Court Opinion

ID: 9716632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:46:20.664732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.366710
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: The majority affirms the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs third amended complaint. I disagree with this result. Under the discovery rule, as the majority correctly states, a party’s cause of action does not accrue for limitations purposes until the party “knows or reasonably should know of an injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused.” 189 Ill. 2d at 608 (citing, inter alla, Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981)). The majority acknowledges that the issue of whether an action has been brought within the time allowed by the discovery rule should ordinarily be resolved as a question of fact. 189 Ill. 2d at 609. However, the majority concludes that in this case the pleadings establish that plaintiffs suit is untimely as a matter of law. 189 Ill. 2d at 610. Although the majority never states whether plaintiff actually “knew” or merely “reasonably should have known” before January 1994 that she had sustained a wrongfully caused injury, either conclusion would be suspect in light of the allegations contained in the third amended complaint. Plaintiff explicitly stated that she did not incur any physical harm from Kuhl’s sexual abuse, nor did she realize until June 1994 that her childhood molestation had caused her any psychological harm. The complaint also contains the allegation that Susan Phipps Yonas, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who had examined the plaintiff, was of the opinion that many victims of childhood sexual abuse were unaware that such abuse had caused them psychological problems. The complaint further alleged that Yonas believed that plaintiff may have been “unable” to comprehend any link between the apparently destructive path her life was on and the abuse she had suffered as a child. In light of these allegations, it is difficult to comprehend how the majority can conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff knew or should have known that she had been injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused. If the majority’s objection is to the lack of a specific allegation as to when plaintiff first became aware that she had some degree of psychological dysfunction, the proper course would seem to be to allow plaintiff to replead, rather than dismissing the case with prejudice. The cornerstone, if not the entire edifice, of the majority’s analysis is Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995). See 189 Ill. 2d at 611-13. Golla was a case in which an automobile driver was involved in an accident in September 1985. It was conclusively established that plaintiff sustained physical injuries in the accident of which she was aware at the time. She did not file suit until August 1989, after the relevant limitations period had expired. Plaintiff argued that her suit was nevertheless timely because she had not become aware of the extent of her injuries until March 1988. This court rejected plaintiff’s argument and affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant. We held that there was “no requirement that a plaintiff must discover the full extent of her injuries before the statute of limitations begins to run. Because the plaintiff knew or should have known at the time of the accident both that she was injured and that the injury may have been wrongfully caused, the limitations period commenced at that time.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 367. I believe the majority’s reliance on Golla is misplaced. First, this case should not be governed by the “sudden, traumatic event” rule. Although the majority disclaims having answered this question (189 Ill. 2d at 608), Golla is a case in which the “sudden, traumatic event” rule' was clearly applied. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 362-63. Golla expressly characterized its holding as follows: “when a plaintiff sustains an immediate personal injury as a result of a sudden, traumatic event, such as the car accident in this case, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the accident. The limitations period is not tolled and does not begin anew simply because a latent injury may arise from the same traumatic event.” (Emphasis added.) Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 371-72. Accordingly, unless this case involves a “sudden, traumatic event,” the majority’s reliance on Golla is misplaced. Our appellate court has succinctly explained the difference between “sudden, traumatic event” cases and cases involving “disease”: “The essential question is the same in both instances, i. e., when was or should have plaintiff been aware of a right to sue; however, the limitations period begins to run at a different time under each line of cases, depending upon the nature of the injury. ‘Traumatic injury’ cases involve situations where the injury is such that the plaintiff knows or should know that someone may be legally responsible for it. [Citations.] Thus in ‘traumatic injury’ cases, the limitations period commences when a plaintiff learns of his injury. [Citations.] ‘Disease’ cases, on the other hand, involve injuries which do not themselves put the plaintiff on notice that someone may be legally at fault. In ‘disease’ cases the limitations period does not commence when the plaintiff learns of his injury, but only after the plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to know that he or she has a physical problem and also that someone is or may be responsible for it.’ ” Witherell v. Weimer, 77 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (1979), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 85 Ill. 2d 146 (1981).1  Golla reaffirmed that a distinction must be drawn between “sudden, traumatic event” cases and cases involving “nontraumatic” events, and that in the latter type of case the discovery rule must toll the limitations period “until the plaintiff either knew or reasonably should have known that he was injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 366. See also Hutson v. Hartke, 292 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415 (1997), stating: “In some types of cases, the awareness of a physical problem carries with it the awareness of a wrongful causation, and the running of the limitations period begins. In some cases, a person may have the knowledge of a physical problem without the knowledge of any ‘wrongful cause.’ In such cases, the limitations period does not begin to run until a reasonable person would or should know of a wrongful cause.” I am a layman with respect to matters psychological, but I would suggest that it is uncontroversial that psychological dysfunction can occur without an outside causative agent. Accordingly, I believe it is improper to hold as a matter of law that a plaintiff’s awareness of any psychological distress automatically puts him on notice that his distress may potentially have an external causative agent, therefore starting the limitations clock running. More fundamentally, however, even if this case were governed by the sudden, traumatic event rule, basing our result on Golla puts the cart before the horse. Golla stands for the proposition that in sudden, traumatic event cases the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff first becomes aware of any injury. But this begs the threshold question, i.e., When did the plaintiff first become aware of her injury? The majority’s analysis of this question in this case amounts to nothing more than a conclusion: “the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint make it clear that the plaintiff had sufficient information about her injury and its cause to require her to bring suit long before the date of discovery alleged in the complaint.” 189 Ill. 2d at 610. There is no factual basis for this conclusion. In the complaint plaintiff explicitly states that Kuhl’s molestation caused her no contemporaneous physical injury and that her psychological injuries did not develop until later in her life. There is no indication in the complaint as to when plaintiff’s psychological injuries in fact arose or when she became aware of them, but plaintiff did specifically allege that until June 1994 she was unaware of the link between her psychological injury and the abuse she alleges she endured as a child. These statements must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Carver v. Nall, 186 Ill. 2d 554, 556 (1999); In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 184 (1997). Moreover, the statement of Yonas suggests that it is common for victims of childhood molestation to be unaware of psychological problems resulting therefrom. How, then, does the majority conclude that plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of her injuries and that her injuries were wrongfully caused before January 1994? The majority several times notes that plaintiff does not contend that she repressed her memories of the abuse. Although the majority does not explicitly so state, the implication seems to be that awareness of childhood sexual abuse is tantamount to awareness of injury — that if one is aware of having been sexually abused, one must be aware that one was psychologically injured thereby. I cannot endorse so broad a statement as a matter of law, especially in light of the factual contentions directly to the contrary in the complaint. A number of jurisdictions have held that even in the absence of repressed memory claims the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases until the plaintiff becomes aware of his or her injuries and the causal link between the injuries and the past events. See, e.g., Dunlea v. Dappen, 83 Haw. 28, 924 E2d 196 (1996); Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W2d 261 (Iowa 1995); Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 262 Mont. 175, 864 E2d 776 (1993); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); McCreary v. Weast, 971 E2d 974 (Wyo. 1999). But see Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St. 3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402 (1994) (discovery rule inapplicable in childhood sexual abuse cases in which plaintiff knows his or her attacker and does not raise' a claim of repressed memory). Some other cases which have affirmed limitations-based dismissals have done so because it was clearly established that before filing the complaint the plaintiff was aware of past abuse, psychological injury, and the possibility of some relationship between the injury and the abuse. See, e.g., Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W2d 45 (Iowa 1995). There is no basis for such a conclusion in the allegations of the third amended complaint in the instant case. I see no reasoned distinction between this case and cases involving toxic exposure, in which the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff realizes or should realize that a past event has harmed him. See, e.g., Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 169-71 (1981). The toxic exposure cases are not based on “repressed memory” of the event which caused the injury — the plaintiff in Nolan had worked with asbestos products for over 32 years. Rather, the timeliness of the filing of such cases is evaluated according to the date on which the plaintiff “knows or reasonably should know of an injury and also knows or reasonably should know that the injury was caused by the wrongful acts of another” (Emphasis added.) Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 169. The mere fact that a plaintiff remembers the event which is ultimately found to have caused his injury does not necessarily impute awareness of a link between the event and the injury. If it did, the complaint would have been untimely in Nolan, in which the plaintiff was always aware that he had worked with asbestos and was aware of physical problems as early as 18 years before filing his complaint. See Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 163-64. Why should a plaintiff irrebuttably be imputed awareness of a causative link between a past event and a current psychological ailment when our past precedent holds that plaintiffs are not automatically imputed awareness of a relationship between a past event and a current physical ailment? The only support marshaled by the majority is two cases which it cites for the proposition that there exists a legal presumption of an intent to harm and a resulting injury from the type of acts plaintiff alleges Kuhl to have committed. See 189 Ill. 2d at 611 (citing Doe v. Montessori School, 287 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297 (1997), and Scudder v. Hanover Insurance Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 921, 928-29 (1990)). But this presumption does not constitute a basis for imputing to the plaintiff knowledge that she had been psychologically injured by the sexual abuse she had suffered as a child. To so hold would turn Doe on its head. In Doe, defendants argued that the complaint (filed by the victim’s parents during her minority) should have been dismissed as unripe because the victim did not remember the events which allegedly caused her injury. See Doe, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 298-99. Far from utilizing the presumption to impute awareness to the victim, however, the Doe court relied on the presumption to conclude that the case was ripe because the victim had been injured even though the victim was not aware of her injury. The question in the instant case is not whether the victim was injured by her childhood molestation, but when she became or should have become aware of that injury and its wrongful cause. Scudder, the other case cited by the majority, involved a determination whether an insurer had a duty to defend or indemnify its insured against a claim that he had molested four juveniles. The Scudder court held that because injury was “practically certain” to result from a sexual assault, the acts allegedly committed by the insured fell within a policy exclusion for injuries “ ‘expected or intended by the insured,’ ” such that summary judgment in favor of the insurer was proper. Scudder, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 926, 928-29. See also West American Insurance Co. v. Vago, 197 Ill. App. 3d 131, 137 (1990). Scudder did not involve any question whether the plaintiffs were aware of their injuries. Neither Doe nor Scudder supports the majority position. To paraphrase an earlier case, if the plaintiff were barred from prosecuting this action because she must be said, as a matter of law, to have been psychologically injured prior to January 1994, she would have had only a delusive remedy against defendants. It would mean that at some past moment in time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, plaintiff was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of her mind. Under this view her failure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a mental disease of whose symptoms she may not even have been conscious would constitute waiver of her right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery and disability. See Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 168, quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169, 93 L. Ed. 1282, 1292, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1024 (1949). With this result I cannot concur, and I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.  Although this court overruled the appellate court on the ultimate question as to whether the plaintiffs complaint was timely, finding that plaintiff was in possession of sufficient facts to have been put on notice that her condition may have been externally caused, we did not reject the appellate court’s explanation of the difference between disease and injuries caused by sudden, traumatic events. See Withered, 85 Ill. 2d at 156-58.