Court Opinion

ID: 9730417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:11:50.514858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.326449
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion overlooks a significant complicating factor in the present case. The original custody order, from which Father sought a modification, awarded joint legal custody to the parties. IND.CODE § 31-1-11.5-21(f) (1988) provides: "'joint legal custody' means that the persons awarded joint custody will share authority and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child's upbringing, including the child's ed*752ucation, health care, and religious training." Further, the statutory authorization for joint legal custody specifies factors which must be considered prior to such an award:
"(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint custody;
(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare;
(3) the wishes of the child and whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;
(4) whether the persons awarded joint custody live in close proximity to each other and plan to continue to do so; and
(5) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody."
IND.CODE § 31-1-11.5-21(g). Of primary importance, but not determinative of the matter, is a consideration of whether the parties have agreed to a joint legal custody arrangement. Id.1
The child custody statute, which until a 1983 amendment did not provide for joint custody, also includes guidelines for consideration when making a more traditional custody award to one parent. See P.L. 283-1983, See. 1. The joint custody guidelines set out above do not precisely mimic the guidelines for a traditional custody award. The legislature specifically ac knowledged the special considerations inherent to a determination of the propriety of a joint custody award. Accordingly, the standard for modifying a joint custody award should also reflect the basic differences between modification of a joint eusto-dy award and modification of a more traditional custody award.
As noted by the majority, the modification of a custody award requires a finding of a substantial and continuing change of circumstances which render the existing custody order unreasonable. Schenk v. Schenk (1991), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 973, 977; IND.CODE § 31-1-11.5-22(d) (1990). Further, it is generally true that a move which makes visitation inconvenient will not, standing alone, warrant a modification of custody. Poret v. Martin (1982), Ind., 434 N.E.2d 885, 890. However, in the case of joint custody the parties equally share in decision-making regarding the child's upbringing including health care, education, and religion, even where physical custody is not divided equally. Unlike the considerations for awarding custody to an individual parent, when making the initial award of joint custody the court must determine the physical proximity of the partie and whether they intend to remain in close proximity.
The majority compellingly exposes the emotional upheaval that accompanies a sudden change in a custody arrangement. Also as noted by the majority, it is counterproductive to stigmatize a parent as blameworthy for initiating changes, such as a move, which are normal. However, implicitly each parent makes a commitment to abide by the "groundrules" upon which joint custody was awarded. This is especially true of the specific guidelines which must be considered prior to such an award. An interstate move by one joint custodian such as in the present case, would significantly hamper the other joint custodian's ability to share in decisions statutorily awarded to the joint custodians regarding the child's education, health care and religious training.
Remaining mindful of the difference between an initial award of custody and a modification of custody, as noted above the child custody statute treats differently initial awards of sole custody and awards of *753joint custody. It follows that a modification of joint custody likewise requires an alternative standard to that employed when a party seeks to modify a sole custody award. When joint custody has been awarded and the parties find themselves litigating an alteration to one of the statutory factors upon which a joint custody award must be based, the trial court should be vested with the discretion to view the underlying factors for the initial award as significant or determinative. Thus, a substantial alteration to one of the factors should support a finding that the alteration would irreparably impair the assumptions upon which a successful and beneficial joint custody award was based, thereby warranting a modification of the joint custody arrangement as in the best interests of the child.
An awareness of the divisiveness innate to dissolution and custody proceedings is reflected in the statutory considerations required prior to an award of joint custody. The considerations attempt to insure that joint custody will not be awarded unless some spirit of cooperation between the parties concerning the best interests of the child is readily apparent. Once joint custody has been awarded, the parties must be able to maintain that spirit of cooperation. The pitfall of awarding and maintaining a joint custody arrangement primarily to placate the parties should be avoided as not in the best interests of the child.
The present case points out the frailties of adhering to the standard for modification of a sole custody award when the modification sought is from a joint custody award. Here, the parties are each fit to act as sole or joint custodians.2 Neither party has attempted to alter the arrangement in some egregious manner. Also, neither party has misbehaved regarding the custodial arrangement. Yet, as benign an act as a move may be, in a case such as the present, where the trial court views such an act as a substantial deviation from the factors upon which the joint custody arrangement was premised, a court on review should not indulge a standard il suited to joint custody in order to impose the existing joint custody arrangement upon the parties and the child. Consequently, I would vote to affirm the trial court's decision modifying primary physical custody of the child to the Father.

. Although the agreement of the parties is not determinative in Indiana, the legislature has deemed an agreement a "primary" consideration prior to an award of joint custody. IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-21(g). It has been suggested that an equally important factor contributing to the success of a joint custody arrangement is a provision for the eventuality of an interstate move by either of the joint custodians. See Annot., Joint Custody of Children (1982), 17 A.L.R.4th 1013, 1017-18, citing Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 Cal.L.Rev. 978 (Sept.1977).

. The present case is relatively unburdened by considerations of the fitness of the parents to maintain joint custody. Cf. Drewett v. Drewett (1988), La.App., 524 So.2d 893 (Louisiana's statutory presumption that continued joint custody is in best interests of children was adequately rebutted by mother's proposed move out of state which would take children from father, home, school and friends, and by evidence of allegations that mother's sister had abused children, and that the parties subjected children to displays of temper and violence); Burrington v. Howard (1988), Ind.App., 521 N.E.2d 371, 373 (joint custody modified to sole custody with father where mother's proposed move constituted substantial and continuing change rendering original custody order unreasonable and other contributing factors included perceived indifference to effect of move upon child and mother's and new husband's tendency to place their interests above those of child).