Court Opinion

ID: 9593901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:25:39.802387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:20.772967
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached in this case. I write to state the reason for my concurrence.
In my view, the agreement between Clement and Farmers is not an employment agreement. It is a contract establishing an agency relationship. Our Court of Appeals has stated that “an insurance agent whose function is solely to bring about contractual relations between his principals and others on his own initiative, without being subject to the principal’s direction as to how he shall accomplish this result, is ordinarily held to be an independent contractor.” Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 112 Idaho 461, 465, 732 P.2d 699, 703 (Idaho App.1987). The agreement here specifically states that Clement is an independent contractor and not an employee. This difference is crucial to my decision. If Clement were an employee of Farmers, my vote might very well be different.
In Anderson the court of appeals said: For the sake of discussion we will assume — but we do not decide — that the limited protection afforded by law to employees at will also applies to independent contractors.
112 Idaho at 468, 732 P.2d at 706.
I am not prepared to make the same assumption. The employee at will rule is limited to “employees” who have not been hired for a definite period of time. Thomas v. Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 92 Idaho 337, 341, 442 P.2d 747, 751 (1968); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 98 Idaho 330, 333, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977); MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hospital, 108 Idaho 588, 589, 701 P.2d 208, 209 (1985); Watson v. Idaho Falls Hospitals, 111 Idaho 44, 47, 720 P.2d 632, 635 (1986); Spero v. Lockwood, Inc., 111 Idaho 74, 75, 721 P.2d 174, 175 (1986); Jones v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 111 Idaho 591, 593, 726 P.2d 703, 705 (1986). An employment relationship is a distinctly different relationship than a principal-independent contractor relationship. The benefits and obligations are substantially different. An employee has many benefits that an independent contractor does not. Among these are worker’s compensation coverage, unemployment bene*302fits, and contributions by the employer to the social security fund. An employee is also subject to many obligations that an independent contractor is not. Among these is supervision and direction by the employer. Correlatively, under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer is liable in tort for the tortious conduct of an employee committed within the scope of employment. Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 46 Idaho 334, 268 P. 19 (1928); Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 911, 655 P.2d 116, 118 (Idaho App.1982). Ordinarily, a principal is not liable for the tor-tious conduct of an independent contractor. Gates v. Pickett & Nelson Construction Co., 91 Idaho 836, 842, 432 P.2d 780, 786 (1967).
Clement and Farmers chose to contract with one another to create a principal-independent contractor relationship. The duties and responsibilities of that relationship are defined by the agreement between them. None of the legal principles that relate to an employer-employee relationship apply here. Clement was not an employee at will. He was not even an employee.
Because I have concluded that Clement was not an employee, I do not believe that the public policy exception to the employment at will rule needs to be considered here. Clement contracted to act as an agent of Farmers for a period that was stated in the agreement to end on his death or upon termination by either himself or Farmers on three months written notice. The agreement provided for payment to Clement upon the termination by Farmers to compensate Clement for any policy premiums that he had earned. What Clement seeks is damages representing future renewal premiums to which he might have become entitled if the agreement had not been terminated. These premiums are not something to which Clement was entitled under the agreement. They were mere expectancies. Unless we were to treat Clement as an employee of Farmers, we should not reach the question of why Farmers terminated the agreement and whether that reason would be a violation of public policy.
If we were to open the door to the public policy exception in this case, I believe that we would find it necessary to apply the same rule in all cases in which a contract was terminated by one of the parties pursuant to a provision in the contract. This would be a drastic change in the law of contracts. I am not prepared to make that leap.
Likewise, the contention by Clement that we should apply a good faith standard to the termination of the agreement by Farmers would constitute a novel development in our law. Whether good faith is required in terminating an employee at will must await determination in a case that poses the issue. This is not such a case.