Court Opinion

ID: 9551588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:55:58.523805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:14.839512
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, C.J.
(dissenting) — Before examining the applicable law, it is necessary to review the facts, some of which are glossed over by the majority.
I
The plaintiff is John Cogan as personal representative of the Banchero estate. Cogan is an experienced lawyer, knowledgeable in real estate matters. He had been trying to sell the Banchero property for several years prior to the events which are the focus of this case; he had contacted *669many brokers and had advertised the sale, but his efforts had not produced a single offer at any price.
Several factors made this property difficult to sell. The market was "distressed." Moreover, the property was a vacant lot, bisected by a creek, within a flood plain, and within a Shorelines Management area. Thus, there were a number of potential development problems. Finally, the estate’s unequivocal demand for a cash sale was an additional burden.
When Cogan contacted defendant broker, he set the price at $280,000 and required "a quick cash pay-off." He never inquired of defendant broker's opinion regarding the value of the property or terms. Nor did he list the property with defendant broker in the contractual sense. He simply wrote to six brokers, including defendant, informing them of the property and its sale price. Thus, this situation is factually different from most broker cases wherein the duty of the broker includes the "exercise [of] reasonable care, skill, and judgment in securing for the principal the best bargain possible”. Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bur. of Olympia, Inc., 73 Wn.2d 225, 229, 437 P.2d 897 (1968).
The offer from Paul Ginn through defendant broker was the sole offer received by Cogan. The Ginn earnest money agreement was for the exact price asked by the estate, $280,000, payable in cash at closing. According to Cogan, the conditions included in the agreement were those customarily included in offers to purchase commercial real estate and were such as could generally be satisfied by good faith efforts on the part of the purchaser.
The earnest money agreement named the offeror as "Paul Ginn and/or assigns." Mr. Cogan acknowledged that the use of "and/or assigns" is frequently used with commercial earnest money offers. He stated he was not concerned with the possibility of the sale of Paul Ginn's interest before closing, since it was a cash sale. Upon signing the agreement, the estate was legally bound to convey the property to Ginn and/or his assigns. The sale was to be closed within 120 days after court approval.
*670Subsequently, almost 3 months later, Allied's interest in the property was renewed because of problems with other alternatives they had been pursuing. Allied had been offered the property before, so they knew what Ginn had paid for it and they knew he had a legal right to assign his earnest money right.
At this point, the relationships, rights and liabilities of the parties are beyond challenge. The estate had sold at its asking price and terms, cash. It had agreed that Ginn could assign the earnest money right to purchase. Ginn did so. The estate knew it was legally bound to convey to Ginn's assignee. Cogan himself acknowledged that it was immaterial who the assignee was because the purchaser had to pay cash. No advantage was sought or taken by the broker or Allied. The broker had violated no duty or obligation to the estate.
The only event upon which the majority relies is a 30-day extension for closing made by Allied and relayed to the estate by defendant broker. There was no great mystery, conspiracy or duplicity about this request; the three shareholders of Allied merely decided to purchase in their individual names for tax and financial planning reasons, and to accomplish this they needed additional time to arrange personal financing. The trial court specifically found that the corporate assignee, Allied, could have completed the transaction by the original closing date.. Thus, no covert advantage to Allied or harm to the estate was sought or achieved.
When the estate inquired as to the reason for the request, the broker's employee said he did not know the specifics, but it had something to do with financing. Both statements were true — the employee, who had been employed by broker after the estate-Ginn deal was signed, knew nothing more and the request did have something to do with financing. Cogan made no further inquiry.
It must be emphasized that at this time Cogan was fully aware that Ginn had assigned his rights to Allied. Allied had not only notified the estate of the assignment, but had *671also sent a copy of the assignment document which disclosed every term of the Ginn-Allied agreement, including the payment of the additional $40,000. Mr. Cogan had replied by letter, stating "I am pleased to hear that you will be buying the property."
Thus, at the time of the extension request, Cogan knew that Allied was the purchaser and that some aspect of their financing was the reason for the extension request. He also knew what his options were: he could have (1) declined to grant the extension as he had a binding contract with a specified closing date, (2) exacted consideration for granting the extension, or (3) requested more information. Although an attorney experienced in real estate transactions, he did none of these things. He asked no further questions. He made no contact with Allied. He made no requests or demands for consideration. He simply granted the extension.
To summarize, the facts reveal that the estate received everything it asked for. It sold its property for the price it asked, in cash. It could have closed on the specified date, but granted an extension without requesting, or even inquiring about, consideration for the extension. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded the estate $660 to cover the expenses incurred from the extension, and with this award, I have no quarrel.
The estate wants more, however. It wants, in essence, the benefit of a bargain that, from hindsight, might have been. Cogan argues that he had the right to know the defendant broker was receiving a commission for selling Ginn's right to assign. As this commission had no legal effect on the rights and duties between the estate and the purchaser (Ginn or Allied), one can only hypothesize that Cogan wanted the opportunity to renegotiate the broker's commission from the initial sale in light of the broker's subsequent, additional profit from the sale of Ginn's right. The estate was bound by its contract, however; whether it might have made a better deal in retrospect is truly irrelevant.
The majority opinion serves to rewrite a contract freely *672entered into by a knowledgeable and sophisticated seller, ostensibly because of facts that are totally immaterial to the estate-broker relationship. I dissent.
II
The trial court made a finding of fact that: "It was not a material fact in reference to that request for extension that Paul Ginn had obligated himself to pay Kidder Mathews (broker) a commission on his sale." (Italics mine.) This fact is crucial to the outcome of the case. Nonetheless, no party assigned error to it. The majority, therefore, exceeds the proper scope of review when it concludes that this fact is material and should have been disclosed.
The scope of appellate review is limited. In Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 53, 586 P.2d 870 (1978) we stated:
No error has been assigned to the findings of fact so they become the established facts of this case. Consequently our review is limited to determining whether those facts support the trial court's conclusions of law and judgment.
(Citations omitted. Italics mine.) The majority totally ignores this legal premise. Instead, it cites to the error assigned by plaintiff to the court's failure to make certain conclusions of law, specifically that a duty to disclose the dual agency existed. Majority, at 666. Such a conclusion does not stem from the uncontested findings of fact, however. Thus, the majority is clearly attempting to substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court in order to reach the conclusion it desires. This it may not do. We stated emphatically in Fay v. Allied Stores Corp., 43 Wn.2d 512, 519, 262 P.2d 189 (1953):
It makes no difference that, as a matter of original determination, we might have decided otherwise had the issues of fact been submitted to us initially.
The materiality of a fact is to be decided by the trier of fact, the trial court or the jury.
*673[T]he circumstances as to what facts are material and require full disclosure, where they do not involve self-interest, kinship, or strictly adverse interest . . . cannot be determined as a matter of law, but must be determined by the trier of facts after consideration of all the evidence.
Brandt v. Koepnick, 2 Wn. App. 671, 675, 469 P.2d 189 (1970); see also Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 475, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963); Adkins v. Lee, 127 Ga. App. 261, 264, 193 S.E.2d 252 (1972); Williams v. Burnside, 207 Iowa 239, 242-43, 222 N.W. 413 (1928); Sheffer v. Rudnick, 291 Mass. 205, 210, 196 N.E. 864 (1935); Guild v. More, 32 N.D. 432, 442, 155 N.W. 44 (1915). Even though this court on the same facts might have reached a different conclusion, we are bound to accept the trial court's findings. Therefore, challenges to conclusions of law are without merit if the conclusions are supported by the unchallenged findings of fact. Cf. Brandt v. Koepnick, supra.
Applying the proper scope of review, it is clear that the trial court's conclusion, that no duty to disclose existed, is supported by its findings of fact, including the finding that disclosure of the broker's agency relationship with Allied was not material to the issue of the extension of the closing date. Therefore, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
The trial court found that nondisclosure of the commission from Ginn was not a material fact. Why? Because this particular seller, under these facts, was legally bound to sell to Ginn or his assigns.
A material fact is one to which a reasonable person might attach importance in choosing his course of action, . . . in other words, it is a fact that could reasonably be expected to influence the conduct of a person with respect to the transaction in question.
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 168, 174 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The nondisclosure was not and could not be material because it could not reasonably be expected to influence the conduct of the seller. It was a matter of fact, *674an actuality, as determined by the trial court, that the seller had contracted to sell to Ginn or his assigns. It was a matter of fact, an actuality, that Ginn had assigned his contractual right of purchase to another. The seller had no choice but to honor the assignment. Therefore, the commission from that assignment is necessarily immaterial because it could not be reasonably expected to influence the seller's course of action. Whether or not Ginn was to pay a commission could not influence the seller's course of action since the seller had foreclosed any other course of action by agreeing to sell to Ginn or his assigns. One can hardly be influenced in his conduct or course of action when he has heretofore contractually obligated himself to perform a specific event, i.e., convey to Ginn or his assigns.
The duty of a broker includes no more and no less than the duty to disclose material facts. Such is the Washington and universal rule. Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 526, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Patrick v. Cochise Hotels, 76 Ariz. 136, 143, 259 P.2d 569 (1953); Loughlin v. Idora Realty Co., 259 Cal. App. 2d 619, 629, 66 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1968); Hardy v. Davis, 223 Md. 229, 232, 164 A.2d 281 (1960); Bell v. Strauch, 40 Tenn. App. 384, 409, 292 S.W.2d 59 (1954); Guisinger v. Hughes, 363 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 392 (1958). As materiality defines the duty to disclose, the uncontested facts here do not permit this court to find such a duty as a matter of law.
The majority makes much of the fact that the broker did not explain its agency relationship to Allied when requesting the extension from Cogan. With reference to the extension, defendant broker was simply a conduit, passing on the request. The delay in closing did not benefit defendant broker. Nor would the refusal of the extension have harmed defendant, since Allied would have honored the closing date. The only hypothetical injury is the estate's lost opportunity to extract consideration for the extension. This was the result of Cogan's failure to pursue this option; it *675was not related in any way to the broker's relation to the parties to the transaction.
The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that the commission should be forfeited are factually distinguishable. In each of those cases, the broker actively induced the seller to act in a way that benefited the purchaser. For example, in Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bur. of Olympia, Inc., 73 Wn.2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968), the buyer was a relative of the real estate agent, the offer was less than the listed price, and the agent persuaded the seller to accept the lower figure. The broker also misinformed the seller that he did not know the purchaser. In Ramsey v. Sedlar, 75 Wn.2d 901, 454 P.2d 416 (1969), the real estate agent changed the papers at closing to include a provision that was not part of the original agreement and was solely for the benefit of the purchasers. Moreover, the sellers were not informed that the real estate agent was also one of the purchasers. Wesco Realty, Inc. v. Drewry, 9 Wn. App. 734, 515 P.2d 513 (1973) similarly involved changes made in the terms of the agreement for the sole benefit of the buyer, without explanation to the sellers who were dependent on the real estate agent to understand the details of the transaction.
In contrast, here the broker did not mislead or misinform the seller. He did no more than inform Cogan, a sophisticated businessman, of the extension request. The request was not for the broker's benefit nor did he persuade Cogan to accept it. Moreover, Cogan was not harmed by the extension. Thus, this simply is not a situation that the principles of the fiduciary duties of an agent were designed to protect against. I dissent from the majority's opinion which serves only to save a sophisticated, knowledgeable seller from the consequences of his own failure to request consideration for a delay in closing.
Dolliver, J., concurs with Brachtenbach, C.J.
Reconsideration denied October 1, 1982.