Court Opinion

ID: 9865123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:24:21.132665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:26.794885
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
The views expressed in the majority opinion seem to me to be so at variance with sound legal principles, that I am forced to dissent.
*137Zadra, in Grlenwood Springs, mailed Ms check to Updike, who received it at Boise, Idaho. The check was drawn upon the First National Bank of Grlenwood Springs, and was payable to the order of Updike. The check bears the endorsements of Updike, the Updike Sheep Co., the First National Bank of Idaho, Boise, Idaho, the Colorado National Bank and the Denver branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The endorsement of each of the three banks contained a guaranty of prior endorsements. The cheek was paid to the Federal Reserve Bank by the drawee bank at Glen-wood Springs.
The trial court had no jurisdiction, because the crime charged and of which Updike was convicted was not committed in Colorado. The crime of obtaining property by false pretenses is committed where the property is obtained by the defendant. Pepper v. People, 75 Colo. 348, 225 Pac. 846; 11 R. C. L. p. 854. The charge in the present case is obtaining money by false pretenses, and Updike was convicted of obtaining money by that means. The jurisdiction of the trial court, therefore, depends upon whether or not the money was obtained by Updike in Glenwood Springs. If it was not obtained there by Updike, the court was without jurisdiction. Of course, payment to an agent is payment to the principal. As it is undisputed that Updike did not personally receive the money in Glenwood Springs, the question is narrowed to this: Was, or was not, the bank to whom the drawee bank paid the money in Glenwood Springs the agent of Updike ?
Not one of the endorsements on the check was, in terms, “for collection;” each was a general, not a restrictive, endorsement. Section 3853, Compiled Laws, provides: “An indorsement is restrictive, which either: First — Prohibits the further negotiation of the instrument; or Second — Constitutes the indorsee the agent of the indorser ; or Third — Vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some other person.” In Federal Reserve *138Bank v. First National Bank, 87 Colo. 158, 286 Pac. 116, we held that, in the absence of special agreement, when a paper is endorsed without restriction by a depositor and at once passed to his credit by the bank to which he delivers it, he becomes the creditor of the bank and the latter becomes the owner of the paper, and in making collection is not the agent of the depositor; but whether such a transaction constitutes a sale or a mere deposit for collection depends upon the attending circumstances. In Scully v. Denver National Bank, 76 Colo. 227, 230 Pac. 610, we held that a check deposited with a bank and credited to the account of the depositor, upon which he drew from time to time, was a sale and not a deposit for collection. In Bromfield v. Cochran, 86 Colo. 486, 283 Pac. 45, we held that when a bank credits to the account of the payee the amount of a check deposited by him, and permits him to draw thereon, it thereby elects not to exercise the rig’ht to decline payment until collection, and becomes the owner of the check. To the same effect, see: Union National Bank v. Maines-Hough Motor Co., 70 Colo. 132, 197 Pac. 753; Manatee County State Bank v. Bruen-Fisher Fruit Co., 70 Colo. 342, 201 Pac. 560; City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 271 U. S. 489, 46 Sup. Ct. 554, explained in Federal Reserve Bank v. First National Bank, supra. The law announced in those cases is the law as it is stated in Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 25 Sup. Ct. 243. In that case a senator of the United States was charged with and convicted of having rendered services for a certain corporation before the post office department, in matters in which the United States was interested, and with having received payment therefor in St. Louis, Missouri. The case was brought and prosecuted in the federal district court for the eastern district of Missouri. The defendant claimed that the crime, if any, was not committed in Missouri, and, therefore, that the trial court was without jurisdiction. There, as here, the question was, Where did the defendant receive the money? The undisputed evidence was to the *139effect that the corporation sent from St. Lonis to the defendant in Washington its check drawn on a trust company in St. Louis; that the defendant deposited the check in his hank in Washington, receiving credit therefor at once; that the check was subsequently paid by the drawee trust company in St. Louis. The cashier of the Washington bank testified that the defendant had the right, immediately after the credit was made, to draw out the whole, or any portion thereof, without waiting for the payment of the cheek at St. Louis, and that there was a custom, when a check was not paid, to charge it up against the customer’s account. In that case, as in this, the trial court submitted to the jury the question as to where the payment was made to the defendant. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the money was not received by the defendant at St. Louis; that if any crime was committed, it was not committed in St. Louis; and that the trial court, therefore, was without jurisdiction. The court said, among other things: “There was no oral or special agreement made between the defendant and the bank at the time when any one of the checks was deposited and credit' given for the amount thereof. The defendant had an account with the bank, took each check when it arrived, went to the bank, indorsed the check which was payable to his order, and the bank took the check, placed the amount thereof to the credit of the defendant’s account, and nothing further was said in regard to the matter. In other words, it was the ordinary case of the transfer or sale of the check by the defendant and the purchase of it by the bank, and upon its delivery to the bank, under the circumstances stated, the title to the check passed to the bank and it became the owner thereof. It was in no sense the agent of the defendant for the purpose of collecting the amount of the cheek from the trust company upon which it was drawn. * * * The testimony of Mr. Brice, the cashier of the Biggs National Bank, as to the custom of the bank when a check was not paid, of charging it up against the depositor’s *140account, did not in the least vary the legal effect of the transaction; it was simply a method pursued by the bank of exacting* payment from the indorser of the check, and nothing* more. There was nothing* whatever in the evidence showing any agreement or understanding as to the effect of the transaction between the parties — the defendant and the bank — making it other than such as the law would imply from the facts already stated. * * * A careful scrutiny of the evidence with relation to this charge to the jury shows that there was no foundation for submitting to the jury the question of what was the understanding (other1 than such as arose from the transaction itself, as shown by uncontradicted evidence) between the defendant and the bank at the time when these various checks were deposited with the bank and their proceeds placed to the credit of the defendant. There was no agreement or understanding* of any kind other than such as the law makes from the transaction detailed, which was itself proved by uncontradicted evidence offered by the Government itself. In the absence of any special agreement that the effect of the transaction shall be otherwise (and none can be asserted here), there is no doubt that its legal effect is a change of ownership of the paper, and that the subsequent action of the bank in taking steps to obtain payment for itself of the paper which it had purchased can in no sense be said to be the action of an agent for its principal, but the act of an owner in regard to its ovni property.”
The rule announced by us in Federal Reserve Bank v. First National Bank, supra, is substantially the rule announced in Burton v. United States, supra. If there are any authorities to the contrary, they were not called to the court’s attention, nor do they appear in the majority opinion. On this point, the only case cited by counsel for the people is Pepper v. People, 75 Colo. 348, 225 Pac. 846. That case does not support the position taken by the people. There, according to the record, the undisputed evidence showed clearly that the draft, drawn by *141Pepper in Westcliffe on the complaining witness in Denver, was left by Pepper with a bank in Westcliffe for collection, was forwarded to a Denver bank for collection, and was there paid by the complaining witness. We held that in snch circumstances the payment to the Denver bank was payment to Pepper’s agent, and therefore that the crime of obtaining the money by false pretenses was committed, not in Custer county, from which the draft was sent, but in Denver. That holding is strictly in harmony with the Burton decision, supra ; indeed, it applied the very principle announced in that case. Had the check in the Burton case been sent to St. Louis for collection, the decision would have been the same as in the Pepper case.
Bearing in mind that, as we said in Federal Reserve Bank v. First National Bank, supra, whether a transaction constitutes a sale or a mere deposit for collection depends upon surrounding circumstances, it is important that the surrounding circumstances be fully disclosed, and that no material evidence thereof be excluded. But, as we shall see, material evidence offered by the defendant was rejected by the court. When Updike was on the witness stand, his counsel asked him the following questions : “State whether or not, Mr. Updike, that check was given to the cashier of the First National Bank of Idaho, Boise, Idaho, for immediate deposit and credit to your account or for collection.” “State whether or not anything was said to you by the cashier of the bank at that time as to the deposit of that particular check.” The court sustained an objection to each question. Thereupon Updike’s counsel made a formal offer of evidence to the effect that upon receipt of the cheek, Updike deposited it, endorsed in blank, with the bank in Boise for immediate credit in order that his company might at once purchase lambs; that the check was accepted by the bank as cash and not for collection; that it was forthwith credited to the account of his company; that the company and Updike, as an officer thereof, were given the privilege of im*142mediately checking npon said account and withdrawing the funds represented thereby; and that there were no conditions, restrictions, or agreements “attached to or made or entering into the deposit of said check.” Under our decision in Federal Reserve Bank v. First National Bank, supra, and under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Burton case, supra, that evidence was admissible. In sustaining the objections thereto, the court erred.
The witness McCarthy, president of the G-lenwood Springs National Bank, produced in court the remittance sheet used by the Denver branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in transmitting the check. Counsel for Updike offered to prove by another witness, Mr. Driscoll, whose qualifications as an expert on banking matters were not challenged, that the rules, regulations, customs and usages of Federal Reserve Banks and their branches in handling for collection, payment and credit items transmitted by other banks are uniform throughout the entire United States as respects all Federal Reserve Banks; that all such Federal Reserve Banks and their branches use the same general and substantial form of remittance letters in transmitting such checks, drafts and other items to the drawee banks; that the form of remittance sheet used by the Denver branch of the Federal Reserve Bank in transmitting the check in question showed that it was deposited in the bank of original deposit for immediate credit; that forwarding the item was done by the bank of original deposit as the owner of the item, and not as the agent of the depositor for collection only; and that the Federal Reserve Bank uses an entirely different form of remittance letter in transmitting items for collection only, where the original deposit had been for collection and where no immediate credit had been given to the account of the depositor. In sustaining the objection to the offer of such evidence and in sustaining the objection to the admission of the remittance sheet, the court erred.
*143This is not a case of variance, as in the majority opinion it is assumed to be. The three cases cited in paragraph 1 of that opinion have no application to the situation disclosed by the record in the present case. Arnett v. People, 91 Colo. 56, 11 P. (2d) 806, is wholly unlike the case at bar. There, according to the record, the charge was that the defendants obtained from W. F. Cross, in the county of Routt, in the state of Colorado, $409 in money. The proof was that they did obtain the money in that county and state, and the defendants were convicted of having done so. They obtained the money by cashing Cross’s check in Routt county. As they obtained, in that county and state, the money that they were charged with having obtained there, we held that the fact that they used a check as a means of obtaining the money did not relieve them from the charge. Indeed, the transaction was the same, in effect, as though A had handed to B a written slip, ordering the cashier in his store in that county to pay money to B, and the cashier had paid it to B personally, as ordered. If Arnett and his codefendants, though they received the check, had not obtained the money, they could not have been convicted, under the information filed, of having obtained the check. This shows that, for the purposes of such a case as the one at bar, the distinction between a check and money is a substantial one, just as the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Burton case, supra, held it to be. In the case at bar, Updike was charged with having obtained money by false pretenses, and was convicted of having so obtained the money; and yet, when it appears that the crime of obtaining- the money was not committed in this state, the court holds that we may ignore the charge actually made and the verdict actually rendered, and affirm the conviction; that, although Updike did not receive the money in this state, he did receive a check here; that the distinction between a check and money is not a substantial one; and that to hold, as the Supreme Court of the United States held in the Burton case, supra, that *144in such a case as this there is a substantial difference between a, check and money is “ridiculous.” In Roll v. People, 78 Colo. 589, 243 Pac. 641, the defendant was charged with having obtained a check (not money) by means of a confidence game, and was convicted of having obtained the check (not money) by that means. In the present case, both the charg'e and the conviction concerned money, and yet the court upholds the conviction, although the money was not obtained by the defendant in this state. The case of Briggs v. People, 76 Colo. 591, 233 Pac. 836, sheds no light whatever upon the question that we are considering. Language used in an opinion must be considered in connection with the facts and issues in the case decided. American Mortgage, Co. v. Logan, 90 Colo. 157, 7 P. (2d) 953. The language quoted in the majority opinion in the present case was used concerning' a situation wholly unlike that existing in this case. Briggs was convicted of misapplying* a check, the proceeds of a sale by him of stock that he had converted. Discussing that situation, we said: ‘ ‘ The instant he sold the stock the bank owned the proceeds; whether cheek, cash or draft is wholly immaterial. Defendant was then a mere agent to receive and pay over. * * * When he deposited the check to his personal credit he transferred it from the possession of the bank, through himself as president, to the possession of Briggs individually. In other words he put the bank’s money in his pocket and spent it.”
In the majority opinion, it is’ said: “If the defendant Updike cannot be tried in Colorado for violating section 6930, C. L. 1921, he cannot be tried anywhere for it.” The assumption that he cannot be tried in Colorado for violating that section is baseless. Under that section a prosecution will lie for obtaining a check by false pretenses. Stoltz v. People, 59 Colo. 342,148 Pac. 865; Whitfield v. People, 79 Colo. 108, 244 Pac. 470; Miller v. People, 72 Colo. 375, 211 Pac. 380. Zadra mailed his check in GHenwood Springs; and, in the circumstances disclosed *145by tbe record, the post office there was the agent of Updike for the purpose of receiving and forwarding the check. Therefore, the mailing of the check was a delivery of the check to Updike at, Glenwood Springs, 11 R. C. L. pp. 854, 855; 16 C. J. p. 191; Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §§64, 66; 6 R. C. L. pp. 611, 612. If Updike had been charged, as he should have been, with having obtained the check by false pretenses, he would have been charged with a crime committed within the .jurisdiction of the trial court.
The question here, as in the Burton case, supra, is whether or not the crime charged, and of which there was a conviction, was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that tried the case. I submit that that question should be answered here, as it was answered in the Burton case, supra, in the negative. The judgment, in my opinion, should be reversed.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the opinion and the judgment of the court.
Mr. Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Htt.t.taru concur in this dissenting opinion.