Court Opinion

ID: 9881843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 14:26:09.247228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:18.037710
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-62

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                             ROBERT J. EKMALIAN.

                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

          The defendant appeals from his conviction, after a jury

 trial, of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of

 intoxicating liquor in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a)

 (1). 1    He makes two arguments on appeal.        First, he argues that

 the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

 his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired.               Second, he

 argues that a misstatement in the prosecutor's closing argument

 resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice

 warranting reversal of the conviction.           We affirm.

          We recite the evidence, together with the reasonable

 inferences to be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to

 1 The defendant was also charged with (but found not responsible
 for) a headlight violation pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 7, and not
 possessing a certificate of registration pursuant to G. L.
 c. 90, § 11.
the Commonwealth.    See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671,

676-677 (1979).    At approximately midnight on September 28,

2019, a State trooper observed the defendant yelling, running,

and jumping around while leaving a Cumberland Farms convenience

store.    The trooper considered the defendant's behavior to be

odd because, in the trooper's experience, most people leaving a

store do not behave in such a way.     The trooper then observed

the defendant drive out of the parking lot without turning on

the car's headlights even though it was nearly midnight and

dark.    With the headlights off, the defendant proceeded onto

Route 32, which is a busy street.     The trooper followed and

initiated a traffic stop shortly thereafter without incident.

When the trooper approached the car and engaged the defendant in

conversation, he observed that the defendant had bloodshot and

glassy eyes, that the defendant's speech was slurred, and that

there was a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the inside of

the car.    The defendant first denied having had anything to

drink, but then admitted to the trooper that he had drunk two

beers that evening.

     When the trooper asked the defendant to get out of the car,

the defendant fumbled with the door handle and had trouble

manipulating it.    After opening the door, the defendant leaned

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up against the frame of the car. 2    The trooper then asked the

defendant to perform three field sobriety tests.     The

defendant's performance on the nine-step walk and turn and the

one-legged stand tests was not satisfactory.     The defendant

completed a correct recitation of the alphabet, but his speech

was slurred.    Based on the totality of his observations, the

trooper placed the defendant under arrest for operating under

the influence of alcohol.

     "[T]o establish the defendant's guilt of OUI in violation

of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), the Commonwealth was required

to prove that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) on

a public way, (3) while under the influence of alcohol."

Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392 (2017).

We focus here only on the third element, which is the only one

in dispute.    "[T]he phrase 'under the influence' refers to

impairment, to any degree, of an individual's ability to safely

perform the activity in question."     Commonwealth v. Veronneau,

90 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479 (2016).     "Thus, 'in a prosecution for

[OUI], the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant's consumption of alcohol diminished the

2 Trial counsel lodged an objection to the trooper's testimony as
to why the defendant leaned against the car, which was allowed.
We do not read the transcript to indicate that the judge struck
the trooper's observation of the defendant's conduct, nor would
there have been a basis for doing so.
                                  3
defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely.'"    Id.,

quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173 (1985).

See Gallagher, supra ("the Commonwealth need not prove that the

defendant was drunk, only that alcohol diminished her ability to

operate a motor vehicle safely").    A "diminished capacity to

operate a motor vehicle may be inferred from circumstances other

than actual bad driving."   Commonwealth v. Rollins, 59 Mass.

App. Ct. 911, 912 (2003).

     In this case, those circumstances included the defendant's

unorthodox behavior coming out of the convenience store, his

driving (albeit only for a short while) in the dark without

headlights, his slurred speech and poor balance, his glassy

eyes, the odor of alcohol, his admission to having drunk alcohol

earlier, and his inability to satisfactorily complete the field

sobriety tests.   Compare Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 390-391

(finding evidence of intoxication "compelling, if not

overwhelming" where defendant parked across two spaces, had

glassy, bloodshot eyes, had odor of alcohol, had slightly

slurred speech, and admitted to consuming three beers just prior

to driving); Commonwealth v. Rarick, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 354

(2015) ("evidence that the defendant had consumed at least six

beers in the hours before he was stopped, that a moderate odor

of an alcoholic beverage was coming from his person, that his

eyes were red and glassy, and that he was speeding while driving

                                 4
on a road where the posted speed limit was clearly marked was

sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to infer that he was

operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor");

Commonwealth v. Lavendier, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 506-507 (2011)

(noting obvious signs of impairment where defendant had, among

other indicators, "strong odor of alcohol, poor balance, and

glassy, bloodshot eyes"); Rollins, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 912

(inability to perform field sobriety tests is evidence of

impairment).

     We now turn to the defendant's argument that by using, in

her closing argument, the phrase "pretty clear" with respect to

the Commonwealth's evidence, the prosecutor misstated the law

and lowered the Commonwealth's burden of proof.    Although the

prosecutor could have more artfully phrased her point, the gist

of the prosecutor's comment -- taken in context -- would have

been understood to refer to the unambiguity or strength of the

evidence, not to the Commonwealth's burden of proof.    "Closing

arguments must be viewed 'in the context of the entire argument,

and in light of the judge's instructions to the jury and the

evidence at trial.'"     Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670,

687 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412

Mass. 224, 231 (1992).    In any event, we see no risk that the

prosecutor's phrasing would have caused the jury to

misunderstand the Commonwealth's burden of proof given the

                                   5
multiple occasions 3 on which the judge correctly instructed the

jury that the Commonwealth bore the burden to prove each element

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.      See Commonwealth v.

Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 114 (1987).

     For the reasons set out above, the conviction is affirmed.

                                     Judgment affirmed.

                                     By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                       Shin & Ditkoff, JJ. 4),

                                     Clerk

Entered:   October 4, 2023.

3 The judge instructed the jury on the Commonwealth's burden of
proof at the beginning of the trial, during the judge's final
instructions, and again in response to a question posed by the
jury during their deliberations.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                6