Court Opinion

ID: 9796787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:04:54.843052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:29.159256
License: Public Domain

OPALA, J.,
dissenting
1 The dispositive question posed for our decision is whether the text of Art. 2, See. 18, Ok1. Const., confers on the Attorney General the authority to convene a multicounty grand jury to investigate activities occurring within a single county. The court's answer is in the affirmative. Its pronouncement relies exclusively on the legislative "clarification" of the constitutional language, Art. 2, See. 18, Ok. Const., contained in the Multicounty Grand Jury Act, 22 0.98.2001 and 0.8. Supp. 2007, §§ 851and 358.
T2 In reaching today's conclusion the court has utterly abdicated its role as the legal system's recognized paramount and exclusive arbiter of the Constitution's meaning. The Legislature's discretion is not unlimited, although its conclusions are often entitled to much deference. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515 and 536, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2162 and 2172, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997).
T3 I decline to yield to the Legislature the court's paramount and exelusive power to act as the ultimate arbiter of the constitution's text.1 Marbury v. Madison, supra; City of Boerne v. Flores, supra.

. The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Constitution's meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch. Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81, 120 S.Ct. 631, 644, 145 L..Ed.2d 522.