Court Opinion

ID: 9572628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:43:21.233544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:41.234720
License: Public Domain

Bashara, P. J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from my Brother Cavanagh’s opinion.
In 1968 Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act1 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”), which imposed restrictions on the garnishment of earnings effective July 1, 1970. In substance the Act limits garnishments on compensa*372tion for personal services to the lesser of 25% of disposable income or the difference between thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage and the employee’s disposable income.2
The Michigan garnishment procedure allows a garnishee defendant to claim a setoff against the principal defendant. DCR 738.6 states that "[Except as to claims for unliquidated damages for wrongs or injuries, [the garnishee defendant] may claim any setoff of which the garnishee could have availed himself against the principal defendant if he had not been garnisheed * * * ”.
The issue is whether the garnishment limitation of the Act applies to a setoff taken by the garnishee defendant as repayment for a loan made to the principal defendant. The garnishee defendant argues that 75% of the principal defendant’s disposable earnings are exempt from garnishment under the Act, and that the garnishee defendant takes priority over the remainder pursuant to the setoff provision of DCR 738.6. The plaintiff argues that the Act only applies to garnishments and not to voluntary deductions from the principal defendant’s earnings in repayment of a loan to an employer.
The Act defines "garnishment” as "any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt”. 15 USCA 1672(c). The U.S. Court of Appeals in Western v Hodgson, 494 F2d 379, 382 (CA 4, 1974), interpreted this provision in determining whether wage assignments3 were cov*373ered by the Act. The Court stated:
"[I]t appears clear that by the term 'garnishment’ Congress contemplated some type of judicial transaction. Nothing in the legislative history of the statute is to the contrary. The purported wage assignments in the instant case, however, were brought about by neither legal or equitable procedure. They were negotiated between the parties and subsequently implemented according to their tenor without judicial intervention. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that these agreements are not 'garnishments’ within the meaning of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.” (Footnotes omitted.)
I also note that the arrangement between the garnishee defendant and principal defendant was not brought about by a legal or equitable procedure, but rather, was voluntarily negotiated between the parties.
The Secretary of Labor acting through the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor is given authority to enforce the provisions of the Act. Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, §306, 82 Stat 164 (1968), 15 USCA 1676. Pursuant to this authority opinions are issued by the Wage and Hour Division construing the Act. The opinions of the Wage and Hour Division indicate that the Act applies only to garnishments and similar transactions enforced by judicial proceeding and does not apply to voluntary private transactions such as wage assignments. See Opinion *374Letters of Wage-Hour Administrator, CCH Lab L Rep, Transfer Binder, March 1969-June 1973: ¶ 30,626, March 18, 1970; ¶ 30,641, May 18, 1970; ¶ 30,662, July 6, 1970; ¶ 30,684, August 25, 1970; ¶ 30,722, December 23, 1970. We recognize that these opinions are not binding upon our Court but they are entitled to be given consideration in arriving at our conclusion.4
Finally, the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress did not intend it to operate on voluntary private transactions, such as wage assignments. During debate on the Act in the House of Representatives, Congressman Whitener of North Carolina stated:
"I do not know whether it is an oversight or not-that there is nothing said about the assignment of wages procedures available in most States of the Union. The assignment of wages procedure are [sic] the ones that an unscrupulous businessman will be using * * * . I see nothing here that prevents an unscrupulous merchant [from] getting his customer to assign wages at the time he makes a purchase. That is not a garnishment procedure and would not be precluded by the bill.”5
I would hold that Congress never intended Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act to apply to a voluntary, loan agreement between an employer and an employee whereby the employer *375deducts a portion of the employee’s salary for repayment of a loan to the employee.
Since the Act does not apply to voluntary private transactions between the employee and the employer, the setoff provision of DCR 738.6 must be read in conjunction with the Act. The clear import of DCR 738.6 is that the garnishee defendant is entitled to a setoff before the plaintiff can reach the funds of the principal defendant in the possession of the garnishee defendant. See also Mary v Lewis, 57 Mich App 14; 225 NW2d 206 (1974), rev on other grounds, 394 Mich 443; 231 NW2d 648 (1975), reh granted 395 Mich 902 (1975). The garnishee defendant was entitled to setoff the amount he actually intended to deduct from the principal defendant’s earnings.6 As per the disclosure the garnishee defendant was permitted a setoff of 25% of the principal defendant’s disposable earnings of $163.58 which was computed on the disclosure as $40.89.
After setoff by the garnishee defendant the plaintiff was entitled to garnish 25% of the principal defendant’s disposable earnings of $163.58 which amounted to $40.90. The setoff of the garnishee defendant is not to be deducted in determining "disposable earnings” because it was not a deduction "required by law to be withheld”. 15 USCA 1672(b). The failure of the garnishee defend*376ant to withhold $40.90 from the principal defendant’s earnings results in liability of $40.90 to the plaintiff.
The principal defendant was then entitled to the remaining balance.
Though the majority opinion labels its interpretation of setoff as neither new nor novel, no precedent is cited to support the interpretation espoused. By applying general rules of construction the majority has in fact placed a new and novel interpretation on setoff as it relates to garnishment proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court long ago in North Chicago Rolling Mill Co v St. Louis Ore & Steel Co, 152 US 596; 14 S Ct 710; 38 L Ed 565 (1894), construed setoff to mean that the garnishee defendant takes its setoff against the principal defendant. This is the. overwhelming majority view. See cases cited in 38 CJS, Garnishment, § 203, p 439, and 6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment and Garnishment, § 372, p 820. Moreover, the majority’s interpretation flies in the face of DCR 738.6 which provides that the setoff is to be taken against the principal defendant.
The majority at footnote 6 states: "Garnishees should not join with debtors in raising garnishee deductions solely to thwart garnishing creditors. Such deductions may be fraudulent.” I fail to see how a garnishee defendant, who has a legitimate claim against the principal defendant and priority under DCR 738.6 over the garnishor, is committing a fraud by raising his setoff to 25% of disposable income when a writ of garnishment is served, as long as the garnishee defendant deducts that amount and there has been no prior specific agreement to deduct less. The result is to allow an employer, who is periodically deducting less than *37725% of an employee’s disposable income in repayment of a loan, to defeat the rights of judgment creditors indefinitely by increasing the deduction to 25% of disposable income when writs of garnishment are served. This is patently inequitable.
I would reverse both the circuit court and the district court and enter judgment in accordance with this opinion.

 "§ 1672.
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(a) The term 'earnings’ means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.
(b) The term 'disposable earnings’- means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required bylaw to be withheld.
(c) The term 'garnishment’ means any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt. "(Emphasis supplied.) "§ 1673.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 206(a)(1) of Title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable,
whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2).” Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 302 & 303, 82 Stat 163 (1968), 15 USCA 1672 & 1673.

 At the time of the garnishment in 1971 the Federal minimum wage was $1.60 per hour. See Title III of Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended September 23, 1966, § 301, 80 Stat 838; 29 USCA 206. Thirty times $1.60 is $48. The difference between the principal defendant’s disposable earnings of $163.58 and $48 is $115.58. This is more than 25% of $163.58 which is $40.89. Therefore, the 25% limitation is used.

 A "wage assignment” is generally defined as a "private arrange*373ment under which the debtor, without compulsion of law, transfers his right to receive part or all of his future wages to a third person to pay an antecedent debt or.to induce the extension of credit”. Hawk-land, Federal Restrictions on Garnishments of Earnings; Herein of Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 75 Com L J 213, 216 (1970). I recognize that the facts in our case do not present a true wage assignment. However, the facts are sufficiently analogous with a wage assignment to aid us in the interpretation of the scope of Title IH of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.

 The effect to be given to opinions of the Wage-Hour Administrator was outlined in Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 140; 65 S Ct 161; 89 L Ed 124 (1944). "We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.

 114 Cong. Rec. 1837 (1968).

 There is no prohibition against an employer deducting from an employee’s earnings the amount of any indebtedness owed by the employee to employer. MCLA 408.521; MSA 17.271. Nor is there any statutory limitation on the amount the employer can setoff to satisfy the obligation. However, I believe the employer will be constrained to exercise restraint in invoking his right to setoff. If an employee is faced with a 25% setoff against disposable earnings to satisfy a debt owed an employer and a 25% garnishment against disposable earnings, he may no longer believe that it is profitable to keep working. The employer in this situation must exercise restraint in setoff or the employee will resign and the employer may well lose any opportunity that he had for repayment of the loan.