Court Opinion

ID: 9550348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:16.521495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:25.302002
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of the court, but add these comments to clarify what I understand to be the basis and scope of our ruling. In Donnelly v. State, 516 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1973), the Alaska Supreme Court held that an indigent person who has been convicted of a crime and whose conviction has been affirmed on appeal has the right to appointed counsel for purposes of preparing and litigating an initial post-conviction relief application. Inasmuch as the supreme court has decided that representation by counsel is a matter of right, there is simply no basis for concluding that post-conviction relief applicants should receive anything less than the full, effective assistance of counsel that is constitutionally guaranteed. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 400-402, 105 S.Ct. 830, 838-39, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Accordingly, an attorney appointed as counsel for a post-conviction relief applicant cannot decline representation based merely on a personal conclusion that no meritorious grounds exist. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
Nor can withdrawal be allowed under Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). That case holds that competent counsel need not raise all arguable legal issues on appeal and leaves to counsel, rather than the defendant, the tactical choice of which issues to assert. The decision to raise no issue at all in a post-conviction relief application is clearly not the type of tactical choice contemplated by the Court in Jones.
It would of course be possible for this court to adopt a procedure allowing counsel to withdraw upon making the type of showing required in Anders. We have elected instead to require counsel to provide representation, even when, in counsel’s view, no nonfrivolous grounds for relief exist. Our decision to follow this course is supported by two closely related considerations. First, because applications for post-conviction relief typically raise claims that have not previously been raised or litigated, any conclusion that a potential claim is frivolous may well be premature until an application has been filed and the opportunity for formal discovery has arisen. See Donnelly v. State, 516 P.2d at 398 n. 4. Second, if a formal application is filed and there in fact proves to be no underlying merit to the claim, the application itself will act as the functional equivalent of an An-ders brief, because summary disposition of the application will be appropriate and no hearing will be necessary. Donnelly, 516 P.2d at 398-99. There is thus little need to add an Anders procedure to the existing *411rule governing post-conviction relief applications.
One final point deserves emphasis. Our decision addresses the circumstances presented in the case before us — a case in which counsel did not file or assist in prosecuting the post-conviction relief application below. I do not construe this court’s opinion to express any view concerning the appropriate procedure for withdrawal of counsel when the superior court has ruled on a post-conviction relief petition and counsel determines that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal. As I understand it, we do not foreclose the possibility of adopting an Anders procedure to allow withdrawal at that stage. Similarly, in cases arising under Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292 (Alaska App.1984) — where ineffective assistance of counsel is one of several issues on direct appeal but must first be developed by post-conviction relief proceedings or a motion for a new trial in the trial court — our decision does not foreclose the possibility that appellate counsel may be permitted to make a tactical choice to forego the ineffective assistance of counsel issue on appeal if other more persuasive grounds for appeal exist. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-53, 103 S.Ct. at 3312-13.