Court Opinion

ID: 9380176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 16:01:59.895786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.101318
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 17, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                  1210384 and 1210392
                                _________________________

Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of the Estate
             of Carlos Lens Fernandez, deceased

                                                  v.

    City of Chickasaw, Michael E. Reynolds, Cynthia Robinson
              Burt, Arellia Taylor, and George Taylor

                       Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court
                        (CV-18-901354 and CV-19-903361)

STEWART, Justice.
1210384 and 1210392

     Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of the estate of

Carlos Lens Fernandez, deceased, appeals from a summary judgment

entered in two separate actions by the Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial

court") in favor of the City of Chickasaw, Michael E. Reynolds, Cynthia

Robinson Burt, Arellia Taylor, and George Taylor ("the defendants"). For

the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss appeal no. 1210384 and affirm

the judgment in appeal no. 1210392.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     According to the allegations in the complaints and the evidence

submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the summary-judgment

motions, on May 27, 2016, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Sgt. George Taylor

("Sgt. Taylor"), a police officer employed by the Chickasaw Police

Department, discovered an automobile on the shoulder of the on-ramp to

an interstate highway. Carlos Lens Fernandez ("Lens") was passed out

inside the automobile, and the automobile's engine was running. After he

failed to complete various field sobriety tests, Lens acknowledged that he

was intoxicated. Sgt. Taylor arrested Lens for driving under the influence

and, with assistance from Officer Gregory Musgrove, transported Lens to

the Chickasaw City Jail ("the jail").

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1210384 and 1210392

     At the jail, Sgt. Taylor attempted to conduct a breath test to

determine Lens's blood-alcohol level, but Lens repeatedly fell asleep or

lost consciousness. Sgt. Taylor then called Sgt. Phillip Burson into the

room to assist. Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Burson were able to conduct a breath

test on Lens, and the results of the test showed Lens's blood-alcohol level

was .12%. At approximately 3:11 a.m., Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Burson took

Lens to a jail cell and placed him on his back on a cot. Lens did not advise

Sgt. Taylor or any other person that he had any medical issues or that he

needed medical attention. According to both Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Burson,

Lens appeared to be intoxicated, and nothing about their encounter with

Lens indicated to them that Lens needed medical attention.

     Arellia Taylor ("Jailer Taylor") was the jailer/dispatcher on duty at

the time Lens was booked into the jail. Jailer Taylor wrote the following

concerning Lens on a jail log: "Need photo, medical questions & changing

out, & printing" and "Draeger .12, Unable or too intoxicated to stay up

and use phone, answer questions, get finger printed or change clothes

upon arrest." At approximately 6:00 a.m., Cynthia Robinson Burt ("Jailer

Burt") took over as the jailer/dispatcher. Because of Lens's condition and

                                     3
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apparent inability to answer questions, neither Jailer Taylor nor Jailer

Burt fully completed a medical-screening form pertaining to Lens.

     Jailer Burt checked on Lens when she first began her shift, and she

subsequently monitored Lens through a video-monitoring system. At

8:38 a.m., Jailer Burt checked on Lens, but he did not respond to Jailer

Burt's oral commands. Jailer Burt summoned Officer Robert Wenzinger

and asked him to check on Lens. Officer Wenzinger stated that, when he

checked Lens, he could not find a pulse and noticed that Lens was cool to

the touch on his arm and neck. Jailer Burt notified her supervisor of the

situation and dispatched emergency medical services. At 8:50 a.m.,

personnel with the Chickasaw Fire Department arrived at the jail and

began attempts to resuscitate Lens. Lens was pronounced dead at 9:14

a.m. Lens's autopsy report listed the cause of death as "hypertensive and

atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease."

     On May 26, 2018, pursuant to § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, Murey

commenced a wrongful-death action ("the first action") against the City

of Chickasaw ("the City"); Michael E. Reynolds, the public-safety director

for the City; Jailer Burt; and numerous fictitiously named defendants;

the first action was assigned case no. CV-18-901354. Murey also asserted

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1210384 and 1210392

various federal claims in the complaint. On June 15, 2018, the named

defendants in the first action filed a joint notice of removal to the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ("the federal

district court").

      While the first action was pending in the federal district court,

Murey filed an amended complaint in which he, among other things,

intentionally omitted the fictitiously named defendants because the

federal district court had previously indicated that it would strike those

defendants. See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir.

2010) ("As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in

federal court."). The named defendants in the first action moved for a

summary judgment. On November 26, 2019, the federal district court

entered a summary judgment in favor of those defendants on the federal

claims and dismissed Murey's state-law wrongful-death claim, over

which it had exercised supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a), without prejudice.

      On December 24, 2019, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d),

Murey commenced a second wrongful-death action in the trial court ("the

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second action"); that action was assigned case no. CV-19-903361. Section

1367(d) provides:

     "The period of limitations for any claim asserted under
     subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that
     is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the
     dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled
     while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it
     is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling
     period."

     In addition to the defendants he had named in the first action,

Murey also named Jailer Taylor and Sgt. Taylor, a married couple, as

defendants. On December 25, 2019, Murey filed in the trial court a

motion to reinstate the first action and to consolidate the second action

with the first action; the trial court granted that motion. Murey also

purported to substitute the Taylors for fictitiously named defendants

that had been designated in the original complaint in the first action.

     On January 29, 2020, the defendants filed an answer in the second

action in which they asserted various affirmative defenses. On July 9,

2020, the Taylors filed in the second action a motion to dismiss, asserting

that the claims against them were barred by § 6-5-410(d), Ala. Code 1975,

which requires wrongful-death actions to be commenced within two years

of the decedent's death, and that neither the complaint in the second

                                    6
1210384 and 1210392

action naming them as defendants nor Murey's purported substitution of

them for fictitiously named defendants designated in the original

complaint in the first action related back to the filing of the original

complaint in the first action. Murey filed a response in which he asserted

that he had properly substituted the Taylors for fictitiously named

defendants under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that

the claims against them related back to the filing of the original

complaint in the first action. On January 15, 2021, the trial court entered

an order denying the Taylors' motion to dismiss filed in the second

action.1

     On August 2, 2021, Murey filed a "first amended complaint" in both

the first action and the second action, and the defendants filed a joint

answer in both actions. Thereafter, the defendants moved for a summary

judgment. The defendants asserted that Murey's claims against the

individual defendants were barred by State-agent immunity and that the

     1The Taylors filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court
denied. Thereafter, the Taylors petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus, seeking the dismissal of the second action against them. This
Court denied the petition by an unpublished order. Ex parte Taylor (No.
1200341, Mar. 17, 2021).

                                    7
1210384 and 1210392

City was not vicariously liable. The defendants also argued that Murey

had failed to show that any act of the defendants had caused Lens's

death. The defendants later filed an additional summary-judgment

motion in which they argued that Murey's claims against the Taylors

were barred under § 6-5-410(d) because those claims had not been

asserted within two years of Lens's death. The defendants supported

their motions with, among other evidence, deposition and affidavit

testimony from the defendants, Murey's expert witnesses, and other

witnesses; copies of the jail's operations policy and prisoner-transport

policy; the autopsy and toxicology report related to Lens; the jail log

related to Lens's booking; and the written description of the City's

jailer/dispatcher job duties.

     Murey filed a response in opposition the defendants' summary-

judgment motions to which he attached, among other evidence,

deposition testimony from his expert witnesses: Dr. Thomas Shull (a jail-

administration expert), Dr. Anthony Maggio (an emergency-medicine

expert), Dr. Michael Marlin (an emergency-medicine and medical-

toxicology expert), and Ahna Stolfi (a paramedic). Murey also submitted

a State Bureau of Investigation report, other deposition and affidavit

                                   8
1210384 and 1210392

testimony, the defendants' responses to interrogatories, Reynolds's

employment contract with the City, and a prehospital-care summary

completed by Stolfi. The substance of Murey's arguments and experts'

opinions was that the defendants had negligently prevented Lens from

receiving a medical evaluation from trained medical personnel and that,

if Lens had been provided medical attention, he would have survived

because he would have been in a hospital where he could have received

close monitoring and rapid intervention.

     On January 28, 2022, the trial court entered a summary judgment

in both actions in favor of all the defendants. Murey timely filed a notice

of appeal each action. This Court consolidated the appeals.

                                Discussion

                          I. Appeal No. 1210384

     Appeal no. 1210384 is an appeal from the judgment entered in the

first action. At the outset, we must determine whether this Court has

jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the " '[l]ack of subject matter

jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties and it is the duty of an

appellate court to consider lack of subject matter jurisdiction ex mero

                                     9
1210384 and 1210392

motu.' " MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co., 78 So. 3d 391, 393 (Ala.

2011) (quoting Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d 766, 768 (Ala. 1983)).

     As mentioned earlier, the first action was removed to the federal

district court shortly after its commencement. After the federal district

court entered a summary judgment on the federal claims and elected not

to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

wrongful-death claims, it dismissed the state-law claims without

prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The federal district court did not

remand the first action to the trial court.

     Pursuant to the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, after a

defendant has effectuated the removal of an action, "the State court shall

proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." 28 U.S.C. §

1446(d) (emphasis added). This Court has previously interpreted 28

U.S.C. § 1446(d) as requiring an order of remand before a state trial court

may proceed with an action that has been removed. See Weinrib v.

Duncan, 962 So. 2d 167, 169 (Ala. 2007) (explaining that, after removal

is effectuated, a "state trial court [is] divested of jurisdiction over the

underlying case and [cannot], in the absence of an order of remand, take

any further action regarding the case. The federal removal statute is

                                    10
1210384 and 1210392

explicit on this point." (emphasis added)); King v. Landrum, 370 So. 2d

945, 947 (Ala. 1979) (relying on Doerr v. Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 106, 76

N.W.2d 505, 512 (1956), and holding that a removed "action resumed its

position as though no removal had ever been attempted upon remand to

state court" (emphasis added)); and Ex parte Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,

707 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1997) (adopting the holding in King and

recognizing that "actions taken in a state court immediately become

effective again upon remand and have the same effect as if no removal

had taken place" (emphasis added)).

     Regardless of whether the state court's jurisdiction is considered to

be "stayed" or "divested" during removal, it is clear that the federal

court's entry of an order remanding the case to the state court is required

before the state court can resume substantive action in the case. Any

action taken without a remand order is void for a lack of jurisdiction. This

holding is in keeping with decisions of other courts. See, e.g., Quixtar,

Inc. v. Campbell, 298 Ga. App. 617, 617-18, 680 S.E.2d 661, 662 (2009)

(" '[W]hen an action in a State court is removed to a Federal district court,

the jurisdiction of the State court is suspended until the case is remanded

to the State court, at which time the case resumes the status it occupied

                                     11
1210384 and 1210392

at the time of the removal.' " (citation omitted)); Musa v. Wells Fargo

Delaware Tr. Co., 181 So. 3d 1275, 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("A

'state court is allowed to resume jurisdiction of the removed case if, and

only if, the federal court grants permission by entering an order of

remand.' " (citation omitted)); Lynn v. Aria Health Sys., 227 A.3d 22, 31

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (adopting the reasoning from Fessler v. Hannagan,

144 Pa. Cmwlth. 274, 278, 601 A.2d 462, 464 (1991), and holding that a

trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's attempt to

"reinstate" a previously removed action that had been dismissed, rather

than remanded, by the federal court); Fessler v. Hannagan, 144 Pa.

Cmwlth. at 278, 601 A.2d at 464 ("There is no suggestion in [28 U.S.C. §

1446] that dismissal of the action in federal court somehow operates as

an automatic remand to the state court …."); Miller v. Equifax, Inc., 228

Or. App. 324, 208 P.3d 498 (2009) (holding that a state trial court was

without jurisdiction to consider an amended complaint filed in a

previously removed action when the federal court had dismissed, instead

of remanded, the action and that, in that scenario, the plaintiff was

required to refile the action as a new case); Willis v. Shelby Cnty. (No.

W2008-01487-COA-R3-CV, June 8, 2009) (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)

                                    12
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(unpublished opinion) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that federal court's

dismissal of a removed action operated as an automatic remand to the

state court and explaining "that a state court has no jurisdiction to

resume proceedings where a federal court, in its discretion, dismisses the

case rather than remanding it"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of

County of Santa Clara, 132 Cal. App. 3d 670, 183 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1982)

(holding that a state trial court had no power to resume proceedings via

an amended complaint purportedly filed in previously removed action

when federal court had dismissed, instead of remanded, the action); and

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Preston, 842 F.Supp. 1441, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1992)

(holding that, because a previously removed case had never been

remanded, the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the

action).

     Accordingly, because the federal district court dismissed, rather

than remanded, the state-law wrongful-death claims in the first action,

the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Murey's motion to

reinstate the first action and any other subsequent pleadings or motions

purportedly filed in that action. Therefore, any action taken by the trial

court after the removal of the first action -- including the entry of a

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1210384 and 1210392

summary judgment -- is void. " 'A judgment entered by a court lacking

subject-matter jurisdiction is absolutely void and will not support an

appeal; an appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from such

a void judgment.' " MPQ, 78 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Vann v. Cook, 989 So.

2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)). Accordingly, we dismiss appeal no.

1210384.

                         II. Appeal No. 1210392

     Appeal no. 1210392 is an appeal from the judgment entered in the

second action, which was commenced by Murey within 30 days of the

federal district court's dismissal of the state-law wrongful-death claims

in the first action. Therefore, Murey complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

See Weinrib, 962 So. 2d at 170; and Roden v. Wright, 611 So. 2d 333 (Ala.

1992). "Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for state-law

claims is tolled only when a party seeks to refile in the state court the

same state-law claims the party asserted in the federal court." Rester v.

McWane, Inc., 962 So. 2d 183, 186 (Ala. 2007). Accordingly, Murey

properly invoked the trial court's jurisdiction with regard to the second

action, insofar as that action asserts the same state-law claims that were

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asserted in the first action before the expiration of the applicable statute

of limitations.

                      A. Claims Against the Taylors

     Murey did not assert claims against the Taylors until he

commenced the second action on December 24, 2019. Lens died on May

27, 2016, and any wrongful-death claim was required to have been

asserted within two years of Lens's death. See § 6-5-410(d), Ala. Code

1975. Accordingly, Murey's claims against the Taylors are time-barred,

unless the limitations period applicable to those claims was tolled.

However, the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not apply to

circumstances in which the claims asserted in a refiled action differ from

those asserted in the dismissed federal-court action or in which the

claims are asserted against new defendants. See Rester, 962 So. 2d at

186 (holding that § 1367(d) did not apply because the claims asserted in

the federal court were different from the claims asserted in state court);

Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., Inc., 254 So. 3d 862, 872 (Ala. 2017)

(explaining that § 1367(d) was inapplicable to toll the statute of

limitations for a plaintiff's claims that were added against a new

defendant after the action was remanded from federal court because

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those claims had not been asserted at the time that the case was removed

to federal court). Our construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) is in line with

federal courts' construction of § 1367(d) as being inapplicable to claims

asserted against new defendants. See, e.g., Cooper v. City of New York

(No. 17-CV-1517 (NGG) (RLM), Aug. 5, 2019) (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (not

reported in Federal Supplement); Barnett v. Connecticut Light & Power

Co., 967 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599-600 (D. Conn. 2013), aff'd, 580 F. App'x 30

(2d Cir. 2014); and Brengettcy v. Horton (No. 01 C 197, May 5, 2006)

(N.D. Ill. 2006) (not reported in the Federal Supplement). Moreover, the

United States Supreme Court has indicated that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)

applies only to claims previously asserted against a defendant within the

applicable limitations period: "Whenever § 1367(d) applies, the defendant

will have notice of the plaintiff's claims within the state-prescribed

limitations period. Likewise, the plaintiff will not have slept on her

rights. She will have timely asserted those rights, endeavoring to pursue

them in one litigation." Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, ___,

138 S. Ct. 594, 608 (2018).

     Because Murey did not assert wrongful-death claims against the

Taylors in the first action that was removed to federal court, but, rather,

                                    16
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first asserted those claims in the second action, which was commenced

after the expiration of the two-year limitations period in § 6-5-410(d), 28

U.S.C. § 1367(d) did not apply to toll the limitations period applicable to

the wrongful-death claims against the Taylors. See Rester, 962 So. 2d at

186; Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., 254 So. 3d at 872.

     Murey also relies on relation-back principles pursuant to Rule 9(h)

and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., in arguing that his claims against the

Taylors are not time-barred because, he asserts, he substituted the

Taylors for fictitiously named defendants. Rule 9(h) permits a party who

is ignorant of the name of a defendant to instead designate a fictitiously

named defendant in its complaint and to subsequently amend the

complaint to substitute the defendant by name after its identity is

discovered. Rule 9(h) works in conjunction with Rule 15(c)(4), which

permits an amended complaint substituting a defendant for a fictitiously

named defendant to relate back to the date of the original complaint

when the plaintiff was ignorant of the defendant's identity at the time of

the filing of the original complaint and the plaintiff thereafter exercised

due diligence in discovering the defendant's identity. See Ex parte

Cowgill, 301 So. 3d 116, 123 (Ala. 2020).

                                    17
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     The Taylors were specifically named as defendants in the original

complaint filed in the second action; they were not substituted for

fictitiously named defendants against whom claims had previously been

asserted in the second action. The second action was commenced after

the expiration of the applicable limitations period. The complaint filed in

the second action cannot relate back to the original complaint filed in the

first action. Although the second action was purportedly consolidated

with the first action, consolidated actions retain their separate identities

and the parties and pleadings in each action are not merged into a single

action. Solomon v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 1211, 1222 (Ala.

2006); Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d 34, 50 (Ala. 2005); and

League v. McDonald, 355 So. 2d 695, 697 (Ala. 1978). Therefore, relation-

back principles do not apply to make timely the Murey's claims against

the Taylors.

     Because Murey's wrongful-death claims against the Taylors are

time-barred, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the

Taylors. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health

Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003) ("[T]his Court will

affirm the trial court on any valid legal ground presented by the record,

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regardless of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was

rejected, by the trial court.").

              B. Claims Against the Remaining Defendants

      We now turn to the remaining claims in Murey's appeal regarding

the summary judgment entered in favor of the City, Reynolds, and Jailer

Burt. Murey asserts that neither Reynolds nor Jailer Burt are shielded

by State-agent immunity and, consequently, that the City is likewise not

immune from suit.

      A State agent may be entitled to immunity from civil liability in his

or her personal capacity under certain circumstances. See § 36-1-12(c),

Ala. Code 1975; see also Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala.

2000) (plurality opinion) (providing restatement of the law regarding

State-agent immunity, which was adopted by a majority of the Court in

Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).

            "We note that '[i]mmunity applies to employees of
      municipalities in the same manner that immunity applies to
      employees of the State. See Ex parte City of Birmingham, 624
      So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 1993). Ex parte Cranman, [792 So. 2d 392
      (Ala. 2000),] did nothing to alter this application.' City of
      Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So. 2d 910, 916 (Ala. 2007)."

Ex parte Tucker, 303 So. 3d 467, 472 (Ala. 2019).

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     In discussing the application of State-agent immunity, this Court

recently explained:

           "In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000),
     a plurality of this Court restated the law governing State-
     agent immunity. Although Cranman was a plurality decision,
     the restatement of the law governing State-agent immunity
     set forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by a majority
     of this Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala.
     2000). In 2006, this Court, in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950
     So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006), modified category (4) of the
     Cranman restatement. Accordingly, the full Cranman
     restatement of the law governing State-agent immunity, as
     modified by Hollis, supra, is as follows:

                  " 'A State agent shall be immune from civil
           liability in his or her personal capacity when the
           conduct made the basis of the claim against the
           agent is based upon the agent's

                " '(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs;
           or

                " '(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
           administration of a department or agency of
           government, including, but not limited to,
           examples such as:

                     " '(a)  making       administrative
                adjudications;

                      " '(b) allocating resources;

                      " '(c) negotiating contracts;

                     " '(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
                assigning, or supervising personnel; or
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               " '(3) discharging duties imposed on a
         department or agency by statute, rule, or
         regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or
         regulation prescribes the manner for performing
         the duties and the State agent performs the duties
         in that manner; or

               " '(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement
         of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
         limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
         attempting to arrest persons[, or serving as peace
         officers under circumstances entitling such officers
         to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code
         1975]; or

               " '(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
         duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
         releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing
         persons of unsound mind, or educating students.

               " 'Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
         in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State
         agent shall not be immune from civil liability in
         his or her personal capacity

                    " '(1) when the Constitution or
              laws of the United States, or the
              Constitution of this State, or laws,
              rules, or regulations of this State
              enacted or promulgated for the purpose
              of regulating the activities of a
              governmental       agency       require
              otherwise; or

                    " '(2) when the State agent acts
              willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
              bad faith, beyond his or her authority,
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                 or under a mistaken interpretation of
                 the law.'

     "792 So. 2d at 405 (bracketed modification added by Hollis,
     950 So. 2d at 309)."

Burton v. Hawkins, [Ms. 1200825, Mar. 11, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.

2022); see also § 36-1-12(c) and (d). A State agent bears the initial burden

of demonstrating that the State agent was engaged in conduct that would

entitle him or her to immunity. Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d

450, 452 (Ala. 2006). After the State agent successfully demonstrates that

he or she was engaged in conduct that would entitle the State agent to

immunity, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by

substantial evidence the applicability of one of the two exceptions to

immunity. See § 36-1-12(d)(1) and (2); Ex parte Pinkard, [Ms. 1200658,

May 27, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022).

                               1. Reynolds

     Murey concedes that Reynolds, as the City's public-safety director,

demonstrated that he was engaged in a function that would entitle him

to State-agent immunity. Murey argues, however, that Reynolds lost that

entitlement to immunity by acting beyond his authority. Murey's sole

contention in support of his assertion that Reynolds acted beyond his

                                    22
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authority is that Reynolds failed to provide any medical training to Sgt.

Taylor, Sgt. Burson, Jailer Taylor, and Jailer Burt, which, he asserts,

was required by Reynolds's employment contract with the City.

     In opposition to the defendants' summary-judgment motions,

Murey presented a copy of an employment contract between Reynolds

and the City that required Reynolds to, among other things, "direct[] and

develop[] a training program including general law enforcement,

firearms, fire service, fire prevention, fire suppression and other

employee development training programs …." Citing Howard v. City of

Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 210 (Ala. 2003), Murey asserts that, although

Reynolds had the discretion to determine the amount and the timing of

training provided, he could not abandon the duty to provide training

altogether. As the defendants point out, however, although the contract

imposed a duty on Reynolds to direct and develop certain training

programs, none of those programs involved medical training. Murey has

not pointed to any evidence indicating that Reynolds was required to

provide medical training for any City employee in support of his

contention that Reynolds acted beyond his authority. Therefore, Murey

did not meet his burden of presenting "substantial evidence"

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demonstrating that Reynolds had acted beyond his authority or that

Reynolds's actions otherwise fell within one of the exceptions to State-

agent immunity. Ex parte Pinkard, ___ So. 3d at ___. Accordingly, Murey

has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in entering a summary

judgment in favor of Reynolds.

                              2. Jailer Burt

     Murey first argues that Jailer Burt did not meet her burden of

demonstrating that she was engaged in a function that would entitle her

to State-agent immunity. Conversely, the defendants, relying on Ex parte

Price, 256 So. 3d 1184 (Ala. 2018), argue that Jailer Burt's position as a

jailer/dispatcher required her to exercise discretion in carrying out

departmental policies and that, therefore, she was engaged in a function

that would have entitled her to State-agent immunity.

     In Ex parte Price, this Court discussed the distinction recognized in

Cranman " 'between conduct involved in planning or decision-making in

the administration of government and the conduct of those required to

carry out the orders of others or to administer the law with little choice

as to when, where, how, or under what circumstances their acts are to be

done.' 792 So. 2d at 402." 256 So. 3d at 1189. This Court held, among

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other things, that the prison warden in that case, who was tasked with

broad responsibility for the safety and security of the prison and its

officers and inmates, was engaged in conduct that placed her within

category (2) of the Cranman restatement. Id. at 1190. This Court relied,

in part, on Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 209-10 (Ala. 2003),

in which this Court had recognized that the chief of police in that case

was "responsible for the 'day-to-day operations of the … city jail' " and

that "[t]hose activities fall squarely within category (2) of the Cranman

formula." Murey argues that Ex parte Price is distinguishable because,

he says, Jailer Burt was not involved in planning or decision-making and,

unlike the warden in Ex parte Price, was simply carrying out orders with

little discretion as a "lower member" of the City's "hierarchy."

     Although Jailer Burt was not the warden, or a police chief, and

although Jailer Burt was not engaged in a function that is explicitly

outlined under category (2) of the Cranman restatement, this Court has

previously explained: " '[T]he situations listed in subparagraphs (2)(a)-(d)

of the Cranman immunity rule are expressly only "examples" of the

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general principle stated in paragraph (2) itself.' Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So.

2d 21, 31 (Ala. 2002)." Howard, 887 So. 2d at 210. 2

     The defendants presented evidence demonstrating that Jailer Burt

was employed as a jailer/dispatcher for the City and that only one

jailer/dispatcher is on duty at a time. Jailer Burt, as the sole

jailer/dispatcher on duty, was responsible for, among other tasks, the

care and supervision of inmates. Jailer Burt's usual duties included

booking, monitoring, feeding, releasing, and providing medical care to

inmates, if necessary. Jailer Burt was also tasked with performing her

duties as a dispatcher, which included receiving calls regarding

emergency    services,   dispatching officers,   completing   department

paperwork, and pulling warrants. Reynolds's testimony indicated that

jailers were expected to follow the jail's operations policy as a guideline

but that jailers had to multitask and exercise discretion in handling their

various job duties.

     2Additionally, we note that, if Jailer Burt had been releasing Lens
from custody, which is one of her job duties as a jailer, she would have
been performing a function that explicitly entitled her to State-agent
immunity. See § 36-1-12(c)(5), Ala. Code 1975 (recognizing immunity
when the State agent is "[e]xercising judgment in the discharge of duties
imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners").
                                    26
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     The evidence submitted indicates that Jailer Burt was tasked with

exercising her discretion in conducting the operations of the jail and in

supervising inmates in custody, which, in turn, constitutes administering

the policies and procedures of the City. Accordingly, Jailer Burt

presented evidence demonstrating that Murey's claim against her --

which was based on how she handled Lens's supervision and care while

in custody -- arose from Burt's performance of a job function that would

entitle her to State-agent immunity. 3 See, e.g., Shell v. Butcher, 339 So.

3d 226, 231 (Ala. 2021) ("It is undisputed that [the municipal jailers] were

discharging duties pursuant to Montgomery municipal-jail policies and

procedures and, therefore, generally would be entitled to State-agent

immunity."). Accordingly, the burden then shifted to Murey to present

substantial evidence demonstrating the applicability of one of the two

exceptions to State-agent immunity. Id.

     3Although   this Court has held that "a municipal jailer who lacks
the authority of a police officer cannot claim immunity under concepts
applicable to the immunity of a State agent under § 6-5-338(a)," Walker
v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474, 501 (Ala. 2010), this Court has also
recognized that a municipal jailer may nevertheless qualify for State-
agent immunity under another applicable Cranman category of
immunity. Shell v. Butcher, 339 So. 3d 226, 231 (Ala. 2021).
                                    27
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      Murey argues that, even if Jailer Burt was entitled to State-agent

immunity under one of the categories of the Cranman restatement, she

would be stripped of that immunity because she acted beyond her

authority by failing to follow the jail's rules and policies.

      "One of the ways in which a plaintiff can demonstrate that a
      State agent acted beyond his or her authority is by offering
      evidence that the State agent failed ' "to discharge duties
      pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated
      on a checklist." ' Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052
      (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d [173,] 178
      [(Ala. 2000)])."

Shell, 339 So. 3d at 231. Although Murey vaguely describes actions that

he asserts were beyond Jailer Burt's authority, he neither delineates the

particular policies and procedures that he asserts Jailer Burt violated nor

explains how those alleged policies and procedures come within the scope

of this Court's holding in Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052

(Ala. 2003).

      Murey asserts that Jailer Burt acted beyond her authority when

she failed to complete a medical-screening form pertaining to Lens. That

form was partially completed by Jailer Taylor, but she was unable to

finish the portions of the form that required direct responses from Lens.

Jailer Burt testified that she had "planned to complete the medical

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questionnaire, [and] take [Lens's] photo and fingerprints[,] after serving

breakfast that morning" and that "[t]here was no standard procedure

that required those tasks to be completed by a specific time. In similar

situations in the past, those tasks were completed once the arrestee is

able." Murey does not identify any policy that requires the completion of

a medical-screening form within a certain time or by a certain individual

or otherwise explain how Jailer Burt's failure to obtain Lens's answers to

complete the form violates a detailed rule or regulation. See Giambrone,

874 So. 2d at 1052.

     Murey also asserts that Jailer Burt acted beyond her authority

when she failed to contact emergency medical services after reading the

information regarding the severity of Lens's intoxication on the jail log

and because, he asserts, she failed to check on Lens every 30 minutes.

The jail log is a preprinted form, and it states under "SPECIAL NOTES"

to "1. CHECK INMATE EVERY 30 MINUTES." As noted above, Jailer

Taylor handwrote on the jail log: "Need photo, medical questions &

changing out, & printing." Jailer Taylor also wrote: "Draeger .12, Unable

or too intoxicated to stay up and use phone, answer questions, get finger

printed or change clothes upon arrest." The evidence indicated that,

                                   29
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when Jailer Burt began her shift at around 6:00 a.m., Lens was sleeping

in his cell, and there was no evidence to suggest that, at that time, Lens

was in need of medical attention. Moreover, Reynolds indicated in

deposition testimony that determining whether an inmate needed

medical treatment would be the job of the arresting officer and the

booking jailer, neither of which were Jailer Burt.

     With regard to Jailer Burt's alleged failure to check on Lens, Jailer

Burt testified that she was trained to check on the inmates every hour

but that she checked on them as frequently as possible by physically

viewing them from outside their cells and through the video-monitoring

system. Jailer Burt testified that she had checked on Lens every 5 to 10

minutes on the video-monitoring system.4 Each time that Jailer Burt

checked on Lens, it appeared to her that he was sleeping. Murey has not

presented evidence demonstrating that Jailer Burt failed to check on

Lens or that 30-minute "special note" in the jail log was a detailed rule

or regulation that Jailer Burt failed to comply with.

     4Murey   asserts that Jailer Burt could not see Lens on the video-
monitoring system with the lights off, but all the evidence he points to in
support of that assertion is from Jailer Taylor and his jail-administration
expert, and that evidence does not indicate that Jailer Burt could not see
Lens when she checked on Lens through the video-monitoring system.
                                    30
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     Murey also appears to assert that Burt's actions violated the jail's

operations policy, which outlines procedures for, among other things,

booking, housing, and releasing inmates. That policy contains the

following section pertinent to this appeal:

     "J. NECESSARY PAPERWORK

           "1. JAIL SHEET

           "2. INTERVIEW SHEET: After interview, both the
     Docket Personnel and Patrol Supervisor will review it and
     sign it. …"

     Reynolds's testimony indicated that jailers are expected to follow

the jail's operations policy, but that jailers have to multitask and exercise

discretion in handling their various job duties. Like the jail log, the jail's

operations policy does not explicitly outline whether the booking jailer or

a subsequent jailer is responsible for completing the "necessary

paperwork," nor does it provide a deadline or timeline as to when the

paperwork must be completed. Murey acknowledges that there is no

specific time frame in which to complete the paperwork, but, he argues,

the paperwork was never completed. However, the lack of particularity

in the jail's operations policy and jail log demonstrates that those are not

the type of detailed rules or regulations envisioned in Giambrone. See

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Shell, 339 So. 3d at 232 (holding that jail's policies that were "broadly

phrased" and ambiguous and did "not indicate which correctional officer

is tasked with the duty stated in the provision" were not akin to a detailed

checklist under Giambrone). Accordingly, based on the materials

submitted in opposition to the summary-judgment motions, Murey has

not demonstrated by substantial evidence that Jailer Burt acted beyond

her authority or that the trial court erroneously entered a summary

judgment in Jailer Burt's favor.

                                3. The City

     The City's liability hinges on the liability of its employees. See § 11-

47-190, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that a municipality may be liable for

damages for an injury caused by "the neglect, carelessness, or

unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of the municipality

engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty").

"[I]f a state actor is immune from liability for a particular act or omission,

the state or municipality is also immune from liability for the same act

or omission." City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925 So. 2d 944, 954 (Ala. 2005)

(citing Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2003)). Because

Murey has not established that Reynolds and Jailer Burt are not immune

                                     32
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from liability, he has, likewise, failed to establish the City's liability for

their actions. Moreover, Murey does not present any argument regarding

the City's alleged liability. See Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala.

1982) ("When an appellant fails to argue an issue in its brief, that issue

is waived."). Accordingly, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of

the City is affirmed.

                                 Conclusion

     Appeal no. 1210384 is dismissed. In appeal no. 1210392, the

summary judgment entered in favor of all the defendants is affirmed.

     1210384 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

     1210392 -- AFFIRMED.

     Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.

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