Court Opinion

ID: 2963691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:59.486421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:44.858659
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          November 3, 1995  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1094

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               LUIS RAUL RIVERA-GOMEZ,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The opinion of  this court  issued on October  12, 1995,  is
          corrected as follows:

          On  page  7, line  20,  change "is  only  admissible" to  "may be
          excluded"

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1094

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               LUIS RAUL RIVERA-GOMEZ,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                           Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges,
                                            ______________

                             and Gorton,* District Judge.
                                          ______________

                              _________________________

               Carlos   A.   Vazquez-Alvarez,   Assistant  Federal   Public
               _____________________________
          Defender,  with  whom  Benicio  Sanchez  Rivera,  Federal  Public
                                 ________________________
          Defender, was on brief, for appellant.
                Jose  A. Quiles-Espinosa,  Senior Litigation  Counsel, with
                ________________________
          whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Edwin O. Vazquez,
               _____________                              ________________
          Assistant United States Attorney,  were on brief, for  the United
          States.

                              _________________________

                                   October 12, 1995

                              _________________________

          _______________
          *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.    A  jury convicted  defendant-
                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          appellant Luis  Raul Rivera-Gomez on three  counts of carjacking,

          18 U.S.C.   2119, and three counts of aiding and abetting the use

          and carriage  of firearms during  and in relation  to a crime  of

          violence, 18  U.S.C.    2(a), 924(c).   In terms of  prison time,

          the  trial  judge   imposed  concurrent  180-month  incarcerative

          sentences for the first two carjacking counts, a sentence of life

          imprisonment for  the third carjacking, and  concurrent sentences

          of five years, to  run consecutively to the other  sentences, for

          the  firearms  counts.   This  appeal  challenges an  evidentiary

          ruling, a  case management  ruling, and the  constitutionality of

          the life sentence.

          I. BACKGROUND
          I. BACKGROUND

                    The evidence adduced at  trial involved three  separate

          carjacking  incidents.    We   sketch  the  facts  as  the   jury

          warrantably  could have  found  them,  resolving all  evidentiary

          conflicts in  the government's favor and  adopting all reasonable

          inferences therefrom that support the verdict.

                    The first carjacking occurred on December 3, 1993.  The

          victim, Cesar Correa  Rivera (Correa), had driven  a friend home.

          While they  were  parked  outside  her abode,  a  vehicle  nudged

          Correa's car.  Not knowing the vehicle or trusting its occupants,

          Correa  tried to flee.   After a  brief chase, the  rogue vehicle

          blocked Correa's path  and two  armed men alighted.   One of  the

          men,  later identified  as Jose  Roman Hernandez  (Roman), struck

          Correa on  the head twice  with his revolver  and ordered him  to

                                          3

          relinquish  his  valuables.   Meanwhile,  the  second man,  later

          identified as Rivera-Gomez, threatened  Correa's companion with a

          gun.  Appellant eventually ordered the victims to kneel and stare

          at the ground.   Roman then departed in the  carjackers' original

          vehicle, leaving appellant to drive Correa's automobile.

                    Four days  later, the  same two marauders  assaulted an

          elderly retired couple, Rufino  Garcia Maldonado (Garcia) and his

          wife, Clara.  The  assault occurred when Clara left  the couple's

          car  to  open the  gate  leading into  their  driveway.   One man

          threatened her with  a weapon and forced her to the ground, while

          the second man pointed a gun at Garcia's head, ordered him out of

          the car  (a red  Suzuki), and  relieved him of  his wallet.   The

          robber then struck  Garcia on  the head, and  he and his  comrade

          drove off in the Suzuki.

                    A short time later, the Garcias' Suzuki, with appellant

          at  the wheel, pulled alongside a Mazda RX-7 operated by Reynaldo

          Luciano Rivera (Luciano).  Roman, then a passenger in the Suzuki,

          pointed a gun  at Luciano and ordered him to  freeze.  Instead of

          submitting  to  this  minatory  demand, Luciano  stepped  on  the

          accelerator.   At  the same  time, his  companion, Dalia  Hidalgo

          Garcia  (Hidalgo), leapt to the  ground.  The  predators fired in

          the  direction of the escaping  car, and, when  it stopped, Roman

          shot  Luciano  in  the  head at  point-blank  range.   Apparently

          realizing that they had  killed the young man, Roman  and Rivera-

          Gomez fled the scene without expropriating the Mazda.

                    Soon  thereafter, a  homicide  detective spotted  a red

                                          4

          Suzuki  in  the vicinity  and, having  received  a report  of the

          latest incident, circled  to pursue it.   After a Hollywood-style

          chase  involving  several police  vehicles,  the  Suzuki crashed.

          Appellant exited through the driver's door, and Roman exited from

          the passenger's side.  The authorities quickly apprehended them.

                    On January  5, 1994, a  federal grand jury  charged the

          two  men  with three  counts of  carjacking  and three  counts of

          aiding and abetting each other in  the use of firearms during and

          in relation to  crimes of violence.   Count 3  of the  indictment

          featured an allegation concerning  Luciano's death.  Though Roman

          entered a plea, appellant maintained  his innocence.  Following a

          three-day trial, a jury found appellant guilty on all six counts.

          This appeal ensued.

          II.  DISCUSSION
          II.  DISCUSSION

                    Appellant advances three assignments  of error.  First,

          he maintains that the district court  erred in admitting evidence

          of Luciano's death.  Second, he argues that the court should have

          declared  a mistrial  when a  prosecution witness  stated in  the

          jury's  presence  that Roman  had  pleaded guilty.    Finally, he

          suggests  that his life sentence punishes him for an offense with

          which  he  was  never  charged  (Luciano's  murder),  and,  thus,

          transgresses the  Constitution.  We address  these reputed errors

          sequentially.

                     A.  Admission of Evidence of Victim's Death.
                     A.  Admission of Evidence of Victim's Death.
                         _______________________________________

                    Appellant,   who  unsuccessfully  moved  in  limine  to
                                                             __  ______

          forestall the prosecution from showing that Luciano was killed in

                                          5

          the course  of the third incident, asseverates  that the victim's

          death was irrelevant to  the question of guilt  on the charge  of

          attempted carjacking,  and that no evidence  concerning the death

          should have been admitted.  Our study of this asseveration begins

          with  the language of  the carjacking statute,  which provided on

          the date of appellant's offense:

                         Whoever,  possessing a  firearm  .  .  .
                    takes   a  motor   vehicle   that  has   been
                    transported,   shipped,    or   received   in
                    interstate  or  foreign  commerce   from  the
                    person or  presence of  another by  force and
                    violence  or by intimidation,  or attempts to
                    do so, shall -
                              (1)  be fined  under this  title or
                    imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
                              (2) if serious bodily  injury . . .
                    results,  be   fined  under  this   title  or
                    imprisoned not  more than 25 years,  or both,
                    and
                              (3)  if  death  results,  be  fined
                    under this title or imprisoned for any number
                    of years up to life, or both.

          18 U.S.C.   2119 (Supp. V 1993).

                    Appellant  asserts that  the district  court mistakenly

          thought that  the victim's  death constituted  an element of  the

          offense, and allowed the evidence on that basis.  This was error,

          he  maintains,  because  subsection   (3),  the  "death  results"

          provision,  is not  an element  of the  offense, but,  rather, is

          simply a  sentencing enhancement mechanism.   Thus, he concludes,

          the victim's death had no bearing upon the determination of guilt

          for the underlying offense,  and should not have been  brought to

          the jury's attention.

                    As  an  inauguratory  matter,  we  disavow  appellant's

          assertion  that  the  district  court held  the  "death  results"

                                          6

          provision  to be a separate element of the offense of carjacking.

          As we parse the  version of the statute under  which Rivera-Gomez

          was  convicted, the crime of carjacking  had four elements, viz.,
                                                                      ____

          (1) taking (or attempting to take) from the person or presence of

          another,  (2) by force,  violence, or  intimidation, (3)  a motor

          vehicle   previously  transported,   shipped,   or  received   in

          interstate or foreign  commerce, (4)  while using  or carrying  a

          firearm.1   See United  States v.  Johnson, 32  F.3d 82,  85 (4th
                      ___ ______________     _______

          Cir.),  cert. denied,  115 S.  Ct. 650  (1994); United  States v.
                  _____ ______                            ______________

          Harris, 25 F.3d  1275, 1279 (5th Cir.)  cert. denied, 115  S. Ct.
          ______                                  _____ ______

          458 (1994); United States  v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419,  1422 (5th
                      _____________     _________

          Cir. 1994).

                    The  district  court appears  to  have understood  this

          structure,  and  the  record  suggests  that  the court  did  not

          consider  the death  of a  victim to  be a  further (independent)

          element  of the carjacking offense.  Judge Laffitte stated at the

          pretrial hearing  on the motion  in limine that the  death of the
                                           __ ______

          victim was  an offense element "not  as such," but  only as "part

          and parcel" of the "force and violence" element of the carjacking

          charge.  In the same vein, the judge's jury instructions outlined

                              
          ____________________

               1Section 2119 has  since been  amended.  In  the 1994  crime
          bill, Congress substituted  the phrase "with the  intent to cause
          death  or  serious  bodily   harm"  for  the  language  requiring
          possession  of  a firearm.   See  Violent  Crime Control  and Law
                                       ___
          Enforcement Act of 1994,   60003(a)(14), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
          Stat. 1796, 1970.  Thus, the new law leaves the offense with four
          elements,  but  changes  the focus  of  the  fourth element  from
          weaponry to intention, requiring  that the prosecution prove that
          the defendant perpetrated  the crime with the specific  intent of
          causing death or serious bodily harm.

                                          7

          the four essential elements of carjacking described above, saying

          nothing  about   "death  results"   as  an   independent  element

          applicable to count 3.

                    In  our  view,  then,  the  court's  admission  of  the

          evidence  derived  not  from  a misapprehension  that  the  death

          constituted an  independent offense element, but,  rather, from a

          belief  that  evidence of  Luciano's  death helped  to  prove the

          essential  "force  and  violence"  element.   The  question  that

          remains is whether the court blundered in allowing the government

          to present the challenged evidence as a means of proving that the

          carjackers employed force and violence  in carrying out the third

          incident.  We think not.

                    It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the

          death of a victim  will not be relevant  to the use of force  and

          violence during the commission  of an attempted carjacking.   See
                                                                        ___

          Fed. R.  Evid. 401 (defining "relevant  evidence"); United States
                                                              _____________

          v.  Rodriguez, 871  F. Supp.  545,  549 (D.P.R.  1994) (approving
              _________

          admission  of  evidence of  "the victim's  death  as well  as the

          manner  and means by which  it was accomplished"  as relevant and

          "highly  persuasive"  of "force  and  violence"  in a  carjacking

          prosecution).   This  case  is certainly  not the  exception that

          proves the rule.  Nevertheless, relevancy does not tell the total

          tale.    Evidence,  though  relevant,  may  be excluded  "if  its

          probative  value is  substantially  outweighed by  the danger  of

          unfair  prejudice, confusion  of  the issues,  or misleading  the

          jury."  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  We turn, therefore, to the balance of

                                          8

          probative worth and unfair prejudice.

                    In  this  instance,  appellant insists  that,  even  if

          evidence concerning the killing was probative of guilt  under the

          force  and violence element of  the offense, it  was not actually

          necessary  to the prosecution's  case   the  government had other

          evidence, such  as the  circumstances of the  carjackers' initial

          encounter with the victim, that  would have made the point    and

          the likelihood was great that grisly details would stir the baser

          passions of  the jurors and cloud their  minds so that they could

          not make  an objective  appraisal  of the  evidence before  them.

          Thus,  appellant's  thesis runs,  the  risk  of unfair  prejudice

          inherent in  permitting the  prosection to introduce  evidence of

          the  homicide  substantially   outweighed  whatever   incremental

          probative value the evidence may have supplied.

                    We  review   a  trial  court's  rulings   admitting  or

          excluding  particular  evidence for  abuse  of  discretion.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v.  Holmquist, 36  F.3d 154, 163  (1st Cir.  1994),
          _____________     _________

          cert. denied, 115  S. Ct.  1797 (1995); Veranda  Beach Club  Ltd.
          _____ ______                            _________________________

          Partnership  v. Western Surety Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1373 (1st Cir.
          ___________     __________________

          1991);  United States v. Nazarro,  889 F.2d 1158,  1168 (1st Cir.
                  _____________    _______

          1989).   We grant the  trial court especially  wide latitude when

          Rule 403 balancing is the subject of review.  "Only  rarely   and

          in extraordinarily  compelling circumstances   will  we, from the

          vista  of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-

          the-spot  judgment concerning the  relative weighing of probative

          value and unfair effect."  Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d
                                     _______    _________________

                                          9

          1331,  1340 (1st Cir.  1988).  This  deference is equally  due in

          criminal cases.   See, e.g., United  States v. Rodriguez-Estrada,
                            ___  ____  ______________    _________________

          877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Ingraham, 832
                                             _____________    ________

          F.2d 229, 233-34  (1st Cir.  1987), cert. denied,  486 U.S.  1009
                                              _____ ______

          (1988); United States v.  Tierney, 760 F.2d 382, 388  (1st Cir.),
                  _____________     _______

          cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985).
          _____ ______

                    Through this  modest lens, we see  no cognizable defect

          in the  district  court's Rule  403  balancing.   Whatever  other

          evidence  was available,  evidence  of  Luciano's death  remained

          highly  probative of  culpability for an  essential element  of a

          section 2119 offense.  Presumably,  like most evidence offered by

          the  government in a criminal case, this evidence was designed to

          prejudice the  jury  against  the defendant  in  the  sense  that

          exposure  to it would  render a conviction more  likely.  But the

          introduction of relevant evidence to influence perceptions is the

          stuff of  our adversary system  of justice.   The law  protects a

          defendant against unfair  prejudice, not  against all  prejudice.
                            ______                          ___

          See  Rodriguez-Estrada, 877  F.2d at  155-56; Onujiogu  v. United
          ___  _________________                        ________     ______

          States, 817  F.2d 3, 6 (1st  Cir. 1987); see also  Veranda Beach,
          ______                                   ___ ____  _____________

          936 F.2d at 1372 (explaining that "trials were never meant  to be

          antiseptic affairs;  it is  only unfair prejudice,  not prejudice

          per se, against which  Rule 403 guards").  Since the  evidence at

          issue is so tightly linked to guilt as defined by the elements of

          the offense,  it would  be surpassingly  difficult  to justify  a

          finding of unfair prejudice stemming from its introduction.

                    Here, moreover, there are several additional weights on

                                          10

          the  scale favoring  admissibility.  For  one thing,  because the

          perpetrators fled immediately after  the shooting, leaving behind

          both  the  Mazda  and  a dying  man  in  the  driver's  seat, the

          government's case on  count 3  depended on its  ability to  prove

          attempted carjacking.   Without  knowing of Luciano's  death, the

          jury may have been left to wonder why two supposed carjackers had

          turned their backs on  an expensive, late-model sports car.   For

          another  thing, Hidalgo,  understandably concerned  with her  own

          safety at the time the incident occurred, could give only limited

          testimony  as to what transpired,  and there was  a definite risk

          that the jury,  if uninformed of Luciano's  passing, would engage

          in  speculation as  to  why the  prosecution  did not  offer  his

          testimony at trial.   See, e.g., United States v.  Accetturo, 966
                                ___  ____  _____________     _________

          F.2d 631, 637 (11th Cir.  1992) (holding the fact of a  witness's

          death  admissible as  "relevant  to explain  the  fact that  [the

          witness]  did  not  testify"   and  to  prevent  the   jury  from

          speculating),  cert. denied,  113 S.  Ct.  1053 (1993);  see also
                         _____ ______                              ___ ____

          United  States v. Williams, 51  F.3d 1004, 1010  (11th Cir. 1995)
          ______________    ________

          (citing  Accetturo in admitting evidence of a victim's death in a
                   _________

          carjacking prosecution), petition for  cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 11,
                                   ________ ___  _____ _____

          1995) (No. 95-5555).

                    These   considerations,   taken   in   the   aggregate,

          underscore the  invulnerability of  the district  court's ruling.

          The evidence here did more than tend to show guilt on one element

          of  the offense;  it also  constituted a  crucial chapter  in the

          government's  narrative  account   of  appellant's   carjackings,

                                          11

          allowing  the  jury  to  put  matters  into  perspective.   Trial

          evidence is supposed to help  the jury reconstruct earlier events

          and  then  apportion  guilt  or  responsibility  as  the law  may

          require.   Rule  403 exists  to facilitate  this process,  not to

          impede  it.   We think  it follows  that, although  a "controlled

          environment for  the reception of  proof is essential,  . .  . an

          artificially  sterile  environment   is  neither  necessary   nor

          desirable."   Wagenmann  v. Adams,  829 F.2d  196, 217  (1st Cir.
                        _________     _____

          1987); see also  United States v.  McRae, 593 F.2d 700,  707 (5th
                 ___ ____  _____________     _____

          Cir.) ("Unless trials are to be conducted on scenarios, on unreal

          facts tailored and sanitized for the occasion, the application of

          Rule  403 must be  cautious and sparing.   Its major  function is

          limited  to excluding  matter  of scant  or cumulative  probative

          force,  dragged in by  the heels for the  sake of its prejudicial

          effect."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979).
                     _____ ______

                    When  a  trial  court  in  a  criminal  case  exercises

          discretion at first  hand, the  court of appeals  should go  very

          slowly  in interfering  with its  judgment calls.   The  need for

          caution  is magnified when, as  now, a challenged  ruling has the

          effect of vindicating the government's well-established "right to

          present  to the jury  a picture of  the events relied upon  . . .

          including  proof of  all  elements of  the  crime for  which  the

          defendant  has been brought to trial."  United States v. Tavares,
                                                  _____________    _______

          21  F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1994)  (en banc) (citation and internal

          quotation marks omitted).   Here, the  disputed evidence is  both

          picture and proof; though lurid, it is part of what old-fashioned

                                          12

          lawyers might call the  res gestae, and it is  directly probative
                                  ___ ______

          of an element of  the offense.  Consequently,  the court did  not

          err in admitting it.   After all, it is the rare case  in which a

          court  must require that the  story of the  crime be spoon-fed to

          jurors in bits and pieces from which every drop of juice has been

          drained.

                            B.  Denial of Mistrial Motion.
                            B.  Denial of Mistrial Motion.
                                _________________________

                    During  his  trial  testimony,  a  prosecution witness,

          homicide   detective   Lama-Canino,   blurted  out   that   Roman

          (appellant's  partner in crime) had entered a guilty plea.  Judge

          Laffitte immediately struck the statement, instructed  the jurors

          to  disregard it, and warned them not to ponder the codefendant's

          fate.    However,  the  court  refused  to  declare  a  mistrial.

          Appellant assigns error.

                    The trial  judge is best situated to make a battlefield

          assessment  of  the impact  that a  particular piece  of improper

          information may  have on a jury.   See United States  v. Lau, 828
                                             ___ _____________     ___

          F.2d  871, 874  (1st  Cir. 1987),  cert.  denied, 485  U.S.  1005
                                             _____  ______

          (1988).   For this reason,  we have long  recognized that motions

          for  mistrial are  committed to  the presider's  discretion, see,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., United States  v. De Jongh, 937 F.2d 1,  3 (1st Cir. 1991),
          ____  _____________     ________

          especially  when such a motion  is predicated on some spontaneous

          trial development  that can best be gauged in the ebb and flow of

          the  trial itself, see United States v.  Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 617
                             ___ _____________     ______

          (1st Cir.  1994),  cert. denied,  115  S. Ct.  919 (1995).    Our
                             _____ ______

          reluctance  to intervene is often reinforced by an awareness that

                                          13

          in most cases a firm, timely curative instruction will adequately

          quell  the  potential  for  prejudice.    See  United  States  v.
                                                    ___  ______________

          Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1161, 1184 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
          _________                                       _____ ______

          S.  Ct. 2714 (1994); United  States v. Ferreira,  821 F.2d 1, 5-6
                               ______________    ________

          (1st Cir. 1987).

                    Although  every  trial  is different,  and,  therefore,

          every  mistrial motion is sui generis, the assignment of error in
                                    ___ _______

          this case is  reminiscent of  that advanced in  United States  v.
                                                          _____________

          Bello-Perez,  977  F.2d   664  (1st  Cir.  1992).     There,  the
          ___________

          defendant's  paramour twice  blurted out  that the  defendant had

          suffered  a gunshot  wound  in an  event  unrelated to  the  drug

          trafficking conspiracy with  which he  was charged.   See id.  at
                                                                ___ ___

          672.    The  district   judge  gave  a  contemporaneous  curative

          instruction on each occasion, and refused to  declare a mistrial.

          We upheld the ruling.  See id.
                                 ___ ___

                    Here, as in Bello-Perez,  the trial court's handling of
                                ___________

          the witness's rash comment was well within the broad range of its

          discretion.   The  analogy operates  on at  least three  levels.2

          First, here, as in Bello-Perez, the offensive information, though
                             ___________

          unfit for  jury consumption,  was  not of  a kind  that might  be

                              
          ____________________

               2Appellant belatedly  attempts to distinguish the  two cases
          on the ground that here, unlike in Bello-Perez, 977  F.2d at 672,
                                             ___________
          the offending  witness   a police officer   acted in bad faith by
          deliberately  uttering  the improper  testimony.    At the  time,
          however,  appellant's  counsel expressed  his agreement  with the
          judge's  assessment  that the  witness  had  made a  spontaneous,
          accidental slip of the tongue.  That ends  the matter.  Arguments
          not raised in  the lower court  cannot be unfurled for  the first
          time on appeal.  See United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 (1st
                           ___ _____________    _____
          Cir. 1992).

                                          14

          thought irredeemably to  poison the  well.  The  fact that  Roman

          pleaded guilty  had no bearing  upon appellant's primary  line of

          defense    mistaken identity    and  had nothing  to do  with the

          government's  attempt to prove that  Rivera-Gomez was the man who

          accompanied Roman during the carjacking spree.

                    Second, the strength  of the government's  overall case

          is frequently a  cardinal factor  in evaluating the  denial of  a

          mistrial motion.  Here, as in Bello-Perez, the prosecution's case
                                        ___________

          was extremely  robust.   There is  a correspondingly  small risk,

          therefore, that Lama-Canino's wayward  remark could have been the

          straw  that broke  the dromedary's  back.   See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________

          Scelzo, 810 F.2d 2, 5 (1st Cir. 1987).
          ______

                    Third,  permitting  the   trial  to  proceed   is  more

          palatable because, as in Bello-Perez, the judge gave an immediate
                                   ___________

          curative instruction   a  device that we have regularly  endorsed

          as  a means of dispelling potential prejudice.  See United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v. Chamorro,  687 F.2d 1,  6 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  459 U.S.
             ________                               _____ ______

          1043 (1982).   We not only believe that the  language used by the

          court fit the occasion, but we  also take heed that appellant did

          not    then or now   suggest a more  felicitous phrasing.  At the

          expense  of carting  coal to  Newcastle, we  note, too,  that the

          judge, in  a commendable  abundance of caution,  again admonished

          the  jurors in his final instructions that appellant alone was on

          trial, and that Roman's  guilt or innocence was not a matter with

          which  they  should concern  themselves.   We are  confident that

          these instructions,  in combination, eliminated  any prospect  of

                                          15

          prejudice that  might otherwise  have flowed from  the gratuitous

          aside.

                    As  a  fallback  position,  appellant claims  that  the

          district court's instructions did  more harm than good, reminding

          the jury of  the substance of the improper observation.   In some

          respects,  of course, instructions cautioning jurors to disregard

          testimony  may often  appear  to turn  evidence  into a  form  of

          forbidden  fruit.  Every parent knows that admonitions to refrain

          sometimes  only emphasize the attraction.  Cf. Tom Jones & Harvey
                                                     ___

          Schmidt,  Never Say No (The  Fantastiks, 1960) ("My  son was once
                    ____________

          afraid  to  swim; the  water made  him wince.    Until I  said he

          mustn't swim; he's been  swimmin' ever since.").  But  jurors are

          not children, and our system of trial by jury is  premised on the

          assumption  that jurors  will  scrupulously  follow  the  court's

          instructions.  See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987);
                         ___ __________    _____

          Francis  v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1984); Sepulveda, 15
          _______     ________                                _________

          F.3d at  1185.  Here,  we have no  basis (apart  from appellant's

          self-interested  speculation) to  presume that  the evils  of the

          cure exceeded  those of  the  disease, and  we therefore  decline

          appellant's unsupported invitation to  surmise that the jury took

          the wrong message from the curative instruction.

                    To  recapitulate, given  the nature  of the  taint, the

          strength of  the  government's case,  and the  promptness of  the

          district court's  instructions, we are unprepared to say that the

          court misused its discretion in denying the mistrial motion.  See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v.  Sclamo,  578 F.2d  888,  891 (1st  Cir.  1978)
          ______________     ______

                                          16

          (upholding a denial of  mistrial after witness' improper comment,

          "in light of the strong case and substantial evidence produced by

          the  government, and in view  of the court's  cautionary words to

          the jury concerning stricken testimony").

                          C.  Imposition of a Life Sentence.
                          C.  Imposition of a Life Sentence.
                              _____________________________

                    In  his final  foray, appellant  takes aim at  the life

          sentence  imposed on  count 3.   Having  argued earlier  that the

          "death results" provision of the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C.

            2119  (3), is  not an  element of the  offense, see  supra Part
                                                            ___  _____

          II(A), appellant now  posits that the  life sentence he  received

          punishes him for a crime    Luciano's murder   with which  he was

          never  charged, and  that,  therefore, his  sentence offends  the

          Constitution.  We discern no constitutional infirmity.

                    Appellant's   argument   is   not    entirely   without

          foundation.  We agree  with him that subsection (3)  demarcates a

          sentence-enhancing  factor, and  does  not  establish a  separate

          offense  with an additional element.  After all, not every matter

          mentioned  in the text of a criminal statute comprises an element

          of the offense.

                    To be sure,  attempting to distinguish  between offense

          elements and sentence enhancers can sometimes be a daunting task.

          When  deciding  how a  particular  statutory  allusion should  be

          construed,  an  inquiring  court   must  mull  the  language  and

          structure of  the statute,  and, when necessary,  its legislative

          history.   See United  States v. Forbes, 16  F.3d 1294, 1298 (1st
                     ___ ______________    ______

          Cir.  1994); United  States v.  Ryan, 9 F.3d  660, 667  (8th Cir.
                       ______________     ____

                                          17

          1993), modified on other grounds, 41 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 1994) (en
                 _________________________

          banc), cert. denied,  115 S.  Ct. 1793 (1995);  United States  v.
                 _____ ______                             _____________

          Rumney, 867 F.2d 714,  717-19 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,  491 U.S.
          ______                                    _____ ______

          908  (1989); United States v.  Jackson, 824 F.2d  21, 23-24 (D.C.
                       _____________     _______

          Cir. 1987).

                    The structure of section 2119, the unexpurgated text of

          which  is quoted supra at p. 5,3 strongly indicates that Congress
                           _____

          intended its subsections to be sentence-enhancing factors and not

          elements  constituting separate  species of  carjacking offenses.

          The  initial paragraph  of the statute  establishes the  crime of

          carjacking.  That paragraph ends  with the word "shall," followed

          by  three subsections.   These  subsections are  not structurally

          independent   provisions  in  which  the  essential  elements  of

          carjacking   are  redefined   and  embellished   with  additional

          components.    Rather,  the  structure  is  integrated,  and  the

          statutory provisions form a seamless whole.

                    The first  subsection limns the base  sentence, and the

          following two subsections clear the way for enhanced sentences if

          either serious bodily injury or death results from the commission

          of the carjacking  offense.  Ripped from  their textual moorings,

          subsections (2) and (3) would be little more than gibberish; they

          are   incapable  of   "stand[ing]  alone,   independent  of   the

          [underlying]  offense."  Ryan, 9 F.3d at 667.  Consequently, this
                                   ____

          statutory structure  comprises persuasive evidence  that Congress

                              
          ____________________

               3The 1994 amendment, discussed supra note 1, does not affect
                                              _____
          our analysis of these subsections.

                                          18

          intended the  second and third subsections simply  to augment the

          sentences for  certain aggravated  carjackings, not  to establish

          additional  offenses  with independent  elements.   Accord United
                                                              ______ ______

          States  v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1995); Williams, 51
          ______     ______                                    ________

          F.3d at 1009.

                    Although this reading is the most natural and sensible,

          especially given the interdependence of the provisions, we go the

          extra  mile   and  venture  into  the   legislative  history  for

          confirmation of Congress's  intent.  The path  is plainly marked,

          see Oliver,  60 F.3d  at  553, and  we can  deduce  no reason  to
          ___ ______

          retrace its  contours.   The Eleventh  Circuit has  collected and

          canvassed  the  relevant   historical  materials,  examined  them

          perspicaciously, and  concluded that  the  background of  section

          2119 makes manifest that Congress intended subsection (3) to be a

          sentence  enhancer,  not  a separate  offense.    See  id.   This
                                                            ___  ___

          conclusion is unarguable, and we adopt it.

                    Having  concluded  that  18   U.S.C.     2119(3)  is  a

          sentence-enhancing factor, we next consider the constitutionality

          vel non of  appellant's life sentence  on count 3.   Viewed as  a
          ___ ___

          sentence-enhancing   factor,   subsection   (3)    represents   a

          congressional  judgment that  the punishment  for  committing the

          crime of carjacking should be harsher if the offense, as actually

          perpetrated,  includes  conduct that  produces  the  demise of  a

          victim.    In  this sense,  the  architecture  of  the carjacking

          statute bears a family  resemblance to the design of  the federal

          sentencing  guidelines, which  make  generous use  of "sentencing

                                          19

          enhancement  regimes  evincing  the judgment  that  a  particular

          offense  should  receive  a  more  serious  sentence  within  the

          authorized range if it  was either accompanied by or  preceded by

          additional criminal activity."   Witte v.  United States, 115  S.
                                           _____     _____________

          Ct.  2199, 2208  (1995).   For example,  under U.S.S.G.    1B1.3,

          "this  court  has repeatedly  upheld  the  inclusion as  relevant

          conduct of acts either  not charged or charged but  dropped," and

          authorized resort to that  conduct as a sentence-enhancing datum.

          United  States v.  Garcia,  954  F.2d  12,  15  (1st  Cir.  1992)
          ______________     ______

          (collecting cases).  By like token, a defendant convicted of drug

          trafficking  will find his sentence enhanced if it turns out that

          he  possessed a  dangerous  weapon during  the commission  of the

          crime,  see  U.S.S.G.  2D1.1(b)(1),  or  if a  victim  died under
                  ___

          circumstances that would constitute murder, see id.  2D1.1(d).
                                                      ___ ___

                    The  Supreme  Court  has  made it  pellucid  that  such

          sentencing enhancement schemes do  not constitute punishments for

          separate offenses:   "the  fact that the  sentencing process  has

          become more  transparent under the guidelines . . . does not mean

          that the defendant is now being `punished' for uncharged  conduct

          as though it were a distinct criminal `offense.'"  Witte,  115 S.
                                                             _____

          Ct.  at  2207;  see also  id.  at  2206-07  (explaining that  the
                          ___ ____  ___

          consideration  given  to  particular  aspects  of  character  and

          conduct  at sentencing "does  not result in  `punishment' for any

          offense  other   than  the  one   of  which  the   defendant  was

          convicted").  So it is here.  Appellant is not being punished for

          the  uncharged crime of murder, but, rather, he is being punished

                                          20

          more  severely for  the crime of  carjacking because  his conduct

          during the  commission of the crime led to the loss of a victim's

          life.

                    Of course, the burgeoning  use of sentence enhancers by

          Congress and the Sentencing Commission  as part of the  catechism

          of  punishment   poses  an   obvious  danger  that,   in  extreme

          circumstances, the  lagniappe might  begin to overwhelm  the main

          course.  In  all probability, there are constitutional  limits on

          the way sentencing factors can be deployed in the punishment of a

          substantive offense.  See id. at 2208; McMillan v.  Pennsylvania,
                                ___ ___          ________     ____________

          477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).  But that proposition is only of academic

          interest where, as here, the sentence enhancement scheme "neither

          alters  the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a

          separate offense calling for a separate penalty."   McMillan, 477
                                                              ________

          U.S. at 87-88.

                    In this case, under appellant's own reading of the law,

          Congress  has,  in  essence,  established   a  statutory  maximum

          sentence of  life  imprisonment for  carjacking,  and  authorized

          courts to levy such a sentence when a defendant's conduct results

          in  the victim's  death.  This  paradigm is  no different  in its

          legal effect than if Congress had  set a statutory range of up to

          life in prison, and  the sentencing guidelines, through a  web of

          enhancement  factors, had authorized a sentence of life only on a

          finding  by  the  sentencing court  that  the  crime  resulted in

                                          21

          death.4  In fine,  section 2119 establishes only one  offense and

          sets a range of punishment for that offense, varying according to

          conduct.     So   viewed,  the   sentencing  scheme   crosses  no

          constitutional boundaries.

          III.  CONCLUSION
          III.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need  go  no further.    From  aught  that appears,

          appellant  was  fairly  tried,  justly  convicted,  and  lawfully

          sentenced.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               4One might argue that  because a judge has no  discretion to
          impose a life sentence unless death results,   2119(c)(3) amounts
                                 ______
          to a  "rule" establishing  a separate,  uncharged offense.   This
          argument would  fail.  "Regardless of  whether particular conduct
          is taken  into account by  rule or as  an act of  discretion, the
          defendant is  still  being  punished  only  for  the  offense  of
          conviction."  Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2207.
                        _____

                                          22