Court Opinion

ID: 9352449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 16:00:20.842362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:50.533967
License: Public Domain

20-1993
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                              BIA
                                                                         Wilson, IJ
                                                                      A206 521 061
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
 3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 4   on the 6th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 8                 Chief Judge,
 9            BETH ROBINSON,
10            MYRNA PÉREZ,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   AMARJIT SINGH,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                  20-1993
18                                                          NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Law Office
25                                      of Jaspreet Singh, Jackson
26                                      Heights, NY.
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                                  Attorney General; Zoe J. Heller,
 3                                  Senior Litigation Counsel; Craig
 4                                  W. Kuhn, Trial Attorney, Office of
 5                                  Immigration Litigation, United
 6                                  States Department of Justice,
 7                                  Washington, DC.

 8          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DENIED.

12          Petitioner Amarjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,

13   seeks review of a June 9, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming

14   a May 8, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying

15   his    application    for   asylum,   withholding     of    removal,    and

16   relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).                  In re

17   Amarjit Singh, No. A 206 521 061 (B.I.A. June 9, 2020), aff’g

18   No. A 206 521 061 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 8, 2018).                    We

19   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

20   procedural history.

21          Under   the   circumstances,     we   have   reviewed    the    IJ’s

22   decision as modified by the BIA and consider only the adverse

23   credibility determination on which the BIA relied.               See Xue

24   Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d

25   Cir.    2005). We review      adverse    credibility       determinations
                                        2
 1   under a substantial evidence standard, see Hong Fei Gao v.

 2   Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and treat the

 3   agency’s fact-finding as “conclusive unless any reasonable

 4   adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,”

 5   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 6       “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

 7   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

 8   determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s

 9   or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

10   whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances

11   under   which   the    statements   were   made), the   internal

12   consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of

13   such statements with other evidence of record . . . without

14   regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

15   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

16   relevant factor.”     8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).    “We defer

17   . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the

18   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable

19   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

20   Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008);

21   accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.       Substantial evidence

                                     3
 1   supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

 2         Singh alleged that he was persecuted by members of the

 3   Congress Party on account of his work for the Shiromani Akali

 4   Dal Mann Party.       The agency did not err in relying on

 5   inconsistencies between Singh’s border interview, credible

 6   fear interview, application, and testimony regarding when he

 7   was allegedly beaten by Congress Party members and whether he

 8   was   arrested   during   the   incidents       because    the   interview

 9   records   have    sufficient     indicia        of   reliability.     Both

10   interviews   were   memorialized       in   a   verbatim   question    and

11   answer format, the interviewers asked questions designed to

12   elicit an asylum claim, and there was no indication that Singh

13   had difficulty understanding or answering questions.                   See

14   Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004);

15   see also Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir.

16   2009); Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir.

17   2005).

18         The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between

19   the border interview and later statements.                 See 8 U.S.C.

20   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).      Singh stated at the border interview

21   that he was arrested, but in subsequent statements said he

                                        4
 1   was not.        And he gave different dates for the two alleged

 2   beatings by Congress Party members.                      The agency reasonably

 3   determined       that    Singh     failed          to   provide      a     sufficient

 4   explanation for the inconsistences.                     See Majidi v. Gonzales,

 5   430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more

 6   than    offer    a    plausible     explanation          for   his       inconsistent

 7   statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a

 8   reasonable      fact-finder       would       be    compelled     to      credit   his

 9   testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).                    Contrary to Singh’s

10   position, the agency did not err in relying, in part, on the

11   date     discrepancy.             The     agency         may    “rely        on    any

12   inconsistency,” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167, and Singh’s

13   statements          created      direct       inconsistencies             about    the

14   circumstances and dates of the two incidents of physical harm

15   that were the basis of his claim, see Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d

16   at 79 (“[A]n applicant’s testimonial discrepancies . . . must

17   be weighed in light of their significance to the total context

18   of   his   .    .    .   claim    of    persecution.”          (quotation         marks

19   omitted)).

20          In addition to the inconsistencies, the agency reasonably

21   concluded that the lack of reliable corroborating evidence

                                               5
 1   further undermined Singh’s credibility.              See Biao Yang v.

 2   Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s

 3   failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

 4   credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general

 5   makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has

 6   already been called into question.”).            Singh’s corroborating

 7   evidence was entitled to little weight and undermined his

 8   claim because Singh testified that most of the authors of the

 9   letters and affidavits did not witness the attacks and a

10   letter documenting Singh’s medical treatment after the second

11   alleged attack was prepared years after the treatment and was

12   not   supported    by   contemporaneous       records.         See   Y.C.   v.

13   Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer

14   to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an

15   applicant’s documentary evidence.”).

16         Taken    cumulatively,   the       inconsistencies       and   lack   of

17   reliable corroboration provide substantial evidence for the

18   adverse       credibility   determination.               See     8    U.S.C.

19   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145

20   n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[T]his court [has] recognized that even

21   a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing

                                          6
 1   that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple

 2   inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”);

 3   Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166–67; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.

 4   The   adverse   credibility   determination   is   dispositive   of

 5   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

 6   three forms of relief are based on the same discredited

 7   factual predicate.    See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–

 8   57 (2d Cir. 2006).

9          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

10   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

11   stays VACATED.

12                                  FOR THE COURT:
13                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14                                  Clerk of Court

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