Court Opinion

ID: 9551124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:48:06.40646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:06.111685
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring) — The full sweep of the majority opinion clearly sets aside existing administrative procedures and substitutes full de novo judicial examination, review, and resolution of cases substantially comparable to the instant one, involving the regulation of motor vehicular traffic and the right of individuals to operate motor vehicles. There seems little reason to reiterate the facts and circumstances set out by the majority; nor is there need to refer in detail to the complexities and the confusions of the existing administrative-regulatory legislative pattern which was followed or applied somewhat ad hoc, to say the least, in the instant case. These matters are obvious from reading the majority opinion and the decisions in Gnecchi v. State (1961), 58 Wn. (2d) 467, 364 P. (2d) 225, and State ex rel. Ralston v. Department of Licenses (1962), 60 Wn. (2d) 535, 374 P. (2d) 571.
I have been reluctant to concur in the majority opinion. My reluctance has been because the full sweep of the majority opinion seems to override some reasonably well established, workable, and acceptable modern concepts respecting the relationships and the interrelated functions of administrative regulatory agencies and the courts, as well as the review of actions and decisions of the former by the latter. However, I now concur. My reasons for doing so are: First, I am convinced that there is no alternative except for the judiciary to require and provide (as attempted in the majority opinion) some semblance of a reasonable legal procedure as a due process check upon the chaotic procedure instanced in the present case, to say nothing of that instanced in Gnecchi v. State, supra, and *106State ex rel. Ralston v. Department of Licenses, supra. Second, my concurrence also is prompted by the conviction that the majority decision herein will be regarded as sui generis and should be cited as precedent for only comparable cases in this particular field of administrative law. Parenthetically, it may be hoped that private and governmental administrative and other agencies, (a) interested and concerned with the safety of the motoring public, and (b) likewise interested and concerned that appropriate regulation of motor vehicular traffic be efficient and effective, but be accomplished in a fair, reasonable and due-process manner, may be stimulated to participate and cooperate in a study and research project, the objective of which would be a well planned, well drafted, and effective but fair and reasonable over-all code (a) for the regulation of motor vehicular traffic, (b) for the protection of the motoring public, and (c) to provide reasonable due process protections to any citizens charged with motor vehicle violations.
December 10, 1963. Petition for rehearing denied.