Court Opinion

ID: 9749216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:28:17.516223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:45.200178
License: Public Domain

King, C. J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion holds that the questionnaire of the motor vehicle commissioner was so worded that if the plaintiff had a $20,000/$20,000 bodily injury policy in effect, even though that policy provided no coverage at all for the accident prompting the questionnaire, it *646was proper for Aetna not to return the bottom portion of the SR-21 form. From this, the majority holds that there was no inconsistency in Aetna’s failing to return the SR-21 form and thereafter claiming, under the New York statute, that there was no coverage of this accident. I am unable to accept this reasoning. It seems to me that where, as here, the facts were simple, undisputed and known to Aetna, its failure to return the form was properly found by the trial court to amount to a waiver of Aetna’s right to disclaim liability by reason of the New York statute.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. In order to waive a claim of law, however, it is not necessary that a party be certain of the correctness of the claim and its legal efficacy. It is enough if he knows of the existence of the claim and of its reasonably possible efficacy. Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 257, 205 A.2d 780. Nor is it necessary that the waiver be in express terms. It may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied. Andover v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 153 Conn. 439, 445, 217 A.2d 60. In other words, waiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable so to do. DiFrancesco v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 162, 168, 134 A. 789.
Form SR-21, and the procedure thereunder, was devised in order to carry out General Statutes §§ 14-116 and 14-117, which require the commissioner to determine, after a particular accident, whether adequate minimum insurance coverage of that accident exists or whether security should be required sufficient to satisfy any judgment which may thereafter be rendered as a result of personal injuries or property damage sustained in that acci*647dent.2 This is especially clear from the provision of § 14-117 that the commissioner require the owner or operator of the vehicle to furnish security to the extent that limits of insurance coverage, if under $20,000 for personal injuries, are below the amount determined by the commissioner to be necessary to satisfy any judgment for damages resulting from that accident. In effect, this was held in Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 210, 120 A.2d 700, in which it was decided that the commissioner should require security only to the extent that a real estate attachment was inadequate. That this was the legislative intent is further emphasized by subdivision (6) of § 14-119 and by § 14-122. It is obvious that the existence of a policy of insurance generally covering the operation of a motor vehicle but only under circumstances not involved in a particular accident is not a compliance with the security requirements of the financial responsibility law as to that accident and should not be treated by the insurer, under the form SR-21 procedure, as such a compliance. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Come, 100 N.H. 177, 185, 123 A.2d 267.
We now turn to the question whether Aetna’s action in failing correctly to point out the lack of any coverage of this particular accident could prop*648erly be found by the court to operate as a waiver of any rights Aetna might otherwise have under § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law. Waiver must be based on facts known, actually or constructively, at the time of the waiver. Here there was no factual problem or dispute whatsoever. That the accident occurred in Connecticut and involved interspousal coverage, and that alone, was known to Aetna from the outset. The wording of the policy, as in the Jenkins case, clearly in terms covered the accident. The only question was the legal effect of the New York statute. Aetna at all times had full knowledge of the simple operative facts.
In Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 573, 579, 116 A.2d 169 (decided in 1955), we held, in the absence of any relevant New York authority, that § 167 (3) was not intended to, and did not, apply to an accident occurring outside the state of New York. Later, in 1957, the New York Court of Appeals held, in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 8, 143 N.E.2d 357, that the New York statute applied to interspousal actions “no matter where the accident occurs.”
That was the state of the law when Aetna was called upon to act on form SR-21, and that remained the state of the law until long after Aetna made its disclaimer of coverage on January 27, 1960, following the institution of the wrongful death action. This disclaimer was made over two years before the Superior Court decision in the Jenkins case on August 17, 1962, and almost five years prior to our decision of the appeal in the Jenkins case on December 15, 1964. Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 205 A.2d 780. Aetna pointed to *649nothing, which could have affected its conduct, occurring between the date of its failure to indicate lack of coverage to the commissioner on the SR-21 form and its disclaimer of coverage on January 27, 1960. As far as appears, Aetna knew at all times that it intended to deny interspousal coverage on the basis of the Stecker case and to litigate that issue. It chose not to offer any explanation of its completely inconsistent action in failing to indicate its claimed lack of coverage to the motor vehicle commissioner. Presumably this was because there was no rational explanation. It made no claim of lack of understanding of the SR-21 questionnaire or of ignorance of the Williamson and Stecker cases. Indeed the latter claim could hardly have been made since Connecticut is the state in which Aetna has its home office, while New York is the state in which Aetna claims the policy was issued. The trial court had ample basis for concluding that Aetna had full knowledge of its right to claim that the New York statute relieved it of liability and of the possible, if not probable, efficacy of such a claim. Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 257. Aetna voluntarily chose to act in a way which gave the commissioner unequivocal assurance of interspousal coverage. At the trial of this action, it chose not to explain its conduct in failing to alert the commissioner to any doubt as to interspousal coverage.
On the one hand, public policy demands that the motor vehicle commissioner be given accurate information by an insurance carrier as to the coverage available for the satisfaction of a judgment growing out of a motor vehicle accident occurring in Connecticut. This is the primary purpose of the form SR-21 procedure and of the statutes in furtherance of which the form is utilized. On the other *650hand, insurance carriers cannot fairly be required at their peril to resolve uncertain or disputed questions of fact which are essential to a determination of coverage under their policies. Consequently, they cannot be charged with waiver on facts not known by them, actually or constructively, when they return the SR-21 form to the motor vehicle commissioner.
Here there were no factual questions to be determined. The salient facts were simple, known and undisputed. The only question was, in the event suit was instituted in Connecticut, where it obviously would have to be instituted if the Stecker rule could possibly be avoided, whether our court would adhere to its decision in the Williamson case in the face of the Stecker decision. Aetna had full opportunity to explain, under “Remarks” on the SR-21 form, any uncertainty it might have had on the state of the law as to coverage of this particular accident. It made no explanation. Instead it adopted a course of action which caused the commissioner to understand that interspousal coverage existed. The obvious result would be to cause the commissioner to absolve Donald Breen from the necessity of posting security and to leave the plaintiff in the wrongful death action without the protection which the statute was intended to afford. This was not, without explanation, a proper course for Aetna to pursue, especially since on its face the wording of the policy, like that of the policy in the Jenkins case, covered Breen’s liability for the interspousal accident. See LaPoint v. Richards, 66 Wash. 2d 585, 594, 403 P.2d 889.
Waiver is a question of fact, and, under the particular facts of this case, I do not think that the court erred in concluding that Aetna’s action in *651failing to return the SR-21 form was conduct inconsistent with its reliance on the New York statute as a defense. Such conduct, unexplained, could he found to be a waiver. The finding that there was no evidence that Aetna knowingly or intentionally relinquished a known right to rely on § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law was technically correct. Such evidence involved Aetna’s state of mind and lay solely in Aetna’s power to produce. As previously noted, Aetna made no attempt to offer any evidence in explanation of its conduct. But the memorandum of decision makes it clear that the court found that Aetna, by its unequivocal and unexplained conduct, which was wholly inconsistent with any reliance on the New York statute, waived the benefit of that statute. This conclusion was warranted on the subordinate facts of this case.
On the one hand, I do not think it should be held that an insurance company, by failing correctly to point out any limitations on, or lack of, coverage in returning form SR-21, under any and all circumstances ipso facto has waived, or is estopped to claim, any limitation or lack of that coverage. See cases such as Behringer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 275 Wis. 586, 593, 82 N.W.2d 915. Nor, on the other hand, do I think it should be held that an insurance company can give any information, regardless of how erroneous, in its response to the motor vehicle commissioner under the SR-21 form without risk, under any circumstances, of having such action result in a waiver or estoppel of any limitation or lack of coverage, as seems to have been held in Seaford v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 719, 724, 117 S.E.2d 733. But see the later North Carolina case of Harris v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 499, 503, *652135 S.E.2d 209; see also 7 Am. Jur. 2d 301, Automobile Insurance, § 7.
Aetna’s conduct was wholly inconsistent with any claim of lack of coverage by reason of § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law. It made no attempt to explain that inconsistency. On the particular facts of this case, the court’s conclusion of waiver should not be disturbed.
I cannot accept, at least as applied to the facts of this case, Aetna’s claim that as a matter of law it could not waive the provisions of § 167 (3) because waiver can never result in the expansion of the coverage of any insurance policy. See note, 1 A.L.R.3d 1139; Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 259, 205 A.2d 780. Such a holding here would emasculate, if not destroy, the efficacy of our form SR-21 procedure. See cases such as LaPoint v. Richards, supra.
I think the judgment should be affirmed on the ground of waiver.
Alcorn, J. I concur in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice.

 It should be noted that our financial responsibility law has two aspects. One aspect, with which we are concerned here, is the requirement that the owner and operator of a car involved in an accident, if not effectively insured, must give security for the satisfaction of any claims for damages arising from that accident or suffer, inter alia, the loss of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state. General Statutes § 14-117. The other aspect, with which we are not here concerned, is the requirement that one found to have violated certain enumerated provisions of the motor vehicle law must provide, by insurance or otherwise, financial responsibility for future accidents. General Statutes § 14-112; see Hein v. Natiomoide Mutual Ins. Co., 106 N.H. 378, 382, 213 A.2d 197.