Court Opinion

ID: 9613834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:20:15.803061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:32.282098
License: Public Domain

Justice EDMUNDS
dissenting.
The majority’s resolution of this case improperly interprets the applicable statutes. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
A municipality that is annexing a neighboring area must provide a report that includes “[a] statement setting forth the plans of the municipality for extending to the area to be annexed each major municipal service performed within the municipality at the time of annexation.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-35(3) (2005). The trial court found as fact that the Village'of Marvin’s Annexation Report and Amended Annexation Report furnished information as to the services currently provided by the Village. The trial court went on to find as a fact that, after annexation, the area to be annexed would receive “services on substantially the same basis and in the same manner as services received elsewhere in the [municipality].” Based on these findings, *263the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the Village had “satisfied all statutory requirements regarding the provision of services to” the area to be annexed.
Although we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo, the majority appears to accept that the Village complied with the facial requirements of N.C.G.S. § 160A-35(3). The public policy set out in N.C.G.S. § 160A-33 and quoted by the majority requires no more than that the area to be annexed receive the same services as are provided within the annexing municipality. Nevertheless, the majority now relies on N.C.G.S. § 160A-33 to add a gloss to N-.C.G.S. § 160A-35(3) to require that the annexing municipality provide public services that exceed to a “meaningful” degree the services the area to be annexed is already receiving.
While I fully sympathize with the plaintiffs’ frustration at finding themselves involuntarily annexed, “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.” Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990). This Court does not have authority to add requirements to the statute. Plaintiffs’ remedy lies with the General Assembly.
Justice Parker joins in this dissenting opinion.