Court Opinion

ID: 9583189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:35:49.904154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:52.787820
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, J.,
dissenting in part.
Contributory negligence invariably is a factual question to be decided by a jury. This is especially true when the plaintiff, as here, is armed with a presumption of fact that he is incapable of committing acts of negligence. That presumption prevails until overcome by sufficient proof to the contrary. Norfolk Southern Ry v. Fincham, 213 Va. 122, 127, 189 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1972). The jury has *931found that defendant failed sufficiently to rebut the presumption. The trial judge has ratified that conclusion. Under this evidence, I think the judge and jury were right.
The record shows that this ten-year-old boy, aware that “trains were dangerous” and that “you could get hurt by riding a train,” nevertheless was willing to take a “chance” in order “to be like the other boys” he had observed climbing on and off moving railway cars. This evidence, in my view, demonstrates the precise kind of childish conduct born of an immature impulse that, when combined with the presumption, creates an issue of disputed fact on the question of contributory negligence.
The majority dwells on the fact that the child said he knew of the danger. That such an utterance was made is not significant; scarcely any child over seven years of age, regardless of his intelligence quotient, could be expected to say that the activity of train-jumping is safe.
The crucial inquiry, I submit, in determining if the presumption against negligence has been overcome, is whether this child, considering his knowledge of the danger, had the capacity of other similarly situated children to exercise sufficient discretion, self-control and restraint to withstand the childish urge to take a “chance” in order “to be like the other boys.” Such an appraisal cannot accurately be made by focusing only upon the printed appellate record of what the child has said. He must be seen and observed on the witness stand so that his capacity and intelligence can be assessed based, not just upon what he says, but upon how he says it. Astuteness, on the one hand, or thoughtlessness, on the other, must be judged by demeanor as well as the spoken word. The jury and trial judge had that opportunity for personal evaluation; this Court did not.
Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.