Court Opinion

ID: 9394502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 17:07:19.847943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.535271
License: Public Domain

J-A08034-23

                                   2023 PA Super 83

    T. LEE ROUSE                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KIMBERLY ROSENBERG AND                     :   No. 828 WDA 2022
    HOWARD ROSENBERG, HER                      :
    HUSBAND AND MARTHA LAUX                    :

                  Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                             No(s): GD-21-014912

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                           FILED: May 15, 2023

        This case involves a cause of action for emotional distress resulting from

interference with a dead body. Under § 868 of the First Restatement of Torts,

as adopted by our Supreme Court in Papieves v. Lawrence, 263 A.3d 118,

120 (Pa. 1970), “one who wantonly mistreats or, acting without privilege,

intentionally withholds the body of a decedent is liable in tort to the member

of the decedent’s family who is entitled to the disposition of the body.” The

issue here is whether a person “intentionally withholds” a missing murder

victim’s body where they allegedly acted as accessories after the fact but are

not alleged to have helped hide the body or even know its location.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A08034-23

     The plaintiff, T. Lee Rouse (Rouse), sued Kimberly and Howard

Rosenberg   (the   Rosenbergs),   and      Martha   Laux   (Laux)   (collectively,

Defendants). The Rosenbergs’ son murdered Rouse’s son and hid his body in

a park where it remained undiscovered for over two months.          During that

time, the Rosenbergs came into possession of the handgun that their son used

to commit the murder. Rather than take it to the police, the Rosenbergs took

it to their marriage counselor, Laux. She then took the handgun to the police

but lied about how she found it.     Based on all this, Rouse alleged that

Defendants delayed the proper disposition of her son’s body.         Defendants

countered that they could not be held liable for interference with a dead body

because there was no allegation that they ever touched or controlled her son’s

body, let alone even knew its location. Agreeing with Defendants, the Court

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) dismissed Rouse’s action

on preliminary objections.

     On appeal, Rouse argues that she pleaded sufficient facts to withstand

demurrer because (1) this case is analogous to Papieves, and (2) she was

not required to show that Defendants ever physically touched or hid her son’s

body. After review, we affirm.

                                      I.

     As discussed, this case arises from the tragic murder of Rouse’s son,

Christian Moore-Rouse (Christian), who was killed by the Rosenbergs’ son,

Adam Rosenberg (Adam). As alleged in Rouse’s complaint, the facts of which

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we take as true,1 Christian and Adam attended community college together

and became friends. The Rosenbergs knew that their son was friends with

Christian because he would often visit Adam at their home, which is where he

lived.     In fact, Kimberly Rosenberg would sometimes drive her son to

Christian’s home or let him use the Rosenbergs’ credit card to pay for rides

for Christian to come to the house.

         In the spring of 2019, Adam began showing signs of severe mental

illness, eventually escalating into violence.    Because of his behavior, the

Rosenbergs had Adam involuntarily committed five times by the end of the

summer. Then, in October 2019, he overdosed on heroin and was in a coma

for a week, then inpatient treatment for three weeks. After Adam returned

home to live with his parents, Christian was the only person who would come

visit him, as Kimberly Rosenberg would also still drive Adam to visit Christian.

         On December 21, 2019, Adam invited Christian to his parents’ home

and paid for his ride. After Christian arrived, Adam shot him in the back of

the head with a .9 mm handgun. Adam then dragged Christian’s body across

the roadway in front of his parents’ house and left it in a wooded public park.

____________________________________________

1 Since we are reviewing rulings on preliminary objections in the nature of
demurrers, we take as true all material facts pled in the complaint, and any
reasonable inferences deduced therefrom.          See Commonwealth v.
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 936 n.1 (Pa. 2021) (citation
omitted).

                                           -3-
J-A08034-23

A few days later, Christian’s family reported him missing. Within two weeks,

homicide detectives were assigned to investigate his disappearance.

       In the weeks after the murder, the Rosenbergs somehow came into

possession of the handgun that Adam used to kill Christian. As alleged by

Rouse, either (1) Adam told his parents what he had done and gave them the

handgun, or (2) the Rosenbergs found the handgun in their residence and

knew that it was likely evidence of a crime committed by their son.

       In any event, after obtaining the handgun, the Rosenbergs took it to

Laux and transferred possession of it over to her to prevent or delay Adam’s

arrest. According to Rouse, the Rosenbergs told Laux about their son’s severe

mental illness and drug problems, as well as their knowledge or belief that

Adam was involved in Christian’s disappearance.      After being told this, on

January 20, 2020, Laux took the handgun to the police. When asked how she

came into possession of the handgun, Laux lied and told the police that she

had found it while walking her dog in a park. Sadly, it would be over a month

until Christian’s body was found on March 3, 2020.

       On December 14, 2021, Rouse sued Defendants,2 alleging that their

actions delayed the police investigation and eventual discovery of her son’s

body. As a result, Rouse averred, she was prevented from making proper

____________________________________________

2Rouse also sued a company that she believed was Laux’s employer but later
dropped them from the suit.

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disposition of her son’s body and suffered severe emotional distress.

Defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, construing

Rouse’s complaint as attempting to raise claims of intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Rouse responded by clarifying that she was

seeking recovery for the tort of negligent interference with dead bodies under

§ 868 of the Second Restatement of Torts. However, because no Pennsylvania

court has recognized that cause of action, she argued in the alternative that

her cause of action was for wanton or intentional interference with dead bodies

under Papieves, which, as noted, adopted the definition of the tort under

§ 868 of the First Restatement of Torts:

      A person who wantonly mistreats the body of a dead person or
      who without privilege intentionally removes, withholds or operates
      upon the dead body is liable to the member of the family of such
      person who is entitled to the disposition of the body.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 868 (1939).

      In Papieves, the defendant struck a 14-year-old boy with his car and,

rather than getting medical help, hid the boy's body in his garage for a few

days before enlisting a friend to help bury the body in a nearby field. After

the body was found, the boy’s parents brought a claim against the defendant

and his friend seeking to recover for the “mental anguish, emotional

disturbance, embarrassment, and humiliation” they had suffered. On appeal

from dismissal of the action, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,

concluding that “recovery may be had for serious mental or emotional distress

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directly caused by the intentional and wanton acts of mishandling a decedent’s

body.” Papieves, 263 A.3d at 121.

      As construed by Rouse, Papieves held that a family member can

recover for emotional distress where a killer intentionally hides the victim’s

body and others assist, thus preventing proper disposition. Like the parents

in Papieves, Rouse asserted, she was suing the persons who acted as

accessories after the fact in withholding the location of her son’s body.

      In response to Rouse’s clarification, Defendants noted that Pennsylvania

courts have declined to adopt § 868 of the Second Restatement of Torts. As

for intentional interference under Papieves, Defendants asserted that § 868

of the First Restatement of Torts, by its plain language, requires that a person

wantonly mistreat or intentionally remove, withhold or operate a dead body.

Thus, Defendants argued, a person could not be liable unless that person had

some kind of physical contact or control over the decedent’s body, which

Rouse was not alleging.

      The trial court agreed and sustained the preliminary objections with

leave for Rouse to amend her complaint.         After she declined to do so,

Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to file an amended complaint. On

July 11, 2022, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Rouse

timely appealed and now raises these two issues:

      1. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by sustaining
      preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to a Complaint
      in Civil Action averring facts that support a cognizable claim under
      the Restatement (First) of Torts, Section 868, Interference with

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        Dead Bodies, which establishes the principle of liability for
        emotional distress damages caused to the member of the family
        of a deceased person who is entitled to the disposition of the body
        against any person who, without privilege, intentionally or
        wantonly withholds the dead body?

        2. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by sustaining
        preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to a Complaint
        in Civil Action averring facts that support a cognizable claim under
        the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 868, Interference with
        Dead Bodies, which establishes the principle of liability for
        emotional distress damages to a member of the family of a
        deceased person who is entitled to the disposition of the body
        against any person who intentionally, recklessly or negligently
        withholds the body of the dead person or prevents its proper
        interment or cremation?

Rouse’s Brief at 3.3

                                               II.

        As noted in our introduction, Rouse makes two arguments for why her

claim of interference with a dead body should have withstood demurrer. First,

she contends that the facts here are “on all fours” with those in Papieves.

____________________________________________

3   As noted, the law governing preliminary objections is well-settled:

        Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should be
        granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient.
        Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the
        court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no
        testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be
        considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the
        demurrer. All material facts set forth in the pleading and all
        inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as
        true.

Caltagirone v. Cephalon, Inc., 190 A.3d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citations omitted). Our standard of review is de novo. Id.

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Second, she asserts that there is no “hands on” requirement for interference

with a dead body, that is, a person does not need to physically touch the

decedent’s body to be liable for the tort. For support of this contention, she

cites our opinion in Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202 (Pa.

Super. 2012). After review, we find neither Papieves nor Weiley supports

the novel claim that she is attempting to raise.

                                       A.

      In Papieves, the Supreme Court gave the following summary of the

underlying facts:

      … Richard Papieves, the fourteen year old son of Joseph V. and
      Margaret Papieves (plaintiffs-appellants herein), disappeared
      from his home on June 11, 1965. It was subsequently discovered
      that on that day Papieves by had been struck by a motor vehicle
      operated by a minor, one Owen Norman Lawrence (defendant
      herein). Whether Papieves was killed or seriously injured in the
      collision is not of record. Without attempting to obtain medical
      assistance and without notifying either the [] or the boy's parents,
      Lawrence removed Papieve’s body from the scene of the accident,
      took it to his home, and hid it in his garage. Some few days later,
      Lawrence contacted one Joseph J. Kelly, also a minor, and
      requested his assistance in disposing of the body of Papieves.
      Defendant Lawrence and Kelly thereupon took Papieves’ body to
      a field near Darby Creek Road in Marple Township, Delaware
      County, where they dug a grave and interred the decedent. More
      than two months later, the partially decomposed body of young
      Papieves was found, and his remains were returned to his parents.

      Thereafter, plaintiffs commenced this suit by filing and having
      served a complaint in trespass against Lawrence and Kelly,
      alleging that defendants’ acts constituted an invasion of, and an
      unlawful interference with, plaintiffs’ right to the possession of the
      decedent’s body; that such acts constituted an unlawful and
      indecent disposal of decedent’s body without the authority or
      consent of the plaintiffs; and that defendants had so acted with
      the intent to prevent the plaintiffs from discovering the fate of

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      their son. Plaintiffs averred that as the result of the aforesaid acts
      they had suffered mental anguish, emotional disturbance,
      embarrassment, and humiliation; they sought damages in excess
      of $10,000 against both defendants.

      Defendant Kelly filed preliminary objections in the nature of a
      demurrer and a motion for more specific pleadings. [The trial]
      court sustained Kelly’s demurrer and dismissed the complaint.
      This appeal followed.

Papieves, supra at 119.

      On appeal, while noting that no Pennsylvania court had yet allowed

recover for emotional distress “resulting from the mishandling of the body of

a deceased relative,” the Court observed that other jurisdictions have

“recognized claims for mental suffering caused by the defendant’s wanton or

intentional mishandling of the body of the decedent,” including “the unlawful

interment or disinterment of a body, intentional interference with a burial, the

wanton mutilation or unauthorized embalming of a corpse, and other

intentional, reckless or wanton acts likely to cause severe emotional distress.”

Id. at 120 (collecting cases). While some of these jurisdictions emphasized

the next-of-kin’s property rights in the decedent’s body, the Court found that

“the real[]issue is the right of a decedent’s nearest relatives to protection

against intentional, outrageous or wanton conduct which is peculiarly

calculated to cause them serious mental or emotional distress.” Id. at 121.

      While thus recognizing that “any extension of legal liability to acts which

cause emotional distress is not without its problems,” the Papieves Court

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concluded that the parents of the deceased boy could continue with their cause

of action.

      …There can be little doubt that mental or emotional disorders
      brought on by conduct such as that set forth in the complaint at
      bar may be every bit as real, every bit as debilitating as ailments
      which have more obviously physical causes. For this reason, the
      obvious and inherent difficulties of the proof, or disproof, of
      emotional distress and the measurement of damages for such
      injury are not adequate cause, standing alone, to deny recovery.
      We conclude that recovery may be had for serious mental
      or emotional distress directly caused by the intentional and
      wanton acts of mishandling a decedent’s body which are
      here alleged.

Id. at 121 (emphasis added).

      First, as a factual matter, we cannot agree with Rouse that, like the

parents in Papieves, she is also suing “the persons who acted as accessories

after the fact in order to continue the body’s withholding for a period of over

two months.” Rouse’s Brief at 15. Under this argument, Rouse analogizes

Defendants with the defendant Kelly in Papieves who had nothing to do with

decedent’s death but helped hide his body by digging a grave and burying the

decedent. Here, in contrast, there is no allegation that Defendants helped

Adam hide Christian’s body in the wooded public park near the Rosenbergs’

residence. In fact, there is no allegation that Defendants ever even learned

the location of Christian’s body. Thus, we find Rouse’s attempt to analogize

this case to Papieves unavailing.

      Rouse also argues that Papieves “establishes that where a killer hides

his victim’s body and others subsequently assist in the ongoing concealment,

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that interference with a dead body causing emotional distress to the family

member entitled to disposition of the body is a viable § 868 cause of action

against not only the original perpetrator, but also against his after the fact

accessories.” Id.4

       There are two things wrong with this argument—one factual and one

legal. Factually, even if we accepted Rouse’s interpretation of Papieves—

which we do not—her complaint does not allege that Defendants assisted in

the ongoing concealment of the missing victim’s body. Again, there are no

allegations that Defendants helped hide, move or cover up Christian’s body.

At most, Rouse’s complaint alleges that the Rosenbergs somehow came into

possession of the murder weapon and either knew or suspected that Adam

was responsible for Christian’s disappearance, and that they used their

marriage counselor to turn the murder weapon into the police under a false

explanation. While these facts might not paint Defendants in a positive light,

those facts also do not show that they did anything to conceal the location of

a murder victim’s body or thwart the police from discovering it, let alone even

know where it was located.

____________________________________________

4  “Accessory” is defined as “[s]omeone who aids or contributes in the
commission or concealment of a crime,” while the sub-definition “accessory
after the fact” is defined as “[a]n accessory who was not at the scene of the
crime but knows that a crime has been committed and who helps the offender
try to escape arrest or punishment.” ACCESSORY, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019).

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      That brings us to the second problem with Rouse’s argument on

Papieves: § 868 of the First Restatement of Torts, by its plain language,

does not apply to Defendants’ alleged conduct.         As noted, § 868 allows

recovery against a person who “wantonly mistreats” the decedent’s body or,

without privilege, “intentionally removes, withholds or operates upon” the

dead body. Accordingly, as we recognized in Weiley,

      [a] plain reading of section 868 reveals that a party can plead that
      the defendant acted with a wanton state of mind in the
      mistreatment of a body, as per the first portion of section 868, or
      that the defendant acted intentionally, without privilege, to
      remove, withhold or operate on the dead body, as per the
      second portion of section 868, or that the defendant acted with
      both states of mind.

Weiley, supra at 209 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

      Our focus here is on the second portion, since Rouse’s theory of her

cause of action under § 868 is that the Defendants acted to intentionally

“withhold” her son’s dead body. First, for a person to “withhold” something—

in this case, a dead body—would require that the person have possession,

control, authority or, at the very least, know about the dead body’s existence

or location. Indeed, the verb “withhold” is defined as: “to hold back from

action,” “to keep in custody,” or “to refrain from granting, giving, or allowing.”

Merriam-Webster’ Collegiate Dictionary 1439 (11th ed. 2014). Applying these

definitions to this case, Defendants could not hold back, keep in custody or

refrain from granting or giving Christian’s body because there is no allegation

that they possessed it or controlled it.

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       We also note that under the second portion of § 868, “withhold” is

grouped with “remove” and “operate” as the forms of proscribed intentional

conduct. Reading these terms together as we would any statute,5 we ascribe

a meaning to “withhold” a dead body as we would ascribe to “remove” or

“operate on” a dead body. For a defendant to “remove” a dead body, that

____________________________________________

5 “The ancient maxim ‘noscitur a sociis’ summarizes the rule that the meaning
of words may be indicated or controlled by those words with which they are
associated. Words are known by the company they keep.” Northway Vill.
No. 3, Inc. v. Northway Properties, Inc., 244 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1968). The
principle of noscitur a sociis is applied to “avoid ascribing to one word a
meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus
giving unintended breadth to the Acts of the [General Assembly].” Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (citations and quotations omitted).
Pursuant to this rule, “the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of words associated with it.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 79 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. Super. 1951)
(footnote omitted).

A related concept is that of ejusdem generis. “Under ... [the] doctrine
ejusdem generis (‘of the same kind or class’), where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will
be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general
nature or class as those enumerated.” McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of
Pa., 686 A.2d 801, 806 (Pa. 1996) (citations omitted). Stated in somewhat
repetitive yet different language, the rule of ejusdem generis instructs that
“where general words follow an enumeration of ... words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to ... the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.” Steele v. Statesman Ins. Co., 607
A.2d 742, 743 (Pa. 1992) (citations omitted). This maxim is codified
conceptually in Section 1903(b) of the Statutory Construction Act, which
provides, “General words shall be construed to take their meanings and be
restricted by preceding particular words.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(b). See
generally S.A. by H.O. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Sch. Dist., 160 A.3d 940, 945–
46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

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defendant would need to physically touch it or, at the very least, have some

kind of custody or authority over the dead body. The same holds true if a

defendant were to “operate on” a dead body, as the defendant would need to

physically touch the dead body in some fashion. Consistent with these words,

we read “withhold” in § 868 as requiring that the person possess, control or

have some kind of dealing with the body in the same way they would need to

have if the person were to “remove” or “operate on” a dead body.

      That this is the proper reading of § 868 is supported by the comment

that the drafters of the First Restatement of Torts provided in 1939.

      a. A member of the family [citation] of a deceased person who is
      entitled to the disposition of the body has an action of tort against
      one who wantonly maltreats or improperly deals with the body
      of such person. This right exists although there has been no harm
      except such harm to the feelings as is inseparable from the
      knowledge of the defendant’s conduct. The right to maintain an
      action for intentional interference with the body exists although
      there was no intent to do a tortious act, as where a body is
      misdelivered by the railroad or where a surgeon performs an
      autopsy mistakenly believing that he is privileged to do so. …

      b. The cause of action is primarily for mental suffering caused by
      the improper dealing with the body. …

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 868 cmt. a-b (emphasis added).

      In Papieves, likewise, our Supreme Court used the same language in

recognizing the tort. Indeed, in adopting § 868 to allow recovery under the

facts of the case, the Papieves Court clarified that “recovery may be had for

serious mental or emotional distress directly caused by the intentional and

wanton acts of mishandling a decedent’s body.” Papieves, 263 A.2d at

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121 (emphasis added). On this point, we note that Rouse has not pointed us

to any cases after Papieves interpreting its holding in the way she proposes,

namely, that § 868 creates a cause of action for a family member of a missing

person against any person who acts as an accessory after the fact in some

fashion, regardless of whether that person took any action concerning the

missing person’s body.

     Thus, to recap, we read neither § 868 nor Papieves as allowing for

recovery in the circumstances involved here where a murder victim is missing

and the defendant allegedly acts as an accessory after the fact in some

manner, regardless of whether the defendant knew the dead body’s location.

Again, the focus of § 868, as adopted in Papieves, is on the mishandling of

the dead body that causes the family member’s emotional distress. Unless

there is an allegation that the defendant “wantonly mistreats” the dead body

or intentionally removes, withholds or operates on it, then there can be no

liability under § 868 or Papieves.

                                      B.

     Next, Rouse argues that there is no “hands on” requirement under

§ 868, that is, she was not required to plead that Defendants physically

touched or moved Christian’s body.      As noted, for support, she cites this

Court’s decision Weiley for the proposition that there is no such requirement

for recovery under § 868 or Papieves. After review, however, we find that

Weiley does not support her argument.

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      In Weiley, without the consent of the plaintiff son, the defendant

hospital sent the deceased body of the plaintiff’s father, via a funeral home,

to a medical school for holding. After several days of contacting the school to

find his father’s body, the son went to the medical school to retrieve his

father’s body for cremation and discovered that post-mortem procedures had

been performed on his father’s body. As result, the son sued the hospital for,

among other causes of action, tortious interference with a dead body.

      On appeal from dismissal of the cause of action, this Court reversed the

trial court’s holding that the plaintiff son failed to state a cause of action

against the hospital because he failed to allege that the hospital, in

transferring his father’s body for medical dissection, specifically intended to

cause him to have serious mental distress.      See Weiley, supra at 210.

Turning to what level of intent was required under Papieves, we concluded

that the Papieves Court applied a definition of “intent” that matched that

given in the Second Restatement of Torts.

      References in Papieves to conduct that is “likely to cause” or has
      a high probability of causing serious mental distress comports with
      the definition of “intent” found in the Restatement (Second) of
      Torts: “The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of
      this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause
      consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences
      are substantially certain to result from it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
      OF TORTS § 8A (1965). In Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386
      Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403, 407 (1956), our Supreme Court applied
      this definition of intent to conclude that the defendant tortfeasor
      intentionally polluted the plaintiff’s land because it knew its
      operations were the cause of the pollution, yet continued its
      operations unabated despite this knowledge. This is the same
      definition applied in Papieves. Thus, we conclude that this

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       definition of intent, for the purpose of the second portion of section
       868, is met by showing either a desire to cause mental distress or
       a belief or knowledge that one’s conduct is substantially certain to
       cause the plaintiff mental distress, as where “the actor knows that
       the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result
       from his act, and still goes ahead” with the conduct anyway.
       RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b.

Weiley, supra at 211.

       Applying the correct definition of intent to the cause of action against

the hospital, we found that plaintiff son pleaded sufficient facts to establish

that the defendant hospital intentionally interfered with his father’s dead body.

In so concluding, we have the following summary for why his claim withstood

demurrer:

       … Weiley was the family member entitled to disposition of the
       body. This privilege or authority was not transferred to Hospital.
       Hospital knew that Weiley did not want organ donation or
       dissection. Yet, without trying to contact Weiley or otherwise
       obtain consent, it transferred and/or donated the body to School
       despite this knowledge.         School accepted the body as an
       anatomical donation whereupon it was dissected. Hospital’s
       unauthorized conduct caused this result, and, given Hospital’s
       knowledge of Weiley’s contrary wishes and Weiley’s distraught
       feelings and involvement as expressed throughout the time of his
       father’s treatment, a factfinder could conclude that Hospital was
       substantially certain that Weiley would suffer serious emotional
       distress, sufficient for the “intentional” portion of section 868.

Id. at 213.6

____________________________________________

6 We also concluded that the plaintiff son pleaded sufficient facts under a
“wanton mistreatment” theory of the cause of action. See Weiley, supra at
213-14.

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        Rouse reads Weiley as establishing that there is no “hands on”

requirement for a claim of interference with a dead body under § 868 because,

in Weiley, the defendant hospital that transported the father’s body to the

medical school for dissection “never touched the body.” Rouse’s Brief at 19.

However, as our review shows, the main issue in Weiley was what definition

of “intent” should apply to § 868 under Papieves. Whether § 868 requires

that the defendant physically touch or control the decedent’s dead body was

not an issue in the case; instead, the issue was whether the defendant hospital

acted with sufficient intent.        In any event, even if we accepted Rouse’s

strained reading of Weiley, her argument would still not work because the

defendant hospital had possession of and controlled the decedent’s body

unlike the Defendants here, who are not alleged to have even known the

location of Christian’s body.         Thus, we find Rouse’s reliance on Weiley

misplaced. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we conclude that Rouse failed

to plead sufficient facts for a cause of action for interference with a dead body

under Papieves and § 868 of the First Restatement of Torts.

                                           III.

        In her second issue, Rouse requests that we expand the tort of

interference with dead bodies to include negligent conduct under § 868 of the

Second Restatement of Torts.7 She also recognizes, however, that in Hackett

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7   Under § 868 of the Second Restatement of Torts:

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v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. 1987), this Court was faced

with the same request and declined to adopt § 868 under the Second

Restatement of Torts. As we explained in Weiley:

       In Hackett, the plaintiff asserted a negligence claim to recover
       for emotional damages caused by the defendant’s careless
       preparation of the plaintiff’s mother’s body and its mishandling of
       the casket during shipment from Pennsylvania to California, which
       resulted in damage to both the casket and the body. Hackett,
       528 A.2d at 972. The Court recognized that the Restatement
       (Second) of Torts contained a revised and expanded section 868
       to include negligent conduct. Id. at 973. However, the Hackett
       court stated that our Supreme Court had not considered or
       adopted the revised Restatement provision and concluded that
       “any extension of the Papieves rule of recovery to include actions
       for negligent infliction of emotional distress must come from the
       Supreme Court itself, through express adoption of the 1977
       Restatement (Second) revision of Section 868.” Id. at 974.10.

       Pennsylvania has not yet adopted the revised version of section
       868 to include negligent interference with a body, and we are
       currently restricted to the Papieves Court’s limitation of this tort
       to wanton or intentional conduct in accordance with the First
       Restatement of Torts section 868.

Weiley, supra at 214.

       Because we are bound by our existing precedent, we will not expand the

tort of interference with dead bodies to include the definition under the Second

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       One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes,
       withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person
       or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability
       to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the
       disposition of the body.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977).

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Restatement of Torts. If Rouse seeks such an expansion, it will need to come

from our Supreme Court.

        Order affirmed.

        Judge Stabile joins the opinion.

        Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date:    5/15/2023

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