Court Opinion

ID: 9392547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 14:05:49.298935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.494518
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0466-MR

EMILY CLEMENTS                                                         APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 18-CI-001151

STEAK ‘N SHAKE, INC.; CINDY
BURDETTE; AND RODNEY TODD                                              APPELLEES

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; KAREM AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Emily Clements (“Appellant”) appeals from an

order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of Steak

‘n Shake, Inc. and Cindy Burdette (“Appellees”) in her action alleging that she was

subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge. Appellant

argues that the circuit court erred in applying a common law tort theory to a

statutory claim; in dismissing the claim of retaliatory discharge; and that Steak ‘n
Shake’s destruction of a video showing an alleged sexual assault should result in a

judgment against Steak ‘n Shake on all claims. After careful review, we find no

error and affirm the opinion and order granting summary judgment.

                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

               In 2017, Appellant was a 16-year-old, hourly employee at a Steak ‘n

Shake restaurant located on Dixie Highway in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Her

duties included taking customer orders, serving food, refilling drinks, and cleaning

her work area. Rodney Todd was employed at the same Steak ‘n Shake restaurant

as a grill cook. He worked the back half of the restaurant and helped with the

drive-through.

               According to Appellant, on December 23, 2017, she was in the

employee breakroom at the restaurant when Todd entered the room. This was only

the second time that she had any interaction with him. According to Appellant,

Todd approached her, made a vulgar, highly inappropriate sexual comment to her,

and then grabbed her in the area of her buttocks and vagina. Appellant would later

state in her deposition that she was shocked and offended by what Todd did, and

told two other servers named Emily and Taylor what had occurred. According to

1
 Appellant’s statement of the case, as required by Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure
(“RAP”) 32(A)(3), consists solely of Appellant’s affidavit. Our recitation of the facts is based on
Appellant’s affidavit; the affidavit of Steak ‘n Shake employee relations manager, Rebekah
Nevin; and other portions of the record.

                                               -2-
Appellant, both servers told Appellant that she should tell a manager what

happened.

             Appellant went on to state that the incident caused her to forget to

submit a customer’s order. According to Appellant, this resulted in Steak ‘n Shake

employee Cindy Burdette berating Appellant in front of customers in the

restaurant. In an affidavit, Steak ‘n Shake employee relations manager, Rebekah

Nevin, stated that Burdette was a server who occasionally worked a temporary

shift lead when no manager was present. Appellant stated that one of the guests

told Burdette that Burdette’s treatment of Appellant was cruel, unkind, and

unacceptable. Appellant said that Burdette’s response to the customer was to mind

her own business.

             After Burdette approached Appellant about failing to submit the

customer’s order, Appellant informed Burdette about the incident involving Todd.

According to Appellant, Burdette stated that Todd was important to the restaurant

and could lose his job based on Appellant’s accusation.

             The customer who objected to Burdette’s treatment of Appellant

exited the building and spoke with Appellant’s father, Scott Tyler, who was

waiting to pick up Appellant. According to Appellant, Tyler told Appellant that

the customer was concerned that Appellant was emotionally okay and that Tyler

should go in the restaurant and talk to Appellant. Tyler entered the dining area,

                                         -3-
and told Appellant to get her things and leave because she was not going to work

there any longer if Burdette was going to berate her like that. Appellant told her

father that Burdette had already terminated Appellant’s employment for talking to

the customer about work-related issues. When asked in deposition whether

Burdette said, “you’re terminated,” Appellant answered “yes.” Appellant stated

that she had already been terminated before her father entered the restaurant.

When Tyler confronted Burdette about berating Appellant in front of customers,

Appellant stated that Burdette cursed at him, told him he was fat, and stated that it

was none of his business.

             When Appellant and Tyler were in his vehicle, Appellant told him

about the incident with Todd. Tyler became very upset and started yelling at a

group of employees who were outside the restaurant. He told them that he and the

customers had called the police. Two police officers arrived shortly thereafter and

interviewed several individuals present about the unwanted touching by Todd.

Appellant told the police that he touched her between her buttocks and vagina.

The officers subsequently produced a report which is part of the record. No

criminal charges were filed.

             That same day, Burdette called Steak ‘n Shake general manager Alex

Potter and informed him of Appellant’s claim of sexual harassment. According to

Nevin’s affidavit, Potter instructed Burdette to document the statements she

                                         -4-
obtained about the incident and give them to Potter. The following day, Tyler

called the Steak ‘n Shake hotline to make a complaint about the way his daughter

was treated. According to Nevin, Tyler stated that Appellant no longer worked for

Steak ‘n Shake.

              On December 24, 2017, district manager Mike Rauls called Tyler,

requested any text messages between Todd and Appellant, and told Tyler that

Steak ‘n Shake would take appropriate action. After Rauls received the text

messages from Tyler, he instructed Potter to terminate Todd’s employment. Rauls

told Potter to inform Appellant of Todd’s termination, and to ask Appellant if she

would return to work. Potter apparently was unable to get in contact with

Appellant. Potter then told Tyler of Todd’s termination and Tyler said that his

daughter would not be returning to work at Steak ‘n Shake.

               On February 23, 2018, Tyler filed a complaint in Jefferson Circuit

Court on behalf of Appellant against Steak ‘n Shake, Burdette, and Todd. The

complaint, and two subsequent amended complaints,2 alleged that Steak ‘n Shake

improperly terminated Appellant’s employment in response to her claim of sexual

harassment, that Steak ‘n Shake destroyed video evidence of the assault, and that

Steak ‘n Shake attempted to silence Appellant by telling her that she could have

2
 Tyler was the plaintiff on the original complaint. Having reached the age of majority,
Appellant was the plaintiff on the first and second amended complaints filed in February and
October, 2021, respectively.

                                              -5-
her job back if she dropped the matter. The second amended complaint asserted

claims of sexual harassment, battery, and unlawful retaliation. The sexual

harassment/hostile work environment claim and improper retaliation claim were

grounded on Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) Chapter 344, i.e., the Kentucky

Civil Rights Act or “KCRA.”

             Steak ‘n Shake and Burdette later moved for summary judgment. In

support of the motion, they asserted that Steak ‘n Shake could not be held

vicariously liable for Todd’s alleged intentional tort, as Todd’s actions were clearly

not performed within the scope of his employment. Second, they argued that

Appellant could not prove the existence of a hostile work environment, as Steak ‘n

Shake terminated Todd’s employment within four days of the incident. They

argued that they were entitled to summary judgment on Appellant’s retaliation

claim, as Appellant quit her job and suffered no adverse employment action. In

addition, Burdette argued that the harassment claim must fail because there was no

individual liability under the KCRA.

             On March 31, 2022, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order

granting the motion of Steak ‘n Shake and Burdette for summary judgment. It

determined that Kentucky case law expressly holds that an employer is not

vicariously liable for an employee’s intentional tort of a sexual nature which is

outside the scope of employment. After citing the elements of a KCRA, the court

                                         -6-
determined that Appellant could not satisfy the element requiring proof that Steak

‘n Shake failed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct the sexually

harassing behavior. It based this conclusion on the fact that Steak ‘n Shake

immediately investigated Appellant’s claim and terminated Todd’s employment

within four days of the incident. The court went on to conclude that the claim of

retaliation must fail because Burdette did not have the authority to fire Appellant,

and because Appellant quit immediately after the incident. This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. “The record must be

viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary

judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party

will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. Id.

“Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not

succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of

                                          -7-
material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a summary

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).

                             ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

                Appellant argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court committed reversible

error in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. She asserts that the

circuit court erred in applying a common law tort theory to her statutory civil rights

claim alleging a hostile work environment; that the court erred in dismissing the

retaliation claim; and, that Steak ‘n Shake’s alleged destruction of a video of the

incident entitled her “to dismissal of Appellees defenses pertaining to Appellant’s

claim of a hostile work environment.” The focus of her claim of error is her

contention that she established a prima facie claim under the KCRA sufficient to

overcome the motion of Steak n’ Shake and Burdette for summary judgment.

                Appellant has not complied with RAP 32(A)(4),3 which requires,

                [a]n argument conforming to the statement of Points and
                Authorities, with ample supportive references to the
                record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue of
                law and which shall contain at the beginning of the
                argument a statement with reference to the record
                showing whether the issue was properly preserved for
                review and, if so, in what manner.

3
    Formerly Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 76.12(4)(c)(v).

                                               -8-
              Appellant’s argument section of the brief does not contain a statement

at the beginning with reference to the record showing whether each issue was

properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.

              “A brief may be stricken for failure to substantially comply with the

requirements of these rules.” RAP 31(H)(1). The rule requiring an argument

section including a statement of preservation is a requirement of RAP 32

encompassed by RAP 31(H)(1).

              When a party fails to abide by the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we

may choose “(1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) to strike

the brief or its offending portions . . . ; or (3) to review the issues raised in the brief

for manifest injustice only[.]” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App.

2010) (citation omitted); see also Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 153-55

(Ky. 2021). Though it does not comply with RAP 32(A)(4), Appellant did address

preservation in a footnote. Per Hallis, we will ignore the deficiency and proceed

with the review.

         SEXUAL HARASSMENT/HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

              Under KRS 344.040, it is unlawful for an employer, on
              the basis of sex, to discriminate against an individual
              with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
              privileges of employment . . . [or] to limit, segregate, or
              classify employees in any way which would . . . tend to
              deprive an individual of employment opportunities or
              otherwise adversely affect status as an employee. In
              other words, consistent with Title VII of the 1964 Federal

                                            -9-
                Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.[4] § 2000e-2(a)(1), the KCRA
                prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace that creates
                hostile or abusive work environment. The Kentucky
                Supreme Court has made clear that since the provisions
                of KCRA are virtually identical to those of the Federal
                act[,] . . . in this particular area we must consider the way
                the Federal act has been interpreted. In addition, an
                interpretation given to a federal statute by the United
                States Supreme Court is binding on state courts, any state
                law, decision, or rule to the contrary notwithstanding.

                       To establish successfully a prima facie showing of
                a cause of action predicated upon hostile work
                environment based on sex, a plaintiff must demonstrate
                that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was
                subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the
                harassment was based on her sex, (4) the harassment
                created a hostile work environment, and that (5) the
                employer is vicariously liable.

Becker v. Saber Management-Kentucky, LLC, No. 2009-CA-000089-MR, 2009

WL 4060859, at *3-4 (Ky. App. Nov. 25, 2009) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). These elements apply to a claim of co-worker sexual

harassment. See Grego v. Meijer, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 676 (W.D. Ky. 2002).

                When viewing the record in a light most favorable to Appellant per

Steelvest, supra, we conclude that evidence exists sufficient to demonstrate the

existence of the first three elements of Becker. Appellant is a member of a

protected class per KRS 344.040(1), she was subjected to sexual harassment, and

the harassment was based on her sex.

4
    United States Code.

                                            -10-
             As to whether the fourth element, i.e., the creation of a hostile

environment, may be proven, “the court must consider all of the circumstances,

including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s performance.” Thornton v. Federal

Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Appellant’s claim of an unwanted touching between her

buttocks and vagina, if true, is clearly “physically threatening or humiliating” per

Thornton.

             The fifth element to be proven, if the matter were to proceed to trial, is

whether Steak ‘n Shake is vicariously liable for Todd’s acts. In order to hold an

employer accountable for an employee’s sexual harassment of a co-worker,

             [p]laintiff must show that Defendant knew or should
             have known of the sexual harassment and failed to
             implement prompt and appropriate corrective
             action. When an employer responds to charges of co-
             worker sexual harassment, the employer can be liable
             only if its response manifests indifference or
             unreasonableness in light of the fact the employer knew
             or should have known. The act of discrimination by the
             employer in such a case is not the harassment, but rather
             the inappropriate response to the charges of harassment.

Grego, 239 F.Supp.2d at 681 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote

omitted).

                                         -11-
             The record demonstrates that Steak ‘n Shake conducted a pre-

employment background check of Todd and implemented proactive anti-

harassment policies. When notified of Appellant’s claim that Todd touched her in

an unwanted, sexual manner accompanied by vulgar language, Burdette called

Steak ‘n Shake general manager Alex Potter and informed him of Appellant’s

claim. Potter informed district manager Mike Rauls, who called Tyler. Rauls

conducted a brief investigation and then instructed Potter to terminate Todd’s

employment. These actions occurred within 4 days of the incident, and during a

timeframe which included the Christmas holiday. Even when considered in a light

most favorable to Appellant, these facts do not evince an indifferent or

unreasonable response by Steak ‘n Shake sufficient to establish Steak ‘n Shake’s

vicarious liability for Todd’s acts. Since Appellant cannot prove an essential

element of her sexual harassment claim, Steak ‘n Shake is entitled to summary

judgment on this issue. The Jefferson Circuit Court properly so concluded.

                                  RETALIATION

             Appellant next argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in

dismissing her retaliation claim. She asserts that after informing Burdette of

Todd’s action, Burdette improperly terminated Appellant’s employment in

retaliation of the claim. Citing Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790 (Ky. 2004), Appellant argues that in order to

                                        -12-
overcome Steak ‘n Shake’s motion for summary judgment on this issue, she must

only demonstrate that: 1) Steak ‘n Shake was aware of Appellant’s complaint and

2) there was a close, temporal relationship between the protected activity and the

adverse action. Appellant contends that the record clearly reveals that Steak ‘n

Shake management was aware of the complaint and that there was a close,

temporal relationship between Appellant’s complaint and the termination of her

employment. On this basis, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in

granting Steak ‘n Shake’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.

             KRS 344.280(1) prohibits an employer’s retaliatory
             response to an employee’s report or complaint about
             conduct which violates the KCRA. Interpreting unlawful
             retaliation under the KCRA consistent with the
             interpretation of unlawful retaliation under federal law,
             the Kentucky Supreme Court has set forth the elements
             of a prima facie case of retaliation under KRS 344.280 as
             follows: (1) an employee was engaged in a protected
             activity; (2) the exercise of the employee’s civil rights
             was known by the employer; (3) the employer thereafter
             took an employment action adverse to the employee; and
             (4) a causal connection existed between the protected
             activity and the adverse employment action.

                    Once a prima facie case of retaliation is
             established, the employer must articulate some
             legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If
             such a legitimate reason is articulated, the employee's
             burden is to “demonstrate that the proffered reason was
             not the true reason for the employment decision. In order
             to withstand summary judgment on the issue of pretext,
             the employee must produce evidence that either the
             proffered reason: (1) has no basis in fact; (2) did not

                                        -13-
             actually motivate the adverse employment action; or (3)
             was insufficient to warrant the adverse action.

Becker, 2009 WL 4060859, at *7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             In her second amended complaint and deposition, Appellant alleged

that Burdette fired her in retaliation for her complaint and for calling the police.

When asked in deposition if Burdette used the words “you’re terminated” shortly

after Appellant’s complaint, Appellant responded in the affirmative. The question

for our consideration is whether the record, when viewed in a light most favorable

to Appellant, satisfies elements (3) and (4). That is, whether Steak ‘n Shake took

adverse employment action (i.e., fired Appellant), and whether a causal connection

existed between Appellant’s claim of sexual harassment and the adverse action.

             At first blush, Appellant’s deposition would appear to satisfy elements

(3) and (4), at least in the context of a summary judgment motion. Steak ‘n Shake,

however, asserts that Burdette was merely a server who worked as a temporary

shift lead when no manager was on site. Burdette, it argues, had no authority make

human resources decisions nor to fire Appellant.

             Further, Steak ‘n Shake notes that on the evening of the incident,

Appellant’s father told Burdette that his daughter would not return to work. On

December 24, 2017, Tyler also called the Steak ‘n Shake employee hotline and

said that Appellant would not be returning to work. In addition, Rauls instructed

                                         -14-
Potter to inquire if Appellant would return to work. According to the record,

Potter did not hear back from Appellant.

             Given the totality of the record, we conclude that Appellant did not

suffer adverse employment action as a result of her complaint. The uncontroverted

deposition testimony is that Burdette had no authority to hire or fire employees.

Tyler repeatedly stated that Appellant would not be returning to work – a wholly

understandable response given what Appellant told him about the incident.

Finally, Steak ‘n Shake management, who did have the authority to hire and fire

employees, sought to have Appellant continue with her employment. We conclude

therefrom that, even when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to

Appellant, she could not prove essential elements of her retaliation claim if the

matter proceeded to trial. We find no error.

                                    SPOLIATION

             Lastly, Appellant argues that Steak ‘n Shake destroyed a closed-

circuit video of the incident, and that this destruction or spoliation should result in

sanctions including dismissal of Appellees’ defenses. She asserts that in response

to the claim of spoliation, Steak ‘n Shake’s counsel responded via email that no

spoliation occurred, and that any video of the incident would have been recorded

over in the normal course of business.

                                          -15-
             Appellant does not cite to any portion of the record demonstrating that

a video of the incident existed, nor that any spoliation occurred. A series of emails

appended to Appellant’s written argument, which purports to be a conversation

between Appellant’s counsel and Steak ‘n Shake’s counsel, is not marked as an

exhibit and Appellant does not cite to it as part of the record. Arguendo, even if a

video of the incident existed and was destroyed, which the record does not

demonstrate, Appellant could not prevail on her sexual harassment and retaliation

claims for the reasons stated above. Finally, Appellant’s claim of spoliation was

not addressed in the order of summary judgment on appeal, though Appellant

claims that it was raised in response to the motion for summary judgment. The

duty rested with Appellant to ensure that the order of summary judgment addressed

all issues before the court, and if necessary to make a CR 52.02 motion to amend

its findings or make additional findings. McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130,

134 (Ky. App. 2008). “In the absence of such a motion, this Court must presume

that the evidence presented at trial supports the trial court’s conclusions.” Id.

(citation omitted).

                                  CONCLUSION

             When the record is viewed in a light most favorable to Appellant with

all doubts resolved in her favor, Steelvest, supra, we conclude that the Jefferson

Circuit Court properly determined that there were no genuine issues of material

                                         -16-
fact and that Steak ‘n Shake and Burdette were entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law. Appellant could not demonstrate that Steak ‘n Shake was vicariously liable

on her claim of sexual harassment, as Steak ‘n Shake took quick action to

terminate Todd’s employment after being notified of Appellant’s claim. Appellant

could also not prevail on a claim of retaliation, since Burdette had no authority to

fire Appellant, her father stated more than once that she would not return to Steak

‘n Shake, and Steak ‘n Shake management inquired if Appellant were willing to

continue working. Finally, Appellant offered no evidence of spoliation, nor that it

would have overcome her inability to prove essential elements of the underlying

claims. For these reasons, we affirm the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit

Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEES STEAK ‘N
                                           SHAKE AND CINDY BURDETTE:
Kurt A. Scharfenberger
Louisville, Kentucky                       Kenneth B. Siepman
                                           Kevin Roberts
                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE TODD.

                                         -17-