Court Opinion

ID: 9784954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:58:32.290101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:01.466644
License: Public Domain

Opinion of
ACOBA, J.,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
I agree that the findings of fact and conclusions of law did not comply with the Ha-wai'i Supreme Court’s remand order and, therefore, they were insufficient to show Defendant-Appellant Jay Jeffrey Werner (Defendant) could actually pay $20,000 in restitution.
The majority goes on, however, to conclude that the order of the first circuit court (the court) “to pay ten percent of his gross income satisfies the [restitution] requirement better than ordering [Defendant] to pay specific monthly payments[,]” majority opinion at 15, because “[depending on [Defendant’s] income, a specific monthly payment could be too much or too little.” Id. I respectfully disagree.
First, I think it is premature to determine whether the percentage method of payment is “reasonable” until after the court has sufficiently determined whether Defendant can actually pay $20,000 in restitution. See State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297-98, 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985) (holding that “it is incumbent upon the trial court to enter into the record findings of fact and conclusions that the manner of payment is reasonable and one which [defendant can afford”). The method of payment may be governed by the amount of restitution ordered, and the latter matter has been remanded.
Second, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has said that “[i]t seems intuitively obvious ... that a sentencing court cannot determine restitution ‘in an amount the defendant can afford to pay’ without determining the manner of payment.” State v. Gaylord 78 Hawai'i 127, 153 n. 50, 890 P.2d 1167, 1193 n. 50 (1995) (quoting Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 706-605(1X9)) (emphasis in original). Since the ultimate amount of restitution is tethered to the manner of payment, both determinations should be reserved for remand.
Third, the manner of payment in the instant case is simply too ambiguous to enforce. The order merely orders “payments equal to 10 percent of [Defendant’s] annual income,” without specifying whether annual income means gross or net income, whether payments are to be made on a monthly basis, and whether “annual income” is to be determined retroactively. Payment based on a measure of Defendant’s total annual income is inherently subject to potential dispute if paid periodically, unless all restitution payments are postponed to the end of a designated “year.”
I must disagree, therefore, that the percentage approach is “better” than an order requiring specific monthly payments. Specific monthly payments establish certainty for both victim and defendant, can be conveniently accounted for and verified, and thus, I believe, provide more incentive for compliance, especially when enforced by the court. It is because monthly income may be “too much or too little” that the percentage approach is cumbersome and, I submit, unworkable; any material change in financial circumstances may be dealt with in the future by new court orders. Id at 154 n. 50, 890 P.2d at 1194 n. 50 (holding that “the courts have the statutory authority to alter, amend, or revoke restitution orders on the basis of unforseen or changed circumstances *298and to impose consequences upon defendants who fail unjustifiably to discharge their obligations thereunder”).