Court Opinion

ID: 9688443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:47:30.329908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:38.877325
License: Public Domain

D. J. Shipman, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Long-standing administrative interpretations of a statute, while entitled to considerable weight, are not conclusive and cannot be used to override a logical reading of the statute. People v Dunn, 104 Mich App 419, 425; 304 NW2d 856 (1981), and Stratton-Cheeseman Management Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 159 Mich App 719, 724; 407 NW2d 398 (1987).
In the present case, we have not been presented with a long-standing administrative interpretation of MCL 436.18(1); MSA 18.989(1). Rather, mlcc relies on its decisions rendered in 1983 and 1984 regarding other licensee transfer requests as support for its decision to condition Sunshine’s transfer request of a specially designated merchant beer *146and wine license on plaintiff’s resigning or selling his premises. Furthermore, I find no ambiguity in § 18. When construed with the Liquor Control Act, as a whole, it is clear that the purpose of this section is to prevent any conflict of interest between the law enforcement officer’s interest in a liquor license and the law enforcement officer’s special duty to enforce the provisions of the Liquor Control Act within his or her jurisdiction. See MCL 436.1(4); MSA 18.971(4). However, it is also clear that § 18 only prevents a law enforcement officer from having an interest in a liquor license. It does not foreclose all business relations between the law enforcement officer and a holder of a liquor license.
In this fact situation, the transaction in question is a lease agreement. There is nothing in the lease that ties its terms, conditions of default, or cash flow to the success or failure of the beer and wine license. Although it appears that plaintiff benefits from Sunshine’s liquor license to the extent that Sunshine would not move its party store to plaintiff’s premises unless mlcc approved the transfer of its liquor license, I do not believe that this constitutes an "indirect interest” in a liquor license as contemplated by the Legislature.
The undisputed facts are totally devoid of any participation by plaintiff in Sunshine’s business or his receipt of financial benefits other than the rent Sunshine pays for the use of plaintiff’s premises. Thus, I find that mlcc’s application of § 18 to plaintiff was not authorized by law. Plaintiff’s purely landlord-tenant relationship with Sunshine, without more, does not create an interest in Sunshine’s liquor license. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s opinion and order.
Plaintiff has raised constitutional arguments in *147support of the declaratory judgment in his favor. Plaintiff did not seek declaratory relief based on those constitutional issues. Consequently, I agree with the majority and decline to review those issues. Harris v Pennsylvania Erection & Construction, 143 Mich App 790, 795; 372 NW2d 663 (1985).
I would affirm.