Court Opinion

ID: 9583097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:47.010539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:13.673587
License: Public Domain

Justice KIRSHBAUM
concurring in the result only.
The majority holds that legislative policies underlying section 15-11-502, 6B C.R.S. (1987), require the conclusion, as a matter of statutory construction, that a will not attested to by a sufficient number of witnesses prior to the testator’s death is invalid and rejects the exceptional circumstances exception to such requirement adopted by the Court of Appeals. Because I find the rule announced by the Court of Appeals more compatible with the pertinent legislative policies, I would affirm the Court of Appeals judgment in its entirety.
As the majority recognizes, section 15-11-502, 6B C.R.S. (1987), is silent as to the date upon which an attesting witness must sign a document purported to constitute a will. At 1238. The majority then adopts the rule that such witness need not sign the document at the moment the testator’s execution thereof was in fact witnessed, but rather may do so at any time prior to the death of the testator. At 1239. It suggests this rule is necessary to effectuate the intent and beneficial purposes of the above-referenced statute. At 1238.
In my view, the rule adopted by the majority unnecessarily frustrates relevant legislative policy. The majority suggests one purpose of the statute is to reduce the possibility of fraud. At 1238. The majority does not explain why a rule permitting signatures up to the date of a testator’s death, which period of time might well greatly exceed the nine months presented here, more properly protects heirs, beneficiaries, and the public from fraud in probate matters than the rule articulated by the Court of Appeals. It is difficult to accept the proposition that a document attested to twelve months subsequent to the date it is executed by the testator is less suspect than a document attested to two days subsequent to such date but one day subsequent to the testator’s death. Surely the availability of adversarial adjudicatory proceedings is the primary safeguard against fraudulent conduct in matters of probate, whatever rule is adopted governing the date for securing signatures of attesting witnesses.
More importantly, another purpose of the section at issue and of the entire probate code is to safeguard and protect decedents’ estates and to assure the fulfillment of a decedent’s wishes concerning the disposition of that person’s estate. § 15-10-102, 6B C.R.S. (1987);1 In re McGary’s Estate, 127 Colo. 495, 496, 258 P.2d 770, 771 (1953). The rule adopted by the majority unnecessarily frustrates this policy, whatever its actual effect might be with respect to reducing the potential for fraudulent conduct.
In the absence of legislative direction, judicial inquiry should focus on what rule best accommodates all circumstances surrounding the actual witnessing of a testator’s sincere desires for the distribution of the testator’s estate. In my view, the exceptional circumstances rule formulated by the Court of Appeals more appropriately acknowledges the policy of ensuring the fulfillment of the true wishes of a testator while reducing the possibility of fraudulent conduct. In this era of rapid transit and *1241instantaneous communication capabilities, it is not difficult to envision a number of scenarios in which witnesses to a testator’s recorded wishes might not actually execute the document articulating those wishes until some time subsequent to the testator’s death. Requiring the proponent of a purported will to establish exceptional circumstances justifying late execution by an attending witness satisfies concerns about fraud. Avoiding the adoption of a day-certain rule reduces the likelihood that an intellectually appealing but artificial cut-off date will in practice ensure the frustration of a decedent’s wishes respecting the distribution of his or her estate.2
The majority relies upon the rationale of Rogers v. Rogers, 71 Or.App. 133, 691 P.2d 114 (1984), to support its conclusion. At 1239. The reasoning in Rogers is circuitous at best. The observation that a will cannot become operative until the death of a testator does not address, let alone answer, the problem created by legislative silence with respect to when an attesting signature must be affixed to a document that affects legal rights only upon the happening of such death.
I agree with the majority, as did the Court of Appeals, that the reasonable time standard adopted in In re Peters, 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987), does not represent a satisfactory solution. At 1239. It must be observed, however, that the majority’s recognition that a witness’ signature will be deemed valid if affixed to a document purporting to constitute a will at any time prior to the testator’s death, though subsequent to the testator’s execution of the document, could itself be characterized as a bright line “reasonable time” rule. Such rule could invite all of the uncertainties inherent in the standard announced in In re Peters.
The exceptional circumstances test formulated by the Court of Appeals better satisfies the broad legislative objectives of ensuring fair effectuation of the desires of a decedent. It places a burden upon attesting witnesses who delay their execution of a purported will to convince a probate court that exceptional circumstances justified such delay. Such flexible rule provides a standard that is manageable, equitable and responsive to important pragmatic considerations inherent in the peculiar emotional time frames characteristic of those critical life events giving rise to contested probate matters.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm not only the judgment of the Court of Appeals but also the rule articulated therein.3
I am authorized to say that Justice MUL-LARKEY joins in this concurrence.

. The statute states in full as follows:
Purposes — rule of construction. (1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(a)To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons;
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for settling the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors;
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts;
(e) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
§ 15-10-102, 6B C.R.S. (1987).

. Had the General Assembly considered some day-certain rule to be appropriate, it could have adopted one similar to the provision that a devisee must survive a testator by 120 hours. § 15-11-601, 6B C.R.S. (1987).

. Because in my view the record reveals that as a matter of law the facts relied upon to justify the late signings here do not constitute exceptional circumstances, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that adoption of the exceptional circumstances rule would require a remand for further probate proceedings. At 1239 n. 5.