Court Opinion

ID: 9897474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:43.750471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.760309
License: Public Domain

.139 Nev., Advance Opinion 3      2
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                STARR SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE                            No. 84986
                CO.,
                Petitioner,                                        !r,

                vs.
                THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT                       fr;
                                                                             FILE
                                                                   gr7
                COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                             SEP 1 11 2023
                IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF                                 •
                CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
                MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT JUDGE,
                Respondents,
                  and
                JGB VEGAS RETAIL LESSEE, LLC,
                Real Party in Interest.

                            Original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
                challenging a district court order denying a motion for summary judgment
                in an insurance action.

                            Petition granted.

                Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg and
                Abraham G. Smith, Las Vegas; Clyde & Co US LLP and Amy M. Samberg
                and Lee H. Gorlin, Las Vegas,
                for Petitioner.

                Latham & Watkins LLP and John M. Wilson, San Diego, California;
                Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg, Reno,
                for Real Party in Interest.

                Christian Kravitz Dichter Joh.nson & Sluga, LLC, and Tyler J. Watson,
                Las Vegas; Robinson & Cole LLP and Wystan Michael Ackerman,
                Hartford, Connecticut,
                for Amicus Curiae American Property Casu.alty Insurance Association.

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                      McDonald Carano LLP and Adam D. Hosmer-Henner, Chelsea Latino, and
                      Jane E. Susskind, Reno,
                      for Amicus Curiae Nevada State Medical Association.

                      Kemp Jones, LLP, and Don Springmeyer, Las Vegas; Reed Smith LLP and
                      David M. Halbreich, Amber S. Finch, Margaret C. McDonald, and
                      Katherine J. Ellena, Los Angeles, California,
                      for Amicus Curiae Panda Restaurant Group, Inc.

                      Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and Frank M. Flansburg, III, Las
                      Vegas; Covington & Burling LLP and Wendy L. Feng, San• Francisco,
                      California,
                      for Amicus Curiae Boyd Gaming Corporation.

                      Pisanelli Bice, PLLC, and James J. Pisanelli and Debra L. Spinelli, Las
                      Vegas; Reed Smith LLP and John N. Ellison and Richard P. Lewis, New
                      York, New York,
                      for Amicus Curiae United Policyholders.

                      Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and Frank M. Flansburg, III, Las
                      Vegas; Latham & Watkins LLP and Brook B. Roberts, John M. Wilson,
                      and Corey D. McGhee, San Diego, California, and Christine G. Rolph,
                      Washington, D.C.,
                      for Amicus Curiae Caesars Entertainment, Inc.

                      Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and Frank M. Flansburg, III, Las
                      Vegas,
                      for Amicus Curiae Golden Entertainment, Inc.

                      Snell & Wilmer, LLP, and Patrick G. Byrne, Las Vegas,
                      for Amicus Curiae Wynn Resorts, Limited.

                      Kemp Jones, LLP, and Michael J. Gayan, Las Vegas,
                      for Arnicus Curiae Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc.

                      Messner Reeves LLP and Renee M. Finch, Las Vegas,
                      for Amici Curiae Bloomin' Brands, Inc.; Circus Circus LV, LP; Restaurant
                      Law Center; and Treasure Island, LLC.

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                        BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN• BANC.

                                                           OPINION

                        By the Court, CADISH, j.:
                                    Real party in interest JGB Vegas Retail Lessee, LLC, owns
                        and. operates a retail shopping mall en the Las Vegas Strip.              When

                        COVID-19 forced JGB to shut down abruptly, it suffered significant
                        economic losses. It now seeks to recoup thoSe losses under its commercial
                        property insurance policy, arguing that the presence of COVIDL19 on the
                        property created the requisite "direct physical loss or damage" covered
                        under the policy. We consider whether that policy provides such coverage.
                        As a matter of law, we conclude it does not.
                                          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                                    Petitioner    Starr   Surplus    Lines   Insurance    Co.   provides

                        .:ommercial property insurance.         JGB, which owns and operates the
                        "Grand Bazaar Shops" (the Shops) on the.Las Vegas Strip, is one of Starr's
                        policyholders.   The "perils insured against" under the policY's genetal
                        coverage grant include "all risks of direct . physical los.s or damage to
                        covered property while at INSURED LOCATIONS occurring during the
                        Term of this POLICY, except as hereinafter excluded or limited."
                                    The policy also includes a business interruption section,
                        providing   Overage      for   Ilfoss   directly   resulting   from • necessary
                        interruption of the Insured's NORMAL business operations. caused by
                        direct ph.ysical loss or damage to real or personal property covered
                        herein, ... arising from a peril insured against hereunder" during the
                        term of the poliCy and while located at insured locations. In addition, the
                        business interruption coverage extends to losses from interruption by civil.
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                     or military authority, meaning those losses sustained "when, as a direct
                     result of damage to or destruction of property within" one mile of the
                     Shops "by the peril(s) insured against, access to such described premises is
                     specifically prohibited by order of civil or military authority."          This

                     business interruption insurance falls within the policy's time element
                     coverage, which generally permits recovery for "loss resulting from the
                     inability to put damaged property to its normal use." See 5 New Appleman
                     on Insurance Law Library Edition, § 41.01[2][a] (Jeffery E. Thomas, ed.,
                     2022).
                                 Other time element provisions extend coverage even further.
                     Relevant   here,    this    includes   coverages   like   the   extra   expense,

                     ingress/egress,    and     rental   value   endorsements."      Though     these

                     endorsements provide coverage for various losses, coverage under each one
                     is contingent on the losses being caused bY the perils insured against:
                     "direct physical loss or damage to covered property." Moreover, most of
                     these provisions impose a period of indemnity beginning "with the date of
                     direct physical loss or damage by any •of the perils covered herein" and
                     ending "on the date when the damaged or destroyed property at the
                     INSURED LOCATION should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with the
                     exercise of due diligence and dispatch."2

                           'Some of these endorsements contain coverage provisions for
                     interruption by civil or military authority comparable to that in the
                     business interruption section as well.

                           2 The rental value endorsement's measure of recovery mirrors this
                     period of indemnity, in that it is "for only such length of time as would be
                     required with the exercise of due diligence and dispatch to rebuild, repair
                     or replace such part of the property." The ingress/egress endorsement and
                     civil or military authority provisions have specified 14-day time •limits.

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101 19479 .4§EZAA,                                           4
                             Despite broad covera.ge, the policy also contains multiple
                 exclusions. The pollution and. contamination exclusion., for example, bars
                 coverage for "loss or damage caused by or resulting from any of the
                 following regardless of any cause or event contributing concurrently or in
                 any other sequence to the loss":
                            1. contamination;
                             2. the actual or threatened release, discharge,
                             dispersal, migration or seepage of POLLUTANTS
                            at an INSURED LOCATION during the Term of
                             this POLICY .
                 Thus, loss or damage caused by pollution or contamination is excluded.
                 And the policy further defines those excluded pollutants or contaminants
                 as including viruses:
                             The term "POLLUTANTS" or "CONTAMINANTS"
                             shall mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
                             irritant or CONTAMINANT including, but not
                             limited to, smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids,
                             alkalis, chemicals, virus, waste, (waste includes
                             materials to be recycled, reconditioned or
                             reclaimed) or hazardous substances as listed in
                             the Federal WATER Pollution Control Act, Clean
                             Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
                             of 1976, and Toxic Substances Control Act, or as
                             designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection
                             Agency.
                             The COVID-19 pandemic began a. few months into the policy
                 term, during which the SARS-CoV-2 virus rapidly spread infection
                 throughout the country. As a result, several of JGB's tenants closed their
                 businesses, and by March 2020, Nevad.a's Governor mandated that all
                 nonessential businesses close to prevent the virus's spread. (Restaurants,
                 we note, were allowed to provide take-out and delivery services during the
                 shutdown.) By June 2020, the Shops were allowed to reopen, subject to
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                     restrictions designed to redu.ce th.e sprea.d of the virus. Some of JGB's
                     tenants never reopened.
                                 The closures resulted in economic strife for both JGB and its
                     tenants.   Reopening required additional expenses, too: jGB and its
                     tenants installed sanitizer stations, social-distancing signs, and plexiglass
                     and performed regular cleanings to reduce the chance of spreading the
                     virus at the Shops.    Amidst the closures and accompanying economic
                     troubles, JGB filed a claim with Starr. It sought coVerage for lost business
                     income, extra expenses, and any other applicable coverage "[i]ia connection
                     with the recent. shutdowns, closures, and other directives."
                                 Starr later responded to JGB's claim with a reservation of
                     rights letter, raising concerns about wh.ether coverage existed. Thereafter,
                     JGB filed suit against Starr for breach of contract, declaratory judgnient,
                     violations of the Nevada Unfair. Claims PractiCes Act, and breach of the
                     covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The complaint chiefly•alleged that
                     it was "highly likely" that COVID-19 was present on the premises of the
                     Shops, "thus damaging the property . that jGB leased to its tenants" and
                     warranting business interruption and other time element coverage under
                     the policy. Meanwhile, Starr formally denied JGB's claini.
                                 Discovery proceeded, revealing (1) how the COVID-19 virus
                     spreads in aerosolized form; (2) that SARS-CoV-2 is a physical particle
                     that can deposit onto property for several days, which can then transmit
                     froin the infected property as a "fomite"; (3) confirmed cases of COVID-19
                     at the Shops and statistical modeling. indicating a strong likelihood that
                     individ.uals with COVID-19 were at the Shops before and after the
                     Governor's first closure ord.er; (4) the associated likelib.00d that these
                     infected individuals rapidly redeposited SARS-CoV-2 onto the Shops'

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                    property; and (5) various measures used by JGB and its tenants to reduce
                    the chance of catching or spreading the virus. Nevertheless, Starr moved
                    for summary judgment, arguing that the presence of COVID-19 did not
                    amount to the "direct physical loss or damage" needed for coverage as a
                    matter of law. It added that loss of use cannot qualify because it is mere
                    economic loss.   Further, Starr argued that coverage for loss or damage
                    caused by a "virus" was precluded under the policy's express exclusions.
                                In opposition, JGB argued that the plain and ordinary

                    meaning of "direct physical loss or damage" mandated coverage.         JGB

                    pointed to its undisputed scientific evidence showing that the SARS-CoV-2
                    virus is a physical particle that can "land on and attach to property and
                    last for days," can "remain infectious while suspended in air as well as on
                    property," and cannot be removed with routine cleaning. Collectively, it
                    contended that this evidence indicated how the virus both damaged the
                    Shops and rendered the Shops unsafe for their purpose, so as to amount to
                    "direct physical loss or damage."
                                Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion in
                    part and denied it in part. It concluded that "whether COVID-19, or the
                    virus that causes it, does or does not physically alter property in order to
                    trigger one or more coverages under the Policy is a matter of fact to be
                    determined at trial" and that it had not yet determined whether the
                    pollution and contamination exclusion applies.    It rejected JGB's Odra-

                    contractual claims as a matter of law and granted summary judgment in
                    Starr's favor on those claims, however, such that only the breach of
                    contract and declaratory relief claims remain. Starr then filed the instant
                    writ petition challenging the denial of summary judgment on the
                    remaining claims.

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                                              MSC S SION
                We elect to entertain the petition for a writ of mandamus
                             In urging the court to entertain the petition, Starr con.tends
                that the petition raises legal issues of first impression and fundamental
                public importance. It emphasizes that it does not dispute JGB's evidence
                for purposes of resolving these legal issues. Further, Starr underscores
                the number of pending cases in Nevada district courts addressing these
                issues, arguing that our review will aid judicial economy. JGB argues that
                we should deny the petition because fact questions persist.3
                            A writ of mandamus is available to correct clear error or an
                arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion when there is no other
                adequate legal remedy. Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist.
                Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). It is an extraordinary
                remedy that "only issue[s] at the discretion of this court." See State v.
                Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Anzalone), 118 Nev. 140, 146, 42 P.3d 233,
                237 (2002). In exercising this discretion, we have established a general.
                policy of declining to consider writ petitions challenging district court
                orders denying summary judgmen.t. Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc. v. Second
                Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 583, 585, 262 P.3d 699, 700 (2011). An
                exception to this general policy may apply, however, when a writ petition

                      3Starr alternatively seeks a   writ of prohibition, but it provides no
                argument as to why prohibition would be an appropriate remedy. Based
                on the nature of the relief requested and the district court's jurisdiction
                over breach of contract matters. this petition does not implicate the
                standard for prohibition relief. See Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth
                Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. 643, 649, 331 P.3d 905, 909 (2014)
                (recognizing that a writ of prohibition is appropriate when a district court
                exceeds its jurisdiction).

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                presents an "opportunity to clarify an. important issue of laW and doing so
                serves judicial economy."    Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 138

                Nev. 104, 106, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022). Even so, our review is improper
                if factual disputes persist. See Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136
                Nev. 678, 684, 476 P.3d 1194, 1199 (2020).
                            We conclude that this petition falls within the exception to our
                general policy. Whether all-risk commercial property insurance like that
                in Starr's policy cover's losses arising froth the COVID-19 pandemic
                presents an important legal issue of first impression "likely to be the
                subject of extensive litigation.' See Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
                120 Nev. 1021, 1025, 102 P.3d 600, 603 (2004). .In fact, Starr has pOinted
                to several cases involving this question that are pending in Nevada
                district courts, so our clarification may promote "judicial economy and
                administration by assisting other jurists, parties, and lawyers." Walker,
                136 Nev. at 683, 476 P.3d at 119.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                       •
                Although the district court held that factual issues existed, we discern Tio
                .such fa.ct issues precluding our review of the coverage questions raised in
                this petition, especially as Starr does not dispute JGB's evidence. State,
                Dep't of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial .Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 549, 556, 402
                P..3d 677, 684 (2017) (entertaining and issuing writ of mandamus where
                the court considered undisputed material facts in contract interpretation
                case); see also Fed. Ins. Co. v. Coast Converters, Inc., 130 Nev. 960, 965,
                339 P.3d 1281, 1284 (2014) (recognizing that categorizing loss under an
                insurance policy was a legal (iluestion, such that "the district court erred in
                sending it to the jury").    We therefore elect to entertain the petition.,
                addressing these legal questions further below.

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                    Standard of review •
                                We review de novo a district court order resolving a summary
                    judgment motion. Renown Reel Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
                    130 Nev. 824, 828, 335 P.3d 199, 202 (2014).         Summary judgment is

                    appropriate when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
                    the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." NRCP 56(a). If
                    the movant bears its "initial burden of production to show the absence of a
                    genuine issue of material fact," "then the party opposing summary
                    judgment assumes a burden of production •to show the existence of
                    genuine issue of material fact." Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev.,
                    123 Nev. 598, 602, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (2007).           Interpretation of an

                    insurance policy is also a legal question reviewed de novo. See Nationwide
                    Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moya, 108 Nev, 578, 582, 837 P.2d 426, 428 (1992).
                    Starr's all-risk policy requires direct physical loss or damage to the covered
                    property, rneaning coverage applies when there is a material or tangible
                    destruction of or injury to the covered property itself
                                Modern commercial property insurance covers either "named
                    perils" or "all risk."   2 Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman,
                    Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes 1568 (20th ed. 2021). As the
                    name suggests, an all-risk insurance policy is designed to cover "losses
                    caused by any fortuitous peril." Id.; see also Coast Converters, 130 Nev. at
                    967, 339 P.3d at 1286 ("It is well recognized that insurable loss of or
                    damage to property must be occasioned by a fortuitous, noninevitable, and
                    nonintentional event." (emphasis omitted)). Still, the coverage grant is not
                    totally unlimited.   The touchstone of commercial property insurance is
                    that it insures against the property's "damage or destruction."        See 2
                    Jeffrey W. Stempel & Erik S. Knutsen, Stempel and Knutsen on Insurance

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( 1), NM%    AR*,
                Couerage § :15.01[C] (4th ed. 2019) (explaining how to make out a prima
                facie case for all-risk coverage).
                            The parties here contest the reach of coverage i.n an all-risk

                policy. While JGB claims coverage under several provisions, the parties'
                dispute focuses on the phrase "direct physical loss or damage."         Starr

                argues that "direct physical loss or damage" requires either "distinct,
                demonstrable, physical alteration" to property or "some sort of structural
                or physical change to a property, actually altering its functionality or use."
                JGB argues that requiring something like "distinct, demonstrable,
                physical alteration" is too limiting.      It distinguishes between covered

                damage and loss, maintaining that damage exists where a physical force
                "alters the surfaces or air of covered property," while loss exists where a
                physical force, like the COVID-19 virus, is "present on or around covered
                property, rendering it partially or wholly unusable, unsafe, or unfit for its
                intended purpose." JGB claims that this latter sort of loss "is recoverable
                by itself, without need to show 'damage."
                            Resolving this dispute requires that we first assess the policy's
                text. And we assess language in an insurance policy like we do in any
                contract; our chief aim is to effectuate the intent of the parties. Century
                Sur. Co. u. Casino W., Inc., 130 Nev. 395, 398, 329 P.3d 614, 616 (2014);
                see also 16 Williston on Contracts § 49:14 (4th ed. 2014). Where the tOd
                reveals clear meaning viewed in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, the
                court cannot look beyond the four corners of the policy. See Casino W., 130
                Nev. at 398, 329 P.3d at 616.        However, where the meaning remains

                ambiguous, the court construes the policy against the drafter.        United

                Nat'l Ins. Co. u. Frontier Ins. Co., 120 Nev. 678, 684, 99 P.3d 1153, 1156
                (2004).   Ambiguity exists if the policy creates "{multiple] reasonable

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(11 1947A
                expectations of coverage as drafted." Casino W., 130 Nev. at 398, 329 P.3d
                at 616 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                              Because the policy does not define the term "direct physical
                loss or damage," we begin with its plain meaning. See Okada u. Eighth
                Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 6, 12, 408 P.3d 566, 571 (2018) (consulting
                dictionary definitions of a term not defined within a statutory scheme);
                Casino W., 130 Nev. at 400, 329 P.3d at 617 (starting with the dictionary
                definition in interpreting an insurance policy's exclusionary provision).
                The word direct is commónly defined as "stemming immediately from a
                result."    Direct, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 353 (11th ed.
                2020); see also Direct, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining
                dire:-:t as "Mree from extraneous influence" and "immediate"). Indeed, the
                use of "direct" in commercial property insurance policies "signals
                'immediate' or 'proximate' cause, as distinct from rernote or incidental
                cau.ses."     New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition, suPra
                § 42.02[3].    Physical is defined in part as "having material existence."
                Physical, Merriarn-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, supra at 935; see also
                Phy.sical, Black's Law Dictionary (defining physical as "pertaining to real,
                tangible objects"). Loss is defined- as "destruction, ruin,' and the "act of
                losing possession." Loss, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, supra.
                at 736. Finally, damage i.s defined as "loss or harm resulting from injury
                to Person, property, or reputation.'" Id. at 314.
                              Rules' of grammar also aid interpretation of this policy
                language.     See. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
                Interpretation of Legal Texts 140 (2012) ("Words a.re to be given the
                meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them.").             The

                pOlicy's general coverage grant insures "against all risks of direct pfsicai

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                loss or damage to covered property." The phrase "to covered property"
                following "direct physical loss or damage" functions as a "postpositive
                modifier," such that it applies to both loss and damage. See id. at 14'7
                ("When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all
                nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally
                applies to the entire series."). Moreover, as a prepositional phrase, "to
                covered property" links the object of that phrase "with another part of the
                sentence to show the relationship between them."              See The Chicago
                Manual of Style 11 5.172 (17th ed. 2017). With the preposition "to," that
                relationship is generally one of direction. See id. Thus, in context, "to"
                indicates that the object of the preposition (i.e., property) is "the person or
                thing affected by or receiving something" (i.e., direct physical loss or
                damage). See To, Oxford Dictionary of English 1867 (3d ed. 2010).
                            "Direct" and "physical" further affect how coverage applies. In
                the phrase "direct physical loss or damage," both "direct" and "physical"
                function as prepositive modifiers giving meaning to "loss" and "damage"
                individually.   See Scalia & Garner, supra. 148 (noting that "internal
                personnel" in the phrase "internal personnel rules and practices of an
                agency" modifies both "rules" and "practices" (citing Jordan v. United
                States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1978), superseded in
                part by statute as recognized in ACLU of N. Cal. v. FBI, 881 F.3d 776, 780
                n.3 (9th Cir. 2018))). The policy thus establishes two bases for coverage:
                "direct physical loss" as well as "direct physical damage."
                            At the same tim.e, "direct" modifies the "idea expressed by the
                combination of the first adjective and the noun." See The Chicago Manual
                of Style, supra I! 5.91. Read together, "dired physical loss" and "direct
                physical damage" then ind.icate that there are physical losses and physical

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                dam.ages that are not direct, but coverage will extend only to those that
                are direct.   See id. (using "white brick h.ouse" to explain that "a white
                house could be made of many different materials"). And "[w]hatever is
                modified" by direct must be direct "[t]o something." See Jordan, 591 F.2d
                at 764. Through the prepositional phrase "to covered property," that
                something here is the actual property. See The Chicago Manual of Style,
                supra 11 5.172. Thus, in incorporating the pertinent dictionary definitions
                and analysis of the phrasing, we conclude that the plain language of
                "direct physical loss . . . to covered property" requireS material- or tangible
                destruction or dispossession as a result of material or tangible impact
                directed toward the property itself.      Meanwhile, the plain language of

                "direct physical... damage to covered property" requires a material or
                tangible harm or injury directed toward the property itself.4 Cf. Uncork &

                      4 As previewed above, the other endorsements in the policy, including
                those that JGB claims coverage under, use identical language--"direct
                physical loss or damage"—or at least analogous language—"direct result of
                loss or damage by a peril insured against"—and are dependent on a
                showing of the peril insured against. Even the interruption by civil or
                military authority provisions applica.ble to the business interruption
                section and other time element endorsements cover only those losses
                incurred when access to covered property is restricted "as a direct result of
                damage to or destruction of property within one (1) statute mile" of the
                insured property "by the peril(s) insured against." (Emphasis added.) In
                addition, while they are not followed with the prepositional phrase "to
                covered property," these endorsements again use analogous language: "to
                real or personal property covered herein," "of real or personal property," or
                "to property of a type insured against." Taken together, and given that
                JGB's coverage claim is dependent on "direct physical loss or damage to
                covered property" as the general peril insured against, the same
                requirements imposed by this language apply to the endorsements and
                specified interruption by civil or inilitary authority provisions. See PHI
                Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 838, 842 n.4 (5th Cir. 2023)
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0.)) 1947A
                Create LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 27 17.4th 926; 931-33 (4th Cir. 2022)
                (construing the plain meaning of the terms "physical loss" and "physical.
                damage," when used in reference to a defined premises, as "material
                destruction or material harm" respectively).
                              Consistent with JGB's argument, "loss" and "damage" here
                „
                    are not necessarily synonymous." Scott G. Johnson, What Con.stitutes
                Physical Loss or Damage in a Property Insurance Policy?, 54 Tort Trial &
                Iris. Prac. L.J. 95, 99 (2019). Yet, though the disjundive "or" directs that
                each word retains its own meaning; lA Norman Singer & Sharabie
                Sutherland Statutory Construction .§ 21:14 (7t.h ed. 2009) (discussing .how
                "or" is disjunctive and typically establishes "different meanings because
                otherwise the statute or provision would be redundant"), they are not
                wholly "distinct concept[s]," Uncork & Create LLC, 27 F.4th at 932 11.8.
                "Loss" instead "connotes a greater degree of harm than the word
                'damage." ld. "Harm," therefore, is generally a critical feature of both
                "loss" and "damage."5     See Newman Myers Kreines Gross Harris, P.C. v.
                Great N. Ins. Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 323, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (reasoning that
                "direct physical loss or damage" "connote[s] actual, demonstrable harm of
                some form to the premises itself').
                             Take "fire, water, or sm.oke"—classic cases of such loss or
                damage—for example. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co.,
                311 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2002).          These physical forces constitute

                (applying same coverage analysis to time element and civil authority
                claims because those provisions also required "physical loss dr d.amage").

                        5This harm prerequisite should not be construed to write out cases of
                theft. See Verveine Corp. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 184 N.E.3d 1266, 1274
                n.12 (Mass. 2022) ("There can of course i3e 'physical loss of property
                without damage . . . if it is stolen or otherwise disappears.").
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  1,17A
                                                      15
                "physical impediment" necessitating repair or remediation. Cf. Rose's 1,
                LLC v. Erie Ins. Exch., 290 A.3d 52, 63-64 (D.C. 2023); see also Port Auth.,
                311 F.3d at 235 (explaining that damage from these sources "may
                demonstrably alter the components of a building and trigger coverage").
                In contrast, courts assessing early disputes under commercial property
                insurance denied coverage when there was no "direct invasion" of the
                property. See Cleland Simpson Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J.,
                140 A.2d 41, 44-46 (Pa. 1958) (declining coverage in the insurer's favor,
                under a named-peril policy, for inability to use the property due to a state
                of emergency absent "crystallization into damage or destruction" by fire).
                              And, even in much of the caselaw addressing "loss of use" and

                "uninhabitability" that JGB and amici curiae direct us to, we discern some
                physical impact culminating in harm to the property. For example, in a
                leading case on uninhabitability, the court in Western Fire Insurance Co.
                v. First Presbyterian Church, 437 P.2d 52, 55 (Colo. 1968), held that
                "infiltration and contamination of the foundation, walls and rooms of the
                church building as to render it uninhabitable" was a covered loss. In this
                way, the building's uninhabitability was contingent on some disabling
                impact to the property. See id. (describing the covered loss of use as not
                just the loss of use of the church "viewed in splendid isolation," but as the
                44
                     consequential result of... the accumulation of gasoline around and
                under the church building").       The same defining characteristic--the
                property's     accompanying    physical   impairment—underscores• other

                instances of uninhabitability. See, e.g., Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass'n
                v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-01932-CL 2016 WL 3267247, at *4 (D.
                Or. June 7, 2016) (holding that coverage existed because an outdoor
                theatre "sustained 'physical loss or damage to property' when the wildfire

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                                                     16
  1947A
                 smoke infiltrated the theater and rendered •it unusable for its intended
                 purpose"), vacated by joint stipulation, No. 1:15-cv-01932-CL, 2017 WL
                 1034203 (D. Or. Mar. 6, 2017); Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Imperial
                 Plaza v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 939 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1061-62, 1069 (D.
                 Haw. 2013) (recognizing that arsenic in flooring materials invaded
                 concrete slab so as to cause a continuous injury of "direct physical loss or
                 damage").
                              Whether one calls this a "distinct,• demonstrable, phy'sical
                 alteration" as Starr urges, or something else, insurable uninhabitability or
                 loss   of   use    depends   on   some    essential        harm—some     "detriment,

                 disablement, ... [or] ruin"—to the property itself.               William C. Burton,

                 Burton's Legal Thesaurus 472 (6th ed. 2021) (listing synonyms for the
                 word "harm"); see also Santo's Italian Café LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., 15 F.4th

                 398, 404-05 (6th Cir. 2021) (summarizing that coverage in loss of use
                 caselaw exists where the property "became practically useless for
                 anything"). At bottom, Ip]hysical' has to mean something."                   Wakonda

                 Club v. Selective Ins. Co. of Arn., 973 N.W.2d 545, 549, 552 (Iowa 2022)
                 (interpreting "direct physical loss of or damage to property" in a COVID-19
                 property insurance dispute and reasoning that such language requires
                 that the property loss have a "physical aspect").            We cannot, therefore,

                 base coverage on economic loss alone. See Terry Black's Barbecue, LLC v.
                 State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F.4th 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2022). As illustrated,
                 our assessment under the Physical loss or damage provisions asks whether
                 the property experienced material or tangible dispossession, destruction,
                 harm, or injury, "rather than forced closure of the premises for reasons
                 exogenous     to   the   premises   themselves,       or    the    adverse   business

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                                                          17
i1 /1   1947A
                consequences that flow from such closure." See Great N. Ins. Co., 17 F.
                Supp. 3d at 331.
                Because the claimed losses stemming from the physical presence of SARS-
                CoV-2 virus do not fall within the ordinary meaning of the policy's direct
                physical loss or damage coverage as a matter of law, the district court erred
                in not granting summary judgment in Starr's favor
                             Starr contends that JGB does not satisfy the plain meaning of
                the policy's direct physical loss or damage requirement, as the presence of
                COVID-19 neither physically alters the property nor• requires the
                intervention that property damage or loss necessitates.      Further, Starr

                argues that coverage cannot stand on JGB's temporary loss of use of the
                insured premises without any detriment to the property itself.          JGB

                argues that the district court correctly denied the summary judgment
                motion because it provided substantial evidence that the COVID-19 virus
                creates loss by rendering the Shops unusable or uninhabitable, or damage
                by physically altering the property.      lt also contends that such "direct
                physical loss or damage" does not require loss or damage visible to the
                naked eye.
                             As a threshold matter, the inability to see the COVID-19 viruS
                with the naked eye is not the deciding factor.       Both physical loss and

                physical damage can arise from invisible or microscopic forces, as they
                have a physical presence and occupy physical space. To hold otherWise
                would ignore a litany of physical forces, such as odors, noxious gasses,
                asbestos, or lead, for instance, that can jeopardize the property. See, e.g.,
                Yale Univ. v. Cigna Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (D. Conn. 2002)
                (recognizing that asbestos and lead were "contaminating conditions" that
                could cause property loss or d.amage); Mellin v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 115 A.3d
                799, 803-05 (explaining that "physical loss" "encornpass[es] changes that

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                                                     18
(01 I947A
                are perceived by sense of" smell. sight, or touch when assessing whether
                coverage could exist for cat urine).
                            However, even taking JGB's unrebutted, scientific evidence as
                true, it fails to demonstrate how the Shops were subject to the type of
                material, tangible harm constituting direct physical loss or damage
                "within the meaning of the policy." See Sch,leicher & Stebbins Hotels, L.I.0
                v. Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 2022-0155, 2023 WL 3357980, at *3
                (N.H. May 11, 2023) (publication pending). First, JGB offers evidence that
                the COVID-19 virus "is a physical particle that deposits on the property
                and lasts for days."    (Emphasis added.)      But "direct physical loss Or
                damage to covered property" requires something more involved—the
                property must receive or be affected by actual physical harm. See To,
                Oxford Dictionary of English, supra at 1867; see also Verveine Corp., 184
                N.E.3d at 1273 (explaining that the "direct physical loss or damage"
                language "characterizes what effects the covered causes must have on the
                property to trigger coverage, not the causes themselves"). SARS-CoV-2's
                presence on the property, on the other hand, indicates mere placement on
                the property. See The Chicago Manual of Style, supra 1[ 5.172 (stating
                that "on" indicates the "notion[ ]" of position). Presence of a physical virus
                on the property, even if it "attaches to" the property, does not give rise to
                the necessary transformative element of something like "fire, water, or
                smoke." See Port Auth., 311 F.3d at 236. Otherwise, the alleged presence
                of a physical force would "render[] every sneeze, cough, or even exhale" a
                qualifying harm. Cosmetic Laser, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 554 F.
                Supp. 3d 389, 407 (D. Conn. 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-2160-CV,
                2022 WL 4111813 (2d Cir. Apr. 13, 2022). Ultimately, as the Wisconsin
                Supreme Court recently observed, "the presence of COVID-19 does not
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4()) I 947A
                                                       19
                       constitute a physical loss of or damage to property because it ctoes not.
                       alter the appearance, shape, color, structure, or other material dimension
                       of the property." Colectivo Coffee Roasters, Inc. v. Soc'y Ins., 974 N.W.2d
                       442, 447 (Wis. 2022).
                                     Next, evidence that the virus remains harmful while in the air

                       or as "fomites" is similarly unconvincing because it does not demonstrate
                       that the virus is harmful to the property.6 At most, SARS-CoV-2's virality
                       in the air is evidence of harm imperiling people; not property. Commercial
                       property insurance is concerned with the converse: "[T]he policies insure
                       property, riot people."     Schleicher, 2023 WL 3357980, at *7; see also

                       Tapestry, Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 286 A.3d 1044, 1060 (Md. 2022)
                       (explaining    that   scientific   evidence   illustrating   "how   Coronavirus

                       particles[] are expelled. . . and are then dispersed more widely into the
                       surrounding air" is not evidence that those same particles `.`physically
                       damage[] air over which [the policyholder] has possessory rights"). JGB's
                       evidence that the virus can spread via harmful "fomites" once it lands on
                       the surface of property suffers from the same problem, as it does not
                       indicate that the property was actually harmed.         Cf. Brown Jug, Inc. v.

                             6The   Oxford Dictionary of English defines fomite as "objects or
                       materials which are likely to carry infection, such as clothes, utensils, and
                       furniture." Fornite, Oxford Dictionary of English, supra at 680. In the
                       COVID-19 context, JGB explained how SARS-CoV-2 "can land on and
                       attach to property," such that the virus is "capable of transmission on
                       property in the form of fomites." And amicus curiae Nevada State Medical
                       Association relied on a scientific article explaining that "transmission via
                       fomites (contaminated surfaces) . . is possible for SARS-CoV-2." Ana K.
                       Pitol & Timothy R. Julian, Community Transrnission of SARS-CoV-2 by
                       Surfaces: Risks and Risk Reduction Strategies, 8 Env't Sci. & Tech.
                       Letters, Issue 3, 263, 263 (2021).

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                                                              2,0
101 1947A    '61git°
                Cincinnati Ins. Co., 27 F. 4th 398. 404 (6th Cir. 2022) (utilizing ordinary
                meaning of "direct physical loss" in dismissing allegations that failed to

                allege harm). Foinite-based transmission instead typifies another way the
                virus "pos[es] health risk to humans," as opposed to property. Tapestry,
                286 A.3d at 1060. Though this evidence shows that the COVID-19 virus is
                "harmful," it simply does not equate to evidence that any property suffered
                physical harm. See Sagorne, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 56 F.4th 931, 935
                (10th Cir. 2023) ("[T]he loss or damage itself mnst be physical; not Siniply
                stem from something physical.").
                            JGB's remaining evidence of its own remediation efforts 'does
                not support a coverable loss or damage, either.          Both the business

                interruption section and. the extra expense endorsement measure recovery
                based on the "period of indemnity," which begins at "the date of direct
                physical loss or damage" and ends "on the date when the damaged or
                destroyed property ... should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with the
                exercise of due diligence and dispatch."    (Emphasis added.)       The rental

                value endorsement Measures recovery Similarly. Yet, jGB and its tenants
                implemented     social-distancing,   plexi glass   installation.,   sanitizing
                mechanisms, and regular cleaning. Such preventive measures do not aim
                to "repair, rebuil[d], or replace[ ]" the property; they aim to iedress the
                way people pose harm to one another by carrying and transmitting the
                virus at the property.
                            The same is still true in view of JGB's and amici's assertions
                that routine cleaning does not remove the rapidly redepositing SARS-CoV-
                2 from the property. Even then, the Shops remain "physically intact. and
                functional," and the property is "neither lost nor changed" due to the
                presence of the virus in the interim.       Cajun Conti LW v. Certain

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                Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 359 So. 3d 922, 927 (La. 2023). Indeed, if
                direct physical loss or damage to property existed because people on or
                inside of it may spread illnesses, an insured operating a school, hospital,
                gym, or dormitory could convert its property insurance policy into a
                "maintenance contract" for the "inevitable" risk of illness in public spaces.
                See Port Auth., 311 F.3d at 236. This "cannot be right." See Cosmetic
                Laser, 554 F. Supp. 3d at 407 (rejecting coverage for losses related to
                COVID-19 under property insurance policy despite "truism that mucus or
                saliva, ejected from a sneeze, attaches and adheres to surfaces").
                Accordingly, just as JGB's claimed remediation efforts fall short of those
                contemplated in the policy, so does its claimed "physical alteration" fail to
                constitute that contemplated in the policy. See Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers
                Cas. Ins. Co. of Ant., 15 F.4th 885, 892 (9th Cir. 2021).
                            We recognize that JGB supplied evidence that facially bolsters
                an uninhabitability or loss-of-use theory of "direct physical loss or
                damage." Not only did the pandemic lead to the Shops' temporary and
                even some tenants' permanent closure, but SARS-CoV-2 also at first blush
                appears to share the "contaminating" nature of physical fOrces in many
                uninhabitability cases.   See New Appleman on Insurance Law Library
                Edition, supra § 46.03[3][a] ("Contamination of property by vapors,
                bacteria, or other foreign substances has been found to constitute
                'physical' loss when it renders the property essentially unusable."); see
                also, e.g., Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hardinger, 131 F. App'x 823, 824, 826
                (3d Cir. 2005) (E. coli bacteria); Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Prop.
                Cas. Co. of Am., No. 2:12-cv-04418 (WHW) (CLW), 2014 WL 6675934, at
                *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (ammonia); Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon v.

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  1947A
                                                     22
                       Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1.332, 1334 (Or. App. 1993) (rnethampheta.mine odor);
                       Mellin, 115 A.3d at 801 (cat urine odor in condominium unit).
                                   Still, this case differs from cases in which potential coverage

                       was found based on uninhabitability or loss of use. Uninhabitability cases
                       are often characterized by a physical force that originates in the property.
                       See, e.g., Yale, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (building built with asbestos and
                       lead products causing contamination); Gregory Packaging, 2014 WL
                       6675934, at *1 (refrigerator installed in facility used anh.ydrous aminonia
                       as refrigerant). These forces Were not, as is the case here, merely present
                       at the property by way of people breathing, sneezing, or coughing
                       throughout the property. Cf. Hardinger, 131 F. App'x at 827 (well was the
                       source of E. coli bacteria); Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass'n, 2016 WL
                       3267247, at *1 ("srnoke from a nearby wildfire filled" the property). And in
                       those cases, even when the force does not originate within the property, it
                       is so connected to the property that the property effectively becomes the
                       source of its own loss or damage. See, e.g., Mellin, 115 A.3d. at 801 (N.H.
                       2015) (describing how owners tried several times to eliminate the cat
                       urine odor in the condominium unit to no avail); Cook v. Allstate 1-ns. Co.,
                       No. 48D02-0611-PL-01156, 2007 Ind. Super. LEXIS 32, *1-2 (Ind. Super.
                       Ct. Nov. 30, 2007) (detailing multiple failed attempts to remove brown
                       recluse spiders from the home). The continued livelihood of these forces
                       stemmed from the property itself, by physically entering and becoming
                       endemic to the property. But the livelihood of the COVID-19 virus does
                       not. stern from the property itself; it sterns from the people who frequent
                       the property.
                                   In this vein, where coverage is found, the property typically
                       exhibits some sert of defect jeopardizing the property's habitability or

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             ofiapr.
                                                           23
O   1907A
                   function. Compare Olmsted Mecl. Ctr. v. Cont'l Ca.s. Co., 65 F.4th 1005,
                   1009 (8th Cir. 2023) (rejecting the idea that "direct physical loss or
                   damage is established whenever property cannot be used for its intended
                   purpose" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pentair, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee &
                   Liab. Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 2005))), with Ostrager &
                   Newman, supra 1573 (explaining that some courts may allow coverage
                   "[w]here the loss of use is a result of some physical damage or alteration to
                   the property")     For . example, damage from• mold contamination was

                   covered where it resulted from "defective workmanship.' See Prudential
                   Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lillard-Roberts, No. CV-01-1362-ST, 2002 WL
                   31495830, at *3 (D. Or. June 18, 2002).     Carbon monoxide damage was

                   likewise insurable where it stemmed from a dysfunctional chimney. - Sec-,
                   Matzner v. Seaco Ins. Co., No. 96-0498-B, 1998 WL 566658, at *1, *4
                   (Mass. Super. Aug. 12, 1998) (finding coverage for damage from carbon
                   monoxide due to faulty chimney).      These covered risks. arose from the
                   property, even if their secondary effect posed health risks to people at the
                   property.    Here, however, both the problem of COVID-i9 and its
                   associated health risks are entirely dependent on people being present at
                   the property, rather than arising from any harm to or defect in the
                   property itself. See Kim-Chee LLC v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 535 F. Supp.
                   3d. 152, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (acknowledging that COVID-19 poses a
                   "mortal hazard to humans, 'but little or none to buildings which remain
                   intact and available for use once the huinan occupants no longer present a

                   health risk to one another"), affel, No. 21-1082-cv, 2022 WL 258569 (2d
                   Cir. Jan. 28, 2022).
                               The absence of a defect both. inherent to the property and that

                   compromises the property's essential function reaffirms why summary

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im 1947A    44V
              N.
                                                       24
               .
                              judgment is appropriate here. There are many ways that real or personal
                              property may cease to be useful. Not all of them are inherent to the
                              property. Here, too, people might be dissuaded from visiting the Shops for
                              a host of reasons: the weather, the market, their preferences, or even their
                              personal health and well-being. None of these reasons show property loss
                              or damage, and JGB likewise has not provided evidence creating a
                              material issue of fact to the contrary.
                                          For these same reasons, we also conclude that coverage Cannot
                              exist under the civil or military authority and ingress/egress provisions.
                              Coverage under those provisions depends on restricted access due to
                              "damage to or destruction of property ... by peril(s) insured against"
                              within one mile of the Shops or as a "direct result of loss or damage by a
                              peril insured against" within one mile of the Shops, respectively. In the
                              same way the Shops did not experience the peril of "direct physical loss or
                              damage," it follows that JGB's evidence does not support that the Shops or
                              the property within one mile of it are subject to the kind of harm
                              contemplated under these policy provisions as a matter of law.• See JOE,
                              LLC v. Travelers Indern. Co. of Conn., 483 F. Supp. 3d 828, 837 (C.D. Cal.
                              2020) (rejecting coverage under a civil authority endorsement "[flor
                              similar reasons" that the court rejected coverage under a business
                              interruption and extra • expense endorsement because the comp]aint did
                              not allege losS or damage to property).
                                          In sum, we conclude that the district court clearly erred in
                              denying Starr summary judgment on JGB's breach of contract and
                              declaratory relief claims because JGB's evidence in opposing summary
                              judgment does not create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the
                              existence of "direct physical loss or damage" as required for coverage

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                                                                   95
f( I) 1947A   -‘41e.),..044
                under the policy.     The evidence, taken as true, demonstrates only

                economic loss sustained amidst a worldwide pandemic.            Because such

                economic loss was not caused by direct physical loss or damage to the
                property, we would turn away from "the North Star of this property
                insurance policy" should we uphold the summary judgment denial under

                these circumstances. See Santo's, 15 F.4th at 402. Accordingly, Starr is
                entitled to summary judgment on these remaining claims in light of JGB's
                failure to make a showing sufficient to establish coverage.        We join• a

                striking majority of our colleagues across the country in reaching this
                conclusion. See Oregon Clinic, PC v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 75 F.4th
                1064, 1071 n.1 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting "more than 800 cases nationwide").
                The pollu,tion and contamination exclusion also bars coverage because the
                policy explicitly and unambiguously defines "pollution or contamination" to
                include a virus
                            Even if we found JGB's position on the existence of "direct
                physical loss or damage" persuasive here, Starr maintains that the
                pollution and contamination exclusion otherwise bars coverage becauSe
                the definition of "pollutants or contaminants" in the policy undisputedly
                includes "virus."   JGB contends that the COVID-19 virus does not fail
                within the type of virus referenced in that definition, as the definition's
                surrounding context shows that the exclusion is intended to preclude
                coverage only for "traditional environmental pollution." Situated in this
                context. JGB argues that "virus" is intended to exclude coverage only for
                viruses stemming from pollution, such as "when a wastewater treatment
                plant releases virus-containing waste into the water supply."
                           An exclusion "must be narrowly tailored so that it 'clearly and
                distinctly communicates to the insured the nature of the limitation, and
                specifically delineates what is and is not covered:" Casino W., 130 Nev. at
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                                                    26
101 lq•VIA
                       398, 329 P.3d at 616 (quoting Griffin u. Old Republic Ins. Co., 122 Nev.
                       479, 485, 133 P.3d 251, 255 (2006)).        Therefore, the onus falls on the

                       insurer to use "obvious and. unambiguous language" in drafting the
                       exclusion, indicative of the "only reasonable interpretation." Id. at 399,
                       329 P.3d at 616. An insurer also carries the burden of "establish[ing] that
                       the exclusion plainly applies to the particular case before the- court." Id.;
                       see also Stempel & Knutsen, supra § 15.01[C] ("[E]stablished coverage can
                       be defeated or reduced only if the insurer shoulders the burden of
                       persuasion to establish the applicability of an exclusion . . . that reduCes or
                       restricts coverage.").
                                     Thus, analysis of the exclusion here must begin with the plain
                       text. In interpreting policy language in its "ordinary and popular sense,"
                       the court must step into the shoes of "one not trained in law or in
                       insurance."     Casino W., 130 Nev. at 398, 329 P.3d at 616 (internal
                       quotation marks omitted).        Nevertheless, lo]ne should assume the

                       contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think
                       otherwise." See Scalia & Garner, supra at 70; see also Galardi u. Naples
                       Polaris, LLC', 129 Nev. 306, 310, 301 P.3d 364, 367 (2013).             If two

                       reasonable interpretations exist, the exclusion is ambiguous, and the court
                       should construe the ambiguity "against the drafting party• and in favor .of
                       the insured." See Farmers Ins. Grp. u. Stonik By & Through Stonik, 110
                       Nev..64, 67, 867 P.2d 389, 391 (1994). We look to the pOlicy language as a
                       whole in our assessment, seeking to avoid absurd results. Casino W., 130

                       Nev. at 398, 329 P.3d at 616.                         •

                                     The initial question here    a question of law----is then whether

                       the meaning of "virus" as used in the pollutants or contaminants definition
                       clearly encompasses SARS-CoV-2 and thereby bars coverage under the

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(1)1 I947A    .14030
                                                             27
exclusion. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal, 119 Nev. 62, 64, 64 P.3d 472,
473 (2003) (addressing extent of coverage as a legal question).           We

conclude it does.    The definition explicitly lists "virus" as one of the
excluded pollutants or contaminants. Virus is commonly defined as "the
causative agent of an infectious disease" or "any of a large group of
submicroscopic infective agents that are regarded either as extremely
simple microorganisms or as extremely complex molecules, that typically
contain a protein coat surrounding an RNA or DNA core."                Virus,

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, supra at 1397-3.8.             It is

undisputed that SARS-CoV-2 is a virus. Thus, an ordinary and popular
understanding from "one not trained in law or insurance" of the word
"virus" extends to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. See Casino W., 130 Nev. at 398,
329 P.3d at 616.
            Our decision in Casino West does not compel a different result.
There, we held that an "absolute pollution" exclusion in a commercial
general liability policy that defined pollutant as "any solid, liquid, gaseous
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste" was susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation. Casino W., 130 Nev. at 399-400, 329 P.3d at
616-17.   One interpretation included carbon monoxide as part of those
excluded pollutants, while the other limited the exclusion to only
traditional environmental pollution. Id. at 399, 329 P.3d at 616-17. These
competing interpretations required that we construe the provision against
the insurer and hold that the exclusion would not bar coverage for injuries
caused by carbon monoxide. Id. at 401, 329 P.3d at 618. Crucially, our
conclusion warned insurers that they "must plainly state" the outer
bounds of an exclusion with "obvious and unambiguous language." See id.

                                     28
                at 401, 329 P.3d at 618 (second cla.use quoting Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire
                Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 164, 252 P.3d 668, 674 (2011)). In Casino West, the
                insurer failed to do so. Here, Starr has; it unambiguously listed "virus" as
                an excluded pollutant or contamina.nt. See Zwillo V, Corp. v. Lexington
                Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1042 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (rejecting
                policyholder's reading of a similar pollution and contamination exclusion
                that   would   cabin   the   excluded     viruses to   those   of traditional
                environmental pollution because such a reading "requires overlooking the
                word 'including" preceding a list of excluded contaminnts). This makes
                Casino West fundamentally different from the case at hand.        -
                            True, the exclusion and definition here parrot some of the
                same language of that in Casino West giving rise to ambiguity. See 130
                Nev. at 400, 329 P.3d at 617. Yet, the Starr policy also includes the word
                "virus."   While the other listed substances might be indicative of
                "traditional environmental pollution" themselves, the addition of "virus"
                transforms the clause into one excluding both a "health-harming
                containinantH" like a virus "and environmental pollutants." See Circus
                Circus LV, LP v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co., 525 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1278 (D.
                Nev. 2021), aff'd, No. 21-15367, 2022 WL 1125663 (9th Cir. APr. 15, 2022).
                Other courts have held similarly under analogous circumstances. See, e.g.,
                Zwillo V, Corp., 504 F. Supp. 3d at 1042-43; Northwell Health, Inc. v.
                Lexington Ins. Co., 550 F. Supp. 3d 108, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (rejecting a
                construction Of "contamination" that would exclude "one of the terms in its
                contractual definition"). In fact, a court interpreting the same exclusion in
                a Starr policy held that it precluded coverage for similar alleged loss or
                damage. See Ford of Slidell, LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. CV
                21-858, 2021 WL 5415846, at *10-11 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 2021).

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                             No doubt, context is important in interpreting policy language.
                See Galardi, 129 Nev. at 310, 301 P.3d at 367. In that regard, JGB poi.nts
                to C.J. Segerstrorn & Sons v. Lexington Insurance Co., No.: 8:22-cv-00466-
                MEMF-JDEx, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33293 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023),
                which    held   that   the surrounding language       in a    pollution and
                contamination exclusion like that in this case was enough. to su.pply a
                reasonable interpretation of coverage limiting "virus" to that of traditional.
                environment pollution: • Still, Segerstrom is otherwise diStinguishable.
                The court there was also "guided" by an express coverage grant for
                outbreaks of communicable diseases. Segerstrom, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
                33293, at *19-20. Here, the policy contains no such coverage grant.
                             Even if we could not distinguish Segerstrom, centext does not
                Write out explicit terms. See Farmers Ins. Grp., 110 Nev. at 67, 867 P.2d
                at:391 (explaining that this court will neither "rewrite contract provisions
                that are otherwise unambiguous" nor "increase an obligatiOn to• the
                insured where such was intentionally and unambiguously limited by the
                parties").   In particular, though we must import context into our
                interpretation, embracing JGB's reading of "virus" would ignore our
                equally compelling directive tc adopt the viewpoint of "the layperson
                untrained in the law or the insurance business."          44A Am. Jur. 2d.
                Insurance § 2038 (2013); see also Casino W., 130 Nev. at 398, 329 P.3d at
                616.    Given. that the defined pollutants or contaminants in this policy
                exPressly include "virus," we are not prepared to say that someone
                untrained in law or insurance would think that the ordinary and popular
                meaning of a virus, even situated among other pollutants, would 'refer only
                to viruses such as the suggested wastewater-based viru.seS. See CaSino
                W., 1.30 Nev. at 399, 329 P.3d at 616-1.7; Williston on Contracts, supra §

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                      49:17 ("[A] policy is not ambiguous simply because creative possibilities as
                      to its meaning can be suggested by the parties." (internal quotation marks
                      omitted)).
                                   Also telling, many of the cases that JGB points to in arguing
                      that COVID-19 causes "direct physical loss or damage" are often labeled
                      tf contamination" cases.   See New Appleman on Insurance Lau) Library
                      Edition, supra § 46.03[3][a]; see Rose's .1, 290 A.3d at 64. The provision
                      here is a contamination exclusion. Therefore, under jGB's direct-physical
                      loss-or-damage   theorY, arguing that     the   presence    of SARS-CoV-2
                      physically affects the property, its "claims allege contamination and fall
                      within this exclusion." Lindenwood Female Coll. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
                      61 F.4th 572, 574 (8th Cir. 2023).
                                   Finally, the International Organization for Standardization's
                      (ISO) standardized "absolute virus exclusion" provides only taneential
                      support for JGB's position.      Though ISO began recommending that
                      insurers incorporate this exclusion following the 2006 SARS outbreak, its
                      existence does not prove that the word "virus" in this policy must be
                      limited to that stemming from pollution events.            Instead, the ISO
                      recommendation simply reveals a better practice for excluding a COVID-
                      19-type claim than what the parties have done here. See ISO Form CP 01
                      40 07 06(C) ("With respect to any loss or damage subject to the exclusion
                      in Paragraph B., such exclusion supersedes any exclusion relating to
                      "pollutants." (italics added)). A more ideal approach, however, does not
                      render the plain language used here moot or subject to a different
                      interpretation. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 CITA:. b (Am.
                      Law Inst. 1981) ("[W]ords of an integrated agreement remain the most

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                important evidence of intention.").7 We thus conclude that the exclusion
                stands as an independent basis warranting summary judgment in Starr's
                favor.
                                                CONCLUSION
                                We conclude that the district court erred in denying summary
                judgment because JGB's claims cannot stand as a matter of law.           In
                opposing summary judgment, JGB did not make a showing of the "direct
                physical loss or damage to covered property" required to establish
                coverage under Starr's commercial property insurance policy. The fact
                that the COVID-19 virus was present in or on the property does not
                establish that there was any physical harm to the property as required.
                Moreover, because the policy's pollution and contamination exclusion
                applies to a "virus," even if they would otherwise be covered, jGB's claims
                for losses resulting from COVID-19 are excluded from coverage. While we
                are sympathetic to the economic woes JGB—and so many other businesses
                in Nevada—suffered as a result of the COVID-1.9 pandemic, its claim for
                coverage under this type of insurance policy falls short. Accordingly, we
                grant the petition and direct. the clerk of this court to issue a writ of
                mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying Starr's
                motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract. and declaratory

                           are not persuaded by the other caselaw JGB offers as
                         7 We
                supplemental authority, a.s JGB overreads the cas6s' -holdings.. See, e.g.,
                Novant Health Inc. v. Ant. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co.. 563 F. Su.pp. 3d
                455, 460-62 (M.D.N.C. 2021) (denying motion to dismiss where there was a.
                question as to whether the exclusion was jurisdictionally applicable); Sac.
                Downtown Arena LLC v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 637 F. Supp. 3d 865, 871
                (E.D. Cal. 2022) (refusing to apply the pollution and contamination
                exclusion because the policy contained a cornmunica.ble disease
                endorsement).

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                relief claims and enter an order granting summary judgment in Starr's
                favor.8

                                                                                       ,
                                                            Cadish
                We concur:

                                                                   Pick.               , j.
                Stiglich                                    Pickering

                                                            Lee
                                                                     sg'fh
                Herndon

                   I.

                Parraguirre                                 Bell

                        8In light of this decision, we lift the stay of proceedings imposed by
                our July 29, 2022, order.
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