Court Opinion

ID: 9559430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:29:03.403627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:59.595533
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Pringle
specially concurring:
I am in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Moore in the majority opinion of the Court.
As was pointed out in Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., (N.J.) 181 A (2d) 481 (decided May 21, 1962), which dealt with the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, courts are required to respect and sustain the exercise of police power by the legislature where it seeks to apply remedial measures to conditions deemed detrimental to the welfare of the people, and where such measures are reasonably related to the objectives sought to be attained and are not clearly arbitrary. In such circumstances the questions of policy, wisdom and expediency of such measures are questions for the legislative and not the judicial branch of the government.
The Colorado Legislature has spoken with respect to the exercise of this power in dealing with discrimination in housing. The obvious effect upon the welfare of the people of the state as the result of discrimination because of race, color, religion or creed is well stated by Judge Francis, speaking for the entire New Jersey Court in Jones v. Haridor, supra at page 485, and the prohibi*256tion of such discrimination could well bring about substantial progress toward the elimination of such deleterious situations.
As pointed out by the majority opinion here and in Jones v. Haridor, supra, and the cases cited therein, the right of an owner to use his property as he wishes is not absolute. It is, and always has been, subject to reasonable restraint under the police power so long as the exercise of such power bears a reasonable relation to the public health, safety and welfare, such I believe to be the case here.
I would also clarify my position with respect to Section 2 of the order issued by the Commission requiring the respondents to afford to the complainants the opportunity of purchasing a comparable home in the same general neighborhood or a comparable neighborhood in Colorado Springs, and under the same terms and conditions such housing would be offered to any other person.
The findings of the Commission, amply supported by the testimony, show that respondents were engaged in practices prohibited by the Fair Housing Act, specifically, in that they refused to sell the property in question to the complainants Rhone solely because of their race. While guarantees that other prospective purchasers from the respondents would not be subjected to similar discriminatory action are proper, relief can and should be afforded to the complainants where possible so that they may be permitted to exercise their rights as citizens of this country.
I am of the opinion that if there was evidence in the record to support such order, then the affirmative portion of the order set forth in Section 2 was quite within the provisions of Section 12 of the Fair Housing Act, which the Court finds constitutional, that is, that portion of Section 12 which empowers the Commission to “take affirmative action (* * *) including the transfer, rental or lease of housing.” There is, however, no evidence in *257this record that respondents had comparable homes listed in the same neighborhood or in comparable neighborhoods, and I would therefore hold that under the state of this record the order was too broad. I do not understand that the majority opinion is in disagreement with my view, but I would clearly point out my reasons for concurring in the striking of paragraph 2 of the order.