Court Opinion

ID: 9941985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 13:06:00.818019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:34.219400
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA23-308

                               Filed 20 February 2024

Wake County, No. 17 CVD 164

JENNIFER C. DURBIN, Plaintiff,

             v.

MATTHEW L. DURBIN, Defendant.

      Appeal by Defendant from order entered 8 July 2022 by Judge Julie Bell in

Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 November 2023.

      Jackson Family Law, by Jill Schnabel Jackson, for plaintiff-appellee.

      Fox Rothschild LLP, by Kip D. Nelson and Jonathan L. Taggart, for defendant-
      appellant.

      MURPHY, Judge.

      When ruling on a motion for the modification of child custody, the existence of

an ongoing conflict or propensity for conflict between the parties that has persisted

since the original custody order does not preclude a conclusion on behalf of the trial

court that the ongoing conflict constitutes, or contributes to, a substantial change in

circumstances affecting the welfare of the children. However, it is also not presumed

from the mere existence of an ongoing conflict that the conflict adversely affects the

children, especially where, as here, the trial court’s findings of fact actually suggest

the children were relatively insulated from the conflict. As the trial court’s findings

of fact in this case did not support its conclusion of law that a substantial change in
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                                  Opinion of the Court

circumstances affecting the welfare of the children had occurred, we reverse the trial

court’s modification order.

                                  BACKGROUND

      This case arises from an 8 July 2022 order of the trial court modifying child

custody shared between Plaintiff, Jennifer Durbin, and Defendant, Matthew Durbin,

in response to Plaintiff’s 8 October 2021 motion. The order, which substantially

rendered permanent the terms of two temporary child custody orders entered 12

January 2022 and 9 February 2022, replaced the previously effective Consent Order

for Child Custody and Child Support entered 30 October 2020. The original order

provided, in relevant part, that Plaintiff and Defendant shared joint legal custody,

shared physical custody in roughly equal measures, shared a responsibility for

communicating information pertaining to the children’s health, and expressly

contemplated the children having routine medication. The original order further

established an obligation to act in good faith to “enhance and nourish the relationship

between each other and the children” and to avoid scheduling activities for the

children during the other party’s custodial time.

      In addition to the original order, the parties entered into an Order Appointing

Parenting Coordinator by Consent on 10 December 2020 appointing Tiffany Lesnik

as the replacement for their original parenting coordinator, Dr. Kari Lenox. In the

wake of her appointment, Defendant and Lesnik developed a contentious

relationship, with Defendant moving on 30 April 2021 for the termination of Lesnik’s

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                                    Opinion of the Court

appointment and for review of her decision as to the reallocation of custody in the

summer of 2021 to accommodate Plaintiff’s vacation plans. The trial court denied

both motions, and conflict between Lesnik and Defendant seemingly continued

through October of the same year, with Defendant continually alleging Lesnik’s

preferential treatment of Mother.

       On 8 October 2021, Plaintiff made a Motion to Modify Child Custody, citing,

inter alia, Defendant’s interference with the children’s therapy appointments and

insufficient attentiveness to the children’s medical needs as the basis for

modification. After entering the two aforementioned temporary orders on 12 January

2022 and 9 February 2022, the trial court entered its Order Modifying Child Custody

on 8 July 2022, which severely decreased Defendant’s time with the children and

delegated “final decision-making authority” on all major parenting decisions to

Plaintiff:

                               FINDINGS OF FACT

             1. Plaintiff is a resident of Wake County, North Carolina.

             2. Defendant is a resident of Wake County, North Carolina.

             3. [] Plaintiff and [] Defendant were married to each other
             on [26 May] 2007 and separated from each other on or
             about [23 September] 2016.

             4. There were two children born of the marriage, . . . born
             [10 December] 2008[] and . . . [8 September] 2010.

             5. A permanent custody order was entered on [30 October]
             2020.

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6. The parties’ first parent coordinator was Dr. Kari Lenox.

7. Tiffany Lesnik was appointed the Parent Coordinator on
[15 December] 2020. Her term expired on [15 December]
2021.

8. On [24 September] 2021, the PC filed a report to the
Court detailing numerous problems with the current
custody order and requesting an expedited hearing.

9. After a hearing on [27 October] 2021, the Court entered
a temporary custody order giving [] Plaintiff sole legal
custody and primary physical custody, with [] Defendant
exercising alternate-weekend visitation.

10. A second Parent Coordinator report was filed on [8
December] 2021.

11. After a hearing on [10 January] 2022, the Court entered
a new temporary custody order and appointed Lisa
LeFante as the new Parent Coordinator on [9 February]
2022.

12. There is an ongoing conflict between the parties that is
interfering with important decisions being made that affect
the health, education and welfare of the minor children.

13. The case continues to be a high-conflict and the parties
have had three different parent coordinators.

14. [] Defendant at times will refuse to respond to
Plaintiff's requests for information in a timely manner.

15. During Ms. Lesnick’s tenure as PC, [] Defendant
refused or delayed providing information that the PC
requested, and he was hostile and behaved inappropriately
in his responses to the PC. Specifically:
   a. On or about [9 April] 2021, the PC contacted []
   Defendant and asked for some basic information about
   his positive COVID test, including when he tested

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  positive, whether anyone else lived with him, and if
  anyone in his home had tested positive. The PC’s
  questions were reasonable under the circumstances.
  b. Defendant reacted with hostility, refusing to respond
  to the questions, demanding to know why she needed
  medical information, accusing the PC of breaching his
  trust, calling her questions “bizarre,” and accusing the
  PC of colluding in a “witch hunt” with Plaintiff.
  c. Defendant ultimately provided answers to the PC’s
  questions after several days, but his delay in responding
  was unreasonable and his hostile response was
  inappropriate.
  d. On [23 September] 2021, [] Defendant contacted []
  Plaintiff claiming he was dealing with a “behavioral
  issue” with [the parties’ elder son] and wanting to review
  the phone and text logs for [that son’s] phone.
  e. When the PC contacted the parties and asked Mr.
  Durbin to provide some information on what the
  “behavioral issue” was so that the parties could address
  it in a uniform manner, Defendant refused to provide
  any information. Further, Defendant’s response on [24
  September] 2021, at 9:40 a.m., was hostile, telling the
  PC neither she [n]or Plaintiff were “ready for co-
  parenting,” accusing the PC of lying, and threatening to
  “limit or cease [his elder son’s] cell phone usage” if he
  didn’t get what he wanted.

16. Both minor children attend therapy. [The parties’ elder
son] sees Dr. Brian Mackey and [the parties’ younger son]
sees Dr. Jennifer Hayden. Both children have good
relationships with their therapists.

17. There were substantial problems with scheduling
regular therapy for the minor children for several months
in 2020. Defendant was uncooperative with both Dr. Lenox
and Ms. Lesnick in the PC’s attempts to ensure that [the
parties’ elder son] was receiving regular therapy.

18. The current PC, Lisa LeFante, did not testify that
problems continued under her tenure with Defendant
making sure that [the parties’ elder son] attended regular

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therapy.

19. Both Dr. Mackey and Dr. Hayden testified that the
scheduling problems were resolved and that [] Defendant
now brings both children to therapy and seems supportive
of their treatment.

20. Over Plaintiff’s objections, [] Defendant began
requiring the children to speak with Plaintiffs estranged
mother, who lives in California and suffers from severe
mental illness.

21. There has been an ongoing dispute between the parties
about the children’s medical conditions and the consistent
administration of prescribed medications. Specifically:
  a. [The parties’ elder son] has asthma and serious
  allergies requiring him to use inhalers on a regular basis
  and to carry an EpiPen and emergency inhaler at all
  times. [The elder son’s] medication is kept in a blue bag
  that he carries with him at all times.
  b. [] Plaintiff and her husband testified that they have
  been in [the elder son’s] presence when he was with []
  Defendant on several occasions and they did not see the
  medication bag, so they presumed that it was not with
  [him]. Defendant testified that the bag was always
  there, but sometimes it was in a backpack. The Court
  does not have sufficient information to determine
  whether the medication was present or not.
  c. [] Plaintiff had contacted the PC on more than one
  occasion to voice concerns about Defendant’s failure to
  administer the child’s medication as prescribed.
  d. Plaintiff and her husband testified that on at least 4
  occasions, when [the parties’ elder son] returned from
  visits with Defendant, that the count on his inhaler
  (which has a dosage counter on the medication) was
  inconsistent with the number of doses he should have
  taken while in Defendant’s custody.
  e. [] Defendant offered no explanation, but it appears to
  the Court that he takes a “hands off” approach and lets
  [the parties’ elder son] regulate his own medication.
  f. The Court finds that, in light of [the elder son’s]

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  medical condition, it is in the child’s best interest for
  both parents to take responsibility for making sure that
  he takes his medicine consistent with the doctor’s
  recommendations and not leave it to the child to be
  responsible for his own medications.
  g. On [29 July] 2021, the PC issued a directive on the
  medication issue. The email said, in relevant part, “I am
  going to ask you both to keep a medication
  administration chart while [your elder son] is with you
  that will indicate: The medication administered, the
  amount, the date and the time.”
  h. Despite [the elder son’s] diagnosed medical problems,
  and the PC’s directive, the conflict over the child’s
  medication continued. Defendant did not maintain the
  medication log, made the child maintain the medication
  log, told Plaintiff and the PC that the child (who is 12)
  was responsible for his own medication, and argued with
  both Plaintiff and PC in multiple emails rather than
  simply make sure [the elder son] received his medication
  and maintaining the log so that both parents could make
  sure that they were consistent and coordinated in their
  administration of medication for [him].
  i, [The parties’ younger son] broke his arm while zip-
  lining.

22. Defendant did not cooperate with Ms. Lesnik’s
directives regarding [his elder son’s] medication.

23. Plaintiff wanted to get the children vaccinated for Covid
19. [] Defendant disagreed and wanted to speak to the
children’s pediatrician and allergist.

24. Defendant received recommendations from the
pediatrician (Dr. Fennell) regarding the Covid vaccine.
Defendant’s recollection of the doctor’s recommendations,
and what he told Plaintiff about it, were different from
what the doctor had actually said and provided in
correspondence to Defendant. This caused further conflict
between the parties and substantially delayed Plaintiff's
ability to get the kids vaccinated.

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25. Defendant schedules extracurricular activities during
Plaintiff's custodial time without her consent.

26. Plaintiff frequently presumes any delay of information
or mistake in providing information is intentional on the
part of [] Defendant. While the Court believes that delays
and mistakes by Defendant in providing information to
Plaintiff creates more conflict between the parties, so does
Plaintiff's presumption.

27. The amount of conflict between the parties is not in the
children’s best interest, but neither party seems capable of
reducing the conflict.

28. Since the entry of the [12 January] 2022, temporary
order, there have been fewer custodial exchanges between
the parties. The reduction in exchanges has helped reduce
some of the conflict between the parties.

29. Defendant and his mother both testified that the boys
seem “sad” to him. However, [the parties’ elder son] is
doing so well in therapy that he can decrease the frequency
of his appointments.

30. Plaintiff and her husband testified to very positive
relationships with the children.

31. [] Plaintiff has remarried . . . . Her new husband has a
very positive and close relationship with the children.

32. The Court finds that the above listed findings
constitute a substantial change in circumstances
warranting the entry of a temporary custody order
modifying the terms of the October 2020 Permanent
Custody Order.

                CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The parties are properly before the Court and that the
Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter herein and there exist facts justifying this Court to

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assume jurisdiction to determine the custody of the minor
children.

2. North Carolina is the home state of the minor children.

3. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7, since the entry of the
last custody order there has been a substantial change in
circumstances that adversely affects the minor children
and a modification of the permanent custody order is
warranted.

4. This Order is in the best interests of the minor children.

5. Both parties have the ability to comply with the terms
and conditions contained herein.

6. Findings of Facts that are more appropriately considered
Conclusions of Law are incorporated by reference as if fully
set forth herein.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED as follows:

1. The permanent custody order is modified as follows:
   a. The parties shall continue to share joint legal custody,
   The parties shall in good faith confer and attempt to
   mutually agree on major decisions affecting the
   children’s health, education and welfare. In the event
   the parties are unable to reach mutual agreement on a
   major decision, [] Plaintiff shall have final decision-
   making authority. Day-to-day decisions shall be made
   by the custodial parent.
   b. [] Plaintiff shall exercise primary physical custody and
   [] Defendant shall have visitation as follows:
      i. Defendant shall have custody of the minor children
      on alternate weekends from the end of school Friday
      until the beginning of school Monday morning.
      ii. In the event one child does not have school on a
      custodial exchange day (either Friday or Monday), the
      parties shall exchange custody of both children—the
      child who is in school and the child who is not in

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                   Opinion of the Court

    school—at 5 p.m. on that regular exchange day.
c. Therapy: The minor children shall continue in therapy
at 3C Family Services until such time as their individual
therapists release each child from therapy. Neither
parent shall take any action to terminate or interfere in
the therapeutic relationship. In addition:
    i. The parents may participate in the children’s
    therapy as directed by the individual therapist.
    ii. The children’s individual therapists shall
    recommend the frequency and duration of
    appointments for each child and the parties shall
    comply with the recommendation.
    iii. Appointments shall be scheduled for each child to
    comply with the therapist’s recommendations,
    regardless of whose custodial time the appointment
    may fall on. The custodial parent shall transport the
    child to and from the therapy appointment as
    scheduled. In the event there is a dispute between
    the parties on the day or time a therapy appointment
    is to be scheduled, the Parent Coordinator shall
    determine the time and date of the appointment.
d. Medication: The parties shall comply with the Parent
Coordinator’s directive on medication for the children.
Specifically, the parties shall maintain a medication log
for [the parties’ elder son] as outlined in the [24 August]
2021, directive issued by the Parent Coordinator.
Neither parent shall make the child complete the log, or
make the child responsible for maintaining his own
medication schedule. Both parents shall ensure that the
children take any and all medication as prescribed by
their respective medical providers, including but not
limited to making sure that Epipens and inhalers are
available to the child as directed by the physician(s).
e. The parents shall subscribe to Our Family Wizard
within 5 days of entry of this order. All communication
between the parties shall be through Our Family Wizard
and all medical appointments and extracurricular
activities shall be placed on the OFW calendar. In the
event of an emergency involving a child, the parties may
text one another.
f. [] Defendant shall not threaten, insult or harass the

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  Parent Coordinator, and shall not use abusive language
  in his communication with her (i.e., calling her a liar).
  Neither party shall record the Parent Coordinator.

2. Holiday Custodial Schedule. The holiday/summer
custodial schedule as outlined herein shall supersede the
regular custodial schedule listed above.          After the
holiday/summer schedule concludes, the regular custodial
schedule listed above shall continue as if the
holiday/summer schedule never occurred. While [the
parties’ younger son] remains enrolled at The Raleigh
School, the parties shall use [] The Raleigh School calendar
to determine the dates of the holidays referenced in
provisions (3a) to (3f), below. Once [the parties’ younger
son] is no longer attending The Raleigh School, the parties
shall use the WCPSS calendar to determine the dates of
holidays and school breaks.

  ....

3. Transportation. Each parent will be responsible for
picking up the children at school, the residence of the other
parent, or child’s activity to begin his or her custodial time
with the children.

4. Lisa LeFante shall remain the parent coordinator until
the expiration of her term. Either party may ask for the
reappointment of Ms. LeFante or another parent
coordinator at the expiration of her term.

5. Medical Emergencies. In the event of a medical
emergency, the party who is with the minor child shall
promptly notify the other parent as soon as it is practicable
to do so. If any injury, accident or health-related problem
arises which necessitates the hospitalization of the child,
both parties shall have the right to visit the child at
reasonable times for reasonable periods of time. Defendant
and Plaintiff shall promptly notify the other of any serious
illness and/or injury to the child which requires medical
attention. Each party shall inform the other of any medical
or health problems which arose while the child is in the

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physical custody of one of the parents.

6. Both parents shall provide each other with any
medication which the child is taking at the time of the
transfer of physical custody of the child and they shall
provide each other with sufficient information to allow the
other party to obtain refills of that medication, if
appropriate.

7. Non-disparagement. [] Defendant and Plaintiff each will
endeavor, in good faith, to enhance and nourish the
relationship between each other and the children. Each
party will attempt to foster feelings of affection between
the child(ren) and the other party, and neither party shall
do anything to estrange the child(ren) from the other party
or to injure the child(ren)’s opinion of the other party in any
manner. Neither party shall disparage the other parent
within hearing of the minor children or allow any third
party to do so. Neither party shall discuss the litigation
with the children.

8. Child-Related Activities and Appointments. Each party
shall provide to the other party information concerning a
child’s activities and each shall encourage participation by
the other parent. Neither party shall schedule activities
for a child during the other party’s custodial time without
prior consent, and any programs or enrollments by a child
which may involve significant time commitments by the
other parent shall be agreed upon in advance. If one parent
schedules an appointment (medical, therapy, school
conference, etc.) for a child, that parent shall immediately
notify the other parent so that parent may attend.

9. Access to Information. Both parents shall have equal
access to all personnel at the school and shall be permitted
to communicate directly with those persons without
interference by the other parent. It is the responsibility of
each parent to obtain report cards and interim grade
reports directly from the school and not rely on the other
parent. For any written documents for which there cannot
be duplication (school work, progress chart, weekly folders,

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and the like) the parent in possession shall make copies for
the other parent of any and all important documents and/or
documents with deadlines. Both parents shall have equal
access to all opportunities for field trips, chaperoning,
parent participation at school functions, PTA and the like,
and no parent shall interfere with the other parent’s right
or ability to participate.

10. Telephone and Electronic Contact. Each parent shall
be entitled to communicate with the children via telephone,
email, text, IM, Skype, twitter, Facebook or any other age-
appropriate electronic means. All such communication
shall be at reasonable times and at reasonable periods of
the day.

11. Records. Each parent shall be entitled to immediate
access to any third-party records and information
pertaining to the child including, but not limited to,
medical, dental health, school or educational records.

12. Travel. Should either parent plan to take the child out
of North Carolina, that parent shall inform the other forty-
eight (48) hours in advance of the planned travel and shall
inform the other of the destination, address and telephone
number; in the event such travel is not planned in the 48-
hour time frame, the traveling parent shall inform the
other immediately at the time the plans are made. Should
cither parent wish to take a child out of the country, that
parent shall inform the other 30 days in advance of the
planned travel and shall fully inform the other parent of
the complete itinerary of the travel and provide contact
information, including telephone numbers. Both parents
shall cooperate in obtaining passports for the children. At
the request of the traveling parent, the non-traveling
parent shall execute any consent forms or other written
documents necessary.

13. Relocation. Should either party decide to relocate
outside of Wake County or more than 20 miles from his or
her current residence, that party shall notify the other at
least 90 days in advance of such a move, or if relocation is

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             likely to occur in less than 90 days, the party wishing to
             relocate shall notify the other within twenty-four hours of
             being informed (or making a decision) that relocation must
             or is likely to occur. If the relocation takes a parent thirty
             (30) or more miles from his or her current residence, the
             children shall remain in the physical custody of the non-
             relocating parent pending further agreement of the parties
             or entry of a court order. Both parties will discuss changes
             in the custodial schedule that will benefit the children. In
             the event the parties cannot agree upon changes to the
             custodial schedule, the parties shall participate in
             mediation as soon as practicable after the notice, but
             within 30 days from the notice of relocation. In the event
             no agreement is reached in mediation, but as soon as
             practicable following the declaration of an impasse, but
             within thirty (30) days, the parties shall participate in
             arbitration regarding the custody issue, as set out herein.

             14. All PC Directives previously issued and not otherwise
             modified by the provisions of this order shall remain in
             effect.

             15. This cause is retained by the Court for entry of further
             Orders.

      Defendant timely appeals from the 8 July 2022 order.

                                      ANALYSIS

      Defendant argues the trial court erred in entering its 8 July 2022 order because

no substantial change in circumstances affecting the children’s wellbeing existed,

because modification was not in the best interests of the children, and because the

order improperly delegated de facto sole custody to Plaintiff. As we agree the order

was not entered pursuant to a substantial change in circumstances affecting the

children’s wellbeing, we reverse.

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      When reviewing the modification of a child custody order, we “must examine

the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by

substantial evidence.” Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474 (2003) (citations

omitted). Unopposed findings of fact “are presumed to be supported by the evidence

and are binding on appeal,” James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 104 (1955) (marks and

citations omitted), while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In re C.B.C, 373

N.C. 16, 19 (2019). Whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred and

whether that change affected the minor children are conclusions of law and must be

supported by the trial court’s findings of fact. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 475; see also Cox

v. Cox, 238 N.C. App. 22, 26 (2014) (“The trial court’s conclusions of law must be

supported by adequate findings of fact.”).

      Here, the trial court’s findings of fact begin with general observations that this

case is, and continues to be, high-conflict. The order then notes that a variety of

conflicts and developments have occurred since the entry of the 2020 order: the

management of the case shifting between three separate parenting coordinators;

defendant responding slowly to requests for information by Plaintiff and one of the

parenting coordinators; “hostile” behavior by Defendant toward the same parenting

coordinator; Defendant exposing the children to Plaintiff’s estranged mother, the

boys’ maternal grandmother; an ongoing dispute as to the administration of the eldest

child’s asthma medication; the parties’ younger son having broken his arm;

Defendant having scheduled activities during Plaintiff’s custodial time; Defendant

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and Plaintiff disagreeing as to the appropriateness of the children receiving Covid

vaccines; Plaintiff remarrying; and Plaintiff assuming bad faith on the part of

Defendant.1 The order then notes that the decreased reduction in custodial changes

since the entry of the 12 January 2022 temporary order “has helped reduce some of

the conflict between the parties,” concludes as a matter of law that a substantial

change in circumstances affecting the children had occurred, and orders, inter alia,

that Defendant’s custodial time be permanently reduced to alternate weekends and

that Plaintiff have “final decision-making authority” on “major decisions affecting the

children’s health, education and welfare.”

       Accepting, as we must, the trial court’s unchallenged finding of fact, see James,

242 N.C. at 104, we do not believe the trial court’s findings of fact actually

demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the

children. At the threshold, we note that the absence of meaningful findings as to the

circumstances as they existed at the time of the 30 October 2020 consent order makes

our review difficult, as we cannot determine with certainty what the circumstances,

as the trial court determined them to be, were at the time of that order. Cf. Benedict

v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 377 (1994) (“[T]he [modified order] contains no findings as

to the existing circumstances [at previous points in time]. It contains no findings of

       1 The order also notes that Defendant was “uncooperative” with the parenting coordinator’s

requests that the eldest child regularly attended therapy. However, further findings of fact clarify
that this problem had been resolved at the time of the order’s entry.

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changed circumstances since these dates.”), disapproved of on other grounds by

Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616 (1998); see also Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App.

638, 645 (2013) (marks and citations omitted) (“[W]hen evaluating whether there has

been a substantial change in circumstances, courts may only consider events which

occurred after the entry of the previous order, unless the events were previously

undisclosed to the court.”). Nonetheless, our review of the record and the findings in

the modified order present us with information sufficient to make a determination on

the question of whether a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare

of the children occurred.

      In determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact support a substantial

change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the children, we review two of our

recent custody modification cases, Smith v. Dressler, __ N.C. App. __ (2023), and

Conroy v. Conroy, __ N.C. App. __ (2023), which are particularly instructive, as both

cases turned on the issue of whether a substantial change in circumstances had

occurred. In Smith, the trial court had entered a modified custody order concerning

the parties’ minor child, citing among the purportedly changed circumstances that

the plaintiff had “married, given birth to a child, been honorably discharged from the

Air Force, returned to North Carolina, acquired a home in Wilson, gained proximity

to and more support from her family, and been re-employed by Pfizer,” as well as that

the defendant did not schedule visitation time with some members of the plaintiff’s

family. Smith, __ N.C. App. at __. The trial court also noted that the minor child had

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received a number of injuries while under the defendant’s supervision—injuries the

plaintiff alleged indicated abuse or neglect on the part of the defendant—and that the

defendant had not disclosed a potential Covid infection. Id. at __. We also noted that

“CPS [] found no evidence of abuse after investigating [the] [f]ather at [the] [m]other’s

behest,” which was a factor the trial court had used when deciding whether a

substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Id. at __.

      We vacated and remanded the order on the basis that no substantial change of

circumstances existed. Id. at __. The plaintiff’s marriage, new child, discharge from

the Air Force, and changes in living arrangements and employment had already been

disclosed to the trial court prior to the entry of the previously-effective custody order;

therefore, they did not qualify as substantially changed circumstances since the entry

of the prior order. Id. at __ (“[T]he trial court erred when it considered and re-

evaluated events which were disclosed to and considered by the trial court prior to

the entry of the First Custody Order.”) (citing, inter alia, Woodring, 227 N.C. App. at

645, and Ford v. Wright, 170 N.C. App. 89, 96 (2005)).            Considering only the

remaining changes in circumstances—the injuries to the child alleged to constitute

abuse or neglect—we rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a substantial change in

circumstances affecting the welfare of the child had occurred, noting the absence of

evidence that the injuries to the child were the product of abuse or neglect. Id. at __.

Moreover, we further remarked that, even if we considered the evidence previously

disclosed and addressed in the prior order, that information would not have been

                                          - 18 -
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                                          Opinion of the Court

sufficient to constitute a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of

the child. Id. at __.

        By contrast, in Conroy v. Conroy, the trial court’s findings of fact supporting a

substantial change in circumstances included an escalating pattern of the plaintiff’s

increasingly erratic behavior. While the trial court found that the plaintiff “expressed

significant disdain and contempt for [any] person that she apparently perceived to be

‘against’ her,” Conroy, __ N.C. App. at __, the primary thrust of the trial court’s order

concerned her extreme behaviors toward her children and the defendant. These

behaviors included blaming her thirteen-year-old daughter for issues raised to the

trial court; speaking about the defendant in expletives in the presence of the children;

preventing the children going on a pre-planned trip with the defendant by locking

them inside the home; threatening to call the police on the defendant while her

daughter was riding to soccer practice with the defendant; attempting, in bad faith,

to have the defendant ejected from one of their children’s basketball games; cursing

at, and taking the call phone of, one of her children’s friends for remarks made in the

wake of the November 2020 presidential election2; destroying the children’s

        2 For more complete context, the entirety of the trial court’s finding of fact with respect to

this incident was as follows:

                Following the election of Joe Biden in November 2020, [the plaintiff]
                became offended by a comment made by one of [her son]’s friends. [The
                plaintiff] responded by telling the child in the presence of her own
                minor children that he had “no friends;” by calling him names,
                including a “little shit;” and by confiscating and keeping the child’s cell

                                                  - 19 -
                                        DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                         Opinion of the Court

electronics in front of them as a means of punishment; choking her daughter;

encouraging the children to bully one another; and engaging in otherwise excessive

corporal punishment. Id. at __.

       Although the plaintiff in Conroy argued that these behaviors did not constitute

a substantial change in circumstances because her interpersonal relationships had

always been poor and her behavior toward the defendant had been “erratic and

unpredictable” since at least the entry of the original custody order, id at __, we held

that the parties’ “continued communication problems and their failure or inability to

cooperate and co-parent constituted a substantial change.” Id. at __. In doing so, we

relied primarily on the following excerpt from Laprade v. Barry:

               It is beyond obvious that a parent’s unwillingness or
               inability to communicate in a reasonable manner with the
               other parent regarding their child’s needs may adversely
               affect a child, and the trial court’s findings abundantly
               demonstrate these communication problems and the
               child’s resulting anxiety from her father’s actions. While
               father is correct that this case overall demonstrates a
               woeful refusal or inability of both parties to communicate
               with one another as reasonable adults on many occasions,
               we can find no reason to question the trial court’s finding
               that these communication problems are presently having a
               negative impact on [the minor child’s] welfare that

               phone. Bizarrely, [the plaintiff] brought this child’s mother[] . . . in to
               testify on her behalf. [The mother] testified that her son was so afraid
               of [the plaintiff] after the [i]ncident that her husband had to go to [the
               plaintiff’s] home to retrieve their son’s cell phone on their son’s behalf.
               Throughout her own and [the other mother’s] testimony, [the plaintiff]
               completely failed to recognize any problem with her own behavior
               (directed at a child) and, instead, blamed said child for “provoking” her.

Conroy, __ N.C. App. at __.

                                                 - 20 -
                                       DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                        Opinion of the Court

               constitutes a change of circumstances. In fact, it is
               foreseeable the communication problems are likely to affect
               [the minor child] more and more as she becomes older and
               is engaged in more activities which require parental
               cooperation and as she is more aware of the conflict
               between her parents. Therefore, we conclude that the
               binding findings of fact support the conclusion that there
               was a substantial change of circumstances justifying
               modification of custody.

Laprade v. Barry, 253 N.C. App. 296, 303-04 (2017) (emphasis in original) (citing

Shipman, 357 N.C. at 473-75); id. at __.

       To be sure, the facts of this case fall in a gray area between Smith and Conroy.

Like the plaintiff in Smith, Plaintiff’s arguments to the trial court included a range

of allegations that Defendant had mishandled the health of one of the children,

including allegedly unsafe conduct during the height of the pandemic. Smith, __ N.C.

App. __. And, also as in Smith, a contributing factor in the trial court’s conclusion

that a substantial change affecting the welfare of the children had occurred was

Plaintiff’s remarriage. Id. at __. However, these circumstances alone, especially in

the absence of a finding of the remarriage’s impact on the minor children’s wellbeing,

does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances.3 See id. at __; see also

Hassell v. Means, 42 N.C. App. 524, 531 (“Remarriage in and of itself is not a sufficient

change of circumstance to justify modification of a child custody order.”), disc. rev.

denied, 298 N.C. 568 (1979); Kelly v. Kelly, 77 N.C. App. 632, 636 (1985) (“Remarriage

       3 We also note that the Plaintiff’s remarriage had occurred in March 2019, well before the entry

of the October 2020 consent order.

                                               - 21 -
                                       DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                        Opinion of the Court

without a finding of fact indicating the effect of remarriage on a child is not a

sufficient change of circumstance to justify modification of a child custody order.”).

Moreover, like in Smith, ordinary injury and response to common illness are not

themselves sufficient to constitute a substantial change in circumstances affecting

the wellbeing of the children. Smith, __ N.C. App. at __.

      Meanwhile, this case also shares a number of salient features with Conroy,

most notably in the trial court’s observation of deteriorating communication between

the parties. Defendant, like the plaintiff in Conroy, has, according to the trial court’s

findings, developed a contentious relationship with, and wariness of, other

participants in the case,4 see Conroy, __ N.C. App. __, and has reacted negatively

toward them on a number of occasions. Similar to the findings of fact in Conroy, the

trial court described decision-making conflicts over                 major parenting decisions

between the parties as “ongoing” and noted the “case continue[d] to be high-conflict”;

however, unlike in Conroy, a significant portion of the negative communications

      4 Including, perhaps, the trial court:

              [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL:] . . . I’m going to implore you to please,
              you know, give Mr. -- give what Mr. Durbin says a fair shake. I know
              that he’s been in front of you several times and you’ve been very
              displeased with him in past hearings, but I’m asking for you to let that
              go for a little bit, listen to what he says, and take it seriously. Thank
              you.

              THE COURT: For the record, the Court will note that the court listens
              to all parties in every hearing, takes everything’ seriously, and makes
              decisions upon the evidence. So the Court will take exception to the
              statement otherwise.

                                               - 22 -
                                        DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                         Opinion of the Court

noted by the trial court in its findings of fact were directed at, or involved, the

parenting coordinator. Also unlike in Conroy, no specific findings linked the parties’

negative communication to the wellbeing of the children; and, in fact, the instances

of conflict actually discussed by the trial court all appear to have been

communications to which the children were not privy. But see Conroy, __ N.C. App.

at __ (noting among the trial court’s findings of fact that the plaintiff’s “significant

disdain and contempt for” others, including that voiced in front of the minor children,

involved in the case resulted in direct distress to—and, at times, punishment of—the

minor children); Laprade, 253 N.C. App. at 301 (noting among the trial court’s

findings of fact that the defendant’s behavior toward the child with relation to the

parties’ conflicts led to high anxiety in the parties’ minor child).

      Indeed, the only findings directly concerning the children’s wellbeing with

relation to the parties’ conflicts were the broad observations in findings 27 through

29.5 These findings, however, relate to the reduction in conflict between the parties

      5 These findings read, in full, as follows:

              27. The amount of conflict between the parties is not in the children’s
              best interest, but neither party seems capable of reducing the conflict.

              28. Since the entry of the [12 January] 2022, temporary order, there
              have been fewer custodial exchanges between the parties. The
              reduction in exchanges has helped reduce some of the conflict between
              the parties.

              29. Defendant and his mother both testified that the boys seem “sad”
              to him. However, [the parties’ elder son] is doing so well in therapy
              that he can decrease the frequency of his appointments.

                                                - 23 -
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                   Opinion of the Court

and not to any specific impact on the wellbeing of the children, limiting the relation

between the two to a cursory note about conflict not being in the children’s best

interest. The only finding of the three involving the wellbeing of the children pertains

to the eldest son’s progress in therapy—treatment which, by the trial court’s own

findings, was supported without conflict by both parties as of the time of the order’s

entry.

         While it may be “obvious that a parent’s unwillingness or inability to

communicate in a reasonable manner with the other parent regarding their child’s

needs may adversely affect [the] child,” see Laprade, 253 N.C. App. at 303, it is also

not to be presumed from the mere existence of an ongoing conflict that the conflict

adversely affects the child, especially where the trial court’s findings of fact actually

suggest the children were relatively insulated from the conflict. This is especially

true where, as here, both boys are active teenagers approaching adulthood, can

articulate their preferences for themselves, and can take far more responsibility for

their activities and schedules than a younger child could.

         Nor is it the case that conflict between a party and a prior parenting

coordinator necessarily constitutes a substantial change in circumstances affecting

the welfare of the child. Parenting coordinators serve an important function on behalf

of our courts, see generally N.C.G.S. § 50-92 (2023), but they are, ultimately,

                                          - 24 -
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                  Opinion of the Court

susceptible to human error and bias, especially when their station requires involving

themselves in their assignees’ emotionally-charged conflicts. Such susceptibility is

especially present when a disparity exists in the parents’ ability to manage the optics

of the communications to which the parenting coordinator is exposed and

advantageously leverage the necessary, yet inorganic, rules of engagement presented

by court-ordered custodial arrangements. For this reason, conflict between a party

and a parenting coordinator is not per se evidence of impact on minor children whose

custody is involved in that case. Were it otherwise, a trial court may be tempted to

modify a custody order out of mere logistical convenience to itself and its coordinator

appointees, rather than acting with due concern for a disfavored parent’s

“fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his

or her children . . . .” Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 60 (2001) (marks omitted)

(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).

      The trial court’s conclusion that “there has been a substantial change in

circumstances that adversely affects the minor children” is not supported by its

findings of fact; we therefore reverse the trial court’s modification order. Ford, 170

N.C. App. at 96. Having so held, Defendant’s arguments as to the best interests of

the children and the legal status of the custodial arrangement ordered by the trial

court are moot. Roberts v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass’n, Inc., 344 N.C. 394, 398-99

(1996) (marks and citations omitted) (“A case is moot when a determination is sought

on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing

                                         - 25 -
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                  Opinion of the Court

controversy.”)

                                   CONCLUSION

      The trial court’s modification of child custody was not supported by a

substantial change in circumstances affecting the children’s wellbeing, and we

therefore reverse the order of the trial court. Ford, 170 N.C. App. at 96.

      REVERSED.

      Judge TYSON concurs.

      Judge COLLINS dissents by separate opinion.

                                         - 26 -
 No. COA23-308–Durbin v. Durbin

      COLLINS, Judge, dissenting.

      I would affirm the trial court’s order granting primary decision-making

authority and primary physical custody to Plaintiff. I therefore respectfully dissent.

                                    I.    Background

      Plaintiff and Defendant were married on 26 May 2007. They had two children

together, Charles, born in 2008, and Timothy, born in 2010.6 On 23 September 2016,

the parties separated. They entered into a consent order for child custody and child

support on 9 February 2017 (“Initial Consent Order”) wherein they agreed to share

legal and physical custody of the children and to various other custody terms.

      Plaintiff filed a motion to modify child custody on or around 27 October 2020.

The trial court entered a consent order on 30 October 2020 (“Permanent Custody

Order”) maintaining all the terms of the Initial Consent Order but adding a term

specifically providing for the appointment of a parenting coordinator. The parties

entered into a consent order on 15 December 2020 appointing Tiffany Lesnik (“PC”

or “Parenting Coordinator”) as their parenting coordinator for a one-year term. The

parties gave the PC authority over the following: transition time/pickup/delivery;

sharing of vacations and holidays; method of pickup and delivery; transportation to

and from visitation; participation in child care/daycare and baby-sitting; bed time;

diet; clothing; recreation; before and after school activities; extracurricular activities;

      6 We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the minor children.   See N.C. R. App. P. 42.
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                 COLLINS, J., dissenting.

discipline; health care management; alterations in schedule which do not

substantially interfere with the basic time share agreement; participation in

visitation, including significant others and relatives; telephone contact; alterations to

appearance, including tattoos or piercings; the children’s passports; and education.

      Defendant filed motions on 30 April 2021 to modify or terminate the PC’s

appointment as their parenting coordinator and for an expedited review of two of the

PC’s decisions concerning the parties’ summer 2021 custodial schedule. In June 2021,

Defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees and for apportionment of the PC’s fees

between the parties. Defendant’s motions came on for hearing on 8 July 2021. The

trial court entered an order on 2 August 2021 finding, in pertinent part:

             10. Defendant testified that approximately eight (8)
             parenting coordinator decisions made between January 14,
             2021 and April 13, 2021 created unnecessary confusion and
             conflict between the parties. Additionally, the decisions
             concerning the 2021 summer schedule created an unequal
             distribution of days between the parties which Defendant
             testified was not the intent of the Custody Order because
             the Custody Order intends the parties to share equal
             physical custody of their minor children.
             ....
             13. The Parent Coordinator’s decisions were based on
             rational and reasonable consideration of the children’s best
             interests, and the Parent Coordinator communicated with
             the children’s school, both parents, and the minor child’s
             therapist in reaching her decisions.
             14. The Parent Coordinator’s decisions did not
             substantially alter the time-sharing arrangement set forth
             in the custody order.
             15. The Court finds the parenting coordinator’s March 1,

                                            2
                                         DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                       COLLINS, J., dissenting.

                2021 decision concerning Father’s Day weekend and the
                alterations to the custodial schedule during the summer of
                2021 were reasonable.
                16. The parties are high conflict.
                17. The parties will benefit from the continued services of
                a parenting coordinator. . . .

        The trial court thus declined to modify the PC’s decisions, denied Defendant’s

motion to modify or terminate the PC’s appointment, dismissed Defendant’s motion

for attorney’s fees, and held Defendant responsible for the PC’s fees related to the

hearing.

        The PC filed a Parenting Coordinator’s report7 (“first report”) on 24 September

2021,8 alleging problems with the current custody arrangement, requesting a change

in custody, suggesting that Defendant undergo a psychological evaluation, and

requesting an expedited hearing. A hearing on the report was set for 27 October

2021.

        On 8 October 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to modify child custody, seeking to

modify the Permanent Custody Order.

        7 “The parenting coordinator may file a report with the court regarding any of the following:

(1) The parenting coordinator’s belief that the existing custody order is not in the best interests of the
child. (2) The parenting coordinator’s determination that the parenting coordinator is not qualified to
address or resolve certain issues in the case. (3) A party’s noncompliance with a decision of the
parenting coordinator or the terms of the custody order. (4) The parenting coordinator’s fees as set
forth in G.S. 50-95. (5) The parenting coordinator’s request that the parenting coordinator’s
appointment be modified or terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-97(a) (2021).
        8 The PC’s first report is not in the record.

                                                    3
                                         DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                       COLLINS, J., dissenting.

        Defendant filed a Motion for Psychological Evaluation on 19 October 2021,

moving for an order requiring Plaintiff to submit to a psychological evaluation.

Defendant alleged that the PC had filed a report “suggest[ing] Defendant should

undergo a psychological evaluation” but that “Plaintiff exhibits many behaviors that

are to the detriment of the minor children, and Defendant’s ability to co-parent with

her” and the “[PC] is, for some reason, hyper focused on Defendant, and refuses to

hold Plaintiff accountable for any of her erratic and harmful behavior.”

        The PC’s first report came on for hearing on 27 October 2021. On 8 December

2021, the PC filed a second Parenting Coordinator’s report (“second report”) with the

court detailing problems with the Permanent Custody Order and requesting an

expedited hearing.9 The PC’s appointment as the parties’ Parenting Coordinator

expired on 15 December 2021. The second report came on for hearing on 10 January

2022.

        By order entered 11 January 2022, the trial court appointed Lisa Lefante as

the parties’ parenting coordinator for a term of two years. The order noted that the

parties had not consented to the appointment of a parenting coordinator, that the

matter was a high-conflict case, and that the appointment of the parenting

coordinator was in the best interests of the children.            The second parenting

        9 The PC’s second report is not in the record.

                                                   4
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                 COLLINS, J., dissenting.

coordinator had the same scope of authority as the PC, with the addition of authority

over the minor children’s therapy.

      The following day, 12 January 2022, the trial court entered a Temporary Order

for Child Custody (“First Temporary Order”) based upon its hearing of the PC’s first

report. The trial court found, in relevant part, as follows:

             8. There is an ongoing conflict between the parties that is
             interfering with important decisions being made that affect
             the health, education and welfare of the minor children.
             9. On or about April 9, 2021, the PC contacted the
             Defendant and asked for some basic information about his
             positive COVID test, including when he tested positive,
             whether anyone else lived with him, and if anyone in his
             home had tested positive. The PC’s questions were
             reasonable under the circumstances.
             10. Defendant reacted with hostility, refusing to respond to
             the questions, demanding to know why she needed medical
             information, accusing the PC of breaching his trust, calling
             her questions “bizarre,” and accusing the PC of colluding in
             a “witch hunt” with Plaintiff.
             11. Defendant ultimately provided answers to the PC’s
             questions after several days, but his delay in responding
             was unreasonable and his hostile response was
             inappropriate.
             12. On September 23, 2021, the Defendant contacted the
             Plaintiff claiming he was dealing with a “behavioral issue”
             with [Charles] and wanting to review the phone and text
             logs for [Charles’s] phone.
             13. When the PC contacted the parties and asked Mr.
             Durbin to provide some information on what the
             “behavioral issue” was so that the parties could address it
             in a uniform manner, Defendant refused to provide any
             information. Further, Defendant’s response on September
             24, 2021, at 9:40 a.m., was hostile, telling the PC neither

                                            5
                    DURBIN V. DURBIN

                   COLLINS, J., dissenting.

she [n]or Plaintiff were “ready for co-parenting,” accusing
the PC of lying, and threatening to “limit or cease
[Charles’s] cell phone usage” if he didn’t get what he
wanted.
14. Defendant’s response was unproductive and hostile and
the Court has serious concerns about his ability to coparent
with the Plaintiff.
15. There are issues with the children attending therapy as
recommended. Specifically:
      a. The minor children are both in therapy at 3C
      Family Services. [Charles’s] therapist is Brian
      Mackey. [Timothy’s] therapist is Jennifer Hayden.
      Both children have attended therapy regularly for
      over a year and both children have a good rapport
      with their individual therapists.
      b. Dr. Mackey, [Charles’s] therapist, had
      recommended that [Charles] attend therapy weekly.
      [Charles] suffers from anxiety.
      c.
      d. There have been ongoing problems scheduling
      appointments for [Charles] during the Defendant’s
      custodial time going back to October 2020. The
      Defendant complained about appointments being
      scheduled during his custodial time or scheduled
      during school hours.
      e. As a result of the conflict, [Charles] had numerous
      cancelled therapy appointments during 2021 and as
      of the hearing date, half of all remaining therapy
      appointments were cancelled for the rest of the year.
      f. Defendant was previously held in contempt for
      interfering with the children’s therapy.
      g. The Court finds that it is immaterial whose
      custodial time the children’s therapy appointments
      are scheduled on, so long as the children are
      receiving therapy as directed by the therapists.
16. There has been an ongoing dispute between the parties

                              6
                    DURBIN V. DURBIN

                  COLLINS, J., dissenting.

about the children’s medical conditions and the consistent
administration of prescribed medications. Specifically:
      a. [Charles] has asthma and serious allergies
      requiring him to use inhalers on a regular basis and
      to carry an Epipen at all times.
      b. The Plaintiff had contacted the PC on more than
      one occasion to voice concerns about Defendant’s
      failure to administer the child’s medication as
      prescribed.
      c. On July 29, 2021, the PC issued a directive on the
      medication issue. The email said, in relevant part, “I
      am going to ask you both to keep a medication
      administration chart while [Charles] is with you
      that will indicate: The medication administered, the
      amount, the date and the time.”
      d. Despite [Charles’s] diagnosed medical problems,
      and the PC’s directive, the conflict over the child’s
      medication continued. Defendant did not maintain
      the medication log, made the child maintain the
      medication log, told Plaintiff and the PC that the
      child (who is 12) was responsible for his own
      medication, and argued with both Plaintiff and PC
      in multiple emails rather than simply make sure
      [Charles] received his medication and maintaining
      the log so that both parents could make sure that
      they were consistent and coordinated in their
      administration of medication for [Charles].
      e. Defendant’s refusal to comply with the PC’s
      directive had an adverse effect on [Charles’s] health
      and was not in the child’s best interest.
17. The minor children attend two different schools.
[Charles] attends Oberlin Middle School while [Timothy]
attends The Raleigh School. The schools operate on two
slightly different schedules when it comes to teacher
workdays and holidays so that there are instances when
one child does have school and the other does not on a
specific day or days.
18. While the order is clear that the Raleigh School

                             7
                                        DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                      COLLINS, J., dissenting.

               calendar controls for determining holiday and vacation
               days for the children, there have been repeated disputes
               and problems with determining custodial exchange times
               and days. This conflict over the school schedules has served
               to increase the conflict between the parties.
               19. The Defendant has been hostile to the Parent
               Coordinator. He has frequently resorted to calling her a
               liar, threatened to file grievances with the State Bar, has
               responded to the PC’s questions about mundane issues
               with transcripts of prior court hearings and claims that the
               PC has lied, misled the court, colluded with Plaintiff and
               Plaintiff’s counsel.
               20. Defendant’s aggressive and hostile responses to the PC
               are inappropriate. The Court previously found that the PC
               was acting appropriately and was to remain in place until
               the end of her appointed term. The PC is due cooperation
               and respect from both parties, and the appropriate
               response of a party to a disagreement with the PC is to
               bring it to the Court, not to attempt to threaten and
               intimidate the Parent Coordinator.
               21. The parties[’] inability to communicate with one
               another effectively make it appropriate to require them to
               utilize Our Family Wizard for all non-emergency
               communications.
               22. The Court finds that the above listed findings
               constitute a substantial change in circumstances
               warranting the entry of a temporary custody order
               modifying the terms of the October 2020 Permanent
               Custody Order.

       Upon these findings, the trial court concluded that “it is appropriate and in the

best interests of the minor children to enter a temporary custody order.” 10 The trial

       10 See N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-97(d) (2021) (“The court, after a hearing on the parenting

coordinator’s report, shall be authorized to issue temporary custody orders as may be required for a
child’s best interests.”).

                                                  8
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                COLLINS, J., dissenting.

court thus ordered, in pertinent part, as follows: the parties continue to share joint

legal custody but Plaintiff shall have final decision-making authority; Plaintiff have

primary physical custody and Defendant have visitation “on alternate weekends from

the end of school Friday until the beginning of school Monday morning”; the parties

comply with the PC’s directive on the children’s medication; and Defendant not to

threaten, insult, or harass the PC, and not to use abusive language in his

communication with her. Any provisions of the Permanent Custody Order and PC

directives not modified by the First Temporary Order remained in effect.

      The trial court entered another Temporary Order for Child Custody (“Second

Temporary Order”) on 9 February 2022, based on the 10 January 2022 hearing on the

PC’s second report. The trial court found, in relevant part, as follows:

             9. At the prior hearing on the Parent Coordinator’[s] first
             report to the Court, the Court found that the Defendant
             was aggressive and threatening toward the Parent
             Coordinator and ordered him to stop using hostile language
             and threatening the PC.
             10. Following the hearing on the first PC report the
             Defendant took the following actions:
                    a. Defendant filed a bar grievance against the
                    Parent Coordinator[.]
                    b. Defendant, through counsel, undertook extensive
                    discovery including requests for production of
                    documents requiring the Parent Coordinator to
                    spend more than 10 hours producing hundreds of
                    pages of emails, including all her emails with the
                    Defendant.
                    c. Defendant’s counsel noticed the Parent
                    Coordinator to appear and testify at a deposition.

                                           9
                                DURBIN V. DURBIN

                               COLLINS, J., dissenting.

                   Counsel would not provide the Parent Coordinator,
                   whose term had expired, why having her sit for a
                   deposition would be productive.
                   d. Defendant threatened to file a motion for
                   sanctions against the Parent Coordinator.
                   e. Immediately after the last hearing, the Defendant
                   informed the minor children of changes in the
                   custodial schedule prior to any order having been
                   submitted, causing distress to the children. He did
                   not inform the Plaintiff in advance that he was going
                   to tell the children about the litigation.
            11. The Defendant has been intent on getting the Parent
            Coordinator removed, beginning with his Motion to Modify
            or Terminate Parent Coordinator’s Appointment filed on
            April 30, 2021.
            12. The Defendant’s actions, including those actions by and
            through counsel, directed at the Parent Coordinator are, in
            the Court’s view, retaliatory.
            13. While the Parent Coordinator has done an excellent job
            in her role, the Court is concerned that because of the
            Defendant’s tactics and animosity, she cannot be effective
            in her role going forward. The Court also does not want to
            expose the Parent Coordinator to further retaliatory
            actions by the Defendant.
            ....
            20. There is an ongoing conflict between the parties that is
            interfering with important decisions being made that affect
            the health, education and welfare of the minor children.
            21. The Court finds that the above listed findings
            constitute a substantial change in circumstances
            warranting the entry of a temporary custody order
            modifying the terms of the October 2020 Permanent
            Custody Order.

      Based upon its findings, the trial court concluded that it was appropriate and

in the best interests of the minor children to enter a temporary custody order. The

                                         10
                                 DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                COLLINS, J., dissenting.

trial court maintained the custody provisions from the First Temporary Order but

modified the parenting coordinator.

      Plaintiff’s motion to modify the Permanent Custody Order came on for hearing

on 3 March 2022. By order entered 8 July 2022 (“Order on Appeal”), the trial court

concluded that there had been a substantial change in circumstances that adversely

affected the minor children since entry of the Permanent Custody Order, and that

modification of the Permanent Custody Order was warranted.

      The trial court made 32 findings of fact, some with sub-findings; the relevant

findings of fact are recited above by the majority. Upon its conclusion that there had

been a substantial change in circumstances adversely affecting the minor children

since entry of the Permanent Custody Order, and that a modification of the

permanent custody order was warranted, the trial court essentially ordered the

custody terms of the First Temporary Order and the Second Temporary Order become

permanent.

      Defendant appealed.

                                 II.      Analysis

      Defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a

substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children and that

modification was in the best interest of the children, and by awarding primary

decision-making authority to Plaintiff.

                   It is well established in this jurisdiction that a trial

                                           11
                     DURBIN V. DURBIN

                    COLLINS, J., dissenting.

court may order a modification of an existing child custody
order between two natural parents if the party moving for
modification shows that a substantial change of
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child warrants a
change in custody. The party seeking to modify a custody
order need not allege that the change in circumstances had
an adverse effect on the child.          While allegations
concerning adversity are acceptable factors for the trial
court to consider and will support modification, a showing
of a change in circumstances that is, or is likely to be,
beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in
custody.

       ....

       The trial court’s examination of whether to modify
an existing child custody order is twofold. The trial court
must determine whether there was a change in
circumstances and then must examine whether such a
change affected the minor child. If the trial court concludes
either that a substantial change has not occurred or that a
substantial change did occur but that it did not affect the
minor child’s welfare, the court’s examination ends, and no
modification can be ordered. If, however, the trial court
determines that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of
the child, the court must then examine whether a change
in custody is in the child’s best interests. If the trial court
concludes that modification is in the child’s best interests,
only then may the court order a modification of the original
custody order.

       When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or
deny a motion for the modification of an existing child
custody order, the appellate courts must examine the trial
court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.

       ....

                              12
                                 DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                COLLINS, J., dissenting.

                    In addition to evaluating whether a trial court’s
             findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, this
             Court must determine if the trial court’s factual findings
             support its conclusions of law. With regard to the trial
             court’s conclusions of law, our case law indicates that the
             trial court must determine whether there has been a
             substantial change in circumstances and whether that
             change affected the minor child. Upon concluding that
             such a change affects the child’s welfare, the trial court
             must then decide whether a modification of custody was in
             the child’s best interests. If we determine that the trial
             court has properly concluded that the facts show that a
             substantial change of circumstances has affected the
             welfare of the minor child and that modification was in the
             child’s best interests, we will defer to the trial court’s
             judgment and not disturb its decision to modify an existing
             custody agreement.

Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 473-75, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253-54 (2003) (quotation

marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

A. Change of Circumstances

      When considering a party’s request to modify a custody order, “courts must

consider and weigh all evidence of changed circumstances which affect or will affect

the best interests of the child, both changed circumstances which will have salutary

effects upon the child and those which will have adverse effects upon the child. In

appropriate cases, either may support a modification of custody on the ground of a

change in circumstances.” Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 619, 501 S.E.2d 898, 899

(1998).   Where “the effects of the change on the welfare of the child are not

self-evident,” it “necessitate[s] a showing of evidence directly linking the change to

the welfare of the child[,]” and requires that “the trial court make findings of fact

                                           13
                                 DURBIN V. DURBIN

                               COLLINS, J., dissenting.

regarding that connection.”   Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255, 256

(emphasis omitted).

      Defendant argues that no evidence was presented and no findings of fact were

made to establish the circumstances that existed in October 2020 when the Initial

Custody Order was entered. I agree with the majority that “the Record and the

findings in the [Order on Appeal] present us with information sufficient to make a

determination on the question of whether a substantial change in circumstances

affecting the welfare of the child occurred.”    Therefore, I too reject Defendant’s

argument.

      Defendant next argues that there was no substantial change in circumstances.

I disagree with Defendant’s argument and the majority’s analysis on this issue.

      The trial court’s findings show a high level of conflict between the parties,

primarily caused by Defendant, that has interfered with important actions being

taken and important decisions being made, which has negatively affected the health

and welfare of the minor children. Defendant has been uncooperative and hostile

toward Plaintiff: Defendant refused to timely respond to Plaintiff’s request for

information; Defendant began having the children speak with Plaintiff’s estranged

mother, over Plaintiff’s objections; Defendant failed to timely administer Charles’s

asthma medication and then refused to keep a medication chart detailing the amount,

the date, and the time of Charles’s medication administration to ensure Charles

received his medication; Defendant misrepresented to Plaintiff what the doctor’s

                                         14
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                 COLLINS, J., dissenting.

recommendation was regarding the children’s COVID vaccines, delaying them

getting vaccinated; and Defendant failed to communicate with Plaintiff before

scheduling the children’s activities during Plaintiff’s custodial time.

       Similarly, Defendant was uncooperative and hostile toward the PC: Defendant

refused or delayed in responding to the PC’s request for information, including

refusing to respond to the PC’s request for basic information regarding his positive

COVID test; Defendant refused to provide the PC with information regarding his

son’s alleged “behavior issue” and instead told her that neither she nor Plaintiff were

“ready for co-parenting”; Defendant was uncooperative with the PC’s attempts to

ensure that Charles was receiving regular therapy; and Defendant refused the PC’s

directive to keep a medication chart to ensure that Charles timely and consistently

received his asthma medication.

       The findings show that Defendant’s uncooperative and hostile behavior has

negatively affected the children: Charles did not appropriately receive his asthma

medication when with Defendant; Defendant’s refusal to keep a medication chart to

help ensure that Charles consistently received his medication put Charles’s health at

risk; the children were delayed in receiving their COVID vaccinations; both children

are in therapy; and there were difficulties scheduling Charles’s therapy.

Furthermore, as noted in prior cases, conflict between parents affect children

differently as they become older, involved in more activities, and are more aware of

the conflicts:

                                           15
                                   DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                 COLLINS, J., dissenting.

             It is beyond obvious that a parent’s unwillingness or
             inability to communicate in a reasonable manner with the
             other parent regarding their child’s needs may adversely
             affect a child, and the trial court’s findings abundantly
             demonstrate these communication problems and the
             child’s resulting anxiety from her father’s actions. While
             father is correct that this case overall demonstrates a
             woeful refusal or inability of both parties to communicate
             with one another as reasonable adults on many occasions,
             we can find no reason to question the trial court’s finding
             that these communication problems are presently having a
             negative impact on Reagan’s welfare that constitutes a
             change of circumstances. In fact, it is foreseeable the
             communication problems are likely to affect Reagan more
             and more as she becomes older and is engaged in more
             activities which require parental cooperation and as she is
             more aware of the conflict between her parents. Therefore,
             we conclude that the binding findings of fact support the
             conclusion that there was a substantial change of
             circumstances justifying modification of custody. This
             argument is overruled.

Laprade v. Barry, 253 N.C. App. 296, 303-04, 800 S.E.2d 112, 117 (2017) (emphasis

and citation omitted); see also Shell v. Shell, 261 N.C. App. 30, 37, 819 S.E.2d 566,

572 (2018) (“Here, the trial court specifically noted the changes in communication

and cooperation since the 2012 order. Although the parties had always had trouble

communicating, Father had become even less willing to cooperate with Mother.”).

      There is no support for the majority’s assertion that “the trial court’s findings

of fact actually suggest the children were relatively insulated from the conflict” and

it is naïve to think that the children have been or could be insulated from this conflict.

Joint decision making and shared custody–with the children frequently going back

and forth between parents–requires a high level of parental cooperation. Just as in

                                           16
                                    DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                 COLLINS, J., dissenting.

Laprade, “it is beyond obvious” here that the high level of conflict caused by

Defendant has taken its toll on the children’s welfare, including directly impeding

Plaintiff’s ability to parent and co-parent the children. Laprade, 253 N.C. App. at

303-04, 800 S.E.2d at 117. Furthermore, just as in Laprade, it is foreseeable that the

conflict is likely to continue to affect the children more and more as they become older.

Id. at 304, 800 S.E.2d at 117.

      The trial court also made findings of fact regarding circumstances that

positively affected the children.    Since the entry of the First Temporary Order,

wherein Plaintiff was given primary custody of the children and Defendant given

alternate weekend visitation, “there have been fewer custodial exchanges between

the parties. The reduction in exchanges has helped reduce some of the conflict

between the parties.” Furthermore, Charles “is doing so well in therapy that he can

decrease the frequency of his appointments.” Additionally, Plaintiff has remarried,

and her new husband has “very positive relationships with the children.” These

findings show the “changed circumstances which [had] salutary effects” on the

children. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 619, 501 S.E.2d at 899.

      The findings of fact are amply supported by the record evidence, including: the

hearing testimony; court filings included in the record on appeal, including the Initial

Consent Agreement, Permanent Custody Order, First Temporary Order, and Second

Temporary Order; and the documentary exhibits, including numerous emails

between the parties and between parties and the PC.

                                           17
                                        DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                      COLLINS, J., dissenting.

       The majority suggests that the conflict between the Defendant and the PC may

have been a result of the PC’s “error and bias” and that Plaintiff manipulated the

communications with the PC to Plaintiff’s advantage.11 Essentially, the majority lays

the blame for Defendant’s conduct on Plaintiff. There is no basis in the record to

support the majority’s position and the majority’s conjecture was soundly rejected by

the trial court in its intermediate orders, none of which are challenged on appeal.

       “[I]n custody cases, the trial court sees the parties in person and listens to all

the witnesses.” Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 63, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001)

(citation omitted). With this perspective, the trial court is able “to observe the

demeanor of the witnesses and determine their credibility, the weight to be given

their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Yurek v.

Shaffer, 198 N.C. App. 67, 80, 678 S.E.2d 738, 747 (2009) (citations omitted). This

opportunity of observation “allows the trial court to detect tenors, tones and flavors

that are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges.”

Adams, 354 N.C. at 63, 550 S.E.2d at 503 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

       11 The majority writes, “Parenting coordinators serve an important function on behalf of our

courts, see generally N.C.G.S. § 50-92 (2021), but they are, ultimately, susceptible to human error
and bias, especially when their station requires involving themselves in their assignees’ emotionally-
charged conflicts. Such susceptibility is especially present when a disparity exists in the parents’
ability to manage the optics of the communications to which the parenting coordinator is exposed
and advantageously leverage the necessary yet inorganic rules of engagement presented by court-
ordered custodial arrangements.”

                                                 18
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                COLLINS, J., dissenting.

      The record in this case includes evidence of Defendant’s disruptive

litigiousness and the trial court’s orders consistently rejecting Defendant’s claims.

Defendant filed a motion on 30 April 2021 to review two of the PC’s decisions.

Defendant also filed a motion to modify or terminate the PC’s appointment.

Defendant then filed a motion for attorney’s fees and to apportion the PC’s fees

between the parties.    At the hearing on his motions, “Defendant testified that

approximately eight (8) parenting coordinator decisions made between January 14,

2021 and April 13, 2021 created unnecessary confusion and conflict between the

parties. Additionally, the decisions concerning the 2021 summer schedule created an

unequal distribution of days between the parties . . . .” The trial court, in denying

Defendant’s motions, found that the PC’s decisions were “based on rational and

reasonable consideration of the children’s best interests” and “did not substantially

alter the time-sharing arrangement set forth in the custody order,” and that the

parties would continue to benefit from the continuing services of a parenting

coordinator.

      The PC filed a report on 24 September 2021 detailing numerous problems with

the permanent custody order and suggesting that Defendant receive a psychological

evaluation. In response, Defendant moved the trial court to order Plaintiff to undergo

a psychological evaluation, alleging that “Plaintiff exhibits many behaviors that are

to the detriment of the minor children, and Defendant’s ability to co-parent with her,”

and that “[a]n evaluation of Plaintiff would substantially assist the Court in its

                                          19
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                 COLLINS, J., dissenting.

determination of whether Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to parent the minor

children.”

      After a hearing on 27 October 2021 on the PC’s first report, Defendant engaged

in the following litigation, characterized as “retaliatory” by the trial court: Defendant

filed a bar grievance against the PC; Defendant undertook extensive discovery

requiring the PC to spend more than 10 hours producing hundreds of pages of emails,

including all her emails with the Defendant; Defendant noticed the PC to appear and

testify at a deposition; and Defendant threatened to file a motion for sanctions against

the PC. Also, immediately following that hearing, Defendant unilaterally informed

the minor children of changes in the custodial schedule prior to any order having been

submitted, causing distress to the children. The trial court found that Defendant

“was aggressive and threatening toward the Parent Coordinator” and “ordered

[Defendant] to stop using hostile language and threatening the PC.”

      The trial court’s First Temporary Order, issued after a hearing on the PC’s first

report, made numerous findings regarding Defendant’s hostile and disruptive

behavior which negatively affected the children’s physical and mental health, most of

which were included in the Order on Appeal.

      These intermediate orders, none of which are challenged on appeal, establish

that Defendant’s pattern of litigious, uncooperative, and hostile conduct, and

Defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the PC, adversely affected the children’s health,

                                           20
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                COLLINS, J., dissenting.

and that Defendant’s involvement of the children in the litigation caused distress to

the children.

      Furthermore, the findings of fact supported the trial court’s conclusions of law

that since the entry of the last custody order there has been a substantial change in

circumstances that adversely affects the minor children and a modification of the

permanent custody order is warranted.

      Defendant argues essentially that because this case has always been high

conflict and because he has always been difficult, there has been no substantial

change in circumstances. However, the findings of fact do not evidence a mere

continuation of conflict and Defendant’s poor behavior; the findings show an increase

in both, starting after entry of the Permanent Custody Order and continuing to

escalate until the entry of the First Temporary Order changing the terms of the

custody. Moreover, even if this case presented merely a sustained high level of

conflict caused by Defendant’s continuous difficult behavior over a period of time, the

effect of the conflict and behavior has led to a substantial change in the parenting

coordinator’s and Plaintiff’s ability to deflect and absorb such conflict and ensure the

health and well-being of the children.      This substantial change has negatively

affected the children.

B. Best Interests

      “Upon determining that a substantial change in circumstances affecting the

welfare of the minor child occurred, a trial court must then determine whether

                                          21
                                      DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                  COLLINS, J., dissenting.

modification would serve to promote the child’s best interests.” Shipman, 357 N.C.

at 481, 586 S.E.2d at 257 (citation omitted). Trial courts are “vested with broad

discretion in custody cases and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.”

Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527, 530, 655 S.E.2d 901, 903 (2008) (citation omitted).

       As detailed above, the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

record evidence. Moreover, the findings of fact amply support its conclusion of law

that modification of the Permanent Custody Order would serve the children’s best

interests.

C. Primary Decision Making

       “[North   Carolina]    trial    courts    have   wide   latitude   in   distributing

decision-making authority between the parties based on the specifics of a case.”

Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 17, 707 S.E.2d 724, 736 (2011) (citation

omitted). The trial court’s deviation from pure joint legal custody is reviewed on

appeal for abuse of discretion, but “a trial court’s findings of fact must support the

court’s exercise of this discretion.” Id.

       Here, the trial court ordered as follows:

              The parties shall continue to share joint legal custody. The
              parties shall in good faith confer and attempt to mutually
              agree on major decisions affecting the children’s health,
              education and welfare. In the event the parties are unable
              to reach mutual agreement on a major decision, the
              Plaintiff shall have final decision-making authority.
              Day-to-day decisions shall be made by the custodial parent.

                                            22
                                  DURBIN V. DURBIN

                                COLLINS, J., dissenting.

      This decision was supported by sufficient findings of fact to show that such a

decision was warranted, namely, Defendant’s extensive history of misconduct and

refusal to cooperate with Plaintiff and the PC. As discussed above, the trial court

made findings of fact detailing past conflict between the parties which illustrate

Defendant’s hostility and refusal to cooperate and the effect Defendant’s misconduct

had on the minor children.

      Defendant has failed to show that the trial court’s decision giving final

decision-making authority to Plaintiff on major issues involving the children was

manifestly unsupported by reason or that it could not have been the result of a

reasoned decision. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err.

                                          23