Court Opinion

ID: 9763903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:00:37.889756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:51.020982
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge
(dissenting).
In order to revoke appellant’s probation it was necessary for the state to show that he had committed an offense against the laws of this state.
A complaint was filed charging appellant with the crime of burglary.
The judge proceeded to try the appellant for that offense and adjudged him to be guilty. Upon that adjudication of guilt, probation was revoked and appellant ordered to the penitentiary.
So here is a defendant charged by complaint with the felony offense of burglary and tried upon that complaint in an ex parte proceeding and adjudged to be guilty of that offense—all without indictment or trial before a jury.
A more flagrant violation of the constitutional right of trial by jury can hardly be conceived.
I have heretofore expressed my views regarding such violation of a constitutional right, in my dissenting opinions in Miller v. State, No. 30,539, 168 Tex. Cr. Rep. 550, 330 S. W. 2d 466, and in Leija v. State, 167 Tex. Cr. R. 300, 320 S. W. 2d 3, Gossett v. State, 162 Tex. Cr. R. 52, 282 S.W. 2d 59.
My only reason for again calling attention to such con-*5elusion is that this case is the first of which I am aware where a complaint was filed and a conviction resulted from a trial conducted upon that complaint before the judge.
I wonder what punishment the trial court inflicted when he found this appellant guilty of burglary? If the judge had the right to try and to convict appellant of that offense, he had the right and it was his duty to fix the penalty authorized by law.
Punishment is necessary to a valid judgment in a felony case. Art. 766, C. C. P.; Cagle v State, 147 Tex Cr R 140, 179 S. W. 2d 545.
Thus is demonstrated the fact that the constitutional right of trial by jury was not accorded this appellant.
I respectfully dissent.