Court Opinion

ID: 9919023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 14:02:30.644304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.190855
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                        Decided: January 17, 2024

           S23Y1117, S23Y1119. IN THE MATTER OF DERRIC
                            CROWTHER.

        PER CURIAM.

        These disciplinary matters arose from the conduct of Derric

Crowther (State Bar No. 198838) in two separate cases. The matters

are currently before the Court on the report and recommendation of

the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review Board”), which

reviewed the report and recommendation of Special Master Jo Carol

Nesset-Sale at the request of Crowther pursuant to Bar Rules 4-214

and 4-216. The Special Master recommended that Crowther be

disbarred for his violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8 (e), 1.15 (I), 1.15

(II), and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct

(“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a

single violation of Rules 1.3, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), or 8.4 (a) (4) is
disbarment, and the maximum penalty for a single violation of Rules

1.4, 1.5, or 1.8 (e) is a public reprimand. The Review Board adopted

the Special Master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law but

recommended that Crowther receive a four-year suspension. Both

the Bar and Crowther filed exceptions in this Court.

     The misconduct at issue involves allegations of Crowther’s

systematic violations of the trust accounting rules, as well as his

failure to resolve a dispute with one of his clients over settlement

funds, charging that client an excessive fee, and disbursing all of the

settlement funds to himself or his law firm despite the ongoing

dispute with the client. In recommending a four-year suspension,

the Review Board disagreed with the Special Master only about the

balance of aggravating and mitigating factors and relied on In the

Matter of Favors, 283 Ga. 588 (662 SE2d 119) (2008), to support its

recommendation. However, as explained below, the Board’s

recommendation is not supported by our precedent, including

Favors, or by the records in these matters. Accordingly, after

considering the records and both parties’ exceptions to the Board’s

                                  2
report and recommendation, we conclude that disbarment is

appropriate for Crowther’s misconduct in these two cases.

     1. Procedural History

     The State Bar initially pursued four separate complaints

against Crowther but dismissed two of the matters. The remaining

cases were State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) No. 7134 and

SDBD No. 7390. In SDBD No. 7134, Crowther was charged with

violating Rules 1.8 (e); 1.15 (I) (a), (b), (c), and (d); and 1.15 (II) (a)

and (b). In SDBD No. 7390, he was charged with violating Rules 1.3,

1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) (4). During litigation of these

matters, Crowther filed two petitions for voluntary discipline,

requesting either a public reprimand or a three-month suspension

to resolve all pending matters. The Special Master rejected both

petitions. Based on Crowther’s admissions, the Bar filed a motion

for summary judgment in SDBD No. 7134, which was granted as to

Rules 1.8 (e); 1.15 (I) (a), (b), and (c); and 1.15 (II) (b). The Special

Master granted summary judgment to Crowther only on Rule 1.15

                                    3
(II) (a),1 concluding that he did not violate that subsection by

delegating to his office manager the task of administering his trust

account. As to SDBD No. 7390, the Bar filed a motion for summary

judgment, which the Special Master granted in its entirety. The

Special Master held a hearing on aggravation and mitigation on May

24 and 25, 2022.

     In her report and recommendation, the Special Master noted

that SDBD No. 7390 arose from a 2019 grievance filed by a client

who had previously filed a grievance against Crowther in 2013 that

was dismissed in 2014. The instant formal complaint was based on

Crowther’s actions that occurred between 2014 and 2019. The

Special Master concluded that the four-year statute of limitation

and two-year tolling provision in Bar Rule 4-222 (a) “authorize[d] a

look-back to February 4, 2014, the date of the dismissal [of the 2013

grievance], or September 4, 2013, the date of the [2013] grievance,

which would be the farthest reach of the six-year look-back.” The

     1 Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides, in relevant part, that all funds “held by a

lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered
from a trust account.”

                                     4
Special Master observed that she could consider matters outside of

the statute of limitation, which would provide “essential context”

and would be relevant to resolving issues involving aggravation and

mitigation, Crowther’s mental state, restitution, and a pattern of

misconduct.

     2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

     (a) SDBD No. 7390

     In 2006, the client filed a pro se medical malpractice action

against a Macon hospital on behalf of herself, her siblings, and as

the administratrix of her mother’s estate (collectively, “plaintiffs”),

alleging malpractice by the hospital’s nurses in connection with her

mother’s death. Crowther entered the case in 2007. The attorney-

client relationship was governed by a 2009 Retainer Agreement,

which contained a handwritten amendment stating that “[t]his

contract was modified due to client agreeing to pay a portion not to

exceed $25,000.00 of the legal expenses.” The client paid Crowther

$25,000 for legal expenses between 2007 and 2009. The Retainer

Agreement also provided that if the case settled, Crowther’s law firm

                                  5
would “endorse any check made out to us or to either you or us and

deposit it in our trust account. If the check requires your signature

as well, we will advise you immediately so that you can come in and

endorse the check”; the firm would then schedule a meeting with the

client to collect her money and review how the funds had been

disbursed, which would include a statement detailing “exactly

where the money has gone (your proceeds, attorney[] fees, payments

to medical providers, other expenses, etc.).” (emphasis supplied).

     In 2012, Crowther learned from a new expert that the nurses

had not actually deviated from the applicable standard of care. He

pursued settlement with the hospital, and the parties settled in

August 2012. The hospital issued two checks totaling $187,500, with

a $7,500 check paid directly to a defense expert and the remaining

$180,000 paid to the order of the client, individually and as

administratrix of her mother’s estate; to her siblings; and to

Crowther and his law firm. At the time Crowther received the check,

he had not obtained releases of liability from the plaintiffs, which

were required under the terms of the settlement. The reverse side of

                                  6
the check showed that Crowther deposited it into an account that is

now closed, and that he had endorsed it for himself and “w/p per k”

for the plaintiffs. No one else endorsed the check. Crowther claimed

during the disciplinary proceedings that the Retainer Agreement

authorized him to endorse and deposit the check and that the client

had given him permission over the phone to endorse it, but the client

testified that she never gave Crowther such permission. The Special

Master found Crowther’s testimony not credible and rejected his

reading of the Retainer Agreement, noting that the phrase “w/p per

k” meant “with permission per contract,” but the Retainer

Agreement did not authorize Crowther to endorse a check made out

to both his law firm and the plaintiffs without also getting the

plaintiffs to endorse it. The Special Master observed that the client

did not even see the settlement check until 2016, when an attorney

for the hospital gave her a copy.

     On September 19, 2012, the parties informed the court of the

settlement and that Crowther had not yet obtained the requisite

releases from the plaintiffs. The court dismissed the case without

                                    7
prejudice, ordering that Crowther “shall not distribute the proceeds

of any settlement funds until all plaintiffs have executed the

negotiated releases.” A medical lienholder was entitled to some of

the settlement funds pursuant to a medical lien, but before making

any disbursements, Crowther needed to negotiate and reduce the

amount of the lien. During the disciplinary hearing, Crowther

asserted that he believed that the order prohibited a distribution to

the plaintiffs until they signed the releases but did not prohibit a

distribution to himself and his firm. Thus, Crowther distributed to

himself $46,875, which he testified was his attorney fee, calculated

as 25% of the total $187,500 settlement. However, the Special

Master found that the order was “unequivocal” that Crowther had

to obtain executed releases from the plaintiffs before he could

disburse any of the funds. In October 2012, when the releases had

still not been executed, the hospital filed a motion to enforce the

settlement agreement, requesting that the court dismiss the case

with prejudice to prevent any attempt by the client to relitigate the

claims. The court gave Crowther two weeks to respond, and

                                 8
dismissed the case with prejudice when he did not. To date, the

plaintiffs have not signed the releases and have received no money

from the settlement.

     The Special Master found that between the dismissal of the

first grievance in February 2014 and April 2016, Crowther had

removed the settlement funds from his now-closed trust account.

The Special Master stated that in addition to attorney fees,

Crowther distributed to his law firm reimbursements for costs, fees,

and expenses totaling $131,476.08. Crowther could not say how the

funds had been spent because he did not keep individual client

ledgers, and he testified that he no longer had the bank records and

could not obtain them because the bank did not keep records that

far back. He testified at his 2020 deposition in the disciplinary

proceedings that expenses and attorney fees consumed all the funds,

so his client was entitled to nothing.

     The client requested an accounting from Crowther in two

certified mailings in 2014, to which he did not respond and which he

later claimed he did not receive. On April 14, 2016, the client made

                                  9
a written request for her file; Crowther acknowledged that request

and said she could pick it up in June of that year. In further

correspondence during the summer of 2016, the client expressed

frustration about not receiving the file yet. An attorney reached out

to Crowther on behalf of the client, and in an August 4, 2016 letter,

Crowther stated that if the attorney represented the client, he would

no longer communicate with the client directly. He also mentioned

that the client owed him $5,997.20 for a copy of her file that he had

made. The Special Master found that the attorney did not become

the client’s lawyer as a result of this communication, and no lawyer

except Crowther had ever represented the client in the post-

settlement phase of the case. The Special Master observed that the

client had requested her original file, and she did not agree to pay

for copies.

     By September 2019, the client had received neither proceeds

from nor an accounting of the $180,000, so she filed a second

grievance. In his response to the formal complaint, Crowther stated

under oath that, per the terms of the 2012 court order, he could not

                                 10
distribute the funds until the plaintiffs had executed releases of

liability and he had negotiated the medical lien. Crowther also

stated that the client had incurred additional expenses for the copies

of her file. However, the medical liens were never negotiated or

settled, and none of the proceeds were held separately for the

lienholder or the client until a determination of their interests had

been made. The Special Master found that Crowther had declared

unilaterally that there was no fee dispute and that he had spent all

of the money because the funds were not presently held in any of his

trust accounts.

     In response to the 2013 and 2019 grievances, and at the 2022

aggravation/mitigation hearing, Crowther submitted three “draft

closeout statements” reflecting the breakdown of fees, costs, and

expenses, which he had never previously provided to the client. The

2013 draft closeout reflected attorney fees of $62,500 (calculated

based on 33.33% instead of 25% as stated in the Retainer

Agreement) and expenses of $95,154.34, and the portion owed to the

client was $34,081.16. The Special Master observed that the

                                 11
Retainer Agreement provided that the firm would “pay up front any

costs in proceeding with your claim, such as travel, fees for copying

records, court costs, and the like,” and those expenses would be

reimbursed from the settlement funds. The Special Master noted

that some of the itemized fees in the 2013 draft closeout were

$20,341.12     for   photocopies;    “standard     telephone     fee[s]”   for

maintaining a landline and cell phone; meals billed at the per diem

rate rather than actual cost; and various office supplies. The 2013

draft closeout also included the cost of providing every student in

Crowther’s trial advocacy class2 with a complete set of discovery and

pleadings, and costs associated with a mock trial, focus groups, and

a psychodramatist. While the attorney fees were correctly calculated

as 25% of the settlement in the 2019 and 2022 draft closeouts, the

2022 draft closeout had a line item of “0” for the medical lien, and in

      2 In his November 25, 2013 response to the client’s 2013 grievance (which

he attached as “Ex. 2” to his 2020 supplemental answer to the notice of
investigation of the 2019 grievance), Crowther stated that the client allowed
him to use her case as a case study for his trial advocacy students, that they
reviewed parts of the case in class each week, that he printed all of the
discovery and pleadings for his students, and that he had printed more than
55,000 pages in connection with the client’s case.

                                      12
the 2019 draft closeout, the copying fees included $15,364 in post-

settlement copying costs, reflecting in part the cost of the two copies

of the client’s file made in 2016, billed at $5,997.20 each.

     Crowther testified in his 2020 disciplinary deposition that the

client’s up-front $25,000 payment was an advance of attorney fees

because he had agreed to reduce his contingency fee to 25%. In

contrast, the client testified that she had asked Crowther how much

the case would cost, and he said the total expenses would be $25,000,

but she also contradictorily testified that she may have been

obligated to pay expenses beyond that amount. Citing principles of

statutory construction in construing the fee agreement, the Special

Master resolved this ambiguity and found that the handwritten

amendment in the Retainer Agreement limited the client’s

responsibility for expenses to $25,000. The Special Master found

neither the 2013 nor the 2019 draft closeout documents had a line

item for this payment, and Crowther did not give the client an

accounting of or invoice for the payment.

                                  13
           i.   Rule 1.33

      The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.3

by failing to pursue strategies to close the case other than futilely

attempting to have the plaintiffs sign releases, opining that

“[l]eaving the matter in a moribund, unattended state for a decade

was not the answer.” The Special Master further concluded that

Crowther violated Rule 1.3 by ceasing all communication with the

client in 2016, indicating that he had abandoned her, and by failing

to diligently return her file after she requested it.

          ii.   Rule 1.44

      3 Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence

and promptness in representing a client,” and defines “reasonable diligence” to
mean that “a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client
in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the
lawyer.”
      4 Rule 1.4 provides in relevant part that

      (a) A lawyer shall:
         (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
         with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined
         in Rule 1.0 (h), is required by these rules;
         ...
         (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
         matter; [and]
         (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for
         information[.]

                                       14
     The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.4

by   failing   to   provide    reasonable,     necessary,     and     honest

communication to the client about his disbursal of the settlement

funds. In particular, the Special Master noted that in his response

to the 2013 grievance, Crowther stated that the client was aware

that the settlement proceeds had not been disbursed because she

had not signed the release, and in his 2020 supplemental answer to

the notice of investigation, he stated that he had not made the

disbursements because the case had not concluded.

        iii.   Rule 1.5

     The Special Master stated that to comply with Rule 1.5 (a)5, a

lawyer must determine a reasonable basis for costs and fees charged

     (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
     necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
     regarding the representation.
     5 A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an

     unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The
     factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
     include the following:
        (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
        the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the
        legal service properly;

                                     15
to a client; that fees cannot be used to generate profit; and that only

“hard costs” like court reporter fees and costs of a deposition

transcript can be passed to the client if the fee agreement permits.

But “soft costs” like in-house copying must be calculated to

determine the appropriate basis for the per-copy charge, and

imposing administrative fees to cover soft costs or to increase office

profits to the detriment of the client is prohibited under Rule 1.5.

See also Comment 1 to Rule 1.5 (providing that lawyer may seek

reimbursement of services like in-house copying or phone services

“either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has

       (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular
       employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
       (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
       services;
       (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
       (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
       circumstances;
       (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
       the client;
       (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or
       lawyers performing the services; and
       (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

                                      16
agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects

the cost incurred by the lawyer”).

     The Special Master stated that Crowther knew or should have

known that the Retainer Agreement did not allow him to charge the

client over $131,000 in costs and expenses. She examined each of the

draft closeouts in detail, and concluded that they contained “clearly

excessive, unreasonable fees and deceptive fees,” in violation of Rule

1.5 (a). The Special Master further noted that the draft closeouts

contained charges for administrative costs (such as photocopies and

phone lines) for the maintenance of Crowther’s law firm, to which

the client did not consent. The Special Master stated that line items

that were not actual reimbursements (such as meals, phone lines,

and copying costs) allowed Crowther to make extra profit from the

client. The Special Master found that the fees and rates in the draft

closeouts were not disclosed in the Retainer Agreement and that

many of the fees were not comparable to the types listed in the

Agreement.

                                 17
     The Special Master further concluded that Crowther violated

Rule 1.5 (a) by charging the client $5,997.20 for a copy of the file he

made for himself before giving her the original file. The Special

Master concluded that this action violated Crowther’s fiduciary

obligation to the client, and his communications about it were

deceptive, including his failure to disclose that he did not intend to

give her the original file and that the charge for the copy would be

taken out of the settlement funds.

     As to Rule 1.5 (c)6, the Special Master observed that Crowther

acted as though the case was completed, even though he had not

       6 (1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for

       which the service is rendered . . . . A contingent fee agreement
       shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the
       fee is to be determined, including the percentage or
       percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
       settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be
       deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are
       to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.
       (2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer
       shall provide the client with a written statement stating the
       following:
         (i) the outcome of the matter; and,
         (ii) if there is a recovery showing:
            (A) the remittance to the client;

                                      18
obtained the executed releases from the plaintiffs; negotiated with

the medical lienholder; assessed his outstanding expenses and fees

with invoices and receipts; provided a final accounting; or held a

closeout meeting with the client. The Special Master stated that

Crowther prematurely paid himself the wrong amount because he

treated the client’s $25,000 payment as extra attorney fees and

secretly took the remaining money as costs and fees. The Special

Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.5 (c) (2) (ii) by

failing to provide the written statement required in contingency fee

cases to inform the client about her recovery and how the amount

was determined, which required him to detail the litigation costs,

expenses, and fees.

           (B) the method of its determination;
           (C) the amount of the attorney fee; and
           (D) if the attorney’s fee is divided with another
           lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the
           lawyer’s firm or law office, the amount of fee
           received by each and the manner in which the
           division is determined.

                                    19
        iv.   Rule 1.15 (I)7

     The Special Master observed that it was not ascertainable from

any bank records when the settlement funds were disbursed because

Crowther did not manage, account for, or identify funds with

     7 Rule 1.15 (I) provides in relevant part that

     (a) A lawyer shall hold funds . . . of clients or third persons that are
     in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
     separate from the lawyer’s own funds . . . . Funds shall be kept in
     one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved
     institution . . . . Complete records of such account funds . . . shall
     be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six
     years after termination of the representation.
     (b) For the purposes of this rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third
     person’s interest in funds . . . in the lawyer’s possession if: (1) the
     interest is known to the lawyer, and (2) the interest is based upon
     one of the following: (i) a statutory lien . . . . The lawyer may
     disregard the third person’s claimed interest if the lawyer
     reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien[.]
     (c) Upon receiving funds . . . in which a client or third person has
     an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third
     person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law
     or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to
     the client or third person any funds . . . that the client or third
     person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
     person, shall render a full accounting regarding such property.
     (d) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession
     of funds . . . in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person
     claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer
     until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a
     dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in
     dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is
     resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the
     funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.

                                       20
specificity. In fact, he admitted that for years, he systematically

failed to maintain individual client account ledgers or separate

client funds and that he misused his law firm’s local operating and

trust accounts by making payments from one account that should

have been made from the other and not timely moving his own funds

out of the trust account. The Special Master concluded that

Crowther violated Rule 1.15 (I) (a) by failing to separate the client’s

settlement funds, to maintain a separate ledger for any client’s

funds, or to keep his own funds separate from funds belonging to the

client and the medical lienholder; Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by disregarding

the lienholder’s interest in the settlement funds; and Rule 1.15 (I)

(c) by failing to notify the client and the lienholder about the receipt

of the funds, to promptly disburse the funds due to them, and to

render a full accounting of the funds upon the client’s written

request.

     The Special Master further concluded that Crowther violated

Rule 1.15 (I) (d) by failing to separate the portion of funds subject to

the third-party claim by the lienholder and contested by the client;

                                  21
to promptly distribute to the lienholder and the client the funds not

in dispute; and to hold the funds separate until there was an

accounting and severance of their interests or until any dispute was

resolved. The Special Master observed that in his response to the

2013 grievance, Crowther did not mention whether he had

distributed any money to himself or his firm, and he had not

completed an accounting, so he could not have known how much of

the settlement funds would be owed to the lienholder or how much

would be distributed to the client. Thus, the Special Master

presumed that Crowther “had kept a substantial amount of the

money in his trust account to cover those distributions.” The Special

Master then noted the “missed opportunities” to resolve the

distribution issue, including Crowther’s failure to file a response to

the hospital’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, or to seek

a judicial remedy such as interpleader.

          v.   Rule 1.15 (II) (b)8

      8 Rule 1.15 (II) (b) provides that “[n]o personal funds shall ever be
deposited in a lawyer’s trust account, except that unearned attorney’s fees may

                                      22
      In the formal complaint, the Bar alleged that Crowther

violated Rule 1.15 (II) (b) by failing to keep and maintain trust

account records showing the exact balance of the funds held for the

client and the lienholder, and by withdrawing funds for his personal

use without first debiting the amount against his trust account

records and recording it. The Special Master summarily concluded

that Crowther admitted to violating Rule 1.15 (II) (b) in his answer

to the formal complaint.

         vi.   Rule 8.4 (a) (4)9

      The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 8.4

(a) (4) because, at some point between February 2014 and April

2016, he took the entire amount of the settlement proceeds

“surreptitiously, in a manner to avoid scrutiny or accountability.”

be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer
may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service
charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and
maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or
third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the
personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer’s fees
debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.”
      9 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that a lawyer violates the GRPC when he

“engage[s] in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”
                                      23
The Special Master also concluded that Crowther violated Rule 8.4

(a) (4) by knowingly making false statements about the nature of the

client’s   $25,000   advance   payment     during   the   disciplinary

proceedings because during his 2020 deposition, he claimed that the

meaning of “legal expenses” was ambiguous, resulting in a

difference of interpretation between him and the client. The Special

Master observed that OCGA § 13-2-2 provides rules of contract

interpretation, including that “[t]he custom of any business or trade

shall be binding only when it is of such universal practice as to

justify the conclusion that it became, by implication, a part of the

contract,” and that “[i]f the construction is doubtful, that which goes

most strongly against the party executing the instrument or

undertaking the obligation is generally to be preferred.” OCGA § 13-

2-2 (3), (5). The Special Master noted that attorneys routinely

differentiate between attorney fees and expenses, so under OCGA §

13-2-2 (3) and (5), the client’s understanding of the payment as being

for expenses prevailed. The Special Master then stated that in his

response to the 2013 grievance, Crowther had only admitted that

                                  24
the $25,000 was for “initial” expenses, contrary to the Retainer

Agreement’s characterization of it as the upper limit of the client’s

responsibility for expenses. Moreover, in his response to the 2013

grievance, Crowther stated that the client was given an accounting

showing that the $25,000 had been exhausted during litigation.

However, the alleged accounting was never produced, and the client

denied receiving it.

     The Special Master further concluded that Crowther violated

Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by stating in his 2020 supplemental answer to the

notice of investigation that he had not made the disbursements

because the case had not concluded. The Special Master concluded

that this statement, which was made under oath, was false and

misleading, and was carefully crafted to give the client hope for a

disbursement, though Crowther knew all of the money had been

distributed to him and his firm by 2016.

     (b) SDBD No. 7134

     In 2016, Crowther settled two personal injury matters on

behalf of two sets of clients. A financing company had provided

                                 25
“settlement financing” in both matters in exchange for which the

clients granted it a lien on any settlement. After Crowther settled

the matters, money was deposited into his trust account. He paid

other lienholders, but did not pay the financing company, even

though its liens were designated on the closeout documents in each

case. A representative of the financing company filed a grievance in

2018, claiming that Crowther failed to pay liens of $3,298 and

$1,220. Crowther paid those amounts to the financing company after

the grievance was filed with personal funds that he deposited into

his trust account. He acknowledged that his management of the

accounts was deficient and admitted to improperly advancing $100

to one of the clients so that she could buy a medically recommended

bed. The Special Master found that Crowther failed to protect the

interests of the financing company at the time the settlement funds

were disbursed to the clients, and he did not notify the financing

company of the settlements.

     The Special Master observed that the investigation of the

grievance included an examination of the trust and operating

                                26
accounts for Crowther’s law firm, which focuses on personal injury

cases involving contingency fee agreements. Three years of bank

statements were produced in discovery, as well as ledgers and other

accounting documents. The Special Master noted that, contrary to

the trust accounting rules, Crowther initially deposited all of the

money he earned into his trust account, even money from flat-fee

cases and rents he was owed, which mingled with funds owed to

clients and third parties. Sometimes, his trust account would fall

below the amount he needed to pay clients, which required him to

put his own money in the account, pay liens on settlement funds via

credit card or from his operating account, or transfer money from his

operating account to his trust account. He also left much of the

financial administration up to his bookkeeper’s discretion. The

Special Master opined that Crowther’s careless administration and

poor recordkeeping of his trust account resulted from inadequate

protocols and a failure to regularly account for the status of

individual client funds.

                                 27
            i.   Rule 1.8 (e)10

      The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.8

(e) because he admitted that before the settlement funds were

received in one of the personal injury cases, he advanced money to

the client so that she could purchase a medically recommended bed.

The Special Master further observed that Crowther occasionally

used his credit cards to pay clients’ medical bills and expenses before

reimbursing himself from client funds transferred from his trust

account to his operating account.

           ii.   Rule 1.15 (I)

      The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.15

(I) (a) based on his admission that he was responsible for the funds;

that his trust account lacked proper safeguards, resulting in

temporary shortfalls; that he sometimes paid client expenses,

including liens, out of his operating account; and that he failed to

maintain trust account records showing the exact balances for each

      10 Rule 1.8 (e) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not provide financial
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,”
subject to exceptions not relevant here.

                                     28
client or to preserve such records for six years. She concluded that

Crowther violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b) based on his admission that he

disregarded the financing company’s interest in the funds by failing

to maintain in his trust account the amount of the liens, even though

the closeout documents in both personal injury cases referenced the

liens. The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule

1.15 (I) (c) by failing to notify the financing company of the

settlement or to promptly deliver its funds.

          iii.   Rule 1.15 (II)

     The Special Master concluded that Crowther admitted to

violating Rule 1.15 (II) (b) by depositing personal funds into the

trust account and by failing to maintain the required records.11

     (c) Application of ABA Standards

     The Special Master then turned to the ABA Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), to analyze in both

matters (1) the duties violated; (2) Crowther’s mental state; (3) the

     11  The Special Master reiterated that she had granted summary
judgment to Crowther on Rule 1.15 (II) (a), and the Bar does not contest this
conclusion.

                                     29
actual or potential injury caused by his misconduct; and (4)

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. See In the Matter of

Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52) (1995).

           i.     Duties Violated

     The Special Master noted that, in connection with SDBD No.

7390, she considered only the duties Crowther violated after the

2013 grievance was dismissed, which included the duties of

diligence; communication; transparency and reasonableness in

matters regarding fees and expenses; candor; and integrity in

professional practice. As to SDBD No. 7134, the Special Master

found that Crowther violated his duty to avoid conflicts of interest.

As to both matters, the Special Master found that he violated his

duty of safekeeping property and trust accounts.

     ii.        Mental State

     With respect to Rule 1.15 (I) (a), the Special Master found that

the Bar did not produce evidence that Crowther intentionally set up

his trust account to be out of compliance with the trust accounting

rules, and that there was no evidence that he had attended CLEs on

                                    30
trust accounts or consulted with other attorneys or the Bar’s Law

Practice Management Program (the “Program”). However, she found

that Crowther declined an offer from the Program to review the

firm’s trust account. Moreover, by delegating to his bookkeeper

authority over his accounts without guidance or direction, Crowther

knowingly ignored trust account rules. The Special Master found

that Crowther intended that money be deposited into and released

from his trust account pursuant to the scheme created by the

bookkeeper; that client funds would not be separated or accounted

for with accurate ledgers; and that records would not be kept on the

funds. The Special Master found that Crowther intentionally put

earned fees or other personal funds into the trust account and

knowingly paid client expenses using credit cards or the firm’s

operating account. Additionally, the Special Master stated that

Crowther intentionally failed to resolve the medical lien in SDBD

No. 7390 or to hold the settlement funds until the lien was paid, and

he paid the financing company’s lien in SDBD No. 7134 only after

the grievance was filed. In SDBD No. 7390, the Special Master found

                                 31
that Crowther acted intentionally, exhibiting a pattern of behavior

driven by “unrestrained greed and profiteering,” when he signed the

settlement check without the client’s permission, disbursed the

settlement funds to himself in violation of the 2012 court order, and

continued to misrepresent to the Bar and the client that the

settlement funds were available until he admitted at his 2020

deposition that they had all been disbursed.

     ii.   Actual or Potential Injury

     The Special Master found that the grievants in both matters

suffered serious injury. In SDBD No. 7134, the financing company

suffered actual injury when Crowther failed to notify it and pay the

liens from the settlement funds, but that injury was remediated

when Crowther paid the liens after the grievance was filed. In SDBD

No. 7390, the client and her siblings suffered actual injury due to

the unresolved medical lien and because Crowther paid himself the

settlement funds that belonged to them. The Special Master noted

that the 2022 draft closeout reflected that he owed the client

                                 32
$34,148.92, and Crowther testified that he was prepared to pay that

amount.

     iii.   Aggravation and Mitigation

     The Special Master then summarized testimony from the

aggravation/mitigation hearing, with particular focus on SDBD No.

7390 and the client’s testimony, and testimony from Crowther’s

numerous character witnesses. The Special Master also summarized

in detail Crowther’s own testimony, in which he referred to the client

and her sister in SDBD No. 7390 as “elderly ladies” and “like family,”

and stated that he did not intend for the case to go unresolved for so

long and that he wished they could reach an agreement about how

much money the plaintiffs were owed. Nonetheless, he maintained

that under the Retainer Agreement, he was entitled to all of the fees

and expenses he had disbursed to his firm.

     Crowther also testified that he often adjusts a client’s expenses

where “real money” was not involved (such as legal research, phone

lines, and making copies), and in automobile accident cases, he

waives fees until his attorney fee is less than the amount the client

                                 33
will receive. Crowther has a new bookkeeper to handle his bank

accounts, tracks costs and expenses appropriately, and has hired an

accountant to conduct quarterly audits. Crowther’s experience in

law firms before starting his own practice did not include education

about trust accounts, though he acknowledged that he was

responsible for knowing the trust account rules. Crowther testified

about being active in his church, supporting programs that help low-

income students improve their college admissions scores and

increase their chances of getting into good colleges, and allowing law

students to shadow him.

     In aggravation, the Special Master found that Crowther acted

with a dishonest or selfish motive in connection with SDBD No.

7390, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and committed multiple

offenses. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a), (c)-(d). The Special Master

found that Crowther submitted false evidence or statements or

engaged in deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, see

ABA Standard 9.22 (f), because in connection with SDBD No. 7390,

he made false statements during the investigatory phase of the 2013

                                 34
grievance; failed to correct those statements until his 2020

deposition; gave false deposition testimony about the nature of the

client’s $25,000 payment; and gave false testimony at the

aggravation/mitigation hearing about receiving verbal permission

from the client to endorse the settlement check. The Special Master

found that Crowther refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of

his conduct, see ABA Standard 9.22 (g), because for a long time, he

maintained a belief that his bookkeeper bore some responsibility for

his accounting practices not being compliant with the GRPC; that in

connection with SDBD No. 7390, he did not acknowledge any

wrongdoing except for his systemic trust accounting issues, and his

2022 draft closeout still charged the client for fees and expenses that

were not permitted by the Retainer Agreement; and that when

asked by Bar counsel whether he believed he had been diligent in

resolving the client’s case, he gave several non-responsive answers,

which “typifies the strained efforts [he] made to avoid responsibility

and accountability.”

                                  35
     The Special Master found that Crowther, a member of the

State Bar of Georgia since 2000, had substantial experience in the

practice of law; that he was indifferent to making restitution

because he did not make restitution in SDBD No. 7134 until after

the grievance was filed, and has never made restitution in SDBD

No. 7390; and that the plaintiffs in SDBD No. 7390 were vulnerable

victims due to their advanced ages, among other reasons. See ABA

Standard 9.22 (h)-(j). Finally, the Special Master found that

Crowther had committed illegal conduct in SDBD No. 7390, see ABA

Standard 9.22 (k), noting that in 2014, the client contacted law

enforcement to have him investigated for fraud, but that

investigation was closed without charges being filed. Nonetheless,

the Special Master found that Crowther’s actions, including

misrepresenting his authority to endorse the settlement check,

siphoning money from the settlement funds, and misrepresenting

from 2014 until 2020 that the money was still available for

distribution, constituted theft under OCGA § 16-8-2 and forgery

under OCGA § 16-9-1 (d).

                                36
     In mitigation, the Special Master found that Crowther had no

prior disciplinary record; he had a good reputation as an attorney;

he presented testimony of his good character; and he served low-

income students through mentoring and scholarships. See ABA

Standard 9.32 (a), (g).

     (d) Recommendation of Discipline

     Crowther sought a six-month suspension, while the Bar sought

disbarment. The Special Master extensively reviewed cases cited by

Crowther and the Bar. See, e.g., In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206

(857 SE2d 212) (2021) (rejecting recommendations of the special

master and review board and imposing public reprimand for

attorney’s violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II) when clients were

not harmed; substantial mitigating factors were present; and the

only aggravating factors were substantial experience and pattern of

misconduct); In the Matter of Berry, 310 Ga. 158, 158-159 (848 SE2d

71) (2020) (disbarring attorney in default on a notice of discipline for

violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (b) and (c) (2), 1.15 (I), and 8.4

(a) (4) when numerous aggravating factors were present); In the

                                     37
Matter of Gorman, 294 Ga. 726, 726-727 (755 SE2d 746) (2014)

(accepting   special   master’s    recommendation       and    disbarring

attorney for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a)

(4) when no mitigating factors and three aggravating factors were

present). The Special Master also examined Favors, 283 Ga. at 588-

589, in which an attorney filed a petition for voluntary discipline and

received a three-year suspension for her violations of Rules 1.15 (I),

8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4), for spending part of the settlement funds for

herself instead of paying a third party who was entitled to the

money, lying about where the funds had gone, and lying to the

investigative panel during the disciplinary proceeding.

     After observing that the aggravating factors significantly

outweighed the mitigating factors, the Special Master recommended

that Crowther be disbarred and that he make restitution to the

client in SDBD No. 7390 in the amount of $140,625, plus interest at

the statutory rate, calculated starting in August 2012. The Special

Master noted that the amount of restitution represented the total

settlement amount of $187,500, less Crowther’s 25% attorney fee

                                    38
($46,875), and crediting the client with the $25,000 she had already

paid as expenses pursuant to the Retainer Agreement. Crowther

filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and recommendation

and sought review by the Review Board.

     3. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation

     The Review Board found that the Special Master’s factual

findings were not clearly erroneous or manifestly in error and that

her conclusions of law were correct. See Bar Rule 4-216 (a). The

Board thus adopted and incorporated by reference the Special

Master’s findings and conclusions. Turning to the ABA Standards,

the Board also agreed with the Special Master’s analysis of the

duties violated, the lawyer’s mental state, and the potential or

actual injury.

     The Board disagreed, however, with the Special Master’s

balancing of aggravation and mitigation. The Board opined that the

Special Master erred by finding that Crowther’s experience in the

practice of law was aggravating instead of mitigating because

Crowther’s   “inexperience,   specifically   the   lack   of   mentors,

                                 39
contributed to his conduct.” The Board further opined that the

length of time one has practiced law does not negate the fact that

issues may arise if a lawyer does not have proper training or

mentors, and it believed that Crowther did not receive proper

training in law firm management, which explained but did not

excuse his conduct. The Board then stated that the Special Master

“did not give enough weight” to the mitigating factors, noting that

Crowther had shown significant evidence of his good reputation and

character and his lack of prior discipline and opining that the

Special   Master   did   not   fully   appreciate   his   service   to

underprivileged students. Moreover, the Board stated that it was

apparent during Crowther’s oral argument before the Board that his

remorse was genuine. Therefore, the Board recommended that

Crowther be suspended for four years, with reinstatement

conditioned upon paying restitution to the client in SDBD No. 7390

in the amount of $140,625, plus statutory interest from August

2012. The Board stated that it relied on Favors, 283 Ga. at 588, a

case in which the defendant who sought voluntary discipline

                                 40
received a three-year suspension, as a similar case that resulted in

discipline short of disbarment. The Review Board did not cite any

authority from Georgia or otherwise that supports imposition of a

four-year suspension instead of disbarment.

     Both the Bar and Crowther filed exceptions in this Court as to

the Board’s report and recommendation.

     4. State Bar’s Exceptions and Crowther’s Response

     The Bar contends that the Board erred by concluding that

Crowther’s legal experience was not an aggravating factor, even

though he had been practicing for 14 years at the start of the

limitation period for the 2019 grievance. The Bar observes that the

Special Master found Crowther admitted it was his responsibility to

know the trust accounting rules, and that he had substantial

experience as a plaintiff’s lawyer in contingency fee cases. As to

Crowther’s false deposition testimony during the disciplinary

proceeding, the Bar asserts that “[n]o Georgia lawyer should require

a mentor or training or a CLE to know not to lie or misrepresent

facts during a deposition.” The Bar further contends that the Board

                                41
erred by reweighing the aggravating and mitigating factors because

there is no evidence of Crowther’s remorse in the disciplinary

records, and the Special Master did credit the voluminous evidence

of   Crowther’s   good   character,    reputation,   and   service   to

underprivileged students. The Bar argues that although the Special

Master purported to find four mitigating factors, those factors fall

under only two categories in the ABA Standards – lack of prior

discipline and good character or reputation, see ABA Standard 9.32

(a) and (g) – and that two (or four) mitigating factors do not outweigh

nine aggravating factors.

     Finally, the Bar asserts that the Board erred by recommending

a four-year suspension instead of disbarment because (1)

“[g]enerally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or

greater than six months, but in no event should the time period prior

to application for reinstatement be more than three years”; (2) this

Court previously rejected a five-year suspension in a different

disciplinary case because it was unsupported by precedent, the

evidence supported a more severe sanction, and the grievances

                                  42
revealed “a disturbingly extensive pattern of similar misconduct

extending over a period of several years,” In the Matter of Briley-

Holmes, 304 Ga. 199, 208 (815 SE2d 59) (2018); and (3) Favors is

distinguishable because it was initiated as a petition for voluntary

discipline and the attorney presented evidence of numerous

mitigating factors not present in either of Crowther’s matters. The

Bar maintains that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. See In

the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga. 635, 636-637, 641-644 (820 SE2d 716)

(2018) (accepting special master’s recommendation and disbarring

attorney who stole client funds from his trust account and converted

them to his own use and the aggravating factors outweighed the

mitigating factors).

     In response, Crowther argues that the Board correctly

reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors because when he

was hired by the client in SDBD No. 7390 in 2007, he had little

experience with the trust accounting rules; that Hunt is

distinguishable because that attorney intentionally stole client

funds but here, Crowther believed he was entitled to a portion of the

                                 43
settlement funds for his attorney fees and expenses; and that his

violations of the trust accounting rules were merely negligent

instead of intentional, but he has remedied those deficiencies and he

promptly paid the financing company’s liens in SDBD No. 7134 once

he became aware of them.

     5. Crowther’s Exceptions and State Bar’s Response

     In Crowther’s exceptions, he first argues that the Board

erroneously approved the Special Master’s summary judgment

rulings, which improperly resolved disputed issues of fact in SDBD

No. 7390 as to his belief about whether he could disburse the

settlement funds to himself, whether his statements in response to

the 2013 grievance were untrue, and whether his conduct violated

Rule 8.4 (a) (4). Second, Crowther contends that the Board

erroneously approved the Special Master’s consideration of matters

that occurred before the 2013 grievance was dismissed because the

Bar stipulated that he was not subject to discipline for that conduct,

since it fell outside the four-year statute of limitation in Bar Rule 4-

222 (a). Crowther further contends that the Bar was not entitled to

                                  44
rely on the two-year tolling provision in Bar Rule 4-222 (a) because

the Bar failed to show that Crowther or his actions were unknown

during that period. Third, Crowther contends that there was no

clear and convincing evidence in SDBD No. 7390 that he violated

Rule 1.5 because the Bar presented no evidence that the rates he

used to calculate expenses for meals, copies, and travel were

unreasonable; that there was no clear and convincing evidence that

he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) because the Special Master did not find

that he intended to be deceitful, fraudulent, dishonest, or to make

misrepresentations; and the Special Master erred in SDBD No. 7134

by finding that he was indifferent to making restitution to the

financing company and that his violations of the GRPC were

intentional and knowing, rather than negligent.

     Finally, Crowther observes that he came from a low-income

background, but ultimately went to college, served in the Army, and

attended law school, and he now mentors and teaches law students

from his community, who are historically underrepresented in the

legal profession. He argues that a four-year suspension is excessive

                                45
and not supported by case law, and he requests a two-year

suspension with restitution to be paid to the client in SDBD No.

7390, though he contends the amount should be adjusted to reflect

the expenses documented in the 2013 draft closeout.

     The Bar responds that the Special Master properly granted

summary judgment; that her conclusions as to each of the Rules

Crowther violated were correct; and that her findings as to

Crowther’s restitution to the financing company and as to his mental

state were supported by the evidence. The Bar argues that although

it did not allege that Crowther violated the GRPC before February

2014, that did not limit inquiry by the Special Master and Board into

the history of the case and the facts giving rise to his ongoing

violations of the GRPC. The Bar argues that it was entitled to tolling

because Crowther’s offenses were unknown at the time it dismissed

the 2013 grievance because the violations had not yet occurred and

the client had not yet notified the Bar. See In the Matter of Allison,

267 Ga. 638, 641-642 (481 SE2d 211) (1997) (in a case where the

investigative panel initiated a grievance in 1992 for acts occurring

                                 46
between 1986 and 1988, holding that when a victim does not come

forward within the statute of limitation, the Bar may take

advantage of the two-year tolling provision). The Bar also asserts

that Crowther is estopped from arguing that the Special Master

erred by considering evidence from before February 2014 because

Crother himself presented that evidence to support his defense. The

Bar notes that the Special Master explicitly limited her

consideration of Crowther’s violations of the GRPC to conduct that

occurred after February 2014, and she correctly considered all

relevant evidence in her analysis of the ABA Standards.

     5. Analysis and Conclusion

     In reviewing the Special Master’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law, the Review Board reweighed facts found by the

Special Master, even though the Review Board did not conclude that

the Special Master’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. With

respect to this reweighing, we note the following.12 We disagree with

     12 We note that the Bar Rules do not expressly prohibit the Review Board

from reweighing the Special Master’s findings as to aggravation and

                                    47
the Review Board that Crowther’s legal experience was mitigating.

In 2014, the earliest time of the misconduct for which the Bar seeks

discipline, Crowther had been practicing law for 14 years in total,

and he had been a solo practitioner at least since 2007, when the

elderly client hired him. Under the circumstances presented by this

case, Crowther’s alleged lack of mentors and experience with

handling trust accounting matters is immaterial to the question of

whether he had substantial experience in the practice of law.13

Moreover, we agree with the Bar that the Board placed more

emphasis on Crowther’s service to his community than was

appropriate. Additionally, we note that even if the Board was correct

that the Special Master erred by failing to find that Crowther

exhibited remorse, the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors

mitigation. But to the extent that the Review Board made additional findings
with respect to disputed issues (e.g., findings about Crowther’s community
service or his level of remorse), we caution the Review Board that these are the
sort of fact and credibility findings that generally should be left to the Special
Master in the first instance. See Bar Rule 4-216 (a).
      13 The Review Board’s reliance on Crowther’s alleged lack of mentoring

rings particularly hollow in light of Crowther’s own assertion that he should
be given the benefit of mitigation for serving as a mentor to underprivileged
students.

                                       48
would still weigh heavily in favor of aggravation. Finally, we agree

with the Bar that Favors is distinguishable. Although Favors

involved similar violations of the GRPC, it came before the Court on

a petition for voluntary discipline and numerous mitigating factors

were present – including the fact that the attorney had made

restitution, which Crowther has failed to do in SDBD No. 7390 – and

resulted in a three-year, rather than a four-year, suspension.

Further, the Board cited no authority from Georgia or otherwise to

support a four-year suspension, and “a three-year suspension . . . is

generally the maximum amount of time this Court will consider for

a suspension.” In the Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. 168, 177 (3) (886

SE2d 811) (2023).

     We reject all of Crowther’s exceptions. As a threshold matter,

we note that while the Special Master summarized matters that

occurred outside of the statute of limitation in SDBD No. 7390, she

did so only to establish the background of the case, to examine the

aggravating and mitigating evidence, and to determine the

appropriate amount of restitution. Her conclusions as to Crowther’s

                                 49
violations of the GRPC only deal with his misconduct during the

applicable limitation period, 2014 to 2019. Moreover, the Bar was

entitled to take advantage of the two-year tolling provision in Bar

Rule 4-222 (a) because when it dismissed the 2013 grievance in

2014, Crowther’s future violations of the GRPC (i.e., disbursing all

of the settlement funds at some point between 2014 and 2016;

attempting to charge the client for two copies of her voluminous file

even though she had requested the original; and lacking diligence in

returning the client’s file, providing an accounting, or resolving the

dispute over the funds) were unknown and in fact, had not yet

occurred.

     Second, Crowther’s argument that the Special Master erred by

granting summary judgment as to alleged disputes of material fact

in SDBD No. 7390 lacks merit. The Special Master properly

reviewed the record and concluded that, as a matter of law,

Crowther’s conduct from 2014 to 2019 violated the provisions of the

GRPC with which he was charged because (1) the superior court’s

2012 order prohibited Crowther from making any distributions until

                                 50
the plaintiffs had executed releases of liability, but Crowther

distributed the settlement funds to himself between 2014 and 2016

even though the plaintiffs had never executed the releases, and (2)

Crowther’s response to the 2013 grievance stated that the client

knew the funds had not been distributed because she had not yet

executed a release of liability, indicating that the funds were still

available to be distributed at that point.

     As to Crowther’s argument that there was no clear and

convincing evidence that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4), we have defined

“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”

under Rule 8.4 (a) (4) to mean “conduct that is intended or likely to

mislead another.” In the Matter of Woodham, 296 Ga. 618, 625 (769

SE2d 353) (2015). The Bar charged Crowther with violating Rule 8.4

(a) (4) by making false statements to “[his client] and others about

the status of settlement funds” and by converting those funds for his

own use. While the Special Master granted summary judgment on

Rule 8.4 (a) (4) based on Crowther’s misleading statements to the

client that funds were still available to be distributed, the Special

                                  51
Master also granted summary judgment on Rule 8.4 (a) (4) based on

conduct that was not charged. To the extent the Special Master

found Crowther in violation of conduct under Rule 8.4 (a) (4) that

was not charged, we do not address that conduct and consider it only

in aggravation. Cf. Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 316 Ga. 855, 873

(892 SE2d 3) (2023).14

      Crowther’s argument that the Special Master erroneously

granted summary judgment on Rule 1.5 similarly lacks merit, as the

Special Master correctly concluded that it was undisputed that the

draft closeouts submitted by Crowther reflected expenses of over

$130,000 and included exorbitant charges for soft costs such as

copying and telephone lines that were impermissible under the

Rule. Pretermitting whether his payments to the financing company

      14 As we explained in a recent judicial discipline matter, “[i]mposing
discipline on a judge solely based on the judge’s response to a JQC inquiry,
without the JQC first filing formal charges against the judge alleging such
conduct constituted a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, might raise due
process concerns.” Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 316 Ga. at 873 n. 19. Similarly,
in this Bar discipline case, we consider uncharged offenses that arose during
the disciplinary process only as an aggravating factor in determining the
proper sanction.

                                      52
after the grievance was filed in SDBD No.7134 preclude a finding of

indifference to making restitution in that matter, the Special Master

also found that this aggravating factor applied in SDBD No. 7390,

because Crowther had never made restitution to the client in that

matter.

     Finally, Crowther’s argument that a two-year suspension is

warranted in light of his good character and service to his

community is unpersuasive. While we commend his community

service, a two-year suspension is not supported by precedent or by

the records in these two disciplinary matters. We have previously

disbarred attorneys for violating the trust accounting rules and

other provisions of the GRPC when numerous aggravating factors

are present, even if the attorney provides evidence of his good

character and reputation. See, e.g., Berry, 310 Ga. at 158-159

(disbarring attorney in default on a notice of discipline for violations

of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (b) and (c) (2), 1.15 (I), and 8.4 (a) (4)

when numerous aggravating factors were present); Hunt, 304 Ga. at

636-637, 641-644 (disbarring attorney for violations of Rules 1.15 (I),

                                   53
1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) (4) when numerous aggravating factors were

present); In the Matter of Harris, 301 Ga. 378, 379 (801 SE2d 39)

(2017) (accepting special master’s recommendation and disbarring

attorney for violating Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II); attorney in default

on formal complaint); Gorman, 294 Ga. at 726-727 (accepting special

master’s recommendation and disbarring attorney for violations of

Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) (4) when no mitigating

factors and three aggravating factors were present).

     Having carefully reviewed the records, we agree with the

Special Master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for

Crowther’s misconduct in these two disciplinary matters, in which

he violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8 (e), 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a)

(4), with reinstatement conditioned upon the payment of restitution

to the client in SDBD No. 7390 in the amount of $140,625, plus

interest at the statutory rate from August 2012. See In the Matter of

Davis, 316 Ga. 30 (885 SE2d 771) (2023) (disbarring attorney for

violations of Rules 1.7, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), 3.4, 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b), and 8.4

(a) (5), with reinstatement conditioned upon the full payment of a

                                    54
probate judgment that arose from the attorney’s professional

misconduct); In the Matter of Anderson, 286 Ga. 137 (685 SE2d 711)

(2009) (disbarring attorney for violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15

(II), with reinstatement conditioned upon repayment of a judgment,

making restitution, and completing the State Bar’s Law Practice

Management Program); In the Matter of Oellerich, 278 Ga. 22 (596

SE2d 156) (2004) (disbarring attorney for using his client’s estate as

a source of funds for his close corporation, with reinstatement

conditioned upon his making full restitution to the estate).

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Derric Crowther

be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in

the State of Georgia. Crowther is reminded of his duties pursuant to

Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

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