Court Opinion

ID: 9963742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 05:06:16.879311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:58.439718
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                      UNPUBLISHED
In re K. A. BIGGS, Minor.                                             April 25, 2024

                                                                      No. 367434
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC No. 2023-000273-NA

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and CAMERON and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent,1 appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to minor
child, KAB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f)(i) (child has a guardian but parent failed or neglected to
provide child regular and substantial support for two years or more), and (ii) (child has a guardian
but parent has failed to visit, contact, or communicate with the minor child for two years or more).
Respondent contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider that a personal protection order
(“PPO”) and the COVID-19 pandemic prevented her from exercising her parental rights. Because
the limitations imposed by the PPO and COVID-19 were lifted early in the relevant two-year
period under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f), we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s
parental rights.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

       Petitioner is T.L. Welton, who has no blood relation to KAB, but is married to D.R. Welton,
who is respondent’s aunt’s first cousin.2 T.L. Welton petitioned for permanent custody of KAB
on February 27, 2023. The relevant period of inquiry under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f), therefore, is
February 27, 2021 to February 27, 2023. D.R. Welton joined in the petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. Petitioners are co-guardians of KAB who has been in their custody

1
   The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the minor child’s father after having
determined the child’s father is unknown and unascertainable. No appeal on his behalf has been
filed. Consequently, we will refer to the child’s mother as “respondent.”
2
  Petitioners will be referred to as “petitioners” throughout this opinion, but will be referred to
individually as T.L. Welton and D.R. Welton when necessary.

                                                 -1-
since September 2016 when respondent was 22 years old and homeless. Respondent’s aunt, and
D.R. Welton’s first cousin, T.L. Glaster, connected respondent with petitioners who agreed to care
for KAB. Petitioners filed for guardianship in October 2016, and were awarded guardianship on
January 24, 2017.

       Respondent petitioned the probate court in October 2017 and in March 2018 for
termination of the guardianship, but the court denied both requests. Sometime between the first
and second petition to terminate the guardianship, respondent called the Michigan State Police
(“MSP”) and told them KAB had been kidnapped. In response to this behavior, the court granted
T.L. Welton a PPO against respondent. The PPO expired sometime in 2019 or 2020, but
respondent has not had contact with petitioners since.

         Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, our Michigan Supreme Court entered Administrative
Order No. 2020-13 (AO 2020-1), which became effective March 15, 2020. The order directed
Michigan courts to use technology to enable parties to participate in remote proceedings and
facilitate electronic filing and service. Id. Our Supreme Court rescinded AO 2020-14 on July 26,
2021, allowing Michigan courts to resume holding in-person proceedings as necessary.

        On February 27, 2023, petitioners filed a petition in the Wayne Circuit Court Family
Division for permanent custody of KAB, requesting the parental rights of respondent and the
unidentified father be terminated to allow adoption. The trial court took judicial notice of the
Letters of Guardianship and exercised jurisdiction over KAB under MCL 712A.2(b)(6).
T.L. Welton testified that, from the beginning of the relevant period, February 27, 2021 to the
filing of the termination petition, she never received any financial assistance or material support
from respondent for KAB’s benefit. Respondent also never had any parenting time with KAB or
tried to have any contact with him. D.R. Welton testified that respondent could contact him and
speak to KAB if she wanted, but had never done so.

       Petitioners were married for 12 years and lived together with KAB for almost eight years.
KAB called them “mom” and “dad” and thrived in their care. They provided KAB parental
guidance, love, affection, and provided for his material, physical, medical, and spiritual needs.
Respondent last had contact with KAB in January 2017, when he was 14 months old, and she made
no effort to contact petitioners since February 27, 2021. Respondent provided no portion of her
income for KAB’s benefit. She claimed that she did not do so because she feared petitioners.

        The referee recommended terminating respondent’s parental rights to KAB because
petitioners met their burden by showing that clear and convincing evidence established that
respondent did not make efforts to contact or support KAB since February 27, 2021. The presiding
judge adopted the referee’s recommendation and entered an order terminating the parental rights
of respondent and the unknown father. Respondent now appeals.

3
    505 Mich xcix (2020).
4
    507 Mich cxcvii (2021).

                                                -2-
                                  II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

     Respondent contends the trial court erred when it overlooked the effect the PPO and the
COVID-19 pandemic had on her ability to contact and provide support for KAB. We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). “If the court finds that
there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the
child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional
efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). “We review
the trial court’s determination of statutory grounds for clear error.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App
252, 272; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial
court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. at 272-273 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “This Court reviews de novo questions about the correct interpretation and application
of statutes and court rules.” Home-Owners Ins Co v Andriacchi, 320 Mich App 52, 71; 903 NW2d
197 (2017); see also In re Piland, 336 Mich App 713, 720; 972 NW2d 269 (2021).

                                          B. ANALYSIS

       “ ‘[T]o terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing
evidence.’ ” In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 635; 853 NW2d 459
(2014), quoting In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). Termination is
appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) when:

         (f) The child has a guardian under the [EPIC5], and both of the following have
         occurred:

                (i) The parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting
                the minor, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide
                regular and substantial support for the minor for a period of 2 years
                or more before the filing of the petition or, if a support order has
                been entered, has failed to substantially comply with the order for a
                period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition.

                (ii) The parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate
                with the minor, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected,
                without good cause, to do so for a period of 2 years or more before
                the filing of the petition. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(f).]

5
    Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq.

                                                 -3-
This Court has defined “good cause” as “a legally sufficient or substantial reason . . . .” In re
Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 10-11; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). “[T]he court must determine whether
statutory grounds for termination exist by looking at the two years immediately preceding the filing
of the termination petition.” In re Caldwell, 228 Mich App 116, 120; 576 NW2d 724 (1998).

        The plain language of MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) specifies that, if KAB has guardians under
EPIC and the provisions of subsections (i) and (ii) are proven by clear and convincing evidence to
have existed for at least two years before the petition’s filing and while the guardianship remained
in place, the parent effectively abandoned the minor child both financially and physically,
requiring termination. In this case, KAB had appointed guardians. The trial court concluded that
evidence established that respondent had not provided any support for KAB for two years before
the petition’s filing. Evidence established that, although respondent had been employed for five
years and provided care for her two other children, she provided nothing for KAB. Such evidence
established respondent’s ability under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f)(i) to provide regular and substantial
support for KAB, but respondent failed to do so.

        Respondent argues that the PPO and COVID-19 prevented her from providing financial
support. Petitioners correctly assert that respondent continued to have access to the probate court
during COVID-19. AO 2020-1 merely required courts to adjust to virtual hearings and electronic
filing. Respondent was not prevented from participating in any proceedings in the probate court.
The trial court did not err by concluding that alternative channels were available to respondent to
provide support to KAB during the pandemic. The court properly noted that respondent “could
have gone to the Probate Court and requested an address that she could send financial support.
She could have initiated her own Financial Support Order through the Friend of the Court. The
Friend of the Court did not close through this period.”

        Our Supreme Court rescinded AO 2020-1 on July 26, 2021, five months into the relevant
period. To the extent that COVID-19 inhibited respondent’s ability to access the probate court
between February 27, 2021, and February 27, 2023, after July 2021 she had in-person access to
the court available to her. Accordingly, she cannot claim that the administrative order prohibited
her from fulfilling her parental responsibilities during the relevant period. The PPO also expired
in either 2019 or 2020, well before the relevant period began. Accordingly, she cannot claim that
the PPO prohibited her from fulfilling her parental responsibilities during the relevant period.

        Respecting MCL 712A.19b(3)(f)(ii), the trial court correctly concluded that clear and
convincing evidence established that respondent failed, without good cause, to visit, contact, or
communicate with KAB from February 27, 2021 to February 27, 2023. Respondent argues that
the PPO prevented her from communicating with KAB and that petitioners prevented contact with
KAB. Testimony at trial, however, established that respondent at least had Glaster’s contact
information, and she could have communicated with Glaster to connect her with petitioners, who
Glaster saw regularly. Respondent never asked Glaster about KAB, and the two had not
communicated for five years at the time of trial. Evidence established that respondent had no
contact of any kind with Glaster, petitioners, or KAB between February 27, 2021, and February
27, 2023. Although respondent claims that she would have contacted KAB given the opportunity,
the evidence establishes that she did nothing during the relevant period.

                                                -4-
        Petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that, for at least two years before the
petition’s filing and while a guardianship remained in place, respondent effectively abandoned
KAB both financially and physically. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination decision
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f).

                                      III. BEST INTERESTS

        Respondent contends that the trial court erred when it failed to consider how the PPO
deprived her of contact with KAB, and that T.L. Welton was related to KAB, which weighed
against termination. We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “We . . . review for clear error a trial court’s decision that termination is in a child’s best
interests.” In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch Minors, 340 Mich App 326, 333; 985 NW2d 912
(2022). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special
opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id.

                                           B. ANALYSIS

         “Once a statutory basis for termination has been shown by clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re LaFrance, 306
Mich App 713, 732-733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). “ ‘The focus at the
best-interests stage has always been on the child, not the parent.’ ” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson
Minors, 311 Mich App 49, 63; 874 NW2d 205 (2015) (alterations omitted), quoting In re Moss,
301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “Best interests are determined on the basis of the
preponderance of the evidence.” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App at 733. The trial court is permitted
to consider multiple factors in deciding whether termination serves the child’s best interests
including:

       the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
       permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
       parent’s home. Other considerations include the length of time the child was in
       care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the
       foreseeable future, if at all, . . . . [In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson Minors, 311 Mich
       App at 63-64 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

However, placement with a relative weighs against termination. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164;
782 NW2d 747 (2010). Indeed, “the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time
of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was
in the children’s best interest.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144
(2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

         In this case, the trial court considered KAB’s calling petitioners “mom” and “dad” and that
the child has known no man to be his father other than D.R. Welton. The trial court also considered
evidence that petitioners provided KAB with not only basic necessities, but many extracurricular
activities “important for development of a young person . . . .” The trial court took into

                                                 -5-
consideration that T.L. Welton is KAB’s great aunt’s first cousin’s wife, a relative under MCL
712A.13a(1)(j)(i).6 Although the trial court did not explicitly state on the record that KAB’s
relation to petitioners weighed against termination, the trial court took judicial notice of the Letters
of Guardianship which showed KAB was in petitioners’ care for almost eight years. Importantly,
the trial court explained, “I appreciate and certainly gave all the lawyers some leeway because
especially when it’s family that’s raising someone else’s child, there’s history there.” In In Re
Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 435; 871 NW2d 868 (2015), this Court held that the trial
court did not err in finding that termination served the children’s best interests where the children’s
aunt and uncle were willing to adopt them and both children were excelling in their relatives’ care.
This case is very similar. Despite the familial relation, the trial court found that termination served
KAB’s best interests because evidence established the excellent care he received under petitioners’
care and custody. Petitioners also sought and were taking steps to adopt KAB. Respondent had
no bond with KAB and never contacted or communicated with him for years. We are not
persuaded that the trial court erred in its best-interest analysis or decision. Accordingly, the trial
court properly ordered the termination of respondent’s parental rights to KAB.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                               /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                               /s/ Anica Letica

6
 MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(i) (emphasis added) states a “relative” means an individual who is at least
18 years of age and is:
       Related to the child within the fifth degree by blood, marriage, or adoption,
       including the spouse of an individual related to the child within the fifth degree,
       even after the marriage has ended by death or divorce, the parent who shares
       custody of a half-sibling, and the parent of a man whom the court has found
       probable cause to believe is the putative father if there is no man with legally
       established rights to the child.

                                                  -6-