Court Opinion

ID: 9905371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 15:03:50.453248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:13.631474
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 549
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION III
                                      No. CV-23-484

 TIFFANY BAKER                                 Opinion Delivered November 29, 2023
                               APPELLANT
                                               APPEAL FROM THE CLARK COUNTY
                                               CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                                            [NO. 10JV-22-5]

 ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF        HONORABLE BLAKE BATSON,
 HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR      JUDGE
 CHILDREN
                     APPELLEES AFFIRMED

                         WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

       Tiffany Baker appeals the Clark County Circuit Court’s order terminating her

parental rights to Minor Child 1 (MC1), born on March 15, 2006, and Minor Child 2

(MC2), born on February 27, 2007. Baker challenges only the circuit court’s finding that

termination was in the best interest of MC1 and MC2. Specifically, she contends that the

court’s best-interest finding was clearly erroneous because (1) the circuit court found the

children were not likely to be adopted and did not make an alternative finding that adoption

was legally irrelevant, (2) termination would sever their relationship with their maternal
grandmother, and (3) termination did not serve the purpose of the Juvenile Code but was

implemented to punish her. We affirm the circuit court’s order.1

       On March 1, 2022, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a

petition for dependency-neglect contending that the removal of MC1 and MC2 from Baker’s

custody was necessary due to neglect and parental unfitness. The affidavit attached to the

petition explained that DHS had opened a dependency-neglect case in July 2021 involving

MC3, Baker’s youngest child and a sibling of MC1 and MC2. All three children had been

living with their legal guardian and maternal grandmother, Michelle Sims. In July 2021,

MC3 had been ordered into DHS custody after a family-in-need-of-services (FINS) court

hearing, where Sims testified that MC3 has severe behavioral problems and that she was

concerned about her safety and the safety of others in her home. The circuit court exercised

an emergency hold on MC3 and placed him in foster care.

       The affidavit further stated that on August 26, 2021, Sims filed a petition to terminate

her guardianship of MC1, MC2, and MC3, which was granted. Custody of MC1 and MC2

was returned to Baker. MC1 and MC2 refused to follow Baker’s rules, left home without

permission, and were gone for two or three days at a time. The children said Baker was “not

their mother because she was not active in their lives for over twelve years.” DHS opened a

       1
         This case is the companion case to Baker v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,
2023 Ark. App. 550, also handed down today, in which Baker has appealed the termination
of her parental rights to Minor Child 3 (MC3), born on December 29, 2007. The cases
proceeded under different case numbers with two termination orders and two notices of
appeal. However, a single termination hearing was held for all three children. The children’s
father is deceased.

                                              2
protective-services case for Baker, MC1, and MC2 and provided parenting-program services,

resources for housing, acute-residential-treatment referrals, referrals for private placement of

children, family counseling, and home visits, only some of which Baker pursued.

       On January 12, 2022, MC1 was not attending school, and Baker reported her as a

runaway. On February 14, MC1 got into a fight at school and refused to go with Baker after

the school called Baker to come get her; she finally agreed to stay with a friend. The next

day, Baker contacted DHS and said that she could no longer provide care to MC2 and could

not handle his behavior. Baker also reported to DHS that the children were better off if she

was dead, she was leaving MC2 at home, and she did not want anyone to call or try to locate

her. On February 16, Baker called the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Department to help with

MC2, but when they arrived, MC2 had run away. He returned the next day and was

transported to Rivendell for an assessment. After he was released, MC1 and MC2 were

removed from Baker’s custody and placed in the custody of DHS.

       MC1 and MC2 were adjudicated dependent-neglected on the basis of parental

unfitness in an order entered on April 11. The circuit court set a goal of reunification with

Baker. An agreed review order was entered on August 15 in which the court continued the

goal of reunification. The court found Baker was unfit at that time and had no stable

housing, employment, or transportation. The court also found that DHS had provided,

offered, or referred services; attempted home visits; and made reasonable efforts to finalize a

permanency plan for the juveniles.

                                               3
       The circuit court entered another agreed review order on November 7, again finding

Baker unfit but continuing the goal of reunification. However, the court warned Baker that

unless she made significant progress before the scheduled permanency-planning hearing in

January 2023, DHS would recommend a goal change to termination. The DHS report

attached to the order noted that MC1 was in a qualified residential treatment program in

Little Rock and adjusting well, although she had been unable to maintain a job due to drug

screens that were positive for marijuana. MC1 was receiving counseling, completing a

transitional life-skills training course, and taking daily medication. MC2 was in a residential

treatment facility in Forrest City where he struggled to follow rules, was physically aggressive

toward residents and staff, and walked off campus without permission.

       On January 9, 2023, the court held a permanency-planning hearing and changed the

goal for MC1 and MC2 to adoption. The court determined that Baker had not complied

with the case plan and orders of the court, finding that she had used methamphetamine

since the last review hearing, was not employed, lacked stable housing, and had unreliable

transportation. A week later, DHS filed a petition to terminate Baker’s parental rights to

MC1 and MC2.

       The court held a termination hearing for all three children on April 3. Baker admitted

that she used methamphetamine one time during the case, contested the drug screens that

she failed, denied that she refused to submit to random drug testing, and made excuses for

why she could not go to inpatient drug treatment. She testified that Sims had guardianship

                                               4
over MC1, MC2, and MC3 for eleven years and blamed Sims for the children’s behavioral

problems.

       Sims testified that she obtained guardianship over the children in 2011 because Baker

had recently left her husband, was homeless, and was using methamphetamine. Sims stated

that she raised the children until 2021 when she filed the FINS petition because she could

not control MC3. Thereafter, she began to have problems with MC1 and MC2, and

ultimately, she decided to terminate the guardianship. Sims stated that she had not contacted

MC1 or MC2 since they had been taken into DHS custody but that she would like to have

a relationship with her grandchildren.

       Laura Mergele, the DHS family-service-worker supervisor, testified that Baker tested

positive for amphetamine and buprenorphine in October 2022 and methamphetamine and

amphetamine in December 2022 and that she refused to show up for random drug testing.

Mergele stated that five appointments were scheduled for Baker for a psychological

evaluation, but Baker did not attend any of them. Regarding MC1 and MC2, Mergele

testified about the behavior problems MC1 and MC2 have and the treatment they were

receiving. She said that MC1 and MC2 did not want to return to their mother’s custody and

did not want to be adopted. Instead, they wanted to learn to be independent. Mergele was

asked why DHS was recommending termination if adoption was not likely, and she said:

              Because through the life of the case, therapists have noted that when the kids
       have contact with their mom, then they dysregulate, they struggle, they have more
       behaviors and acting out. And therapists have noted that for the kids to move forward
       in their life and in therapy, they need closure and the ability to know, especially for,

                                              5
       like [MC1], that they don’t have to have contact with her. . . . And, so, it’s – it’s for
       their mental health and their best interest for their lives.

Mergele was also asked why an order prohibiting Baker from initiating contact with the

children (instead of termination) would not be sufficient, and Mergele stated that the

children needed “finality so they can move forward.” Finally, Mergele testified that if MC1

and MC2 wanted to be adopted, they would be adoptable.

       On April 20, the circuit court entered an order terminating Baker’s parental rights to

MC1 and MC2 on the grounds of twelve months failure to remedy; other subsequent factors;

and aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of reunification. The court also found that

termination of Baker’s parental rights is in the best interest of MC1 and MC2, stating that

it considered all relevant factors, including the likelihood that the juveniles would be

adopted if parental rights were terminated and the potential harm that could be caused by

returning the juveniles to Baker. Regarding adoptability, the court provided the following

explanation:

       As to the juveniles’ adoptability, the Court finds that the juveniles are not likely to be
       adopted, because the juveniles have significant behavioral barriers to adoption
       However, the Court finds that the juveniles do not wish to be adopted, but rather to
       remain in Department custody, continue to avail themselves of the Department’s
       Transitional Youth Services, and to engage in services toward the goal of APPLA.[2]
       Moreover, the Department continues to provide mental and behavioral health
       services to the juveniles, which could improve their potential to become adoptable.

Finally, the court found that the juveniles shall continue in the care and custody of DHS,

that the permanency plan shall be APPLA, and that DHS is authorized to consent to the

       2
           APPLA is an acronym for another planned permanent living arrangement.

                                               6
adoption of the juveniles without Baker’s consent. Baker brings this appeal from the court’s

order.

         We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Cheney v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 209, 396 S.W.3d 272. We will not reverse the circuit court’s decision

unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App.

323, at 10, 669 S.W.3d 865, 872. An order terminating parental rights must be based upon

a finding by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds stated in the termination

statute is satisfied and that the sought-after termination is in the children’s best interest. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (Supp. 2023). Credibility determinations are left to the finder of fact.

Kerr v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 271, at 6, 493 S.W.3d 342, 346.

         Baker does not appeal the court’s findings of statutory grounds for termination. Her

appeal is a narrowly targeted challenge to the court’s best-interest finding. She contends that

the court’s finding that termination was in the juveniles’ best interest was clearly erroneous

because it found that MC1 and MC2 were not likely to be adopted and did not make an

alternative finding that adoption was legally irrelevant; termination jeopardized the juveniles’

relationship with their grandmother; and it did not serve the permanency purpose of the

Juvenile Code “since they did not need to be freed for adoption” and suggests that the court’s

decision was implemented for punishment.

         We first address Baker’s challenge to the court’s consideration of adoptability. In

making a best-interest determination, the circuit court is required to consider two factors:

(1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted, and (2) the potential harm to the child if

                                                7
custody is returned to a parent. Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 725, at 4,

478 S.W.3d 272, 275. The law does not require the circuit court to find that the juveniles

are adoptable in order to terminate a parent’s rights. In McDaniel v. Arkansas Department of

Human Services, 2013 Ark. App. 263, at 4, this court held that adoptability is not an essential

element of proof in a termination case. It is merely a factor that must be considered by the

circuit court in determining the best interest of the child. Id. at 4–5. The fact that children

are not up for adoption, standing alone, does not preclude this court from affirming the

termination due to the potential harm the parent poses. Lyall v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2023 Ark. App. 81, at 19, 661 S.W.3d 240, 252.

       Rather, this court is required to consider adoptability and find by clear and

convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

Rocha v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 454, at 12, 637 S.W.3d 299, 308. The

polestar is that termination of parental rights must, after consideration of all relevant

circumstances including adoptability, be shown to be in the child’s best interest. Grant v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 636, at 13, 378 S.W.3d 227, 233.

       The circuit court clearly considered adoptability in this case as evidenced by its

paragraph explaining its consideration. The court noted that adoption was not likely due to

behavioral barriers, but it also found that the barriers to adoption were likely to be reduced

with the juveniles in DHS custody because the services being provided to the juveniles “could

improve their potential to become adoptable.” Moreover, Mergele, the DHS family service

worker, testified that if MC1 and MC2 wanted to be adopted, they “would be adoptable.”

                                               8
Mergele also testified, however, that neither MC1 nor MC2 wants to be adopted. She said

they both want to learn how to be independent and want their mother’s parental rights to

be terminated. The circuit court found that MC1 and MC2 were at risk of potential harm

should they be returned to Baker’s custody in light of her drug use and instability, and Baker

does not challenge that finding on appeal. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court

sufficiently considered the adoptability factor and that it did not clearly err in concluding

that termination was in the best interest of MC1 and MC2.

       Baker also contends that termination of her parental rights jeopardized the juveniles’

relationship with Sims, which she argues is contrary to their best interest. In support of her

argument, she cites our decisions in Caldwell v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010

Ark. App. 102, and Lively v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2015 Ark. App. 131, 456

S.W.3d 383. We disagree that the circumstances in this case are similar to those in either

Caldwell or Lively. The issue in both Caldwell and Lively was whether termination of the

father’s rights was in the children’s best interest when there was no question of permanency

given that the mother had custody, the paternal grandparents had a strong bond with the

children, and the grandparents had been the most stable influence in the children’s lives.

Termination of the father’s rights in those cases was not necessary for the children to have

permanency. They already had permanency with their mother. Here, the children were not

in Baker’s permanent custody or in any parent’s custody. They were in DHS custody.

       Moreover, termination of Baker’s rights was not involuntarily severing a strong bond

with a grandparent. Sims’s voluntary decision to terminate her guardianship of the juveniles

                                              9
is what initiated this dependency-neglect case and the resulting termination of Baker’s

parental rights. Sims admitted at the hearing that she had not contacted MC1 or MC2 since

they had been placed in DHS custody. Sims said she had not heard from MC2 in a long time

but that she had received text messages from MC1. Sims stated that she wanted the children

to get the help they needed and “whatever’s in their best interest.” And the evidence at trial

indicated she could continue to have a relationship with MC1 and MC2 if Baker’s rights

were terminated. Mergele testified that they could continue this relationship if they desired.

The issues in Lively and Caldwell are not a concern here.

       Finally, Baker argues that termination is not in the children’s best interest because it

does not serve the purpose of the Juvenile Code, which is to clear a child for permanency.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3) (Supp. 2023). She claims DHS terminated her parental

rights to MC1 and MC2 because “she had not checked all the boxes, even though the minors

did not need to be cleared for adoption, and they had a permanency plan that would allow

achievement of the code’s purpose without termination being implemented.” She further

claims that this is a case where “two juxtaposed women with vastly different socioeconomic

and lifestyle histories faced the exact same failures and lack of control over the minors, and

yet [Sims] was regarded as the ‘life-long’ appropriate point of contact, and [Baker] was vilified

and stripped of her parental liberty.” Baker claims that she was singled out and that the

termination of her parental rights “smacks” of punishment.

       There is no evidence in the record to support Baker’s claim that the circuit court

terminated her parental rights to punish her. Rather, the circuit court’s order demonstrates

                                               10
that it appropriately considered the best-interest factors—including adoptability and potential

harm—when finding termination of Baker’s parental rights was in the best interest of MC1

and MC2.

       Additionally, section 9-27-341(a)(3) refers to permanency, not adoption. At the time

of the hearing, MC1 was seventeen years old and MC2 was sixteen. Mergele testified that

MC1 and MC2 wanted closure and finality, which meant termination of Baker’s parental

rights. Mergele said that MC1 had a plan for her life—to finish high school and go into the

military—and MC1 thinks it is in her own best interest to terminate Baker’s parental rights.

MC2 also told Mergele that he does not want to return to his mother’s care, he knows he

needs help, and he cannot get that help from Baker. He is also considering the military

because he wants more structure in his life. Mergele said that the therapists throughout the

case noted that when the children have contact with Baker they struggle, “dysregulate,” and

act out. Mergele said the children’s therapists noted that they need closure and the certainty

that they do not have to continue contact with Baker, and the therapists opined that

termination of parental rights was best for the children’s mental health. Mergele testified

that termination was necessary for the children to move forward. We hold that the circuit

court’s best-interest finding in this case is consistent with the purpose of the Juvenile Code,

was not designed to punish Baker, and is not clearly erroneous.

       Affirmed.

       ABRAMSON and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

       Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

                                              11
Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

                                    12