Court Opinion

ID: 9634927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:29:18.354596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:04.496196
License: Public Domain

*333
Orth, J,

dissenting:

At the time of the arrest of Wade Iglehart Johnson (appellant), Maryland District Rule 709 a, now M.D.R. 723 a,1 provided:
“A defendant shall be taken before a conveniently available judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier of (1) twenty-four hours after arrest or (2) the first session of court after the defendant’s arrest upon a warrant, or, where an arrest has been made without a warrant, the first session of court after the charging of the defendant. Such charging shall take place promptly after arrest.”
A majority of this Court holds today:
“[A]ny statement, voluntary or otherwise, obtained from an arrestee during a period of unnecessary delay in producing him before a judicial officer, thereby violating M.D.R. 723 a, is subject to exclusion when offered into evidence against the defendant as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. A statement is automatically excludible if, at the time it was obtained from the defendant, he had not been produced before a commissioner for his initial appearance within the earlier of 24 hours after arrest or the first session of court following arrest, *334irrespective of the reason for the delay. Where, however, the delay in presentment falls within the outer limits established by M.D.R. 723 a, it is incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether the State has met its burden of showing that the delay was necessary under the circumstances of the particular case.”
I am in complete disagreement with this holding.
I
We have long recognized the common law duty of police officers “to convey the prisoner in a reasonable time and without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate____” Kirk & Son v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 407, 35 A. 1089 (1896); Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 265, 26 A. 286 (1893). We have never held, however, that a violation of the duty, in itself, was sufficient to exclude from evidence any statement, voluntary or otherwise, obtained by the police.
When the Municipal Court of Baltimore City was created in 1961, the legislature provided: “Whenever any person shall be arrested in the City of Baltimore upon any criminal charge ... it shall be the duty of the police officer or constable making such arrest, or in whose custody the person arrested may be, to take such person before a judge of the criminal division of the Municipal Court of Baltimore City____” Code (1957, 1966 Repl. Vol.) Art. 26, § 115 (repealed 1972).2 We discussed § 115 in Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 431-432, 209 A. 2d 595 (1965). We rejected the argument that the statute required that an arrestee be taken before one of the judges of the Municipal Court immediately after his arrest. We observed: “No time limit is set in the Section as to when it is compulsory that an arrested person be taken before one of *335the judges; and no mention is made to the effect that a failure to take such a person before one of the judges by a specified time shall render a voluntary confession inadmissible. Had the Legislature so intended, it would havé been a very simple task to manifest such intention.” Id at 432. We held: “[T]he failure to take the [arrestee] before a judge of the Municipal Court prior to Ms confession did not render them inadmissible.” Id. at 432. See Metallo v. State, 10 Md. App. 76, 79-80, 267 A. 2d 804, cert. denied, 259 Md. 734 (1970) in which the Court of Special Appeals pointed out that the statute provided no sanctions for failure to comply with its provisions. The court in Blackburn v. Copinger, 300 F. Supp. 1127, 1140-1142 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 421 F. 2d 602, cert. denied, 399 U. S. 910 (1970), declared that the statute clearly did not permit the police to interrogate a suspect against whom they may have no evidence of any legal force for an indeterminate period of time. It said: “If Blackburn were a federal prisoner, the violation by the police of their duty to bring him before a judicial officer would by itself result in the inadmissibility of his confession. This per se rule has not been held to apply to criminal prosecutions in state courts. But in assessing whether Blackburn’s confession was voluntary, his detention contrary to the explicit law of Maryland is an important factor.” Id. at 1142.
Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) Art. 52, § 97 (h) (repealed in 1972), applicable to Montgomery County, provided inter alia: “Each arrested person shall be taken before such committing magistrate3 immediately following arrest without delay.” In Murphy v. State, 8 Md. App. 430, 260 A. 2d 357 (1970) the Court of Special Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge Murphy, now Chief Judge of this Court, characterized a challenge to a statement obtained in violation of the statute as not one in the constitutional sense, but rather one “through application of a non-constitutional exclusionary rule of evidence similar to that fashioned by the Supreme Court in Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 [, 77 S. Ct. *3361356 (1957)], i.e., that the sanction to be applied for failure of the police to immediately bring an arrested person before a committing magistrate ... was exclusion of any post-arrest statements made from evidence.” Id. at 436. The intermediate court held that the trial judge properly overruled this ground of objection to the admissibility of the statement. In Jackson v. State, 8 Md. App. 260, 269, 259 A. 2d 587 (1969), cert. denied, 257 Md. 734 (1970), the Court of Special Appeals said by way of dicta that as the statute failed to provide any sanctions for non-compliance, the intent of the legislature was not to embrace the sanctions applied by the Supreme Court in Mallory which were not controlling as to prosecution in the state courts. See Cox v. State, 192 Md. 525, 536, 64 A. 2d 732 (1949).
Public Local Laws of Baltimore City formerly made it the duty of a police officer or constable making an arrest or having custody of a person arrested to take the arrestee before a Justice of the Peace. Baltimore City Code of Pub. Loe. L. (1938) Art. 4, § 742. Section 916 of the article required that “[a]ll persons arrested in the daytime under the provisions of this sub-division of this Article shall be taken by the officer making the arrest immediately before the nearest Police Justice for examination, except that all females and male children under fourteen years of age who may be arrested or taken into custody shall be taken before the nearest Police Justice for examination when there shall be matrons at the stationhouse as hereinafter provided.” 4 In Grear v. State, 194 Md. 335, 71 A. 2d 24 (1950) Grear was arrested in Baltimore City and held, without being taken before a magistrate, although one was available, from nine o’clock Sunday morning until four o’clock Monday afternoon, and a confession was obtained from him while he was so held. Grear contended that he was unlawfully held in violation of the local laws and that his confession was therefore inadmissible. We saw no material difference, in the circumstances, between § 742 and § 916. The Court believed *337that “[o]ne reason, if not the only reason [why Grear was not immediately taken before a magistrate] was the desire to get a confession first.” Id. at 348. It recognized that “[l]ack of sufficient evidence to hold [an arrestee] could not be a valid or pertinent reason. Lack of evidence to hold him lawfully manifestly could not justify holding him unlawfully.” Id. at 348. It made clear, however, that it did not mean to suggest “that in any case a duty to take a person arrested immediately before a magistrate for examination implies a right to be immediately discharged unless the State then and there produces testimony which would be sufficient to hold the prisoner after a full preliminary hearing or a full hearing on habeas corpus.” Id. at 348-349. The Court found that Cox v. State, 192 Md. 525, 64 A. 2d 732 (1949) and James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 65 A. 2d 888 (1949) were dispositive:
“In the Cox case (followed in the James case) we held that the fact that evidence has been obtained unlawfully does not necessarily make it inadmissible, and that unless the facts show that the illegal arrest in itself constituted such duress as to make the confession involuntary, the same rule as to admissibility of the confession is applicable as where the arrest is legal.” Id. at 349.5
It held that the test for the admissiblity of the confession was whether it was voluntarily given in the circumstances and was “the product of the suction process of interrogation” as to be “the reverse of voluntary.” Id. at 349-351. See Edwards v. State, 194 Md. 387, 391-393, 71 A. 2d 487 (1950). In White v. State, 201 Md. 489, 94 A. 2d 447 (1953), it was claimed that White had been held for such a length of time before being taken before the magistrate as to make his confession involuntary and to affront his constitutional rights. Hammond, J., speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
“This contention has been so recently made and so fully answered in James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 65 A. *3382d 888; Grear v. State, 194 Md. 335, 71 A. 2d 24; and Edwards v. State, 194 Md. 387, 71 A. 2d 487, in exhaustive and penetrating analyses of the law and the cases that we do not feel it is necessary, desirable, or appropriate to refish these waters. Suffice it to say that a very careful consideration of all of the circumstances of this case, both as to the manner in which the confession was obtained and the length of time during which the accused was held, leads us to believe that there is less possibility of injury to, or deprivation of, his constitutional rights than in the similar cases just cited.” Id. at 493.
It is manifest that this Court consistently adhered to the view that a violation, of the duty to take an arrestee immediately before a magistrate whether imposed by the common law or by statute did not perse render a confession inadmissible, its admissibility being determined under the voluntariness standard.
II
Upon the creation of the District Court of Maryland in 1971, this Court adopted rules for its governance. It was then, through M.D.R. 709, effective 5 July 1971, that, over and above the common law duty, the right to speedy production before a judicial officer was secured to arrestees on a uniform statewide basis. “As originally proposed, the rule would have directly tracked the provisions of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which as construed constitutes the so-called Mallory Rule. The language of the first sentence of M.D.R. 709 (a) following ‘without unnecessary delay’ was added to supply an interpretive gloss following vigorous objection to the earlier draft by Police Commissioner Pomerleau of Baltimore City and by the State’s Attorneys’ Association.” 2 G. Liebmann, Maryland District Court Law and Practice (hereinafter referred to as Liebmann) § 941, at 142 (1976).6 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449, 77 S. *339Ct. 1356 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943).
The majority holds that the prompt presentment requirement of M.D.R. 723 a is mandatory. I am in accord with that holding, but not with all the reasons advanced to support it. I think that the express terms of the rule itself, declaring in unequivocal language that a “defendant shall be taken ... without unnecessary delay” to a judicial officer following arrest is sufficient in itself to denote an imperative obligation inconsistent with the exercise of discretion. Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-565, 369 A. 2d 1011 (1977); Bright v. Unsat. C. & J. Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169, 338 A. 2d 248 (1975). I see no need to go further. The alternative reason presented by the majority suggests, at the least, constitutional overtones which were not intended by this Court in adopting the rule. It is true that the rule provides procedures whereby a person taken into custody is afforded the opportunity to be informed of and receive the benefit of certain rights, for example, advice as to the charges, right to counsel and preliminary hearing, and determinations with respect, to pretrial release and probable cause. But the rule, like its counterpart in the federal system, is not derived from the federal or state constitutions beyond being the product of the exercise of the Court’s supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. at 341, Cox v. State, 192 Md. at 536.
Ill
Accepting that the rule is mandatory, it does not follow that a violation of it automatically operates to exclude a statement *340voluntarily obtained. Had we so intended, an intention incidentally which would have been contrary to our prior decisions, it would have been a very simple task to manifest such intention. But the rule we adopted provides no sanctions for its violation.
The per se exclusionary rule adopted by the majority bestows full constitutional import to the right of an arrestee to be promptly taken before a judicial officer. It makes the right the equivalent of the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination. But the rule itself, regardless of the purpose it serves, lacks the constitutional basis which emerged from the Fourth Amendment’s ban against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment’s ban against self-incrimination which justified the exclusionary rule for a violation of them. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
The per se exclusionary rule today adopted by this Court, is, as the majority observes, contrary to decisions of “the vast majority of state courts” and the present trend of federal courts, see footnote 5 of the majority opinion. As we have seen, it departs from the prior decisions of this Court relating to the issue. Moreover Liebmann, § 941, at 142, cautions:
“The partial tracking of the language of the federal rule and the grounds urged for [the] modification [of M.D.R. 709 a] should not be taken as implying that a statement obtained by police during a period of delay not authorized by the rule would be excludable even though it otherwise meets Miranda standards since this possibility was not discussed when the rule was drawn.”
If the possibility was discussed when the rule was recently revised, no resolution of the issue is reflected in M.D.R. 723 a as adopted.
The primary function of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of future police misconduct,. United States v. *341Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 446, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).7 That function is ill served here. In my opinion, to exclude a voluntary confession from evidence merely because a police officer has presented an arrestee before a judicial officer a fraction of a second too late under the mandate of the rule, no matter what the reason, debases the judicial process. It is so patently against the interest of the general public and the sensible administration of criminal justice that I am not the least bit persuaded otherwise by the arguments advanced by the majority. “There is no war between the Constitution and common sense,” Mapp, 367 U. S. at 657, but the adoption of a perse exclusionary rule as the sanction for violation of Rule 723 a certainly does not recognize this.
I cannot dispute the majority’s belief that “the protection of the right of an accused to prompt production before a judicial officer following arrest will be most effectively accomplished by a per se exclusionary rule.” But the most effective protection of a non-constitutional right of an accused is not the sole goal of criminal justice. There is also to be considered the protection of the right of society to have a person who has committed offenses against it answer for his acts according to the law of the land. The public good is not always enhanced by punishing the police for a procedural deficiency. In United States v. Ceccolini, U. S., 98, S. Ct. 1054, decided 21 March 1978 [67 L.W. 4229, 4232, 21 March 1978], the Supreme Court of the United States expressly reaffirmed an observation it made a half a century ago:
“ ‘A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers have not played according to rule.’ McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927).”
In short, I would not adopt a rule which requires that we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and *342award a new trial for no other reason than that the police were 45 minutes late in presenting Johnson before a judicial officer.
Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Smith authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.

. As the majority opinion points out in its note 1, effective 1 July 1977, chapter 700 of the Maryland District Rules underwent extensive revision, but only slight changes were made in former M.D.R. 709 a. It was redesignated as M.D.R. 723 a, and now reads:
“A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier of (1) 24 hours after arrest or (2) the first session of court after the defendant’s arrest upon a warrant or, where an arrest has been made without a warrant, the first session of court after the charging document is filed. A charging document shall be filed promptly after arrest if not already filed.”
The majority opinion noted that for the sake of clarity, all references to the Maryland District Rules are to the version currently in effect, unless otherwise indicated. The same procedure is followed in this dissenting opinion.

. Acts 1961, ch. 616, which enacted the law codified as Art. 26, § 115, of which the above provision was a part, at the same time repealed § 428 of the Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1949) as amended by ch. 458, Acts 1951. The former law was in substance the same as § 115 except that the arrestee was to be taken before a justice of the peace. Gerstein v. State, 10 Md. App. 322, 327, 270 A. 2d 331 (1970), cert. denied, 260 Md. 720, cert. denied, 402 U. S. 1009 (1971).

. A committing magistrate under the Section was an employee of the People’s Court for Montgomery County appointed by the county executive with the advice and consent of the chief judge of the People’s Court for Montgomery County and designated as a committing magistrate.

. Baltimore City Code of Pub. Loe. L. (1938) Art. 4, § 742 and § 916 appeared in Baltimore City Code Pub! Loe. L. (1949) as Art. 4, § 428 and § 565 respectively. Section 428 was repealed by Acts 1961, ch. 616 and § 565 was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 203.

. For the present status of the law, see Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 337 A. 2d 100 (1975); Ryon v. State, 29 Md. App. 62, 349 A. 2d 393 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 302, 363 A. 2d 243 (1976).

. The majority suggest on the authority oiLiebmann, that “[i]n response to comments from state and local law enforcement officials ... the proposed rule was modified to incorporate a presumption of illegality, which applies *339whenever an arrestee is detained by police beyond 24 hours or the first session of court following arrest without having been taken to a judicial officer.” I do not interpret Liebmann as saying that. It seems to me that there is a significant distinction between a modification “to supply an interpretive gloss” and a modification “to incorporate a presumption of illegality.” It appeared to Liebmann, however, that the modification of the rule, by implicitly defining permissible delay, in any event, repudiated the cases under Federal Rule 5 (a) excluding statements obtained during periods of delay resulting from unavailability of a magistrate. Liebmann, § 941, at 142-143. LAebmann notes, n. 3, at 143: “Thus it would be inappropriate for the Maryland courts to follow eases such as United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78 (C.A.2d, 1965) and Coleman v. United States, 114 U.S. App. D. C. 185, 313 F.2d 576 (1962).”

. The majority point out that the exclusionary rule has received sharp criticism from some quarters, including the Chief Justice of the United States. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 416, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).