Court Opinion

ID: 9942563
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Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:03:10.443321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:14.635146
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(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2023                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

                        MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

        CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

 No. 22–721.      Argued November 28, 2023—Decided February 21, 2024
After petitioner Damian McElrath killed his mother, the State of Georgia
  charged him with three crimes related to her death: malice murder,
  felony murder, and aggravated assault. At trial, the jury returned a
  split verdict against McElrath: “not guilty by reason of insanity” with
  respect to malice-murder, and “guilty but mentally ill” as to the other
  counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the
  jury’s “guilty but mentally ill” verdict for felony murder was “repug-
  nant” to the jury’s “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict for malice
  murder under Georgia law, because the verdicts “required affirmative
  findings of different mental states that could not exist at the same
  time.” See 308 Ga. 104, 112, 839 S. E. 2d 573, 579. The court vacated
  both the malice-murder and felony-murder verdicts pursuant to Geor-
  gia’s so-called repugnancy doctrine, and authorized retrial. Ibid., 839
  S. E. 2d, at 580. On remand, McElrath argued that the Double Jeop-
  ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited Georgia from retrying
  him for malice murder given the jury’s prior “not guilty by reason of
  insanity” verdict on that charge. The Georgia courts rejected that ar-
  gument.
Held: The jury’s verdict that McElrath was not guilty of malice murder
 by reason of insanity constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy pur-
 poses notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury’s other verdicts.
 Pp. 5–10.
    (a) The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . .
 be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
 limb.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. “[I]t has long been settled under the Fifth
 Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s
 jeopardy, and . . . is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
 offence.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 188 (internal quotation
2                         MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

                                   Syllabus

    marks omitted). The Court’s “cases have defined an acquittal to en-
    compass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to estab-
    lish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S.
    313, 318. Once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate. The
    principle “that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on
    error or otherwise,’ ” is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the
    history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” United States v. Martin
    Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 571. Whatever the basis for a jury’s
    verdict, see Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U. S. 5, 10, the Dou-
    ble Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s
    acquittal. Pp. 5–7.
       (b) Georgia law specifically provides that a defendant who estab-
    lishes an insanity defense “shall not be found guilty of [the] crime.”
    Ga. Code Ann. §§16–3–2, 16–3–3. Here, the jury concluded that
    McElrath was not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the
    malice-murder charge. That verdict was unquestionably a “ruling that
    the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for
    an offense,” Evans, 568 U. S., at 318, and thus an acquittal.
       Georgia argues that there was no valid verdict pursuant to Georgia
    law, and thus no acquittal. But whether an acquittal has occurred for
    double jeopardy purposes is a question of federal law, and a State’s
    characterization of a ruling is not binding on the Court. Smalis v.
    Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140, 144 n. 5. While States have the power
    “to regulate procedures under which [their] laws are carried out,” Pat-
    terson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201, the ultimate question remains
    whether the Double Jeopardy Clause recognizes an event as an acquit-
    tal. The jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity here consti-
    tuted such a determination, and it is of no moment that the verdict
    was accompanied by other verdicts appearing to rest on inconsistent
    findings. An acquittal is an acquittal, even when a jury returns incon-
    sistent verdicts. Bravo-Fernandez, 580 U. S., at 8. Georgia argues
    that the bar to second-guessing an acquittal applies only to general
    verdicts, but the Court’s cases prohibit any speculation about the rea-
    sons for a jury’s verdict of acquittal—even when, as here, specific jury
    findings provide a factual basis for such speculation. To do otherwise
    “would impermissibly authorize judges to usurp the jury right.” Smith
    v. United States, 599 U. S. 236, 252. Pp. 7–10.
315 Ga. 126, 880 S.E. 2d 518, reversed and remanded.

   JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
                        Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 22–721
                                   _________________

   DAMIAN MCELRATH, PETITIONER v. GEORGIA
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
                       GEORGIA
                              [February 21, 2024]

   JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
   Under Georgia law, a jury’s verdict in a criminal case can
be set aside if it is “repugnant”—meaning that it involves
“affirmative findings by the jury that are not legally and
logically possible of existing simultaneously.” 308 Ga. 104,
111, 839 S. E. 2d 573, 579 (2020). In this case, a jury found
that petitioner Damian McElrath was “not guilty by reason
of insanity” with respect to a malice-murder count, but was
“guilty but mentally ill” regarding two other counts—felony
murder and aggravated assault—all of which pertained to
the same underlying homicide. Invoking the repugnancy
doctrine, Georgia courts nullified both the “not guilty” and
“guilty” verdicts, and authorized McElrath’s retrial.
   McElrath now maintains that the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the State from retrying
him for the crime that had resulted in the “not guilty by
reason of insanity” finding. Under the circumstances pre-
sented here, we agree. The jury’s verdict constituted an ac-
quittal for double jeopardy purposes, and an acquittal is an
acquittal notwithstanding its apparent inconsistency with
other verdicts that the jury may have rendered.
2                  MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

                      Opinion of the Court

                               I
                               A
   This case begins with tragedy. In 2012, petitioner
Damian McElrath, then 18 years old, killed his mother Di-
ane. Diane, a single parent who had adopted McElrath
when he was two years old, struggled for years with caring
for him. At a young age, McElrath was diagnosed with bi-
polar disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
He responded poorly to psychiatric treatment and some-
times refused to take his prescribed medication. He had
trouble in school, including suspensions and low grades,
and experienced several run-ins with law enforcement.
These issues, among others, led to quarrels between
McElrath and his mother.
   A few years before Diane’s murder, McElrath’s mental
health began to deteriorate substantially, eventually man-
ifesting in his belief that Diane was poisoning his food and
drink with ammonia and pesticides. At some point,
McElrath began to exhibit other delusions, such as a belief
that he was an FBI agent who regularly traveled to Russia
and had killed multiple people. These delusions intensified
to the point that, just a few weeks before the events giving
rise to this case, McElrath was committed to a mental-
health facility, where he was diagnosed with schizophrenia.
After two weeks of hospitalization, clinical staff believed
that McElrath was no longer a threat to himself or others
and that there was no evidence of further delusions. Thus,
McElrath was discharged.
   One week later, McElrath stabbed Diane to death. Im-
mediately after the stabbing, McElrath composed a note in
which he explained that he had killed Diane because she
had been poisoning him and that she had in fact confessed
to doing so. McElrath then called 911; he told the dispatch
officer that he had killed his mother and asked if his actions
were wrong. After law enforcement arrived at the scene,
McElrath was taken to a police station for interrogation,
                     Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                     3

                          Opinion of the Court

where he told the investigator, “I killed my Mom because
she poisoned me.” 308 Ga., at 105, 839 S. E. 2d, at 575 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
                              B
  Georgia charged McElrath with three crimes stemming
from Diane’s death: malice murder, felony murder, and ag-
gravated assault. At trial, McElrath did not dispute that
he killed Diane but asserted an insanity defense.
  Under Georgia law, a jury may find a criminal defendant
“not guilty by reason of insanity” if, at the time of the crime,
he “did not have mental capacity to distinguish between
right and wrong” or he committed the crime “because of a
delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered
his will to resist committing the crime.” Ga. Code Ann.
§§16–3–2, 16–3–3, 17–7–131(c)(1) (2019). Such a verdict re-
sults in the defendant’s commitment to a state mental-
health facility until a court determines that release is ap-
propriate. §17–7–131(d). Even if a defendant fails to prove
an insanity defense, a Georgia jury may still render a ver-
dict of “guilty but mentally ill,” under which the State De-
partment of Corrections may, at its discretion, refer a de-
fendant for temporary mental-health treatment. §§17–7–
131(c)(2), (g).
  The jury returned a split verdict against McElrath. It
found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice-
murder charge and guilty but mentally ill on the felony-
murder and aggravated-assault charges. The trial court ac-
cepted the jury’s verdict, and eventually sentenced
McElrath to life imprisonment based on the felony-murder
conviction.1
  McElrath appealed. He argued that the felony-murder
——————
  1 The aggravated-assault conviction merged into the felony-murder

conviction because, under Georgia law, it served as a predicate for felony
murder. See Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 737, 715 S. E. 2d 155, 157
(2011).
4                      MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

                          Opinion of the Court

conviction should be vacated because the guilty-but-men-
tally-ill verdict for that crime was “repugnant” to the jury’s
“not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict for malice murder.
See 308 Ga., at 112, 839 S. E. 2d, at 579 (explaining that,
under Georgia’s so-called “repugnancy” doctrine, a state
court may set aside a verdict as repugnant when there are
“affirmative findings by the jury that are not legally and
logically possible of existing simultaneously”).
  The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with McElrath
that the verdicts were repugnant under Georgia law.2 As
the court explained, “the not guilty by reason of insanity
verdict on malice murder and the guilty but mentally ill
verdict on felony murder based on aggravated assault re-
quired affirmative findings of different mental states that
could not exist at the same time during the commission of
those crimes as they were indicted, proved, and charged to
the jury.” Ibid. There was no way to reconcile those ver-
dicts because, as the court noted, the jury could not con-
clude “that the crimes occurred at different times or
through distinct acts.” Ibid., n. 15, 839 S. E. 2d, at 579,
n. 15. But instead of vacating only the felony-murder con-
viction, as McElrath had requested, the State Supreme
Court vacated both the malice-murder and felony-murder
verdicts. Id., at 112, 839 S. E. 2d, at 580.3
  On remand, McElrath argued that the Double Jeopardy
——————
   2 McElrath appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which

has appellate jurisdiction over all murder cases. See Ga. Const., Art. VI,
§6, ¶3; see also Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 567, 722 S. E. 2d 765, 770
(2012) (Hunstein, C. J., concurring) (noting that the Georgia Constitu-
tion provides the State Supreme Court with “jurisdiction to decide direct
appeals in life-imprisonment murder cases”).
   3 Georgia represents that, outside of this case, the Georgia Supreme

Court has applied the repugnancy rule only once, in Turner v. State, 283
Ga. 17, 655 S. E. 2d 589 (2008). See Brief in Opposition 15. In contrast
with McElrath’s case, the court in Turner vacated only the guilty ver-
dicts, leaving the jury’s verdict of acquittal intact. See 283 Ga., at 21,
655 S. E. 2d, at 592.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)             5

                      Opinion of the Court

Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited Georgia from re-
trying him for malice murder in light of the jury’s prior “not
guilty by reason of insanity” verdict on that charge. The
trial court rejected this argument, and McElrath again ap-
pealed.
   The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. 315 Ga. 126,
880 S. E. 2d 518 (2022). The court recognized that, “[u]nder
the general principles of double jeopardy,” the verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity “would appear to be an acquittal
that precludes retrial, as not guilty verdicts are generally
inviolate.” Id., at 130, 880 S. E. 2d, at 521. But the court
concluded that the acquittal at issue in this case “los[t] con-
siderable steam” when considered alongside the verdict of
guilty but mentally ill, and because the verdicts were re-
pugnant, “both [were] rendered valueless.” Ibid. In the
court’s view, repugnant verdicts were no different for dou-
ble jeopardy purposes from “a situation in which a mistrial
is declared after a jury is unable to reach a verdict.” Ibid.,
880 S. E. 2d, at 522.
   Justice Pinson concurred, noting that he could not “quite
shake the doubt” that the court’s ruling was inconsistent
“with the quite-absolute-sounding bar against retrying a
defendant who has secured an acquittal verdict.” Id., at
132, 880 S. E. 2d, at 523. He joined the majority, however,
because “[t]his lingering doubt [was] not enough to justify
dissenting from an otherwise unanimous Court.” Id., at
133, 880 S. E. 2d, at 523.
   We granted certiorari. 600 U. S. ___ (2023).
                                II
   The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person
shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. The “con-
trolling constitutional principle” of the Clause “focuses on
prohibitions against multiple trials.” United States v. Mar-
tin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 569 (1977) (internal
6                   MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

                      Opinion of the Court

quotation marks omitted). “[I]t has long been settled under
the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final,
ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and . . . is a bar to a subse-
quent prosecution for the same offence.” Green v. United
States, 355 U. S. 184, 188 (1957) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
   What, then, is an acquittal? “[O]ur cases have defined an
acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s
proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an of-
fense.” Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313, 318 (2013).
“[L]abels do not control our analysis in this context; rather,
the substance of [the ruling] does.” Id., at 322. In particu-
lar, we look to whether the ruling’s substance “relate[s] to
the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.” United States
v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 98, n. 11 (1978) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
   Once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate.
We have described this principle—“that ‘[a] verdict of ac-
quittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise’ ”—
as “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of
double jeopardy jurisprudence.” Martin Linen, 430 U. S.,
at 571. This bright-line rule exists to preserve the jury’s
“overriding responsibility . . . to stand between the accused
and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is
in command of the criminal sanction.” Id., at 572.
   We have long recognized that, while an acquittal might
reflect a jury’s determination that the defendant is innocent
of the crime charged, such a verdict might also be “the re-
sult of compromise, compassion, lenity, or misunderstand-
ing of the governing law.” Bravo-Fernandez v. United
States, 580 U. S. 5, 10 (2016); see also United States v. Pow-
ell, 469 U. S. 57, 65 (1984). Whatever the basis, the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a
jury’s acquittal. As a result, “the jury holds an unreviewa-
ble power to return a verdict of not guilty even for imper-
missible reasons.” Smith v. United States, 599 U. S. 236,
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)            7

                      Opinion of the Court

253 (2023) (internal quotation marks and alterations omit-
ted).
  For double jeopardy purposes, a jury’s determination that
a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity is a conclu-
sion that “criminal culpability had not been established,”
just as much as any other form of acquittal. Burks v. United
States, 437 U. S. 1, 10 (1978). Such a verdict reflects “that
the Government ha[s] failed to come forward with sufficient
proof of [a defendant’s] capacity to be responsible for crimi-
nal acts.” Ibid.
                               III
   Georgia law specifically provides that a defendant who
establishes an insanity defense “shall not be found guilty of
[the] crime.” Ga. Code Ann. §§16–3–2, 16–3–3. Here, after
being instructed on Georgia’s insanity defense, see
App. 89a–92a, the jury concluded that McElrath was not
guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the malice-mur-
der charge. That jury determination was unquestionably a
“ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to estab-
lish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans, 568 U. S., at
318; see also Burks, 437 U. S., at 10.
   This conclusion is consistent with Georgia’s concession
that if the “not guilty” verdict were considered in isolation—
that is, if the jury had reached the same conclusion under
the same circumstances on a single count—it would have
constituted a valid verdict of acquittal under state law. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 31–32. As we have long recognized, jeop-
ardy clearly terminates under these circumstances. See
United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 671 (1896); see also 6
W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Proce-
dure §25.3(b), p. 821 (4th ed. 2015) (describing this princi-
ple as “the cornerstone of double jeopardy jurisprudence”).
   In resisting this straightforward conclusion, the State re-
iterates the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding that, because
the “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict was repugnant
8                   MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

                      Opinion of the Court

to the jury’s other verdicts, all the verdicts the jury ren-
dered in McElrath’s case were “a nullity and should not
have been accepted by the trial court.” 315 Ga., at 127, 880
S. E. 2d, at 520. Georgia thus maintains that, because no
verdict under state law issued, no acquittal took place.
   We cannot agree. To start, it is well established that
whether an acquittal has occurred for purposes of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause is a question of federal, not state, law.
Again, an acquittal occurs when there has been a ruling
“relat[ing] to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.”
Scott, 437 U. S., at 98, n. 11 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). And “labels”—including those provided by state law—
“do not control our analysis in this context.” Evans, 568
U. S., at 322. Thus, it is not dispositive whether a factfinder
“incanted the word ‘acquit’ ”; instead, an acquittal has oc-
curred if the factfinder “acted on its view that the prosecu-
tion had failed to prove its case.” Id., at 325. Because of this
focus on substance over labels, a State’s “characterization,
as a matter of double jeopardy law, of [a ruling] is not bind-
ing on us.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140, 144, n. 5
(1986); see also Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U. S. 462, 468–
469 (2005).
   To be sure, “[t]he States possess primary authority for de-
fining and enforcing the criminal law,” Engle v. Isaac, 456
U. S. 107, 128 (1982)—a power that permits States “to reg-
ulate procedures under which [their] laws are carried out,”
Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201 (1977). But the
ultimate question is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
recognizes an event as an acquittal. In making that deter-
mination, we ask whether—given the operation of state
law—there has been “any ruling that the prosecution’s
proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an of-
fense.” Evans, 568 U. S., at 318. Here, for the reasons al-
ready discussed, the jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of
                      Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                      9

                           Opinion of the Court

insanity constituted such a determination.4
   That McElrath’s “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict
was accompanied by other verdicts that appeared to rest on
inconsistent findings is of no moment. As we have ex-
plained, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-
guessing an acquittal for any reason. See Martin Linen,
430 U. S., at 571. An acquittal is an acquittal, even “when
a jury returns inconsistent verdicts, convicting on one count
and acquitting on another count, where both counts turn on
the very same issue of ultimate fact.” Bravo-Fernandez,
580 U. S., at 8. As far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned,
“[i]nconsistency in a verdict is not a sufficient reason for
setting it aside.” Harris v. Rivera, 454 U. S. 339, 345 (1981)
(per curiam).
   Georgia contends that this bar to second-guessing an ac-
quittal applies only to general verdicts of acquittal, because
in evaluating a general verdict, there is no way to ascertain
the true basis of the jury’s decision. Here, by contrast, the
jury based its verdicts on specific “affirmative findings of
different mental states that could not exist at the same
time.” 308 Ga., at 112, 839 S. E. 2d, at 579. Georgia main-
tains that, under the State’s repugnancy doctrine, such
“special findings” allow for an informed review (and poten-
tial nullification) of inconsistent jury verdicts, including a
verdict of acquittal. Brief for Respondent 39.
   Georgia is mistaken. Once there has been an acquittal,
our cases prohibit any speculation about the reasons for a
jury’s verdict—even when there are specific jury findings
that provide a factual basis for such speculation—“because
it is impossible for a court to be certain about the ground
——————
   4 We need not, and do not, address the Double Jeopardy Clause’s appli-

cation to a trial judge’s rejection of inconsistent or incomprehensible jury
findings under state law. Cf. Brief for Missouri et al. as Amici
Curiae 7–8. What is at issue here is Georgia’s claim that, when a not-
guilty verdict on one count is inconsistent with a guilty verdict on an-
other count, double jeopardy poses no barrier to retrial on the former.
10                     MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

                          Opinion of the Court

for the verdict without improperly delving into the jurors’
deliberations.” Smith, 599 U. S., at 252–253. We simply
cannot know why the jury in McElrath’s case acted as it did,
and the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids us to guess. “To
conclude otherwise would impermissibly authorize judges
to usurp the jury right.” Id., at 252.
                        *    *     *
  The jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on
the malice-murder charge was an acquittal for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Clause therefore bars
retrial of McElrath on that charge.5 The judgment of the
Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
                                            It is so ordered.

——————
  5 On remand, the Georgia courts may address as a matter of state law

the status of McElrath’s vacated conviction for felony murder. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 64–67.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)            1

                      ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–721
                          _________________

   DAMIAN MCELRATH, PETITIONER v. GEORGIA
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
                       GEORGIA
                      [February 21, 2024]

   JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.
   I join the opinion of the Court but write to clarify my un-
derstanding of what we have held. In this case, there was
indisputably an acquittal on the malice-murder charge.
The jury returned a not-guilty verdict on that count, the
trial judge entered a judgment of acquittal on that count,
and petitioner appealed that part of the judgment. Because
the Constitution does not permit appellate review of an ac-
quittal, the State Supreme Court’s decision must be re-
versed. As I understand it, our holding extends no further.
   As the Court recognizes, the situation here is different
from one in which a trial judge refuses to accept incon-
sistent verdicts and thus sends the jury back to deliberate
further. Some States follow this practice, and our decision
does not address it. We have held that federal law does not
prevent the acceptance of inconsistent verdicts, United
States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57, 68–69 (1984); Dunn v. United
States, 284 U. S. 390, 393–394 (1932), but we have never
held that the Constitution mandates that practice—which
is not necessarily favorable to either the prosecution or the
defense. Nothing that we say today should be understood
to express any view about whether a not-guilty verdict that
is inconsistent with a verdict on another count and is not
accepted by the trial judge constitutes an “acquittal” for
double jeopardy purposes.