Court Opinion

ID: 9771073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:30:51.56658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:24.663653
License: Public Domain

JOHNSTONE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and preface my remarks by stating that good intentions alone do not make law that proves constitutionally sound. I do not doubt the good intentions of the members of the Jefferson Fiscal Court. Although I agree with the result reached by Justice Stephens’ dissent, I write separately to address in detail the decision in Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, Kentucky v. Brady, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 681 (1994). As a result of the Brady decision, the Fiscal Court adopted Resolution 24 on May 23, 1995. On June 27, 1995, the Fiscal Court repealed Resolution 24 and adopted Resolution 34 in its place.
In Brady, we concluded that there were five problems with the Jefferson Fiscal Court’s method of allocating and administering school transportation subsidies. Id. at 683-84. Resolution 34 addresses and resolves some of the five problems, but does not resolve all of them. Therefore, Resolution 34 is still fatally defective.

Problem One

The first problem in Brady was that the funds were paid directly to the parochial schools. Pursuant to Resolution 34, the transportation subsidy plan no longer provides that money shall be paid directly to any *914private or parochial school for transportation cost reimbursement. Rather, transportation subsidies are now paid directly to the contract bus services. I agree with the court below that the present payment scheme is fundamentally different from the payment scheme outlined in Brady, so it does not offend the Brady decision.

Problem Two

The second problem in Brady was that the funds were expended solely for the benefit of parochial school students. Just as before the Brady decision, the Fiscal Court transportation subsidies are exclusively expended for the benefit of private and parochial school children under Resolution 34. While the Ap-pellees contend that Brady merely held that payment of the subsidy funds directly to private and parochial schools was permitted and that the Fiscal Court’s total exclusion of public school children was entirely discretionary and permitted under Brady, I disagree.
Both Appellees argue that the Fiscal Court’s decision to exclude all public school children and any elective public educational programming is not fatal. They contend that KRS 158.110 mandates that the Board of Education provide transportation to all public school children attending public school who do not live within a reasonable walking distance to the nearest school. Therefore, according to Appellees, these children would never be the intended recipients under KRS 158.115. However, the clear language of KRS 158 .110(1) states that “[b]oards of education may provide transportation from their general funds or otherwise for any pupil of any grade to the nearest school_” (Emphasis added.) The words “must provide” appear nowhere in the plain language of the statute. Consequently, the statute is clearly discretionary, and not mandatory in nature.
Appellees also acknowledge that some public school children who have chosen to attend a public school other than the school designated by the Board of Education are not being provided with bus transportation because it would not be economically feasible to establish service. Thus, we can only conclude that Appellees’ contention that “the cost of public school transportation ... is already fully funded by [over twenty-four million in] tax dollars” is simply not correct.

Problem Three

The third problem in Brady was that only select private and parochial schools were eligible on a tuition cost charged basis. The record in the instant case shows that Resolution 34, unlike the resolution in Brady, no longer establishes a tuition ceiling as a prerequisite to eligibility for the transportation subsidy funds. As currently implemented, the resolution merely requires that an application be submitted by the private or parochial school seeking funds. Therefore, the third Brady problem is addressed and solved by Resolution 34.

Problem Four

The fourth problem in Brady was that a strict “public health and safety” analysis was flawed, because payments were withheld from some students based upon the particular private or parochial school they chose to attend. However, as noted above, the record demonstrates that Resolution 34 no longer requires a tuition ceiling for private or parochial schools to receive transportation subsidies from the Fiscal Court. Even though the “public health and safety” issues from Brady are not present under Resolution 34, a “public health and safety” analysis demonstrates that the Resolution, in its application, is fatally flawed.
Appellees correctly contend that in Nichols v. Henry, Ky., 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945), the Court upheld KRS 158.115 as constitutional on its face. Furthermore, Appellees cite Rawlings v. Butler, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 801, 807 (1956), in support of their positions. However, Rawlings specifically stated that “[i]n Nichols v. Henry ..., we upheld the constitutionality of this 1944 Act as one not designed to aid secular or private schools, but to protect all children from the hazards of the highway who under our compulsory attendance law were forced to attend school.” (Emphasis in original). Therefore, we agree with Appellees that, in the past, KRS 158.115 was held to be constitutional in its plain language. However, Appellees ignore the fact that facial constitutionality does *915not guarantee that the application will be constitutional. I emphasize that our holding in Rawlings stressed that aid must be available to protect all children from the hazards of the highway, and not just parochial school students.
Moreover, the record shows that under Resolution 24, the repealed predecessor of Resolution 34, the vast majority of the Fiscal Court’s funds would have been allocated to the public schools based upon the school’s application and the number of students requiring bus transportation. Faced with this apparently undesirable result, the Fiscal Court instituted a new program based upon the newly-enacted Resolution 34, which again diverted over ninety percent of the available funds to aid parochial schools. It seems that the health and safety needs of the public and non-parochial private school students have effectively been excluded from participation in the “health and safety” program.
Accordingly, because the application of Resolution 34 is unconstitutional, it does not solve the fourth problem described in Brady.

Problem Five

The fifth and final problem in Brady was that the funds were not disbursed in compliance with the methods prescribed by KRS 158.115(2). As noted above, the Fiscal Court has altered its disbursement practice to distribute transportation subsidy funds either to the Board of Education or directly to contract bus services. I agree with the ruling of the court below that either one of these methods is permissible under KRS 158.115(2), since both of these means are specifically enumerated in the statute as acceptable transportation methods.

Conclusion

In summary, while the Fiscal Court’s most recent attempt to allocate funds to the parochial schools corrects some of the concerns voiced in Brady, several fundamental issues from Brady are yet to be resolved. As a result, I would find that Resolution 34, as applied, is inherently flawed and constitutionally invalid.
STEPHENS and STUMBO, JJ., join this dissent.