Court Opinion

ID: 9756869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:05:54.470633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:29.453370
License: Public Domain

*169OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN, Justice.
Appellant, Michael G. Blouse, was apprehended at a roadblock on State Route 216 in York County. The roadblock was authorized and conducted by the Penn Township Police Department. Its purpose was to detect license, registration and equipment violations. Appellant was subsequently convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension.
Appellant now appeals from an order of the Superior Court, 390 Pa.Super. 650, 561 A.2d 816, affirming the judgment of sentence of the Common Pleas Court of York County imposing a fine of two hundred dollars for operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension.
At issue is the constitutionality of systematic, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary roadblocks for the purpose of insuring safety on our highways by disclosing registration, licensing and equipment violations. We believe that systematic roadblocks are constitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that the balancing of interests approach is the appropriate method for determining reasonableness under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
It is undisputed that the stopping of an automobile and the detention of its occupants is a seizure subject to constitutional restraints. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” In order to determine the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure a balancing analysis is utilized, wherein the intrusion on the individual of a particular law enforcement practice is balanced against the government’s promotion of legitimate interests. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); United States v. *170Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116; Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). A central concern in balancing the opposing interests is protecting the individual from arbitrary invasions at the unfettered discretion of the officers in the field. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d at 362.
In Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987), we expressly approved the balancing of interests approach in limited situations.1 We concluded in Johnston that, in the canine sniff search situation, the balancing of interests tipped in favor of the government, and permitted the search even though based on less than probable cause. The systematic roadblock situation is one of the few situations worthy of the balancing of interests approach to determine the reasonableness of a seizure based on less than probable cause. The balancing of the need to seize against the invasion which the seizure entails is appropriate in this type of situation, because the probable cause requirement would be wholly inadequate to satisfy the goal sought to be achieved, and there is no other way to obviate this type of harm.
In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987), in the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, the plurality upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint roadblocks carried out in compliance with prescribed guidelines. To reach that result, the plurality applied the balancing of interests approach and concluded that the minimal intrusion on the individual was outweighed by the compelling public interest in apprehending drunk drivers. The plu*171rality, however, concluded that the police exceeded their authority as delegated by the legislature in conducting the roadblock in question. Although only one justice joined the Tarbert opinion in full, it is clear that of the six who participated, four expressed the view that systematic roadblocks are constitutional.2 Therefore, Tarbert provides significant authority for this case.
In applying Tarbert to the case sub judice, the rationale behind upholding the constitutionality of drunk driving roadblocks applies equally to all systematic roadblocks, where the compelling interest of the state in protecting its citizens from harm, i.e. the mass carnage that results from unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles occupying the road, outweighs the privacy interests of the individual. In this case, the state has a vital interest in maintaining highway safety by ensuring that only qualified drivers are permitted to operate motor vehicles, and that their vehicles operate safely, thus assuring that dangerous drivers as well as dangerous automobiles are kept off the road. The intrusion upon the individual is minimal where the roadblock is conducted in accordance with specific enumerated guidelines, eliminating the discretion that is problematic in random traffic stops. Lastly, the risk of detection, both actual and perceived, will provide an effective deterrent to Motor Vehicle Code violations. To this end, Sergeant Gilbert testified that during the three hour period that the roadblock was conducted, 27 violations were detected, thus evidencing the advancement of the legitimate interests it was *172designed to serve (N.T. 3/23/88, p. 45). In this type of case, the public interest cannot be met by less intrusive means, because traditional law enforcement procedures, such as stops based on a probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard, are incapable of detecting status offenses as opposed to observable offenses.
In Tarbert, the following guidelines were suggested by the plurality to ensure constitutionality under the Pennsylvania Constitution:
[T]he conduct of the roadblock itself can be such that it requires only a momentary stop to allow the police to make a brief but trained observation of a vehicle’s driver, without entailing any physical search of the vehicle or its occupants. To avoid unnecessary surprise to motorists, the existence of a roadblock can be so conducted as to be ascertainable from a reasonable distance or otherwise made knowable in advance. The possibility of arbitrary roadblocks can be significantly curtailed by the institution of certain safeguards. First the very decision to hold a drunk-driver roadblock, as well as the decision as to its time and place, should be matters reserved for prior administrative approval, thus removing the determination of those matters from the discretion of police officers in the field. In this connection it is essential that the route selected for the roadblock be one which, based on local experience, is likely to be travelled by intoxicated drivers. The time of the roadblock should be governed by the same consideration. Additionally, the question of which vehicles to stop at the roadblock should not be left to the unfettered discretion of police officers at the scene, but instead should be in accordance with objective standards prefixed by administrative decision.
Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 293, 535 A.2d at 1043.
Substantial compliance with the guidelines is all that is required to reduce the intrusiveness of the search to a constitutionally acceptable level. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 293, 535 A.2d at 1043.
In response to the guidelines set forth in Tarbert, the legislature amended 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) to provide:
*173(b) Authority of a police officer. — Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. As amended 1983, July 22, P.L. 122, No. 32, § 4, imd. effective; 1985, June 19, P.L. 49, No. 20 § 10, effective in 60 days.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).
The roadblock in this case was carried out pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). We now adopt the guidelines set forth in Tarbeii, because they achieve the goal of assuring that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. See, Brown v. Texas, supra. Applying the guidelines set forth in Tarbert to the present case, we conclude that the roadblock in question was conducted in a constitutionally acceptable manner. The police shift commander testified that the roadblock was conducted pursuant to a written departmental policy. (N.T. 3/23/88, p. 5). In accordance with this policy, the shift commander authorized the roadblock in question. At the scene of the roadblock, warning flares were placed in both directions and every car in both directions was stopped. The decision where to place the roadblock was based on the large number of license, equipment and inspection violations which were detected during evening hours while carrying out other routine stops. (N.T. 3/23/88, p. 9-10). Based upon the foregoing, the roadblock was conducted in substantial compliance with the Tarbert guidelines, and thus, in a constitutionally acceptable manner under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
We conclude, therefore, that systematic, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary roadblocks are constitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution and that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b), authoriz*174ing such roadblocks, does not offend our constitution. Since the roadblock in question was conducted in accordance with the guidelines prescribed in Tarbert, it was carried out in a constitutionally acceptable manner. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins this opinion and files a concurring opinion.
FLAHERTY, J., files a dissenting opinion joined by ZAPPALA and CAPPY, JJ.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion joined by FLAHERTY and CAPPY, JJ.

. In Johnston we held that, when determining whether there was a search, the balancing of interests approach was appropriate only in cases "analytically similar to Terry ”. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. at 463, 530 A.2d at 78. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). We found that the circumstances of the canine sniff search in that case lacked the exigencies of Terry and therefore, the balancing test was inappropriate to determine whether there was a search. But once we concluded that a search had occurred, we found "the balancing inquiry appropriate to determine whether this particular kind of search in these circumstances necessarily implicates the full-blown warrant requirements of other police searches". Johnston, 515 Pa. at 464, 530 A.2d at 79. Thus, we approved the balancing approach as a measure of the reasonableness of a particular search.

. Mr. Justice McDermott joined Chief Justice Nix in Announcing the Judgment of the Court. Mr. Justice Papadakos, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the conclusion that non-discriminatoiy, systematic roadblocks by the police under well-defined parameters are constitutional, but declined to join the opinion because he believed the Court should not have addressed the constitutional issues. It is clear from my dissenting opinion in Tarbert that I agreed with the plurality’s finding concerning the constitutionality of systematic roadblocks. Mr. Justice Flaherty concurred in the result without explanation. Mr. Justice Zappala filed a concurring opinion in which he found the roadblocks unconstitutional because conducted without probable cause. The views of Chief Justice Nix, Mr. Justice McDermott, Mr. Justice Papadakos and myself, as expressed in the Tarbert decision are evidence of this Courts willingness to uphold the constitutionality of systematic roadblocks.