Court Opinion

ID: 9483840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:32:56.839855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:51.975974
License: Public Domain

LAY, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
This ease is properly resolved by retroactively applying the amended version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Ever since United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801), the general rule has been that appellate courts apply the law in effect at the time that their decision is rendered. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836-37, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1576-77, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281, 89 S.Ct. 518, 525, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969). Of course, there are certain exceptions. Where manifest injustice would result to one of the parties or where there is clear congressional intent to the contrary, courts do not follow the rule. Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 837, 110 S.Ct. at 1577.
In United States v. Kimberlin, 776 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.1985), this court phrased the latter exception somewhat differently. On the question of whether interim Fed. R.Civ.P. 35(b) should be applied retroactively, the court stated that it would not do so unless the legislature “pretty clearly” indicated that intent. Id. at 1347. The Kim-berlin court rejected retroactive application, because there was no indication, either in the rule’s “language or genesis,” that retroactive application was intended. Id. at 1347-48.
Unlike Kimberlin, in the instant matter, the Supreme Court stated in its order that the amended rules “shall' take effect on December 1, 1991, and shall govern all proceedings in civil actions thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil actions then pending." 134 F.R.D. 525 (1991) (emphasis added). I would think this clear direction would put the matter to rest.
However, the majority contends that this language “says only that new acts in cases already on the docket should, to the extent just and practicable, conform to the new rules.” Thus, the majority would read “pending” to mean only cases in which the district court has not yet made a decision, but which have already been filed with the court. In my opinion, this interpretation is clearly wrong.1
*856First, it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of “pending.” Black’s Law Dictionary states that “an action or suit is ‘pending’ from its inception until the rendition of final judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1020 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court has defined “final judgment” to mean “one where ‘the availability of appeal’ has been exhausted or has lapsed, and the time to petition for certiorari has passed.” Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2015 n. 14, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n. 5, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1734 n. 5, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). Thus, a common sense reading of the word “pending” in the Supreme Court’s order would include cases pending on appeal, not simply awaiting disposition before the district court. The majority contends that by employing the dear-statement approach of Kimberlin, it must read the word “pending” as not inclusive of’ cases pending on appeal. In my view, the language of the Supreme Court order is the paradigm of the Kimberlin clear statement, and the majority creates ambiguity where none exists.2
Finally, the majority’s interpretation is contrary to the other circuit court decisions on this issue. See Hill v. United States Postal Serv., 961 F.2d 153, 155-56 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that amended Rule 15(c) applies retroactively to case pending on appeal); Skoczylas v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 961 F.2d 543, 545-46 (5th Cir.1992) (same); Bayer v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 334-35 (D.C.Cir.1992) (stating in dicta that amended Rule 15(c) applies to cases pending on appeal). Indeed, even the First Circuit, which has refused to apply Rule 15(c) retroactively, has not employed the majority’s reasoning, but rather has found that retroactive application on the particular facts would work a “manifest injustice.” See Freund v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 956 F.2d 354, 362-63 (1st Cir.1992); Afanador v. United States Postal Serv., 976 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.1992).
The majority contends that the Supreme Court’s order as to amended rules “says nothing about changing the consequences of actions completed before December 1, 1991.” I respectfully submit no such statement is needed. As noted above, the plain meaning of “pending” includes cases pending on appeal. Although retroactive application of a rule may change the rights of the parties, it does not require a clear statement that appellate courts, as well as district courts, are to apply the amended law. See United States v. Schooner Peg*857gy, 1 Cranch 103, 110, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801) (“[I]f, subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed”).
In my view, the majority’s complicated and somewhat questionable3 analysis relating to Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), an analysis neither party’s brief has suggested, unnecessarily transforms a simple case into a difficult one. This is especially true where all we have to do is apply the Supreme Court’s clear mandate that amended Rule 15(c) applies to all pending cases. Here, it would be neither impracticable nor unjust to do so, because defendant Shallbetter received notice of the suit well within the time period to serve the complaint. I therefore concur in the majority’s result.

. The majority cites as support for its position the decision in Farrell v. McDonough, 966 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.1992). In Farrell, the Seventh Circuit applied the former version of Rule 15(c) in *856a case decided after its amendment, but did not discuss the retroactivity issue. Id. at 282-83. The majority now relies on "the assumption of Farrell" to hold that retroactive application is improper, as if Farrell had actually considered the question. The fact that the court did not discuss the issue implies that the parties did not raise or brief the issue and the court did not consider the issue. Thus, Farrell has little, if any, relevance to this case and cannot be said to require the majority’s result.

. Also instructive on the meaning of the word "pending” are cases dealing with the retroactive application of the 1985 amendments to the Equal Access to Justice Act. In those amendments, Congress stated that "the amendments made by this Act shall apply to cases pending on or commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” Pub.L. No. 99-80, § 7a, 99 Stat. 183, 186. Subsequently, a number of circuit courts attempted to define whether certain cases were "pending” for purposes of retroactive application. The majority of courts found that cases were pending even if the case had been fully decided on the merits and only the post-judgment motions for attorney fees remained. See, e.g., Western Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 821 F.2d 459 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. 6.93 Acres of Land, 852 F.2d 633 (1st Cir.1988); Center for Science in the Pub. Interest v. Regan, 802 F.2d 518 (D.C.Cir.1986). In United States v. 1002.35 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d 733 (10th Cir.1991), for example, the merits had been decided and appealed, and the only remaining matter was a petition for attorney fees before the district court. Id. at 736.- The Tenth Circuit held that the amended version of the EAJA applied because the case was still "pending.” Id. Indeed, in a case where the merits and the fee issue had been finally decided by the trial court, and only the fee question remained on appeal, the Fifth Circuit held the case was still "pending” and that the amended version of the EAJA applied. See Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 775 F.2d 1284, 1285-86 (5th Cir.1985) (case "pending" where law went into effect on same day that Fifth Circuit denied petition for rehearing en banc because plaintiff could still have petitioned for certiorari before the Supreme Court). These cases illustrate that the term "pending" includes not only cases where a decision on the merits is final, but even cases where the only remaining questions are post-judgment motions on appeal.

. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39-40, 107 S.Ct. 1538, 1541-42, 95 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987), where the Court observes:
We decline respondents’ invitation to require that when a federal court borrows a statute of limitations to apply to a federal cause of action, the statute of limitation's provisions for service must necessarily also be followed, even when the borrowed statute is to be applied in a context somewhat different from the one in which those procedural rules originated.
Inevitably our resolution of cases or controversies requires us to close interstices in federal law from time to time, but when it is necessary for us to borrow a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, we borrow no more than necessary.
(Footnotes omitted).