Court Opinion

ID: 9405673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 21:05:51.853193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.416769
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                 2023 IL App (4th) 220708-U                      FILED
This Order was filed under                                                        June 28, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is              NO. 4-22-0708                           Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                                   4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed     IN THE APPELLATE COURT                            Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                           OF ILLINOIS

                                       FOURTH DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )     Appeal from the
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )     Circuit Court of
            v.                                                )     Tazewell County
 DANIEL T. SUTTNER,                                           )     No. 20CF716
            Defendant-Appellant.                              )
                                                              )     Honorable
                                                              )     Paul Gilfillan,
                                                              )     Judge Presiding.

                 PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
                 Justices Cavanagh and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER
¶1      Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and
              remanded with instructions, finding defendant did not receive ineffective
              assistance of counsel but remand for a new sentencing hearing was warranted
              because the State failed to fulfill its notice obligations under section 111-3(c) of
              the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

¶2               In December 2020, the State charged defendant, Daniel T. Suttner, with criminal

sexual assault as a Class 1 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(4) (West 2020). The charging

document did not indicate the State sought to use defendant’s prior aggravated criminal sexual

assault convictions to enhance the charge to a Class X felony. However, before jury selection,

the State told the trial court that defendant was subject to Class X sentencing pursuant to section

11-1.20(b)(1)(C) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) because of those prior

convictions. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(b)(1)(C) (West 2020). Defendant’s trial counsel agreed. At
the trial’s conclusion, the jury found defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault. The court,

relying on the parties’ representation that defendant was subject to Class X sentencing, sentenced

defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment.

¶3             Defendant appeals, arguing (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when

he did not object to inadmissible hearsay testimony, (2) the State failed to comply with section

111-3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/111-3(c)

(West 2020)) because it did not provide the requisite notice in the charging document that it

sought to enhance the charge to a Class X felony and pursue Class X sentencing, and

(3) defendant was not eligible for Class X sentencing because his prior aggravated criminal

sexual assault convictions, which he accrued when he was 15 years old, can no longer be used to

enhance the charged offense. We affirm defendant’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand

with directions.

¶4                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶5             On December 10, 2020, the State charged defendant with criminal sexual assault

as a Class 1 felony, alleging he knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration with C.S., who

was at least 13 years old but younger than 18 years old, where defendant used his penis to make

contact with C.S.’s vagina, and defendant held a position of trust, authority, or supervision in

relation to her. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(4) (West 2020). The charging document did not

indicate the State sought to enhance the charge to a Class X felony and pursue a Class X

sentence, nor did it cite any statute under which the charge might be enhanced.

¶6             Before jury selection, the State told the trial court that defendant was eligible for

Class X felony sentencing under section 11-1.20(b)(1)(C) of the Criminal Code because he had a

prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault, and trial counsel agreed.

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¶7             At trial, C.S. testified she was born on October 23, 2002. Defendant’s daughter,

M.S., was one of C.S.’s best friends. When C.S. was 16 years old, defendant’s wife, Michelle,

became her legal guardian, and she moved into defendant’s home. When she lived with

defendant, C.S. did not pay for rent, groceries, or utilities, and she referred to defendant as “dad.”

¶8             Defendant, who was born on July 21, 1976, had sexual intercourse with C.S.

when she was 17 years old, during which he penetrated her vagina with his penis. C.S. tried to

decline his advances and reminded him he was supposed to be her father figure, but defendant

ignored her. C.S. testified this occurred during the weekend of M.S.’s eighteenth birthday, while

the rest of defendant’s family attended a demolition derby.

¶9             Detective Andrew Thompson of the Pekin Police Department interviewed C.S. on

December 2, 2020. During the interview, C.S. informed Thompson defendant had sexual contact

with her when she was 17 and 18 years old, and she described where it happened. When

Thompson realized the offense occurred outside of his jurisdiction, he transferred the case to the

Tazewell County Sheriff’s Office.

¶ 10           Detective Charles Huff of the Tazewell County Sheriff’s Office interviewed

defendant, who confessed to having a sexual relationship with C.S. that included vaginal

intercourse. Based on the timeline defendant provided, Huff determined C.S. was 17 years old

when defendant first had sexual intercourse with her. Specifically, defendant said their first

sexual encounter occurred approximately one week after the East Peoria Cleanup in 2020, which

took place from October 5, 2020, until October 9, 2020. Defendant also mentioned it happened

during a demolition derby held around the same time as M.S.’s birthday—M.S.’s birthday is

October 18, and the record shows the Peoria Expo Gardens hosted a demolition derby on

October 17, 2020.

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¶ 11          During Huff’s testimony regarding his interviews with C.S., M.S., and Michelle,

the following exchanges occurred:

                       “Q. You also spoke with the victim, [C.S.], in regards to this case; is that

              right?

                       A. I did. Yes.

                       Q. Okay. And in your discussion with her, did she divulge sexual contact

              between herself and the Defendant, Daniel Suttner?

                       A. Yes.

                       Q. Did she divulge sexual contact between herself and the Defendant

              when she was under 18 years of age?

                       A. Yes, she did.

                       Q. And were her statements to you corroborated by your interview by the

              Defendant, as well as your view of the cell phone evidence in this case?

                       A. Yes. Yes.

                       Q. Meaning were they consistent?

                       A. Yes, they were consistent.

                                              ***

                       Q. Okay. And did you do any other investigation? Did you speak with

              anyone else?

                       A. Yes, I did.

                       Q. Who else did you speak with?

                       A. I spoke with the Defendant’s wife, Michelle Suttner, and the

              Defendant’s daughter, [M.S.].

                                                -4-
                       Q. And in your discussions with [M.S.] and Michelle, did you discuss the

               timeline of events with them?

                       A. Yes, I did.

                       Q. And did your discussion with [M.S.] and Michelle Suttner corroborate

               or was it consistent with the information from the Defendant and victim in this

               case?

                       A. Yes, it was.”

¶ 12           At the trial’s conclusion, the jury found defendant guilty of criminal sexual

assault.

¶ 13           The presentence investigation report showed defendant was convicted of two

counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault as a Class X felony in 1991, when he was 15 years

old.

¶ 14           During the sentencing hearing, the State again asserted defendant faced a Class X

sentencing range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment, and trial counsel agreed. The trial court

accepted this assertion and sentenced defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment. According to the

judgment form, defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault as a Class 1 felony, but he

was subject to a Class X felony sentencing range pursuant to section 11-1.20(b)(1)(C) of the

Criminal Code. Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider the sentence.

¶ 15           This appeal followed.

¶ 16                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17           On appeal, defendant argues (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

not objecting to inadmissible hearsay testimony from Thompson and Huff; (2) the State failed to

provide notice in the charging document that it sought to enhance the charge against defendant to

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a Class X felony and pursue a Class X sentence, as required by section 111-3(c) of the Procedure

Code; and (3) he was not eligible for Class X sentencing because his prior aggravated criminal

sexual assault convictions could not be used to enhance the charge against him and the sentence

he faced. We affirm defendant’s conviction, finding he did not receive ineffective assistance of

counsel, but we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the matter due to the State’s

noncompliance with section 111-3(c) of the Procedure Code. Because we remand for

resentencing for lack of notice, we need not reach defendant’s final argument.

¶ 18                           A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 19           Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel did not object to purportedly inadmissible hearsay statements made by Detectives Huff

and Thompson. We disagree.

¶ 20           “Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is subject to the

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).” People v. Rogers, 2021 IL

126163, ¶ 17, 184 N.E.3d 222. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

show both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) prejudice resulted from that

deficiency.” People v. Eubanks, 2021 IL 126271, ¶ 30, 190 N.E.3d 177 (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 681, 691-92). “A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test and a failure to

satisfy any one of the prongs precludes a finding of ineffectiveness.” People v. Simpson, 2015 IL

116512, ¶ 35, 25 N.E.3d 601.

¶ 21           To satisfy Strickland’s deficiency prong, “the defendant must demonstrate

counsel’s performance was so inadequate that counsel was not functioning as the counsel

guaranteed by the sixth amendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Gunn, 2021

IL App (4th) 200398, ¶ 42, 195 N.E.3d 806. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong, “the

                                               -6-
defendant must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Gunn, 2021 IL App (4th) 200398, ¶ 42. “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffective assistance claim on the ground that it lacks sufficient prejudice, then a court may

proceed directly to the second prong and need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient.” People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331, 934 N.E.2d 470, 482 (2010) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697).

¶ 22           Here, we can proceed directly to Strickland’s prejudice prong, as there is not a

reasonable probability the trial’s result would have been different but for counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance. See Gunn, 2021 IL App (4th) 200398, ¶ 42. Defendant argues

Thompson’s and Huff’s respective testimony that C.S. told them defendant had sexual

intercourse with her when she was 17 years old, as well as Huff’s testimony that M.S.’s and

Michelle’s statements were consistent with defendant’s and C.S.’s statements, improperly

bolstered C.S.’s credibility. However, the trial evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated

defendant’s guilt.

¶ 23           To prove defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault, the State needed to prove

defendant, when he was 17 years of age or older, sexually penetrated C.S. before she turned 18

years old, while holding a position of trust, authority, or supervision over her. See 720 ILCS

5/11-1.20(a)(4) (West 2020). The record contains evidence satisfying each element. Defendant

admitted, in a recorded interview with Detective Huff, he had sexual intercourse with C.S.,

including vaginal penetration, on the weekend of M.S.’s eighteenth birthday, which was October

18, 2020. At that time, defendant was 44 years old. C.S. was just days shy of turning 18 on

October 23, 2020. Additional testimony showed Michelle and M.S. attended a demolition derby

                                                -7-
in Peoria during the weekend of M.S.’s eighteenth birthday, and the Peoria Expo Gardens hosted

a demolition derby on October 17, 2020. Defendant’s reply brief acknowledges, “[Defendant]

told a police officer that he had sex with C.S. on his daughter’s birthday weekend, and it is true

that on that weekend, C.S. was seventeen years old.” Further, when defendant had sexual

intercourse with C.S., he was married to C.S.’s legal guardian, C.S. lived in his home—where

she did not pay for rent, groceries, or utilities—and she referred to defendant as “dad.” C.S.

testified that, when defendant first initiated sexual contact with her, she reminded him he was

supposed to be her father figure.

¶ 24            Defendant insists he suffered prejudice because counsel did not object to three

hearsay statements that strengthened C.S.’s credibility. Even assuming, arguendo, these

statements constituted inadmissible hearsay, the fact remains defendant admitted in a recorded

interview that he had sexual intercourse with C.S. when she was 17 and he was 44. Likewise, the

evidence showing C.S. referred to defendant as “dad,” C.S. lived in his house for free, and his

wife was C.S.’s legal guardian remains unchallenged. Due to the overwhelming nature of the

evidence presented, there is not a reasonable probability the trial’s outcome would have been

different but for trial counsel’s failure to object to the testimony in question. See Gunn, 2021 IL

App (4th) 200398, ¶ 42. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual

assault and reject his request for a new trial, as he did not receive ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. See Gunn, 2021 IL App (4th) 200398, ¶ 42.

¶ 25                                        B. Sentencing

¶ 26            Defendant argues remand for a new sentencing hearing is warranted because

(1) he was ineligible for Class X sentencing because the State did not provide the requisite notice

that it sought to enhance his criminal sexual assault charge to a Class X felony based on his prior

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convictions and (2) his prior aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions could not be used to

enhance his sentence. The State insists defendant’s notice argument is moot, and that the invited

error rule bars defendant’s argument regarding his prior convictions.

¶ 27                                        1. Mootness

¶ 28           As a preliminary matter, the State asserts defendant’s section 111-3(c) notice

argument is moot because no actual controversy exists, as defendant never faced an enhanced

charge—rather, he was charged with and convicted of a Class 1 felony. An issue on appeal is

moot where a reviewing court cannot grant effective relief to a complaining party. Holly v.

Montes, 231 Ill. 2d 153, 157, 896 N.E.2d 267, 271 (2008). Here, we can grant defendant

effective relief in the form of a remand for resentencing. See Holly, 231 Ill. 2d at 157. The issue

of the State’s compliance with section 111-3(c) is not moot, and we consider its merits.

¶ 29                                    2. Section 111-3(c)

¶ 30           Section 111-3(c) of the Procedure Code provides:

               “When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction, the

               charge shall also state the intention to seek an enhanced sentence and shall state

               such prior conviction so as to give notice to the defendant. *** For the purposes

               of this Section, ‘enhanced sentence’ means a sentence which is increased by a

               prior conviction from one classification of offense to another higher level

               classification of offense set forth in Section 5-4.5-10 of the Unified Code of

               Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-10); it does not include an increase in the sentence

               applied within the same level of classification of offense.” 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c)

               (West 2020).

                                                -9-
“The legislature enacted section 111-3(c) as a catch-all notice provision, thereby requiring the

State to notify a defendant in all cases where it intends to charge the defendant with a higher

classification of offense based on the defendant’s prior convictions for that same offense.”

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 290, 642 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (1994).

“[U]nder section 111-3(c), the State must give notice in the charging instrument whenever a

defendant will be charged with a higher classification of offense because of prior convictions.”

People v. Zimmerman, 239 Ill. 2d 491, 501, 942 N.E.2d 1228, 1234-35 (2010).

¶ 31           Defendant aptly analogizes this case to People v. Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d 200,

717 N.E.2d 420 (1999). There, as here, the defendant was charged with and convicted of

criminal sexual assault as a Class 1 felony. Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 206, 209. At sentencing,

the State claimed the defendant was eligible for Class X sentencing, and the trial court agreed,

finding the defendant’s “sentence should be enhanced because he was a Class X offender in that

he conceded having been previously convicted within the past 10 years of aggravated criminal

sexual assault.” Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 206-07. The appellate court vacated the defendant’s

sentence and remanded the matter because the State pursued an enhanced sentence without

providing notice in the charging document. Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 212. The appellate court

laid out its reasoning thusly:

               “[T]he State charged defendant with a Class 1 offense, although it later

               established that the he [sic] actually committed a Class X offense due to the

               existence of his prior conviction. However, *** [section] 111-3 of the Code of

               Criminal Procedure require[s] the State, if it intends to elevate the class of

               defendant’s offense, to give him notice of this intention within the charging

               instrument. The State failed to do so. Therefore, defendant must be treated as

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               having committed a Class 1 offense, rather than a Class X offense.” Beasley, 307

               Ill. App. 3d at 212.

¶ 32           The Beasley court’s rationale applies here. The record shows the State charged

defendant with criminal sexual assault as a Class 1 felony pursuant to section 11-1.20(a)(4) of

the Criminal Code, which becomes a Class X felony if the defendant was previously convicted

for “any offense involving criminal sexual assault that is substantially equivalent to or more

serious” to the charged offense. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(b)(1)(C) (West 2020). Importantly, under

section 11-1.20(b)(1)(C), the prior conviction does not merely subject a defendant to an

increased sentencing range—it elevates the offense itself, thereby qualifying the defendant for an

enhanced sentence and triggering the State’s obligation to provide notice in the charging

document. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(b)(1)(C) (West 2020); 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c) (West 2020).

¶ 33           Defendant received an “enhanced sentence,” as defined by section 111-3(c),

because he was charged with a Class 1 felony, but the State relied on his prior conviction to

pursue a Class X sentence. See 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c) (West 2020) (“ ‘[E]nhanced sentence’

means a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one classification of offense to

another higher level classification of offense.”); Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 211. While the

judgment form asserted defendant was convicted of Class 1 criminal sexual assault, and he was

subject to Class X sentencing under section 11-1.20(b)(1)(C), this was error. If the State wanted

to use defendant’s prior convictions to subject him to Class X sentencing, the charge itself

needed to be enhanced. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(b)(1)(C) (West 2020); see also Beasley, 307 Ill.

App. 3d at 211 (“Clearly, [the statute] elevate[s] the offense (not just the sentence) of criminal

sexual assault from being a Class 1 felony to being a Class X felony. This is why the current

section states that an offender who has a previous triggering offense ‘commits a Class X

                                                - 11 -
felony.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)). Section 11-1.20(b)(1)(C) does not allow for a half-measure

wherein the defendant is convicted of a Class 1 offense but receives a Class X sentence.

¶ 34           If the State wished to pursue a Class X sentence, it should have charged defendant

with criminal sexual assault as a Class X felony pursuant to section 11-1.20(b)(1)(C) or

otherwise indicated in the charging document it sought to use defendant’s prior aggravated

criminal sexual assault convictions to elevate the offense. Under section 111-3(c) of the

Procedure Code, where the State seeks to elevate the charged offense, it must notify defendant of

this intention in the charging document. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c) (West 2020); Beasley, 307 Ill.

App. 3d at 212. When the State does not provide the requisite notice, remand for resentencing

consistent with the charged offense’s class is appropriate. See Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 212.

¶ 35           Even if defendant’s prior convictions could be used to elevate the offense from a

Class 1 felony to a Class X felony, which would qualify defendant for Class X sentencing, the

State was required to notify defendant, in the charging document, of its intention to seek a Class

X sentence and cite the prior conviction relied upon to enhance the sentence. See 725 ILCS

5/111-3(c) (West 2020). Because the charging document did not include this information, the

State failed to fulfill its notice obligation under section 111-3(c). Therefore, defendant must be

treated as having committed a Class 1 offense, and he is subject to Class 1 sentencing rather than

Class X sentencing. See Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 212.

¶ 36                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s criminal sexual assault

conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

¶ 38           Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.

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