Court Opinion

ID: 9705996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:29:28.90671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:38.083146
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 11. dissenting. I do not agree that the property distribution was equitable in this case. Although the trial court thought it was giving wife exactly what property she requested, it overlooked that her request for property with a lesser value included a cash payment to make up the difference in the value of property awarded to husband. As a result, the award was unequal in a case in which the findings indicate that, absent the efforts of wife and despite the negative actions of husband, there would have been no marital estate to distribute. Wife brought the error to the trial court’s attention through a scatter-shot post-trial motion. That may be why the trial court ruling on the motion addressed some issues specifically, and indicated that all other issues were denied. Because the ruling on the posUtrial motion did not directly address the equalization issue, all we know is that it was denied. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion to distribute marital property, see Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 500, 697 A.2d 644, 654 (1997); however, the denial of plaintiffs post-trial motion, in light of the error and the equities as weighed by the court itself, is inexplicable. It is either a mistake or an abuse of discretion. Therefore, I respectfuEy dissent from the majority’s opinion that the trial court carefuEy weighed the 15 V.S.A. § 751 factors and made an equitable distribution. I would reverse and remand both because wife should have been awarded her attorney’s fees, as the majority holds, and for reconsideration of the property distribution.
¶ 12. Given the trial court’s findings, it is hard to affirm an unequal division of property in this case, espeeiaEy because the record does not indicate that the trial court carefuEy exercised its discretion when it denied wife’s post-trial motion. It is a more likely conclusion that, in the numerous issues that were presented for reconsideration, wife’s claim that the court had misunderstood her request was *592overlooked. The court may also have thought that its refusal to change the value of one of the assets, the little house, resolved the equalization issue. In fact, the court’s resolution of the valuation issue did not affect the disparity wife sought to equalize. Accepting the court’s valuation, wife still requested a cash equalization of $16,000. The original opinion acknowledges the inequality in distribution and justifies it by stating that the division does not have to be equal and that the court agrees in principle with wife’s proposal. It is one thing to approve an unequal distribution that wife requested; it is another to approve it on the same ground when wife points out that the court misunderstood her claim and she has the trial exhibit to prove it. The majority opinion glosses over this by pointing to the original decision, which begs the question.
¶ 13. Moreover, it was not necessary for the trial court to have found fault in the break up of the marriage to conclude that the equities substantially favored wife and should have been recognized in the property distribution. See 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(12) (court may consider the “respective merits of the parties”). As the trial court found, wife acted to preserve what few assets the parties owned. Indeed, almost the entire decision centers on husband’s destructive conduct with respect to the assets — his intransigence in selling the marital home, his failure to pay the taxes, and failure to maintain the house, leaving it in a “filthy, uncleaned condition, ... [with] junk cars and trailers and other debris on the site.” Husband’s actions required that wife advance funds at the closing for repairs and cleanup. The funds came from another asset that husband had virtually abandoned, an insurance policy on which he failed to pay the premiums. Husband failed to make support payments, ran up credit card debt, failed to give wife money for groceries and child care, and in the trial court’s opinion, lied about his income. Husband also precipitated the disintegration of the marriage by physically abusing wife — a fact that the trial court includes in its findings, but does not discuss when reviewing the statutory factors that guide the property distribution decision. After making these findings, it is not surprising that the trial court agreed with wife’s request. As I stated previously, the trial court’s original opinion and its ruling on wife’s post-trial motion never addressed the equalization aspect of wife’s plan. As a result, wife received only 43% of the marital estate, according to the trial court’s belief that this was her complete proposal.
¶ 14. Under these circumstances, it is hard to affirm the decision. It is true that property distribution does not have to be exactly equal, but we should not affirm an unequal distribution that is not supported by the evidence and is unaccompanied by an explanation. Cf. Hayden v. Hayden, 2003 VT 97, ¶ 9, 176 Vt. 52, 838 A.2d 59 (remanding property distribution based on faulty valuation when trial court opinion “contain[ed] no discussion that could assist this Court in meaningful review”). Accepting the trial court’s valuation of the total marital estate, with which I agree, wife should have received an additional $16,000 from husband to equalize the distribution. This was not a wealthy marriage, but that is all the more reason that wife, who works as a bookkeeper, should receive her due. Wife has custody of the parties’ only child, and at the time of the hearing, wife was forty-nine years old and she and her son were living with wife’s mother. The additional $16,000 in equalization that her plan called for might have allowed her a down payment on a home, or a contribution to a retirement fund. See 15 V.S.A, § 751(b)(6) (court may consider the “needs of each party”).