Court Opinion

ID: 9385393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 16:07:23.784738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.273752
License: Public Domain

J-S22005-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 DANNY CANDELARIO                           :
                                            :
                   Appellant                :   No. 1948 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-64-CR-0000108-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                              FILED APRIL 06, 2023

     Danny Candelario appeals from the August 19, 2021 judgment of

sentence of twelve to twenty-four months of incarceration stemming from his

conviction for simple assault. We affirm.

     On October 17, 2020, Joseph Dovin, Appellant’s eighty-year-old

neighbor, was helping Joann Candelario, Appellant’s wife, change a headlight

on her vehicle. N.T. Jury Trial, 7/12/21, at 22. Fifty-two-year-old Appellant

exited the residence and began shouting profanities at Mr. Dovin. Id. at 25.

As Appellant approached the vehicle, Mrs. Candelario repeatedly attempted to

hinder Appellant’s efforts to swing at Mr. Dovin.    Id. at 25-26.   However,

Appellant eventually pushed past Mrs. Candelario, knocking her to the ground,

and continued his advance. Id. at 25-27. Fearing an imminent attack and

unable to retreat quickly, Mr. Dovin hit Appellant in the face with the small

wrench that he had been utilizing to change the headlight as he attempted to
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back away towards his home. Id. at 22. Appellant retaliated by following

Mr. Dovin to his driveway where he punched him in the face with a closed fist,

knocking Mr. Dovin backwards a few feet where he landed on his back, hitting

his head on the roadway. Id. at 28-29, 46-47. Appellant then fled the area.

      Two witnesses observed the incident and summoned emergency

services to render aid to Mr. Dovin. Id. at 37-43 (explaining that she watched

Appellant punch Mr. Dovin in the face, saw him fall backwards, and heard what

sounded like a skull cracking as his head contacted the cement); Id. at 59-65

(describing watching Appellant strike his wife and then punch a retreating

Mr. Dovin, who fell to the ground before she called 911). Appellant sustained

a small bruise under his left eye. Id. at 28-29, 72; see also Defendant’s

Exhibit 1. Meanwhile, Mr. Dovin suffered a black eye and bruising along the

entire right side of his face and was unable to open his mouth for three days.

Id.

      Appellant was arrested and charged with simple assault and summary

counts of harassment and disorderly conduct stemming from the physical

altercation with Mr. Dovin. At trial, Appellant did not testify. However, he

argued that he acted in self-defense through the testimony of his wife who

claimed that she had slipped on some gravel and Mr. Dovin had attacked

Appellant when he attempted to render her aid. Id. at 81. After hearing the

evidence and the arguments of counsel, the jury convicted Appellant of simple

assault. The trial court found Appellant not guilty of the summary offenses

and   deferred   sentencing   pending   the   completion   of   a   pre-sentence

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investigative report.       The court later sentenced Appellant to serve the

standard range sentence of twelve to twenty-four months of imprisonment.

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary

aspects of his sentence, which the court denied.

       Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on September 10, 2021.

Four days later, his counsel filed a motion requesting leave to withdraw from

representation because Appellant had “verbally dismissed” him and indicated

a desire to proceed pro se.          Motion to Withdraw, 9/14/21, at ¶ 7.   On

September 20, 2021, Appellant filed a second pro se notice of appeal,1

referencing the judgment of sentence and “ineffectiveness of counsel.” Notice

of Appeal, 9/20/21, at 1. On the same day, the trial court issued an order

directing Appellant’s counsel to file a statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Counsel, who had not yet been granted

leave to withdraw, did not timely file the court-ordered Rule 1925(b)

statement. After the time for filing a timely Rule 1925(b) statement expired,

Appellant pro se filed a “statement of reasons” in which he asserted that his

counsel was ineffective and requested the appointment of a new attorney.

Statement of Reasons, 11/12/21, at 1.

       Thereafter, counsel filed with this Court an application for leave to

withdraw as counsel, and we issued an order directing the trial court to

conduct a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa.
____________________________________________

1 This Court later dismissed, as duplicative, the appeal docketed at 1949 EDA
2021 following the second notice of appeal.

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1998). On November 23, 2021, after conducting a Grazier hearing, the trial

court granted counsel’s request to withdraw and permitted Appellant to

proceed pro se. Order, 11/23/21, at 1. Appellant subsequently filed motions

with the trial court asserting that he never agreed to proceed pro se and

requested the appointment of new counsel, which the trial court denied. See

Motion for Legal Representation, 2/16/22, at ¶ 2; Motion for Relief, 2/16/22,

at ¶¶ 1-4; Order, 3/1/22, at 1.2 Ultimately, we remanded this matter for a

second time to appoint new counsel for Appellant, the filing of a counseled

Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, and the submission of a responsive

Rule 1925(a) opinion. On remand, the trial court appointed current counsel,

and both the trial court and Appellant complied with the mandates of Rule

1925. Thereafter, we directed counsel to file a brief on Appellant’s behalf,

which we received.3        The Commonwealth has also submitted an appellate

brief.

         Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

2 This Court also received copies of those motions and denied them without
prejudice to Appellant’s right to apply to the trial court for the requested relief.
Order, 4/25/22, at 1.

3 We note that Appellant filed his brief late. “[T]he late filing of an appellate
brief may result in sanctions from the appellate court, including . . . dismissal
of the appeal, where the late filing impedes our review.” Clark v. Peugh,
257 A.3d 1260, 1264 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up). While we do not
condone the lateness of Appellant’s filings, we decline to dismiss the instant
appeal as Appellant’s tardiness has not impeded our review. Id.

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      1.    Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove beyond
      a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally, knowingly or
      recklessly caused bodily injury to the victim?

      2.    Whether the sentence imposed by the trial court, which was
      in the aggravated range of the Pennsylvania sentencing
      guidelines, was clearly unreasonable and manifestly excessive
      given the circumstances of the Appellant and the case?

Appellant’s brief at 7.

      We first consider Appellant’s sufficiency challenge for the simple assault

conviction. See id. at 16-19. Appellant avers that because Mr. Dovin struck

Appellant first, Appellant acted in self-defense and the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his simple assault conviction. Id. at 17-18.

      Our scope and standard of review when considering challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence are well settled:

      Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
      question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
      of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
      we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
      favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
      to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
      [T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
      need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
      province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
      to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
      evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
      every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
      finder.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305–06 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

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      A person is guilty of simple assault “if he attempts to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”    18

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). “Bodily injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical

condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.

      Appellant does not dispute that his punch caused Mr. Dovin to suffer

bodily injury.   Rather, Appellant contends that he was justified in striking

Mr. Dovin because he was acting in self-defense.     Generally, “[t]he use of

force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that

such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself

against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present

occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). However, the justified use of force requires:

      a) the actor was free from fault in provoking or continuing the
      difficulty which resulted in the use of deadly force; b) the actor
      must have reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of
      death or serious bodily injury, and that there was a necessity to
      use such force in order to save himself or others therefrom; and
      c) the actor did not violate any duty to retreat or to avoid the
      danger.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quotation

marks and citation omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b).

      If a defendant properly raises self-defense, the burden rests on the

Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s act

was not justifiable self-defense. Id.

      The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at least
      one of the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe
      that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the
      accused provoked or continued the use of force; or 3) the accused

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      had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with complete
      safety.

Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 559 (Pa.Super. 2008). The

requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two aspects, one subjective

and one objective. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (Pa.

2012).

      First, the defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide
      belief that he was in imminent danger, which involves
      consideration of the defendant’s subjective state of mind. Second,
      the defendant’s belief that he needed to defend himself with
      deadly force, if it existed, must be reasonable in light of the facts
      as they appeared to the defendant, a consideration that involves
      an objective analysis.

Id. To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free from fault in provoking

or escalating the altercation that led to the offense. Id. at 751.

      Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, supports Appellant’s simple assault conviction.           Through

Mr. Dovin’s testimony, the evidence established that while Mr. Dovin struck

first, he did so in response to Appellant’s provocation. See N.T. Jury Trial,

7/12/21, at 25-27 (Mr. Dovin explaining that he hit Appellant after

Mrs. Candelario’s attempts to restrain her husband from attacking Mr. Dovin

failed). Indeed, our review of the record revealed that Appellant provoked the

incident by verbally assaulting and charging at Mr. Dovin, before escalating

the encounter by continuing to advance upon Mr. Dovin as he attempted to

flee. Id. at 25-29. Furthermore, two eye-witnesses corroborated Appellant’s

testimony that he was backing away towards his home when Appellant struck

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him. Id. at 37-43, 59-65. Thus, it was well-within the province of the jury

to find that Appellant did not act out of an honest belief that he was in

imminent danger or that a reasonable person in Appellant’s position would

have felt that they needed to defend themselves. Accordingly, we find that

the record supports the court’s decision, and we see no reason to disturb it.

      In his second claim, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of

his sentence. The following principles apply to our consideration of whether

review of the merits of his claim is warranted. “An appellant is not entitled to

the review of challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right.

Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d

1001, 1006-07 (Pa.Super. 2014). In determining whether an appellant has

invoked our jurisdiction, we consider four factors:

      (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2)
      whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
      motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether
      appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a
      substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id.

      Appellant filed both a timely motion for reconsideration of his sentence

and a notice of appeal.    In his motion, Appellant requested that the court

reconsider his sentence because his wife had been diagnosed with terminal

cancer and Mr. Dovin had struck him first.        See Post-Sentence Motion,

8/27/21, at unnumbered 1-2. However, in his brief, Appellant alleges that his

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sentence was contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing

process because the standard range sentence he received also reflected the

statutory maximum for a second-degree misdemeanor. See Appellant’s brief

at 20. Appellant did not raise this issue before the trial court. Accordingly,

Appellant did not properly preserve the claim and we cannot consider it. See

Samuel, supra at 1006; see also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d

1030,    1042    (Pa.Super.     2013)     (en    banc)   (“[I]ssues   challenging   the

discretionary aspects of sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or

by presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings.

Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is

waived[.]”). Accordingly, Appellant’s final issue is waived.4

____________________________________________

4 Even if Appellant had preserved the issue, he would still not be entitled to
relief as he failed to raise a substantial question that the sentence appealed
from was inappropriate under the Sentencing Code in his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)
statement. At a minimum a Rule 2119(f) statement “must articulate what
particular provision of the code is violated, what fundamental norms the
sentence violates, and the manner in which it violates that norm.”
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132-34 (Pa.Super. 2014).
Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement merely declares “that his sentence was
imposed contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing
scheme.” Appellant’s brief at 14-15. Appellant’s boilerplate Rule 2119(f)
statement does not specify which fundamental norm his sentence allegedly
violates. Accordingly, the only way this Court could possibly determine
whether Appellant has raised a substantial question is to review the argument
section of his brief. Yet, it is well established that the “Superior Court [is] not
permitted to rely on its assessment of the argument on the merits of the
[discretionary aspects] issue to justify post hoc a determination that a
substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17,
19 (Pa. 1987). Therefore, since Appellant failed to comply with the minimum
requirements of Rule 2119(f), we find that he has failed to present a
substantial question.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2023

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