Court Opinion

ID: 9711692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:36:47.492299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:06.714980
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, J.
I regret that I must dissent from the majority opinion, which reverses the trial court’s conviction of the appellant of second degree burglary. I must do this because I think the opinion departs from well settled princi*127pies of appellate review of the evidence when a case comes before this Court on appeal.
I feel the majority opinion not only weighs the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, but in fact substitutes this Court’s opinion as to what is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which conclusion is one solely for the jury.
Examining the facts most favorable to the State in this appeal, we find that the appellant was arrested by the sheriff when he was found lying in a ditch at the side of the road about a mile and half from the meat market, which had been broken into during the night. He had a sack of meat which he admitted was in his possession, and packages of cigarettes. It was about 7:30 a.m. when he was arrested. The majority opinion says it was 91/2 hours after the time of the burglary. We find nothing in the evidence showing exactly when the burglary occurred except that the shop was closed about 10:00 o’clock the night before and the burglary was discovered about 7:30 a.m. the next morning.
The evidence shows without contradiction that someone had entered the meat market during the night through a hole in the ceiling by breaking through the plastering. At the time the police officers arrested the appellant, the evidence shows that the arresting officer positively testified as to appellant: “Well, he had plaster on his coat, his pants; also he had some plaster in his hair.”
We find no reason to say, as the majority opinion says, that it was “something that looked like plaster.!’ The evidence shows that there was loose plaster on the floor and on top of the meat counter below the hole in the ceiling where the entry was made into the store. It appears to me that all this evidence is favorable to the State, for consideration in support of the jury’s verdict in identifying the appellant.
The majority opinion further says: “The meat and cigarettes which had been in the possession of appellant met the general description of those goods that had been taken from *128the meat market, but were never positively identified specifically as those taken from the meat market.” We know of no rule of law which says that stolen property has to be “positively” or absolutely identified beyond any doubt. The fact of the matter is, it is recognized in law that fungible goods, because of their similarity, can never be absolutely identified. It is practically impossible to positively identify such goods as wheat, potatoes, meat or even money which has been stolen, except by some identification and characteristics of the containers, sacks, etc., in which such fungible goods are contained. In this case, in our opinion, the cigarettes that were stolen were identified as accurately and positively as could be.
The evidence shows that the serial numbers of the packs of cigarettes (Pall Malls) taken from the appellant when he was arrested matched the numbers of the packs remaining in the store. It appears to us this is sufficient evidence for the jury’s consideration that it was part of the property stolen.
The evidence shows as to the identification of the meat which was found in the possession of the appellant that the owner of the store said that each piece was wrapped in a green paper and also a “pink colored paper” that was the same as that used in his shop. The owner testified with reference to the meat in question as follows:
“Q Now, I wonder, sir, if you will step down here, please, to the table which is directly in front of the Judge’s bench. On this table, there is what has been identified and admitted in evidence as State’s Exhibit 14. I’ll ask you to step around here to the side, sir, if you can. You will notice that in State’s Exhibit 14 there are items of green paper. Can you identify those items sir?
“A Well, this is the kind of green paper that we buy to paper our meats on.
“Q And when you say paper our meats, to what are you referring? What do you do with this green paper?
*129“A We cut our meat, then we also wipe the sawdust off, then we paper each piece like this (indicating), in order to keep its color. If we didn’t why its color would make it dark in here.
“Q All right, sir. Now, these items of meat are also wrapped in a pinkish colored paper. Are you able to identify that paper ?
“A Yes, that’s the same type of paper that we wrap our meat in.
“Q Now, I’ll ask you, if you will, sir, to look directly at the meat itself. Are you able from examining some of ' these pieces of meat to tell anything about it, or about where they might have come from?
“A I couldn’t tell you where they come from, because we buy beef from different packers, in fact, three that we buy most of all of our beef from, but as far as the trim, we do trim our meat close. I mean, for example, this round is trimmed exactly the way we trim our rounds. Most of the fat is taken off the edge.
“Q When you get this beef from your wholesaler, it’s not cut as it is right now, is it?
“A No. we buy our beef all in sides.
“Q All in sides ? And you have people there in your establishment, in your business, who cut your beef for you for resale?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Now, I believe there was testimony to the effect this morning that Marion Thomas is employed at your grocery store; is that right?
“A Marion is the meat manager. He does all the buying and does most all the cutting and trimming.
“Q And would you say that the type of beef which you have here today, in your opinion, was trimmed by Marion Thomas?
“A Yes, from all indications, it is. I mean, in all this, the bone, in this cut for example, the bone is taken off here, the meat is trimmed off next to the bone; for example, like this cut here.
“Q In your opinion then, Mr. Thomas, this meat was trimmed by Marion Thomas?
“A It looks just exactly the way we trim our meat.”
*130This is as definite and certain as any owner could be about such fungible goods as meat or cigarettes which have been stolen, without the owner placing identifying marks such as his initials on each piece, in anticipation of a burglary.
The owner of the store stated that his manager trims and cuts the meat in the fashion in which the meat in evidence was cut. It was wrapped with green paper and a pink paper used in his shop. For this witness to go further and express his opinion that it was the exact property stolen or taken from his shop would have been a conclusion which was for the jury to determine from the evidence. The jury had the facts and the jury made that determination. We in this Court have no right to usurp the constitutional right of the jury to determine the facts in this case. It is not necessary that every bit of evidence as to identity of the property stolen, be absolutely and conclusively identified. Very few things in this world are positive and certain beyond any doubt or question. It is sufficient if the identification is established by circumstantial evidence which satisfies the jury. Mason v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 206, 191 N. E. 2d 705.
The unexplained possession of recently stolen goods in the hands of a defendant is sufficient to sustain a conviction of larceny or burglary where there is evidence of a breaking in by a defendant, as in this case. The evidence is inextricably bound together. The person who committed this larceny could do it by no other means than breaking into the building through the ceiling from the evidence presented to the jury. He had marks of such break-in (plaster on his hair and his clothing).
With this evidence any average person on the street would conclude that appellant was guilty, just as the jury did.
It has long been the doctrine of criminal jurisprudence — so long in fact — that the “memory of man runneth not to the contrary” that on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, “we may consider only that evidence most favorable *131to the State, together with all reasonable and logical inferences.” Tait v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 35, 38, 188 N. E. 2d 537, 540.
“At the same time, we may not weigh conflicting evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses.” Metz v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 536, 538, 194 N. E. 2d 617, 618.
“On appeal only the evidence most favorable to the State will be considered, as well as all reasonable and logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Cox v. State (1964), 246 Ind. 91, 201 N. E. 2d 693, 695.
Judge Jackson, speaking for the Court very recently (March, 1967) stated:
“This Court has repeatedly held that it will not weigh the evidence but will consider that evidence most favorable to the State when reviewing the suiflciency of evidence.” Walker v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 319, 224 N. E. 2d 45, 46.
Judge Mote, speaking for this Court, has said:
“It is amazing that so many appellants come to this Court relying on the ground under discussion here when it is well settled that this Court does not weigh the evidence nor will it determine the credibility of witnesses.” Rice v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 200, 223 N. E. 2d 579, 582.
We, on appeal, must sustain the judgment of the jury .and trial court if there is any evidence with reasonable inferences to support it. We must on this appeal consider the evidence most favorable to the State. We may not say on appeal in this Court that the evidence must convince us beyond a reasonable doubt. That is for the jury below — not for us on appeal.
The majority opinion says in part. “The evidence is not conclusive that the goods are those actually stolen.” (Our italics) Our answer to that statement is, the evidence does not have to be conclusive. Circumstantial evidence is never conclusive, yet it can be the basis of a conviction. The majority opinion further says in part: “Since the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the goods found *132were indeed those stolen . . . this Court must reverse the decision of the trial court.”
I feel this Court has usurped the jury’s function in this case, and if this majority opinion stands, it will violate the fundamental principles of appellate review in criminal cases. The opinion will haunt us, as some other improvident opinions have in the past, and be cited to urge us to weigh the evidence in other criminal cases on review, as was deplored by Judge Mote in his comment above.
I feel the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 231 N. E. 2d 45.