Court Opinion

ID: 9957880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 16:01:01.691854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:58.803805
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ALBERT CHANG,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         DC-0752-22-0446-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: April 4, 2024
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Albert Chang , Potomac, Maryland, pro se.

      Sandra Santos , Fairfield, California, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his appeal claiming harassment and retaliation for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                  2

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.      Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).           After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the initial decision
except as expressly MODIFIED as follows: (1) we VACATE the administrative
judge’s finding that the appellant made only generalized allegations and sweeping
conclusions; and (2) we VACATE the administrative judge’s reasoning pertaining
to the agency’s termination of the appellant’s accused harasser.

                                BACKGROUND
      The appellant retired from his position as a GS-14 Supervisory Financial
and Loan Business Specialist in Washington, District of Columbia, in December
2021. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 7, Tab 7 at 18. He filed an equal
employment opportunity (EEO) complaint asserting that he was forced to retire
due to discrimination based on his race and national origin and retaliation for
prior opposition to harassment. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-44. He received a final agency
decision in May 2022. Id. This appeal followed. Id. at 1, 3.
      The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order providing notice to
the appellant that his appeal would be dismissed absent a nonfrivolous allegation
that his retirement was involuntary. IAF, Tab 5 at 2. Following the parties’
submissions, IAF, Tabs 6-8, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, IAF, Tab 9,
Initial Decision (ID) at 11.
                                                                                   3

      The appellant has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR)
File, Tab 3, and the agency has responded in opposition to his petition, PFR File,
Tab 4. The appellant has replied to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tab 6.

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant did
not allege facts which, if proven, could establish that his decision to retire was
involuntary.   ID at 10-11.    On review, the appellant reasserts that he had no
choice but to retire because he had been subjected to a hostile work environment
since May 2020. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6, Tab 6 at 4-5; IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
      An employee-initiated action, such as a resignation or retirement, is
presumed to be voluntary and generally is not an appealable adverse action. See
Shoaf v. Department of Agriculture, 260 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
However, the Board has jurisdiction over an employee-initiated action as a
“constructive” adverse action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 if the appellant
establishes the following: (1) that he lacked a meaningful choice, and (2) this
was because of the agency’s improper actions. See Bean v. U.S. Postal Service,
120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 11 (2013) (setting forth a two-part jurisdictional standard as
a unifying principle for all constructive adverse action appeals).     To obtain a
jurisdictional hearing, the appellant must make nonfrivolous allegations of a
constructive adverse action.    See Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
758 F.2d 641, 642-43 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 11, 14. An
allegation generally will be considered nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty
of perjury, an individual makes an allegation that (1) is more than conclusory;
(2) is plausible on its face; and (3) is material to the legal issues in the appeal.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
      Turning to the appellant’s allegations, he has been treated for depression
and retired for the sake of his mental health in response to unbearable harassment
based on his race or national origin that went unaddressed by his agency. IAF,
                                                                                          4

Tab 6 at 4.        He did not allege any specific medical restrictions that were
incompatible with his assigned duties.         Cf. Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 11-13
(explaining that the first part of the two-part jurisdictional standard is met if an
appellant has no option but to work outside of medical restrictions).
Nevertheless, we examine the appellant’s factual allegations to determine whether
he has presented a plausible claim the agency engaged in a course of action that
made working conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the
appellant’s position would have felt compelled to retire. 2               See Axsom v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 12 (2009); see also Bean,
120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 11 (explaining the first part in the two-part jurisdictional
requirement in constructive adverse action appeals—that the appellant lacked a
meaningful choice).
         We disagree with the administrative judge’s statement that the appellant
made only generalized allegations of harassment and discrimination and presented
sweeping conclusions, not facts. ID at 9. The appellant supplied the final agency
decision on his EEO complaint, which contains his specific factual allegations.
IAF, Tab 1 at 8-44. Namely, the appellant set forth specific emails from the
accused harasser 3 and specific conduct by the accused harasser in meetings. Id.
For example, the appellant alleged that his colleague harassed him by not
capitalizing the first letter of his name in several emails, assigning 55 projects to
his staff without his consent, refusing to meet with him on work -related matters,
requesting via email that the appellant stop emailing him, and interrupting the
appellant’s discussion of a technical issue during a meeting by yelling, “this is
ridiculous!”      IAF, Tab 1 at 9, 26, 28.       The appellant also set forth details
regarding his complaints to managers about the alleged harassment as well as the

2
   At the jurisdictional stage, we consider the appellant’s allegations of race
discrimination or retaliation only insofar as they relate to this issue. See Pickens v.
Social Security Administration, 88 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 6 (2001); Markon v. Department of
State, 71 M.S.P.R. 574, 577-80 (1996).
3
    These emails are evidenced in the agency’s file. IAF, Tab 7 at 48-59, 62-64, 73-85.
                                                                                    5

ways in which they failed to appropriately address his complaints. IAF, Tab 1
at 5, 12-13, 26-33, Tab 8 at 6-7, 11. Therefore, we vacate the statement in the
initial decision. Nevertheless, the administrative judge discussed the appellant’s
specific factual allegations as background and appears to have considered them in
his decision.   ID at 2-4, 10-11.    We agree with his conclusion that the facts
described by the appellant did not rebut the presumption of the voluntariness of
his retirement because a reasonable person in his position would not have felt
compelled to retire under such circumstances. ID at 10-11.
      Significantly, the administrative judge reasoned that the departure of the
appellant’s accused harasser from the agency in early September 2021, a few
months prior to the appellant’s December 2021 retirement, made his allegations
of an ongoing intolerable working conditions implausible. ID at 9; IAF, Tab 8
at 6-7. We generally agree with this reasoning. Events temporally close to an
employee’s retirement are usually the most probative evidence of involuntariness.
See Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 1342-43 (recognizing, however, that all events must be
considered in context, i.e., as part of the totality of the circumstances). Here, the
main cause of the alleged hostile work environment was no longer a factor by the
time the appellant decided to retire. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 7 at 38. We note that
the appellant alleged, however, that his depression continued through his
retirement because of the agency’s mishandling of its anti-harassment policy.
IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 13-15, Tab 8 at 6-8; PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-6. He alleged that
Human Resources refused to supply him with a report of its investigation into his
harassment complaint; an unrelated EEO decision issued in November 2021 found
a violation of the Rehabilitation Act in another division headed by his supervisor;
and, upon being told by the appellant that he was considering retirement, his
supervisor suggested that he wished him to leave quietly. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 13-15,
Tab 8 at 6-8. We find that these circumstances, considered in the context of all
the other events alleged by the appellant beginning in May 2020, could not be
viewed as so difficult or unpleasant as to compel a reasonable person to retire.
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IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 9. Thus, the first part of the two-part jurisdictional standard in
Bean is not met. See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 11. We need not address the
second part, i.e., the agency’s culpability, in this case. Id.
      We modify the administrative judge’s decision in one other, minor respect.
We vacate the administrative judge’s reasoning that the agency’s termination of
the appellant’s accused harasser undermined his assertion that the agency failed
to respond to his complaints such that he had no choice but to retire. ID at 9-10;
IAF, Tab 8 at 6-7. As the appellant noted correctly in his petition for review, the
agency did not terminate the appellant’s accused harasser: he separated from the
agency under 5 C.F.R. § 715, which covers non-disciplinary separations, and
began employment at another Federal agency.          PFR File, Tab 3 at 5, 9; IAF,
Tab 7 at 38, 70, 98, 101. This factual finding is immaterial to our conclusion that
the appellant has not presented nonfrivolous allegations of working conditions
under which a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to retire.
      Lastly, the appellant submits evidence for the first time in his petition for
review. He presents evidence of his antidepressant medications, which he states
were prescribed for symptoms caused by the alleged harassment. PFR File, Tab 3
at 4-5, 7-8.   He also submits a March 2022 memorandum from the agency’s
human resources office, which clarifies information already in the record about
his accused harasser’s separation from the agency . PFR File, Tab 3 at 9; IAF,
Tab 7 at 98, 101. We decline to consider evidence submitted by the appellant for
the first time with his petition for review because he has not shown that it was
unavailable before the close of the record before the administrative judge. See
Chin v. Department of Defense, 2022 MSPB 34, ¶ 8; Avansino v. U.S. Postal
Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). In addition, the new evidence is not of
sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision.
See Spivey v. Department of Justice, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶ 15; Russo v. Veterans
Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).
                                                                                      7

      Thus, we affirm the initial decision, which dismissed his appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, as modified.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

4
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        8

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                  9

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
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other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
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Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.