Court Opinion

ID: 9914135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 17:07:49.803975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:20.629827
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Todd, 2023-Ohio-4847.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                   :
                                                                 No. 20AP-587
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,            :             (C.P.C. No. 97CR-6191)

v.                                               :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Casey Todd,                                      :               No. 20AP-588
                                                              (C.P.C. No. 98CR-0033)
                 Defendant-Appellee.             :
                                                             (REGULAR CALENDAR)
                                                 :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on December 29, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L.
                 Gilbert for appellant. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

                 On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Robert D.
                 Essex for appellee. Argued: Robert D. Essex.

                  APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

MENTEL, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, filed a motion seeking a nunc pro tunc
entry from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas stating the sex offender
classification of defendant-appellee, Casey Todd, arguing that its omission from his
judgments of conviction was a clerical error. The trial court denied the state’s motion and
granted Mr. Todd’s petition challenging his sex offender reclassification. As explained
below, the trial court’s rulings were not erroneous, although some of its reasoning was.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
        {¶ 2} On November 7, 1997, the state filed an indictment against Mr. Todd alleging
seven counts of rape under R.C. 2907.02, with six counts carrying sexually violent predator
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                      2

specifications under R.C. 2941.148. (Nov. 7, 1997 Indictment, Case No. 97CR-6191
(hereinafter, “Case No. 6191.”)) The counts alleged that Mr. Todd had inflicted multiple
sexual acts by force or threat of force on a minor victim over a period of years when the
victim was aged nine to thirteen. Id. Two months later, the state filed another indictment
alleging fourteen counts of rape committed by Mr. Todd, eight with sexually violent
predator specifications. (Jan. 6, 1998 Indictment, Case No. 98CR-0033 (hereinafter, “Case
No. 33.”)) The victim was another minor who was six and seven years old on the offense
dates. Id.
       {¶ 3} Mr. Todd entered into plea agreements with the state to resolve the
charges. In Case No. 6191, he pled guilty to one first degree felony count of rape with no
violent sexual predator specification and, in lieu of one other rape count, he pled guilty to
the lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05, a third degree
felony. In Case No. 33, he pled guilty to one first degree felony count of rape absent a violent
predator specification. He agreed to serve a ten-year prison sentence for each rape
conviction, to be served concurrently, and he agreed to a term of probation for the gross
sexual imposition conviction. (July 14, 1999 Entry of Guilty Plea, Case No. 6191; July 14,
1999 Entry of Guilty Plea, Case No. 33.) Both plea agreements noted Mr. Todd’s stipulation
to be classified as a sexual predator under Megan’s Law, the then-current sexual offender
registry notification (“SORN”) law.        See Former R.C. 2950.09, repealed in 2007
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10.
       {¶ 4} The trial court’s judgment in Case No. 6191 stated that it had “found the
Defendant guilty of the charge to which the plea was entered” and sentenced Mr. Todd to
ten years imprisonment on the rape charge, to run concurrently with the sentence in Case
No. 33. (July 14, 1999 Jgmt. Entry, Case No. 6191 at 1.) The judgment made no mention of
the gross sexual imposition charge from the plea agreement or Mr. Todd’s stipulation to the
sexual predator classification. Id. The judgment in Case No. 33 stated that the trial court
had accepted Mr. Todd’s plea, found him guilty of the offense of rape, and imposed a ten-
year prison term to run concurrently with the sentence in Case No. 6191. (July 14, 1999
Jgmt. Entry, Case No. 33.) A year later, the trial court entered a “Corrected Judgment
Entry” stating that five years of the sentence was mandatory. (Aug. 10, 2000 Corrected
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                      3

Jgmt. Entry, Case No. 33.) However, as in Case No. 6191, the entry made no mention of
Mr. Todd’s sexual offender classification under Megan’s Law.
       {¶ 5} Megan’s Law had two statutorily defined sex offender classifications:
“habitual sex offender” and “sexual predator.” See Former R.C. 2950.01(B) (defining
“habitual sex offender” as “a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually
oriented offense and who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more
sexually oriented offenses”) and R.C. 2950.01(E) (defining a “sexual predator” as “a person
who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and
is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses”). The sentencing
judge was required to conduct a hearing and consider a number of statutory factors to
classify the defendant as a sexual predator. Former R.C. 2950.09(B). The habitual sex
offender classification depended on the defendant’s criminal history and could also attach
to a defendant classified as a sexual predator. Former R.C. 2950.09(E).
       {¶ 6} Another category, “sexually oriented offender,” applied to a defendant who
had committed what qualified as a “sexually oriented offense” under Megan’s Law but
otherwise did “not fit the description of either habitual sex offender or sexual predator.”
State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 407 (1998), superseded by statute as recognized in State
v. Williams, 114 Ohio St.3d 103, 2007-Ohio-3268, ¶ 9. The “sexually oriented offender”
classification was “the least restrictive designation” under Megan’s Law. State v. Hayden,
96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, ¶ 9. For a defendant who was “neither a habitual sex
offender nor a sexual predator, the sexually oriented offender designation attache[d] as a
matter of law.” Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. Upon conviction for a sexually oriented
offense under Megan’s Law, a defendant was “automatically classified as a sexually oriented
offender” and subject to the registration and notification requirements applicable to that
classification. Id. at ¶ 15. See also State v. Zerla, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1087, 2005-Ohio-
5077, ¶ 7 (applying Hayden and holding that the “defendant’s status as a sexually oriented
offender arose by operation of law, and not as a result of the trial court’s * * * judgment,” as
“the trial court plays no role in the imposition of the sexually oriented offender
designation”).
       {¶ 7} Megan’s Law was repealed in 2007 with the passage of Senate Bill 10, the
Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”). The General Assembly passed the AWA in order to comply with
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                     4

the requirements of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, P.L. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587, a federal statute that “created national standards for sex-offender registration,
community notification, and classification.” State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-
Ohio-2424, ¶ 18-20 (describing passage of the AWA and its federal counterpart). Unlike
Megan’s Law, the AWA does not rely on any judicial determination of a defendant’s sex
offender classification. “Instead, offenders are classified as Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex
offenders (or child-victim offenders) based solely on the offender’s offense.” Id. at ¶ 21.
The AWA directed the Attorney General to reclassify offenders with a previous Megan’s Law
classification under the new law’s tier system and notify them by mail of their new
classification before its effective date. R.C. 2950.031(A). The AWA also provided offenders
with the “right [to] a court hearing to contest” the Attorney General’s reclassification.
R.C. 2950.031(E).
       {¶ 8} Against these changes in Ohio’s SORN laws, Mr. Todd was released from
prison in 2007 and, with no mention of a judicially determined classification in the
judgment entries of his criminal cases, was classified by operation of law as a sexually
oriented offender. (Nov. 5, 2020 Supp. to Def.’s Petition to Contest Reclassification at 2.)
Under Megan’s Law, a sexually oriented offender had to comply with the registration and
notification requirements for ten years. Former R.C. 2950.07(B)(3). After receiving
notification from the Attorney General that he was to be reclassified as a Tier III sex
offender under the AWA, a classification that carries a lifetime registration requirement
under R.C. 2950.07(B)(1), Mr. Todd filed a petition under R.C. 2950.031(E) to contest the
reclassification on July 24, 2008. He argued that the Tier III reclassification under the
AWA was unconstitutional under the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution
because it violated his right to due process, subjected him to double jeopardy, and was being
applied retroactively. (July 24, 2008 Def.’s Petition to Contest Reclassification.) As relief,
he requested orders from the trial court declaring the AWA unconstitutional as applied to
him, as well as an order declaring that he “shall be subject only to those requirements and
sanctions contemplated and agreed upon by the parties at the time of his plea agreement,
guilty plea and sentencing, and only to those understood and voluntarily agreed to by him
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                                 5

at the time of his plea agreement, guilty plea and sentencing.”1 Id. at 4-5. Nearly a year
later, the state filed a motion for leave to file a memorandum opposing the petition. The
state argued that the AWA was constitutional as applied to Mr. Todd and noted that he had
stipulated to his “status as a sexual predator” by referencing the plea agreements he had
signed. (July 1, 2009 Mot. for Leave to File Memo Opp. Petition Contesting Reclassification
at 2.)
         {¶ 9} For the next eleven years, the trial court did not rule on Mr. Todd’s petition.
During this time, a number of cases challenged the constitutionality of the AWA. The
Supreme Court of Ohio held that its automatic reclassification provisions, R.C. 2950.031
and 2950.032, violated the doctrine of separation of powers because they authorized the
executive branch to reopen final judgments and reclassify offenders who had already been
subject to judicial classification under Megan’s Law. Bodyke at paragraphs one and two of
the syllabus. In addition, Supreme Court of Ohio held that the AWA, “as applied to
defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article
II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive
laws.” State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, syllabus. Although the AWA
purported to repeal Megan’s Law, such repeal was held to be “invalid as it affects offenders
originally classified under Megan’s Law” and such offenders have “a continuing duty to
comply with Megan’s Law requirements.” State v. Brunning, 134 Ohio St.3d 438, 2012-
Ohio-5752, ¶ 22. “Megan’s Law’s separate statutory scheme continues to apply to offenders
who committed a sexually oriented offense prior to the effective date of the AWA, and the
repeal of the hearing provisions required to classify those offenders is ineffective as it affects
offenders subject to Megan’s Law.” State ex rel. Grant v. Collins, 155 Ohio St.3d 242, 2018-
Ohio-4281, ¶ 13.
         {¶ 10} On February 19, 2020, the state filed a motion asking the trial court to rule
on Mr. Todd’s petition, taking the position that he should still be classified as a Tier III
offender under the AWA or, alternatively, a sexual predator under Megan’s Law. (Feb. 19,

1 We note that this request could be interpreted as asking the trial court to declare him a sexual predator

under Megan’s Law because, as Mr. Todd concedes, that was what he stipulated to as part of his plea
agreement. However, such a declaration would have been error because, as explained below, the trial court
rendered no judgment addressing his classification under Megan’s Law. Thus, relief under the petition
could not be a return to a classification that was never rendered.
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                      6

2020 Mot. for Expedited Consideration of Petition to Contest Reclassification.) The state
also filed a motion requesting that the trial court issue a nunc pro tunc entry adding a sexual
predator classification to Mr. Todd’s original judgments. (Nov. 12, 2020 Mot. for Nunc Pro
Tunc Entry.)       Describing the omission as a “clerical error,” the state invoked both
Civ.R. 60(A) and Crim.R. 36 as grounds for its motion. Id. at 3.
       {¶ 11} On November 5, 2020, Mr. Todd filed a memorandum in opposition to the
state’s motion. He argued that under Bodyke and Williams, the AWA could not be applied
to him. (Nov. 5, 2020 Supp. to Def.’s Petition to Contest Reclassification at 4.) He also
argued that, because he had completed both his prison sentence and the ten-year
registration requirement applicable to sexually oriented offenders under Megan’s Law,
reclassification as a sexual predator would violate his right to due process. Id. at 4-5. He
additionally argued that res judicata prohibited any correction of the judgments with a nunc
pro tunc entry because the state “could have filed an appeal of the faulty entry” but failed to
do so. Id. at 4.
       {¶ 12} After a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling granting Mr. Todd’s petition
challenging reclassification and denying the state’s motion for a nunc pro tunc entry. The
trial court rejected the state’s assertion that Mr. Todd could be classified as a Tier III
offender under the AWA, stating that its “argument runs afoul of the Supreme Court
precedent” in Williams and Bodyke. (Nov. 23, 2020 Decision & Entry at 6.) Concluding
that “the AWA cannot be applied to Mr. Todd,” the trial court granted his petition and
declared that “he is to be classified as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law.” Id.
       {¶ 13} The trial court denied the state’s request for a nunc pro tunc entry on several
grounds. First, the trial court agreed that the judgments’ failure to mention “the parties’
stipulated classification” of Mr. Todd as a sexual predator under Megan’s Law was “an
error,” but ruled that the state “needed to correct it on direct appeal.” Id. at 8, citing State
v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-311, 2011-Ohio-6669. Second, the trial court distinguished
State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, in which the Supreme Court of Ohio
endorsed the use of a nunc pro tunc entry to remedy the omission of a postrelease control
from a sentencing entry. The defendant in Qualls was still in prison and postrelease control
had not started at the time it was decided, whereas Mr. Todd would “go from having
completed registration, to registering for the rest of his life” if a nunc pro tunc entry
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                                     7

reclassified him as a sexual predator. Id. at 9. Third, the trial court found that the omission
of the sexual predator classification was a substantive error, not a clerical one, and therefore
not amenable to correction by a nunc pro tunc entry. Finally, citing State v. Harper, 160
Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, State v. Hudson, 161 Ohio St.3d 166, 2020-Ohio-3849,
and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, the trial court stated that
the error in the sentencing entries rendered them voidable, not void, and therefore only
able to be corrected by direct appeal. Id. at 11.
        {¶ 14} The state filed a motion for leave to appeal under R.C. 2945.67(A), which we
granted.2 (Apr. 1, 2021 Journal Entry.) The state raises two assignments of error:
                 [I.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in granting
                 the petition contesting reclassification as a sexually oriented
                 offender under Megan’s Law when the record reflected the trial
                 court’s finding that the defendant is a sexual predator.
                 [II.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying
                 the motion for a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the court’s
                 clerical error in omitting the sexual predator finding from the
                 judgments.
        {¶ 15} We will first address the state’s second assignment of error, which challenges
the trial court’s denial of the state’s motion for a nunc pro tunc entry. When moving the
trial court, the state cited both Civ.R. 60(A) and Crim.R. 36 as grounds for granting the
nunc pro tunc entry. (Nov. 12, 2020 Mot. for Nunc Pro Tunc Entry at 3.) As explained
below, only Civ.R. 60(A) applies here. A trial court ruling under Civ.R. 60(A) is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Bond v. de Rinaldis, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-756, 2018-Ohio-930,
¶ 13 (“Appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s
decision under Civ.R. 60(A) to correct clerical mistakes in a judgment.”).
        {¶ 16} The state argues that the omission of Mr. Todd’s classification as a sexual
predator under Megan’s Law from the original judgment “was plainly an error that was
clerical in nature,” noting references to the classification in paperwork filed on the docket
and in the sentencing transcript. (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 33-34.) Supposing that

2 The state invoked R.C. 2945.67(A), which allows discretionary review of rulings in criminal cases where

no statute or rule expressly provides for appellate jurisdiction over the ruling. However, because
proceedings under Megan’s Law are civil, our jurisdiction to review the second assignment of error actually
arises under our authority to review a trial court’s ruling on a motion under Civ.R. 60(A). E.g., State ex rel.
Litty v. Leskovyansky, 77 Ohio St.3d 97 (1996) (reviewing trial court ruling on a Civ.R. 60(A) motion).
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                                   8

this paperwork “did not reach the clerical typist for inclusion in the court’s judgment,” the
state concludes that the omission of the sexual predator classification was clerical “[b]y
definition” and subject to correction by nunc pro tunc entry. Id. at 34. The state also rejects
the trial court’s ruling that it was required to correct the omission by a direct appeal and
that res judicata now bars it from obtaining relief. Id. at 35-36. In support, the state cites
State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, in which the Supreme Court of Ohio
upheld a trial court’s correction by nunc pro tunc entry of its failure to state the period of
postrelease control in the judgment entry that it had imposed at sentencing. Id. at 36-37.
        {¶ 17} Mr. Todd’s response defends the trial court’s ruling that res judicata applies,
citing State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-311, 2011-Ohio-6669, in which this court affirmed
a trial court’s decision to vacate a defendant’s Tier III classification under the AWA and
reinstate his previous Megan’s Law classification. (Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 15-16.)
He also argues that Qualls is distinguishable because the defendant in that case was still
serving time when it was decided, whereas Mr. Todd has completed both his prison
sentence and the registration requirement under his Megan’s Law classification. Id. at 19.
Furthermore, in Mr. Todd’s reading, Qualls only applies to corrections of postrelease
control. Id. at 20.
        {¶ 18} Before discussing the propriety of a nunc pro tunc entry in this matter, an
examination of the existing judgment entries is in order. The dated judgment entries in
both of Mr. Todd’s criminal cases stated that he had pled guilty to certain offenses and that
the court had found him guilty of those offenses, and stated as well as the specific sentences
imposed. (July 14, 1999 Jgmt. Entry, Case No. 6191; July 14, 1999 Jgmt. Entry, Case No.
33.) Thus, both judgment entries bear all the indicia of being final appealable orders of Mr.
Todd’s criminal convictions.3 Crim.R. 32(C) (“A judgment of conviction shall set forth the
fact of conviction and the sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk
shall enter it on the journal.”); State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204,

3 The state argues that under State v. Craig, 159 Ohio St.3d 398, 2020-Ohio-455, the judgment in Case No.

6191 was not a final appealable order because it did not reflect the dismissal of the gross sexual imposition
charge in Count One of the indictment. Thus, the state argues the judgment could be corrected with a nunc
pro tunc entry to reflect the dismissal and the sexual predator classification under Megan’s Law. Whether
or not the judgment of conviction in Case No. 6191 was a final appealable order, the fact remains that the
Megan’s Law proceeding never culminated in a final appealable order, as discussed below. The two
proceedings are “legally distinct.” Hunter v. Binette, 154 Ohio St.3d 508, 2018-Ohio-2681, ¶ 16.
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                                  9

paragraph one of the syllabus (explaining that under Crim.R. 32(C) “A judgment of
conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the
fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp
indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk”).
        {¶ 19} However, “[p]roceedings under Megan’s Law were civil in nature, not
criminal.” State ex rel. Hunter v. Binette, 154 Ohio St.3d 508, 2018-Ohio-2681, ¶ 16. “As
a result, sex-offender-classification proceedings were ‘legally distinct from the proceedings
governing a defendant’s underlying criminal conviction(s) and sentence.’ ” Id., quoting
State v. Gibson, 2d Dist. No. 2009 CA 47, 2010-Ohio-3447, ¶ 25. For this reason, “courts
often addressed the criminal sentence and the classification determination in separate
entries and treated them as separately appealable orders.”4 Id. Thus, in a criminal
proceeding in which a conviction requires a judicial determination of the offender’s
classification under Megan’s Law, the question of whether the judgment of conviction is a
final appealable order is distinct from the question of whether the judicial determination of
the sex offender’s classification is a final appealable order. See Gibson at ¶ 22 (holding that
“[a] defendant’s sex offender classification is not a ‘final judgment of conviction’ and is not
a part of the criminal sanctions imposed upon a convicted defendant under the sentencing
statutes”); State v. Megarry, 4th Dist. No. 17CA1051, 2018-Ohio-4242, ¶ 20 (holding that
“[a] sex-offender classification under Megan’s Law constitutes a final appealable order
even when the sentencing entry itself is not a final appealable order”); State v. Dobrski, 9th
Dist. No. 06CA008925, 2007-Ohio-3121 (appellate court had no jurisdiction to review
deficient judgment of conviction that did not contain all Crim.R. 32(C) requirements
because it was not a final appealable order, but did have jurisdiction to review sex offender
classification under Megan’s Law because it was a separate final appealable order under
R.C. 2505.02(A)(2)); State v. Hultz, 9th Dist. No. 06CA0032, 2007-Ohio-2040, ¶ 21
(holding that appellate court could “proceed to consider Defendant’s appeal of his sexual

4 Although the statutory text of Megan’s Law stated that “the judge shall specify in the offender’s sentence

and the judgment of conviction that contains the sentence” whether or not the judge had determined that
the offender was a sexual predator, as Binette acknowledged, it was not always possible to include the
determination in the judgment of conviction. Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3); Binette at ¶ 16. For example, the
sexual offender hearing and the sentencing hearing might be held at different times, as one requirement of
Megan’s Law was that the judge “conduct the hearing prior to sentencing” the defendant. Former
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1).
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                    10

predator designation separately from his appeal of his sentence, despite the fact that the
sentencing entry was not a final appealable order”). As all parties acknowledge, the
judgment entries in this case make no mention of Mr. Todd’s sex offender classification.
They are judgment entries of conviction that terminated the trial court’s criminal
jurisdiction over Mr. Todd. State v. Gilbert, 143 Ohio St.3d 150, 2014-Ohio-4562, ¶ 9
(“Once a final judgment has been issued pursuant to Crim.R. 32, the trial court’s
jurisdiction ends.”). However, because no judgment entry addressed the question of his
sex offender classification, Mr. Todd’s “legally distinct” civil sex offender proceedings under
Megan’s Law remain unresolved. Binette at ¶ 16.
       {¶ 20} A trial court previously failed to enter judgment of a sex offender’s
classification under Megan’s Law and we addressed the complications this created in two
related cases. First, in State v. Ronan, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1387, 2005-Ohio-5088
(“Ronan I”), the defendant entered a guilty plea to multiple counts of rape and unlawful
sexual contact with a minor. Id. at ¶ 2. On appeal, he challenged both the trial court’s
sentence and the sexual predator classification under Megan’s Law. Id. We reversed the
trial court for imposing more than the minimum sentence on the defendant, a first-time
offender, without making the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(B). Id. at ¶ 5. However,
we lacked jurisdiction to address the trial court’s sexual predator determination. Id. at ¶ 8.
“Because the trial court has not journalized its decision finding defendant to be a sexual
predator, we lack a final appealable order.” Id., citing R.C. 2505.02. Accordingly, the
challenge to the sex offender classification portion of the appeal was dismissed. Id.
       {¶ 21} On remand, a new judge resentenced the defendant, but “declined to address
the sexual predator finding made by the prior trial judge.” State v. Ronan, 10th Dist. No.
06AP-63, 2007-Ohio-168, ¶ 5 (“Ronan II”). The defendant appealed the new sentence and
the state cross-appealed the trial court’s failure to enter the prior judge’s classification of
the defendant as a sexual predator. Id. at ¶ 6. The defendant then dismissed his appeal of
the sentence, but we addressed the state’s cross-appeal. Id. at ¶ 7.
       {¶ 22} Ronan II noted that, under Rule 7 of the Rules of Superintendence for the
Courts of Ohio, a trial court is required to journalize a judgment entry within 30 days of its
verdict or decision. Id. at ¶ 10. Furthermore, in a civil case, Civ.R. 63(B) allows a successor
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                  11

judge to enter judgment if the original judge is unable to do so. Id. at ¶ 11. Applying these
rules to the procedural history of Ronan I, we stated:
                  In this case, the original trial judge complied with [former]
                  R.C. 2950.09(B)(1)(a), conducted the required hearing and
                  found that appellant was a sexual predator. However, that
                  finding was not reduced to judgment by journal entry. Hence,
                  in our earlier decision, we found that there was no final
                  appealable order and, therefore, we had no jurisdiction to
                  entertain appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s finding that
                  he was a sexual predator.
                  Because there was no final appealable order as to the sex
                  offender classification, nothing precluded the trial court from
                  carrying out its duty to journalize that decision. Moreover,
                  because we expressly held that without a final appealable order,
                  we lacked jurisdiction to consider the sexual predator
                  classification, our remand for resentencing could not have
                  implicated the sexual predator classification decision made by
                  the original trial judge. The trial court remained free to
                  journalize that sex offender classification finding or grant a new
                  sex offender classification hearing. See Civ.R. 63(B).
Id. at ¶ 16-17.
       {¶ 23} Lacking a final appealable order to review, we could only dismiss the state’s
cross-appeal. Id. at ¶ 21. Without jurisdiction, this court could provide no remedy because
“procedendo, not appeal, is appropriate where a court has either refused to render
judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.” Id., citing
State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna, 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 184 (1995).
       {¶ 24} The procedural history of this case raises many of the same issues. As in
Ronan I and Ronan II, the judgment entries of Mr. Todd’s convictions were silent as to the
sexual predator determination. Because no separate judgment entry journalized the
determination, there was no final appealable order terminating Mr. Todd’s civil
proceedings under Megan’s Law. “The fact that the criminal aspects of the case were
reduced to a sentence and therefore, provided a final judgment from which to appeal does
not alter the fact that the civil portion of the case was not reduced to judgment.” Ronan II
at ¶ 19.
       {¶ 25} Because “[p]roceedings under Megan’s Law were civil in nature, not
criminal,” Civ.R. 60(A), not Crim.R. 36, is the appropriate rule under which to evaluate the
state’s request for a nunc pro tunc entry. Binette at ¶ 16. Civ.R. 60(A) codifies the common
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                    12

law rule allowing courts to issue nunc pro tunc entries, “a power the courts have always
had.” State ex rel. Henry v. Britt, 67 Ohio St.2d 71, 74 (1981). See also Heinrichs v. 356
Registry, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-532, 2016-Ohio-4646, ¶ 61 (“The common law rule
giving courts the power to enter nunc pro tunc orders has been codified by Civ.R. 60(A).”).
The rule states: “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time
on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders.” Civ.R. 60(A). The rule “permits a trial court, in its discretion, to correct clerical
mistakes which are apparent on the record, but does not authorize a trial court to make
substantive changes in judgments.” State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 77 Ohio St.3d 97,
100 (1996), citing Londrico v. Knowlton, 88 Ohio App.3d 282 (9th Dist.1993).
       {¶ 26} “The function of an entry nunc pro tunc is the correction of judicial records
insofar as they fail to record, or improperly record, a judgment rendered by the court, as
distinguished from the correction of an error in the judgment itself, or in the failure to
render the judgment.” Caprita v. Caprita, 145 Ohio St. 5, 7 (1945). “A nunc pro tunc order
may not render a judgment or modify a judgment never made in the first instance.”
Showcase Homes v. Ravenna Sav. Bank, 126 Ohio App.3d 328, 330 (3d Dist.1998), citing
McKay v. McKay, 24 Ohio App.3d 74, 75 (11th Dist.1985). The use of a nunc pro tunc entry
to correct “mistakes in judgments” presupposes that a court rendered judgment. Civ.R.
60(A). Here, however, the court never rendered a judgment dispositive of Mr. Todd’s
classification under Megan’s Law.
       {¶ 27} The state’s attempts to frame the error as clerical and not substantive cannot
conjure a judgment to correct where none exists. The state points first to the sentencing
transcript. After imposing sentence, the original judge considered the statutory factors
relevant to a sexual predator determination under Megan’s Law before stating: “In applying
the criteria and the conclusion [that Mr. Todd was likely to reoffend], the court does
determine that Mr. Todd is a sexual predator.” (July 12, 1999 Tr. at 41-42.) However, “a
court speaks only through its journal entry and not by oral pronouncement or mere written
minute or memorandum.” Scheidler v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-
584, 2005-Ohio-105, ¶ 12, citing Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109 (1953). See also
Bittmann v. Bittmann, 129 Ohio St. 123, 127 (1934) (“The oral announcement of a judgment
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                   13

or decree by the trial court binds no one. It is axiomatic that the court speaks from its
journal.”) A judge’s oral determination that a defendant is a sexual predator under Megan’s
Law is not a judgment. State v. Bowman, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1025, 2003-Ohio-5341, ¶ 19
(holding that “even though the trial court orally pronounced defendant to be a sexual
predator * * * because a court speaks from its journal and not by oral pronouncements from
the bench * * * [the] oral pronouncement did not constitute judgment”).
       {¶ 28} The state also points to several administrative filings on the docket, including
a “sentencing sheet” and a “processing sheet” containing handwritten notations,
presumably of court staff, evidencing Mr. Todd’s status as a sexual predator.           Such
documents are not judgments. See State v. McLaughlin, 157 Ohio App.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-
1780, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.) (holding that there was no final judgment where trial court announced
decision at hearing and filed “a criminal case processing sheet the next day reflecting that
oral ruling”). We have previously rejected the argument that the presence on the docket of
such administrative records entitles the state to a nunc pro tunc entry stating a Megan’s
Law sex offender classification absent from the sentencing entry. State v. Smith, 10th Dist.
No. 11AP-311, 2011-Ohio-6669, ¶ 8. Because there was no judgment rendered in the civil
Megan’s Law proceeding, the state was not entitled to a nunc pro tunc entry to remedy its
absence.
       {¶ 29} We acknowledge that the text of Megan’s Law states that “the judge shall
specify in the offender’s sentence and the judgment of conviction that contains the
sentence” the sexual predator determination, if made. Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3). The
General Assembly certainly intended for a Megan’s Law classification and the judgment of
conviction to coexist in a single entry. Thus, Megan’s Law itself, as drafted, requires the
judgment of conviction to contain the sex offender classification. But when a trial court
fails to include this language, it does not only fail to comply with a formal statutory
mandate. Because Megan’s Law proceedings were held to be civil and remedial by the Ohio
Supreme Court, and “sex-offender-classification proceedings were ‘legally distinct from the
proceedings governing a defendant’s underlying criminal conviction(s) and sentence,’ ” a
trial court that omits a Megan’s Law classification fails to enter a final judgment in that
parallel proceeding. Binette at ¶ 16. That is the holding of Ronan I and Ronan II, and we
are bound by it. Res judicata does not apply here because it “cannot apply if the trial court
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                  14

never issued a final, appealable order.” State ex rel. McIntyre v. Summit Cty. Court of
Common Pleas, 144 Ohio St.3d 589, 2015-Ohio-5343, ¶ 7, citing State v. Griffin, 138 Ohio
St.3d 108, 2013-Ohio-5481, ¶ 3. Res judicata “is inapplicable here because the non-
punitive, civil, sexual predator finding was never reduced to judgment.” Ronan II at ¶ 19.
       {¶ 30} Furthermore, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently explained in State
v. Schilling, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-3027, its holding in Henderson—that res
judicata bars challenges to errors in a final judgment that a party fails to challenge in a
direct appeal as long as the trial court did not err in the exercise of its subject matter
jurisdiction—does not apply to sexual offender classifications under either Megan’s Law or
the AWA that arise as a matter of law. In Schilling, neither the “sentencing entry nor any
other judgment entered by the trial court * * * actually imposed, by judicial determination,”
the defendant’s Tier I status under the AWA. Schilling at ¶ 23. Only a “document signed
by Schilling and the trial-court judge that informed Schilling of his duty to register and
report as a Tier I offender and the court’s entry noting that Schilling had been informed of
those duties” referenced the classification. Id. However, the court explained, “[n]either of
these is a trial-court judgment such that our holding in Henderson might apply to any error
it may contain.” Id. “Likewise, classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s
Law and the attendant registration and reporting obligations do not arise from a trial
court’s judgment.” Id. at ¶ 25. Here, as well, neither of the final judgments in Mr. Todd’s
criminal cases “actually imposed, by judicial determination,” a sexual predator
classification under Megan’s Law. Id. at ¶ 23. His classification as a sexually oriented
offender under Megan’s Law did “not arise from a trial court’s judgment,” but was
automatic and by operation of law. Id. at ¶ 25.
       {¶ 31} Contrary to the position of the trial court and Mr. Todd, our mention of res
judicata in Smith does not bind the state. In Smith, as in this case, there was “no sex
offender classification in the sentencing entry.” Smith at ¶ 2. The state reclassified the
defendant as a Tier III offender under the AWA, and we affirmed the trial court’s decision
to grant the defendant’s petition contesting reclassification under R.C. 2950.031(E). Id. at
¶ 2, 16. We rejected the state’s argument that a nunc pro tunc entry could correct the
judgment with a judicial determination of the defendant as a sexual predator under
Megan’s Law because of an “incomplete record” that lacked a transcript and only
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                  15

mentioned the determination in a notation on a sentencing sheet. Id. at ¶ 9. “In any event,”
we stated, “res judicata bars the state from challenging the sentencing entry now, given that
it could have previously filed an appeal when the entry was issued 14 years ago.” Id. Smith
failed to recognize our previous holdings in Ronan I and Ronan II, as well as the dichotomy
between the civil, remedial Megan’s Law proceedings and the criminal sentence and
conviction, that should have resulted in recognizing that there was no final appealable order
before the court under Megan’s Law. An appellate court “not only has the right, but is
entrusted with the duty to examine its former decisions and, when reconciliation is
impossible, to discard its former errors.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216,
2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 43. Smith is overruled only to the extent that it held that res judicata
applies to a Megan’s Law determination that is absent from a judgment entry of conviction.
       {¶ 32} The trial court’s reasoning when overruling the state’s motion for a nunc pro
tunc entry also appears to arise from concerns about finality and disapproval of the effect
lifetime registration would have on Mr. Todd:
              Treating the failure to include a classification in the Entry as a
              clerical error will drastically change Mr. Todd’s status. As of
              now, Mr. Todd has served his prison sentence and completed
              his required registration. This has been his status since 2018.
              * * * The consequence of labeling that a clerical error is
              changing Mr. Todd’s status from [having] finished registering,
              to registering for the rest of his life.
(Nov. 23, 2020 Decision & Entry at 7.)
       {¶ 33} The trial court’s concerns are misplaced. Although Mr. Todd has been
released from prison, any expectation of finality does not extend to his status under
Megan’s Law because “classification as a sex offender under Megan’s Law is a civil, remedial
consequence of the conviction and not a punitive component of criminal sentencing.” State
ex rel. Grant v. Collins, 155 Ohio St.3d 242, 2018-Ohio-4281, ¶ 17. “The classification
requirements inherent in Megan’s Law were determined by the Ohio Supreme Court to be
civil and remedial, and thus are not a punishment within the defendant’s sentence.” State
v. Bell, 12th Dist. No. CA2015-10-077, 2016-Ohio-7363, ¶ 13 (affirming trial court’s decision
granting state’s motion to reclassify defendant under Megan’s Law who had erroneously
been classified under the AWA and rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over him because his prison term was complete before the
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                    16

reclassification hearing). See also State v. Sturgill, 4th Dist No. 16CA21, 2017-Ohio-2736,
¶ 23 (applying Bell and “find[ing] no statutory authority that divested the trial court’s
jurisdiction to hold the required [Megan’s Law classification] hearing, despite Appellant’s
release from prison over two years ago”).
        {¶ 34} Finally, we note that Qualls does not entitle the state to a nunc pro tunc entry
“correcting” Mr. Todd’s criminal judgment of conviction. Qualls held that a trial court may
remedy the omission of postrelease control from a judgment of conviction with a nunc pro
tunc entry if it qualified as a clerical error under Crim.R. 36. Qualls, 2012-Ohio-1111, at
¶ 15.   Unlike Megan’s Law, postrelease control is a criminal sanction and part of a
defendant’s criminal sentence. See R.C. 2967.28(B) (“Each sentence to a prison term * * *
shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control”).
Postrelease control is not a component of a civil proceeding, like Megan’s Law. Under
Qualls, its omission could be corrected under Crim.R. 36, but that rule has no application
in a civil proceeding under Megan’s Law. Qualls at ¶ 30. In Qualls, omitting postrelease
control did not affect the validity of the final judgment that the nunc pro tunc entry
corrected. Here, however, omission of the Megan’s Law determination was itself a failure
to enter a final appealable order in that parallel but “legally distinct” civil proceeding.
Binette, 2018-Ohio-2681, at ¶ 16. Qualls has no application to this case.
        {¶ 35} The trial court did not err by denying the state’s motion, but its reasoning was
incorrect. Under Ronan I and Ronan II, there was no final appealable order entered in Mr.
Todd’s Megan’s Law proceeding, so there was no judgment entry to correct. The second
assignment of error is overruled.
        {¶ 36} We now turn to the first assignment of error, which challenges the trial court’s
ruling on Mr. Todd’s petition for reclassification under the AWA. As noted previously,
before the Ohio Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, the AWA’s reclassification
process was designed to automatically apply the statute’s three-tier classification system to
sex offenders previously classified by judicial determination under Megan’s Law. See
Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 22 (describing the AWA’s reclassification scheme, under which
tier status was “assigned solely by reference to the offense” to persons previously classified
under Megan’s Law). Although the reclassification was intended to apply automatically,
the AWA did provide offenders with a process to challenge the reclassification. An offender
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                      17

could file a petition to “request as a matter of right a court hearing to contest the application
to the offender * * * the new registration requirements” under the AWA. R.C. 2950.031(E).
The statute stated that “at the hearing, all parties are entitled to be heard, and the court
shall consider all relevant information and testimony presented relative to the application
to the offender” of the AWA’s registration requirements. Id. In such a hearing, the offender
has the burden to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the new registration
requirements do not apply to the offender” to resist reclassification. Id. Although the
Supreme Court of Ohio invalidated the AWA’s automatic reclassification of offenders
already classified under Megan’s Law in Bodyke, that holding “did not invalidate the
petition process for challenging a sex-offender classification under” the AWA. State v.
Palmer, 131 Ohio St.3d 278, 2012-Ohio-580, paragraph one of the syllabus.
       {¶ 37} According to the state, Mr. Todd did not meet the burden under
R.C. 2950.031(E) to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to
not be classified as a Tier III offender under the AWA. (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 18.)
The state argues that State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, which held
that offenders subject to Megan’s Law could not be reclassified under the AWA because of
the constitutional     prohibition on retroactive punishment,            does    not foreclose
reclassification of a Megan’s Law offender:
              The AWA changes were not ‘punitive’ as applied to child rapists
              who have been determined to be a sexual predator. The
              difference in being treated as a Tier III offender under AWA
              and being a sexual predator is minimal and is fully justified by
              the remedial and regulatory purposes of the law in seeking to
              provide some measure of protection from offenders like
              defendant who raped multiple victims.
(Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 20.)
       {¶ 38} In its brief, the state compares the registration requirements for sexual
predators under Megan’s Law to those for Tier III offenders under the AWA and concludes
that the differences are “minimal” and not “punitive” under Williams. Id. at 21. In the
state’s view, the change in nomenclature from “sexual predator” to “Tier III” is even
“ameliorative.” Id. According to the state, “[t]he minimal changes are not ‘punitive’ as
applied to sexual predators, and therefore the logic of Williams is inapplicable to an
offender found to be a sexual predator.” Id.
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                      18

       {¶ 39} In response, Mr. Todd argues that “the state continues to hold on to
arguments that have been soundly rejected for years.” (Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6.)
He believes that Williams applies to him and that the state’s arguments amount to attempts
“to deflect and mischaracterize” its holding. Id. at 7.
       {¶ 40} As an initial matter, we note that the state’s argument relies on the incorrect
premise that Mr. Todd was judicially determined to be a sexual predator under Megan’s
Law. For the reasons previously discussed, there is no final judgment stating such a
determination.
       {¶ 41} Even if there were a final judgment stating that Mr. Todd was judicially
determined to be a sexual predator under Megan’s Law, the state’s argument would still
fail. The holding of Williams is unambiguous. The AWA, “as applied to defendants who
committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio
Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws.”
Williams at syllabus. The phrase “defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its
enactment” is broad and encompasses Mr. Todd. Elsewhere, Williams refers to the class of
persons it applies to in similarly broad terms: “The issue before us is whether these changes,
when applied to a person whose crime was committed prior to the enactment of S.B. 10,
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.” Id. at ¶ 7. See also id. at ¶ 21 (concluding
that “imposing the current registration requirements on a sex offender whose crime was
committed prior to the enactment of S.B. 10 is punitive”). The defendant in Williams
committed a sex offense prior to the AWA’s passage but was classified under it as a Tier II
offender. Id. at ¶ 1-3. Thus, the set of facts before the Supreme Court provided it with the
opportunity to limit its holding to a particular class of sex offenders that did not include
those judicially determined to be sexual predators under Megan’s Law. There is no carveout
of the Williams holding for “child rapists who have been determined to be a sexual
predator,” as the state suggests. (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 20.) Williams held that the
AWA was punitive as applied to all persons who committed sex offenses prior to its passage,
regardless of the type of sex offense committed, or even if they had actually been subject to
judicially determined classification under Megan’s Law. See Williams at ¶ 21 (“When we
consider all the changes enacted by S.B. 10 in aggregate, we conclude that imposing the
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                     19

current registration requirements on a sex offender whose crime was committed prior to
the enactment of S.B. 10 is punitive.”).
       {¶ 42} Because Williams applies to Mr. Todd, the trial court did not err when it
granted his petition challenging his reclassification as a Tier III offender under the AWA.
Under Williams, Mr. Todd’s reclassification violated the prohibition on retroactive
punishment because he committed the sexual offenses that prompted the Tier III
classification years before the AWA’s enactment. Williams at syllabus. The trial court
properly applied Williams in the first part of its discussion when granting the petition.
       {¶ 43} However, after applying Williams, the trial court stated:
              Moreover, the practical results of applying the AWA to Mr.
              Todd are significant, not minimal. The practical result is Mr.
              Todd will go from a sexually oriented offender who has
              completed his registration requirement, to a Tier III sex
              offender subject to lifetime registration. Thus, the AWA cannot
              be applied to Mr. Todd.
(Nov. 23, 2020 Decision & Entry at 6.)
       {¶ 44} This reasoning is erroneous. The AWA cannot be applied to Mr. Todd not
because of the “significant” effect it would have on him, but because Williams held that to
do so would violate the constitutional prohibition on retroactive application of the law.
Furthermore, the trial court’s statement could be interpreted to fall outside the bounds of
the remedy contemplated by R.C. 2950.031(E):
              If at the conclusion of the hearing the court finds that the
              offender or delinquent child has proven by clear and
              convincing evidence that the new registration requirements do
              not apply to the offender or delinquent child, the court shall
              issue an order that specifies that the new registration
              requirements do not apply to the offender or delinquent child.
       {¶ 45} Mr. Todd “is entitled to the remedy allowed by the statute: a declaration that
the AWA does not apply to him and reinstatement of his previous classification.” Hawkins
v. State, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-979, 2016-Ohio-8016, ¶ 18. A petitioner “is not entitled to a
declaration that he has no duty to register, or an order declaring his name be removed from
any sex offender registry maintained by state or local authorities.” Id. at ¶ 19. See also State
v. Bowling, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-36, 2015-Ohio-3123, ¶ 7, 10, stating that R.C. 2950.031(E)
“authorizes only a determination of whether the new Ohio ‘Tier’ classification applies to the
offender” and that the petition process “was not a vehicle for the state to challenge his
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                     20

original classification”); State v. Chapman, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-70, 2015-Ohio-4042, ¶ 9
(stating that “petitioners under R.C. 2950.031(E) are entitled to orders directing their
return to their previous classifications” but not an opportunity for the state to relitigate the
classification). Whether or not Mr. Todd had completed his registration requirement under
Megan’s Law was not the subject of the petition, and the statute does not authorize a court
to rule on that issue. Nevertheless, the trial court did not err when granting the petition.
We overrule the state’s second assignment of error.
       {¶ 46} Having overruled the state’s two assignments of error, the judgments of the
trial court denying the state’s motion for a nunc pro tunc entry and granting Mr. Todd’s
petition challenging reclassification under R.C. 2950.031(E) are affirmed.
                                                                         Judgments affirmed.
                    DORRIAN, J., concurs with separate opinion.
           LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concurs in judgment only with separate opinion.

DORRIAN, J., concurring.
       {¶ 47} I concur with the majority and would overrule both of the state’s assignments
of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. I write separately, however, to
emphasize that we overrule the second assignment of error for reasons other than those
articulated by the trial court and to underscore that the trial court retains continuing
jurisdiction to classify Todd as a sexual predator consistent with the parties’ joint
stipulation and the trial court’s classification reflected in the record from the sentencing
hearing.
       {¶ 48} I concur with the majority that, consistent with the precedent of this court set
forth in State v. Ronan, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1387, 2005-Ohio-5088 (“Ronan I”), and State
v. Ronan, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-63, 2007-Ohio-168 (“Ronan II”), no final appealable order
exists with regard to the trial court’s classification of Todd pursuant to Megan’s Law.
       {¶ 49} I also concur with the majority that State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-311,
2011-Ohio-6669, is overruled to the extent it held that res judicata applies to a Megan’s Law
determination that is absent from a judgment entry of conviction. The Supreme Court of
Ohio’s recent decision in State v. Schilling, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-3027, supports
such a conclusion.
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                    21

       {¶ 50} I also concur that the trial court could not issue a nunc pro tunc entry
reflecting the trial court’s sexual predator classification reflected in the transcript because
a judgment regarding Megan’s Law classification was never rendered in the first place.
(Majority opinion at ¶ 24-25, 29.)
       {¶ 51} Therefore, for the reasons articulated herein, not for the reasons articulated
by the trial court, I concur with the majority that the trial court did not err in denying the
state’s motion for nunc pro tunc and would overrule the second assignment of error.
       {¶ 52} Furthermore, I point out that, although not by means of a nunc pro tunc
entry, the trial court retains jurisdiction to enter a judgment reflecting the sexual predator
stipulation of the parties and classification by the court reflected in the transcript from the
hearing regarding Megan’s Law classification which took place at the end of the sentencing
hearing on July 12, 1999. The following excerpts from the transcript of that hearing are
particularly relevant:
              [THE COURT]: [Prosecutor] Canepa, if you could give me the
              terms of the plea first and then the facts of the respective
              cases.

              ***

              [PROSECUTOR] CANEPA: Also, your Honor, there is an
              agreement by and between the parties, a stipulation, that
              [Todd] will be found a sexual predator for the purpose of
              registration under 2950.09 of the Ohio Revised Code.

              ***

              Also, again, your Honor, the parties stipulate that [Todd] will
              be found a sexual predator for the purpose of 2950.09, which
              would require lifetime registration and notification for
              [Todd].

              ***

              [THE COURT]: Now, [having sentenced Todd,] the next thing
              we need to do is to consider the type of classification that is
              required under what we refer to as House Bill 180. I am not
              sure it is necessary to do this, but I think, as a matter of safety,
              I will go ahead and do it anyway.
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                           22

             First of all, the court notes that the age of Mr. Todd at this time
             is 22 years. The age of the victims when the offenses occurred
             -- and this obviously went on for a more extended period of
             time with [M.C.] than it did with [M.W.]. But those ages were,
             I believe, six years and 11 years.

             The court is not aware of any prior criminal record that Mr.
             Todd has. There were multiple victims to this offense. Drugs,
             alcohol, that type of thing, were not used to perpetuate the
             offense.

             The question as to whether or not unusual cruelty was used in
             this offense, obviously, the offense by itself, by its very nature,
             is cruel. But I don’t believe that the statute is referring to that
             when they ask the court to consider cruelty.

             I believe what they are talking about is whether or not there
             was torture in the form of beatings, body mutations, that type
             of thing. Fortunately, that type of cruelty was not present in
             this particular case.

             The court further feels that Mr. Todd has a mental disorder or
             a mental disease that cannot be cured. It is possible that it can
             be controlled. The rate of success in the treatment of this
             disease is getting better, but it is not full proof.

             Based on that, the court cannot say that it does not believe that
             it is likely that Mr. Todd would reoffend. Or, putting it a
             different way, the court does believe that it is likely that Mr.
             Todd might reoffend at some future time.

             In applying the criteria and the conclusion, the court does
             determine that Mr. Todd is a sexual predator. And, therefore,
             reporting will be required for the rest of his life. The form of
             reporting and the details of that will be explained by the
             institution prior to Mr. Todd being released from prison.

             Is there anything else on belief of the state of Ohio?

             [PROSECUTOR] CANEPA: I believe that’s everything, your
             Honor.

             THE COURT: Is there anything on behalf of the Mr. Todd?

             [ATTORNEY] SCOTT: No, your Honor.

(Emphasis added.) (Case No. 20AP-587 July 12, 1999 Tr. at 2, 4-6, 41-43.)
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                   23

       {¶ 53} In Ronan II, after finding there was no final appealable order, we instructed
the trial court that it would have the option to either journalize its prior Megan’s Law
classification or grant a new sex offender classification hearing:
              In this case, the original trial judge complied with R.C.
              2950.09(B)(1)(a), conducted the required hearing and found
              that appellant was a sexual predator. However, that finding was
              not reduced to judgment by journal entry. Hence, in our earlier
              decision, we found that there was no final appealable order
              and, therefore, we had no jurisdiction to entertain appellant's
              challenge to the trial court's finding that he was a sexual
              predator.

              Because there was no final appealable order as to the sex
              offender classification, nothing precluded the trial court from
              carrying out its duty to journalize that decision. Moreover,
              because we expressly held that without a final appealable order,
              we lacked jurisdiction to consider the sexual predator
              classification, our remand for resentencing could not have
              implicated the sexual predator classification decision made by
              the original trial judge. The trial court remained free to
              journalize that sex offender classification finding or grant a
              new sex offender classification hearing. See Civ.R. 63(B).

              ***

              Throughout the course of the proceedings, the trial court has
              had jurisdiction over the civil sexual predator issue.
              Therefore, upon remand following [Ronan’s] first appeal, the
              trial court had the opportunity to review the factual findings
              of the first trial judge and complete the judicial process by
              journalizing the sexual predator finding, or to conduct a new
              sexual predator hearing.

(Emphasis added.) Ronan II at ¶ 16-20.
       {¶ 54} The Supreme Court’s holding in Schilling seems to confirm our reasoning in
Ronan that the trial court has continuing jurisdiction over the sex offender classification in
this case. Schilling held that State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784,
only applies with respect to errors in a trial court’s exercise in judgment; accordingly, the
Supreme Court held the trial court did not err when, 11 years after it erroneously classified
the defendant at sentencing as a Tier I sex offender under the Adam Walsh Act, the trial
court entered a judgment entry stating the defendant was a sexually oriented offender
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                   24

under Megan’s Law. The Supreme Court reasoned that “neither Schilling’s sentencing
entry nor any other judgment entered by the trial court in this case actually imposed, by
judicial determination, the Tier I classification”; rather, the classification happened
automatically by operation of law. Schilling at ¶ 23. Relevant to the case before us now,
the Supreme Court further held “[l]ikewise, classification as a sexually oriented offender
under Megan’s Law” does “not arise[] from a trial court’s judgment” but also “arises
automatically from the person’s conviction for a sexually oriented offense * * * and the
person’s past conduct not qualifying the person as a habitual sex offender or a sexual
predator.” Id. at ¶ 25.
       {¶ 55} Therefore, contrary to the trial court’s reliance on Smith, State v. Harper, 160
Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, and Henderson to determine it could not impose the
sexual predator classification now, Ronan II authorized the trial court to impose the sexual
predator classification it previously determined. Schilling supports our conclusion in
Ronan II.
       {¶ 56} I make two final observations. First, in Ronan II, we also instructed that
procedendo, not appeal, is the proper remedy where no final appealable order exists.
“Here, the trial court has failed to reduce to judgment the decision in which appellant was
found to be a sexual predator. Procedendo, not appeal, would be the proper remedy for
cross-appellant in this case.” Id. at ¶ 21.

       {¶ 57} Second, if the trial court enters a final judgment entry as to Todd’s
classification pursuant to Megan’s Law, such an entry will “not negate the finality of [his]
conviction and sentence nor subject them to an appeal [if] the sexual predator
determination [is] journalized.” State v. Morgan, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-620, 2007-Ohio-
1700, ¶ 16 (dismissing as untimely Morgan’s assignments of error relating to sufficiency
and manifest weight).

LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concurring in judgment only with separate opinion.
       {¶ 58} Because I would find Todd’s original sentencing entry was a final appealable
order with respect to his Megan’s Law classification and that res judicata applies to bar the
state from subsequently arguing that classification was incorrect, I respectfully concur
separately.
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                    25

       {¶ 59} There is no dispute here that Todd was convicted of a sexually oriented
offense, as that term is defined under Megan’s Law. As the majority notes, pursuant to
Megan’s Law, a person who is convicted of a sexually oriented offense is subject to one of
three possible sex offender classifications: (1) sexually oriented offender, (2) habitual sex
offender, and (3) sexual predator. Former R.C. Chapter 2950. Under the plain language of
Megan’s Law, an offender is classified as a sexually oriented offender by operation of law,
while the remaining two classifications, habitual sex offender and sexual predator, must
occur by court action. Former R.C. Chapter 2950; State v. Sansone, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-
799, 2012-Ohio-2736, ¶ 9. Thus, at minimum, an offender who commits a sexually oriented
offense during the applicable dates of Megan’s Law will be designated, by operation of law,
a sexually oriented offender.
       {¶ 60} Here, when Todd entered his guilty plea, the trial court conducted a hearing
and purported to find Todd a sexual predator under Megan’s Law. However, the trial court
did not include Todd’s designation as a sexual predator in the sentencing entry. Instead,
the entry was silent as to any Megan’s Law classification. The majority concludes the trial
court’s failure to include any Megan’s Law classification in the entry renders the entry non-
final with respect to the Megan’s Law classification. I disagree and, for the following
reasons, would find the omission of the classification in the entry nonetheless resulted in a
final appealable order with respect to the Megan’s Law classification.
       {¶ 61} Significantly, under former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), a trial court determining
whether to classify a defendant as a sexual predator “shall conduct a hearing to determine
whether the offender is a sexual predator * * * prior to sentencing and, if the sexually
oriented offense is a felony, may conduct it as part of the sentencing hearing.” (Emphasis
added.) Additionally, under former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3), the trial court must specify the
sexual predator classification in the sentencing entry. Specifically, the statute states:
              If the judge determines that the offender is not a sexual
              predator, the judge shall specify in the offender’s sentence and
              the judgment of conviction that contains the sentence that the
              judge has determined that the offender is not a sexual predator.
              If the judge determines by clear and convincing evidence that
              the offender is a sexual predator, the judge shall specify in the
              offender’s sentence and the judgment of conviction that
              contains the sentence that the judge has determined that the
              offender is a sexual predator and shall specify that the
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                  26

              determination was pursuant to division (B) of this section. The
              offender and the prosecutor who prosecuted the offender for
              the sexually oriented offense in question may appeal as a
              matter of right the judge’s determination under this division as
              to whether the offender is, or is not, a sexual predator.

(Emphasis added.) Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3). (1999 version.) Thus, even though the
Megan’s Law classification is collateral to the criminal conviction, the statute specifically
requires that the trial court include its determination of a defendant’s status as a sexual
predator under Megan’s Law in the judgment of conviction that contains the sentence. As
this court has previously held, where the sentencing entry does not indicate that the
defendant is a sexual predator under Megan’s Law, that classification does not attach
pursuant to the terms of former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3). State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-
311, 2011-Ohio-6669, ¶ 10. Here, the trial court failed to include Todd’s classification as a
sexual predator in the sentencing entry. I would follow Smith and find that the trial court’s
failure to include the sexual predator classification in the sentencing entry means the
classification did not attach. Id. Instead, because the classification of sexually oriented
offender occurs by operation of law, Todd is a sexually oriented offender. Id., quoting State
v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4196, paragraph two of the syllabus (stating that
if the offender “ ‘is neither a habitual sex offender nor a sexual predator, the sexually
oriented offender designation attaches as a matter of law’ ”).
       {¶ 62} Additionally,   as   noted   in   the   quoted     language   above,   former
R.C. 2950.09(B)(3), either the defendant or the prosecutor may appeal as a matter of right
from the trial court’s determination that a defendant is or is not a sexual predator. If the
state believed Todd should have been classified as a sexual predator, its remedy was to
appeal from the original sentencing entry even though the entry was silent as to the Megan’s
Law classification because, as explained above, the classification of sexually oriented
offender occurred by operation of law. The state did not timely appeal from Todd’s original
sentencing entry, and res judicata now bars the state from challenging the Megan’s Law
classification in the sentencing entry that was issued more than 24 years ago. Smith at ¶ 9,
citing State v. Haynes, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-574, 2004-Ohio-591, ¶ 8-10 (“res judicata bars
the state from challenging the sentencing entry now, given that it could have previously
filed an appeal when the entry was issued 14 years ago”).
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                    27

       {¶ 63} The majority acknowledges this court’s decision in Smith but does not follow
it because Smith does not acknowledge another line of prior cases from this court, State v.
Ronan, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1387, 2005-Ohio-5088 (“Ronan I”), and State v. Ronan, 10th
Dist. No. 06AP-63, 2007-Ohio-168 (“Ronan II”). In Ronan I, this court held “[b]ecause the
trial court has not journalized its decision finding defendant to be a sexual predator, we lack
a final appealable order” and dismissed the defendant’s appeal challenging his
classification. Ronan I at ¶ 8. In Ronan II, we relied on Ronan I and additionally concluded
that res judicata would not apply because there was no final appealable order with respect
to the Megan’s Law classification. Thus, the majority here would rely on Ronan I and
Ronan II and would overrule Smith. I would do the opposite.
       {¶ 64} In Ronan I, this court did not engage in any analysis of the statutory
requirement of former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) that designation as a sexual predator must be in
the sentencing entry and how that portion of Megan’s law must interplay with the provision
of Megan’s Law making the sexually oriented offender classification occur as a matter of
law. Instead, this court made a perfunctory statement that failure to journalize the sexual
predator decision rendered the order non-final. Ronan II then expanded on this court’s
error in Ronan I when it continued to conclude the order was non-final with respect to the
Megan’s Law classification and, as such, res judicata would not apply. Smith, on the other
hand, appropriately examines the statutory framework of Megan’s Law and concludes,
correctly, that because the sexually oriented offender classification occurs as a matter of
law, the sentencing entry is final with respect to the Megan’s Law designation even where
the entry omits the designation. Thus, I would reaffirm Smith and instead would overrule
Ronan I and Ronan II.
       {¶ 65} Further, I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of and reliance on
two decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio: State ex rel. Hunter v. Binette, 154 Ohio St.3d
508, 2018-Ohio-2681, and State v. Schilling, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-3027. The
majority notes the statutory requirement in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) that the trial court
include the sexual predator designation in the judgment of conviction that contains the
sentence but relies on Binette for the proposition that former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) allowed
for more flexibility than the plain language indicates. In Binette, the defendant challenged
the finality of his sentencing entry containing his criminal sentence on the grounds that the
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                      28

trial court’s failure to include the Megan’s Law classification by continuing the sexual
predator hearing rendered the judgment non-final.            The Supreme Court disagreed,
explaining that the trial court’s failure to determine the Megan’s Law classification had no
effect on the finality of the criminal judgment of conviction and sentence, as the “sex-
offender-classification proceedings were ‘legally distinct from the proceedings governing a
defendant’s underlying criminal conviction(s) and sentence.’ ” Binette at ¶ 16, quoting State
v. Gibson, 2d Dist. No. 2009 CA 47, 2010-Ohio-3447, ¶ 25. Thus, the holding in Binette
relates to the finality of the criminal judgment of conviction and sentence and not to the
finality of the Megan’s Law classification.
       {¶ 66} Nonetheless, the majority then expands the analysis in Binette as necessarily
indicating that a trial court that omits a Megan’s Law classification has failed to enter a final
judgment in the classification. I do not agree. Though I acknowledge the Supreme Court
states in Binette that “courts often addressed the criminal sentence and the classification
determination in separate entries and treated them as separately appealable orders,” the
Supreme Court does not engage in an analysis of whether such separate proceedings and
resulting entries are permissible, under the plain terms of the statute, and what impact on
the finality of the Megan’s Law classification such separate entries would have. Id. at ¶ 16,
citing State v. Dobrski, 9th Dist. No. 06CA008925, 2007-Ohio-3121, ¶ 1. That statement
also must be read in the context of the court’s analysis of the finality of the criminal
judgment of conviction and sentence. As there is no analysis in Binette of the finality of a
Megan’s Law classification, I would not expand Binette to support the majority’s position
here. Moreover, I would not find the statement in Binette about courts addressing the
classification in a separate entry erodes the requirement from the plain language of the
statute: that the court making the sexual predator designation must do so in the criminal
judgment of conviction and sentence. Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3).
       {¶ 67} In Schilling, the other Supreme Court case upon which the majority relies,
the trial court erroneously classified the defendant as a Tier I sex offender under the AWA
when, pursuant to the date the defendant committed the offense, the defendant should have
been classified under Megan’s Law. Id. at ¶ 1. Neither the state nor the defendant appealed
the trial court’s erroneous classification under the AWA instead of Megan’s Law. More than
11 years after his conviction, the defendant sought early termination of his sex offender
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                   29

registration status under the AWA. In response, the state argued that based on the date of
his offense, Megan’s Law, and not the AWA, applied to his classification status. The trial
court agreed with the state that the defendant was a sexually oriented offender under
Megan’s Law. On appeal, the First District reversed the trial court and found that because
the trial court’s erroneous classification of the defendant under the AWA rather than
Megan’s Law was a final judgment and neither party appealed, res judicata operated to bar
the state’s argument pursuant to State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784.
The state appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court disagreed with the First
District and reversed. Specifically, the Supreme Court held “that a person’s classification
as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law occurs by operation of law, and
therefore, our recent decision in Henderson * * * does not apply to a trial court’s error in
determining a person’s sex-offender classification.” Schilling at ¶ 39.
       {¶ 68} The majority relies on the holding of Schilling to support its position that res
judicata cannot apply where the trial court did not issue a final judgment. However, the
Supreme Court in Schilling did not hold that an erroneous classification under Megan’s
Law is not a final appealable order. Nor did Schilling hold, as the majority suggests, that
res judicata can never operate to bar a state’s challenge to an error in the trial court’s
classification of an offender under Megan’s Law. Instead, Schilling reiterates that because
classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law occurs by operation of law,
a state’s failure to appeal from an error in classification does not prevent the operation of
law classification from occurring.
       {¶ 69} The circumstances here are distinct from the procedural history in Schilling.
In Schilling, the state acknowledged its initial failure to appeal from the erroneous
classification but argued that because the sexually oriented offender classification under
Megan’s Law occurs as a matter of law, the state’s failure to appeal did not affect the
operation of law classification from occurring, and the Supreme Court agreed. Here, the
state is not advocating for the operation of law classification of sexually oriented offender.
Instead, the state seeks the more onerous classification of the sexual predator designation
under Megan’s Law. This situation is procedurally distinct from Schilling. Here, I would
find that even though the trial court failed to include the Megan’s Law classification in the
judgment of conviction, at minimum, the sexually oriented offender classification occurred
Nos. 20AP-587 & 20AP-588                                                                    30

by operation of law. If the state believed Todd should have received a higher classification,
here, sexual predator classification, such classification does not occur by operation of law,
and the state had the responsibility to appeal from that error at the time of the judgment.
The state did not do so here, and Schilling does not operate to relieve the state from its
failure to file a timely appeal.
         {¶ 70} Lastly, I would find nunc pro tunc is not appropriate here given the plain
language of former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) that the state may appeal as of right the trial court’s
failure to designate the offender a sexual predator under Megan’s Law. Thus, although the
state is correct that the record clearly indicates the trial court intended to classify Todd as
a sexual predator, the state’s remedy was to file a timely appeal from the original sentencing
entry.
         {¶ 71} For these reasons, I would overrule both of the state’s assignments of error.
Because the majority reaches this outcome for different reasons, I respectfully concur
separately.
                                   ___________________