Court Opinion

ID: 9757305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:30:10.911794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:37.854875
License: Public Domain

BELL, Chief Judge, dissenting which HARRELL and GREENE, JJ., join.
In this case, we are asked, by the appellant, the State of Maryland, to determine “whether the suppression court err[ed] in ruling that the Maryland DNA Collection Act is unconstitutional as violative of the Fourth Amendment.”1 More specifically, the question is whether the Circuit Court for Montgomery County erred when, having found that the Maryland DNA Collection Act, Maryland Code (1994, 2003 Replacement Volume), § 2-501 et seq. of the Public Safety Article, was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it granted the appellee’s motion to suppress physical evidence in a first degree rape and robbery case. The majority concludes that it did. It holds “that the Maryland DNA Collection Act ... is constitutional and does not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Maryland Constitutions.” *53State of Maryland v. Charles Raines, 383 Md. 1, 5, 857 A.2d 19, 21 (2004). It reasons, in summary,
“[t]he [Maryland DNA Collection] Act’s provisions allowing the State to obtain the DNA profile of a certain group of convicted persons to store in a DNA data base is reasonable, because the minimal physical intrusion on the inmate, a person with a diminished expectation of privacy, is outweighed by the legitimate governmental interest in identifying persons involved with crimes, including vindicating those falsely convicted.”
Id. at 41-42, 857 A.2d at 43.
In arriving at this holding, the majority accepts the State’s argument that the DNA collection act “is consistent with the Fourth amendment’s totality of the circumstances test, which assesses the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment intrusion by balancing the degree of the government’s intrusion upon the individual’s expectation of privacy against the promotion of the government’s legitimate interest.” Id. at 14-15, 857 A.2d at 27. Like the State, the majority characterizes the government intrusion in this case, the search — the buccal swab — as minimal, “as appellee, an incarcerated felon, had a diminished expectation of privacy,” id. at 14-15, 857 A.2d at 27, and announces the legitimate government interest, which it characterizes as “properly identifying individuals and protecting the public,” as having been “served.” Id.
The majority relies on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (1992),2 the fact *54that the overwhelming number of courts that have addressed the issue has upheld the constitutionality of DNA collection statutes and its “independent assessment” of the reasonableness of DNA collection searches. Interestingly, it purports not to address the State’s alternative argument, that the statute passes muster under the “special needs” exception, as “collection of ‘DNA from convicted offenders and storing their DNA profiles serve[ ] special law enforcement interests.’ ” Id.
I disagree and, guided by the traditional tenets of Fourth Amendment3 jurisprudence, I dissent.
From the earliest days of search and seizure jurisprudence, it has been clear that, in its purest form, the Fourth Amendment mandates that no search of place, property or person or seizure, should be effectuated and no evidence resulting from such a search and seizure should be considered unless there has been a sufficient showing of a particularized and focused suspicion, amounting to probable cause, that the place or individual to be searched was involved in criminal activity. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2041, 150 L.Ed.2d 94, 100 (2001); See Generally, Wayne LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.1(a). From its inception,
“the Fourth Amendment was the colonists’ response to the unlimited intrusions by the British government into their *55privacy in the 1700s. Using a Writ of Assistance, British customs officials were able to enter any home and search the premises for evidence of customs violations. These officials did not need ‘to have particularized suspicions about any person or place before searching, nor were they required to justify their actions to any authority after the search.’ The Framers found these unchecked governmental actions by the British unacceptable. To ensure that their new government would not have this type of arbitrary power, and to protect against the recurrence of these unchecked governmental actions, the Framers included the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, granting the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”
See Denise Robinson, Kaupp v. Texas: Breathing Life into the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 761 (Spring 2004).
This protection was, and continues to be, greatest with respect to the search of a private home. United States v. Unites States Dist. Ct for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752, 764 (1972) (“[Pjhysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed”) “[A]t the very core of Fourth Amendment, ‘stands the right of a [person] to retreat into [her] own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 31, 121 S.Ct. at 2041, 150 L.Ed.2d at 100, quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d 734, 739 (1961). Undergirding, and forming the foundation for, this jealously guarded and rigid protection of private homes from governmental invasions without probable cause was the bedrock principle of the common law that there exists an “ ‘overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.’ ” Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L.Ed.2d 214, 224 (1984) quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1387, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 660 (1980).
*56A citizen’s privacy interests are not limited to his or her home, however. Rather, those interests extend to his or her person. As the Supreme Court observed in Katz v. United States,
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 [, 315 (1966)]; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [, 1204 (1927)]. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”
389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 582 (1967). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 898-99 (1968), in which, quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734, 737 (1891), the Supreme Court held that “ ‘[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’ ”
To be sure, the Court, in some cases, has reformulated the probable cause standard, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 941 (1967) (holding that “[i]f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.”) and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947 (1967) (“The agency’s particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved”), and has relaxed the probable *57cause standard for searches,4 in others, see, e.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968) (holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480-3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1220 (1983) (holding that “search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, *58reasonably warrant’ the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons”); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1098, 108 L.Ed.2d 276, 286 (1990) (holding “that as an incident to arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion [that persons were actually in the areas], look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched”); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 122 S.Ct. 587, 592, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, 506-507 (2001) (holding that “when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer[, who is already] subject to a search condition [pursuant to his probation agreement,] is engaged in criminal activity, [then] there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s ... privacy interests is reasonable.”). In still others, the Court has dispensed with the requirement for particularized and focused suspicion as a prerequisite for search.5 Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 2564-65, 153 L.Ed.2d 735, 744 (2002); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); Natl. Treasury Employees Union v. *59Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1391, 103 L.Ed.2d 685, 703 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n. 489 U.S., 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).
The cases in this latter category reflect the permissible exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements that the Supreme Court has recognized, those being “special” interests or needs searches,6 undertaken to further some important and legitimate societal interest, other than the general interest in law enforcement. Reflective of such interests are random prison searches designed to ensure the security of penal institutions, see Hudson, at 529, 104 S.Ct. at 3202, 82 L.Ed.2d at 404-405,7 random drug and alcohol testing in occupations directly impacting the public safety, ensuring public safety by *60regulating certain occupations,8 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679, 109 S.Ct. at 1398, 103 L.Ed.2d at 710-711 (holding reasonable a U.S. Customs regulation requiring urine testing of all employees who applied for a promotion that required the carrying of a gun and involvement with drug interdiction, given that the “government’s compelling interest in safeguarding borders and public safety outweighed diminished privacy expectation”); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634, 109 S.Ct. at 1422, 103 L.Ed.2d at 670-71 (holding railroad regulation requiring random drug testing without particularized suspicion to be reasonable in light of connection to public safety); drug testing of students, Earls, 536 U.S. at 824, 122 S.Ct. at 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d at 744 (urine testing of students engaged in extracurricular activities to prevent health and safety risks of drug use); Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 661-64, 115 S.Ct. at 2394-2396, 132 L.Ed.2d at 579-82 (holding that school district’s requirement that all students who wished to participate in interscholastic sports submit to random urinalysis testing was reasonable in light of the overwhelming interest in ensuring that youth are drug free).
These changes do not indicate, however, that the Court has abandoned the requirement that most searches be justified by some level of particularized or focused suspicion or that suspicionless searches are the rule whenever the intrusion occasioned by the search is “minimal” and justified by a law enforcement purpose or purposes. On the contrary, two recent cases make clear the Supreme Court’s position with respect to suspicionless searches for general criminal law enforcement purposes.
*61In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), the Court considered the constitutionality of an automobile checkpoint program set up to discover and interdict illegal drugs. At the checkpoint, officers stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, and, with each stop, one officer approached the vehicle, explained that it was being stopped at a drug checkpoint and asked for license and registration. Id. at 35, 121 S.Ct. at 450, 148 L.Ed.2d at 339. While the officer looked for signs of impairment and conducted an open view examination, a narcotics-sniffing dog was walked around the outside of each car. Id. at 35, 121 S.Ct. at 450-51, 148 L.Ed.2d at 339. Although acknowledging that “the sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is ‘much less intrusive than a typical search,’ ” id. at 40, 121 S.Ct. at 453, 148 L.Ed.2d at 343, quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 121 (1983), after noting the usual rule — “[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,” id. at 37, 121 S.Ct. at 451, 148 L.Ed.2d at 340 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1298, 137 L.Ed.2d 513, 519 (1997)) — and reviewing the “only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply,” 9 id., the Court nevertheless held that the seizure in that *62case was not carried out pursuant to a legitimate special governmental need, but, rather, served as a mask for detecting evidence of criminal ■wrongdoing. The Court explained:
“We have never approvéd a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. We suggested in Prouse that we would not credit the ‘general interest in crime control’ as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops. Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is *63to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 41-42, 121 S.Ct. at 454, 148 L.Ed.2d at 343.
The Court rejected an argument that the checkpoint at issue in Edmond had the same “ultimate purpose” as the roadblocks previously upheld, to arrest those suspected of committing crimes. On that point, the Court explained:
“If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.”
Id. at 42, 121 S.Ct. at 454, 148 L.Ed.2d at 344. Finally, the Court was clear, the gravity of the threat alone may not define the means that may be used to pursue a given purpose. “Rather,” it asserted,
“in determining whether individualized suspicion is required, we must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue. We are particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.”
Id. at 42-43, 121 S.Ct. at 454-55. 148 L.Ed.2d at 344.
This approach and rationale was reiterated and reconfirmed in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001). In that case, the Court held unconstitutional a hospital policy that tested the urine of pregnant women for illegal drugs, the positive results of which were provided to prosecutors for use in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 84-86, 121 S.Ct. at 1292-93, 149 L.Ed.2d at 220-221. In so holding, the Court noted that the searches of the women involved were based neither on “probable cause to believe that they were using cocaine [nor] even the basis for a reasonable *64suspicion of such use [of cocaine].” Id. at 76, 121 S.Ct. at 1287-88, 149 L.Ed.2d at 215. The Court declined to accept the City’s argument that “protecting of the mother and child” served a beneficent purpose, when “it ... [was] clear from the record that an initial and continuing focus of the policy was on the arrest and prosecution.” Id. at 82, 121 S.Ct. at 1290, 149 L.Ed.2d at 219 (citation omitted).10 To that end, the Court reasoned that:
“[w]hile the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes, in order to reach that goal. The threat of law enforcement may ultimately have been intended as a means to an end, but the direct and primary purpose of [the] policy was to ensure the use of those means. In our opinion this distinction is critical. Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents’ view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate rather than immediate purpose. Such an approach is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 82-84, 121 S.Ct. at 1291-92, 149 L.Ed.2d at 219-20.
The majority disclaims any reliance on “special needs” cases, maintaining that such reliance is unnecessary. Moreover, it does not contend that there is particular or articulable reason to suspect the respondent or, indeed, any of the convicted felons subject to the DNA collection statute, of engaging in any wrongdoing other than that for which he has, or they have, been convicted. And the statute does not contain, or make, findings that would substitute for such individualized and focused suspicion. Rather, the majority *65relies on a kind of, as the respondent characterizes it, “free floating ‘totality of the circumstances’ balancing test of the sort employed in the ‘special needs’ line of cases” to sustain the constitutionality of the DNA collection act. The balance that it posits as applicable to the determination of the reasonableness of the subject search pits the diminished expectation of privacy of a convicted felon against the legitimate government interest of “identifying persons” and more specifically, the majority submits, “in establishing a more accurate method to identify recidivists for several purposes.” 383 Md. at 17-18, 857 A.2d at 28-29.
Because, as we have seen, the majority has determined that the intrusion occasioned by the search is minimal — taking a buccal swab of the cheek takes only a few seconds, it reasons — the majority concludes that the balance favors the government interest.
The balance is free floating because there is no context to the expectation of privacy prong; apparently, there are no limits to it. Furthermore, the purpose posited for why the exploitation of that diminished expectation of privacy is proper bears no relation to the respondent’s status as a convicted felon or to the penal institution’s ability safely and effectively to house him. Authority for this balancing test, the majority finds in Knights, supra.
Knights does not stand for the proposition for which the majority cites it. In that case, Knights, the respondent, was on probation for a drug offense. As a condition of probation, Knights agreed to a provision in his release contract which stated that he “submitfs] his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.” 534 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. at 588, 151 L.Ed.2d at 502. Shortly after he was placed on probation, Knights and an associate, Simoneau, were linked to several arsons involving Pacific Gas and Electric (PG & E) property. Having surveilled Knights and his co-conspirator, during the course of which he observed *66Knights in possession of what appeared to be several pipe bombs and observed some suspicious objects, including a Molotov cocktail, two brass padlocks reported stolen from the PG & E property that had been set on fire, and a gasoline can, in Simoneau’s truck while it was-parked outside of Knights’s apartment, id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. at 589, 151 L.Ed.2d at 502-503, and aware of the search provision in Knights’s probation order,, a detective searched Knights’s apartment, uncovering substantial evidence that Knights had been involved in setting the fires.11
Knights was arrested and subsequently indicted for conspiracy to commit arson, possession of an unregistered destructive device and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In his pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search, Knights argued that the search was an illegal one. Id. at 116, 122 S.Ct. at 590, 151 L.Ed.2d at 503. Although the United States District Court for the Northern District of California held that the detective had reasonable suspicion that Knights was involved with incendiary devices, it nevertheless granted the motion to suppress on the ground that the search was for “investigatory” rather that probationary purposes. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Ooley, 116 F.3d 370 (9th Cir.1997), in which it held that a search condition in a probation order “must be seen as limited to probation searches, and must stop short of investigation searches.” Id. This holding being at odds with California precedent, which held that the probation condition at issue drew no distinction between probationary searches and investigatory searches, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to assess the constitutionality of searches made pursuant to this common California probation condition.” Id.
*67After establishing the correct mode of analysis, namely, to balance the privacy interests of the respondent with legitimate government interests, the Court acknowledged that Knights’s status as a probationer was integral to both prongs of the analysis. First, the Court held that probationers have a lower expectation of privacy by virtue of their involvement with the criminal system. On that point, the Court stated:
“Probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed by ‘a court upon an offender after verdict, finding or plea of guilty.’ ” Griffin [v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,] 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (quoting G. Killinger, H. Kerper, & P. Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice System 14 (1976)). Probation is “one point ... on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service[.]” 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709. Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers “do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.... Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. at 591, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505. (some citations omitted). The Court took notice that, in that case, the petitioner’s expectation of privacy was significantly diminished because “[t]he probation order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it,” id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. at 592, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505; he was on notice that his probation agreement included a condition allowing law enforcement officials to search his premises without notice.
With respect to the government interest side of the balance, the Court observed that the government’s “interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting potential victims of criminal enterprise, may justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen.” Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 592, 151 L.Ed.2d at 506. This is so, it *68pointed out, because “it must be remembered that ‘the very assumption of the institution of probation’ is that the probationer ‘is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.’” Id. at 120, 122 S.Ct. at 592, 151 L.Ed.2d at 506, quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 488 U.S. 868, 880, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3172, 97 L.Ed.2d 709, 721 (1987).
Given the lowered expectation of privacy, the Court held that, rather than the usual requirement of probable cause, all that was necessary for the search in that case was reasonable suspicion. Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 592-93, 151 L.Ed.2d at 507. More particularly, the Court explained:
“We hold that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house. The degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of which there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interests reasonable. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (individualized suspicion deals ‘with probabilities’). Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable.... Those interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard here. When an officer has reasonable suspicion that the probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.”
Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 592-93, 151 L.Ed.2d at 506-507 (some citations omitted).
Having so held, despite the fact that, by its terms, the probation condition permitted a suspicionless search, the Court did not decide “whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated Knights’s reasonable expectation of privacy (or constituted consent ...) that a search *69by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. at 592 n. 6, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505 n. 6.
As indicated, the majority’s reasonableness analysis relies on the reasoning in Knights. It finds particularly instructive the Court’s recognition that probationers, in certain circumstances, enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy. Building on that premise, it reaches the conclusion that prisoners who are incarcerated, such as the respondent in this case, enjoy even a more diminished expectation of privacy — so much so, in fact, that the usual requirement of an individualized and articulable basis for a search of such persons, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, does not apply. In this regard, the majority places great emphasis on the fact that the search in Knights was of a home, rather than, as here, a buccal swab of the respondent’s cheek. Thus, it reminds us that ‘Knights dealt with an intrusion that has long been held to be ‘the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed’ — the search of a private home.” 383 Md. at 16-18, 857 A.2d at 28-29 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752, 764 (1972)).
The majority then contrasts the level of expectation of privacy Knights could expect to enjoy in his own home and the much lower expectation of privacy enjoyed by incarcerated inmates, concluding that, in the context of prison, the expectation of privacy is so low, when weighed against the “minimal” intrusion of a buccal swab (which I shall address later), that it is negligible: “Here, appellee was not on probation living in his own home — he was incarcerated. The government intrusion was not an unauthorized entry into a private home, but a buccal swab of the cheek lasting a few seconds.” 383 Md. at 17-18, 857 A.2d at 28-29. The majority’s analysis misses the point and is significantly flawed.
Knights is not a suspicionless search case. On the contrary, as the Court took pains to point out, the detective had a *70reasonable suspicion that the probationer, Knights, was engaged in wrong-doing and it was that suspicion that prompted the surveillance and ultimately the search of the apartment. The issue that had to be resolved was whether a probation provision that was a condition of probation, permitting a search of the probationer’s home with or without a warrant and with or without cause, provided sufficient indicia of reasonableness to render the warrantless search constitutional. Stated differently, the issue presented to the Court for resolution involved determining the standard that would apply to justify the warrantless search of the home of a probationer, a condition of whose probation permitted such a search. That is the way the Supreme Court analyzed the case and decided it, concluding, after balancing the interests of the respondent and the State, that the search was reasonable. Inexplicably, the majority fails to do so and, instead, analyzes the case as if the Supreme Court had decided the question that that Court expressly did not decide. See 534 U.S. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. at 592 n. 6, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505 n. 6.
■ Significantly, in making the balance in Knights, the Supreme Court provided guidance as to the relationship that must exist between the two sides of the balance. It is to be recalled that the Court indicated that the respondent’s status as a probationer informed both sides of the balance, thus providing a context for the expectation of privacy; it must be assessed in light of the competing interest of the government. The Knights Court analyzed the relationship it identified between the expectation of privacy of a probationer and the government interest in apprehending criminals, — that relationship is especially significant when a condition of probation is that the probationer himself obey all laws and not commit criminal violations — and struck the balance in favor of the government.
In this case, the majority does not address whether there is any relationship between the expectation of privacy of the respondent and the State interest sought to be served by the DNA collection, and, if so, what that relationship is and how it impacts each of the interests. Certainly, there is no “legiti*71mate penological interest,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d at 79, served by the collection of DNA from convicted and incarcerated felons, for the benefit of which those felons’ privacy expectations must be subordinated. The collection of DNA simply is not necessary in the interest of the effective prison administration or internal security. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546-547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d at 473. Even if the reason for taking the buccal swab were identification, as the majority urges, and not to obtain evidence and, thus, it is not a part of the State’s general interest in detecting crime, it still would not provide justification for the search, since even that purpose would not provide justification for the search in the prison context. It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority does not pursue the “special needs” rationale.
But I do not believe that the search passes constitutional muster even if the majority’s totality of the circumstances balancing test analysis were sound. It is simply wrong to say that the interest being served by the search is identification. That is belied, in fact, by the statute itself. Maryland Code (2003) § 2-505 of the Public Safety Article makes crystal clear that the purpose of the DNA collection statute is to “database” DNA for use in solving crimes, those earlier committed as well as those that may be committed in the future. It provides:
“ § 2-505. Purpose of collecting and testing DNA samples.
“(a) In general. — To the extent fiscal resources are available, DNA samples shall be collected and tested:
(1) to analyze and type the genetic markers contained in or derived from the DNA samples;
(2) as part of an official investigation into a crime;
(3) to help identify human remains;
(4) to help identify missing individuals; and
(5) for research and administrative purposes, including:
(i) development of a population data base after personal identifying information is removed;
*72(ii) support of identification research and protocol development of forensic DNA analysis methods; and
(iii) quality control.
“(b) Limitations on DNA records. — (1) Only DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.
(2) DNA records may not be used for any purposes other than those specified in this subtitle.”
In addition, the State does not deny, and in fact admits, that the immediate and primary purpose of the act is the “public interest in prosecuting crimes more accurately” and it maintains that the act “assist[s] more effectively in investigations of crimes likely to involve DNA than some other DNA laws, because the Maryland law covers a broader range of offenders.” Moreover, the candor of Judges Raker and Wilner on this point, expressed in their concurring opinions in this case, see 383 Md. at 43-45, 50-51, 857 A.2d at 44-45, 49 (Raker, J. and Wilner, J., concurring), is refreshing and absolutely on the money. Judge Wilner states it thus:
“I doubt as well the premise that the purpose for collecting this information is not to discover evidence of criminality but merely to establish identity. It is true, of course, that the DNA sample will be used to establish identity, but the principal purpose of establishing identity will be to provide evidence of criminality, evidence that will allow the police to establish probable cause to collect precisely the same evidence for use in court. The foundation upon which these laws rest, and the invocation of United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) to sustain them, is that convicted criminals are more likely to have committed other crimes and are more likely to commit future crimes than the general population, and that collecting and storing their DNA will materially assist law enforcement agencies in solving crimes and perhaps deter those from whom the samples are taken from committing future crimes. In my view, it is, at best, misleading even to suggest, much less hold, that this program is not designed *73for the predominant purpose of providing evidence of criminality. It clearly is.”
Id. at 50-51, 857 A.2d at 49 (Wilner, J. concurring).
I reject, as disingenuous the argument that the act “does not constitute the gathering of direct evidence of a crime.” As the majority points out, what is contemplated is that the act “serves to identify the perpetrator similar to the way investigators have used fingerprints for many years.” Whether direct evidence or not, that use of the identification is itself evidence, as will become even more evident when it is introduced as such in the perpetrator’s trial.
In determining that the search is reasonable, the majority also characterizes as minimally intrusive the buccal swab required to collect the DNA sample. Raines, at 18-19, 39, 857 A.2d at 29, 41-42. The DNA sample, moreover, the majority states, amounts to a simple identification technique akin to fingerprints. Id. at 35-36, 857 A.2d at 39-40. I am not persuaded.
Although the intrusion of a buccal swab may be minimal in a physical sense, it certainly is great when the vast amount of personal and private information DNA contains is considered. As was recently explained:
“While the DNA profile is often referred to as a type of genetic ‘fingerprint,’ this analogy is far too simplistic. Although current profiling methods utilize only limited amounts of genetic information, with the mapping of the human genome now underway, future DNA analysis may soon reveal an individual’s medical history; proclivity toward certain diseases; and hereditary information such as race, physical, and behavioral traits. Thus, biological samples ... have the potential to reveal far more intimate information about the individual donor than a simple fingerprint---- Unlike an individual’s fingerprint, which use is limited to identification, information potentially contained in a DNA profile may subject an individual to embarrassment, humiliation, public hostility, and even financial harm.”
*74Jeffrey S. Grand, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 2277 (2002). In light of the heightened sensitivity of the information available through DNA analysis, as contrasted with fingerprinting, I find the search in this case highly intrusive. Unlike fingerprints, which contain all of the useable identifying information at the time the prints are taken, the DNA search does not end with the swab. To the contrary, the swab is then subjected to scientific tests, which may extract very sensitive, personal, and potentially humiliating information.
Regardless of how physically intrusive the DNA swab is, the fact of the matter is that the State has not sufficiently established that there is any individualized basis for the search, probable cause or some appropriate level of suspicion, that would justify any intrusion upon the respondent’s constitutionally-protected privacy interest in his own body. Neither has the majority identified a government interest sufficient to override the respondent’s privacy interest.
Judges Raker and Wilner recognize that this is so and are troubled by it. Nevertheless, because, as Judge Wilner puts it, “[a]s a group, defined by their own judicially-determined conduct, [Convicted felons] do constitute a special threat to public safety, even while in prison and certainly after their release,” 383 Md. at 51-52, 857 A.2d at 49 (Wilner, J. concurring), they overlook the absence of a legitimate State interest and the absence of any individualized focus, choosing instead to treat the information gathering as akin to “the collection and storage of fingerprints”12 or “mug shot” photographs. Id. *75at 51-52, 857 A.2d at 49. That the DNA is more reliable serves as the apology for its more intrusiveness. In short, it seems that to Judges Raker and Wilner, the ends really justify the means.13
It must be conceded that a DNA database may be, indeed, already has demonstrated that it may be a valuable tool for solving crimes that otherwise would be difficult of solution or would not be solved and could be a boon to those falsely accused, by exonerating them, as it has been to some already. That does not, however, answer the constitutional question. Undoubtedly, there are many crime fighting tools that, if allowed to be used, without restraint or with minimal oversight and unrestrained by the Fourth Amendment, would prove quite effective in detecting and solving crime, yet would wreak havoc with constitutional rights, even of inmates. It is for that reason that throughout the history of the Fourth *76Amendment, considerable efforts have been made to strike a balance between the State’s law enforcement goals and the constitutional rights of the individual citizen. See Wayne LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.1(a) (3d ed.) (2004); see also Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 465, 478-95 (1984); Weber, The Birth of Probable Cause, 11 Anglo-American L.Rev. 155 (1982). Surely the framers wanted law enforcement to operate in an effective and efficient manner; however, they were wise enough not to adopt a “by any means necessary” stance. In fact, the means and limitations which lawxenforcement utilized to enforce the law did not, and do not, “just matter,” they became, and remain, key to any well-thought-out legal analysis and correct exposition of the law regarding the Fourth Amendment.
I am also reminded of the wise counsel of Mr. Justice Brandéis, given in a similar vein within the context of an illegal wiretap:
“[I]t is ... immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944, 957 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
I dissent.
Judges HARRELL and GREENE join in the views expressed herein.

. Responding to the State of Maryland’s petition for certiorari raising this question, the appellee, Charles Raines, filed a Conditional Cross Petition for Certiorari, presenting the question, ‘‘Did the suppression court err in ruling that the Maryland DNA collection statute was not a penal statute in violation of the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions, as applied to the appellee?” Although the majority reaches this question, affirming the trial court’s ruling that the statute is not an ex post facto law, I do not, and need not, given my resolution of the question that the State l'aises.

. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.1992) predates City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001), both of which, as we will see, reaffirmed the individualized suspicion requirement as a prerequisite for most searches and seizures. Indeed, Edmond, made a point of distinguishing Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), a sobriety checkpoint case, the existence of which the Jones court found quite significant. Acknowledging its checkpoint *54cases, including Sitz (involving a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road) and the suggestion in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) that a roadblock with the purpose of verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be permissible, the Court nevertheless was emphatic: "In none of these cases ... did we indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38, 121 S.Ct. at 451-52, 148 L.Ed.2d at 341 (2000).

. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

. I note that the Supreme Court, in the border patrol checkpoint cases, has held that stops, hence seizures, were reasonable without the articulation of reasonable suspicion, when the stops were evenly enforced for every automobile that passed through the checkpoint, were minimally intrusive and there was a compelling need for those stops to stem the overwhelming 1ide of entry of illegal aliens into the country. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3085, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1131-33 (1976) (recognizing that "traffic-checking [permanent checkpoints] program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border,” and holding that, although checkpoint stops are seizures, as contemplated under the Fourth Amendment, because they involve only a brief detention, during which a question or two must be answered and documents produced, and neither ihe vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can be seen without a search, the stops could be made in the absence of reasonable suspicion). Similarly, stops at sobriety checkpoints have been upheld in the absence of particularized and focused suspicion. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485-86, 110 L.Ed.2d 412, 420-21 (1990) (holding that the "seizure” of motorists who were stopped at a sobriety checkpoint at which all vehicles were stopped, was reasonable without, individualized suspicion in light of the magnitude of the drunk-driving problem and the determination of law enforcement officials that such checkpoints were necessary to apprehend such individuals before tragedy strikes). But see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 618 (1975) (holding that although roving patrols in which officers stop and question motorists about their resident status may be conducted without probable cause, such stops must, at least, show that the “stopping officer is ‘aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion’ that a vehicle contains illegal aliens who may be illegally in the country.”).

. Although not involving a search, at best only a seizure, the Supreme Court recently addressed the “special needs” doctrine in Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004). The Court upheld the constitutionality of a roadblock checkpoint, which police set up to obtain information about an earlier hit-and-run accident. Id. at 427, 124 S.Ct. at 891, 157 L.Ed.2d at 853. Each car that approached the roadblock was stopped for 10-15 seconds, the passengers were provided with a flyer with information about the hit-and-run and asked if they knew anything about it. As the respondent approached the officers, he swerved his van, almost hitting an officer. He was arrested after the officer smelled alcohol on his breath and conducted a sobriety test. Id. at 422, 124 S.Ct. at 888, 157 L.Ed.2d at 849. The respondent challenged his arrest on the basis that the checkpoint violated his Fourth Amendment rights against illegal search and seizure. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "the stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others.” Id. at 423, 124 S.Ct. at 889, 157 L.Ed.2d at 850.

. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 941 (1967) and See v. City of Seattle, supra, 387 U.S. at 545, 87 S.Ct. at 1740, 18 L.Ed.2d at 943 may, in one sense, fall into this category, as well. In Camara, as the Court in United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1130 (1976), explained, “the Court required an ‘area' warrant to support the reasonableness of inspecting private residences within a particular area for building code violations, but recognized that ‘specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling' was not required to enter any given residence.... In so holding, the Court examined the government interests advanced to justify such routine intrusions ‘upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen' ... and concluded that under the circumstances the government interests outweighed those of the private citizen.” (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d at 941.)

. The Court, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202, 82 L.Ed.2d 393, 405 (1984), explained why no particularized suspicion was required for such searches:
"prison searches [that] must be conducted only ... when suspicion is directed at a particular inmate is to ignore the realities of prison operation. Random searches of inmates, individually or collectively, and their cells and lockers are valid and necessary to ensure the security of the institution and the safety of inmates and all others within its boundaries. This type of search allows prison officers flexibility and prevents inmates from anticipating, and thereby thwarting, a search for contraband.”

. In Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-322, 117 S.Cl. 1295, 1303-1305, 137 L.Ed.2d 513, 525-28 (1997), the Court declined to hold that a Georgia statute that mandated that candidates for elected office pass a drug test asserted a special need akin to the drag testing for the employees in Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), noting that the railroad employees directly affected public safety, but that, because it was unlikely that the statute was sufficiently tailored to accomplish the goal of having drug-free political representatives, it amounted to a symbolic statute which was an insufficient government interest when weighed against privacy rights.

. Those exceptions were delineated by the Court, as follows:
“While such suspicion is not an “irreducible” component of reasonableness, Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, we have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply. For example, we have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to serve "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (random drug testing of student-athletes); [Nat.] Treasury Employees [Union] v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (drug tests for United States Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety regulations). We have also allowed searches for certain administrative purposes without particularized suspicion of misconduct, provided that those searches are appropri*62ately limited. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-704, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (warrantless administrative inspection of premises of “closely regulated” business); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507-509, 511-512, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (administrative inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine cause of blaze); Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-539, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (administrative inspection to ensure compliance with city housing code).
"We have also upheld brief, suspicionless seizures of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens, Martinez-Fuerte, supra, and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). In addition, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), we suggested that a similar type of roadblock with the purpose of verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be permissible. In none of these cases, however, did we indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38, 121 S.Ct. 447, 451-52, 148 L.Ed.2d 333, 340-41 (2000).

. The Court noted that "[njowhere ... does the document discuss different courses of medical treatment for either mother or infant, aside from treatment for the mother’s addiction.” Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 1291, 149 L.Ed.2d 205, 219 (2001).

. Those items included, "a detonation cord, ammunition, liquid chemicals, bolt cutters telephone pole-climbing spurs, drug paraphernalia, and a brass padlock stamped 'PG & E.’ " United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115, 122 S.Ct. 587, 589, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, 503 (2001).

. To the extent that the comparison is made to fingerprints, while their purposes may indeed overlap, there is a difference in kind between the collection of fingerprint data and DNA. For the collection of fingerprints, there is no invasion of the body, but with DNA collection such an invasion most assuredly occurs. And, of course, the information fingerprints convey is obtained, and exhausted, when the prints are taken. Moreover, fingerprints are taken, as a matter of course, from anyone arrested and thus required to be booked, as a means of identification of all of those persons. There are no distinctions drawn based on the crime committed, whether there is a conviction or the degree of the threat that the person is perceived to represent, now or in *75the future. Thus, the fact that fingerprints might later prove to be strong, even dispositive, evidence against a defendant in an unrelated case is really incidental to, not the purpose of, their being taken. When, however, fingerprints are not obtained as a part of the normal booking procedure, there certainly is, and necessarily has to be, some individualized basis for seeking them. That is decidedly not the case with respect to DNA collection pursuant to the act.

. It is interesting that one of the reasons the majority, (note the reliance on Jones v. Murray), and Judges Raker and Wilner, would uphold the DNA collection statute is because of the threat to the public that some convicted felons pose. That is recognition on their part that, to some extent, there must be a basis that is specific to the person that justifies the collection. Rather than focusing on each individual convicted felon, however, they lump them all together by holding that an amorphous and ill-defined suspicion of a group suffices. This is reminiscent of the general warrant, one that fails sufficiently to specify the place or person to be searched or the things to be seized, thus authorizing a random or blanket search, see Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 261, 292 A.2d 86, 89 (1972); see also Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (“That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.”), and the writ of assistance, making an already scary scenario even scarier.