Court Opinion

ID: 9723620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:23:08.539911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:50.409358
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Achor, J.
I concur in the result of the decision in this case because, in my opinion, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding and judgment which is affirmed.
However, I do not concur in that part of the opinion which holds that the ground here assigned in the motion for new trial was insufficient, and therefore presented no question.
The ground for new trial here assigned was: “(2) That the finding and judgment are not sustained by sufficient evidence.” The statutory ground for new trial is that “. .. the finding ... is not sustained by sufficient evidence.” Acts, 1905, ch. 169, §282, p. 584, being §9-1903, Burns’ 1942 Replacement (1953 Supp.). The question presented is, does the language here used substantially comply with the statute or can we with reason say that the use of the additional words “and judgment”' completely nullified the right of the litigant to rely upon the asserted ground for new trial?
In my opinion the rule which this court has here reaffirmed and the cases in support of the rule cited in the majority opinion, is not well reasoned. The cases cited refer back to the case of Lynch v. Milwaukee Harvester Co. (1903), 159 Ind. 675, 676, 677, 65 N. E. 1025. In that case the ground for new trial was “That the finding and judgment are contrary to the evidence.” (Our italics). The reason for the decision in that case was stated as follows: “. . . It may be, that, upon verdicts or findings in strict accord with the law and evidence, judgments contrary to the law and evidence are rendered. But the remedy against such errors is a motion to modify the judgment, ...” I agree that the *86decision of the court in that case rests upon a logical basis. The phrase “That the finding and judgment are contrary to the evidence" is not only outside the terms of the statute, it is ambiguous and assumes that the evidence might support a different judgment, but not the particular judgment. Accordingly, the court held that error, if any, in the finding and judgment should be corrected by motion to modify the judgment and not by motion for new trial.
The same logic does not apply in the case at bar or those cases cited in the majority opinion. Here the error assigned is “That the finding and judgment are not sustained by sufficient evidence.” The language follows that of the statute (§9-1903, supra), except that the words “and judgment” are added. There is no assumption here that under any circumstances the evidence is sufficient to support this or any other finding or judgment, and, if “the finding ... is not sustained by sufficient evidence,” as asserted, it necessarily follows that any judgment based thereon is erroneous and must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The words “and judgment,” as used, are incapable of adding to or detracting from the remainder of the ground assigned for new trial. They are mere surplusage.
I recognize that it is the duty of this court to diligently adhere to firmly established precedents affecting the substantive rights of our people, for they have a right to govern their lives by such rules with confidence. However, where, as here, we are involved with a purely procedural question, I am of the firm opinion that we are duty bound to follow the principle that where the reason for the rule fails, the rule itself fails.
Also, in my opinion, the precedent reaffirmed in the majority opinion is contrary to the often announced policy of our courts, to liberally construe- our procedural *87statutes to the end that, where such construction permits, the rights of litigants may be decided upon their merits. Although, in this particular case, the court has fortified its decision by deciding the question presented upon its merits, as long as the above rule stands, litigants have no assurance that it will not be employed to deny them such an opportunity on another occasion.
Emmert, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 123 N. E. 2d 891.