Court Opinion

ID: 9893475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:06:21.352596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:15.645489
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                             No. 22–0089

      Submitted September 14, 2023—Filed October 27, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

JOHNNY BLAHNIK CHURCH a/k/a DREW ALAN BLAHNIK,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Christopher L.

Bruns, Judge.

      The defendant challenges the propriety of a verdict-urging instruction.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.

      McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.
      Leon F. Spies of Spies & Pavelich, Iowa City, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert and Louis S.

Sloven, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
                                         2

MCDONALD, Justice.
      When a jury in deliberations communicates to a judge that they may be

deadlocked, the judge has considerable discretion to give to the jury a

supplemental instruction, known as a verdict-urging instruction, to encourage

continued deliberations. The judge’s decision to give a verdict-urging instruction

will be reversed only where the circumstances show the verdict-urging

instruction coerced the jury’s verdict. The sole question presented in this appeal

is whether the district court abused its considerable discretion and coerced the

jury’s verdict by giving a verdict-urging instruction after being told that the jury

was divided 11–1 and that one juror was not following the judge’s instructions.

                                         I.

      Johnny Blahnik Church, also known as Drew Alan Blahnik, stabbed and

killed Christopher Bagley. Bagley suffered at least thirteen different stab

wounds, including wounds to his neck, chest, and abdomen. After Church killed

Bagley, Church helped bury Bagley’s body and then lied to investigators and a

grand jury about what had happened.

      Church was indicted for murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa

Code sections 707.1 and 707.2(1)(a) (2018), obstructing prosecution, in violation
of Iowa Code section 709.3(1), and abuse of a corpse, in violation of Iowa Code

section 708.14(1)(b). The facts and circumstances of Church’s offenses are

largely immaterial to the resolution of this appeal, and we need not discuss them

any further. What is material to the resolution of this appeal are the facts and

circumstances related to Church’s trial and the jury’s deliberations, and we

discuss those facts and circumstances at some length.

      Church’s trial began on Friday, July 16, 2021. At trial, Church asserted a

defense of justification. The case was submitted to the jury at approximately
4:06 p.m. on Monday, July 26. The jury met for thirty-five minutes, separating
                                           3

at 4:41 p.m. that day. The jury resumed deliberations the following day,

Tuesday, meeting for nearly three hours total between 9 a.m. and noon. On

Wednesday, the jury deliberated for approximately seven hours in total.

      The jury reconvened on Thursday, July 29. At approximately 10:06 a.m.,

the jury sent a note to the district court: “A juror is failing to follow specific rules

set forth by you in the rule packet provided. In regards to 45 + 52.”

Instruction 45 related to Church’s justification defense, and instruction 52

related to a person’s duties after using deadly force. Based on this note, the court

believed the jurors were deadlocked. Nonetheless, after conferring with counsel,

the district court responded with a written note to the jury: “As previously

instructed, you are required to apply the law set forth in the instructions already

provided to you.”

      Approximately one hour later, the jury informed the court attendant that

it was deadlocked. After conferring with the attorneys, the district court

instructed the jury to communicate with the court in writing, and the jury sent

the following note signed by the foreperson:

      We have a juror that is refusing to follow certain rules set forth by
      you. We took a vote to whether or not we felt this person was
      deliberately not following a rule. The vote was 11 to 1. We have gone
      over this rule numerous times with this juror. The response has
      been “I don’t care, I’m not changing my opinion.”

The court made a record with the attorneys after receiving the jury’s note. The

State requested the district court issue a verdict-urging instruction. Church’s

counsel objected. The court denied the prosecutor’s request to issue a

verdict-urging instruction. Instead, the court sent a question to the jury: “Do you

believe further deliberations would be fruitful?”

      Shortly thereafter, at 11:37 a.m., the jury sent the following response,
signed by the foreperson, to the district court’s question: “No, we feel that
                                        4

because the rules set forth by this court are not being followed by a single juror

that deliberations would NOT be fruitful.” After receiving the jury’s response, the

district court again met with the lawyers. The prosecutor renewed his request

for a verdict-urging instruction, and Church’s counsel objected. Church’s

counsel argued that issuing a verdict-urging instruction under these

circumstances would be coercive. After considering the parties’ arguments, the

district court issued the following written verdict-urging instruction:

            You have been deliberating upon this case for a considerable
      period of time, and the Court deems it proper to advise you further
      in regard to the desirability of agreement, if possible.

            The case has been exhaustively and carefully tried by both
      sides and has been submitted to you for decision and verdict, if
      possible. It is the law that a unanimous verdict is required. While
      this verdict must be the conclusion of each juror and not a mere
      acquiescence of the jurors in order to reach an agreement, it is still
      necessary for all of the jurors to examine the issues and questions
      submitted to them with candor and fairness and with a proper
      regard for, and deference to, the opinion of each other. A proper
      regard for the judgment of others will greatly aid us informing our
      own judgment.

             Each juror should listen to the arguments of other jurors with
      a disposition to be convinced by them; and if the members of the
      jury differ in their views of the evidence, such difference of opinion
      should cause them all to scrutinize the evidence more closely and to
      reexamine the grounds of their problem. Your duty is to decide the
      issues of fact which have been submitted to you, if you can
      conscientiously do so. In conferring, you should lay aside all mere
      pride of opinion and should bear in mind that the jury room is no
      place for espousing and maintaining, in a spirit of controversy,
      either side of a cause. The aim ever to be kept in view is the truth as
      it appears from the evidence, examined in light of the instructions
      of the Court.

            Please continue your deliberations.

The district court issued the instruction at approximately 12:08 p.m.

      Three and one-half hours later, at 3:39 p.m., the jury informed the district
court it had reached a verdict. The jury found Church guilty of murder in the
                                          5

second degree, obstructing prosecution, and abusing a corpse. The district court

polled the jurors in open court, asking each one: “Is this your verdict?” Each

juror answered in the affirmative without any doubt or hesitation noted in the

record.

      Church appealed his convictions, and we transferred the case to the court

of appeals. The court of appeals concluded the jury’s verdict was coerced, vacated

Church’s convictions, and remanded the case for a new trial. We granted the

State’s application for further review.

                                          II.

      “Supplemental instructions urging a jury to reach a unanimous verdict

have ‘long been sanctioned.’ ” State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 911 (Iowa 2003)

(quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988)), overruled on other

grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2010). The district court “has

considerable discretion in determining whether [a] verdict-urging instruction[]

should be given.” State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d 803, 808–09 (Iowa 1980). We

will reverse a district court’s decision to give a verdict-urging instruction only

where the verdict-urging instruction coerced or helped coerce the jury’s verdict.

See State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Iowa 2022). In determining whether the
instruction coerced or helped coerce the jury’s verdict, we generally look at “the

content of the verdict-urging instruction,” “the timing surrounding the verdict,”

and the “responses from juror polling to ensure each juror was not coerced into

their verdict.” Id. These considerations are not exclusive, however, and each case

must be decided based on the totality of the circumstances. See id. “The ultimate

test is whether the instruction improperly coerced or helped coerce a verdict or

merely initiated a new train of real deliberation which terminated the

disagreement.” Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808.
                                         6

                                         A.

      The disposition of this case is largely controlled by our recent decision in

State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1. In that case, the defendant was charged with

first-degree murder. Id. at 7. “After seven hours of jury deliberation, the court

attendant informed the court that the jury may be deadlocked.” Id. at 17. Over

the defendant’s objection, the district court gave the jury a verdict-urging

instruction. Id. After the jury was provided with an oral verdict-urging

instruction, “they deliberated for approximately four and a half hours before

returning with a guilty verdict.” Id. On appeal, the defendant contended that the

verdict-urging instruction coerced the jury’s verdict and that he was entitled to

a new trial. Id. We concluded the defendant failed to establish coercion or

potential coercion of the jury’s verdict. In analyzing the most relevant factors, we

concluded the content of the instruction was not coercive, id. at 18, the timing

of the jury’s verdict did not evidence coercion, id. at 20, and the jury poll did not

evidence coercion, id. at 21.

      As in Davis, none of the most relevant factors support the conclusion that

the district court’s verdict-urging instruction coerced or helped coerce the jury’s

verdict. With respect to the content of the instruction, the instruction in this case
contained none of the language our courts have found coercive or potentially

coercive. The instruction did “not target jurors in the minority.” Id. at 18. The

instruction “did not identify the number of jurors with a minority opinion.” Id.

The instruction did “not express any requirement that the jury reach a verdict.”

Id. The instruction did “not discuss the possibility of a retrial or the mounting

litigation expenses.” Id.

      In addition to not containing coercive or potentially coercive language, the

instruction contained appropriate language to prevent potential coercion. The
instruction was broad and was directed to “each” and “all” of the jurors rather
                                                 7

than those in the minority. The instruction urged unanimity but also provided

that the jury should do so only “if possible” and only if the jurors could

“conscientiously do so.”

        In short, the content of the district court’s verdict-urging instruction is

materially indistinguishable from that found to be noncoercive in Davis and

other decisions. See, e.g., Davis, 975 N.W.2d at 18–19; Piper, 663 N.W.2d at 912;

Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808; State v. Gibbs, No. 22–0006, 2023 WL 152568,

at *4    (Iowa    Ct.    App.     Jan. 11,     2023);     State v.    Parmer,      No. 13–2033,

2015 WL 2393652, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 20, 2015); State v. Power,

No. 13–0052, 2014 WL 2600214, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 11, 2014).1

        The timing of the verdict does not support the conclusion the jury’s verdict

in this case was coerced or potentially coerced. When we examine the timing of

the jury’s verdict, the essence of the inquiry is whether the length of the jury’s

post-instruction deliberations evidenced the jury engaged in new, real, and

worthwhile deliberations that terminated the disagreement. See Davis,

        1A verdict-urging  instruction is frequently referred to as an “Allen charge,” originating
from the Supreme Court case Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1896), which
approved the use of a verdict-urging instruction. The language approved in Allen included
language that directed jurors in the minority to rethink their position in light of the view of the
majority, among other things. See id. at 501. Because the language in the instruction in this
case does not include some of the language approved in Allen but later thought to be problematic,
the instruction is not a true “Allen charge.” See State v. Lamb, 261 S.E.2d 130, 131–32
(N.C. 1979) (discussing deficiencies in the instruction approved in Allen and subsequent
developments in improving a verdict-urging instruction); Commonwealth v. Greer, 951 A.2d 346,
355 (Pa. 2008) (“The Allen charge came to be commonly used in both the state and federal courts,
but over time, various courts raised concerns respecting that part of the charge encouraging
jurors in the minority to reconsider their views in light of the majority vote, with the fear being
that such an emphasis might be unduly coercive.”); State v. Steven G.B., No. 93-1658-CR,
1996 WL 426089, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. July 31, 1996) (explaining that the modified instruction
“is not the instruction used in the case giving rise to the term ‘Allen’ charge” but that “attorneys
and trial courts continue to refer to the instruction as the Allen charge”); 6 Wayne R. LaFave et
al., Criminal Procedure § 24.9(d), at 674 (4th ed. 2015) (“But many courts have turned away
from the Allen charge, some of these approving the use of more guarded language.”). We thus
refer to the instruction in this case as a verdict-urging instruction.
                                         8

975 N.W.2d at 19; Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808. In Davis, we concluded that

“[f]our and a half hours was ample time for the jurors to engage in meaningful

conversation on the evidence presented and thoroughly evaluate each other’s

opinions.” 975 N.W.2d at 20. In State v. Myers, we found post-instruction

deliberations of forty-one minutes were sufficient to show the jury commenced

new, real deliberations that terminated the jury’s prior disagreement.

140 N.W.2d 891, 898 (Iowa 1966). In this case, the jury deliberated three and

one-half hours after receiving the district court’s verdict-urging instruction. This

negates any suggestion of coercion. See State v. Quitt, 204 N.W.2d 913, 914

(Iowa 1973) (“The record here does not suggest coercion. In fact, it rather

demonstratively negatives it. The fact the jury deliberated 3 hours 52 minutes

following the giving of the verdict-urging instruction (which elapsed time

included time out for the evening meal), indicates the jury gave additional

consideration to the record before a verdict was reached.”); Campbell,

294 N.W.2d at 811 (finding no coercion where jury deliberated two and a half

hours post-instruction); State v. Kelley, 161 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Iowa 1968)

(holding there was “nothing here to suggest coercion” where the jury deliberated

for twenty-two hours and returned a verdict two and one-half hours
post-instruction); State v. Bogardus, 176 N.W. 327, 329 (Iowa 1920) (holding

there was no coercion where jury returned a verdict one and one-half hours

post-instruction).

      With respect to the third consideration, the jury poll did not reveal any

evidence of coercion or potential coercion. “The purpose of polling the jury is to

determine that the verdict returned is actually the verdict of each individual

member.” Davis, 975 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting State v. Morelock, 164 N.W.2d 819,

823 (Iowa 1969)). In this case, each juror was polled in open court before the
judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant and asked, “[I]s this
                                        9

your verdict?” Each juror responded with “it is” or “yes.” As in Davis, “neither

party nor the trial court judge identified any hesitation, comments, or body

language from the jurors during polling that would indicate coercion.”

975 N.W.2d at 21.

      In sum, we conclude this case is materially indistinguishable from our

recent decision in Davis. As in Davis, the most relevant facts and circumstances

do not support the conclusion the district court’s verdict-urging instruction

coerced or potentially coerced the jury’s verdict. Instead, the record reflects the

district court issued an instruction with appropriate content. After receiving the

instruction, the jury resumed deliberations for an additional three and one-half

hours, which our precedents hold is sufficient to demonstrate they commenced

a train of new deliberations to resolve their prior disagreement. After the jury

returned its verdict in open court, each of the jurors affirmed the verdict without

any hesitation.

                                        B.

      The court of appeals reached a different conclusion. The court of appeals

held the jury’s verdict was coerced, vacated Church’s convictions, and remanded

the case for a new trial. In reaching the conclusion that the jury’s verdict was
coerced, the court of appeals attempted to distinguish Davis. The court of

appeals focused its attention on the timing of the jury’s verdict, the jury’s

disclosure of their numerical division to the district court, and the majority

jurors’ purported feelings of “open hostility toward [the] lone holdout juror.” We

conclude the court of appeals erred in its analysis.

      With respect to the timing of the jury’s verdict, rather than focusing on the

absolute length of the jury’s post-instruction deliberations, the court of appeals

focused on the “more intricate gauge” of the “ratio of the deliberations before and
after” the verdict-urging instruction. In Davis, we did recognize that some of our
                                        10

cases have “looked at the ratio of ‘the time spent in deliberation before, and the

duration of the deliberations after, such an instruction was given.’ ” 975 N.W.2d

at 20 (quoting State v. Peirce, 159 N.W. 1050, 1054 (Iowa 1916), abrogated on

other grounds by State v. McLaughlin, 94 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa 1959)). However, in

Davis, we stated the ratio was a “less relevant” consideration than the absolute

length of the jury’s post-instruction deliberations. Id. Regardless, relying

primarily on State v. Peirce, 159 N.W. 1050, the court of appeals concluded that

the ratio of pre- and post-instruction deliberations in this case “point[ed] to

coercion and prejudice.”

      Peirce does not support the court of appeals’ coercion analysis for two

reasons. First, Peirce announced a presumption of prejudice not applicable here.

In Peirce, “the jury had been kept together some 13 days and had been

deliberating upon its verdict some 48 hours.” Id. at 1054. “It stood three for

acquittal and nine for conviction when the additional instruction was given, and

returned a verdict of guilty in something less than 4 hours thereafter.” Id. The

Peirce court conducted a thorough review of the relevant cases and concluded

that “where the disagreement is of more than ordinary and usual duration,” a

presumption of prejudice arises if the “verdict is reached in a time short in
comparison.” Id. at 1055. In this case, the jury’s pre-instruction deliberations of

thirteen hours were not of more than ordinary and usual duration than one

would expect in a multi-count case involving first-degree murder and a

justification defense. The presumption of prejudice articulated in Peirce is

inapplicable here.

      Second, the critical fact in Peirce was not the ratio of pre- and post-

instruction deliberations. Instead, it was the fact that the jury was confined over

the weekend and had to reach a verdict to avoid continued confinement for an
additional day:
                                         11

      After some 48 hours of disagreement three stood for acquittal when
      the instruction was given. That it was late on Saturday night. That
      it got into the jury room the trial judge had gone home and out of
      town for over Sunday, and that, while there was a judge in town, he
      could only act to receive a verdict. It fairly had conveyed to it the
      idea that failure to agree meant confinement over Sunday at least.

             We think this raises a presumption of prejudice.

Id. In stark contrast, in this case, the jury was not confined, and the jury

returned its verdict on a Thursday in the middle of the afternoon. Unlike the jury

in Peirce, the jury in this case was not subject to continued restraint over the

weekend to reach a verdict.

      The court of appeals also focused its attention on the fact that the jury

disclosed its numerical division to the district court. The mere fact that the jury

made the district court aware that the members were split 11–1 does not support

the conclusion that the district court’s verdict-urging instruction was coercive or

potentially coercive. We addressed a similar issue in State v. Piper, 633 N.W.2d

894. In that case, the jury “sent a note to the judge stating, ‘We are a hung jury.

Ten guilty; two not guilty.’ ” Id. at 911. The district court ordered the jury to

continue deliberations, and two hours later the jury returned a guilty verdict.

See id. On appeal, we concluded the jury’s verdict was not coerced even though

the numerical division “was volunteered by the foreperson in the notes sent to

the trial judge.” Id. at 912. Critically, as in this case, “the court did not inquire

into the voting breakdown.” Id. Courts throughout the country are in accord with

Piper and conclude that giving a verdict-urging instruction is not reversible error

merely because the trial judge inadvertently learned of the numerical division of

the jury, including where the jury was divided 11–1. See, e.g., United States v.

Santiago, 834 F. App’x 417, 418 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d

1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1364–65
(11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hotz, 620 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1980); Sanders v.
                                         12

United States, 415 F.2d 621, 631–32 (5th Cir. 1969); Drayton v. State, 778 S.E.2d

179, 182, 183–84 (Ga. 2015); Jackson v. State, 782 S.E.2d 287, 292–93 (Ga. Ct.

App.   2016);   Henson    v.   Commonwealth,     No.   2020–SC–0343–MR,        2021

WL 5984690, at *14–15 (Ky. Dec. 16, 2021); Barnett v. State, No. 2012, Sept.

term, 2019, 2021 WL 1040498, at *6 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 18, 2021);

People v. Parker, No. 263276, 2007 WL 486485, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15,

2007) (per curiam); State v. Blackwell, 747 S.E.2d 137, 142 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013);

Commonwealth v. Greer, 951 A.2d 346, 360–61 (Pa. 2008); Draper v. State, 335

S.W.3d 412, 415, 417–18 (Tex. App. 2011); State v. Evans, No. 18–1044, 2020

WL 1487808, at *7–8 (W. Va. Mar. 23, 2020).

       The court of appeals recognized that the district court’s knowledge of the

numerical division did not, in and of itself, prohibit the verdict-urging

instruction. In the court of appeals’ view, however, there was more: Not only was

the district court aware the jury was split 11–1, but the district court was also

aware the majority jurors had expressed “animosity” toward the lone holdout. In

particular, the court of appeals found that the jury’s notes “disparaged” the lone

holdout, that the notes had a “harsh tone,” that the jury “revealed open hostility

toward a lone holdout juror,” and “that the jury had turned its ire on the lone
holdout.” The notes were “an unusually open expression of animosity from the

majority jurors toward the lone holdout.” In the court of appeals’ view, the district

court’s awareness of the majority jurors’ open hostility toward the lone holdout

supports the conclusion that the jury’s verdict was coerced.

       We conclude the court of appeals erred in two respects. First, the record

does not support the court of appeals’ characterization of the majority jurors’

feelings toward the holdout juror. The jury’s notes to the district court stated

that a single juror was “failing to follow,” “refusing to follow,” and “deliberately
not following” the district court’s instructions, a point the jury determined by
                                        13

vote. The notes were direct, but they do not evidence “disparagement,” “hostility,”

“ire,” or “an unusually open expression of animosity.” Neither the district court

nor the attorneys characterized the majority jurors’ views in this way after

receiving the notes from the jury. In Church’s motion for new trial, he did not

characterize the majority jurors’ views in this way. Even on appeal, Church does

not characterize the majority jurors’ views in this way. The court of appeals took

artistic license here, but the picture painted lacks fidelity to the record and the

parties’ arguments.

      Second, the court of appeals’ focus on the purported ire of the majority

jurors missed the relevant inquiry in analyzing a verdict-urging instruction. The

psychological pressure jurors place on each other to try and reach a unanimous

verdict is inherent in the jury process. “No doubt, jurors in a minority position

always feel some form of pressure to bow down to the will of the majority.” Greer,

951 A.2d at 361. Similarly, jurors in the majority also “feel pressure to switch

views, if only to get the matter over with.” Id. In determining the propriety of a

verdict-urging instruction, however, we are not so concerned with the inherent

psychological pressure jurors place on each other during deliberations. See id.

(“These sorts of ephemeral psychological pressures are both inherent in the jury
function and difficult to measure. . . . [W]e should tread carefully before allowing

speculation about such effects to control the relevant jurisprudence.”). Instead,

we are more concerned with whether “the instruction improperly coerced or

helped coerce a verdict.” Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808 (emphasis added). And,

in particular, whether the instruction encouraged jurors to abandon their

conscientiously held positions.

      This distinction is evident in the primary case upon which the court of

appeals relied, Smalls v. Batista, 191 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 1999). Smalls did not
conclude the jury’s verdict was coerced due to psychological pressure and
                                         14

small-group dynamics inherent in the jury process. The verdict-urging

instruction in Smalls was found defective only because it “failed to include

instructions reminding jurors not to abandon their conscientiously held views,

even if holding firm would leave a minority of the jurors unconvinced.” 191 F.3d

at 280. It was the “lack of cautionary language . . . that render[ed] the charge

coercive and a violation of Smalls’ constitutional rights to due process and a fair

trial.” Id. As discussed above, that instructional defect is not present in this case.

                                         III.

      For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and we

affirm Church’s convictions.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.