Court Opinion

ID: 9881920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 17:19:26.271446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.730766
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/4/23 Richter v. Manber CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 YEHUDA RICHTER et al.,                                            B320605

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. 21STPB05075)
           v.

 MARK MANBER,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ruben N. Garcia and Edward M. Ross,
Judges. Affirmed.
      Altshuler & Spiro, Bruce J. Altshuler for Appellant Yehuda
Richter.
      Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach for Appellants
Ingeborg Manber, Helen Manber, Edward Solomon and Benjamin
Solomon.
       Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Adam F. Streisand,
Golnaz Yazdchi, Valerie E. Alter for Respondent Mark Manber.
       Probate Code section 172001 authorizes “a trustee or
beneficiary of a trust” to petition the court regarding the internal
affairs of a trust, allowing such persons to seek relief including
construction of the trust instrument, redress for breaches of
trust, and removal of the trustee. Persons who are not a “trustee
or beneficiary of a trust” lack standing under section 17200.
       At issue in this case is whether appellants Helen Manber,
Ingeborg Manber, Edward Solomon, and Benjamin Solomon
(collectively MS appellants) and appellant Yehuda Richter have
standing to file section 17200 petitions regarding the Robert
Richter Trust (“the trust”), settled by the now-deceased Robert
Richter. The trust provides that “[u]pon the death of the settlor,
the specific beneficiaries of The Robert Richter Trust shall be
determined solely and exclusively by Mark Daniel Manber,
nephew of the settlor.” It further provides that the “settlor
wishes” appellants to receive certain distributions.
       Asserting they had standing as trust beneficiaries, the MS
appellants filed a petition for orders removing or suspending
respondent Mark Daniel Manber as trustee, surcharging Mark2
for damaging the trust assets, and an accounting. Yehuda
separately filed a petition seeking orders removing Mark as
trustee and appointing a successor trustee, compelling
distribution of trust assets to Yehuda, and an accounting.
Pointing to the language giving him the sole and exclusive right

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Probate Code.
2     We refer to the parties by their first or given names to
avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.

                                 2
to determine trust beneficiaries, Mark filed demurrers to both
petitions on the ground that appellants lacked standing under
section 17200. The trial court agreed and sustained the
demurrers without leave to amend.
       The MS appellants and Yehuda now contend the trial court
erred by sustaining the demurrers. We reject their contentions.
The trust unambiguously vests the right to determine the
beneficiaries “solely and exclusively” in Mark in his personal
capacity, thereby rendering the gifts to appellants precatory and
depriving them of any interest in the trust.
                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.     The Parties
       Appellant Ingeborg Manber is the elder sister of late settlor
Robert Richter. Respondent Mark Manber is Ingeborg’s son, and
appellant Helen Manber is her daughter. Appellants Benjamin
and Edward Solomon are Helen’s adult sons. Yehuda Richter
“had a long and close relationship with the Decedent Robert
Richter for many years”; it is unclear whether or how he may be
related to Robert, Mark, or the MS appellants. Robert lived in
Los Angeles County and died there on or about March 3, 2020,
when he was 89. MS appellants live in the Bay Area. Mark lives
in Texas, and Yehuda lives in Israel.
II.    The Trust
       Robert executed the trust before a notary on or around May
30, 2018, when he was 87 years old. Appellants allege that
Robert drafted the trust himself.
       The trust contains six sections. Section I, “Trust Name,”
states the name of the trust. Section II, “Trust Property,”
identifies the trust assets, which “shall be used for the benefit of
the trust beneficiaries, and shall be administered and distributed

                                 3
by the trustee in accordance with this trust instrument.” Section
III, “Reserved Powers of Settlor,” states that the trust is
amendable and revocable during Robert’s life “without notifying
any beneficiary,” and that Robert retains all rights to income,
profits, and control of the trust assets during his life. It further
provides that if a licensed physician certifies in writing that
Robert “has become physically or mentally incapacitated, the
successor trustee shall manage the trust, and shall apply for the
benefit of the settlor any amount of trust income, or trust
principle [sic], necessary in the trustee’s discretion for the proper
health care, support, maintenance, comfort, or welfare of the
settlor, in accordance with his accustomed manner of living, until
the settlor, as certified by a licensed physician, is again able to
manage his own affairs, or until his death. Any income in excess
of amounts applied for the benefit of the settlor shall be
accumulated and added to the trust property.” Section III also
states that after Robert’s death, “this trust becomes irrevocable
and may not be altered or amended in any respect unless
specifically authorized by this instrument, and may not be
terminated except through distributions permitted by this
instrument.”
       Section IV of the trust is titled “Trustees.” Paragraph (A)
provides that Robert is the trustee until his incapacity or death,
at which point “the successor trustee shall be Mark Daniel
Manber, nephew of the settlor, or if he is unable to serve, or
continue serving, as successor trustee, the successor trustee shall
be Helen Sabina Manber, niece of settlor.” Paragraph (B) states,
“Any trustee shall have the right to appoint, in writing which
shall be notarized, additional trustees to serve in the order
nominated if all successor trustees named in Paragraph IV(A)

                                  4
cannot serve as trustee.” Paragraph (C) clarifies that “the term
‘trustee’ shall include any successor trustee,” and paragraphs (D)
and (E) respectively provide that “[n]o bond shall be required of
any trustee,” and “[a] trustee shall be compensated for all
reasonable expenses incurred in the administration of the trust.”
       Because the disputes in this case primarily center on
Section V, titled “Beneficiaries,” we reproduce the entire section
here verbatim.
       “(A) Upon the death of the settlor, the specific beneficiaries
of The Robert Richter Trust shall be determined solely and
exclusively by Mark Daniel Manber, nephew of settlor. No
person has any claim to the assets of the trust.
       “(B) The settlor wishes that the family of Aron Ross
receives about one million dollars in assets according to
instructions given by Aron Ross at the time of distribution.
       “(C) The settlor wishes that the family of Yehuda Richter
living in Elon Moreh, Israel receives about one million dollars in
assets according to instructions given by Yehuda Richter at the
time of distribution.
       “(D) The settlor wishes that the trustee make a donation of
assets to the Hillcrest Retirement Homes in the amount he/she
feels is commensurate to the care and support the settlor had
received and the assistance the trustee was given in the
settlement of the final account with the organization.
       “(E) The settlor wishes that the remaining funds be used
for the benefit of his sister Ingeborg-Ruth Manber nee Richter,
his nephew Mark Daniel Manber, and his niece Helen Sabina
Manber and her two sons Benjamin and Edward.

                                  5
       “(F) Upon the death of the settlor, the trustee shall
distribute the trust assets entirely at his/her discretion with
respect to time and amounts.”
       The final section of the trust, Section VI, is titled “Trustee’s
Powers and Duties.” It states that “the trustee shall have all
authority and powers allowed or conferred on a trustee under
California law and subject to the trustee’s fiduciary duty to the
settlor and the beneficiaries,” and directs that “[t]he trustee shall
pay the settlor’s debts and death taxes from the trust assets at
his/her discretion.”
III. Pre-Litigation Events
       The MS appellants allege in their petition that Robert “was
severely ill in December 2019 through March 3, 2020.” However,
there is no allegation in either petition that a licensed physician
declared Robert physically or mentally incompetent during this
period. The MS appellants allege that generally, and during this
period in particular, Robert had a close relationship with Helen.
They allege that “Helen and Robert spoke on the phone almost
daily . . . . and Helen was intimately involved in
recommendations regarding optimizing Robert’s medications and
care.” They further allege that “Robert and Mark spoke only
occasionally,” and that Mark did not call Robert when “Robert’s
health situation was critical in his final months.”
       On December 31, 2019, while Robert was still alive, Mark
signed and had notarized a document titled “Distribution of Trust
Assets for the Robert Richter Trust.” The document states, in its
entirety, “This is to authorize Helen Sabina Manber to act in my
place in all matters related to the Robert Richter Trust.” The MS
appellants allege that Mark prepared the document “entirely on
his own accord and without first discussing it with Helen.” Mark

                                  6
faxed the document to Helen along with a copy of the trust.
Yehuda alleges that the document “effectively amounts to a
written notarized resignation by Mark Manber as of December
31, 2019,” while the MS appellants allege it was a “Trustee
Withdrawal Agreement.” All appellants also allege that Mark
was the trustee at all relevant times.
       Robert died on March 3, 2020. The MS appellants allege
that Helen and Benjamin traveled to Los Angeles to handle
Robert’s affairs, while Mark “was unwilling to travel from Texas
and show any involvement whatsoever in the arrangements
pertaining to Robert’s death.” They further allege that during
the next several months, Helen “performed the tasks and
functions that a Trustee must, by collecting information, making
necessary calls, and sending her findings and progress to Mark.”
       In an email to Helen dated July 29, 2020 that is attached to
the MS appellants’ petition, Mark thanked Helen for her “current
proposals regarding disposition of the Robert Richter Trust.”
Those proposals appear to include marked-up draft letters to
Yehuda and non-party Aron Ross regarding distributions to those
individuals. In an email to Benjamin dated July 30, 2020
apparently regarding the same proposals, Mark stated, “I am the
sole trustee of this trust. Period.!!!,” and “I will not sign your
letters.!!!!!!”
       A clean copy of a letter from Mark to Yehuda, dated July
27, 2020, is attached to Yehuda’s petition; Yehuda alleges that he
received the letter at some unspecified point. The letter quotes
the portion of Section V, Paragraph (C) of the trust stating that
Robert “wishes that the family of Yehuda Richter . . . receives
about one million dollars in assets.” It further states that “the
trust also gives me [Mark] the power to ‘determine solely and

                                 7
exclusively’ who the beneficiaries will be and how much they will
get,” and, “[a]s such, you will receive the following assets totaling
$1,000,000 as of July 27, 2020,” namely $990,000 in “stocks,
bonds, and mutual funds” due to a previous $10,000 gift from
Robert. The letter states that it is accompanied by “a notice
stating that you are a beneficiary of the Robert Richter Trust,”
and that the letter is intended “to clearly delineate the assets you
can expect to receive.” The letter concludes with a request that
Yehuda sign and return “the included challenge waiver” and
suggests that doing so will facilitate “immediate[]” distribution of
funds to Yehuda.
       Similar letters and waivers of rights to contest the trust,
also dated July 27, 2020, addressed to Helen, Ingeborg, Yehuda,
and Aron Ross are attached to the MS appellants’ petition. The
letters to Helen and Ingeborg quote the portion of Section V,
Paragraph (E) stating that Robert “wishes that the remaining
funds be used for the benefit of his sister Ingeborg-Ruth Manber
Nee Richter, his nephew Mark Daniel Manber, and his niece
Helen Sabina Manber and her two sons Benjamin and Edward.”
They state that “‘remaining’ refers to any funds not provided to
Aron Ross or Yehuda Richter,” both of whom “will receive no
more than $1,000,000 in stocks,” and that Helen and Ingeborg
“will receive” “[e]xactly one-third of the ‘remaining funds’
described above.’
       The MS appellants allege that Mark retained counsel in or
around September 2020. They attached to their petition a letter
dated September 23, 2020, from Mark’s counsel to Ingeborg. The
letter stated that counsel represented Mark “in his capacity as
trustee” and that enclosures included a copy of the trust, a
section 16061.7 notification, and a “Consent to Waiver of the 120-

                                  8
Day Period to Object, pursuant to Probate Code Section 16061.7
and 16061.8.”3 Included with the letter were blank “Consent to
Waiver” forms for Aron Ross, Yehuda, “Representative of
Hillcrest Retirement Homes,” Helen, Benjamin, and Edward, but
not Ingeborg. Each of the “Consent to Waiver” forms identified
its recipient as “a named beneficiary” of the trust.
       The MS appellants further allege that Mark’s counsel “sent
the beneficiaries a letter describing Mark’s proposed distribution
schedule for the Trust assets.” The letter, attached to the MS
appellants’ petition, is addressed not to the MS appellants but to
attorney Thomas Worth. It states that the market value of the
trust as of September 24, 2020 was $9,277,664.20. It notes
Mark’s “wide discretion” and states that he “is considering the
following distribution schedule, to be distributed outright and
free of trust:
       “1.   $1 million cash to Aron Ross.
       “2.   $1 million cash to Yehuda Richter.
       “3.   $10,000 to Hillcrest Retirement Home. [sic]
       “4.   Maintaining a $1 million reserve in Trust to pay
Trust expenses, attorneys’ fees, accountants, estate taxes, costs of

3      Section 16061.7 requires a trustee to notify each
“beneficiary of the irrevocable trust” and “heir of the deceased
settlor” of certain events, including when a trust becomes
irrevocable. (§ 16061.7, subds. (a), (b)(1), (b)(2).) It requires that
the notice include the following text “You may not bring an action
to contest the trust more than 120 days from the date of this
notification by the trustee is served upon you or 60 days from the
date on which a copy of the terms of the trust is delivered to you
during that 120-day period, whichever is later.” (§ 16061.7, subd.
(h).) Section 16061.8 limits the time to contest a trust to the
period stated in section 16061.7, subdivision (h). (§ 16061.8.)

                                  9
administration. An accounting of the expenses will be provided
to the remaining beneficiaries.
       “5.   The remainder (using today’s numbers, the
remainder would be $6,267,664.20) to be divided three [sic] ways:
1/3 to Ingeborg Ruth Manber, 1/3 to Mark Manber, and 1/9 to
Helen Manber, 1/9 to Benjamin Solomon, and 1/9 to Edward
Solomon.
       “6.   At the conclusion of the Trust administration, after
all expenses are paid, any remaining amount of the $1 million
reserve will be divided: 1/3 to Ingeborg Ruth Manber, 1/3 to Mark
Manber, and 1/9 to Helen Manber, 1/9 to Benjamin Solomon, and
1/9 to Edward Solomon.”
       The MS appellants allege that Mark made a distribution in
excess of $1 million to Aron Ross in or around November 2020,
without subtracting $150,000 that Ross previously withdrew
from a joint account he shared with Robert. They allege that
Mark did not advise “any other beneficiaries” of the distribution
and “has not produced any records reflecting this transaction.”
       The MS appellants further allege that Mark made a
distribution of “approximately $811,684 to Edward, without
notice to other beneficiaries,” on or about December 15, 2020, and
a distribution of “approximately $806,816 to Benjamin, again
without notice to other beneficiaries,” on or about January 7,
2021. They allege that Mark required Edward and Benjamin to
place the funds with Mark’s brokerage firm. They further allege
that in February 2021, “Benjamin and Edward repeatedly
requested an accounting and other financial details regarding the
distributions that Mark had made to them,” but Mark “responded
with a short error-riddled email failing to provide any substance.”

                                10
       Yehuda alleges that, around this same time, Mark “sought
additional documents” from Yehuda, including his Social Security
card and American passport. On January 13, 2021, Yehuda sent
Mark an email stating that he did not have his Social Security
card and that his accountant had advised him that a W-9 form
“should suffice.” Later that day, Mark sent a response email
stating, “I decide what satisfies me. I am the trustee. Period!!!!”
On January 18, 2021, Yehuda sent Mark an email stating that he
could not get an American passport due to the “the corona period”
and asking if he could provide his original birth certificate and
Israeli passport instead. Yehuda also referenced the W-9 form
again. Mark responded a few hours later, “No & No. Quite
frankly I have decided not to distribute any assets to you. I lived
in Israel myself & would not have acted like you are doing. This
is final!!!”
       Counsel for Yehuda and the MS appellants subsequently
sent Mark letters demanding that he make the distributions
Robert “wished” for in the trust and provide an accounting.
Yehuda also made a formal demand for an accounting pursuant
to sections 16062, 16063, and 17200, subdivision (b)(7)(C). There
are no allegations regarding a response to Yehuda or his counsel.
Through counsel, Mark told the MS appellants, “I have reviewed
the Trust. Your clients are entitled to nothing and Mark owes
your clients nothing. Mark will proceed accordingly and we
demand that your clients cease making meritless demands and
threats against Mark regarding the Trust.”
                    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.     MS Appellants’ Petition and Related Proceedings
       On May 21, 2021, the MS appellants jointly filed a petition
pursuant to section 17200 “for (1) removal of Trustee Mark

                                11
Manber; (2) suspension; (3) accounting; and (4) surcharge.” Their
petition included the allegations summarized above as well as
allegations that Mark “behaved erratically and irritably” toward
them, including calling them names and insulting them.
Regarding standing, the petition alleged, “Petitioners are
beneficiaries of the Richter Trust and are therefore interested
parties under Probate Code section 17200(b)(1) with standing to
petition for the removal of Mark as trustee.”
       The MS appellants alleged that Mark was subject to
removal as trustee on numerous grounds: refusal to distribute
trust funds, breach of the duty to inform, mismanagement of
trust funds, unreasonable and unspecified trust expenses, breach
of the duties of care and loyalty through self-dealing, breach of
discretionary powers, and unfitness to serve as trustee. The MS
appellants also alleged Mark must be suspended as trustee
pending resolution of their removal petition to preserve the trust
property. They further asserted that Mark “must be ordered to
produce a report, an accounting, a disclosure of remaining assets,
and transfer of the trust records” under sections 16060, 16062,
and 16064. Finally, they asserted that Mark “should be
surcharged for damages to trust assets,” which they alleged
“exceed $3 million.” In their prayer for relief, the MS appellants
requested orders permanently removing Mark as trustee and
replacing him with Helen as successor trustee; suspending Mark
as trustee pending his permanent removal; precluding Mark from
further use of trust assets, particularly to fund the instant
litigation; requiring him to file a report of accounting and produce
all financial and tax records pertaining to the trust and
distributions made; and surcharging him for damages to the trust
assets.

                                12
       After filing their petition, the MS appellants filed and
Yehuda joined two motions for preliminary injunction seeking to
immediately suspend Mark as trustee and preclude his use of
trust assets. The trial court, Judge Susan J. Matcham, heard
and denied the motions on July 28, 2021. During the hearing,
the court remarked that “the language in section 5-A is fairly
clear, and it’s set out right in the beginning of the trust. And to
me, it’s determinative language when a ruling has to be made in
this preliminary . . . setting.”
       Mark filed a demurrer to the MS appellants’ petition. He
asserted that the MS appellants failed to allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action because they failed to demonstrate they
were beneficiaries of the trust and therefore lacked standing
under section 17200. Specifically, Mark argued that the trust
was a “‘power of appointment trust’ under Probate Code section
15205” that afforded him, in his individual, non-fiduciary
capacity, the “sole and exclusive authority to determine the
persons to whom to make gifts and in what amounts.” He further
argued that the power of appointment rendered the “wishes”
precatory and non-binding and did not create any future
interests.
       The MS appellants opposed the demurrer. In addition to
arguing that the demurrer was untimely, they contended that it
should be denied because they had standing as trust
beneficiaries. They argued that the trust expressly designated
them as beneficiaries, and the “settlor wishes” language was
mandatory, not precatory, because it was directed to the trustee.
They further argued that the trust was not a power of
appointment trust, that Mark had ceded his status as trustee to
Helen, and Mark’s admission they were beneficiaries and

                                13
distributions to Edward and Benjamin estopped him from
claiming otherwise. Mark filed a reply in support of the
demurrer.
       The trial court, Judge Edward M. Ross, heard the demurrer
on October 13, 2021. The court stated that its tentative was to
sustain the demurrer before giving the parties an opportunity to
argue. Counsel for MS appellants contended that the demurrer
was untimely and that Mark “said that we were beneficiaries. He
cannot pivot now and say we’re not.” Counsel for Mark
responded that the demurrer was timely and that section 16061.7
requires notice to be given “to not only beneficiaries but any heir
at law.” Mark’s counsel further argued that the trust gave him
discretion over beneficiaries in his personal capacity, and that
leave to amend would be futile. Counsel for the MS appellants
responded that the section 16061.7 notice was “not just some
letter,” and instead “in and of itself, gives us standing to move
forward and precludes this motion from being granted.”
       The court asked counsel for the MS appellants whether he
would like leave to amend. Counsel did not provide an answer.
The court then sustained the demurrer without leave to amend,
adding, “I would like it noted I would grant you leave to amend if
you wanted it.” The court subsequently issued a minute order
stating that the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend
and ordering the MS appellants’ counsel to prepare the order
after hearing. The court also issued a separate minute order that
same day stating that the MS appellants’ petition was denied
without prejudice.
       Notwithstanding the order directed at the MS appellants’
counsel, Mark’s counsel prepared and filed a notice of ruling on
the demurrer and proposed judgment of dismissal. The trial

                                14
court, Judge Edward M. Ross, signed the order after hearing on
December 20, 2021 but did not sign or enter the proposed
judgment. The MS appellants filed a notice of appeal on January
6, 2022. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, however,
because appellants failed to provide the court with a final
appealable order. The MS appellants moved to vacate the
dismissal on various grounds, including their procurement on
March 7, 2022 of a signed “nunc pro tunc order”4 correcting the
other October 13, 2021 minute order to state that their petition
was denied with prejudice. The appellate court did not reinstate
the appeal.
       The MS appellants filed a notice of appeal from the March
7, 2022 order on May 2, 2022. Their opening brief did not
disclose any of the history in the preceding paragraph to this
court. We requested supplemental briefing regarding the
appealability of the March 7, 2022 order. In that briefing, the
parties agreed that the March 7, 2022 order changed the court’s
dismissal of the petition without prejudice to a dismissal with
prejudice and thus had the legal effect of a final judgment. (See
In re Estate of Miramontes-Najera (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 750,
754-755.) We are satisfied that the March 7 order constitutes a
final, appealable order under section 1304, notwithstanding the
continued absence of a signed judgment. We also granted the MS
appellants’ motion for calendar preference.

4      It seems the order was mislabeled. “An order made nunc
pro tunc should correct clerical error by placing on the record
what was actually decided by the court but was incorrectly
recorded. It may not be used as a vehicle to review an order for
legal or judicial error by ‘correcting’ the order in order to enter a
new one.” (In re Marriage of Padgett (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 830,
852.)

                                 15
II.    Yehuda’s Petition and Related Proceedings
       On June 7, 2021, Yehuda filed a verified section 17200
petition seeking to remove Mark as trustee and appoint a
successor trustee, compel distribution of trust assets to Yehuda,
and provide an accounting. Mark filed a demurrer to the petition
on September 27, 2021.
       Yehuda subsequently filed a first amended petition on
October 7, 2021. In that petition, the salient allegations of which
are summarized above, Yehuda asserted that he had standing “as
a named beneficiary of the Trust.” He prayed for distribution of
either $1 million “as provided in the Richter Trust” or $990,000
“based on the letter of July 27, 2020 from Mark Manber to
petitioner”; removal of Mark as trustee “based on his failure to
carry out his Trustee duties, for a breach of his fiduciary duties,
due to his conflict of interest in favoring his own financial
interests over those of the intended beneficiaries, in arbitrarily
favoring himself and other beneficiaries over Petitioner and other
similarly situated beneficiaries, and failing to timely provide an
accounting to Petitioner”; an accounting; a determination that
Mark resigned as trustee on December 31, 2019 and was
succeeded by Helen; orders surcharging Mark and barring him
from using trust assets to defend the action; and, in the
alternative, an order that the July 27, 2020 letter constituted a
proper exercise of Mark’s power of appointment or other
discretion in favor of Yehuda.
       Mark filed a demurrer to the first amended petition on
November 12, 2021. Mark argued that Yehuda failed to state a
cause of action because he failed to establish he was a beneficiary
of the trust with standing to petition under section 17200. Mark
pointed to the court’s remarks and rulings on the preliminary

                                16
injunction motions and his demurrer to the MS appellants’
petition; he also filed a request for judicial notice of documents
relevant to those proceedings. He argued the same result should
be reached here for the same reasons: namely, the trust
unambiguously vested in Mark personally the sole and exclusive
discretion to determine the beneficiaries such that Robert’s
“wishes” were precatory. Mark further argued that he did not
exercise his power of appointment in favor of Yehuda, there was
no basis for estoppel, and Yehuda lacked standing even if the
court found Mark resigned as trustee.
       Yehuda filed oppositions to the demurrer and request for
judicial notice. In his opposition to the demurrer, Yehuda argued
that the trust was ambiguously drafted and that Mark had
“cherry-picked” provisions to support his contention to the
contrary. Yehuda further argued that the trust gave him a gift,
asserting that Robert’s inclusion of his address was “evidence
that a gift to him was intended and not discretionary by Manber.”
He also contended that the trust did not give Mark a power of
appointment, and that in any event Mark resigned as trustee and
could not subsequently “un-resign.” Yehuda asserted that the
court was required to accept as true his allegations regarding
Mark’s resignation and Helen’s installation as successor trustee,
and that “other allegations cannot be adjudicated by demurrer.”
Mark filed a reply in support of the demurrer. He also filed an
additional request for judicial notice of the reporter’s transcript
from the hearing on his demurrer to the MS appellants’ petition.
       The trial court, Judge Ruben Garcia, heard the demurrer
on February 24, 2022. Mark’s counsel reiterated the arguments
in the demurrer, and reminded the court that two previous judges
had ruled in his favor. Yehuda’s counsel objected to the court

                                17
taking judicial notice of or otherwise relying on previous rulings
made by other judges. He further contended that the specific
gifts and residuary clause in the trust suggested no power of
appointment was intended, and that the “wishes” language was
not precatory. Yehuda’s counsel also argued that Mark resigned
as trustee; Mark’s counsel responded that the December 31, 2019
document had no effect because Mark was not the trustee at that
time. The court took the matter under submission.
       At a subsequent hearing on March 3, 2022, the court orally
sustained Yehuda’s objections to the requests for judicial notice.
It also sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The
court concluded that Yehuda was not a named beneficiary
because that “would require the court to fully disregard the clear
language stating that Mark Manber has exclusive authority to
determine beneficiaries.” It further concluded that Mark did not
exercise a power of appointment in favor of Yehuda, as “this is
contradicted by the further allegations which assert that Manber
has refused to distribute the property from which the court can
only infer that Manber has exercised his power to revoke the
appointment.” The court also rejected Yehuda’s claim that he
had standing because Mark resigned as trustee, stating that the
theory “is not directly pled in the petition” and “the petition lacks
allegations that, if the power of appointment were delegated, it
has been exercised in favor of the petitioner.”
       The court entered a signed judgment of dismissal with
prejudice on April 13, 2022. On April 11, 2022, Yehuda filed a
notice of appeal from the March 7, 2022 order concerning the MS
appellants’ petition. We liberally construe this premature and
inaccurate notice as pertaining to the April 13, 2022 judgment.
(See In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75-76.)

                                 18
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       When a demurrer challenges a complaint or petition on
standing grounds, “the court may not simply assume the
allegations supporting standing lack merit and dismiss the
complaint. Instead, the court must first determine standing by
treating the properly pled allegations as true. If, having taken
the allegations as true, the court finds no standing, it should
sustain the demurrer. . . .” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th
822, 827 (Barefoot).)
       “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual
allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) On appeal after a demurrer has
been sustained, we determine de novo whether the complaint
states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Loeffler v.
Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100.) We “‘assume the
truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual
allegations’” (ibid.), but we do not credit “contentions, deductions
or conclusions of fact or law.” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1, 6.) We also consider exhibits attached to the
complaint. (Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 390, 400 (Hoffman).) We affirm “‘if proper on any
grounds stated in the demurrer, whether or not the court acted
on that ground.’” (Id. at p. 399.) The appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer.
(Id. at pp. 399-400.)
       Where the court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, we also decide whether there is a reasonable probability
the complaint can be cured by amendment. (Hoffman, supra, 179
Cal.App.4th at p. 400.) If so, it is generally an abuse of discretion

                                 19
to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. (Id. at pp. 400-
401.) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the
complaint can be cured by amendment. (Id. at p. 401.)
II.    Analysis
       Under the Probate Code, a “beneficiary” is “a person to
whom a donative transfer of property is made or that person’s
successor in interest,” and “[a]s it relates to a trust, . . . a person
who has any present or future interest, vested or contingent” in
the trust. (§ 24, subd. (c).) The MS appellants and Yehuda
contend they meet this definition because Section V, paragraphs
(C) and (E) provide them with bequests.5 Those provisions state,
respectively, that “The settlor wishes that the family of Yehuda
Richter living in Elon Moreh, Israel receives about one million
dollars in assets according to instructions given by Yehuda
Richter at the time of distribution,” and “The settlor wishes the
remaining funds be used for the benefit of his sister Ingeborg-
Ruth Manber nee Richter, his nephew Mark Daniel Manber, and
his niece Helen Sabina Manber and her two sons Benjamin and
Edward.”
       “‘“The interpretation of a written instrument, including a . .
. declaration of trust, presents a question of law unless
interpretation turns on the competence or credibility of extrinsic
evidence or a conflict therein. Accordingly, a reviewing court is
not bound by the lower court’s interpretation but must
independently construe the instrument at issue. [Citations.]”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘In construing a trust instrument, the

5     The MS appellants have joined and adopted the arguments
raised in Yehuda’s opening and reply briefs, and Yehuda has
joined and adopted the arguments raised in the MS appellants’
opening brief.

                                  20
intent of the trustor prevails and it must be ascertained from the
whole of the trust instrument, not just separate parts of it.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Marshall (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 447, 452-453.) “The paramount rule in construing
such an instrument is to determine intent from the instrument
itself and in accordance with applicable law.” (Brown v. Labow
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 795, 812.) The Probate Code contains
rules of construction for use “where the intention of the
transferor is not indicated by the instrument.” (§ 21102, subd.
(b).) Those include “an interpretation that will give every
expression some effect, rather than one that will render any of
the expressions inoperative” (§ 21120), construing all parts of
instrument “in relation to each other and so as, if possible, to
form a consistent whole” (§ 21121), and giving words “their
ordinary and grammatical meaning unless the intention to use
them in another sense is clear and their intended meaning can be
ascertained” (§ 21122). “Technical words are not necessary to
give effect to a disposition in an instrument.” (§ 21122.)
       Here, the trust uses the words “the settlor wishes.” “The
usual rule is that an expression of desire on the part of a testator
is a mere request when addressed to his devisee but is to be
construed as a command when addressed to his executor.” (In re
Estate of Hood (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 782, 786.) The same is true
in the context of a trust. (Ibid.) Where an expression of desire is
addressed to a trustee, it is thus construed as a command; in this
case, a command to the trustee that appellants receive a gift from
the trust would render them beneficiaries. Appellants urge such
an interpretation here.
       However, section V, paragraph (A) provides that “the
specific beneficiaries of The Robert Richter Trust shall be

                                21
determined solely and exclusively by Mark Daniel Manber,
nephew of the settlor. No person has any claim to the assets of
this trust.” Appellants assert that this provision is directed to
Mark as trustee, but this interpretation does not square with
either the plain text of paragraph (A) or the text of other
provisions in the trust. Paragraph (A) says “Mark Daniel
Manber, nephew of the settlor”; it does not use the word “trustee”
or refer to Mark in any specific capacity. Elsewhere in the trust,
Robert consistently used the word “trustee” when providing
directions to the person serving in that capacity. For instance,
section III, paragraph (C) provides that if “the settlor has become
physically or mentally incapacitated, the successor trustee shall
manage the trust, and shall apply for the benefit of the settlor
any amount of trust income, or trust principle [sic], necessary in
the trustee’s discretion for the proper health care, support,
maintenance, comfort, or welfare of the settlor.” Section IV,
“Trustees,” similarly refers to the trustee and successor trustee in
an explicit and generic sense, stating that “[a]ny trustee shall
have the right to appoint, in writing which shall be notarized,
additional trustees to serve in the order nominated,” “[n]o bond
shall be required of any trustee,” and “[a] trustee shall be
compensated for all reasonable expenses incurred in the
administration of the trust.” Section VI, “Trustee’s Powers and
Duties,” provides that “the trustees shall have all authority and
powers allowed or conferred on a trustee under California law
and subject to the trustee’s fiduciary duty to the settlor and the
beneficiaries,” and “[t]he trustee shall pay the settlor’s debts and
death taxes from the trust assets at his/her discretion.” Section
V, paragraph (A) is a notable deviation from this practice,
indicating a distinct aim.

                                22
      Appellants point to section V, paragraph (F) as evidence
that “Section V contains Robert’s instructions to the successor
trustee, expressly stating that ‘the trustee shall distribute the
trust assets. . . .” This provision, like the numerous others quoted
above, refers to the trustee generically. It reads in full, “Upon
the death of the settlor, the trustee shall distribute the trust
assets entirely at his/her discretion with respect to time and
amounts.” It therefore lends little support to appellants’
assertion that section V, paragraph (A) is also a direction to the
trustee, because it plainly indicates that Robert knew how to
direct the trustee to make a discretionary determination in his or
her capacity when he intended to do so. Section V, paragraph (A)
instead refers to Mark without reference to trustee. It is not this
court’s role “to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has
been inserted” from section V, paragraph (A). (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1858; see Prob. Code, § 1000.) Moreover, “[w]here the person
directed to carry out the wishes of the testator is both executor
and legatee, the courts in construing the effect of the language
have refused to follow the strict rule which imposes a mandatory
duty on the executor and have apparently treated the words as
being addressed to him in his capacity as legatee.” (In re Kearns’
Estate (1950) 36 Cal.2d 531, 534-535; see also In re Collias’ Estate
(1951) 37 Cal.2d 587, 590 [same].)
      Section V, paragraph (A) has the hallmarks of a power of
appointment, “a power that enables a powerholder acting in a
nonfiduciary capacity to designate a recipient of an ownership
interest in or another power of appointment over the appointive
property.” (§ 610, subd. (f).) “[N]o particular form of words is
necessary to create a power of appointment.” (Estate of
Rosecrans (1971) 4 Cal.3d 34, 38.) Instead, section 621,

                                23
subdivision (a) provides that a power of appointment is created
where “(1) There is a creating instrument. (2) The creating
instrument is valid under applicable law. (3) . . . [T]he creating
instrument transfers the appointive property. (4) The terms of
the creating instrument manifest the donor’s intent to create in a
powerholder a power of appointment over the appointive property
exercisable in favor of a permissible appointee.”
       Appellants contend these criteria are not met here because
Mark is a trustee who has the duty to act in a fiduciary capacity.
However, section V, paragraph (A) does not refer to Mark in that
capacity and the power to select beneficiaries may lie in “the
trustee or some other person.” (§ 15205, subd. (b)(2); cf. Tubbs v.
Berkowitz (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 548, 555 [noting a dearth of
authority holding that a donee cannot exercise a general power of
appointment in his favor if he also is the trustee of an irrevocable
trust].)
       Appellants also contend that other provisions of the trust,
those authorizing Yehuda (and Aron Ross) to provide instructions
regarding distribution and the residuary clause, “contradict[ ] a
grant of a POA.” We see no inherent contradiction. The trust
provides that Mark has sole and exclusive discretion to determine
the beneficiaries. If he chooses to provide a gift to Yehuda, the
time and amount of any distribution are entirely within the
trustee’s discretion. Robert’s “wishes” that Yehuda receive an
approximate amount in accordance with his own instructions
may provide guidance, but do not limit the discretion of either
Mark or the trustee. Similarly, Robert’s “wishes” that remaining
funds “be used for the benefit” of the MS appellants do not
restrict Mark’s authority to determine the beneficiaries or the

                                24
trustee’s discretion “with respect to time and amount” of any
distributions made.
       Appellants further contend that section V, paragraph (A)
confers “a grant of administrative authority to act as Trustee,”
analogizing it to case law holding that the power to “settle all
questions hereunder with respect to the execution of said trust”
did not grant a power of appointment. (See Kaiser v. Gibson
(1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 319, 323.) Section V, paragraph (A) does
not refer to administration of the trust, nor does it refer to the
trustee. For that reason, appellants’ contentions that Mark could
not exercise the power because he resigned as trustee lack merit.6
Similarly lacking in merit are appellants’ speculations that “it is
likely that Robert did not even know what a POA was
conceptually or legally,” and that Robert “could not have intended
to create a power of appointment because a power of appointment
trust is a terrible estate planning device.”
       Appellants contend that even if Mark does have a power of
appointment, they have standing to argue that he exercised it in
their favor when he sent section 16061.7 consents of waiver and
letters proposing a distribution schedule to them and is estopped
from claiming otherwise. Although the probate court has the
inherent power to decide these types of trust-adjacent matters,
see Barefoot, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 827-828, appellants must
have arguable standing to raise them. They do not here. The
July 2020 letter emphasized that Mark had the sole and
exclusive power to determine the beneficiaries, and the
September 2020 letter Mark’s counsel sent to the MS appellants

6     Yehuda asserts that we must accept as true his allegations
that Mark resigned as trustee on December 31, 2019, but we do
not credit conclusions of fact or law.

                                25
stated that Mark was “considering” a certain distribution
schedule, not that he was promising one. Further, as Mark’s
counsel argued at the demurrer hearing, section 16061.7 requires
notice to be given “to not only beneficiaries but any heir at law,”
and the MS appellants were Robert’s heirs at law. Their receipt
of the letter and mandatory notice did not give them a present or
future interest in the trust. Even if it did, “[u]nless made
expressly irrevocable by the creating instrument or the
instrument of exercise, an exercise of a power of appointment is
revocable . . . so long as the interest in the appointive property,
whether present or future, has not been transferred.” (§ 695,
subd. (b).) The trust does not make Mark’s power irrevocable,
and because he holds the power in a nonfiduciary capacity he is
not bound to act in any particular way when exercising or
revoking the exercise of the power. While we certainly do not
condone the apparently capricious behavior alleged here, Mark
was not bound by the proposed distribution schedule in the letter
as no property had been transferred.
       Mark did transfer trust property to appellants Benjamin
and Edward, and the MS appellants contend this gave Benjamin
and Edward standing as trust beneficiaries.7 At the very least,
they contend for the first time on appeal that Benjamin and
Edward have standing to seek an accounting as “interested
parties” under section 48, and that a leading treatise states that
appointees “may have standing to compel an accounting by the
trustee of the trust of the property subject to the power.” They do

7     We note that these distributions to purported residuary
beneficiaries were made prior to gifts appellants argue were
mandatory, including the distribution to Yehuda. Appellants do
not appear to take issue with this.

                                26
not expand on the circumstances in which such standing “may”
exist, but assert that Dunlap v. Mayer (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 419
is controlling because it holds that the estate of an individual
who had an income interest in a trust during her lifetime had
standing to seek an accounting after she passed. We are not
persuaded appellants have demonstrated error by the court.
       Even if we assume Benjamin and Edward had standing to
seek an accounting, whether to grant such a request lies within
the discretion of the trial court. (See Esslinger v. Cummins
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 517, 520, 526-528.) Appellants have not
demonstrated the court abused its discretion here. Dunlap is not
on point inasmuch as it concerns the survivability of a claim, and
appellants did not raise this issue at any point during the
hearing on the demurrer. They also declined the court’s offer to
provide them with leave to amend to clarify their allegations or
assert standing under section 48 in addition to section 17200.
       Finally, the MS appellants contend Helen has standing to
challenge Mark’s administration of the trust because the trust
names her as a successor trustee. Their petition did not allege
standing on this basis, and their opening brief states that Helen
did not challenge Mark’s status as trustee “in the interest of
family harmony” notwithstanding the December 31, 2019
document purportedly authorizing Helen to act in Mark’s place.
There are no allegations in the petition that Helen is the current
trustee, and appellants declined the opportunity to amend their
petition to assert standing on this basis. Their cited case law
concerning standing under the Elder Abuse Act is not applicable
here. (See Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220.) The
court did not err in sustaining the demurrer.

                                27
                          DISPOSITION
       The order sustaining the demurrer to the MS appellants’
petition without leave to amend and the judgment in favor of
Mark and against Yehuda are affirmed. The parties are to bear
their own costs of appeal.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                          COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

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