Court Opinion

ID: 9581399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:31.562664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:55.117645
License: Public Domain

Deen, Judge,
dissenting. I concur in the dissent of Chief Judge Felton and for additional reasons I further dissent.
Chief Judge Benjamin Harvey Hill vividly outlines what I believe to be the applicable law in the case of Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Hudson, 10 Ga. App. 169, 171 (73 SE 30): “The courts generally have found some difficulty in holding the master liable for a homicide intentionally committed by his servant, in the absence of any express command on the part of the master, and the majority of adjudications seem to favor the theory that in the absence of express authority the master is not liable in damages for a deliberate, intentional, and wilful homicide committed by his servant. 1 Thomp. Neg. § 571. But, whatever may be the adjudications in other jurisdictions on this subject, it is settled by the statute law of this State that the master would be liable where the homicide was committed by the servant in the prosecution and within the scope of the master’s business, whether it was actually committed by the command of the master, or was the result of negligence on the part of the servant, or his voluntary act. . .
“The master is not an insurer against wrongs perpetrated by his servants. It would be unjust to hold him responsible for these wrongs, unless they were done by the servant while he was in the performance of the master’s business and was acting within the scope of his employment. The rule of liability in the case is based upon the old maxim, ‘Qui facit per alium facit per se,’ and if the servant, instead of doing that which he is employed to do, does something which he is not employed to do at all, and the act is not properly within the scope of his employment, it can not be said that the master does the act by his servant. Mr. Thompson, in his work on Negligence (section 526), lays down the test by which to determine whether a servant acts within the scope of his employment. ‘The test is not that the act of the servant was done during the existence of the employment, —that is to say, during the time covered by the employment, ■ — but *507whether it was done in the prosecution of the master’s business; whether the servant ivas at that time engaged in serving his master; for, if the servant steps aside from his master’s business, for however short a time, to do an act not connected with such business, the relation of master and servant is for the time suspended, and the servant alone is responsible for his act committed by him during this period.’ In the case of Savannah Electric Co. v. Hodges, 6 Ga. App. 470 (65 SE 322), Judge Russell, speaking for this court, quoted approvingly the foregoing test of liability of the master for the servant’s act, and held that ‘if the servant steps aside from his master’s business, for however short a time, to do an act entirely disconnected from it, and injury results to another from such independent voluntary act, the servant may be liable, but the master is not liable.’
“The decision of this court in the case just cited would seem to control the case now under adjudication, for the facts of the two cases are not so different as to afford substantial room for .any different application of the rule of law. The question here to be decided, under this rule of law, is whether the killing of Hudson by Jackson was done by Jackson in the prosecution or furtherance of his employer’s business, or whether in the killing Jackson turned aside from his master’s business and committed an act wholly disconnected therefrom, and for the consequences of which he, and not his master, would be liable. While repeated adjudications in analogous cases leave the solution of this question not entirely free from doubt, still it seems to us, restricting our view to the facts of this transaction, and not looking beyond, or permitting ourselves to become perplexed in the maze of contradictory rulings, that we should adopt, as the most reasonable conclusion, the view that when Jackson committed this homicide he had turned aside for that purpose from his master’s business and was engaged in his own personal matter. Jackson made against Hudson, an implied accusation of improper conduct. Hudson resented this accusation by in effect denouncing Jackson as a liar, and Jackson immediately ran to his box on the engine, secured his pistol, and instantly shot and killed Hudson. He shot Hudson, because Hudson *508called him a liar. It was to resent what he deemed a personal insult. He did not shoot and kill Hudson because in his opinion Hudson had been guilty of cutting off the air-brakes and thus interrupting him in the proper discharge of his official work; and, even if he had done this, it is not clear that the master would have been liable. The killing was due solely to an insulting epithet used by Hudson. Jackson was acting for his master in delivering the cars to the Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company, and if Hudson had interfered with this work, and Jackson had resented such interference, and made an assault and battery, or killed Hudson for such interference, it might be claimed that the tort was committed by Jackson in connection with his master’s business; but it can not be doubted that the killing of Hudson was due solely to the insulting epithet, and that but for it the homicide would not have occurred. If the truth of this proposition is not sufficiently apparent from the mere statement of the facts, we are sure it can not be rendered any more manifest by argument, or by citation of authority. We therefore do not deem it profitable to extend the discussion on this point. See Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568 (28 SE 251, 40 LRA 95).
“The cases relied upon by counsel for the defendant in error —Savannah Electric Co. v. Wheeler, 128 Ga. 550 (58 SE 38, 10 LRA (NS) 1176), and Mason v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 135 Ga. 741 (70 SE 225, 33 LRA (NS) 280)— are distinguished by their facts from the present case. Both of these were cases of passengers, where the rule of extraordinary diligence applies, and the master is under a duty through his agents of personally protecting the passenger from any insult either by one of his own employees or by third persons. In the Wheeler case the conductor drew a pistol and fired at a passenger, missing the passenger and killing an innocent woman passing on a public street through which the car was running, because the passenger had asked the conductor for his change. The Supreme Court held that this tort of the conductor was within the scope of his business in collecting fares. In the Mason case the passenger was drunk and disorderly, and used foul and abusive language to the conductor, which brought on a *509difficulty, and the conductor was in the discharge of his duty in attempting to eject the disorderly passenger.” (Emphasis supplied.) The allegations in the case sub judice show that Thompson and Bowers engaged in an argument with Hunter, left and armed themselves with weapons and returned to the home of Hunter for the purpose of killing him and Thompson shot him with a pistol are analogous to the above cited case when Jackson engaged in an argument with Hudson and “Jackson immediately ran to his box on the engine, secured his pistol, and instantly shot and killed Hudson.”
“In explanation of the rule, this court long ago held, as the result of the authorities examined and cited, that when the servant is in the performance of his master’s orders or authorized acts, and in the doing thereof conducts himself so negligently or unskilfully that injury results to another, then the doctrine of respondeat superior applies, and the master will be liable in an action on the case; but that, for the acts of the agent wilfully and intentionally done without the command and authorization of the master, the servant, and not the master, is liable; and that the rule has no application when the servant actually wills and intends the injury, or steps aside from the purpose of the agency committed to him, and inflicts an independent wrong.” (Emphasis supplied.) Goodloe v. Memphis & Charleston R. Co., 107 Ala. 233, 240 (18 S 166, 29 LRA 729, 54 ASR 67). “There can be no agency in the perpetration of a crime, misdemeanor, or any unlawful act, and all parties participating therein are principals.” 2 CJS 1039, 1040, Agency, § 12. “An agent cannot be said to be acting within the scope of his agency if the act complained of if done by the master would be unlawful.” Porter v. South Penn Oil Co., 125 W. Va. 361, 364 (24 SE2d 330). Parry v. Davison-Paxon Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 55 (73 SE2d 59), holds: “The allegations of the petition negate the essential fact necessary to hold the master liable for the tortious acts of the servant, for the allegations clearly show that the assault was not committed in furtherance of the master’s business, but, rather, clearly show the affair to be a personal matter between the manager and the plaintiff.” In Savannah Electric Co. v. Hodges, 6 Ga. App. 470, 475 (65 SE 322), it was held, *510“Up to this time water had been used to put out a fire, but, no water being present, Spahn decided to try compressed air. He put out the fire, but the cracking noise attracted Nichols and other employees. Nichols directed Spahn to go into the engine to adjust a valve, and held the air hose to put out any fire which might appear. As Spahn ascended the engine Nichols turned the air pipe on him, causing him to jump and the bystanders to laugh. Nichols then turned the hose on Currie, so that the air struck him about the buttocks. The air passed through his rectum, perforated his bowels, and caused his death. Currie’s widow brought suit against the company. . . The fact that Nichols, while holding the hose, conceived the purpose of using it and did use it upon the employees, in sport, is undisputed, and is wholly inconsistent with any assumption that he was then in any way attempting to serve the defendant. His act was a clear departure, for the time, from that service, and the quickness with which it was done can not be made the test. If the turning aside from the -master’s business be only for an instant, so that it be complete, the authorities agree that there is no liability on his part for the defendant’s act.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I would affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.