Court Opinion

ID: 9600926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:33:21.926503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:21.682501
License: Public Domain

*40Finley, J.
(dissenting) — In 1933, the legislature of the state of Washington enacted the so-called “Little NorrisLaGuardia act.” The Federal Norris-LaGuardia act served as a model for this legislation and for comparable laws in numerous other states. All of these statutes were very similar, and in many respects identical in language. Unquestionably they were enacted to assist and favor the cause of organized labor. Considering the era in which they were passed and the definite legislative intent or purpose prompting their enactment, it is somewhat difficult for me to conceive how a contrary intent or purpose seriously can be attributed to this legislation. Yet that is what has happened in our state, and in a very brief period of time.
The really significant provisions of our “Little NorrisLaGuardia act,” its enforcement provisions, placing a restraint upon the unlimited issuance of labor injunctions by the courts of this state, were held to be unconstitutional in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 409, 63 P. (2d) 397. This was despite the vigorous and scholarly dissent of Judge Blake, supported in separate dissents by Judge Beals and Judge Millard. Thus, the statute for all practical purposes was completely emasculated by the decision in the Blanchard case. But it has been resurrected— at least in part. Its statement of policy (Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 7, § 2, p. 10, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-2) originally drafted to favor the cause of labor, has been subverted. It has been warped contrariwise and is now destructive of the original intent and purpose of the act. Judicial rather than legislative architects have wrought this abrupt mutation.
In the majority opinion, the position is taken that Gazzam v. Building Service, etc., 29 Wn. (2d) 488, 188 P. (2d) 97, is controlling, if respondent Morris had any employees. Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local 309, 33 Wn. (2d) 646, 207 P. (2d) 206, on the other hand, is said to be controlling if no employees were involved and the business was employer-operated.
*41The Gazzam case is to be criticized in my opinion, in as much as it was based on the theory that the policy of the labor disputes act, expressed in Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-2, disapproved picketing for a closed shop; see Judge Blake’s dissent in Fornili v. Auto Mechanics’ Union, etc., 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422, and Judge Hamley’s dissent in Ostroff v. Laundry & Dye Works Drivers’ Local No. 566, 37 Wn. (2d) 595, 225 P. (2d) 419. The Gazzam case, of course, was also based somewhat upon the theory that stranger picketing is unlawful per se. However, that theory is in direct conflict with the explicit policy of the state of Washington as it was expressed legislatively by Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-13(c). In addition, such reasoning is probably not in accord with the Federal constitution; see American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 85 L. Ed. 855, 61 S. Ct. 568; Building Service Employees’ International Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, 539, 94 L. Ed. 1045, 70 S. Ct. 784. Admittedly, the supreme court of the United States, without qualification or analysis of it, has accepted our decision in the Gazzam case as authoritative in the matter of state policy. Seemingly, as a practical matter, state policy thus ascertained is now to be the guide in determining the legality or illegality of picketing. This appears to be in contrast to the view formerly dominant that picketing, being more or less an equivalent of free speech, is entitled to the protection of the United States constitution (the Swing case).
Now, if no employees were involved and the business of Mr. Morris was employer-operated, it is a most strained, if not impossible, construction of Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-2 [P.P.C. § 695-3], to conclude that it in any manner disapproves of the picketing of an employer-operated business, which has no employees who could be subjected to coercion. The alleged legislative policy as construed by our court to justify the result in the Gazzam case actually seems to have no basis for application in the Hanke situation. In the latter decision, our court reiterated from Gazzam that stranger picketing always amounts to unlawful coercion, and further supported its result with the argument that the *42union’s interest in the welfare of its members was outweighed by the interest of the community in allowing small business to operate free from dictation by “outside interests.” This was purely and simply an argument of policy. It is judicial in origin rather than legislative. The last policy expression of our state legislature relative to labor and picketing was in the “Little Norris-LaGuardia act.” The legislative policy explicitely set forth in that statute does not in any way support the above argument.
I find no legislative intent expressed in the statutes of this state justifying the results reached in the Hanke case, in the Gazzarn case, or in the majority opinion in the case at bar. It seems to me that in each instance judicial intent prevailed over legislative intent. This is inconsistent with my understanding of the principle inherent in the separation-of-powers doctrine and the proper functioning of each co-ordinate branch of government in its respective field. Applying a clearly stated or apparent legislative purpose or policy, particularly where it is based upon state police power and its exercise by the legislature, is one thing. It is quite another matter to synthesize such a purpose or policy through judicial inference and construction. The latter situation certainly is one that calls for judicial self-restraint of a very high order. If we are to talk about legislative intent at all, and the policy of our “Little Norris-LaGuardia act,” it appears to me that a result opposite from that reached in the majority opinion is indicated.
I dissent.