Court Opinion

ID: 9765681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:13:42.094072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:13.407388
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. In his sixth point of error, appellant contends the trial court prevented him from questioning the venire members on whether the fact a young child had been killed would influence their consideration of probation. The victim was a two-and-a-half year-old girl.
During voir dire, the trial court prohibited appellant’s counsel’s hypothetical questions about whether the venire could consider probation in a murder case where the victim was a child. The standard of review in a case where the defendant claims he was improperly restricted on voir dire is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (trial court should have permitted voire dire regarding panel’s prejudice when a nun was the victim of rape). If the restriction on voir dire was improper, we do not engage in the harm analysis. In such a case we are required to reverse.
The majority distinguishes Nunfio because the prohibited inquiry prevented the defense counsel from determining jury bias in favor of categories of persons as “witnesses : e.g., nun versus layperson.” Slip op. at 515. Nothing in Nunfio supports the majority’s holding that the nun’s role as a witness (rather than her role as a victim) was the issue. Under the majority’s analysis, a defendant may question the venire about its potential bias for or against a person who will be a witness, but not about the venire’s bias for or against a person who was the victim.
The majority attempts the same distinction of Abron, “white woman versus black man in Abron.” Maj. op. at 515. Again, nothing in the Abron opinion supports the majority’s inference that it was the white woman’s role as a witness (rather than her role as a victim) that was at issue. The issue in Abron was the race of the defendant versus the race of the victim. One of *518the questions the defense counsel was prevented from asking was if it would make a difference to the panel if the victim had been black, instead of white. Nothing in the opinion suggests it was the complaining witness’ role as a witness that was the issue; it was her role as the victim.
Only Hernandez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), supports the majority. In Hernandez, the issue was whether the police officer was more believable than an ordinary citizen. There was nothing in the Hernandez opinion to suggest that the police officer’s role as the complaining witness played any part in the voire dire.
The majority’s position is that a trial court may not limit questions regarding the venire’s prejudice against a certain type of person as a witness, but may limit questions regarding the venire’s prejudice against a certain type of person as a victim. I see no logic in that distinction; neither can I find any support for it in the cases the majority cites.
We should sustain point of error six, reverse the judgment, and remand the cause for a new trial.