Court Opinion

ID: 9645386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:23:20.819559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:44.726933
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice, dissenting. A careful consideration of the wording of the Complaint in this case and review of the many authorities dealing with the question here under consideration leads me to a different conclusion than that reached by the majority. First, attention is called to the well established rule that a Demurrer will be sustained to a Complaint which does not state a cause of action or to one that pleads only conclusions of the law. See: Civil Code Page 96, Section 109; Keith v. Freeman, et al, 43 Ark. 296; Southern Orchard Planting Company v. Gore, 83 Ark. 78, 102 S. W. 709; Pharr v. Knox, 145 Ark. 4, 223 S. W. 400; Driesbach v. Beckham, 178 Ark. 816, 12 S. W. 2d 408; Seubold v. Fort Smith Special School District, 218 Ark. 560, 237 S. W. 2d 884. Since the Complaint (as is conceded in this case) does not allege willful and wanton negligence on the part of appellee (Tingle) appellant cannot recover under the wording of her Complaint because of Ark. Stats. § 75-913- § 75-915, the “guest statute” unless she was a “passenger” and not a “guest” in appellee’s car. The decisive question, therefore, is: Does the Complaint show appellant to be a “passenger” or a “guest”? It is apparent that this is a question which calls for close distinctions — distinctions which this Court has not heretofore made clear. The many authorities which I have reviewed, some of which are hereafter set out, are practically unanimous in approving the following principles which are applicable to the case under consideration. [a] If both the passenger and the owner-driver derive a tangible and substantial benefit then the rider is a passenger and can recover on simple negligence. [b] “Tangible and substantial benefit” means something more than that based on companionship. [c] If the owner-driver derives any special benefit (possibly either tangible, substantial or otherwise) over and above that received by the rider, then the rider is a passenger and can recover. In the case of Leete v. Griswold Post, No. 79, American Legion, 114 Conn. 400, 158 A. 919, it was held that the benefit must be tangible. Raub v. Rowe, Tex. Civ. App., 119 S. W. 2d 190, reiterates a principle that there must be “. . . the element of material benefit to the defendant driver in the form of possible profits, where the elements of friendship and hospitality were not involved, and where the ride was taken as an integral part of a business transaction. . . .” In the case of Rogers v. Vreeland, 16 Cal. App. 2d 364, 60 P. 2d 585, the Court in construing the “guest” statute of that State among other things said: “Doubtless the Legislature intended to change the rule heretofore adopted in this state, that an invited guest could recover for simple negligence, and to provide that such a person could not recover in the absence of a showing of intoxication or willful misconduct; and we are of the opinion that the section is applicable to a case such as the one now before us, where the riders, on a trip purely social, and without any commercial or business element, agreed to pay their share of the running expenses of the automobile and their share of any other expense on the trip. We do not consider such an arrangement between the rider and the driver as the giving by the former to the latter of such compensation as removes the riders from the status of ‘guest’ within the meaning of the act.” Blashfield, in Ms Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 1942 Pocket Part of Volume 4, Section 2292, in dealing with this same question says that: “. . . the benefit accruing to or conferred upon the operator of one of the guest class must be a tangible one growing out of a definite relationship.” The same author further states: ‘ ‘ One important element in determining whether a person is a guest within the meaning and limitations of such statutes is the identity of the person advantaged by the carriage. If, in its direct operation it confers ... no benefits, other than such as are incidental to hospitality, companionship or the like, upon the person extending the invitation, the passenger is a guest witMn the statutes . . .” The above quotation was approved in the case of Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216, 112 S. W. 2d 30. In the case of Iles v. Lamphere, 60 Ohio App. 4, 18 N. E. 2d 989, appellant sued appellees to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the negligent operation by appellee of an automobile in which they were riding. In material part the Complaint stated: “That Mrs. Lamphere was President and Mrs. lies was Treasurer of the Ladies Aid Society of the Seventh Day Adventist Church of West Clarksfield; that solely as officers and agents of this society and in pursuance of arrangements hy the officers and members thereof and of a ‘common purpose of purchasing of food supplies to be served by said society at a public sale to be held some days thereafter, proceeded to travel in Mrs. Lamphere’s automobile. . . ’” The trial court sustained a demurrer and Mrs. lies appealed. The Court stated in its opinion that : “The sole question in controversy is whether Mrs. lies was a guest passenger of Mrs. Lamphere within the meaning of Section 6308-6, General Code.” (Said statute contains the same terms with regards to willful and wanton misconduct of the drive that are found in our statute above referred to). The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the trial court, among other things, stated: “There must have been some beneficial consideration flowing from Mrs. lies to Mrs. Lamphere to exclude Mrs. lies from its operation (operation of the statute). Now, what benefit was bestowed by her upon Mrs. Lamphere? Neither of them was engaged in any personal business or undertaking. . . There is no allegation of fact from which may be inferred any benefit pecuniary or otherwise received by Mrs. Lamphere from Mrs. lies.” A careful analysis of the facts and the holdings in the ease of Henry, et ux v. Henson, et ux, Tex. Civ. App., 174 S. W. 2d 270, which is relied on so heavily by the majority, convinces me that it supports the statements and principles above set forth. In that case appellee (Henson) recovered a judgment against appellant in the trial court which the Appellate Court reversed and dismissed. The facts which were proven in that case are, to my mind, stronger to show that appellee (Mrs. Henson) was a passenger than are the allegations in the Complaint under consideration to show that Mrs. Simms was a passenger. It would unduly lengthen this dissent to reiterate fully the testimony in the cited case but it does show, when construed in the light most favorable to an affirmance of the judgment, that Mrs. Henry received more benefits from the trip which they were making as delegates to the Conference of Missionary Societies than Mrs. Simms could possibly receive under the allegations of her Complaint. On this point it is revealing to compare the Henry case with the present case. The benefits accruing to Mrs. Henry were: [a] As the incoming president of the Missionary Society she would receive valuable advice and direction from Mrs. Henson who had just served in that capacity, and [b] she would get the benefit of shorthand notes which Mrs. Henson was going to make. All these were special benefits expected to accrue to Mrs. Henry. On the other hand, Mrs. Simms alleges no benefits, special or otherwise, that were to accrue to Mrs. Tingle. In fact all expected benefits from their undertaking would accrue to the Church and not to either of the parties. Moreover, the logical inference is that Mrs. Simms had more special interest in the undertaking because she was the wife of the pastor of the Church. To be sure this Court does not want to unnecessarily discourage public spirited women from jointly engaging in church activities, but I submit that more discouragement would result from the decision of the majority. Hereafter, under that decision, any accommodating woman who extends a ride to a friend on a church mission must take into account the extra risk to which she will be subjected. Justices Holt and Smith join in this dissent.