Court Opinion

ID: 9759237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:09:53.77765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.384562
License: Public Domain

AKIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that appellant’s amended answer was not properly before the trial court where the docket sheet contains an initialed notation by the trial judge granting an extension for the filing of amended pleadings. Neither can I agree that the record on review is to be construed in a light favorable to the trial court’s judgment in a summary-judgment proceeding. Consequently, I would hold that the plaintiff’s right to recover on its amended petition was not precluded as a matter of law by Modern’s summary-judgment evidence. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment *153and remand this cause. Thus I must dissent.
Energo International Corporation (Ener-go) contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment when appellant had on file an amended answer with supporting affidavits alleging offsets to appellee’s claim, which amended-petition allegations were not precluded as a matter of law by movant’s summary-judgment evidence. I agree. The docket sheet of the trial court contains the following written entry:
“6/17/85 Plaintiff’s MSJ. Argued. Under advisement to 6/30/85 for all pleadings filed to be amended.” (Judge’s initials).
This notation establishes that the trial judge extended the time for the filing of amended pleadings until June 30, 1985. Energo filed the amended answer on June 17, 1985, and the file mark on the amended answer reflects this date. The majority disregards this evidence on the ground that “a docket entry forms no part of the record which may be considered; it is a memorandum made for the trial court and clerk’s convenience.” I disagree with this statement. The cases cited by the majority as supporting this proposition ignore the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in N-S-W Corporation v. Snell, 561 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977), which holds that a docket entry may be considered to supply facts in certain situations. See also Mathews v. Looney, 132 Tex. 313, 123 S.W.2d 871 (1939); Ford v. Ireland, 699 S.W.2d 587, 588 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1985, no writ); Whitexintl Corporation v. Justin Companies, 669 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Courtlandt Corporation v. Trico Service Corporation, 600 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Furthermore, it is well settled that the docket entry is a part of the court record and need not have been tendered into evidence to be considered either by the trial court or by the appellate court. Petroleum Equipment Financial Corporation v. First National Bank of Fort Worth, 622 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex.Civ.App.—Ft. Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.), citing Port Huron Engine & Thrasher Co. v. McGregor, 131 S.W. 398 (Tex.1910), and Bockemehl v. Bockemehl, 604 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ). See also Kluck v. Spitzer, 54 S.W.2d 1063, 1065 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1932, writ refused); Pruet v. Coastal States Trading, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986); Wood v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, 671 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.App. — Austin 1983, no writ); City of San Antonio v. Terrill, 501 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Hillhouse v. Allumbaugh, 258 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex.Civ.App.— Eastland 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Perry v. Perry, 122 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1938, no writ); and Acosta v. Realty Trust Co., 111 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex.Civ.App—Austin 1937, no writ). Accordingly, I would hold that the trial judge’s docket sheet may be considered in determining whether the amended answer was properly before the court in a summary-judgment proceeding.2
Neither can I countenance the majority’s misdirected adherence to the rule of review that the record be construed in a light favorable to supporting the trial court’s *154judgment. This rule does not apply in summary-judgment proceedings. The granting of a summary judgment should be affirmed on appeal only if the record established a right to the summary judgment as a matter of law. McNaab v. Kentucky Central Life Insurance, 631 S.W.2d 253 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ). Consequently, there is a “heavy, horrendous burden placed upon the movant” for summary judgment. Lee v. McCormick, 647 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1983, no writ). Because of this burden on the movant in summary-judgment cases, where all matters considered by the trial court are in the record, the appellate court will not indulge any presumptions in favor of the judgment. Kenney v. Porter, 557 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hungate v. Hungate, 531 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.Civ.App—El Paso 1975, no writ). See also Board of Adjustment v. Leon, 621 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1981, no writ), which held “In a summary judgment case an appellate court will not indulge presumptions in favor of the judgment.” Id. at 435. Furthermore, where there is no indication that evidence was introduced before and considered by the trial court which is not brought forward in the record, no presumptions are to be made in favor of a summary judgment. Box v. Bates, 162 Tex. 184, 346 S.W.2d 317, 319 (1961). The case the majority relies upon, Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.1985) is distinguishable in that it was not a summary-judgment proceeding, nor did it state that that rule is applicable to summary-judgment proceedings. Consequently, no presumptions can be made in favor of the trial court’s judgment for Modern Industrial Heating, Inc.
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Modern Industrial Heating, Inc. because Energo’s amended answer with supporting affidavits raised a material fact issue with respect to Energo’s claim of offset. The docket sheet reveals that the trial judge permitted the filing of Energo’s amended answer, and no presumptions favorable to the judgment can be made otherwise. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for trial.

. Contrary to footnote 2 to the majority opinion, my proposed holding would not permit a docket entry to defeat a written judgment. The majority misunderstands the holding in N-S-W Corporation v. Snell that a docket entry may not be used to defeat a final judgment. The rule properly interpreted, means that a docket entry of what the judgment purports to be cannot override or cast doubt upon the written judgment, where the two are different. That rule does not apply as here where the docket sheet in no way contradicts the written judgment. If the majori-tys understanding of the rule was correct, that the "docket entry may not be used to defeat the final summary judgment for Modern,” then an exception to the rule could never exist because in all cases the docket-sheet entry has been used to support a ground for reversal of a judgment. Indeed, the majority’s statement is contrary to all cases in which the docket sheet entry has been used to support judgment nunc pro tunc. £⅛, City of San Antonio v. Terrill, 501 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).