Court Opinion

ID: 9779891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:55:44.956759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:56.481661
License: Public Domain

DARDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I would respectfully dissent from the majority.
The facts, as recounted by the majority, arguably could support their conclusion that the jury could not have reasonably disbelieved that Coleman's use of deadly foree was necessary. On the other hand, however, I believe that the totality of the evidence and cireumstances surrounding this case support the reasonable conclusion that the jury just could not reach a unanimous verdict as to whether Coleman was justified in using deadly force against Dye at the time of the incident. As a result, I believe the majority's conclusion impermis-sibly impinges upon the jury's role as the trier of fact.
This case represents a relatively rare moment where the entire incident was preserved for the trier of fact, i.e., the jury, to decide what happened. Specifically, the activity in the yard next to the studio *665before the shooting and during the shooting of Dye by Coleman was captured on video by a surveillance camera. This video was shown to the jury. The area shown may be described as an upside-down "L"with the horizontal leg parallel to the back of a house; the vertical leg on the right, parallel to the studio.
For at least five minutes before Dye's arrival, Coleman is pacing alongside the studio with a handgun in one hand and a cell phone in his other, apparently talking on the cell phone.3 Jermaine is in the area primarily beyond the view of the camera, but at the end of the vertical leg past the studio. From the opposite end of this "L" (at the left end of the horizontal leg), Dye is seen coming around the corner of the house; he has a gun in his hand but it is pointed downward toward the ground. Dye walks on the diagonal directly toward his son, with his eyes fixed upon his son. Dye is not walking toward the door of the studio; nor does he appear to be looking at Coleman. At this point in time, Coleman is near the right angle corner of the "L." 4 As Dye moves diagonally past him, Coleman appears to step toward Dye, raise his gun, and shoot Dye, who immediately begins to fall to the ground. Coleman shoots Dye a second time.5 It is at this point that Coleman "turned to Jermaine." (Tr. 330). Coleman sees that Jermaine's gun, which had been under his long athletie-type shirt and in its holster, is "pointed at [Coleman]"; and Coleman shoots Jermaine. (Tr. 330).
Consistent with the video, Dye testified that as he walked across the yard, his "focus" was on "[his] son," and that he was going "towards [his] son." (Tr. 185). He further testified that he "asked" his son, "where that n**ger at or where Omar at." Id. Coleman also testified that when Dye walked into the yard, he was "looking at" his son, and "was not looking at [Coleman]" when he said, "F**k that. Where the n**ger at? " (Tr. 327).
A defendant who raises the claim of self-defense must show three facts: "(1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he acted without fault; and (8) he had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm." Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind.2000). It is the State's burden to negate "at least one of the elements of the defendant's self-defense claim." Id.
I believe that the evidence must be considered sequentially and separately as to each count-first, the evidence as to shooting of Dye, and then the separate evidence as to the shooting of Jermaine. After reviewing the video that the jury saw, I am of the opinion that the testimony at trial and the video evidence could support the reasonable inference that Coleman was not in fear for his life as Dye was walking past him, while also supporting the reasonable inference that Coleman was in fear for his life when facing Jermaine's drawn weapon. Such analysis supports my conclusion that we simply cannot know what determination the jury reached, or failed to reach.
Because a "jury's deliberations are secret and not subject to outside examination," Yeager v. United States, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 2368, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009), we cannot know why the first jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the attempted murder of Dye. It may be that one of the twelve jurors believed that the State had failed to negate Cole*666man's claim of self-defense as to Dye; but it may also be that there were eleven jurors who believed that the State had negated Coleman's claim of self-defense; and, as a result, the jury could not arrive at a unanimous verdiet for conviction, as required by law. In other words, the jury hung as to the charge of attempted murder, requiring a mistrial and resulting retrial on that count. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that issue preclusion applies here, and I would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Coleman to be re-tried for the attempted murder of Dye.

. Coleman testified that he had placed calls to several people during this time.

. It seems undisputed that Jermaine's gun is holstered at this time.

. Coleman admitted that he fired the second shot at Dye "as he was going to the ground." (Tr. 308, 329).