Court Opinion

ID: 9902608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:20:40.32511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:54.973667
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA

                      Case No. 5D22-466
                 LT Case No. 2020-30972-FMCI
                         CORRECTED

MICHAEL THOMAS SCHMIDT,

    Appellant,

    v.

DANIELLE RENEE SCHMIDT,

    Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Stasia Warren, Judge.

Brian P. North, of Kenny Leigh & Associates, for Appellant.

Joan Stefanec Briggs and Garrett L. Briggs, of Adams,
Briggs and Briggs, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

                         October 6, 2023

EDWARDS, C.J.,

      This appeal is from the final judgment dissolving the parties’
marriage of 29 years. Appellant, Michael Thomas Schmidt
(“Former Husband”), appeals certain financial rulings made by the
trial court that he claims lack factual or legal support and
disproportionately favor Appellee, Danielle Renee Schmidt
(“Former Wife”). He argues that the amount of permanent alimony
awarded to Former Wife exceeds his ability to pay, that the trial
court failed to determine what his monthly net income was, and
that the trial court made no quantified findings of Former Wife’s
needs as far as retroactive alimony. He claims that the inequitable
distribution of marital assets and liabilities ordered by the trial
court is not justified nor supported by competent, substantial
evidence. We agree. We reverse and remand the final judgment
for further proceedings.1

      The parties had three children during the marriage, all of
whom are now adults. Former Wife initially worked in the child
day care field. The parties later agreed that Former Wife would
stop working outside the home so that she could assume greater
responsibility for the children and the obligations associated with
running the household. Former Wife has obtained a bachelor’s
degree and is pursuing a master’s degree relevant to her career
goal in the field of counseling. During the marriage, Former
Husband earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees that enabled him
to be employed in the information technology field. He earned
approximately $120,000 annually in the final years of their
marriage but was earning $105,000 at the time of trial.

       The parties separated and Former Wife filed for dissolution
seeking alimony and a distribution of marital assets and liabilities,
following which, Former Husband filed a counter-petition. While
they were separated, Former Husband voluntarily provided
support to Former Wife at the rate of $3,200 per month.2 However,
he ceased making those payments when they were unable, through
mediation, to achieve a mutually agreeable resolution of the
financial aspects of their dissolution. Former Husband lives with
his girlfriend and her two young children.

    1 Former Husband does not contest Former Wife’s entitlement

to an award of permanent periodic alimony in some amount nor
does he assert that the trial judge failed to make appropriate
findings as to Former Wife’s current financial need.
    2 The trial court’s mistaken statement that the voluntary
support payments were $3,500 per month is not supported by the
record.

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                    Analysis of Alimony Issues

          Standard of Review Regarding Alimony Issues

       A claim for alimony, including whether to impute income to
a party, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Saario v. Tiller, 333
So. 3d 315, 320–21 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980)). Discretion is abused
only when no reasonable judge could adopt the view of the trial
court. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203. However, a determination
on the amount imputed is reviewed for competent, substantial
evidence. Saario, 333 So. 2d at 321. Competent, substantial
evidence is such evidence “as will establish a substantial basis of
fact from which the fact at issue can be reasonably inferred.” Botto
v. State, 307 So. 3d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing De Groot
v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957)).

      Former Husband argues that the trial court’s awards of
alimony constitute an abuse of discretion for three reasons: (1)
because the amount of permanent periodic alimony awarded
exceeds his ability to pay, (2) because the court’s consideration of
his girlfriend’s income and treatment of it as his own income was
erroneous, and (3) because the court awarded retroactive alimony
without making the necessary findings of need and ability to pay
during the relevant time period.

            Former Husband’s Ability to Pay Alimony

       We consider first Former Husband’s claim that the amount
of permanent periodic alimony awarded exceeds his ability to pay.
A “specific factual determination [of] . . . ability to pay alimony”
must be made under section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes. After a
brief discussion of various financial information, the trial court
here made the conclusory finding that Former Husband “has the
ability to pay alimony since the Wife does not have the ability
to provide for her needs and necessities of life” (emphasis added).
This is clearly flawed logic, as one spouse’s need does not establish
the other spouse’s ability to pay. Furthermore, findings of ability
to pay alimony that are conclusory or sparsely reasoned cannot be
affirmed. Rodolph v. Rodolph, 344 So. 3d 451, 456 (Fla. 4th DCA

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2022); Cleveland v. Cleveland, 841 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 4th DCA
2003).

       Canakaris and its progeny make it clear that calculations of
ability to pay must be based on net, rather than gross, income.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1197; Gilliard v. Gilliard, 162 So. 3d
1147, 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 116 So.
3d 473, 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Specific findings on this point are
generally required. Kingsbury, 116 So. 3d at 475. In his Amended
Financial Affidavit, Former Husband claimed that his gross
monthly income from work was $8,800, a number the trial court
accepted. When Former Husband deducted payroll taxes from his
gross salary, that left a net monthly income of $6,756.18.3

      The law is clear that the reasonable and necessary living
expenses of Former Husband are to be deducted from his net
income to calculate his actual ability to pay. See Will v. Will, 277
So. 3d 182, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Nadrich v. Nadrich, 936 So.
2d 15, 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Former Husband claimed $7,405
in monthly expenses; however, the trial court struck $2,360 as
being unreasonable.4 Doing the math, the trial court allowed
$5,045 as Former Husband’s reasonable and necessary monthly
expenses. When these reasonable and necessary monthly
expenses are subtracted from his net income of $6,756.18, Former
Husband has $1,711.18 remaining as his ability to pay alimony.

    3 For the reasons explained in the next section, we do not
include Former Husband’s paramour’s annual income of $35,000
when calculating his net income.
    4  The trial court found the following monthly expenses,
totaling $1,400, to be unreasonable, but gave no explanation of
why: $290 for phone expenses, $100 for home repair and
maintenance, and $1,010 for auto expenses including gasoline and
insurance. The final judgment did not set forth what expenses in
those categories would be reasonable, although it is uncontested
that Former Husband has a vehicle which uses gasoline and must
be insured. On remand, the trial court shall set forth its legally
supportable reasons for each exclusion and what amount, if any,
it deems reasonable.

                                 4
Obviously, one cannot pay $3,000 per month as permanent
periodic alimony given that ability to pay. Nor do those figures
support the ability to pay additional retroactive alimony of $36,000
over three years at the rate of $1,000 per month.

       An award of alimony will be reversed when the obligor’s
payments “virtually exhaust his income.” Williams v. Williams, 10
So. 3d 651, 652–53 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); see also Bolton v. Bolton,
898 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding excessive
award was abuse of discretion); Squindo v. Osuna-Squindo, 943
So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Using the calculations above,
it is clear that the amount of the permanent periodic alimony
awarded would: exceed Former Husband’s ability to pay,
“absolutely exhaust” his available income, and place him into a
deficit position. The award of $3,000 as permanent periodic
alimony was therefore an abuse of discretion. We reverse and
remand for further consideration of the amount of permanent
periodic alimony to be awarded.

                Imputation of Girlfriend’s Income

      As part of its consideration of Former Husband’s ability to
pay, the trial court attributed to him the entire $35,000 annual
income of his live-in girlfriend, including governmental benefits for
the care of her two children. “It is well-settled that a successor
spouse may not be required to pay support owed by his or her
spouse to a former spouse.” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 426 So. 2d
1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); accord Fried v. Fried, 375 So. 2d
46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).5 Logically, the same holds true here for
Former Husband’s girlfriend, and her financial status “is not
ordinarily relevant to the amount of alimony which the divorced
spouse is capable of paying.” Montgomery, 426 So. 2d at 1256. The
exceptions discussed in Montgomery and Fried do not appear to be
present in the case at hand. Thus, the trial court erred as a matter

    5 The same general rule holds true in child support cases. See

Nadeau v. Reeves, 328 So. 3d 1001, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)
(holding it was error to use new spouse’s financial contributions to
inflate the calculated income of the remarried parent).

                                 5
of law in considering the income of the Former Husband’s
girlfriend.

      As a matter of factual findings, the trial court also erred. It
would appear that the trial court, inexplicably, assumed that
neither the girlfriend nor her children had any deductions or
expenses of their own to be paid from her own income; thus,
imputing 100% of her income to Former Husband. The trial court’s
additional factual assumption, that the girlfriend’s income went
into a joint account shared with Former Husband, is directly
contrary to the record evidence which shows it went into her
separate account. There was no evidence to support any of those
assumptions.

       Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall not consider the
income of the Former Husband’s girlfriend in determining his
ability to pay alimony.

                        Retroactive Alimony

      As noted above, the trial court ordered Former Husband to
pay $36,000 in retroactive alimony at the rate of $1,000 per month
for 36 months, on top of the $3,000 per month awarded for
permanent alimony. An award of retroactive alimony must be
supported by evidence of need and ability to pay during the
retroactive period. Abbott v. Abbott, 187 So. 3d 326, 328 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2016); Vitro v. Vitro, 122 So. 3d 382, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012);
Valentine v. Van Sickle, 42 So. 3d 267, 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

      Here, the trial court made no such findings.

       The final judgment sets forth the trial court’s rationale for a
retroactive award by stating: “Husband stopped all support of the
Wife [during the retroactive period] . . . . Therefore, retroactive
spousal support is hereby awarded . . . .” The implicit assumption
is that, because Former Husband voluntarily paid $3,200 per
month from the date of separation until October 2020, she had
continued need and he had continued ability to pay during the
retroactive period. But the conclusion does not necessarily follow.
And the trial court’s findings as to the parties’ current need and
ability are no substitute. In Henry v. Henry, the Fourth District

                                  6
reversed because, as here, the trial court made limited, present-
tense findings of current need and ability that did not relate back
to the retroactive period or otherwise replace the necessary
analysis. 191 So. 3d 995, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

      Absent those necessary findings, the award of retroactive
alimony was an abuse of discretion. We reverse the award of
retroactive alimony and remand for further consideration and
findings on this issue.

        Inequitable Distribution of Assets and Liabilities

                        Standard of Review

      The standard of review of a trial court’s determination of
equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities is abuse of
discretion. Bogard v. Bogard, 490 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1986) (citing
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1197); Marconi v. Erturk, 293 So. 3d 19,
20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

       Under section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes (2021), when
distributing marital assets and liabilities the trial court “must
begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal,
unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on
all relevant factors,” going on to enumerate a non-exhaustive
series of factors, (a) through (j). Departures from the presumptive
equal division must be justified in findings made by the trial court.
Porzio v. Porzio, 760 So. 2d 1075, 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Here,
the trial court did enumerate its findings in accordance with
section 61.075, but they do not support the inequitable distribution
set forth in the final judgment.

      The final judgment awards each spouse the car that each has
and the money each has in that spouse’s bank accounts. As for
marital liabilities, the final judgment requires Former Wife to
assume approximately $52,000 in debt while Former Husband is
ordered to assume $168,000 in debt.

      Former Husband argues that the trial court erred in basing
an unequal distribution of marital assets and liabilities on the fact
that, during their marriage, he “would deplete any retirement or

                                 7
IRA accounts when he changed jobs.” The final judgment states
that there was no evidence of intentional dissipation, waste, or
depletion of material assets. As a rule, “expenditures and
investment decisions which do not rise to the level of misconduct
will not support an unequal distribution of marital assets.”
Boutwell v. Adams, 920 So. 2d 151, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing
Branch v. Branch, 775 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)); see
also Kyriacou v. Kyriacou, 173 So. 3d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA
2015); Tradler v. Tradler, 100 So. 3d 735, 740–41 (Fla. 2d DCA
2012). Accordingly, the use or depletion during the marriage of
retirement or IRA accounts by Former Husband while between
jobs should not have been a consideration in the equitable
distribution of marital assets and liabilities in this case. Because
the trial court failed to explain how that factored into its
consideration leading to the inequitable distribution, we cannot
assume that its error is harmless as we cannot analyze the possible
bases for the inequitable distribution. See Harreld v. Harreld, 682
So. 2d 635, 636–37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

       Additionally, the final judgment awarded to each spouse the
money that each spouse had in his or her bank account at the time
of trial without any consideration or finding of what all those
amounts were.6 The final judgment once again makes an
unsupported statement regarding Former Husband’s girlfriend’s
$35,000 income being “in their joint account” and inappropriately
treats it as a marital asset distributed to Former Husband. The
trial court here ignored our prior admonition that trial courts
“must make specific written findings about the identity and value
of the parties’ significant assets in order to allow intelligent
review.” Barabas v. Barabas, 923 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006). Furthermore, the inequitable distribution of marital
liabilities is explained only inferentially by reference to Former
Husband’s greater earning ability compared to Former Wife’s and
her inability to pay the debts. Neither is an acceptable legal basis
for an unequal distribution of marital liabilities without some
further explanation from the trial court. See Vilardi v. Vilardi,
225 So. 3d 395, 396 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

    6 There were findings regarding some, but far from all,

accounts.

                                 8
      Accordingly, the distribution of marital assets and liabilities
set forth in the final judgment is reversed and remanded for
further consideration and the entry of an amended final judgment
that includes specific findings of fact and statements of legal bases
consistent with this opinion.

                            Conclusion

       The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

WALLIS, J., concurs.
EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in part, concurring in result, with
                opinion.

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.

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                                                Case No. 5D22-466
                                      LT Case No. 2020-30972-FMCI

EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in part, concurring in result with
opinion.

      While I agree with the majority that the final judgment must
be reversed as to permanent periodic alimony, retroactive alimony,
and the unequal distribution of assets and liabilities, I would do so
on a more limited basis. Therefore, although I agree on the
disposition, I cannot join the majority’s analysis.

      First, I disagree with the majority’s analysis concerning
Former Husband’s inability to pay the alimony award. The trial
court made no finding establishing Former Husband’s net income.
Instead of arguing on appeal that this failure was error, Former
Husband argues that he is unable to pay the alimony award based
on an assumed net income.

      But it is the trial court’s prerogative to determine net
income, not ours. See Reese v. Reese, 363 So. 3d 1202, 1211 (Fla.
6th DCA 2023). Therefore, I would not attempt to calculate
Former Husband’s ability to pay based on our own findings. Given
the trial court’s unchallenged failure to make a finding on net
income, I conclude that we are unable to review the trial court’s
finding on ability to pay the award—at least not based on Former
Husband’s income. See Crouse v. Crouse, 368 So. 3d 6, 8 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2023) (“Because the circuit court did not make a finding about
the parties’ net incomes, we cannot determine whether the
alimony award leaves the Former Husband with significantly less
net income.”).

      Second, Former Husband argues that the exclusion of his
monthly expenses for telephone, gas, and auto insurance is error.
Given our record, I agree and would reverse for reconsideration of
Former Husband’s reasonable expenses. While I do not join the
majority’s primary reason for reversing the alimony award, the
trial court’s error as to Former Husband’s expenses will
nevertheless require the trial court to reconsider the award. See
Will v. Will, 277 So. 3d 182, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“In
calculating the appropriate amount of alimony, the trial court is
                                 10
obligated to consider the former husband’s living expenses when
determining his ability to pay.”).

      Third, I agree with the majority that the trial court erred
when it imputed income earned by Former Husband’s girlfriend
to Former Husband. See Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So. 2d 612,
613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, Former Husband did not
challenge a lack of factual findings concerning the girlfriend’s
expenses on appeal. I therefore do not join that part of the
majority’s discussion.

       Fourth, I agree that the award of retroactive alimony is in
error because, as Former Husband argues, it is calculated based
on Former Wife’s need and Former Husband’s ability to pay as of
the time of trial rather than during the retroactive period. See
Henry v. Henry, 191 So. 3d 995, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). I do not
join the remainder of the majority’s discussion on this issue.

      Finally, I agree that the unequal distribution of liabilities
must be reversed because it appears the trial court improperly
considered the income of Former Husband’s girlfriend as a basis
for the unequal distribution.

      However, I do not join the balance of the majority’s analysis
because the remaining issues are either not preserved or not raised
on appeal. For instance, the majority finds error in the trial court’s
decision to award “each spouse the money that each spouse had in
his or her bank account at the time of trial without any
consideration or finding of what all those amounts were.” But
Former Husband did not challenge this part of the final judgment,
and it is not a court’s function to seek out and raise arguments for
the parties. See City of Mia. v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla.
1959) (“It is an established rule that points covered by a decree of
the trial court will not be considered by an appellate court unless
they are properly raised and discussed in the briefs.”).

       Nevertheless, having concluded that we must reverse the
unequal distribution of liabilities, any change in the distribution
of liabilities could require a reconsideration of the distribution of
assets as well. See Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1981) (“[W]hen a trial judge is found to be in error as to some

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aspect of his disposition the cause should be remanded with
sufficient authority that he may again exercise broad discretion to
modify the related matters within his original plan for division and
support as may be necessary in order to do equity and justice
between the parties in view of the changes required by the
appellate opinion.”); accord Dwyer v. Dwyer, 981 So. 2d 1254, 1258
(Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“Because the equitable distribution scheme
has to be revisited on remand to address the use of marital funds
to pay off the mortgage on the Husband’s commercial property, the
trial court must again consider the parties’ assets and liabilities
and the Husband’s claims for credit for the mortgage payments
and for a special equity.”). Therefore, I would remand for
reconsideration of both.

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