Court Opinion

ID: 9824759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:19:18.312135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:27.303762
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
It is urged on this application that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the state to introduce evidence of other forgeries and the uttering of those similar to the one described in the indictment. In the original opinion we did not pass upon that question, as we did not think the ruling of the court could have affected the result of the trial. However, evidence of this character is always admissible in prosecutions for forgery and uttering forged instruments for the purpose of showing the intent with which the act charged was committed. Kirby v. State, 16 Ala. App. 467, 79 So. 141; McDonald v. State, 83 Ala. 46, 3 So. 305; Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247, 84 Am. Dec. 782.
It is now insisted that there is no evidence that the bill of lading, the basis of the prosecution, was not signed by one of the clerks named by the witness Lowery as having authority to sign the same. Lowery testified that “it [the signature] did not look like it.” This in effect was testimony to the best of his opinion, and no objection was interposed to Lowery as a qualified witness. Again this witness testified unqualifiedly that the signature on the bills of lading for 78 bales of cotton was not his, nor any of the parties named by him as having authority to sign the same. This paper being in evidence was there for comparison of handwriting and was evidence from which the court or jury might form a conclusion as to the genuineness of the signature on the alleged forged instru-ment. Williams v. State, 20 Ala. App. 337, 104 So. 38; Code 1923, §§ 7705, 7707; Ingram v. State, ante, p. 182, 106 So. 393.
It was shown by the witness Lowery that he had issued and signed for the railroad company bills of lading for cotton similar in mark, description, and number of bales; that these bills of lading had been surrendered to the delivery carrier at point of destination upon delivery of the cotton described and by the delivering carrier these genuine bills of lading were delivered to the issuing carrier; that they were now in the offices of these carriers beyond the state; and that he knew the facts because he had seen the bills of lading on the files in Savannah, Ga., and West Point, Ga., and was testifying from “what those original bills of ladings showed.” The original 'bill of lading being beyond the jurisdiction of the court and collateral to the issue, secondary evidence of the contents was admissible. Allen v. State, 79 Ala. 34; Griffin v. State, 129 Ala. 92, 29 So. 783. Moreover, even with this evidence eliminated, there would still remain the forgery by the defendant of what purported to be a contract by which a right or interest in 22 bales of cotton would if genuine have been transferred, conveyed, or changed or affected; the uttering of this forged instrument upon which, together with other instruments of like kind, defendant obtained a large sum of money from the Fourth National Bank on drafts secured by the forged instruments; that the drafts were not paid and “no such cotton as that sent.” The proper predicate fojr a confession having been laid to the witness Rossell, there was evidence of a confession by the defendant that the bills of lading were forgeries; that the cotton described had been delivered to the mills on original bills of lading and paid for weeks before. None of this evidence was denied, nor was there any evidence tending to prove any fact which would in any way tend to show an honest intention in the whole transaction. The defendant offered no testimony.
Forgery, under section 4121 of the Code of 1923, is: “Any person who, with intent to injure or defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, counterfeits,” * * * certain instruments being or purporting to be the act of another or who utters same, etc., is guilty of forgery in the second degree. That the defendant did falsely make or forge this bill of lading and that he did utter it is not denied. The only question left is, did he intend to defraud? It is a maxim of the law too well understood to admit of doubt that the defendant intended the natural consequences of his act. The law is not divine. It cannot look into a man’s heart and tell what his motives are or what he intends except by what he does: “It is not what goeth into a man which defileth him, but what cometh out.” 1-Ie did forge the paper, he did defraud. The law, therefore, in the absence of proof to the contrary, must presume that he intended to forge, utter, and defraud.
Intent is a necessary ingredient of every offense involving moral turpitude, and this criminal intent is usually to be proven *479only by tbe acts of tbe defendant. It is true tbe jury must believe the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but the doubt, if any, must have a legal basis. It must not be capricious and without legal foundation. In this case there was no other conclusion to be drawn than that defendant intended the natural consequences of his act.
The application is overruled.