Court Opinion

ID: 9388650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 07:08:16.807882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.616285
License: Public Domain

In The

                                 Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               __________________

                               NO. 09-21-00380-CR
                               __________________

                     DEREK DEVONE COBBS, Appellant

                                          V.

                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 435th District Court
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 19-06-08928-CR
__________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Derek Devon Cobbs appeals his conviction for continuous sexual

abuse of a child, namely J.P. 1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b). A jury found

Cobbs guilty and assessed punishment at life in prison. Cobbs appeals his conviction,

raising eight issues, complaining about the denial of his motion for continuance,

      1We    use initials to refer to the alleged victim, a minor child, and pseudonyms
to refer to the child’s family members. See Tex. Const. art. 1, § 30(a)(1) (granting
crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
dignity and privacy throughout the criminal judicial process”).
                                               1
denial of his challenge for cause, admission of Zoom testimony, ineffective

assistance of counsel, and the sufficiency of the evidence. As discussed below, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                 THE EVIDENCE

      In October 2019, a grand jury indicted Cobbs for indecency with a child. See

id. § 21.11(a)(1). The 2019 indictment alleges that Cobbs:

      on or about June 08, 2017, and before the presentment of this
      indictment, in the County and State aforesaid, did then and there, with
      intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, engage
      in sexual contact with J.P., a child younger than 17 years of age, by
      having child touch the defendant’s genitals[.]

In November 2021, a grand jury reindicted Cobbs for continuous sexual abuse of a

child. See id. § 21.02. The indictment alleges that Cobbs:

      on or about June 08, 2019, and before the presentment of this
      indictment, in the County and State aforesaid, did then and there, during
      a period that was 30 or more days in duration, to-wit: from on or about
      June 8, 2017 through June 8, 2019, when the defendant was 17 years of
      age or older, commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against J.P., a
      child younger than 14 years of age, namely, Indecency with a Child by
      engaging in sexual contact with J.P. by having said child touch the
      Defendant’s genitals with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual
      desire of the Defendant[.]

      Jose Alaniz, a former Investigator Specialist with Child Perspective

Investigation, testified that in June 2019, he investigated an allegation of abuse

involving Cobbs. Alaniz explained that Mother reported the abuse, and he

interviewed the children and set up J.P.’s forensic interview.

                                         2
      Julie Pilgrim, a forensic interviewer at Children’s Safe Harbor, testified that

she conducted J.P.’s forensic interview. Pilgrim testified that J.P. reported that in

different incidences, Cobbs, her stepfather, looked at her feet while exposing and

rubbing his penis, and he put her feet on both sides of his penis and used her feet to

rub his penis. Pilgrim testified that J.P. explained that he would stop when “white

Stuff” came out of his penis. Pilgrim testified that J.P., who was twelve when the

abuse occurred, reported that the incidents happened at least twice per week in

different locations, including the stairs, and J.P. stated the first incident happened

when she was in fourth grade and the last incident happened in her current house,

either in Cobbs’s bedroom or the laundry room. Pilgrim explained that J.P. reported

that Cobbs sent her text messages containing a money sign and a question mark and

paid to see her feet.

      Mother testified that in 2011, when J.P. was four, she moved in with Cobbs,

and in 2017, right before J.P. finished fourth grade, they moved to a new house.

Mother testified that Cobbs had a “porn addiction[,]” and a sexual attraction to feet,

and he attended sexual anonymous meetings. Mother explained that Cobbs

masturbated while rubbing her feet and used her feet to masturbate. Mother testified

that in 2019, J.P. told her that Cobbs had been inappropriate with her and had played

with her feet while he played with his private parts and that the first incident occurred

in their old house. Mother testified that Cobbs told her he had done something

terrible and ruined the family and threatened to commit suicide. Mother testified that
                                           3
she made a report and gave J.P.’s phone to the police, and she identified J.P and

Cobbs in photographs and provided the police a copy of text communications

between J.P. and Cobbs.

      J.P. testified that when she was ten years old in fourth grade and before they

moved to their current house, Cobbs began to act “inappropriate” towards her by

showing his penis, and the abuse stopped at the end of her sixth-grade year when she

was twelve. J.P. explained that the incidents occurred about twice a week, and Cobbs

would expose and touch his penis and ask to see her feet. J.P. testified that Cobbs

would stop when he ejaculated and “[w]hite stuff[]” would go on her feet or the

floor. J.P. further testified that Cobbs rubbed his penis on her lower back and “many

times[]” he put her feet on his penis and “rub them back and forth.” J.P. explained

that the incidents occurred over a long period of time and for a period longer than

thirty days. J.P. also explained that Cobbs sent her text messages with a money sign

and question mark when he wanted her to go into his room and show him her feet,

and he gave her twenty dollars or less and told her to delete the messages. J.P.

testified that she did not tell Mother because she was afraid her siblings would move,

but she told Mother because she became afraid of Cobbs. J.P. took screen shots of

the text messages Cobbs sent her, which were published to the jury.

      Detective Joe McGrew of the Conroe Police Department testified that he

investigated Cobbs’s case and attended J.P.’s forensic interview. Detective McGrew

interviewed Mother, who provided clothing and granted permission to search her
                                          4
home for possible DNA evidence on the carpets. Detective McGrew explained that

Cobbs exhibited suspicious behavior and prevented him from entering the home, and

when he frisked Cobbs for safety, he observed Cobbs had two cell phones, and

Mother claimed that one of the cell phones was hers. Detective McGrew testified

that Cobbs also claimed ownership, and when he asked Cobbs for the phone to

determine the owner, Cobbs gave him the phone and Mother opened the phone and

showed him a picture of a young person’s feet. Detective McGrew further testified

that he determined the phone belonged to Cobbs, and he seized Cobbs’s phone and

gave it to the crime scene investigator, because based on information he obtained

from J.P.’s forensic interview, he had reason to believe it contained evidence of a

crime. Detective McGrew explained that he obtained a search warrant for Cobbs’s

cell phone, and the crime scene investigator downloaded photographs from the cell

phone. Detective McGrew also explained that after Mother identified the people and

criminal elements in the photographs, Cobbs was arrested.

      Detective McGrew testified that based on his reasonable belief that there may

be biological evidence in the home, the crime lab took samples from the home, and

one sample of carpet from the stairs was AP positive, meaning there were enzymes

consistent with semen fluid. Detective McGrew explained that due to an oversight

on his part, the samples were not DNA tested. Detective McGrew also obtained

evidence from J.P.’s damaged cell phone, which contained a text conversation

                                        5
between J.P and Cobbs, and Mother provided screen shots of that same text

conversation from J.P.’s new cell phone.

      Officer Stoney Cook, the crime scene investigator with the Conroe Police

Department, testified that he extracted data from Cobbs’s cell phone and gave the

data to other investigators to evaluate the extraction and run reports. The summary

extraction report was admitted into evidence.

      Investigator Jerry Thomas of the Montgomery County District Attorney’s

Office testified that he is assigned to Human Trafficking and Internet Crimes Against

Children and works in the Forensics Lab. Investigator Thomas testified that he

assisted in the examination of Investigator Cook’s extraction which included images

of J.P. that were identified as concerning. Investigator Thomas explained that one

image depicted a male holding a penis in his hand above two feet, and the person

was wearing joggers that were identified as J.P.’s. Investigator Thomas explained

that another image depicted the same feet and penis, but the penis appeared to be

touching or resting on the feet. Investigator Thomas testified that the extraction also

included a text message between Cobbs and J.P.

      A.C. testified that Cobbs was married to her sister, and in July 2003, she was

sixteen years old when she visited Cobbs and her older sister in Austin. A.C. testified

that during her visit she was injured in a car accident, and while she was laying on

the couch in the living room, Cobbs positioned her feet together, put his penis

between her feet, and “started entering [her] feet in an out.” A.C. explained that she
                                           6
was scared and pretended to be sleeping, and Cobbs stopped after he heard a noise

from the bedroom. A.C. also explained that she did not tell her sister about the

incident until a couple of years later, and after her sister told her about the allegations

against Cobbs, she spoke with the detective and agreed to testify.

      Cobbs’s sister testified she and Cobbs have a close relationship, and she

described Cobbs as having the perfect family. Cobbs’s sister explained that Mother

had told her about Cobbs’s pornography addiction, but she was not aware that he

had any obsession with feet. Cobbs’s sister characterized J.P.’s relationship with

Cobbs as being “[a] bit disrespectful[,]” and she wondered why J.P. was acting that

way. Cobbs’s sister testified that Cobbs sent her a text message telling her that, “‘I

have lost everything important to me due to sexual immorality[.]’” Cobbs’s sister

also testified that Cobbs was worried about going to jail.

       Cobbs denied having a foot fetish, taking pictures of his penis with J.P.’s feet,

and using J.P.’s feet to masturbate his penis. Cobbs testified that J.P. lied to the jury

because he disciplined her. Cobbs also denied putting his penis between A.C.’s feet

and claims she lied.

                                      ANALYSIS

      Again, in eight issues, Cobbs complains about the denial of his motion for

continuance, denial of his challenge for cause, admission of Zoom testimony,

ineffective assistance of counsel, and the sufficiency of the evidence.

                                            7
                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      We address Cobbs’s eighth issue first because it challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict and, if sustained, it would result in

rendition of a judgment of acquittal. See Price v. State, 502 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. A person

commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if:

      (1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person
      commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the
      acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and

      (2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse,
      the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is a child younger
      than 14 years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of
      the victim at the time of the offense.

Act of May 26, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 1038, § 2, 2017 Tex. Sess. Laws 4079,

4079 (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b)). Section 21.02 of the

Penal Code defines “act of sexual abuse” as including, among other things, an act

that constitutes the offense of “indecency with a child under section 21.11(a)(1), if

the actor committed the offense in a manner other than by touching, including

touching through clothing, the breast of a child[.]” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §

21.02(c)(2). A person commits the offense of indecency with a child if the person

engages in sexual contact with a child younger than 17 years of age or causes the

child to engage in sexual contact. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” means the

following acts, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of

                                          8
any person: (1) any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of

the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child; or (2) any touching of any part

of the body of a child, including touching through clothing, with the anus, breast, or

any part of the genitals of a person. Id. § 21.11(c). The State need not prove the exact

dates of the abuse, only that “there were two or more acts of sexual abuse that

occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration.” Brown v. State,

381 S.W.3d 565, 574 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); Lane v. State, 357

S.W.3d 770, 773–74 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see also

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(d) (“[M]embers of the jury are not required to agree

unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the

defendant or the exact date when those acts were committed.”).

      In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give deference to the factfinder’s responsibility to fairly

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. If the record

contains conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved such

facts in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. See Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 899 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,
                                           9
778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury as factfinder is the sole judge of the weight of

the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, and it may believe all, some, or none

of the testimony presented by the parties. See Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App.

1995). The appellate court does not reweigh or determine the credibility of the record

evidence, nor does it substitute its own judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams

v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

      “Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: ‘Circumstantial

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.’” Clayton, 235

S.W.3d at 778 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). Each fact need not point directly

and independently to the guilt of the defendant, as long as the cumulative force of

all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Temple v.

State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citations omitted); Hooper, 214

S.W.3d at 13; Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The

testimony of a child victim, standing alone and without corroboration, is sufficient

to support a conviction for indecency with a child. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

38.07(a), (b)(1) (providing that child’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a

conviction for a sexual offense when the child is under the age of seventeen at the

time of the alleged offense); Chasco v. State, 568 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2019, pet. ref’d).
                                         10
      The 2021 indictment alleges that between June 8, 2017, and June 8, 2019,

Cobbs committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against J.P. by having J.P. touch

his genitals with the intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire. J.P. added that

“many times[]” Cobbs put her feet on his penis and would “rub them back and forth.”

J.P. explained that the incidents occurred over a long period of time and for a period

longer than thirty days. J.P.’s testimony alone was sufficient to support the verdict.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1); Chasco, 568 S.W.3d at 258.

J.P.’s testimony was corroborated by pictures and messages on Cobbs’s phone and

Mother’s testimony that Cobbs had a sexual attraction to feet and used her feet to

masturbate.

      The jury, in its role as factfinder, could have found J.P.’s testimony credible.

The jury could have believed J.P.’s testimony that the abuse started when she was in

fourth grade, ended when she was in sixth grade, and occurred about twice a week.

The jury also could have believed that the alleged offenses occurred prior to the date

of the indictment and continued over a two-year period. Based on the evidence at

trial, the jury could have concluded that Cobbs, “during a period that is 30 or more

days in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.” See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 21.02(d); Lane, 357 S.W.3d at 774. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury’s authority to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, we conclude that

a reasonable factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense
                                         11
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1);

Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at

778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Chasco, 568 S.W.3d at 258; Lane, 357 S.W.3d at

774. We overrule issue eight.

                             Motion for Continuance

       In issue one, Cobbs complains the trial court erred by denying his motion for

continuance because he was not served with a copy of the 2021 Reindictment at least

ten days before trial as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 27.12 (allowing defendant ten days to file written pleadings

in cases where the defendant is entitled to be served with a copy of the indictment),

28.10 (allowing the defendant not less than ten days to respond to an amended

indictment). Cobbs argues that the impaneling of the jury had to be outside the ten

days, because otherwise the State could reindict a case the day before a jury was

impaneled as long as the jury was not sworn for an additional ten days, thereby

denying the defendant an adequate time to prepare a trial strategy before beginning

jury selection. The State argues Cobbs waived his complaint because his motion did

not specifically urge article 27.12, and regardless he had adequate time to prepare a

defense.

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance for an abuse of

discretion. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To establish

an abuse of discretion, a defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced by the
                                         12
denial of his motion due to his counsel’s inadequate preparation time. Id.; Heiselbetz,

906 S.W.2d at 511. A bare assertion that counsel did not have adequate time to

prepare a defense does not alone establish prejudice. Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 764.

      Cobbs filed an Objection to the Reindictment, arguing that the new charge

should have been considered a new indictment and received its own cause number

because it concerns a different offense and range of punishment. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc Ann. art. 28.10. The trial court conducted a hearing on Cobbs’s Objection

to the Reindictment, during which Cobbs reurged his objection under article 28.10

and argued that the amended indictment for continuous sexual abuse of a child

violated his rights by depriving him of enough time to prepare his defense. See id.

The trial court explained that article 28.10 addressed an amended indictment, but

this case concerned a reindictment, which is a new indictment under the same

existing cause number. The trial court denied Cobbs’s Objection to the Reindictment

based on article 28.10 and determined that Cobbs had more than ten days to prepare

for the 2021 Reindictment.

      While Cobbs complains that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial

court’s ruling deprived him of adequate time to prepare a defense, Cobbs failed to

establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his request for a

continuance. The trial court noted that counsel had been on the case more than 400

days and had access to the discovery involving the same sexual acts, dates, and same

victim alleged in the November 2021 Reindictment. The record shows the November
                                          13
2021 Reindictment alleged the same elements as the June 2019 Information charging

Cobbs with continuous sexual abuse of a child and alleging that Cobbs committed

two or more acts against J.P., namely indecency with a child, by engaging in sexual

contact and having J.P. touch his genitals. The record also contains a June 2019

Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest in which Detective McGrew averred that Mother

reported that Cobbs masturbated in J.P.’s presence while looking at her bare feet.

Detective McGrew testified that J.P. reported that Cobbs would hold her bare feet

against his penis and use her feet to masturbate. J.P. reported that the activity started

when she was ten and ended when she was twelve and occurred in her bedroom and

on the stairs of the residence. Detective McGrew stated that several samples from

stains in J.P.’s room and the stairs tested positive for seminal fluid. Detective

McGrew also averred that Cobbs voluntarily gave him a phone, which Mother

identified as Cobbs, and Mother displayed a photograph from the phone that she

identified as J.P.’s feet and Cobbs’s penis. Detective McGrew stated there was

probable cause to believe Cobbs committed the felony offense of continuous sexual

abuse of a child and requested a warrant authorizing Cobbs’s arrest.

      Additionally, in September 2021, the State provided notice of extraneous acts

it intended to use during trial. The notice stated that on many occasions between

2013 and 2019, Cobbs committed the offense of indecency with a child against J.P.

by making J.P.’s feet contact and/or masturbate Cobbs’s sexual organ. The notice

indicated that Cobbs’s cell phone contained two photographs of his sexual organ and
                                           14
J.P.’s feet and messages asking J.P. if she wanted to make twenty dollars and to

delete the messages. Therefore, the record shows that defense counsel had prior

notice of the allegations contained in the 2021 Reindictment as early as June 2019.

      We conclude that Cobbs failed to show that he was actually prejudiced by his

counsel’s alleged inadequate time to prepare his defense. See Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at

764; Heiselbetz, 906 S.W.2d at 511. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Cobbs’s Objection to the Reindictment and his

request for a continuance to have additional time to prepare a defense. We overrule

issue one.

                                Challenge for Cause

      In issue two, Cobbs complains the trial court erred by denying his challenge

for cause to venireperson 27, who allegedly made statements indicating a bias or

prejudice that led to the dismissal of eleven other panel members. The State argues

Cobbs failed to establish the trial court’s denial of his challenge for cause was

harmful because he did not use a peremptory strike on the complained-of juror or

request an additional strike.

      The record shows the State inquired as to whether the prospective jurors could

follow the one-witness rule and convict based on the testimony of one witness if they

believed the child witness beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the elements of the

offense, and twelve prospective jurors, including venireperson 27, raised their cards.

The record also shows that when defense counsel asked if anyone felt like they could
                                         15
not give her client the benefit of the presumption of innocence, eleven prospective

jurors raised their card, including venireperson 27. At the end of jury selection when

defense counsel asked the prospective jurors if there was anything they needed to

share, venireperson 27 made the following statement:

      I feel from my experience, the children will not tell a lie normally. Lots
      of time, they won’t. They will be honest. So, if we start accusing kids
      telling a lie, there must be a reason for you to accuse them. So, at times
      if you start accusing kids telling a lie, there is a reason they are telling
      this lie. So, I just view the question you had over there and present over
      there just seems try to guide me into something. I don’t feel comfortable
      with it.

      During the bench conference, defense counsel moved to strike thirteen

prospective jurors for cause based on the one-witness rule, and the State had no

objection. The trial court granted defense counsel’s challenges for cause except for

venireperson 27 without stating a reason. Later, when defense counsel renewed her

objection to venireperson 27 regarding the presumption of innocence and not being

able to say the defendant was not guilty at the time of having heard no evidence, the

State opposed the challenge and argued that the nature and context of the “scaled

question” gave an improper definition of the law. The trial court denied defense

counsel’s renewed objection to venireperson 27. After the trial court seated the jury,

which included venireperson 27, the trial court asked the parties if they had any

objections after looking at their work product and the seated jury, defense counsel

stated “[n]ot in that regard,” but that she had a Batson challenge.

                                          16
      The record shows that Cobbs used all ten of his peremptory strikes on various

prospective jurors, and he did not use a peremptory strike on venireperson 27, ask

the trial court to grant him additional strikes, or identify venireperson 27 as an

objectionable juror who sat on the jury. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

35.15(b). To preserve error for a trial court’s erroneous denial of a challenge for

cause, Cobbs must show that he asserted a clear and specific challenge for cause,

that he used a peremptory challenge on the complained-of venireperson, that his

peremptory challenges were exhausted, that his additional strike was denied, and

that an objectionable juror sat on the jury. See Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 807

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Burg v. State, No. 09-16-00200-CR, 2018 WL 1747393, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2018, pet. granted) (mem. op.), aff’d, 592 S.W.3d 444,

449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Cobbs failed to preserve his complaint for our review.

See Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 807; Burg, 2018 WL 1747393, at *2; Andrus v. State, 495

S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.). We overrule issue two.

                                 Zoom Testimony

      In issue three, Cobbs complains the trial court erred by allowing a witness to

appear by Zoom in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States and

Texas Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Cobbs argues the trial court failed

to make a specific necessity finding as required by Haggard v. State, 612 S.W.3d

318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The State argues that unlike Haggard, Cobbs failed to

object to the remote testimony and thus waived this complaint for our review.
                                        17
      “[T]he right of confrontation is a forfeitable right–not a waivable-only right–

and must be preserved by a timely and specific objection at trial.” Deener v. State,

214 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted); see

Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An appellant fails to

preserve error when he does not object to the remote testimony of a State’s witness.

See Broussard v. State, No. 09-20-00259-CR, 2022 WL 2056388, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont June 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(citing Jones v. State, Nos. 05-21-00019-CR & 05-21-00021-CR, 2022 WL 854915,

at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding that appellant failed to preserve error because he did not

object to the remote testimony)).

      The record shows that before Investigator Cook testified, the trial court stated

that the State and Cobbs agreed that Investigator Cook could testify via Zoom due

to medical related necessity. The record further shows that Cobbs did not object to

Investigator Cook testifying remotely. We conclude that since Cobbs failed to object

to Investigator Cook’s remote testimony, he failed to preserve error. See Tex. R.

App. P. 33.1; Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 347; Broussard, 2022 WL 2056388, at *7; Jones,

2022 WL 854915, at *5; Deener, 214 S.W.3d at 527. We overrule issue three.

                              Ineffective Assistance

      In issues four, five, and six, Cobbs complains his counsel was ineffective by

failing to: (1) object to evidence obtained from the alleged unlawful seizure of his
                                         18
cellphone; (2) object to the search warrant which was obtained after the alleged

illegal search and seizure of this cellphone; and (3) to know the predicate for

character testimony. Cobbs argues that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s

deficient performance resulted in an unfair trial.

      To establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, Cobbs must

demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984). The party alleging ineffective assistance has the

burden to develop facts and details necessary to support the claim. See Jackson v.

State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A party asserting an ineffective-

assistance claim must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Thompson v. State, 9

S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted). An appellant’s failure

to make either of the required showings defeats the claim on ineffective assistance.

Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

      The right to effective assistance of counsel ensures the right to reasonably

effective assistance and does not require that counsel must be perfect. See Ingham v.

State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Isolated failures to object

ordinarily do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. Ordinarily, on

direct appeal, the record will not have been sufficiently developed to demonstrate in
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the appeal that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under the Strickland

standards. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Before we denounce trial counsel’s actions as ineffective, counsel should normally

be given an opportunity to explain the challenged actions. Goodspeed v. State, 187

S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citation omitted). When counsel has not

been given an opportunity to explain the challenged actions, we will find deficient

performance only when the conduct was “‘so outrageous that no competent attorney

would have engaged in it.’” Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001)).

      The record does not indicate that Cobbs filed a motion for new trial to allege

ineffective assistance. The record is silent as to trial counsel’s tactical and strategic

decision making. Moreover, Cobbs did not demonstrate that, but for counsel’s

alleged errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Graves v.

State, 310 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, pet. ref’d). In addition,

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is not apparent from the record. See Freeman v. State,

125 S.W.3d 505, 506–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Cobbs cannot defeat the strong

presumption that counsel’s decisions during trial fell within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. Since nothing

in the record supports the conclusion that trial counsel’s complained-of conduct was

so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it, we overrule

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Cobbs’s fourth, fifth, and sixth issues. See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. Having

overruled each of Cobbs’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                   _________________________
                                                      W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                          Chief Justice

Submitted on March 15, 2023
Opinion Delivered April 19, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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