Court Opinion

ID: 9753965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:36:20.152869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:45.742177
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge, concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, namely, that the repeal of the criminal statute of limitations never extinguished the civil right to support, but only the ancillary criminal enforcement remedy. However, I feel it is necessary to add a comment concerning the effect of the statute of limitations upon an illegitimate child’s right to collect support.
As the majority notes in its chronology of the law, a mother of a child born out of wedlock was required to institute criminal charges within two years of the birth of *280the child, if paternity was in dispute, prior to the institution of a civil suit for support. Therefore, if a mother failed to bring such criminal charges, or if the Commonwealth on the mother’s behalf was not vigorous in prosecuting such cases, the child’s right to receive support could be foreclosed. However, no such limitation was placed upon a legitimate child, who could bring an action for support until the age of eighteen.
There can be no doubt that both the mother and father of a child born out of wedlock have the duty to support such child. Commonwealth v. Rebovich, 267 Pa.Super. 254, 406 A.2d 791 (1979). To subject a child born out of wedlock to a limitation period, however reasonable, is to limit that child’s unqualified right to receive support from his father. As other jurisdictions have found, such limitation upon an illegitimate child’s right to receive support violates the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution. See: State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. West, 378 So.2d 1220 (Fla.1979); State of Montana, Department of Revenue, Department of Social Rehabilitative Services v. Wilson, 634 P.2d 172 (Mont.l981); Stringer v. Dudoich, 92 N.M. 98, 583 P.2d 462 (1978); County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C.App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980). As the court stated in Cogdell, supra, “Those jurisdictions which have invalidated such statutes [of limitations] on Equal Protection grounds have generally held that they constitute an overly broad restriction on the rights of illegitimates which in fact does result in an impenetrable barrier to support actions.” Id. at 187, 264 S.E.2d at 820. In Stringer, supra, the court held that “if there is no limitation on the right of a legitimate child to seek support from his parent, then there can be no limitation on the same right for an illegitimate child.” Id. 92 N.M. at 100, 482 P.2d at 464.
By Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 106, No. 46, § 2, eff. June 27, 1978, 62 P.S. § 2043.31 was amended to provide for a new, civil means of securing enforcement of an illegitimate child’s right to receive support. However, a six-year limita*281tion period was placed upon the institution of such causes of action, whereas no comparable time limit was established with respect to causes of action brought by legitimate children. This matter, however, is for the attention of the Legislature.
These comments notwithstanding, I agree with the majority’s position that, in the case at bar, appellant’s civil action for support, brought within six years of the birth of her child, was not barred. Accordingly, I concur.