Court Opinion

ID: 2964287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:23:15.980386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:00.539360
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          October 11, 1996  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          October 11, 1996  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1614
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    JOHN HOULIHAN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

          No. 95-1615
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  JOSEPH A. NARDONE

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

          No. 95-1675
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                MICHAEL D. FITZGERALD

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

          The opinion of this court issued on August 22, 1996, is corrected
          as follows:

               On page 52, line 22, change "Boylan" to "O'Bryant"
                                            ______      ________

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1614

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    JOHN HOULIHAN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

          No. 95-1615

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  JOSEPH A. NARDONE

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

          No. 95-1675

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                MICHAEL D. FITZGERALD

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                              _________________________

               Charles W. Rankin, with  whom Rankin & Sultan was  on brief,
               _________________             _______________
          for appellant Houlihan.
               Jonathan   Shapiro,  with  whom  Angela  Lehman  and  Stern,
               __________________               ______________       ______
          Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin were on brief, for appellant Nardone.
          __________________________
               Kevin  S. Nixon,  with whom  Robert Y.  Murray and  Ramsey &
               _______________              _________________      ________
          Murray were on brief, for appellant Fitzgerald.
          ______
               Nina Goodman,  Attorney, Dep't of Justice,  with whom Donald
               ____________                                          ______
          K.  Stern, United  States Attorney,  Paul V.  Kelly and  Frank A.
          _________                            ______________      ________
          Libby,  Jr., Assistant  United  States Attorneys,  and Daniel  S.
          ___________                                            __________
          Goodman and David S.  Kris, Attorneys, Dep't of Justice,  were on
          _______     ______________
          brief, for the United States.

                              _________________________

                                   August 22, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  These appeals present a hothouse
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          of efflorescent issues set against a backdrop composed of roughly

          equal parts of  drugs, money, and mayhem.  Two  of those issues  

          one implicating the Confrontation  Clause and the other involving

          Fed.  R.  Crim. P.  24(c)    raise  important questions  of first

          impression in this circuit.  In the pages that follow, we offer a

          skeletal  outline of the case and then  put flesh on the bones by

          addressing,  first, the appellants' two flagship claims.  We next

          consider  a   series  of  discovery  disputes   and  conclude  by

          discussing, albeit in a more abbreviated fashion, a laundry  list

          of other asseverations.  In  the end, after careful consideration

          of  the  parties'  arguments   and  close  perscrutation  of  the

          compendious record, we  affirm the judgments below in large part,

          but reverse  one defendant's  conviction on three  related counts

          and bring a contingent sentencing determination to closure.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    Overcoming   the  temptation   to  engage   in  Homeric

          recitation of the  riveting facts that emerged  during a seventy-

          day trial, we opt instead to sketch the evidence at this juncture

          and  reserve  greater  detail  until the  need  arises  to  place

          specific issues into  workable context.   We draw  our sketch  in

          colors that coordinate with  the jury's verdicts, consistent with

          record support.  See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707,
                           ___  ____  _____________    _____

          711 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1063 (1993).
                               _____ ______

                    For  nearly  four  years  Michael  Fitzgerald and  John

          Houlihan  ran a ruthlessly  efficient drug ring  from an unlikely

                                          4

          command   post:       Kerrigan's   Flower   Shop,    Charlestown,

          Massachusetts.   The  organization  commanded  the allegiance  of

          numerous   distributors,   stationary   and   mobile,   including

          Jennierose Lynch, William "Bud" Sweeney, George Sargent, and Alan

          Skinner.    These  minions,  and  others  like them,  helped  the

          organization  supply  cocaine  to  hordes of  buyers  through  an

          elaborate street-level distribution network that arranged most of

          its  sales with the  aid of electronic  pagers, assigned customer

          codes, and preset rendezvous points.

                    Fitzgerald  and  Houlihan  imposed  a  strict  code  of

          silence on all who  came into contact with them,  including their

          own troops.  They dealt severely with persons who seemed inclined

          to  talk too freely.  Joseph Nardone, a professional assassin who

          bragged  that he was the "headache man"   when the organization's

          chieftains had a  headache, Nardone got rid of it    acted as the

          principal  enforcer.   Over  time,  the  gang's targets  included

          Sargent, Sweeney (who survived multiple attempts on his life, but

          was left paralyzed  from the  chest down), a  rival drug  dealer,

          James Boyden III, and the latter's son and helpmeet, James Boyden

          IV.

                    The Fitzgerald-Houlihan axis dominated  the Charlestown

          scene  through 1993.  Ultimately,  the authorities broke the code

          of silence and a federal  grand jury indicted twelve  individuals

          (including  Fitzgerald, Houlihan,  and  Nardone) on  a myriad  of

                                          5

          charges.1  After  trial, the two  ringleaders and their  enforcer

          were found guilty of engaging in a racketeering enterprise (count

          1),  racketeering  conspiracy  (count  2), conspiracy  to  commit

          murder in aid of  racketeering (counts 5, 7 &  9), and conspiracy

          to distribute  cocaine (count 20).   See  18 U.S.C.     1962(c) &
                                               ___

          (d),  1959(a);  21  U.S.C.     846.    The  jury  also  convicted

          Fitzgerald  and  Houlihan  of  aiding  and  abetting  murder  and

          attempted murder in  aid of racketeering (counts 6, 8,  11 & 12),

          instigating murder  for hire (counts 15, 16  & 17), engaging in a

          continuing  criminal  enterprise  (count  19),  and  distributing

          cocaine (counts 21 through 29).  See  18 U.S.C.    1959(a), 1958;
                                           ___

          21 U.S.C.    848,  841(a)(1).  The  jury found Nardone guilty  of

          murder  and attempted murder in aid of racketeering (counts 6, 8,

          11  & 12),  see 18  U.S.C.    1959(a), and  using and  carrying a
                      ___

          firearm  during and in relation to crimes of violence (counts 39,

          40, 42 &  43), see 18  U.S.C.   924(c).   The jury also  returned
                         ___

          special  forfeiture verdicts.  See 18  U.S.C.   1963; 21 U.S.C.  
                                         ___

          853.   The district  court sentenced  each defendant  to multiple

          terms of life imprisonment.  These appeals blossomed.

          II.  THE VOICE FROM THE GRAVE
          II.  THE VOICE FROM THE GRAVE

                    The district  court admitted over objection portions of

          hearsay  statements made  by George  Sargent on  the  theory that

                              
          ____________________

               1Of  these  twelve, only  Fitzgerald, Houlihan,  and Nardone
          appear  as appellants  before us.   Three  of their  codefendants
          (Skinner, Lynch,  and  Joseph Houlihan)  eventually pled  guilty;
          five others were granted a separate trial; and one (William Herd)
          was   acquitted  by  the  same  jury  that  convicted  the  three
          appellants.

                                          6

          Sargent's murder constituted a waiver of the Confrontation Clause

          vis- -vis the murderers.2   Houlihan and Nardone  assign error to

          this order and to a salmagundi of related rulings.

                                A.  Setting the Stage.
                                A.  Setting the Stage.
                                    _________________

                    Sargent  served as  a  distributor for  the Fitzgerald-

          Houlihan organization.  The police arrested him twice during 1992

          on drug-trafficking charges.   Both times, Sargent made voluntary

          statements that inculpated Fitzgerald and Houlihan in a sprawling

          drug conspiracy  and tended  to link  them with  several murders.

          The statements also furnished  evidence probative of the elements

          of  the offenses with which Nardone had been charged, but Sargent

          did not mention him by name.   On June 28, 1992   within a  month

          after  he  gave the  second  statement    police  found Sargent's

          corpse in a parking lot.  He had been killed by a bullet wound to

          the head inflicted at close range.

                    The government filed a pretrial motion for an order (1)

          authorizing  a  state trooper,  Mark  Lemieux,  to testify  about

          Sargent's  statements following  his March  1992 arrest,  and (2)

          permitting the jury  to hear a redacted version of  the taped May

          1992  interview conducted  by Boston police  detectives following

          Sargent's  second  arrest.     The  government  argued  that  the

          appellants    who had been charged with Sargent's murder   waived

          their rights  to  object to  the  admission of  his  out-of-court
                              
          ____________________

               2Because  the  government  did  not prove  to  the  district
          court's  satisfaction  that Fitzgerald  shared  his codefendants'
          intent to forestall Sargent from cooperating with the police, the
          court ruled that  Sargent's statements could not be  used against
          Fitzgerald.  The correctness of that ruling is not before us.

                                          7

          statements on either Confrontation Clause or hearsay grounds when

          they  successfully  conspired  to  execute him  for  the  express

          purpose of preventing his cooperation with the authorities.   The

          district court took the motion under advisement and, near the end

          of  the  government's  case  in chief,  admitted  the  challenged

          evidence against  Houlihan and  Nardone, but not  Fitzgerald, see
                                                                        ___

          supra note 2, concluding  that the government had shown  by clear
          _____

          and convincing  evidence that those defendants  conspired to kill

          Sargent at  least in part for the  purpose of preventing him from

          cooperating  with   the  police,  and  that   such  actions  were

          tantamount  to a  knowing waiver  of their  confrontation rights.

          See United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 363-65 (D. Mass.
          ___ _____________    ________

          1995).3

                  B.  Waiver by Homicide:  The Confrontation Clause.
                  B.  Waiver by Homicide:  The Confrontation Clause.
                      _____________________________________________

                    To resolve Houlihan's and Nardone's main objections, we

          must  decide  whether a  defendant  waives his  rights  under the

          Confrontation Clause by murdering  a potential witness to prevent

          that witness  from  turning state's  evidence  and/or  testifying

          against him at trial.  We believe that he does.

                    It is apodictic that "in all criminal prosecutions, the

          accused shall  enjoy the right  . . .  to be confronted  with the

          witnesses against  him .  . . ."   U.S. Const.  Amend. VI.   This

          trial right  is  designed to  assure defendants  of a  meaningful

          opportunity to cross-examine  the witnesses  who testify  against
                              
          ____________________

               3The district  court also  published a  preliminary opinion,
          United States v.  Houlihan, 871  F. Supp. 1495  (D. Mass.  1994),
          _____________     ________
          which is of little moment in regard to these appeals.

                                          8

          them,  see,  e.g., Delaware  v. Van  Arsdall,  475 U.S.  673, 678
                 ___   ____  ________     ____________

          (1986);  United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir.
                   _____________    _____________

          1996), thereby enhancing the jury's ability to separate fact from

          fiction.

                    Though the Confrontation Clause is a cornerstone of our

          adversary system of  justice, it  is not an  absolute; there  are

          circumstances in  which the prosecution may  introduce an unsworn

          out-of-court statement without procuring the declarant's presence

          at trial.  See, e.g., Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205-07 (1st
                     ___  ____  ______    ____

          Cir. 1987) (discussing  exception for spontaneous  exclamations),

          cert. denied, 485  U.S. 990  (1988).  Moreover,  a defendant  may
          _____ ______

          waive  his  right to  confrontation  by  knowing and  intentional

          relinquishment.   See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)
                            ___ ______    _______

          (holding  that  a  guilty  plea  is  an  express  waiver  of  the

          constitutional  right  to  confrontation); see  also  Johnson  v.
                                                     ___  ____  _______

          Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).  While a waiver of the right to
          ______

          confront  witnesses typically is express, the law is settled that

          a defendant also may waive it through his intentional misconduct.

          See,  e.g., Taylor  v.  United States,  414  U.S. 17,  20  (1973)
          ___   ____  ______      _____________

          (finding such  a waiver  when a  defendant boycotted  his trial);

          Illinois  v. Allen,  397  U.S. 337,  343  (1970) (ruling  that  a
          ________     _____

          defendant  waives  the  right  to confrontation  by  engaging  in

          disruptive  behavior requiring  his  removal  from the  courtroom

          during the trial).

                    By  the same token, courts  will not suffer  a party to

          profit by his own  wrongdoing.  Thus, a defendant  who wrongfully

                                          9

          procures  a  witness's absence  for  the purpose  of  denying the

          government that  witness's testimony  waives his right  under the

          Confrontation Clause  to object to  the admission  of the  absent

          witness's hearsay statements.   See Reynolds v. United States, 98
                                          ___ ________    _____________

          U.S. (8  Otto)  145, 158  (1878)  (holding that  the  defendant's

          refusal to disclose the whereabouts of a witness constituted such

          a waiver); Steele  v. Taylor,  684 F.2d 1193,  1201-02 (6th  Cir.
                     ______     ______

          1982) (holding  that  a  defendant  who  silences  a  witness  by

          exploiting  an   intimate  relationship   waives  the   right  to

          confrontation), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983); United States
                          _____ ______                        _____________

          v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th  Cir. 1979) (concluding that a
             ______

          defendant  waives  his  confrontation  right  by  threatening   a

          witness's life  and bringing about the  witness's silence), cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied, 449 U.S. 840  (1980); United States v. Carlson,  547 F.2d
          ______                        _____________    _______

          1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir.  1976) (similar), cert. denied, 431  U.S.
                                                    _____ ______

          914 (1977).   Moreover, it is  sufficient in this regard  to show

          that the  evildoer was motivated  in part by a  desire to silence
                                            __ ____

          the witness; the  intent to deprive the  prosecution of testimony

          need not  be the actor's sole  motivation.  Cf. United  States v.
                                   ____               ___ ______________

          Thomas,  916 F.2d  647, 651  (11th Cir.  1990) (stating  that the
          ______

          obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C.   1503,  requires proof

          that the defendant's conduct was "prompted, at least in part," by

          the requisite corrupt motive).

                    Houlihan and Nardone  argue, however, that the  waiver-

          by-misconduct doctrine, even if good law,  should not be employed

          here because Sargent was  not an actual witness    no charges had
                                           ______

                                          10

          been  lodged against Houlihan or Nardone at the time of Sargent's

          murder, and no grand jury had as yet been convened    but at most

          a turncoat cooperating  with the  police.  Thus,  they could  not

          have been on  notice that they  were waiving a  trial right.   We

          find this argument unpersuasive.  Although the reported cases all

          appear to involve actual  witnesses, see, e.g., United States  v.
                                               ___  ____  _____________

          Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.  456 &
          ____                              _____ ______

          496  (1994); United States  v. Mastrangelo, 693  F.2d 269, 271-72
                       _____________     ___________

          (2d  Cir. 1982),  cert.  denied, 467  U.S.  1204 (1984),  we  can
                            _____  ______

          discern  no  principled   reason  why  the   waiver-by-misconduct

          doctrine  should  not  apply  with equal  force  if  a  defendant

          intentionally silences a potential witness.
                                   _________

                    When  a  defendant  murders  an  individual  who  is  a

          percipient  witness  to  acts  of criminality  (or  procures  his

          demise) in order  to prevent  him from appearing  at an  upcoming

          trial, he denies the government the benefit of the witness's live

          testimony.  In much the same way, when a defendant murders such a

          witness (or procures  his demise)  in order to  prevent him  from

          assisting an  ongoing criminal  investigation, he is  denying the

          government  the benefit  of  the witness's  live  testimony at  a

          future trial.  In  short, the two situations are  fair congeners:

          as long as  it is reasonably  foreseeable that the  investigation

          will culminate in the bringing of charges, the mere fact that the

          homicide  occurs  at an  earlier step  in  the pavane  should not

          affect   the  operation  of  the  waiver-by-misconduct  doctrine.

          Indeed, adopting  the contrary  position urged by  the appellants

                                          11

          would  serve  as a  prod to  the  unscrupulous to  accelerate the

          timetable and murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later.

          We  see no justification for creating  such a perverse incentive,

          or  for distinguishing  between  a defendant  who assassinates  a

          witness  on  the  eve of  trial  and  a  potential defendant  who

          assassinates a potential  witness before charges  officially have

          been  brought.  In either case, it  is the intent to silence that

          provides notice.

                    We  therefore hold  that when  a person  who eventually

          emerges  as   a  defendant  (1)  causes   a  potential  witness's

          unavailability  (2) by  a wrongful  act (3)  undertaken with  the

          intention of preventing the  potential witness from testifying at

          a future trial, then  the defendant waives his right to object on

          confrontation  grounds   to  the  admission  of  the  unavailable

          declarant's out-of-court statements at trial.

                    Before applying this  holding to the  case at hand,  we

          must  correctly calibrate the quantum of proof.  The lower court,

          paying obeisance to United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629-30
                              _____________    ______

          (5th  Cir. Unit B), cert.  denied, 456 U.S.  1008 (1982), adopted
                              _____  ______

          the  minority view and decided that the government must prove the

          predicate facts essential to the waiver by "clear and convincing"

          evidence.  Houlihan, 887  F. Supp. at 360.  This  sets too high a
                     ________

          standard.  Unlike the Fifth Circuit, we think that the government

          need  only prove such predicate  facts by a  preponderance of the

          evidence.

                    The  Thevis  court  compared  the  waiver-by-misconduct
                         ______

                                          12

          problem  to the  admissibility of  in-court identifications  that

          follow tainted  out-of-court identifications.  See,  e.g., United
                                                         ___   ____  ______

          States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967) (requiring government to
          ______    ____

          prove by  "clear and  convincing" evidence in  such circumstances

          that  the   proposed  in-court  identification   has  a  reliable

          independent  basis).    With   respect,  we  believe  the  better

          comparison is  to the admission of  out-of-court statements under

          the coconspirator exception  to the  hearsay rule.   See Fed.  R.
                                                               ___

          Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).   To invoke the  coconspirator exception, the

          proponent of the statement  must "show by a preponderance  of the

          evidence" certain  predicate  facts, namely,  "that a  conspiracy

          embracing both the declarant and the defendant existed,  and that

          the declarant uttered  the statement during and in furtherance of

          the  conspiracy."  United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180
                             _____________    _________

          (1st Cir. 1993), cert.  denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714  (1994); see also
                           _____  ______                           ___ ____

          Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).
          _________    _____________

                    Proving  the conditions precedent  to the applicability

          of  the coconspirator exception  is analytically and functionally

          identical  to proving  that a  defendant's wrongdoing  waives his

          rights under the Confrontation  Clause.  See Steele, 684  F.2d at
                                                   ___ ______

          1203;  United  States v.  White, 838  F.  Supp. 618,  624 (D.D.C.
                 ______________     _____

          1993).  We therefore align ourselves with the majority of federal

          appellate courts  that have  considered the question,  see, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Mastrangelo,  693  F.2d  at 273;  Steele,  684  F.2d  at 1202-03;
          ___________                       ______

          Balano, 618 F.2d at 629, and set the government's burden of proof
          ______

          at the preponderance-of-the-evidence level.

                                          13

                    Measured  against this more conventional benchmark, the

          district court's findings  easily pass muster.   The record amply

          demonstrates that  Houlihan and Nardone knew  when they conspired

          to  murder Sargent that they  were depriving the  government of a

          potential witness.   First, the district  court supportably found

          that they  believed Sargent was  cooperating with the  police and

          could  harm them and the organization by talking.4  See Houlihan,
                                                              ___ ________

          887 F. Supp. at 363-64.   Second, Sargent was in fact cooperating

          with law enforcement officials at the time and made two voluntary

          statements  in  which  he   provided  detailed  accounts  of  the

          organization's  modus operandi,  descriptions of  the principals'

          roles  in various  murders,  and a  frank  admission of  his  own

          involvement in the conspiracy.   While the defendants' perception

          of  likely cooperation may  well be enough to  meet this prong of

          the  test,  the  fact  of Sargent's  cooperation  reinforces  the

          inference  that the  killers  believed Sargent  was spilling  the

          beans and  murdered him on that account.  Last but not least, the

          conspirators knew  to a certainty  that Sargent had  keen insight

          into their felonious  activities both  from his own  work in  the

          distribution network and from  sundry conversations in which they

          spoke  openly to  him    in  retrospect, too  openly    of  their

          participation in serious crimes.

                    This  evidentiary  foundation  sturdily   supports  the

                              
          ____________________

               4It  is  noteworthy that,  after  Judge Young  ruled  on the
          admissibility  of Sargent's  statements,  Sweeney testified  that
          Houlihan told him, flat out, that Sargent had been killed because
          he "was talking to the cops."

                                          14

          conclusion  that  Houlihan  and  Nardone  reasonably  could  have

          foreseen Sargent becoming  a witness against them  and plotted to

          kill  him in  order to  deprive the  government of  his firsthand

          testimony.  Hence, the  district court did not err  in overruling

          objections to  the introduction of portions  of Sargent's out-of-

          court  statements insofar  as those  objections stemmed  from the

          Confrontation Clause.5

                   C.  Waiver by Homicide:  The Hearsay Objections.
                   C.  Waiver by Homicide:  The Hearsay Objections.
                       ___________________________________________

                    Houlihan  and Nardone  next  argue that,  even if  they

          waived their confrontation rights,  the district court should not

          have admitted  Sargent's  hearsay statements  because  they  were

          tinged  with self-interest  (having been  made in  police custody

          with  a  stiff  sentence  for distributing  large  quantities  of

          narcotics  in  prospect)  and  therefore  lacked  "circumstantial

          guarantees of trustworthiness."  Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).  On the

          facts  of  this  case, we  agree  with  the  district court,  see
                                                                        ___

          Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. at 362, 367, that Houlihan's and Nardone's
          ________

          misconduct waived  not only  their confrontation rights  but also

          their  hearsay objections,  thus rendering  a special  finding of

          reliability superfluous.

                              
          ____________________

               5In  a related vein, Houlihan  and Nardone complain that the
          district court failed to conduct  an evidentiary hearing prior to
          ruling  on  the  admissibility  of Sargent's  statements.    This
          complaint  strikes us  as  a  thinly-veiled  effort to  rehash  a
          discovery  dispute  that we  discuss infra  Part  IV(B).   In all
                                               _____
          events, the district court heard arguments of counsel and thirty-
          seven days of trial testimony before deciding that the statements
          could be utilized.   In  these circumstances, the  court did  not
          outstrip the bounds of  its discretion in declining to  convene a
          special mid-trial evidentiary hearing.

                                          15

                    The  Supreme Court  has yet to  plot the  crossroads at

          which  the  Confrontation  Clause   and  the  hearsay  principles

          embedded in the Evidence Rules intersect.  The question is subtly

          nuanced.   Though the two bodies of law are not coterminous, they

          husband essentially the same interests.  See California v. Green,
                                                   ___ __________    _____

          399 U.S.  149, 155-56 (1976).   Both attempt to  strike a balance

          between  the government's  need  for probative  evidence and  the

          defendant's stake in testing the government's case through cross-

          examination.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448  U.S. 56, 65 (1980).  As a
                        ___ ____    _______

          result, whether hearsay principles are more or less protective of

          a  defendant's  right  to  cross-examination  than  confrontation

          principles depends on the point at which the balance is struck in

          any particular instance  (recognizing, however, that  the balance

          can  be  struck at  different levels  in  different cases).   See
                                                                        ___

          Green, 399 U.S. at 156.
          _____

                    In this case,  we can take matters a step  further.  In

          constructing  the balance the  main interest that  must be offset

          against the government's need for evidence is the accused's right

          to confrontation (for  this is the right from which  the right to

          cross-examine springs).   Once the confrontation  right is lifted

          from  the scales  by operation  of the  accused's waiver  of that

          right,  the balance  tips  sharply  in  favor  of  the  need  for

          evidence.  See Thai, 29 F.3d at 841 (holding that a defendant who
                     ___ ____

          waives  his  confrontation   right  by  wrongfully  procuring   a

          witness's  silence also waives  hearsay objections vis- -vis that

          witness); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992)
                    _____________    ______

                                          16

          (similar);  see  also  Steele,  684  F.2d  at  1201  (noting that
                      ___  ____  ______

          "English  and  American  courts  have  consistently  relaxed  the

          hearsay rule  when the  defendant wrongfully causes  the witness'

          unavailability").   Here, then, inasmuch as  Houlihan and Nardone

          waived their confrontation right by colloguing to murder Sargent,

          they  simultaneously  waived their  right  to  object on  hearsay

          grounds to the admission of his out-of-court statements.6  Hence,

          the  district  court  appropriately   eschewed  the  request  for

          findings under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).

                    Houlihan and  Nardone have  a fallback position.   They

          suggest that the district  court's admission of Sargent's out-of-

          court statements violated their rights to due process because the

          admissions  allowed  them   to  be  convicted  on  the  basis  of

          unreliable evidence.  See Green, 399 U.S. at 163 n.15 (ruminating
                                ___ _____

          that  "considerations  of  due  process, wholly  apart  from  the

          Confrontation Clause, might prevent  convictions where a reliable

          evidentiary  basis   is  totally  lacking").     We  reject  this

          initiative.   Whatever criticisms  justifiably might  be levelled

          against Sargent's  statements, the portions  of those  statements

          that Judge Young allowed  into evidence are not so  unreliable as

                              
          ____________________

               6We  caution that a waiver  of confrontation rights does not
          result in the automatic  surrender of all evidentiary objections.
          For example, a district court  still should exclude relevant  but
          highly  inflammatory evidence, misconduct notwithstanding, if the
          danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence's
          probative  value.   See  Fed. R.  Evid.  403.   Presumably,  such
                              ___
          evidence would have  been excludable on  a non-hearsay ground  if
          the declarant were available to testify, so there is no reason to
          admit   it   when   the   defendant   procures   the  declarant's
          unavailability.

                                          17

          to  raise  due  process  concerns.    Other  evidence  abundantly

          corroborates   (and  in  many   instances  replicates)  Sargent's

          account.   For  instance, his  description of  the organization's

          modus operandi  and his assessment of  Houlihan's leadership role

          were confirmed and described in  excruciating detail by a  galaxy

          of  live witnesses  (e.g.,  Michael Nelson,  Bud Sweeney,  Cheryl

          Dillon).7  No more is exigible.

                                 D.  The Redactions.
                                 D.  The Redactions.
                                     ______________

                    After  ruling that  portions of  Sargent's out-of-court

          statements  were  admissible against  Houlihan  and  Nardone, the

          court  limited the May 30,  1992 statements to  those that "would

          have  been competent  and admissible  evidence had  the declarant

          been able to testify in person," and also excluded those portions

          that "directly  or  through innuendo"  might offend  the rule  of

          Bruton v. United States,  391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968)  (holding that
          ______    _____________

          the introduction at a joint trial  of a nontestifying defendant's

          statements  that implicate a  codefendant constitutes prejudicial

          error).   Houlihan,  887 F. Supp.  at 365.   Houlihan and Nardone
                    ________

          objected,  contending that  the  editing process  heightened  the

          force of Sargent's statements, and that if the interviews were to

          be introduced at all, then the  entire text should be fair  game.

          The district court overruled the objections.

                              
          ____________________

               7Perhaps  the  weakest  link   in  the  chain  is  Sargent's
          statement regarding  a suggestive but ambiguous conversation that
          he had with Houlihan  shortly before the killing of  James Boyden
          III.   But this tale is relevant  principally to the three counts
          against Houlihan on which we order his convictions reversed.  See
                                                                        ___
          infra Part V(B).  Thus, any error in admitting it is harmless.
          _____

                                          18

                    On  appeal,  Houlihan  and   Nardone  argue  less  that

          Sargent's  statements   should   have  been   redacted   somewhat

          differently and more that  they should not have been  redacted at
                                                                         __

          all.8   They assert that  when a defendant  waives his rights  to
          ___

          make   Confrontation  Clause   and  hearsay   objections  through

          misconduct,  the absent  declarant's full  out-of-court statement

          should be admissible  at the  behest of either  the proponent  or

          opponent of the statement.   This assertion rests on  a misguided

          notion.

                    The  cardinal  purpose   of  the   waiver-by-misconduct

          doctrine is to ensure that a wrongdoer does not profit in a court

          of  law by  reason  of his  miscreancy.   By  murdering  Sargent,

          Houlihan and Nardone  denied the prosecution  the benefit of  his

          live  testimony.  To compensate for that denial the court allowed

          the  government  to introduce  portions  of  the interviews  that

          Sargent  gave to  the  police.   The  defense, however,  was  not

          entitled  to any  compensation,  and permitting  it to  introduce

          additional hearsay statements (apart from statements necessary to

          place the portions  used by  the government into  context and  to

          render them not misleading)  would be to reward bloodthirstiness.

          We decline to stamp a judicial imprimatur on a calculated murder.

          Thus,  we hold that a  homicidal defendant may  by his misconduct

                              
          ____________________

               8Though  the  district  court  applied  the  same  redaction
          principles to the police officer's testimony concerning the March
          interview (which was not  recorded or transcribed) and  the tape-
          recorded  May interview, the emphasis on appeal is on the latter.
          While we restrict  our discussion to that recording,  our holding
          applies with equal force to the earlier debriefing.

                                          19

          waive  his hearsay objections, but that waiver does not strip the

          government of its right  to lodge hearsay objections.  It is only

          the party who wrongfully procures a witness's absence  who waives

          the  right to object to  the adverse party's  introduction of the

          witness's prior out-of-court statements.  See White, 838 F. Supp.
                                                    ___ _____

          at 625; see also Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202.
                  ___ ____ ______

                    To sum up, since  courts should not reward  parties for

          their  own misdeeds,  a prior  out-of-court  statement made  by a

          witness whose unavailability stems from the wrongful conduct of a

          party,  aimed at  least  in part  at  achieving that  result,  is

          admissible against that party as long as the statement would have

          been admissible had  the witness  testified.  But  the party  who

          causes  the witness's unavailability is  not entitled to the same

          prophylaxis.  Consequently, under settled jurisprudence governing

          totem-pole  hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 805, the tape of Sargent's
                               ___

          interview itself  constituted first-level hearsay not  within any

          recognized exception,  and  the district  court  did not  err  in

          admitting some  portions at the government's  urging and refusing

          to admit the rest of the recording at the appellants' behest.

                    Houlihan  and Nardone  offer  a second  reason why  the

          trial  court   erred  in  excluding  the   balance  of  Sargent's

          statements.  This construct  pivots on Evidence Rule 106,  a rule

          that codifies  principles of  fairness and completeness.9   Under
                              
          ____________________

               9The rule provides in pertinent part:

                    When  a  . .  .  recorded  statement or  part
                    thereof is introduced by a party, an  adverse
                    party  may  require  him   at  that  time  to

                                          20

          it, a party  against whom a  fragmentary statement is  introduced

          may demand  that the rest of the statement (or so much thereof as

          is appropriate) be admitted  into evidence in order to  place the

          excerpt in context.

                    It is readily evident that, as the appellants maintain,

          Rule 106  can serve its  proper function only if  the trial court

          from time  to time is prepared to permit the introduction of some

          otherwise inadmissible  evidence.   See United States  v. Sutton,
                                              ___ _____________     ______

          801  F.2d 1346,  1368  (D.C. Cir.  1986).   Be  that  as it  may,

          completeness,  like beauty,  is  frequently  in  the eye  of  the

          beholder.   The trial court is in the best position to assess the

          competing centrifugal  and centripetal  forces that bear  on this

          calculus.   Thus, when the trial court, acting in its discretion,

          finds  that proffered excerpts,  standing on  their own,  are not

          misleading,  its judgment  is  entitled to  great  respect.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Boylan,  898 F.2d 230, 256-57 (1st  Cir.), cert.
          _____________    ______                                     _____

          denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990).  So it is here.
          ______

                    Houlihan and Nardone  dwell on incompleteness primarily

          because Judge  Young declared two sets  of comments inadmissible.

          (1) Sargent told the police, inter alia, that James Boyden IV was
                                       _____ ____

          selling drugs  in Lynch's  territory; that Fitzgerald  warned him

          and had  him beaten,  but  to no  avail; and  that  he then  told

          Sargent  that  he  would  "just  have  to kill"  the  interloper.
                              
          ____________________

                    introduce any other part . . . which ought in
                    fairness  to be  considered contemporaneously
                    with it.

          Fed. R. Evid. 106.

                                          21

          Claiming that Fitzgerald's remarks to Sargent provided Fitzgerald

          with a  different motive  to murder  Sargent, Houlihan  sought to

          have  this part  of Sargent's  statement admitted  into evidence.

          Houlihan   claims  that   omitting  references   to  Fitzgerald's

          involvement in the  murder made  it appear that  he, rather  than

          Fitzgerald, was the mastermind  responsible for that crime.   (2)

          In a similar  vein, Nardone  claims that the  court's refusal  to

          permit  him to introduce  references in the  interviews to Herd's

          putative involvement in the Boydens' killings made it appear that

          Nardone carried out those murders single-handed.

                    The  court found that  these incremental  excerpts were

          "segregable"  from  the  portions  of  the  interviews  that  the

          government had  proffered and denied the  appellants' requests to

          admit  them.  Houlihan,  887 F. Supp.  at 366.   In assessing the
                        ________

          court's  rulings,  three  facts are  worthy  of  note:   (1)  the

          interview segments  admitted into evidence contained  no explicit

          reference whatever to the  Boydens' murders; (2) neither Houlihan

          nor Nardone were charged with the slaying of James Boyden IV; and

          (3)  Sargent  never mentioned  Nardone  by name  anywhere  in the

          course of either  debriefing.   Bearing these facts  in mind,  we

          conclude  that  the lower  court acted  within  the realm  of its

          discretion in refusing to invoke Rule 106.

                    Houlihan and  Nardone also claim that  the court should

          have admitted  other portions of Sargent's  interviews to impeach

          his  credibility.   See  Fed. R.  Evid.  806 (providing  that the
                              ___

          credibility of  a hearsay declarant "may be attacked . . . by any

                                          22

          evidence which would  be admissible for  those purposes if  [the]

          declarant  had testified  as  a witness").    The district  court

          rejected this claim because it found the additional excerpts "too

          convoluted, collateral, or cumulative to be admitted."  Houlihan,
                                                                  ________

          887 F.  Supp. at 368.   Having reviewed the items,  we discern no

          error in their exclusion.

                    Trial  courts  have  considerable  leeway  in  imposing

          outside limits on  cross-examination.  See Van Arsdall,  475 U.S.
                                                 ___ ___________

          at  679;  Laboy-Delgado,  84  F.3d  at  28.    Here,  the  record
                    _____________

          demonstrates that the appellants had a full and fair  opportunity

          during  their cross-examination of  the officers  who interviewed

          Sargent to cast doubts upon his  veracity.  They made the most of

          this opportunity.10   By  contrast, the  extra material that  the

          appellants wished to introduce  lacked genuine impeachment  value

          and  promised to  add  virtually nothing  of  consequence to  the

          grueling cross-examination.   Thus, we cannot  fault the district

          court for excluding this exiguous material.  See Van Arsdall, 475
                                                       ___ ___________

          U.S. at 679 (stating  that cross-examination appropriately may be

          limited if redundant or marginally relevant); Boylan, 898 F.2d at
                                                        ______

          255-56 (similar).

                    To  say  more would  be  supererogatory.   Because  our

          painstaking  review of the record  reveals no solid grounding for
                              
          ____________________

               10For  example, during cross-examination of Detective Harris
          (who  taped and  testified  about the  May  1992 interview),  the
          appellants  showed that  Sargent had  a lengthy  criminal record;
          that he gave up his  confreres while facing the possibility of  a
          fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for drug trafficking; and
          that  he had  been  promised low  bail,  among other  things,  in
          exchange for cooperation.

                                          23

          the  claim  that  the district  court  flouted  Rule  106 in  any

          respect, we refuse to meddle.

                              E.  Prejudicial Spillover.
                              E.  Prejudicial Spillover.
                                  _____________________

                    There is one  last leg  to this phase  of our  journey.

          Fitzgerald  alleges that  the  admission of  Sargent's statements

          resulted in unfair prejudice to him.  The record reveals none.

                    Because the  prosecution must  show the existence  of a

          conspiracy to prove a conspiracy charge, evidence implicating one

          coconspirator is  likely to be  directly relevant to  the charges

          against  his codefendants.   See United  States v.  O'Bryant, 998
                                       ___ ______________     ________

          F.2d  21,  26 (1st  Cir. 1993).   Even  if  it is  not, mistrials

          grounded  on  spillover  prejudice are  rare.    As  long as  the

          district court limits the admission of the challenged evidence to

          a particular defendant or defendants, the other defendants cannot

          rewardingly complain  unless the  impact of  the  evidence is  so

          devastating  that, realistically,  instructions  from  the  bench

          cannot be expected to repair the damage.  See  Sepulveda, 15 F.3d
                                                    ___  _________

          at 1184.

                    Silhouetted against  this set of  rules, the flimsiness

          of  Fitzgerald's claim come into  bold relief.   What excites the

          emotions in one  case may  be routine evidence  in another  case.

          The material  distilled from  Sargent's statements    which would

          have stood out like a  sore thumb in a prosecution rooted  in the

          relative  gentility  of  white-collar   crime     does  not  seem

          especially  sensational when  evaluated  in light  of the  other,

          plainly admissible evidence that permeated this seventy-day  saga

                                          24

          of nonstop violence.  Moreover, the district court instructed the

          jurors  on  the spot  that they  were  not to  consider Sargent's

          statements  in deciding  Fitzgerald's fate.   To  complement that

          directive, the  court redacted all references  to Fitzgerald from

          the  portions of  those statements  that the  jury heard,  and it

          repeated  its  prophylactic  instruction  on  several  occasions.

          Under these circumstances, the presumption that jurors follow the

          court's  instructions is  intact.   Ergo, Fitzgerald  suffered no

          unfair prejudice.

          III.  ALTERNATE JURORS
          III.  ALTERNATE JURORS

                    The  appellants calumnize  the district  court because,

          despite their repeated objections, the court refused to discharge

          the  alternate jurors once deliberations commenced and compounded

          its   obduracy  by   allowing  the   alternate  jurors   to  have

          intermittent contact with the  regular jurors during the currency

          of jury deliberations.  This argument requires us to address, for

          the first time, the interplay between violations of Fed. R. Crim.

          P. 24(c) and the applicable test for harmless error.

                    The imperative of Rule  24(c) is clear and categorical:

          "An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be

          discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict."  Fed.

          R. Crim. P. 24(c).   The rule reflects the abiding  concern that,

          once a criminal case has been submitted, the jury's deliberations

          shall  remain private  and  inviolate.11   See  United States  v.
                                                     ___  _____________
                              
          ____________________

               11Notwithstanding  that  Criminal  Rule  23(b)  permits  the
          remaining  eleven  jurors   to  return  a  valid  verdict   if  a
          deliberating juror is excused for cause, the wisdom of Rule 24(c)

                                          25

          Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964).
          _______________________

                    Here, the  appellants' claim of error  is well founded.

          Rule  24(c)   brooks  no  exceptions,  and   the  district  court

          transgressed  its  letter  by  retaining  the   alternate  jurors

          throughout  the deliberative  period.   The  lingering  question,

          however, is  whether the infraction requires us to invalidate the

          convictions.  The appellants say that it does.  In  their view, a

          violation of  Rule 24(c)  automatically necessitates a  new trial

          where, as  here, the defendants  preserved their claim  of error,

          or, at least, the continued contact between regular and alternate

          jurors that transpired  in this  case demands that  result.   The

          government  endeavors to  parry  this thrust  by classifying  the

          error as benign.  We find that the Rule 24(c) violation caused no

          cognizable harm, and we deny relief on that basis.

                    The watershed  case in this recondite corner of the law

          is United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).   There the trial
             _____________    _____

          court  permitted  alternate jurors,  while under  instructions to

          refrain from engaging personally  in the deliberative process, to

          remain  in  the   jury  room  and   audit  the  regular   jurors'

          deliberations.  See id. at 727-29.  The jury found the defendants
                          ___ ___

          guilty.   The court of appeals, terming the presence of alternate

          jurors  in   the  jury  room  during   deliberations  "inherently

          prejudicial,"  granted  them new  trials  although  they had  not

                              
          ____________________

          remains  debatable.    We   can  understand  a  district  judge's
          reluctance, following  a long,  complicated, and  hotly contested
          trial,  to release alternate jurors before a verdict is obtained.
          But courts, above all other institutions, must obey the rules.

                                          26

          lodged contemporaneous  objections.  United States  v. Olano, 934
                                               _____________     _____

          F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1991).  The Supreme Court demurred.  It

          noted  that  unless  an  unpreserved  error  affects  defendants'

          "substantial rights," Fed.  R. Crim. P.  52(b), the error  cannot

          serve as a fulcrum  for overturning their convictions.   507 U.S.

          at  737.   The  Court then  declared that  the mere  "presence of

          alternate jurors during  jury deliberations  is not  the kind  of

          error  that `affect[s]  substantial  rights'  independent of  its

          prejudicial  impact."   Id.   Instead,  the  critical inquiry  is
                                  ___

          whether  the presence of the  alternates in the  jury room during

          deliberations actually  prejudiced the defendants.   See   id. at
                                                               ___   ___

          739.

                    The  Justices conceded  that, as a  theoretical matter,

          the presence of any outsider,  including an alternate juror,  may

          cause  prejudice if  he  or  she  actually  participates  in  the

          deliberations either "verbally" or through "body language," or if

          his   or  her  attendance  were  somehow  to  chill  the  jurors'

          deliberations.    Id.   The  Court  recognized, however,  that  a
                            ___

          judge's cautionary  instructions to alternates  (e.g., to refrain

          from injecting themselves into  the deliberations) can operate to

          lessen or eliminate  these risks.  See id. at 740 (remarking "the
                                             ___ ___

          almost invariable assumption  of the law that jurors follow their

          instructions") (quoting  Richardson v.  Marsh, 481 U.S.  200, 206
                                   __________     _____

          (1987)).  Thus, absent  a "specific showing" that the  alternates

          in fact participated in, or otherwise chilled, deliberations, the

          trial  court's instructions to the alternates not to intervene in

                                          27

          the jury's deliberations precluded a finding of plain error.  Id.
                                                                        ___

          at 741.

                    This  case presents  a  variation on  the Olano  theme.
                                                              _____

          Here, unlike in Olano, the appellants  contemporaneously objected
                          _____

          to the district court's retention  of the alternate jurors,  thus

          relegating  plain  error  analysis  to  the  scrap  heap.    This

          circumstance denotes two things.   First, here, unlike  in Olano,
                                                                     _____

          the  government,   not  the  defendants,  bears   the  devoir  of

          persuasion with  regard to  the existence  vel non  of prejudice.
                                                     ___ ___

          Second,  we must today answer the precise question that the Olano
                                                                      _____

          Court  reserved for  later  decision.    See  id.    Withal,  the
                                                   ___  ___

          framework  of the inquiry in all other respects remains the same.

          See id. at  734 (noting  that, apart from  the allocation of  the
          ___ ___

          burden of  proof, a claim of  error under Fed. R.  Crim. P. 52(b)

          ordinarily  requires  the   same  type  of  prejudice-determining

          inquiry  as does  a preserved  error).   We do  not discount  the

          significance of this  solitary difference, see, e.g., id.  at 742
                                                     ___  ____  ___

          (Kennedy, J., concurring) (commenting  that it is "most difficult

          for  the Government  to  show  the  absence of  prejudice"),  but

          "difficult" does not mean "impossible."  Since Olano teaches that
                                                         _____

          a violation of Rule 24(c) is  not reversible error per se,12  see
                                                                        ___

          id.  at 737, we must  undertake a particularized inquiry directed
          ___

          at  whether the instant  violation, in the  circumstances of this

          case,  "prejudiced  [the   defendants],  either  specifically  or
                              
          ____________________

               12On   this  score,   Olano   confirmed   what  this   court
                                     _____
          anticipated.  See United  States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d  75, 80-81
                        ___ ______________    ________
          (1st Cir. 1982) (dictum).

                                          28

          presumptively."  Id. at 739.
                           ___

                    Our task, then, is to decide if the government has made

          a sufficiently convincing case  that the district court's failure

          to  observe  the  punctilio of  Rule  24(c)  did  not affect  the

          verdicts.  See, e.g., id. at 734; Kotteakos v. United States, 328
                     ___  ____  ___         _________    _____________

          U.S. 750,  758-65 (1946).   In performing this task,  we find the

          Court's  reasoning in Olano instructive.  Cf. Lee v. Marshall, 42
                                _____               ___ ___    ________

          F.3d  1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding Olano Court's reasoning
                                                    _____

          transferable to  harmless error  analysis in  habeas case).   The

          risks  that  were  run  here  by  retaining  the  alternates were

          identical  to  the risks  that  were run  at the  trial  level in

          Olano,13  and  the  district   judge's  ability  to  minimize  or
          _____

          eliminate those risks was the same in both situations.

                    The  operative  facts are  as  follows.   Although  the

          district  court  retained  the  alternates,  subsequent  physical

          contact  between  them  and  the  regular  jurors  occurred  only

          sporadically   confined mostly to the beginning of each day (when

          all  the jurors  assembled  prior to  the  commencement of  daily

          deliberations) and lunch time  (when court security officers were

          invariably  present).14   Judge  Young  at  no time  allowed  the
                              
          ____________________

               13In  one respect, treating this case as comparable to Olano
                                                                      _____
          tilts matters in  the appellants' favor.  There, the undischarged
          alternates actually stayed in the jury room during deliberations.
          507 U.S.  at 729-30.   Here, they  did not;  indeed, the  regular
          jurors  and the  undischarged alternates  were never  in physical
          proximity while the deliberative process was ongoing.

               14On one occasion  when the  regular jurors were  on a  mid-
          morning break, an alternate juror retrieved a plate of delicacies
          from  the jury room.   Defense counsel brought  this interlude to
          Judge  Young's attention,  and  the judge  immediately agreed  to

                                          29

          alternates to come within earshot of the deliberating jurors.

                    Equally as  important, the  court did not  leave either

          set  of venirepersons  uninstructed.   At  the  beginning of  his

          charge, Judge  Young  told  the alternates  not  to  discuss  the

          substance of the case either among themselves or with the regular

          jurors.   He then directed the  regular jurors not to discuss the

          case with the alternates.  Near the end of the  charge, the judge

          admonished  all the talesmen that "if [the regular jurors are] in

          the  presence  of the  alternates or  the  alternates are  in the

          presence of  the jurors,  [there is to  be] no talking  about the

          case,  no  deliberating about  the  case."   The  regular  jurors

          retired  to  the  jury  room  for  their  deliberations, and  the

          undischarged  alternates retired  to an  anteroom in  the judge's

          chambers  (which  remained  their  base  of  operations  for  the

          duration of the deliberations).

                              
          ____________________

          instruct  the  alternates to  stay out  of  the jury  room during
          breaks (except  for retrieving  snacks from  the  jury room  when
          court security  officers confirmed that a  break in deliberations
          had occurred).
                 On another  occasion defense counsel voiced suspicion that
          a  note from  the jury  to the  judge (requesting  transcripts of
          several witnesses' testimony) had been written in the presence of
          the  alternates.  At counsels' urging, Judge Young, in the course
          of responding to the note in open court, asked each juror whether
          "the alternates and the deliberating jurors, or vice versa, [had]
          discussed the  substance of the  case" during the  pertinent time
          frame.  All the jurors responded in the negative, and Judge Young
          reinstructed  the regular jurors not to discuss the case with, or
          deliberate  in  the  presence  of,  the  alternate  jurors.   The
          defendants took no exception either to the form of the inquiry or
          to the instructions that the court gave.

                                          30

                    The deliberations lasted eleven  days.15  Each morning,

          Judge Young asked the regular jurors and the alternate jurors, on

          penalty of perjury, whether  they had spoken about the  case with

          anyone  since the previous day's  adjournment.  On each occasion,

          all the jurors (regular and alternate) responded in the negative.

          The  judge reiterated  his instructions  to both the  regular and

          alternate  jurors  at  the close  of  every  court  session.   In

          addition,  he  routinely  warned   the  venire  that,  when  they

          assembled the next morning  before deliberations resumed, "no one

          is to talk about the case."

                    On this record, we believe that the regular jurors were

          well  insulated  from the  risks posed  by  the retention  of the

          alternates.   The judge repeatedly instructed the jurors   in far

          greater  detail  than  in  Olano    and  those  instructions were
                                     _____

          delicately   phrased  and   admirably   specific.     Appropriate

          prophylactic instructions are a means of preventing the potential

          harm  that hovers when a  trial court fails  to dismiss alternate

          jurors on schedule.  See Olano, 507 U.S. at 740-41; United States
                               ___ _____                      _____________

          v.  Sobamowo, 892  F.2d 90,  97 (D.C.  Cir. 1989)  (Ginsburg, J.)
              ________

          (attaching   great  importance  to   trial  court's  prophylactic

          instructions  in holding  failure to  discharge  alternate jurors

          harmless); cf. United States v. Ottersburg, 73 F.3d 137, 139 (7th
                     ___ _____________    __________

          Cir. 1996)  (setting aside verdict and  emphasizing trial court's
                              
          ____________________

               15On the  third day a regular juror had to be excused.  With
          counsels' consent, Judge  Young replaced the  lost juror with  an
          alternate and instructed the  jurors to begin deliberations anew.
          On  appeal,   neither  side   contests  the  propriety   of  this
          substitution.

                                          31

          failure to provide such instructions).  Courts must presume "that

          jurors, conscious  of the gravity  of their task,  attend closely

          the particular  language of the  trial court's instructions  in a

          criminal case,"  Francis  v.  Franklin, 471  U.S.  307,  324  n.9
                           _______      ________

          (1985), and that they follow those instructions.

                    Here, we  have more than the usual presumption that the

          jury understood the  instructions and followed  them.  The  court

          interrogated the  entire panel   regular  jurors and undischarged

          alternates   on a daily basis, and received an unbroken string of

          assurances  that the  regular  jurors  had  not spoken  with  the

          alternates concerning the substance of  the case, and vice versa.

          Just  as it is  fitting for appellate  courts to presume,  in the

          absence  of a  contrary indication,  that jurors  follow  a trial

          judge's instructions, so, too, it is fitting for appellate courts

          to  presume, in the absence of a contrary indication, that jurors

          answer a trial judge's questions honestly.

                    One  last observation is  telling.  Over  and above the

          plenitude  of instructions, there  is another  salient difference

          between this case and Ottersburg (the only reported criminal case
                                __________

          in which a federal  appellate court invalidated a verdict  due to

          the trial court's failure to discharge alternate jurors).   Here,

          unlike  in  Ottersburg, 76  F.3d  at 139,  the judge  at  no time
                      __________

          permitted the alternates  to sit in on, or  listen to, the jury's

          deliberations (even  as mute  observers).  Hence,  the alternates

          had  no  opportunity to  participate  in  the deliberations,  and

          nothing  in the  record  plausibly suggests  that they  otherwise

                                          32

          influenced  the jury's actions.   If the mere  presence of silent

          alternates in  the jury room during  ongoing deliberations cannot
                     _______________________________________________

          in  and of  itself  be deemed  to  chill discourse  or  establish

          prejudice,  see Olano,  507 U.S.  at 740-41,  it  is surpassingly
                      ___ _____

          difficult to imagine how absent (though undischarged) alternates,

          properly   instructed,  could   have  a   toxic  effect   on  the

          deliberative process.16

                    We will  not paint  the lily.   Given  the lack  of any

          contact  between  regular  and alternate  jurors  during  ongoing

          deliberations,  the  trial   judge's  careful  and   oft-repeated

          instructions,   the  venire's  unanimous   disclaimers  that  any

          discussions about the case took place between the  two subgroups,

          the overall  strength of the prosecution's  evidence on virtually

          all  the counts of  conviction, and the  discriminating nature of

          the  verdicts that  were returned  (e.g., the jury  acquitted the

          appellants  on  sundry  counts  and  also  acquitted  the  fourth

          defendant, Herd,  outright), we conclude that  the government has

          carried its burden of demonstrating that the outcome of the trial

          would  have  been  precisely  the  same  had  the  district court

          dismissed the  alternate jurors  when the  jury first  retired to

          deliberate.   It follows that because  the appellants suffered no
                              
          ____________________

               16In Cabral v.  Sullivan, 961  F.2d 998 (1st  Cir. 1992),  a
                    ______     ________
          case  that  antedated  Olano,  we considered  a  civil  analog to
                                 _____
          Criminal  Rule 24(c) and stated that "[w]hen a trial court allows
          an . . .  alternate juror[] to deliberate with the regular jurors
          .  .  . an  inherently prejudicial  error  is committed,  and the
          substantial  rights of the parties  are violated."   Id. at 1002.
                                                               ___
          In the instant case, unlike in Cabral, there is neither proof nor
                                         ______
          reason to  suspect that the  undischarged alternates participated
          in the regular jurors' deliberations.

                                          33

          prejudice  in  consequence of  the  court's bevue,  they  are not

          entitled to return to square one.

          IV.  DISCOVERY DISPUTES
          IV.  DISCOVERY DISPUTES

                    The   appellants   stridently  protest   a   series  of

          government actions  involving document discovery.   We first deal

          with a  claim that implicates  the scope  of the  Jencks Act,  18

          U.S.C.       3500,  and   then   treat   the  appellants'   other

          asseverations.

                             A.  Scope of the Jencks Act.
                             A.  Scope of the Jencks Act.
                                 _______________________

                    The   Jencks  Act  provides  criminal  defendants,  for

          purposes  of cross-examination,  with a  limited right  to obtain

          certain  witness   statements  that  are   in  the   government's

          possession.   That right is subject to  a temporal condition:  it

          does   not  vest  until  the  witness  takes  the  stand  in  the

          government's case  and completes  his direct  testimony.   Id.   
                                                                     ___

          3500(a).    It  is  also subject  to  categorical,  content-based

          restrictions delineated in  the statute: a statement is  not open

          to production under the Jencks  Act unless it (i) relates  to the

          same subject  matter as  the  witness's direct  testimony, id.   
                                                                     ___

          3500(b), and  (ii) either comprises  grand jury testimony,  id.  
                                                                      ___

          3500(e)(3),  or  falls  within  one  of  two  general classes  of

          statements, namely,

                    (1) a written statement made by [the] witness
                    and signed or  otherwise adopted or  approved
                    by him;
                    (2)  a stenographic,  mechanical, electrical,
                    or  other  recording,   or  a   transcription
                    thereof,  which  is a  substantially verbatim
                    recital  of an  oral  statement made  by said
                    witness  and recorded  contemporaneously with

                                          34

                    the making of such oral statement . . . .

          18 U.S.C.   3500(e)(1)-(2).

                    In  this  case,  the  government  agents  who  led  the

          investigation instructed  all but the most  senior prosecutors to

          refrain  from  taking  notes  during pretrial  interviews.    The

          appellants decried this practice in the district court, but Judge

          Young  found  that  even  the  deliberate  use  of  investigatory

          techniques designed to minimize the production of written reports

          would  not violate  the Jencks  Act.   Before us,  the appellants

          renew their challenge.  We, too, think that it lacks force.

                    The  Jencks  Act  does  not  impose  an  obligation  on

          government  agents to record witness interviews  or to take notes

          during  such  interviews.   After all,  the  Act applies  only to

          recordings,  written statements,  and  notes  that  meet  certain

          criteria, not to items that never came into being (whether or not

          a  prudent investigator     cynics might  say an  unsophisticated

          investigator    would  have  arranged things  differently).   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v.  Lieberman, 608  F.2d 889, 897  (1st Cir.  1979)
          _____________     _________

          (rejecting  a claim  that the  government has  "a duty  to create

          Jencks Act  material by recording everything  a potential witness

          says"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980); accord  United States
                  _____ ______                        ______  _____________

          v. Bernard, 625 F.2d  854, 859 (9th Cir. 1980); United  States v.
             _______                                      ______________

          Head,  586 F.2d  508, 511-12  (5th Cir.  1978); United  States v.
          ____                                            ______________

          Fielbogen, 494 F. Supp. 806, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d
          _________                                         _____

          265 (2d Cir. 1981) (table).  It has been suggested  that if there

          were evidence  that lawmen  "engaged in manipulative  or coercive

                                          35

          conduct"  during  the course  of  an audience  with  a particular

          witness, the failure to  record that event might  give rise to  a

          Jencks Act violation.  Lieberman, 608 F.2d at  897 (dictum).  But
                                 _________

          this dictum, even if it might be of  some moment in a proper case

          (a  matter  on which  we take  no view)  is  cold comfort  to the

          appellants.   There is no  proof of such a  scenario here,17 and,

          without  such  proof,  government interviews  with  witnesses are

          "presumed to have been conducted with regularity."  Id.
                                                              ___

                    In the absence of a  contrary legislative command   and

          none currently exists    the choice among available investigatory

          techniques is,  within wide limits,  for the Executive  Branch in

          contradistinction  to   the  Judicial  Branch.     The   practice

          challenged here is  not beyond  the pale.   Accordingly, we  hold

          that the government did not violate the Jencks Act by instructing

          agents to minimize note-taking.18

                    Still,  we do  not mean  to imply  that we  endorse the

          practice.  Eschewing tape recordings and ordering law enforcement

          agents  not to  take notes  during pretrial  interviews is  risky

                              
          ____________________

               17The appellants  claim that instructing agents  not to take
          notes  constitutes  a  deliberate  strategy   to  manipulate  the
          quantity of discoverable material.   But, this is simply  not the
          sort of manipulation to which the panel referred in Lieberman.
                                                              _________

               18In  a related  vein,  we likewise  reject the  appellants'
          assertion that the government violated the Jencks Act by parading
          law  enforcement officers rather than percipient witnesses before
          the  grand jury.  "Hearsay evidence is  a sufficient basis for an
          indictment," and  the mere  fact that  the government  chooses to
          rely  on hearsay evidence in  presenting its case  before a grand
          jury raises "no hint of government misconduct."  United States v.
                                                           _____________
          Font-Ramirez,  944 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
          ____________                                    _____ ______
          U.S. 1065 (1992).

                                          36

          business      and  not  guaranteed  to  redound   either  to  the

          sovereign's credit or  to its  benefit.  By  adopting a "what  we

          don't  create can't come back to  haunt us" approach, prosecutors

          demean  their primary mission:  to see  that justice is done.  In

          more parochial terms, the government also loses  the advantage of

          records  that  it  may  subsequently need  to  safeguard  against

          witnesses  changing  their  stories or  to  refresh recollections

          dimmed by  the passage  of time.   By  and large,  the legitimate

          interests  of law  enforcement  will be  better  served by  using

          recording equipment and/or taking  accurate notes than by playing

          hide-and-seek.

                               B.  Delayed Disclosures.
                               B.  Delayed Disclosures.
                                   ___________________

                    The appellants also  complain that delays  attributable

          to governmental  foot-dragging unfairly hampered their ability to

          cross-examine witnesses.   The  centerpiece of this  complaint is

          the appellants' insistence that, in addition to going very slowly

          in  creating potentially discoverable  materials, the prosecutors

          withheld extant materials, such  as existing notes, under various

          pretexts, claiming that the notes comprised attorney work-product

          and that they did not  contain substantially verbatim recitals of

          witnesses' statements.

                    The appellants' complaint is unproductive.  Acting with

          commendable  thoroughness, the  district court  reviewed all  the

          prosecutors' notes  and kindred materials in  camera to determine

          which documents (or portions  of documents) were producible under

          the  Jencks Act.    The government  turned  over what  the  court

                                          37

          ordered  it  to produce  at the  time(s)  when the  court ordered

          production to be made.

                    In all events, we have held with a regularity bordering

          on the  echolalic that "delayed disclosure  claims cannot succeed

          unless the  aggrieved  defendant demonstrates  prejudice  arising

          from the delay."  Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1179  (citing cases); see
                            _________                                   ___

          also  United  States v.  Saccoccia, 58  F.3d  754, 781  (1st Cir.
          ____  ______________     _________

          1995), cert.  denied, 116 S. Ct.  1322 (1996).  In  this context,
                 _____  ______

          demonstrating prejudice demands  red meat and strong  drink   but

          the  appellants have  served  up much  less  hearty fare.    They

          articulate  how the delayed  disclosures supposedly impeded their

          ability to  cross-question witnesses largely by  reference to two

          examples.  Neither example is compelling.

                    First, the appellants suggest  that they were  unfairly

          surprised  because,  after  Nardone's henchman,  Michael  Nelson,

          testified  at  trial that  Fitzgerald alone  had given  Nardone a

          contract on the life of James Boyden III, they obtained the grand

          jury  testimony  of  a  subsequent  witness  (a  law  enforcement

          officer) which  indicated that Nardone, in  chatting with Nelson,

          implicated both  Houlihan and  Fitzgerald in ordering  the hit.19
                     ____

          The appellants claim that the inconsistency between the officer's

          grand jury testimony,  on one hand, and Nelson's trial testimony,
                              
          ____________________

               19When this inconsistency surfaced, the government contended
          that  the grand jury witness  simply made a  mistake, and pointed
          out that, according  to the prosecutors' notes,  Nelson stated in
          his  pretrial interview  that Fitzgerald alone issued  the order.
          At  this juncture the court directed  the prosecutors to disclose
          the  summary prepared by a government attorney for the use of the
          officer who appeared before the grand jury.

                                          38

          on  the other hand, could have been exploited to discredit Nelson

          on  cross-examination.   We  are skeptical;  given that  Nelson's

          statements during his pretrial interview, see supra note  19, and
                                                    ___ _____

          at  trial were consistent, this tidbit would have been of dubious

          value for impeachment purposes.  Moreover, while Nelson was still
                                                     ______________________

          on the  witness stand,  the appellants  had  possession of  other
          _____________________

          documents  that  revealed  the  same inconsistency.    For  these

          reasons,  we are fully satisfied that any delay in the disclosure

          of the  law enforcement  officer's grand  jury testimony  did not

          affect the  outcome of  the  trial.   Consequently, the  incident

          fails to prove the  appellants' point.  See, e.g.,  United States
                                                  ___  ____   _____________

          v. Devin, 918 F.2d  280, 290-91 (1st Cir. 1990)  (explaining that
             _____

          delayed disclosure  of  impeachment  material  does  not  warrant

          reversal if the material would not have altered the verdict).

                    The second vignette concerns a prosecutor's note to the

          effect that Nardone told  Nelson that there were two  reasons why
                                                           ___

          Sargent  had to  be killed:   first,  because Houlihan  felt that

          Sargent  "was a risk" and "could hurt [Houlihan] by talking"; and

          second,  "as a showing of  respect to the  Murrays" (a bookmaking

          group  to whom  Sargent  was heavily  indebted).   Regarding  the

          second  reason,  Nelson  explained that  Fitzgerald  and Houlihan

          asked the Murrays  to post  $50,000 bail for  Bobby Levallee,  an

          organization  stalwart, in  exchange for  having Sargent  killed.

          Because  the government  did  not reveal  this  note until  after

          Nelson had completed his  testimony, the appellants' thesis runs,

          they were unable to cross-examine him efficaciously.

                                          39

                    This  proffer, too,  is wide  of the  mark.   Under any

          circumstances, the  note has  only marginal evidentiary  value in

          light  of the  extensive  proof confirming  Houlihan's desire  to

          silence  Sargent in order to keep him from telling the government

          what he  knew   a desire that the note itself acknowledges.  Even

          more  important,  the appellants  had  sufficient  notice of  the

          alternative "gambling  debts" motive well before  Nelson left the

          stand.    Nelson himself  testified  on  direct examination  that

          Fitzgerald and Houlihan wanted  Sargent killed for "two reasons":

          because they believed that the police had coopted him and because
                                                                ___

          they were concerned about "all [Sargent's] gambling debts."  And,

          moreover,  the record indicates that the  appellants had the rest

          of  the   prosecutors'  notes   (some  of  which   discussed  the

          alternative  motivation) in  hand  before  Nelson  completed  his
                                             ______

          testimony; indeed,  Houlihan's counsel  relied on those  notes to

          elicit  information on  cross-examination about  Sargent's gaming

          debts   and  his  connection   to  the  Murrays.     Under  these

          circumstances,   no  reversible  error   inhered.     See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at  781 (finding no prejudice from  delay when
          _________

          defense counsel  obtained information  in time to  prepare cross-

          examination); United  States v. Hodge-Balwing, 952  F.2d 607, 609
                        ______________    _____________

          (1st  Cir.  1991) (finding  no  prejudice from  late  delivery of

          documents  when the  prosecutor's opening  statement alerted  the

          defense to the same information).

                    If more were  needed   and  we doubt that  it is    the

          sockdolager is  the district court's volunteered  ruling that the

                                          40

          appellants  could recall  Nelson  during their  case for  further

          cross-examination on  the basis  of the information  disclosed in

          the note.   The appellants  chose to let  this opportunity  pass.

          The rule is clear that a defendant's failure to recall a witness,

          despite permission  to  do so,  undermines a  claim of  prejudice

          based  on  a  disclosure  that  materialized  after  the  witness

          finished testifying (but  before the  trial ended).   See  United
                                                                ___  ______

          States v. Arboleda,  929 F.2d  858, 864 (1st  Cir. 1991);  United
          ______    ________                                         ______

          States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1988).
          ______    ____

                                C.  Supervisory Power.
                                C.  Supervisory Power.
                                    _________________

                    In a  last-ditch effort  to right  a sinking  ship, the

          appellants embrace a dictum contained in United States v. Osorio,
                                                   _____________    ______

          929  F.2d 753, 763 (1st Cir. 1991) ("When confronted with extreme

          misconduct and prejudice as a result of  delayed disclosure, this

          court  will consider  invoking its  supervisory powers  to secure

          enforcement  of better  prosecutorial practice  and reprimand  of

          those  who fail to observe it.") (citation and internal quotation

          marks omitted).  Based on  this dictum, they ask that  we unleash

          our supervisory  power and vacate their convictions  as an object

          lesson to  the government.  In the  bargain, they suggest that we

          issue  a blanket  rule prohibiting  prosecutors  from instructing

          their  colleagues in  law enforcement  not to  take  notes during

          witness interviews.20

                              
          ____________________

               20Respecting, as we do,  the coordinate powers of  the other
          two  branches of government, we decline to issue any such blanket
          proscription.   See supra  Part IV(A) (discussing  particulars of
                          ___ _____
          appellants' underlying objection).

                                          41

                    Federal courts should  refrain from dismissing  charges

          or  overturning  convictions  merely   as  a  device  to  conform

          executive  conduct  to judicially  favored  norms.   Rather,  the

          courts'  supervisory power  should be  used in  this way  only if

          plain   prosecutorial  misconduct  is   coupled  with  cognizable

          prejudice  to  a  particular defendant.    See  United  States v.
                                                     ___  ______________

          Santana,  6 F.3d  1,  10-11 (1st  Cir.  1993); United  States  v.
          _______                                        ______________

          Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 310 (1st Cir. 1989); see also United
          _____________                                     ___ ____ ______

          States  v. Hasting, 461 U.S.  499, 507 (1983)  (holding that when
          ______     _______

          prosecutorial misconduct constitutes no more than harmless error,

          no relief is warranted under supervisory power).

                    Here, both prerequisites  for judicial intervention are

          wanting.   First  and foremost,  the tactics  complained of    if

          improper at  all    fall  far  short of  a showing  of  egregious

          misconduct  that might  impel  a federal  court  to consider  the

          drastic  step  of vacating  a  conviction as  a  sanction against

          overzealous prosecutors.  Second, the delayed disclosures did not

          harm the  defendants' substantial rights.   See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________

          Walsh, 75  F.3d 1,  8  (1st Cir.  1996) (demonstrating  prejudice
          _____

          requires more than mere "assertions that the defendant would have

          conducted cross-examination differently").

                    That ends the  matter.  The supervisory power is strong

          medicine  and, as we have  said, "[p]otent elixirs  should not be

          casually dispensed."  Santana, 6 F.3d  at 10.  There is no reason
                                _______

          to write such a prescription in the circumstances of this case.

          V.  MISCELLANEOUS
          V.  MISCELLANEOUS

                                          42

                    The appellants, represented by  able counsel, marshal a

          plethora of other arguments.  We address some of these arguments,

          explaining briefly why we accept or reject them.  The points that

          we  do not mention are insubstantial and may be dismissed without

          elaboration.

                                 A.  Murder for Hire.
                                 A.  Murder for Hire.
                                     _______________

                    Fitzgerald  and  Houlihan,  in  chorus,  challenge  the

          sufficiency  of  the  evidence  supporting  their murder-for-hire

          convictions arising out of the annihilations of Boyden III (count

          15)  and Sargent (count 16),  and the attempts  on Sweeney's life

          (count 17).  With  one exception, the sole ground on  which these

          challenges rest is the allegation that the prosecution fell short

          of establishing the requisite nexus between the use of interstate

          facilities  and  the  defendants'  biocidal  activities.21    The

          challenge fails.

                    The  controlling legal  standard is  prosaic.   "When a

          criminal defendant undertakes  a sufficiency  challenge, all  the

          evidence,  direct and  circumstantial,  must be  viewed from  the

          government's  coign of  vantage, and the  viewer must  accept all

          reasonable  inferences  from  it  that are  consistent  with  the

          verdict."   United States  v. Valle, 72  F.3d 210, 216  (1st Cir.
                      _____________     _____

          1995).  Though each element of the  offense must be proven beyond

          a reasonable doubt, the government's burden "may  be satisfied by

          either  direct  or circumstantial  evidence,  or  any combination
                              
          ____________________

               21The exception  relates to count  15, as to  which Houlihan
          offers a  wider-ranging sufficiency  challenge.  We  address that
          challenge separately.  See infra Part V(B).
                                 ___ _____

                                          43

          thereof."  United  States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d  462, 467 (1st Cir.
                     ______________    _______

          1994).   If a rational  jury, indulging all  credibility calls in

          favor of the  verdict, could  find the defendant  guilty on  this

          basis,  then the inquiry terminates.  See United States v. David,
                                                ___ _____________    _____

          940 F.2d  722, 730 (1st Cir.  1991), cert. denied, 502  U.S. 1046
                                               _____ ______

          (1992).

                    Moving from  the general  to the specific,  the murder-

          for-hire statute makes it unlawful to use or cause another person

          to  use "any  facility in  interstate or  foreign commerce,  with

          intent that a  murder be committed . . . as consideration for . .

          . anything of pecuniary value."  18 U.S.C.   1958.  In this case,

          the prosecution  sought to convict  by proving, inter  alia, that
                                                          _____  ____

          the plotters  used telephone  calls as  a means of  accomplishing

          their ends.  The appellants  did not claim below, and do  not now

          claim,  that   telephone  lines   fall  outside  the   rubric  of

          "facilities in  interstate commerce."   We therefore  assume that

          point  in the government's favor, see United States v. Slade, 980
                                            ___ _____________    _____

          F.2d  27, 30 (1st Cir.  1992) ("It is a  bedrock rule that when a

          party  has not presented an  argument to the  district court, she

          may not unveil  it in the  court of appeals."); United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          Zannino, 895  F.2d 1, 17  (1st Cir.)  (noting "settled  appellate
          _______

          rule" that issues  not briefed and  properly developed on  appeal

          are  waived), cert. denied,  494 U.S.  1082 (1990),  and consider
                        _____ ______

          only the claim that they do  advance:  that the evidence fails to

          show  the use  of  telephones in  the  course of  committing  the

          charged crimes.

                                          44

                    In  interpreting  18  U.S.C.    1958,  it  is  entirely

          appropriate to look  to case  law construing the  Travel Act,  18

          U.S.C.   1952.   See United States v. Edelman,  873 F.2d 791, 794
                           ___ _____________    _______

          (5th Cir. 1989)  (explaining that Travel  Act jurisprudence is  a

          proper referent because "the  obvious purpose" of the murder-for-

          hire statute is "to supplement" the Travel Act); see also S. Rep.
                                                           ___ ____

          No.  225,  98th   Cong.,  1st  Sess.   306,  reprinted  in   1984
                                                       _________  __

          U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3485 (noting  that the murder-for-hire statute

          "follows the format"  of the Travel  Act).  In  United States  v.
                                                          _____________

          Arruda, 715  F.2d 671  (1st Cir.  1983), a  Travel  Act case,  we
          ______

          stated:  "There is no requirement that  the use of the interstate

          facilities be essential to the scheme:  it is enough that the . .

          . use of  interstate facilities makes  easier or facilitates  the

          unlawful  activity."    Id.  at 681-82  (citations  and  internal
                                  ___

          quotation marks omitted).   This is the commonly held  view, see,
                                                                       ___

          e.g.,  United States  v. Lozano,  839 F.2d  1020, 1022  (4th Cir.
          ____   _____________     ______

          1988); United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 203 (3d Cir.), cert.
                 _____________    _____                               _____

          denied, 479  U.S. 1017 (1986), and we confirm today that the non-
          ______

          essentiality  principle announced  in Arruda  is embodied  in the
                                                ______

          murder-for-hire statute.

                    The key, then, is whether the jury plausibly could have

          found that the appellants actually used a telephone to facilitate

          Sargent's and  Boyden  the elder's  deaths  and the  attempts  on

          Sweeney's life.   We  hasten to  add, however,  that there is  no

          requirement  that  each  accused  use a  facility  in  interstate

          commerce, or that each accused intend such a facility to be used,

                                          45

          or even that each accused know that such a facility probably will

          be used.  See Edelman, 874 F.2d at 795; see also United States v.
                    ___ _______                   ___ ____ _____________

          Heacock,  31  F.3d  249,  255  n.10  (5th  Cir.  1994)  (applying
          _______

          identical principle under Travel  Act); United States v. Sigalow,
                                                  _____________    _______

          812  F.2d  783,  785 (2d  Cir.  1987)  (same);  United States  v.
                                                          _____________

          McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321,  1361 (7th Cir.) (same), cert.  denied,
          _________                                          _____  ______

          444 U.S. 833 (1979).  Hence, if the government proves that one of

          the participants used the telephone or some comparable interstate

          facility  in  furtherance  of   the  scheme,  then  the  required

          facilitative nexus is established as to all participants.

                    In this case,  we think that the  jury rationally could

          find a facilitative nexus  between the use of telephones  and the

          criminal  activities underlying  the  counts of  conviction.   By

          March  of  1992,  Fitzgerald,  a parole  violator,  had  taken up

          involuntary  residence  in a  state  penitentiary.   The  record,

          together  with  reasonable   inferences  extractable   therefrom,

          permitted the jury  to find  that he made  daily telephone  calls

          from  prison  to  an  indicted coconspirator,  John  Doherty,  at

          Kerrigan's Flower Shop; and  that Doherty, acting as Fitzgerald's

          internuncio, supplied  Nardone with the weaponry  needed to mount

          the  attacks.   Telephone records  introduced into  evidence also

          indicate that Fitzgerald called  Nardone several times at Lynch's

          apartment in and around  the dates on  which the murders were  to

          occur.   Since the jury reasonably could regard the various calls

          as  an  important link  in the  communicative  chain that  led to

                                          46

          murder   and  attempted   murder,   the   appellants'   challenge

          founders.22

                         B.  The Murder of James Boyden III.
                         B.  The Murder of James Boyden III.
                             ______________________________

                    Houlihan  asserts  that  his  convictions  on  count  5

          (conspiring to murder James Boyden  III in aid of  racketeering),

          count 6 (abetting that  murder), and count 15 (hiring  another to

          perform that murder) cannot stand.   His major theme is  that the

          government failed to  link him  to the murder  in any  meaningful

          way.  We find merit in this proposition.

                    To convict Houlihan for conspiring to murder in aid  of

          racketeering,  see  18 U.S.C.     1959(a),  or for  abetting  the
                         ___

          murder,  see  id.,  the government  had  to  prove  that (1)  the
                   ___  ___

          organization  masterminded by Fitzgerald and Houlihan constituted

          a  racketeering enterprise;  (2)  that, depending  on the  count,

          Houlihan conspired to commit, or aided and abetted the commission

          of,  the  murder;  and  (3)  that Houlihan  participated  in  the

          arrangement "for  the purpose of maintaining  or increasing [his]

          position  in a [racketeering] enterprise."   Id.   By like token,
                                                       ___

          under the murder-for-hire statute the government had to prove (1)

          that  Houlihan joined  in  causing the  killing  of another,  (2)

                              
          ____________________

               22Although not  an element  of the  offense, it is  pellucid
          that  the jury  easily could  have believed  Fitzgerald's actions
          vis- -vis  Sargent and  Sweeney were  undertaken with  Houlihan's
          knowledge  and consent.    To  cite  just one  example,  Houlihan
          personally paid Nardone his  $5,000 "headache elimination" fee at
          Kerrigan's Flower Shop  on the day after  Nardone ended Sargent's
          life.  Further examples are unnecessary.  It suffices to say that
          extensive evidence pointed to  the conclusion that Fitzgerald and
          Houlihan   jointly  orchestrated   both  Sargent's   slaying  and
          Sweeney's travails.

                                          47

          paying a  price or  other  consideration, (3)  with the  specific

          intent to  commit the  substantive crime  (murder), and  (4) that

          interstate  facilities   were  used  by   one  or  more   of  the

          participants in the  course of  perpetrating the crime.   See  18
                                                                    ___

          U.S.C.   1958.

                    A  common thread runs through all three counts.  In one

          form  or another, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable

          doubt  that in the spring  of 1992 Houlihan  "conspired to murder

          James Boyden III" (count  5), and/or "aided, abetted, counselled,

          commanded  [or]  induced"  that  murder (count  6),  and/or  used

          "facilities  in  interstate   commerce  .  .  .   to  hire  other

          individuals and  to arrange the  intended murder of  James Boyden

          III" (count 15).   Under each of these counts, the government had

          to  show at a  bare minimum that Houlihan  intended the murder of

          James  Boyden III  to  take place  and  that he  acted  upon that

          intent.  See,  e.g., United  States v. Santiago,  872 F.2d  1073,
                   ___   ____  ______________    ________

          1079  (1st Cir.) (explaining  that proof of  a charged conspiracy

          requires, inter alia,  proof of intent to  commit the substantive
                    _____ ____

          offense),  cert.  denied, 492  U.S. 910  &  493 U.S.  832 (1989);
                     _____  ______

          United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating
          _____________    _____

          that an aider and abettor must "consciously share[]  the specific

          criminal   intent  of   the  principals");   18  U.S.C.      1958

          (specifically  requiring  proof  that the  defendant  acted  with

          "intent  that a murder be committed").   In other words, as Judge

          Young  instructed  the  jury, the  government  had  to show  that

          Houlihan "intentionally  arranged for the murder  of James Boyden

                                          48

          III  by Joseph Nardone," or  "aided and abetted  that crime," and

          that he had the "specific intent" of causing the murder.

                    We  have combed  the  record in  light  of this  highly

          specific subset  of charges  to determine whether  the government

          satisfied  its burden of  proving beyond a  reasonable doubt that

          Houlihan perpetrated  these three  interrelated crimes.   We have

          come  up empty.  In  our judgment there  is insufficient evidence

          that Houlihan,  whatever other atrocities he  may have committed,

          intended to bring  about the  execution of James  Boyden III,  or

          that he participated  in any  culpable way in  the commission  of

          that crime.

                    The evidence  depicts Fitzgerald  as the leader  of the

          organization  and  Houlihan   as  his  second-in-command.     The

          government's theory is that Nardone  killed Boyden III, and  that

          Fitzgerald and Houlihan jointly  directed him to do so.   But the

          government's star  witness, Nelson, testified that,  according to

          Nardone, Fitzgerald alone ordered the murder.23

                    This  seems reasonable  in view  of the  fact that  the

          murder grew out  of events surrounding  the assassination of  the

          victim's  son   (Boyden  IV).     The  younger   Boyden,  against

          Fitzgerald's explicit  warning, had continued to  sell cocaine in

          the "sales territory" assigned  to Jennierose Lynch (Fitzgerald's

          paramour).  After several violent encounters, Boyden IV turned up

                              
          ____________________

               23Indeed,  when it was pointed out that a grand jury witness
          had  testified  otherwise,  the  government  protested  that  the
          witness had made a  mistake.  See supra note 19.   The grand jury
                                        ___ _____
          testimony was not admitted at the trial.

                                          49

          dead.  The government  charged Fitzgerald, Lynch, and Herd    but

          not Houlihan   with that murder.  As recounted earlier, the judge

          granted Fitzgerald's motion for a mistrial on those  charges (and

          he presumably remains  subject to retrial); the judge ordered the

          charges against Lynch dropped as part of an overall plea bargain;

          and the jury acquitted Herd.

                    The record strongly suggests  that the son's murder set

          the stage for  the father's  murder, and that  the killings  were

          related.  The government makes no effort to implicate Houlihan in

          the former crime, and there is  only a tenuous set of  inferences

          linking him to the latter crime.

                    Virtually the  only intimation that  Houlihan may  have

          played  a role in the killing of  Boyden III comes from Sargent's

          tape-recorded  statement  during  which  the  following  colloquy

          transpired (references  in the colloquy to "Boyden, Sr." refer to

          James Boyden III):

                    SARGENT:   I was  having a couple  of drinks,
                    SARGENT:
                    and [Houlihan]  mentioned .  . . that    that
                    there's two . . . that's going to go.

                                    *     *     *

                    . . . John  Houlihan mentioned before that he
                    could have somebody kill anybody he wants.

                                    *     *     *

                    DET. HARRIS:  There was the homicide of James
                    DET. HARRIS:
                    Boyden, Sr.

                    SARGENT:  Right.
                    SARGENT:

                    DET. HARRIS:   Would  you tell us  about that
                    DET. HARRIS:
                    homicide?

                    SARGENT:   All I know is when I had talked to
                    SARGENT:

                                          50

                    John in  the bar, he had  mentioned there was
                    going to be two  . . . people dead,  and that
                    night   that same night that I talked to him,
                    that's when Boyden Sr. got killed . . .

                    DET. HARRIS:   How  many hours before  Boyden
                    DET. HARRIS:
                    Sr.  was  killed did  that  conversation with
                    [Houlihan] take place?

                    SARGENT:  I'd say about three hours.
                    SARGENT:

          Passing  obvious  questions   about  the   reliability  of   this

          uncorroborated hearsay statement, see supra note 7 & accompanying
                                            ___ _____

          text,  this  seems  too porous  a  foundation  on  which to  rest

          homicide charges.

                    Laying  out   the  inferential   chain  on  which   the

          government's theory  depends illustrates its weakness.   From the

          dialogue that we have quoted, the government suggests that a jury

          could plausibly infer that Houlihan was referring to the upcoming

          murder of James Boyden III in his "two .  . . that's going to go"

          comment; and that, from this  inference, the jury could plausibly

          infer  that Houlihan  intended  to bring  about  that murder  and

          participated in it in  some meaningful way.   This is simply  too

          great a stretch.   Houlihan did not mention  James Boyden III  in

          his  conversation with  Sargent, and  it is  not even  clear that

          Sargent  understood Houlihan  to be  referring to  any particular

          individuals.  Rather, the import of Sargent's comment seems to be

          that succeeding  events filled in  the blanks.   And  even if  we

          accept  the first  suggested  inference, the  record hardly  will

          support the further inference that Houlihan had a specific intent

          to murder James Boyden III, or that he abetted the ensuing crime.

          At  most, the  conversation suggests  an awareness  of  a planned

                                          51

          slaying, not necessarily participation in it.

                    The   government  tries  to   buttress  these  strained

          inferences  by  pointing  to  Sargent's parroting  of  Houlihan's

          statement  that  he  "could   have  somebody  kill  anybody"  and

          labelling this as evidence  that Houlihan directed the commission

          of  this particular murder.   But that argument  proves too much.

          On the  government's reasoning, Houlihan could  have been charged

          and  convicted of  any murder.   The  government also  points out
                             ___

          that, on  the day after the murder,  Nardone collected his fee at

          Kerrigan's Flower Shop.   Because this  bore some resemblance  to

          the  method  of  payment  that Houlihan  employed  after  Nardone

          murdered  Sargent, see supra note  22, the government  asks us to
                             ___ _____

          infer that Houlihan  also must  have arranged this  payment.   We

          think  for two reasons  that the suggested  inference is dubious.

          First, the  difference in payment methodology is significant:  on

          the  latter occasion  (Sargent's murder),  the government  proved

          that Houlihan personally paid  the fee to Nardone; on  the former

          occasion  (Boyden the elder's murder),  it did not.   Second, the

          record shows that Fitzgerald not only ordered the murder of James

          Boyden III but also, though imprisoned, remained in daily contact

          with Doherty, and that  Doherty (who was based at  Kerrigan's) or

          any of several other underlings could have arranged the payment.

                    Even   so,  given  the   working  relationship  between

          Houlihan  and Fitzgerald and their use of Nardone as a triggerman

          in connection with Sargent's murder and the attempts on Sweeney's

          life, the question of  evidentiary sufficiency is close.   In the

                                          52

          end, however, we do  not think that  the evidence measures up  to

          the requirement   which we apply de novo   that a reasonable jury

          be able  to find each  element of the  crime to have  been proven

          beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.    Given   Nelson's  uncontradicted

          testimony that only one individual   Fitzgerald    sanctioned the

          execution of James Boyden  III, and also given the  nexus between

          the Boydens' murders,  we believe  that the  chain of  inferences

          forged by the prosecution is too loose (albeit by the slimmest of

          margins) to hold Houlihan  criminally responsible for the charged

          crimes.

                                    C.  Severance.
                                    C.  Severance.
                                        _________

                    The  reader will  recall  that the  indictment  charged

          Herd, Lynch, and Fitzgerald   but not Houlihan and Nardone   with

          offenses related to the murder of James Boyden  IV.  Houlihan and

          Nardone contend that the  court had an obligation to  sever their

          trials from  the trial of  the counts  relating to the  Boyden IV

          murder.24  We disagree.

                    When   several  defendants  are   named  in  a  unified

          indictment,  there is  a strong presumption  that they  should be

          tried together.  See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.  534, 538-
                           ___ ______    _____________

          39 (1993); O'Bryant, 998 F.2d at 25.  To obtain a severance under
                     ________

          such   circumstances,  a   defendant  must   demonstrate  extreme

          prejudice, such as by showing a "serious risk that a joint  trial

                              
          ____________________

               24Ironically, none of the counts related to this murder bore
          fruit:  the jury found Herd not guilty; the court  relieved Lynch
          of  responsibility when she  pleaded guilty to  other counts; and
          the court granted Fitzgerald a mistrial.

                                          53

          would compromise  a specific trial right," or  would "prevent the

          jury from making  a reliable judgment about  guilt or innocence."

          Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.
          ______

                    Houlihan and Nardone cannot scale these heights.  Their

          central thesis  is that the government's  evidence concerning the

          Boyden IV murder tended  to show that the victim  was slaughtered

          in an  organization-related turf battle, and therefore threatened

          to infect the  jury's consideration  of other counts.   But  they

          dress this  thesis in the  gossamer vestments of  speculation and

          surmise.  That is not enough.  "There is always some prejudice in

          any  trial  where more  than one  offense  or offender  are tried

          together   but such `garden variety' prejudice, in and of itself,

          will not suffice" as a basis for obligatory severance.  O'Bryant,
                                                                  ________

          898 F.2d at 246.

                    To  be sure, there is  a gray area  in which reasonable

          people  might disagree about the advisability of a severance.  In

          the vast majority  of those cases, however, the  severance battle

          is conclusively won or lost in the district court.  See O'Bryant,
                                                              ___ ________

          998 F.2d at 25  (explaining that the court of  appeals ordinarily

          should defer to the district  court's evaluation of the necessity

          for separate trials); United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 308
                                _____________    _______

          (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a denial  of severance will only be

          reversed for a "manifest abuse of discretion"), cert. denied, 502
                                                          _____ ______

          U.S.  1079 (1992).   This  case falls  within the  sweep  of that

          generality, not within the  long-odds exception to it.   Not only

          is the inference of  undue prejudice that the appellants  seek to

                                          54

          draw  somewhat attenuated,  but also  any possible  prejudice was

          dissipated by the trial court's  firm, carefully worded, and oft-

          repeated  instructions  to  the  jurors,   forbidding  them  from

          considering  the evidence anent the  murder of Boyden the younger

          in deciding the charges against either Houlihan or Nardone.25  On

          this record, we are confident that the trial court  did not abuse

          its considerable discretion in  denying the requested  severance.

          See,  e.g., Boylan, 998 F.2d at 25; United States v. Gomez-Pabon,
          ___   ____  ______                  _____________    ___________

          911 F.2d 847, 859-60 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074
                                                _____ ______

          (1991).

                           D.  The Ford/McDonald Conundrum.
                           D.  The Ford/McDonald Conundrum.
                               ___________________________

                    At trial  the government  called Steven Ford  and Edwin

          McDonald as witnesses  regarding the murder  of James Boyden  IV.

          Houlihan    and    Nardone   successfully    solicited   limiting

          instructions.   Prior  to  each witness's  testimony Judge  Young

          admonished  the  jury  that  the testimony  was  admissible  only

          against  Fitzgerald, Herd, and Lynch, and not against Houlihan or

          Nardone.   Notwithstanding these limiting  instructions, Houlihan

          and  Nardone asked to cross-examine Ford and McDonald.  The court

          blocked that maneuver.   Houlihan and Nardone press the  point in

          this  venue,  alleging that  the  court's  ruling violated  their

          confrontation   rights  and  otherwise  constituted  an  improper

          exercise of discretion.
                              
          ____________________

               25The   court  enhanced   the  efficacy   of   the  limiting
          instructions by  insisting  that all  the  government's  evidence
          relating  to this murder be presented compactly at the same point
          in  the trial.   This is a  salutary practice, and  we commend it
          generally to trial courts confronted with analogous situations.

                                          55

                    To demonstrate a violation of the Confrontation Clause,

          a  defendant must show that  he was "prohibited  from engaging in

          otherwise  appropriate  cross-examination   designed  to  show  a

          prototypical form  of bias  on the  part  of the  witness."   Van
                                                                        ___

          Arsdall, 475  U.S. at 680.  Here, there was no abridgement of the
          _______

          defendants'  constitutional  rights.   The  Confrontation  Clause

          demands that a  defendant have  the opportunity  to confront  and

          cross-examine  the witnesses against him; at least in the absence
                                       ___________

          of special circumstances   and none appear here   the Clause does

          not  create  a right  to  confront or  cross-examine  persons who

          appear  as  witnesses exclusively  against  others  (even if  the

          others  are codefendants in a joint trial).  Because neither Ford

          nor McDonald was  a witness "against" either Houlihan or Nardone,

          the constitutional claim is stillborn.

                    Absent  a  constitutional violation,  "appellate courts

          will grant  relief from  the shackling of  cross-examination only

          for manifest  abuse of discretion."  Boylan, 898 F.2d at 254.  We
                                               ______

          discern no trace of abuse in  this instance.  Despite the lack of

          cross-examination,26  the  limiting instructions  fully protected

          Houlihan's  and  Nardone's  legitimate  interests.   Furthermore,

          allowing counsel  for Houlihan and Nardone  to cross-examine Ford

          and  McDonald could well have had a boomerang effect, leading the

          jury to believe that, contrary  to the judge's instructions,  the

          testimony  had  some  relevance  to  the  charges  against  their
                              
          ____________________

               26Of course, these witnesses did not emerge unscathed.  Ford
          and McDonald  were vigorously  cross-examined by counsel  for the
          implicated defendants, Fitzgerald included.

                                          56

          clients.   Hence, the restriction on  cross-examination was well-

          tailored to the occasion.

                     E.  Rulings Related to the Partial Mistrial.
                     E.  Rulings Related to the Partial Mistrial.
                         _______________________________________

                    After granting  Fitzgerald  a partial  mistrial on  the

          counts  pertaining to the murder of James Boyden IV, the district

          court  refused to  grant his  motion to  strike the  testimony of

          three witnesses, each of whom testified to some extent about that

          murder,27 or in  the alternative,  to declare a  mistrial on  the

          remaining counts against him.   Before us, Fitzgerald claims that

          the  testimony  had no  relevance  to the  surviving  counts, and

          included details  about the  slaying of  the younger  Boyden that

          might well have horrified the jurors and prejudiced  them against

          him.

                    We  review  the district  court's  ruling  to admit  or

          exclude particular  evidence for abuse of discretion.  See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States  v. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d 993, 997 (1st Cir. 1995); United
          ______     ____________                                    ______

          States  v. Holmquist,  36 F.3d  154, 163  (1st Cir.  1994), cert.
          ______     _________                                        _____

          denied, 115  S. Ct. 1797 (1995).   The same  standard pertains to
          ______

          motions to  strike evidence previously admitted.   See Sepulveda,
                                                             ___ _________

          15 F.3d at  1184.  Here,  the district court styled  the disputed

          testimony as being "probative . . . of other counts in the case,"

          and   denied  the  motion  to  strike  on  that  basis.    Having

          scrutinized  the  testimony in  light  of  the surviving  charges

          against  Fitzgerald,  we   are  persuaded  that,  as   Fitzgerald
                              
          ____________________

               27The witnesses in question  are Veronica Boyden (the mother
          of  James  Boyden IV),  Marie  Boyden-Connors  (his sister),  and
          Frances Hannigan (a former owner of Kerrigan's Flower Shop).

                                          57

          maintains, it was prejudicial  to some degree.   But that is  not

          the end of the road.  "[A]ll evidence is meant to be prejudicial;

          it  is  only unfair  prejudice which  must  be avoided."   United
                       ______                                        ______

          States v. Rodriguez-Estrada,  877 F.2d 153,  156 (1st Cir.  1989)
          ______    _________________

          (emphasis in original).  Thus, our inquiry must proceed.

                    Fitzgerald  cast  the  motion  to  strike  in  "all  or

          nothing"  terms.   In ruling  on it,  the  district court  had to

          compose  a balance between the probative value of the evidence as

          a whole and the risk of unfair prejudice attendant to  keeping it

          before the jury.  See Fed. R. Evid. 403.  And though the evidence
                            ___

          was  prejudicial in  a sense,  it was  also plainly  probative of

          Fitzgerald's role  as the kingpin  in the  organization and  bore

          directly on the remaining charges against him.28

                    While  the  question  is   admittedly  close,  we   are

          unprepared to say that the evidence's unfairly prejudicial impact

          substantially outweighed its probative worth.  "Only rarely   and

          in extraordinarily  compelling circumstances   will  we, from the

          vista  of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-

          the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighting of  probative
                              
          ____________________

               28A  few  examples  may assist  in  giving  texture to  this
          conclusion.   Veronica Boyden testified that  she heard Lynch, an
          indicted coconspirator,  threaten  to call  Fitzgerald  if  James
          Boyden  IV continued to poach on her sales territory.  Similarly,
          Boyden-Connors testified  that Fitzgerald himself  warned her  to
          keep  her  brother  away  from  Lynch's  territory.    Hannigan's
          testimony, overall,  related more to the  structure and operating
          practices of the Fitzgerald-Houlihan organization and less to the
          slaying of James  Boyden IV.   By way  of illustration,  Hannigan
          testified at  length  about Fitzgerald's  presence at  Kerrigan's
          Flower  Shop,  his  meetings  there  with  other  members of  the
          conspiracy, and  his daily  telephone calls to  Doherty from  his
          prison cell during the period of his immurement.

                                          58

          value and unfair effect."  Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d
                                     _______    _________________

          1331,  1340 (1st Cir. 1988).   This is not such  an occasion.  It

          follows that the  lower court  did not misuse  its discretion  in

          denying both  Fitzgerald's motion  to strike and  his alternative

          motion to declare an across-the-board mistrial.

                           F.  The Armed Robbery Reference.
                           F.  The Armed Robbery Reference.
                               ___________________________

                    Nardone had also been  charged with committing  several

          armed  robberies.  The  district court severed  the armed robbery

          counts  before trial.    When Nelson  (one  of Nardone's  alleged

          coconspirators) testified, Houlihan's counsel cross-examined him.

          In the  course of the  cross-examination, the lawyer  proffered a

          copy  of Nelson's cooperation agreement with  the government.  No

          objection   appearing,  the  court  admitted  the  document  into

          evidence.   Appended  to the  cooperation agreement  (now a  full

          exhibit)  was a copy of  the information that  the government had

          filed against Nelson (which  contained, inter alia, a  count that
                                                  _____ ____

          described an  alleged Nelson/Nardone  armed robbery).   Four days

          later, Nardone's counsel  asked the district court  to delete all

          references to  him from the exhibit  before it went to  the jury.

          The court refused.  Nardone assigns error.  We uphold the ruling.

                    There  is danger  in  delay,  and  the  contemporaneous

          objection rule is, for  the most part, strictly enforced  in this

          circuit.  See, e.g.,  United States v.  Taylor, 54 F.3d 967,  972
                    ___  ____   _____________     ______

          (1st  Cir. 1995); United States  v. Griffin, 818  F.2d 97, 99-100
                            _____________     _______

          (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987).  While  it is true
                      _____ ______

          in  this  case that  Nardone's  attorney  ultimately objected,  a

                                          59

          belated objection does not cure the original default.

                    To be sure,  we might  be impelled to  intervene if  we

          thought that,  despite the  lack of a  contemporaneous objection,

          the district court  committed plain error  by refusing to  redact

          the references to Nardone which appeared in the information.  See
                                                                        ___

          Olano, 507 U.S. at  732-37 (discussing dimensions of plain  error
          _____

          review); see also  Fed. R. Crim.  P. 52(b).   But here, no  plain
                   ___ ____

          error looms.  During cross-examination of Nelson   two days after
                                                                      _____

          Houlihan's  counsel  introduced  the cooperation  agreement  into

          evidence without objection and  two days before Nardone's counsel
                                                   ______

          broached the  idea of  redaction    the latter  questioned Nelson

          extensively about the armed robbery and drug conspiracy described

          in  the  information.   Although  these  questions were  artfully

          phrased   to  avoid   any   explicit   reference   to   Nardone's

          participation in  those crimes, we  believe that this  harping on

          the  contents of  the information  bolsters the  district court's

          decision not to  excuse the lack of a  contemporaneous objection.

          We  conclude,   therefore,  that  the  court   acted  within  its

          discretion  in declining to relax the usual rule and in rejecting

          Nardone's tardy request for redaction.29

                                G.  Jury Instructions.
                                G.  Jury Instructions.
                                    _________________
                              
          ____________________

               29As  an aside,  we  note that  there is  no inkling  of any
          prejudice stemming from  this ruling.   For one  thing, the  jury
          acquitted Nardone on several counts, so it is impossible to argue
          convincingly  that  the   unredacted  information   irretrievably
          poisoned  the jurors against him.   For another  thing, given the
          powerful  evidentiary strands  that tied  Nardone tightly  to two
          brutal  murders and several other murder  attempts, we doubt that
          the  references about  which he  now complains  could conceivably
          have altered the jury's verdicts.

                                          60

                    The appellants  posit that the district  court's charge

          did  not impart the degree of participation required to convict a

          defendant of conspiracy  charges under  the Racketeer  Influenced

          and  Corrupt Organizations  Act (RICO),  18 U.S.C.     1961-1969.

          The  RICO statute criminalizes  "conduct[ing] or participat[ing],

          directly  or  indirectly, in  the  conduct  of [an]  enterprise's

          affairs" through a pattern of racketeering activity.  18 U.S.C.  

          1962(c).   To  convey this  element of  the RICO  offenses, Judge

          Young instructed the jury that  the prosecution must prove beyond

          a reasonable doubt,

                    that by engaging in a pattern of racketeering
                    activity  the specific individual accused . .
                    . conducted or participated in the conduct of
                    the  enterprise's affairs.   The term conduct
                    and   participate  in   the  conduct   of  an
                    enterprise includes the performance  of acts,
                    functions or  duties which are related to the
                    operation of the enterprise.  A person may be
                    found to  participate in  the conduct  of the
                    enterprise even though he  has no part in the
                    management or control of the enterprise.

                    The appellants fault  this instruction because it  told

          the jury  that a defendant could  be found guilty even  if he did

          not participate "in the management or control of the enterprise."

          In their view, the Court's opinion in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507
                                                _____    _____________

          U.S.  170 (1993), signifies the opposite.   But this asseveration

          misconstrues  Reves.   There,  the  Court  interpreted the  words
                        _____

          "conduct or participate" as they  appear in section 1962(c),  and

          determined that those  words require a defendant's  participation

          in either "the operation or management of the enterprise itself."

          Id. at  185.  But because  the defendant in Reves  was an outside
          ___                                         _____

                                          61

          accounting firm that had only a contractual relationship with the

          allegedly corrupt  enterprise   it  audited the books  and issued

          financial  reports,  but neither  controlled  the  enterprise nor

          participated  in  either  its  operation  or  management     RICO

          liability did not attach.  See id. at 186.
                                     ___ ___

                    The  case  at  hand  is of  a  distinctively  different

          stripe.    Unlike  the accountants  in  Reves,  who were  classic
                                                  _____

          "outsiders,"  the appellants here  are quintessential "insiders,"

          that is,  persons whom  the  evidence places  in the  maw of  the

          criminal activity.30   We have previously held  that insiders who

          are  integral  to  carrying  out  the  enterprise's  racketeering

          activities    and the appellants  clearly fit that  description  

          come  within  the definitional  sweep  of section  1962(c).   See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v. Hurley,  63 F.3d  1, 9  (1st Cir.  1995), cert.
          ______________    ______                                    _____

          denied, 116 S. Ct.  1322 (1996); United States v.  Oreto, 37 F.3d
          ______                           _____________     _____

          739,  750-51 (1st  Cir.  1994), cert.  denied,  115 S.  Ct.  1161
                                          _____  ______

          (1995).  The instructions given in this case are  in all material

          respects identical to those that we approved in Hurley and Oreto.
                                                          ______     _____

          Consequently, we reject this  assignment of error without further

                              
          ____________________

               30Nardone's claim  that he was an  independent contractor is
          imaginative  but unconvincing.   The  evidence supports  the view
          that  Nardone was an insider.  He maintained regular contact with
          Fitzgerald   and  Houlihan   throughout  the   duration   of  the
          conspiracy; he obtained his armaments directly  from them; and he
          took orders from them.  Indeed, Nardone's description  of himself
          as the  organization's "hit  man" and "headache  man" belies  his
          more recently manufactured "independent contractor" label.

                                          62

          elaboration.31

                                   H.  Forfeiture.
                                   H.  Forfeiture.
                                       __________

                    Houlihan contends that the government failed to produce

          sufficient evidence to  support the forfeiture of a house located

          at 80  Ferncroft Road, Tewksbury, Massachusetts.   The government

          lodged the forfeiture count  under 18 U.S.C.   1963(a)32  and the

          jury  found in  its favor.   The  property had  been deeded  by a

          third-party  seller to  Francis Jackson  (Houlihan's uncle),  and

          Houlihan's contention  is that, because title  stood in Jackson's

          name, the property could  not be forfeited in consequence  of his

          (Houlihan's) peccadilloes.

                    "[C]riminal forfeiture is a punishment, not a  separate

          criminal  offense."    Saccoccia, 58  F.3d  at  783.   In  such a
                                 _________

                              
          ____________________

               31The appellants also claim that the district court erred by
          refusing  to repeat  its  concededly correct  definition of  what
          constitutes a  racketeering "enterprise"  in its  instructions to
          the jury on those counts that charged murder and attempted murder
          in aid of racketeering.  Judge Young chose instead to incorporate
          by  reference his correct definition  of a RICO enterprise (given
          to the  jury earlier in  the charge); and,  in the same  vein, he
          specifically  informed the  jury  that, as  to all  racketeering-
          related  counts, they  must find the  existence of  an enterprise
          meeting the statutory criteria as an element of each offense.  In
          light  of the perfectly sensible  course taken by  the judge, the
          appellants'  claim  is  unfounded.    A  trial  court  has  broad
          discretion to formulate jury instructions as it sees fit, as long
          as it  touches all the bases.  See United States v. DeStefano, 59
                                         ___ _____________    _________
          F.3d  1,  4 (1st  Cir.  1995).   Here,  taking the  charge  as an
          integrated whole, see,  e.g., United States v.  Cintolo, 818 F.2d
                            ___   ____  _____________     _______
          980, 1003 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1988),  we
                                     _____ ______
          find no error.

               32Insofar  as it  is  germane to  Houlihan's situation,  the
          statute provides in substance that a  RICO offender shall forfeit
          to  the  government  any  property  interest  or  thing of  value
          acquired  with the  proceeds of  racketeering  activity.   See 18
                                                                     ___
          U.S.C.   1963(a).

                                          63

          proceeding,  the government  can satisfy its  burden of  proof by

          either direct or circumstantial  evidence.  See id.  at 782.   In
                                                      ___ ___

          this  instance  we  conclude  without  serious  question  that  a

          rational factfinder could  determine    as this jury  did    that

          Houlihan  was the de  facto owner of  the house, and  that it had

          been   purchased   with   proceeds  derived   from   racketeering

          activity.33

                    Real estate  agents testified  that they  took Houlihan

          and  his wife,  along  with Jackson,  on  tours of  the  dwelling

          several  times during 1993; that  Houlihan told them  that he was

          "interested" in  buying it;  that Houlihan attended  the pre-sale

          inspection  and the two closings that proved to be necessary; and

          that the property was  purchased entirely for cash (approximately

          $195,000).  And,  moreover, both  Houlihan and his  wife were  in

          residence at the premises  when the authorities arrested Houlihan

          in October of 1993.

                    These pieces of evidence combine to form a picture that

                              
          ____________________

               33The district court instructed the jury that the government
          had the  burden of  proving entitlement  to  forfeiture beyond  a
          reasonable doubt.  The  proof here is capable of  satisfying that
          standard.  We note, however   although we leave the question open
            that the government may have conceded too much.  Compare United
                                                             _______ ______
          States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231,  234 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
          ______    ______
          criminal   forfeiture  under   21   U.S.C.      853  requires   a
          preponderance  of the  evidence,  not proof  beyond a  reasonable
          doubt), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 925 (1996) and United States  v.
                  _____ ______                            _____________
          Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690,  695 (11th Cir. 1992) (en  banc) (holding
          ________
          that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies generally
          in criminal forfeiture cases involving drug proceeds) with United
                                                                ____ ______
          States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 906 (3d  Cir. 1994) (holding that
          ______    _______
          government, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding under 18 U.S.C.  
          1963(a), must prove  beyond a reasonable doubt that  the targeted
          property was derived from the defendant's racketeering activity).

                                          64

          reveals  Houlihan as the actual  owner of the  home in Tewksbury,

          with Jackson serving merely  as a straw.  Then, too, the evidence

          is  reinforced by the utter  absence of any  proof indicating how

          Jackson  might have acquired so  large an amount  of cash.  Given

          the  totality of the circumstances, the jury was entitled to find

          that  the   house  was  forfeitable  as  a  fruit  of  Houlihan's

          racketeering.  See id.  ("Jurors, after all, are not  expected to
                         ___ ___

          resist common-sense  inferences based  on the realities  of human

          experience.").

                                   I.  Sentencing.
                                   I.  Sentencing.
                                       __________

                    The  sentences  imposed  by  the  district   court  are

          unremarkable in  most respects.   The sole  exception relates  to

          count  20.   That count  charged Fitzgerald  and  Houlihan, among

          others,  with  conspiracy  to distribute  a  controlled substance

          (cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C.    846.  As to Fitzgerald and

          Houlihan,  Judge  Young  imposed  contingent  sentences  of  life

          imprisonment,  to take effect "only  if the sentence  on count 19

          [which charged  a continuing criminal enterprise  in violation of

          18  U.S.C.   848] is reversed [or] otherwise dismissed."  Because

          we  affirm  the   conviction  and  sentence  on   count  19,  the

          contingency  that Judge  Young envisioned  has  not materialized.

          Hence, we now vacate  Fitzgerald's and Houlihan's convictions and

          sentences on count 20.  We explain briefly.

                    If an indictment charges a defendant with participating

          in both a conspiracy and a  continuing criminal enterprise (CCE),

          and if the former is used as a predicate act to prove the latter,

                                          65

          then the conspiracy is in actuality a lesser-included offense  of

          the CCE charge, and  the defendant may not lawfully  be sentenced

          for  both crimes.  See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d
                             ___ _____________    _______________

          148, 152-53  (1st  Cir.),  cert. denied,  502  U.S.  862  (1991);
                                     _____ ______

          Stratton v.  United States, 862  F.2d 7,  9 (1st Cir.  1988) (per
          ________     _____________

          curiam).  To do  otherwise would result in cumulative  punishment

          violative of the Double  Jeopardy Clause.  See Jeffers  v. United
                                                     ___ _______     ______

          States,  432 U.S.  137,  154-58 (1977)  (plurality op.);  Rivera-
          ______                                                    _______

          Martinez, 931 F.2d at 152-53.
          ________

                    We need  not wax  longiloquent, for the  government, to

          its  credit,  concedes  the  point.    Thus,  our  affirmance  of

          Fitzgerald's and Houlihan's convictions and sentences on count 19

          necessitates the  vacation of their convictions  and sentences on

          count 20.  See Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 153 (holding that the
                     ___ _______________

          Double  Jeopardy  Clause  requires  vacation  of  conviction  and

          sentence on conspiracy  count when a  defendant is convicted  and

          sentenced on both conspiracy and CCE counts).

          VI.  CONCLUSION
          VI.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need  go  no further.    For  the  reasons we  have

          discussed at  length   perhaps at too much length   we affirm the

          convictions  and  sentences  of   all  three  appellants  in  all

          respects, save only for (a) Houlihan's convictions on counts 5, 6

          and 15 (which are reversed), and (b)  Fitzgerald's and Houlihan's

          convictions on count 20 (which are vacated).

                    So Ordered.
                    So Ordered.
                    __________

                                          66