Court Opinion

ID: 9895574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 19:08:34.329659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:34.992538
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Olentangy Commons Owner, L.L.C. v. Fawley, 2023-Ohio-4039.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                 TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Olentangy Commons Owner LLC,                        :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :                  No. 22AP-293
                                                                (M.C. No. 2022CVG008080)
v.                                                  :
                                                               (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Erin Fawley,                                        :

                Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                         D E C I S I O N

                                 Rendered on November 7, 2023

                On brief: Willis Law Firm LLC, Alexander H. Maxwell,
                William L. Willis, Dimitrios G. Hatzifotinos, Solomon J.
                Parini, and Clint B. Charnes, for appellee. Argued:
                Alexander H. Maxwell.

                On brief: The Legal Aid Society of Columbus, Madison A.
                Hill, Kaci Philpot, and Thomas N. Pope, for appellant.
                Argued: Madison A. Hill.

                On brief: The Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, Joseph C.
                Tomino, and Matthew D. Vincel; Community Legal Aid
                Services, Inc., and Andrew D. Neuhauser; Advocates for
                Basic Legal Equality, Inc., Michael W. Loudenslager, and
                Matthew N. Currie; Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio
                LLC, and John E. Schrider, Jr.; Southeastern Ohio Legal
                Services, and Peggy P. Lee, for Amicus Curiae.

                     APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

JAMISON, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Erin Fawley, appeals a judgment of the Frankin County
Municipal Court granting plaintiff-appellee, Olentangy Commons Owner LLC (“Olentangy
No. 22AP-293                                                                                2

Commons”), restitution of the premises Fawley leased from Olentangy Commons. For the
following reasons, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedure
       {¶ 2} Fawley leased a residence on Deacon Circle in Columbus, Ohio from
Olentangy Commons. Fawley did not pay her rent for March 2022. On March 7, 2022,
Olentangy Commons gave Fawley a three-day “Notice to Leave the Premises,” as required
by R.C. 1923.04. Fawley did not leave. On March 21, 2022, Olentangy filed a forcible entry
and detainer action against Fawley in the municipal court.
       {¶ 3}   On April 27, 2022, Fawley moved to dismiss the forcible entry and detainer
action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fawley argued that Olentangy Commons
failed to provide her with a notice to vacate the leased premises at least 30 days prior to
filing for eviction, as required by 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1).       That section is part of the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), which Congress passed
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It states that “[t]he lessor of a covered dwelling
unit may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date that is
30 days after the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate.” 15
U.S.C. 9058(c)(1). Olentangy Commons did not file a response to Fawley’s motion to
dismiss.
       {¶ 4} Trial before a magistrate occurred on April 27, 2022. Olentangy Commons
proved all the evidence necessary to prevail on its forcible entry and detainer action. Fawley
argued the motion to dismiss.
       {¶ 5} In an April 27, 2022 decision, the magistrate determined that 15 U.S.C.
9058(c)(1) did not bar Olentangy Commons’ forcible entry and detainer action. First, the
magistrate concluded that 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) did not limit the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the municipal court. Second, the magistrate interpreted 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) as requiring
a landlord to provide a tenant with a notice to vacate 30 days before a court-ordered set
out. Consequently, a landlord could file a forcible entry and detainer action less than 30
days after providing the tenant with a notice to vacate the premises, as long as the set out
occurred after the 30-day period elapsed. In this case, the magistrate concluded, the
mandate of 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) was satisfied where well over 30 days had passed between
service of the notice to vacate on March 7 and the magistrate’s April 27 decision, which
No. 22AP-293                                                                                 3

granted Olentangy Commons restitution of the premises. The trial court issued a judgment
entry adopting the magistrate’s decision on May 2, 2022.
         {¶ 6} Fawley objected to the magistrate’s decision.            Olentangy Commons
responded to the objection. In a judgment dated May 13, 2022, the trial court overruled
the objection. Initially, the trial court rejected Olentangy Commons’ argument that 15
U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) had expired. The trial court then held that “assuming for purposes of this
decision that the subject premises are a ‘covered property’ under the CARES Act, the Court
finds that the Magistrate set forth a reasonable basis for interpreting [15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1)]
to mean no eviction set out may occur requiring the tenant to vacate during the 30 days
after service of the notice to vacate under R.C. 1923.04.” (May 13, 2022 Decision & Entry
at 2.)
II. Assignments of Error
         {¶ 7} Fawley now appeals the May 13, 2022 judgment, and she assigns the
following errors:
                [1.] The lower court erred when it held that Section 4024(c)(1)
                of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
                only requires that 30 days elapse before the client is set out as
                opposed to requiring a 30-day notice to vacate.

                [2.] The court erred when it held defects in the notice to vacate
                are not jurisdictional.

III. Motion to Dismiss
         {¶ 8} Before addressing the merits of Fawley’s assignments of error, we must
consider Olentangy Commons’ motion to dismiss. According to Olentangy Commons, we
should dismiss this appeal because it is moot. Olentangy Commons contends that this
appeal became moot when Fawley vacated her apartment.
         {¶ 9} After Fawley filed her notice of appeal on May 20, 2022, Olentangy Commons
notified her that it was terminating her lease at the end of the lease term—September 8,
2022. Olentangy Commons threatened to evict Fawley if she did not move out of her
apartment on or before September 8, 2022. Fawley complied with the terms of her lease
and timely vacated her apartment.
         {¶ 10} The distinguishing characteristic of a moot case is that it involves no actual,
genuine live controversy, the resolution of which can definitely affect existing legal
No. 22AP-293                                                                               4

relations. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter, 141 Ohio St.3d 419, 2014-Ohio-5457,
¶ 4; accord State ex rel. Citizens for Community Values, Inc. v. DeWine, 162 Ohio St.3d
277, 2020-Ohio-4547, ¶ 7 (“A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”). (Internal citations and
quotations omitted.)    A case may become moot when, during the pendency of the
proceedings, an event occurs without the fault of either party, which renders it impossible
for the court to grant any relief. Tschantz v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133 (1991).
Because it is the duty of judicial tribunals to decide justiciable controversies, courts
generally do not decide moot questions. State ex rel. Grendell v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of
Commrs., 168 Ohio St.3d 154, 2022-Ohio-2833, ¶ 9; accord M.R. v. Niesen, 167 Ohio St.3d
404, 2022-Ohio-1130, ¶ 10 (“Courts do not review cases that no longer present live
controversies.”).
       {¶ 11} In this case, Fawley appeals a judgment entered against her in an action for
forcible entry and detainer. Such an action provides an aggrieved landlord with an
expedited method to recover possession of real property.          T&R Properties, Inc. v.
Wimberly, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-567, 2020-Ohio-4279, ¶ 8; Rithy Properties, Inc. v.
Cheeseman, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-641, 2016-Ohio-1602, ¶ 15. A judgment in an action for
forcible entry and detainer only determines the right to immediate possession of the
property. Wimberly at ¶ 8; Cheeseman at ¶ 15. “ ‘If immediate possession is no longer at
issue because the defendant vacates the premises and possession is restored to the plaintiff,
then continuation of the forcible entry and detainer action or an appeal of such an action is
unnecessary, as there is no further relief that may be granted.’ ” Wimberly at ¶ 8, quoting
Cheeseman at ¶ 15.
       {¶ 12} Because Fawley has vacated the apartment at issue in the forcible entry and
detainer action, the controversy between the parties is now moot. See Wimberly at ¶ 9
(determining that there was no actual, justiciable controversy between the parties because
the tenant had vacated the apartment that was the subject of the eviction action);
Cheeseman at ¶ 16 (same). Fawley, however, argues that three exceptions to the mootness
doctrine apply to this appeal, thus precluding its dismissal.
       {¶ 13} First, Fawley argues that this court should review her appeal because the
issues she raises in it are capable of repetition, yet evading review. This exception to the
No. 22AP-293                                                                                   5

mootness doctrine applies “only in exceptional circumstances” where: “(1) the challenged
action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration, and (2)
there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the
same action again.” State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 231
(2000).
       {¶ 14} Regarding the first element, we have held a forcible entry and detainer action
is not too short in duration to be fully litigated through appeal because an appellant may
seek a stay of execution of judgment pursuant to R.C. 1923.14(A). Cheeseman at ¶ 23. In
relevant part, R.C. 1923.14(A) states, “[i]f an appeal from the judgment of restitution is filed
and if, following the filling of the appeal, a stay of execution is obtained and any required
bond is filed with the court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court, the judge of
that court immediately shall issue an order to the sheriff, police officer, constable, or bailiff
commanding the delay of all further proceedings upon the execution.”
       {¶ 15} The holding of Cheeseman, however, does not apply in this case. Fawley
obtained a stay of the judgment of eviction, albeit through this court rather than the
municipal court. She nevertheless had to vacate her apartment because her lease ended.
We have recognized previously that “the natural term of a tenant’s lease may expire during
the pendency of an appeal, requiring the tenant to vacate the premises and allowing the
landlord to assert the appeal is moot.” Wimberly at ¶ 12. That is exactly what occurred in
this case. The expiration of the lease rendered the stay Fawley obtained immaterial.
       {¶ 16} Olentangy Commons filed its forcible entry and detainer action on March 21,
2022. Fawley’s lease expired on September 8, 2022—about five and one-half months later.
Olentangy Commons argues that this period was sufficient for Fawley to have fully litigated
the action. Given the practical realities of litigation, we are not persuaded. We conclude
that Fawley has established the forcible entry and detainer action was too short in duration
for her to fully litigate it through appeal before her lease term ended.
       {¶ 17} Regarding the second element of the exception, an appellant must establish
more than a theoretical possibility that the same action will arise again. Grandview
Heights v. B.S.H., 10th Dist. No. 22AP-207, 2023-Ohio-940, ¶ 14; Croce v. Ohio State
Univ., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-14, 2021-Ohio-2242, ¶ 23. There must be a reasonable
No. 22AP-293                                                                                   6

expectation or demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the
same complaining party. B.S.H. at ¶ 14; Croce at ¶ 23.
       {¶ 18} According to Fawley, she now lives in a different apartment. Because Fawley
does not identify the property or its owner, we cannot ascertain whether 15 U.S.C.
9058(c)(1) applies to Fawley’s new apartment. Moreover, we can only speculate whether
Fawley will fail to pay her rent at that property, thus making her vulnerable to the eviction
process.
       {¶ 19} Fawley has provided this court with evidence that she got two more three-day
notices to vacate from Olentangy Commons after receiving the March 2022 notice to vacate.
Before Fawley moved out of her apartment, Olentangy Commons served three-day notices
to vacate on Fawley in May and July 2022 for her alleged failure to pay her rent. Thus,
Fawley had a reasonable expectation of being subject to the same action that led to this
appeal while living at Olentangy Commons.            But Fawley is not living at Olentangy
Commons anymore. We cannot assume that Fawley’s current landlord will give Fawley a
three-day notice based on another landlord’s conduct.
       {¶ 20} Fawley, therefore, has not established that there is a reasonable expectation
that she will be subject to the same action again. Consequently, we decline to invoke the
exception to the mootness doctrine for appeals that are capable of repetition, yet evade
review.
       {¶ 21} Next, Fawley argues that the collateral-consequences exception to the
mootness doctrine applies. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized an exception to the
mootness doctrine if the appealed judgment causes the appellant to suffer a collateral
disability. Cyran v. Cyran, 152 Ohio St.3d 484, 2018-Ohio-24, ¶ 8. For example, an appeal
of a conviction for a traffic offense falls within this exception to the mootness doctrine
because, even after the defendant has paid the fines and costs, the statutory imposition of
points on the defendant’s driver’s license constitutes a collateral disability. In re S.J.K., 114
Ohio St.3d 23, 2007-Ohio-2621, ¶ 14, 18. However, “the collateral-consequences exception
to mootness applies [only] in cases in which the collateral consequence is imposed as a
matter of law.” Cyran at ¶ 9.
       {¶ 22} Fawley identifies only one collateral consequence the law imposes because of
an eviction: the termination of Section 8 voucher assistance for an eviction from federally
No. 22AP-293                                                                                  7

assisted housing. See Richmond’s Ent., Inc. v. Anderson, 2d Dist. No. 266774, 2016-Ohio-
609, ¶ 12, citing 24 C.F.R. 982.552. Fawley does not claim that she will suffer this collateral
consequence as a result of her eviction. Instead, she contends that an eviction on her credit
report will cause her difficulty in renting another apartment. This consequence, however,
is a practical, not a legal, consequence of the judgment Fawley appeals. Therefore, the
consequence Fawley claims she will suffer because of the eviction judgment is insufficient
to invoke the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine.
       {¶ 23} Finally, Fawley asserts that this court should review her appeal because it
raises an issue of great public interest. “Ohio recognizes an exception to the mootness
doctrine for cases which present a debatable constitutional question or a matter of great
public or general interest.” Tschantz, 57 Ohio St.3d at 133. Courts of appeals invoke this
exception with caution and only on rare occasions. B.S.H. at ¶ 19; Wimberly at ¶ 15.
Nevertheless, this court has previously applied the matter-of-great-interest exception
where the issues in the appeal had the potential to affect every landlord, tenant, and
property management company in Franklin County. Wimberly at ¶ 15.
       {¶ 24} The case before this court raises the issue of whether 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1)
requires lessors of covered properties to give tenants 30-day notices to vacate prior to filing
actions for forcible entry and detainer. Fawley argues that this issue is one of great public
interest because it impacts large numbers of landlords, tenants, and management
companies in Franklin County.
       {¶ 25} As we stated above, 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) states, “[t]he lessor of a covered
dwelling unit may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date
that is 30 days after the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate.”
The statute only applies if a tenant’s unit qualifies as a “covered dwelling.” Id. A “covered
dwelling” includes residential tenancies, so long as the rented premises is “on or in a
covered property” and the tenant occupies the premises. 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(1)(A) and (B).
The term “covered property” means any property that (1) participates in certain federal
housing programs, or (2) has a federally backed mortgaged loan or federally backed
multifamily mortgage loan. 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(2)(A) and (B).
       {¶ 26} The covered federal housing programs are listed in 34 U.S.C. 12491(a) and 42
U.S.C. 1490r. 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(2)(A) and (B). The list of covered federal housing
No. 22AP-293                                                                              8

programs is expansive and includes public housing (42 U.S.C. 1437d), the Section 8
Housing Choice Voucher Program (42 U.S.C. 1437f), the Section 8 Project-Based Rental
Assistance Program (42 U.S.C. 1437f), the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly
Program (12 U.S.C. 1701q), Section 811 Supportive Housing for People with Disabilities (42
U.S.C. 8013), along with many others. 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(2)(A)(i); 34 U.S.C. 12491(a)(3).
Additionally, the list of covered federal housing programs contains a catch-all provision to
encompass “any other Federal housing programs providing affordable housing to low- and
moderate-income persons by means of restricted rents or rental assistance, or more
generally providing affordable housing opportunities, as identified by the appropriate
agency through regulations, notices, or any other means.” 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(2)(A)(i); 34
U.S.C. 12491(a)(3)(P).
       {¶ 27} Coverage also extends to properties with federally backed mortgage loans
and federally backed multifamily mortgage loans, which are loans secured by any lien on a
residential property. 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(4)(A) & (5)(A). Federally backed mortgage loans
secure liens on properties that house one to four families, while federally backed
multifamily mortgage loans secure liens on properties that house five or more families. Id.
To qualify as a federally backed mortgage loan or a federally backed multifamily mortgage
loan, the loan must be:
              [M]ade in whole or in part, or insured, guaranteed,
              supplemented, or assisted in any way, by any officer or agency
              of the Federal Government or under or in connection with a
              housing or urban development program administered by the
              Secretary of Housing and Urban Development [“HUD”] or a
              housing or related program administered by any other such
              officer or agency, or is purchased or securitized by the Federal
              Home Loan Mortgage Corporation [“Freddie Mac”] or the
              Federal National Mortgage Association [“Fannie Mae”].

15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(4)(B) and (5)(B).
       {¶ 28} As Fawley points out, because the definition of “covered property” is so
broad, there are a large number of covered properties in Franklin County. See 15 U.S.C.
9058(a)(2). The covered properties include federally backed loans insured by the Federal
Housing Administration (“FHA”), Veterans Administration (38 U.S.C. 3703), and
Department of Agriculture (42 U.S.C. 1472(h)). The FHA insures multifamily mortgages
through multiple programs. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1713; 12 U.S.C. 1715i; 12 U.S.C. 1215n(f).
No. 22AP-293                                                                                  9

As of October 31, 2023, FHA insured the mortgages of 75 properties containing multifamily
housing that are located in Franklin County (excluding assisted living facilities and nursing
homes). U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Insured Multifamily
Mortgages,            Active           MF           Insured            Mortgage            File,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/comp/mf_fhasl_active (accessed Nov. 3,
2023). Those properties have a total of 11,628 units. Id.
       {¶ 29} Even more importantly, Fannie Mae- and Freddie Mac-owned loans are
encompassed under the definition of “covered property.” 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(4)(B) and
(5)(B). The Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) conducts monthly surveys of
mortgage markets and collects data regarding mortgages, including the property price, the
cumulative loan-to-value ratio, the terms of the mortgage, the creditworthiness of the
borrower, and whether Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae acquired the mortgage. According to
the data collected by the FHFA, Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae acquired: (1) 51 percent of the
mortgage loans originated in 2018; (2) 52 percent of the mortgage loans originated in 2019;
and (3) 62 percent of the mortgage loans originated in the first 6 months of 2020. Federal
Housing Finance Authority, What Types of Mortgages do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Acquire?,        https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/Blog/Pages/What-Types-of-Mortgages-Do-
Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Mac-Acquire.aspx (accessed Nov. 3, 2023). On average, Freddie
Mac or Fannie Mae acquired 54 percent of the mortgages originated from 2002 through
the first 6 months of 2020. Id.
       {¶ 30} While the data we rely upon is not part of the record, a court may take judicial
notice of adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute in that they are “either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.” Evid.R. 201(B). A court, including an appellate court, may take judicial
notice at any stage of the proceedings.           Evid.R. 201(F); State v. Murphy, 10th
Dist. No. 12AP-952, 2013-Ohio-5599, ¶ 23.          Because Evid.R. 201(B) is modeled on
Fed.R.Evid. 201(B), federal law interpreting the federal rule is appropriate and persuasive
authority in interpreting the virtually identical Ohio rule. Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc.,
145 Ohio St.3d 329, 2015-Ohio-3430, ¶ 24. Multiple federal courts have taken judicial
notice of data contained in government publications and on government websites.
No. 22AP-293                                                                                 10

Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr, 830 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir.2016), quoting
Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir.2011) (“recognizing ‘the
authority of a court to take judicial notice of government websites’ ”); United States v. Neal,
577 Fed.Appx. 434, 452, (6th Cir.2014), fn. 11 (stating that “courts may take judicial notice
of government statistics such as United States census data”); New Mexico ex rel.
Richardson v. BLM, 565 F.3d 683, 703 (10th Cir.2009), fn. 22 (taking judicial notice of
data on websites of government agencies); Fortuna v. Winslow, 607 F.Supp.3d 29, 36
(Me.2022) (holding that government publications are matters of public record and thus
proper subjects of judicial notice); Coastal Wellness Ctrs., Inc. v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co.,
309 F.Supp.3d 1216, 1220 (S.D.Fla.2018), fn. 4 (“The Court may take judicial notice of
government publications and website materials.”); Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F.Supp.3d
407, 435 (S.D.N.Y.2014), fn. 27 (“Courts may take judicial notice of data contained in
Government reports.”).
        {¶ 31} The data we cite above is a matter of public record, as a list of the multifamily
mortgages the FHA insures appears on HUD’s official website and the statistics regarding
the mortgages acquired by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae appear on the FHFA’s official
website. It cannot be reasonably questioned that each agency’s official website is an
accurate source for the information provided. Consequently, pursuant to Evid.R. 201, we
take judicial notice of the data published by the FHA and the statistics calculated by the
FHFA.
        {¶ 32} Although we have examined only a sampling of the types of properties
included in the definition of “covered properties,” the data demonstrates that numerous
covered properties are located in Franklin County. The prevalence of covered properties in
Franklin County means the issue in this case—whether 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) requires a 30-
day notice to vacate prior to filing an eviction action—impacts substantial numbers of
landlords, tenants, and property managers. The trial court recognized this, too, stating that
“this issue will recur frequently, especially in light of the presumably large number of
property owners who have a federally-backed mortgage.” (May 13, 2022 Decision & Entry
at 2.) We, therefore, conclude that the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases of great
public or general interest applies to this case.
No. 22AP-293                                                                                11

       {¶ 33} As a final matter, we must address Olentangy Commons’ argument that this
appeal is moot because the trial court assumed, but did not decide, that Olentangy
Commons’ property was a covered property under 15 U.S.C. 9058(a). As we stated above,
a case becomes moot when it involves no actual, genuine live controversy, the resolution of
which can definitely affect existing legal relations. Hunter, 2014-Ohio-5457 at ¶ 4; Citizens
for Community Values, Inc., 2020-Ohio-4547 at ¶ 7. The trial court had multiple grounds
on which it could decide Fawley’s motion to dismiss: it could find she did not occupy a
covered dwelling, so 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) did not apply to her; it could find that 15 U.S.C.
9058(c)(1) had expired; or it could interpret the text of 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) and decide
when on the timeline preceding eviction the lender must provide a 30-day notice to vacate.
The trial court assumed that the statute applied so that it could reach the statutory
interpretation question. The trial court then interpreted the statute to require the service
of a notice to vacate 30 days prior to the court-ordered set out. By assuming that 15 U.S.C.
9058(c)(1) applied, the trial court did not render the controversy between the parties “dead”
or moot. The trial court still could, and did, grant relief to the parties—it denied the motion
to dismiss and granted a judgment of restitution of the premises. Accordingly, the trial
court’s assumption did not moot this appeal.
       {¶ 34} In the end, we conclude that this appeal became moot when Fawley vacated
the apartment at the end of the lease term. Nevertheless, we will address the merits of this
appeal under the exception to the mootness doctrine that applies to cases of great general
or public interest. We thus deny Olentangy Commons’ motion to dismiss.
IV. Analysis
       {¶ 35} By her first assignment of error, Fawley argues that the trial court erred in
interpreting 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1). We agree.
       {¶ 36} The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law, which an appellate court
reviews de novo. State v. Bertram, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1456, ¶ 11. Because this
appeal involves the interpretation of a federal statute, we must apply federal rules of
statutory construction. Lake Cty. Natl. Bank v. Kosyder, 36 Ohio St.2d 189, 191 (1973).
       {¶ 37} Under settled principles of federal statutory construction, a court must first
determine whether the statutory text at issue is plain and unambiguous. Roberts v. Sea-
Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 100 (2012); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009).
No. 22AP-293                                                                               12

“ ‘[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there.’ ” Arlington Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291, 296 (2006), quoting Connecticut Natl. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
Consequently, if a statute is unambiguous, a court applies the statute according to its terms.
Carcieri at 387.
       {¶ 38} According to 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1), “[t]he lessor of a covered dwelling unit
may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date that is 30
days after the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate.” Fawley
interprets that section to mean that the lessor must wait 30 days after providing the tenant
with a notice to vacate before filing an action to evict the tenant. Olentangy Commons
interprets the section to mean that a law enforcement officer cannot set out the tenant until
30 days after the tenant has received the notice to vacate. To resolve this dispute, we must
determine what type of action by the lessor constitutes “requir[ing] the tenant to vacate the
covered dwelling unit.” 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1).
       {¶ 39} In Ohio, an eviction proceeding is known as a forcible entry and detainer
action, which is governed by R.C. Chapter 1923. Such actions provide the only legal method
by which a landlord can require a residential tenant to vacate the leased premises. Staley
v. Phillips, 1st Dist. No. C-210438, 2022-Ohio-2112, ¶ 22, 24; State v. Dennis, 182 Ohio
App.3d 674, 2009-Ohio-2173, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.); Midkiff v. Adams Cty. Regional Water Dist.,
409 F.3d 758, 764 (6th Cir.2005). Ohio landlord-tenant law expressly prohibits a landlord
from evicting a residential tenant in any other manner. R.C. 5321.15(A) (“No landlord of
residential premises shall initiate any act * * * for the purpose of recovering possession of
residential premises other than as provided in Chapters 1923., 5303., and 5321. of the
Revised Code.”). Because a landlord must file a forcible entry and detainer action to require
a tenant to vacate the rented premises, the plain language of 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) mandates
that a landlord must provide a tenant with a notice to vacate 30 days before filing such an
action. Other courts that have interpreted 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) have reached the same
conclusion. See Watson v. Vici Community Dev. Corp., W.D.Okla. No. CIV-20-1011-F,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55211 (Mar. 28, 2022) (“The CARES Act requires certain landlords
to give tenants at least 30 days’ notice to vacate a covered dwelling before filing a petition
for eviction.”); In re Arvada Village Gardens LP v. Garate, 2023 Colo. 24, ¶ 17 (2023) (“A
No. 22AP-293                                                                               13

landlord of a property covered by the CARES Act must give thirty days’ notice before filing
for [forcible entry and detainer] in Colorado.”); Sherwood Auburn, L.L.C. v. Pinzon, 24
Wash. App.2d 664, 679 (2022) (“[T]he plain language of the CARES Act notice provision
requires that landlords subject to the act provide a 30-day notice to tenants prior to
commencing an unlawful detainer action.”).
       {¶ 40} Olentangy Commons argues—and the trial court found—that the landlord
does not “require[ ] the tenant to vacate” until the tenant is set out. (May 13, 2022 Decision
& Entry at 2.) However, the landlord does not order or perform the set out—the court and
law enforcement officers do those things. According to 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1), the actor
prohibited from requiring the tenant to vacate is “[t]he lessor,” not the court or law
enforcement officers. Thus, Olentangy Commons and the trial court’s interpretation is not
consistent with the plain language of the statute. See Pinzon at 673 (rejecting the argument
that 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) simply prohibits state trial courts from evicting tenants during the
30-day period following service of a notice to vacate because “[t]he CARES Act notice
provision clearly prohibits the lessor * * *—not a state trial court—from requiring a tenant
to vacate a covered housing unit prior to expiration of the notice period”).
       {¶ 41} Olentangy Commons next argues that 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) expired on
July 24, 2020. This argument is based on reading 15 U.S.C. 9058(c) in conjunction with 15
U.S.C. 9058(b). Together these subsections state:
              (b) Moratorium. During the 120-day period beginning on
              the date of enactment of this Act [enacted March 27, 2020], the
              lessor of a covered dwelling may not—

                     (1) make, or cause to be made, any filing with the court
                     of jurisdiction to initiate a legal action to recover
                     possession of the covered dwelling from the tenant for
                     nonpayment of rent or other fees or charges; or

                     (2) charge fees, penalties, or other charges to the tenant
                     related to such nonpayment of rent.

              (c) Notice. The lessor of a covered dwelling unit—

                     (1) may not require the tenant to vacate the covered
                     dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the
                     date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a
                     notice to vacate; and
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                      (2) may not issue a notice to vacate under paragraph (1)
                      until after the expiration of the period described in
                      subsection (b).

(Emphasis sic.)
       {¶ 42} The CARES Act was enacted on March 27, 2020, so the 120-day moratorium
created by subsection (b) ended on July 24, 2020. According to Olentangy Commons, the
notice provision in 15 U.S.C. 9058(c) expired on the same day as the moratorium provision
in 15 U.S.C. 9058(b). We are not persuaded by this argument.
       {¶ 43} Unlike the moratorium provision, the notice provision does not include an
expiration date. We cannot insert an expiration date in 15 U.S.C. 9058(c) when Congress
omitted one from that subsection. See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, __U.S.__, 140 S.Ct. 1721,
1725 (2020) (stating that a court “may not narrow a provision’s reach by inserting words
Congress chose to omit”). According to the plain language of the statute, the moratorium
provision expired, but the notice provision did not. See Garate at ¶ 13 (holding that 15
U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) did not expire). Consequently, Olentangy Commons’ interpretation of 15
U.S.C. 9058(c) is contrary to the unambiguous text of the statute.
       {¶ 44} Moreover, Olentangy Commons’ interpretation is nonsensical. Under 15
U.S.C. 9058(c)(2), lessors did not have an obligation to provide a 30-day notice to vacate
pursuant to subsection (c)(1) until after the moratorium expired. Consequently, 15 U.S.C.
9058(c)(1) did not become operative until July 25, 2020—the day after the moratorium
expired. Under Olentangy Commons’ interpretation of 15 U.S.C. 9058(b) and (c), the notice
provision in subsection (c)(1) is meaningless, as it would have expired on July 24, 2020—a
day prior to becoming operational. Thus, Olentangy Commons’ interpretation conflicts
with the rule that “ ‘a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,
so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’ ” Corley v. United
States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009), quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (further
quotation omitted).
       {¶ 45} Finally, the statute’s title, “[t]emporary moratorium on eviction filings,” does
not alter our analysis. 15 U.S.C. 9058. The title references the temporary nature of the
moratorium, but is silent regarding the duration of the notice provision. Additionally,
“ ‘[t]he title of a statute * * * cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For interpretative
No. 22AP-293                                                                               15

purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase.’ ”
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 221 (1998), quoting Trainmen v.
Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947). Here, the text of 15 U.S.C.
9058(c)(1) contains no ambiguity, so we need not resort to the statute’s title for assistance
in interpreting it.
         {¶ 46} As a final argument, Olentangy Commons maintains that 15 U.S.C.
9058(c)(1) preempts Ohio law, and in doing so, violates the Tenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Olentangy Commons, however, never made this argument
before the trial court. Generally, a party waives the right to raise on appeal an argument it
could have raised, but did not, in earlier proceedings. Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 122
Ohio St.3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, ¶ 34. Because Olentangy Commons failed to raise its
preemption or constitutional arguments before the trial court, it cannot assert them now
on appeal.
         {¶ 47} In sum, we conclude that 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) requires that a lessor of
covered dwelling must provide a tenant with a notice to vacate 30 days before filing a
forcible entry and detainer action. Accordingly, we sustain Fawley’s first assignment of
error.
         {¶ 48} By her second assignment of error, Fawley argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that failure to comply with 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) did not deprive the court of
subject-matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
         {¶ 49} The word “jurisdiction,” when set apart by itself, is a vague term, which
encompasses several distinct concepts, including subject-matter jurisdiction and
jurisdiction over a particular case. Ostanek v. Ostanek, 166 Ohio St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-2319,
¶ 20. Subject-matter jurisdiction is “the constitutional or statutory power of a court to
adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-
Ohio-2913, ¶ 23. A court determines whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists by focusing
on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy. Id. Determination of
subject-matter jurisdiction “ ‘should be confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial
authority among different courts.’ ” Ostanek at ¶ 21, quoting 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, 6 (3d Ed.2017).
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       {¶ 50} “A court’s jurisdiction over a particular case refers to the court’s authority to
proceed or rule on a case that is within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Bank of
Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 19. Jurisdiction over a particular
case turns on the rights of the parties involved in the case. Id. “[A]n inquiry into a party’s
ability to invoke a court’s jurisdiction speaks to jurisdiction over a particular case, not
subject-matter jurisdiction.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 22.
       {¶ 51} Municipal courts are statutorily created in R.C. 1901.01, and their subject-
matter jurisdiction is set by statute. State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880,
¶ 11; Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶ 7.
R.C. 1901.18(A)(8) grants municipal courts original jurisdiction in “any action of forcible
entry and detainer.” Municipal courts, therefore, have subject-matter jurisdiction over
forcible entry and detainer actions.
       {¶ 52} Although the failure to comply with 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) does not factor into
a determination of subject-matter jurisdiction, it impacts whether a municipal court has
jurisdiction over a particular case. A landlord who does not provide a 30-day notice to
vacate as required by 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) cannot invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the municipal court. See Pinzon at 681, fn. 12 (because the landlord did not give a 30-day
notice, it could not avail itself of the superior court’s subject-matter jurisdiction). Thus, due
to the landlord’s failure to comply with the statute, the municipal court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over that particular action for forcible entry and detainer.
       {¶ 53} In short, a municipal court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over forcible
entry and detainer actions, but will lack jurisdiction over a particular forcible entry and
detainer action if the plaintiff failed to provide a 30-day notice to vacate if required by 15
U.S.C. 9058(c)(1). The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding that a failure to comply
with 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) could not deprive it of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,
we overrule Fawley’s second assignment of error.
V. Conclusion
       {¶ 54} Given our rulings on Fawley’s assignments of error, we must reverse the trial
court’s judgment denying the motion to dismiss. Although the trial court may possess
subject-matter jurisdiction, dismissal remains the appropriate remedy if the court lacks
jurisdiction over the particular case. See Kuchta at ¶ 23 (a defect that deprives a trial court
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of jurisdiction over a particular case, like lack of standing, “require[s] a court to dismiss the
action”). However, as Olentangy Commons points out, a remand is necessary to resolve the
factual issue of whether the leased premises constitutes a “covered dwelling unit,” thus
triggering the obligation to provide a 30-day notice to vacate under 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1).
Because the trial court assumed but did not decide that this case involved a covered
dwelling, the issue remains unresolved. Fawley attached to her motion evidence that she
purports establishes that Fannie Mae acquired Olentangy Commons’ mortgage of the
leased premises through assignment. As a court of review, we cannot determine in the first
instance whether this evidence is sufficient to establish the leased premises as a “covered
dwelling.” See In re D.R., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-697, 2023-Ohio-539, ¶ 37 (“As an appellate
court * * *, we will not make factual findings in the first instance.”).
       {¶ 55} Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we deny Olentangy Commons’ motion
to dismiss.   We sustain Fawley’s first assignment of error and overrule the second
assignment of error, and we remand this matter to the Franklin County Municipal Court
for further proceedings consistent with the law and this decision.
                                                                 Motion to dismiss denied;
                                                       Judgment reversed; cause remanded.

                             BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., concurs.
                          DORRIAN, J., concurs in judgment only.