Court Opinion

ID: 9836907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:28.698667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.272109
License: Public Domain

EFFRON, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result).
The majority holds that in a case involving pretrial punishment not tantamount to confinement, it is appropriate to apply any credit against the sentence adjudged at trial rather than the sentence approved by the convening authority. In the absence of a precedent requiring a different result, I agree that the military judge did not err in this ease.
I note, however, that this result produces an anomaly where there has been a pretrial agreement limiting the maximum confinement that may be approved by the convening authority. If a servicemember has been sub*158jected to illegal pretrial punishment consisting of (or tantamount to) confinement, the convening authority must apply the credit in a manner that provides effective relief. United States v. Suzuki, 14 MJ 491 (CMA 1983). In the present case, for example, if the pretrial punishment had been tantamount to confinement, then the 8 months’ cledit would have been applied against the 36-month maximum confinement period under the pretrial agreement. See United States v. Larner, 1 MJ 371 (CMA 1976); see also United States v. Suzuki, supra. This would have produced a sentence of 28 months. In the present case, however, appellant has received no such relief despite the ruling by the military judge that the remedy for illegal pretrial punishment required a credit of 8 months.
In the present case, the improper punishment involved actions not tantamount to confinement, so the credit was not applied against the maximum sentence imposable under the pretrial agreement, but instead was applied against the adjudged sentence. Because the adjudged sentence (whether designated as 63 or 51 months), as reduced by the 8-months’ credit was greater than the 36 months provided for in the pretrial agreement, appellant received no relief, despite the military judge’s determination that he had suffered illegal punishment so serious that it warranted 8 months’ confinement credit.
There does not appear to be any significant policy reason that would explain why 8-months’ confinement credit in the case of one type of punishment should be applied against the maximum sentence that could be approved by the convening authority (i.e., the maximum imposable under a pretrial agreement), while the credit for another type of punishment is applied against the adjudged sentence without regard to a pretrial agreement. This anomaly is subject to further distortions if consideration of the potential initial release date is taken into account. See Larner, supra.
I would hold, prospectively, that confinement credit be applied in the same manner for all types of pretrial confinement and pretrial punishment, and that it be applied against the sentence that may be approved by the convening authority, rather than the sentence adjudged at trial. This would eliminate speculation as to whether the court-martial actually granted relief, and would ensure — under United States v. Suzuki, supra — that an adjudication of illegal pretrial punishment results in effective relief.