Court Opinion

ID: 9763713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:53:14.88892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:34.479051
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully with the result reached in this case. I undertake to set forth separately, however, my views of the proper rationale for the result reached in part V of the Majority Opinion concerning the admissibility of evidence of a witness’s unwillingness to submit to a polygraph test.
I would disavow the dictum in Mottram,1 on which the defendant relies, to the extent it indicates that evidence of unwillingness to take a polygraph test becomes admissible by a showing, without more, that the reason for the refusal was a belief in the reliability of the test as an indicator of truthfulness. In my opinion, the decision to admit or exclude such evidence should be made by the trial court, using the discretionary balancing test of M.R.Evid. 403, and giving due regard to factors that weigh heavily in favor of exclusion.
In Mottram, the Court’s attention was focused upon the question of the scientific reliability of the polygraph. The Court noted that since the reliability of the polygraph as an instrument for the determination of truthfulness had not been scientifically established, polygraph test results were not admissible evidence. Moreover, evidence of a witness’s unwillingness to take such a test was inadmissible, at least where the witness’s reason for refusing was unknown, since the refusal had no probative value unless the jury attributed a non-existent reliability to polygraph testing. But the Court observed that where the witness based his refusal on his own belief that the test was reliable, then the refusal could be used as evidence of the witness’s consciousness of guilt without requiring the jury to attribute any reliability to polygraph tests.
While the suggestion in Mottram is logically sound, its application creates problems of confusing the jury and wasting time while exploring such collateral issues as the witness’s familiarity with polygraph testing and his motives for refusing to take the test. In addition, we have recently recognized another factor which also weighs heavily against admission of polygraph test results or a witness’s unwillingness to take such a test. In State v. Williams, Me., 388 A.2d 500, 502-03 (1978), we stated that “admissibility of lie detector evidence .. . poses the serious danger that a mechanical device, rather than the judgment of the jury, will decide credibility.” Similarly, evidence of a person’s unwillingness to take a polygraph test, even where that person believed the test to be reliable, is apt to unduly narrow the jury’s focus in determining credibility. See State v. Trafton, Me., 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 n.2 (1981).
The jury, as the fact finder, should have an opportunity to evaluate a witness’s testimony as a whole, taken in the light of the witness’s demeanor, the other evidence, and common sense, combining the whole as “concurrent elements of a single intellectual equation.” Qualey v. Fulton, Me., 422 A.2d 773, 776 (1980). The danger of informing a jury of a witness’s unwillingness to take a polygraph test lies in the likelihood that the jurors, in assessing that witness’s general credibility, will place undue emphasis upon their determination of why the witness was unwilling to take the test and upon their own beliefs as to whether or not such a test is reliable in indicating truthfulness.
The danger of unduly impinging on the jury’s function as the assessor of credibility, compounded by the need to explore collater*1304al issues, renders the statement in Mottram improperly simplistic. Nevertheless, the question of admissibility of evidence about polygraph tests should not be resolved by a per se rule of exclusion, but rather by careful application of the discretionary balancing test of M.R.Evid. 403. In applying that test, the trial court must place special emphasis on the unique danger to jury impartiality that is posed by evidence of refusal to submit to a polygraph test. In a rare case, a trial court, applying the standards of Rule 403, may conclude that the danger of prejudice is overcome by the probative value of such evidence.2 While such a situation seem unlikely, we cannot say as an abstract proposition that it will never occur. See Edwards v. Black, Me., 429 A.2d 1015 (1981). The determination that unfair prejudice exists can more properly be made by the trial court, in the context of the specific case, than by a judicially fashioned per se rule of exclusion. Where, as in the instant case, the trial court concludes that the peculiar characteristics of the evidence would lead the jury “to exaggerate its probative value” as it bears on the credibility assessment, that conclusion will be given great weight on appeal and will be reversed only for the clearest kind of abuse of discretion. I find no such abuse in this case. That conclusion is all that is required to decide this case.
We have in place, under 4 M.R.S.A. § 9 — A, a specific procedure by which the Supreme Judicial Court can promulgate new evidentiary rules with the benefit of mechanisms that assure an in-depth study of the need for such rules as well as of the policy considerations that bear upon the formulation of a specific rule. The rule-making process presents an opportunity for consideration of the knowledge and views of the trial bench and bar and the lay public. That procedure is attuned to exploring and determining the reasons for a proposed rule of evidence on a much more comprehensive basis than is possible in the process of normal appellate review. I suggest that if a per se exclusionary rule is to be promulgated, it can more knowledgeably be done through the rule-making process.

. For example, consciousness of guilt could be shown by evidence that a witness refused to take a lie detector test on the ground that he believed the test was trustworthy or dependable. If, however, the evidence showed a contrary belief by the witness, namely, that the test was not trustworthy or not dependable, no inference of consciousness of guilt could be drawn.
State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 333, 184 A.2d 225, 230 (1962).

. Of course, as long as the polygraph is not recognized as scientifically reliable, the results of such tests themselves will be inadmissible as evidence.