Court Opinion

ID: 9366602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 15:03:18.835354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:53.834665
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                     No. 21–1918

             Submitted December 14, 2022—Filed January 27, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RACHAEL KAY SOKOL AND DAVID LANGDON
SOKOL.

Upon the Petition of RACHAEL KAY SOKOL,

      Appellee,

and Concerning DAVID LANGDON SOKOL,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie K. Vaudt,

Judge.

      A spouse seeks further review of a court of appeals decision modifying the

spousal support award. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN

PART AND REVERSED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

AS MODIFIED.

      McDonald,    J.,   delivered    the   opinion   of   the   court,   in   which

Christensen, C.J., and Oxley, McDermott, and May, JJ., joined. Mansfield, J.,

filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which

Waterman, J., joined.

      Kate Simon and Tyler J. Johnston of Cordell Law, LLP, Des Moines, for

appellant.
                                    2

      Stacey N. Warren of CashattWarren Family Law, P.C., Des Moines, for

appellee.
                                          3

McDONALD, Justice.

      Transitional spousal support “is appropriate when a party capable of

self-support nevertheless needs short-term financial assistance to transition

from married to single life.” In re Marriage of Mills, ___ N.W.2d. ___, ___ (Iowa

2022) (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530,

545 (Iowa 2022)). Transitional spousal “support is intended to resolve a

short-term liquidity crunch” and “should be of a short duration.” Id. at ___. In

this case, the court of appeals modified a dissolution decree to award a payee

spouse seven years’ transitional spousal support. On further review, we conclude

the court of appeals erred in modifying the decree to award transitional spousal

support under the circumstances presented.

                                          I.

      Rachael and David Sokol married in 2002. There were two children born

into the marriage, one in 2006 and another in 2014. In 2019, Rachael petitioned

for dissolution of the marriage. Following a two-day virtual trial, the district court

entered its decree in August 2021.

      At the time of the decree, Rachael was 45 and David was 43. Rachael

earned $440,000 per year as a doctor. David owned a home repair and

remodeling business, which he started in 2013. The company grew over the years

and had approximately $553,000 in revenue in 2020; David, however, had never

paid himself a salary from the company. Based on the company financials, the

district court imputed to him annual income of $50,000. The Sokols owned a

residence, a commercial property, several vehicles, retirement accounts,
                                         4

extensive personal property, and other assets. The Sokols also had debt,

including mortgages on the property, Rachael’s student loans, and several credit

cards.

      With respect to the children, the district court granted Rachael and David

joint legal custody and shared physical care, with Rachael to pay David $2,000

per month in child support. Although the district court granted the parties joint

legal custody of the children, the decree provided Rachael could “decide on the

course of action” with respect to decisions for the children. Regarding the division

of property, the district court equitably divided the Sokols’ assets. Rachael

received the marital home, one vehicle, her retirement account, half of the

expected income tax refunds, various tactical gear, the entirety of her student

loan debt, and all the couple’s shared credit card debt. David received the

commercial property, two vehicles, his retirement account, half of the expected

income tax returns, and all assets belonging to his business. In total, the district

court awarded each party net assets of approximately $660,000. As to spousal

support, the district court ordered Rachael to pay David $3,000 per month in

rehabilitative spousal support for four years. The district court reasoned the

support was necessary to give David time to build a more “concrete, realistic

business model” and “improve his earning capacity.”

      David timely filed his notice of appeal, and we transferred the matter to

the court of appeals. With respect to custody, David argued the district court’s

grant of final decision-making authority to Rachael was not consistent with joint

legal custody. Regarding the property division, David argued: (1) the district
                                        5

court double-counted the value of commercial property awarded to him, (2) the

district court erred in awarding Rachael certain guns and tactical gear that were

registered in David’s name, (3) the district court erred in awarding Rachael

$85,000 more than David by rejecting his valuation of certain property, and

(4) the district court erred in treating Rachael’s medical school debt as a marital

debt. As to spousal support, David argued the length of the marriage warranted

traditional, rather than rehabilitative, spousal support. David emphasized that

more substantial awards are commonplace in dissolutions of long marriages in

which one spouse has significantly higher earning capacity than the other.

      The court of appeals affirmed the dissolution decree with modifications.

With respect to custody, the court of appeals held the grant of final

decision-making authority to Rachael was not consistent with joint legal custody

and modified the decree accordingly. Regarding the property division, the court

of appeals affirmed the district court in all respects. As to spousal support, the

court of appeals modified David’s award from rehabilitative support at $3,000

per month for four years to transitional support at $5,000 per month for seven

years. In the court of appeals’ view, this was necessary to “bridge the gap” and

“assist[] David with the transition from married to single life.” The court of

appeals also reasoned the “award will provide David time to build his business

and draw sufficient income to maintain a comparable standard of living to what

he enjoyed during the marriage.”

      Rachael filed an application for further review contesting the court of

appeals modification of the spousal support award. David did not resist the
                                          6

application for further review, and he did not seek further review of any issue.

“When considering an application for further review, we have discretion to review

all the issues raised on appeal or in the application for further review or only a

portion thereof.” In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). We

exercise our discretion by limiting our review to the spousal support award. The

decision of the court of appeals is final as to all other issues. See id.

                                         II.

      Our review of a spousal support award is de novo. In re Marriage of Mann,

943 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 2020). “Although our review is de novo, we afford

deference to the district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons.” Hensch v.

Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). The institutional deference

afforded the district court in determining spousal support counsels against

undue tinkering with spousal support awards. An appellate court should disturb

the district court’s determination of spousal support “only when there has been

a failure to do equity.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015)

(quoting In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005)). Otherwise,

“[w]hen appellate courts unduly refine these important, but often conjectural,

judgment calls, they thereby foster appeals in hosts of cases, at staggering

expense to the parties wholly disproportionate to any benefit they might hope to

realize.” In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996) (en banc).

                                         III.

      Alimony originated in English ecclesiastical courts as an obligation of the

husband to provide continued support for his wife upon separation. E.g. Cynthia
                                         7

Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the Remarriage-Termination

Rule, 81 Ind. L.J. 971, 983 (2006) [hereinafter Starnes]. This was a time when

absolute divorce was not available, or at least not readily available:

             Prior to the English reforms of 1857, the rationale for alimony
      was simple enough: upon marriage a husband undertook a lifetime
      obligation to support his wife. Although he could obtain a legal
      separation from her (divorce a mensa et thoro), rarely could he fully
      sever marital ties (divorce a vinculo). Accordingly, a husband’s duty
      of support continued throughout his wife’s life, whether or not they
      lived together. Alimony was the mechanism, designed by the English
      ecclesiastical courts, for enforcing the husband’s lifetime obligation
      to support and sustain his wife. Indeed, the word “alimony” derives
      from the Latin “alimonia,” which means sustenance.

             Underpinning the husband’s support obligation was an
      assumption that married women should not be expected to support
      themselves. Employment opportunities for women were limited, and
      a married woman’s property was subject to her husband’s control.
      Indeed, at common law a married woman’s identity merged into that
      of her husband, who bore a moral and legal obligation to provide for
      her. As Blackstone observed, “[T]he very being or legal existence of
      the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
      incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under
      whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything . . . .”

Id. (alteration and omission in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 William

Blackstone, Commentaries *442); accord Jolly v. Jolly, 1 Iowa 9, 11 (1855) (“It is

the nourishment—the maintenance—the allowance made for the support of the

wife, which is given and fixed by the proper court out of the husband’s estate,

when they are legally separated.”); Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital

Residuals: Applying an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24

Harv. Women’s L.J. 23, 39–48 (2001) [hereinafter Collins] (summarizing

historical justifications for alimony); Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The
                                         8

Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 L. &

Contemp. Probs. 197, 197–98 (1939) (summarizing history of alimony).

      Iowa had long-recognized alimony—the duty of the husband to provide for

his former wife—as a form of relief for the wife in a dissolution action. Our

territorial statutes provided “the court shall make such order and decree

touching . . . the alimony and maintenance of the wife . . . as from the nature of

the case and circumstances of the parties may appear to the court equitable and

just.” Iowa Rev. St. ch. 65, § 5 (Terr. 1843). The 1851 Iowa Code provided that

“[w]hen a divorce is decreed the court may make such order in relation to the

. . . property of the parties and the maintenance of the wife as shall be right and

proper.” Iowa Code § 1485 (1851).

      This concept of alimony—as a form of maintenance for the wife—remained

unchanged until 1977. In 1977, the general assembly broadened the concept of

alimony to include spousal support equally available to either party. 1977 Iowa

Acts ch. 138, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 598.21 (1979)) (providing the court may

enter order for “the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified”). At present,

the Code provides, “Upon every judgment of annulment, dissolution, or separate

maintenance, the court may grant an order requiring support payments to either

party for a limited or indefinite length of time . . . .” Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)

(2019). The Code then provides a list of factors for the district court to consider

in determining whether to award spousal support and in determining the

amount and duration of any such award. Id. § 598.21A(1)(a)–(j).
                                         9

      While Iowa law has long recognized that one party may be required to

provide financial support to the other party upon dissolution of the marriage, the

theoretical justification for the provision of such support has not been

well-developed. The lack of theoretical justification is not unique to Iowa. See

Starnes, 81 Ind. L.J. at 984 (“These visions of limited divorce and lifetime support

obligations, of course, do not satisfactorily explain alimony after the advent of

absolute divorce.”). As the American Law Institute has noted:

      Shifting conceptions of alimony’s purpose underlie its
      recharacterization in recent years as “maintenance” or “spousal
      support.” No single model has proven satisfactory, however, and
      alimony remains a residual category, functionally defined as those
      financial awards available in connection with the dissolution of a
      marriage that are not child support or the division of property.

Am. L. Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and

Recommendations § 5.01 cmt. a, at 875 (2002) [hereinafter Principles of the Law

of Family Dissolution]. Another commentator explained:

      American cases elaborate upon the statutory rules, but actual
      alimony awards as well as their rationales vary from jurisdiction to
      jurisdiction and from case to case. Even the definition of ‘need’—the
      most fundamental issue created by such statutes—is hopelessly
      confused. Is the wife ‘in need’ only when she is unable to support
      herself at a subsistence level? A moderate middle class level? The
      level to which she was accustomed in the marriage, no matter how
      high? The courts have used all of these approaches. Without an
      articulated theory, we cannot argue that any of these definitions is
      correct. In short, no one can explain convincingly who should be
      eligible to receive alimony, even though it remains in almost every
      jurisdiction.

Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1989)

[hereinafter Ellman] (footnotes omitted).
                                         10

      As there is no consensus justification for the provision of spousal support,

numerous theories abound. For its part, the American Law Institute has adopted

a loss-based approach to spousal support. See Principles of the Law of Family

Dissolution § 5.02 cmt. a, at 878 (“The principal conceptual innovation of this

Chapter is therefore to recharacterize the remedy it provides as compensation for

loss rather than relief of need.”). Other theoretical justifications include contract,

partnership, restitution, fault, protection of the public fisc, and needs-based

analysis, among a host of others. See Collins, 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. at 39–48

(summarizing justifications); Ellman, 77 Calif. L. Rev. at 13–40 (summarizing

justifications). “While various theories have since been articulated to explain

continuation of the practice, alimony in cases of absolute divorce seems to have

survived through inadvertence rather than by deliberation.” Collins, 24 Harv.

Women’s L.J. at 28. In this area, as with many others, “[t]he life of the law has

not been logic: it has been experience.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common

Law 1 (Dover ed. 1991) (1881).

      In the absence of any grand theory, Iowa’s courts have nonetheless, case

by case, developed workable constructs to channel judicial discretion in

awarding spousal support. “Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its

allowance is determined based on the particular circumstances presented in

each case.” Mills, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Iowa courts are “to equitably award spousal

support by considering” the criteria listed in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1).

Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 107. In applying these statutory criteria, our precedents

have recognized four forms of spousal support deemed equitable: traditional,
                                       11

reimbursement, rehabilitative, and transitional. Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 539–42;

Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 408. “Each type of spousal support has a different goal.” In

re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 2008). The amount and

duration of a spousal support award should be tailored to achieve the underlying

equitable purpose of the spousal support award. Mills, ___ N.W.2d at ___ (“The

precise ‘amount and duration’ of a spousal support award will vary ‘according to

the purpose it is designed to serve.’ ”) (quoting In re Marriage of Hettinga, 574

N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (en banc)).

      An award of traditional spousal support is equitable in marriages of long

duration to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the lifestyle to which he or

she became accustomed. Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 412. Generally, only “marriages

lasting twenty or more years commonly cross the durational threshold and merit

serious consideration for traditional spousal support.” Id. at 410–11. When

traditional spousal support is ordered, the duration of support should

correspond with need. Id. at 411. “Termination of spousal support may be

appropriate when ‘the record shows that a payee spouse has or will at some point

reach a position where self-support at a standard of living comparable to that

enjoyed in the marriage is attainable.’ ” Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 111 (quoting Gust,

858 N.W.2d at 412).

      Reimbursement “support allows the spouse receiving the support to share

in the other spouse’s future earnings in exchange for the receiving spouse’s

contributions to the source of that income.” Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 826. It “is

predicated upon economic sacrifices made by one spouse during the marriage
                                        12

that directly enhance the future earning capacity of the other.” In re Marriage of

Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 1989) (en banc). Reimbursement support may

be warranted where, for example, “a spouse contributed to the other’s earning

capacity” by supporting them through a degree program and where the

supporting spouse “cannot otherwise be compensated for their contributions.”

Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 544. Generally, reimbursement support should “not be

subject to modification or termination until full compensation is achieved.

Similar to a property award, but based on future earning capacity rather than a

division of tangible assets, it should be fixed at the time of the decree.” Francis,

442 N.W.2d at 64.

      “Rehabilitative spousal support is ‘a way of supporting an economically

dependent spouse through a limited period of re-education or retraining

following divorce, thereby creating incentive and opportunity for that spouse to

become self-supporting.’ ” Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 826 (quoting Francis, 442

N.W.2d at 63). Without a showing that the recipient spouse seeks reeducation,

retraining, or some discrete period of time to increase earning capacity to become

self-supporting, rehabilitative spousal support is inappropriate. See Francis, 442

N.W.2d at 64. “Because self-sufficiency is the goal of rehabilitative alimony, the

duration of such an award may be limited or extended depending on the realistic

needs of the economically dependent spouse, tempered by the goal of facilitating

the economic independence of the ex-spouses.” Id.

      Lastly, transitional spousal support is warranted where the recipient

spouse may already have the capacity for self-support at the time of dissolution
                                          13

but needs short-term assistance in transitioning to single life. See Pazhoor, 971

N.W.2d at 541–42. Dissolution of the marriage is expensive for the family unit:

one residence becomes two, two beds become four, one set of pots and pans

becomes two sets, etc. This requires a sufficient amount of liquidity for down

payments, security deposits, a new vehicle, household items, and the like. See,

e.g., In re Marriage of Hinshaw, No. 12–1783, 2013 WL 3273584, at *5 (Iowa Ct.

App. June 26, 2013) (affirming transitional spousal support award where spouse

testified support would get her on her feet in “establishing a residence for herself

and the children”); In re Marriage of Byrne, No. 03–0788, 2003 WL 23220082,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003) (“Of the approximately eighty thousand

dollars worth of property she received, less than one half of that amount was in

cash or other liquid assets available to assist in her transition to self-

sufficiency.”). Where the requesting spouse has sufficient income or liquid assets

to meet these immediate needs, transitional spousal support is inappropriate.

See Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 541–42. With respect to duration, the immediate

needs of the recipient spouse generally “can be addressed through the issuance

of orders on temporary matters while the dissolution proceeding is pending. But

if additional relief is still necessary to assist in that transition, it should be of a

short duration.” Mills, ___ N.W.2d at ___.

      The generally recognized categories of spousal support are not mutually

exclusive. Courts may issue hybrid awards “to accomplish more than one of the

foregoing goals.” Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 539. “[T]here is nothing in our case law

that requires us, or any other court in this state, to award only one type of
                                        14

support.” Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 827. This does not mean, however, that courts

are free to award spousal support not corresponding to any recognized category

of support. Although the generally recognized categories of spousal support are

not mutually exclusive, they are the exclusive categories of spousal support our

precedents have recognized as equitable.

      The district court’s discretion within these generally-recognized categories

is broad, but the district court’s discretion outside these generally-recognized

categories is limited. The facts justifying an award of spousal support not falling

within the well-established equitable categories should be extraordinary. See,

e.g., Mills, ___ N.W.2d at ___ (affirming award of traditional spousal support

where the mother suffered permanent disability during childbirth even where the

marriage was not close to meeting the “the typical durational threshold”).

      With that background, we directly address the spousal support award at

issue here. The district court ordered Rachael to pay David $3,000 per month

for four years as rehabilitative spousal support. The court of appeals modified

this award to $5,000 per month for seven years as transitional spousal support.

Rachael sought further review of the court of appeals decision, but David did

not. In our discretion, we limit our consideration to whether the court of appeals

erred in modifying the district court’s spousal support award.

      We conclude the court of appeals modification was erroneous in two

respects. First, the court of appeals erred in concluding transitional, rather than

rehabilitative, spousal support is appropriate here. Transitional spousal support

and rehabilitative spousal support are separate and distinct and serve different
                                        15

purposes. See Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 541–42 (“Transitional alimony can

ameliorate inequity unaddressed by the other recognized categories of support.

. . . We now formally recognize transitional alimony as another tool to do

equity.”). Transitional spousal support addresses short-term liquidity needs

associated with splitting one household into two; whereas rehabilitative spousal

support addresses training, education, work-readiness, and human capital

development.

      There is no evidence in this record that David needed transitional spousal

support. He was awarded approximately $660,000 in the property settlement,

including significant liquid assets held in several checking accounts. See id. at

545 (“Transitional alimony is not needed when the recipient has sufficient

income or liquid assets to facilitate the change to single life.”). What David

needed was sufficient time to improve his skills and retool his business plan to

increase his income. That is what the district court’s well-reasoned rehabilitative

spousal support award was shaped to do. This is not a case of transitional

support but instead one of rehabilitative support, and the court of appeals erred

in concluding otherwise. See id. at 540 (“Transitional alimony is not centered on

retraining and the growth of human capital, which is the focus of rehabilitative

alimony.”).

      Second, the court of appeals erred in concluding that a transitional

spousal support award of seven years would be equitable. As noted above,

transitional spousal support should be short in duration. Those states

recognizing transitional, or bridge-the-gap, support have also concluded it
                                        16

should be of short duration. See id. at 540–41 (collecting cases). Because

transitional spousal support is focused on solving a short-term liquidity issue, a

transitional spousal support award generally should not exceed one year in

duration. See Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d at 922 (“An alimony award will differ in

amount and duration according to the purpose it is designed to serve.”).

                                        IV.

      In sum, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of

appeals. We affirm the court of appeals modification of the custodial provisions

of the decree, and we affirm the court of appeals decision affirming the district

court’s property division. We reverse the court of appeals modification of the

district court’s spousal support award in its entirety. The court of appeals

modification of the decree directing Rachael to pay David transitional spousal

support for a period of seven years is inconsistent with our caselaw regarding

both the category and duration of spousal support. The district court’s order

directing Rachael to pay David rehabilitative spousal support in the amount of

$3,000 per month for a period of four years is consistent with our caselaw

regarding both the category and duration of spousal support.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND

REVERSED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS

MODIFIED.

      Christensen, C.J., and Oxley, McDermott, and May, JJ., join this opinion.

Mansfield, J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which

Waterman, J., joins.
                                       17

                                                #21–1918, In re Marriage of Sokol

MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

      I respectfully dissent in part. I would affirm all aspects of the court of

appeals decision, including the award of spousal support. While I agree with the

majority’s general statements of legal principles governing alimony in Iowa, I

disagree with how the majority has applied them in the present case.

      I also think the majority is being perhaps unfair to the court of appeals. In

a case decided less than a year ago, we decided to recognize a fourth form of

alimony—“transitional” alimony—by way of dicta in a case where we weren’t

awarding transitional alimony. See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530,

541, 545 (Iowa 2022). The new title we used, “transitional,” is perhaps confusing

because one of our three existing forms of alimony, “rehabilitative,” is also

transitional in nature. That is, both rehabilitative and transitional alimony are

meant to facilitate the receiving spouse’s transition to life without the other

spouse. See id. at 544–45. With the benefit of today’s decision, the distinctions

should now be clearer, but we should not overturn a court of appeals decision

that correctly applies the law of spousal support even though it may have chosen

the wrong words.

      I. “Tinkering” with Alimony.

      I agree that appellate courts should be reluctant to interfere with awards

of spousal support. We have said that this should occur only when there is “a

failure to do equity.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015)

(quoting In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005)). Unless and
                                        18

until our state adopts formal alimony guidelines, appellate courts should not be

second-guessing lower courts’ judgment calls.

      But tinkering is tinkering whether we do it or the court of appeals does it.

I might have voted to affirm the district court’s alimony award if I had been on

the court of appeals, but today for the same reasons, we ought to be predisposed

to let the court of appeals’ award stand. Given the length of marriage and the

large, longstanding difference in the spouses’ incomes and earning capacities,

the court of appeals’ award of $5,000 per month for seven years seems well

within the range of reasonableness.

      The majority quotes from In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa

1996) (en banc), to support its no-tinkering credo. I am puzzled by the inclusion

of the Benson quotation here. The present case is not one where appealing the

alimony    award    involves    “staggering   expense   to   the   parties   wholly

disproportionate to any benefit they might hope to realize.” Id. at 257. Rather,

the amounts at stake are substantial. Indeed, the court of appeals increased the

alimony by a total of $276,000. Also, the marginal cost of appealing alimony here

was relatively small because the legal error in the custody determination already

provided a ground for appeal.

      II. In re Marriage of Pazhoor.

      The court of appeals will likely feel that it has been blindsided and treated

unfairly by today’s ruling. Just last year, after the district court decree had been

entered in this case, we decided In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530. There

we increased a district court award of alimony from $7,500 a month over five
                                       19

years to $8,500 a month over seven years. Id. at 545–46. Pazhoor involved a

physician with annual income of $415,000 to $500,000 and a spouse whose

annual income was only $23,000. Id. at 535. The spouse with the far lower

income had a medical degree but no medical license. Id. at 534. The marriage

had lasted seventeen years. Id. at 536. We held that “hybrid traditional and

rehabilitative alimony” justified the seven-year, $8,500 per month alimony,

noting that the physician “can afford to pay substantial alimony, the disparity in

the parties’ earning capacity is great, and the marriage lasted seventeen years.”

Id. at 546.

      The court of appeals used Pazhoor as its blueprint to decide this case. It

reviewed the facts and law of Pazhoor and said that it found the case

“instructive.” It is not surprising the court of appeals turned to Pazhoor for

guidance; not only was Pazhoor our latest decision on alimony, but its facts are

similar. Here, as in Pazhoor, Rachael was a physician earning approximately

$500,000 annually when she filed for divorce. She had given up her medical

director position in 2020 but still earned $440,000 annually. David had

originally worked as a furniture salesman earning $70,000 per year while

Rachael was completing her residency. However, David had long ago given up

that job and started his own business, which had not been paying him a salary.

The parties’ marriage had lasted nineteen years. Moreover, David’s business had

suffered economically during the COVID-19 pandemic and had endured

considerable physical damage in the 2020 derecho.
                                        20

      The court of appeals, relying on Pazhoor, found that $5,000 a month

alimony was appropriate here. It noted that this amount was appropriate to

“provide David time to build his business and draw sufficient income to maintain

a comparable standard of living to what he enjoyed during the marriage.” This

alimony could also provide time for him to “shift careers back into sales.”

      The majority harvests Pazhoor for some single-sentence legal propositions.

Yet it never actually discusses the case itself or attempts to explain why it might

be distinguishable. I find Pazhoor pretty close to the present case. I think the

court of appeals deserves some explanation as to how it went astray in following

Pazhoor. I don’t think it did.

      III. Labels.

      In my view, the only quibble one can have with the court of appeals

decision in this case is one of nomenclature. The court of appeals described the

alimony it was ordering as “transitional,” whereas Pazhoor described the similar

type of alimony it was awarding as “hybrid traditional and rehabilitative

alimony.” 971 N.W.2d at 546.

      I believe the court of appeals’ labeling error is excusable. Pazhoor had just

been decided a few months before. In Pazhoor we decided to recognize a new type

of alimony: transitional alimony. Id. at 539–42, 545. We then said transitional

alimony didn’t apply, without giving much explanation for why it didn’t apply.

See id. at 545. This departs from our usual practice. Normally, we don’t recognize

a new legal principle in a case where the principle isn’t relevant—that’s pure

dictum. Also, Pazhoor didn’t provide a lot of details on how transitional alimony
                                        21

actually works or how it differs from rehabilitative alimony. See id. at 544–45.

Consider the following excerpt from Pazhoor:

      Transitional alimony can ameliorate inequity unaddressed by the
      other recognized categories of support. Divorcing spouses must
      adjust to single life. If one is better equipped for that adjustment and
      the other will face hardship, then transitional alimony can be
      awarded to address that inequity and bridge the gap. We now
      formally recognize transitional alimony as another tool to do equity.

Id. at 542. Respectfully, our opinion in Pazhoor—which I wholeheartedly joined—

didn’t provide much guidance for lawyers or lower courts.

      Finally, the word “transitional” is itself somewhat confusing because

rehabilitative alimony is also transitional. In fact, Pazhoor may have

unintentionally added to that confusion. In Pazhoor, we described a prior case,

In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 2020), as a situation where we

“declined to award transitional alimony,” which it really wasn’t. Pazhoor, 971

N.W.2d at 539. In Mann, we actually declined to award rehabilitative alimony,

stating “that such transitional alimony is usually appropriate in the context of a

traditional marriage where a spouse has surrendered economic opportunities

and needs a period of time to get retooled to enter the work force.” 943 N.W.2d

at 23 (emphasis added). In other words, all we were saying in Mann was that

rehabilitative alimony is transitional in nature. See id. It is understandable why

the court of appeals got its signals crossed in the present case.

      The more important question, though, is whether the court of appeals

decision should be cast aside simply because it used the wrong verbiage. I think

not. If you read the substantive reasoning behind the court of appeals decision,

the court is discussing and relying on considerations pertinent to a hybrid of
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traditional and rehabilitative alimony—e.g., (1) that “the disparity in earning

capacity will remain great,” (2) that the award of alimony will allow David “to

maintain a comparable standard of living to what he enjoyed during the

marriage,” (3) that David needs time to rebuild and fortify his business so it

generates income for him, and (4) that if David can’t build up his business he

needs time “to rejoin the workforce in a sales position similar to what he worked

in before the family’s return to Iowa.” Makes sense to me.

      Moreover, putting aside the importance of being fair to the court of

appeals, David shouldn’t pay a price simply because the court of appeals may

have followed the correct principles but used the wrong name for them. In

appealing the district court award, he specifically asked for traditional alimony

on top of the rehabilitative alimony he had been granted by the district court.

The court of appeals in effect went partway, granting David a hybrid of

transitional and rehabilitative alimony while calling it something else.

      IV. Conclusion.

      For the reasons stated, I would affirm the court of appeals decision in its

entirety.

      Waterman, J., joins this concurrence in part and dissent in part.