Court Opinion

ID: 9753890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:34:13.079075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:44.722755
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
with whom RUDMAN, J. and SAUFLEY, J., join, dissenting.
[¶ 9] I respectfully dissent. The Court’s opinion accurately summarizes the current state of the law derived from some recent duty to defend cases. Elliott v. Hanover Ins. Co., 1998 ME 138, 711 A.2d 1310 and Penney v. Capitol City Transfer, Inc., 1998 ME 44, 707 A.2d 387.
1. Duty to defend is a question of law. Elliott at ¶ 6, p. 1312, Penney at ¶ 4, p. 388.
2. The duty to defend is determined by comparing the allegations in the underlying complaint with the provisions of the insurance policy. Id.
3. The duty to defend exists if the complaint reveals a potential that the facts ultimately proved may come within the coverage. Id.
4. We do not consider evidence beyond the face of the complaint and the policy in determining duty to defend. Elliott at ¶ 7, p. 1312; Penney at ¶ 5, p. 388-89.
[¶ 10] However, the Court’s opinion extends the law beyond where we have gone before, speculating about what the complaint might, but does not, allege to create a duty to defend under a new speculative comparison test.
[¶ 11] The complaint includes no allegations of emotional distress, bodily injury or property damage to generate a duty to defend under the York Insurance policy.1 *987The duty to defend is derived not from the face of the complaint but from speculation that proof of one of the economic torts alleged might “carry the possibility of an award for emotional distress.”
[¶ 12] In one of our most recent duty to defend cases, Johnson v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 1999 ME 106, 733 A.2d 977, we did not engage in such speculation about claims, like emotional distress, that might be, but were not, alleged. Instead we compared the words of the underlying complaint with a similarly worded homeowner’s policy and ruled that the policy did not impose a duty to defend against a conversion claim; Johnson at ¶ 5, p. 979.
[¶ 13] Using the same test we used in Johnson, comparison of the text of the complaint and the language of the York policy, does not support the possibility of an award for emotional distress or other bodily injury or property damage as envisioned by the Court.
[¶ 14] The Court cites three counts of the underlying Probate Court complaint which, in its view, may raise a possibility for an award covered by the policy: (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty (count IV); (2) Conversion (count V); and (3) Interference with Expectancy of Inheritance (count VI).
[¶ 15] The estate and the decedent are the entities alleged to have been wronged in the breach of fiduciary duty count. Certainly, neither could suffer emotional distress or other bodily injury from such a breach. To the extent that loss of value or assets of the estate due to the alleged breach of fiduciary duty might be construed as “property damage,” such a loss would not be a covered loss because it is excluded as an “intentional loss” under the terms of the policy which define an excluded intentional loss as:
any loss arising out of any act committed: (1) By or at the direction of an ‘insured,’ and (2) With the intent to cause a loss.
[¶ 16] Since the losses asserted in count IV, necessarily resulted from actions which Lambert voluntarily and knowingly undertook to reduce the assets of the estate, losses resulting from such intentional acts by Lambert are not a covered loss under the policy.
[¶ 17] Under the interpretation of “tangible property” and “intangible property” we adopted in Johnson v. Amica Ins. Co., 1999 ME 106, ¶¶4-5, 733 A.2d at 978-79, it also appears that at least some of the items alleged to have been converted, for example bank accounts, were not “tangible property.” Thus, their conversion or misuse was not “property damage” under the York policy.
[¶ 18] The same reasons would bar a claim under the York policy for the losses alleged in the conversion count, count V.
[¶ 19] Similar difficulties are faced in comparison of the terms of the policy and the interference with expectancy of inheritance count. This tort is more frequently called “wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance.” The key allegation of this count is that: “Defendant, by and through his overt actions described above, improperly and without justification, by means of fraud, intimidation and undue influence, interfered with plaintiff Umbaugh’s expectancy.” This paragraph, and the terminology of count VI, generally track the cause of action for wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance as outlined in our recent cases, Morrill v. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 7, 712 A.2d 1039, 1041; Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 885 n. 2 (Me.1995); DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me.1995).
[¶ 20] What is alleged to be damaged here is an intangible expectancy of benefits. That intangible expectancy is not covered under the policy’s definition of *988“property damage” which “means physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property.” See Johnson v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 1999 ME 106, ¶¶4-5, 733 A.2d at 978-79.
[¶ 21] The Court notes that this count might carry “the possibility of an award for emotional distress.” However, a person who may be one of many persons who might claim an expectancy of an inheritance, is only an “indirect” victim of a tort-feasors wrongful conduct against a decedent or an estate. Such an individual would not qualify to bring an emotional distress claim under our precedent in Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 284-285 (Me.1992); see also Michaud v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 1998 ME 213, ¶¶ 15-17, 715 A.2d 955, 959. Additionally, a claim of wrongful interference with an expected inheritance can only succeed with proof of conduct sufficiently intentional, as indicated by the allegations in the complaint, that it would be excluded by the intentional loss exclusion of the York policy.2
,[¶ 22] Thus, comparison of the allegations of the underlying complaint and the language of Lambert’s homeowner’s insurance policy, does not provide even a possibility that any allegation might be made that could trigger liability under the policy. The parties to Lambert’s homeowner’s insurance policy, in entering into the insurance contract, certainly did not intend that it would cover claims by estates alleging improper interference with the assets of estates, and the language of the York policy is sufficiently clear that such coverage is excluded.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

. The York Insurance policy defines the terms "bodily injury, ” "property damage" and "occurrence" as follows:
1. "Bodily injury” means bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death that results.
5. "Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, which results, during the policy pe*987riod, in: (a) "Bodily Injury;” or (b) "Property Damage.”
6. “Property Damage” means physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property.

. See Morrill v. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 7, 712 A.2d 1039, 1041-42, indicating one element of the tort is "an intentional interference by a defendant through tortious conduct, such as fraud, duress or undue influence.”