Court Opinion

ID: 9953281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 18:01:19.622919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:53.341222
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10866      Document: 111-1         Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/21/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit
                             ____________
                                                                          FILED
                                                                    January 26, 2024
                              No. 22-10866
                             ____________                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                          Clerk
Rolex Watch USA, Incorporated,

                                        Plaintiff—Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                   versus

Beckertime, L.L.C.; Matthew Becker,

                             Defendants—Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Northern District of Texas
                        USDC No. 4:20-CV-1060
               ______________________________

Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
      The petition filed by Rolex Watch USA for panel rehearing is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. We withdraw our
previous opinion and substitute the following:
      Following a bench trial for this trademark infringement dispute
brought under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, et seq., the district court
determined that BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademark but refused to
disgorge BeckerTime of its profits after finding that the laches defense
applied. It then enjoined BeckerTime from further infringement, subject to
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                                 No. 22-10866

various exceptions.    The parties cross-appealed, with Rolex seeking a
modification to the injunction, treble profits, and attorneys’ fees, and
BeckerTime seeking the application of an alternative test to determine
infringement. As explained below, we AFFIRM in part, MODIFY in part,
and REMAND in part.

                                      I
       This is a trademark infringement dispute involving allegations of
counterfeit and infringing use of Rolex’s marks by BeckerTime. Rolex is a
luxury watch seller with a legally protectable interest in numerous
trademarks. BeckerTime sells primarily decades-old preowned watches
containing Rolex branded parts. The at-issue watches in this case are
watches sold by BeckerTime that are identified as “Genuine Rolex,” but
contain both Rolex and non-Rolex parts. The watches specifically considered
by the district court contained additional diamonds, which were added “as
hour markers to the refinished dials by drilling holes in the dials and placing
aftermarket diamonds or other stones and settings in the holes.” To refinish
dials, BeckerTime “strips the dial down to bare metal, then, after the
refurbishing process is complete, reapplies Rolex’s trademarks.” These
“modifications” are not performed or authorized by Rolex.
       BeckerTime lists the retail prices of their modified watches with
comparison prices to new Rolex watches, but for the watches considered, the
district court found that “Rolex has never sold a watch matching the
description” provided by BeckerTime. The at-issue watches contain “at
least one Rolex trademark” and “aftermarket bezels (not made or endorsed
by Rolex) . . . including bezels with added diamonds.” BeckerTime further
applies “aftermarket bands or straps (not made or endorsed by Rolex)” that
“sometimes include a genuine Rolex clasp or buckle displaying Rolex’s
trademarks.” The parts BeckerTime adds to the at-issue watches “do not

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bear any markings indicating BeckerTime is the source.” Further, the district
court found that the parts replaced, such as the bezel, dials, and bracelets,
“are integral and necessary to the at-issue watches.”
       In September 2020, Rolex sued BeckerTime alleging counterfeit and
infringing use of Rolex’s trademark in connection with the advertising,
promotion, service, and sale of watches and individual watch parts that are
not authorized or sponsored by Rolex and that are not genuine products of
Rolex. Rolex sought to enjoin BeckerTime from infringing its trademark and
to force it to disgorge its profits related to infringement. The parties waived
a jury and proceeded to a bench trial on October 25, 2021.
       The district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, and set
out its Final Judgment which enjoined BeckerTime from using Rolex’s
trademark in specific applications. It held that “BeckerTime infringed
Rolex’s trademark protection by counterfeiting Rolex watches.” However,
after balancing the equities, the district court concluded that Rolex was not
entitled to disgorge BeckerTime’s profits because laches applied. It made no
rulings as to attorneys’ fees or treble damages under the Lanham Act. This
appeal followed.

                                        II
       Following a bench trial, we review the district court’s factual findings
for clear error and review any legal issues de novo. Guzman v. Hacienda Recs.
& Recording Studio, Inc., 808 F.3d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir. 2015). Likelihood of
confusion is a question of fact reviewed for clear error. Elvis Presley Enters.,
Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 196 (5th Cir. 1998). Factual findings made during
a bench trial deserve “great deference.” Guzman, 808 F.3d at 1036. A
district court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is “implausible in
the light of the record considered as a whole.” Brumfield v. Cain, 808 F.3d
1041, 1057 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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       Though we review legal issues de novo, we review the scope of the
district court’s injunction and its application of laches for an abuse of
discretion. Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 334 (5th
Cir. 2008). “A district court’s ruling regarding [15 U.S.C.] §§ 1116 and 1117
remedies is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Quick
Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000)).

                                      III
                            A. Infringement
       We first address whether the district court applied the correct legal
framework to determine that BeckerTime infringed on Rolex’s trademarks.
We conclude that it did.
       BeckerTime argues that a modified test for infringement involving
“decades’ old” products arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947). According to
BeckerTime, the district court improperly applied the traditional digits of
confusion factors without any discussion of Champion. Rolex counters that
the district court applied the correct legal framework, noting that it
appropriately followed Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816 (1998),
and other established precedent involving altered watches. Rather than
suggesting that Champion is inapplicable, Rolex argues that the district court
implicitly concluded that Champion’s “misnomer” exception applied in the
instant case.
       The district court did not address Champion. It instead relied on the
traditional “likelihood of confusion” analysis. “To recover on a claim of
trademark infringement, a plaintiff must first show that the mark is legally
protectable and must then establish infringement by showing a likelihood of
confusion.” Am. Rice, 518 F.3d at 329. First, the district court determined

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that Rolex’s marks were registered and incontestable, as required by statute.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a)-(b). Next, the district court determined that
Rolex had shown that BeckerTime’s use of the mark “creates a likelihood of
confusion in the minds of potential consumers” relying on the non-
exhaustive list of factors set forth in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 2000).1 It concluded that these factors
“point towards a likelihood of confusion and therefore infringement.”
        BeckerTime urges us to reject the district court’s analysis, noting that
“these factors are insufficient on their own to balance Rolex’s trademark
rights with the rights of an owner (such as BeckerTime) of a used (here,
vintage) watch in repairing and customizing that watch without having to
remove the underlying Rolex marks.” Pointing to district court cases in our
circuit, BeckerTime requests we consider additional factors, including (1) the
extent and nature of changes made to the product, (2) the clarity and
distinctiveness of the labeling on the rebuilt product, and (3) the degree to
which any inferior qualities associated with the reconditioned product would
likely be identified by the typical purchaser with the manufacturer. See Neles-
Jamesbury, Inc. v. Valve Dynamics, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 964, 970 (S.D. Tex.
1997); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Prudhomme, 765 F. Supp. 1551, 1567 (N.D.
Tex. 1991).
        We decline today to consider these additional factors because there is
no need in this case. Although the district court did not expressly cite

        _____________________
        1
         These factors include “(1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) similarity of design
between the marks; (3) similarity of the products; (4) identity of retail outlets and
purchasers; (5) similarity of advertising media used; (6) the defendant’s intent; (7) actual
confusion; and (8) degree of care exercised by potential purchasers.” Am Rice., 518 F.3d at
329.

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Champion, our review of the record indicates it properly considered and
applied Champion.2
        In Champion, the plaintiff was a manufacturer of spark plugs which it
sold under the trademark “Champion.” 331 U.S. at 126. The defendant
collected these used plugs, repaired and reconditioned them, and resold
them, while retaining the word “Champion” on the repaired and
reconditioned plugs. Id. The district court concluded that the defendant
infringed the Champion trademark and enjoined the defendant from offering
or selling any of the plugs that had been repaired or reconditioned unless,
inter alia, the trademark and type and style marks were removed. Id. at 126-
27.
        On appeal, the Second Circuit found infringement and unfair
competition, but it eliminated the requirement that the trademark and type
and style marks be removed from the repaired or reconditioned plugs. Id. at
127. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Second Circuit’s
relief was adequate—particularly its decision that the defendant was not
required to remove the trademark “Champion” from the resold plugs. Id. at
128.
        The Supreme Court clarified that Champion dealt with “second-hand
goods,” as BeckerTime does in the instant matter. Id. “We put to one side
the case of a manufacturer or distributer who markets new or used spark
plugs of one make under the trade mark of another.” Id. But the plugs at

        _____________________
        2
           Although the district court did not expressly mention Champion in its ruling
following the bench trial, it addressed BeckerTime’s Champion argument in the context of
disclosures in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. It noted that BeckerTime
was unable to show that its disclosures were sufficient because Rolex had “successfully
shown that there has been at least some level of confusion,” so a genuine dispute of material
fact existed as to whether the disclosures were sufficient under Champion.

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issue “are nevertheless Champion plugs and not those of another make.” Id.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision because the
plugs were “clearly and distinctively sold as repaired or reconditioned rather
than as new.” Id. at 130.
       The Supreme Court carved out an exception (the “misnomer”
exception) in “[c]ases . . . where the reconditioning or repair would be so
extensive or so basic that it would be a misnomer to call the article by its
original name, even though the words ‘used’ or ‘repaired’ were added.” Id.
at 129. In Champion, the misnomer exception did not apply because it
involved “no more than a restoration . . . of their original condition,” not a
new design. Id.
       Thus, Champion instructs that a reseller may utilize the trademark of
another, so long as it involves nothing more than a restoration to the original
condition, and not a new design. In that case, “[f]ull disclosure gives the
manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.” Id. at 130.
       Here, BeckerTime does more than recondition or repair vintage Rolex
watches. As the district court found, BeckerTime produced “modified
watches,” with “added diamonds,” “aftermarket bezels,” and aftermarket
bracelets or straps. It found that the watches sold by BeckerTime were
“materially different than those sold by Rolex.” In fact, the district court
found that Rolex has never sold watches matching the descriptions provided
by BeckerTime. Unlike the plugs in Champion that “are nevertheless
Champion plugs and not those of another make,” BeckerTime’s watches are
of another make and cannot properly be called genuine Rolex watches. See
Champion, 331 U.S. at 128. Moreover, throughout its brief, BeckerTime
describes this process as “customization,” not restoration. Accordingly,
Champion’s misnomer exception properly applied to the facts of this case and

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the district court did not err by conducting a traditional digits of confusion
analysis.
       In applying the correct test, the district court concluded that “the
digits of confusion point towards a likelihood of confusion and therefore
infringement.” The district court found that customers had “inquired as to
the authenticity,” stating “they are confused as to whether the watch is fully
genuine Rolex.” The district court also found that BeckerTime “ha[d]
received complaints about the quality of the watches and complaints that the
watch was not actually composed of exclusively genuine Rolex parts.”
Although BeckerTime includes many disclaimers, the district court found
these were insufficient because “[s]ubsequent potential purchasers” may
not have access to those, and because the “disclosures mislead purchasers
into thinking there is a comparable genuine Rolex, when in fact, there is not
always one.”
       We find no clear error in the district court’s determination that
BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademark because its watches, lacking
sufficient disclosures, created a likelihood of confusion in consumers. See
Capece, 141 F.3d at 196. After applying the correct test, the district court
made factual findings that are well supported by the record.
                               B. Remedies
       We next turn to Rolex’s arguments about the scope of relief granted
by the district court. We first consider the district court’s application of the
laches defense precluding disgorgement of BeckerTime’s profits. We then
address the district court’s decision not to award treble profits and attorneys’
fees. Finally, we consider the proper scope of the injunction.
       i. Laches Defense
       Rolex argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that
BeckerTime’s “deliberate counterfeiting” did not bar laches, claiming

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BeckerTime’s “unclean hands” preclude it from relying on this equitable
defense. Further, assuming arguendo that BeckerTime acted in good faith,
Rolex argues that BeckerTime has failed to show that it suffered undue
prejudice caused by Rolex’s delay in filing suit. BeckerTime counters that
the district court correctly found insufficient evidence of unclean hands to
preclude equitable defenses, and that sufficient evidence shows that
BeckerTime was unduly prejudiced by Rolex’s delay in pursuing its
remedies.
       “A laches defense cannot be asserted by a party with unclean hands
because it is equitable.” Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 620 (5th
Cir. 2013). “A defendant who intentionally infringes a trademark with the
bad faith intent to capitalize on the markholder’s good will lacks the clean
hands necessary to assert the equitable defense.” Id. (quoting Bd. of
Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550
F.3d 465, 490 (5th Cir. 2008)).
       The district court found that there was “insufficient evidence to show
[BeckerTime] had unclean hands” and that “Rolex failed to show [the]
subjective and knowing bad faith necessary to foreclose [BeckerTime’s]
equitable defenses.” This finding considered the “inherent” aspect of
reselling luxury goods—that sellers wish to benefit from the reputation and
goodwill of the brand name. But it rejected that this alone is sufficient to
show unclean hands. The record supports the district court’s conclusion, as
the emails between BeckerTime and its customers show it goes to great
lengths to clarify which parts are original Rolex, which are customized or
modified, and which are aftermarket. This supports the district court’s
conclusion that BeckerTime did not intentionally infringe Rolex’s mark and
thus was not precluded from raising this equitable defense.

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       A defendant urging a laches defense for inexcusable delay that causes
prejudice must establish: “(1) delay in asserting one’s trademark rights, (2)
lack of excuse for the delay, and (3) undue prejudice to the alleged infringer
caused by the delay.” Am. Rice, 518 F.3d at 334 (quoting Westchester Media,
214 F.3d at 668). The time period for laches “begins when an owner of a
mark first has knowledge of the accused use.” Id. (citation omitted); see also
Capece, 141 F.3d at 205 (“The period for laches begins when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the infringement.”).
       The district court concluded that at a minimum, Rolex’s agent
“should have known about BeckerTime in 2010, ten years prior to the filing
of the lawsuit, and no later than 2013 when [a Rolex employee] wrote that
BeckerTime watches were junk.” It further found that “Rolex offer[ed] no
valid justification for this delay.” It determined that “BeckerTime likely
would not have shifted its business model to be reliant on the sale of altered
Rolex watches if Rolex had brought this suit promptly. BeckerTime relied on
Rolex’s cooperation in building this valuable business, and Rolex assisted
BeckerTime with the importation of watches for repair or return.”
Accordingly, the district court determined that Rolex may not disgorge
BeckerTime of its profits. This conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.
See Am. Rice, 518 F.3d at 334.
       On appeal, Rolex offers no justification for the delay, instead arguing
that BeckerTime failed to show prejudice. But the record supports that the
ten years of permitted sales enabled BeckerTime to build up a successful
business that it would not otherwise have invested in absent Rolex’s delay in
filing suit. This is clear prejudice. Accordingly, the district court correctly
decided that BeckerTime not be disgorged of profits resulting from Rolex’s
delay in filing suit.

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       ii. Attorneys’ Fees and Treble Profits
       Next, Rolex claims that the district court erred in not awarding treble
profits and attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). BeckerTime claims
that the district court correctly applied principles of equity to bar monetary
recovery by Rolex and that Rolex has waived any argument concerning
trebling or attorneys’ fees by failing to move for such relief below.
BeckerTime emphasizes the district court’s finding that there was
insufficient evidence of deliberate counterfeiting by BeckerTime to warrant
the imposition of treble profits and attorneys’ fees.
       Section 1117 of the Lanham Act sets forth the statutory scheme for
awarding profits in a trademark infringement case. Section 1117(a) entitles a
mark holder to recover the defendant’s profits, subject to the principles of
equity. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 582,
584 (5th Cir. 1980). “A plaintiff’s entitlement to disgorged profits is
assessed based on the equities of the case and does not automatically follow
from liability.” Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 919 F.3d 869,
875 (5th Cir. 2019). Further, Champion instructs that where the equities of
the case may be satisfied by an injunction, the court will not award profits to
the plaintiff. See Champion, 331 U.S. at 131 (denying accounting in unfair
competition and trademark infringement case where injunction satisfied
equities of case). Here, the record supports the district court’s denial of
profits to Rolex pursuant to § 1117(a) because it properly found that the
laches defense applied and refused to disgorge BeckerTime of its profits.
Further, we are satisfied that the injunction properly addresses the equities
of the case.
       But when counterfeit marks are involved, as appears to be the case
here, § 1117(b) of the Lanham Act applies. Under this subsection, when a
defendant knowingly and intentionally uses the mark or designation of
another, a plaintiff seeking a remedy under § 1117(a) is entitled to three times

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the defendant’s profits plus reasonable attorneys’ fees in every case, except
where there are “extenuating circumstances.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
       The district court did not express any opinion regarding treble profits
and attorneys’ fees. Rolex is not entitled to treble profits, as the district court
refused to disgorge BeckerTime of any profits because it properly applied the
defense of laches. Although § 1117(b) also contemplates attorneys’ fees, we
agree with BeckerTime that Rolex’s requested relief is foreclosed. First, the
district court made no finding of intentionality. It specifically stated that
“Rolex failed to show subjective and knowing bad faith necessary to foreclose
equitable defenses.” Accordingly, Rolex has not met its burden of showing
intentionality under § 1117(b). Additionally, Rolex waived its request for
attorneys’ fees. Our precedent is clear—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(2) requires parties to move for attorneys’ fees within fourteen days of
entry of final judgment, and failure to do so constitutes waiver. United Indus.,
Inc. v. Simon-Hartley, Ltd., 91 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1996). There is no
dispute that Rolex failed to move for attorneys’ fees with the district court
and it cites no authority to excuse that failure. Accordingly, the district court
did not err in opting not to award treble profits and attorneys’ fees.
       iii. Scope of Injunction
       Finally, Rolex argues that the district court erred by not enjoining
BeckerTime from using non-genuine bezels and non-genuine dials on Rolex-
branded watches. BeckerTime argues that the injunction comports with the
district court’s factual findings and the equitable principles it considered.
       We agree with Rolex that the district court should have enjoined the
sale of Rolex watches with non-genuine bezels. The district court specifically
found that “advertisements labeling watches with a non-genuine bezel as a
Rolex is likely to confuse customers” and that, like dials and bracelets, bezels
“are integral and necessary to the at-issue watches.” Consistent with these

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findings, the district court prohibited BeckerTime from displaying the
“GENUINE ROLEX” trademark “in any disclosures in connection with
goods or services of watches that include: non-genuine (i.e. not made by
Rolex) bezels.” Yet by excluding non-genuine bezels from parts 1(a) and (b)
of its injunction, the district court treated “integral and necessary” watch
parts inconsistently, authorized BeckerTime to sell what it believed would
likely cause confusion if advertised, and permitted BeckerTime to use Rolex
trademarks on watches with non-genuine bezels, but prohibited the same
action if it used the GENUINE ROLEX trademark in a disclosure.
       These orders are difficult to reconcile, and we therefore grant Rolex’s
requested relief and add non-genuine bezels to parts 1(a) and (b) of the
district court’s injunction to make it consistent with the district court’s other
findings and to treat all “integral and necessary” watch parts the same. See
Meece, 158 F.3d at 825.
       We also agree with Rolex that part 1(a) of the district court’s
injunction should be modified to include all non-genuine dials, including
those with original Rolex marks. We are persuaded by Rolex’s argument
that, unlike part 1(b) of the injunction, part 1(a) contains no limitations on
customer requests. However, we reject Rolex’s argument that the district
court erred by excluding all non-genuine dials from part 1(b) of the
injunction. Part 1(b) specifically carved out instances in which customers
requested customization and would thus not be confused, and there is no
affirmative authorization in part 1(b) as sweeping as that of part 1(a).
       We likewise reject Rolex’s argument that the district court erred in
requiring that BeckerTime inscribe “CUSTOMIZED BY BECKERTIME”
on the back of the watches, claiming it should not permit them to continue
selling “counterfeit” watches at all. But the district court here specifically
found that the disclosures BeckerTime made did not “fully alleviate

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confusion,” and it is reasonable that the district court required an additional
disclosure to adequately alleviate any remaining confusion.
       Finally, we reject Rolex’s argument that the district court improperly
permitted BeckerTime to sell counterfeit watches upon customer request.
The district court reasonably found that, with the required disclosures, no
customer requesting a customized watch by BeckerTime would confuse it
with a genuine Rolex watch.
       However, turning to section 1(c), we agree with Rolex that the
typographical errors in the section render it vague and unqualified. See State
of Louisiana. v. Biden, 45 F.4th 841, 846 (5th Cir. 2022) (“To comply with
Rule 65(d) a district court’s order should state its terms specifically and
describe in reasonable detail the conduct restrained or required.”).
However, we cannot understand the district court’s intent as to this section.
Accordingly, we order a limited remand solely for the district court to clarify
its language in part 1(c). Specifically, it should correct the two following
typographical errors by filling in the missing language as it deems
appropriate: (1) “where the (including. . .” and (2) “or to which other have
been added.” The remainder is affirmed as modified.
                                      IV
       For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
insofar as it concluded that BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademarks, that
the laches defense prevented disgorgement of BeckerTime’s profits, and that
Rolex was not entitled to treble profits or attorneys’ fees. We AFFIRM AS
MODIFIED the district court’s injunction in part and REMAND in part
to correct the errors outlined above. This is a limited remand. Accordingly,
should either party seek appellate review following modification of the
injunction by the district court, the appeal will be assigned to this panel. See
M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 288 (5th Cir. 2018).

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