Court Opinion

ID: 9526356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:16:03.316702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:30.126555
License: Public Domain

TOMUANOVICH, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I share the majority’s frustration with intrusive telephone solicitations. But I do not agree that the provision requiring that a live operator obtain consent before a message is played complies with the freedom of speech requirements placed on the states by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the portions of the majority’s opinion which hold that the live operator provisions are constitutional.
I agree with the majority that the state may place more restrictions on commercial speech than on political speech. I also agree that the provisions mandating that ADAD’s disconnect within ten seconds after termination of the call by the recipient and limiting the use of ADAD’s to certain hours of the day are constitutional because they further the state’s substantial interest in protecting privacy and safety.
I do not believe, however, that the live operator requirements are constitutional. Under Central Hudson, if commercial speech is not deceptive, the state can regulate it only to further a substantial state interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). I heartily agree with the majority that the state has a substantial interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens.
But even when the state demonstrates a substantial interest, a statute regulating commercial speech must “directly advance” that interest to be valid. Id. A regulation of commercial speech “may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.” Id. The majority holds that the privacy interest being advanced is the interest in being free of interruptions from “the shrill and imperious ring of the telephone.” But the live operator requirements advance that interest only incidentally, if at all. Once the person being called picks up the telephone, the interruption of privacy already has occurred. At that point, from a privacy perspective, it makes no difference whether the caller is a person or a machine. The damage to privacy is done, and the solution is the same in either situation: hang up the telephone. In this respect, Casino’s solicitations are quite possibly less intrusive than live callers: I suspect that most people can hang up on a machine more easily and more quickly than they could on a live operator. Thus, I believe this is precisely the type of “ineffective” regulation discussed in Central Hudson because, in all likelihood, the live operator requirement actually intrudes upon rather than protects privacy.
The majority also argues that by forcing telephone solicitors to hire live operators, fewer calls will be made and the privacy of the citizens will be protected. But this regulation allows those who use ADAD’s to make just as many calls as before if they are willing to hire live operators. Thus, I do not see how this requirement protects privacy. It simply makes commercial speech more expensive than it would be without the live operator requirement.
Finally, Central Hudson requires that regulation of commercial speech must not be “more extensive than is necessary” to serve the state’s substantial interest. Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 2351. That language has recently been construed to mean that *893the limitation on speech must be a “reasonable fit” to the state interest being advanced. Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3034, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). The live operator requirements fail on this ground as well. When the live operator requirements are subjected to any meaningful level of judicial scrutiny, it is clear that they do not further the state’s interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens. I simply cannot imagine how a statute that does not directly advance and perhaps impedes the state’s purported interest can possibly meet the “reasonable fit” requirement of Fox.
I respectfully dissent and would hold the live operator requirements unconstitutional.