Court Opinion

ID: 9661100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:29:15.839722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:25.525259
License: Public Domain

Messmore, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the' majority opinion which interprets section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943, specifically the part thereof as follows: “Every child born out of wedlock shall be considered as an heir of the person who shall, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, have acknowledged himself to be the father of such child, * *
The burden devolves upon the plaintiff to establish that (1) the children were .born out of wedlock, (2) that Marvin L. Hagler is their father, and (3) that the father recognized them as his children in accordance with the statute. In re Estate of Oakley, 149 Neb. 556, 31 N. W. 2d 557.
The first and second of these elements of proof have been established. Thus, the third element of proof is directly involved in this case.
In Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co., 160 Neb. 410, 70 N. W. 2d 482, exhibit No. 15 was received in evidence. It is an application by Marvin L. Hagler for employment by Bekins. Van and Storage Company. The following is the pertinent part thereof: “Names, ages, relationship and address of any persons dependent on you for support or to whose support you are contributing.” He wrote: “Ruby Hagler - Wife age 26. 2 Sons. David Lee & Michel Dennis Hagler. age 2-1 yr.” The instrument was signed “Lee Hagler” in the presence of Bekins’ personnel officer.
Ruby Hagler was not the wife of Lee Hagler. David Lee and Michael Dennis Hagler were born out of wedlock.
Under the authority of Lind v. Burke, 56 Neb. 785, 77 N. W. 444, and also Moore v. Flack, 77 Neb. 52, 108 N. *604W. 143, we determined that all Hagler signed was an application for employment setting forth whom he deemed' to be his dependents, and that exhibit No. 15 was insufficient under section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943, to prove that the alleged father legitimated the two children, the subject of this action, for the reason that exhibit No. 15 was not an express, unequivocal, and unquestionable acknowledgment of the paternity of the illegitimate children that would make proper compliance with the statute.
In the majority opinion this court said: “A principle declared applicable in reference to an acknowledgment of the father of a child born out of wedlock is that it must be one in which the paternity is directly, unequivocally, and unquestionably acknowledged.” Lind v. Burke, supra; Moore v. Flack, supra. The court went on to say: “In Lind v. Burke, supra, it was said: *.* * £he writing must be in and of itself sufficient, unaided by extrinsic evidence, to establish the paternity.’ This statement was approved in Moore v. Flack, supra.” The court concluded: “* * * that to the extent that Lind v. Burke, supra, and Moore v. Flack, supra, hold that a writing in order to satisfy the requirements of section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943, must be in and of itself sufficient, unaided by extrinsic evidence, to establish paternity, they are overruled.”
It is apparent that primarily to arrive at this conclusion the majority opinion relies on the case of In re Estate of Winslow, 115 Neb. 553, 213 N. W. 819.
Let it be said here that we are dealing with the law as previously determined by this court in interpreting section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943. It cannot be doubted that the principles announced in the cases of Lind v. Burke, supra, and Moore v. Flack, supra, have been the law in this jurisdiction since December 8, 1898, until now.
I deem it advisable to analyze In re Estate of Winslow, supra. This was an action to determine whether the estate of John Woolman Winslow, deceased, who died *605intestate, never having been married, should descend to his collateral kindred or to Ida Belle Warriner, who claimed to be an illegitimate daughter of Winslow, and that she had been legitimated by his action so as to be entitled to inherit. Section 1228, Comp. St. 1922, was involved. Insofar as necessary here, it provided - as follows: “Every illegitimate child shall be considered as an heir of the person who shall, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, have acknowledged himself to be the father of such child, and shall in all cases be considered as an heir of his mother,, and shall inherit his or her estate in whole or in part as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock.” The evidence established that Winslow became nearly blind and could not see to write. JIe procured a Mrs. Peebles to write three letters for him to Mrs. Warriner, dictated by him and written in his presence. They were addressed to Ida Belle Warriner, and therein the salutation was “Dear daughter,” or “Dear daughter and children,” and the letters ended, “Your loving father, J. W. Winslow.” These letters, written by himself, and also the ones written by Mrs. Peebles at his dictation, contain an unequivocal acknowledgment that he was the father of Mrs. Warriner. There was the written acknowledgment. The only question was whether these letters were signed in the presence of a competent witness. This evidence was not as clear as could be desired. The record shows that one William Winslow, a cousin of the deceased and one of his collateral kindred, who would be entitled to inherit unless Mrs. Warriner was properly adjudged to be his sole heir, for a number of years lived in the home of the decedent. He testified, apparently with some reluctance, that several of the letters in question were in the handwriting of John W. Winslow; that Win-slow wrote them; that the witness read a number of the letters after they were written; and that they were handed to him by Winslow for him *606to read. The court said: “Taking his evidence as a whole, we think a fair inference is that the letters were written and signed by Winslow in his presence. If such be the fact, then there is a compliance with the statute which would legitimate Mrs. Warriner and entitle her to inherit.” Mrs. Peebles testified that she was present, and took the dictation of Mr. Winslow, and after she did so, read the letters to him, including the address, the salutation, and the signature above which were the words: “Your loving father.” A sister of Mrs. Peebles was also present when one of these letters was written. She heard it read, including the salutation and the signature, and knew that it was read to Mr. Winslow. The letter, as a whole, was written at his instance and request. After it had been written and read to him it was sealed in an envelope and Winslow, himself, took the letter and deposited it in a United States mail box. The court said: “The statute requires the acknowledgment to be signed in the presence of a competent witness, but that does not necessarily mean that the actual writing of the signature shall be made by the father. If one is disabled by reason of crippled hands or defective eye-sight so that he cannot write, no one would contend that it would be impossible for him to comply with the statutory provision. He may direct another to write his name, and when he does so the signature is as much his own as though he had held the pen which wrote his name. Where a person’s name is signed for him, at his direction and in his presence, by another, the signature becomes his own.’ 36 Cyc. 451. (The only authority cited in this case.) Winslow requested Mrs. Peebles to write the letter for him. He intended, as evidenced by his-act in depositing the letter in the mail box, that it should be sent to Mrs. Warriner. Inferentially and in effect, Winslow requested Mrs. Peebles to write his name. Moreover, he ratified and adopted her writing as his signature, and did so intentionally. The signature was appended in his presence and, as to one of *607the letters, in the presence of both. Mrs. Peebles and her sister.” He thereby legitimated Mrs. Warriner as his daughter and she was entitled to inherit his estate.
The opinion does not set out the circumstances of the letters written nor the circumstances of those written by Mrs. Peebles. They are, however, set out in the original brief of . the appellant on appeal to this court and in the motion for rehearing. I will not state the circumstances of these letters except to say that acknowledgment, if there be such, must, be found in the salutation and conclusion. Nowhere in the body of the letters is there even an allusion to the subject of paternity, to say nothing of a direct, unequivocal, and unquestionable acknowledgment thereof. One letter written by the deceased began “Dear daughter” and concluded “Your loving father”; another in his handwriting began “Dear daughter” and concluded “from your uncle”; a third began “Dear daughter” and concluded “your loving granddad”; and the fourth with the salutation “Dear Daughter” and signed simply “J. W. W.” I believe it is apparent that had the opinion contained the proper factual situation this court would not have held that it was sufficient compliance with the statute.
In the motion for rehearing in In re Estate of Winslow, supra, counsel made a most urgent request of this court to base its opinion on an interpretation of the statute or, in the alternative, to show wherein Lind v. Burke, supra, and Moore v. Flack, supra, were inapplicable, or at least to distinguish such cases from the case at bar, or overrule the same. This request was ignored. Obviously In re Estate of Winslow, supra, constitutes no authority for an interpretation of what is now section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943, and has no applicability to any case involving such section of the statutes.
In Lind v. Burke, supra, released December 8, 1898, what is now section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943, was involved.Incidentally, this section of the statute was enacted by the Legislature in 1860, Laws 1860, page 64, the only *608change being made therein now appears with reference to children born out of wedlock. This was an action to recover an alleged interest in the estate of August Lind, deceased. The appellee pleaded that he was the illegitimate child of August Lind, born in Sweden prior to the time the latter during his life came to America; and that appellee had been rendered capable of heirship by an acknowledgment in writing, in the presence of a competent witness, by August Lind of his relationship of father of the appellee. From a decree favorable to appellee’s contention an appeal was taken. The appellee contended that any writing that is an acknowledgment of the fact of paternity in the presence of any competent person is sufficient to meet the requirements of the law. The court said: “We are satisfied that a writing, to fulfill the requirement of the law * * * must be * * * one in which the paternity is directly, unequivocally, and unquestionably acknowledged.” It appeared from the evidence that the appellee was born in Sweden, where August Lind lived. The latter came to the United States and became a resident of Hamilton County, and subsequently the owner of land and considerable personal property. August Lind thought the appellee should come to the United States, and purchased necessary tickets from Mr. McEndree of Lone Tree, now Central City, and forwarded the same to his relatives in Sweden. In compliance with the written directions which accompanied the tickets, his relatives in Sweden started the boy on his journey to the United States. He arrived safely, was met by August Lind, and lived with him for a time apparently as one of the family. McEndree’s deposition was taken, and it is in substance as follows: That when August Lind bought the steamship ticket for the transportation of the appellee, he required McEndree to write a letter or statement to be carried by the boy during his trip and shown to people along the route. This letter was written in English and stated from and to where the boy was traveling, and requested that the boy be *609assisted in selecting his vessel and railroad trains. This letter was written by McEndree, and attached to it was the signature of August Lind, put there at August Lind’s request. As he remembered the letter it was as follows; “To Whom May Make Inquiries of the Bearer, Charles Lind, My Dear Son, who Holds a Steamship Ticket from Sweden to Lone Tree, Nebraska; This Boy is traveling alone under the management of the Cunard Steamship Co., and whose folks reside in Lone Tree, Nebraska. Who will kindly assist the boy in seeing that he gets the right vessel named on his ticket and railroad train through to Lone Tree, Neb., will confer a great favor on his father, the undersigned, August Lind.” At the same time a letter was written in Swedish by August Lind to his relatives, which is not relevant.
The court said, in analyzing the above evidence: “It will be noticed that in the latter letter there is nothing which contains a reference to the boy in the character of a child, or even a relative of the writer. * * * The first one quoted contains a reference to the boy as a ‘son’ of the writer. This expression may be used to mean a male child, issue or offspring, but also may be applied to a distant male descendant, or any young male person may be so designated, as a pupil, a ward, an adopted male child or dependent. (Webster’s International Dictionary; Century Dictionary.) In it also appears the words ‘his father.’ The term ‘father’ may mean the male parent; a male who has begotten a child. It may also mean the adopted father, or a male ancestor more remote than a parent. (Webster’s International Dictionary; Century Dictionary.) It must not be forgotten in this examination that it is not because the person can be shown to be the offspring, or is in fact the illegitimate child, that it may assert heirship, but because it has been in writing acknowledged; and hence the writing must be in and of itself sufficient, unaided by extrinsic evidence, to establish the paternity. With the many concurrent significations which belong to the words used *610and modified as they were, even if they are now as they stood in the original writings, * * * the writings cannot be adjudged sufficient to fulfill the statutory requirement.”
In Thomas v. Estate of Thomas, 64 Neb. 581, 90 N. W. 630, the dispute related to the construction of section 31, chapter 23, Comp. St. 1901, now section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943. The facts are not too important, except to say that under the same the writing was sufficient to comply with the statutes. It was decided that it was immaterial whether or not the writing was made with intent to constitute heirship by the rule of strict construction of writings of this nature when made as announced in Lind v. Burke, supra. The rule of strict construction was not changed or modified.
Lind v. Burke, supra, was followed in Moore v. Flack, supra, filed June 20, 1906. The facts, in substance, were as follows: Robert Moore, a former resident of Kentucky, died in Kearney County, Nebraska, August 18, 1889, seized of a quarter section of land situated in that county. J. W. Gilman was the administrator of his estate which was closed in January 1891. During the progress of the administration the right of heirship to the estate was contested between John F. Moore, who claimed to be a half brother of the deceased, and Daisy D. Moore, who claimed to be the daughter and sole heir of the deceased, the latter represented by a guardian ad litem who was her attorney in the action. The county court found in favor of the half brother and against the minor Daisy D. Moore. Thereafter the lands in controversy passed by mesne conveyance from John F. Moore to the defendant Henry J. Flack who purchased them on July 12, 1892, and cultivated and occupied the lands as his own. In January 1903, Daisy D. Moore filed a petition in the district court alleging ownership of the lands in dispute as a daughter and sole heir of Robert Moore, deceased, and asked that the former decree of the county court that declared John F. Moore the sole heir at law of *611Robert Moore, deceased, be set aside because it was procured by fraud' and perjury, and also that the conveyances from John F. Moore to Flack be canceled and held for naught and the title to the lands in controversy be quieted in her. Thomas Moore, an alleged child of Robert Moore, deceased, intervened in the suit, and filed a petition in which he alleged he was the illegitimate child of the deceased; that he had been recognized in writing as such by the deceased in- the presence of a competent witness; and that because of such recognition he was entitled to the inheritance as the sole heir of Robert Moore, deceased. He further alleged that he was an infant in Kentucky at the time of the proceeding in the probate court of Kearney County, and had no notice of any kind of proceeding in the county court. He further alleged that John F. Moore, to whom the inheritance had been awarded in the county court, was a bastard and not a legitimate half brother of Robert Moore, deceased. Flack, the defendant, answered these petitions, alleging his ownership of the lands by mesne conveyances from John F. Moore, and pleaded the proceeding in the county court as a bar to the claims of both plaintiff and intervener. There was judgment for the defendant, petitions of the plaintiff and intervener were dismissed, and separate appeals brought to this court by the plaintiff and the intervener. The intervener’s evidence was to the effect that the deceased had been adjudged the father of the intervener in a bastardy proceeding instituted against him in the county court of Rowan County, Kentucky. It was the recollection of the presiding judge that the deceased had admitted in court that he was the father of -the child. There was no evidence that such admission was made, if at all, in writing. A deposition was introduced by the intervener of a witness who testified that he resided for many years in Rowan County, Kentucky, and had known Robert Moore since 1870; that he last saw him at Farmers, Rowan County, Kentucky, shortly before he went to Nebraska, and had a *612conversation with Robert Moore about Omie Oney’s bastard child in Farmers, Rowan County, Kentucky, and Robert Moore said he wanted to get the child away from her, as it was his child; that he had had the child adopted by her consent, and wanted the witness to assist him in getting the child away; and that he wrote Omie Oney a note which this witness gave to her. The note said: “I am going .to leave. I have to leave you. I bid old Kentucky good bye for a while. I don’t just know when I will be back. Take good care of our boy, and call him Thomas Moore, and I will give him a good start some day.” This witness read the note to Omie Oney. The witness further stated that he saw Robert Moore with Thomas Moore (intervener) after Omie Oney moved onto witness’ place. Robert Moore would come over and stay 2 days at a time with the child, staying at the witness’ house at night. On cross-examination the witness said this letter was written and signed in his presence. Omie Oney testified that she could neither read nor write, but that she remembered the contents of the note, just as stated by the witness. She put the note away in a paper box with other papers and it was lost. She was unable to find it. The court said: “It is clear that the evidence with reference to the bastardy proceeding is wholly insufficient to show an acknowledgment within the provisions of section 31, supra. So the only question is as to the sufficiency of the testimony of Gearhart (the witness who gave the deposition) and Omie Oney to establish an acknowledgment, in writing, by the deceased of the paternity of the intervener.” The question was, was the writing a sufficient recognition to create an heirship within the meaning of the statute? The material portion of this note as testified to was: “Take good care of our boy, and call him Thomas Moore, and I will give him a good start some day.” The court said: “In Lind v. Burke, 56 Neb. 785, the sufficiency of an acknowledgment of paternity under this section of the statute was examined into, and, while the question *613as to whether the instrument must have been acknowledged with the intent to create a right of heirship was not determined, yet it was there said: ‘We are satisfied that a writing, to fulfil the requirement of the law * * * must be at least one in which the paternity is directly, unequivocally, and unquestionably acknowledged.’ It is further said in the opinion: ‘It must not be forgotten in this examination that it is not because the person can be shown to be the offspring, or is in fact the illegitimate child, that it may assert heirship, but because it has been in writing acknowledged; and hence the writing must be in and of itself sufficient, unaided by extrinsic evidence, to establish the paternity.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) The writing was then held to be insufficient under the statute. The court said: “The reference to intervener as ‘our boy’ in the note is not a clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of the paternity of the boy. Nor is the request that the child be named Thomas Moore equivalent to an acknowledgment that Robert Moore was the natural father of the child. Nor is the promise that T will give him a good start some day’ inconsistent with any other theory than that the writer of the note was the father of the child. In the later case of Thomas v. Estate of Thomas, 64 Neb. 581, it was decided that it was immaterial whether or not the writing was made with the intent to constitute an heirship, but the rule of strict construction of writings of this nature, when made, as announced in Lind v. Burke, supra, was not modified.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Van Hove v. Van Hove, 94 Neb. 575, 143 N. W. 815, the plaintiff was the illegitimate son of Maria Leonia Audenaert, a citizen of Belgium, who intermarried with August Van Hove in Belgium in 1887. The plaintiff was 7 years of age at that time. The contention was that the plaintiff was an heir of August Van Hove under section 4931, Ann. St. 1911, now section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943. The record of the marriage in Belgium recited that: “The above named husband and wife agreed tak*614ing as their lawful children and to recognize them as such: Engene Audenaert, born at Sinay, the 9th of March, 1880.” The record appears to have been signed by August Van Hove, and it is contended that this satisfied the statute. The court said: “Under the laws of Belgium, which are shown in the record, it does not appear easier to establish heirship in such cases than under our statutes.” The record was held to be clearly insufficient to meet the requirements of the statute, citing Lind v. Burke, supra, and Moore v. Flack, supra. In other words, the rule announced in such cases was adhered to.
The interpretation placed by this court on what is now section 30-109, R.. R. S. 1943, has stood for a period of nearly 60 years without modification. No case has overruled such interpretation or endeavored to distinguish Lind v. Burke, insofar as the rule announced with reference to said statute is concerned. The Legislature has not seen fit to interfere with the statute as originally enacted, except in the minor detail above mentioned. The majority opinion now overrules Lind v. Burke, supra, and Moore v. Flack, supra, as stated therein, and now places an entirely different and very liberal interpretation and, in fact, adds to the statute certain elements not contemplated by the Legislature.
I make the further observation that in determining heirship or the right to inherit, strict interpretation of the statutes governing the same should be adhered to. The interpretation now placed on section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943, leads to no other result than to invite and permit questionable litigation. I conclude the majority opinion is wrong in its interpretation of section 30-109, R. R. S. 1943.