Court Opinion

ID: 9736637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:01:34.49188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:07.801833
License: Public Domain

*68BELL, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that a knife and a pager, recovered as the result of a search of the petitioner’s school locker,1 were properly admitted into evidence during the petitioner’s delinquency proceedings. When the search occurred, the petitioner was an eighth grade student at the Mark Twain School in Montgomery County and, as such, subject to that school’s “Policies Regarding Student Behavior,” a copy of which he and his parent had received and signed for. In addition to stating the school’s commitment “to maintain[ing] a safe environment for students and staff,” the policy this document announces oh the search of school lockers is as follows:
“Mark Twain subscribes to Montgomery County Public Schools’ Search and Seizure policy,[2] which provides that *69the principal or the administration’s designee may conduct a search of a student or of the student’s locker if there is probable cause to believe that the student has in his/her possession an item, the possession of which constitutes a criminal offense under the laws of the State of Maryland. These items include weapons, drugs or drug paraphernalia, alcohol, beepers and electronic signalling devices.”
Not surprisingly, the petitioner relied heavily on this policy in arguing that the evidence against him should be suppressed.
*70The majority reviews and analyzes the “Supreme Court cases that [have] come to dominate the current debate over locker searches in the public schools,” 358 Md. at 54, 746 A.2d at 408, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 2d 720 (1985) and Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) and recognizes the arguments upon which the parties relied. See 358 Md. at 54, 746 A.2d at 407. But to reach its decision in this case, it did not accept the State’s argument3 or even totally reject the petitioner’s. In fact, in rejecting the petitioner’s arguments and determining that the school policy is inapplicable and, indeed irrelevant, the majority advances, and finds dispositive, an argument that the State neither relied upon4 nor presented to the trial court and on which neither the trial court nor the Court of Special Appeals rested its decision.5
*71Acknowledging that, “[o]n its face, and without regard to the broader legal context, [the school policy], published by the local school authorities, could serve as a basis for an expectation that lockers will not otherwise be searched,” 358 Md. 50, 62, 746 A.2d 405, 412 (2000), the majority concludes that Maryland Code (1978, 1999 Repl.Vol.) § 7-308 of the Education Article6 trumps that policy; “it is th[e] State policy [embodied in this statute] that determines whether, and to what extent, petitioner had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker assigned to him.” 358 Md. at 62, 746 A.2d at 412.
Section 7-308 provides:
“(a) Authority to search student.—(1) A principal, assistant principal, or school security guard of a public school may make a reasonable search of a student on the school premises or on a school-sponsored trip if he has a reasonable belief that the student has in his possession an item, the possession of which is a criminal offense under the laws of this State or a violation of any other State law or a rule or regulation of the county board.
“(2) The search shall be made in the presence of a third party.
“(b) Authority to search school.—(1) A principal, assistant principal, or school security guard of a public school may *72make a search of the physical plant of the school and its appurtenances including the lockers of students.
“(2) The right of the school official to search the locker shall be announced or published previously in the school.
“(c) Rules and regulations.—The [State] Department [of Education] shall adopt rules and regulations relating to searches permitted under this section.”
As required by statute, the State Board of Education has adopted a by-law, which mirrors the statute. See, COMAR 13A.08.01.14E and F.
To the majority,
“The plain words of the statute and by-law establish a State policy distinguishing between the searches of students and the search of lockers. In conformance with the requirements of T.L.O., the search of a student requires a reasonable belief on the part of the school official that the student has contraband in his or her possession. School lockers, on the other hand, are not regarded as the personal property of the student. They are classified as school property, part of the ‘plant of the school and its appurtenances,’ and, no doubt because of that, school officials are permitted to search the lockers as they could any other school property. No probable cause is required; nor is any reasonable suspicion required.”
358 Md. at 63, 746 A.2d at 412.7 After tracing the history of the State statute and the accompanying by-law, it concludes:
“Although educational matters affecting the counties are under the control of the county board of education (see § 4-101(a) of the Education Article[8]), the authority of the *73county school boards is always subject to statutes enacted by the General Assembly and to the supervening authority of the State Board of Education. A county board cannot adopt and enforce a policy affecting the operation of the public schools or the rights, privileges, or obligations of public school students that is inconsistent with public general law or with by-laws of the State Board of Education, which have the force of law. See Wilson v. Board of Education, 234 Md. 561, 200 A.2d 67 (1964); Bd. of Education of Prince George’s County v. Waeldner, 298 Md. 354, 470 A.2d 332 (1984). By both statute and State Board of Education by-law, school lockers are treated as school property and are subject to search by designated school officials in the same manner as other school property. It is not within the power of a local school board or superintendent, or any subordinate official, to establish and enforce a policy that provides otherwise.”
Id. at 66, 746 A.2d at 414. Finally, asserting that the Montgomery County school search policy “is obviously inconsistent with the governing State law,” the majority holds that it “is invalid and nugatory and cannot serve as a basis for a student to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker provided by the school.” Id. at 66, 746 A.2d at 414.
I dissent.
As hard as the majority tries, it has not persuasively explained why the issue that we took this case to decide— whether the search of petitioner’s school locker violated the Fourth Amendment—has not been presented. To be sure, it can not be gainsaid that the petitioner had an expectation of privacy. Not only was there a school policy granting a level of privacy, but it was communicated in the student policies, and given to the petitioner and his parent, both of whom were *74required to sign it in acknowledgment of receipt. Thus, the critical issue is whether the petitioner could legitimately rely on the policy, and whether the policy could give rise to an expectation of privacy.
The test of a valid privacy expectation is whether a subjective expectation of privacy existed that society would recognize as reasonable. See, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1497, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). Generally, Fourth Amendment protections are based on the petitioner’s legitimate expectation of privacy in light of the relevant circumstances. See, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359, 88 S.Ct. 507, 515, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 586(1967). Whether, in a given circumstance, a petitioner’s expectation of privacy is legitimate and reasonable is determined by “balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 740, 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731 (1985); see also, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940 (1967). The totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the thing alleged to be the basis of the expectation, the actions of the petitioner and of the school, all inform that determination.
Cases on searches of a student’s person teach that “reasonableness of the circumstances” is the correct standard. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742, 83 L.Ed.2d at 734; Acton, 515 U.S. at 652, 115 S.Ct. at 2390, 132 L.Ed.2d at 574. In T.L.O.,, the Supreme Court held that,
“Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception ... second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified interference in the first place.”
Id. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. at 742, 83 L.Ed.2d at 734-35. While the Supreme Court has declined to extend this analysis to school lockers, other courts have, reaching different results. The majority argues that many cases involving the search of school lockers have held that the limited use of lockers, as well *75as their accessibility by administrators via keys or combinations, impart no real expectation of privacy. See, e.g. Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (1981), People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479, 249 N.E.2d 366 (1969). Other jurisdictions have held that students do have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their school lockers. See, e.g. State v. Engerud, 93 N.J. 308, 460 A.2d 701 (1983), State v. Michael G., 106 N.M. 644, 748 P.2d 17, 19 (1987), In Interest of Dumas, 357 Pa.Super. 294, 296-99, 515 A.2d 984, 985-86 (1986), State v. Joseph T., 175 W.Va. 598, 336 S.E.2d 728, 737 (1985).
While differing on whether an expectation of privacy was created, these courts agree that a published school policy may determine if there is an expectation of privacy as well as its the extent. See, e.g. Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d at 665 (The court held there was no reasonable expectation of privacy where the published school policy “state[d] that lockers remain under the jurisdiction of the school, notwithstanding the fact that they were assigned to individual students; that the school reserved the right to inspect all lockers at any time ...”); State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d at 737 (The court found grounds for a locker search based on a “reasonable suspicion” of violation of school rules, where the student handbook stated that “[sjtudents do have rights to privacy and may reasonably expect that their lockers will not be searched unless appropriate school officials consider a search absolutely necessary to maintain the integrity of the school environment and protect other students.”).
The school policy is thus the standard against which to judge whether the petitioner’s expectation of privacy was reasonable in light of the circumstances. See, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338, 105 S.Ct. at 741, 83 L.Ed.2d at 732 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200, 82 L.Ed.2d 393, 402. See also, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641 (1980)).9
*76The State statute exists, to be sure, but it is by no means as clear as the majority says it is, nor is the local school policy obviously inconsistent with that statute. It also is quite clear that there has been utterly no compliance with the statutory requirement of prior notification, a circumstance which, by itself, would seem to call for suppression of the search fruits and reversal of the delinquency judgment.
Whether the school policy conflicts with and, therefore, is invalid in light of the State statute is an issue involving statutory interpretation. The majority relies on a plain reading of the State statute to demonstrate the conflict with the local school policy. As I view it, giving the statute a plain reading demonstrates only that the language of the statute is at best ambiguous. Once the ambiguity is exposed, it is obvious to me that the reading the majority gives the State statute is simply wrong.
I concede that, by giving subsection (b)(1) a liberal interpretation, one could conclude, as the majority does, that it gives the officials mentioned an absolute or unconditional right to search the physical plant of a school, including its lockers. So reading the statute renders subsection (b)(2) irrelevant; if the majority is correct, there is no reason for a requirement of prior notice. Prior notice of what the law has already clearly proscribed hardly seems necessary. Moreover, as the majority opinion makes clear, failure to give the notice does not affect the validity of the search. See 358 Md. at 67-68 n. 2, 746 A.2d at 415 n. 2. It is well settled that a statute should not be interpreted so as to render any part of it meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory. Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997); GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 714 (1993).
*77On the other hand, when § 7-308 is read in its entirety, another plausible interpretation becomes evident. Subsection (l)(a) sets forth a clear standard that governs the search of a student on school premises or while on a school sponsored trip—reasonable belief—and the only condition placed on the official conducting the search is that the search be made in the presence of a third person. See subsection (a)(2). This is to contrasted with section (b), which is structured quite differently. While subsection (b)(1), permits certain school officials to search the physical plant, including lockers, subsection (b)(2) addresses only lockers, requiring the prior announcement or publication of “[t]he right of the school official to search the locker.” Because § (b) does not contain an express standard, even though it treats lockers differently, perhaps necessarily so, from the other parts of the physical plant over which the school officials have complete control and to which they have not ceded any rights to the students, I believe that a fair reading of that section as a whole is that the school officials are given the right to search the lockers, but the extent of that right, the standard to govern the exercise of that right, is left to the determination of the individual schools, which determination is required to “be announced or published previously in the school.” Thus, rather than being inconsistent, the State statute and the local policy are totally consistent.
The interpretation I give § 7-308(b) is consistent with and true to the rules of statutory construction. See, Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc., 349 Md. 499, 523, 709 A.2d 142, 154 (1998) (“When interpreting any statute, Court must look to the entire statutory scheme, and not any one provision in isolation, to effect the statute’s general policies and purposes.”) (quoting County Commissioners v. Bell Atlantic, 346 Md. 160, 178, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (1997)); Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 348 Md. 143, 149, 702 A.2d 760, 763 (1997) (“In interpreting statute, Court of Appeals construes statute as a whole, interpreting each provision of statute in context of the entire statutory scheme.”) (quoting Blondell v. Baltimore Police, 341 Md. 680, 691, 672 A.2d 639, 645 (1996)); Condon v. State of Maryland-University of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 758 *78(1993) (“All parts of statute are to be read together to determine intent, and reconciled and harmonized to the extent possible.”) (quoting Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 596, 380 A.2d 1052); Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 15-16, 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992) (“Court attempts to divine legislative intent from entire statutory scheme, as opposed to scrutinizing parts of statute in isolation.”) (quoting Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual, 322 Md. 689, 697, 589 A.2d 944 (1991); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471 (1988)). Moreover, under this interpretation every part of the statute has meaning.
Furthermore, this interpretation makes good common sense. The schools in this State are not monolithic; they are different. School officials are the ones best able to assess and define their school’s needs and set the basic rules and regulations pertaining to discipline and ensuring the safety of the school. The Legislature simply provided the flexibility as to locker searches to allow individual schools to determine the standard to be applied to the search of school lockers, based on the school environment and experience. This interpretation accounts for the promulgation by the school of a policy as to lockers and explains why the policy was not overridden by the State Board, as it could have done.10 If the majority interpretation were correct, there would be no reason for individual schools to address locker searches through their own policies.
While § 7—308(b)(1) grants certain public school officials the right to search student lockers, it fails either to clearly *79delineate a State-wide standard to govern that right to search or clearly to prohibit schools from defining for themselves the extent of their right to search lockers. The conclusion reached by the majority, that Maryland school districts may not impose conditions on the right to search lockers or formulate different standards, flies in the face of the statute.
Section 7-308(b) clearly conditions a school official’s right to search a student’s locker on the student having been given prior notification. In the case sub judice, previous notice of an absolute right to search was never given; indeed, the notice that was given was that the exact opposite situation applied. Therefore, I would hold that this is a sufficient basis on which to hold that the school had no right to search, even if the State statute is controlling. Invoking the right post hoc not only is unfair under the circumstances, but it violates expressly what is unambiguously the language of the statute and thus the intent of the Legislature. The majority argues that, because the school’s announced policy was invalid, compliance with the State statute is excused. That can not be correct. As my mother put it to me years ago, “two wrongs do not make a right.”

. The knife and the pager were in a bookbag in the locker, which also was searched. No issue of the propriety of that search has been presented, however.

. The Montgomery County Public Schools Regulation on Student Rights and Responsibilities, states in pertinent part:
"III. Guidelines
"N. Search and Seizure
"1. The principal, assistant principal, or security assistant may conduct a reasonable search of a student on the school premises or on a school-sponsored activity under the following conditions:
*69"a) He/she has reason to suspect that the student is in possession of an item, the possession of which constitutes a criminal offense under the laws of Maryland or a violation of any other state law or a rule or regulation of the school board,
"b) He/she conducts the search in the presence of a third party who is of majority age.
"4. The principal, assistant principal, or security assistant, may conduct a search of school premises including lockers.
"5. When a search of a student’s locker is to be conducted, the principal, assistant principal, or security assistant should make a reasonable effort to obtain the consent of the affected student(s) prior to the search.
"6. The principal will inform parents and students, in writing, at the beginning of each school year regarding the laws and policies governing search and seizure, including specifically the right to search lockers.”
Regulation History: New Regulation, August 19, 1994; revised June 27, 1997; revised July 20, 1998.
The Montgomery County Public Schools Regulation on Search and Seizure states:
"III. Procedures
"A. The principal of each school will inform parents and students about the laws, policies, and regulations regarding search and seizure through distribution of the MCPS student handbook at the beginning of the school year.
"B. Authorized personnel conducting a search of a student's person, possessions, or locker will make a reasonable effort to obtain the consent of the student prior to the search. A third party of majority age must be present at the time of a search of a student.
"C. Authorized school personnel may search a student's person, if the authorized person has a reasonable belief that the student has possession of an item, the possession of which is a criminal offense under the laws of Maryland or a violation of any other state law or MCPS policy, regulation, or rule.”
*70Administrative History: Formerly Regulation No. 270-7 May 21, 1979 (directory information updated, October 1986); revised June 11, 1993; revised October 4, 1996.

. The majority opinion correctly summarized the State’s argument:
“Relying principally on Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), the State contends that general reasonableness, not probable cause, is the appropriate standard to apply and that, under that standard, the search of petitioner’s locker and bookbag was justified. It urges that petitioner had, at best, only a limited privacy interest in his school locker, that the search of the locker was a minimal intrusion, that school safety constitutes a compelling governmental interest, that the locker search was an "efficacious” means of satisfying that interest, and that, on balance, the minimal intrusion of the locker search was outweighed by the compelling interest in school safety.”
358 Md. 50, 54, 746 A.2d 405, 407 (2000).

. In its brief in this Court, the State did cite the State statute and posit that an argument could be made based on it that the petitioner had no expectation of privacy. That was done as apart of another argument, that while it is "an open question,” whether students possess any privacy interest in their lockers, based on Maryland law, a finding could be made that a lowered, or no legitimate privacy interest existed; it was not advanced as the dispositive argument that the majority finds it to be.

. Maryland Rule 8-131 (a) provides:
*71"(a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”
In truth, the petitioner has had no opportunity to respond to the majority’s argument and neither party has briefed the issue. This is another reason that only the issue we took this case to decide, rather than the issue the majority has chosen, should be addressed.

. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to Maryland Code (1978, 1999 Repl.Vol.) of the Education Article.

. The majority is correct that there is a conflict between the State statute and the school policy as it relates to the search of the student’s person. At issue here, however, is the search of the student’s locker, as to which I demonstrate infra, no such conflict exists.

. Section 4-101 addresses the function of the county boards. It provides:
*73“(a) Educational matters that affect the counties shall be under the control of a county board of education in each county.
“(b) Each county board shall seek in every way to promote the interests of the schools under its jurisdiction.”

. The school policy requires probable cause for the search of a student’s locker. I have found no case upholding the probable cause standard as necessary in a school environment, but then I have not come across a *76case in which the school, by its policy statement, created that level of privacy. In any event, the information on which the school in this case acted did not approach reasonable suspicion; the non-individualized tip which sparked the search of petitioner's locker fell far below both the school policy and that found applicable by the courts that have addressed the issue.

. The county policies which correspond to the Mark Twain School search and seizure policy have been in effect since 1979 and 1994, respectively. It should be noted, under COMAR 13A.01.02.01B, that,
"B. Power to Stay Action of County Boards.
The State Superintendent of Schools shall have the authority, either at the request of the President of the State Board of Education, or on his or her own motion, to order a stay, not to exceed 60 days in duration, of any action taken by way of rule, regulation, resolution, bylaw, or other order; provided, however, that the stay be issued within 5 days of the date notice of the action is received by the State Board of Education from the local board, that the stay may be dissolved at any time by the State Board of Education.”