Court Opinion

ID: 9601718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:49:24.239491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:17.410999
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.,
dissenting: While I agree with much of what is said by the majority, I must respectfully dissent from the result reached in this case. The sole issue before the court below was the petition for approval of a compromise agreement entered into by the administrator and the trustee and beneficiary of the Leon Stahl inter vivos trust. Mr. Stahl entered into a trust agreement on April 29, 1975, wherein certain property was transferred to R. L. Goodyear, as trustee. Included in the assets specified in the agreement were three certificates of deposit with a face value of *56$32,000.00. The administrator claimed the certificates as assets of the decedent’s estate while the trustee maintained they were assets of the trust. The trustee filed a petition to strike the certificates from the inventory and appraisal filed by the administrator which was contested by the administrator and ten of the heirs of Leon Stahl.
The trustee’s petition was originally set for hearing in the probate court and proper notice was given to all interested parties. All of the heirs-at-law of Leon Stahl, except Lillabelle Stahl, a niece, were represented by counsel. While Lillabelle received notice of all proceedings, she did not participate with the other heirs in contesting the petition of the trustee.
The original petition to strike the certificates from the inventory was heard by the probate court on July 28, 1976. A full hearing was held, after proper notice, with all parties except Lillabelle participating. After a decision adverse to the administrator and the heirs, an appeal was taken to the district court where again a full hearing was held with all contesting parties being present in person and/or represented by competent counsel. Following the hearing the matter was taken under advisement by the Hon. Robert F. Stadler, District Judge. While the matter was under advisement, the administrator and trustee reached a settlement and prepared a proposed “Compromise Settlement.” The administrator then filed a petition with the district court asking that the proposed settlement be approved. Attached to the petition was a copy of the settlement agreement. A copy of the petition, agreement and notice of hearing was again served on all parties and their respective counsel. The petition specifically sought approval of the proposed settlement agreement attached as an exhibit and did not ask for anything else. Paragraph 6 of the administrator’s petition reads:
“6. That the administrator feels that it is in the best interest of the estate and the heirs thereof to accept said compromise offer, and asks this Court for an order authorizing and directing the administrator as the sole representative of the heirs, and the exclusive person having the authority on behalf of the heirs, to accept the said settlement.”
On October 11, 1977, all parties interested again appeared in person or by counsel and the district court, after a full hearing, entered its order which is now the subject of this appeal. It may be conceded that the journal entry on that hearing was poorly *57prepared and overly broad in its terms. However, the fact remains that the sole question before the trial court on October 11, 1977, was the petition to approve the specific compromise settlement agreement and nothing else. The compromise agreement subsequently signed by the parties was identical to the one attached to the petition filed with and heard by the trial court. The majority states “The district court should have held a hearing on the specific compromise settlement proposed and either approved or disapproved that compromise settlement.” That is exactly what happened. The specific compromise settlement was the only issue before the court and the judge gave the administrator authority to proceed with settlement. He could only have been approving the specific settlement agreement which was the only issue before the court.
Leon Stahl died October 9, 1975. This estate has been pending for over three and one-half years and I do not believe it to be in the best interests of justice, the heirs, the estate or the trust, to extend these proceedings further due to the failure of the scrivener to be more specific in his drafting of the journal entry. The parties have had their day in court; in fact, they have had three days in court by way of three different hearings. The compromise of $10,000 to the estate when it was already faced with an adverse decision from the probate court would appear reasonable and evidently was so viewed by the district court when it approved the settlement.
In Mann v. Tatge Chemical Co., Inc., 201 Kan. 326, 440 P.2d 640 (1968), we stated:
“We have examined the points raised by the cross-appeal, with respect to the court’s findings, and though in some instances the language used by the court might have been more explicit, we find no error which could be said to affect a substantial right of the result of the litigation. Technical errors are to be disregarded, and error, in order to be grounds for reversal, must be such as to affect the substantial rights of the parties. (2A West’s Kansas Digest, Appeal and Error, § 1027; 1 Hatcher’s Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.], Appeal and Error, § 509.) Such being the case we shall not burden this opinion with further discussion of those points.” p. 339.
No substantial rights of the administrator and the heirs have been adversely affected by the proceedings in the trial court. This litigation should be brought to a close so that what is left of the estate and trust may inure to the benefit of the parties entitled thereto and should not be further delayed by a technicality of *58pleading which failed to properly state what actually took place in the trial court.
While I am in general agreement with the basic principles of law set forth by the majority, I cannot concur that they must be applied to the facts in this case when the real issue in question has actually been determined by the trial court after proper notice and hearing. I further disagree with the broad statements contained in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the syllabi wherein the majority states that a compromise settlement can only be determined at the hearing on a demand and that after approval of a compromise the court must allow or disallow the demand. Compromises and settlements of contested claims have always been a favorite of the law and should be given serious consideration by the court at any stage of the proceedings. In addition, once a compromise settlement has been reached and approved, there is no reason for the court to allow or disallow the demand as the same has already been resolved by the parties and the court.
I would affirm the trial court’s decision.
Miller and McFarland, JJ., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.