Court Opinion

ID: 9604604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:24:08.800731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:22.998471
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge:
(concurring).
I concur fully in the main opinion. I write separately to expand upon why, in my judgment, the juror-witness contact in this case does not require reversal.1
As I read State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), two preliminary and two more substantive inquiries are relevant in considering whether the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted. Preliminarily, the questioning of the juror and/or witness must be exhaustive and “disclose the entire contents of the conversation.” Id. at 280. In addition, a complete transcript must be made and provided on appeal. Id. These preliminary requirements were both met in this case. The trial court’s examination was thorough and penetrating, eventually eliciting, as the dissent points out, disclosure of the comments about police officer credibility. Moreover, both the prosecutor and defense counsel asked further questions of the juror. The complete examination was transcribed and is part of the record before us.
The more substantive inquiries are 1) whether the witness is “an important prosecution witness,” and 2) “the scope and subject matter of the conversation.” See id. Moreover, there is interplay between these two inquiries: The more important the witness, the less relevant the subjects discussed by the witness and juror. Thus, in Pike, the subject discussed, namely a backyard slip-and-fall sustained off-duty, was itself quite harmless. Nonetheless, because of the importance of the witness, as “both the arresting officer and a witness at the scene of the altercation,” id., Pike’s conviction was reversed. Although the backyard slip-and-fall was unrelated to the proceedings, the discussion “had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the juror’s judgment as to credibility.” Id. at 281.
*98In the instant case, the witness Hailes was quite unimportant. As explained in the main opinion, his limited testimony was confined to mundane and undisputed matters. Accordingly, his credibility was wholly inconsequential. Whether a juror had “a sense of familiarity” with Hailes or considered him a very scoundrel, he was not a pivotal witness and the verdict would clearly be the same, regardless of his preceived credibility. Stated another way, his testimony was inherently credible and was not challenged or controverted by defendant, making Hailes a minor, rather than an important, witness.
Even where, as here, the witness is so unimportant that the impact of increased familiarity on his credibility is inconsequential, attention must be given to the “scope and subject matter of the conversation” between juror and witness. Id. at 280. Of key concern in this case is Mr. Hailes’ remark about the believability of police officers. While it is likely the unsolicited comment was dismissed out of hand by the juror, consistent with the strict approach of Pike we need to assume, for purposes of analysis, that the comment prompted reflection by the juror on the veracity of police officers and the conclusion that perhaps police officers were, after all, more believable than witnesses generally. As the dissenting opinion observes, “police officers are generally the most important witnesses for the prosecution,” and in the typical criminal case an observation such as the one made by Hailes, however gratuitous and innocently intended, would render the presumption of prejudice all but impossible to rebut.
Here, however, the officers were no more important as witnesses than Hailes. Unlike the officer in Pike, who not only effected Pike’s arrest, but also was a key witness to the events which led to his discharging a shotgun at a car driven by rowdies, the police witnesses in this case, as explained in note 8 to the main opinion, testified to matters not in dispute. Their testimony, if believed, established that the car found at defendant’s home was stolen. However, whether or to what extent they were believed was of no moment, since defendant conceded the car was stolen, albeit not by him. Testimony tying defendant to the original theft was offered exclusively by witness Luce, and it was the credibility of Luce, not the police officers, which mattered.2 This is best emphasized by defendant’s closing argument, which was devoted to a lengthy discussion of perceived problems with Luce’s identification of defendant as the person who drove off with the Mustang, while omitting any reference to the police officers’ testimony.
As I see it, the state has demonstrated that Hailes was not an important witness and that, in the peculiar context of this case, the subjects discussed by the juror3 and witness were inconsequential. These factors, when coupled with the juror’s unqualified expression that she had not been influenced by the conversation with Hailes, serve to rebut the presumption of prejudice which arises under Pike.

. In so stating, I acknowledge the question is a close one. I also note my agreement with the dissent that the preferred course in this case would have been to excuse the juror and seat one of the available alternates. In this area, trial courts should err on the side of caution to avoid even the least doubt about the jury’s impartiality. All such problems are avoided, as the dissent observes, if jurors are rigorously segregated from witnesses.

. By contrast, had Hailes commented about the high degree of believability of used car salesmen, I would go the other way. Mr. Luce was an important witness and his credibility, memory, and identification were material.

. I do not share the dissent's concern about possible taint of a second juror. It is clear from the record that the second juror walked away as Mr. Hailes sat down to "share an ashtray" with the one juror with whom he then struck up conversation.