Court Opinion

ID: 9628031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:05:19.117887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:56.257088
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins in part.
As the majority opinion notes, this appeal came on for review as a result of a district court order which dismissed appellant’s motion to compel discovery. The majority upholds this order utilizing Rule 26(b)(3), W.R. C.P. as authority. Because it is my belief that the majority opinion has laid, the groundwork for the future erosion of our policy of open and full discovery, which policy permeated the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, I find it necessary to dissent. For the reasons discussed below, I would have reversed this case and remanded for a new trial.
INTRODUCTION
My principal disagreement with the majority opinion pertains to the conclusion that Dr. Harrison’s statements to his insurer were protected under the attorney-client privilege. Not only do I have trouble with the conclusion, but I am also bothered by the fact that the majority also concludes that the statements were protected by Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P. The interesting aspect of the majority opinion is that it notes that if a matter is privileged under Rule 26(b)(1), then inquiry into application of additional Rule 26(b) provisions is unnecessary, yet it does just that in reverse order. First, the majority concludes that the statements to the insured were protected under work product and then concludes that those same statements were privileged. Basically, the majority opinion addresses that which, in its own words, “is unnecessary” to address. My reason for discussing the Rule 26(b)(3) question in relation to Dr. Harrison’s statements to his insurer relates to my conclusion that the statements were not privileged. This, in my opinion, is the proper application of Rule 26(b), W.R.C.P.
I must also disagree with the majority’s reasoning and conclusions which hold that the statements of Dr. Harrison to his insurance carrier and the reports of the medical review panel are protected from discovery under the work-product exception embodied in Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P. My disagreement comes from the fact that I believe the appellant in this case has made the requisite showing of need required under the provisions of the rule. I reach this conclusion because the record reflects substantial evidence of failure on the part of appellant to discover necessary information for the preparation of her case. The appellee’s memory of the events leading up to the claim was either totally lacking, or was very sketchy, as evidenced by the answers in his deposition. Also, it is apparent that if Dr. Harrison’s memory was fresh at any time it was when he gave the statements to his insurance carrier long before the complaint in this case was filed. To me these factors do not amount to surmise on the part of the appellant that the information she sought to discover would be different; rather it reflects a showing of substantial need on her part for the information in order to prepare her case. The majority states that the appellant had the equivalent of the material sought to be discovered because she had been able to compile her own chronological lists of her visits with Dr. Harrison, and such list was admitted into evidence. In my judgment, this conclusion by the majority is bottomed in conjecture and surmise when it is remembered that appellant never was permitted to compare her memory of the events with Dr. Harrison’s because she was precluded from discovering the materials necessary for such a comparison.
In addition, I feel that the majority opinion has misstated what the appellant was seeking to discover in relation to the medical review panel. The majority concludes that the issues in this case do not encompass the question of whether or not the results of the medical review panel utilized by ap-pellee are subject to discovery. The jurists *336comprising the majority base this conclusion on a finding that, in her brief, the appellant framed the issue in terms of discovering only reports prepared by Dr. Harrison for use before the review panel. I believe that the issue of what the appellant desired to discover as to the review panel should be framed in terms of what she asked to discover below. This can easily be determined by referring to her Interrogatory Number 11 which read:
“11. Has any other physician, or panel of physicians reviewed this case and the treatment rendered by you therein, for any purpose whatsoever with a view toward determining the negligence or lack of negligence, or with a view toward critiquing the care provided by you. If so, please state the name of each such physician, or pane] of physicians, when such review occurred, what, if any, reports were rendered as a result of such review or critiquing, and the present location of such reports.” (Emphasis added.)
To me, the appellant was clearly seeking to discover not only the names of the physicians who participated in the panel, but also the reports, if any, that were issued by the panel. This request is what the trial court refused to allow and it is difficult to perceive how the language of that request could be read any differently. It follows from the above conclusion that in order to properly address the issue surrounding the review panel, it was incumbent upon the majority to discuss Rule 26(b)(4), W.R.C.P. This position is strengthened by the fact that since appellant requested the names of the doctors on the panel, then, in order to determine the propriety of such a request, Rule 26(b)(4) must be consulted, because it governs attempts by a party to discover information concerning his adversary’s experts. And since in my view Rule 26(b)(4) was at issue, it should out of necessity have been addressed by the majority since Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P. is subject to its terms.1 Based on these factors I feel compelled to address the Rule 26(b)(4) question and will do so in this dissent.
Finally, I am disturbed with the approach of the majority which seems to suggest that the appellant in this case failed to satisfy Rule 26(b)(3) because she herself obviously made no attempt to assemble her own medical review panel. Such a conclusion, at least for me, is anomalous in light of the difficult position any plaintiff faces when pursuing a malpractice case. I am sure that any practicing attorney in this state who has represented a plaintiff in a malpractice suit is familiar with the difficulties faced in preparing for such litigation. I am not able to contemplate a situation in a malpractice case in which a plaintiff could assemble a group of doctors from any given locale for the purpose of reviewing a claim which is being brought against one of the members of the local medical profession. From any realistic point of view it should be conceded that such a task would be impossible. Even if the impossible could be accomplished, it could only be done at astronomical expense. To hold the plaintiff in this case to such a burden in itself establishes a prime example of such “undue hardship” as was contemplated by the framers of Rule 26(b)(3).
Considering the above comments, I would have addressed this appeal in the following manner.
ARE THE STATEMENTS PROTECTED
FROM DISCOVERY BY THE ATTOR-, NEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
Under § l-12-101(a)(i), W.S.1977,2 communications made by a client to his attor*337ney and those embodying advice from an attorney to his client are protected from disclosure unless such protection is waived by the client. This section sets out the Wyoming version of attorney-client privilege. Since passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, after which the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled, the scope of the attorney-client privilege has been a subject of great concern. The main reason for the concern is that the rules are designed to embody liberal discovery while the privilege acts as a bar to discovery.3
Since the attorney-client privilege acts as an absolute bar to discovery or disclosure, it has been suggested that it should be limited to its traditional contours. 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2017. Such traditional contours are those described in § 1-12-101, supra. Generally, it is assumed that communications between a client and a third party or one who is not a lawyer are not protected; however, the privilege will not be lost if the client communicates to one who is an agent of his attorney. McCormick on Evidence, § 91 (2d ed. 1972). Obviously, in this case the agent of Dr. Harrison’s insurance company qualifies as a third party; thus in order for the privilege to apply he must be deemed an agent for the attorney whom the insurer later employs. This has been the approach of the cases holding that statements to a party’s insurance company are protected under the attorney-client privilege. Many of the courts dealing with this issue have held that if the statement made by an insured to his insurer concerns an event which may be made the basis of a claim against him, and the claim is covered by the policy, then such statement is a privileged communication under the attorney-client privilege as long as the policy requires the company to defend and the communication is intended for the use of an attorney selected to defend the claim. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 659. Instructive on this approach is a recent holding of the Nebraska Supreme Court.
In Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court found that statements made by a defendant, in an automobile accident suit, to her insurance company were protected because the insurance company was deemed the agent of an attorney later selected to handle the insured’s case. The court also stated that the fact that the statement was made to a field claims agent and not to an attorney was not controlling. 206 N.W.2d at 48. A similar approach has also been followed by the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of Bellmann v. District Court in and for the County of Arapahoe in the Eighteenth Judicial District, 187 Colo. 350, 531 P.2d 632 (1975). These decisions conclude that statements by an insured to his insurance company are privileged as long as the policy requires the company to defend any claims brought against the insured that are covered by the policy.
I feel, however, that the rule expressed in the above cases extends the attorney-client privilege into areas it was never intended to apply. Although the privilege clearly applies to some communications that are made to agents of an attorney, the agents referred to are not indemnity insurers but rather are stenographers, secretaries, and investigators employed directly by the attorney. McCormick on Evidence, supra.
The better approach to this question was discussed in the case of Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis.2d 152,127 N.W.2d 73 (1964). There it was held that statements by an insured to his insurance carrier cannot be viewed as statements solely designed for the preparation of a defense to a claim. Rather, such statements are given by the insured in order to satisfy a condition in his policy and also to allow the insurer to determine adjustments, or to determine whether the insured’s actions are even covered by the policy. 127 N.W.2d at 75-76. The conclusion was that the statements contained too many other elements to allow them to be *338considered a statement by a client to his attorney. The fact that the insurance company is the first party to utilize the statements is inconsistent with the idea that they are privileged communications between an attorney and a client.
The approach taken by the Wisconsin court is persuasive, and the better view is to consider a statement made by an insured to his insurance company to be in the ordinary course of the company’s business and, thus, not protected by the attorney-client privilege. This rule does not preclude from protection statements made to those who are truly agents of an attorney, meaning those subject to his direct control such as a secretary or stenographer. Dr. Harrison’s insurance carrier cannot be considered an agent since in this case counsel for Dr. Harrison was not yet hired. His statements to the insurer were made in the ordinary course of business and were not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Although appellee does not claim in his brief that the statements, documents or reports submitted to the medical review board were privileged under the attorney-client privilege, since the trial court held they were it becomes necessary to address this issue.
Basically, the trial court felt that the mere presence of appellee’s attorney during the “hearing” in front of the medical review panel was enough in and of itself to establish application of the attorney-client privilege. I cannot agree. In finding that the privilege applied, the trial court cited the following passage from McCormick on Evidence, supra, ¶ 91 at 189-190:
“Moreover, in cases where the client has one of his agents attend the conference, or the lawyer calls in his clerk or confidential secretary, the presence of these intermediaries will be assumed not to militate against the confidential nature of the consultation, and presumably this would not be made to depend upon whether the presence of the agent, clerk or secretary was in the particular instance reasonably necessary to the matter in hand. It is the way business is generally done and that is enough. As to relatives and friends of the client, the results of the cases are not consistent, but it seems that here not only might it be asked whether the client reasonably understood the conference to be confidential but also whether the presence of the relative or friend was reasonably necessary for the protection of the client’s interests in the particular circumstances.”
This does not seem to suggest that the mere presence of an attorney protects the privilege when any third party is present, but rather it suggests that whenever a third party is present, except the lawyer’s agents discussed earlier, a question arises whether the privilege exists at all. The quoted passage even suggests that the presence of a client’s relative may destroy the privilege. In light of this I cannot find that the statements made by Dr. Harrison to an uninterested and independent review panel are protected by the attorney-client privilege. It is the nature of the third party that controls, not the fact that Dr. Harrison’s attorney was also present.
ARE THE STATEMENTS PROTECTED FROM DISCOVERY BY THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE?
The more difficult issue in this appeal pertains to the claim of the appellee that his statements to the insurance carrier and to the medical review panel are all protected from discovery by application of the work-product doctrine. As the majority opinion notes, the work-product doctrine is embodied in Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P.; the language of that rule is in pertinent part as follows:
“(3) Trial Preparation; Materials. — Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the par*339ty seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation;” (Emphasis added.)
Although this rule specifically mentions that materials prepared by a party’s insurer in preparation of litigation or for trial are not discoverable unless the party seeking discovery makes the requisite showing of need, the first requirement that must be met under the rule is that the materials be prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. Based on my conclusion that the statements by the insured to his insurance company were made in the ordinary course of business, it would be inconsistent to also hold that such statements are made in anticipation of litigation. This was the exact issue to come before the Kansas Supreme Court in Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592 P.2d 915 (1979). There it was held that Rule 26(b)(3)4 was not designed to insulate insurance companies merely because they constantly deal with potential claims. Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 592 P.2d at 919, citing from Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, D.C.N.D.I11., 54 F.R.D. 367 (1972). The court felt that the majority of cases had held that
“ * * * unless the investigation made by an insurance carrier has been at the request or under the guidance of counsel, the investigation is conclusively presumed to have been made in the ordinary course of business and not in anticipation of litigation or in preperation for trial.” 592 P.2d at 920.
Since the statements made by Dr. Harrison to his insurance carrier were made some 15 months before appellant Thomas filed her original complaint and before counsel was hired, they were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Thus a prerequisite of Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P., has not been satisfied.
Although I am vitally concerned with the position of physicians in relation to malpractice claims and also their relationships with their insurance carriers, it is also important, as previously noted, to consider the difficulties which confront plaintiffs as they attempt to obtain adequate information to prepare their cases. To hold as nondiscov-erable statements made by a doctor to his insurance company before a suit is filed and before any counsel is retained, unduly burdens the plaintiff’s preparation for trial. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1446, and Rogotzki v. Schept, 91 N.J.Super. 135, 219 A.2d 426 (1966).
Turning to the statements made by Dr. Harrison before the medical review board, I conclude that the work-product doctrine does apply. It is apparent from the facts that the review panel was organized at the request of Dr. Harrison’s insurer, and also for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the doctor’s care of his patient was adequate and proper. In addition, at the time the panel was convened, counsel had been retained and he was also present when the panel met. I, therefore, have little doubt that the review panel was intended to assist the doctor’s lawyer in the preparation of litigation and for trial. Thus, under Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P., unless the appellant proved that she had substantial need of the reports from the panel in the preparation of her case and that she was unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of these reports by other means, she was not entitled to discover under Rule 26(b)(1).
Given the facts of record, it is clear that these reports were important for the preparation of the appellant’s case. Earlier in this opinion, I stressed my concern for the difficult position in which plaintiffs in malpractice suits find themselves. Essentially, *340a malpractice suit amounts to a layman challenging a qualified expert, namely a defendant’s physician. Rogotzki v. Schept, supra. The New Jersey Superior Court in that case described this difficulty:
“Where the expert testimony of a defendant doctor is brought into issue as a result of his exercise of expert judgment, pretrial discovery relating to his opinion and exercise of judgment in the course of treating his patient is no different from any case in which an adverse party has knowledge of relevant matters, to hold otherwise would, particularly in a medical malpractice case, put a plaintiff to a disadvantage.” 219 A.2d at 436.
In the case at bar the appellant was seeking discovery of the facts brought to light in the interchange between Dr. Harrison and the review panel. It was important for her to be able to ascertain what those facts were, and what was said at that meeting. Although the appellant claims that she desired the information for the purpose of impeaching Dr. Harrison, that was not her only purpose in seeking this information. The materials were also essential to preparation of her case as a whole. For, as the majority notes, if the appellant’s only claim was that she thought the reports might contain information that could be used to impeach Dr. Harrison, it would not amount to a sufficient showing under the rule. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 26.64[3]. However, the central issue in this case was the amount and nature of the care provided the appellant by Dr. Harrison. A major discrepancy in the facts arose as to when the appellant was treated by Dr. Harrison and what treatment was prescribed by him at that time. Additionally, the facts show that Dr. Harrison was not very clear as to the dates and nature of his treatment either in his depositions or at trial. Thus, the only way for appellant to know what occurred at the meeting before the review panel was to obtain possession of such materials as were a product of the meeting.
In this case, the appellee in his answer to appellant’s interrogatory precluded discovery of the information by other means, simply by refusing to ever tell the appellant where any reports were or even who the doctors sitting on the panel were.
In light of this, I conclude that under the facts of this case the appellant has made the requisite showing under Rule 26(b)(3), supra, and that the trial court erred in not allowing discovery of the materials arising from the meeting with the review panel under Rule 26(b)(1), supra.
WERE THE REPORTS FROM THE MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL NOT DISCOVERABLE UNDER RULE 26(b)(4), W.R.C.P.?
The appellee further claims that the materials arising from the medical review panel are protected from discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), W.R.C.P., which provides:
“(4) Trial Preparation; Experts. — Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (bXl) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
* * * * * *
“(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means;” (Emphasis added.)
This rule is intended to preclude a party from obtaining information from an expert witness who was specially hired by an opposing party but who is not going to testify at trial. According to Professors Wright and Miller, the rule was designed to protect information acquired from an expert by a party at his own expense, but only when such expert testimony is not indispensable for trial. 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil: § 2032. Thus the rule is designed to protect such information because it is assumed that the party seeking *341disclosure can obtain the same type of information from some other expert in the field. The present facts do not present the situations considered by the drafters. Here there was no other way for the appellant to know what went on before the review panel unless she could obtain the reports arising therefrom. Additionally, under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), she was at least entitled to the names of the physicians sitting on the panel.5 Only those doctors sitting on the panel knew what was said and this information could be acquired in no other way. Thus, I conclude that Rule 26(b)(4) was not designed to apply to the present situation, and the reports were not protected from discovery under its provisions.
CONCLUSION
I believe my approach to this case is the only way this court can further the policy of full and fair disclosure embodied in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. My grave and substantial misgivings brought on by the majority’s opinion have necessitated my filing this dissent.

. A portion of Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P. provides: “(3) Trial Preparation; Materials. — Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule * *

. Section l-12-101(a)(i), W.S.1977, reads:
“(a) The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
“(i) An attorney or a physician concerning a communication made to him by his client or patient in that relation, or his advice to his client or patient. The attorney or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient, and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies the attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject-,” (Emphasis added.)

. Under our decision in Barber v. State Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 726-727 (1959), we said that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure favor full and fair disclosure at the discovery stage.

. The Kansas rule is identical to Rule 26(b)(3), W R.C.P.

. This suggestion is made in Wright & Miller, § 2032, cited above, and I deem this interpretation applicable to our rule which is identical to the federal rule.