Court Opinion

ID: 9825160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 12:12:00.038129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:28.153991
License: Public Domain

*162On Rehearing.
 In the original opinion in this case we held that there was sufficient evidence tending to prove that the defendant was the party being talked to by his codefendant to make the conversations admissible, as against the objection that the testimony of the long-distance operator who listened in on the conversations was hearsay. This evidence did not rest alone on the testimony of Mrs. Taylor, the operator. She knew and could testify that Holland, the codefendant, was at her end of the line; she heard and could testify as to what he said to somebody at the other end of the line who answered to the call for defendant, from defendant’s phone in Decatur; she could and did testify that to the best of her knowledge the same party who talked on the 17th talked again with Holland on the 19th. The published directory for Decatur showed defendant’s number to be 8; that was the number called for by Mrs. Taylor both on the 17th and 19th. Defendant admitted to W. F. Holland that he had talked to eodefendant Holland over the phone on the 19th. No. 8 telephone was located in defendant’s store, and he and a boy by the name of Ivans testified that defendant was in his store all of the afternoon and night of the 19th until 10 o’clock at night. Brasher, a witness for defendant, testified to a long-distance message frone Holland on the 19th, coming to defendant’s phone from Town Creek, but this witness said defendant was out and that he (Brasher) did the talking. Ward Holland, the codefendant, testified to both telephone conversations with defendant, but of course, his testimony in this particular must be corroborated. That is done by defendant’s admission to W. E. Holland that he had talked with Ward Holland on the 19th and the testimony of Brasher that Ward • talked to defendant’s phone on the 19th and by the testimony of Mrs. Taylor that Ward Holland called over long . distance on the 17th and 19th on reverse calls, which were accepted by the party at Decatur answering to the name of defendant. The question of the identity of defendant at the Decatur end of the line was for the jury. There being evidence tending to prove that the defendant was at the Decatur end of the line in conversation with his codefendant, Ward Holland, on December 17th and 19th, the evidence of the conversation was admissible. Kirby v. State, 16 Ala. App. 467, 79 So. 141.
Complaint is made that the court in the original opinion did not discuss the testi,mony of Mrs. Ward Holland; it being claimed that she was allowed to testify to incriminatory statements made to her by defendant without a proper predicate having been laid to show that such statements were voluntary.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the conversation between Mrs. Ward Holland and defendant tend to show that she went to defendant’s drug store; that they talked about Ward Holland and his arrest.; that defendant said he would do- all he could to get him (Ward) out; that he ought to because Ward had been working for defendant. “He said he would spend everything he had to get him out. He said he would hire lawyers to get him out.” The conversation proceeded in the most friendly manner, and the evidence indicates nothing but confidence between the two. There is not the slightest evidence of force, duress, or coercion. Confessions and admissions in the nature of confessions, to be admissible, must be voluntary, and that they were voluntary must appear. This is usually shown by an examination of the witness on voir dire, as to promises, threats, etc. Where, however, the facts and circumstances under which they were made affirmatively show that there were no improper influences proceeding from the person, or from the surrounding circumstances, the confessions or admissions are prima facie voluntary, and are admissible. Williams v. State, 4 Ala. App. 92, 58 So. 925; Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 10 So. 522; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114; Fincher v. State, 211 Ala. 388, 100 So. 657; Patton v. State, 197 Ala. 180, 72 So. 401.
It is insisted that the witness Harbin should not have been allowed to testify as to the value of the stock of musical instruments destroyed in the fire. This witness testified that he inspected the stock before the fire, and that he knew its approximate value, and that he had experience in inspecting such property for the purpose of writing insurance contracts. This witness was competent to testify as to the value of the stock.
The indictment is substantially in the form prescribed in Act of Legislature 1927, p. 552 et seq., and is sufficient.
 However, the court is of the opinion, after reading and considering the entire record en banc, that the defendant’s motion for a new trial should have been granted on the fourteenth ground of said motion. The law contemplates that every citizen charged with crime shall have a speedy trial, but without such undue haste as will force a trial without a reasonable time for preparation. Under the facts of this case, including the circumstances surrounding the trial, this court feels and so holds that the defendant has not received such a trial as is contemplated by the Constitution. Milligan v. State, 208 Ala. 223, 94 So. 169. For the error of the trial court in refusing the motion for a new trial on the fourteenth ground, the judg*163ment of affirmance is set aside, and the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.