Court Opinion

ID: 9653221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:41:31.573521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:48.004611
License: Public Domain

CALVERT, Chief Justice.
This appeal arises out of a special proceeding, filed pursuant to authority conferred by Article 5929, to change the name of a minor. The application was filed by William C. King, III, acting by and through his mother, Jan T. Newman, who was joined in the proceeding by her husband, Harry E. Newman. The application sought a change of the minor’s name to John Tracy Newman. The minor’s natural father, William C. King, Jr., intervened in the proceeding and contested the application. In a trial before the court, sitting without a jury, judgment was entered changing the minor’s name from William C. King, III, to John Tracy Newman, and adjudicating certain other matters not involved on appeal. William C. King, Jr. appealed. The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial. 421 S.W.2d 149. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment because of the failure of that court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor in the hearing on the application. No complaint was made of the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem by either of the contending parents in either the trial court or the court of civil appeals. The right of an appellate court to reverse a trial court judgment on unassigned error is limited to situations in which the error can properly be classified as “fundamental error.” Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947). The first question to be decided then is whether failure of a trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a minor in a change-of-name proceeding is fundamental error.
Art. 5929, Vernon’s Tex.Civ.Stats., provides :
“Whenever it shall be to the interest of any minor to change his name, the guardian or next friend of said minor shall file his application in the district court of the county of said minor’s residence, alleging the reason for the change and giving the full name which the minor wishes to adopt. The judge of said court, if the facts alleged and proven satisfy him that such change will be for the benefit and interest of the minor shall grant authority to change his original name and adopt another.”
Rule 44, in so far as is relevant, provides: “Minors * * * who have no legal guardian may sue and be represented by ‘next friend’ under the following rules: (1) Such next friend shall have the same rights concerning such suits as guardians have * * 1 Rule 173 provides :
“When a minor * * * may be a defendant to a suit and has no guardian within this State, or * * * is a party to a suit either as plaintiff, defendant or intervenor and is represented by a next friend or a guardian who appears to the court to have an interest adverse to such minor * * *, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for such person * * * 9>
 Under the quoted provisions of Art. 5929 and Rules 44 and 173, a change of name application may be filed on behalf of a minor by “next friend,” who has all the rights concerning the proceeding that a guardian would have; and displacement of the next friend with a court appointed guardian ad litem, although mandatory when authorized, is authorized only when it “appears to the court” that the next friend has an interest “adverse to the minor.” While caution would dictate the displace*422ment in every legal proceeding in which the pleadings or the evidence indicate a reasonable possibility of adverse interest, an error in judgment by the trial judge in deciding the preliminary issue of adverse interest and in failing or refusing to make the displacement does not differ in ultimate effect from errors in judgment which a trial judge may make in deciding many other questions during the course of a trial. While the two opinions in Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947), do not purport to particularize every error which will be regarded as fundamental, they do lay down general rules which we have recognized and followed in determining whether a judgment will be reversed on unassigned error. Error which directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally was specifically held to be fundamental in Ramsey v. Dunlop. Error in assuming jurisdiction where none exists was held to be fundamental in McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957). On the other hand, errors occurring in the trial process have been consistently held not to be fundamental. See State v. Sunland Supply Co., Tex.Sup., 404 S.W.2d 316 (1966); Kimbrough v. Walling, Tex.Sup., 371 S.W.2d 691 (1963); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (1962); Wagner v. Foster, 161 Tex. 333, 341 S.W.2d 887 (1960); Texas Co. v. State, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83 (1955); City of Deer Park v. State, 154 Tex. 174, 275 S.W.2d 77 (1955) ; Worden v. Worden, 148 Tex. 356, 224 S.W.2d 187 (1949). Error in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor plaintiff who is represented by a regular guardian or next friend affects the rights of only the particular minor and the particular litigants; it does not adversely affect the interest of the public generally. Neither does it deprive the court of jurisdiction, once obtained, to proceed to judgment in the case. We hold, therefore, that the court of civil appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment because of failure of that court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the applicant, William T. King, III.
The only case cited by the court of civil appeals which bears a close relationship to the problem of fundamental error is Cooper v. Liverman, 406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1966, no writ). Reversal of the trial court’s judgment in that case because of failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was based upon a proper assignment of error. In this case no such point of error was presented to the court of civil appeals.
We granted writ of error in this case primarily to consider and decide the question of fundamental error. William T. King, Jr., as appellant, had five points of error before the court of civil appeals. All of the points raise questions of law which this court has jurisdiction to decide.
Two of the points of error assert that the judgment of the trial court deprives the appellant and his child of a property right in the name of William T. King, III, without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and § 19, Art. 1 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.St. There was no denial of procedural due process in this case as there was in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965), an adoption case. In this case the father had notice of the hearing on the application and participated fully therein. The contention seems primarily to be that there are constitutional prohibitions against taking the name of a natural father away from his child unless the father’s conduct has been such as to forfeit his right to have his child bear it. We know of no cases so holding and have been cited to none. In Matter of Thomas, 404 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1966), the Supreme Court of Missouri held, contrary to an appellant’s contention, that a judgment of a trial court changing the surname of the appellant’s son did not constitute a denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Consti*423tution of Missouri. In the instant case the trial court ordered the child’s name changed upon express findings that the change was in the best interest of the child. We hold that the judgment does not violate constitutional rights of either the father or the child.
The other three points of error assert, in one form or another, that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the child’s name changed. Argument under these points presents two basic reasons for contending that the trial court’s action represents an abuse of discretion, viz.: (1) the evidence does not show that the right to have the child bear his natural father’s name had been forfeited by misconduct or unfitness on the part of the father, and (2) certain conduct on the part of the mother and stepfather establishes that the change of name is not in the child’s best interest.
Aside from his argument relating to constitutional rights, the father does not question that the basic consideration in a proceeding of this character is the best interest of the child. It is made so by the provisions of Art. 5929, and it would be so in any event in the absence of a restraining statute. The courts have generally recognized that a protesting father has a protectible interest in having his child bear his surname, and they will exercise the power to change the name reluctantly and only where the substantial welfare of the child requires the change. See 53 A.L.R.2d 914.
The evidence in the record before us is reviewed in some detail in the opinion of the court of civil appeals and need not be set out here at length. The child was born on May 27, 1959. The mother and father of the child were divorced on May 22, 1961, when the child was only two years of age. Custody was awarded to the mother. The father was given visitation rights and was required to make monthly support payments, an obligation he has faithfully discharged. The mother married Harry E. Newman on August 22, 1961, and the child has lived in their home at all times since that date. He was nearly seven years old at the time of trial. A daughter was born to the Newmans on June 21, 1962, and a son was bom to them on November 7, 1963. The trial court found that the only name the child has ever called himself since he learned to talk is John Tracy Newman, and he is so called by the Newmans, his half-brother and half-sister, his playmates, his school teachers, his Sunday school teachers, and all other people with whom he has come into contact; the child has always referred to Harry E. Newman as his father; there exists a warm and loving relationship between the child and his mother, stepfather, half-brother and half-sister, as well as with the parents of the stepfather; it would be humiliating, embarrassing, confusing, and, in reasonable probability, disruptive in his home life as well as his associations for him to go by one name when all the members of his immediate family go by another name; and that “the impact of now calling him William C. King, III, instead of the only name he has been called practically all of his life, to wit: John Tracy Newman, might, in all reasonable medical probability, have a detrimental effect on his personality as he grows older.” These findings are not attacked on appeal as having no support in the evidence. See Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 312 S.W.2d 943, at 948 (1958). Finally, the trial court found and concluded upon “full and satisfactory evidence” that the best interest of the child would be served by changing his name.
The trial court’s finding that failure to change the child’s name might have a detrimental effect on his personality as he grows older was based on the testimony of a doctor who had been the child’s pediatrician since his birth and the testimony of a child psychologist. The pediatrician testified that there is “quite a bit of emotional trauma to a child when he suddenly finds out * * * that he doesn’t have the same name as the family. * * * ” The child psychologist testified that he thought it “psychologically * * * possible and *424probable that there will be some impairment to the child if his name is changed [back to William C. King, III].”
Fully appreciating the wish of a father that his son continue to bear his name, we nevertheless cannot hold on the record before us that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the name change in this case. With the trial court’s judgment supported by evidence which the trial judge found to be “full and satisfactory,” its exercise of discretion cannot be overthrown by the father’s deep-seated and understandable wish that his son continue to bear his name or by the fact that he has been guilty of no misconduct which would bring the name into disgrace or disfavor. Neither, we add, should it be overthrown by the fact that the mother had the child baptised in the name of John Tracy Newman in 1963 and registered him in school in that name in 1964, 1965 and 1966 when his legal name was William T. King, III, and on each occasion gave the name of his father as Harry E. Newman. These were but some of the facts and circumstances to be considered by the trial judge in deciding whether the best interest of the child required that his name be changed.
The judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SMITH, J., notes his dissent.
DISSENTING OPINION

. All references to Rules are to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.