Court Opinion

ID: 9826995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:02:29.330185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:20.673763
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Upon more mature consideration of this case on rehearing we have concluded that a wrong disposition was made thereof in our original opinion, and that the case should be reversed and remanded for another trial.
The evidence will not support our finding that appellee was being paid $150 per month for his services as pumper at the time of the accident. If the evidence were considered apart from the testimony of the appellee himself, and if we would be justified in construing appellee’s testimony as a matter of opinion merely, as we did in arriving at our conclusions expressed in the original opinion, the evidence would be sufficient; but we were not justified in so construing the evidence. The appellee himself, whose testimony indicates that he is an intelligent witness, and whose appointment as receiver would indicate as much, testified in the following language:
“When I was appointed as receiver, of course, I wanted some compensation, I wanted some money. There was a definite understanding as to what I was to receive as receiver. I understood I was to receive a certain amount as receiver. That amount was $150. That is as receiver and to look after the lease.
“I was fully aware of the fact that I was receiver of the Harris-Eisher Oil Company, and acting as such.”
The testimony of a party to a suit and admissions made by him must be construed as binding upon him, and not merely as raising issues of fact. His testimony is governed by different rules to those governing witnesses who are not parties. Mhoon v. Cain, 77 Tex. 316, 14 S. W. 24; Nerio v. Christen (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 1038; Smith v. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.) 184 F. 387, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 429; Hubb-Diggs Co. v. Mitchell (Tex. Civ. App.) 256 S. W. 702.
The evidence quoted can be construed by us in no other light than that this salary was paid to appellee as receiyer. The most favorable light to appellee in which it could be construed would be that a part of it was paid to him as receiver and a part for looking after the lease. The amount which it was estimated would compensate him for his services as receiver and the amount which would compensate him for his services as a pumper are not separated in the testimony, and we are therefore left without any wage upon which to base the amount of compensation. If, as a matter of fact, appellee agreed to do the work as a pumper without pay, on condition .that he be paid this wage as receiver, he had the right to make that agreement, and we have no authority to change it or otherwise construe it. If appellee’s salary was paid him as a receiver, he would have been entitled to draw that salary, even if the wells had ceased to produce and he had been thereby relieved of his duties as pumper on tbe day following his appointment. If that was the nature of his employment, as his evidence indicates, then it follows as a necessary conclusion that there was no wage as a pumper upon which compensation could be based.
The. appellee’s pleadings do not specifically allege that he was receiving the sum of $150 per month, or any other sum, for services as pumper on the lease. The petition is insufficient on that account.
The motion for rehearing is granted; the judgment of this court at a former day affirming the judgment of the trial court is set aside; the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded.