Court Opinion

ID: 9852137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:25:14.135526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:23.013621
License: Public Domain

MAYNARD, Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent because I do not believe that Ms. Wurzburg can be held liable for the gas leak of her lessee under any settled principle of law applicable to the facts of this case. It is clear to me that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Wurzburg.
The proper resolution of this ease is simple. As quoted by the majority in syllabus point 3, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 379A (1965) states:
A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to persons outside of the land caused by activities of the lessee or others on the land after the lessor transfers possession if, but only if, (a) the lessor at the time of the lease consented to such activity or knew that it would be carried on, and (b) the lessor knew or had reason to know that it would unavoidably involve such an unreasonable risk, or that special precautions necessary to safety would not be taken.
Here, Ms. Wurzburg agreed to the sale of gasoline by 7-11, so the fust prong of the test is met. Concerning the second prong, however, there is no activity undertaken by the lessee which involves an unreasonable risk. As noted, but ignored, by the majority, our case of Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 170 W.Va. 511, 515, 295 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1982) states that while “the accumulation and use of combustible gas for a private purpose” is an abnormally dangerous undertaking, “[conditions and activities that are a ‘natural’ use of the land are not within the rule, such as ... gasoline in a filling station[.]” Plainly, this Court has stated that operating a gasoline station is not an abnormally dangerous activity that creates an unreasonable risk of harm. Accordingly, applying our law, Ms. Wurzburg is not liable as a lessor in this case.
However, this opinion creates new law out of thin air. In syllabus point 4, the majority opines that “the storage, sale, or distribution of gasoline is subject to the same analysis, as expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519 and 520 (1976), that we would apply to any other activity involving similar or greater danger to the public.” I understand this to mean, when combined with the law articulated in syllabus point 3, that strict liability applies to the operation of every gasoline station in West Virginia, and that every lessor who leases his premises to a lessee who operates a gasoline station is now subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the gasoline. Hence, by the drafting of a single syllabus point, the majority has increased by ludicrous proportions the liability of those who operate gasoline stations and those who own the land upon which *39these stations are located. This amounts to nothing more than an unwarranted modification and expansion of our law.
In addition, this holding defies common sense. There are thousands of gasoline stations in this State located everywhere from rural roadways to the downtown areas of our largest cities. We rarely hear, however, of a gasoline-related accident occurring at one of these stations. Also, it is simply not a common belief of those who live near gasoline stations or those who regularly use them that these stations pose a high degree of risk. Furthermore the storage, sale, and distribution of gasoline is absolutely essential to the life of our nation.
Finally, I fail to see the reason for the inclusion of syllabus point 4 in the opinion. The law governing nuisances is not applicable to the instant ease where a single explosion caused damage to surrounding property. This is apples and oranges. There is simply no way to characterize the occurrence here as a nuisance.
In conclusion, I would have applied our law as written and concluded that Ms. Wurzburg is not liable for the accident at issue. Therefore, I would have affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on her behalf. Accordingly, I dissent.