Court Opinion

ID: 9701563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:24:59.761573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:25.153855
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
dissenting.
By applying an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the term “direct result” in N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43—adopted today in Gerba v. Board of Trustees, PERS, 83 N.J. 174 (1980)—the Court has placed an exceedingly difficult—if not impossible— burden on the claimant to show medical causation on remand. Under a proper interpretation of the statutory term, claimant’s application is clearly warranted, for there is ample evidence of direct causation in the record. Since a remand is unnecessary, I respectfully dissent.
Under the governing statute, an accidental disability pension would be warranted “if it were shown that the disability directly resulted from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a preexisting disease.” Cattani v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 69 N.J. 578, 586 (1978). I continue to believe that the aggravation of a preexisting condition, directly caused by a traumatic event, can satisfy the statutory standard if the accident triggered what had previously been a relatively latent condition. Gerba, 83 N.J. at 197-198 (Pashman, J., dissenting). “The mere fact that claimant ultimately might have suffered from this condition in the distant future cannot detract from its sudden manifestation after [the traumatic event].” Cattani, 69 N.J. at 596 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
The majority in the present case remands because it finds that the evidence is “unclear” whether the trauma constituted the *173direct cause of the disability. Ante at 171—172. It bases this conclusion on its view that the term “direct result” in N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43 requires that the trauma be the “essential significant or the substantial contributing cause of the ultimate disability.” Ante at 171-172. I do not claim to understand the meaning of this phrase. Judging from the majority’s application of it, this novel standard imposes too heavy a burden on disabled public employees'."
Under the proper interpretation of the statute, a remand is unnecessary. A brief review of the evidence clearly shows a definite causal relationship between the trauma and the disability. The report of Dr. William C. Wilentz, a physician employed by the New Jersey Highway Authority, stated that Korelnia suffered' from an “unstable back superimposed on an underlying pathology of his spine which was aggravated by [the traumatic event.]” Dr. Paul E. Van Horn, on behalf of the Division of Pensions, stated in his report that claimant “had an underlying degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine which became symptomatic and disabling by way of the [traumatic event].” Finally Dr. William H. Coleman’s report, also prepared for the Division of Pensions, stated that “[fjrom a medical standpoint there does appear to be a causal relationship between the disability and the alleged traumatic incident.”
The medical proofs above clearly demonstrate that Korelnia’s disability “directly resulted from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a preexisting disease.” Cattani, 69 N.J. at 586. As in Gerba, the evidence shows that the traumatic event ignited what had previously been a relatively dormant condition. Gerba, 83 N.J. at 196-197 (Pashman, J., dissenting). This is not a case where the disability “would have occurred when it did irrespective of the traumatic event.” In re Sigafoos, 143 N.J. Super. 469, 473 (App.Div.1976), certif. den., 72 N.J. 458 (1976).
The Appellate Division reversed the Board of Trustees’ denial of Korelnia’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:15A—43. For the foregoing reasons and those expressed in my dissenting opinion in Gerba, I would affirm that judgment.
*174For reversal and remandment—Justices SULLIVAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK—5.
For affirmance—Justice PASHMAN—1.