Court Opinion

ID: 9950520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 14:19:42.406057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:21.794583
License: Public Domain

2024 WI 13

                  SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                 2020AP2007

COMPLETE TITLE:           Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., Barron County
                          Developmental Services, Inc., Diversified
                          Services, Inc.,
                          Black River Industries, Inc. and Headwaters,
                          Inc.,
                                    Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners,
                                v.
                          State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review
                          Commission,
                                    Respondent-Co-Appellant,
                          State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce
                          Development,
                                    Respondent-Appellant.

                             REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                             Reported at 406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778
                                          (2023 – published)

OPINION FILED:            March 14, 2024
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:            September 11, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:                 Circuit
   COUNTY:                Douglas
   JUDGE:                 Kelly J. Thimm

JUSTICES:
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined.
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
ZIEGLER, C.J., joined with respect to ¶¶110-61 and 163-98.
HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For     the     petitioners-respondents-petitioners,            there    were
briefs       filed     by    Kyle   H.   Torvinen,     and   Torvinen,    Jones    &
Saunders,         S.C.,     Superior;    Eric   C.   Rassbach   (pro   hac     vice),
Nicholas R. Reaves (pro hac vice), Daniel M. Vitagliano (pro hac
vice), and The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington,
D.C. There was an oral argument by Eric Rassbach.

       For     the     respondent-appellant         and    respondent-co-appellant,
there was a brief filed by Christine L. Galinat, and Department
of Workforce Development, Madison; Jeffrey J. Shampo, and Labor
and    Industry        Review    Commission,       Madison.       There    was   an   oral
argument by Jeffrey J. Shampo.

       An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel R. Suhr, and
Hughes    &     Suhr      LLC,   Chicago,   IL;     Caleb    R.    Gerbitz,      James   M.
Sosnoski, and Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nichols SC, Milwaukee,
on    behalf     of       Maranatha   Baptist     University,      Maranatha      Baptist
Academy, Concordia University Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Family
Counsel, and the Wisconsin Association of Christian Schools.

       An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert S. Driscoll, and
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren SC, Milwaukee; Stephen M. Judge (pro
hac vice), Tiernan Kane (pro hac vice), and South Bank Legal,
South Bend, IN, on behalf of Catholic Conferences of Illinois,
Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota.

       An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gene C. Schaerr (pro
hac vice), James C. Phillips (pro hac vice), and Schaerr Jaffee
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Matthew M. Fernholz, and Cramer, Multhauf
&     Hammes,    LLP,        Waukesha,   on       behalf    of    Minnesota-Wisconsin
Baptist Convention, Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, National
Association          of    Evangelicals,      American      Islamic       Congress,      The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, General Council on
Finance and Administration of the United Methodist Church, The
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, and Islam and Religious
Freedom Action Team.

                                              2
      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy Feldhausen,
Tiffany Woelfel, and Amundsen Davis LLC, Green Bay; Sarah M.
Harris (pro hac vice), Mark S. Storslee (pro hac vice), Rohit P.
Asirvatham       (pro    hac       vice),     and     Williams          &    Connolly      LLP,
Washington,      D.C.,    on      behalf     of   Professors        Douglas         Laycock    &
Thomas C. Berg.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Levi W. Swank, Benjamin
Hayes,    and    Goodwin       Procter       LLP,    D.C.;       Dina       Ljekperic,       and
Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, NY; David W. Simon, Gregory N.
Heinen,    and    Foley       &    Lardner     LLP,       Milwaukee,         on     behalf    of
International      Society        for    Krishna     Consciousness           and     The     Sikh
Coalition.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jon P. Axelrod, J.
Wesley Webendorfer, and DeWitt LLP, Madison; Howard Slugh (pro
hac   vice),     and    The       Jewish    Coalition       for    Religious         Liberty,
Washington, D.C., on behalf of Jewish Coalition for Religious
Liberty.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Samuel Troxell Grover,
Patrick C. Elliott, Madison, on behalf of Freedom From Religion
Foundation.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by David Earleywine, and
Wisconsin Catholic Conference, Madison; Bradley G. Hubbard (pro
hac   vice),      Elizabeth         A.     Kiernan        (pro    hac       vice),     Zachary
Faircloth (pro hac vice), Jason J. Muehlhoff (pro hac vice), and
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Dallas, TX, on behalf of Wisconsin
Catholic Conference.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jonathan Judge, and
ArentFox     Schiff      LLP,       Chicago,        IL,     on    behalf       of     Catholic
Charities USA.
                                              3
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ryan J. Walsh, John D.
Tripoli, and Eimer Stahl LLP, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin
State Legislature.

                              4
                                                                  2024 WI 13
                                                          NOTICE
                                            This opinion is subject to further
                                            editing and modification.   The final
                                            version will appear in the bound
                                            volume of the official reports.
No.    2020AP2007
(L.C. No.   2019CV324)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                      :            IN SUPREME COURT

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., Barron County
Developmental Services, Inc., Diversified
Services, Inc., Black River Industries, Inc.
and Headwaters, Inc.,

            Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners,

      v.
                                                              FILED
State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review             MAR 14, 2024
Commission,
                                                          Samuel A. Christensen
                                                         Clerk of Supreme Court
            Respondent-Co-Appellant,

State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce
Development,

            Respondent-Appellant.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined.
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
ZIEGLER, C.J., joined with respect to ¶¶110-61 and 163-98.
HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.          Affirmed.
                                                                     No.   2020AP2007

     ¶1     ANN     WALSH     BRADLEY,   J.     The     petitioners,        Catholic

Charities Bureau, Inc. (CCB) and four of its sub-entities, seek

an exemption from having to pay unemployment tax to cover their

employees.       They assert that they are exempt from coverage under

Wisconsin's       Unemployment     Compensation       Act     because      they    are

operated primarily for religious purposes.

     ¶2     Accordingly, CCB together with the four sub-entities

(Barron     County      Developmental        Services,       Inc.,      Diversified

Services, Inc., Black River Industries, Inc., and Headwaters,

Inc.) seek review of a court of appeals decision reinstating a

decision    of    the   Labor   and   Industry      Review    Commission       (LIRC)

concluding that CCB and the four sub-entities were not "operated

primarily    for    religious     purposes"     and    thus    not     exempt     from

making contributions to the state unemployment insurance system.1

The petitioners specifically contend that they are exempt from

unemployment       insurance    contributions       pursuant      to    Wis.      Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2. (2019-20),2 which exempts from the definition

of "employment" covered by the Act those "[i]n the employ of an
organization       operated     primarily     for     religious      purposes       and

     1 Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 12, 406
Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778 (reversing the order of the circuit
court for Douglas County, Kelly J. Thimm, Judge).
     2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                         2
                                                                No.        2020AP2007

operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a

church or convention or association of churches."3

      ¶3    They   assert   that    they    are    "operated   primarily         for

religious purposes" because the Diocese of Superior's motivation

is primarily religious, i.e., their charitable works are carried

out   to   operationalize      Catholic     principles.      The    petitioners

further argue that a contrary interpretation would run afoul of

the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and that

as a result it also would violate Article I, Section 18 of the

Wisconsin Constitution.4

      ¶4    On   the   other    hand,   LIRC      advances   that     it    is   the

organization's actual activities, and not its motivations, that

are paramount in the analysis.              Under this formulation, LIRC

contends the petitioners do not fulfill the religious purposes

      3Both parties agree that the first half of the statute is
not at issue, that is that CCB is "operated, supervised,
controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention
or association of churches."
      4Although CCB and its sub-entities allege a violation of
the Wisconsin constitution, they did not develop an argument
apart   from   their   assertions   under  the   United   States
Constitution.    They assert in a footnote that if the statute
violates the First Amendment, then it must also violate the
Wisconsin Constitution.     It is true that "[t]he Wisconsin
Constitution, with its specific and expansive language, provides
much broader protections for religious liberty than the First
Amendment."   Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶66, 320
Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868 (citing State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d
56, 64, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996)). However, any argument that Wis.
Stat.   § 108.02(15)(h)2.   violates   the  state   constitution
specifically is undeveloped.      We generally do not address
undeveloped arguments, and we will not do so here. Sw. Airlines
Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶32 n.10, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960
N.W.2d 384.

                                        3
                                                                        No.     2020AP2007

exemption       because     their    activities           are    secular.       Such    an

analysis, in LIRC's view, does not violate the First Amendment

or Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.

    ¶5      We     determine      that     in     our    inquiry     into    whether     an

organization       is   "operated         primarily       for    religious    purposes"

within    the     meaning    of    Wis.    Stat.        § 108.02(15)(h)2.,       we    must

examine     both     the     motivations          and     the    activities      of    the

organization.       Applying this analysis to the facts before us, we

conclude that the petitioners are not operated primarily for

religious purposes within the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2.                              We

further conclude that the application of § 108.02(15)(h)2. as

applied to the petitioners does not violate the First Amendment

because    the     petitioners      have    failed        to    demonstrate     that   the

statute     as     applied    to     them        is     unconstitutional      beyond     a

reasonable doubt.

    ¶6      Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals.

                                             I
    ¶7      Each Roman Catholic diocese in Wisconsin has a social

ministry arm, referred to as Catholic Charities.                            As a whole,

Catholic Charities' mission "is to provide service to people in

need, to advocate for justice in social structures and to call

the entire church and other people of good will to do the same."

    ¶8      The Catholic Charities entity at issue in this case is

that of the Diocese of Superior, which we refer to as CCB.                             Its

statement of philosophy indicates that it has "since 1917 been
providing        services    to     the     poor        and     disadvantaged     as    an
                                             4
                                                                    No.   2020AP2007

expression of the social ministry of the Catholic Church in the

Diocese of Superior" and that its "purpose . . . is to be an

effective sign of the charity of Christ."                  In its provision of

services, CCB assures that "no distinctions are made by race,

sex, or religion in reference to clients served, staff employed

and board members appointed."            CCB aims to provide services that

are "significant in quantity and quality" and not duplicative of

services provided by other agencies.

    ¶9    Occupying       the    top    position     in   CCB's     organizational

chart is the bishop of the Diocese of Superior, who exercises

control over CCB and its sub-entities.                    The bishop serves as

CCB's president and appoints its membership, whose function is

to "provide[] essential oversight to ensure the fulfillment of

the mission of Catholic Charities Bureau in compliance with the

Principles of Catholic social teaching."                  CCB's code of ethics,

which is "displayed prominently in the program office of all

affiliate agencies," likewise sets forth the expectation that

"Catholic Charities will in its activities and actions reflect
gospel values and will be consistent with its mission and the

mission of the Diocese of Superior."

    ¶10   Under     the     umbrella         of   CCB,    there     are   numerous

separately      incorporated         sub-entities.          These     sub-entities

operate   "63    programs       of    service . . . to       those    facing    the

challenges of aging, the distress of a disability, the concerns

of children with special needs, the stresses of families living

in poverty and those in need of disaster relief."

                                         5
                                                                                   No.     2020AP2007

       ¶11    Four     sub-entities           are     involved       in     this       case.       The

first    is   Barron       County          Developmental         Services,         Inc.        (BCDS).

BCDS contracts with the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation

to   provide        job    placement,         job      coaching,        and       an     "array     of

services      to     assist       individuals            with    disabilities             [to]    get

employment in the community."                      Prior to December of 2014, BCDS

was not affiliated with the Diocese of Superior, and in fact had

no religious affiliation at all.                       At that time, BCDS reached out

and requested to become an affiliate agency of the Diocese.                                         It

receives no funding from the Diocese.

       ¶12    The     second          sub-entity         at     issue        is     Black        River

Industries, Inc. (BRI).                     It provides services to people with

developmental or mental health disabilities, as well as those

with    a    limited      income.            These     services        include         home-based,

community-based,           and    facility-based              job      training          and     daily

living services.            Among BRI's offerings are a food services

program, a document shredding program, and a mailing services

program.       BRI's funding comes largely from county and state
government.          It    does       not    receive         funding      directly        from     the

Diocese.

       ¶13    Diversified         Services,           Inc.    (DSI)     is    the        third    sub-

entity       implicated          in        this     appeal.            It         provides        work

opportunities        to    individuals            with    developmental            disabilities.

Additionally,        DSI    hires          individuals        without        disabilities          for

production     work.         It       is    not   funded        by   the     Diocese,          instead

                                                  6
                                                                       No.    2020AP2007

receiving its funding from Family Care, a Medicaid long-term

care program,5 and private contracts.

     ¶14    Finally, the fourth sub-entity involved is Headwaters,

Inc., which provides "various support services for individuals

with disabilities," "training services related to activities of

daily    living," "employment          related         training       services"     and

additional employment-related support.                   It also provides Head

Start home visitation services, and at one time offered birth-

to-three    services     before    a   different         entity   took       over   that

aspect     of   its     operations.           Like    the     other    sub-entities,

Headwaters is funded primarily through government contracts and

does not receive funding from the Diocese.

     ¶15    These four sub-entities are overseen by CCB, which,

among      other      things,     provides           management       services      and

consultation; establishes and coordinates the missions of the

sub-entities;      and   approves      all     capital      expenditures,      certain

sales of real property, and investment policies of the sub-

entities.          In     turn,     the       sub-entities        themselves        set
organizational goals and make plans to accomplish those goals,

employ staff, set program policies, enter into contracts, raise

funds, and assure regulatory compliance.

     ¶16    Additionally, CCB's executive director supervises the

operations of each of the sub-entities.                     However, neither those

employed by nor those receiving services from CCB or the sub-

entities are required to be of any particular religious faith.

     5   See Wis. Admin. Code ch. DHS 10.

                                          7
                                                                                 No.    2020AP2007

Individuals participating in the programs do not receive any

religious training or orientation, and CCB and the sub-entities

do   not      try     to       "inculcate       the    Catholic      faith       with        program

participants."

       ¶17        In 1972, the Department of Industry, Labor and Human

Relations         made     a    determination         that    CCB    was    subject          to   the

unemployment compensation law after CCB submitted a form that

self-reported            the    nature     of    its    operations         as    "charitable,"

"educational," and "rehabilitative," not "religious."6                                   CCB has

been making unemployment contributions since that time.

       ¶18        In 2015, the Douglas County Circuit Court determined

that a sub-entity of CCB not involved in the present case was

"operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus exempt from

contributing to the state unemployment system.7                                  The following

year, CCB and the sub-entities sought a similar determination

that       they    qualified         for   the   exemption,         bringing         their     claim

first to the Department of Workforce Development (DWD).

       ¶19        DWD denied the petitioners' request to withdraw from
the state system.                It stated:           "It has been determined these

organizations            are     supervised       and        controlled         by     the    Roman

Catholic          Church,      but    it   has    not    been       established         they      are

       CCB and the sub-entities are exempt from federal income
       6

tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which provides exemption
to, among other entities, those "operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes."

       Challenge Ctr., Inc. v. LIRC, Douglas County Case No.
       7

2014CV384 (George L. Glonek, Judge).

                                                  8
                                                                   No.   2020AP2007

operated primarily for religious purposes."                 CCB and the sub-

entities appealed DWD's determination, and an administrative law

judge (ALJ) reversed.            Consequently, DWD petitioned LIRC for

review, and LIRC reversed the ALJ, concluding consistent with

the original DWD decision that the petitioners are not operated

primarily    for    religious     purposes.      It     observed    that   "while

services    may    be   religiously    motivated      and   manifestations      of

religious    belief,      a     separate     legal    entity   that      provides

essentially secular services and engages in activities that are

not religious per se . . . falls outside the scope of Wis. Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2.," regardless of any affiliation the entity may

have with a religious organization.

      ¶20   Subsequently, CCB and the sub-entities sought judicial

review in the circuit court and the pendulum swung again, as the

circuit court reversed LIRC's decision.               DWD and LIRC appealed,

and the court of appeals reversed, reinstating LIRC's decision

that CCB and the sub-entities did not establish a religious

purpose.8    Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 12,
406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778.             The court of appeals concluded

that "for an employee's services to be exempt from unemployment

tax the organization must not only have a religious motivation,

but   the    services         provided——its     activities——must         also   be

primarily religious in nature."             Id., ¶33.    Such an analysis, in

      8The court of appeals initially certified the appeal to
this court, but we denied the certification.   See Wis. Stat.
§ (Rule) 809.61; Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, No.
2020AP2007, unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7,
2021).

                                        9
                                                                          No.     2020AP2007

the court of appeals' view, does not violate either the federal

or   state         constitution          because     "focusing       on     the       stated

motivations          and    the     organization's          activities      allows       the

reviewing body to conduct an objective, neutral review that is

'highly fact-sensitive' without examining religious doctrine or

tenets."      Id., ¶54.

     ¶21      Applying       this    understanding,          the    court   of       appeals

determined that "CCB and its sub-entities failed to meet their

burden   to      establish        that    they     are     exempt   from    Wisconsin's

unemployment insurance program and that LIRC properly determined

that each of the employers was 'operated primarily to administer

[or provide] social service programs' that are not 'primarily

for religious purposes.'"                 Id., ¶55.        CCB and the sub-entities

petitioned for this court's review.

                                             II

     ¶22      In     an    appeal   from    a     LIRC   determination,         we   review

LIRC's decision rather than that of the circuit court.                            Masri v.

LIRC, 2014 WI 81, ¶20, 356 Wis. 2d 405, 850 N.W.2d 298.                                  Our
review is limited by statute.                    See Wis. Stat. § 108.09(7)(c)6.

We may either confirm the commission's order or set it aside on

one of three grounds:             (1) if the commission acted without or in

excess of its powers; (2) if the order was procured by fraud; or

(3) if the commission's findings of fact do not support the

order.     Id.       LIRC acts outside of its power when it incorrectly

interprets       a    statute.       DWD    v.     LIRC,    2018    WI    77,    ¶12,    382

Wis. 2d 611, 914 N.W.2d 625.

                                             10
                                                                                   No.    2020AP2007

      ¶23      We will uphold LIRC's findings of fact as long as

there    is    substantial            and    credible         evidence    to     support        them.

Friendly Vill. Nursing and Rehab, LLC v. DWD, 2022 WI 4, ¶13,

400     Wis. 2d 277,            969    N.W.2d 245.              We     review      LIRC's       legal

conclusions,         i.e.,        questions        of        law,     independently        of     the

decisions rendered by the circuit court, the court of appeals,

and the commission.                   Id.; Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI

75, ¶84, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.

      ¶24      In    our        review,      we    are        called     upon      to     interpret

Wisconsin          statutes.             Statutory           interpretation          presents       a

question       of     law         that       we     review          independently          of     the

determinations of the circuit court, the court of appeals, and

the   commission.               Greenwald         Fam.       Ltd.    P'ship     v.      Village    of

Mukwonago, 2023 WI 53, ¶14, 408 Wis. 2d 143, 991 N.W.2d 356;

Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶84.

      ¶25      Additionally, our review is informed by constitutional

principles.               The    application            of     constitutional            principles

likewise presents a question of law.                                 St. Augustine Sch. v.
Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶24, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635.

                                                  III

      ¶26      We     begin       with       a     short        summary       of        Wisconsin's

unemployment         insurance         scheme      and       then    address     the      competing

interpretations of "operated primarily for religious purposes"

within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.                                   In examining

this question, we address first whether we must look to the

purpose       of    the    church       in   operating          the    organization         or    the
purpose of the nonprofit organization itself in our analysis.
                                                  11
                                                                           No.    2020AP2007

We     address         second    whether     the        organization's       motivations,

activities, or both, drive the analysis of whether a purpose is

"religious" within the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2.                               Next, we

apply our interpretation of the statute to the facts before us.

Finally,         we    examine     the     petitioners'          assertion       that   such

interpretation violates the First Amendment.

                                                A

       ¶27        The      Wisconsin        legislature           passed        the     first

unemployment compensation law in the nation in 1932.9                              Then, as

now,       the   law     evinces    a    strong         public   policy    in     favor   of

compensating the unemployed.                Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶31,

375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426.

       ¶28       At a macro level, "[t]he system generally provides for

collecting        limited       funds    from       a   large    number    of    employers,

particularly during periods of stable employment, then paying

out benefits during periods of high unemployment from the funds

that have been accumulated."                Maynard G. Sautter, Employment in

Wisconsin        § 12-1     (Matthew      Bender        2023).     The     statutes     were
enacted "to avoid the risk or hazards that will befall those

who, because of employment, are dependent upon others for their

livelihood."           Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 69,

330 N.W.2d 169 (1983).             "Consistent with this policy, Wis. Stat.

ch.     108       is     'liberally      construed         to     effect     unemployment

       See Daniel Nelson, The Origins of Unemployment Insurance
       9

in Wisconsin, 51 Wis. Mag. Hist. 109, 109 (1967); Operton v.
LIRC,   2017  WI   46,  ¶57,  375   Wis. 2d 1,  894  N.W.2d 426
(Abrahamson, J., concurring).

                                             12
                                                                                No.    2020AP2007

compensation coverage for workers who are economically dependent

upon others in respect to their wage-earning status.'"                                  Operton,

375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32 (quoting Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at 62).

       ¶29    The     legislature         has    recognized        the     social       cost    of

unemployment         and    the    need    to    share      the    burden       presented       by

unemployment.         See Wis. Stat. § 108.01(1).                       "In good times and

in    bad    times    unemployment         is    a    heavy    social      cost,        directly

affecting many thousands of wage earners.                            Each employing unit

in Wisconsin should pay at least a part of this social cost,

connected      with        its    own     irregular         operations,         by     financing

benefits for its own unemployed workers."                         Id.

       ¶30    "Generally, any service for pay for a public, private,

or nonprofit employer is employment [covered by ch. 108], but

the service must be provided in Wisconsin or be provided for an

employer with operations in Wisconsin."                           Peter L. Albrecht et

al., Wisconsin Employment Law § 12.3 (8th ed. 2023).                                    However,

some    services       are       statutorily         exempt    from      the     "employment"

services addressed by the unemployment compensation law.                                     E.g.,
Wis. Cheese Serv., Inc. v. DILHR, 108 Wis. 2d 482, 486, 322

N.W.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1982) (examining whether an individual is

exempt       from     the        unemployment         system       as      an        independent

contractor); see Sautter, Employment in Wisconsin § 12-3.                                    It is

one     of   those     exemptions,         which       we     will      refer     to    as     the

"religious purposes" exemption, that is at issue in the present

case.

       ¶31     The religious purposes exemption is set forth as part
of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h), which provides in full:
                                                13
                                                                         No.     2020AP2007

      "Employment" as applied to work for a nonprofit
      organization, except as such organization duly elects
      otherwise with the department's approval, does not
      include service:

      1. In the employ of a                   church    or       convention       or
      association of churches;

      2. In the employ of an organization operated primarily
      for religious purposes and operated, supervised,
      controlled, or principally supported by a church or
      convention or association of churches; or

      3. By a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed
      minister of a church in the exercise of his or her
      ministry or by a member of a religious order in the
      exercise of duties required by such order.
      ¶32     Specifically, CCB and the sub-entities seek exemption

pursuant to subd. 2, which contains two conditions that both

must be fulfilled in order for the exemption to apply.                             First,

the   subject     organization         must    be     "operated      primarily          for

religious      purposes."            Second,    the     organization             must    be

"operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a

church   or    convention       or    association      of    churches."            It    is

undisputed that the second condition is satisfied, as CCB and

the   sub-entities     are   without      question      "operated,         supervised,

controlled,      or    principally       supported"         by     the     Diocese       of

Superior.      Our inquiry thus focuses on the first condition only:

"operated primarily for religious purposes."

      ¶33     In addressing the issue presented, we must answer the

threshold question of           whose purposes we must examine in our

analysis——those of the Diocese or those of CCB and the sub-

entities.       To    resolve    this    inquiry,      we    look        first    to    the
language of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.                     Sw. Airlines Co. v.

                                         14
                                                                           No.     2020AP2007

DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶22, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384 (citing

State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45,

271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).

          ¶34    Like the court of appeals, our review of the plain

language of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. leads us to conclude

that      "the    reviewing   body     is    to   consider     the    purpose       of   the

nonprofit organization, not the church's purpose in operating

the    organization."         Cath.        Charities   Bureau,       406    Wis. 2d 586,

¶24.       There are several textual cues in this language that guide

us to our conclusion.              We look first to the sentence structure

of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.                   This structure indicates that

the religious purposes exemption applies to "service . . . [i]n

the employ" of an "organization," as opposed to service in the

employ of a church.                The way the sentence is structured, the

phrase "operated primarily for religious purposes" modifies the

word "organization," not the word "church."

          ¶35    Such an understanding is confirmed by a look to the

surrounding provisions.               See Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8,
¶15, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373.                   The subdivision directly

before          the    religious       purposes        exemption,           Wis.       Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)1., exempts from the definition of "employment"

for unemployment compensation purposes service "[i]n the employ

of        a      church."            The      subdivision        directly            after,

§ 108.02(15)(h)3.,           exempts       service     "[b]y    a     duly        ordained,

commissioned or licensed minister of a church."                        Those employed

by    a    church     are   thus    addressed     in   subdivisions          1.    and   3.,
indicating, as the court of appeals concluded, that "employees
                                             15
                                                                                          No.      2020AP2007

who fall under subd. 2. are to be focused on separately in the

statutory scheme from employees of a church."                                           Cath. Charities

Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶25.

         ¶36    Thus, a focus on the church's purpose rather than the

organization's             purpose      would      render             a    significant          portion      of

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. surplusage.                                     See State v. Martin,

162 Wis. 2d 883, 894, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) ("A statute should

be   construed            so     that   no    word          or    clause          shall       be   rendered

surplusage and every word if possible should be given effect.").

To explain, Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. contains two provisions

that both must be fulfilled.                      In order to be exempt, a nonprofit

organization must be "operated primarily for religious purposes"

and "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported

by a church."              § 108.02(15)(h)2.

         ¶37    If we looked to the church's purpose in operating the

organization only, then any religiously affiliated organization

would always be exempt.                       A church's purpose is religious by

nature,        and        this    focus      is    reflected               in   all      of     its     work,
including           any    sub-entities           it    oversees.                 If    the     tax-exempt

status of a nonprofit organization operating under the umbrella

of   a    church          is   predicated         on    the       religious            purposes        of   the

church,        an    organization            operated            or       controlled      by       a   church

always will automatically satisfy the first condition.                                             In other

words,     the       second       condition        of       Wis.          Stat.    § 108.02(15)(h)2.

would subsume the first.                  This would cause the first requirement

of the statute to be surplusage, a reading we cannot endorse.
We   therefore             will     examine        the           purpose          of     the       nonprofit
                                                       16
                                                                       No.    2020AP2007

organization, and not that of the church, in determining whether

a nonprofit organization is "operated primarily for religious

purposes."

                                              B

       ¶38       Having determined that we look to the purpose of CCB

and the sub-entities, and not that of the Catholic Church in

operating CCB and the sub-entities, we turn next to another

methodological disagreement between the parties.                          CCB and the

sub-entities        contend    that      in       our   inquiry    into   whether    an

organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" we

must    look      primarily   to   the    organization's          motivations,    while

LIRC advances that the organization's activities are paramount.10

       ¶39       Specifically, CCB and the sub-entities argue that the

court       of   appeals   incorrectly        limited     the     religious   purposes

exemption to church-controlled entities with both purposes and

       Other jurisdictions have taken varying approaches to
       10

similar questions.      For example, some jurisdictions have
considered the activities of an organization in determining
religious purpose. See, e.g., Samaritan Inst. v. Prince-Walker,
883 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo. 1994) (concluding that an organization does
not "operate primarily for religious purposes" because the
"services offered are essentially secular"); Cathedral Arts
Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 95 So. 3d 970, 973
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (determining that although an
organization's motivation may be religious, the organization's
"primary purpose in operating . . . is to give art instruction
to underprivileged children" and it is therefore not entitled to
the exemption). Conversely, other jurisdictions have granted a
religious purpose exemption based on the motivations of the
organization.   See, e.g., Dep't of Emp. v. Champion Bake-N-
Serve, Inc., 592 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Idaho 1979) (concluding that a
bakery operated by Seventh Day Adventist church was operated
primarily for religious purposes despite a commercial aspect).

                                              17
                                                                              No.    2020AP2007

activities that are religious.                       They assert that the court of

appeals' analysis fails to follow the statutory language because

the    statute         refers     only    to    a     religious         "purpose"    and     not

religious "activities."

       ¶40    LIRC responds that looking at only an organization's

motivation would allow the organization to determine its own

status       without          consideration      of       its    actual    function.         It

advances that such an interpretation would run afoul of the

maxim that tax exemptions are to be narrowly construed.                                      In

LIRC's view, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the

term    "operated,"            which   appears       in    the    statute,       "connotes   an

action       or        activity."         See       Cath.        Charities       Bureau,     406

Wis. 2d 586, ¶31.

       ¶41    Again, we begin our analysis with the language of the

statute, and in particular the language at the center of this

case:    "operated primarily for religious purposes."                               The court

of appeals commenced its analysis by examining the key words

"operated" and "purposes," and we do likewise.
       ¶42    An oft-cited dictionary defines "operate" as "to work,

perform,          or     function,        as    a     machine        does."          Operate,

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/operate (last visited Feb. 27,

2024),    see          also    Operate,      Merriam-Webster            Online    Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operate (last visited

Feb. 27, 2024) (defining "operate" as "to perform a function").

As the court of appeals concluded, this definition suggests an

action    being         taken——in      the     context      of    the    statute    at     issue

                                                18
                                                                           No.   2020AP2007

meaning "what the nonprofit organization does and how it does

it."    Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶31.

       ¶43     This same dictionary defines "purpose" as "the reason

for    which      something    exists     or    is    done,     made,       used,   etc."

Purpose, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/purpose (last visited

Feb. 27, 2024).          The use of "reason" in this definition implies

"motivation,"       or    as   the    court     of   appeals        put    it,   "why    the

organization acts."            Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586,

¶31.

       ¶44     In examining the meaning of the statute, we must give

reasonable effect to every word.                 State v. Rector, 2023 WI 41,

¶19, 407 Wis. 2d 321, 990 N.W.2d 213.                    We read the statute as a

whole.         Belding,    352   Wis. 2d 359,           ¶15.        Accordingly,        both

"operated" and "purposes" must be given full effect.                             In order

to illustrate how to do this, we consider first the consequences

if our analysis considered motivations only or activities only

in determining whether an organization is operated primarily for

religious purposes.
       ¶45     Considering purposes, i.e., motivations, alone would

give short shrift to the word "operated."                      In this scenario, an

organization could be exempt based purely on its stated reason

for doing what it does, but its actual "operations" would not

enter     the     calculus.          Conversely,     if    we       were    to   consider

activities only, then "purposes" would be rendered surplusage.

A singular focus on the "operations" of the organization at the

expense      of   the    "purpose"     would     lead     us   to    excise      from   the

                                           19
                                                                No.   2020AP2007

analysis the connection between the organization's activities

and its religious mission that the statute requires.

       ¶46    Reading the statute as a whole, the text and structure

of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. indicate that both activities

and motivations must be considered in a determination of whether

an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes."

Such   an     interpretation    is   consistent   with    the    unemployment

compensation law's legislatively-recognized purpose.                  See Wis.

Stat. § 108.01; Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at 61 (explaining

that     in     determining     liability     under      the     Unemployment

Compensation Act, "the act itself should be put in perspective,

and the underlying purpose of the act should be given paramount

consideration").      The unemployment compensation law addresses an

"urgent public problem" and does so by sharing "fairly" the

economic burdens of unemployment.          Wis. Stat. § 108.01(1)-(2).

       ¶47    In light of this, we have stated that the unemployment

compensation law is "remedial in nature and should be liberally

construed      to   effect    unemployment   compensation       coverage    for
workers who are economically dependent upon others in respect to

                                      20
                                                            No.   2020AP2007

their wage-earning status."     Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at 62.11

As a corollary to this principle, it follows that if a statute

is   liberally    construed,   then    exceptions    must    be   narrowly

construed.    McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶10, 300 Wis. 2d 358,

731 N.W.2d 273.

     ¶48   Correctly demonstrating a narrow construction of the

exception, the court of appeals here concluded that looking at

an organization's motivations in a vacuum "would cast too broad

a net."      Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶37.             Sole

reliance on self-professed motivation would essentially render

an   organization's    mere    assertion    of   a   religious      motive

     11Although the United States Supreme Court has in the past
applied a similar principle of liberal construction of remedial
statutes, see Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968), recent
cases suggest a potential step back from this approach.     See,
e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct.
1134, 1142 (2018).      Nevertheless, we follow (and do not
overrule)   the   Wisconsin   approach   to    our  Unemployment
Compensation Act and our precedent regarding the interpretation
of remedial statutes under the Act. See Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1,
¶32; Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 62, 330
N.W.2d 169 (1983); see generally Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
2010 WI 75, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493; Stuart v.
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 22, ¶21, 308
Wis. 2d 103, 746 N.W.2d 762 (explaining that "remedial statutes
must be liberally construed to advance the remedy that the
legislature intended to be afforded").       The statutory text
confirms the original intent of the legislature to provide broad
coverage for unemployed workers that is "shared . . . fairly"
among employers. See generally Wis. Stat. § 108.01.

                                  21
                                                                     No.   2020AP2007

dispositive.12       See Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal

Revenue, 950 F.2d 365, 372 (7th Cir. 1991) ("While we agree with

Living Faith that an organization's good faith assertion of an

exempt purpose is relevant to the analysis of tax-exempt status,

we cannot accept the view that such an assertion be dispositive.

Put    simply,   saying      one's    purpose       is   exclusively       religious

doesn't necessarily make it so.").

       ¶49   Although the motivations of an organization certainly

figure into the analysis, allowing self-definition to drive the

exemption    would    open    the    exemption      to   a   broad    spectrum     of

organizations     based      entirely    on     a    single    assertion      of     a

religious motivation.13        This would run counter to the direction

that    we   construe   the    exemption      narrowly.        Considering         the

       The stopping point of the argument presented by CCB and
       12

the sub-entities is unclear. For example, at the administrative
hearing in the present case, the Archbishop of Milwaukee
testified that he is responsible for overseeing numerous grammar
schools and high schools, 10 hospitals, and five colleges.
Under the petitioners' argument, these entities' employees,
numbering in the thousands, would seemingly lack coverage under
the state unemployment system.

       The argument advanced by the petitioners did not garner
       13

anywhere close to a majority vote when addressed by the United
States Supreme Court.      At oral argument, Justice Thomas's
concurrences in both Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 196-98
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) and Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.
v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069-70 (2020)
(Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J.), were invoked to
support the idea that courts must wholly defer to an
organization's good-faith claims instead of examining the
activities of the organization. However, this position was not
supported by the majority in either case.

                                        22
                                                            No.     2020AP2007

organization's activities in addition to its motivations is in

line with the directive that we follow a narrow construction.

       ¶50   Our decision in Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 2009

WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868, additionally buttresses

our conclusion.       In that case, the court addressed an issue of

whether      a    teacher's   position    in   a   religious      school    is

"ministerial" such that the First Amendment bars suit under the

Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.14

       ¶51   In examining this question, the court applied the two-

part "primary duties" test.        "The first step is an inquiry into

whether the organization in both statement and practice has a

fundamentally religious mission."          Id., ¶48.    Second, the court

inquires "into how important or closely linked the employee's

work is to the fundamental mission of that organization."                  Id.,

¶49.

       ¶52   Although the legal issue and context were different in

Coulee, we agree with the court of appeals that it "provides

guidance     in    understanding   the    religious    purposes    exemption

       The "ministerial exception" recognizes "that the First
       14

Amendment protects houses of worship from state interference
with the decision of who will teach and lead a congregation."
Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶39. Premised on the "idea
that the 'introduction of government standards [in]to the
selection   of  spiritual   leaders   would  significantly, and
perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and
state,'" the exception "recognizes that 'perpetuation of a
church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to
preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its
doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at
large.'"   Id. (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985)).

                                     23
                                                                     No.     2020AP2007

here."       Cath.    Charities     Bureau,       406    Wis. 2d 586,       ¶43.        To

explain, the first step of the primary duties test involves an

inquiry into an organization's mission.                     In analyzing such a

question, the Coulee court examined both the "statement" and

"practice"     of    the    organization.           Coulee      Cath.     Schs.,       320

Wis. 2d 275,     ¶48.       See    also     Our   Lady    of    Guadalupe       Sch.    v.

Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2067-69 (2020).

In other words, it analyzed both the professions and actions of

the organization to determine the organization's "mission."

       ¶53   The "mission" inquiry in Coulee is analogous to the

"purpose" analysis we conduct in the present case.                              Indeed,

mission and purpose are even listed as synonyms by a popular

thesaurus.          Mission,      https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/mission

(last visited Feb. 27, 2024).                The concepts are thus related,

and the Coulee court's analysis of two factors, professions and

operations, in its "mission" inquiry supports our examination of

similar dual considerations in the "purpose" question in the

present case.        See also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct.
at 2067-69.

       ¶54   Further,      the    Seventh      Circuit's       decision    in    United

States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981), lends support

to the assertion that the organization's activities have a role

to play in determining the organization's "purpose."                       In Dykema,

which involved a determination of a pastor's tax liability, the

Seventh Circuit observed that "religious purposes" is a "term of

art in tax law" and that the IRS, in order to determine whether
such     a   purpose       is     present,        must     examine        whether      an
                                          24
                                                                          No.     2020AP2007

organization's "actual activities                       conform to the requirements

which Congress has established as entitling them to tax exempt

status."     Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).

      ¶55    The Dykema court also emphasized that its inquiry into

religious     purpose          is    based        on    "objective    criteria,"     which

"enable     the    IRS        to    make    the    determination       required    by    the

statute     without           entering      into       any   subjective   inquiry       with

respect to religious truth which would be forbidden by the First

Amendment."             Id.    at    1100.         It    further     charted    "[t]ypical

activities of an organization operated for religious purposes"

as including:

      (a)   corporate   worship     services,    including   due
      administration   of    sacraments    and   observance   of
      liturgical rituals, as well as a preaching ministry
      and evangelical outreach to the unchurched and
      missionary   activity    in   partibus   infidelium;   (b)
      pastoral counseling and comfort to members facing
      grief, illness, adversity, or spiritual problems; (c)
      performance   by   the    clergy   of   customary   church
      ceremonies affecting the lives of individuals, such as
      baptism, marriage, burial, and the like; (d) a system
      of nurture of the young and education in the doctrine
      and discipline of the church, as well as (in the case
      of mature and well developed churches) theological
      seminaries for the advanced study and the training of
      ministers.
Id.   We reproduce this list not to create any requirement for an

organization to be determined to have a religious purpose, but

merely as an illustration.                   The Dykema court's listed hallmarks

of a religious purpose are by no means exhaustive or necessary

conditions        and    the       listed    activities        may   be   different      for

different faiths.

                                                  25
                                                                    No.     2020AP2007

     ¶56    We do not adopt a rigid formula for deciding whether

an organization is operated primarily for religious purposes.

See Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal

Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012).                    Instead, we

agree     with     the     Dykema    court      that     an   examination     of    an

organization's activities lends itself to an objective inquiry

that does not lead us into a First Amendment quagmire, as will

be discussed further below.15

     ¶57    We therefore conclude that in determining whether an

organization       is    "operated       primarily      for   religious    purposes"

within    the    meaning     of   Wis.    Stat.       § 108.02(15)(h)2.,    we     must

examine     both     the     motivations        and     the   activities     of    the

organization.

     15Our examination of an organization's activities also
finds support in a federal law utilizing the same language as
the statute we examine here. See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1)(B). A
report of the House Ways and Means Committee on that law sets
forth an example of its application that focuses on an
organization's activities:

     Thus, the services of the janitor of a church would be
     excluded, but services of a janitor for a separately
     incorporated college, although it may be church
     related, would be covered.         A college devoted
     primarily to preparing students for the ministry would
     be exempt, as would a novitiate or a house of study
     training candidates to become members of religious
     orders.     On the other hand, a church related
     (separately   incorporated)   charitable   organization
     (such as, for example, an orphanage or a home for the
     aged) would not be considered under this paragraph to
     be operated primarily for religious purposes.

H.R. Rep. No. 91-612, at 44 (1969).     Congress thus envisioned
that an examination of activities, and not merely motivations,
would be undertaken given the language we examine in this case.

                                           26
                                                                       No.    2020AP2007

                                            C

      ¶58     We turn next to apply our statutory interpretation to

the facts before us.           The burden to establish an exemption is on

CCB and the sub-entities.              See Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at

66; Sw. Airlines, 397 Wis. 2d 431, ¶24 (explaining that "[t]he

burden   is    on    the     party   seeking     the    exemption      to    prove   its

entitlement" and "taxation is the rule and exemption is the

exception").

      ¶59     CCB and the sub-entities profess to have a religious

motivation.         Specifically, they state that their services "are

based on gospel values and the principles of the Catholic Social

Teachings."         Indeed, it is part of CCB's mission to "carry on

the redeeming work of our Lord by reflecting gospel values and

the moral teaching of the church."                  We accept these statements

at face value, and LIRC does not argue that these assertions of

religious motivation are insincere, fraudulent, or otherwise not

credible.       Cf.    Holy       Trinity   Cmty.      Sch.,    Inc.   v.    Kahl,    82

Wis. 2d 139,        155,    262   N.W.2d 210     (1978)    (indicating        that   the
court is "obliged to accept the professions of the school" as to

its affiliation and "to accord them validity without further

inquiry" but the court may "look behind such decisions where

there is evidence of fraud or collusion").

      ¶60     However, accepting an organization's motivations does

not end the inquiry as we must also examine its activities.                          We

look for guidance from prior cases to further the analysis.                           In

Dykema, the court's examination of activities focused on whether
an   organization          participated     in   worship       services,     religious
                                            27
                                                                      No.   2020AP2007

outreach, ceremony, or religious education.                Dykema, 666 F.2d at

1100.    Here, such criteria weigh in favor of a determination

that CCB's and the sub-entities' activities are not "primarily"

religious in nature.           The record demonstrates that CCB and the

sub-entities, which are organized as separate corporations apart

from    the    church     itself,     neither    attempt    to    imbue      program

participants with the Catholic faith nor supply any religious

materials to program participants or employees.                        Although not

required, these would be strong indications that the activities

are primarily religious in nature.

       ¶61    Our own precedent, albeit in another First Amendment

context, further bolsters this conclusion.                  In Coulee Catholic

Schools,       320      Wis. 2d 275,      ¶48,      we     distinguished          "one

religiously-affiliated         organization      committed       to    feeding    the

homeless      [that]    has    only   a   nominal    tie    to    religion"       from

"another      religiously-affiliated            organization          committed     to

feeding the homeless [that] has a religiously infused mission

involving teaching, evangelism, and worship" for purposes of the
ministerial exception.           CCB and the sub-entities fit into the

former category.          Both employment with the organizations and

services      offered     by    the    organizations       are    open      to    all

participants regardless of religion.

       ¶62    CCB's and the sub-entities' activities are primarily

charitable and secular.             The sub-entities provide services to

individuals with developmental and mental health disabilities.

These activities include job training, placement, and coaching,
as well as services related to activities of daily living.                         CCB
                                          28
                                                                          No.    2020AP2007

provides background support and management services for these

activities——a wholly secular endeavor.                    See supra, ¶¶10-15.

    ¶63     Such    services     can    be       provided      by    organizations        of

either    religious     or    secular        motivations,           and   the     services

provided would not differ in any sense.                       This is illustrated by

a historical look at one of CCB's sub-entities, BCDS.                            As noted

by the court of appeals, BCDS was not under the CCB umbrella

until    2014,     before    which     it        had    no    affiliation        with    any

religious    organization.             See       Cath.       Charities      Bureau,      406

Wis. 2d 586, ¶59.           Yet the services provided before and after

BCDS's partnership with CCB commenced were exactly the same.                              We

agree with the court of appeals that "[t]he fact that the manner

in which BCDS carried out its mission did not change after it

became an affiliate of CCB supports our conclusion that BCDS'

purpose and operations are not primarily religious."                         Id.

    ¶64     The other three sub-entities at issue offer services

comparable to those offered by BCDS.                    In other words, they offer

services that would be the same regardless of the motivation of
the provider, a strong indication that the sub-entities do not

"operate primarily for religious purposes."

    ¶65     This    result     is    further           supported     with    a    look    to

federal law.        We observe that Wisconsin's religious purposes

exemption contains verbatim language to a provision of federal

law, with which Wisconsin's law was enacted to conform.                            See 26

U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1)(B); 1971 S.B. 330 (noting that the proposed

changes to Wisconsin law "will bring Wisconsin's law in line
with the 1970 amendments to the federal unemployment tax act"
                                            29
                                                             No.   2020AP2007

and that "[a]ny less coverage would cost federal tax credits").

A report of the House Ways and Means Committee on that federal

law indicates that, identical to Wisconsin's law, it:

      excludes services of persons where the employer is a
      church or convention or association of churches, but
      does not exclude certain services performed for an
      organization which may be religious in orientation
      unless it is operated primarily for religious purposes
      and   is    operated,   supervised,   controlled,   or
      principally supported by a church (or convention or
      association of churches).
H.R. Rep. No. 91-612, at 44 (1969).               Importantly, the House

Report continues and provides examples of employment that would

and would not be entitled to the exemption:

      Thus, the services of the janitor of a church would be
      excluded, but services of a janitor for a separately
      incorporated college, although it may be church
      related, would be covered.         A college devoted
      primarily to preparing students for the ministry would
      be exempt, as would a novitiate or a house of study
      training candidates to become members of religious
      orders.     On the other hand, a church related
      (separately   incorporated)   charitable   organization
      (such as, for example, an orphanage or a home for the
      aged) would not be considered under this paragraph to
      be operated primarily for religious purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).

      ¶66   Comparing the services offered by CCB and the sub-

entities here to the listed examples, the "orphanage" or "home

for   the   aged"   is   analogous.        The   services   provided   by   a

religiously run orphanage and a secular one do not differ in any

meaningful sense.        The same is true of a "home for the aged."

And the same principle applies to the developmental services
provided by the sub-entities at the center of this case.

                                      30
                                                                            No.   2020AP2007

      ¶67    Although CCB and the sub-entities assert a religious

motivation behind their work, the statutory language indicates

that this is not enough to receive the exemption.                            An objective

examination of the actual activities of CCB and the sub-entities

reveals     that    their    activities         are    secular        in    nature.         We

therefore      conclude     that    CCB    and        the    sub-entities          are     not

operated primarily for religious purposes within the meaning of

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.

                                           IV

      ¶68    Finally, we examine the petitioners' assertion that

the    above       statutory       interpretation            violates         the        First

Amendment.16       Specifically, they advance that such analysis and

conclusion creates a conflict with the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution by violating both the Establishment

Clause and Free Exercise Clause.

      ¶69    Together      referred   to        as    the    Religion       Clauses,       the

Establishment       and     Free   Exercise           clauses    provide          in     their

entirety:          "Congress       shall    make        no      law        respecting       an
establishment      of     religion,   or    prohibiting          the       free    exercise

thereof . . . ."        U.S. Const. amend. I.

      ¶70    The Establishment Clause protects against three main

evils:      sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement

       In full, the First Amendment provides:
      16                                         "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.

                                           31
                                                                                   No.    2020AP2007

of the sovereign in religious activity.                             Jackson v. Benson, 218

Wis. 2d 835, 856, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998) (citing                                     Walz v. Tax

Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).                        In other words, it operates

to prohibit          the government from enacting laws that "aid one

religion,          aid   all     religions,         or    prefer        one       religion      over

another."          Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,

216 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330

U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).

       ¶71    It further prohibits the excessive entanglement of the

state    in         religious         matters,       a        principle       known        as     the

entanglement doctrine.                St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶42.

Excessive          entanglement        occurs       "if       a    court     is     required       to

interpret       church      law,       policies,         or       practices."            L.L.N.    v.

Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 687, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997).                                      Such an

inquiry is prohibited by the First Amendment.                                Id.     However, "a

court may hear an action if it will involve the consideration of

neutral principles of law."                   Id.

       ¶72    On the other hand, the Free Exercise Clause assures
"the    right       to   harbor        religious     beliefs"           by    "protecting         the

ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live

out their faiths in daily life."                              Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch.

Dist.,       597     U.S.      507,     524    (2022).             It   protects         religious

organizations' right "to decide for themselves, free from state

interference, matters of church government as well as those of

faith and doctrine."                  Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶37

(quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
                                                32
                                                                           No.     2020AP2007

      ¶73     Both Religion Clauses inform a doctrine known as the

church autonomy principle, which "is perhaps best understood as

marking a boundary between two separate polities, the secular

and the religious, and acknowledging the prerogatives of each in

its own sphere."           Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 677 (7th Cir.

2013).      "The church-autonomy doctrine respects the authority of

churches      to    select        their     own      leaders,       define       their    own

doctrines,        resolve    their        own     disputes,      and    run      their    own

institutions free from governmental interference."                            Id. (quoted

source      omitted).         In    other        words,     it      protects      religious

institutions from "secular control or manipulation."                               Kedroff,

344 U.S. at 116.

      ¶74     The Religion Clauses are inherently in tension with

each other.        We acknowledged this complicated interplay in State

v.   Yoder,    49    Wis. 2d 430,         444,       182   N.W.2d    539   (1971)        aff'd

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).                         Indeed, the Religion

Clauses     are     "not    the    most     precisely       drawn      portions     of    the

Constitution."        Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.                 Both clauses are "cast
in absolute terms,"           id., and therefore have the tendency to

"overlap, can conflict, and cannot always be squared on any

strict theory of neutrality."               Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d at 444.

      ¶75     The United States Supreme Court has also acknowledged

these tensions, instructing that "[a]dherence to the policy of

neutrality" is paramount to prevent "the kind of involvement

that would tip the balance toward government control of churches

or governmental restraint on religious practice."                                Walz, 397

                                                33
                                                                  No.   2020AP2007

U.S. at 669-70.             At the same time, it emphasizes that strict

adherence is not always feasible:

         The course of constitutional neutrality in this area
         cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could
         well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions,
         which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or
         favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.       The
         general principle deducible from the First Amendment
         and all that has been said by the Court is this: that
         we will not tolerate either governmentally established
         religion or governmental interference with religion.
         Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts
         there is room for play in the joints productive of a
         benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
         exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
         interference.
Id. at 669.

         ¶76     A religious institution's First Amendment rights are

not unlimited.          Just as there are limitations on First Amendment

free speech, i.e., the proverbial prohibition of yelling "fire"

in a crowded theater,17 so too are there limitations here.                    The

challenge         is   to   balance   the    competing    interests.     We   are

assisted in achieving this balance by a review of precedent, and

by   a        review   of   how   other   jurisdictions    have   navigated   the

challenge.

         ¶77     An as-applied challenge, such as that brought by CCB

and the sub-entities, requires an assessment of the merits of

the challenge by considering the facts of the particular case in

         17   See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

                                            34
                                                                  No.     2020AP2007

front of the court.18         State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264

Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.           For an as-applied challenge to

succeed, the challenger must demonstrate that the challenger's

constitutional    rights      were    actually      violated.           State    v.

Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶18, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765.                       If

such a violation occurred, the operation of the law is void as

to the facts presented for the party asserting the claim.                       Id.

We presume that the statute is constitutional, and the party

raising   a    constitutional        challenge      must    prove       that    the

challenged    statute   has    been    applied   in    an    unconstitutional

manner beyond a reasonable doubt.           Id.; State v. Christen, 2021

WI 39, ¶32, 396 Wis. 2d 705, 958 N.W.2d 746; State v. Wood, 2010

WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.

    ¶78   With   this   standard       in   mind,    we    turn     now    to   the

petitioners' constitutional claims to determine whether CCB and

    18 There are two major types of constitutional challenges:
facial and as-applied. State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶17, 395
Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765.       A party challenging a law as
unconstitutional on its face must show that the law cannot be
constitutionally enforced under any circumstances.      Id.   In
contrast, in an as-applied challenge, the court assesses the
merits of the challenge by considering the facts of the
particular case before it. Id., ¶18. The parties' briefing was
not particularly clear regarding which type of challenge CCB and
the sub-entities bring here. Both LIRC and the court of appeals
interpreted the petitioners' challenge to be an as-applied
challenge, and we do the same. See Cath. Charities Bureau, 406
Wis. 2d 586, ¶47 ("[W]e note that the parties do not argue that
the statute itself violates the First Amendment, meaning that
CCB does not assert a facial constitutional challenge.").     In
any event, the standard for a facial challenge is more
stringent, and if an as-applied challenge fails, then a facial
challenge will also necessarily fail because the law can be
constitutionally applied in at least one circumstance.

                                      35
                                                                                   No.        2020AP2007

the sub-entities have made the requisite showing that Wis. Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2. has been unconstitutionally applied to them

beyond a reasonable doubt.                   CCB and the sub-entities claim that

LIRC's     statutory       interpretation              leads       to     a    violation       of    the

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in three ways:

(1) by causing an excessive state entanglement with religion,

(2)   by    violating          the    church       autonomy         principle,        and      (3)     by

discriminating "against religious entities with a more complex

polity" and "penalizing CCB for its Catholic beliefs regarding

how it must serve those most in need."                             We address each argument

in turn.

                                                   A

      ¶79    CCB and the sub-entities assert initially that LIRC's

interpretation            of     the        statutory          exemption          violates            the

Establishment            Clause        by     occasioning               an     excessive            state

entanglement        with        religion.           Specifically,              they     argue        that

examination of an organization's activities "requires Wisconsin

courts      (and    government          officials)            to     conduct       an     intrusive
inquiry into the operations of religious organizations that seek

the religious purposes exemption."

      ¶80    However, the protection provided by the Establishment

Clause      is     not    a     blanket       protection            against        any        type    of

governmental inquiry into a religious organization.                                       There are

certain     instances          that     require        some     investigation,            including

determining        tax     liability          or       the     applicability             of     a     tax

exemption.           See        Walz,       397     U.S.       at       675-76.           In        fact,
investigations           into    tax-exempt            status       are       consistent       with     a
                                                  36
                                                                   No.     2020AP2007

long-standing      tradition        of   treating     religious    organizations

equally under the law.             See id. at 680.      Indeed, both taxation

of churches and exemption "occasion[] some degree of involvement

with religion."        Id. at 674.

       ¶81    The Establishment Clause does not treat religion as a

third rail that courts cannot touch.                  Rather, it ensures that

the inevitable "degree of involvement" in such a determination

does    not   cross    into   an    evaluation   of    religious    dogma.        The

Supreme Court, in fact, has "upheld government benefits and tax

exemptions that go to religious organizations, even though those

policies have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion,"

Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2067,

2092 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

       ¶82    Although    such      an   inquiry      necessarily        links    the

government      with     religious       organizations,     "some        degree    of

involvement" does not offend the First Amendment.                        Walz, 397

U.S. at 674; see also id. at 697 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring).

An inquiry evaluating "the scope of charitable activities in
proportion to doctrinal pursuits may be difficult," but such

difficulty "does not render it undue interference with religion"

as long as it "does not entail judicial inquiry into dogma and

belief."      Id. at 697 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring).

       ¶83    The truth or falsity of a religious belief is not a

proper matter for us, or any other court to decide, but courts

still    must   answer    "delicate      question[s]"     to   avoid      "allowing

every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in
which society as a whole has important interests."                       Yoder, 406
                                          37
                                                                      No.    2020AP2007

U.S. at 215-16.          The key is for any inquiry a court undertakes

to remain on the right side of the line and not involve an

examination into the religious beliefs, practices, or dogma of

an organization.          Cf. St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶¶47-

49.   For example, in St. Augustine School, we observed that an

examination of "a school's professions that are published on its

public website or set forth in filings with the state does not

necessarily require any investigation or surveillance into the

practices     of    the     school."            Id.,   ¶48.      Consideration        of

"professions"           without     any     surveillance        of        whether     an

organization's          practices    are        consistent    with    a     particular

religious dogma ensures that the inquiry remains on the right

side of the line.         Id., ¶49.

      ¶84   Such is our challenge here.                 We begin the inquiry by

again looking at the statute at issue.                  As set forth above, the

language     of    Wis.     Stat.    § 108.02(15)(h)2.         dictates       that    we

examine both the organization's motivations and activities to

determine whether the organization is "operated primarily for
religious    purposes"       and    thus    is     entitled   to     exemption       from

unemployment tax.

      ¶85   Examining both the motivations and activities of the

organization requires minimal judicial inquiry into religion, as

there is no examination of whether CCB's or the sub-entities'

activities        are     consistent       or     inconsistent       with     Catholic

doctrine.     A court need only determine what the nature of the

motivations and activities of the organizations are——not whether
they are "Catholic" enough to qualify for the exemption.
                                           38
                                                                                   No.     2020AP2007

       ¶86    Again,         this        inquiry          requires       "some           degree      of

involvement" with religion.                        See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.                       But

rather than necessarily creating a constitutional problem, such

an inquiry is inherent in any statutory scheme that offers tax

exemption to religious entities.                         Id.; see id. at 675 ("There is

no    genuine    nexus       between         tax    exemption         and    establishment           of

religion.").          The review we endorse in this case is a neutral

and secular inquiry based on objective criteria, examining the

activities and motivations of a religious organization.                                     See St.

Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶5 (concluding that a "neutral

and    secular         inquiry"          into        a     religious         organization            is

constitutional); Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1100 (applying "objective

criteria" to an investigation into a religious organization's

activities.)

       ¶87    Our     conclusion             is    consistent         with       those    of    other

courts that have examined similarly "delicate" questions.                                           For

example,        in     Dykema,           the        Seventh       Circuit              examined      an

organization's         actual          activities,        just    as    we        do    here.       Id.
("Objective          criteria          for    examination         of        an     organization's

activities . . . enable                 the       IRS     to    make        the        determination

required by the statute without entering into any subjective

inquiry with respect to religious truth which would be forbidden

by the First Amendment.").                        Our examination of the motivations

and actual activities of an organization here is akin to our

consideration         of     a       school's      corporate      documents,             professions

with regard to self-identification and affiliation, and website
to    which   we      gave       a    constitutional           seal    of    approval          in   St.
                                                   39
                                                                             No.     2020AP2007

Augustine     School.             398   Wis. 2d 92,       ¶5.         This    "neutral      and

secular"     inquiry      does      not    intrude      on     questions      of   religious

dogma.      See id.

      ¶88    Further,         a    look    to      history     strongly       supports      our

consideration of an organization's activities, to which CCB and

the   sub-entities            object.         As     detailed      below,     this    history

establishes        two   essential         principles        for    our     purposes      here.

First,      that    an        inquiry      into       "purpose"       that    examines      an

organization's actual activities has long been established in

statutory enactments and the common law, and second, that courts

have embraced, rather than shunned, a judicial inquiry into an

organization's           actual         activities        in       order      to     make     a

determination of "purpose" to inform whether the organization

qualifies for exemption.                  Our decision here is thus consistent

with court's historical treatment of similar questions.

      ¶89    Religious tax exemption has been traced from ancient

times through the British common law.                          See John W. Whitehead,

Tax Exemption and Churches:                        A Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 521, 524-36 (1992).                               British common

law, and certain colonial legislatures, widely granted property

tax   exemptions         to    church      property.           John    Witte,      Jr.,     Tax

Exemption     of    Church        Property:           Historical       Anomaly       or   Valid

Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363, 372-74 (1991).

The   law    of     equity,        on   the     other     hand,     also      accorded      tax

exemption to church properties, but only to those which were

devoted to "charitable uses."                        Id. at 375.          Thus, there has
historically been some examination of a property's actual use,
                                                40
                                                                    No.        2020AP2007

not just reliance on an organization's religious character.                           In

other words, courts have long placed import on what a religious

organization does, and not just on what it says.

      ¶90     As    these   exemptions          evolved,     statutory         language

likewise focused on an organization's "purpose."                     Indeed, from

the earliest statutory enactments regarding tax exemption for

religious       entities,       an    examination      of     an   organization's

activities has been part and parcel of the inquiry.

      ¶91     For instance, the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894,

one of the earliest tax statutes that referenced an exemption

for   religious      purposes,       provided    a   tax    exemption     to    a   flat

income tax.        It stated:

      "[N]othing      herein      contained      shall      apply
      to . . . corporations,     companies,   or     associations
      organized   and    conducted   solely    for    charitable,
      religious,    or    educational     purposes,     including
      fraternal beneficiary associations."       Though the law
      was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
      1895, the exemption language contained in the act
      would provide the cornerstone for tax legislation
      involving   charitable    organizations    for   the   next
      century.
Paul Arnsberger, et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector:                          An

SOI Perspective, IRS Stat. of Income Bull. 105, 106-07 (Winter

2008),       www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf.                Similarly,          a

subsequent enactment, the Revenue Act of 1909, granted exemption

to    "any    corporation       or    association     organized     and        operated

exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes,

no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any

                                          41
                                                                            No.    2020AP2007

private      stockholder         or   individual."           Id.     at     107    (emphasis

added).

       ¶92    The    ubiquity         of   religious       tax   exemptions         and    the

analytical consequences of such exemptions have been recognized

by the United States              Supreme Court.            Specifically, the             Walz

Court   observed          that   "Congress,       from     its     earliest       days,    has

viewed the Religion Clauses of the Constitution as authorizing

statutory real estate tax exemption to religious bodies," noting

several examples from the early 1800's.                      Walz, 397 U.S. at 677.

As stated above, however, the Walz court also emphasized that

"some   degree       of     involvement"       with       religion     is    a     necessary

consequence     of        offering     tax   exemption      to     religious       entities.

Id. at 674.

       ¶93    Tax exemptions for entities with a religious "purpose"

being well-established in historical enactments, it is paramount

that there be a mechanism for determining if an organization

qualifies.          See    Ecclesiastical         Order    of    Ism   of    Am,    Inc.    v.

Chasin, 653 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Mich. 1986) ("Without [an
examination of religious activities], it would be difficult to

see how any church could qualify as a tax exempt organization

'for    religious         purposes.'").           Such     an    endeavor         inherently

requires judicial inquiry and has on many occasions throughout

the history of both federal and state law resulted in denial of

                                             42
                                                                              No.     2020AP2007

tax exemption where religion is claimed as the basis of the

exemption.19

       ¶94       For the above reasons, we conclude that CCB and the

sub-entities           have   failed     to     demonstrate      beyond       a     reasonable

doubt       an    unconstitutional        entanglement          with      religion.         The

motivations and activities framework dictated by the language of

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. does not require the court to stray

from        a    neutral      and     secular        inquiry    to     an     impermissible

examination of religious dogma.

                                                B

       ¶95       CCB   and    the     sub-entities       contend       next    that     LIRC's

interpretation violates the church autonomy principle.                                 Namely,

they    argue       that      the    church     autonomy       principle       is     violated

because LIRC's interpretation penalizes the choice CCB made to

structure itself and its sub-entities as corporations separate

from the church itself.                 CCB and the sub-entities advance that

the    church      autonomy         principle    is    violated      by     "divid[ing]      up

religious bodies according to secular principles."                                  They point

       See, e.g., Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404,
       19

407 (1886); All Saints Par. v. Inhabitants of Town of Brookline,
59 N.E. 1003, 1004 (Mass. 1901); Trinity Church v. City of New
York, 10 How. Pr. 138, 140-41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); In re City
of Pawtucket, 52 A. 679, 679 (R.I. 1902); Frederick Cnty.
Comm'rs v. Sisters of Charity of Saint Joseph, 48 Md. 34, 43
(Md. 1878); see also Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442,
462-63, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992); Midtown Church of Christ, Inc. v.
City of Racine, 83 Wis. 2d 72, 73-74, 264 N.W.2d 281 (1978);
John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 521, 545 n.184 (1992)
(collecting cases both upholding and disallowing property tax
exemptions for churches and other religious organizations).

                                                43
                                                                               No.     2020AP2007

to    Kedroff,      344     U.S.    94,    to     assert     that       the    government      is

thereby      "interfering          with   the     Church's         internal       governance,"

which adversely affects the faith and mission of the church

itself.

       ¶96        Kedroff     illustrates            the     type       of     ecclesiastical

governance matters protected by the church autonomy principle.

At issue in Kedroff was an inter-church controversy over the

right to use a Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York City.                                    Id.

at 96-97.          The controversy arose between the North American

Russian Orthodox churches, which claimed the right to use the

cathedral belonged to an archbishop elected by them, and the

Supreme      Court      Authority,        which       claimed       the       right    belonged

instead to an archbishop appointed by the patriarch in Moscow.

Id.     New       York's     highest      court      ruled    in    favor      of     the    North

American churches, based on a state law requiring every Russian

Orthodox church in New York to recognize the determination of

the    governing           body     of    the        North    American            churches      as

authoritative.          Id. at 99 n.3.
       ¶97    The Kedroff Court concluded that the state statute at

issue was unconstitutional because it allowed the "power of the

state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to

the   principles        of    the    First      Amendment"         by   "displac[ing]         one

church administrator with another . . . [thereby] pass[ing] the

control      of    matters        strictly       ecclesiastical           from      one     church

authority to another."               Id. at 119.             The right to acquire the

cathedral         was      determined       to       be    "strictly          a      matter    of
ecclesiastical government."                Id. at 115.
                                                44
                                                                                    No.       2020AP2007

       ¶98    In     contrast          to    the    New      York        statute      at      issue   in

Kedroff, Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. neither regulates internal

church         governance                   nor         mandates              any             activity.

Section 108.02(15)(h)2.                 defines         what        employment          is    for     the

purposes      of    unemployment             insurance         without       reference          to    any

religious principles or any attempt to control internal church

operations.          Put simply, it does not concern matters that are

"strictly" or even remotely "ecclesiastical," which belong to

the church alone.           See id.

       ¶99    CCB     and    the       sub-entities            claim      that      viewing         their

motives      and     activities             separate         from     those      of      the    church

penalizes          their     "choice          to        be     'structured              as     separate

corporations'——a religious decision grounded in church polity

and internal governance."                     On the contrary, the claim that in

order to receive the exemption the church is now required to

structure      itself       as     a    single      entity          rather     than          separately

incorporated subsidiaries is unpersuasive.                                The statute at issue

dictates that it is the motivation and activities of the non-
profit that determine its tax-exempt status, not its corporate

structure.

       ¶100 It       is      not        difficult            to      imagine        a        non-profit

organization structured as a separate sub-entity of a church

that is "operated primarily for religious purposes," that is,

with both motivations and activities that are religious.                                              For

example,      if    one     of   the        religiously-motivated                sub-entities          in

this   case    partook       in        activities        such       as    those     cited       by    the
Dykema court as indicative of a religious purpose, see supra,
                                                   45
                                                                             No.   2020AP2007

¶55,    it    would   have    a    stronger         argument    that,       despite   being

incorporated      separately        from      a    religious     institution,         it   is

nevertheless "operated primarily for religious purposes" within

the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.20                          Thus, CCB and the

sub-entities have failed to demonstrate that the church autonomy

principle has been violated beyond a reasonable doubt because

the statute does not interfere with its internal governance or

any ecclesiastical matters.

                                               C

       ¶101 Next,     CCB     and       the    sub-entities        claim      that    LIRC's

proposed       interpretation       as     applied       to    them     abandons      "[the]

bedrock principle of neutrality among religions" and violates

the Free Exercise Clause in at least two ways.                              First, CCB and

the    sub-entities     advance         that       it   violates      the    principle     of

neutrality because "it discriminates against religious entities

with a more complex polity."                  In other words, CCB and the sub-

entities contend that the Catholic Church is penalized under

LIRC's       interpretation       for    "organizing          itself    as    a    group   of

        See also Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 895 A.2d
       20

965, 970 (Me. 2006) (concluding that a nonprofit organization
which, in part, provides healthcare to island communities, is
operated primarily for religious purposes because of its
religious motivations and activities including bringing pastors
to   island   communities,  offering  Christmas  programs,  and
employing clergy members); Peace Lutheran Church v. State,
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 906 So. 2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (determining that a child care center
located at a church was operated primarily for religious
purposes because it provided outreach for the church and its
"religious purposes pervade all aspects of the school/day care
center.").

                                              46
                                                                               No.     2020AP2007

separate    corporate        bodies——in               contrast    to     other        religious

entities    that    include       a   variety          of    ministries    as        part    of    a

single incorporated or unincorporated body."

     ¶102 Second,       CCB    and         the    sub-entities         claim    that        LIRC's

interpretation is not neutral because it penalizes them "for

[their] Catholic beliefs regarding how [they] must serve those

most in need."         They point to LIRC's and the court of appeals'

decisions as "identifying [certain21] characteristics of CCB's

ministry as factors favoring denial of an otherwise-available

exemption."        Such an interpretation, in the petitioners' view,

"flies in the face of Catholic beliefs about care for the poor"

and "favors religious groups that require those they serve to

adhere     to    the    faith         of     that         group   or     be      subject          to

proselytization."

     ¶103 As a threshold matter, a party making a free exercise

challenge must demonstrate that the challenged law burdens their

religious       exercise     in       a     constitutionally            significant          way.

"[T]he Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a
governmental       program    unless,            at   a     minimum,   inclusion        in    the

program    actually     burdens           the     claimant's      freedom       to     exercise

religious rights."            Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of

     21LIRC and the court of appeals observe that CCB does not
engage in any of the following activities: inculcating Catholic
faith;   teaching   the   Catholic   religion;   evangelizing   or
participating   in   religious   rituals  or   worship   services;
requiring employees, participants or board members to be of
Catholic faith; requiring attendance at religious training,
orientation, or services; and disseminating religious materials.

                                                 47
                                                                        No.   2020AP2007

Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington

Twp., 374 U.S. at 223 ("[I]t is necessary in a free exercise

case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it

operates against him in the practice of his religion.").                             If

such a burden has been shown, then the analysis proceeds to the

second step, where a party may carry its burden of proving a

free exercise violation by showing that a governmental entity

has burdened a sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy

that is not "neutral" or "generally applicable."                       Bremerton, 507

U.S. at 525.

     ¶104 Importantly         for    our    Free          Exercise    analysis,    LIRC

asserts that CCB and the sub-entities have not shown that "the

unemployment insurance system burdens their religious beliefs."

In LIRC's view, "[i]nclusion in the unemployment program is not

a   constitutionally         significant         burden."            LIRC's    argument

continues: "The commission's interpretation does not prohibit

the Diocese or the employers from engaging in any activity.                         The

employers have participated in the State unemployment insurance
program   for    many        years   and        do    not     contend     that    their

participation was a significant or substantial burden on their

religious practices or beliefs."

     ¶105 A     look    to     United      States         Supreme    Court    precedent

illustrates that LIRC's position is correct.                         "[T]o the extent

that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases

the amount of money appellant has to spend on its religious

activities,      any     such        burden          is      not     constitutionally
significant."     Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization
                                           48
                                                                                  No.    2020AP2007

of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).                           "[T]he very essence of such

a tax is that it is neutral and nondiscriminatory on questions

of religious belief."                 Id. at 394; see Hernandez v. Comm'r of

Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (concluding that

the burden imposed by a provision of the Internal Revenue Code

governing      charitable         deduction            was    "no     different         from   that

imposed by any public tax or fee" and that even a "substantial

burden      would      be    justified       by    the       'broad      public    interest      in

maintaining        a    sound    tax    system,'         free       of   'myriad        exceptions

flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.'") (quoted

source omitted); accord Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶65

("General      laws         related    to    building         licensing,       taxes,      social

security, and the like are normally acceptable.").

      ¶106 Such is the nature of the unemployment tax at issue

here.       CCB and the sub-entities have not identified how the

payment of unemployment tax prevents them from fulfilling any

religious function or engaging in any religious activities.                                     As

the United States Supreme Court said, the decrease in the money
available for religious or charitable activities that comes with

paying   a    generally         applicable         tax       is   not    a   constitutionally

significant burden.             Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391.

CCB   and    the       sub-entities         thus       cannot     surmount     the       threshold

inquiry to demonstrate a Free Exercise violation.                                   Because CCB

and the sub-entities have failed to demonstrate that the statute

imposes a constitutionally significant burden on their religious

practice, we need not address the petitioners' argument that the
statute violates principles of neutrality.
                                                  49
                                                                       No.     2020AP2007

     ¶107 Accordingly, we conclude that CCB and the sub-entities

have therefore not met their burden under their Free Exercise

claim     to     show      that     the     law        as-applied     to      them      is

unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.22

                                            V

     ¶108 In sum, we determine that in our inquiry into whether

an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes"

within    the    meaning     of    Wis.    Stat.      § 108.02(15)(h)2.,        we    must

examine     both     the     motivations         and    the    activities       of     the

organization.       Applying this analysis to the facts before us, we

conclude that the petitioners are not operated primarily for

religious purposes within the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2.                              We

further conclude that the application of § 108.02(15)(h)2. as

applied to the petitioners does not violate the First Amendment

because    the     petitioners      have    failed      to    demonstrate      that    the

statute     as     applied    to     them       is    unconstitutional        beyond     a

reasonable doubt.

     ¶109 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of
appeals.

     By    the     Court.—The      decision      of    the    court   of     appeals    is

affirmed.

     22To the extent that CCB and the sub-entities argue that
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. is facially unconstitutional, such
a challenge also fails.        For a facial challenge to be
successful, it must be demonstrated that the law cannot be
constitutionally enforced under any circumstances.    Roundtree,
395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶17.   Our conclusion that § 108.02(15)(h)2. can
be constitutionally enforced under the present circumstances
necessarily precludes such an argument.

                                            50
                                                                        No.    2020AP2007.rgb

       ¶110 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.                  (dissenting).

       "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which                                are
       Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's."

Matthew 22:21 (King James).

       ¶111 The State of Wisconsin gives a tax exemption to any

nonprofit       organization          "operated        primarily         for      religious

purposes and operated . . . by a church . . . ."                              Wis. Stat. §

108.02(15)(h)2.          Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. and four of its

sub-entities (collectively, "Catholic Charities") are operated

primarily for a religious purpose——fulfillment of the command of

Jesus Christ himself to serve others——and operated by the Roman

Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin.                      The majority rewrites

the statute to deprive Catholic Charities of the tax exemption,

rendering unto the state that which the law says belongs to the

church.

       ¶112 Impermissibly          entangling          the    government        in    church

doctrine, the majority astonishingly declares Catholic Charities

are    not    "operated     primarily     for      religious       purposes"         because

their activities are not "religious in nature."                           Majority op.,

¶60.     The statute, however, requires only that a nonprofit be

operated primarily for a religious reason.                          "The statute is

neutral as to the type of service an organization provides; it

speaks       only   in   terms   of    the       purpose     of   the     organization."

Cathedral Arts Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 95

So.    3d    970,   975    (Fla.    Dist.        Ct.   App.    2012)      (Swanson,        J.,
dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).
                                             1
                                                                                No.    2020AP2007.rgb

       ¶113     The    majority's           misinterpretation            of       the      exemption

renders the statute in violation of the First Amendment of the

United     States        Constitution              as      well        as        the       Wisconsin

Constitution.          By    focusing         on       whether    a    nonprofit           primarily

engages    in      activities         that    are        "religious         in        nature,"    the

majority      transforms         a    broad    exemption          into      a     denominational

preference       for     Protestant           religions          and        a     discriminatory

exclusion     of      Catholicism,          Judaism,       Islam,       Sikhism,           Hinduism,

Buddhism, Hare Krishna, and the Church of Latter Day Saints,

among others.          The First Amendment forbids the government from

such   religious        discrimination             and     commands         neutrality           among

religions in the provision or denial of a government benefit.

       ¶114 The       majority's            misinterpretation               also        excessively

entangles the government in spiritual affairs, requiring courts

to determine what religious practices are sufficiently religious

under the majority's unconstitutional test.                                 The majority says

secular entities provide charitable services, so such activities

aren't     religious        at       all,    even       when     performed            by   Catholic
Charities.         The majority's determination directly contradicts

Catholic Charities' faith:

       The [Catholic] Church's deepest nature is expressed in
       her three-fold responsibility:      of proclaiming the
       word   of  God   (kerygma-martyria),   celebrating the
       sacraments (leitourgia), and exercising the ministry
       of charity (diakonia).    These duties presuppose each
       other and are inseparable. For the Church, charity is
       not a kind of welfare activity which could equally
       well be left to others, but is a part of her nature,
       an indispensable expression of her very being.

                                                   2
                                                               No.    2020AP2007.rgb

Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, ¶25 (2005).1                    Courts should

be uncomfortable judging matters of faith.                   Not only does the

constitution forbid the exercise, but courts are susceptible to

mischaracterizing deeply religious activities, which for some

faith      traditions    include    dancing,    Bhakti-yoga,       and     sharing    a

meal,      as   amicus    curiae,    International        Society    for     Krishna

Consciousness and the Sikh Coalition, informs this court.                          The

majority instead looks through a seemingly Protestant lens to

deem       works   of    charity    worthy     of   the    exemption        only     if

accompanied        by    proselytizing——a       combination         forbidden        by

Catholicism, Judaism, and many other religions.2

       ¶115 The majority mangles Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. to

reflect      its   policy   preferences,     supplanting     the     law    actually

enacted by the people's representatives in the legislature.                        The

majority's activism renders the exemption unconstitutional.                          I

dissent.3

       https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-
       1

xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-
caritas-est.html.

       Amicus Br. Professors Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, at
       2

15-16 (internal citations omitted) ("Many evangelical Christians
view conversion and overt worship as indispensable elements of
their charitable activities.      But Catholics and Jews view
service itself as a distinct mode of worship that should remain
separate from proselytizing.").

       Continuing its telling trend, the majority refuses to
       3

address any arguments against its desired result.     Clarke v.
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 79, ¶206, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998
N.W.2d 370 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting the
majority "pretend[ed] the respondents made an argument that
[was] easier for the majority to dismiss" instead of addressing
the parties' actual argument).      This dissent details the
majority's analytical blunders, which lead the majority to
absurdly conclude Catholic Charities      are purely secular.
                               3
                                                          No.   2020AP2007.rgb

                             I.    BACKGROUND

    ¶116 Every      Roman   Catholic     diocese   in   Wisconsin     has   a

Catholic Charities entity, which is its social ministry arm.

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. (CCB) is the Catholic Charities

entity for the Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin.             The purpose of

CCB "is to be an effective sign of the charity of Christ" by

providing services according to an "[e]cumenical orientation,"

meaning the organization makes no distinction on the basis of

race, sex, or religion regarding those served, employed, or who

serve   on   its   board.    CCB   has   separately     incorporated     sub-

entities, four of which are parties in this dispute.             The bishop

of the Diocese of Superior oversees CCB's programs and services

Justice Brian Hagedorn also dissents, questioning why the
majority   reads  the  exemption   narrowly  in   the  face  of
constitutionally protected religious freedom.   If the majority
sincerely stands behind its analysis, it should explain where
the dissents go astray. As Justice Antonin Scalia put it,

    When I have been assigned the opinion for the Court in
    a divided case, nothing gives me as much assurance
    that I have written it well as the fact that I am able
    to respond satisfactorily (in my judgment) to all the
    onslaughts of the dissents or separate concurrences.
    The dissent or concurrence puts my opinion to the
    test, providing a direct confrontation of the best
    arguments on both sides of the disputed points. It's
    a cure for laziness, compelling me to make the most of
    my case.

Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. Ct. Hist.
33, 41 (1994).   Pitifully, the majority does not make the most
of its case.   Generally, when a party fails to respond to the
legal arguments advanced in a case, the court considers the
arguments conceded. United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI
App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578 (citing Schlieper
v. DNR, 188 Wis. 2d 318, 322, 525 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1994)).
By refusing to offer a word of rebuttal in response to the
dissents, the majority concedes its analysis lacks legal merit.

                                     4
                                                                      No.   2020AP2007.rgb

and is in charge of Catholic Charities.                     It is uncontested that

Catholic Charities are operated for a religious reason.

      ¶117 In 2016, Catholic Charities asked to withdraw from the

Wisconsin unemployment tax system.                 The Department of Workforce

Development    (DWD)       denied     the       request.           Catholic    Charities

appealed,     and    an     administrative         law      judge     reversed       DWD's

decision.      The    Labor    and     Industry        Review       Commission      (LIRC)

reversed the administrative law judge's decision.

      ¶118 LIRC determined Catholic Charities are not "operated

primarily      for        religious         purposes"         under         Wis.      Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2.           LIRC    decided       "[t]he      activities,          not    the

religious motivation behind them or the organization's founding

principles, determine whether an exemption from participation in

the   unemployment        insurance    program         is   warranted."            Although

"[Catholic Charities'] services may be religiously motivated and

manifestations       of    religious        belief,"        LIRC    decided        Catholic

Charities'    activities       are     not       "religious         per     se."         LIRC

determined "the provision of help to the poor and disabled" is
"essentially secular," and therefore denied Catholic Charities

the exemption.       The circuit court reversed LIRC's decision.                          The

court of appeals then reversed the circuit court.

      ¶119 The court of appeals decided Catholic Charities do not

operate primarily for religious purposes——holding that Catholic

Charities'      activities            are        not        sufficiently            "viewed

as . . . inherently religious."                 Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v.

LIRC, 2023 WI App 12, ¶45, 406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778.                               The
court of appeals held that to receive the exemption under Wis.

                                            5
                                                                        No.   2020AP2007.rgb

Stat.     § 108.02(15)(h)2.,            Catholic       Charities         must     have     a

religious      motivation         and     engage       primarily         in     activities

"religious in nature."              Id., ¶34.          According to the court of

appeals, "a religious motivation does not, by itself, mean that

the organization is operated primarily for religious purposes."

Id., ¶62.      It is "the type of religious activities engaged in by

the     organization"      that        determines      its      eligibility       for    the

exemption.         Id.,    ¶45.         The    court     of     appeals       acknowledged

Catholic Charities have a religious motivation for conducting

their charitable activities. Id., ¶¶56-57.                         Nevertheless, the

court     of     appeals     decided          Catholic        Charities'        charitable

activities       "are     neither       inherently        or     primarily       religious

activities":

       CCB and its sub-entities do not operate to inculcate
       the Catholic faith; they are not engaged in teaching
       the Catholic religion, evangelizing, or participating
       in religious rituals or worship services with the
       social service participants; they do not require their
       employees, participants, or board members to be of the
       Catholic faith; participants are not required to
       attend   any  religious   training,   orientation,  or
       services; their funding comes almost entirely from
       government contracts or private companies, not from
       the Diocese of Superior; and they do not disseminate
       any religious material to participants.     Nor do CCB
       and its sub-entities provide program participants with
       an "education in the doctrine and discipline of the
       church."
Id., ¶58 (quoting United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1100

(7th    Cir.     1981)).      "While          [Catholic       Charities']       activities

fulfill    the    Catechism       of    the    Catholic        Church    to    respond    in

charity to those in need, the activities themselves are not
primarily religious in nature."                   Id., ¶59.      The court of appeals

                                              6
                                                                              No.     2020AP2007.rgb

held any "spreading of [the] Catholic faith accomplished" by

Catholic Charities' activities is only "indirect."                                      Id., ¶61.

The     court   of     appeals    concluded             that       although      "the     Catholic

Church's tenet of solidarity compels it to engage in charitable

acts, the religious motives of CCB and its sub-entities appear

to be incidental to their primarily charitable functions."                                     Id.,

¶62.

                         II.     STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

        ¶120 The Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Act provides

temporary benefits to eligible unemployed workers.                                       Employers

contribute to a government account via a tax.                                       In 1972, the

state exempted certain religious nonprofits from paying the tax.

See     ch.     53,     Laws     of        1971.         Currently,           the      law     says,

"'Employment' as applied to work for a nonprofit organization .

.   .   does    not    include    service           .   .     .    [i]n    the    employ      of   an

organization          operated    primarily             for       religious         purposes       and

operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a

church or convention or association of churches[.]"                                    Wis. Stat.
§ 108.02(15)(h)2.

        ¶121 To       receive         an     exemption             under      Wis.       Stat.       §

108.02(15)(h)2., a nonprofit must meet two requirements:                                           (1)

the     organization      must        be     "operated            primarily      for     religious

purposes"       and      (2)     the        organization             must        be     "operated,

supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or

convention or association of churches[.]"4                                 The parties agree

       Cf. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran
        4                                                                   Church       v.    South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 782 n.12 (1981).

                                                7
                                                                        No.    2020AP2007.rgb

Catholic     Charities      are        "operated,      supervised,       controlled,      or

principally supported by a church."                    The parties dispute whether

Catholic     Charities          are      "operated      primarily         for     religious

purposes."           An     examination           of     the     statute's         language

unencumbered       by     the    majority's       policy       agenda    shows     Catholic

Charities are operated for religious purposes and entitled to

the exemption.

       ¶122 The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain a

law's objective meaning.                 State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for

Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶47, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110

(quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶25, 260 Wis. 2d

633,   660   N.W.2d       656);       see   Friends     of   Black      River    Forest   v.

Kohler Co., 2022 WI 52, ¶39, 402 Wis. 2d 587, 977 N.W.2d 342

(stating the        Kalal       framework involves "ascertaining statutory

meaning,"    not     what       the    legislature      or     "statute       'intended'").

Courts are supposed to focus on the text of the statute to

derive "the fair meaning [from] the text itself."                             Brey v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶11, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970
N.W.2d 1 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46, 52); Friends of

Black River Forest, 402 Wis. 2d 587, ¶28 n.13 (In a "textually

driven analysis . . . the language of the cited statutes drives

the inquiry . . . .").                "Statutory language is given its common,

ordinary,     and       accepted        meaning,       except     that        technical   or

specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or

special definitional meaning."                    Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45

(citations omitted);             see also      Wis. Stat.        § 990.01(1).          If a

                                              8
                                                                        No.   2020AP2007.rgb

statute's      meaning      is    plain,     the      interpretive        process      ends.

Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (citations omitted).

      ¶123 To      determine      the   meaning        of   a   statute,        this   court

consults the text, context, and structure of the statute.                              Brey,

400   Wis.    2d   417,     ¶11   (citing        Milwaukee      Dist.    Council       48   v.

Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24, ¶11, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d

153).     Canons of construction, dictionaries, and the rules of

grammar      "serve    as   'helpful,      neutral       guides'"       to    determine     a

statute's meaning.          James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶23 n.12, 397

Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.

Garner,      Reading    Law:      The   Interpretation           of     Legal    Texts      61

(2012)); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 187

(1998) (first citing Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1); and then citing

Swatek v. Cnty. of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45

(1995))       ("For     purposes        of       statutory        interpretation            or

construction, the common and approved usage of words may be

established by consulting dictionary definitions."); Scalia &

Garner, supra, at 140 ("Words are to be given the meaning that
proper grammar and usage would assign them."); Neil M. Gorsuch,

A Republic, If You Can Keep It 132 (2019) (noting the rules of

grammar      "play     no    favorites"          in    statutory        interpretation).

Application of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation

inexorably leads to the unremarkable conclusion that a nonprofit

is "operated primarily for religious purposes" if it is managed

primarily for religious reasons.                      Ascertaining the meaning of

the religious exemption's first requirement ("operated primarily

                                             9
                                                            No.   2020AP2007.rgb

for religious purposes") requires a proper understanding of two

words——"operated" and "purposes."

                              A.     Operated

    ¶124 LIRC     argues    the    word     "operated"    means     "to     work,

perform, or function."       According to LIRC, the word "operate"

"connotes" activity.       The majority agrees.          Majority op., ¶42.

Catholic Charities argue the word means "managed" or "used."                     A

textual analysis reveals the word "operated," as used in Wis.

Stat.   § 108.02(15)(h)2.,        means     "managed."         Basic      grammar

verifies the correctness of this interpretation.

    ¶125 "Although       drafters,     like     all    other      writers       and

speakers,    sometimes   perpetrate       linguistic    blunders,       they    are

presumed to be grammatical in their compositions.                 They are not

presumed to be unlettered."           Scalia & Garner, supra, at 140

(footnotes     omitted).          Courts      are     supposed     to     prefer

interpretations in accord with the rules of grammar over non-

grammatical readings.      See Indianhead Motors v. Brooks, 2006 WI

App 266, ¶9, 297 Wis. 2d 821, 726 N.W.2d 352 (rejecting an
interpretation that "defie[d] the rules of grammar").                   The word

"operated" appears twice in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.                       Each

                                     10
                                                                    No.    2020AP2007.rgb

time,    "operated"       is    a   transitive       verb,5     taking       the        word

"organization"       as   its   direct     object.          "Operated"       should      be

interpreted in its transitive sense.                 See State ex rel. DNR v.

Wis. Ct. of Appeals, Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶29, 380 Wis. 2d 354,

909 N.W.2d 114.       "Managed" is a common definition of "operated"

when used as a transitive verb.                 E.g., Operate, The Random House

Dictionary     of   the   English     Language       1009    (1st    unabridged         ed.

1966)    (defining    "operate"      in     the    transitive       sense     as    "[t]o

manage    or    use";     "[t]o      put    or      keep . . . working             or     in

operation"; and "[t]o bring about out, effect, or produce, as by

action or the exertion of force or influence").                           Other textual

clues confirm "operated" means "managed."

    ¶126 The whole text of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. must be

considered when interpreting the word "operated."                            "Statutory

interpretation centers on the 'ascertainment of meaning,' not

the recitation of words in isolation."                  Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417,

¶13 (citation omitted).             "Context is a primary determinant of

meaning." Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167; see Clarke v. Wis.

    5  In its brief, LIRC insists "operated" is an intransitive
verb with no direct object.        The majority agrees, citing
internet dictionary definitions of "operate" in the intransitive
sense. See majority op., ¶42. LIRC and the majority are wrong;
"operated" is a transitive verb in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.
It is the "organization"——the direct object——that is "operated"—
—transitive   verb——"primarily   for  religious   purposes"   and
"operated"——transitive verb——"by a church or convention or
association      of      churches[.]"           § 108.02(15)(h)2.
Section 108.02(15)(h)2.   has a passive construction.         See
generally Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern English Usage 676
(4th ed. 2016).     "[O]nly transitive verbs can appear in the
passive voice." C. Edward Good, A Grammar Book for You and I .
. . Oops, Me! 33 (2002).

                                           11
                                                                           No.   2020AP2007.rgb

Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 79, ¶198, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998 N.W.2d

370 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing                                 Towne v.

Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).                         The word "operated" is used

twice in § 108.02(15)(h)2.:                     "operated primarily for religious

purposes and          operated, supervised, controlled, or principally

supported        by    a     church       or     convention         or     association      of

churches[.]"          (Emphasis added.)              "[A]bsent textual or structural

clues to the contrary[,]"                 we presume a word used multiple times

in a statute bears the same meaning throughout.                              DNR, 380 Wis.

2d 354, ¶30 (citations omitted); DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007

WI 15, ¶29, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 (quoting Harnischfeger

Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 663, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)) ("It

is   a   basic    rule      of    construction          that   we   attribute       the   same

definition to a word both times it is used in the same statute

or     administrative            rule.").            The     text    and     structure      of

§ 108.02(15)(h)2.           confirm       the    word      "operated"      bears    the    same

meaning in both uses.                 Section 108.02(15)(h)2. uses the word

"operated"       twice      within    the       same       sentence,     providing     strong
evidence the word means the same thing in both instances.                                 Miss.

ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 171 (2014)

(quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)) ("[T]he

'presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing

throughout a statute' is 'at its most vigorous when a term is

repeated within a given sentence.'").                          Additionally, the word

"operated" is a transitive verb in both uses, sharing the same

direct object:             "organization."             It is not credible that the
word     "operated,"        which    is     used      twice    in   the     same    sentence,

                                                12
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sharing the same direct object, means something different in

each use.    See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606

(1941)   ("It   is       hardly    credible     that   Congress      used        the   term

'person' in different senses in the same sentence.").

      ¶127 In        its      second        appearance         in         Wis.         Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2., the word "operated" is followed by the verbs

"supervised, controlled, [and] principally supported."                            It is a

basic principle of statutory interpretation that the meaning of

words should be understood "by reference to their relationship

with other associated words or phrases."                   State v. Popenhagen,

2008 WI 55, ¶46 n.25, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611.                                  When

words "are associated in a context suggesting that the words

have something in common, they should be assigned a permissible

meaning that makes them similar.                 The [associated-words canon]

especially holds that 'words grouped in a list should be given

related meanings.'"           Scalia & Garner,          supra, at 195 (citing

Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312,

322 (1977)).       "Managed" is a definition of "operated" that works
for   both   uses    of     the    word    "operated"     in   the        statute,       and

"managed"    has     a    related    meaning     to    "supervised,        controlled,

[and] principally supported."              § 108.02(15)(h)2.          The majority's

proffered interpretation of "operated"——"to work, perform, or

function, as a machine does[,]" majority op., ¶42 (quoted source

omitted)——is       utterly        unlike   "supervised,        controlled,             [and]

principally supported."             § 108.02(15)(h)2.          Because "operated"

means "managed" in its second appearance, it most likely means
"managed" in its first appearance as well.

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       ¶128 The text, its context, and the canons of construction

all support the conclusion that "operated" means "managed" in

Wis.    Stat.    § 108.02(15)(h)2.                     The    definition       of     "operated"

advanced by LIRC and adopted by the majority simply does not

work.      Both define "operated" to mean "to work, perform, or

function . . . ."               Majority op., ¶42 (citations omitted).                         Both

treat    "operated"         as     a    synonym        for     the    word     "activity"——an

interpretation         unsupported           by    the       statutory    text.         Treating

"operated" as a stand in for the noun "activity" either assigns

"operated" two different senses in the same sentence, or gives

"operated" a meaning oddly dissimilar to the words surrounding

it in its second use.                    See § 108.02(15)(h)2.                 (requiring the

nonprofit       to         be     "operated,           supervised,           controlled,         or

principally supported by a church or convention or association

of     churches").              Additionally,          defining       "operated"        to    mean

"activity"      transmogrifies            a       verb,      "operated,"       into     a     noun,

"activity."            The        majority's           interpretation          of     "operated"

violates             the           "fundamental                rule            of           textual
interpretation . . . that neither a word nor a sentence may be

given a meaning that it cannot bear."                           Scalia & Garner, supra,

at 31.

                                        B.    Purposes

       ¶129 The majority correctly concludes the word "purposes"

means the reasons for which something is done.                                  Majority op.,

¶43 (quoting         Purpose, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/purpose

(last    visited       Feb.       27,     2024));         purpose,       The       Random    House
Dictionary      of    the       English      Language         1167    (1st     unabridged       ed.

                                                  14
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1966) (defining "purpose" as "the reason for which something

exists or is done, made, used, etc."); see also Brown Cnty. v.

Brown Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n, 2022 WI 13, ¶38, 400 Wis. 2d 781,

971    N.W.2d    491     (internal      quotation    marks        omitted)        (quoting

Purpose, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/purpose             (last    visited       Feb.      14,    2022))

(the       "common    definition"    of    "purpose"        is    "the     reason     why

something       is    done   or   used"    or   "the    aim       or      intention     of

something").         To be "primarily operated for religious purposes,"

the nonprofit must be managed primarily for a religious reason.

       ¶130 LIRC        resists   this     common-sense           understanding         of

"purposes,"          insisting    "purposes"        means        "[t]he      employers'

business activity, objectives, goals and ends."                            LIRC argues

this court should not consider the reasons why a nonprofit is

operated.       LIRC cites a legal dictionary——purpose, Black's Law

Dictionary       1493    (11th    ed.     2019)——for        its    conclusion         that

"purposes" means "business activity."                Because "purposes" is an

ordinary term,6 however, we should use ordinary dictionaries to

       In its brief, LIRC tepidly argues the term "religious
       6

purposes" is a term of art in tax law, citing United States v.
Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981). The majority gestures at
(but does not commit to) the same argument, likewise relying on
Dykema.   Majority op., ¶54.     While Dykema deemed "religious
purposes" a "term of art in tax law," 666 F.2d at 1101, it did
not cite any authority to support its contention; it also failed
to explain why it believed the phrase is a term of art.       No
cases support Dykema's assertion; only two parroted it.      The
only cases to treat "religious purposes" as a term of art are
Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1101, Living Faith, Inc. v. Commissioner,
950 F.2d 365, 376 (7th Cir. 1991), which cited Dykema, and
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 12, ¶39,
406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778, the court of appeals decision
in this case, which cited only Dykema.         In reaching its
conclusion, the Dykema court interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3),
                               15
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aid our search for its meaning.           See Sanders v. State of Wis.

Claims Bd., 2023 WI 60, ¶14, 408 Wis. 2d 370, 992 N.W.2d 126

(lead     opinion)   (internal   citations    omitted)     ("To     determine

common     and   approved   usage,   we   consult    dictionaries.          To

determine the meaning of legal terms of art, we consult legal

dictionaries."); see majority op., ¶43 (quoted source omitted).

Unless a word or phrase is a legal term of art or statutorily

defined, words and phrases are given their "common, ordinary,

and accepted meaning."       Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.           "Business

activity" is anything but the ordinary meaning of "religious

purposes."       LIRC's assertion that "purposes" means "objectives,

goals and ends" does not logically lead to considering only

Catholic     Charities'     activities,    much     less    whether     those

activities are inherently religious.         An objective, goal, or end

cannot be divorced from motives.           "Purposes" means the reason

something is done, the motivation underlying the action.                 As a

matter of simple logic, "purposes" does not mean the action

itself.

which exempts entities operated exclusively for "religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes."    Federal regulations undermine Dykema's
characterization of "religious purposes" as a term of art.
Regulations define what "charitable," "educational," "testing
for public safety," and "scientific" mean.          26 C.F.R. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)-(5). Conspicuously absent is any definition
of what "religious" means under the statute.             Dykema's
representation that "religious purposes" is a term of art in tax
law is also severely undermined by divergent interpretations of
"operated primarily for religious purposes" embraced by state
courts.   See majority op., ¶38 n.10 (collecting a sample of
cases).   Neither Dykema, LIRC, nor the majority have provided
any basis for construing "religious purposes" as a term of art.

                                     16
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 C.    Applying the Plain Meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.

       ¶131 As a matter of statutory construction, common usage of

ordinary      terms,    and     basic      grammar,         "operated        primarily      for

religious      purposes"        means      managed          primarily        for     religious

reasons.       See,    e.g.,     Czigler        v.    Adm'r,     Ohio      Bureau     of    Emp.

Servs., 501 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).                            No one disputes

that   the    only     reason      the    Catholic          Church    operates        Catholic

Charities is religious.             See majority op., ¶59; see also Cath.

Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶47 ("[N]either DWD nor this

court dispute that the Catholic Church holds a sincerely held

religious belief as its reason for operating CCB and its sub-

entities.").          It's    no    surprise          the    issue      is       uncontested——

Catholic Charities' raison d'être is religious.                                  A court must

accept   a    religious       entity's      good       faith       representations          that

religious      beliefs       motivate      an        operation       and     the     operation

furthers a religious mission.                   Holy Trinity Cmty. Sch., Inc. v.

Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 154-55, 262 N.W.2d 210 (1978); See United

States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Corp. of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,

483    U.S.   327,     342    (1987)       (Brennan,         J.,     concurring        in    the

judgment)      ("Determining             that     certain          activities         are    in

furtherance             of           an              organization's                  religious

mission . . . is . . . a means by which a religious community

defines itself."); See also Kendall v. Dir. of Div. of Emp.

Sec., 473 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Mass. 1985); Hollis Hills Jewish Ctr.

v. Comm'r of Lab., 461 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(stating      that     an    employer's          statement         that      its     operation

                                            17
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furthers a religious objective, "made in good faith, must be

accepted by civil courts").               That should end the inquiry, and

Catholic Charities should receive the tax exemption.                       Regardless

of whose motivations are relevant——Catholic Charities' or the

Diocese of Superior's——Catholic Charities are managed primarily

for religious reasons.

                                D.    Whose Purposes

       ¶132 Because it is undisputed that the only reason Catholic

Charities are operated is religious (no matter whose purposes

are relevant under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.) the majority

need not decide whose purposes are relevant.                     Nevertheless, the

majority      answers    the    question,      botching    the    analysis.          The

answer should be obvious from the statutory text:                        The purposes

of   the   entity      that    operates    the    nonprofit      are    the   relevant

purposes under the statute.               When trying to figure out why a

nonprofit exists, ask the manager, not those managed.

       ¶133 The majority comes to the opposite conclusion, deeming

the nonprofit's subjective motivations relevant.                        Majority op.,
¶34.       The    majority's         rationale     is    unconvincing.          As     a

preliminary matter, the majority relies on a false dichotomy.

The majority asks whether——in all cases——the analysis focuses on

the church's motivations or the nonprofit's motivations.                             See

id.,   ¶33.      Not    all    cases,     however,      will   present     those     two

options.      The text of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. indicates it

is the operator's motivations that are relevant.                         A nonprofit

could operate itself.           Alternatively, a "church or convention or
association       of     churches"        could      operate      the      nonprofit.

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§ 108.02(15)(h)2.               As   a   third         option,       a    third         party    could

operate the nonprofit.               The statute's language contemplates that

a nonprofit may be operated by a third party and the exemption

will be available if the nonprofit is "operated primarily for

religious purposes" and "supervised, controlled, or principally

supported     by      a     church       or       convention             or   association              of

churches[.]"        § 108.02(15)(h)2.

      ¶134 With the majority's false dichotomy discredited, the

majority's conclusion collapses.                       There is no surplusage under a

textualist     reading.              When     a        church       operates        a    nonprofit,

focusing on the church's motivations for doing so will not lead

to   every    religiously            affiliated          organization            "automatically"

receiving     an     exemption           because            "[a]     church's           purpose        is

religious by nature."                See majority op., ¶37.                   When a nonprofit

is   self-operated         or    operated         by    a    third       party    other         than   a

church,      the     "operated           primarily            for        religious         purposes"

requirement        still    has      force.7            The     "operated         primarily        for

religious     purposes"         requirement            is    not    "pointless,"           Scalia       &
Garner, supra, at 176, if the relevant motives are that of the

nonprofit's operator, which could be the nonprofit itself or a

third party other than a church.                         The surplusage canon applies

only if an interpretation renders a word or phrase meaningless

      7The majority's surplusage argument is additionally flawed
because it relies on the false assumption that a church's
purposes are by definition religious.    Id., ¶37.    While that
sounds reasonable, it is not universally true.           Nothing
precludes a church from taking an action for a nonreligious
reason.   Similarly, it is not true that a school's motivations
are by definition educational.

                                                  19
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or redundant.            See id.        That is not the case under a fair

reading of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.

      ¶135 The       majority        also    argues        we     should      focus     on    the

nonprofit's       motivations         because       the    exemption       relates       to    the

services     of     the       employees      of     a     nonprofit,       not    a     church.

Majority op., ¶34.8              But whose services are exempt under the

statute does not indicate whose purposes are relevant under Wis.

Stat.      § 108.02(15)(h)2.                The     majority's         conclusion        simply

doesn't follow from its premises.                         The majority persists with

its fallacious analysis, arguing the nonprofit's motivations are

always the relevant motivations because "the phrase 'operated

primarily         for      religious         purposes'            modifies        the         word

'organization,' not the word 'church'" in § 108.02(15)(h)2.                                    Id.

No   one    denies       it    is    the    nonprofit           that   must      be    operated

primarily for religious purposes, not the church.                                      But that

doesn't mean the nonprofit's motivations control the application

of the statute.

      ¶136 If      (as    the       majority      agrees)       "purposes"       means       one's
subjective reason for doing something, then in determining why a

nonprofit is being operated, it is the operator's motives that

matter.       According         to   the    majority,        however,       the       court    can

determine     the       subjective      reason       why    a    nonprofit       is    operated

without     examining         the    motives        of    the     entity      operating       the

      8The majority similarly argues that "[t]hose employed by a
church are . . . addressed in subdivisions 1. and 3. [of Wis.
Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)], indicating . . . that 'employees who
fall under subd. 2. are to be focused on separately in the
statutory scheme from employees of a church.'"          Id., ¶35
(quoting Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶25).

                                               20
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nonprofit.              The       majority's            conclusion         refutes             itself.

Apparently the majority would ask a car why it is being operated

rather than asking the driver.                      If the majority's analysis seems

ridiculous, that's because it is.

                                  E.    The Majority's Test

       ¶137 The majority affirms LIRC's denial of the exemption

under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. using a two-prong test:                                              A

nonprofit must (1) operate primarily for a religious reason and

(2)    primarily        engage         in       activities       that   are     "religious            in

nature."       Majority op., ¶¶59-67.                     The majority's test, however,

is unmoored from the text of § 108.02(15)(h)2.                                       The majority

insists its test is the only way to "give reasonable effect to

every word" in the statute because considering purposes alone

would "give short shrift to the word 'operated.'"                                   Id., ¶¶44-45.

But    the    majority's          reformulation            of    the    text    relies          on    an

unreasonable         interpretation                  of      § 108.02(15)(h)2.,                     while

impermissibly adding words to the statute.

       ¶138 The     majority            offends         basic      rules       of        grammar      by
transmuting        "operated,"              a    transitive        verb,       into        a    noun——

"activity."        It does not address what "operated" means in its

second       use   in    Wis.          Stat.       § 108.02(15)(h)2.;               instead,         the

majority      completely          ignores         the     fact   that    the        word       is   used

twice,       employing        a    divide-and-conquer               method          of     statutory

interpretation this court has rebuked many times.                                        E.g., Brey,

400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶13 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47); see

also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167; King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.
473,     500-01         (2015)          (Scalia,          J.,      dissenting)             ("[S]ound

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interpretation requires paying attention to the whole law, not

homing in on isolated words or even isolated sections.                      Context

always matters.").

      ¶139 The    majority      completely       reimagines         the    statute.

Compare the statute's actual language to the majority's remaking

of it:

            Wisconsin Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.:                 "'Employment' as

             applied       to       work           for          a         nonprofit

             organization . . . does not include service . . . [i]n

             the employ of an organization operated primarily for

             religious     purposes        and      operated,          supervised,

             controlled, or principally supported by a church or

             convention or association of churches[.]"

            Majority's interpretation:           "'Employment' as applied

             to work for a nonprofit organization . . . does not

             include     service . . . [i]n          the        employ      of    an

             organization operated that has primarily for religious

             purposes    and primarily performs          activities that are
             religious     in   nature,      which         is    and      operated,

             supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a

             church or convention or association of churches[.]"

The      majority's      interpretation          violates        the      "cardinal

maxim . . . that courts should not add words to a statute to

give it a certain meaning."         State v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶24,

389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271 (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 2019

WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165) (internal quotation
marks omitted); State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶23, 390 Wis. 2d

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248,   938     N.W.2d       521       (quoting     Fond     Du    Lac     Cnty.      v.   Town    of

Rosendale,         149    Wis.    2d     326,    334,       440    N.W.2d      818     (Ct.    App.

1989)).        Instead           of    reading        words       into    the       statute      and

rearranging         the     words       to   meet       a     desired      result,        we   must

"'interpret         the    words       the   legislature          actually          enacted    into

law.'"       Neill, 390 Wis. 2d 248, ¶23 (quoting Fitzgerald, 387

Wis. 2d 384, ¶30).

       ¶140 Troublingly, the majority's redefinition of "operated"

to mean "activities" does not require a nonprofit to primarily

engage    in    activities            that   are      "religious         in    nature."          The

majority      fails       to   identify         the    source      of    its    "religious        in

nature" requirement; it simply declares it and moves on.                                         The

majority also fails to explain where——in the text——the majority

derives      the    factors       it     uses    to     deny      Catholic      Charities        the

exemption.

       ¶141 With no support for its interpretation in the text of

Wis.     Stat.       § 108.02(15)(h)2.,                 the       majority          attempts      to

"buttress[]         [its]      conclusion"         with     this    court's         decision      in
Coulee Catholic Schools.                 Majority op., ¶50.                But that decision

concerned the ministerial exception under the First Amendment,

not the statute at issue in this case.                             Coulee Cath. Schs. v.

LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.                                         Because

Coulee Catholic Schools has nothing to say about the meaning of

§ 108.02(15)(h)2., the case is irrelevant.                               The majority baldly

asserts the decision "'provides guidance in understanding the

religious       purposes          exemption           here[,]'"         majority       op.,      ¶52
(quoting Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶43), but

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fails to explain how Coulee Catholic Schools sheds any light on

the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2., a statute it never mentions.

    ¶142 The majority also mistakenly relies upon federal cases

interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which exempts from taxation

"[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,

organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,

scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational

purposes . . . ."             Cases     interpreting        and     applying        this

exemption      do    not    support   the    majority's     conclusion        that    an

exemption under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. is available only

if (1) a nonprofit's motivations are primarily religious and (2)

the actual activities engaged in by the nonprofit are primarily

"religious in nature."           The majority relies on a case from the

Seventh Circuit,           United States v. Dykema.               But the majority

misunderstands Dykema and other federal cases interpreting 26

U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

    ¶143        To     the     extent       federal       courts         evaluate     an

organization's activities, they do not delve into whether the
organization's        activities      are    "religious    in     nature,"     as     the

majority does.         Instead, some federal courts use activities as

evidence of motive in cases interpreting and applying 26 U.S.C.

§ 501(c)(3).          Dykema is not an exception.                 As the court in

Dykema explained, "it is necessary and proper for the IRS to

survey   all    the    activities      of    the   organization,         in   order   to

determine whether what the organization in fact does is to carry

out a religious mission or to engage in commercial business."
666 F.2d at 1100 (emphasis added).

                                            24
                                                                   No.    2020AP2007.rgb

      ¶144 The Seventh Circuit later verified the limited role an

organization's activities might play in the inquiry.                            As the

Seventh Circuit explained in Living Faith v. Commissioner, in

evaluating "whether [an organization] is 'operated exclusively'

for exempt purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3)" "[the

court] focus[es] on 'the purposes toward which an organization's

activity are directed, and not the nature of the activities."

950 F.2d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoted source omitted).                            The

activities and the "particular manner in which an organization's

activities     are     conducted"        are     simply     "evidence"         used   to

"determin[e] whether an organization has a substantial nonexempt

purpose"     because    "an    organization's       purposes       may    be   inferred

from its manner of operations."                Id. at 372; accord Presbyterian

& Reformed Publ'g. Co. v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir.

1984) (stating the "inquiry must remain that of determining the

purpose to which the . . . activity is directed"); B.S.W. Grp.,

Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57 (1978) (citation omitted)

("[T]he purpose towards which an organization's activities are
directed, and not the nature of the activities themselves, is

ultimately     dispositive          of   the    organization's       right       to   be

classified as a section 501(c)(3) organization exempt from tax

under section 501(a)."); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Comm'r, 41

T.C. 719, 728 (1964) (first citing Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden,

263   U.S.    578,     582    (1924);     and    then     citing    Unity      Sch.   of

Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61, 70 (1926)) ("The statute requires, in

relevant     part,   that     the    committee     be   organized        and   operated
exclusively for religious purposes.                 In this requirement, the

                                          25
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statutory       language       treats    as   a     touchstone,          not     the

organization's        activity,   but    rather   the    end    for   which     that

activity is undertaken.").              Activities serve only as "useful

indicia   of    the    organization's     purpose   or    purposes."           Living

Faith,    950    F.2d     at    372.9      Dykema's      list    of     "[t]ypical

activities"10 in which an organization operated for religious

    9  See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (stating "[a]n
organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or
more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities
which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified
in section 501(c)(3).   An organization will not be so regarded
if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in
furtherance of an exempt purpose").
    10    Dykema provided the following list:

    (a)   corporate   worship     services,    including   due
    administration   of    sacraments    and   observance   of
    liturgical rituals, as well as a preaching ministry
    and evangelical outreach to the unchurched and
    missionary   activity    in   partibus   infidelium;   (b)
    pastoral counseling and comfort to members facing
    grief, illness, adversity, or spiritual problems; (c)
    performance   by   the    clergy   of   customary   church
    ceremonies affecting the lives of individuals, such as
    baptism, marriage, burial, and the like; (d) a system
    of nurture of the young and education in the doctrine
    and discipline of the church, as well as (in the case
    of mature and well developed churches) theological
    seminaries for the advanced study and the training of
    ministers.

Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1100.

     It is unclear why the majority relies on Dykema's list as
heavily as it does.    Dykema did not cite any legal authority
supporting its list of typical religious activities.    See id.
The court simply made it up.     Moreover, Dykema's list is not
used by other courts. The only published opinions having relied
on its list are the court of appeals, below, and this court——in
this very case. Moreover, Dykema's list was meant to serve only
as a list of "[t]ypical activities" done for a religious
purpose.    Id.   Nothing in Dykema suggests a nonprofit is
                               26
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purposes might engage is just that——a list of typical religious

activities.       666 F.2d at 1100.        Courts interpreting and applying

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) have acknowledged that religious purposes

might be unorthodox or resemble secular purposes.                          E.g., Golden

Rule Church Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719 (holding a commercial enterprise

was operated for religious purposes because it was created as an

illustration of the applicability of a church's teachings in

daily   life);     accord   Dep't    of    Emp.    v.    Champion          Bake-N-Serve,

Inc., 592 P.2d 1370 (Idaho 1979) (holding a bakery was "operated

primarily for religious purposes" under state law because the

students    at    issue   worked    at    the   bakery      as   a    part     of   their

religious training); see Amos, 483 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (noting "[c]hurches often regard the

provision    of    [community      services]      as    a   means      of    fulfilling

religious duty and of providing an example of the way of life a

church seeks to foster").

    ¶145 Federal cases interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) do

not support the majority's bifurcated purpose-activities test,
under   which      courts   must    determine          whether   an        activity    is

religious or secular in nature.                 At most, the federal cases

support examining an organization's activities as evidence of

"operated primarily for religious purposes" only if the
organization engages primarily in activities that are "religious
in nature," as the majority requires.

     The majority also wrongly asserts that the Dykema court
"examined an organization's actual activities."   Majority op.,
¶87. The Dykema court did no such thing. The court reversed a
district court decision denying the enforcement of an IRS
summons that called for 14 categories of records belonging to a
church. 666 F.2d at 1098, 1104.

                                          27
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motive.        Because both LIRC and the majority concede that the

reason      Catholic     Charities        are    operated         is    religious,       federal

precedent       supplies       no        support      for        the    majority's        faulty

conclusion.

       ¶146 It is unsurprising that no other court has adopted the

majority's       approach;          it     is     incoherent.               The      majority's

bifurcated purpose-activities test falls apart upon the faintest

scrutiny.         Most    obviously,            religious         activities         cannot     be

separated       from    religious          purposes.             It    is     the    underlying

religious motivation that makes an activity religious.                                        See,

e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,

715-16 (1981); Univ. of Great Falls v. N.L.R.B., 278 F.3d 1335,

1346    (D.C.    Cir.     2002).           For       example,         anyone——religious         or

irreligious——could use peyote,11 kill animals,12 grow a 1/2–inch

beard,13 or use Saturday as a day of rest.14                            One could read the

Bible for secular or religious reasons.                          Cf. Locke v. Davey, 540

U.S.    712,    734-35    (2004)         (Thomas,       J.,      dissenting)        (explaining

that    "the    study     of   theology          does    not      necessarily          implicate
religious      devotion     or      faith"       since      it    may    be    done     "from    a

secular perspective as well as from a religious one").                                        One

       Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
       11

872 (1990).

       Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
       12

U.S. 520 (1993).

       Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (holding a prison's
       13

refusal to allow a Muslim to grow a 1/2-inch beard violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).
       14   Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

                                                28
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could erect a cross to promote a Christian message or honor

fallen soldiers.              See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 588 U.S.

___,   139      S.      Ct.     2067,       2082       (2019).            Such       activities        are

religious      activities         only       if     motivated         by    religious          beliefs.

See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360-61 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby

Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 717 n.28 (2014); Wisconsin v.

Yoder,    406       U.S.       205,    216     (1972)          ("A    way       of    life,     however

virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to

reasonable         state      regulation          of     education         if    it     is    based     on

purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the

Religion       Clauses,         the        claims      must      be       rooted        in    religious

belief.").              Unable        to     divorce           religious         activities           from

religious motivations, the majority's activities prong swallows

the majority's purposes prong.                            The only activities that are

"religious in nature," according to the majority, are activities

that   presuppose          a    religious          purpose——e.g.,               proselytizing          and

teaching one's religious doctrine.                            Majority op., ¶¶55, 60.                  The

majority's purposes prong is superfluous.
       ¶147    The      majority's          activities           prong      doesn't          simply    ask

whether       an     activity         is     religious,          it       asks       whether     it     is

"religious         in    nature."             But        no     activities           are     inherently

religious;         religious      motivation             makes       an    activity          religious.

The    majority         actually           inquires           whether      Catholic          Charities'

activities are stereotypically religious.                                  Nothing in the text

of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., however, prompts the court to

determine          what         religious              activities           are            sufficiently
stereotypical.            The majority never explains what an inherently

                                                    29
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religious         activity      is,     leaving         it     up     to     courts          to   make

determinations of religiosity on an ad hoc basis.                                             What is

inherently        religious         will     simply      reflect          what    an     individual

judge subjectively regards as religious enough.                                        The statute

does    not       demand       this     exercise,         and       more     importantly            the

constitution bars such an inquiry.                       Infra, ¶¶163-97.

       ¶148 Further            highlighting             the      deficiencies                of    the

majority's test, the majority fails to explain why the factors

it    furnishes        make     an     activity         more    or    less        "religious        in

nature."      For example, why does offering a service to those of a

different faith tradition make the activity less "religious in

nature"?       See majority op., ¶61.                    Doesn't this factor conflict

with    the       majority's        statements          that    religious          outreach        and

evangelism are "religious in nature"?                           Id., ¶60.           The majority

asserts       that       activities          resembling        secular           ones    are      less

"religious        in     nature."          Id.,   ¶¶63-64,          66.      But       the    overlap

between       secular       and       religious         conduct       does        not    make      the

religious conduct any less religious.                           As the Court of Appeals
for    the    District         of     Columbia         Circuit      explained,           "[t]hat      a

secular university might share some goals and practices with a

Catholic      or       other    religious          institution            cannot        render     the

actions      of    the    latter       any    less      religious."              Univ.       of   Great

Falls, 278 F.3d at 1346.

       ¶149 Incoherency aside, the majority's primarily-religious-

in-nature-activities                requirement          is     highly           susceptible        to

manipulation.            "[T]he definition of a particular program can
always be manipulated" such that the inquiry may be "'reduced to

                                                  30
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a simple semantic exercise.'"             See Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All.

for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 215 (2013) (quoting

Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001)).                          The

activities of Catholic Charities can be characterized as the

provision    of    charitable    social        services.        They    can   also    be

characterized       as      "providing         services    to     the     poor       and

disadvantaged as an expression of the social ministry of the

Catholic Church in the Diocese of Superior" and acting as "an

effective sign of the charity of Christ."                  A religious activity

can be described narrowly, making it sound more secular, or

described    broadly,       making   it    sound    more   religious.          Baking

sounds secular while religious training sounds religious; both

characterizations could fit the activities at issue in a case.

See Champion Bake-N-Serve, Inc., 592 P.2d 1370.                    Whether one is

entitled    to    the    exemption   under      Wis.   Stat.     § 108.02(15)(h)2.

cannot turn on word games.

    ¶150 The        court    makes   meager       effort   to     explain     why     it

considers activities like proselytizing and teaching religious
doctrine more religious than religiously motivated charitable

services.        Many religions consider charity a central religious

practice.        As one amicus——the Jewish Coalition for Religious

Liberty ("the Jewish Coalition")——explains, it believes each of

the commandments in the Torah is a divine obligation.15                        One of

the obligations is charity, which the Jewish Coalition explains

    15   Amicus Br. Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, at 7.

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is sometimes connected to religious rituals and sometimes not;

regardless, both equally express the Jewish commandments.16

      ¶151 The      majority's        conclusion     that    Catholic         Charities'

activities       are    not    religious        because   their     activities        are

charitable is unsupportable.              In this case, there is no daylight

between religious activities and charitable activities.                         See St.

Augustine's Ctr. for Am. Indians, Inc. v. Dep't of Lab., 449

N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting St. Vincent DePaul

Shop v. Garnes, No. 74AP-76, 1974 WL 184313, *3 (Ohio Ct. App.

Sept. 17, 1974) (unpublished opinion)) (alterations in original)

("[T]he     terms      'charitable'     and     'religious'      are     not   mutually

exclusive and . . . 'the fact that an organization is charitable

does not preclude it from being religious.'").                     In their briefs,

Catholic Charities explain that charity is a religious activity

for   Catholics,        in    which    Catholic     Charities      engages      as    the

Diocese     of    Superior's      social      ministry      arm.         According    to

Catholic Charities, "[c]harity is 'the greatest' of the Catholic

Church's      theological        virtues . . . .             Charity . . . is           a
'constitutive          element    of      the     Church's       mission        and    an

indispensable expression of her very being.'"                      Consistent with

Catholic doctrine——as documented in the briefs——"[t]he Catholic

Church 'claims works of charity as its own inalienable duty and

right.'"         Catholic     Charities    explains       that   according       to   the

Catholic faith, charity is a religious duty they must fulfill in

an    impartial        manner,   without        proselytizing.           As    Catholic

Charities inform us, "'the Church's missionary spirit is not

      16   Id. at 7-8.

                                           32
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about       proselytizing,        but    the       testimony       of     a     life    that

illuminates the path, which brings hope and love.'"                               Catholic

Charities "carr[y] on [the Diocese of Superior's] good work by

providing programs and services that are based on gospel values

and principles of the Catholic Social Teachings."                             The purpose

of Catholic Charities "is to be an effective sign of the charity

of Christ[.]"           Multiple amici similarly confirm that charity is

a     religious     activity       in    each       of    their      respective        faith

traditions.        As one court observed, "the concept of acts of

charity as an essential part of religious worship is a central

tenet of all major religions."                 W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of

Zoning Adjustment of D.C., 862 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D.D.C. 1994).

       For example, one of the five Pillars of Islam——the
       fundamental ritual requirements of worship, including
       ritual prayer——requires Muslims of sufficient means to
       give alms to the poor and other classes of recipients.
       Also, Hindus belonging to the Brahmin, Ksatriya, and
       Vaisya castes are required to fulfill five daily
       obligations of worship, one of which is making
       offerings to guests, symbolized by giving food to a
       priest or giving food or aid to the poor. The concept
       finds its place in Judaism in the form of tendering to
       the poor clothing for the naked, food for the hungry,
       and benevolence to the needy.
Id.         (internal        citations        omitted).             Reflecting          this

understanding,          an   Illinois    court17        recently    reversed      a    state

agency       determination       that    an   organization         was    not    primarily

operated for religious purposes, holding the agency "erred by

recharacterizing          [the   provision         of   meals,     homework     help,    and

       Illinois courts consider the activities of a nonprofit in
       17

cases   under    the  Illinois    equivalent   of   Wis.   Stat.
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. E.g., Concordia Ass'n v. Ward, 532 N.E.2d 411
(Ill. Ct. App. 1988).

                                              33
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literacy       improvement]      as     secular         activities"           when     the

organization      "characterized       [those        activities]         as    religious

exercises" of the organization.           By The Hand Club for Kids, NFP,

Inc. v. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 188 N.E.3d 1196, ¶52 (Ill. Ct. App.

2020).        The same is true in this case.                  Catholic Charities'

charitable activities are a part of their religious exercise,

which    means     those   activities         are     religious.          This       court

belittles       Catholic   Charities'         faith——and      many       other       faith

traditions——by      mischaracterizing           their    religiously           motivated

charitable activities as "secular in nature," majority op., ¶67—

—that is, not really religious at all.

    ¶152 Ultimately,          the    majority        demolishes     its       own    test,

obliquely      saying   the   activities        the     majority     will      consider

inherently religious "may be different for different faiths."

Id., ¶55.       If what constitutes an inherently religious activity

might    be    different   for      different       faiths,   the    majority        must

explain why religiously motivated charity is not an inherently

religious activity for Catholics.              It never does.
    ¶153 The         majority's         erroneous          interpretation              and

application of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.——which produces the

demeaning conclusion that the social ministry arm of the Diocese

of Superior is inherently secular——would be baffling but for the

majority's       admissions      of     its         results-oriented           approach.

According to the majority, a plain reading of the statute would

be "'too broad'" a policy, so the majority adopts a contorted

construction instead.         Id., ¶48 (quoting Cath. Charities Bureau,
406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶37).               The majority anxiously speculates a

                                         34
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plain      reading    might       exempt     Catholic   colleges,        schools,   and

(gasp) hospitals.          Id., ¶48 n.12.18          This court has neither the

authority nor competency to decide how broad or narrow a policy

should be.         The legislature decided how broadly the exemption

sweeps, and it is not for this court to second-guess that policy

decision.      Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022

WI   57,    ¶96,     403   Wis.    2d   1,    976   N.W.2d   263   (Rebecca     Grassl

Bradley, J., concurring) ("The people of Wisconsin elect judges

       The majority's footnote expressing indignation at the
      18

prospect that religious colleges, schools, and hospitals might
be exempt under Catholic Charities' reading of the exemption
appears to prejudge issues not before this court.          Amicus
curiae, Maranatha Baptist University, et al., comprises a
collection of faith-based nonprofits that primarily provide
education.    Its brief notes that a number of its members
currently   qualify  for   the   exemption   under    Wis.  Stat.
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., but would likely lose that exemption if this
court upholds the court of appeals.        Amicus Br. Maranatha
Baptist University, et al., at 5-6.        Amicus argues "[t]he
federal government has long counted religious schools as being
operated primarily for religious purposes."        Id. at 9 n.1
(citing Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 28-87, U.S.
Dept. of Labor (June 10, 1987)) ("'The second category of
services exempt from the required coverage are those performed
in    the    employ    of   religious     schools     and   other
entities . . . .'"). The majority simply ignores this argument.

     Curiously, the majority's assumption that Catholic colleges
and schools cannot qualify for the exemption exists in tension
with the cases upon which it relies.     The majority analogizes
its test to cases applying the ministerial exception under the
First Amendment. In each of the cases the majority cites,
however, the religious school received the exception. Our Lady
of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct.
2049 (2020); Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d
275, 768 N.W.2d 868; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).     The majority
neglects to explain why Catholic colleges and schools receive
such radically different treatment under the test it employs in
this case.

                                             35
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to interpret the law, not make it."); See also Scalia & Garner,

supra,    at    21;   Antonin       Scalia,     A    Matter     of    Interpretation:

Federal   Courts      and    the     Law   20   (1997)       ("Congress          can   enact

foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for courts

to decide which is which and rewrite the former.").                                "Courts

decide what the law is, not what it should be.                       In the course of

executing this judicial function, we neither endorse nor condemn

the legislature's policy choices."                    See Sanders, 408 Wis. 2d

370, ¶44.       Judges have no authority to advance their favored

policies by expanding or narrowing a statute's text beyond what

the fair meaning of the statute contemplates.

    ¶154 To       mask      its    policy-driven       reasoning,          the    majority

employs   the    shibboleth         that   remedial     statutes       are       liberally

construed      and    exemptions        are     narrowly       construed——a            long-

discredited      maxim       that     pawns     judicial        activism           off    as

legitimate,      textual          interpretation.             See    CTS         Corp.    v.

Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 12 (2014) (stating the remedial statute

canon is not "a substitute for a conclusion grounded in the
statute's      text   and     structure").            The     majority's         unabashed

reliance on the remedial statute canon is troubling given the

immense     criticism       the    so-called        canon    has     received.           The

majority makes clear it is aware of these criticisms, but uses

the maxim anyway, without defending it.                     Majority op., ¶47 n.11.

The majority should not employ the maxim so thoughtlessly, since

it has been severely criticized and abandoned by many jurists

espousing a wide range of judicial philosophies.                           E.g., Regions
Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir. 2019)

                                           36
                                                                        No.    2020AP2007.rgb

(expressly       refusing     to    apply   the    so-called           remedial       statute

canon because of its "dubious value"); Dir., Off. of Workers'

Comp. Programs, Dep't of Lab. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry

Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 135 (1995) (calling the maxim the "last

redoubt of losing causes"); Keen v. Helson, 930 F.3d 799, 805

(6th Cir. 2019) (describing the maxim as the least useful of the

interpretive tools a judge might use); see also E. Bay Mun.

Util. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 142 F.3d 479, 484 (D.C. Cir.

1998)       ("express[ing]       . . . general      doubts       about        the   canon").

Antonin Scalia once compared the canon's use to Chinese water

torture,       in    which    "one's     intelligence           [is]        strapped       down

helplessly" as the maxim is repeated as a "ritual error[]."

Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis,

40 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 581, 581 (1989) [hereinafter Assorted

Canards].

       ¶155 Judges        have     discarded      the     remedial          statute      canon

because it has three critical flaws.                     The first is the canon's

"indeterminate         coverage."       Regions         Bank,    936        F.3d    at   1195.
Jurists have been unable to agree on what constitutes a remedial

statute.        Scalia,      Assorted    Canards,        supra,        at     583-86;      Ober

United Travel Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 135 F.3d 822,

825    (D.C.    Cir.    1998)      ("Although     courts        have    often       used    the

maxim[,] . . . it is not at all apparent just what is and what

is    not      remedial      legislation.").              This     is         unsurprising,

considering "almost every statute might be described as remedial

in    the    sense   that    all    statutes     are     designed       to     remedy      some
problem."       CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 12; accord Scalia & Garner,

                                            37
                                                                      No.    2020AP2007.rgb

supra, at 364 ("Is any statute not remedial?                         Does any statute

not seek to remedy an unjust or inconvenient situation?"); Keen,

930 F. 3d at 805 (noting that the canon's "trigger——a 'remedial

statute'——is hopelessly vague").

       ¶156 Second,        what    constitutes      a     "liberal"         or    "strict"

construction is unanswerable.                Scalia & Garner, supra, at 365.

As Antonin Scalia noted, the canon "lay[s] a judicial thumb" "of

indeterminate weight"             "on one or the other side of the scales"

in statutory interpretation.                Scalia, Assorted Canards, supra,

at 582.     "How 'liberal' is liberal, and how 'strict' is strict?"

Id.    No one can say.

       ¶157 Finally, the maxim is "premised on two mistaken ideas:

(1) that statutes have a singular purpose and (2) that [the

legislature] wants statutes to extend as far as possible in

service of that purpose.                Instead, statutes have many competing

purposes,       and     [the      legislature]      balances         these       competing

purposes by negotiating and crafting statutory text."                            Keen, 930

F.3d   at   805    (citing       Newport    News,   514    U.S.      at     135-36);     CTS
Corp., 573 U.S. at 12 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480

U.S.    522,      525–26       (1987)    (per    curiam))       ("[T]he         Court    has

emphasized      that     'no    legislation      pursues       its   purposes      at    all

costs.'"); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. ___, 138

S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (citations omitted).                        As Richard Posner

explained,        the      maxim    is      "unrealistic         about       legislative

objectives"       and    "ignore[s]        the   role     of    compromise         in   the

legislative       process       and,     more    fundamentally,           the    role    of
interest       groups,     whose       clashes   blunt     the       thrust      of     many

                                            38
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legislative     initiatives."             Richard      A.     Posner,      Statutory

Interpretation——in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.

Chi.   L.   Rev.    800,   808-09    (1983).          The    maxim    ignores    that

"limiting provisions . . . are no less a reflection of the

genuine 'purpose' of the statute than the operative provisions,

and it is not the court's function to alter the legislative

compromise."       Scalia & Garner, supra, at 21.               Those who employ

the maxim rarely appreciate that "[t]oo much 'liberality' will

undermine the statute as surely as too literal an interpretation

would."     In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).

       ¶158 In fact, the remedial statute "canon" is not a canon

at all.     It is "an excuse" to reach a desired result.                   Keen, 930

F.3d at 805; Scalia, Assorted Canards, supra, at 586 (stating

the maxim "is so wonderfully indeterminate" it can always be

used to "reach[] the result the court wishes to achieve").                          Its

vagueness makes it "an open invitation" to ignore the statute's

text and "engage in judicial improvisation" to reach the judge's

preferred outcome.         Scalia & Garner, supra, at 365-66.                    This
court should abandon the maxim and return to deciding cases

based upon the fair meaning of the text.                Instead of reading the

exemption    strictly,     "the     court      need   only    determine      'how    a

reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have

understood the text at the time it was issued.'"                        United Am.,

LLC v. DOT, 2021 WI 44, ¶44, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317

(Rebecca    Grassl    Bradley,      J.,    dissenting)       (quoting      Scalia    &

Garner, supra, at 33).         The majority violates the rule that a
"strict construction" cannot be "an unreasonable construction."

                                          39
                                                                 No.    2020AP2007.rgb

Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶25, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960

N.W.2d 384 (citing Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. City of

Wauwatosa, 2011 WI 80, ¶32, 336 Wis. 2d 522, 800 N.W.2d 906);

see also McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶10, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731

N.W.2d 273 (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 371 (2006)) (stating

exemptions     to    remedial    statutes      "'should     be     strictly,      and

reasonably, construed and extend only as far as their language

fairly warrants'").        To the extent the maxim delivers any value,

it is not even applicable in this case because the statute is

unambiguous.        State of Wis. Dep't of Just. v. DWD, 2015 WI 114,

¶32, 365 Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545 (quoting Salazar v. Ramah

Navajo      Chapter,    567    U.S.    182,    207      (2012)    (Roberts,       J.,

dissenting)).

       ¶159 The majority compounds its errors by using legislative

history to contradict (rather than confirm) the plain meaning of

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.           Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51; State

v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 897 n.5, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).

Legislative history is not the law, and it cannot override the
law's clear meaning.          See State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶55,

380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 (Kelly, J., concurring) ("[W]e

give effect only to what the legislature does, not what it tried

to do.").      In this case, the majority does not even cite state

legislative history; instead, it relies upon federal legislative

history to contravene the plain meaning of a state law.                        In so

doing, the majority makes another "law's history superior to the

law itself[.]"         Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 71, ¶91, 398
Wis.   2d    386,    961   N.W.2d     346    (Rebecca    Grassl        Bradley,   J.,

                                        40
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dissenting).                Using       long-discredited             methodologies,        the

majority's interpretation discards the statutory text, ignores

its plain meaning, and triggers constitutional quandaries.

III.        THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
                       AND THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
       ¶160 The          majority's     decision      is    an   egregious       example    of

legislating         from    the     bench.      It    takes      a   simple     statute    and

twists its language to narrow its sweep.                               In so doing, the

majority engages in religious discrimination and entangles the

state       with    religion      in    violation      of     the     First     Amendment.19

Courts sometimes——though inappropriately——warp a statute's fair

meaning to save it from unconstitutionality.                           See St. Augustine

Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶112, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635

(Rebecca        Grassl       Bradley,          J.,    dissenting)            (discussing    a

particularly egregious example).                      In this case, the majority

bends over backwards to alter the statute's meaning and create a

constitutional violation, turning the canon of constitutional

avoidance on its head.                 State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶8, 281

Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769 (quoting Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI

52,    ¶65,        271    Wis.    2d    295,    680   N.W.2d         666);     Jankowski    v.

Milwaukee Cnty., 104 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981)

(quoting Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp. v. DNR, 84 Wis. 2d 32, 50,

       Any constitutional issues arising from a plain-meaning
       19

interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. are not before
the court. Similarly, the constitutionality of the second prong
of § 108.02(15)(h)2., requiring the nonprofit to be "operated,
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or
convention or association of churches[,]" is not before the
court. See, e.g., Christian Sch. Ass'n of Greater Harrisburg v.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Lab. & Indus., 423 A.2d 1340, 1346-47
(Pa. 1980).

                                                41
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268 N.W.2d 153 (1978)); Baird v. La Follette, 72 Wis. 2d 1, 5,

239    N.W.2d   536   (1976)   ("Where    there        is   serious    doubt     of

constitutionality,     we   must   look   to     see    whether     there   is   a

construction of the statute which is reasonably possible which

will avoid the constitutional question.").

       ¶161 The First Amendment declares:          "Congress shall make no

law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free    exercise   thereof . . . ."       U.S.    Const.     amend.    I.      The

Religion Clauses of the First Amendment apply to the states via

the Fourteenth Amendment.          Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing

Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.

296, 303 (1940).20       Catholic Charities claim an inquiry into

       Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States Supreme
       20

Court has questioned whether the Establishment Clause properly
applies to states. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-
79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45, 49-51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-93
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572
U.S. 565, 604-07 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n,
588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2095 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue,
591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263-64        (2020) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas has argued the Establishment Clause
is a "federalism provision," Newdow, 542 U.S. at 45 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment), which merely prohibits Congress
"from establishing a national religion" and "interfer[ing] with
state establishments."    Id. at 50.    It does "not protect any
individual right."    Id.   Under this theory, the Establishment
Clause, "resists incorporation." Id. at 45. "[A]n incorporated
Establishment Clause would prohibit exactly what the text of the
Clause seeks to protect:      state establishments of religion."
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2095 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citation omitted). Scholars have debated whether the
Establishment Clause was meant to be incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment.      Compare Vincent Philip Muñoz, The
Original   Meaning   of   the   Establishment   Clause   and  the
                                42
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whether their activities are "religious in nature" violates the

First     Amendment      by    discriminating         against   their       religious

practices and excessively entangling the government in religious

affairs.

    ¶162 The        majority      improperly      stacks      the    deck      against

Catholic Charities' claims under the Religion Clauses from the

outset,     requiring       Catholic    Charities       to   prove     their     First

Amendment       rights   are    violated      "beyond    a   reasonable        doubt."

Majority    op.,     ¶77.       "The    United    States     Supreme     Court     has

abandoned the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for assessing

the constitutionality of statutory law[,]" and this court must

follow    the    Court's      pronouncements     on    issues   of     federal    law.

Winnebago Cnty. v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, ¶65, 391 Wis. 2d 35, 940

N.W.2d    875    (Rebecca      Grassl   Bradley,      J.,    dissenting)       (citing

Edward C. Dawson, Adjusting the Presumption of Constitutionality

Based on Margin of Statutory Passage, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 97,

109 (2013)).        "No United States Supreme Court case since 1984

Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 J. Const. L. 585 (2006),
and William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause:
Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DePaul L. Rev.
1191 (1990), with Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment   Clause:   The   Rise   of  the   Nonestablishment
Principle, 27 Ariz. State L.J. 1085 (1995), and Nathan S.
Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Agreeing to Disagree: How the
Establishment Clause Protects Religious Diversity and Freedom of
Conscience 75-84 (2023).     Regardless, the Court has held the
Establishment Clause applies to the states, and we are duty
bound to apply the Court's decisions interpreting and applying
the Establishment Clause. State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶18-
19, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142; cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454
U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy to
prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this
Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.").

                                         43
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has     applied      a    strong        presumption           of     constitutionality          in

challenges to federal statutes."                       Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients

& Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶78, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d

678    (Rebecca      Grassl       Bradley,       J.,     concurring)           (citing    Dawson,

supra,    at   109       n.43).         Instead,       the    Court       "will    strike      down

statutes upon a 'plain showing' of their unconstitutionality, or

when their unconstitutionality is 'clearly demonstrated.'"                                     Id.,

¶80.      "This      court      continues        to     reflexively            apply    the   rule

without any acknowledgement of the United States Supreme Court's

reformulation        of     the     standard."               Id.     (citations         omitted).

Conforming to the standards articulated by the Court would end

the     absurdity         of      applying         the        beyond-a-reasonable-doubt

standard.      The majority does not hold Catholic Charities' First

Amendment rights are not violated by its interpretation of Wis.

Stat.    § 108.02(15)(h)2.;              instead,        it        merely      holds     Catholic

Charities failed to prove their rights are violated "beyond a

reasonable       doubt."          See    C.S.,     391       Wis.    2d    35,    ¶67    (Rebecca

Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).
                           A.     Religious Discrimination

       ¶163 The          majority's         interpretation                of      Wis.        Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2. violates the First Amendment's Free Exercise

Clause     and     Establishment            Clause           by     discriminating            among

religious faiths.           The majority sidesteps the issue of religious

discrimination by declaring Catholic Charities failed to show

the law burdens their free exercise of religion.                                  Majority op.,

¶¶105-07.          The      majority,        however,              misapprehends         Catholic
Charities' alleged burden, causing it to erroneously conclude

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there is no burden on their free exercise at all.                           Contrary to

the majority's assertions, Catholic Charities do not allege that

paying the tax itself burdens their free exercise of religion.

See Id.21          Catholic Charities never argued the Free Exercise

Clause guarantees them an exemption from paying the unemployment

tax.        Instead, Catholic Charities assert that discriminatorily

denying them the exemption under § 108.02(15)(h)2. burdens their

free exercise of religion.

       ¶164 Catholic Charities are correct.22                      The United States

Supreme      Court     has    long    held    that      withholding     a   benefit    or

privilege based on religious status or activity may constitute a

burden on the free exercise of religion.                          Sherbert v. Verner,

374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,

Inc.    v.    Comer,    582    U.S.    449,       466    (2017)   (holding     expressly

requiring      a    religious    institution            to   renounce   its    religious

character in order to receive a public benefit imposes a penalty

       The majority exclusively relies upon cases in which the
       21

litigant argued the Free Exercise Clause required the state to
provide an exemption from a generally applicable tax. Majority
op., ¶105 (first citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of
Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990); and then citing
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989)); see also
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting that the
Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from paying social
security taxes even if the payment of such taxes violates one's
sincerely held religious beliefs).

       The Free Exercise Clause would not, absent Wis. Stat. §
       22

108.02(15)(h)2., require the state to exempt Catholic Charities
from paying the tax.    After it creates a religious exemption,
however, the state cannot discriminate against certain religions
or religious practices in applying the exemption. See Carson v.
Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 785 (2022); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 41 T.C. 719, 729 (1964).

                                             45
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on the free exercise of religion); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of

Revenue, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020) (quoted

source omitted) (noting "precedents have 'repeatedly confirmed'

the straightforward rule that . . . [w]hen otherwise eligible

recipients      are   disqualified        from    a     public          benefit        'solely

because   of    their    religious      character,'          we    must       apply     strict

scrutiny");     Carson    v.     Makin,     596       U.S.    767,           786-88     (2022)

(holding religious status or activity cannot be the basis for

denying a benefit or privilege); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery

Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).                                 As the Supreme

Court said long ago, "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that

the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the

denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (citations omitted).

    ¶165 Supreme Court precedent has focused on the denial of a

"generally available" benefit to those with a religious status

or who engage in certain religious activities.                          Carson, 596 U.S.

at 780.     For example, in Sherbert, an employer fired a member of
the Seventh-day Adventist Church because she would not work on

Saturdays, and the state later denied her otherwise generally

available      unemployment      benefits        because          it        determined     her

religious      beliefs    were    not     "good       cause"           to     reject     other

employment.       374 U.S. at 400.               The Supreme Court held that

denying   her    unemployment      benefits        because         of        her   religious

practices placed a burden on her free exercise of religion:

    Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared
    ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the
    practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to
    forego that practice is unmistakable.      The ruling
                              46
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      forces her to choose between following the precepts of
      her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
      and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
      order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental
      imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
      burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a
      fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
      worship.
Id.   at    404.      As     the   court       concluded,     "to     condition       the

availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to

violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively

penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties."
Id. at 406.23

      ¶166 In      Trinity     Lutheran,        a   state   offered         grants    to

nonprofits to help finance the purchase of rubber playground

surfaces.    582 U.S. at 454.           The program awarded grants based on

several    religiously       neutral     criteria,     such    as     the     level   of

poverty in the surrounding area and the applicant's plan to

promote    recycling.        Id.   at    455.       However,    the       state   denied

Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center a grant it was

otherwise qualified to receive because of the state's policy to

deny grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church,

sect, or religious entity.              Id. at 455-56.        The Court held that

denying Trinity Lutheran the otherwise available grant burdened

       See also Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450
      23

U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that failure to provide a Jehovah's
Witness unemployment benefits because he quit his job due to his
religious objections to making armaments burdened his free
exercise); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480
U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that failure to provide a member of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church unemployment benefits because she
was fired after refusing to work from sundown on Friday to
sundown on Saturday in accordance with her religious beliefs
burdened her free exercise of religion).

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Trinity     Lutheran's         free       exercise       of   religion.            The    Court

reasoned       a     denial     based        on       religion     penalizes        religious

exercise:

       [T]he Department's policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a
       choice: It may participate in an otherwise available
       benefit program or remain a religious institution. Of
       course, Trinity Lutheran is free to continue operating
       as a church . . . .    But that freedom comes at the
       cost of automatic and absolute exclusion from the
       benefits of a public program for which the Center is
       otherwise fully qualified.       And when the State
       conditions a benefit in this way, . . . the State has
       punished the free exercise of religion: "To condition
       the    availability    of     benefits . . . upon    [a
       recipient's]   willingness   to . . . surrender[]   his
       religiously impelled [status] effectively penalizes
       the free exercise of his constitutional liberties."
Id. at 462 (some alterations in original) (quoting McDaniel v.

Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion)).                                The Court

acknowledged         the     state's       policy       did   not      constitute        direct

coercion over religious exercise.                      Id. at 463.         But withholding

an otherwise available benefit based on religious status creates

constitutionally           intolerable           indirect     coercion          over,    and     a

penalty on, religious exercise.                       Id. (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at

450)   ("[T]he       Free     Exercise       Clause      protects      against      'indirect
coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just

outright prohibitions.'").

       ¶167 In       Carson,        a    state    provided       tuition    assistance          to

parents    who       lived     in       school    districts       that    were     unable       to

operate    a       secondary    school.           596    U.S.     at     773.      Under       the

program, parents chose the school they wanted their child to

attend    and       the    state        school    administrative          units     paid       the
school.        Id. at 773-74.               In order for a private school to

                                                 48
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receive     the     payment,       the    school         needed     to        meet     basic

requirements      under     the   state    compulsory          education        law,    like

offering a course on the history of the state.                                Id. at 774.

State     law     excluded     "sectarian"        schools         from       the     tuition

reimbursement program.             Id.     The petitioners wished to send

their children to schools that were, but for the "nonsectarian"

requirement, eligible to receive the tuition assistance.                              Id. at

776.

       ¶168 The      Court        held     the        program's          "nonsectarian"

requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause because the law

"'effectively      penalize[d]      the    free    exercise'        of       religion"       by

conditioning the tuition assistance on the school's religious

character.       Id. at 780.       The state argued that lesser scrutiny

should apply because it was not discriminating against religious

status,    but    withheld     state      funds    if     the     school       engaged      in

certain    religious        activities.         Id.      at    786-87.          The    Court

rejected the status-activities distinction, noting that "[a]ny

attempt to give effect to such a distinction by scrutinizing
whether    and    how   a    religious     school        pursues       its     educational

mission      would . . . raise           serious         concerns            about     state

entanglement with religion and denominational favoritism."                                  Id.

at 787 (citations omitted).

       ¶169 The     exemption      in    this     case    is    available            only    to

religiously        affiliated       institutions.                 See         Wis.      Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2.         (requiring      the     nonprofit       to     be     "operated,

supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or
convention or association of churches" in order to receive the

                                          49
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tax    exemption).           Nonetheless,            the        principles        underlying

Sherbert, Trinity Lutheran, and Carson have equal force when the

alleged     discrimination        occurs        among          religious      institutions,

rather than between religious and secular entities.

       ¶170 The     Sherbert-Trinity          Lutheran-Carson              line    of     cases

prohibit indirect coercion and penalties on religious exercise.

E.g., Carson, 596 U.S. at 778 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450);

Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 ("Where the state conditions receipt

of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious

faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct

mandated     by    religious       belief,       thereby          putting      substantial

pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate

his    beliefs,    a     burden   upon    religion             exists.").         Failure    to

provide     a     benefit,    which      is      otherwise            available      to     any

religiously       affiliated      entity,        to        a    religious      institution

because     of     its     religious     status           or     religious        activities

"condition[s]       the    availability         of    [a]        benefit[]        upon    [its]

willingness to violate a cardinal principle of [its] religious
faith[,]    effectively       penaliz[ing]           the       free   exercise      of    [its]

constitutional liberties."             Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.                    Even if

a     benefit     is      available      only        to        religiously        affiliated

organizations, the denial of the benefit still pressures the

entity to forego its religious practices, forcing the entity to

"choose between following the precepts of [its] religion and

forfeiting benefits."             Id. at 404.              As in Sherbert, Trinity

Lutheran, and Carson, such a choice burdens the free exercise of
religion.

                                           50
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      ¶171 At      their     core,    the    Religion          Clauses      prohibit      the

government       from   discriminating           among    religions.             "From    the

beginning,       this      nation's     conception         of     religious           liberty

included, at a minimum, the equal treatment of all religious

faiths without discrimination or preference."                          Colo. Christian

Univ.     v.    Weaver,     534    F.3d     1245,        1257    (10th      Cir.      2008).

Historically,       England       privileged       the    Church      of    England       and

penalized non-established religions and practices.                           In the 16th

century, Parliament enacted the Thirty-nine Articles of Faith,

which determined the tenets of the Church of England and the

liturgy for religious worship.                Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.

McConnell, Agreeing to Disagree: How the Establishment Clause

Protects       Religious    Diversity       and    Freedom      of   Conscience          12-13

(2023).        Additionally, "[t]he Acts of Uniformity of 1549, 1559,

and     1662     required      all    ministers           to     conform         to     these

requirements, making the Church of England the sole institution

for   lawful     public     worship."        Id.    at    13.        "There      were    also

specific 'Penal Acts' suppressing the practice of faiths whose
tenets were thought to be inimical to the regime."                               Id. at 14.

The practice of establishing churches "of the old world [was]

transplanted       and . . . thrive[d]             in    the     soil       of    the     new

America."        Everson, 330 U.S. at 9.                 In the American colonies

religious dissenters were often penalized for their heterodox

religious practices.          For example, in Connecticut in the 1740s,

religious dissenters were fined and imprisoned for preaching and

meeting.        Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 90
(2002).        In Virginia, laws "fin[ed] 'scismaticall persons' who

                                            51
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refused       to   have       their     children      baptized,    prohibit[ed]            the

immigration        of     Quakers,        and       outlaw[ed]     Quaker        religious

assemblies."       Chapman & McConnell, supra, at 17.

       ¶172 "During the Revolution, American establishments lost

their severity," and states tended to abandon direct penalties

on     non-established         religions        and    religious    practices          while

retaining privileges for the established religion and religious

practices of the state.                 Hamburger, supra, at 89-90.                   By the

time    the    First     Amendment       was    written,   "at     least    ten       of   the

twelve state constitutional free exercise provisions required

equal     religious           treatment        and     prohibited       denominational

preferences."           Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1257 (citing

Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious

Liberty, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1559, 1637–39 (1989)).                           One of the

"essential legal elements of disestablishment" in the states was

denominational equality.                 Chapman & McConnell, supra, at 57.

The principle that the government cannot prefer one religion

over     another        has    "strong        historical    roots     and        is    often
considered one of the most fundamental guarantees of religious

freedom."           Jeremy           Patrick-Justice,      Strict       Scrutiny           for

Denominational Preferences: Larson in Retrospect, 8 N.Y.C. L.

Rev. 53, 54-55 (2005).                  The constitutional bar on religious

discrimination among faiths emanates from both Religion Clauses.

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982); Colo. Christian

Univ., 534 F.3d at 1257.

       ¶173 The      Supreme          Court    has    unwaveringly      affirmed           the
central       principle       that    government      cannot   prefer      one    religion

                                               52
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over another:       "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause

is   that   one      religious        denomination             cannot       be         officially

preferred over another."              Larson 456 U.S. at 244; Everson, 330

U.S. at 15 (stating that under the Establishment Clause, a state

cannot    "pass     laws   which       .     .       .   prefer     one      religion            over

another.");       Cutter   v.    Wilkinson,              544   U.S.    709,           720       (2005)

(stating religious exemptions must be "administered neutrally

among different faiths"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314

(1952)    ("The     government        must       be      neutral    when         it    comes       to

competition between sects."); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill.

Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 707 (1994) ("[I]t is clear

that neutrality as among religions must be honored."); Epperson

v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.            97, 103-04              (1968) ("Government in our

democracy . . . must be neutral in matters of religious theory,

doctrine,    and    practice.           It       may      not . . . aid,              foster,      or

promote     one       religion             or         religious         theory              against

another . . . ."); see also Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 662

(2019)    (Kagan,    J.,     dissenting          from      grant      of    application            to
vacate    stay)     (describing        denominational              neutrality              as    "the

Establishment Clause's core principle").                            "At a minimum, the

protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at

issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or

regulates   or     prohibits      conduct            because   it     is    undertaken            for

religious reasons."          Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City

of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (citations omitted); Emp.

Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990).     State     laws      and   practices           "which      happen          to    have    a

                                                53
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'disparate      impact'       upon     different       religious      organizations"

resulting      from      secular       criteria        do    not      amount      to     a

denominational preference or religious discrimination, but laws

that   do    not    merely    incidentally       discriminate       against      certain

religions      or    religious       practices      receive        strict      scrutiny.

Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Colo.

Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1257.

       ¶174 The          majority's              primarily-religious-in-nature-

activities test necessarily and explicitly discriminates among

certain      religious    faiths      and    religious      practices.           As    the

majority      construes       Wis.     Stat.     § 108.02(15)(h)2.,            religious

institutions that do not perform sufficiently religious acts to

satisfy the court's subjective conceptions of religiosity will

be denied the exemption.               The government cannot "discriminate

between 'types of institutions' on the basis of the nature of

the religious practice these institutions are moved to engage

in."     Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1259.

       ¶175 While the application of secular criteria that leads
to     disparate      treatment        of      religions     is       not      religious

discrimination, the relevant criteria under the majority's test

are    not    secular.         The    majority      denies      the       exemption    to

institutions if they do not primarily engage in activities the

court deems "religious in nature"——a criterion that can only be

described as religious.              See Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533

("A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious

practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language
or    context.").        It   includes      only   a   small,      and     ill-defined,

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subset of religious activities.                        The majority employs factors

that are similarly not secular.                       For example, the majority asks

whether    a    nonprofit           engages      in     worship     services,       religious

ceremonies,          serves      only     co-religionists,          or     imbues     program

participants          with       the     nonprofit's          faith.        Such     criteria

certainly sound religious, not secular.

       ¶176 The       majority         declares       Catholic     Charities       ineligible

for the exemption because Catholic Charities do not participate

in   worship     services,             engage    in     religious       outreach,     perform

religious       ceremonies,             provide        religious        education,     "imbue

program participants with the Catholic faith[,] []or supply any

religious       materials         to     program        participants       or    employees."

Majority       op.,    ¶60.            Additionally,       the     majority      denies     the

exemption       on    the     non-secular         and     discriminatory         basis    that

Catholic Charities employ and serve non-Catholics.                                 Id., ¶61.

In the majority's view, Catholic Charities' religious practices

resemble secular social services too much.                              Id., ¶¶63-64, 66.

The majority's "test" compares the nonprofit's activities to an
arbitrary       list        of      stereotypical          religious        activities       to

determine      whether        the      activities       are     sufficiently       religious.

Id.,   ¶100     (explaining            that     activities       like    those     listed   in

Dykema are more likely to be "religious in nature" in the eyes

of the court).

       ¶177 The        majority's         test        overtly    discriminates        against

Catholic Charities because they follow Catholic doctrine.                                    As

Catholic       Charities         explain,       Catholic        doctrine     commands     they
engage in charity without limiting their assistance to fellow

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Catholics       and    bars    them       from        proselytizing          when       conducting

charitable acts.              Under the Free Exercise Clause, the state

cannot condition a benefit upon the abandonment of religious

practices.           The majority puts Catholic Charities to a choice:

They may receive the tax exemption by violating their religious

beliefs or they can conduct their operations in accordance with

their faith and forgo the exemption.                         Conditioning a benefit in

this manner burdens the free exercise of religion.                                         Trinity

Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 462.

       ¶178 The              majority's                 primarily-religious-in-nature-

activities test poses a particular danger for minority faiths.

The majority's conception of what constitutes activities that

are    "religious       in    nature"        reflects          a    narrow     view       of    what

religious practice looks like.                        Many amici submitted briefs to

this    court    explaining         how      a    test      like     the     majority's        will

discriminate against minority faiths.

       ¶179 The       brief    of   the      International            Society       for    Krishna

Consciousness          and    the     Sikh       Coalition          ("the    Coalition")          is
particularly illuminating.                  It notes that government officials

are less likely to be familiar with minority faith traditions,

and therefore may perceive minority religious practices as less

"religious       in      nature"       than           the    activities            of     majority

religions.24         The Coalition identifies many activities central to

their       faiths    but    likely    to        fail    the       majority's       test,      which

compares a nonprofit's activities to a list of stereotypical

       Amicus
       24        Br.    International    Society                               for         Krishna
Consciousness and the Sikh Coalition, at 11.

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(and largely Protestant) religious activities, because the list

is derived from a "Western" understanding of religion.25                             For

example, adherents of Hare Krishna have a religious practice

called "Prasadam," during which adherents prepare food, offer it

to their deity, and distribute it to the general population.26

Sikhs     have    a     religious     practice      of    providing      a   community

kitchen, "serving free meals and allowing people of all faiths

to break bread together."27                 According to the Coalition, this

practice     is       "foundation[al]       to    the    Sikh   way     of   life;    it

represents the principle of equality among all people regardless

of religion . . . ."28            The Coalition rightly worries that these

religious practices will be characterized by courts as "secular

in nature" under the majority's test.

     ¶180 State          actors     cannot       treat   one    faith's      religious

practices as "religious in nature" and another's practices as

"secular in nature."          Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67,

70 (1953) ("To call the words which one minister speaks to his

congregation a sermon, immune from regulation, and the words of
another minister an address, subject to regulation, is merely an

indirect way of preferring one religion over another.").                             The

United     States       Supreme     Court    subjects      such   overt      religious

discrimination to strict scrutiny.                  See, e.g., Espinoza, 140 S.

     25   Id. at 11-13.
     26   Id. at 12-13.
     27   Id. at 13.
     28   Id.

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Ct.     at      2278     (Gorsuch,             J.,     concurring)           (stating       "any

discrimination against religious exercise must meet the demands

of    strict    scrutiny").            A     government       policy      satisfies      strict

scrutiny only if it "advances 'interests of the highest order'

and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests."                               Fulton v.

City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 541 (2021) (quoting Church

of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546).                         "That standard 'is not watered

down'; it 'really means what it says.'"                            Tandon v. Newsom, 593

U.S. 61, 65 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting Church of Lukumi, 508

U.S.    at   546).       As       scholars      have        noted,   however,      "'[i]t    is

difficult       to     imagine         the      circumstances            under    which     the

government would have a compelling need to prefer some religions

over others."          Richard F. Duncan, The Clearest Command of the

Establishment          Clause:         Denominational             Preferences,      Religious

Liberty,     and     Public       Scholarships         that       Classify    Religions,      55

S.D. L. Rev. 390, 392 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting

Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional

Law: Substance and Procedure 14 (3d ed. 1999)); see also Church
of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 578-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the

judgment)      (arguing       a    law     that      discriminates        against       religion

automatically fails strict scrutiny because such a law in not

narrowly tailored "by definition").

       ¶181 LIRC does not even suggest the state has a compelling

interest        in     denying           the      exemption          under       Wis.      Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2.         in       a    manner       that     discriminates        among     the

various      faiths.          LIRC,        like       the     majority,      misunderstands
Catholic       Charities'         asserted      burden       on    the   free    exercise    of

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their religion.           LIRC believes the asserted burden is paying a

tax.     In response to this misconception of Catholic Charities'

claim, LIRC asserts the whole of Wis. Stat. ch. 108 is justified

by   the    compelling      interest        in    "providing         broad      unemployment

insurance access to workers . . . ."                         LIRC then argues the law

is   narrowly     tailored       because     "it        is    impossible        to   construct

workable tax laws that account for the 'myriad of religious

beliefs.'"         LIRC's       arguments        miss    the      mark.         Under    strict

scrutiny,        LIRC     needed       to   provide           a    compelling          interest

justifying the discrimination between religions.                                 See Fulton,

593 U.S. at 541; Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1269.                                  LIRC

failed to do so.            This court cannot invent justifications for

the state to save the statute from unconstitutionality.                                       See

Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1268 ("We cannot and will not

uphold     a    statute    that    abridges        an        enumerated      constitutional

right      on   the     basis     of   a    factitious            governmental         interest

. . . .");       Redeemed       Christian    Church          of   God   (Victory        Temple)

Bowie v. Prince George's Cnty., 17 F.4th 497, 510-11 (4th Cir.
2021) (citation omitted) ("To survive strict scrutiny review,

the government must show that pursuit of its compelling interest

was the actual reason for its challenged action."); Kennedy v.

Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507,                           543 n.8 (2022) (quoting

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)) (noting

"'justification[s]' for interfering with First Amendment rights

'must    be     genuine,    not    hypothesized              or   invented      post    hoc   in

response to litigation'").                  In the absence of any compelling
interest to justify the state's discrimination among religions,

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§ 108.02(15)(h)2.,         as   interpreted        by     the     majority,          cannot

survive strict scrutiny.

      ¶182 This case illustrates the interconnection between the

right to free exercise and the Constitution's bar on religious

establishments.          Citizens are inhibited from freely practicing

their faiths when the government doles out benefits or imposes

penalties on the basis of religious practice.                        As Justice Neil

Gorsuch explained:

      The First Amendment protects religious uses and
      actions for good reason.   What point is it to tell a
      person that he is free to be Muslim but he may be
      subject to discrimination for doing what his religion
      commands, attending Friday prayers, living his daily
      life in harmony with the teaching of his faith, and
      educating his children in its ways? What does it mean
      to tell an Orthodox Jew that she may have her religion
      but may be targeted for observing her religious
      calendar?   Often, governments lack effective ways to
      control what lies in a person's heart or mind.     But
      they can bring to bear enormous power over what people
      say and do.    The right to be religious without the
      right to do religious things would hardly amount to a
      right at all.
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2277 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).                                 The
"free    competition        between      religions"           protected         by     the

Establishment Clause requires "that every denomination . . . be

equally at liberty to exercise and propagate its beliefs.                               But

such equality would be impossible in an atmosphere of official

denominational      preference."        Larson,         456   U.S.     at    245.       The

Religion Clauses "make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and

creeds   as   the    spiritual        needs   of    man       deem     necessary"        by

"sponsor[ing] an attitude on the part of government that shows
no   partiality     to    any   one   group   and   that        lets   each     flourish

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according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its

dogma."             Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.                   "Free exercise thus can be

guaranteed only when legislators——and voters——are required to

accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to

small, new, or unpopular denominations."                                 Larson, 456 U.S. at

245.

          ¶183 While the Free Exercise Clause does not require the

state          to    provide        a     tax    exemption       to   religious            nonprofits,

"[w]hat benefits the government decides to give, whether meager

or    munificent,              it    must       give     without      discrimination           against

religious conduct."                     Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2277 (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring).              In our constitutional order, there are no second-

class religions or religious practices.                                 The Religion Clauses

bar       discrimination                against        religious      status,     beliefs,          and

practices:                "Eliminating             [religious]         discrimination            means

eliminating all of it."                         See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.

v.    President           &    Fellows      of     Harvard      Coll.,    600    U.S.        181,   206

(2023).             The majority errs by inventing and operationalizing a
test that discriminates against Catholic Charities' religious

practices——and those of many faith traditions going forward.

          ¶184 The protection against religious preferences embodied

in the First Amendment is even more explicit in the Wisconsin

Constitution, which bars the state from giving "any preference .

.     .    by       law       to    any    religious          establishments          or    modes   of

worship."29            Wis. Const. art. I, § 18; Coulee Cath. Schs., 320

       Article I,
          29                        section        18    of    the    Wisconsin        Constitution
provides in full:

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Wis.        2d   275,    ¶60    (explaining         the    Wisconsin       Constitution

"provid[es] expansive protections for religious liberty" beyond

what the First Amendment provides).                  As this court proclaimed in

Weiss,       Article     I,   section   18    of    the    Wisconsin       Constitution,

sometimes called the No Preference Clause,30 "probably furnished

a more complete bar to any preference for, or discrimination

against, any religious sect, organization, or society than any

other state in the Union."              State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of

Sch. Dist. No. 8 of City of Edgerton, 76 Wis. 177, 208, 44 N.W.

967 (1890) (Cassoday, J., concurring).31

       ¶185 The          majority's      interpretation            of      Wis.      Stat.

§ 108.02(15)(h)2. blatantly violates the No Preference Clause.

In   Weiss,       this    court    explained        that     the   phrase       "modes   of

worship"         is   capacious,      embracing       "any     and      every     mode   of

worshiping the Almighty God."                     Id. at 211-12.            It includes

       The right of every person to worship Almighty God
       according to the dictates of conscience shall never be
       infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to
       attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
       maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any
       control of, or interference with, the rights of
       conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by
       law to any religious establishments or modes of
       worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the
       treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or
       religious or theological seminaries.

       King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 185 Wis. 2d 25, 61, 517 N.W.2d
       30

671 (1994) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).

       While the discussion appears in the concurring opinion of
       31

Justice Cassoday, it was on a subject expressly reserved for his
consideration, which makes it the opinion of the court.    State
ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 165 n.3, 115 N.W.2d
761 (1962).

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"'the performance of all those external acts, and the observance

of those rites and ceremonies, in which men engage with the

professed and sole view of honoring God.'"                     Id. at 212 (listing

additional dictionary definitions).                  Because the statute, under

the majority's interpretation, provides benefits for religiously

affiliated nonprofits that engage in activities the court deems

"religious in nature," it prefers some modes of worship over

others.    Catholic Charities explained that charitable works are

a form of worship for Catholics, who may not proselytize while

engaged in acts of charity.              The majority denies the exemption

to Catholic Charities because they did not engage in other modes

of worship, like proselytizing.                   The majority's test prefers

some types of worship (e.g., proselytizing) over others (e.g.,

religiously motivated charity).

      ¶186 Instead      of    addressing       the    Wisconsin       Constitution's

impact on this case, the majority dodges the issue, dismissing

it in a footnote as "undeveloped."                  Majority op., ¶3 n.4.             But

that is not true.          The Wisconsin Legislature, as amicus curiae,
thoroughly      explains     in   its    brief      why   a    test    like     the   one

employed   by    the    majority       violates     the   No   Preference        Clause.

That clause "operate[s] as a perpetual bar to the state . . .

giving . . . any preference by law to any religious sect or mode

of   worship."         Weiss,     76    Wis.   at    210-11.          The    majority's

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preference for some religious practices over others violates the

Wisconsin Constitution.32

                             B.    Religious Entanglement

       ¶187 The       Establishment         Clause    provides,       "Congress         shall

make    no    law    respecting      an     establishment       of    religion,"         U.S.

Const. amend. I, and "prohibits the excessive entanglement of

the state in religious matters."                    St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis.

2d 92, ¶42 (citing L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 686, 563

N.W.2d      434    (1997)).        The     Establishment      Clause      precludes       the

state       from    making    "intrusive          judgments    regarding         contested

questions of religious belief or practice."                           Colo. Christian

Univ., 534 F.3d. at 1261.                  "[T]he Religion Clauses protect the

right of churches and other religious institutions to decide

matters of faith and doctrine without government intrusion . . .

and any attempt by government to dictate or even to influence

such matters . . . constitute[s] one of the central attributes

of an establishment of religion."                  Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v.

Morrissey-Berru,          591 U.S. ___,           140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020)
(internal citations and quotations marks omitted).

       ¶188 Civil         courts     may     answer    only     factual      and        legal

questions;         they   lack     any   authority     or     competency      to    answer

theological         questions.       Presbyterian       Church       in   U.S.     v.    Mary

Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,

       Because the majority dodges the religious discrimination
       32

issues presented by its test, litigants likely will bring such
claims in the future, forcing the majority to admit its error.
"This decision might as well be written on the dissolving paper
sold in magic shops." Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S.
522, 551 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).

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445-47,    449-50      (1969).           As     James      Madison       explained         in    his

Memorial and Remonstrance, the idea that a "Civil Magistrate is

a    competent    Judge     of     Religious         truth    .    .     .   is    an     arrogant

pretension"       that      has    been       "falsified"          by     history.           James

Madison,        Memorial          and         Remonstrance             Against          Religious

Assessments, reproduced in Everson, 330 U.S. at 67 (appendix to

dissent    of     Rutledge,        J.).          The       majority's        opinion       proves

Madison's thesis.           The majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. §

108.02(15)(h)2. not only encourages excessive entanglement with

religion, it compels such entanglement.

       ¶189 The        majority's         requirement             that       a      nonprofit's

activities be primarily "religious in nature" forces courts to

answer debatable theological questions courts have no authority

to answer.       The majority's test requires courts to decide what

activities are sufficiently religious to qualify as "religious

in    nature."        The    First       Amendment         bars    the       government         from

ranking activities on a scale from least to most religious.                                      See

Thomas,    450       U.S.   at     714    ("The       determination           of    what     is    a
'religious'       belief      or       practice       is    more        often      than    not     a

difficult and delicate task . . . .                        However, the resolution of

that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the

particular      belief      or    practice       in     question;        religious         beliefs

need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible

to    others    in    order       to    merit    First       Amendment           protection.").

"Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation," and this

court cannot choose which religiously motivated actions are, in
their essence, religious.                 Id. at 716.             A court cannot decide

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whether an organization primarily conducts activities that are

"religious in nature" without violating the First Amendment.

       ¶190 Determining whether an organization's activities are

primarily       "religious       in     nature"     will       lead       to    examining       the

activities      performed        by    nonprofits,         which      will      be     forced      to

prove     whether        their     religiously            motivated            activities       are

sufficiently       religious.            "What      makes      the     application            of    a

religious-secular distinction difficult is that the character of

an   activity     is     not     self-evident.            As    a    result,         determining

whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching

case-by-case      analysis.            This    results      in      considerable            ongoing

government entanglement in religious affairs."                                 Amos, 483 U.S.

at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Espinosa v.

Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 481 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 951

(1982).

       ¶191 For     example,          religious      schools        will        be     forced      to

defend    the    religious        nature      of    textbooks,        class          instruction,

examinations,       fieldtrips,          employees,         students,            parents,       and
more.        "[T]his      sort     of    detailed         inquiry         into       the    subtle

implications        of     in-class        examinations             and        other       teaching

activities would itself constitute a significant encroachment on

the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."                                           New

York    v.   Cathedral         Acad.,    434       U.S.    125,      132       (1977).         "The

prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does

or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the

constitutional                   guarantee                  against                     religious
establishment . . . ."                Id. at 133; accord Presbyterian Church

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in U.S., 393 U.S. at 449 ("First Amendment values are plainly

jeopardized       when . . . litigation                  is    made        to     turn       on   the

resolution    by        civil     courts     of        controversies            over        religious

doctrine     and        practice.").               The        intrusive          inquiries        the

majority's test demands may recur.                       While a court initially may

deem a nonprofit's activities primarily "religious in nature,"

the nonprofit may later lose its exempt status.                                 See Walz v. Tax

Comm'n,     397    U.S.     664,       673    (1970)          ("Qualification               for   tax

exemption    is     not    perpetual         or    immutable[.]").                    The    majority

gives the state license to monitor whether nonprofits fail to

hit   the   proper        ratio    of    activities            that       are     "religious       in

nature" to "secular in nature." "'[P]ervasive monitoring' for

'the subtle or overt presence of religious matter' is a central

danger    against        which    [the     Court       has]        held    the        Establishment

Clause guards."            See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 694

(1989)    (citations        omitted).             To   force       religious           entities    to

repeatedly        satisfy        the     state         that        their        activities        are

"religious in nature" is anathema to the First Amendment.
      ¶192 The             majority's                  primarily-religious-in-nature-

activities        test     puts     state         officials          and        courts       in   the

constitutionally           tenuous       position             of     second-guessing              the

religious significance and character of a nonprofit's actions.

Catholic     Charities            strenuously            maintain          their        charitable

activities        are      religious         and         central          to      their       faith.

Nevertheless,            this      court          rejects           Catholic            Charities'

understanding       of      the     religious           significance             of     their     own
activities, insisting those activities are actually "secular in

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nature."      The First Amendment forbids such second-guessing and

recharacterization of Catholic Charities' activities.                           Lyng, 485

U.S. at 457-58 ("[T]he dissent's approach would require us to

rule   that    some    religious        adherents      misunderstand          their     own

religious beliefs.         We think such an approach cannot be squared

with the Constitution or with our precedents, and that it would

cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to

play.");   Thomas,       450    U.S.    at    716    ("[I]t      is   not     within    the

judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the

petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the

commands of their common faith.").

       ¶193 The    entanglement         occasioned         by     the       impermissible

second-guessing of sincere religious claims is compounded by the

majority's     claim     that    what    constitutes        an    activity       that    is

"religious in nature" "may be different for different faiths."

Majority op., ¶55.         The majority has already made clear it will

not take nonprofits at their word that their activities are

"religious in nature."           For what constitutes an activity that is
"religious in nature" to change from religion to religion, the

court must study the doctrines of the various faiths and decide

for itself what religious practices are actually religious.                             The

Constitution      bars    civil        courts       from   such       intrusions       into

spiritual affairs.             Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979)

(stating civil courts are barred from "resolving . . . disputes

on the basis of religious doctrine and practice").                              "Plainly,

the First Amendment forbids civil courts from" "determin[ing]
matters at the very core of a religion——the interpretation of

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particular        church      doctrines    and     the    importance         of    those

doctrines to the religion."               Presbyterian Church in U.S., 393

U.S. at 450.            The majority opinion strikes at the heart of

religious autonomy.

       ¶194 The majority denies Catholic Charities the exemption

under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. in part because they employ

and   serve    those     of    other   religions.        This    is    not    a   lawful

criterion.         Courts are not allowed to determine who is and is

not a co-religionist.            "[W]ho or what is Catholic . . . is an

inquiry that the government cannot make."                   Holy Trinity, 82 Wis.

2d at 150-51.           Deciding who is and is not a co-religionist is

plagued     with       entanglement    problems.          Are    those       no   longer

practicing a faith co-religionists?                    Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at

2069.       Who decides?         "Would the test depend on whether the

person in question no longer considered himself or herself to be

a member of a particular faith?                   Or would the test turn on

whether     the    faith      tradition   in     question      still    regarded     the

person as a member in some sense?"                 Id.    "What characteristics,
professions of faith, or doctrinal tenets render a [person] part

of a particular denomination?             The statute doesn't tell us, and

it would be unconstitutional for any state actor, including a

court, to resolve the question."                 St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis.

2d    92,   ¶138    (Rebecca     Grassl   Bradley,       J.,    dissenting).         Who

constitutes        a    co-religionist     is      a     religious,      not      legal,

question.         Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1264-65 (noting

such a question "requires [the state] to wade into issues of
religious contention").

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       ¶195 Whether a nonprofit engages in religious education or

"imbue[s] program participants with the Catholic faith" presents

additional entanglement problems.                       Majority op., ¶60.                 The court

must decide what constitutes religious education and evangelism—

—religious         questions        whose       answers     will    vary       from        faith        to

faith.       Does conducting charity as an illustration of the love

of    one's    deity      count?          What     about    engaging       in       a    commercial

enterprise to illustrate one's faith applied to daily life?                                            See

Golden Rule Church Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719.                          "What principle of law

or    logic    can      be    brought      to    bear     to   contradict           a    believer's

assertion that a particular act" educates others about his faith

and acts as a form of proselytizing or evangelism?                                       See Smith,

494     U.S.       at     887.         Whether          activities       are         "'[religious

education]'         or       mere     'education'          depends       as     much         on        the

observer's point of view as on any objective evaluation of the

educational         activity."            Colo.    Christian        Univ.,      534        F.2d.        at

1263.       "The First Amendment does not permit government officials

to    sit     as    judges       of    the       'indoctrination'          quotient"              of     a
nonprofit.          Id.       Similar problems abound with the majority's

declaration         that      activities          involving        worship          services           and

religious      ceremonies           are     more       "religious     in      nature."                 See

Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 633-34 (2d Cir.

2020)       ("The       government        must     normally        refrain          from         making

assumptions         about      what     religious         worship     requires.").                     The

majority's         criteria         invite       the    state      and     courts           to     make

religious determinations and second-guess the sincere assertions
of religiosity of those operating nonprofits.

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    ¶196 The       majority     does   not     deny    its        inquiry        entangles

church   and    state,   but    simply     asserts         that    the       entanglement

occasioned by its misreading of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. is

"inherent in any statutory scheme that offers tax exemption to

religious      entities"33——a    preposterous         claim       in     light      of   the

majority's     failure   to     properly      interpret       the       statute,     which

simply requires the nonprofit's motivations be religious.34                              The

majority    believes     its    consideration         of    whether          a   nonprofit

primarily    performs    activities      "religious         in    nature"         does   not

unduly entangle government and religion because its inquiry is a

"neutral    and    secular     inquiry     based      on    objective            criteria."

Majority op., ¶86.        But there is nothing neutral, secular, or

objective about the majority's test for whether activities are

"religious in nature."           The majority's test asks whether the

activities are similar——in some undefined and arbitrary way——to

stereotypical religious activities listed in a Seventh Circuit

decision, which made the list up from whole cloth.                                See id.,

¶100 (stating that "if one of the religiously motivated sub-
entities in this case partook in activities such as those cited

by the Dykema court as indicative of a religious purpose" the

court would be more likely to decide it is operated primarily

    33   Majority op., ¶86.
    34 The majority claims that without an examination of a
nonprofit's activities, it wouldn't be possible for a nonprofit
to qualify for a tax exemption premised on a "religious
purposes" requirement.    See id., ¶93 (citing Ecclesiastical
Order of Ism of Am, Inc. v. Chasin, 653 F. Supp. 1200, 1205
(E.D. Mich. 1986)).   Of course, the court could simply accept
Catholic Charities' sincere claims that they operate for
religious purposes.

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for religious purposes).              The test does not "rel[y] exclusively

on objective, well-established concepts of . . . law familiar to

lawyers and judges."             Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.                        Instead, it

relies upon each justice's subjective sense of what is genuinely

religious and what is not.

      ¶197 While       the    majority       does      not    ask    "whether         [Catholic

Charities] are 'Catholic' enough to qualify for the exemption,"

majority op., ¶85, the majority improperly entangles itself with

religion     by     asking      whether       Catholic         Charities'           concededly

religious activities are sufficiently religious.                            The majority's

protestation that its decision doesn't "intrude on questions of

religious dogma"35 is dystopian——"a manner of Orwellian newspeak

by which 'religious' means something other than 'religious.'"

St.   Augustine       Sch.,     398    Wis.       2d    92,    ¶141       (Rebecca      Grassl

Bradley, J., dissenting).               The majority doesn't simply answer

"'delicate' questions," majority op., ¶87, it treads where the

Constitution forbids the judiciary from intruding.

                                  IV.       CONCLUSION
      ¶198 The        majority's        decision         constitutes            a     profound

overreach     of     the     judicial       power.           The    majority         radically

transforms Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., which provides a tax

exemption     for     nonprofits       managed         primarily         for    a    religious

reason     "and     operated,    supervised,           controlled,         or       principally

supported      by     a    church      or     convention            or    association        of

churches[.]"         Finding the exemption too broad as a matter of

policy, the majority excludes nonprofits it deems insufficiently

      35   Id., ¶87.

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religious.    As newly interpreted, the statute violates the First

Amendment    and   the   Wisconsin      Constitution.       The    majority's

primarily-religious-in-nature-activities            test     embodies        an

unlawful    preference   for    some   religious   practices      and   thereby

discriminates against others.          The test also requires courts to

answer     theological   questions      well   beyond      the    judiciary's

purview.     The majority exercises the power of the legislature,

rewriting § 108.02(15)(h)2., and proclaims itself the arbiter of

what is and is not religious.           Whatever authority the majority

believes it possesses to assume these roles is not found in the

Wisconsin Constitution.        I respectfully dissent.

    ¶199 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE

KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins ¶¶110-61 and ¶¶163-98 of this dissent.

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      ¶200 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.       (dissenting).     Although I would

not reach the constitutional questions and do not sign onto

every point in the analysis, I agree with the construction of

the   statute   in   Justice   Rebecca   Grassl   Bradley's      thoughtful

dissent.     I also agree with the excellent discussion of the

majority's   misplaced   reliance   on   the   remedial   statute    canon.

Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent, ¶¶154-58.             There is no

particular reason to assume a statutory exemption in an area

like religious freedom——a constitutionally protected category to

which the law regularly gives wide latitude——should be construed

narrowly.    I respectfully dissent.

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