Court Opinion

ID: 9869949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:44:11.798611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:42.736950
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, JUDGE:
CONCURRING IN PART/DISSENTING IN PART
¶ 1 I agree that Appellant’s first degree murder conviction should be affirmed. Unfortunately, I also agree that Appellant’s life without parole sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. This is because Appellant was not given the type of individualized sentencing proceeding now mandated by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 *965U.S. -, 136 S.Ct 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 699 (2016). After Miller and Montgomery, States must ensure that defendants facing a life without parole sentence for homicides committed before the age of eighteen (18) receive an individualized sentencing procedure that considers evidence relating to their youth and immaturity at the time of the offense. I disagree, however, with the majority’s approach on remand.
¶ 2 In this case, the trial court disallowed Appellant’s attempt to present evidence to the jury of mitigating circumstances related to his youth and background. Moreover, trial counsel did not present such evidence at formal sentencing to supplement the information contained in the presentence investigation report. 22 O.S.2011, § 982(D) (“If either the defendant or the district attorney desires, a hearing shall be set by the court to allow both parties an opportunity to offer evidence proving or disproving any finding contained in a [PSI] report, which shall be a hearing in mitigation or aggravation of punishment.”) (emphasis added). Hence, the trial court was given no reason at formal sentencing to deviate from the jury’s sentencing recommendation. I agree with Judge Lumpkin that the jury’s recommendation as to punishment is just that—a recommendation the trial court should follow absent extenuating circumstances—and that the trial court here retained authority to deviate from the jury’s recommended sentence to address the constitutional issues raised by Miller and Montgomery.
¶ 3 However, the majority opinion wrongly expands the requirements of Miller and Montgomery by mandating that the jury on remand find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant is irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible. The Supreme Court has not adopted a formal fact-finding requirement nor mandated any formal framework for sentencing. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736; Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2471, 2476. We must be mindful that the Court in Miller specifically addressed the constitutionality of a mandatory life without parole sentencing scheme, which Oklahoma does not have. In finding that the “Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison .without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”, Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, the Court reasoned in part that:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he, cannot usually extricate himself—-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and. peer pressures may have affected him.
Id., 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (emphasis added).
¶ 4 Notably, the Court in Montgomery did not expand the Court’s holding in Miller. At issue in Montgomery was whether Miller should be applied retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 726. Granted, it is undeniable that the Court utilized Montgomery to provide additional guidance-albeit in dicta, see People v. Holman, 405 Ill.Dec. 371, 58 N.E.3d 632, 642-43 (Ill. App. 2016)—regarding the implications of Miller, which this Court, cannot discount despite Oklahoma’s non-mandatory life without parole sentencing option.
¶ 5 Had evidence of mitigating circumstances like that discussed in Miller and Montgomery been presented either at trial or formal sentencing, I do not believe there would be any constitutional infirmity with Appellant’s sentence, Such evidence would have allowed the jury and the trial court to consider in determining sentence whether the murder of Christopher Lane was a product of the transient “immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness, and recklessness” of Appellant’s youth, Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2669, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993)), or whether Appellant is “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). That is all Miller and Montgomery require. The jury was not required to make specific factual *966findings on these issues—let alone make such findings beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not impose that level of exacting certitude for the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances leading to the ultimate selection of sentence in a capital case. See, e.g., Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, ¶ 84, 293 P.3d 198, 220. I fail to see why we would require this for the noncapital sentencing decision in this case. I therefore dissent to the majority’s approach in this regard.
¶ 6 Whether this Court agrees with it or not, the handwriting is on the wall. Clarifying Miller in Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court clearly interprets the Eighth Amendment to prohibit life without parole in the majority of juvenile homicide offender cases, restricting imposition of this sentence to the rare juvenile “whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. Thus, this matter highlights the need in cases of this type for the sentencer to be presented with and consider mitigating circumstances like that discussed in Miller and Montgomery. Ultimately, legislative intervention is needed in this area to address the appropriate procedural framework. See 22 O.S.2011, § 975. One relatively straightforward option would involve implementation of a trial proceeding in which relevant mitigating evidence is presented to the jury during the sentencing portion of a bifurcated trial proceeding.
¶ 7 Based upon the foregoing, I concur in part and dissent in part to the majority’s analysis.