Court Opinion

ID: 9951896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 15:01:07.525638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:22.120902
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11718   Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 03/19/2024    Page: 1 of 14

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
              United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11718
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        In re: ERIC WATKINS,
                                                                Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 0:19-mc-63180-WPD
                          ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11718

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Eric Watkins, proceeding pro se, filed a motion seeking leave
        to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging constitutional claims
        stemming from his suspension from a public library located on a
        college campus.
               Watkins is a serial litigant who is subject to a filing injunc-
        tion that prevents him from filing any new lawsuit in the Southern
        District of Florida without prior court approval. In a prior case, we
        upheld this filing injunction on appeal “so long as the court merely
        screen[s] out the frivolous and malicious claims and allow[s] the
        arguable claims to go forward.” Watkins v. Dubreuil, 820 F. App’x
        940, 948 (11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (alterations adopted, quota-
        tion marks omitted). The district court screened Watkins’s pro-
        posed complaint and determined he did not present an arguable
        case and concluded this was a frivolous lawsuit. Watkins now ap-
        peals. After careful review, we agree with the district court that
        Watkins’s claims are frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the dismis-
        sal of Watkins’s proposed claims.
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        23-11718                 Opinion of the Court                             3

                                             I.
                In his proposed § 1983 complaint, Watkins sought to bring a
        civil suit against library supervisor Victoria Weidman, an unknown
        Broward Community College security guard, and an unknown
        Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BSO”) deputy for suspending
        him from the North Regional/Broward College Library, claiming
        that they violated his First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment
        rights, and Due Process rights.
               The proposed complaint alleged that, on April 23, 2019,
        Watkins was suspended from the library for thirty days following
        an altercation with a library patron and the library supervisor.
        Watkins attempted to use the restroom at the library and encoun-
        tered a male, who he claimed “verbally assaulted” him. The alter-
        cation between the two men resulted in the summoning of police
        and the college security guard. Immediately following the inci-
        dent, the defendants collectively engaged in what Watkins alleges
        was a “limited and biased” investigation. At the conclusion of the
        investigation, Weidman and the security guard determined that
        Watkins would be suspended from the library for thirty days.
                 During a discussion in the library lobby with Watkins,
        Weidman referred to Watkins as “sir” and Watkins vehemently ob-
        jected, stating, “my name is not sir, sir is a Faggot and a madicone”
        [sic]. 1 Watkins alleged that Weidman was “quite familiar” with

        1 Watkins most likely meant to use the word “maricon” in his proposed com-

        plaint. The word “maricon” is an extremely offensive Spanish slang term that
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11718

        him (due to a prior lawsuit he filed against her) and she knew he
        did not like being called “sir.” Following the exchange, the BSO
        deputy attempted to admonish Watkins, who explained why he did
        not like being called “sir.” After Watkins left the library building
        and was sitting outside, the BSO officer and security guard fol-
        lowed Watkins and engaged him. The security guard told Watkins
        that he was going to “trespass warn” him from returning to the
        library and warned, if Watkins ever returned, he would be arrested
        for trespassing. Watkins claims he was detained in order to be pho-
        tographed for the trespass warning. He then left the premises.
               Although Watkins did not receive any written notice of his
        suspension from the library on the day of the incident, he received
        written notice of his suspension on June 6, 2019, from an individual
        in the Director of the Broward County Library division. He was
        given ten days to file an appeal. On June 12, 2019, Watkins filed his
        notice of appeal, and on June 25, 2019, the library division re-
        sponded, stating that the thirty-day suspension was moot because
        it had run its course.
               On appeal, Watkins argues that the district court erred in
        denying his motion for leave to file the proposed complaint be-
        cause the complaint had “arguable merit.” Watkins avers that the
        defendants violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
        Due Process Clause rights by (1) suspending him from the library,
        in violation of his freedom of speech; (2) unlawfully detaining him

        refers to an individual who is homosexual. See https://www.span-
        ishdict.com/translate/maric%C3%B3n (last visited March 7, 2024).
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        23-11718                Opinion of the Court                          5

        while he was leaving the library, so they could take a trespass photo
        without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, in violation of the
        Fourth Amendment; and (3) suspending him from the library and
        accusing him of trespass without written notice, in violation of the
        Fourteenth Amendment.
                                          II.
                We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for
        failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), us-
        ing the same standards that govern Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.,
        dismissals. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
        But a determination of frivolity “is best left to the district court,”
        Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001). So we review a
        dismissal as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for an abuse of
        discretion only. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir.
        2008). Under this deferential standard, we will affirm unless the
        district court made a clear error of judgment or applied an incorrect
        legal standard. Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d
        1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
                A complaint may be frivolous if it lacks arguable factual or
        legal merit, or if the realistic chance of ultimate success is slight.
        Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349. Frivolity review is intended “to discourage
        the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, base-
        less lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because
        of the costs of bringing suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
        (1989). In determining frivolousness, the district court may also
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                23-11718

        consider “a litigant’s history of bringing unmeritorious litigation.”
        Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1350.
                When conducting a frivolity screening pursuant to
        § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the district court has no requirement to assume
        the truth of the allegations, unlike on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Co-
        field v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 515 (11th Cir. 1991)
        (discussing the same statute previously codified at § 1915(d)). So a
        claim capable of surviving a motion to dismiss “may nonetheless
        be dismissed as frivolous because the factual contentions are so far-
        fetched or baseless.” Id. But even if a complaint legally states a
        claim and the facts are not fantastic, dismissal on the grounds of
        frivolity can be justified in narrow circumstances, such as a “ques-
        tionable claim” by a litigant with a “long history of bringing un-
        meritorious litigation.” Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd.,
        915 F.2d 636, 641 (11th Cir. 1990).
                Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
        concluded that Watkins’s April 2023, proposed complaint lacked
        arguable merit. Citing numerous previous unsuccessful lawsuits,
        the district court, which was most familiar with Watkins’s litigation
        history, determined that Watkins “has a pattern of cursing and dis-
        playing disruptive behavior in public places, like singing anti-gay
        songs, complaining about the term ‘Sir’ and using the word ‘Fag-
        got[,]’” and then suing the individuals who confront him. The dis-
        trict court concluded that the allegations in Watkins’s current
        pleading were “entirely consistent” with his pattern of “goading in-
        dividuals into responding to this inappropriate behavior so that he
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        23-11718                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        can later sue them, usually years later, just as the statute of limita-
        tions is about to run.” And here, he did so on “nearly the last day
        before the statute [of limitations ran].” Under these circumstances,
        the district court determined that the proposed complaint was yet
        another malicious lawsuit.
               Given Watkins’s history and the facts alleged in the pro-
        posed complaint, we find that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion when it concluded Watkins’s claims were frivolous and
        warranted dismissal.
                                             III.
               Besides this, Watkins presented “questionable” claims. See
        Clark, 915 F.2d at 61. Watkins seeks to sue the library supervisor,
        a police officer, and a security officer individually for damages un-
        der § 1983. 2 So to prevail he must show that the defendants vio-
        lated his constitutional rights. See Waldron v. Spicher, 954 F.3d 1297,
        1303 (11th Cir. 2020). He cannot do that.
        A.     First Amendment Retaliation Claim
                The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no
        law abridging the freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. Gen-
        erally, “the First Amendment prohibits government officials from
        subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in pro-
        tected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019)

        2 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code makes any person acting under color

        of state law liable for depriving another person of a federal right. 42 U.S.C.
        § 1983.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11718

        (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
        ted). To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a
        plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in constitutionally pro-
        tected speech; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely af-
        fected that protected speech; and (3) a causal connection exists be-
        tween the defendant’s retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on
        the plaintiff’s speech. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d
        1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019). A person suffers an adverse action if
        “the defendant’s allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a
        person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment
        rights.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005).
                In a previous case Watkins ﬁled, we recognized that the First
        Amendment protects the right to receive information, including
        the “‘right to some level of access to a public library.’” In re Watkins,
        No. 23-10359, 2023 WL 5664171, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2023)
        (quoting Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d
        1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992)). But that right to access is not boundless,
        nor does it allow patrons of the library to engage in “‘conduct that
        would disrupt the quiet and peaceful library environment.’” Id.
        (quoting Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1256).
               According to Watkins’s proposed complaint, he was sus-
        pended from the library for thirty days, asked to leave, and “tres-
        passed” after he used anti-gay slurs in response to Weidman’s refer-
        ring to him as “sir.” As the library supervisor, Weidman could rea-
        sonably view oﬀensive and homophobic language as disruptive to
        the “quiet and peaceful library environment.” Kreimer, 958 F.2d at
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        23-11718               Opinion of the Court                          9

        1256. And the BSO oﬃcer and security guard reasonably could
        have reached the same conclusion. Given Watkins’s disruptive and
        oﬀensive behavior, the oﬃcials did not act unreasonably in sus-
        pending Watkins from the library. So they did not violate Wat-
        kins’s First Amendment rights. DeMartini, 942 F.3d at 1289.
               In short, Watkins has no viable First Amendment claim.
        B.     Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Seizure Claim
                The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of persons to
        be free from unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Terry
        v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968). To be reasonable, a custodial seizure
        must be supported by probable cause. Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d
        899, 905 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The Fourth Amendment
        contemplates three categories of police-citizen encounters: (1) a
        consensual police-citizen interaction involving no coercion or de-
        tention; (2) a brief seizure or investigatory detention; and (3) an ar-
        rest. Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006). A Fourth
        Amendment seizure occurs when an officer, through “physical
        force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [a person’s] free-
        dom of movement, through means intentionally applied.” Chan-
        dler v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir.
        2012) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
        omitted).
               The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit an oﬃcer from
        making an investigatory stop, commonly known as a Terry stop,
        even without probable cause to make an arrest, if (1) the oﬃcer has
        a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11718

        to commit a crime, and (2) the stop was reasonably related in scope
        to the circumstances that justiﬁed the interference in the ﬁrst place.
        United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011). Account-
        ing for all the particular circumstances, though, no seizure occurs
        under the Fourth Amendment if a reasonable person would have
        believed that he was free to leave. Id. Under Florida law, “a stop
        merely to issue a trespass warning is not a Terry stop, but rather a
        consensual encounter.” Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310, 311 (Fla.
        Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (footnote omitted). Consensual encounters do
        not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.
               Watkins’s brief encounter with law enforcement did not vi-
        olate his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Alt-
        hough Watkins contends he was “detained” by the BSO deputy,
        the complaint lacks any allegations that Watkins was physically re-
        strained or that he was advised that he was not free to leave. See
        Chandler, 695 F.3d at 1199. And while the deputy would have been
        required to show reasonable suspicion that Watkins had commit-
        ted or was about to commit a crime to conduct a more intrusive
        detention, Watkins was not subjected to a seizure within the mean-
        ing of the Fourth Amendment.
                Here, the stop was made “merely to issue a trespass warn-
        ing[,]” inform Watkins of his suspension from the library premises,
        and enable the officer to take a photograph to enforce the trespass
        warning. Under these facts, the stop was a consensual encounter
        under Florida law. See Rodriguez, 29 So. 3d at 311. Importantly,
        nowhere in the proposed complaint does Watkins state that the
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        23-11718                Opinion of the Court                         11

        BSO deputy directed him to remain anywhere, told him that he did
        not have any choice in the matter, or that he could not leave until
        a written trespass warning was issued. Cf. Moore v. State, 200 So. 2d
        1290, 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). Under the circumstances al-
        leged, no violation of Watkins’s Fourth Amendment rights oc-
        curred since the issuance of a trespass warning does not require
        probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Miller, 458 F.3d at 1257;
        Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.
        C.     Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
               The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may de-
        prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
        of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause requires
        that an individual be given appropriate notice and an opportunity
        to be heard before such a deprivation. Catron v. City of St. Petersburg,
        658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011). That said, the notice and hear-
        ing “may be postponed until after the deprivation has occurred.”
        Id.
               For a procedural-due-process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
        must prove (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty
        or property interest, (2) state action, and (3) constitutionally inade-
        quate process. Id. We have recognized a “constitutionally pro-
        tected liberty interest to be in parks or on other city lands of their
        choosing that are open to the public generally.” Id. (citing City of
        Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)). An individual may forfeit his
        liberty interest by committing trespass or other violations of the
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11718

        law. Id. (citing City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir.
        1994)).
               In Counts I and II of the proposed complaint, Watkins takes
        issue with Weidman’s refusal to provide him with a copy of the
        thirty-day suspension and the security guard’s failure to give a writ-
        ten notice of trespass.
               With respect to his thirty-day suspension from the library,
        Watkins cannot show that the process afforded to him was consti-
        tutionally inadequate. Weidman initially gave Watkins a verbal
        notification of his suspension from the library on April 23, 2019—
        the date of the incident. And although Watkins did not receive
        written notice at that time, his proposed complaint concedes that
        he received written notice of his suspension from the library on
        June 6, 2019. He has not alleged any facts that indicate the written
        notice was substantively inadequate or that any delay in receiving
        written notice prejudiced him in exercising his right to appeal the
        suspension. Under these circumstances, no procedural-due-pro-
        cess violation occurred. See Catron, 658 F.3d at 1266.
               Likewise, no constitutional violation occurred with respect
        to the alleged failure to provide a trespass notice. Under Florida
        law, “[a] person who, without being authorized, licensed, or in-
        vited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than
        a structure or conveyance[ ] [a]s to which notice against entering
        or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the of-
        fender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation” commits a trespass on
        property other than a structure or conveyance. Fla. Stat. §
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        23-11718               Opinion of the Court                         13

        810.09(1)(a)(1). Nothing in the statute requires the trespass notice
        to be written. And here, Watkins was given a verbal warning by
        the security guard regarding trespass. Watkins also was not ar-
        rested for trespass.
               Not only that, but any trespass notice is arguably encom-
        passed in the suspension notice that Watkins did receive. This is
        particularly true since Watkins alleged that the security guard, not
        the BSO officer, provided the trespass notice. Regardless, Watkins
        takes issue with only the fact that he did not receive a copy of a
        written trespass warning. But that is not required. He also does
        not allege the lack of formal procedure—set out in an ordinance or
        otherwise—by which a recipient of a trespass warning may chal-
        lenge the basis of the warning or the terms of the warning violates
        his rights. Cf. Catron, 658 F.3d at 1265-66. Finally, because Watkins
        admitted to using homophobic slurs in the library, he arguably vi-
        olated the law by disturbing the peaceful environment of the li-
        brary. Consequently, Watkins may have forfeited his liberty inter-
        est and no procedural-due-process violation took place. See id. at
        1266.
                                         IV.
               The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
        Watkins’s proposed complaint lacked merit and his claims were
        frivolous. This is especially so, given Watkins’s extensive history
        of meritless litigation involving nearly identical allegations in prior
        suits.
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        14                   Opinion of the Court              23-11718

             For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of
        Watkins’s motion for leave to file a complaint.
              AFFIRMED.