Court Opinion

ID: 9634223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:06:10.408429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:58.885023
License: Public Domain

RUIZ, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority opinion that appellate counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act have an obligation to effect an appeal from the denial of a D.C.Code § 23-110 motion challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel. Like Judge Glickman, I see nothing in the statutory mandate that appointed counsel provide representation “through appeals,” D.C.Code § 11-2603 (2001), that would limit counsel’s responsibility to motions filed during the pendency of direct appeal pursuant to our Shepard rule. As I’ve already indicated, the significance of Shepard is that, by making § 23-110 the procedural vehicle for developing the record in order to supplement claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the due process right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal encompasses appellate counsel’s duties in connection with developing before the trial court and bringing to appeal these supplemental § 23-110 claims. See (Charles) Thomas v. United States, 772 A.2d 818, 829-30 (D.C.2001) (Ruiz, J., dissenting in part) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)). That constitutional ground provides an additional basis for granting relief to appellant here, but in this case, the statutory right suffices.