Court Opinion

ID: 9781089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:06:34.517841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:56.454950
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 23-0952
                                 Filed August 30, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF R.F.,
Minor Child,

J.F., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

          Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Adam D.

Sauer, District Associate Judge.

          A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

          Richard N. Tompkins Jr. of Tompkins Law Office, Mason City, for appellant

father.

          Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

          Jane M. Wright, Forest City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

          Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Gamble, S.J.*

          *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.

       A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. He claims

(1) termination is not in the child’s best interests, (2) the juvenile court should have

applied a permissive exception to forgo termination, and (3) he should have

additional time to work toward reunification.1

       We review termination proceedings de novo. In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518,

522 (Iowa 2020). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights where there

is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination. Evidence

is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the

correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re T.S., 868

N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted).

       We generally use a three-step analysis to review the termination of a

parent’s rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). We consider:

(1) whether grounds for termination have been established, (2) whether

termination is in the children’s best interests, and (3) whether we should exercise

any of the permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73. However, if a

parent does not challenge any of the three steps, we need not address it on appeal.

See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We end our analysis by addressing

any additional claims raised by a parent. In re S.D., No. 22-1141, 2022 WL

3906757, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2022).

1 The father makes a passing suggestion that the juvenile court did not have

authority to place custody and physical care of the child with the mother. However,
Iowa Code section 232.117(3) (2023) explicitly permits the juvenile court to place
custody of a child with “a parent of the child whose parental rights have not been
terminated.”
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       The father does not challenge the statutory grounds authorizing termination.

So we bypass our first step and move on to the second—whether termination is in

the child’s best interests. When making a best-interest determination, we “give

primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and

emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Taking

these factors into consideration, we conclude termination is in the child’s best

interests.

       The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) became

involved with this family in February 2022 following concerns that the father was

caring for the child while under the influence of methamphetamine. The father has

a long history of methamphetamine use, which has remained a concern throughout

this case.2 He was discharged from substance-abuse treatment twice for non-

attendance or noncompliance. He attempted to thwart drug testing by submitting

nonhuman urine twice, and he has not submitted to testing since that time. The

father admitted to using methamphetamine about a month before the termination

hearing.     Critically, the father refuses to acknowledge the impact his

methamphetamine use has on the child’s safety.

       Given the father’s significant, and largely unaddressed, methamphetamine

addiction3 and refusal to appreciate the dangers of parenting a child while under

2 The father first used methamphetamine at age twenty-one and was thirty-two

years old at the time of the termination hearing.
3 The father has been diagnosed using the DSM-5 with stimulant use disorder-

amphetamine type, severe; as well as adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance
of emotions and conduct; cannabis use disorder, severe; and alcohol use disorder,
severe, in sustained remission.
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the influence of methamphetamine, we conclude the father cannot provide the

child with a safe environment or basic stability. The impact of the father’s inability

to provide stability became apparent prior to termination as the child has become

weary of his future relationship with the father and questions when visits will end.

There is no question the father and the child share a bond of love with one another.

But the risk of breaking this bond does not outweigh the risk to the child’s safety.

Because the father cannot provide a safe environment for the child nor the basic

stability and security all children deserve, we conclude termination is in the child’s

best interests.

       Next, we consider whether the father established a permissive exception to

preclude termination. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at476 (explaining the burden of

establishing a permissive exception to preclude termination is on the parent). The

father points us to section 232.116(3)(a), which permits the court to forgo

termination when “a relative has legal custody of the child,” because the child was

in the mother’s legal custody at the time of the termination hearing. Yet the father

provides no compelling argument as to why this exception should be applied. In

fact, forgoing termination would run counter to the child’s best interests. We

decline to apply this exception to termination.

       Finally, we address the father’s request for additional time to work toward

reunification. The court may grant a parent an additional six months to work toward

reunification under certain circumstances.         See Iowa Code § 232.117(5)

(permitting the court to enter a permanency order pursuant to section 232.104 if it

does not terminate parental rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a

permanency option of giving the parents an additional six months). In order for the
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court to grant the parent additional time to work toward reunification, it must be

able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral

changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal

of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional

six-month period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b).

       The DHHS worker had numerous conversations with the father imploring

him to take responsibility and engage with services before it was too late. The

father made some progress toward some parenting goals during supervised

visitation. But he was unable to consistently demonstrate proper parenting in order

to progress beyond supervision. Further, the father now professes to appreciate

he has a substance-abuse problem and is taking some steps to seek out inpatient

treatment. However, we are not persuaded the father’s eve-of-trial conversion is

likely to result in sustained progress. See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa

1994) (“Any efforts on [the parent’s] part to accept parenting responsibilities are of

very recent origin.    We see them as an eleventh hour attempt to prevent

termination of [the parent’s] parental rights.”); In re K.M., No. 21-0520, 2021

WL 3076429, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 21, 2021) (“[T]he mother made little

progress on her long-standing substance-abuse issues until about two months

prior to the termination hearing. Her late progress does not convince us the need

for termination will no longer exist after an additional six months.”). A recent

substance-abuse assessment described the father as in the pre-contemplation

stage of change. This leads us to believe it will take a significant amount of time,
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more than six months, for the father to meaningfully address his substance

abuse—the primary barrier to reunification.

      AFFIRMED.