Court Opinion

ID: 9892421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 19:05:07.129027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:21.339885
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/23/23
                            CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                              SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 CITY OF GILROY,                                   H049552
                                                   (Santa Clara County
         Petitioner,                               Super. Ct. No. 20CV362347)

         v.

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA
 CLARA COUNTY,

       Respondent;

 LAW FOUNDATION OF SILICON
 VALLEY,

     Real Party in Interest.
 LAW FOUNDATION OF SILICON                         H049554
 VALLEY,                                           (Santa Clara County
                                                   Super. Ct. No. 20CV362347)
         Petitioner,

         v.

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA
 CLARA COUNTY,

         Respondent;

 CITY OF GILROY,

         Real Party in Interest.
                                   I. INTRODUCTION
        Petitioner Law Foundation of Silicon Valley (Law Foundation) is a “nonprofit
legal services organization whose mission is to advance the rights of under-represented
individuals and families through legal services, strategic advocacy, and educational
outreach.” During its investigation of complaints by homeless persons that their personal
property was being destroyed during cleanups of homeless encampments, the Law
Foundation made numerous public record requests to the City of Gilroy (City). 1
       Dissatisfied with City’s responses to its public records request, Law Foundation
filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief alleging that City
had violated the California Public Records Act (CPRA; Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.) 2
In the October 1, 2021 order, the trial court denied the petition for a writ of mandate and
granted declaratory relief in part, finding that City had violated the CPRA in responding
to Law Foundation’s public records requests but rejecting Law Foundation’s request for a
declaration that City had violated the CPRA by failing to preserve responsive records it
claimed were exempt while Law Foundation’s public records requests were pending.
       Both parties filed writ petitions in this court challenging parts of the trial court’s
order. In case No. H049552, City of Gilroy v. Superior Court, City contends that the trial
court erred in granting declaratory relief, failing to find that Law Foundation’s claims of
CPRA violations were moot, and tentatively finding that Law Foundation is the
prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs and attorney fees. In case No. H049554,
Law Foundation v. Superior Court, Law Foundation argues that the trial court erred in
denying Law Foundation’s request for a declaration that the City violated the CPRA by
destroying responsive records after it received the Law Foundation’s CPRA requests.
       For the reasons stated below, we determine that (1) the trial court erred in case
No. H049552, City of Gilroy v. Superior Court by granting declaratory relief on the basis
of its findings that City’s past conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s public records
requests violated the CPRA; and (2) the trial court did not err in case No. H049554, Law

       1
          To be consistent with the parties’ terminology in their briefs and in the
proceedings below, we will refer to unhoused persons as homeless.
        2
          The CPRA was previously codified as section 6250 et seq. and was recently
recodified and reorganized as section 7921.000 et seq. All further statutory references
are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                               2
Foundation v. Superior Court, by denying Law Foundation’s request for a declaration
that City violated the CPRA by failing to preserve responsive records it claimed were
exempt while Law Foundation’s public records requests were pending. We will therefore
issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate the October 1, 2021 order and to
enter a new order denying Law Foundation’s petition for writ of mandate and complaint
for declaratory relief in its entirety.
                                 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       A. Records of GPD Body-Worn Camera Video Footage
       Gilroy Police Department (GPD) receives complaints about homeless
encampments that have been established on private or public property, including the
property of the Santa Clara Valley Water District (Water District). When requested by
the Water District, GPD assists with the cleanup of homeless encampments (also known
as sweeps) on Water District property. According to former Chief of Police Scot
Smithee, “[d]uring an encampment cleanup, GPD officers proceed in advance of the
Water District crews. The GPD officers locate and investigate individuals who have
failed to comply with the prior written and oral notices to vacate the premises. Officers
make contact with these individuals to investigate potential violations of the law, such as
trespass or illegal storage, and direct individuals to collect their belongings and
immediately vacate the property prior to the Water District personnel arriving to
complete the cleanup.” The Water District is responsible for collecting belongings left at
the cleanup site and either disposing of them or leaving items of apparent value at the site
for homeless persons to retrieve later. GPD collects and stores a few items, such as
identification cards.
       According to Smithee, GPD officers assisting with homeless encampment
cleanups have body-worn cameras (bodycams), which they activate “if they are engaging
in a criminal investigation or enforcement action.” Video footage generated by GPD
officers’ bodycams is collected and stored in accordance with GPD’s record management

                                              3
system. David Boles, GPD’s records manager, is responsible for the collection and
maintenance of all GPD records, including video footage from bodycams. Boles is also
responsible for responding to public record requests for GPD records. City’s records
retention policy for GPD records requires bodycam video footage to be retained for one
year, then automatically deleted by a computer system unless flagged for preservation.
Once a bodycam video is automatically deleted, it cannot be recovered or viewed by
GPD.
       B. Law Foundation’s 2018 Public Records Requests
       After receiving complaints from homeless persons that their personal property was
being destroyed during cleanups of homeless encampments, the Law Foundation began
an investigation that included making numerous public record requests to City. Relevant
here, Law Foundation submitted an October 9, 2018 request that included the following:
(1) “Request 11: Any and all public records constituting, reflecting or relating to the
proactive enforcement of Quality of Life violations between January 1, 2015 through the
present”; (2) “Request 18: Any and all public records constituting, reflecting or relating
to the number of encampment sweeps conducted between January 1, 2015 through the
present”; and (3) “Request 24: Any and all public records constituting, reflecting or
relating to the Zero Tolerance Policy regarding the homeless and Quality of Life
violations between January 1, 2015 through the present.”
       City provided responsive materials to Law Foundation’s October 9, 2018 public
records requests with an October 29, 2018 response from the assistant city attorney that
stated in part, “[t]he GPD’s law enforcement records generally, and Quality of Life
criminal code enforcement records specifically, are exempt from disclosure under the
[CPRA].” 3 GPD did not provide any bodycam video footage in response to Law

       3
        The CPRA exempts “ ‘[r]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by,
or records of intelligence information or security procedures of . . . any state or local

                                             4
Foundation’s October 9, 2018 public records request, or in response to Law Foundation’s
subsequent public records requests to GPD dated October 15, 2018, and November 8,
2018, that similarly sought records related to cleanups of homeless encampments. Since
GPD’s bodycam video footage was determined by the City Attorney to be exempt, Boles
did not search for or review any bodycam video footage after receiving Law
Foundation’s October and November public records requests.
      C. Law Foundation’s May 2019 Public Records Requests
      Law Foundation staff attended a May 2019 homeless task force meeting at GPD
where, according to Law Foundation, Chief Smithee stated that all homeless encampment
sweeps are videotaped. Law Foundation then submitted a May 20, 2019 public records
request to City that requested (1) “All videos taken by the Gilroy Police Department
during sweeps in Gilroy conducted between January 1, 2016 and the present;” (2) “All
videos taken by the Gilroy Police Department of the encampment sweep behind the
Compassion Center on April 26, 2019;” and (3) “All audio recordings by the Gilroy
Police Department during sweeps between January 1, 2016 through the present.” Law
Foundation later agreed to limit its request to video and audio recordings produced from
January 1, 2019, through the present.
      After City received the May 20, 2019 public records request, City and Law
Foundation engaged in a series of communications regarding the scope of the request and
City’s need to review the videotapes and audio recordings to determine if any fell outside
the exemption for records of investigations and investigatory files. City subsequently
provided some responsive materials with a June 11, 2019 letter from the assistant city
attorney, which informed Law Foundation that its request for GPD bodycam video
footage from the homeless encampment sweeps was denied because the bodycam videos
were exempt from disclosure.

police agency.’ ” (National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 493
[citing former § 6254, subd. (f), now § 7923.600, subd. (a)] (National Lawyers Guild).)

                                            5
       In a June 21, 2019 letter the Law Foundation demanded that City “produce video
and audio recordings of sweeps in Gilroy that were not taken during a criminal
investigation for a ‘specific and concrete’ law enforcement purpose.” After further
communications between the parties, on August 12, 2019, the Law Foundation notified
City that it intended to file a petition for writ of mandate seeking a court order to compel
City to release GPD video and audio recordings of encampment sweeps occurring
between January 1, 2016 through the present. Due to Law Foundation’s stated intention
of filing a writ petition to obtain release of the bodycam video footage, on August 22,
2019, GPD voluntarily placed a “ ‘litigation hold’ ” on the footage to preserve it beyond
the one-year retention period.
       City then decided to release GPD bodycam video footage from encampment
sweeps that did not relate to citations or arrests. 4 After reviewing the bodycam footage,
in October 2019 City provided approximately 52 minutes of footage from homeless
encampment sweeps that were conducted on June 1, 2018, February 17, 2019, and April
26, 2019. City withheld from disclosure 10 minutes and four seconds of GPD bodycam
video footage from encampment sweeps conducted on February 8, 2018, and February 9,
2018, that showed two encounters in which GPD officers issued citations. According to
Boles, GPD’s records manager, “[a]side from the 10:04 minutes of footage that [City]
continued to withhold and the 52 minutes of footage released to [Law Foundation], no
other body camera footage from encampment sweeps conducted between January 1, 2016
and May 20, 2019 was located within [City’s] possession.”

       4
         We omit any facts or discussion pertaining to City’s requirement that Foundation
pay for City’s redaction of the bodycam videos to preserve individuals’ privacy, since the
record reflects that City has refunded the fees and the redaction fees are no longer at
issue.

                                              6
                            III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. October 8, 2020 Order
       The parties agree that the trial court performed an in camera review of the 10
minutes and four seconds of bodycam video footage that City had withheld as exempt
pursuant to section 7923.600, subdivision (a) exemption for investigatory records. The
parties also agree that in the October 8, 2020 order the trial court ruled that the exemption
was valid and the footage was properly withheld. The October 8, 2020 order was not
included in the record on appeal and is not at issue in the present original proceedings.
       B. Law Foundation’s Petition for Writ of Mandate
       In December 2020 Law Foundation filed a verified first amended petition for writ
of mandate and complaint for equitable relief (hereafter, writ petition or petition) alleging
that City had committed several violations of the CPRA.
       In the writ petition, Law Foundation asserted that City did not inform Law
Foundation until July 2020 that it had destroyed potentially responsive GPD bodycam
video footage while Law Foundation’s public records requests were pending. At that
time, City informed Law Foundation that all bodycam video footage prior to August 2019
had been destroyed, with the exception of one June 2018 video that was later provided by
City. According to Law Foundation, City “did not put any kind of preservation flag or
hold on police body camera footage until August 22, 2019, [and] did not begin reviewing
‘potentially responsive video footage’ until August 12, 2019.”
       Law Foundation also asserted that following its May 2019 public records requests
for GPD bodycam videos pertaining to homeless encampment sweeps, City did not
provide any bodycam videos until October 24, 2019, after a series of communications
between the parties regarding City’s response to Law Foundation’s May 2019 public
records requests.
       Based on these and other allegations, Law Foundation asserted a cause of action
for violations of former sections 6253 and 6253.9 [now sections 7922.500 and 7922.570]

                                              7
and article I, section 3 of the California Constitution. The alleged violations included
City’s delay in responding to public records requests, City’s failure to search for
responsive records, and City’s destruction of responsive records while Law Foundation’s
public records requests were pending. Law Foundations sought a writ of mandate
directing City to produce all requested records not lawfully withheld and also declaratory
relief, as follows: (1) a declaration that Law Foundation had a right to responses to its
requests that were compliant with CPRA’s time limits and rules regarding extensions of
time; and (2) a declaration that City failed to produce responsive records that existed at
the time of Law Foundation’s requests but were subsequently destroyed. Law
Foundation also sought an award of attorney fees and costs.
       City filed an answer to the writ petition affirmatively asserting that Law
Foundation was not entitled to the relief requested.
       C. Trial Court Proceedings
              1. Pretrial Briefing
       Before the hearing in this matter, the parties submitted pretrial briefs supported by
declarations and documentary evidence. Law Foundation argued in its pretrial brief that
it was entitled to declarations that City’s actions were unlawful under the CPRA, as
follows: (1) “City conducted inadequate search(es) for public records, including police
video camera footage, responsive to the Law Foundation’s [CPRA] requests dated
October 9, 2018; October 15, 2018; November 8, 2018; and May 20, 2019 . . .;” (2) “City
provided inadequate written response(s) to each of the CPRA Requests, including by
failing to specify the exempt records or representing that they no longer existed;” (3)
“City unlawfully allowed potentially responsive police video camera records to be
destroyed both while the CPRA Requests were pending, and after this litigation
commenced;” (4) “City improperly and without notice to the Law Foundation,
categorized all police video camera footage of homelessness sweeps as categorically
exempt under the CPRA, and declined even to review them until after this litigation was

                                             8
threatened;” (5) “City failed to meet its burden to prove that all withheld records were
properly exempt and/or could not be redacted, including those it allowed to be
destroyed;” and (6) “City failed to timely respond to the CPRA Requests.”
       Law Foundation also sought a “[d]eclaration from the Court that an adequate
search requires . . . City to watch and listen to a responsive clip of bodycam footage in its
entirety before determining that it is exempt from disclosure under the CPRA.” Finally,
Law Foundation sought “[a]n injunction that enjoins . . . City from destroying records
requested under a CPRA Request and deemed exempt for a period of three years after
receipt of the CPRA Request.” Law Foundation did not argue that a writ of mandate
should issue directing City to produce all requested records not lawfully withheld.
       In its trial brief, City contended that the writ petition should be denied because its
actions in response to Law Foundation’s CPRA requests were reasonable and did not
violate the CPRA. City also contended that the CPRA did not require City to place a
litigation hold on records that were withheld as exempt. Further, City argued that Law
Foundation’s claims of CPRA violations were moot, because prior to litigation City had
provided all responsive GPD bodycam video footage in its possession, except for the
10 minutes and four seconds of footage that the trial court had previously ruled was
exempt.
              2. October 1, 2021 Order
       In the October 1, 2021 “order of judgment” the trial court denied the writ petition,
granted declaratory relief in part, and denied the request for injunctive relief, as follows:
“The Court grants declaratory relief: (1) . . . [C]ity violated the CPRA by conducting an
inadequate search related to the Law Foundation’s 2018 Public Records Act requests . . .;
(2) with respect to the 2018 requests, . . . City had a duty to, but did not, watch the
bodycam footage before asserting a blanket exemption when the details of the footage
were unclear on their face in order to determine whether the exemption applies, separate
the exempt and nonexempt material, if any, and share information derived from the

                                              9
exempt records with the requester as to why any withheld records were exempt rather
than a boilerplate response that parrots the law. . . . ; and (3) [City’s] response to the
November 2018 CPRA request was not timely, occurring 33 days after the request was
received.”
       The trial court denied declaratory relief as to Law Foundation’s claims that City
had an obligation to preserve records, finding that “City did not violate the CPRA by
failing to preserve responsive records upon receipt of the Law Foundation’s multiple
Public Records Act requests,” and “City did not violate the CPRA by failing to preserve
responsive body camera footage after placing a litigation hold.”
       Additionally, the trial court denied “Law Foundation’s request for an injunction
preventing the City from destroying any footage for three years after receiving a Public
Records Act request under the CPRA . . . because it asks the Court to expand the duties
imposed upon an agency by the legislature, as the CPRA does not allow for prospective
relief for presumed or potential future CPRA violations.”
       In the October 1, 2021 order the trial court also stated a tentative ruling that costs
and attorney fees would be awarded to Law Foundation as the prevailing party because
City had produced public records after litigation began and because the court had
“granted declaratory relief finding that . . . City violated the CPRA,” with a final
determination to be made upon separate motions.
       D. Petitions for Writ of Mandate
       Both parties filed writ petitions in this court challenging parts of the trial court’s
order. In case No. H049552, City of Gilroy v. Superior Court, City contends that the trial
court erred in granting declaratory relief, failing to find that Law Foundation’s claims of
CPRA violations were moot, and tentatively finding that Law Foundation is the
prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs and attorney fees. In case No. H049554,
Law Foundation v. Superior Court, Law Foundation argues that the trial court erred in

                                              10
denying Law Foundation’s request for a declaration that City violated the CPRA by
destroying responsive records after it received the Law Foundation’s CPRA requests. 5
       In each original proceeding, this court issued a temporary stay and an order to
show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue as requested in the petition, and
afforded the parties the opportunity for further briefing and oral argument. We also
granted the application of the League of California Cities and the California Special
Districts Association for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of City in each
original proceeding.
                                      IV. DISCUSSION
       A. Overview of California Public Records Act
       “The California Public Records Act . . . establishes a right of public access to
government records. ‘Modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 552 et seq.) [FOIA], the [CPRA] was enacted for the purpose of increasing freedom of
information by giving members of the public access to records in the possession of state
and local agencies.’ [Citation.] In enacting the statute in 1968, the Legislature declared
this right of access to be ‘a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state’
([former] Gov. Code, § 6250 [now § 7921.000])—a declaration ratified by voters who
amended the California Constitution in 2004 to secure a ‘right of access to information
concerning the conduct of the people’s business’ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1),
added by Prop. 59, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)). [Citation.]” (National Lawyers Guild,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 492.)
       Section 7923.500 provides that the trial court’s order under the CPRA, “which
either directs disclosure of records by a public official or supports the official’s refusal to
disclose records, is immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for issuance
of an extraordinary writ. [Citation.] The standard for review of the order is ‘an

       5
        On the court’s own motion, we ordered case Nos. H049552 and H049554 to be
considered together for purposes of oral argument and disposition.

                                              11
independent review of the trial court’s ruling; factual findings made by the trial court will
be upheld if based on substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]” (City of San Jose v. Superior
Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1016 [citing former § 6259, subdivision (c)].) In
performing our review, we may consider federal “ ‘legislative history and judicial
construction of the FOIA’ ” in construing the CPRA. (Ibid.)
       B. City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (H049552)
       City contends that the trial court erred in ruling that City violated the CPRA by
(1) performing an inadequate search in response to Law Foundation’s 2018 public
records requests; (2) failing to review GPD bodycam video footage and separating
exempt from non-exempt footage; and (3) providing an untimely response to Law
Foundation’s November 2018 public records request. City also contends that the trial
court erred in tentatively ruling that Law Foundation is the prevailing party and may be
entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees. Further, City argues that the trial court
erred in granting declaratory relief since the court did not order production of records and
no additional responsive, non-exempt records can be produced, and therefore the matter
is moot.
       Law Foundation disagrees, arguing that the trial court did not err in finding that
City’s conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s CPRA requests violated the CPRA,
and it was not necessary for the court to find that City was negligent. Law Foundation
also argues that the trial court has broad authority to grant declaratory relief with respect
to the right to inspect public records. Finally, Law Foundation argues that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in tentatively ruling that Law Foundation is the prevailing
party for purposes of an award of costs and attorney fees. 6

       6
        We decline the parties’ invitation to review the trial court’s tentative ruling that
Law Foundation is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs and attorney fees,
and we express no opinion on any future award of costs and attorney fees.

                                              12
       We need not address the merits of the trial court’s rulings that City violated the
CPRA in responding to Law Foundation’s public records requests, since, as we will
discuss, we determine that the matter is moot and declaratory relief is not available under
the circumstances of this case.
              1. Mootness
       “ ‘It is well settled that an appellate court will decide only actual
controversies . . . . We will not render opinions on moot questions or abstract
propositions, or declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter at issue on
appeal.’ ” (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 852, 866.) “Stated differently, moot cases ‘are “[t]hose in which an actual
controversy did exist but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to
exist.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. County of
Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722.) “A case is moot when the decision of the
reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.
[Citation.]’ ” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 204, 214 (MHC); see also Committee for Sound Water & Land Development
v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 405 [same].)
       Regarding the relief available under the CPRA, this court has stated that “[t]he
CPRA provides no . . . remedy that may be utilized for any purpose other than to
determine whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed.” (County of
Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 127 (County of Santa
Clara).) Thus, the CPRA “provides no remedy for failure to timely comply with a
request for records.” (Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 483.)
       Under the FOIA, “after the agency produces all non-exempt documents and the
court confirms the agency’s proper invocation of an exemption, the specific FOIA claim
is moot because the injury has been remedied. [Citations.]” (Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Services (9th Cir. 2016) 811 F.3d 1086, 1103.) Under the CPRA, an action

                                              13
seeking a declaration that the plaintiffs could inspect and copy primary election ballots
was deemed moot because the ballots had been recycled and could not be produced in
response to a public records request. (Citizens Oversight, Inc. v. Vu (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 612, 615 [exercising discretion to decide moot issue as a matter of public
interest].)
       In this case, it is undisputed that (1) City has produced all responsive nonexempt
GPD bodycam video footage in its possession; and (2) the trial court’s prior October 8,
2020 order ruled that the GPD bodycam footage withheld by City was properly withheld
as exempt. Since Law Foundation has not raised any issue in this original proceeding as
to “whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed,” we cannot grant
Law Foundation any effective relief under the CPRA. (See County of Santa Clara,
supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) Accordingly, Law Foundation’s claims regarding the
propriety of City’s past conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s public records
requests are moot.
              2. Declaratory Relief
       We understand the Law Foundation to contend that the matter is not moot because
the trial court had broad authority to grant declaratory relief with respect to whether
City’s past conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s public records requests violated
the CPRA. We are not persuaded. The California Supreme Court has instructed that
“under the [CPRA], only a person seeking disclosure . . . may seek a judicial declaration
regarding the agency’s obligation to disclose a document.” (Filarsky v. Superior Court
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 428-429 (Filarsky).) “The sole purpose of such an action is to
permit the expeditious ‘determination of the obligation to disclose records requested from
a public agency . . . .’ [Citation.]” (County of Santa Clara, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at
p. 128.)
       Here, City’s obligation to disclose the 10 minutes and four seconds of bodycam
footage withheld as exempt by City was determined in City’s favor in the prior October

                                             14
8, 2020 order, which is not at issue in the present original proceeding. Since the CPRA
does not provide for declaratory relief other than to determine a public agency’s
obligation to disclose records, Law Foundation may not seek declaratory relief under the
CPRA with respect to the propriety of City’s past conduct in responding to Law
Foundation’s public records requests. (See County of Santa Clara, supra, 171
Cal.App.4th at p. 128.)
       Moreover, Law Foundation has not shown that declaratory relief is available under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, which “authorizes a declaratory judgment ‘in
cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective
parties. . . .’ ” (SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th
1043, 1061 (SJJC).) It is well established that the “ ‘[d]eclaratory procedure operates
prospectively, and not merely for the redress of past wrongs. It serves to set
controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or
commission of wrongs; in short, the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive
justice, to declare rights rather than execute them.’ [Citations.]” (Babb v. Superior Court
(1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848.) Accordingly, “complaining of past acts” by the defendant
does not constitute an actual controversy “ ‘relating to the legal rights and duties of the
respective parties’ within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060.” (SJJC,
at p. 1062.)
       “ ‘The court may refuse to [grant declaratory relief] in any case where its
declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the
circumstances.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.) The trial court’s decision to entertain an
action for declaratory relief is reviewable for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Filarsky,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 433.) Since the trial court’s grant of declaratory relief in this case
was based on Law Foundation’s complaints that City’s past acts in responding to Law
Foundation’s public records requests violated the CPRA, we determine that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting declaratory relief that is not authorized under either the

                                              15
CPRA or Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. (See SJJC, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1062.)
       Law Foundation relies on the decisions in Community Youth Athletic Center v.
City of National City (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1385 (Community Youth) and Galbiso v.
Orosi Public Utilities Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063 (Galbiso), for a contrary
conclusion, but those decisions are distinguishable.
       In Community Youth, the appellate court ruled that a city had a duty under the
CPRA to disclose a consultant’s field survey records because the city had a contractual
ownership interest in those records and the right to possess them. (Community Youth,
supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429.) The appellate court also ruled that the city had an
obligation under the CPRA to produce raw crime data in response to a public records
request. (Id. at p. 1430.) The trial court’s grant of declaratory relief on the basis that the
city’s responses to these public record requests violated the CPRA was upheld as to both
categories of records. (Id. at pp. 1429, 1430.)
       However, no issue was raised in Community Youth, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 1385
regarding whether the public records requests were moot or whether declaratory relief
was authorized under the CPRA or Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. “An appellate
decision is not authority for everything said in the court’s opinion but only ‘for the points
actually involved and actually decided.’ [Citations.]” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
17 Cal.4th 599, 620.) And, in any event, the issues raised in Community Youth primarily
concerned a city’s obligation to disclose certain records under the CPRA. (Community
Youth, supra, at p. 1417.) The decision in Community Youth, supra, therefore does not
support Law Foundation’s contention that a trial court has broad authority to grant
declaratory relief regarding the propriety of a city’s past acts in responding to public
records requests under the CPRA where, as here, a public agency’s obligation to disclose
public records is not at issue.

                                              16
       In Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, the appellate court upheld the trial
court’s ruling that a public utility district’s refusal to allow the plaintiff access to its
office to inspect public records violated the CPRA. (Id. at p. 1086.) However, the
appellate court reversed the trial court’s order denying attorney fees to the plaintiff, ruling
that she was the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney fees under the
CPRA. (Id. at p. 1089.) No issue was raised in Galbiso, supra, as to whether the CPRA
issue was moot or whether declaratory relief was authorized with respect to the public
utilities’ past acts in responding to public records requests. Instead, the attorney fees
issue was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor because “Galbiso prevailed by vindicating her
right of access to inspect public records.” (Id. at p. 1088.)
       For these reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in granting declaratory relief
with respect to City’s past conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s public records
requests.
       C. H049554 Law Foundation v. Superior Court
       Law Foundation challenges that part of the trial court’s October 1, 2021 order
denying its request for a declaration that City violated the CPRA by failing to preserve
responsive records it claimed were exempt while Law Foundation’s public records
requests were pending and prior to court review.
               1. The Parties’ Contentions
       Law Foundation argues that the CPRA should be broadly interpreted to impose a
duty upon public agencies to preserve all documents responsive to a public records
request that have been withheld as exempt for three years, pursuant to the three-year
limitations period provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 338. Law Foundation
asserts that absent a duty to preserve, public agencies are able “to delay and obstruct the
inspection of public records forever by simply allowing an agency to assert a blanket
objection and then run out the clock on preservation, even if all or portions of the records
actually are not exempt.” According to Law Foundation, City violated the CPRA by

                                                17
failing to preserve while the requests were pending numerous bodycam videos that were
responsive to Law Foundation’s public record requests.
       City responds that the trial court did not err because the CPRA is not a records
retention statute, and the CPRA does not impose a duty on a public agency to place a
litigation hold or retain records while a public records request is pending. City maintains
that the retention of public records is governed by specific statutes, which authorized
City’s records retention policy of automatically deleting bodycam video footage after one
year, with certain exceptions such as retaining footage that is evidence in a criminal
prosecution. Alternatively, City argues that Law Foundation’s requests for disclosure of
GPD’s bodycam video footage of homeless encampment sweeps were not pending when
the footage was automatically deleted.
              2. Analysis
       We agree with City that the CPRA is not a records retention statute since the
CPRA lacks any provisions pertaining to records retention. The CPRA is also silent with
respect to any obligation on the part of a public agency to keep any particular records or
to preserve records after a public records request has been made. The CPRA “itself does
not undertake to prescribe what type of information a public agency may gather, nor to
designate the type of records such an agency may keep, nor to provide a method of
correcting such records. Its sole function is to provide for disclosure.” (Los Angeles
Police Department v. Superior Court (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 661, 668.)
       The Government Code provides the statutory retention periods that apply to a
city’s retention of public records. In general, the retention period is two years: “Unless
otherwise provided by law, with the approval of the legislative body by resolution and the
written consent of the city attorney, the head of a city department may destroy any city
record, document, instrument, book, or paper, under the department head’s charge,
without making a copy thereof, after the same is no longer required. [¶] . . .[¶] This

                                            18
section does not authorize the destruction of: [¶] . . .[¶] Records less than two years
old.” (§ 34090, subd. (d).)
       A separate provision applies to video recordings: “Notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 34090, the head of a department of a city or city and county, after one year,
may destroy recordings of routine video monitoring, and after 100 days may destroy
recordings of telephone and radio communications maintained by the department. This
destruction shall be approved by the legislative body and the written consent of the
agency attorney shall be obtained. In the event that the recordings are evidence in any
claim filed or any pending litigation, they shall be preserved until pending litigation is
resolved.” (§ 34090.6, subd. (a).)
       The retention of data from body-worn cameras is expressly governed by Penal
Code section 832.18, which provides in part: “[N]onevidentiary data including video and
audio recorded by a body-worn camera should be retained for a minimum of 60 days,
after which it may be erased, destroyed, or recycled. An agency may keep data for more
than 60 days to have it available in case of a civilian complaint and to preserve
transparency.” (Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(A).) The statute also provides that
“[e]videntiary data including video and audio recorded by a body-worn camera under this
section should be retained for a minimum of two years under any of the following
circumstances,” which include recordings of officer use of force or officer involved
shootings, recordings of an arrest or detention of an individual, and recordings relevant to
a complaint against a law enforcement agency or officer. (Pen. Code, § 832.18,
subd. (b)(5)(B).) Further, recordings from a body-worn camera that are relevant to a
criminal prosecution may be retained for an additional time. (Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd.
(b)(5)(C).) However, Penal Code section 832.18 also provides: “This section shall not
be interpreted to limit the public’s right to access recorded data under the California
Public Records Act.” (Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (d).)

                                             19
       City’s record retention schedule for GPD bodycam videos is consistent with these
statutory provisions, since it provides that police video recordings are retained for one
year “unless retained as evidence associated with a crime report.”
       We recognize Law Foundation’s concern that public records that are potentially
responsive to a public records request may be deleted while the request is pending.
However, as we have discussed, the CPRA does not govern the retention of public
records. The CPRA also does not require public agencies to retain records that are
potentially responsive to a public records request, and we may not insert such a
requirement in the CPRA. Additionally, the CPRA does not impose a duty on public
agencies to advise persons requesting public records of the existence of retention statutes.
In performing our independent review of the construction of the CPRA, we are mindful
that the California Supreme Court has instructed that a court “may not broaden or narrow
the scope of the provision by reading into it language that does not appear in it or reading
out of it language that does. ‘Our office . . . “is simply to ascertain and declare” what is
in the relevant statutes, “not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been
inserted.” ’ ” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545 (Doe); see also
Rittiman v. Public Utilities Commission (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1018, 1043 [court could
not revise a provision of the CPRA]; United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron &
Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1089 [the correct interpretation of a statute is an issue of
law, which we review de novo.])
       Therefore, we are precluded from construing the CPRA, as Law Foundation
argues, to impose a duty upon public agencies to preserve for three years all documents
responsive to a public records request that have been withheld as exempt, pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 338 [three-year limitations period]. For that reason,
even assuming that Law Foundation seeks prospective relief under Code of Civil
Procedure 1060, declaratory relief is not available because City has no duty under the

                                             20
CPRA to preserve all documents that have been withheld as exempt. (See County of
Santa Clara, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.)
       However, it has been held that an injunction may issue that requires a city to
preserve potentially responsive emails while CPRA litigation is pending, subject to the
plaintiff posting an undertaking. (Stevenson v. City of Sacramento (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
545, 549.) Law Foundation did not take such action. We do not decide here whether a
person requesting public records is precluded from seeking an order staying or enjoining
the destruction of public records pursuant to the retention statutes while litigation is
pending under the CPRA.
       The Law Foundation’s reliance on federal decisions construing FOIA is not
persuasive, since the federal decisions are inconsistent with regard to a public agency’s
obligation to preserve records after a FOIA request is made. For example, in Laughlin v.
Commissioner (S.D. Cal. 1999) 103 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1223 (Laughlin), the district court
stated: “A government improperly destroys agency records under FOIA only if it
destroys them after a FOIA request has been made to the agency. [Citation.]” In
Wadelton v. Department of State (D.D.C. 2015) 106 F.Supp.3d 139, 147, the district
court followed Laughlin, supra, 103 F.Supp.2d at page 1223, stating that an “agency is
under an obligation not to destroy records after it receives a FOIA request.”
       On the other hand, it has been stated that “the bar on intentionally destroying
material sought by a FOIA request does not forbid an agency from unintentionally
destroying FOIA material in accordance with a neutral record retention policy. . . . An
agency’s routine record retention policy . . . is the paradigmatic example of a non-suspect
explanation for destroying a document.” (Pinson v. Department of Justice (D.D.C. 2017)
236 F.Supp.3d 338, 356, fn. 24.) An agency’s failure to place a “ ‘litigation hold’ ” on
potentially responsive records did not violate FOIA where no showing was made that the
agency purposefully destroyed the records to avoid disclosure. (Houser v. U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services (D.D.C. 2020) 486 F.Supp.3d 104, 114.)

                                              21
       Further, Law Foundation’s reliance on federal decisions ruling that a public
agency may not intentionally destroy documents after receiving a public records request
is unavailing, since no issue of intentional destruction to evade disclosure was raised in
the present proceedings. (See, e.g., Chambers v. U.S. Department of Interior (D.C. Cir.
2009) 568 F.3d 998, 1000 [summary judgment reversed due to issue of material fact
regarding whether Department of Interior intentionally destroyed a document after it was
requested].)
       Finally, we need not address Law Foundation’s reliance on state court decisions
from other jurisdictions. Although the decisions of our sister states are not controlling on
matters of state law, they may be “instructive to the extent we find their analysis
persuasive.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 175.) Here,
the decisions of sister state courts construing their own statutory schemes for the
disclosure of public records or the FOIA do not persuade us that we may insert a records
preservation requirement in the CPRA. (See Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 545.)
       For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Law
Foundation’s request for a declaration that that City violated the CPRA by failing to
preserve responsive records it claimed were exempt while Law Foundation’s public
records requests were pending and prior to court review.
                                          V. DISPOSITION
       In H049552, City of Gilroy v. Superior Court: Let a peremptory writ of mandate
issue directing the superior court to vacate the October 1, 2021 order and to enter a new
order denying Law Foundation’s petition for writ of mandate and complaint for
declaratory relief in its entirety.
       In H049554, Law Foundation v. Superior Court: Let a peremptory writ of
mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate the October 1, 2021 order and to
enter a new order denying Law Foundation’s petition for writ of mandate and complaint
for declaratory relief in its entirety.

                                               22
      Upon finality of this decision, the temporary stay order is vacated. Costs in this
original proceeding are awarded to petitioner City of Gilroy.

                                            23
                                       _______________________________
                                       Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
 Danner, J.

______________________________________
 Wilson, J.

H049552, H049554
City of Gilroy v. Superior Court
Law Foundation of Silicon Valley v. Superior Court
 Trial Court:                               Santa Clara County Superior Court
                                            Superior Court No.: 20CV362347

 Trial Judge:                               The Honorable Nahal Iravani-Sani

Attorneys for Petitioner
City of Gilroy:                              William D. Ross
                                             David Paul Schwarz
                                             Kypros Gabriel Hostetter
                                             Law Offices of William D. Ross

Attorneys for Real Party in Interest
Law Foundation of Silicon Valley:            Annette Denise Kirkham
                                             Nadia Aziz
                                             Hai Tri Dao
                                             Erika Kay Fairfield
                                             Law Foundation of Silicon Valley

                                             Thomas Philip Zito
                                             Disability Rights Advocates

                                             Neel Chatterjee
                                             Wendell Lin
                                             Megan Deanne Bettles
                                             Faraz Behnamjou
                                             Monte Cooper
                                             Goodwin Procter LLP

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
League Of California Cities,
California Special Districts Association:    Donald A. Larkin
                                             Office of the City Attorney

H049552
City of Gilroy v. Superior Court
Trial Court:                                  Santa Clara County Superior Court
                                              Superior Court No.: 20CV362347

Trial Judge:                                  The Honorable Nahal Iravani-Sani

Attorneys for Petitioner
Law Foundation of Silicon Valley:             Nadia Aziz
                                              Hai Tri Dao
                                              Brian T. Nichols
                                              Law Foundation of Silicon Valley

                                              Thomas Philip Zito
                                              Disability Rights Advocates

                                              Neel Chatterjee
                                              Wendell Lin
                                              Megan Deanne Bettles
                                              Faraz Behnamjou
                                              Monte Cooper
                                              Goodwin Procter LLP

Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest
City of Gilroy:                               William D. Ross
                                              David Paul Schwarz
                                              Law Offices of William D. Ross

                                              Andrew L. Faber
                                              Jolie Houston
                                              Berliner & Cohen

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
League Of California Cities,
California Special Districts Association:     Donald A. Larkin
                                              Office of the City Attorney

H049554
Law Foundation of Silicon Valley v. Superior Court