Court Opinion

ID: 9838021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-03 08:10:22.588802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:58.976781
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Rendered and Memorandum Majority Opinion filed August 29,
2023. Concurring Opinion to Follow.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-19-00372-CR
                             NO. 14-19-00373-CR

                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
                                       V.

                      JASPER ROBIN CHEN, Appellee

          On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 16
                           Harris County, Texas
                Trial Court Cause No. 2233753 & 2250796

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this appeal, which returns to us on remand from the court of criminal
appeals, we reconsider a facial challenge to Penal Code section 42.07(a)(7),
otherwise known as the electronic-harassment statute, in light of recent opinions
from the court of criminal appeals. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a)(7). We
conclude that the challenged version of the electronic-harassment statute is not
facially unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
render judgment that appellee Jasper Chen’s application for pre-trial habeas-corpus
relief is denied.

                                  I.     BACKGROUND

       The charging instrument in this case alleged that:

       on or about April 15, 2018 continuing through October 29, 2018,
       [appellee] did then and there unlawfully, with intent to harass, annoy,
       alarm, abuse, torment and embarrass another, namely, [the
       complainant], send repeated electronic communications, to-wit:
       electronic mail and instant message in a manner reasonably likely to
       harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment and embarrass.
       Appellee filed an application for writ of habeas corpus and motion to quash
the information, arguing that the statute under which he was charged, Penal Code
section 42.07(a)(7) (the “electronic-communications-harassment statute”), is
facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him under the First
Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.09 (“If
a person is confined on a charge of misdemeanor, he may apply to the county
judge of the county in which the misdemeanor is charged to have been committed,
or if there be no county judge in said county, then to the county judge whose
residence is nearest to the courthouse of the county in which the applicant is held
in custody.”). Specifically, he argued it was vague and overbroad. The trial court
granted the application, a writ of habeas corpus was issued, and appellee and the
State appeared for a hearing on the application. After the hearing, the trial court
concluded the statute is facially unconstitutional and granted habeas-corpus relief
and the motion to quash the information, thereby discharging the appellee. See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.40. This appeal followed.1

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         In a unitary notice of appeal, the State appealed both “from the trial court’s order
dismissing the information in cause number 2233753,” which has been assigned case number
14-19-00373-CR by this court, “and from its order granting habeas relief in cause number
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         Upon original submission, we concluded that the electronic-harassment
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. See
State v. Chen, 615 S.W.3d 376, 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Ex parte Chen, 665 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. Crim. App.
2022). But after we issued our judgments, the court of criminal appeals decided Ex
parte Barton, 662 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) and Ex parte Sanders, 663
S.W.3d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022), and in both of those related cases, the court of
criminal appeals determined that earlier versions of the electronic-harassment
statute were not facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.

         In light of its decisions in Barton and Sanders, the court of criminal appeals
vacated the judgment in this case and remanded the case back to us for
reconsideration.

                                    II.    ANALYSIS

         The State asserts that the trial court erred by granting the motion to quash
and granting appellee’s requested habeas relief because the electronic-harassment
statute is constitutional. Specifically, the State argues the electronic-harassment
statute: (1) does not implicate the First Amendment; (2) satisfies intermediate
scrutiny because it serves a legitimate state interest; and (3) is not overbroad or
vague. The State additionally claims that the present case is controlled by our
court’s recent decision in Ex parte Ordonez, No. 14-19-01005-CR, 2023 WL
4711526, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 25, 2023, no pet. h.). We
agree.

         In Ordonez, this court concluded that the electronic-harassment statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. See Ex parte

2250796,” which has been assigned case number 14-19-00372-CR by this court.

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Ordonez, No. 14-19-01005-CR, 2021 WL 245219, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication), vacated,
No. PD-0145-21, 2022 WL 16626255 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2022) (per
curiam). Just as here, the court of criminal appeals granted the State’s petition for
discretionary review in Ordonez, vacated this court’s judgment, and remanded the
case to this court for further consideration in light of Sanders and Barton.

      On remand in Ordonez, our court concluded that the 2017 version of the
electronic-harassment statute does not implicate the First Amendment, despite its
expanded definition of “electronic communication”:

      This expanded definition may have broadened the types of electronic
      communications that can be used to complete the offense, but the
      gravamen of the offense itself did not change. As with the 2001
      version in Barton and the 2013 version in Sanders, the gravamen is
      still the repeated sending of electronic communications in a manner
      reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass,
      or offend another. That “repeated sending of electronic
      communications” is noncommunicative conduct, even when such
      conduct is accompanied by speech—just as the Sanders court
      explained with its examples involving e-mails and computer code.
      Accordingly, we conclude that the 2017 version of the electronic
      harassment statute does not implicate the First Amendment.

Ex parte Ordonez, 2023 WL 4711526, at *3 (internal quotation omitted).

      Because the First Amendment was not implicated, our court then reviewed
Ordonez’s constitutional challenge under the rational-basis test. See id. Under that
test, the statute is presumed to be valid, and a reviewing court must uphold the
statute if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Barton, 662
S.W.3d at 884. Our court noted that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting
the substantial privacy interests of individuals from harassment, and that the 2001
version of the electronic-harassment statute served that interest. Ex parte Ordonez,

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2023 WL 4711526, at *3. Accordingly, because “[t]he same reasoning applies here
to the 2017 version of the electronic harassment [statute,]” we concluded that the
electronic-harassment statute was presumed to be valid. Id.

      In Ordonez, we also observed that because the First Amendment was not
implicated, Ordonez could not maintain an overbreadth challenge to the
electronic-harassment statute. See id. (quoting Barton, 662 S.W.3d at 885
(“Since § 42.07(a)(7) does not regulate speech, and therefore does not implicate
the free-speech guarantee of the First Amendment, the statute is not susceptible to
an overbreadth challenge.”)).

      As for Ordonez’s vagueness challenge, because the First Amendment was
not implicated, we observed that Ordonez was required to show that the 2017
version of the electronic-harassment statute was unduly vague as applied to her
own conduct. See Ex parte Ordonez, 2023 WL 4711526, at *3 (citing Barton, 662
S.W.3d at 885). But because she did not present any argument regarding her own
conduct, we concluded that her vagueness challenge failed. See Ex parte Ordonez,
2023 WL 4711526, at *3.

      Following     our   precedent    in       Ordonez,   we   conclude   that   the
electronic-harassment statute does not implicate the First Amendment. Likewise,
we presume the electronic-harassment statute is valid because the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Because the First Amendment is not
implicated, appellee cannot maintain an overbreadth challenge to the
electronic-harassment statute. See Barton, 662 S.W.3d at 885; Ex parte Ordonez,
2023 WL 4711526, at *3. Also, appellee’s vagueness challenge fails because he
does not present any argument regarding his own conduct. See Barton, 662 S.W.3d
at 885; Ex parte Ordonez, 2023 WL 4711526, at *3.

      Through supplemental briefing, appellee urges our court—despite Sanders
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and Barton—to rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Counterman v.
Colorado,     No.   22-138     (U.S.    June       27,   2023)   to   conclude   that   the
electronic-harassment statute is unconstitutional. However, this court has already
considered and rejected this argument in Ordonez. See Ex parte Ordonez, 2023
WL 4711526, at *4 (“Counterman did not specifically examine whether the
sending of repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to
harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another was
noncommunicative, as the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Barton and
Sanders.”).

      We therefore sustain the State’s sole issue.

                                 III.    CONCLUSION

      The trial court reversibly erred in granting appellee’s application for pretrial
habeas-corpus relief and granting the motion to quash in each of these two criminal
cases. Therefore, in each of the appeals, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
render judgment that appellee’s application for pretrial habeas-corpus relief be
denied. We reinstate the information in trial court cause number 2233753 so that
the trial court may conduct further proceedings on this information.

                                         /s/       Charles A. Spain
                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Hassan (Hassan, J., concurring
with concurrence to follow).
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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