Court Opinion

ID: 9593460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:22:33.737558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:43.960175
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 41. (dissenting). The majority adopts a rule that allows the State to try an acquitted defendant for perjury if the State produces "newly discovered evidence" consisting of nothing more than some third person saying, in essence, "The acquitted defendant told me that he lied under oath." This type of evidence does not contain a sufficient degree of reliability to overcome the interest of finality that underlies issue preclusion and double jeopardy. I would allow the trial of an acquitted defendant for perjury in cases where the issue of fact central to the prosecution was necessarily determined in the former trial, but only when the "newly discovered evidence" contains a high indicia of reliability. This evidence does not.
¶ 42. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970), the United States Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of issue preclusion as an "extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice." This doctrine provides that "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. However, "[i]n the context of a perjury indictment relating to testi*192mony given at a former trial on a substantive charge, the doctrine of [issue preclusion] does not bar the perjury prosecution unless the issues of fact central to that prosecution were necessarily determined in the former trial." United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971); Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961)). Thus, in some cases, the doctrine serves as a limit on the State's ability to take a "second shot" at a defendant. See Nash, 447 F.2d at 1385-86. In this respect, the doctrine of issue preclusion serves the same purpose as the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1980) (noting that the underlying idea of a constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is that " 'the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.-'") (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
¶ 43. The doctrine of issue preclusion serves an important function in limiting subsequent prosecutions of acquitted defendants in some cases. The importance of this doctrine is demonstrated in cases where it may serve to limit a subsequent prosecution brought in bad faith by a prosecutor. Equally significant, the doctrine may also limit subsequent prosecutions brought about by meritless "newly discovered evidence" submitted by a disgruntled victim or another person seeking revenge against the acquitted *193defendant for any number of motives. Certainly, the majority opinion recognizes that harassment may, to a certain extent, exist. However, my concern is that the majority's "newly discovered evidence" exception does not adequately protect an acquitted defendant's interest in finality recognized in the principles of issue preclusion and double jeopardy, particularly in cases involving the type of evidence presented here.
¶ 44. Despite the importance of the doctrine of issue preclusion, I also acknowledge that perjury is detrimental to the truth-seeking function of our system of justice and should not be tolerated in our pursuit of reliable verdicts. As a result, I would not conclude, as some courts have, that a person acquitted of an offense may not be prosecuted for perjury based on testimony that he provided in his own defense, even though a conviction of perjury would necessarily'implicate the issue tried at the first trial. See Nash, 447 F.2d at 1385-86; United States v. Plaster, 16 F. Supp. 2d 667, 672 (W.D. Vir. 1998). Instead, I conclude, as the majority has, that a "newly discovered evidence" exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion is necessary to- serve these competing policy interests.
¶ 45. However, the majority adopts a "newly discovered evidence" test that is similar to cases where a defendant, subsequent to his conviction, may seek a new trial based on his discovery of new evidence calling his conviction into doubt. See State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473-74, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997); State v. Carnemolla, 229 Wis. 2d 648, 656, 600 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1999). Certainly, this test provides adequate parameters for allowing defendants to challenge their own convictions. This test, however, is inadequate to protect a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime from being prosecuted again based on an issue that was *194already determined at the first trial. The State should only be able to retry a defendant in very limited circumstances, and therefore, a test should be adopted with more stringent requirements than the test that is used by the majority.
¶ 46. Under the majority's test, a prosecutor may be able to pursue a perjury claim in instances where the "newly discovered evidence" amounts to nothing more than testimony from a disgruntled party or an ill-motivated person whose testimony merely contradicts the defendant's testimony at his first trial. Unless there is something more, and the State here does not suggest that there is anything more, any subsequent perjury prosecution will amount to nothing more than a swearing contest between the State's witness and the defendant, which requires another determination of credibility by the jury. As a result, defendants are not secure with an acquittal; they have no sense of finality. Under this test, anyone can make a damning statement against an acquitted defendant, and the acquitted defendant is once again subjected to prosecution. As a result, an acquitted defendant who has testified at his own trial will live in daily fear of further prosecution.
¶ 47. In short, I conclude that the "newly discovered evidence" presented here does not present a high enough degree of reliability to offset the competing policy concern of finality.
¶ 48. The majority primarily relies on State v. Bolden, 639 So. 2d 721 (La. 1994), in concluding that a new evidence exception should be adopted. In Bolden, the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted in a Louisiana state court of second degree murder in March of 1987. Bolden, 639 So. 2d at 721-22. Approximately five years later, the defendant confessed to the murder dur*195ing prosecutorial questioning on another matter in New Jersey. Id. at 722. As a result of this statement, the defendant was charged in Louisiana for perjury based on his statements denying guilt in the 1987 murder trial. Id. at 722—23. The Bolden court concluded:
[TJhe state in good faith has obtained new and additional evidence that was not previously available to it indicating that defendant testified falsely under oath during the former trial. Under these circumstances, applying the doctrine of [issue preclusion] with 'realism and rationality1 as required by Ashe, we believe that the state should not be barred from prosecuting defendant for perjury.
Id. at 726. The Bolden court adopted this new evidence exception based on dicta from other courts and did not provide any further detail or guidance on how to determine whether evidence was "new or additional evidence." Id. at 725-26.
¶ 49. The "new and additional evidence" at issue in Bolden is much different than the "newly discovered evidence" at issue in Canon's case. Such a direct admission of guilt by the defendant in Bolden is highly reliable. Here, however, the evidence presented involves hearsay testimony that is being presented to once again impeach the defendant's testimony from his first trial. The State should not be allowed to proceed with a perjury trial based on such testimony when the issue was adjudicated in a former trial. Instead, the majority's test for "newly discovered evidence" should specifically exclude such evidence. Only highly reliable evidence, such as recorded admissions of guilt from a defendant or, alternatively, reliable tangible evidence that was not available at trial should allow the State to proceed with a perjury prosecution. Such tangible evi*196dence may include items such as a document or weapon that provides clear evidence to show that the defendant committed perjury. The evidence may also include tangible evidence brought about by a recent technological advance, such as DNA evidence that directly contradicts a defendant's denial of guilt. Limiting our "newly discovered evidence" exception in this respect will protect a defendant's interest in finality, while at the same time permitting a prosecution for perjury oii a previously determined issue.
¶ 50. Thus, under any "newly discovered evidence" exception that I would adopt, the testimony from Que Sada would not qualify as "newly discovered evidence." Testimony alone would never qualify because it would lead to nothing more than a swearing contest between the defendant and the witness on the same issue decided at the first trial. In this case, the State has not presented any other evidence in support of the perjury complaint. As a result, under such an exception, this court could conclude as a matter of law that Que Sada's testimony would not qualify as "newly discovered evidence." Remand to the circuit court would be futile because the exception would specifically exclude such testimony. Dismissal of the complaint would then be appropriate if issue preclusion applied.
¶ 51. In this case, I believe that the circuit court may have been correct in concluding that the issue was decided at the first trial, but I am troubled by the circuit court's failure to review the entire trial transcript in making its decision. Such a difficult decision must be made in view of the entire transcript. Unfortunately, the majority opinion neglected to provide any guidance to future courts to aid in their determination of whether an issue, which forms the basis for a criminal perjury complaint, was previously determined at trial. *197In her dissent, Chief Justice Abrahamson appropriately addressed this as a real problem with the majority's opinion. I share her concern.
¶ 52. In the end, however, I agree with the result reached by Chief Justice Abrahamson in her dissent. In short, the perjury complaint against Canon lacks probable cause because it is based on the unsworn testimony of Que Sada. Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed, and the court of appeals' decision should be affirmed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 53. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion.