Court Opinion

ID: 9832861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:15:24.646951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:54.198952
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[4, 5] In passing upon that portion of the court’s charge complained of in the third assignment of error we held that, whether or not the charge contained an abstractly accurate statement of the law, it was our opinion that appellant could not have been prejudiced by it, for the reason that the petition charged, and the undisputed evidence showed, that the £ar had for many days been left by defendant unguarded on one of its tracks, and that many times prior to the date of appellant’s injury various children had pushed the car back and forth, and had played with it on the track in full view of and with the consent and knowledge of defendant’s servants, and therefore no harm could have resulted to appellant by giving the charge. We still think that the giving of the charge was harmless if, as we first stated, the proof of these facts was undisputed. But appelant, in his motion for a rehearing, has called our attention to the fact that the proof in this regard was conflicting, and cites us to the testimony of the witness George McMullen, who was the roadmaster of defendant, wherein he says:
“I never saw any little hand cars — push cars —left standing on the track. They are always left to one side of the track on the ground. They were lifted up and put on the ground, unless the men happened to be using them; the men would use them — would have to put ties or rails or shell on them. And on Sundays and holidays they would take these push cars off the track and leave them to one side of the track. Sometimes they would run them down into the yard. Whether they did this all the time I do not know; I was not there all the time.”
This testimony was not called to our attention by the parties in their briefs, and the only testimony referred to by them was that which sustained the allegation above referred to in plaintiff’s petition; hence, assuming that there was no testimony other than that, we stated that the allegations were sustained by the undisputed proof. In heretofore passing upon the charge in question we stated that we were inclined to the opinion that the charge, abstractly considered, was correct. But we did not go fully into an investigation of the question because, for the reasons stated, we believed that, even if the charge was erroneous, no harm could have resulted to appellant by giving it. The raising of an issue of fact by the testimony of the witness McMullen has necessitated a further investigation of the point raised by the assignment, and upon further consideration we have reached the conclusion that the charge was not correct, and that it was harmful, because it placed upon the plaintiff a greater burden to establish the liability of the defendant than the law placed upon him. Under this charge the jury could not have found for plaintiff unless they first found that the unguarded push car was both attractive and dangerous to children. If they did so find, then, before plaintiff could recover, they were required by the charge to find that the defendant was accustomed to leave the car on the track unguarded. If the jury so found, then they were required, before they could find for plaintiff, to go further and find that the car was customarily resorted to by children for play, and, not only this, but that this custom was known to the defendant, and not hindered by it, or that it should have known of such custom by the exercise of proper care. We think that, if the push car was attractive and dangerous to children, and easily 'moved along the track by them, that the defendant’s liability for injuries received by a child who had been attracted to and was playing with the car would be established by showing that the car was left unguarded on the track in a public street, and where the evidence showed that many children lived, if the defendant knew or ought to have known that it was or would likely be resorted to by children for play, without showing that the defendant was accustomed to leave the car on the track unguarded, or that children customarily resorted thereto for play.
The jury might have believed that the defendant customarily took the push cars off the track and placed them upon the ground when not in use by its employés, or ran them down in the yard, as testified by the witness McMullen, and that the leaving of them upon the track unguarded was not customary, but occasional only, and, if they did so believe, then under the charge they were required to find for defendant, even though they should also find that the cars when so left on the track were attractive and dangerous to children, and that children, with the knowledge or consent of the defendant, resorted to them for purposes of play upon such occasions as they were left upon the track unguarded. The learned trial judge was led into the error, no doubt, by the allegations of the petition and the testimony referred to in our main opinion, overlooking, as we did, the testimony of the witness Mc-Mullen which raised the conflict. Any statement in our main opinion in conflict with the ruling here announced is hereby withdrawn.
The judgment of the court below in favor of the Galveston Electric Company and the Galveston-Houston Electric Railway Company is affirmed, and reversed and remanded as to the defendant Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation.