Court Opinion

ID: 9401245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 15:02:00.59052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.496229
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13128   Document: 32-1    Date Filed: 06/12/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13128
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       IVAN AMNAY,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.,
       DOES 1-10,
       inclusive,
       WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A.,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13128     Document: 32-1        Date Filed: 06/12/2023   Page: 2 of 9

       2                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13128

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02610-WFJ-CPT
                          ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Ivan Amnay appeals the district court’s order dismissing Am-
       nay’s second amended complaint against Defendants Select Portfo-
       lio Servicing, Inc. (“Select Portfolio”) and Wilmington Trust, N.A.
       (“Wilmington”). No reversible error has been shown; we aﬃrm.
                                           I.
              Brieﬂy stated, this appeal involves a dispute about Amnay’s
       ownership interest in non-homestead residential property in Palm
       Harbor, Florida (“Property”). According to his second amended
       complaint, Amnay owned the Property subject to a mortgage. The
       loan documents were executed and recorded in July 2007. Amnay
       later ﬁled an action in bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy pro-
       ceedings, Amnay’s personal obligation under the promissory note
       was discharged. The mortgage lien on the Property, however, re-
       mained intact.
USCA11 Case: 22-13128        Document: 32-1       Date Filed: 06/12/2023        Page: 3 of 9

       22-13128                 Opinion of the Court                              3

              On 10 October 2018, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed the
       Property to Wilmington pursuant to a Trustee’s Deed. The Trus-
       tee’s Deed was recorded on 22 January 2019. 1
              According to Amnay, the Property was then rented out by
       Defendants and fell into disrepair. Amnay says Select Portfolio ap-
       proached him “with an oﬀer to modify the lien and payments due
       under the loan, including waiving arrearages and making the Plain-
       tiﬀ the owner of the Property (subject to Defendant’s lien), if Plain-
       tiﬀ would agree to take over care and maintenance of the Prop-
       erty.” Amnay agreed to assume maintenance of the Property on
       the condition that he be permitted to rent the Property and to re-
       tain the rental payments.
             Amnay says the terms of the parties’ agreement are re-
       ﬂected in a written Lien Modiﬁcation Agreement, with an eﬀective
       date of 1 November 2019 (“Modiﬁcation Agreement”). 2 Accord-
       ing to Amnay, the Modiﬁcation Agreement also “eﬀected a transfer
       of ownership of the Property to Plaintiﬀ.”
              Amnay says he performed his obligations under the Modiﬁ-
       cation Agreement by making monthly payments and by maintain-
       ing insurance on the Property for almost two years. Amnay also
       says he made “substantial repairs” to the Property, including

       1 A copy of the Trustee’s Deed is attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
       2 A copy of the Modification Agreement is attached to Amnay’s initial com-
       plaint.
USCA11 Case: 22-13128     Document: 32-1     Date Filed: 06/12/2023    Page: 4 of 9

       4                     Opinion of the Court                22-13128

       replacing the roof, installing a fence, repairing the plumbing, and
       painting.
              After the lease on the Property expired, Amnay sought to
       ﬁnd another tenant. Defendants, however, asserted -- based on a
       settlement agreement entered into by Amnay and Select Portfolio
       in a separate civil action -- that the Modiﬁcation Agreement was no
       longer in eﬀect and that Amnay had relinquished all interest in the
       Property.
              Amnay then ﬁled this civil action. In his second amended
       complaint, Amnay asserted a claim for declaratory relief (Count I),
       seeking a declaration (1) that Amnay owns the Property; (2) that
       Defendants’ attempts to prevent Amnay from renting or selling the
       Property were unlawful; and (3) that Amnay’s interest in the Prop-
       erty is unaﬀected by the other civil-action settlement agreement.
       Amnay also purported to assert against Defendants claims for an-
       ticipatory breach of contract (Count II), breach of the duty of good
       faith and fair dealing (Count III), promissory estoppel (Count IV),
       and unjust enrichment (Count V). Defendants moved to dismiss.
              In a reasoned order, the district court granted Defendants’
       motion to dismiss and dismissed with prejudice Amnay’s second
       amended complaint. The district court concluded that Amnay’s
       claim for declaratory relief was speculative and alleged no present,
       ascertainable, and actual controversy. The district court dismissed
       Amnay’s claim for anticipatory breach of contract, concluding that
       Amnay failed to allege facts suﬃcient to establish that Defendants
       owed Amnay a duty under the Modiﬁcation Agreement, that
USCA11 Case: 22-13128      Document: 32-1          Date Filed: 06/12/2023   Page: 5 of 9

       22-13128                Opinion of the Court                          5

       Defendants repudiated that duty, or that such a repudiation would
       give rise to damages. Because Amnay failed to state a claim for
       anticipatory breach of contract, the district court concluded that
       Amnay could state no claim for breach of implied duty of good
       faith and fair dealing.
              The district court next concluded that Amnay could state no
       claim for promissory estoppel in the light of Amnay’s position that
       the terms of the parties’ agreement were reﬂected in the Modiﬁca-
       tion Agreement. The district court then dismissed Amnay’s claim
       for unjust enrichment based on Amnay’s allegations that Amnay
       received consideration, including rental income from the Property
       and a reduced monthly payment amount.
              For the reasons stated by the district court, the entire dismis-
       sal was justiﬁed.
                                             II.
               We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to
       state a claim, accepting all properly alleged facts as true and con-
       struing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiﬀ. See Butler
       v. Sheriﬀ of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012).
               A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
       the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 8(a)(2). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a plain-
       tiﬀ’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
       requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recita-
       tion of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp.
       v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations and brackets
USCA11 Case: 22-13128      Document: 32-1     Date Filed: 06/12/2023     Page: 6 of 9

       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13128

       omitted). Instead, “a complaint must contain suﬃcient factual
       matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
       on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation
       omitted). To state a plausible claim for relief, plaintiﬀs must go be-
       yond merely pleading the “sheer possibility” of unlawful activity by
       a defendant; plaintiﬀs must oﬀer “factual content that allows the
       court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
       for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
              In ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court
       applied properly the pleading standard set forth in Iqbal and
       Twombly. The district court accepted as true -- and construed in
       Amnay’s favor -- the factual allegations set forth in Amnay’s com-
       plaint. The district court also considered properly the Trustee’s
       Deed and the Modiﬁcation Agreement: documents that are central
       to Amnay’s claims and the authenticity of which is undisputed. See
       Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. For Disease Con-
       trol & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). Contrary to
       Amnay’s assertion, the district court did not engage impermissibly
       in weighing the evidence or in resolving issues of disputed fact.
       Nor was the district court required to accept as true Amnay’s legal
       conclusion about the ownership of the Property. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
       at 678 (noting that a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
       conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
USCA11 Case: 22-13128         Document: 32-1          Date Filed: 06/12/2023          Page: 7 of 9

       22-13128                   Opinion of the Court                                  7

              On appeal, Amnay argues chieﬂy that he alleged suﬃcient
       facts to demonstrate that he was the owner of the Property.3 In
       support of his argument, Amnay relies on “Property Owner” lan-
       guage in the Modiﬁcation Agreement, including this language in
       the ﬁrst sentence of the Modiﬁcation Agreement: “This Lien Mod-
       iﬁcation Agreement (“Agreement”) is eﬀective November 1, 2019,
       between IVAN AMNAY, (“Property Owner”) and Select Portfolio
       Servicing, Inc., acting on behalf of the lien holder, (“Lien
       Holder”).”
               Under Florida law, real estate can be conveyed validly only
       through a written document that, among other things, contains
       “words which denote the intention of the parties to a deed to trans-
       fer the title from one to another.” See Fla. Stat. §§ 689.01(1) (requir-
       ing a conveyance of real estate to be made in writing), 689.02
       (providing a statutory form of a warranty deed of conveyance to
       land); Tucker v. Cole, 3 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. 1941) (explaining that a
       valid conveyance of real property must include “apt words of con-
       veyance”); Sanders v. Ransom, 20 So. 530, 531 (Fla. 1896) (noting that
       -- although “[n]o particular form of words is necessary to eﬀect a
       valid conveyance of lands” -- the words used must “show an intent
       to convey a present interest”).

       3 Amnay’s appellate brief does not address separately the asserted causes of
       action or the district court’s stated reasons for dismissing each count for failure
       to state a claim for relief.
USCA11 Case: 22-13128       Document: 32-1        Date Filed: 06/12/2023       Page: 8 of 9

       8                        Opinion of the Court                    22-13128

              That Wilmington acquired valid title to the Property in 2018
       via the Trustee’s Deed is undisputed. According to Amnay, title in
       the Property was later conveyed back to him, pursuant to the Mod-
       iﬁcation Agreement. We disagree: no words of conveyance are pre-
       sent.
              The Modiﬁcation Agreement includes provisions that revise
       the terms of the original lien, including setting out a new principal
       balance, interest rate, and monthly payment schedule. The Modi-
       ﬁcation Agreement contains no language that can be construed
       reasonably as reﬂecting an intention by the parties to convey title
       in the Property. 4 In context, that the Modiﬁcation Agreement re-
       ferred to Amnay using the term “Property Owner” is insuﬃcient
       to demonstrate an intent to convey title to the Property.
              Considering the factual allegations in the complaint and the
       plain language of the Modiﬁcation Agreement and the Trustee’s
       Deed, the district court committed no error in concluding that
       Plaintiﬀ failed to allege facts suﬃcient to demonstrate his owner-
       ship of the Property under Florida law.
              Nor can we conclude that the district court erred in dismiss-
       ing with prejudice Amnay’s second amended complaint. Amnay had
       already twice amended his complaint: once as a matter of course
       and once after the district court’s dismissed without prejudice

       4 Nor does the Modification Agreement contain language that seems to reflect
       the supposed agreement for Amnay to take over the maintenance responsibil-
       ities on the Property or to retain rental payments.
USCA11 Case: 22-13128       Document: 32-1       Date Filed: 06/12/2023      Page: 9 of 9

       22-13128                Opinion of the Court                            9

       Amnay’s ﬁrst amended complaint for failure to state a claim. When
       -- as in this case -- a counseled plaintiﬀ fails to request properly leave
       to amend in the district court, the district court need not grant sua
       sponte leave to amend before dismissing the complaint with preju-
       dice. See Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542
       (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
              AFFIRMED.