Court Opinion

ID: 9897581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:23.592377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:53.756297
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3207-21

PATRICIA WASHBOURNE,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS
AN ADMINISTRATRIX AD
PROSEQUENDUM FOR THE
ESTATE OF DARREN
WASHBROUNE,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TOKIWA COSMETICS AMERICA,
LLC, BERKOWSKY AND
ASSOCIATES, INC., ANDERSEN
INTERIOR CONTRACTING, INC.,
JOVIN DEMO, INC., LAMANNA
ELECTRIC, INC., and
MID-ATLANTIC MECHANICAL, INC.,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

ALLMARK DOOR COMPANY, LLC,
and CASTLE FIRE PROTECTION, INC.,

     Defendants.
__________________________________
            Submitted October 30, 2023 — Decided November 9, 2023

            Before Judges Mawla and Chase.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-5859-19.

            The Dratch Law Firm, PC, attorneys for appellant
            (Brian Michael Dratch, of counsel and on the briefs;
            Daniel A. Lebersfeld, on the briefs).

            Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin,
            attorneys for respondent Berkowsky and Associates,
            Inc. (Walter F. Kawalec, III, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Patricia Washbourne appeals from a May 20, 2022 order granting

summary judgment in favor of defendant Berkowsky and Associates, Inc., and

dismissing her negligence complaint. We affirm.

      The following facts were undisputed. Defendant was a general contractor

hired to oversee renovations at a 155,000 square foot facility owned by Tokiwa

Cosmetics America, LLC. The decedent Darren Washbourne was plaintiff's

husband. He worked for Allmark Door Company, LLC, which was one of four

subcontractors hired by defendant. Each subcontractor was responsible for a

different aspect of the renovations. One subcontractor handled demolition, a

second performed the plumbing and HVAC work, the third performed carpentry,

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and Allmark removed, stored, and replaced the facility's high-speed roll-up

doors.

      Decedent suffered from diabetes and had peripheral neuropathy, which

decreased sensation in his feet and caused him to be admitted to the hospital on

two prior occasions with foot-related injuries.     Plaintiff was deposed and

testified decedent came home the night of November 20, 2018, and told her he

stepped on a screw at a jobsite. He did not wear his work boots and instead wore

loafers, and said he noticed the screw when he returned to his truck and heard

metal scraping on the footboard. The screw penetrated the shoe and went into

his foot. Decedent removed the screw and, with plaintiff's assistance, dressed

the wound. Decedent then discarded the screw and the loafers. Two days later,

decedent and his family gathered at his sister-in-law's home for Thanksgiving.

That evening decedent became pale, nauseous, and developed a fever.

      The next day, decedent went to the hospital. He called Allmark to inform

them he was at the hospital and said he was injured at the Tokiwa jobsite.

Medical reports from the hospital noted decedent's foot was swollen and that he

had stepped on a screw at the jobsite. Decedent was treated and discharged, but

remained ill and was readmitted to the hospital nearly two weeks later. He was

diagnosed with cellulitis in his right foot. Doctors amputated a toe and treated

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him for sepsis. Decedent was released six days later. However, the day after

his release, plaintiff discovered him passed out on the floor. He underwent

surgery to remove a pulmonary clot and eventually developed heart and kidney

failure. Abdominal pain revealed bowel ischemia, and exploratory surgery

discovered decedent had gangrenous areas in his small and large bowel, which

physicians concluded were inoperable.

      Decedent died the following day. The death certificate listed the cause of

death as cardiogenic shock and pulmonary embolism related to an ischemic

bowel. Plaintiff's medical expert opined the puncture from the screw set off a

chain of events resulting in decedent's death.

      Defendant argued for summary judgment on four grounds. The motion

judge granted summary judgment on one of these grounds, finding defendant

was not liable to subcontractors for known and obvious hazards incidental to

their job. Although decedent only noticed the screw when he returned to his

truck, the judge granted plaintiff every favorable inference and assumed the

screw was from the jobsite. Regardless, he reasoned as follows:

            [T]he duty to provide a reasonably safe place in which
            to work is relative to the nature of the invited endeavor
            and does not entail the elimination of potential
            operational hazards[,] which are obvious and visible to
            the invitee . . . upon ordinary observation.

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                   A stray screw laying on the floor is obvious and
            visible upon ordinary observation . . . this is especially
            so when the invitee is an experienced laborer hired
            either to correct the very danger present or to perform
            his task amidst the visible hazards.

                    [Decedent] was . . . new to Allmark, but he has
            been in this business for a[]while. He's familiar with
            worksites. He's familiar with construction sites. He
            knows the value of wearing his work boots . . . because
            there are sharp debris at worksites . . . . As clean as you
            keep a worksite, there is always the possibility of
            that . . . .

      On appeal, plaintiff argues: (1) there was sufficient evidence to show

decedent sustained his injury at the jobsite; (2) the motion judge's ruling the

screw was an open and obvious hazard inherent to the nature of decedent's work

was erroneous as a matter of law; (3) the judge's ruling that a liability expert

was required to opine on the standard of care was error; and (4) the judge

correctly refused to grant summary judgment on grounds of spoliation because

plaintiff discarded the screw and the sock. As we noted, the judge's opinion is

based on the second argument. Therefore, the third point raised by plaintiff is

irrelevant. Moreover, we decline to address the first argument because the judge

assumed the screw was from the jobsite.        Plaintiff prevailed on the fourth

argument, which is also irrelevant to our considerations.

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        Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-

2(c).    The determination requires the motion judge consider "whether the

competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder

to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). "[W]hen the evidence 'is so

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' . . . the trial court

should not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Ibid. (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). "[W]e review the trial court's

grant of summary judgment de novo[,] under the same standard as the trial

court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189,

199 (2016).

        "[A] general contractor enjoy[s] broad immunity from liability for injuries

to an employee of a subcontractor resulting from either the condition of the

premises or the manner in which the hired work [is] performed." Tarabokia v.

Structure Tone, 429 N.J. Super. 103, 112-13 (App. Div. 2012); see also Wolczak

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                                         6
v. Nat'l Elec. Prod. Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 64, 75 (App. Div. 1961) ("The duty to

provide a reasonably safe place in which to work is relative to the nature of the

invited endeavor and does not entail the elimination of potential operational

hazards which are obvious and visible to the invitee upon ordinary

observation."). This immunity is based on the fact "that a general contractor

'may assume that the independent contractor and [their] employees are

sufficiently skilled to recognize the dangers associated with their task and adjust

their methods accordingly to ensure their own safety.'" Tarabokia, 429 N.J.

Super. at 113 (quoting Accardi v. Enviro-Pak Sys. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 457, 463

(App. Div. 1999)). Exceptions to this general rule include where the general

contractor retains control of the manner and means of work or furnishes

defective equipment. Ibid. See Izhaky v. Jamesway Corp., 195 N.J. Super. 103,

106 (App. Div. 1984).

      Beyond these exceptions, determining the existence of "a duty 'involves

identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors—the relationship of the

parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise

care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.'" Alloway v. Bradlees,

Inc., 157 N.J. 221, 230 (1999) (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132

N.J. 426, 439 (1993)). "The analysis is both very fact-specific and principled;

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it must lead to solutions that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and

generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future conduct." Hopkins, 132

N.J. at 439.

       Plaintiff cites Sanna v. National Sponge Company1 and Izhaky, and argues

the motion judge could not grant summary judgment on grounds the hazard was

open and obvious because, at best, this "merely raises an issue of contributory

negligence, which . . . can only be resolved by the jury." Plaintiff's reliance on

these cases is misplaced. In Sanna, the property owner contributed to supplying

the components that injured the plaintiff. 209 N.J. Super. at 69. In Izhaky, the

defendant landowner involved itself in the work, thus "remov[ing] the limited

immunity" applicable to general contractors. 195 N.J. Super. at 107. Here,

defendant neither retained control over the manner and means of the work nor

provided the work equipment.

       None of the Hopkins factors necessary to establish a duty exist here.

Decedent was an employee of a wholly owned subcontractor and had no

relationship to defendant. The nature of the risk, namely, that decedent would

encounter a screw during renovations at a massive jobsite involving several

other subcontractors, was not so unusual as to require us "to place the burden of

1
    209 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 1986).
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                                           8
preventing the harm upon . . . defendant." Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J.

269, 296 (2012). There is no evidence defendant did not exercise care such that

the presence of a screw would not be an obvious and visible hazard at such a

jobsite. Decedent was not wearing his work boots, despite his medical condition

and history.   Finally, under the facts presented here, we are unconvinced

upending the immunity afforded general contractors by ascribing a duty to

defendant would meet the public interest.

      Affirmed.

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