Court Opinion

ID: 9745957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:44:39.371476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:06.736424
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SLATER, dissenting: The majority finds that admitting patients to St. Joseph’s hospital and treating them there is “practicing medicine” but the defendant is not engaging in a “medical practice” in doing so. Even if one accepts the majority’s restrictive definition of a medical practice as encompassing only the physical assets “such as offices, patient files, furniture, medical equipment, instruments, professional books, fixtures, and buildings” (337 Ill. App. 3d at 1079), I fail to see how the hospital escapes this definition. After all, the hospital certainly has all of the physical assets referred to by the majority, in abundance. Indeed, in explaining how a “medical practice” differs from “practicing medicine,” the majority states that the former is “a distinct entity, the business of which is to medically treat patients.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1079. This definition precisely describes a hospital. See Berlin, 179 Ill. 2d at 17, 688 N.E.2d at 113 (hospitals are authorized, even mandated, by statute to provide medical services). Nevertheless, the majority curiously concludes that “the hospital is not a medical practice.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1079-80. I would find, at a minimum, that St. Joseph’s hospital is engaging in a “medical practice.” Under the noncompetition agreement, the defendant is prohibited not only from engaging in a medical practice but also from “being otherwise affiliated with any person or entity engaged in the type of business prohibited by this Agreement in the Geographic Area.” In my view, any reasonable interpretation of this provision bars the defendant from maintaining staff privileges at the hospital. Accordingly, I would reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.