Court Opinion

ID: 9783656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:55:07.257037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:28.977837
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Chief Justice,
concurring:
T28 I concur with the majority's opinion. I write separately, however, because I believe that in making an apparently stylistic change to Utah Code section 78-12-35 (the tolling statute), the legislature may have unintentionally eliminated the tolling of the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions.
1 29 Section 78-12-35 provides:
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for commencement of this action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2002) (emphasis added). The majority concludes that under this plain language, out-of-state tolling does not apply to medical malpractice actions if the action accrues when the defendant is out of the state. To do so, the majority focuses on the phrase, "as limited by this chapter." It reasons that because of this phrase, the only limitation periods that may be tolled pursuant to this section are those limitations contained in chapter 12. In contrast, the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions is contained in chapter 14. Because this limitation falls outside of chapter 12, out-of-state tolling, by its plain terms, does not apply. Also, to avoid an unreasonable distinction based on one day, the majority extends the chapter limitation to medical malpractice actions that accrue while a defendant is in the state.
"1 30 The majority stresses this is the plain language of the statute. I agree. The stat*198ute cannot reasonably be read another way. It is therefore not. ambiguous, and this court will not resort to other interpretive tools-in particular, legislative history. See Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, ¶ 17, 123 P.3d 437.
{31 Nonetheless, I hesitate because this determinative language may have been intended only as a stylistic change. We have noted that "the tolling statute remains materially unchanged from its original enactment." Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 25, 158 P.3d 532. The original version of the tolling statute read:
If where the cause of action shall acerue against a person, he is out of the Territory, the action may be commenced within the term Rkerein limited, after his return to the Territory; and if after the cause of the action shall have accrued, he depart the Territory, the time of his absence shall not be part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
Act of Feb. 16, 1872, ch. XIII, § 28, 1872 Utah Laws 18, 23 (emphasis added). Since 1872, the legislature has made "a few minor changes to [the] text." Olseth, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 25, 158 P.3d 532.
1 32 In 1987, one of these "minor" changes replaced the phrase "herein limited" with "limited by this chapter." Act of Jan. 28, 1987, ch. 19, § 4, 1987 Utah Laws 8310, 311. Arguably, as the Arnolds have emphasized in this case, the legislature intended this to be a stylistic change. Floor debates show that the amending bill had three purposes: (1) eliminate the tolling of statutes of limitation for incarcerated person, (2) redefine insanity to toll statutes of limitations during mental incompetence, and (8) reduce the statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions to two years. Senate Floor Debate, S.B. 26, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 16, 1987); see also House Floor Debate, S.B. 26, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1987) (identifying the same three purposes). Moreover, the bill's sponsor used a medical malpractice action as an example to explain to other senators the process of tolling. Senate Floor Debate, S.B. 26, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 16, 1987) (Statement of Senator Lyle W. Hillard).
133 Today the court's reading of the tolling statute transforms this "minor" change into a material, substantive change. Generally, a plain reading of a statute discerns legislative intent. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Cir., 2008 UT 88, ¶ 18, 200 P.3d 643. Yet here, a "minor" change-perhaps intended only to update anachronistic language-now has the consequence of eliminating tolling for a host of limitation periods that lie outside chapter 12, including the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. If this consequence was unintended, then the legislature ought to revise section 78-12-85 to make its intent clear under the plain language of the statute.
T 34 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S concurring opinion.