Court Opinion

ID: 9621172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:52:39.921253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:41.792500
License: Public Domain

Judge CRISWELL
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The trial court here required defendant to register with local law enforcement agencies, to undergo a sex offender treatment plan, and to pay a sex offender surcharge. Each of these requirements is governed by a separate statutory provision, and those provisions are not uniform in their application to offenders. Consistent with the explicit terms of each of these statutes, I conclude that, while the court properly required defendant to register with local law enforcement authorities, as required by § 18-3-412.5, C.R.S.1998, it improperly required her to undergo the treatment prescribed by § 16-11.7-101, et seq., C.R.S.1998, or to pay a sex offender surcharge under § 18-21-103, C.R.S.1998. Hence, I concur with the majority in reversing the surcharge requirement. I disagree with the majority, however, that defendant was properly ordered to undergo evaluation or treatment as a sex offender.
1. The Registration Requirement
Section 18-3 — 412.5 requires persons who are convicted of “unlawful sexual behavior” to register with local law enforcement agencies; the substantive terms of this statute make no reference to a “sex offender.” Section IS — 3—412.5(l)(b)(I) through (XXIII), C.R.S.1998, adopts its own definition of unlawful sexual behavior for this purpose. Under this definition, a conviction of any one or more of some 20 specified offenses, or of any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of those offenses, constitutes unlawful sexual behavior. Among the convictions itemized are those for sexual exploitation of children, soliciting for child prostitution, and pandering of a child.
In addition, however, § 18-3-412.5(l)(b)(XXIII), C.R.S.1998, is specific in also classifying as unlawful sexual behavior:
Any offense that has & factual basis of one of the offenses specified in [the earlier portions of § 18-3-412.5(l)(b) ]. (emphasis supplied)
In addition, § 18-3^12.5(l)(b), C.R.S.1998, is also specific in requiring the registration of any person convicted in Colorado on or after July 1, 1994:
of an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior or for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior_(em-phasis supplied)
Under the specific terms of this statute, therefore, if the factual basis for the conviction of any offense involves circumstances that would constitute a violation of one or more of the statutes referred to in § 18-3-412.5(l)(b)(I) through (XX), the conviction will be considered one for “unlawful sexual behavior,” irrespective whether the actual conviction is for violation of one of the referenced statutes or some other offense.
Here, defendant was ndt convicted of any of the specific statutes referred to in § 18-3-412.5(l)(b). However, it is undisputed that the factual basis for the offense to which she pleaded guilty involved a violation of one or more of those statutes. Hence, under the specific terms of this statute, defendant’s conviction was for unlawful sexual behavior, and she was required to register according to its terms.
*9412. The Treatment Requirement
Sections 16-11.7-101, et seq., C.R.S.1998, is the statute that adopts a comprehensive program for the evaluation and treatment of all “sex offenders.” It was originally adopted in 1992, see Colo. Sess. Laws 1992, ch. 86 at 455, et seq., and has' not been amended in any manner material to this dispute since that time.
This statute contains an explicit definition of “sex offense,” § 16-11.7-102(3)(a) through (f), C.R.S.1998, that refers to the same 20 statutes to which § 18-3-412.5(b)(I) through (XX) of the registration statute refers. However, unlike the registration statute, this treatment statute does not make an offense not enumerated in its definition a “sex offense” merely because the factual predicate for that offense may demonstrate the violation of one of thosé statutes. Under this treatment statute, a sex offense is only an offense described in one or more of the 20 specific statutes referred to in its definition of that term.
Likewise, this statute’s definition of “sex offender” differs substantially from the registration statute’s description of the persons to whom that statute applies. Under § 16-11.7-102(2), C.R.S.1998, a sex offender is either:
— a person convicted after July 1, 1994, of one of the specific offenses described; or
— a person convicted of “any criminal offense, if such person has previously been convicted of a sex offense” as described in § 16-11.7-102(3), or “if such person has a history of any sex offenses as defined in [§ 16-11.7-102(3) ].” (emphasis supplied)
The majority and I agree that defendant has never been convicted of a “sex offense” under this statute. Nor does she have a “history” of any such offenses, as those terms are generally understood and defined in this treatment statute. The majority says, however, that the term “history” is ambiguous because the phrase, “history of sex offenses,” could refer either to “convictions for - one or more enumerated sex offenses” or as including “the underlying circumstances of the [present] offense.” I disagree.
The majority and I apparently agree that a statute must be interpreted in accordance with the common and ordinary meanings placed upon the words used by it. See People v. Valencia, 906 P.2d-115 (Colo.1995). Indeed, the General Assembly itself has commanded that statutory “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to ... common usage.” Section 2-4-101, C.R.S.1998.
Further, -a criminal defendant’s “history” - has acquired a common meaning and is used to distinguish between the events underlying the present offense and events occurring in the defendant’s past before commission of the offense giving rise to his or her present ■conviction. See ABA Criminal Sentencing Standards, Standard 18-3.13(d)(3d ed.1994) (restrictions on probation must bear “reasonable relationship to the individual’s current offense and criminal history” (emphasis supplied)); People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030 (Colo.1998) .(referring to circumstances surrounding offense and defendant’s criminal, history in the disjunctive); St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028 (1997) (same); People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315 (1997) (same).
I cannot agree, therefore, that the term “history” is in any manner- ambiguous. Hence, any reference to legislative history to aid in the construction of.this term is both unnecessary and inappropriate. See Anderson v. Watson, 953 P.2d 1284 (Colo.1998); In re Marriage of Pickering, 967 P.2d 164 (Colo.App.1997).
I do note, in passing, that the term “offenses” as used here may be ambiguous because it may refer to a history of prior convictions or merely to a history of prior violations from which no convictions resulted. Here, however, any such ambiguity is irrelevant because defendant has a history of neither.
I am fortified in my conclusion upon this subject by the specific provisions of the registration statute reviewed above. That statute was adopted before the treatment statute, see Colo. Sess. Laws 1991, ch. 69 at 393, et seq., but it has been amended to adopt the present definition of “unlawful sexual behavior” only recently. See Colo. Sess Laws *9421998, eh. 139 at 389, et seq. The registration statute clearly addresses the issue presented here by the use of precise language, and that language demonstrates that the General Assembly knows how to make a statute applicable to the circumstances here if it chooses to do so.
In contrast, no similar language can be found in the treatment statute. And, while I might wish that the General Assembly had defined “sex offenders” under the treatment statute to include the same persons who are required to register under the registration statute, I am unable to conclude, as does the majority, that the absence of language in the treatment statute evidences an intent to include the language to be found in the registration statute.
3. The Surcharge Statute
Section 18-21-103, C.R.S.1998, levies a surcharge upon a person convicted of a “sex offense,” which bears the same meaning for this purpose as is to be found in the treatment statute, § 16-11.7-102(3).
The majority concludes that, while defendant is a “sex offender” under § 16 — 11.7— 102(2), she did not commit a “sex offense” under § 16-11.7-102(3). Hence, the majority holds that the trial court erred in imposing the sex offender surcharge upon her.
Although I do not employ the majority’s analysis, I agree that defendant did not commit a sex offense under § 16-11.7-102(3). Hence, I also agree with the majority that the imposition of a surcharge upon her was improper.
In summary, then, while I conclude that § 18-3-412.6 requires defendant to register, I also conclude that neither the treatment statute, § 16-11.7-102(3), nor the surcharge statute, § 18-21-103, applies to defendant, and I therefore dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion.