Court Opinion

ID: 9395087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 00:02:32.442923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:05.185077
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/16/23 Geoulla v. Cal. Automobile Ins. Co. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

DANIEL GEOULLA,                                              B314486

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BS170239)
         v.

CALIFORNIA AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

     Defendant and
Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Reversed
and remanded with instructions.
      B&D Law Group, Mahsa Farid, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Shaver, Korff & Castronovo, Thomas W. Shaver and Tina
M. Bhatia, for Defendant and Respondent.
                       I.   INTRODUCTION

      Plaintiff Daniel Geoulla appeals from an order dismissing
an arbitration brought under the Uninsured Motorist Act
(Insurance Code section 11580.2 et seq. (section 11580.2)) for
failure to conclude the proceeding within the mandatory five-year
limitation proscribed by the Act. We reverse and remand with
instructions.

    II.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Following a rear-end collision with an uninsured motorist,
plaintiff demanded arbitration under section 11580.2 seeking
uninsured motorist benefits from defendant.1 During the next
five years, the parties selected an arbitrator, propounded
multiple rounds of discovery, took depositions, and engaged in
extensive law and motion practice; but they did not schedule an
arbitration hearing within that time.
        Because plaintiff failed to conclude the arbitration within
the five-year limitation proscribed by section 11580.2, subdivision
(i) (as extended for six months by Emergency Rules 9 and 10),
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding. In his
opposition, plaintiff conceded that the extended five-year period
had run and that his attorneys had miscalendared the deadline.
He maintained, however, that the five-year limitation should be
extended because defendant had engaged in discovery abuses.
According to plaintiff, that conduct estopped defendant from
relying on the five-year statute and otherwise made it impossible,

1         Defendant is California Automobile Insurance Company.

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impracticable, or futile to conclude the arbitration within the
limitations period.
       On April 30, 2021, the trial court heard argument on the
motion to dismiss and issued a minute order explaining that
“difficulty in obtaining discovery has not been recognized in
making arbitration (or trial based on Code of Civil Procedure
[section] 583.420) impossible, impracticable, or futile. ([Langan
v. McCorkle] (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 805, 809.)” After excluding
from consideration defendant’s discovery conduct, the court went
on to find that the “true” cause of the delay in completing the
arbitration was the miscalendaring of the five-year deadline by
plaintiff’s law firm. The court therefore granted the dismissal
motion, and plaintiff timely appealed.

                       III.   DISCUSSION

       On appeal, plaintiff renews his assertion that, due to
defendant’s discovery abuses, it was impossible, impracticable, or
futile to complete the arbitration within that statutory time limit,
citing among other cases, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Superior
Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 95, 102, 106 (Westinghouse).)
       “Section 11580.2[, subdivision] (i), . . . requires that
uninsured motorist arbitration be (1) initiated within one year of
the date of accident, and (2) completed within five years from the
institution of arbitration.” (Santangelo v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 804, 810–811 (Santangelo).)
       Under section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(3), “[t]he doctrines of
estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and futility apply
to excuse a party’s noncompliance with the statutory timeframe,
as determined by the court.” (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez (1995)

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38 Cal.App.4th 783, 792.) “‘The question of impossibility,
impracticability, or futility is best resolved by the trial court,
which “is in the most advantageous position to evaluate these
diverse factual matters in the first instance.” [Citation.] The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the circumstances
warrant application of the . . . exception. [Citation.] . . . The
trial court has discretion to determine whether that exception
applies, and its decision will be upheld unless the plaintiff has
proved that the trial court abused its discretion. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]’” (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62
Cal.4th 1081, 1100.)
       “‘Generally, delays encountered in discovery are part of the
“normal delays involved in prosecuting lawsuits” and do not
excuse failure to bring a case to trial within the five-year limit.’
(Bank of America v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1000,
1016 . . . ; see Bruns [v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011)] 51
Cal.4th [717,] 731 [(Bruns)] [‘“[t]ime consumed by the delay
caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of
demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of
waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the
contemplation of these exceptions [for periods during which it
was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring the action to
trial]”’].)” (Martinez v. Landry’s Restaurants, Inc. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 783, 796.)2

2     The purpose of the time limitation on uninsured motorist
arbitrations is analogous to the rationale underlying the five-year
statutory limitation on bringing civil actions to trial. (See Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 583.310, 583.340, 583.360; Santangelo, supra, 65
Cal.App.4th at p. 813–814 [even before the enactment of the five-
year limitation period in section 11580.2, a plaintiff would have

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        Under some circumstances, however, “it may clearly be
impracticable to bring a case to trial because substantial
discovery remains to be completed at or near the end of the five-
year period. The necessity for further discovery may be due to
dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiff or on the part of
defendant. If [the] plaintiff has completed all of his discovery and
is or has been ready to proceed to trial and the record shows that
[the] defendant has failed to vigorously pursue discovery, the
nonreadiness of the case is due to [the] defendant. In that
situation, impracticability would constitute an excuse for
noncompliance if [the] plaintiff’s conduct is otherwise reasonable.
However, had [the] plaintiff been the dilatory party, mere
impracticability is not an excuse, since the impracticability arises
from [the] plaintiff’s own fault.” (Westinghouse, supra, 138
Cal.App.3d 95, 105–106.)
        Here, the trial court suggested that it could not consider
the discovery issues raised by plaintiff when determining
whether the impracticability exception applied. Although we
normally presume the trial court was aware of and understood
the scope of its authority and discretion under the applicable law,
if “‘the record affirmatively shows the trial court misunderstood
the proper scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is
required to permit that court to exercise informed discretion with
awareness of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.’
[Citation.]” (Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 299, 334.) Accordingly, we conclude the trial court

been subject to dismissal for delay in prosecution under
analogous statutory sections, such as Code of Civil Procedure
section 583.310 et seq., which requires mandatory dismissal of
superior court actions not brought to trial within five years].)

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erred by assuming that difficulty in obtaining discovery can never
establish impossibility, impracticability, or futility in bringing a
case to arbitration and must therefore remand the matter to
ensure the court exercises its informed discretion in deciding
whether the difficulties in this case warrant an exception to the
five-year deadline. In reaching this conclusion, we express no
view as to the merits of defendant’s motion or whether the
discovery abuses alleged by plaintiff excused his admitted failure
to calendar the five-year deadline and comply with it. Those are
matters left to the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of all the circumstances of this case.

                      IV.   DISPOSITION

      The judgment is reversed with instructions to conduct
further proceedings on the dismissal motion consistent with this
opinion. Plaintiff is awarded costs on appeal.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           KIM, J.

We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.                         BAKER, J.

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