Court Opinion

ID: 9745434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:56:32.370722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.712872
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Royse, J.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion that if the contract was reformed as sought by the *255appellants in their complaint it would not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. I believe the majority opinion herein is in direct conflict with, and in effect overrules, the case of Ames v. Ames (1910), 46 Ind. App. 597, 91 N. E. 509. The contract in that case was as follows:
“October 11, 1906.
This contract between Lydia Ellen Ames and Charlotte B. Ames.
Lydia Ellen Ames sells to Charlotte B. Ames, all of her interest in the real estate formerly owned by Augustus Ames, deceased, for $3,000.”
Speaking through Judge Hadley, this court in that case (pp. 600-601) said:
“It is insisted, under various exceptions, that the contract set out is insufficient to support a decree for specific performance, for the reason that the description of the land sold is too indefinite and uncertain. It is well established that where the description given is consistent, but incomplete, and its completion does not require the contradiction or alteration of that given, nor that a new description should be introduced, parol evidence may be received to complete the description and identify the property. Tewksbury v. Howard (1894), 138 Ind. 103; Maris v. Masters (1903), 31 Ind. App. 235; Warner v. Marshall (1906), 166 Ind. 88; Howard v. Adkins (1906), 167 Ind. 184.
“It is also settled that parol evidence is competent to apply the terms of a contract to the subject-matter. Colerick v. Hooper (1852), 3 Ind. 316, 56 Am. Dec. 505; Tewksbury v. Howard, supra; Warner v. Marshall, supra, and cases cited.
“It is not the office of a description to identify land, but to furnish the means of identification. Warner v. Marshall, supra, and cases cited.
“An indefiniteness or ambiguity that may be certain or clear by such explanatory evidence as is admissible under the rules of evidence, is not to be treated as vitiating the instrument. Warner *256v. Marshall, supra. In such case, while the written contract may not be varied or contradicted by parol evidence, such evidence may be admitted to explain its obscure passages; not for the purpose of changing the contract, but of developing the true sense and intention of the parties. Warner v. Marshall, supra.
“The restrictions of this proposition are illustrated by the following quotation from observations of Mr. Justice Holmes, set out with approval in Warner v. Marshall, supra: “I do not suppose that you could prove, for purposes of construction as distinguished from avoidance, an oral declaration or even an agreement that words in a dis-positive instrument making sense as they stand should have a different meaning from the common one; for instance, that the parties to a contract orally agreed that when they wrote 500 feet it should mean 100 inches, or that Bunker Hill Monument should signify Old South Church.” (My emphasis)
On pages 601 and 602 are listed a large number of ■descriptions contained in written memorandum (many of which are much less definite than would be the contract herein if reformed) which were held sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute.
The rule announced in that case has been followed by both this court and the Supreme Court. Taylor v. Taylor et al. (1910), 174 Ind. 670, 679, 680, 93 N. E. 9; Dowd v. Andrews et al. (1922), 77 Ind. App. 627, 632, 134 N. E. 294; Luther v. Bash et al. (1916), 61 Ind. App. 535, 542, 112 N. E. 110; Morton v. Gaffield (1912), 51 Ind. App. 28, 32, 33, 98 N. E. 1007.
It is to be kept in mind that this appeal questions the action of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer to appellants’ complaint. I am of the opinion the complaint states a cause of action for reformation of the contract of the parties and if, on the trial of the cause, those allegations were proved, then if the appellants *257could, by proper explanatory evidence which did not alter or change the written memorandum, identify the land, they would be entitled to a specific performance of the contract. I cannot agree with the majority that it necessarily follows from the allegations of the complaint that “there was no garage or driveway in existence” at the time of the agreement. However, even if this be true, it does not necessarily follow that at .the time of the agreement the actual location of the garage and driveway was not determined. Under such circumstances the west boundary might be established by parol or other evidence. In my opinion appellants should have the opportunity to prove their case.
I believe the judgment should be reversed.
Note. — Reported in 116 N. E. 2d 642.