Court Opinion

ID: 9900449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:13:06.120923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.598851
License: Public Domain

No. 274                  May 24, 2023                        177

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                 MARIO MORALES, JR.,
                aka Mario C. Morales, Jr.,
                aka Mario Morales Junior,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
               Umatilla County Circuit Court
                  19CR31487; A171443

  On remand from the Oregon Supreme Court, State v.
Morales, 370 Or 471, 520 P3d 882 (2022).
   Jon S. Lieuallen, Judge.
   Submitted on remand January 17, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
   MOONEY, J.
   Affirmed.
178   State v. Morales
Cite as 326 Or App 177 (2023)                                               179

            MOONEY, J.
         This case is before us on remand from the Supreme
Court. State v. Morales, 309 Or App 777, 482 P3d 819 (2021)
(Morales I), vac’d and rem’d for recons in light of State v.
Shedrick, 370 Or 255, 518 P3d 559 (2022), 370 Or 471, 520
P3d 882 (2022) (Morales II). At issue is defendant’s first
assignment of error, “in which he contends that he should
have been acquitted on the criminal mischief charge because
there was insufficient evidence that he had the required cul-
pable mental state as to the amount of damages.” Morales I,
309 Or App at 778. In Morales I, we applied State v. Jones,
223 Or App 611, 196 P3d 97 (2008), rev den, 345 Or 618
(2009), and State v. Stowell, 304 Or App 1, 12, 466 P3d
1009 (2020), to the first-degree criminal mischief statute,
ORS 164.365(1)(a)(A),1 and concluded that the state was not
required to prove a particular mental state with respect to
the value of property damaged or destroyed to support a con-
viction for first-degree criminal mischief. Because we agreed
with the state that it was not required to prove a culpable
mental state, we rejected defendant’s claim of error without
addressing his evidentiary sufficiency argument. Morales I,
309 Or App at 778-79. The Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Shedrick after we decided Morales I and concluded that
ORS 161.095(2),2 the statute requiring proof of a culpable
mental state for material elements of an offense, applies to
the property-value element of first-degree theft, abrogating
both Jones and Stowell. Given that holding, and given the
abrogation of cases we specifically relied on to reach our
decision in Morales I, the Supreme Court remanded this
case to us for further consideration.
   1
       ORS 164.365 provides, as relevant here:
       “(1) A person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the first degree
   who, with intent to damage property, and having no right to do so nor reason-
   able ground to believe that the person has such right:
         “(a) Damages or destroys property of another:
        “(A) In an amount exceeding $1,000[.]”
   2
       ORS 161.095 provides, as relevant here:
       “(2) Except as provided in ORS 161.105 (Culpability requirement inappli-
   cable to certain violations and offenses), a person is not guilty of an offense
   unless the person acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each
   material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental
   state.”
180                                                         State v. Morales

         Upon reconsideration, as we explain, we conclude
that the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding
that defendant acted with criminal negligence with respect
to the amount-of-damage element of first-degree criminal
mischief, the culpable mental state that defendant asserts
is required by ORS 161.095(2).3 Accordingly, the trial court
correctly denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquit-
tal and, therefore, we affirm.4

         Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal
mischief after waiving jury and proceeding with a stipulated
facts bench trial.5 The parties stipulated that, among other
things, defendant entered a vacant dwelling in Pendleton
without the owners’ permission by kicking in the back door,
that defendant “caused damage” to both the door and to the
doorframe, which were “in fairly new condition,” and that
the owners paid a contractor $1,045 to remove the dam-
aged door and frame and to install and paint a new door
and frame. It was further agreed that the cost break-down
included $440 for the cost of the new door and frame, $30 for
the cost of the paint, and $575 in labor costs.

         Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s failure
to acquit him. He argued that ORS 161.095(2) required the
court to find that he was at least criminally negligent with
respect to the amount-of-damage element of the offense and
that there was insufficient evidence that he was at least
criminally negligent with respect to the amount-of-damage
element of the crime and that there was insufficient evi-
dence that the amount of damage exceeded $1,000.

    3
      The trial court did not state on the record whether it determined that defen-
dant acted with a culpable mental state with respect to the amount-of-damage
element of criminal mischief, and defendant did not ask it to do so. On appeal,
defendant does not argue that the trial court failed to determine whether he
acted with the requisite culpable mental state; instead, defendant argues only
that the court should have acquitted him because, in defendant’s view, the evi-
dence is legally insufficient to support a finding that he acted with criminal neg-
ligence with respect to the amount-of-damage element of the offense.
    4
      In Morales I, we rejected defendant’s second assignment of error without
discussion. Because that assignment was not preserved, we decline to revisit it
now.
    5
      Defendant pleaded guilty to methamphetamine-related and trespassing
charges. Those convictions are not before us.
Cite as 326 Or App 177 (2023)                             181

          We turn first to the question of whether the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Shedrick—applying ORS 161.095(2)
to first-degree theft—would similarly apply to first-degree
criminal mischief. The answer depends on whether the
amount-of-damage element of first-degree criminal mis-
chief is a “material” element of that crime. State v. Owen,
369 Or 288, 295, 505 P3d 953 (2022). A “material element”
of a criminal offense refers to any fact that the state must
prove to convict a defendant, except for facts “relating to
when and where a crime could be prosecuted, like the stat-
ute of limitations, jurisdiction, and venue.” Id. at 317. The
amount-of-damage element of first-degree criminal mis-
chief, like the property-value element of first-degree theft,
does not pertain to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction,
or venue. It is, instead, an element that distinguishes the
crime of first-degree criminal mischief from the lesser
crimes of second- and third-degree criminal mischief. The
amount-of-damage element of first-degree criminal mischief
is, thus, closely analogous to the property-value element
of first-degree theft. It is clearly material to the charged
crime.

         Moreover, there is nothing within the text of ORS
164.365 itself that expressly or impliedly excepts first-degree
criminal mischief from the requirements of ORS 161.095(2),
and the parties have not provided any legislative history
that would suggest that the legislature intended such an
exception. The analysis parallels that undertaken by the
Supreme Court in Shedrick and we readily conclude that
ORS 161.095(2) requires proof of a culpable mental state
for the amount-of-damage element of first-degree criminal
mischief. Finally, Shedrick did not answer the question of
what level of culpable mental state is required, and instead
proceeded assuming that the applicable mens rea was crim-
inal negligence. Because, as in Shedrick, the parties do
not contend that a greater mens rea than criminal negli-
gence applies, we also assume that standard applies here.
See State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, ___ P3d ___ (2023)
(discussing rationale for treating culpable mental state as
criminal negligence where neither party argues for a higher
culpable mental state).
182                                              State v. Morales

         Under ORS 161.085(10), a person is criminally neg-
ligent as to a statutory result or a circumstance of a crimi-
nal offense
   “* * * when * * * [the] person fails to be aware of a substan-
   tial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that
   the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature
   and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a
   gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
   person would observe in the situation.”
         Here, the evidence would allow the finding that
defendant acted with criminal negligence. First, it would
allow an inference that defendant was unaware that he
would cause damage “in an amount exceeding $1,000” when
he kicked the door in. The question then reduces to whether
there was sufficient evidence of a “substantial and unjus-
tifiable risk” that $1,000 worth of damage would result
from kicking in the door and that defendant’s failure to be
aware of that risk was a “gross deviation” from what “a rea-
sonable person” would understand in that situation. ORS
161.085(10); see State v. Boggs, 324 Or App 1, 524 P3d 567
(2023) (similarly applying ORS 161.085(10) on remand from
the Supreme Court in a first-degree theft case). We conclude
that the evidence to which the parties stipulated—that
defendant so damaged a fairly new door and door frame that
the door and door frame had to be replaced and painted—
was sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that
defendant failed to be aware of a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that he would cause at least $1,000 in damage when
he kicked the door open. The trial court properly declined to
acquit based on insufficiency of the evidence.
         Affirmed.