Court Opinion

ID: 2717670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-13 15:06:25.539164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:35.061389
License: Public Domain

COURT ()F CHANCERY
OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

K|M  AY\/AZ|AN CHANCERY COURTHOUSE

MA TER m CHANCER\/ 34 T*‘e Ci'°‘€
s <;Eoneetovvw, DELAWARE 19947
Anr)

NEW CASTLE COUNTV COURTHOUSE
500 NORTH K|NG STREET, SU|TE 11400
W|LM|NGTON, DELAWARE 19980~3734

August l3, 2014

J ames P. Sharp, Esquire

Moore & Rutt, P.A.

122 West l\/Iarket Street
Georgetown, DE 19947
Elizabeth C. Fillingame, Esquire
Grady & Hampton, P.A.

6 North Bradford Street

Dover, DE l9904

RE: Sussex County v. Jeanne Sisk and Beulah McQueen
Civil Action No. 89l5-MA

Dear Counsel:

On September l7, 2013, Plaintiff Sussex County filed a complaint for
injunctive relief against Defendants Jeanne Sisk and Beulah McQueen concerning
an illegal shed located on their lot in a mobile home park in Rehoboth Beach.
Pending before me are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Court of
Chancery Rule 56 and Motion to Dismiss under Rule l2(b)(6), both of which are
opposed by Defendants. F or the reasons below, l recommend that the Court grant
Plaintiff’ s motion for summary judgment because Defendants are barred under the

doctrine of res judicata from re-litigating the issue of the legality of their shed. l

Page l ofll

 

also recommend that the Court dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims for abuse of
process for their failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The defendants are a daughter and mother who lease Lot A-16 in Sea Air
Mobile City in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. They own a manufactured home that
is located on Lot A-l6, and have resided there for nearly 40 years. This is the
second time that SussexiCounty has sought injunctive relief against these
Defendants concerning a non-conforming shed on Lot A-l6. ln 2008, Sisk placed
an 8' x l0' shed on the property and, on January 28, 2()09, Defendants were sent

notice by a Sussex County building official that they were in violation of the rear

yard and side yard setback requirements, the separation requirements for structures n

in a mobile home park, and the requirement to obtain a building permit for the
shed. On June 9, 2009, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint for injunctive relief in
this Court, requesting the Court find Defendants in violation of the Sussex County
Code, permanently enjoin Defendants from continued use of the property in
violation of the Code, and require Defendants to bring the property into
compliance within 30 days or else Sussex County would undertake removal or
demolition of the illegally placed structure at Defendants’ expense.' This action

was stayed on December 14, 2010,2 pending Defendant Sisk’s appeal to Superior

‘Sussex County v. Sisk et al., C.A. No. 4653-l\/IG (Del. Ch.), Docket Item No. 1 ("D.l.
#5$).
21¢1_ ar D.I. 14

Page 2 ofll

Court from the denials of her appeal and application for a variance by the Sussex
County Board of Adjustment (the "Board"), and ultimately dismissed by
stipulation of the parties on April 20, 201 1,3 after Sisk lost her appeal in Superior
Court.

As recited in the decision of the Superior Court, there were three 8' x 10'
sheds placed on Lot A-16 over the nearly 40 years Defendants leased this
property." The first shed was placed on a concrete pad behind the mobile home in
1969 by Sisk’s stepfather. ln the 1990s, Sisk replaced the first shed with another
shed of the same size without obtaining a building pennit. In 2007, Sussex County
put a moratorium on applications for building and placement permits for Sea Air
because many of the structures in this old mobile home park were in violation of
the current zoning code. On May 30, 2007, Sussex County entered into an
agreement with Sea Air whereby Sussex County would treat existing structures in
Sea Air as non-conforming structures and not issue any zoning violations for them,
but any replacement or new structures would be subject to the current zoning code.
In order to place a new structure or replace an existing structure on a lot, a tenant
would have to obtain Sea Air’s prior written approval, and obtain a survey showing

the proposed location of the new or replacement structure. If necessary, the tenant

31¢1. arD.l. 15.
4 See Sisk v. Sussex County Board ofAdjuslment, 201 l WL 855857, at *l (Del. Super.
Feb. 25, 2011).

Page 3 of ll

would have to submit an application for a variance to the Board of Adjustment,
together with the survey, for the approval.

In 2008, Sisk replaced her second shed with a third 8' x 10' shed without
obtaining a building permit or Sea Air’s approval, as a result of which the Sussex
County building official issued a violation notice to McQueen and Sisk.$ When the
violation was not corrected, Sussex County filed its first suit against McQueen and
Sisk in this Court on June 9, 2009. Shortly thereafter, on June 25, 2009, Sisk filed
an appeal of the violation notice and an application for a variance with the Board
of Adjustment.

Sisk’s appeal and application were originally rejected as untimely and
incomplete because her application for a variance did not include a survey, but the
Board relented and accepted an amended appeal and application on July 29, 2010. 6
After a hearing, the Board denied Sisk’s appeal as untimely and rejected her
application for a variance because without a survey the Board could not make an
informed decision.

Sisk appealed the decisions of the Board of Adjustment to the Superior
Court, which upheld those decisions, ruling in part: "Sisk’s second shed was never
a lawful non-conforming structure. She acknowledged that it was built without a

building permit.  Replacing an unlawful non-conforming structure with another

5 1a ar *2.

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unlawful non-conforming structure does not cleanse the original unlawfulness."7

After Sisk lost her Superior Court appeal, Defendants removed their shed from Lot
A-l6, and the shed remained off the property for approximately one year. In 2012,
Defendants returned the shed to LotA-16 and placed it in the same location on
their lot.

On January 7, 2014, Defendants filed an amended answer to the Plaintiff` s
second petition for injunctive relief, alleging that the shed was not in violation of
the Sussex County Code because a building permit had been issued in 1969 for the
construction of an 8' x 10' shed on Lot A-l6. Defendants also counterclaimed that
the Sea Air homeowners, in general, and Sisk, individually, had been subjected to
abuse of process by Sussex County.

Plaintiff now argues that Defendants are barred by the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel from re-litigating the issue of the illegality of the
shed and from claiming abuse of process. Defendants counter that these doctrines
do not apply because Defendant McQueen was not a party to the 2010 Superior
Court appeal, and McQueen was the only person at that time with knowledge of
the existence of the 1969 building permit. Defendants also argue that Defendant
Sisk was a pro se litigant and did not possess the knowledge necessary to make an

abuse of process claim during the 2010 litigation. Furthermore, they contend that

61¢1.

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additional facts regarding this claim have been discovered since the 2010 litigation,
i.e., either Sussex County made a mistake in denying the existence of the 1969
permit or else the County deliberately defrauded the court in denying the existence
of the permit.

At my request, the parties submitted memoranda on the issue of whether,
under the doctrine of resjudz`cata, McQueen was privy to the Superior Court
appeal that was brought by Sisk. Defendants contend that McQueen should not be
bound by the 201 1 Superior Court ruling because she was not a named party to the
action nor was she privy to the details surrounding the litigation. McQueen admits
in an affidavit that she knew of the litigation about the shed between her daughter
and Sussex County, but she was not aware that the existence of a building permit
was at issue. lf McQueen had known that the existence of the building permit was
disputed, she would have come forward with the information that a building permit
had been obtained in 1969 for both the addition to her home and the construction
of a shed. Sisk admits in her affidavit that she purposely kept her mother out of the
Superior Court appeal and did not discuss the case with her because of her age and
poor health. Plaintiff nevertheless argues that McQueen should be bound by the

Superior Court ruling because mother and daughter clearly had a close relationship

71a at *6.

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and their interests were sufficiently aligned as tenants in maintaining a shed on
their property.

The doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent unnecessary and
burdensome litigation about facts and theories that have been or should have been
litigated previously.g 'l`he five elements that are needed to establish res judicata
are:

(1) The court making the prior adjudication had jurisdiction;

(2) The parties in the present action are either the same parties or in privity

with the parties from the prior adjudication;

(3)The cause of action must be the same in both cases or the issues decided

in the prior action must be the same as those raised in the present case;

(4) The issues in the prior action must be decided adversely to the plaintiff’ s

contentions in the instant case; and

(5) The prior adjudication must be final.()

As to the first element, it is undisputed that Superior Court had jurisdiction
over the appeal from the Board of Adjustment.m Second, Sisk initiated the appeal
and both Sisk and Sussex County were parties to the Superior Court appeal. The

parties, however, dispute whether McQueen was in privity with Sisk. "Privity is

8 Elliotl v. Danberg, 2013 WL 6407676, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 6, 2013).
9 Bailey v, City of Wilmz`ngton, 766 A.2d 477, 481 (Del. 2001) (citations omitted).
‘° see 9 Dez. C, § 6916.

Page 7 ofll

 ‘a legal determination for the trial court with regard to whether the relationship
between the parties is sufficiently close to support preclusion."’" The record
shows that Sisk was acting on her own behalf and as an agent for her mother in
pursuing her pro se appeal in Superior Court. McQueen was aware of the litigation
that her daughter was having with Sussex County about the shed even though she
was not aware of all the details. Sisk admitted handling all disputes for her mother
because of l\/I.cQueen’s health - McQueen has had heart problems since 2011 and
has been advised by her physician to avoid stress. The attomey who represented
Sisk in her appeal to the Board from the violation notice and her application for a
variance also represented both Sisk and McQueen in Sussex County’s first action
against them in this Court, C.A. No. 4653-MG. This attorney, although he never
directly communicated with McQueen, assumed that Sisk was properly acting as
her mother’s agent because their interests were the same. This same attorney, on
behalf of Sisk and l\/lcQueen, subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of C.A. No.
4653-1\/IG,'2 thus inducing the County reasonably to suppose that the denial of
Sisk’s appeal in Superior Court had the effect ofdetermining the legal obligations

of both Sisk and l\/IcQueen.B Therefore, l conclude that McQueen was in privity

ll Aveta Irzc., v. Cavallz`erz', 23 A.3d 157, 180 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting Hz`ggz`ns v. Walls,
901 A.zd 122, 133(1)@1. super 2005)).

‘2 sussex Ceemy v. sisk er ez., C.A. No. 4653-1\/10 (Del. Ch.) D.1. 15.

‘3 Avera lne., 23 A.zd err 130 wiring Kehzs v. Kenereeh Ce»~p., 791 A.zd er 763, 769 (Del.
ch. 2000)).

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with Sisk during the Superior Court appeal not only because the two women have a
close familial relationship and their interests were aligned on the issue of the shed,
but also because of Sisk’s conduct in acting as her mother’s agent throughout the
entire litigation process.

As to the fourth element, the cause of action in the prior litigation concerned
the legality of the placement of a third shed on Lot A-16 in 2008. In 2011, the
Superior Court upheld the Board of Adjustment’s denial of Sisk’s appeal from the
violation notice and denial of Sisk’s application for a variance. Since no appeal
was taken from the Superior Court’s decision, the illegality of 2008 placement of a
shed on LotA-16 was finally determined in the prior litigation, thus satisfying the
fifth element. The current litigation brought by Plaintiff to remove the shed that
Defendants subsequently placed in the same location on Lot A-16 raises the exact
same legal issues that were decided adversely to Sisk in 2011. Therefore,
Defendants are precluded under the doctrine of res judicata from re-litigating these
issues

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ counterclaims should be dismissed
because they should have been raised during the prior litigation and are now
untimely. Defendants respond by claiming that as a pro se litigant, Sisk did not
possess the knowledge to make an abuse of process claim during the 2010

litigation; moreover, facts supporting these claims have been discovered since the

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2010 litigation concerning Sussex County’s possible knowledge of the existence of
the 1969 building permit.

1n their counterclaims, Defendants allege that Sisk was targeted by Sussex
County because she served as president of the homeowners association in Sea Air
for many years and was vocal in opposing the County on various issues for the
benefit of the homeowners of Sea Air. Defendants allege there are many sheds in
Sea Air that are also in violation of the Code but their owners have not been
violated for non-compliance, thus demonstrating that Sisk has been targeted by the
County and this dispute has been an abuse of process. Further, Defendants allege
that the Sea Air community as a whole has been vocal in its opposition to County
action, and that the County has maliciously and arbitrarily imposed only on Sea
Air homeowners the requirement that they obtain variances and surveys in
conjunction with a building permit; hence, this is another abuse of process by
Sussex County, according to Defendants.

"The elements of a claim of abuse of process are: (1) an ulterior 1notive; and
(2) a willful act in the use of the legal process that is not proper in the regular

14 .
" Some form of coercion to

conduct of the proceedings, i.e., the current litigation.
obtain an advantage that is not properly involved in the proceeding itself must be

shown, such as obtaining the surrender of property or the payment of money by use

Page 10 ofll

of the process as a threat. Abuse of process as a claim pertains to the "perversion
of the process after it has been issued" as opposed to malicious prosecution which
focuses on the initiation of that process. 15
Defendants are focusing on the initiation of the legal process, i.e., Sisk
individually being targeted with a notice of violation or Sea Air homeowners
generally being denied building permits, rather than on any alleged coercion by
County officials during the regular conduct of the legal proceedings. As a result,
Defendants have failed to state a claim of abuse of process in both counterclaims.
Therefore, 1 recommend that the Court grant the motion to dismiss the
counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
For the reasons above, 1 recommend that the Court grant Plaintiff’ s motion
for summary judgment and motion to dismiss.
Respectfully
/s/ Ki1n E. Ayvazian

Kim E. Ayvazian
l\/laster in Chancery

KEA/kekz

14 Preferred Investment Services, lrzc. v. T & H Bail Bo)tds, Inc., et al., 2013 WL
3934992, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2013).

‘5 1a (quoring Pfer;yfee v. srare Faem Mar_ Aare. ms Ce., 2011 WL 7062493, er * 16 (13@1.

Super. Dec. 20, 201 l)).

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