Court Opinion

ID: 9900371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:48.088059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.855812
License: Public Domain

No. 435             August 30, 2023                  665

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                 JESSE RYAN ROSE,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
             Deschutes County Circuit Court
                  22CR01210; A178325

  Walter Randolph Miller, Jr., Judge.
  Submitted April 7, 2023.
    Richard E. Oberdorfer and Oberdorfer Law Firm LLC
filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
  Reversed and remanded.
666                                                  State v. Rose

         TOOKEY, P. J.
         Defendant was charged with driving under the
influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010. After the trial
court denied his petition to enter into diversion, ORS 813.200
to 813.270, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. On
appeal, he seeks reversal of his conviction and remand to
allow him to withdraw his conditional guilty plea and enter
his already-filed DUII diversion guilty plea. The state con-
cedes that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s peti-
tion to enter into diversion for the reasons the court stated
and that the case should be remanded for the court to recon-
sider its ruling. We agree and accept the concession. We
therefore reverse defendant’s conviction and remand.
         As relevant here, ORS 813.215 provides:
          “(1) A defendant is eligible for diversion if the defen-
   dant meets all of the following conditions:
           “(a) On the date the defendant filed the petition for
   a driving while under the influence of intoxicants diversion
   agreement, the defendant had no charge, other than the
   charge for the present offense, pending for:
           “(A) An offense of driving while under the influence
   of intoxicants in violation of:
           “(i) ORS 813.010; or
          “(ii) The statutory counterpart to ORS 813.010 in
   another jurisdiction;
           “(B) A driving under the influence of intoxicants
   offense in another jurisdiction that involved the impaired
   driving of a vehicle due to the use of intoxicating liquor,
   cannabis, psilocybin, a controlled substance, an inhalant
   or any combination thereof; or
           “* * * * *
           “(b) The defendant has not been convicted of an
   offense described in paragraph (a) of this subsection within
   the period beginning 15 years before the date of the com-
   mission of the present offense and ending on the date the
   defendant filed the petition for a driving while under the
   influence of intoxicants diversion agreement.
           “(c) The defendant has not been convicted of a fel-
   ony offense described in ORS 813.010(5)(a).
Cite as 327 Or App 665 (2023)                                  667

            “(d) The defendant was not participating in a driv-
   ing while under the influence of intoxicants diversion pro-
   gram or in any similar alcohol or drug rehabilitation pro-
   gram in this state or in another jurisdiction on the date the
   defendant filed the petition for a driving while under the
   influence of intoxicants diversion agreement. A defendant
   is not ineligible for diversion under this paragraph by rea-
   son of participation in a diversion program or any similar
   alcohol or drug rehabilitation program as a result of the
   charge for the present offense or a charge for violation of
   ORS 471.430.
            “(e) The defendant did not participate in a diversion
   or rehabilitation program described in paragraph (d) of this
   subsection within the period beginning 15 years before the
   date of the commission of the present offense and ending on
   the date the defendant filed the petition for a driving while
   under the influence of intoxicants diversion agreement. A
   defendant is not ineligible for diversion under this para-
   graph by reason of participation in a diversion program or
   rehabilitation program described in paragraph (d) of this
   subsection as a result of the charge for the present offense
   or a charge for violation of ORS 471.430.”
(Emphases added.)
          Under ORS 813.215(1)(a)(A)(ii) and ORS 813.215(1)(b),
a defendant is ineligible for diversion if they have been con-
victed of DUII under ORS 813.010 or its “statutory counter-
part * * * in another jurisdiction” within the prior 15 years.
Under ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B) and ORS 813.215(1)(b), a defen-
dant is ineligible for diversion if they have been convicted
in the prior 15 years of, “[a] driving under the influence of
intoxicants offense in another jurisdiction that involved the
impaired driving of a vehicle due to the use of intoxicating
liquor, cannabis, a controlled substance, an inhalant or any
combination thereof.” Under ORS 813.215(1)(e), a defendant
is ineligible for diversion if they have participated in a diver-
sion or rehabilitation program “within the period beginning
15 years before the date of the commission of the present
offense and ending on the date the defendant filed the peti-
tion for a driving while under the influence of intoxicants
diversion agreement.”
       In his written motion to enter a diversion program,
defendant disclosed a 2016 Colorado conviction for “driving
668                                                  State v. Rose

while ability impaired” (DWAI), defined in Colo Rev Stat
§ 42-4-1301(1)(b). But defendant directed the trial court’s
attention to State v. Guzman/Heckler, 366 Or 18, 46, 455 P3d
485 (2019), in which the Supreme Court held that Colorado’s
DWAI offense does not include an element of “perceptible
impairment,” as required by Supreme Court case law under
ORS 813.010, and therefore is not a statutory counterpart to
ORS 813.010 under ORS 813.215(1)(a)(A)(ii). See also State
v. Nelson, 318 Or App 230, 231, 505 P3d 1105 (2022) (Under
Guzman/Heckler, an out-of-jurisdiction offense is a “stat-
utory counterpart” of Oregon DUII only if the elements of
the defendant’s prior convictions are the close equivalent, or
“match,” the elements of the Oregon offense.).
         Defendant also argued that he had no previous
conviction for an offense involving “impaired driving,” ORS
813.215(1)(a)(B); see State v. Mazzola, 356 Or 804, 813, 345
P3d 424 (2015) (the impairment element of ORS 813.010(1)
can be proved either by a blood alcohol content (BAC) level
of .08 percent or by showing “that the driver was impaired
to a perceptible degree while driving.”).
        The trial court nonetheless denied defendant’s
motion for diversion under ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B):
            “THE COURT: Okay. After considering the argu-
   ments, and then further reviewing the materials attached
   to the motion to enter diversion that are from the Colorado
   DWAI conviction, I do find as a result of the DWAI con-
   viction in Colorado, that defendant is disqualified under
   ORS 813.215(A)—excuse me, subsection (1)(B) because
   the DWAI conviction does constitute a driving under the
   influence of intoxicants [offense] in another jurisdiction
   that involved the impaired driving of a vehicle through the
   use of intoxicating liquor, cannabis, psylocibin, controlled
   substance, inhalant, or any combination thereof. [T]hose
   are elements of the DWAI. I do not believe that the Court
   is required to element match to determine whether that
   DWAI constitutes a statutory counterpart * * *, because
   this is not being argued as a * * *disqualifying statutory
   counterpart under the other provisions that would make
   [defendant] ineligible for diversion. And even if the Court
   were to accept the argument of defense counsel * * * that he
   was not statutorily disqualified, the Court would exercise
   its discretion * * * to deny the diversion petition due to the
Cite as 327 Or App 665 (2023)                                 669

   fact that, you know, approximately six years ago or less,
   in relation to the Colorado DWAI, [defendant] would have
   been ordered to participate and engage in the same nature
   of treatment * * * that is contemplated by the Oregon
   diversion education and treatment and that would be a—
   another basis for disqualification. So, I’m denying * * * the
   petitioner for diversion.”

         The court thus did not base its rejection of defen-
dant’s petition on the rationale that the Colorado offense was
a “statutory counterpart” under ORS 813.215(1)(a)(A)(ii);
rather, the court reasoned that the Colorado offense required
a rejection of petitioner’s request for diversion because it
was a “driving under the influence of intoxicants offense in
another jurisdiction that involved the impaired driving of a
vehicle.” ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B). After the trial court rejected
defendant’s petition for diversion, defendant entered a condi-
tional guilty plea to the charge of DUII, reserving his right
to appeal the trial court’s denial of his entry into diversion.
         On appeal, defendant contends (and the state con-
cedes) that, in light of Guzman/Heckler, the trial court erred in
denying his petition for diversion, and we agree. In Guzman/
Heckler, the court did not address ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B).
But citing Mazzola, 356 Or at 813, the court noted in Guzman/
Heckler that the impairment element of ORS 813.010(1) can
be proved either by a blood alcohol content (BAC) level of .08
percent or by showing “that the driver was impaired to a
perceptible degree while driving.” Guzman/Heckler, 366 Or
at 46. See also State v. Clark, 286 Or 33, 39, 593 P2d 123
(1979) (describing state’s burden to establish that driver was
“under the influence” either through BAC level or based on
“observable physical symptoms”). The court emphasized that
the “perceptible degree” standard has applied to “impair-
ment” in proof of DUII for “close to a century.” Id. The court
said, “the ‘perceptible degree’ standard draws a line between
slight impairment that does not violate the law and the more
significant impairment that does.” Id. at 48. The court noted
in Guzman/Heckler that although Colorado’s DWAI offense
required “impairment,” it was not impairment to a percepti-
ble degree. Rather, the Colorado offense “extends to drivers
who are slightly and imperceptibly impaired.” 366 Or at 47.
670                                                              State v. Rose

Thus, the court concluded, the Colorado offense was not a
statutory counterpart of DUII.
        In conceding that the trial court erred in holding
that defendant had a previous conviction for an offense
involving impaired driving, ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B), the
state argues that, to prove that defendant committed the
Colorado offense of DWAI, the prosecution “did not need to
prove that defendant’s alcohol and/or drug use necessarily
had any actual effect on his driving,” and that, because the
prosecution did not need to prove that the use of intoxicants
made defendant’s driving any different or worse than it
otherwise would have been, it did not need to prove that
defendant’s offense involved “impaired driving.”1 Thus, the
state contends, the record did not support the trial court’s
conclusions that defendant’s Colorado offense “involved the
impaired driving of a vehicle” due to intoxicants.
        We accept the state’s concession that the trial court
erred. The court said in Guzman/Heckler that the Colorado
offense of DWAI did involve impairment, but not impair-
ment to a “perceptible degree.” Thus, the court said, a per-
son could be convicted of DWAI even if the intoxication was
imperceptible. Id. at 47.2 Under ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B), the
   1
     The state argued:
   “Because the prosecution [for defendant’s Colorado DWAI] did not need to
   prove that use of intoxicants made defendant’s driving any different or worse
   than it otherwise would have been, it did not need to prove that defendant’s
   offense involved “impaired driving.”
   2
     The court said:
   “Under Colorado law, the impairment element is satisfied when a person is
   ‘affect[ed] * * * to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the
   person ordinarily would have been, either mentally or physically, or both men-
   tally and physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or
   due care in the safe operation of a vehicle. Colo Rev Stat § 42-4-1301(1)(g)
   (2010). By contrast, the impairment element of ORS 813.010(1) can be proved
   either by a blood alcohol content (BAC) level of .08 percent or by showing
   ‘that the driver was impaired to a perceptible degree while driving.’ State
   v. Mazzola, 356 Or 804, 813, 345 P3d 424 (2015). The ‘perceptible degree’
   standard has been part of our law for close to a century. See State v. Noble,
   119 Or 674, 678, 250 P 833 (1926); State v. Robinson, 235 Or 524, 531, 385 P2d
   754 (1963). The state argues that there is little difference between DWAI and
   DUII under ORS 813.010. We disagree. Colorado’s DWAI law criminalizes
   driving even while imperceptibly intoxicated, provided that the individual’s
   mental or physical abilities relating to driving are affected ‘to the slightest
   degree.’ Colo Rev Stat § 42-4-1301(1)(g) (2010). That conduct falls below the
   ‘perceptible degree’ of intoxication threshold set by ORS 813.010(1). To be
Cite as 327 Or App 665 (2023)                                             671

Colorado offense must have been for “impaired driving.” If,
as the court said in Guzman/Heckler, the Colorado offense
of DWAI is established by intoxication that is imperceptible,
then, as the state correctly concedes, the person’s driving
is not impaired as required by ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B). Thus,
a person who has been convicted of the Colorado offense of
DWAI has not necessarily been convicted of an offense involv-
ing impaired driving, as required by ORS 813.215(1)(a)(B).
See also State v. Santos-Ramirez, 312 Or App 117, 493 P3d
522 (2021) (construing the same statutory wording in ORS
809.235(1)(b)(B) “to encompass out-of-state offenses only to
the degree that those offenses require proof that a person’s
driving was impaired by the use of intoxicants”). We there-
fore conclude that defendant’s Colorado conviction for DWAI
is not a conviction involving “impaired driving,” as required
by Oregon law under ORS 815.215(1)(a)(B).
         The trial court said that, alternatively, it would
“exercise its discretion” to
   “deny the diversion petition due to the fact that, you know,
   approximately six years ago or less, in relation to the
   Colorado DWAI [defendant] would have been ordered to
   participate and engage in the same nature of treatment
   * * * that is contemplated by the Oregon diversion education
   and treatment.”
The trial court’s discussion appears to refer to 813.215(1)(e),
under which a person is not eligible for diversion if they
have participated in a diversion program within the last
15 years. See ORS 813.215(1)(e). But, as the parties agree,
the evidence here did not establish that defendant had par-
ticipated in a diversion or rehabilitation program after his
Colorado DWAI conviction.
          It is possible that, by referencing its “discretion,”
the court had in mind ORS 813.220, which lists criteria
that a court, in its discretion, should consider in determin-
ing whether to allow diversion for a person who establishes
eligibility under ORS 813.215. See, e.g., State v. Warrington,
   sure, imperceptible intoxication can also violate ORS 813.010(1)(a), but only
   when the person’s BAC at the time of driving was 0.08 or higher. DWAI,
   under Colorado law, criminalizes lower levels of imperceptible intoxication
   because it extends to even the ‘slightest degree’ of impairment.”
Guzman/Heckler, 366 Or at 45-46.
672                                              State v. Rose

219 Or App 566, 184 P3d 1160 (2008); State v. Wright, 204
Or App 724, 726, 131 P3d 838 (2006) (“Once a defendant
establishes eligibility, whether contested or not, the decision
to allow diversion in a particular case is a matter of discre-
tion left to the trial court. ORS 813.220.”). We agree with
defendant that the circumstances described by the court do
not appear to relate to the criteria listed in that statute.
        We therefore reverse defendant’s conviction and
remand for reconsideration of defendant’s petition for
diversion.
        Reversed and remanded.