Court Opinion

ID: 9744568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:06:59.347329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.087199
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN delivered the opinion of the court: William C. Holtzman was convicted after a bench trial of criminal trespass to State supported land in violation of activity proscribed by section 21 — 5, chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1969. Upon conviction, a fine was imposed. By this appeal from that conviction, the defendant urges that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and, further, that the statute defining the offense as here applied is violative of the defendant’s constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom of petition. We agree with the contention that the evidence does not establish a violation of the statute, and therefore we do not reach the constitutional issue. Section 21 — 5 of chapter 38, so far as is here relevant, defines the offense as: “Whoever enters upon land supported in whole or in part with State funds, * * * or any building on such land, * * * or remains upon such land or in such building after receiving notice from the State or its representative to depart, and who thereby interferes with another person’s lawful use or enjoyment of such building or land, shall be fined not to exceed $1,000 or imprisoned in an institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year.”  The People urge that the word “interferes” as used in the statute means that kind of conduct which by its nature tends to hinder, disrupt or obstruct the orderly function of the official enterprise being carried on in the building or on the land. We accept that definition as generally applicable to the proscribed activity. As thus defined, the statute clearly prohibits activity that interferes with another persons use or enjoyment of such land or building after receiving notice to depart. Thus, entering upon land supported in whole or in part by State funds, or remaining thereon after receiving notice to depart and interfering are each essential elements of the offense. The facts and evidence in this case establish that the defendant, a student at the University of Illinois at Champaign, was soliciting signatures to a petition demanding that the University stop purchasing iceberg lettuce. The defendant was in sympathy with the United Farm-workers Union and his activity was in furtherance of the so-called “lettuce boycott”. He sought signatures in the Union Building, in the area of the snack bar, its lobby, and near the condiment trucks or trays in that area. The evidence is that the defendant, as a student of the University and as one who had paid an activity fee, was entitled to use the facilities of the Union Building, including the snack bar area. Without a detailed recitation of the evidence, it is fair to say that his solicitation of signatures at the head of the cafeteria line caused some congestion and “interfered” with the orderly and apparently the fast movement of that line. The defendant was asked by an employee of tire Union to stop his activity. The defendant did stop his solicitation in that location.  The defendant then moved to the public lobby area outside thé snack bar, outside the food serving or cashier area. In this new position, he again solicited signatures to his petition. A university police officer saw his activity and instructed him to discontinue. The officer handed the defendant a copy of the university regulation that sought to regulate picketing and to prohibit picketing inside university buildings. The defendant did not cease his efforts. John Cocker, assistant director of the Union, told the defendant he could not engage in his picketing in the new location. The defendant did not cease. Cocker left, returned with another police officer, and the defendant was thereafter arrested. There is no evidence that the defendant’s conduct in the second or lobby location interfered with the use or enjoyment of the premises by any other person; thus, interference after the requisite notice is not established. Hie offense as defined by the statute is not established. (See People v. Bufford, 132 Ill.App.2d 417, 270 N.E.2d 550.) The conviction is therefore reversed. Reversed. SIMKINS, J., concurs.