Court Opinion

ID: 9955110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 18:02:29.728501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.300532
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/24 P. v. Mason CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166353
 v.
 ANTHONY MAURICE MASON,                                                 (Solano County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. VCR229101)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Anthony Maurice Mason was convicted of two counts of
continuous sexual abuse of his two daughters. He maintains the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) and improperly instructed the
jury on that issue, and, cumulatively, these errors were prejudicial. We
affirm.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         The details of defendants’ molestation of his daughters, T.M. and L.M.,
are not relevant to the claims he raises on appeal. Defendant committed
various acts of sexual abuse against T.M. and L.M. over the course of several
years when they were under 14 years old.

                                                               1
      At trial, a clinical psychologist, Blake Carmichael, testified as an expert
on CSAAS and child sexual abuse disclosure.1 CSAAS is a tool to help
educate people about children who have been sexually abused and to dispel
myths about how children who have been abused behave. There are five
components to CSAAS: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment or
accommodation (coping), (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure,
and (5) recantation or retraction. CSAAS is “not used to determine if a
[particular] kid was abused or not.”
      Dr. Carmichael testified he did not know anything about the facts of
the case, had not read reports or interviews related to the case, and knew
nothing about the specific victim in the case or the relationship of “the
victim” to the defendant. He testified at length about each of the five aspects
of CSAAS and how those factors relate to disclosure of sexual abuse.
      The jury convicted defendant of two counts of continuous sexual abuse
of a child. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to a
total term of 50 years to life.
                                  DISCUSSION
Admission of Expert Testimony2
      Defendant claims Dr. Carmichael testified to matters that exceeded the
permissible scope of CSAAS evidence, constituted inadmissible profile
evidence, inappropriately incorporated the specific facts of the case, and was
improperly “quantitative.”

      1We discuss defendant’s objections to specific aspects of Dr.
Carmichael’s testimony in further detail below.
      2  We review a trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony for abuse
of discretion. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299 (McAlpin).)

                                       2
      “Expert testimony on CSAAS has long been held admissible in
California for the limited purposes of dispelling commonly held myths or
misconceptions about child sexual abuse and aiding the jury in ‘evaluating
the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.’ ” (People v. Sedano
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 474, 479 (Sedano), quoting People v. Lapenias (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias); see McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
pp. 1300–1301.) CSAAS testimony is admissible “ ‘ “to explain the emotional
antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior,” ’ such
as delayed disclosure of the abuse.” (Sedano, at p. 479; McAlpin, at pp. 1300–
1301; People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 215.)
      Challenged Testimony
      While defendant acknowledges CSAAS evidence generally was relevant
and admissible in this case, he challenges specific testimony responding to
questions asked by the prosecution.
      First, in response to questions by the prosecutor, Dr. Carmichael
testified: “[M]ost people who commit sex offenses are men” and the “vast
majority” of child sexual offenses are committed by someone the child knows,
who is in “an ongoing, trusted future relationship [with the child] that is
continued to be maintained while the abuse is occurring and even thereafter.”
      Second, in response to the prosecutor asking whether the “non-abusing”
parent being “out of the house a lot or not present” could contribute to the
concept of secrecy, Dr. Carmichael responded: “I would tend to kind of
capture that with the second component, the helplessness, because even if
there’s people in the child’s life that you would think they could tell or should
tell, if that other person is not available because they work a lot, they’re
drinking or otherwise unavailable, that leaves a child more isolated or in a
helpless position. They rely on other people for their safety. Kids cannot be

                                        3
viewed as mini adults and being the same kind of assertiveness to make
things stop. So people in the child’s life who otherwise are responsible for
their safety are not available, not around or the child feels like they just can’t
tell them for various reasons, that can maintain secrecy for long periods of
time.” When asked again about the effect of the “non-offending” parent being
absent, Dr. Carmichael confirmed the other parent being physically absent
“absolutely” could have an effect on helplessness, but added, “again it’s a
misconception that just because someone is there the child would be able to
tell. It’s if the child feels that person would be ineffective and/or they are
actually absent, again leading this helplessness to grow even greater.”
      Third, in response to the prosecutor asking whether “the size of the
perpetrator” can affect the concept of helplessness, Dr. Carmichael answered:
“It certainly can. Again, feeling intimidated physically without speaking a
word can cause that helplessness to grow.” Asked whether the role of the
perpetrator in the family can affect helplessness, Dr. Carmichael testified:
“Sure. The closeness the child feels, again the role and authority figure, even
people who have, um, influence on the child’s future, like we talk about
coaches and playing time is related to pleasing a coach. Well, if the child
feels like they’re doing something to make the coach upset or get them in
trouble and they’re seeking, you know, playing time or even a scholarship at
college, you know, compromising those opportunities by saying something is
something kids weigh heavily. So, again, the role, the size and stature within
the relationship are all being considered.”
      Fourth, in response to the prosecutor asking about a child describing
sexual abuse but appearing “to smile or be in a good mood,” Dr. Carmichael
stated a child could be “distancing oneself [from] those negative emotions.
You know, kids giggling because they’re uncomfortable. They feel nervous.

                                        4
So maybe cracking a smile or trying to again deal with that nervous energy in
different ways. So it’s not unexpected that a child who has been sexually
abused to be uncomfortable and kind of lets that nervous out with giggling or
something like that.”
      Finally, in response to the prosecutor asking why a “non-offending
parent” who becomes aware of abuse might not tell anyone, Dr. Carmichael
stated: “So the parent themselves may be ashamed of it, but they also have a
relationship with the perpetrator they’re having to manage. They may rely
on that person for finances, a home, be in disbelief that someone who is
supposed to care for the child would even do such a thing. Pretty common
reaction of kind of the bewilderness [sic] when at first something like that
comes up. Those are reasons why a non-offending parent or a person in the
child’s life may not talk about it or even believe it.”
      Permissible Scope of CSAAS Evidence
      Defendant maintains these portions of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony
exceeded the scope of permissible CSAAS evidence by focusing on the
characteristics of the perpetrator and the behavior of the “non-offending”
parent rather than on children’s general reactions to sexual abuse. That is
not an accurate characterization of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony.
      Rather, Dr. Carmichael’s testimony was appropriately directed at
helping the jury understand common misconceptions about child victims of
sexual abuse. His statements that “the vast majority” of children are abused
by someone they know and are in a trusted relationship with, rather than a
stranger, elaborated on the context in which such abuse generally occurs and
dispelled a common misunderstanding as to the relationship between child
victims and their abusers. (See McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1302–1303
[one of the popular notions requiring correction is that “ ‘The layperson

                                         5
imagines the child offender’ ” to fit particular stereotypes, including that the
offender is “ ‘a stranger’ ”].) This testimony also helped the jury understand
child-victim behavior. Dr. Carmichael testified child sexual abuse “is
occurring within a relationship where they often know the perpetrator, care
about the perpetrator, oftentimes has a loving relationship with their
perpetrator. And so it’s within that context the child is experiencing the
abuse and grappling with the ideas of what might happen if I did tell.” Dr.
Carmichael further explained people who commit sex offenses “identify
victims and their vulnerabilities and their trusts” in order to build a
relationship with them, maintain secrecy, and “secure a trust so that a sexual
touch is integrated into those relationships . . . [and] becomes familiar and
normal for this to occur in that relationship.” He added, based on research in
the area of child abuse, “the relationship the child has with their perpetrator”
tends to result in “longer delays in telling about it” because a child victim
weighs the consequences of disclosure and “feels responsible for the negative
impact on those around them that also affects the perpetrator.” In sum, such
testimony falls well within the ambit of permissible CSAAS evidence both to
counter common misconceptions about child sexual abuse and explain why
child sexual abuse victims may delay reporting abuse. (Sedano, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.)
      Similarly, Dr. Carmichael’s testimony that the majority of child sex
abusers are male was offered in response to a line of questioning about the
research on how child sex abuse victims act and disclose abuse. He explained
the gender of the abuser can affect the way children tend to react to abuse
“because of the differences between men and women and then also the child
victim and the role that they have in that relationship.” Dr. Carmichael’s
testimony about the physical “size” of the perpetrator, the perpetrator’s role

                                        6
in the child’s life, and the physical absence of the “non-abusing parent” were
also appropriately discussed as circumstances contributing to a child’s feeling
of helplessness and reluctance to disclose abuse.
        As to Dr. Carmichael’s testimony about reasons a non-offending parent
may not report abuse, similar expert testimony was held admissible in
McAlpin to explain why a mother did not report her daughter’s molestation to
the police. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1301–1302 [rules applicable to
CSAAS evidence applied equally in the context of the failure of child’s parent
to report molestation].) But even if such testimony exceeded the permissible
bounds of CSAAS evidence, it was not prejudicial to defendant’s case. The
testimony was extremely brief, based on generalities, and offered nothing
specific to suggest defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, any error in admitting this
response was harmless. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247
[erroneous admission of expert testimony only warrants reversal if it is
reasonably probable more favorable result would have been reached in
absence of error].)
        “Profile” Evidence
        Next, defendant maintains the challenged portions of Dr. Carmichael’s
testimony constituted improper “profile” evidence that invited the jury to
convict him based on common characteristics of an abuser. That is not the
case.
        “Profile evidence is generally inadmissible to prove guilt.” (People v.
Robbie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1084.) “A profile is a collection of conduct
and characteristics commonly displayed by those who commit a certain
crime.” (Ibid.) In Robbie, the prosecution questioned the expert witness with
hypothetical questions incorporating the defendant’s specific alleged sex
offender conduct. (Id. at pp. 1083–1084.) The expert testified such behavior

                                         7
was “typical of a particular kind of criminal,” and described the defendant’s
conduct as the “ ‘most prevalent type of behavior that I’ve seen with sex
offenders.’ ” (Id. at p. 1084.)
      Here, however, Dr. Carmichael’s testimony that most child abusers are
male, have a close relationship with their victims, and are adults physically
larger than the children they abuse, described only attributes that generally
apply to child sexual abusers. It did not purport to describe a “profile” of a
“typical” abuser with defendant’s specific characteristics who engaged in the
“specific alleged sex offender conduct” in which defendant allegedly engaged.
For example, defendant’s assertion that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony about the
perpetrator’s role “in the family” was improper “profile” evidence was based
on a hypothetical example of a coach who plays an important role in a child’s
life, a circumstance not remotely present in this case. (See, e.g., Sedano,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 483 [“The category of people ‘who have an
existing relationship with the victim’ is a category so broad and nebulous that
it cannot be construed as a ‘profile’ that would lead a jury to convict just
because defendant falls within it.”].)
      Too Fact Specific
      Defendant also maintains Dr. Carmichael’s testimony was
impermissibly focused on the specific facts and circumstances of this case,
rather than the general class of child sex abuse victims. Again, defendant’s
argument lacks merit.
      Generally, it is improper for an expert to testify about CSAAS in a
manner that directly coincides with the facts of the case. (See People v.
Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393 [expert may not give “ ‘general’ ”
CSAAS testimony in a way that allows jury to apply CSAAS to the facts of
the case and conclude the child was sexually abused]; People v. Jeff (1988)

                                         8
204 Cal.App.3d 309, 338 [expert’s testimony based on series of hypothetical
questions that incorporated “the exact same facts and details” as told by
victim to social worker improperly conveyed that the jury should accept
victim’s version of events as true]; People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
1372, 1384 [“better practice” is to limit an expert’s testimony “to observations
concerning the behavior of abused children as a class” and “avoid testimony
which recites either the facts of the case at trial or obviously similar facts”].)
      Here, Dr. Carmichael testified he did not know any circumstances of
the instant case. The prosecutor, in turn, asked broad questions regarding
the gender of the “majority” of offenders, whether the majority of offenders
have a close relationship with their victims, whether the size of the
perpetrator can have an impact on helplessness, and why a child might
appear to be smiling when describing abuse, and Dr. Carmichael’s responses
were based on the general class of victims, not the specifics of the case. The
prosecutor did not ask hypothetical questions that incorporated “the exact
same facts and details” included in any reports of interviews or examinations
of T.M. or L.M. (See People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074
[“Where, as here, the expert testifies regarding the behavior of abused
children as a class, there is little, if any, chance the jury will misunderstand
or misapply the evidence.”].)
      “Quantitative” Testimony
      Citing to Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at page 179; People v. Wilson
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 559, 568, 570–571 (Wilson); and People v. Julian (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 878, 883–886 (Julian), defendant lastly claims Dr.
Carmichael’s testimony that the majority of abusers are male and have a
close relationship with their victim was impermissibly “quantitative.”
However, these cases are inapposite.

                                         9
      All three concerned statistical or quantitative testimony about the
infrequency of false allegations of sexual abuse. (Lapenias, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 179 [expert testimony that it was “ ‘rare’ for children to
make false allegations of sexual abuse” violated rule that expert may not give
an opinion as to whether another witness is telling the truth or the defendant
is guilty]; Wilson, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 570 [statistical evidence
regarding percentages of false allegations of sex abuse “had the effect of
telling the jury there was at least a 94 percent chance” a child sex abuse
victim was telling the truth]; Julian, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 886 [expert’s
92 to 99 percent probability evidence invited jurors to find the defendant
guilty based on statistical probabilities].)
      The testimony defendant challenges, by contrast, did not serve to
bolster the witnesses’ credibility by telling the jury they were likely telling
the truth. (See Sedano, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 481 [statistical evidence
94 percent of abusers had a pre-existing relationship with an abused child did
not “improperly bear on the specific complainant’s veracity, as false
allegation statistics necessarily do” but rather helped “the jury objectively
‘evaluat[e] the credibility of an alleged child victim’ ”].) Defendant contends
Sedano was wrongly decided because statistical evidence about pre-existing
relationships with abusers is assertedly unnecessary to target a
misconception about childhood sexual abuse and permits the jury to decide a
defendant is guilty based on “profile” evidence. However, the Sedano court
drew an important distinction, and one with which we agree, between
statistical evidence about the infrequency of false allegations of child abuse,
which does not address a common misconception about children who are

                                        10
sexually abused, and statistical evidence showing most abused children are
in a relationship with their abuser, which does.3 (Sedano, at pp. 481–483.)
Jury Instruction
      Defendant also challenges the jury instruction on CSAAS testimony, a
version of CALCRIM No. 1193, given in this case. He maintains the
language of the instruction was ambiguous and likely misled the jury to
believe it could consider the CSAAS testimony as evidence of his guilt.
      As a threshold matter, the Attorney General maintains defendant
forfeited his claim of instructional error given that he requested the
instruction given, made no claim the language was ambiguous, and did not
suggest alternative language or request an alternative instruction (such as
CALJIC No. 10.64 which he now maintains is a clearer instruction) that
would have cured the assertedly ambiguous language. Generally, when a
defendant has requested an instruction he later attempts to challenge on
appeal, he will be foreclosed from doing so under the “invited error” doctrine.
(See People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 723 [“doctrine of invited error
bars a defendant from challenging an instruction given by the trial court
when the defendant has made a ‘conscious and deliberate tactical choice’ to
‘request’ the instruction”].) And generally, a defendant’s “failure to request
clarification of an instruction that is otherwise a correct statement of law
forfeits an appellate claim of error based upon the instruction given.” (People
v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151, disapproved on other grounds in People
v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) Nevertheless, as the parties
recognize, an appellate court “may also review any instruction given, refused

      3 Given that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony was properly admitted, there
is no merit to defendant’s additional claim that his constitutional rights were
abridged by its admission. (See People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 949;
Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174.)

                                       11
or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if
the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1259.) Accordingly, we will exercise our discretion to consider defendant’s
challenge to the instruction. (See People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1087.)
      CALCRIM No. 1193 has been repeatedly upheld by the courts. (See
Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176 [“[CALCRIM No. 1193]
accurately instructs the jury on the law: the proper use—and the proper
limitations on the use—of CSAAS evidence”]; People v. Munch (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 464, 473–474; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494,
503–504 (Gonzales).)
      Defendant asserts none of these decisions is instructive because he
raises a different challenge—that the instruction was “ambiguous” due to the
“double negative” in its third sentence. Specifically, defendant claims the
language “You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
[T.M.] and [L.M.]’s conduct were not inconsistent with the conduct of someone
who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of her [sic]
testimony” (italics added), can have different meanings and a juror could
reasonably read “not inconsistent” to mean “consistent” and thus use the
CSAAS testimony as evidence he committed the charged crimes.
      However, read in context and in its entirety, the instruction did not
allow the jury to find defendant guilty on the basis of the CSAAS evidence.
To begin with, the second sentence of the instruction expressly told jurors the
CSAAS testimony was “not evidence that the defendant committed any of the
crimes charged against him.” And read as a whole, the language of the
instruction clearly conveyed that CSAAS testimony seeks to explain why
certain behavior does not, contrary to common opinion, suggest a victim’s

                                      12
allegations are false. In addition, Dr. Carmichael expressly stated CSAAS is
an educational tool, is “not used as a checklist,” and is not used to
“diagnos[e]” sexual abuse or determine whether a child has been sexually
abused. (See Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 503 [CSAAS instruction
“must be understood in the context of [the CSAAS expert’s] testimony”].) In
short, a reasonable juror would understand the “not inconsistent” language to
mean the jury could use the CSAAS testimony “to conclude that [the victim’s]
behavior [did] not mean [the victim] lied . . . [about being] abused.”4
(Gonzales, at p. 504.)
      Nor is there any merit to defendant’s assertion that CALCRIM No.
1193 is even more confusing when read in conjunction with CALCRIM No.
226, which informed the jury it could consider “anything that reasonably
tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy” of testimony. Not only is
CALCRIM No. 1193 a more specific instruction that any reasonable juror
would understand pertains to and limits the use of CSAAS testimony, but Dr.
Carmichael expressly testified to the limitations of such testimony.
      In sum, it was not reasonably likely any juror understood the
instruction that was given as allowing the use of the CSAAS testimony as
evidence defendant committed the charged crimes, and the trial court did not
commit instructional error.
Cumulative Error
      Because the trial court did not err in admitting the CSAAS testimony
or in instructing the jury, defendant’s claim of cumulative error also fails.

      4 That defendant could have requested CALJIC No. 10.64, which he
maintains is a clearer instruction, is irrelevant to whether the CALCRIM No.
1193 that was given here was ambiguous and allowed the jurors to use the
CSAAS testimony as “evidence that the defendant committed any of the
crimes charged against him.”

                                       13
(See People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017 [no cumulative error where
there are “no errors to aggregate”].)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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                                            _________________________
                                            Banke, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

_________________________
Castro, J.*

**Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A166353, People v. Mason

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