Court Opinion

ID: 9907306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 03:02:02.249467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:43.817196
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                    )
                                      )
        v.                            )       ID No. 1901019378
                                      )
NAZJHEIR LLOYD,                       )
                                      )
                    Defendant.        )
                                      )

                       Date Submitted: November 15, 2023
                        Date Decided: December 5, 2023

                                     ORDER

        Upon consideration of Defendant Nazjheir Lloyd’s (“Lloyd”) Motion for

Sentence Modification (“Motion”),1 Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), statutory

and decisional law, and the record, IT APPEARS THAT:

        (1)   On December 5, 2019, Lloyd pled guilty to Possession of a Firearm or

Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PFABPP”) (IN19-03-0397), and Possession

of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) (IN19-03-0396).2

Lloyd was sentenced the same day as follows: 8 years at Level V, suspended after 5

years at Level V, for 6 months Level IV DOC Discretion, followed by 1 year at

Level III for PFABPP; and 3 years at Level V for PFDCF.3

1
  D.I. 27.
2
  D.I. 23.
3
  D.I. 24.
                                          1
       (2)    Lloyd filed the instant Motion on November 15, 2023.4 In his Motion,

Lloyd claims “[t]he Court did not apply mitigating factors related to [his] age or

socio-economic upbringing and did not fashion a sentence to account for anything

but correctional treatment.”5 He also claims the case “proceeded without any

adherence to the then (2019) DOJ guidance as dictated in the new Attorney General’s

memo to her staff titled, ‘Fairness and Equity in the Criminal Justice System:

Internal policies,’” where the policy reads,

       [w]e will adopt an office-wide presumption not to charge multiple
       minimum mandatory crimes when one crime accounts for the facts and
       circumstances of an event. Deputies will focus on limiting the number
       of charges in an indictment to those that most accurately reflect the
       misconduct and are most provable.6

He claims that if the policy had been followed, he would have only been charged

with one crime as opposed to two.7 Therefore, he requests a modification to his

Level V confinement and/or Level IV alternatives.8

       (3)    Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) governs motions for modification

of sentence.9 The purpose of Rule 35(b) is to “provide a reasonable period for the

Court to consider alteration of its sentencing judgments.”10 Rule 35(b) contains

4
  D.I. 27.
5
  Id.
6
  Id.
7
  Id.
8
  Id.
9
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
10
   State v. Remedio, 108 A.3d 326, 331 (Del. Super. 2014).
                                               2
procedural bars for timeliness and repetitiveness.11 Under Rule 35(b), the “[C]ourt

may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the

sentence was imposed” and will consider untimely motions “only in extraordinary

circumstances or pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4217.”12 Furthermore, the Court cannot

modify the minimum mandatory portion of a sentence.13

       (4)    Lloyd’s Motion is procedurally barred. His Motion is untimely since it

is brought nearly four years after sentencing—well past the 90-day deadline.14

Lloyd cites his good behavior, the various treatment programs in which he has

participated in, and the Attorney General’s 2019 guidelines sent out in a memo.15

While the Court commends Lloyd on good behavior and program participation, the

Court does not find any “extraordinary circumstances” to warrant an extension of

the 90-day deadline.16

       (5)    Even if Lloyd’s Motion pled sufficient facts to overcome the time bar,

his sentences for PFABPP and PFDCF are minimum mandatory sentences, and

therefore, Court lacks authority to reduce it.17 As such, the Court finds the sentence

11
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
12
   Id.
13
   11 Del. C. § 4204(d); D.I. 27.
14
   D.I. 27.
15
   Id.
16
   See State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 607 (Del. Super. 2015) (explaining that extraordinary
circumstances must specifically justify the delay, be beyond the movant’s control, and be the
reason the movant was prevented from timely filing) (emphasis added).
17
   See 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)b; 11 Del. C. § 1447(a) (repealed by 81 Laws 2019, ch. 66 § 2).
                                               3
is appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing.

      NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lloyd’s Motion

for Sentence Modification is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                              /s/ Jan R. Jurden
                                        Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

cc:   Original to Prothonotary
      Erik C. Towne, DAG
      Nazheir Lloyd (SBI # 00145363)

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