Court Opinion

ID: 9891437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 16:08:51.215409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:21.321241
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41214

BOYAPATI C. REDDY

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

B. LOURDAMMA REDDY,

       Plaintiff,

v.

NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

       Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
Casey Fitch, District Court Judge

Boyapati C. Reddy
El Paso, TX

Pro Se Appellant

Raul A. Carrillo, Jr.
Las Cruces, NM

for Appellee

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1}   Plaintiff appealed following the denial of his request for an award of litigation
expenses. We previously issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing
to affirm. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we
remain unpersuaded. We therefore affirm.

{2}     The relevant background information and legal principles have previously been
set forth. We will avoid undue reiteration here, and focus instead on the content of the
memorandum in opposition.

{3}      Plaintiff continues to assert that he is entitled to an award under the plain
language of NMSA 1978, Section 42A-1-25 (1981). [MIO 1-3] His argument narrowly
focuses on the cited subsections, without duly recognizing or applying the broader
statutory framework. “Statutory provisions must be interpreted in context, [and] as a
whole.” Moongate Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 2014-NMCA-075, ¶ 13, 329 P.3d
727. As we explained in Moongate, the relevant statutory provisions make clear that
litigation expenses are awarded to condemnees when condemnation actions conclude
adversely to the condemnor. Id. That did not transpire in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff
was not entitled to an award.

{4}     Plaintiff continues to argue that the case of Landavazo v. Sanchez, 1990-NMSC-
114, 111 N.M. 137, 802 P.2d 1283, supports his position. [MIO 2, 3] However, as we
previously observed, Landavazo reflects our Supreme Court’s determination that
Section 42A-1-25 permits awards of attorney fees to successful inverse condemnation
plaintiffs. See Moongate, 2014-NMCA-075, ¶ 17 (citing Landavazo, 1990-NMSC-114, ¶
26-30). Again, that is not the situation presented in this case.

{5}     The memorandum in opposition entirely fails to acknowledge or address
Moongate. We therefore adhere to our initial assessment of this matter, and reject
Plaintiff’s assertion of error.

{6}    Finally, we understand Plaintiff to contend that a different result should be
reached because his underlying claim was meritorious. [MIO 2] However, that claim was
dismissed as a consequence of Plaintiff’s own litigation misconduct, and that disposition
was subsequently affirmed on appeal. We will not entertain Plaintiff’s arguments relative
to the merits under the circumstances. See generally State ex rel. King v. UU Bar
Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 2009-NMSC-010, ¶¶ 19, 145 N.M. 769, 205 P.3d 816 (“We
have long held that a decision by an appeals court on an issue of law made in one
stage of a lawsuit becomes binding on subsequent trial courts as well as subsequent
appeals courts during the course of that litigation.”).

{7}    Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and
herein, we affirm.

{8}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge