Court Opinion

ID: 9707113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:02:46.735584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.270372
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The instant appeal is before this Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court for the determination of two interrelated questions: First, whether the Pennsylvania laws in effect at the time of sentencing allowed the Commonwealth to obtain review of the sentences suspended by the sentencing court; and second, whether United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), is controlling on the double jeopardy issue. See Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 353, 88 L.Ed.2d 183 (1985). Contrary to the majority, I would answer both questions in the negative and hold that resentencing is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. I therefore dissent.
Mr. Goldhammer was initially sentenced on March 3, 1981, to two consecutive prison terms of one to five years *596on one count each of bribery and theft by deception. Sentence on 55 counts each of bribery and theft was suspended. Upon reconsideration the sentencing court imposed a two-to-five year term on the theft conviction and five years’ probation on the bribery count on April 8, 1981. Mr. Goldhammer appealed all of the convictions to the Superior Court but did not challenge the propriety of the sentences imposed.1 The Commonwealth did not attempt to cross-appeal from the judgments of sentence. The Superior Court vacated 34 of the theft convictions on the ground that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(a); Mr. Goldhammer’s remaining convictions were affirmed. Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 322 Pa. Super. 242, 469 A.2d 601 (1983). Mr. Goldhammer did not seek further review. In response to the Superior Court’s order, the Commonwealth, in requesting reargument, sought the novel relief of a remand for resentencing on the affirmed convictions. The Superior Court denied relief and the Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal in this Court, which was granted. The Commonwealth’s primary argument on appeal concerned the statute of limitations issue. In the alternative, however, the Commonwealth requested, as it had in the Superior Court, a remand for resentencing on remaining valid theft convictions. This Court affirmed the Superior Court on the statute of limitations issue and also held that the requested remand would violate double jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 507 Pa. 236, 489 A.2d 1307 (1985). In response to the Commonwealth’s petition for writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed this Court’s order and re*597manded for further consideration. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, supra.
The first question we have been requested to address, whether Pennsylvania law permits the prosecution to seek review of the sentences suspended by the sentencing court, is not adequately addressed by the majority. The right of the Commonwealth to appeal from adverse decisions in criminal cases is limited to pure questions of law. Commonwealth v. Rawles, 501 Pa. 514, 462 A.2d 619 (1983); Commonwealth v. Blevins, 453 Pa. 481, 309 A.2d 421 (1973); Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973); In re Gaskins, 430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 662, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 989, 89 S.Ct. 470, 21 L.Ed.2d 451 (1968); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 204, 11 L.Ed.2d 149 (1963); Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 168 A.2d 328 (1961); Commonwealth v. Hartman, 383 Pa. 461, 119 A.2d 211 (1956). Under settled Pennsylvania law, the sentence imposed lies within the sole discretion of the sentencing court and will not be reviewed by an appellate court unless it exceeds statutorily prescribed limits or is so manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment for the offense committed. Commonwealth v. Cottle, 493 Pa. 377, 426 A.2d 598 (1981); Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550, 317 A.2d 250 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hill, 453 Pa. 349, 310 A.2d 88 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lee, 450 Pa. 152, 299 A.2d 640 (1973); Commonwealth v. Person, 450 Pa. 1, 297 A.2d 460 (1972); Commonwealth v. Brown, 443 Pa. 274, 278 A.2d 170 (1971); Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208, 275 A.2d 81 (1971); Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 275 A.2d 78 (1971). We have never recognized a right to appeal a legal sentence. In the instant case neither side has at any point contended that the sentencing scheme established is illegal or involves an improper exercise of discretion. In his appeal to the Superior Court Mr. Goldhammer sought to challenge only his underlying theft and bribery convictions. Moreover, at the time of sentencing there was no statutory authorization for an appeal *598challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.2 Thus, under the laws in force in Pennsylvania when Mr. Gold-hammer was sentenced, the Commonwealth was not entitled to appellate review of the sentences in question.
The above conclusion is critical in answering the United States Supreme Court’s second question, i.e., whether United States v. DiFrancesco, supra, is applicable under the circumstances of this case. DiFrancesco concerned a challenge to a federal statute which permitted the government to seek enhancement of a sentence imposed upon a “dangerous special offender” by authorizing an appeal to the court of appeals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3576. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const, amend. 5. The rationale expressed by that Court for that conclusion was that the defendant could have no legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence because it was subject to a government appeal. United States v. DiFrancesco, supra 449 U.S. at 136, 101 S.Ct. at 437. Pennsylvania had no comparable statute and, as noted above, there was no authority in our statutes or case law for an appeal of a sentence within prescribed limits. Where the defendant appeals his conviction but does not challenge the sentence imposed thereon, only the conviction is exposed. Thus, unlike the defendant in DiFrancesco, Mr. Goldhammer was entitled to rely on the finality of his sentence absent a determination on appeal that his convictions were invalid.
Contrary to the bald assertion of the majority, such a defendant would have no reason to anticipate that a sentence affirmed on appeal might be disturbed in the event the judgment of sentence on a different conviction was invalidated,3 such a turn of events has not been even a *599remote possibility under Pennsylvania law. DiFrancesco did nothing to alter that fact. While it did address the finality of a sentence where the legislature has, in fact, given the prosecution the right to appeal therefrom, DiFrancesco did not confer such a right. Rather, the Court acknowledged that the government “ ‘has no right of appeal in a criminal case, absent explicit statutory authority.’ ” Id. at 131, 101 S.Ct. at 434, quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84-85, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2190, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). For the foregoing reasons, the principles expounded in DiFrancesco have no applicability in the instant case, which explains why DiFrancesco was not cited in our previous opinion in this matter. See Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, supra at —, 106 S.Ct. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the reasons expressed above, I would reinstate our original decision in this matter, which held that resentencing Mr. Goldhammer would violate double jeopardy.
United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert denied 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 3055, 69 L.Ed.2d 422 (1981), from which the majority derives its theory that “ ‘[w]hen a defendant challenges one of several interdependent sentences, he, in effect, challenges the entire sentencing plan[,]’ ” slip op. at 7, quoting Busic, supra at 947, is of no avail under the circumstances of this case.4 In Busic the defendants challenged the validity of consecutive sentences for assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 111, and use of a firearm to commit a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Thus the legality of the sentences themselves was made the subject of the proceedings. Cf. United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1983) (District Court could not alter unchallenged legal sentence after successful challenge to illegal sentence). In the instant case we are faced with a situation in which the defendant did not question the validity of the sentences imposed, he challenged only the legality of his underlying convictions, on which he alleged the statute of *600limitations had run. Therefore he did not “assume the risk” of retaliatory resentencing by exercising his right of appeal.
In addition to the double jeopardy violation, there are two adequate and independent state grounds for reinstating our order in this matter. First, the Commonwealth is precluded from complaining that Mr. Goldhammer should be resentenced on the suspended counts by this Commonwealth’s well-established doctrine of waiver. See Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). When the sentencing court suspended sentence on 110 of Mr. Goldhammer’s convictions, the Commonwealth, although undoubtedly aware of the statute of limitations issue raised in this case, stood mute. See RR130a (N.T. April 8, 1981, at 57). Then, after Mr. Goldhammer’s statute of limitations challenge was sustained by the Superior Court, the Commonwealth questioned, for the first time, the propriety of the suspended sentences. It is settled law that an issue will not be considered for the first time on appeal.5 Pa.R.A.P. 302; Commonwealth v. Wallace, 495 Pa. 295, 433 A.2d 856 (1981).
The second, and even more fundamental, state ground barring the Commonwealth from demanding resentencing is the fact that the Commonwealth prevailed in the Superior •Court on the convictions that were not barred by the statute of limitations. Given the present posture of this matter, the Commonwealth must be viewed as attempting to appeal a decision in its favor. We have not in the past permitted such an anomaly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vanders Richardson, No. 1412 E.D. Allocatur Dkt. 1985. The convictions on which sentence was suspended, which were not appealed to this Court, are not properly before us. Therefore the Commonwealth can establish no predicate for relief under Pennsylvania Law.
*601For all of the above reasons, I am compelled to register my dissent.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The Superior Court listed Mr. Goldhammer’s claims on appeal as follows:
(1) The court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained from appellant’s attorney, from his bank and pursuant to an arrest warrant, the affidavit for which contained inaccurate information.
(2) The evidence was insufficient to sustain the forgery convictions.
(3) Many of the theft charges were barred by the statute of limitations.
Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 322 Pa.Super. 242, 245, 489 A.2d 601, 602 (1983).

. Section 9781(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), effective July 22, 1982, now provides for limited review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Mr. Goldhammer was sentenced in 1981.

. In Commonwealth v. Duff, 414 Pa. 471, 200 A.2d 773 (1964), this Court held that an imposition of a suspended sentence represented an exhaustion of the sentencing power and would not permit a subsequent imposition of a prison sentence.

. I note also that at least one Circuit has recently declined to adopt "the broad rule ... that an increase of a sentence is permissible whenever one or more sentences that were part of a 'sentencing plan’ are vacated.” United States v. Pisani, 787 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir.1986).

. Waiver was not pursued as a ground for affirmance in the Commonwealth’s initial appeal to this Court. We may, however, raise the issue sua sponte. E.g., Commonwealth v. Triplett, 476 Pa. 83, 381 A.2d 877 (1977).