Court Opinion

ID: 9763457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:45:44.285989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:43.711039
License: Public Domain

*110
Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

In my view, the requirement of 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) and of the court’s order, that the wiretap be conducted so as to minimize the interception of unauthorized communications, was clearly violated in this case. I disagree with Part I of the majority opinion, which decides otherwise, on essentially three grounds.
First, in holding that “[t]urning off the tape recorder on personal calls was plainly part of’ a reasonable “effort to minimize,” the majority relies upon an unlawful action by the police. The same statute, in 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(a), requires that the “contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by this Chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device.” Since there is no suggestion in this case that it was not “possible” to record all communications, the police violated the statute by turning off the tape recorder. Congress, in enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520, could not have intended that a failure to record would constitute compliance with the statutory minimization requirement when at the same time Congress directed that all communications be recorded.
Second, the majority opinion places the burden upon the petitioners to have made an adequate record on the minimization issue. However, it is settled that the prosecution has the burden of proof on this matter. United States v. Rizzo, 491 F. 2d 215, 217-218 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 416 U. S. 990, 94 S. Ct. 2399, 40 L.Ed.2d 769 (1974); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F. 2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U. S. 936, 94 S. Ct. 2651, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974). Moreover, even if the petitioners had the initial burden on the question, the presentation of evidence disclosing that all calls on a home telephone were listened to in their entirety, including all personal calls to or from members of the household not involved in the alleged criminal activity, would constitute a prima facie showing of a failure to meet the statutory minimization requirement, thereby shifting *111the burden to the State to present evidence justifying its action.
Third, in light of the record in this case, and the principles set forth in decided cases involving the minimization requirement of 18 U.S.C. 2518(5), there was simply no compliance with the statutory mandate by the police here. The cases cited in the majority opinion do not support the result reached in this case.
(1)
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520, was enacted in response to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), where the Court reversed, on Fourth Amendment grounds, criminal convictions based in part upon evidence obtained by eavesdropping. See State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 266, 292 A. 2d 86 (1972); Senate Report No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News, 2112, 2113, 2153. Berger involved eavesdropping authorized by an overbroad New York statute, and Katz involved eavesdropping without judicial authorization. In striking down the New York statute, the Court in Berger stated that the statute failed to contain safeguards “to prevent unauthorized invasions of the ‘sanctity of a man’s home’ ” and “invasions of privacy.” 388 U. S. at 58. In listing certain specific defects in the statute, the Supreme Court pointed to the authorization to eavesdrop without requiring the police officer “to describe with particularity the conversations sought” and giving the “officer a roving commission to ‘seize’ any and all conversations.” {Id. at 59.) Consequently, the first purpose of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was said to be “protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications . . . .” Senate Report, supra, at 2153.
One of the specific measures adopted by Congress in Title III to protect the privacy of communications, and to overcome the problem found in Berger of giving the police *112“officer a roving commission” to intercept communications, was the provision in 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) that every order “shall contain a provision” that the wiretapping or eavesdropping “shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this Chapter .. ..” See United States v. Tortorello, 480 F. 2d 764, 783 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 866, 94 S. Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973) (the minimization requirement was adopted “in order to prevent unnecessary intrusion into the privacy of the surveillance target”); United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 411 (S.D.N.Y.), on remand from 475 F. 2d 832 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 485 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U. S. 903, 94 S. Ct. 2598, 41 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974) (“minimization is . . . one element of the composite group of statutory safeguards included in the Act.”).
In the instant case, the communications subject to interception under Title III, and those specified in the order of the circuit court, were “wire communications . . . between Willie Ross and his supplier” and “wire communications . . . between Willie Ross and his buyers” concerning the delivery and price of illegal narcotic drugs. Nevertheless, Prince George’s County Police Detective Elmer L. Snow, the only witness at the suppression hearing on the minimization issue, testified that he or one of the other police officers “listened to each and every conversation that emanated from the phone number in its entirety.” While stating that he did not “really pay attention to what the children were saying” in calls from “a child to a child,” he admitted that even those calls were listened to by him in their entirety.1 Snow acknowledged that there were “several” personal calls on the telephone in question, although he was unable to say how many, and that all of these calls were listened to completely. *113Snow’s testimony disclosed that the only effort by him or the other police officers designed to minimize the interception of calls was that “once a call was determined that it was a personal call, and clearly personal, then the tape recording was cut off.”
Since the police did nothing else which might arguably constitute an effort to minimize the interception of non-pertinent calls, the majority opinion relies upon the turning off of the tape recorder as amounting to a reasonable and good faith effort to minimize. However, in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, in the very same section as the minimization requirement, Congress provided (18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(a)):
“The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by this Chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device.” (Emphasis supplied.)
There is, of course, no suggestion in this case that it was not “possible” to record all of the conversations. Therefore, each failure by the police to record a conversation or part of a conversation was a violation of the statute.
An illegal act under a statute cannot rationally be the basis for holding that another requirement of the same statute, viz. minimization, was met. Moreover, it is inconceivable that Congress could have intended that the turning off of the tape recorder be an act towards minimization within the meaning of subsection (5) of 18 U.S.C. 2518, when at the same time it mandated in subsection (8)(a) of 18 U.S.C. 2518 that the contents of all communications be recorded.
In addition, the language of subsection (8)(a) refutes the majority’s view that the words “intercept” and “interception” in the statute mean “the acquisition of a message by means of a tape recorder as well as by means of the human ear.” Subsection (8)(a) provides that the contents of a “communication intercepted by any means authorized *114by this Chapter shall ... be recorded on tape.” (Emphasis suppliéd.) Obviously the words “intercepted” and “recorded” are used to designate different actions. The statute makes it clear that the recording of the communication is a separate procedure, occurring subsequent to the interception of the communication. See United States v. Bynum, supra, 360 F. Supp. at 408-409.
The failure to record conversations which are intercepted, instead of satisfying the minimization requirement of the statute, may frustrate the effort of a court to determine whether those unrecorded conversations should have been listened to in their entirety. In United States v. Manfredi, supra, 488 F. 2d at 599, the Court of Appeals pointed out that “[t]he court has examined . . . the transcription sheets with some care in order to appreciate more fully the claims made by both the defendants and the Government with respect to minimization.” See also United States v. Bynum, supra, 475 F. 2d at 837, where the Court of Appeals stated that the “reels of tape” containing the recording of the conversations had to be analyzed in order to determine whether there had been minimization. And on remand, in United States v. Bynum, supra, 360 F.Supp. at 406, the district court pointed to the recording of “all interceptions” as being part of the government’s minimization plan.
As pointed out by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the first Bynum opinion, supra, 475 F. 2d at 837, and by the district court on remand in the same case, 360 F.Supp. at 409, the “ ‘evil’ to be limited by this [minimization] requirement is the listening to innocent calls.” Whether or not there is a record of the calls does not lessen the invasion of privacy if all calls were listened to in their entirety. What is accomplished by the failure to record is to deprive the reviewing court of the opportunity to examine the intercepted calls in order to determine whether the interceptions were consistent with the minimization requirement.
The statutory mandate that all intercepted calls be recorded is a salutary one. But in any event, the violation of the recording requirement cannot be relied upon as *115constituting compliance with the minimization requirement of the same statute.
(2)
Another error in the majority opinion in this case relates to the burden of proof on the minimization issue. The majority state that “[t]he record made by petitioners on the minimization question at the suppression hearing was . . . ‘woefully weak or silent’ on the” various factors pertinent to the matter of minimization. While describing the record as “sparse,” the majority nevertheless decide that they “shall consider the issue on the evidentiary record made by the petitioners on their motion to suppress.” The majority thus assume that the petitioners had the burden of making an “evidentiary record” to establish that the police had failed to minimize interceptions.
However, the cases hold that the prosecution has the burden of proof on the minimization issue. In United, States v. Rizzo, supra, 491 F. 2d at 217, the Court of Appeals stated:
“The burden of proof on the minimization issue under either federal or state law necessarily rests, in the first instance, on the Government. . . . The United States Attorney must be prepared to sustain that burden even in a case where the defense is unprepared or chooses not to present its own evidence on the issue. The Government might, of course, in a proper case, move for a postponement or adjournment when, after meeting its initial burden, it becomes necessary to present more extensive analysis of eavesdropping materials to rebut analysis and argument by defense counsel.”
See also United States v. Manfredi, supra, 488 F. 2d at 600.
It is only logical for the prosecution to have the burden of proving compliance with the minimization requirement. The duty to comply with the statutory mandate is the State’s. The statute places no duty upon the accused. Moreover, the factors pertinent to minimization are matters within the *116peculiar knowledge of the State and not the accused. It is the prosecution which is supposed to know of the number of calls during the period of the wiretap, the number of calls related to alleged criminal activity, the number of personal calls, the nature of the calls, the parties involved, etc. And it is the prosecution which is supposed to have a recording of the calls so that the number and character of the calls can be scrutinized to determine if an effort was made to minimize.
In the present case, the State introduced absolutely no evidence at the suppression hearing on the minimization question. The only evidence was the testimony of Detective Snow who was called as a witness by the petitioners.2
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the petitioners had the burden of initially coming forward with evidence on the minimization issue, they met the burden in this case. Petitioners presented evidence showing that the tapped telephone was a residential telephone with persons other than Willie Ross living in the household,3 that the police listened to all calls on the telephone in their entirety, that included among the calls listened to were “several” personal calls, that the police officer in charge of the wiretap operation did not know how many calls or how many personal calls were made during the wiretap period, and that the police failed to record the monitored personal conversations thereby preventing a court from scrutinizing them. This presentation of evidence by the petitioners certainly amounted to a prima facie showing of a failure by the police to comply with 18 U.S.C. 2518(5). If petitioners had the burden of proof on minimization (which they did *117not), enough was shown to shift the burden to the State to present evidence justifying the police action.
(3)
Considering the record in the present case, there was simply no effort here to minimize the interception of non-pertinent communications. The majority’s conclusion to the contrary goes far beyond any of the cases on the minimization question, including those cited in the majority opinion.
In several of the cases cited by the majority, the police did not listen to all calls in their entirety during the wiretap period; moreover, there were other factors present, which are not present here, which were deemed to justify the conclusion that a reasonable effort toward minimization was made. In United States v. Cox, 462 F. 2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), while the court stated that the electronic eavesdropping was “extensive” and that “[apparently there were irrelevant conversations recorded,” there is no indication that all calls in their entirety were monitored. Also in Cox, all of the monitored calls were recorded, and there was judicial supervision of the interceptions with reports to the judge every five days during the wiretapping. In United States v. Tortorello, supra, 480 F. 2d at 783-785, the court pointed out that “[a]s soon as it was determined that any conversation overheard was not pertinent, all interception immediately ceased.” The number of non-pertinent calls intercepted in Tortorello was deemed to be “de minimis.”
The court in United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 196 (W.D. Pa. 1971), pointed out that it “reviewed the transcript of all of the calls, a lengthy and tedious task, and finds that . . . the monitoring of many conversations was terminated . . . In United States v. Bynum, supra, 360 F. Supp. at 408-417, all of the intercepted calls were recorded; many non-pertinent calls were not intercepted; as to several calls the monitoring agent “dropped his headphone” and stopped listening when it was determined that a call was *118innocent; and the court found “that the percentage of intercepted conversations that were not relevant or which fell outside of the broad scope of the authorization orders was de minimis.” See also United States v. Rizzo, supra, 491 F. 2d at 217 (“both monitoring and recording were stopped when it had been determined that a call was not pertinent”); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1049 (D. Md.), aff'd on different issue sub nom United States v. Giordano, 469 F. 2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U. S. 505, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (only 355 out of 630 calls containing conversations were monitored).
It is true that a few federal court cases have upheld particular wiretaps as being in compliance with the minimization requirement even though all calls were monitored in their entirety. See United States v. James, 494 F. 2d 1007, 1018-1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Manfredi, supra. Regardless of the validity of these holdings in light of the congressional mandate that “every” wiretap shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of innocent conversations, they do not support the majority decision in the present case. In James, the telephone was used exclusively to conduct illegal business, and the place where it was “located served no residential function.” (494 F. 2d at 1020, 1022-1023.) The conversations were recorded, and regular reports were submitted to the authorizing judge during the period of the wiretap (id. at 1022). Finally, in James, at least seventy percent of the calls related to the narcotics conspiracy, and only twelve percent could “be determined to involve neither narcotics nor other criminality.” (Ibid.) In Manfredi, all of the calls were recorded, and the court examined the transcriptions in order to evaluate the government’s claim that it did as much as it could to minimize. (488 F. 2d at 599.)
It is readily apparent that in the cases holding that there was government compliance with the minimization requirement, the prosecution presented substantial evidence upon which the courts could base their holdings. The State presented no such evidence here. The record in this case contains less evidence on minimization than was present in *119the first Bynum case, supra, 475 F. 2d at 837, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to find minimization and remanded the matter for further proceedings, saying (emphasis supplied):
“Unlike the district court cases which have considered the minimization problem in other Circuits, we have here no breakdown or analysis of the intercepted conversations. We do know that 198 reels of tape containing more than 3000 conversations were made available to appellants before trial. What percentage of these are irrelevant or innocuous we do not know. The record only indicates that on one phone between January 30, 1971 until February 13, 1971, some 770 completed telephone calls were intercepted. Of these, 108 allegedly relate to illegal drug traffic and 21 refer to other criminal activity. This information is provided in the affidavit of an Inspector of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in support of the extension of the initial wiretap order of Judge Travia.
“A reading of the testimony of the agent who supervised the surveillance would indicate that all conversations were recorded but only those presumably inculpatory were ever transcribed. The mischief lies in the interception obviously and what was not transcribed remains unknown. Although there is an allegation that the conversations were coded and guarded, which may account for the total interception, we are provided with no explanation of why some minimization was not possible to achieve. We know nothing of the nature or tenor of those calls which might be deemed innocent. ”
In the subject case, we know even less about the intercepted calls.
In State v. Siegel, supra, 266 Md. at 273-274, this Court stated with respect to Title III, and in particular with *120respect to the requirement that wiretap orders contain a direction to minimize interceptions, the following:
“The State urges that no more than substantial compliance with the federal act is essential. In its brief it takes the rather cavalier attitude that: ‘The rote recitation that the interception shall be executed as soon as practicable and in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subjected to interception has no real meaning so long as the authorizing court’ scrutinizes the manner in which the surveillance was actually conducted. We cannot accept this rationalization. The statute sets up a strict procedure that must be followed and we will not abide any deviation, no matter how slight, from the prescribed path.”
In my view, the portion of the majority opinion relating to the minimization of interceptions represents a clear departure from what the Court so recently and forcefully stated in Siegel.

. The majority opinion points out that Snow testified that “no conversations between Ross and his attorney, clergyman, psychiatrist, or medical doctor were intercepted.” However, the reason why no such calls were intercepted was because there were in fact no calls between Ross and these persons. There was one call between someone else in Ross’s home and a “law clerk” in the office of the caller’s lawyer, and this call, like all others, was listened to in its entirety.

. It is noteworthy that when petitioners’ counsel, attempted to ascertain from Detective Snow certain information relevant to minimization, such as the number of calls and the number of personal calls when the tape recorder was turned off, Detective Snow was unable to give the information.

. The testimony at the suppression hearing disclosed generally that there were children living in the home who used the telephone. Later in the case, the record reveals specifically that petitioner Willie Ross’s wife, Gloria Ross, and their three minor children were residents of the house. There has never been even any suggestion in the case that Gloria Ross or any of the children were engaged in criminal activity.