Court Opinion

ID: 9582325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:25:22.192824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:40.225838
License: Public Domain

CARTEE., J., Dissenting.
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Edmonds, but feel that something further should be said in regard to the holding in the majority opinion. It is there held that a robbery is also a violation of section 209 of the Penal Code, called “kidnapping.” The prosecuting attorney is given the sole and arbitrary power to determine whether a person shall suffer life imprisonment without possibility of parole or even death on the one hand, or, in the case of robbery in the second degree, as little as one year’s imprisonment. It all depends on the charge he chooses, at his whim or caprice, *204to make against the accused. If he charges both robbery and kidnapping and the defendant is convicted of both crimes, he must suffer the greater punishment provided for lddnapping, or, if he wishes, he may charge kidnapping alone and likewise obtain the extreme penalty. However, he may charge robbery alone, and, in case of a conviction, lesser punishment would follow. All these things could occur on the identical set of facts which establish only-robbery as will later appear. It is not to be supposed that the Legislature intended to place any such drastic and arbitrary power in the hands of the district attorney. On the contrary, it is clear that it did not intend to embrace the crime of robbery in section 209 of the Penal Code. Every robbery, whether first or second degree, necessarily involves some detention or holding of the victim if we give those words a narrow and restricted meaning. The Legislature has carefully defined robbery and fixed its punishment, deeming that punishment adequate. If it had intended to depart from those provisions, it would have done so directly by amending the robbery statute. It would not have attempted to achieve that result by amending section 209, the kidnap statute. The case falls squarely within In re Shull, 23 Cal.2d 745 [146 P.2d 417], where this court held that a statute imposing an additional five-year term of imprisonment where a felony was committed with a deadly weapon was not intended to apply to the felony of assault with a deadly weapon, for the elements in both instances were the same and the punishment for the latter was clearly defined. It is there said: “It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature believed that for felonies in which the use of a gun was not one of the essential factors, such as rape, larceny, and the like, an added penalty should be imposed by reason of the fact that the defendant being armed with such a weapon would probably be more dangerous because of the probability of death or physical injury being inflicted by the weapon. Hence, such a condition would be reasonable grounds for increasing the penalty where felonies are involved which do not include as a necessary element being armed with a pistol. The Legislature has by other acts imposed an increased' punishment where the only additional factor, being armed with a deadly weapon, is present. The only difference between a simple assault and one with a deadly weapon is the latter factor. The commission of a simple assault is declared a misdemeanor, and the punishment therefor is a fine of not over $500 or imprisonment in the county jail for six months, or by both. (Pen. Code, §§ 240, *205241.) When there is added to the assault the use of a deadly weapon the punishment is increased to imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten years or in the county jail not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or by both fine and imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 245), and if section 1168(2) (a) or 3024(2) is applicable and the weapons therein mentioned are used, the minimum term is fixed at five years where the perpetrator is not one previously convicted of a felony. Briefly, the Legislature has fixed the punishment for an assault where a deadly weapon is used, a particular crime, and it is not to be supposed that for the same offense without any additional factor existing the added punishment should be imposed. In felonies where a deadly weapon is not a factor in the offense, the additional punishment is imposed by section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act, because of the additional factor of a deadly weapon being involved. ’ ’
Applying the foregoing rule to the ease at bar, it seems obvious to me that by the amendment to section 209 of the Penal Code the Legislature did not intend to make the punishment for kidnapping applicable to robbery, but such is the holding of the majority in this case.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 18, 1950. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.