Court Opinion

ID: 9941175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 00:01:59.840554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:19.236638
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/24 P. v. Sheppard CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B318179

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA474459
           v.

 CHARIS DEJUAN SHEPPARD,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.
      Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        ____________________
       Charis Dejuan Sheppard appeals his conviction for first-
degree murder. He argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation and
that the trial court erred in denying his motions to unseal
identifying juror information and to proceed in pro per at his
sentencing hearing. We affirm.
                                  I
       We recount the factual and procedural background.
       Sheppard was best friends with Brad Brown. Sheppard
had previously dated Brown’s sister, Samantha, but Sheppard
and Brown remained friends after that relationship ended.
Sheppard had lived with Brown’s family for a few months at one
point. Sheppard and Brown sometimes argued, but the fights
were never physical. LaDawn Reed, Brown’s wife, and
Carmalida Walker, Brown’s step-daughter, had both known
Sheppard for years.
       On December 30, 2018, Sheppard picked Brown up, and the
two went to lunch. Brown was unhappy with the way Sheppard
was treating Sanicka Cummings, a woman with whom Sheppard
had had a son. Brown expressed his displeasure to Sheppard.
       Sheppard dropped Brown off at Brown’s house in the early
afternoon. The two men began communicating again via text and
phone calls that evening around 6:00 p.m. That day through
early the next morning the two exchanged 87 texts and phone
calls, 73 of which originated from Brown’s phone. Brown
continued to admonish Sheppard for his treatment of Cummings.
Brown also accused Sheppard of having an affair with Brown’s
wife, Reed.
       Around 2:00 a.m., Brown was again arguing with Sheppard
on the phone. Brown walked through his home with his phone on

                               2
speaker phone so Reed and Walker heard Sheppard’s voice.
Brown then walked outside, continuing the call.
       Sheppard drove back to Brown’s neighborhood, but parked
his car around the corner from Brown’s house.
       Reed and Walker heard a loud boom from outside the
house. They went out the front door to a gate from which they
could see the driveway. They saw Brown crouching down next to
his car, picking some papers off the ground. The driver’s side
door was open.
       Sheppard had on a black ski mask and was wearing all
black clothes.
       Sheppard was standing next to Brown. Sheppard was
holding a gun.
       Brown sat in the driver’s seat and closed the door, though
the window was open. Sheppard told Reed something to the
effect of, “LaDawn, you better get your husband. I never messed
with you.” Reed and Walker both recognized Sheppard’s voice
through the ski mask.
       Reed replied that this was between the two men.
       Sheppard said, “Leave my fucking family alone. I should
smoke your ass. You lucky I know Sam [Brown’s sister].”
Sheppard reached in the open window with the hand not holding
the gun and seemed to grab at something. He then stuck his gun
through the open car window.
       Sheppard shot Brown once in the chest.
       Brown said, “Oh, he shot me, Dawny. Call 9-1-1.”
Sheppard ran down the driveway and away from the house.
Video showed the car Sheppard had been driving that day speed
away shortly after, running a stop sign.

                                3
      Reed called the police. Brown was dead at the scene.
Officers interviewed Reed, Walker, Reed’s sons who had been in
the house during the shooting, Samantha Brown, and a neighbor.
      Sheppard fled to Carlsbad. A few days after the shooting,
Sheppard stopped using his cell phone and started using a burner
phone with a Las Vegas number. Police were able to track this
number to an address in the Bay Area where they apprehended
Sheppard about three weeks after the shooting.
      An information charged Sheppard with the murder of
Brown.
      Sheppard denied any involvement in the shooting and
repeatedly insisted to the police that he had not been there. He
claimed his cell phone had been stolen.
      At trial, Sheppard testified that he had lied to the police
because he did not think they would believe him because he is
Black.
      Sheppard’s account to the jury differed from what he told
police.
      Sheppard’s trial testimony was that he had gone to talk to
Brown because Brown kept talking about Sheppard’s treatment
of Cummings and accusing Sheppard of an affair with Brown’s
wife. He did not bring a gun. When Sheppard arrived, he spoke
to Brown in the driveway. Brown got a beanie out of the trunk of
his car, and then got in the driver’s seat, leaving the door
open. While Sheppard was talking to Brown, Reed and Walker
came out. Sheppard asked Reed to confirm they were not having
an affair. Reed responded that she “ain’t got time for stuff like
that.” Brown pulled a gun out of the beanie and pointed it at
Sheppard. Sheppard tried to knock the gun out of Brown’s hand,
but as he did so, the gun pointed at Brown and accidentally went

                               4
off. Sheppard insisted he had not meant to kill Brown and had
not brought a gun to the encounter.
      During the second day of jury deliberations, defense
counsel reported to the court that he had seen a juror speaking
with an alternate juror in the hall after lunch. The court
questioned the juror who said she had not spoken about anything
substantive with the alternate juror. The court then spoke to the
alternate juror who reported the juror had told him information
about the subject of the deliberations. After discussing with
counsel, the court excused both the juror and alternate
juror. The court chose another alternate juror to join the jury
and instructed the jury to begin deliberating again.
      After a few hours, the jury sent the court a note saying the
jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict and that ten of the
jurors agreed on first-degree murder and two agreed on second-
degree murder. The court brought the jury back into court and
reminded them not to tell anyone how the vote stood unless
asked by the court. The court then told the jury to go home for
the day and resume deliberating in the morning. One juror
moved his head and eyes. The court questioned the juror who
said he was tired. In response to the court’s question, he said he
was able to continue. Several jurors then asked for proof of
continuing jury duty for their employers, and the court instructed
them where to obtain the appropriate documents.
      Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, citing the jury’s
ongoing violation of court orders and apparent fatigue. The court
denied the motion.
      The next morning, after about two and a half more hours of
deliberation, the jury reached a verdict. The jury found Sheppard
guilty of first-degree murder.

                                5
       Defense counsel filed a motion to unseal juror information,
arguing he needed it to provide evidence of juror misconduct to
support a motion for mistrial. In support of his motion, he
declared he had “reason to believe that an inquiry into the jurors’
emotional response at being told to begin deliberating again, and
whether or not those emotions caused them to rush their
deliberations or pressure any of the other jurors might tend to
increase the validity of Defendant’s reasons for moving for a new
trial.” He declared he also had “reason to believe that the
[dismissed] foreperson may have been the ‘lone holdout’ on the
jury in favor of a not guilty verdict and that once she was
removed the jury did not deliberate again but rushed into
rendering a guilty verdict.” At a hearing, the trial court denied
the motion, finding the defense counsel had not provided any
reason beyond speculation to believe juror misconduct had
occurred.
       At the sentencing hearing, which had been continued three
times, defense counsel told the court Sheppard wanted to
represent himself at the sentencing hearing. The court found the
motion was untimely and denied it.
       Sheppard appeals.
                                  II
       Sheppard argues that insufficient evidence supported the
conviction for first-degree murder, that the court should have
unsealed juror information, and that he should have been allowed
to represent himself at the sentencing hearing. We affirm.
                                  A
       When considering Sheppard’s claim about insufficient
evidence, we review the record as a whole, considering the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn in the light most

                                6
favorable to the verdict. (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th
40, 87.)
       A murder is of the first degree where the murder was
premeditated and deliberate. (People v. Morales (2020) 10
Cal.5th 76, 88.) Our Supreme Court has identified three
categories of evidence generally sufficient to support a finding of
premeditation and deliberation: 1) planning activity, such as
what and how the defendant did before the killing that show he
directed his actions toward, and intended them to result in, the
killing; 2) motive, including the defendant’s relationship and
conduct toward the victim from which a motive may be inferred,
and 3) manner of killing, including the nature of the killing, such
as how particular or exacting it was, from which the jury could
infer the defendant must have intentionally killed in accordance
with a preconceived design. (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d
15, 26-27.) These guidelines are not exhaustive or rigid. (People
v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 420.)
       Substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding.
       There was evidence of planning.
       Wearing a ski mask, Sheppard parked around the corner
from Brown’s house at 2:00 a.m. with a loaded gun. He chose his
attire to be all black clothing. Sheppard kept Brown on the
phone but did not say, “I am coming to your house” or the like.
       The jury was entitled to infer Sheppard had planned a fatal
night ambush.
       There was evidence of motive.
       Brown had been aggravating Sheppard. Brown was
continuously criticizing Sheppard about Cummings. Brown also
was accusing Sheppard of having an affair with Brown’s wife.
Sheppard claimed there was no affair. Affair or no, Brown’s

                                 7
verbal assaults were aggravating Sheppard. Aggravation is
motive.
       Sheppard points to other evidence in the record. He argues
he was wearing black clothes all day, not just when he came over
in the dark, and speaking to Reed and Walker ensured he would
be identified. He testified Brown was the one with the gun, not
him. He argues there was no motive and in fact Brown was his
best friend. He testified the shooting was an accident, and he
fled because he did not think the police would believe a Black
man. He did not call 911 because he had heard Walker tell Reed
to do so and assumed she would.
       We do not reweigh evidence. (Manibusan, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 87.) Our review is not whether the evidence could
have supported a finding against premeditation and deliberation,
but whether it did support such a finding. (Ibid.)
       The jury had an ample evidentiary foundation for its
verdict.
                                  B
       Sheppard claims the trial court erred in denying his motion
to unseal juror information. A trial court should release juror
contact information only where a party provides good cause to do
so. (Code Civ. Proc. § 237, subd. (b).) Good cause requires a
prima facie showing to support a reasonable belief that jury
misconduct of a character likely to have influenced the verdict
occurred. (People v. Cook (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 345
(Cook).)
       Sheppard did not provide good cause.
       In support of the motion, defense counsel declared that he
had “reason to believe that an inquiry into the jurors’ emotional
response at being told to begin deliberating again, and whether

                                8
or not those emotions caused them to rush their deliberations or
pressure any of the other jurors might tend to increase the
validity of Defendant’s reasons for moving for a new trial.” He
declared he also had “reason to believe that the [dismissed]
foreperson may have been the ‘lone holdout’ on the jury in favor
of a not guilty verdict and that once she was removed the jury did
not deliberate again but rushed into rendering a guilty verdict.”
       The trial court held a hearing and allowed counsel to
argue. The court found that the basis for the motion was that the
court had substituted jurors, and the jury came back with a
verdict, in the defense’s view, fairly quickly. The court found no
evidence to support a reasonable belief sufficient to support a
prima facie showing. Defense counsel offered only
speculation. (People v. Wilson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 839, 852
[speculation about how verdict reached does not establish good
cause].) The court also noted the new jury had deliberated for
almost five hours over two days, a “substantial time.”
       Sheppard argues the court failed properly to consider that
the new jury violated the court’s order by reporting the vote and
expressed fatigue, which suggested a rush to judgment. The
transcript reflects that the court did consider these issues. The
trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. (Cook,
supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 346.)
                                  C
       Sheppard argues the trial court improperly denied his
motion to represent himself at his sentencing hearing. This
argument errs.
       Defendants have a constitutional right to defend
themselves if they elect to do so in a timely, unequivocal,
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent fashion. (Faretta v.

                                9
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834-836.) However, a defendant
can lose this right through delay. We leave untimely motions to
the discretion of the judge. (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d
121, 124 (Windham).)
       Sheppard waited until the day of his sentencing hearing,
which had been continued three times, to make this motion. The
family was present to give their victim statements, which
Sheppard knew the court had scheduled for that date. Sheppard
did not file a noticed motion, but informed the court of his request
at the start of the hearing. It was in the court’s discretion
whether to grant the motion.
       The court’s comments assure us the court based its decision
on relevant factors. Sheppard had ample opportunity to raise the
issue before. He knew family members had come to court to offer
their statements. The court rightly showed concern for
purposeful delay and obstruction of the orderly administration of
justice. The decision to proceed as planned was not an abuse of
discretion.
                          DISPOSITION
       We affirm the judgment.

                                           WILEY, J.
We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.          VIRAMONTES, J.

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