Court Opinion

ID: 9659260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:36:31.988924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:05.622238
License: Public Domain

*114Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). These cases involve the question whether a prosecutor abuses his discretion in charging a felony under the circumstance that the identical conduct could be charged as a misdemeanor.
I am satisfied that a system which permits such procedure allows a denial of equal protection of the law under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions.
I reject the usual arguments advanced to justify the practice.
Assuming that the conduct constituting the offenses is identical, I cannot ascribe to the Legislature an intent to allow such selective law enforcement, nor indeed agree to give effect to it if such intent be divined.
Likewise, I find unacceptable the claim that the criminal record of the defendant is a proper basis for distinction in the charge.
It is only after conviction that different treatment for distinct instances of the same offensive conduct may be justified. The Legislature has enacted habitual criminal statutes specifying progressively greater punishment for recidivism. No one questions a judge’s authority to impose a heavier penalty within the statutory range of a sentence according to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the offender. Approval of different punishment after conviction, however, will not sanction different charges for identical conduct before conviction.
In these cases, I would read both statutes, MCL 750.356; MSA 28.588 and MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592, to require charging according to the value of the property stolen. Because the value did not exceed $100, only a misdemeanor could be charged. Had the value exceeded $100, a felony *115could be charged according to where the crime took place. If such offense was in a store, only the 4-year felony could be charged. Had such offense occurred in some other place, the 5-year felony charge would have been applicable.
In each case, I would reduce defendant’s conviction to a misdemeanor and remand for resentencing.
Levin, J., concurred with Kavanagh, J.