Court Opinion

ID: 9660372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:11:55.699838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:18.846631
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice.
In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true, and every *547reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and doubts resolved in his favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985).
The majority holds that evidence that Smith entered into the intersection against a red light is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Smith acted recklessly because Smith was statutorily authorized to proceed against a red traffic light after slowing for safe operation. The majority also concludes that the “motion for summary judgment established Smith was not reckless as a matter of law.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority must necessarily rely on the testimony of Smith and Dudley Wait, Smith’s expert. In my opinion, however, neither Smith’s nor Wait’s testimony can be relied upon to conclusively establish that Smith sufficiently slowed the ambulance “as necessary for safe operation,” because both Smith and Wait relied on Smith’s testimony that Smith’s light was green. In fact, despite the statutory language, Smith testified that if his light was red, he would have been required to stop. Smith testified as follows:
Q. Fair enough, Code 3, what is the procedure?
A. Code 3, the procedure would be lights and sirens are going. I am to yield to traffic as traffic is to yield to me at the same time. I slow down assuming that traffic is going to yield to me; and upon doing that, if there is a red light, I must first stop at the red light and clear the intersection, noticing that all traffic is going to yield before proceeding through it; and at that time I would be able to use turning lanes, of course, going the proper direction, but also still making sure that I come to a complete stop before proceeding through the intersection.
Q. Okay, and where are you supposed to stop?
A. I am supposed to stop where all the other designated cars are supposed to — where the cars are designated to stop, behind the line.
As to the occurrence in question, Smith testified that he “didn’t come to a complete stop [at the intersection] due to the light being green.” Furthermore, Janda testified that it looked like the ambulance was going fast, although she could not say at what speed.
In my opinion, summary judgment could have been granted in this case if Wait had assumed that the light was red and stated that Smith slowed “as necessary for safe operation” in view of the red light. None of the evidence in our record, however, conclusively establishes that Smith slowed as necessary for safe operation in proceeding past a red light because the only evidence relating to whether Smith sufficiently slowed the ambulance is based on the disputed assumption that the light was green. The majority cannot, in my opinion, rely on testimony that Smith slowed the ambulance in proceeding past a green light to conclude as a matter of law that Smith slowed “as necessary for safe operation” in proceeding past a red light. Because the majority fails to apply the governing standard of review by overlooking the effect that the disputed assumption has on the summary judgment evidence that was presented, I respectfully dissent.