Court Opinion

ID: 9632138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:04:14.051207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:43.732522
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, J.,
with whom SMITH, C. J., and McQUADE, J., concur, dissenting in part:
After the filing of the wife’s complaint for divorce, a temporary restraining order was issued by the court restraining the defendant from going upon the home premises occupied by the plaintiff and minor children, and from interfering with or molesting them.
In the prayer of her complaint, in addition to the divorce, custody of the children and an award of support for the children, plaintiff prayed:
“That the plaintiff be awarded all of the community property of the plaintiff and defendant and that defendant be required to complete the payments on the residence so that plaintiff may have a home for the children.”
The community property consisted principally of the home which was subject to an incumbrance of $3,000. After trial the court found:
“The plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence her allegations of cruelty on the part of the defendant or sufficient grounds for separate maintenance; on some occasions over many years past, the defendant upon returning home, while tired or aggravated after working *384hard on his regular job as a mail carrier for the Postal Department in Grangeville, or after completing his night work at the grocery store, did use profanity in the presence of the plaintiff and the children and on some occasions called her a ‘stupid moron,’ and on others a ‘horses ass,’; defendant also, after many years of marriage tended to take the plaintiff for granted and neglected to tell her he loved her, but it is apparent that plaintiff, up until the spring of 1966, accepted these occasional epithets as a part of marriage to the defendant; that the same do not constitute mental cruelty to the plaintiff, but if so, the plaintiff has not brought this action within a reasonable time after the commencement of the use of such language toward her by the defendant and her cause of action, if any she had, is, and must be denied under Subdivision 4 of Section 32-611 Idaho Code.”
Judgment was entered denying a divorce, vacating the temporary restraining order, and providing that defendant husband, “as head of the household and family, is hereby restored to the occupancy of the family home.” It is our long established rule that findings supported by evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. However, we do not agree with the grounds upon which that conclusion was based, and for that reason we cannot concur in the denial of separate maintenance. The plaintiff testified that through the years of the marriage defendant had habitually addressed vile and profane language toward her, which conduct on his part increased in frequency and intensity ,as the years went by. She testified that he repeatedly called her “a horse’s ass,” “stupid moron,” “god-damn liar,” “bastard,” and “immoral slut.” (The latter epithet was addressed to her only once.) Defendant admitted the use of the first three epithets; said nothing about the fourth; and denied the fifth. She further testified that along about March, 1966, and prior to the filing of her complaint on May 4, 1966, defendant had in a scuffle knocked her to the bathroom floor and kicked her with his boot, and on another occasion had seized her by the throat, threatening to choke her; had dragged her to the bedroom and had thrown her upon the bed with such force and violence that she bounced or rolled off to the floor on the other side; that she had left his bed and bedroom at that time and thereafter slept on the davenport in another room; that in the course of this altercation she attempted to telephone the police; that defendant wrested the phone from her twice and threatened to jerk the “god-damn wires out” if she persisted.
Defendant testified, as to the bathroom incident, that plaintiff slapped him, he grabbed her wrists, she slumped to the bathroom floor and that he did not kick her. As to the bedroom incident, he testified that he took hold of her arms in an attempt to restrain her from leaving the bedroom; that he did not push her or throw her onto the bed, but that she fell over the corner of the bed.
As to the result or effect of defendant’s conduct plaintiff testified that she had contemplated a divorce some years earlier; that defendant promised he would try to do better; that his use of the epithet “goddamn liar” was so frequent around the home that the children had begun to call each other liars; that she had become frightened and fearful of the defendant. In response to a question put to her by the trial judge she testified that defendant’s conduct finally triggered the divorce action. “I told him [defendant] I just couldn’t go on any more,” and “I told him that I had been walked on long enough,” and “I got so I hated to see him come home, and that’s a terrible thing and you think, well its time to go hide.” “I felt like I was being abused all the time. I couldn’t enjoy life.”
She was directly asked about the possibility of reconciliation and testified that she did not think it possible, and when asked to explain why, she said that on oc*385casions He Had been mean and abusive toward the children and that the children were beginning to respond by the same kind of conduct, and that defendant was the type to hold a grudge, and that she having filed an action for divorce, “We could never be entirely compatible again.”
We do not recite the conduct of defendant toward plaintiff for the purpose of finding error in the court’s denial of the divorce, but for the purpose of showing that plaintiff did establish sufficient grounds for separate maintenance. It is clear from the record that the trial judge minimized plaintiff’s testimony and accepted the explanations given by defendant, and also his testimony that he loved his wife and family and wanted to continue the marital relationship. It is also clear that it was the purpose of the trial judge in his findings and judgment to effect a reconciliation between the parties in the interest of the family relationship and the children of the marriage.
Reconciliation would be the best solution of the problems presented to the court in this case. The parties are the parents of six children ranging in age from 5 to 16 years at the time the action was commenced. Defendant’s income from his employment at the post office and his janitorial work two nights a week in a local food store provides little more than the bare necessities for the family, and defendant has accumulated considerable indebtedness in addition to the incumbrance on the home. If a divorce had been granted the trial court would have been confronted with the problem of dividing the family and arranging for the support of two households out of income scarcely sufficient for one. However, as the trial judge remarked during the course of the trial, the law could not compel the plaintiff to live with the defendant as his wife if she refused to do so; and yet that is the effect of the judgment entered. Plaintiff must receive defendant back into the home and live there with him in order to obtain food and clothing for her children and food for herself. (Her own clothing has been provided by gifts from friends and relatives and the remodeling of her high-school clothing.) To support such a judgment, the court must find not only that a divorce is not justified, but that reconciliation probably can be effected. In any event, the reasoning upon which the trial court based its conclusions cannot be supported.
Applicable propositions long recognized by this court are: (1) The. court in denying a divorce may nevertheless award separate maintenance where the parties cannot live together. Parsons v. Parsons, 72 Idaho 455, 243 P.2d 973 (1952); Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, 68 Idaho 275, 193 P.2d 391 (1948); Sauvageau v. Sauvageau, 59 Idaho 190, 81 P.2d 731 (1938); Radermacher v. Radermacher, 59 Idaho 716, 87 P.2d 461 (1938).
(2) “In an action for divorce on the ground of mental cruelty, the particular acts of cruelty complained of are not of themselves the determining factor, but the question of whether the alleged acts of cruelty caused grievous mental suffering on the part of the innocent party is the determining question.” Parsons v. Parsons, 72 Idaho 455, at 456, 243 P.2d 973 (1952).
Parks v. Parks, 91 Idaho 420, 422 P.2d 618 (1967); Veach v. Veach, 87 Idaho 237, 392 P.2d 425 (1964) ; Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, supra; Beckstead v. Beckstead, 50 Idaho 556, 299 P. 339 (1931) ; Donaldson v. Donaldson, 31 Idaho 180, 170 P. 94 (1917). (3) Repetition of an act of cruelty, which has been condoned, nullifies the condonation and restores the condoned act as a ground for divorce. Chresst v. Chresst, 77 Idaho 486, 295 P.2d 704 (1956); Arestizabal v. Arestizabal, 67 Idaho 492, 186 P.2d 218 (1947); Olson v. Olson, 47 Idaho 374, 276 P. 34 (1929); and (4) a course of offensive conduct by one spouse toward the other, extending over a period of years and resulting in grievous mental suffering to the innocent party, will constitute grounds for a divorce, although the isolated acts, separately and individually consid*386ered, may be regarded as trivial. Parks v. Parks, 91 Idaho 420, 422 P.2d 618 (1967) ; Veach v. Veach, 87 Idaho 237, 392 P.2d 425 (1964) ; Angleton v. Angleton, 84 Idaho 184, 370 P.2d 788 (1962); Beckstead v. Beckstead, 50 Idaho 556, 299 P. 339 (1931) ; Donaldson v. Donaldson, 31 Idaho 180, 170 P. 94 (1917). In the Donaldson case this court quoted with approval from Mosher v. Mosher, 16 N.D. 269, 113 N.W. 99, 12 L.R.A.,N.S., 820, 125 Am.St.Rep. 654, as follows:
“ ‘A continuous course of fault-finding, threats, and other acts, intended to aggravate and annoy the other party to a marriage, though each act is trifling in itself, may cause such a degree of mental suffering as to constitute a ground for divorce on the charge of extreme cruelty! ” 31 Idaho at 184, 170 P. at 95.
In Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, supra, this court quoted from Sauvageau v. Sauvageau, supra, as follows:
“ ‘So, it will be seen from the foregoing authorities, that it has been the uniform rule in this state for the trial courts to entertain jurisdiction to direct the payment of maintenance and support for a wife and minor children, when for good reason she is living separate and apart from the husband. * * * The fact that decree of divorce has been denied does not oust the court of jurisdiction to make appropriate orders for the custody, care and welfare of the minor children and the maintenance of the children and wife.’ (Emphasis added.)”
and then said:
“A suit for divorce under our system is a suit in equity. A divorce court in the exercise of its general equitable powers may grant such incidental relief as the evidence warrants when it has both parties before it. Where, as here, the wife resists a divorce suit of the husband, and the divorce is denied, the court, as an incident to the full disposition of the matter before it, can award separate maintenance for the wife and children or for the wife alone if there be no children, for such time as the parties live separate and apart, particularly when it appears from the evidence that the parties are not living together and such fact is not the fault of the wife, and the wife or family is in need of such maintenance and the husband has the ability to provide the same. In such a case it is not necessary that the wife file a cross-suit for separate maintenance.” 68 Idaho at 280, 281,193 P.2d at 394.
In 141 A.L.R. 399, at 403, where the Idaho cases are collected, referring to jurisdiction of equity courts to grant separate maintenance, the annotator said:
“The jurisdiction of the chancery courts to grant in a proper case separate maintenance or alimony without divorce (where no divorce was asked, or where, divorce being asked, the proof did not justify it, but did justify a separate maintenance) was also sustained or recognized without much elaboration in the following cases in which the question was expressly raised:”
In this case plaintiff cannot be said to have condoned defendant’s treatment of her merely because she chose to endure it for a number of years until its cumulative effects drove her to seek a divorce. I.C. § 32-614. Neither is the limitation provided by I.C. §§ 32-611(4) and 32-615(3) applicable in such case. Here the offensive conduct continued up to the time of the separation of these parties, and even after the complaint was filed, according to plaintiff’s testimony.
Defendant did not discontinue, or testify that he had discontinued, his offensive course of conduct at any time prior to the commencement of the action. Neither did defendant contend nor testify that plaintiff was guilty of cruelty toward him. Thus, ground for a judgment of separate maintenance was fully established, if it were found that the parties could not live together. Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, supra; 10 A.L.R.2d 466, Anno.—Civil Suit for Support—Defenses.
*387In this case it is not appropriate to say that plaintiff could later file an action for separate maintenance, in case she cannot be reconciled to her marriage relationship with defendant. Such an action would involve additional costs and counsel fees which these parties cannot afford.
“ ‘Equity having obtained jurisdiction of subject matter of a dispute, will retain it for the settlement of all controversy between the parties with respect thereto.’ Fogelstrom v. Murphy, 70 Idaho 488, 222 P.2d 1080, 1083, and cases there cited. It is also the rule in this state (except in default cases) that the court will grant all proper relief consistent with the case, made and embraced within the issues, whether the particular relief be prayed for or not. Sec. 10-704 I.C.; [Citations].” Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 122, 227 P.2d 351 (1951).
Gem-Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Small, 90 Idaho 354, 411 P.2d 943 (1966); Jones v. State, 85 Idaho 135, 376 P.2d 361, 3 A.L. R.3d 1158 (1962); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 353 P.2d 760 (1960); Fort Hall Indian Stockmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Thorpe, 82 Idaho 458, 354 P.2d 516 (1960); Anderson v. Cummings, 81 Idaho 327, 340 P.2d 1111 (1959); Summers v. Martin, 77 Idaho 469, 295 P.2d 265 (1956) ; Sims v. Purcell, 74 Idaho 109, 257 P.2d 242 (1953).
This cause is remanded to the district court with directions to vacate the judgment and to hear any further or supplemental evidence the parties or either of them may offer, and make a finding as to whether these parties can be reconciled, and if not, to grant either a divorce or separate maintenance to appellant.
No costs allowed.