Court Opinion

ID: 9840041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 00:00:37.491297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:14.539484
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-51125   Document: 00516895882   Page: 1   Date Filed: 09/14/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                          _____________                             FILED
                                                            September 14, 2023
                            No. 21-51125                       Lyle W. Cayce
                          _____________                             Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                versus

   Francisco Mora-Carrillo,

                                               Defendant—Appellant,

                        consolidated with
                          _____________

                            No. 21-51126
                          _____________

   United States of America,

                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                versus

   Graciano Moral-Carrillo,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
Case: 21-51125      Document: 00516895882            Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/14/2023

                                    No. 21-51125
                                  c/w No. 21-51126

                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                          USDC Nos. 4:17-CR-282-1,
                                       4:21-CR-237-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:
          Francisco Mora-Carrillo was convicted of illegally reentering the
   country after a previous deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) &
   (b)(2). He claims that the district court wrongly denied his request for a jury
   instruction about duress and inappropriately applied an enhancement to his
   sentence for obstruction of justice. Finding no such errors, we AFFIRM.
                                I. Background
          Mora is a Mexican national. Beginning in the early 1990s, Mora built
   a substantial criminal record in the United States, including convictions for
   burglary, assault, drug possession, and driving under the influence. In 1992,
   he was deported to Mexico for the first time. Yet he repeatedly returned to
   this country, as evidenced by his ever-growing criminal record. He was
   deported again in 1993, 1999, 2004, and 2007.
          In 2007, only months after his last deportation, Mora was arrested in
   the United States and pled guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent
   to distribute marijuana. He now claims that La Linea, a Mexican drug cartel,
   had threatened to kill him unless he smuggled the drugs into the United
   States. The district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by
   three years of supervised release.     After Mora’s incarceration, he was
   deported to Mexico two more times—in 2012 and 2019.
          On March 1, 2021, Mora was arrested for the instant offense. He was
   caught smuggling four other illegal aliens across the border. When arrested,

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                                    No. 21-51125
                                  c/w No. 21-51126

   he gave the false name of Graciano Moral-Carrillo, and stated that he was not
   afraid to return to Mexico.
          At trial, Mora pled not guilty. He sought to convince the jury that,
   while he was in Mexico in both 2017 and 2020, La Linea had kidnapped and
   beaten him for his cooperation with United States officials related to the 2007
   drug trafficking conviction. In late February 2021, he testified, La Linea
   kidnapped him in Mexico again, took the deed to his house, and told him to
   smuggle people across the border if he “wanted everything to be all right.”
   He understood this as a death threat. He also presented corroborating
   testimony from his sister that he had disappeared in 2017, later to be found
   in the United States, and from his employer that Mora had been kidnapped
   and beaten by La Linea in 2020, and then gone missing again “more or less
   in February” 2021. On the basis of this evidence, Mora requested that a
   duress instruction be given to the jury. The district court denied the request
   but allowed the evidence to be used to show a lack of intent.
          The jury found Mora guilty. The district court applied U.S.S.G.
   § 3C1.1, a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, on the premise
   that Mora lied to the court during his testimony. The court sentenced him
   to 105 months of imprisonment. The district court also revoked Mora’s
   supervised release for a 2017 illegal reentry conviction and sentenced him to
   18 months of imprisonment to be served concurrently with his conviction for
   the 2021 reentry.
          Mora appeals the conviction and the revocation of his supervised
   release.   However, he has not briefed any arguments specific to the
   revocation.
                                 II. Discussion
          Mora challenges (1) the district court’s denial of his request for a jury
   instruction about duress; (2) the application of the obstruction-of-justice

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                                     No. 21-51125
                                   c/w No. 21-51126

   enhancement; and (3) the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b), his statute
   of conviction. None of the challenges succeeds.
                             A. The Duress Instruction
          We review a district court’s denial of a requested jury instruction for
   abuse of discretion. United States v. Storm, 36 F.3d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir.
   1994). Reversible error only arises where “(1) the requested instruction is
   substantially correct; (2) the actual charge given to the jury did not
   substantially cover the content of the proposed instruction; and (3) the
   omission of the instruction would seriously impair the defendant’s ability to
   present his defense.” Id. In conducting this review, we take the evidence in
   the light most favorable to the defendant. United States v. Giraldi, 86 F.3d
   1368, 1376 (5th Cir. 1996).
          Duress is an affirmative criminal defense that consists of four
   elements:
          First: That the defendant was under an unlawful and present,
          imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce
          a well-grounded fear of death or serious bodily injury to himself
          ...;
          Second: That the defendant had not recklessly or negligently
          placed himself . . . in a situation where he . . . would likely be
          forced to choose the criminal conduct;
          Third: That the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative
          to violating the law, that is a reasonable opportunity both to
          refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened
          harm; and

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                                          No. 21-51125
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           Fourth: That a reasonable person would believe that by
           committing the criminal action, he . . . would directly avoid the
           threatened harm.
   5th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 1.38 (2019).
           The defendant must present proof of each element to receive a jury
   instruction on duress. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th
   Cir. 1998). This court’s precedents “make it clear that the defense only
   arises if there is a real emergency leaving no time to pursue any legal
   alternative.” Id. at 874. “Any rule less stringent than this would open the
   door to all sorts of fraud.” The Diana, 74 U.S. 354, 361 (1868). The
   defendant must be in serious danger “at the moment” he commits the
   offense; fear of future harm is insufficient. United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d
   115, 118 (5th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Ramirez-Chavez,
   596 F. App’x 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2015).
           Even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Mora, he has
   not presented proof that he was in danger at the moment of his offense. He
   testified that he was abducted on February 24 or 25 and told to smuggle
   people across the border if he “wanted everything to be all right.” He
   crossed the border on March 1, at least four days later. During his jury trial,
   Mora never presented evidence—even in his own testimony—of what
   happened in the meantime. Thus, there is no reason to believe that he was
   detained, followed, or surveilled in the interim between his abduction and the
   commission of the offense. 1 In other words, he presented no evidence that
           _____________________
           1
             Mora argues in his reply brief (1) that he was never released after his abduction in
   late February and (2) that the migrants he was smuggling might have been monitoring him
   for the cartel. But he did not say any of this at trial, and his employer’s statement that she
   stopped seeing him “more or less in February” is at best consistent with, but not evidence
   of, the first proposition. He also offers no reason to believe that the persons he was
   trafficking across the border would report back to the cartel. In any event, the legally

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                                         No. 21-51125
                                       c/w No. 21-51126

   he was committing the crime because of “a real emergency leaving no time
   to pursue any legal alternative.” Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 874. Because Mora
   was obliged to present evidence of each element of duress, yet failed as to the
   first element, we need go no further. The district court did not abuse its
   discretion.
                       B. The Obstruction of Justice Enhancement
           “We review the district court’s application or interpretation of the
   Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings, such as a finding of
   obstruction of justice, for clear error.” United States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724,
   737 (5th Cir. 2015). The government argues that Mora did not adequately
   preserve this issue, in which case this court reviews for plain error; Mora
   disagrees. See United States v. Rodriguez, 602 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2010).
   We assume without deciding that Mora is correct. Under his preferred
   standard, the court affirms the finding if it is “plausible in light of the record
   as a whole.” Smith, 804 F.3d at 737. Where, as here, the finding hinges on
   the credibility of a witness, the district court’s determination is given
   “particular deference.” Id.
           The obstruction of justice enhancement applies if “the defendant
   willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
   administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
   sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the obstructive
   conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant
   conduct.”      U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.       Perjury warrants the enhancement. Id.
   § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(B). For these purposes, “perjury” means willfully giving
   “false testimony concerning a material matter.” United States v. Dunnigan,

           _____________________
   relevant question is whether he was under threat at the moment of the offense, not whether
   he ran a risk of future harm by not complying.

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                                     No. 21-51125
                                   c/w No. 21-51126

   507 U.S. 87 (1993). While “it is preferable for a district court to address each
   element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding,” we do not
   reverse so long as “the court makes a finding . . . that encompasses all of the
   factual predicates for a finding of perjury.” Id., 507 U.S. at 95.
          Mora argues that the district court’s finding did not address all the
   elements of perjury. The district court stated that “this Defendant lied under
   oath to that jury” and that “he obstructed justice.” Mora posits that this
   does not address whether the lie was willful or material.
          The argument fails.       First, the district court adopted Mora’s
   presentence report, which made a willfulness finding. Second, a “sentencing
   court need not expressly find that the false testimony concerned a material
   matter; it is enough that materiality is obvious.” United States v. Perez-Solis,
   709 F.3d 453, 470 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
   Here, the court disbelieved Mora’s testimony that he was under duress
   during the 2007 drug-smuggling incident. This was a material fact because it
   supported Mora’s argument that he was once again placed under duress in
   2021. The transcript lacks clear grammar, but the district court’s sentiments
   are clear:
          I also think that, frankly, the whatever threats and potential or
          possible duress that have been testified to about the 2007, nor
          the Court to even believe those, the Court does not—with the Court
          to even believe those, it wouldn’t necessarily, and I think that’s
          independent of this offense and don’t believe that would
          necessarily be a linchpin to proving that whether there was
          duress involved here or not, present here or not.
          Thus, we find that the district court’s finding “encompasses all of the
   factual predicates for a finding of perjury.” Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95.

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                                    No. 21-51125
                                  c/w No. 21-51126

   Consequently, there was no clear error in the sentencing court’s application
   of the enhancement.
                              C. Apprendi Challenge
          Last, Mora challenges the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) in
   light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). As the defendant
   acknowledges, that argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United
   States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
                              III. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

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