Court Opinion

ID: 9795878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:41:10.925762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:40:31.158695
License: Public Domain

Judge CONNELLY
specially concurring.
The majority upholds Colorado's financial disclosure requirements on "issue committees" supporting or opposing ballot issues. I concur in the results reached by the majority but write separately because my analysis differs in some respects.
As the majoﬁty explains, this is a constitutional challenge to Colorado's requirements on their face rather than as applied to a particular organization. A facial challenger has the daunting burden of showing "no set of cireumstances exists under which the Act would be valid, i.e. that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Porty, -- U.S. --, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1190, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (internal pune tuation omitted); compare McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2008) (upholding facial constitutionality of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 provision outlawing certain corporate "electioneering communications"), with Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1016, 163 L.Ed.2d 990 (2006) (holding MceConmell did not foreclose as-applied challenges to same provision), and FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (holding same provision unconstitutional as applied).
Colorado's definition of an issue committee is not vague "in all of its applications," Washington State Grange, - U.S. at --, 128 S.Ct. at 1190. The vagueness challenge turns on one word: "a" rather than "the" before "major purpose." Independence Institute contends the major purpose of an organization "is easily determinable in «advance," but a major purpose is "inherently vague." Such a categorical contention is demonstrably incorrect. Take, for example, an "organization that has four equally important purposes, only one of which is electoral advocacy." North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir.2008) (NCRL ). It will be easier, not harder, to determine "a" rather than "the" major purpose of that organization.
I cannot subscribe to the discussion in the majority opinion that in my view goes further than necessary or appropriate to reject this facial challenge. The majority opinion contains an extended discussion of cases that have "narrowly" construed provisions to avoid vagueness problems, and it outlines factors pertinent to a "fact-specific inquiry" into whethér an organization is or is not an issue committee. But in my view the Colorado definition easily withstands a facial challenge without any narrowing construction be-youd what the Secretary of State already provided. Discussion of factors relevant to determining whether an organization is an issue committee should be reserved for a case in which the legal definition must be applied to a particular organization under a given set of facts. In such a case, a multipurpose organization would remain free to raise an as-applied constitutional challenge.
Next, I agree with the majority's rejection of the overbreadth challenge but again remain concerned with any suggestions the challenge fails because of some judicial interpretation of the definition. Administrative regulations, not judicial construction, have obviated the only real overbreadth concern by requiring multipurpose issue committees to report only ballot-specific contributions and expenditures. Secretary of State Cam*1144paign and Political Finance Rules 4.15, 8 Code Colo. Regs. 1505-6.
The Supreme Court has not-in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 LEd.2d 659 (1976); in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986); or in any other decision-accorded talismanic constitutional significance to whether "the" or "a" modifies major purpose. 'To the contrary, in a related context, it has upheld regulation of lobbyists where "one of the main purposes of such 'person," or one of the main purposes of such contributions" was to influence legislation. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 623, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) (emphases added).
Next, I concur with the majority's holding that the reporting requirements do not violate the First Amendment right to speak anonymously on ballot issues. I write separately to opine that Independence Institute's contentions on this point are more substantial than its vagueness and overbreadth challenges.
Anonymous speech has a long and vital tradition predating the Constitution (as in the Federalist Papers ), and at least in some cireumstances it is constitutionally protected. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-57, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 LEd.2d 426 (1995). Moreover, one of the most compelling interests justifying disclosure of political candidate contributions, that of "deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof," McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, 124 S.Ct. 619, does not apply to ballot issues. See California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1179 n. 9 (9th Cir.2007). The only applicable state interest-educating the electorate about financial interests behind ballot issues-is much less weighty than the interest in avoiding actual or apparent corruption of politicians. See Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P24 748, 755 (Colo.2000) ("identity of supporters and opponents of a ballot initiative would be potentially helpful to the electorate, but the information is not nearly as critical as the identity of candidate supporters").
Nonetheless, as set forth in the majority opinion, Supreme Court dicta and lower court holdings have approved ballot issue disclosure requirements. Under these cases, a state's interest in disclosing financial interests behind ballot issues is sufficiently compelling (albeit less so than in the political candidate context) to overcome the right to speak anonymously. I therefore concur in the majority opinion on this point and in the rest of its opinion rejecting Independence Institute's case-specific appellate arguments.