Court Opinion

ID: 9727969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:53:53.125148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:44.673071
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Gunther, J.:
The appellant in this case was convicted on two indictments, one of which charged the offense of bookmaking and the other the charge of being a common gambler. The only question involved in this appeal is whether or not testimony concerning a telephone conversation between the appellant and another person, which was intercepted by means of wire tapping by the police officers of the City of Lancaster, should *336have been admitted in evidence. Tbe trial court allowed evidence thus obtained to be admitted over appellant’s objection. The Commonwealth concedes that this evidence formed a material part of its case and that if this admission was improper, a new trial should be granted.
The common law rule was that the admissibility of evidence did not depend upon its being legally obtained, and following this rule, the Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly sustained convictions based upon evidence procured by police officers whose conduct ivas violative of the search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Montanero, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 133, 96 A. 2d 178. The majority of state jurisdictions have likewise held that evidence thus illegally obtained was nevertheless admissible, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Wolf v. Colorado, U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782, pointing out that 30 of the 47 state courts which have passed on this question have allowed the admission of such evidence and that 17 have rejected it. The U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, established the principle, since then law in all of the United States courts, that evidence obtained by means which would constitute an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a Federal Court. But, as has been stated, this decision has not been followed in the majority of state courts, trying state offenses.
Evidence obtained by wire tapping has been held by the Supreme Court not to be violative of the Fourth Amendment, the Court stating that this Amendment protected against only an unlawful physical entry against the abstraction of tangible property. Olm-stead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 *337L. Ed. 944. However, this decision proved generally unpopular with the result that in several subsequent sessions of Congress, bills were introduced designed to prohibit the practice of wire tapping. Finally in the Federal Communications Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C.A. 605, there was contained a provision (Section 605) which prohibited the interception of any communication by wire and likewise prohibited the divulging or publishing of the contents of such communication. In the leading case of Nardone v. U. S., 302 U. S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314, it was held that Federal officers were included in this prohibition and that the words “divulge and publish” applied to testimony given before a court. The Court in the last cited case reversed a conviction based on evidence obtained by wire tapping. Furthermore, in the case of Weiss v. U. S., 308 U. S. 321, 60 S. Ct. 269, 84 L. E. 298, it was held that the cited section of the Act applies to intrastate as well as to interstate communications. These decisions have established the law upon this question for all trials in Federal District courts.
The Supreme Court, however, has been very careful to point out that it does not intend to establish a rule of evidence which shall be binding upon State Courts conducting trials involving state offenses. Thus it was stated in the case of Schwartz v. State of Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 73 S. Ct. 232, 97 L. Ed. 231: “Indeed, evidence obtained by. a state officer by .means which would constitute an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to. the-Federal Constitution is nonetheless admissible, in a state court, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, while such evidence, if .obtained by a federal officer, would be clearly inadmissible in a federal court; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. The problem under §605 is somewhat different because the *338introduction of the intercepted communications would itself be a violation of the statute, but in the absence of an expression by Congress, this is simply an additional factor for a state to consider in formulating a rule of evidence for use in its own courts.”
Despite the prohibition contained in the Federal Communications Act and the Nardone decision, the courts of several jurisdictions accordingly have admitted evidence so obtained. The State of New York for instance has by Statute provided for the admissibility of evidence obtained by wire tapping, providing, however, certain safeguards against its abuse. The New York Statute requires that an application be made to the Court by the Attorney General, the District Attorney, or a high ranking police officer for permission to intercept telephone messages. Cause must be shown and the particular conversations sought to be intercepted must be detailed. Pennsylvania in common with many other states has no such regulatory Statute, and should it how be held that wire tapping evidence is admissible, it must be admitted indiscriminately and without reserve.
Indeed, this question has never been passed upon by the Appellate Courts of this State, the sole Pennsylvania decision being that of Commonwealth v. Char-pentier, in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Allegheny County, in which Judge Soffbi/ in an opinion reported at .99 P.L.J. 219 (78 D & C 389) held such evidence to be admissible. In this opinion, the learned' Judge pointed out . that the' -United. States .Supreme Court has scrupulously refrained from establishing a rule of evidence which would be binding'upon State. Courts, and hence she found no .valid reason .to exclude, the testimony.
Notwithstanding this decision, the Appellate.Courts of this State, if théy deem it in the. interest .of. justice *339and good morals, may very well follow the suggestion contained in the case of Schwartz v. Texas, supra, and exclude such evidence in obedience to the strong public policy enunciated in Section 605 of the Act and in the decisions of the United States Courts. There being no prior Pennsylvania appellate decisions upon this point, our courts are not bound by the rule of stare decisis, as they are as regards the admissibility of evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure.
There is a clear distinction between the two types of cases and the prior decisions of the courts of this state in the latter field should not be considered as precedents in disposing of the present case. An illegal search or seizure is open and notorious and can readily be redressed, whereas the interference with a person’s privacy of conversation is necessarily secret and unknown to the person affected. His conversation can be monitored for months without his knowledge. He is therefore not in a position to invoke official machinery to protect himself. As pointed out in a recent article in 52 Columbia Law Review, page 165, there has been a great increase in the use of wire tapping apparatus, not alone by public officers in serious cases, but by private persons conducting private investigations such as are involved in labor disputes and domestic relations cases. Wire tapping is done not only by the police, but by government agencies, legislative committees, political organizations, law firms, and private detective offices. In a great majority of cases, unless the desired information is obtained, the victims have been completely unaware that every detail of their private lives lias been bared to some person or group with a hostile interest.-
Perhaps one of the most -precious incidents of our liberty is the reasonable right of privacy and nothing can be more intolerable than to realize that our most *340intimate conversations are being exposed to the scrutiny of outside persons, either public or private.
It is not determinative that the motives of those who indulge in this practice are sincere. Mr. Justice Brandéis stated in his dissent in the Olmstead case, supra, “As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared to wire tapping.” (page 476) “It is better that a few criminals escape than that the privacies of life of all the people be exposed to the agents of the government, who will act at their own discretion, the honest and the dishonest, unauthorized and unrestrained by the courts.” (page 479). “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.” (page 479). Mr. Justice Holmes in the same case referred to wire tapping as a “dirty business.”
It is my opinion that while this question is still open for decision, our courts should take a sound American position and refuse to admit evidence obtained from such a dubious source. Perhaps a regulatory Statute such as exists in New York might keep this practice within bounds. But in the absence of regulation of any sort, the knowledge that testimony obtained in violation of the Federal Statute will nevertheless be honored by Pennsylvania courts must encourage a widespread and irresponsible resort to this questionable technique and a consequent disrespect for law.
It is idle to say that the victim has his remedy either by civil action or by instituting a prosecution under the. Federal Statute. As has been pointed out,' one who has been subjected to wire tapping can rarely know the extent or duration of such subjection. Again, damages to an intangible right are difficult to prove, and more difficult to recover. Insofar as the criminal *341remedy is concerned, this practice has been so widespread, even in the offices of the government, that a conviction would be practically impossible to obtain.
The world has been shocked by the judicial methods employed in the last few years in the totalitarian governments of Europe, both in the obtaining of evidence and in the actual trial of cases. It is generally reported that in Nazi Germany prior to its defeat, and in Soviet Russia at the present timé, there has been a complete lack of personal privacy and of the normal confidence and intimacy of personal relationships, and that instead a universal suspicion everywhere prevails. It is probably far fetched to compare such conditions with the frankness and freedom of expression which is characteristic of this country, but never! heless it is important that we should exhibit to the world a complete contrast to totalitarian methods, and that as we reject their concept of government, we likewise reject any practice of espionage which is a natural characteristic of their type of thought.
The offenses with which this defendant was charged are not heinous crimes. They are instead in the nature of malum prohibitum. Perhaps extraordinary methods may be necessary in the detection and punishment of crimes of great social significance even though not justifiable in cases such as the present. Judge Learned Hand in the case of United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629, suggests that a distinction should be made as to permitting wire tapping evidence in the trial of minor misdemeanors and in the trial of serious felonies. He states in his opinion at page 640 “. . . and perhaps it would be desirable to set limits — as, for example, . . . cases of espionage, sabotage, kidnapping extortion and in general investigations involving national security and defense — to the immunity from *342‘wiretapping’ of those who are shown by independent evidence to be probably engaged in crime.”
Considering the widespread abuse which has already arisen from unrestricted wire tapping, and considering the lack of statutory safeguards in this Commonwealth and the nature of the present offense, it is my opinion that this conviction should be reversed.