Court Opinion

ID: 9950928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 06:05:47.339396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:29.564295
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      March 14, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 364032
                                                                      Kalamazoo Circuit Court
CLINT DARRELL WILLIAMS,                                               LC No. 2022-000308-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals by right his jury convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; and
unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve concurrent terms of 24 to 40 years’ imprisonment for
armed robbery and 12 to 30 years’ imprisonment for unlawful imprisonment. We affirm.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        This case stems from an armed robbery that took place inside a Dunham’s Sports store in
February 2022 during which a man forced the victim, Ethan Wood, a Dunham’s employee, into
the men’s restroom, pulled out a gun, pointed it at Wood, demanded that Wood hand over his keys,
and threatened to shoot Wood if he did not comply. After the robbery, the store’s manager
contacted law enforcement to report the incident. The responding officers were provided access
to the store’s surveillance video footage. After reviewing the video, the officers had a suspicion
that defendant committed the robbery, based on the officers’ previous encounters with defendant
and the distinctive manner of walking of the suspect recorded in the surveillance video, which
matched the way defendant walked. The next day, officers visited an inn that defendant frequented
and observed him walking along the nearby sidewalk displaying his distinctive stride. The officers
stopped defendant on unrelated outstanding warrants and discovered that defendant carried a
pocket knife, a set of keys, and a BB or airsoft-style handgun that, at first glance, appeared to be a
real handgun. The set of keys were identified as Wood’s, so the police arrested defendant and
charged him with armed robbery and unlawful imprisonment. During defendant’s police

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interview, he admitted that the gun was the same gun used during the robbery at Dunham’s.
Defendant also acknowledged that the robbery took place and that he scared an employee.

        At his trial, however, defendant testified that his acquaintance, Michael Larthridge,
committed the robbery and that defendant took the fall for him. Defendant further testified that,
during his police interview, he provided the officers with the details that Larthridge told him, and
that he also agreed to any additional details that the officers offered. Defendant essentially testified
that he lied during his police interview and was not the person who committed the armed robbery.
The jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery and unlawful imprisonment.

        At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court adjusted the scoring of sentencing
guidelines offense variables (OVs) by assessing 5 points for OV 1, not 15 points as originally
assessed; 0 points for OV 2, originally 5 points; 0 points for OV 10, originally 5 points; and 25
points for OV 13, originally 0 points. After making these changes, defendant’s total OV score of
55 points place him at OV Level III. As a fourth-offense habitual offender, the trial court
calculated defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range as 135 months to 450 months (11.25
years to 37.5 years). The trial court sentenced defendant as described previously. Defendant now
appeals.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

         Defendant argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial in four ways:
(1) testimony given by a police officer involved in the investigation impermissibly encroached on
the province of the jury, (2) the prosecution engaged in improper and prejudicial cross-examination
of defendant, which amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, (3) the trial court’s commentary
following the admission of a defense exhibit pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, and (4) the
trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of armed robbery—
larceny from the person—as he requested. Defendant also argues that he is entitled to resentencing
because OVs 1, 2, 8, and 10 were incorrectly scored, which resulted in him being sentenced outside
his correctly scored minimum sentencing guidelines range.

                                    A. WITNESS TESTIMONY

         Defendant first argues that he was deprived his constitutional right to a fair trial because
the trial court permitted testimony from one of the investigating officers, on the ground that the
testimony encroached on the province of the jury. We disagree.

        We review “for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s evidentiary rulings that have been
properly preserved.” People v Fomby, 300 Mich App 46, 48; 831 NW2d 887 (2013). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        MRE 602 provides, in pertinent part, that a “witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of
the matter.” Further, MRE 701 permits a lay witness to provide testimony in the form of an opinion
if the opinion is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” A witness cannot,

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however, “express an opinion on the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charged offense.” Id.
at 48-49.

         Kalamazoo County Sheriff Deputy Bailey Kloosterman testified regarding his
identification of potential suspects from his viewing the store’s surveillance video footage which
depicted the perpetrator’s stature and movement within the store. Deputy Kloosterman stated that
he thought about persons the police had encountered who might match the description. The
prosecution asked Deputy Kloosterman to describe the suspect’s stature and walk. Deputy
Kloosterman began testifying how the suspect appeared in the surveillance footage, but defense
counsel cut off his testimony and objected, arguing that the jury had seen the video which spoke
for itself, and the jury did not need the witness’s editorial comments on what he thought the video
showed. The prosecution argued that the witness would testify regarding his personal observations
of the video and that those observations led him to further the investigation. The trial court denied
the objection and permitted Deputy Kloosterman to testify as to what the video meant to him and
led him to do. The record reveals that Deputy Kloosterman explained how the perpetrator’s walk
featured a distinct limp that suggested an injury to the right foot or leg. Deputy Kloosterman also
testified that the perpetrator in the video appeared to be at least six feet/six inches. Deputy
Kloosterman explained that viewing the surveillance video led him to consider defendant a suspect
which caused him to conduct further investigation. The record reveals that the testimony featured
Deputy Kloosterman’s rationally based perception of the surveillance footage which helped the
jury understand how Deputy Kloosterman used the video as part of the investigation of the crime
to identify possible suspects. The trial court properly admitted Deputy Kloosterman’s testimony
under MRE 701 and did not abuse its discretion by doing so.

         Defense counsel made a second objection to Deputy Kloosterman’s testimony when he
testified that the boots that defendant wore when police stopped him appeared to be the same boots
depicted in the store’s surveillance footage. Defense counsel argued that such testimony was not
based on personal knowledge and merely speculative. Although Deputy Kloosterman did not
definitively know that the boots that defendant wore came from the store, he based his testimony
on his personal observations of defendant’s boots and the boots depicted in the surveillance video
footage. The trial court properly admitted Deputy Kloosterman’s testimony of the surveillance
video footage and defendant on the day of his arrest under MRE 701 because it was rationally
based on his perceptions and it assisted the jury in understanding his investigation and the
conclusions he drew from the evidence collected during that investigation. Therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted his testimony.

                             B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

       Defendant next argues that the court deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial
because the prosecution questioned defendant about his experience with the criminal justice
system during cross-examination. Defendant contends that this constituted prosecutorial
misconduct that warrants a new trial. We disagree.

       We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct “de novo to determine whether the
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 475; 802
NW2d 627 (2010). Prosecutorial misconduct is a nonstructural error subject to the harmless-error
standard. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 276; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). Such an error is

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harmless if “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the
defendant guilty absent the error.” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 640 n 29; 628 NW2d 540 (2001)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

          “A prosecutor has committed misconduct if the prosecutor abandoned his or her
responsibility to seek justice and, in doing so, denied the defendant a fair and impartial trial.”
People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 62; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). A defendant’s right to a fair trial
can be denied when the prosecution makes improper remarks that “so infect the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id.; see also Darden v
Wainwright, 477 US 168, 181; 106 S Ct 2464; 91 L Ed 2d 144 (1986). We evaluate “instances of
prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis, reviewing the prosecutor’s comments in context
and in light of the defendant’s arguments.” Lane, 308 Mich App at 62-63. Further, our Supreme
Court has held that “[i]t is elementary that any witness who testifies, including a defendant in a
criminal case, ‘puts in issue’ his credibility, or as it is sometimes called, his character for
truthfulness.” People v Bouchee, 400 Mich 253, 266; 253 NW2d 626 (1977). “Cross-examination
is a critical method of testing a witness’s credibility and exposing weakness in a witness’s account.
And it is appropriate that cross-examiners be afforded wide latitude to do their job.” People v
Evans, 335 Mich App 76, 90; 966 NW2d 402 (2020).

        Before defendant testified on his own behalf, defense counsel and the trial court agreed
that defendant’s prior criminal convictions would not be discussed during cross-examination
because of staleness. However, the trial court cautioned defense counsel that, if defendant took
the stand and said that he had no experience with the criminal justice system, he risked opening up
all of his prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes. During direct examination,
defendant testified that he had been “[i]ndulging in criminal activity.” At the start of cross-
examination, the prosecution asked defendant in what forms of criminal activity he had been
indulging, to which defense counsel objected, arguing that the line of questioning moved into the
realm of MRE 609. The trial court permitted the prosecution to ask defendant to elaborate on what
he meant by indulging in criminal activity. Defendant testified that he had previously been
incarcerated, in trouble with law enforcement, and questioned by law enforcement.

         Throughout this line of questioning, the prosecution did not ask about specific crimes that
defendant committed. Instead, the prosecution’s questioning focused on defendant’s past
interactions with law enforcement, which seemingly established defendant’s familiarity with the
investigation process. This was imperative to the prosecution’s case because defendant appeared
to attempt to have the jury believe that the police manipulated defendant into falsely confessing to
commission of the charged offenses. The record reflects that defense counsel questioned Detective
Sergeant Warren Misner whether he had a picture of defendant’s former girlfriend in a folder
during defendant’s interview, whether the police use psychological pressures during interviews as
tactics to get suspects to confess, and whether his job entailed getting a suspect to make an
incriminating statement. Under the circumstances presented in this case, the prosecution
reasonably attacked defendant’s credibility by eliciting testimony during cross-examination of his
experience with law enforcement to reasonably suggest to the jury that defendant would not easily
fall for manipulative tactics that law enforcement employed. Such questioning did not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct.

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                                   C. JUDICIAL PARTIALITY

        Defendant next argues that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair
trial by commenting regarding a defense exhibit, which he claims pierced the veil of judicial
impartiality. We disagree.

        “The question whether judicial misconduct denied defendant a fair trial is a question of
constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 168; 869
NW2d 233 (2015). “When the issue is preserved and a reviewing court determines that a judge
has pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, a structural error has been established that requires
reversing the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial.” Id. at 178. However, because
defendant failed to object to the trial court’s remark based on piercing the veil of judicial
impartiality, the issue is not preserved for appellate review. People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583,
597; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). We review unpreserved claimed constitutional errors “for plain error
affecting a defendant’s substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error
must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected
substantial rights.” Id. (citation omitted). “The third requirement generally requires a showing of
prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. (citation
omitted). “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of
an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. at 764-765
(quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).

        The conduct of the trial court “deprives a party of a fair trial if the conduct pierces the veil
of judicial impartiality.” Stevens, 498 Mich at 164. See also Bracy v Gramley, 520 US 899, 904-
905; 117 S Ct 1793; 138 L Ed 2d 97 (1997). The trial court’s “conduct pierces this veil and violates
the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial when, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is
reasonably likely that the judge’s conduct improperly influenced the jury by creating the
appearance of advocacy or partiality against a party.” Stevens, 498 Mich at 164. In reviewing a
claim of judicial partiality, we first consider “the nature or type of judicial conduct itself.” Id.
at 172. “Identifying the nature of the conduct provides the starting point to evaluate whether the
conduct overstepped the line of judicial impartiality.” Id. at 173. “Improper judicial conduct may
come in many forms, including belittling of counsel, inappropriate questioning of witnesses,
providing improper strategic advice to a particular side, biased commentary in front of the jury, or
a variety of other inappropriate actions.” People v Swilley, 504 Mich 350, 371-371; 934 NW2d
771 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        In this case, the contested comment occurred during the trial court’s ruling on the
prosecution’s objection to the admission of Defense Exhibit A, a document from the Kalamazoo
County Sheriff’s Office that indicated the dates of incarceration of Michael Larthridge, the
acquaintance whom defendant testified committed the armed robbery. The exhibit showed that
Larthridge was not in custody at the time of the armed robbery, which was consistent with
defendant’s and Larthridge’s parole officer’s testimonies. The prosecution objected to its
admission on relevancy grounds. The trial court overruled the prosecution’s objection and stated
in the presence of the jury that the exhibit could be admitted “for what it’s worth.” Defendant
claims the remark expressed bias.

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        After identifying the nature of the judicial conduct, we consider “the tone and demeanor
the trial judge displayed in front of the jury.” Stevens, 498 Mich at 174. In this case, the trial
court’s comment regarding the exhibit does not appear to indicate bias against defendant or in
favor of the prosecution. Although the statement “for what it’s worth” could be interpreted as an
opinion of the exhibit’s value, read in context, the trial court’s comment appears to be directed
toward the prosecution’s argument that the exhibit lacked relevancy because most people were not
incarcerated at the time the armed robbery occurred. Our conclusion is supported by the fact that
the trial court made no other comments throughout the trial that indicated any bias against
defendant or in favor of the prosecution. The record does not indicate a biased or condescending
tone and the court’s remark did not elicit an objection or prompt other action by defense counsel.

         Once tone and demeaner are considered, we next consider “the scope of judicial
intervention within the context of the length and complexity of the trial, or any given issue therein.”
Id. at 176. The record does not indicate or even suggest that the trial court unnecessarily intervened
throughout the trial; rather, the trial court only intervened to address the parties’ respective
objections. Concerning the contested comment, the trial court minimally intervened as needed to
understand the reason the exhibit had relevance and to rule on its admissibility.

         After the length and complexity are reviewed, we consider “the extent to which a judge’s
comments or questions were directed at one side more than the other.” Id. at 176-177. “Judicial
partiality may be exhibited when an imbalance occurs with respect to either the frequency of the
intervention or the manner of the conduct.” Id. at 177. The record shows that the trial court did
not direct significantly more questions or comments to defense counsel than the prosecution.
Further, the manner in which the trial court questioned the attorneys and provided commentary on
the evidence was similar for defense counsel and the prosecution. The record does not establish
that the trial court commented or questioned defense counsel more than the prosecution, nor did
the trial court act disproportionately toward either party.

        We also consider “the presence or absence of a curative instruction.” Id. at 177. “[D]uring
the course of a proceeding, a trial judge has the ability to issue a curative instruction immediately
in response to conduct that could give rise to the appearance of bias.” Id. In this case, the trial
court did not give an immediate curative instruction after the trial court ruled on the exhibit’s
admissibility. However, during final jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

              As jurors, you must decide what the facts of this case are. This is your job,
       and nobody else’s. You must think about all the evidence and then decide what
       each piece of evidence means and how important you think it is.

                                               * * *

               My comments, rulings, questions, and instructions are also not evidence. It
       is my duty to see that the trial is conducted according to the law, and to tell you the
       law that applies to this case. However, when I make a comment or give an
       instruction, I’m not trying to influence your vote or express a personal opinion
       about the case. If you believe that I have an opinion about how you should decide
       this case, you must pay no attention to that opinion. You are the only judges of the
       facts, and you should decide this case from the evidence.

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Because jurors are presumed to follow the instructions provided by the trial court, People v Unger,
278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008); see also Weeks v Angelone, 528 US 225, 234;
120 S Ct 727; 145 L Ed 2d 727 (2000), the final jury instructions cured any prejudicial effect the
trial court’s comment during the admission of Defense Exhibit A may have had.

                                    D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

         Defendant argues further that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to a
fair trial by refusing to instruct the jury on larceny from the person which he asserts is a necessarily
included lesser offense of armed robbery. We disagree.

        Whether larceny from a person is a lesser included offense of armed robbery is “a question
of law, which this Court reviews de novo.” People v Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 626; 685 NW2d 657
(2004). However, “a trial court’s determination whether a jury instruction is applicable to the facts
of the case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d
419 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant’s request for an instruction on a
lesser included offense presents a preserved, nonconstitutional error. People v Cornell, 466 Mich
335, 364; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). Our Supreme Court has held that “harmless error analysis is
applicable to instructional errors involving necessarily included lesser offenses[.]” Id. at 361.
Accordingly, such an error does not warrant reversal unless “it is more probable than not that the
error was outcome determinative.” Id. at 364 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Therefore,
to prevail, defendant must demonstrate that it is more probable than not that the failure to give the
requested lesser included [offense] instruction undermined reliability in the verdict.” Id.

         Our Supreme Court explained that “a requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser
offense is proper if the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element
that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it.”
Id. at 357. An offense is a necessarily included lesser offense if “[i]t is impossible to commit the
greater offense without first committing the lesser offense.” Id. at 361.

       In Nickens, our Supreme Court explained:

       a lesser offense instruction is appropriate only if the lesser offense is necessarily
       included in the greater offense. Necessarily included lesser offenses are offenses
       in which the elements of the lesser offense are completely subsumed in the greater
       offense. Thus, an instruction on a lesser offense is proper where all the elements
       of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, and a rational view of the
       evidence would support such an instruction. [Nickens, 470 Mich at 626 (quotation
       marks and citations omitted).]

        Before final jury instructions were given, defendant requested that the trial court instruct
the jury on two lesser included offenses of armed robbery—unarmed robbery and larceny from the
person. In making its decision to instruct the jury on unarmed robbery, but not larceny from the
person, the trial court stated:

             Here there are no disputed facts, and I don’t believe that there is a rational
       view of the evidence that could lead the jury to support a finding of guilt on
       people—larceny from the person. There is undisputed evidence that either

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       something was—that either a weapon was used or something to cause a reasonable
       person to believe that a weapon was being used. That’s what’s there.

On appeal, defendant argues that, if a rational view of the evidence supported a finding of guilt for
unarmed robbery, it also should have supported a finding of guilt for larceny from the person. We
disagree.

        The elements of armed robbery are (1) larceny, (2) use of force or violence against a victim
or placing the victim in fear, and (3) possession of a dangerous weapon or an article fashioned in
a manner that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the article is a dangerous weapon.
MCL 750.529. The elements of unarmed robbery are (1) larceny, and (2) use of force or violence
against a victim or placing the victim in fear. MCL 750.530. The elements of larceny from the
person are (1) larceny, and (2) from the person of another. MCL 750.357. Analysis of the elements
of the three offenses permits the conclusion that the commission of armed robbery involves both
unarmed robbery and larceny from the person. Larceny from the person is subsumed within the
two other offenses. Therefore, larceny from the person is a necessarily included lesser offense of
armed robbery.

        The trial court, however, was not obligated to instruct the jury on both necessarily included
lesser offenses unless a rational view of the evidence would support such an instruction. As
explained in Cornell, “a requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is proper if
the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of
the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” Cornell, 466
Mich at 357. A review of the elements of the offenses indicates that a factual dispute as to the use
of a weapon would need to be apparent for the trial court to instruct on armed robbery and unarmed
robbery, and a factual dispute as to both the use of a weapon and the use of force would need to
be apparent for the trial court to instruct on all three offenses. The elements of larceny from the
person does not require proof of either fact. As the trial court noted, the record does not indicate
a factual dispute as to the use or possession of a dangerous weapon. A dispute as to the dangerous
nature of the weapon existed, given that defendant used a BB or airsoft gun rather than a firearm,
but the trial court did not need to instruct on larceny from the person unless a disputed factual issue
existed whether defendant used a weapon and force against Wood or placed Wood in fear. The
record reflects that no dispute existed as to the use of a weapon or defendant’s placing Wood in
fear. The evidence established that defendant forced Wood at gun point into the men’s restroom
and threatened to shoot him if he did not hand over his keys. Wood’s testimony established that
defendant’s conduct placed him in fear of being harmed, which goes beyond the offense of larceny
from the person. Therefore, a rational view of the evidence did not support a finding of guilt for
larceny from the person because evidence established that defendant used force during the
commission of the robbery. Defendant therefore, was not entitled to an instruction on larceny from
the person.

                                         E. SENTENCING

       Defendant also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because OVs 1, 2, 8, and 10 were
improperly scored, resulting in him being sentenced outside of his correctly scored minimum
sentencing guidelines range. We disagree.

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         In reviewing a trial court’s scoring of the sentencing guidelines, its “factual determinations
are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People
v Abbott, 330 Mich App 648, 654; 950 NW2d 478 (2019). Clear error exists when we are “left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Id. “Whether the facts, as found,
are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute . . . is a question of statutory
interpretation,” which we review de novo. Id. However, an unpreserved challenge to the scoring
of the guidelines is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Kimble, 470
Mich 305, 312; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). Defendant preserved the issue of the scoring of OVs 1, 2,
and 10 by objecting to their scoring at his sentencing hearing. However, defendant failed to object
to the scoring of OV 8, which means he did not preserve that claimed error for appellate review.
To establish plain error, a defendant must prove that “1) [an] error . . . occurred, 2) the error was
plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Carines, 460 Mich
at 763. To satisfy the last element, a defendant must generally show prejudice, “i.e., that the error
affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id.

        “Under the statutory sentencing guidelines, the trial court must score the applicable offense
and prior record variables to determine the appropriate range for the minimum sentence.” Kimble,
470 Mich at 309. Although the “sentencing guidelines are advisory in all applications,” People v
Posey, 512 Mich 317, 325; ___ NW2d ___ (2023), “[a] defendant is [still] entitled to be sentenced
by a trial court on the basis of accurate information,” People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88; 711
NW2d 44 (2006). “A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be
scored, provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v
Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). It “may consider all record evidence
before it when calculating the guidelines, including, but not limited to, the contents of a
presentence investigation report, admissions made by a defendant during a plea proceeding, or
testimony taken at a preliminary examination or trial.” People v Johnson, 298 Mich App 128, 131;
826 NW2d 170 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Resentencing is an appropriate
remedy when “a defendant’s sentence is based on an inaccurate calculation of the sentencing
guidelines range and, therefore, does not conform to the law.” People v Underwood, 278 Mich
App 334, 337; 750 NW2d 612 (2008).

        Defendant argues that OVs 2 and 10 were erroneously assessed five points each. The
sentencing information report, however, shows that zero points were assessed for OVs 2 and 10.
The trial court decided during defendant’s sentencing hearing to assess defendant zero points for
OVs 2 and 10. Therefore, defendant’s arguments on appeal pertaining to OVs 2 and 10 are moot.

        As for OV 1, the prosecution concedes that the trial court erroneously assessed five points.
MCL 777.31(2)(e) states that a trial could should “not score 5 points if the conviction offense is a
violation . . . MCL 750.82 and 750.529.” The jury convicted defendant of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529; therefore, the trial court clearly erred by assessing defendant five points for OV 1.
Subtraction of the 5 points erroneously assessed for OV 1 reduces defendant’s total OV score to
50 points, rather than 55 points. With such correction, defendant’s OV score still places him at
OV Level III, which means that his minimum sentencing guidelines range remains unchanged. To
warrant resentencing, defendant must establish that the trial court also erroneously assessed points
to OV 8.

                                                 -9-
         MCL 777.38 provides that 15 points must be assessed for OV 8 if “[a] victim was asported
to another place of greater danger or to a situation of greater danger or was held captive beyond
the time necessary to commit the offense[.]” The term “asported,” in the context of OV 8, is not
statutorily defined. However, our Supreme Court has held that “[a] plain reading of asportation is
this: If a victim is carried away or removed ‘to another place of greater danger or to a situation of
greater danger,’ MCL 777.38(1)(a), the statutory language is satisfied.” People v Barrera, 500
Mich 14, 21; 892 NW2d 789 (2017). This Court has interpreted “another place” or “situation of
greater danger” to include a location “away from the presence or observation of others,” People v
Chelmicki, 305 Mich App 58, 70-71; 850 NW2d 612 (2014), and “places where others [are] less
likely to see [the] defendant committing crimes.” People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 491; 769
NW2d 256 (2009).

        The trial court did not address the scoring of OV 8 at defendant’s sentencing hearing
because defendant did not object to its scoring; however, the Michigan Department of Corrections,
in crafting defendant’s presentence investigation report, noted that 15 points were assigned to
OV 8 because defendant “forc[ed] the victim into a separate room of the business and instruct[ed]
him not to leave or he’ll shoot him.” According to Wood’s testimony, defendant pushed Wood
backward toward the restrooms and forced Wood to unlock the men’s restroom and enter it. This
testimony strongly suggests that Wood did not enter the restroom voluntarily, but rather did so to
appease defendant and avoid defendant using greater force against him to make him comply.
Therefore, defendant “asported” Wood to the restroom, which, under our jurisprudence,
constituted a place of greater danger. Although nothing in the record explicitly states that another
employee was nearby when Wood was in the hunting department, removing Wood to the restroom
constituted a tactic to ensure no other employees would witness defendant’s robbery of Wood.
Because the restroom was a location “away from the presence or observation of others,” Chelmicki,
305 Mich App at 70-71, it constituted a place of greater danger under the statutory language that
governs the scoring of OV 8. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it assigned
15 points for OV 8 because defendant asported Wood to a place of greater danger. In sum, absent
the erroneous scoring of OV 1, defendant’s total OV score equaled 50 points, resulting in OV
Level III. Because this does not alter the minimum sentencing guidelines range, defendant is not
entitled to resentencing.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                              /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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