Court Opinion

ID: 9897195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:08.142899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:54.290722
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                                 Electronically Filed
                                                 Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                                 CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                 16-OCT-2023
                                                 08:07 AM
                                                 Dkt. 69 OP

                IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

                        OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

                                ---o0o---

               WALTER N. GUITY, Petitioner-Appellant,
                                  v.
                STATE OF HAWAI#I, Respondent-Appellee

                          NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

         APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                     (CIVIL NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

                            OCTOBER 16, 2023

          GINOZA, CHIEF JUDGE, HIRAOKA AND WADSWORTH, JJ.

                 OPINION OF THE COURT BY HIRAOKA, J.

           Self-represented Petitioner-Appellant Walter N. Guity

petitioned the Circuit Court of the First Circuit,1 under Hawaii

Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 661B, for redress for wrongful

conviction and imprisonment.       Respondent-Appellee State of

Hawai#i moved to dismiss.     The Circuit Court granted the motion

and entered judgment in the State's favor, against Guity.             Guity

     1
           The Honorable Jeffrey P. Crabtree presided.
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

appeals.    We hold that Guity's petition satisfied the pleading

requirements of HRS § 661B-1(b)(1) as to one of his convictions,

but not the other.      Accordingly, we vacate the judgment; vacate

in part the Circuit Court's order dismissing Guity's petition;

and remand for further proceedings.

                               I. BACKGROUND

            The facts underlying Guity's petition were recited in

State v. Guity, 144 Hawai#i 557, 445 P.3d 138 (2019) (Guity II).

In May 2010 Guity was indicted on multiple counts, including

attempted sexual assault in the first degree (the Family Court

Case).2    The complaining witness in the Family Court Case was

Guity's wife.     In March 2011 Guity was indicted on multiple

counts of sexual assault of a different woman (the Circuit Court

Case).3

            Guity agreed to enter pleas in both cases.          In the

Family Court Case, he pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of

Sexual Assault in the Third Degree.         In the Circuit Court Case,

he pleaded guilty to one count of Sexual Assault in the Second

      2
            We judicially notice the documents filed in the Family Court Case
pursuant to Rule 201, Hawaii Rules of Evidence, Chapter 626, Hawaii Revised
Statutes (2016). The counts alleged in the indictment were: (1) Abuse of
Family or Household Members in violation of HRS § 709-906; (2) Terroristic
Threatening in the Second Degree in violation of HRS § 707-717(1);
(3) Kidnapping in violation of HRS § 707-720(1)(d); (4) and (5) Attempted
Sexual Assault in the First Degree in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and
707-730(1)(a); and (6) Interference with Reporting an Emergency or Crime in
violation of HRS § 710-1010.5(1).
      3
            We also judicially notice the documents filed in the Circuit Court
Case. The counts alleged in the indictment were: (1), (2), and (3) Sexual
Assault in the Second Degree in violation of HRS § 707-731(1)(a); and (4),
(5), and (6) Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree in violation of HRS § 707-
733(1)(a).

                                      2
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Degree.   The State agreed to dismiss all remaining counts in the

Family Court Case and the Circuit Court Case.

             Before he was sentenced, Guity moved to withdraw his

guilty pleas.     The trial court denied Guity's motion.          Guity was

sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 12 months for the Family

Court Case and 18 months for the Circuit Court Case.4

             Guity appealed.    We held that Guity should have been

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in the Family Court Case

because, under the law at that time, the offense of sexual

assault in the third degree could not be committed by a defendant

against their spouse.5      State v. Guity, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016

WL 6427681, at *6-7 (Haw. App. Oct. 31, 2016), as amended,

(Nov. 21, 2016) (mem.) (Guity I), vacated on other grounds by

Guity II.    We also held that the trial court failed to obtain a

valid waiver of Guity's right to counsel before the hearing on

his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.          Id. at *9.     We vacated

the convictions and remanded for further proceedings.

             Guity applied for a writ of certiorari.          In Guity II
the supreme court held that Guity should have been allowed to

withdraw his guilty plea in the Circuit Court Case as well as the

Family Court Case, because the pleas were part of a global plea

agreement.    144 Hawai#i at 558, 563, 445 P.3d at 139, 144.            The

      4
            Guity contends, and the State doesn't dispute, that he served the
full term of his sentences. See State v. Guity, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016 WL
6427681, at *6 n.6 (Haw. App. Oct. 31, 2016), as amended, (Nov. 21, 2016)
(mem.) (Guity I) ("It appears that by the time briefing in this appeal was
completed, Guity had completed serving his concurrent terms of imprisonment on
both convictions."), vacated on other grounds by Guity II .
      5
            The relevant law has since been amended.   See Guity I, 2016 WL
6427681, at *1 n.1.

                                      3
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

supreme court remanded both cases "with instructions to accept

Guity's withdrawal of both pleas and for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion."      Id. at 563-64, 445 P.3d at 144-

45.

          On remand in the Family Court Case, Guity moved to

dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 because of defects in the

indictment.   The trial court granted the motion and dismissed

Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 without prejudice.        The State moved to

nolle prosequi Counts 1 and 6 without prejudice "on the ground

that Counts 2-5 were dismissed without prejudice[.]"          The trial

court granted the motion.     The crime for which Guity pleaded

guilty and was convicted (sexual assault in the third degree)

wasn't charged in the indictment.

          On remand in the Circuit Court Case, Guity moved to

dismiss all six counts because of defects in the indictment.              The

trial court granted the motion "with prejudice, as the State can

no longer prosecute the case due to lack of contact with the

complainant."

          Guity filed the petition below on May 14, 2021.            He

sought redress from the State for wrongful convictions and

imprisonment under HRS Chapter 661B.       The State moved to dismiss

the petition or, alternatively, for summary judgment.          The

Circuit Court granted the motion.       It ruled:
                3.    The court's analysis is straight-forward. HRS
          Section 661B-1 is clear. To present an actionable claim
          against the State for wrongful conviction and imprisonment,
          Mr. Guity must allege that he was convicted, was sentenced,
          and was imprisoned, and that his judgment of conviction was
          reversed because he was actually innocent of the crimes for
          which he was convicted, and the court decision so states (or

                                    4
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

           the petitioner was pardoned and the pardon so states)
           (emphasis added).
                 4.    There is no dispute that Mr. Guity obtained
           dismissal of a charge against him. However, it is also
           undisputed that no court decision connected with the
           dismissal states he was actually innocent. Mr. Guity argues
           that the presumption of innocence should apply. Mr. Guity
           is absolutely correct that he is presumed innocent in the
           context of the criminal justice system. But he is now in a
           different arena -- asserting a civil claim for damages. HRS
           Section 661B-1 controls civil claims for wrongful
           imprisonment. The presumption of innocence that cloaks
           Mr. Guity in a criminal case does not apply in civil
           litigation. The statute clearly states and is clearly
           intended to limit financial claims against the State to
           situations where there is an actual and express finding of
           actual innocence by the court considering the criminal case.

A written order was entered on October 27, 2021.

           This appeal followed.         After briefing was completed, we

entered an order under Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure

(HRAP) Rule 28(b)(4)6 for supplemental briefing on whether HRS

§ 661B-3(b)(1)7 should be applied in this appeal.            Both parties

filed timely supplemental briefs.

     6
           HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) provides, in relevant part:
           If an appellate court, when acting on a case on appeal,
           contemplates basing the disposition of the case wholly or in
           part upon an issue of plain error not raised by the parties
           through briefing, it shall not affirm, reverse, or vacate
           the case without allowing the parties the opportunity to
           brief the potential plain-error issue prior to disposition.
     7
           HRS § 661B-3 (2016) provides, in relevant part:

           (b)   The following shall be affirmative defenses, on which the
     State shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence:
           (1)   The petitioner was serving a term of imprisonment for
                 another crime, including crimes under the laws of the
                 United States, concurrently with imprisonment for the
                 crime or crimes for which petitioner was actually
                 innocent[.]

                                     5
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                       II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

          A.    Motion to Dismiss

          "A circuit court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is

reviewed de novo."    Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 143
Hawai#i 249, 256, 428 P.3d 761, 768 (2018) (citation omitted).

We apply the same standard applied by the circuit court:
          [A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
          state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
          plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
          or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief.
          The appellate court must therefore view a plaintiff's
          complaint in a light most favorable to him or her in
          order to determine whether the allegations contained
          therein could warrant relief under any alternative
          theory. For this reason, in reviewing a circuit
          court's order dismissing a complaint . . . the
          appellate court's consideration is strictly limited to
          the allegations of the complaint, and the appellate
          court must deem those allegations to be true.

Id. at 257, 428 P.3d at 769 (citation omitted).         "However, in

weighing the allegations of the complaint as against a motion to

dismiss, the court is not required to accept conclusory

allegations on the legal effect of the events alleged."            Kealoha

v. Machado, 131 Hawai#i 62, 74, 315 P.3d 213, 225 (2013)

(citation omitted).

          The State's motion to dismiss included five exhibits

that were not excluded by the Circuit Court.         That would

ordinarily have converted the motion to dismiss into one for

summary judgment.    See Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)

Rule 12(b); Andrade v. County of Hawai#i, 145 Hawai#i 265, 268-69,

451 P.3d 1, 4-5 (App. 2019).      The exhibits, however, consisted of

our memorandum opinion in Guity I; the supreme court opinion in

Guity II; and findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders

                                    6
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

entered on remand in the Family Court Case and the Circuit Court

Case.       Hawaii Rules of Evidence Rule 201 permits a court to

notice adjudicative facts if they are "not subject to reasonable

dispute."       "The most frequent use of judicial notice of

ascertainable facts is in noticing the contents of court

records."       Uyeda v. Schermer, 144 Hawai#i 163, 172, 439 P.3d 115,

124 (2019) (citation omitted).8           A trial court may judicially

notice the contents of court records without converting a motion

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.              See Khoja v.
Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018).9

Accordingly, we apply the standard of review applicable to HRCP

Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.

        8
               However:

               a distinction must be carefully drawn between taking
               judicial notice of the existence of documents in the Court
               file as opposed to the truth of the facts asserted in those
               documents. Factual allegations, conclusions, and findings,
               whether authored by the court, by the parties or their
               attorneys, or by third persons, should not be noticed to
               prove the truth of the matters asserted even though the
               material happens to be contained in court records. A court
               may only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted
               in documents such as orders, judgments, and findings of fact
               and conclusions of law because of the principles of
               collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the law of the case.
Uyeda, 144 Hawai#i at 172, 439 P.3d at 124 (cleaned up) (emphasis omitted).
        9
            Although cases interpreting provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding upon us, we may
refer to them for their persuasive authority in interpreting the Hawai#i Rules
of Civil Procedure and Hawaii Rules of Evidence. Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai#i
46, 57 n.15, 292 P.3d 1276, 1287 n.15 (2013) (noting Hawai#i courts "can look
to cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for persuasive
guidance." (citation omitted)); State v. Fitzwater, 122 Hawai#i 354, 366 n.7,
227 P.3d 520, 532 n.7 (2010) ("Although cases interpreting provisions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence are . . . not binding on us, we may refer to them
for persuasive authority in interpreting similar provisions of the Hawaii
Rules of Evidence." (citation omitted)).

                                         7
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

           B.    Statutory Interpretation

           Interpretation of a statute is a question of law

reviewed de novo.     Barker v. Young, 153 Hawai#i 144, 148, 528

P.3d 217, 221 (2023).      We start with the statute's language;

"implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost

obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language

contained in the statute itself."         Id. (citation omitted).        But

"when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness

or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, . . . the

meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the

context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences

may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning."              Id.
(citation omitted).     We may also "resort to extrinsic aids in

determining legislative intent, such as legislative history, or

the reason and spirit of the law."        Id. (citation omitted).

                             III. DISCUSSION

           Guity argues that the Circuit Court erred by granting

the State's motion to dismiss "because Guity's case met all the

grounds according to the legislative statue [sic]."10           HRS

§ 661B-1 (2016) provides:
           Statement of claim for compensation. (a) Any person
           convicted in a court of the State and imprisoned for one or
           more crimes of which the person was actually innocent may

      10
            Guity's opening brief doesn't comply with HRAP Rule 28(b). But to
promote access to justice, the supreme court instructs that self-represented
litigants shouldn't be foreclosed from appellate review because they fail to
comply with court rules. Erum v. Llego, 147 Hawai#i 368, 380-81, 465 P.3d
815, 827-28 (2020). Accordingly, we address what we discern to be Guity's
arguments.

                                      8
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

          file a petition for relief pursuant to this chapter for an
          award of damages against the State; provided that the
          requirements of subsection (b) are met.

                (b)   To present an actionable claim against the State
          for wrongful conviction and imprisonment, the petitioner
          shall allege that the petitioner was convicted of one or
          more crimes under the laws of the State, was subsequently
          sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or
          any part of the sentence and either that:

                (1)    The judgment of conviction was reversed or
                       vacated because the petitioner was actually
                       innocent of the crimes for which the petitioner
                       was convicted, and the court decision so states;
                       or
                (2)    The petitioner was pardoned because the
                       petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes
                       for which the petitioner was convicted and the
                       pardon so states.

(Bold italics added.)

          Guity's petition, written in the first person, alleged

that he was convicted and sentenced in the Family Court Case and

in the Circuit Court Case; served his sentences; appealed his

convictions; the convictions were vacated "because I was innocent

of the crimes for which I was convicted"; and both cases were

dismissed on remand.

          The State argues that "[t]he Hawai#i Supreme Court

vacated Guity's conviction because the circuit court wrongly
refused to let him withdraw his guilty plea.          It made no finding

of 'actual innocence[,]'" nor did its opinion "so state[]."               The

State also argues that "actually innocent" is a legal term of art

meaning "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency[,]" and

that a person is "actually innocent" if "they did not commit the

underlying conduct upon which their conviction was based."

                                     9
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

             A.   The legislature did not define the phrase
                  "actually innocent" and the legislative
                  history does not provide definitive guidance.

             HRS Chapter 661B doesn't define the phrase "actually

innocent."    The State contends the phrase is a legal term of art
meaning "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency."             The

State appears to be referring to federal habeas corpus law.11               A

state prisoner who is procedurally unable to obtain habeas relief

from the state's highest court may seek relief from a federal

court if the petitioner demonstrates that a "constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent[.]"      Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106
S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986) (emphasis added).             In such a

case, "failure to consider the claim[] will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice."         Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991).             The

miscarriage of justice exception applies only in extraordinary

cases, and "'actual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere

legal insufficiency."      Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

      11
            The State's brief cites Williams v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 3d
1115 (W.D. Wash. 2021), a federal habeas case, and In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696
(Tex. 2012). Under the Texas wrongful imprisonment statute, "[a] person is
entitled to compensation if the person 1) has served in whole or in part a
sentence in prison under the laws of this state, and 2) has been granted
habeas relief on a court determination that he is 'actually innocent' of the
crime for which he was sentenced." In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d at 700.

                                      10
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

623, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998).12           HRS Chapter

661B doesn't mention federal law on habeas relief.            Nor does the

legislative history mention federal habeas law.

           HRS Chapter 661B was enacted on June 29, 2016.             2016

Haw. Sess. Laws Act 156, § 5 at 513.          The bill for Act 156 (2016)

had been introduced during the previous legislative session.

H.B. 1046, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015).13         The bill was carried

      12
            Even under federal law, "actual innocence" doesn't always mean
that the defendant did not commit the crime of which they were convicted. In
federal habeas cases when the petitioner challenges a state death penalty,
"actual innocence" is established by showing that but for a constitutional
error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty under the applicable state law. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.
333, 336, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992).
     13
           The bill proposed this language:

           (b)   To present an actionable claim against the State for
           wrongful conviction and imprisonment, the claimant shall
           allege:
                 (1)   That the claimant has been convicted of one or
                       more crimes, was subsequently sentenced to a
                       term of imprisonment, and has served all or any
                       part of the sentence, under the laws of this
                       State;
                 (2)   On grounds consistent with innocence and
                       supported by findings that clearly state such
                       consistency, for the crime or crimes which the
                       claimant was sentenced:

                       (A)   That the claimant was pardoned for the
                             crime or crimes;
                       (B)   That the judgment of conviction was
                             reversed or vacated; and:

                             (i)    The accusatory instrument was
                                    dismissed; or
                             (ii)   If a new trial was ordered, either
                                    the claimant was found not guilty at
                                    the new trial or the claimant was
                                    not retried and the accusatory
                                    instrument was dismissed; or
                       (C)   The statute, or application thereof, on
                             which the accusatory instrument was based,
                             violated the constitution of the United
                             States or the State of Hawaii;
                                                               (continued...)

                                      11
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

over to the 2016 session.14      A "Special Committee On Redress for

Unlawful Imprisonment" was convened by the Hawai#i chapter of the

American Judicature Society (AJS) in 2015 to revise the bill's

language.    H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 411-16, in 2016 House

Journal, at 903.15

            The AJS committee's co-chair submitted written

testimony to the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor

explaining that the AJS committee had "reviewed legislation

adopted in many of the several states and also looked at some of

the objections to a 2015 proposed bill[.]"          Senate Committee on

Judiciary and Labor on House Bill 1046, H.D.2, 28th Leg., Reg.

Sess. (Mar. 14, 2016) (testimony of Mark J. Bennett16).17           The AJS

committee "believed the proposed statute afforded appropriate

      13
            (...continued)
                  (3)   That the claimant did not commit any of the
                        crimes charged in the accusatory instrument, or
                        the acts or omissions charged in the accusatory
                        instrument did not constitute a crime;

                  (4)   That the claimant did not commit or suborn
                        perjury or fabricate evidence to cause or bring
                        about the claimant's conviction; provided that
                        neither a confession or admission later found to
                        be false, nor a guilty plea to a crime the
                        claimant did not commit, shall constitute
                        perjury or fabrication under this paragraph[.]
H.B. 1046, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015), available at https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/sessions/session2015/bills/HB1046_.PDF.
      14
            See Haw. Const. art. III, § 15 ("Any bill pending at the final
adjournment of a regular session in an odd-numbered year shall carry over with
the same status to the next regular session.").
      15
            Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_HD1_HSCR411-16_.pdf.
      16
            The other co-chair for the AJS committee was the Honorable
Jeannette H. Castagnetti.
      17
            Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
Testimony/HB1046_HD2_TESTIMONY_JDL_03-15-16.PDF.

                                      12
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

compensation and yet also provided appropriate safeguards for the

State and the taxpayers, striking a fair balance."            Id.   As

recognized by the Conference Committee and the Senate Committee

on Judiciary and Labor, the AJS committee's suggestions were

incorporated into the version of H.B. 1046 that was ultimately

enacted as HRS Chapter 661B.        See Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 146-16, in
2016 House Journal, at 1410 ("Your Committee on Conference notes

that the language in this measure is substantially similar to the

draft legislation proposed by the Hawaii Chapter of the American

Judicature Society Special Committee on Redress for Unlawful

Imprisonment.");18 S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3045, in 2016 Senate
Journal, at 1309 ("Your Committee finds that the language in this

measure is substantially similar to the draft legislation

proposed by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Judicature Society

special committee on redress for unlawful imprisonment.")19.

            There is no indication that the AJS committee suggested

incorporating the phrase "actually innocent" in the proposed law

as a term of art meaning "factual innocence, not legal

insufficiency[,]" as in federal habeas law.           Nor is there any

indication that the bill's final language was based on any other

state's statute.     Indeed, the State's answering brief describes

the redress statutes of Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut,

      18
            Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_CD1_CCR146-16_.pdf.
      19
            Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_SD1_SSCR3045_.pdf.

                                      13
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas,

Washington, and the District of Columbia, but our statute appears

to be uniquely worded.

           The legislative committee reports don't clearly state

what the phrase "actually innocent" was intended to mean, either.

But they do give some indication of the general legislative

intent.   The House Committee on Judiciary reported:
                 Your Committee finds that compensation for wrongful
           imprisonment generates many viewpoints about the State's
           responsibility in these circumstances. Wrongful convictions
           and the subsequent incarcerations may be the result of many
           factors, including eyewitness misidentification, false
           confessions, improper forensic science, and government
           misconduct. The conundrum confronting any compensation
           scheme is to identify deserving individuals who are innocent
           of crimes from those who are not.

                 . . . .
                 Upon careful consideration, your Committee has amended
           this measure by deleting its contents and inserting the
           language of H.B. No. 1046, H.D. 1, Proposed, which provides
           compensation and expungement of conviction to persons who
           can demonstrate that they were wrongfully convicted and
           imprisoned when actually innocent.

H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 411-16, in 2016 House Journal, at 903

(emphasis added);20 cf. State v. Kamana#o, 103 Hawai#i 315, 321,

82 P.3d 401, 407 (2003) (noting that "[a] sentencing court may
not draw a negative inference of lack of remorse from the

defendant's silence at sentencing where he has maintained,

throughout the proceedings, that he did not commit the offense of

which he stands convicted — i.e., that he is actually innocent"

(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

     20
           See supra note 15.

                                     14
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

            Further, the Conference Committee reported, in relevant

part:
                  The purpose of this measure is to provide compensation
            and expungement of conviction to persons who can demonstrate
            they were wrongfully convicted and imprisoned when actually
            innocent.

                  . . . .
                  Innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of
            crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been uniquely
            victimized, have distinct challenges re-entering society,
            and have difficulty achieving legal redress due to a variety
            of substantive and technical obstacles in the law. . . .
            Your Committee on Conference finds that these individuals
            deserve a process of redress over and above the existing
            tort remedies to seek compensation for damages from the
            jurisdiction that wrongly convicted and imprisoned them.

Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 146-16, in 2016 House Journal, at 1410

(emphasis added).21

            With this in mind, we address the convictions at issue

in Guity's HRS Chapter 661B petition.

            B.    The Circuit Court erred by dismissing Guity's
                  petition with respect to the Family Court
                  Case.

            Guity pleaded guilty to, was convicted of, and was

imprisoned for 12 months for, Sexual Assault in the Third Degree,

in violation of former HRS § 707-732(1)(f) (Supp. 2009).             The

statute provided, in relevant part:
            (1)   A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
                  third degree if:

                  . . . .
                  (f)   The person knowingly, by strong compulsion, has
                        sexual contact with another person or causes
                        another person to have sexual contact with the
                        actor.

      21
            Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_CD1_CCR1416-16_.pdf.

                                      15
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

(Emphasis added.)     When Guity was convicted, "sexual contact"

meant:
            any touching, other than acts of "sexual penetration", [sic]
            of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not
            married to the actor, or of the sexual or other intimate
            parts of the actor by the person, whether directly or
            through the clothing or other material intended to cover the
            sexual or other intimate parts.

HRS § 707-700 (Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).

            The complainant in the Family Court Case was Guity's

wife.    In Guity I we stated:
                  Under the law applicable to the charges in Guity's
            cases, the offense of third-degree sexual assault to which
            Guity pleaded guilty could not be committed by a defendant
            against his or her spouse. . . . Accordingly, given the
            Legislature's definition of the offense, Guity pleaded
            guilty to an offense — third-degree sexual assault against
            his wife — that was legally impossible for Guity to commit.

2016 WL 6427681, at *1 (emphasis added).          We also noted:
                  Here, the Circuit Court clearly violated [Hawai#i
            Rules of Penal Procedure] Rule 11(g) in entering judgment on
            Guity's plea of guilty to third-degree sexual assault of his
            wife. Not only did the Circuit Court and the parties know
            that there was no factual basis for Guity's guilty plea to
            third-degree sexual assault, but they affirmatively knew
            that it was legally impossible for Guity to have committed
            this offense. . . .

                  . . . [A] court's acceptance of, and entry of judgment
            on, a guilty plea to an offense that it knows the defendant
            could not legally commit implicates the integrity of the
            judicial system. We conclude that allowing such action by a
            court would be contrary to the truth-seeking function of the
            criminal justice system and would serve to undermine the
            integrity of the system and public confidence in the system.

Id. at *7-8 (emphasis added).        Accordingly, we vacated Guity's

conviction in the Family Court Case.

            The supreme court also stated, in Guity II:
                  At the time of the plea agreement, it was legally
            impossible for Guity to have committed the crime to which he
            had pleaded guilty in the family court case relating to his
            wife. . . .

                                      16
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                . . . .
                The ICA held correctly that Guity was entitled to
          withdraw his guilty plea in the family court case because
          "the Circuit Court definitively knew that it was legally
          impossible for Guity to have committed third-degree sexual
          assault of his wife[.]"

144 Hawai#i at 559, 562-63, 445 P.3d at 140, 143-44 (emphasis

added).

          The State argues that the court decision reversing or

vacating a conviction must contain the precise words, "actually

innocent," because HRS § 661B-1(b)(1) requires that "the court

decision so state[]."     Were that the case, any court could

subvert an actually innocent person's standing to make a claim

for redress by simply omitting the words "actually innocent" from

its decision.   That result would be absurd.        See Barker, 153

Hawai#i at 149 n.8, 528 P.3d at 222 n.8 (noting that "if a

literal construction of statutory language would produce an

absurd result, we presume that result was not intended and

construe the statute in accord with its underlying legislative

intent" (cleaned up)).

          Neither Guity I nor Guity II contained the words
"actually innocent."      However, Guity I states there was no

factual basis (because the complaining witness was Guity's wife)

or legal basis (because the definition of "sexual contact"

excluded contact with the defendant's spouse) for Guity's

conviction.   And Guity II noted it was legally impossible for

Guity to have committed the offense to which he pleaded guilty in

the Family Court Case.     Given the undisputed facts in the Family

                                    17
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Court Case, that was the equivalent of stating that Guity was

actually innocent of the crime for which he had been convicted —

Sexual Assault in the Third Degree of his wife.           Accordingly, we

hold that Guity's petition met the pleading requirements of HRS

§ 661B-1(b)(1) with respect to the Family Court Case,22 and that

the Circuit Court erred by dismissing Guity's petition with

respect to the Family Court Case.23

           C.    The Circuit Court did not err by dismissing
                 Guity's petition with respect to the Circuit
                 Court Case.

           In the Circuit Court Case, Guity pleaded guilty to

Sexual Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-

731(1)(a) (Supp. 2009).      The trial court denied Guity's motion to

withdraw his guilty plea.      Guity had represented himself at the

hearing on the motion.      In Guity I we held that the trial court

failed to obtain a valid waiver of Guity's right to counsel

before the hearing.     2016 WL 6427681, at *8-9.       We remanded to

the trial court for further proceedings.         Nothing in our

memorandum opinion can reasonably be interpreted as stating that

Guity was actually innocent of Sexual Assault in the Second

Degree.

           In Guity II the supreme court noted that our "remand

instructions require the [trial] court to rehear the motion to

     22
            We express no opinion on whether, or how, HRS § 661B-3(b) should
be applied on remand, or whether Guity is entitled to redress under HRS
§ 661B-3(c). This opinion addresses only the propriety of the Circuit Court's
order granting the State's motion to dismiss.
     23
           Our holding is limited to the specific facts of this case.

                                     18
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

withdraw the plea, leaving the possibility open that the [trial]

court could deny Guity's motion to withdraw the remaining plea."

144 Hawai#i at 561, 445 P.3d at 142.   The supreme court held that

Guity's plea agreement "was clearly a global plea agreement[,]"

id. at 562, 445 P.3d at 143, and "because Guity was entitled to

withdraw his plea in the family court case, he was also entitled

to withdraw his plea in the circuit court case[,]" id. at 563,

445 P.3d at 144.   The supreme court remanded "with instructions

to accept Guity's withdrawal of both pleas and for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion."   Id. at 563-64, 445
P.3d at 144-45.    Nothing in the supreme court's opinion can

reasonably be interpreted as stating that Guity was actually

innocent of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree.

          On remand Guity moved to dismiss all six counts because

of defects in the indictment.   The trial court granted the motion

because the indictment failed "to define or specify 'compulsion'

as defined in HRS § 707-700[.]"    The dismissal was "with

prejudice, as the State can no longer prosecute the case due to

lack of contact with the complainant."   Nothing in the trial

court's order can reasonably be interpreted as stating that Guity

was actually innocent of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree — or

any other counts of the indictment.    We also note that HRS

§ 661B-1(b)(1) requires that "the court decision" that "reversed

or vacated" the "judgment of conviction" state that the

petitioner was "actually innocent of the crimes for which the

petitioner was convicted[.]"    The trial court's order dismissing

                                  19
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

the indictment did not reverse or vacate Guity's judgment of

conviction.   It could not be relied on as the decision stating

that Guity was actually innocent for purposes of HRS § 661B-

1(b)(1).

           On this record, Guity's petition did not — and could

not — satisfy the pleading requirements of HRS § 661B-1(b)(1)

with respect to the Circuit Court Case.      The Circuit Court did

not err by dismissing Guity's petition with respect to the

Circuit Court Case.

                            IV. CONCLUSION

           For the reasons explained above, we vacate the Circuit

Court's "Judgment" entered on December 15, 2021; and vacate in

part the Circuit Court's "Order Granting Defendant State of

Hawaii's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary

Judgment, Filed August 17, 2021[,]" entered on October 27, 2021,

to the extent it dismissed Guity's petition with respect to his

conviction in the Family Court Case, but affirm that order to the

extent it dismissed Guity's petition with respect to his

conviction in the Circuit Court Case.     We remand to the Circuit

Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On the briefs:                         /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
                                       Chief Judge
Walter N. Guity,
Self-represented                       /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Petitioner-Appellant.                  Associate Judge

Ewan C. Rayner,                        /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Deputy Solicitor General,              Associate Judge
State of Hawai#i,
for Respondent-Appellee.

                                  20