Court Opinion

ID: 9719844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:06:38.55818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:10.579371
License: Public Domain

Opinion Concurring in Part, and Dissenting in Part
Staton, P.J.
I would concur in the majority opinion to the extent that the cause is to be remanded to the Full Industrial Board for a hearing and finding on the issue of total permanent disability. Covarubias v. Decatur Casting (1976), 171 Ind. App. 534, 358 N.E.2d 174, is cited by the majority for the proposition that “evidence that the employee could not return to his former occupation [is] insufficient to establish permanent total disability.” I read Covarubias, supra, to say that such evidence in itself is insufficient.
Perez need only show the Industrial Board that he is unable to carry on reasonable types of employment — not that he is utterly incapable of functioning. The only evidence in the record is to the effect that Perez “will not be able to return to a functional vocation again.” Reasonable employment, for one experienced only in manual labor would, of necessity, be manual labor. Yet, the evidence revealed the medical opinion that Perez is one hundred per cent disabled “insofar as [emr ployment] entails bending, stooping, lifting, physical effort.” The day he was evaluated by the plant physician as being *25020 % permanently partially impaired, U.S. Steel took his badge, sent him home, and said, “Okay, that’s it.” U.S. Steel never called. Perez back to work — for any job. The Full Industrial Board has a responsibility to make a specific finding on total permanent disability. Stoner v. Howard Sober, Inc. (1954), 124 Ind. App. 581, 118 N.E.2d 504; Delaware Machinery & Tool Co. v. Yates (1973), 158 Ind. App. 167, 301 N.E.2d 857.
I dissent from the majority’s holding on the issue of medical expenses because I can find no evidence in the record to controvert Perez’ statement that Dr. Martino (the specialist to whom Perez originally was sent by U.S. Steel) advised further medical treatment. The verbatim testimony of Perez reveals:
“Q. Did Dr. Martino do anything else for you?
“A. No, he checked on me for another couple months more. One day he told me, T can’t do nothing for you any more.’ Say, ‘You probably going to need another surgery.’ I said, ‘Well, I had two surgeries already, they didn’t help, why should I take me another surgery if you going to help me?’ So, but in the meantime he say, ‘Nothing I can do for you, you got to see your own doctor if you want to.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Martino did not testify. The evidence is not in conflict, yet the Board found that “Dr. Martino released plaintiff from his care and advised against any additional surgery.” The majority picked up this phrase, but it lacks support in the record.
The Board found that the medical attention Perez sought after Dr. Martino was unauthorized. The fact that Perez was still receiving temporary disability payments negates the Board’s (and majority’s) implication that the injury had reached “a permanent and quiescent state.” Roush v. W. R. Duncan & Son (1932), 96 Ind. App. 122, 183 N.E. 410.
Under the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Acts, the Company is liable for the costs incurred and accruing as a result of Perez’ efforts toward rehabilitation while temporarily totally disabled.
*251“. . . If in an emergency or because of the employer’s failure to provide such attending physicians or such surgical, hospital or nurses’ services and supplies or such treatment by spiritual means or prayer, as herein specified, or for other good reason, a physician other than that provided by the employer treats the injured employee during the period of such employee’s temporary total disability, or necessary and proper surgical, hospital, or nurses’ services and supplies are procured toithin said period, the reasonable cost of such service and supplies shall, subject to the approval of the industrial board, be paid by the employer.” (Our emphasis.) IC 1971, 22-3-3-4 (Burns Code Ed.)
The record discloses that there existed the possibility for relief from the pain Perez suffered. The company failed to provide further treatment. Yet, IC 1971, 22-3-3-4 (Burns Code Ed.) provides that during the period of the employee’s temporary total disability the reasonable cost of service and supplies shall be paid by the employer “subject to the approval of the industrial board.”
“Workmen’s compensation is for the benefit of the employee. . . . Accordingly, it is well-established that the Act be liberally construed in favor of the employee so as to not negate the Act’s humane purposes. . . .
“The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for work-related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive such compensation.
“ ‘One of the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to transfer from the worker to the industry in which he is employed and ultimately to the consuming public a greater portion of economic loss due to industrial accidents and injuries.’” (Citations and footnotes omitted.) Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427.
Thus, it would negate the Act’s “humane purposes” to construe “subject to the approval of the industrial board” as a broad authority to disallow medical payments which arguably stemmed from a stipulated accident and injury.
The uncontradicted evidence indicated the advisability of ongoing treatment. The Board’s decision is contrary to the facts as presented and should be reversed. Perez is entitled *252to reimbursement for medical expenses incurred during the period after he was released from U.S. Steel’s physician while still on temporary total disability.
Note. — Reported at 359 N.E.2d 925.