Court Opinion

ID: 9942702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 19:01:16.498044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:27.827649
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                    Fifth Circuit
                            ____________                          FILED
                                                           February 20, 2024
                             No. 22-50697
                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
                            ____________                           Clerk

United States of America,

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                   versus

Marco Antonio Abundiz,

                                        Defendant—Appellant.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Western District of Texas
                       USDC No. 3:20-CR-2409-1
               ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
      Convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) and sentenced to life
imprisonment for sexually abusing his six-year-old niece, K.Z., Marco
Antonio Abundiz argues the district court erred by: (1) denying his right to
confrontation by allowing K.Z. to testify via CCTV; (2) failing to make the
findings required under 18 U.S.C § 3509 before allowing K.Z. to testify via
CCTV; (3) admitting evidence of a previous sexual assault; (4) admitting
evidence that he possessed child pornography; and (5) instructing the jury
regarding evidence admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.
We AFFIRM.
                                        No. 22-50697

                                              I.
        In 2020, six-year-old K.Z. told her mother, Adriana Zapata, that
Abundiz (K.Z.’s uncle and Adriana’s brother) had been sexually abusing her
while babysitting her in their home on the Fort Bliss Army Base in El Paso,
Texas. According to testimony at trial, K.Z. reported to her parents and
multiple medical professionals that on multiple occasions, Abundiz would
sexually molest her.
        Further investigation revealed that Abundiz previously sexually
abused his minor cousin, who testified that Abundiz had sex with her
numerous times over an eight-year time span before she was sixteen.1
Abundiz was charged with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor
under the age of 12 years in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c).
                                  A. K.Z. Testimony
        1. CCTV
        Before trial, the Government moved to allow K.Z. to testify via CCTV
outside the personal presence of Abundiz and the jury, in accordance with
18 U.S.C. § 3509, the federal statute defining child victims’ rights when they
are required to testify at trial.2 At a March 28, 2022 hearing on the motion,
the Government called Dr. Lubit, an expert in forensic, child, and adolescent

        _____________________
        1
            Abundiz was never prosecuted for this conduct.
        2
          Prior to the hearing, the district court also issued a written order explaining the
law under 18 U.S.C. § 3509 and establishing the relevant standards for the hearing.
Abundiz notes that the Government’s initial request for CCTV testimony had a “fatal
failure” in that it did not request a hearing despite the fact that “every single circuit court
that considered this issue [child victims testifying under 18 U.S.C. § 3509] required that a
hearing be held.” The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether hearings are necessary and
need not reach this issue because the district court cured any error by holding a hearing.

                                              2
                                        No. 22-50697

psychiatry.3 Lubit began by providing general testimony about child victims
who testify in the presence of their abusers. He testified that, in his opinion
and based on scientific literature, child victims who must “be confronted by
or see” their abusers are “re-traumatize[d]” by the experience as it can be
an “immense traumatic trigger causing a great deal of fear, anxiety, and
distress.” Lubit further explained that forcing a child victim to be in the same
space as her abuser causes “betrayal trauma,” which may make the child
distrust society, the police, and the legal system, “damag[ing] [their] ability
to trust adults in general.”
       Turning to K.Z., Lubit testified that he spoke with her three times but
that K.Z. was hesitant to discuss the assault on all three occasions because
“it was too painful.” Lubit opined it was “too anxiety provoking” for her.
Lubit further testified that K.Z. was scared of Abundiz and had substantial
anxiety about seeing him and speaking about the assault. He explained that
“[s]he reports very clearly she is frightened of [Abundiz].” If K.Z. were
forced to speak about the assault in Abundiz’s presence, Lubit opined that
K.Z. would be “so flooded with anxiety, that she wouldn’t be able to” testify.
He also stated that having to testify in front of Abundiz would “re-
traumatize” K.Z., “deepen the trauma she has,” and cause more than de
minimis “betrayal trauma.” Moreover, Lubit suggested that being in the
same room as Abundiz would, “to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty . . . prevent [K.Z.] from being able to testify” and that having an
adult attendant in the courtroom would not resolve this issue. Finally, Lubit
testified K.Z. faced a higher risk of trauma if she were required to testify in
the presence of Abundiz rather than permitted to testify via CCTV.

       _____________________
       3
           At no time did Abundiz object to Lubit’s qualifications as an expert.

                                              3
                                 No. 22-50697

According to Lubit, this risk of trauma was more than mere nervousness or
reluctance.
       Following this testimony, the district court granted the Government’s
request to allow K.Z. to testify via CCTV:
       I find that the tender age of the child dictates that she be
       allowed to testify via closed-circuit TV. The combination of the
       time elapsed since the incident and the facts and circumstances
       leading to the incident and what has transpired since the
       incident, again, dictates that this testimony happen -- her
       testimony take place in the less stressful set of circumstances
       that can be fashioned to do so. I find that to avoid the
       appearance for any -- to avoid any misapprehensions,
       misperceptions, or any presumption of guilt or of risk to the
       child, only the child should be on camera when she is testifying.

       The court specified procedures for K.Z.’s CCTV testimony and
requested to meet with K.Z., her guardians, and counsel in chambers to
explain the process and instill upon K.Z. the need to testify truthfully. Then,
the following exchange occurred:
       AUSA: Is your Honor finding under Section 3509(b)(1)(B)(ii)
       that there is a substantial likelihood established by expert
       testimony that the child would suffer emotional trauma from
       testifying?
       Court: Yes.
       2. K.Z. Testimony
       Pursuant to the district court’s order, K.Z. testified via CCTV. K.Z.,
who was seven-years-old and in second grade at the time of trial, testified that
she remembered living in Texas and that Abundiz babysat her. When asked
what Abundiz did to her, K.Z. said “he always does something bad to me,”
he “always see[s] my private part [sic],” and he “licks” her private parts.

                                       4
                                       No. 22-50697

She said this occurred “more than one time” while Abundiz was “sitting on
his bed” and she was “laying down.”4
            B. Maria Feliz Ramirez & Rosalva Hernandez Testimony
        The Government also offered the testimony of Maria Feliz Ramirez,
Abundiz’s sister, and Rosalva Hernandez, Abundiz’s stepsister.
        Maria explained that she lived with Abundiz until she was fourteen
and recalled a moment when Abundiz told her he was dating their stepsister,
Rosalva, who would have been no more than 11 years old at the time. Maria
recalled Abundiz asking her to remember when she walked in on him and
Rosalva having sex:
        So he told me that they were dating. And I was 16, so I didn’t
        even know how to react. I was just like, Oh, that’s cool. And
        then he was like, Oh, you walked in on us one time. And I was
        like, Oh, no, I didn’t. He was all, like, Yeah, you came into my
        room to, like, clean. And I put the blanket over me really quick.
        Rosalva also testified and confirmed these allegations. She said that
she lived with Abundiz as a child and that she had sex with him from when
she was eight until she was sixteen, numerous times “on a weekly basis.”

        _____________________
        4
           K.Z. made similar reports to medical professionals who testified at trial. Alena
Cummings, an EMT who responded to the scene, testified to K.Z.’s statements on the day
of the arrest. On that day, Cummings spoke privately with K.Z. and later testified that K.Z.
shared “that her uncle told her to go up to the room. . . . and then he kissed her on her lips
and touched her in her genital area,” which K.Z. called her “pee-pee” while “point[ing]
to her vagina.” Although K.Z. could not identify the day this happened, Cummings
understood that the assault occurred in the house. Leticia Sprinkle, the registered nurse
who examined K.Z. the day she was brought to the hospital, also testified that K.Z. made
similar statements during the examination. Furthermore, K.Z. indicated to Sprinkle that
Abundiz kissed her genitalia and mouth with his lips and tongue, but not her breasts. K.Z.
denied penetration and other sexual acts, but she said “it was wet” when she was asked
how she knew Abundiz used his tongue. Based on her examination, Sprinkle believed that
the assault happened a few days prior.

                                              5
                                        No. 22-50697

         In response to the Government’s motion in limine and over Abundiz’s
objections, the district court admitted this evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 413 (“FRE 413”). First, the district court determined that FRE
413 authorized this testimony as evidence of “any other” prior sexual assault
admissible under the rule. Under FRE 413, “[i]n a criminal case in which a
defendant is accused of a sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that
the defendant committed any other sexual assault.”5 “Sexual assault”
includes a crime under federal or state law involving “any conduct prohibited
by 18 U.S.C. chapter 109A.”6 Because Abundiz was charged under 18
U.S.C. § 2241(c), which falls within 18 U.S.C. chapter 109A, the court
concluded that Rosalva and Maria’s testimony fell squarely within the Rule’s
ambit.

         _____________________
         5
             Fed. R. Evid. 413(a).
         6
             Fed. R. Evid. 413(d)(1).
         7

                                             6
                                No. 22-50697

                    C. Kathleen Fronczak Testimony
       Kathleen Fronczak, an FBI task force officer, appeared on behalf of
the Government and testified that the FBI flagged Abundiz one year earlier
after his name matched the physical mailing address associated with an IP
address that had shared child pornography files. After K.Z.’s mother
reported the assault, Fronczak interviewed Abundiz at a hospital, where he
was staying due to a COVID-19 exposure. Abundiz waived his Miranda rights
and told Fronczak that K.Z. told her mother he “kissed her upstairs in his
bedroom.” Abundiz “explained that he didn’t know why she had said
something like that, that he thought maybe she was mad at him . . . because
she had been punished earlier in the day for misbehaving, and he had laughed
at her.” Abundiz also “couldn’t advise how she would get an idea to say
something like this or would even know to say something like this.”
       Abundiz also admitted to Fronczak that he had previously
downloaded child pornography using the UTorrent network, which was the
same software used by the IP address that shared child pornography in 2019.
Specifically, Abundiz recalled downloading a large file with a bunch of
smaller files in it and explained that he would search for material using the
terms “CP” (child pornography) and “PTHC” (pre-teen hard core). He also
said he downloaded content such as “The Anarchist Cookbook,” “anime,”
and “videos of animals and children being killed” and that he believed he
would one day be caught and go to jail because of the child pornography.
       Under Federal Rule of Evidence 414, the district court admitted
Fronczak’s testimony regarding the FBI’s child pornography investigation as
well as her statements that Abundiz admitted to accessing child

                                      7
                                           No. 22-50697

pornography.8 Rule 414 permits courts “[i]n a criminal case in which a
defendant is accused of child molestation” to “admit evidence that the
defendant committed any other child molestation” for “any matter to which
it is relevant.”9

                                                                  The court admitted
Fronczak’s testimony after finding that the probative value of testimony
regarding Defendant’s possession of child pornography was not
“substantially outweighed by undue prejudice or any of the other concerns
in Rule 403.”
                                  D. Jury Instructions
       This Circuit has yet to adopt a FRE 413 and FRE 414 pattern jury
instruction. As a result, the district court crafted its own, declining to adopt
the exact instructions used by the Ninth or Eighth Circuits that the
Government suggested, modeling its instructions on those of the Eighth
Circuit.10
       _____________________
       8
           See infra Section III.B.

       9
           Fed. R. Evid. 414(a).
       10
            The final instruction read:

       PREVIOUS ACTS                  OF    SEXUAL        ABUSE   AND   CHILD
       PORNOGRAPHY
       You have heard evidence that the defendant may have committed other
       offenses of sexual abuse and downloading of child pornography and child
       sexual abuse material. The defendant was not convicted of any of these

                                                8
                                        No. 22-50697

        On April 1, 2022, the jury found Abundiz guilty, and the district court
sentenced him to life in prison, five years of supervised release if he were to
be released, and a $100 special assessment.
        Abundiz timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
                                             II.
        Abundiz contends the district court erred by allowing K.Z. to testify
via CCTV. We find no error.
                                             A.
        First, Abundiz argues that allowing K.Z. to testify via CCTV violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as outlined in Crawford v.
Washington. This issue is reviewed de novo and rejected by this Court.11

        _____________________
        offenses. The defendant is not charged with any of these offenses. You may
        consider the evidence of any of these offenses only if you unanimously find
        that the offense or offenses you are considering is more likely true than not
        true of having occurred.

        You decide that by considering all of the evidence of the given offense and
        deciding whether it is more likely than not to have occurred. This is a lower
        standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.
        You must disregard the offense or offenses you find to have not been
        proved as stated in the previous paragraph. The offense or offenses that
        you find to have been proved as previously stated, can be considered by
        you in deciding any matter for which you find them relevant.
        11
           United States v. Cotto-Flores, 970 F.3d 17, 39 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing United States
v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2004)); United States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d
555, 558 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause [of the Sixth Amendment] are reviewed
de novo, but are subject to a harmless error analysis.”) (alteration and emphasis in original).

                                              9
                                          No. 22-50697

        The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
confront witnesses who testify against them.12 However, the Supreme Court
has recognized several exceptions to the right to physically confront
witnesses.13 Relevant here, the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig held:
        [I]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state
        interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of
        testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to
        justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child
        witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the
        absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant. 14
        Following Craig, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b) to “specify[]
the procedures to be used in federal courts to allow a child victim to testify
via [CCTV].”15 Of note, § 3509(b) permits 2-way CCTV under certain

        _____________________
        12
             U.S. Const. amend. VI.
        13
          See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (former testimony of
unavailable witness); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (hearsay exceptions); Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183–84 (1987) (hearsay statements of nontestifying
coconspirators); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1970) (trial judge may remove
defendant from courtroom for disruptive behavior). As the Bourjaily Court explained:
        While a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use
        of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this
        Court has rejected that view as “unintended and too extreme.” Rather, we
        have attempted to harmonize the goal of the Clause—placing limits on the
        kind of evidence that may be received against a defendant—with a societal
        interest in accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-
        court statements.
        Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted).
        14
             Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).
        15
             United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 1993).

                                               10
                                       No. 22-50697

circumstances, providing a greater ability for defendants to confront
witnesses than the Craig Court, which upheld the use of 1-way CCTV.16
        In 2004, the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington held that
testimonial out-of-court statements by witnesses are barred by the
Confrontation Clause unless the witness is otherwise unavailable and the
defendant had a previous opportunity for cross-examination.17 Abundiz
argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford “conflict[s]” with
Craig—and presumably by extension, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)—and that
“various courts and scholars have struggled to reconcile Craig with the
Court’s subsequent holding in Crawford.” Abundiz’s argument reduces to
his contention that “given Crawford’s protections, it’s just a matter of time
before a clash between the two makes its way to the Supreme Court.”
        Abundiz provides no supporting citations for these assertions but
properly concedes that “Crawford did not overturn Craig” and that “Craig
governs this case.”18 He has also failed to elaborate on how having a child
testify in real time, subject to cross-examination, via CCTV in response to
expert findings that she is likely to be traumatized, conflicts with Craig. Nor
has Abundiz explained how this situation differs from other exceptions to the

        _____________________
        16
            Compare Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (“So long as a trial court makes such a case-
specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a State from using
a one-way closed circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony by a child witness
in a child abuse case.”), with 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(A) (“In a proceeding involving an
alleged offense against a child, the attorney for the Government . . . may apply for an order
that the child’s testimony . . . be televised by 2-way closed circuit television.”).
        17
           Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“[T]he common law in 1791
conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior
opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those
limitations.”).
        18
         See United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 492 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring)
(“Crawford did not overturn Craig.”).

                                             11
                                            No. 22-50697

Confrontation Clause that the Supreme Court and all Circuit Courts have
repeatedly upheld.19
                                                 B.
          Second, Abundiz argues that the district court failed to make the
requisite factual findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b). Section 3509(b) “sets
forth the conditions under which a child may testify by closed-circuit
television.”20 Specifically, it provides that “[i]n a proceeding involving an
alleged offense against a child, the attorney for the Government . . . may
apply for an order that the child’s testimony be taken in a room outside the
courtroom and be televised by 2-way closed circuit television.”21 If the court
finds, inter alia, that “[t]he child is unable to testify because of fear” or
“[t]here is a substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that the
child would suffer emotional trauma from testifying” in open court, then
“[t]he court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by closed-
circuit television.”22 Accordingly, Abundiz argues the district court failed to
find on the record that K.Z. would be unable to testify in open court because
of either fear or a substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that
she would suffer emotional trauma.23
          Whether the district court’s relevant factual findings under
18 U.S.C. § 3509 were supported by evidence in the record is reviewed for

          _____________________
          19
               See supra note 13.
          20
               Cox, 871 F.3d at 484 (citing United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 898 (6th Cir.
1998)).
          21
               18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(A).
          22
               18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii).
          23
           At oral argument, Abundiz appeared to concede this issue; but to the extent he
does not, this Court rejects the argument.

                                                     12
                                        No. 22-50697

clear error, although whether such factual findings are “sufficient to permit
the use of closed-circuit television testimony” is a legal question reviewed de
novo.24 Upon review, this Court finds no error.
        As described supra Section I.A.1, the district court held a pre-trial
hearing, heard expert testimony on this issue, and concluded K.Z. would be
unable to testify in open court because there was a substantial likelihood she
would suffer emotional trauma if forced to do so. Dr. Lubit testified that it
was “too anxiety provoking” for K.Z. to discuss the assault one-on-one with
him and that K.Z. repeatedly expressed she would be “quite afraid if she had
to see [Abundiz].” Lubit testified that K.Z. was afraid to see Abundiz in the
courtroom and that “if she had to talk about it, she would even be worse.”
Lubit opined that K.Z. would be “so flooded with anxiety, that she would not
be able to” testify in court, and that her fear would, “to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty . . . prevent her from being able to testify.” Lubit further
explained that in-court testimony would “re-traumatize her,” “deepen the
trauma she has,” and cause “betrayal trauma”; moreover, Lubit said the risk
of trauma was substantially more likely if K.Z. testified in front of Abundiz
than apart from him. Finally, Lubit explained that courtroom
accommodations would not reduce the risk of trauma and that K.Z. would
still be “traumatized and very, very anxious.”
        After hearing from Lubit, the district permitted K.Z. to testify via
CCTV given her “tender age,” “[t]he combination of the time elapsed since
the incident and the facts and circumstances leading to the incident,” and

        _____________________
        24
           Cotto-Flores, 970 F.3d at 39 (citing Turning Bear, 357 F.3d at 735–36); Turning
Bear, 357 at 735–36 (“The district court was required to make certain findings in order to
permit [the child victim] to testify by closed-circuit television. Whether the district court’s
relevant factual findings were supported by evidence in the record is reviewable under the
ʻclearly erroneous’ standard . . . .”).

                                              13
                                       No. 22-50697

“what has transpired since the incident.” Then, the court confirmed on the
record        that    these       findings        supported       its     ruling      under
18 U.S.C. § 3509(1)(B)(ii). Finally, the judge limited his ruling so that K.Z.
would be the only witness allowed to appear on camera to avoid any
“misapprehensions, misperceptions, or any presumption of guilt.”
         The district court’s findings are plausible, supported by Lubit’s
testimony, and stated on the record. Abundiz’s argument fails.25
                                             III.
         Abundiz contends the district court erroneously admitted evidence
regarding prior sexual assaults and his possession of child pornography.26 We
find no error.
                                             A.
         Abundiz argues the district court erred in admitting Maria and
Rosalva’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 413 for two
reasons. First, Abundiz contends the testimony was unfairly prejudicial
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Second, Abundiz claims the district
court improperly admitted the testimony as evidence of his character without

         _____________________
         25
            There is little precedent in this Court addressing the requirements under
18 U.S.C. § 3509, but the district court’s findings comport with those of other circuits. See,
e.g., United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 2019) (in dicta, describing
that an expert witness with extensive experience in assessing trauma in sexually abused
children forming an individualized opinion that a child victim would suffer trauma from
testifying in front of the defendant would be a sufficient factual finding to support use of
CCTV under §3509(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
         26
           Although Abundiz’s briefs refer to “two” prior sexual assaults—of both Maria
and Rosalva—a review of the record shows that Rosalva and Maria testified about
Abundiz’s abuse of Rosalva during his youth. As a result, this Court will consider only
allegations of Rosalva’s sexual assault.

                                             14
                                       No. 22-50697

making on-the-record findings regarding the alleged assaults. We reject both
arguments.
        1. Relevancy and Prejudice
        The district court admitted Maria and Rosalva’s testimony pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence 413. Abundiz argues that this testimony should
not have been admitted because it lacked probative value and was unfairly
prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. As Abundiz preserved this
argument, we review for an abuse of discretion subject to a harmless error
analysis.27 “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an
error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 28 However,
an evidentiary error may “be excused if it was harmless, particularly if there
is ʻother overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.’”29
        Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, relevant evidence is generally
admissible unless otherwise provided by the federal Constitution, statute, or
the Federal Rules of Evidence.30 Although Rule 404(b) prohibits otherwise-

        _____________________
        27
           United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Escalante–Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Girod, 646
F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“[F]or any of the evidentiary rulings to be reversible error, the admission of the evidence
in question must have substantially prejudiced Sanders’s rights.”).
        28
            United States v. Caillier, 80 F.4th 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing United States
v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 239–40 (5th Cir. 2005)).
        29
          United States v. Nguyen, 504 F.3d 561, 571 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.
Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1992)) (cleaned up).
        30
         Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.

                                             15
                                           No. 22-50697

relevant “propensity” evidence,31 FRE 413 provides a “broad exception” to
FRE 404(b) and expressly allows the admission of character and propensity
evidence in sexual assault cases to prove a defendant acted in conformity with
that character.32 Nevertheless, evidence admitted under FRE 413 remains
subject to FRE 403’s balancing test under which a “court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”33 Unfair prejudice may be “mitigated by the
district court’s careful instruction to the jury” that the defendant is on trial
only for the charged crimes, not for the other conduct, act, or offense.34
Ultimately, it is a “rare case” that would “warrant[] reversal of a district
court’s Rule 403 analysis.”35

        _____________________
        31
          “Propensity” evidence refers to “evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act
[admitted] to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
        32
           Fed. R. Evid. 413(a) (“In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a
sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual
assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”); United
States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Congress intended to expand the
admissibility of character or propensity evidence relating to sexual assault by creating a
broad exception to the prohibition in Rule 404(b).”).
        33
             Fed. R. Evid. 413; Fed. R. Evid. 403.
        34
             United States v. Lewis, 796 F.3d 543, 548 (5th Cir. 2015).
        35
             Id. (citing Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387). In Dillon, this Court stated:
        A district court’s determination under Rule 403 with respect to whether
        the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger
        of unfair prejudice is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard but,
        at least generally, with “an especially high level of deference to” the
        district court, with reversal called for only “rarely and only when there has
        been a clear abuse of discretion.”
Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

                                                 16
                                        No. 22-50697

        After reviewing the record, we find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. First, Abundiz argues that
Maria and Rosalva’s testimony lacked probative value and was not relevant
to the case at hand because Rosalva’s alleged assaults were remote in time
and “unadjudicated.”36 The district court disagreed and in doing so,
explained its application of the Rules of Evidence to the facts.

                                                                            The district
court appropriately found that Rosalva’s alleged assaults need only be
relevant to be admissible under FRE 413; Abundiz did not need to be
formally charged or convicted for the conduct to be admissible. The court
found the evidence regarding a defendant’s “history of allegations of sexual
assault” probative “in a trial for aggravated sexual abuse” and not
“substantially outweighed by the concerns in Rule 403.”
        We agree and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the testimony probative and relevant. An “alleged sexual assault does
not need to have been identical” to the charged sexual assault for it “to be
admissible, but aspects of the assault must have sufficient probative value as
to some element of the charged offense to not be substantially outweighed by
its danger of unfair prejudice.”37 Rosalva’s testimony that Abundiz raped her
as a child speaks to Abundiz’s tendency to commit sexual assault generally,
and with children and family members specifically. Maria’s testimony
corroborates Rosalva’s account. And statements by Abundiz’s counsel at
trial—notably, that “there is great similarity” between the “prior acts” and
“the act charged”—refute Abundiz’s current argument that the assaults are
        _____________________
        36
           Abundiz also objects on the grounds that the assault occurred within the context
of “child abuse and unlawful status.” However, he failed to elaborate on this argument.
        37
             Dillon, 532 F.3d at 389.

                                             17
                                       No. 22-50697

too dissimilar to offer value. Finally, because part of Abundiz’s defense was
that K.Z. misidentified the perpetrator, this evidence that he committed
previous sexual assaults is particularly probative. 38
        Abundiz’s second argument—that the testimony was unfairly
prejudicial—fares no better. While Maria and Rosalva’s testimony may be
prejudicial, “prejudice” is not enough: Rule 403 only prohibits evidence
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.39 Abundiz’s only contention regarding unfair prejudice is that
“the admission of this kind of evidence caused undue prejudice with the jury
who was likely moved with undue passion and emotion to punish the
appellant.”
        That the district court “took great care in weighing the evidence of”
additional alleged assaults and “admitted [only] those that it determined to
be relevant” supports the conclusion that it appropriately exercised its
discretion.40 Specifically, the district court declined to admit “additional
evidence relating to Abundiz[’s] abuse of [Maria]” in part because it did not

        _____________________
        38
          Although the district court did not expressly address Abundiz’s arguments that
the assaults were “unadjudicated” or “undermined by the underlying parental child
abuse,” the court sufficiently justified its ultimate ruling and implicitly addressed
Abundiz’s objections.
        39
             Fed. R. Evid. 403.
        40
           Dillon, 532 F.3d at 391 (“[The district court] held that their testimony would
have been unfairly prejudicial because those two alleged sexual assaults were remote in time
and dissimilar in their commission to the charged offenses. The district court took great
care in weighing the evidence of all these prior sexual assaults. It admitted those that it
determined to be relevant, and it excluded those that it determined to be unfairly
prejudicial. In making these decisions, we are unable to conclude, under the applicable
standard of review, that the district court abused its discretion.”).

                                            18
                                      No. 22-50697

comply with Rule 403.41 In short, the district court did not blindly admit all
evidence of prior sexual incidents but carefully considered the admissibility
of each instance under the appropriate legal standards. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Maria and Rosalva’s
testimony.42
        2. FRE 104(b)
        Second, Abundiz argues that the district court erred in admitting
Maria and Rosalva’s testimony because it did not “make a preliminary
finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant committed the other act and that it constituted an ʻoffense
of sexual assault’ for purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 413.”43 He also appears to
suggest that the district court was required to make this finding on the record.
        While Abundiz objected to the want of a “probable cause finding”
before the district court, he did not reference Federal Rule of Evidence 104
or the correct “preponderance of the evidence” standard applicable to
whether uncharged acts under FRE 413 may be submitted to the jury.44

        _____________________
        41

        42
           Further, without the evidence relating to Maria and Rosalva, the trial would have
been little more than “a swearing match between K.Z. and Abundiz, which is a primary
reason Rules 413 and 414 were enacted.” See Guidry, 456 F.3d at 502–03 (“Because sexual
assault allegations are often reduced to a swearing match, Congress aimed to assist the fact
finder’s assessment of credibility through allowing evidence of the defendant’s extrinsic
sexual misconduct as character or propensity evidence.”).
        43
         On appeal, Abundiz uses both “probable cause” and “preponderance of the
evidence” language to describe his objections.
        44
           Fed. R. Evid. 104; Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387 (describing that the preponderance
of the evidence standard applies to evidence proffered under Rule 413).

                                            19
                                          No. 22-50697

Because Abundiz’s objections below did not put the district court on
sufficient notice of his claim, we review for plain error.45
        Federal Rule of Evidence 104 requires courts to decide preliminary
questions about whether evidence is relevant and admissible. 46 Under Rule
104(b), “[w]hen the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists,
proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does
exist,” but courts are permitted to preliminarily admit the evidence, so long
as the required proof is introduced later.47 In certain instances, courts are
required to conduct a hearing on a preliminary question, but there is
otherwise no requirement that a district court make “on the record” findings
regarding preliminary issues.48 Moreover, this Court has held:
        To be admissible under Rule 413, the uncharged “offense of
        sexual assault” need not be established by a conviction . . . but
        the district court must make a preliminary finding that a jury
        could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that
        the defendant committed the other act and that it constituted
        an “offense of sexual assault” for purposes of Rule 413. 49

        _____________________
        45
          Because Abundiz cited the wrong standard in his objection below, he likely did
not provide the district court with sufficient notice of his claim and, as such, did not
preserve the error. See Lewis, 796 F.3d at 545 (“To preserve error, an evidentiary objection
must ʻstate[ ] the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context.’”) (citation
omitted) (alteration in original). Furthermore, the record indicates that the district court
did not address his concern, increasing the likelihood that Abundiz failed to sufficiently
apprise the court of his objection. See id. at 546 (ruling that plain error review applied when
defendant argued before the district court that FRE 413 evidence should not be admitted
because it was intrastate and not interstate but on appeal, defendant argued the same
evidence should not have been admitted for a different reason).
        46
             Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
        47
             Fed. R. Evid. 104(b).
        48
             Fed. R. Evid. 104(c).
        49
             Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387 (internal citations omitted).

                                               20
                                       No. 22-50697

        Thus, although the district court made no on-the-record findings
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) that the alleged assaults
occurred, the failure was not plain error. To start, Rule 104(b) does not on its
face require an explicit finding, nor does Abundiz offer case law suggesting
otherwise. Instead, the text of Rule 104(b) merely requires the existence of
“proof” that is “sufficient to support a finding” that the incident occurred.
Here, the district court made implicit findings that the assaults took place
when it found the allegations probative.
        More telling is the district court’s instruction to the jury that it “may
consider the evidence of any of these offenses [FRE 413 and FRE 414
evidence] only if you unanimously find that the [prior] offense or offenses
you are considering is [sic] more likely true than not true of having
occurred.” As a result, the absence of an express finding under FRE 104(b)
by the district court was not plain error: the court implicitly made the Rule
104(b) finding and cured any potential error by jury instruction.50
                                             B.
        We turn next to Abundiz’s argument that it was unfairly prejudicial
for the district court to admit evidence that Abundiz possessed child
pornography under FRE 414, which “in a criminal case in which a defendant
is accused of child molestation, [allows] the court [to] admit evidence that
the defendant committed any other child molestation.” 51 In particular, the
district court admitted Abundiz’s statements to FBI Agent Fronczak as well
as the results of an independent FBI investigation showing that a device with

        _____________________
        50
           Moreover, Abundiz does not claim the Court should exercise its discretion due
to a serious effect on “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
See Escalante–Reyes, 689 F.3d at 419 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
        51
             Fed. R. Evid. 414(a).

                                             21
                                          No. 22-50697

an IP address linked to his mailing address shared such materials. Before the
district court, Abundiz objected to this evidence on the basis that his
statements to Fronczak were involuntary. He has abandoned this argument
on appeal and instead argues that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.
Because his prejudice argument was not made below, this Court reviews the
objection for plain error and finds none.
         As a threshold matter, Abundiz gives this issue little attention,
devoting only two lines of his brief to arguing the evidence was prejudicial
because “he was convicted and received a life sentence.” 52 He does not
explain how this evidence was unfairly prejudicial as required under FRE
403. Finally, even assuming some error, Abundiz presents no argument that
the error was clear or that it affected his substantial rights. We find no plain
error.
                                               IV.
         Finally, Abundiz contends the jury instructions regarding evidence
admitted under FRE 413 and 414 were erroneous because they “did not
clearly state how the jury would use all of the 413/414 evidence,”
“confuse[d] the standard of proof required to convict,” and “g[a]ve the jury
the ability to convict using a ʻlower standard’ of proof.” 53

         _____________________
         52
              Abundiz argues:
         Even if Fed. R. Evid. 414(a) allows [the evidence] in as a similar act of child
         molestation, the prejudicial effect when combined with the R.H. and M.R.
         testimony cannot be overstated. In fact, there is no way to quantify the
         prejudice this admission caused the appellant’s right to a fair trial other
         than he was convicted and received a life sentence.
         53
              Abundiz sufficiently preserved this objection.

                                               22
                                        No. 22-50697

       We review this challenge for an abuse of discretion.54 When
considering whether a jury instruction was supported by the evidence, this
Court “view[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.”55
Erroneous jury instructions are considered harmless if a court, “after a
ʻthorough examination of the record,’ is able to ʻconclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the
error.’”56
       Upon review, Abundiz’s arguments are unpersuasive. The district
court appropriately exercised its discretion to draft jury instructions57 as this
Circuit does not have pattern jury instructions for FRE 413 and FRE 414
evidence. And more to the point, the district court’s instructions were
       _____________________
       54
            United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 504 (5th Cir. 2008).
       55
            United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
       56
          United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999)).
       57
       PREVIOUS              ACTS      OF    SEXUAL      ABUSE      AND      CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
       You have heard evidence that the defendant may have committed other
       offenses of sexual abuse and downloading of child pornography and child
       sexual abuse material. The defendant was not convicted of any of these
       offenses. The defendant is not charged with any of these offenses. You may
       consider the evidence of any of these offenses only if you unanimously find
       that the offense or offenses you are considering is more likely true than not
       true of having occurred.
       You decide that by considering all of the evidence of the given offense and
       deciding whether it is more likely than not to have occurred. This is a lower
       standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.
       You must disregard the offense or offenses you find to have not been
       proved as stated in the previous paragraph. The offense or offenses that
       you find to have been proved as previously stated, can be considered by
       you in deciding any matter for which you find them relevant.

                                              23
                                         No. 22-50697

sufficient and do not indicate clear, reversible error. The court modeled the
language from the Eighth Circuit’s pattern instructions but modified them in
three major ways: (1) removing the word “believable” from the fourth line;
(2) repeating the preponderance standard to avoid reducing the standard of
proof for prior act evidence; and (3) removing language suggesting specific
ways that the jury could use the evidence to avoid “nudg[ing]” the jury.58 As

       _____________________
       58
            The Eighth Circuit’s pattern instructions stated:
       2.08A DEFENDANT’S PRIOR SIMILAR ACTS IN SEXUAL
       ASSAULT AND CHILD MOLESTATION CASES (FED. R. EVID. 413
       AND 414)
       You [are about to hear] [have heard] evidence that the defendant may have
       previously committed [another] [other] offense[s] of [sexual assault] [child
       molestation]. The defendant is not charged with [this] [these] other
       offense[s]. You may consider this evidence only if you unanimously find it
       is more likely true than not true. You decide that by considering all of the
       evidence and deciding what evidence is more believable. This is a lower
       standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find that [this
       offense has] [these offenses have] not been proved, you must disregard [it]
       [them]. If you find that [this offense has] [these offenses have] been
       proved, you may consider [it] [them] to help you decide any matter to
       which [it is] [they are] relevant. You should give [it] [them] the weight and
       value you believe [it is] [they are] entitled to receive. You may consider the
       evidence of such other act[s] of [sexual assault] [child molestation] for its
       tendency, if any, to show the defendant’s propensity to engage in [sexual assault]
       [child molestation] [.] [, as well as its tendency, if any, to [determine whether the
       defendant committed the acts charged in the Indictment] [determine the
       defendant’s intent] [determine the identity of the person who committed the
       act[s] charged in the Indictment] [determine the defendant’s (motive) (plan)
       (design) (opportunity) to commit the act[s] charged in the Indictment]
       [determine the defendant’s knowledge] [rebut the contention of the defendant
       that [his] [her] participation in the offense[s] charged in the Indictment was the
       result of (accident) (mistake) (entrapment)] [rebut the issue of __________
       raised by the defense].] Remember, the defendant is on trial only for the crime[s]
       charged. You may not convict a person simply because you believe [he] [she] may
       have committed similar acts in the past.

                                                24
                                     No. 22-50697

modified, the district court appropriately informed the jury that evidence
admitted under FRE 413 and 414 may be used for any relevant purpose only
if it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. As drafted, the
instructions track the language of the Rules of Evidence and do not
improperly suggest how the jury should use the evidence.59
        Contrary to Abundiz’s assertions, the instructions do not allow the
jury to convict using a lower standard of proof, nor do they confuse the
preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt standards. And although the
instructions do not specifically instruct the jury on how to use the evidence,
they need not do so because the Federal Rules of Evidence permit juries to
use the evidence for any relevant purpose. In short, as the Government
argues, “[t]he district court’s thoughtful consideration of how to craft this
jury instruction in the absence of a pattern instruction was well-balanced and
aimed to ensure that the jury followed the law regarding consideration of the
Rule 413 and 414 evidence;” there was no abuse of discretion.
                                          V.
        The district court properly allowed K.Z. to testify via CCTV and did
not err in admitting testimony of Abundiz’s previous sexual assault or in
crafting jury instructions about using evidence admitted under FRE 413 and
414. We AFFIRM.

        _____________________
Manuel of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit
§2.08A (2021) (emphasis added only on parts removed or changed when comparing this
instruction to the district court’s instruction in this case.)
        59
             Fed. R. Evid. 413; Fed. R. Evid. 414.

                                          25