Court Opinion

ID: 9827011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:03:58.326008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:40.519950
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant, in its motion for rehearing, objects to our finding of fact wherein we stated that the car in question had been “just received from the factory,” when it had been in use by appellee for at least 17 days, and also that we wei’e in error in stating:
“What factory made it, where situated, or its reputation, other than the name of the car, is not shown.”
Appellee was the only witness who testified on that point, and he stated in part as follows:
“I have managed and operated hand cars for 27 years. X could not tell where the factory is located where this ea^ came from, but I think it is in Missouri. I understand that this car, together with a number of others, was ordered by the company from that factory, and the factory had shipped them to the company. The hand car was a Sheffield make. I suppose it was put up by the Sheffield Company. The name of the car was the Sheffield car. I have known the Sheffield car about some 20 years, and state as a railroad man that the Sheffield car is recognized as a standard car. I mean by this that a Sheffield car was always considered as a good car, well put together and well manufactured. It was considered a reasonably safe car for the purposes for which it was intended to be used.”
There is no testimony other than this as to the make, the factory which made the car, or that the railway company had made any inspection of it, or that before it was turned out by the factory it had made an inspection or test of the car. Appellee states:
“I understand that this car, together with a number of others, was ordered by the company from that factory, and the factory had shipped them to the company.”
Conceding that the understanding of the appellee is sufficient to show the facts stated by him are correct, was the appellant authorized to rely solely upon the reputation of the factory, about which there is no testimony, other than the mere facts of being ordered and furnished, sufficient to show ordinary care on the part of appellant in furnishing the car to its servant?
It is urged by appellant that the quotation in our opinion from Labatt’s work on Master and Servant is but his individual opinion, while in the same connection he announces the weight of authority is that buying a new machine from a reputable manufacturer is conclusive proof of the use of due care on the part of the master. While the excerpt quoted is the individual views of Mr. Uabatt, who is a law-writer of reputation, we think they are sound in principle, and in the absence of a holding from our Supreme Court on the question, we adopt them in preference to the holding in some other jurisdictions, which hold that the master has done his duty when the appliance has been purchased from a reputable manufacturer. We prefer the rule in other jurisdictions when it is held that the master is not absolved from all duty of inspection, but holds him to only reasonable and practicable inspection. He is not required to tear appliances or machinery to pieces, but should make some test which would satisfy a prudent person that the machinery was safe for use. Sharpley v. Wright, 205 Pa. 253, 54 Atl. 896. Here the appellant made no kind of test. There was no care shown to ascertain that the manufacturer had tested the machine as to being properly put together for use. The machine was too tightly geared, which might have been discovered by an ordinary inspection, but this appellant did not make.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.