Court Opinion

ID: 9377544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 07:09:04.44407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:14.763628
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 1, 2023

                                    S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-21-00530-CV

           IN THE INTEREST OF I.F., E.F. AND F.F., CHILDREN

               On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. DF-19-21932

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Garcia
                             Opinion by Justice Garcia
      This case involves a suit for the dissolution of marriage referred to arbitration

pursuant to a postnuptial agreement (the “Agreement”). In three issues, Malcom

Fajemirokun (“Husband”) argues: (i) the trial court had no authority to determine

the validity of the Agreement, (ii) the trial court abused its discretion by referring

the matter to arbitration because there was no valid agreement to arbitrate, and (iii)

the trial court’s appointment of the arbitrator was contrary to the terms of the

Agreement. Concluding Husband’s arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.
                                  I.   Background

      Husband and Lola Fajemirokun (“Wife”) were married in 2010 and signed the

Agreement during the marriage. The Agreement provides for binding arbitration in

accordance with Texas law, including the Texas Family Code.

      Wife filed a petition for divorce in 2019 and Husband filed a counterpetition.

Both Parties subsequently amended their pleadings. Wife’s second amended petition

requested that the divorce be referred to arbitration in accordance with the

Agreement.

      The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the Agreement

and the requested referral to arbitration. After the hearing, the court ruled that the

Agreement is valid and enforceable and signed an order referring the case to

arbitration.

      Both parties appeared for arbitration. After Wife rested, at Husband’s

direction, Husband’s attorney refused to proceed. Husband provided no testimony

regarding custody, possession, access to and support for the children, or division of

property.

      The arbitrator signed an award and Wife requested that the court confirm the

award. The court conducted a hearing, confirmed the award, and entered the final

decree of divorce from which Husband now appeals.

                                         –2–
                                   II.   Analysis

      We note at the outset that Husband appears before us pro se. We construe

liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same

standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and

rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex.

1978). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a

litigant who is represented by counsel. Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). The law is well established that, to

present an issue to this Court, a party’s brief shall contain, among other things, a

concise, nonargumentative statement of the facts of the case, supported by record

references, and a clear and concise argument for the contention made with

appropriate citations to authorities and the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; McIntyre v.

Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Bare assertions

of error, without argument or authority, waive error. See Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer,

943 S.W.2d 477, 486 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied); see also Fredonia

State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (appellate

court has discretion to waive point of error due to inadequate briefing). When a party

fails to adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal. Devine v. Dallas

County, 130 S.W.3d 512, 514 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). Within this

framework, we address Husband’s issues.

                                         –3–
A.       The Validity of the Agreement

         We understand Husband’s first issue to argue the trial court had no authority

to address the validity of the Agreement. Specifically, Husband’s first issue states:

         The district court erred in law when it assumed jurisdiction and
         entertained the validity of the prenuptial agreement and made a
         pronouncement that the agreement was enforceable, which decision
         formed the basis for the judgment of the trial court.1

         In a July 9, 2020 hearing, Wife’s counsel argued the court had a duty to

determine the validity of the arbitration clause before sending the case to arbitration.

Husband’s counsel responded that Husband disputed the validity of the entire

agreement. The court noted its obligation under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.6015 to

determine the validity and enforcement of a contract with an arbitration clause, ruled

that the court would determine whether to order arbitration and whether the

arbitration clause is valid, and continued the hearing to a later date. Husband did not

object.

         The hearing resumed on July 22, 2020. Wife’s counsel argued that the purpose

of the hearing was to determine the validity of the arbitration clause. Husband’s

counsel made no opening statement, and offered no evidence, argument, or objection

concerning arbitration or the scope of the hearing. Instead, Husband’s evidence

consisted solely of evidence challenging the validity of the entire Agreement.

     1
       But Husband’ brief also states the issue in different ways. For example, Husband also describes the
issue as “The question of whether the entire postnuptial agreement as a whole was fraudulently induced
was for the arbitrator or the court to decide.” (Emphasis added). And the text that follows does not further
inform our understanding of Husband’s assertions of error.
                                                   –4–
Husband never argued that the court had no authority to determine the validity of the

Agreement. Indeed, Husband was the one who put the validity of the Agreement

before the court. Having done so, Husband cannot now complain the court had no

authority to decide the validity of the Agreement, and the issue has not been

preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

         Finally, even if the issue had been preserved, the trial court had the authority

to determine the validity of the Agreement under these facts. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. §§ 6.6015, 153.00715. Husband’s first issue is resolved against him.

B.       Referral to Arbitration

         We understand Husband’s second issue to argue the trial court abused its

discretion by referring the case to arbitration.2 But Husband did not object to

arbitration per se, nor did he object to the appointment of the arbitrator. Husband did

not move to stay arbitration. He appeared at the arbitration and participated until he

walked out. Thus, the objection to arbitration has not been preserved for our review.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

         Even if the issue had been preserved, Husband’s argument fails. Husband’s

complaint on appeal concerns the validity of the Agreement itself, not the arbitration

     2
     To the extent Husband intended to argue otherwise, the issue is waived for inadequate briefing. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.

                                                 –5–
clause within the Agreement. The record, however, supports the trial court’s

conclusion that the Agreement is valid and enforceable.

      The party contesting the validity and enforceability of a postnuptial agreement

has the burden to prove that the agreement is not enforceable. In re Eaton, No. 02-

14-00239-CV, 2014 WL 4771608 at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.)

(mem. op.). The Family Code sets forth the exclusive remedies and defenses against

the enforcement of a partition or exchange agreement:

      (a) A partition or exchange agreement is not enforceable if the party
      against whom enforcement is requested proves that:

      (1) the party did not sign the agreement voluntarily; or

      (2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was signed and, before
      the execution of the agreement, that party:

      (A) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or
      financial obligations of the other party;

      (B) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
      disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party
      beyond the disclosure provided; and

      (C) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, adequate knowledge
      of the property or financial obligations of the other party.

      (b) An issue of unconscionability of a partition or exchange agreement
      shall be decided by the court as a matter of law.

      (c) The remedies and defenses in this section are the exclusive remedies
      or defenses, including common law defenses.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.105.

      Husband’s argument is that the Agreement at issue is not the agreement he

signed. But he offered no evidence other than his own testimony in support of this

                                        –6–
allegation. As the court found at the conclusion of the July 20 hearing, Husband

admitted that he signed the Agreement and failed to offer into evidence any

alternative agreement he claims to have signed.

      Wife testified that she and Husband signed a “postnup agreement,” and had

ridden in the same car to the location where the Agreement was signed. The

Agreement was admitted into evidence. Wife explained that she and Husband signed

each page of the Agreement in front of a notary public and she witnessed Husband

signing the Agreement. Both Husband and Wife provided their driver’s licenses to

the notary and the notary reviewed each license.

      The Notary Public who acknowledged the Agreement also testified that it was

her signature on the Agreement and her notary stamp. The Notary Public also

testified that she listed information related to the identity of the parties in her notary

book and had each party sign the book. The pages from the notary book were

admitted into evidence.

      Husband admitted that he traveled to the bank where the Agreement was

signed with Wife. He further acknowledged that he signed a postnuptial agreement

on the same date reflected on the Agreement attached to Wife’s second amended

petition.

      Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding the

Agreement is valid and enforceable. Because the Agreement required the parties to

                                          –7–
attend binding arbitration, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by referring the

parties to arbitration. We resolve Husband’s second issue against him.

C.    Appointment of the Arbitrator

      Husband’s third issue argues the “provisions for the appointment of the

arbitrator was (sic) not complied with.” But Husband fails to explain how non-

compliance occurred, why he maintains it occurred, or provide citations to the

record. The issue is waived for inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1;

Sullivan, 943 S.W.2d at 486.

      Moreover, the record reflects that Husband did not timely object to the

arbitrator Wife proposed or to the appointment of that arbitrator by the court. He did

not request that the arbitration be stayed, or in any other way bring the alleged error

to the trial court’s attention. Therefore, the issue has not been preserved for our

review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Husband’s third issue is resolved against him.

                                  III.   Conclusion

      Having resolved all of Husband’s issues against him, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                             /Dennise Garcia/
                                             DENNISE GARCIA
                                             JUSTICE
210530F.P05

                                          –8–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF I.F., E.F.                  On Appeal from the 255th Judicial
AND F.F., CHILDREN,                            District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-21-00530-CV                             Trial Court Cause No. DF-19-21932.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
                                               Justices Reichek and Nowell
                                               participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

     It is ORDERED that appellee
recover her costs of this appeal from appellant IN THE INTEREST OF I.F., E.F.
AND F.F., CHILDREN.

Judgment entered March 1, 2023

                                         –9–