Court Opinion

ID: 9400895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 18:02:15.1018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:48.762600
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-30323       Document: 00516780349        Page: 1   Date Filed: 06/09/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                      FILED
                                                                   June 9, 2023
                                   No. 20-30323
                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Peter M. Hoffman,

                                                        Defendant—Appellant.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 2:14-CR-22-1

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jolly and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         The panel does not agree on the judgment that should be rendered in
   this case. Judge Jolly would affirm the district court’s judgment in its
   entirety. Chief Judge Richman would dismiss the appeal, concluding the
   notice of appeal was not timely.      Judge Dennis would remand for an
   evidentiary hearing and resentencing. The net effect is that the sentence
   imposed by the district court stands, and the case is not remanded to the
   district court. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED by an equally
   divided court.
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                                           No. 20-30323

          Judge Jolly joins fully in the following opinion. Chief Judge Richman
   concurs only in Part I, and files a dissenting opinion. Judge Dennis concurs
   only in Parts II(A) and III, and files a dissenting opinion. The opinion of a
   majority of the panel is reflected only in Parts I, II(A) and III of the following
   opinion:
          Peter Hoffman appeals the district court’s resentencing order, as well
   as the district court’s dismissal of his motion for reconsideration.
                                                 I
          Peter Hoffman (“Hoffman”), his wife Susan Hoffman, and Michael
   Arata were indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail
   fraud. Hoffman, Susan Hoffman, and Arata jointly owned Seven Arts
   Pictures Louisiana, LLC (Seven Arts), through which they purchased a
   dilapidated mansion at 807 Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans with the goal
   of converting it into a film postproduction facility.1 To offset the costs of the
   project, Seven Arts applied for film infrastructure tax credits offered by the
   State of Louisiana.2 The program has two steps: first, applicants must file an
   initial tax credit application and obtain a precertification letter from the state;
   second, applicants must file a report tallying their production costs, which
   must be audited by an independent accountant.3 The state then reviews the
   submitted materials and decides whether to issue the tax credits. 4 The
   Government alleged that Hoffman, Susan Hoffman, and Arata “submitted
   fraudulent claims for tax credits, mostly by (1) submitting false invoices for
   construction work and film equipment or (2) using “circular transactions”

          1
              United States v. Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 2018).
          2
              Id.
          3
              Id. at 532.
          4
              Id.

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   that made transfers of money between bank accounts look like expenditures
   related to movie production.”5
          The jury convicted Hoffman on all charged counts. Hoffman moved
   for a new trial as well as for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied
   Hoffman’s motion for a new trial but partially granted his motion for
   acquittal. Specifically, the court entered judgments of acquittal for Hoffman
   on five counts of wire fraud.
          Hoffman’s first presentence report (PSR) calculated an advisory
   sentencing range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment, based on a total
   offense level of 35 and a criminal history category of I. Hoffman’s offense
   level calculation included an 18-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G.
   § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) because Hoffman was responsible for an intended loss
   amount of $3,665,739.12, and a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G.
   § 3C1.1 because Hoffman obstructed justice. The adjustment for obstructive
   conduct was based on Hoffman committing perjury at trial regarding claims
   he made for expenditures on consulting fees.
          Among other objections, Hoffman objected to (1) the PSR’s assertion
   that he had committed perjury, and thereby obstructed justice; and (2) the
   PSR’s intended loss calculation, on the basis that the state suffered no actual
   or intended loss because the 807 Esplanade project was ultimately
   completed.
          At sentencing, the district court overruled Hoffman’s objections to
   the obstruction of justice enhancement and withheld ruling on his objection
   to the intended loss calculation pending a hearing on the issues of forfeiture
   and restitution. The court adopted then the PSR’s guidelines range of 168 to

          5
              Id. at 531.

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   210 months of imprisonment. In choosing an appropriate sentence for
   Hoffman, the court reasoned that there was a “serious dispute” as to
   whether the state suffered an actual loss. In addition, the court considered
   Hoffman’s health issues and stated that it believed probation would be
   sufficient to “deter other criminal conduct.” Accordingly, the district court
   granted Hoffman a downward variance and sentenced him to concurrent six-
   year terms of probation on all counts of conviction. The district court
   subsequently granted the Government’s motion for forfeiture but denied its
   request for restitution of the full amount of the issued tax credits, noting that
   the state had suffered no actual loss because the 807 Esplanade project was
   ultimately completed and operated as planned.
          Hoffman appealed his convictions, and the Government cross-
   appealed his probationary sentences as well as the district court’s entry of
   judgments of acquittal on the five counts of wire fraud.6 This court affirmed
   the judgments of conviction and reinstated Hoffman’s convictions on the five
   counts of wire fraud.7 But it vacated Hoffman’s sentence of probation as
   substantively unreasonable, concluding that the circumstances of the offense
   and Hoffman’s criminal history made probation “a variance too far.” 8 In
   reaching that conclusion, this court relied, in part, on the “colossal” gap
   between Hoffman’s probationary sentence and his guidelines range of 168 to
   210 months of imprisonment.9 In discussing why Hoffman’s “Guideline
   range was so high,” our court noted the “facts” that “the intended loss
   exceeded $3.5 million, . . . [Hoffman] abused his position of trust as a lawyer

          6
              Id.
          7
              Id. at 552.
          8
              Id. at 559.
          9
              Id. at 555.

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   to facilitate the fraud, and he obstructed justice by lying at trial.” 10
   Consequently, this court remanded the case for resentencing.11
          On remand, the second PSR calculated the same offense level and
   advisory sentencing range as the first PSR. The second PSR also arrived at
   the same intended loss amount. Hoffman objected to the second PSR, again
   challenging its findings as to his obstruction of justice by committing perjury
   and the intended loss amount. A revised, third PSR maintained the same
   offense level and guidelines range calculations, but increased the intended
   loss amount.
          Prior to resentencing, Hoffman moved for an evidentiary hearing on
   the issues of whether the Government had sufficiently proven, for purposes
   of the guidelines calculation, that (1) he committed perjury at trial, and
   thereby obstructed justice and (2) he had the subjective intent to cause a loss
   to the state. Finding that the issues had been fully briefed, the district court
   denied the motion for an evidentiary hearing.           Hoffman also filed a
   supplemental sentencing memorandum in which he argued for another
   probationary sentence based on his same objections to the guidelines
   calculations.
          At the resentencing hearing, the district court overruled Hoffman’s
   objections to the guidelines enhancements, except for his objection to the
   intended loss amount, which it noted would be addressed in a written order.
   The court resentenced Hoffman to concurrent terms of 20 months of
   imprisonment on each count—a 148-month variance from the bottom of the
   guidelines range—followed by concurrent two-year terms of supervised
   release. On the same day, the district court issued a resentencing order.

          10
               Id. at 555-56.
          11
               Id. at 559.

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   Pertinently, the court determined that it was bound by the “mandate rule”
   to accept this court’s implicit determination in the first appeal that
   Hoffman’s guidelines range was 168 to 210 months, as well as the PSR’s
   “methodology” in arriving at that range. Further, the court concluded that,
   for the same reason, it could not revisit Hoffman’s challenges to the various
   guidelines enhancements, including his challenge to the intended loss
   amount.
          The district court entered its resentencing judgment on February 19,
   2020. On February 28, 2020, Hoffman filed a “motion for reconsideration”
   of the resentencing order.      Hoffman filed a supplemental motion for
   reconsideration on April 24, 2020, arguing that he should be sentenced to
   home confinement or granted compassionate release in light of his age, his
   health, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which was rapidly spreading through
   prison facilities.
          On May 14, 2020, the district court entered an order dismissing
   Hoffman’s motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically,
   the court determined that its resentencing order was a final judgment that
   could be corrected only on appeal or through one of the limited statutorily
   authorized sources for a modification of his sentence, which do not include
   common-law motions for reconsideration. Hoffman filed a notice of appeal
   the next day, noting his intent to appeal the district court’s resentencing
   order as well as the dismissal of his motions for reconsideration.
                                         II
                                         A
          As an initial matter, the Government argues that Hoffman’s notice of
   appeal—filed one day after the denial of his motion for reconsideration but
   86 days after the entry of the judgment—was untimely. Federal Rule of
   Appellate Procedure 4(b) requires the notice of appeal in a criminal case to

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   be filed within fourteen days of the entry of the judgment.12 Although the
   timeliness of a notice of appeal in a criminal case is not jurisdictional and may
   be waived,13 if the Government objects to an untimely filing a “court’s duty
   to dismiss the appeal [is] mandatory.”14
           Rule 4(b)(3)(A) provides an exception to the fourteen-day time period
   provided by Rule 4(b).15 The rule “list[s] several motions that, if timely
   made, toll the time to appeal till after entry of an order denying the motion.
   However, a motion for reconsideration, which is a judicial creation not
   derived from statutes or rules, [i]s not among the motions listed.” 16
   Although not listed in Rule 4(b), the Healy doctrine provides that “despite
   the absence of a governing statute or procedural rule, a motion for
   reconsideration in a criminal case filed within the original period in which an
   appeal is permitted ‘render[s] the original judgment nonfinal for purposes of
   appeal for as long as the petition is pending.’”17 “The effect of a timely filed
   motion to reconsider is to extend the time in which to appeal so that it begins
   to run when the motion is denied.”18 “Thus, in essence, . . . a timely filed
   motion for reconsideration [has] the same tolling effect as the motions
   expressly addressed by [Rule] 4(b).”19

           12
                Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
           13
                United States v. Martinez, 496 F.3d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 2007).
           14
                Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 18 (2005).
           15
                Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(3)(A).
           16
                United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1143 (5th Cir. 1995).
           17
              United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1466 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
   States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976)).
           18
              United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 563, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States
   v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78 (1964)).
           19
                Brewer, 60 F.3d at 1143.

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          The Government argues that Congress abrogated the Healy doctrine
   in the sentencing context through its express limits on sentence modification
   in 18 U.S.C. § 3582, Rule 4(b), and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule
   35(a). Consequently, the Government maintains that Hoffman’s notice of
   appeal was untimely, and we must dismiss his appeal.
                                                  B
          Given that Hoffman’s sentence remains intact whether we dismiss his
   appeal or affirm the district court, and because I would ultimately affirm the
   district court on other grounds, I will assume, without deciding, that
   Hoffman’s notice of appeal was timely.

                                                 III
          Next, we address Hoffman’s argument that the district court erred in
   dismissing his motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction. We review
   de novo whether the district court had jurisdiction to reconsider Hoffman’s
   sentence.20
          “‘[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of
   imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment’ and may not be modified by a
   district court except in limited circumstances.” 21 “A trial judge lacks
   authority to correct a sentencing error unless Congress has provided
   otherwise. Outside of such a provision of authority, errors at sentencing may
   be corrected only on appeal.”22

          20
               United States v. Bridges, 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997).
          21
               Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)).
          22
               United States v. Murray, 700 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 2012) (footnotes omitted).

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           In Hoffman’s supplemental motion for reconsideration, he requested
   compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18
   U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, as
   Hoffman admitted to the district court, he did not exhaust his administrative
   remedies as required to bring a motion for compassionate release under
   § 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirements are not jurisdictional
   but are mandatory.23 Accordingly, although the district court had jurisdiction
   to consider Hoffman’s compassionate release claim, the court properly
   dismissed the claim given that Hoffman failed to satisfy the statutory
   requirements.24
           Alternatively, rather than relying on a statutory provision of authority,
   Hoffman argues that his motion for reconsideration is a common-law motion
   that the district court has jurisdiction to consider. As a general rule, a district
   court has common law jurisdiction to hear a motion to reconsider. 25
   However, our precedent makes clear that the general rule does not apply in
   the sentencing context in light of Congress’s limit to the circumstances in
   which a district court can modify a sentence of imprisonment.
           In United States v. Bridges,26 the district court granted a defendant’s
   motion to reconsider his sentence.27 On appeal, this court noted that the
   district court’s “authority to correct or modify a sentence [wa]s limited to
   those specific circumstances enumerated by Congress in 18 U.S.C.

           23
                United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2020).
           24
            See United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district
   court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion for compassionate release because the
   defendant failed to satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement).
           25
                United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78 (1964).
           26
                116 F.3d 1110 (5th Cir. 1997).
           27
                Id. at 1111-12.

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   § 3582(b).”28 The court concluded that the district court’s modification of
   the defendant’s sentence was not authorized under any of the provisions in
   § 3582(b).29          Accordingly, “the district court lacked jurisdiction to
   resentence [the defendant].”30
           Similarly, in the unpublished decision in United States v. Landry,31 a
   defendant asserted that his motion to reconsider his sentence “was a
   ‘common law’ motion to reconsider over which the district court had
   jurisdiction.”32 This court rejected that argument, concluding that the
   district court did not err in denying the motion for lack of jurisdiction,
   because the motion did not fall under one of the limited exceptions in
   § 3582.33
           Hoffman does not attempt to distinguish Bridges or Landry. Instead,
   Hoffman argues that this court held in United States v. Greenwood34 that a
   district court has jurisdiction to hear a common-law motion to reconsider a
   sentence. Hoffman is incorrect. In Greenwood, this court expressly chose not
   to resolve the question of whether a district court has non-statutory authority
   to resentence a defendant.35 This circuit’s case law has since clarified that a

           28
                Id. at 1112.
           29
                Id.
           30
                Id.
           31
                111 F. App’x 777 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished).
           32
                Id. at 778.
           33
                Id. (citing United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1994)).
           34
                974 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1992).
           35
             Id. at 1470 (“We note that the issue of whether a district court possesses a non-
   statutory or ‘inherent’ authority to correct an illegal sentence has been the subject of
   numerous recent appellate decisions in the various circuits. This circuit has never squarely

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   district court’s authority to modify a sentence of imprisonment is limited to
   the circumstances authorized by Congress.36 Because Hoffman’s motion for
   reconsideration is not authorized by a statutory provision of authority,37 we
   affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hoffman’s motion for reconsideration.
                                                  IV
           Next, I consider Hoffman’s challenges to the district court’s
   sentencing order. Hoffman’s primary argument is that the district court
   erred by holding that it was bound by the mandate rule on remand and thus
   was prevented from reconsidering Hoffman’s guidelines range calculation.
   We review “de novo a district court’s application of the remand order,
   including whether the law-of-the-case doctrine or mandate rule forecloses
   the district court’s actions on remand.”38
           Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “the district court on remand . . .
   abstains from reexamining an issue of fact or law that has already been
   decided on appeal.”39 The mandate rule is “a specific application of the
   general doctrine of law of the case.”40 “Absent exceptional circumstances,
   the mandate rule compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a
   superior court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly
   decided by the appellate court.”41

   addressed this issue . . . . We do not believe, however, that we need to reach this issue
   here.” (footnotes omitted)).
           36
                Bridges, 116 F.3d at 1112.
           37
                See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
           38
                United States v. Carales-Villalta, 617 F.3d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 2010).
           39
                United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d 578, 582 (5th Cir. 2012).
           40
                United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2002).
           41
                United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2004).

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          “To determine whether the district court’s actions on remand
   complied with the mandate rule, this court must determine the scope of its
   mandate” in our opinion vacating Hoffman’s sentence and remanding the
   matter for resentencing.42 “This court has adopted a restrictive rule for
   interpreting the scope of the mandate in the criminal resentencing
   context.”43 “[O]nly those discrete, particular issues identified by the appeals
   court for remand are properly before the resentencing court.” 44
          Hoffman contends that the mandate rule is inapplicable in this case,
   and did not bar the district court from revisiting its guidelines calculation on
   remand, because the only issue decided on appeal was whether Hoffman’s
   sentence of probation was substantively reasonable. Hoffman maintains that
   neither the district court nor this court on appeal made an actual decision
   regarding his objections to the offense-level increases in his PSR based on the
   obstruction of justice finding and the intended loss calculation. In response,
   the Government argues that the first appeal “impliedly decided that
   Hoffman’s advisory guidelines range was proper, precluding relitigation of
   the issue during Hoffman’s resentencing.”
          In the first appeal, this court did not explicitly address whether the
   district court committed a procedural error in calculating Hoffman’s
   guidelines range.        Instead, the pertinent sentencing issue was whether
   Hoffman’s sentence of probation was substantively reasonable in light of his
   guidelines range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. 45 Yet “[b]efore a
   court of appeals can consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence,

          42
               Id.
          43
               Matthews, 312 F.3d at 658.
          44
               United States v. Marmolejo, 139 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1998).
          45
               United States v. Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2018).

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   ‘[i]t must first ensure that the district court committed no significant
   procedural error.’”46 Thus, by reaching the issue of whether Hoffman’s
   sentence was substantively reasonable, the court implicitly determined that
   the court did not commit a procedural error in calculating Hoffman’s
   guidelines range.47
           Further, Hoffman’s guidelines range was the framework from which
   the court determined whether his sentence was substantively reasonable. For
   instance, the court observed that “the gap” between Hoffman’s 60-month
   probationary sentence and the recommended guidelines range was
   “colossal.”48 The court explained that Hoffman’s guidelines range was so
   high because he received guidelines enhancements “because the intended
   loss exceeded $3.5 million, the scheme was sophisticated, [Hoffman] led it,
   he abused his position of trust as a lawyer to facilitate the fraud, and he
   obstructed justice by lying at trial.”49 The court characterized these findings
   as “facts.”50
           Consequently, the only “discrete, particular issue[] identified by the
   appeals court for remand” was the substantive reasonableness of Hoffman’s
   sentence, not the calculation of his guidelines range. By continuously relying
   on the guidelines range in its analysis of whether Hoffman’s sentence was
   substantively reasonable, this court impliedly decided that the guidelines

           46
             Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1910 (2018) (quoting Gall v.
   United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
           47
               Hoffman, 901 F.3d at 562 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
   (“As the majority acknowledges, the district court in this case committed no procedural
   error: it correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range.”).
           48
                Id. at 555.
           49
                Id. at 555-56.
           50
                Id. at 556.

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   range was proper. Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that
   the mandate rule prevented it from reconsidering Hoffman’s guidelines
   range.
                                                    V
                       Finally, Hoffman contends that the district court erred on
   remand by not conducting an evidentiary hearing with respect to his
   challenges to his guidelines range. A district court’s denial of an evidentiary
   hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion.51 Because I conclude that the
   mandate rule barred the district court from reconsidering Hoffman’s
   guidelines range on remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   denying an evidentiary hearing on an issue it could not consider.
            For these reasons, I would hold that both the district court’s order
   dismissing Hoffman’s motion for reconsideration, and the district court’s
   resentencing order, are AFFIRMED.
                                           *        *         *
            Due to the lack of agreement as to the judgment to be entered in this
   appeal, the district court’s judgment stands. The district court’s judgment
   is AFFIRMED because the panel is equally divided.

            51
                 United States v. Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 927 (5th Cir. 1994).

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   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
          I concur in parts II(A) and III of the majority opinion, but dissent as
   to the majority’s determination that the mandate rule barred the district
   court from reconsidering Hoffman’s sentencing guidelines range in light of
   the evidence demonstrating that the state suffered no loss in this case.
   Because the prior panel’s implied approval of the intended loss enhancement
   applied to Hoffman’s guidelines range was clearly erroneous and resulted in
   manifest injustice in Hoffman’s calculated sentencing range—both in his
   initial sentencing and his re-sentencing on remand—the panel should reverse
   the district court’s resentencing order and order the district court to hold an
   evidentiary hearing to allow it to re-calculate Hoffman’s sentencing
   guidelines range.
          While the mandate rule generally forecloses a district court from
   reconsidering any issues decided by an appellate court, it is not without
   exceptions. United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2004). For
   example, a district court may reexamine issues already decided by the
   appellate court if the appellate court’s decision “was clearly erroneous and
   would work a manifest injustice.” United States v. Pineiro, 470 F.3d 200, 205–
   06 (5th Cir. 2006); see also U.S. v. Vahlco Corp., 895 F.2d 1070, 1072 (1990).
   Here, while the district court determined that it need not follow this court’s
   erroneous prior determination that Hoffman had been sentenced to
   probation before this case, the district court did not consider whether this
   exception also applied to the intended loss enhancement applied to
   Hoffman’s sentencing guidelines range, despite explicitly lamenting the

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   error and unfairness of the enhancement.1 This is precisely the situation2
   where the manifest injustice exception to the mandate rule may be used to
   prevent the imposition of an unfairly harsh and erroneous sentencing
   enhancement.
           The prior panel’s determination regarding the intended loss amount
   was clearly erroneous. As explained in my dissent in the prior appeal in this
   case, and reiterated by the district court on remand, the state did not actually
   incur the $3.6 million intended loss amount used in adding an 18-level
   enhancement to Hoffman’s sentencing guidelines range. See United States v.
   Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523, 563 (5th Cir. 2018), as revised (Aug. 28, 2018)
   (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“That the state ultimately suffered no loss is all the
   more significant because Peter’s Guidelines range was only as high as it was
   because of an 18-level enhancement for the $3.6 million ‘intended loss’
   calculated in the PSR, a loss the state did not actually incur.”).3 The

           1
             As noted by the district court, “[n]ot only did the reality of a completed project
   (and the State forensic auditor’s best estimate of qualifying project expenditures) negate
   actual loss, but it would appear to call into question -- or at least hinder the ability to show
   by a preponderance -- subjective intended loss as well.” See also United States v. Nielson,
   455 F. App’x 526, 527 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The government has the burden of proving by a
   preponderance of the evidence the facts that support a sentencing enhancement.”).
           2
            The government argues that Hoffman waived any argument that the district court
   could have departed from the mandate rule because he did not argue that any of the
   exceptions applied. But Hoffman did object. He consistently objected to the intended loss
   enhancement applied to his sentencing guidelines range throughout this litigation,
   including during his resentencing and on appeal.
           3
             While I commented in my prior dissent that “the district court in this case
   committed no procedural error: it correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range,” I
   also noted that our court was foreclosed from reweighing the sentencing factors, and as
   such, the district court was well within its discretion to impose a lighter sentence than that
   recommended by the sentencing guidelines in this light of these extenuating circumstances
   that rendered this a no-loss, victimless crime. Hoffman, 901 F.3d at 563-64 (Dennis, J.,
   dissenting).

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                                        No. 20-30323

   application of the erroneous 18-level enhancement, which constituted the
   majority of Hoffman’s final 35-point4 offense level, resulted in a manifest
   injustice by condemning Hoffman to a recommended sentence substantially
   higher than that warranted by the facts of this case. See Vahlco, 895 F.2d at
   1072 (declining to follow portion of prior decision that would lead to
   “manifestly unjust” result). Because the prior panel’s acquiescence to the
   inflated and inaccurate intended loss amount resulted in a manifest injustice
   in the calculation of Hoffman’s sentencing guidelines range, the panel should
   reverse the district court’s resentencing order and remand with instructions
   that the district court assess the applicability of the manifest injustice
   exception to the mandate rule and hold an evidentiary hearing to reconsider
   the factual basis for the intended loss enhancement.
          Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent with respect to the
   majority’s determination that the mandate rule precluded the district court
   from holding an evidentiary hearing to reconsider Hoffman’s guidelines
   range given that the intended loss enhancement was based on erroneous facts
   and resulted in a manifest injustice. I concur in the remaining portions of the
   majority opinion.

          4
            In the absence of the 18-level enhancement based on the purported intended loss
   amount, Hoffman’s recommended sentencing range would have been 24-30 months, rather
   than the 168-210 months sentence recommended by the Guidelines. See U.S. Sent’g
   Guidelines Manual ch. 5 pt. A (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018).

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                                            No. 20-30323

   Priscilla Richman, Chief Judge, dissenting:
           I write separately because I would dismiss Hoffman’s appeal as
   untimely. Hoffman argues that his notice of appeal was timely because,
   under the Healy doctrine,1 his motion for reconsideration suspended the time
   to file a notice of appeal. I would follow the First and Seventh Circuits and
   hold that Congress abrogated the Healy doctrine in the sentencing context.2
           Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which encompasses 18
   U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment
   once it has been imposed except” in a few limited circumstances.3 In this
   case, Hoffman identified 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as the statutory basis for
   his motion for reconsideration. However, Hoffman first raised his claim
   under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in his supplemental motion, which was filed more than
   14 days after the entry of the judgment.                       Accordingly, Hoffman’s
   supplemental motion was not “filed within the original period in which an
   appeal is permitted” and therefore cannot suspend the time to file a notice of
   appeal, even under the Healy doctrine.4 Only Hoffman’s original motion for
   reconsideration, which was filed within 14 days of the entry of the judgment,
   can be considered in determining whether the motion suspended the time to
   file a notice of appeal.

           1
               United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78 (1964).
           2
            United States v. Townsend, 762 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Congress long ago
   abrogated this common-law practice in the sentencing context.”); United States v.
   Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 777 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[A]s to sentencing, Congress has
   eliminated the common-law practice of allowing motions for reconsideration.”).
           3
               18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 777 F.3d at 41.
           4
              United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1466 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
   States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976)).

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                                            No. 20-30323

           Hoffman offers no statutory basis for his requested relief in the
   original motion for reconsideration. When there is no statutory basis for a
   criminal defendant’s motion for reconsideration of sentence, the defendant
   “must proceed within the confines of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure]
   35(a).”5 Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, Rule 35(a) broadly allowed
   district courts to “correct an illegal sentence at any time.”6 The Sentencing
   Reform Act amended Rule 35, eliminating a district court’s power to modify
   a sentence except on remand.7 “Even after this change in the law, however,
   a few courts held that district judges retained some inherent authority to
   correct sentencing errors within the time allowed for filing an appeal.” 8 Rule
   35 was amended again in 1991 “to curtail that development.”9
           Today, Rule 35(a) provides that “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing,
   the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical,
   or other clear error.”10 Further, the 2002 amendment to Federal Rule of
   Appellate Procedure 4(b) clarified that “[t]he filing of a motion under
   Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) does not suspend the time for filing
   a notice of appeal from a judgment of conviction.”11 Therefore, Hoffman’s
   motion did not suspend the time for filing a notice of appeal and Hoffman

           5
               Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 777 F.3d at 41.
           6
                Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, Rule Applicable to Offenses Committed Prior to Nov. 1,
   1987.
           7
               Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, § 215(b).
           8
             United States v. Townsend, 762 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing United States
   v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1989)).
           9
                Id.
           10
                Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a).
           11
                Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(5).

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                                             No. 20-30323

   was required to file his notice of appeal within the 14-day time period of Rule
   4(b).
           Our precedent in United States v. Greenwood12 does not compel a
   different result. In Greenwood, the court applied the Healy doctrine and held
   that the Government’s motion to reconsider the defendant’s sentence
   suspended the time period for the Government to file a notice of appeal. 13
   When Greenwood was decided it was still unsettled “whether a district court
   possesses a non-statutory or ‘inherent’ authority to correct an illegal
   sentence.”14 The court concluded that it “need take no position on the
   extent of the district court’s retained corrective powers, if any,” concluding
   that it was “enough . . . that the government’s reconsideration motion cannot
   under today’s case law, be said to have been unquestionably and blatantly
   outside the district court’s jurisdiction to resolve.”15
           Since Greenwood, our case law has clarified that a district court cannot
   modify a term of imprisonment after it is imposed unless authorized by 18
   U.S.C. § 3582.16            Further, Greenwood was decided prior to the 1991
   amendment to Rule 35 and the 2002 amendment to Rule 4(b). 17 The court
   in Greenwood recognized that “Congress or the bodies collectively
   responsible for adopting the Federal Criminal Rules [could] send a clearer
   signal that [the Healy doctrine] is not still the law.”18 The amendments to

           12
                974 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1992).
           13
                Id. at 1471.
           14
                Id.
           15
                Id. (quoting United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991)).
           16
                United States v. Bridges, 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997).
           17
                See Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1470 n.17.
           18
                Id. at 1471 (quoting Carr, 932 F.2d at 71).

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                                     No. 20-30323

   Rule 35(a) and Rule 4(b) did just that. Consequently, Greenwood does not
   control this case.
             For these reasons, Hoffman’s motion for reconsideration did not
   suspend the time period for him to file a notice of appeal. Because Hoffman
   failed to file a notice of appeal within 14 days of the entry of the judgment, his
   appeal is untimely. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal. However, were
   we to have jurisdiction, I agree fully with the panel’s analysis of all other
   issues.

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