Court Opinion

ID: 9762291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:19:06.460548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:32.924977
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Justice.
Respondent, as plaintiff in the trial court, filed a suit under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, against petitioner, as defendant and compensation insurance carrier of plaintiff’s employer, alleging that he had suffered total disability from an injury received in the course of plaintiff’s employment as the result of an accidental injury to plaintiff’s left leg and right and left hands. Plaintiff, by a trial amendment, in the alternative pleaded that he received injury to specific members of his body, to-wit: to his left leg and to his right and left hands.
With regard to the disability resulting from the injuries to the three specific members of plaintiff’s body, the trial court submitted similar issues regarding each member. First, the court inquired if plaintiff “sustained any total loss of the use of his left leg following the injury.” The jury answered, “yes.”
Next the court inquired as to the “duration, if any, of such total loss.” The jury was instructed to answer, “Permanent” or “by giving the number of weeks,” or “None.” To these issues the jury answered 60 weeks’ total loss of use of the left leg; 59 weeks’ total loss of use of plaintiff’s right hand; and 59 weeks’ total loss of use of plaintiff’s left hand. Therefore the total loss of use of each of the three members was found to be "temporary” rather than “permanent.”
In its answer to the issues submitted with regard to the specific injuries the jury found that plaintiff had suffered permanent partial disability of a definite percentage as to his left leg; his right hand; and to his left hand.
The jury’s answer to other special issues confined his disability solely to his specific injuries, consequently there is no question o f a'general injury recovery in this case. No complaint was made of these findings anil the denial of recovery by plaintiff for gen - eral injuries.
The parties stipulated that the period io.c temporary total loss of use of each of the three members was 59 weeks for each member.
In rendering judgment for plaintiff’s temporary total loss of use of the specific members, the trial court refused to cumulate the total loss of use of each specific member, and rendered judgment only for 59 weeks’ total loss of use at the maximum rate of $35.00 per week. The court cumulated the permanent partial disabilities for the length of time and at the percentage of disability found by the jury. Petitioner does not complain in this court of the cumulative award for permanent partial disabilities, therefore, we do not have this question before us and assume, without deciding, that the trial court’s action was correct.
The Court of Civil Appeals reformed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment so as to award plaintiff recovery for each temporary total loss of use, thus cumulating the recovery for the temporary total loss of use of three specific members. 366 S.W.2d 263.
The Court of Civil Appeals based its judgment upon the wording of the last clause of the following paragraph found in Article 8306, Section 12, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes, reading as follows:
“Where the employee sustains concurrent injuries resulting in concurrent incapacities, he shall receive compensation only for the injury which produces the longest period of incapacity; but this Section shall not affect liability for the concurrent loss or the loss of the use thereof of more than one (1) member, for which member compensation is provided in this schedule, compensation for specific injuries under this law shall be cumulative as to time and not concurrent.”
All emphasis in this opinion is that of this Court unless otherwise indicated.
*301We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Defendant, as petitioner in this Court, by its first three points of error attacks the allowance by the Court of Civil Appeals of three separate periods of total loss of use of the specific members of plaintiff’s body, viz: 60 weeks for left leg; 59 weeks for right hand; and 59 weeks for left hand. In its Application for Writ of Error defendant says: “Simply stated, the question before the court is the amount of compensation respondent (plaintiff) should receive for the 59-weelc period following his accident, a period of time when he was totally disabled and suffered from total loss of use of three specific members of his body.”
Respondent claims that although the record shows only 59 weeks’ total loss of the use of each of the three specific members, when you add this temporary total loss to the permanent partial loss of use of each of the three members, you have a permanent loss of use for each of the three members, and that the Court of Civil Appeals was correct in cumulating the recovery for the total loss of use.
The question must be solved by the language of the paragraph from Article 8306, § 12, quoted above. The facts establish that each member was injured as the result of only one accident, and that the incapacities to each member were concurrent. The 59 weeks’ total loss of use to each of the three members covered the same 59 weeks of •elapsed time.
In the case of Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Patterson (1946), 144 Tex. 573, 192 S.W.2d 255, the employee alleged that he had suffered the total and permanent loss of use of the fingers, his thumb, and of the hand and arm. The jury found plaintiff suffered the total loss of use of each of the three fingers for twelve weeks, followed by a partial loss of use of each of the three fingers for 26 weeks, and the percentage of the partial loss was 50%. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the case for failure of the trial court to submit affirmatively and unconditionally a part of plaintiff’s cause of action. This action was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The trial court’s judgment awarded to plaintiff cumulative compensation for the loss of the use of the three fingers. The Court of Civil Appeals did not pass on that point. Upon appeal to this Court it was held that because the total loss of use of the fingers was only temporary (for 12 weeks) that it was error to award cumulative compensation for such loss of use; that plaintiff should recover only for the longest period of incapacity resulting from such temporary total loss of use of the three fingers, plus 26 weeks of 50% partial loss of the use of the three fingers for one period only. Recovery was limited to 38 weeks, being for the temporary loss of use of only one finger.
Discussing that part of Article 8306, § 12, which we have quoted above, this Court said:
“The payment, contemplated by the statute, for temporary loss of use of a member of the body is compensation for incapacity and is measured by the duration of the incapacity. When, as in the instant case, an employee suffers concurrent injuries, here injuries to three of his fingers, resulting in concurrent temporary incapacities and he is paid for the injury that has caused the longest period of incapacity, his compensation has been measured by, and payment has been made for, the full period of incapacity caused by the injuries. The weekly payments, if cumulated, would continue well beyond the period of the concurrent incapacities.
“The last part of the paragraph of Section 12 above quoted applies, in our opinion, to permanent loss and permanent loss of use, and not to temporary loss of use, because of the use of the *302words 'loss or the loss of the use’ with no reference to temporary loss of use, and because that portion of the paragraph speaks of the loss or the loss of the use of more than one member ‘for which member compensation is provided in this schedule.’ The schedule sets out definite compensation for the loss of different members of the body, that is, payments for a specified number of weeks for the loss of each member listed in the schedule, which payments are to be made for the full number of weeks specified, and without reference to any period of incapacity. There is no schedule of payments for temporary losses of use. Compensation for them is measured, as has been said, by the duration of the incapacity.” 192 S.W.2d p. 259, 2d col. (9, 10) and (11).
In the case of Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Hollingshead, 1955, Tex.Civ.App., 282 S.W.2d 305, writ refused, plaintiff Hollingshead sued for compensation for injuries of a general nature resulting in total and permanent disability to perform labor, tie also sought recovery for specific injuries to his right and left legs, resulting in the total loss of the use of both legs. The jury found that plaintiff suffered a temporary loss of the use of his legs; that he suffered total loss of the use of his right leg for 100 weeks; total loss of use of his left leg for 100 weeks; and a partial loss of use of his left leg to the extent of 20% for an additional 150 weeks. The trial court’s judgment cumulated or added together the total number of weeks of loss of use suffered to both legs as found by the jury and granted compensation therefor.
On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for plaintiff to recover compensation only for the 100 weeks’ loss of use of his left leg, plus a recovery for 20% partial loss of use of that leg for the 150 weeks as found by the jury.
The Court of Civil Appeals followed the case of Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Patterson, supra. Among other things the Court of Civil Appeals said:
“The pleadings and evidence show that the injuries to appellee’s legs were concurrent injuries. By the term of the above statute appellee was entitled to receive compensation only for the injury which produced the longest period of incapacity. The injury to appel-lee’s left leg which produced 100 weeks ‘loss of the use’ and twenty per cent partial ‘loss of the use’ for 150 weeks was temporary and was a longer period of incapacity than the 100 weeks ‘loss of the use’ of his right leg. He was therefore entitled to receive compensation only for the incapacity caused by the injury to his left leg, and the court erred in allowing compensation for the injury to his right leg.
“We cannot agree with appellee’s contention that the determination of this case is controlled by the latter portion of the above quoted statute [Art. 8306, § 12] which provides that ‘this section shall not affect liability for the concurrent loss or the loss of the use thereof of more than one member * Jji * > »
 We construe the paragraph of § 12, Art. 8306 we have before us, so that the first clause thereof applies to temporary loss or loss of use of specific members resulting from injuries received in one accident so that such concurrent incapacities may not be cumulated, but the employee receives-“compensation only for the injury which produces the longest period of incapacity.”1 The last clause of this paragraph (and which we have italicized in our quotation of this paragraph) has application only to total loss, to permanent partial loss, or the permanent total loss of use of a specific member, or members. As to such incapacities which are permanent, the employee shall be entitled to cumulate the recovery of compensation as to time and not concurrent.
*303Under the facts of this case, and our construction of the statute, we do not reach the problem of compensation being payable for longer than 401 weeks. We reserve the decision of that question until it is properly before us and determinative of the result.
Respondent relies on some language in the case of Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n v. Maledon, 1930, Comm. of App., 27 S.W.2d 151 to support the Court of Civil Appeals holding.
The language of the court shows that the court was not speaking of specific injuries to two or more specific members, but only of one injury to one specific member of the body concurring for a part of the time with a general injury. The court allowed only for a period of "total disability” (as the court designated temporary total loss of use for 20 weeks) to the hand, plus the permanent partial incapacity to the hand for 131 weeks (being the balance of the statutory schedule of 150 weeks for total loss of a hand). Neither concurrent injuries nor concurrent disabilities of a specific member were present in that case.
Respondent also relies on the case of Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n v. Brownlee (1953), 152 Tex. 247, 256 S.W.2d 76, to support the cumulation of recovery allowed by the Court of Civil Appeals. That case was one which involved the point of whether or not the plaintiff’s injury to the second and third fingers of his right hand extended to and affected his right hand so as to entitle plaintiff to a recovery for 50% permanent loss of use of his right hand. Both courts below had awarded recovery for compensation for the loss of the use of his right hand. The question of cumulation of recovery was not raised or discussed in this court’s opinion. This Court held there was no evidence sustaining the jury finding that the injuries sustained by respondent extended to the hand. Therefore the court reversed the judgments of the courts below and rendered judgment for the amount agreed upon between the parties for the partial loss of use of the two fingers.
Plaintiff also relies on the case of Travelers Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 1962, Tex.Civ.App., 353 S.W.2d 511, writ refused, as authority to sustain his contention. That case is not in point in the case at bar. The employee had sustained two separate hernias as a result of one accident suffered March 31, 1960. The trial court had awarded 26 weeks for each hernia. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this judgment. In affirming, the Court of Civil Appeals held that each hernia was a specific injury, for which the Legislature has scheduled a maximum of 26 weeks’ compensation to be paid. Therefore, if an employee has suffered two hernias, he is entitled to receive pay for 52 weeks.
Plaintiff relies on the case of Griffith v. Goforth, 1946, 184 Tenn. 56, 195 S.W.2d 33, to sustain his contention that we should cumulate the temporary total loss of use of each of the three specific members. The Goforth case is not in point in the present case. It is based on the Tennessee Compensation Statute, which reads differently from ours. That the court did not hold the disabilities should be cumulative is clearly shown by its language.
“We cannot conceive that it was the intention of the Legislature, in making the schedule as found under subsection (c) [the specific injury schedule], to permit an injured employee to pyramid separate and distinct injuries to different members of his body, adding together the number of weeks for permanent partial disability to each member, until the total has aggregated 692 weeks, and be paid $12,565 as compensation therefor.” [From 6, 7, 1st col. p. 37 of 195 S.W.2d].
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed.
CULVER, WALKER and GREEN-HILL, JJ., join in this opinion.
*304NORVELL, J., concurs with written opinion.
CALVERT, C. J., dissents and is joined by HAMILTON and STEAKLEY, JJ.
SMITH, J., dissents.

. “Where the employee sustains concurrent injuries resulting in concurrent in-capacities, he shall receive compensation only for the injury which produces the longest period of incapacity; but this Section shall not affect liability for the concurrent loss or the loss of the use thereof of more than one (1) member, for which member compensation is provided in this schedule, compensation for specific injuries under this law shall be cumulative as to time and not concurrents (Italics are used to designate the two clauses of tlie paragraph.)