Court Opinion

ID: 9930147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 14:10:13.142406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:04:30.797662
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-22-00227-CV

                                            Kevin HEADY,
                                              Appellant

                                                  v.

                                        Julieta Fuentes HEADY,
                                                 Appellee

                   From the 365th Judicial District Court, Maverick County, Texas
                              Trial Court No. 19-06-37527-MCVAJA
                         Honorable Amado J. Abascal III, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 31, 2024

AFFIRMED

           In this appeal from a final decree of divorce, appellant Kevin Heady challenges the trial

court’s order of possession of his children. Kevin argues the trial court erred when it did not grant

him extended standard possession under sections 153.317 and 153.3171 of the Texas Family Code.

We affirm.

                                            BACKGROUND

           Kevin and appellee Julieta Fuentes Heady were married on June 22, 2013 and ceased living

together as husband and wife in June 2019. Kevin and Julieta have two minor children. Julieta
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filed for divorce on June 20, 2019. On July 16, 2019, Kevin filed an answer and counterpetition

for divorce. The parties agreed to a non-jury trial, and the trial court held a final hearing on

December 16, 2020. Apparently, the parties disagreed on the outcome of several issues following

the final hearing and the trial court held several hearings over the next year as the parties sought

clarification on the trial court’s oral ruling at the final hearing. The trial court signed a final decree

of divorce on January 19, 2022 that stated the divorce decree was “judicially PRONOUNCED

AND RENDERED . . . on December 16, 2020 and further noted on the court’s docket sheet on the

same date, but signed on January 19, 2022.”

        The divorce decree named the parents joint managing conservators of the children and

named Julieta as the conservator with the right to designate the children’s primary residence.

Relevant to this appeal, the trial court ordered “that the conservators shall have possession of the

children at times mutually agreed to in advance by the parties, and, in the absence of mutual

agreement, it is ORDERED that the conservators shall have possession of the children under the

specified terms set out in this Standard Possession Order.” See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§§ 153.3101–153.316 (codifying terms of the standard possession order). Kevin did not request

findings of fact and conclusions of law nor did he bring forward the transcript of the final hearing

held on December 16, 2020; instead, the only portion of the reporter’s record that Kevin designated

was a hearing held on December 20, 2021 wherein the parties disputed how some of Kevin’s

employment benefits should be divided.

        Kevin appeals.

                                              DISCUSSION

        In his first issue, Kevin argues he is automatically entitled to an extended standard

possession order under section 153.3171 of the Texas Family Code because he lives less than fifty

miles from the children’s primary residence. In his second issue, Kevin argues he made an election

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for an extended standard possession order under section 153.317 of the Texas Family Code and

the trial court’s decision not to include these extended possession times in its order is an abuse of

discretion.

                                      STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “Trial courts have wide discretion regarding custody, control, possession, support, and

visitation matters involving children.” In re E.B., No. 04-13-00039-CV, 2014 WL 2547598, at *4

(Tex. App.—San Antonio June 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). “We review a trial court’s decision

on custody, control, possession, and visitation matters for an abuse of discretion; and we reverse a

trial court’s order only if we determine, from reviewing the record as a whole, that the trial court’s

decision was arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. Thus, we will reverse only if the trial court abused

its discretion by acting without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.

                                 TEXAS FAMILY CODE § 153.3171

       Subsection 153.3171(a) of the Texas Family Code states, “if the possessory conservator

resides not more than [fifty] miles from the primary residence of the child, the [trial] court shall

alter the standard possession order . . . to provide that the conservator has the right to possession

of the child as if the conservator had made the elections for alternative beginning and ending

possession times under” section 153.317. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.3171(a). In other words,

subsection 153.3171(a) mandates the trial court render the extended standard possession order if

the possessory conservator lives within fifty miles of the child’s primary residence. Id. However,

subsection (a) does not apply if:

       (1)    the possessory conservator declines one or more of the alternative beginning
              and ending possession times under [s]ubsection (a) in a written document
              filed with the court or through an oral statement made in open court on the
              record;

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       (2)   the court is denying, restricting, or limiting the possessory conservator’s
             possession of or access to the child in the best interest of the child under
             [s]ection 153.004; or
       (3)   the court finds that one or more of the alternative beginning and ending
             possession times under [s]ubsection (a) are not in the best interest of the child,
             including:
             (A) because the distances between residences make the possession schedule
                 described by [s]ubsection (a) unworkable or inappropriate considering
                 the circumstances of the parties or the area in which the parties reside;
             (B) because before the filing of the suit, the possessory conservator did not
                 frequently and continuously exercise the rights and duties of a parent
                 with respect to the child; or
             (C) for any other reason the court considers relevant.

Id. § 153.3171(b).

       Section 153.3171 took effect on September 1, 2021 and applies to a suit affecting the

parent-child relationship that is pending in a trial court on that date. Act of June 16, 2021, 87th

Leg., R.S., ch. 896, §§ 5, 6, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 5478, 5519 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 153.3171); see also In re K.S.L., No. 05-22-00084-CV, 2023 WL 2009985, at *5 n.1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Feb. 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Section 153.3171 of the Texas Family Code . . .

applies to a suit affecting the parent-child relationship that is pending in the trial court on the

effective date of the Act.”).

       The parties dispute whether section 153.3171 applies to the case at bar. Julieta argues the

trial court orally pronounced and rendered its ruling at the final hearing on December 16, 2020 as

memorialized in the final decree of divorce. See Gamboa v. Gamboa, 383 S.W.3d 263, 270 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (“Judgment is rendered when the decision is officially

announced either orally in open court or by a memorandum filed with the clerk.”); see also Howe

v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 260 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding the earlier date a final

ruling was judicially pronounced and rendered controls over the date the decree was signed when

the decree recites that the divorce ruling was judicially pronounced and rendered on the earlier

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date). Julieta argues that because the trial court pronounced and rendered its final ruling on

December 16, 2020, the case was no longer pending on September 1, 2021, when section 153.3171

took effect. Kevin, on the other hand, argues the trial court did not render a final ruling on

December 16, 2020, because the parties continued to litigate essential issues in subsequent

hearings. See Gamboa, 383 S.W.3d at 270 (“In order to be an official judgment, the trial court’s

oral pronouncement must indicate an intent to render a full, final, and complete judgment at that

point in time.”). Therefore, Kevin argues, the case was pending until the trial court signed the

final decree of divorce on January 19, 2022. Because it is not necessary to resolve this dispute to

affirm the trial court’s order granting standard possession as opposed to extended standard

possession, we assume without deciding section 153.3171 applies to this case.

       Assuming section 153.3171 applies to this case, the evidence would have to show that

Julieta and Kevin lived within fifty miles of each other and that none of the reasons listed in

subsection 153.3171(b) precluded the application of subsection 153.3171(a)’s requirement that the

trial court render an extended standard possession order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.3171.

       The only portion of the reporter’s record that Kevin brought forward in this appeal was a

transcript from a hearing on December 20, 2021, wherein the parties argued over how Kevin’s

retirement and employment benefits should be divided between the parties. The parties did not

discuss possession or where the parents resided in that hearing. Although he was entitled to

findings of fact and conclusions of law upon request, the record does not reflect that Kevin ever

requested findings of fact or conclusions of law. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.3171(c) (“On

the request of a party, the court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the

order under this section.”).

       “It is the appellant’s burden to bring forward an appellate record showing reversible error

by the trial court.” Sareen v. Sareen, 350 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no

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pet.). Where an appellant has failed to request fact findings, the reviewing court will review the

record in the light most favorable to the judgment, imply all findings necessary to support the

judgment, and uphold the judgment on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. In re

S.H., 590 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied). “Where the pertinent evidence

is not included in the appellate record, an appellate court must presume that the omitted evidence

supports the trial court’s judgment.”        Thottam v. Joseph, No. 01-13-00377-CV, 2015 WL

1632454, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing

Enter. Leasing Co. of Hous. v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2004)).

        Here, Kevin has failed to bring forward an appellate record showing reversible error

occurred. Subsection 153.3171(a) only applies if there is sufficient evidence that Kevin and Julieta

live not more than fifty miles from each other. See id. § 153.3171(a). There is no evidence in the

record indicating the distance between Kevin’s and Julieta’s homes. Further, without a complete

reporter’s record we cannot determine whether Kevin declined through an oral statement made in

open court on the record one or more of the alternative beginning and ending possession times of

the extended standard possession order outlined in subsection 153.317(a). See id. § 153.3171(b)(1)

(providing subsection 153.3171(a) does not apply if “the possessory conservator declines one or

more of the alternative beginning and ending possession times under [subsections

153.317(a)(1)(C), (2)(C), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7)(C), (8), and (9)] in a written document filed with the

court or through an oral statement made in open court on the record”). Because Kevin has failed

to request findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must imply all findings necessary to support

the trial court’s judgment. See S.H., 590 S.W.3d at 594. And, because pertinent evidence

supporting Kevin’s position is not included in the appellate record, we must presume that the

omitted evidence supports the judgment. See Thottam, 2015 WL 1632454, at *4 (citing Barrios,

156 S.W.3d at 550). Thus, we must imply the trial court found either Kevin lives more than fifty

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miles from Julieta’s home—the children’s primary residence—or that Kevin declined one of the

alternative possession times listed in subsection 153.317(a). 1

           Accordingly, we overrule Kevin’s first issue.

                                         TEXAS FAMILY CODE § 153.317

           Subsection 153.317(a) of the Texas Family Code provides that “[i]f elected by a

conservator,” the trial court shall alter the standard possession order to provide for extended

standard possession by ordering the alternative beginning and ending possession times listed in

that subsection. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.317(a). “A conservator must make an election

under [s]ubsection (a) before or at the time of the rendition of a possession order[,]” and “[t]he

election may be made: (1) in a written document filed with the court; or (2) through an oral

statement made in open court on the record.” Id. § 153.317(b).

           Kevin argues he made an oral election for extended standard possession at the final hearing

on December 16, 2020. As mentioned above, Kevin failed to bring forward the transcript of that

hearing to be included as part of the appellate record. Sareen, 350 S.W.3d at 317 (“It is the

appellant’s burden to bring forward an appellate record showing reversible error by the trial

court.”). In his reply brief, Kevin argues his oral election for extended standard possession is

1
    The trial court’s order denying Kevin’s motion for reconsideration states:

               The Court finds that at the trial on the merits, the Court did not make a finding that it would not
           be in the best interest of the children that [Kevin] be granted the election for Extended Standard
           Possession.

                The Court finds that [Kevin] failed to make an election under section 153.317(a) [of the Texas
           Family Code] before or at the time of the rendition of the possession order as required under section
           153.317(b) [of the Texas Family Code]. Therefore, the Court at the time of rendition did not make
           a finding as to whether the election was or was not in the best interest of the children. Accordingly,
           the request for Extended Standard Possession is denied.

Because the trial court expressly stated in its order that it did not consider whether extended standard possession would
be in the children’s best interests, we decline to imply findings that the extended standard possession order would not
be in the children’s best interests.

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contained within a partial transcript of the final hearing that was filed in the clerk’s record as an

attachment to his response to Julieta’s motion for reconsideration of final orders. While the clerk’s

record is part of the appellate record, the transcript Kevin points us to is not a certified copy of the

final hearing, i.e., it does not contain the court reporter’s certification that the transcript is a true

and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested by counsel.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(b) (“The official or deputy reporter is responsible for preparing, certifying,

and timely filing the reporter’s record if: (1) a notice of appeal has been filed; (2) the appellant has

requested that the reporter’s record be prepared; and (3) the party responsible for paying for the

preparation of the reporter’s record has paid the reporter’s fee . . . .”). Moreover, it is a partial

transcript that only contains portions of what appears to be counsel’s closing argument.

        We question whether it is proper for us to consider this partial, uncertified transcript to

show that Kevin made an election for extended standard possession under section 153.317. See

Kanan v. Plantation Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., No. 13-11-00282-CV, 2012 WL 593067, at *2

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 21, 2012, order) (denying in part appellants’ motion

“insofar as it seeks to file an uncertified copy of the reporter’s record”); Thomson v. Riley, No. 01-

05-00421-CV, 2005 WL 3560617, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2005, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.3(b), it is the responsibility of the

court reporter—not the appellant—to file the reporter’s record.”). Nevertheless, this partial,

uncertified transcript reveals that Kevin requested a “50/50 access schedule” with either a “week

on, week off, [or] two-two-three” possession schedule. We need not decide whether it is necessary

to consider the uncertified, partial transcript because Kevin’s original counterpetition for divorce

also requested “the terms and conditions of the parties’ possession of and access to the children be

split 50/50.”

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       Without citing authority, Kevin asserts—to make an election under section 153.317—he

was only required to “make [a request] asking for possession and access greater than that provided

in a [standard possession order], and to make such statement before the possession order is

rendered.” We disagree.

       Although there are no magic words to make an election under section 153.317, the election

must be specific enough to give the trial court and the opposing party notice of what is being

requested. See Cruz v. Cruz, No. 04-17-00594-CV, 2018 WL 6793847, at *3 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Dec. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The record before us does not reflect, nor does

[appellant] present evidence of, any election by him to be awarded an alternative standard

possession order under section 153.317(a).”). The family code clearly outlines the possession

schedule under a standard possession order. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.3101–

153.316. Likewise, the family code clearly outlines the possession schedule under an extended

standard possession order. See generally id. § 153.317.

       In contrast, a “50/50 access schedule” is not outlined in the family code and is a completely

different type of possession schedule than those schedules under a standard possession order and

an extended standard possession order. See Teneyck v. Teneyck, No. 02-22-00437-CV, 2023 WL

5615873, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“After the close of

evidence, the trial court asked [Father] to explain why he requested a 50/50 schedule versus

expanded visitation.”); In re T.E.H., No. 05-21-00938-CV, 2022 WL 17485037, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Dec. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he parties entered into a Rule 11 agreement

stipulating that they would have a 50/50 possession and access schedule, alternating weeks of

possession.”); In re M.J., No. 09-09-00355-CV, 2010 WL 3042438, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

Aug. 5, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (affirming a trial court’s

standard possession order although appellant requested a “50/50 split in custody” and appellee, on

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the other hand, testified that “extended standard possession would be best”); S.H., 590 S.W.3d at

591–92 (recognizing a difference between the extended standard possession order appellant

assumed the trial court would render and the 50/50 possession schedule employing the

“two/two/five/five split for possession of the children” that the trial court ordered); see also In re

Marriage of Draper, No. 07-22-00123-CV, 2023 WL 2138964, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

Feb. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Nor did the trial court implement a standard possession order.

In lieu thereof, the parents [were] awarded what the court [labeled] ‘Week On/Week Off’ . . . or

‘50/50’ periods of possession . . . .”); In re V.J.A.O., No. 05-15-01534-CV, 2017 WL 930025, at

*7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 9, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it rendered a standard possession order rather than the 50/50, week-on/week-

off arrangement requested by appellant).

       Here, we conclude Kevin’s general request for an undefined “50/50 access schedule” did

not contain the specificity required to inform the trial court that he was making an election for an

extended standard possession order with alternative beginning and ending possession times under

section 153.317 because a standard possession order, extended standard possession order, and

50/50 possession order are three distinct schedules of possession. Our conclusion is further

supported by the trial court’s order denying Kevin’s motion for reconsideration. The order denying

reconsideration states: “The Court finds that [Kevin] failed to make an election under section

153.317(a) [of the Texas Family Code] before or at the time of the rendition of the possession

order as required under section 153.317(b) [of the Texas Family Code].”

       As mentioned above, we do not have a transcript of every hearing conducted before

rendition of the final decree of divorce. Unless the rules regarding a lost, destroyed, or inaudible

reporter’s record apply, which they do not in this case, “the reviewing court must presume the

evidence presented in the record is legally and factually sufficient to support the order or judgment

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at issue.” Sareen, 350 S.W.3d at 317; Ruiz v. Ruiz, No. 02-12-00136-CV, 2013 WL 530958, at *3

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding the reviewing court is

“entitled to presume . . . that the evidence presented in the [missing] record is legally and factually

sufficient to support” the trial court’s order (citing Sareen, 350 S.W.3d at 317)); see also TEX. R.

APP. P. 34.6(f) (providing the rules regarding a lost, destroyed, or inaudible reporter’s record).

Further, Kevin did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, it is implied that

the trial court made all necessary findings of fact to support its judgment, and we must imply that

Kevin did not make an oral election for extended standard possession prior to rendition of the final

decree of divorce. See In re Marriage of Harrison, 557 S.W.3d 99, 131 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Because the record does not reflect that Kevin made an election

for extended standard possession before the trial court rendered its final ruling, we hold the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it rendered a standard possession order.

       Accordingly, Kevin’s second issue is overruled.

                                            CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce.

                                                    Irene Rios, Justice

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