Court Opinion

ID: 9673480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:12:41.975621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:42.098184
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing

Appellant states in her motion for rehearing that this court erred by failing to consider her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant concedes that, on Pages 3 and 25 of her brief, the sixth point of error accidentally copied her fifth point of error. Appellant points out that the point was correctly stated on Page ii of the table of contents where it read:
The verdict was contrary to law and evidence in that there was insufficient evidence as to the amounts of moneys allegedly taken under Counts One, Two and Three of the Indictment and that there was insufficient evidence as to the commercial bribery as alleged in Counts Twenty-five through Ninety-six.
Appellant also points out that the State was not misled by this mistake, noting that the State’s brief argued in reply to the sixth point of error:
There was sufficient evidence admitted of the amounts of money misappropriated as alleged in counts one, two, and three of the indictment and there was sufficient evidence admitted of commercial bribery as alleged in counts twenty-five through ninety-six of the indictment.
Appellant’s argument under the sixth point of error discusses the sufficiency of the evidence. This court has now considered the sufficiency of the evidence under the sixth point as stated on page ii of the table of contents.
We hold that the evidence is sufficient under the test stated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). "When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding of guilt, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of all the essential elements of each offense.
We also hold that the evidence is “factually” sufficient under the test stated in Clewis v. State,—S.W.2d-[, 1996 WL 37908] (No. 450-94, Tex.Cr.App., January 31, 1996) (not yet reported). The evidence contrary to the verdict does not outweigh the evidence which supports the verdict, and we hold that the jury’s verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence presented at trial so as to be “clearly wrong and unjust.” Clewis v. State, slip opinion at Page 13, — S.W.2d at-.
Three of the State’s witnesses, Twy-lah Jo Beaty, Gladys Posey, and Linda Po-sey, testified that they had seen appellant cut “three-on” cards into “one-on” bingo cards. Another witness for the State, Ron Moe, testified that appellant had him cut “three-on” cards into “one-on” cards which would then be sold for $1.00 each. The evidence showed that no “one-on” cards were purchased during the year, but the books kept by appellant showed “one-on” card sales. The State’s auditors estimated that the “potential unreported receipts” for the three Bingo charities were $77,118 (Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 8460 Auxiliary), $39,460 (Comanche Hospital Guild), and $24,980 (Comanche County Crime Stoppers, Inc.). A rational fact finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of misapplication of more than $10,000 from each of the three charities who were to profit from the Bingo games. Further, those findings are not against the great weight of the evidence presented at trial so as to be “clearly wrong and unjust.” Clewis v. State, slip opinion at Page 13,—S.W.2d at-.
We also hold that the evidence is “legally” and “factually” sufficient to support *341the jury’s verdicts on Count Nos. 25 through 96 of the indictment. The president of the hospital guild testified that the guild never consented to having a portion of the lease money paid back to appellant. The treasurer of the Veterans of Foreign War Post 8460 Auxiliary testified that the auxiliary did not consent to appellant receiving a part of the rent payments which were paid for the lease of the building. Eldon Tupin, former President of Comanche County Crime Stoppers, testified that he did not know that appellant got any of the rent money back from Gladys Posey. The sixth point of error is overruled.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.