Court Opinion

ID: 9547673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:50:17.791879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:56.498000
License: Public Domain

*915RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. The majority reverses the judgment on the ground of improper admission of testimony “concerning gang membership and drug use” by defendant. (Ante, p. 903.) In my view, the asserted “errors” were entirely harmless under the circumstances in this case.
1. Admissibility of Common-group Membership
Defendant asserted an alibi. Defense witnesses Ozaeta, Reeves, Valenzuela, and defendant himself, testified that he was elsewhere during the offense. On cross-examination, and over defendant’s objections, the prosecution was permitted to establish that defendant and his witnesses each belonged to a youth group known as the El Monte Flores. The majority’s accusation that the prosecutor “portray[ed] appellant as a Chicano gang member predisposed to commit violent crimes” {ante, p. 914) seriously misstates the record. The prosecutor made no references whatever to “gangs,” “Chícanos,” or “violent crimes,” and he offered no evidence on these subjects. As the record shows, the prosecutor was merely permitted to show that defendant and his alibi witnesses were each members of the same youth group. Defendant’s own witness described the group as “just good friends that are in our neighborhood.” The prosecutor offered no evidence to refute that benign characterization. Subsequently, defense counsel elicited the further information that the group consisted of 250-300 members and was believed by the police to be a “gang.”
The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence pertaining to the group membership shared by defendant and defense witnesses. In my view, the issue is controlled by In re Wing Y. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 69, 79 [136 Cal.Rptr. 390], a case which the majority conveniently ignores.
In Wing Y., during the course of a wardship proceeding, the prosecutor cross-examined defense witnesses regarding their membership with defendant in the Wah Ching, a Chinatown gang. Unlike the present case, evidence was also introduced regarding the gang’s past criminal activities. The Wing Y. court acknowledged the general proposition, fully applicable here, that “a witness may, on cross-examination, be asked about group membership he shares with a party to the action, on the theory that such common membership is a factor that tends to impeach a witness’ testimony by establishing bias.... Thus, the prosecution in the instant case properly could inquire of [defense] witnesses ... re*916garding their friendship with Wing, including their common group membership, as a means of attacking their credibility as witnesses, by establishing a bias in favor of the minor.” (67 Cal.App.3d at pp. 76-77, italics added; see also People v. Dominguez (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 481, 499 [175 Cal.Rptr. 445]; People v. Perez (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 470, 477 [170 Cal.Rptr. 619] [gang membership admissible if relevant]; People v. James (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 876, 886 [128 Cal.Rptr. 733]; People v. Avila (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 627, 631 [85 P.2d 200]; Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f).)
The court in Wing Y. Concluded, however, that it was improper to introduce evidence of both (1) defendant Wing’s gang membership, based upon hearsay and reputation evidence rather than upon the personal knowledge of the testifying officer; and (2) the gang’s supposed criminal activities. (67 Cal.App.3d, at pp. 77-79.) The court stressed that, apart from its use for impeachment purposes, evidence of gang membership ordinarily has no “‘tendency in reason’ to prove a disputed fact, i.e., the identity of the person who committed the charged offense. Membership in an organization does not lead reasonably to any inference as to the conduct of a member on a given occasion. Hence, the evidence was not relevant! It allowed, on the contrary, unreasonable inferences to be made by the trier of fact that the. minor Wing was guilty of the offense charged on the theory of ‘guilt by association.’” (P. 79, italics in original.)
The case before us is readily distinguishable from Wing Y Here, in questions pointed to the subject of the group membership shared by defendant and his witnesses, the prosecution relied on neither hearsay nor reputation evidence, but upon the direct knowledge of the witnesses. Moreover, my review of the record discloses that no testimony was elicited, nor prosecutorial suggestions advanced, regarding any criminal activities by the group’s members. Thus, the majority’s assertion that the jury “undoubtedly identified” the group as a criminal gang (ante, p. 905) is totally speculative and unfounded.
In any event, had defendant believed that the jury might infer some improper gang activities by El Monte Flores, he could readily have sought appropriate limiting instructions or an admonition which would have confined the jury’s consideration of such evidence to impeachment purposes. Having failed to request such an admonition or instruction, defendant cannot now complain that evidence, properly admissible for *917impeachment purposes, was inadmissible to prove his guilt or discredit his character. This is the clear implication of section 355 of the Evidence Code. (See People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63-64 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534] and fn. 19, disapproving People v. Williams (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 970, 976-978 [90 Cal.Rptr. 292].)
2. Admissibility of Defendant’s Drug Use and Addiction
One of the arresting officers testified, over defendant’s objection, that when he was arrested defendant appeared to be under the influence of PCP (phencyclidine), that his arm bore puncture marks indicating recent heroin injections, and that in the officer’s opinion defendant was a heroin addict with a daily habit costing between $25 and $75 daily. Such evidence was adduced for the sole purpose of establishing a possible financial motive for the attempted robbery with which defendant was charged. Defendant contends that any evidence of his drug use and narcotic addiction was inadmissible as being overly prejudicial when weighed against its slight probative value in this case. (Evid. Code, § 352.) I agree that the evidence was inadmissible. However, I would find the error harmless under the circumstances in this case.
Prior cases have upheld the admission of evidence of the defendant’s addiction or use of narcotics where such evidence is probative of defendant’s motive for committing a drug-related crime. (People v. Copeland (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 713, 715 [338 P.2d 1] [forgery of drug prescriptions]; People v. O’Brand (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 752, 754 [207 P.2d 1083] [burglary to steal narcotics]; see People v. Morales (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 259, 264 [151 Cal.Rptr. 610] [possession or sale of narcotics].) Such evidence is potentially inflammatory and, in light of the possible prejudice to the defendant from disclosure of such evidence to the trier of fact, the cases preclude its admission for purposes of establishing a motive to commit those offenses which are unrelated to narcotics. (People v. Bartlett (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 787, 793-794 [64 Cal.Rptr. 503] [burglary]; People v. Davis (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 156, 161-162 [43 Cal.Rptr. 357] [robbery]; People v. Enriquez (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 481, 485 [11 Cal.Rptr. 889] [robbery/murder]; People v. Guiterrez (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 115, 122-123 [312 P.2d 291] [attempted burglary].) As expressed by the Davis court, “The law entitled appellant to stand before the jury presumptively innocent and of good character. In characterizing him as a narcotics user, ... the prosecution branded him as a habitual lawbreaker, a loathsome, unworthy person, predisposed to rob or steal to support his habit.” (P. 162.)
*918On the other hand, I cannot say that the error, standing alone, had such a grave impact as to require reversal of the judgment. Three defense witnesses corroborated defendant’s alibi testimony. Even if the evidence of defendant’s drug habit may have led the jury to doubt defendant’s own version of events, no reason is suggested why that evidence would have cast doubts on the veracity of defendant’s witnesses, who were not similarly tainted. Moreover, at trial defendant was positively identified as the gunman by four eyewitnesses, although their pretrial identifications were somewhat clouded. The jury was thus confronted with a credibility duel between three alibi witnesses and four eyewitnesses. Having examined the entire record, I do not believe that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached if the drug use or addiction evidence had not been admitted. There thus occurred no miscarriage of justice under article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 834 [299 P.2d 243].)
I would affirm the judgment and remand for resentencing under In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 335 [130 Cal.Rptr. 719, 551 P.2d 23], and People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436, 447-448 [172 Cal.Rptr. 652].
Mosk, J., concurred.
On July 22, 1982, the dissenting opinion by Justice Richardson was modified to read as printed above.