Court Opinion

ID: 9794833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:12:32.88936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:10.070754
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the substantive views expressed by Justice Burke in the majority opinion.
However, I also agree with that portion of the dissent of *447Justice Peters relating to the discretionary power conferred upon this court by section 1181, subdivision 7, of the Penal Códe, and I would be inclined to exercise the power in this case. The, statute unequivocally provides the authority to *448modify a judgment “by imposing the lesser punishment without granting or ordering a new trial'’ not only to trial courts, but also “this power shall extend to any court to which the case may be appealed.” Since the Supreme Court is the only court to which the ease is appealed when the death penalty is imposed, it seems undebatable that the Legislature intended the power to extend to this court. As Justice Holmes taught us nearly a century ago, ‘ ‘ There is a strong presumption in favor of giving words their natural meaning and against reading them as if they said something else.” (Merrill v. Preston (1883) 185 Mass. 451, 455.)
As recited in the dissent, there is a long line of cases based upon People v. Odle (1951) 37 Cal.2d 52 [230 P.2d 345], holding that, absent' error affecting the penalty determination, this court will not interfere with a judgment of death. Conceding, as I must, that this series of cases exists, I cannot join in holding that error becomes sanctified and unassailable merely by constant repetition. The doctrine of stare decisis includes no such command.
The court in Odie based its construction that this court had no power to reduce the punishment, on the ground inter alia that “To construe the section otherwise would give the court clemency powers similar to those vested in the Governor (Cal. Const., art. VII, §1), and raise serious constitutional questions relating to the separation of powers. ’ ’ (Id. at p. 58.)
Reduction of a sentence by a court is clearly a judicial *449function. That the Governor is authorized to exercise a similar act in the form of clemency does not make it any less a judicial function. If there is any deviation from traditional separation of powers, it arises because the Constitution confers that one “judicial” power upon the Chief Executive. Nothing therein provided suggests, however, that similar statutory. authority resting in the courts interferes with normal separation of powers, for the courts merely continue to exercise no executive function but only conventional judicial power. In holding otherwise, Odie was in error, and subsequent cases relying upon it as precedent compounded the error. (See dissent by Schauer, J., in People v. Odie, 37 Cal.2d at p, 61 [230 P.2d 345].)
I am not unmindful of the fact that whenever this court chooses to adopt the correct interpretation of section 1181, subdivision 7, we will “stand at the threshold of a previously unopened door” (Murphy, J., dissenting in Associated Press v. United States (1945) 326 U.S. 1, 59 [89 L.Ed. 2013, 2051, 65 S.Ct. 1416]), and we may be inundated with petitions for habeas corpus inviting us to exercise discretion anew in cases long since final. I do not deem that potentiality to be crucial, however, for this court has no obligation to reopen cases decided under a previously prevailing interpretation of the iaw. Retroactivity is properly frowned upon as imposing “burdens upon the administration of criminal justice” when it results in the reconsideration of “cases that were correctly decided under the law in force at the time of trial.” (In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 381 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].) It must also be noted that we have here no federal or state constitutional imperative, and no issue of prejudicial error as in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810] (applied retrospectively in In re Jackson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 500 [39 Cal.Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420]), but merely interpretation of a discretionary penal statute. Under that code section I would exercise our statutory power to reduce punishment only prospectively, in cases deemed appropriate.