Court Opinion

ID: 9750051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:15:26.381656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:02.107801
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree that appellee’s constitutional rights were violated when the trial court failed to honor his assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self incrimination. I emphasize though, that I would not find open court to be a custodial setting warranting Miranda warnings to a prisoner witness facing a so-called “perjury trap.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Pa.Super. 153, 565 A.2d 160 (1989); Commonwealth v. Melson, 383 Pa.Super. 139, 163-75, 556 A.2d 836, 848-53 (1989) (Kelly, J., dissenting). However, when, as here, the prisoner witness in open court asserts his Fifth Amendment rights not to confess past perjury, that right must be honored. Here, that right was not honored.
My disagreement with the majority has to do with its construction of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(h). Succinctly, the fact that appellee’s in-court confession was excludable, and that the Commonwealth may or may not have been able to prove appellee’s perjury without that confession, in no way undermines the reliability of the adjudication of guilt which resulted from appellee’s subsequent guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Ryan, 523 Pa. 547, 568 A.2d 179 (1990).
Here, as in Ryan, the defendant acknowledged guilt and made no timely attempt to withdraw or challenge the plea, *628but later challenged his plea in a PCRA proceeding.1 The PCRA challenge was not on the basis of facts suggesting possible innocence or false confession, but on facts suggesting that prior counsel had overlooked the potential exclusion of the most damaging evidence known to be available against appellee, and that had appellee known that, he might not have pled guilty. Such claims are not cognizable under the new PCRA.
Our legislature has restricted the grounds for relief via PCRA proceedings to constitutional violations “which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermine the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(2)(i) and (ii). I see nothing in this record which could reasonably shake one’s confidence in the reliability of the verdict. Appellee’s counsel’s ineffectiveness denied appellee information which might have altered appellee’s assessment of whether the Commonwealth could prove, what the excludable but nonetheless reliable evidence would have conclusively established, i.e. appellant’s guilt.
Similarly, I find no “unlawful inducement” (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii), which may be said to have motivated the plea. Ignorance of grounds to suppress reliable evidence is not an “unlawful inducement” to plead guilty.
Essentially, appellant lost the chance to risk a throw of the dice. I do not read the new PCRA act to provide for the recovery of such losses.
Hence, I respectfully dissent.

. Ryan also involved a serial ineffectiveness claim, as well as evidence of a purgation of guilt motive to confess. Nonetheless, the critical similarity here, is the dispositive factor under the PCRA.