Court Opinion

ID: 9581850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:19:38.606643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:17.904317
License: Public Domain

Sears, Presiding Justice.
On January 29, 2001, under the authority of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act,1 the Floyd County District Attorney filed a civil in personam forfeiture complaint against appellants David and Amy Pimper (“the Pimpers”) and their wholly-owned corporations, D.L. Pimper Group, Inc., and Wall Street Creations, Ltd. (“the corporations”). This action was taken following investigations by both the Securities & Exchange Commission and the State. The State’s complaint asserted appellants’ involvement in theft, wire fraud, mail fraud, and violation of the Georgia Securities Act.2 The complaint explained the basis for the superior court’s exercise of jurisdiction, identified certain property to be forfeited, and gave detailed grounds for the forfeiture.3
Also on January 29, the District Attorney obtained an ex parte order from the superior court temporarily restraining appellants from transferring, concealing, assigning or disposing of all assets held in both individual and corporate capacities. Also acting ex parte, the trial court appointed a receiver and assigned him plenary powers to take immediate control of appellants’ assets, books, and possessions; to assume sole control of the corporations; and to report to the court as to appellants’ financial status. The ex parte hearing was not transcribed. However, at a subsequently-held hearing, the trial court made statements indicating that on January 29, it was presented with sufficient sworn testimony and other evidence to support its entry of the TRO and appointment of the receiver.4
Within 24 hours of entry of the trial court’s orders, on January 30, 2001, a hearing was held before the superior court at which appellants were afforded an opportunity to be heard on whether the State’s forfeiture action, the court’s ex parte appointment of a receiver, and issuance of the TRO were improper. Appellants, however, declined to give testimony or submit any evidence before the trial court, stating that they were “unable to bring witnesses forward who are willing to testify and risk criminal prosecution themselves, or further investigation, or risk waiving their privilege against self-incrimination.”
Six days later, on February 5, 2001, appellants filed a motion to dissolve the TRO and receivership order, alleging that the ex parte proceedings were improper. The following day, February 6, the supe*625rior court held a hearing on appellants’ motion to dissolve, again affording appellants the opportunity to present testimony and other evidence to contest the State’s civil forfeiture action. Once more, appellants offered neither sworn testimony nor evidence to the trial court. The superior court then scheduled a full evidentiary hearing on appellants’ dissolution motion, to be held four days later. That hearing was delayed while appellants sought unsuccessfully to remove this matter to the federal court, and the full hearing was rescheduled for February 15, 2001. On February 13, the State notified appellants that as part of its forfeiture action, it was subpoenaing their sworn testimony and the production of documents. The next day, appellants agreed to indefinitely postpone any evidentiary hearing on their motion to dissolve the TRO and receivership due to an improper ex parte hearing. On February 19, 2001, no evidence having been submitted in support of appellants’ motion to dissolve, the motion was denied based upon the pleadings. Appellants appealed that denial to this Court.
On February 21, 2001, the receiver reported to the trial court there were virtually no assets remaining in appellants’ estates not already subject to the claims of secured creditors, many of which were asserted before the State’s forfeiture action was filed. On February 22, 2001, an involuntary petition for bankruptcy was brought against one of the corporations, D.L. Pimper Group, Inc. On February 26, 2001, the other corporation, Wall Street Creations, Ltd., filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. On February 26 and 27, acting on the State’s motion, the trial court entered orders dismissing the State’s forfeiture action and the underlying TRO and receivership. The trial court reapproved its dismissal of the State’s action on April 17, 2001.5
Thereafter, the receiver was automatically converted by operation of law into a Bankruptcy Court custodian, and thus became authorized to dispose of property in the two bankruptcy estates only in accordance with the directives of the Bankruptcy Court.6
On June 22, 2001, the grand jury returned a 75 count indictment *626against David Pimper, alleging theft by deception,7 unlawful securities practice,8 false swearing,9 and the making of false writings and statements.10 On August 1, 2001, following a briefing and hearing, the Bankruptcy Court approved payment of the custodian’s fees. Thereafter, the Bankruptcy Court custodian determined that $2,493.72 he had held since February 2001 was the personal property of the Pimpers, and did not belong to the estate of either of the two corporations in bankruptcy proceedings. On August 23, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court custodian sent a check in the amount of $2,493.72 to the Pimpers and their counsel. The Pimpers’ counsel refused to accept the check from the Bankruptcy Court custodian. It is undisputed by the record that after the $2,493.72 was returned to the Pimpers, none of their personal assets are being held by the State as part of the now-defunct receivership. On September 26, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court custodian filed his final accountings of the estates of the two bankrupt corporations.
Insofar as this appeal concerns the bankrupt corporations, it rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and is subject to the mandatory automatic stay provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.11 Therefore, this appeal must be dismissed with regard to the corporations.12
Insofar as this appeal concerns the Pimpers in their individual capacities, it is moot. An appeal is moot when it seeks to determine an issue which, if resolved, cannot have any practical effect on the underlying controversy,13 or when such resolution will determine only abstract questions not arising upon existing facts or rights.14 The Pimpers appealed to this Court complaining that the receivership and TRO should be dissolved. Such dissolution occurred when the State’s RICO action was dismissed in February 2001, more than six months ago. While the statutory procedures for wrapping up a receivership may not have yet been completed, it is undisputed by the record that the receivership no longer exists and currently holds no assets belonging to the Pimpers in their individual capacity.
Thus, the record shows that appellants have obtained the relief they sought in the superior court — dissolution — and the State no longer exercises dominion over their personal assets. Any resolution *627of the issues raised in appellant’s appeal will not have a practical effect on an underlying case or controversy, and would merely address such issues in the abstract. It follows that the appeal, insofar as it concerns the Pimpers in their individual capacity, is moot. It is, of course, well established that mootness is ohe of the grounds for dismissal of appeals set forth in OCGA § 5-6-48 (b).
The dissent raises well-grounded concerns regarding the constitutional ramifications of an in personam RICO forfeiture action such as the one brought in this appeal, and urges that because these constitutional issues might recur and yet evade review, this appeal should not be dismissed as moot. However, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the constitutional issues raised by the dissent, because the issues were not ruled upon by the trial judge after having been raised in the trial court.15
In conclusion, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction over that portion of this appeal that is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, and all remaining issues are moot. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety.

Dismissed.

All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, C. J., and Hunstein, J., who dissent.

 OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq.

 OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq.

 See OCGA § 16-14-7 (e).

 See Caldwell v. State, 253 Ga. 400-401 (321 SE2d 704) (1984).

 Contrary to appellants’ argument, the record reflects legitimate bases for the State’s dismissal of its RICO action. The State’s decision to dismiss was based primarily upon its discovery that the receivership estate was “both smaller and less liquid” than had been anticipated. This information was brought to light on February 21, when it was reported to the trial court that virtually no assets remained in the appellants’ estates not already subject to secured claims. Two days later, the State informed the trial court that it no longer made sense to maintain the receivership, as appellants’ poor financial condition rendered the receivership estate of no use in compensating the victims of appellants’ purported fraudulent investment scheme. Three days later, on February 26, the State moved to dismiss its RICO action.

 See 11 USC §§ 101 (1) (A), 543 (a).

 OCGA § 16-8-3.

 OCGA § 10-5-12.

 OCGA § 16-10-71.

 OCGA § 16-10-20.

 11 USC § 362; Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 320-321 (51 SC 465, 75 LE 1060) (1931).

 Id.; 11 USC § 362.

 Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 909 (5th ed. 1979); see Brown v. Spann, 271 Ga. 495, 496 (520 SE2d 909) (1999).

 Id.

 Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 (239 SE2d 18) (1977) (The Supreme Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless it clearly appears that the point was properly raised in the trial court and was the subject matter of a ruling by the trial judge). Moreover, the unique circumstances that led to the dissolution of the receivership in this appeal, and which form the basis of our dismissal, do not demonstrate that the issues raised by the dissent are likely to evade review, should they arise in future cases.