Court Opinion

ID: 9770951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:26:18.695221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:23.071549
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
In Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 788 (1969), this Court laid the foundation for the opinion it renders today. Therein we said it is permissible to impeach a witness with a prior unsworn statement that is inconsistent with the testimony given on the stand. Further, we said that the unsworn statement can be considered by the jury as substantive evidence, a position few, if any, other jurisdictions have followed. In the federal system, the prior statement, if unsworn, cannot even be considered for purposes of evaluating the veracity of the witness. The reason for this prohibition is clearly set out in United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576 (4th Cir.1994):
We must be mindful of the fact that prior unsworn statements of a witness are mere hearsay and are, as such, generally inadmissible as affirmative proof. The introduction of such testimony, even where limited to impeachment, necessarily increases the possibility that a defendant may be convicted on the basis of unsworn evidence, for despite proper instructions to the jury, it is often difficult for jurors to distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence.... Thus, the danger of confusion which arises from the introduction of testimony under circumstances such as are presented here is so great as to upset the balance and [to] warrant continuation of the rule of exclusion.
Id. at 580 (quoting United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir.1975)).
For reasons that seemed valid in 1969, this Court declined to conserve the prohibition against using hearsay as an impeachment tool and, going further, allowed the hearsay, unsworn testimony not subject to cross examination, to be considered by the jury as substantive evidence. Now we take a further step. By virtue of this opinion, the majority further extends the Jett doctrine by holding that a witness may now be called for the sole purpose of impeaching another wit-' ness with his or her prior inconsistent statements. As noted in United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir.1984):
It would be an abuse of [Federal Rule of Evidence 607], in a criminal case, for the prosecution to call a witness that it knew would not give it useful evidence, just so it could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between impeachment and substantive evidence— or, if it didn’t miss it, would ignore it. The purpose would not be to impeach the witness but to put in hearsay as substantive evidence against the defendant, which Rule 607 does not contemplate or authorize.
The fourth circuit, in United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir.1975), stated that “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority is, however, that impeachment by *901prior inconsistent statement may not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible.” Sadly, in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, this subterfuge is permitted, if not encouraged, by the adoption of KRE 801-A (a)(1). The unfairness of this tactic and the tragic neglect of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are ignored. I not only dissent from this opinion, but I would overrule Jett v. Commonwealth and amend the Kentucky Rules of Evidence to remove all reference to Jett.
LAMBERT, J., joins this dissenting opinion except as to the suggestion that Jett v. Commonwealth be overruled, but believes that it should not be extended.