Court Opinion

ID: 9391415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 12:06:26.215543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.204333
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA22-461

                                 Filed 02 May 2023

Durham County, No. 20 CVD 2222

AHMED O. CHAHDI, Plaintiff,

              v.

JOCELYN I. MACK, Defendant.

        Appeal by Plaintiff from judgment entered 28 October 2021 by Judge James T.

Hill in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 January

2023.

        Perry, Perry, & Perry, P.A., by Chelsi C. Edwards and Robert T. Perry, for
        Plaintiff-Appellant.

        Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, P.L.L.C., by Kara V. Bordman
        and Camilla F. DeBoard, for Defendant-Appellee.

        GRIFFIN, Judge.

        Plaintiff Ahmed O. Chadhi appeals from final judgment entered upon a jury

verdict finding Plaintiff was not injured by the negligence of Defendant Jocelyn I.

Mack. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine

of sudden emergency, dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and

awarding attorney’s fees. We hold the trial court properly instructed the jury on the

doctrine of sudden emergency. Plaintiff’s remaining contentions are not properly

before this Court.
                                    CHAHDI V. MACK

                                    Opinion of the Court

                   I.    Factual and Procedural Background

       On 7 November 2014, Defendant was driving her grandmother’s 2010 Pontiac

vehicle when she experienced a brake failure. Upon discovering the brake failure,

Defendant asked the other passenger, her fourteen-year-old niece, to call her

grandmother.     Defendant spoke on the phone with her grandmother for several

minutes and continued driving toward downtown Durham as she felt uncomfortable

and unsafe trying to stop the car. After several miles, Defendant approached a red

light at an intersection, pulled into the parking lot of Buy Quick Food Mart, and,

while traveling nearly 10 mph, collided with the convenience store. Plaintiff was

working in the store at the time of the collision. As a result of the impact from the

collision, an indoor display fell on Plaintiff’s arm.

       On 13 September 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint (“17 CVD 4116”) alleging

Defendant was negligent in operating the vehicle and Plaintiff was personally injured

as a result. Defendant filed an answer and Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for leave

to amend and add causes of action for gross negligence and punitive damages. The

amendment was allowed, and Defendant filed another answer. Plaintiff, again, filed

motion for leave to amend which was granted and Defendant answered. On 19

August 2019, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to punitive

damages. Following a hearing, on 29 August 2019, Judge Shamieka L. Rinehart

entered an order granting partial summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for

punitive damages with prejudice. On 25 February 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice of

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                                    Opinion of the Court

voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to the remaining claims in 17 CVD 4116.

        On 10 March 2020, Plaintiff filed a summons and complaint (“20 CVD 2222”)

which included a second claim for relief for willful and wanton conduct. On 16 April

2020, Defendant answered and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a

motion to strike the issue of punitive damages. After a hearing, on 29 June 2020,

Judge Rinehart filed an order granting the motion to strike and awarding attorney’s

fees.

        On 14 September 2021, the 20 CVD 2222 matter came on for trial by jury before

the Honorable James T. Hill in Durham County District Court. Ultimately, the trial

court submitted two questions to the jury: “Was [ ] Plaintiff, Ahmed Chahdi injured

by the negligence of Defendant Jocelyn Mack?” and “What amount is Plaintiff Ahmed

Chahdi entitled to recover for his injury?” The trial court instructed the jury as to

the doctrine of sudden emergency. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant.

On 19 November 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.

                                    II.   Analysis

        Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of

sudden emergency, dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and awarding

attorney’s fees. We disagree.

A. The Doctrine of Sudden Emergency

        Plaintiff argues the trial erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of sudden

emergency because (1) there was not an emergency requiring immediate action to

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                                  Opinion of the Court

avoid injury, and (2) assuming there was an emergency, Defendant’s negligence

created the emergency. We disagree.

      When reviewing challenges regarding the appropriateness of jury instructions,

we must first determine “whether the trial court abused its discretion, and, second,

whether such error was likely to have misled the jury.” Goins v. Time Warner Cable

Se., LLC, 258 N.C. App. 234, 237, 812 S.E.2d 723, 726 (2018) (internal citations

omitted) (citing Murrow v. Daniels, 321 N.C. 494, 499-500, 364 S.E.2d 392, 396 (1988);

Union Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 240 N.C. App. 274, 290–91,

771 S.E.2d 590, 601 (2015)). Further, “we consider whether the instruction requested

is correct as a statement of law and, if so, whether the requested instruction is

supported by the evidence.” Minor v. Minor, 366 N.C. 526, 531, 742 S.E.2d 790, 793

(2013) (citation omitted).

      The doctrine of sudden emergency applies “when a defendant is confronted by

an emergency situation not of his own making and requires [the] defendant to act

only as a reasonable person would react to similar emergency circumstances.”

Massengill v. Starling, 87 N.C. App. 233, 236, 360 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1987) (citation

omitted). In order to submit jury instructions regarding this doctrine, the trial court

must find substantial evidence of two essential elements: “(1) an emergency situation

must exist requiring immediate action to avoid injury, and (2) the emergency must

not have been created by the negligence of the party seeking the protection of the

doctrine.” Allen v. Efird, 123 N.C. App. 701, 703, 474 S.E.2d 141, 142–43 (1996)

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                                   Opinion of the Court

(internal marks and citations omitted).         “Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (citations omitted).

Further, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party that is

claiming the benefit of the sudden emergency doctrine. Masciulli v. Tucker, 82 N.C.

App. 200, 206, 346 S.E.2d 305, 308–09 (1986).

      Unequivocally, where evidence exists regarding the issue of a sudden brake

failure caused not by the defendant’s own negligence, it is prejudicial error not to

instruct the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency. See Stevens v. Southern Oil

Co. of N.C., 259 N.C. 456, 460, 131 S.E.2d 39, 43 (1963) (holding that defendants were

entitled to instruction on the doctrine of sudden emergency as the jury, based on

evidence presented, may decide that the brakes had been defective); Stanley v. Brown,

261 N.C. 243, 248, 134 S.E.2d 321, 325 (1964) (holding that where the defendant

presented substantial evidence of an unforeseeable brake failure, he was entitled to

a jury instruction regarding the sudden emergency doctrine); Horne v. Trivette, 58

N.C. App. 77, 81, 293 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1982) (holding that where there was evidence

tending to show the defendant was confronted with a sudden emergency, the trial

court was correct in giving the instruction).

   1. Emergency

      Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to present substantial evidence that she

was confronted with an emergency requiring immediate action to avoid injury

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                                  Opinion of the Court

because she had sufficient notice and ample time to address the brake failure prior

to the collision. Specifically, Plaintiff argues Defendant noticed the brake failure

several miles from the collision site and spoke on the phone with her grandmother

for 60 to 120 seconds following the discovery. Therefore, Plaintiff contends, given the

distance and time Defendant traveled, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude the

brake failure required Defendant to immediately react.

      As noted above, where there is substantial evidence of a sudden brake failure

caused not by the defendant’s own negligence, it is prejudicial error not to instruct

the jury on the issue of sudden emergency. See supra II.A. Even still, we address

Plaintiff’s argument as to the alleged lack of emergency.

      Plaintiff’s argument here—the trial court erred in its instruction because the

brake failure did not require Defendant to act immediately—aims to effectually limit

the definition of a sudden emergency to include only those situations in which a

defendant is able to immediately resolve the situation, thereby confusing immediate

action with immediate resolution. While we understand our precedent indicates the

doctrine applies only where an emergency situation exists requiring the defendant to

take immediate action to avoid injury, we must also consider the facts surrounding

the alleged emergency situation. Plaintiff’s argument fails to recognize that a brake

failure will generally, inevitably end in an unavoidable accident, in spite of a

defendant acting immediately to avoid injury.

      Further, despite Plaintiff’s attempt to redefine the circumstances under which

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                                  Opinion of the Court

the doctrine of sudden emergency applies by limiting what constitutes “immediate

action,” our case law specifies the doctrine is a mere application of the prudent man,

or reasonable person, standard stating:

             The emergency is merely a fact to be taken into account in
             determining whether he has acted as a reasonable man so
             situated would have done. The extent to which it will
             excuse a departure from the care and judgment which
             would be required under normal circumstances will,
             therefore, vary with the suddenness with which the
             emergency developed, the seriousness of the threatened
             damage and other circumstances calculated to excite and
             confuse. The doctrine of sudden emergency, moreover,
             relates solely to the appraisal of conduct occurring after the
             emergency is observed.

Rodgers v. Carter, 266 N.C. 564, 568, 146 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1966); see also Foy v.

Bremson, 286 N.C. 108, 120, 209 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1974) (“The sudden emergency rule

is a mere application of the rule of the prudent man.”). Moreover, our Supreme Court

holds, “[o]ne who is required to act in an emergency is not held by the law to the

wisest choice of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of ordinary care and

prudence, similarly situated, would have made.” Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 497, 499,

181 S.E. 562, 563 (1935) (citations omitted). The application of the doctrine does not

focus on the instant in which the defendant was able to resolve the emergency, but

rather on whether, taking the emergency into account, the defendant acted as a

reasonable person would, given similar circumstances.

      In regard to the existence of an emergency situation, if the court is presented

with substantial evidence that an emergency situation existed requiring the

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                                   CHAHDI V. MACK

                                  Opinion of the Court

defendant to act immediately to avoid injury, it is within the court’s discretion to

instruct the jury on the doctrine and for the jury to decide if the defendant acted

reasonably given the circumstances. See Allen, 123 N.C. App. at 703, 474 S.E.2d at

142–43; see also Rodgers, 266 N.C. at 568, 146 S.E.2d at 810; Foy, 286 N.C. at 120,

209 S.E.2d at 446.

      Here, Defendant was driving toward downtown Durham when she realized the

car would slow, but not stop. Defendant noted, in her deposition, she was unable to

pull the car over before she reached the Buy Quick, as other options were not safe or

feasible. Specifically, Defendant noted she did not want to pull into a church parking

lot where cars lined both sides of the street, such that she might hit them upon trying

to take a sharp turn into the lot without proper, working brakes; nor did she feel safe

pulling into the Shell gas station parking lot at night as it was a known hangout for

vagrants.

      Because Defendant introduced substantial evidence of a sudden brake failure,

which unequivocally creates an emergency situation, and substantial evidence as to

her actions after the discovery of the brake failure, it was not an abuse of discretion

to instruct the jury on the doctrine—assuming Defendant was not otherwise

negligent. Further, because the presentation of evidence was such that a jury could

decide whether Defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances, the trial court

did not err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency, given the

emergency situation alone.

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                                   CHAHDI V. MACK

                                  Opinion of the Court

   2. Negligence

      Plaintiff argues if an emergency existed, the emergency was caused by

Defendant’s own negligence as she continued to drive after realizing there was a

brake failure.

      As noted above, in order to submit jury instructions regarding the doctrine of

sudden emergency, there must be substantial evidence showing the emergency was

not “created by the negligence of the party seeking the protection of the doctrine.”

Allen, 123 N.C. App. at 703, 474 S.E.2d at 142–43. While we hold a sudden brake

failure must be considered an emergency situation, it is only upon the presentation

of sufficient evidence that the brake failure was not caused by the defendant’s own

negligence which requires the trial court to instruct on the sudden emergency

doctrine. See supra II.A.

      Plaintiff here argues not that Defendant was negligent as to the brake failure

itself, but negligent in the conduct she undertook upon the discovery of the brake

failure. Further, in analogizing the instant case with our Court’s opinion in Allen v.

Efird, Plaintiff contends Defendant was negligent because she lost control under

static conditions, as indicated by her collision with Buy Quick, and not after an

unexpected change in condition. Allen, 123 N.C. App. at 702, 474 S.E.2d at 142.

      In Allen, the defendant was driving on a wet roadway when he hydroplaned

and lost control of his vehicle. Id. The defendant spun off the road on the right, then

came back across the road striking the plaintiff’s vehicle in the oncoming lane of

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                                   Opinion of the Court

traffic. At trial, upon the defendant’s request, the court instructed on the doctrine of

sudden emergency. Id. at 702, 474 S.E.2d at 142. On appeal, this Court overturned

the decision and ordered a new trial reasoning the “defendant had been proceeding

on wet roads for some time prior to the accident, and [made] no assertion that there

was any unexpected change in condition for the worse immediately prior to his loss

of control.” Id. at 704, 474 S.E.2d at 143. Further, we noted the defendant failed to

present evidence of a sudden change of driving conditions or of “any road condition or

highway exigency . . . that he could not have avoided through the exercise of due

care.” Id.

      Here, Plaintiff correctly asserts Defendant discovered the brake failure and

continued driving. However, unlike the defendant in Allen, Defendant in this case

had no choice but to continue driving, under the “static condition” of having failed

brakes, as the emergent situation faced by Defendant was that she could not stop her

vehicle. Further, Defendant introduced evidence of the brake failure and the reason

she neglected to stop prior to Buy Quick. Thus, Defendant here, unlike the defendant

in Allen, not only introduced evidence of an “unexpected change in condition for the

worse”—the brake failure—but also of a sudden change in condition “[she] could not

have avoided through the exercise of due care”—as she was inevitably going to run

into something regardless of how reasonably she acted.

      As such, we hold the trial court did not err in instructing on the doctrine of

sudden emergency, as it is for the jury to decide whether Defendant’s conduct was

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                                   Opinion of the Court

negligent after realizing her brakes failed.

B. Punitive Damages and Attorney’s Fees

      Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for punitive

damages and awarding attorney’s fees. We decline to address these contentions as,

for the following reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish either of these issues is

properly before this Court.

      Any party who is entitled by law to appeal from a judgment of a trial court

rendered in a civil action may take appeal by filing a notice of appeal. N.C. R. App.

P. 3(a). Moreover, pursuant to Rule 3(d), the notice of appeal must “designate the

judgment or order from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken.”

N.C. R. App. P. 3(d). “An appellant’s failure to designate a particular judgment or

order in the notice of appeal generally divests this Court of jurisdiction to consider

that order.” Yorke v. Novant Health, Inc., 192 N.C. App. 340, 347, 666 S.E.2d 127,

133 (2008); see also Rite Color Chemical Co. v. Velvet Textile Co., 105 N.C. App. 14,

17, 411 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1992). We recognize there is generally no right to appeal

from an interlocutory order which does not affect a substantial right and that only

upon appeal from the final judgment does this Court have jurisdiction to review

issues related to such an order. See Van Engen v. Que Scientific, Inc., 151 N.C. App.

683, 686, 567 S.E.2d 179, 182 (2002); Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 578, 291 S.E.2d

141, 144 (1982). However, where a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a remaining claim

which survives summary judgment, the appeal is no longer premature “but rather

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                                   Opinion of the Court

has the effect of making the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment a final

order” that can be immediately appealed. Combs & Assocs. v. Kennedy, 147 N.C. App.

362, 367, 555 S.E.2d 634, 638 (2001).

      There are two exceptions, under which this Court “may liberally construe a

notice of appeal to determine it has jurisdiction over a ruling not specified in the

notice.” Chee v. Estes, 117 N.C. App. 450, 452, 451 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1994). “First, if

the appellant made a mistake in designating the judgment intended to be appealed”

but the intent to appeal can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee was

not misled, the appeal will not be dismissed. Id. at 452, 451 S.E.2d at 351. Second,

the appeal will not be dismissed where the “appellant technically fails to comply with

procedural requirements in filing papers with the court but accomplishes the

functional equivalent of the requirement.” Id. at 452, 451 S.E.2d at 351.

      Plaintiff here, pursuant to Rule 3(d), only noticed appeal “from the final

judgment entered by Judge James T. Hill on October 28, 2021” in file number 20 CVS

2222. Nevertheless, Plaintiff now attempts to argue issues on appeal concerning the

trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to punitive

damages in 17 CVD 4116, a completely separate case which Plaintiff voluntarily

dismissed. Plaintiff offers no ground for appellate review of this order entered in a

separate file number and has not sought review of this order by way of certiorari. We

conclude this order is not before us to review.

      Plaintiff further seeks review of the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s

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                                   Opinion of the Court

motion to strike allegations concerning punitive damages in Plaintiff’s 20 CVS 2222

complaint and awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Defendant entered by Judge

Shamieka L. Reinhart. Plaintiff did not designate these interlocutory orders in his

notice of appeal from the final judgment. However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-278 provides:

“Upon an appeal from a judgment, the [appellate] court may review any intermediate

order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment.” N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 1-278 (2021). Applying this statute, “[t]his Court has held that even when a notice

of appeal fails to reference an interlocutory order, in violation of Rule 3(d), appellate

review of that order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-278 is proper under the following

circumstances: (1) the appellant must have timely objected to the order; (2) the order

must be interlocutory and not immediately appealable; and (3) the order must have

involved the merits and necessarily affected the judgment.” Tinajero v. Balfour

Beatty Infrastructure, Inc., 233 N.C. App. 748, 757, 758 S.E.2d 169, 175 (2014)

(citation omitted).

      Here, however, Plaintiff has, again, made no effort to assert grounds for this

Court to review the interlocutory order striking allegations of punitive damages or

awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-278. See N.C. R. App. P.

28(b)(4). In the absence of any proffered basis for review of these orders, we conclude

they are not properly before us. Moreover, Plaintiff’s arguments that he should be

permitted to pursue punitive damages claims arising from the accident are

necessarily resolved against Plaintiff in light of our decision concluding there was no

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                                   Opinion of the Court

error at trial and affirming the trial court’s judgment entered upon the jury verdict

determining Defendant was not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries on the same facts.

                                III.   Conclusion

      For the aforementioned reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in

instructing the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency. Further, we decline to

address Plaintiff’s remaining contentions regarding punitive damages and attorney’s

fees as neither issue is properly before this Court.

      NO ERROR.

      Judge ZACHARY and HAMPSON concur.

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