Court Opinion

ID: 9840304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 21:00:29.413128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:12:07.770481
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216     Doc: 35         Filed: 09/14/2023   Pg: 1 of 22

                                               PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1216

        ROEE KIVITI; ADIEL KIVITI,

                    Plaintiffs - Appellants,

        v.

        NAVEEN PRASAD BHATT,

                    Debtor - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cv-00909-AJT-JFA)

        Argued: March 7, 2023                                    Decided: September 14, 2023

        Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in
        which Judge Rushing and Senior Judge Motz joined.

        Maurice Belmont VerStandig, THE VERSTANDIG LAW FIRM, LLC, Henderson,
        Nevada, for Appellants. Justin Philip Fasano, MCNAMEE HOSEA, P.A., Greenbelt,
        Maryland, for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 2 of 22

        RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

               We must police Congress’s limits on judicial review, even when both parties would

        rather we not. Adiel and Roee Kiviti paid Naveen Bhatt to renovate their Washington,

        D.C. home. But he wasn’t properly licensed. So, according to D.C. law, there was a chance

        he owed them their money back. Rather than pay, he invoked the bittersweet sanctuary of

        bankruptcy. Refusing to be evaded that easily, the Kivitis pursued him, filing a two-claim

        complaint against him in bankruptcy court. Because of bankruptcy-law nuances, the suit

        was fruitful for the Kivitis only if they won on both claims.

               One can thus imagine their frustration when the bankruptcy court dismissed one

        claim but not the other. The claims were meant to rise or fall together. It wasn’t worth the

        trouble to either party to litigate the remaining claim to completion without knowing if the

        dismissed one would be revived on appeal—the juice just wasn’t worth the squeeze. But

        their problem was that they could only appeal final orders. And the partial dismissal wasn’t

        final because one claim survived.

               So they hatched a plan to make the bankruptcy court’s order final by voluntarily

        dismissing the surviving claim without prejudice. They could then immediately appeal the

        court-dismissed claim and decide afterward whether it was worth further litigating the

        party-dismissed claim.

               At the district court, the plan went off without a hitch. The district judge accepted

        that the bankruptcy court’s partial dismissal was now final, and so reviewable, and then

        affirmed it. The Kivitis appealed to this Court, hoping to get the bankruptcy court’s order

        reversed and move forward on both claims. Meanwhile, Bhatt was content to not have to

                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023    Pg: 3 of 22

        litigate the claim that the bankruptcy court had left standing. Everything was unfolding as

        the parties had hoped.

               Or so they thought. The thing is, we don’t allow parties to manufacture finality like

        this. Congress told federal courts to review only final bankruptcy orders, barring some

        exceptions not relevant here. And we zealously guard that boundary, rejecting clever

        gambits aimed at eroding the statutory line between us and plenary review. Since this is

        one of those gambits, we must reject it. The bankruptcy court’s partial dismissal was not

        a final order. Nor did the parties’ after-the-fact machinations make it one. We thus vacate

        the district court’s order for lack of jurisdiction.

        I.     Background

               The Kivitis hired Bhatt to renovate their home in Washington, D.C. To renovate

        homes in D.C., contractors need to be licensed by the District. Because Bhatt told the

        Kivitis he was properly licensed, they thought everything was above board. Yet, delayed

        and defective, the renovations did not go well. And, as it turned out, Bhatt was not properly

        licensed. So the Kivitis sued him in D.C.’s Superior Court to the tune of $58,770—every

        penny they had paid him. But then Bhatt filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

               Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidates the debtor’s estate. Subject to some exceptions, an

        appointed trustee identifies and liquidates the debtor’s assets. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a),

        725, 726. To permit the trustee’s orderly resolution, creditors are barred from seeking to

        recover outside the bankruptcy system. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 727. Creditors, instead,

        file proofs of claim showing what they claim to be owed by the debtor. See Fed. R. Bankr.

        P. 3001(a). The allowed claims—those that are found valid—are then satisfied in order of

                                                        3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35         Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 4 of 22

        priority (secured creditors before unsecured, for example). If, as often is the case, there

        aren’t enough assets to satisfy all the unsecured claims, then the unsecured creditors split

        the remainder of the debtor’s assets pro rata. So those creditors often get little-to-none of

        their sought-after funds.

               Once a debtor’s assets are liquidated and distributed, his debts are generally

        discharged by the bankruptcy court. Discharged debt cannot be collected outside of

        bankruptcy. This promotes Chapter 7’s goal of giving debtors a “fresh start” post-

        bankruptcy; debtors couldn’t start anew if they left bankruptcy only to face an onslaught

        of legal claims. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Ma., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007). But not

        all debts are discharged. As relevant here, a debt is non-dischargeable if it was obtained

        through “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”         See 11 U.S.C.

        § 523(a)(2)(A).

               In addition to a proof of claim, the bankruptcy code also permits a creditor to seek

        relief by filing what is known as an adversary proceeding.          Adversary proceedings

        resemble civil suits and take place within a broader bankruptcy case. See In re Boca Arena,

        Inc., 184 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“In bankruptcy, adversary proceedings

        generally are viewed as ‘stand-alone lawsuits’. . .”). They pit some parties involved in the

        bankruptcy against each other, resolving some of their discrete issues.

               When Bhatt filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the code automatically stayed the

        Kivitis’ D.C. Superior Court action. Automatic bankruptcy stays stop any collection

        efforts, including lawsuits, outside the bankruptcy system. So it was the Chapter 7 process

                                                     4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 5 of 22

        or nothing. The Kivitis entered the bankruptcy fray by filing both an adversary proceeding

        and a proof of claim.

               The Kivitis’ adversary proceeding brought two counts:            Count I asked the

        bankruptcy court to declare Bhatt owed them $58,770 under D.C. law; Count II asked it to

        pronounce that debt nondischargeable. In other words, tell Bhatt he owes us money and

        that—despite the bankruptcy—he must pay in full.

               The bankruptcy court rejected Count II, finding that, if a debt existed, it was

        dischargeable. So it partially dismissed the adversary proceeding. But it allowed Count I

        to proceed toward trial to determine whether Bhatt owed the Kivitis any money. It never

        got there.

               As an alternative to the adversary proceeding, the Kivitis also filed a proof of

        claim—in the broader bankruptcy case, yet outside the adversary proceeding—stating they

        had a right to payment of the $58,770 from Bhatt’s estate. When the Kivitis filed their

        proof of claim, they became eligible for some portion of that distribution unless an

        interested party successfully objected to it. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). Given the fact their

        claim was unsecured (i.e., low priority) and the state of Bhatt’s finances, they seemed

        unlikely to recover their full claim this way.

               The Kivitis’ strategy was a hedge. The proof of claim advanced the same legal

        theory to obtain the same money as they sought in Count I of the adversary proceeding.

        But the proof of claim was limited to some share of whatever assets were left in the

        bankruptcy estate. The adversary proceeding, in contrast, might permit full recovery. But

        that full recovery existed only outside the bankruptcy estate. And to get outside, the Kivitis

                                                         5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35        Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 6 of 22

        had to establish that the claim was not dischargeable. Otherwise, the adversary proceeding

        was limited to the same share of the assets that the proof of claim would cover. So—unless

        the bankruptcy judge’s ruling that the debt to the Kivitis was dischargeable was

        overturned—any right to recover from the adversary proceeding was duplicative of their

        proof of claim. The Kivitis’ proof of claim was thus a fallback: If the ruling on

        dischargeability stood, then the proof of claim gave Kivitis a chance to receive some of

        their money, even if they were unlikely to receive all their money.

               But if the Kivitis had to rely on their fallback, both parties preferred to know right

        away. They would rather understand how appellate courts felt about dischargeability

        (Count II) before deciding whether they should expend the resources to litigate the debt

        (Count I). If Count II could not be saved, the real fight would move to the proof-of-claim

        process and effort spent adjudicating Count I would be largely wasted.

               So the parties struck a deal. They voluntarily dismissed Count I, without prejudice,

        “so as to give rise to a final order from which an appeal of the dismissal of Count II of the

        Complaint may be taken.” J.A. 63. Having done so, the Kivitis appealed their Count II

        loss to the district court, who affirmed it. They then appealed to this Court.

        II.    Discussion

               The district court did not have jurisdiction over the Kivitis’ appeal. District courts

        have jurisdiction to hear appeals from “final judgments, orders, and decrees” entered in

        bankruptcy “cases and proceedings.” 1 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). The bankruptcy court’s order

               1
                They also sometimes have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory bankruptcy appeals.
        28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), (3). This is not one of those times.
                                                     6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216        Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023       Pg: 7 of 22

        dismissing Count II was not a final order when entered because Count I remained. And

        the parties cannot collude to create finality after the fact through a voluntary dismissal

        without prejudice. See Waugh Chapel S. v. United Food and Com. Workers Union Local

        47, 728 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2013). So there was no final order, which means the district

        court had no jurisdiction.

               A.      The Order was not final when entered

               We, as appellate judges, are used to weeding out interlocutory appeals

        masquerading as final-order appeals. That is because many appeals we get purport to be

        final-order appeals and it is up to us to make sure they are. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The

        courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district

        courts.”); Va. Dep’t of Corr. v. Jordan, 921 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[C]ourts must

        always assure themselves of subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits.”). And

        while we sometimes struggle to describe district-court finality at the margins, at base, a

        district-court order is final when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for

        the court to do but execute the judgment.” Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 792 (4th Cir. 2022)

        (en banc) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).

               Finality plays a similar role in bankruptcy. Parties to a bankruptcy can appeal

        bankruptcy-court decisions to district courts. But they generally can appeal only “final”

        judgments and orders. See § 158(a). 2 So a district-court judge considering whether she

               2
                Section 158(a) governs appeals from dispositive bankruptcy-court decisions. See
        28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (c)(2). A separate provision controls “objections” to non-binding,
        “proposed findings and conclusions.” See id. § 157(c)(1). This opinion deals with only
        the former.
                                                        7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 8 of 22

        can review a bankruptcy-court order engages in an analysis similar to our analysis when

        considering whether we can review a district-judge’s order.

               Similar. Not identical. The fact is that “the concept of finality in bankruptcy cases”

        is “more pragmatic and less technical.” McDow v. Dudley, 662 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir.

        2011). Bankruptcy cases are often a conglomeration of multiple discrete disputes that “but

        for the status of the bankrupt party . . . would be separate, stand-alone lawsuits.” In re

        James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 166 (7th Cir. 1992). So we call an order that

        “definitively” disposes of one of these discrete disputes “final,” and allow a party to

        immediately appeal it, even if it does not dispose of the broader bankruptcy case. Ritzen

        Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586–87 (2020). But we only do so

        because the Bankruptcy Code allows us to. While § 1291 facilitates review of final

        decisions in district-court cases, § 158(a) allows for appeals from final judgments, orders,

        and decrees entered in both bankruptcy “cases and proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)

        (emphasis added). The rules are different. Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501

        (2015). Said another way, to be appealable, the challenged bankruptcy decision does not

        have to end the entire bankruptcy case; it just has to end a proceeding inside the case. See

        In re Boca Arena, 184 F.3d at 1286; Bullard, 575 U.S. at 501–02; cf. Britt, 45 F.4th at 792.

               The initial step in the analysis is perhaps the hardest, if only because it is the most

        novel. To decide whether a bankruptcy-court order is final, a court first needs to know

        what the proper scope of the proceeding, or “discrete dispute,” adjudicated below was. See

        Bullard, 575 U.S. at 501–02 (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,

        547 U.S. 651, 657 n.3 (2006)). By this we mean the court needs to find the “appropriate

                                                      8
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35         Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 9 of 22

        procedural unit for determining finality.” Ritzen, 140 S. Ct. at 588. Once that unit is

        determined, the process becomes more familiar: we apply the finality principles from our

        § 1291 jurisprudence to that unit. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[1][b] (2023) (“Once

        the courts [determine the appropriate procedural unit] . . ., the principles developed under

        section 1291 will control the determination of finality.”); In re Integrated Res., Inc., 3 F.3d

        49, 52–53 (2d Cir. 1993).

               The appropriate procedural unit for determining finality here is the adversary

        proceeding. Adversary proceedings are discrete disputes. They are cabined off from the

        main bankruptcy case by their own complaint, filing fee, motions, subset of parties, docket

        numbers, and judgment. In re Ayre, 360 B.R. 880, 885 (C.D. Ill. 2007). As a result,

        adversary proceedings resemble “stand-alone lawsuits” brought inside the bankruptcy. See

        In re Boca Arena, 184 F.3d at 1286. So an order ending the litigation on the merits in an

        adversary proceeding is immediately appealable even when “the umbrella bankruptcy case

        remains pending.” See Ritzen, 140 S. Ct. at 586–87; In re Boca Arena, 184 F.3d at 1286;

        In re AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 1999); In re La. World Exposition, Inc.,

        832 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1987).

               Likewise, an order only partially ending the adversary proceeding is not. 1 Collier

        on Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[5] (2023) (“[O]nce one identifies the adversary proceeding . . . that

        is a separate judicial unit for purposes of determining finality, it becomes clear that orders

        entered during the course of that proceeding that leave the merits to be determined are

        interlocutory.”). Since adversary proceedings are “essentially a separate civil proceeding

        within the bankruptcy proceeding,” In re Ayre, 360 B.R. at 885, many of the Federal Rules

                                                      9
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35         Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 10 of 22

        of Civil Procedure apply to them, including those governing finality, see Fed. R. Bankr. P.

        7054(a). And under those Rules—unless a judge “expressly determines” otherwise—an

        order dismissing fewer than all the claims against a defendant is not final. Fed. R. Civ. P.

        54(b) (absent specific finding “any order or other decision, however designated, that

        adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . does not end the action as to any of the claims

        . . . .”); see also Fox v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 201 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2000)

        (“Ordinarily, a district court order is not ‘final’ until it has resolved all claims as to all

        parties.”).

               Put simply, “the ‘discrete dispute’ is the adversary proceeding itself, not a particular

        claim within that proceeding.” Ayers v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 819 F. App’x 180, 181 (4th Cir.

        2020) (per curiam). So an order dismissing only one claim in a multi-claim adversary

        proceeding does not amount to a final order. Id.; In re Esteva, 60 F.4th 664, 672–73 (11th

        Cir. 2023).

               The bankruptcy court’s order was thus not final when entered. The order dismissed

        Count II with prejudice, ending litigation on the merits for that claim. Yet it did not dismiss

        Count I. That count had a ways to go before it was finally adjudicated. Consequently, the

        court had more to do than “execute the judgment.” Britt, 45 F.4th at 792. So the partial

        dismissal was not an appealable final order. 3

               3
                 This conclusion stands even though the order determined that any debt was
        dischargeable. Dischargability orders are core proceedings under § 157(b)(2), which is a
        “‘textual clue’ that Congress viewed” them as discrete disputes. See Ritzen, 140 S. Ct. at
        590. But that fact alone does not “clinch the matter.” Id. (cleaned up). Since the
        dischargability decision did not “conclusively resolve” the adversary proceeding, id. at
        588, it was not a final order.
                                                      10
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216        Doc: 35        Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 11 of 22

               B.      The parties cannot manufacture finality

               The parties will be unsurprised by our holding that the bankruptcy court’s order was

        not final—and so not appealable—when entered. After all, that is why they agreed to

        dismiss Count I. They thought that, by doing so, they would make the order final because

        there would no longer be anything left to adjudicate in the adversary proceeding. J.A. 63

        (agreeing to dismiss Count I “so as to give rise to a final order from which an appeal . . .

        may be taken”); J.A. 73 (“The instant appeal is from an interlocutory order that became a

        final order upon dispensation of the remaining cause of action below.”).

               They were wrong. They cannot “use voluntary dismissals as a subterfuge to

        manufacture jurisdiction for reviewing otherwise non-appealable, interlocutory orders.”

        See Waugh Chapel S., 728 F.3d at 359. When Congress requires finality, we must ensure

        that “every matter in the controversy . . . [is] decided in a single appeal.” Microsoft Corp.

        v. Baker, 582 U.S. 23, 36 (2017) (quoting McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665–66 (1891)).

        Yet, if we allowed the parties to appeal Count II now, there would be nothing to stop them

        from reinstating—and then separately appealing—Count I down the line. See J.A. 63

        (agreeing that the dismissal is “without prejudice to the [Kivitis’] right to amend their

        pleadings so as to seek a finding of liability should there be an appellate remand”). Such

        tactics impermissibly “erode the finality principle” Congress enacted. See Microsoft, 582

        U.S. at 37; see also In re AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d at 619 (explaining that the “flexible”

        nature of bankruptcy finality does not “overcome the general aversion to piecemeal

        appeals” (cleaned up)). So the voluntary dismissal did not make the bankruptcy court’s

        earlier, partial dismissal final.

                                                     11
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 12 of 22

               True, some partial dismissals are final and appealable after the parties voluntarily

        dismiss the remaining claims. See Affinity Living Grp., LLC v. StarStone Specialty Ins.

        Co., 959 F.3d 634, 638–39 (4th Cir. 2020). But that’s only when the district court dismisses

        some claims and, in the process, makes it legally impossible to prevail on the remaining

        claims, even while allowing them to limp on. 4 Id. In this sense, the litigants do not

        impermissibly create finality by voluntarily dismissing the doomed claims; they merely

        recognize that it already effectively exists. See id. at 639 (hearing an appeal from a case

        that was “legally over” even before the voluntary dismissal).

               That is not what happened here. These parties set out to create finality, not

        recognize it. The adversary proceeding was not “legally over” after the bankruptcy court’s

        partial dismissal. See id. Count II’s dismissal did not mean the Kivitis could not prevail

        on Count I. Count I asked whether Bhatt was in debt to the Kivitis—i.e., whether Bhatt

        violated D.C. law by renovating the Kivitis’ house without a license and thus owed them

        money. Count II asked whether any such debt was dischargeable—i.e., whether Bhatt

        obtained such a debt through “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” See

        11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Just because the bankruptcy court found that Bhatt had obtained

               4
                  This distinction is more than semantic. To illustrate, compare Microsoft with
        Affinity Living Group. In Microsoft, the district court’s partial order denied the plaintiffs’
        motion for class certification. 582 U.S. at 27. But that denial had no effect on the merits
        of the claims the parties voluntarily dismissed. Legal success was just as likely as it had
        been before the order, any resulting pay out would just be less lucrative. But, in Affinity
        Living Group, the district court’s partial order dismissed two of the plaintiffs’ four claims
        on the ground the defendant had no duty under the policy to the plaintiff. 959 F.3d at 639.
        And that duty was an essential element of the two claims that remained. Id. So the order
        meant there was no way for the plaintiff to legally succeed on the claims—they were
        “legally over” before they were voluntarily dismissed. Id.
                                                     12
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35         Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 13 of 22

        no debt through fraud did not mean the Kivitis were wrong that he violated D.C. law. Count

        I was still very much alive.

               The parties agree that the Kivitis could have prevailed on Count I’s merits even after

        Count II’s dismissal. In fact, they maintained their proof of claim which sought the same

        monies. Yet the Kivitis still argue that their voluntary dismissal recognized rather than

        created finality because, they say, their Count II loss rendered the adversarial proceeding

        moot. According to them, a moot proceeding is “legally over” and so this appeal falls

        within Affinity Living Group’s safe harbor.

               The root of their mootness argument is that, without Count II, any judgment they

        won via Count I could not be collected outside bankruptcy and their $58,770 would be

        recovered—if at all—only through the bankruptcy’s proof-of-claims process. So once

        Count II failed, they argue, Count I became legally moot. A case is moot when “it is

        impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever” to the complaining party. 5

        Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC., 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660 (2019) (quoting

        Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)). Recall that if a debt is discharged, it cannot

        be collected outside the bankruptcy proceedings. So if the bankruptcy court agreed Bhatt

        owed the Kivitis money (success on Count I), but determined that debt dischargeable

               5
                To be clear, we are describing Article III mootness and not “equitable mootness.”
        So-called “equitable mootness” is not real mootness but a pragmatic doctrine particular to
        bankruptcy under which appellate courts dismiss an appeal when “changes to the status
        quo following the order being appealed make it impractical or inequitable to ‘unscramble
        the eggs.’” In re Castaic Partners II, LLC, 823 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2016); In re Bate
        Land & Timber, LLC, 877 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 2017). It is not implicated here.

                                                      13
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35             Filed: 09/14/2023   Pg: 14 of 22

        (failure on Count II), the Kivitis could not directly use the judgment they won from Count

        I to force Bhatt to pay them outside of bankruptcy. Their only means of recovery would

        be within bankruptcy, via their already filed proof of claim. 6 The Kivitis thus contend that

        they could not get “any effectual relief” from the adversary proceeding, rendering it moot.

        Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 10 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Messrs. Kiviti’s claim

        . . . caused the remaining case to become moot, and to accordingly strip the Bankruptcy

        Court of Article III jurisdiction.”).

               The Kivitis’ argument is clever; but it misses at least one critical link: Mootness is

        an Article III doctrine, and bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts. Mootness arises

        out of Article III’s “case-or-controversy” requirement. The United States’s judicial Power

        extends only to cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To be a case or controversy,

        parties must have a “‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit,” at each stage of the

        litigation. Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 478 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v.

        Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 161 (2016).

        If they lose that stake, their case drifts beyond the judicial Power and becomes moot. See

        United States v. Payne, 54 F.4th 748, 751 (4th Cir. 2022). But since bankruptcy courts are

        not Article III courts, they do not wield the United States’s judicial Power. Stern v.

               6
                 That is not to say that the Kivitis or Bhatt could not use the resolution of Count I
        indirectly, inside the greater bankruptcy case. Depending on who prevailed on Count I,
        that ruling could affect the proof of claim—filed before the same judge, in the same case,
        and based on the same legal theory. Such indirect use of the resolution of Count I, however,
        does not impact the Kivitis’ argument that the adversary proceeding was moot.
                                                        14
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 15 of 22

        Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011). 7 So they can constitutionally adjudicate cases that

        would be moot if heard in an Article III court. 8

               To be sure, a bankruptcy case must—at the start—be within the judicial Power.

        Section 1334 grants near-exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters to federal district

        courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). The district court may then refer a bankruptcy case to a

        bankruptcy judge (who serves as a unit of the district court). 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 151. 9

        But, of course, a district court can only refer a case that it has jurisdiction over. See Ex

        parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed

        at all in any cause.”). So before a bankruptcy case is referred to a bankruptcy court, the

        case must satisfy Article III. See In re Curtis, 571 B.R. 441, 447 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017)

        (“[T]he bankruptcy court’s power to hear, or to hear and determine, as the case may be,

               7
                 At least, they do not do so lawfully. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 469. That is not to say
        they do not adjudicate matters that Article III courts could also adjudicate. They do. See
        id. at 488 (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284
        (1856)). Our point here is that they are not constitutionally limited to deciding only matters
        an Article III court could adjudicate.
               8
                  The harder question may be why they can constitutionally adjudicate cases that are
        within the judicial Power and so could be heard in Article III courts. See Oil States Energy
        Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372–73 (2018) (“Congress
        cannot confer the Government’s judicial Power on entities outside Article III.” (cleaned
        up)); cf. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 n.11 (1989); Stern, 564 U.S. at
        492 n. 7; Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 678–79 (2015). But we need
        not dive into this question here.
               9
                 In practice, referrals occur automatically because virtually all district courts have
        entered standing orders of reference. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.02[1] (2023). These
        orders refer every bankruptcy case to bankruptcy judges so that district courts don’t need
        to make case-by-case referrals.
                                                     15
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 16 of 22

        bankruptcy cases and proceedings is entirely dependent upon the referral by the district

        court.”).

               So too must Article III be satisfied after the bankruptcy court acts and the case is

        returned to the district court from the bankruptcy court. Every action by a district court is

        constrained by Article III, including reviewing a bankruptcy court order. So a district court

        has no authority to act without an existing constitutional case or controversy. See In re

        Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Croniser, No. 22-1227,

        2022 WL 7935991, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (unpublished).

               But that limit on the district court’s authority does not constrain the bankruptcy

        court. Once a case is validly referred to the bankruptcy court, the Constitution does not

        require it be an Article III case or controversy for the bankruptcy court to act. See In re

        Technicool Sys., Inc., 896 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Bankruptcy courts are not Article

        III creatures bound by traditional standing requirements.”). 10 That requirement comes

        from the Constitution’s limits on the judicial Power. Bankruptcy courts do not wield

        judicial Power. End of story.

               At least that is the end of the constitutional story. The statutory story—i.e., whether

        bankruptcy courts have statutory authority to decide a constitutionally moot matter—is

               10
                  Through a separate mechanism, district courts can refer cases or proceedings to a
        bankruptcy court while retaining the exclusive authority to enter “any final order[s] or
        judgment[s].” See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). In that situation, the bankruptcy court can only
        recommend a disposition. Id. Since that case or proceeding is truly being adjudicated by
        the district court, Article III’s constraints may apply. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Gypsum Co.,
        60 F.4th 73, 81 (4th Cir. 2023). That is not this case’s posture.
                                                     16
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35         Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 17 of 22

        more complex. Still, the tale concludes the same way: a bankruptcy court can adjudicate

        a constitutionally moot matter.

               Bankruptcy courts, as statutory creatures, have whatever power Congress lawfully

        gives them. So to see if bankruptcy courts can decide matters outside the judicial Power,

        we check to see if Congress has given them that power. And Congress has said that

        bankruptcy courts “may hear and determine all [bankruptcy] cases . . . and all core

        proceedings . . . referred” to them by a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (emphasis

        added). Not just those that could be fully adjudicated in district court. Once a bankruptcy

        case lands in bankruptcy court, any number of things could happen before the estate’s

        distribution is settled. As relevant here, the parties could embroil themselves in an

        adversary proceeding. But whether that proceeding could itself be adjudicated in an Article

        III court is of no moment. By § 157’s text, a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction requires only

        that the case or core proceeding arise under Title 11 and be referred to the bankruptcy court.

        § 157(b)(1). Section 157 does not require every “discrete dispute[ ],” see Ritzen, 140 S.

        Ct. at 587, arising post-referral to satisfy Article III. Nor does any other provision.

               Against this silence, Congress has elsewhere explicitly imported some Article III-

        type requirements onto bankruptcy courts. For example, it created so-called “bankruptcy

        standing” by giving “parties in interest” a right to be heard, at least in Chapter 11

        bankruptcies. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b); In re Capital Contracting Co., 924 F.3d 890, 895

                                                     17
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216      Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023     Pg: 18 of 22

        (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing § 1109(b)). 11 And it also codified some version of mootness

        for real-property cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m); In re Rare Earth Mins., 445 F.3d 359,

        363 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that § 363(m) “creates a rule of ‘statutory mootness’”). Yet

        these principles are not the same as Article III’s limits and Congress has never imported

        all those limitations. We refuse to make that choice for it; indeed we cannot do so. See

        Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 96

        (2012) (“[W]hat a text does not provide is unprovided.”).

               A few bankruptcy courts confronting this issue have disagreed. They point to a

        district court’s authority to “withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding” referred

        to a bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). They also think it significant that Congress

        called bankruptcy courts “unit[s] of the district court,” with judges that are “judicial

        officer[s]” thereof. See § 151. Following these breadcrumbs, those courts have held that

        a bankruptcy court’s power depends on a district court’s power—and thus evaporates if the

               11
                  “Bankruptcy standing” under § 1109(b) refers to a party’s ability to object in the
        bankruptcy court. See In re Cap. Contracting Co., 924 F.3d at 894–96; In re Kaiser
        Gypsum Co., 60 F.4th at 81–82. This is distinct from “bankruptcy appellate standing,”
        which concerns a party’s ability to appeal a bankruptcy order. In re Kaiser Gypsum Co.,
        60 F.4th at 81–82. Courts have split over whether bankruptcy standing simply incorporates
        Article III’s requirements or imposes more stringent limitations. Compare In re Global
        Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 2011) (bankruptcy standing is coextensive
        with Article III standing) with In re Tower Park Props., LLC, 803 F.3d 450, 456–57 & n.6
        (9th Cir. 2015) (bankruptcy standing is more restrictive than Article III standing); see also
        In re Cap. Contracting Co., 924 F.3d at 895. They are also split over whether it applies
        outside of Chapter 11 bankruptcies. See id. And whether bankruptcy appellate standing
        survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark International v. Static Control
        Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), is an open question. See In re Kaiser Gypsum Co.,
        60 F.4th at 82. We need not confront these issues today. We simply reference § 1109(b)
        because it is evidence that when Congress wants to impose certain Article III-esque
        requirements on bankruptcy courts, it does so explicitly.
                                                     18
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 19 of 22

        case strays outside of Article III’s bounds. See, e.g., In re Kilen, 129 B.R. 538, 542–43

        (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (“In light of the derivative nature of the bankruptcy court’s power,

        it is obvious that the constitutional standards of Article III which bind the district court also

        bind the bankruptcy court.”); In re Interpictures, Inc., 86 B.R. 24, 28–29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.

        1988); but cf. Stern, 564 U.S. at 500–01. 12

               We are unconvinced. Congress requires bankruptcy courts to get cases from district

        courts and allows district courts to withdraw cases. And the Constitution limits the cases

        a district court can refer or withdraw. But these two facts do not add up to a limit on the

        types of matters a bankruptcy court can adjudicate after referral, nor a requirement that

        those matters be eligible for withdrawal. That could be how it works—if Congress said so.

        Yet Congress has not said so. So that is not how it works.

               In the same vein, we refuse to overread Congress’s designation of bankruptcy courts

        as “unit[s]” of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 151. Certainly, district courts oversee

        many aspects of bankruptcy courts. For example, when bankruptcy judges consider

        matters within the judicial Power, district courts can—indeed sometimes must—review

        those actions. § 157(a), (b)(1), (c)(1). But bankruptcy courts are not “mere adjuncts” of

               12
                  Although it did not, language in our opinion, In re Grewe, 4 F.3d 299 (4th Cir.
        1993), could be read as endorsing this view. In deciding whether bankruptcy courts are
        “court[s] of the United States” as the term is used in an attorney’s fees provision, we said
        that “bankruptcy courts are, for jurisdictional purposes, inseparable from the district court.”
        See, e.g., id. at 304. But there we were concerned with the statutory power to award
        attorney’s fees, not Article III’s case-or-controversy limitation. So that case does not
        answer this question. It merely reminds us that “jurisdiction” “is a word of many, too
        many, meanings.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v.
        Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)).
                                                       19
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216        Doc: 35        Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 20 of 22

        district courts. Stern, 564 U.S. at 487. They exercise “broad powers” under their own

        statutory grant of jurisdiction. See id. at 488. Congress did not impliedly limit that express

        grant through cryptic labelling in a separate provision.

               The argument to the contrary depends on finding something inherent about the

        words “cases” and “proceedings” in the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions that brings

        them necessarily within the judicial Power. It assumes that when Congress gave federal

        courts (Article III and non-Article III alike) jurisdiction over bankruptcy “cases” and

        “proceedings,” it imbued those words with Article III’s limits. So that, even absent Article

        III, the statutes themselves would require the same level of adversariness.

               But we do not ordinarily interpret a jurisdictional statute’s constraints to be the same

        as the Constitution’s. In fact, we often go out of our way to create differences and draw

        distinctions even where—unlike here—the statute uses Article III’s precise language. See

        Navy Fed. Credit Union v. LTD Fin. Servs., LP, 972 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Unlike

        the constitutionally permitted ‘minimal diversity’ jurisdiction, diversity must be ‘complete’

        to satisfy this Congressional grant.” (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806)).

               If we did, our caselaw would look very different. The constitutional-jurisdiction

        inquiry would often collapse into the statutory one. Yet it doesn’t. For example, litigants

        can have statutory jurisdiction to sue States even if the Constitution forbids it. See, e.g.,

        Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). More to the point, we dismiss moot cases

        because they are no longer Article III cases, not because they fall outside the scope of a

        statute. See, e.g., Eden, LLC v. Justice, 36 F.4th 166, 169–72 (4th Cir. 2022). So we refuse

        to read in Article III’s limits.

                                                      20
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023      Pg: 21 of 22

               To recap, bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts. So Article III constraints—

        such as mootness—do not apply to them as a matter of constitutional law. They only apply

        if Congress said so in a statute. But it hasn’t. And that means whether Count I was

        constitutionally moot is beside the point. The bankruptcy court could still adjudicate it.

               Since the Kivitis cannot argue that their adversary proceeding was constitutionally

        moot when Count II was dismissed, they have not shown the proceeding was legally

        doomed when they dismissed Count I. 13 They are thus left arguing the order was final

        because Count I was practically over post-dismissal. See, e.g., Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 4

        (claiming there was “no judicial economy” to pursuing Count I before appealing Count II).

        Yet the Supreme Court rejected this exact reasoning in Microsoft. The Microsoft plaintiffs

        also thought it “economically irrational” to litigate their still-legally-viable claims to final

        judgment. Microsoft Corp., 582 U.S. at 34. Still, the Court refused to let them create

        finality by voluntarily dismissing those claims. Id. at 36; see also Affinity Living Grp., 959

        F.3d at 639 (distinguishing between claims that are “legally” and merely “practically”

        over). Here too, it is irrelevant that the parties think there is “no judicial economy” in

        litigating Count I to final judgment before they appeal the order dismissing only Count II.

        Count I is legally viable, and its dismissal was without prejudice, so that dismissal did not

               13
                 The Kivitis raised no other arguments for why the proceeding was legally over
        when Count II was dismissed and so we do not address any. This means we do not consider
        any of the Bankruptcy Code’s codified “standing-esque requirements.” See In re Cap.
        Contracting Co., 924 F.3d at 895. We thus offer no opinion on whether a bankruptcy court
        may dismiss a claim in an adversary proceeding that it views—in a non-constitutional
        sense—as “moot.” The Kivitis have not argued it could.
                                                      21
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1216       Doc: 35          Filed: 09/14/2023    Pg: 22 of 22

        create a final order under § 158(a). And that means the district court lacked jurisdiction to

        review it.

                                     *            *            *
               Lower federal courts have only the power given to them by Congress. But they

        have every inch of that power. That is true for us. And it is true for bankruptcy courts.

        For district courts, that means—irrelevant exceptions aside—they can hear appeals only

        from final bankruptcy orders. For bankruptcy courts, that means they are essentially

        unencumbered by Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. The Kivitis would have

        us ignore Congress on both fronts. They, like Bhatt, implore us to review the bankruptcy

        court’s non-final order despite Congress’s explicit instructions to the contrary. They then

        beseech us to etch one limit on our power into the bankruptcy code. We decline their

        entreaties. Having done so, it is clear that the district court reviewed a non-final order.

        Since it had no jurisdiction to do so, its order is

                                                                                       VACATED
                                                                                 AND REMANDED.

                                                       22