Court Opinion

ID: 9684857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:16:45.433653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:00.627029
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
The prior dissenting opinion is withdrawn.
This is a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071. Applicant is represented by counsel appointed by this Court. The instant application presents twenty claims for relief which allege serious constitutional violations. However, the majority dismisses the application because counsel did not file the application timely. Id., at § 5. Believing the majority willfully violates the intent of article 11.071 in dismissing the application through no fault of the condemned inmate, I dissent.
I.
In Ex Parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), we considered the legislative debates in both the House and the Senate to determine the legislative intent for enacting article 11.071. In Torres, we restated the debates as follows:
... Representative Gallego, the House sponsor of the bill, emphasized the intent to limit a convicted person to “one bite at the apple”:
And we tell individuals that, everything that you can possibly raise the first time, we expect you to raise it initially, one bite of the apple, one shot_[Answer-ing questions]. I think we’ll have less filed, because what we’re attempting to do here is to say, raise everything at one time. You get one bite of the apple. If you have to stick the kitchen sink in there, put it all in there. And, we will go through those claims, one at a time, and make a decision, but none of this, one — one—every week you file a new petition which is currently basically what happens.
House floor, S.B.440, May 18, 1995, Tape 166, Side A (ellipsis and bracketed material inserted). While the Legislature limited applicants to one bite of the apple, they clearly contemplated that that bite would be a full one. The recognized corollary to requiring an applicant to raise all of his claims at once is that every claim raised in that initial proceeding would be considered and decided.1
Therefore, the intent of the legislature in enacting article 11.071 is clear, to provide *613each applicant with one full “bite at the apple.”
II.
Under section 5 of article 11.071, the instant application may be dismissed as untimely filed. However, when the application was untimely filed by counsel appointed by this Court, we should invoke our original jurisdiction. Texas Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 5, provides:
Subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and, in criminal law matters, the writs of mandamus, procedendo, prohibition, and certiorari. The Court and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue such other writs as may be necessary to protect its jurisdiction or enforce its judgments. The Court shall have the power upon affidavit or otherwise to ascertain such matters of fact as may be necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction.
As I pointed out in my dissent in Ex Parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 232 (Tex.Cr.App.1996): “The legislative history demonstrates the purpose of the amendment was to provide this Court with greater power to grant extraordinary writs in criminal cases.” (emphasis in the original). Case law supports this interpretation of Art. V, Sec. 5 of our Constitution. See, Ex Parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third District, 885 S.W.2d 389, 399 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). Nevertheless, five members of this Court, in an opinion authored by Judge McCormick, concluded that the legislature, by using the word “original” in Section 4(a), intended for article 11.071 to be the “exclusive proeedure[] for the exercise of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction under Article 5, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution,” Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 222.
Today’s majority concludes that interpretation of the statute was correct and that we do not have original jurisdiction to reach the merits of the instant application. However, the majority ignores the fact that following Davis, the legislature amended article 11.071 and replaced the word “original” with the word “initial.” This was done to make it clear that article 11.071 was not intended to affect this Court’s original jurisdiction under Article V, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution.2 Therefore, we do have original jurisdiction to reach the merits of the instant application, should we so choose to exercise it.
III.
The majority believes “[t]he screamingly obvious intent of Article 11.071 is to speed up the habeas corpus procedures for capital cases ...” Ante, at 611. Therefore, the majority concludes speed should be our only concern when interpreting the statute. However, I believe the majority works from a faulty premise. If speed was the “screamingly obvious intent” of the Legislature when enacting the statute, why is the State allowed an unlimited time, upon request, to respond to a habeas application? See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 § 7(a).3
*614I believe the “screamingly obvious” intent of article 11.071 was to provide competent counsel. This belief is based upon the literal text of article 11.071 § 2(a), which provides: “An applicant shall be represented by competent counsel unless the applicant has elected to proceed pro se ...”4 Indeed, to date, the Legislature has appropriated approximately $6,000,000.00 for the compensation of counsel.5 The undeniable outcome of condemned inmates receiving competent counsel is an expedited habeas process.
IV.
Today, a majority of the Court chooses which sections of article 11.071 will be strictly adhered to and which will be loosely construed.6 The majority dismisses the instant application as untimely filed, piously contending the law must be followed.7 In so doing, the majority wholly ignores that WE failed in our duty to appoint competent counsel. By choosing this selective construction of the statute, the majority willfully violates the intent of article 11.071. Applicant has not had his “one bite at the apple” through no fault of his own. Indeed, the fault lies with this Court by appointing less than competent counsel.
The majority fails to accept our statutory responsibility for appointing competent counsel. Because we refuse to correct an appointment of less than competent counsel by invoking our original jurisdiction to reach the merits of the instant application, I dissent.
OVERSTREET, J., joins.

. All emphasis supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. In Marin v. State, 891 S.W.2d 267, 271-272 (Tex.Cr.App.
When the Legislature meets, after a particular statute has been judicially construed, without changing that statute, we presume the Legislature intended the same construction should continue to be applied to that statute. Lewis v. State, 58 Tex.Crim. 351, 127 S.W. 808, 812 (App.1910). Additionally, the Code Construction Act provides: "when examining amendments to existing legislation to determine legislative intent, it is presumed that the legislature was aware of case law affecting or relating to the statute.” Tex.Gov't Code Ann. Sec. 311.023(3); and, Grunsfeld v. State, 843 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
Certainly, the converse is true: When the Legislature meets, after a particular statute has been judicially construed, and the Legislature changes that statute, we presume the Legislature intended to alter the construction previously applied to that statute.

. In the instant case, the State requested and received an additional 221 days to respond to applicant’s writ. However, today the majority rejects the instant application without ever receiving the required response from the State.
In similar cases arising out of Harris County, the State is routinely granted one year to respond to the writ application.

. The majority alleges applicant’s counsel disregarded information from this Court's Executive Administrator regarding the time to file this writ. Ante, at 610. If this is true, then CLEARLY counsel was incompetent and her continued representation of applicant violated Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071, § 2(a). Why the majority fails to acknowledge the screamingly obvious truth that applicant did not receive the statutorily mandated assistance of competent counsel is frustrating, especially when it appears our staff was on notice regarding counsel’s failings.

. Counsel in the instant case has been paid in excess of $6,000.00.

. The majority emphasizes in italics the "shall” when citing the statute requiring dismissal of untimely applications. Ante, at 611. Not once does the majority even mention the requirement that this Court "shall” appoint competent counsel. No citation, no italics, no consideration whatsoever. Perhaps Judge Womack can cite me to a case which determines which "shall” shall be followed.
Judge Womack also chastises the dissenters stating “[o]ur oaths are to uphold the constitutions and laws of this country and state.” Ante, at 611. His implication being that because the dissenters believe all the laws must be followed, including the appointment of competent counsel, we are somehow not following our oaths. I resent his intimations, and I continue to believe that each section of Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 is equally valid and should have its intended effect.

.In addition, the majority astounds me when they state the statutory exceptions for late filings are "only for applicants who should not have been convicted or sentenced to death. This applicant is not such a person, nor does anyone contend that he is.” Ante, at 611. Even a cursory review of the instant application makes it "screamingly obvious” that applicant does contend he should not have been convicted or sentenced to death. In fact, applicant alleges twenty reasons why he should not have been convicted or sentenced to death. For the majority to so blatantly misrepresent these facts is not only disingenuous but downright disturbing.