Court Opinion

ID: 9760619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:05:22.705256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:14.916668
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Although a thoroughly considered opinion has been, heretofore delivered by this court sustaining-the respondent upon every material question, this court now reverses itself on motion for rehearing to the extent of holding-in favor of the petitioners on their claim, that they had perfected title under the-*919Texas ten-year limitations statute, Article 5510, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes.
The present opinion recognizes that the respondent is the owner of the land in controversy and would he entitled to recover the same hut for its conclusion that the hearsay testimony of Atkins, Paddock’s foreman, bridges the gap in the possession between January, 1942, and January, 1943, the date of the lease contract between Williamson and Paddock. This court’s former opinion, in which I concurred by written opinion, held:
“In view of the ‘floating’ break of one year in Beeler’s possession, the break of about three years between Beeler and Holt, and the break of slightly more than a year between Holt and Paddock, the trial court properly held as a matter of law that petitioners had failed to prove any ten consecutive years of adverse possession." (Emphasis added.)
The Court still adheres to its original view that Petitioners cannot rely upon the possession of Beeler, but begins the claimants’ ten-year possession with the Holt possession and the Paddock possession “when he [Paddock] moved his cattle into the pasture after Holt vacated.”
It is my position that the Atkins’ testimony does not fill in the break between Holt and Paddock referred to in the Court’s November, 1963, opinion. The Court neglects to note that Paddock had grazed his cattle on the land during the interim between the possession of Beeler and that of Holt. There is no evidence of privity of ■possession. The attribute of peaceable and .■adverse possession which is held by “different persons successively” is that “there ■must be- privity of estate between them.” Atkins testified that after Beeler left “we -started using, Paddock Ranch started using ■that.” “At that time LH 7 Ranch, Mark .-and Paddock used it.” When Atkins' was asked if “the Paddocks move(d) in shortly .after he (Beeler) left?” Atkins said “he • didn’t remember how long,” “not very long” .and Atkins said further “Paddock used it between Beeler and Holt.” The land was fenced then. The fence would turn cattle. This is the extent of Atkins’ testimony about the “adverse possession” of Williamson for the years 1936, 1937 and the early part of 1938. Holt left, and apparently gave up the premises, in January, 1942. Sometime before April 13, 1942, according to Atkins, Paddock instructed his foreman, Atkins, to begin using the Williamson pasture. Paddock also stated to the witness, Atkins, that it was his pasture after January 10, 1942; that he, Paddock, had subleased from Holt for the remainder of that year, and that after 1942 he would lease it from Williamson. This is not evidence of a tenancy relationship between Williamson and Paddock. This testimony fails to establish that the Petitioners have discharged their burden of showing affirmatively the facts with reference to their use of the land during the year, 1942. See Bowles v. Watson, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W. 120, 121, no wr. hist.; Mhoon v. Cain, 77 Tex. 316, 14 S.W. 24 (1890); Orsborn v. Deep Rock, 153 Tex. 281, 267 S.W.2d 781 (1954); Moore v. Wooten, Tex.Com.App., 280 S.W. 742 (1926); Id., Tex.Com.App., 283 S.W. 153; Urschel v. Garcia, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 804 (1942), er. ref., w. o. m. This last case was cited with approval by this court in the Orsborn v. Deep Rock case.
Aside from the danger of allowing a witness to testify as to what his deceased former employer said, Atkins’ testimony is not sufficient to support the Williamson claim of limitation by exclusive and adverse possession. The Urschel case reveals that it was a case such as we have here where the claimant’s witness testimony was a pure conclusion of law, and amounted to no evidence of any of the facts of possession. In the Urschel case, the Court said in part:
“In the first place, some gaps in ap-pellee’s possession were sought to be bridged by appellee’s statement that he, ror others for him, ‘took possession,’ ‘went into possession,’ ‘was in possession,’ and the like. Those statements *920were pure conclusions of law on the part of the plaintiff-witness, and constituted no evidence of possession. 2 Tex.Jur. p. 74, § 38.
“Other gaps in possession were sought to he filled by appellee by testifying that between occupation by lessees he ‘had a man’ there in the pasture to ‘keep up the fences’ around the enclosure. There was no evidence that appellee was cultivating or otherwise actually using the land in the enclosure. It is well settled that the mere maintenance of fences around or other improvements on land, unaccompanied by actual occupancy or open use, does not constitute such adverse possession as will support a claim of title by limitation ; a constructive possession alone is not sufficient. 2 Tex.Jur. p. 82, § 43; Niday v. Cochran, 42 Tex.Civ.App. 292, 93 S.W.1027, writ refused.
* * * ' * * *
“We are of the opinion that this testimony, consisting almost entirely of conclusions of law and generalities of fact, falls far short of that clear and satisfactory proof essential to a showing of such peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession and use of land as will support a limitation title under the statute. Art. 5510, R.S.1925; 2 Tex.Jur. p. 74, § 38, p. 82, § 43; Moore v. Wooten, Tex.Com.App., 280 S.W. 742; Id., Tex.Com.App., 283 S.W. 153; Murphy v. Welder, 58 Tex. 235; West Production Co. v. Kahanek, 132 Tex. 153, 121 S.W.2d 328; Gibbs v. Corbett, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W. 260; Niday v. Cochran, 42 Tex.Civ.App. 292, 93 S.W. 1027. * * * ”
There is no competent evidence that Paddock held under Williamson prior to 1943.
Furthermore, I am of the opinion that the possession of tenants, extending beyond the terms of the written tenant leases, does not inure to the benefit of the Williamsons.
Petitioners cannot recover under the ten-year statute of limitations even though it was established by the evidence that the possession of the tenants Beeler, Plolt and Paddock was for a continuous ten-year period. This for the reason that these tenants went into possession under a written lease agreement which does not describe or include the land in controversy. The testimony shows that possession throughout was no different in character than when it began.
When an owner of land claims under the statutes of limitation by virtue of the possession of a tenant (the situation here) he is deemed to have possession only of that land of which, as between him and his tenant, the latter has lawful possession under the terms of the lease contract. In this case, the Beeler lease for the year 1934, specifically described only Section 55, the exact description being:
“All that certain tract or parcel of land lying and being situated in Harris County, Texas, and known and described as 605.086 acres out of Section 55, Block 3, H. & T. C. R. R. Co. Survey, Patent 360, Volume 106, Certificate No. 28/2069.”
Although only one lease was introduced, it is clear from Beeler’s testimony that he held the land under a written lease. I conclude that his occupancy of the land each and every year was by virtue of the written lease agreement. The tenants in this case held under restrictive leases. Possession of these tenants of the land in controversy, extending as it did beyond the terms of the written leases, did not inure to the benefit of the Williamsons. See 1 Tex.Jur. Ten Year Supp., p. 178, Adverse Possession, Sec. 41a; Williams v. Fuerstenberg, Tex.Com.App., 23 S.W.2d 305; Niendorff v. Wood, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 161, wr. ref.; Brownlee v. Landers, Tex.Civ.App., 166 S.W.2d 734.