Court Opinion

ID: 9792024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:22:09.92538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.249648
License: Public Domain

Springer, J.,
concurring:
I agree that the record in this case does not support a finding of malice which would support a punitive damage award. I strongly disagree, however, with the reasoning of the plurality opinion which, incorrectly I think, would limit the Nevada statutory expression, “malice, express or implied,” to cases of express malice only, that is to say, cases in which the defendant is shown to have harbored a “deliberate intention to injure, vex, annoy or harass” the plaintiff. Plurality Opinion at 9. It is clear to me that “malice, express or implied” necessarily goes beyond the intentional injury by one person of another and that the statute and our cases require a broader definition of malice than that offered by the plurality opinion.
Our statute refers to two kinds of malice, express malice and implied malice. Express malice denotes the deliberate intention to harm someone. Implied malice is a malice of unintended harm, a malice implied in law when wrongdoers, without intending spe*12cific harm, act in an irresponsible manner knowing that harm to someone will probably follow. One of several Nevada case examples of implied malice supporting a punitive damage award can be seen in the Nevada Cement case. In that case the defendant cement company had no “deliberate intention to injure” anyone, it merely caused noxious materials to emanate from its plant knowing that injury to those in the area would be the probable consequence of its heedless actions. Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 514 P.2d 1180 (1973). This implied malice on the part of Nevada Cement Company was held by this court to support a punitive damage judgment. Id. at 452, 514 P.2d at 1183.
Similarly, this court recognized the presence of implied malice in the Leslie case in which plaintiffs were injured by escaping chlorine gas. Leslie v. Jones Chemical Co., 92 Nev. 391, 551 P.2d 234 (1976). We approved a punitive award absent even a hint of any “intention to injure” the plaintiffs. Id. at 394, 551 P.2d at 235. Again in Filice we expressly recognized that an unintended injury could still be malicious when harm was the “necessary consequence” of a defendant’s “willful” acts. Village Development Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 315, 526 P.2d 83, 89 (1974). Given our case law and a statute providing for both express malice and implied malice, it is not easy to understand how the plurality can reach the conclusion that there is no such thing as implied malice in Nevada. I think I understand the source of the confusion and believe that this area of law is in need of some clarification.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘malice,’ as used by courts and lawyers in the last century, was a hopelessly versatile and ambiguous term, carrying a broad spectrum of meanings . . . (especially when it was modified by terms such as ‘actual’ or ‘express,’ . . .)” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 39 n.8 (1983). The “hopelessly versatile and ambiguous” term malice has indeed been assigned a “broad spectrum of meaning” in the jurisprudence of this state and its sister state, California.1 I *13hope to narrow this spectrum of meaning and oifer an intelligible meaning and definition of the statutory expression, “malice,” express or implied.

*14
“Malice, Express or Implied”

Former NRS 42.010 (now NRS 42.005) allows punitive damages to be awarded in cases wherein a defendant is “guilty” of “malice, express or implied.” (My emphasis.)
Express malice, sometimes called “[mjalice in fact, or actual malice, denotes ill will on the part of the defendant, or his desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it.” Nevada Credit Rating Bur. v. Williams, 88 Nev. 601, 610, 503 P.2d 9, 14 (1972). Express malice, then, may be seen as a malice of intended harm, the kind of malice which the plurality believes is the only kind of malice.
Implied malice is malice of unintended harm2; it is “distinguished from [express malice] simply by absence of the need to look to the actor’s motivation and purpose.” 2 J. Ghiardi & J. *15Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice § 19.19 at 60 (1985). Unlike express malice, implied malice does not require that the defendant be motivated by ill will or intent to harm anyone. Malice has been implied in law “whenever a tort resulted from a voluntary act, even if no harm was intended.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 39 n.8 (my emphasis). For example, a person may do something knowing it to be dangerous and realize at the time that someone will probably get hurt, yet have no real intention to harm anyone. Such a person is guilty of implied malice. Where a person consciously acts in a dangerous manner, knowing that the probable result of that action will be injury to others, inquiry into actual motive or intent becomes unnecessary because the law will infer from such willful misconduct the “ ‘legal equivalent’ of actual malice.” Ghiardi, id.3
In Village Development Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 315, 526 P.2d 83, 89 (1974), we accurately noted that in previous cases we had “sustained awards of punitive damages where evidence showed the wrong was willful, and the damage either intended or a necessary consequence” of the willful wrongdoing. (My emphasis.) This court’s use of the disjunctive in Filice shows rather clearly Nevada’s acceptance of both a malice of intended harm (express malice) and a malice of conscious wrongdoing but of unintended harm (implied malice).
The language of Filice embraces both kinds of malice. If the defendant intends to harm, the defendant is guilty of express malice. If the defendant does not intend to harm anyone, yet knows that the probable or “necessary consequences” of his or her acts will be harm to some unidentified victim, than the defendant is guilty of implied malice. Otherwise put, when the defendant knows that injury will probably result from his or her *16actions and, consciously disregarding the probability of injury to others, goes ahead wrongfully to commit the dangerous acts, such a defendant is guilty of implied malice and is subject to being punished by punitive damages. Implied malice is a culpable state of mind that is manifested by a person’s conscious taking of excessive risks at the expense of injury to others; so, when one consciously decides to act in a dangerous manner and that decision is made despite the knowledge that the action will probably result in injury to others, such a decision, such a conscious disregard4 of the safety and personal integrity of other persons, constitutes malice, malice implied in law.
Examples of implied malice are easy to come by. A useful example was given by Senator Cliff Young during legislative hearings on punitive damages as now codified in NRS 42.005 (formerly NRS 42.010). Apparently recognizing the culpability of unacceptable, deliberate risktaking and of exposing others to danger even if no harm was specifically intended, Senator Young gave this illustration:
Suppose a big drug company puts out a certain drug and they know there is something wrong with it, but they still put. forward a big campaign for it. Then you can sue for punitive damages.
Hearings on S.B. 198 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., (1967) (statement of Senator Cliff Young, sponsor of S.B. 198) (my emphasis). Senator Young was, at that time, at least, of the opinion: “An irresponsible attitude toward an individual or a group as a whole is a ground for punitive damages.” Id. Product liability cases such as the hypothetical case suggested by Senator Young are classic instances of the need to punish those who injure others in an irresponsible manner but without having any actual malice or intention to harm any given person.5 The rule proposed *17by the plurality would eliminate punitive damage awards in the type of drug case exampled by Senator Young during legislative deliberations.
Assuming that “malice express or implied” is not restricted to the deliberate injury of an intended victim, I think it is necessary to go on to examine how the type of cognition called malice can be applied to an impersonal corporation thus making a corporation liable in punitive damages for its animus malus.

Corporate Malice

Malice is essentially a mental concept, a cognitive process; and definitionally we run into trouble when we start talking about malice’s being exhibited by a corporate entity. Malice as a state of mind must in some way be accommodated to the “corporate mentality” if corporations are, indeed, to be found guilty of “malice, express or implied.” It is settled law, however, that corporations can be guilty of malice and can be mulcted in punitive damages for such malice. “[T]o render a corporation liable in exemplary damages, the intent or malice necessary to warrant the imposition of such damages must be brought home to it.” 2 S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. Gans, The American Law of Torts, § 8.51 (1985) (my emphasis).
Punitive damage liability of a corporation for malice may be “brought home” to a corporation directly or vicariously. By “directly” I mean malice and ill will that issues forth from the corporation itself. For example, a corporate board could decide that the corporation was going to inflict wrongful or unwarranted injury on a competitor and thereby render the corporation liable for punitive damages by reason of such express corporate malice. A corporation could also be guilty directly by reason of the implied malice in a case where corporate management orders corporate actions, knowing that the probable consequences of the corporate actions would be injury to others.
A good example of implied malice’s being directly attributed to or “brought home” to a corporation can be found in the previously mentioned case of Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 514 P.2d 1180 (1973), in which the corporation “knew” of the probable harmful results of its wrongful acts. The Nevada Cement Company "knew from the outset that a large volume of dust was being discharged” wrongfully into populated areas by one of its cement kilns. 89 Nev. at 452, 514 P.2d at 1183 (my emphasis). After becoming aware of the harmful effects of the emissions from its kiln, the company “intentionally operated” the kiln anyway. The Nevada Cement Company was directly guilty of implied malice, even though this court erroneously labeled the conduct “malice in fact.” Id. at 452, 514 P.2d at 1183.
*18Another excellent example of malicious misconduct’s having been “brought home” directly to the corporation itself is found in the California case of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.Rptr. 348 (App. 1981). Although the current California punitive damage statute does not, as in Nevada, refer to civil malice in terms of being either “express” or “implied,” the California statute, Civil Code section 3294, does define two different species of malice: one is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff” (express malice); and the other is where malice is present not because the defendant has the intent to cause injury to someone but, rather, because the defendant has acted “with a willful and-conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others” (implied malice). Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990). In Grimshaw, Ford Motor Company was held liable for punitive damages by reason of Ford’s corporate decision to continue to install dangerous fuel tanks on its Pinto automobiles. The evidence was that Ford management could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but made a knowing corporate decision to defer such correction, the decision being based on a cost-benefit analysis which balanced human life and safety against corporate profit. This kind of corporate decision-making was held to have “constituted ‘conscious disregard’ of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public.” Grimshaw, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 384 (my emphasis). It was clear that corporate management “knew that the Pinto’s fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death” and that Ford management “could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided” not to on the basis of a “cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.” Id. (my emphasis). Such willful wrongdoing on the part of the Ford corporation, whose management “knew” of the injuries that would probably result from the corporate decision, is a very lucid example of what I would call direct implied malice.6
*19Direct implied malice would not, on the other hand, be present in the absence of some “conscious” wrongdoing that can be attributed to the corporation itself. For example, in Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 651, 708 P.2d 297, 304 (1985), malice was held to be missing in a product liability case involving design defects in the Jeep CJ-5. Unlike the Grimshaw case, the proof did not show corporate knowledge of a “dangerous tendency to roll” nor did it show any “conscious” corporate action which knowingly subjected Jeep operators to probable injury as was the case in Grimshaw. Id. Because the Jeep Corporation had not acted consciously or deliberately, and hence maliciously, this court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give punitive damage instructions. Id.
In Nevada Cement, Murray and Grimshaw the malice in question is that of the corporate entity itself. It is the “institutional mentality” of the corporation (Grimshaw, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 384) that is guilty of this kind of implied malice and which can be blamed for injuries to others even though the corporation had no plan to injure any specific person. It is the corporate entity itself that is acting maliciously in these cases. In Nevada Cement and Grimshaw the corporations, as corporations, acted wrongfully in their corporate guise. Their acts were not intended to do particular harm in the sense that the infliction of injury was not the corporation’s “conscious object”; rather the corporate decisions were known by corporate management to be likely to produce injury to others. Such corporations are guilty of direct implied malice.
A corporation may also be derivatively liable for malice, express or implied. A management employee may in the course and scope of managerial operations intend to injure someone. The corporation would then be held vicariously liable for the express malice of its managing agent. An example of indirect or vicarious corporate liability for punitive damages can be found in the case Cerminara v. California Hotel and Casino, 104 Nev. 372, 760 P.2d 108 (1988). In Cerminara we recognized the right of an injured plaintiff to recover punitive damages against a corporation where there is an act of malice “on the part of any officer, director or managing agent of the corporation.” Id. at 378, 760 P.2d at 111.
I would hold that a corporation could also be liable vicariously *20for the implied malice of its “officer, director or managing agent,” absent the kind of direct corporate action found in Nevada Cement and Grimshaw. For example, if the general manager of Circus-Circus actually had known that a criminal assault was the probable consequence of maintaining the security system then in place, yet notwithstanding such knowledge continued at the same dangerous level of security, I would say that this corporate agent could be found guilty of implied malice and that such malice could be imputed to the corporation.
In the case at hand there appears to be no direct malice on the part of Circus-Circus Corporation. There is no direct corporate action, as there was in Nevada Cement and Grimshaw, which was either intended to harm or which showed an irresponsible, conscious disregard for the safety of others.
If corporate malice is to be found in this case, it must be derivative in nature, derived vicariously from the malicious acts of the corporation’s officers, directors or managing agents. Since there is no evidence that any agent of the Circus-Circus Corporation intended to injure Craigo, the only possible malice than can be attributed to the Circus-Circus Corporation is implied malice on the part of a managing agent of the corporation. I now consider the question of whether any agent of the Circus-Circus Corporation has been guilty of implied malice that can be imputed to Circus-Circus.

Malice in Wonderland

The plurality is “constrained to observe that if this court had recognized malice in law (implied malice) as a basis for proving malice under NRS 42.010” it would be compelled to affirm the punitive award because there is “ample evidence in the record proving disregard by management level personnel at Circus-Circus of safety measures reasonably necessary to remedy hazardous conditions in its parking garage.” I, of course, agree with the plurality opinion that there is ample evidence that management failed properly to regard “reasonably necessary” safety measures to remedy hazardous conditions in the garage. This failure to use reasonable care, this failure to “remedy hazardous conditions,” is called negligence. The trial court awarded $45,000 as compensation for the injuries suffered by reason of this negligence. I have no quarrel at all with Craigo’s being compensated for his injuries. What I quarrel with is punishing Circus-Circus for malicious misconduct in what is essentially a negligence, maybe even a gross negligence, case.
Although there is evidence in this case that the general manager was made aware of reports of criminal activity in the parking garage (mostly vandalism and petty theft), and although, as *21charged by Craigo, management took “no steps to remedy the situation,” I see this kind of a failure to attend properly to duty as negligence, not malice. No officer, director or managing agent can be seen as having engaged in the kind of conscious wrongdoing which constitutes malice, express or implied.
There is some focus in this case on the general manager as the source of punitive damage liability. The general manager did have notice of an array of petty crime in the parking garage area and probably had a duty to “do something” about security in that area. This is a far cry, however, from saying that the manager consciously disregarded a known danger — that he knew a physical assault in the garage was imminent and nevertheless acted (or failed to act) in a manner that he knew would probably result in physical injury by criminal assault.
Craigo’s counsel argued that malice was present because management “recklessly disregarded known safety measures.” Those safety measures included increasing the number of security officers and installing electronic surveillance devices. If we were to accept the assumption that safety measures of this kind are generally “known” to increase the level of security, this is not to say that failing to increase safety measures amounts to anything more than failing to exercise due care. If the general manager knew that security could be improved by increasing the number of security personnel or by installing electronic devices, this does not mean that he knew that in the absence of increased security a criminal assault such as occurred in this case was probably going to happen. Absent the second-mentioned kind of knowledge, knowledge that certain decisions would probably result in injury, there can be no implied malice as I have described it. As I have indicated, the manager may be seen to have been “reckless” or to have exhibited “unconscionable irresponsibility,” Filice, 90 Nev. at 315, 526 P.2d at 89, in failing to attend to “known safety measures,” but his is not malice. No agent of Circus-Circus can be said to have been aware or conscious of the probability that a criminal assault was going to be the probable or “necessary consequence” of any management decision or decisions in this regard. I would absolve Circus-Circus from punitive damage liability for this reason.
In today’s society one never knows when or where a murder, a robbery, or a mugging is going to occur. It is hard to conceive of a specific decision that the corporation itself or individuals in management positions could have made that would have prevented crimes from occurring in its parking garage, or any place else. There is no evidence that Circus-Circus, directly or vicariously, made a deliberately wrongful decision, the necessary or probable result of which would have been the robbery and battery of Craigo or other patrons.
*22The type of punishment-deserving conduct contemplated by the term “malice” is not present under the facts of this case; and no malice has been “brought home” to the Circus-Circus Corporation. 2 S. Speiser, supra.

Conclusion

Since “[t]hree justices shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business,” NRS 2.140, there is, with the filing of this opinion, no binding ruling on what really means “malice, express or implied” in this state.7 I have presented a proposed rule for defining and applying the statutory expression, “malice, express or implied,” for the purpose of determining liability for punitive damages. The rule that I propose is, in my opinion, consistent with both the statute and our cases. I hope that the rule which I offer will be of some guidance to the trial courts until such time as a majority of this court or the legislature expresses itself on the subject. I consider my suggested application of the concept of implied malice to be quite guarded and very much in harmony with the cautious position of the American College of Trial Lawyers which is cited in the plurality opinion and in my footnote 2.1 agree particularly with that portion of the College of Trial Lawyers report which recommends that punitive damages be reserved to those extreme cases reflecting cognitive behavior that is outrageous and indicative of bad motive or evil mind. Plurality Opinion at 8 and at 8 n.5. Certainly knowingly installing dangerous automobile gas tanks, knowlingly purveying dangerous medicines or knowingly poisoning the atmosphere would be cognitive behavior that is indicative of bad motive and evil mind. The worrisome side of the plurality opinion is that under it this kind of outrageous “cognitive behavior” would go unpunished by punitive damages. If the manager had made a conscious decision not to increase security even if he knew that this would probably result in criminal assaults on patrons, then he and Circus-Circus should be liable for punitive damages. This is not the case, but if it were, I think that punitive damages would be in order.

 The ambiguity often found in judicial attempts to define and apply the concepts of express malice and implied malice is exhibited in both Nevada and California case law. My view, that the statutory expression “malice express or implied” refers to two forms of malice, malice in fact and malice in law, is belied by the language of Nevada Credit Rating Bureau which contains, ostensibly at least, language to the effect that there is only one kind of malice, namely, malice in fact, and that the phrase “express or implied” refers not to two kinds of malice but “only to the evidence by which malice is established.” Nevada Credit Rating Bur. v. Williams, 88 Nev. 601, 609, 503 P.2d 9, 14 (1972). The faulty conclusion that there is but one kind of malice, that is express malice, sometimes called “malice in fact,” originated in a 1911 California case, Davis v. Hearst, 116 P. 530 (Cal. 1911). Davis was an intentional tort case involving only express malice, and it was decided *13without reference to a statute, like ours, which specifies two kinds of malice, “express or implied.” Subsequently, courts in both Nevada and California quoted Davis and ruled that there was only one form of malice, that involving the specific intention to hurt someone. Although California courts frequently cited Davis, at the same time they were recognizing a form of malice which involved unintended injury (implied malice) as one of two predicates for awarding punitive damages. In 1941, the California Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that wanton and reckless misconduct was sufficient to support punitive damages based on malice. Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co., 118 P.2d 465, 469 (Cal. 1941). In 1960, in Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 8 Cal.Rptr. 514, 517-18 (App. 1960), “conscious disregard for the rights of others” was recognized as malice. These cases were followed by a series of rather confusing cases that again insisted that there was only the one kind of “actual” malice, yet allowed recovery in situations in which there was clearly no actual intent to harm.
In 1965, Nevada adopted California’s statute verbatim, together with its sometimes inconsistent and confusing judicial gloss. The confusion was to some extent recognized and clarified by the California courts in the case of G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218, 222-23 (App. 1975). Recognizing the divergency in California law, the court said:
In order to test plaintiff’s allegations as a charge of malice, it is necessary to observe the elements of the malice which justifies an exemplary award. At this point one discovers a plethora of appellate elucidations. California courts have indulged in a profusion of pejorative terms to describe malice. A survey reveals several separate and somewhat divergent currents of California case law.
Searle pointed out that while some courts had repeated the Davis language about malice being limited to intentional harm only and about malice in fact’s being the only kind of cognizable malice, a number of appellate decisions recognized varying forms of unintentional injury infliction as being sufficient to establish the animus malus, or evil motive, required for punitive damages. Id. at 223-24.
The Searle court concluded that “conscious disregard of safety [was] an appropriate description of the animus malus which may justify an exemplary damage award when nondeliberate injury is alleged.” Id. at 225 (emphasis in original). Citing Roth v. Shell Oil Co., the California Supreme Court also acknowledged that conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights would support a punitive damage award under the statute. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Cal. 1974). Thus, the California courts resolved the conflict between the Davis requirement of malice in fact and the later cases which also allowed implied malice to support punitive damages by allowing punitive damages to be based on conscious wrongdoing with probable but not intended injurious consequences. Id.
Nevada’s experience is parallel to California’s. In its cases Nevada had cited Davis and Nevada Credit Rating Bureau on the requirement of “actual malice” and then approved punitive awards that were clearly based on unintended injury. While paying lip service to the requirement that malice in fact — intent to harm — must be found, this court has regularly allowed recovery for unintended harm in the form of reckless disregard for the rights of others. See e.g., Leslie v. Jones Chemical Co., 92 Nev. 391, 551 P.2d 234 (1976) (stating that malice could be inferred from a disregard of known *14safety procedures); Village Development Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 526 P.2d 83 (1974) (stating that malice could be found if the act was willful and the damage a necessary result); Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 514 P.2d 1180 (1973) (citing Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 (App. 1967), and holding that wanton disregard for the rights of others amounted to legal malice).

 In defining the malice of unintended harm the trial court used the words “when a defendant consciously and deliberately disregards known safety measures in reckless disregard of possible results.” These words are taken directly from Leslie v. Jones Chemical Co., 92 Nev. 391, 393, 551 P.2d 234, 235 (1976). I would be leery of perpetuating the use of the term “reckless” because it is ambiguous and easily confused with gross negligence and other terms that relate to the risk inherent in behavior rather than to the mental state of the actor. Sometimes reckless is defined in terms of being merely “careless” or “heedless”; sometimes it refers to the mental state of “indifference to[] consequences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety to others, although no harm was intended.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1142 (5th ed. 1979). Likewise, “indifference” does not convey the conscious or willful excessive risktaking which is at the heart of implied malice. Under a statute, such as Nevada’s, which states malice as a ground for awarding punitive damages, recklessness as a form of excessive negligence, and indifference, insofar as the word may mean mere carelessness, do not reach the level of punishable culpability contemplated by the term malice. The report of the American College of Trial Lawyers, mentioned in the text, “would not permit punitive awards where the element of consciousness is sufficiently lacking, such as in the case of negligent, or even grossly negligent, conduct.” American College of Trial Lawyers, “Report on Punitive Damages of the Committee on Special Problems in the Administration of Justice,” at 10 (March 3, 1989). I agree with this, as I agree also that the standard for culpability for punitive awards “should require a conscious and egregious invasion of the rights of others” such as intentional torts or “torts based on lesser degrees of cognition, such as where the defendant acts in a willful or wrongful manner.” Id. The necessary “degree of cognition” for implied malice is the knowledge or consciousness of danger. A person who is negligent fails to perceive danger; a person guilty of implied malice perceives the danger but willfully disregards it: “I know that someone will probably get hurt, but I am going to do it anyway.”

 The universally accepted rationales for punitive and exemplary damages are, as the words denote, to punish the offender for wrongful acts and to set an example, that is, to deter others. Punishment by way of civil fines, punitive damages, is not to be levied lightly or indiscriminately. Malice in punitive damage cases is analogous to malice aforethought in the criminal law of homicide. In the law of homicide, express malice aforethought means an intention to kill. Implied malice aforethought, on the other hand, does not require actual ill will or intention to kill and signifies a general malignancy, an “abandoned and malignant heart” that the law infers from the manner in which the homicide was committed. Thus, when a person charged with murder has willfully committed an act which by its nature is likely to result in death or serious bodily harm, the law will furnish the necessary element of malice aforethought. It will imply the mental requisite for murder by implying malice aforethought from the culpable conduct of the accused. Implied malice in tort law is comparable to implied malice aforethought in the law of homicide. Implied malice in tort law is also a Active mental state implied in law from the conscious wrongdoing of the tortfeasor, irrespective of actual ill will or the presence of an intention to harm someone.

 The essence of the “culpable mental state” called implied malice is the decision to go ahead knowingly with an activity that one knows will probably end up in an injury to another person. To say that one acts in a manner that he or she knows will probably hurt someone is the same as saying that such person is consciously disregarding the rights or safety of others. “Conscious disregard” is, then, another way of referring to an intentional risktaking which one knows will probably result in injury.

 An interesting statutory analogue to the implied malice discussed in this opinion is found in former NRS 42.010(2), wherein punitive damages were allowed in cases in which a defendant wrongfully, that is, “caused an injury by the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of NRS 484.379 or 484.3795 after willfully consuming or using alcohol or another substance, knowing that he would thereafter operate the motor vehicle.” (My emphasis.) In such a case, irrespective of any actual malice or ill will, a defendant may be held for unintended harmful consequences resulting from this kind of wrongful conduct. This statutory species of implied malice can be taken as legislative approval of a kind of malice that does not require a specific intent to injure.

 In connection with the historical footnote above, note 1,1 note that in the Grimshaw opinion the court rejected Ford’s contention that it did not have fair warning of punitive damage liability based on unintentional wrongdoing stating that such an argument “ignores the long line of decisions in [California] beginning with Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co. (1941), [cite omitted], holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a nondeliberate or unintentional tort where the defendant’s conduct constitutes a conscious disregard of the probability of injury to others.” Grimshaw, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 383 (citations omitted). The Grimshaw court made this pronouncement on the history of punitive damage law relying on prior decisional law. Id.
The California Legislature codified the judicial interpretation of the types of malice required for punitive damage liability when it amended Civil Code section 3294 to include the following definition of malice: “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or *19despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990). This amendment did not change the malice required for punitive damages but rather made clear, as had decisional law, that implied malice would support an award of punitive damages. See Krusi v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 192 Cal.Rptr. 793, 802 (App. 1983).

 See Forrester v. Southern Pacific Co., 36 Nev. 247, 281 (1913). “As Earle, J., did not participate in the decision in the Quigley case, any statements in the opinion of Hawley, C. J., and Beatty, J., in which both did not concur, are not binding as law because lacking the concurrence of a majority of the court.”