Court Opinion

ID: 9408372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 16:08:22.205861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.561960
License: Public Domain

J-S11043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    JULIAN ROBINSON                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1633 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 2, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0005059-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                   FILED JULY 12, 2023

        Appellant, Julian Robinson, appeals from the judgment of sentence,

entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial

conviction for persons not to possess firearms and bench trial conviction for

the summary offense of driving without a license.1 We affirm.

        The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as

follows:

           [T]he evidence established that on the afternoon of
           November 24, 2019, at approximately 12:30 P.M., Sergeant
           Dathan Schlegel of the Upper Macungie Police Department
           served a Protection From Abuse [(“PFA”)] Order on
           [Appellant] near his place of employment at Windkits on
           Penn Drive [in] Allentown…. Specifically, earlier in the day,
           Sergeant Schlegel had received a telephone call from the
           Easton Police Department requesting that he serve
           [Appellant] with a [PFA] Order that was obtained by
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501, respectively.
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       [Appellant’s] girlfriend, Ishona Thompson. A member of the
       Easton Police Department was not able to serve the PFA
       Order because the warehouse where [Appellant] worked at
       was not within the jurisdiction of the Easton Police
       Department.      The Easton Police Department provided
       Sergeant Schlegel with the necessary information, including
       a photograph of [Appellant] from his Pennsylvania
       Identification Card and the description of the vehicle that
       [Appellant] was driving.4

          4 [Appellant] did not possess a valid license to drive a
          vehicle from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but
          rather a Pennsylvania Identification Card.

       In compliance with typical protocol of the Upper Macungie
       Police Department, Sergeant Schlegel requested assistance
       to serve the PFA Order upon [Appellant], as domestic
       situations are volatile by nature. Sergeant Schlegel arrived
       in the location of [Appellant’s] place of employment and
       located the subject vehicle, a silver Kia Optima, within the
       parking lot of the Windkit warehouse facility. Sergeant
       Schlegel then parked his police cruiser down the street from
       [Appellant’s] place of employment and waited for back up
       to arrive on scene. However, a few minutes later, Sergeant
       Schlegel observed [Appellant] leaving the parking lot in the
       silver Kia and drive past him on Penn Drive. Sergeant
       Schlegel conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle.

       [Appellant] was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Sergeant
       Schlegel approached the vehicle and he requested that
       [Appellant] exit the vehicle, patted him down for weapons,
       confirmed his identity, and explained and provided him with
       the PFA paperwork. Additionally, [Appellant] indicated to
       Sergeant Schlegel that he did not possess a firearm or
       ammunition, and he executed a Relinquishment of Firearm
       Form in conjunction and compliance with the PFA Order. At
       this time, [Appellant] was free to leave, but he was unable
       to drive the Kia Optima because he did not have a valid
       driver’s license and his girlfriend, the victim of the PFA, was
       the registered owner of the vehicle and she wanted her
       sedan back. Consequently, [Appellant] asked Sergeant
       Schlegel for his wallet, cell phone, and charger that were
       located in the front of the vehicle. These items were
       provided to [Appellant] and he walked back to his place of

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          employment on Penn Drive.

          Sergeant Schlegel remained on scene with the vehicle. He
          contacted [Appellant’s] girlfriend, Ms. Thompson, and
          explained to her the location of the vehicle for her to come
          and retrieve it. Ms. Thompson arrived shortly thereafter,
          with another woman. Upon her arrival, Ms. Thompson
          immediately asked Sergeant Schlegel if he would search her
          vehicle. She then attempted to pop the trunk with her set
          of keys, but was unsuccessful because [Appellant] had left
          his keys in the ignition. Therefore, Ms. Thompson utilized
          that set of keys to open the trunk. Upon looking inside the
          trunk, Sergeant Schlegel observed on the driver’s side of
          the trunk a pair of men’s size 11½ black Nike Jordans,6 and
          contained within the right sneaker was a handgun with the
          grip sticking out. Sergeant Schlegel took custody of the pair
          of sneakers and carried them to his patrol vehicle where he
          made the firearm safe.         The firearm, a Taurus semi-
          automatic 9mm Millenium G2, was fully functional per the
          results of functionality testing, and the magazine had twelve
          (12) live rounds in it and there was one (1) bullet in the
          chamber.

              6 At the time of this incident, [Appellant] was wearing
              similar shoes to the black Nike sneakers located in the
              trunk of his vehicle. In fact, [Appellant] conceded that
              the men’s size 11½ black Nike sneakers were his.[2]

          Upon returning to the Upper Macungie Police Department,
          Detective Adam Miller entered the firearm into evidence. He
          dusted the firearm, magazine, and bullets for fingerprints.
          No fingerprints were lifted from these items. In furtherance
          of the investigation, Detective Miller also swabbed the gun
          (both the exterior and the interior), and the bullets in an
          attempt to collect samples of DNA for analysis. The swabs
          were sent out to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab in
          Bethlehem, Pennsylvania for analysis and testing.
          Furthermore, Detective Miller obtained a search warrant for
____________________________________________

2 Defense counsel made this concession during his closing argument when he
stated: “And, now, we have a shoe, sneakers that are 180 septillion times
likely to be [Appellant’s]. I’ll tell you that they’re his shoes.” (N.T. Trial,
3/16/22, at 133).

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          a buccal swab sample from [Appellant] in order to provide
          that to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab for
          comparison purposes. Additionally, the Nike sneakers were
          also sent out for testing and analysis. Thomas Rataic, an
          expert in the field of DNA profiling and testing with the
          Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab, tested the DNA
          samples provided. Specifically, Mr. Rataic processed the
          samples, interpreted the data, and compared them to the
          reference DNA provided by [Appellant]. With regard to the
          firearm, the results from the exterior of the gun indicated
          that there were three (3) DNA profiles present. Mr. Rataic
          compared [Appellant’s] DNA obtained from the buccal swab
          to the profiles on the firearm. He opined to a reasonable
          degree of scientific certainty that it was sixty-three (63)
          sextillion times more likely that the DNA came from
          [Appellant] and two (2) other individuals than three (3)
          unknown profiles. Insufficient sample of DNA was obtained
          to analyze the bullets. With regard to the Nike sneakers,
          the results indicated that there were four (4) DNA profiles
          present. Mr. Rataic compared [Appellant’s] DNA obtained
          from the buccal swab to the profiles on the Nike sneakers.
          Mr. Rataic concluded to a reasonable degree of scientific
          certainty that it was one-hundred and eighty (180) septillion
          times more likely that the DNA came from [Appellant] and
          three (3) other individuals than four (4) unknown profiles.

          In addition, Katherine Cross, an expert in the field of DNA
          and forensic analysis, reviewed the DNA and serology
          reports, as well as Mr. Rataic’s reports and conclusions. Ms.
          Cross found that Mr. Rataic’s methodology, procedure, and
          analysis were appropriate. However, Ms. Cross opined that,
          based on Locard’s Exchange Principle, it is possible that the
          DNA transferred from [Appellant’s] Nike sneakers to the
          firearm found therein, or possibly vice versa.

          [Appellant] and his girlfriend spoke via the telephone after
          this incident. Their telephone conversations were recorded
          and preserved. [The Commonwealth entered recordings of
          the conversations into evidence at trial.3       During the
____________________________________________

3At trial, the Commonwealth submitted discs containing the recorded phone
calls, and it played the discs for the jury. (See N.T. Trial, 3/16/22, at 63-69).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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          conversations, Appellant and his girlfriend discussed the
          circumstances surrounding Appellant’s interaction with the
          police. Specifically, Appellant insinuated that his girlfriend
          asked police to search the vehicle because she knew that
          police would discover a firearm.]

(Trial Court Order and Opinion, filed 5/19/22, at 3-7) (internal record citations

and some footnotes omitted).

       Appellant’s first trial commenced on September 20, 2021.            After

deliberating, the jury became deadlocked. On September 27, 2021, the court

declared a hung jury and granted a mistrial. Appellant proceeded to a second

jury trial on March 15, 2022. On March 17, 2022, the jury found Appellant

guilty of persons not to possess firearms. The court also found Appellant guilty

of the summary offense of driving without a license. On May 2, 2022, the

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of five (5) to ten (10) years’

imprisonment, plus fines and costs. That same day, Appellant timely filed a

post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence.          The court

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion by order and opinion filed on May

19, 2022.

       On June 21, 2022, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.4 On June

22, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

____________________________________________

Although the discs are not contained in the certified record on appeal, the trial
court opinion quoted several portions of the conversations at issue. (See Trial
Court Opinion at 7-10).

4 Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on the Tuesday after the
Juneteenth holiday.

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statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule

1925(b) statement on July 12, 2022.

      Appellant now raises two issues for our review:

         Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain [Appellant’s]
         conviction for persons not to possess a firearm if the
         evidence of possession was conflicted, unclear, or otherwise
         confusing?

         Whether the verdict was against the weight of all the
         evidence in regards to the proof of whether or not
         [Appellant] was properly proven to have the necessary
         possession of the firearm to justify the conviction?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

      Appellant’s two issues are related, and we address them together.

Appellant contends that the Commonwealth linked him to the firearm “based

primarily on DNA evidence retrieved from the firearm and the sneaker in which

it had been located in the trunk of the vehicle.”       (Id. at 7).   Appellant

maintains that “the DNA evidence and the experts’ reports were contradictory

and could not support the proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]

possessed the firearm.” (Id.) Specifically, Appellant insists that the presence

of his DNA on the firearm “could only prove that the gun came in contact with

something that had some of [Appellant’s] trace DNA on it and that was

transferred to the exterior of the gun.” (Id. at 12-13). Under the totality of

these circumstances, Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth presented

insufficient evidence to support the firearms conviction, and the verdict was

against the weight of the evidence. We disagree.

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      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

          As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
          claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most
          favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the
          benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
          evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
          verdict when it establishes each material element of the
          crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
          beyond a reasonable doubt.              Nevertheless, the
          Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
          certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
          resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
          and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of
          fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

          The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
          wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that
          the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a
          crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where
          the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn
          therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence.
          Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that
          of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,
          accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
          demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s
          crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
          convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super.

2013)).

      Additionally,

             The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder
             of the fact who is free to believe all, part or none of
             the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
             witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its
             judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may

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            only reverse the … verdict if it is so contrary to the
            evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

         Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d
         666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has
         ruled on the weight claim below, an appellant court’s role is
         not to consider the underlying question of whether the
         verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather,
         appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably
         abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408

(2003), cert denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)

(most internal citations omitted).

      The Uniform Firearms Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

         § 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture,
              control, sell or transfer firearms

            (a)   Offense defined.—

                  (1) A person who has been convicted of an
            offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without
            this Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence
            or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c)
            shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
            manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control,
            sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this
            Commonwealth.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

      “When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the

Commonwealth must establish constructive possession….” Commonwealth

v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Haskins, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa.Super. 1996)). “Constructive possession is

the ability to exercise conscious control or dominion over the illegal substance

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and the intent to exercise that control.” Id. “The intent to exercise conscious

dominion can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.”          Id.

“Constructive possession may be found in one or more actors where the item

in issue is in an area of joint control and equal access.” Commonwealth v.

Valette, 531 Pa. 384, 388, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (1992).

         It is well established that, as with any other element of a
         crime, constructive possession may be proven by
         circumstantial     evidence.      In   other   words,   the
         Commonwealth must establish facts from which the trier of
         fact can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised
         dominion and control over the contraband at issue.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36-37 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 651 Pa. 10, 202 A.3d 42 (2019) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

      Instantly, the Commonwealth’s evidence established that Appellant was

the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle stopped by Sergeant Schlegel.

Sergeant Schlegel stopped the vehicle to serve Appellant with PFA paperwork.

After the stop, Appellant’s girlfriend arrived at the scene and asked the

sergeant to search the trunk.    Sergeant Schlegel and Appellant’s girlfriend

used Appellant’s vehicle key to open the trunk. Inside the trunk, the sergeant

found a firearm stuffed inside Appellant’s sneaker. Both the firearm and the

sneaker contained Appellant’s DNA.

      Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, sufficient evidence supported the firearms conviction. See

Sebolka, supra.     Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary, it was

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reasonable for the jury to infer that the presence of Appellant’s DNA on the

firearm constituted circumstantial evidence of constructive possession. Id.

Under the totality of these circumstances, the Commonwealth demonstrated

Appellant’s conscious control or dominion over the contraband. See Jones,

supra. Moreover, the court evaluated Appellant’s post-sentence motion and

determined that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock

one’s sense of justice. Based upon the foregoing, we cannot say that the court

abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion. See Champney, supra.

Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his appellate claims, and we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/12/2023

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