Court Opinion

ID: 9562091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:21:26.077112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:12.388344
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
Because we are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court of *798Georgia, it is my opinion that we have no alternative but to reverse the judgment of conviction in this case and, therefore, I must respectfully dissent. Contrary to the majority, I can come to no conclusion other than that the confession of the appellant was obtained in a manner proscribed by the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), and that therefore the same was inadmissible. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court stated: “[Although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler, supra, at 372, 376 [99 SC 1755, 60 LE2d 286] the Court had strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ” Edwards v. Arizona, supra at 484. (Emphasis supplied.) The majority’s attempt to avoid applying thé clear mandate of Edwards by focusing semantically upon the utilization of “further interrogation” and “re-interrogation” so as to factually distinguish this case is clearly contrary to the spirit and letter of Edwards.
In holding that “under the circumstances of this case it would be totally incongruous to hold that the detectives violated defendant’s right to counsel by asking him in the elevator if he wanted to make a statement,” the majority cites as “Accord” cases, Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325 (2) (282 SE2d 629) (1981) and Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80 (1) (a) (287 SE2d 531) (1982). Both Cervi and Krier deal with the situation wherein the defendant was appointed counsel in another state and brought back to Georgia where he was clearly given Miranda warnings and waived his Miranda rights. Thus, these cases are distinguishable. It is noted that the majority cites only as a “Compare” case the post Edwards decision of our Supreme Court in Vaughn v. State, 248 Ga. 127 (281 SE2d 594) (1981). I believe that Vaughn is controlling Georgia authority demonstrating the applicability of the Edwards rule to the case at bar. As was held in Vaughn, it is clear to me that “ [t]here is no indication in the record in this case that appellant’s request for an attorney was either ambiguous or equivocal. Nor is there any indication in the record that *799appellant initiated the resumption of the interrogation. His written statement should, therefore, not have been admitted.” Vaughn v. State, supra, 131.
Subsequent to Edwards, the Supreme Court decided Oregon v. Bradshaw,-U. S.- (103 SC-, 77 LE2d 405) (1983) and attempted to clarify how the courts should apply Edwards. However, Bradshaw clearly involved a subsequent initiation of discussion by the defendant with the police officers. The sole question in Bradshaw was whether or not what the defendant said was sufficient to constitute the necessary “initiation” of a new dialogue with the authorities. In the instant case, White said nothing to the detectives and talked with them, and subsequently confessed, only after the detectives asked White if he wanted to make a statement.
It appearing that the confession found admissible by the trial court was obtained in violation of the rule laid down in Edwards and clarified in Bradshaw, it is my opinion that the judgment of conviction must be reversed. See also Mobley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 154, 156 (296 SE2d 617) (1982).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Shulman and Presiding Judge Quillian join in this dissent.