Court Opinion

ID: 9733170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:55:56.47565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:39.023515
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
A miscarriage of justice here attends. I must therefore dissent.
I.
Under Lewis v. Storms, 290 N.W.2d 494 (S.D.1980), Albert Freeman has established that the jury verdict of $100,000 is “unreasonable, arbitrary, and unsupported by the evidence.”
Freeman’s Exhibit # 1 (attached hereto) reflects an itemization of medical expense totalling $129,771.03. Notwithstanding the majority opinion’s statement to the contrary, said Exhibit # 1, appended hereto and by reference made a part hereof, is captioned a STIPULATION (between Freeman and City). It reads:
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED as follows: That the Plaintiff, Albert L. Freeman, incurred the following medical bills in the total amount of $129,771.03 for the treatment of injuries received on December 19, 1988. Said amount is reasonable and necessary for the treatment rendered.
It is obvious that the verdict was for less than the stipulated damages. Notwithstanding the Chief Justice’s footnote attempting to traduce this writing, the stipulation reflects that the amount of $129,-771.03 was “necessary for the treatment rendered.” Necessary means necessary and the city should not be able to wiggle out of it.
II.
Additionally, majority opinion incorrectly discourses and decides this appeal, inter alia, on contributory negligence of Albert Freeman. Note the attached VERDICT of the jury reflecting 50% “Degree of Fault” on the part of the City of Rapid City and “50% Degree of Fault” on the part of Berg. Jurors then collectively depict the “TOTAL” “Degree of Fault” as 100% upon City of Rapid City and Berg. Perforce, jurors assigned no percent of fault on Freeman, whatever reasoning, contrary thereto, this Court now chooses to employ. Pray tell, how can Freeman be negligent in any percent when the 100% negligence has been entirely pro-rated (used up!)? Furthermore, there can be no assessment of a degree of fault on the part of Freeman because no party to this litigation ever made a written or oral request to include Freeman as a negligent contributor. City is too late now; it is trying to sneak in the *37back door. We should set aside this verdict as to the damages but not as to the liability. Liability has been decided: The verdict expresses that “We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above entitled action and sworn to try the issues therein, find for the Plaintiffs below ...” There is no liability left to be tried. Only damages must be tried. Mr. Chief Justice’s footnote on the assessment of a degree of fault fails to appreciate the legal point of the dissent. The idea of the majority opinion, as you thread through the opinion, is that Freeman was negligent, inter alia, if it [the jury] believed his lights were not on. Furthermore, the winning appellee argues that Freeman was contributorily negligent by standing between the two vehicles. This argument cannot be advanced now because it was not advanced during the jury trial. Weaver v. Boortz, 301 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1981). By the terminology “negligent contributor,” which apparently has drawn attention of the Chief Justice, it was my intent to establish that Freeman could not be guilty of contributory negligence because the jury found that the city was 50% at fault and Berg was 50% at fault.
We now tell South Dakota’s Trial Bench: Next time, instruct on Degen. It is, obviously, too late, under that theory, to help this poor fellow. This jury was sincerely troubled on the damage issue; it wanted legal advice from the trial judge.* Two separate notes were sent out by the jury. Trial judge responded by having this typed on a handwritten note: “You must rely upon the instructions as given. S/Merton B. Tice, Jr., Circuit Court Judge.” Instructions of Law are to be given in accordance with the issues presented. Had an admonition or instruction been given, as suggested by the majority opinion, under Degen, this inadequate award of damages would not have developed. Under SDCL 15-6-59(a), (5) and (6), it follows that the Motion for New Trial should have been granted. Yes, the jury was advised that Berg had settled with Freeman, but they were not advised that the settlement was for $100,000, Berg’s policy limits. The jury was trying to arrive at a good and just verdict but valuable information was withheld from them. Where an injustice has been done by the jury’s verdict, the remedy lies in granting a new trial. Simmons v. City of Sioux Falls, 374 N.W.2d 631, 632 (S.D. 1985). A new trial should be restricted to damages. Statutory authority for this latter sentence may be found at SDCL 15-6-59(a): “A new trial may be granted on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes: (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or ... that it is against law.” (Emphasis added mine). The jury was forced to speculate on the amount of the Berg settlement. On Instruction No. 32, the jury was instructed that it must fix the amount necessary to reasonably and fairly compensate for the elements of loss. This instruction concluded by stating that the verdict must not be on speculation or conjecture. But that is exactly what the jury had to do.
I am hereby authorized to state that Justice WUEST joins this dissent.
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 See, notes of jury, consisting of two pages attached hereto, sent to the trial judge, filed in Circuit Court, Pennington County, South Dakota, on February 11, 1991.