Court Opinion

ID: 8752836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 11:33:43.934618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:03.544742
License: Public Domain

SEVERENS, Circuit Judge,
having stated the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The petition in this case, although conforming to the regulations of the Code of Ohio respecting pleadings, is in the similitude of the common-law declaration in an action of trespass on the case, and demands a judgment for damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff and those whom he claims to represent in consequence of the wrongful acts of the defendant set out in the petition.
The joinder of the causes of action which the plaintiff claims for himself and those he represents is supposed to be authorized by section 5008 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which reads as follows:
*621“When tlie question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, •or when the parties are very numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.”
It is contended that this provision extends to all civil actions, whether brought to enforce an equitable or a legal right, and the case of Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N. E. 735, is cited by counsel for the plaintiff in support of that contention. For the defendant it is contended that the operation of this statutory provision is limited to those cases where by the rules and practice of the court of chancery such representation of parties not otherwise before the court was permissible, and reference is made to other decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, which are thought to support that view. Trustees, etc., v. Thoman, 51 Ohio St. 285, 37 N. E. 523; Quinlan v. Myers, 29 Ohio St. 500, 508.
In view of the fact that notwithstanding all distinctions in matters of form in pleading are obliterated by the Code, and all causes of action, whether legal or equitable in their nature, are presented in a common form of statement, the necessity for making the distinction arises in determining the mode of trial; for causes of action of a legal nature are in Ohio tried by a’jury, while causes resting upon the principles of equity are tried by the court. But the verdict of a jury upon such a petition as this, for instance, would be wholly inadequate to accomplish the ultimate purpose or to settle the variety of issues that might arise within the boundaries of the case. But it is said that it might bring the fund into court, and then the court might distribute it to those entitled. But in a court of equity both these results are attained in a single suit. From the elasticity of its procedure it could in the same procedure determine all incidental issues, and thus avoid a multiplicity of suits. But we shall not undertake to decide whether or not the statute referred to authorizes such a method of proceeding as this, which is an action to recover a judgment for damages merely, to be ascertained upon the principles of the common law; for if it were conceded that under this provision of the Code of Ohio, construed as the plaintiff claims it should be, the suit might go on in the courts of the state, yet the provision would be of no force or effect after it was removed into the federal court. When the cause was brought there it came into a forum where different modes of procedure obtain in cases at law and in equity, and it became necessary to determine the nature of the case, and assign it to the law or to the equity side of the court accordingly, and to re-frame the pleadings if necessary. It is impossible for a state statute to prescribe.a practice which will require the federal courts to ignore the distinction between law and equity — a distinction as old as are the courts themselves. The latter courts must deal with the case in recognition of this distinction. They cannot, sitting as courts of equity, try an action at law, nor, sitting as courts of law, proceed by the methods of equity or administer equitable remedies. The cases upon this subject are so numerous as hardly to justify citation, but we refer to a few: Thompson v. Railroad Co., 6 Wall. 134, 18 L. Ed. 765; Hurt v. Hollingsworth, 100 U. S. 100, 25 L. Ed. 569; McConnell v. Assur. Soc., 16 C. C. A. 172, 69 Fed. 113; Goodyear Shoe *622Mfg. Co. v. Dancel, 56 C. C. A. 300, 119 Fed. 692. But the plaintiff from the beginning has insisted upon his right to a legal remedy and a trial by jury. He demanded a judgment for damages. In the Circuit Court the case was docketed as a law case. After the removal, the plaintiff took no action to bring his case into the equity side of the court; but, although one of the grounds of the demurrer was that the case was one of equitable cognizance and the plaintiff was given the right to plead further, he elected to> stand by his pleading as one at law, and brought the case here on writ of error, whereon this court can deal only with questions of law, predominant among which is the one whether in a federal court of law the plaintiff can maintain a suit so constituted at all, conceding the facts to be as alleged. He had the technical right to pursue this course, and obtain the judgment of the court upon his own theory. In a former case (McConnell v. Provident Life Assurance Society, supra), brought to this court by appeal from a decree in a suit begun in a state court to recover the amount claimed to be due on a policy of insurance where the court below had tried the case on the equity side pursuant to a method prescribed by a statute of Tennessee, under a misapprehension of the court and counsel, we reversed the decree, and remanded the case, with directions to permit the plaintiff to reframe his pleadings and resort to the law side of the court. But in that case no question had been raised in the court below upon the question here involved. The plaintiff had made no distinct election, and the statute of limitations would have barred a writ of error. It is not contended, nor could it be, that an action such as this could have been originally prosecuted as a suit at law in the Circuit Court of the United States; but it is claimed that by the privilege accorded by the state law he could so prosecute it in the state courts, and that the same privilege attended him on the removal. He invoked the exercise of the jurisdiction of the federal court upon his action as a court of law, and that court could not do otherwise than to deal with it in that capacity, and, consistently with the law governing it, it properly held that the suit could . not be maintained.
The assignment of errors, which are all leveled at the judgment itself, must therefore fail. It would be manifestly out of place for us to enter upon the merits of the case.
The judgment is affirmed.