Court Opinion

ID: 9678269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:15:24.148082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.563632
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
GRANT, Justice.
In the motion for rehearing, the Texarkana Memorial Hospital and the physicians called to our attention that we did not address appellants’ points 23-26 in our original opinion. These points of error contend that the trial court erred in allowing immaterial evidence in opinion form on negligence, proximate cause, gross negligence, and heedlessness and recklessness in regard to the conduct of the physicians and hospital without requiring that the questions and answers be related to specific conduct raised by the pleadings and proof. We had not addressed these points of error, because we had already ruled that the experts could not testify as to mixed issues of fact and law. We agree with the contention that the questions and answers should *341not be broader in scope than the pleadings and also that conclusions should be based upon specific conduct and should encompass only matters involved in the proof before the jury. We have again reviewed the references to which the hospital and physicians referred. In most instances, we find the context of the testimony or the specific references in the questions are sufficient to confine them to the pleadings and proof. In some instances, the questions and answers were so general that they may have encompassed matters outside of the pleadings and proof; however, in these four instances, no objection was made to the effect that they were outside of the pleadings and proof. Therefore, our finding of error remains as addressed in our original opinion.
In their motion for rehearing, the appellants urged the reconsideration of the point of error involving the failure of the appel-lees to lay the proper predicate before the introduction of other cases involving RLF.
They cite the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 29 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 449 (June 25, 1986). In that case the Supreme Court declared that the defendant was entitled to defend itself “by explaining, rebutting, or demonstrating the untruthfulness of the objectionable evidence without waiving its objections.” In the Scurlock Oil Co. case, the Court was dealing with statements made during the closing arguments, not in the introduction of evidence. However, their language indicates that a defendant is entitled to utilize any means available to defend itself against inadmissible evidence as long as the defendant remains in a defensive posture.
The Scurlock Oil Co. case cites two other Supreme Court cases. One is the case of Roosth & Genecov Production Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an objection to evidence was not waived by cross-examination and explanatory testimony after the objectionable evidence was admitted. This case involved the introduction of the replacement of a foundation block after the event which occasioned the lawsuit. The case does not clearly indicate whether or not the explanatory testimony was offered by one of the defendant’s witnesses.
The other case cited in the Scurlock Oil Co. opinion is the case of State v. Chavers, 454 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.1970). This case involved testimony by the State’s expert on redirect examination to rebut matters already introduced and about which the expert was questioned concerning “a three hundred dollar sale” which was based on incompetent evidence. The Supreme Court said the State had a right to defend itself, and in so doing did not waive its objection.
In - our original opinion, we cited five cases which indicated that the introduction of evidence on a matter which had been objected to when the plaintiff introduced the same, would constitute a waiver of that objection.
In McDonough v. Zamora, 338 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court held that where hearsay testimony was objected to, the objection was waived when the objecting party independently develops the same testimony and offered a letter to that effect. In the case of Dohoney v. Womack, 1 Tex.Civ.App. 354, 19 S.W. 883, aff'd on rehearing, 20 S.W. 950 (Tex.Civ.App.1892, writ ref’d), the court held that where a deed had been objected to because no proof had been made of the proceedings in a probate court or in the sale and confirmation thereof, this objection was waived when the objecting party introduced the same deed into evidence. In the case of Simmons v. Capital Diesel & Industrial Machine Works, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the appellant objected to the admission of an offer of compromise. The court held that this objection was waived by the objecting party when that party testified to the check offered in *342settlement of the claim and went into detail as to how the amount was calculated.
In the case of Maizel v. Bush, 337 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the appellant had objected to testimony explaining the meaning of a contract involved in the case. The court held that the objection was waived when the appellant offered testimony explaining the meaning of the contract. City of Houston v. Howe & Wise, 323 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.), was a case in which the appellants complained that the appellee went outside the bounds of the contract with certain testimony, and the court found this had been waived because the appellee had also gone outside the bounds of the contract in the questioning of its expert witness, a consulting engineer. However, the court also said that his testimony had to do mainly with his performance under the contract rather than his construction of the contract.
It is difficult to reconcile this line of cases with the Supreme Court cases on this issue. Certainly in a situation in which the evidence is objected to because of the failure to lay a proper predicate, the evidence would become admissible if the opposing party brought in evidence which would lay the predicate.
In the present case, numerous references were made during the trial to “blind babies at Wadley.” The portion of the record which the Birchfields contend constituted a waiver was the testimony of Dr. Betty Lowe which was as follows:
Q Now Mr. Branson has referred to blind babies as Wadley, over and over again. Other than Kellie, in the years prior to Kellie, were there blind babies from R.L.F. at Wadley Hospital?
A We — there were some babies that had retrolental fibroplasia.
Q Now let me repeat my question. Were there blind babies, plural, other than Kellie, at Wadley Hospital prior to Kellie’s birth?
A No, sir.
Q How many blind babies were there at Wadley prior to Kellie, that you know of, Doctor Lowe?
A One.
Q Now there were some babies, just like everywhere else in American (sic), then and now, who had R.L.F., weren’t there?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so I think Mr. Branson has been referring to five, so that leaves three babies with R.L.F., and would you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury whether or not those three were blind babies, and if not, what was the degree of their visual impairment?
A Can I mention them one by one?
Q Yes. Let’s not mention names.
A All right.
Q Just refer to the babies.
A There was one baby, a baby girl born in 1970, who weighed two pounds two ounces. She did indeed have several problems and was a sick baby, and she did have retrolental fibroplasia that is described as being aborted; and what that means is that it’s mild, and that child does go to school and does not have that much problem with its vision. There was another baby that was a three pound twin, and she had mild retrolental fibroplasia in one eye. Her care was identical to that of her twin. The twin has no problem with his eyes at all. That child does not have a visual defect, although she does indeed go to an ophthalmologist regularly.
Q Now let me stop you. That child had one perfectly normal eye? Did I understand you correctly?
A Yes, sir, she has some retrolental changes in one eye.
Q All right, and the other eye is perfectly all right?
A That’s right.
Q And even the one with the R.L.F. changes in it, does she have vision there?
A Yes, sir.
Q All right, go ahead.
A The next child weighed about eighteen hundred grams, did indeed have *343again an ill neonatal course, has retrolen-tal fibroplasia in both eyes and although he is considered legally blind, clinically that child is healthy. He goes to school, public school, with the help of big print books, and I think the last time any of us at Southern Clinic saw him, he had the usual eight, nine year old bicycle type accident that a child frequently has.
Q You mean this blind baby that Mr. Branson talks about does have visual impairment, but is still able to ride his bicycle?
A Yes, sir, there is no question about him having visual impairment. He certainly does, but he is a healthy boy. He does ride his bicycle, he plays ball, and does the activities that he wants to do.
Q And he is going to public school.
A Yes, with the help of large print textbooks.
Q All right, Doctor, that completes the five, quote, “blind babies” at Wadley, does its not?
A There was the baby that was born in 73.
Q That would be the Reppond child?
A Yes, sir.
Q All right, and that child is blind.
A Yes, sir. That baby was actually born at Clarksville, had a great deal of difficulty. He is blind. He does have some brain damage, and at this point in time it would appear that that baby probably had some sort of interuterine difficulty that contributed to his problems long before he was born.
The hospital also contends that it should not be considered to have waived its objection, because of evidence which was offered by the physicians and not the hospital. In reconsidering this evidence in light of the Scurlock Oil Co. decision allowing defensive measures of explaining, rebutting, or demonstrating the untruthfulness of the objectionable evidence, we find that this evidence did not constitute a waiver.
We again examine the record to determine if a proper predicate was laid to the introduction of references to the “five blind babies.”1 Many of the cases involving the laying of a proper .predicate for other occurrences involve automobile or train accidents which occurred at the same location, but the Texas cases consistently require that the other occurrences be “reasonably similar” or “under substantially similar conditions.” Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Cooper, 563 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.1978); Nevauex v. Park Place Hospital, Inc., 656 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Reynolds & Huff v. White, 378 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1964, no writ).
The only testimony that the Birch-fields contend in their brief laid a predicate for the introduction of the other incidents of RLF is the testimony of the expert witness Dr. Eichenwald.2 This testimony does not establish that these occurrences were under reasonably similar or substantially similar conditions as the Birchfield baby. Specifically, the evidence does not show what babies or how many babies to which he is making reference, nor does it show that the other babies received excessive or improperly administered supplemental oxygen during the treatment by the hospital and physicians involved in this suit which is the alleged cause of the RLF. The causation was a hotly disputed issue in the suit, and the mere fact that the other children had RLF does not establish that they were treated with supplemental oxygen at Tex-*344arkana Memorial Hospital. (Dr. Eichen-wald, an expert witness for the Birchfields, acknowledged that RLF sometimes occurs when no supplemental oxygen is administered.)
In reviewing the record, we find that at least thirty-nine references were made by the attorneys for the Birchfields or by their witnesses to other instances of RLF at the hospital by referring to either “five blind babies” or to the Reppond baby or the Cardwell baby. Twelve of these references were made to the Reppond child, and although a proper predicate was not laid initially, near the end of the trial the following evidence was offered:
Q That — I’m entitled to have you answer my question, and that statement about about both babies is absolutely true. One of them is now nine, and the other one is ten, they both in 1973 and ’4 went for hundreds of hours with oxygen therapy and no blood gasses monitered, and they’re both stone blind, aren’t they?
A That’s true.
' This evidence is sufficient to establish that the Reppond case was reasonably similar to the present case. We conclude that a proper foundation was laid for the introduction of the Reppond case, although this did not authorize the references to the settlement of this case which we found to be error in the original opinion.
This leaves over twenty references which included references to babies blinded by RLF to which a proper predicate was not laid. These references include the following:
During the testimony of Dr. Eichenwald:
Q Now to your knowledge how many babies have been blinded in that hospital since then?
A Five.
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Q Unless Wadley Hospital was truly a disaster area, statistically with no more premature infants than they treat, my recollection is maybe one hundred and fifty a year at the outside, in a five-year period, unless it is truly a disaster area going on, could you get five blind babies?
A No. Statistically, that just simply couldn’t happen unless things were done very badly. [This question and answer was also read to the jury during the final argument.]
During the testimony of the hospital administrator:
Q All right. Now I want you to assume that the testimony in this case has been so far that after that occurred, in the next several years, next few years, there were five cases of exactly what Betty Lowe was warning against coming out of that nursery, retrolental fibropla-sia, in five cases of children that were blinded. Will you assume that for me?
A As the instructions, I will.
During the testimony of Nurse June Derrick:
Q Okay. Do you think the parents of those five blind children that came out of the nursery after Betty Lowe stood up and said if you don’t get us some facilities to accurately monitor blood gasses you’re going to have some blind babies and you’re going to be legally liable, should feel as though you had a really good nursery, ma’am?
During the testimony of Dr. Ehrenkranz:
Q And they had from 1971 to about ’76, according to their testimony, five cases of blindness coming out of that hospital. Now does that say anything to you, Doctor, as a neonatologist who treats sick babies?
A It would suggest that there is a problem in the way the babies are being monitored and cared for. If they were all of the same caliber in terms of their status or condition, medical condition, as Kellie — in other words if they were essentially small, well premature infants, it would make me be concerned about how they were monitored, how they were cared for, and specifically the amount of oxygen that they were exposed to. [This *345question and answer was also read to the jury during the final argument.]
During the testimony of Dr. Hall:
Q Well, Doctor, you are being sued on a Cardwell baby in another case, aren’t you?
A That’s the one.
During the testimony of Dr. Lowe:
Q You’re a defendant in the Cardwell case which is set in October of this year, aren’t you?
A I am a defendant in the Cardwell case.
We conclude that these references being a recurring theme throughout the trial constituted error of a nature that is calculated to and probably did cause rendition of an improper verdict. Moreover, when the cumulative effect of the other errors mentioned in our original opinion combines with this error, the probability is multiplied and the judgment cannot stand.
Therefore, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
BLEIL, J., not participating.

. We do not refer to the future tense statement alleged to have been made by the party Dr. Lowe that "We are going to have some blind babies at Wadley.” This would be admissible as an admission against interest. Rather we address the references to the "five blind babies” or specific cases other than the Birchfield child.

. The testimony of Dr. Eichenwald was as follows:
Q And did Betty Lowe’s prediction come true? That is, they did not get the facilities to accurately monitor, with trained personnel and equipment, the blood gasses of premature infants in Wadley Hospital, and there were blind babies.
A Yes, according to—I think it was Doctor May’s deposition ...