Court Opinion

ID: 9793829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:53:38.490894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:30.073450
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the prevailing opinion. The respondent sued for failure of the appellant (hereafter referred to as the Board) to renew his teaching contract. He was a tenured teacher in the district and was entitled to a contract for the ensuing school year if he made application for a position that he was capable of handling.
The school in which he had been teaching had to be closed because of age and lack of pupils. The teachers were told that if they desired to teach during the next year they should make written application to the Board.
Instead of applying for a position in the district wherein his services would be most useful, Mr. Pratt sent a letter requesting an assignment at the Todd Elementary School in the town of Roosevelt. The Superintendent of the Board discussed the application with Mr. Pratt and expressed doubts as to his ability to handle the work in that school as a new method of teaching was to be -utilized which required special training, viz: a “team teaching method.” Mr. Pratt testified that “I was pretty disgusted. So I replied that I wouldn’t like to work for somebody that didn’t want me.”
It is obvious that he intended to teach in the new school or not at all. He never made application to teach in any other school in the district and seemed determined to make his own assignment regardless of his ability to do the work.
Shortly after his conversation with the Superintendent, he made application for a teaching position in an adjoining school district, and on August 14, 1973, he sent a letter requesting a hearing on his termination. The request was granted, and he was heard on September 5,1973. There were no positions available by that time, and it does not appear from the record that he was willing to teach elsewhere than in the new school.
On September 24, 1973, he wrote to the Board demanding reinstatement. On April 24 following, he commenced this action to recover damages and to be reinstated as a teacher in the district.
At the court trial of this matter, two stipulations were entered into by Mr. Lyb-bert, counsel for the Board, and Mr. Dib-blee, counsel for Mr. Pratt. It is set forth as follows:
MR. LYBBERT: I understand that the plaintiff is willing to stipulate that they have not proceeded or intended to proceed under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and have not attempted nor have they complied with the notice provisions of that act.
MR. DIBBLEE: I understand that’s correct.
MR. LYBBERT: No. 2: I understand from our previous conversation that you are not making any claim under the provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, Section 53-51-1, at 2d.
MR. DIBBLEE: That’s correct.
Prior to 1975 the law1 required that a claim against a political subdivision of the state “. . . shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within ninety days after the cause of action arises; . .” The word claim means any claim brought against a governmental entity.2
By stipulation of counsel at the outset of trial, it was admitted that Mr. Pratt did not comply with the notice provision of law, *300and, therefore, the claim of being wrongfully discharged is forever barred, even assuming it otherwise had merit.
The jury found that Mr. Pratt was discharged and did not voluntarily resign from teaching. In my opinion, such a finding is entirely contrary to the evidence, and reasonable men could not have concluded as did the jury in this case.
The argument is made that the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act3 renders the Governmental Immunity Act inapplicable in teacher termination cases. The trouble with that argument is that no claim was made at trial under the Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, and it cannot be injected into the matter on appeal.
It seems obvious to me that Mr. Pratt decided upon his assignment and when he did not get it, he concluded it would be best not to work, and to sue for the salary that he did not earn.
The trial court erred in taking the question of damages from the jury and deciding it as a matter of law. However, since Mr. Pratt is not entitled to recover at all, the question of damages is not important.
I would reverse the judgment but would award no costs.
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of EL-LETT, C. J.

. 63-30-13, U.C.Aa953.

. 63-30-2(5), U.C.A.1953.

. Title 53, Chapter 51, U.C.A.1953 (1975 Pocket Supp.).