Court Opinion

ID: 9530394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:29.829411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:05.965522
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.—I dissent.
In my opinion, the majority’s reversal of the decree cannot be reconciled with Van Strien v. Jones, 46 Cal.2d 705 [299 P.2d 1] ; Estate of Fernstrom, 157 Cal.App.2d 380 [321 P.2d 25], and the cases cited therein.
In Van Strien, this court said at page 707: “It is well settled that where in a will a testator’s child is intentionally omitted or given $1.00 or any other sum, section 90 of the Probate Code is satisfied although the child is not mentioned by name. (Estate of Minear, 180 Cal. 239 [180 P. 535] ; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238 [168 P. 113] ; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287 [142 P. 838] ; Estate of Doell, 113 Cal.App. *2552d 37 [247 P.2d 580].) The use of such terms as ‘relatives’ and ‘children’ have been held sufficient to designate heirs who might otherwise be pretermitted (Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20 [239 P. 406] ; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645 [34 P. 513] ; cf. Estate of Utz, 43 Cal. 200), but such generalities as ‘anyone who may contest this will’ and ‘any other person’ do not include heirs otherwise pretermitted (Estate of Price, 56 Cal. App.2d 335 [132 P.2d 485]; Estate of Cochran, 116 Cal.App. 2d 98 [253 P.2d 41]).”
This court there recognized that the general language of a simple “no-contest” clause, such as “anyone who may contest this will” or “any other person,” is insufficient to satisfy section 90 of the Probate Code. On the other hand, this court further recognized that an affirmative expression of intention to disinherit, or to leave a nominal amount to, all other persons, known or unknown to the testator, who might claim to be his “relatives” or “heirs,” is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of said section.
In the present case, the will of the testator clearly and affirmatively manifested his intention to disinherit, except to the extent of a nominal sum of one dollar, “any person or persons who may . . . assert any claim to share my estate by virtue of relationship or otherwise. ...” (Emphasis added.) This is not a simple “no-contest” clause but, on the contrary, the clause clearly shows the testator’s intention to disinherit, except to the extent of one dollar, any person who might assert a claim by reason of being a relative of the testator. Such a clear and unambiguous expression of the testator’s intention should suffice. (Van Strien v. Jones, supra, 46 Cal. 2d 705; Estate of Trichett, 197 Cal. 20 [239 P. 406] ; Estate of Minear, 180 Cal. 239 [180 P. 535] ; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238 [168 P. 113] ; Estate of Fernstrom, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d 380; Estate of Allmaras, 24 Cal.App.2d 457 [75 P.2d 557] ; Estate of Lombard, 16 Cal.App.2d 526 [60 P.2d 1000].)
Under the cited authorities, the fact that the testator combined the disinheritance clause with a “no-contest” clause appears immaterial. Furthermore, the fact that the testator declared in clause “Second” of his will that he had no issue of a second marriage but made no reference to a prior marriage or issue thereof tends to defeat rather than to support appellant. In Estate of Fernstrom, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d 380, the court said at page 385 that “the rule is settled that when a testator has declared in his will that he intends to omit all heirs not therein provided for, such declared intention and *256purpose will be given effect and it is immaterial whether the testator knew of the existence of the particular claimant or whether the particular claimant was in the testator’s mind. In the Allmaras, Lombard and Minear eases, it appeared from the wills involved that the testators did not have the unsuccessful claimants in mind, for, in each of those cases, as in the instant case, the testator declared that he had “no children.” If a testator’s erroneous statement in his will that he has no children does not vitiate the effect of a general disinheritance clause, a fortiori, a correct statement, such as made by the testator here, that he has no children by a particular marriage should not do so. Moreover, the very limitation by the testator of clause “Second” to a denial of issue of his second marriage clearly indicates the testator’s recognition of the possible existence of issue of a prior marriage to whom the disinheritance clause was particularly intended to apply.
In the light of the cited authorities and the clear expression of the testator’s intention in his will, I am of the opinion that the trial court properly ruled, as a matter of law, that appellant was not entitled to share as a pretermitted heir.
I would affirm the decree.
Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 22, 1960, Schauer, J., and Me Comb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.