Court Opinion

ID: 9906018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 19:02:33.571347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.267907
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 Besh v. Jaureguito CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 BASIL BESH,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                               A164397
 v.
 JOHN W. JAUREGUITO,                                          (Alameda County Super. Ct.
                                                              No. RG21098090)
      Defendant and
 Respondent.

          Plaintiff Basil Besh, M.D., and defendant John Jaureguito,
M.D., are orthopedic surgeons and business partners.1 While
exploring a buyout by Besh of Jaureguito’s interest in one of their
businesses, Jaureguito sent an email to Besh and others accusing
Besh of breaching his fiduciary duties to their businesses,
Jaureguito, and their other partners, and of improperly diverting
business profits to himself. In response, Besh sued Jaureguito for
defamation. The trial court granted Jaureguito’s special motion
to strike filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure2 section

          1 For convenience, and intending no disrespect, we refer to

the doctors by their last names.
          2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

                                                      1
425.16, known as the anti-SLAPP statute. Besh appeals. He
argues Jaureguito’s statements are not protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute and the litigation privilege does not apply. We
disagree and affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
      Besh and Jaureguito each own a 50 percent share of two
entities: Medland Development, LLC (Medland Development),
and Medland Staffing, LLC (Medland Staffing; collectively,
Medland entities). Medland Development owns, operates, and
leases a medical office building in Fremont. Besh manages the
Medland entities. Besh and Jaureguito own Precision
SurgiCenter, LLC, (SurgiCenter) together with three other
physicians (SurgiCenter physicians), with Besh serving as one of
SurgiCenter’s managers.
      In 2020, Jaureguito approached Besh about the possibility
of Besh buying Jaureguito’s share of Medland Development. The
negotiations focused on the value to be assigned to Medland
Development’s office building. As he conducted due diligence,
Jaureguito discovered alleged conflicts of interest related to
Besh’s management of Medland Development and leasing of
office space in Medland Development’s office building.
      Thereafter, Jaureguito sent Besh an email accusing him of
having a conflict of interest and breaching his fiduciary duties to
the Medland entities, SurgiCenter, and those businesses’
members. Jaureguito asserted that Besh entered into a new
lease between Medland Development and SurgiCenter without
consent or approval from the members of either entity. He

                                 2
claimed that in doing so Besh violated his fiduciary duties both to
the members of SurgiCenter and to Jaureguito as a member of
Medland Development based on the lease terms. Jaureguito told
Besh to: (1) move forward with the change in ownership and
management of SurgiCenter, (2) “stop diverting Surgicenter
profits to Medland Staffing by charging an unjustified 5% of the
cost of all Surgicenter personnel, which money you have been
improperly paying all to yourself,” and (3) resign as a manager of
either Medland Development or SurgiCenter. Jaureguito copied
the SurgiCenter physicians on the email.
      Three weeks later, Jaureguito filed a lawsuit against Besh
and the Medland entities (dissolution action). The complaint
asserted causes of action for dissolution, wind up and
appointment of receiver as to the Medland entities, breach of
management agreements, constructive trust, accounting, and
unjust enrichment.
      This litigation followed. Besh sued Jaureguito for
defamation based on statements in Jaureguito’s email.
Jaureguito filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-
SLAPP statute. In his supporting declaration, Jaureguito stated
he wrote the email with serious consideration of filing litigation
against Besh regarding the issues raised in the email. He
explained he had already hired an attorney to file a lawsuit based
on these issues and he copied his attorney on the email.
      The trial court granted the special motion to strike,
concluding the email was a pre-lawsuit communication made in
connection with anticipated litigation and sent to the

                                 3
SurgiCenter physicians, who were interested persons with
mutual and overlapping business interests. The court also
determined Besh had not met his burden of showing probability
of success on the merits because the litigation privilege (Civ.
Code, § 47, subd. (b)) applied to Jaureguito’s statements.
                          DISCUSSION
I.   The Anti-SLAPP Statute and Standard of Review
      The anti-SLAPP statute is designed to prevent meritless
lawsuits from chilling individuals’ exercise of their rights of
petition or free speech. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884.) A special motion to strike may be
brought against claims “arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Anti-
SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process.
Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing
that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected
activity in which the defendant has engaged. [Citations.] If the
defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate
its claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1061 (Park).) If the plaintiff cannot make this demonstration, the
court will strike the claim. (Wilson, at p. 884.)
      We review the trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion
de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.) We
consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits

                                  4
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) In the second step, the “court does not
weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is
limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient
claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence
as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine
if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.)
II.   Step One: Claims Arising from Protected Activity
      Initially, we must decide whether Besh’s defamation claims
arise from protected activity. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)
As relevant here, protected activity includes “any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)
      To fall within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2),
Jaureguito’s statements must have been made “in connection
with” an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body.
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) A “statement is ‘in connection with’
litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to
the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons
having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 (Neville).) The requisite
connection must not be merely with a proceeding but with an
issue under review in that proceeding. (Rand Resources, LLC v.

                                  5
City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620; Paul v. Friedman (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 853, 867 (Paul).) When interpreting the statute,
“we keep in mind that the Legislature has instructed the courts
to construe the anti-SLAPP statute ‘broadly.’ ” (Dorit v. Noe
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 458, 468.)
      Applying this standard, we conclude Jaureguito’s
statements constitute protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2). First, Jaureguito’s statements relate to the
substantive issues in the dissolution action, which seeks
dissolution of the Medland entities due to Besh’s alleged breaches
of his fiduciary duties. In his email, Jaureguito accuses Besh of
having conflicts of interest and breaching his fiduciary duties to
all parties, including the SurgiCenter physicians. He claims that
in entering the lease, Besh breached his fiduciary duties to
Jaureguito as a member of Medland Development and to all
SurgiCenter members. Jaureguito asks Besh to distribute all
profits owed to Jaureguito, to stop diverting SurgiCenter profits
to Medland Staffing, and to resign as manager of Medland
Development or SurgiCenter. These statements relate to the
dissolution action, in which Jaureguito alleges Besh breached his
fiduciary duties in managing the Medland entities, causing
deadlock and internal dissension. Like the email on which Besh’s
defamation suit is based, the dissolution action includes
allegations that Besh misappropriated funds from the Medland
entities, threatened to unilaterally amend leases, and refused to
make distributions to Jaureguito.

                                   6
      Contrary to Besh’s claim, this case bears no resemblance to
Paul, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 853. There, a securities broker filed
a lawsuit against an attorney who, during a preceding arbitration
proceeding, conducted a “harassing investigation” into the
broker’s life and disclosed to the broker’s clients private
information about the broker’s financial affairs, spending habits,
tax liabilities, and personal relationships. (Id. at pp. 861, 856–
858.) The Paul court held the attorney’s intrusive investigation
into the broker’s personal life and subsequent disclosures did not
come within the anti-SLAPP statute because they did not occur
in connection with an issue under review in the arbitration
proceeding, which concerned the broker’s alleged securities fraud.
(Id. at pp. 856, 857, 867–868.)
      Here, by contrast, the issues in the dissolution action
include whether the Medland entities should be dissolved based
on deadlock and internal dissension due to allegations of Besh’s
breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of funds, and refusal
to make distributions. Jaureguito’s email concerns these
allegations and relates to these issues.
      Second, Jaureguito’s statements are directed to people
having some interest in the dissolution action. (Neville, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) Besh is correct that SurgiCenter
and the SurgiCenter physicians are not parties to the dissolution
action. But a person need not be a party in order to have some
interest in the litigation. “Although many anti-SLAPP cases
involving prelitigation communications concern demand letters or
other statements to adverse parties or potential adverse parties

                                  7
[citations], there is no such requirement in the text of section
425.16, subdivision (e)(2). That provision has been held to protect
statements to persons who are not parties or potential parties to
litigation, provided such statements are made ‘in connection with’
pending or anticipated litigation.” (Id. at pp. 1270, 1259–1260,
1267–1268 [letter sent to company’s customers accusing former
employee of misappropriation of trade secrets and discouraging
customers from doing business with former employee constituted
protected activity].)
      The SurgiCenter physicians have some interest in the
dissolution action because it is litigation between two fellow
owners of SurgiCenter that is based, at least in part, on a claim
that Besh misappropriated Medland Staffing funds by charging
SurgiCenter unjustified fees then diverting its profits. The
SurgiCenter physicians possess an interest in claims that one of
their managers and co-owners overcharged them and
misappropriated those funds. Additionally, Jaureguito may have
believed the SurgiCenter physicians could be witnesses in the
dissolution action. (See Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1267–1268 [company “reasonably could believe” the letter
recipients “had an interest in the dispute as potential witnesses
to, or unwitting participants in, [former employee’s] alleged
misconduct”].)
      Finally, prelitigation statements “made in good faith
anticipation of litigation under serious consideration at the time
the statements were made” may constitute protected activity
under the anti-SLAPP statute. (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v.

                                 8
 Rubin (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 493, 499.) So too here. In his
 declaration in support of the special motion to strike, Jaureguito
 explained that he wrote the email in good faith and with serious
 consideration of filing litigation against Besh; indeed, he noted he
 had hired an attorney to file a lawsuit and copied his attorney on
 the email. Just three weeks later, Jaureguito filed the
 dissolution action. (See, e.g., Trinity Risk Management, LLC v.
 Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
 995, 1005 [owner copied company’s attorney on email and
 complaint filed days after sending email].) A reasonable
 inference from the evidence is that Jaureguito contemplated
 litigation against Besh seriously and in good faith when he wrote
 the email. (See Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1269.) In
 sum, we conclude the statements constitute protected activity.
       Next, we must determine whether Besh’s claims arise from
 protected activity. “[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of
 action . . . arising from’ means simply that the defendant’s act
 underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an
 act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” (City of
 Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.) Jaureguito’s speech
 itself, i.e., his email, forms the basis for Besh’s defamation
 complaint, so his claims arise from Jaureguito’s protected
 activity.
III.   Step Two: Probability of Prevailing
       We next consider whether Besh demonstrated his “claims
 have at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at

                                   9
p. 1061.) The trial court determined that the litigation privilege
bars Besh’s claims. We agree.
      “Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) defines what is
commonly known as the ‘litigation privilege.’ ” (Kashian v.
Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 912.) The privilege
typically “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and
(4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.”
(Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The litigation
privilege “may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must
overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v.
Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323.) Doubt about whether the
privilege applies is decided in favor of applying it. (Kashian,
supra, at p. 913.)
      Besh argues the litigation privilege is inapplicable for two
reasons, neither of which is persuasive. First, Besh argues the
litigation privilege does not apply because the SurgiCenter
physicians copied on the email are not parties to, and do not have
an interest in, the dissolution action. But the litigation privilege
includes “publication to nonparties with a substantial interest in
the proceeding.” (Susan A. v. County of Sonoma (1991)
2 Cal.App.4th 88, 94; see also Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape
& Recreation Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 4–6 [letter sent by
attorney for homeowners association to association members];
Costa v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 673, 676, 678
[letter sent by board chair of fraternal lodge to membership of

                                 10
subsidiary lodge].) As previously discussed, the SurgiCenter
physicians have an interest in the dissolution action.
      Relying on Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134
(Rothman), Besh contends the SurgiCenter physicians are
uninterested parties unrelated to the dissolution action. In
Rothman, during a press conference, a celebrity’s representatives
claimed an attorney and his clients had falsely accused the
celebrity of torts to extort money from the celebrity. (Id. at
pp. 1138–1139.) Rothman held the litigation privilege does not
extend to litigating in the press. (Id. at pp. 1139, 1149.) The
court explained that the persons to whom the statements were
made had “no legitimate connection with” litigation between the
attorney’s clients and the celebrity. (Id. at p. 1151.) While the
representatives’ statements during the press conference
“happen[ed] to parallel” the celebrity’s litigation interests in that
they “complement[ed]” the celebrity’s desire to be publicly
vindicated, they did not function to advance his interests in the
litigation itself. (Id. at pp. 1147–1148.)3

      3 Other cases on which Besh relies, many concerning

statements made to the general public, are similarly
distinguishable because they involve statements to the press.
(See, e.g., GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 141, 145–146, 153–154 [privilege did not
encompass a press release and tweet]; Argentieri v. Zuckerberg
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 768, 776, 785 [privilege did not apply to
statement sent to press]; Susan A. v. County of Sonoma, supra,
2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 92–94 [privilege did not apply to statements
psychologist made to reporter about evaluation of juvenile
criminal defendant].)

                                  11
      Besh asserts the crux of Rothman is that any
communication to a nonparticipant does not come within the
litigation privilege because it is not necessary to, nor in
furtherance of, the litigation. We disagree. Rothman did not
hold that the privilege cannot apply to a communication to a
nonparty. The court explained that the communication must
have a functional connection to litigation in that it “must function
as a necessary or useful step in the litigation process and must
serve its purposes.” (Rothman, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146.)
Here, Jaureguito’s statements advance his interests in, and serve
as a useful step in the process of, the dissolution action. In his
email, Jaureguito expresses allegations of Besh’s wrongdoing and
makes requests of Besh based on these allegations, and the
dissolution action includes claims addressed in the email. This
satisfies the “connection or logical relation” requirement of the
litigation privilege. (Id. at pp. 1145, 1146.)
      We are no more persuaded by Besh’s related contention
that the litigation privilege does not apply because the email is
not a prelitigation demand. Besh cites Edwards v. Centex Real
Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, to support his argument.
There, our colleagues in Division Three held “that the privilege
attaches at that point in time that imminent access to the courts
is seriously proposed by a party in good faith for the purpose of
resolving a dispute, and not when a threat of litigation is made
merely as a means of obtaining a settlement.” (Id. at p. 36.) As
Edwards explained, the litigation privilege may attach to pre-
litigation statements when a judicial proceeding is “actually

                                  12
contemplated seriously and in good faith to resolve a dispute,”
meaning that “the mere potential or ‘bare possibility’ that judicial
proceedings ‘might be instituted’ in the future is insufficient to
invoke the litigation privilege.” (Ibid.)
      Here, as previously discussed, the record demonstrates
there was not merely a potential or bare possibility of future
litigation when Jaureguito wrote the email. Instead, he in good
faith contemplated and seriously considered litigation. (Action
Apartment Association, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 [“prelitigation communication is privileged
only when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good
faith and under serious consideration”].) Jaureguito filed the
dissolution action only three weeks after sending his email, and
included his attorney on it. “While not dispositive, whether a
lawsuit was ultimately brought is relevant to the determination
of whether one was contemplated in good faith at the time of the
demand letter.” (Dickinson v. Cosby (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655,
683.) In sum, we conclude Besh cannot demonstrate a probability
of prevailing because the litigation privilege bars his claims.
                          DISPOSITION
      The order granting Jaureguito’s anti-SLAPP motion is
affirmed. Jaureguito is entitled to his costs on appeal (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2)) and may seek recovery of his attorney’s
fees pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c), in amounts to be
determined by the trial court. (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1271.)

                                            BROWN, P. J.

                                 13
WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
HIRAMOTO, J.                        Besh v. Juareguito (A164397)

     
        Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                               14