Court Opinion

ID: 9453026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:59:55.277182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:27.966323
License: Public Domain

DUFFY, Senior Circuit Judge,
affirming in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in parts (1) to (3) of Judge Fairchild’s opinion rejecting appellant’s arguments based on variance, admission of a confession and cruel and unusual punishment.
The fourth and major issue presented by this case concerns the instruction given by the trial court on the defense of insanity. This Court today adopts the American Law Institute definition of insanity and reverses this conviction for a new trial.
I think that a reversal in this case is entirely unwarranted. What did the trial judge do that is now proclaimed to be reversible error? The answer is that the judge gave an instruction that was based upon the instruction approved by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 379, 17 S.Ct. 360, 41 L.Ed. 750. The trial judge gave an instruction that was recognized as proper in this Circuit.
The majority recognizes that the requisite elements of cognition and volition are present in the Davis instruction as well as in the A.L.I. definition. All relevant expert testimony on the defendant’s mental condition was received in evidence. The instruction which was given should be read in its entirety rather than with attention focused upon individual words. When considered as a whole, it is clear that the instruction contained all the required elements for the jury’s consideration, and was in accordance both with the prior decisions of this Court1 and with the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis. In these circumstances, the failure to use the A.L.I. definition, which has not prior to this time been adopted by this Circuit, cannot, in my opinion, constitute reversible error. See Pope v. United States, 8 Cir. (1967), 372 F.2d 710, 735-736; Wion v. United States, 10 Cir. (1963), 325 F.2d 420, 430, cert. den. 377 U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 1354, 12 L.Ed.2d 309; United States v. Currens, 3 Cir. (1961), 290 F.2d 751, 776-777 (Judge Hastie dissenting in part).
*690I have no objection to the use of an instruction such as that set forth in Judge Fairchild’s opinion in future cases in this Circuit. We should recognize, however, that much of the difference between the various definitions which have been proposed is one of language rather than of substantive legal standards. As has been recently stated:
“We still entertain a deep suspicion that, despite the welter of legal, psychiatric, and philosophic theory and verbiage, much of the legal problem is basically semantic and engulfed in words, and that a practical American jury in any given case (except, possibly, upon the McDonald-Durham approach), will reach the same conclusion, whether it be instructed along traditional M’Naghten and irresistible impulse lines, or upon any of the approaches of Currens or Freeman or variations thereof.” Pope v. United States, supra, 372 F.2d at page 735.
Since the instruction given was in accordance with appropriate legal standards, I would affirm the judgment.

. United States v. Cain, 7 Cir. (1962), 298 F.2d 934; United States v. Westerhausen, 7 Cir. (1960), 283 F.2d 844. See also United States v. Cooks, 7 Cir. (1966), 359 F.2d 772; United States v. Williams, 7 Cir. (1967), 372 F.2d 76, both decided subsequent to the trial below.