Court Opinion

ID: 9476282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:52:05.043212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:13.665783
License: Public Domain

MILBURN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the correct approach would be to remand this case to the Secretary for an award of benefits, I respectfully dissent.
Once it was established that plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work, the burden shifted to the Secretary to show that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform “substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir.1986); see also Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir.1985). There must be “a finding supported by substantial evidence that [plaintiff] has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.” O’Banner v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, 587 F.2d 321, 323 *774(6th Cir.1978); see also Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir.1984) (per curiam). The Secretary may meet this burden by reference to the medical vocational guidelines (“the grids”) unless plaintiff suffers from nonexertional limitations which significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations. See Bapp, 802 F.2d at 604-05; Day v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 663, 664-65 (8th Cir.1986); Damron v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 778 F.2d 279, 281-82 (6th Cir.1985); Tucker v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 793, 795-96 (8th Cir.1985); Francis, 749 F.2d at 1566—67; Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 580-81 (10th Cir.1984) (per curiam).
The ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from “severe chest pain and hypertension.” The AU’s finding is supported by plaintiff’s testimony that he suffers severe chest pain and hypertension accompanied by dizziness and headaches. Plaintiff's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Ganesh’s diagnosis of hypertension and hypertensive cardiovascular disease and his observation of plaintiff’s experiencing chest pain and dizziness. Plaintiff’s testimony was further corroborated by Dr. Patel’s diagnosis of uncontrolled hypertension and his observation of plaintiff’s experiencing chest pain.
Although the AU found that plaintiff suffers “severe chest pain,” he described plaintiff’s complaints of severe chest pain as exaggerated. The AU explained that “[w]hile [plaintiff] stated that chest pain occurs not only upon exertion or excitement, but at rest also, [Dr. Ganesh’s] report indicated that [plaintiff] experiences chest pain upon exertion or excitement only.” Dr. Ganesh’s report, however, indicates that plaintiff’s chest pain may be “brought on” by activity or exertion, but in no way precludes the possibility that plaintiff suffers chest pain while resting. The AU further found plaintiff’s testimony generally not persuasive, explaining that while plaintiff testified that he does minimal driving, he also testified that his car, a 1979 vehicle, has 28,000 miles on it. There is, however, no inconsistency in this testimony in light of the fact that there were three other individuals in plaintiff’s family who could have driven the car and the fact that the record does not reveal the mileage on the car when it was purchased. Therefore, the AU’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence and should be overturned. See Hardin v. Heckler, 795 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir.1986); King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974-75 (6th Cir.1984).
But regardless of the AU’s credibility determination, it is undisputed that plaintiff suffers severe chest pain and hypertension accompanied by headaches and dizziness. Pain and dizziness are nonexertional limitations. Bolton v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 536 (8th Cir.1987) (pain and dizziness are nonexertional limitations); Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1105 (10th Cir.1985) (pain is a nonexertional limitation); Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (pain is a nonexertional limitation); Pettijohn v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 669, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (chest pain may be a nonexertional limitation); Bellamy v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.1985) (pain and dizziness are nonexertional limitations); Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir.1984) (per curiam) (dizziness and chest pain are nonexertional limitations); Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (dizziness and pain are nonexertional limitations); Jolly v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 472, 473 (8th Cir.1984) (dizziness is a nonexertional limitation); Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir.1983) (dizziness is a nonexertional limitation); Kreie v. Bowen, 656 F.Supp. 765 (D.Kan.1987) (dizziness is a nonexertional limitation); Fields v. Harris, 498 F.Supp. 478, 492 (N.D.Ga.1980) (dizziness is a nonexertional limitation).
The majority erroneously defines “nonexertional” as encompassing only mental, sensory, and environmental limitations. The residual functional capacity categories in the grids are based upon the physical exertion requirements of jobs in the economy and, therefore, the grids consider only impairments that result in exertional or strength limitations. Channel, 747 F.2d at *775580 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567). “[A] claimant’s placement in a particular category depends on his ‘ability to do physical activities such as walking, standing, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, reaching, [and] handling.’ ” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.-1545(b)). There are, however,
“[s]ome medically determinable impairments, such as skin impairments, epilepsy, and impairments of vision, hearing or other senses, postural and manipulative limitations, and environmental restrictions [that] do not limit physical exertion.” ... Mental impairments, such as the “ability to understand, to carry out and remember instructions and to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and work pressures in a work setting,” ... are likewise nonexertional....
Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c), (d)). The regulations mention mental, sensory, and environmental limitations only by way of example and do not dictate that other limitations which affect more than physical exertion may not be considered nonexertional. Id.; see also McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1148 (8th Cir.1982).
The AU found that plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations do not significantly limit his ability to perform a full range of sedentary work. The AU’s finding is not, however, supported by any evidence in the record. The evidence relevant to whether plaintiff’s capacity to perform sedentary work is significantly limited by his nonexertional limitations consists of Mr. Gold-stein’s testimony and Ms. Johnson’s report. Mr. Goldstein, when asked to consider plaintiff’s chest pains, high blood pressure, shortness of breath, dizziness, and gout, testified that plaintiff could not engage in any vehicle operating. Ms. Johnson reported that plaintiff’s chest pains and dizziness would preclude vehicle operating as a realistic occupation.
The AU erred in relying on the grids in the presence of plaintiff’s significant nonexertional limitations. See Green, 749 F.2d at 1072 (court held that the AU erred in applying grids where the claimant suffered nonexertional impairments; namely, chest pains and dizziness); see also Warmoth v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1109, 1112 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (court held that reliance on the grids requires “reliable evidence of some kind” that the claimant’s nonexertional limitations “do not significantly diminish the employment opportunities otherwise available”); Bellamy, 755 F.2d at 1383 (court held that AU erred in relying on grids where the claimant suffered significant nonexertional impairments, primarily dizziness); Channel, 747 F.2d at 582 (court held that absent a finding, supported by substantial evidence, that the claimant’s nonexertional impairments do not limit the range of jobs available to plaintiff, reliance on the grids is improper); Allen v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 726 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1984) (court held reliance upon grids improper where the AU’s conclusion that the claimant’s nonexertional limitations were not significant was not supported by substantial evidence). The majority would remedy this error by remanding to the Secretary to determine once again whether plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations are significant enough to prevent plaintiff from performing a full range of work at the designated level. It is unreasonable in my view to give the Secretary another chance to consider this issue because, given the evidence of record, the administrative proceeding would only further delay an award of benefits. See Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 222-23 (3d Cir.1984).
Where the Secretary has failed to establish that the claimant’s nonexertional limitations are not significant, “the Secretary must produce expert vocational testimony or other similar evidence to establish that there are jobs available in the national economy for a person with the claimant’s characteristics.” Tucker, 776 F.2d at 795-96; see also Bapp, 802 F.2d at 606; Damron, 778 F.2d at 282; Channel, 747 F.2d at 581-82. Mr. Goldstein’s responses to the hypothetical questions posed by the AU do not support a finding that there are jobs in the economy which plaintiff can perform given his present condition. A vocational expert’s responses to hypothetical questions may constitute substantial evidence *776only if the questions posed accurately portray the claimant’s impairments. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1562-63 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 218; Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 722 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir.1983) (per curiam); McMillian v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 215, 221 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam). The AU’s hypothetical, to which Mr. Goldstein responded that there are jobs in the economy which plaintiff can perform, did not mention plaintiff's chest pains or hypertension. Mr. Gold-stein, when asked to consider plaintiff’s hypertension, dizziness, and chest pain, responded that plaintiff could not perform the jobs previously identified. Since there is no other evidence in the record that would support a finding that plaintiff is capable of performing specific jobs in the economy, the Secretary has failed to carry his burden of proof and benefits should be awarded. See Woods v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 808 F.2d 506, 507 (6th Cir.1987); MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir.1986).
Even if the Secretary’s failure tó discharge his burden of proof did not require a finding that plaintiff is disabled, a finding that plaintiff is disabled would still be required by the grids. The grids provide that a person restricted to sedentary work who is age fifty to fifty-four, and whose education does not permit direct entry into skilled work, must be found disabled unless he has acquired transferable skills as a result of his past work. 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table No. 1, Rule 201.14.1 Skills will be considered transferable when the skilled or semiskilled work activities performed in past work can be used to meet the skilled or semiskilled work activities of other jobs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(1). Skills relate to vocationally significant work activities, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565(a), 404.1568, and are distinguishable from aptitudes which relate to the basic work activities necessary to do most jobs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). See Ellington v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 738 F.2d 159, 160-61 (6th Cir.1984); Weaver v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 722 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir.1983). Terms such as “alertness,” “coordination,” and “dexterity” describe aptitudes or abilities rather than acquired skills. See Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 220; Ellington, 738 F.2d at 160-61; Weaver, 722 F.2d at 311-12.
The AU, in concluding that plaintiff’s prior work imparted transferable skills, relied upon the testimony of Mr. Goldstein, the vocational expert. Mr. Goldstein opined that plaintiff's prior work as a high-low operator resulted in plaintiff’s acquiring “skills” in the “general vehicle operating area” which were transferable to “sedentary vehicle operating positions” such as in-plant jitney driver and sedentary messenger vehicle operator. Although Mr. Goldstein did not identify what qualities fell within the “general vehicle operating area,” these qualities would include the ability to use hands and feet dexterously, hand-eye-foot coordination, manipulative abilities, and spacial perception. See Podedwomy, 745 F.2d at 219-20 (operation of crane involved similar qualities); Morgan v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 664 F.Supp. 273, at 277, No. 85-CV-74290-DT (S.D.Mich.1986) (operation of high-low involved similar qualities). “These qualities are abilities and aptitudes necessary in nearly all jobs, ... rather than the work skills that may support a finding of transferability.” Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 220; see Ellington, 738 F.2d at 160-61; Weaver, 722 F.2d at 311-12; Morgan, 664 F.Supp. at 277. Since the AU’s determination that plaintiff’s prior work as a high-low operator imparted transferable skills is not supported by substantial evidence, a finding of disability is required by the grids. Rule 201.14, Table No. 1 of Appendix 2, Subpart 2; Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with instructions that the district court remand to the Secretary for an award of benefits from the onset date of plaintiff’s disability. I would leave to the Secretary *777the determination of the appropriate onset date.

. Plaintiffs age, educational level, and the skill level of his previous job are undisputed.