Court Opinion

ID: 9498529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:19:50.273805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:53.030398
License: Public Domain

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I am not persuaded that our holding in United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000(9th Cir. 1997), compels a finding that the jury trial waiver in this case is unenforceable.
In Duarte-Higareda, the jury trial waiver was invalidated because “the district court ... fail[ed] to conduct a colloquy with Duarte to ensure that his jury waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id. at 1003. In this case, the district court did question Mr. Bailon-San-tana regarding the jury trial waiver he executed.
The jury trial waiver executed by Bail-on-Santana specified that he “knowingly, voluntarily and freely” waived his right to a jury trial. The waiver _ also acknowledged that the contents had been read to Bailon-Santana in Spanish. The problem, according to the majority opinion, is that the waiver was translated by Edmundo Espinoza, Bailon-Santana’s attorney..
Mr. Espinoza inserted the following declaration into the waiver:
I, EDMUNDO ESPINOZA (handwritten), am fluent in written' and spoken English and Spanish languages. I accurately translated this entire waiver from English into Spanish to defendant Gilberto Bailon-Santana on this date.
*1263The jury trial waiver was signed by Bail-on-Santana and his attorney on September 22, 2003. Approximately two weeks later, Bailon-Santana’s trial commenced. On the first day of trial, in the presence of the parties and a court interpreter, the court noted its intention to “confirm” the jury trial waiver. The court stated:
The court has granted the party’s request for jury waiver, and this was previously filed. And so, I want to confirm with both parties and defendant that this is how they wish to proceed.
Mr. Bailon-Santana, you gave up your right to jury trial set forth in the writing that you signed back on September 22, 2003; is that correct?
(emphasis added.)
The interpreter, replying on behalf of Bail-on-Santana, affirmed that he signed the jury waiver. The court verified that Mr. Espinoza served as the interpreter for Bailon-Santana during the course of events culminating in the jury waiver and accepted the waiver with the following words:
Then I find, based upon the written waiver once again, that the defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to have the matter tried to a jury in light of today’s further agreement along with the explanations set forth in the waiver filed on September 29.
The majority opinion acknowledges Mr. Espinoza’s representation that he is fluent in Spanish and accurately translated the waiver to his client. Nevertheless, the majority opinion invalidates the waiver because Mr. Espinoza is not a certified court interpreter. This holding goes far beyond our ruling in Duarte-Higareda.1 In Duarte-Higareda, we focused on the court’s failure to “conduct a colloquy with the defendant to ensure that the waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.” Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d at 1003. The district court in this case did as we directed in Duarte-Higareda.2 It inquired of the defendant and of his counsel regarding the circumstances surrounding the execution of the waiver. The certified court interpreter conveyed the court’s inquiries and remarks to Bailon-Santana. The record reflects no expression of surprise, confusion or objection from Bailon-Santana upon hearing that his counsel “served as the interpreter” during the jury waiver process.
This case is a far cry from Security Farms v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.1997), where the ability and credibility of the translator were legitimately called into doubt. See id. at 1011(deseribing the translator’s need for an interpreter during his deposition). No similar challenge was raised as to Mr. Espinoza’s translation of the jury trial waiver. Under the circumstances of this case, I cannot agree that the district court failed to discharge its responsibility of ensuring that the defendant’s jury waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

. Cf. United States v. Valdivia, 60 F.3d 594, 595 (9th Cir. 1995), where we rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated upon defense counsel's use of the defendant's daughter as an interpreter.

. The majority opinion characterizes this statement as "mistaken.” See Majority Opinion, p. 1261 - 1262 n. 3. However, in Duarte-Higareda, we held that the district court "failed to discharge[its] responsibility [b]y failing to address Duarte at all.” Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d at 1003. Although the court’s inquiry in this case was not ideal, it cannot be said that the court failed to address Bailon-Santana at all.