Court Opinion

ID: 9680510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:32:43.731463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:28.936344
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
A felony offense is per se one involving moral turpitude and is, therefore, ordinarily available to impeach a witness. However, by legislative mandate a conviction for possession of marihuana, though a felony, “may not be considered a crime of moral turpitude,” Article 4476-15, § 4.051(e), V.A. C.S., effective September 1, 1981; see also former § 4.05(c). Thus, the 1969 conviction of appellant for possession of marihuana was not admissible for purposes of impeaching his testimony at the guilt stage. Coupled with its remoteness, permitting the State to use the prior conviction to attack his credibility is such an egregious error against appellant that his trial was fundamentally unfair.
Nor do I agree that the error was waived by appellant’s testimony at the punishment hearing. Not only is his “admission” of guilt hopelessly equivocal, but also had it not been for the erroneous receipt of evidence about the prior conviction, appellant might not have testified on punishment.
Accordingly, I dissent.