Court Opinion

ID: 9388226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 14:00:28.283646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:18.970391
License: Public Domain

22-1717-cv
     Techu-El v. Conetta

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 20th day of April, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 7               MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8               BETH ROBINSON,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   Rashad Techu-El,
13
14                           Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16                     v.                                                  22-1717
17
18   Drew Conetta, Lieutenant Port Chester Police
19   Department, Badge #321, Christopher Bivona,
20   Officer Port Chester Police Department, Badge
21   #2, Village of Port Chester/Town of Rye,
22
23                           Defendants-Appellees,
24
25   Port Chester Police Department,
26
27                     Defendant.
28   _____________________________________
29
30
 1   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                      Rashad Techu-El, pro se, New
 2                                                                 Windsor, NY.
 3
 4   FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                     No appearance.
 5

 6          Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

 7   New York (Swain, C.J.).

 8          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

10          Appellant Rashad Techu-El, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal

11   of his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 28, 2020, Port Chester Police Officer

12   Christopher Bivona pulled over Techu-El for speeding.           Rather than providing his driver’s

13   license, Techu-El informed Officer Bivona that he was exercising his “right to travel freely,

14   unfettered, and unencumbered on the public roadways/highways.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. He

15   claimed that the noncriminal traffic infraction did not require him to show identification. After

16   repeating this explanation to Lieutenant Drew Conetta, whom Officer Bivona summoned for

17   backup, Techu-El was handcuffed, arrested, held at the police station for around five hours, and

18   eventually released.

19          Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Techu-El filed a civil rights lawsuit against

20   Bivona, Conetta, the Village of Port Chester, and the Town of Rye, alleging that the stop and arrest

21   violated his constitutional rights and several federal criminal statutes. The district court dismissed

22   his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief can

23   be granted and permitted amendment to correct the identified deficiencies. See generally Techu

24   El v. Conetta, No. 22-CV-0111 (LTS), 2022 WL 1036793 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2022). The amended

                                                       2
 1   complaint was dismissed for substantially the same reasons. See generally Techu-El v. Conetta,

 2   No. 22-CV-0111 (LTS), 2022 WL 2704101 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2022). Techu-El timely appealed.

 3   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

 4           We review a § 1915(e)(2) dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo and assess whether

 5   the pro se litigant’s amended complaint, liberally construed, states a facially plausible claim for

 6   relief. See Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018). We also

 7   liberally construe Techu-El’s pro se appellate brief to “raise the strongest arguments [it]

 8   suggest[s].” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017).

 9           The district court correctly determined that Techu-El’s false-arrest theory was based on a

10   “mistaken view of the law” drawn from out-of-context case citations and inapplicable dictionary

11   definitions. Techu-El, 2022 WL 2704101, at *3. Techu-El’s related contention that a traffic

12   violation cannot provide the basis for a constitutional traffic stop is also incorrect, as a traffic stop

13   is presumptively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “where the police have probable cause

14   to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).

15   Techu-El does not otherwise claim that the rationale for the stop was false or baseless.

16           Techu-El also failed to state a constitutional claim premised on his arrest or detention

17   because the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for offenses such as speeding

18   or unlicensed driving, even if—as Techu-El asserts—those are not “arrestable” offenses under

19   state law. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“[S]tate restrictions [on arrests] do

20   not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”).

21           Finally, Techu-El’s claim that his body and vehicle were “unlawfully searched,”

22   Appellant’s Br. at 5, fails to allege a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. When a police

                                                        3
 1   officer “has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the Fourth Amendment

 2   allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous

 3   incident of arrest.” Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004) (citation omitted).

 4   Likewise, police officers may conduct “a search of the arrestee’s person.” Chimel v. California,

 5   395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Here, the alleged search was incidental to arrest.

 6          We have considered Techu-El’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

 7   Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

 8
 9                                               FOR THE COURT:
10                                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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