Court Opinion

ID: 9905963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 17:10:10.971381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:01.960364
License: Public Domain

J-A19022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: S.Y., A MINOR :              IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :                   PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
  APPEAL OF: C.T., FATHER           :
                                    :
                                    :
                                    :
                                    :
                                    :              No. 560 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000992-2020

  IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D.Y.T., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: C.T., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 561 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the Decree Entered September 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000247-2022

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                            FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2023

       C.T. appeals from the September 26, 2022 decree granting the petition

filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to S.D.Y.T., born in September

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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2020.1 Appellant also appeals from the separate permanency review order,

entered the same date, that changed S.D.Y.T.’s permanency goal to adoption.

We affirm the goal change order and vacate the termination decree as moot.

       S.D.Y.T. was born seven weeks premature and was immediately

admitted into the neonatal intensive care unit.       She tested positive for

Marijuana and Oxycodone. Mother’s test results revealed those substances,

as well as Fentanyl and Tramadolin. DHS obtained protective custody of the

child and placed her with her current pre-adoptive resource, T.M. The court

adjudicated S.D.Y.T. dependent on November 17, 2020, approximately two-

and one-half months after her birth.

       Although Appellant was identified on the birth certificate, he had no

contact with the child in the two years since her birth. See N.T., 9/26/22, at

13-16, 24-25. He did not attend the dependency proceedings, care for the

child, or comply with any of his goals under the single case plan (“SCP”),

including disclosing his location to the agency.2 Id. at 13, 16, 24. In this

regard, during the evidentiary hearing, Mother testified that Appellant was not

the birth father, but merely a friend who sympathized with her situation

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1 In a separate decree, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of

T.Y. (“Mother”), who filed a separate appeal.

2  The certified record does not support several of the trial court’s factual
findings that it gleaned from DHS’s petition to terminate Appellant’s parental
rights. For example, the testimony that DHS presented at the hearing belies
the assertion that Appellant showed any interest in being a parental resource
for the child. See N.T. 9/26/22, at 13-16, 24-25.

                                           -2-
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because she had been raped by a now-deceased family acquaintance and

became pregnant with S.D.Y.T. as a result of that victimization. Id. at 63-64.

       On April 13, 2022, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Appellant’s parental rights to S.D.Y.T. pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and

(8) and § 2511(b). DHS attached a copy of the birth certificate and the details

of Appellant’s acknowledgment of paternity.        See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a)

(“[having filed an acknowledgment of paternity], the father shall have all the

rights and duties as to the child which he would have had if he had been

married to the mother at the time of the birth of the child, and the child shall

have all the rights and duties as to the father which the child would have had

if the father had been married to the mother at the time of birth.”). The trial

court appointed Jay Stillman, Esquire to represent Appellant, who responded

by filing a petition for paternity testing.3     The petition noted both that

____________________________________________

3 The record is silent concerning the appointment of legal interest counsel for

two-year-old child S.D.Y.T. as contemplated in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) (“The
court shall appoint counsel to represent the child in an involuntary termination
proceeding when the proceeding is being contested by one or both of the
parents.”). It is clear, however, that the court appointed Irene Levy, Esquire
to serve as guardian ad litem during the termination hearings and advocate
the child’s best interests. It is our duty to ascertain whether the trial court
determined that counsel could simultaneously represent the child’s best
interests and legal interest, i.e., her preferred outcome. However, the
certified record established that S.D.Y.T. was two years old at the time of
these proceedings and incapable of articulating a well-settled preference with
respect to the termination of the rights of Appellant, whom she never met, we
observe no structural defect in the underlying proceedings pursuant to
§ 2313(a). See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding that
where “the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment” the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant is seeking to challenge his paternity and that he has not engaged in

the dependency proceedings. The trial court granted the petition and ordered

the paternity testing, the results of which excluded Appellant from biological

parentage. Based, in part, on the test results confirming that Appellant “is

not the father after all,” counsel sought leave to forgo the court’s prior

instruction “to have a conversation with his client prior to the next court date.”

Motion to Remove Requirement for Counsel to Speak with Client, 9/26/22, at

1, 2 (quoting Status Review Order, 8/8/22 cleaned up)). The certified record

does not reveal whether the trial court granted counsel’s motion, but counsel’s

false impression concerning the paternity test’s effect on the termination

proceedings is obvious. Rather than discuss with Appellant the alternative of

relinquishing parental rights voluntarily pursuant to § 2501, and thereby

alleviating DHS’s need to terminate parental rights involuntarily, counsel

represented his client as if the results of the paternity test would resolve the

issue of Appellant’s parental rights unilaterally.4

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mandate of § 2313(a) “is satisfied where the court has appointed an attorney-
guardian ad litem who represents the child’s best interests during such
proceedings.”).

4 A parent may file a petition to relinquish his or her parental rights to an
agency pursuant to § 2501, which states:

       § 2501. Relinquishment to agency

       (a) Petition.-- When any child under the age of 18 years has been
       in the care of an agency for a minimum period of three days or,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       At the outset of the September 26, 2022 hearing, the trial court

acknowledged that the results of the paternity test excluded Appellant, who

did not attend the hearing because he was incarcerated. N.T., 9/26/22, at 6.

The court immediately excused Attorney Stillman, but upon DHS’s interjection

that Appellant “is on the birth certificate. So [the agency] will need to have

his rights terminated,” the trial court reversed course and directed Attorney

Stillman to participate in the hearing. Id. at 6-7. Counsel noted his confusion

but ultimately complied with the court’s directive. Id. at 7.

       While DHS focused upon terminating Appellant’s rights involuntarily to

facilitate the anticipated adoption, the agency neglected to see if Appellant,

the non-biological father who never maintained any contact with S.D.Y.T.,

desired to relinquish his rights voluntarily or consent to adoption. Instead,

preoccupied with the perceived “need” to terminate Appellant’s rights

involuntarily, DHS re-asserted “because he’s on the birth certificate[,the

agency] will need to mark and move the DNA test, and then have [Appellant’s]

rights terminated for purposes of the hearing.” Id. at 7. Thereafter, DHS

____________________________________________

       whether or not the agency has the physical care of the child, the
       agency has received a written notice of the present intent to
       transfer to it custody of the child, executed by the parent, the
       parent or parents of the child may petition the court for permission
       to relinquish forever all parental rights and duties with respect to
       their child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a).

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presented evidence to establish the statutory grounds to involuntarily

terminate Appellant’s parental rights, and following the evidentiary hearing,

the trial court entered a decree terminating Appellant’s parental rights

pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and § 2511(b). The trial court also

filed a separate order changing S.D.Y.T.’s permanency goal from reunification

to adoption.

       Appellant filed notices of appeal to this Court at both above-captioned

docket numbers, along with respective concise statements of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 5

Thereafter, he filed a petition to amend the birth certificate, which the trial

court granted on November 10, 2022, directing “the Pennsylvania Department

of Health, Division on Vital Records” to remove Appellant from the “Birth

Certificate as the named [f]ather.” Order, 10/10/22. DHS subsequently filed

a petition to terminate the parental rights of any unknown father, noting “[t]he

child’s birth certificate [now] reflects father as ‘information not recorded’ and

is therefore unknown.” DHS Petition, 5/31/23, at 1.

       Appellant presents the following questions, which we reordered for ease

of review:

       1.   Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in entering
       a Decree that Appellant involuntarily lost parental rights to the
       minor child S.D.Y.T., where the trial court had previously found
____________________________________________

5 After Attorney Stillman filed facially untimely appeals, this Court deemed
him per se ineffective. The trial court appointed Maureen F. Pié, Esquire, and
we granted the ensuing petitions to appeal nunc pro tunc.

                                           -6-
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       that Appellant was not S.D.Y.T.’s parent, and therefore did not
       have any parental rights to terminate[?]

       2. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in entering an
       Order changing the minor child S.D.Y.T.’s permanency goal from
       reunification with Appellant where Appellant was identified as a
       parent of the child on said Order, because the trial court had
       previously found that Appellant was not the child’s parent, and
       therefore did not have any legal right to reunification with the
       child[?]

       3. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by entering
       the aforesaid Decree without cause, thereby creating, for
       Appellant, vulnerability to the collateral consequences of an
       involuntary termination of parental rights, and thus denying him
       constitutional due process under both the Pennsylvania and United
       States Constitutions[?]

       4. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by entering
       the aforesaid Order without cause, thereby creating, for Appellant,
       vulnerability to the collateral consequences of a goal change
       to Adoption and thus denying him constitutional due process
       under both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions[?]

       5. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by thus
       creating further delay for the child’s permanency by causing
       Appellant to clear the record through this appeal. Such delay is
       contrary to judicial economy and the child’s right to
       permanency[?]

Appellant’s brief at 8-9 (emphasis in original).6

       Appellant’s    arguments      are       easily   grouped   into   three   essential

contentions: (1) the termination decree and goal change order were

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6 We note with displeasure that Appellant’s substantive arguments do not align

with the statement of issues, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) (stating that
each argument section shall be “divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued”). Counsel is cautioned to comply with the rules of
appellate procedure in future filings.

                                           -7-
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unnecessary after Appellant presented to the court the results of the paternity

test that excluded him as a possible birth parent; (2) the trial court violated

Appellant’s constitutional rights in terminating parental rights and changing

S.D.Y.T.’s permanency goal in relation to a non-genetic parent; and (3) the

impact of the trial court’s goal change order was to delay S.D.Y.T.’s

permanency unnecessarily.

      Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
      appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
      has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
      must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
      concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
      the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
      support.    Termination of parental rights has significant and
      permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
      the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
      establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
      which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
      as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
      hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

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Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      Similarly, we also review the trial court’s permanency determinations

for an abuse of discretion.    See Interest of J.B., 296 A.3d 1234, 1238

(Pa.Super. 2023).    As with our review of the factual record in termination

cases, we must also “accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations

of the trial court if they are supported by the record,” but, again, we are not

bound by the trial court’s “inferences or conclusions of law.” In re R.J.T., 9

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

      Initially, Appellant complains that the “the trial court lost jurisdiction

over him under both the Juvenile Act and the Adoption Act” once he presented

the results of the paternity test to the court. Appellant’s brief at 21. This

assertion is founded on the faulty premise that the test result was tantamount

to a legal determination of paternity. It was not. Indeed, while the results of

the paternity test were relevant in determining the child’s genetic parentage,

that issue was not actually before the court in light of the birth certificate

identifying Appellant as the father. In this regard, the Pennsylvania statute

governing paternity explicitly provides, in part, that “an acknowledgment of

paternity shall constitute conclusive evidence of paternity without further

judicial ratification[.]” 23 Pa.C.S § 5103. Furthermore, absent fraud, which

is not implicated in this case, the results of the paternity test could not divest

Appellant of his parental rights and responsibilities. See S.N.M. v. M.F., 175

                                      -9-
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A.3d 333, 338 (Pa.Super. 2017) (holding, absent proof of fraud, even if

appellant was not child’s biological father, he remained the child’s legal father

based upon his acknowledgment of paternity). Thus, contrary to Appellant’s

protestations, as a matter of law, so long as Appellant was listed on the birth

certificate, he remained the legal father of S.D.Y.T. until his parental rights

were voluntarily relinquished or involuntarily terminated. As Appellant did not

relinquish his parental rights, the court did not err in conducting the

involuntary termination and goal change proceedings notwithstanding the

documentation excluding him as a birth parent.        Hence, Appellant cannot

meritoriously assert that the results of the paternity test stripped the trial

court of jurisdiction over the petitions to terminate his parental rights and

change S.D.Y.T.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

      The crux of Appellant’s second assertion is that where, as here, a parent

is not the birth father and did not exercise his parental rights beyond executing

the acknowledgment of paternity and appearing on the birth certificate, the

collateral consequences of involuntary termination impinge on his right to due

process insofar as the mere fact of involuntary termination presents “an

enhanced risk of infringement or loss of rights to the care, custody and control

of [his] other children with whom he has intact parental rights.” Appellant’s

brief at 14. He observes, for example, that the Juvenile Act regards “a prior

involuntary termination of parental rights as an aggravated circumstance in

dependency matters related to other children.” Id.

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       As Appellant accurately observes, a finding of aggravated circumstances

based upon the involuntary termination of parental rights of one child greatly

impacts his rights as to a different child in any future dependency proceedings.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining aggravated circumstances as, inter alia, “(5)

The parental rights of the parent have been involuntarily terminated with

respect to a child of the parent.”). Essentially, an adjudication of aggravated

circumstances subjects a parent to the possible divestment of reunification

resources and the hastening of the goal change. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 1705 (B)

(“If the court finds aggravated circumstances exist, the court shall determine

whether reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the

child from the home or to preserve and reunify the family shall be made or

continue to be made[.].”)

       Thus, noting that a parent’s constitutional right to direct the care,

custody, and control of their child is a fundamental right that subjects

government interference to strict scrutiny,7 Appellant contends that less

restrictive measures exist to sever parental rights in anticipation of adoption,

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7 As the United State Supreme Court expressed in Troxel v. Granville, 530

US 57, 65 (2000), “[t]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.” Pursuant to the strict scrutiny analysis, government
action that significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right is
upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest and if it is
narrowly tailored to effectuate that purpose. See Nixon v. Commonwealth,
839 A.2d 277, 287 (Pa. 2003) (“Where laws infringe upon certain rights
considered fundamental, . . . courts apply a strict scrutiny test.”).

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i.e., providing an opportunity to voluntary relinquish parental rights or

amending the child’s birth certificate. Id. at 13-15 (footnotes omitted). He

continues, “[t]he burden of bearing an aggravated circumstance on one’s

parental rights to one’s other children’s care and control is a burden on a

fundamental right which requires the court to apply strict scrutiny analysis:

the compelling state interest involved (in this case to allow Child to achieve

safe permanency) may only be accomplished by the least restrictive means

available.” Id. at 15, 19. As the trial court neglected to pursue the least

restrictive means in severing Appellant’s legal connection with S.D.Y.T, he

asserts that the termination decree constitutes a denial of due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the due

process and remedies clauses of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.8

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8 The United States Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as

follows:

       The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive
       any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
       law.” We have long recognized that the Amendment’s Due Process
       Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, guarantees more
       than fair process.      The Clause also includes a substantive
       component that “provides heightened protection against
       government interference with certain fundamental rights and
       liberty interests.

Troxel, supra at 65 (some quotations omitted) (citations omitted).

      Similarly, the Pennsylvania due process clause provides, “All men are
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       As Attorney Stillman neglected to assert this due process challenge

during the termination and goal change proceedings, the trial court did not

address this aspect of Appellant’s claims. Hence, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P.

302 (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for

the first time on appeal.”). Furthermore, in passing on the novel claim as

presented in the Rule 1925(b) statement, the court reasoned that, because

Appellant was identified as the birth father on the birth certificate and failed

to remove that designation during the dependency proceedings, the action to

involuntarily terminate his parental rights was warranted. Thus, the court’s

Rule 1925 opinion did not confront Appellant’s argument regarding the

collateral consequences of the termination of his parental rights. See Trial

Court Opinion, 4/13/23, at 8, 9.

       Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that the cumulative effect of

Attorney Stillman’s documentation of the paternity test, misapprehension of

the test’s significance on the proceedings, attempt to be released from the

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acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing
their own happiness.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 1, And finally, our remedies clause
provides, in relevant part:

       All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in
       his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
       course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
       denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth
       in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature
       may by law direct.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 11(a).

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hearing, and bewilderment at his necessity to participate constitutes an

objection to the trial court’s decision to proceed with the termination hearing

that satisfies Rule 302(a), no relief is due. Our reasoning follows.

      Preliminarily, as it relates specifically to the goal change order, the

polestar of any dependency matter must be the “safety, permanency[,] and

well-being of the child,” which takes precedence “over all other considerations,

including the conduct and the rights of the parent.” In the Interest of M.T.,

101 A.3d 1163, 1175 (Pa.Super. 2014).             In particular, Juvenile Act

§ 6351(f)(1)-(5), (6), (9) mandates that a trial court consider a number of

discrete factors in adjudicating a goal change petition. See In re J.B., supra

at 1239. Inasmuch as a goal change is not a basis for finding aggravated

circumstances in a future proceeding pursuant to § 6302, Appellant’s

argument concerning the collateral consequences of the termination decree

does not translate to the goal change order entered in this case.        In fact,

Appellant’s status as a legal parent has no bearing on the child’s best interests

or the statutory factors that the juvenile court is mandated to review in

adjudicating a goal change petition. As the certified record supports the trial

court’s review of the relevant elements of the best-interest determination, we

do not disturb it.

      For the identical reasons, we reject Appellant’s contention, listed as his

fifth question presented, that the goal change order delayed S.D.Y.T.’s

permanency by causing Appellant to initiate this appeal. Appellant raised this

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claim only in the Rule 1925(b) statement that he filed at the dependency

docket.9 In relation to the goal change order, the change of a permanency

goal from reunification essentially relieves the agency from continuing any

reunification efforts. See Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook, 3rd Edition

(2019) § 14.4.       Accordingly, it did not affect the potential termination of

Appellant’s parental rights.       Id.at § 14.3 (“Although the processes of goal

change to adoption and the filing of the petition for termination of parental

rights go hand in hand, they are two separate issues.”). Hence, neither the

goal change order nor the ensuing appeal from that order bears on the

anticipated adoption. See e.g., In re Adoption of S.E.G., 901 A.2d 1017,

1026 (Pa. 2006) (“an agency may file a termination petition even where

reunification remains the permanency goal for the child”); In re M.T., 101

A.3d 1163, 1166 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (“a goal change from

reunification to adoption is not a necessary prerequisite to the initiation of

involuntary termination proceedings.”). Consequently, this claim also fails.

       Turning to the decree terminating Appellants’ parental rights, we agree

with the trial court’s conclusion that, notwithstanding the conclusive scientific

evidence establishing Appellant’s lack of genetic relationship with S.D.Y.T., so

long as the birth certificate identified Appellant as the birth father, it was

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9  Accordingly, any argument asserting the ostensible delay caused by
Appellant’s appeal from the termination decree is waived. See 1925(b)(4)
(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance
with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).

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appropriate for the court to involuntarily terminate Appellant’s parental rights

in anticipation of the child’s adoption. While we do not countenance DHS’s

refusal to seek Appellant’s voluntary relinquishment as an alternative to

involuntary termination under the facts of this case, we have no basis to

conclude that the trial court erred in terminating Appellant’s parental rights

involuntarily in this situation.

      Having found no reversible error, we must nevertheless acknowledge

that the trial court entered a November 10, 2022 order removing Appellant’s

name from the birth certificate and therefore rendered the termination decree

moot. Generally, “an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of

the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.” In re D.A., 801

A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, we

may reach the merits of a moot question if one of the following exceptions

applies: “1) the case involves a question of great public importance, 2) the

question presented is capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review,

or 3) a party to the controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision

of the trial court.” Id. (citations omitted).

      Here, no case or controversy currently exists because the trial court

granted Appellant’s request to modify S.D.Y.T.’s birth certificate and remove

the parental designation, thereby removing the impediment to adoption.

Moreover, none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply because it

does not involve a matter of public importance and, unlike Appellant’s chosen

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path in the case at bar, similarly situated parents can avoid the potential

collateral   consequences   simply   by   relinquishing   their   parental   rights

voluntarily. Thus, this case is moot and no reason exists to circumvent the

doctrine to reach the merits of Appellant’s arguments relative to the

termination decree.

      When a case becomes moot due to an interceding coincidence, the

“established practice” is for the appellate court to “vacate the judgment below

and remand with a direction to dismiss.”        See e.g.      United States v.

Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)).           Our High Court recently

reiterated this principle in Ball v. Chapman, 289 A.3d 1, 12 n.37 (Pa. 2023).

It observed, “‘in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system

which has become moot while on its way to the Supreme Court of the United

States or pending the Court’s decision on the merits,’ and where the lack of

review is attributable to ‘happenstance,’ the judgment will be reversed or

vacated, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.” Id.

(quoting Munsingwear, supra at 39) (cleaned up).

      Accordingly, insofar as the order modifying S.D.Y.T.’s birth certificate

permanently removed Appellant’s name from the birth certificate and that

document no longer impedes the child’s anticipated adoption, the only residual

effect of the decree involuntarily terminating Appellant’s parental rights is to

potentially contaminate future dependency actions unnecessarily. Thus, to

avoid the harmful repercussions of the now-superfluous decree, we vacate the

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decree and remand with instructions for the court to dismiss the involuntary

termination proceeding against Appellant as moot.

      Goal change order affirmed. Decree vacated, and case remanded with

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 11/30/2023

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