Court Opinion

ID: 9782851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:24:31.891137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:15.329019
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the trial court properly denied Fletcher’s Criminal Rule 4(B) motion for discharge and therefore respectfully dissent.
The basis of my disagreement centers upon the Majority’s interpretation of Jenkins v. State, 809 N.E.2d 361 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, and its rejection of Jenkins to the extent that Jenkins provides authority for the trial court’s denial of Fletcher’s motion for discharge. The Majority indicates that certain language in our Supreme Court’s decision in Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828 (Ind.2000), as cited and discussed in Jenkins, “may suggest” that appointment of counsel, not counsel’s entry of an appearance, is the relevant time for purposes of determining whether a defendant may file a pro se motion for speedy trial. Op. at 929. I interpret Jenkins to hold that the Underwood language means precisely that, and I agree with Jenkins in this respect.
As explained in Jenkins, for purposes of a pro se Crim. R. 4(B) motion to dismiss, a defendant’s representation may take one of three forms: pro se, representation by counsel, and hybrid representation. A pro se defendant clearly may speak for himself or herself via a motion for speedy trial and therefore such a motion is valid. As to the latter two alternatives, the court noted that by failing to “clearly and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation” when the court appointed counsel to represent him, Jenkins acquiesced in counsel’s presentation of the defense. Jenkins v. State, 809 N.E.2d at 367. The court stated that a “clear and unequivocal” request for self-representation in this context would require an objection to the appointment of counsel by Jenkins. Id. The court held that, following the appointment of counsel, Jenkins would similarly be required to clearly and unequivocally indicate his wish to proceed via the third form, i.e., by hybrid representation, and that “filing ... pro se motions did not amount to a request to proceed with hybrid representation.” Id. at 368. Thus, the court concluded, because “Jenkins did not adequately assert his right to self-representation or desire to proceed with hybrid representation, he was entitled only to be heard through his attorney[.]” Id.
In the instant case, Fletcher did not clearly and unequivocally object, to the appointment of counsel and thus to proceed pro se. Neither did he clearly and unequivocally express a wish to proceed with hybrid representation. This leads inescapably to the conclusion that Fletcher acquiesced in representation by appointed counsel. To paraphrase the Jenkins court’s conclusion on this issue, because “counsel had been appointed before [Fletcher] filed ... his early trial motion[ ], the court was not required to accept the motion[] for filing”, much less grant it. Id. at 367. I would affirm the trial court in all respects.