Court Opinion

ID: 9629532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:44:12.405826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:20.417861
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
On the basis of what in my judgment are sound propositions, having a vital bearing on the balance of power between the three branches of government, I dissent from declaring the statute unconstitutional.
First, the only searches which are prohibited by our constitutional provisions are those which are unreasonable.1
Second, the Legislature has fashioned this statute in obvious awareness of the foregoing, and has laden it with requirements that any such inspection must be reasonable. It must be done by a representative presenting appropriate credentials and at “reasonable times” and in a “reasonable manner.”
Third, it is our duty to assume that the statute will be understood, applied, and adhered to in a constitutional manner:2 i. e., that the only inspections performed will be subject to the clearly stated restrictions of reasonableness; and therefore under those restrictions, there can be no unreasonable search authorized by the statute. In authorizing an inspection in the interests of safety and health, I see no likelihood of oppressive conduct or undue annoyance. If the proposed inspection is regarded by the inspected -as unreasonable, he can refuse; then the inspector must obtain judicial approval and a warrant.
Fourth: a fundamental principle of constitutional law is that the judicial branch should exercise judicial restraint, and should not intrude into the legislative prerogative 3 and not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is so beyond a reasonable doubt.4 It is important to keep in mind that the judiciary has an awesome responsibility in that it can exercise final judgment on the prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as upon its own; and that practically the only restraint thereon is its own sense of self-restraint. It is obvious that if such restraint is not exercised the courts could arbitrarily arrogate to themselves dangerous powers which could impair- or destroy the balance of power which has served so *898well as one of the distinctive advantages of our system of government. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the judiciary resist the temptation to extend its own authority and that it exercise great care not to encroach upon the prerogatives of the other two branches.
On the basis of what has been said above, it is my opinion that it is not only contrary to sound policy and well-established principles of law, but is unnecessary and ill-advised, to declare the statute unconstitutional.

. Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 14; U.S.Const., Fourth Amendment.

. Vanlaningham v. Dept. of Business Regulation, Utah, 566 P.2d 1238, citing Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P.2d 400.

. Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643.

. Salt Lake City v. Savage, Utah, 541 P.2d 1035, citing Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958; and Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234.