Court Opinion

ID: 9461237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:09:14.0641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:57.469051
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the judgment of the Court. However, I would affirm the district court only after consideration of the legitimacy of the lineup procedure employed in this case, since I believe such an analysis is required by United States v. Wade 1 and Gilbert v. California.2
At the trial of Robert Battles and two codefendants for bank robbery, the major issue with regard to Battles was identity; Battles took the position that he had not participated in the robbery. The only identification testimony linking Battles with the crime was that of Sergeant Armstrong of the Pittsburgh Police Department. At trial, the sergeant unqualifiedly identified Battles as the man who, just after the robbery, shot at him and then escaped.3 The police officer also testified that he had previously selected Battles from a lineup conducted six weeks after the bank robbery and approximately three months before trial.4 Accordingly, the reference to the lineup by Armstrong could reasonably have been taken by the jury as corroborative of the police officer’s recollection, and therefore of some significance in light of the key issue in the case.
At the lineup Battles’ attorney requested permission to see the identification cards marked by the persons present to observe the lineup, but this request was denied. The defendant claims that, as a result, his right to effective assistanee of counsel was curtailed and the lineup was invalid under the precepts of Wade and Gilbert. At a pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the district court stated that the lineup procedure was valid and the court also found that the sergeant had a basis independent of the lineup for his in-court identification of Battles.5
Wade held that where a lineup is conducted in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, no identification testimony by witnesses present at the lineup may be introduced at trial unless it can be shown by “clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.”6 Gilbert held that introduction at trial of testimony that the witness had earlier identified the defendant at an illegal lineup constitutes a per se violation of exclusionary principles,7 and that a new trial omitting mention of the lineup identification was mandated.8
In the present case evidence of the lineup identification was presented at trial. Thus, under Gilbert, if that lineup had been held in derogation of Battles’ constitutional rights, allusion at trial to the lineup proceedings would require reversal, although, since the district court had concluded that the sergeant had an independent recollection of Battles, the policeman would not have been precluded from giving identification testimony that derived from unrelated sources.
*795Unlike Judge Aldisert, I do not believe that Sergeant Armstrong’s independent basis enabling him to identify the defendant may be used to vindicate the introduction of the lineup testimony if such lineup violated Wade and Gilbert. Since the lineup did comprise part of the prosecutor’s evidence, we may affirm Battles’ conviction, that turned to a considerable extent on the identification issue, only if we conclude that the circumstances of the lineup here did not deprive the defendant of his .constitutionally protected right to the assistance of counsel.
In support of his position that the lineup here violated the principles of Wade and Gilbert, defendant cites People v. Williams.9 In Williams, a post indictment lineup was conducted in the presence of the defendant’s attorney. After the witness had observed the lineup, but before he manifested any recognition of the suspects, police led the witness outside the presence of the attorney to make his oral identification. The California Supreme Court held such procedure impermissible, pointing out that the rationale supporting Wade and Gilbert was:
[T]o enable an accused to detect any unfairness in his confrontation with the witness, and to [be sure] that he will be aware of any suggestion by law enforcement officers, intentional or unintentional, at the time the witness makes his identification. It is not the moment of viewing alone, but rather the whole “procedure by which [a suspect] is identified” that counsel must be able to effectively reconstruct at trial.10
Where defendant’s attorney was excluded from the critical scene when the witness announced “that’s the man,” 11 the California court held that the lineup did not provide adequate safeguards against improper witness suggestion.
The lineup procedure may be divided into three phases: (1) presentation of suspects, (2) recognition by viewers, and (3) manifestation by the viewers of the identification or lack of identification. Each in its own fashion is subject to abuse.12 The claim here, as in Williams, is not that the circumstances surrounding the presentation of the suspects at the lineup were unduly suggestive. Rather, the argument is directed to the potential for abuse inherent in the recognition and voting processes.
In contrast to Williams, however, where the defendant’s attorney was prohibited from attending the third, or manifestation, portion of the identification procedure, here there are crucial factual differences. In the present case, the circumstances of the lineup were carefully controlled to minimize unfairness or suggestion in the presentation of the suspects as well as in the recognition and voting phases. Moreover, all significant acts of identification and voting took place in the attorney’s presence.
Testimony at the suppression hearing disclosed that at the lineup, and in the presence of defendant’s attorney:
Witnesses were seated, isolated from one another, around the viewing room;13
Before the suspects came on to the lineup platform, neither the police personnel conducting the lineup nor the witnesses knew the positions suspects would take or the numbers they would wear;14
*796No talking was permitted between witnesses or with police officers during the lineup; 15
In contrast to the oral identification in Williams, identifications were made by-marking on paper ballots, and a record thus exists of identifications;16
Ballots were marked before any communication was permitted.17
The issue presented on this appeal is whether defendant’s counsel may, as a matter of constitutional right, see the marked ballots at the time they are given to the lineup officials. Although the attorney was denied permission at the lineup to see the marked ballots, and although the better course would seem to indicate that defense attorneys see the ballots in such situations, it would not appear that the refusal creates error of constitutional dimension. No allegation is made of irregularities in the presentation or recognition phases of the lineup procedure. Nor is any suggestion made that the ballots in question were altered between the time of the lineup and the following day when they were made available to the attorney.
Under this particular set of facts, and in the absence of any showing or allegation of contrivance or bad faith on the part of the witness or those conducting the lineup, the procedures which occurred here cannot be designated as unconstitutional. Since the lineup as described does not violate the constitutional norms established by the Supreme Court, identification testimony by Sergeant Armstrong, including lineup identification, was properly admitted into Battles’ trial.
Because I agree with Judge Aldisert’s conclusion that the defendant' has set forth no other grounds for reversal, I concur in affirming the judgment of the district court.
Circuit Judge ROSENN joins in this concurring opinion.

. 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

. 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967).

. Trial Transcript 82-84, 89.

. Id. 91-92 (direct examination); 135 (cross-examination).

. Suppression Hearing Transcript (S.H.) 146-47.

. 388 U.S. at 240, 87 S.Ct. at 1939.

. In Wade no testimony regarding the lineup was introduced, and the case was remanded for a determination whether the witness had a basis for independent observations. The situation in Gilbert, where testimony of the lineup was admitted at trial, was expressly distinguished. See Wade, n. 32 and accompanying text, 388 U.S. at 240, 87 S.Ct. at 1939.

. Of course, if the appellate court determines that introduction before a jury of an illegal lineup identification is harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reversal is not required. However, no harmless error finding would appear appropriate in the situation presented here.

. 3 Cal.3d 853, 92 Cal.Rptr. 6, 478 P.2d 942 (1971).

. 92 Cal.Rptr. at 8, 478 P.2d at 944, quoting People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 348, 82 Cal.Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643 (1969).

. 388 U.S. at 236, 87 S.Ct. at 1937.

. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).

. S.H. 90 (Testimony of Detective Frank Cupus, who conducted the lineup).

. S.H. 53 (Sgt. Armstrong); 91 (Detective Cupus).

. S.H. 54 (Sgt. Armstrong); 91-92 (Detective Cupus).

. S.H. 90 (Detective Cupus).

. S.H. 73-75 (Sgt. Armstrong); 90-92 (Detective Cupus).