Court Opinion

ID: 9685540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:46:34.348729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:07.544189
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I write separately to express my opinion that the limitation of the cross-examination of Peggy Stevens regarding the alleged welfare fraud was an error of constitutional dimension. However, I do not believe that it warrants reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Nor do I believe that this Court, sua sponte, should remand this case to the trial court for a Ginther hearing. People v Gin-ther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Thus, I concur with Justice Boyle that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.
The defendant had the constitutional right to cross-examine Peggy Stevens and to inquire into her truthfulness and credibility. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 316; 94 S Ct 1105; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974):
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. ... A more particular attack on the witness’ credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to *439issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is "always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.”
Exploration of the allegation that Stevens had previously engaged in welfare fraud and had involved the defendant in that fraud could have aided the defense in its attempts to show that Stevens not only was a dishonest person, but also was willing to implicate her mother in a crime. Thus, I agree that the evidence should have been admitted, and the fact that it was not infringed upon the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation.
The lead opinion states that "[w]here the error is not of constitutional dimension, the inquiry is whether the defendant’s conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice.” Ante, p 391, n 7. Because I believe that the error is of constitutional dimension, I believe that the proper test is stated in the Court of Appeals opinion in People v Catey, 135 Mich App 714; 356 NW2d 241 (1984). In the absence of preservation, if a constitutional question regarding the admissability of evidence is raised, we must determine whether it is decisive of the outcome of the case. See id.; People v Banning, 329 Mich 1; 44 NW2d 841 (1950).
I do not believe that the failure to allow this cross-examination was decisive of the outcome. The jury already knew that Peggy Stevens was receiving complete immunity for her testimony. This showed that Stevens had a motive to fabricate and that she was biased. It heard her admission that she participated in the planning of a murder. However, it still chose to believe her testimony that the defendant was a part of the conspiracy to kill the decedent. Thus, I do not *440believe that the failure to allow cross-examination regarding the alleged welfare fraud warrants reversal of the defendant’s conviction.
As for the question whether Stevens’ testimony about what Tony Hill said to the decedent before killing him fell under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, I agree with Justice Levin that this issue was not properly preserved at trial, and I find that review of it is unwarranted.
I would affirm the defendant’s conviction.
Riley, J., concurred with Brickley, J.