Court Opinion

ID: 9925404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 18:01:30.812771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.361374
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2067     Document: 010110986353      Date Filed: 01/19/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        January 19, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 23-2067
                                                   (D.C. No. 2:22-CR-01932-MIS-1)
  JUAN VASQUEZ-CASTRO,                                         (D.N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Appellant, Juan Vasquez-Castro, entered a guilty plea and was convicted of

 reentry of a removed alien pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). The district court

 sentenced Mr. Vasquez-Castro to 48 months’ imprisonment, varying upward from the

 U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months.

 Mr. Vasquez-Castro appeals, arguing his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal
 Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2067     Document: 010110986353        Date Filed: 01/19/2024     Page: 2

                               I.       BACKGROUND

       Mr. Vasquez-Castro is a citizen of Guatemala. He was born in Guatemala in

 July 1993. When Mr. Vasquez-Castro was approximately fifteen years old, his family

 asked whether he was willing to live and work with one of his brothers in the United

 States. Mr. Vasquez-Castro agreed to move, although he does not remember who

 brought him to the United States without inspection. Mr. Vasquez-Castro reportedly

 lived in Memphis, Tennessee, for three years before moving to Dodge City, Kansas,

 with his brother and his brother’s family.

       In 2017, Mr. Vasquez-Castro was convicted of attempted rape of his twelve-

 year-old niece. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) in the instant case

 provides that, in April 2017, a faculty member at Dodge City Middle School

 contacted the police to report allegations of sexual assault made by a female student.

 According to an official affidavit, the defendant kissed his twelve-year-old niece on

 the mouth, tried to take off her shirt, touched her breasts, and touched her vagina

 beneath her clothing. Mr. Vasquez-Castro then bought the victim a cell phone and

 told her not to tell anyone about the incident. Mr. Vasquez-Castro was arrested and

 interviewed by the police, at which point he admitted to forcing a kiss on the victim,

 grabbing her by the arms, and holding her still, while he tried to lift her shirt. He

 stated he used his hands to feel the victim’s belly, breast, and front torso, and

 subsequently touched the victim under her clothing, touching her breasts and vagina.

 He then digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina. He reported he gained an erection

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 from this, but let the victim go because he wanted to have sex with her and knew it

 was wrong.

        Later, in November 2017, during an evaluation with the Kansas Department of

 Corrections, Mr. Vasquez-Castro denied the incident and stated he only gave the

 victim a cell phone. He admitted to telling the police he touched the victim in a

 sexually inappropriate manner, but stated he admitted to having done so because the

 police repeatedly asked him the same question and Mr. Vasquez-Castro thought that

 by admitting to the incident, the police would let him go. He alleged the victim

 engaged in sexual behavior with a friend with the same name as Mr. Vasquez-Castro.

        Mr. Vasquez-Castro was charged with attempted rape in Kansas state court and

 pleaded no contest to the charge. The standard presumptive sentence for the offense

 was 59 months of incarceration. However, the court sentenced him to 48 months’

 incarceration, departing downward based on the victim’s request, Mr. Vasquez-

 Castro’s age, and Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s criminal history. He was subsequently

 deported from the United States on October 21, 2020.

        On October 8, 2022, United States Border Patrol agents found

 Mr. Vasquez-Castro, in Doña Ana County, New Mexico, attempting to conceal

 himself. He admitted to being a citizen of Guatemala without legal authorization to

 enter or remain in the United States. Mr. Vazquez was charged with reentry of a

 removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(2). He entered a

 guilty plea.

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       The PSR calculated Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s total offense level as 13 and his

 criminal history category as III, resulting in a Guidelines imprisonment range of 18 to

 24 months. Neither party objected to the PSR. Mr. Vasquez-Castro requested a low-

 end Guidelines sentence, or downward variance, asserting that such a sentence would

 be sufficient. The Government opposed Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s request and asked that

 the court sentence Mr. Vasquez-Castro at the high end of the Guidelines range. The

 district court notified the parties before sentencing that it was contemplating an

 upward variance.

       The district court sentenced Mr. Vasquez-Castro on April 11, 2023. The court

 reiterated at the sentencing hearing that it was considering an upward variance. The

 Government stated its position that a high-end sentence of 24 months would be

 sufficient to protect the public and deter Mr. Vasquez-Castro from returning to the

 United States again. Mr. Vasquez-Castro requested a sentence on the lower end or

 below the Guidelines range, arguing through counsel that he had been a model

 prisoner, he has family in his home country, he was very isolated at the time of his

 2017 conviction, his relationship with his twelve-year-old niece was not sexual in

 nature, and he pleaded guilty to molesting her because he was frightened of getting a

 more severe sentence. Mr. Vasquez-Castro then addressed the court directly. He

 apologized for entering the country illegally, explained that he had gotten married

 and had a child since he was deported in 2020, and stated that he returned to the

 United States in search of employment to provide for his family. He requested the

 opportunity to be reunited with his wife and child. At the district court’s request,

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 Mr. Vasquez-Castro then explained the events leading up to his 2017 conviction,

 reiterating that he never had a sexual relationship with his niece.

       The district court then described the facts it was considering in determining an

 appropriate sentence for Mr. Vasquez-Castro. The court noted that it was

 “considering all [Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s] arguments,” including that he “was coming

 to [the] United States to work, that economic circumstances in his home country are

 very difficult, and he has a family to support; [his] argument made in his motion that

 his travel to the United States was very difficult, including having to pay human

 smugglers; [and] that [he] speaks Spanish[.]” Supp. ROA Vol. VI at 16–17. The court

 did not find “any [of] these factors merit a lower sentencing, given [Mr. Vasquez-

 Castro’s] behavior while in the United States committing now his second felony in

 the United States.” Id. at 17.

       The district court also “consider[ed] that [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] denies sexually

 assaulting the 12-year-old victim in his prior State case, even though [he] admitted to

 at least some of the . . . allegations against him.” Id. The court considered

 Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s argument “that he was young when he committed these State

 crimes and he was culturally isolated,” although the court “note[d] that

 [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] came to live in the United States with his older brother and

 was a member of a church which apparently had other Guatemalans in it, so he was

 not completely isolated; he had family and church surrounding him.” Id. The district

 court also “consider[ed] [Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s] argument that he has worked at the

 detention center and that he’s a model prisoner and that the State will extradite

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 [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] for his State crime,” as well as “[his] argument that he has

 family in his home country that supports him” and “family here in the U.S. that

 supports him as well.” Id.

       The court noted it was considering “the argument that [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] is

 innocent of the crime against the little girl and that he pled because he was frightened

 and this was actually just some confusion about a child having a cell phone” and

 “that the victim in that case may have asked for less time, which is why

 [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] only got a 48-month sentence in his State case.” Id. at 17–18.

 The court also considered that the Government was asking for a higher-end sentence.

       The district court considered Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s history and the nature and

 circumstances of the offense, noting that his history “includes a 2017 conviction for

 attempted rape where [he] molested his 12-year-old step-niece.” Id. at 18. The court

 considered “that this offense is of [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] returning to the country in

 which he committed this serious crime while still on probation for that crime,

 returning only two years after his release for the State sentence.” Id.

       The district court also considered “the need for the sentence imposed to

 provide just punishment, respect for the law, adequate deterrence, and protection of

 the public.”1 Id. It found “an increased sentence is just punishment,” as “[i]t helps

 protect the public from [Mr. Vasquez-Castro], [and] provides adequate deterrence to

       1
          Given Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s immigrant status, the district court announced
 that it would not consider treatment because Mr. Vasquez-Castro would be returned
 to Guatemala upon completion of his sentence. Neither party requested that the
 district court consider treatment.
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 him for committing further crimes.” Id. at 18–19. The court “considered that

 [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] received a lenient sentence for his prior sex case and then

 violated his probation by coming back to the United States quickly upon release.” Id.

 at 19. The court explained that it was “not re-punishing him for his State crime or

 trying to make up for a lenient sentence in his State court [case],” and instead was

 “just noting that the lenient sentence in his prior case did not prevent him from

 coming to the United States so quickly upon release; thereby committing another

 felony” and “considering the need to protect the public” because Mr. Vasquez-Castro

 “ha[d] shown his ability to molest children.” Id. Thus, district court concluded that

 “just punishment requires the Court to give a higher-than-Guideline[s] sentence

 because [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] reentered the country illegally after having committed

 a very serious crime while in the country” and “he was released from prison on that

 crime only about two years before he committed this crime.” Id.

        The court also “consider[ed] the kinds of sentences available, sentencing

 range, and the Guideline[s] policies” and “the need[] to avoid unwarranted

 sentencing disparities.” Id. at 19–20. It explained that Mr. Vasquez-Castro “received

 a somewhat lower sentence for his prior sex offense, a lower sentence than . . . most

 defendants are given,” thus finding that “this sentence, in part, will avoid

 unwarranted sentencing disparities because many defendants would have received a

 higher sentence.” Id. at 20. All the same, “if there is any sentencing disparity,” the

 court found that such a disparity “is, in fact, warranted by the facts in this case.” Id.

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       The court then sentenced Mr. Vasquez-Castro to 48 months’ imprisonment.

 This represented an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months.

 Mr. Vasquez-Castro timely appealed, challenging the substantive reasonableness of

 the sentence imposed.

                                II.      DISCUSSION

                                A.     Standard of Review

        “Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the

 Guidelines range, [we] must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion

 standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The substantive

 reasonableness of a sentence centers on “whether the length of the sentence is

 reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in

 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2007).

 The factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

 defendant’s history and characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the

 seriousness of the crime, deter future criminal conduct, protect the public from the

 defendant’s further crimes, and provide training, medical care, or rehabilitation;

 (3) the sentences available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) the Sentencing

 Commission’s policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence

 disparities; and (7) the need for restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United

 States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910, 915 (10th Cir. 2018).

       “We give substantial deference to the district court’s weighing of these

 factors.” Barnes, 890 F.3d at 915. Thus, “[w]e do not reweigh the sentencing factors

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 but instead ask whether the sentence fell within the range of rationally available

 choices that [the] facts and the law at issue can fairly support.” United States v. Blair,

 933 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). We “will

 only overturn a sentence that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly

 unreasonable,” United States v. Williams, 994 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2021)

 (quotation marks omitted).

       “If [the district court] decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is

 warranted, [it] must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the

 justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall,

 552 U.S. at 50. “[A] major departure should be supported by a more significant

 justification than a minor one.” Id.; see also United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149,

 1158 (10th Cir. 2014) (“A ‘major’ variance should have ‘a more significant

 justification than a minor one.’” (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50)). All the same, while

 we “may consider the extent of the deviation,” we “may not apply a presumption of

 unreasonableness.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. To the contrary, “we uphold even

 substantial variances when the district court properly weighs the § 3553(a) factors

 and offers valid reasons for the chosen sentence.” Barnes, 890 F.3d at 916. “Still, we

 do not just provide a rubber stamp of approval and therefore must determine if the

 district court’s proffered rationale, on aggregate, justifies the magnitude of the

 sentence.” United States v. Walker, 74 F.4th 1163, 1202 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal

 quotation marks omitted).

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                                       B.   Application

        Mr. Vasquez-Castro asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

  He argues the district court abused its discretion when it varied upward from the

  Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months and sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment.

  Specifically, Mr. Vasquez-Castro claims “[t]here was insufficient cause to issue an

  upward variance and the sentence was otherwise substantively unreasonable,”

  arguing the district court did not properly weigh the mitigating factors Mr. Vasquez-

  Castro identified. Appellant’s Br. at 12. He also asserts the district court “myopically

  focused” on his 2017 conviction. Id.

        Failure to Consider Mitigating Factors

        Mr. Vasquez-Castro first asserts the district court did not consider the

  mitigating factors in this case. He notes there was nothing aggravating about the

  conduct in the instant offense. Additionally, Mr. Vasquez-Castro argues the district

  court did not properly consider his personal history and the circumstances of this

  case, including that he has been a model prisoner and has family to support in

  Guatemala. Mr. Vasquez-Castro also notes that he was here for economic reasons, he

  did not commit any new crimes while in the United States, this is his first

  immigration offense, he has no criminal history beyond the 2017 conviction, and

  there is a low risk of recidivism.

        When imposing sentences, district courts “should engage in a holistic inquiry

  of the § 3553(a) factors,” Lente, 759 F.3d at 1174 (quotation marks omitted), and

  “consider every convicted person as an individual,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 52 (quoting

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  Koon v United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). But while the court should not focus

  solely on one factor, United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2017),

  it “need not afford equal weight to each § 3553(a) factor,” United States v. Cookson,

  922 F.3d 1079, 1094 (10th Cir. 2019). “[W]e must . . . defer not only to a district

  court’s factual findings but also to its determinations of the weight to be afforded to

  such findings.” United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 808 (10th Cir. 2008). Where a

  district court decides to vary, it “properly engages in [the § 3553(a)] inquiry when it

  bases its decision on specific, articulable facts supporting the variance and does not

  employ an impermissible methodology or rely on facts that would make the decision

  out of bounds.” Barnes, 890 F.3d at 916.

        In this case, the district court expressly discussed and considered the § 3553(a)

  factors, including the allegedly mitigating factors identified by Mr. Vasquez-Castro.

  For example, the court considered the nature and circumstances of the offense and

  Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s history and characteristics, noting that “[Mr. Vasquez-Castro]

  was coming to [the] United States to work, that economic circumstances in his home

  country are very difficult, and he has a family to support,” Supp. ROA Vol. IV at 16,

  and “that [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] has worked at the detention center and that he’s a

  model prisoner,” id. at 17. Despite considering these facts, the district court

  determined that “an increased sentence is just punishment,” noting that it would help

  protect the public and provide adequate deterrence. Id. at 18. The district court also

  considered the kinds of sentences available, the Guidelines range, and the Guidelines

  policy statements, concluding that the presumptive reasonableness of the Guidelines

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  range of 18 to 24 months was overcome by the facts of the case, particularly

  Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s prior conviction and his reentry into the country shortly after

  his release. Finally, the court found that an increased sentence would avoid any

  unwarranted sentencing disparity because Mr. Vasquez-Castro received a lower

  sentence for his 2017 conviction than most defendants are given.

        Mr. Vasquez-Castro disagrees with how the district court weighed each these

  § 3553(a) factors. But the record reflects that the district court considered each of the

  factors, and we must defer to the weight the court afforded to them. United States v.

  Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1305 (10th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e will not examine the weight a

  district court assigns to various § 3553(a) factors, and its ultimate assessment of the

  balance between them anew.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the

  district court properly explained its decision to vary upward and based that decision

  on appropriate consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, the resulting sentence was

  substantively reasonable.

        Focus on the 2017 Conviction

        In addition, Mr. Vasquez-Castro argues the district court “myopically focused

  on [his] prior State sex offense and re-punished him for . . . what it perceived to be

  too low of a sentence.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. He argues the Guidelines already took

  his prior conviction fully into consideration when the court calculated his criminal

  history category. Thus, Mr. Vasquez-Castro argues that the district court’s upward

  variance essentially double-counted his 2017 conviction.

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         Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s argument that the court improperly focused on his prior

  conviction is without merit. As has been addressed, the district court considered the

  § 3553(a) factors at length. There is “[n]o limitation” placed on the information that a

  district court may consider “concerning the background, character, and conduct” of a

  defendant at sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Further, we must defer to the district

  court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court’s discussion of his 2017

  conviction does not alone render Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s sentence substantively

  unreasonable.

         In addition, contrary to Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s assertion, the district court did

  not repunish him for his 2017 conviction. The court expressly stated that it was

  “sentencing [Mr. Vasquez-Castro] only for this crime,” Supp. ROA Vol. IV at 20,

  and that it was “not re-punishing him for his State crime or trying to make up for a

  lenient sentence in his State court [case],” id. at 19. Instead, the district court

  explained that it was “considering [Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s] past behavior in imposing

  a sentence that will deter [him], protect the public, and satisfy the other 3553(a)

  factors.” Id. at 20. And the court noted “that the lenient sentence in his prior case did

  not prevent him from coming to the United States so quickly upon release; thereby

  committing another felony.” Id. at 19.

         Finally, Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s argument that the Sentencing Guidelines

  already counted his 2017 conviction, and that the district court’s further

  consideration of that conviction resulting in a “double counting,” is unavailing. The

  Sentencing Guidelines themselves reflect that a defendant’s criminal history may

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  justify a sentence above the Guidelines range. For example, the Guidelines explicitly

  consider the possibility of upward variances when “reliable information indicates that

  the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the

  seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant

  will commit other crimes.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines

  Manual, § 4A1.3(a)(1) (Nov. 2021). Similarly, under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), when a

  defendant engaged in criminal conduct resulting in a felony conviction prior to his

  first order of deportation or removal, his offense level for illegal reentry will increase

  by an amount calculated based on the length of the sentence imposed for the prior

  felony conviction. The comments to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 explain “[t]here may be cases

  in which the offense level provided by an enhancement in subsection (b)(2)

  . . . substantially understates or overstates the seriousness of the conduct underlying

  the prior offense.” Id. § 2L1.2, comment. (n.6). When “the length of the sentence

  imposed does not reflect the seriousness of the prior offense[,] . . . a departure may

  be warranted.” Id. Thus, the district court’s consideration of the 2017 conviction does

  not render Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s sentence substantively unreasonable.

                               III.       CONCLUSION

        Contrary to Mr. Vasquez-Castro’s arguments, the district court’s weighing of

  the § 3553(a) factors, consideration of his prior offense conduct, and resulting

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  sentencing decision was substantively reasonable. Because we conclude the district

  court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Carolyn B. McHugh
                                             Circuit Judge

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