Court Opinion

ID: 9720009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:12:47.926649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.237258
License: Public Domain

Carr, C. J.
(dissenting). While in the employ of defendant, plaintiff on January 23, 1953, sustained a disabling heart attack. He did not at the time file a claim under the workmen’s compensation act* of the State, presumably being advised by his physician, as it is claimed, that there was no connection between his work and the heart condition. It is not *469disputed that at the time the physician- reported to the employer that “the present disability was not due to the patient’s occupation.”
Under date of July 17, 1958, plaintiff made application for hearing and adjustment of claim. Shortly prior thereto the physician who had treated him. in 1953 following his heart attack expressed the opinion that plaintiff’s work “may have caused this attack.” The hearing referee denied compensation on the ground that statutory requirements with reference to notice and claim had not been observed, Such decision was reversed by 2 members of the workmen’s compensation appeal board and plaintiff was awarded compensation from January 24, 1953, at the rate of $32 per week for total disability, until the further order of the compensation department. He was also granted $561 for medical expenses, with interest on all weekly payments past due, and on the item of medical expense, at the rate of 5% per annum. On leave granted defendant has appealed, the question at issue relating to the matter of interest.
The action of the appeal board with reference to interest was based on the decision of a majority of this Court in Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Company, 358 Mich 510. In that case application was made for entry of judgment in circuit court on the basis of unpaid workmen’s compensation award. The appeal was from the circuit court judgment. The appeal board had not allowed interest.
The statute as enacted by the legislature and amended from time to time does not authorize the allowance of interest on payments required to be made under an award of compensation. Nor may authority to make such addition be implied from any provision of said statute. It must be borne in mind that we are dealing here with an obligation *470imposed by law and the incidents thereof have been prescribed by the legislature. In Luyk v. Hertel, 242 Mich 445, 447, Mr. Justice Wiest, speaking for the Court, said:
“The workmen’s compensation law is a departure, by statute, from the common law, and its procedure provisions speak all intended upon the subject. ‘ Rights, remedies, and procedure thereunder are such and such only as the statute provides. If the statute is short of what it should contain in order to prevent injustice, the defects must be cured by. future legislation and not by judicial pronouncement. * * *.
“Rules, of law and procedure, applicable to common-law actions, may not be considered in construing the workmen’s compensation act, for such act is in derogation of the common law and substitutes its own code of procedure, inclusive of review. See Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich 298 (Ann Cas 1916D, 724, 6 NCCA 807).”
The rule of interpretation so declared was followed by this Court in Fowler v. Muskegon County, 340 Mich 522. After referring to the holding in Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich 181, 184, where it was declared that “interest in Michigan is purely statutory”, this Court unanimously held (p 526) that:
“Under our holding in the Luyk Case, supra, the remedy for all matters connected with compensation must be found in the statute, and our holding in the Kermott Case, supra, is that interest is statutory. It must follow that where the statute does not provide for interest, none can be granted.”
We think the correct rule of law was recognized in the above cited cases. The statute clearly points out the procedure to be followed in order to reach a determination as to the liability of an employer for the payment of compensation under the act, and the extent of liability in- that respect. Certainly it *471cannot be said that, in the absence of a specific agreement between employer and employee, the possible obligation under the statute must be recognized in advance of such determination. Clearly the legislature has not seen fit to impose any penalty for failure of such prepayment.
The present case presents a striking example of the policy of requiring the payment of interest on an award from the date of disability. For 5-1/2 years, according to the finding of the appeal board, plaintiff did not know that he had any claim for compensation, and it is even more apparent that defendant had no reason to believe that there was any possible liability on its part for the payment of an award under the statute. It is a matter for the legislature to determine the right to interest on compensation payments, if such is to be allowed. As well stated in Luyk v. Hertel, supra, we are not dealing here with legal and procedural rules applicable to common-law actions. The statute is controlling rather than incidents involved in the application of contract law.
For the reasons above stated and for further reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion in Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis, supra, the order of the workmen’s, compensation appeal board should be modified by eliminating the award of interest therefrom.
Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, C. J.

 PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948, §411.1 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.141 et seg.]).