Court Opinion

ID: 9595029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:34:59.653181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:54.458637
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge.
Sylvia Jackson brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of her motions to dismiss the indictment and to suppress evidence. The indictment charges Jackson with possession of cocaine in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (a). The trial court refused to suppress evidence supporting the State’s case that a blood specimen of her stillborn fetus tested positive for a metabolite of cocaine.
Jackson, who was 24 weeks pregnant, was attacked by her boyfriend. She was struck repeatedly in the face and stomach by her assailant, who knew she was pregnant, and told her that he was going “to make her lose it” Two days later she experienced heavy vaginal bleeding and went to the hospital emergency room. She was “found to have no fetal heart tones and fetal demise.” She related the beating to attending physicians and was admitted for further evaluation. The following day she delivered a stillborn fetus. The next day she was presented with and signed a form authorizing the hospital to dispose of the fetus rather than release it to a mortuary. On a different form, she was asked: “Would you like an autopsy done on the deceased?” She responded “no.”
The coroner notified the medical examiner of the death and authorized an autopsy for the reason that the stillbirth occurred several days after a reported beating of the mother, which was detailed in a police investigative report. The autopsy was performed “under the provisions of The Georgia Death Investigation Act” and it was concluded from the physical examination of the body that the cause of death was stillbirth. The medical examiner ordered laboratory procedures, submitting to the laboratory the body’s liver for toxicology and blood for toxicology and possible typing, pursuant to ascertaining the cause of death. The report of the forensic chemist and the chief toxicologist of the Division of Forensic Sciences of the GBI included the conclusion that the blood specimen was positive for a cocaine metabolite.
Based at least in part upon the evidence of cocaine found in the blood test performed on the stillborn fetus, the grand jury returned an indictment against Jackson, charging that “[she] did possess and have under her control, cocaine.”
1. It was not error to refuse to dismiss the indictment, regardless of whether or not the evidence should have been suppressed.
Assuming that the evidence was correctly not suppressed, Jackson contends that she cannot be convicted of possession of cocaine, which possession is based on evidence of a cocaine metabolite having been found in her stillborn fetus’ blood following an autopsy purportedly authorized by the Georgia Death Investigation Act and brought *392about when defendant was seeking maternal health care.
Her first argument is that this tenuous circumstantial evidence, found not even in her own body, could not constitute “possession” by her, citing Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625 (398 SE2d 360) (1990). That is to say, the evidence is insufficient. Her second argument is that the evidence here does not establish criminal “possession” by her, as contemplated by the General Assembly in OCGA § 16-13-30 (a).
The problem with these arguments is twofold. Number one, the indictment does not charge that she possessed cocaine by virtue of its metabolite’s presence in the blood of a stillborn fetus delivered of her. It merely charges her with possession of cocaine. The motion to dismiss is essentially a general demurrer, which “challenges the very validity of the indictment.” State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 485 (238 SE2d 38) (1977). The legal sufficiency of the pleading, not the evidence, is the issue. Id. The latter will not be inquired into. Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga. 791, 793 (113 SE2d 609) (1960); Brown v. State, 121 Ga. App. 228 (173 SE2d 470) (1970).
“The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment... is found in the answer to the question: Can the defendant admit the charge as made and still be innocent? If he can, the indictment is fatally defective.” State v. Eubanks, supra at 485. Obviously, if defendant admits that she possessed cocaine at any time within the period alleged, she would be guilty of the crime.
Secondly, defendant is attempting to use the motion to dismiss as though it were a motion for summary judgment, which does not exist in criminal procedure because, for one thing, the parties cannot be compelled to reveal the evidence on which their positions are based. If by defendant’s argument she means that the grand jury could not have indicted her based on this evidence, the record does not disclose what was presented to the grand jury. Even assuming the fetus’ blood metabolite evidence was illegal, the burden is on a defendant seeking to quash an indictment to overcome the presumption that it was returned on legal evidence by showing that there was no other competent evidence upon which it could lawfully have been returned. Meriwether v. State, 63 Ga. App. 667 (11 SE2d 816) (1940); see also Brown v. State, supra.
2. As to Jackson’s claim that the blood test results from the stillborn fetus should have been suppressed, the state correctly asserts that no search warrant or consent from Jackson was required for the medical examiner to conduct the autopsy and blood test on the stillborn fetus. “[T]here is no constitutionally protected right in a decedent’s body. Rather, the courts have evolved the concept of quasi property in recognition of the interests of surviving relatives in the possession and control of decedents’ bodies. We do not find this common law concept to be of constitutional dimension.” (Emphasis in *393original.) Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 61 (335 SE2d 127) (1985). Jackson’s quasi-property interest in the stillborn fetus will not support a privacy claim sufficient to implicate the search and seizure provisions of the United States Constitution. A search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed by state action. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 531 (417 SE2d 353) (1992). “The principal purpose of these constitutional provisions is to protect privacy not property interests. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967).” Lowe v. State, 203 Ga. App. 277, 280 (416 SE2d 750) (1992).
Moreover, in light of Jackson’s report that she had been severely beaten prior to the stillbirth, the state had a compelling interest in investigating the cause of death. See OCGA § 16-5-80 (offense of feticide). Under the Georgia Death Investigation Act (OCGA § 45-16-20 et seq.) “[w]hen any person dies in any county in this state ... [a]s a result of violence ... it shall be the duty of any law enforcement officer or other person having knowledge of such death to notify immediately the coroner or county medical examiner. ... A coroner or county medical examiner who is notified of [such death] shall order a medical examiner’s inquiry of that death.” OCGA § 45-16-24 (a) (1), (b). A medical examiner’s inquiry is an investigation into the circumstances surrounding such death, and may include an autopsy and other tests and examinations to determine the cause of death. OCGA §§ 45-16-21 (1), (10); 45-16-22 (c); 45-16-25 (c). The blood testing was done as part of the autopsy performed on the stillborn fetus to determine the cause of death. There is no evidence that the death investigation, autopsy, or testing pursuant thereto was a subterfuge to investigate Jackson for possession of cocaine.
Citing State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 157 (419 SE2d 32) (1992), Jackson contends that the Death Investigation Act does not apply because it refers to the death of a “person” rather than a fetus. Luster, supra,1 Division 1 (physical precedent) held that “the word ‘person’ in a criminal statute may not be construed to include a fetus unless the legislature has expressly included it, since at common law a fetus was not considered a person.” This principle has no application here for two reasons. First, the Death Investigation Act is civil not criminal legislation, and an unborn fetus has been included within the *394definition of “person” in various types of civil actions. See Billingsley v. State, 183 Ga. App. 850, 851 (360 SE2d 451) (1987). Secondly, the Act was applied here to authorize the autopsy and blood test on the body of a stillborn fetus. Obviously, the Legislature intended for the Act to apply to a stillborn fetus to enable the state to fully investigate the cause of death, especially in cases which may result in a prosecution for feticide. An unborn fetus when stillborn becomes a deceased person within the meaning of the Death Investigation Act.
Assuming, without deciding, that Jackson had a privacy interest in the body of the stillborn fetus sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections, this would provide no basis to suppress the blood test results. The exclusionary rule used to suppress evidence seized in illegal search and seizures applies only to Fourth Amendment violations involving law enforcement officers. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 489 (216 SE2d 586) (1975). The autopsy and testing done on the fetus, although performed at the state crime lab, was part of the medical examiner’s investigation under the Death Investigation Act. “[Although a coroner’s inquest [or a medical examiner’s investigation] may uncover facts that lead to the prosecution of a person for homicide, OCGA § 45-16-35, a coroner [or medical examiner] has no law enforcement authority such as that given to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, see OCGA §§ 35-3-4 (b) and 35-3-8, and the Georgia State Patrol, see OCGA §§ 35-2-32 and 35-2-33. In this regard, the verdict of a corner’s inquest [or the result of a medical examiner’s investigation] is merely advisory to officers charged with the execution of public laws.” Kilgore v. R. W. Page Corp., 261 Ga. 410, 411-412 (405 SE2d 655) (1991) (concluding a coroner is not a law enforcement agency for purposes of the Open Meetings Act). Although medical examiners are state officers, whose actions may bring the Fourth Amendment into play where a privacy interest is involved, they are not law enforcement officers to whom the exclusionary rule is applied. See Young, supra at 494. In any event, in conducting the autopsy and testing, the medical examiner acted in good faith to carry out duties imposed under the Death Investigation Act to investigate the report of a violent death. Such action taken in reasonable compliance with the Death Investigation Act is a justifiable official intrusion, which does not unreasonably infringe upon any constitutionally protected privacy interest. See Young, supra at 494-496.
Moreover, there is no reason to apply the exclusionary rule merely because any law enforcement officer became aware of the blood test results produced in the course of the medical examiner’s investigation. The testing was done at the crime lab as part of the investigation undertaken by the medical examiner based on reports that the fetus may have suffered a violent death. As previously noted, there is no indication that the death investigation and testing was a *395subterfuge to investigate Jackson for possession of cocaine. Law enforcement officials, who are doing their job in a place where they are entitled to be, are not required to ignore evidence of a criminal offense which appears in the course of their lawful activity. There was no Fourth Amendment violation, since any law enforcement officer, who became aware of the blood test results under these circumstances, was authorized to seize this evidence under the “plain view” doctrine. See Merriman v. State, 201 Ga. App. 817, 819 (412 SE2d 598) (1991).
The evidence sought to be excluded was found during an autopsy and accompanying blood test authorized under the Death Investigation Act. There is no reason to exclude this evidence, and the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.

Judgment affirmed.

Pope, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Cooper, Johnson and Blackburn, JJ., concur. Beasley, P. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 In Luster a pregnant woman was charged with both possession of cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-30 (a)), and with distributing or delivering cocaine to her unborn child by ingesting it during her pregnancy in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). We concluded that the distribution and delivery charge under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) must be dismissed because the statute on its face and legislative intent indicated it did not apply to those facts. The possession charge under OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) remained.