Court Opinion

ID: 9862277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:05:48.913781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:56.530228
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s decision to accept the rationale and reasoning applied in Budney and to reject the reasoning set forth in Thompson and, therefore, respectfully dissent. The majority claims the federal statute contains an “absolute prohibition against recovery from any person not covered by an express exception.” 358 Ill. App. 3d at 232. I find such an interpretation ignores the federal mandate that “the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual” at the appropriate time prescribed by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (2000). As the majority notes, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) defines the term “estate” and further allows for a state to refine that definition. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2000); 358 Ill. App. 3d at 231. As the majority more than adequately and fairly sets forth the reasoning and rationale behind the Budney and Thompson decisions, it would be redundant to engage in a lengthy analysis of the two differing schools of thought here. Suffice it to say, I believe the Thompson court was correct in holding that the expansive definition of “estate” contained within the federal statute is broad enough to encompass a claim against the estate of a deceased spouse such as Ms. Tutinas in this matter. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court and, therefore, respectfully dissent.