Court Opinion

ID: 9851323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:10:39.304287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.469607
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, P.J.
(concurring). Although I am the author of the majority opinion, I write separately to register some added observations about this case.
We correctly follow the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), in this case. However, post-Grady decisions cast substantial doubt about the continuing vitality of Grady. Were it not for Grady, or if we had the authority to limit Grady, I suggest that a strong case could be made for *778affirming the trial court's ruling that Kurzawa's double jeopardy rights are not violated by this successive prosecution.
The state argues that we should interpret Grady narrowly, limiting its application to those situations where jeopardy has attached to a clearly smaller offense before the greater offense is later charged. The state notes that the United States Supreme Court itself has noted problems with lower courts overreading Grady. In United States v. Felix, 112 S.Ct. 1377, reh'g denied, 113 S.Ct. 13 (1992), the Supreme Court acknowledged it would decline to read the language [of Grady] so expansively, because of the context in which Grady arose and because of difficulties which have already arisen in its interpretation. Felix, 112 S.Ct. at 1384. Instead, the Supreme Court in Felix harkened back to pre-Grady law to permit the successive prosecution. Id. at 1384-85.
Other jurisdictions have interpreted Grady in the narrow manner urged by the state or have otherwise embellished on the Grady analysis such that the clear thrust of Grady is avoided. See, e.g., Ladner v. Smith, 941 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1665 (1992), and Ex Parte Ramos, 806 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
However, our principal function as an error-correcting court (see Hillman v. Columbia County, 164 Wis. 2d 376, 396, 474 N.W.2d 913, 920 (Ct. App. 1991)) does not permit us to so limit a decision of the United States Supreme Court on a point of federal constitutional law. Therefore, we previously certified this case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court asking that court to take up and clarify the effect, if any, of Grady and post-Gracfy decisions on Wisconsin double jeopardy law. However, the supreme court declined to take jurisdiction over this *779appeal. We thus are left with Grady as the governing statement from the United States Supreme Court.
We also certified to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the question of the proper double jeopardy methodology in this successive prosecution case. In State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992), the supreme court clarified the methodology to be applied when multiple offenses are charged in a single prosecution. First, the multiple offenses are measured under the Blockburger 1 "elements only" test. This inquiry asks whether the elements of the multiple charges are the same. If so, double jeopardy exists and the subsequent prosecution is barred. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493-95, 485 N.W.2d at 4-5.
If not, a presumption exists that the legislature intended to permit cumulative punishments for both offenses, id. at 495, 485 N.W.2d at 4, and the inquiry moves to a second level — whether this presumption is overcome by the demonstration of a contrary legislative intent. If so, the legislative intent — not double jeopardy principles — will preclude the subsequent prosecution. See id. See also State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 159 & n.3, 493 N.W.2d 23, 25 (1992).
Grady, however, does not follow this second prong of the Sauceda methodology. Instead, Grady asks whether "[t]o establish an essential element of an offense charged . . . [the state] will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." Grady, 495 U.S. at 521. In our certification, we asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court whether the Sauceda methodology or the Grady methodology applies in a successive prosecution case. We acknowledged that Sauceda concerned multiple charges in a single prosecution, whereas Grady was a successive *780prosecution. We inquired whether such a distinction made any difference.
Again, with the supreme court having declined to take jurisdiction over this appeal, we do not see it as within our powers or function to say that the methodology set out by the United States Supreme Court in the successive prosecution setting of Grady does not also apply in this successive prosecution case. Therefore, we see ourselves obliged to follow Grady.
However, this leaves the law in a state which, in some cases, permits multiple charges in a single prosecution but forbids such charges in a successive prosecution. In fact, this may well be such a case. If the state had charged Kurzawa in a single prosecution with both forgery and theft by fraud, such would clearly survive the Blockburger double jeopardy prong of the test since the elements of the two offenses are different. And, I suggest that such multiple charging might also survive the legislative intent prong of the test under the approach taken by Sauceda.2 Yet, under Grady, this prosecution is doomed.
*781These possible disparate results make no sense to me. I appreciate the three areas of interest which double jeopardy protects. See majority opinion at 773. And I acknowledge that a defendant who is required to defend in a successive prosecution may well suffer a greater constitutional injury than one who is required to defend multiple charges in a single proceeding. 3 However, the difference is in the degree of the constitutional violation — not whether the violation exists in the first place. I question whether different methodologies, allowing for these disparate and illogical results, are required.
In Sauceda, the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly acknowledged the confusion existing in some lower courts as to the applicable double jeopardy test. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493, 485 N.W.2d at 4. Although Sauceda has both its fans and critics as to the merits, the decision is nonetheless helpful to the bench and bar because it resolves any conflict or confusion which may *782have existed under prior case law as to the proper double jeopardy methodology.
The question which remains unanswered is whether the Sauceda approach can and should also apply in a successive prosecution case. If so, the prospect of inconsistent results which Sauceda and Grady presently invite can be avoided. If not, then the bench and bar of this state will at least know that such inconsistency is constitutionally necessary.
In summary, we are obligated to follow the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Grady, even though it is an opinion of questionable and declining merit. If it were within the authority of this court, I would urge the application of Sauceda, a better reasoned opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).

 I say this because many of the reasons cited by the supreme court to justify the multiple charging in State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 497-501, 485 N.W.2d 1, 5-7 (1992), are also present in this case: a defendant should not be immunized from criminal responsibility simply because the conduct violates more than one criminal statute or subsection; the criminal offenses of forgery and theft by fraud have been recognized as separate and distinct for many years; and the penalties can be (and are as charged in this case) different.
In addition, unlike Sauceda where the elements of the multiple offenses were congruent except for the age of the minor and the state of unconsciousness, here the elements of the offenses have no such congruity. Looking at the forgery side of the coin, the common requirement in each element of forgery is a writing; theft *781by fraud has no such requirement. Forgery requires that the writing create or transfer legal obligations or rights; theft by fraud does not. Forgery requires that the writing be uttered; theft by fraud does not. Forgery requires that the writing be falsely made or altered; theft by fraud does not. Forgery requires that the defendant know that the writing was falsely made or altered; theft by fraud does not. See Wis J I — Criminal 1453, 1492.
On the other side of the coin, theft by fraud requires, inter alia, a false representation to the owner or the owner's agent; forgery does not. Theft by fraud requires that the false representation be made with intent to defraud the owner or the owner's agent; forgery does not. Theft by fraud requires that the defendant obtain title to the property by virtue of the misrepresentation; forgery does not (the crime lies in the uttering of the writing, not in the obtaining of the property). And, finally, theft by fraud requires that the owner be defrauded; forgery does not. Id.

 See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518 (1990).