Court Opinion

ID: 9580319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:01.587585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:12.431790
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
concurring specially.
I do not concur in the holding that a collision with a component part of an automobile can never, as a matter of law, be a collision with a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Georgia uninsured motorist statute. Pursuant to the Georgia uninsured motorist statute, the plaintiff may recover uninsured motorist benefits in this case either by showing that she actually collided with an unknown vehicle or by providing a description of how the accident was caused by an unknown vehicle, which is corroborated by the testimony of an eyewitness. See OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (2). In this case, it is not necessary to *715conclude whether the plaintiff actually collided with an unknown vehicle when she collided with the tire and rim assembly lying in the roadway. Instead, the plaintiff/claimant alleges that the accident was caused by a rim and tire assembly and that her description of the accident is supported by three eyewitnesses. Thus, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not have actual physical impact with an unknown vehicle. She may recover under the corroborated description alternative of the uninsured motorist statute.
In this case, neither the claimant nor the eyewitnesses will be able to describe the existence of an unknown vehicle. Nevertheless, their description at least includes, by implication from the circumstances, the existence of an unknown vehicle. Cf. Hoffman v. Doe, 191 Ga. App. 319 (381 SE2d 546) (1989) (in which the claimant was not able to give a description of the accident which implied a phantom vehicle). The issue, then, is whether the existence of a phantom vehicle, under the particular circumstances of this case, may be supplied by circumstantial evidence and implication. I agree that pursuant to this court’s holding in J. C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 190 Ga. App. 727 (380 SE2d 282) (1989) the existence of a phantom vehicle may be established by the circumstances, opinion testimony and from “the jury’s common sense. . . .”
The defendant in this case is not entitled to summary judgment because it has not pierced the allegation that the accident was caused by an unknown vehicle. The defendant has presented no evidence of how the tire assembly came to be in the roadway, but merely stated that it could have arrived there by any means, including the intentional act of a miscreant. But this argument was rejected in Woodard, in which we concluded: “If appellant contends, as it obviously does, that the [component part of a vehicle] might have come from anywhere, then it must concede the possibility and, according to the witnesses, the likelihood, that it fell from a [vehicle] after being fastened insecurely.” Id. at 731. Here, the plaintiff has not yet offered any testimony or other evidence to support its allegation that the tire assembly came from a motor vehicle. But the party opposing a motion is under no duty to present evidence in opposition to the motion until the moving party has produced evidence demanding a judgment. Horton v. Wombles, 182 Ga. App. 214 (2) (355 SE2d 124) (1987); Peoples Bank &c. v. Austin, 159 Ga. App. 223 (2) (283 SE2d 81) (1987). Just as the trial evidence in Woodard did not demand a verdict that the component part which caused the accident had not originated from a motor vehicle, likewise in this case the record does not demand a judgment that the tire assembly did not originate from a motor vehicle, as the plaintiff alleges. A jury issue is presented concerning whether the tire assembly fell off a motor vehicle or came to be in the *716road by any other means.
Decided March 19, 1992
Reconsideration denied April 2, 1992
Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Bryant, Andrew J. Hill III, Gregory A. Daniels, for appellant.
Scott & Quarterman, Howard T. Scott, Donald T. Wells, Jr., for appellee.