Court Opinion

ID: 9894406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 18:04:20.093932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:34.578837
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/1/23 In re L.S. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re L.S., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 D082294
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES
 AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. No. J520665)

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 M.T.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed.
         Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
         Defendant M.T. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights as to her son, L.S. under Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 322.26. Her sole contention is that the court
should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to
adoption, pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm the
order.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                    A. Petition
         In January 2021, the Agency received a report of a serious car accident
in which the vehicle went down an embankment and overturned with then

five-year-old L.S. in the car. Mother was driving. L.S.’s father (Father)2 was
also present. They were both intoxicated and admitted consuming alcohol
and engaging in a verbal argument that contributed to the accident. No one
suffered major injuries but Mother and L.S. were transported to a hospital to
address minor injuries and pain.
         Mother was initially arrested but then released at the hospital. Once
L.S. was medically cleared, he was released to Father’s care. Three days
later, the Agency observed the family’s home in disarray with broken or
missing windows covered in plywood, the front door being held closed by a
stretch cord, and empty alcohol bottles in the front yard. A neighbor reported
that there was “a ton of alcohol use” and that she constantly heard people in
the family home using profanity and being verbally abusive.

1    All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise stated.

2    Father’s parental rights were also terminated. He is not a party to this
appeal.
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      Paternal grandfather explained that Mother and Father have a lot of
issues that are exacerbated by drug and alcohol use. He reported Father uses
marijuana and Adderall, and has tested positive for amphetamines. Mother
has also used methamphetamine. L.S. did not suffer physically, but paternal
grandfather noticed psychological effects. He shared that from when L.S.
was “a little boy,” Mother and Father would scream and yell at him if he was
being too loud or interrupting, and there is still “a lot of yelling and cussing”
at L.S.
      The Agency attempted to mitigate the safety concerns by offering
voluntary services, but ultimately filed a petition in February 2021, under
section 300, subdivision (b), alleging L.S. was at substantial risk of harm due
to Mother’s and Father’s substance abuse. Mother and Father agreed to a
safety plan for L.S. to stay in the home of paternal grandparents, and to not
have unsupervised contact with L.S.
                     B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Period
      The Agency reported that the family had prior child welfare referrals
related to alcohol abuse and domestic violence. In October 2018, there was a
substantiated referral for general neglect after Father hit Mother in the head
with a plastic water pitcher while then two-year-old L.S. was present. It was
reported that L.S. was present on numerous occasions when there were large
parties and other incidents of at least verbal domestic abuse.
      Paternal grandfather reported that over the past few years, L.S.
expressed that he does not want to see fighting anymore. When Mother and
Father yell at each other, sometimes L.S. would “wind[ ] up in the middle of
it” or step in and tell them to stop, and act like a “marriage moderator.”
Paternal grandmother agreed that L.S. has “seen a lot of fights” and would be
the “mediator.”

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      L.S. was assessed to have anxiousness and/or unhappiness and there
were concerns regarding possible trauma from the accident. He had
nightmares almost every night, was “fairly panicked and anxious,” and was
cautious of going anywhere by himself. However, he was adjusting well to
living with paternal grandparents, doing well in school, and becoming more
confident. L.S. said he wanted to live at paternal grandparents’ house, but he
also liked being at his parents’ house.
      Mother separated from Father within one month of the petition. She
visited L.S. randomly and would disappear for days at a time; no one would
know where she was, which “distress[ed]” L.S. When she did visit, the visits
were positive.
      The juvenile court sustained the petition in April 2021, removed L.S.
from Mother’s and Father’s custody, placed L.S. with paternal grandparents,
and ordered supervised visitation and reunification services to include
substance abuse treatment and testing.
                            C. Reunification Period
      Mother did not engage in substance abuse treatment until April 2022—
one year after L.S.’s removal. Throughout the reunification period, L.S.
continued to do well in paternal grandparents’ home. He was ultimately
diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). With the support of
paternal grandparents and the stability of living in their home, L.S.
progressed in school and therapy, although he sometimes had setbacks and
was negatively impacted by Mother’s inconsistency.
         1. Six-Month-Review Period
      L.S. began therapy in June 2021 and was starting to develop positive
coping mechanisms. His therapist reported he felt safe and happy with
paternal grandparents. He also started kindergarten, which he enjoyed. He

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appeared to be adjusting well to school and making friends easily.
Throughout this period, Mother continued to be inconsistent in visiting L.S.
L.S. described his visits with Mother as “good” but said “I don’t see my
mommy a lot.”
      Mother began outpatient treatment at McAlister’s North Central
Women’s Recovery Center (McAlister) in August 2021, but her participation
was unsatisfactory, she had multiple unexcused absences, and she continued
to test positive. She was discharged in October 2021.
         2. 12-Month-Review Period
      In January 2022, Mother said she was trying to get into detox. She told
L.S. that she might not be able to visit for a week or two and told him it was
something she needed to do to get him back. L.S. displayed aggressive
behavior at school that month. When discussing this in therapy, L.S.
explained that Mother was telling him he would be going home soon. He
seemed to be grieving the removal from Mother, which he was exhibiting
with anger. His therapist reported he was protective of his parents,
particularly Mother, and opined that he had an anxious attachment to her.
Mother’s visits continued to be inconsistent, including late arrivals,
cancelations, and no-shows. Her inconsistent visitation impacted L.S.’s mood
and caused him to worry and have increased anxiety. When she did visit, the
visits were positive.
      L.S. continued his therapy where the focus was on separation from
Mother and Father since that appeared to be impacting him the most. L.S.’s
trauma symptoms improved, in general, but he continued to experience more
generalized anxiety and continued to have sleep disturbances. By April 2022,
L.S. had begun communicating his feelings better and was doing well with
the consistency and structure that paternal grandparents provided. L.S.’s

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teacher also noted that the stability and structure contributed to his growth
in school. Maternal grandmother reported that L.S. was still very concerned
about whether his parents were “okay,” especially Mother. And his therapist
was still concerned with Mother’s inconsistency in his life.
        Mother began treatment at McAlister again in April 2022. In June
2022, she reported she was almost two months “clean.”
          3. 18-Month Review Period
        During this period, Mother continued to be engaged in treatment and
provide negative drug tests. As a result, she began unsupervised visits in
August 2022, which took place in the community. However, paternal
grandmother expressed frustration that Mother was still inconsistent with
her visits. The Agency discussed a consistent visitation schedule with
Mother, who agreed it would be helpful.
        L.S. reported the unsupervised visits were positive and he would be
“okay” with having visits at Mother’s home. While L.S. did not have any
concern or fear with returning to Mother, he wanted to continue living with
paternal grandparents where he had been for over a year and a half. By this
time, he started first grade and was still doing well academically and with his
peers. He was also still benefiting from therapy. L.S. expressed that he was
happy with the stability he had with paternal grandparents and did not want
any changes. The Agency recommended terminating reunification services
because although Mother made progress in her treatment, she was still very
new in her recovery given her long history of substance abuse and was not
ready to take on full parenting responsibilities if L.S. were returned to her
care.
        At the contested 18-month review hearing in October 2022, the court
found that returning L.S. to Mother would create a substantial risk of

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detriment to L.S.’s well-being and did not find exceptional circumstances to
extend services beyond the 18-month deadline. It therefore terminated
Mother’s reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
                        D. Permanency Planning Period
      During a child family team meeting in February 2023, the participants
discussed concerns that L.S. still saw himself as his parents’ caretaker and
needed reminders to not worry about his parents. Paternal grandfather
explained that L.S. was “ ‘very wary and guarded’ ” about his parents’
feelings and watched for changes in their mood and behavior. He also
seemed to be careful about what he said or did not say to Mother because he
did not want to hurt her feelings or disappoint her.
      For the majority of this period, Mother was having consistent
unsupervised visitation with L.S. The visits were positive but at times L.S.
wanted the visit to take place at paternal grandparents’ home where he felt
“more safe.” When visits did take place at Mother’s home, L.S. had paternal
grandmother wait outside rather than leave him alone with Mother. By May
2023, one month before the section 366.26 hearing, Mother once again
became inconsistent with her visitation. She was difficult to contact, would
not confirm locations or times, would not show up to visits, and rescheduled
visits at the last minute.
      At Mother’s request, the court ordered a bonding study. The
psychologist who conducted the study observed Mother and L.S. during a
four-hour visit in the community. She found that L.S. “engages in healthy
(secure) attachment behaviors toward Mother.” The interactions were
positive, playful, reciprocal, and appropriate. L.S. seemed relaxed and calm
with Mother, and Mother was affectionate and appropriate. The psychologist
concluded that “[c]onsidering the beneficial relationship between Mother and

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Child, severing contact could be detrimental. Even if not immediately
destabilizing, there may be challenges related to negotiating the ambiguous
loss that can result where there is a healthy parent-child relationship that is
severed without significant reason (e.g., a continuously unhealthy or unsafe
parent).” She recommended that the court “consider the substantial, positive
relationship observed between the child and his mother when making any
determinations regarding the future of both parties.”
      The Agency reported that there was no doubt L.S. loves Mother and
Mother loves him, but they appeared to have more of a best friend
relationship rather than a mother-son relationship. While there were periods
when Mother was unable to keep in consistent contact, L.S. looked forward to
visits, which had been positive, engaging, and fun. During visits, they
played, joked around, smiled, and laughed together. However, L.S. ended
visits with no distress or emotional dysregulation, and he never asked for
Mother when he was hurt or frightened, or between visits.
      The Agency assessed that the issues L.S. may experience if Mother’s
parental rights were terminated did not outweigh the benefits of adoption.
Paternal grandparents provided a stable and safe home environment for L.S.,
who continued to progress in school, extracurricular activities, and therapy.
In the past two years in paternal grandparents’ care, L.S. became
increasingly independent and higher functioning in his daily activities. He
also gained confidence and skills to regulate his emotions, set boundaries,
and self-advocate. Noting that Mother’s visitation recently became sporadic
again, the Agency emphasized that L.S. deserved stability, consistency, and
structure. When asked, L.S. initially did not know how he would feel if he
could not see his parents again and then said he would feel sad and very mad
if his parents were no longer part of his life. However, he expressed that he

                                       8
wanted to continue living with paternal grandparents. Paternal
grandparents were committed to adopting L.S.
         4. Permanency Planning Hearing
      At the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, the court found
that L.S. was generally and specifically adoptable. Regarding the parent-
child relationship exception to adoption, the court noted Mother’s visits had
been fluctuating shortly before the hearing but nonetheless found that there
was sufficient visitation and contact to satisfy prong one.
      The court then reasoned the fact that then seven-year-old L.S. spent
the first five years of his life with Mother weighed in favor of satisfying prong
two. However, the court noted L.S.’s relationship with Mother was that of a
best friend, L.S. did not experience anxiety or dysregulation after visits with
Mother, and until recently, L.S. preferred to have visits inside or near
paternal grandparent’s home where he felt safer. Additionally, reports that
L.S. worried about his parents, saw himself as the caretaker for his parents,
watched for changes in his parents’ behavior, and took on the role of mediator
in the first five years of his life demonstrated parentified behavior, which
weighed against finding that prong two was met. The court also noted L.S.
did not ask for Mother when he was hurt or frightened nor asked to see her
between visits, which weighed against finding that prong two was satisfied.
On balance, the court found Mother did not satisfy prong two.
      In assessing prong three, the court gave “little weight” to the bonding
report because of the psychologist’s limited observation. It recognized that
terminating Mother’s parental rights “could likely have lasting impacts on
[L.S.].” But when considering the benefits of adoption, the court found that
severing the relationship would not be detrimental. Concluding no exception

                                        9
to adoption applied, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to L.S. and
ordered the plan of adoption.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception did not apply. We conclude, however,
that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that L.S. did not have a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to Mother, and the juvenile court
was within its discretion to decline to apply the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception.
      “After reunification services have terminated, the focus of a dependency
proceeding shifts from family preservation to promoting the best interest of
the child including the child’s interest in a ‘placement that is stable,
permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional
commitment to the child. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 529, 534 (Fernando M.).) At a permanency plan hearing, the
court may order one of three alternatives: terminate parental rights and
order adoption, appoint a legal guardian, or long-term foster care. If the
dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over
the alternative permanency plans. (Ibid.; In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) Once the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable, the burden
shifts to the parent to demonstrate that a statutory exception applies. (Id. at
p. 1225; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the parent does not establish the
applicability of a statutory exception, the juvenile court must terminate
parental rights. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316
(Katherine J.).)
      One such statutory exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies if “[t]he court finds a

                                         10
compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to
the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception requires the
parent to prove three elements: “1) regular visitation and contact with the
child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; (2) a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship; and 3)
a showing that terminating the attachment would be detrimental to the child
even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 847.)
      “We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship, for substantial evidence.” (In
re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 [citing to In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 639–640 (Caden C.)].) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’ ” and
will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings even where substantial evidence
to the contrary also exists. (Caden C., at p. 640, citations omitted.) “[T]he
ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with [the] parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) A court
abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
      Here, the juvenile court found Mother satisfied the first element of
regular visitation and contact with L.S. The Agency conceded this point
below and does so again on appeal.

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      Turning to the second element—the existence of a beneficial parent-
child relationship—the juvenile court must “consider the evidence showing
whether the parent’s actions or inactions ‘continued or developed a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ ” (In re B.D.,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230 [italics added].) To determine whether the
parent has established this element, the court considers factors including the
age of the child, the amount of time the child spent in the parent’s custody,
the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and
the child’s particular needs. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The
court should also examine “how children feel about, interact with, look to, or
talk about their parents.” (Ibid.)
      Mother contends there was overwhelming evidence of a positive
emotional attachment between L.S. and her such that L.S. would benefit
from continuing that relationship. We do not disagree that Mother and L.S.
have a meaningful relationship. Seven-year-old L.S. spent the first five years
of his life in Mother’s care, loves Mother, enjoys his visits with her, and would
be sad or mad if she were not part of his life. However, we must affirm the
lower court’s finding if supported by substantial evidence even though other
evidence may support a different result. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640.) To this point, Mother argues the juvenile court’s determination that
the negative effect of interaction between her and L.S. outweighed the
positive was not supported by the record. We disagree.
      First, Mother contends the court’s finding that L.S. exhibited
“parentified behavior” did not accurately describe the current relationship at
the time of the hearing. We acknowledge that the parenting behavior
developed during L.S.’s first five years of his life when he lived with Mother
and Father. However, those early years shaped L.S.’s relationship with

                                       12
Mother and the negative effect carried on. As recent as February 2023, there
was still concern that L.S. saw himself as his parents’ caretaker and needed
reminders to not worry about them. Paternal grandfather informed the
Agency that L.S. continued to worry about his parents, was guarded about
their feelings, and watched for changes in their mood and behavior. As such,
there was substantial evidence that L.S. still exhibited parentified behavior
at the time of the hearing.
      Second, Mother argues the fact that L.S. did not ask for her between
visits or when he was hurt or frightened, and L.S.’s ability to separate from
her without anxiety or distress shows secure attachment rather than a lack of
attachment. However, we must indulge all reasonable inferences in support
of the court’s ruling. (Adoption of Arthur M. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 704,
717.) It was reasonable to infer from this evidence that L.S. did not have a
significant, positive, emotional attachment to Mother. Moreover, other
evidence supports this inference. As of May 2023, there were reports that
L.S. still preferred to visit with Mother at paternal grandparents’ home
where he felt “more safe.” Until recently, maternal grandmother stayed in
the vicinity of unsupervised visits with Mother because L.S. wanted her to be
nearby. When L.S. did have visits at Mother’s house, L.S. would have
maternal grandmother wait in the driveway until he told her she could leave.
L.S.’s therapist also opined that there was an anxious attachment between
L.S. and Mother. In sum, Mother’s argument that the court should have
considered L.S.’s ability to separate from her as evidence of a positive
attachment fails.
      Finally, Mother claims the juvenile court failed to explain why the
negative aspects of the relationship outweighed the positive aspects.
However, the court was not required to recite its grounds, reasons, or specific

                                       13
findings regarding any of the three elements in determining that the parent-
child relationship exception does not apply. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1131, 1156.) Nonetheless, the court correctly explained that interaction
between the child and parent will always have some incidental benefit to the
child but that is not enough. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212,
229 [the parent must demonstrate “more than incidental benefit to the child”
and “more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the
child, or pleasant visits”].) The court weighed the evidence in finding that
L.S. did not have a significant, positive, emotional attachment to Mother. It
is not our place to reweigh the evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640, citations omitted.)
      The third element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
requires the juvenile court to determine whether terminating the parental
relationship would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 633.) “[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the
trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s
relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement
in a new adoptive home. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632.) This requires the
juvenile court to determine “how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an
adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) The
juvenile court must then weigh the loss of this relationship with “the benefit
of placement in a new, adoptive home . . . .” (Ibid.)
      Mother contends the court’s conclusion that severing L.S.’s relationship
with her would not be detrimental lacked analysis. But again, the court was
not required to recite its grounds, reasons, or specific findings in determining
that the parent-child relationship exception does not apply. (In re A.L.,

                                       14
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156.) Mother also contends the court abused its
discretion in declining to adopt the findings of the psychologist who
conducted the bonding study. Although she contends there was no evidence
the report was flawed or inaccurate, the court’s basis for giving “little weight”
to it was that the psychologist observed Mother and L.S. together for only
four hours. Again, it is not for us to reweigh evidence when evaluating the
factual basis for an exercise of discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 641.)
      Nonetheless, the court did not wholly disregard the bonding study. The
court recognized that severing the relationship with Mother “could likely
have” impacts on L.S. during his childhood and into adulthood. However, on
balance when considering the benefits of adoption, the court concluded that
terminating the relationship would not be detrimental to L.S.—i.e. any harm
from terminating the relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) We must affirm the court’s
determination unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (Id. at
p. 641.) We cannot say that it was.
      This is a difficult case where Mother did have a meaningful
relationship with L.S. However, the outcome is clear when considering that
at this point, when reunification services have been terminated, the focus
shifts from family preservation to promoting the children’s best interest,
including the children’s interest in a stable, permanent home. (Fernando M.,
supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) Given L.S.’s PTSD and other issues
stemming from the first five years of his life in Mother’s care, stability was
crucial for him. Paternal grandparents provided that and in the two years in
their care, L.S. progressed in school, extracurricular activities, and therapy.
Mother, on the other hand, was at times inconsistent and unreliable,

                                       15
including canceling, not showing up to, arriving late to, or rescheduling visits
at the last minute. This negatively impacted L.S.’s mood and caused him
worry and increased anxiety. As recent as May 2023, the month before the
section 366.26 hearing, Mother had begun this pattern again. The court
noted her recent “fluctuating” visits, and although this did not preclude the
court from finding that Mother satisfied the first element of regular visitation
and contact, it reasonably supports the court’s ultimate conclusion that the
benefit of stability provided by adoption outweighed any harm from
terminating the parental relationship.
      The record here does not support a conclusion that this is an
extraordinary case where preservation of the parent’s rights should prevail
over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement. (In re Jasmine D.
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception to adoption and terminated Mother’s parental rights.

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                              DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.

                                            O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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