Court Opinion

ID: 9367691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 17:07:50.599312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.782435
License: Public Domain

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                             2023 PA Super 14

 MICHELE LOFTUS AND RICHARD              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 LOFTUS, HER HUSBAND                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 KATRINA DECKER                          :
                                         :   No. 611 WDA 2021
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: EASTERN ALLIANCE             :
 INSURANCE GROUP                         :

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 23, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County
                     Civil Division at No. 11725 CD 2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS,
        J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN,
        J.

DISSENTING OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:              FILED: FEBRUARY 1, 2023

     I would conclude the facts alleged in Appellant’s petition meet the

requirements for a collateral appeal under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 313. Consequently, I am constrained to dissent.

     “In order for this Court to have jurisdiction, an appeal must be from an

appealable order.” Bogdan v. Am. Legion Post 153 Home Ass’n, 257 A.3d

751, 755 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).       The Rules of Appellate

Procedure expressly allow for the appeal of collateral orders. Id. at 755; see

also Pa.R.A.P. 313.

     Section (b) of Rule 313 defines a collateral order as an order (1)
     separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where
     (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review and (3)
     the question presented is such that if review is postponed, until
J-E02005-22

      final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost. To
      benefit from the collateral order doctrine, an order must satisfy all
      three elements. Keefer v. Keefer, … 741 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super.
      1999).

Nemirovsky v. Nemirovsky, 776 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. Super. 2001).

      The Majority concludes Appellant failed to meet the second and third

requirements of a collateral order. Reviewing only the writ of summons, the

Majority emphasizes the writ contains no statement of facts, claims, right or

prayer for relief.    Maj. Op. at 9.    According to the Majority, “without a

complaint, the record does not contain sufficient information upon which to

determine whether Appellant’s intervention is proper under the Rules of Civil

Procedure.”     Id. at 10. The Majority misapprehends the procedural posture

of this case.

      This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to intervene.

Intervention is governed by Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 2327, 2328,

and 2329. Contrary to the Majority’s assertion, the focus is not on the writ of

summons, but on the petition to intervene.

      Rule 2327 provides:

      At any time during the pendency of an action, a person not
      a party thereto shall be permitted to intervene therein, subject to
      these rules if

      (1)     the entry of a judgment in such action or the satisfaction of
              such judgment will impose any liability upon such person to
              indemnify in whole or in part the party against whom
              judgment may be entered[.]

Pa.R.C.P. 2327 (emphasis added). Rule 2329 requires:

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      Upon the filing of the petition and after hearing, of which due
      notice shall be given to all parties, the court, if the allegations
      of the petition have been established and are found to be
      sufficient, shall enter an order allowing intervention; but an
      application for intervention may be refused if

      (1) the claim or defense of the petitioner is not in subordination
      to and in recognition of the propriety of the action; or

      (2) the interest     of    the   petitioner   is   already   adequately
      represented; or

      (3) the petitioner has unduly delayed in making application for
      intervention or the intervention will unduly delay, embarrass or
      prejudice the trial or the adjudication of the rights of the parties.

Pa.R.C.P. 2329 (emphasis added).

      “In ruling on a petition to intervene, the trial court is required to

determine   whether    ‘the     allegations    of   the    petition   have      been

established’ and, assuming that they have, whether they demonstrate an

interest sufficient to justify intervention.” Bogdan, 257 A.3d at 757 (citation

omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the trial court is required to ascertain the

facts from the petition through a Rule 2329 hearing.

      The facts as alleged by Appellant in the verified petition establish all

three requirements for a collateral appeal. First, the denial of intervention to

protect Appellant’s subrogation rights is separable from resolution of any claim

the Loftuses file against the third-party tortfeasor, Katrina Decker. See, e.g.,

Bogdan, 257 A.3d at 756 (concluding underwriter’s right to intervene was

peripheral to a declaratory judgment action that would resolve coverage

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issues).    The Majority agrees Appellant established the first prong for a

collateral order. Maj. Op. at 8.

        Second, Appellant averred that its insured, the Loftuses, threatened to

abandon their existing action if Appellant did not accept less than its statutory

lien.   Intervention Petition, 2/25/21, ¶ 21; see also Pa.R.C.P. 1007(1)

(providing an action may be commenced by a praecipe for a writ of summons).

By threatening not to timely file a complaint, the Loftuses sought to coerce

Appellant to accept less than its statutory lien. Id. ¶ 21.

        A workers’ compensation carrier’s right of subrogation is protected by

statute. See 77 P.S. § 671 (“Where the compensable injury is caused in whole

or in part by the act or omission of a third party, the employer shall be

subrogated to the right of the employe[e] ….”). This Court has recognized

that the right of a workers’ compensation carrier to recover its statutory lien

from an award an employee receives in a civil suit, is too important to be

denied review. Gleason v. Alfred I. DuPont Hosp. for Children, 260 A.3d

256, 261 (Pa. Super. 2021).        Similarly, the Loftuses’ tactic of coercion to

deprive Appellant of its full statutory lien is too important to be denied

immediate review.       Id.   I would conclude Appellant met the second

requirement for a collateral order.

        Third, Appellant establishes that intervention is the sole means to

protect Appellant’s subrogation rights at this stage in the proceedings.

According to Appellant, the Loftuses threatened to abandon their existing

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action if Appellant refuses to accept less than its statutory lien. Intervention

Petition, 2/25/21, ¶ 21. It is undisputed that Appellant cannot enforce its

subrogation rights in a separate action against Decker. See Hartford Ins.

Grp. ex rel. Chen, 199 A.3d at 853 (“absent the injured employee’s

assignment or voluntary participation as a party plaintiff, the insurer may not

enforce its Section 319 right to subrogation by filing an action directly against

the tortfeasor”). See id.; see also Gleason, 260 A.3d at 261. Intervention

is Appellant’s sole means of protecting its statutory subrogation rights.

Because Appellant’s intervention petition satisfies the three requirements for

a collateral order, I would conclude the appeal is properly before us. See

Bogdan, supra.

      Regarding the merits of Appellant’s appeal, I would conclude the trial

court erred by not adhering to the Rules of Civil Procedure.        Without the

hearing required by Rule 2329 and the trial court’s issuance of findings, this

Court cannot review the propriety of intervention. Thus, I would conclude the

trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s intervention petition

without conducting a hearing. See Pa.R.C.P. 2329; see also Bogdan, 257

A.3d at 757 (“[A] question of intervention is a matter within the sound

discretion of the court below, and unless there is a manifest abuse of such

discretion, its exercise will not be interfered with on review.” (quoting Wilson

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 517 A.2d 944, 947 (Pa. 1986) (citations

and quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

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