Court Opinion

ID: 9833926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:08:57.839972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:09.226075
License: Public Domain

On Motion for rehearing.
The appellee challenges the holding of this court in stating there was a cause of action asserted against Katherina Borchers in the cause in which the original judgment was rendered. Now, let us ascertain if there was. It alleges:
“For cause of action plaintiff says heretofore, to wit, on the 2d day of April, A. D. 1914, defendants Henry Borchers and Kather.ina Bor-ehers executed and delivered to said S. E. Dowdy their promissory note in words and figures substantially as follows.
“ ‘$406.00. San Antonio, April 2, 1914.
“ ‘On October 1, 1914, after date, for value received, I, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of S. E. Dowdy at the office of W. A. Wurzbaeh, in San Antonio, Texas, the sum of four hundred and six dollars ($406.00) in gold, with interest from date hereof until maturity at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum, and 10 per cent, per annum after maturity, interest payable maturity, with 10 per cent, attorney’s fees on the principal and interest if this note is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, or if collected by suit or through administration or bankruptcy proceedings upon the estate of payor.
“ ‘In case default is made in payment of this note or any installment of interest when due, then this note, and all the notes of even date herewith, shall become due and payable at the option of the payee or legal holder thereof. Deferred payments of' interest shall bear interest at the rate of 10 per cent, per annum.
“ ‘This note is secured by a chattel mortgage on the following described furniture: One brass bed with mattress; one carpet; one washstand; one dresser; one chiffonier; one dressing table; one rocking chair, all of bird’s-eye maple; five chairs; one sofa;, one table; one big carpet; two small rocking chairs; two small rugs; one curtain; all the linoleum in the house at No. 330 Marlborough place, in the city of San Antonio, Bexar county, Texas.
“ ‘[Signed!) Henry Borchers.
“ ‘Katherina Borchers.’
“And to secure said note defendants Henry Borchers and Katherina Borchers executed and delivered to said S. E. Dowdy their certain mortgage on the property above described, said mortgage being of even date with said note, wherein and whereby said Henry Borchers and Katherina Borchers became bound and obligated to pay the sum of money and interest and attorney’s fees named in said note. •
*1056“That interest on said note has been paid up to the 29th day of December, A. D. 1914, and there is now due on same the principal sum of $406, and interest from the 29th day of December, A. D. 1914, at the rate of 10 per cent, per annum.
“The defendants were often requested to pay said principal and interest, but have failed to pay same or any part of it. And by reason of default of defendants payment of said note plaintiff has been compelled to place same in the hands of an attorney for collection, to wit, Ben P. Lane, an attorney of San Antonio, Tex., and has agreed to pay the said attorney the attorney’s fee stipulated on said note, to wit, 30 per cent., wherein and whefeby the defendants are bound and obligated to pay said 10 per .cent, attorney’s fees.
“By reason of said mortgage plaintiff has valid and subsisting lien upon the property above described and is entitled to have same foreclosed.
“Therefore plaintiff prays that defendants be cited to appear at the next regular term of this honorable court and answer this petition, and that on final hearing thereof she have judgment against defendants Henry Borehers and ICatherina Borehers, as principals, and S. E. Dowdy, as surety, for her debt in the sum of $406 principal, and interest at the rate of 10 per cent, per annum from the 29th day of December, A. D. 1914, together with 10 per cent, on the amount of said principal and interest as attorney’s fees and for costs of court, and for foreclosure on said chattel mortgage, and for such and other and further relief, both in law and equity, to which she may be justly entitled.”
Now, if this does not state a canse of action, it will be very difficult to plead one merely on a joint obligation. If this is not a complete answer to appellee’s contention, then read the supplemental petition in the same case as to what is alleged as an estoppel pleaded, setting up the agreement of the said defendants to secure an extension of the note for 90 days:
“ ‘In consideration of the extension of our note of $406.00 made April 1, 1914, to S. E. Dowdy, and now due, we agree to pay you $10.00 for your legal services, pay the interest up to date in the sum of $16.32, and pay ninety days’ interest in advance at 10 per cent.., in the sum of $10.15, same aggregating $36.39, which we agree to pay October 3, 1914, and we agree to promptly pay the holder of the note entire principal of said note amounting to $400.-00, ninety days from this date.
“ ‘[Signed] Henry Borehers.
“ ‘[Signed] K. Borehers.’
“And plaintiff pleads said agreement as an estoppel to defendants’ attempted plea of failure of consideration.
“And plaintiff further pleads the same as a binding contract and agreement on the part of the defendants to pay said note at the time set out in said contract, to wit, 90 days from the 1st day of October, A. D. 1914, and an extension- of 90 days was granted defendants in consideration of said promise and payment of interest..
“That plaintiff acquired said note sued on .herein from a bona fide' innocent purchaser for ■ a valuable consideration, who acquired said : note before the maturity thereof, and with- ■ out notice of any of the alleged defenses there■to, attempted to be set up in defendants’ answer, and that she is entitled to all the rights of such innocent purchaser.”
We cannot see how appellee can, in the face of the pleading itself, a reference to which they invoke, contend for a single moment that there was no pleading or service in the case upon her, and that such judgment was void.
The appellee contends the holding is in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court and other cases in this state, and cites in support of her position Shaw v. Proctor (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 1104, contending we overruled the cases of Trimble v. Miller, 24 Tex. 214, Covington v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 368, Menard v. Sydnor, 29 Tex. 257, and Haynes v. Stovall, 23 Tex. 625, in which appellee asserts in the motion that in all those eases the petitions were just such as theirs. If they were, still the questions decided in all except the Shaw Case were raised on a direct appeal. Harris v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 79 (not in point).
Since writing the opinion in this ease we have written an elaborate opinion in the case of the Edinburg Irrigation Co. et al. v. A. Ledbetter et al., where we discuss very similar questions on collateral attacks upon judgments.
In the Shaw Case, supra, the basis of the judgment attacked was that it was based upon a promissory note executed by Nettie Temple Proctor and her son, Louis E. Proctor, she being a married woman at the time, and she did not execute the note with the knowledge or consent of her husband, Ered J. Proctor. It -was not for necessaries nor for the benefit of herself or children, but as an accommodation to her son in a business transaction. In such cases the statute provides, among other things:
“Wife shall never be the joint maker of a note or a surety on any bond or obligation of another without the joinder of her husband with her in making such contract.” Art. 4624, Vernon’s Sayles’.
Such obligations of the wife without the joinder of the husband are void. They are in the very teeth of the statute, and are invalid obligations, and that is all that is held in the cited eases.
The case of Trimble v. Miller, cited supra, is not in point. This case was disposed of on an appeal and judgment reversed and cause remanded because the petition failed to disclose that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the. wife’s separate property, or any other fact that would authorize a judgment against her. To the same effect is the case of Haynes v. Stovall, cited supra.
Precisely to the same effect is the case of *1057Covington v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 368, cited supra by appellee. In part it cites the Trimble Case as an authority for the holding. This case was decided on a direct appeal from the judgment. To the same effect is the case of Menard v. Sydnor, cited supra by appellees. This was a direct appeal from the judgment, and it was held:
“It appears very clearly that Virginia Menard, one of the plaintiffs in error, was, at the date of the- execution of the deed of trust which is the foundation of this suit, and at the time this judgment was rendered, a feme covert, the wife of her coplaintiff in error, and this judgment is rendered against her generally, and execution authorized to issue as well against her as against A. B. Menard, her husband,, for such amount as may be left unpaid by the sale of the land.
“It is not pretended that there is any such allegation of facts in the petition as would make the debt sued for a charge on the separate estate of Mrs. Menard, without which, it is well settled, a general judgment against her cannot be sustained. Lynch v. Elkes, 21 Tex. 230; Trimble v. Miller, 24 Tex. 215; Haynes v. Stovall, 23 Tex. 625.”
If this cause bad been a direct appeal from the judgment, as it was in the above-cited cases, and the suit shown to be in a joint obligation of the wife and the husband or an obligation not for the benefit'of her separate estate and children, it would not have stood, and the relief here would have been the same as held in the cases cited.
This cause presents an attack upon a voidable judgment not on appeal, and there is no similar case cited where the husband and wife are sued upon their joint obligation, that the judgment is void.
Of course, if we are in conflict with, or are overruling, our Supreme Court, as is vigorously contended, then a writ of error would no doubt be granted. But we do not so view the matter, and, as there is nothing new presented that we have not already considered, we adhere to our original opinion, and the motion is overruled.