Court Opinion

ID: 9703578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:01:16.421146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:50.313089
License: Public Domain

*401OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s decision to quash the appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing Count III of the complaint. I, however, concur only in the result of the majority’s decision to affirm the dismissal of Count IV.
As the majority noted, the order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing Count IV is a final and appealable order. See Trackers Raceway, Inc. v. Comstock Agency, Inc., 400 Pa.Super. 432, 438-439, 583 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1990).
Appellant’s Count IV is a claim for infliction of emotional distress.1 I agree with the majority’s reasoning and legal support for affirming the dismissal of the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, I think the majority discussion of emotional distress is inadequate because it commingles intentional and negligent concepts. Therefore, I am writing this concurrence.
A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress will lie if three factors are present:
(1) plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it;
(2) the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact on plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; and
(3) plaintiff and the victim were closely related as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Love v. Cramer, 414 Pa.Super. 231, 233, 606 A.2d 1175, 1177 (1992) (citations omitted). Additionally, Pennsylvania law requires that plaintiff allege a physical harm in order to sustain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. (citing Mazzagatti v. Everingham by Everingham, 512 Pa. *402266, 516 A.2d 672 (1986)). The law, however, does not specify the amount of harm that must be alleged. Id.
Similar to the case at bar, the plaintiff in Love brought an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress against her deceased mother’s physician. Plaintiff alleged that the doctor’s negligence led to her mother’s death. The day that her mother died, plaintiff had been resting beside her mother’s side and was forced to witness the death. Plaintiff claimed that as a result she suffered ongoing depression, nightmares, stress and anxiety, all resulting in a need for psychological treatment.
The Love Court noted, without speaking to the ultimate merits of the case, that plaintiffs “observance of the lack of medical care, along with her observance of her mother’s heart attack is enough to sustain her claim for negligent infliction of emotional stress.” Id. 414 Pa.Super. at 236, 606 A.2d at 1178. We did not find the passage of time between the doctor’s alleged negligence and the time of the actual injury to be a handicap in plaintiffs case. In addition, this Court concluded that plaintiff had alleged sufficient physical manifestations of emotional suffering to survive a demurrer. Id., 414 Pa.Super. at 238, 606 A.2d at 1179. As a result, we reversed the trial court’s order which sustained the demurrer.
Similarly, appellant claims that the nursing home’s negligence caused her mother to suffer and eventually die from a gangrenous infection. Appellant witnessed this spreading infection because she was present when her mother’s dressings were removed. She alleged that this caused her to become “extremely upset, nauseous and violently ill at the scene.” (Second amended complaint at para. 55).
Following Love, I believe that appellant’s observance of her mother’s spreading infection would be sufficient to sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. A crucial variation from Love, however, is that appellant here did not sufficiently allege a physical injury. Plaintiff Love asserted that she suffered continuing depression, nightmares, stress and anxiety. In contrast, appellant only claimed to have become upset, ill and nauseated at the scene of the unwrap*403ping. Her injuries are not of the same magnitude that prompted this Court’s decision in Love. See Id. For this reason, the order sustaining the demurrer should be affirmed.
In my opinion, it is imperative to distinguish the torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and differentiate the ways that appellant respectfidly failed to satisfy the requirements of each. Therefore, I concur only in the majority’s result.

. Appellant lumps her claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress into one count. Since these are different causes of action, she should have pled them separately. Pa.R.C.P. § 1020, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Despite appellant’s failure to do so, the majority addresses both claims and so will I.