Court Opinion

ID: 9695590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:23:59.366953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:14.611984
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Eobeets:
It is a commonplace that hard cases make bad law, yet it is one that we need remember. There can be no doubt that this Court is now faced with a hard case. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the result reached represents bad law. Despite the brutality of the crime, despite the overwhelming evidence of the existence of the elements of murder in the first degree, despite my own evaluation of the psychiatric testimony here in dispute, I must dissent. In my view, the majority unwisely restricts the purpose for which psychiatric evidence may be admitted, and thereby binds the courts of this Commonwealth to a rule which is contrary to enlightened modern authority.
Although conceding that psychiatric testimony is admissible to assist in fixing the penalty following a finding of guilty of murder in the first degree,1 the majority holds that such evidence is not competent and inadmissible on the issue of whether the accused acted *332with that state of mind necessary to support such a conviction. I am unable to agree with the majority’s conclusion. I deem such evidence competent and admissible for both purposes.
When an accused pleads guilty to murder generally, the offense charged in the indictment becomes duly established as murder in the second degree. Commonwealth, v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 525, 50 A. 2d 317, 319 (1947). In order to raise the offense to murder in the first degree, the Commonwealth has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the slaying was “willful, deliberate and premeditated. . . ,”2 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, as amended, 18 P.S. §4701; Commonwealth, ex rel. Andrews v. Russell, 420 Pa. 4, 6, 215 A. 2d 857, 858 (1986); Commonwealth v. Kurus, 371 Pa. 633, 637, 92 A. 2d 196, 198 (1952); Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 525, 50 A. 2d 317, 319 (1947).
No citation of authority is necessary for the proposition that even an accused who has pleaded guilty to murder generally has the right to adduce evidence which, if believed by the factfinder, would rebut evidence of the Commonwealth that all the elements necessary to support a conviction of murder in the first degree were present. I therefore fail to understand why *333the majority, even though recognizing that the state of mind of the accused is the additional factor in this case which the Commonwealth must establish in order to prove murder in the first degree, nevertheless concludes that psychiatric testimony is not competent on this issue. While reasonable men may differ as to the weight to be accorded psychiatric testimony, it cannot reasonably be said that such testimony is legally incompetent or legally irrelevant on the issue of state of mind. Particularly is this so when such testimony is competent when the defense of insanity is raised and the issue is whether the accused was sufficiently responsible for his conduct to be held accountable in the eyes of the law.3 To hold that psychiatric testimony is competent for this purpose but not competent for the lesser purpose of negating the existence of that state of mind required to support a conviction of murder in the first degree is inconsistent and unjustified.
So long as the Legislature has elected to distinguish between degrees of murder and to define murder in the first degree as a slaying which was “willful, deliberate and premeditated”, I believe that this Court should not preclude the use of psychiatric testimony to negate the inference that the accused acted with that state of mind. The most realistic rule devised to deal with the problem presently before this Court is that of The American Law Institute: “Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense.” A.L.I. Model Penal Code, *334§4.02(1) (Official Draft, 1982). Equally relevant is the comment which immediately follows this rule: “if states of mind such as deliberation or premeditation are accorded legal significance, psychiatric evidence should be admissible when relevant to prove or disprove their existence to the same extent as any other relevant evidence.”
Since it is not clear from the opinion of the court below that this evidence was admitted for the purposes here indicated, I would vacate the judgment there entered and remand so that the hearing judge could consider the psychiatric testimony on the issue of degree of guilt. If, after admitting the psychiatric testimony and considering it for the purpose of determining the degree of guilt of the defendant, the hearing judge concludes that such testimony is insufficient to rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation, I would affirm the finding of murder in the first degree entered below, since the record clearly indicates that the evidence adduced is sufficient to support such a finding. However, if after considering the psychiatric testimony, the hearing judge concludes that the testimony rebuts the Commonwealth’s evidence of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation, a finding of murder in the second degree should be duly entered.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 89 A. 2d 782 (1952); A.L.I. Model Penal Code §4.02(2) (Official Draft 1962).

 The full statutory definition of murder in the first degree is: “All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any -arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first degree. All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree.” Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, as amended, 18 P.S. §4701. Since we are not here presented with murder committed by means of poison or by lying in wait, or with a murder committed in the perpetration of one of the enumerated felonies, murder in the first degree could only be predicated on a finding that the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated;

 It should be noted, however, that this area of the law could also benefit from a fresh review by the judiciary. One court which has recently reviewed the area has adopted the A.D.I. Model Penal Code test of legal insanity. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F. 2d 1073 ( 2d Cir. 1966). I believe this to be a step in the right direction.