Court Opinion

ID: 9906043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:28.098301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.889589
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Haynes CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B322383

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA465884)
           v.

 KYRON RENA HAYNES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ramiro P. Cisneros, Judge. Remanded with
directions.
      Bird Rock Law Group, Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Yun K. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  __________________________
      In 2018, Kyron Rena Haynes pleaded no contest to
attempted pandering by encouraging. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 266i, subd.
(a)(2), 664.) Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the trial court
imposed three years of formal probation with a suspended upper
term sentence of three years in prison. Haynes later violated
probation, and the three-year upper term sentence was executed.
On appeal, Haynes argues that the trial court’s refusal to reduce
his sentence under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 567) was error.
       We remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

                  PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District
Attorney on May 9, 2018, Haynes was charged with pandering by
encouraging. (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2).) It was alleged that Haynes
suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the
meaning of the Three Strikes Law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j),
1170.12.)
      A June 5, 2018 presentence probation report recommended
that Haynes be convicted as charged and that the high term be
imposed. In support of the recommended upper term, the
probation report listed five circumstances in aggravation: (1) the
manner in which the crime was carried out indicated planning,
sophistication, or professionalism; (2) the crime involved a
potential threat of great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a
high degree of cruelty; (3) Haynes had a growing criminal record

      1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
of increasing seriousness; (4) Haynes was on juvenile probation
when the crime was committed; and (5) Haynes’s prior
performance on juvenile probation was unsatisfactory.
       On September 11, 2018, Haynes pleaded no contest to
attempted pandering by encouraging (§§ 266i, subd. (a)(2), 664),2
and admitted that he suffered a prior juvenile conviction. The
prosecution dismissed the strike allegation per a plea agreement
the People had reached with Haynes. Defense counsel stipulated
to a factual basis for the plea as reflected in discovery, the pre-
plea report, and any preliminary hearing transcript.3 The trial
court sentenced Haynes to three years of formal probation with a
suspended sentence of the high term of three years.
      On December 16, 2019, the court revoked Haynes’s
probation. On April 6, 2020, the court conducted a bench
warrant hearing, and released Haynes on his own recognizance.
On September 10, 2020, the court issued a bench warrant after
Haynes failed to appear for a bench warrant hold hearing. On
May 19, 2022, Haynes, who had been remanded, failed to appear
for the bench warrant hearing without sufficient excuse. The
court set the matter for a probation violation hearing.
      Haynes filed a sentencing memorandum on June 13, 2022,
arguing, as relevant here, that the trial court was prohibited
from imposing the high term, and must instead impose the low
term due to amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) made

      2 Prior to Haynes’s no contest plea the prosecution moved,
pursuant to the plea agreement, to amend the information to
allege attempted pandering instead of pandering.

      3 Only the June 5, 2018 probation report is contained in the
record on appeal.

                                 3
by Senate Bill 567 because Haynes was a youth (under 26 years
of age) at the time he committed the offense, and there was no
evidence that imposing the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice. Haynes alternatively asserted that the court
was required to impose the presumptive middle term under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) and (2) unless aggravating
circumstances supporting a high term were found true by a jury,
through a court trial, or stipulated by Haynes.
       On June 21, 2022, Haynes waived his right to a probation
revocation hearing and admitted the probation violation.
       At a sentencing hearing on June 28, 2022, defense counsel
informed the court that she had filed the sentencing
memorandum stating Haynes’s position. The court acknowledged
that it had received and read Haynes’s sentencing memorandum.
The court stated that it was aware of Senate Bill 567 and
understood that the legislation was retroactive under In re
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). However, the court
concluded that Haynes was not entitled to resentencing. By
agreeing to have the upper term suspended in exchange for being
placed on probation, Haynes impliedly agreed to the underlying
facts supporting the sentence. Haynes stipulated to the
underlying facts as reflected in discovery, the pre-plea hearing,
and pre-plea report. The trial court stated that it also considered
Haynes’s youth under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), but found
that the same findings rendered him ineligible for the lower term.
The court reasoned, “Defendant agreed to have three years of
prison suspended in exchange for being put on probation. [¶]
This was not a case where a judge weighing factors in mitigation
and aggravation decided to give the defendant three years
suspended which I believe if that occurred in this case defendant

                                4
would be entitled to a resentencing. That’s not the case here.”
The court ordered executed the previously imposed three-year
suspended sentence.
      Haynes timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

       In 2018, when Haynes pleaded no contest and the trial
court imposed the negotiated upper-term suspended sentence,
courts had discretion under former section 1170, subdivision (b)
to impose any of the three possible terms in the sentencing triad
for attempted pandering. Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill
567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) in two ways that are at
issue here.
       First, under subdivision (b)(1), “[w]hen a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided. . . .” A sentence exceeding the middle term
may be imposed “when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify the [sentence to be imposed] . . . and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) A trial court may also
“consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
The aggravating circumstance or circumstances that justify
imposition of the upper term must be set forth on the record.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(5)).

                                 5
         Second, subdivision (b)(6)(B) provides: “Notwithstanding
paragraph (1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of
the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The person is a youth, or was a youth as
defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the
commission of the offense.”
         Haynes contends that Senate Bill 567, which became
effective after his sentence was imposed but before it was
executed, applies to his case retroactively, and that the trial court
erred by refusing to apply the amendments to section 1170,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) and (b)(6).
         The issue is one of statutory interpretation; our review is
de novo. (People v. Fox (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 826, 831 (Fox).)
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . .
is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the
law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it
a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that
language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose
and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the
language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning
unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation,
courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose,
legislative history, and public policy.” ’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “In the
end, we ‘ “must select the construction that comports most closely

                                   6
with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the
statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd
consequences.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Forester (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
447, 453–454.)
       Section 1170 is silent as to whether subdivision (b) applies
retroactively. Historically, California courts have held that,
pursuant to Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, “(i) in the absence of a
contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that
ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet
final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675.) “ ‘The Estrada rule rests on the
presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing
only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any
retroactive effect, “a legislative body ordinarily intends for
ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as
possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that
are final and sentences that are not.” ’ ” (People v. Stamps (2020)
9 Cal.5th 685, 699 (Stamps).) We agree with the parties that
section 1170, subdivision (b) is ameliorative under Estrada and
that Haynes’s case is nonfinal for Estrada purposes. (See People
v. Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680 [“legislation ameliorating
punishment presumptively applies to suspended execution cases
pending on appeal from an order causing a previously imposed
sentence to take effect”].) Although the People concede that
Senate Bill 567 is retroactive, they argue that Haynes cannot
benefit from the legislation because it does not apply at all in the
context of a stipulated plea agreement.

                                 7
Plea Agreements

       “ ‘ “ ‘A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the
defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be
bound.’ ” ’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701.) Unlike civil
contracts, “ ‘as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to
incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or
enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of
public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does
not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law
that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.’ (§ 1016.8,
subd. (a)(1).) Therefore, ‘[a] plea bargain that requires a
defendant to generally waive unknown future benefits of
legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other
changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not
knowing and intelligent.’ (§ 1016.8, subd. (a)(4).)” (People v.
Todd (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 373, 379 (Todd), review granted
Apr. 26, 2023, S279154.) “ ‘Judicial approval is an essential
condition precedent to the effectiveness of the “bargain” worked
out by the defense and prosecution.’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 705.) The trial court “may evaluate the fairness of a
proposed sentence in determining whether to approve the
bargain” (id. at p. 709), and is “the ultimate arbiter of whether
the disposition is fair and appropriate.” (People v. Prudholme
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 970 (Prudholme)).
       “ ‘Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its
inherent sentencing discretion, “a judge who has accepted a plea
bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that
bargain. [Citation.]” ’ ” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 973.)

                                  8
“[S]ection 1192.5, subdivision (b) expressly provides that once it
approves a plea agreement, ‘the court may not proceed as to the
plea other than as specified in the plea.’ ” (Ibid.) At that point,
the court “ ‘ “ ‘lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of a plea
bargain so that it becomes more favorable to a defendant unless,
of course, the parties agree.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Should the court
consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to
reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.” ’ ” (Ibid.) This
does not mean that “the court surrenders its sentencing
discretion the moment it accepts a negotiated plea.” (Stamps,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701.) Rather, a court is prohibited “ ‘from
unilaterally modifying the terms of the bargain without affording
. . . an opportunity to the aggrieved party to rescind the plea
agreement and resume proceedings where they left off.’ ” (Ibid.)
        “The statutory scheme contemplates that a court may
initially indicate its approval of an agreement at the time of the
plea but that ‘it may, at the time set for the hearing on the
application for probation or pronouncement of judgment,
withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the
matter . . . .’ (§ 1192.5.)” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 705–
706.) “ ‘[T]he court, upon sentencing, has broad discretion to
withdraw its prior approval of a negotiated plea.’ ” (Id. at p. 706.)
        Although the trial court cannot unilaterally modify the
terms of the plea agreement (§ 1192.5 (b)), both the Legislature
and the electorate “ ‘for the public good and in furtherance of
public policy, and subject to the limitations imposed by the
federal and state Constitutions, [have] the authority to modify or
invalidate the terms of an agreement.’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 703.) “The [Legislature or the] electorate may bind
the People to a unilateral change in a sentence without affording

                                   9
them the option to rescind the plea agreement.” (Harris v.
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 992; accord People v. Flores
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.)

Analysis

      Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6)(B)

       We need not engage in significant analysis to reach a
resolution with respect to Haynes’s contention that he is entitled
to imposition of the lower term pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(B). Haynes did not argue in his sentencing
memorandum to the trial court, at the sentencing hearing, or in
his opening brief to this court that his youth “was a contributing
factor in the commission of the offense,” as section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(B) requires, nor did he offer any evidence that
would support a finding that his youth was a contributing factor.
(Italics added.) He has simply stated, in a cursory fashion, that
he was a youth at the time of the offense. Even if we assume that
section 1170, subdivision (b) applies to Haynes’s case, given the
complete absence of evidence that his youth was a contributing
factor in the offense or any argument to support imposition of the
lower term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B), Haynes’s
claim necessarily fails. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 984, 992 [“in order to trigger the presumption [of the
lower term pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B)], there
must be some initial showing that the defendant’s youth was a
contributing factor, and only then must the record affirmatively
show compliance with the statute”].)

                                10
      Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(1)

            Senate Bill 567’s Amendments Apply to Negotiated
            Plea Agreements

       The Courts of Appeal are divided as to whether a defendant
who stipulated to the upper term pursuant to a plea agreement is
entitled to remand under Senate Bill 567, and the issue is
pending before the Supreme Court. (Fox, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 833–834 [defendant entitled to remand]; Todd, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at pp. 381–382 [same]; People v. Sallee (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 330, 340–341 (Sallee), review granted Apr. 26, 2023,
S278690 [defendant not entitled to remand]; People v. Mitchell
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1057–1059 (Mitchell), review granted
Dec. 14, 2022, S277314 [same].)
       The nay-sayers—the Court of Appeal, First District,
Division Five in Mitchell, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, and the
Court of Appeal, Fifth District in Sallee, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
330—espouse the view that the plain language of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(1) (“ ‘When a judgment of imprisonment is to be
imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court
shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to
exceed the middle term . . . .’ ”) limits its application to situations
in which the trial court exercises its discretion to select one of
three terms in a sentencing triad. (Sallee, at p. 337; Mitchell, at
pp. 1057–1059.) Mitchell and Sallee followed the rationale of
People v. Brooks (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1099 (Brooks), which held
that retroactive relief under amended section 1170.91, “which
mandate[s] consideration of trauma resulting from military
service as a mitigating factor when a court exercises determinate

                                  11
sentencing triad discretion,” is unavailable where a sentence is
imposed pursuant to a stipulated plea agreement. (Sallee, at
p. 338; Mitchell, at pp. 1057–1059.) Mitchell and Sallee reasoned
that when a plea agreement is negotiated for a fixed sentence,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) is not implicated because the trial
court has no authority to select the term of imprisonment.4
(Sallee, at p. 338; Mitchell, at pp. 1057–1059.) Additionally,
Mitchell and Sallee held that the purposes of Senate Bill 567’s
amendments—to “ensure ‘ “that aggravating facts are presented
to the jury before a judge imposes a maximum sentence as
decided in Cunningham v. California [(2007) 549 U.S. 270]” ’ and
that ‘ “individuals facing time have the ample ability to dispute
information in the record that might not be true” ’ ”—are not a
concern in the plea context, because the defendant has waived his
or her right to a trial. (Mitchell, at p. 1059; accord Sallee, at p.
340.) Sallee further observed that application of section 1170,

      4 In their letter briefing, the People distinguish between the
posture of this case—where the sentence was imposed prior to the
period of probation and executed only after probation was later
revoked—and the Court of Appeal cases discussed, in which
imposition of the sentence was suspended. When a sentence is
imposed but not executed, the court “may revoke the suspension
and order that the judgment shall be in full force and effect.”
(§ 1203.2, subd. (c); People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081,
1087–1088.) The court must order the previously-imposed
sentence into effect and has no discretion to modify it. This is a
distinction without a difference, however, with respect to the
issue of retroactivity presented here. Provisions that operate
retroactively, as the amendments to section 1170, subdivisions
(b)(1) and (b)(2) do, relate back to the imposition of sentence,
regardless of the current stage of the proceedings, as long as the
case is not yet final.

                                 12
subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) to negotiated pleas “would create
absurd consequences that do not further or promote the general
purpose of the statute.” (Sallee, at p. 340.) Specifically, a
“defendant would be permitted to enter a plea and agree to a
stipulated upper-term sentence, while nonetheless asserting a
statutory right under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), to a jury
trial on aggravating factors supporting the agreed-upon upper
term,” thereby eliminating the contractual obligations of the plea
agreement. (Ibid.)
       Subsequent to Mitchell, some Courts of Appeal have taken
a different view. (Fox, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833–834;
Todd, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 381–382.) In Todd,5 the
Court of Appeal, Sixth District, observed that unlike the statute
in Brooks, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th 1099, which permitted recall of
sentence if new mitigating factors were not considered at
sentencing, “section 1170, subdivision (b) does not merely add
additional factors to be considered among many in the trial
court’s sentencing determination. It prohibits the imposition of
the upper-term sentence absent specific findings.” (Todd, at
p. 378.) The Todd court expounded: “In Brooks, the plea bargain
resulted in a sentence that was within the boundaries of the
Penal Code’s sentencing structure. Here, the imposition of the
aggravated term exceeds the court’s authority unless the
statutory prerequisites are met or waived because the aggravated
term cannot be imposed absent the court’s finding of those
circumstances.” (Id. at p. 379.)
      Additionally, Todd reasoned that “ ‘as a general rule, plea
agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the

      5 Todd, the first of the cases to disagree with Mitchell, was
published on the same day as Sallee.

                                13
state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public
good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter
into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them
from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to
apply to them.’ (§ 1016.8, subd. (a)(1).) Therefore, ‘[a] plea
bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown
future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate
decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the
date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.’ (§ 1016.8, subd.
(a)(4).)” (Todd, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 379.)
       Finally, Todd stated: “The Mitchell decision appropriately
underscores the primacy of the plea agreement against
discretionary judicial interference, other than acceptance or
rejection. [Citation.] But the relevant question here is not
whether the sentencing judge is bound by the parties’ stipulated
sentence, but whether Todd is entitled to the ameliorative effect
of Senate Bill No. 567’s new sentencing provisions.” (Todd,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.) Relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685, where the court
held that the defendant was entitled to seek the exercise of the
trial court’s new discretionary authority to strike an
enhancement that was included in the defendant’s plea
agreement to a stipulated sentence, Todd held that the defendant
was entitled to the benefits of Senate Bill 567. (Id. at pp. 380–
381.)
       In Fox, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at page 833, the Court of
Appeal, First District, Division One, agreed with Todd that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Stamps compelled the conclusion
that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 567:
“As Stamps explained, the fact that a defendant agreed to a

                               14
specific term prevents a trial court from striking a prior-serious-
felony enhancement while imposing the balance of a stipulated
sentence, but it does not prevent the court from striking the
enhancement and permitting the prosecution to withdraw from
the plea agreement. [Citation.] This is because a trial court’s
‘exercise of its new discretion to strike the serious felony
enhancement, whether considered a new circumstance in the case
or simply a reevaluation of the propriety of the bargain itself,
would fall within the court’s broad discretion to withdraw its
prior approval of the plea agreement.’ ” (Id. at pp. 833–834.) Fox
emphasized that remand is even more appropriate in the present
context than it was in Stamps, because regardless of whether the
trial court exercised its discretion in Stamps the resulting
sentence would be legal, whereas “under Senate Bill No. 567 an
upper-term sentence is not even authorized unless aggravating
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found
true beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 834.)
       Fox also addressed Sallee’s conclusion that interpreting the
statute in this way would result in “absurd consequences.” (Fox,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) Fox explained that there was
no danger that a defendant would plead to a stipulated sentence
and then assert his or her right to a jury trial on aggravating
circumstances—section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) permitted the
defendant to stipulate to the aggravating circumstances obviating
the need for trial. (Ibid.) Fox rejected the argument that the
defendant implicitly agreed to the existence of aggravating
factors by agreeing to the upper term; the defendant could not
have agreed to the requirements for imposition of the upper term
before they existed. (Id. at p. 835.)

                                15
       We join Todd and Fox in holding that the amendments to
section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) apply to stipulated
plea agreements, for the reasons set forth in those cases.
Moreover, in turning to the words of the statute to divine
legislative intent, we note that the plain language of subdivision
(b)(1) does not limit its applicability to situations in which the
trial court exercises its discretion to select a term—the statute
applies “[w]hen a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and
the statute specifies three possible terms.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1),
italics added.) The trial court does not select a sentence where
the parties have negotiated a plea to a fixed term, but the trial
court imposes the sentence “in its sound discretion” in every case
where a disposition is made by negotiated plea. (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(1)). As our Supreme Court has stated, “ ‘a plea agreement
does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion.’ ”
(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 973.) Although the court
lacks discretion to unilaterally modify the terms of a plea
bargain, it is “the ultimate arbiter,” tasked with evaluating the
fairness of the bargain. (Id. at p. 970.) No plea bargain may go
forward without judicial approval. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 705.) The “sound discretion” referenced in section 1170,
subdivision (b)(1) is broad enough to encompass the discretion a
court exercises when it determines whether to approve a plea
agreement or withdraw approval of a plea it has accepted at
sentencing.
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) also employs the word
“impose” rather than “select” (or some equivalent) when
describing the circumstances under which a sentence greater
than the middle term may be imposed: “The court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when . . . .” (§ 1170,

                                16
subd. (b)(2), italics added.) This interpretation of subdivisions
(b)(1) and (b)(2) is consistent with section 1192.5, pursuant to
which “the trial court is obligated to determine whether there is a
factual basis for a plea of guilty or no contest when that plea
arises from a negotiated resolution of the charges.” (People v.
Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 571; see also People v.
Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1182.) “Although not
constitutionally required [citation], such an inquiry furthers
constitutional considerations attending a guilty plea [citation],
protects against the entry of a guilty plea by an innocent
defendant, and makes a record in the event of appellate or
collateral attacks on that plea.” (People v. Marlin, at p. 571.)
       Even assuming the language of section 1170, subdivision
(b) is amenable to more than one interpretation, the purposes
behind the enactment of Senate Bill 567 lend further support
that it applies to negotiated plea agreements. The Legislature
codified the goals behind the amendments in section 1170,
subdivision (a): “The Legislature finds and declares that the
purpose of sentencing is public safety achieved through
punishment, rehabilitation, and restorative justice. When a
sentence includes incarceration, this purpose is best served by
terms that are proportionate to the seriousness of the offense
with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders
committing the same offense under similar circumstances.” We
can discern no reason that uniformity and proportionality in
sentencing is any less important when sentencing a defendant
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to achieving these
legislative goals than sentencing any other defendant
proportionally and uniformly is.

                                17
       Finally, the rationale behind Estrada supports application
of ameliorative legislation in as many contexts as possible.
Although Estrada is employed to determine whether a new law
was intended to be applied retroactively, the principles behind it
are relevant in other contexts as well: absent an indication to the
contrary, “ ‘ “a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative
changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible,
distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final
and sentences that are not.” ’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 699.) Under the rationale of Estrada, we construe the
Legislature’s intent as extending the benefits of section 1170,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) to all situations in which a court
exercises its discretion to impose a sentence within a sentencing
triad.

            Remand Under Stamps Is Appropriate

       Having determined that Senate Bill 567 applies to
negotiated plea agreements, we must now decide how it is to be
applied. When determining how to apply ameliorative legislation
to negotiated plea agreements we look to legislative intent to
determine whether the Legislature intended to (1) permit the
defendant to seek the benefit of the new legislation on remand
but allow the prosecution to withdraw from the plea agreement,
or (2) exercise its own authority to change the terms of the
existing plea bargain to afford the defendant the benefit of the
new legislation while leaving the balance of the agreement intact.
       In Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685, the Supreme Court
addressed how Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1393) should be applied to a stipulated plea

                                 18
agreement. (Id. at pp. 698–700.) Stamps pleaded to one count of
first degree burglary and admitted one serious felony conviction.
(Id. at p. 693.) His total sentence of nine years included a five-
year enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667, subdivision
(a). (Ibid.) Subsequent to Stamps’s sentencing, Senate Bill 1393
amended section 1385 to give trial courts discretion to strike an
enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a); a
court had no discretion to strike such an enhancement before the
law was amended. (Ibid.) Stamps appealed his sentence on the
ground that Senate Bill 1393 applied to his case retroactively.
(Ibid.)
       The Supreme Court held that Senate Bill 1393 constituted
an ameliorative change and that Stamps’s case was not yet final
for Estrada purposes. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 699.) With
respect to remedy, Stamps argued that his case must be
remanded to the trial court to permit it to decide whether to
strike the five-year enhancement, while otherwise leaving his
sentence intact. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) The
Supreme Court disagreed. The court explained that the trial
court lacked the discretion to unilaterally modify the terms of the
plea agreement by striking the enhancement while leaving the
remainder of the plea in place. (Id. at p. 701.) Although the
Legislature was vested with the power to grant trial courts that
discretion, the court concluded that it did not intend to do so
through the enactment of Senate Bill 1393. (Id. at p. 702
[Legislature’s “action did not operate to change well-settled law
that a court lacks discretion to modify a plea agreement unless
the parties agree to the modification”].)
       The Supreme Court distinguished Stamps’s case from
Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 (Harris). There,

                                19
the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion with respect
to Proposition 47, which “ ‘reduced certain nonviolent crimes,
including the grand theft from the person conviction in [Harris],
from felonies to misdemeanors.’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 702.) Proposition 47’s provisions specifically applied to
defendants “ ‘serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial
or plea,’ ” signaling that the electorate intended to extend relief to
all eligible defendants. (Id. at p. 703.) Harris reasoned that
“ ‘[t]he resentencing process that Proposition 47 established
would often prove meaningless if the prosecution could respond to
a successful resentencing petition by withdrawing from an
underlying plea agreement and reinstating the original charges
filed against the petitioner.’ [Citation.] In such cases, ‘ “the
financial and social benefits of Proposition 47 would not be
realized, and the voters’ intent and expectations would be
frustrated.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Harris concluded that, through Proposition
47, the electorate exercised its authority to “bind the People to a
unilateral change in a sentence without affording them the option
to rescind the plea agreement.” (Ibid.)
       Stamps then discussed how Harris had distinguished the
circumstances before it from People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d
208 (Collins). (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 703.) In that case,
the Legislature decriminalized the offense to which the defendant
had pleaded. (Ibid.) Collins observed that if the defendant could
no longer be convicted (other counts were dismissed per the plea
bargain) and was no longer vulnerable to imprisonment, the state
would be “ ‘substantially deprived of the benefits for which it
agreed to enter the bargain.’ ” (Ibid.) Collins concluded such a
result was “ ‘bounty in excess of that to which [the defendant] is
entitled’ ” that “destroys a fundamental assumption underlying

                                 20
the plea bargain.” (Id. at pp. 703–704.) Collins invalidated the
plea agreement, but held that the People were entitled to
reinstate any counts dismissed as a consequence of the bargain.
(Ibid.)
       Stamps found the considerations in Harris inapplicable.
(Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 704.) The court concluded that
nothing in the language or history of Senate Bill 1393 suggested
that the Legislature intended to overturn the long-standing rule
that a trial court may not unilaterally modify the terms of a plea
agreement. (Ibid.) Moreover, allowing a trial court “to strike the
serious felony enhancement but otherwise retain the plea
bargain, would frustrate the Legislature’s intent to have section
1385 apply uniformly, regardless of the type of enhancement at
issue, by granting the court a power it would otherwise lack for
any other enhancement.” (Ibid.) Finally, the legislation neither
mentioned pleas nor provided a mechanism for relief in the case
of a plea agreement. (Ibid.)
       Stamps concluded that the defendant was entitled to some
benefit, however, and held that limited remand was appropriate
to permit him to seek the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to
strike the five-year section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement.
(Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.) If the trial court declined to
exercise its discretion on remand, the plea would stand. (Ibid.) If
the court indicated that it was inclined to exercise its discretion
and the People were unwilling to modify the plea to reflect the
five-year reduction in sentence, the People had the option of
withdrawing from the plea. (Ibid.) The court could also
withdraw its “ ‘near-plenary’ ” approval of the plea agreement.
(Id. at p. 708.) Stamps emphasized that it was the defendant’s

                                 21
choice to decide whether to seek relief, in light of the potential
consequences to the plea agreement. (Ibid.)
       After briefing was complete in the present case, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Prudholme, supra, 14
Cal.5th 961. We invited the parties to submit additional letter
briefing regarding the impact of Prudholme on this case, if any.
Both parties filed letter briefs in response. Haynes argued that
under Prudholme this court should permit him to seek the benefit
of Senate Bill 567 while leaving the remainder of the plea intact.
The People argued that Prudholme is inapplicable to this case.
       In Prudholme, the defendant pleaded to second degree
robbery, which is “a wobbler punishable by a prison term of 16,
24, or 36 months, or up to one year in the county jail,” in
exchange for dismissal of one count of second degree robbery.
(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 964, fn. omitted.) The parties
agreed to three years of probation with the condition that
Prudholme would serve one year in county jail, which he had
already done. (Ibid.) Prudholme appealed. While the appeal
was pending the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950), effective January 1,
2021. (Ibid.) Prudholme argued that he was entitled to
retroactive application of the new legislation, which amended
section 1203.1 to reduce the maximum probation for most
felonies, including second degree burglary, to two years. (Ibid.)
Prudholme argued, as Stamps had, that he was entitled to the
benefit of the new legislation while leaving the remainder of his
plea agreement intact. (Ibid.)
       The Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature
intended in enacting assembly Bill 1950 to exercise its own
authority to change the terms of existing plea bargains to afford

                               22
defendants the benefit of the new legislation while leaving the
balance of the agreement intact. (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 979.) The court reasoned: “The legislative history of
Assembly Bill 1950 reflects a determination by the Legislature
that a shorter period of probation would more effectively achieve
the rehabilitative goals undergirding probation by concentrating
services earlier in the probation cycle when they are predicted to
be most effective.” (Id. at p. 976.) Assembly Bill 1950 “did not
reduce the punishment for any particular offense or
enhancement. Instead, it reduced the maximum allowable
probation term for a wide range of offenses.” (Id. at p. 979.) The
Legislature had rejected “a case-by-case approach” thereby
“signal[ling] its view that, for an eligible defendant, a shorter
period of probation generally serves the public’s interests,
regardless of how a conviction was secured.” (Id. at p. 977.) The
court observed that if the prosecution determined that two years
of probation was insufficient, its “only recourse would be to
require a plea to a more serious offense, making Assembly Bill
1950’s two-year probation limit inapplicable, or to seek a prison
term. . . . [Doing so] would transform plea bargains for
probationary terms into dispositions calling for admission of a
more serious offense or a state prison sentence,” thwarting the
purpose of the legislation. (Id.at pp. 977–978.) “Reducing
[Prudholme]’s probationary term from three to two years here
would not so ‘fundamentally alter[ ] the character of the bargain’
that the People should have an opportunity to withdraw from the
plea agreement.” (Id. at p. 978.) The court observed that
Prudholme had already served his jail sentence and would serve
a probation period, though of shorter duration. (Ibid.) “Under
these circumstances . . . neither the mandates of section 1192.5

                                23
nor the Stamps remand procedure should apply. The proper
remedy here is to modify the judgment to reflect the new
probationary term of two years.” (Id. at p. 979.)
       Haynes contends that under the reasoning in Prudholme,
this court must direct the trial court to resentence him to the
default midterm sentence for attempted pandering (two years)
under section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) without
allowing the prosecution the opportunity to withdraw from the
plea agreement. Haynes argues that the Legislature’s goal of
mitigating the effects of mass incarceration applies in all cases;
permitting the prosecution to withdraw from fixed plea
agreements would undermine that goal. Haynes further asserts
that directing the trial court to sentence him to the default
midterm sentence would not fundamentally alter the character of
the bargain. Haynes would still be subject to a custodial term
and the legislative aim of aligning sentencing with the goals of
equity, justice, and rehabilitation would be fulfilled.
       We agree with the People that that the limited remand
described in Stamps and applied in Fox and Todd is the
appropriate remedy. Haynes’s argument ignores that Senate Bill
567 does not mandate imposition of the midterm in all cases. In
cases where aggravating circumstances exist and can be proved
in compliance with the statutory standards, imposition of the
upper term sentence is still appropriate. Some defendants who
pleaded to the upper term will be entitled to the benefits of
Senate Bill 567, but in other cases, the court may readily
determine that the upper term is justified by the defendant’s
admissions or prior convictions. Directing the trial court to
impose a default midterm sentence where aggravating
circumstances are present and adequately proven would thwart

                                24
the goal of proportional, uniform sentencing. Under these
circumstances, the trial court need only state the aggravating
circumstances justifying imposition of the upper term for the
record, and the plea will stand.
       In circumstances where it cannot be readily determined
whether aggravating circumstances exist and can be adequately
proven, it will still be the case that the upper term is justified in
a particular defendant’s case. Sentencing these defendants to the
midterm without the opportunity for further inquiry would
thwart the legislative purpose of Senate Bill 567 as well.
Additionally, even where aggravating circumstances do not exist,
simply resentencing defendants to the midterm would so
“ ‘fundamentally alter[ ] the character of the bargain’ ” that the
People should be permitted to withdraw from the plea agreement.
(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 978.) The effect of Assembly
Bill 1950 was to reduce the probation period for all defendants
convicted of certain crimes to two years. The Supreme Court
emphasized that although there were certain aspects of probation
that imposed burdens on defendants, probation is not
traditionally considered punishment. (Id. at pp. 978.) The court
determined that it did not fundamentally alter the bargain to
reduce Prudholme’s probation period in part because he had
served the full term of imprisonment that he agreed to serve
under the plea bargain. (Id. at p. 979.) Remand under Senate
Bill 567, on the other hand, could result in the reduction of a
defendant’s term of incarceration. As our colleagues in the Court
of Appeal, First District, Division One have stated, the
“amendment of section 1170(b) to make the middle term the
presumptive term unless aggravating circumstances are proven
is a significant legal change” that could impact the fairness of the

                                 25
plea bargain. (Fox, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) This is true
with respect to both parties. In this case, Haynes’s term of
imprisonment would be reduced by one third, which is a
significant change in the bargain that would “ ‘fundamentally
alter’ ” the agreement. (Prudholme, at p. 978.) Accordingly, the
People are entitled to the option of withdrawing from the plea
agreement if the agreement cannot stand.
       As in Stamps, in light of the potential consequences to the
plea, on remand Haynes may decide whether to seek relief under
section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2). If Haynes seeks
relief, the trial court must determine whether the upper term can
be imposed in compliance with section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1)
and (b)(2). If the upper term can lawfully be imposed, the trial
court must state the aggravating circumstances supporting the
upper term on the record, and the plea will stand. If the upper
term cannot be lawfully imposed, and the parties are unable to
reach a modified agreement that the trial court approves, the
trial court must withdraw its approval of the plea.

                               26
                        DISPOSITION

      The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        MOOR, J.

I concur:

            RUBIN, P. J.

                               27
The People v. Kyron Rena Haynes
B322383

BAKER, J., Concurring

       I join the majority’s analysis and resolution of defendant
and appellant Kyron Haynes’s (defendant’s) Penal Code section
1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B) contention. As to defendant’s Penal
Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) claim, however, that is an
issue our Supreme Court is set to resolve, and our opinions
resolving this appeal are unpublished. I accordingly believe it
suffices to state my agreement with the result and disposition in
People v. Fox (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 826 without need to join in
all the particulars of the majority’s Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b)(1) rationale.

                           BAKER, J.