Court Opinion

ID: 9702137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:56:24.926078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:33.914059
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring in result.
The struggle the court has in reconciling the anonymous tip in this case appears to arise out of the characterization of the inquiry made by the police officer under the circumstances recited in the majority opinion as a “stop” which implements all the protections of the Fourth Amendment. It may be that is what Justice Rehnquist meant in writing for the majority in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), when in reference to an officer’s authority to make a forcible stop he noted, at footnote 1 of the opinion, that it was not contended that the defendant acted voluntarily in rolling down the window of his car. Perhaps that footnote now enshrines this inquiry as a Fourth Amendment “stop.” I am not convinced that it is.
Adams relied, as does the majority opinion, on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Terry Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, in concluding that the officer in that case had seized Terry and subjected him to a search when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing, observed at footnote 16 of the opinion:
“Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record whether any such ‘seizure’ took place here prior to Officer McFadden’s initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that up to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had occurred.”
To conclude that Justice Rehnquist in the footnote in Adams meant to imply, because it was not contended that the defendant “acted voluntarily in rolling down the window,” that henceforth all such similar situations are, as a matter of law, assumed to be Fourth Amendment stops or seizures, is contrary to Terry and, for that matter, such a result is not supported by the facts in Adams which led to the conclusion that the stop in that case was a Fourth Amendment stop. One authority has observed that Adams does not meet head on the issue of whether or not such conduct constitutes a stop. In 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.2(h) (1987), at footnote 202, the author observes that in Adams “the officer asked the suspect, seated in a parked car, to open the door, and when he instead rolled down the window the officer immediately searched for a gun. The Court merely observed that such a limited search was permissible whenever ‘the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop,’ and footnoted that proposition with the comment that the state ‘does not contend that Williams acted voluntarily in rolling down the window of his car.’ ”
That same respected treatise would conclude that such a stop is not a stop subject to Fourth Amendment protection. LaFave indicates there is no seizure if, for example, the officer interrogates in a conversational manner, does not order the defendant to do *335something or demand that he do it and does not ask questions which are overbearing or harassing in nature and does not make any threats or draw a weapon. On the other hand, the encounter becomes a seizure if the officer engages in conduct which a reasonable man would view as threatening or offensive if performed by another private citizen. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.2(h) (1987). LaFave observes this analytical approach is useful in those cases concerning police contact with persons seated within parked vehicles and states:
"... the mere approach and questioning of such persons does not constitute a seizure. The result is not otherwise when the officer utilizes some generally accepted means of gaining the attention of the vehicle occupant or encouraging him to eliminate any barrier to conversation. The officer may tap on the window and perhaps even open the door if the occupant is asleep. A request that the suspect open the door or roll down the window would seem equally permissible, but the same would not be true of an order that he do so. Likewise, the encounter becomes a seizure if the officer orders the suspect out of the car. So too, other police action which one would not expect if the encounter was between two private citizens — boxing the car in, approaching it on all sides by many officers, or use of flashing lights as a show of authority — will likely convert the event into a Fourth Amendment seizure.” 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, at 415-417. [Footnotes omitted.]
Minnesota, under somewhat different facts, cites with approval LaFave’s conclusion that courts generally have held that it does not by itself constitute a seizure for an officer to simply walk up and talk to a driver sitting in an already stopped car. State v. Alesso, 328 N.W.2d 685 (Minn.1982); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756 (Minn.1980). Cases from several other jurisdictions are cited by LaFave in support of the conclusion that activity such as we have present in this case does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. A few of those cases will serve to illustrate the point. '
In State v. Boswell, 294 S.E.2d 287, 294 (W.Va.1982), the West Virginia Supreme Court, in holding that there was no seizure where a police officer approached a parked van, tapped on the window, and asked for identification, concluded:
“In determining the threshold question of whether the defendant has been seized, we look to the intensity of the initial inquiry. The less intense the initial inquiry the less likely that a seizure will be found. The intensity of the inquiry will determine whether the initial threshold of ‘seizure’ has been crossed.”
In footnote 11 the West Virginia court explained that the term intensity “is designed to cover a variety of fact patterns which surround the initial inquiry between the police and the individual. It embraces the degree of physical intrusion but also more subtle means of coercion or intrusion including the number of officers involved, their demeanor, their conduct and the length of questioning of the defendant.”
The New Mexico Appellate Court concluded that no seizure took place where an officer approached the defendant who was parked in his own driveway. State v. Montoya, 94 N.M.App. 542, 612 P.2d 1353 (1980). The Kansas Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion where an officer approached a parked car and put questions to the occupants. State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 602 P.2d 1344 (1979).
LaFave further notes that “the confrontation is a seizure only if the officer adds to those inherent pressures by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in social intercourse. The critical factor is whether the policeman, even if making inquiries a private citizen would not, has otherwise conducted himself in a manner which would be perceived as a nonoffensive contact if it occured between two ordinary citizens.” 3 W. LaFave at 412.
Here, in the words of the majority opinion, “The officer approached Wibben’s car and tapped on the window with his flashlight. Wibben rolled down the window and he asked her if she were okay. Wibben *336responded that she was okay and that she was waiting for a friend.” The fact the officer received an anonymous tip is not relevant to the issue of whether or not there was a stop.
I cannot conclude that this was a stop, or seizure, which implicates the Fourth Amendment. I therefore would not reach the issue of whether or not the officer had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a law had been violated and whether or not the officer could rely on the anonymous tip.
I concur in the result.
GIERKE, J., concurs.