Court Opinion

ID: 9352777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 19:02:35.287438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:59:55.522942
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50158         Document: 00516602363              Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/09/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                 January 9, 2023
                                        No. 22-50158                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk

   B.W., a minor, by next friends M.W. and B.W., formerly known herein as
   Jon AISD Doe,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Austin Independent School District,

                                                                    Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:20-CV-750

   Before King, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.*
   Per Curiam:**
         B.W., a white high school student, appeals the dismissal of his
   complaint against AISD alleging that he was subject to race-based harassment
   and retaliation once he reported the harassment. For the following reasons,
   we AFFIRM.

         *
             Judge Haynes concurs in the judgment only.
         **
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-50158

                                          I.
          The events alleged below took place between Plaintiff-Appellant
   B.W.’s eighth- and tenth-grade years as a student in the Austin Independent
   School District (“AISD”), the Defendant-Appellee in this case. All of these
   allegations originate from B.W.’s fourth amended complaint (the
   “Complaint”), the operative complaint in this action.
          The Complaint alleges that B.W. first experienced harassment while
   he was in the eighth grade at O’Henry Middle School following a field trip in
   October 2017 where he wore a hat emblazoned with the slogan “Make
   America Great Again.” According to the Complaint, there was an almost
   immediate “attitudinal change by staff and other students from friendly and
   inviting to cold and hostile.” In November 2017, B.W.’s parents met with the
   middle school’s principal, Principal Malott, after a number of unspecified
   “incidents” in which B.W. had been treated “poorly” “to address concerns
   that B.W. was becoming an object of derision because of his political beliefs.”
   Yet, although Principal Malott promised that an action plan was forthcoming,
   B.W. was subject to verbal attacks “on almost a daily basis . . . because of his
   political allegiance to President Trump.” In January 2018, B.W.’s parents
   again met with Principal Malott to express their concerns for B.W.’s safety
   and the continued absence of the promised action plan; no action plan was
   put in place, though, after this second meeting.
          The Complaint alleges that the harassment escalated throughout the
   Spring 2018 semester. In February 2018, B.W. experienced “backlash and
   push back” after he refused to participate in a student walkout protesting gun
   violence. As the semester progressed, B.W. was “ostracized” for being a
   Republican, a supporter of former president Trump, white, and Christian.
   He was also “harassed” for being racist, anti-feminist, and anti-gay; B.W.
   asserts that he does not espouse these views. For example, the Complaint

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   alleges that B.W. was “made fun of . . . for being a Christian” in Latin class
   when another student said, “Ah, Christians should understand Latin.” And
   “[i]n band class, two students repeatedly harassed B.W. for being Caucasian
   by repeating the evils of the white race in American history.” The Complaint
   also alleges that Principal Malott participated in this “stereotypical think.”
   On one occasion, when B.W. was listening to music using his ear buds,
   Principal Malott “yanked one ear bud out of his ear and stated sarcastically,
   ‘Are you listening to Dixie?’” Principal Malott then walked away laughing to
   herself, and other students witnessed the entire incident.
          The Complaint alleges that B.W. “experienced more and more
   random derogatory comments” from students and teachers after Principal
   Malott’s remarks. One teacher, Ms. Morgan, told B.W. very loudly that she
   was “getting concerned about how many white people there are.” An aide in
   B.W.’s math class, Ms. Cathey, repeatedly called B.W. “Whitey” and said,
   “You need help Whitey?” or “Can’t figure this one out Whitey?” when he
   raised his hand. And Mr. Borders, a teacher, “was very hostile toward B.W.”
   for the entirety of a school field trip. On another occasion, a student pointed
   to the cross around B.W.’s neck and loudly stated, “I don’t like that your
   [sic] forcing your religion on me.” B.W. was left in tears following an incident
   involving his former friend and then-student council president, D.K. D.K.
   had created a meme of B.W. as a hooded Ku Klux Klansman, and later
   admitted to creating the meme because his father had told him not to be
   friends with anyone who was a conservative.
          In May 2018, B.W. wore his “Make America Great Again” hat while
   receiving his diploma at his middle school graduation. Mr. Borders
   responded by “meanly saying” to B.W.: “Ya know, we’re trying to create a
   safe environment here!” The Complaint alleges that there were “no
   apparent consequences for anyone at O’Henry . . . for the way B.W. had been

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   mistreated, simply because B.W. held a different political belief than other
   students and apparently met the harasser’s stereotypical prejudices.”
          The Complaint alleges that the animus toward B.W. continued into
   his freshman year at Austin High School. At the beginning of the Fall 2018
   semester, D.K. approached B.W. about the Ku Klux Klan meme he had
   created of B.W. during the previous school year. B.W. then filed for and
   received a “Stay Away Agreement” between himself and D.K. a few days
   later, but D.K. and his friends “continued to harass” B.W. after the Stay
   Away Agreement went into effect. On one occasion, D.K. approached B.W.
   in front of a group of students saying, “So you really said that? Gay people
   don’t exist?”; B.W., however had never made such a statement. The
   Complaint alleges that “Staff” then met with D.K. and his parents regarding
   his treatment of B.W., but D.K.’s behavior toward B.W. did not improve
   after this meeting.
          B.W. struggled with other members of the student body that semester
   as well. He was insulted and kicked for wearing a Ted Cruz shirt. In his ELA
   class, B.W. asked if he could write a paper on the Second Amendment; the
   other students in the class responded by chanting “School Shooter! School
   Shooter!” while the teacher, Mr. Meadows, looked on in silence. And later
   in the semester, another student “mockingly asked” B.W., “Why are you a
   racist?” That same day, the same student approached B.W. again, this time
   in front of other students as well, and stated that B.W. was a “[f]ucking
   racist.” Later in the semester, B.W. was the only student to rise in his home
   room class for the Pledge of Allegiance when it came on over the loudspeaker;
   a student then told B.W., “America is only for white people.”
          The Complaint also describes various interactions between B.W. and
   his teachers during the Fall 2018 semester. On B.W.’s birthday, his MAPS
   teacher, Mr. Mathney, walked into class and loudly stated, “Woke up this

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   morning to see all the stupid things Trump had done!” During debate class,
   the teacher, Ms. Cooney, loudly stated, “Trump is running [sic] our
   democracy and he is a liar.” A few days after Halloween, Mr. Meadows asked
   the ELA class if anyone had any Halloween candy. When B.W. offered some
   of his, Mr. Meadows responded, “Your candy would be filled with hate and
   oppression” in front of the entire class. And when a substitute teacher, Ms.
   Mauser, overheard B.W. and his friends having a conversation regarding a
   girlfriend during a MAPS class, she told B.W., “I will not have a white man
   talk to me about gender issues!”
         In September 2018, B.W. and his parents filed their first grievance
   with the school board describing their previous complaints regarding B.W.’s
   treatment and the lack of any investigation into those incidents. Two months
   later, after the family met with school officials, the high school assistant
   principal, Steven Maddox, was assigned to investigate B.W.’s parents’
   concerns. The Complaint alleges that B.W. began to suffer from retaliation
   shortly after the investigation was opened. A few days after the meeting with
   school officials, D.K. purposefully bumped into B.W. and said, “I don’t
   deserve what’s happening to me.” D.K.’s friends also approached B.W.
   asking, “Why he’s a homophobe?” and “Why he’s a racist?” In December
   2018, Assistant Principal Maddox provided a written response that
   summarized the conclusions from his investigation. In the written response,
   Assistant Principal Maddox determined that there was no teacher bias and
   harassment. He also concluded that D.K.’s treatment of B.W. qualified as
   bullying according to AISD’s policies and procedures. Assistant Principal
   Maddox then spoke with D.K. and his parents and had B.W. and D.K. sign
   another Stay Away Agreement.
         The Spring 2019 semester was no different for B.W. The Complaint
   alleges that the “verbal bullying and harassment” occurred multiple times a
   day and included B.W. being called a racist, “cussed at,” and “flicked off”

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   daily, often in front of teachers who never intervened. After B.W. had
   expressed his political opinion during a class discussion, the substitute
   teacher, Ms. Mosher, responded “When you are old enough to think for
   yourselves [sic], you will no longer be a conservative.” She then proceeded
   to kick B.W. out of the class and into the cold outside. The Complaint alleges
   that Ms. Mosher generally “verbally harasse[d]” B.W. in front of his
   classmates “because of his political support for Republican Ideology.”
          In February 2019, B.W. was attacked while helping a fellow student
   with a math assignment. B.W. was using his laptop, which had stickers
   supporting Donald Trump on its casing. The encounter began when another
   student, I.L., began tracing a swastika on the back of the student that was
   being helped by B.W. I.L. then told B.W., “I’m going to beat the shit out of
   you.” The next thing B.W. remembers is that he was lying on the ground
   bleeding after being struck multiple times. B.W. and his family reported this
   incident to the AISD police the next day, but the Complaint alleges that no
   action was taken. B.W. later discovered that I.L. had told others that I.L. had
   assaulted B.W. because B.W. was white; B.W. also heard that I.L.’s friends
   were “out to get [B.W.]” In March 2019, B.W. brought a poster of Justice
   Antonin Scalia to his debate class. The teacher, Ms. Cooney, was visibly
   irritated, yelled at B.W., and also told him, “You’re pissing me off!” in front
   of the entire class.
          The Complaint alleges that the harassment continued throughout
   B.W.’s sophomore year of high school as well. Like he was during the prior
   school year, B.W. was called a racist, “cussed at,” and “flicked off” daily.
   D.K. and his friends also “continued to harass and intimidate B.W.” I.L.’s
   friends did so as well and would try to trip B.W. as he would walk by. On one
   occasion, a student told B.W., “if you support Trump you must be stupid.”
   In September 2019, B.W. returned to his debate classroom to retrieve his
   poster of Justice Scalia, but the poster was no longer there. In November

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   2019, B.W. was “berated” while serving as an aide in the attendance office
   by Ms. Lindsay when she saw a Trump/Pence sticker on his new computer.
   And during the Fall 2019 semester, while B.W. was in the locker room after
   cross country practice, “a number of African American students came in and
   said ‘here are all the white boys!’” In March 2020, while B.W. was talking
   with some friends at lunch, a girl standing next to the group turned to look
   directly at B.W. and said very loudly, “Oh my Fucking [sic] God, I’m going
   to kill all Trump supporters, I don’t give a shit who hears it. I want to kill all
   of them.” After an investigation, the AISD police determined that they
   would be taking no further action because the student who had made the
   threat “did not have the means to kill all Trump supporters.”
          All AISD schools were shut down the day after the incident at lunch
   due to the COVID-19 outbreak. B.W. never returned to school and was
   homeschooled during the following 2021–22 school year. Throughout the
   period in question, B.W. and his family repeatedly submitted both formal and
   informal complaints to school administrators recounting the alleged bullying
   and harassment. The Complaint alleges, though, that school administrators
   never acted to remedy the bullying and harassment.
          On July 14, 2020, B.W. filed his initial complaint, asserting claims
   against AISD for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for negligence. In its fifth iteration that was
   filed on May 27, 2021, the Complaint maintains the § 1983 claims and adds
   claims seeking redress under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
   Chapters 106 and 110 of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code. With
   respect to the Title VI claims, which are at issue before us, the Complaint
   alleges that AISD knew that B.W. was being harassed because of his race and
   race-based stereotypes, yet “failed to keep him safe from harm, and failed to
   provide him an environment that was not hostile,” i.e., that AISD acted with
   deliberate indifference. Additionally, the Complaint alleges that B.W. was a

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   victim of retaliation due to his reporting of the harassment subject to Title
   VI. On May 28, 2021, AISD moved to dismiss the Complaint.
          On January 28, 2022, the magistrate judge, who had been referred
   AISD’s motion, issued his report and recommendations and recommended
   that the Complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Regarding the Title VI claims,
   the magistrate judge reasoned that the Complaint was devoid of facts that
   would evince race-based harassment and that the few racially related
   allegations resembled “political statements about race made in B.W.’s
   presence.” Furthermore, the magistrate judge determined that the few
   racially related harassment allegations occurred too infrequently to meet the
   standard for a race-based harassment claim under Title VI. The magistrate
   judge also concluded that B.W. had inadequately pleaded his Title VI
   retaliation claim because the Complaint did not allege that B.W.’s harassers
   were aware that he had filed grievances with either school. On February 15,
   2022, the district court accepted and adopted the magistrate judge’s report
   and recommendations. On appeal, B.W. only challenges the dismissal of his
   Title VI claims.
                                         II.
          We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss for
   failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838
   F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 2016). To survive such a motion, a complaint must
   allege enough facts, accepted as true, “to state a claim to relief that is
   plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
   “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
   allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
   for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
   Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint must
   include “factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to

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   relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th
   Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Conclusory statements or
   “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” are
   insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “The
   plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
   defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint pleading facts “that are
   ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line
   between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting
   Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Whether the plausibility standard has been met is
   a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
   judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
                                          A.
          Under Title VI, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground
   of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
   the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
   activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI
   “prohibits only intentional discrimination.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch.
   Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 407 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
   Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001)). A school district receiving
   federal funds may also be liable for student-on-student harassment under
   Title VI’s deliberate indifference standard if:
          (1) the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively
          offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to
          educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school”
          (a racially hostile environment), and the district (2) had actual
          knowledge, (3) had “control over the harasser and the
          environment in which the harassment occurs,” and (4) was
          deliberately indifferent.

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   Id. at 408 (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526
   U.S. 629, 644, 650 (1999)). Harassment “must be more than the sort of
   teasing and bullying that generally takes place in schools.” Id. at 409 (quoting
   Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 167 (5th
   Cir. 2011)); see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 651–52 (“Indeed, at least early on,
   students are still learning how to interact appropriately with their peers. It is
   thus understandable that, in the school setting, students often engage in
   insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is
   upsetting to the students subjected to it. Damages are not available for simple
   acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, however, even where
   these comments target differences in gender.”).
          We first observe that the bulk of the Complaint’s allegations do not
   mention B.W.’s race at all. And the few that do are not “so severe, pervasive,
   and objectively offensive that [they] can be said to [have] deprive[d] [B.W.]
   of access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by [his]
   school[s].” See Fennell, 804 F.3d at 408. Indeed, each of these few incidents
   occurred within a period spanning over two-and-a-half years and was
   perpetrated by a different actor. Of these incidents, only one is truly severe—
   where I.L. made it known that he had assaulted B.W. because he was white.
   But this alone is not enough to establish harassment, even when considered
   alongside the few, less severe, race-based allegations. Accordingly, taken
   together, these few, relatively mild, and isolated incidents do not meet the
   standard for race-based harassment.
          Two cases from this circuit are illustrative of this point. In Fennell v.
   Marion Independent School District, three black sisters alleged that their school
   district was deliberately indifferent to a racially hostile educational
   environment. 804 F.3d at 402. The district court dismissed their case on
   summary judgment. Id. at 401–02. This court affirmed the judgment on
   appeal but held that, while there was no genuine dispute as to the school

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   district’s deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs had raised a genuine dispute
   that a racially hostile environment existed. Id. at 409–10. Specifically, there
   were multiple instances of nooses being left for black students (or their
   parents) to find, which on one occasion was accompanied by a note that was
   filled with racial animus and epithets, id. at 402; frequent use of the n-word
   and other epithets were directed at black students, id. at 403–04; one of the
   plaintiffs was “admonished” for her hairstyle by the athletic director who
   referred to it offensively and required her to cut and redye her hair, id. at 404;
   one of the plaintiffs received a text from a white classmate of an animation of
   Ku Klux Klan members chasing former president Barack Obama, id. at 405;
   a teacher told one of the plaintiff’s classes that “all black people [are] on
   welfare,” id. at 405; and another plaintiff was told by her peers that “[b]lack
   girls [aren’t] pretty enough to be cheerleaders” when she tried out for the
   cheerleading squad, id. at 406. The school district contended that the
   harassment was “too periodic and sporadic to constitute a racially hostile
   environment,” but we disagreed. Id. at 409. First, we reasoned that “[t]here
   is no question . . . that repeatedly being referred to by one’s peers by the most
   noxious racial epithet in the contemporary American lexicon, [and] being
   shamed and humiliated on the basis of one’s race is harassment far beyond
   normal schoolyard teasing and bullying.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
   Relatedly, we also determined that the incident where a noose was
   accompanied “by a vitriolic and epithet-laden note . . . underscore[d] the
   severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive nature of the harassment.” Id.
   Second, although we recognized that racial epithets being directed at black
   students may have occurred more infrequently than on a biweekly basis, we
   were persuaded that the degree to which those remarks were offensive
   counseled finding that they amounted to racial hostility. See id.
   (“Furthermore, this court has held that racially offensive remarks made
   every few months over three years was sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of

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   whether a hostile environment exists under Title VII.” (citing Walker v.
   Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by
   Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006))).
          In Sewell v. Monroe City School Board, 974 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2020), we
   revived Title VI and Title IX claims that had been dismissed in the district
   court. There, the plaintiff-student, Jaylon Sewell, had alleged that he had
   suffered harassment stemming from his wearing his hair in a hairstyle that
   purportedly violated the school board’s dress code. Id. at 581–82. After
   Sewell was prohibited from attending the first day of school due to his
   hairstyle, the dean of students “ridiculed him every other day by calling him
   a thug and a fool,” and at one point asked him if he “was gay with that mess
   in his head.” Id. at 581 (internal quotations omitted). The dean also
   discouraged students from talking with Sewell and encouraged a female
   student to lie and accuse Sewell of sexual assault; the dean told Sewell that
   he “wouldn’t be getting in so much trouble if his hair were not that color.”
   Id. In reversing the case’s dismissal, we reasoned that it was plausible that
   the dean’s harassment of Sewell originated “from a discriminatory view that
   African American males should not have two-toned blonde hair.” Id. at 584.
   We noted the many ways that the dean treated Sewell and other black male
   students differently from students who were not black males: only black
   males were sent to the dean’s office on the first day of school for not
   complying with the dress code, only Sewell was penalized for not adhering to
   the dress code despite other non-black and non-male students’ failure to
   comply as well, and the verbal abuse Sewell suffered could be directly tied to
   his race and sex. Id. We therefore held that Sewell’s complaint had
   adequately pleaded that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe,
   pervasive, and offensive to deprive him of an educational benefit. Id. at 585.
   Of particular import to us were the dean’s ridiculing of Sewell every other
   day, his discouraging of other students from talking to Sewell, and his

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   encouraging of another student to “concoct an allegation that Sewell had
   sexually assaulted her.” Id. at 585.
          Here, B.W. does not allege that any epithets akin to those used in
   Fennell were directed at him. Nor does he point to a frequency of racially
   motivated verbal harassment like that in Sewell. Instead, he argues that the
   “totality” or “constellation of surrounding circumstances” makes his case.
   In raising this argument, he points to a string of inapposite Title VI and Title
   IX cases. All of these cases describe events that either occurred with greater
   frequency or were more serious than what B.W. alleges. See Carmichael v.
   Galbraith, 574 F. App’x 286, 290 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Depending
   on the evidence at trial or summary judgment, the series of incidents where
   Jon’s underwear was forcibly removed could plausibly constitute numerous
   acts of objectively offensive touching. Such acts plausibly fall outside the list
   of simple insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific
   conduct which are understandable . . . in the school setting and are not
   actionable under Title IX.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Doe
   v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 982 F. Supp. 2d 641, 652 (D. Md. 2013)
   (“Plaintiffs’ evidence supports the inference that Classmate subjected JD to
   a few instances of sex-charged conduct, including raunchy remarks, lewd
   gestures, self-exposure and, arguably, inappropriate touching.”), aff’d, 605
   F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015); Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.3d 438,
   448 (6th Cir. 2009) (“DP was repeatedly harassed over a number of years
   [more than 200 times in one school year]. . . . This pervasive harassment
   escalated to criminal sexual assault.”), abrogated on other grounds by Foster v.
   Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 982 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2020).
          Furthermore, the allegations that B.W. argues should be considered
   within the totality of the circumstances lie outside the scope of racial animus.
   For example, B.W. contends that “the use of a Klu [sic] Klux Klan meme and
   later being called a Nazi and racist over and over represents [sic] a type of

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   racial animus like no other.” But this is just one of his many flawed attempts
   to conflate political with racial animus. B.W. argues that we may infer that
   the political animus he suffered had racial undertones as well. By his
   reasoning, an attack on a white person because of his conservative or
   Republican views is necessarily an attack on him because of his race. But the
   inferences required to come to this conclusion are unreasonable as
   membership in either group is not foreclosed to those who are not white. And
   the Complaint itself belies this reasoning as it alleges that D.K.
   “admitted . . . that he made the KKK meme about B.W. because D.K.’s
   father told him not be [sic] friends with anyone who was a Conservative.”
   The Complaint is replete with examples demonstrating that most of the
   incidents B.W. experienced were due to his ideological beliefs. B.W. fails to
   connect this political animus to the racial animus that he must show for his
   Title VI claim. Therefore, this claim was appropriately dismissed. 1

           1
              B.W. references some of the incidents involving his teachers in arguing that he
   was subject to severe and pervasive harassment due to his race but cites no authority for
   the proposition that a cause of action exists under Title VI for teacher-on-student
   harassment. Indeed, B.W.’s claim is predicated on our holding in Fennell where we
   determined that a cause of action for student-on-student harassment may be brought under
   Title VI. 804 F.3d at 408–09. The bounds of our decision in Fennell, however, did not
   extend to claims for teacher-on-student harassment. B.W. has modeled his Title VI claim
   as one for harassment as opposed to one for intentional discrimination. And in his reply,
   for the first time B.W. argues that a cause of action for teacher-on-student harassment
   exists citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). In that
   case, the Supreme Court held that one may bring a deliberate indifference claim against a
   school district under Title IX for teacher-on-student harassment. Id. at 290, 292–93. In
   Fennell, we applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe
   County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 646–47 (1999), that a school district may be liable
   for student-on-student harassment based a deliberate indifference theory under Title IX,
   to Title VI due to the similarities between both legislative schemes. Fennell, 804 F.3d at
   408. It appears as if B.W. would have us extend the holding in Gebser to claims falling under
   Title VI as well by utilizing our reasoning in Fennell. While this argument is compelling,
   B.W. fails to raise it at all in his opening brief and devotes less than one sentence to it in his
   reply without any analysis. Therefore, we consider the argument forfeited and do not weigh

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                                         No. 22-50158

                                               B.
           B.W. also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his Title VI
   retaliation claim. As this circuit has done in recent decisions, we will assume
   without deciding that Title VI includes a claim for retaliation. See Sewell v.
   Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 586 n.4 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Title IX
   encompasses retaliation claims. So we assume without deciding that Title VI
   does too.” (citation omitted)); Jones v. S. Univ., 834 F. App’x 919, 923 n.3
   (5th Cir. 2020) (“We assume without deciding that Title VI encompasses a
   retaliation claim.”) (per curiam); Bhombal v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F.
   App’x 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[a]ssuming, without deciding” that a Title
   VI retaliation claim “is available” for the purpose of ruling on its viability at
   the motion to dismiss stage) (per curiam). To successfully plead such a claim,
   a plaintiff must show “(1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that
   the Defendants took a material action against her[;] and (3) that a causal
   connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.”
   Jones, 834 F. App’x at 923 (citing Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir.
   2003)); see also Sewell, 974 F.3d at 586 (“A retaliation plaintiff must show
   that the funding recipient or its representatives took an adverse action against
   him because he complained of discrimination. That typically means the
   funding recipient itself signed off on the adverse action.” (citation omitted)).
           “As in other civil rights contexts, to show protected activity, the
   plaintiff in a Title VI retaliation case need only . . . prove that he opposed an
   unlawful employment practice which he reasonably believed had occurred or

   the incidents involving B.W.’s teachers in determining that his Title VI harassment claim
   is not well pleaded. See Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2003)
   (“issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed waived”); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d
   1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have
   abandoned the claim.”).

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                                      No. 22-50158

   was occurring.” Peters, 327 F.3d at 320 (internal quotations omitted); see also
   Bisong v. Univ. of Hous., 493 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911–12 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
   (applying same). In the educational context, it follows that the plaintiff must
   have been opposed to an unlawful educational practice. When describing the
   complaints to school administrators that B.W. raised in middle school, the
   Complaint provides scant detail as to their substance and only ever alleges
   that B.W. and his parents were concerned about diversity of thought and
   B.W. being harassed on account of his political ideology. The same can be
   said of most of the complaints B.W. filed in high school as well. Notably, the
   Complaint provides more detail regarding one particular grievance, the
   second formal grievance that B.W. filed. Specifically, the Complaint states
   that B.W. alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and
   Title IX, but it omits any mention of Title VI. There are no other factual
   allegations that could otherwise support a reasonable inference that B.W. and
   his parents engaged in a protected activity, i.e., that they complained to AISD
   that B.W. had been harassed on account of his race. Therefore, B.W. cannot
   satisfy the first prong of the test for a Title VI retaliation claim.
                                          III.
          The bullying as alleged in this case is a cause for concern. But while
   we do not condone bullying in any form, Title VI does not support a claim for
   bullying generally. A plaintiff like B.W. must allege that he was harassed
   because of his race, color, or national origin. B.W. has failed to do so.
   Likewise, because he cannot show that he was engaged in a protected activity
   when reporting the alleged harassment to school administrators, B.W.’s
   retaliation claim cannot overcome a motion to dismiss. Therefore, for the
   foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of this action is
   AFFIRMED.

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