Court Opinion

ID: 9745319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:48:29.342894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:59.060791
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WEBBER dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In medieval London there existed in the Lambeth area the priory of St. Mary of Bethlehem. In the dialect of the day, “Bethlehem” would become “bedlam.” In 1402 the priory was turned into a hospital for lunatics and its name was soon shortened to “Bedlam.” From that the term has come to mean tumultuous uproar and confusion characteristic of early asylums. I submit that the principal opinion returns mental health proceedings to the days of Bedlam, when incarceration and restraint were the only approved methods of dealing with mental cases. Until approximately 20 years ago, incarceration and restraint were State policy in Illinois. The large institutions at Jacksonville and Manteno and elsewhere about the State now stand largely vacant, but a generation ago they were crowded. In the middle 1960’s psychiatric theory emphasized community-based outpatient treatment, and in pursuance of that theory, which became the policy of the State, the various mental health centers were built (e.g., Meyer in Decatur, Adler in Champaign, McFarland in Springfield). So far as I am able to determine, that still remains the policy of the State. To put it another way, restraint must be the last option. In Shlensky, Constitutional Problems with Mental Commitment in Illinois, 62 Ill. B.J. 552, 558-59 (1974), the author states: “The psychiatric profession is cognizant of the rights of mentally ill patients. In the March, 1973 issue of the American Journal of Psychiatry (130:3), the American Psychiatric Association published a position statement on involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill which was revised from previous positions. Basically the Association took the position that most persons who need hospitalization for mental illness can and should be informally and voluntarily admitted to hospitals in the same manner that hospitalization is afforded for any other illness. The Association also took cognizance of the fact that modern concepts of psychiatric treatment emphasized the use of community-based outpatient facilities for the treatment and care of the mentally ill who voluntarily seek these services. Psychiatrists nowadays attempt to avoid hospitalization to every possible extent, although for some patients a period of hospitalization, usually brief, continues to be the indicated treatment. On the other hand, the Association recognized that a small percentage of patients who need hospitalization are unable, because of their mental illness, to make a free and informed decision to hospitalize themselves. Their need for and the right for treatment in a hospital should not be ignored. Public policy demands that some form of involuntary hospitalization be available for those mentally ill patients who constitute a danger either to themselves or to others.” I submit that this respondent is not one of that small number of persons referred to by Dr. Shlensky who are unable to make the decision to commit themselves. The majority pays lip service to the burden of proof, clear and convincing evidence, but places its imprimatur on restraint when the only evidence is that of delusional thoughts and not a scintilla of evidence of real or potential harm to the respondent or others. To test the thesis, let us assume that the respondent here was a defendant in a criminal proceeding and raised the affirmative defense of insanity under section 3 — 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 3 — 2). Would anyone seriously argue that she had sustained her burden of proof with the evidence in this record? I think not. While it may be bootless to argue the evidence and procedures below, since each of these cases must stand on its own, yet I feel a couple of cómments are in order. First of all, two petitions were filed, one signed by Mrs. Payne and the other by an emergency room nurse at St. John’s Hospital; yet neither of these petitioners was called to testify. Presumably they are eyewitnesses. One can only speculate as to why the State either neglected to call, or deliberately avoided calling, them. Much is made in the record and in the briefs over the letters sent by respondent to Mr. and Mrs. Payne. They are properly described in Mrs. Payne’s petition for involuntary admission of respondent as “rambling and incoherent.” Yet there is no suggestion of threats or intimidation in any of them. If Molly Bloom’s soliloquy in James Joyce’s Ulysses, which is rambling and incoherent, is considered great literature, on what basis can a private series of letters of a similar nature be considered per se a menace? This respondent has been condemned on the basis of delusional and hallucinatory thinking, which Dr. Bornstein said “perhaps” or “could” make her dangerous to herself or others. If all the persons in Illinois who have at one time or another engaged in delusions, or even hallucinations, were to be locked up, as was this respondent, we will be required to reopen all of the State hospitals and enlarge them by many times. “Bedlam” is not the criterion. The criterion is clear and convincing evidence, not a series of subjunctive phrases from an expert witness. I would reverse the trial court.