Court Opinion

ID: 9963587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:28:08.77415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:53.296623
License: Public Domain

J-S11015-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RON LARKIN                                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1975 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 12, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0016013-2010

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RON LARKIN                                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2109 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 12, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0016014-2010

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 25, 2024

       Ron Larkin appeals from the order dismissing his “Petition to Arrest

Judgment of Sentence for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Fraud,”

which the court treated as an untimely third petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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      This Court previously summarized the background of this matter as

follows:

      On January 3, 2012, [Appellant] entered a negotiated plea
      agreement and pled guilty to two counts of first[-]degree murder
      and a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1) of the Uniform Firearms
      Act [in two criminal cases]. In accordance with the terms of the
      plea agreement, the Commonwealth did not seek the death
      penalty. The trial court sentenced [Appellant the same day] to
      consecutive terms of life imprisonment on the murder bills and a
      concurrent prison term of three-and-a-half to seven years of
      incarceration on the firearms bill.

      [Appellant] did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal.
      Instead, he timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court
      thereafter appointed counsel to represent [Appellant]. PCRA
      counsel filed a brief pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550
      A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc), stating that the issues
      raised in [Appellant’s] pro se petition were without merit and that
      there were no additional issues which could be raised in an
      amended PCRA petition. On April 9, 2014, after reviewing the
      record and the pleadings, the PCRA court dismissed the petition
      without an evidentiary hearing, holding that the petition had no
      merit.

      [Appellant] appealed. On November 12, 2015, [this] Court
      affirmed the dismissal of the PCRA petition. [Appellant] did not
      seek further review by the Supreme Court.

      On or about June 29, 2018, [Appellant] filed a “Petition for Writ of
      Habeas Corpus” in which he alleged [that] the trial court and PCRA
      court lacked personal and/or subject matter jurisdiction. On
      August 20, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed the . . . PCRA petition
      as untimely.

Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 354 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc)

(cleaned up). On appeal, we concluded that the relief requested in the petition

for writ of habeas corpus was cognizable under the PCRA, and affirmed on the

basis that the petition was untimely. Id. at 355-56. Appellant sought relief

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from our High Court, which denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth

v. Larkin, 251 A.3d 773 (Pa. 2021).

      On June 17, 2022, Appellant filed the instant petition at both of his

underlying criminal cases. Therein, he asserted that the trial court “knowingly

and intelligently committed fraud in bringing charges against [him] without

having subject matter jurisdiction[,]” and accordingly that the judgments

against him were void.       Petition to Arrest Judgment of Sentence and

Conviction, 6/17/22, at 1, 3. Notably, the petition did not address the PCRA

or purport to raise any of its timeliness exceptions.    Treating the filing as

Appellant’s untimely third PCRA petition, the court issued notice of its intent

to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant responded, arguing that

the court could modify its sentencing orders at any time in accordance with

42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, concerning modification of orders, particularly in response

to his allegations of fraud. The court ultimately dismissed the petition without

a hearing through a single order entered in both criminal cases.

      Appellant timely filed pro se notices of appeal in both cases. The PCRA

court did not direct Appellant to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant did not do so.       The court issued a Rule

1925(a) opinion addressing its denial of Appellant’s petition. We consolidated

the appeals sua sponte. Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

“Did the common pleas [court] procured [sic] [Appellant’s] conviction by way

of fraud[?]” Appellant’s brief at 3 (cleaned up).

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      Initially, we must first consider whether the court properly treated his

petition as one filed pursuant to the PCRA. In that vein, we have stated that

“[i]t is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving

post-conviction relief.”     Larkin, 235 A.3d at 355 (citation omitted).

“Regardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a petition filed after

a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief

contemplated by the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Hagan, 306 A.3d 414, 421-

22 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Torres,

223 A.3d 715, 716 (Pa.Super. 2019) (reiterating that “so long as a pleading

falls within the ambit of the PCRA, the court should treat any pleading filed

after the judgment of sentence is final as a PCRA petition”) (citations omitted).

      In his petition, Appellant requested that his convictions be voided,

asserting that the trial court committed fraud in knowingly hearing the

criminal charges while it lacked jurisdiction. As recounted above, our Court

considered and rejected a nearly identical contention on appeal from the

denial of Appellant’s second PCRA petition, which he titled a petition for writ

of habeas corpus.     See Larkin, 235 A.3d at 355 (“Because [Appellant]’s

jurisdictional challenge is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA court did not

err in treating his writ of habeas corpus as a PCRA petition”). Just as before,

Appellant’s attempt to bypass the PCRA by raising this issue in a different kind

of petition is to no avail. The relief sought remains cognizable under the PCRA

and, therefore, no matter what he calls the underlying petition, it is subject to

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the strictures of the PCRA.    We therefore readily conclude that the court

properly treated the underlying petition as a PCRA petition.

      Accordingly, we address the propriety of the PCRA court’s dismissal

order as follows: “On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of

review calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is

supported by the record and free of legal error. We apply a de novo standard

of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.”          Commonwealth v.

Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 567 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

      Before turning to the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must determine

whether his petition was timely, since neither this Court nor the PCRA court

has jurisdiction to consider an untimely PCRA petition. See Commonwealth

v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1030-31 (Pa.Super. 2019). In this respect, the

PCRA provides as follows:

      Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

            (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
            interference by government officials with the presentation
            of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
            Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
            States;

            (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
            unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
            ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

            (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
            recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
            the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period

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              provided in this section and has been held by that court to
              apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). Any petitioner invoking one of these exceptions must

file a petition “within one year of the date the claim could have been

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Additionally, the petitioner “bears the

burden   of    pleading   and   proving   an   applicable   statutory   exception.”

Commonwealth v. Pew, 189 A.3d 486, 488 (Pa.Super. 2018).

      Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in February 2012, after

he elected not to appeal his convictions to this Court. There is no dispute that

the instant petition was facially untimely when it was filed.           Therefore,

Appellant was required to plead and prove one of the enumerated exceptions

to the PCRA’s time-bar in his petition before the court could consider the

merits of his claims.

      The PCRA court held that Appellant neglected to do so here, stating

thusly: “Instantly, [Appellant] failed to acknowledge, let alone meaningfully

address[,] the PCRA’s statutory time-bar. Instead, he ignored the time-bar

and solely discussed his substantive claim.        This kind of presentation fell

woefully short of [Appellant]’s obligation to explain how one of the three . . .

statutory exceptions applied.” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/23, at 2.

      Upon review of the certified record, we agree with the court that

Appellant did not articulate or raise in his petition any of the PCRA’s timeliness

exceptions, or otherwise take any steps to overcome that jurisdictional hurdle.

Nor did he seek leave to amend in order to articulate a timeliness exception

after the court notified him that it intended to treat his filing as a PCRA

                                      -6-
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petition. Since Appellant did not meet his burden, we conclude that his third

PCRA petition was untimely and that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits

of the arguments raised therein.       See Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1031.

Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 4/25/2024

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