Court Opinion

ID: 9579724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:57:54.872762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:43.250338
License: Public Domain

*148Brailsford, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the able opinion of Mr. Justice Lewis, which predicates liability for plaintiff’s injuries on the lessor’s negligence in repairing the sunken floor in September, 1959. These repairs restored the floor to a safe condition, in which it remained for approximately one year. However, because of an insufficient mixture of mortar and sand and of other factors for which the lessor was responsible, the joints in the brick floor were not durable and crevices gradually developed. Because of these, the floor became unsafe for plaintiff’s use some months prior to her injury, and further repairs were needed. This condition was open and obvious and was known to both parties. The lessor acknowledged it and, from time to time, assured plaintiff that repairs would be made. There was ample opportunity after the hazard developed and before plaintiff was injured for this to have been accomplished or for plaintiff to have moved out of the apartment.
Under the law of this jurisdiction, as ably expounded in the majority opinion, no obligation to make repairs arises from the relation of landlord and tenant. A landlord is not liable for personal injuries resulting from a defect in premises wholly occupied by a' tenant, even though the landlord may be contractually obligated to repair. There are exceptions to the rule of non-liability, notably, where there are latent defects, known to the landlord, of which he fails to give notice. Furthermore, a landlord who undertakes to make repairs or improvements, while the property is occupied by a tenant, must do so in a reasonably prudent manner, and will be liable in tort for any injury caused by his negligence in this respect. The principle on which liability for negligence in making repairs rests is the same whether the intervention of the landlord has been gratuitous or pursuant to a contractual obligation to repair. Its logical basis is that the landlord, by making the repairs, gives an implied assurance that the work has been carefully done and the premises restored to a safe condition for occupancy. 52 C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 c. (2) page 44.
*149Here, the crevices to which plaintiff’s injuries are attributed developed gradually, and in full view, after the 1959 repairs had been made. Plaintiff knew of their existence for some months before she was injured in September, 1961. The prior intervention of the lessor had no tendency to deceive her as to the condition of the floor at the time of her injury. Her plight was exactly the same as though the crevices had existed at the inception of her tenancy, for which, admittedly, no liability would have attached.
In my judgment, the following quotation from 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, 1962 Supplement, page 57, is sound and shows that the principle relied upon simply does not fit the facts of this case:
“* * * The basis of the liability of a landlord for negligence in making repairs without any obligation to do so is generally considered to be the reliance placed upon such conduct or the confidence induced thereby. Therefore, it must appear that the person injured did in fact rely upon the making of the repairs when using the premises in order to render the landlord liable for an injury due to negligence in making the repairs.”
In addition to the authorities cited above and in the majority opinion, see Annotation, 150 A. L. R. 1373; Prosser, Law of Torts, (2d) Ed., page 476; and Restatement of Torts, Sec. 362.
Assuming, however, that the evidence is sufficient to establish a prima jade case of liability, in my judgment, the only reasonable inference from the admitted facts is that plaintiff assumed the risk of harm from this known hazard. The parakeet incident may explain her momentary forgetfulness, but cannot soundly be held to have relieved her of the consequences of her antecedent, deliberate choice to continue using the defective floor, thus, “impliedly agreeing to look out for herself and to relieve the defendant of responsibility.” Baker v. Clark, 233 S. C. 20, 25, 103 S. E. *150(2d) 395, 396. The only escape from this conclusion which the court’s instructions offered to the jury was the opportunity to find that plaintiff acted reasonably in relying upon the lessor’s promises to repair. Any such right of reliance terminated on the lessor’s death, more than twenty days prior to plaintiff’s injury.
I would reverse the judgment below.