Court Opinion

ID: 9526333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:15:54.301082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:27.437746
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCUSKEY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Based upon my review of the record, I find the trial court’s decision to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, I believe the majority has misapplied our supreme court’s holding in In re Marriage of Eckert (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 316, 518 N.E.2d 1041. The trial court heard testimony that the father has never missed a visitation with Adam and shows a sincere desire to maintain and further develop their relationship. “When a parent has assiduously exercised his or her visitation rights, ‘a court should be loath to interfere with it by permitting removal of the children for frivolous or unpersuasive or inadequate reasons.’ ” Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1046, quoting D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio (1976), 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 30. It is also well established that it is in the best interests of children to have a healthy and close relationship with both parents, as well as with other family members, and thus the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent should be carefully considered. (In re Marriage of Stone (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 238, 559 N.E.2d 92.) In the instant case, the record shows the joint parenting agreement contains a provision stating that it is in Adam’s best interest to have close, frequent and continuing contact with both parents. The joint parenting agreement also granted the father custody of Adam for extensive periods of time. In addition, the agreement’s provisions gave both parties equal rights regarding the major decisions in Adam’s life on such issues as education, health care, and religious training. All the evidence introduced indicates that the mother and father are both loving parents and Adam has a strong attachment to both of them. Residing in Illinois, Adam will be able to continue these essential contacts with both parents. Maintaining these relationships is paramount to the career objectives of the mother’s new husband. Also, almost all of Adam’s extended family members live in the area of Peoria and Quincy. Maintenance of these family contacts is very important for the best interests of Adam. The record shows that Eric Henrikson, the mother’s new husband, never applied for or sought a job in Illinois or any of the surrounding States. Henrikson also admitted there are positions available in Illinois for people with his job qualifications. The record also indicates Henrikson has discretion as to his place of employment. However, he clearly stated that he did not even bother looking for a position in Illinois. Dr. Frank Froman, a psychologist, testified that Henrikson was the classic mean and meddling stepfather. Dr. Froman further related that Adam needs to maintain the continuity of the relationships he has, not only with his father but also with his extended family. Applying the Eckert standards to the instant case, we first consider the likelihood that the proposed move will enhance the general quality of life for the child and the parent having physical custody. As far as the mother is concerned, the record does not show that her general quality of life will be directly enhanced by removing Adam to Washington, D.C. Nevertheless, the mother in the instant case seemingly overstates the importance of the impact of the move on her own quality of life. The focus at all times must remain on the best interest of Adam. The increase in the custodial parent’s quality of life is only important insofar as it increases the child’s quality of life and furthers the child’s best interests. “If the obvious happiness the spouse would receive from being able to live with a new spouse were sufficient to prove removal [is] in the child’s best interests, court supervision of the proceedings would be unnecessary, and at best, ceremonial.” (In re Marriage of Berk (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 459, 466, 574 N.E.2d 1364, 1369.) I find the mother failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the best interests of Adam would be served by moving him from Illinois to Washington, D.C. Additionally, I believe the majority has improperly applied the factors set forth in Eckert concerning: (1) whether removal is merely a ruse intended to defeat or frustrate visitation; and (2) if a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached if the move is allowed. The trial court observed a great amount of animosity between Henrikson and the father. The record clearly shows that Henrikson had no intention of seeking employment in Illinois or the Midwest. I believe Henrikson’s decision to seek employment in Washington, D.C., was calculated to severely limit the father’s visits with Adam and remove the child from his extended family in Illinois. I believe the majority opinion flies in the face of Eckert by minimizing the importance of the father’s extensive visitation with Adam. Furthermore, the trial court’s order granting the father five weeks’ visitation in the summer is grossly inadequate to compensate for the extensive visitation previously granted by the joint parenting agreement. Considering the distance and the cost of travel to Washington, D.C., if removal was properly granted, the father should have been awarded visitation with Adam for the entire summer. I believe the limited visitation granted by the trial court was an abuse of discretion in light of the father’s previous extensive visitation and the terms of the joint parenting agreement. The majority opinion has misapprehended Eckert. The majority opinion has overlooked the fact that removal of Adam from Illinois will cause him to lose the direct benefit of his father’s guidance in education and religious training as envisioned by the joint parenting agreement. Eckert emphasized the substantial impairment removal would have on the noncustodial parent’s involvement with the child. Eckert focused on the best interest of the child and not on the professional improvement of the stepfather or the economic benefit to the petitioner. The majority opinion improperly dwells on the indirect benefits that removal would have on the petitioner instead of focusing on the best interests of the child which should be the court’s paramount concern. For the reasons indicated, I believe the petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof, and therefore, I dissent.