Court Opinion

ID: 9712028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:44:54.742333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:09.274312
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In my view, defendant’s aggregate sentence of 50 years exceeds the limit mandated by the legislature as set forth in the sentencing statutes applicable to defendant. Therefore, the court errs when it states that the imposed sentence is within the statutory limits. See 193 111. 2d at 210. Because the record affirmatively demonstrates that both the parties and the trial judge misapprehended the parameters of the sentencing range to be utilized in this case, I would remand the matter for resentencing. As noted in the court’s opinion, defendant was convicted by two separate juries of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and criminal sexual abuse. At the ensuing sentencing proceedings, the trial judge and the parties proceeded under section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which provides in pertinent part that “When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender.” 730 ILCS 5/5— 5 — 3(c)(8) (West 1994). Moreover, defendant, having been convicted of two separate offenses, was to receive two sentences. At the sentencing hearing, the State, citing to section 5 — 8— 4(b) of the Code, requested that the trial judge impose “consecutive terms of sentencing with respect to each incident up to 60 years.” Section 5 — 8—4 allows the sentencing judge to determine whether multiple sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively. See 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4 (West 1994). According to section (b) of the statute, consecutive sentences “shall not be imposed” unless the sentencing judge, having considered the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and character of the defendant, “is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.” 730 ILCS 5/5— 8 — 4(b) (West 1994). The trial judge expressed his belief on the record that consecutive sentences were warranted based on the evidence adduced at the hearing: “the sentence that I give here today must be targeted at the goal of keeping Mr. Stacey from committing further instances of sexual crimes *** to protect the public ***.” Due to the dual applicability of both section 5 — 5— 3(c)(8) and section 5 — 8—4(b) of the Code, the trial judge and the parties considered 6 to 30 years (the range for Class X offenses) to be the appropriate range for each sentence to be imposed. The State sought two 30-year sentences to be imposed consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 60 years. Defense counsel asked that the minimum be imposed. The trial judge ultimately decided upon two 25-year sentences to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 50 years. Neither the trial judge nor the parties, however, took into account the limiting language contained in section 5 — 8—4(c)(2), which states: “[T]he aggregate of consecutive sentences shall not exceed the sum of the maximum terms authorized under Section 5 — 8—2 for the 2 most serious felonies involved.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(c)(2) (West 1994). Section 5 — 8—4(c)(2) plays an important role in fashioning consecutive sentences. The aim of the statute “is to limit the total length of consecutive sentences imposed on a defendant, while still fairly punishing the defendant in relation to the severity of the crimes. Such a purpose is reasonable in the context of punishing a defendant for a series of crimes, where the stacking of penalties can result in sentences of extraordinary harshness.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 436 (1995), citing 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 18 — 4.5 (2d ed. Supp. 1986). See also People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (2000) (same).1  We recently explained in Pullen that section 5 — 8— 4(c)(2) limits the aggregate of consecutive sentences to be imposed upon a defendant who has been convicted of Class 1 or 2 felonies, but is eligible for sentencing as a Class X offender because of prior convictions. We noted that section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) has been construed by this court to mean that, while defendant is to be sentenced as a Class X offender, the classification and character of the felonies committed does not change. See People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000); People v. Olivo, 183 Ill. 2d 339, 340-41 (1998); People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 224 (1996); People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 290 (1994). In other words, section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) leaves unaffected the classification of a defendant’s offenses. We explained in Thomas that the legislative intent behind the provision was to subject defendants convicted of Class 1 and Class 2 felonies to an enhanced sentencing range of from 6 to 30 years. See Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 224. However, the fact that a defendant is to be sentenced as a Class X offender, pursuant to section 5 — 5—3(c)(8), does not change the classification of the “two most serious felonies involved” for purposes of consecutive sentencing under section 5 — 8—4(c)(2). Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42-43 (and cases cited therein). In light of these principles, we held in Pullen that where, as here, a defendant has been convicted of two Class 2 felonies and is eligible for sentencing as a Class X offender, the aggregate of the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court may not exceed the sum of the maximum terms authorized under section 5 — 8—2 for Class 2 felonies. The maximum term authorized for a Class 2 felony, under section 5 — 8—2, is 14 years. See 730 ILCS 5 — 8— 2(a)(4) (West 1994). Therefore, the maximum aggregate sentence authorized in this case was 28 years. The trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of 50 years of imprisonment, a sentence that exceeds, by 22 years, the sentence authorized by statute. Defendant’s sentence is therefore void. See Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42-43. In light of the foregoing, our precedent mandates that we vacate defendant’s sentences and remand the matter for resentencing. JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.  The legislature amended section 5 — 8—4(c)(2) in response to this court’s decision in Tucker. Pub. Act 90 — 128, §5 (eff. July 22, 1997). The amendment eliminated the aggregate limitation in cases, such as this, where the offenses were not committed as part of a single course of conduct. This amendment could not be applied in this case because it was not in effect on the dates defendant committed the crimes at issue. Moreover, a retroactive application of the amendment would violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by the law when the act to be punished occurred.