Court Opinion

ID: 9906698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 22:00:48.341613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:24.023165
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 23a0264p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                            ┐
 MARLEAN A. AMES,
                                                            │
                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,      │
                                                             >        No. 23-3341
                                                            │
        v.                                                  │
                                                            │
 OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES,                         │
                             Defendant-Appellee.            │
                                                            ┘

  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
                  No. 2:20-cv-05935—Algenon L. Marbley, District Judge.

                            Decided and Filed: December 4, 2023

             Before: MOORE, McKEAGUE, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

                                     _________________

                                           COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Edward L. Gilbert, EDWARD L. GILBERT CO., L.P.A., Akron, Ohio, for
Appellant. Cathleen B. Slater, Megan E. Jewett, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

       The court delivered a PER CURIAM opinion. KETHLEDGE, J. (pp. 7–8), delivered a
separate concurring opinion.
                                     _________________

                                            OPINION
                                     _________________

       PER CURIAM. Marlean Ames sued the Ohio Department of Youth Services under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting claims of discrimination based on sexual
orientation and sex. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, holding
that Ames lacked evidence of “background circumstances” necessary to establishing her prima-
 No. 23-3341                   Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.                         Page 2

facie case for her claim based on sexual orientation, and that Ames lacked evidence of pretext for
purposes of her sex-discrimination claim. We affirm.

                                                I.

       We view the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to Ames. See Sloat v.
Hewlett-Packard Enter. Co., 18 F.4th 204, 207 (6th Cir. 2021).

       The Ohio Department of Youth Services oversees the confinement and rehabilitation of
juvenile felony offenders in the state. The Department hired Ames, a heterosexual woman, in
2004, and in 2014 it made her its Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (which the
Department referred to as “PREA”). The position was “unclassified,” meaning that Ames was
an at-will employee who could be dismissed without cause. Ohio Rev. Code § 124.11.

       In 2017, Ames was assigned a new supervisor, Ginine Trim, who is gay. Trim reported
to Assistant Director Julie Walburn. In a December 2018 performance evaluation, Trim said that
Ames met “expectations” in ten competencies and exceeded them in one. In January 2019,
Ohio’s governor appointed Ryan Gies to be the Department’s Director. Walburn and Gies are
both heterosexual.

       In April 2019, Ames applied and interviewed to be the Department’s Bureau Chief of
Quality. The Department chose not to hire her for that position. In a conversation after the
interview, Trim congratulated Ames on 30 years of public service, but also suggested that Ames
retire. Four days later, on May 10, 2019, Walburn and Human Resources Administrator Robin
Gee called Ames into a meeting where they terminated her as PREA Administrator and gave her
the option of returning to her previous position, which would amount to a demotion. Ames took
the demotion, reducing her wages from $47.22 an hour to $28.40. The Department then selected
Alexander Stojsavljevic, a 25-year-old gay man, for the position of PREA Administrator,
informing him two business days later of his promotion.          Later, in December 2019, the
Department chose Yolanda Frierson, a gay woman, as its Bureau Chief of Quality.
 No. 23-3341                   Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.                         Page 3

         Ames later filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which issued a right-to-sue letter. Ames then brought this suit, in which the district
court granted summary judgment. This appeal followed.

                                               II.

         We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Spees v. James
Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 2010).

         Ames sought to prove her discrimination claims by indirect evidence, which required her
to show the following: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subject to
an adverse employment decision; (3) that she was qualified for the relevant position; (4) and that
her employer treated more favorably a similarly qualified person who was not a member of the
same protected class. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir.
2016).

                                               A.

         We begin with Ames’s claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation, in which she
says the Department discriminated against her when it denied her a promotion to Bureau Chief
and demoted her from the position of PREA Administrator. Ames is heterosexual, however,
which means she must make a showing in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-
facie case. Specifically, Ames must show “background circumstances to support the suspicion
that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Arendale v.
City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up); see also Murray v.
Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985).

         Whether Ames made the necessary showing of “background circumstances” is the
principal issue here. For otherwise Ames’s prima-facie case was easy to make: her claim is
based on sexual orientation, which is a protected ground under Title VII, see Bostock v. Clayton
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020); she was demoted from her position as PREA
Administrator and had held that position for five years, with reasonably good reviews; and she
 No. 23-3341                    Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.                       Page 4

was replaced by a gay man. Moreover, for the Bureau Chief position that Ames was denied, the
Department chose a gay woman.

       Where Ames founders, however, is on the requisite showing of “background
circumstances.” Plaintiffs typically make that showing with evidence that a member of the
relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with
statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination by the employer against members of the
majority group. See Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002);
Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 615 (6th Cir. 2003). But Ames has made
neither showing. First, Ames was terminated as PREA Administrator by Walburn and Gies, who
are both heterosexual. Ames does argue that Trim, a gay woman, was the person who denied her
the position of Bureau Chief and who instead chose Frierson, who is also gay. But Ames argued
in the district court that Walburn and Gies were the decisionmakers for that position, which
means that Ames’s argument that Trim was the decisionmaker is forfeited. See Watkins v.
Healy, 986 F.3d 648, 667 (6th Cir. 2021). Second, Ames’s only evidence of a pattern of
discrimination against heterosexuals is her own demotion and the denial of the Bureau Chief
position. Under our caselaw, however, a plaintiff cannot point to her own experience to establish
a pattern of discrimination. See Sutherland, 344 F.3d at 615 (requiring statistical evidence
beyond plaintiff’s own experience to prove pattern); see also Treadwell v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
447 F. App’x 676, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2011).

       Ames therefore has not made the necessary showing of “background circumstances.” For
that reason her claim of sexual-orientation discrimination fails.

                                                 B.

       Ames next argues that a jury could find that she was demoted from her position as PREA
Administrator because of her sex. The Department concedes that Ames has stated a prima-facie
case as to this claim, because she was replaced by a man. But the Department has provided
nondiscriminatory reasons for her demotion: namely, that Gies had been appointed Director of
the Department a few months before, in January 2019; that Gies wanted to improve the
Department’s performance regarding “sexual victimization[,]” and wanted “people in places that
 No. 23-3341                   Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.                          Page 5

can fulfill the vision of moving us forward, not just meeting minimum standards”; and that
Ames’s 2018 evaluation showed she mostly met expectations rather than exceeded them, and
needed improvement in some areas.

       To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must ultimately prove both that her employer’s stated
reason for the adverse employment decision “was not the real reason for its action, and that the
employer’s real reason” was discrimination. E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767
(6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). At summary judgment, however, a plaintiff need only produce
evidence that would allow a jury to find that her employer’s stated reason “is unworthy of
credence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000); see Miles v. S.
Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2020). To that end, a plaintiff can
typically create a genuine issue of fact by producing evidence that the employer’s stated reason
(1) had no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the employer’s actions; or (3) was
insufficient to motivate the employer’s actions. See Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 11 F.4th 498,
515 (6th Cir. 2021).

       Ames contends that the Department’s reasons for demoting her had no basis in fact. But
Gies was in fact appointed in January 2019, a few months before Ames’s demotion; and her
evaluation the month before was lukewarm in many respects and critical in some others.
Specifically, for 10 of 11 of the “competencies” for which Ames was evaluated, her rating was
“meets expectations” rather than that she “exceeds” them.         And in three areas—providing
accurate guidance to “other groups[,]” “[p]erforming day-to-day (routine) administrative
tasks[,]” and managing and distributing “all PREA grant-related funds[,]” the report noted that
she had “an opportunity to improve[.]” The report therefore provides some support for the
Department’s stated reasons for demoting her, which means they had some basis in fact. Ames
therefore has not created a genuine issue of fact on this ground. See Miles, 946 F.3d at 888-89
(“For a plaintiff’s challenge to the factual basis of an employer’s proffered termination rationale
to establish pretext, the plaintiff must provide evidence that the employer’s allegations never
happened.”).

       Ames also contends that that the Department has offered shifting justifications for
Ames’s demotion, which in her view is evidence that the Department’s stated reasons did not
 No. 23-3341                   Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.                         Page 6

actually motivate its decision to demote her. Ames is right that the Department has offered
different reasons for her demotion at different times. When Walburn and Gee told Ames about
her demotion, they refused to provide any reason for it. Later, before the EEOC, the Department
said that it demoted Ames because her position was at-will and that it could remove her at any
time without cause. And Gies, in his deposition, said that Ames was not the right person to
fulfill his “vision” of exceeding PREA minimum standards rather than just meeting them.
Absent some conflict between an employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse
employment decision, however, that the employer offers more than one of them—even at
different times—is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact as to pretext. Miles, 946 F.3d at
891. Hence this contention likewise falls short.

       Finally, the Department’s process for promoting Stojsavljevic to the PREA Administrator
position was not so irregular as to create a genuine issue as to pretext. On that issue Ames
provides no evidence other than her own experience in applying for the PREA Administrator
position. Such evidence is insufficient. Nor were Ames’s qualifications for that position so
“objectively superior” to Stojsavljevic’s as to create a genuine issue as to pretext. The district
court was correct to grant summary judgment.

                                         *         *   *

       The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
 No. 23-3341                  Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.                        Page 7

                                     _________________

                                      CONCURRENCE
                                     _________________

       KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the court’s opinion in full, but write to
express my disagreement with the rule that we must apply here. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 bars employment discrimination against “any individual”—itself a phrase that is entirely
clear—“because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).    Thus, to state the obvious, the statute bars discrimination against “any
individual” on the grounds specified therein. Yet our court and some others have construed this
same provision to impose different burdens on different plaintiffs based on their membership in
different demographic groups. Specifically—to establish a prima-facie case when (as in most
cases) the plaintiff relies upon indirect evidence of discrimination—members of “majority”
groups must make a showing that other plaintiffs need not make: namely, they must show
“background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer
who discriminates against the majority.” Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255
(6th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up) (quoting Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67
(6th Cir. 1985)).

       Our panel is bound to apply this rule here, since Ames claims that the Department
discriminated against her because of her status as a heterosexual. As a member of a majority
group, Ames must make the requisite showing of “background circumstances”; and, as our
opinion explains, she has not done so. Meanwhile, nobody disputes that Ames has established
the other elements of her prima-facie case, which would be enough to establish that case if she
were a gay person. And Ames’s evidence of pretext is notably stronger for this claim than for
her sex-discrimination one: twice in one year the Department promoted an arguably less-
qualified gay employee in a manner adverse to Ames; and in promoting one of those employees,
Yolanda Frierson, the Department circumvented its own internal procedures because Frierson
lacked the minimum qualifications for the job. Thus—based our application of the “background
circumstances” rule alone—we deny Ames a jury trial on this claim.
 No. 23-3341                    Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.                          Page 8

       The “background circumstances” rule is not a gloss upon the 1964 Act, but a deep scratch
across its surface. The statute expressly extends its protection to “any individual”; but our
interpretation treats some “individuals” worse than others—in other words, it discriminates—on
the very grounds that the statute forbids. Yet five circuits (including our own) have adopted the
“background circumstances” rule since the D.C. Circuit first adopted it in 1981. See Parker v.
Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Murray, 770 F.2d at 67; Mills
v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 455-57 (7th Cir. 1999); Hammer v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d
722, 724 (8th Cir. 2004); Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1992).
Two circuits have expressly rejected this rule. See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 157-62
(3d Cir. 1999); Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011).
Five others simply do not apply it. See Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir.
2000); Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80-81 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2009);
Lightner v. City of Wilmington, N.C., 545 F.3d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 2008); Byers v. Dallas
Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000); Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d
1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010).

       Respectfully, our court and others have lost their bearings in adopting this rule. If the
statute had prescribed this rule expressly, we would subject it to strict scrutiny (at least in cases
where plaintiffs are treated less favorably because of their race). And nearly every circuit has
addressed this issue one way or another. Perhaps the Supreme Court will soon do so as well.