Court Opinion

ID: 9606010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:45:03.588158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:31.583570
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
I dissent.
The majority opinion rests on the proposition that “The last amendment, though executed after the parties’ final divorce, does not mention a second marriage or remarriage, nor indicate that the ratification of the wording ‘resumption of former relations’ is to have any different connotation than it had as embraced in the preceding agreements referable to the October 8, 1928, marriage as the only one then contracted between the parties. It is the general rule that in considering marriage settlement agreements, the court must seek the intention of the parties ‘at the time of [their] execution, for it is their intention at such time that governs. ’ [Citations.] Reaffirmance and ratification of agreements will preserve their legal effect but will not change it.” (Italics added.)
It appears to me that the conclusion of the court as above *434quoted in italics is too narrow. I think, further, that when we “seek the intention of the parties” in respect to a series of agreements we are not bound to relate our inquiry solely to. the status of the parties at the date of the original document but rather that we should consider their circumstances as of the respective dates of the several agreements.
The relevant purposes of the antenuptial agreement of October 1, 1928, and of the several amendments thereafter executed, are clearly apparent from the language used. As disclosed in the majority opinion the parties agreed “ ‘in anticipation of [their forthcoming] marriage, the parties desire [d] ... to fix and determine the rights of each of them in any and all property . . and ‘in consideration of said marriage,’ each party specifically ‘waive [d] any and all rights, claims and demands ... in and to [the] property’ of the other, ‘both during . . . life and after . . . death.’ The agreement of June 28, 1935, made while the parties were ‘living separate and apart,’ was executed ‘in consideration of the premises and of the mutual covenants’ therein ‘contained’ . . . Expressly included in second party’s release and waiver were future claims of ‘interest in community property,’ ‘right to . . . homestead,’ and ‘any and all claims and rights, present and future, to support . . . saving and excepting such as aré provided for by this instrument’ . . . Specifically recognizing ‘the possibility of a future reconciliation, the parties declare [d] their intention to be that a reconciliation, either temporary or permanent ... or a restoration of the former relations of said parties, or a further separation, temporary or permanent, after any reconciliation’ should ‘not render this agreement or the “Ante-Nuptial Agreement” ... or any provision hereof or thereof, invalid, inoperative, rescinded or revoked’ . . . Each of the various property settlement agreements subsequently executed by the parties was denominated ‘ amendment to agreement. ’ . . . The last or ‘fifth amendment to agreement’ was that of August 24, 1943, some nineteen months after the entry of the final decree of divorce in the first action . . . And again ‘the parties’ ratified and reaffirmed ‘all of the . . . agreements and amendments’ theretofore executed and agreed that ‘the same [should] continue in full force and effect as herein clarified. ’ ” (Italics added.)
The significant fact in relation to the last agreement is that by it, for admittedly valid consideration, the parties, being then divorced, agreed that the original antenuptial *435contract together with the several amendments, should ‘ ‘ continue in lull force and effect” in the event of a “resumption of former relations.” The “former relations” of the parties included those of husband and wife; such “former relations” could be resumed only by remarriage; the republished and redeclared provisions relative to possible future marriage could have significance, in their futurity aspects as of that date, only to a remarriage; the parties did remarry and this litigation has ensued.
The majority opinion affirms the trial court in holding that “all of the aforementioned agreements, including that of August 24, 1943, ‘are now and were at all times valid and subsisting and have not been cancelled, rescinded or annulled’ but ‘since the marriage’ of the parties ‘on May 11, 1945 . . . their rights and duties towards each other . . . are controlled by the laws of the State of California and not by the said agreements as to all things occurring since said marriage on May 11, 1945.’ ” The decree, among other things, allows the plaintiff the sum of $300 a month provided for by the agreements and in addition awards her “the sum of $600.00 per month for her support and maintenance” until she remarries; it also bestows upon her certain community property and assigns to her “a portion of the homestead theretofore declared by her upon defendant’s separate property known as the Santa Ynez ranch.”
The effect of the majority opinion is to give to plaintiff all the continuing benefits and to relieve her of all continuing obligations under the several agreements; as to defendant, insofar at least as the agreements are executory, the judgment imposes on him their burdens but deprives him of their benefits.
This holding seems to me to allow the plaintiff “to both eat her cake and have it too. ’ ’ I would reverse the portions of the decree which are the subject of appeal.
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 28, 1949. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.