Court Opinion

ID: 9409550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 17:04:18.16888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.420581
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/17/23 P. v. Slater CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061331

           v.                                                        (Super. Ct. No. 17CF1369)

 ROBERT IRVING SLATER,                                               OPINION

    Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lance P.
Jensen, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Markham Read Zerner and John J.E. Markham II for Defendant and
Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Lynne G.
McGinnis, Kelley Johnson and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                                                  *          *          *
              Defendant Robert Irving Slater was a practicing worker’s compensation
attorney when he entered into an agreement with the owner of USA Photocopy. Under
this agreement, USA Photocopy paid a third party to perform intake interviews with
clients of defendant’s practice, saving a significant amount of his own employees’ time
and therefore money. In exchange, defendant used USA Photocopy’s services during all
workers’ compensation proceedings on those cases. The law, however, prohibits
referring workers’ compensation clients for renumeration. Defendant was ultimately
convicted of conspiracy, submitting false and fraudulent claims against insurers, and 21
counts of insurance fraud. He was sentenced to probation for two years.
              On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he
had the requisite intent to refer clients for compensation in violation of the Labor Code.
We find that defendant’s inadequate briefing failed to meet his burden to demonstrate
error, and even if he had briefed the case properly, our review demonstrates the requisite
substantial evidence to support the verdicts. We therefore affirm the judgment.

                                             I
                                          FACTS
Background Facts
              Defendant was admitted to practice law in California since 1975. He was a
solo practitioner who had handled workers’ compensation cases since at least the late
1990’s.
              USA Photocopy, located in Santa Ana, provided attorney services,
including photocopying and sending subpoenas for records for workers’ compensation
cases. The company would then bill insurance carriers for its services. During the
relevant time period, Edgar Gonzalez was the owner of USA Photocopy and Enrique
Villagomez was the manager.

                                             2
               As of 2011, Peter Ayala worked as a “legal investigator performing intake
services.” He learned that Villagomez had work in the form of “sign-up services
available,” and subsequently had a meeting with Gonzalez and Villagomez at the USA
Photocopy office. During the course of the conversation, it was brought up that Ayala
would be working directly for one attorney – defendant. After working out a payment
structure with Gonzalez and Villagomez, all three of them went to defendant’s office and
met with him.
               Ayala’s role was to meet with the potential “workers’ compensation client
to fill out the intake retainer . . . and also get the retainer signed for the claim.”
Defendant’s office provided the names of the clients, who had previously contacted his
law office. On average, Ayala would see two to three clients per day, with the
information about the potential clients sent to him by defendants’ employees. Ayala
would also have the client, with his assistance, complete various forms, including the
workers’ compensation appeals board application for adjudication, medical release forms,
and fee disclosure forms, among others. With regard to copy services, there was a form
signed by clients giving USA Photocopy permission to perform copy services “and the
medical release forms as well.” Ayala would return the forms to defendant’s office in
digital form, and returned the originals in person approximately every two weeks.
               Ayala was told to send an invoice for his services every two weeks to USA
Photocopy, which paid him for his services. Ayala had done similar work in the past for
approximately 13 attorneys, and this was the first time he would be paid by a party other
than an attorney. There was no written contract between Ayala, defendant, and USA
Photocopy. Ayala was paid by USA Photocopy as an independent contractor. Between
September 2012 and September 2015, Ayala invoiced a total of $196,280.00 to USA
Photocopy. Over the six years his relationship with USA Photocopy and defendant
lasted, Ayala estimated he performed intake services for about 2,000 clients for
defendant, and USA Photocopy was the only copy service used for those clients. Ayala

                                                3
did not perform any service for USA Photocopy other than the services he performed for
defendant.
              Employees from USA Photocopy went to defendant’s offices once or twice
a month to obtain records. The USA Photocopy employees would “show up for the
entire day and copy all these records.” Someone from defendant’s office would prepare a
basket of files in advance of the visit, and the USA Photocopy employees would go
through each “file and look for the employer, the insurance, and the medical facilities”
the injured worker had visited. They would also obtain personal information about the
employee such as name, date of birth, and date of injury.
              The USA Photocopy personnel would then take the information back to
their offices and use the data to generate subpoenas to employers, insurance companies,
and each medical facility at which the worker had received treatment. As the injured
worker’s attorney, defendant would authorize all subpoenas that were issued. Each entity
would respond to the subpoena with records or by stating they had no responsive records.
USA Photocopy would separately bill the cost for each subpoena to the workers’
compensation insurance carrier, regardless of whether the subpoena resulted in the
production of documents.
              USA Photocopy expected to work on each case Ayala brought to defendant
that went forward. At one point, USA Photocopy sent an e-mail to defendant with some
of Ayala’s invoices attached, highlighting the names of several clients. USA Photocopy
inquired as to the status of those clients, because while they knew that not every case
would go forward, they did expect to generate work for each case where Ayala provided
services and followed up on the status of those cases.

                                             4
Charges
                In an amended complaint, defendant was charged with conspiracy (Pen.
Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1), Lab. Code, § 32151 (count 1)); submitting a false and
fraudulent claim (Pen. Code, § 549 (count 2)); and 21 counts of insurance fraud based on
concealing or failing to disclose information that affects a person’s right to an insurance
benefit (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (b)(3) (counts 3-23)). The complaint also alleged that
defendant had engaged in a pattern of related fraudulent conduct involving the taking of
more than $100,000.00.

Trial Testimony
                In addition to the testimony relating to the background facts summarized
above, numerous other witnesses testified at trial.
                James Fisher, a licensed attorney, testified for the prosecution as an expert
in workers’ compensation. He had 31 years of professional experience at the Department
of Industrial Relations, Division of Workers’ Compensation, in a number of roles. Fisher
was asked about a hypothetical that mirrored the facts of this case: “[A] copy service has
an arrangement with an attorney where the copy service would pay a person to perform
services for the attorney by signing up workers’ compensation clients for the attorney.
[¶] Also, in return, the attorney would use the copy service to obtain and serve records
for those same workers’ compensation clients.” Fisher stated these facts would be
prohibited by section 3215.
                The prosecutor then varied the hypothetical, asking Fisher to add the fact
that “the copy service then sends bills to the insurance carrier for the copy services for the
workers’ compensation clients above.” Fisher opined that if the insurance carrier knew
of the arrangement, they could not lawfully pay the bill.

1
    Subsequent statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                               5
              Defendant’s evidence included the testimony of his pastor and his son, who
was also an attorney. Both testified that defendant was an honest person. Workers’
compensation attorney Avedis Gabriel Injejikian also testified. He had 32 years of
experience as an attorney and had known defendant for 22 years. Based on his personal
observations and reputation, he testified that defendant was “extremely honest, extremely
reliable.”
              Defendant also offered the testimony of John Hernandez, a workers’
compensation attorney, who represented both workers and companies. He was also a
mediator and arbitrator, and a retired workers’ compensation judge. Hernandez first met
defendant professionally between 2002 and 2005. He testified that defendant had a
reputation for integrity and Hernandez held defendant in high regard. He referred his
own family members to defendant and was always very impressed with his work. He
also testified that defendant was “knowledgeable in the workers’ compensation field and
workers’ compensation law.”
              With respect to his own practice, Hernandez testified that he used different
copy companies. While he was familiar with the practice of sign-up work, such as Ayala
performed, he had never heard of a situation where a copy service paid a third party to
perform it.

Verdict and Sentencing
              The jury convicted defendant on all 23 counts. The jury also found the
enhancement regarding the pattern of fraudulent conduct true. The court later denied
defendants’ motion to vacate the verdict and for a new trial due to lack of sufficient
evidence.
              The court sentenced defendant to serve a total of 183 days, with 182 of
those days suspended on the successful completion of two years of supervised probation.
Six months of the probation term was to be served with an ankle bracelet. The court also

                                             6
ordered defendant to pay $356,175.24 in victim restitution in addition to statutory fines
and fees.
              Defendant now appeals.

                                             II
                                      DISCUSSION
              Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that he did not possess the
requisite state of mind to violate section 3215, which was an element of each of the
crimes of which he was convicted with the exception of count 2, submitting a false and
fraudulent claim under Penal Code section 549.

Standard of Review
              “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
determine ‘“whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the
offense charged.”’ [Citations.] Under such standard, we review the facts adduced at trial
in the light most favorable to the judgment, drawing all inferences in support of the
judgment to determine whether there is substantial direct or circumstantial evidence the
defendant committed the charged crime. [Citation.] The test is not whether the evidence
proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether substantial evidence, of credible and
solid value, supports the jury’s conclusions. [Citation.] [¶] In considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, we cannot reweigh the evidence, as the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within
the province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Rather, we simply consider whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Unless it is clearly shown that ‘on no hypothesis

                                             7
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict,’ the conviction
will not be reversed.” (People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837, 842.)
                The standard of review is the same even when the case relies on
circumstantial evidence. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1572
(Sanghera).)2 We must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from
that evidence. (Id. at p. 1573.)

Relevant Crimes
                Defendant was charged with conspiracy in count 1. (Pen. Code, § 182,
subd. (a)(1).) As the jury was properly instructed, the elements of conspiracy are an
agreement to commit a crime and at least one overt act in furtherance of the crime. The
crime the jury was instructed with was referral of clients for compensation in violation of
section 3215.
                Section 3215 states: “Except as otherwise permitted by law, any person
acting individually or through his or her employees or agents, who offers, delivers,
receives, or accepts any rebate, refund, commission, preference, patronage, dividend,
discount or other consideration, whether in the form of money or otherwise, as
compensation or inducement for referring clients or patients to perform or obtain services
or benefits pursuant to this division, is guilty of a crime.”
                The jury was instructed as follows with respect to the elements of a
violation of section 3215: “1. The defendant offered, delivered, received or accepted;
[¶] 2. A rebate, refund, commission, preference, patronage dividend, discount, or other
consideration, whether in the form of money or otherwise; [¶] 3. As compensation or
inducement; [¶] 4. For referring patients or clients to USA PHOTOCOPY;

2
 Defendant’s reply brief spends much of its time stating why cases that state general
principles of law, such as the standard of review and how inferences are used, are not
factually similar to his own case. This is entirely unhelpful and beside the point.

                                               8
AND [¶] 5. USA PHOTOCOPY performed or obtain[ed] services or benefits in the
Workers’ Compensation and Insurance system.” In short, the prosecution’s theory was
that in exchange for workers’ compensation intake work performed by Ayala, which
saved defendant a great deal of time and money over the years, defendant gave USA
Photocopy all of the copying and subpoena business that arose from those referrals.
              In count 2, defendant is charged with violating Penal Code section 549,
which states, in relevant part: “[A]ny person . . . who solicits, accepts, or refers any
business to or from any individual or entity with the knowledge that, or with reckless
disregard for whether, the individual or entity for or from whom the solicitation or
referral is made, or the individual or entity who is solicited or referred, intends to
violate Section 550 of this code . . . is guilty of a crime . . . .” The jury was instructed
that to prove this crime, the prosecution must prove that the defendant referred business
to or from USA Photocopy, and the defendant either knew or acted with reckless
disregard as to whether USA Photocopy intended to violate Penal Code section
550(b)(3).
              In counts 3 through 23, defendant was charged with insurance fraud by
violating Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(3). That subdivision states: “It is
unlawful to do, or to knowingly assist or conspire with any person to do, any of the
following: . . . [¶] . . . Conceal, or knowingly fail to disclose the occurrence of, an event
that affects any person’s initial or continued right or entitlement to any insurance benefit
or payment, or the amount of any benefit or payment to which the person is entitled.”
Here, the prosecution’s theory was that Gonzalez concealed or knowingly failed to
disclose USA Photocopy’s financial relationship with defendant with the intent to
defraud. Under section 139.32, subdivision (f), if an insurance carrier knew an attorney
referred a person to a copy service and received any type of compensation for doing so,
or had any financial interest in the copy service, the insurance carrier would not pay any
bills for that work.

                                               9
Defendant Failed to Meet his Burden
              Defendant did not include a straightforward statement of facts in his
opening brief. Rather, he included a “combined factual and procedural statement”
(boldfacing & capitalization omitted) that consisted primarily of arguments presented at
trial and why those arguments support his position. He included nothing that could
possibly be interpreted as an even-handed account of the evidence presented. This
violates rules 8.204(a)(2)(C) and 8.360(a) of the California Rules of Court.3
              It also violates the principles set forth in Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th
1567: “Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment
challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error. [Citation.] Thus, when a criminal defendant claims on appeal that his
conviction was based on insufficient evidence of one or more of the elements of the
crime of which he was convicted, we must begin with the presumption that the evidence
of those elements was sufficient, and the defendant bears the burden of convincing us
otherwise. To meet that burden, it is not enough for the defendant to simply contend,
‘without a statement or analysis of the evidence, . . . that the evidence is insufficient to
support the judgment[] of conviction.’ [Citation.] Rather, he must affirmatively
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient.” (Id. at p. 1573.)
              “How does a defendant make such a showing? Perhaps the best way to
understand that point is to understand how a defendant does not make such a showing.
He does not show the evidence is insufficient by citing only his own evidence, or by
arguing about what evidence is not in the record, or by portraying the evidence that is in
the record in the light most favorable to himself. It has long been understood in the
context of civil appeals, where the burden is likewise on the appellant to demonstrate that

3
 Additionally, many of defendant’s “factual” statements in his opening brief and nearly
all such statements in his reply brief lack record references, which violates rule
8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court.

                                              10
the evidence is insufficient, that ‘[a] recitation of only [the appellant’s] own evidence or a
general unsupported denial that any evidence sustains the findings is not the
“demonstration” contemplated under the rule.’ [Citation.] . . . There is no reason in law
or logic that these same principles should not apply in an appeal in a criminal case.
These principles are fundamental to the very nature of appellate review, and they must be
respected by the criminal defendant who seeks review of his conviction as much as by the
appellant in a civil case.” (Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1573-1574.)
              “Thus, to prevail on a sufficiency of the evidence argument, the defendant
must present his case to us consistently with the substantial evidence standard of review.
That is, the defendant must set forth in his opening brief all of the material evidence on
the disputed elements of the crime in the light most favorable to the People, and then
must persuade us that evidence cannot reasonably support the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]
If the defendant fails to present us with all the relevant evidence, or fails to present that
evidence in the light most favorable to the People, then he cannot carry his burden of
showing the evidence was insufficient because support for the jury’s verdict may lie in
the evidence he ignores.” (Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.)
              Defendant failed these requirements rather spectacularly. His “combined
factual and procedural statement” (boldfacing & capitalization omitted), which is less
than five pages long, stated the charges against him and then proceeded to summarize the
underlying facts in less than half a page (without record references unless he was directly
quoting from the prosecutor’s or defense counsel’s argument – which, of course, is not
evidence at all). This comes nowhere close to setting forth “all of the material evidence
on the disputed elements of the crime in the light most favorable to the People” as
required by Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at page 1574. Because he failed to do so,
he cannot carry his burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.

                                              11
Substantial Evidence
              Even if defendant had adequately briefed this appeal, our own review of the
record demonstrates substantial evidence to uphold the verdicts. To prove defendant
guilty of conspiracy and insurance fraud, the prosecution was required to prove defendant
conspired to refer clients for compensation in violation of section 3215.4 The jury was
properly instructed that the intent to violate section 3215 was an element of the crime of
conspiracy.
              Defendant’s only argument is that the evidence did not support that he
knew the referral scheme at issue in this case was a crime. Despite defendant’s argument
to the contrary, the prosecution was not required to present “letters, emails, nor any other
correspondence” or evidence of “consciousness of guilt.” Defendant’s knowledge of the
law and intent to violate it can be inferred from the circumstances of the case. “Because
intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof, it may be inferred from all the facts and
circumstances disclosed by the evidence.” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236,
1245; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 355 [“Mental state and intent are
rarely susceptible of direct proof and must therefore be proven circumstantially].)”
              In People v. Paredes (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 858, the office administrator of
a radiology practice (Parades) entered into an oral agreement with the owner of a medical
clinic through which the radiology practice would pay the clinic a referral fee for patients
referred to the radiology practice for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans. Parades
received invoices from the clinic for patient referral fees and arranged to pay those fees.
(Id. at p. 861.) Later, the clinic’s co-owner arranged for the referral of patients from a

4
 Specific intent to violate section 3215 is not an element of that section, but the intent to
commit a crime is an element of conspiracy. (People v. Koenig (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
771, 806.) Violation of Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(3), requires intent to
defraud pursuant to the plain language of the statute.

                                              12
chiropractic office to the radiology practice in exchange for compensation. Insurance
companies were billed for at least some of these services. (Id. at p. 862.)
              Paredes was charged with violating section 3215 and insurance fraud under
Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(3). (People v. Paredes, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at
p. 860.) Paredes, like defendant, argued there was insufficient evidence of his mental
state to violate section 3215. (Id. at p. 865.) The court rejected this argument, finding
that “the jury could clearly find that Paredes knew that he was offering or delivering
compensation for patient referrals.” (Ibid.) A higher degree of knowledge is required
here, because conspiracy, as noted above, requires specific intent. But defendant is also a
person who possessed more knowledge than Paredes, who was an office manager, not an
attorney.
              Defendant was admitted to practice law in 1975 and operated his own law
office. The defense itself presented evidence that defendant was an experienced attorney
who had been practicing workers’ compensation law for at least 22 years. According to
Hernandez, the retired workers’ compensation judge, defendant did impressive work and
was “knowledgeable in the workers’ compensation field and workers’ compensation
law.” Based on defendant’s level of knowledge and experience, the jury could infer that
defendant knew the laws involving what kinds of referrals were lawful and which ones
were not in the context of workers’ compensation law.
              Defendant certainly had ample notice that this scheme might have been
illegal and that he should inquire further. A defendant cannot remain willfully ignorant
and then claim a lack of knowledge about the specific law he was violating as a defense
to a specific intent requirement. (People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 779.)
[“‘[T]he law recognizes honest purpose, not dishonest ignorance of the law, as a defense
to a charge of committing a crime requiring “specific intent.”’”] Defendant should have
realized that something might be amiss with a scheme that provided him with thousands
of dollars worth of free labor. He could have consulted with his malpractice carrier, an

                                             13
ethics hotline, or even the insurance carriers he worked with on a daily basis as a
workers’ compensation attorney if he did not wish to research the issue himself.
              Further, the very oddness of the scheme involved here – where Ayala was
paid by USA Photocopy, rather than by defendant himself – a type of scheme the
experienced workers’ compensation attorney and retired Judge Hernandez had never
heard of – suggested that something was not aboveboard. The jury was entitled to infer
from the oddity of the scheme that defendant, as an experienced attorney, was aware it
was illegal. The lack of a written agreement – something a reasonable jury might
consider routine for a lawyer – also suggests knowledge of illegality. Taken together,
and given the substantial evidence standard, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable
jury to infer that defendant was aware that the referral scheme violated the law.

                                            III
                                      DISPOSITION
              The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

                                            14