Court Opinion

ID: 9462593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:44:49.780247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:39.999822
License: Public Domain

*705ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
with whom ELY, HUFSTEDLER and WALLACE, Circuit Judges, join (dissenting).
Jewell was convicted and received concurrent sentences on two counts: (1) knowingly or intentionally importing a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1); (2) knowingly or intentionally possessing, with intent to distribute, a controlled substance, id. § 841(a)(1). We agree with the majority that the jury was not required to find, as to count one, that the defendant knew which controlled substance he possessed. We further agree that the additional state of mind required by count two — intent to distribute the substance — must be specifically proven as an element of a section 841(a)(1) violation.
The sole question raised by appellant is whether the following jury instruction constitutes reversible error:
The Government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, as to Count 2:
1. That the defendant knowingly brought the marijuana into the United States and with respect to Count 2 that he knowingly possessed the marijuana as charged.
The Government can complete their burden of proof by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not actually aware that there was marijuana in the vehicle he was driving when he entered the United States his ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of his having made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.
At the outset, it is arguable that the “conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth” instruction is inherently inconsistent with the additional mens rea required for count two — intent to distribute. It is difficult to explain that a defendant can specifically intend to distribute a substance unless he knows that he possesses it.1 In any event, we would not approve the conscious purpose instruction in this case, because it falls short of the scienter independently required under both counts.2
The majority opinion justifies the conscious purpose jury instruction as an application of the wilful blindness doctrine recognized primarily by English authorities. A classic illustration of this doctrine is the connivance of an innkeeper who deliberately arranges not to go into his back room and thus avoids visual confirmation of the gambling he believes is taking place.3, The doctrine is commonly said to apply in deciding whether one who acquires property under suspicious circumstances should be charged with knowledge that it was stolen.4
One problem with the wilful blindness doctrine is its bias towards visual means of acquiring knowledge. We may know facts from direct impressions of the other senses or by deduction from circumstantial evidence, and such knowledge is nonetheless “actual.” Moreover, visual sense impres*706sions do not consistently provide complete certainty.5
Another problem is that the English authorities seem to consider wilful blindness a state of mind distinct from, but equally culpable as, “actual” knowledge.6 When a statute specifically requires knowledge as an element of a crime, however, the substitution of some other state of mind cannot be justified even if the court deems that both are equally blameworthy.7
Finally, the wilful blindness doctrine is uncertain in scope. There is disagreement as to whether reckless disregard for the existence of a fact constitutes wilful blindness or some lesser degree of culpability.8 Some cases have held that a statute’s scien-ter requirement is satisfied by the constructive knowledge imputed to one who simply fails to discharge a duty to inform himself.9 There is also the question of whether to use an “objective” test based on the reasonable man, or to consider the defendant’s subjective belief as dispositive.10
The approach adopted in section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code clarifies, and, in important ways restricts,11 the English doctrine:
When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of *707its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
This provision requires an awareness of a high probability that a fact exists, not merely a reckless disregard, or a suspicion followed by a failure to make further inquiry. It also establishes knowledge as a matter of subjective belief, an important safeguard against diluting the guilty state of mind required for conviction. It is important to note that section 2.02(7) is a definition of knowledge, not a substitute for it; as such, it has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 & n.29, 90 S.Ct. 642, 652, 24 L.Ed.2d 610, 623 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1553, 23 L.Ed.2d 57, 87 (1969).
In light of the Model Penal Code’s definition, the “conscious purpose” jury instruction is defective in three respects.' First, it fails to mention the requirement that Jewell have been aware of a high probability that a controlled substance was in the car. It is not culpable to form “a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth” unless one is aware of facts indicating a high probability of that truth. To illustrate, a child given a gift-wrapped package by his mother while on vacation in Mexico may form a conscious purpose to take it home without learning what is inside; yet his state of mind is totally innocent unless he is aware of a high probability that the package contains a controlled substance. Thus, a conscious purpose instruction is only proper when coupled with a requirement that one be aware of a high probability of the truth.
The second defect in the instruction as given is that it did not alert the jury that Jewell could not be convicted if he “actually believed” there was no controlled substance in the car. The failure to emphasize, as does the Model Penal Code, that subjective belief is the determinative factor, may allow a jury to convict on an objective theory of knowledge — that a reasonable man should have inspected the car and would have discovered what was hidden inside. One recent decision reversed a jury instruction for this very deficiency — failure to balance a conscious purpose instruction with a warning that the defendant could not be convicted if he actually believed to the contrary. United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 586-89 (2d Cir. 1975).
Third, the jury instruction clearly states that Jewell could have been convicted even if found ignorant or “not actually aware” that the car contained a controlled substance. This is unacceptable because true ignorance, no matter how unreasonable, cannot provide a basis for criminal liability when the statute requires knowledge.12 A proper jury instruction based on the Model Penal Code would be presented as a way of defining knowledge, and not as an alternative to it.
The majority opinion cites three cases, all in the Second Circuit, which approve conscious purpose instructions in prosecutions under the same statute as Jewell was charged. In two of these cases the jury instruction included one of the elements of the Model Penal Code provision which was omitted in the instant case.13 Of course, jury instructions should be considered in context and not subjected to unduly technical analysis. Yet we remain convinced that the instructions given in this case were erroneous; they could have permitted the jury to convict Jewell without being certain beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the mens rea required for knowing possession or importation under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) & 960(a).
We do not agree with the majority that we can only reverse if the conscious purpose instruction constituted “plain error.” Before the instruction was given, the defense *708counsel objected “strenuously” on the basis that the jury could convict Jewell for failure to make an adequate attempt to check out the car. When the trial judge rejected this argument, the defense counsel further requested that he “add an addendum” to the charge so the jury would understand it properly. The trial court rejected this suggestion as well, and cut off further argument, saying “The record may show your objection.”
Although the defense counsel did not fully anticipate our analysis of the conscious purpose instruction, he came close. (1) He gave a reason for his objection — that the instruction would allow conviction without proof of the scienter element. (2) He further suggested adding “an addendum” to warn the jury against misinterpreting the instruction. We believe these objections were sufficient to require reversal on appeal unless the deficiencies in the instruction were harmless error.14
We do not question the sufficiency of the evidence in this case to support conviction by a properly-instructed jury.15 As with all states of mind, knowledge must normally be proven by circumstantial evidence. There is evidence which could support a conclusion that Jewell was aware of a high probability that the car contained a controlled substance and that he had no belief to the contrary. However, we cannot say that the evidence was so overwhelming that the erroneous jury instruction was harmless. Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment on this appeal.

. “Want of knowledge . . . may disprove the existence of a specific intent. Thus one cannot intend to steal property which he believes to be his own however careless he may have been in coming to that belief.” R. Perkins, Criminal Law 778 (2d ed. 1969) (footnote omitted).

. The challenged instruction was given for count two only, but it would seem to be applicable as well to the state of mind required for count one. A jury would be easily confused by the apparent difference in standards, at least absent explicit instructions on the point. Therefore we think it would be inappropriate to invoke the concurrent sentence rule to affirm Jewell’s conviction on the basis of count one.

. See, e. g., Bosley v. Davies, [1875] L.R. 1 Q.B. 84.

. See 2 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 568 (1957 & Supp.1975). This situation — use of circumstantial evidence to prove a contemporaneous state of mind— should be distinguished from the use of one fact to support the inference of a previous event. See McAbee v. United States, 434 F.2d 361, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1970) (permissive inference that possessor of property recently stolen in another state was the thief and had transported it in interstate commerce).

. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967).

. See G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part § 57, at 157 (2d ed. 1961) (“To the requirement of actual knowledge there is one strictly limited exception.”); Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 Modern L.Rev. 294, 302 (1954) (wilful blindness is “as culpable as actual knowledge).
The use of the term “actual knowledge” in this manner is misleading in suggesting the possibility of achieving a state of total certainty, and that only such knowledge is “actual.” In fact, we commonly act on less than complete information and in this world may never know one-hundred-percent certainty.
‘Absolute knowledge can be had of very few things,’ said the Massachusetts court, and the philosopher might add ‘if any.’ For most practical purposes ‘knowledge’ ‘is not confined to what we have personally observed or to what we have evolved by our, own cognitive faculties.’
R. Perkins, supra note 1, at 775, quoting Story v. Buffam, 90 Mass. 35, 38 (8 Allen) (1864), and State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135, 140, 17 S.W. 290, 292 (1891).

. This case does not present the question of how far Congress could reduce the requirement of a mens rea for possession of drugs. The statutes use the terms “knowingly or intentionally.” It is true that a strict interpretation of the scienter requirement may produce fewer convictions in combating “the growing menace of drug abuse.” But the Supreme Court has cautioned that “the purpose of every statute would be ‘obstructed’ by requiring a finding of intent, if we assume that it had a purpose to convict without it.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259, 72 S.Ct. 240, 247, 96 L.Ed. 288, 298 (1952). Here it is clear that Congress intended to require knowledge as an element of these offenses.
The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute.
Id. at 263, 72 S.Ct. at 249, 96 L.Ed. at 300.

. Compare G. Williams, supra note 6, at 158-59, with Edwards, supra note 6, at 303-06. A “reckless disregard” instruction was approved in one case relied upon by the majority. See United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-13 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924, 94 S.Ct. 1428, 39 L.Ed.2d 480 (1974).

. E. g., Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735, 19 S.Ct. 812, 815, 43 L.Ed. 1150, 1153 (1899). These cases generally involve regulatory statutes, the violation of which is malum prohibitum. Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 248-51 (8th Cir. 1958). Yet one case relied upon by the majority regarded Spurr as “comparable” to the former narcotics importation statute. See Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962).

. See R. Perkins, supra note 1, at 778 & n.77; R. Anderson, supra note 4, at 281-82 & nn.6-8.

. Professor Perkins observes that section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code “covers must less than ‘knowledge’ as it has been interpreted as a mens-rea requirement in the common law.” With regard to the receipt of stolen property, he criticizes the Code for not imposing liability in “the case of the man who has no belief one way or the other, but has been put on notice that it may be stolen and ‘shuts his eyes’ in order not to find out.” R. Perkins, supra note 1, at 799.

. See note 7 supra.

. See United States v. Olivares-Vega, 495 F.2d 827, 830 nn.10 & 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020, 95 S.Ct. 494, 42 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974) (instruction required acquittal if defendant believed he did not possess controlled substance); United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 1974) (conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment when he “had every reason to believe” he possessed a controlled substance). The third case cited by the majority is discussed in note 14 infra.

. Thus the instant case is distinguishable from United States v. Dozier, 522 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1975). There counsel made no objection to the jury charge, and the Second Circuit held the conscious purpose instruction was not so unbalanced as to constitute plain error. Id. at 228.

. Thus we have no disagreement with the sufficiency-of-evidence cases cited in note 13 of the majority opinion. However, they are not in point for the instant appeal.