Court Opinion

ID: 9540076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:12:36.860306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:35.963530
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with my colleagues as to their determination of all the issues raised in this appeal with one exception. That exception pertains to the trial court’s order that the respondent father pay to the petitioner mother the sum of $750 as an award of attorney fees. I believe that this award should have been affirmed. The law in Illinois is clear that an award of attorney fees, and the amount thereof, lies in the discretion of the trial court and will not be set aside unless there is an abuse of discretion. Moses v. Moses (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 443, 270 N.E.2d 513. The majority opinion sets forth the financial status of the respective parties as near as the trial court was able to ascertain the same. We note that the financial standing of the parties in the instant case is proportionately quite similar to that found in the case of Knox v. Knox (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 816, 334 N.E.2d 891. In Knox the reviewing court sustained the trial court’s award of attorney fees in the amount of *1,000. I have alluded to the fact that the trial court experienced some difficulty in ascertaining the financial standing of the respondent. That the trial court had such a problem is supported by the record. The respondent had no difficulty reciting his obligations and expenditures he made for flowers and gifts, but his memory faltered as to the value of his assets. He did not know how many shares of Caterpillar stock he had vested in his retirement program, nor could he recall the sales price of a home which he had recently sold and he couldn’t remember what he had paid or agreed to pay for a new home purchased only a few weeks prior to the modification hearing. This court encountered a similar situation in the recent case of Courson v. Courson (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 318, 361 N.E.2d 1173, and we deemed that such evasiveness should be a factor in determining whether an award of attorney fees should be made. For the reasons set forth I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which denied the petitioner an award of attorney fees. In my opinion the court did not abuse its discretion in making such an award in the sum of *750.