Court Opinion

ID: 9378423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 15:04:42.37713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.090074
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2021-CA-0775-MR

CANDY ROGERS, AS MOTHER
AND NEXT FRIEND OF ZACHARY
ROGERS                                                            APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 17-CI-000232

JULIE WILLIAMS                                                      APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Candy Rogers, as Mother and Next Friend of Zachary Rogers,

brings this appeal from a June 8, 2021, Memorandum and Order of the Jefferson

Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of Julie Williams and

dismissing the claims against her. We affirm.
                                  BACKGROUND

             The underlying relevant facts are as follows:

                    In the fall of 2016, [Zachary] was a seventh grader
             at Frederick Law Olmsted Academy North (“Olmsted”),
             an all-boys middle school in the Jefferson County Public
             School System (“JCPS”). On the morning of December
             16, 2016, between 11:20 and 11:50, [Zachary] and
             several other students were eating lunch in the cafeteria.

                    Williams, the seventh-grade counselor, was one of
             three employees supervising the students in the
             cafeteria. She was at one end of the cafeteria facing the
             students and directly in front of [Zachary]. The other two
             supervisors, the assistant principal and security guard,
             were at the other end of the cafeteria, also facing the
             students. Williams was walking around the cafeteria.
             For a short period of time, she was sitting in front of the
             table where [Zachary], K.T., and another boy sat. The
             boys were being rambunctious. Williams told them to
             stop “clowning around.” After a few minutes, she got up
             to walk to another part of the cafeteria. Within seconds,
             a fight broke out between [Zachary] and K.T. The
             assistant principal and security guard rushed over and
             broke up the fight, separating the boys. Immediately,
             [Zachary] went to the office, utilized an ice pack, and
             waited for his mother to pick him up. . . .

Williams v. Rogers, as Mother and Next Friend of Z.R., No. 2017-CA-001945-MR,

2019 WL 2157576, at *1-2 (Ky. App. May 17, 2019) (footnotes omitted). Zachary

was subsequently taken to Norton Children’s Hospital where it was determined

that he suffered multiple fractures to his face.

             On January 12, 2017, Candy Rogers, as Mother and Next Friend of

Zachary Rogers, filed a complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court (Action No. 17-CI-

                                          -2-
000232) against, inter alios, the school principal, the assistant principal, and

Williams. Relevant to this appeal, Rogers asserted claims against the three

defendants for negligence and negligent supervision. The principal, the assistant

principal, and Williams filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that

qualified official immunity barred Rogers’ claims. The circuit court ultimately

granted partial summary judgment dismissing the claims against the principal and

the assistant principal; however, the court denied summary judgment as to

Williams.

             In denying summary judgment as to Williams, the circuit court

determined that Williams was performing a ministerial act while supervising the

students; thus, she was not entitled to qualified official immunity. Williams

pursued a direct appeal to this Court (Appeal No. 2017-CA-001945-MR) from the

circuit court’s interlocutory order denying her motion for summary judgment. This

Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying summary judgment as to Williams.

The Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

             As Williams was not entitled to qualified official immunity, Williams

and Rogers then engaged in additional discovery regarding Rogers’ claims for

negligence and negligent supervision. Williams subsequently filed another motion

for summary judgment claiming she did not breach any duty owed to Zachary and

that the altercation between Zachary and K.T. was not reasonably foreseeable.

                                          -3-
             By Memorandum and Order entered June 8, 2021, the circuit court

granted summary judgment in favor of Williams on the claims for negligence and

negligent supervision. The circuit court held that Zachary’s “injuries were not

foreseeable and there is no causal link between any action or omission on the part

of Williams and [Zachary’s] claimed injuries. Accordingly, Williams cannot be

held liable for [Zachary’s] injuries as a matter of law.” June 8, 2021,

Memorandum and Order at 11. Rogers’ claims against Williams were dismissed

with prejudice. This appeal follows.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Our standard of review upon appeal of a summary judgment is

“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any

material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citing Kentucky

Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03). Upon a motion for summary judgment, all

facts and inferences in the record are viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and “all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citation omitted). As

if there are no factual issues, a summary judgment looks only to questions of law

and we review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Brown

v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. App. 2016); see also Blackstone Mining Co.

                                         -4-
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2010), as modified on denial of

reh’g (Nov. 23, 2011).

             Rogers contends the circuit court erred by granting summary

judgment in favor of Williams. More particularly, Rogers contends the circuit

court erred by determining that Williams owed no duty of care to Zachary as the

altercation between Zachary and K.T. was not foreseeable. In other words, Rogers

asserts the circuit court failed to address genuine issues of material fact that were

germane “to the issue of foreseeability of harm as an element of the duty of care in

Rogers’ negligence and negligent supervision claim(s)[.]” Rogers’ Brief at 19.

Our review proceeds accordingly.

                                     ANALYSIS

             It is well established that in order to prevail upon a claim of

negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a legally-cognizable duty, (2) a

breach of that duty, (3) causation linking the breach to an injury, and (4) damages.”

Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 729 (Ky. 2016). And, although duty may be

established in various ways, ultimately the decisive factor is foreseeability.

Boland-Maloney Lumber Co., Inc. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Ky. App.

2009) (citation omitted); see also Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 89

(Ky. 2003). And, whether a duty is owed is a question of law for the court to

                                          -5-
decide. Pathways, Inc., 113 S.W.3d at 89.1 It is equally well settled that a teacher

may be liable for injuries caused by his or her negligent supervision and must take

“all reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to its students.” Williams v. Ky.

Dep’t of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Ky. 2003). As Rogers’ claims of negligence

and negligent supervision hinge upon foreseeability, our focus shifts there.

              It has been said generally that every person “owes a duty to every

other person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable

injury.” Burnett, 302 S.W.3d at 686 (citation omitted). And, as this Court pointed

out in Burnett “[a]lthough foreseeability tends to be elusive in definition, perhaps

most famously, Judge Cardozo stated on the subject of duty that ‘[t]he risk

reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed[.]’” Id. at 686 (quoting

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)). As to

foreseeability in a negligent supervision claim, the court should only consider the

facts that the defendant “knew, or should have known, about before the incident at

issue.” Hugenberg v. W. Am. Ins. Co./Ohio Cas. Grp., 249 S.W.3d 174, 182 (Ky.

App. 2006).

1
 This Court is cognizant of the ruling in Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Society, 413 S.W.3d
901 (Ky. 2013) where the Supreme Court arguably moved any from analyzing foreseeability as a
matter of law under the duty prong of negligence, but rather under the breach prong. However,
Shelton, 413 S.W.3d 901, is a premises liability case that involved an analysis of open and
obvious risks, and to date is limited in application to premises actions of alleged negligence
against landowners and landlords. Accordingly, we do not believe it is applicable to this case.

                                              -6-
             In the case sub judice, based on the record on appeal, we agree with

the circuit court that the altercation between Zachary and K.T. was not reasonably

foreseeable by Williams. It is undisputed that neither Zachary nor K.T. had ever

been involved in any incidents at school that would put Williams on notice of a

potential physical altercation. Also, it is uncontroverted that neither Zachary nor

K.T. had ever been involved in a fight at school, had any history of disciplinary

issues, or had engaged in the sort of behavior that would put Williams on notice of

a possible physical altercation. There was certainly nothing in the record to

indicate that Williams knew or should have known that a physical altercation

might occur between Zachary and K.T. In the absence of foreseeability, there was

simply no duty upon Williams to anticipate the physical altercation that occurred.

As the undisputed facts reflect the altercation between Zachary and K.T. was not

reasonably foreseeable by Williams, we believe the circuit court properly granted

summary judgment in favor of Williams and dismissed Rogers’ claims for

negligence and negligent supervision against Williams.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Memorandum and Order of the

Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Andrew E. Mize           Mark S. Fenzel
Louisville, Kentucky     Matthew P. Dearmond
                         Louisville, Kentucky

                        -8-