Court Opinion

ID: 9401834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 14:00:59.166059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.535769
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1757    Document: 34    Page: 1   Filed: 06/14/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

      IN RE: UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS, INC.,
                      Appellant
               ______________________

                        2022-1757
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 14/282,785.
                   ______________________

                  Decided: June 14, 2023
                  ______________________

     JAMES J. LUKAS, JR., Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Chicago,
 IL, argued for appellant Universal Electronics, Inc. Also
 represented by BENJAMIN GILFORD, GARY R. JAROSIK,
 MATTHEW J. LEVINSTEIN.

    OMAR FAROOQ AMIN, Office of the Solicitor, United
 States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, ar-
 gued for appellee Katherine K. Vidal. Also represented by
 MAI-TRANG DUC DANG, THOMAS W. KRAUSE, ROBERT
 MCBRIDE, AMY J. NELSON, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED.
                  ______________________

    Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
Case: 22-1757    Document: 34      Page: 2    Filed: 06/14/2023

 2                         IN RE: UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS, INC.

      Universal Electronics, Inc. filed U.S. Patent Applica-
 tion No. 14/282,785, claiming priority to 2006. After Uni-
 versal cancelled a number of claims, the assigned examiner
 in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office rejected all the
 remaining claims (claims 1 and 12–16) for obviousness, un-
 der 35 U.S.C. § 103 (pre-2011 version), in light of three
 prior-art references: Gardner (U.S. Patent Pub. No.
 2008/0319852), Hu (U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2013/0304817),
 and Drayson (U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2013/0276010). The
 Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the examiner’s re-
 jections. Universal timely appeals. We have jurisdiction.
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A); 35 U.S.C. § 141(a). We affirm.
     The ’785 application describes and claims methods for
 displaying advertising content. As relevant to the limited
 issues on appeal here, claim 1, which the parties agree is
 representative, requires “a device” and a “second app in-
 stalled on the device . . . [that] function[s] to display the
 advertising content as an overlay” to content being
 streamed on a display. J.A. 15.
     The key prior-art reference, Hu, describes “[a] method
 of operation of a content delivery system” that can perform
 a variety of functions, including overlaying an advertise-
 ment over content streamed on a display. J.A. 1265; J.A.
 1281–82, ¶¶ 163–65. Hu teaches a “first device,” “second
 device,” and “third device” that are components of its con-
 tent delivery system. Hu also teaches that a part of its con-
 tent delivery system is an “overlay module,” which is a part
 of Hu’s “content module,” that can function to overlay ad-
 vertisements on a display. As the Director explains, and
 as Universal does not dispute, the “sole dispute as to
 whether the prior art combination teaches the limitations
 of claim 1 turns on whether Hu teaches placing overlay
 module 722 on third device 108.” Director’s Response Br.
 at 30.
     The Board, affirming the examiner, found that Hu does
 teach placing the overlay module on the third device. J.A.
Case: 22-1757     Document: 34     Page: 3    Filed: 06/14/2023

 IN RE: UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS, INC.                          3

 5; see J.A. 931; J.A. 1026–28. What Hu teaches is a ques-
 tion of fact. See, e.g., Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC,
 938 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Under the substan-
 tial-evidence standard of review, we must affirm the find-
 ing of what Hu teaches if that finding is reasonable. Id. at
 1330.
      The reading of Hu adopted by the examiner and the
 Board is reasonable. As the examiner explained, Hu
 teaches that the third device itself can include “a third con-
 trol unit,” which can “execute[] a third software” that “pro-
 vides the intelligence of the content delivery system 100.”
 J.A. 1026 (citing J.A. 1278, ¶ 116). The examiner reasoned
 that this intelligence includes overlaying, performed by the
 overlay module as part of the intelligence that can be on
 the third device. J.A. 1026–27. The Board affirmed those
 findings. J.A. 5. This is a reasonable reading of Hu.
      We reject Universal’s argument that a separate pas-
 sage in Hu suggests otherwise. Although Hu provides that
 the content module, which includes the overlay module,
 can be implemented “in the first device 102 or the second
 device 106,” J.A. 1284, ¶ 199, nowhere does Hu state that
 it cannot be installed on the third device, and ¶ 116 of Hu
 is reasonably understood to indicate that it can be so in-
 stalled. See J.A. 1278, ¶ 116; J.A. 1270 (Fig. 7); see J.A. 5.
 Nothing in Hu contradicts the Board’s finding that Hu sug-
 gests that the overlay module can be installed on the third
 device. The Board’s finding therefore is supported by sub-
 stantial evidence. See Bradium Technologies LLC v. Iancu,
 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that prior
 art “must be considered not only for what it expressly
 teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests” (quoting In re
 Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).
     Besides disputing the Board’s finding about Hu just
 discussed, Universal faults the Board for not identifying a
 motivation to combine Hu with Gardner. But the examiner
 found such a motivation, reflecting a suggestion made in
Case: 22-1757    Document: 34     Page: 4    Filed: 06/14/2023

 4                        IN RE: UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS, INC.

 Gardner, see J.A. 931, and when appealing to the Board,
 Universal did not challenge that finding in its opening
 brief, see J.A. 1001–09, thus depriving the examiner of no-
 tice that such an issue had to be addressed in the exam-
 iner’s answer filed with the Board. The contention is
 therefore forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv). We see no
 basis to disregard the forfeiture.
     We have considered Universal’s remaining argu-
 ments, which we find unconvincing. For the foregoing rea-
 sons, we affirm the Board’s decision affirming the
 examiner’s rejection of pending claims 1 and 12–16 as un-
 patentable.
                        AFFIRMED