Court Opinion

ID: 9828502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:26:45.763314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:49.863891
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The members of this court have reviewed the record in the light of the argument of the attorneys for the parties, and have reached the conclusion, as before, that the appellant cannot be held personally liable for the debt sued upon. The appellant was acting as agent merely, and the liability insurance was arranged for and taken out at the instance and for the benefit of the Easter Warehouse Company, known to the agent of appellee. Such intention of the parties is manifest, and as between themselves is controlling. Therefore the motion for rehearing will be overruled. , .
As the original opinion is not sufficiently definite, and may be misleading as to the precise point of ruling, we incline to explain and limit the ruling as applicable to the present case. We sustained, as we do now, the assignment of error quoted in the original opinion. The suit was brought for the purpose of charging the appellant .for the balance of unpaid premiums on a policy of liability insurance issued by appellee. There was no express agreement to pay premiums. The appellant pleaded and offered evidence for the purpose of showing that he was not personally bound to pay the premiums, and had acted in arranging for liability insurance as agent merely for the Kent H. Easter Warehouse Company, a corporation, who was the principal known to the agent of appellee. The appellee claimed that the appellant was not an agent, and could not be legally held to be an agent, but an' independent contractor, and that the indemnity insurance was for his benefit as an independent contractor, and because thereof he was personally liable for the premiums. In our opinion, the evidence established the contention of appellant, and judgment was in this court directed in his *697fayor. The following inaptly appears in the opinion:
“Assuming the appellant might be held liable as an independent contractor as to third parties for tort (Edmondson v. Coco-Cola Co. [Tex. Civ. App.] 150 S. W. 273),” etc.
It was not intended to hold that appellant was an independent contractor, and that the ease referred to was decisive of, or similar to, the present case. The distinction between the two cases is of marked character. In that case Arthur Tufts was to erect the building and to be paid therefor “the total cost of the building, plus 10 per cent.” Tufts, and not the owner of the building, “was to furnish and to pay out of his own money, in the first instance, for the materials and labor. In the present case the appellant was to be paid for his services as superintendent of the construction “10 per cent.” of the cost of construction. He was not to furnish and pay for any materials and labor. The Easter Warehouse Company was to provide and pay, in the first instance, out of its own money, “for all materials and labor.” While appellant was given the choice of employees, and given the authority to discharge if not satisfactory to him, as incidental to the duties of superintendent, he was not capable of contracting with reference to the work, except in the capacity of agent. He was not the employer that must indemnify .the injured workman. He had no specific interest in the contract independently of his service. He was to furnish nothing but his services. He incurred no liability for material and wages of the workmen. He had the right to cease his services should he so desire. The contract imports a hiring for the duration of the erection of the building, unless the appellant is guilty of some breach of duty warranting his discharge. Therefore the evidence does not conclusively show, as urged by appellee, that appellant was in the relation of independent contractor, and nowise in the relation of principal and agent, entirely negativing and disproving the defense in the case.