Court Opinion

ID: 9627218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:39:33.487833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:57.017088
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. The underlying crimes in this case were three counts of negligent homicide associated with driving while intoxicated. There were three deaths that resulted •— Barbee’s child, his girlfriend, and another friend. Barbee pled guilty to these counts and was sentenced to ninety days in jail, six months of in-house alcohol rehabilitation, sixty months of supervised probation, costs and fines, and a three-year revocation of his driver’s license. He began driving before the three-year revocation period had expired. Barbee argued at the revocation hearing before the circuit judge that his premature driving was “excusable.” The circuit judge disagreed and revoked his probation. I cannot say that the circuit judge was clearly erroneous in his finding, and for that reason I dissent. The majority tries to justify its departure from the circuit judge’s finding by saying this is a unique case. This case, most assuredly, turns on its facts, but it hardly qualifies as unique. The majority then reverses the circuit judge without applying our standard of review. In order to reverse the circuit judge, we must hold that his finding was clearly erroneous. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Our caselaw is legion in support of this principle. See, e.g., Lemons v. State, 310 Ark. 381, 836 S.W.2d 861 (1992) (stating that a trial court’s findings in a probation revocation hearing will be upheld unless clearly against the preponderance of the evidence). The majority cites the Lemons case but avoids discussion of this substantial hurdle. Then there is the issue of assessing witness credibility. The circuit judge did exactly that. Here is what the circuit judge said at the conclusion of the revocation hearing: The COURT: You know, witnesses were sworn. I listened to the testimony. And based upon the testimony I reached a finding. And I’m not of the opinion that documentary evidence is required. So I’ll deny that motion. The COURT: Well, you know, he certainly — I know I take these matters serious. And you have credible witnesses on both sides. Who do you believe when they’re saying something differendy? And I was convinced that Mr. Barbee was instructed when his driver’s license were, the effect of revoking, the effect of having a driver’s license revoked is that you should not drive. And I just, here again, I don’t want to go on hindsight —• Defense Counsel: Your Honor — THE COURT: — but I’m convinced that he had violated — I stand behind the findings that he had violated condition number nineteen. The underlying charge here is the three lives that were taken. That weighed heavily upon my making this choice. It is boilerplate law that this court defers to the trial court in matters of witness credibility. We never deviate from that principle. What follows is a sampling of cases where we recognized that doctrine in no uncertain terms: Hale v. State, 343 Ark. 62, 31 S.W.3d 850 (2000) (this court will not second-guess credibility determinations); Pyle v. State, 340 Ark. 53, 8 S.W.3d 491 (2000) (conflicts in testimony are for the trial court to resolve, as it is in a superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses); Rankin v. State, 338 Ark. 723, 1 S.W.3d 14 (1999) (credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing is for the trial judge to determine, and this court defers to the superior position of the trial judge in matters of credibility); Wright v. State, 335 Ark. 395, 983 S.W.2d 397 (1998) (credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing is for the trial judge to determine, and this court defers to the superior position of the trial judge in matters of credibility); Tabor v. State, 333 Ark. 429, 971 S.W.2d 227 (1998) (credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing is for the trial judge to determine, and this court defers to the superior position of the trial judge in matters of credibility); Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 941 S.W.2d 411 (1997) (this court has repeatedly held that it will defer to the trial court’s finding of fact when the only determination is credibility of a witness); Humphrey v. State, 327 Ark. 753, 940 S.W.2d 860 (1997) (this court defers to the trial court’s superior position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses); Hill v. State, 325 Ark. 419, 931 S.W.2d 64 (1996) (a trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses at a Denno hearing, and his determination that appellant voluntarily confessed was not clearly erroneous); McCoy v. State, 325 Ark. 155, 925 S.W.2d 391 (1996) (conflicts in testimony are for the trial court to resolve, as it is in a superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses); Davis v. State, 318 Ark. 212, 885 S.W.2d 292 (1994) (credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing is for the trial judge to determine, and this court defers to the superior position of the trial court in matters of credibility). Why a majority of this court has departed from this well-settled principle in this case is troublesome. But that is precisely what the majority has done. It has weighed the evidence, assessed witness credibility, and then adopted Barbee’s theory of this case. In doing so, the majority has implicitly concluded that the circuit judge clearly erred. This case of negligent homicide was an extremely serious matter. Drinking was involved. Three people were killed. The judge heard all of the evidence on why Barbee began driving before his three-year probation expired. The judge apparently did not believe Barbee when he said he was misled by the Chicot County Revenue Office. Rather, the judge concluded that Barbee took advantage of a computer glitch and violated his probation. I cannot say the circuit judge was clearly erroneous. For that reason I would affirm. Glaze and Imber, JJ„ join.