Court Opinion

ID: 9749133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:24:39.73671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:44.257884
License: Public Domain

SHERTZ, Judge,
dissenting:
I.
As the majority notes, the docket entries do not indicate when, or even whether, the Prothonotary complied with the notice requirements set forth in Pa.R.Civ.P. 1038(c).1 Al*476though such disregard of procedural requirements is not to be condoned, I believe that to remand, whereby the Prothonotary’s dereliction is visited upon the parties, is neither necessary nor desirable.
If, in fact, the Prothonotary failed to give the 1038(c) notification, then Appellant’s exceptions were not untimely. If, however, such notice was given, though not reflected in the docket entries, two possibilities exist: either Appellant filed her exceptions within ten days after receipt of notice, or she did not. If the former, then the trial court did not err in considering the exceptions on their merits. If the latter, then I would treat the trial court’s statement that exceptions “were filed within the period limited by Pa.R.Civ.P. 1038(d)” as evidencing leave to file exceptions more than ten days after receipt of notice. Such a reading would “comport with the liberality of construction which should attend the Rules of Civil Procedure” and “be in keeping with the teaching of Pa.R.Civ.P. 248.” E. J. McAleer & Co. v. Iceland Products, Inc., 475 Pa. 610, 614, 381 A.2d 441, 443 (1977).
In addition, it is to be noted that Appellee Bank has not asserted on appeal that the trial court’s denial of its motion to quash the exceptions was error. This is quite understandable in view of the fact that no prejudice resulted from the trial court’s consideration of possibly untimely exceptions inasmuch as the Bank prevailed on the merits, i. e. the trial court dismissed the exceptions.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand. In my judgment, the better course is to address the merits of the case and thereby avoid further delay, unnecessary additional expense and the unavailing utilization of valuable and limited judicial resources.
II.
In reaching a decision on the merits, I find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Appellee, North Side Deposit *477Bank (“Bank”) is entitled to restitution. Hence, I would affirm.
This case arises from the following facts. In April 1977 Appellant, Lorry A. Sarver, and her husband, Ernest F. Sarver, plaintiff below, opened a joint savings account at the Bank. On June 16, 1978, the couple separated, and on June 19, 1978, Mr. Sarver went to the Bank to make a withdrawal of $1,359.32, exactly one-half the balance then in the account. Mr. John Sakala, the branch manager, permitted Mr. Sarver to make the withdrawal, even though Mr. Sarver did not present the passbook, and Mr. Sarver immediately deposited the entire amount withdrawn in a newly opened account, which was in his name alone.2
Mrs. Sarver arrived at the Bank as Mr. Sarver was leaving, attempted to make a withdrawal at the drive-in window and was told by the teller that she would have to go inside to conduct the transaction. She did so, presented the passbook to a teller in the Bank, and was mistakenly permitted to withdraw the entire balance of the account as reflected in the passbook, i. e. $2,718.64.
Thus, the Bank paid out to Mr. and Mrs. Sarver one and one-half times the balance of their account. Upon learning of its error, the Bank took the funds from Mr. Sarver’s newly opened individual account and applied them to cover the overpayment. Mr. Sarver was then advised that there were no funds in his separate account, and his passbook was marked “issued in error—void.”
Mr. Sarver instituted suit against the Bank, and the Bank joined Mrs. Sarver as an additional Defendant. The trial court held for Mr. Sarver and against the Bank and for the Bank against Mrs. Sarver. This appeal by Mrs. Sarver followed.
On appeal, Mrs. Sarver contends that the relationship between a bank and a depositor is governed by an express contract, the terms of which are set out in the passbook. *478She is incorrect. The rules printed in a passbook are only for the convenience and protection of the bank and may be waived by it. In re Blose’s Estate, 374 Pa. 100, 103, 97 A.2d 358, 359 (1953).
The relationship between a bank and a depositor is that of debtor and creditor. Coffin v. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 97 A.2d 857 (1953). With respect to a general deposit account, the bank is the debtor of the depositor to the amount of the balance in the account. Moreover, under a theory of implied contract, the bank must repay that amount to the depositor on demand. 5A Michie on Banks and Banking § 1, at 11 (1973); see Weiner v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, 160 Pa.Super. 320, 51 A.2d 385 (1947). However, once demand by the depositor and payment by the bank to the depositor are made, the contractual relationship ceases. 5A Michie on Banks and Banking § 9, at 35 (1973).
Appellee Bank did not breach its contract with Mr. and Mrs. Sarver by paying out one-half of the balance of the joint savings account to Mr. Sarver, without requiring that he present the passbook. Nor did the Bank act in a commercially unreasonable or negligent manner in doing so.
Following its payment to Mr. Sarver of $1,359.32, the Bank remained obligated to pay only the balance on deposit in the account on demand of Mr. or Mrs. Sarver. Thus, when Mrs. Sarver received $2,718.64, the amount that both the teller and Mrs. Sarver believed to be the correct balance, she received funds to which she was not entitled.
This case clearly falls within the Restatement of Restitution § 20 (1937), which states that:
A person who has paid another an excessive amount of money because of an erroneous belief induced by a mistake of fact that the sum paid was necessary for the discharge of a duty, for the performance of a condition, or for the acceptance of an offer, is entitled to restitution of the excess.
In the instant case, the Bank, in order to discharge its duty, was required to pay the balance of the savings account to *479either Mr. or Mrs. Sarver on demand. To that end, both the Bank and Mrs. Sarver erroneously believed that the Bank was obliged to pay, and that Mrs. Sarver was entitled to receive, $2,718.64. Moreover, this belief was induced by a mistake of fact; that is, both the Bank3 and Mrs. Sarver thought that the balance was $2,718.64. In fact, the balance then was $1,359.32, and the Bank was obligated to pay out only that amount. Thus, the Bank is entitled to restitution of the excess, and the trial court’s order requiring Appellant, Lorry A. Sarver, to repay $1,359.32 to the Bank should be affirmed.

. It appears from a reading of the record that Mr. Sarver’s withdrawal of one-half the balance of the joint account was prompted by his belief, which he communicated to Mr. Sakala, that Mrs. Sarver might attempt to withdraw the entire $2,718.64.

. Ordinarily the knowledge of the branch manager, Mr. Sakala, that the balance was actually $1,359.32 would be binding on the Bank. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 268 (1958). However, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 278 (1958) states that:
The principal is affected by the knowledge which the agent has when acting for him or, if it is the duty of the agent to communicate the information and not otherwise to act, the principal is affected afíer the lapse of such time as is reasonable for its communication.
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Sarver made their respective withdrawals within a few minutes of each other. The trial court found that this fact caused the Bank mistakenly to overpay Mrs. Sarver. Implicit in the trial court’s finding are the conclusions that sufficient time had not elapsed for Mr. Sakala reasonably to have communicated his knowledge and that Mr. Sakala’s knowledge, therefore, is not imputable to the Bank.