Court Opinion

ID: 9858279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:19:31.663201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:45.523483
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(dissenting) — I am unable to agree with the legalistic legerdemain by which the majority converts a commercial dance hall,' regularly operated for substantial. profit, into a “private home or place”; and likewise construes the 'holding of regular dances several times each year to be merely, “occasional private social gatherings of friends, or relatives.” The holding of the majority, and the reasoning by which it is reached, appear to me to fly in the face of common knowledge and of common sense. : '
. The meaning and application of the words “private home or *316place” are discussed in the dissent in Carey v. Iowa Liquor Control Commission, 257 Iowa 245, 132 N.W.2d 429, and will not be repeated here. It will suffice to say that I think the same reasoning on this point is applicable to both cases.
I. Plaintiff’s action is in equity. It is in the form of a declaratory-judgment proceeding; it avers that it has no adequate remedy at law; and it asks “such other and further equitable relief as may be just and proper in the premises.” I doubt this construction of the action is, or will be, challenged. Its significance lies in the point that we are not bound by the findings of fact of the trial court, but should make our own evaluation of them.
II. It is well settled that an exception to a statute enacted for the public benefit is to be construed most strongly against those who claim rights under it. Those who claim under the exception must show that they come both within the words and the reason thereof. Wood Brothers Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 562, 563, 1 N.W.2d 655, 661; Hawkeye Portland Cement Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 198 Iowa 1250, 1255, 201 N.W. 16, 19. It can hardly be denied that the part of section 30 of the Iowa Liquor Control Act enacted by the Sixtieth General Assembly, and which the plaintiff relies upon here to shield its operations, is an exception to the general provisions of the section. First, the section makes it unlawful to allow the dispensing or consumption of intoxicating beverages in any establishment which does not have a liquor license; and then, as an exception, says the general provision shall have no application “to occasional private social gatherings of friends or relatives in a private home or place.”
While there are without doubt those who disagree that the Iowa liquor-by-the-drinlc Act, as passed by the Sixtieth General Assembly, is in fact conducive to the public benefit or welfare, Av'e must accept such purpose as being the intent of the legislature. Within the rule first above stated in this division, it was therefore incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that it comes within the exception; and we must construe it “most strongly” against it, and in favor of the public. Addressing this dissent to the question of the meaning of the words “occasional private *317social gatherings”, I think that in this endeavor it has entirely failed.
III. It seems clearly to have been the intention of the legislature to except “occasional” private gatherings of friends or relatives, or both, in private homes, or similar places, such as hotel or motel rooms. But that it intended to license the repeated consumption of liquor at regular affairs in commercial ballrooms or similar business places conducted for profit I am unable to believe. The language of the exception does not so indicate; and we should take the legislature at what it said, rather than what it might have said, or what we think it should have said, or what individual members of the lawmaking body say they thought they were saying.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s illustration of a wedding party as an “occasional” gathering. With some exceptions in certain localities and among certain people, a wedding is indeed occasional rather than regular. But I fail to see how this aids the plaintiff or supports the majority’s conclusion. Nor does the ease cited, Biermann v. Guaranty Mutual Life Insurance Co., 142 Iowa 341, 346, 120 N.W. 963, 965, throw any light on the question or aid the majority. The real holding of that case is that knowledge of the insured’s drinking habits by the agent who wrote the policy was imputed to the insurer, and if the jury found such knowledge, falsity of the representations was no defense. I quote: “It must therefore be held under the finding of the jury that, if the representations made in the application were false, the falsity was known to the defendant when the policy was issued. Under such circumstances, the fact that the warranty was broken when made constitutes no defense.”
The majority properly states the definitions of the word “occasional” from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary : “1: occurring or operating on a particular occasion * * * 4: met with, appearing, or occurring irregularly and according to no fixed or certain scheme.” Webster’s Intercollegiate Dictionary defines the word as “occurring now and then; incidental.” In general, it is the antonym of “regular”; Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 291, 81 A. L. R. 1222.
*318IY. We proceed then .to an examination of the record. In passing, it is noticed that the plaintiff says it is unable to secure a liquor license because of zoning ordinances; an unfortunate circumstance, but one which does not authorize the courts to relieve its dilemma by a strained construction of statutory law; in effect, for plaintiff’s purposes, to license the unlicensed.
The plaintiff pleads that it rents the ballroom about twenty or thirty times each year to tenants in the building for private parties. In addition it is leased to the B’Nai B’rith, high school graduating classes, veterans’ organizations and voluntary associations of persons forming dancing ■ clubs. The record shows that the net income from the dance hall is from $3500 to $3700 per year; gross income about $4000. This furnishes about 12% percent of the total income of the plaintiff from the entire building, which is otherwise devoted to apartments. The ballroom seats from 200 to 300 persons. The plaintiff furnishes glasses for use of the parties in mixing and drinking the liquor which they bring.
It is evident that the operation of. this facility is something-more than occasional.- It is a commercial moneymaking place, used regularly by various organizations. But the majority thinks the word “occasional” applies only to those using the hall and not to the plaintiff. However that may be, it seems clear that the consumption of intoxicating liquor may not be permitted by the owner of the establishment unless the meetings are themselves “occasional”. •
But Mr. Weldon Coe, the resident manager of the building, testified that “some of these organizations have rented it once a month; some of them twice a month.” Again he said “I have had clubs use these premises on the first Saturday in the month and the last Saturday in the month. The clubs ordinarily meet between the last of September and the last part of May. Dance dates are arranged ahead in the Grandy-Pratt office with Mr. McHugh. In the period of seven years, clubs have not met on precisely the same date.”
Apparently the dance clubs, at least, sign leases for the use of the- ballroom for some time ahead. This inference comes from the testimony of Hugh McHugh, who was associated with the *319real-estate firm which had general charge of the building. He said: “None of the dance clubs have signed leases for next year, and have all notified me they will not sign a lease unless they are allowed to bring liquor, their own personal bottles, in the ballroom.”
This paints a picture of a'dance hall regularly used by several groups. While they do not always meet on the same dates, they do meet regularly on some dates. Some of the lessees, prob- ■ ably the dance clubs, use the room once a month, some twice. They sign leases in advance. This is something more than incidental; it is a fixed and regular series of meetings by these organizations. Is it any less “regular” because the meeting dates are not always the same ? The signing of leases for coming years in itself implies a regularity, an assurance of meetings during the period of the lease. The whole record shows the operation of the dance hall as a commercial moneymaking project; it shows meetings regularly held by various organizations each year, some several times during the year; and it shows that some of them at least operate under written leases which -we must assume fix the dates upon which the room is available to them. As the Colorado Supreme Court said in Public Utilities Commission v. Watson, 138 Colo. 108, 113, 330 P.2d 138, 141, “there is nothing obscure or mysterious about the word ‘occasional’ * * In Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of New York v. Blackwell, 260 Ala. 463, 468, 71 So.2d 267, 270, the Alabama Supreme Court quoted ivith approval this definition from Webster’s New International Dictionary (Second Ed.) : “Casual, occasional; coming without regularity; incidental.” “Occasional, occurring at irregular intervals; infrequent.” “Regular, steady or uniform in course, practice or occurrence.”
We are here the judges of the facts. There was no factual dispute, in the evidence, so that the general rule that we give weight to the findings of the trial court has no significance. The question is not which evidence is true, but what are the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed evidence! The plaintiff’s case must rest entirely upon the fact that the various organizations do not meet at exactly the same dates or on fixed schedules. But they do meet regularly each year on some dates; *320they meet once or twice each month; and some of them in accordance with written leases.
The purpose of the dancing clubs is to dance. Some of them have been organized, and dancing, for many years, none for less than 15 years. It should not be possible to say that their meetings are not regular, but are casual, or incidental, or occasional. The parties held by residents in the apartment building may indeed be occasional; but the other organizations we know have regular meetings, even though not always on the same dates. If the meetings of any of these in the ballroom are merely occasional, the record does not so show. Mr. McHugh testified: “The only function of the ballroom is for the clubs and the four or five other organizations that we have leased it to.”
We must assume that the beneficial purpose of the lawmakers was to afford a greater intimacy with John Barleycorn by making his wares more readily available to the citizenry; very likely in the interest of “gracious living.” It is not for us to say whether this purpose was laudable or otherwise; policy making, in Iowa at least, is still for the legislative body rather than for the courts. But equally it is not for us to extend the policy by a strained construction of the statutes nor to situations not justified by a fair evaluation of the evidence and a proper construction of the statute.
I am unable to agree that the plaintiff has carried the not inconsiderable burden of showing itself within the fair meaning of the exception to the general provisions of section 30.
V. The question whether the dance hall leased by the plaintiff to these groups is a “private place” within the meaning of the statute and the application of the rule of ejusdem generis is discussed fully in the dissent in Carey v. Iowa Liquor Control Commission, 257 Iowa 245, 132 N.W.2d 429, and need not be repeated here. It is evident, however, that the rule governs the situation here as well as in the Carey case. A commercial ballroom does not have the characteristics of a “private home” and so is not a “place” as the term is used in the statute.
I would reverse.
GaRfield, C. J., joins in this dissent.