Court Opinion

ID: 4068610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 00:04:08.422012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:03:38.389530
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                    04-15-00259-CV
                                                                        FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                             SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
                                                                              6/24/2015 10:14:34 PM
                                                                                     KEITH HOTTLE
                                                                                             CLERK

                       NO. 04-15-00259-CV
                                                                   FILED IN
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS      4th COURT OF APPEALS
                                                SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
          FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                              06/24/2015 10:14:34 PM
                     SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
                                                 KEITH E. HOTTLE
                    CITY OF SAN ANTONIO                Clerk

                                                  APPELLANT

                                     V.

               ROXANA TENORIO, INDIVIDUALLY
          AND ON BEHALF OF PEDRO TENORIO, DECEASED

                                                    APPELLEE
             From the 73rd District Court of Bexar County, Texas
                       Trial Court No. 2014-CI-14704
                 Honorable Stephani Walsh, Judge Presiding

                  BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
                  CITY OF SAN ANTONIO

Dan Pozza                         Martha G. Sepeda, Acting City Attorney
State Bar No. 16224800            State Bar No. 13143100
Attorney at Law                   Michael D. Siemer, Assistant City Attorney
239 East Commerce Street          State Bar No. 18343670
San Antonio, Texas 78205          Office of the City Attorney
(210) 226-8888 – Phone            Litigation Division
(210) 224-6373 – Fax              111 Soledad Street, 10th Floor
danpozza@yahoo.com                San Antonio, Texas 78205
                                  (210) 207-8784 – Phone
                                  (210) 207-4357 – Fax
                                  martha.sepeda@sanantonio.gov
                                  michael.seimer@sanantonio.gov

                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT,
                        CITY OF SAN ANTONIO
                 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant                          Appellate Counsel

City of San Antonio                Dan Pozza
                                   State Bar No. 16224800
                                   Attorney at Law
                                   239 East Commerce Street
                                   San Antonio, TX 78205
                                   (210) 226-8888 – Phone
                                   (210) 224-6373 – Fax
                                   danpozza@yahoo.com

                                   Appellate and Trial Counsel

                                   Martha G. Sepeda, Acting City Attorney
                                   State Bar No. 13143100
                                   Michael D. Siemer, Assistant City Attorney
                                   State Bar No. 18343670
                                   Office of the City Attorney
                                   Litigation Division
                                   111 Soledad Street, 10th Floor
                                   San Antonio, TX 78205
                                   (210) 207-8784 – Phone
                                   (210) 207-4357 – Fax
                                   martha.sepeda@sanantonio.gov
                                   michael.seimer@sanantonio.gov

Appellee                           Appellate and Trial Counsel

Rosana Tenorio, Individually and   Joe Brad Brock
on Behalf of Pedro Tenorio,        State Bar No. 03040830
Deceased                           Law Office of Joe Brad Brock
                                   5866 S. Staples, Suite 103
                                   Corpus Christi, TX 78413
                                   (361) 884-1086 – Phone
                                   (361) 884-8446 – Fax
                                   joebrad@thebrocklawfirm.com

                                     -ii-
                                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                                         Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... vii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ........................................... viii
ISSUES PRESENTED............................................................................................. ix
1.       Because the evidence is conclusive that the City of San Antonio did
         not have subjective awareness of its fault, the City of San Antonio did
         not have actual notice. ................................................................................... ix

2.       Because the City of San Antonio conclusively disproved it had actual
         notice, it retains governmental immunity from suit that defeats the
         trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. ......................................................... ix

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................2

ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3
I.       Notice provisions are jurisdictional requirements in suits against a
         governmental unit. .......................................................................................... 3

II.      Tenorio did not comply with any of the notice provisions............................. 5

III.     Actual notice means subjective awareness of fault. ....................................... 5
IV.      There is not a shred of evidence within the exhaustive investigative
         materials provided to Tenorio that the City had subjective awareness
         of fault. ............................................................................................................ 9

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................10

                                                             -iii-
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................12

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................13

APPENDIX

Tab A             Order Denying Defendant, City of San Antonio’s Plea to the
                  Jurisdiction

                                                          -iv-
                                   INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases                                                                                                Page

Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,
      34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) ........................................................................3

Cathey v. Booth,
     900 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) ............................................ 5, 6

City of Amarillo v. Martin,
       971 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1998) ......................................................................4

City of Dallas v. Carbajal,
       324 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. 2010) ................................................................. 4, 7

City of Houston v. Torres,
       621 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. 1981) ......................................................................5

Harris County v. Sykes,
      136 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. 2004) ......................................................................4
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale,
     964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998) ......................................................................3

Miranda v. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife,
     133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004). .....................................................................3

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
      852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ......................................................................3

Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller,
      51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2001) ................................................................... 3, 4

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones,
      8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999) ..........................................................................4
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy,
      74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) ........................................................................3

Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons,
      140 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2004) ................................................................. 6, 8

                                                     -v-
Statutes
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN., Chapter 101.......................... 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034.................................................................................4

                                                     -vi-
                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case.         Roxana Tenorio, Individually and on behalf of Pedro
                            Tenorio, Deceased (“Tenorio”), brought suit against the
                            City of San Antonio under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
                            CR 1-6.

Course of proceedings.      The City of San Antonio filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction
                            based on Tenorio’s failure to provide notice of her
                            claim within the relevant city charter and statutory
                            notice provision deadlines and because the City of San
                            Antonio did not have actual notice of her claim. CR 11-
                            61.
Trial court disposition.    The trial court denied the City of San Antonio’s Plea to
                            the Jurisdiction. Tab A. CR 76-77.

                                       -vii-
              STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

      Because the evidence is conclusive that the City of San Antonio was not

subjectively aware of its fault, the City of San Antonio did not have actual notice.

The City of San Antonio does not believe this Court’s decisional process will be

aided by oral argument.

                                       -viii-
                            ISSUES PRESENTED

1.   Because the evidence is conclusive that the City of San Antonio did not have
     subjective awareness of its fault, the City of San Antonio did not have actual
     notice.

2.   Because the City of San Antonio conclusively disproved it had actual notice,
     it retains governmental immunity from suit that defeats the trial court’s
     subject matter jurisdiction.

                                      -ix-
TO THE HONORABLE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS:

      Appellant, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, files this its Brief of Appellant, and

respectfully shows the Court as follows:

                           STATEMENT OF FACTS

      Tenorio brought suit against the City of San Antonio (“the City”) under the

Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN., Chapter

101, alleging that she was severely injured, and her husband was killed, in a motor

vehicle collision on September 2, 2012. At the time of the collision she and her

husband were riding on a motorcycle on Loop 410 in San Antonio, Texas when

they were struck head-on by a vehicle being operated by Defendant, Benito Garza.

Garza was driving on the wrong side of the highway at the time of the collision.

Tenorio alleges that at the time of the collision Garza was being pursued by

officers of the San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”) and further alleges that

SAPD officers were negligent in initiating the pursuit and in failing to terminate

the pursuit. CR 1-6.

      Tenorio did not give the City notice of her claim, nor of the claim asserted

on behalf of her husband, before filing suit almost two years after the collision.

Tenorio failed to give the City notice of her claim within ninety (90) days as

required under Article XII, Sec. 150 of the City of San Antonio Charter (CR 58)

and failed to give notice of her claim within six months as required by §101.101
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. Instead, Tenorio asserts that the City had actual

notice of her claim as a result of (1) the “Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report”

(TXDOT Form CR-3) prepared by SAPD after the accident 1 (2) a number written

witness statements; and (3) by the SAPD Incident Report. CR 55.

                        SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

      Notice to a governmental entity, such as the City of San Antonio, is a

jurisdictional requirement. Tenorio did not give notice of her claim to the City of

San Antonio as required by TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. §101.101(a) nor

did she give notice of her claim against the City as required by Article XII, Sec.

150 of the Charter of the City of San Antonio and as ratified by TEX. CIV. PRAC &

REM. CODE ANN. §101.101(b). Likewise, the City of San Antonio did not have

actual, subjective awareness of its alleged fault in producing or contributing to

Tenorio’s injuries or those of her husband. Accordingly, the trial court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction because the City of San Antonio retains its

governmental immunity. Tenorio’s suit should be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.

1
      The codes contained in the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report – Code Sheet (TxDOT
      Form CR – 3CS) can be found on the Texas Department of Transportation’s website at:
      http://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/trf/crash_notifications/cr3_code_sheet.pdf; also
      see CR 59-60.

                                             -2-
                                  ARGUMENT

I.     Notice provisions are jurisdictional requirements in suits against a
       governmental unit.

       Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter

jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda v.

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004). A plea to the

jurisdiction is a dilatory plea by which a party challenges a court's authority to

determine the subject matter of the action. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34
S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). A party suing a governmental entity bears the

burden of affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the

cause. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001).

Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to

de novo review by the appellate court. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v.

IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964
S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). When considering a plea to the jurisdiction, the

court must construe the pleadings in favor of the pleader and look to the pleader's

intent. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.

1993). However, the court is not required to look solely to the pleadings when

deciding a plea to the jurisdiction; the court may consider evidence relevant to

jurisdiction when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at

555.

                                         -3-
      Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter

jurisdiction unless the State expressly consents to the suit. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). Governmental immunity operates like

sovereign immunity to afford similar protection to subdivisions of the State,

including counties, cities, and school districts. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d
635, 638 (Tex. 2004). A plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's

jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity. Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587.

Thus, under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a municipality is immune

from tort liability for its own acts or the acts of its agents and employees unless the

Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §101.001 et seq. (“the

TTCA”) clearly and unambiguously waives immunity. City of Amarillo v. Martin,

971 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1998). In order to recover against a governmental entity,

such as the City of San Antonio, a plaintiff must give timely notice of her claim to

the City. TEX. CIV. PROC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a).

      The provision of notice is a jurisdictional requirement in all suits against a

governmental unit. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; See also City of Dallas v.

Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. 2010). Article XII, Section 150 of the City of San

Antonio Charter requires a plaintiff to give the City written notice of any claim for

injuries or damages within ninety (90) days after the injuries or damages were

sustained, as a condition precedent to recovery. CR 58. Section 101.101(b) of the

                                         -4-
Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) ratifies and approves this provision. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. §101.101(b). The Texas Supreme Court has held

that Charter notice requirements are mandatory and their satisfaction is a condition

precedent to maintaining a cause of action. See City of Houston v. Torres, 621
S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. 1981).

II.    Tenorio did not comply with any of the notice provisions.

       Tenorio concedes in her Answers to Interrogatories that she did not give

notice of her claim to the City of San Antonio within the time prescribed by the

City Charter. She likewise concedes that she did not give notice of her claim

against the City of San Antonio in the timeframe provided by Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. §101.101(a). CR 55. Therefore, Tenorio must rely upon the

“actual notice” provision of the TTCA.

III.   Actual notice means subjective awareness of fault.

       Section 101.101(c) of the TTCA provides that the formal notice

requirements of section 101.101(a) “do not apply if the governmental unit has

actual notice that death has occurred, that the claimant has received some injury, or

that the claimant's property has been damaged.” TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE

ANN. § 101.101(c). In Cathey v. Booth, the Texas Supreme Court held that a

governmental entity has actual notice when it has “knowledge of (1) a death,

injury, or property damage; (2) the governmental unit's alleged fault producing or

                                         -5-
contributing to the death, injury, or property damage; and (3) the identity of the

parties involved.” Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

In Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 343–48 (Tex.

2004) the Texas Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the second requirement:

             What we intended in Cathey by the second requirement
             ... was that a governmental unit have knowledge that
             amounts to the same notice to which it is entitled by
             section 101.101(a). That includes subjective awareness of
             its fault, as ultimately alleged by the claimant, in
             producing or contributing to the claimed injury.... It is not
             enough that a governmental unit should have investigated
             an incident ..., or that it did investigate, perhaps as part of
             routine safety procedures, or that it should have known
             from the investigation it conducted that it might have
             been at fault. If a governmental unit is not subjectively
             aware of its fault, it does not have the same incentive to
             gather information that the statute is designed to provide,
             even when it would not be unreasonable to believe that
             the governmental unit was at fault.
140 S.W.3d at 347–48.

      In this passage, and several others, the Texas Supreme Court has made clear

that merely investigating an accident is insufficient to provide a city with actual

notice of a claim. See, e.g., id. at 347 (“Cathey cannot fairly be read to suggest that

a governmental unit has actual notice of a claim if it could or even should have

learned of its possible fault by investigating the incident.”); id. at 348 (“[A]

governmental unit cannot acquire actual notice merely by conducting an

investigation, or even by obtaining information that would reasonably suggest its

                                          -6-
culpability. The governmental unit must have actual, subjective awareness of its

fault in the matter.”).

         The Texas Supreme Court has explicitly held that a police report noting the

perceived cause of an accident does not provide a governmental unit with actual

notice     of    its   fault   in   causing      the   accident.   In   City of Dallas v.

Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. 2010) the Texas Supreme Court held that a police

report concerning an automobile accident was, at most, an initial response to an

accident, and held that the police report failed to give the City of Dallas actual

notice of the Plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 538.

         The facts of Carbajal are highly instructive. Olivia Carbajal sued the City

of Dallas for injuries she sustained after driving onto an excavated road. Id. at 538.

A Dallas police officer who responded to the accident filed a written report

describing the accident, in relevant part, as follows:

                Comp[lainant] said that she saw the barricades but none
                were blocking what she thought was a clear way to get on
                the freeway. Comp[lainant] said that before she knew it
                she had driven her veh[icle] into a gap on the street. [I]
                observed at the listed offense loc[ation] that there were
                no barricades blocking the gap in the road.

Id. at 538.

         Summarizing the incident, the police report stated that Carbajal drove her

“veh[icle] into [a] gap in [the] street [that] was not properly blocked.” Id. at 538.

Approximately a year after the accident, Carbajal filed suit against the City of

                                           -7-
Dallas. Id. at 538. It was undisputed that Carbajal did not provide formal notice as

required by TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a). Id. at 538. Carbajal

contended, however, that the police report provided the City of Dallas with

subjective awareness of the claim, thereby establishing actual notice under TEX.

CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(c). Arguing that the report did not

provide actual notice, the City of Dallas filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial

court denied the plea, and the court of appeals affirmed.

      In reversing the holding of the Dallas Court of Appeals, the Texas Supreme

Court noted that, even though both parties agreed that the road was not properly

barricaded, the police report in question did not provide the City of Dallas with

subjective awareness of its fault because it did not expressly state that the City was

at fault. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 538. The Court noted that the report only

described the apparent cause of the accident (missing barricades) and did not say

who failed to erect or maintain the barricades. Id. at 538. The Texas Supreme

Court held that the police report was merely a routine investigation, and was

insufficient to provide actual notice to the City of Dallas. Id. at 538 (citing Texas

Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2004)).

                                         -8-
IV.   There is not a shred of evidence within the exhaustive investigative
      materials provided to Tenorio that the City had subjective awareness of
      fault.

      In this case, Tenorio admits that she failed to give notice of her claim to the

City of San Antonio as required by §101.101 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

Likewise, Tenorio admits that she did not give notice to the City of San Antonio as

required by the City Charter. Instead, Tenorio contends (CR 55) that the City had

actual notice of her claim by virtue of (1) the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report

(CR 22-25); (2) the sworn statements of the witnesses (CR 26-43); and (3) the

SAPD Offense Report concerning the crash in question (CR 44-52).

      But none of these documents support Tenorio’s contention. Nowhere in any

of the documents identified by Tenorio does it allege that the City, or any

employee of the City, caused the accident, was at fault, did anything wrong or was

in any way culpable. In Box No. 36 of the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report,

labeled “Contributing Factors (Investigator’s Opinion)”, the vehicle designated as

“Unit 1” ( Unit 1 is identified on the first page of the Crash Report as being

operated by Garza) the investigating officer listed the code number “43” which

means “Fleeing or Evading Police”. CR 23. The investigating officer did not list

any other factors that contributed to the accident. The investigating officer only

attributed contributing factor to Garza and did not list any city employee as

contributing to the cause of the accident.

                                         -9-
      In the “Investigator’s Narrative Opinion of What Happened” the

investigating officer notes that “driver of unit 1 was evading police” but says

nothing that even infers that any City employee did anything wrong or was at fault

in any way in causing the accident. CR 23. Nowhere in any of the written

statements identified by the Tenorio does anyone say that the City, or any of its

employees did anything wrong, and nowhere in the SAPD Incident report does it

say that the City, or any of its employees did anything wrong. CR 26-52. Absent

some evidence, somewhere, that the City or its employees did something wrong or

was in some way at fault in causing the Tenorio’s injuries or her husband’s death,

there is no actual notice to the City. If there is no actual notice to the City, then the

City’s immunity to suit is preserved and the case must be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Notice of a claim to a governmental entity, such as the City of San Antonio,

is a jurisdictional requirement. Because Tenorio did not give formal notice of her

claim to the City of San Antonio under the City Charter or by statute, she must

show that the City had actual, subjective awareness of its fault or culpability in

causing the accident. In this case, the City did not have actual notice of its alleged

culpability. The Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report, the written witness

statements and the SAPD Offense Report concerning the crash in question do not

                                          -10-
contain any allegation of wrongdoing on the part of the City or its officers. None of

the documents submitted as part of the City’s Plea or Tenorio’s response make any

reference to the City’s fault or culpability in causing the accident. The City

conclusively proved it did not have actual notice.

                                       PRAYER

      Appellant, City of San Antonio, prays that the trial court’s denial of its Plea

to the Jurisdiction be reversed and the case dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. The City also prays for all such other relief to which it is entitled.

                                  Respectfully submitted,

                                  Martha G. Sepeda, Acting City Attorney
                                  State Bar No. 13143100
                                  Michael D. Siemer, Assistant City Attorney
                                  State Bar No. 18343670
                                  Office of the City Attorney
                                  Litigation Division
                                  111 Soledad Street, 10th Floor
                                  San Antonio, Texas 78205
                                  (210) 207-8784 – Phone
                                  (210) 207-4357 – Fax
                                  martha.sepeda@sanantonio.gov
                                  michael.seimer@sanantonio.gov

                                          -11-
                               /s/Dan Pozza
                               Dan Pozza
                               State Bar No. 16224800
                               239 East Commerce Street
                               San Antonio, Texas 78205
                               (210) 226-8888 – Phone
                               (210) 224-6373 – Fax
                               danpozza@yahoo.com
                               ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
                               CITY OF SAN ANTONIO

                        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I hereby certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing Brief of
Appellant was served via electronic transmission, on this the 25th day of June,
2015, to:

Joe Brad Brock
Law Office of Joe Brad Brock
5866 S. Staples, Suite 103
Corpus Christi, TX 78413
joebrad@thebrocklawfirm.com

Attorney for Rosana Tenorio, Individually
and on Behalf of Pedro Tenorio, Deceased

                                             /s/Dan Pozza

                                      -12-
                    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1.   The undersigned certifies that this Brief of Appellant complies with the type-
     volume limitation of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) because this brief contains
     2,600 words, excluding parts of the brief exempted by Tex. R. App. P.
     9.4(i)(1).
2.   This brief complies with the typeface requirement of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e)
     because this brief has been prepared in a conventional typeface of 14-point
     font in the text.

                                             /s/Dan Pozza

                                      -13-
TAB A
                                    No. 2014CI14704

ROXANA TENORIO, INDIVIDUALLY                     §                   IN THE DISTRICT COURT
AND ON BEHALF OF PEDRO
TENORIO, DECEASED
                                                 §
v.                                               §                   73RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                                                 §
BENITO GARZA AND CITY OF SAN                     §
ANTONIO                                          §                   BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

          ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO'S
                    PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

       On this date came on to be heard Defendant CITY OF SAN ANTONIO'S Plea to

the Jurisdiction. The Plaintiff and the Defendant appeared by and through counsel, and

after considering the City of San Antonio's Plea to the Jurisdiction, the pleadings on file

and the argument of counsel, the Court finds the Defendant, City of San Antonio's Plea

to the Jurisdiction should be in all things DENIED.

       Accordingly, it is Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that Defendant, City of San

Antonio's, Plea to the Jurisdiction is DENIED.
                                                      11PfJ../1...
       SIGNED AND ENTERED this           l0    day ofMttrch, 2015.
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO
Martha G. Sepeda, Acting City Attorney
SBN: 13143100
Office of the City Attorney
Litigation Division
111 Soled St., 10111 Floor
San Ant ·o, TX 78205

             1emer
Assistant City Attorney
SBN: 18343670
(210) 207-8784 I (210) 207-4357 FAX
Attorney for Defendant, City of San Antonio

Law Offi e o~oe, Bra 'Brock
5866 S. S pl , S ite 103
Corpus Ch ti , a 78413

               \
Joe Brad B o ~.
Attorney for laintiff
SBN: