Court Opinion

ID: 9703806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:08:10.02055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:51.743254
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion.
Arterburn, J.
I regret that I have to dissent to the majority opinion. The evidence is without contradiction that the appellant was discovered about 8:00 o’clock in the morning in the parts room of the Cohen Brothers garage on North Senate Street in the City of Indianapolis. A watchman had seen him in another room in the warehouse and accordingly notified the owners and the police. The general manager broke through the door in the parts room where he found the appellant crouching up against the wall, attempting to hide. He had previously been seen by the watchman, crouched over among the bins and shelves where the small parts are located. When the general manager asked him what he was doing, he said he was looking for work. Mr. Cohen, the other partner, said that the appellant was “hiding in the southwest corner behind, crouched behind a door.” When he asked him what he was doing there he said he came in to get warm. The witness also said that the appellant smelled from drinking whiskey. The watchman testified that he first saw the appellant in one part of the building and finally discovered him in the parts room, and upon discovery, appellant said “I just, came in there to get a drink of water.” The watchman said that there was another person with him who apparently had fled and was not seen by any of the witnesses.
*444The main issue in this case is the question of whether or not there are circumstances and facts from which an inference of guilt may be drawn by reason of the appellant’s presence in a place where he had no right to be under the suspicious circumstances which have been related. In that connection his contradictory statements or excuses which he gave reflect upon his guilt, and we also have the added fact that on his own direct examination by his own counsel, he admitted a record of previous convictions of burglary and robbery which, if it has no probative value to show his intent or purpose, at least affects his credibility and whether his statements may be accepted as truthful. The evidence as to intent, a mental condition, can only be proved by circumstantial evidence, outward acts or statements of the individual involved. The intent of the defendant may be read from acts, conduct, and inferences fairly deductible from all circumstances. 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Burglary, §52.
“The intent, however, may, and generally must, be proved by circumstantial evidence, for as a rule it is not susceptible of direct proof; and it has been held that the evidence of intent sufficient to support a conviction of burglary may be slight, in the absence of any evidence that the entry was made with any other intent . . . Even; where the felony was not actually committed, an intent to commit it may be inferred from the time and manner at and in which the entry was made, or the conduct of accused after the entry, or both.” 12 C.J.S., Burglary, § 55.
In the case of Kondrup v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 320, 235 N. E. 2d 703, 705, this Court dealt with a case somewhat similar, although in that connection the defendant was observed to be holding a gun in his hand while inside the shop into which he had broken. Judge Lewis therein stated:
“While it is true that no one actually saw the appellant consummate the felony, the intent to commit a felony may be inferred from the circumstances which legitimately permit it. [Citing cases] Also, it is well settled that the issue of intent is for the jury to determine.”
*445That opinion also quotes with approval the following statement:
“Where the evidence, either direct or .circumstantial, is such that two inferences may reasonably be drawn therefrom, one of guilt and one of innocence, it is not within the province of this court to determine which inference should have controlled, that being exclusively for the trial court. [Citing cases]”
In Higgins v. State (1964), 246 Ind. 62, 202 N. E. 2d 569, a case with an almost identical set of facts was presented to this Court. In that case a home owner came home suddenly and heard someone running down his basement stairs. He ran and grabbed the intruder and asked him what he was doing there and his reply was, he was looking for work. He and his son held the defendant until the police arrived. He was charged in the case with burglary, and we affirmed the conviction on the ground that his fleeing and his excuse for being present in a place where he had no right to be, were matters and facts from which a jury could .conclude that he was guilty.
The majority opinion seems to us to soften the significance of the testimony that the appellant was hiding or crouching at the time he was discovered. In my opinion, this evidence is uncontradicted, and it is evidence of guilty intent, the same as that to be drawn where a man flees from the scene of a crime. Police officer Hunter stated that he found “Crawford hiding” in the parts room in the place where the small parts were kept. A partner, Cohen, testified “We found this man right here hiding in the southwest corner behind, crouched behind a door.” The general manager, Morey, testified that they had been informed someone was in the building and they, with the police, were searching for the invader and that he found the parts room with the door locked, which was usually not locked; that he burst the door open “and just inside the room hiding right beside the door was a man stand*446ing there.” At another point he says the appellant was “squeezed against the wall.” At another point he says that the appellant was “hugging the wall.” The watchman, when he first discovered the appellant in the building says, “He was stooped down trying to get something or to hide his face from me or something like that in some way in that manner.”
In addition to all these guilt-laden acts of the appellant, we have further testimony that the window in the storeroom had been newly broken out and it was not broken the day previous, and they thereafter boarded up the window. The owners further testified that they had not authorized any one to .clean the place up where the appellant was found nor had they hired any one to do so nor had they attempted to hire any one or to secure any one for that purpose, and that they had authorized no one to enter the building at the time the appellant was found there. In my opinion, it would contravene all good reasoning to conclude the appellant was inside the building without a felonious purpose. The trier of the facts, whether he be the jury man or the judge, places himself in the position of the average man. The average man would draw no other conclusion than that appellant’s purpose was felonious. It would strain the reasoning of the average juryman to conclude that the appellant was innocent, and for this Court to draw such a conclusion, I regret to say, in my opinion, makes it appear ridiculous.
The majority opinion penalizes efficient methods of law enforcement, such as alarm systems. Police officers promptly alerted, must wait until the intruder has first seized property or committed a rape or some other felony before the intruder may be convicted of a felony. A home owner who finds an intruder in his home at night will be surprised to learn that such a law-breaker cannot be convicted of a felony until he has first seized property or raped somebody, even though he can make no logical explanation- of why he is there and even though he may be hiding or attempting to flee.
*447I feel the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Lewis, C.J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 241 N. E. 2d 795.