Court Opinion

ID: 9606500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:50:22.564999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:13.698861
License: Public Domain

*488Justice Meyer
dissenting.
I concur in all respects with the dissent of Justice Whichard but wish to add my observations concerning what I perceive to be the majority’s erroneous application of the rules governing summary judgment.
The majority concludes that certain language from the separation agreement in question, specifically the phrase “if the parties have lived continuously separate and apart for that full period” (one year), is unambiguous and subject to but one reasonable interpretation. For this case at least, says the majority, this interpretation is that a husband and wife live “continuously separate and apart” only if they do not engage in even a single act of sexual intercourse. Because it is admitted that the parties had sexual intercourse on at least one occasion during the period of time in question, continues the majority, the trial court’s order granting the wife’s motion for summary judgment was proper. In fact, the disputed language from the separation agreement is perfectly susceptible to at least two different and plausible meanings — either of which a jury could and should have been allowed to find as reflecting the intent of the parties when they entered into the contract of separation. In my opinion, the majority has clearly erred in affirming summary judgment for the wife.
Rule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted only where a forecast of the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 289 S.E. 2d 363 (1982); N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1983). The party moving for summary judgment must establish the lack of any triable issue, and all inferences of fact from the evidence proffered at the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion. Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.C. 298, 354 S.E. 2d 495 (1987). Summary judgment is a harsh and drastic remedy not to be granted “unless it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Dendy v. Watkins, 288 N.C. 447, 452, 219 S.E. 2d 214, 217 (1975) (emphasis added). Most importantly, a motion for summary judgment should be denied “if different material conclusions can be drawn from the evidence.” *489Credit Union v. Smith, 45 N.C. App. 432, 437, 263 S.E. 2d 319, 322 (1980).
Notwithstanding the majority’s conclusion to the contrary, there is indeed a genuine issue of material fact in the case at bar — namely, just what this husband and wife intended by their use of the phrase “lived continuously separate and apart” in paragraph four of the disputed separation agreement. The majority here concludes incorrectly that the contested language could only be interpreted to mean that husband and wife must refrain from even a single act of sexual intercourse in order for the transfer of interest under paragraph four to go forward. In fact, the language used here by the parties is ambiguous. It could no doubt just as easily be found, for example, that these parties intended the language to mean that, during the year in question, they must not resume living together in the same household as husband and wife. In that event, the property would go to the husband. Where the language in question is unclear and the parties’ intentions are in doubt, interpretation of an agreement is for the jury under proper instructions from the court. Parker Marking Systems, Inc. v. Diagraph-Bradley Industries, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 177, 341 S.E. 2d 92, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 336, 346 S.E. 2d 502 (1986).
This case is for the jury and entry of summary judgment for the wife was improper.
Justice WHICHARD joins in this dissenting opinion.