Court Opinion

ID: 9634312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:41.341832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:18.621345
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b), precluded appellant’s Commanding Officer from interrogating him or asking him for a statement without advising him inter alia of the nature of the accusation against him. The captain’s failure to do so, albeit under mistake, would have precluded the use of his confession in a military court. See 10 U.S.C. § 831(d). See also United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 376 M.R. 249 (1967) (the military equivalent of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966]). At a minimum, Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice required the warnings provided in that section where, as here, a suspect’s commanding officer requested a statement from him. McGrath’s commanding officer failed to give the warnings required by the Code. As a matter of comity this Court should recognize the Uniform Code and the decisions of the military courts interpreting that Act of Congress governing military justice as persuasive authority with respect to the warnings required and the admissibility, in a civilian court, of evidence obtained by the military from its members. See e.g. Parisi *121v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 46, 92 S.Ct. 815, 822, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972).1
I am not convinced that under the “totality of circumstances” appellant was in actual custody during his conversation with his commanding officer. See p. 497 (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Nix, in which Mr. Justice McDermott joins). Moreover, I am concerned that by focusing merely on the “custodial” aspect of the case rather than both “custodial” and “by law enforcement officers” the opinion announcing the Judgment of the Court opens the Miranda rule to applications which are unintended and unforeseeable. However, because the Code of Military Justice would require such warnings we need not stretch or strain the Miranda rule in order to find that warnings should have been given to the appellant prior to the eliciting of his confession.
Thus, I disagree with Mr. Justice Larsen that Miranda applies here as a matter of either Pennsylvania or United States constitutional law.

. But see United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.1978). I am unpersuaded that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on police misconduct sufficient to justify its application, even in the face of "good faith” by law enforcement officials. However, without further instruction from the United States Supreme Court, I am unable to accept the suggested alternate holding in Newell that exclusion by a non-military criminal court of evidence obtained by the military has no effect on the military’s conduct in interrogating its personnel.