Court Opinion

ID: 9901474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 20:03:09.089586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:33.564188
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/2/23

                 TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                   SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                    COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
                                     APPELLATE DIVISION

THE PEOPLE,                                        Appellate Division No.: CA296005
                                                   Trial Court Case No.: M280287
                Plaintiff(s) and Respondent(s),    Trial Court Location: Central Division

        v.
                                                   DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS
ROHULLAH HAMIDI,                                   (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT

                Defendant(s) and Appellant(s).

        APPEAL from the October 19, 2022 judgment of conviction following jury trial entered by
Superior Court, San Diego County, Robert Amador, Judge. This matter was scheduled for argument
and taken under submission on July 27, 2023.
        AFFIRMED.
        On May 30, 2023, Appellate Division Judge Maryann D’Addezio issued an Order of
Recusal and did not participate in the review or consideration of this appeal.
        On May 22, 2021, Ms. Magdalena crossed the street at an unmarked crosswalk at the corner
of El Cajon Boulevard and Altadena. Mr. Hamidi struck and killed her as he passed a vehicle
stopped at the crosswalk in a different lane. After doing so he stopped, turned on emergency lights,
and requested someone to call 911. Mr. Hamidi told law enforcement—and testified—that he did
not see Ms. Magdalena until she was running into the crosswalk. There were videos from several

                 DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT
angles of the accident showing the stopped car, Mr. Hamidi driving, and Ms. Magdalena going
through the crosswalk and being hit.
       On March 23, 2022, Mr. Hamidi was charged with one count of misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter pursuant to Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2). The alleged negligent acts
were passing a stopped vehicle at a crosswalk (Veh. Code, § 21951) and failing to yield to a
pedestrian (Veh. Code, § 21950). During trial, the defense requested that the trial court give
CALCRIM No. 3404 as an instruction and that the trial court give an instruction regarding the
meaning of “overtake and pass.” The trial court denied both of those requests. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty on September 27, 2022. Sentencing occurred on October 19, 2022. Mr. Hamidi
timely filed his notice of appeal on November 1, 2022.
       Accident Instruction
       Appellant requested that the trial court give the instruction CALCRIM No. 3404.
CALCRIM No. 3404 is a “pinpoint” instruction, and “on request, a criminal defendant is entitled to
pinpoint instructions ... if the instructions are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Nelson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 542.) When reviewing the denial of a request for a jury instruction, doubts as
to the sufficiency of the evidence are resolved in favor of the accused. (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21
Cal.4th 935, 944.) In doing so, we do not weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and we focus on
matters that could justify the instruction rather than the “customary summary of evidence
supporting the judgment.” (People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 15–16.) However, when the
evidence is “minimal and insubstantial ..., the court need not instruct on its effect.” (People v.
Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People
v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 138.) As our Supreme Court has cautioned, “unsupported theories
should not be presented to the jury” and “[t]rial courts have the duty to screen out invalid theories
of conviction, either by appropriate instruction or by not presenting them to the jury in the first
place.” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1131.)
       For homicides, the accident defense stems from Penal Code section 195, which states in
part: “Homicide is excusable … [w]hen committed by accident and misfortune, or in doing any
other lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful
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                 DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT
intent.” The defense requires that the defendant act lawfully. (People v. Attema (1925) 75 Cal.App.
642, 655.) “‘Misfortune’ when applied to a criminal act is analogous with the word ‘misadventure’
and bears the connotation of accident while doing a lawful act.” (People v. Gorgol (1953) 122
Cal.App.2d 281, 307–308.) “An act which is expressly forbidden by law is an unlawful act and an
act committed in a manner forbidden by law is committed in an unlawful manner.” (People v.
Wilson (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 108, 114.) To be unlawful, such an act does not need to be a crime.
(Ibid.) Here, Mr. Hamidi’s conduct was not lawful.
        Vehicle Code section 21951 makes it unlawful for a vehicle approaching from the rear to
pass a vehicle that “has stopped . . . at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a
pedestrian to cross the roadway.” In this case, it is uncontroverted that there was a vehicle stopped
at an unmarked intersection, that Ms. Magdalena was crossing, and that Mr. Hamidi approached the
stopped vehicle from the rear and passed the stopped vehicle. While merely driving through a
crosswalk is not inherently unlawful, Mr. Hamidi’s driving in this instance violated Vehicle Code
section 21951the evidence presented regarding Mr. Hamidi’s driving in this instance does not
support an accident defense instruction.
        For the defense of accident to apply, there must be substantial evidence of the accident
negating the required intent. “The accident defense is a claim that the defendant acted without
forming the mental state necessary to make his actions a crime.” (People v. Gonzales (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 382, 390, disapproved in People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, fn. 3 [“to the
extent [it] hold[s] a sua sponte instruction on accident is required when the defense is raised to
negate the intent or mental element of the charged crime”].) “In each case, the defense of accident
was raised to rebut the mental element of the crime or crimes with which the defendant was
charged. (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 998.) The mental state required for a violation
of Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2), is ordinary negligence. The mental state of
negligence is “a want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or
omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns.” (Pen. Code, § 7, subd.
(2).)

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                 DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT
        Appellant argues that giving the instruction is justified because of Mr. Hamidi’s testimony
and statements that it was an “accident,” that he did not see Ms. Magdalena, that it was dark, that
the crosswalk was not lit, that Ms. Magdalena ran into the crosswalk, and that the stopped vehicle
blocked his view. None of this evidence is substantial evidence of an accident negating ordinary
negligence.
        Mr. Hamidi’s conclusory statements that it was an accident do not constitute substantial
evidence. Such statements are impermissible lay opinion. No evidence was presented that Mr.
Hamidi had any legal expertise or understanding of the legal meaning of the accident defense.
“Witnesses must ordinarily testify to facts, leaving the drawing of inferences or conclusions to the
jury or court.” (Froomer v. Drollinger (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 90, 98.) A defendant’s blanket claim
it was an accident is not necessarily sufficient to support the accident defense. (See People v.
Piorkowski (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 324.)
        Mr. Hamidi’s broad statements that he did not see Ms. Magdalena do not negate ordinary
negligence. Multiple cases describe a driver not seeing someone in the crosswalk as negligent.
“[W]here a driver did not see his victim until the instant of impact or not at all he is guilty of gross
negligence or of an entire indifference to those who were using the street or highway
simultaneously with him.” (People v. Flores (1947) 83 Cal.App.2d 11, 14.) “It is also established
that appellant did not see respondent in the crosswalk at that time, although she must have been
there. There is sufficient evidence to justify the finding of the trial court that the appellant driver
therefore was negligent.” (Hall v. Kaufman (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 264, 267; see also People v.
Leitgeb (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 764, 769–770.) Therefore, the blanket assertion about not seeing Ms.
Magdalena does not negate ordinary negligence.
        Mr. Hamidi’s claims that it was dark also fails to negate the intent of ordinary negligence.
“The driver of the vehicle is not permitted to lessen compliance with his duties because of the hour
of the day or night . . ..” (Moritz v. City of Santa Clara (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 573, 576 [referring to
Veh. Code, §§ 21950 & 21951].)
        Nor does the lack of flashing lights negate the mental state of ordinary negligence, as both
alleged negligent acts apply to unmarked crosswalks. (Veh. Code, §§ 21950 & 21951.)
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                 DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT
       The argument that Ms. Magdalena ran into the crosswalk is in essence a contributory
negligence argument. Contributory negligence is not a defense to a crime. (People v. Schmies
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38, 46 citing People v. Rodgers (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 166, 167.) “It has
been repeatedly held that contributory negligence is not available as a defense or excuse for crime.”
(People v. Rodgers (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 166, 167.) Defense cannot do an end-run around this
prohibition by relabeling it an accident argument. And it is error to instruct in a way that implies to
the jury that contributory negligence is a defense. (People v. Marconi (1931) 118 Cal.App. 683,
687–688.)
       Injury to a pedestrian as a result of a driver’s view being obstructed by a stopped vehicle
that the driver is passing at a crosswalk is the very harm that Vehicle Code section 21951 was
designed to prevent. In a civil case, this would trigger a rebuttable presumption that Mr. Hamidi
was negligent. (See Evid. Code, § 669.) There is no case law establishing that Evidence Code
section 669 applies to criminal cases, but even assuming the presumption does not apply, section
669 helps illustrate why Mr. Hamidi’s asserted inability to see Ms. Magdalena does not negate the
mental state of ordinary negligence. The analysis under section 669 requires courts to ask if the
“death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or
regulation was designed to prevent….” In light of the Legislature’s enactment of Vehicle Code
section 21951, a driver who passes a stopped vehicle in a crosswalk would be considered negligent
because a reasonable person would know their view is obstructed at a location where pedestrians
are likely to be. A driver’s assertion that they did not see a pedestrian under these circumstances,
even if true, does not serve to negate the driver’s negligence.
       As none of the evidence argued as a basis for the accident defense negated the mental state
of ordinary negligence, the trial court did not err in declining to give the CALCRIM No. 3404
instruction.
       This does not mean that the defense of accident can never exist in a case under Penal Code
section 192, subdivision (c)(2). For example, if Mr. Hamidi’s testimony was that he saw the car
stopped at the intersection and attempted to stop but—because of mechanical failure or other

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                 DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT
misfortune—he was unable to stop before the intersection, that would negate ordinary negligence as
he was trying to exercise due care.
       Appellant appears to suggest that unintentionally causing a death equates with
“accidentally” causing a death, but vehicular manslaughter has never been premised on an intent to
cause the death. Again, we believe that an accident instruction, in the context of a vehicular
manslaughter case, may be justified when the vehicle proceeds in a manner unintended by the
driver (e.g., the car goes backwards when the driver thinks it is going to go forward). Appellant
never contended that he lost control of the vehicle. He drove exactly where he intended to drive. He
was just surprised, due to his failure to strictly comply with the Vehicle Code, to find a pedestrian
in his path. Being surprised at a negative result of driving does not equate with bearing no criminal
responsibility for the driving, nor is surprise that unsafe driving resulted in a death sufficient to
justify an accident defense instruction.
       Overtake and Pass Instruction
       Appellant also requested the following instruction: “To overtake and pass a vehicle, the
overtaking vehicle must have been approaching the overtaken vehicle from the rear in the same lane
prior to overtaking and passing.” This requested instruction is not an accurate statement of law or of
the legal definition of “overtake and pass.” Contrary to the proposed defense instruction, Vehicle
Code section 21754 describes several situations as overtaking and passing that do not require a lane
change: “The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass to the right of another vehicle only under
the following conditions: (c) Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district with
unobstructed pavement of sufficient width and clearly marked for two or more lines of moving
traffic in the direction of travel. (d) Upon a one-way street. (e) Upon a highway divided into two
roadways where traffic is restricted to one direction upon each of such roadways…” These are
descriptions of lawful driving described by the Legislature as “overtaking and passing.” The trial
court noted this in its decision not to give the instruction. Because the requested instruction did not
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                 DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT
accurately state the law, the trial court did not err in not giving the instruction.
        The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Unanimously affirmed.

ALBERT T. HARUTUNIAN III
Presiding Judge, Appellate Division

FRANK L. BIRCHAK
Judge, Appellate Division

BRAD A. WEINREB
Judge, Appellate Division

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                 DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT
Counsel for Appellant, Rohullah Hamidi:
TROY BRITT, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KATIE BELISLE, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
451 A STREET, SUITE 900
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

Counsel for Respondent, The People:

MARA ELLIOTT, CITY ATTORNEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
1200 THIRD AVE, SUITE 700
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

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              DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT