Court Opinion

ID: 9890756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-15 21:11:59.564004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:12.798913
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                  OF TEXAS

                         NO. WR-94,985-01

         EX PARTE STEVEN CHARLES EWTON, Applicant

       APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
     CAUSE NO. 1355716-A IN THE 351ST DISTRICT COURT
                  FROM HARRIS COUNTY

    NEWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion in which HERVEY,
RICHARDSON and WALKER, JJ., joined.

     This case requires us to decide whether Applicant’s attorney’s

failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Applicant of an appeal, not

whether that appeal would ultimately be successful.          The Court

concludes that Applicant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to file a notice of appeal and I join the Court’s order granting

Applicant an out of time appeal. Counsel’s failure deprived Applicant
                                                                             Ewton — 2

of a proceeding he desired, and under Garza v. Idaho, he is entitled to

that appeal regardless of whether Applicant validly waived his right to

appeal. 1       Though the focus on Applicant’s waiver is ultimately a

distraction from the actual issue before us, I would make a few

observations in response to the State’s arguments in this regard.

         First, Applicant’s general waiver of appeal executed prior to

sentencing cannot act as a valid non-negotiated waiver because it was

not knowing or intelligent.               As we held in Ex parte Delaney, a

defendant cannot knowingly or intelligently waive an appeal of the

sentencing portion of a               hearing    revoking deferred adjudication

probation prior to the actual sentencing hearing. 2                 So, to the extent

that the State seeks to argue that Applicant’s waiver was a general,

non-negotiated waiver, that argument must fail because it was

executed prior to the sentencing hearing in this case.

         Second, Applicant did not enter into a plea bargain that deprived

him of his right to appeal. 3             In Jones v. State, we clarified that a

negotiated waiver of an appeal as part of an open plea does not

1
    Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. 738, 747 (2019).

2
  Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 798-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“simply knowing the
range of punishment for the offense is not enough to make the consequences of a waiver
known with certainty, because it still does not allay the concern that unanticipated errors
may occur at the punishment phase of trial”).

3
    See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).
                                                                             Ewton — 3

amount to a plea bargain that forecloses the ability to appeal under

Rule 25.2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 4 This is because in the

case of an open plea, the trial court does not follow a set punishment

recommendation from the State. In this case, Applicant pleaded true

to the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate without an

agreed sentence.         Applicant did not enter into a plea bargain that

deprived him of his ability to appeal the sentencing at the hearing on

the     motion    to   adjudicate      his   deferred     adjudication      community

supervision.

        Third, I do not believe the record established that Applicant

negotiated a waiver of his right to appeal in exchange for his plea of

true.     The State’s abandonment of the new offense allegation

contained in the motion to adjudicate appears on a document dated

five months before the plea itself.            Characterizing that abandonment

notation as “undated” doesn’t establish when it was made or that it

was made in exchange for Applicant’s plea. But even assuming it was

made in exchange for Applicant’s plea, I question whether it

4
  Jones v. State, 488 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (recognizing the case was
“not a plea-bargain case because there was no agreed punishment recommendation” that
would deprive the defendant of his ability to appeal and holding instead that the defendant
had negotiated a waiver of his appeal); see also Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (holding that Rule 25.2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply only to
plea bargains with regard to guilty pleas, not pleas of true on revocation motions).
                                                                              Ewton — 4

constitutes consideration for Applicant’s plea of true given that any

finding on that allegation would not have prevented the State from

proceeding with a prosecution of Applicant for that new offense. 5                        It

may have been part of an agreement, but the record does not

establish that it was. And regardless, prejudice is still presumed when

an attorney fails to file a desired notice of appeal even when a

defendant has signed a waiver of appeal. 6

       Ordinarily,     I   might     suggest      a   remand      for    further    record

development on Applicant’s writ, but, as mentioned above, the

question in this case is not whether Applicant’s waiver of appeal was

valid. The question is whether counsel failed to file Applicant’s notice

of appeal despite Applicant’s expressed desire to appeal. The record

establishes this constitutional violation. And had Applicant been given

the appeal he desired, the court of appeals would have been

5
  State v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“a subsequent criminal
prosecution is not barred following a trial judge’s finding of ‘not true’ at a revocation
hearing”). Additionally, the abandonment of the allegation would not have prevented the
State from introducing evidence of the new law violation to justify the maximum sentence
that Applicant ultimately received. The State’s decision to abandon the allegation is not on
par with the State’s consent to a waiver of a jury trial that authorizes a judge to assess
punishment. See, e.g., Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Neither is it on par with the State’s abandonment of an enhancement allegation that
changes the range of punishment. See, e.g., Jones, 488 S.W.3d at 807.

6
  Garza, 139 S.Ct. at 749 (“Accordingly where, as here, an attorney performed deficiently in
failing to file a notice of appeal despite the defendant’s express instructions, prejudice is
presumed ‘with no further showing from the defendant on the merits of his underlying
claims.’”).
                                                                               Ewton — 5

responsible for sorting out whether Applicant waived his appeal. 7

Placing Applicant back in the position he would have been had he been

given the opportunity to appeal allows Applicant the proceeding he

was deprived of to play out as it should have. 8                       However limited

Applicant’s right to appeal might have been, it still included the right to

have a court of appeals determine whether he had waived that right to

appeal. 9 Applicant’s victory in this regard may be a pyrrhic one, but it

is one he is nonetheless entitled to.

         With these thoughts I join the Court’s order granting habeas

corpus relief.

Filed: October 11, 2023

Publish

7
  See, e.g., Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 615 (holding a court of appeals is obligated to review the
record to ascertain whether a certification that an appeal has been waived is correct).
8
  Garza, 139 S.Ct. at 749 (noting that presuming prejudice based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel for the failure to file a requested notice of appeal “does no more than
restore the status quo that existed before counsel’s deficient performance forfeited the
appeal, and it allows an appellate court to consider the appeal as that court otherwise would
have done on—direct review, and assisted by counsel’s briefing”).

9
    See Id.