Court Opinion

ID: 9766208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:36:55.508036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.347969
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge
(dissenting):
I disagree with the majority’s holding that “[wjhere . a crime has been committed, a suspect has been located, and the officer reasonably believes that the suspect has a handgun in his coat pocket, ... a direct search of the pocket for the protection of the officer is proper.” 243 Pa.Super. at 85, at 461.
*85In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court said:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing1 of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court emphasized that even a “frisk” “constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security.” Id. at 24-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1882. Thus, the general rule is that an officer must frisk first before he may make any further *86intrusion.2 The language used by the majority, it seems to me, is inconsistent with this rule.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), I take to establish a narrow exception to the Terry rule: when special circumstances warn the officer that the “frisk” may not be adequate to insure his safety, he may make an immediate and direct invasion of the suspect’s clothing and person — limited to such action as necessary to seize the suspected weapon. The question, therefore, is whether such special circumstances are to be found in the present case.
The majority appears to rely solely on the bulge in appellee’s pocket, a bulge the size of a small or larger handgun.2
3 I do not consider this sufficient justification for a search of the pocket without a preliminary frisk. If it were, it would follow that most bulges in suspects’ clothing would justify searches, since most bulges could be said to suggest the presence of some weapon.
I have nevertheless concluded that this search might be justified by an additional circumstance. The officer asked appellee, immediately after stopping him, what he had in his pocket, and appellee gave no answer. N.T. at 21-22. Silence as to the nature of a big bulge in one’s pocket might be threatening — just enough to bring the case within Adams.
Despite this conclusion I am unable to join the majority because of a procedural difficulty. The hearing judge did not mention appellee’s silence in his recitation *87of the facts. Perhaps he did not believe the officer’s testimony, in which case “ [i] t is not for us as an appellate court to disagree; the judge’s finding binds us, Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 255, 352 A.2d 40, 45 (1976) (citing Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 269, 293 A.2d 33, 39 (1972))”. Commonwealth v. Scavincky, 240 Pa.Super. 550, 562, 359 A.2d 449, 455 (1976) (dissenting opinion by Spaeth, J.). It is equally possible that the judge did not consider the silence relevant — a judgment that would indicate a failure to understand and apply the Adams gloss on the Terry rule, and thus an error of law requiring reversal. This guesswork could and should be avoided by requiring more complete findings. Pa.R.Crim.P. 323 (i).
I would therefore reverse and remand for complete findings, to be followed by a disposition consistent with the principles of law I have set forth above.
HOFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion.

. Other language in Terry makes it clear that the court is referring here to a “frisk” and not to any further search of outer clothing.
For example, the Court states that the search must . . . be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.
The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of [this standard]. Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions. He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. . . . Officer
McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find. 392 U.S. at 29-30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. (Emphasis added).

. This is also the rule adopted by the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. See § 110.2(4), and comment thereon, at 11, 278-80 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975).

. The majority states that the officer testified that he observed a bulge “in the shape of a handgun.” Slip opinion at 1. I think this an inaccurate inference. The officer testified:
He had a big bulge in his pocket. So I just searched him to see if it was a weapon. It looked like a weapon, because he had a big bulge in his pocket.
N.T. at 21.