Court Opinion

ID: 9665513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:50:17.015823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:16.289078
License: Public Domain

PEEPLES, Justice,
concurring.
I join the panel’s judgment and most of Justice Hardberger’s opinion. But I respectfully disagree with his criticism of this state’s practice of instructing juries about inferential rebuttal matters that are raised by the evidence. In particular, I take issue with the suggestions that they comment on the weight of the evidence, improperly emphasize the defendant’s theory of the case, and serve no purpose.
Our system trusts juries by putting tremendous power in their hands. We give them considerable discretion to assess credibility, find facts, and determine damages. The evidence seldom raises sole cause. But when it does, I think we can trust jurors with *498an instruction that tells them this simple truism: If a nonparty caused the occurrence 100 percent, then it necessarily follows that none of the parties could have caused it in whole or in part. If juries are not intellectually capable of understanding an inferential rebuttal instruction, we need to ask whether we have overestimated their capacity for exercising the vast power we have given them in deciding the controlling issues.
Inferential rebuttal instructions serve the valid purpose of helping juries focus on the parties’ contentions. If the jury believes that a nonparty’s acts or omissions were the sole cause of an incident, isn’t the jury supposed to find that the defendant’s conduct did not cause it?
It is said that inferential rebuttal instructions emphasize the defendant’s theory of the case. But every instruction emphasizes something about the case. And most of the other parts of the charge emphasize the plaintiffs theory of the case — negligence and proximate cause. It seems to me good practice to explain to the jury each litigant’s theory of the case within our existing questions and instructions and then to let the jury choose which theory to accept.
I acknowledge that existing instructions could be worded more simply. But if the complaint is that present instructions are esoteric or confusing, the answer is to improve their wording, not to prohibit them completely.
Criminal juries are trusted with comparable instructions. “It is well established that a defendant is entitled to an affirmative submission of every defensive theory raised by the evidence, [citations omitted]. This rule applies with equal force to defensive theories regarding the cause of death in murder prosecutions.” Hill v. State, 585 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (emphasis in original) (criminal defendant entitled to instruction submitting defensive theory that victim died of natural causes, and was not choked and beaten). In other words, though the state must prove as part of its case in chief that the defendant murdered the decedent, our law allows an instruction telling the jury that if they believe the decedent died of natural causes they should acquit. That is an inferential rebuttal instruction.
Similar instructions may be given on the inferential rebuttal defense of alibi. See Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 95, 96-97 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (affirmative instruction on alibi is proper). That is, even though the state may have to prove as part of its case in chief that the defendant was present at a crime scene, our law allows an instruction that if the jury believes the defendant’s alibi, it should acquit. That is an inferential rebuttal instruction.
Why should we allow trial courts to instruct juries about a criminal defendant’s defensive theory but forbid them to do the same thing in a civil ease? It seems rational to allow instructions pointing out that if a certain version of events is accepted, the logical consequence is a defense verdict. The instructions promote truthful, rational decisionmaking by juries, which should be our goal.
Our law has work enough to do without attempting to change settled instructions, especially when they are not causing problems but instead are serving the worthwhile goal of clarifying the parties’ contentions for the jury.