Court Opinion

ID: 9565474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:22:00.279487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:41.500045
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion, but write separately to express my views regarding the constitutionality of OCGA § 51-12-1 (b).
*47The majority opinion correctly points out that, historically, not only has evidence of collateral sources been determined to be irrelevant, see generally French Management Co. v. Long, 169 Ga. App. 702 (2) (314 SE2d 666) (1984), evidence of collateral sources has been recognized as creating a “substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.” Eichel v. New York Central R. Co., 375 U. S. 253, 255 (84 SC 316, 11 LE2d 307) (1963). As such, a statute authorizing the admission in evidence of collateral sources should be carefully scrutinized by the courts. At a minimum, such a statute must be drawn with great precision in order to ensure that the prejudices inherent in admitting evidence of collateral sources are limited and that the due process pitfalls are avoided. OCGA § 51-12-1 (b) fails to accomplish either of these goals.
A statute is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violates due process, if “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 250 Ga. 709, 712 (300 SE2d 673) (1983). This court has held that “an act of the General Assembly which is afflicted with such an infirmity is unenforceable and therefore void.” City of Atlanta v. Southern R. Co., 213 Ga. 736, 738 (101 SE2d 707) (1958).
“A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to . . . juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 (92 SC 2294, 33 LE2d 222) (1972). The vagueness doctrine “requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for . . . triers of fact” to apply to statutes. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 572-573 (94 SC 1242, 39 LE2d 605) (1974). OCGA § 51-12-1 (b) not only fails to establish any means of calculating the measure of damages in a given case, it also provides no clear guidelines to assist the trier of fact in determining for what purposes evidence of collateral sources should be considered. As such, the statute is too vague to be enforced and is, therefore, unconstitutional under the due process clauses of the Georgia and United States constitutions.
I would also note that the language of the statute authorizing the admission in evidence of “all . . . wage loss replacement, income replacement ... or payments available to the injured party from any and all . . . private sources . . .” is unconstitutionally vague. What does this language mean? What does it include? Is it expansive enough to allow a trier of fact to consider evidence of gifts, financial assistance from a family member or religious or charitable organization, alimony, child support, gambling and lottery winnings, trust funds, tax refunds, stock dividends, and countless other arbitrary sources of funds? In painting with such a broad brush, the General Assembly has left us with a statute which is entirely too vague. This *48is particularly true when one considers that the statute provides for the admissibility of evidence that is otherwise irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in the action and fails to provide the trier of fact any guidelines as to how these facts may be considered or applied in its deliberations.
Decided March 15, 1991 —
Reconsideration denied March 27, 1991.
Bennett & Hamilton, Lindsay H. Bennett, Jr., Hubert E. Hamilton III, for appellant (case no. S90A1101).
Jones, Cork & Miller, H. Jerome Strickland, H. J. Strickland, Jr., for appellant (case no. S90A1245).
Dickens, Mangum, Burns & Moore, G. Lee Dickins, Jr., Middleton & Anderson, Eugene Brooks, Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semlar & Stair, Thomas S. Carlock, D. Gary Lovell, Jr., Davis, Gregory & Christy, Hardy Gregory, Jr., Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Richard L. Greene, for appellee.
I have examined statutes from other states which have modified the common law collateral source rule. None of these statutes leaves the damage award entirely to the subjective determination of the trier of fact, as does OCGA § 51-12-1 (b). These other statutes specifically limit the evidence of collateral benefits which may be introduced, and/or provide guidelines for the trier of fact to apply in considering evidence of collateral benefits.6
Therefore, I conclude that while a statute could be drafted which would avoid the due process problems associated with vagueness, this statute falls far short of doing so. For these reasons, I find OCGA § 51-12-1 (b) to be unenforceable and void.
I am authorized to state that Judge Thomas Pope joins in this special concurrence.
*49Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, Dow N. Kirkpatrick, Harmon, Owen, Saunders & Sweeney, David C. Will, H. Andrew Owen, Dennis, Corry, Porter & Thornton, R. Clay Porter, Craig P. Siegenthaler, amici curiae.

 See, e.g., Arizona, A.R.S. § 12-565 (allows only evidence of payments or benefits which result from the plaintiff’s injury); California, Civil Code § 3333.1 (evidence of collateral benefits is limited to benefits received from Social Security, disability, health or accident insurance); Connecticut, Gen. Stat. § 52-225 (requires the trial court to reduce the amount of a jury award where evidence of specific enumerated collateral benefits is introduced); Florida, Fla. Stat. § 627.7372 (provides for the trial court to instruct the jury to deduct collateral source benefits from the verdict in tort cases arising out of the operation of motor vehicles); Illinois, 111. Rev. Stat. § 2-1205 (provides for reducing the judgment in a medical malpractice case by enumerated percentages where evidence of specified collateral benefits is admitted); Indiana, Ind. Code § 34-4-36-2 (provides for the admission of certain collateral source payments and specifically excludes others); Iowa Code § 668.14 (allows evidence of collateral benefits relating to economic losses resulting from the tort except to the extent payments are pursuant to a state or federal program or are assets of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s family); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (limits collateral sources to payments related to the injury or disability in question).