Court Opinion

ID: 9803952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 16:12:43.993504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:03:42.484335
License: Public Domain

LaSalle, J.,
concurs in part and dissents in part and votes to modify the judgment with the following memorandum: I agree with majority to the extent that they hold that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree. However, I respectfully dissent, and vote to modify the judgment, because I conclude that the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for the crime of burglary in the second degree.
The events leading to the defendant’s arrest are not in substantial dispute. On June 10, 2009, at approximately 8:00 a.m., the police received a radio transmission of an armed robbery in progress at a residence, perpetrated by two black males. Police officers arrived at the location of the home invasion within minutes of the radio transmission. Upon the officers’ arrival at the residence, they observed two of the complainants on the porch, still gagged and partially bound. The complainants used gestures to direct the officers’ attention to two men, later identified as Kenneth Myers and Kelvin Santos, who were walking on the sidewalk. Myers and Santos starting running, and three of the police officers, including Officer Soto, chased them. During the chase, Santos discarded an object which Officer Soto observed to be a gun when he ran past it, but Officer Soto did not stop to retrieve the gun at that time. Myers and Santos turned a corner, and Officer Soto lost sight of them for two to three seconds. Upon turning the corner, Officer Soto observed no one on the street, but saw a rear door to a vehicle being closed. Officer Soto approached the vehicle, and saw Myers and Santos in the back seat. Officer Soto approached the driver’s side door, and observed the defendant fumbling with the car keys and attempting to put the key in the ignition. Officer Soto opened the driver’s side door, pulled the defendant out, laid him *1434on the ground, and handcuffed him. Myers was handcuffed by another officer. Santos started running again, but was soon apprehended and taken into custody. The defendant was placed in the police car. Later, one of the complainants arrived at the scene of arrest, observed the defendant in the police car, and indicated that he recognized him as an acquaintance of his girlfriend. The defendant was subsequently taken to the precinct where, after being advised of his rights, he made inculpatory statements.
The issue presented in this case is whether Officer Soto had probable cause to arrest the defendant. I disagree with the majority, and would hold that under the undisputed facts and circumstances of the case, probable cause existed to arrest the defendant.
“Probable cause to arrest requires the existence of facts and circumstances which, when viewed as a whole, would lead a reasonable person possessing the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that an offense has been or is being committed, and that the defendant committed or is committing that offense” (People v Wright, 8 AD3d 304, 306 [2004]; see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]; People v Capela, 97 AD3d 760, 760-761 [2012]). When determining whether a police officer has probable cause for an arrest, “the emphasis should not be narrowly focused on . . . any . . . single factor, but on an evaluation of the totality of circumstances, which takes into account the realities of everyday life unfolding before a trained officer who has to confront, on a daily basis, similar incidents” (People v Bothwell, 261 AD2d 232, 234 [1999] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Graham, 211 AD2d 55, 58 [1995]; People v Cabot, 88 AD2d 556, 557 [1982]; People v Wright, 8 AD3d at 307). A determination of whether probable cause existed for an arrest is to be made “after considering all of the facts and circumstances together . . . Viewed singly, these may not be persuasive, yet when viewed together the puzzle may fit and probable cause found” (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d at 423).
In this case, an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances fully supports the conclusion that probable cause existed for Officer Soto to arrest the defendant. After responding to a call for an armed robbery in progress, Officer Soto and his fellow officers found two individuals bound and gagged gesturing toward Myers and Santos, who began to flee on foot. Officer Soto observed Santos discard an object, which he moments later observed to be a handgun. Myers and Santos then entered the rear of a nearby vehicle, and Officer Soto observed the defendant fumbling with the keys, attempting to put them in the ignition.
*1435Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, I do not believe the defendant’s behavior can be viewed as “innocuous.” Indeed, in my view, the totality of the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonable person possessing the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that the defendant was acting in concert with Myers and Santos, in attempting to assist them to flee the scene of the home invasion (see People v Wright, 8 AD3d at 307; People v Attebery, 223 AD2d 714, 715 [1996]). Therefore, I would hold that the hearing court properly determined that there was probable cause for the defendant’s arrest, and no basis to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
Accordingly, because I conclude that there was probable cause for the defendant’s arrest, and because I determine the defendant’s remaining contentions, apart from the contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, are without merit, I would vote to modify the judgment, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating the conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and the sentence imposed thereon, and to dismiss that count of the indictment.