Court Opinion

ID: 9477855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:33:08.159055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:05.424872
License: Public Domain

KEARSE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result and in much of the reasoning of the majority opinion but write separately principally to emphasize what I believe need not be litigated with respect to certain issues on remand. As the majority opinion notes, in December 1983, Farid obtained a judgment against Smith in state court “holding (1) that Farid was entitled to possession of the Tarot materials; (2) that the ‘policies and practices’ denying him the materials were unconstitutional; and (3) enjoining Smith from interfering with Farid’s efforts to obtain the materials.” Ante at 920. Apparently there is no question that the same policies are at issue here, for the latest alleged deprivation occurred in August 1984, and Smith’s brief on appeal states that the policies in effect in 1982-*9271984 were revised in November 1984. Thus, the state court judgment has a number of res judicata effects for the present action.
First, to the extent that Farid here seeks a declaratory judgment that the policies are unconstitutional or seeks equitable relief with respect to the Tarot materials, his claim is precluded. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18 (1982). He has litigated these rights and obtained a judgment; if the rights already recognized have not been honored, his proper recourse is to return to state court and seek enforcement of his judgment, not to seek a new judgment to the same effect in federal court.
Second, to the extent that Farid seeks damages, his present claims are not barred by the state court judgment because that judgment was obtained in an Article 78 proceeding, in which the state court lacked the plenary power to award damages. See N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. 7806 (McKinney 1981); Schwab v. Bowen, 41 N.Y.2d 907, 908, 394 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617, 363 N.E.2d 341 (1977); Leisner ¶. Bahou, 97 A.D.2d 860, 861, 469 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (3d Dep’t 1983), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 985, 475 N.Y.S.2d 282, 463 N.E.2d 623, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087, 105 S.Ct. 595, 83 L.Ed.2d 704 (1984). Since the power to award damages was limited, Farid did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate damages claims, and the state court judgment does not preclude their litigation in this action. See Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.1986).
Third, even with respect to Farid’s claims for damages, the state court judgment holding these policies unconstitutional precludes relitigation of the issue of the constitutionality of the policies. The district court is required to give effect to the state court’s ruling that they are unconstitutional. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (judgments of a state court “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State”); Petrella v. Siegel, 843 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.1988); see Smith v. Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 192-93, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71, 429 N.E.2d 746 (1981).
Finally, though the December 1983 state judgment is not res judicata as to damages issues other than the constitutionality of the policies, two facts make that judgment quite significant with respect to any assertion by Smith in the present case of a defense of qualified immunity from an award of damages. Such a defense must be rejected if the defendant’s action violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The facts that the judgment (a) was against Smith and (b) held unconstitutional the very policies at issue here would seem to be a clear impediment to any grant of immunity.