Court Opinion

ID: 9668585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:18:46.551538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.217710
License: Public Domain

Edwards, J.
(concurring). The workmen’s compensation appeal board found that plaintiff, Eula Sheppard, was disabled as a result of “an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment” by the defendant bank on December 14, 1953. The record discloses that the plaintiff became disabled as a result of a back injury she received in the course of her employment lifting file trays of the approximate weight of 25 pounds when 1 of them stuck in the file and she gave a “yank” to free it. The appeal board did not find, nor does the record disclose, any other source of the injury or disability than the single event described above.
On appeal to this Court much of the debate between the parties has pertained to whether or not the fact situation referred to above represented an unexpected or fortuitous event of an “accidental” nature. This Court believes, however, that there is no necessity in this case to pass on this question since under any construction of the record and the findings of the appeal board which are supported by the rec*613ord, it is clear that plaintiff’s disabling personal injury arose out of and during the course of her employment. This Court has held on numerous occasions that the 1943 amendment to the workmen’s compensation act* eliminated any requirement for finding an accidental injury precedent to recovery by one who suffers a personal injury arising out of and during the course of his occupation. Anderson v. General Motors Corp. (1946), 313 Mich 630; Kasarewski v. Hupp Motor Car Corp. (1946), 315 Mich 225; Schinderle v. Ford Motor Co. (1947), 316 Mich 387; Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1947), 317 Mich 149. See, also, Croff v. Lakey Foundry & Machine Co. (1948), 320 Mich 581.
It is, of course, true that almost 9 years after the amendment referred to was adopted, and had been repeatedly applied by the appeal board of the workmen’s compensation commission and by the Supreme Court in the cases listed above, a majority of the Supreme Court reversed its holding on the current point in dispute in the case of Arnold v. Ogle Construction Company (1952), 333 Mich 652. There 4 members of the Court joined Justice Carr in an opinion holding that the plain effort of the legislature in 1943 to eliminate the requirement of “accident” in the workmen’s compensation act was invalidated by the continuation of the term “accidental injury” in the title of the act, thereby holding exactly contrary to the prevailing opinions in the Anderson, Kasar-ewslci, Schinderle, Saméis, and Croff Cases referred to above.
Since the Arnold Case (1952), subsequent decisions have dealt primarily with the difficult and tenuous argument as to what sort of fact situation relat*614ing to injury constitutes an unexpected or fortuitous event, and, hence, an “accident.” Nuyen v. U. S. Foundry Corp. (1955), 342 Mich 70; Simpson v. Matthes (1955), 343 Mich 125; Brazauskis v. Muskegon County Board of Road Commissioners (1956), 345 Mich 480; Beltinck v. Mt. Pleasant State Home and Training School (1956), 346 Mich 494.
Paralleling the decisions referred to above, but plainly dealing with additional issues not involved in the instant case, are those cases in which the Court has dealt with claims for compensation under the 1937 and 1943 amendments filed by persons who claimed compensation as a result of heart disease, heart attack, or stroke. Hagopian v. City of Highland Park (1946), 313 Mich 608; O’Neil v. W. R. Spencer Grocer Co. (1946), 316 Mich 320; Schlange v. Briggs Manufacturing Company (1950), 326 Mich 552; May v. A. H. Powell Lumber Co. (1953), 335 Mich 420; McGregor v. Conservation Department (1953), 338 Mich 93; Nichols v. Central Crate & Box Company (1954), 340 Mich 232; Wieda v. American Box Board Company (1955), 343 Mich 182.
Involved in these cases were defendant claims that the injury considered was due to an ordinary disease of life (CL 1948, § 417.1 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17. 220] ), or to some pre-existing condition or disease.
These issues are not posed in the simple personal injury case currently before us and, hence, are not considered or decided herein.
The sole issue posed by appellants is: “Do the undisputed facts show that the plaintiff sustained an accidental personal injury?”
For purposes of this opinion our present question may be stated: Where a disabling personal injury has been suffered by a compensation claimant, arising out of and during the course of employment, should this Court in interpreting the present workmen’s compensation act require proof of a causal *615“accident” precedent to recovery? The decision is purely one of statutory interpretation. Eights under the workmen’s compensation act were created by legislative enactment, and plainly the legislature had and has the power properly to amend its own words.
Let us then once again examine the history of the legislature’s attempt to settle this question, a history, incidentally, previously recited by Justice Btjshnell in Anderson, Justice Dethmers in Croff, Justice North in Arnold, and Justice Smith in Wieda.
In 1941 the Michigan legislature authorized the creation of a study committee to undertake a general revision and modernization of the workmen’s compensation statute. House Eesolution No 78, 2 House Journal 1941, p 1779.
Such a committee was appointed and in 1943 made its report. House Journal 1943, p 318 et seq. At the same session of the legislature (1943), outgoing Governor Murray D. Van "Wagoner in his exaugural message hoped “that this legislature will see fit to follow its recommendations.” House Journal 1943, 40 at page 42. Incoming Governor Harry F. Kelly, now a member of this Bench, in a legislative message referred to the anticipated committee report and recommended “that amendments to the Michigan workmen’s compensation act be made to bring about comprehensive liberalization of its present provisions.” House Journal 1943, 31 at page 39.
The report of the committee read as follows:
“One change in this part of the proposed act abolishes the schedule of 31 occupational diseases contained in the 1937 amendment to the present law and also abolishes the requirement that injuries be accidental.” House Journal 1943, at page 320.
Two members of the committee filed a supplemental report which stated, in part:
*616“But we do insist that there should not be deleted from the present law, as the other 2 voting members propose, the fact that all other personal injuries must be accidental.” House Journal 1943, 334 at page 337.
With these reports before it the legislative session of 1943 adopted a comprehensive series of amendments (PA 1943, No 245), among which the following pertain directly to the question currently before-the Court.
Part 1, § 10(a) dealing with the liability of an employer to a subemployee, prior to the 1943 amendment spoke of “accidental injury;” the 1943 amendment deleted “accidental.”
Part 2, § 7 says that dependency shall be determined as of the date of “injury;” prior to 1943 this read as of the date of “accident.”
Part 2, § 11 was rewritten, in part, in 1943 thereby eliminating 3 usages of “accidental injury;” in addition, in 2 other places “accident” was specifically changed to “injury.”
Part 2, § 12 deals with death benefits; the word “accident” was deleted and the word “injury” added in 2 places by the 1943 amendment.
In part 2, § 15 prior to 1943 “accident” or “accidental personal injury” appeared in a total of 6 places. ' The 1943 revision served to substitute “injury” for “accident” in 4 places, eliminate “accidental” in another; but it retained — phrased clearly in the alternative to the word “injury” — 1 reference to-“accident.”
Part 3, § 13 was practically rewritten in 1943, but prior thereto this section provided for filing for judgment in the county where the “accident” occurred; subsequently it provided for filing in the county where the “injury” occurred.
Part 3, § 17 dealing with records and reports of injuries, employed “accident” or “accidental injury”' *617a total of 36 times prior to 1943. In that year it was greatly shortened and practically rewritten. It now requires the employer to report “the time and cause of the accident, the nature and extent of the injury and disability.”
Part 4, § 1 contained 3 references to “accident” or “accidental injury” prior to 1943. While this section was amended in that year the 3 presently considered references were not altered. The section has, however, been amended on 3 different occasions since 1943 (PA 1951, No 151;. PA 1952, No 107; PA 1953, No 198). The 1952 amendment specifically inserted “compensable injuries or compensable occupational diseases” in lieu of the 3 aforementioned references.
Part 7, § 2, which was added to the act by the 1937 amendment (PA 1937, No 61), originally spoke of “personal injury by accident;” in 1943 this was amended to read simply “personal injury.”
The key section of the act, part 2, § 1, was likewise amended in 1943 to read as follows:
“[An employee, who] receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is at the time of such injury subject to the provisions of this act, shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided, or in ease of his death resulting from such injuries such compensation shall be paid to his dependents as hereinafter defined. [The term ‘time of injury’ or ‘date of injury’ as used in this act shall in the case of a disease or in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event be the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability or death.]*” (CL 1948, §412.1 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.151].)
*618While this amendment did not eliminate any reference to “accident,” since there was none in the paragraph as previously written, it is significant that in the material added in 1943 the legislature used the term “a single event” where “accident” would undoubtedly have been used but for the legislative intent to dispense with this requirement.
It should be noted that no change was made in the title of the act at the time of this series of amendments, the title already having been amended in 1937 by adding thereto the terms “occupational injuries or disease” in order to provide for part 7 which was added in that year. Since that amendment the crucial portion has read:
“Providing compensation for the disability or death resulting from occupational injuries or disease or accidental injury to or death of employees.”
It is, of course, obvious that industrial injuries arising from “accidents” (fortuitous events by this Court’s previous definition) continue to be compen-sable under these amendments. The problem dealt with by these amendments was that posed by industrial injuries resulting from ordinary work performed in an ordinary manner and previously held noncompensable because “nonaccidental” under the Court’s previous definition. There is thus nothing-inconsistent with the stated legislative purpose in the term “accidental injury” being retained in the title of the act where it is in the clear alternative to “occupational injuries.”
The interpretation. of the 1943 amendments was first made by the workmen’s compensation commission. Its interpretation is clearly mirrored in an article in the Detroit Bar Quarterly (Detroit Lawyer), Jan 1945, Yol 13, pp 8, 10, written by James L. Hill, a member of the commission at that. *619time, and entitled “Progress in the Field of Workmen’s Compensation.” Mr. Hill, referring to part 2, § 1, as quoted above, said:
“That section definitely provides compensation for a personal injury due to a disease, for a personal injury not attributable to a single event and for a personal injury due to a single event. If it was intended to compensate for a personal injury due to a single event only if such event was an accidental occurrence, then the word ‘accident’ would undoubtedly have been used in section 1 rather than the term ‘single event.’
“It has been argued that the term ‘personal injury’ as now used throughout the act cannot be construed to include such injury for the reason that the title of the act limits compensation benefits to cases of ‘disability or death resulting from occupational injuries or disease or accidental injury.’ It has been claimed that the title of the act is not broad enough to bring within its scope a personal injury due to a single event unless the cause of the personal injury is some unusual, unexpected or fortuitous occurrence. That claim is based on the contention that the term ‘occupational injuries’ as used in the title of the act is limited to injuries which occur little by little, drop by drop, and which cannot be described accurately as an occupational disease. In the writer’s opinion, there is no reason for so limiting the scope of the term ‘occupational injuries.’ It is a broad term and easily embraces an injury due to a single event whether accidental or not. It would be a strained construction, indeed, to hold that a back strain resulting from a single heavy lift could not be classified as an occupational injury.”
The interpretation of the legislative attempt to eliminate “accidental” from the statute first came before the Supreme Court in 2 cases, decisions in which were handed down on the same day, March 4, 1946. In the first of these, Hagopian v. City of High*620land Park, supra, Justice Btjtzel wrote for denial of compensation to a Highland Park refuse worker who suffered a heart attack during the course of his normal day’s work, arguing strongly that the requirement of an accidental event had not been eliminated from the statute. The Court divided 5 to 3 with Justice Bushnell authoring the dissenting opinion urging affirmance of the award and holding that the requirement of an “accidental injury” had been eliminated by the 1943 amendments.
In Anderson v. General Motors Corp., supra, issued the same date, the Court, by a 6 to 2 margin, affirmed an award to a claimant who, while engaged in his normal day’s occupation of lifting gun barrels, suffered a disability diagnosed as a probable “ruptured nucleous polyposis” {sic).
In an opinion concurring in affirmance Justice North explained his vote on both prevailing sides as follows:
“Decision in the instant case is not controlled by Justice Butzel’s opinion in Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, 313 Mich 608, for the following reasons. In the instant case Anderson’s personal injury clearly arose out of and in the course of his employment. His injury was not at all in the nature of an ordinary disease 'of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment,’ which would render such an injury noncompensable.” Anderson v. General Motors Corp., supra, p 638.
Justice Bushnell, after reviewing the history of this legislation in much the same fashion as outlined above, said in the prevailing opinion in the Anderson Case, at page 636:
“The conclusion is inescapable that the legislature had squarely before it the question of whether or not the then requirements of the act as to acci*621dental injury should be retained or abolished, and that it deliberately arrived at the decision to abolish such requirements. That this was the intent of the legislature is indicated in a chart submitted by plaintiff, which quotes portions of 6 sections of the act before the 1943 amendment, and the same portions thereafter in each of which the words ‘accidental’ or ‘accident’ have been deleted and the word ‘injury’ substituted therefor.
“During the 2-1/2 years since this amendment of the act, we apprehend that the department of labor and industry has been construing the law to mean that an injury to be compensable does not have to be accidental in nature. Although we have no information in the record before us as to the number of claims so determined, we are able to conclude from the paucity of applications for writs of certiorari involving this point that the department’s interpretation has been generally accepted by the profession. We feel sure that such interpretation eliminates the seeming need for doubtful testimony as to slipping, falling, et cetera, which is replete in cases prior to the amendment.”
In Schinderle v. Ford Motor Co. (1947), supra, Justice Reid, speaking for the unanimous Court, affirmed an award of compensation with the following language (pp 394, 395):
“The deputy commissioner found, ‘That on 11-26, 1943 the above named employee did receive a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by the above named employer.’ This award was affirmed by the department on appeal. The award is construed by us to be a finding that the injury was, as stated in the report of defendant, i.e., myositis. The injury is attributable to a single event, which occurred as plaintiff turned while handling a heavy board. The myositis did not exist before the injury.
*622“Under the authority of Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 313 Mich 630, the injury in the instant case is compensable.”
Since in the Schinderle Case there was testimony of a “slip,” the positions of the various Justices may not have been completely stated therein.
In Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1947), supra, while upholding an award of workmen’s compensation to a plaintiff who suffered epicondylitis after 7 months of work for defendant as a tire builder, the thinking of the Court was expressed in 4 separate opinions. Justice Reid wrote for affirmance under part 7 of the act (Justice Butzel concurring) ; Justice Boyles wrote a separate opinion also concurring in affirmance under part 7. Justice North held for affirmance under a theory of nonaccidental personal injury under the authority of Anderson, supra (Justices Bushnell and Dethmers concurring). Justice Sharpe dissented (concurred by Justice Carr).
In Croff v. Lakey Foundry & Machine Co., supra, Justice Dethmers wrote the prevailing opinion affirming an award of compensation by a 4-4 division to a core setter who suffered a back injury during the course of heavy lifting which was normal to his job. Justice Dethmers’ opinion says, in part, as follows (pp 585, 586):
“Mr. Justice Bushnell’s opinion in the Hagopian Case directs attention to the number of instances in which the words ‘accident’ and ‘accidental’ were eliminated from the act by the 1943 amendment and the term ‘injury’ substituted for the terms ‘accident’ and ‘accidental injury.’ His opinion in the Anderson Case points out that this was not done inadvertently or merely for the purpose of substituting a term which would have equal application to accidental injury and occupational disease, but rather that the legislature acted in response to a specific committee *623recommendation to abolish the requirement that an injury must be accidental to make a resultant disability compensable.”
In Arnold v. Ogle Construction Co. (1952), supra, a majority of the Court finally reversed its interpretation of the effect of the 1943 amendments pertaining to nonaccidental personal injuries. In again reviewing the entire history of the legislative enactment in similar fashion as originally undertaken by Justice Butzel in Hagopian v. City of Highland Park (1946), supra, Justice Carr held that proof of accidental injury was still required in spite of the 1943 amendments because the legislature had not in 1943 amended the title of the act to eliminate therefrom the term “accidental injury.” Four Justices concurred with Justice Carr. Justices Dethmers and Btjshnell concurred in Justice North’s dissenting opinion which is so pertinent to our current problem as to suggest quotation, with our complete approval (pp 667-669):
“The real reason urged in support of the conclusion that nonaccidental injuries are not compensa-ble, is that the title to the workmen’s compensation act (as we repeatedly held prior to the 1937 amendment) was not broad enough to permit awards of compensation under part 2 of the act for nonacci-dental injury. This, we think, ignores the combined effect of the 1937 amendment and the 1943 amendment.
“Prior to 1937 the act provided compensation only in event of one cátese of a personal injury or death of an employee — i. e., an accidental injury. This limitation was expressed in the title which prior to the 1937 amendment (so far as here material) read:
“ ‘An act * * * providing compensation for the accidental injury to or death of employees.’
“But the title as amended in 1937 was and is not confined to a single ground — i. e., accidental injury, for awarding compensation. Instead by the 1937 *624amended title the possible scope of the act was broadened so that it included 3 grounds or circumstances under which an injured employee (or his dependents in event of his death) might receive an award of compensation. This 1937 amended title (so far as material here) provides for ‘compensation for the disability or death resulting from [1] * †*§occupational injuries [2]* or disease [3]* or accidental injury to or death of employees.’
“While it is a fair inference that at the time the primary purpose of the 1937 amendment was to make the act ample to include occupational diseases, as specified, nonetheless it was also sufficient to include ‘occupational injuries’ as well as accidental injuries. The reason that thereafter, and prior to the 1943 amendment, we repeatedly held a nonaccidental injury was not compensable was that the act itself in part 2 still provided for compensation only in event that the injury was accidentally sustained. Evidently to overcome this restriction the legislature in 1943 materially amended part 2 of the act. As noted by Mr. Justice Btjshnell in the Eagopian Case, supra, ‘the words “accident” and “accidental” were used 54 times in the act before its amendment (in 1943) and now both words are used only 5 times;’† and Justice Btjshnell further comments (p 613):
“ ‘It is obvious to even the ordinary lay reader that the scope of the title of the act in question is *625sufficient to embrace tbe provisions of tbe 1943 amendment, and that this amendment in connection with the title does not offend or contravene the mandate of article 5, § 21 of the 1908 Constitution of this State.’ ”
“If subsequent amendments to the body of an act would be within the scope of the title, if they had been enacted at the same time the title was amended, they should still be considered as within the amended title. In Common Council of Detroit v. Schmid, 128 Mich 379, 388 (92 Am St Rep 468), we said:
“ ‘It seems, therefore, that the law is fully settled in this State that whatever might have been incorporated into the original act under the title of such original act may be added by way of amendment under the most general title.’
“The last above quotation is approvingly embodied in Surtman v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich 270, 277. Thus, since the 1937 amendment to the workmen’s compensation act, we have an act entitled sufficiently broad to cover ‘occupational injuries’ sustained by employees, provided such injuries arise out of and in the course of the employment — i. e., that there be a causal relation. And in the body of the act, as amended in 1943, numerous changes were made by substituting ‘personal injury’ for ‘accidental injury.’ Scarcely any reason for such changes can be given except that the legislature intended thereby to delete from the act the limitation that an injury sustained by an employee would not be com-pensable except it was caused accidentally or by some fortuitous circumstance.
“In view of the foregoing we think it must be held that since the 1943 amendment an occupational injury suffered by an employee is not noncompensable merely because it is nonaccidental.”
Justice Smith’s dissent in Wieda (1955), supra, added to this discussion of the problem of title the following pertaining to the intent of the legislature in the 1943 amendment (p 203):
*626“It will be observed that the insertion of the suggested word ‘accidental’ has been rejected. It should also be noted that the same amendment undertook a wholesale excision of the words ‘accident’ and ‘accidental injury,’ from other portions of the act, and the substitution of the word ‘injury.’ Anderson v. General Motors Corporation, supra. Our words in People v. Adamowski, 340 Mich 422, 429, would seem particularly applicable at this point:
“ ‘When the legislature affirmatively rejected the statutory language which would have supported the State’s present view, it thereby made its intention crystal clear. We should not* without a clear and cogent reason to the contrary, give a statute a construction which the legislature itself plainly refused to give.’ ”
It might be noted that Justice Black in his opinions in the Beltinck and Brazauskis Cases, supra, cited and relied upon Justice Smith’s dissent in the Wieda Case.
In Justice Carr’s opinion in the instant case he quotes from the headnotes in the Wieda Case as follows :
“An unfortunate result may not be given the retroactive effect of making a particular event or happening accidental in nature which was not of such character when it took place and, thereby, impose liability under portion of workmen’s compensation act requiring that injury to be compensable must have been proximately caused by an accident (CL 1948, § 412.1 et seq., as amended).” (Syllabus 3.)
The above quotation referring to “portion of workmen’s compensation act requiring that injury to be compensable must have been proximately caused by an accident” is completely erroneous; there is no such portion of the workmen’s compensation act currently on the statute books in Michigan, nor was there at the time of the Wieda decision, *627and this mistake should not be compounded hy being included in an opinion of this Court. V
It remains then only to be said that this Co'urt now reverts to its original interpretation of the 1943 amendment and holds that a'personal injury arising out of and during the course of employment under that amendment does not have to be.“accidental” in origin as a condition precedent to recovery. .'The holding to - the contrary previously discussed in Arnold v. Ogle Construction Co., supra, and subsequent decisions is hereby overruled.
: The award of the workmen’s compensation conn mission should be affirmed,'with costs' to the appellee".
Addendum.
“Say not, the struggle'naught availeth.”*
Six members of our Court have now written oh-this case. This illustrates the long history of the controversy which, I.dare to predict, is here resolved.'r
Out of all'the welter of our words and variety, of reasons comes this cleár-cut.' conclusion: There■ is no longer a'requirement that “an accident”„or “a fortuitous” -event (this Court’s previous definition of “accident”) he proven as a condition precedent for recovery of workmen’s compensation for a single-event personal injury which arises out of and during the course of employment. .A clear majority of the Court (including the'writer) takes the .view that this conclusion results inevitably from the 1943 amendments' hereby again ’ given their intended effect. Several Justices (including the writer) likewise feel that such a requirement (i. e., proof of “fortuitous event”) need never have been made for the reasons outlined in Justice Smith’s eloquent dissent in Wieda (Wieda v. American Box Board Co., 343 *628Mich 182) since the word “accident” previously contained in the act as a requirement should he defined to include both the unexpected event and the unexpected result.
Justice Smith’s opinion in the instant case deals also with those cases in which the Court appeared to indicate that where there was proof of a preexisting ailment or injury, then, in spite of the 1943 amendments, proof of “accident” as the Court had previously construed it was still required. This question was not dealt with in the preceding opinion because as indicated the record shows no pre-exist-ing ailment or injury in this case. In a companion case (Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich 635) decided this day, where there was evidence of a pre-existing ailment, we also lay this ghost. The holding in this latter ease of a clear majority of the Court (including the writer) indicates a second clear-cut conclusion: Under the workmen’s compensation statute and the 1943 amendments thereto, evidence of a preexisting ailment or injury does not create any requirement of proof of “accident” or “fortuitous event” (this Court’s previous definition of “accident”) as a condition precedent to recovery granted other statutorily-required proof.

 For references to the original aet, its amendments and sections as hereinafter discussed, see PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10 (CL 1948, § 411.1 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 17.141 et seg.]).

 Bracketed material added by 1943 amendments.

 Bracketed matter supplied. — Reporter.

 As noted earlier in this opinion, 3 of these usages have now been eliminated. The words “accident” or “accidental” are now found in the relevant sections of the workmen’s compensation statute in only 2 places (once in pt 2, § 15, and once in pt 3, § 17). In each instance the use is clearly alternative to the word “injury.” Taking the statute as a whole, in addition the word “accidental” is retained in the title of the act alternatively phrased to “occupational injuries,” and the word “accident” is retained in the names of the industrial accident board and the State accident fund and may likewise be found, apparently by sheer inadvertence, retained in pt 5, § 5, dealing with premiums and assessments under the State aceident fund. (See CLS 1954, § 412.15, CL 1948, § 413.17, title, CL 1948, §§ 413.1, 415.2 and 415.5 [Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 17.165, Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.191, title, Stat Ann 1950 Rev §§ 17.174, 17.200 and 17.203].)

 Arthur Hugh Clough, first line of poejn hy same name “Say Slot the.Struggle Naught availeth.” Oxford-Bool!; of English Verse 1250— 1900, p 880. “.....