Court Opinion

ID: 9930356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 18:03:49.881033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:14:00.026197
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/6/24 P. v. Singer CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A167198
 v.
 KENNETH GENE SINGER, III,                                              (Lake County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. CR2656)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         In 1989, a jury found defendant Kenneth Gene Singer, III, guilty of
first degree murder and second degree robbery and found he personally used
a firearm in the commission of the offenses. Singer, who was 21 years old
when he committed the offenses, was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.
         In 2022, Singer filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (§ 1170(d)). The trial court denied
the petition on the ground the recall and resentencing procedure is available
only to defendants who were under 18 years old when they committed the life
offense, but Singer was 21 years old when he committed his offense.
         On appeal, Singer contends he is eligible for recall and resentencing
because section 1170(d)(8)(B) provides that youth is a factor to be considered
in resentencing and a “youth” is any person who was under 26 years old when

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the offense was committed. We reject Singer’s reading of section 1170(d) and
therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying his petition.
                                 DISCUSSION
      We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (MacIsaac v.
Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076,
1081–1082.) Our task is to determine the Legislature’s intent, and we first
“look to the words of the statute themselves.” (Id. at p. 1082.) “If the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our task is at an end, for there
is no need for judicial construction.” (Id. at p. 1083.) Accordingly, we begin
with the language of section 1170(d).
      Subparagraph (d)(1) identifies who is eligible to file a petition for recall
and resentencing. It specifies that “a defendant who was under 18 years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years . . . may submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing,” so long as the defendant did not torture
the victim and the victim was not a public safety official. (§ 1170(d)(1)(A) and
(B), italics added.)
      Subparagraph (d)(2) sets forth the requirements for a petition. “The
petition shall include the defendant’s statement that the defendant was
under 18 years of age at the time of the crime and was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, the defendant’s statement describing
their remorse and work towards rehabilitation, and the defendant’s
statement that one of [four specified circumstances] is true.” (§ 1170(d)(2),
italics added.)1

      1 A petition must include a statement that one of the four following

circumstances is true: “(A) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony

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      If a trial court determines that one or more of the four specified
circumstances applies, then subparagraph (d)(5) requires the court to “recall
the sentence and commitment previously ordered and hold a hearing to
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not
previously been sentenced . . . .” (§ 1170(d)(5).)
      Subparagraphs (d)(6) through (9) and (11) of section 1170 provide
guidance to the trial court at the resentencing stage.
      As relevant to Singer’s appellate claim, subparagraph (d)(8) provides in
part: “[T]he court may also resentence the defendant to a term that is less
than the initial sentence if any of the following were a contributing factor in
the commission of the alleged offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth
or was a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time
of the commission of the offense. [¶] (C) Prior to the instant offense, or at the
time of the commission of the offense, the person is or was a victim of
intimate partner violence or human trafficking.” (§ 1170(d)(8), italics added.)
      A “youth” under section 1016.7, subdivision (b), is “any person under 26
years of age on the date the offense was committed.”

murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law. [¶] (B) The
defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other
felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior
to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall. [¶] (C)
The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant.
[¶] (D) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation
or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing
themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those
programs have been available at their classification level and facility, using
self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse.”
(§ 1170(d)(2).)

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      Singer contends “the inclusion of subdivision (d)(8)(B) in section 1170,
makes him eligible for resentencing because he was under the age of 26 years
at the time the murder was committed.” The language of section 1170(d)
clearly and unambiguously provides otherwise. The eligibility requirements
of section 1170(d)(1) include the circumstance that the defendant “was under
18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the
defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole.” Further, a compliant petition must include a “statement that the
defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the crime and was
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.” (§ 1170(d)(2).)
      Section 1170(d)(8), on the other hand, identifies circumstances that
may be considered at the resentencing stage, but it does not expand the pool
of defendants who are eligible to petition for recall and resentencing in the
first place. Section 1170(d)(8)(A), for example, allows a court to consider the
circumstance that “psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” was a
contributing factor in the offense, but this cannot plausibly mean that anyone
who has experienced trauma is now eligible for recall and resentencing under
section 1170(d).
      Singer argues we should nonetheless read section 1170(d)(8)(B) to
mean he is eligible for recall and resentencing under the “rule of lenity.”
Under this rule, “when a statute defining a crime or punishment is
susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, the appellate court should
ordinarily adopt that interpretation more favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57.) “ ‘The rule [of lenity] applies only
if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended’ ”; it
does not apply “ ‘unless two reasonable interpretations of the same provision
stand in relative equipoise, i.e., that resolution of the statute’s ambiguities in

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a convincing manner is impracticable.’ ” (Id. at p. 58.) The rule does not
apply in this case because section 1170(d) is not ambiguous. Moreover, even
assuming ambiguity, we would not construe section 1170(d)(8)(B) in a
manner that would implicitly repeal an eligibility requirement clearly stated
in section 1170(d)(1). (See Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th
627, 637 [“Repeals by implication are disfavored”].)2
                                DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s petition for recall and resentencing is
affirmed.

      2 Singer argues for the first time in his reply that the trial court’s

reading of the statute renders section 1170(d)(8)(B) superfluous and should
be rejected. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in reply.
(People v. Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005).

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                                           _________________________
                                           Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Mayfield, J.*

A167198, People v. Singer

      * Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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