Court Opinion

ID: 9773940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:04:45.538551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:24.805247
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I believe that Act 53, as it currently exists, does not provide sufficient procedural protections to satisfy due process.
*83Avoiding erroneous deprivations is one of the Due Process Clause’s primary concerns. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The Superior Court, and the present majority, respectively conclude that the risk of error under Act 53 is constitutionally tolerable primarily by analogy to the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), and to Georgia’s psychiatric commitment statute evaluated in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). I find Act 53 materially distinguishable from both enactments, and believe further that, in view of the relatively long periods of time that minors may be involuntarily confined, the statute’s procedures are inadequate to guarantee a sufficiently low risk of error.
First, regarding the MHPA, although provisions that are arguably analogous to Act 53 were upheld in In re J.M., 556 Pa. 63, 726 A.2d 1041 (1999), there are some notable differences between the two statutes. Under the MHPA, the initial involuntary commitment period is limited to several days, see 50 P.S. § 7302(d), and is based on a substantial risk that the individual will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or others. See id. § 7301(b); In re J.M., 556 Pa. at 75 n. 9, 726 A.2d at 1048 n. 9 (highlighting the “emergency nature, therapeutic purpose and short duration of a Section 7302 warrant”). Pursuant to Act 53, the minor’s initial commitment lasts up to 45 days, and is not predicated upon a risk of immediate bodily injury or death. As this Court explained in In re Seegrist, 517 Pa. 568, 539 A.2d 799 (1988):
It is clear that the scheme adopted [in the MHPA] envisions that more extensive procedural or “due process” protections will apply as the amount of time a person may be deprived of liberty increases above a bare minimum. For treatment not exceeding seventy-two hours, minimal procedural safeguards are available. For treatment not to exceed twenty days, a full though informal hearing must be held. For longer periods of treatment, a full-fledged adjudicatory hearing is necessary. We think that this is a perfectly appropriate statutory system that fully comports with due process.
*84Id. at 574, 539 A.2d at 802. Here, not only is the initial commitment longer than twenty days, the court can order successive 45-day confinement periods indefinitely so long as it finds that the minor will continue to benefit from inpatient services. See 71 P.S. § 1690.112a(d).
While I agree with the majority that a child’s constitutional due process rights are not equivalent to those of an adult, the reasons for such distinction pertain to children’s peculiar vulnerabilities and lack of maturity, see Majority Opinion at 67-69, 2 A.3d at 1214-15 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-39, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 3043-46, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979)), as well as the predominance of parental rights and governmental interests regarding childhood development, see id. at 73-76, 2 A.3d at 1218-19. Where, however, the Due Process Clause is concerned with avoiding factual error as a basis for liberty deprivations, the same standards apply equally to both adults and children, and this is true notwithstanding that the law in question may be designed to promote the minor’s welfare and may be denominated as civil rather than criminal. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073-75, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). See generally Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 318, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1455, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Institutionalization is a decisive and unusual event. The consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are more tragic where children are involved.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The majority relies heavily upon the Supreme Court’s Par-ham decision, and I agree that that matter provides important guidance. However, Parham involved legislation dealing with the commitment of minors to psychiatric hospitals due to mental illness, and the Supreme Court upheld the statutory framework while emphasizing the general reliability of investigations undertaken by medical doctors. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 612-13, 99 S.Ct. at 2509; id. at 613, 99 S.Ct. at 2510 (“Georgia’s statute envisions a careful diagnostic medical inquiry to be conducted by the admitting physician at each regional hospital.”); see also Majority Opinion at 76, 2 A.3d at 1219 (adverting to Parham’s description of “what essentially is a medical determination”). In conjunction with its focus on *85the medical nature of the determinations made under the Georgia law, the Supreme Court also described the inherent, extra-legal procedural safeguards occasioned by the events that would ordinarily precede the commitment of a child:
In the typical case, the parents of a child initially conclude from the child’s behavior that there is some emotional problem — in short, that “something is wrong.” They may respond to the problem in various ways, but generally the first contact with the State occurs when they bring the child to be examined by a psychologist or psychiatrist at a community mental health clinic.
Most often, the examination is followed by outpatient treatment at the community clinic. In addition, the child’s parents are encouraged, and sometimes required, to participate in a family therapy program to obtain a better insight into the problem. In most instances, this is all the care a child requires. However, if, after a period of outpatient care, the child’s abnormal emotional condition persists, he may be referred by the local clinic staff to an affiliated regional mental hospital.
At the regional hospital an admissions team composed of a psychiatrist and at least one other mental health professional examines and interviews the child — privately in most instances. This team then examines the medical records provided by the clinic staff and interviews the parents. Based on this information, and any additional background that can be obtained, the admissions team makes a diagnosis and determines whether the child will likely benefit from institutionalized care.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 614-15, 99 S.Ct. at 2510.
In comparison with the above, an Act 53 drug-dependency assessment may initially be ordered based on a one-sentence unsworn petition (as it was in this case), and the dependency assessment may be grounded on a relatively short, uncounseled interview by an assessor who is not a physician.1 See 71 *86P.S. § 1690.112a(b)(2). As noted, the court may then order confinement for up to 45 days based solely on the assessor’s testimony.2 These procedures do not require a thorough background evaluation based on such things as school and social agency records, an omission I find noteworthy in light of Parham’s observation that, in view of the “risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care,” the factfinder’s inquiry “must carefully probe the child’s background using all available sources, including, but not limited to, parents, schools, and other social agencies,” in addition to an interview with the child. Parham, 442 U.S. at 606-07, 99 S.Ct. at 2506. Although drug or alcohol addiction assessments may differ from evaluations involving mental illness, these pronouncements from Parham, in my opinion, cast some doubt upon the adequacy of Act 53’s procedural safeguards.
*87The Commonwealth undoubtedly has an important objective to ensure that minors receive treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, and the minor’s parents retain a recognized interest in ensuring that their drug-dependent children obtain treatment, as cogently articulated by the Attorney General, see Brief for Appellee at 16-22, and the majority, see Majority Opinion at 66-72, 2 A.3d at 1213-17. On balance, however, I would find that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a minor to greater due process protections than those supplied by Act 53 before the state may institutionalize him involuntarily for 45 days.3 I am not insensitive to the possibility that family ties may be strained by pitting children against their parents or guardians as adversaries in a judicial setting, see Parham, 442 U.S. at 610, 99 S.Ct. at 2508, and hence, I would not conclude that adversarial testing of the petitioner’s veracity or motives is constitutionally required — particularly as the petition itself becomes largely irrelevant once an assessment is ordered. I would hold, though, that, in view of the substantial involuntary commitment periods authorized by Act 53, and the possibility of erroneous deprivations due to the brevity of the assessment process, the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a minor to a more thorough evaluation concerning the need for inpatient treatment than the relatively scanty procedures outlined in Act 53. For example, I would be more comfortable with a legislative scheme under which the assessor is expressly required to use other sources besides an interview with the child,4 and/or the final recommendation concerning treatment *88is made by a physician, so as to bring its reliability within the parameters expounded by the Supreme Court in Parham.

. Although Act 53 requires that the court appoint counsel for the minor, it does not specify when such appointment must' be made or that counsel must be present during the minor's drug and alcohol assess*86ment. Here, for example, the interview took place before counsel had an opportunity to consult with his client. This may be problematic because, unlike evaluations for possible mental illness, Act 53 assessments require an individual, acting as an agent for the state, to question the minor concerning alleged illegal conduct, a process that could implicate distinct constitutional limitations, particularly if counsel is absent during the questioning.
In seeking review, Appellant raised this issue by asserting that any such admissions might lead to the initiation of a criminal or delinquency prosecution with no protection against the use of the minor’s own statements in the prosecution. The issue, moreover, is fairly subsumed within this Court’s allocatur grant, which asks generally whether Act 53 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See In re F.C., 601 Pa. 573, 975 A.2d 1082 (2009) (per curiam). See generally Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (making the privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). However, Appellant does not pursue the question in his merits brief to this Court, and thus, it is waived.

. The assessor may retain an interest in having the minor admitted, as she may be a staff member at the treatment facility where the minor is ultimately confined. See N.T. June 12, 2007, at 2, reproduced in R.R. 20a (reflecting that the assessor in the present case was employed by the facility where Appellant was ultimately confined). The Supreme Court in Parham adverted to this possibility, but deemed it unproblematic in view of the district court’s finding that the hospital staff in Georgia acted conscientiously. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 616, 99 S.Ct. at 2511.

. In my opinion, the circumstances surrounding the underlying commitment in this case illustrate the need for such additional protections. Here, a fourteen-year-old boy was subjected, without any prior notice, to arrest and shackling at his home by multiple law enforcement agents, who then transported him to the courthouse where he remained shackled throughout the entire evaluative process, including the court hearing. All of this occurred without any criminal charges having been lodged. Although I agree with the majority to the degree it concludes that the judge was not likely prejudiced in his fact-finding role, the fact that Act 53 appears to allow for such heavy-handed actions against minors within a purely civil context supports the conclusion that its due process protections are inadequate to pass constitutional scrutiny.

. Such sources could include, for example, records from the social services agency and an interview with the Act 53 petitioner. It appears *88that, in this case, the assessor did have access to some of these sources. See N.T. June 12, 2007, at 22-27, reproduced in R.R. 40a-45a (reflecting the testimony of the assessor regarding the information she obtained concerning Appellant's drug use). However, that fact is irrelevant to the facial constitutional analysis of Act 53, which does not require that information-gathering step.