Court Opinion

ID: 9717167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:59:38.515362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.774779
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoppman, J.:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority of this Court because I cannot “agree with the court below that the magistrate had sufficient information before him to decide objectively that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant.”
Although the facts are summarized by the majority opinion, I believe it would be helpful to set out the relevant parts from the record. The police officer who gathered most of the information relied upon for the search warrant testified, in part, as follows:
“. . . I had information from the informants that-1 work with that there is a pot party that was in progress and still in progress in McMurray Road. The informant contacted me, told me that there was a party going — Shadyside, where this originated from, and that they made a map, [which] showed them how to get the *317directions to go to this Jansma’s house on McMurray Road.
“. . . [T]he parties [sic] was taking place at this Ida Jane Jansma’s house. Her parents was [sic] supposed to be in New York. She had the house, the party was taking place at this house with different people from Shadyside in the Pittsburgh area was [sic] coming to and from this house on McMurray Road for the purpose of this pot party.
“There was going to be and was at the house at the time marijuana and that Monday morning and afternoon there was supposed to be ‘acid’ brought in, which is LSD.
“Q. Now, had you had occasion to use the information of this informant at prior times? A. Many a times. Q. And did this information that you had received turn out to be reliable? A. Very much so. . . . Q. . . . Did you observe this house on McMurray Road before this raid was made [and before you went for the search warrant] ? A. Yes, we did. Q. And what did you observe there? A. We noticed that there was [sic] a lot of cars. ... A. We seen [sic] the cars in the driveway, we seen [sic] a couple kids standing by the cars. The lights was [sic] on. No outside activity outside the kids being in the driveway, about four or five of them. A couple cars pulled out, a couple cars pulled in.”
The hearing court summarized the above as follows:
“Let’s see if I can sum this up. You had received information from a previously reliable confidential informant that there was to be a pot and possibly acid party at Jansma’s in Peters Township, that there had been a map made for people from Shadyside to get there and, with certain other officers, you went out and you observed that some sort of a party was in progress, a number of people there, lights on in the *318house, people coming and going. You then went before a Peters Township magistrate, related the information to him and to Fetty, and Fetty signed the complaint for the search warrant[.]”
Upon the above information a warrant was issued. I believe this information was insufficient, however, to support a finding of probable cause and to justify the issuance of a search warrant.
Probable cause exists if the factual evidence, which the police officer swears to, would warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that a crime was or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925). In most instances, in reviewing the issuance of a warrant, we need only ascertain what facts were discovered by the police officer and sworn to before the magistrate, whether his testimony should have been given credence, and whether the credible facts were enough to satisfy the “reasonable belief” rule.
When the police officer has discovered little or nothing on his own but is relying upon information supplied by an informant, we make a similar inquiry, modified by our concern with the hearsay now present. (1) We ascertain what facts were discovered by the informant. (2) We decide whether the police officer’s testimony supports the belief that the informant was credible. (3) We then decide whether the credible facts (both the informant’s and the police officer’s) were enough to satisfy the “reasonable belief” rule. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 581 (1969) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964).
Neither (1) nor (2) is satisfied by the testimony taken below.
With respect to the informant’s information, we have only Ms conclusion that a “pot party” was in progress. We do not know how he came to that con*319elusion, whether from personal observation or from a third party. Were it from personal observation, we would be satisfied to rely upon it. But were it from a third party, we would need to know how the third party came to his conclusion and whether he was credible. The deficiency could have easily been remedied had we been given information upon which we could conclude that indeed a “pot party” was in progress. We cannot, however, permit an informant to make a conclusion we are constitutionally compelled to make ourselves. See Spinelli v. United States, supra at 415-416, 89 S. Ct. at 588-89; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948).*
With respect to the informant’s credibility, we have only the police officer’s conclusion that the informant’s information had always been accurate. The police officer had obtained information “[m]any a times,” and the information was “very much” accurate. We cannot make the same conclusion, however, because the police officer did not reveal what kind of information he had received in the past from the informant, whether the information had led to arrests, and if so, how many, and whether the information had led to convictions, and if so, how many. We cannot permit the police officer to make a conclusion we are constitutionally compelled to make ourselves. Ibid.
Thus, because we cannot conclude that the informant’s information was reliable and because we cannot conclude that the informant was credible, the warrant *320should not have been issued. I would suppress tbe evidence obtained through the use of the unlawful warrant and, therefore, reverse the judgments obtained through the use of the evidence and grant a new trial.
Montgomery and Spaulding, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

 In some instances, we can conclude that the informant’s information was reliable if its character implies that it could only have been obtained first-hand. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, supra at 416-418, 89 S. Ct. at 589-590. The instant informant’s information could have been obtained on the street or at the neighborhood bar. Id. at 417, 89 S. Ct. at 589. It is not the kind of detailed description that would make it reasonable for us to conclude that the informant had a factual basis for his conclusion.