Court Opinion

ID: 9909844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 15:06:13.24149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:58.500946
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0698-22

M.J.S.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.R.A.S.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided December 14, 2023

                   Before Judges Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County,
                   Docket No. FV-01-0565-23.

                   Tonacchio, Spina & Compitello, attorneys for appellant
                   (Ciro A. Spina, of counsel; Stephen R. Cappetta, on the
                   brief).

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1
 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the victim in these proceedings.
R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
      Defendant C.R.A.S. appeals from the October 27, 2022 final restraining

order (FRO) entered against her under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act

(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant argues the Family Part judge

erred in finding plaintiff M.J.S. had demonstrated the predicate act of

harassment and that the FRO was necessary to ensure his future protection. Our

review of the record demonstrates the judge's findings are supported by

sufficient credible evidence. We affirm.

                                      I.

      The parties were married for eighteen years and had three children. The

parties separated in May 2019 and divorced in April 2022. They shared joint

custody of their minor children with a fifty-fifty parenting time arrangement.

      On October 16, 2022, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order

(TRO) after filing a domestic violence complaint alleging defendant committed

a predicate act of harassment.     Concomitantly, defendant applied for and

received a TRO. On October 27, following a trial, plaintiff was granted an FRO

against defendant, but defendant's application for an FRO was denied. On

appeal, defendant challenges only the issuance of plaintiff's FRO.

      During the trial, the parties testified to a long history of acrimony and

contentiousness. They had filed multiple prior domestic violence complaints

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against each other. Prior to the time of trial, they had entered into a consent

order imposing mutual civil restraints.

      Plaintiff testified that defendant had sent multiple disturbing text

messages ridiculing his girlfriend and threatening him.        At trial, the text

messages were introduced without objection and stated in pertinent part:

            This is my final request . . . [t]hat . . . you have your
            boyfriend remove the pictures that ha[ve] my children
            on her public profile and remove our children from her
            Facebook profile. Otherwise, I'll remove my children
            from your life. There is no lie in the fact that your
            boyfriend publicly posted our children, and I asked you
            to remove it. Instead[,] your boyfriend decided to make
            it personal with me. I don't care that you have a
            boyfriend. You shouldn't be embarrassed by that.
            Having said that, in order for it to be a defamation it
            would have to harm her financially, and since this is a
            private message between a mother and a father, the
            mother which is trying to protect her children from your
            predatory boyfriend, I don't believe that it falls in the
            category of defamation, but she can give it a shot if she
            wants. Then there's always the truth that is the defense.
            It's okay for her to be a transvestite, but that doesn't
            mean that I have to like or act like she's not.

      Plaintiff testified that although he found the text messages "harassing," he

sought the restraining order after his daughters told him to review his Yelp and

Facebook pages and he discovered a damaging review. Plaintiff owned a karate

school and believed his Yelp page was relevant to his business. He believed

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defendant created the review, which accused him of being a "sexual predator."

The review provided:

            Parents beware with your daughters. The owner,
            [M.J.S.] will enroll your child when they are a baby and
            when that baby turns of legal age he will sleep with her,
            proven in court documents by the young lady where he
            sued someone for making true statements. It's called
            grooming.

Plaintiff testified the review was so concerning that he contacted Yelp to remove

it, but learned it was a "process" and it took "a week" to remove. He relayed

people inquired about the review, and he was concerned with the number of

people who might have read it.

      Plaintiff asserted he knew defendant left the review because she used an

account under the name "Colleen . . . ," which she had also used for a review on

her friend's business's page in Pennsylvania.     During cross-examination of

plaintiff, defendant posed, "you had a relationship with a person who was now

a young adult, early [twentie]s, that you had trained from the age of five?" and

then volunteered to the judge the information was the truth. Defendant admitted

to leaving a review on her friend's business's page but denied leaving the review

on defendant's page, claiming it was not from her phone and her account was

hacked. Defendant maintained, "if [plaintiff was] accusing [her] of slander," the

review was "a true statement."

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      In his TRO complaint, plaintiff indicated there was an extensive history

of domestic violence. He testified, without objection, to multiple prior incidents

in which defendant allegedly: "hit [him] with [a] car"; "forged [his] name on a

life insurance policy which gave her ownership of [his] policy"; attempted to

"set [his] truck on fire"; "burn[ed] all [his] clothes, and . . . punched [him] in the

face"; and tried to hit him "with a fire poker." Both parties claimed issues with

tracking on their children's iPhones' "location sharing" and "Find My iPhone"

features.

      After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the judge issued

an oral decision, finding plaintiff had proven, by a preponderance of the

evidence, the predicate act of harassment. The judge further found that an FRO

was necessary to protect plaintiff from immediate or future acts of domestic

violence.

      On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred by issuing the FRO given that

plaintiff failed to establish that she committed a predicate act of harassment, and

failed to articulate an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of

domestic violence. After our review of the trial testimony, the judge's findings,

and the applicable law, we find no merit to defendant's arguments.

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                                        II.

      Our review of an FRO issued after a bench trial is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H.,

463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). In reviewing "a trial court's order

entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial

deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based

upon those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 312-13 (App. Div.

2023) (alteration in original) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205,

215 (App. Div. 2015)). Trial court findings are "binding on appeal when

supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J.

Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12

(1998)). "We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court

because the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears

them testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in

evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)

(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412).

      We do not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless they are "so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant [,] and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." S.D. v.

M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417. 429 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at

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412). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely

hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the differe nce

between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise.'" C.C., 463

N.J. Super. at 428 (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). However,

we review de novo a trial judge's legal conclusions. C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at

429.

       The New Jersey Legislature enacted the PDVA "to assure the victims of

domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide."

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. The PDVA protects victims of domestic violence, which

include, among others, persons who have been "subjected to domestic violence

by a . . . former spouse." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super.

208, 219-20 (App. Div. 2017) (recognizing the amended definition of "[v]ictim

of domestic violence" evinced "the Legislature's intent to broaden the

application" of the PDVA).

       The entry of an FRO under the PDVA requires the trial judge to make

certain findings pursuant to a two-step analysis delineated in Silver v. Silver,

387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006).         Initially, "the judge must

determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible

evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)

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has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). The judge is also

required to consider "any past history of abuse by a defendant as part of a

plaintiff's individual circumstances and, in turn, factor that history into its

reasonable person determination." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 403. "'A single act can

constitute domestic violence for the purpose of the issuance of an FRO,' even

without a history of domestic violence."       C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 434-35

(quoting McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. Super. 502, 506 (App. Div. 2007)).

Second, if a predicate act is proven, the judge must determine whether a

restraining order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from immediate harm or

further acts of abuse. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. A previous history of

domestic violence between the parties is one of six non-exhaustive factors a

court is to consider in evaluating whether a restraining order is necessary to

protect the plaintiff. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1); see also D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467

N.J. Super. 308, 324-25 (App. Div. 2021) (holding whether a judge should issue

a restraining order depends, in part, on the parties' history of domestic violence).

      Harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, is a predicate act of domestic violence

enumerated under the PDVA. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c), a person

commits an act of harassment

            if, with purpose to harass another, he:

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                                         8
                  [(a)] Makes, or causes to be made, one or more
                  communications anonymously or at extremely
                  inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse
                  language, or any other manner likely to cause
                  annoyance or alarm;

                        ....

                  [(c)] Engages in any other course of alarming
                  conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with
                  purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other
                  person.

To commit harassment, a defendant must "act with the purpose of harassing the

victim." D.M.R., 467 N.J. Super. at 323. "'A finding of purpose to harass may

be inferred from the evidence presented' and from common sense and

experience."   Ibid. (quoting H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003)).

"Although a purpose to harass can be inferred from a history between the parties,

that finding must be supported by some evidence that the actor's conscious

object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might be alarmed

or annoyed is insufficient." J.D., 207 N.J. 487. A judge must consider "the

totality of the circumstances to determine whether the harassment statute has

been violated." H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 326 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404).

                                      III.

      Guided by these standards, we discern no basis to disturb the judge's entry

of an FRO against defendant. In concluding that defendant committed the

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                                       9
predicate act of harassment under the first Silver prong, the judge found "pretty

horrific texts or at least harassing texts," and noted that while plaintiff was

testifying about the messages, defendant was "smiling and smirking." Although

the messages were troubling, the judge found "most concerning . . . th[e]

[review] on Yelp, which [he] believe[d] 100 percent [defendant] did." The

review was deemed "damaging" and "dangerous" to plaintiff's business, and

defendant's harassment "ha[d] to be addressed."        Specifically, in his oral

decision, the judge had cited to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, referencing the language

under subsection (a) and finding that defendant had made "unwanted

communications" through "text applications," which were "annoying and

alarming." The judge's finding that defendant committed the predicate act of

harassment is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.

      Relevantly, the judge made ample credibility findings.           Plaintiff's

testimony regarding the text messages and Yelp review was deemed credible

based on his "good demeanor," "even tone," and "eye contact."         Regarding

defendant's credibility, she was observed to have "made good eye contact," but

spoke over plaintiff "a few times," had "contradictions" in her statements, and

was "completely unbelievable" at times.         The judge specifically found

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defendant's explanation regarding the Yelp review, that her phone and account

were hacked, incredible as "[defendant] flat out didn't tell the truth."

      Defendant's assertion that the Yelp review was "an isolated act" based on

mere "circumstantial evidence," which did not sufficiently support a finding that

she committed a predicate act of domestic violence, is unavailing. The judge

based the harassment finding on both the Yelp review and defendant's

"unwanted communications." Further, he concluded that defendant "absolutely"

did not act with "any other purpose" other than to "harass and humiliate and

embarrass, which was both annoying and alarming." We defer to the judge's

findings "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of

credibility." MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412).

      With respect to the second Silver prong, the judge found the FRO was

necessary to protect plaintiff from "immediate danger," "further abuse," and

future harm. The parties acknowledged a long history of prior complaints and

relevantly, at the time of trial, the parties had agreed to mutual civil restraints.

With this background established, the judge noted "when the dust was settled,"

defendant "went out of [her] way to publicly humiliate" plaintiff and found he

could not "allow" her "conduct to continue." The judge determined the FRO

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                                        11
was necessary for plaintiff's protection. We are satisfied the credible evidence

in the record supports the judge's decision.

      To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining arguments lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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