Court Opinion

ID: 9907243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 23:23:26.14571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:54.681125
License: Public Domain

12/05/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                                October 25, 2023 Session

               STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LORI ANNE PIERCE

                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Bradley County
                  No. 20-CR-264      Sandra N.C. Donaghy, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                           No. E2023-00163-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

A Bradley County jury found Defendant, Lori Anne Pierce, guilty of possession of
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony (Count 1); possession
of alprazolam with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony (Count 2); possession of
clonazepam with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony (Count 3); and attempted
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to deliver, a Class A misdemeanor
(Count 4). On appeal, Defendant challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to prove
that she constructively possessed the contraband on all four counts. Defendant also
challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to prove intent to sell or deliver on all
counts. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction
of the judgment forms to indicate Defendant’s proper offender status and release eligibility.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed;
                                 Case Remanded

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.
HOLLOWAY, JR., and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Brennan M. Wingerter, Assistant Public Defender, Appellate Director (on appeal); and
Donald Leon Shahan, Jr., District Public Defender (at trial), for the appellant, Lori Anne
Pierce.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Stephen D. Crump, District Attorney General; and April D. Romeo,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
                                               OPINION

                                  I. Factual and Procedural History

        On February 3, 2020, agents of the 10th Judicial District Drug Task Force executed
a search warrant at a residence they had been surveilling “for a bit” at 3434 Buchanan Road
in Cleveland, Tennessee. Defendant lived at the residence, a mobile home, with her
husband, David Pierce, who owned the residence. Agents were looking for Defendant, but
she was not present during the search. Mr. Pierce was present, along with three other
individuals: Andrea Andrews, Jamar Scott, and an unknown male. Agents did not arrest
anyone that day, but after the search, they presented the case to the Bradley County Grand
Jury, which returned an indictment against Defendant, charging her with possession of
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of alprazolam with the intent
to sell or deliver, possession of clonazepam with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession
of drug paraphernalia with intent to deliver.

        During the search, agents found drug contraband inside a single bedroom. Agents
found a butane torch, a used glass smoking pipe typically used to smoke methamphetamine,
a prescription bottle, and a pill bottle containing Xanax, the brand name for alprazolam, on
a nightstand to the left of the bed. Agent Brandon Coffel testified that agents found
clonazepam and a bottle of Xanax on the left nightstand. On the right nightstand, agents
found two pill bottles filled with Xanax. Agent Coffel found it easy to identify the pills as
Xanax due to his training and experience, and Agent Dominick Kienlen identified the
Xanax as “totem poles.” One of the bottles was prescribed to an “Amber Bankston,” who
was not present at the residence. There were sandwich bags inside the right nightstand
with one inside the pill bottle. Agent Coffel testified that drug users typically do not have
bags inside their pill bottles. Detective Dave Jones found three glass pipes inside the room.
Agents also found a zipper pouch full of unused syringes. Agent Coffel testified that users
“typically” either smoked or injected their drugs, and it was rare for a single user to ingest
drugs by both methods. When Agent Coffel was asked whether, in his training and
experience, “sellers ever sell the mechanism by which to take the drug and needle with
their product,” he replied, “Yeah, it happens.”

       Agents also found a pack of cigarettes, a bowl with a spoon in it, one bag of
methamphetamine, Defendant’s cellphone, digital scales, and clean corner baggies under
the bed covers. On top of the covers, agents found an additional bag of methamphetamine
and one Oreo cookie bag. The two bags of methamphetamine were packaged as “eight
balls ready to . . . sell.”1 Detective Jones testified that dealers use digital scales to

       1
           According to Agent Coffel, an “eight ball” is 3.5 grams of any drug.
                                                    -2-
accurately measure and split drugs into smaller amounts, and typically users do not possess
or use them.

       Additionally, agents found a box of plastic sandwich bags by the bed in Defendant’s
bedroom. Agent Kienlen explained that while keeping sandwich bags by one’s bed seemed
“uncommon,” such a practice was “common for drug dealers.” Agent Kienlen and
Detective Jones both testified that drug dealers could obtain “corner baggies” from plastic
sandwich bags; a drug dealer would cut the corners from the plastic sandwich bag and use
the resulting, smaller “corner bags” to package drugs for resale.

       The bedroom where the contraband was found contained multiple indicators that it
was Defendant’s: a picture on the wall with Defendant’s name, “Lori Pierce,” on it,
numerous self-care products made for women, a picture of one of Defendant’s boyfriends,
notes addressed to Defendant, Defendant’s cellphone, a receipt for “Rent” from “Lori,”
and Defendant’s purse. In the purse, agents found Defendant’s driver’s license (with the
3434 Buchanan Road address), her Social Security card, an EBT card bearing Defendant’s
name, and a credit card which also bore Defendant’s name. The driver’s license was issued
October 1, 2019, approximately four months before the search. Nothing in the record
indicates that similar items bearing others’ names or information were found in the
bedroom.

       Within the bedroom, agents also located $139. The State offered proof that this
amount was comparable to the price of an eight ball of methamphetamine. On the floor,
agents also found a magnetic “stash box” which the agents explained dealers use to store
and hide illegal contraband. There was a security camera in the bedroom pointed toward
the door and two other surveillance cameras set up outside the residence. This camera
system was different than most home camera systems because it was not set up to record;
it could only provide a live feed. Detective Jones testified that drug dealers use live
surveillance feeds to alert them to law enforcement officers or to protect their contraband
from theft.

      The other bedroom at the residence had a Peyton Manning jersey and an Atlanta
Braves flag. A television had the names “Lori,” David,” and “Dave” on the login screen.

        Agent Kienlen testified that the Drug Task Force submitted the narcotics they found
at the residence to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Crime Lab. A TBI agent
determined the methamphetamine to be nine grams in total. Agent Hannah Peterson, a
special agent forensic scientist with the TBI and expert in chemical analysis of narcotics,
identified 6.53 grams of methamphetamine from Defendant’s residence. TBI policy is to
test narcotics to the “nearest weight threshold” so Agent Peterson did not test an additional
amount of suspected methamphetamine found in a corner baggie because it would not reach
                                            -3-
the next weight threshold. Agent Peterson identified four green tablets as clonazepam, a
Schedule IV drug. Alprazolam (Xanax) is also a Schedule IV drug.

        Detective Jones testified that while it was not uncommon for a drug user to possess
3.5 grams of methamphetamine, nine grams indicates an intent to sell or deliver. According
to the detective, a typical dosage of methamphetamine is one-quarter gram with some users
able to build up a tolerance to one or one and a half gram(s) per day through multiple doses.
The nine grams found here, therefore, equates to thirty-six doses. Detective Jones also
testified because dealers can split pills into two or four pieces, dealers did not need to carry
large quantities of pills.

       Detective Monica Datz, an expert in crime scene investigation and latent print
examination, received sixteen fingerprints from the residence. Of those sixteen prints, only
four were potentially suitable for comparison. Three of those prints came from the
magnetic stash box, and the fourth came from the inside cover of the battery compartment
on the scales. Those prints were not matched to Defendant or any of the other individuals
who were present during the search. Detective Datz testified that it was possible the
unsuitable prints could have matched Defendant, but she could not testify with absolute
certainty whether Defendant touched any of the items.

        After the State rested its case, Defendant chose not to testify or present any evidence.
The jury convicted Defendant of Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment, as charged, and of
the lesser included offense of attempted unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia with
intent to deliver as to Count 4. The trial court sentenced Defendant to eight years as to
Count 1, two years as to Counts 2 and 3, and 11 months and 29 days as to Count 4. The
court imposed the sentences concurrently, and suspended the sentence to supervised
probation after service of 121 days in the county jail. Defendant filed a motion for new
trial, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal follows.

                                         II. Analysis

       Defendant argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to “prove the
statutory elements of ‘possession’ and ‘intent.’” The State argues that the evidence is
sufficient to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt for all counts.

                                   A. Standard of Review

      The standard of review for a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in
                                             -4-
original) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R. App. P.
13(e); State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011). “This standard of review is
identical whether the conviction is predicated on direct or circumstantial evidence, or a
combination of both.” State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tenn. 2018) (citing State
v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011)).

       A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with one of
guilt on appeal; therefore, the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove why the evidence
is insufficient to support the conviction. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing State v. Sisk,
343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)). On appeal, “we afford the prosecution the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which
may be drawn therefrom.” Id. at 729 (quoting State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn.
2010)); State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In a jury trial, questions
involving the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to evidence,
as well as all factual disputes raised by such evidence, are resolved by the jury as the trier
of fact. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d
405, 410 (Tenn. 1990). Therefore, we are precluded from re-weighing or reconsidering the
evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Stephens, 521 S.W.3d 718, 724
(Tenn. 2017).

        Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-434(a)(4), “it is an offense for a
defendant to knowingly . . . [p]ossess methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, deliver
or sell methamphetamine.” Similarly, it “is an offense for a defendant to knowingly . . .
[p]ossess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell the controlled
substance.” Id. § 39-17-417(a)(4). Alprazolam (Xanax) and clonazepam are Schedule IV
controlled substances. Id. § 39-17-412(c)(2), (11). As relevant to this case, it is also
unlawful for a person to “possess with intent to deliver” any “drug paraphernalia, knowing,
or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to . . .
process, prepare, test, . . . pack, repack, store, [or] contain . . . a controlled substance[.]”
Id. § 39-17-425(b)(1). As charged in the indictment here, the paraphernalia included
“digital scales, resale bags, and [three] glass pipes[.]” As charged to the jury, “A person
commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
the offense . . . [a]cts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and
believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the person’s part[.]”
Id. § 39-12-101(a)(2).

       In this case, Defendant does not challenge whether the substances contained 0.5
grams of methamphetamine or more, or that the substances were alprazolam and
clonazepam. Nor does Defendant challenge the discovery of drug paraphernalia inside the
residence. Thus, we only analyze the elements of possession and intent below.

                                             -5-
                                    1. Constructive Possession2

        For each of the charged offenses, the State was required to prove the element of
possession. Id. §§ 39-17-417, -425, -434. Defendant argues that the evidence was not
sufficient because she was not present during the search of her residence, other individuals
were present at her residence during the search, her fingerprints were not identified on any
of the contraband, she was not in possession or under the influence of any contraband when
she was later arrested, there was no physical or testimonial evidence linking her to the
contraband, and the State “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant] had
recently been at the residence.” The State argues that there was sufficient evidence for a
rational trier of fact to conclude that Defendant had constructive possession of the
contraband. We agree with the State.

       Tennessee courts have repeatedly held that “‘possession’ may be either actual or
constructive.” State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001) (first citing State v.
Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 444-45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); and then citing State v.
Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). There is no question that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that Defendant actually possessed the contraband; thus, we must
determine whether Defendant constructively possessed the contraband. For constructive
possession to exist, “there must be proof that the accused had ‘the power and intention at a
given time to exercise dominion and control over . . . [the contraband] either directly or
through others.’” State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tenn. 2013) (citations and
internal quotations omitted) (quoting Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903).

        Although the mere presence or association of an individual with a person or an area
where drugs are found is not enough to support a finding of constructive possession, id.
(first citing State v. Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); and then citing
State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)), “a person in possession
of the premises where controlled substances are found may also be presumed to possess
the controlled substances themselves.” State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 846 (Tenn. 2001)
(citing Armstrong v. State, 548 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)). A defendant
may also be found jointly and constructively in possession of contraband when the
defendant shares ownership or control over the premises where contraband is found. See
State v. Golden, No. W2005-02743-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2242212, at *4 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Aug. 4, 2006) (citing State v. Copeland, 677 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1984)). In sum, constructive possession rests on the totality of the circumstances of each

        2
          The facts and circumstances related to possession are identical for each count. As such, we will
address all counts together.

                                                  -6-
case and may be proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d at
534; Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379.

        Defendant argues because she was not at the residence while police searched it, and
because there is no temporal connection to show when she was last there, the evidence is
insufficient to convict her of possession. This is an argument regarding the weight of the
evidence and was for the jury to determine, which rejected it. Under our standard of
review, we are precluded from reweighing the evidence. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729. And
we are required to draw every reasonable inference in the State’s favor. Id. In doing so,
we look at the totality of the circumstances. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d at 534. Regardless,
there was a temporal connection between Defendant and the premises. Her cell phone, her
driver’s license, and her credit and EBT cards were there. Also, the pack of cigarettes and
food found on the bed in the room indicate her recent presence. A reasonable jury could
infer that Defendant had recently been in the room or intended to return.

       Defendant also argues that the State did not identify her fingerprints on the
contraband. Although true, many fingerprints were inconclusive and none of them were
linked to anyone else. Defendant also argues that there was no physical or testimonial
evidence linking her to the contraband. We agree there is no direct evidence of Defendant’s
possession. But as we discuss in this opinion, we respectfully disagree with Defendant’s
characterization of the facts that there was no physical evidence. There was physical
evidence, albeit circumstantial. The State also may use circumstantial proof, which alone
is enough to sustain a conviction. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379. Further, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State regardless of whether the conviction is
predicated on direct or circumstantial evidence. Williams, 558 S.W.3d at 638.

       Defendant argues this case is like State v. Jones, No. W2018-01421-CCA-R3-CD,
2020 WL 974197, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020), in which we found the
evidence insufficient to prove the defendant constructively possessed a gun and
contraband. In Jones, the gun and contraband were in a hotel room with the defendant and
another individual. Id. The police did not find any contraband on the defendant. Id. The
State did not present any proof as to who rented the room or possessed the key. Id. It also
did not present any proof related to how long the defendant had been in the room, how long
he intended to stay, or whether any of the effects in the room belonged to him. Id. The
defendant also possessed $118, but we found that amount insignificant in comparison to
the $400 the other individual in the room possessed. Id.

       Here, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence shows that Defendant did constructively possess the contraband. This case is
different than Jones, where the State failed to prove ownership of the hotel room where the
contraband was found, as the contraband here was found inside a bedroom at Defendant’s
                                           -7-
residence. This specific bedroom had multiple indicia from which a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude that the bedroom belonged to Defendant. The room had Defendant’s name
on the wall, a picture of one of her boyfriends, and notes addressed to Defendant. The
room also contained her personal effects, including her cellphone and purse—which
contained her driver’s license, Social Security card, credit card, an EBT card, and a receipt
for “Rent” from “Lori.” Defendant’s recently issued driver’s license bore the 3434
Buchanan address. And, no other personal effects of anyone else were located in the room.

        Tennessee courts have held that a defendant can be in possession of contraband even
if the defendant is not present where the contraband is located. Ross, 49 S.W.3d at 846
(concluding that the defendant constructively possessed contraband in a motel room,
registered in his name, that contained personal effects identifying the defendant, even
though defendant was not present during the search); State v. Brown, 823 S.W.2d 576,
578-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that the defendant constructively possessed
contraband found at a house next door to the garage where he worked because the
defendant had a key to the house and was observed going to and from the house, even
though he was in the garage during the search). We conclude that the evidence here was
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that Defendant possessed the premises where
the contraband was found, and thus she constructively possessed the contraband as well.
See Ross, 49 S.W.3d at 846 (citing Armstrong, 548 S.W.2d at 336). Defendant is not
entitled to relief on this issue.

                                 2. Intent to Sell or Deliver

        On each of the charged offenses, the State also was required to prove the element of
intent. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1), (e)(2); -425(b)(1), (b)(2); -434(a)(4),
(e)(1). As discussed below, Defendant makes several arguments that the evidence was not
sufficient to establish intent to sell or deliver. The State argues that any rational trier of
fact could have found Defendant intended to sell or deliver the drugs beyond a reasonable
doubt because Defendant possessed “digital scales, plastic corner baggies, and quantities
of drugs that indicated they were not solely for personal use.” We agree with the State.

        Under Tennessee law, it “may be inferred from the amount of a controlled substance
or substances possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the
arrest, that the controlled substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of
selling or otherwise dispensing.” Id. § 39-17-419. We have interpreted this language to
permit a “jury to draw an inference of intent to sell or deliver when the amount of the
controlled substance and other relevant facts surrounding the arrest are considered
together.” State v. Belew, 348 S.W.3d 186, 191 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (emphasis in
original). “Proof of intent usually consists of circumstantial evidence and the inferences
that can be reasonably drawn from that evidence.” Id. at 190 (first citing Hall v. State, 490
                                            -8-
S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn. 1973); and then citing State v. Benson, No. M2003-02127-CCA-
R3-CD, 2004 WL 2266801, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2004)).

        Tennessee courts, including our supreme court, have held that when a search yields
digital scales and plastic sandwich bags alongside a relatively large amount of contraband,
it “clearly demonstrate[s] that the defendant had an intent to sell the controlled substance.”
Ross, 49 S.W.3d at 845 (emphasis in original) (first citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419
(1997); and then citing State v. Chearis, 995 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)).
“Such ‘other relevant facts’ that can give rise to an inference of intent to sell or deliver
include the absence of drug paraphernalia, the presence of a large amount of cash, and the
packaging of the drugs.” State v. Pewitte, No. W2013-00962-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL
1233030, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2014). Indeed, in Belew, we explained that this
court has affirmed convictions where the amount of the controlled substance was greater
than .5 grams and there was other evidence that allowed the jury to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant had intent to sell or deliver. 348 S.W.3d at 191-92. In Chearis,
we concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s finding of intent to
deliver when the defendant possessed 1.7 grams of crack cocaine, no drug paraphernalia,
and 5.1 grams of baking soda. 995 S.W.2d at 645. In State v. Logan, 973 S.W.2d 279, 281
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), we found sufficient evidence of intent to sell to support a
conviction when the defendant possessed a large amount of cash and several small bags of
cocaine. In State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), we found
the absence of drug paraphernalia and the manner of packaging of drugs supported an
inference of intent to sell. In State v. Frey, No. M2003–01996–CCA–R3–CD, 2004 WL
2266799, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2004), testimony about 1.8 grams of cocaine, a
“stack” of cash, and absence of drug paraphernalia constituted sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s inference of intent to sell. Further, the presence of different types of
drugs can be indicative of an intent to sell or deliver. See State v. McCulloch, No. E2021-
00404-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2348568, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2022), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2022).

        Defendant advances several arguments why she did not possess the contraband with
the intent to sell or deliver. First, Defendant argues that the methamphetamine was in two
eight ball baggies, and Detective Jones testified an eight ball is not unusual for personal
use. But Detective Jones also testified that two eight balls of methamphetamine suggest a
larger quantity than for personal use. Detective Jones testified that a typical dosage of
methamphetamine is one-quarter gram. The nine grams found in Defendant’s bedroom
equates to thirty-six doses. Further, “we have affirmed convictions where the amount of
the controlled substance was greater than .5 grams and there existed physical or testimonial
evidence, which allowed the jury to draw a permissible inference from the facts
surrounding the arrest that the defendant had intent to sell or deliver.” Belew, 348 S.W.3d
at 191 (compiling cases); see also Chearis, 995 S.W.2d at 645.
                                            -9-
        Defendant also argues that the pills were not packaged in a manner that suggested
intent to sell or deliver. Defendant claims this suggests the drugs were for personal use.
However, Agent Kienlen testified that there was an empty sandwich bag inside a pill bottle,
and drug users did not typically keep plastic bags inside their pill bottles. The jury also
heard testimony about a box of plastic bags next to the bed and that “corner baggies,” as
found here, indicated an intent to sell or deliver because dealers “don’t want to put [drugs]
in an overly large bag. . . . [They] cut the corner off. [They] can usually put a user amount
in there and tie it up.” And, “when [they] have a whole lot of bags [they] can make several
corner baggies.” Agent Kienlen also testified that while it is uncommon for a box of bags
to be beside one’s bed, “it is common for drug dealers.” Defendant also argues that digital
scales can suggest personal use rather than intent to sell or deliver because drug users
measure their purchases to ensure they are not “shorted.” But our supreme court has held
that a search yielding digital scales and plastic sandwich bags alongside a relatively large
amount of narcotics, “clearly demonstrate[s] that the defendant had an intent to sell the
controlled substance.” Ross, 49 S.W.3d at 845 (emphasis in original, citations omitted);
see also Logan, 973 S.W.2d at 281; Brown, 915 S.W.2d at 8.

       Defendant argues that the presence of a “burnt glass pipe and butane torch, plus a
bag of clean needles, further indicates personal use by the multiple people who were at the
shared residence—some of whom apparently preferred to inhale narcotics while others
preferred an injection method.” First, as the State points out and Detective Jones testified,
just because Defendant may have been a drug user or addict, that does not mean that
Defendant was not also a dealer. Agent Coffel also testified that drug users commonly
either inject or smoke their drugs but not both. Agent Coffel’s testimony suggested
Defendant’s possessing needles allowed her to include them with the drugs she sold to
those users who preferred to inject the substances. Considering there was no evidence
tying any other individual to the contraband found in Defendant’s bedroom, other than the
mere presence of those individuals in other rooms of the house during the search, we find
no basis to support Defendant’s argument that the evidence is insufficient on this theory.
See Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d at 90 (citing Cooper, 736 S.W.2d at 129).

        Finally, Defendant argues that only a small amount of money and no ledger were
found. Police found $139 in Defendant’s room. The State offered proof that $139 is
“comparable to what someone might spend on an eight ball of meth.” See Logan, 973
S.W.2d at 281 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); Frey, 2004 WL 2266799, at *8. While Defendant
argues that the absence of a ledger suggests Defendant was not dealing, the presence of
two surveillance cameras around the residence, and one in Defendant’s bedroom pointed
at the door, suggests otherwise. The cameras were not set up to record footage, but simply
to provide a live, continuous stream. In the light most favorable to the State, this evidence

                                           - 10 -
suggests that Defendant used the cameras to be aware of unwanted individuals, such as
police or other drug dealers, to protect Defendant’s drug dealing and product.

        We conclude that due to the large amount and different kinds of contraband,
presence of digital scales, plastic corner bags, presence of paraphernalia suggesting
multiple methods of consumption, multiple surveillance cameras, and money comparable
to the price of an eight ball of methamphetamine, any rational trier of fact could find that
Defendant possessed the contraband (both narcotics and drug paraphernalia3) with intent
to sell or deliver beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                      B. Defendant’s Sentences

        Defendant does not challenge the lengths or manners of service for her convictions.
But as Defendant notes in her brief, the judgment forms in this case do not contain notations
indicating Defendant’s proper offender status and release eligibility. “If the judgment of
conviction does not include a sentence range, it shall be returned to the sentencing court to
be completed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-105(c). We agree. Accordingly, this court
remands the case to the trial court for the entry of amended judgment forms which properly
reflect Defendant’s offender status and release eligibility.

                                            III. Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the
case to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgments.

                                                 ____________________________________
                                                 MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE

        3
           We believe that the proof supports a finding of both possession and an intent to sell or deliver,
and it is not a defense to attempt liability that the crime “attempted was actually completed.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-12-101(c). State v. Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 863 (Tenn. 2015).
                                                  - 11 -