Court Opinion

ID: 9671942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:45:57.552548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.213676
License: Public Domain

SHANNON, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The parties recognize the rule that to recover for mental suffering one must prove some physical illness or injury accompanied, or produced by, the mental injury except in cases of intentional tort or gross negligence. Duncan v. Luke Johnson Ford, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 777 (Tex.1980); Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.1980); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (Tex.1900); Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59 (Tex.1890); Washam v. Hughes, 638 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.App.1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Richie claims, of course, that he suffered mental injuries sustained as the result of Carrell’s intentional tort. The district court agreed and awarded Richie $25,000 for mental distress and anguish.1 Under these facts, I regard that award as excessive.
Mental anguish has been defined as “a high degree of mental suffering” and “intense pain of body or mind.” McAllen Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Alvarez, 581 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex.Civ.App.1979, no writ); Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chamberlain, 169 S.W. 370, 371 (Tex.Civ.App.1914, no writ). The term “anguish” is derived from the Latin word “anguis,” a snake, referring to the writhing and twisting of the animal body when in great pain. Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick, supra at 622; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chamberlain, supra. In order to recover for mental anguish, it is necessary to show something more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation or anger. Ryder Truck Rentals v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Tex.Civ.App.1979, no writ); Cactus Drilling Company v. McGinty, 580 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1979, no writ).
Carrell’s bullying stunt in Richie’s office is indefensible, and I agree in the affirmance of the judgment for exemplary damages. Even so, Carrell’s roughneck conduct does not relieve Richie of his burden to prove up damages in his separate claim for mental distress and anguish.
Richie’s evidence, in summary, was that because of the assault and battery, he was “frightened” and “humiliated.” At the time of the assault, the proof supports Richie’s assertion that, as a result of the assault, he was scared and ashamed. For that mental distress and anguish he should be compensated. Nevertheless, beyond that point, there was not much evidence of mental suffering and such proof, that there was, does not reach the level of intense pain of mind necessary to recover for mental anguish. In support of his contention of a continued fearful state of mind, Richie recited that he saw Carrell two or three times and that, as a result, he was “terrified.” Doubtless, his sighting of Carrell recalled to Richie the assault which was not a pleasant memory, but Richie did not testify, for example, that such “terror” caused him to lose any real estate commissions or resulted in his dropping any deals. *47For all this record shows, Richie was capable of carrying on his business and daily life. In addition, it is unmistakable that his state of mind was not such that Richie thought it necessary to seek medical assistance.
Pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 440 (Supp. 1985) a court of appeals, if the court is of the opinion that the verdict and judgment of the trial court are excessive, may suggest remittitur of the excess, and if remit-titur is not filed, the appellate court may reverse the trial court’s judgment. The court of appeals is required to exercise its sound judicial judgment and discretion in the ascertainment of what amount would be reasonable compensation for the injury sustained, and treat the balance as excess. Wilson v. Freeman, 108 Tex. 121, 185 S.W. 993 (Tex.1916). In determining whether the verdict of the jury was excessive, the court of appeals must first arrive at a conclusion, after a review of the evidence, as to what sum would be held to be reasonable if it had been assessed by the fact finder. Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Syfan, 91 Tex. 562, 44 S.W. 1064 (1898); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Pierce, 519 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Ham, 454 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Civ.App.1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The district court was empowered to assess damages for mental distress and anguish should it conclude under the proof that Richie’s mental distress amounted to a level of intense pain of mind. As previously written, Richie testified that he was frightened and humiliated. It is plain that most of Richie’s emotional travail occurred at the time of the assault. The proof of mental distress beyond that time is indeed scanty and that proof is not indicative of compensable pain of mind.
After a consideration of all of the evidence in support of the district court’s award of $25,000, I have concluded reasonable compensation for Richie’s mental suffering to be $10,000. Beyond that sum, I regard the court’s judgment as excessive and not supported by the evidence. Considering the evidence and the law relating to recoveries for mental anguish, I conclude, under Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 440, the judgment to be excessive and I would suggest a remittitur of $15,000.

. As matter of fact, the judgment provides that Richie recover from Carrell $25,000 "as compensatory damages for injuries to [Richie] and [Richie’s] personal property ...” As Richie proved up no damages other than those directed towards mental injuries, we may conclude that the award is solely in response to his claim for mental distress and anguish.