Court Opinion

ID: 9634888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:27:29.060476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:41.935167
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Respondent Linda Metrish, Warden of Michigan’s Kinross Correctional Facility, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting Petitioner Stephen Fleming’s application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his habeas petition, Fleming challenges his convictions for second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony on the grounds that: (1) the trial court should have excluded his confession under Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), because the police failed to “scrupulously honor” his assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (2) the trial court’s exclusion of certain witness testimony denied him his fundamental right to present a defense. The district court conditionally granted habeas relief on both claims.
Although I concur in the majority’s holding that the district court improperly granted Fleming habeas relief on his claim regarding the exclusion of Fowler’s testimony, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion regarding Fleming’s Mosley claim. When considered in context, the numerous exhortations by the police encouraging Fleming to “get with the program” and “cooperate” rose above the level of mere admonition. At the time, Fleming was handcuffed in a police vehicle, and police officers were celebrating the discovery of the murder weapon right in front of him, allegedly shouting and pointing in his direction. Although Fleming made clear that he did not want to answer questions related to the homicide, the record indicates that the police repeatedly pressured him to “do the right thing” and “get with the program,” comments plainly aimed at wearing down Fleming’s resistance to questioning. In other words, despite Fleming’s prior invocation of his right to remain silent, the officers at the scene failed to “scrupulously honor” his decision to cut off questioning.
I.
Although acknowledging that there are “strong arguments” on both sides, the majority reverses the district court’s ruling *538with respect to Fleming’s Mosley claim based primarily on its conclusion that the deferential standard of review required under AEDPA applies. By its very terms, however, AEDPA applies only to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added); see Danner v. Motley, 448 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir.2006). AEDPA thus requires deference only where the defendant’s federal claim was “adjudicated” on the merits, not, more broadly speaking, whenever a state court merely addresses — or, in the parlance of the majority, “evaluates” — the merits of the claim. Conversely, where the state courts do not rule on the merits of a claim, this Court reviews the claim de novo. See Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.2003) (“Where, as here, the state court did not assess the merits of a claim properly raised in a habeas petition, the deference due under AEDPA does not apply. Instead, this court reviews questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.” (internal citation omitted)). Because the Michigan courts reviewed Fleming’s claim for plain error only, the majority’s conclusion that the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, nevertheless, is entitled to deference under AEDPA is improper. In fact, the majority’s insistence on deference is, under the circumstances, contrary to controlling authority, illogical, and manifestly unjust. Having properly raised his Mosley claim before the trial court, and pressed that claim at every stage of his state court proceedings, Fleming is entitled to a full review of the merits of his claim.
Because it concluded that Fleming had “forfeited” his Mosley claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals did not rule on the merits of that claim, but instead reviewed the claim for plain error only. People v. Fleming, No. 228731, 2002 WL 988568, at *1 (Mich.Ct.App. May 14, 2002) (per curiam). Under the plain-error framework, Fleming was required to show not only that the police failed to honor his decision to remain silent, but also that the trial court’s error was .“plain” and affected his “substantial rights.” Id.; see also Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 901 (6th Cir.2008) (describing petitioner’s burden under the plain-error standard). Regardless of whether the Michigan Court of Appeals explored some aspects of the merits of Fleming’s Mosley claim in conducting its inquiry, it is undeniable that the court did not consider the merits of Fleming’s claim outside the context of its plain-error inquiry. Indeed, the Michigan Court of Appeals made clear that, even had Fleming satisfied the requisite elements of the plain-error inquiry, reversal would be “warranted” only if he also could show that “the plain, forfeited error ... seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Fleming, 2002 WL 988568, at *1; see also Cristini, 526 F.3d at 901 (“If all three [plain-error] conditions are met, we may then exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if ... the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”) (citing United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir.2007)). The Michigan court’s application of the plain-error standard thus placed significant burdens on Fleming that he otherwise would not have had to bear to establish a violation under Mosley. See Benge v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 236, 246 (6th Cir.2007) (recognizing that it was “less burdensome” for petitioner to satisfy the elements of his Strickland claim than to demonstrate plain error); Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir.2003) (noting that the plain-error standard of review is “a highly deferential standard, to put it mildly”).
*539Under these circumstances, the controlling rule in this circuit is that AEDPA does not apply and the claim is reviewed de novo. In the habeas context, this Court does not construe a state court’s plain-error review as negating the determination that a claim has been procedurally defaulted. See Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir.2000) (“Controlling precedent in our circuit indicates that plain error review does not constitute a waiver of state procedural default rules.”); Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir.1989) (“We would be loath to adopt an exception to the ‘cause and prejudice’ rule that would discourage state appellate courts from undertaking the sort of [manifest injustice] inquiry conducted by the Michigan court, and we do not believe that the state court’s explanation of why the jury instructions resulted in no manifest injustice can fairly be said to have constituted a waiver of the procedural default.”). Rather, we “view a state appellate court’s review for plain error as the enforcement of a procedural default.”1 Hinkle v. Randle, 271 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir.2001); see also Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 673-74 (6th Cir.2006). For that reason, this Court does not construe a state court’s plain-error review as an adjudication “on the merits” for purposes of § 2254.2 See, e.g., Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 590 (6th Cir.2008) (affording no deference to state court’s plain-error review of petitioner’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim); Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 511 (6th Cir.2008) (“The [state] court’s plain-error review is not considered a review on the merits... .”); Benge, 474 F.3d at 246 (expressly applying de novo review to prejudice prong of Strickland claim where state court reviewed claim for plain error); see also Grayer v. McKee, 149 F. App’x 435, 442 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting district court’s conclusion that state court’s plain-error analysis constituted a review of the merits of petitioner’s claim).
As these cases demonstrate, the controlling rule in this circuit is that no deference is due under AEDPA where a state court reviews a petitioner’s habeas claim for plain error only, regardless of whether the court’s plain-error inquiry may have delved into the merits of the claim.3 As this Court expressly and unequivocally held in Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754 (6th Cir.2006), a state court’s plain-error review is not due deference under AEDPA because “[p]lain error analysis is more properly viewed as a court’s right to overlook procedural defects to prevent manifest injustice, but is not equivalent to a *540review of the merits.” Id. at 765 (emphasis added). Accordingly, where the state courts determine that a claim has been forfeited and thus review that claim for plain error only, AEDPA does not apply and no deference is due. Rather, we are free to exercise our independent judgment and review the claim de novo.
Even if one were to ignore this litany of cases and accept the majority’s flawed contention that “there is no authority squarely on point that decides this key question,” the express language of AEDPA requires deference only where a defendant’s federal claim has been “adjudicated” on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nothing in AEDPA even remotely suggests that deference is required more broadly where a state court merely addresses merits-related aspects of a defendant’s federal claim. Consequently, because the Michigan courts resolved Fleming’s Mosley claim on the basis of a state procedural rule — and, in fact, did so improperly — the “principles of comity, finality, and federalism” noted in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), are not implicated here.4
Today’s decision marks an extraordinary and unjustified departure from that controlling rule. In fact, to justify its conclusion, the majority goes to great lengths to distinguish and cabin the holding of Benge and this Court’s other cases declining to defer to a state court’s plain-error inquiry, but those efforts are unpersuasive. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, nothing in Benge indicates that it is relevant whether the state courts may have tangentially considered the merits of petitioner’s claim in addressing the “error” element of the plain-error inquiry. Rather, the decision in Benge to review the defendant’s claim de novo was based entirely on the determination that the state court’s plain-error inquiry imposed additional burdens on the habeas petitioner. See 474 F.3d at 246-47. As the Benge Court explained, AEDPA’s mandate to defer to state court judgments “does not factor into [the] resolution” of the actual prejudice prong of the petitioner’s Strickland claim because the Ohio Supreme Court had analyzed the claim “only in the context of plain error review, not under the governing — and less burdensome — Strickland standard.” Id. at 246. In reaching that conclusion, the Benge Court reasoned that, “[b]ecause [the petitioner] could have met his burden under Strickland despite not being able to demonstrate plain error, this analysis did not constitute an ‘adjudication on the merits’ of [his] ineffeetive-assistance-of-counsel claims.” Id. Nothing in Benge suggests that the Court’s ruling was affected by whether any merits-related issues may have fallen within the scope of the state court’s plain-error inquiry.
According to the majority, Benge does not control here because, in Fleming’s case, the state court’s “use of the plain-error standard of review ... simply made reversal of the state trial court’s judgment less likely, but did not cause the Michigan Court of Appeals to bypass the merits of Fleming’s claim and thereby avoid triggering AEDPA deference.” The majority’s reasoning simply cannot be squared with *541Benge, where the Court declined to defer to a state court’s plain-error inquiry precisely because that standard made the defendant’s showing more “burdensome,” 474 F.3d at 246, a conclusion which seems indistinguishable from the majority’s conclusion that Fleming’s chance of success under the plain-error standard was “less likely.”
Nor can the majority’s position be reconciled with the holding of Lundgren that a state court’s plain-error review, even though it may require the court to explore certain aspects of the merits of the claim, “is not equivalent to a review of the merits.” 440 F.3d at 765 (emphasis added). Indeed, as our sister circuits have recognized, “[t]o decide whether an error is plain requires consideration of the merits — but only so far as may be required to determine that issue. It does not open up the merits any wider for consideration by the federal court.”5 Neal, 99 F.3d at 844; see also Roy v. Coxon, 907 F.2d 385, 390 (2d Cir.1990) (“[E]ven if the state court has addressed the questions of (a) whether there was error, and (b) whether the error was prejudicial, if these questions were answered in the context of plain-error analysis, the decision was not sufficiently a ruling on the merits to authorize the federal court to reach the merits.” (emphasis added)). Despite the majority’s best efforts to distinguish Benge and Lundgren, the rule announced in those cases controls our review here. And those decisions dictate that deference is not required here, regardless of whether the state court considered some aspects of the merits of Fleming’s claim in reviewing his claim for plain error.
The majority’s position is inconsistent not only with the express holdings of Benge and Lundgren, but also with the logic underlying those decisions. In general, “a federal court may not consider a claim for habeas corpus relief if the claim was procedurally defaulted in state court.” Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 374 F.3d 383, 387 (6th Cir.2004). There are exceptions, however. For instance, the federal courts may consider the merits of a claim that has been procedurally defaulted where the petitioner demonstrates “cause and prejudice.” See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (noting that a petitioner can overcome procedural default by demonstrating “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,” or demonstrating “that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice”). The federal courts also may consider a purportedly defaulted claim where the state court’s procedural-default determination was wrong as a matter of law. See Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986) (describing this circuit’s four-part test for determining whether a claim in fact has been procedurally defaulted).
In the latter case, where a federal court finds error in the state court’s procedural-default ruling, the federal courts are not bound by the state court’s adjudication of the claim, even if the state court proceeded to review the claim for plain error or manifest injustice, or under any other “safety valve” standard. See Campbell, 515 F.3d at 178. And for good reason, because rejecting the state court’s underlying default ruling necessarily implies that the state court’s application of a more burden*542some “safety valve” standard was improper. In light of such a determination, although it is true that the “state court’s substantive reasoning does not simply vanish along with its erroneous procedural-default determination,” as the majority quips, it is illogical to continue to insist on deferring to a state court’s improperly-applied, and undoubtedly more burdensome, plain-error inquiry. See Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 765.
This interplay between a state court’s default ruling and its application of plain error review also undermines the majority’s unsupported contention that “whether a claim should be addressed on collateral review [or whether review is precluded] under the judicially created doctrine of procedural default is independent of the question whether Congress requires deference pursuant to AEDPA.” If the federal courts have rejected the state court’s “analytically prior” ruling that a claim has been proeedurally defaulted, then there is no justification for the federal courts to be bound by the effects of that determination, i.e., the application of a more burdensome safety valve standard. In fact, such a rule would be manifestly unjust as it would imply that a defendant who has properly raised a federal claim in state court is never afforded a full review of the merits of his claim at any stage. The majority’s baseless contention that we are obliged to give deference to any state court adjudication where the state court “conducts any reasoned elaboration of an issue under federal law” thus is fundamentally unfair to criminal defendants who have properly raised their claims in state court, but, through no fault of their own, have never been afforded a full review of the merits of their claims.
The majority’s insistence that deference is required whenever “the state court conducts any reasoned elaboration of an issue under federal law” also is in tension with other aspects of this Court’s habeas jurisprudence. For instance, in Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.2006), we recognized an important exception to the deference owed state court adjudications under AEDPA, holding that de novo review is appropriate “when a claim made on federal habeas review is premised on Brady material that has surfaced for the first time during federal proceedings,” even where the state courts ostensibly addressed that claim on the merits. Id. at 469. In such cases, we have construed the development of new evidence as giving rise, in effect, to a new claim, and thus have held that deference is not required under § 2254(d) in such cases. Id. In Brown v. Smith, 551 F.3d 424 (6th Cir.2008), we expanded the scope of that exception, holding that the principle announced in Joseph “applies generally,” not just in the context of Brady claims. Id. at 430 (applying de novo review to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that had been addressed “on the merits” by the state courts).
Although the majority’s insistence on deference in this case is not entirely irreconcilable with this line of cases, it seems more than a little awkward that de novo review is appropriate where the state courts undeniably have addressed a petitioner’s claim “on the merits” but improperly failed to consider critical evidence in conducting that inquiry, and yet deference is required where the state courts undoubtedly reviewed a claim for plain error only and we have rejected the state court’s entire premise for applying that standard. Indeed, the majority’s insistence on deference whenever the state courts conduct “any reasoned elaboration of an issue under federal law” is utterly inconsistent with the logic and interests underlying our application of de novo review in Joseph and Brown, both of which concluded that a *543state court’s consideration of issues related to the merits of a defendant’s claim does not require deference under AEDPA.
If, as the majority insists, the “principles of comity, finality, and federalism” identified in Williams, 529 U.S. at 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, were implicated not only where a state court adjudicates a claim on the merits, but whenever a state court decision merely addresses the merits of a defendant’s claim, then application of de novo review in Joseph and Brown would be inconsistent with AEDPA. The Supreme Court, however, has assumed, without deciding, that deference under AEDPA is not required and that de novo review is appropriate in such eases. See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652-53, 124 S.Ct. 2736, 159 L.Ed.2d 683 (2004) (noting that “some Courts of Appeals have conducted de novo review [in such cases] on the theory that there is no relevant state-court determination to which one could defer” and “assuming, arguendo, that this analysis is correct”); see also Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 297 (4th Cir.2003); Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir.2002). This is not, as the majority suggests, merely a linguistic distinction without any substantive import. Rather, it is distinction dictated by the express terms of AEDPA, and one that is necessary to draw if we are to make cohesive sense of the numerous decisions by this Court and our sister circuits applying de novo review where a state court, despite addressing and evaluating the merits of a party’s federal claim, has resolved the claim on the basis of state procedural default rules.
In this case, therefore, the majority’s decision to reject the Michigan Court of Appeals’ determination that Fleming forfeited his Mosley claim also negates the entire basis for subjecting that claim to plain-error review in the first place. It is beyond dispute that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ premise for reviewing Fleming’s Mosley claim for plain error was that Fleming had forfeited the claim. See Fleming, 2002 WL 988568, at *1. Now that the majority has rejected that underlying default ruling, there no longer is any basis for limiting review of Fleming’s claim to plain error. Our policy of providing an opportunity for state courts to correct constitutional errors before a petitioner may seek relief in federal court, see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31, 111 S.Ct. 2546, simply is not implicated under these circumstances. Thus, although — or, rather, because — -I agree with the majority’s determination that the Michigan Court of Appeals improperly found that Fleming had defaulted on his Mosley claim, I dispute the majority’s conclusion that AED-PA’s deferential standard of review continues to apply.
Absent de novo review by this Court, the merits of Fleming’s Mosley claim will never have been fully considered by any court, state or federal, despite the majority’s recognition that the claim was not procedurally defaulted. Such an outcome is particularly unjust in this case because, as the majority acknowledges, “were Fleming’s appeal a direct one to be reviewed de novo, the possibility exists that we might have agreed with Fleming’s position.” Having properly raised his Mosley claim before the trial court and pressed that claim at every stage of his state court proceedings, Fleming is entitled to a full review of the merits of his claim. Fleming is entitled to de novo review.
For these reasons, I do not agree with my colleagues’ analysis of Fleming’s Mosley claim. At least until today, it seemed well-settled that a state court’s plain-error review of a petitioner’s habeas claim did not constitute an adjudication “on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In my opinion, that rule applies here and *544controls our review of Fleming’s Mosley claim. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed Fleming’s Mosley claim for plain error only, our review of that claim “is not circumscribed by a state court conclusion.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). And because there is no state court adjudication to which we must defer, we are free to exercise our independent judgment and review Fleming’s claim de novo. See Maples, 340 F.3d at 436.
II.
Applying de novo review, I conclude that Fleming’s confession should not have been admitted at trial because the police ignored the rigid requirements of Mosley and failed to “scrupulously honor” Fleming’s invocation of his right to remain silent.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court established certain procedural safeguards designed to protect the rights of a suspect, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be free from compelled self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court specified, among other things, that if the suspect “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that, at this point, the suspect “has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege,” and thus “any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” Id. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Although not all statements obtained after a suspect invokes his or her right to remain silent are, as the majority puts it, “necessarily inadmissible in all cases,” statements obtained after the suspect has decided to remain silent will be excluded where the suspect’s “right to cut off questioning” was not “scrupulously honored.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321. In determining whether the police “scrupulously honored” a suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent, we must inquire into “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).
In this case, the circumstances surrounding Fleming’s interrogation make clear that the police did not “scrupulously honor” his decision to remain silent. On November 19, 1999, Detective Robert Lesneski and other officers executed a search warrant for Fleming’s residence and surrounding curtilage. When the police arrived at his residence, Fleming initially was “very cooperative,” and even volunteered that the police would find drugs (hashish) in a barn on his property. After locating the drugs, Detective Lesne-ski contacted a narcotics team from another jurisdiction to assist the search team in dealing with the drug evidence.
After securing the drugs, Detective Lesneski returned to speak with Fleming. Detective Lesneski testified that, although Fleming was “not in custody at that time,” he nevertheless advised Fleming of his Miranda rights and asked Fleming if he would be willing to talk. Fleming responded that he did not want to talk about “that fucking homicide.” A “short time later,” Detective Lesneski placed Fleming under arrest based on the drug evidence collected, handcuffed him in front of his body with plastic hand ties, and placed him in the back seat of a Michigan State Police *545cruiser, under the watch of Trooper De-vine.
Shortly thereafter, Detective Lesneski received a call informing him that the search team had located a shotgun in a nearby creek. Detective Lesneski immediately left the area where Fleming was being held to join the search team at that location. When he arrived, Detective Lesneski was informed that the search team had located a twelve-gauge shotgun wrapped in plastic and secured with duct tape. Detective Lesneski briefly examined the weapon and determined that it was a Remington pump-action shotgun, the same model as the weapon used to shoot the victim. Detective Lesneski then sent the weapon to the forensics lab for further processing.
Sometime after Detective Lesneski left Fleming’s residence, Trooper Devine also decided to join the search team at the creek. Trooper Devine transferred Fleming to the front passenger seat of a narcotics van now at the scene, and asked Sergeant Robert Clayton, a narcotics officer with the Ogemaw County Sheriffs Department, to sit in the van and watch Fleming. Fleming remained in the van for several hours while the search of his residence and property continued, allegedly because the police lacked the personnel to transport Fleming to jail without interrupting the search. During that time, Sergeant Clayton and Fleming engaged in “small talk.”
Approximately two hours after Fleming was transferred to Sergeant Clayton’s custody, the search team returned from the creek. Believing that they had just located the murder weapon, the returning officers were visibly excited and began celebrating their discovery. From his vantage point in the van, Fleming could see the celebration. Although Fleming could not hear what was being said outside the van, he testified that he observed Detective Lesneski gesturing toward him and believed Detective Lesneski to exclaim, “Hell, yeah, I got you!”
At this point, Sergeant Clayton told Fleming that things did not look good for him, and then stated that it would be in Fleming’s “best interest” to “do the right thing.” According to Fleming, Sergeant Clayton also warned: “If you have any chance at any thing, ... I would [ ] strongly recommend that you get with the program.” When he testified about this particular moment, Fleming stated that he felt like “a whole garage full of police officers” was “staring” at him, and he became very “concerned, upset, [and] nervous.” Almost immediately thereafter, Sergeant Clayton asked Fleming if he wanted to speak with Detective Lesneski. Fleming relented and agreed to speak with Detective Lesneski.
A few minutes later, Sergeant Clayton informed Detective Lesneski that Fleming wished to speak with him. A few more minutes passed before Detective Lesneski walked over to the van, excused Sergeant Clayton, and sat down with Fleming. Fleming recalled that he was very upset at the time, and began feeling nauseous, “like he had to vomit.” Fleming acknowledges that Detective Lesneski was very accommodating, and “pulled the van up” so that the other officers would not see Fleming crying. Detective Lesneski also agreed to open a window or door to give Fleming some air.
Detective Lesneski testified that, after being summoned to the van by Sergeant Clayton, he did not ask Fleming “any questions or begin interrogation at all.” In fact, Detective Lesneski claims that he did not “sa[y] anything at all to [Fleming] prior to him speaking out on these issues.” Rather, according to Detective Lesneski, Fleming voluntarily proceeded to make several incriminating statements, ultimately confessing that he shot and killed Scott *546York with the shotgun that the police had just found.
Fleming disputes Detective Lesneski’s version of events, especially with respect to one crucial issue. Fleming claims that, before he made any incriminating statements, Detective Lesneski stated that he was confident he had just found the murder weapon, and warned Fleming that “it [would] be within [Fleming’s] best interests to cooperate.” At this point, Fleming relented and began talking to Detective Lesneski.
Rather than advising Fleming of his Miranda rights at this point, Detective Lesneski waited until Fleming had confessed before interrupting him to remind him of his rights. According to Detective Lesneski, after being readvised of his rights, Fleming offered more details about the incident, such as the location of the shooting and what type of gun and shells he used. Approximately one hour later, the police transported Fleming to the Are-nac County Sheriffs Department, where Fleming was advised of his Miranda rights yet again, and a recorded statement was taken. In his recorded statement, Fleming again confirmed that he shot York, but now claimed that York had threatened to kill Fleming and his family.
All told, the record indicates that the police advised Fleming of his Miranda rights on three separate occasions over the course of the day: first, after the police discovered drugs in Fleming’s barn; second, several hours later in the narcotics van after Fleming already had confessed to Detective Lesneski; and, finally, at the police station before Fleming gave a recorded statement. Sergeant Clayton and Detective Lesneski claim that they never made any promises or threats to Fleming. Fleming, however, claims that, while he was not “directly” threatened, Sergeant Clayton did warn him to “get with the program” and Detective Lesneski did shout and gesture at him and then implored him “to cooperate.”
Upon Fleming’s motion to exclude his confession, the trial court held a Walker hearing to determine whether Fleming’s initial inculpatory statements to Detective Lesneski were admissible at trial. As the majority points out, the parties dispute the precise issue addressed at the Walker hearing. The State claims that the hearing addressed only whether Fleming’s statements were “voluntary.” Fleming, on the other hand, contends that defense counsel also asserted that Fleming’s statements should be excluded under Mosley because Sergeant Clayton and Detective Lesneski continued to interrogate Fleming and to pressure him to confess after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court concluded that Fleming’s statements were admissible.
After a three-day jury trial, Fleming was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Fleming appealed his conviction as a matter of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In an unpublished opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Fleming’s conviction. Fleming, 2002 WL 988568. In reaching that conclusion, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that Fleming had forfeited his Mosley claim because the Walker hearing “addressed only the voluntariness of his confession.” Id. at *1. The Michigan Court of Appeals thus reviewed that claim for plain error only. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals did not consider the merits of Fleming’s Mosley claim outside the context of its plain-error inquiry. Id. at *1-2. The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied Fleming’s application for leave to appeal. People v. Fleming, 468 Mich. 872, 659 N.W.2d 234 (2003).
*547III.
In light of the Michigan Court of Appeals’ default ruling, if Fleming’s Mosley claim is to be considered at all, it must be because the Michigan court’s determination that Fleming had forfeited the claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling law, or unreasonable in light of the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). And that is precisely what the majority has determined. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Fleming’s Mosley claim was not procedurally defaulted, I write separately on this point only because I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that this holding rests on the State’s concession that the Mosley issue had been raised in state court. Whether or not the State concedes the point, the record evinces that Fleming’s Mosley claim was fairly presented at the Walker hearing, and thus the issue was properly preserved for appeal.
The doctrine of procedural default provides: “In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Federal habeas review of a state court judgment thus is precluded under this doctrine only if the state court judgment “rests on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).
In the direct review context, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine is jurisdictional. In the collateral review context, however, the doctrine is based on comity. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (“Without the rule, ... habeas would offer state prisoners whose custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the State’s interest in enforcing its laws.”). Nevertheless, the doctrine has a statutory dimension in the habeas context because it serves to reinforce AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement. See id. at 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (“In the absence of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaustion requirement by defaulting their federal claims in state court.”).
Under AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (emphasis added). To satisfy this requirement, a claim raised in a habeas petition must be “properly presented” to the state courts in a procedural context where a merits review is possible. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (“Section 2254(c) requires only that state prisoners give state courts a fair opportunity to act on their claims.” (emphasis in original)); Franklin v. Rose, 811 F.2d 322, 324-25 (6th Cir.1987). Accordingly, it is not necessary for the state courts to resolve the claim, only that it be fairly presented. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728.
As to Fleming’s Mosley claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the Walker hearing “addressed only the volun-*548tariness of his confession,” and thus concluded that the claim had been “forfeited.” Fleming, 2002 WL 988568, at *1. The district court rejected that conclusion as contrary to controlling law, instead finding that the “clear record” showed that Fleming properly raised the issue and thus preserved his Mosley claim. Fleming v. Mettrish, No. 04-CV-72365, 2007 WL 2875281, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Sept.28, 2007) (citing Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 967 (6th Cir.1983)). The transcript of Fleming’s Walker hearing confirms the district court’s conclusion.
In determining whether a claim has been “fairly presented,” this Court has focused on four actions that a defendant can take that are significant in preserving a claim for habeas review: “(1) reliance upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) reliance upon state cases employing federal constitutional analysis; (3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) alleging facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law.” McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir.2000). As the record demonstrates, Fleming’s counsel took all four of these actions during the Walker hearing.
As to the first two factors, there is no serious question that defense counsel relied on both federal and state authority recognizing that the police must respect a suspect’s right to remain silent. During closing arguments, defense counsel expressly referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mosley, as well as cited to and quoted from People v. Catey, 135 Mich.App. 714, 356 N.W.2d 241 (1984), the leading Michigan case interpreting and applying Mosley.
Relying on both Catey and Mosley, Fleming’s counsel also unambiguously framed the issue in terms of a Mosley violation, arguing that Fleming’s confession should be excluded because the police “ignored” his assertion of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Quoting from Catey, defense counsel also specifically argued that the “subsequent interrogation” by Sergeant Clayton and Detective Lesne-ski had “the characteristics of a repeated effort to wear down the defendant’s resistance.” To support that claim, defense counsel elicited testimony that went not just to the voluntariness issue, but also to the circumstances under which Fleming ultimately was persuaded to confess despite his earlier assertion of his intention to remain silent. The record thus confirms that defense counsel also satisfied the final two factors that this Court has considered “significant to the determination whether a claim has been ‘fairly presented.’ ” McMeans, 228 F.3d at 681.
Despite this clear record, the State argues that Fleming failed to fairly present his Mosley claim to the trial court because Fleming’s suppression motion challenged the admissibility of the confession on vol-untariness grounds only. During closing arguments at the Walker hearing, the State certainly urged the court to focus on “nothing but voluntariness,” and the trial court did state that the “only issue” it needed to resolve was “whether or not it was voluntary.” But the trial court apparently understood the voluntariness inquiry as encompassing the Mosley issue,6 as it *549ultimately held that, “[g]iven all the circumstances, I — -I believe that [Fleming’s] statement under Edwards, Mosley, Katey [sic] that under this fact scenario, it’s voluntary.”
In any event, regardless of whether the state trial court couched its ruling in terms of voluntariness, the only relevant question for determining procedural default is whether Fleming “fairly presented” his Mosley claim to the state courts. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45, 119 S.Ct. 1728. Because defense counsel undoubtedly did so, I would affirm the district court’s determination that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ ruling that Fleming forfeited his Mosley claim is an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
IV.
Having rejected the Michigan Court of Appeals’ default ruling as contrary to controlling authority or unreasonable in light of the record, our review of Fleming’s Mosley claim is not constrained by that court’s plain-error review. Regardless of whether the Michigan courts addressed aspects of Fleming’s claim in conducting that inquiry, it is evident that the Michigan courts never considered the merits of Fleming’s Mosley claim outside the context of the plain-error inquiry. With no state court adjudication “on the merits” to which we must defer, we review the claim de novo.
In the habeas context, this Court reviews a district court’s legal conclusions de novo, but will not set aside its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Dyer v. Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 283-84 (6th Cir.2006). State-court determinations, on the other hand, generally are governed by the standard of review set forth in the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As explained above, however, AEDPA’s deferential standard of review applies only to claims that were adjudicated “on the merits” by the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Where a state court does not reach the merits of a claim, this Court applies de novo review. Danner, 448 F.3d at 376; Maples, 340 F.3d at 436.
Here, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that Fleming had forfeited his Mosley claim by failing to raise it at the Walker hearing. Fleming, 2002 WL 988568, at *1. Based on the default ruling, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed Fleming’s claim for plain error only. Id. Under that standard, the Michigan Court of Appeals required Fleming to establish that the trial court’s ruling regarding the “the voluntariness of his confession” was in error, and that “the error was plain, i.e. clear or obvious ... [and] the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. In addition, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that, even if Fleming made such a showing, “an appellate court must then exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse.” Id. (emphasis added). The court further noted that “[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Clearly, the application of the plain-error standard of review placed significant additional burdens on Fleming over and above the showing required under Mosley.
For the reasons explored in detail above, I believe that controlling authority dictates *550that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ plain-error analysis does not constitute an adjudication “on the merits” for purpose of AEDPA. See Benge, 474 F.3d at 246; Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 765. Ignoring this controlling precedent, the majority concludes that AEDPA’s deferential standard of review applies. I cannot subscribe to that conclusion.
In light of the Michigan court’s ruling that Fleming had forfeited his Mosley claim, if we are to consider that claim at all it must be because the Michigan court’s default ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling law or unreasonable in light of the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Although the majority rejects the Michigan court’s determination that the claim had been procedurally defaulted, it nevertheless continues to insist that the state court’s adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA. But once we determine that the Michigan court’s default ruling was in error, we no longer are bound by whatever “safety valve” review the state courts may have applied to avoid serious injustice, regardless of whether that inquiry explored the merits of Fleming’s claim to some extent. See Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 765 (holding that a state court’s plain-error inquiry “is not equivalent to a review of the merits”); see also Roy, 907 F.2d at 390 (holding that a state court’s plain-error inquiry is “not sufficiently a ruling on the merits”).
If, as the majority now holds, the Michigan court’s default ruling is wrong as a matter of law, then we no longer owe deference to the Michigan court’s undeniably more burdensome review of Fleming’s claim. Thus, the deferential review required under AEDPA is inapplicable, and we must review the claim de novo. Maples, 340 F.3d at 436 (“Where, as here, the state court did not assess the merits of a claim properly raised in a habeas petition, the deference due under AEDPA does not apply.”).
y.
Applying de novo review, as I conclude we must, it is evident that the police failed to fully respect and scrupulously honor Fleming’s decision to cut off questioning.
A. A Suspect’s Fifth Amendment Right to Cut Off Questioning
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V. This privilege against self-incrimination requires that law enforcement officials “must cease” questioning any suspect who invokes his or her right to remain silent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
The Miranda safeguards “come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). In other words, the term “interrogation” under Miranda “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Whether police conduct constitutes “interrogation” is determined “without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police.” Id. Thus, if a suspect invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the police “must cease” all interrogation of the suspect, including any comments that “the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”
In defining the scope of Miranda’s protections, the Supreme Court has concluded that “the admissibility of statements ob*551tained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends ... on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). That is to say, the police violate a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights where they “fail[ ] to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind.” Id. at 105-06, 96 S.Ct. 321. The Mosley Court, however, rejected as “extreme” the notion that Miranda requires “a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances,” reasoning that such a blanket rule “would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests.” Id. at 102, 96 S.Ct. 321.
The facts in Mosley supported the conclusion that the defendant’s rights had been scrupulously honored because his subsequent statements were made to another officer, regarding another crime, and after a significant period of time had elapsed since the suspect had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. 423 U.S. at 104-05, 96 S.Ct. 321. In addition, the Court emphasized that the suspect “was given full and complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation,” and was “reminded again that he could remain silent and could consult with a lawyer, and was carefully given a full and fair opportunity to exercise these options.” Id. at 104-05, 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added).
In assessing Fleming’s claim, we first must determine whether the comments made by Detective Lesneski and Sergeant Clayton constitute “interrogation” under Innis. If so, we then must consider whether the police fully respected Fleming’s decision to remain silent. That inquiry requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances, including, among other things, whether: (1) Fleming was advised of his Miranda rights before the initial interrogation; (2) questioning stopped immediately once Fleming asserted his right to remain silent; (3) the police waited a significant period of time after Fleming’s invocation of his right to remain silent before questioning him again; (4) Fleming received fresh Miranda warnings before the interview that led to his confession; and (5) the subsequent interrogation concerned the same crime that was the subject of the first interrogation. Because we must examine the totality of the circumstances, these factors are merely signposts that help guide our inquiry. The fundamental consideration is, as the First Circuit has put it, whether the suspect remained “in charge of the decision whether and to whom he would speak.” United States v. Andrade, 135 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir.1998).
B. Innis and Mosley Analysis
Approximately one hour into the search of Fleming’s property, the police discovered drugs in Fleming’s barn. At that point, Detective Lesneski advised Fleming of his rights, and asked if Fleming would be willing to talk to him. Fleming emphatically stated that he would not discuss any matters related to the homicide. Although Fleming did not state that he wished to remain “silent,” the Supreme Court has long held that “no ritualistic formula or talismanic phrase is essential in order to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.” Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194, 75 S.Ct. 687, 99 L.Ed. 997 (1955). Fleming’s refusal to discuss the homicide *552was sufficient to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 518-19 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that suspect invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege where she repeatedly made statements such as “I don’t want to talk about it” in response to questions about the crime).
Detective Lesneski initially respected Fleming’s decision, and immediately stopped questioning Fleming. Fleming was then arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the backseat of a state police vehicle. An hour or so later, Fleming was transferred from the backseat of the police cruiser to the front passenger seat of a police van.
There is no indication in the record that Fleming was transferred to Sergeant Clayton’s custody in order to facilitate further questioning. Sergeant Clayton was called to the scene only after the search was underway, and only because the search team discovered narcotics on the premises. Moreover, Sergeant Clayton is a member of the narcotics team from the Ogemaw County Sheriffs Department, not the Are-nac County Sheriffs Department, which was leading the investigation into York’s murder. It thus is possible that Sergeant Clayton was unaware of the underlying homicide investigation that was the impetus for the search being conducted. In fact, Sergeant Clayton testified that he did not know what evidence the rest of the search team was looking for when they left to search the nearby creek.
Sergeant Clayton’s motives, however, are irrelevant. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Because Fleming had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, all coercive police practices “must cease,” and the police were required to “scrupulously honor” Fleming’s decision to remain silent. Although Detective Lesne-ski’s direct interrogation ceased, the police officers at the scene — whether intentionally or not is irrelevant — persisted “in repeated efforts to wear down [Fleming’s] resistance” to questioning. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06, 96 S.Ct. 321. Fleming was arrested, placed in handcuffs, and then detained in custody at the scene for several hours while the search of his residence and property continued. The police kept Fleming in position to observe their search, and celebrated their discovery of the shotgun right in front of him. In fact, on Fleming’s account, Detective Lesneski gestured in Fleming’s direction and declared “Hell, yeah, I got you!” At this point, Sergeant Clayton told Fleming that things did not look good for him and then stated that it would be in Fleming’s “best interest” to “do the right thing.” According to Fleming, Sergeant Clayton also “strongly recommend[ed]” that Fleming “get with the program.” Sergeant Clayton then asked Fleming whether he wished to talk to Detective Lesneski. At this point, Fleming relented.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, it is evident that the police did not “scrupulously honor” Fleming’s decision to remain silent. Even if Fleming’s version of events is discounted, Sergeant Clayton’s statement that Fleming should “do the right thing,” when considered in context, rose above the level of mere admonition. As an experienced police officer, Sergeant Clayton certainly should have known that such a statement, especially when made at the scene of an ongoing warrant search and shortly after the discovery of the murder weapon, was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682.
That conclusion is all the more certain if Fleming’s version of events is accepted. According to Fleming, Sergeant Clayton also “strongly” encouraged him to “get with the program.” Fleming also claims *553that Detective Lesneski explicitly advised him that it was in his best interest “to cooperate.” Although neither Sergeant Clayton nor Detective Lesneski ever directly asked Fleming about the homicide, these statements, especially when taken together, demonstrate a persistent and not-so-subtle effort to persuade Fleming to discuss the homicide. Accordingly, I respectfully must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that these statements do not rise to the level of “interrogation” under Innis.
Recognizing the inherently “coercive pressures of the custodial setting,” the Mosley Court emphasized that, once a suspect decides to terminate an interrogation, that decision must be “fully respected” and the police must not “try either to resume the questioning or in any way to persuade [a suspect] to reconsider his position.” 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). Although Mosley stopped short of creating a per se rule prohibiting the police from ever asking a suspect to reconsider his or her refusal to answer questions, it does require that the police make every effort to ensure that “such reconsideration is urged in a careful, noncoercive manner at not too great length and in the context that a defendant’s assertion of his right not to speak will be honored.” United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir.1972).
The conduct of the police in this case is dramatically different in every relevant respect from the conduct that the Supreme Court found acceptable in Mosley. Here, the police did not seek to reinitiate questioning regarding a different crime. The police also did not reinitiate contact with Fleming in a careful or noncoercive manner. Nor did the police readvise Fleming of his Miranda rights before taking his statement. Rather, the police handcuffed Fleming and kept him locked in a car for several hours.7 Then, they rejoiced in the discovery of evidence right in front of him, with the lead investigator gesturing and shouting at him. After building a rapport with Fleming during hours of “small talk,” Sergeant Clayton then advised Fleming to “do the right thing” and encouraged him to “get with the program.” And putting to rest any doubt that these comments were intended to do anything other than wear down Fleming’s resistance to questioning, Sergeant Clayton almost immediately asked Fleming if he wanted to speak to Detective Lesneski. And when Detective Lesneski arrived, he also pressured Fleming “to cooperate.”8 At this point, Fleming relented.
*554If the rule announced in Mosley is to have any meaning at all, certainly it must protect against such coercive tactics. Certainly, it must prevent law enforcement personnel from repeatedly pressuring a suspect to “do the right thing” and “get with the program.” Certainly, it must preclude the police from explicitly pressuring a suspect “to cooperate” after the suspect already has invoked his or her Fifth Amendment right to cut off questioning.
Whether overt or more subtle, Mosley protects against the state’s attempts to encourage, pressure, persuade, or coerce a suspect to abandon his or her decision to remain silent. Although Mosley permits the police to present new information to a suspect so that he is able “to make informed and intelligent assessments of [his] interests,” 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. 321, encouraging a suspect to “get with the program” and “do the right thing” so that he is not “sorry” for something he has not said certainly exceeds the scope of permissible interaction with a defendant who already has invoked his right to remain silent. Indeed, each of these comments evinces an unequivocal intent to persuade Fleming to confess, or at least abandon his decision to remain silent. Such efforts plainly are inconsistent with the duty of the police under Mosley to “scrupulously honor” a suspect’s decision to remain silent.
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Fleming is not required to show that the police interrogation was “very, very one-sided,” as was the case in Thomplcins v. Berghuis. Rather, Fleming must show only that the police failed to “scrupulously honor” his decision to remain silent. 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321. In fact, it is the state that bears the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the right to remain silent, once invoked, in fact has been “knowingly and voluntarily waived.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (citation omitted). As the Third Circuit has noted, in those cases “where the right to remain silent was held not to have been scrupulously honored, the circumstances lead to a conclusion that the police resumed questioning for no other reason than to induce the defendant to change his mind.” Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1029 (3d Cir.1988) (citing United States v. Charlton, 565 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.1977)). Such is the case here, as the comments by Sergeant Clayton and Detective Lesneski obviously were made “for no other reason than to induce” Fleming to abandon his decision not to answer questions about the homicide.
In describing the twin pillars of Miranda’s prophylactic warnings — the right to counsel and the right to remain silent— the Supreme Court repeatedly has insisted on a “relatively rigid” application of these requirements. Fare, 442 U.S. at 718, 99 S.Ct. 2560. Underlying the Court’s insistence on such rigidity is the recognition that “the coercive setting of custodial interrogation is ready-made for the infringement, whether intentional or inadvertent, of constitutional protections, such that suspects must be plainly advised of their rights so they may act on them.” Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 430 (6th Cir.2007) (Cole, J., dissenting). A rigid application of Mosley thus is necessary to protect against the inherently coercive pressures of the custodial setting, and to ensure that an in-custody confession is the result of a knowing and voluntary waiver of an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination.
*555If, as the majority believes, the rule announced in Mosley tolerates the coercive pressures applied here, Mosley’s, admonition that the police must “scrupulously honor” and “fully respect” a suspect’s decision to cut off questioning will be rendered nearly meaningless. Indeed, on the majority’s view, Mosley will protect against only the most egregious coercive practices. Badgering a suspect under the hot lights of an interrogation room is not the only means of wearing down a suspect’s resistance to answering questions. To remain a viable deterrent against more subtle coercive practices, Mosley must be applied rigidly. See Van Hook, 488 F.3d at 430-31 (Cole, J., dissenting) (detailing the Supreme Court’s insistence on a rigid application of the parallel rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)).
Because the investigating officers did not scrupulously honor Fleming’s decision to cut off questioning, any statements obtained after Fleming asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege were obtained in violation of Mosley and thus should not have been admitted into evidence.
C. Harmless Error Analysis
Where a confession has been erroneously admitted in violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, this constitutional error is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310-11, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., delivering the opinion of the Court with respect to this issue). To determine whether an error is harmless, this Court considers the “ ‘prejudicial impact of [the] constitutional error’ ” and “whether the constitutional violation ‘had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” Vasquez v. Jones, 496 F.3d 564, 575 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007), and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). This standard applies in the context of § 2254 habeas claims regardless of whether the state courts recognized the error. Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 575.
Given the importance of Fleming’s statements in proving the State’s case, the admission of Fleming’s confession was not harmless error. Fleming’s confession— along with his recorded statements and testimony at trial, which are discussed below — undoubtedly was the strongest evidence of his guilt. Other than Fleming’s own statements, the prosecution introduced no evidence corroborating that Fleming shot York or was ever present at the scene of the crime. Without Fleming’s statements, the prosecution also would have been unable to provide the jury with a motive. Fleming’s statements also were crucial in linking the gun to Fleming because there was no physical evidence linking Fleming to the murder weapon.9 Consequently, without Fleming’s own incriminating statements, the prosecution would not have been able to establish the most critical elements of its case against Fleming.
Fleming’s confession and testimony thus were very powerful and prejudicial evidence. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (White, J., delivering the opinion of the Court as to this issue) (“A *556confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). Therefore, the admission of Fleming’s incriminating statements was not harmless error because it prejudicially impacted Fleming’s trial and had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 575. See Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir.1990) (en banc) (finding that admission of confession obtained in violation of Miranda was not harmless error because “the portion of [the defendant’s] confession taken after the Miranda violation — other than the inferences to be made from the fact of the robbery and shooting — was the only concrete, non-circumstantial piece of evidence the state had to prove the premeditation element of the crime”).
D. Post-Miranda Statements and Trial Testimony
The State argues that any error was harmless because Fleming’s first confession was merely cumulative of Fleming’s subsequent statements to the police and his own testimony at trial. This argument, however, assumes that Fleming’s subsequent statements to the police and his testimony at trial should not also be excluded. That assumption is mistaken. Although Fleming made additional incriminating statements to the police after he received a fresh Miranda warning, and also testified at trial to shooting York, those statements also should have been excluded because Fleming’s first confession was elicited in violation of Mosley.
Under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), if an interrogation elicits a voluntary confession but the interrogating officers failed to administer a Miranda warning, subsequent incriminating statements are not necessarily poisoned by the fact that the first confession occurred without a proper Miranda warning. Id. at 309-10, 105 S.Ct. 1285. However, Elstad applies only where the first confession is “unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will” or otherwise the product of a constitutional violation, such as “police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.” Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285.
In this case, unlike Elstad, the failure of the police to scrupulously honor Fleming’s invocation of his right to remain silent was not merely a procedural error in administering Miranda warnings. Rather, the investigating officers’ repeated efforts to wear down Fleming’s resistance to questioning constitute “police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.”10
*557Other relevant factors that traditionally guide our inquiry into whether a confession obtained in the wake of a Fifth Amendment violation should be admitted into evidence also weigh in favor of exclusion. In deciding whether a second confession has been tainted by a prior coerced statement, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to “examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285. In particular, courts must consider “the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators.” Id. at 310, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Whether effective Miranda warnings preceded the subsequent statements also is relevant. West-over v. United States, decided together with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 496-97, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
In Fleming’s case, an examination of these factors makes clear that there was no “break in the stream of events ... sufficient to insulate [his post-Miranda] statement from the effect of all that went before.” Clewis v. State of Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967). Fleming’s subsequent incriminating statements were elicited in close proximity to the first, unconstitutionally-obtained confession. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (“[I]t would ordinarily be unrealistic to treat two spates of integrated and proximately conducted questioning as independent interrogations subject to independent evaluation simply because Miranda warnings formally punctuate them in the middle.”). And, unlike other cases where this Court has permitted the admission of subsequent statements, there was no relevant change in Fleming’s custodial conditions. See Coomer v. Yukins, 533 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir.2008) (upholding as reasonable the admission of subsequent statements elicited after “several hours had passed since her first oral confession” because police informed the defendant that “circumstances had changed [and] that she was now in custody”); United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 497 (6th Cir.2008) (finding no error in admission of incriminating post-Miranda statements made after initial unwarned but voluntary statements that were not elicited as the result of “interrogation”). Given that Detective Lesneski’s second set of Miranda warnings was delivered in the middle of a confession that was elicited in violation of Mosley, Fleming’s post-Miranda statements also should have been excluded. See United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 429-30 (6th Cir.2008).
Whether Fleming’s trial testimony also is tainted by the admission of Fleming’s prior incriminating statements is a closer call. Because the trial court failed to exclude statements elicited in violation of Fleming’s Fifth Amendment rights, it is impossible to say whether Fleming would have adopted a different trial strategy and decided not to testify in his own defense. Compare Burks v. Perini, No. 85-3507, 1986 WL 18388, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov.25, 1986) (“Accordingly, this court concludes that the government’s use of Burks’ involuntary statement did not induce him to testify on his own behalf and that the trial court’s decision to admit his confession, although erroneous under the circumstances, constituted harmless error.”). Because the entire thrust of Fleming’s trial strategy was determined by the trial court’s failure to exclude his confession, however, Fleming’s trial testimony must be set aside in determining whether harm*558less error occurred. See Kordenbrock, 919 F.2d at 1099-1100.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s resolution of Fleming’s Mosley claim. I would affirm the district court’s decision to grant the habeas petition on that basis and order that Fleming be retried or released.

. The Michigan court’s “safety valve” review for plain error is not unique. "Many states have procedural default rules with similar 'safety valves' for situations in which enforcing the procedural default would work a serious injustice.” Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172, 178 (3rd Cir.2008) (citing Neal v. Gramley, 99 F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir.1996)).

. The majority argues that all of our cases holding that AEDPA deference does not apply in this context resolved only the "analytically prior question of whether a federal court is permitted to hear an issue in the first placet, or whether we are precluded from addressing the claim] under the doctrine of procedural default.” Contrary to the majority's argument, although each of these decisions obviously addressed the default issue, even a cursory review demonstrates that they also proceeded to resolve what standard of review applies in this context.

. In Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir.2003), the Tenth Circuit surveyed the various approaches that the Courts of Appeals have adopted regarding this issue, concluding that there is a split among the circuits and, significantly, identifying this Court as construing a state court's plain-error review as an application of state procedural default rules rather than an adjudication on the merits. Id. at 1205 n. 7 (citing Hinkle, 271 F.3d at 244).

. Underlying our decision in Vasquez v. Jones, 486 F.3d 135 (6th Cir.2007), is the express recognition that a state court’s consideration of a "claim” is distinct from its consideration of an "issue” relevant to that claim. Id. at 141. If, according to Vasquez, only "modified AEDPA deference” is required where a state court undoubtedly "adjudicated the claim [on the merits,] but with little analysis on the substantive constitutional issue,” id., then there is even less justification to apply full AEDPA deference, as the majority does here, where the state court adjudicated and resolved the federal claim on state procedural grounds and merely addressed merits-related issues in the course of that discussion.

. It is important to stress that de novo review is appropriate here not because the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed Fleming’s claim for plain error, but rather because, unlike Neal, we have determined that the state court’s procedural-default determination was in error.

. The trial court seems to have conflated the inquiry into the voluntariness of Fleming's confession with the inquiry required under Mosley. The two inquiries, however, are distinct. "While the suspect’s state of mind is central to the voluntariness finding, the Mosley test focuses on what the police did, and when, after the suspect exercised his or her right to remain silent.” United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378, 1384 (1st Cir.1992). Thus, under Miranda and Mosley, "a court need determine specifically whether there has *549been a voluntary waiver only after the government has carried its burden of showing that it complied with the required procedures.” Id. at 1383 (citations omitted).

. The majority considers the time that elapsed between Fleming's initial refusal to answer questions about the homicide to cut in favor of its conclusion that there is no Mosley violation. Although the time factor may lean slightly in the State's favor, this cannot be the crucial factor in determining whether a Fifth Amendment violation occurred in this case. Unlike Mosley, the conditions of Fleming’s detainment did not permit him to independently reconsider his decision to remain silent. Fleming was kept in handcuffs at the scene the entire time. He also was subjected to repeated efforts by the police to convince him to discuss the homicide. Considering the totality of the circumstances, it does not appear that sufficient time elapsed to neutralize the "inherently compelling pressures" of Fleming's circumstances. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In any event, other factors are much more probative of whether a Mosley violation occurred in this case.

. In an effort to support its tenuous conclusion, the majority mischaracterizes some of Detective Lesneski's comments. In particular, the majority claims that Detective Lesne-ski’s "suggestion” to cooperate was accompanied by "a caution not to say anything about which he [Fleming] would be ‘sorry.’ ” But, as the majority opinion concedes earlier, Detective Lesneski told Fleming that he should not “be sorry for something you have or haven’t said." Far from urging Fleming to be cautious, the suggestion that Fleming should not *554be sorry for something he has not said is yet another example of Detective Lesneski trying to chip away at Fleming's decision to remain silent.

. The only evidence to this effect was testimony that Fleming owned a shotgun that looked similar to or was the same model as the shotgun found in the creek. Although the shotgun was discovered in a stream on or near Fleming's property, Fleming was renting the property at the time, the property was expansive and open, and the location where the gun was found was a part of the creek that was “kind of a party spot, or used to be.”

. Logically, this would seem to be true of all cases involving Mosley violations, especially where the police engaged in deliberate “efforts to wear down [a suspect’s] resistance and make him change his mind,” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06, 96 S.Ct. 321, because such coercive police tactics are akin to the deliberate "police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings” that the Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (plurality), requires the exclusion of post -Miranda statements. Taken together with Justice Kennedy’s more narrow concurrence, a majority of the Court in Seibert agreed that a "deliberate” question-first strategy would preclude post-warning statements unless curative measures were taken. Id. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J\, concurring) ("The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the deliberate two-step strategy was employed. If the deliberate two-step strategy has been used, postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning statements must be excluded un*557less curative measures are taken before the postwarning statement is made.”).