Court Opinion

ID: 9494719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:44:45.377229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:34.412306
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
Concurring and Dissenting:
I concur in the determination that Gua-gliardo was properly convicted. However, I dissent from the determination that certain of the supervised release terms are improper.
First, although Guagliardo assérts that a prohibition on his possession, use, etc., of pornography is overly broad, it seems to me that we foreclosed that argument when we held that a prohibition on possession of “sexually stimulating” material was a proper condition of supervised release. See United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (9th Cir.1998). While the attack there was on the basis of the First Amendment and on a lack of reasonable relationship to rehabilitation, we could hardly have turned the attack aside if we found the condition overly broad or unintelligible. Sexually stimulating” is no narrower than and may well be broader.
Second, the proximity of residence requirement is not too broad at all because Guagliardo could not be trapped into a violation of his supervised release terms. His residence must be approved by the probation officer in the first place, and it is plain that he could not be in violation of the terms if he obtained that approval, as he is required to do. In many ways, the term is less restrictive than one which would set a certain rigid number of feet. It will allow the officer to both reasonably accommodate Guagliardo and protect young children. Leaving some definition up to the probation officer is not error. See United States v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262, 1265 n. 2 (9th Cir.1989). Should the probation officer go too far, the district court can correct that in due course. See United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir.1982).
Finally, I agree that the search term is proper, if not read and implemented literally. However, some care will be required in its implementation. It indicates that a search may take place “with or without reasonable or probable cause.” I am not at all certain that a search without any reasonable cause is necessarily proper,1 and the Supreme Court has recently declined to address that question. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,-n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587, 592 n. 6, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, -n. 6 (2001).2
Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct 3164, 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987).

. In Knights, as here, the search term provided for a search with or without reasonable cause.