Court Opinion

ID: 9461488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:15:51.913057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:05.550766
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge, with whom GODBOLD, Circuit Judge,
joins (specially concurring):
We concur in the court’s judgment, and in Parts I and II of Judge Goldberg’s opinion. In our view, however, the merits of this case can be decided without holding that segregated locals constitute a per se violation of Title VII. As Judge Goldberg notes, p. 275, ante, the lower court here specifically found that “the Government has discharged . . [its] burden . [of showing] that the maintenance of 'segregated locals constitutes a pattern or ' practice depriving individuals of working opportunities, because of their race or national origin.” 334 F.Supp. at 980. In United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 5 Cir. 1971, 451 F.2d 418 this court wrote:
The record clearly discloses that the existence of ‘separate but equal’ locals has had, and may continue to have, post-Act deleterious effects on blacks We conclude that the District Court erred in refusing to hold that the failure to consolidate the locals violates section 703(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(c).
451 F.2d at 457. We read this language to make merger of segregated locals mandatory whenever they are shown to have had actual discriminatory effect on employment opportunities. Since in this case Judge Garza found that employment discrimination resulted from the existence of segregated locals, Jacksonville Terminal left him no discretion to refuse merger. Hence, the order on appeal must be reversed. If a case ever comes to us with a finding by the district court that no actual employment discrimination arose from segregated locals, we may then properly consider the necessity for a rule of per se illegality. On this basis we join the court’s judgment.