Court Opinion

ID: 9756177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:12:20.005255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:15.329674
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the Majority’s determination that Appellant’s statements to Detective Capello were properly admitted at trial.
This court in Commonwealth v. Calloway, 313 Pa.Super. 173, 459 A.2d 795, (1983) announced: “any statements made in connection with an offer to plead guilty are inadmissible”. Appellant’s statements to Detective Capello cannot be characterized as anything other than statements made in connection with an offer to plead guilty.
The Majority in interpreting the holding of Calloway states: “In the course of its ruling that the defendant’s offer to plead guilty was properly admitted at trial because he was not under arrest ... the Calloway Court set forth some guidelines to address the admissibility of such an offer at trial”. Majority Opinion at 487, emphasis added. -The error with the Majority’s analysis rests in its conclusion that the appellant in Calloway made an offer to plead guilty. The Calloway court admitted the appellant’s statements because they did not amount to an “offer to plead *490guilty”. The Calloway court stated: “In the instant case, we conclude that appellant’s statements were not made attendant to plea negotiations”. Commonwealth v. Calloway, 313 Pa.Super. at 185, 459 A.2d at 801. Accordingly, the guidelines set forth by the Calloway court do not “assess the admissibility of such an offer”, rather they aid in characterizing a statement as an offer.
This distinction is important and was recognized by an Illinois Appellate Court in citing Calloway. In Illinois v. Tennin, 123 Ill.App. 894, 79 Ill.Dec. 64, 463 N.E.2d 202 (1984), the court noted that in cases where statements were found inadmissible as plea related, each defendant clearly sought a concession. When a defendant did not make manifest his plea offer the statements were not characterized as part of a plea discussion and were admitted at trial. To constitute a statement made in connection with an offer to plead guilty it must contain rudiments of the negotiation process. The court in Illinois v. Tennin, supra, also outlined other explanations for statements seeking a “deal” which would indicate that they were not plea related. Such would be the case where one sought to negotiate his release without bond, or where one requested that the charges against him be dropped in exchange for information. Statements made in these instances would not constitute statements made in connection with an offer to plead guilty.
To determine whether or not the statements made by an accused are in connection with plea negotiations, a court must first look to see if the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea, and whether that expectation was reasonable. The totality of the circumstances including the Commonwealth’s interest in participating in such a discussion must be examined to determine if the statements were plea related. Commonwealth v. Calloway, supra, 313 Pa.Super. at 184, 459 A.2d at 801.
In holding that the appellant’s statements in Calloway were simply unsolicited, unilateral remarks and that the *491appellant could not have had a reasonable subjective expectation that his statements were made in regard to a plea negotiation, the court stated:
Appellant at the time he uttered the statements, was not under arrest, and would not be placed under arrest for the crime until some three months after his personal communication with the district attorney. Not being a defendant, there is then no reason for us to assume that he was offering to plead guilty to a crime for which he had not been charged. There are myriad possible explanations underlying his motivation to provide “information” for a “deal”. We do not know what “information” was or what type of “deal” he wanted to arrange. Neither did the district attorney. We know what appellant claims now, i.e., he was attempting to open a plea bargaining discussion, but our focus seeks an explanation at the time the statements were made.
Id., 313 Pa.Superior Ct. at 185, 459 A.2d at 801.
The statements made by Appellant in the instant case when analyzed with regard to the totality of the circumstances cannot be characterized as anything other than plea related. Unlike the appellant in Calloway, Appellant herein was under arrest when according to the Commonwealth’s version of the incident:
... (O)n August 18, 1983, Detective Capello was working at his desk in the Detective Division of the Lebanon City Police Department when the defendant came into Capello’s office, unrequested; sat next to Capello’s desk and began talking. Capello had not requested any information from the defendant. First, the defendant told Capello that he had been arrested for “drunk driving” after running a stop sign. Wolf then told Capello he want to make a deal with the District Attorney to consolidate the charges of statutory rape and “drunk driving” so that he could do all his time at once. Wolf expressed concern that if he did his time separately, he would be in jail for a long time. Wolf also said that the victim had been *492through enough, she shouldn’t have to go through another trial, what they did to her was stupid, but when “you are drinking you do stupid things.” Capello responded by telling Wolf he would have to talk to his lawyer and sent him on his way.
Commonwealth Brief at 4-5.
It is inconceivable that there is any explanation for Appellant’s statements other than that they were made in connection with an offer to plead guilty.
The majority in determining that the statements are admissible relies on the fact that the Commonwealth showed no interest in participating in a discussion. While the Calloway court noted that the Commonwealth’s interest in participating in the discussions is important to assess the accused’s subjective expectation of negotiating a plea, the Calloway court did not set forth this type of finding as the dispositive test to determine if the statements were plea related. To rely solely on the Commonwealth’s unwillingness to enter plea negotiations would be unfair and contrary to the purpose of the Rule which seeks to protect a defendant from adverse inferences based upon statements made when seeking to negotiate a plea. The court in Calloway recognized that a system which encourages plea bargains is an essential and highly desirable component of the administration of justice.
Under the decision reached by the Majority today, only the Commonwealth could initiate plea bargaining. There would be no instance where an accused could approach the Commonwealth and seek to initiate a plea arrangement. I do not believe such a result was intended by the Calloway court.
Since I would find that the statements made by Appellant to the detective were made in accordance with an offer to plead guilty, I would reverse the Judgment of Sentence and remand the case for a new trial.