Court Opinion

ID: 9904785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 21:02:58.456139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:25.566264
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 Aguilar v. Dignity Health CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 DANNY RUIZ AGUILAR,                                          B313734

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BC712630)
           v.

 DIGNITY HEALTH et al.,

           Defendants and
           Respondents.

      APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rafael A. Ongkeko, Judge. Affirmed.
      Kenneth M. Sigelman & Associates and Kenneth M.
Sigelman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, and Matthew S.
Levinson for Defendants and Respondents Scott A. Beasley and
David N. Steinberg.
      La Follette, Johnson, DeHaas, Fesler & Ames, Christopher
P. Wend, and David J. Ozeran for Defendants and Respondents
Michelle D. Henry and Keith A. Kolber.
              __________________________________
       Appellant Danny Ruiz Aguilar alleges that, either during
his delivery by caesarean section in April 2010 or shortly
thereafter while in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) of the
California Hospital Medical Center (CHMC), his skull was
fractured, leading to a traumatic brain injury and neurological
impairment, such as impaired cognitive and motor skills. In
2018, through his guardian ad litem, he sued several defendants,
including the four respondents in this appeal: David N.
Steinberg, Scott A. Beasley, Michelle D. Henry, and Keith A.
Kolber. Steinberg is an obstetrician who assisted non-party
Thomas Cachur in Aguilar’s delivery; Beasley, Henry, and Kolber
are neonatologists who cared for Aguilar after birth until he was
transferred to Children’s Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA) six days
later. In the operative complaint, Aguilar alleged causes of action
for medical negligence, fraud, and willful misconduct, contending
the defendants caused and/or knew of his skull fracture but
deliberately concealed and failed to treat it.
       Each respondent moved for summary judgment, which the
trial court granted. On appeal, Aguilar alleges the court erred
because: (a) it failed to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; (b)
Aguilar established a triable issue of material fact on each cause
of action; and (c) a different judge denied the motion for summary
judgment brought by Cachur.
       We conclude that Aguilar: (a) failed to establish the
prerequisites for res ipsa loquitur; (b) did not establish a triable
issue of material fact as to his causes of action; and (c) forfeited
the argument regarding the ruling on Cachur’s motion by failing
to supply an adequate record. We therefore affirm.

                                  2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

      A.     Aguilar’s Complaint
      Aguilar filed a complaint in July 2018, and a first amended
complaint (the operative complaint) in October 2018. The first
amended complaint alleged that, on April 9, 2010, “during the
delivery and/or in the immediate neonatal/post-delivery period,”
Aguilar “suffered a traumatic head injury as a direct result of
negligent[] and/or reckless conduct by” all or some of the
defendants, including the respondents. Aguilar further alleged
that the respondents (and others) knew of his injury but
deliberately concealed it from Aguilar and his mother. Aguilar
also alleged that on April 14, 2010, a CT scan of his head showed
“multiple abnormalities, including, but not limited to,
abnormalities demonstrating traumatic injury to the head and
brain,” including “skull fracture, acute subdural hematoma in
multiple locations, parenchy[m]al hemorrhage within multiple
areas of the brain, and extra-axial soft tissue swelling.” The
report dictated by the radiologist reviewing this scan asked
whether there was a “ ‘history of traumatic delivery?’ ” Aguilar
contended that the failure to treat his brain injury caused “a
substantial volume of brain tissue” to die. Based on these facts,
Aguilar alleged causes of action for medical negligence, fraud,
and willful misconduct against all the defendants, including the
respondents and non-party Cachur.

      1 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

                                 3
      B.    Motions for Summary Judgment

            1.     Evidence
       Respondents and Aguilar each submitted expert witness
declarations in support of or in opposition to the motions for
summary judgment. While, as discussed below, the opinions of
these experts differed, the timeline of events that each expert
constructed after reviewing the medical records did not conflict.
For ease of discussion and to avoid repetition, we set forth the
relevant portions of the agreed-upon timeline:
       On March 30, 2010, Aguilar’s mother presented at Clinica
De Los Angeles Medical Group “with pregnancy complications of
gestational diabetes mellitus and borderline hypertension.” One
week later, she returned “with increased blood pressure,
headache, and blurred vision.”
       On April 9, 2010, Cachur delivered Aguilar via C-section at
34 weeks gestation; Steinberg assisted in the delivery. The
report for the birth made no reference to any significant
complication or trauma. Aguilar was born “dusky, with no tone,
no respiratory effort, and low heart rate.” After being stimulated
and given positive pressure ventilation, Henry intubated him and
transferred him to the NICU, where it was discovered that he
suffered from thrombocytopenia; his hematocrit was 62.8
percent.2 Henry examined Aguilar after admission and her notes
indicated his head was “ ‘normocephalic and atraumatic’ ” with a
“soft anterior fontanelle.” Aguilar remained in Henry’s care until

      2 According to Aguilar’s appellate brief, thrombocytopenia

is a condition of having low blood platelets and hematocrit
measures the volume of a person’s red blood cells (i.e., the
proportion of red blood cells in the blood).

                                 4
7:00 a.m. on April 10, at which time he was transferred to
Kolber’s care. Aguilar remained on assisted ventilation until
April 10. Throughout his stay at CHMC, Aguilar’s muscle tone
remained low, and he had difficulty tolerating oral secretions.
       On April 10, 2010, Kolber prepared a NICU Progress
Record, noting Aguilar’s head was “normocephalic and
atraumatic with soft anterior fontanel.” He was extubated to
nasal positive pressure. His hematocrit was 46.7 percent.
       On April 11, 2010, Aguilar’s “anterior fontanelle remained
flat and soft, and [his] head without evidence of trauma.” His
hematocrit was 46.4 percent. He suffered “bradycardia-
desaturation events” in the morning and “a cardiorespiratory
arrest requiring reintubation and chest compressions” in the
evening. Kolber did not note any head trauma or abnormal head
findings.
       On April 12, 2010, Beasley’s Progress Record noted
Aguilar’s “head as normocephalic and atraumatic and the
anterior fontanelle as soft.” Due to the “persistent abnormal
neurologic exam,” Beasley “ordered a head ultrasound to evaluate
for infarction or intracranial hemorrhage”; the ultrasound was
“interpreted as unremarkable.” Kolber again did not note any
head trauma or abnormal head findings.
       On both April 13 and 14, 2010, Beasley’s Progress Record
noted Aguilar’s “anterior fontanelle remained soft and his head
normocephalic and atraumatic.” However, Beasley noted that
Aguilar had “decreased tone, decreased movement, decreased
deep tendon reflexes, and decreased gag reflex,” leading him to
order a CT scan of Aguilar’s brain, wanting “ ‘Eval for infarction
or malformation.’ ”

                                5
        On April 14, 2010, Aguilar’s hematocrit was 35.6 percent.
The radiologist reviewing the CT scan (Alix Vincent) “noted an
acute subdural hematoma posterior to the cerebellar hemispheres
and in the peritentorial regions with a small subarachnoid
component present in the supravermian cistern. He also noted
an acute subdural hematoma present in the occipital regions and
interhemispheric fissure. Dr. Vincent’s report also noted low
attenuation changes in the white matter of the cerebral
hemispheres with extensive encephalomalacia involving the right
cerebral hemisphere with associated parenchymal hemorrhagic
change.” Finally, Vincent reported a “strong suspicion for
fracture involving the posterior edge of the right parietal bone at
the level of the posterior aspect of the right lambdoid suture” and
asked, “[i]s there a history of traumatic delivery?” Vincent spoke
with Kolber, advising that “there was a subdural hematoma
compressing the right cerebellum with a ‘probable right occipital
fracture.’ ” Vincent’s report was the first mention of trauma or
injury to Aguilar’s head, apart from the listing of “ ‘evaluat[ing]
for . . . intracranial hemorrhage’ ” as a reason for the cranial
ultrasound.
        On April 15, 2010, Aguilar was transferred to CHLA. The
physician who examined Aguilar’s head upon admission noted
there was a “ ‘palpable fracture at Rt occipital area.’ ” He was
discharged on July 20, 2010.
        In 2017, Aguilar was readmitted to CHLA. An Invitae
Myopathy panel was performed; it revealed that Aguilar was
born with “micro-tubular myopathy.”

            2.   Respondents’ Motions
     In March 2020, Beasley moved for summary judgment.
Supported by the declaration of neonatologist Denise M. Suttner,

                                6
Beasley argued that he acted within the standard of care, that
“there is no clinical evidence to suggest that Danny Ruiz-Aguilar
[sic] sustained any traumatic injury to his head prior to April 12,
2010 when the ultrasound was ordered by Dr. Beasley,” that
CHLA “found no evidence of a skull fracture or any other
traumatic cause of the neurologic deficits exhibited by” Aguilar,
that “the myotubular myopathy with which the plaintiff was
diagnosed was the likely cause of the neurologic abnormalities”
he exhibited, and that nothing Beasley did or did not do resulted
in any injury to Aguilar. As to the fraud and willful misconduct
causes of action, Beasley argued that he had established he was
unaware of any traumatic injury to Aguilar’s head, and that had
there been such an injury, Beasley would have “intervened and
ensured that timely and appropriate care was rendered thereto.”
       In April 2020, Henry and Kolber moved for summary
judgment on Aguilar’s cause of action for medical negligence.3
Supported by the declaration of neonatologist Krisa Van Meurs,
they argued that they acted within the standard of care and that
no action or inaction on their part caused Aguilar’s injury, which
“was not caused by a head injury during or after birth, but was
most likely a genetic condition, as demonstrated by the plaintiff’s
subsequent medical care at Children’s Hospital of Los Angeles.”
They added that “[t]here were no signs or symptoms displayed by
Danny [Aguilar] during the time they treated him prior to April
14, 2020 by which they were required under the standard of care
to order a CT scan or undertake other testing to investigate a

      3 In October 2019, the court granted Henry and Kolber’s

unopposed motion for summary adjudication as to fraud and
willful misconduct. Aguilar has not contended the court erred in
doing so.

                                 7
possible brain injury” and “[t]here was no clinical evidence to
suggest that Danny sustained any traumatic head injury during
the time he was under the care of Dr. Henry or Dr. Kolber.”
      In June 2020, Steinberg moved for summary judgment.
Supported by a declaration from obstetrician and gynecologist
James A. Macer, Steinberg argued that he assisted Cachur in the
C-section delivery of Aguilar and that his role “would have been
limited to ensuring that the primary surgeon’s view remained
unobstructed, holding sutures and keeping blood out of the way
for the primary surgeon, and generally helping to facilitate the
flow of the surgery itself.” Steinberg claimed he “would not have
had any contact during or after the delivery with minor plaintiff,”
“did not provide any further care to the infant after he was
passed to the neonatal team,” and “did not make any chart
entries relative to [his] role as assistant surgeon on April 9,
2010.” Steinberg stated “he did not injure the infant’s head, did
not crush the infant’s head, and did not drop the infant.” He also
professed to have no knowledge or recollection of anyone else
injuring Aguilar’s head. He therefore argued he met the
standard of care and was entitled to summary adjudication on
the medical negligence cause of action. Steinberg additionally
argued he was entitled to summary adjudication on the fraud
cause of action because Aguilar could not show that Steinberg
deceived or concealed anything from Aguilar. Finally, he argued
he was entitled to summary adjudication on the willful
misconduct cause of action because Aguilar could not show that
Steinberg had knowledge that any injury to Aguilar was
probable, or that Steinberg had consciously refrained from taking
action to prevent Aguilar’s injury.

                                 8
            3.     Aguilar Opposes the Motions
      In February 2021, Aguilar submitted substantively
identical oppositions to all three motions.4

                  (a)     Expert Declarations
       Aguilar submitted the same three expert declarations in
opposition to each motion for summary judgment. Specifically,
he submitted declarations from neonatologist Maureen Sims,
child neurologist William Weiss, and neuroradiologist Barry
Pressman. All claimed to have reviewed Aguilar’s medical
records, and arrived at the following opinions.
       First, Pressman asserted the April 12 cranial ultrasound
was not normal; it revealed “bilateral posterior subdural
hemorrhage extending into the interhemispheric fissure and onto
the right side of the tentorium and subdural hemorrhage in the
posterior fossa,” which was “consistent with hemorrhaging from
impact (as opposed to a stroke-type bleed or other etiology) and,
therefore, evidence of trauma to the baby’s head.”
       Second, Sims opined that the April 14 CT scan “reveals a
significant skull fracture” and “extensive intracranial and
parenchymal bleeding,” which indicates “serious trauma to the
baby’s head that fractured the skull.” Weiss concurred, and
added that the neuroradiologist’s findings from this scan were
“consistent with Dr. Pressman’s subsequent review of the
ultrasound images.”
       Third, Sims stated that the symptoms experienced by
Aguilar from birth—“need for a resuscitation involving chest
compressions and intubation, the initial hypotension and poor

      4 Aguilar’s opposition to Henry and Kolber’s motion did not

discuss the fraud and willful misconduct causes of action.

                                9
pulses,” “drop in his hematocrits,” “low platelet count,”
“profoundly low sodium values with the probable diagnosis of
SIADH,” second “cardiac arrest,” “poor respiratory effort, low
muscle tone,” and “inability to tolerate oral secretions”—all “point
to an intracranial process and were eventually identified on the
CT scan (skull fracture and associated intracranial bleeding,
parenchymal bleeding and subdural hematoma).” Weiss agreed
that Aguilar’s “signs of neurological injury were caused by the
skull fracture, intracranial bleeding, parenchymal bleeding,
subdural hematoma, and associated brain injury.”
       Fourth, Sims believed the “intracranial hemorrhages and
skull fracture was caused either at birth (i.e. during the
extraction of the baby via C-section) or in the immediate, post-
delivery period (i.e. from head banged or dropped in the delivery
room or NICU)” and “[t]he injuries to the baby’s skull and brain,
as evidenced by the April 14, 2010 CT images, were so significant
that they could only have been caused by a blunt force-type
trauma (like being dropped on his head or head being banged of
hard object) or from a crush-type trauma (i.e. from traumatic
extraction efforts during delivery).” Weiss concurred.
       Fifth, Sims asserted that Aguilar’s injuries were so
significant that “it would have been impossible for the medical
providers involved in baby boy Aguilar’s delivery (Dr. Cachur, Dr.
Steinberg and CHMC labor/delivery nurses) and/or immediate
post-delivery care (Scott A. Beasley, M.D., Michele Henry, M.D.
and Keith Kolber, M.D.) to not have witnessed and/or known
about the baby’s skull injury.” Weiss did not opine it would have
been impossible for the doctors not to notice the injury, but stated
it was “surprising” they did not do so. He also opined that any
doctor who dropped Aguilar or caused or saw a “crush injury”

                                10
during the C-section would have known or suspected the ensuing
trauma.
       Sixth, Sims averred that both the CHLA admitting
physician’s description of the fracture as “ ‘palpable’ ” on April 15,
2020, and “the nature of the fracture and bleed findings on the
April 14, 2020 CT” scan indicated the skull fracture was visible
and palpable “for several days.” It was therefore not credible that
“Dr. Henry, Dr. Kolber, Dr. Beasley and/or Dr. Steinberg would
have missed” the skull fracture in their examinations, “and more
likely than not that these medical providers either negligently
missed the findings or intentionally failed to document and treat
the skull fracture.” Both negligently missing the skull fracture
and noting it but failing to record or treat it would fall below the
standard of care.
       Seventh, Sims claimed the failure to record and treat the
skull fracture was “a substantial factor in causing or contributing
to baby boy Aguilar’s harm by causing the skull fracture and
intracranial hemorrhage and/or failing to recognize the fracture
and intracranial hemorrhage and initiate immediate supportive
care and assessment,” because “time is of the essence in taking
care of a brain injury caused by trauma and quite literally any
type of earlier intervention in baby boy Aguilar’s traumatic brain
injury treatment would have resulted in a better outcome and
reduction of neurological residuals.” Sims suggested that
“evaluation for hypothermia, close vigilance to blood pressure
values, and supportive care for head trauma” all “would have
resulted in an improvement in baby boy Aguilar’s condition.” She
further opined that no subsequently diagnosed genetic condition
would have “caused a skull fracture and intracranial hemorrhage
and/or resulted in the neurological abnormalities that baby boy

                                 11
Aguilar suffered from in the neonatal period which resulted
directly from that skull fracture.”

                  (b)     Opposition
       Instead of directly addressing the respondents’ claims that
they did not cause, know of, or conceal Aguilar’s injuries, Aguilar
argued that the three expert witness declarations he submitted
“establish that the moving defendants in this case fell below the
standard of care by causing or failing to recognize/treat DANNY
[Aguilar]’s skull fracture and intracranial hemorrhage - which,
according to the nature and extent of the skull fracture and
intracranial hemorrhage, would have been recognized either at
the time of the trauma that cause[d ]it or to any of the moving
defendants who examined DANNY.” These declarations also
“establish that the negligence of the moving defendants in this
case was a substantial factor in causing the skull fracture/intra
cranial [sic] hemorrhage and/or the worsening of DANNY’s
condition by failing to recognize/treat the skull
fracture/intracranial hemorrhage in a timely fashion.” Aguilar
further claimed it was not “credible” that no defendant noticed a
fracture that the admitting physician at CHLA deemed
“ ‘palpable.’ ” Aguilar concluded that no subsequently diagnosed
genetic condition—such as myotubular myopathy—would have
“caused a skull fracture and intracranial hemorrhage and/or
resulted in the neurological abnormalities that baby boy Aguilar
suffered from in the neonatal period [sic] which resulted directly
from that skull fracture (poor tone, decreased respiratory efforts,
etc.). The trauma is what caused the skull fracture and
intracranial hemorrhage, not any genetic condition.”
       As to the fraud and willful misconduct causes of action,
Aguilar argued that the expert witness declarations established

                                12
that “Aguilar’s skull fracture occurred either at birth (i.e. during
the extraction of the baby via C-section) or in the immediate,
post-delivery period (i.e. from trauma in the delivery room or
NICU),” that the fracture was “more likely than not, caused by a
crush-type trauma (i.e. from traumatic extraction during
delivery), or from blunt force-type trauma (being dropped on his
head),” and that “the medical provider(s) actually observing or
suspecting crush-type trauma or blunt force-type trauma would
likely have known or suspected this trauma had occurred.”
However, none of Aguilar’s doctors “recorded trauma or a
suspicion of trauma, or reported it to the family” even though it
was “unbelievable that the trauma which caused the injury was
not suspected by these medical providers.” The opposition did not
mention the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

                  (c)     Separate Statement
       In response to each fact in Steinberg’s separate statement,
Aguilar either admitted the fact or denied it with the following
statement: “Dr. Henry and Dr. Kolber [sic] fell below the
standard of care by causing and/or negligently/intentionally
failing to recognize, record or treat baby boy Aguilar’s skull
fracture. To a reasonable degree of medical probability, Dr.
Henry and Dr. Kolber’s conduct was a substantial factor in
causing or contributing to baby boy Aguilar’s harm. The skull
fracture occurred either at birth (during delivery) or several days
before the April 14, 2010 CT. To a reasonable degree of medical
probability, the fracture was so significant that it would have
been obvious to any physician performing an examination of the
head. The admitting physician at CHLA noted a ‘palpable’

                                13
fracture.”5 As support, Aguilar cited “Declaration of Maureen
Sims, M.D., paras. 4 (a-f) (Exhibit 1); Declaration of William
Weiss, M.D., paras. 4 (a-f) & 5 (a-e) (Exhibit 2); Declaration of
Barry Pressman, M.D. (Exhibit 3); Excerpts of Records from CA
Hospital Medical Center (Exhibit 4) and Excerpts of records from
Children’s Hospital Los Angeles (Exhibit 5).”
      In responding to Beasley’s separate statement, Aguilar
largely repeated all or a portion of the same denial he used in
responding to each fact in Steinberg’s separate statement,
changing only the names of the physicians.6 Aguilar did the
same for his response to Henry and Kolber’s separate statement.7

         5 In response to Dr. Steinberg’s “fact” that he never

received correspondence regarding a “notice of intent to
commence professional negligence,” Aguilar denied the fact and
asserted “Dr. Steinberg was sent and received a notice of intent.”
         6 In response to Beasley’s “fact” that the change in Aguilar’s

hematocrit was “reflective of normal physiologic changes in a
newborn, multiple blood draws and intracranial hemorrhaging
not consistent with a skull fracture,” Aguilar added to his denial:
“The neurological abnormalities are consistent with a skull
fracture.”
         7 In response to Henry and Kolber’s separate statement,

Aguilar at times stated the skull fracture occurred “from trauma
at birth” instead of just “at birth.” Also, in denying Henry and
Kolber’s “fact” that Aguilar’s injuries were caused by tubular
myopathy (which they did not cause), Aguilar added: “Regardless
of any subsequent diagnosis of a genetic condition, such as
myotubular myopathy, this would not have caused a skull
fracture and/or resulted in the neurological abnormalities that
baby boy Aguilar suffered from in the neonatal period which
resulted directly from that skull fracture (poor tone, decreased
respiratory efforts, etc.). The trauma is what caused the skull
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

                                       14
            4.    Reply Briefs
     In March 2021, all respondents filed a reply brief.
Respondents also objected to several portions of Aguilar’s expert
witness declarations as speculative and conclusory.

                  (a)     Henry and Kolber
       Henry argued that she had only been responsible for
Aguilar’s care from April 9 to April 10, and Aguilar’s experts had
not opined that the symptoms he experienced during that time
should have alerted Henry to head trauma. Additionally, the
experts had not opined that Aguilar’s head trauma would have
been apparent before Henry’s responsibility for Aguilar’s care
ended. Henry also contended Aguilar’s experts failed to explain
how Aguilar’s condition would have improved if detected before
April 14. While acknowledging one expert had given examples of
potential courses of treatment, Henry argued that the expert
failed to “explain[] how, to a reasonable medical probability,
[those courses of treatment] would have resulted in a different
outcome.” Moreover, Henry pointed out that Aguilar underwent
an intracranial ultrasound on April 12, and the radiologist who
reviewed the resulting images concluded there was no evidence of
intracranial bleeding. Although one of Aguilar’s experts
disagreed with that finding, Henry argued any mistake in
reading the ultrasound was not attributable to her.
       Kolber echoed Henry’s arguments, arguing that he only
treated Aguilar between April 10 and April 12, and Aguilar’s
experts based their argument on the totality of Aguilar’s
symptoms from birth until transfer to CHLA. Similarly, Kolber

fracture, not any genetic condition.” No additional evidence was
cited to support these denials.

                                15
argued Aguilar had failed to establish that Kolber’s alleged
inaction harmed Aguilar in any way.

                  (b)     Beasley
       Beasley argued that Aguilar’s experts improperly lumped
four physicians together in opining that “ ‘Dr. Henry, Dr. Kolber,
Dr. Beasley and/or Dr. Steinberg’ were negligent and that their
conduct was ‘at a minimum, below the standard of care of medical
providers taking care of a newborn infant,’ ” but failed “to
establish a triable issue of material fact as to the compliance with
the standard of care by BEASLEY.” Beasley additionally pointed
out that he had complied with the standard of care in ordering a
cranial ultrasound and a CT scan. Like Henry and Kolber,
Beasley dismissed as “speculative and conjectural” the opinion of
Aguilar’s expert that earlier detection would have ameliorated
his outcome, and added that the experts did not “render any
opinion, based upon competent admissible evidence, that any act
or failure to act on the part of BEASLEY resulted in the alleged
skull fracture of the plaintiff nor that to a reasonable medical
probability any act or failure to act on the part of BEASLEY
alone resulted in any injury or damage to the plaintiff.” As to the
fraud and willful misconduct causes of action, Beasley contended
Aguilar had failed to submit any competent evidence to challenge
his assertion that he did not cause and had no knowledge of any
trauma to Aguilar’s head.8

      8 As to Aguilar’s assertion that on April 15, the admitting

physician at CHLA noted a palpable fracture, Beasley contended
that out of the 18,415 pages of CHLA records, only one page
made reference to a “ ‘palpable’ fracture.”

                                16
                  (c)     Steinberg
       Steinberg faulted Aguilar for not submitting a declaration
from an obstetrician and gynecologist. Steinberg also argued
that an expert opinion that Aguilar’s injuries “ ‘occurred either at
birth . . . or in the immediate post-delivery period’ ” was
insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether
Steinberg caused Aguilar’s injury. He additionally contended he
was entitled to summary adjudication on the fraud and willful
misconduct causes of action because Aguilar submitted no
evidence to contradict Steinberg’s own declaration that he had
made no representations to Aguilar’s mother, that he had no
knowledge about any peril to Aguilar, and that he had not
consciously failed to act to avoid some peril.

      C.    The Court Grants Summary Judgment

            1.     Oral Argument
      The court heard the motions in April 2021. At oral
argument, Aguilar contended Steinberg’s motion should be
denied because Aguilar’s experts had opined the injury to his
skull had occurred at delivery or shortly thereafter, that anyone
involved in Aguilar’s care would have known of the injury, and
that Steinberg was present at the delivery.
      Aguilar argued the motions of Henry and Kolber should be
denied because a reasonable inference could be drawn that
“Doctors Henry and/or Kolber caused or witnessed the incident.”
After Aguilar’s counsel posited a hypothetical about a patient
who awoke from surgery with a sponge in his abdomen but no
idea which of his four surgeons left the sponge there, the court
interrupted to ask, “You’re not making a res ipsa argument, are
you?” Aguilar’s counsel responded, “Well, I could be, but I don’t

                                 17
know taking it a step further by having expert declaration and
evidence in support of our claim. [sic] I know some attorney[]s
who might try to make a case like this fly[,] your honor[,] without
any experts and say[,] hey[,] I don’t have to go through the
trouble or the expense of proving my case. It’s res ipsa, and
maybe those attorneys would get by on summary judgment by
doing so and maybe I should as well but beyond that we have
evidence to support our claims in the form of competent expert
testimony.”
       In response to a statement by Beasley’s counsel that
Aguilar was attempting to “convert the case into a res ipsa case,”
Aguilar’s counsel countered that res ipsa loquitur was “not some
separate cause of action,” but “a theory of liability under a
negligen[ce] claim,” and “to the extent this is a res ipsa case, it
is.” Counsel asserted it was “beyond logical to say that a baby
like Danny Ruiz Aguilar would not have a skull fracture causing
significant hemorrhaging in or about the brain, absent the
negligence of one or more of the medical providers involved in
this case.” He continued, “So I’m saying that. I think it’s clear
from the records that that’s true. I think under a res ipsa theory
-- and, again, res ipsa is meant for a purpose like this where
there is no direct evidence, kind of like the sponge case I cited to
earlier.” Aguilar’s counsel contended that while he could
establish liability through “reasonable inference” and “a res ipsa
theory,” he had “not stopped there” and was not “resting on our
laurels on a res ipsa claim.” As to Beasley specifically, Aguilar
argued his motion should be denied because Beasley had
examined Aguilar multiple times and noted a “normal exam,”
which was untrue.

                                18
            2.    Written Ruling
      Three weeks later, the court issued a detailed 28-page
order granting respondents’ motions for summary judgment.

                  (a)     Evidentiary Objections
       Regarding respondents’ evidentiary objections, the court
sustained the objection to Sims’s testimony that “time is of the
essence in taking care of a brain injury caused by trauma and
quite literally any type of earlier intervention in baby boy
Aguilar’s traumatic brain injury treatment would have resulted
in a better outcome and reduction of neurological residuals. For
example, had the providers involved in baby boy Aguilar’s
neonatal care recognized and acted upon his signs and symptoms
of head trauma at any point in time before April 14, 2020, the
following treatment would likely have been initiated sooner:
evaluation for hypothermia, close vigilance to blood pressure
values and supportive care for head trauma. To a reasonable
degree of medical probability, this would have resulted in an
improvement in baby boy Aguilar’s condition.” The court struck
this testimony in its entirety, finding it to be speculative, lacking
foundation, conclusory, and an improper expert opinion.
       The court also struck the phrase “it would have been
impossible” from Sims’s testimony that “it would have been
impossible for the medical providers involved in baby boy
Aguilar’s delivery (Dr. Cachur, Dr. Steinberg and CHMC
labor/delivery nurses) and/or immediate post-delivery care (Scott
A. Beasley, M.D., Michele Henry, M.D. and Keith Kolber, M.D.)
to not have witnessed and/or known about the baby’s skull
injury,” finding it speculative, lacking foundation, and conclusory.

                                 19
                  (b)     Medical Negligence
       Addressing the cause of action for medical negligence first,
the court found Steinberg had established a prima facie case that
his conduct did not fall below the standard of care, and that
nothing he did or did not do caused Aguilar’s injury. The court
further found that Aguilar failed to create a triable issue of fact
as to both issues, faulting Aguilar’s failure to submit a
declaration from an obstetrician / gynecologist on the standard of
care issue, and finding inadequate his experts’ declarations
because they “offer[ed] only a possibility” that the injury occurred
during delivery and “conclusorily combines conduct of all moving
Defendants to attempt to establish causation, with no effort to
specifically explain how Steinberg’s specific conduct contributed.”
       As to Henry and Kolber, the court found both had met their
prima facie burden to demonstrate their conduct did not fall
below the standard of care, and that nothing they did or did not
do caused Aguilar’s injuries. It further found that Aguilar had
submitted sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to
whether they had fallen below the standard of care by failing to
notice or treat the skull fracture. However, the court
nevertheless granted summary judgment because it held that
Aguilar had failed to submit any evidence that Henry or Kolber
caused the skull fracture, and had failed “to create a triable issue
that there would have been a difference in outcome or how his
condition would have improved” had Henry or Kolber done
something differently.
       As to Beasley, the court found that he had met his prima
facie burden to demonstrate that his conduct did not fall below
the standard of care and that nothing he did or did not do caused
Aguilar’s injuries. It further found that Aguilar had created

                                 20
triable issues of fact as to whether Beasley’s conduct had fallen
below the standard of care because he failed to notice the skull
fracture. However, the court granted Beasley’s motion because
Aguilar failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to causation.
The court found the expert witness declarations “replete with
‘and/or’ opinions—i.e., multiple possibilities.” For example, the
court noted the expert opinions “cast blame on Dr. Henry, Dr.
Kolber, Dr. Beasley and/or Dr. Steinberg” and noted “[t]here is
no explanation as to what exact conduct by each defendant was
the direct cause of Plaintiffs injuries and how.” (Emphasis in
original.) The court stated that while Aguilar faulted Beasley for
failing to notice the injury sooner, the opinions of Aguilar’s
experts failed to explain “how earlier intervention would have
resulted in a better outcome.” (Emphasis in original.)

                   (c)   Fraud and Willful Misconduct
       The court then found that both Steinberg and Beasley had
made a prima facie showing that they had neither concealed facts
nor had knowledge of any injury to Aguilar’s head. It further
found that Aguilar “failed to meet [his] burden of offering
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact that each of the
moving defendants act[ed] intentionally to actually injure
Plaintiff or conceal Plaintiff’s injury” when his experts’ opinions
were that the doctors “either negligently missed the findings
or intentionally failed to document and treat the skull
fracture.” (Emphasis in original.)
       In May 2021, the court entered judgment in respondents’
favor. Aguilar timely appealed.

                                 21
      D.      A Different Judge Denies the Motion for
              Summary Judgment by Thomas Cachur
       In December 2022, Aguilar asked us to judicially notice the
trial court’s April 2022 ruling denying the motion for summary
judgment brought by Thomas Cachur, the doctor who delivered
Aguilar.9 In this ruling, the court granted Cachur’s motion for
summary adjudication as to fraud and willful misconduct, finding
that Aguilar “failed to come forward with admissible evidence to
create a triable issue of material fact that Cachur acted willfully.”
However, it denied Cachur’s motion as to the medical negligence
cause of action, finding that, while Cachur successfully
established a prima facie case to negate an element of Aguilar’s
cause of action, Aguilar’s “assertion of res ipsa loquitur is
sufficient to carry his burden to create triable issues of material
fact.” Judge Dillon’s order also noted, without criticism or
disagreement, that Judge Ongkeko had granted summary
judgment to the respondents in this appeal.
       We granted Aguilar’s request for judicial notice. However,
the appellate record is still bereft of the pleadings associated with
Cachur’s motion for summary judgment—his initial motion and
supporting evidence, Aguilar’s opposition and any opposing
evidence, and any reply. Nor do we have a transcript of the
hearing on Cachur’s motion.

      9 This motion was decided by Judge Timothy Patrick

Dillon. The motions on appeal were decided by Judge Rafael
Ongkeko. Judge Dillon’s order also mentions that the trial court
had granted unopposed motions for summary judgment by
“Grand Medical Associates and Roy Silver, M.D.,” but had denied
a motion brought by Dignity Health.

                                 22
                             DISCUSSION
       “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the
burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact
and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “Once the
defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., §
437c, subd. (p)(2).) A triable issue of material fact exists where
“the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at p.
850.) Where summary judgment has been granted, “[w]e review
the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the evidence
the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that
which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted
inferences the evidence reasonably supports.” (Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)

      A.     Aguilar Fails to Establish the Applicability of
             Res Ipsa Loquitur
       “Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary rule for ‘determining
whether circumstantial evidence of negligence is sufficient.’
[Citation]. In California, it is ‘a presumption affecting the burden
of producing evidence.’ ” (Howe v. Seven Forty Two Co., Inc.
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1161.)
       Aguilar contends the court erred in finding he had not met
his burden to show a triable issue of fact because the evidence he
submitted in opposition to the motions for summary judgment
sufficiently established the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Respondents disagree, arguing that Aguilar forfeited the right to

                                23
argue res ipsa loquitur by failing to assert the doctrine below,
that Aguilar failed to present evidence to establish the
prerequisites for the doctrine, and that the presumption created
by the doctrine disappeared once respondents presented evidence
to demonstrate they were not negligent. Because we agree that
Aguilar failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the
doctrine, we do not consider respondents’ other arguments.
       It is well settled that a plaintiff must demonstrate three
conditions for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply: “ ‘ “(1) the
accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” ’ ” (Newing v.
Cheatham (1975) 15 Cal.3d 351, 359.)
       Beasley and Steinberg argue that Aguilar failed to “proffer
evidence that defendants had exclusive control of plaintiff during
all relevant times.” Henry and Kolber concur that Aguilar “did
not establish that only the defendant health care providers had
access to him during the time that the claimed head injury
occurred, as opposed to the parents or visitors having had access
to the infant.” They add that Aguilar “did not provide any
evidence whatsoever that his parents or a relative or family
friend, any of whom could accidentally banged his head, did not
hold him during the period of time that he claims that the injury
could have occurred.”
       Aguilar counters that his expert witnesses reviewed his
medical records and found “no indication that Danny was
anywhere other than in the NICU on a ventilator (or with nasal
breathing prongs) during the time in question” and that these

                                  24
experts testified there were “only two possible causes for the
fracture—either dropping or banging his head or crushing it
during the delivery—while he was under the doctors’ care in the
NICU.” Aguilar further contends that “[c]ommon sense is also
enough to determine that Danny was injured while in the
exclusive control of Drs. Steinberg, Henry, Kolber, and Beasley,”
adding that “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that
anyone other than the doctors had control over Danny’s safety
during his time in the NICU.”
       We agree with respondents. Even were we to infer from
the expert witness declarations that Aguilar spent his entire
post-delivery stay in the NICU before being transferred to CHLA,
that would not establish that Aguilar was not visited by a parent
or relative during his time there. “Common sense” tells us that a
parent or relative may have visited Aguilar in the NICU, and
that it is just as likely that a medically untrained relative
negligently fractured Aguilar’s skull. Again, while Aguilar’s
expert witnesses presumably could have averred that the records
disclosed no such visitors during his six-day stay at CHMC
(assuming that were true), the experts did not do so.
       Because Aguilar failed to present evidence at summary
judgment that his injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the respondents,
he may not invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against these
respondents to meet his burden to show the existence of a triable
issue of material fact.10

         10 We find distinguishable Aguilar’s case citations to Folk v.

Kilk (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 176 and Sanchez v. Bay General
Hospital (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 776. Neither case presented a
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

                                       25
      B.    The Court Did Not Err in Finding Aguilar
            Failed to Establish a Triable Issue of Material
            Fact

            1.      Medical Negligence
       “The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice
are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other
members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a
breach of the duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the
negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting loss or
damage.” (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
297, 305.)
       The court found that each respondent had established a
prima facie case that their conduct did not fall below the
standard of care, and that nothing they did or did not do caused
Aguilar’s injuries. It further found that while Aguilar had
demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether the conduct of
Beasley, Henry, and Kolber fell below the standard of care, he
had failed to do so regarding the issue of causation for each
respondent, thereby entitling them to summary adjudication on
medical negligence.
       Aguilar contends the court erred because it used an
incorrect evidentiary standard. Specifically, Aguilar claims that

situation in which someone other than the defendant (or its
agent) could have caused the injury. (Folk, at p. 181 [plaintiff’s
claim against doctors “rests upon their failure to take a throat
culture in time to have the results available before the surgery”];
Sanchez, at p. 788 [“[n]o doubt exists” that decedent “was under
the exclusive control of the nursing staff of defendant” when
injuries occurred].)

                                26
because he established the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, he was relieved from “his burden to proffer evidence to
prove exactly what Drs. Steinberg, Henry, Kolber, and Beasley
did to cause his injuries,” and the court should have determined
whether respondents had established that their negligence did
not cause Aguilar’s injuries. Aguilar also argues the court erred
in striking a portion of his expert witness’s testimony. Finally,
Aguilar claims that “ ‘all favorable inferences that may
reasonably be derived from’ his experts’ declarations” established
that Aguilar “suffered a brain injury that affects his motor and
cognitive skills, the brain injury is a result of the skull fracture,
and Drs. Steinberg, Henry, Kolber, and Beasley’s negligence
caused the skull fracture.”
       We dispense with Aguilar’s first argument—as discussed
above, we find that Aguilar failed to establish the applicability of
res ipsa loquitur. We address the remaining two arguments
below.

                   (a)    The Court Did Not Err in Striking
                          Testimony
       Sims testified in her declaration that “time is of the essence
in taking care of a brain injury caused by trauma and quite
literally any type of earlier intervention in baby boy Aguilar’s
traumatic brain injury treatment would have resulted in a better
outcome and reduction of neurological residuals. For example,
had the providers involved in baby boy Aguilar’s neonatal care
recognized and acted upon his signs and symptoms of head
trauma at any point in time before April 14, 2020, the following
treatment would likely have been initiated sooner: evaluation for
hypothermia, close vigilance to blood pressure values and
supportive care for head trauma. To a reasonable degree of

                                 27
medical probability, this would have resulted in an improvement
in baby boy Aguilar’s condition.” The court struck this testimony
in its entirety, finding it to be speculative, lacking foundation,
conclusory, and an improper expert opinion.
       Aguilar contends that “[t]he trial court’s rulings on
evidentiary objections in determining a motion for summary
judgment are reviewed for abuse of discretion” and respondents
agree. Aguilar argues the court abused its discretion by
excluding this testimony because the testimony was based on
Sims’s “experience treating newborns and the evidence in the
medical records that gives rise to the presumption that Drs.
Steinberg, Henry, Kolber, and Beasley’s negligence caused the
skull fracture” and “based on her knowledge that Danny’s
injuries would have been less severe or non-existent had Drs.
Steinberg, Henry, Kolber, and Beasley not been negligent and
caused Danny to sustain a skull fracture.” We discern no abuse
of discretion.
       “An expert’s opinion rendered without a reasoned
explanation of why the underlying facts lead to the ultimate
conclusion has no evidentiary value because an expert opinion is
worth no more than the reasons and facts on which it is based.”
(Wicks v. Antelope Valley Healthcare Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th
866, 881.) While Sims opined that earlier intervention would
have improved Aguilar’s condition, she failed to provide any sort
of reasoned explanation for how it would have done so.
Specifically, she opined that, had Aguilar’s fracture been
discovered earlier, “the following treatment would likely have
been initiated sooner: evaluation for hypothermia, close vigilance
to blood pressure values and supportive care for head trauma.”
But she failed to explain why being evaluated for hypothermia,

                                28
having medical professionals paying closer attention to blood
pressure values, or undergoing the vaguely described “supportive
care for head trauma” would have improved Aguilar’s outcome,
particularly when Aguilar was born with a congenital myopathy.
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exceeds the
bounds of reason; even if we disagree with the trial court’s
determination, we uphold the determination so long as it is
reasonable.” (Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150,
1163.) On this record, we do not find the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason in excluding Sims’s testimony as speculative
and conclusory.

                  (b)     Aguilar’s Evidence Fails to Raise a
                          Triable Issue as to Causation
      Aguilar argues that, while his expert witnesses’
declarations may be “ ‘at times a bit obtuse,’ ” they still establish
that “Drs. Steinberg, Henry, Kolber, and Beasley’s negligence
caused the skull fracture.” We disagree.
      Respondents were potentially responsible for two separate
harms to Aguilar—the skull fracture itself and the delayed
discovery of the fracture. As to the skull fracture itself, the court
found Aguilar failed to rebut respondents’ prima facie showing
that they had not caused the fracture. The court pointed out that
the declarations from Aguilar’s expert witnesses were “replete
with ‘and/or’ opinions—i.e., multiple possibilities.” For example,
they opined that the injury “was caused during the c-section
and/or at some time after the c-section.” Additionally, the
declarations “cast blame on Dr. Henry, Dr. Kolber, Dr. Beasley
and/or Dr. Steinberg,” but lacked an “explanation as to what
exact conduct by each defendant was the direct cause of
Plaintiff’s injuries and how.”

                                 29
       As for the failure to discover the fracture, Aguilar does not
dispute that Steinberg assisted only in the delivery, and never
touched or examined Aguilar. Nor does Aguilar provide any
evidence showing that Steinberg witnessed or had any knowledge
of his skull being fractured. As for the three neonatologists, the
court found that even if there were a triable issue as to whether
they should have discovered the skull fracture, Aguilar failed to
establish that earlier discovery would have changed his
prognosis. Acknowledging that one of Aguilar’s experts had
stated earlier detection would have permitted certain courses of
treatment, the court found that the expert “never explains how
earlier intervention would have resulted in a better outcome.
What improvement would have occurred? How would each
example of an earlier intervention have reduced injury or
improved Plaintiff’s condition? Would earlier intervention have
completely eliminated any risk of Plaintiff’s injuries? What effect
do other factors have (complicated pregnancy history, mother’s
health, myotubular myopathy diagnosis) on Plaintiff’s injuries?”
       We agree with the trial court’s analysis. Aguilar can point
to no direct evidence contradicting each respondent’s testimony
that they did not cause the skull fracture. As to the discovery of
the fracture, Aguilar’s expert opined it had been palpable for
“several days” before April 15, when it was noted by the
admitting physician at CHLA. In other words, it should have
been detectable “several days” before April 15. But Aguilar
provided no competent evidence as to how the earlier discovery
would have ameliorated his outcome. We therefore hold that the
trial court did not err in finding Aguilar failed to establish a
triable issue of material fact as to whether respondents’ actions
caused his injuries.

                                30
            2.     Fraud and Willful Misconduct
      Sims testified that “it would have been impossible for the
medical providers involved in baby boy Aguilar’s delivery (Dr.
Cachur, Dr. Steinberg and CHMC labor/delivery nurses) and/or
immediate post-delivery care (Scott A. Beasley, M.D., Michele
Henry, M.D. and Keith Kolber, M.D.) to not have witnessed
and/or known about the baby’s skull injury.”11 The court struck
the phrase “it would have been impossible” as speculative,
lacking foundation, and conclusory.
      Aguilar contends the court abused its discretion in doing so
because the testimony was based on “evidence in the medical
records” and Sims’s “experience . . . working with newborns and
their neurological issues.” We disagree. Given that Sims could
only speculate as to when the fracture occurred, it was within the
bounds of reason for the trial court to find speculative the
pronouncement that it would have been “impossible” for Cachur,
Steinberg, Beasley, Henry, “and/or” Kolber to not have
“witnessed and/or known” about the fracture. This is especially
true when Sims also testified that it was “more likely than not
that these medical providers either negligently missed the

      11 Aguilar argues that both Sims and Weiss concluded “it is

not possible that the doctors who delivered Danny or cared for
him in the NICU did not witness a blunt force type trauma to
Danny’s head that caused the skull fracture and intracranial
bleeding.” Weiss did not claim it was “not possible”; he testified
“it is surprising that the medical providers involved in baby boy
Aguilar’s delivery (Dr. Cachur, Dr. Steinberg and CHMC
labor/delivery nurses) and/or immediate post-delivery care (Scott
A. Beasley, M.D., Michele Henry, M.D. and Keith Kolber, M.D.)
did not suspect that baby boy Aguilar had a significant brain
hemorrhage or injury.”

                                31
findings or intentionally failed to document and treat the skull
fracture.” If the medical providers could have “negligently
missed” the fracture, then it is self-evidently not “impossible”
that they did not “witness[] and/or know[]” about the fracture.
Thus, we agree with the trial court’s finding that, because
respondents’ alleged failure to discover Aguilar’s injury “could
have been negligent” and Aguilar’s expert was “speculative as to
who kn[e]w what at what time and the extent of that knowledge,”
Aguilar failed to overcome respondents’ showing that they had no
knowledge of Aguilar’s injury and did not intentionally conceal
any facts. Because fraud and willful misconduct both require an
intentional act, we hold the court did not err in finding Steinberg
and Beasley were entitled to summary adjudication as to those
causes of action.

      C.     Aguilar Has Forfeited Any Argument Regarding
             the Denial of Cachur’s Motion
       Aguilar’s final argument is that, because Judge Dillon
denied Cachur’s motion for summary judgment, we are required
to reverse the grant of the summary judgment motions on appeal,
lest this case be plagued with “inconsistent rulings.”
Respondents counter—and Aguilar admits—that Aguilar
presents no direct authority to support this argument. Nor does
Aguilar explain why, if the rulings truly were inconsistent, we
could not determine that it was Judge Dillon’s ruling that was
incorrect as opposed to Judge Ongkeko’s. But we need not decide
these issues because we lack a sufficient record to determine
whether the denial of Cachur’s motion was inconsistent with the
granting of respondents’ motions. While Aguilar asked us to
judicially notice Judge Dillon’s ruling, he failed to provide

                                32
Cachur’s moving papers, any opposition or reply, and any
reporter’s transcript from the hearing.
       Aguilar argues that the record before us is sufficient
“because the trial court’s ruling on Dr. Cachur’s motion contains
a detailed recitation of the parties’ arguments and evidence.” But
Judge Dillon also noted Judge Ongkeko’s granting of the
summary judgment motions at issue here, without criticism,
implying Judge Dillon did not find those rulings inconsistent
with his own.
       “ ‘It is the duty of an appellant to provide an adequate
record to the court establishing error. Failure to provide an
adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved
against appellant.’ ” (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center,
Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) Because Aguilar failed to
provide an adequate record regarding the denial of Cachur’s
motion, he has forfeited this argument.

                        DISPOSITION
       The judgments are affirmed. Respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                                CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                  WEINGART, J.

                               33