Court Opinion

ID: 9672662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:58:36.617288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:29.917389
License: Public Domain

*751DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 47. (concurring). In this state, circuit courts have broad discretion in making maintenance determinations. In 1995 this court emphasized that "the amount and duration of maintenance is entrusted to the sound discretion of the circuit court." Olski v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 237, 243 n.2, 540 N.W.2d 412 (1995). "An appellate court will not disturb a circuit court's decision unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion." Id. These principles of broad discretion in the circuit court and substantial deference by an appellate court were reaffirmed last year in King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 247-48, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999).
¶ 48. The circuit court's broad discretion in maintenance determinations contrasts with its limited discretion in other areas of family law. For instance, absent certain circumstances, circuit courts are required to "presume that joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child" in custody determinations, Wis. Stat. § 767.24(2)(am) (1999-00), and they are "required to calculate the appropriate award of child support by using the DHSS percentage standards unless a party requests a deviation and the court finds that the percentage standards are unfair to the child or any party." Evenson v. Evenson, 228 Wis. 2d 676, 687-88, 598 N.W.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1j) (1999-00).
¶ 49. Sound discretion in maintenance determinations must reflect consideration of the factors set out in Wis. Stat. § 767.26, but the factors in the statute do not appear to be weighted, implying that the weighting will be done by the circuit court.
¶ 50. In addition, the court's discretion is underscored by the broad catchall at the end of the section, in which the court may consider "such other factors as the *752court may in each individual case determine to be relevant." Wis. Stat. § 767.26(10).
¶ 51. In this case, the circuit court awarded maintenance payments to Julia Meyer based in part upon her contribution to the education, training, and increased earning power of Dr. Joseph Meyer during the period from 1986 to 1997. Because Julia Meyer did not marry Joseph Meyer until 1993, she made more than seven years of contribution outside of the marriage. The circuit court thought these seven-plus years should count. In making the award, the court explained its determination by using the very words contained in Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), "contribution.. .to the education, training, or increased earning power" of the other party. It emphasized that the statute did not "specifically say 'during the marriage.'" The court then observed:
It is clear that other factors are to be considered specifically during the marriage.
But, in this situation, where the parties have made contributions to — one party has made a contribution to the increased earning capacity and education of the other throughout their relationship, the Court is, in my mind, free to consider the total amount of the contribution and not just simply the contribution during the marriage because' that's not what the statute says.
I do believe that, standing by itself, the contribution of Mrs. Meyer to the education, training, and increased earning capacity of Dr. Meyer is sufficient. . .to provide her some compensation under a fairness and equity argument in this case.
*753¶ 52. The circuit court is charged with the responsibility of ensuring "a fair and equitable financial arrangement between the parties in each individual case." LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987). The court in this case articulated specific statutory language in making its award. It could have cited the even broader authority for its discretion in Wis. Stat. § 767.26(10). I cannot conclude on these facts that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by making an error of law. Consequently, I join this court's strong majority opinion as well as the concurrence of Chief Justice Abrahamson.
¶ 53. I also note, as does the Chief Justice, that Wis. Stat. § 767.26(8) is potentially relevant in this case. This subsection is relevant to statutory interpretation because it explicitly entertains the possibility that "any mutual agreement" before marriage may be considered in the maintenance determination.
¶ 54. For the foregoing reasons, I concur.
¶ 55. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join this concurrence.