Court Opinion

ID: 2963687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:56.937358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:19.839175
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1623

                                  BAYBANK-MIDDLESEX,

                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                          RALAR DISTRIBUTORS, INC., ET AL.,

                                      Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Charles R.  Bennett, Jr., with  whom Kevin J. Simard  and Riemer &
            ________________________             _______________      ________
        Braunstein, were on brief for appellant.
        __________
            Christopher W. Parker,  with whom Rudolph F. DeFelice,  McDermott,
            _____________________             ___________________   __________
        Will &  Emery, Paul R.  Salvage, Susan L.  Burns, and Bacon  & Wilson,
        _____________  ________________  _______________      _______________
        were on brief for appellees.

                                 ____________________
                                   November 7, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.   Following its  unsuccessful
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            intermediate appeal to the district  court, Baybank-Middlesex

            ("Baybank")   again   challenges   the   bankruptcy   court's

            disallowance of  its  claim  for  postpetition  interest  and

            attorney fees  under its loan  agreement with the  Chapter 11

            debtors, Ralar Distributors, Inc.  and its parent corporation

            Halmar  Distributors, Inc.  (collectively "Ralar").   Baybank

            recovered  in  full  its   loan  principal  and  all  accrued

            prepetition interest; only postpetition interest and fees are

            now  at  issue.     Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Baybank

            ultimately recovered  its  prepetition  claim  in  full,  the

            bankruptcy court found that Baybank had been undersecured and

            thus was  not entitled to postpetition fees  and interest; in

            so ruling, the court relied on  its finding at a hearing held

            shortly  after the commencement of the  case that Baybank was

            "under water."

            The bankruptcy  court also rejected  Baybank's argument  that

            Ralar's  failure to  adequately protect  Baybank's collateral

            entitled  Baybank to a "superpriority" administrative expense

            claim for the  postpetition interest and fees.   The district

            court affirmed, and we now affirm the district court.

                                         I. 
                                         I. 
                                         __

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                      On October 16, 1989, Ralar, a wholesale distributor

            of household  and hardware items, filed  a voluntary petition

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            for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.   At that

            time,  Ralar owed Baybank  approximately $10 million, secured

            by all of Ralar's assets.  

                      Shortly  after  the Chapter  11  filing, Ralar  (as

            debtor  in  possession) and  Baybank  reached  an impasse  in

            negotiations concerning  Ralar's use  of cash  collateral and

            inventory during  the pendency of the  Chapter 11 proceeding.

            Baybank ultimately refused to  extend further credit to Ralar

            or  to allow  Ralar  to use  Baybank's collateral,  prompting

            Ralar to move for a bankruptcy court order allowing it to use

            the  collateral.  Over  the next four  months, the bankruptcy

            court held a  series of "cash collateral  hearings," at which

            Baybank objected  to the continued use of  its collateral and

            sought immediate foreclosure.   At the first hearing, Baybank

            and Ralar  reached a stipulation  allowing Ralar to  use cash

            collateral.   At  three subsequent  hearings, the  bankruptcy

            court issued orders allowing Ralar to continue its operations

            using  the collateral  despite  Baybank's objection,  finding

            that  Baybank's interests  were adequately  protected because

            Ralar's continued  sales of inventory to  its customers would

            yield  a higher net return  than Baybank could  realize if it

            foreclosed.    At the  second  cash  collateral hearing,  the

            bankruptcy  court  found  that  Baybank  was   "under  water"

            (undersecured),  but  that  Ralar's  operating  plan  was not

            likely to put Baybank further under water.

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                                          3

                        After four months  of operation under  bankruptcy

            court  orders allowing Ralar to use the collateral, the court

            ultimately found that Ralar's plan of inventory reduction was

            no  longer protecting  Baybank's interests.   Thus,  in March

            1990  it  granted Baybank  relief  from  the automatic  stay,

            permitting Baybank to foreclose on Ralar's assets.   

                      Payments   Ralar   made  to   Baybank   during  its

            postpetition  operations  combined with  the proceeds  of the

            foreclosure were  sufficient to  repay all of  Baybank's loan

            principal,   all   accrued  prepetition   interest,   and  an

            unspecified amount of  postpetition interest.   Subsequent to

            the  foreclosure, Baybank  filed a  proof of  claim for  $2.2

            million,   comprised   entirely   of    Baybank's   unsecured

            postpetition  interest, attorney fees,  and collection costs,

            which  Ralar   was  obligated   to  pay  Baybank   under  the

            preexisting loan  agreement.   Because  Baybank  already  had

            liquidated all  of Ralar's assets, this  claim was unsecured.

            However,  Baybank sought to recover the postpetition interest

            and   fees  as  a  so-called  "superpriority"  administrative

            expense claim under 11  U.S.C.   507(b), arguing that  if its

            collateral  had been  adequately  protected, the  foreclosure

            proceeds  would have  been  sufficient to  cover the  claimed

            postpetition interest and fees.  

                      The bankruptcy  court disallowed the  claim in  its

            entirety,   ruling  that  (1)  Baybank  was  an  undersecured

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                                          4

            creditor   and   therefore  was   not  entitled   to  recover

            postpetition interest and fees  under 11 U.S.C.   506(c), (2)

            Baybank  failed   to  demonstrate  a   failure  of   adequate

            protection,   and  (3)   Baybank  was   not  entitled   to  a

            superpriority claim  under 11  U.S.C.   507(b) even  if Ralar

            had  failed  to  provide  adequate  protection  of  Baybank's

            interest in the  collateral.  The district court affirmed the

            bankruptcy  court's   factual   finding  that   Baybank   was

            undersecured  and found as a  matter of law  that Baybank was

            not  entitled  to postpetition  interest  and fees  nor  to a

            superpriority claim for failure of adequate protection.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

            A.  Standard of Review
            ______________________

                      We  review  challenged   rulings  of  law  by   the

            bankruptcy  court  and  the  district court  de  novo,  while
                                                         __  ____

            contested  findings  of  fact  by the  bankruptcy  court  are

            reviewed only for clear  error.  See Western Auto  Supply Co.
                                             ___ ________________________

            v. Savage Arms,  Inc. (In  re Savage Indus.,  Inc.), 43  F.3d
               __________________  ___________________________

            714,  719-20 n.8 (1st  Cir. 1994).   We are free  to affirm a

            district court's ruling on any ground supported in the record

            even  if the  issue  was  not  pleaded, tried,  or  otherwise

            referred  to  in the  proceedings  below.   Levy  v.  Federal
                                                        ____      _______

            Deposit Ins. Corp., 7 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1st Cir. 1993).
            __________________

            B.  Postpetition Interest and Fees
            __________________________________

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                                          5

                      Baybank  sought   postpetition  interest,  attorney

            fees, and collection costs that it claimed it was entitled to

            charge  Ralar under the terms  of the loan  agreement.  Under

            the  Bankruptcy  Code,   only  "oversecured"  creditors   are

            entitled  to receive  postpetition interest  and loan-related

            fees  and costs.  11  U.S.C.   506(b);1 United  Sav. Ass'n of
                                                    _____________________

            Texas v.  Timbers of  Inwood Forest  Assocs., Ltd., 484  U.S.
            _____     ________________________________________

            365, 372 (1988).  A creditor is oversecured when the value of

            its collateral exceeds the  amount of its claim; postpetition

            interest  and fees are allowable  only to the  extent of that

            oversecurity.  See Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. at 372.
                           ___ ________________________

                      At   the  second   cash  collateral   hearing,  the

            bankruptcy judge made these factual findings:

                           It seems clear, at least I certainly
                      find,   that   a   liquidation  of   this
                      inventory at this point, if  the bank, as
                      sought,  were  permitted  to  foreclosure
                      [sic],  that  a liquidation  only through
                      bulk sales  would produce a  disaster for
                      all, and certainly for the bank . . . .

                                
            ____________________

            1.  11 U.S.C.   506(b) provides in relevant part: 

                      To the  extent  that an  allowed  secured
                      claim is secured by property the value of
                      which . . . is greater than the amount of
                      such claim, there shall be allowed to the
                      holder  of such  claim, interest  on such
                      claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
                      charges provided for under  the agreement
                      under which such claim arose.

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                                          6

                           Both secured parties,2  I find,  are
                      now under  water.   The question is,  the
                      debtor's  proposal, is  it likely  to put
                      them  further under  water.   And I  find
                      that it  is not likely, it  is not likely
                      that  the debtor's proposal  will put the
                      secured parties further under water.3

            "Under  water" in  the  context of  security interests  means

            undersecured, i.e., the value of the collateral is  less than

            the amount of  the debt.   Webster's Third New  International
                                       __________________________________

            Dictionary 2491 (1986).  Thus, at a  fully litigated, two-day
            __________

            evidentiary  hearing   held   just  two   weeks   after   the

            commencement of bankruptcy, the  bankruptcy judge found in no

            uncertain terms that Baybank was an undersecured creditor.4

                      Baybank argues that  the bankruptcy judge's finding

            that  Baybank  was  undersecured  was obiter  dictum,  not  a
                                                  ______  ______

            factual finding,  and that  the courts  below erred  in using

            that dictum  to disallow its claim  for postpetition interest

            and  fees.  We disagree.  The bankruptcy judge stated clearly

                                
            ____________________

            2.  There was  another secured  creditor, junior  to Baybank,
            also seeking relief from the stay because of lack of adequate
            protection; only Baybank is a party to this appeal.

            3.  Because  much  of  Ralar's  inventory was  seasonal,  the
            bankruptcy  judge  determined  that a  forced  liquidation by
            Baybank  would yield less than Ralar's plan to continue sales
            and use the proceeds to purchase new in-season inventory.  We
            assume that the judge's prediction proved to be correct; that
            would  explain why  Baybank recovered  all its  principal and
            prepetition interest  in spite  of the judge's  finding that,
            based on liquidation value, Baybank was "under water."

            4.  There has been no suggestion, nor is it plausible on this
            record, that  Baybank was oversecured  at the time  of filing
            but that the collateral value eroded substantially in the two
            weeks between filing and the November 1 hearing.

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                                          7

            that he  was making a  finding, and there was  good reason to

            make that finding in that context.

                      At  the hearing  where  the bankruptcy  judge found

            that  Baybank  was "under  water,"  the precise  issue  to be

            decided was  whether Baybank was adequately protected against

            erosion  in  collateral  value,  as  required  by  11  U.S.C.

              363(e).    The parties  presented  evidence  on the  effect

            Ralar's use of cash collateral would likely have on the value

            of Baybank's  collateral.  In making  the adequate protection

            determination,  it  was entirely  logical  for  the judge  to

            consider the value  of the collateral relative to  the amount

            of the debt  owed Baybank.  Indeed, we think  it would be odd

            not to  determine collateral value in  an adequate protection

            hearing.  A sufficient equity  cushion is itself a recognized

            form of  adequate protection, thus collateral  valuation is a

            logical step in making an adequate  protection determination.

            See, e.g., First Agric. Bank v. Jug End in the Berkshires, 46
            ___  ____  ______________________________________________

            B.R. 892, 899 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) ("The classic protection

            for a secured debt justifying continuation of the stay is the

            existence  of an `equity  cushion.'").  We  conclude that the

            bankruptcy judge's finding that  Baybank was undersecured was

            not dictum, but a factual finding made as part of an adequate

            protection determination.  Baybank has not shown that finding

            to be clearly erroneous.

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                                          8

                      Baybank  also  makes  this  related  argument:    a

            finding  that a creditor  is adequately protected,  made at a

            hearing early  in a Chapter 11  case, cannot be binding  at a

            later hearing to determine whether that protection ultimately

            proved  inadequate.   If  such a  finding  were binding,  the

            argument  goes, then a court that once found protection to be

            adequate  could  never later  find  that  the protection  had

            failed, and section 507(b), which provides  a "superpriority"

            claim where  adequate protection  fails, would be  rendered a

            nullity.  We agree with that argument, as far as it goes, but

            it falls short in this appeal.  We find that Baybank's appeal

            is foreclosed by  the bankruptcy court's finding  at the cash

            collateral  hearing that  Baybank was  undersecured, not  its
                                                   ____________

            finding that Baybank  was adequately protected.   We need not
                                      ____________________

            determine whether there was  a failure of adequate protection

            because  (1) Baybank,  as  an undersecured  creditor, is  not

            entitled to  postpetition interest and  fees under    506(b)5

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Baybank might have argued, but did not, that even a valid
            finding as to collateral value made at an adequate protection
            hearing  has no res judicata effect when valuations are to be
                            ___ ________
            made  for other purposes at later proceedings.  See, e.g., In
                                                            ___  ____  __
            re  Richardson,  97  B.R.  161, 162  (Bankr.  W.D.N.Y.  1989)
            ______________
            (valuation of  creditor's collateral made for  one purpose is
            not res  judicata as  to later  valuation in  same bankruptcy
                ___  ________
            case for  different purposes).  Instead,  Baybank avoided the
            res  judicata issue  by arguing that  "The issue  before this
            ___  ________
            Court is not the value of Baybank's collateral.  The material
            issue  is  whether or  not  the  Bankruptcy Court's  adequate
            protection order failed. .  . . Thus, the valuation  issue is
            not  material  to  this  appeal."    We  will   not  consider
            potentially  applicable  arguments  that  are   not  squarely
            presented  in a  party's appellate  brief. See,  e.g., United
                                                       ___   ____  ______

                                         -9-
                                          9

            and (2) Ralar's use of the collateral caused no  harm or loss

            to Baybank that could give rise to a claim under   507(b), as

            we explain further below.

                                
            ____________________

            States  v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (appellate
            ______     _______
            arguments not presented "squarely and distinctly" are  deemed
            waived).

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                                          10

            C.  Baybank's Claim for Failure of Adequate Protection
            ______________________________________________________

                      Baybank asserts that Ralar's use of  the collateral

            eroded its value, constituting an allowable claim entitled to

            superpriority  under  11 U.S.C.    507(b).6    The basis  for

            Baybank's claim is that  it "suffered a loss" due  to Ralar's
                                         _______________

            use of  the collateral; most  of its brief  focuses, however,

            not on the nature or extent of that claimed loss,  but on how

            such a loss can become an allowable superpriority claim under

              507(b).  Baybank has failed to present a plausible argument

            on the threshold issue of whether in fact it suffered a loss,

            given that it recovered its prepetition claim in full.

                                
            ____________________

            6.  11 U.S.C.   507(b) provides: 

                      If  the trustee, under  section 362, 363,
                      or 364 of  this title, provides  adequate
                      protection of the interest of a holder of
                      a claim secured by  a lien on property of
                      the debtor and  if, notwithstanding  such
                      protection,  such  creditor  has a  claim
                      allowable under subsection (a)(1) of this
                      section arising from  the stay of  action
                      against such property  under section  362
                      of this  title, from  the  use, sale,  or
                      lease  of such property under section 363
                      of this title, or  from the granting of a
                      lien under section 364(d) of  this title,
                      then  such  creditor's  claim under  such
                      subsection shall have priority over every
                      other claim under such subsection.

            A "claim  allowable under subsection (a)(1)  of this section"
            is, by further cross-reference, an  "administrative expense[]
            allowed  under section  503(b)."   See 11  U.S.C.  507(a)(1).
                                               ___
            The  relevant  part  of    503(b)  allows  as  administrative
            expenses  "the  actual,  necessary  costs  and  expenses   of
            preserving the estate."  See 11 U.S.C.   503(b).
                                     ___

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      The logical structure of Baybank's argument is: (1)

            Ralar's  unprofitable  operations using  Baybank's collateral

            resulted  in an  erosion  in the  total  value of  collateral

            securing Baybank's  loan; (2) if the collateral  had not been

            so eroded, the collateral value  would have exceeded the debt

            owed Baybank,  and as an  oversecured creditor it  would have

            been  eligible for  postpetition  interest and  fees under   

            506(c);  (3)  thus,  Ralar's  use of  the  collateral  caused

            Baybank  to suffer a loss  to the extent  of the postpetition

            interest and fees it  would have recovered had there  been no

            erosion in  collateral value, and that loss is a "claim . . .

            arising from the stay of  action against [its collateral]" as

            provided in   507(b);  (4) Ralar's use of the  collateral and

            therefore  the  resultant  "loss" to  Baybank  were  "actual,

            necessary costs and expenses  of preserving the estate" which

            qualify as  an administrative claim under    503(b); and, (5)

            the  erosion in collateral  value resulted from  a failure of

            adequate  protection,  thus entitling  Baybank  to receive  a

              507(b)  "superpriority"  for  its    503(b)  administrative

            expense claim.  This fascinating argument has led the parties

            and two courts through a  complex maze of ambiguous statutory

            provisions and opaque, inconsistent case law.  We decline the

            invitation  to enter the  labyrinth ourselves, believing that

            we need go no further than its threshold.

                                         -12-
                                          12

                      Because we find no  error in the bankruptcy judge's

            factual  finding that Baybank  was undersecured,  we conclude

            that Baybank had no  entitlement to postpetition interest and

            fees  and thus  suffered no loss  that might  give rise  to a

            claim under    503(b)  and 507(b).  Put  differently, even if

            there  was  somehow  a  failure  of  adequate  protection  (a

            question we do not reach), Baybank has no claim "arising from

            the stay of action",  see   507(b), because it  recovered its
                                  ___

            prepetition claim  in full; as an undersecured creditor it is

            entitled to  no more.   On the contrary,  it appears (as  the

            bankruptcy   judge  concluded)   that  Ralar's  use   of  the

            collateral  benefitted Baybank,  allowing it  to  recover its
                        __________

            prepetition claim in full in spite of its being  undersecured

            at the start of the Chapter 11 case.  In any event, it simply

            is  not necessary to address  whether there was  a failure of

            adequate protection where an undersecured creditor ultimately

            recovers  its prepetition claim  in full.   We  conclude that

            Ralar's  use  of  Baybank's  collateral  caused  no  loss  to

            Baybank, therefore Baybank has  no claim under     503(b) and

            507(b).

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                      For  the reasons articulated  above, we  affirm the

            district court's judgment.

                      Affirmed.  Costs to the appellees.
                      Affirmed.  Costs to the appellees.
                      ________   ______________________

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