Court Opinion

ID: 9560741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:54:48.338468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:09.364532
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
Under the particular facts of this case, I concur with the majority opinion that the appellee is barred from contesting the issue of his paternity. However, I wish to express some reservations about the absolute rule regarding the application of the doctrine of res judicata endorsed by the majority opinion.
Generally, where a final judgment in a prior divorce proceeding adjudicates the issue of paternity, the father is bound by that judgment and may not resurrect the issue in a subsequent child support or contempt proceeding brought against the father by the Department of Human Resources. See Macuch v. Pettey, 170 Ga. App. 467 (1) (317 SE2d 262) (1984). However, there are exceptions to that general rule, one of which must be where the prior judgment was obtained by fraud.
In Macuch, in holding that the appellant was estopped from disputing paternity because of a prior divorce judgment which addressed that issue, this court specifically emphasized the absence of any allegation of fraud or mistake over the paternity of the child as stipulated in the divorce decree. In Fleeman v. Dept. of Human Resources, 208 Ga. App. 97 (430 SE2d 135) (1993), this court again noted that paternity could not be relitigated, “absent fraud that would cause the divorce judgment to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied.)
If ever there was fraud that would cause setting aside a divorce judgment ordering a man to pay child support, concealing another man’s paternity of the child would be such fraud. However, in order to prevent subsequent denials of paternity that are themselves fraudulent, before a party should be allowed to contest a prior adjudication of paternity based on fraud, the party should be required to produce convincing evidence of the fraud, and to pay into the court registry the child support obligation established under the prior judgment during the pendency of the subsequent proceeding. (Presumably, the other parent would need to be joined, in order to facilitate setting aside that fraudulent prior judgment.)
In the instant case, if the appellee already had in his possession a valid blood test that demonstrated his non-paternity of the child, the result here would very likely be different. However, the appellee actu*794ally presented no evidence supporting his claim that the prior adjudication of his paternity was obtained through fraud. Rather, he merely asserted in his unverified answer and counterclaim that, following the divorce decree, his ex-wife told him that he was not the father of the child.
Decided June 2, 1993.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Teresa E. Lazzaroni, Staff Attorney, for appellant.
G. Martin Adcock, for appellee.
Mere allegations of fraud are insufficient to allow challenging a prior adjudication of paternity based on fraud. For that reason, I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court erred in allowing the appellee to relitigate his already-established paternity.