Court Opinion

ID: 9381175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 00:00:29.140425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.489354
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10728      Document: 00516684121         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                       March 21, 2023
                                   No. 21-10728
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Christopher Kalejaiye Ajayi,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:20-CR-290-6

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Christopher Ajayi appeals his conviction and 151-month sentence for
   his involvement in a pill mill. We affirm.

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-10728       Document: 00516684121           Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                      No. 21-10728

                                            I.
            Ajayi was a pharmacist in a “pill mill” drug distribution operation.
   Abbreviating, the crime worked like this: corrupt doctors wrote fake
   prescriptions, Ajayi filled those prescriptions, and the “patients” (or their
   handlers) took the prescribed drugs and sold them on the street. Ajayi’s
   operation involved three drugs: hydrocodone, a “semisynthetic opioid”;
   carisoprodol, a muscle relaxant; and promethazine with codeine, a high-
   strength cough syrup.
            The jury convicted Ajayi of one drug conspiracy count for each
   predicate drug, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. It also convicted Ajayi of two
   additional counts for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and
   carisoprodol, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The district court sentenced
   him to 151 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the applicable Guidelines
   range.
            On direct appeal, Ajayi argues that errors in the district court’s jury
   instructions require his retrial. In the alternative, Ajayi argues that the district
   court miscalculated his Sentencing Guidelines offense level. We (II) review
   Ajayi’s jury-charge contentions, then we (III) review his sentence.
                                           II.
            Ajayi’s points of error connected to his jury instructions can be
   consolidated into two items: whether the jury instructions (A) adequately
   conveyed the mens rea requirements for Ajayi’s offenses or (B) improperly
   characterized the weight of the evidence.
                                           A.
            Ajayi argues that the district court failed to precisely articulate the
   mens rea element applicable to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846 offenses, in the
   context of a pharmacist ordinarily authorized to distribute drugs. So, to

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                                       No. 21-10728

   evaluate Ajayi’s conviction, we must first define the mens rea requirements
   of both 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846. Because that involves statutory
   construction, our review is de novo. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714
   F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013).
          Start with § 846, which imposes liability on anyone who “attempts or
   conspires” to commit certain drug offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. The
   Supreme Court has held that “conspiracy” in the § 846 context takes the
   term’s common-law definition. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14
   (1994). The mens rea for common-law conspiracy is specific intent; the
   defendant must intend to agree and must intend that a substantive offense be
   committed by some member of the conspiracy. Ocasio v. United States, 578
   U.S. 282, 288 (2016).
          Next consider 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Section 841(a) is the substantive
   drug distribution statute. It requires that a defendant, without legal
   authorization, “knowingly or intentionally” possess with intent to distribute
   or actually distribute drugs. Id.
          Ajayi’s arguments focus on the district court’s § 841(a) instructions.
   The district court’s jury charge said that in the context of a pharmacist,
   “possess with intent to distribute” means “to possess with intent to deliver
   or transfer possession of a controlled substance to another person, with or
   without any financial interest in the transaction, and outside the scope of
   professional practice or not for a legitimate medical purpose.”
          Ajayi argues the above instruction, and others related to it, failed to
   capture the mens rea required by § 841(a). Ajayi obviously possessed and
   intended to transfer possession of controlled substances every time he filled
   a prescription. The crux of the matter is not just whether Ajayi knew that he
   was filling prescriptions, but also whether he had subjective awareness of the
   illegitimate nature of those scripts when he filled them. Ajayi argues that the

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   district court’s instructions left open the possibility of conviction based solely
   on the objectively illegitimate nature of the prescriptions, because the district
   court did not make clear whether “intent” modifies only “deliver or
   transfer” or continues to modify through “not for a legitimate medical
   purpose.”
          After Ajayi was convicted but before argument was heard in this case,
   the Supreme Court decided Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022).
   There, the Court held that when a healthcare professional authorized to
   dispense controlled substances is charged with violating § 841(a), the
   Government must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
   knew that he or she was acting in an unauthorized manner.” Id. at 2375. In
   other words, the defendant must subjectively understand the illegitimate
   nature of the distribution they facilitate to commit an offense under § 841(a).
   Id. at 2381. Filling an objectively illegitimate prescription is not a sufficient
   condition to convict. Id.
          In this case, the district court drafted Ajayi’s jury charge before it
   could benefit from Ruan’s guidance. The district court did make clear,
   however, that conviction for a § 846 conspiracy offense requires that a
   defendant know “the unlawful purpose of the agreement” and join “in the
   agreement willfully, that is, with the intent to further its unlawful purpose.”
   Significantly, Ajayi’s reply brief appears to concede that this conspiracy
   instruction was adequate. At oral argument, Ajayi’s counsel acknowledged
   that the individual conspiracy instruction was appropriate, but disputed the
   holistic sufficiency of the instructions.
          It is true that we evaluate jury instructions as a whole, in the context
   of the trial record. See United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255, 266 (5th Cir. 2014);
   United States v. Guidry, 406 F.3d 314, 321 (5th Cir. 2005). On the specific
   facts of this case, we find that even if idiosyncratic portions of the jury charge

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   lacked clarity on § 841(a)’s mens rea requirement, the adequate § 846 mens
   rea instruction filled any gap by clearly requiring that the jury find that Ajayi
   have understood the illegitimate nature of his conduct.
          Further, any error in the § 841(a) instruction was harmless. See United
   States v. Gas Pipe, Inc., 997 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2021) (indicating that claims of
   jury instruction error are subject to harmless error review). The district court
   not only provided a concededly adequate conspiracy instruction but also
   paired it with an instruction consistent with Pinkerton v. United States, 328
   U.S. 640 (1946). Ajayi does not dispute that predicate § 841(a) offenses
   occurred in furtherance of the alleged § 846 conspiracy for which he was
   convicted. That is enough to sustain a conviction for those predicate § 841(a)
   offenses. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646–47.
                                            B.
          Ajayi next argues that the district court’s jury charge improperly
   commented on the weight of the evidence. Ajayi’s argument ties to a single
   page of the district court’s twenty-two page charge, on which the trial court
   explained circumstances that might support a jury’s inference that scripts
   filled by Ajayi were illegitimate.
          Ajayi objected to the relevant portion of the jury instructions at trial,
   but he did not state the grounds for his objection. We require that a party
   attempting to preserve jury instruction error not only object but also assert
   specific grounds for that objection at trial and then argue consistently with
   those grounds on appeal. See United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d 349, 355 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (finding plain error review applicable where defendant made an
   unspecific objection); United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1402 (5th Cir.
   1992) (“A party may not state one ground when objecting to an instruction
   and attempt to rely on a different ground for the objection on appeal.”).
   Accordingly, we review this argument for plain error only.

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          We have previously held that trial court judges may not “usurp[] the
   province of the jury” by applying the law to the facts in the jury’s stead.
   United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1318, 1325 (1983). That said, trial
   judges do retain a “common-law power to comment on the evidence,”
   provided they do so without “calling the turn” (deciding the outcome). Id.
   at 1324–25 (quotation omitted). This power includes “wide latitude in
   commenting on the evidence during [a trial court’s] instructions to the jury.”
   United States v. Jara-Favela, 686 F.3d 289, 297–98 (5th Cir. 2012). In Jara-
   Favela, the trial court’s “possibly confusing” oral instructions arguably
   suggested that the defendant had lied. Id. at 298. On review, we found that
   “the record as a whole” revealed no “serious[] prejudice” and that the
   remarks in context did not appear to demand the jury reach a specific
   conclusion. Id. at 298–99.
          Here, the trial court’s remarks explained relevant, available inferences
   in conditional language, but did not dictate that the jury reach any specific
   outcome. The trial court also emphasized to the jury that they should “not
   assume from anything I may have done or said during the trial that I have any
   opinion” concerning the case, and that the jury must “arrive at your own
   verdict.” Our review of the remainder of the trial record reveals no evidence
   of bias on the part of the trial judge.
          Ajayi does not come close to showing plain error.
                                             III.
          Ajayi also argues that the district court miscalculated his offense level
   and Guidelines sentencing range. More precisely, Ajayi challenges (A) the
   drug weight for which he was held liable, (B) a premises enhancement, and
   (C) an obstruction enhancement. We consider each item in turn and find no
   reversible error.

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                                        A.
          Ajayi’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) recommended holding Ajayi
   responsible for 947 kilograms of converted drug weight. Under the
   Sentencing Guidelines, that converted drug weight yields a base offense level
   of 28. See U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(c). The district court adopted the PSR’s findings
   and its recommended base offense level.
          The PSR’s converted drug weight calculation includes every
   promethazine and carisoprodol prescription that Ajayi filled for the doctor at
   the heart of the alleged pill mill conspiracy. Ajayi argues that is unfair,
   because even if he came to know the scripts were illegitimate, the
   Government has not shown that he knew of the illicit purpose of the very first
   promethazine and carisoprodol prescriptions he filled for the offending
   doctor. Some allowance, Ajayi contends, must be made for that.
          Even if Ajayi is correct, however, any error connected to carisoprodol
   or promethazine was harmless. That is because 99.9% of the converted drug
   weight attributed to Ajayi stems from hydrocodone. Everything else was a
   drop in the bucket that could not plausibly impact Ajayi’s offense level or
   Guidelines range.
          Ajayi also disputes the PSR’s measurement of this hydrocodone
   liability. The PSR held Ajayi liable for ~14,000 hydrocodone pills filled in
   response to prescriptions issued by the offending doctor, from December
   2014 onward. But the PSR did not impose liability for around 5,000
   hydrocodone pills filled for the relevant doctor prior to December 2014,
   around the time when hydrocodone was reclassified as a Schedule II drug (an
   increase in seriousness from its prior classification) and around when
   pharmacists obtained certain tools to help catch illegitimate prescriptions.
   Other than a suggestion that his liability be cut by a further third
   (conveniently, just enough to secure a lower Guidelines calculation), Ajayi

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   does not argue with specificity why a different hydrocodone converted
   weight ought be preferred to the one the PSR derived. We are deferential to
   a PSR’s drug weight calculation in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the
   defendant. 1 United States v. Kearby, 943 F.3d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 2019). Such
   deference is warranted here.
                                                B.
           Over Ajayi’s objection, the district court imposed a two-level
   enhancement for maintaining a drug premises. Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the
   Sentencing Guidelines provides for this enhancement when a defendant
   “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a
   controlled substance.” The premises enhancement applies where illicit
   distribution was “one of the defendant’s primary or principal uses for the
   premises.” United States v. Galicia, 983 F.3d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (quotation omitted). The application of § 2D1.1(b)(12) is a factual question
   that we review for clear error. United States v. Guzman-Reyes, 853 F.3d 260,
   263 (5th Cir. 2017).
           In this case, the district court based the enhancement on Ajayi’s
   pharmacy. Ajayi argues that the Government hasn’t established that illegal
   drug transmission was a “primary or principal” use of his pharmacy. But the

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            The best evidence Ajayi offers in support of some unspecified, lower hydrocodone
   converted drug weight calculation is the fact that he was shot in 2016 and had to recuperate
   afterward. Ajayi contends that unspecified others ran his pharmacy for several months after
   this unfortunate event and that he cannot be held liable for prescriptions they dispensed.
   But no medical records substantiate Ajayi’s contention that he was incapacitated for more
   than a short period. The PSR and the district court found that Ajayi’s attribution to others
   lacked credibility. We will not disturb that conclusion. And even if the calculation was off,
   any error was harmless. Ajayi would need to reduce his hydrocodone liability at least 26%
   to secure a lower Guidelines offense level and sentencing range; the chance of doing so by
   evading liability for a few months of 2016 is next to nonexistent when over 70% of his
   hydrocodone liability arose in and after 2019.

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   record indicates that at relevant times, 80% or more of the pharmacy’s
   controlled substances distribution was for prescriptions issued by the doctor
   involved in the alleged drug conspiracy. While the pharmacy itself might have
   had other uses besides illegally distributing controlled substances, the
   evidentiary bar for a premises enhancement is not high. See Galicia, 983 F.3d
   at 844; see also United States v. Loston, No. 21-30772, 2022 WL 17352572 (5th
   Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (per curiam) (reviewing our § 2D1.1(b)(12) precedent).
   Under these circumstances, we lack a “definite and firm conviction that a
   mistake has been committed” and hence cannot find clear error. See United
   States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (defining clear error).
                                         C.
          Finally, Ajayi objects to the district court’s imposition of a two-level
   enhancement for obstruction of justice. Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing
   Guidelines provides a two-level enhancement where the defendant “willfully
   obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
   administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
   sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” The Comments make clear
   that perjury during a defendant’s trial testimony may constitute obstruction.
   See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4.
          A district court’s factual findings concerning § 3C1.1 are reviewed for
   clear error. United States v. Rickett, 89 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1996). We
   review any legal questions de novo. See United States v. Zapata-Lara, 615 F.3d
   388, 390 (5th Cir. 2010).
          Relying on Ajayi’s conviction, the PSR concluded that Ajayi perjured
   himself on the stand when Ajayi testified that he was unaware of the alleged
   drug conspiracy connected to his pharmacy. The PSR, relying on phone
   intercepts and information from Ajayi’s coconspirators, also concluded that
   Ajayi testified untruthfully about his relationships with other participants in

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   the pill-mill distribution scheme. The district court adopted the PSR’s
   conclusions.
          Ajayi argues that the district court failed to comply with the Supreme
   Court’s instruction in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), that trial
   courts applying § 3C1.1 enhancements make clear findings of perjury. Id. at
   95. There, the Supreme Court indicated that “it is preferable for a district
   court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear
   finding.” Ibid. But a § 3C1.1 enhancement survives review when a trial court
   makes a single finding that “encompasses all of the factual predicates for a
   finding of perjury.” Ibid. The trial court may make such a finding by adopting
   a PSR that contains adequate findings. See United States v. Perez-Solis, 709
   F.3d 453, 470 (5th Cir. 2013).
          In Ajayi’s case, the district court adopted the PSR, which adequately
   described Ajayi’s perjury. Nothing more was required. See ibid. Still, the
   district court gave further consideration to Ajayi’s objections before deciding
   at the sentencing hearing that the district court “agree[d] with the
   government as to his testimony that it meets the obstruction enhancement.”
          After carefully reviewing the record, we hold that the district court’s
   findings “encompasse[d] all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury”
   and were legally adequate. See Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95. And, since the
   district court’s factual findings were “plausible in light of the record as a
   whole,” those factual findings were not clearly erroneous. See United States
   v. Lucio, 985 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
          AFFIRMED.

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