Court Opinion

ID: 9705468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:08:07.320648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:16.474475
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority has misapplied the required standard of review applicable to this case, I am compelled to respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly recounts our standard of review when it concludes that where jury verdicts are challenged as being inconsistent, an appellate court presumes that they are consistent unless there is no reasonable theory to support the verdicts. Majority op. at 25 (citing Ferrick Excavating and Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co., 506 Pa. 181, 186, 484 *30A.2d 744, 746 (1984); Beyrand v. Kelly, 434 Pa. 326, 329, 253 A.2d 269, 270 (1969); Hornak v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 433 Pa. 169, 175, 249 A.2d 312, 315 (1969).) What is reasonable, of course, is always subject to honest debate. Here, however, notwithstanding the fact that the majority adopts the correct standard of review, I believe that the “reasonable theory” utilized to reach its ultimate conclusion in the matter sub judice is untenable and implausible.
The majority attempts to harmonize the jury’s verdicts by theorizing that the jury could have found that the first article (“ATL I”) had a defamatory meaning which was, in fact, different and distinct from the defamatory meaning of the second article (“ATL II”). Thus, the question becomes whether this conclusion is a reasonable conclusion based on the facts of this case. A thorough search of the record establishes that although two separate complaints stating independent causes of action were filed and later consolidated for trial, neither initial pleading suggests that the two newspaper articles were capable of two separate and distinct defamatory meanings. To the contrary, the complaints at issue claim that both ATL I and ATL II had the same defamatory meaning. Furthermore, I can find no indication that any alternate theory of defamation was ever presented in evidence or argued at trial; nor was any alternative theory the subject of the trial court’s formal charge to the jury. Thus, to conclude that the lay jury, when deliberating this matter, “could have” come up with an alternative theory of defamation is to conclude that the lay jury possessed significantly more legal talent than any of the professionals involved in the case. Hypothesizing that the jury might have created a new theory of defamation, one on which apparently no evidence was offered and on which the jury was not charged by the court, to me seems to be an eminently unreasonable theory, and therefore, violative of our standard of review.
Although I have the most profound and sincere respect for my former colleague, the late Mr. Justice McDermott, and although I carry in my heart a deep felt realization that what was once an unblemished reputation for competence and integ*31rity was unfairly and unnecessarily sullied by careless, unprofessional and vicious reporting, in matters such as these, I am bound by my oath of office and by my conscience to follow the law as I see it. My late friend and colleague would have required nothing less of me.
For reasons stated above, I am constrained to respectfully disagree with my learned colleagues in the majority and conclude, as have the lower courts, that the verdicts subject to this appellate review are legally inconsistent as applied to the facts at hand and thus, Appellees should be awarded a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.