Court Opinion

ID: 9931231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 18:00:47.153805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:35.234743
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          ___________

                              No. 23-2854
                              ___________

                   GREGORY LEWIS BRADLEY, JR.,
                                      Appellant

                                    v.

  HERMAN AVERY SAYRE; JOHN ARMOUR; WILLIAM SHOUPPE
          ____________________________________

             On Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                          (D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00065)
          District Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan (by consent)
               ____________________________________

  Submitted Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), or for
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
                          on January 25, 2024

          Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

                     (Opinion filed: February 8, 2024)
               ____________________________________
                                      ___________

                                       OPINION *
                                      ___________

PER CURIAM

       Gregory Lewis Bradley, Jr., filed a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

a police officer (Sayre), a magisterial district judge (Armour), and the warden of a county

jail (Schouppe 1). Bradley attached to his operative pleading a criminal complaint pre-

pared by the police in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. That complaint contained an affida-

vit of probable cause documenting the observation by Sayre of Bradley repeatedly strik-

ing a woman, and of strangulation marks on her neck. Bradley claimed that there were

technical defects in the warrant and criminal complaint, which rendered his arrest and de-

tention unlawful under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2

       The parties consented to have the case heard by a federal magistrate judge (the

District Court). The District Court granted the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Armour, determining that he was protected by the Elev-

enth Amendment and by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity because “Judge Ar-

mour was acting within his jurisdiction when he issued the arrest warrant, accepted the

*
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
  Spelled as in the decisions on review.
2
  Bradley raised these same arguments in state court in support of a motion to sup-
press/quash. He lost. See DC ECF No. 67-2. Bradley’s pretrial habeas petition, moreover,
was summarily dismissed by the District Court, see Bradley v. Shouppe, DC Civ. No.
2:21-cv-01632, ECF No. 11 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2022) (order), and he did not appeal that
decision.
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criminal complaint, arraigned Plaintiff, set bail and executed the Commitment Order to

the Beaver County Jail.” DC ECF No. 47 at 7. The District Court also granted the Rule

12(b)(6) motion filed by Schouppe, since he was “protected by quasi-judicial immunity

for complying with the Commitment Order of Judge Armour.” DC ECF No. 47 at 8. The

District Court resolved that, based on its immunity rulings, allowing Bradley to further

amend his pleading would be futile.

       The District Court then issued a case management order to govern proceedings be-

tween Bradley and the remaining defendant, Sayre. Months later, Sayre filed a motion for

summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The District Court determined that

Bradley’s claims against Sayre were Heck-barred. 3 The District Court pointed to the fact

that “Bradley entered into a nolo contendere plea for a simple assault charge brought by

Defendant Sayre,” and that, “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, that plea must be treated the

same as a conviction under Heck.” DC ECF No. 69 at 5-6. Because Bradley’s conviction

was still intact, Heck applied. The District Court determined further that, even if any of

Bradley’s federal claims somehow survived Heck, they were without merit because his

arrest was undeniably supported by probable cause (i.e., by Sayre’s personal observation

of Bradley committing the offense for which he was ultimately convicted). 4 Finally, the

District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims

Bradley may have raised.

3
  Under the ‘favorable termination rule’ of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), un-
less and until a conviction is invalidated, a claimant’s damages action is barred if its suc-
cess would necessarily undermine that conviction. See id. at 486-87.
4
  It does not appear that Bradley has ever proclaimed factual innocence.
                                              3
       Bradley timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our re-

view is de novo. See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014) (providing

standard of review for orders granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions); U.S. ex rel. Schumann v.

Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014) (same, for amendment-futil-

ity rulings); Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (same, for or-

ders granting summary judgment).

       The District Court properly disposed of Bradley’s case, and there is little to add to

the analysis set forth in its memorandum opinions. In particular, we agree with the Dis-

trict Court’s Heck analysis. See, e.g., Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 2016)

(“Curry entered a nolo contendere plea for the charges brought by Yachera, and under

Pennsylvania law, that plea must be treated the same as a conviction under Heck.”).

There is no indication in the record before the District Court that Bradley even pursued,

let alone obtained, postconviction relief.

       We also agree with the District Court that Armour and Schouppe are immune from

suit. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991) (per curiam) (“If judicial immunity

means anything, it means that a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the ac-

tion he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority.’”); Hamilton v. Leavy, 322

F.3d 776, 782–83 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “action taken pursuant to a facially

valid court order receives absolute immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages”).

       Therefore, for the reasons given by the District Court, we will summarily affirm

the judgment below. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2011); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2018).

                                              4