Court Opinion

ID: 9796849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:06:47.662422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:50.591625
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court judgment. I write separately, however, because I cannot join in the majority’s decision to decide this case on the basis of a statute that does not apply to it.
The majority resolves whether plaintiff can recover uninsured motorist benefits from defendant by applying ORS 806.130 to her claim for those benefits. It reasons that that statute, if it applies to defendant, would require defendant to provide no more than the $25,000 in uninsured motorist benefits to plaintiff. Because plaintiff already has received $50,000 in those benefits from her own insurance carrier, she is not entitled to receive additional benefits from defendant.
The problem with that approach is that it decides the case on the basis of a statute that does not apply to defendant, ORS 806.130, while ignoring the statute that does, ORS 278.215. Admittedly, the parties did not identify ORS 278.215 as the controlling statute, but we are not free to ignore that statute simply because the parties have not cited it. See Miller v. Water Wonderland Improvement District, 326 Or 306, 309 n 3, 951 P2d 720 (1998) (“[T]he parties may not prevent a court from noticing and invoking an applicable statute by relying only on other sources of law.”). Accordingly, I believe that we must decide the case under ORS 278.215. That statute provides, as relevant, that
“[a]ny local public body, as defined in ORS 30.260, which establishes a self-insurance fund under ORS 30.282 for or on account of the operation of motor vehicles within the local public body’s control, shall provide the uninsured motorist coverage required under ORS 742.500 to 742.504 and may provide the personal injury protection benefits required under ORS 742.520 to 742.542.
“(3) The uninsured motorist coverage provided under this section shall be excess over any other collateral benefits to which an injured person is entitled, including, but not *104limited to, other uninsured motorist coverage, insurance benefits, governmental benefits or gratuitous benefits.”
ORS 278.215(2), (3). Defendant’s self-insurance fund is subject to this statute.1 It follows, therefore, that, contrary to defendant’s position, defendant’s self-insurance fund must provide uninsured motorist coverage “for and on account of the operation of motor vehicles within [defendant’s] control.”
Because of the basis on which I believe that we should decide this case, we need not decide what monetary limit applies to the uninsured motorist coverage that ORS 278.215 requires defendant to provide. I note, however, that the limit depends on the language of ORS 278.215, rather than on the language of ORS 806.130 on which the majority relies. See 176 Or App at 97-98.
Furthermore, I am uncertain whether the interpretation that the majority gives to ORS 806.130 is correct. When the latter statute is viewed in context with its predecessor, ORS 486.570 (1981),2 and with the uninsured motorist coverage statutes, ORS 742.500 to ORS 742.504, it appears to set the limit of uninsured motorist coverage for a self-insurer that is subject to ORS 806.130 and that does not *105specify an amount of uninsured motorist coverage at the liability limit set by the self-insurer for its fund. Both ORS 806.130(3)3 and ORS 742.502(2)(a)4 specify that the people responsible for selecting the amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided by a self-insurer or a motor vehicle insurer cannot select an amount that is less than the minimum amount required by ORS 806.070 for liability coverage, which is now $25,000 for injury or death to one person in any one accident. See ORS 806.070(l)(a), (2)(a). However, ORS 742.502(2)(a) also provides that a
“motor vehicle bodily injury liability policy shall have the same limits for uninsured motorist coverage as for bodily injury liability coverage unless a named insured in writing elects lower limits.”
If a motor vehicle liability insurance policy contained no provision for uninsured motorist coverage, the coverage would be imposed by statute, and it would be imposed at the liability limit for the policy. See ORS 742.038; ORS 742.502(2)(a).
I am not sure that the result would be different for a self-insurer that is subject to ORS 806.130 and that fails to agree to provide uninsured motorist coverage.5 Such a self-insurer is required to agree
*106“to pay the same amounts with respect to an accident occurring while the [self-insurance] certificate is in force that an insurer would be obligated to pay under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy.”
ORS 806.130(3). An insurer that failed to provide uninsured motorist coverage under its policy would be required to pay an uninsured motorist claimant up to the liability limit specified in the policy, so a self-insurer that failed to provide uninsured motorist coverage might be required to pay such a claimant up to the liability limit of its coverage as well.61 am equally unsure whether the result would be different under ORS 278.215(2) for a self-insured local public body such as defendant that failed to include uninsured motorist coverage as a component of its self-insurance fund.7
As I noted earlier, however, I do not believe that we need to decide what limit applies to the uninsured motorist coverage that ORS 278.215(2) requires defendant to provide through its self-insurance fund. Because defendant’s self-insurance fund does not, by its terms, include uninsured motorist coverage, the coverage that does apply to defendant is the coverage required by law. ORS 278.215(2) requires *107defendant to provide uninsured motorist coverage for motor vehicles within its control. As discussed below, I would conclude that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to support a finding that her vehicle was under defendant’s control. Consequently, her vehicle is not one that is subject to uninsured motorist coverage under defendant’s self-insurance fund.
The trial court decided plaintiffs declaratory judgment claim for uninsured motorist coverage by granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. See ORCP 21B. In evaluating such a motion, “we accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, Stringer v. Car Data Systems, Inc., 314 Or 576, 584, 841 P2d 1183 (1992), recons den 313 Or 308, 844 P2d 905 (1993), but disregard any allegations that are conclusions of law, Tydeman v. Flaherty, 126 Or App 180, 182, 868 P2d 755 (1994).” Huang v. Claussen, 147 Or App 330, 332, 936 P2d 394, rev den 325 Or 438 (1997); see also Walthers v. Gossett, 148 Or App 548, 558, 941 P2d 575 (1997) (plaintiff must do more than state “bald legal conclusion [s]” in order to provide a factual predicate for her claim for relief). In Huang, the plaintiff alleged a claim for breach of contract under a creditor-beneficiary theory. We held that the defendants were entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff had failed to allege any facts showing that the parties to the contract intended to benefit the plaintiff. Huang, 147 Or App at 333-35. Plaintiffs complaint suffers from a similar defect on the issue whether her vehicle was subject to defendant’s control.
As noted, ORS 278.215(2) requires defendant to provide uninsured motorist coverage under its self-insurance fund for all vehicles within its control. In her complaint, plaintiff does not specifically allege that the vehicle was in defendant’s control. Moreover, the facts that she alleges cannot rationally lead to that conclusion.8 Neither we nor the Supreme Court has determined what “control” means for *108purposes of ORS 278.215. However, definitions from other contexts indicate that the term “control” contains an element of authority or domination that is absent from the facts alleged in this case. For instance, in construing a statute addressing the control of real property by public utilities, the Supreme Court quoted the definition of “control” in Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary and concluded that “control” in that context meant “the power or authority to guide, manage or direct [such property], or even [the power to] * * * restrain another entity’s domination of that property.” Western Generation Agency v. Dept. of Rev., 327 Or 327, 332-33, 959 P2d 80 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In a case that is more factually similar to this one, we construed the meaning of “borrow” in an insurance policy and held that it contained an element of control that the trial court could properly conclude was missing in light of the evidence before it. Gold v. Casserly Landscape, Inc., 121 Or App 62, 64-65, 853 P2d 1341 (1993) (Gold II). The vehicle at issue in Gold II was registered as a personal vehicle by a corporate officer named Casserly. Casserly had repeatedly used the vehicle for corporate business, and, when he did so, the corporation reimbursed him for expenses related to that use. Additionally, Casserly often lent the vehicle to Vandercook, another officer of the corporation, for transportation to and from work. Gold v. Casserly Landscape, Inc., 104 Or App 313, 315, 801 P2d 844 (1990), on recons 107 Or App 441, 812 P2d 33, rev den 312 Or 234 (1991) (Gold I). Vandercook was using the vehicle in the course of his employment for the corporation when he struck and killed plaintiffs decedent. One of the corporation’s insurance policies covered nonowned vehicles, and it defined “non-owned” to exclude vehicles that were leased or borrowed. Plaintiff sued the insurance company on that policy, alleging that the vehicle was “non-owned,” in other words, that it had not been borrowed by the corporation and therefore was covered under the policy. Id. In Gold II, we held that the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the corporation had not borrowed the vehicle, in spite of the fact that Vandercook had used it for the corporation’s benefit. Gold II, 121 Or App at 64-66. In so holding, we noted that
*109“[t]he ordinary meaning of‘borrow’ includes not only that one receives the benefit of the object’s use but also that the borrower receives temporary possession, dominion over or control of the object’s use. Some element of substantial control is generally understood to be included within the meaning of the act of borrowing.”
Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
To survive defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff would have had to allege facts that, if true, could lead a reasonable person to conclude that defendant controlled plaintiffs van while plaintiff used it for defendant’s benefit. Our analysis in Gold II indicates that use and control are separate issues, and, therefore, the fact that plaintiff used her van for defendant’s benefit would not be sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude that defendant controlled the van.9
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that she “was engaged in defendant’s business” in that she “was driving her privately owned vehicle on approved school business” and that she was “an agent of [defendant] for the transportation of student, staff and non-staff luggage.” She further alleged that defendant was “required or instructed” by the camp to transport its luggage separately from the students, that defendant “did not have the staff or employees available to effect the separate luggage transport,” that defendant lacked the funds to hire separate luggage transport, and that defendant specifically asked plaintiff to transport the luggage after she volunteered to serve as a chaperone for the field trip. The above allegations say nothing about whether defendant had the right to control plaintiffs van, for example, by determining who could drive it, how it would be driven or used, what could be carried in it, or where and when it would be fueled. Based on our determination in Gold II that control and use are separate questions, we know that the fact that plaintiff used her van for defendant’s benefit cannot in and of itself be used to establish that defendant had the requisite right to *110control the van. In this case, plaintiff has alleged only the use of her van for defendant’s benefit; nothing in her complaint tends to suggest that defendant controlled her van during that use.
In summary, I would conclude that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because plaintiff did not allege facts tending to show that defendant controlled plaintiffs van. Consequently, defendant was not required by ORS 278.215(2) to provide plaintiff with uninsured motorist benefits from its self-insurance fund. Although I disagree with the majority as to the analysis that it uses to address plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim, I agree with the result that it reaches on that claim as well as with its resolution of plaintiffs contract claim.

 Defendant is a local public body as defined in ORS 30.260, which defines “[plublic body” to include school districts and a “[l]ocal public body” as “any public body other than the state.” ORS 30.282(1) provides, in turn, that the
“governing body of any local public body may procure insurance against liability of the public body and its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties, and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, may establish a self-insurance fund against such liability of the public body and its officers, employees and agents.”
Defendant’s self-insurance fund is a fund established under ORS 30.282(1), and it insures defendant and its officers, employees and agents against liability arising from the operation of motor vehicles.

 ORS 486.570 (1981) is the direct predecessor of ORS 806.130. Compare ORS 486.570 (1981) with ORS 806.130. It allowed a person who had more than 25 registered vehicles to apply to the state Insurance Division for a certificate of self-insurance. Under the statute, each applicant had to
“agree to pay the same amounts with respect to an accident occurring while the certificate is in force that an insurer would be obligated to pay under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy, including uninsured motorist coverage and liability coverage.”
ORS 486.570(2) (1981).

 ORS 806.130(3) provides that a self-insurer who obtains a self-insurance certificate from the state Department of Transportation must
“[a]gree to pay the same amounts with respect to an accident occurring while the certificate is in force that an insurer would be obligated to pay under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy, including uninsured motorist coverage and liability coverage to at least the limits specified in ORS 806.070.”

 ORS 742.502(2)(a) provides, as relevant, that a
“motor vehicle bodily injury liability policy shall have the same limits for uninsured motorist coverage as for bodily injury liability coverage unless a named insured in writing elects lower limits. The insured may not elect limits lower than the amounts prescribed to meet the requirements for ORS 806.070 for bodily injury or death.”

 That presumably could not happen, because ORS 806.130 requires a person to apply for and obtain a certificate of self-insurance from the state Department of Transportation in order to function as a self-insurer under that statute. See ORS 806.130(1). Because issuance of the certificate is conditioned on the self-insurer’s agreement to provide uninsured motorist coverage in amounts not less than the limits specified in ORS 806.070, see ORS 806.130(3); ORS 806.140(1), no self-insurer under ORS 806.130 could obtain the required certificate without providing the required uninsured motorist coverage. That fact confirms the inapplicability of ORS 806.130 to defendant. If the statute applied to defendant, defendant would have gotten a certificate of self-insurance from the state Department of *106Transportation and, as a consequence, would have provided uninsured motorist coverage for its vehicles. It did not do that, which suggests, again, that the statute does not apply to defendant, that the majority is deciding the case on an improper basis, and that the majority’s reliance on an inapplicable statute is causing it to resolve an issue that presumably could never arise, to wit, the consequence of a self-insurer’s failure to provide the uninsured motorist coverage required by ORS 806.130(3).

 I acknowledge that the language quoted above from ORS 806.130(3) continues with a clause that states that the obligation undertaken by a self-insurer includes the obligation to pay “insured motorist coverage and liability coverage to at least the limits specified in ORS 806.070.” The majority reads that language in isolation to mean that a self-insurer that fails to include uninsured motorist coverage as a component of its self-insurance fund is subject to having that coverage imposed under ORS 806.130 at the limit specified in ORS 806.070.1 am not so sure. The clause on which the majority relies tells a self-insurer the lowest limits to which it can agree to provide liability and uninsured motorist coverage under its self-insurance fund. I am not sure that it establishes the limit for uninsured motorist coverage that will be imposed when the self-insurance fund is silent about uninsured motorist coverage but specifies a liability limit that is above the minimum specified in ORS 806.070.

 The language in ORS 278.215(2) that imposes that requirement differs from the comparable language in ORS 806.130(3), so the approach used by the majority to determine the coverage limit under ORS 806.130(3) cannot be used to resolve the same issue under ORS 278.215(2).

 In Huang, we noted that the fact that the debtor and the creditor-plaintiff were actually in an adversarial relationship suggested that there was no intent on the debtor and the defendants’ part to benefit the plaintiff. Huang, 147 Or App at 335. This case is similar to Huang in that the fact that plaintiff owned the car that she was driving suggests that she, rather than defendant, controlled it.

 We suggested in Gold II that some evidence of control apart from mere use for the other entity’s benefit was necessary to show borrowing. Gold II, 121 Or App at 64. Implicit in that conclusion is the premise that use for the other’s benefit does not suggest control.