Court Opinion

ID: 9881899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 16:28:25.530125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:23.307014
License: Public Domain

J-S24042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TALIDEEN E. CHAMBERS                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1532 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0002322-2019

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: OCTOBER 4, 2023

       Appellant, Talideen E. Chambers, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County following

the revocation of probation.         Additionally, Appellant’s counsel, Robert M.

Buttner (“Counsel”) has filed a petition to withdraw and accompanying brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth

v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).              We grant Counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm.

       The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of the

case as follows:

       On August 6, 2019, an information was filed by the Luzerne
       County District Attorney against Defendant, Talideen E. Chambers
       [hereinafter, “Appellant”]. Appellant was charged with possession
       with intent to deliver a controlled substance, [35 P.S. § 780-
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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       113(a)(30)], three counts of conspiracy to commit possession
       with intent to deliver a controlled substance and endangering
       welfare of children [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1)].

       On January 21, 2020, Appellant pled guilty to possession with
       intent to deliver heroin and endangering welfare of children. [At
       the hearing, the Commonwealth related it was prepared to prove
       at trial that] during the execution of a search warrant, Appellant
       was located in an apartment with his ten-month-old child and
       other individuals as well as a significant amount of heroin and
       additional items consistent with the sale of the heroin.

       Sentencing occurred on August 26, 2020.              Appellant was
       sentenced to 3 to 23 months on the possession with intent to
       deliver charge. His sentence on the endangering welfare charge
       was 3 to 6 months to be served concurrently. Appellant received
       credit for serving 39 days of incarceration prior to sentencing and
       he was determined to be re-entry eligible. He was also paroled to
       the day reporting center six days later.

       On April 15, 2021, Appellant’s parole was revoked and reinstated.
       His parole was again revoked on October 6, 2022[, after he
       admitted to violations,] which included possessing marijuana and
       drug paraphernalia, possessing a firearm, behaving in a manner
       threatening to the public, failing to pay fines, restitution, program
       fees and a supervision fee, and two new arrests [occurring on
       August 13, 2022 and August 21, 2022]. As a result, Appellant
       forfeited 18 months of street time[1] and he was recommitted to
       serve his original sentence with a new maximum date of April 6,
       2024. He was determined to be re-entry eligible and work-release
       eligible.

       A notice of appeal was filed on Appellant’s behalf on November 4,
       2022. By order dated November 8, 2022, Appellant was directed
       to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
       pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within twenty-one days and serve
       a copy on the Luzerne County District Attorney and [the trial
       court] pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). Because Appellant did
       not file a concise statement, a 1925(a) opinion was originally filed
____________________________________________

1 We understand “street time” to mean the time when a defendant is not

imprisoned, but on probation or parole.

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      on December 30, 2022, which indicated that any issues Appellant
      would attempt to raise have been waived in accordance with
      Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).     The opinion also provided that
      Appellant would be permitted to file a concise statement nunc pro
      tunc if such relief were requested.

      On February 14, 2023, counsel for Appellant filed a Motion for
      Extension of Time to File Concise Statement Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
      1925(b)(2), nunc pro tunc.

      One day later, the motion was granted and a concise statement
      was filed on February 16, 2023. In the statement, appellate
      counsel indicated his intention to file an Anders/Santiago brief
      since there were no “non-frivolous” issues able to be raised on
      appeal.    [The trial court] concurs with appellate counsel’s
      determination that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised
      on appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/2023.

      Counsel has identified the following issue in the Anders brief:

      Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it recommended
      and recalculated the Appellant’s original maximum sentence by
      eighteen (18) months by failing to award him credit for his street
      time while on county parole which results in too severe a
      maximum sentence?

Anders Brief, at 2.

      “When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review

the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel's

request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (citation omitted).    Counsel must comply with the technical

requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for leave to

withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record,

counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) providing a

copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant that he has

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the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional

arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court's attention. See

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc).

     Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements

established by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

           (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and
           facts, with citations to the record;

           (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel
           believes arguably supports the appeal;

           (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is
           frivolous; and

           (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the
           appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
           relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
           statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that
           the appeal is frivolous.

     Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of
     the Anders brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a letter
     that advises the client of his right to: (1) retain new counsel to
     pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
     points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s attention
     in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879-880 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(some citation omitted).

     “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court's duty to conduct its own review of the trial court's proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

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frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an

independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-

frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113

A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted); accord

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

      Upon review, we find counsel has complied with the procedural

requirements of Anders, Santiago, and their progeny.           Counsel provided

Appellant with a letter advising him of his rights pursuant to Commonwealth

v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. 2005), and the letter is attached to

counsel’s withdrawal petition. Counsel also has provided proof of service for

both the petition and the Anders brief. Counsel’s Anders brief complies with

the requirements set forth in Santiago, and it contains copies of both

counsel’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) statement of intent to file an Anders brief and

the trial court opinion.

      We proceed to Counsel’s Anders brief, which presents Appellant’s claim

that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion when it recommitted him

to serve his original sentence and declined to give him credit for the 18

months’ “street time” he spent in good standing on parole. Appellant contends

that his sentence is excessive, arguing that he had showed appropriate

remorse and took responsibility for his violations by declining to contest the

violation of the conditions of his parole and showing a willingness to participate

                                      -5-
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in work release, hold employment, and attend the County Day Reporting

Center program for drug treatment. Appellant's Brief at 5. This claim fails.

      This Court has previously determined that, following the revocation of

parole,

      a defendant appealing recommitment cannot contend, for
      example, that the sentence is harsh and excessive. Such a claim
      might implicate discretionary sentencing but it is improper in a
      parole-revocation appeal. Similarly, it is inappropriate for a
      parole-revocation appellant to challenge the sentence by arguing
      that the court failed to consider mitigating factors or failed to place
      reasons for sentence on the record.

      Challenges of those types [ ] implicate the discretionary aspects
      of the underlying sentence[.]

Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 291 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations

omitted).     Discretionary sentencing challenges cannot be raised on appeal

from parole revocation proceedings because,

      a parole revocation does not involve the imposition of a new
      sentence. Indeed, there is no authority for a parole-revocation
      court to impose a new penalty. Rather, the only option for a court
      that decides to revoke parole is to recommit the defendant to
      serve the already-imposed, original sentence. At some point
      thereafter, the defendant may again be paroled.

Id. at 290.

      As Kalichak makes clear, following the revocation of parole, the trial

court may not impose a new sentence. “[T]he only option for a court that

decides to revoke parole is to recommit the defendant to serve the already-

imposed, original sentence.” Id. As such, “[f]ollowing parole revocation and

recommitment, the proper issue on appeal is whether the revocation court

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erred, as a matter of law, in deciding to revoke parole and, therefore, to

recommit the defendant to confinement.” Id. at 291.

       Here, Appellant admitted to violating the terms of his parole and, on

appeal, he does not contest the trial court's revocation decision and

reimposition of his original sentence. Instead, Appellant argues that the trial

court’s decision to deny credit for his compliant street time reflects an abuse

of discretion and amounts to an excessive sentence. Following the revocation

of parole, however, we do not review resentencing for alleged excessiveness

or   discretionary    aspects    of   sentencing.   See   Kalichak;   See   also

Commonwealth v. Anthony, 297 A.3d 723 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-

precedential decision at *2) (rejecting abuse of discretion challenge to denial

of credit for extensive street time and holding no error of law attended decision

where the parolee admitted she failed to comply with all rules and conditions

applicable to her parole)2; Commonwealth v. Fair, 497 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa.

Super. 1985) (holding that the parolee, when found in violation of parole, is

not entitled as of right to credit for time spent on parole without violation).

Under such authority, we have reviewed Appellant’s revocation sentence,

including the denial of credit for street time spent in good standing, for an

____________________________________________

2 Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, we may cite

non-precedential memorandum decisions of this Court that were filed after
May 1, 2019, for their “persuasive value.” Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2).

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error of law and discern none. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim affords him no

relief.3

       Finally, we have undertaken an independent review of the record

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super.

2015), to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues that counsel

neglected and have discerned none. Therefore, no relief is due.

       Counsel’s Petition to Withdraw is granted.   Judgment of Sentence is

affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/04/23

____________________________________________

3 Similarly, the Anders Brief addresses whether the recalculation of
Appellant’s maximum sentence resulted in an illegal sentence. Finding the
present re-computation of sentence in compliance with Commonwealth v.
Stafford, 29 A.3d 800, 804 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that recomputing a
maximum date does not extend the sentence beyond the original sentence)
and, Counsel concludes that no error of law attends Appellant’s sentence. We
agree with Counsel’s assessment.

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