Court Opinion

ID: 9530078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:57:14.783437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:59.788553
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I find the court’s analysis of common liability (Part IV A.) unpersuasive and therefore dissent from it. In all other respects I agree with the court’s opinion.
The court concludes that there are two pro rata shares to be included in the equation in dividing liability between Colt/Craig Taylor and Murphy, based on its perception that Murphy’s argument under former AS 09.16.010 is somehow inconsistent with former AS 09.16.040. The only inconsistency is of the court’s own making. It creates two categories of tortfeasors, one of whom is designated a “viable” tortfeasor “that can be considered and included in determining common liability for each of these tort-feasor’s pro rata share of the entire liability remaining under former' AS 09.16.010(a) & (b).” The other is designated the “settling” tortfeasor to whom the provisions of former AS 09.16.010(a) & (b) become “inoperable and inapplicable,” and for whom former AS 09.16.040(2) “control[s] and completely discharge^] ... for any purpose whatsoever.” No authority is cited to support the court’s designation of “viable” and “settling” tortfeasors. Furthermore, I do not understand what is meant by the “common liability for each ... tortfeasor’s pro rata share of the entire liability_”
First, there is no language in former AS 09.16.040(2) which precludes or even suggests that a settling tortfeasor cannot be included in the equation to determine the number of shares in the entire liability. Subsection (2) discharges the tortfeasor from all liability for contribution. Including that tortfeasor in the equation does not impose upon that tortfeasor any liability whatsoever for contribution.
Second, I believe that the court and Colt take a wrong turn in their treatment of pro rata shares of “common liability” and “entire liability.” Each term appears once in separate sentences in former AS 09.16.-010(b), and “entire liability” again in former AS 09.16.020.1 Neither term is defined in the statute.2 Nothing compels the conclusion that “pro rata share of the common liability” necessarily means the same as “pro rata share of the entire liability.” It may or it may not.3
*938The official commentary to the uniform act does not provide an answer. The problem is compounded: (1) the 1939 version of the uniform act was amended substantially in 1955; (2) state statutes are far from uniform; (3) case law is not extensive. However, case law does suggest that the court’s construction is incorrect.
Maryland’s comparable statute is entitled the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act. Sections 19 and 20 of the act resemble, but are not identical to comparable sections of our statute.4 In Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md.App. 579, 398 A.2d 490, 513-14 (1979), rev’d on other grounds, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980), Section 20’s provision for “a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tort-feasor,” was held to mean “in numerical shares or proportions based on the number of tortfeasors.” Id. 398 A.2d at 514. Murphy advances this same argument here.
The Maryland court does not trace this definition of pro rata to any conscious effort in earlier decisions to glean legislative intent. Oddly, its genesis seems to have been a lecture given to the Barristers Club of Baltimore by a Baltimore Bar member, who commented that “[w]e all agree” that pro rata means shares based on the number of tortfeasors. The lecturer’s comment became the customary practice. See Id. at 511-13. In Lahocki it was argued that by defining pro rata to mean numerical shares based on the number of tortfeasors, the act’s objective of encouraging settlements was subverted. However, the court found no evidence that the objective was subverted in any manner by this definition and customary practice. The court commented that “there is no way to determine whether it has, in effect, deterred rather than encouraged settlements_” Id. at 514. The court let the definition stand. The court reaffirmed the definition in Chilcote v. Von Der Ahe Van Lines, 55 Md.App. 291, 462 A.2d 536 (1983).
In Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129 (1965), the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted New Jersey’s Joint Tort-feasors Contribution Law. Like Maryland’s act, it resembles, but is not identical to, the Alaska statute. See N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A:53A-3 (West 1987). In Theobald the plaintiff settled with one of three defendants prior to trial. However, a cross-claim had been filed against that defendant, so when the case went to trial, the jury was asked whether that defendant was a tortfeasor. That defendant was found not liable. A retrial against another defendant was held on the issue of damages. The retried defendant sought pro rata reduction of the second verdict, and included all three defendants in the equation. The court held that the defendant found not liable in the original trial was not a tortfeasor for purposes of New Jersey contribution law. Id. 208 A.2d at 131. However, both the opinion of the court and the dissent of Justice Francis assume that but for the finding of no liability on the part of the one defendant, that defendant would have been included in the equation and pro rata reduction ordered, irrespective of the settlement amount paid by that tort-feasor. See Id. at 134, 137. No tortfeasor would have been required to pay more than *939one third of the damages found by the jury-
Colt agrees with Murphy that “a ‘common’ or ‘entire’ liability is created at the instant a plaintiff suffers injury.” Colt then demonstrates how the common liability created in that instant is extinguished by a good faith settlement by a tortfeasor and correctly concludes that the settling tort-feasor cannot be required to contribute “to any other tortfeasor” more than already paid. However, Colt’s argument avoids attempting to explain what is meant by “entire liability.”
Colt criticizes Murphy’s argument by asserting in Section III A. 2. of its Brief of Cross-Appellee that “Murphy’s Analysis Leads to Absurd Results And Discourages Settlement.” Colt correctly states that a purpose of the 1955 amendments to the uniform act was to eliminate provisions of the 1939 act which were seen as deterring settlement. This court then reinterprets Colt’s statement and says that “AS 09.16.-040 ... was adopted for the specific purpose of encouraging settlement.” Colt’s statement of a purpose of the act does not compel its interpretation of the entire act. This court’s reinterpretation is not correct. As this court noted in Criterion Insurance Co. v. Laitala, 658 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1983), “we find it useful to underscore that the purpose of the [Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors] Act is to ensure that all joint tortfeasors pay their fair share of the damages rather than to have only one joint tortfeasor pay all the damages.” Id. at 115. That remains its purpose today.
Colt’s parade of self-serving hypothetical presumably shows the absurd results certain to follow if Murphy’s interpretation is adopted.5 A hypothetical is only as good as the information upon which it is based; in this case, the hypothetical assume or omit too much. Colt’s first hypothetical is an example:
Assume, for example, that P sues A, B, C, and D. A settles on behalf of both himself and B and sues B for contribution. Under Murphy’s analysis, even if B stipulates that the settlement represents the amount of damages for which A and B were potentially liable, A cannot know how much B owes until the initial “common liability” — the sum of all the judgments and settlements involving C and D — is resolved as well, perhaps years in the future.
I assume, perhaps erroneously, that B has not admitted to being a tortfeasor, because Colt omitted that information from the hypothetical. A is going to have to wait for a judicial determination that B is a tortfeasor before A can collect one thin dime from B, and that determination probably will not occur until P’s trial against C and D, or C or D if one of them settles with P, or, if C and D both settle with P, at A’s trial against B. As a practical matter, that is what occurred in this case, as Colt had to go to trial against Murphy to establish that Murphy was a tortfeasor, even though Jackovitch Tractor & Equipment Co., Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp., and Totem Equipment & Supply, Inc. had settled separately with P.
Once we base our decision on whether either interpretation encourages or discourages settlement, we have entered the realm of speculation. A party settles litigation for reasons that are specific to that party at that time.

. Former AS 09.16.020 provides:
In determining the pro rata shares of tort-feasors in the entire liability
(1) their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered;
(2) if equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group constitutes a single share; and
(3) principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.

. The court notes Murphys claim that "common liability’ and "entire liability’ are synonymous, and Colt’s apparent lack of disagreement with that position. Thus the court assumes that any difference between the terms "is not significant in this case.” Op. at p. 935, note 20. I do not agree that the terms are synonymous, or that we should accept the parties’ apparent agreement that they are. Since we are interpreting a statute, we must apply our independent judgment. We should not base our interpretation on an underlying interpretation which the parties assume to be correct, but which we do not independently examine ourselves. I am gratified to note that the court itself does not believe the terms are synonymous, though perplexed that it nonetheless proceeds on the assumption that they are.

.I suggest that the following are examples of "common liability” and “entire liability.”
(1) P sues A, B, C, D, and E. All defendants are solvent. None settle. A jury finds all defendants jointly and severally liable to P. Their liability is "common” to each other. Their common liability is also the “entire liability" to P.
(2) The same parties as in (1), but A, B and C settle separately with P. A jury finds D and E jointly and severally liable to P. The amounts paid by A, B and C are deducted from the amount for which D and E are found liable to P by the jury. D and E’s liability is common to each other. However, the entire liability to P is the total of the amounts paid P by A, B, and C, plus the amount of the judgment owed P by D and E.
(3) The same parties as in (1), but A, B and C settle separately with P. D settles with P for *938D and E. In a trial between D and E, a jury finds that D and E are jointly and severally liable to P, and hence D entitled to contribution from E. D and E's liability is common to each other. However, the entire liability to P is the total of the amounts paid P by A, B, C, and D.

. Section 19 provides:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid. ■
Md.Ann.Code art. 50, § 19 (1991).
Section 20 provides:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor does not relieve him from liability to make contribution to another joint tort-feasor unless the release is given before the right of the other tort-feasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tort-feasor, of the injured person’s damages recoverable against all other tort-feasors.
Md.Ann.Code art. 50, § 20 (1991).

. The court presents one of Colt’s examples to illustrate the "absurdity” of the result of Murphy’s interpretation of the act. Slip Op. at p. 25-26, note 21. First, the court cannot know that the result is absurd without having full knowledge of all considerations that went into Colt’s decision to settle for the amount it did. Second, the court continues to ignore the fact that nobody has forced Colt to settle. Colt settled voluntarily for its own reasons. It is Murphy that is being compelled to contribute.