Court Opinion

ID: 9891783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 17:06:13.71603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:24.945116
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/19/23 In re W.T. CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re W.T., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                         E080473
          Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                         (Super.Ct.No. J290557)
 v.
                                                                         OPINION
 W.T.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Tony Raphael,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Elana

Miller, Deputy Attorney Generals, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Defendant and appellant W.T. (Minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s

postjudgment order denying Minor’s motion to dismiss his petition under Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 782. For the reasons set forth post, we affirm.

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.     PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On September 14, 2021, a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and

Institutions Code section 602(a) charged Minor with robbery under Penal Code section

211, a felony (count 1), and violation of civil rights under Penal Code section 422.6,

subdivision (a), a misdemeanor (count 2).

       On October 8, 2021, two additional felony counts were added to the petition:

(1) count 3—grand theft person under Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c); and

(2) count 4—assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury under Penal Code

section 245, subdivision (a)(4). Minor admitted to counts 3 and 4 and the court dismissed

counts 1 and 2. The juvenile court found Minor came within section 602 of the Welfare

and Institutions Code, and declared Minor a ward of the court. The court then placed

Minor in the custody of his mother with 19 days credit for time served. The court also

placed Minor on formal probation.

       On October 11, 2022, the probation department filed a report stating that Minor

had satisfactorily completed probation. Minor moved for the juvenile court to reduce his

       1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

                                             2
felonies to misdemeanors under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). The People

objected.

      On November 15, 2022, Minor filed a motion requesting the court reduce his

adjudications for grand theft person under Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c) (count

3), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury under Penal Code section

245, subdivision (a)(4) (count 4), from felonies to misdemeanors under Penal Code

section 17, subdivision (b)(3). The People filed a response in opposition to Minor’s

motion.

      On November 30, 2022, the juvenile court stated that it had “read and considered

probation non appearance review packet dated 10/11/2022. Defense motion for PC 17(B)

and People’s response.” Thereafter, the court found that Minor had satisfactorily

completed probation and continued the matter to January.

      At a hearing on January 4, 2023, the juvenile court ordered Minor’s formal

probation terminated. At the same hearing, the court heard Minor’s (1) Penal Code

section 17 motion to reduce his felonies to misdemeanors; and (2) Welfare and

Institutions Code section 782 motion to dismiss Minor’s petition that Minor’s counsel

filed on the day of the hearing. The juvenile court denied both motions.

      Minor filed a timely notice of appeal from the “[d]enial of defense motion under

. . . Section 782 to dismiss and seal record. Motion took place on January 4, 2023.”

      B.     FACTUAL HISTORY

      On September 11, 2021, the victim was walking from his car to visit a friend when

he noticed three male suspects. The suspects attempted to intimidate the victim and

                                            3
prevented him from getting back into his car. One of the suspects was later identified as

Minor. The victim “begged” the suspects to let him go, and told them that he was

“underage.” As the victim tried to run, Minor punched the victim in the face from

behind. Another suspect caught the victim and pushed him into a tree. While Minor and

the other males continuously punched and kicked the victim in the face and torso, to the

point that he almost lost consciousness, they yelled derogatory terms including “faggot”

and “you’re fucking gay.” The victim was, in fact, homosexual. One of the other males

then grabbed the victim’s phone from his pocket, and they all ran away.

                                          DISCUSSION

       A.     THE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY DENIED MINOR’S MOTION TO

              DISMISS UNDER SECTION 782

       Minor contends that the juvenile court erred by denying his section 782 petition.

For the reasons set forth post, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Minor’s motion.

              1.      RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

       In relevant part, section 782 provides: “A judge of the juvenile court in which a

petition was filed or that has taken jurisdiction of a case pursuant to Section 750 may

dismiss the petition, or may set aside the findings and dismiss the petition, if the court

finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the

petition require that dismissal, or if it finds that they are not in need of treatment or

rehabilitation.” (§ 782, subd. (a)(1).)

                                               4
       Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 “is a general dismissal statute that is

similar in its operation to Penal Code section 1385. (People v. Haro (2013) 221

Cal.App.4th 718, 721; see In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 416 similar to [Welf. &

Inst. Code] section 782, Penal Code section 1385 grants trial courts the power to dismiss

a criminal action in furtherance of justice].) Indeed, the two statutes are so closely

analogous that [i]n determining whether a [Welfare and institutions Code] section 782

dismissal is in the interests of justice [citation], some courts have looked to Penal Code

section 1385 for guidance.” (In re J.P. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 74, 78, internal citations

omitted.)

       Effective January 2023, subdivision (a)(2)(A) was added to section 782: “When

exercising its discretion under paragraph (1) at the time the court terminates jurisdiction

or at any time thereafter, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence

offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present, including, but not

limited to, satisfactory completion of a term of probation, that rehabilitation has been

attained to the satisfaction of the court, that dismissal of the petition would not endanger

public safety, or that the underlying offense is connected to mental illness, prior

victimization, or childhood trauma. Proof of the presence of one or more mitigating

circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the petition.”

       A determination under section 782 is reviewed under the abuse of discretion

standard of review. (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 417.) “ ‘ “To show abuse of

discretion, the appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an

arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”

                                              5
[Citation.] Throughout our analysis, we will not lightly substitute our decision for that

rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to

support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where there is

substantial evidence to support them.’ ” (In re S.O. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 781, 786-

787.)

               2.     THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

                      DENYING MINOR’S MOTION

        In this case, Minor argues that “the juvenile court incorrectly premised its decision

on a circumstance of the offense, specifically an offense the Minor did not admit.”

        At the hearing on Minor’s Penal Code section 17 and Welfare and Institutions

Code section 782 motions, on January 4, 2023, the juvenile court asked Minor’s counsel

whether he was “asking to—on [the] one hand, in a motion under [Penal Code section]

17(b)(3), you are asking the Court to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. [¶] And now

pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 782, essentially, you’re inviting the

Court to dismiss the petition and seal the record based on the criteria and standard in

[Welfare and Institutions Code section] 782.” Defense counsel responded: “Correct.”

        The prosecutor opposed both motions. She informed the court that “minor

actually never provided a negative drug test during his period of probation,” and Minor

“was failing two of five of his classes.”

        After further argument by both the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court noted

that Minor admitted to both felony grand theft under Penal Code section 487 (count 3),

and felony assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury under Penal Code section

                                              6
245 (count 4). In exchange for Minor’s admissions, counts 1 and 2 were dismissed:

(1) second degree robbery under Penal Code section 211 (count 1); and (2) count 2 for

misdemeanor violation of civil rights under Penal Code section 422.6.             Thereafter,

the juvenile court went on to explain its reasons for denying Minor’s motion under Penal

Code section 17, which is not at issue on appeal.

       The court then addressed Minor’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code

section 783. The court first noted his decision was “subject to the court’s discretion if the

court finds that the interest of justice and welfare of the person who is the subject of the

petition require the dismissal or it finds that they are not in need of treatment and

rehabilitation.” The court recognized that the court should “give great weight in favor of

dismissing the petition when a person has satisfactorily completed the term of probation

and rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court.”

       The court then found that Minor had “satisfactorily completed a term of

probation.” However, “taking into account the circumstances of the offense, I’m not

finding that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the Court. And I don’t

find that, at this time, that the interest of justice and the welfare of the person, of the

Minor in this case, require the dismissal.”

       As for the “circumstances of the offense,” when the court made its decision on the

Penal Code section 17 petition, the court noted that “the offense in this case, which was

essentially a hate crime.” The court acknowledged that the “nature of the crime in this

case, even though it was dismissed, it was dismissed and discussed,” and the factual

                                                7
circumstances were “summarized in the JD report, along with [Minor’s] performance on

probation.”

       On appeal, Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in making its ruling on the

Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 motion because “the statute does not require a

juvenile court to consider the circumstances of the offense when deciding a [Welfare and

Institutions Code] section 782 motion.” Because “minor did not admit a violation to

Penal Code section 422.6, subdivision (a) (hate crime) . . . those facts should not have

been considered in the juvenile court’s determination.” We disagree.

       We agree with Minor that the hate crime charge was dismissed when Minor pled

guilty to the newly added counts 3 and 4. We, however, disagree with Minor that the

facts pertaining to the hate crime charge should not be considered when ruling on a

section 782 motion. In this case, the same facts formed the basis for all four counts pled

in the petition. Therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it

considered the facts that gave rise to counts 3 and 4. In fact, had the court failed to

consider these facts when ruling on Minor’s section 782 petition, such a failure could be

determined to be an abuse of discretion.

       Minor also argues that “assuming arguendo that the hate crime was allowed to be

considered, Penal Code section 422.6, subdivision (a) is not a [Welfare and Institutions

Code] section 707, subdivision (b) offense and is not considered a serious or violent

felony under Penal Code sections 667.5, subdivision (c) or 1192.8, subdivision (c).

Therefore, under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 782, subdivision (E), the ‘great

weight’ to be afforded to the minor’s mitigating factors would not be affected by the facts

                                              8
of the hate crime or any of the crimes he pled to since none of those were a violent or

serious felony.” (Fn. omitted.)

       We again find Minor’s argument to be without merit. Here, we find that the

juvenile court did give “great weight” to Minor’s mitigating factors, as required under

section 782, subdivision (a)(2)(A). As provided in detail ante, the court not only

considered Minor’s actions and involvement in the crime against the victim, the court

recognized that it should “give great weight in favor of dismissing the petition when a

person has satisfactorily completed the term of probation and rehabilitation has been

attained to the satisfaction of the court.”

       The court then found that although Minor had “satisfactorily completed a term of

probation . . . taking into account the circumstances of the offense, I’m not finding that

rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the Court. And I don’t find that, at

this time, that the interest of justice and the welfare of the person, of the minor in this

case, requires the dismissal.” The record clearly reveals that the court reviewed the facts

of this case and all the documents filed regarding the case and motion. The court

displayed genuine concern for Minor and demonstrated careful consideration at the

hearing.

       The court, after denying the motion, addressed Minor directly giving him

encouragement. The court told Minor that his ruling was “without prejudice,” and the

court wanted to see Minor “continue to do well. I’m not saying you’re not going to earn

a dismissal and sealing. I am just saying because of the nature, I want to see a longer

track record.” Minor responded, “Yes, your Honor.”

                                               9
       When reviewing a ruling on a section 782 motion, the abuse of discretion standard

of review applies. In a recent decision, this court stated: “ ‘The statutory scheme

governing juvenile delinquency is designed to give the court “ maximum flexibility to

craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before it.” [Citation.]

Flexibility is the hallmark of juvenile court law, in both delinquency and dependency

interventions. [Citation.] As noted, the juvenile court has long enjoyed great discretion

in the disposition of juvenile matters [citation], and that discretion is codified in [Welfare

and Institutions] section 782.’ ” (J.P., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 80.)

       Based on the broad powers afforded to the juvenile court and the court’s careful

consideration of Minor’s motion, we cannot say that the court “ ‘exercised its discretion

in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of

justice.’ ” (In re S.O., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 786-787.) We therefore affirm the

juvenile court’s ruling.

                                          DISPOSITION

       The juvenile court’s order denying Minor’s section 782 motion is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                          MILLER
                                                                                             J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                           Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
                                     J.

                                              10