Court Opinion

ID: 9838159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 15:00:53.148125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:48.337645
License: Public Domain

22-887-cv
     Solomon v. Fordham University

                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                            SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).        A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                   At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
 2   at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 3   on the 5th day of September, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   Present:
 6
 7               GUIDO CALABRESI,
 8               SUSAN L. CARNEY,
 9               EUNICE C. LEE,
10                     Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   ESTHER SOLOMON,
14
15                           Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17                   v.                                                          No. 22-887-cv
18
19   FORDHAM UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION, ROSE
20   HILL CAMPUS,
21
22                           Defendant-Appellee.

23   _____________________________________
24
25   For Plaintiff-Appellant:                                            ESTHER SOLOMON, pro se,
26                                                                       New York, NY.
27
28   For Defendant-Appellee:                                             JENNIFER A. MCLAUGHLIN,
29                                                                       Cullen and Dykman LLP,
30                                                                       Uniondale, NY.
 1          Appeal from a March 29, 2022 judgment of the United States District Court for the

 2   Southern District of New York (Ramos, J.).

 3          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 4   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part,

 5   and the action is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

 6          Appellant Esther Solomon, a tenured associate professor at Fordham University’s Gabelli

 7   School of Business (“Fordham”), proceeding pro se, brought claims against Fordham under the

 8   Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Title VII, and

 9   analogous New York State laws. Solomon claimed that Fordham paid her less than similarly

10   situated younger, male, and non-Jewish, members of the predominantly male faculty, whom the

11   university also allegedly favored for promotions. She further alleged that Fordham created a

12   hostile work environment and, when she complained about the pay disparity, retaliated against her

13   by, among other things, changing her teaching assignments and terminating her employment.

14          Across four decisions, the district court dismissed Solomon’s federal claims under Fed. R.

15   Civ. P. 12(b)(6), reasoning that she failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that she had

16   suffered adverse employment actions or to support an inference of discrimination.           Having

17   dismissed the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

18   Solomon’s state law claims.     The court twice granted leave to amend, once plenary and once

19   limited, so that Solomon could correct the identified deficiencies.      See Solomon v. Fordham

20   Univ., No. 18-CV-4615 (ER), 2020 WL 1272617 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020) (dismissing the first

21   amended complaint with leave to amend); Solomon v. Fordham Univ., No. 18-CV-4615 (ER),

                                                      2
 1   2020 WL 7711697 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2020) (dismissing the second amended complaint with

 2   opportunity to move for leave to file the third amended complaint); Solomon v. Fordham Univ.,

 3   No. 18-CV-4615 (ER), 2021 WL 2292916 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2021) (granting limited leave to file

 4   the proposed third amended complaint to amend retaliation claims based on Fordham’s

 5   discontinuation of Solomon’s employee health benefits); Solomon v. Fordham Univ., No. 18-CV-

 6   4615 (ER), 2022 WL 912056 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022) (denying reconsideration of the June 4,

 7   2021 order, dismissing the third amended complaint, and closing the case).           Solomon appealed.

 8   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining underlying facts, the procedural history, and

 9   the issues on appeal.

10                                    *                        *                      *

11           “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

12   construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and

13   drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”       Collins v. Putt, 979 F.3d 128, 132 (2d

14   Cir. 2020) (quoting Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 2015)).             To survive a Rule

15   12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

16   to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

17   (internal quotation marks omitted).        A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff

18   pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

19   liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.        Complaints brought by pro se litigants are entitled to a

20   particularly liberal interpretation.     See Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2021)

                                                           3
 1   (“We construe a pro se complaint liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” (internal

 2   quotation marks omitted)).

 3   I.     Time-Barred Conduct

 4          In the district court’s decision dismissing the first amended complaint, it found that any

 5   claim related to conduct that occurred before March 7, 2017 was time-barred because Solomon

 6   did not file her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) until

 7   January 11, 2018.    Solomon, 2020 WL 1272617 at *9; see also Pikulin v. City Univ. of New York,

 8   176 F.3d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1999) (“An employment discrimination claim must be filed with the

 9   EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination in a state, like New York, with a fair

10   employment agency.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e))).            Because some pre-March 7, 2017

11   conduct formed the basis of, in relevant part, Solomon’s hostile work environment, discrimination,

12   retaliation, and disparate treatment claims, the time-bar impacted her ability to adequately plead

13   those claims before the district court.

14          On appeal, Solomon challenges the district court’s time-bar determination. She contends

15   that, despite the late EEOC filing, the time-bar is inapplicable to her hostile work environment

16   claim and that, under this Court’s precedent, background evidence relating to alleged misconduct

17   may be considered in determining whether her other claims are adequately pled, even if that

18   background evidence precedes the actionable time period.        Appellant’s Br. at 59.    In the hostile

19   work environment context, the Supreme Court has held that a “claim is composed of a series of

20   separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice,” and thus “[i]t does

21   not matter . . . that some of the component acts of the [claim] fall outside the statutory time period.”

22   Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (internal quotation marks

                                                        4
 1   omitted)). As a result, “a charge alleging a hostile work environment claim will not be time barred

 2   so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice

 3   and at least one act falls within the time period.” Davis-Garett v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 921 F.3d

 4   30, 42 (2d Cir. 2019) (alterations omitted and emphasis in the original). Beyond hostile work

 5   environment claims, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred,” but an

 6   employee may still use related prior acts as “background evidence in support of a timely claim.”

 7   Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113. See Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135,

 8   150 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying this principle to evidence of disparate treatment and disparate impact

 9   claims); Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying this

10   principle to evidence of retaliation); see also Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir.

11   2004) (applying this principle to evidence of promotion denials). In light of this Court’s caselaw,

12   Solomon’s pre-March 2017 hostile work environment, discrimination, retaliation, and disparate

13   treatment allegations must therefore be a part of our consideration of her otherwise timely claims.

14              A. Solomon’s Hostile Work Environment Claim

15          Here, even taking into account pre-March 2017 conduct, we affirm the district court’s

16   dismissal of Solomon’s hostile work environment claim, chiefly because Solomon does not

17   adequately plead that “the workplace [wa]s permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,

18   and insult that [wa]s sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment

19   and create an abusive working environment.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 320–

20   21 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Her failure to do so is in large part due to

21   the fact that her allegations concern events occurring over the course of 19 years, involving

22   different individuals and varying kinds of incidents. See id. at 321 (“The incidents complained

                                                     5
 1   of must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be

 2   deemed pervasive.”); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 120 (considering incidents before

 3   and after the limitations period to form the same actionable hostile work environment practice

 4   because they “involve[d] the same type of employment actions, occurred relatively frequently, and

 5   were perpetrated by the same managers”).

 6              B. Solomon’s Discrimination, Retaliation, and Disparate Treatment Allegations

 7          The district court found that Solomon alleged insufficient adverse actions in support of her

 8   claims of discrimination, retaliation, and disparate treatment. In doing so, the court erroneously

 9   failed to take into account the background material of Fordham’s actions beyond the statute of

10   limitations. But that background material may be sufficient so that Fordham’s actions could

11   properly be viewed by a fact-finder as adverse.           Accordingly, as to Solomon’s remaining

12   discrimination, retaliation, and disparate treatment allegations, we remand to the district court for

13   further consideration as to whether, and how, relevant background information impacts Solomon’s

14   ability to meet the pleading standard for those claims.

15   II.    Unequal Pay

16          The district court also dismissed Solomon’s claim of discrimination under the Equal Pay

17   Act on the ground that the Solomon had not produced adequate comparators.                “To prove

18   discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must show that: i) the employer pays different

19   wages to employees of the opposite sex; ii) the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring

20   equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and iii) the jobs are performed under similar working

21   conditions.”   Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal

22   quotation marks omitted). For the second prong, “a plaintiff need not demonstrate that her job is

                                                      6
 1   identical to a higher paid position, but only must show that the two positions are substantially equal

 2   in skill, effort, and responsibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). By

 3   contrast, a plaintiff alleging sex-based compensation discrimination under Title VII need not prove

 4   that she received less pay for the same work; she need only prove that “her employer discriminated

 5   against her with respect to her compensation because of her sex,” such as by paying her less than

 6   they would have if she was male. Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2019)

 7   (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

 8           The district court erred in concluding that Solomon failed to identify similarly situated

 9   comparators, and thus did not sufficiently plead an EPA claim or a Title VII claim. As discussed

10   above, she alleged that she and the tenured male professors were paid different wages, though they

11   had the same job responsibilities, were subject to the same evaluation standards, and were in the

12   same practice area (Management Systems). 1 See Lavin-McEleney, 239 F.3d at 480 (“Whether

13   two positions are substantially equivalent for Equal Pay Act purposes is a question for the jury.”

14   (internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore remand Solomon’s equal pay claims, under

15   both the EPA and Title VII, to the district court for further consideration.

16   III.    Supplemental Jurisdiction and Leave to Amend

17           The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Solomon’s state

18   claims (both statutory and common-law) because it had dismissed her federal claims. See 28

19   U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Since at least some of the federal claims may be reinstated upon further

20   consideration by the district court, we vacate the portion of the court’s judgment declining to

     1
       Solomon alleges that Fordham redacted the comparators’ names when it sent to her counsel a list of male
     professors’ salaries, which may explain why she does not allege the specific job duties of each professor.

                                                         7
 1   exercise supplemental jurisdiction and restore Solomon’s state law claims for the time being. See

 2   Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).

 3          Finally, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Solomon leave

 4   to further amend the properly dismissed federal claims. The district court permitted Solomon to

 5   amend at least three times, and she does not persuasively argue why she should be permitted to

 6   amend further. See Elder v. McCarthy, 967 F.3d 113, 132 (2d Cir. 2020).

 7                                *                       *                      *

 8          For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Solomon’s disparate treatment,

 9   retaliation, and unequal pay claims should have survived the motion to dismiss. We

10   therefore AFFIRM the judgment in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for further

11   proceedings consistent with this order.

12
13                                                 FOR THE COURT:
14                                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                                      8