Court Opinion

ID: 9899892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:13.555825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.115990
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 Czech v. Herrera CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

JEFFERY J. CZECH,                                                     B316020

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. VC051748)
         v.

YVETTE R. HERRERA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed with
sanctions.

     Law Office of Reshma Kamath and Reshma Kamath for
Defendant and Appellant.

     Czech & Howell and Bradley Chester Arnold for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

                           ______________________________
       Defendant and appellant Yvette R. Herrera (Herrera)
appeals from the trial court’s October 5, 2021, order denying her
motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure sections 473 and 473.5.1 Because the trial court did
not abuse its discretion, we affirm that order.
       In addition, Herrera’s counsel, Reshma Kamath (Kamath),
is ordered to pay monetary sanctions to Czech in the amount of
$1,440 and to the court in the amount of $5,000. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.276.)2
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On October 6, 2006, Herrera retained plaintiff and
respondent Jeffery J. Czech (Czech) to represent her in a
dissolution of marriage. Although Czech performed various legal
services for Herrera, Herrera failed to timely pay him, prompting
Czech to bring a breach of contract action against her. In
response, on or about November 14, 2008, Herrera sent Czech an
unsigned answer to the complaint. When Herrera failed to file
her answer with the trial court, Herrera’s default was entered.
On March 24, 2009, a default judgment in the amount of
$29,730.65 was entered in favor of Czech and against Herrera.
       On February 5, 2019, Czech filed and served a notice of
renewal of the judgment.
       More than two years later, on March 24, 2021, Herrera
filed a motion to vacate the renewed judgment. On August 5,

1
     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

2
     All further references to rules are to the California Rules of
Court.

                                 2
2021, the trial court denied her motion as untimely. She did not
file a notice of appeal from this order.
       On September 10, 2021, Herrera filed a motion to set aside
the default judgment (§§ 473, subds. (a)-(d), 473.5) entered nearly
11 years earlier. On October 5, 2021, the trial court denied the
motion as untimely, under both section 473, subdivision (b), and
473.5, subdivision (a). It further found that the judgment was
not void. Finally, it concluded that Herrera was not entitled to
equitable relief.
       On October 13, 2021, Herrera timely filed her notice of
appeal from the trial court’s October 5, 2021, order.
                           DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction and scope of appeal
       Compliance with the requirements for filing a notice of
appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Hollister Convalescent
Hospital, Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 674.) We
independently review our own jurisdiction. (California
Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 252.)
       As set forth above, Herrera’s notice of appeal solely
designates the October 5, 2021, order as the one being
challenged. Because our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope
to the order identified in the notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction
to entertain Herrera’s challenge to the trial court’s August 5,
2021, order. (Soldate v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (1998)
62 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073; rule 8.100(a)(2); Filbin v. Fitzgerald

                                  3
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 173.) We therefore do not address
Herrera’s arguments concerning this order. 3
II. Standard of review
       We review the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion.
(Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th
313, 319; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.) We
review any subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence.
(Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th
249, 257–258.)
III. Relevant law
       A. Section 473, subdivision (b)
       Section 473, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant part that
the trial court “may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her
through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b), italics added.) “The party seeking
relief . . . bears the burden of proof in establishing a right to
relief,” including a satisfactory excuse for the default. (Hopkins
& Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.) “Where ‘“a
party fails to show that a judgment has been taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect
the court may not grant relief. It has no discretion.”’ [Citation.]”
(Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423.)

3
      To the extent that Herrera’s notice of appeal could be
construed to include the August 5, 2021, order, it is untimely.
(Rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).)

                                 4
       B. Section 473, subdivision (d)
       “Section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court ‘may, on
motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside
any void judgment or order.’ ‘[I]nclusion of the word “may” in the
language of section 473, subdivision (d) makes it clear that a trial
court retains discretion to grant or deny a motion to set aside a
void judgment [or order].’ [Citation.] However, the trial court
‘has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set
aside a judgment [or order] that is not void . . . .’ [Citation.]
Thus, the reviewing court ‘generally faces two separate
determinations when considering an appeal based on section 473,
subdivision (d): whether the order or judgment is void and, if so,
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in setting
it aside.’ [Citation.] The trial court’s determination whether an
order is void is reviewed de novo; its decision whether to set aside
a void order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]”
(Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
1009, 1020.)
       “A judgment is ‘void’ only when the court entering that
judgment ‘lack[ed] jurisdiction in a fundamental sense’ due to the
‘“entire absence of power to hear or determine the case”’ resulting
from the ‘“absence of authority over the subject matter or the
parties.”’ [Citations.] To be sure, a court that ‘“‘acts contrary to
[its] authority’”’ ‘“to give certain kinds of relief, or act without the
occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites’” is often said to
lack ‘jurisdiction.’ [Citations.] But such acts do not render the
court’s ensuing judgment or order void. That is because
‘jurisdictional errors can be of two types[:] A court can lack
fundamental authority over the subject matter, question
presented, or party, making its judgment void, or it can merely

                                   5
act in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power, rendering the
judgment voidable.’ [Citation.] Only void judgments and orders
may be set aside under section 473, subdivision (d); voidable
judgments and orders may not. [Citations.]” (People v. The
North River Ins. Co. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 226, 233–234; see also
In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 624 [“A court acts in excess
of jurisdiction ‘where, though the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has
no “jurisdiction” (or power) to act except in a particular manner,
or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence
of certain procedural prerequisites’”].)
       “In determining whether an order is void for purposes of
section 473, subdivision (d), courts distinguish between orders
that are void on the face of the record and orders that appear
valid on the face of the record but are shown to be invalid
through consideration of extrinsic evidence. ‘This distinction may
be important in a particular case because it impacts the
procedural mechanism available to attack the judgment [or
order], when the judgment [or order] may be attacked, and how
the party challenging the judgment [or order] proves that the
judgment [or order] is void.’ [Citation.]” (Pittman v. Beck Park
Apartments Ltd., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1020–1021.)
       “An order [or judgment] is considered void on its face only
when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the
judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic
evidence. [Citations.] . . . If the invalidity can be shown only
through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations
or testimony, the order is not void on its face. Such an order
must be challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by
section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in

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equity. [Citations.]” (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd.,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.)
        C. Section 473.5
        Section 473.5 authorizes the trial court to provide relief
from a default or default judgment for lack of actual notice.
Section 473.5, subdivision (a), provides: “When service of a
summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to
defend the action and a default or default judgment has been
entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and
file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment
and for leave to defend the action.”
        The provision requires the defaulting party to serve and file
the notice of motion within a reasonable time but no later than
two years after entry of the default judgment or 180 days after
service of a written notice of entry of the default or default
judgment, whichever is earlier. (§ 473.5, subd. (a).) Section
473.5, subdivision (b), further requires the moving party to
provide “an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack of
actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or
her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.” When these
conditions are met, the trial court “may set aside the default or
default judgment on whatever terms as may be just and allow the
party to defend the action.” (§ 473.5, subd. (c).)
        D. Copy of proposed answer
        Both section 473, subdivision (b), and section 473.5,
subdivision (b), require the moving party to file and serve a copy
of the proposed answer. (See §§ 473, subd. (b) [“[A]pplication for
this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer
. . . proposed to be filed therein”], 473.5, subd. (b) [“The party

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shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer
. . . proposed to be filed in the action”].)
IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
        Applying these legal principles, we readily conclude that
the trial court did not err in denying Herrera’s motion to set aside
the default judgment. Regarding section 473, subdivision (b), the
motion is woefully untimely—the default judgment was entered
in 2009, but she did not seek relief until 2021.
        Regarding section 473, subdivision (d), the challenged
judgment is not void. Its alleged voidness cannot be determined
without the consideration of extrinsic evidence. (Pittman v. Beck
Park Apartments Ltd., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.)
        Herrera seems to claim that the judgment is void because
she was never served with a copy of the complaint. This
argument fails. A motion for relief from a judgment that is void
for improper service is governed by analogy to section 473.5. (See
Rogers v. Silverman (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1122.) And,
relief under section 473.5 is not available here because, as the
trial court aptly found, Herrera had actual notice of Czech’s
lawsuit against her—on November 12, 2008, she mailed an
unsigned answer to him in response to the complaint.4 Despite
her knowledge of the lawsuit, Herrera did not file a motion to set
aside the default judgment until more than 11 years later. It
follows that her request for relief was untimely.

4
      We disregard Herrera’s argument that her handwriting on
the envelope that contained her unsigned answer, which was
mailed to Czech, was forged. Herrera’s motion to augment the
appellate record with testimony from a handwriting expert was
denied. There is no evidence that her signature on any document
was forged.

                                 8
       Furthermore, her motion was defective as she neglected to
attach a copy of her proposed answer to Czech’s complaint.
(§§ 473, subd. (b), 473.5, subd. (b).)
       Finally, Herrera argues that she is entitled to equitable
relief.5 Setting aside the fact that Herrera offers no legal
authority or argument in support of her contention that equitable
relief is even available, we are not convinced. As the trial court
noted, Herrera was not diligent in seeking relief—she was aware
of Czech’s claims against her in 2008 yet did nothing to defend
the claims or set aside the default judgment for years. And, she
failed to provide the trial court with a copy of the answer she
would file in response to his complaint.
V. Sanctions
       A. Relevant facts
       On February 6, 2023, Kamath, on Herrera’s behalf, filed a
motion to augment the record with testimony from a handwriting
expert that purportedly established that Herrera’s handwriting
on the envelope sent to Czech in November 2008 was forged. On
February 27, 2023, we denied the motion.
       On March 8, 2023, Czech filed a motion to compel Kamath
to share the appellate record pursuant to rule 8.153; he also
requested $1,440 in monetary sanctions. On March 27, 2023, we
granted Czech’s motion, ordering Kamath to share the appellate

5
       In a similar vein, Herrera asserts for the first time on
appeal that we should reverse the judgment because Czech has
unclean hands. By failing to raise this argument below, it is
forfeited on appeal. (Avalos v. Perez (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 773,
776–777; Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 619, 630.)

                                9
record, and noted that the issue of monetary sanctions was
deferred until oral argument on this matter. (Rule 8.276(c).)
        On May 15, 2023, Czech filed a motion to dismiss Herrera’s
appeal and again requested monetary sanctions. Kamath, on
Herrera’s behalf, filed an utterly offensive opposition to Czech’s
motion. On June 1, 2023, we denied Czech’s motion to dismiss,
but (1) forwarded a copy of Herrera’s opposition to Czech’s motion
(prepared by Kamath) “to the State Bar of California in light of
counsel’s unfounded, outrageous, offensive, and insulting
remarks about the judiciary, specifically those directed towards
Presiding Justice Elwood Lui”; and (2) deferred the issue of
monetary sanctions until oral argument on this matter.
        On July 31, 2023, Kamath filed a reply brief on Herrera’s
behalf, reiterating her groundless argument that Czech failed to
pay the requisite costs to Herrera and Kamath in order for the
appellate record to be shared. The reply brief also repeats the
unfounded inflammatory comments about the judiciary and
Presiding Justice Elwood Lui that prompted the referral to the
State Bar of California. In addition, even though we denied
Herrera’s motion to augment the record, the reply brief relies
upon the declaration of the handwriting expert to prove Herrera’s
contention that her handwriting on the November 2008 envelope
was forged.
        B. Relevant law
        Rule 8.276(a) provides, in relevant part: “On motion of a
party or its own motion, a Court of Appeal may impose sanctions
. . . on . . . an attorney for: [¶] . . . (4) Committing any
. . . unreasonable violation of these rules.”
        “[I]t is vital to the integrity of our adversary legal process
that attorneys strive to maintain the highest standards of ethics,

                                  10
civility, and professionalism in the practice of law. In order to
instill public confidence in the legal profession and our judicial
system, an attorney must be an example of lawfulness, not
lawlessness. [¶] Accordingly, an attorney, ‘however zealous in
[her] client’s behalf, has, as an officer of the court, a paramount
obligation to the due and orderly administration of justice . . . .’
[Citation.] An attorney must . . . maintain a respectful attitude
toward the court. [Citations.]” (People v. Chong (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 232, 243; see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068;
Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2023, B321566)
___ Cal.App.5th ___, [2023 Cal.App.LEXIS 5855] [as an officer of
the court, an attorney owes the court and opposing counsel
professional courtesy].)
       C. Analysis
       We agree with Czech that Kamath’s misconduct warrants
the imposition of monetary sanctions against her.6 Early in
these proceedings, she unreasonably delayed in sharing the
appellate record in violation of rule 8.153. Even after we issued
our order on March 27, 2023, counsel continues to press her
meritless contention that Czech and/or his attorney were the ones
at fault for failing to pay costs associated with lending the record.
       Furthermore, on March 22, 2023, Kamath filed an
opposition to Czech’s motion to dismiss that leveled outrageous
comments against the judiciary and Presiding Justice Lui,
prompting us to notify the State Bar of her behavior. Even after
we issued an order notifying the parties that Kamath’s opposition
was being forwarded to the State Bar, Kamath persisted in
raising unfounded and offensive accusations against this court.

6
      Kamath did not appear for oral argument.

                                 11
       She also filed a wholly meritless motion to augment the
record with testimony from a handwriting expert challenging the
trial court’s findings below. Even after we denied her motion to
augment the record with this purported evidence, she continued
to rely upon it in her reply brief.
       Monetary sanctions are awarded against Kamath and in
favor of Czech in the amount of $1,440. In addition, Kamath is
subjected to monetary sanctions payable to the court for her
relentless offensive filings and communications (as well as
attempted communications that have now been blocked). (Rule
8.276(a)(4); Huschke v. Slater (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1162–
1163.) “This payment must be made in full to the Court of
Appeal (in care of Clerk/Administrator) [no later than 15 days of]
the issuance of the remittitur.” (Id. at p. 1163.) “This opinion
constitutes a written statement of our reasons for imposing
sanctions.” (Id. at p. 1164.)

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                           DISPOSITION
       The order is affirmed. Czech is entitled to costs on appeal.
Monetary sanctions in the amount of $6,440 are imposed against
Herrera’s counsel, Reshma Kamath, with $1,440 payable to
Czech and $5,000 payable to the Court of Appeal in care of the
clerk no later than 15 days after the issuance of the remittitur.
The clerk of this court is directed to deposit said sum in the
general fund.
       In addition, Reshma Kamath is ordered to report the
sanctions to the State Bar. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd.
(o)(3).) The clerk of this court is directed to forward a copy of this
opinion to the State Bar. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (b).)
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                       ________________________, J.
                                       ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

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