Court Opinion

ID: 9460020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:37:52.014344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:26.092010
License: Public Domain

JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting on Petition for Rehearing)'.
I must confess I was over-persuaded by my brother Ely and joined in the opinion. Now I am convinced that we were in error.
The issue presented in this case is whether a state legislature may define the terms of a federal statute. The federal statute in question is 18 U.S.C. § 842(i), which makes it a crime for a person who has previously been convicted of a felony to receive explosives in interstate commerce. In construing this statute, this court must decide whether a prior conviction ceases to be a prior conviction when a state law “expunges” it.
The defendant, Timothy Patrick Hoctor, acquired his prior conviction in 1966 for second degree burglary under the *273laws of the State of Washington. This was a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years. The state court sentenced Hoctor to a term of probation. When the term had expired in 1969, the state court discharged the conviction pursuant to Washington’s so-called “expungement statute,” Revised Code of Washington, 9.95.240. Soon aft-erwards, Hoctor was charged under the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 842(i), with receiving explosives in interstate commerce after having been previously convicted of a felony. The district court held that Hoctor, because of the expungement in the state court, had not been previously convicted of a felony within the meaning of § 842(i). The panel unanimously affirmed in what I now believe to be a mistaken interpretation of federal law.
My analysis has four parts: first, a general interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 842 (i); second, a consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 845; third, a consideration of 18 U.S. C. § 848; and fourth, a consideration of relevant cases from the Ninth Circuit.
I
18 U.S.C. § 842 (i)
The twin guides in construing a statute are its words and its ascertainable purpose. If the plain meaning of the words in 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) controlled the case, the outcome would be certain. The statute provides, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to receive any explosive ... in interstate or foreign commerce.” Hoctor has been previously convicted — that is cold fact. His argument, therefore, must necessarily be that behind the plain words lies a silent proviso that convictions “expunged” by state law do not count. Whether such a proviso is indeed implied must be resolved by reference to Congress’ purpose in enacting § 842(i).
Congress’ apparent purpose was to thwart a volatile mixture — the combination of an explosive material with a person having criminal tendencies. In 18 U.S.C. § 841(e), (d), (e), and (f) Congress defined “explosive materials,” a relatively simple task. Nobody would contend that a' state could expunge or alter this definition.
Defining a person having criminal tendencies was tougher. In 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) Congress relied on the expedient and reasonable assumption that persons with criminal tendencies are those who have committed crimes, as evidenced by previous convictions. The shortcomings of this definition are obvious, but it is workable, and perhaps defies improvement. In any event, it reflects a congressional determination as to which persons should be barred from handling explosives — those who have been convicted of felonies. The Washington expungement law, an expression of the public policy of the state, must not be allowed to undercut a congressional determination.
The expungement should be allowed to affect the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) only if the state’s policy coincides with the federal purpose. I think it does not; my view was well-articulated by the Supreme Court when it said in Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104, 63 S.Ct. 483, 485, 87 L.Ed. 640 (1942): “At times it has been inferred from the nature of the problem with which Congress was dealing that the application of a federal statute should be dependent on state law. . . . But we must generally assume, in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, that Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law. That assumption is based on the fact that the application of federal legislation is nationwide (United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402 [61 S.Ct. 659, 660, 85 L.Ed. 913]) and at times on the fact that the federal program would be impaired if state law were to control. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 503 [34 S.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062].”
*27418 U.S.C. § 842(i) necessarily depends on state law to the extent that prior convictions may be rendered by state courts; that was clearly intended by Congress. There is, however, no indication, plain or otherwise, that Congress intended to allow state law to say a conviction is not a conviction for the purposes of § 842(i).
II
18 U.S.C. § 845
If 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) stood alone, the interpretation given it in the opinion might bear more credence. But § 842 (i) does not stand alone; it is merely one provision in a larger statutory scheme by which Congress intends to regulate the interstate commerce in explosives. A key provision in the scheme is 18 U.S.C. § 845(b), which reads: “A person who had been indicted for or convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by this chapter . . . and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the indictment or conviction, and the applicant’s record and' reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety . . . .”
Thus § 845(b) gives the Secretary power to do exactly what the state ex-pungement purports to do — determine that a particular person may be trusted with explosives despite a prior conviction. Since Congress intended this determination to be made to the satisfaction of the Secretary, whose discretion is guided by federal policy, the scheme intended by Congress is disrupted if a state, guided by state policies, may make the determination to nullify a conviction for purposes of § 842(i). If the state’s determination should differ from the Secretary’s, we would face a direct conflict between state and federal authority. Congress surely intended no such conflict. § 845(b) suggests the congressional desire that, for purposes of § 842 (i), only federal authority can “expunge” a conviction.
Ill
18 U.S.C. § 848
The opinion says that 18 U.S.C. § 848 indicates a congressional intent to allow states to “expunge” convictions for purposes of § 842(i). I am unable to attach such meaning to § 848.
§ 848 provides that “No provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Con- • gress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State . . . .” [Emphasis added].
For two reasons it is evident that § 848 does not operate to permit states to expunge convictions for purposes of § 842(i).
First, as stated in the preceding section, I see a direct conflict between the state statute and § 845(b): by giving effect to the state statute in this case we would deprive the Secretary of the final authority vested in him by Congress. This is not to suggest that the state law is entirely void for violating the Supremacy Clause, for in many other situations a state expungement will have no impact on federal policies or federal law; but, to the extent it would undercut § 845(b), the state law cannot be given effect.
Secondly, the state law does not concern the same subject matter as § 842 (i). House Report No. 91-1549 indicates the subject matter to which Congress refers: “This section [§ 848] sets forth the intent of Congress that this chapter shall not be construed to operate to the exclusion of State statutes covering explosive materials . . . .” U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1970, p. 4048. [emphasis added]. The Washing*275ton expungement statute does not cover explosive materials in any way; hence § 848 actually has no relevance to this case.
IV

The Ninth Circuit Cases

The Ninth Circuit has numerous cases holding that state expungement statutes do not affect the scope of certain federal laws on deportation. E. g., Kelly v. I.N.S. (9 Cir. 1965) 349 F.2d 473, cert, denied, 382 U.S. 932, 86 S.Ct. 326, 15 L.Ed.2d 344 (1965); Garcia-Gonzales v. I.N.S. (9 Cir. 1965), 344 F.2d 804, cert, denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1965).
The opinion in this case brushes aside these precedents in a footnote, saying they are not applicable. Two distinctions are drawn, neither of which is persuasive that Kelly and Garcia do not apply to Hoctor.
First, the opinion points out that the deportation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1251, has different language from 18 U.S.C. § 842 (i). The deportation provision refers to persons who have been convicted “at any time,” while 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) refers simply to persons who have been convicted. The absence of “at any time” in § 842(i) fails to indicate Congress’ intent to let states say a conviction is not a conviction.
Secondly, the opinion states that Congress has plenary power over deportation law, while Congress’ power to regulate explosives is of course limited to the sphere of interstate commerce. Although this is so, the fact that Congress’ power to regulate explosives is less than plenary does not mean that a valid enactment, within the limited scope of Congress’ power, is subject to alteration by the states. Federal law, expressing federal policy, is supreme, whether or not it concerns a subject over which Congress has plenary power.
The decision in Garcia controls this case. As said there, “It is sheer fiction to say that the conviction is ‘wiped out’ or ‘expunged.’ . ... ‘Congress intended to do its own defining [of “conviction”] rather than leave the matter to variable state statutes.’ ” Garcia, at pp. 807-808.
The petition for rehearing should be granted and an .opinion filed, reversing the judgment below.