Court Opinion

ID: 9365219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-23 08:09:28.9356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:43.741450
License: Public Domain

In the
                      Court of Appeals
              Second Appellate District of Texas
                       at Fort Worth
                   ___________________________
                        No. 02-22-00380-CV
                   ___________________________

  ALISON MAGUIRE, KERI CARUTHERS, TRACY RUNNELS, AND EMILY
                     MEISNER, Appellants

                                   V.

ROSA RIOS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CITY SECRETARY OF THE CITY
     OF DENTON, TEXAS; THE CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS; GERARD
HUDSPETH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY COUNCIL
  OF THE CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS; VICKI BYRD, BRIAN BECK, JESSE
DAVIS, BRANDON CHASE-MCGEE AND CHRIS WATTS, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
  CAPACITIES AS CITY COUNCILMEMBERS OF THE CITY OF DENTON,
 TEXAS; AND FRANK PHILLIPS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DENTON
           COUNTY ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATOR, Appellees

                 On Appeal from the 431st District Court
           Denton County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 22-4543-431

      Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion on Rehearing

                    2
               MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING

      Appellants Alison Maguire, Keri Caruthers, Tracy Runnels, and Emily Meisner

sued Appellees Rosa Rios, in her official capacity as City Secretary of The City of

Denton, Texas; The City of Denton, Texas (the City); Gerard Hudspeth, in his official

capacity as Mayor of the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas, and Vicki Byrd,

Brian Beck, Jesse Davis, Brandon Chase-McGee, and Chris Watts, in their official

capacities as City Councilmembers of the City of Denton, Texas (the Councilmember

defendants); and Frank Phillips, in his official capacity as Denton County Elections

Administrator. 1 Appellants’ petition for injunctive and declaratory relief turned on

their interpretation of Section 4.13 of the Denton City Charter in attempting to avoid

Maguire’s recall in the then-upcoming November 8, 2022 election.

      The City, Rios, the Councilmember defendants, and Phillips each filed pleas to

the jurisdiction. Rios, the City, and the Councilmember defendants also filed a joint

Rule 91a motion to dismiss, a response opposing Appellants’ request for a temporary

injunction, and a motion to strike Appellants’ pleading exhibits.

      On September 27, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the Rule 91a motion

and Phillips’s plea to the jurisdiction. In two separate written orders signed on

September 28, 2022, the trial court granted both. In the order granting the Rule 91a

      1
       Appellants also sued Donald Duff, in his official capacity as representative of a
committee of electors in the City of Denton, Texas. On September 7, 2022, after
Appellants and Duff filed a joint motion to nonsuit Duff with prejudice, the trial
court granted the nonsuit.

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motion, the trial court ordered that “all plaintiffs’ claims against [The City, Rios, and

the Councilmember defendants, hereinafter City-affiliated defendants] are now

dismissed” with prejudice, and it “fully released and dismissed” these defendants from

the proceedings. In the order granting Phillips’s plea to the jurisdiction, it ordered that

“each and every claim of Plaintiffs” against Phillips “be DISMISSED with prejudice.”

Appellants appealed.

       Maguire was recalled in the November 8, 2022 election, and the Denton City

Council certified that recall on November 22, 2022.

       On November 30, 2022, we informed the parties that it appeared that the relief

sought by appellants had been rendered moot because the November 8, 2022 election

had taken place. See Kolsti v. Guest, 576 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1979, no

writ) (explaining, in electoral context, that the case had become moot because of

intervening events); see also Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze ISD, 484 S.W.3d 416, 418

(Tex. 2016) (“The mootness doctrine applies to cases in which a justiciable

controversy exists between the parties at the time the case arose, but the live

controversy ceases because of subsequent events.”). We asked Appellants (or any

party desiring to continue the appeal) to file a response showing grounds for

continuing the appeal within ten days, or we would dismiss the appeal as moot. See

Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), (c), 44.3.

       Appellants have filed a response, but it does not show grounds for continuing

the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot. See Kosti, 576 S.W.2d at 894;

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see also Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tex. 2022)

(explaining that a court lacks jurisdiction to issue an opinion on a moot controversy).2

We vacate the trial court’s underlying orders and dismiss the case. Alsobrook v.

MTGLQ Inv’rs, LP, No. 22-0079, 2022 WL 17072341, at *2 (Tex. Nov. 18, 2022)

(“M]ootness on appeal requires vacatur of the underlying judgment as well as

dismissal of the case.”). 3

                                                      Per Curiam

Delivered: January 19, 2023

       Before the election, the City-affiliated defendants filed a motion to dismiss this
       2

appeal for lack of a final judgment. Because we dismiss the appeal for mootness, we
do not reach the merits of the City-affiliated defendants’ motion. See Tex. R. App. P.
47.1.

       In their motion for rehearing, Appellants requested that we correct our prior
       3

opinion by vacating the trial court’s underlying orders. Accordingly, we withdraw our
December 22, 2022 opinion and judgment and substitute the above in their place.
Appellants requested the same relief in a motion for rehearing en banc, which is
rendered moot by this memorandum opinion on rehearing.

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