Court Opinion

ID: 9635909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:10:11.873847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:38.800058
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion in this cause, but write separately to address an issue raised by Presiding Judge McCormick in his note. As noted in the majority opinion at p. 294, the court’s charge instructed the jury that:
... the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect [1] the [defendant with its commission; and then from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him.
The highlighted portion of the above charge reflects the standard utilized by appellate courts in determining whether there is sufficient evidence in a case to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness. See Art. 88.14, V.A.C.C.P.; and Cox v. State, 830 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Presiding Judge McCormick’s concern is that this is an appellate doctrine which should not be included in the court’s charge to the jury at guilt/innocence.
This Court recently addressed the application of an appellate concept at the trial level in Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), motion for rehearing pending. In Garrett, the State challenged for cause a prospective juror who stated he could not answer affirmatively the second punishment issue in a capital case based on the facts of the offense alone. The trial judge granted the State’s challenge, which ruling the defendant challenged on appeal. On direct appeal, the State relied upon cases from this Court2 which addressed the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the second punishment issue and held that the facts of the offense alone, if severe enough, will support a jury’s affirmative answer on this issue. The Court noted that this is an appellate standard of review, the minimum legal threshold of sufficient evidence to answer the second punishment issue, and it was not error for a prospective juror to require more evidence than that in his understanding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at p. 859. In this sense, the appellate standard of review was inapplicable to the trial issue. Thus, this Court held the trial judge reversibly erred in granting the State’s challenge.
Another example of this Court not condoning the use of an appellate doctrine at trial is found in Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). In Aguilar, a burglary of a building case, the issue facing the Court was whether the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. In addressing this issue, the Court noted that the presumption of intent to commit theft arising from the non-consensual nighttime entry of a building was an appellate vehicle employed to review the sufficiency of evidence and not a trial vehicle used to prove an element of the State’s case. Id. at 558. Cf. LaPoint v. State, 750 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (presumption may become trial vehicle upon presentation of motion for instructed verdict or motion for new trial).
While I agree that some appellate doctrines are just that, I do not find that to be true in this case. The charge to the jury utilizing the “tends to connect” language informs the jury of the minimum amount of evidence required upon which to lawfully convict the defendant. In my opinion, this charge will always be proper in cases where the State relies upon accomplice witness testimony to convict as it applies directly to the jury's role in weighing the evidence at trial and rendering a verdict. So informing the jury also promotes judicial economy as an appellate court would be required to reverse a conviction if this minimum level of evidence were not present in a case. Hence, I favor use of this “appellate standard” at trial.
*297With these comments, I concur in the majority opinion.

. AH emphasis supplied by this author unless otherwise indicated.

. See Garrett, at p. 859, n. 3, 4.