buried in a document entitled “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” without any language
resembling a court order. The better practice is to enter an order separate and apart from findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
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