Court Opinion

ID: 9675665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:01:26.95568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:00.836325
License: Public Domain

GUDGEL, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority of the panel that the judgment in this case must be reversed. However, I cannot agree that the Supreme Court, in Newman v. Newman, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 137 (1980), approved a definitive formula for determining the value of nonmarital property interests. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to state my views separately.
Using the formula discussed in the Newman case, the discussion of which I believe was dicta in that case, the majority opinion devises a formula trial courts are encouraged to use in valuing nonmarital property interests. In doing so, the previous formulas approved by this Court in Robinson v. Robinson, Ky.App., 569 S.W.2d 178 (1978), and its progeny, are abandoned. While I do not disagree with abandoning the particular formulas approved in Robinson and its progeny, I cannot agree that in light of the Newman case we should proceed to approve a different formula.
I have reached this conclusion after considerable reflection relative to the history and development of this jurisdiction’s substantive domestic relations law. Through the years, we have consistently recognized that the trial court is charged with the duty of resolving all issues in a domestic relations case, including the duty of adjudging a fair and just division of the parties’ marital and nonmarital property. To assist trial courts in performing their duty, we have vested them with wide discretion, and once that discretion has been exercised, we have traditionally been reluctant to interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion or a failure to observe a clear legislative mandate set forth in a statute. Herron v. Herron, Ky., 573 S.W.2d 342 (1978).
If my understanding of the present status of the law is correct, then it follows that we should refrain from giving tacit approval to a formula trial courts are encouraged to use in determining the value of rionmari-tal property interests. This is so, I believe, principally because existence of such an approved formula may encourage trial courts to fail to observe their duty to exercise independent discretion in a given case and disregard the formula, even though the facts of the case may compel such a course. Similarly, the existence of such an approved formula may have a chilling effect upon other trial courts who may wish to exercise independent discretion and depart from the formula in a given case. The importance of our decision not having such an effect, in my view, outweighs any benefit to be derived from the majority opinion’s commendable purpose of providing a workable formula for valuing nonmarital property interests. In addition, since we have never adopted a formula approach to resolve cases involving a division of marital property, I have concluded that we erred, myself included, when we undertook to do so in cases involving nonmarital property.
I do agree, however, that the judgment in this case must be reversed. There is evidence that the parties applied marital funds to reduce the balance of the mortgage indebtedness owed on appellee’s nonmarital real properties. Therefore, some portion of the increased value of the properties at dissolution was attributable to the joint efforts of the parties during the marriage. Accordingly, some portion of their value at dissolution was required to set aside as marital property, KRS 403.190(2)(e), and the court’s failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.