Court Opinion

ID: 9703108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:40:20.124128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:45.766804
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
concurring and dissenting. I concur in the majority’s decision affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his confession. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that there was no violation of defendant’s right to counsel in this case. I would reach the jury charge issue only to hold it was not preserved as required by V.R.CnE 30.
With respect to the jury charge issue, the majority agrees that Rule 30 was not followed but concludes that fairness requires review because the objection to the charge language in issue was raised at the charge conference, the trial court subsequently preserved all objections raised at the charge conference and our disapproval of this practice in State v. Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302, 306, 609 A.2d 972, 975 (1992), occurred only two weeks before the charge in this case. Rule 30 is explicit on the requirement of specific objections, and the grounds therefore, and on the timing of objections. Wheelock simply explained the obvious, that is, that the practice used here is contrary to the rule and contrary to the rationale of giving the trial court one last opportunity to correct error before the jury retires. See id. Thus, in State v. Pelican, 160 Vt. 536, 538, 632 A.2d 24, 26 (1993), we rejected the exact request for fairness sought here in a case where the charge occurred prior to the Wheelock decision. We are acting inconsistently here.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Pelican is unavailing. The relevant language of Pelican is:
Defendant claims that his counsel’s preservation method comported with practice prevailing at the time. We disagree. Our rule and case law required an objection following the instructions to preserve the issue for appeal. See State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 71, 574 A.2d 1248, 1253 (1990) (“‘A claimed error in the jury instructions can be raised on appeal only if, after the delivery of the charge, the aggrieved party made a specific objection, including a clear statement of the matter to which he objects and the grounds of the objection.’”) (quoting State v. Lettieri, 149 Vt. 340, 342, 543 A.2d 683, 685 (1988)).
*304Id. Defendant’s inaction here is also at variance with what our rule and case law require.
Even if Pelican can be distinguished, the critical difference here is that the charge occurred after Wheelock was decided. In State v. Shattuck, 141 Vt. 523, 528-29, 450 A.2d 1122, 1124-25 (1982), we reviewed the options on when to make a new decisional rule effective. One of the options is not to make it effective at some time after the new decisional rule is announced, giving lawyers an opportunity to read the precedential decision. Indeed, we decided to adopt the common-law rule that new judicial decisions are partially retroactive in criminal cases. Id. at 529, 450 A.2d at 1125. It was that rule which Pelican implemented.
I recognize the difficulty of insisting that counsel follow the objection rule even though the trial judge specifically stated such an objection was unnecessary and the appellate issue was clearly before the trial court. Nevertheless, we must be the judge of whether appellate preservation occurred, and I believe we must require strict compliance with the rule. The appellate records we are receiving, including this one, demonstrate why strict compliance is necessary.
Even before the opening of trial, counsel began to discuss potential charge language, and the court began to circulate drafts of its charge. A ninety minute charge conference occurred on the day before the charge was given. In a relatively free-flowing discussion, both prosecution and defense counsel addressed a draft of the charge prepared by the trial judge. There was no attempt to separate formal objections from requests or preferences. There was no summary of positions at the end of the conference. Following an argument, defense counsel used statements like, “I would ask the court to reconsider or to consider that.”
On the next morning, the court handed counsel the final charge and stated that prior objections were preserved. The deficiency in this practice is twofold: (1) the deficiency raised and excused by the majority that no objection was made at the correct time; and (2) the deficiency ignored by the majority and trial court that there never was any objection at all, certainly not one that stated distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of objection. The trial court “preserved” only a free-flowing discussion of the law without ever requiring that the parties formalize positions in terms of objections. Cf. Winey v. William E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. 129, 138, 636 A.2d 744, 750 (1993) (similar civil rule is not followed with a “blanket objection to hundreds of pages of difficult-to-follow argument”).
*305I am aware from the cases we have reviewed that some trial judges are following the practice used here and find it to be a thorough and efficient way to construct a charge. Our perspective is necessarily different. The best jury charge is nevertheless an imperfect attempt to explain complicated and often uncertain legal concepts to the lay jury. Charge conferences frequently become “brain-storming” sessions where virtually any possible position is offered. With the opportunity for reflection, and the benefit of hindsight, creative appellate counsel will find errors in language never seriously considered by the trial judge. Unless we are prepared to accept frequent reversals for errors in jury charge language, we must require that trial counsel itemize serious differences with the charge in a way that the trial judge will consider them. That requirement is contained in Rule 30 but was not followed here.
The majority has stated an additional reason for reaching its conclusion — that the charge was plain error. “Only in extraordinary cases will we find plain error.” State v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 508, 514, 615 A.2d 132, 135 (1992). Under the charge, the jury could transfer Gundlah’s intent to Bacon only if Gundlah’s acts were “incidental to the execution of or as a natural and probable consequence of their original plan, and in furtherance of their alleged common purpose.” Because of the requirement that Gundlah act in furtherance of the common purpose, this language goes beyond the Orlandi language which the majority criticizes. If the charge stated that mere participation in the burglary allowed Gundlah’s intent to be transferred to Bacon, I might agree with the majority. Since the charge requires more, I would not find plain error.
I would, however, reverse and remand all of defendant’s convictions because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. The majority has described some of the facts bearing on this issue. The following is a supplement to the majority’s recitation.
On December 27, 1991, the State moved for a pretrial ruling that the results of DNA analysis conducted by the State would be admissible at trial. The motion indicated that the analysis had shown a match between the murder victim’s blood and blood stains found on defendant’s down vest and blue jeans. It further found that the chance of an unrelated profile match for the stain on the vest was 115,000 to 1 and for the stain on the blue jeans was 26 to 1.
Evidentiary hearings were held on the motion to withdraw on January 14 and 22, 1992; and included evidence from a number of lawyers called by defendant. Trial counsel testified that he had agreed *306to provide representation in the case on the understanding that it involved only the murder charge. When he learned of the full extent of the charges, he requested from the assigned counsel coordinator that he be allowed to bill, and get paid, periodically “to at least try to maintain some sort of economic viability within the office.”1 The coordinator agreed to this arrangement, but no payments were made on trial counsel’s bills because the Office of Defender General ran out of money to pay ad hoc assigned counsel for the fiscal year (July 1, 1991 through June 30, 1992). Trial counsel felt that the State had breached its agreement with him and he was no longer acting voluntarily for defendant.2
Trial counsel asserted that defendant could not be given an adequate defense because “Every hour I give to him, I’m literally hurting myself and my family.” He stated that this placed him in an inherent conflict of interest “where I have to decide whether my family and my law practice and my financial security is destroyed, or whether I adhere to my obligations to the client.” He claimed not to be competent on the DNA admissibility issue. He estimated that he would have to expend about 500 hours of preparation on the question whether the DNA evidence was admissible.3
On February 25,1992, the trial court issued an extensive opinion on the defense motions. The court found virtually all of the facts consistent with trial counsel’s claims. It found:
Compensation of assigned counsel should be adequate because the burden of a serious, complex case (such as this case), may create a situation where the cost of an attorney’s office overhead places direct pressure upon him to reduce services to his client, thus breaching his duty of effective assistance. ...
[The State] agreed that when [counsel] reached $1,000 of chargeable time, a debenture would be submitted and if approved, [counsel] should be paid. However, the State has not fulfilled this agreement. . . .
*307[The current reimbursement] rate of $25.00 per hour is inadequate to meet an ad hoe attorney’s overhead, absent the attorney working out of his own home. . . .
[Estimate seems well taken that a first degree murder case . . . may well involve between 500 and 1,000 hours of work and this constitutes one-third to two-thirds of an attorney’s annual productive year.
The court denied the motions after a lengthy analysis of the right to counsel, the professional and ethical responsibilities of counsel, and the State’s obligations under the United States and Vermont Constitutions and the Vermont Public Defender Act. It ordered, however, that trial counsel obtain approval for defense expenses and submit vouchers for these expenses. It ordered that these vouchers be paid no later than thirty days after submission. With respect to compensating trial counsel’s time, the court ordered him to submit a debenture for all uncompensated time. It further ordered:
Completion of this process by a check in payment of such sums allowed should be received by Mr. Lawlor not more than 30 days after the date of submission. Prompt payment is necessary for the financial responsibility of his law office, and the discharge of his statutory obligations to pay staff in a timely fashion. ... It hardly becomes a system of justice to call upon its attorneys to defend persons charged with serious crime to the extent that we convert the attorney into an outlaw.
(Citations omitted.)4 Trial counsel’s motion to take an interlocutory appeal from this order was denied.
For reasons not appearing in the record, the court’s order was not followed. On the first day of trial in April, trial counsel had still not been paid any amount for his time.
Following this order, a skirmish occurred over payment for a defense DNA expert. Trial counsel contacted potential experts and obtained a price quote from one. The assigned counsel coordinator refused to pay the expert’s rate and made a counteroffer. The expert refused to work for the counteroffer price. On defendant’s motion, the court ordered the State to pay the expert’s requested price. By this time, the expert had refused to provide the services, and trial counsel *308was unable to locate another expert. Defendant moved that the DNA evidence be excluded because the payment controversy had made it impossible for defendant to effectively contest the issue.
A hearing on the defense motion occurred on March 17,1992. Trial counsel insisted he was not competent to contest DNA admissibility and it would not be “fruitful” for him to participate in the DNA admissibility hearing. In response, the prosecutor commented that defense counsel had failed to depose the State’s DNA witnesses and added “I don’t know how I’m going to meet an ineffective assistance claim with regard to that.”
The hearing on DNA admissibility occurred on March 30, 1992. Two expert witnesses testified for the State. Defense counsel neither cross-examined the experts nor offered a memorandum in opposition to admission. On April 2, 1992, the court ruled the DNA testimony was admissible based on the foundation testimony of the State’s experts. Not surprisingly in light of the one-sided record, defendant has not challenged this ruling on appeal.
Trial began on April 6,1992 but only after another major skirmish over the issue of defendant’s representation. A letter from the trial judge to his law clerk was placed in the file by mistake and obtained by a newspaper reporter. The newspaper article stated that the trial judge was “tending to agree” with the prosecutor that trial counsel was trying to make a record of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the judge was “about ready to tell [trial counsel] ... he has exceeded professional limits.” The article also stated that the judge found trial counsel’s “carping about inability to hire a DNA expert to be pretty unbearable.” The trial judge was interviewed and noted that he had ruled that trial counsel had to serve “regardless of economic hardship.” The newspaper story also noted that trial counsel had showed up ninety minutes late for a hearing during the preceding week and explained his conduct as “incompetence, sheer incompetence.”
Following the story’s publication, trial counsel moved to recuse the trial judge, a motion that was referred by the trial judge to the Trial Court Administrative Judge and denied after a telephone hearing. The hearing replayed the issue of trial counsel’s representation, and he reiterated that defendant could not be adequately defended because of lack of resources, and added, “Sometimes the hardest thing in the world to do is sit and do nothing and let a system demonstrate its own failures.”
I have detailed the facts to emphasize that this is an extreme case. It involves one of the most notorious and serious crimes ever to occur *309in Vermont. The number of counts and the complexity of the legal issues, including the unresolved issue in Vermont of the admissibility of DNA evidence and probability calculations, made it an exceptionally difficult and time-consuming case to defend. As the trial court found, defense of the case could consume between one-third and two-thirds of a lawyer’s annual billable hours. As the court also found, trial counsel’s economic constraints were identified at the beginning of the representation and were not contested. Trial counsel was misled, however, into taking on this case, first by the nondisclosure of the multiple felony counts and then by the promise of a payment arrangement that could not be honored. When he found that he could not provide the needed defense consistent with the economic demands of his small firm, trial counsel sought to withdraw and ended up in a protracted battle with the trial judge over his ethical obligations. Although the court privately believed that trial counsel was intentionally failing to provide an adequate defense in order that a conviction could not stand, it refused to allow the withdrawal. Trial counsel essentially stood mute on the major legal issue of the case, the admissibility and use of the DNA evidence.
Although defendant appeals the refusal to allow withdrawal of trial counsel, the State tries to characterize this as a standard ineffeetiveassistance-of-counsel claim, arguing that it is not sustainable proeedurally or substantively. Procedurally, it argues that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim cannot be raised on direct review of the conviction. See In re Moskaluk, 156 Vt. 294, 298, 591 A2d 95, 97 (1991); State v. Davignon, 152 Vt. 209, 222, 565 A.2d 1301, 1308 (1989). Substantively, it argues that there was no showing trial counsel’s actual performance fell below professional norms or that the result would have been different if counsel’s performance had been adequate. See In re Trombly, 160 Vt. 215, 218, 627 A.2d 855, 856 (1993); In re Hanson, 160 Vt. 111, 114-15, 623 A.2d 466, 468 (1993).
This is, however, a case totally unlike those on which the State relies. In each of those cases, the error asserted was based on actions or inactions of counsel and not, as here, a ruling of the trial court. Further, in each of those cases, there was no preservation of the issue during trial; indeed, nonpreservation is very often a part of the performance alleged to be substandard. Here, the issue is fully and exhaustively preserved based on an extensive factual record.
There is, therefore, no procedural reason not to reach the counsel issue raised by defendant. The rule on which the State relies is based on the inadequacy of the record in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel *310cases, see Moskaluk, 156 Vt. at 298, 591 A.2d at 97, a deficiency not present here. In fact, we have a preference for resolving issues on direct review, if possible, rather than going through the duplicative inquiry of a post-conviction relief proceeding. See State v. McCarthy, 156 Vt. 148, 158 n.2, 589 A.2d 869, 875 n.2 (1991). The question is fully preserved below. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (reviewing court cannot presume prejudice resulting from conflict-of-interest claim where claim not raised below).
The larger question is whether the denial of a motion to withdraw in such circumstances can be grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction in the absence of a showing of substandard performance that affected the outcome of the case. I agree with defendant that denial of the motion to withdraw can provide grounds for reversal where there is sufficient showing of a conflict of interest. In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the failure to allow withdrawal of a lawyer representing multiple criminal defendants, because of a conflict of interest among them, constitutes a denial of assistance of counsel and grounds for reversal of the convictions of each defendant. The Court relied on the holding of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942), that the ‘““assistance of counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer should simultaneously represent conflicting interests.’” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482 (quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70). The Court held that where a defense attorney, engaged in the representation of multiple defendants, asserted to the court that a conflict of interest was present, the court had to remove the conflict or “take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel.” Id. at 484. It went on to hold that reversal was the automatic result of the trial court’s failure to resolve the potential conflict, and defendant need not show prejudice. Id. at 488.
I agree with defendant that the Holloway analysis can apply in a case like that before us. Our Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes not only conflicts of interest arising from representation of multiple clients, see DR 5-105(B), but also conflicts where the representation of a client is adversely affected by the lawyer’s “financial... or personal interests.” Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101(A). The Court stressed in Holloway that the “evil. . . is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490. Similarly, here the evil is what counsel fails to do for the client because economic realities greatly *311limit availability of time for pretrial work. I see no difference in the effect on the client between the conflict of interest in Holloway and the conflict that existed here. See Margulies, Resource Deprivation and the Right to Counsel, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 673, 706-07 (1989); Note, The Breath of the Unfee’d Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 626, 642-45 (1991).
Trial counsel relied on the conflict-of-interest theory in support of the motion to withdraw. He argued that a conflict existed because his personal and financial interests prevented the provision of adequate representation to this defendant. The trial court’s findings show that it fully agreed with trial counsel’s assertions except when it came to the remedy. Like the trial court in Holloway, it put itself in the position of recognizing the problem but refused to provide a remedy that protected defendant’s interests.
The words of the Florida Supreme Court in resolving a dispute over fees for appointed criminal defense attorneys are critical here: “[W]e must focus upon the criminal defendant whose rights are often forgotten in the heat of this bitter dispute.” Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 1986). The trial court engaged in an extensive analysis of the professional and ethical obligations of lawyers to honor court appointments in criminal cases irrespective of financial remuneration and concluded trial counsel had an obligation to serve in this case even if unpaid. To the extent defendant’s interests are considered in this analysis, the court appears to view them as protected by the ethical obligation of the lawyer to handle the case diligently, competently and zealously. See Code of Professional Responsibility DR 6-101(A)(l), DR 6-101(A)(2), DR 7-101(A)(l); see also A.O. 4, § 2 (assigned counsel must represent interests of clients “to the full measure of their professional responsibility, without regard to the amount of their compensation, if any”).
We ignore reality if we conclude that the existence of ethical obligations will by themselves ensure effective representation in the face of compelling and unavoidable economic pressures to the contrary. See Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 547 (W Va. 1989) (“[I]n order to avoid an unnecessary burden on lawyers that can create a conflict of interest with their clients, the legislature must create some mechanism for periodic compensation of lawyers as services are performed.”). Indeed, the focus on ethics framed this case as a battle between counsel and the court, with the defendant’s rights lost in that battle. If trial counsel acts unethically, we have remedies to address *312this misconduct; one of these remedies is not to inflict this misconduct on a criminal defendant faced with life imprisonment.
As I read the majority decision, it does not disagree with any of this legal analysis. Instead, it rejects defendant’s claim because trial counsel failed to show in detail the nature of his conflicting economic interest and because the court order resolved the conflict. Neither of these reasons withstand close inspection; a correct analysis requires a retrial because of the violation of defendant’s right to counsel.
The majority’s criticism of trial counsel for failing to detail the precise extent of economic hardship to his law firm or his family and for failing to specify exactly how he was reducing services to defendant because of the lack of payment and the low rate of compensation reminds me of the Arkansas Supreme Court decision overturned in Holloway. As the United States Supreme Court summarized, the Arkansas Court “observed that [the public defender] had failed to outline to the trial court both the nature of the confidential information received from his clients and the manner in which knowledge of that information created conflicting loyalties. . . . [T]he court concluded that the record demonstrated no actual conflict of interests or prejudice to the petitioners, and therefore affirmed.” 435 U.S. at 481. The United States Supreme Court rejected this requirement for a more detailed showing:
It is arguable, perhaps, that defense counsel might have presented the requests for appointment of separate counsel more vigorously and in greater detail. As to the former, however, the trial court’s responses hardly encouraged pursuit of the separate-counsel claim; and as to presenting the basis for that claim in more detail, defense counsel was confronted with a risk of violating, by more disclosure, his duty of confidentiality to his clients.
Id. at 485.5
As in Holloway, the majority’s assertion that trial counsel should have presented the conflict “more vigorously and in greater detail” is *313an ex post facto justification for a decision reached on entirely different grounds. The trial court never took that position. As he said succinctly to the newspaper, he ruled that trial counsel had to continue to provide representation irrespective of “economic hardship.” The judge here, like the judge in Holloway, responded in a way that hardly encouraged pursuit of the motion to withdraw in more detail.
The trial court found that nonpayment of counsel hindered the defense. Although defense counsel testified in general terms, this was because there was no dispute about the relevant facts, and his claim was based on breach of an agreement constructed to meet counsel’s economic needs. He presented his choice starkly — destruction of his law practice and financial security or adherence to his obligations to his client. The State never denied the choice was real, did not cross-examine defense counsel and did not take the position below that the motion should be denied for lack of precise proof. It has not taken that position here.
Much of the majority’s new failure-of-proof theory is nit-picking. For example, the trial court found that the reimbursement rate was below the office overhead rate of all lawyers except those who work out of their home and that the defense of this case could be expected to consume between a third and two-thirds of trial counsel’s billable hours for a year. Despite these findings, the majority faults trial counsel for not showing that the representation of defendant, for which he was not being paid, was causing cash-flow problems.
It would also have been inappropriate for trial counsel to provide much of the information the majority now seeks. The court and prosecutor were concerned that trial counsel was making a record of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the court was suggesting that trial counsel had already exceeded professional limits. Disclosures about how trial counsel was failing to provide a defense to his client would have been a breach of loyalty to the client and would have further impaired a relationship that must be based on trust and confidence.
Unlike the majority, I believe the handling of the DNA issue is very significant in showing the adverse effect on trial counsel’s performance. Contrary to the majority’s hindsight evaluation, the parties clearly believed that the DNA evidence would be of great importance and that DNA admissibility was the major legal issue of the case. DNA evidence was new to Vermont, and this Court had never ruled on its admissibility. In one instance where it had been offered in a *314homicide case, the trial court excluded it because of unreliability of the probability results. See State v. Passino, 161 Vt. 515, 520, 640 A.2d 547, 549 (1994). This case occurred in May of 1991, just before defendant was charged in this case. Apparently, the defendant in Passino was able to keep out the DNA evidence without the benefit of his own experts. See id.
Despite the importance of the DNA issue, trial counsel here essentially gave up on it. He never cross-examined the expert witnesses called by the State in support of admissibility nor did he submit a memorandum of law arguing for exclusion. He had stated he was not “competent” to contest DNA admissibility, and even the prosecutor questioned how he was going to respond to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the admission of the DNA evidence. There could not have been a clearer demonstration of how the defense was impaired by the unwillingness or inability of trial counsel to proceed without being paid.
The majority’s second factual reason for discounting the presence of a conflict of interest in this case is that the court ordered that trial counsel be paid. As the majority acknowledges, the record does not show trial counsel was ever paid prior to trial.6 The record does reflect the submission of debentures as required by the court order. Indeed, the testimony of the assigned counsel coordinator was that trial counsel had submitted debentures to him, and they were unpaid.
The specific order that the majority finds sufficient requires that trial counsel’s debentures be “paid by the Treasurer on warrant.” The Treasurer was never made a party to these proceedings; nor was the Defender General, out of whose budget the payment would be made. Even the assigned counsel coordinator, who was ordered to send the debentures to the Commissioner of Finance, was not a party. I do not believe that the court order represented more than a hope that putting something on paper would achieve the desired result. As the trial judge said in the newspaper interview, the real order was that trial counsel had to serve regardless of economic hardship.
I also believe that the focus on the trial court’s order shifts the analysis to the wrong party. We can speculate ad infinitum on what *315trial counsel could have done to pursue his economic interest, but the reality is that defendant was left with counsel who stated clearly that he could not provide proper representation under the prevailing circumstances. I believe the court’s duty is to protect the defendant, whether or not trial counsel’s economic interests are fully protected in the process.
If we accept that nonpayment of fees, or inadequate levels of compensation, can ever be grounds for denial of assistance of counsel if unaddressed, I believe this case clearly requires reversal. I emphasize again the factors that make this case extreme and extraordinary.
(1) Counsel’s assent to take the case was induced by an inadequate disclosure of its extent and then a broken promise to make periodic payments;
(2) The reimbursement rate did not even cover counsel’s office overhead. See statement accompanying 1993 Amendment to A.O. 4, § 6 (survey determined average hourly overhead rate in Vermont is $47 per hour).
(3) Defendant was charged with first-degree murder and nineteen other crimes. Proper representation would take between one-third and two-thirds of counsel’s annual billable hours. Cf. Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d at 547 (no lawyer in West Virginia can be required to devote more than 10% of a normal work year to assigned counsel cases).
(4) The court found that despite the low reimbursement rate lawyers were available to take major felony cases voluntarily.
(5) The request to withdraw came early in the case before trial counsel had completed extensive pretrial preparation. It is not clear that the trial would have been delayed by a change of counsel.
As demonstrated above, defendant does not have to show prejudice under Holloway, but the record clearly shows it. I do not believe defendant received the assistance of counsel required by the Sixth, Amendment. I would reverse and remand on that basis.

 Although the record is vague on this point, it appears that trial counsel’s firm contained two partners, including him, and two associates.

 Trial counsel also argued that the reimbursement rate of $25 per horn: was “outrageous” and “a taking.”

 The prosecutor estimated that based on the experience in other cases in Vermont, he would put between 100 and 150 hours into the DNA admissibility issue.

 The court also requested that trial counsel file a copy of his debentures with the court. The file does contain a copy of debentures.

 The majority suggests a different standard is necessary to excuse the lack of a detailed showing of conflict of interest, that is — that the trial judge prevented such a showing. This standard takes out of context a description of the trial judge’s actions contained in a footnote in Holloway. See 435 U.S. at 484 n.7. In fact, the standard announced by the Court was that the trial court had “to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel.” Id. at 484. The Court used the trial judge’s conduct to demonstrate that he could not have made such a finding at a specific hearing held in August 1975.

 The majority cites to a statement by the prosecutor, made at the hearing on an interlocutory appeal motion, that $1,500 had been transferred by the Defender General to the Judiciary budget to pay a DNA expert and that showed compliance with the order to pay trial counsel’s fees could be expected. In fact, the evidence was that money was available for expert witnesses but not for reimbursement of counsel. Thus, I do not see the relevance of the availability of expert witness money.