Court Opinion

ID: 9960340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 21:18:07.192378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:22.530327
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                  April 15, 2024
                                                                                  C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK

                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA
                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re J.M. and M.M.

No. 23-162 (Nicholas County CC-34-2018-JA-128 and CC-34-2018-JA-129)

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Mother P.M.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Nicholas County’s February 21, 2023,
order terminating her parental and custodial rights to J.M. and M.M.,2 arguing that the circuit court
erred when it failed to dismiss the DHS’s amended petitions and terminated her rights. Upon our
review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision
affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        The proceedings giving rise to this appeal were previously before this Court. See In re J.M.,
M.M., D.M. and W.M., Case Nos. 20-0958 & 20-0992, 2021 WL 5234719 (W. Va. Nov. 10, 2021)
(memorandum decision). Succinctly, the proceedings were initiated in August 2018 upon
allegations that petitioner failed to seek medical treatment for a child who jumped out of her
moving car and committed domestic violence in front of the children. 3 Thereafter, petitioner was
adjudicated by stipulation, admitting that she abused and neglected the children by committing
domestic violence in their presence. Petitioner was granted a post-adjudicatory improvement
period, multiple extensions, and a post-dispositional improvement period but failed to remain
drug-free. Her drug test results indicated that she was continually using drugs for which she did
not have a valid prescription throughout 2020 while the children lived with her. As her drug use

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Kathleen Murphy. The West Virginia Department of Human
Services appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General
Jake Wegman. Counsel Julia R. Callaghan appears as the children’s guardian ad litem.

       Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated. It is now three
separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the
Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect
appeals, the agency is now the Department of Human Services (“DHS”).
       2
       We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
       3
           Petitioner is the biological grandmother and adoptive mother of J.M. and M.M.

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contravened the terms of her family case plan, the court terminated her rights in its November
2020 dispositional order. However, on appeal, this Court found that the circuit court erred by
terminating petitioner’s rights based on allegations for which she was not adjudicated and for not
considering the children’s wishes, and we vacated the court’s November 5, 2020, dispositional
order. Id. at *4, *6. We further remanded the matter to the circuit court in order for it to enter a
new dispositional order that specifically considered the children’s wishes and linked petitioner’s
drug use to the domestic violence upon which she was adjudicated. Id.

        Upon remand, the circuit court first ordered petitioner, the children, and the children’s
father to undergo psychological evaluations. During petitioner’s evaluation, she denied all
allegations of abuse and neglect and drug abuse. Petitioner stated that she only stipulated to
allegations of domestic violence at her attorney’s suggestion and that the domestic violence did
not occur. The psychological evaluation determined her prognosis for improved parenting was
extremely poor due to her failure to accept responsibility, her minimization of her actions, her
recantation of her stipulation, and her failure to complete an improvement period. The evaluation
stated that there are “no services or interventions that this examiner is aware of that could be
expected to correct or improve [petitioner’s] parenting within a reasonable time, if at all.”

         In December 2021, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing at which the children
testified. J.M., then fourteen years old, and M.M., then fifteen years old, testified that petitioner
and her husband disciplined them by striking them with a belt or their hands but denied any other
abuse. D.M., petitioner’s child who was seventeen at the time and who is not at issue in this appeal,
testified that petitioner was taking and selling prescription pills and would become agitated,
accusing the children of stealing her pills; would take the children with her to buy or sell drugs;
and spent money allocated for utilities on pills, which led to more fighting in the home.
Additionally, D.M. stated that petitioner hit the children with belts. The court ended the hearing to
allow the DHS to amend its petition and set the matter for an adjudicatory hearing. Over the next
two months,4 the DHS filed its second, third, and fourth amended petitions. Those petitions alleged
that petitioner abused drugs to the detriment of her parenting skills and listed instances where
petitioner tested positive for alcohol and various drugs for which she did not have a prescription.
The petitions also alleged that petitioner was buying and selling illegal substances. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the amended petitions for lack of new allegations, but the circuit court deferred
ruling on the motion until the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearings.

        Over the course of three adjudicatory hearings, the court heard testimony from many
witnesses. Petitioner testified that she did not use drugs and her positive screens were inaccurate.
The psychologist who performed the children’s evaluations opined that J.M. and M.M. lacked the
coping skills and maturity to voice a preference regarding termination of their parents’ rights.
Moreover, the psychologist who performed petitioner’s parental fitness evaluation explained that
petitioner’s drug use affected her parenting in that it impaired her thinking and finances. Based on
the evidence presented, the court found that petitioner abused and neglected the children by using
controlled substances and engaging in domestic violence in their presence. The court denied

       4
        During this time, two of petitioner’s four children reached the age of eighteen and were
dismissed from the proceeding below.

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petitioner’s motion to dismiss the amended petitions. Petitioner moved for a post-adjudicatory
improvement period.

       In December 2022, the court held a dispositional hearing. A Child Protective Services
(“CPS”) employee testified that petitioner missed drug screens, had positive drug screens, and that
there were no additional services that could be provided to petitioner to overcome the
circumstances that led to the filing of the petitions. The CPS employee also explained that the
children had been out of the home for the last twenty-four months. Petitioner testified that she did
not need services but would participate in further services if ordered to do so.

        In its February 2023 dispositional order, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s parental
and custodial rights.5 The court considered the children’s wishes but ultimately declined to follow
J.M. and M.M.’s preference for petitioner to retain her rights. The court further found that
petitioner minimized her actions, refused to take responsibility for any abuse or neglect occurring
in her home, and did not show by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to participate
in another improvement period. The court found that petitioner had been provided all possible
services in her previous improvement periods and there were no additional services that would
resolve the abuse and neglect. Based on the evidence, the court found that there was no reasonable
likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions at issue and that termination of
petitioner’s rights was in the children’s best interests. It is from the dispositional order that
petitioner appeals.6

        On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Before this Court, petitioner asserts multiple
assignments of error, the first of which alleges that the circuit court erred when it refused to dismiss
the DHS’s amended petitions. Citing Rule 19(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings, which permits the filing of an amended petition and the reopening of the
adjudicatory hearing “[i]f new allegations arise” after the initial adjudicatory hearing, petitioner
argues that none of the allegations in the amended petitions were “new.” This argument is entirely
without merit, as petitioner readily admits that some allegations were predicated on conduct that
occurred after the proceedings were initiated, clearly demonstrating that she engaged in new
abusive and/or neglectful conduct. Further, to the extent that petitioner argues that the conduct
could not be considered abusive and/or neglectful because the DHS had already removed the
children, we disagree. On the contrary, this Court has been clear that conduct that occurs after the
filing of a petition may be considered in determining whether a parent has abused or neglect a
child. See In re Brandon Lee B., 211 W. Va. 587, 590, 67 S.E.2d 597, 600 (2001) (“[F]acts
developed after the filing of the petition, or amended petition, may be considered in evaluating the
conditions which existed at the time of the filing of the petition or amended petition.”).

       5
         The circuit court’s order terminated petitioner’s “legal, parental, and custodial rights.”
However, we note that West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) provides only for the termination of
parental, custodial, and guardianship rights.
       6
        The father’s parental and custodial rights were also terminated. The permanency plan is
adoption in the current placement.

                                                   3
Accordingly, petitioner cannot establish error in the circuit court’s refusal to dismiss the amended
petitions.

         Next, petitioner claims that the court ignored the children’s wishes at disposition. However,
the record clearly establishes that the court considered the children’s wishes but found that their
best interests did not align with those wishes. As we have explained, West Virginia Code § 49-4-
604(c)(6)(C) “requires a circuit court to give consideration to the wishes of a child who is fourteen
years of age or older” but the “circuit court is not obligated to comply with the child’s wishes.”
Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re J.A., 242 W. Va. 226, 833 S.E.2d 487 (2019). The court considered expert
testimony and the children’s own testimony as to their wishes but declined to follow them, in
keeping with our prior direction. Id. (instructing that the court “shall make the termination decision
based upon a consideration of the child’s best interests” and that the child’s preference is but one
fact to consider). Thus, petitioner’s argument is meritless.

        Petitioner then asserts that the DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
petitioner’s rights should be terminated and the court’s findings were insufficient for such a
finding.7 This argument is simply incorrect, as the circuit court’s twenty-five-page order contains
sufficient findings pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C).8 The circuit court’s order

       7
         Petitioner raises additional assignments of error in which she relies on authority from other
jurisdictions to assert that drug use alone is insufficient to support adjudication and termination of
parental and custodial rights. It is unnecessary to address these arguments, however, because
petitioner was not adjudicated solely upon her substance abuse, nor were her rights terminated
solely upon this issue. Instead, as the record shows, petitioner was also adjudicated of perpetrating
domestic violence in the home and she denied that domestic violence ever took place, despite
having twice been adjudicated for this conduct. Simply put, petitioner’s position has no basis in
the record.
       8
           The relevant portion of that statute states the following:

                         The court order shall state:
                         (i) That continuation in the home is not in the best interest of
                 the child and why;
                         (ii) Why reunification is not in the best interests of the child;
                         (iii) Whether or not the department made reasonable efforts,
                 with the child's health and safety being the paramount concern, to
                 preserve the family, or some portion thereof, and to prevent the
                 placement or to eliminate the need for removing the child from the
                 child’s home and to make it possible for the child to safely return
                 home, or that the emergency situation made those efforts
                 unreasonable or impossible; and
                         (iv) Whether or not the department made reasonable efforts
                 to preserve and reunify the family, or some portion thereof,
                 including a description of what efforts were made or that those
                 efforts were unreasonable due to specific circumstances.

                                                    4
describes that the children’s best interests were served by removing them from petitioner’s care
due to her drug abuse and domestic violence in the home. The court also detailed petitioner’s
continued drug use to the detriment of her parenting abilities and in violation of her improvement
period. The court found that petitioner has been provided all possible services and there are no
additional services that can overcome the conditions of abuse and neglect. Thus, the circuit court’s
findings were sufficient.

       Finally, petitioner contends that the court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives. We
have previously held that

               “[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the
       statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia
       Code § 49-4-604,] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive
       alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West
       Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be
       substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d
       114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). The circuit court made specific
findings that petitioner denied any need for improvement and refused to acknowledge her drug
use, going as far as to question the validity of her drug test results. The record contains ample
evidence to support the circuit court’s findings that there was no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and that it was
necessary for the children’s best interest to terminate petitioner’s parental and custodial rights, as
the children needed continuity of care.9 See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (permitting circuit court
to terminate parental and custodial rights upon finding no reasonable likelihood conditions of
neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and when necessary for the child’s
welfare). The court considered less restrictive alternatives, but ultimately found that termination
was the appropriate disposition. Thus, petitioner’s argument is without merit.

       Petitioner makes numerous arguments but fails to address the crux of the entire
proceeding—her refusal to accept any responsibility for the abuse and neglect that occurred in her
home due to her drug use. We have held that

       [i]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be
       acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth

       9
         Petitioner raises an additional assignment of error in which she argues that the circuit court
erred in finding that there was no reasonable likelihood she could correct the conditions of abuse
and neglect. In support, petitioner cites to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(1), which establishes
that there is no reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected when, in relevant part, “[t]he
abusing parent or parents have habitually abused or are addicted to alcohol, controlled substances
or drugs, to the extent that proper parenting skills have been seriously impaired.” We decline to
address this argument, however, because the circuit court did not rely on this specific subsection.
Instead, as more fully set forth herein, the circuit court relied on petitioner’s refusal to acknowledge
the conditions at issue or that she had any parenting deficiencies that required improvement.

                                                   5
       of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the perpetrator
       of said abuse and neglect, results in making the problem untreatable and in making
       an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re: Charity H., 215
W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004)). Here, a further improvement period would be an
exercise in futility, as petitioner repeatedly stated that she does not believe she did anything wrong.
Thus, petitioner’s arguments entitle her to no relief.

       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
February 21, 2023, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 15, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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