Court Opinion

ID: 9492281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:37:17.48171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:13.761960
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s opinion because I recognize that United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir.1995), is controlling precedent in the Eighth Circuit on the issue of whether the illegality of Lewis’s warrantless arrest under Minnesota law renders the search incident to that arrest unconstitutional. However, I believe that Bell was incorrectly decided and suggest that this case provides a good opportunity for reconsideration of the Bell decision by our court en banc.
I have no quarrel with the well-established principle that federal standards must be applied in judging the legality of the search. Under United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), a lawful custodial arrest is a prerequisite to a warrantless search. In this case, however, we do not have a lawful custodial arrest, and thus the search should not fall under the Robinson exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
In United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), the Court found that the defendant had been *795arrested by New York state officers who lacked arresting authority under state law. The Court then reversed the conviction resulting from evidence seized in a search incident to the arrest. See id. at 593, 68 S.Ct. 222. The Di Re court specifically rejected the government’s argument that the validity of an arrest without a warrant for a federal crime is a matter of federal law to be determined by a uniform rule applicable in all federal courts. See id. at 589, 68 S.Ct. 222. Instead the court held “that in absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity.” Id.
In Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979), the Court stated, “[wjhether an officer is authorized to make an arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law” (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15, and n. 5, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)). And likewise, the Court in Welsh v. Wisconsin, in addressing the circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless arrest by state officers, looked to state law classification of the alleged crime in judging the reasonableness of the arrest, stating “[gjiven that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State’s interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.” 466 U.S. 740, 754 n. 14, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).
The Ninth Circuit applied this precedent in a situation similar to the instant case in United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir.1993), holding “it is clear that state law governing arrests is relevant to assessing the constitutionality of a search incident to that arrest.” In Mota, Santa Ana police officers arrested and searched two brothers for operating a food cart without a valid business license in violation of Santa Ana municipal code. See id. at 1385. Upon searching the brothers, the officers discovered counterfeit bills in their pockets. See id. The Mota court reversed the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the evidence seized from the appellants was unlawfully obtained and should have been suppressed, since the officers were required to only issue a citation and were without legal authority under California law to make a custodial arrest for the infraction. See id. at 1388. I agree with the reasoning and result reached by the Mota court.
As the Mota court observed, the government is asking us to sanction an otherwise unconstitutional search on the basis of an arrest which is illegal as a matter of state law. • See id. at 1387. Minnesota, like California in the Mota case, has specifically removed officer authority to arrest in Lewis’s situation. See Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.01, subd. l(l)(a). Since we are dealing with an arrest by Minneapolis police officers for a violation of a Minneapolis ordinance, the federal court should not sanction an explicit violation of the governing laws as defined by the legislature and courts of the State of Minnesota. See id.; State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn.1998).
Finally, although it is true that at common law an officer could make a warrant-less arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence, I see no basis for relying on this rule in analyzing a statutory misdemeanor. It seems incongruous to rely on common law as authority for an ■ arrest based on a statutory offense, particularly when the same statutory authority has already constrained the power to arrest for that offense.
I urge this court to reconsider Bell en banc.