Court Opinion

ID: 9719084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:42:08.734229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.541102
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and reaffirm my consistent position in Miller-Shugart settings that the fundamental right to trial by jury should be honored.
I reassert here the rationale of my dissent in Hartfiel v. McLennan, 430 N.W.2d 215 (Minn.Ct.App.1988), that the right to trial by jury on the question of reasonableness of a Miller-Shugart settlement is guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution:
“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy. A jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. The legislature may provide that the agreement of five-sixths of a jury in a civil action or proceeding, after not less than six hours’ deliberation, is a sufficient verdict.”
Hartfiel, 430 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting Minn. Const, art. I, § 4). See Minn.R.Civ.P. 38.01 and 39.01. I reiterate here what the Minnesota Supreme Court said in Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn.1982):
[Wjhile the judgment is binding and valid as between the stipulating parties, it is not conclusive on the insurer. The burden of proof is on the claimant, the plaintiff judgment creditor, to show that the settlement is reasonable and prudent. The test as to whether the settlement is reasonable and prudent is what a reasonably prudent person in the position of the defendant would have settled for on the merits of plaintiff’s claim. This involves a consideration of the facts bearing on the liability and damage aspects of plaintiffs claim, as well as the risks of going to trial.
Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
I submit that it was not the holding of Miller that in every case where reasonable*659ness is to be determined that only a court trial be held. We are concerned here with a fundamental constitutional right that should not be lightly set aside by court rule or case law. In my dissent in Hartfiel, I reasoned:
My colleagues and I differ as to the nature of the proceeding on remand to determine reasonableness, i.e., by a motion for summary judgment — a court trial — or a jury trial. It may be that each case that involves a Miller-Shugart settlement will have to be separately examined as to the manner and way in which the issues are raised and to be litigated.
In negligence eases where damages are sought for either or both personal injury or property damage, it is fundamental law that trial by jury is awarded the parties, unless waived. See Minn. Const, art. I, § 4. It should be no different with respect to a Miller-Shugart settlement. Since the settlement is not binding on the insurer, Miller, 316 N.W.2d at 735, and since reasonableness is tested by a consideration of the entire circumstances as to liability and damages, the right to trial by jury should be preserved, including the issue of comparative fault.
Hartfiel, 430 N.W.2d at 223-24 (citation omitted).
When Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Iverson, 445 N.W.2d 824 (Minn.1989), was heard by the supreme court, I had hoped that the supreme court would answer the question as to jury trial, but the supreme court apparently determined it was not necessary to decide the issue. I now respectfully urge the supreme court, either in this case or at an early date, to directly deal with the question of jury trials in Miller-Shugart settings so that trial attorneys and trial courts, as well as the court of appeals, will have a clear understanding of the full meaning of Miller.