Court Opinion

ID: 9897471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:34.290597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:28.887716
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion      3LI
                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                     SHARI KASSEBAUM,                                           No. 83942
                     Appellant,
                     vs.
                     THE STATE OF NEVADA
                                                                                FIL
                     DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
                                                                                SEP 21 2023
                     Respondent.
                                                                                EL
                                                                           CL
                                                                           BY
                                                                                     EF DEPUTY CLERK

                                Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial
                     review in an administrative action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
                     County; Tara D. Clark Newberry, Judge.
                                Affirmed.

                     Law Office of Daniel Marks and Daniel Marks and Adam Levine, Las Vegas,
                     for Appellant.

                     Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Michelle Di Silvestro Alanis,
                     Supervising Senior Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,
                     for Respondent.

                     BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, C.J., and LEE and BELL,
                     JJ.

                                                     OPINION

                     By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:
                                When a state employee requests a hearing to challenge the
                     reasonableness of a disciplinary action under NRS 284.390, the Nevada
                     Administrative Code (NAC) requires the ernployee to attach a copy of the
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written notification of the discipline to the appeal form.        See NAC
284.6562(2)(b). In this appeal, we consider whether that requirement is
jurisdictional or procedural.   After examining the rule's language, we
conclude that the requirement is not jurisdictional but is instead a
procedural claim-processing rule. Furthermore, because the rule provides
that an employee "must" comply with the attachm ent requirement, the rule
is mandatory. Thus, when an employee requests a hearing to challenge a
state employer's disciplinary decision pursuant to NRS 284.390 a.nd fails to
comply with NAC 284.6562's attachment requirement, the appeal is
defective and may be dismissed.      Because the appellant here failed to
comply with the attachment requirement when filing her appeal form and
did not seek leave to amend or otherwise cure that omission, we conclude
that the hearing officer did not err by dismissing her appeal, and we
therefore affirm.'
                  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
              After she was suspended for two days from her position as a
correctional officer with respondent State of Nevada Department of
Corrections    (NDOC),   appellant   Shari Kassebaurn     administratively
appealed by requesting a hearing on the reasonableness of the suspension.
The appeal form Kassebaum completed explained that it "must be
accompanied       by the written notification of         the appointing
authority's decision regarding the proposed action." Notwithstanding
this clear directive, Kassebaum did not attach a copy of NDOC's letter
informing her of the suspension. NDOC moved to dismiss Kassebaum's
appeal, arguing that the requirement to attach the written discipline

       'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted.

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                notification was jurisdictional and that Kassebaum's failure to attach the
                notification to the appeal form divested the hearing officer of jurisdiction to
                consider her appeal. In response, Kassebaum conceded that NDOC would
                likely prevail on its motion but disagreed with certain factual allegations in
                NDOC's motion; she did not seek leave to amend or otherwise cure her
                failure to comply with NAC 284.6562(2)(b).
                             The hearing officer granted NDOC's motion, finding that NAC
                284.6562(2)(b) was a jurisdictional requirement that could not be cured
                because the time for Kassebaum to file an appeal had expired. cf. NRS
                284.390(1) (providing that an employee must file an appeal from a
                disciplinary decision within 10 working days of the effective d.ate of that
                decision).   Kassebaum petitioned the district court for judicial review,
                arguing that the hearing officer erred in dismissing her appeal because
                NAC 284.6562(2)(b) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.          The

                district court denied Ka ssebaum's petition and agreed with the hearing
                officer that the rule is jurisdictional. Kassebaum now appeals to this court.
                                               DISCUSSION
                             We review an "administrative decision in the same manner as
                the district court." Nassiri v. Chiropractic Physicians' Bd., 130 Nev. 245,
                248, 327 P.3d 487, 489 (2014). In doing so, we review questions of law d.e
                novo, "without deference to an agency['s] determination." Elizondo v. Ilood
                Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. 780, 784-85, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013) (quoting City of
                Reno v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of N. Nev., 127 Nev. 1:14, 119, 251
                P.3d 718, 721 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the issue
                here---whether the requirement in NAC 284.6562(2)(b) is jurisdictional—is
                a question of law, our review is de novo. See Washoe County v. Otto, 128
                Nev. 424, 430-31, 282 P.3d 719, 724 (2012) (applying de novo review to

                questions involving statutory construction and jurisdictional issues).
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                             Kassebaum      argues that      the   hearing officer      erred   by
                determining that NAC 284.6562(2)(b) is a jurisdictional rule, urging that it
                is instead a procedural claim-processing rule.2        NDOC contends that the
                rule is jurisdictional such that Kassebaum's failure to follow its
                requirements within the time to file her appeal divested the hearing officer
                of jurisdiction to hear her challenge.
                             To resolve whether the attachment               requirement     is a
                jurisdictional rule, we first consider the difference between jurisdictional
                rules and nonjurisdictional claim-processing• rules. Then, we consider the
                statutory scheme and regulations governing Kassebaum's administrative
                challenge to her suspension.
                Jurisdictional rules concern a tribunal's power to act
                             "Jurisdictional rules go to the very power of [the] court to act."
                Rust v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (198'7).
                See Jurisdiction, Black's Lau) Dictionary (11th ed. 2009) (defining
                "jurisdiction" in part as "[a] court's power to decide a case"); see also Reno
                Spark,s Convention Visitors Auth. v. Jackson, 112 Nev. 62, 65-67, 910 P.2d
                267, 269-70 (1996) (concluding that a hearing officer lacked jurisdiction over
                a party's challenge because the party did not comply with the "jurisdictional
                and mandatory" rule setting a time lirnit to request a hearing).                In

                      2AlthOugh     Kassebaum failed to make this argument before the
                hearing officer, we may consider the issue because it goes to the hearing
                officer's jurisdiction to adjudicate Kassebaum's appeal. See Old Aztec Mine,
                Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged
                in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed •to
                have been waived and will not be considered on appeal." (emphasis added));
                State, Dep't of Ernp't, Training & Rehab., Emp't Sec. Div. v. Sierra Nat'l
                Corp., 136 Nev. 98, 101 n.5, 46 P.3d 18, 22 n.5 (2020) (applying Old Aztec
                when a party failed to raise an argument in administrative proceedings).
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                 Fitzpatrick v. State ex rel. Department of CoMmerce, Insurance Division, we
                 held that "the tirne allotted. by statute for taking an administrative appeal
                 is jurisdictional" such that only a timely appeal invokes administrative
                 appellate jurisdiction.3 107 Nev. 486, 488, 813 P.2d 1004, 1005 (1991). See
                 also State v. Bronder, 136 Nev. 650, 652, 476 P.3d 866, 868 (2020) ("[A] rule
                 providing a time limit for filing an administrative appeal is not procedural
                 but jurisdictional."); Seino v. Ernp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 121 Nev. 146, 150, 111
                 P.3d 1107, 1110 (2005) (noting that the "[s]tatutory periods for requesting
                 administrative review of workers' compensation determinations are
                 mandatory and jurisdictional").
                 Clairn-processing rules concern the procedural steps a party must take
                              In contrast to jurisdictional rules, claim-processing rules "seek
                 to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties
                 take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson ex rel.
                 Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011); see also Kontrick v. Ryan,
                 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (providing that certain bankruptcy rules were
                 claim-processing rules where they did "not delineate what ca.ses bankruptcy
                 courts are competent to adjudicate"); 36 C.J.S. Federal courts § 8 (2014)
                 ("Hurisdictional rules govern a ... court's adjudicatory authority while
                 nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules do riot.").    Although a rule rnay

                 provide that something "shall" or "muSt" occur, not all such mandatory rules
                 are jurisdictional.   See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 146 (2012);
                 Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435 ("Other rules, even if important and
                 mandatory, . . . should not be given the jurisdictional brand."). Thus, while
                 jurisdictional rules may not be waived, parties must timely raise concerns

                         3The parties do not dispute that Kassebaum timely filed her appeal
                 form.
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                about violations of claim-processing rules. Compare Dill u. Gen. Arn. Life
                Ins. Co., 525 F.3d 612, 618-19 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that claim-processing
                issues "may be forfeited if they are not timely raised"), with Jasper v.
                Jewkes, 50 Nev. 153, 156, 254 P. 698, 699 (1927) (explaining that
                jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived).
                NAC 284.6562's attachment requirement is a nonjurisdictional mandatory
                cicum-processing rule
                           When interpreting a statute or rule, "we begin with the text of
                the [rule] to determine its plain meaning and apply 'clear and unambiguous'
                language 'as written." Locker v. State, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 516 P.3d 149,
                152 (2022) (quoting Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179
                (2011)); see also Mahaffey v. Irru'rs Nat'l Sec. Co., 102 Nev. 462, 463-64, 725
                P.2d 1218, 1219 (1986) (examining the language of a rule to determine
                whether it is jurisdictional). Here, the Nevada Legislature created the
                Personnel Commission, see NRS 284.030, and authorized it to appoint
                "hearing officers to conduct hearings and render decisions" regarding
                certain public employment actions, NRS 284.091. NRS 284.390(1) allows
                certain state employees to challenge an employer's disciplinary decision by,
                "[w]ithin 10 working days after the effective date of' the discipline, filing a
                written request for a hearing before a Commission hearing officer "to
                determine the reasonableness of the [discipline]." See also O'Keefe v. State,
                Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 134 Nev. 752, 759, 431 P.3d 350, 356 (2018)
                (describing the process the hearing officer should employ in applying NRS
                284.390(1)). That statute thus sets forth the hearing officer's authority. It
                does not require that the employee attach anything to the written request
                for a hearing officer to determine the reasonableness of the discipline
                imposed. That requirement instead appears in a regulation adopted by the

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                 Commission pursuant to NRS 284.065(2)(d) (authorizing the Commission
                 to "[a]dopt regulations to carry out the provisions of [NRS Chapter 284]").
                              The regulation at issue, NAC 284.6562, begin.s by echoing NRS
                 284.390(1)'s language that an eligible           employee    may   request    a
                 reasonableness hearing only by submitting a written request within 10
                 working days of receiving notice of the challenged discipline. Compare NAC
                 284.6562(1), with NRS 284.390(1). The request must be "submitted on the
                 form provided by the Division of Human Resource Management," as set
                 forth in NAC 284.778(1), and NAC 284.6562(2)(b) requires it to be
                 "[a]ccompanied by the written notification of the" subject discipline.
                              The language of NAC 284.6562(2)(b) does not speak to• the
                 hearing officer's adjudicatory power.       See Sec)), U.S. •Dep't of Labor v.
                 Preston, 873 F.3d 877, 882 (11th Cir. 2017) ("[W]hen, as here, a statute
                 'speaks... not to a court's power,' it should be treated as non-
                 jurisdictional." (quoting United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 (2015))).
                 Nothing in the rule suggests that attaching a copy of the written notification
                 is necessary to invoke the hearing officer's authority to review the
                 challenged discipline. Indeed, another provision in the rule suggests the
                 contrary by addressing when the written notification "need not accompany
                 the request for a hearing."4     NAC 284.6562(3). It thus appears that the
                 purpose of the requirement is to facilitate the hearing officer's review rather
                 than to restrict the officer's authority.
                             Because the rule's language does not clearly indicate that it
                 should "be treated as having• jurisdictional attributes," Henderson., 562 U.S.
                 at 439, we conclude that the rule is nonjurisdictional and the hearing officer

                       4The parties agree that ,the exceutions to the attachment requirement
                 do not apply in this case.
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                erred in. concluding otherwise. Accordingly, Kassebaurn's failure to attach
                the written notice did not divest the hearing officer of jurisdiction to
                consider her appeal.5 See Union Pac. R.R. Co. u. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs
                & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81-82
                (2009) (explaining that failure to adhere to nonjurisdictional filing
                requirements cannot deprive a tribunal of jurisdiction).
                Kassebaurn failed to comply with NAC 284.6562(2)(b), and therefore, the
                district court did not err in dismissing her appeal
                            Having concluded that the hearing officer had jurisdiction over
                Kassebaum's case, we nonetheless conclude that the hearing officer
                properly dismissed the appeal. This court reviews an agency's decision
                granting a motion to dismiss based on construction of a statute de novo.
                Elizondo, 129 Nev. at 784-85, 312 P.3d at 482; see also Otto, 128 Nev. at
                430-31, 282 P.3d at 724 (reviewing de novo whether a statutory provision
                required dismissal).     We also recognize that, when administrative

                regulations are "mandated by the [Llegislature and adopted in accordance
                with statutory procedures," as NAC 284.6562(2)(b) was here; they "have the
                force and effect of law." Turk v. Neu. State Prison, 94 Nev. 101, 104, 575
                P.2d 599, 601 (1978); cf. Crane v. Cont'l Tel. Co. of Cal., 105 Nev. 399, 401,
                775 P.2d 705, 706 (1989) (providing that "{w]hen the [L]egislature creates a
                specific procedure for review of administrative agency decisions, such
                procedure is controlling").    Further;   "[a] timely objection to a claim-

                processing defect can, in some cases warrant dismissal of the case." United

                      5While we   have held that "the proper and timely filing of a notice of
                appeal is jurisdictional," Rust, 103 Nev. at 688, 747 P.2d at 1382, we have
                not held that a party's failure to comply with claim-processing rules within
                the time provided by statute deprives a tribunal of jurisdiction to consider
                an appeal in all circumstances, as NDOC suggests.
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                States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187. 1191 (9th Cir. 2022), cert.
                denied.    U.S.     , 143 S. Ct. 755 (2023); see also Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr,

                924 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that "failure to comply with [a
                claim-processing] rule may be grounds for dismissal of the case").
                            Here, the attachment requirement provides that an employee's

                hearing request "must be . . . [a]ccompanied by the written notification of
                the" disciplinary action being challenged. NAC 284.6562(2)(b) (emphasis
                added). "The word 'must' generally imposes a mandatory requirement."
                Otto, 128 Nev. at 432, 282 P.3d at 725. And "Nhough not jurisdictional,
                mandatory claim-processing rules rernain mandatory."            Donnelly v.

                Controlled Application Review & Resolution Program Unit, 37 F.4th 44, 56
                (2d Cir. 2022); see also Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th at 1191 (recognizing
                that claim-processing rules can still be mandatory); accord 36 C.J.S. Federal
                Courts § 8 (2014) ("Calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is
                not mandatory ....").    Based on the foregoing, it is clear that NAC

                284.6562(2)(b) is a mandatory rule.
                            Because NAC 284.6562(2)(b) is mandatory, we conclude that
                the hearing officer did not err in dismissing Kassebaum's request for a
                hearing for failing to comply with that rule.6 Indeed, Kassebaum conceded
                below that NDOC would likely prevail on its motion to dismiss based on her
                failure to comply. And although Kassebaum argues that the appeal form
                was misleading because it stated that "evidence and back-up documents
                need not be provided at th[at] time," she concedes that it also stated that
                she must attach a copy of the written notice of discipline. We therefore

                     6The parties do not dispute that NDOC timely raised its concern that

                Kassebaum did not comply with the attachment requirement. See Dill, 525
                F.3d at 618-19.
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                     reject any argument that the appeal form's language excused Kassebaum's
                     compliance with NA C 284.6562(2)(b). We further note that Kassebaum did
                     not seek leave to amend her appeal form to attach the notice of discipline
                     even after NDOC filed its motion to dismiss pointing out Kassebaum's
                     omission.
                                 In sum, because the attachment requirement is a mandatory
                     requirement that "ha [s] the force and effect of law," Turk, 94 Nev. at 104,
                     575 P.2d at 601, and because Kassebaum concedes her failure to comply
                     with that rule, her appeal was defective and dismissal was appropriate.
                     Therefore, we conclude that the hearing officer reached the correct result
                     when he dismissed Kassebaum's appeal and, in turn, the district court
                     properly denied her petition for judicial review.7 See Saavedra-Sandoval v.
                     Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010)
                     (explaining that this court "will affirm a district court's order if the district
                     court reached the correct result, even if for the wrong reason").
                                                    CONCLUSION
                                 NAC 284.6562(2)(b) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing
                     rule. Compliance with the rule nonetheless is mandatory. Thus, although
                     the hearing officer had jurisdiction to adjudicate Kassebaum's disciplinary
                     appeal, the hearing officer ultimately reached the right result when he
                     dismissed the appeal based on Kassebaum's failure to comply with NAC

                           7 Given  our conclusion, we need not reach Kassebaum's other
                     arguments, including her argument that the hearing officer denied her due
                     process by failing to conduct a hearing on her appeal. See Cortes v. State,
                     127 Nev. 505, 516, 260 P.3d 184, 192 (2011) ("Constitutional questions
                     should not be decided except when absolutely necessary to properly dispose
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                 284.6562(2)(b). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying
                 Kassebaum's petition for judicial review.

                                                      Stiglich

                 We concur:

                                             ,   J.
                 Lee

                                                 J.

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