Court Opinion

ID: 9597686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:02:07.674185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:13.601462
License: Public Domain

Bowles, Justice.
A writ of certiorari was granted in this case to decide whether Georgia will continue to follow the automobile guest passenger rule as it was established in Epps v. Parrish, 25 Ga. App. 399 (106 SE 297) and approved by this court in Holland v. Boyett, 212 Ga. 458 (2) (93 SE2d 662).
The petitioner, Deborah Ann Bickford, was a guest passenger in a convertible automobile driven by Albert M. Nolen and owned by his father J. T. Nolen. The car went out of control as it entered a curve and rolled over into a ditch, pinning the petitioner underneath. She suffered a brain contusion, basilar skull fracture, a fractured jaw and a compound injury to her right ear.
Following a trial in which the petitioner sought recovery for her injuries against Nolen and his father, the jury which had been charged on the automobile guest passenger rule, returned a verdict in favor of the respondents, father and son. After her motion for new trial was denied, petitioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals wrote a strong opinion denouncing the automobile guest passenger rule, suggesting it to be unsound under the State and Federal *256Constitutions on equal protection grounds and contrary to the public policy of this state. However, they deferred to this court to determine the constitutionality and correctness of the rule. Following the denial of her motion for rehearing, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to this court which was granted.
Petitioner contends that the guest .'rule, distinguishing between paying and nonpaying guests, violates the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions. Although the rule is of judicial origin, it has been in existence for fifty-six years and since that time has been the public policy of this state.
In reviewing the charge that the automobile guest rule violates the equal protection guarantees of the Federal and State Constitutions, this court will apply a rational basis standard of review. There is no suggestion that the right asserted by petitioner is fundamental or that a suspect classification exists in the case. Therefore, the standard of review is that the classification not be arbitrary or unreasonable (Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (90 SC 1153, 25 LE2d 491)), and that a fair and substantial relationship exist between the classification and the purpose of the law. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (92 SC 251, 30 LE2d 225) (1971).
The equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not deny a state the power to treat different classes of people in different ways. It does, however, deny to states the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 [40 SC 560, 64 LE 989] (1920).” Reed v. Reed, supra, p. 76. Within the context of this case, there is no difference in the equal protection provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. Both are intended to prevent extraordinary benefits or burdens from flowing to any one group.
*257Our automobile guest rule precludes a nonpaying guest passenger from recovering damages for personal injuries sustained by the ordinary negligence of the owner or operator. Recovery for gross negligence is allowed. Because clearly two classifications of passengers are made — guests and nonguests — and because each class may be treated differently in identical situations, the issue becomes whether or not the classification is reasonable and bears a fair and substantial relation to the legitimate purpose of the statute.
The purposes traditionally attributed to automobile guest rules and statutes have been the fostering of hospitality by insulating generous hosts from lawsuits instituted by injured guests and the elimination of possible collusive lawsuits.
The distinction made between a paying and nonpaying passenger is a reasonable test for determining whether hospitality has been extended by the host to his guest. This classification of an invited guest made in the automobile guest rule extends throughout other areas of Georgia law. For instance, a Georgia landowner owes a different duty to his business invitee than to his licensee. A gratuitous bailee owes a different duty to a bailor than is owed by a paid bailee.
While it is argued that widespread insurance coverage has negated the hospitality rationale, this does not take into account that the guest’s claim need not be limited to the host’s liability insurance coverage or that a host who finds himself liable in a tort action risks the possibility of a cancellation of his insurance or a substantial increase in his premiums. Although these reasons may not be absolute they are strongly persuasive, and they do satisfy the test of equal protection. The classification of guest passenger bears a fair and substantial relation to a valid, purpose of the rule. Any final determination of values is to be left to the legislature.
The second justification for the classification, the prevention of collusive lawsuits, is also a valid state interest which is sufficiently furthered by the guest rule classification. It is reasonable that an injured guest and an agreeable host may be anxious to see compensation *258paid so long as the host does not have to pay it. They could even conspire against an insurer so that the truth will not be known. Here again, we must defer to legislative judgment. That the rule may also bar some claims is not a sufficient ground to hold the guest passenger classification as violative of the equal protection clause.
Argued September 12, 1977
Decided November 1, 1977
Rehearing denied November 29, 1977.
Pye, Groover & Pye, Tom Pye, for appellant.
Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler & Martin, Robert W. Beynart, Williston C. White, for appellees.
The guest passenger rule, applied uniformly and fairly for fifty-six years in this state has not been modified by statute. It involves an issue of public policy which we feel is well founded and should be upheld until such time as the legislative branch of our state government sees fit to change it.
In holding our automobile guest passenger rule constitutional on equal protection grounds, we are following the majority of state courts which have ruled on the same issue in regard to their own state’s rule. See Sidle v. Majors (Ind.), 341 NE2d 763 (1976); Behrns v. Burke (S.D.), 229 NW2d 86 (1975); White v. Hughes, 257 Ark. 627 (519 SW2d 70) (1975); Duerst v. Limbocker (Or.), 525 P2d 99 (1974); Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288 (315 S2d 570) (1975); Richardson v. Hansen (Colo.), 527 P2d 536 (1974); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 SW2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165 (226 NW2d 121) (1975); Keasling v. Thompson (Iowa), 217 NW2d 687 (1974); Cannon v. Oviatt (Utah), 520 P2d 883 (1974); Delany v. Badame, 49 Ill. 2d 168 (274 NE2d 353) (1971); Justice v. Gatchell (Del.), 325 A2d 97 (1974).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Undercofler, P. J., and Hall, J., who dissent.