Court Opinion

ID: 9688896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:11:08.99637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:59.592233
License: Public Domain

*171M. S. Coleman, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). Both as a matter of public policy and of law, I dissent as to part II of Justice Swainson’s opinion but concur in part I.
The majority decision does violence to the original purpose of the Second Injury Fund, which was to encourage hiring of the handicapped. Under its interpretation, a person who "always had” poor uncorrected vision in one eye comes to his employment with a "first injury”, although the corrected vision is within normal range. The Court creates a new class of handicapped persons, the foreseeable result of which will militate against hiring people wearing eyeglasses or contact lenses.
My dissent in Hilton v Oldsmobile Division of General Motors Corp, 390 Mich 43; 210 NW2d 316 (1973), anticipated this extension of that decision. Hilton was based upon Lindsay v Glennie Industries, Inc, 379 Mich 573; 153 NW2d 642 (1967), which was designated a case of first impression. This designation and treatment ignored the long line of cases which related loss of vision to loss of ability to carry out employment.1 In short, corrected vision was the standard by which "loss of an eye” was measured. The Lindsay Court took the course leading in the opposite direction from established law.
It is agreed that this case affords a logical extension of Lindsay. The result in this case demonstrates how illogical the Lindsay analysis is and reinforces my conclusion in Hilton that "we are headed on a course which is not in the best interest of either employers or employees and which has serious implications for all”.
*172In its opinion reversing the referee’s award, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board quoting from Cline v Studebaker Corp, 189 Mich 514; 155 NW 519; 1916C LRA 1139 (1915) said:
"We agree with the opinion of the Court in Cline, supra, that 'the use of glasses is a very ordinary occurrence both by the young and the old.’ Vision in excess of twenty percent of normal, when corrected by the use of eyeglasses, does not meet the statutory test of industrial loss of vision.”
I also agree.
It could be argued that employers might actually seek to hire a person with poor but correctable eyesight, thus insuring that he or she would pass directly to the Second Injury Fund upon the employee’s first work-related "loss”. The corrected eyesight would not affect the ability to work and one of the injuries specified in MCLA 418.521; MSA 17.237(521) would relieve the employer of his obligation to pay full benefits. "Good for both”, it may be argued.
However, this approach ignores basic economics and is likely to lead to a heady if short-term illusion of "something for nothing”. It does not take a degree in economics to see the fallacy of this "take what you can now and worry about the future later” approach.
The Attorney General, for Second Injury Fund, noted that the fund is supported by a levy on insurance carriers based upon fund expenditures and proceeded to say:
"As insurance companies have to pay more, either in benefits or in assessments, their charge to employers also increases. Self-insured employers must bear increases directly. Thus, every employer and insurance *173carrier is affected by laws and court decision which define total and permanent disability. In order to keep their cost down, the employers must screen out job applicants presenting medical problems which are likely to result in extensive workmen’s compensation payments and medical expenses. If 20/200 uncorrected vision is held to be equivalent to loss of an eye for workmen’s compensation purposes, regardless of the fact that such vision may be corrected to normal or nearly so with glasses, then employers will be forced to view individuals with such vision as already blind in at least one eye and consider this factor in hiring. Individuals with poor, uncorrected vision would have to be considered handicapped despite the fact they could function normally with glasses.”2 (Emphasis added.)
Small businesses and especially those with a small margin of profit experience the greatest impact. Large or small, the cost of doing business in Michigan already has been much affected by our extensions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. When the burdens become too great, businesses terminate, move to another state, cut employment, raise costs to the consumer (including the workman) within the limits of competitive realities or take other steps to curtail costs. In this case, the initial probability is that those hiring will make a predetermination of uncorrected "sight” or "vision” and the result will be hiring of fewer persons within that new class of "the handicapped.”3
1 would reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board as to part II.

 See my analysis of the pre-Lindsay case law in Hilton which disclosed "the fact that in each case of partial loss of vision, the Court analyzes the claim for the 'loss of an eye’ upon the basis of the 'vision’ or 'sight’ remaining with the use of a lens and/or glasses.”

 See similar concerns indicated in the dissent in Komendera v American Bar & Cabinet Manufacturers, 390 Mich 305; 212 NW2d 173 (1973).

 At least two Justices of this Court and attorney for plaintiff fall within that new class.