Court Opinion

ID: 9597728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:02:22.274034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:46.596136
License: Public Domain

Miller, Justice,

concurring:

I agree with the majority that under the circumstances in this case the plea of guilty was not voluntary. I concur, however, because I believe that there may be some confusion engendered over the Court’s second syllabus:
“A guilty plea must manifest an unequivocal and knowledgeable admission of the offense charged and should not be accepted if conditional.”
The guilty plea itself does not “manifest an unequivocal and knowledgeable admission of the offense”, since it normally consists of the simple declaration, “I plead guilty to the charge” or words of like effect. It is the procedure surrounding the taking of the guilty plea that must reveal an unequivocal and knowledgeable admission of the offense charge. Nicely v. Butcher, 81 W.Va. 247, 94 S.E. 147 (1917); State v. Stone, 101 W.Va. 53, 131 S.E. 872 (1926). Consequently, I believe that the Court intended in its second syllabus to indicate that the guilty plea procedure must manifest an unequivocal and knowledgeable admission of the offense charged.
This is consistent with our holding in the recent case of Thomas v. Leverette, W. Va., No. 13903 (1977), where we held that for a guilty plea to be knowingly and intelligently entered, the defendant must be informed of the elements of the offense charged against him. Thomas *12was predicated on the case of Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253 (1976).
From a purely mechanical standpoint, the Court has addressed at some considerable length the factors that should be taken into consideration when a guilty plea is taken before the court in Call v. McKenzie, W.Va., 220 S.E.2d 665 (1975). Call also emphasized the importance of making a' stenographic record of the guilty plea proceeding in order to forestall a future attack on its factual basis.
While it is true that a reading of the indictment may serve to provide a sufficient factual explanation of the elements of the offense to which the guilty plea is tendered, I see some inherent dangers in a rote reliance on this procedure. First, the indictment itself may not embody all of the essential elements of the crime. State ex rel. Combs v. Boles, 151 W.Va. 194, 151 S.E.2d 115 (1966); State v. Harrison, 130 W.Va. 246, 43 S.E.2d 214 (1947); Scott v. Harshbarger, 116 W.Va. 300, 180 S.E. 187 (1935).
Moreover, an illustrated by Thomas and Henderson, some crimes carry lesser included offenses, which may not be charged separately in the indictment. Consequently, the mere reading of the indictment would not sufficiently convey the essential elements of the offense to which the plea is entered.
I also feel a further misconception may arise by the remaining language in the second syllabus that the plea “should not be accepted if conditional”, when coupled with the further statement in the opinion:
“It is the general rule that, in the absence of statutory authority, a court cannot accept a plea of guilty offered on any kind of condition.”
Obviously this language does not mean that a guilty plea cannot be entered pursuant to a plea bargain agreement which contains certain conditions as to future acts on the part of the State. This is a common and accepted practice originally sanctioned by this Court in State v. Ward, 112 W.Va. 552, 165 S.E. 803 (1932). In *13Ward, the defendant entered a guilty plea to one of fourteen indictments, and the State, pursuant to an agreement with defense counsel which was approved by the court, nolled the other indictments. When the State thereafter sought to try the defendant on one of the charges which had been nolled, this Court refused to allow the prosecution, stating: “The promise ... is a pledge of the public faith which in our opinion should be duly kept.” 112 W.Va. at 555, 165 S.E. at 805.
In State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, 154 W.Va. 857, 179 S.E.2d 726(1971), the defendant attacked his plea of guilty on the ground that it had been entered on the promise or condition that the prosecutor would recommend probation. This Court found such a promise was extended and allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty, as the prosecutor failed to do as he had promised.
Clancy, as well as a later case of Call v. McKenzie, supra, clearly approved the practice of plea bargaining and recognized that there may be agreed conditions attached to a guilty plea when it is tendered to the court. Of course, the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, refuse to accept such guilty plea where the conditions are improper or against public policy. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433, 92 S. Ct. 495, 498 (1971); Denham v. Robinson, 72 W.Va. 243, 77 S.E. 970 (1913); W.Va. Code, 62-2-25.
Here the guilty plea was not tendered pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, but was tendered unilaterally by the defendant on the condition that the court construe the statute as mandating probation.1 The court could have refused to accept the plea. Rather, the court *14elected to accept the plea and study the legal question raised by the condition. The court concluded that the statute did not require automatic probation, and sentenced defendant to a term of six months in jail, with a fine of $500.
The guilty plea here was clearly offered on the condition that defendant be dealt with under Section 407 of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. Once the trial court determined that the statute was inapplicable, the underlying voluntariness of the plea was thrown into question. The solution was to inform the defendant, pri- or to imposing sentence on the previous guilty plea, that automatic probation was not required and allow him an opportunity to withdraw the plea of guilty.
I am authorized to state that Justice Harshbarger joins with me in this concurring opinion.

 The guilty plea was tendered in the following fashion:
“Your Honor, at this time the defendant withdraws his plea of not guilty to the charge contained in the indictment which was tendered on August 21, 1975, and tenders to the Court an offer to plead guilty to the crime charged therein, which plea of guilty is to be treated under Section 407 of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act.” (60A-4-407)