Court Opinion

ID: 9790427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:45.272441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.461691
License: Public Domain

*501DISSENTING OPINION OF
WAKATSUKI, J.
I respectfully dissent.
At the outset, I want to emphasize that I do not condone the exclusion of individuals from sitting as jurors solely on the basis of race, religion, sex, or ancestry. However, in this case, the petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition should not have been granted or denied based on gender discrimination as prohibited by our constitution. Rather, the writ should have been dismissed based on petitioner’s lack of standing to obtain the relief petitioner sought.
A.
The primary question to be first answered is whether petitioner has standing in this case for the relief it seeks. In Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 768 P.2d 1293 (1989), there was an allegation that fraud committed by public officials resulted in unlawful depletion of public funds. But this court determined that the plaintiffs in that case lacked standing regardless of whether the allegations were true or not. We, therefore, denied relief to the plaintiffs.
Standing is that aspect of justiciability focusing on the party seeking a forum rather than on the issues he wants adjudicated. And the crucial inquiry in its determination is “whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of... [the court’s] jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. [490,] 498-99 (original emphasis).
Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. at 281, 768 P.2d at 1298 (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 *502Haw. 166, 172, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981)); City & County v. Ariyoshi, 67 Haw. 412, 418, 689 P.2d 757, 762 (1984).
Here, the majority fails to explain how the State of Hawaii, represented by the prosecutor, obtained standing to raise the issue of gender discrimination in this proceeding. The State does not serve on the jury, nor is the State the object of gender discrimination. Further, the State has not shown that, in fact, it has suffered an injury to itself, nor that it has been denied the constitutional right of equal protection. See State v. Wilburn, 49 Haw. 651, 654, 426 P.2d 626, 629 (1967). “Constitutional rights may not be vicariously asserted.” State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 457, 509 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1973).
B.
The relief granted to the State is premised on the following, to-wit: (1) the right to serve on a petit jury is a privilege of citizenship which cannot be arbitrarily denied, and (2) the equal protection clause of the constitution prohibits gender discrimination in petit jury selection.
Overlooking the issue of “standing,” the majority proceeds to hold that State action brings this case within the ambit of the equal protection clause of our constitution. “[G]iven the statutory basis for peremptory challenges, and the fact that it is the judge who must excuse the juror, the defendant’s [] biased peremptory challenges were converted into State action[.]” State v. Levinson, 71 Haw. 493, 500,_P.2d_,_(1990). I disagree with such reasoning because in this case the majority converts a “privilege” to serve into a “right” to serve on a petit jury as a protected right under our constitution, a right to be enforced by the judge. Yet, we do not hear any complaints from the women regarding their exclusion, nor do I envision a judge enforcing the seating of an individual upon his or her insistence to serve as a juror when he or *503she is challenged peremptorily on a legitimate basis. Further, such reasoning must logically apply to peremptory' challenges in civil cases. See Fludd v. Dyke, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989).
I foresee in both criminal and civil trials these “Batson” inquiries “stretching out trials that are already too long, by making the voir dire a Title VII proceeding in miniature,” United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984), and eventually nullifying the whole purpose of peremptory challenges. “[I]t is quite probable that every peremptory challenge could be objected to on the basis that, because it excluded a venireman who had some characteristic not shared by the remaining members of the venire, it constituted a ‘classification’ subject to equal protection scrutiny.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
C.
The majority opinion strongly implies that its decision in this action is merely the other side of the coin to our recent decision in State v. Batson, 71 Haw. 300, 788 P.2d 841 (1990). The outcome of State v. Batson was mandated by the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). As I compare this case with both the U.S. Supreme Court’s and this court’s Batson cases, I am of the opinion that the prosecutor's right to raise questions of discrimination is now far broader than the defendant’s right to do so. This is an irony that should not be perpetrated under the guise of “discrimination.”
In Batson v. Kentucky, the court held that a defendant must first make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury by use of peremptory challenges. Once a prima facie showing is made, the State has the burden of coming forward with a neutral explanation for exercising peremptories on the excluded jurors.
*504To [make a prima facie showing], the defendant first must [establish] that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Similarly, this court held in State v. Batson, 71 Haw. at 302-03, 788 P.2d at 842 (emphasis added).
The rule of law, which we adopt for future cases, is that whenever the prosecution so exercises its peremptory challenges ... to exclude entirely from the jury all persons who are of the same ethnical minority as the defendant, and that exclusion is challenged by the defense, there will be an inference that the exclusion was racially motivated, and the prosecutor must, to the satisfaction of the court, explain his or her challenges on a non-ethnical basis.
These cases indicate that where the prosecutor has suspiciously excluded members of one cognizable group of which the defendant is not a member, the defendáni will not be able to demand an explanation from the prosecutor for such exclusion. For example, a defendant of one ancestry group cannot complain that the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to exclude all jurors of another ancestry group. Were the tables turned and the defense exercises its peremptory challenges by excluding all jurors of the same ancestry group, but not the defendant’s, the prosecutor will be able to compel an explanation. Placing a more difficult burden on the defense than on the prosecution in a criminal trial is contrary to the basic tenets of fairness in our criminal justice system.
There is another digression from State v. Batson which the majority fails to explain. As noted above, the prosecutor can be compelled to explain his or her peremptory challenges when all of *505the members of a cognizable group are excluded. In this case, not all of the women were excluded. Although the defense attorney indicated that he would have excluded the last remaining female juror but for the prosecutor’s motion, the fact remains that not all the members of a cognizable group were excluded. The jury included one woman. Furthermore, the prosecutor himself excluded by peremptory challenges nine male jurors. After listening to argument by the prosecutor, I am convinced that he had patently attempted to exclude males in favor of female jurors.
D.
The majority recognizes that its decision will impose practical difficulties upon the trial courts. Levinson, 71 Haw. at 500-01, _P.2d at_. Some of the difficulties I foresee are (1) the protraction of voir dire which will greatly extend the length and increase the costs of trials; (2) the escalation of rancor and animosity between the parties resulting from accusations of discrimination and bigotry; and (3) the injection of unnecessary peripheral issues into trial. Moreover, there will be the added and continuous burden upon the trial court to sua sponte or upon motion to determine whether unlawful discrimination based on sex, race or religion had been patently exercised in the selection of jury members.
E.
The further erosion of the historical purpose for peremptory challenges is simply unnecessary in this case. I would hold that the State lacked standing to raise the constitutional issue of “equal protection” in seeking relief before this court, and therefore, would dismiss the petition.