Court Opinion

ID: 9691703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 21:00:24.214728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:51.873837
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4710

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JONATHAN EDWARD BURGESS,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00014-GMG-RWT-1)

        Submitted: March 31, 2023                                         Decided: August 23, 2023

        Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Aaron D. Moss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kimberley
        D. Crockett, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jonathan Edward Burgess pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

        possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). The

        district court sentenced Burgess at the bottom of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range

        to 70 months’ imprisonment and 25 years of supervised release. On appeal, Burgess’

        attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that

        there are no meritorious grounds for appeal that are not precluded by the appeal waiver in

        Burgess’ plea agreement, but questioning whether the district court erred in denying

        Burgess a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing

        Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(a) (2018), and in failing to adequately address all of Burgess’

        nonfrivolous mitigation arguments. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal pursuant

        to the appeal waiver in Burgess’ plea agreement.

               Burgess has filed a pro se brief challenging the constitutionality of law

        enforcement’s search of his home 1 and the offense statutes, the validity of his guilty plea

        and conviction, and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Burgess

        also raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct and judicial bias. We affirm in part and

        dismiss in part.

               1
                 Because a guilty plea “waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings
        conducted prior to entry of the plea,” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th
        Cir. 2010), Burgess’ claim challenging the constitutionality of law enforcement’s search
        of his home is not properly before us.

                                                      2
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               “When the government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and has not breached the

        plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls

        within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.

        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the validity of an appeal waiver de

        novo. Id. “A waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive

        the right to appeal.” United States v. Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “Generally though, if a district court questions a defendant

        regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the

        record indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the

        waiver is valid.” United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               Because Burgess did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea or

        otherwise object to the plea hearing in the district court, the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed

        for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). Under the plain

        error standard, we will correct an unpreserved error “only when (1) an error was made; (2)

        the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects

        the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.

        Walker, 32 F.4th 377, 394-95 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,

        143 S. Ct. 450 (2022).

               Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Burgess entered his guilty plea

        knowingly and voluntarily and that a factual basis supported the plea. See United States v.

        DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). Contrary to Burgess’ contention on

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        appeal, there is no indication in the record that Burgess was coerced into pleading guilty.

        “In order for a guilty plea to be valid, the Constitution imposes the minimum requirement

        that the plea be the voluntary expression of the defendant’s own choice.” Moussaoui, 591

        F.3d at 278 (cleaned up). “In evaluating the constitutional validity of a guilty plea, courts

        look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding it, granting the defendant’s solemn

        declaration of guilt a presumption of truthfulness.” Id. (cleaned up). Based on the totality

        of the circumstances, including Burgess’ sworn statements at the plea hearing and

        representation by counsel, Burgess has not rebutted the “presumption of truthfulness”

        accorded his “solemn declaration of guilt.”       Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Discerning no plain error, we conclude that Burgess’ guilty plea is valid.

               Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing, we

        further conclude that Burgess knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his

        conviction and sentence, except for ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial

        misconduct claims. Moreover, the sentencing issues Anders counsel and Burgess raise on

        appeal fall squarely within the scope of the waiver. The same is true for Burgess’ claims

        challenging the validity of his conviction. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion

        to dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as to all issues within the scope of the waiver.

               With respect to Burgess’ allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and judicial bias,

        our review of the record reveals no evidence of such impropriety. 2 See, e.g., United States

               2
                 We assume without deciding that Burgess’ claim of judicial bias resulting in
        constitutional error is not foreclosed by the appeal waiver included as part of the written
        plea agreement.

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        v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 234 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that, to prevail on prosecutorial

        misconduct claim, defendant must show “(1) the prosecutor’s remarks or conduct were

        improper and (2) that such remarks or conduct prejudicially affected [the defendant’s]

        substantial rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rowsey v. Lee, 327 F.3d 335, 341

        (4th Cir. 2003) (“In order to prevail in a deprivation of due process claim, a defendant must

        show a level of bias that made ‘fair judgment impossible.’” (quoting Liteky v. United States,

        510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994))).

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal outside the scope of Burgess’ valid appeal waiver.

        We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal as to all issues within

        the scope of the waiver and affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment. This

        court requires that counsel inform Burgess, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme

        Court of the United States for further review. If Burgess requests that a petition be filed,

        but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this

        court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy

        thereof was served on Burgess.

               We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                               DISMISSED IN PART

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