Court Opinion

ID: 9720773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:41:11.304778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.210097
License: Public Domain

SIMS, J.
I concur in the decision reversing the convictions on counts 1 and 2. It is clear that Vehicle Code section 23102 proscribes “any act.” The question of “bodily injury’ is only of materiality in that it aggravates the offense. The fact that there are several victims cannot transform the single act into multiple offenses.
I dissent from the decision insofar as it reverses the convictions and sentences on counts 5 and 6.
Although the instructions in this case did not contain the refinements engrafted on the statutory law by People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225], and applied in People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389 [93 Cal.Rptr. 721, 482 P.2d 633], I do not find any prejudice in that omission.
Adcock was forced at what he thought was gunpoint to transport the defendant and himself for an appreciable distance. The jury rejected the prosecution’s theory that such transportation was for the purpose’ of robbery. It apparently then was for the purpose of securing transportation for either the stated purpose of going to a hospital other than that to which the victim was willing to take the defendant, or for the purpose of enabling the defendant to escape criminal responsibility for the accident (Veh. Code, § 20001). Since the point is not raised I do not venture an opinion as to whether the defendant can be sentenced for both simple kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 209), and felony hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20001) when the former is committed with the intent and objective of accomplishing the latter. In any event they are separate offenses and authorize separate convictions.
The jury’s verdicts establish that the robbery of Adcock was apparently an afterthought, and not related to the kidnaping so the defendant may be convicted and sentenced for both kidnaping and robbery.
Although it cannot be said as a matter of law that the kidnaping of Mrs. Geer was a kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, there was ample evidence to sustain that finding. It does appear that she was forced to move an appreciable distance, and it is incomprehensible to me that a jury could possibly find that she was not subjected to an increased risk of harm under the circumstances revealed by the evidence;
*85I would affirm the judgment on counts 5 and 6 for the lack of prejudice under both the Watson and Chapman tests. (See People v. Shirley (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 268, 274-275 [88 Cal.Rptr. 853]; and People v. Ramirez (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 345, 356-357 [82 Cal.Rptr. 665].)
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 12, 1971. Sims, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.