Court Opinion

ID: 9727759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:49:46.066305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:42.545076
License: Public Domain

Colwell, D.J., Retired,
dissenting.
1 respectfully dissent for reasons hereafter discussed. The “fighting” evidence was included in the testimony of the State’s eighth witness, Mark Russell Weiss:
Q. Okay. How long have you known A. J. Lenz?
A. Probably about two years.
Q. And have you ever known him to be in any kind of fights or assaults?
A. I had come back with a friend of mine by — across from Iowa, we were coming to Nebraska, by the 13th and L Street. There’s a Kwik Shop located at that intersection.
Q. Okay. The L Street bridge there?
A. And a friend of mine that I had worked with at Longnecker’s, I had driven by it and I saw a fight taking place, I didn’t know who it was at the time.
Q. Let me stop you there. You say the fight taking place. Did you ever find out later who was involved in the fight?
*700A. Yes.
Q. And you learned that A. J. Lenz was one of the people involved?
A. Yes.
MR. GARVEY: Objection, hearsay, foundation, relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. (By Mr. Irwin) And did you ever hear what had started the fight?
A. An argument about a car. Somebody said that A. J.’s car was a piece of junk, and he got very upset and he proceeded to act violently towards this —
Q. That night?
A. Yeah.
Q. Got out of the car, they had a fight?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did A. J. Lenz ever tell you about any other fights he had been in besides — other than that fight?
A. He had indicated where he was at a party, he was walking out to a car, his car, and somebody wanted to pick a fight with him at this party, and he was walking out to his car. And his — some girl was standing on top of the car or in a position where she could kick him, and hit him in the head. And she had kicked him in the head, and he fell down and he got up and he got into a fight then, too.
Q. With just the woman or with anyone else?
MR. GARVEY: I’d object again, Your Honor, I fail to see the relevance.
THE COURT: Sustained on [relevancy],
MR. IRWIN: Your Honor, could we approach the bench?
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
(Discussion held in low tones at the bench, off the record.)
(The following proceedings were had in normal tones.)
MR. IRWIN: No other questions of this witness, Your Honor.
First of all, apparently defendant’s counsel was not concerned about this line of testimony, since the second *701question clearly put counsel on notice about the nature of the subject to be later pursued, and counsel did not object until four questions were asked and answered. After defendant’s objection was overruled, four more questions and answers were elicited before counsel’s objection was sustained, and then there was neither a motion to strike nor to admonish the jury to disregard the evidence.
A litigant may not speculate about the answer to a question and then, after answer has been given, for the first time lodge his objection.... If a party does not make a timely objection to evidence, the party waives the right on appeal to assert prejudicial error....
In order to be timely an objection must ordinarily be made at the earliest opportunity after the ground for the objection becomes apparent.
State v. Archbold, 217 Neb. 345, 352, 350 N.W.2d 500, 505 (1984).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-103(1) (Reissue 1985) provides that
[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and:
(a) In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if a specific ground was not apparent from the context....
Under the state of the record here, defendant’s failure to make a timely objection to the “fighting” questions and answers was a waiver of his right to later raise that issue in this appeal.
Secondly, there is an overwhelming connecting thread of evidence, including circumstantial evidence, proving defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and establishing that the “fighting” evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Parts of that evidence are summarized: Mark Clifford Gosch, the State’s 10th witness, testified concerning all of the details of the robbery, including his part in the planning, travel to the robbery scene, the robbery details, division of the money, identifying the gun, knife, and mask as being items connected with the robbery, and his participation in *702the robbery and the part played by Lenz. Jeffords Byington testified that in April or May of 1986 he became acquainted with Lenz, a neighbor. Lenz told him that he planned to rob Domino’s Pizza and asked Byington to help him, which Byington declined to do. After the robbery, Byington was helping Lenz move a waterbed from the basement of his residence to an upper floor when Lenz said that “him and Mark had ripped off Domino’s.” Byington, being a State police informant, furnished this information to the local police. A search of Lenz’s residence produced the BB gun, knife, and monster mask, all a part of the evidence. The knife had a blade 3 -Vi6 inches long. Laurie Milton, 18 years of age, a codefendant in the trial, testified on her own behalf that she did not participate in the robbery; however, shortly before the robbery she, Lenz, and Gosch left the Lenz residence in the Lenz car. Lenz and Gosch told her that they were going to south Omaha to beat up somebody. At that time Lenz and Gosch took with them the BB gun, knife, and monster mask, which she identified in the evidence. She said that she got into an argument with Lenz about going to south Omaha so they left her off at her mother’s house. The only defense witness for Lenz was Gosch, who was called to describe the gun as being a BB gun, inoperable, since it did not have the required carbon dioxide propellant cartridge. Gosch also testified that the gun belonged to Lenz, who used it in the robbery.
This evidence was very strong and practically conclusive, establishing defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Franklin, 194 Neb. 630, 234 N.W.2d 610 (1975). When the “fighting” evidence is considered with all of the other evidence, it is insignificant as an evidentiary factor relating to defendant’s guilt. See State v. Price, 202 Neb. 308, 275 N.W.2d 82 (1979).
In conclusion, the evidentiary error was not prejudicial to defendant. State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47, 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986). The State’s case could not have been significantly less persuasive had the “fighting” evidence been excluded upon defendant’s timely objection and motion to strike. See State v. Whitmore, 221 Neb. 450, 378 N.W.2d 150 (1985). The evidence did not cause a substantial miscarriage of justice. State v. *703Massey, 218 Neb. 492, 357 N.W.2d 181 (1984); § 27-103(1). The claimed evidentiary error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.