Court Opinion

ID: 9928407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 18:01:50.571389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:10.447342
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10008    Document: 39-1     Date Filed: 01/31/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10008
                          ____________________

        OXFORD HOUSE, INC.,
        a Delaware not for proﬁt corporation 1010
        Wayne Avenue Silver Spring, Maryland 20910,
        OXFORD HOUSE-DOTHAN,
        OXFORD HOUSE-COOP,
        OXFORD HOUSE-DODGE,
                                                    Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        CITY OF DOTHAN, ALABAMA,
        an Alabama municipal corporation,

                                                    Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                     23-10008

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00655-RAH-KFP
                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Oxford House, Inc. (OHI) is a nonprofit umbrella organiza-
        tion which has chartered over 3,000 group homes in the United
        States, including three homes in Dothan, Alabama: Oxford House-
        Coop, Oxford House-Dodge, and Oxford House-Dothan (collec-
        tively, Oxford Houses). Plaintiffs-Appellants OHI and Oxford
        Houses1 appeal the district court’s decision in favor of the City of
        Dothan, Alabama (the City) on Oxford House’s failure-to-accom-
        modate claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). After careful re-
        view and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
                                              I
             OHI is a 501(c)(3) corporation that developed a sober com-
        munal-living concept where residents who are recovering from

        1 When referring only to the nonprofit organization, this opinion will use

        “OHI.” When referring only to the three group homes, this opinion will use
        “Oxford Houses.” When referring to both OHI and Oxford Houses—who to-
        gether brought this case and appeal—this opinion will use “Plaintiffs-Appel-
        lants.” A central issue in this case is whether the Oxford Houses should be
        considered businesses, and because it is not disputed that OHI is a business,
        this delineation between entities is critical.
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        23-10008               Opinion of the Court                         3

        alcoholism or drug addiction live together. Typically, between six
        and fifteen unrelated residents live in these group homes. OHI pro-
        vides charters to the individual houses as long as certain require-
        ments are met: (1) the house must be democratically self-run; (2)
        the house must be financially self-supporting; and (3) the residents
        must immediately expel any resident who returns to drugs or alco-
        hol.
                In 2018, Alabama contracted with OHI to open group
        homes throughout the state, which included the three Oxford
        Houses in Dothan. OHI sought to set up utility services at each
        property in the name of each house. The City’s policy requires that
        if a utility account is to be opened in a business’s name, then that
        business must obtain a business license. Dothan municipal code
        broadly defines “business” to include “any commercial or industrial
        enterprise, trade, profession, occupation, calling, or livelihood, in-
        cluding the lease or rental of residential or nonresidential real es-
        tate, and every other kind of activity whether or not carried on for
        gain or profit.” Dothan City Code § 18-2. The municipal code also
        provides that business licenses are free to nonprofit organizations
        like OHI and its chartered houses. Therefore, if the three Oxford
        Houses are determined to be “businesses” under the municipal
        code, they must obtain a free business license in order to open a
        utility account, or they must qualify for a reasonable accommoda-
        tion.
              OHI requested an accommodation for each house, but the
        City denied the requests, insisting that all utility accounts opened
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10008

        in associational names (including organizations with similar pur-
        poses as OHI) require a business license. Ultimately, OHI employ-
        ees had the landlords of the homes, who are not residents, open
        accounts for each house.
               Plaintiffs-Appellants sued the City for violating the FHA by
        requiring the Oxford Houses to obtain business licenses in order to
        receive utility service. Plaintiffs-Appellants asserted two claims: in-
        tentional discrimination and failure-to-accommodate. Plaintiffs-
        Appellants moved for partial summary judgment on their failure-
        to-accommodate claim while the City moved for summary judg-
        ment on all claims. The district court denied Plaintiffs-Appellants’
        partial motion for summary judgment and granted the City’s mo-
        tion for summary judgment on all the claims. Plaintiffs-Appellants
        timely appealed the denial of the failure-to-accommodate claim.2
                                               II
               “We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, exam-
        ining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
        light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sailboat Bend Sober
        Living, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1274 (11th Cir.
        2022). We will affirm if “there is no genuine issue as to any material
        fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

        2 Plaintiffs-Appellants do not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judg-

        ment in the City’s favor on the intentional discrimination claim.
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        23-10008               Opinion of the Court                         5

                                         III
              Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal the district court’s grant of sum-
        mary judgment in the City’s favor on their failure-to-accommodate
        claim. As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether the Ox-
        ford Houses are businesses under Dothan City Code. If the Oxford
        Houses are businesses and require a business license, we will then
        consider their request for an accommodation and failure-to-accom-
        modate claim.
                                          A
                Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the Oxford Houses are not
        businesses but instead operate as families, and that this familial dy-
        namic is critical to resident recovery. However, the City’s defini-
        tion of “business” is broad, covering “every other kind of activity
        whether or not carried on for gain or profit.” Dothan City Code
        § 18-2. We do not deny the familial nature of the Oxford Houses,
        but however familial they are, they still meet the City’s definition
        of a “business.” The Oxford Houses engage in not-for-profit activ-
        ity: providing support and community to recovering addicts. Each
        house elects its own officers and leases property in the house name
        rather than the name of a resident, and the residents must abide by
        OHI charter requirements, or the house will lose its designation
        and affiliation with the institution. As Plaintiffs-Appellants
        acknowledge, this is enough to give rise to a business classification
        under Dothan’s definition of that term. Therefore, for the pur-
        poses of this appeal, the Oxford Houses were properly categorized
        as “businesses” by the district court, and we proceed now to Plain-
        tiffs-Appellants’ accommodation argument.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                        23-10008

                                                B
               The FHA prohibits discrimination in housing and housing
        related matters. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Specifically, “the FHA pro-
        scribes a defendant’s ‘refusal to make reasonable accommodations
        in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommoda-
        tions may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to
        use and enjoy a dwelling.’” Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1280 (quoting
        42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)) (alteration adopted).
               To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, the plaintiff
        must prove “(1) that he is disabled, (2) that he requested a reasona-
        ble accommodation, (3) that the requested accommodation was
        necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
        dwelling, and (4) that the defendant refused to make the requested
        accommodation.” Schaw v. Habitat for Human. of Citrus Cnty., Inc.,
        938 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019) (alterations adopted and inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted).
              Both the City and Plaintiffs-Appellants moved for summary
        judgment on this claim, focusing their arguments on the reasona-
        bleness and necessity prongs. The district court did not address the
        reasonableness prong. 3 But the district court found that Plaintiffs-

        3 The City argues that even if we find that the district court erred on the ne-

        cessity prong, we can still affirm on the reasonableness prong. See Gundy v.
        City of Jacksonville, 50 F.4th 60, 70 (11th Cir. 2022) (We “may affirm the judg-
        ment of the district court on any ground supported by the record, regard-less
        of whether that ground was relied upon or even considered by the district
        court.” (quoting Kernel Recs. Oy v. Mosely, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012)).
        Although the City is correct, we decline to affirm on this alternate reason
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        23-10008                   Opinion of the Court                                7

        Appellants’ accommodation—waiver of the business license re-
        quirement to set up a utilities account—was unnecessary.
               “The necessity element focuses on the relationship between
        the requested accommodation and the plaintiff’s disability.” Sail-
        boat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1280. “The accommodation must (1) actually
        alleviate the effects of the plaintiff’s disability and (2) address the
        needs created by the plaintiff’s disability.” Id.
               Before we turn to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ reasons for why an
        accommodation is necessary, we must first address their argument
        that the district court improperly applied the summary judgment
        standard. Plaintiffs-Appellants spill considerable ink, but their ar-
        gument lacks merit.
               “The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial bur-
        den to demonstrate the basis for its motion, and must identify the
        portions of the record ‘which it believes demonstrates the absence
        of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906
        F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
        U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “The movant may meet this burden by
        demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present suf-
        ficient evidence to support an essential element of the case.” Id.

        because, as discussed, we find the district court correctly found Plaintiffs-Ap-
        pellants’ accommodation was not necessary. On the other hand, Plaintiffs-
        Appellants argue that the district court erred in failing to consider the reason-
        ableness of the accommodation. But our case law does not require that the
        district court address the reasonableness prong if the plaintiff cannot meet the
        necessity prong. See Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1281.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10008

        “The burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish, by going
        beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue of material fact exists.”
        Id. at 1311–12.
                The City showed that Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to establish
        necessity, which is what the City needed to show to defeat Plain-
        tiffs-Appellants’ summary judgment motion. At that point, Plain-
        tiffs-Appellants needed to produce evidence of necessity, both for
        their own motion and to oppose the City’s motion. As described
        below, Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to do so. Thus, the district court
        properly assessed the motions for summary judgment.
               Turning to the merits, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the
        City should have waived the business license requirement, con-
        tending that the accommodation is necessary because of therapeu-
        tic and financial reasons. The district court disagreed and so do we.
               First, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that an accommodation is
        necessary for therapeutic reasons. They identify two therapeutic
        necessities: the residents’ need for truth, and the residents’ need for
        the Oxford House model. Their truth argument goes like this:
        “[t]he therapeutic need . . . is that ‘recovery under the Oxford
        House model promotes accountability and truth,’ a business li-
        cense incorrectly classifies the residents as a business, and ‘having
        the residents certify or register themselves as a business when they
        are not a business is dishonest and detrimental to their recovery
        and the model.’” Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Dothan, No. 1:21-cv-
        655-RAH, 2022 WL 17475763, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 6, 2022) (alter-
        ation adopted). But the record does not establish that the residents
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        23-10008               Opinion of the Court                        9

        will be the ones filling out business licenses for these homes. So
        far, OHI employees, not residents, have been the ones attempting
        to open utilities accounts. There is no evidence to suggest that the
        residents’ therapeutic needs would be harmed by—or, indeed, that
        they would ever even learn of—OHI employees’ representations
        to the City that Oxford Houses are businesses.
               Plaintiffs-Appellants also argue that the business license re-
        quirement undermines three therapeutic aspects of the Oxford
        House model. One such aspect is an Oxford House’s familial envi-
        ronment. Plaintiffs-Appellants’ expert testified (1) that an Oxford
        House’s familial environment promotes residents’ recoveries and
        (2) that being “in actuality” a business would damage that environ-
        ment by “negat[ing] the specific activity of developing family bonds
        among residents.” But there is no evidence to support what the
        expert meant by “be[ing], in actuality, a business,” and Plaintiffs-
        Appellants offer no explanation for why filing a business license
        would discourage the forming of any familial bonds. Thus, there is
        no evidence that an accommodation is necessary to preserve the
        therapeutic aspect of the Oxford House model.
               Another named benefit of the Oxford House model is that,
        by requiring utilities be put in the house name, an Oxford House
        prevents any one resident from gaining control over others and
        making him or herself invulnerable to expulsion. But again, there
        is no evidence that the business license would result in the kind of
        unilateral control that the Oxford House model seeks to avoid—
        especially if an OHI employee or the individual House’s landlord
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10008

        applies for the license. In fact, registering as a business would avoid
        that problem because there would be no danger that the utilities
        would be in the name of a resident.
               Finally, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the business license
        requirement undermines the Oxford House model by preventing
        the residents from being directly liable to the utility company. One
        of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ experts explained that having the utilities
        in the name of the house promotes responsibility among those
        who live there. Like the district court, we find that this expert evi-
        dence does not show how filing a business license would eliminate
        this responsibility and thus how opening a utility account without
        a business license “actually alleviate[s] the effects of” or “ad-
        dress[es] the needs created by” the residents’ disability—i.e., their
        addiction. Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1280. The district court
        properly found that there was no therapeutic need to exempt the
        Oxford Houses from obtaining a business license for utilities.
                In addition to therapeutic reasons, Plaintiffs-Appellants also
        argue that an accommodation is necessary for financial reasons.
        They maintain that an increase in insurance premiums for the land-
        lords will be passed onto the residents through increased rental
        rates. Even assuming that the increase in insurance premiums pre-
        sented in the district court would be passed onto the residents,
        Plaintiffs-Appellants have “adduced no concrete evidence that [Ox-
        ford House] residents’ addiction has some causal tie to their inabil-
        ity to afford a rent increase.” Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1280. Plain-
        tiffs-Appellants point to one affidavit where, Lori Hortzclaw, a
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        23-10008               Opinion of the Court                       11

        former Oxford House resident and current Regional Manager of
        OHI, explains that increasing the insurance premium will result in
        a 12% increase in rent, making housing costlier and financially out
        of reach for many potential Oxford House residents.
                However, this is even less evidence than what we found in-
        adequate in Sailboat Bend. Again, assuming that increased costs
        would be transferred to the residents, Plaintiffs-Appellants have
        provided no evidence about its current residents’ income and their
        ability (or inability) to afford rent increases. See id. at 1281.
        Holtzclaw’s generalized statements about the risk that residents
        will be unable to afford rent increases are insufficient. See id. The
        district court properly found that there was no financial need to
        exempt the Oxford Houses from obtaining a business license for its
        utilities.
                                         IV
               Thus, the district court did not err in denying Plaintiffs-Ap-
        pellants’ motion for partial summary judgment, nor in granting the
        City’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs-Appellants’ fail-
        ure-to-accommodate claim. We affirm the district court’s judg-
        ment.
              AFFIRMED.