Court Opinion

ID: 9689068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:18:18.94026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:44.196491
License: Public Domain

Blair Moody, Jr., J.
(concurring). I concur with much of the analysis employed and the conclusion reached in Justice Ryan’s opinion that actions charging malpractice against attorneys fall within the two-year malpractice statute of limitation. MCL 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3).
The legislative history, particularly the excision of the limiting phrase "physicians, surgeons or dentists” from the two-year malpractice statute of limitation, lends substantial force to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to broaden the applicability of this provision. The fact that the committee comment to § 5805 states, "[e]xisting time periods have been used”, appears to mean only that the malpractice limitation period remains the same. This comment does not reflect a legislative intention to define or restrict the type of action that may constitute "malpractice” for purposes of applying the malpractice statute of limitation.
The only issue presented for resolution in the instant case is whether actions charging malpractice against attorneys fall within the malpractice limitation period. It is a majority’s understanding that the Legislature intended to broaden the class of malpractice actions subject to § 5805(3) beyond malpractice actions against physicians, surgeons or dentists. At the time the Revised Judicature Act *437was enacted and at the present time, attorneys were and are subject to liability for malpractice under the common law. In addition, attorneys are professionals who must be licensed1 as one prerequisite to practicing their profession.
Since it is clear that attorneys were and are subject to liability for malpractice at common law it is therefore unnecessary in this case to conclusively construe the effect of other sections of the RJA, particularly MCL 600.2912; MSA 27A.2912 and MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838, and thus implicitly decide whether the malpractice statute of limitation applies to actions against members of all state-licensed professions. Further consideration of § 2912 and § 5838 may be helpful in future cases in ascertaining the Legislature’s intent concerning the scope of § 5805(3) and its application to actions against members of other state-licensed professions. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Levin, J.
This case presents the question whether an action alleging legal malpractice is governed by the two-year period of limitation "for actions charging malpractice”, MCL 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3), or by the general three-year period of limitation "for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property”. MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7).
The Judicature Act of 1915 expressly limited the shorter malpractice period of limitation to actions charging "malpractice of physicians, surgeons or dentists”. 1915 PA 314. As part of the general revision and consolidation which culminated in the Revised Judicature Act of 1961, the language of this provision was changed to state, "[t]he period *438of limitations is 2 years for actions charging malpractice”.
The revisors who drafted the act explained in their comments to § 5805, of which this provision is a part, that "[s]ection 5805 is a compilation of the limitations on the general tort remedies. Existing time periods have been used”.
The question whether the omission of the "physicians, surgeons or dentists” language was intended to expand the applicability of the shorter malpractice period to other actions alleging malpractice was before this Court in Kambas v St Joseph’s Mercy Hospital of Detroit, 389 Mich 249, 253-254; 205 NW2d 431 (1973). In Kambas, the Court concluded that the revision had not expanded the application of the malpractice limitation to nurses, and, thus, that actions alleging malpractice of registered nurses were subject to the general three-year period of limitation rather than the two-year period for malpractice. The Court said:
"If it had been the intent of the Legislature to broaden the malpractice limitation, clearly they should have set forth a definition of malpractice.”
The Court also said, in apparent recognition of the revisors’ comment to § 5805:
"Section 5805 is nothing more than a compilation of existing limitations with no change in time periods.”
Although the majority in the instant case maintains otherwise, it appears inescapable to me that by broadening the malpractice limitation to include actions charging legal malpractice the Court has departed from the construction of § 5805(3) indicated in Kambas and has, without an adequate *439or workable basis for distinction, granted to lawyers what was withheld from nurses. Having extended the benefit of the shorter malpractice limitation period to members of the legal profession, it will be difficult to explain a refusal to extend it to other professions.
I dissent not only because I continue to be persuaded1 that the legislative history of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 indicates that the change in language was an effort to simplify the statute rather than to expand the application of the shorter malpractice limitation period, but also because of the uncertainty created by the construction adopted by the majority in place of the construction indicated in Kambas. I would hold that the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 did not change the substantive application of the malpractice period of limitation and therefore, as in Kambas, that it does not apply to professionals other than physicians, surgeons and dentists.
I
The majority concludes that the applicability of the malpractice limitation is to be determined according to whether an action for the negligence of a professional was considered a "malpractice” action by the common law. This means, in effect, that the applicability of the two-year or three-year limitation period will henceforth depend on whether statutes or reported cases can be found which characterize an action for negligence in the conduct of the profession involved as a "malpractice” action. This construction gives talismanic significance to whether the term "malpractice” was used in prior reported decisions and statutes *440to describe an action for the negligence of a professional. No substantive distinction among such actions is implied by the use of the term; to apply the malpractice limitation period to a given profession according to whether an action against a member of that profession was called a "malpractice” action in a judicial opinion before 1961 gives controlling significance to terminology rather than to substance.
Indeed, since the use of the term before today implied no substantive distinction among actions for negligence in the practice of different professions, whether the term was used in an old case or statute may have turned on no more than the writing style of the author. At least it may be said that, since lawyers will now need to research only words, not concepts, preparation for argument on the applicability of the malpractice limitation period to a particular profession has been simplified to a battle between Lexis operators.
The majority’s construction has the effect of rendering uncertain the period of limitation applicable to any given profession. After today, only members of the legal and medical professions (including nurses) can know with confidence which period applies until a court, and probably not until this Court, has searched reported decisions, treatises and statutes relating to actions for the negligent practice of that profession to ascertain whether the word "malpractice” has been used with regard to it with sufficient frequency for the Court to conclude that such an action was considered a "malpractice” action at common law.
The majority’s construction may also result in the application of the malpractice limitation period far beyond what could reasonably have been intended by the Legislature. Even a cursory review *441of case law reveals that "malpractice” has been used to refer to the improper professional conduct of such varied professionals as embalmers and funeral directors,2 barbers,3 veterinarians,4 optometrists,5 and, in the context of "malpractice in office”, county commissioners6 and even judges.7
Moreover, while the Court states that it does not now decide whether actions against professionals other than attorneys are subject to the two-year malpractice limitation period, the Court provides no indication of a rationale for limiting the application of its construction. If, in the course of the profession-by-profession assessment by the courts of whether actions for the negligent practice of the profession were denominated "malpractice” actions in the common law, a generic common-law definition of malpractice is evolved (see Black’s Law Dictionary [4th ed], p 1111: "[malpractice is a]ny professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct”), it will be difficult to distinguish on a principled basis between physicians and lawyers, on the one hand, and such professionals as accountants, chiropractors, psychologists and architects, on the other. (In this connection we note that this Court has said: "[T]he responsibility of an architect does not differ from that of a lawyer or physician.” Bayne v Everham, 197 Mich 181, 199-200; 163 NW 1002 [1917]).
*442If there is a difference between malpractice actions and ordinary negligence actions it is that, since the former involves negligence in the practice of a profession, the applicable standard of care is that of a reasonable member of the profession rather than of a reasonable layman. If the Court’s construction has the effect of extending the malpractice limitation period to all professionals of whom a higher standard of care is required, then it will be difficult to explain why the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 did not extend the malpractice limitation period to all state-licensed professionals.8
If the shorter malpractice limitation period applies to all state-licensed professions, then it applies not only to physicians and lawyers but also, for example, to taxidermists, foresters, surveyors, contractors, landscape architects and community planners. If that is to be the course of adjudication of § 5805(3), Kambas should be openly overruled. Otherwise, nothing will be left of the Kambas decision save that nurses, alone among state-licensed professionals, will be denied the benefit of the shorter malpractice limitation period.
Perhaps the Court is of the opinion that case-by-case adjudication of whether actions for the negligent practice of various professions were known by the common law as "malpractice” actions will eventually produce a reasonable limitation of its construction. It is contrary to the purposes of the *443Revised Judicature Act of 1961, however, to create even such temporary disarray in the jurisprudence of the state. The purpose of the revision was to consolidate, simplify and clarify, not to create uncertainty.
I would adhere to the construction of § 5805(3) indicated in Kambas. Until the Legislature clearly expresses an intent to expand the application of the malpractice limitation period by specifying the types of "malpractice” to which it applies — and those to which it does not — that limitation applies only to the malpractice of physicians, surgeons and dentists.
II
The majority states that "[i]t is clear that we are dealing with a statute whose language is plain and unambiguous on its face”, and that "[o]nce a statute has been declared unambiguous on its face, there is no room for further construction; legislative intent must be gleaned from the clear and explicit words of the statute”. Thus, it is argued, there is no need to consider the legislative history of the act or other extrinsic aids to construction to ascertain the intended meaning of § 5805(3).
While it may be clear that the general meaning of malpractice is negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct in the practice of a profession, it should be evident from the preceding discussion that it is signally unclear whether the term "malpractice” was used in § 5805(3) to refer only to such negligent practice by the medical profession (which, especially in the late 1950’s when the Revised Judicature Act was being drafted, had been and continues to be the most common meaning of the term), or to the malpractice of only physicians and lawyers, or to the malpractice of physicians, law*444yers and other state-licensed professionals (except nurses), or to the malpractice of members of any profession to which a standard of care higher than that of a layman is applied (except nurses).
This is the second case taken by this Court within the last ten years solely to resolve the meaning of this "plain and unambiguous” term.
The majority concludes that the term "malpractice” was intended to have the meaning given it by the common law. Such a construction does not rely exclusively on a facially clear meaning of the statute but, rather, uses the common law as an extrinsic aid in the construction of the term. Aside from the question of whether any aspect of the common law is clear and unambiguous, it is evident that the common law has not developed a clear definition of which actions for the negligent practice of a profession are "malpractice” actions. Given that an action is one for the negligent practice of a profession and thus that the applicable standard of care is that of a reasonable member of the profession rather than that of a reasonable layman,9 the reason for the lack of definition is that nothing has heretofore hinged on whether an action was characterized as a "malpractice” action. It is thus not only unclear whether a particular negligence action is a "malpractice” action at common law, but it is also unclear whether the common law has ever addressed the question.
A court whose responsibility in applying statutes *445is to discern and effectuate the legislative intent may not justifiably ignore competent indicia of that intent. While it has been said that a court will enforce the plain and unambiguous meaning of a statute, the rationale underlying this statement is that in doing so the court will be giving effect to the legislative intent. The linguistic meaning apparent on the face of a statute will be given effect unless other indicia of legislative intent demonstrate with even greater clarity that a contrary meaning was intended. For a court to use the blinders of a self-imposed rule of statutory construction to shut out such indicia is to abdicate the court’s responsibility to implement the legislative purpose.
III
The majority concludes that "the deletion of the words 'physicians, surgeons or dentists’ was the purposeful removal from the statute of language of limitation and is a clear and specific indication of legislative intent to change substantively the meaning of MCL 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3).”
To be sure, had such a deletion occurred in the context of a specific amendment of the section and in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, that would be a strong and perhaps conclusive argument. As a general rule, amendatory statutes are presumed to intend a change in the law, although even this general rule must be qualified in recognition that some amendments attempt only to clarify the original intent of the statute.10
Where the change in the language of a provision, however, occurs not in the context of a specific amendment but as part of a general and *446comprehensive revision and consolidation of statutes into a code, as is the case here, the presumption is otherwise. The United States Supreme Court has said of linguistic and arrangement changes in the 1948 revision of the federal judicial code: " 'it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.’ ” Fourco Glass Co v Transmirra Products Corp, 353 US 222, 227; 77 S Ct 787; 1 L Ed 2d 786 (1957), quoting Anderson v Pacific Coast Steamship Co, 225 US 187, 199; 32 S Ct 626; 56 L Ed 1047 (1912).11 See, also, Muniz v Hoffman, 422 US 454; 95 S Ct 2178; 45 L Ed 2d 319 (1975) (revision of criminal code); Tidewater Oil Co v United States, 409 US 151; 93 S Ct 408; 34 L Ed 2d 375 (1972) (revision of judicial code); United States v Ryder, 110 US 729; 4 S Ct 196; 28 L Ed 308 (1884).
The difference in treatment of changes occurring in the context of general revisions and changes occasioned by specific amendments has been generally recognized:
"The presumption that obtains in the case of an amendment of a statute, that a departure from the law formerly existing is intended, has little, if any, force in the case of a general revision or codification of the laws of a state. Indeed, it is a settled rule of construction that where the entire legislation affecting a particular subject matter has undergone revision and consolidation by codification, the revised sections will be pre*447sumed to bear the same meaning as the original sections, and this is true notwithstanding that there is an alteration in phraseology or an omission or addition of words, for in such case the new language may properly be attributed to a desire to condense and simplify the law or to improve the phraseology.” 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, § 325, p 472 (footnotes omitted).
This principle has been applied to find that a change through a statutory revision from "as provided in this act [article]” to "as provided in sections 76-403, 76-405 and 76-411” did not change the applicability of the altered provision to other sections of the act. In re Estate of James, 192 Neb 614; 223 NW2d 481 (1974). It has been applied to find that a change in a provision that had barred arbitration in a controversy where "one of the parties * * * is an infant” to bar arbitration in a controversy "involving an infant” was not intended to change the law so as to bar arbitration of a dispute over child support and maintenance. Schneider v Schneider, 17 NY2d 123; 269 NYS2d 107; 216 NE2d 318 (1966). It has been applied to find that the deletion of the phrase "of the Treasury” from a provision that a statute of limitations commenced running from the "statement of account * * * by the accounting officers [of the Treasury]” was not intended to make the statute commence running from the statement of account by any government accounting officer. United States v Standard Accident Ins Co, 280 F2d 445 (CA 1, 1960). It has been applied to find that a language change authorizing solitary imprisonment "for the purpose of discipline” rather than "as a prison discipline for the government and good order of the convicts” did not intend to preclude the use of solitary confinement solely for the purposes expressed in the deleted language: "for the govern*448ment and good order of the convicts”. Kelly v Brewer; 239 NW2d 109 (Iowa, 1976). It has similarly been applied in many other cases.12
The reasons for the presumption regarding changes made in the course of a general revision and compilation of statutes is clear. Major purposes of such revisions are to organize, consolidate, simplify and modernize the language of various statutes pertaining to the same general subject matter without any change in the substantive meaning of the prior laws. The realization of such objectives necessarily requires some alterations in the arrangement and wording of the prior laws. Even where the revision is intended to effect some substantive changes, as was the Revised Judicature Act of 1961, it cannot be presumed that any given change was intended to be substantive rather than stylistic unless such intent has been clearly expressed.
This is particularly true where the revision is as broad in scope as the Revised Judicature Act of 1961, which dealt not only with statutes pertaining to the judiciary but also court rules. The committee report observed:
“Overlapping of the statutes and rules has been *449largely eliminated. * * * As a result there are fourteen hundred fewer statute sections. This is made possible by the elimination of approximately nine hundred sections because special or general provisions of the rules now cover the substance of these sections. Five hundred other sections have been consolidated to make the draft statute more clear, or have been dropped because of duplication with other general or special provisions in the statute.” Michigan State Bar Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision — Final Report, Part I, Committee Report and Recommendations (1960) ("Committee Report”), p 9, fn 8. (Emphasis supplied.)
When the Legislature is presented with the committee report on a revision of this scope, and where innumerable linguistic changes are intended merely to simplify and modernize without substantive effect, the Legislature cannot possibly give each change the consideration accorded proposed legislation in the ordinary course of legislative procedure.13
Given the scope of the revision and the nature of the changes, particular importance attaches to the revisors’ comments directed to the Legislature, this Court and the Bar which called attention to and explained the nature of changes made by the revision. Where, as here, the committee comments did not call to the attention of the Legislature what would be, under the majority’s construction, a major change in the law but instead said to the Legislature that no change in "time periods” had been made, it is unrealistic to assume that a deletion of language during the revision was intended to work that major change in the law. As *450mentioned before, the committee comment accompanying § 5805 states, in full: "Section 5805 is a compilation of the limitations on the general tort remedies. Existing time periods have been used.” Or, as expressed in Kambas, "[s]ection 5805 is nothing more than a compilation of existing limitations with no change in time periods.”
It was thus explained to the Legislature, this Court and the Bar that § 5805 merely brought together in one section the various limitations on general tort remedies, without change in the applicable periods of limitation. To find that the section was nonetheless intended to change the time period applicable to actions for the malpractice of lawyers, and perhaps for the malpractice of other professionals, from three years to two years is to infer a change in the law contrary to what was explained to the Legislature.
Where the revision was intended to alter the scope of prior statutes regarding limitations on bringing actions, the committee took care to explain the change. Thus, as to the section on limitations applicable to mortgage foreclosures, the committee comment states:
"Section 5803 is drawn from [1948 CL 609.12] but the second sentence of the statute extends its scope to cover the remedies of foreclosure by publication and other entries under the mortgage as well as foreclosure through the courts.”
Similarly, the committee comment to § 5807 states:
"Section 5807 states the periods of limitations relating to contract damage remedies and extends their application to actions for specific performance of contracts.”
*451The committee comment to § 5823 states:
"Section 5823 broadens the scope of [1948 CL 609.27] by including the term 'counterclaim’ to the extent of the plaintiff’s proved claim.”
Each of these changes, all of which the committee considered to merit highlighting and explanation, were accomplished by language changes far more significant and lucid than the deletion of "physicians, surgeons or dentists” from § 5805(3), which in the majority’s view reflected a clear and unambiguous intent to effect a major change in the law. In § 5803, an entire sentence was added to effect the change. In § 5807, the phrase "or to enforce the specific performance of any contract” was used to expand the coverage of the section to actions for specific performance. In § 5823, the term "counterclaim” was substituted for "set-off” to broaden the scope of the section.
Since the committee took care to explain even changes which appeared so plainly from the language of the new sections, it would be natural for the Legislature to assume that a change as subtle as that which the majority concludes was made in § 5805(3) would have been highlighted in the comments. It is thus unlikely that the Legislature was even aware of the change in § 5805(3), which, since it involved only the deletion of language, would not have appeared from the new language but only from a comparison to the language of the old section.
The broadening of coverage of §291214 and the committee comments thereon are of special significance. The source section for § 2912 applied only to physicians and surgeons, as the source section *452for § 5805(3) applied only to physicians, surgeons and dentists, and provided that the rules applicable to actions for malpractice against physicians and surgeons should also be applicable to actions against persons professing or holding themselves out to be physicians or surgeons. 1948 CL 620.29. This section was expanded to cover persons holding themselves out to be "member[s] of a state licensed profession”.
Unlike the expansion the majority infers from the changes to § 5805(3), this expansion was clearly detailed in the committee comments to the section:
"The source section pertained only to physicians and surgeons. Note that the broadening of this section does not create a new cause of action.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, this expansion of § 2912 was noted in the committee report as a major change from prior statutes. It was the only change in the statutes pertaining to malpractice that was so noted. Under the headings "Major Changes — Statutes”, "Actions for malpractice”, the committee report refers to § 2912 and states:
"At the present time a loophole exists in the action for malpractice. This has been plugged by providing that the standard of the profession will apply to persons professing to be members of the profession, even though they have not been duly licensed.” Committee Report, p 28.
In two separate sections of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 (§ 2912 and § 5838),15 statutes *453pertaining to malpractice were worded to cover professionals in addition to physicians, surgeons and dentists. This Court held in Kambas, and the majority in the instant case agrees, that these sections were not intended to alter the definition of "malpractice” in § 5805(3). It is, however, informative to observe that in each of these two sections, where coverage beyond physicians, surgeons and dentists was clearly intended, the revisors did not simply use the word "malpractice”, as was done in § 5805(3), but instead used or added language to clarify the intended coverage: "a member of a state licensed profession”. Had the revisors intended to similarly expand the applicability of § 5805(3), it is most likely that they would have used similar language.
Surely it is not material whether, as stated by the majority, "[i]n our view, attorneys are deserving of the same protection afforded physicians, surgeons and dentists by the two-year malpractice period of limitations”. If it is to be the policy of Michigan to afford attorneys or other professionals the same protection as is afforded members of the medical profession (although not nurses), that policy should be expressed with clarity by the Legislature and not inferred by this Court from an unremarked compression in language during the course of a broad, general revision and consolidation of statutes.
We would adhere to the construction of § 5805(3) indicated in Kambas: the applicability of the malpractice limitation was not expanded beyond physicians, surgeons and dentists by the changes in language in the Revised Judicature Act of 1961.
We would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 See, e.g., MCL 600.901 et seq.; MSA 27A.901 et seq.

 Kambas v St Joseph’s Mercy Hospital of Detroit, 33 Mich App 127, 132; 189 NW2d 879 (1971) (Levin, J., dissenting).

 Boydston v State, 277 P2d 138 (Okla, 1954).

 Turner v Bennett, 108 SW2d 967 (Tex Civ App, 1937).

 In the Matter of the Suspension or Revocation of the License of Raymond Kerlin, DVM, 151 NJ Super 179; 376 A2d 939 (1977).

 Kime v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 66 Ohio App 277; 33 NE2d 1008 (1940).

 Cargile v State, 194 Ga 20; 20 SE2d 416 (1942).

 In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge No 53, Linwood T Peoples, 296 NC 109; 250 SE2d 890 (1978).

 The act expanded the coverage of MCL 600.2912; MSA 27A.2912, which holds a pseudo-professional to the standard of care required of the profession to which he pretends, beyond physicians and surgeons to all state-licensed professions, indicating that the practice of all state-licensed professions requires a higher standard of care than is required of laymen. As the committee comment to § 2912 notes:
"What this section does is hold the unlicensed person to the standard of care to which a member of the state licensed profession would be held, instead of to the standard of care of a layman, to which unlicensed persons are held at present.”

 If the use of the "malpractice” label has signified no more than the applicability of the higher standard of care due from members of a profession, then actions against all professionals subject to a higher standard of care would have to be considered "malpractice” actions. Such a construction would not only result in a very broad extension in the applicability of the malpractice period of limitation, but would also be plainly inconsistent with Kambas, since nurses are subject to such a higher standard of care.

 Detroit Edison Co v Janosz, 350 Mich 606; 87 NW2d 126 (1957).

 In finding that the 1948 revisions did not substantively alter the law at issue in Fourco, the Court also relied on the expressions in both the Senate and House reports that the revisors’ notes explained all changes, that the notes did not express any substantive change, and that "several of those having importantly to do with the revision say no change is to be presumed unless clearly expressed”. Fourco Glass Co v Transmirra Products Corp, 353 US 222, 227-228; 77 S Ct 787; 1 L Ed 2d 786 (1957).

 See, e.g., Davis v Conour, 178 Colo 376, 382; 497 P2d 1015, 1018 (1972); Wood County v Board of Vocational, Technical & Adult Education, 60 Wis 2d 606, 617-618; 211 NW2d 617 (1973); Fargo v Annexation Review Comm of Cass County, 148 NW2d 338, 348-349 (ND, 1966); Mankato Citizens Telephone Co v Comm’r of Taxation, 275 Minn 107; 145 NW2d 313 (1966); People v Hobbs, 35 Ill 2d 263; 220 NE2d 469 (1966); Town Crier, Inc v Chief of Police of Weston, 361 Mass 682, 686; 282 NE2d 379 (1972); Ohio Dep’t of Natural Resources v Sellers, 14 Ohio App 2d 132, 138-139; 237 NE2d 328, 333 (1968); Jefferson County Teachers Ass’n v Board of Education of Jefferson County, 463 SW2d 627, 629 (Ky, 1970); Briggs Drive, Inc v Moorehead, 103 RI 555; 239 A2d 186 (1968); Welch v Humphrey, 200 Md 410; 90 A2d 686 (1952); Town of Southington v Francis, 159 Conn 64; 266 A2d 387 (1970); and 1A Sands, Sutherlands’ Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 28.10, pp 327-328.

 Briggs Drive, Inc v Moorehead, supra, p 563. This Court has observed that the scope of codifications requires a somewhat different application of the title/object clause of the constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 24). People v Milton, 393 Mich 234, 247-248; 224 NW2d 266 (1974); Regents of University of Michigan v Pray, 264 Mich 693, 697; 251 NW 348 (1933).

 MCL 600.2912; MSA 27A.2912.

 MCL 600.2912; MSA 27A.2912; MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838.