Court Opinion

ID: 9838971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-09 10:09:51.36437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:02.740097
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-22-00305-CR

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                 TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                        TYLER, TEXAS

GREGORY DEWAYNE BOLTON,                             §      APPEAL FROM THE 114TH
APPELLANT

V.                                                  §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE                                            §       SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
          Gregory Dewayne Bolton appeals following the revocation of his deferred adjudication
community supervision. In one issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to quash the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt because one of the
allegations in the motion failed to give him sufficient notice of the nature of the violation. We
affirm.

                                            BACKGROUND
          Appellant was charged by indictment with engaging in organized criminal activity.
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Appellant pleaded “guilty” as charged. The trial
court deferred finding Appellant “guilty” and placed him on community supervision for ten
years.
          Thereafter, the State filed a motion to adjudicate Appellant’s guilt, in which it argued that
Appellant violated certain terms and conditions of his community supervision. Specifically, the
State contended that Appellant (1) failed to report as directed by the Supervision Officer on
September 22, 2022, and (2) failed to abide by all of the terms in State’s Exhibit P1. Appellant
filed a motion to quash the State’s motion regarding the allegation that he failed to abide by the
terms in Exhibit P1 and argued that this allegation is unconstitutionally vague and does not
provide enough specificity for Appellant to know how he violated the condition.
       On November 4, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate
Appellant’s guilt. Before addressing that matter, however, the trial court considered his motion
to quash. After considering the argument of counsel, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion.
Thereafter, Appellant pleaded “true” to the allegation that he failed to report and “not true” to the
allegation that he violated the terms of Exhibit P1. Ultimately, after considering the evidence
underlying the State’s motion and the argument of counsel, the trial court found the allegations in
the State’s motion to be “true,” revoked Appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated him
“guilty” of engaging in organized criminal activity, and sentenced him to imprisonment for
twenty years. This appeal followed.

                                       MOTION TO QUASH
       In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to quash the State’s motion to adjudicate.
Standard of Review
       A person on community supervision is entitled to reasonable notice before the State seeks
to revoke a previously suspended sentence. See LaBelle v. State, 720 S.W.2d 101, 108 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); Johnson v. State, No. 12-05-00376-CR, 2007 WL 60767, at *1 (Tex. App.–
Tyler Jan. 10, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). But the allegations
made in a motion to revoke need not be as precise as would be required in an indictment, and the
state is not bound by the alleged date of occurrence so long as the violation occurred after the
beginning date of community supervision and before the end of the supervision period. See
Chreene v. State, 691 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1985, pet. ref’d) (citing Fowler v.
State, 509 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). Generally, we review a trial court’s
decision to deny a motion to quash for an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158,
163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Johnson, 2007 WL 60767, at *1.
Discussion
       In the instant case, Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to
quash because the allegation in the State’s motion regarding his failure to abide by all terms in

                                                 2
State’s Exhibit P1 1 is “unconstitutionally vague” and did not provide enough specificity for
Appellant to know how he violated this condition. At the hearing, the trial court sought to
explain some of the background facts, which preceded the State’s filing its motion to adjudicate
because Appellant’s counsel at the hearing only recently had undertaken his representation of
Appellant. In its explanation, the trial court stated as follows:

                   So on that issue -- and obviously the record will reflect you are newish to the case.
         Previously, [Appellant] was represented by Mr. Bingham and Mr. Biggs. And we had -- [the
         prosecuting attorney] and Mr. Biggs and I had a meeting in chambers prior to this motion being
         filed or at about the same time it was filed. I don’t remember exactly. But discussions were had
         regarding some more specifics of the allegations with . . . [Appellant’s] then counsel, who
         requested, in part, that the motion to revoke be done this way in order to protect [Appellant’s]
         interests with not having a public document outlining exactly what he was supposed to do. As far
         as the agreement that was done at the time, the request was in part so that, if something were
         worked out, there would not be a public record of what was contained in this addendum, this P-1.
         And so taking that into consideration and, of course, taking judicial notice of everything that got
         us here, I think there’s enough to believe your client was put on notice as to the specific
         allegations . . . .

                  ....

                  Well, and I get Mr. Waldron’s argument that there could be several specific small
         violations. But I do think this P-1 was originally sealed at the request, effectively, of [Appellant].
         It remained sealed up to the time it was released to you and Mr. Waldron, at the request of
         [Appellant]. And this motion was drafted not to include specific language from P-1 at the request
         of [Appellant]. And I understand why you might be making that argument today, Mr. Waldron.

                 But I think, you know, trying to balance -- all this was done at your client’s request. To
        now say, “Well, you should have disclosed everything in this motion that I requested you not to
        disclose,” it’s sort of a catch-22. And I think, given the nature of the contract in P-1, given the
        potential risk to which [Appellant] was exposed, I think we all understand why it was sealed and
        why it was done this way.

         The State argues that Appellant invited the error of which he now complains. The law of
invited error estops a party from making an appellate error of an action he induced. Prytash v.
State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Pedraza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex.
App.–Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).                This rule applies regardless of whether the error is
perceived to be fundamental. See Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth

         1
           Exhibit P1 was filed under seal in this court. But the parties discussed the nature of the exhibit at the
hearing on the State’s motion on the record. Without revealing any details of the exhibit, suffice it to say that the
exhibit generally consists of an agreement between Appellant and the State regarding Appellant’s cooperation with
law enforcement in certain matters. The portions of the reporter’s record from which this can be surmised also are
reproduced in Appellant’s brief.

                                                           3
2002, no pet.); see also Cadd v. State, 587 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (op. on
reh’g).
          Here, the trial court sought to explain to Appellant’s trial counsel, who only recently was
involved in the proceedings, that before the State’s filing of its motion to adjudicate, the court
met with Appellant’s prior attorneys along with the prosecuting attorney and, at Appellant’s
request, the alleged violation was crafted in such a way that the nature of Appellant’s agreement
with the State contained in Exhibit P1 intentionally was obfuscated. The trial court took judicial
notice of these facts, and, to the extent that such facts may not be an appropriate subject of
judicial notice, Appellant made no objection and, therefore, failed to preserve error on that issue.
See Baeza v. State, No. 08-02-00314-CV, 2004 WL 803895, at *2 (Tex. App.–El Paso Apr. 15,
2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Camacho v. State, No.
02-03-00033-CR, 2003 WL 21359367, at *1 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Jun. 12, 2003, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, we hold that because the record reflects
that the allegation at issue was drafted in such a manner in response to and in compliance with
Appellant’s request, we hold that Appellant is estopped from making an appellate error of this
action, which he induced. 2 See Prytash, 3 S.W.3d at 531. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

                                                  DISPOSITION
          Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                            GREG NEELEY
                                                                               Justice
Opinion delivered September 6, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

          2
           We note that Appellant pleaded “true” to the separate allegation that he failed to report as directed. Only
one sufficient ground is necessary to support a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision. Smith v.
State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Cazarez v. State, 606 S.W.3d 549, 559 (Tex. App.–Houston
[1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). And a plea of “true,” standing alone, generally is sufficient to support revocation. See
Cazarez, 606 S.W.3d at 559. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Appellant is not estopped under the invited error
doctrine from raising his sole issue, because the trial court properly could revoke his community supervision based
on his plea of “true” to a separate allegation, we cannot conclude that Appellant was harmed by the trial court’s
denial of his motion to quash.

                                                          4
                                   COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                         SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

                                         NO. 12-22-00305-CR

                                GREGORY DEWAYNE BOLTON,
                                         Appellant
                                            V.
                                   THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                         Appellee

                                Appeal from the 114th District Court
                         of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 114-0560-21)

                       THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
                       It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the
judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, for which execution may issue, and that
this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
                    Greg Neeley, Justice.
                    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.