Court Opinion

ID: 9965783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:01:01.440636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:39.220621
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GREGORY L. BROWN,                               DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         DA-0714-21-0218-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: May 2, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Daniel J. Gamino , Esquire, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the appellant.

      Joan M. Green , Esquire, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the agency.

      Shannon Yero , Garland, Texas, for the agency.

      Tijuana D. Griffin , Little Rock, Arkansas, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
which reversed the appellant’s removal pursuant to the Department of Veterans
Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (VA
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                  2

Accountability Act), Pub. L. No. 115-41, § 202(a), 131 Stat 862, 869-73 (2017)
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 714). For the reasons discussed below, we
GRANT the agency’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision,
and REMAND the case to the Dallas Regional Office for further adjudication in
accordance with this Remand Order.

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant was employed as a GS-7 Lead Police Officer with the
Oklahoma City Veterans Affairs Medical Center’s Police Services. Initial Appeal
File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2, Tab 7 at 7, 12.       The agency removed him effective
March 23, 2021, for failure to follow policy.      IAF, Tab 7 at 12-15, 50-52.
The charge consisted of one specification concerning an incident in March 2020,
when the appellant did not complete a Uniform Offense Report or a Missing
Patient Reaction Worksheet after Police Services was notified of a high-risk
missing patient.   Id. at 50.    In sustaining the charge, the deciding official
determined that it “was supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 12.
      The appellant filed a Board appeal of his removal. IAF, Tab 1. After the
administrative judge held a hearing, IAF, Tab 20, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) decided Rodriguez v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 8 F.4th 1290, (Fed. Cir. 2021), and Connor v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 8 F.4th 1319, (Fed. Cir. 2021). Recognizing that these cases
affected the adjudication of the appellant’s removal, the administrative judge
reopened the record and allowed the parties to submit argument on the impact of
Connor and Rodriguez on the appeal; however, he did not allow them to submit
additional   evidence.    IAF,    Tab   22.     After   both   parties   responded,
the administrative judge issued an initial decision reversing the removal because
the deciding official reviewed the proposed removal under a substantial evidence
standard, instead of a preponderant evidence standard, when determining that the
appellant committed the charged offense.      IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID)
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at 13, 15. The administrative judge declined to apply the harmful error standard
to the deciding official’s application of the incorrect standard of review.
ID at 14.
      The agency has filed a petition for review arguing that the administrative
judge erred in reversing the action as not in accordance with law, instead of
taking evidence as to whether the deciding official actually applied a substantial
evidence standard and, if so, whether doing so was harmful. Petition for Review
(PFR) File, Tab 1. The appellant has responded. PFR File, Tab 3.

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
We remand the appeal for the administrative judge to provide the parties with
an opportunity to present evidence and argument regarding whether the agency’s
error in sustaining the removal based on substantial evidence harmed the
appellant.
      As noted, the deciding official sustained the action based on his conclusion
that there was substantial evidence to do so. IAF, Tab 7 at 12. Before the initial
decision in this case was issued, the Federal Circuit decided Rodriguez, 8 F.4th
at 1296-1301, in which it determined that the agency erred by applying a
substantial evidence burden of proof to its internal review of a disciplinary action
issued under 38 U.S.C. § 714. The court found that substantial evidence is the
standard of review to be applied by the Board, not the agency, and that
an agency’s deciding official must “determine[]” whether “the performance or
misconduct . . . warrants” the action at issue, using a preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof. Id. at 1298-1301 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 714(a)(1)).
      The Federal Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez applies to all pending cases,
regardless of when the events at issue took place.      Semenov v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 22. Applying the decision in Rodriguez, the
administrative judge reversed the agency’s removal as “not in accordance with
law” under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(C). ID at 14-15. He concluded that because
the agency’s action was unlawful, he was required to reverse it. Id. However,
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after the initial decision was issued, the Board issued its decision in Semenov,
2023 MSPB 16. In Semenov, the Board found it appropriate to apply the harmful
error standard from 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2) to the agency’s improper application of
the substantial evidence standard to its review of the proposed removal.
Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶¶ 21-24. We are not persuaded by the finding in the
initial decision, or the appellant’s argument on review, that the agency’s error
requires the Board to reverse the action. ID at 14-15; PFR File, Tab 3 at 10-11.
      On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge incorrectly
relied on McCollum v. National Credit Union Administration, 417 F.3d 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2005), when declining to apply the harmful error standard to the
deciding official’s substantial evidence review.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9.
The administrative judge relied on McCollum for the proposition that when
an appealable action is unlawful in its entirety, i.e., there is no legal authority for
the agency’s action, the Board will reverse such an action as “not in accordance
with law” under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(C), regardless of whether the error was
harmful.   ID at 14.    In McCollum, 417 F.3d at 1339-40, the Federal Circuit
reversed the de facto removal of an employee because it was not in accordance
with law. There, agency officials effectively removed the petitioner for failure to
accept a directed reassignment. Id. at 1335-38. However, the Federal Circuit
found that the only entity with authority to remove the petitioner was a 3-member
Board, which did not vote to remove him. Id. at 1338-40. Instead, other agency
officials processed what amounted to an involuntary separation from service.
Id. at 1338, 1340.     Thus, because “the agency itself, according to its own
authority structure, never removed [the petitioner],” his removal was not in
accordance with law. Id. at 1340.
      An action taken pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 714 “may not be sustained under
[§ 7701(b)]” if the agency committed harmful error, based its decision on a
prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b), or “the decision was not in
accordance with law.”       Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 23 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
                                                                                 5

§ 7701(c)(2)).   The “harmful error” provision of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2) is
applicable to all procedural errors, while the “not in accordance with law”
provision is applicable to other unlawful actions. Doe v. Department of Justice,
121 M.S.P.R. 596, ¶ 12 (2014). Unlike in McCollum, here, the agency itself acted
to remove the appellant.    However, it committed procedural error during the
process by applying the wrong burden of proof in sustaining the removal. This
error in the application of the procedures under 38 U.S.C. § 714 does not render
the action unlawful.    See Rodriguez, 8 F4th at 1296, 1301 (identifying the
appellant’s argument regarding the agency’s application of the substantial
evidence standard under 38 U.S.C. § 714 as one of procedural error, and
remanding the issue for further proceedings); see also Bannister v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 26 F.4th 1340, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (remanding to the
Board a 38 U.S.C. § 714 removal in which the agency improperly applied the
substantial evidence standard “for further proceedings under the correct legal
standard”).   Thus, as we found in Semenov, the harmful error standard from
5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2) applies here. Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 23.
      We therefore remand the appeal for further adjudication. On remand, the
administrative judge should afford the parties an opportunity to submit evidence
and argument, including holding a supplemental hearing if needed, on the issue of
whether the agency’s use of the substantial evidence standard constituted harmful
procedural error. Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 24.

On remand, the administrative judge should allow the parties an opportunity to
present evidence and argument regarding whether the agency considered the
Douglas factors in determining the penalty.
      In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the
Board provided a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to penalty determinations.
In Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶¶ 44-50, the Board concluded that, consistent with
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Connor, 8 F.4th at 1325-26, in reviewing the
penalty in an action taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714, the agency and the Board must
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apply the Douglas factors. Even though the Board is precluded from mitigating
the penalty under 38 U.S.C. §§ 714(d)(2)(B), (d)(3)(C), the Board is required “to
review for substantial evidence the entirety of the [agency’s] removal decision—
including the penalty.”     Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 45 (quoting Sayers v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 954 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). That
review is essentially to ensure that the agency conscientiously considered the
relevant factors and struck a responsible balance of those factors within tolerable
limits of reasonableness. Id., ¶ 48.
      Here, the administrative judge provided the parties with guidance regarding
the Board’s obligation to review the penalty in an action taken under the VA
Accountability Act, pursuant to Connor.       IAF, Tab 22.    However, he did not
allow the parties to submit additional evidence or testimony regarding whether
the deciding official considered the relevant mitigating and aggravating Douglas
factors. IAF, Tab 22 at 2. Further, because he reversed the agency’s action based
on its use of the wrong burden of proof, he did not reach the issue of the
reasonableness of the removal penalty. ID at 15 n.14. In the proposed removal
letter, the proposing official did not reference Douglas. However, he stated that
he considered the appellant’s prior admonishment and suspensions and his job
level and responsibility as Lead Police Officer, and concluded that he lacked
confidence in the appellant’s ability to perform at a satisfactory level or to be
rehabilitated. IAF, Tab 7 at 50. Similarly, in the deciding official’s decision
letter upholding the proposed removal, he also did not reference Douglas;
however, he did state that the penalty of removal was reasonable in light of the
appellant’s prior discipline for failure to follow supervisory instruction as well as
the higher standard to which he was held as Lead Police Officer. Id. at 12.
      Additionally, in his hearing testimony, the deciding official stated that he
did not conduct a Douglas factor analysis; however, he determined that removal
was reasonable in light of the appellant’s prior discipline for the same
misconduct, the seriousness of the offense, his knowledge of the rules and
                                                                                 7

policies violated, and his supervisory role as Lead Police Officer.       Hearing
Transcript at 134-37, 167-69 (testimony of the deciding official).
         Nevertheless, the record does not reflect whether the deciding official
considered any other relevant mitigating Douglas factors in making the decision
to remove the appellant, including, for example, the appellant’s 23-years of
service with the agency and the consistency of the penalty. IAF, Tab 7 at 43; see
Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06.       On remand, the administrative judge should
permit the parties to submit additional evidence and argument on the penalty
issue.     See Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 50.        In reviewing the penalty, the
administrative judge should determine whether the agency proved by substantial
evidence that it properly applied the Douglas factors and whether the agency’s
penalty selection was reasonable, and, if not, he should remand the appellant’s
removal to the agency for a new decision on the appropriate penalty. Id. (citing,
among other cases, Connor, 8 F.4th at 1326-27).

The administrative judge may adopt his prior findings on the appellant’s
affirmative defenses, as clarified by this Remand Order.
         The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove his
affirmative defenses of retaliation for equal employment opportunity (EEO)
activity and a prior non-whistleblower-reprisal Board appeal. ID at 15-21. On
review, neither party challenges the administrative judge’s findings that the
appellant did not prove his affirmative defenses. Id.
         In making his findings regarding the appellant’s EEO affirmative defense,
the administrative judge observed that, pursuant to Savage v. Department of the
Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶¶ 48, 51 (2015), overruled by Pridgen v. Office of
Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, if the appellant shows that a
discriminatory or retaliatory motive was a factor in the contested action, the
Board will reverse the action unless the agency shows that it would have taken
the same action in the absence of its improper motive. ID at 15-16. After the
administrative judge issued his decision, the Board clarified the standards of
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proof applicable to EEO reprisal claims that arise, as does the appellant’s, under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII. IAF, Tab 7 at 8-9,
Tab 13 at 13. As relevant here, the appellant may prove a claim of retaliation by
showing that his prior EEO activity was at least a motivating factor in his
removal. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 20-22, 30. The administrative judge found
that the appellant failed to prove that EEO retaliation was a motivating factor in
his removal. ID at 20. Because he did not show that retaliation was a motivating
factor in his removal, he necessarily failed to meet the more stringent “but-for”
standard. See Desjardin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2023 MSPB 6, ¶ 33. Therefore,
we find that the administrative judge’s application of the burden of proof set forth
in Savage did not impact his determination. See Panter v. Department of the Air
Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not
prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an
initial decision).
      An additional matter requires correction.       In the initial decision, the
administrative judge provides conflicting findings regarding whether the
appellant raised a claim of retaliation under the “cat’s paw” theory, which we
clarify here.    The administrative judge acknowledged that the crux of the
appellant’s reprisal argument is that the proposing official, who he alleges
harbored retaliatory motive against him because he was a responsible
management official in the appellant’s EEO complaint, maintained a “close
personal friendship” with the deciding official, which rendered the deciding
official incapable of making an unbiased decision concerning the appellant’s
removal. IAF, Tab 7 at 20, Tab 12 at 7; ID at 19. The administrative judge
essentially found that the appellant did not prove retaliation under the “cat’s paw”
theory. ID at 19-20. However, he concluded that the appellant did not allege a
claim of retaliation under the “cat’s paw theory.” ID at 20 n.18. We disagree and
find that the appellant here did appear to allege a claim of retaliation under the
“cat’s paw” theory. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 11
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(2012) (explaining the Supreme Court has adopted the term “cat’s paw” to
describe a case in which a particular management official, acting because of an
improper animus, influences an agency official who is unaware of the improper
animus when implementing a personnel action (citation omitted)). Nevertheless,
because we discern no error with the administrative judge’s analysis or finding
that the appellant failed to prove that the proposing official improperly influenced
the deciding official, we find that any such error in identifying the claim is
harmless. See Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282 (finding that an adjudicatory error that
is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of
an initial decision).
      Lastly, in finding that the appellant failed to prove retaliation for his prior
Board appeal of a 3-day suspension, the administrative judge observed that,
pursuant to Warren v. Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir.
1986), an appellant can establish an affirmative defense of non-whistleblower
reprisal by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he engaged in
protected activity, the accused official knew of the protected activity, the adverse
employment action under review could, under the circumstances, have been
retaliation, and there was a genuine nexus between the retaliation and the adverse
action.   ID at 20-21.   We clarify that in Mattison v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8 (2016), the Board observed that this standard also
does not apply when the prior protected activity involves an allegation of reprisal
for EEO activity. Here, the administrative judge did not make a finding as to
whether the appellant’s prior appeal over his 3-day suspension alleged retaliation
for EEO activity; however, upon reviewing the record of that appeal, we find that
it did not.    Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No.
DA-0752-19-0402-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 1, Tab 6 at 9. On remand, the
administrative judge may adopt his prior findings as to the appellant’s affirmative
defenses, as clarified by this Order.
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                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Dallas
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.