Court Opinion

ID: 9831086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:48:05.036767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:30.577190
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Had the contract covering the surrender and cancellation of the policies never been entered into, and had Hagler failed to pay the premium which, in that event, would have fallen due on the $10,000 policy January 15, 1910, that policy by its terms would have become, as the others had become, a policy for a term of years (three years and eight months) instead of a policy for the then indeterminate period of Hagler’s life, and the beneficiaries, at Hagler’s death during that period, would have been entitled to demand and receive of the company only the principal sum ($10,000) stated in the policy, less loans made thereon, instead of said principal sum and one-half the sum of the premiums which had been paid thereon, less loans made on same. The trial court by his judgment annulled the contract referred to, and reinstated the policies as obligations as binding on the company as they were before said contract was entere.d into. We were, and are, of the opinion that said judgment, so far as stated, was correct. But, having reinstated the policies, the trial court refused to give effect to the term in the one for $10,000, providing that the failure by Hagler to pay the premium due thereon should operate automatically to change the policy to one so limiting the company’s liability as to entitle the beneficiaries named therein to demand anything against it only in the event Hagler died before the expiration of three years and eight months following such default, and in that event to demand more of the company than said principal sum, less loans made by the company on the policy, and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs .for said principal sum, less such loans, and for a sum in addition thereto, equal to one-half the amount of the premiums Hagler had paid on the policy before he entered into the contract authorizing its cancellation.
[2,3] We were, apd are, of the opinion that the term specified in said policy, on its reinstatement, should be given, effect, that the trial court should have treated the policy as one for a definite term as stated, and that he erred when he rendered judgment against the company for such additional sum. We further were of the opinion that the contract whereby the policies were surrendered and canceled was valid until set aside, and that the company was not bound to recognize the policies as obligations on its part to pay plaintiffs anything until same were reinstated by the judgment of the court. We accordingly held that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the penalty and attorney’s fees claimed, nor interest on the amounts of the policies; during any of the time intervening between the day, to wit, May 21, 1912, when they furnished the company proof of Hagler’s death and demanded payment of the policies, and the day, to wit, January 20, 1913, the judgment appealed from was rendered. In so holding we now think we erred. The statement in the opinion that “the contract canceling the policies was valid until set aside” is believed to be inaccurate so far as it might be construed to mean that the company was not bound to recognize a liability on its part to plaintiffs until the contract referred to was annulled by the judgment of a court. Facts existing, as found by the jury, which entitled plaintiffs to disaffirm the contract, when they elected .to do so the company was bound by the terms of the policies. Its refusal then to pay the sums due on same entitled plaintiffs to interest on those sums from that date, and also to recover against the company the penalty and attorney’s fees provided by the statute referred to in the opinion. Instead of being reformed by this court as it was, the judgment of the trial court should have been so reformed as to award to plaintiffs a recovery on account of the three policies for $5,000 each of the sum of $12,855, less $465.04, being the sum and interest thereon to May 21, 1912, paid toHagler by the company at the time the policies were surrendered, leaving $12,389.96, to which should be added interest thereon from Blay 21, 1912, to.January 20, 1913, amounting to $493.46, making the amount recoverable on said policies, according to the terms-thereof, $12,883.42, and as to award a recovery on the policy for $10,000 of the sum of $7,830, less $343.73,'' being the sum and interest thereon to Blay 21, 1912, paid toHagler at the time this policy was canceled, leaving $7,486.27, to which should be added interest thereon from Blay 21, 1912, to January 20, 1913, amounting to $298.20, making the amount recoverable on -said policy according to its terms $7,784.47. Having reach*1069ed. the conclusion, as stated, that plaintiffs on the findings made were lawfully entitled, at the time they did so, to wit, May 21, 1912, to demand of the company the payment of said sums of $12,389.96 and $7,486.27, aggregating $19,876.23, and that the company was bound, when said demand was made, to pay said sums, there appears to be no escape from the further conclusion that the statute referred to in the opinion is applicable to the case made, and that plaintiffs were entitled, to recover 12 per cent., amounting to $2,385.14, on said sums of $12,389.96 and $7,486.27, as a penalty, and also to recover “reasonable attorney’s fees for the prosecution and collection of such loss.”
[4] The jury found on uncontradicted testimony that such reasonable attorney’s fees would be the sum of $5,000. The company attacks this finding and the judgment awarding it as excessive, but we have concluded we should not so hold. Therefore the motion of the plaintiffs for a rehearing will be granted, and the judgment heretofore rendered by us will be set aside, and the judgment of the court below will be so reformed as to award a recovery in favor of plaintiffs against the company for the sum of $28,053.03 and interest thereon from the 20th day of January, 1913, and, as so reformed, that judgment will be affirmed.
The motion of the company for a rehearing is overruled.