Court Opinion

ID: 9925756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 21:14:11.048808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.104390
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                             No. 84799-6-I
 JOSHUA MCKINNEY,
                                             DIVISION ONE
                       Appellant,
                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                v.

 CHRISTINE BOOKER,

                       Respondent.

       FELDMAN, J. — Joshua McKinney, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial

court’s denial of his petition for an antiharassment protection order against his ex-

girlfriend, Christine Booker. Because McKinney does not establish that the trial

court abused its discretion in denying the petition, we affirm.

       McKinney previously obtained an antiharassment protection order against

Booker in March 2020. That order was based on harassment that occurred in 2019

and 2020, which included unwanted text messages, unwanted and anonymous

phone calls, and threats. The instant petition for an antiharassment protection

order, in contrast, is predicated on 19 text messages that Booker sent McKinney

in July 2022 in which Booker allegedly threatened and insulted McKinney. The

trial court denied the petition, and denied McKinney’s subsequent motion for
No. 84799-6-I

reconsideration, because McKinney failed to establish that substantial emotional

distress occurred as a result of the July 2022 text messages.

       A trial court’s decision to grant or deny an antiharassment protection order

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App.

779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017).        So, too, is an order denying a motion for

reconsideration. In re Marriage of Tomsovic, 118 Wn. App. 96, 108, 74 P.3d 692

(2003). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or

based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Chandola,

180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). “We will not substitute our judgment

for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.” Greene v.

Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999). Rather, our role is simply to

determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact

and whether those factual findings support the conclusions of law. Id. We also

view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

party who prevailed below. Garza v. Perry, 25 Wn. App. 2d 433, 453, 523 P.3d

822 (2023). Here, that party is Booker.

       The governing statutes are clear. To grant an antiharassment protection

order, a trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence “that the petitioner

has been subjected to unlawful harassment by the respondent.”                   RCW

7.105.225(1)(f). RCW 7.105.010(36)(a) defines “unlawful harassment” as:

       A knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person
       that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such
       person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course
       of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to
       suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
       substantial emotional distress to the petitioner . . . .

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Thus, a petitioner must not only prove that the alleged course of conduct “would

cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress,” they must also

prove that the course of conduct “actually cause[d] substantial emotional distress

to the petitioner.”

       The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in finding that McKinney

failed to establish that substantial emotional distress occurred as a result of the 19

text messages that he received from Booker in July 2022. As the trial court

correctly noted, “In the Petitioner’s original Petition, he says things that they could

do, and then in the part where he alleges harm, he just says you’re -- he talks

about her actions and say[s], ‘were generally emotionally distressing.’ He provides

no other information.” The court exhaustively reviewed the text messages on the

record and agreed with McKinney that the messages “would be distressing,” but

nonetheless confirmed that the evidence does not establish that the text messages

“actually cause[d] substantial emotional distress to the Petitioner” as required to

establish “unlawful harassment” under RCW 7.105.010(36)(a).                Substantial

evidence, as recounted by the trial court, supports this finding.

       Notwithstanding the above analysis, McKinney argues that the trial court

erroneously failed to consider the entire “course of conduct”—which he claims

includes the conduct that warranted the March 2020 antiharassment protection

order—in deciding whether to grant his July 2022 petition for an antiharassment

protection order. This argument misreads the relevant statutes. The phrase

“course of conduct” is defined in RCW 7.105.010(6)(a) as follows:

       a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
       time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. ‘Course of

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       conduct’ includes any form of communication, contact, or conduct,
       including the sending of an electronic communication, but does not
       include constitutionally protected free speech. . . .

Additional guidance is provided in RCW 7.105.010(6)(b), which states:

       In determining whether the course of conduct serves any legitimate
       or lawful purpose, a court should consider whether:

              (i) Any current contact between the parties was initiated by
       the respondent only or was initiated by both parties;

              (ii) The respondent has been given clear notice that all
       further contact with the petitioner is unwanted;

              (iii) The respondent’s course of conduct appears designed to
       alarm, annoy, or harass the petitioner;

              (iv) The respondent is acting pursuant to any statutory
       authority including, but not limited to, acts which are reasonably
       necessary to:

              (A) Protect property or liberty interests;

              (B) Enforce the law; or

              (C) Meet specific statutory duties or requirements;

               (v) The respondent’s course of conduct has the purpose or
       effect of unreasonably interfering with the petitioner’s privacy or the
       purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
       living environment for the petitioner; or

               (vi) Contact by the respondent with the petitioner or the
       petitioner’s family has been limited in any manner by any previous
       court order.

(Emphasis added.)      As the italicized text shows, a prior court order is one

consideration among many, and not the only consideration, in determining whether

an alleged course of conduct constitutes unlawful harassment.

       The trial court here appropriately recognized the prior court order and

corresponding conduct, stating “there’s a lot of reliance on stuff that’s already been

litigated in the past.” But exercising its discretion to weigh the evidence and

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adjudge witness credibility, the court focused its analysis on recent events: “the

stuff that is brought before me today.” It then found “there’s counterbalances

about, you know, what happened.” In doing so, the court reasonably exercised its

discretion and appropriately weighed the evidence. This court will not reweigh that

evidence.

       Moreover, McKinney’s argument, if accepted, would lead to absurd results.

If a trial court were required to grant an antiharassment protection order based

solely on conduct that warranted a previous antiharassment protection order, it

would allow petitioners to satisfy the specific requirements to obtain an

antiharassment protection order merely by pointing to the previous protection order

without proof of a course of conduct presently directed at the petitioner. Such a

holding would also obviate RCW 7.105.405(4)(e), which allows a respondent to

avoid renewal of an antiharassment protection order by proving that they “will not

resume harassment of the petitioner when the order expires.” If McKinney were

correct, the existence of a previous court order would be dispositive. That is not

what the statutes provide, and we decline to interpret them in that fashion. See,

e.g., City of Seattle v. Kopperdahl, 22 Wn. App. 2d 708, 712, 513 P.3d 139 (2022)

(“We avoid a reading that produces absurd results because we presume the

legislature does not intend them.”).

       Next, McKinney contends that the trial court “erred in finding that [Booker’s]

conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress,

but not finding that it actually caused substantial emotional distress.”        This

argument misreads the pertinent statute. Under RCW 7.105.010(36)(a), “The

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course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer

substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional

distress to the petitioner.” (Emphasis added.) By stating these two requirements

in the conjunctive, the statute requires both that the alleged course of conduct

would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress (an

objective test) and that the course of conduct actually caused McKinney to

experience substantial emotional distress (a subjective test). See, e.g., Acheson

v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 19 Wn. App. 915, 920, 579 P.2d 953 (1978) (“Subparagraphs

(1) and (2) of RCW 50.20.090 are written in the conjunctive and both must be

established in order to remove the disqualification from benefits enunciated in the

statute.”).   Given the paucity of persuasive evidence that McKinney actually

experienced such emotional distress, we cannot—and will not—reweigh the

evidence, adjudge witness credibility, or otherwise substitute our judgment for the

trial court’s even if we might have resolved the issue differently. Greene, 97 Wn.

App. at 714.

       Lastly, McKinney contends that the trial court erred in not awarding him

attorney fees under RCW 7.105.340(7)(f). That statute provides, “The court may

order a respondent found in contempt of the order to pay for any losses incurred

by a party in connection with the contempt proceeding, including reasonable

attorneys’ fees, service fees, and other costs.” RCW 7.105.340(7)(f). The statute

relates to a respondent’s failure to surrender their firearms as required by an

extreme risk protection order. See RCW 7.105.340. As no such protection order

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is at issue here, McKinney fails to show that the trial court erred, let alone abused

its discretion, when it did not award attorney fees under this statute.

       We Affirm.

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