Court Opinion

ID: 9399826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 16:11:33.657996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.029559
License: Public Domain

J-S09042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    STEVEN TAYLOR                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1358 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 21, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-42-CR-0000486-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                               FILED: JUNE 6, 2023

       Steven Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals from the order denying his amended

petition seeking relief from the registration requirements of Subchapter H

(“Subchapter H”) of the Sexual Offender Notification and Registration Act

(“SORNA”), which the trial court entered after denying Taylor’s request for a

stay.1 We affirm.

       The procedural history of this appeal is as follows. In July 2015, police

charged Taylor with aggravated indecent assault, among other offenses.

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42. Taylor and the trial court refer to
Taylor’s amended petition as a Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition,
and Taylor has captioned his appeal as an order denying PCRA relief. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. There are no exclusive mechanisms for challenging
the constitutionality of SORNA, and our Supreme Court has held that the
timeliness requirements of the PCRA do not apply to petitions challenging
SORNA. Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 617-18 (Pa. 2020).
Therefore, we will not refer to the amended petition as a PCRA petition.
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Taylor, with the assistance of plea counsel, negotiated an agreement to enter

a guilty plea to aggravated indecent assault, a “Tier-III” offense under

Subchapter H,2 with a sentencing recommendation of three and one-half years

to eight years of imprisonment. The trial court accepted Taylor’s guilty plea

and ordered a sexual offender assessment.        The trial court subsequently

imposed the negotiated sentence and notified Taylor of his obligation to

register for life pursuant of Subchapter H due to his conviction.3

       In November 2021, Taylor filed a pro se petition “to be removed from

SORNA” alleging that Subchapter H was unconstitutional.        Pro Se Petition,

11/17/21.4 The trial court, noting that plea counsel had not withdrawn his

appearance, initially directed counsel to amend the petition. The trial court

then held a conference at which it proposed staying proceedings on the

petition until other courts resolved similar cases based on more developed

records. See N.T., 4/1/22, at 9 (discussing Commonwealth v. Asher, 244

____________________________________________

2See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(7). Tier-III sexual offenders are subject to
a lifetime registration requirement. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(3).
Because Taylor committed his offense in July 2015, Subchapter H applied.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.11(c); 9799.12 (defining the scope of Subchapter
H as applying individuals who commit a sexually violent offense on or after
December 20, 2012, and are convicted for the offense).

3 The record contains no indication that the trial court found Taylor to be a
sexually violent predator.

4 We note that Taylor filed his pro se petition while incarcerated. There is no
indication that Taylor has been released, but plea counsel represented that
Taylor’s maximum sentence would expire on July 22, 2023. See N.T.,
11/15/22, at 11; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(c)(1)(i) (tolling registration
periods during an individual’s incarceration).

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A.3d 27 (Pa. Super. 2020), among other cases). Plea counsel responded that

a more proper procedure would be to hold a full evidentiary hearing on Taylor’s

claim.   See id. at 11.   The trial court directed plea counsel to amend the

petition, and counsel complied. In the amended petition, Taylor claimed that

his lifetime   registration requirement    violated   the   United States and

Pennsylvania constitutions and that Subchapter H was punitive and violated

due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption that he was likely to re-

offend. Citing Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020), in

which our Supreme Court vacated a court of common pleas’ order finding

Subchapter H unconstitutional and remanded for further development of the

record, Taylor argued that the trial court could consider scientific evidence

challenging the veracity of Subchapter H’s irrebuttable presumption.      See

Amended Motion to be Removed from SORNA, 4/18/22, at 2 (unnumbered).

However, Taylor attached no scientific studies to the amended petition. The

Commonwealth requested dismissal of the amended petition because Taylor

provided no scientific evidence to support his claims. See Commonwealth’s

Answer to Amended Motion to be Removed from SORNA, 5/3/22, at 9.

      The trial court held a hearing in November 2022, at which plea counsel

conceded that he did not have any experts or expert reports and that he did

not intend to call witnesses. See N.T., 11/15/22, at 5, 10. Taylor, however,

observed that on remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Torsilieri, the

court of common pleas again found Subchapter H to be unconstitutional and

that our Supreme Court had scheduled arguments in the Commonwealth’s

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appeal in that case. See id. at 6-9.5 Taylor submitted to the court copies of

the most recent court of common pleas’ decision in Torsilieri and a docket in

that case. See id. at 8-9. Taylor’s argument consisted of a request for a stay

pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Torsilieri. See id. at 10-12. The

trial court noted that it previously offered staying the proceedings, but neither

party accepted its offer. See id. at 9-10. The court added that it found no

authority to stay its ruling based on a possible change in the law. See id. at

13. On November 21, 2022, the court denied Taylor’s amended petition due

to Taylor’s failure to carry his burden of demonstrating Subchapter H was

unconstitutional. See Opinion and Order, 11/21/22, at 2-3. Taylor filed a

notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Taylor raises the following issue for our review:

       1. Did the lower court err in concluding that it possessed no
          mechanism to defer ruling on the [Taylor’s] [a]mended . . .
          [p]etition until appellate authority was issued?

       2. Did the lower court err in failing to stay the proceedings once
          it learned that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was accepting
          briefs in the Torsilieri case?

Taylor’s Brief at 4.

       Taylor’s issues both challenge the trial court’s decision not to stay or

defer ruling on his amended petition pending our Supreme Court’s decision in

____________________________________________

5Our Supreme Court has oral arguments in Torsilieri scheduled for May 23,
2023. See Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 97 MAP 2022.

                                           -4-
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Torsilieri.6 This Court reviews the denial for a stay for an abuse of discretion.

See Keesee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2020).                   To

establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show more than a mere

error of judgment; he must demonstrate that the trial court overrode or

misapplied the law or that the judgment it exercised was manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. See id.

       Taylor argues that he was entitled to a stay because requiring him to

litigate an independent challenge to Subchapter H would be duplicative and

an inefficient use of resources considering our Supreme Court’s pending

decision in Torsilieri.       The trial court, as noted above, observed that it

previously offered an option for a stay.         See N.T., 11/15/22, at 9-10.

However, after the court proceeded to rule on Taylor’s amended petition after

he requested a full evidentiary hearing, he then arrived at the hearing with no

evidence. See id. at 9-10, 13.

       Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

decision to deny Taylor’s request for a stay. Taylor insisted on a full

evidentiary hearing, which required a Commonwealth response and the trial

court’s preparation, and then offered no evidence at the hearing. Under these

circumstances, the trial court acted well within its discretion in rejecting
____________________________________________

6 We acknowledge that claims challenging SORNA as an illegal sentence
constitute non-waivable legality of sentencing claims that an appellate court
may consider even when first raised on appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192, 1197 (Pa. 2022). On appeal, however, Taylor does
not develop any legality of sentencing claims or assert that Subchapter H is
punitive.

                                           -5-
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Taylor’s new assertion that a stay would conserve resources. Furthermore,

Taylor’s arguments fail to show an abuse of discretion. See Keesee, 230

A.3d at 1133-34 (noting that factors relevant to granting a stay include: (1)

a strong showing that the petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) a

showing of an irreparable injury if the stay does not issue; (3) the stay will

not substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings; and (4) the

issuance of a stay will not adversely affect the public interest). In addition to

Taylor’s failure to offer any evidence or argument that he was likely to prevail

on the merits, we note the following: (1) a stay would not relieve Taylor of his

registration requirements upon his release from prison; (2) any future decision

by our Supreme Court in Torsilieri will be binding on the Pennsylvania State

Police, the principal entity responsible for administering and enforcing SORNA

requirements, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.32; and (3) if necessary to enforce a

future development in law concerning SORNA, Taylor may seek relief in the

trial court,7 with the Pennsylvania State Police,8 or in the Commonwealth

Court.9
____________________________________________

7See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 617-18 (holding that PCRA time requirements
will not bar challenges to the constitutionality of SORNA).

8 See A.L. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 274 A.3d 1228, 1231 (Pa. 2022)
(discussing state police administrative hearings and the possibility of an
appeal to the Commonwealth Court).

9See J.B. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 288 A.3d 946, 948 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2023) (discussing a SORNA-registrant’s original action against the
Pennsylvania State Police in the Commonwealth Court).

                                           -6-
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       Thus, finding no merit to Taylor’s issues in this appeal, we affirm the

order of the trial court.10

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023

____________________________________________

10Nothing in our decision precludes a trial court from granting a stay of a
petition raising Torsilieri claims. We simply conclude that Taylor’s arguments
have not established an abuse of discretion by the trial court under the facts
and circumstances of this case.

                                           -7-