Court Opinion

ID: 9546116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:25:09.60234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:01.162432
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I find the record completely adequate to support the procedure and action taken by the district court.
The parties filed a “Stipulation and Motion Regarding Order to File Briefs” in which they recited, among other things:
“WHEREAS the attorneys for both parties feel that there exists a substantial body of law which supports these respective positions, * * * ”
Attached to the motion and stipulation was an order which was eventually entered. It set a briefing schedule as requested in the motion and stipulation.
■ In effect, the parties stipulated that there was no issue as to a material fact and recognized that the matter should be decided on the legal issues to be briefed: Whether this amounted to a joint motion for ' summary judgment or whether it amounted to that referred to in the majority opinion as an “agreed case” (which was recognized therein as having been approved by this Court in the cases there cited), the obvious intent of both parties and the court at that point in the proceedings was that the matter should be determined on the legal issues as argued in the briefs. Having set up the trial court in this fashion, we should not allow or approve a contest of the procedure by one of the parties against whom the court ruled in accordance with the procedure to which that party agreed. If not subject to estop-pel, Amfac Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, Wyo., 645 P.2d 73 (1982); National Crude, Inc. v. Ruhl, Wyo., 600 P.2d 716 (1979); Pickett v. Associates Discount Corporation of Wyoming, Wyo., 435 P.2d 445 (1967), at least appellants invited any error.
The majority opinion notes appellants’ contention that a municipality cannot acquire an easement through adverse possession. The opinion questions the existence of the adverse nature of appellee’s possession of the disputed real property, and it comments on the trial court’s holding that appellee was to have the real property in fee simple rather than having an easement over it. The letter opinion of the trial court reflected the propriety of its holding on these issues. In it Judge Hamm sets forth the basis therefor in a manner requiring no enhancement by me. In it he said:
“Section 1-32-202, W.S., 1977 provides:
“ ‘An action may be brought by a person in possession of real property against any person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the adverse estate or interest. The person bringing the action may hold possession himself or by his tenant.’
“This section was apparently renumbered 1-33-301 by the Wyoming Session Laws of 1977, although there is no indication of such change that I could find in Volume 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
“Consolidated Const., Inc. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902 (Wyo.1981) held, quoting Section 8-1-102 (a)(vi), W.S., 1977:
“ ‘Section 8-l-102(a)(vi) provides:
“[‘ “] (a) As used in the statutes unless the legislature clearly specifies a different meaning or interpretation or the context dearly requires a different meaning:
⅜ * * # * %
*363“[' “] (vi) ‘Person’ includes an individual, partnership, corporation, joint stock company or any other association or entity, public or private; * * * [”] (Emphasis added.)
“ ‘This section was designed to provide a general definition of the term “person” to be applied to all of the Wyoming Statutes unless the legislature clearly specifies a different meaning or interpretation or the context clearly requires a different meaning. When we read this quoted passage, which we might add is also clear and unambiguous, the obvious intent of the legislature was to have the definition of “person” apply unless the legislature superseded its application with specific language, or the context of the specific statutory provision requires a different meaning.’
“I am unable to find or hold here that the legislature intended any different meaning with respect to the power of a town to claim property by adverse possession.
“Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 277, 314 P.2d 944, (Wyo.1957) seems to speak for the proposition that a town can maintain a quiet title action. Footnote 4, 77 Wyo. 269 says:
“ ‘Where town acquired title to property and undertook to convey good title to property to federal bureau, and federal bureau was in position analogous to that of tenant, and had some buildings on part of property, town could maintain action to quiet title against lien claimant who was not in possession.’
“The Court’s actual language, on Page 277 is:
“ ‘The town council of Glendo had title and it undertook, it seems, to give the Federal Bureau of Reclamation a good title. The latter, while not exactly a tenant, occupied a position analogous thereto, and it has been held that is sufficient to enable the owner to bring an action to quiet title under a statute such as ours. 74 C.J.S. § 32, p. 59.’
“I see no inconsistency in the language. The court held that ‘The owner’ could bring a quiet title action, and at some point in those proceedings the town of Glendo was the owner.
“It is evident from the record that the street has existed probably since at least 1911, and certainly since 1947, and was maintained by the county up until about 1957. After that, the street has been, and is being, maintained by the town of South Superior without objection by defendants or their predecessors in title. It has been used by the public for well over 38 years, which no one denies. Clearly, the possession, maintenance and use by the town has been 'actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for the statutory period, and under color of title or claim of right.’ Thus, in City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 910, 97 A.L.R. 1, it is said:
“ ‘The specific character of possession necessary to make the bar effective is not specified, but courts have uniformly required it to be adverse and have generally stated, as did this court in Bryant v. Cadle, 18 Wyo. 64, 104 Pac. 23, 106 Pac. 687, that in order that possession may be adverse it must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for the statutory period, hostile and under color of title or claim of right. Courts are agreed that when actual possession is had, as in the case at bar, color of title is not necessary unless expressly required by statute. Bryant v. Cadle, supra; 2 C.J. 125.’
“The same case also stated as follows, which statement was also quoted with approval in Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 343 (Wyo.1966):
“ ‘ * * * The law contemplates that rights in land may be lost to another by means of adverse possession. We are not the judges of the wisdom of that. The prime object in prescribing how such adverse possession shall be made manifest, of what elements or requisites it shall be composed, is to advise the real owner that his ownership is in danger, and the law has deemed the time fixed as sufficiently long, so as to give him ample opportunity to protect his right; and if *364he fails to do so, when thus advised, within the time fixed, he is considered as having acquiesced in the transfer of ownership. Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742. Bearing this in mind, it is a reasonable rule that, when a man has occupied a piece of ground, though under a mistaken belief as to the true boundary, for the period prescribed by law, openly, notoriously, exclusively, and in a manner plainly indicating that he acted as owner thereof, the presumption should be, in the absence of explanatory circumstances showing the contrary, that he occupied the land adversely and under a claim of right, easting the burden of explaining such possession upon the person who disputes his right. * * * ’
“I am fully in accord with plaintiff where it states.
“ ‘Throughout their brief, the Koontzes repeatedly point to the 1981 proposed Agreement (Koontz Exhibit D) as proof that the Town made no prior claims of ownership or prescriptive use as required. Both the Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and W.R.E. 408 state that evidence of offering a valuable consideration in compromising a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissable (sic) to prove liability for the claim or its amount. The Advisory Committee Notes to F.R.E. 408 states that the evidence is irrelevant since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position.’
“Also in Doeng v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 937 (Wyo.1983) the Court held:
“ ‘Nonpayment of taxes on adversely possessed land, while a consideration, does not in itself destroy an adverse possession claim. Rutar Farms and Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, supra [651 P.2d 1129]; Meyer v. Ellis[,] Wyo., 411 P.2d 338 (1966). Nonpayment of taxes by the claimant is usually the case where use to a fence line rather than deed line is the primary basis of the claim. As pointed out in Meyer our Wyoming statute does not require payment of taxes in order to establish adverse possession as do some states. All the other facts and circumstances in the case now before us override any question of taxes. There was no error in that regard.’
“For the above reasons, as well as any additional reasons cited in plaintiff's briefs consistent herewith, I find that the Town of South Superior, which I have heard has changed its name to Superior, has acquired title by adverse possession to the lands occupied by Division Street where it is now, and has been, physically located, and that the defendants are estopped from exercising any right of ownership over said lands and should remove the trailer they have placed thereon. Even if I am in error on the fee title aspects, I also believe that at the least the town has acquired an easement by prescription. It matters little as the result is the same.” (Emphasis in original.)
I would affirm.