Court Opinion

ID: 9671710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:42:21.534051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.603823
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
In our original opinion we said: “Appellant puts much emphasis upon the fact that the instrument was dated March 8, 1955 whereas the indictment alleges it was passed on or about June 14, 1955.” On rehearing he asserts that on June 14, 1956, this contract would not enable its holder, had it been true, to have maintained a civil suit thereon without alleging additional facts because by its terms it was to have been performed and all obligations thereunder ceased long prior to June 14, 1956. He further asserts that on such date because of the passage of time the contract would not have sufficient apparent validity to defraud a person of ordinary prudence, that is, it was a past due instrument as defined by the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Reliance is now had upon Hickman v. State, 44 Texas Cr. Rep. 533, 72 S.W. 587, which was followed in Donald v. State, 165 Texas Cr. Rep. 252, 306 S.W. 2d 360, and which holds that where the indictment shows on its face that it is barred by the statute of limitations, it is essential that the pleader incorporate therein extrinsic allegations to show that it is not in fact so barred.
This contract does not show on its face that it was barred by the statute of limitations and therefore Hickman is not authority here.
We quote from 19 Texas Juris., sec. 24, p. 840: “In addition to the requisites heretofore mentioned, a writing, in order to be the subject of forgery, must ordinarily have sufficient apparent validity to defraud a person of ordinary prudence — although a superficial validity is all that is required.”
The instrument in question here certainly purported a pecuniary obligation and had more than superficial validity.
We are at a loss to know what extrinsic allegations could have been made that would not themselves have been false. Certainly the state could not allege that the parties to the contract had mutually extended the time of performance since this was a forgery in the beginning and no contract had been entered into.
*613Remaining convinced that we properly, decided this case originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.