Court Opinion

ID: 9709164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:41:46.484736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:46.524802
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I believe a preliminary question presented is: Does Pa.R. Crim.P. 1100 start to run from the date on which a private criminal complaint is filed with and approved by an issuing authority, or from the date (some 20 days later) on which an attorney for the Commonwealth approves the complaint?
As the majority opinion indicates, appellant rented a car from Bill Fry Ford, Inc. The car was returned, but Ford calculated that additional rental fees of $339.05 were owed for extra days (beyond the three days that appellant paid for when he rented the car) and for mileage charges. On December 11, 1974, after unsuccessful attempts to reach appellant by telephone, Ford filed a private criminal complaint charging appellant with obtaining a motor vehicle by fraud.1 Ford filed this complaint with the District Magistrate, who approved the complaint on the same day; the complaint then made its way to the District Attorney’s office, where it was marked “Approved” on December 31, 1974.
On June 10, 1975, the Commonwealth filed a petition for extension of time under Rule 1100. About the same time, *166appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with Rule 1100.2 On July 9, 1975, the lower court granted the Commonwealth an extension of time, and denied appellant’s motion to dismiss. Appellant was tried and convicted on August 11, 1975. In post-verdict motions he contended and he contends here, that the petition for extension was not timely and therefore should not have been granted.
Appellant’s trial had to begin within 180 days from the date on which the complaint was filed. Rule 1100(a)(2). If the Commonwealth needed an extension, it had to request it within the same period. Rule 1100(c); Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976). A petition for extension may not be allowed nunc pro tunc. Commonwealth v. Shelton, supra; Commonwealth v. Woods, 461 Pa. 255, 336 A.2d 273 (1975). If December 11, 1974 is taken as the date when the complaint was filed, the 180-day period ran on June 9,1975,3 in which case the petition for extension was untimely and should have been denied. Id.
The Commonwealth argues, however, that the complaint was not “filed” when it was filed with and approved by the District Magistrate on December 11, 1974, but rather when it was approved by the District Attorney’s office on December 31, 1974. Prom December 31, the run date would have been June 29,1975, making the petition for extension timely. The Commonwealth supports this argument by citation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 133 and 134, which provide in pertinent part:
Rule 133. Complaint: Police and Private Affiants
*167(B) Private Complaints
1. When the affiant is not a police officer as defined in Rule 51(C) and the offense(s) charged include(s) a misdemeanor or felony which does not involve a clear and present danger to any person or to the community, the complaint shall be submitted to the attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove without unreasonable delay.
3. If the attorney for the Commonwealth (i) approved the complaint, he shall indicate his decision on the complaint form and transmit it to the issuing authority.
Rule 134. Issuance of Process Pursuant to Complaint
(a) In any proceeding initiated by complaint, the issuing authority shall ascertain that:
1. the complaint has been properly completed and executed;
2. there is probable cause for the issuance of process;
3. when prior submission to the attorney for the Commonwealth is required, that he has approved the complaint.
(b) Upon ascertaining the above matters, the issuing authority shall
(2) Issue a summons or warrant of arrest as the case may be.
Here, it will be observed, the issuing authority and the complainant (Ford) did not follow the directions of, respectively, Rule 134(a)(3) and Rule 133(B)1; they proceeded backwards. The Commonwealth is therefore correct that there was a defect in the complaint. This defect, however, was immaterial, for defective or not, the complaint initiated *168criminal proceedings against appellant. “[I]t is clear that Rule 1100 contemplates the commencement of the running of the mandatory period at the point criminal proceedings are initiated.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 553, 559, 372 A.2d 826, 829 (1977).
In Mitchell the Commonwealth contended that in a case involving an arrest pursuant to a warrant, the Rule should begin to run from — in the Supreme Court’s words, “the complaint should be deemed filed as of” — the preliminary arraignment, since criminal proceedings do not really get under way until the arrest is made and the suspect preliminarily arraigned. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, in part on the ground that
[i]n the situation of an arrest pursuant to a warrant, the complaint is filed prior to arrest, and thus considerations such as disruption of employment, curtailment of associations, subjection to public obloquy, and creation of anxiety, Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972); Commonwealth v. Silver, 238 Pa.Super. 221, 357 A.2d 612 (1976), are brought to bear prior to arrest. Id., 472 Pa. at 561, 372 A.2d at 830.
This analysis must apply here. As we said in Commonwealth v. Silver, 238 Pa.Super. 221, 357 A.2d 612 (1976),
[w]hen a written complaint is filed . . . prosecutorial forces are quickly brought to bear against the named individual. If he is not already in custody the issuing authority, upon approving the complaint, will issue a summons or warrant of arrest. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 134 and 102. If a summons is used the defendant will be commanded to appear for a preliminary hearing, Pa.R.Crim.P. 110; if he fails to comply an arrest warrant will follow, Pa.R.Crim.P. 113. If an arrest warrant is used the defendant will be taken without unnecessary delay for a preliminary arraignment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 122, 130, which will be followed within three to ten days by a preliminary hearing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 140.
*169It is clear that this activity, whether it be complaint followed by summons or arrest, or arrest followed by complaint and preliminary arraignment, has immersed the defendant in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. The defendant has been confronted “with the prosecutorial forces of organized society,” Kirby v. Illinois [406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)]; see Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974), and must begin to deal with the consequences of those forces. Id., 238 Pa.Super. at 229-30, 357 A.2d at 616.
It is true that in the present case, as far as I can tell from the record, no warrant or summons was issued immediately upon the December 11 approval by the District Magistrate. However, it is plain from Rule 1100 that the actual issuance of process is not the event that triggers the running of the Rule; if it were, subsections (aXl) and (2) would read differently. It thus appears that the Supreme Court, through its Rules Committee, has determined that criminal proceedings commence when process may potentially issue, rather than when it actually does issue. This interpretation is confirmed by the Court’s rejection in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra, of the Commonwealth’s contention that the Rule should start to run from the preliminary arraignment. Here, a warrant or summons could have issued solely on the basis of the District Magistrate’s approval of the complaint; the District Attorney’s approval or signature would not have been required. See Pa.R.Crim.P. Ill, 120.
I would, therefore, hold that Rule 1100 started to run from the date on which the complaint was filed with and approved by the District Magistrate. From this conclusion it follows that the Commonwealth’s petition for extension was untimely, and that appellant’s motion to dismiss should have been granted.
CERCONE, J., joins in this opinion.

. The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 1220; 75 P.S. § 1220 (1971). This section was repealed by, and has no equivalent in, the new Vehicle Code.
Because of our disposition of appellant’s Rule 1100 claim, we need not discuss the propriety of using this criminal statute for what appears, from the facts stated and from certain testimony at trial, to be collection of a private debt. See Commonwealth v. Gallo, 473 Pa. 186, 191, 373 A.2d 1109, 1112 (1977), rev’g 236 Pa.Super. 557, 345 A.2d 747 (1975).

. The docket does not record appellant’s motion to dismiss. However, the docket does show the lower court’s order denying the motion, on July 9, 1975. It is therefore evident that the motion was filed timely, under Rule 1100(f).

. The Commonwealth does not argue that the period was extended by exclusions under Rule 1100(d). It did so argue in its opposition to appellant’s post-verdict motions, but there is nothing of record to support its argument.