Court Opinion

ID: 9495424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:02:37.532719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:00.890667
License: Public Domain

KORNMANN, District Judge,
dissenting.
I concur fully with the holding and discussion with regard to deposition testimony, namely that the Iowa state courts’ decision as to that issue is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
*612While I am skeptical of any reasonable rationale for trial counsel to not have requested the judge to ¿poll the jury, especially after not asking for a recess to discuss the matter with his client and the two other defense attorneys, I do not believe that the Iowa courts decided the Strickland issues in a manner that is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
I respectfully dissent on the Sixth Amendment issue. With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to certain findings and holdings in the majority opinion. If nothing else, the state trial court proceedings are not a model of what any trial judge should do. The judge should have questioned the jury or, at a minimum, after having read the very offensive and distorted newspaper article, the judge should have inquired of counsel and perhaps of the three defendants personally whether they wished the judge to question the members of the jury as to whether any juror had read any article about the trial and, if so, what the effect of the article was on the juror or jurors. A trial judge should be especially careful in trials involving several defendants, obviously with different lawyers. Better practice would have been to allow each lawyer to confer privately with his or her client and then perhaps to allow the defendants and all lawyers to confer to attempt to decide what to do in the face of this totally unexpected trial development.
The state court trial judge failed to follow or even consider, as far as we know, what was then clearly established law in the Eighth Circuit, which law is based upon United States Supreme Court cases. We should not retreat from the teaching of United States v. Hood, 593 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir.1979):
Whenever it appears during the course of a trial that the members of the jury may have been exposed to publicity which is adverse to the defendant, the trial judge must make an initial determination as to whether the publicity creates a danger of substantial prejudice to the accused. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 194-195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2629, 49 L.Ed2d 375 (1976); United States v. Pomponio, 517 F.2d 460, 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015, 96 S.Ct. 448, 46 L.Ed.2d 386 (1975). If the trial judge determines that it does, the jurors should then be polled individually to determine whether they have in fact been exposed to the prejudicial information. If any jurors have been so exposed, the trial judge must ascertain the extent and effect of the infection, and what measures, including the possible declaration of a mistrial, must be taken to protect the rights of the accused. See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 819 n. 5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 2985, 53 L.Ed.2d 1099 (1977); United States v. Word, 519 F.2d 612, 615 n. 5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 290, 46 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); United States v. Jones, supra at 194; United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858, 96 S.Ct. 111, 46 L.Ed.2d 84 . (1975) (emphasis supplied).
In this case, the trial court denied Hood’s request for a poll of the members of the jury because, in its view, the -information which was publicized failed to meet the threshold requirement of creating a danger of substantial prejudice to the accused. Prior to the publication of this information about Hood’s arrest for an additional offense, Hood and his wife had already testified extensively about his prior arrests for three counts of murder in Arkansas, and for *613armed robbery and kidnaping in Arizona. Hood’s defense was based upon the contention that he was being harassed by law enforcement authorities by the continual bringing of charges, and their eventual dismissal. While we believe that better practice would require the polling of the jury, we cannot say, under the particular circumstances here, that the court’s failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jones, supra at 194—195; United States v. Armocida, supra at 49; United States v. Anderson, 165 U.S.App. D.C. 390, 402, 509 F.2d 312, 324 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1427, 43 L.Ed.2d 672 (1975) (emphasis supplied).
There is no question, I believe, that one or more members of the jury “may have been exposed to publicity” which was adverse to Mr. Tunstall. We do not have an answer to the “exposure question” but that is not the fault of the defendant. The language emphasized above that the trial judge “must make an initial determination” as to the danger of substantial prejudice was violated here. The language is not that the trial judge “may” or “should consider” such a determination. In the present case, we have no idea what the state trial judge thought or whether he decided anything. He conducted no real hearing of any kind. As far as we know based upon the record before us, he clearly decided nothing other than to deny the motions for a mistrial. The Iowa judge never allowed the defendant to reach the “threshold requirement” because he shut the door before anyone could reach or even consider the threshold. The trial judge in Hood made such an initial determination as to the danger of substantial prejudice and properly so.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that Hood did not set forth a clear constitutional requirement for state courts in this circuit. I think it is immaterial what other circuits have done or failed to do.
The present case is unlike Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), a case in which the state trial judge held a hearing and decided, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the events giving rise to the motion to vacate the jury verdict had not influenced the verdict. “Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Id. at 217, 102 S.Ct. 940. Here, the Iowa trial judge was very frankly not “ever watchful” and made no determination other than to deny the motions for a mistrial. Thus, there are no “findings” of the state trial judge to be presumptively correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
I fully recognize that, as we review a state court decision, we are limited by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. As to the “findings” made by the Iowa Court of Appeals, I do not believe a state appellate court can reasonably make “findings” after the trial court had refused to conduct any hearing, make any inquiry, or even discuss the issues. Such “findings” by the Iowa Court of Appeals cannot be anything more than a guess. There is nothing to permit us to extend a presumption of correctness to the findings of the Iowa Court of Appeals. In other words, I believe that the action taken by the Iowa Court of Appeals “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence (there was none) presented in the state court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The required presumption of *614correctness has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that there was no evidence to support the state court “findings.”
I cannot join in the statement by the majority that Tunstall had an opportunity to persuade the trial judge that the newspapers in the jury room created a danger of substantial prejudice and did not do so. All we have is silence on the part of the trial court and a flat denial of the motions for a mistrial. Neither the lawyers nor the trial judge even mentioned the teaching of Hood or the principle of law decided in Hood. Neither the lawyers nor the trial judge made any mention of the teaching of Bemmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), namely that there is presumptive prejudice if the jury is exposed to factual evidence not offered or received in evidence during the trial. The question of polling jury members was not even discussed by the state trial judge. In other words, unlike the trial judge in Hood, the Iowa judge exercised no discretion as to polling the jury. He neither considered nor decided the question; I believe he was legally required to do both.
The primary function of a trial judge is to see that all parties receive not only a fair trial but the fairest trial possible. Our Constitution does not, as we know, require a “perfect trial.” Trial court judges, however, can and must do much better than was done in this case. State and federal trial judges should, as far as reasonably possible, explain on the record why something is being done or not being done, not leaving appellate courts to “infer,” “assume,” “presume,” or, even worse, “guess.”
I would hold there was clearly a danger of substantial prejudice based upon the article and the circumstances of this trial and that, as a result of the failures of the trial court, the defendant did not receive his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Had the jury been polled and had the trial judge determined that either there was no “infection” or that other measures were not required to protect the rights of the accused, we would not be where we are today. I am unwilling to simply assume that the trial judge had any permissible reason to deny the motion for a mistrial without first deciding the question of prejudice and then questioning the jury. I emphasize again: how could there be evidence of either exposure or influence without asking the jurors the first question and then, if necessary, the second question?
The majority notes that, unlike the facts in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959), there was no evidence before the state courts that any juror in Mr. Tunstall’s trial had read the offending newspaper article. This is true. The reason, however, is because the trial judge failed to perform his duty under clearly established law. The judge knew that some juror in the jury waiting room was-reading some newspaper on the day the offending article was published. This was- more than a red flag. We must also keep in mind that at least two jurors were deceased by the time the state court post-conviction claims could be presented. We know also that habeas counsel in the case of a co-defendant, detailing the refusal of surviving jury members to be interviewed or give affidavits, asked the federal magistrate judge to subpoena living members of the jury to testify about the newspaper article, whether jurors had seen it, and whether jurors had been influenced by it. This motion seeking evidence was denied. I do not know what more Mr. Tunstall or his lawyers in this habeas case could have done.
I also respectfully take issue with this statement: “In the absence of any showing of actual exposure, we find the state trial court had no duty to poll the jury.” It *615seems to me this is the reverse procedure. You could have no evidence in the absence of the judge first considering whether the article was prejudicial in itself, regardless of whether any juror had read the article. He failed to consider anything in that regard, as far as we know. He failed to give any consideration to a poll. Without a poll, there could be no evidence as to any prejudicial effect on the jury and no evidence of actual exposure. After all, only the jury members could provide that evidence.
The Eighth Circuit has in recent years cited with approval United States v. Hood. See United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1535 (8th Cir.1995). Darden also involved a newspaper story published during the trial. United States District Judge George Gunn, Jr. first discussed the article with the defendants and the attorneys, outside the presence of the jurors. Judge Gunn then addressed the members of the jury as a group, asking them if any of them had seen anything on television or in the newspapers about the testimony of a particular witness. None had. Later that same day, the judge again inquired whether anyone had talked to them about any newspaper article. No one had. The appellant claimed that the judge had erred in not questioning each juror individually. Darden makes it clear that the trial judge is to “determine” the prejudicial effect on the jury of any newspaper article published during the trial. Judge Gunn did just that. The state judge in Iowa did nothing. “While we have recommended an individualized inquiry see United States v. Hood ... a collective inquiry is not a per se abuse of discretion. See Baker, 855 F.2d at 1361 (approving a collective inquiry and noting that the ‘[t]he district court was in the best position to measure the prejudicial effect, if any, of the article on the jurors’).” Id. at 1361. Judge Gunn did that. The state trial judge in Iowa measured nothing, as far as anyone knows. He did not measure the prejudicial effect of the article itself and made no inquiry of the jurors, even collectively.
I fully acknowledge the recent decision in King v. Bowersox, 291 F.3d 539 (8th Cir.2002), which decided whether Mr. King’s constitutional rights were violated when the trial court refused to declare a mistrial after the discovery of hallway photographs. I believe the facts and the issues of law are not the same here. In addition, I frankly have some problems understanding how to reconcile King with Remmer, Hood and Darden. My concern is that other trial judges may have the same difficulty.
I believe we also err in, at least partially, basing affirmance on the fact that the trial judge gave certain jury instructions about avoiding media influence. Every trial judge gives some instructions on not reading, not listening to, and not watching news reports during the trial; this is done on a daily basis. While I agree, of course, that we are not to assume that jurors failed to follow the instructions of the court, I am confident that the trial judge in United States v. Hood gave similar (and I would hope better) instructions and Hood did not rest on any such basis. In the present case, the Iowa judge told the jurors only to “not consider” media stories. Such an instruction could well be interpreted to mean there was no problem with listening to or reading them as long as jurors did “not consider” them. He did not ever tell them to “not read, not listen to, and not watch” any broadcasts or news stories, the customary such instruction.
I vote to reverse because I believe the Iowa courts’ decision as to the Sixth Amendment issue, was contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as decided *616by the United States Supreme Court and as previously interpreted by the Eighth Circuit. I would also reverse because I believe the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the lack of evidence presented in the state court proceedings. At a minimum, I would reverse for the district court to conduct a further evidentiary hearing, including hearing from living members of the jury.