Court Opinion

ID: 9391461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 14:00:22.67891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.803846
License: Public Domain

21-6009
   Singh v. Garland
                                                                                BIA
                                                                        A205 936 654

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
   Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of May, two thousand twenty-
   three.

   PRESENT:
              STEVEN J. MENASHI,
              BETH ROBINSON,
              ALISON J. NATHAN,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   HARJIT SINGH,
             Petitioner,

                      v.                                      21-6009
                                                              NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
              Respondent.
   _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER:                    Lawrence Spivak, Esq., Jamaica, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                   General; Anthony C. Payne, Assistant
                                   Director; Abigail E. Leach, Trial Attorney,
                                   Office of Immigration Litigation, United
                                   States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                   DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Harjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

December 1, 2020, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reconsider. In re

Harjit Singh, No. A205 936 654 (B.I.A. Dec. 1, 2020).     We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      We have reviewed only the BIA’s decision denying Singh’s motion to

reconsider because he did not timely petition for review of the BIA’s underlying

decision. See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2006). We review

the denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Jian Hui Shao v.

Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 173 (2d Cir. 2008). An abuse of discretion may be found

where the BIA’s decision “provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs

from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary
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or conclusory statements; that is to say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary

or capricious manner.” Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2005).

      A motion to reconsider “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous

order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C);

see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “A motion for reconsideration is a request that the

Board reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of

law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.” Jin

Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111 (quotation marks omitted). “The BIA does not abuse its

discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion repeats arguments

that the BIA has previously rejected.” Id.

      The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration here. As

the BIA found, Singh’s motion did not identify specific errors of fact or law in the

prior decision but rather urged the BIA to reevaluate the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination and rejection of his late-filed evidence. See id. Singh now argues

that the BIA erred in finding his CAT claim waived on appeal and should have

remanded to the IJ for further consideration of that claim; however, this argument

is not properly before us because he did not raise it in his motion to reconsider.

See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 480 F.3d 104, 118–20 (2d Cir. 2007) (issue

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exhaustion is mandatory); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 265 F.3d 83, 89–90 (2d

Cir. 2001) (concluding that issues regarding IJ’s decision were not properly before

us where the petition was timely only as to the denial of reconsideration).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                       Clerk of Court

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