Court Opinion

ID: 9957265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 21:04:42.64329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:11.785834
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/3/24 P. v. Onley CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B323411

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA387967
        v.

 MICHAEL J. ONLEY,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
      Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A. Miyoshi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                          INTRODUCTION

       Defendant Michael Onley appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition to vacate his first degree murder
conviction and resentence him under Penal Code1 section 1172.6.2
After issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary
hearing, the court found Onley could be convicted of murder
under a currently-valid theory of felony murder because he was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life during the underlying burglary and robbery in which the
victim was killed. On appeal, Onley contends insufficient
evidence supports the court’s major participant and reckless
indifference findings. We affirm.

                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

The Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief
1.    The Burglary, Robbery, and Shooting
     In January 2011, Diaz and Onley were living together, and
Diaz was dating Porscha Chambers. On January 22, 2011,

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Onley filed his petition for resentencing under former section

1170.95, which the Legislature later renumbered to section 1172.6
without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We hereafter
cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference. This is Onley’s third appeal
relating to the same conviction. (See People v. Diaz (Apr. 15, 2016,
B258629) [nonpub. opn.] (Diaz); People v. Onley (Jan. 10, 2019,
B281919) [nonpub. opn.] (Onley).)
3 The factual summary is taken largely from our prior nonpublished

opinion in Diaz. We have omitted some facts that were included in that
opinion and added others that are relevant to this appeal, including a
section discussing the gang-related evidence presented at trial. Onley,

                                    2
Chambers went to Diaz and Onley’s apartment. Ryan Whitmore,
whom Diaz had met earlier that day, was also at the apartment.
Diaz, Chambers, and Whitmore decided to go to a party. Diaz
drove them to a gas station, where they met Cherry. While Diaz
and Cherry talked, Chambers went to a store across the street to
buy a bottle of alcohol. Diaz, Chambers, and Whitmore then went
to Cherry’s house to hang out before the party.
      Cherry lived by himself, but he owned a parrot that talked.
He sold clothes, electronics, and marijuana out of his house.
When they arrived at Cherry’s house, Chambers, Diaz, and
Whitmore drank alcohol and smoked marijuana, and Whitmore
also smoked Phencyclidine (PCP).
      While at Cherry’s house, Chambers allowed Diaz to use her
phone to make several calls. Diaz became fidgety after using
Chambers’s phone. Diaz then asked Chambers to go to the store
to buy some blunts so that they could smoke marijuana. When
Chambers returned about five minutes later, Diaz asked her to go
back outside to grab something from his car, which was parked
near Cherry’s house. When she went outside, Chambers saw
Onley and Moore standing under a tree.
      Chambers then received a call from Onley, who asked for
Diaz. Chambers replied that Diaz was inside Cherry’s house.
Onley and Moore then pulled hoods over their heads and walked
toward the house. As Onley and Moore approached the house,
Whitmore was trying to leave through the front door. Onley and
Moore tried to pull her inside the house with them, but she broke

Octivan Moore and Donivan Diaz were tried by the same jury for the
death of Andrew Todd Cherry.

                                 3
free. Onley and Moore then entered the house and closed the
front door.
       While Whitmore was outside, she heard what sounded like
popping balloons, firecrackers, or gunshots. She then ran away
from Cherry’s house, and Chambers tried to follow her.
Chambers eventually stopped following Whitmore and returned
to Diaz’s car. She then saw Diaz, Onley, and Moore leave the
house. As they left the house, Onley and Moore were carrying
white bags or pillowcases that appeared to be stuffed with items.
Diaz returned to his car, and Onley and Moore got into a different
car. Diaz and Chambers then went looking for Whitmore. They
found her outside of a nearby church, and Diaz told her to get
into his car.
       Diaz then drove Chambers and Whitmore to a party.
Chambers and Whitmore stayed in the car while Diaz went
inside for about 15 minutes. After leaving the party, Diaz
dropped Whitmore off at a house and drove Chambers and
himself to a motel room, where they met Moore who was with an
unknown woman. After about 45 minutes, Moore and the woman
left the motel room, and Diaz and Chambers stayed in the room
until the next morning.
       After leaving the motel, Chambers told Diaz that she was
worried that her fingerprints would be found inside Cherry’s
house. Diaz told her not to worry because he had “got it already.”
During another conversation after they left the motel, Diaz told
Chambers that he had returned to Cherry’s house on January 23,
2011 and found Cherry lying face-down on the ground. He also
told her that “they” had robbed Cherry, that he had Cherry’s
computer, and that “they” had killed Cherry’s bird because it
talked too much.

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2.    The Discovery of Cherry’s Body
       On Monday, January 24, 2011, Cherry’s sister, brother-in-
law, and brother went to Cherry’s house because they hadn’t
heard from him for several days. All doors to Cherry’s house were
locked, so Cherry’s brother and brother-in-law forced open the
front door. They found Cherry, non-responsive, lying face down in
a puddle of blood in the living room, near the front door. Cherry’s
hands were tied behind his back and his feet were bound by a
jump rope. Cherry had suffered seven gunshot wounds: four to
the back of his head, one to his neck, and two to his legs. Nine
expended .22-caliber bullet cartridges were found near Cherry’s
body and throughout his living room. Blood had pooled around
Cherry’s body, and there was blood on the ground in the living
room, the kitchen, the hallway to a bedroom, and near the front
door.
       Law enforcement officers found no signs of forced entry at
Cherry’s house, aside from the front door that Cherry’s brother
and brother-in-law had forced open. The inside of the house,
however, looked like it had been ransacked. Some of the furniture
in the living room was overturned. A computer cable in the living
room had been cut and the corresponding computer was missing.
A dead bird with a broken neck was found in the kitchen, and
some of the bird’s feathers were found in the living room. The
officers also found a large amount of cocaine base, a white
powder, a green leafy substance, and a digital scale in the living
room.
       Several fingerprints were found throughout the house. A
fingerprint that matched Diaz was found on the frame to the
front door, and two prints that matched Whitmore were found on

                                 5
a mug inside the house. Onley’s and Moore’s fingerprints were
not found at Cherry’s house.
      Cherry likely died 24 to 48 hours before his body was found.
3.    The Investigation
      3.1.   Whitmore’s Statements to the Police
       A detective interviewed Whitmore about Cherry’s murder.
Whitmore’s interview was recorded and played to the jury.
       Whitmore initially denied knowing who Cherry was or
having gone to his house. However, she eventually told the police
that a man and a woman, whom she had met on January 22,
2011, but whose names she did not know, took her to Cherry’s
house to hang out, drink, smoke, and watch a movie. The man
who drove her to Cherry’s house was driving a gold sports utility
vehicle. At some point while she was at Cherry’s house, she went
outside to retrieve her purse. The woman with whom she went to
Cherry’s house was already outside. While they were outside,
Whitmore saw two men walk toward the house. The men tried to
pull Whitmore back inside the house, but she pulled free and
stayed outside. She then heard what she thought were gunshots
from inside the house. She became scared and ran to a nearby
church. The man and woman who took Whitmore to Cherry’s
house later found her at the church and forced her into the man’s
gold sports utility vehicle. They then dropped her off at an
unknown location.
       At the end of her interview, the police showed Whitmore a
group of photographs of different men. She identified Diaz as the
man who drove her to Cherry’s house and forced her into his car
after she left the house. On August 15, 2011, Whitmore was

                                6
shown another group of photographs and identified Chambers as
the woman with whom she went to Cherry’s house.
      3.2.   Chambers’s Statements to the Police
      In August 2011, Chambers and Diaz were arrested together
while Diaz was driving a gold sports utility vehicle. A detective
interviewed Chambers about Cherry’s murder later that day.
Portions of Chambers’s interview were played for the jury.
      Most of Chambers’s statements to the police were
consistent with the testimony she later gave at trial. However,
there were some differences between her statements to the police
and her testimony. For example, during the beginning of her
interview, she denied knowing what happened to Cherry on the
night she went to his house, claiming that she left his house early
because she felt sick and had started to vomit.
      During the interview, Chambers stated that Diaz called
Moore before Chambers saw Moore and Onley standing in
Cherry’s front yard. Chambers also recounted a conversation she
had with Diaz the day after they went to Cherry’s house, in
which Diaz described what happened while he was inside the
house with Onley and Moore. She said, “[Diaz] told me that they
have robbed [Cherry] or whatever … [¶] He was like, you don’t
know the dude. No-Good, he said that he think the dude No-
Good, shot him or whatever. I’m like how you don’t know if you
shot him or not, he’s like my head was down. I’m like how you
don’t know? It’s a sound, there’s no way that you cannot hear a
gunshot, you know I’m saying, so how you don’t know if he dead
or not? He just talking about they hurried up and made me
leave.”
      At the end of the interview, Chambers identified Onley
from a photographic lineup. She told the police that Onley was

                                7
Diaz’s brother and that he was one of the two hooded men she
saw enter Cherry’s house on the night Cherry was killed. On
September 27, 2011, Chambers identified Moore from a different
photographic lineup. She identified Moore as the man called
“No-Good,” and she confirmed that he was the other man with
Onley and Diaz on the night defendants robbed Cherry.
     3.3.   Electronic Evidence
            3.3.1. Onley’s Electronic Monitoring Device
       Onley wore an ankle monitor containing a global
positioning system tracking device that the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation used to track his
movements. The monitor was tracking Onley’s movements on
January 22, 2011, the night Cherry was robbed, as well as on
January 23, 2011.
       Around 9:07 p.m. on January 22, 2011, Onley was near a
tree in front of Cherry’s house. Onley then moved inside Cherry’s
house, where he remained from 9:10 p.m. to 9:17 p.m. Data from
Onley’s monitor and two of Cherry’s cell phones showed that after
Onley left Cherry’s house, Onley and Cherry’s phones travelled
together in the same direction for more than an hour.
       Data from Onley’s monitor also showed that at around
8:18 p.m. on January 23, 2011, Onley went back to Cherry’s
house. Onley remained at Cherry’s house until 8:30 p.m. Around
8:35 p.m., he returned to his own home a few blocks away from
Cherry’s house.
            3.3.2. Cell-Phone Records
     The prosecution also introduced records for the cell phones
defendants used around the time of Cherry’s murder. Although
defendants did not use any cell phones registered in their names,

                                8
statements from other witnesses established that defendants had
used other people’s phones to communicate with each other
before and after they entered Cherry’s house on January 22,
2011. Chambers testified that she had allowed Diaz to use her
cell phone several times on January 22, 2011. Deserie Sherlock,
who was working as a prostitute around the time of Cherry’s
murder, testified that a Black male had stolen her phone
sometime between August 2010 and June 2011.
       On January 22, 2011, around the time Moore and Onley
were seen at Cherry’s house, Chambers’s phone received several
calls from a phone number registered in Sherlock’s name. On
January 28, 2011, Moore’s roommate received several phone calls
from the phone registered in Sherlock’s name.
       The prosecution’s cell-phone expert testified about the
locations of Chambers’s and Sherlock’s phones on the evening of
January 22, 2011. At 8:12 p.m., Chambers’s phone communicated
with a cell tower located near Cherry’s house, and Sherlock’s
phone communicated with a cell tower located near Moore’s
house. Between 8:27 p.m. and 9:09 p.m., Chambers’s phone
continued to communicate with the cell towers located near
Cherry’s house. At 8:29 p.m., Sherlock’s phone began to
communicate with cell towers located near Cherry’s house, and it
continued to do so until 9:44 p.m. Data from Onley’s ankle
monitor showed that Onley was moving along the same path as
Sherlock’s phone.
     3.4.   Gang Evidence
     A Los Angeles Police Department officer testified as the
People’s gang expert. The gang expert was familiar with several
gangs in the South Central area of Los Angeles, including the 51
Troubles gang. The 51 Troubles’ primary activities included

                                9
producing and selling narcotics, and committing burglaries,
robberies, shootings, and “lots of murders.”
      Onley, Moore, and Diaz were members of the 51 Troubles,
and they were active in the gang when Cherry was killed. Based
on a hypothetical similar to the facts of this case, the expert
opined that the crimes were committed for the benefit of the 51
Troubles. The expert also opined that the participating gang
members would be expected to back each other up in every aspect
of committing the crimes, regardless of whether the crimes were
“premeditated or preplanned” or spontaneous.
Defense Evidence
1.   Cherry’s Neighbors
      Defendants introduced the testimony of several of Cherry’s
neighbors who either claimed to have seen Cherry alive, or heard
sounds like fireworks or gunshots in the neighborhood, on
January 23, 2011, the day after defendants robbed Cherry. Linda
Page, who lived on Cherry’s street, had grown up with Cherry,
his brother, and defendants. Although Cherry and his brother
were twins, she could tell them apart. She saw Cherry and
another woman at a liquor store near Cherry’s house around
11:00 p.m. on January 23, 2011. Cherry bought her a beer.
      Lucy Gardner was also one of Cherry’s neighbors. She had
known Cherry since he was a teenager. She thought of him like
her “son,” and Cherry would often refer to her as “Momma Lucy.”
She also could tell Cherry and his brother apart. She saw Cherry
and another man at a liquor store around 1:00 p.m. or 2:00 p.m.
on January 23, 2011. Cherry greeted her and told her that he
would see her later. When Gardner returned home from the
liquor store, Cherry pulled up in front of her house and said,

                               10
“ ‘Momma, I see you later on. Do you want anything?’ ” She
replied no, and Cherry left. Cherry returned to her house around
8:00 p.m. that night to ask her if she wanted him to buy her any
food.
      Melba Thompson, who lived a few houses away from
Cherry, heard fireworks around 9:30 p.m. or 10:00 p.m. the night
before Cherry’s body was found. She did not hear any firecrackers
or gunshots on January 22, 2011. Thompson did not know Cherry
or Chambers, but she did recognize Chambers from the
neighborhood. Thompson had seen Chambers come and go from
Cherry’s house on several occasions. She also saw Chambers ride
by Cherry’s house in a car with hydraulics on the morning of
January 23, 2011.
      Freddie Williams, another one of Cherry’s neighbors, told
the police that he had seen Cherry in front of Cherry’s house
between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on January 23, 2011.4 Cherry,
who was with another man at the time, invited Williams to his
house for a beer.
2.    Expert Testimony
      Diaz called Ronald Markman, a psychiatrist, who testified
about the potential effects of PCP, marijuana, and alcohol on a
person’s memory and mental acuity. Dr. Markman testified that
PCP can distort a person’s emotions and ability to think,

4 Freddie Williams was unable to testify because he died before trial.

His statements were introduced through Detective Mun’s testimony.
Detective Mun testified that at the time he interviewed Williams
shortly after Cherry’s body was discovered, Williams’s speech was
slightly slurred and there were several prescription medication bottles
in Williams’s home.

                                   11
perceive, and act. Specifically, PCP can cause a person to suffer
hallucinations and delusional thoughts. PCP can also produce
conditions that “mimic” schizophrenia. Depending on a person’s
history of using PCP and the concentration of PCP used on
a particular occasion, the drug can significantly affect that
person’s ability to accurately perceive what is going on around
her. Dr. Markman also testified that using marijuana can
negatively affect a person’s short-term memory. Finally, Dr.
Markman testified that drinking a pint of gin could affect
a person’s ability to perceive and remember events. However, he
also testified that the extent to which a person’s perception and
memory would be impaired by consuming alcohol on a particular
occasion depends on that person’s history of consuming alcohol. If
the person frequently drinks, she will develop a higher tolerance
to alcohol, and the amount of alcohol needed to impair her
perception and memory will increase.

               PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.    The Trial
      In 2014, the People charged Onley, Diaz, and Moore with
Cherry’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The information alleged each
defendant committed the murder while engaged in the crimes of
robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)) (felony-
murder special circumstance allegation). As to each defendant,
the information alleged a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm in the commission of the murder (§
12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)) and that the murder was committed
for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22).
      The jury found each defendant guilty of murder, and it
found true as to each defendant the felony-murder special

                               12
circumstance allegation and the firearm allegation. The jury
found not true the gang allegation as to each defendant.
      In August 2014, the court sentenced Onley, Diaz, and
Moore each to a term of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. The court vacated the firearm use allegation and ordered
each defendant to pay a $300 parole revocation restitution fine
under section 1202.45. As to each defendant, the court stayed its
restitution order. Defendants appealed.
2.    The First Appeal
      In Diaz, we affirmed Diaz’s and Moore’s convictions.
Although we concluded substantial evidence supported Onley’s
conviction for first degree murder and rejected several of Onley’s
other claims of error, we reversed Onley’s conviction after
concluding the court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to represent himself at the sentencing hearing under Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta motion). We remanded
the matter for a new hearing on Onley’s Faretta motion and
directed the court to strike each defendant’s parole revocation
restitution fine.
3.    The Second Appeal
      After the remittitur issued in Diaz, the trial court granted
Onley’s Faretta motion. Onley filed a motion for a new trial,
arguing, among other things, that the People failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence and the prosecutor committed misconduct
during her closing argument. The court denied Onley’s new trial
motion, resentenced him to life in prison without the possibility
of parole, and re-imposed a $300 parole revocation restitution
fine.

                                13
      Onley appealed. We affirmed Onley’s judgment and
directed the court to strike his parole revocation restitution fine.
4.    The Resentencing Petition
      In April 2021, Onley filed a resentencing petition under
section 1172.6. Onley alleged: (1) he was charged with murder
under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences
theory; (2) he was convicted of murder under one of those
theories; (3) he was not the actual killer; and (4) he could not be
convicted under a currently-valid theory of murder. Onley also
asked the court to appoint counsel to represent him.
      After appointing counsel for Onley, the court found he
made a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing. The
court issued an order to show cause and scheduled an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
      4.1.   Onley’s Testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing
       Onley testified at the evidentiary hearing. Onley used to
live at his mother’s house, which was near Cherry’s house. On
January 22, 2011, the day Cherry was killed, Onley got home
from work around 7:00 p.m. He went to Moore’s house to buy
marijuana, but Moore wasn’t home. Onley returned home before
deciding to go to Cherry’s house to buy marijuana. On his way
there, Onley ran into Moore.
       Onley and Moore reached Cherry’s house around 9:30 p.m.
At the time, Onley was wearing a t-shirt; he was not wearing a
hooded sweatshirt. As Onley and Moore approached the front
door, they saw Whitmore leaving the house. Whitmore bumped
into them as she stepped out of the front door.
       When Onley and Moore went inside the house, Diaz and
Cherry were sitting in the living room. Onley bought some

                                 14
marijuana from Cherry and immediately left the house, while
Diaz and Moore stuck around. According to Onley, it was still
around 9:30 p.m. when he left Cherry’s house.
      After returning to his mother’s house, Onley borrowed
another person’s car and drove to his friend’s house to smoke
marijuana. Around 9:42 p.m., Onley smoked marijuana on his
friend’s porch before returning to his mother’s house.
      Around 8:00 p.m. on January 23, 2011, Onley went back to
Cherry’s house to buy more marijuana. According to Onley,
Cherry was still alive, and he sold marijuana to Onley.
      On January 24, 2011, Onley learned that Cherry had been
murdered.
      Onley denied seeing Chambers outside Cherry’s house or
speaking to her on the phone on the evening of January 22, 2011.
He also denied leaving Cherry’s house with a pillowcase full of
items or getting into a vehicle with anyone outside of Cherry’s
house that night.
     4.2.   The Court’s Ruling
      The court denied Onley’s petition. The court found Onley’s
testimony lacked credibility because it contradicted much of the
evidence presented at trial. The court then applied the factors
outlined in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) and found the
People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Onley was a major
participant in the underlying robbery and burglary who acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Thus, the court
concluded, Onley was ineligible for resentencing under section
1172.6.
      Onley appeals.

                               15
                           DISCUSSION

1.    Applicable Law
      1.1.   Senate Bill. No. 1437 (S.B. 1437) and Section
             1172.6
       S.B. 1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony
murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to ensure a person’s sentence is
commensurate with his or her culpability. (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843; see also People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong).)
       S.B. 1437 also added section 1172.6, which provides people
who have been convicted of murder under one of the now-invalid
theories the opportunity to petition for resentencing. (See §
1172.6; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) A petitioner is
eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if (1) the complaint or
information allowed the prosecution to proceed under a felony
murder theory; (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder
“following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
the petitioner could have been convicted” of murder; and (3) the
“petitioner could not presently be convicted” of murder “because
of changes to Section 188 or 189.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       If the petitioner files a facially sufficient petition, the court
must appoint counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) And, if the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief,
the court must issue an order to show cause. (Id., subd. (c).) The
parties may stipulate that the petitioner is eligible for
resentencing. (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Or if there was a prior finding by
a court or jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless
indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the

                                  16
felony, the court shall vacate the petitioner’s conviction and
resentence the petitioner. (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Otherwise, the court
must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under current
law as amended by S.B. 1437. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) “If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)
         We review the trial court’s factual findings following a
section 1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing for substantial evidence.
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298, 301.) We
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the court’s
order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.) Thus, before we may set
aside the court’s order, it must be clear that “ ‘ “upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support
[it].” ’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
      1.2.   Banks and Clark
       S.B. 1437 amended section 189’s definition of felony murder
by incorporating section 190.2, subdivision (d)’s requirements for
proving a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. (See
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Now, to support a felony-
murder murder conviction, the People must prove that the killing
was committed in the perpetration of, or during an attempt to
perpetrate, one of several enumerated felonies, including robbery
and burglary, and that the defendant either: (1) “was the actual
killer;” (2) “was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,”

                                  17
aided and abetted the killer in the commission of the murder; or
(3) “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subds. (a) & (e).)
        In Banks and Clark, the California Supreme Court clarified
what it means for a defendant to be a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 [discussing major
participant factors]; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623
[discussing reckless indifference factors].) In doing so, the court
looked to the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in
Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 and Tison v. Arizona
(1987) 481 U.S. 137, which “place[d] conduct on a spectrum, with
felony-murder participants eligible for death only when their
involvement is substantial and they demonstrate a reckless
indifference to the grave risk of death created by their actions.”
(Banks, at p. 794; see also Clark, at p. 616 [acknowledging Tison
as “the source of the language of section 190.2, subdivision (d)”].)
        In Banks, the court identified the following factors for
determining whether a defendant was a major participant in the
underlying felony: (1) the role the defendant played in planning
the target crime that led to the victim’s death; (2) the role the
defendant played in supplying or using lethal weapons; (3) the
defendant’s awareness of the particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, the weapons used, or the past experience or
conduct of the other participants; (4) whether the defendant was
present at the scene of the killing and, if so, whether he was in a
position to facilitate or prevent the death; (5) whether the
defendant’s actions or inactions at the scene of the killing played
a particular role in the victim’s death; and (6) the defendant’s

                                18
conduct after lethal force was used. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.) None of these factors is necessary, nor is any one
necessarily sufficient, to establish the defendant was a major
participant. (Ibid.)
       In Clark, the court explained that reckless indifference
“encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist in killing) to
achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically
desire that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 617.) Reckless indifference includes a subjective and
an objective element. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins).) For the subjective element, “ ‘[t]he defendant must be
aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which
the particular offense is committed,’ and he or she must
consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her
actions create.’ ” (Ibid.) To satisfy the objective element, “ ‘ “[t]he
risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       Clark identified the following factors to be considered in
determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life: (1) the defendant’s awareness that a gun or other
weapon would be used during the target offense; (2) the
defendant’s presence at the crime and whether he had an
opportunity to prevent the crime or aid the victim; (3) the
duration of the felony, including how long the defendant and the
victim interacted before the killing; and (4) the defendant’s
apparent efforts to reduce the risk of violence during the

                                  19
commission of the target offense. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp.
618–623; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
      The reckless indifference factors “ ‘significantly overlap’ ”
with the major participant factors, “ ‘for the greater the
defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely he
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 615.) Like the major participant factors, none of the
reckless indifference factors is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient, to establish the defendant acted with
reckless indifference. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) In
weighing these factors, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances. (Ibid.)
      In Strong, the Supreme Court addressed whether a jury’s
pre-Banks and Clark felony-murder special circumstance
findings, like the ones at issue here, have any preclusive effect on
a resentencing petition under section 1172.6. The court held that
neither a jury’s pre-Banks and Clark felony-murder special
circumstance findings, nor a court’s sufficiency of the evidence
review applying the Banks and Clark standards to a jury’s pre-
Banks and Clark felony-murder special circumstance findings,
preclude a petitioner from making a prima facie showing under
section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 715–720.)
2.    Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that
      Onley was a major participant in the underlying
      felonies who acted with reckless indifference to human
      life.
      2.1.   Major Participant
      Applying the factors described in Banks, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Onley was
a major participant in the underlying robbery and burglary.

                                 20
      Evidence supports an inference that Onley helped plan the
crimes. Before Onley and Moore arrived at Cherry’s house, Diaz
used Chambers’s phone to make several calls. Diaz then became
“fidgety.” After Diaz used her phone, Chambers went outside and
saw Onley and Moore standing together in Cherry’s front lawn.
Onley then called Chambers’s phone and asked for Diaz. When
Chambers told Onley that Diaz was inside Cherry’s house, Onley
and Moore pulled hoods over their heads, walked toward the
front door, and entered the house. This evidence supports an
inference that Diaz coordinated with Onley and Moore to rob
Cherry before they arrived at his house, and Onley called Diaz
before entering the house to confirm that Diaz was present.
      Evidence also supports an inference that Onley was present
when Cherry was killed. Whitmore heard gunshots come from
inside Cherry’s house after Onley and Moore entered the house.
Diaz later told Chambers that Moore shot Cherry during the
robbery. According to Diaz, “they”—i.e., Moore and Onley—
“hurried up and made [him] leave” after Cherry was shot.
      There also was evidence that Onley was in a position to
either prevent the killing or aid Cherry after he was shot.
Cherry’s body was found in the living room, near the front door,
with his arms and legs bound and several gunshot wounds to his
head, neck, and legs. Although Onley would have seen Cherry as
he walked out of Cherry’s house, nothing in the record indicates
Onley tried to free Cherry from his restraints before or after he
was shot or otherwise tried to aid Cherry. Instead, Onley and
Moore told Diaz to “hurr[y] up” once Cherry was shot, and Onley
later walked out of Cherry’s front door carrying a bag full of
items, indicating he continued to rob Cherry after the shooting.

                               21
       To be sure, the People didn’t present evidence that Onley
supplied the gun used to kill Cherry or that Onley was aware
lethal force would be used in the underlying crimes. And while
the People presented evidence that Onley, Moore, and Diaz were
in the same gang, and that their gang was known for committing,
among other crimes, “shootings” and “lots of murders,” the People
did not present evidence showing Onley had participated in
violent crimes with Moore or Diaz or was otherwise aware Moore
or Diaz were likely to use lethal force during the crimes. (See
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 810–811 [evidence that the
defendant and some of his cohorts were in a gang known for
“ ‘robberies, shootings, attempted murders, [and] murders’ ” did
not establish the defendant was aware his cohorts previously
engaged in shootings or lethal violence without evidence that
defendant or his cohorts “participated in shootings, murder, or
attempted murder”].) Nevertheless, the absence of such evidence
is outweighed by Onley’s participation in the planning and
execution of the robbery and burglary, his presence at the scene
of the killing, and his continued participation in the underlying
crimes after Cherry was shot. (See People v. Nieber (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 458, 476–477 (Nieber).)
       In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that Onley was a major participant under the factors identified in
Banks.
      2.2.   Reckless Indifference
       Substantial evidence also supports the court’s finding that
Onley acted with reckless indifference to human life under the
factors outlined in Clark.
      Onley participated in the underlying robbery and burglary
and was present in Cherry’s house when Cherry was killed.

                                22
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 [a defendant’s participation in
the events leading up to, and his proximity to, the murder are
relevant to determining whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life].) And, as we just explained, the
evidence supports an inference that Onley did not do anything to
try to prevent Cherry’s death. Diaz told Chambers that after
Moore shot Cherry, “they”—i.e., Moore and Onley—“hurried up”
and made Diaz leave the house. Instead of trying to help Cherry
after he was shot, Onley continued with the robbery and
burglary, walking out of Cherry’s house with a bag of items. (See
ibid. [a defendant’s failure to render aid to the victim while
present at the scene of the killing weighs in favor of a finding of
reckless indifference to human life].)
       The circumstances surrounding the underlying robbery and
burglary and Cherry’s killing also support an inference that
Onley acted with reckless indifference to human life. As our
Supreme Court explained in Clark, “[w]here a victim is held at
gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise restrained in the presence of
perpetrators for prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of
opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly culminating in
murder.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620, italics added.) When
Cherry’s body was found, his arms and legs were bound,
indicating he was restrained before he was shot. As we noted
above, the court could infer that Onley saw Cherry was
restrained before Onley left the house, as Cherry’s body was
found lying near the front door. But nothing in the record
indicates Onley tried to free Cherry from his restraints or
otherwise minimize the risk that Cherry would be killed. (See id.
at p. 622 [evidence that the defendant took steps to reduce the

                                23
risk of violence is relevant in determining whether he acted with
reckless indifference to human life].)
       In addition, the duration of the underlying crimes was not
particularly short. Data from Onley’s ankle monitor showed that
he was inside Cherry’s house for about seven minutes. During
that time, Cherry was restrained and shot, Cherry’s bird was
killed, and Onley and his cohorts were able to ransack Cherry’s
home and leave with several pieces of Cherry’s property. (See
Nieber, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 479 [prolonged duration of
robbery supported inference that the defendant acted with
reckless indifference].) And Cherry’s dead body did not deter
Onley from returning to Cherry’s home the day after he was
killed.
       Onley relies on In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, in
which the appellate court overturned a felony-murder special
circumstance finding because there was insufficient evidence that
the defendant was a major participant in the underlying robbery
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at pp.
404–408.) Ramirez does not help Onley. Although the defendant
in Ramirez supplied the gun that was used to kill the victim, he
did so at a time when no criminal conduct was contemplated. (Id.
at p. 404.) Unlike in this case, the robbery in Ramirez was not
planned, and the defendant “was not at the immediate location of
the killing.” (Id. at pp. 404–405.) Further, the defendant in
Ramirez acted only as a lookout and getaway driver, as opposed
to Onley, who actively participated in the underlying crimes and
was present when Cherry was killed. (Id. at p. 404.)
       In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s findings
that Onley was a major participant in the underlying robbery and
burglary who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The

                               24
court, therefore, properly denied Onley’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6.

                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying Onley’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                     LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      EGERTON, J.

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