Court Opinion

ID: 9743366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:31:48.294636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:40.797852
License: Public Domain

RUCKER, Judge,
Concurring in part and Dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that Miller failed to demonstrate his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. However, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that the State failed to prove Miller confined Howell while armed with a handgun. As the majority points out "handgun" is defined as a "firearm." Ind.Code $ 85-47-1-6. "Firearm," in turn, is defined as "any weapon that is capable of or designed to or that may readily be converted to expel a projectile by means of an explosion." Ind. Code § 85-47-1-5. The evidence in this case demonstrates Miller's pellet gun is a handgun as defined by statute.
I first observe the majority takes issue with the trial court's tendered Instruction No. 6 which defines firearm in terms nearly identical to the statute. See Ind.Code § 35-47-1-5. According to the majority, a more technically accurate definition of firearm is found in Black's Law Dictionary which includes gunpowder as part of the definition. Op. at 754, n. 9. Even if we were to assume that Black's definition of firearm is technically accurate, both this court as well as the trial court are bound by the statutory definition. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue (1991), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1199, 1201 (where the General Assembly has defined a word, the court is bound by that definition even though it conflicts with the common meaning of the word); Ware v. State (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 20, 28, rek. denied (when the Legislature provides a definition for a word, courts are bound by it, regardless of other possible meanings attributable to the word). I find no fault with the trial court's tendered Instruction No. 6. The instruction is consistent with the statute and properly excludes gunpowder as a part of the definition for a firearm.
The question in this case therefore is whether the State presented sufficient evidence to the jury to show that the pellet gun, which Miller used to confine Howell, was either capable of or designed to expel a projectile by means of an explosion. When examining sufficiency claims our standard of review is well settled. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the *758credibility of witnesses. We examine only the evidence most favorable to the State along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction, it will not be set aside. Lite! v. State (1988), Ind., 527 N.E.2d 1114.
The majority sets forth the relevant testimony of Trooper Ooley concerning the operation of the pellet gun and concludes therefrom "[the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the pellet gun was not a firearm." Op. at 756. I disagree with the majority's assessment of the evidence. Indeed the State demonstrated through Trooper Ooley that the pellet gun did not fire by means of gunpowder. However, as discussed above, gunpowder is not a part of the statutory definition for firearm. Rather, the reasonable inference from the Trooper's testimony revealed the gun was at least designed to expel a projectile by means of an explosion.
Unlike "firearm" the term "explosion" is not defined by statute. Thus we are bound to apply its common and everyday meaning. Smithhart v. State (1992), Ind.App., 591 N.E.2d 149. One such common and everyday meaning of explosion is "[Tjo cause to burst noisily; to burst forth with sudden violence or noise from internal energy: as ... to burst violently as a result of pressure from within." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 488 (1984). Trooper Ooley testified the pellet gun is fired in the same fashion as a 9mm Beretta, by pulling the trigger. He also testified the pellet gun operates from gas pressure in the chamber of the gun.
Granted Trooper Ooley was not an expert on the internal operations of a look-alike 9mm Beretta. The jury however could reasonably infer from his testimony and from an examination of the weapon itself that a projectile, namely a pellet, could be expelled through the barrel of Miller's pellet gun by reason of an explosion, namely sudden violence from internal energy caused by the pressure from CO; gas.1 The evidence here is sufficient to sustain Miller's conviction of Criminal Confinement While Armed with a Handgun as a Class B felony. I would therefore affirm the judgment.

. As the majority points out in n. 12, carbon dioxide (CO;) is a non combustible gas. I have no quarrel with the majority on this point. See The Merck Index, An Encyclopedia of Chemicals, Drugs, and Biologicals 1814 (11th ed. 1989) (carbon dioxide does not burn or normally support combustion); See also Fundamentals of General, Organic, and Biological Chemistry, A-9 (1992) (defining combustion as a chemical reaction in which heat and often light are produced and usually refers to burning in the presence of oxygen). However, the fact that carbon dioxide may not be combustible does not resolve the question of whether it is involved in an explosion occurring in the chamber of a pellet gun. See, e.g., 3 McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology 206, 207 (1987) ("Carbon dioxide in a cartridge is used as the propellant in certain pistols"); Glover v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (defining the weapon in that case as a Crossman .177 caliber pellet pistol which, in ordinary operation, "is held in the hand and when fired expels a .177 caliber metal projectile by compressed gas"). Nor does contending, as does the majority, that the pellet is expelled by "physical force" resolve the question before us. We are here confronted with matters of terminology, definition, and statutory construction. The word "explosion" is not a term of art and because it is undefined by statute we are required to use its plain and ordinary meaning. The plain and ordinary meaning of the term, namely: "to burst forth with sudden violence or noise from internal energy" accommodates a variety of activity that might occur in the chamber of a pellet gun including physical force.
Further, nothing in this dissenting opinion should be construed to mean that a license is required to carry a pellet gun. Whether under the provisions of Ind.Code § 35-47-2-1 et seq., the Legislature so intended has never been addressed by this court and is not before this court today.