Court Opinion

ID: 9677882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:03:32.327438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:58.720366
License: Public Domain

BELCHER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion which affirms this conviction.
In considering the appellant’s sixth ground of error the majority opinion states, “ * * * we hold that since it was undisputed that the prosecutrix was chaste and sixteen years old, and appellant admitted that he had intercourse with her, reversible error is not reflected.”
The appellant testified as follows: While he was at Leonard Thornton’s house drinking beer, Gerald Enloe took the pros-ecutrix to a bedroom for around five minutes; then after a while, he again took her to the bedroom for 20 minutes. After that time, Gerald came out, and, “He just winked at us, and he said, T got some of that. If y’all want to try, you can if she doesn’t mind.’ ” 1 After a while, the appellant took the prosecutrix to a bedroom where he had intercourse with her.
The prosecutrix testified in part as follows: After the appellant had threatened to injure her date, Gerald Enloe, she had agreed to allow the appellant to do some “heavy petting.” The appellant after promising “We won’t go all the way,” removed her under pants, climbed on top of her and before she could do anything about it had intercourse with her during which time she was screaming.
The trial court in its charge submitted the issue of the prosecutrix’s prior chastity to the jury.
The indictment in alleging the offense used the word “ravish.”
The testimony of the prosecutrix shows that the act of intercourse by the appellant with her was accomplished by threats.
The trial court recognized and gave effect to her testimony by submitting the issue of threats in his main charge to the jury. Most v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 386 S.W.2d 537.
The verdict of the jury was a general finding of guilt as it did not specify the manner by which the act of intercourse was accomplished.
It is evident from the indictment which used the word “ravish” in alleging the offense, the testimony of the victim, the court’s charge, and the general verdict of the jury that the state relied upon and the jury could have found that threats were used to accomplish the act of intercourse as testified by the prosecutrix and this conviction rests thereon.
It was undisputed that the testimony of the prosecutrix contained material contradictions and discrepancies and was in direct conflict with the testimony of the appellant and other witnesses.
The trial court’s instruction of which the appellant complains is as follows:
“The jury may believe a witness though he be contradicted and may accept a part of his or her testimony and disregard the remainder.”
To which instruction the appellant properly and timely reserved his exception. *127This instruction has never been heretofore expressly approved by this Court. When used during jury argument as shown by the record in this case,2 this instruction placed a lethal weapon in the hands of the prosecutor when he had the support of the trial judge in the court’s charge which the jury had with them while deliberating. It conveys the idea that the jury has the power to select and consider only such evidence as they see proper, when the law makes it their duty to consider all the evidence admitted before them. The instruction complained of is in direct conflict with and violates the mandatory provisions of Art. 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., which directs that the trial court shall not express any opinion as to the weight of the evidence shall not sum up the testimony, discuss the facts, or use any argument in his charge.3
A jury may disbelieve any portion or all of a witness’s testimony, but they are not authorized to disregard it or any part of such testimony as the court’s charge instructed the jury in this case. The jury may disbelieve the testimony, but they cannot refuse to consider it.
It is evident that the appellant has been deprived of valuable rights which denied him a fair and impartial trial and requires a reversal.

. The testimony as to the statements of Gerald Enloe, admitted without objection, were admissible in that they were res gestae.

. In his closing argument to the jury the prosecutor for the state argued as follows pertaining to the instruction quoted above and complained of: “ * * * Let me point out one thing to you, ladies and gentlemen, and I think it’s the most important thing in the whole charge. * * And if that weren’t so, his Honor wouldn’t have told you.”

. In Collins v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 441, 46 S.W. 933, which is quoted by the majority opinion as authority for holding that the instruction complained of here did not necessarily constitute reversible error, the Court held that the instruction complained of there was not subject to the criticism that it “tells the jury that they can arbitrarily regard or disregard the testimony of any witness or witnesses.” It is pointed out that the instruction in Collins v. State, supra, was not the same instruction complained of by this appellant. In. the ease now before the Court the charge instructs the jury that they can disregard the testimony of witnesses as they may so choose.
Navar v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 344 S.W.2d 188; Hudson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 418 S.W.2d 813; and Wright v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 566 cited by the majority opinion correctly state a rule of law, but they do not authorize an instruction such as was given in this case.