Court Opinion

ID: 9905967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 17:10:12.757716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:02.015249
License: Public Domain

J-S36011-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 DERRICK WALKER                        :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 788 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0006112-2019,
           CP-51-CR-0006113-2019, CP-51-CR-0006114-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 DERRICK WALKER                        :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 789 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0006112-2019,
           CP-51-CR-0006113-2019, CP-51-CR-0006114-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 DERRICK WALKER                        :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 790 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0006112-2019,
J-S36011-23

            CP-51-CR-0006113-2019, CP-51-CR-0006114-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2023

      Derrick Walker appeals the aggregate judgments of sentence of twenty-

eight to fifty-six years of imprisonment following his convictions for multiple

counts of rape and related sexual offenses. We affirm.

      The trial court summarized the evidence sustaining Appellant’s

convictions as follows:

             [At] docket CP-51-CR-0006112-2019, the trial evidence
      established that on January 20, 2011, at approximately 12:00
      a.m., Patricia Croy, who had been a small and thinly framed adult
      female, had walked from her nearby home to the 7-Eleven
      convenience store at 5259 Oxford Avenue in Philadelphia. She
      remembered standing outside of the store when she saw a large
      black male approach her. She testified that Appellant flashed
      what appeared to be cash and stated, “you know what to do for
      this.” Feeling fearful, the complainant walked in the same
      direction as Appellant around to the rear of the 7-Eleven. Once
      isolated and out of sight of anyone, Appellant grabbed her, pulled
      her into an alley and demanded that she drop to her knees. When
      the complainant cried out “no,” Appellant pushed her to the
      ground and punched her in the face. He exposed his penis and
      tried to force his penis into her mouth.

             When Ms. Croy would not perform oral sex on him, Appellant
      hauled her up by her shirt and slammed her body onto the hood
      of a car that had been parked in the alley. Appellant then pulled
      her pants down from behind and forced his penis into her vagina;
      he also attempted to place his penis in her anus. After Appellant
      finished, the complainant pulled up her pants and walked
      unsteadily to the front of the 7-Eleven. Appellant walked there as
      well and told the complainant to wait while he went inside the 7-
      Eleven. Appellant told her that he would get some money for her,
      but she told him that she was not a prostitute and did not want

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     his money. As Appellant walked into the store, she ran to her
     nearby home dazed and confused.

           When she got home, Ms. Croy took off her clothes, put on a
     robe and sat on the floor crying for hours. She testified that at
     some point she screamed[,] which had awakened her husband.
     Her husband called the police, and she was taken to Episcopal
     Hospital where she was treated, and a sexual assault examination
     was performed. . . .

           [In case number] CP-51-CR-0006113-2019, the trial
     evidence established that on December 2, 2014, at approximately
     12:30 p.m., the complainant, Tiffany Anderson, walked over to a
     donut shop at 7th Street and Girard Avenue, in Philadelphia, after
     attending her methadone treatment program. Appellant stood
     outside of the shop and initiated a conversation with her about
     headphones he had claimed to be selling. Ms. Anderson agreed
     to look at the headphones, and they began to walk up Girard
     Avenue. Appellant, a large framed black male[,] put his arm
     entirely around her shoulder. This did not alarm the complainant
     because of her past experiences of making . . . drug
     transactions[,] when other persons would place their arm around
     the buyer’s shoulder to give the appearance of familiarity to any
     onlooker.

           The complainant testified that as Appellant placed his arm
     around her shoulder, however, Appellant poked a knife at the base
     of her neck and directed her to keep walking and not to do
     anything to make her “noticeable.” He grabbed her belongings,
     including her iPhone and told her that he would only give it back
     if she did what he said. At knifepoint, Appellant led her into an
     alleyway isolated behind the Dunkin Donuts at 10th Street and
     Girard Avenue and pushed her onto the ground and made her
     perform oral sex upon his penis.

           Ms. Anderson recalled that Appellant had grabbed her face,
     forced her to turn around so that she was still kneeling with her
     face pressed against a metal fence, and pulled down her pants
     and vaginally raped her. When he was done, he told her to leave
     and he did not return her iPhone. The complainant got up shaken
     and dazed and left the alleyway. She ran to a store a few blocks
     away and called her boyfriend and the police. The complainant
     was taken to Episcopal Hospital, Special Victims Unit where she

                                   -3-
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     received medical treatment and a sexual assault examination
     (rape kit)[.] . . .

                 ....

           [At] docket CP-51-CR-0006114-2019, trial evidence
     established that on January 12, 2015, at approximately 11:30
     a.m., the complainant, Battia Harden, who had just moved to
     Philadelphia with her boyfriend and infant daughter, was walking
     around 55th and Thompson Streets, trying to get a sense of what
     was around the neighborhood. She recalled asking a woman on
     the street where she could buy “loosies” (loose cigarettes). She
     followed that woman’s directions as best she could remember but
     surmised that she made a wrong turn when she encountered a
     large framed black male later identified as Appellant.

            When Ms. Harden asked Appellant if he knew where to get
     “loosies,” he replied that he had sold loose cigarettes but that he
     did not have any more on him. He told her that he had more at
     his home nearby and that she should follow him. The complainant
     walked with Appellant to a nearby house. He directed her to an
     isolated area to the rear of the property. There she handed him
     some money. As Appellant entered the house, the complainant
     waited outside with her back facing the property. She made a cell
     phone call and when the call ended, she felt someone from behind
     her put a hand over her mouth and “trip her forward” onto the
     ground and on her stomach. She had jeans on and could feel the
     large man trying to pull them down with one hand while still
     covering her mouth.

           Ms. Harden testified that the male had not been able to pull
     her pants down with one hand as she struggled; he removed the
     hand from her mouth, and she started screaming. He then struck
     her back with a tire iron that she had been able to see out [of] the
     corner of her eye. Her pants came down and he forcibly inserted
     his penis in her vagina. She was not sure if he had ejaculated.

           During the attack, Ms. Harden had begged him to stop and
     to get off her, but Appellant refused. When he finished, Appellant
     ran away. Ms. Harden laid on the cold[,] hard ground crying and
     scared. She then got up and called the police as soon as she got
     home. The police came to her house and she directed the officers
     to the attack location. There, the police officers recovered the tire
     iron and transported Ms. Harden to the Special Victims Unit where

                                     -4-
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      she received medical       treatment    and     a   sexual   assault
      examination. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 10/24/22, at 2-6 (cleaned up).

      On December 12, 2018, the DNA from all three assaults was determined

to match. Six months later, Appellant’s DNA was connected to the three cases

through the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”). Appellant was arrested

on July 6, 2019. Retests of the DNA recovered from the complainants with a

sample from Appellant confirmed that he was the source of the DNA recovered

during the sexual assault examinations.

      Prior to trial, the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to

consolidate the three subject cases, over Appellant’s objection. Further, the

court denied a motion in limine filed by Appellant demanding that the nurses

who prepared examination reports concerning Ms. Harden and Ms. Anderson

testify at trial. Instead, the Commonwealth introduced those two documents

through Allison Denman, a sexual assault nurse examiner and the Clinical

Director of the Philadelphia Sexual Assault Response Center.        The reports

included a single-page chain of custody form completed by the nurses, and

the remainder generally concerned the victims’ responses to standard

questions, medical background, and notes of testing performed for sexually

transmitted diseases. See Commonwealth’s Exhibits C-7, C-16.

      Appellant’s defense at the consolidated jury trial was that each of the

victims was engaging in prostitution at the time of the offense and, therefore,

they consented to the sexual encounters. At its conclusion, the jury convicted

                                     -5-
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Appellant of numerous crimes.1 He was subsequently sentenced as indicated

hereinabove.       Appellant filed timely notices of appeal at each implicated

docket, and we consolidated the matters sua sponte.

          Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:

     I.     Did not the trial court err and abuse its discretion by
            consolidating three unrelated cases into a single trial, where
            the cases did not satisfy any exception to the bar on “other
            crimes” evidence, and consolidation tainted the jury with
            prohibited propensity evidence?

    II.     In admitting forensic laboratory reports through the testimony
            of a surrogate instead of the forensic nurses who prepared the
            reports, did not the trial court violate the Confrontation Clause
            and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rules prohibiting that
            hearsay evidence?

Appellant’s brief at 3 (cleaned up).

          Appellant’s first issue is that the trial court erred in granting the

Commonwealth’s motion to join the three separate cases into one consolidated

trial. As to this issue, this Court has iterated that “[i]n reviewing a trial court

decision to consolidate . . . offenses for trial, our standard is abuse of

discretion.”     Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1190 (Pa.Super.

2013) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

1 Specifically, at CP-51-CR-0006112-2019 (Ms. Croy), Appellant was convicted

of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), and sexual assault.
At CP-51-CR0006113-2019 (Ms. Anderson), Appellant was found guilty of
rape, IDSI, and sexual assault. At CP-51-CR0006114-2019 (Ms. Harden) the
jury convicted Appellant of rape, sexual assault, and possessing an instrument
of crime.

                                           -6-
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      Pursuant   to   Pa.R.Crim.P.   582,   “[o]ffenses   charged   in   separate

indictments or informations may be tried together if . . . the evidence of each

of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is

capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion[.]”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(a)(1). We have stated that “where a trial concerns distinct

criminal offenses that are distinguishable in time, space and the characters

involved, a jury is capable of separating the evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). Further, “[t]he

general policy of the laws is to encourage joinder of offenses and consolidation

of indictments when judicial economy can thereby be effected, especially when

the result will be to avoid the expensive and time[-]consuming duplication of

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1150 (Pa.Super.

2020) (en banc) (cleaned up).

      However, under Rule 583, a court may nonetheless order separate trials

“if it appears that any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants

being tried together.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. Pursuant to this rule, “the prejudice

the defendant suffers due to the joinder must be greater than the general

prejudice any defendant suffers when the Commonwealth’s evidence links him

to a crime.” Commonwealth v. Hobel, 275 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Pa.Super.

2022) (cleaned up). Instead,

      [t]he prejudice of which Rule 583 speaks is . . . that which would
      occur if the evidence tended to convict the appellant only by
      showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was
      incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid
      cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant

                                     -7-
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       evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a
       natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for
       severance by itself.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 186 A.3d 985, 993 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned

up).

       Based upon a collective reading of Rules 582 and 583, our High Court

has devised a three-part test relating to joinder of separate offenses at trial:

       (1) whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be
       admissible in a separate trial for the other; (2) whether such
       evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger
       of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in the
       affirmative, (3) whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced
       by the consolidation of offenses.

Hobel, supra at 1067 (cleaned up).

       When considering whether offenses would be admissible in a separate

trial for the other, we look to Rule 404(b), relating to bad act evidence, where

we have observed as follows:

       Evidence of crimes other than the one in question is not admissible
       solely to show the defendant’s bad character or propensity to
       commit crime. Nevertheless:

             Evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate
             (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or
             accident; (4) a common scheme, plan or design
             embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
             related to each other that proof of one tends to prove
             the others; or (5) the identity of the person charged
             with the commission of the crime on trial.
             Additionally, evidence of other crimes may be
             admitted where such evidence is part of the history of
             the case and forms part of the natural development of
             the facts.

                                      -8-
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Dozzo, supra at 902 (cleaned up). “When offered for a legitimate purpose,

evidence of prior crimes is admissible if its probative value outweighs its

potential for unfair prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353,

358 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      As will be discussed in more detail below, the trial court found that the

applicable Rule 404(b) exception supporting joinder was that involving a

common plan or scheme. Hence, we consider the following principles relating

to that exception:

      [E]vidence of other crimes or bad acts may be admitted where the
      evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive and so
      nearly identical as to become the signature of the same
      perpetrator. Relevant to such a finding will be the habits or
      patterns of action or conduct undertaken by the perpetrator to
      commit crime, as well as the time, place, and types of victims
      typically chosen by the perpetrator. Sufficient commonality of
      factors between the incidents dispels the notion that they are
      merely coincidental and permits the contrary conclusion that they
      are so logically connected they share a perpetrator. If the
      evidence reveals that the details of each criminal incident are
      nearly identical, the fact that the incidents are separated by a
      lapse of time will not likely prevent the offer of the evidence unless
      the time lapse is excessive.

Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 532 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).

While considerate of this standard, we are nevertheless mindful that “[i]t is

impossible for two incidents of sexual assault involving different victims to be

identical in all respects.”   Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 402

(Pa.Super. 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 252 A.3d 1092 (Pa. 2021). Rather,

“what is essential is that the similarities are not confined to insignificant details

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that would likely be common elements regardless of who had committed the

crimes.” Id. (cleaned up).

      Having summarized the applicable law, we now turn to Appellant’s

arguments. He first asserts that the trial court erred in consolidating the three

cases since evidence from each would not have been admissible in the other.

More particularly, he contends that there were not enough similarities to show

a common scheme or plan because the parallels were insufficient to

demonstrate a signature, but rather were common to all rape cases involving

a stranger. See Appellant’s brief at 24-36. Appellant further avers that the

Commonwealth did not prove applicability of any other exception enumerated

under Rule 404(b), whether it be motive, intent, or absence of mistake. Id.

at 37-39.   Finally, he maintains that the probative value of the various

incidents was outweighed by the potential for prejudice, and that the jury was

encouraged to consider his propensity to commit crimes. Id. at 39-42.

      In rejecting this claim, the trial court determined that evidence from

each of the cases would be admissible in trial as to the others pursuant to a

common scheme or plan, and thus concluded that it did not abuse its

discretion in consolidating the three trials.   Id. at 11, 14.    Specifically, it

stated:

      [Appellant’s] common plan[,] scheme[,] and design was to
      predatorily select particularly vulnerable females who were
      strangers to him to satisfy his sexual deviancy. He had perceived
      each female as particularly easy to harm and less likely to be
      believed because of their connection to narcotics. All adult female
      complainants had been approached by Appellant as they were

                                     - 10 -
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       walking in outside environments. In each case, Appellant lured
       and directed his chosen prey to isolated locations behind
       buildings. He terrorized his victims as he raped them. His brutal
       force increased with resistance. The circumstances of each sexual
       attack had evidenced Appellant’s uniquely twisted mindset
       towards women. In each instance he displayed a pretense of
       consent. He apparently viewed his victims as unpaid prostitutes
       deserving of harm. The logical connections were unmistakable.

Id. at 14. The court also noted that Appellant’s defense at trial was that the

victims consented to the sexual encounters, and therefore attacked with vigor

the credibility of the victims. As such, it noted the Commonwealth’s need for

the testimony as to all the encounters to refute Appellant’s consent defense.

Id. at 10. Finally, the court determined that each crime charged was readily

separable by the jury based on the court’s instructions for the jury to evaluate

the evidence of each offense as it concerned each victim.2 Id. at 11-12.

       In the same vein, the Commonwealth asserts that the evidence of each

crime would have been admissible in separate trials pursuant to the exception

for common plan, scheme, and design. See Commonwealth’s brief at 9. It

identifies the commonalities of the incidents as such:

       In each case, [Appellant] approached the victim or sought to
       prolong a random encounter. In each case the victim was alone.
       [Appellant] used some excuse to lure each victim away from safe
       or occupied areas. Each assault occurred outside in a secluded
       area. In each case [Appellant] used physical force to control the
       victim. In two of the cases [Appellant] employed a weapon, in the
       other he employed his fists. In each case [Appellant] had vaginal
____________________________________________

2 In its closing instructions, the trial court directed the jurors to consider each

charge and incident separately, informing them that the charges were
consolidated for a limited purpose, and that they were not permitted to regard
evidence of the other allegations to infer that Appellant was a bad person or
was inclined to commit crimes. See N.T. Trial, 10/29/21, at 148-49.

                                          - 11 -
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      sex with the victim against her will. He ejaculated in each victim.
      Each victim had some real or perceived vulnerability, including
      drug use on the part of two of the victims and third victim’s stated
      unfamiliarity of the area.

Id. at 10 (cleaned up). The Commonwealth also notes that decisions from

this Court have held that common plan or scheme evidence is admissible

without proof of a signature if offered to show something other than identity

of the accused. Id. at 10-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Gray, 296 A.3d 41,

51 (Pa.Super. 2023)). It further argues that Appellant’s claim of prejudice

arising from consolidation is meritless because the jury was capable of

separating the crimes and episodes, which is evidenced by the fact that the

jury acquitted Appellant of possession of an instrument of a crime with respect

to the incident involving Ms. Anderson. Id. at 12.

      Upon careful review of the certified record, we find no abuse of

discretion with the court’s decision to consolidate the three cases at trial.

First, we conclude that “evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible

in a separate trial for the other” under the common plan or scheme exception

to Rule 404(b). Hobel, supra at 1067. The similarities between each of the

three cases are striking, and the comparisons highlighted by both the trial

court and the Commonwealth are supported by the record. After consideration

of Appellant’s pattern of assaults and the types of victims he chose, we find

that the “[s]ufficient commonality of factors between the incidents dispels the

notion that they are merely coincidental and permits the contrary conclusion

that they are so logically connected[,] they share a perpetrator.”       Kurtz,

supra at 532.

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      Further, we determine that the evidence was “capable of separation by

the jury so as to avoid danger of confusion,” and thus satisfied Rule 582.

Hobel, supra at 1067. Each of the three assaults occurred on different dates,

in different locations, and involved different victims. Since the evidence was

“distinguishable in time, space and the characters involved,” there was no

danger the jury was confused. Dozzo, supra at 903. As the Commonwealth

highlights, the jury was demonstrably capable of separating the incidents

because it acquitted Appellant of possession of an instrument of a crime as to

one of the encounters but convicted him of that crime for another.

      In the same vein, we do not find that Appellant was otherwise unduly

prejudiced by the consolidation. The testimony was not of the character that

“tended to convict the appellant only by showing his propensity to commit

crimes.”   Brown, supra at 993.        Rather, as indicated above, it clearly

demonstrated Appellant’s common plan and scheme. We see no reason to

believe that Appellant was unduly prejudiced, especially in light of the court’s

instructions informing the jury to consider the testimony separately as to each

victim. See Commonwealth v. Vucich, 194 A.3d 1103, 1113 (Pa.Super.

2018) (“It is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s

instructions.”).   We also note that in weighing the probative value of

consolidation against the potential for prejudice against Appellant, standing

alone, the testimony of the victims concerning lack of consent was

uncorroborated. Accordingly, the Commonwealth had significant need for the

testimony of each victim to dispute this contention, which in turn increased

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the probative value of this collective evidence.    See Tyson, supra at 362

(concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting common

scheme evidence when it was important to the Commonwealth’s case to

bolster a victim’s testimony of lack of consent).

      In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the

three underlying cases, and Appellant is therefore not entitled to relief on this

claim.

      Appellant’s remaining issue alleges court error when it denied his motion

in limine concerning introduction of the sexual assault examination reports

prepared for two of the victims. Although raised as one issue, this assertion

contains two separate arguments with differing legal standards. Turning to

the first, Appellant argues that introduction of the reports by the

Commonwealth through Ms. Denman, and not the specific nurses who

prepared them, violated his right to confrontation pursuant to the Sixth

Amendment. Id. at 52-59.

      This Court has stated that “[w]hether a defendant was denied his right

to confront a witness under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment

is a question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary.”    Commonwealth v. Tejada, 161 A.3d 313, 317

(Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned up).      The clause provides thimpossat “[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend VI. It prohibits “out-

of-court testimonial statements by a witness unless the witness is unavailable

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and   the    defendant   had   a   prior   opportunity   for    cross-examination.”

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 531 (Pa. 2013).                     A report is

testimonial “if its primary purpose is to establish or prove past events

potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.”         Commonwealth v.

Brown, 185 A.3d 316, 319 n.3 (Pa. 2018).

      The record confirms that Appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine

the nurses about their reports during or before trial. Therefore, the salient

question before us is whether the reports were testimonial.

      Appellant asserts that these “forensic lab reports” were testimonial since

their primary purpose was to establish events relevant to his prosecution. See

Appellant’s brief at 53 (discussing Brown, supra).             He points to certain

portions of the reports, particularly those relating to collection of evidence and

chain of custody, as demonstrative of the fact that they were prepared to aid

law enforcement. Id. at 54-55. Appellant further bolsters this position by

citing a statute mandating the creation of sexual assault evidence collection

programs for hospitals, noting that its purpose is to “promote the health and

safety of victims and to facilitate the prosecution of persons accused of sexual

assaults.”   Id. at 55-56 (quoting 35 P.S. § 10172.3(a)).          He equates the

reports in question to an autopsy report, which was deemed testimonial by

our High Court in Brown. Id. at 57.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court determined that Appellant’s

right to confrontation was not violated because the reports in question were

not testimonial. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/24/22, at 28. It noted that the

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primary purpose for the creation of the reports was for medical treatment of

the victims, not future litigation, as the treating nurses were not agents of the

Commonwealth. Id. at 31. The court further distinguished the various cases

cited by Appellant in his brief, highlighting that in other matters where a

confrontation clause violation was found, it involved testimonial reports that

proved a fact necessary for conviction, such as blood-alcohol levels in a case

involving driving under the influence of alcohol.3 Id. at 31-32.

       We find no error of law with the court’s conclusion that the records in

question are not testimonial.           It is clear that the primary purpose for

completion of the reports was for the nurses at Episcopal Hospital to render

medical assistance and aid to the victims of sexual assaults. Ms. Denman

testified that when patients reported to that center, care was provided

regardless of whether the patients sought to report an assault, and that the

questions on the report were aimed at helping the nurses look for injuries,

proscribe medications, and issue emergency contraception. See N.T. Trial,

10/28/21, at 115-19.         Although there was a single page in the reports

concerning chain of custody and discussing the evidence collected, that fact

does not transmute the reports’ primary purpose of obtaining information in
____________________________________________

3 For its part, the Commonwealth argues that the reports were medical
records, not “forensic laboratory reports,” as asserted by Appellant. See
Commonwealth’s brief at 16, 18. It further contends that the records were
not testimonial, which is supported by the United States Supreme Court’s
affirmation that “statements made to someone who is not principally charged
with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely
to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. at
16-17 (citing Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015)).

                                          - 16 -
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order to provide effective medical care.           As such, we cannot agree with

Appellant that his right to confrontation was violated.

       Appellant’s second argument arising from this claim is that the sexual

assault reports should not have been admitted at trial because they

constituted inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 47-52. We note that, as with all

evidentiary rulings, “when reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply

an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.” Commonwealth v.

Sami, 243 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

       Our High Court has observed that “[t]o constitute hearsay, a statement

first must be uttered out-of-court, and then it must be offered in court for the

truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”                Commonwealth v.

Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. 2021).                  Nonetheless, “[f]acially

inadmissible hearsay still may be introduced as substantive evidence for the

truth of the matter asserted if the statement falls under one of numerous

exceptions to the general hearsay proscription.” Id.

       In its brief, the Commonwealth asserts that the reports fall under two

exceptions to the rule against hearsay:               statements made for medical

treatment     and    records     of   a   regularly    conducted   activity. 4   See

____________________________________________

4 The trial court did not discuss admissibility of the sexual assault reports
under the hearsay rules in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and we note that it denied
Appellant’s motion in limine on the record at trial without significant discussion
of its rationale. See N.T. Trial, 10/27/21, at 15. We bear in mind, however,
“the well-established principle that an appellate court may affirm a valid
judgment based upon any reason appearing in the record.” Commonwealth
v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 264 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

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Commonwealth’s brief at 18.      Concerning statements made for a medical

diagnosis, Rule 803 provides an exception to hearsay when the statement:

      (A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical
      treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment; and

      (B) describes medical history, past or present symptoms, or
      sensations, or the inception of general character of the cause or
      external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to
      treatment, or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.

Pa.R.E. 803(4).

      The following criteria must be satisfied for admission of records of a

regularly conducted activity:

      (A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from
      information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

      (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
      activity of a “business”, which term includes business, institution,
      association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
      whether or not conducted for profit;

      (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

      (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the
      custodian or another qualified witness . . . ; and

      (E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or
      other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Pa.R.E. 803(6).

      Appellant contests that either of these exceptions is met. Particularly,

he maintains that the portion of the reports concerning chain of custody and

collection of evidence do not satisfy the exception concerning medical records

because they are not “reasonably pertinent to medical treatment of

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diagnoses.”   Appellant’s reply brief at 23.     Similarly, he contends that the

business record exception is not satisfied since the reports are not trustworthy

due to possible mistakes or bias by forensic nurses. Id. at 21. Appellant

further argues that they are not reliable because they were prepared for

litigation, and would not meet be deemed trustworthy by federal courts if

analyzed under the similar F.R.E. 803(6). Id. at 21-22.

      We agree with the Commonwealth that the reports in question fell within

both exceptions, and accordingly the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

permitting their admission. As analyzed above, the reports were reasonably

pertinent to medical treatment and described the “inception of general

character of the cause” of symptoms and sensations, thus satisfying the

medical    records   exception.    Pa.R.E.     803(4).   Additionally,   we   find

unsubstantiated by the record Appellant’s bald contention that the reports do

not satisfy the business records exception because they are unreliable. There

was no evidence of abnormality in the collection of the swabs or chain of

custody.    Indeed, Appellant did not cross-examine Ms. Denman about

collection of evidence or chain of custody in this case at all, let alone in an

effort to identify any sort of untrustworthiness in the process. On the contrary,

Ms. Denman, who herself is a sexual assault nurse examiner, testified on a

general level as to the procedure of how, when, and why these reports are

created, establishing that they are contemporaneous records of a regularly

conducted activity at the hospital.     See N.T. Trial, 10/28/21, at 115-19.

Therefore, Appellant cannot succeed on this claim.

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     Since Appellant presents no issue of merit, we have no cause to overturn

his judgments of sentence.

     Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/30/2023

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