Court Opinion

ID: 9644903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:08:15.253759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:19.840986
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
This opinion supplements the opinion of this Court dated June 9, 1987. Triland Investment Group, Jenncorp International, Stylus Holdings, Inc., Bright Hill Development and Realtron Holdings, Inc. (all referred to as Triland) along with Vista Mortgage & Realty, Inc., and L & N Land Corporation (both referred to as Vista) and Elvin Ray Warren (Warren) filed Motions for Rehearing. Since we find no merit in Triland’s and Warren’s motions, they are DENIED. To the extent that this Court awards $76,271.00 as attorney’s fees under the indemnity agreement to Vista and against Triland, Vista’s motion is GRANTED. All other requests by Vista are DENIED.
In this case, Vista not only asserted a claim for attorneys’ fees under an indemnity agreement (a contract), but also asserted a claim for damages for fraud (a tort) against Triland. In an instructed verdict, the trial court awarded Vista attorneys’ fees, stipulated to be $76,271.00, against Triland under the indemnity agreement. In addition, in response to special issues, the jury awarded Vista $76,000 in actual damages and $750,000 in punitive damages on its fraud claim. From the record and statement of facts before us, it appears that, on its tort action, Vista’s evidence of the amount of its actual damages consisted solely of the attorneys’ fees it incurred as a result of this suit. These attorneys’ fees were identical to the fees stipulated by the parties and made a part of the trial court’s instructed verdict on the indemnity agreement.
Although a party may assert any and all causes of action it may have against another, it will be limited to only one recovery of damages. TEX.R.CIV.P. 48; Jones v. Rainey, 168 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1942, writ ref’d). Consequently, when the court rendered judgment, Vista was required to elect only one recovery. The trial court’s judgment awarded Vista $826,271.00 against Triland. *28It appears from the amount of this judgment that Vista elected the contract recovery of $76,271.00, but it was also awarded exemplary damages of $750,000.00 based on its fraud claim. That this was an improper election was not raised by any party to this appeal. We note, however, that it is settled law in this state that one cannot recover exemplary damages for a cause of action based on contract. Texas National Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.1986) (per curiam); Jim Walter Homes, Inc., v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1981). Vista was entitled to elect either $76,271.00 on the contract claim or $826,000.00 ($76,-000.00 + $750,000.00) on the fraud claim.
Under the facts of this case, because this Court reversed the trial court’s award for fraud and rendered a take nothing judgment for Vista, nothing now hinders Vista in asserting its claim for the contract damages.4 See Chesshir v. First State Bank of Morton, 620 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.1981). With all findings necessary to the resolution of this case being before the Court, this Court is authorized to render the judgment which should have been rendered in the trial court. TEX.R.APP.P. 80(b). Consequently, we hold that the judgment of this Court dated June 9, 1987, should be vacated and a new judgment rendered.
To the extent that the trial court’s judgment awards Vista damages in the amount of $826,271.00 for fraud including exemplary damages against Triland, it is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED for Triland. The portions of the trial court’s judgment awarding Warren $114,-000.00 plus attorneys’ fees against Vista and Triland and awarding Vista indemnity against Triland for these amounts are AFFIRMED. To the extent that the trial court’s judgment awards Vista damages in the amount of $826,271.00 against Triland under the indemnity agreement, it is REFORMED to award $76,271.00 to Vista and against Triland and, as reformed, is AFFIRMED.

. Throughout this litigation, Vista has consistently asserted a claim to its attorneys’ fees on the basis of the indemnity agreement. While Triland has contested the application of the indemnity agreement to the facts of this case on various grounds, until its response to Vista’s motion for rehearing, Triland did not contend that the indemnity agreement, if applicable, failed to authorize attorneys’ fees as awarded to Vista by the trial court. In general, matters presented for the first time in a motion for rehearing cannot be considered. See Watson v. Glens Falls Insurance Company, 505 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.1974); McGuire v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 561 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st dist.] 1977, no writ). Furthermore, our own review of the language of the indemnity agreement suggests that it is sufficiently broad to support the trial court’s conclusion that the indemnity agreement encompasses Vista's attorneys’ fees.