Court Opinion

ID: 9524325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:51:49.942797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:35.391232
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Elizabeth Harris’ former employer, Borman’s, Inc. Count I alleged discrimination in violation of the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, Count ii alleged loss of consortium, and Count in alleged both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on all three counts. Plaintiffs appeal as of right. We affirm.
Plaintiff Elizabeth Harris has an eye condition known as congenital nystagmus, which causes a rhythmical oscillation of the eyeballs. She also suffers from extreme nearsightedness. In April, 1979, while she was still in high school, Harris began working as a part-time courtesy clerk at one of defendant’s Farmer Jack grocery stores. After graduation Harris became a full-time employee of defendant. In September, 1982, she requested a *838promotion from courtesy clerk to bakery clerk and was transferred to that position for a trial period.
The duties of a bakery clerk included waiting on customers, filling trays, filling doughnuts with jelly, wrapping doughnuts, cleaning the bakery area, making pizzas, labeling packages of baked goods, and weighing products. In her deposition, Harris stated that she had difficulty performing the labeling and weighing duties because of her handicap. Harris explained that she suffered from night blindness and that the labels were kept on a rack in a dark area of the bakery. Because of this it took her longer to find the correct labels than it took other bakery clerks. She stated that the rack could not be moved to a better-lit location and that her coworkers would not keep the labels organized. Harris also stated in her deposition that she could not do the weighing of products required of a bakery clerk because the bakery department where she worked had an old scale that was up high on a counter and had small numbers which she could not see. Harris stated in the deposition that she had informed the management that she had trouble reading the labels because they were kept in a dark area and that she had trouble reading the scale. She opined that with a digital scale and better lighting she could perform the duties of bakery clerk.
After a twenty-eight-day trial period as a bakery clerk Harris was returned to her courtesy clerk position. She remained in this position for approximately one year before resigning because, as she stated in her deposition, she felt she had no possibility of advancement.
On appeal, plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10) on Harris’ handicap *839discrimination claim. We disagree. MCL 37.1102; MSA 3.550(102) provides:
(1) The opportunity to obtain employment, housing, and other real estate and full and equal utilization of public accommodations, public services, and educational facilities without discrimination because of a handicap is guaranteed by this act and is a civil right.
(2) A person shall accommodate a handicapper for purposes of employment, public accommodation, public service, education, or housing unless the person demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
MCL 37.1103; MSA 3.550(103) defines "handicap” for purposes of the act:
(b) "Handicap” means a determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual or a history of the characteristic which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder which characteristic:
(i) For purposes of article 2, is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position, or is unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion.
Our Supreme Court in Carr v General Motors Corp, 425 Mich 313, 315-316; 389 NW2d 686 (1986), held that the act covers only those persons whose disability is unrelated to ability to perform the job. In this case, Harris’ disability, her poor eyesight, was undisputedly related to her ability to perform the duties of bakery clerk. Harris thus does not meet the act’s definition of a handicapped individual. Since she is not a handicapper within the meaning of the act, her employer had no duty to accommodate under MCL 37.1102(2); MSA *8403.550(102)(2). See Carr, supra. Moreover, since Harris falls outside the scope of the act, she may not base her claim on MCL 37.1202, subds (l)(f) and (g); MSA 3.550(202), subds (l)(f) and (g), dealing with adaptive devices or aids.
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition on their claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. These claims are waived, however, as plaintiffs have failed to cite any authority or advance any specific argument. Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182; 94 NW2d 388 (1959); Butler v DAIIE, 121 Mich App 727; 329 NW2d 781 (1982).
Affirmed.
P. D. Schaefer, J., concurred.