Court Opinion

ID: 9479223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:11:57.190462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:53.750917
License: Public Domain

FLAUM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This case involves the delicate and difficult question of whether the use of handcuffs by police officers transforms an investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. I agree with the majority that there are limited circumstances where handcuffs can reasonably be utilized in the course of an investigatory stop. Unlike the majority, however, I believe that the particular use of the handcuffs in this case indi*974cates that the officers exceeded the scope of an investigative stop and that the defendant was arrested. Because it is undisputed that the police did not have probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a crime at the time I find he was arrested, I would hold that the arrest was illegal and that the district court was correct in suppressing the fruits of that illegal arrest.
I.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court held that police officers may, without probable cause, stop a citizen in order to investigate a crime so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the citizen was involved in a crime. The Court also held that if the officer reasonably believes that the encounter will endanger his or her safety or the safety of others, then he or she may undertake a reasonable search for weapons. Id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. The Court emphasized that “[t]he manner in which the seizure and search [are] conducted is, of course, [a] vital ... part of the inquiry....” Id. at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. The manner of the seizure, to be reasonable, must be carefully tailored to the purpose of the seizure. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2255 n. 11, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether handcuffing a suspect in the course of a Terry stop is ever a reasonable manner of seizure. Nevertheless, the courts that have squarely faced the question have generally approved of the use of handcuffs during a Terry stop. However, those courts have invariably limited the use of handcuffs to two situations in which the manacles are deemed necessary to carrying out the purposes of the stop.1
First, the use of handcuffs has been approved where the handcuffs were reasonably necessary to protect the police officers’ safety before or during the frisk. People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378, 540 N.Y.S.2d 971, 538 N.E.2d 323 (1989); State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069 n. 2 (1984) (en banc); see also United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir.1982) (use of handcuffs did not convert Terry stop into an arrest where third armed suspect was still at large and handcuffs eliminated possibility of assault or escape attempt); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1983) (handcuffs used where suspect made furtive movements with his hands after refusing an order to put his hands in the air).
In Allen, police officers had spotted four men that they had reason to suspect were involved in a recent armed robbery. As the police approached, the suspects scattered in different directions. One of the officers followed a suspect into a dark alley where the suspect was apprehended attempting to scale a wall. The suspect was then handcuffed and brought into a brighter area for questioning, at which time he admitted to the crime. At trial, the defendant alleged that by handcuffing him, the police had illegally arrested him without probable cause and asked for suppression of his admission as the fruit of the illegal arrest.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the use of handcuffs in this situation did not turn the Terry stop into an arrest: “the police officers were entitled to handcuff defendant to effect his nonarrest detention in order to ensure their own safety while they removed him to a more suitable location to pat him down for weapons.” The court noted, however, that one factor in determining the reasonableness of the use of handcuffs is the amount of time in which they are utilized. In Allen, the handcuffing was reasonable because it did not “involve the unnecessary, prolonged handcuffing of a suspect detained on reasonable suspicion after the threat justifying the use of the handcuffs had been neutralized.”
*975Second, handcuff use has been permitted in the context of a Terry stop where the suspect had previously attempted to evade the questioning by police officers, usually by trying to run away. United States v. Purry, 545 F.2d 217, 220 (D.C.Cir.1976); State v. Aguirre, 130 Ariz. 54, 633 P.2d 1047, 1049 (1981); see also 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2 at 31 (1978) (“handcuffing of the suspect is not ordinarily proper, but yet may be resorted to when necessary to thwart the suspect’s attempt ‘to frustrate further inquiry’ ”). In Purry, the suspect was stopped in the vicinity of an armed bank robbery. 545 F.2d at 218-19. The suspect was handcuffed when he “turned and pulled away” as the police officer began to question him. Id. at 219. The appellate court approved the use of the handcuffs on those facts:
Having lawfully stopped Purry Officer Swygert was entitled “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information,” Adams v. Williams, [407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)], and ... handcuffing was an appropriate method of maintaining the status quo while further inquiry was made.
Id. at 220.
II.
In this case, I agree with the majority that the use of handcuffs did not initially transform the Terry stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. At the time the handcuffs were placed on Glenna, the officers possessed information that Glenna may have been carrying several small weapons. That information was corroborated by the ammunition clip found in one of the pockets of the defendant. Thus, I agree that handcuffing the defendant while proceeding with the pat down was a reasonable precaution for the police officers to take to ensure their safety.
I cannot agree, however, that the officers were justified in keeping the defendant manacled once the pat down was completed. At that point, the immediate safety of the officers was no longer in jeopardy. Also, there is no evidence that the defendant was anything less than fully cooperative with the officers. Under those circumstances, the legitimate purpose of the handcuffs was no longer being served after the frisk was completed, and the continuation of the handcuffing indicates that the defendant was under arrest.
The majority, while finding it a “close call,” holds that the continued handcuffing of the defendant after the pat down was not unreasonable. First, the majority states that the officers could have reasonably believed that the handcuffs were necessary to safely effect the stop and confirm or dispel their suspicions that the defendant was committing a crime. As noted above, I do not find any evidence that handcuffs were a necessary safety precaution following the pat down. No weapon was found on the defendant; the defendant was standing at least eight feet away from the van and could not have reached any weapons concealed there; and the defendant made no threatening gestures toward the police. As for the fact that the officers had not yet confirmed or denied their original suspicions, that standing alone is simply inadequate to ever justify the use of handcuffs in a Terry situation. On that rationale, handcuffs would be justified for the entirety of every Terry stop since, by definition, a stop is made to confirm or dispel suspicions and must end when that has been accomplished.
Second, the majority states that “the amount of time Glenna spent in handcuffs in the absence of probable cause for arrest was minimal — no longer than ten or fifteen minutes.” If the handcuffs are not justified by either safety or evasion concerns, however, I believe even a momentary handcuffing constitutes an unreasonable seizure. Also, the majority’s assessment of the time in handcuffs is predicated on finding that the police had probable cause to arrest Glenna after the fireworks were discovered in the van. I believe, however, that even after the fireworks were found, the police lacked probable cause to arrest Glenna.
Possession of fireworks is prohibited in Wisconsin by Wis.Stat. § 167.10(3), which *976states that “[n]o person may possess or use fireworks without a user’s permit from the mayor of the city....” The penalty for violation of that section is forfeiture of not more than $1000. Wis.Stat. § 167.10(9)(b) (1987-88). Conduct which carries with it the possibility only of forfeiture is not a criminal act, Wis.Stat. § 939.12 (1987-88), and thus an arrest is legal only if it is specifically authorized by statute. City of Madison v. Two Crow, 88 Wis.2d 156, 276 N.W.2d 359, 361 (App.1979).
In this case, I can find no statute which authorizes arrest for the violation of § 167.10(3)2 and, therefore, defendant’s arrest based on the possession of fireworks was an illegal arrest.3 It follows that the police had probable cause to arrest not when the fireworks were found in the van, as found by majority, but when the pipe bomb was discovered. While it is unclear exactly how long the defendant remained in handcuffs before the pipe bomb was found, it was necessarily longer than the 10-15 minutes assumed by the majority.
In sum, I believe that on the facts of this case, the defendant was subjected to an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. The district court was correct to suppress the fruits of that illegal seizure. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). I dissent.

. Where those two situations are not present courts have generally held that handcuffing is not a permissible element of a Terry stop but turn that stop into an arrest. People v. Gabbard, 78 Ill.2d 88, 34 Ill.Dec. 751, 753, 398 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1979); State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069 (1984) (en banc).

. It is possible that defendant's arrest was valid under a state statute which permits police to arrest based on the violation of a municipal ordinance. Wis.Stat. § 800.02(6) (1985-86). However, no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that there is any city ordinance prohibiting the possession of the fireworks at issue in this case. Thus, the government has failed to prove that any state statute gave the police the power to arrest the defendant based on the possession of fireworks.

. Of course, the illegal arrest based on the fireworks possession could be grounds in itself for suppressing evidence recovered after that arrest. I would not reach that question, however, in light of my belief that the defendant was illegally arrested when the officers failed to remove the handcuffs after the completion of the pat down.