Court Opinion

ID: 9833429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:41:52.67294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:02.486522
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On rehearing appellant strongly contends that this Court’s original judgment of affir-mance herein was erroneous:
*529(1) In that the permission to file the statement of facts beyond the period allowed by Rule 386, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, is discretionary with the courts, instead of mandatory, as it held, citing Parks v. Purnell, 135 Tex. 182, 141 S.W.2d 585, by the Supreme Court of Texas as so holding.
(2) That, notwithstanding the former holding to the contrary, the record herein does reflect sufficient facts, by way of admissions and statements made in the ap-pellee’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, to form a proper basis for the contentions he originally presented here upon the underlying facts in evidence upon the trial.
(3) That the trial court improperly submitted the two special issues it gave to the jury in the case, wherein it propounded questions of law to them, rather than issues of fact, touching upon whether or not the man Callaway left the scope of his émployment for the appellee when he stopped the bus, got from under the wheel, and assaulted appellant.
None of these presentments, it is determined, should be sustained.
As concerns the first one, appellant misconstrued the holding of the Supreme Court in the Parks v. Purnell case, so cited and relied upon by him, as well as the plain recitations, by proviso, in both rules 386 and 437 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In such provisions it is clearly specified that the 75 days’ time therein allowed is mandatory, jurisdictional, and may not be extended by the court. Wherefore, the parties themselves could not change the imperative duty therein laid upon the courts.
While neither of the parties hereto cites that case, the precise question, on the legal equivalent of the same state of facts here obtaining, was by this court decided adversely to appellant’s contentions in Jennings v. Fredericks et al., on July 19 of 1945, reported in 190 S.W.2d 707, in which a writ of‘error was thereafter unconditionally refused by the Supreme Court.
It would serve no needful purpose to again discuss the question of whether or not the appellee made any material admissions in its motion for judgment non ob-stante veredicto, tending to show any ostensible or apparent agency of Callaway for it on the occasion giving rise to the suit,, since no sustainable ground for now holding differently upon that inquiry has been presented.
As concerns the attempt to complain here of the special issues submitted during the trial by the court below, the record shows that no such objections thereto were submitted to the trial court at that time, hence appellant may not initiate such complaint on appeal. Home Ins. Co. v. Williams, Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 876, writ of error dismissed; City of Winters v. Bethune, Tex.Civ.App., 111 S.W.2d 797 writ of error dismissed; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Stricklin, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W.2d 612, writ of error dismissed, judgment correct.
Motion for rehearing refused.