Court Opinion

ID: 9390620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 00:02:26.664069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.775400
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10746        Document: 00516729617            Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/27/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-10746
                                    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                                                                 April 27, 2023
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
   Linda Byrd,                                                                       Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Clay County, Texas,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 7:21-CV-27

   Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         This case arises under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
   The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant. We affirm.
         On November 3, 2020, Jeff Lyde was elected Sheriff of Clay County,
   Texas. Following his election, Lyde made personnel decisions for his
   upcoming administration. He decided to replace many incumbent

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10746      Document: 00516729617         Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                   No. 22-10746

   supervisors within the Clay County Sheriff’s Office. Since he hoped
   employees who might quit during his tenure would offer “the courtesy of two
   weeks’ notice,” Lyde decided to offer that same courtesy in return. He
   individually emailed to-be-terminated employees on November 16, 2020,
   and advised them that their employment would end on November 30, when
   he assumed office.
          Linda Byrd was one such employee. At 10:57 AM on November 16,
   2020, she received an email from Lyde advising her of her upcoming
   termination. Byrd denies ever seeing the email. In any event, at some
   unknown time on that same November 16, Byrd inquired with the County
   about the possibility of receiving leave pursuant to the Family and Medical
   Leave Act of 1993. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Byrd received paperwork
   from the County on November 18 and completed her leave application on
   November 25, 2020. A Clay County employee outside the Sherriff’s Office,
   apparently unaware of plans to terminate Byrd, granted Byrd’s request for
   leave. Byrd’s leave concluded in January 2021, and the County declined to
   reinstate her.
          Byrd sued Clay County under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615 and §
   2617 (creating a cause of action). A plaintiff may bring an FMLA claim when,
   inter alia, a defendant “interfer[es] with, restrain[s], or den[ies]” the
   plaintiff’s “exercise of FMLA rights.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide,
   Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002). Subject to various limitations, those rights
   include reinstatement after return from leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).
   Byrd contends that the County should have offered her employment upon
   the conclusion of her leave in January 2021.
          Under the FMLA, however, employees may not claim “any right,
   benefit or position of employment” that they would not “have been entitled
   [to] had the employee not taken the leave.” See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B).

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                                   No. 22-10746

   Relying on this section, we have held that an FMLA plaintiff “must actually
   be entitled to the position to which he seeks reinstatement.” Shirley v.
   Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 682 (5th Cir. 2013). That means
   “denying reinstatement to an employee whose right to restored employment
   had already been extinguished . . . does not violate the Act.” Ibid (emphasis
   original). So, when a plaintiff’s position “would have been lawfully
   terminated had she not taken leave,” she cannot prove an FMLA
   interference claim. Amedee v. Shell Chemical LP, 953 F.3d 831, 836 (5th Cir.
   2020). In other words, “[e]mployees cannot immunize themselves from
   legitimate termination by taking FMLA leave.” Id.
          To defeat Clay County’s summary judgment motion, Byrd must show
   the existence of a “genuine dispute” of “material fact.” See Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 56(a). The term “material fact” includes only those facts which could
   “affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
   242, 248 (1986).
          The record makes indisputably clear that had Byrd not taken leave,
   she would have been terminated on November 30, 2020. Unless challenged,
   that factual proposition alone disposes of Byrd’s FMLA claim. See Amedee,
   953 F.3d at 836. Since none of the alleged disputes of fact cited by Byrd in
   this appeal disturb the idea that Byrd’s termination was imminent when she
   sought leave, none of her proffered disputes could affect the outcome of the
   suit. Accordingly, none are “material” for the purposes of Rule 56. See
   Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. For example, Byrd argues that Lyde lacked
   authority to terminate her on November 16, 2020, because at that time he
   was but Sheriff-Elect, not Sheriff. Byrd’s argument is immaterial, because no
   view of Lyde’s position on November 16, 2020, could change the fact that he
   could lawfully terminate Byrd when he planned to do so, on November 30,
   2020. Byrd also contends that a dispute exists over whether she saw Lyde’s
   November 16, 2020 email. But it does not matter whether Byrd knew that her

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                                    No. 22-10746

   job was ending when she applied for leave; it matters only that her job was in
   fact was ending.
          Our precedents make plain that since Byrd would not have stayed
   employed in the absence of FMLA leave, she cannot now make claims based
   on the County’s failure to reinstate her. See Shirley, 726 F.3d at 682.
          AFFIRMED.

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