Court Opinion

ID: 9467901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:59:23.201984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:35.222218
License: Public Domain

THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In dissenting I have two non-reasons and two reasons. The non-reasons are the lack of precedent and my view that we should certify this case to the Supreme Court of Georgia. A decision can be made without the aid of precedent when there is none. However, when our certification rule permits Georgia’s highest court to settle the issue, I look with disfavor upon establishing a precedent for Georgia federal courts in a diversity case when it is obvious that the decision will spawn many progeny.
The two reasons for dissenting are: (1) the complaint does not seek the relief granted by the decision and opinion of the majority; and, (2) the law of negligence and the relationship of the parties give no basis in reason or logic for imposing this liability on a doctor.
Turning to the complaint, it is my conclusion that in its complaint the appellant failed to state a claim against Dr. Berger for simple negligence or medical malpractice. If anything, North American’s complaint states a claim against Dr. Berger for the intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. North American in its complaint alleges that Dr. Berger is a psychia*309trist who disagreed with the FAA’s treatment of its air traffic controllers and their emotional problems. He is charged with conspiring with the controllers to cause them to fail to report for work on the basis of a nervous condition and then diagnose them as disabled because of their working conditions and resulting nervousness. The complaint goes on to allege that Dr. Berger’s wife is a lawyer with an office next to Dr. Berger’s. She is said to handle some of the legal problems of the air traffic controllers, including their claims for workmen’s compensation and private insurance disability benefits. One comes away from the complaint with the reaction that North American is accusing Dr. Berger of having a feud with the FAA and profiting from his fees charged the air traffic controllers. The complaint supports a claim for fraud, for intentional misrepresentation, for gross negligence — it does not support a claim for simple negligence. At no place in the complaint is there a count averring simple negligence in the manner suggested by Form 9 in the Appendix attached to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The appeal does not come to us on a motion to dismiss, but on the district court’s grant of Dr. Berger’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of his negligence vel non vis a vis North American. Intuitively, one realizes that this motion was advanced by Berger’s malpractice insurance carrier so its role in the litigation could be determined. Since I find that neither the allegations nor the affidavits against Berger establish a claim for simple negligence, I would affirm.
Even if the allegations were sufficient, I would affirm. The majority relies primarily on Georgia cases which hold architects liable to third parties. Of course, it is logical to hold architects liable for injury to the public or an adjoining landowner when such injury is the direct result of negligent design by the architect of a structure. That is simple tort law of one party owing reasonable care to another party and extending privity to those who foreseeably might be injured if such care is not taken.
The majority opinion permits every doctor to become potentially liable for payments made by an insurance company to its policyholder, the doctor’s patient, whenever the doctor completes a form describing the patient’s condition, and the doctor has made a mistake in diagnosing the condition. This act of the doctor is done at the request of the company and is done without consideration. The majority opinion imposes a duty on doctors neither foreseeable nor contemplated by the parties or their relationship.
Insurance companies insure persons against such risks as death and disability. It is common knowledge that they pay doctors to conduct examinations when issuing such policies. The policies, in case of a disability claim, require the policyholder to submit to an examination at the request of the company by a doctor hired by the company. Obviously, if a doctor employed by an insurance company misses a diagnosis which results in unwarranted liability of the company, the doctor may be liable to the company for his negligent performance of the contract.
The majority opinion creates privity without any just cause or reason. In the disability policy the insured individual authorizes the insurance company to secure information from any doctor treating him or her in the event of a claim for disability. The company, upon receiving a claim, conducts an investigation of the alleged disability by sending a medical form to doctors treating the claimant, as Berger in this case, by writing the policyholder’s employer, by conducting surveillance, by interviewing neighbors, and by seeking other relevant information. Anyone furnishing information to the company does so gratuitously for the purpose of assisting the company in its assessment of the claim for disability benefits. None of these persons, including a doctor, such as Berger here, is required to cooperate. Most doctors do accommodate their patients by giving the insurance company the same information furnished the patient.
The doctor has a duty to the patient to make a correct diagnosis of his illness, if he has one. Doctors, being human, sometimes err. When they do, they are legally liable *310to the patient for any damages sustained by the patient as the result of the negligence. The employment contract and the relationship create the duty to be careful.
Here our court creates a potential financial liability when there is no contract and no relationship other than a gratuitous one, when the doctor, at the request of the company, puts in writing information about the patient’s condition as he sees it.1 If the doctor knowingly furnishes false information, he may be held liable. If one lies to another, knowing the other will act to his detriment based on the lie, responsibility for such an intentional misrepresentation under certain circumstances may ensue. Furnishing information derived through error, innocently and gratuitously, does not create such a responsibility. Thus, I dissent.

. Does the majority opinion permit a disability insurance company to recover from the claimant’s employer or neighbor who furnishes erroneous information supportive of the claim but negligently arrived at?