Court Opinion

ID: 9841492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 16:10:54.22956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:28.366623
License: Public Domain

J-A07042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JONATHAN EDWARD BOLDT                      :   No. 1786 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered July 1, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-45-CR-0002584-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2022

       The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Monroe

County Court of Common Pleas, which suppressed inculpatory statements

made by Jonathan Edward Boldt (Appellee) to police absent Miranda1

warnings.2 The Commonwealth argues that the trial court (1) did not correctly

apply the test for custodial interrogation when it improperly focused on the

____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2  The Commonwealth filed a certification that the suppression order “will
substantially handicap the prosecution of” Appellant pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
311(d). See Commonwealth’s Statement in Compliance with Pa.R.A.P.
311(D), 7/12/22; see also Commonwealth v. Williams 165 A.3d 994, 995
n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2017) (noting that the Commonwealth may appeal an
interlocutory order suppressing evidence when it provides a certification within
its appeal that the order substantially handicaps the prosecution) (citation
omitted).
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police officers’ subjective intent, rather than whether Appellee reasonably

believed he was free to leave to determine whether he was in custody, and

(2) failed to address the fact that Appellee was not subject to interrogation.

After the review of the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

for further proceedings.

       The facts underlying Appellee’s arrest are as follows.3 On the night of

September 29, 2021, Pocono Township Police were dispatched to the

Brookdale Recovery Center (Brookdale). The Victim, an 18-year-old female

patient, had arrived at Brookdale earlier that same day. See N.T., 10/19/21,

at 5-6. Appellee introduced himself to the Victim by offering her a cigarette.

See id. at 6-7. After dinner, Appellee offered to take the Victim for a walk

around the facilities. See id. at 11-12. The Victim claimed that Appellee led

her to a secluded area off a wooded trail within the territory of the facility,

where there was no camera surveillance.               See id. at 12-15.    He then

purportedly sexually assaulted her.            See id. at 16-20.   The incident was

reported to Brookdale staff, who called police.

       Several officers from the Pocono Township Police Department responded

to the reported assault. Appellee’s interaction with the responding officers

was recorded on the officers’ body camera (body cam) video. The body cam

____________________________________________

3 We glean these facts from Appellee’s preliminary hearing because the matter

was decided on a suppression challenge and a trial has not taken place.
Notably, the Victim testified at the preliminary hearing.

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footage, as well as the preliminary hearing transcript, was admitted at the

suppression hearing as the sole evidence regarding Appellee’s statements to

police. See N.T., 3/18/22, at 12. We summarize the footage as follows.4

Appellee’s first on-camera encounter was with Officer Michael Scicutella, who

frisked him. See Scicutella 1 at 00:00.          When Appellee appeared to walk

away from the officer, Officer Scicutella directed him to return. Id. at 00:44-

00:50.     Officer Scicutella then escorted Appellee, guiding him by the arm,

toward Officers Aron Anglemeyer and Thomas Moser in the facility’s parking

lot.    See Moser at 00:00-00:13; Anglemeyer 1 at 00:01-00:18.           Officer

Scicutella told Appellee to “hang out” with the two officers, and Officer

Anglemeyer directed Appellee to have a seat on the bumper of the police

cruiser.    Anglemeyer 1 at 00:12-00:25.           From this point on, Officers

Anglemeyer and Moser guarded Appellee.

        Officer Anglemeyer told Appellee that they had limited information and

asked him whether he knew why the police may have been called.             See

Anglemeyer 1 at 00:47-00:55. Appellee responded that all he knew was that

____________________________________________

4 The body cam footage is included on a flash drive, and comprised of 11
videos from the perspective of five different Pocono Township Police
Department officers. To address the Commonwealth’s claim on appeal, we
will refer to the following videos: (1) ARAnglemeyer_202109292002
(Anglemeyer 1), (2) ARAnglemeyer_202109292042 (Anglemeyer 2), (3)
ARAnglemeyer_202109292116            (Anglemeyer          4),        (4)
MichaelScicutella_202109292001      (Scicutella      1),    and      (5)
ThomasMoser_202109292002 (Moser).

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he had been told four times by Brookdale staff to stay away from the women

in the facility.    Id. at 00:55-01:29.      Appellee asked to use Officer

Anglemeyer’s phone to call his wife, but the officer refused. Id. at 01:32-

01:42. Appellee told the officers he was angry because one of the women in

the facility called him a “sexual predator.” Id. at 02:15-02:24. As Appellee

became more agitated, Officer Anglemeyer told him to hang tight and sit on a

rock to calm down.    Id. at 02:28-02:43. When Officer Anglemeyer asked

what could have happened that night to require the police, Appellee responded

that he had told a story and used the word “cunt.” Id. at 6:58-7:13. He

stated that two women complained about him and facility staff subsequently

told him to stay 60 feet away from the female patients. See id. at 7:13-7:59.

The officers informed Appellee they would give him a ride after they gathered

his belongings from the facility. Id. at 8:40-9:00.

      For nearly an hour, Appellee chatted with the officers in a conversational

manner and paced around the patrol car. Moser at 10:11-1:03:00. At one

point, he attempted to walk over to a nearby volleyball court, but the officers

told him to “stay over here, buddy,” and he complied. Id. at 11:35-11:45.

Appellee repeatedly expressed impatience regarding the fact that he had to

remain at the facility, threatening to leave and go to a hotel. See Anglemeyer

1 at 11:55-12:45.    The officers briefed Appellee that they would help him

retrieve his phone and wallet and offered to take him to a hotel later. Id. at

12:45-13:04.

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      Meanwhile, out of Appellee’s earshot, Officer Anglemeyer had a

conversation near another patrol car with Officer Scicutella and Detective

James Wagner, who was on the phone. See Anglemeyer 2 at 03:00-06:49.

Detective Wagner instructed the officers to question Appellee before he could

“get cold feet” and “lawyer up.” Id. at 03:55-04:08. Detective Wagner asked

Officer Anglemeyer to question Appellee “if he had sex with [the Victim] and

confront him about the allegations.” Id. at 05:00. Officer Anglemeyer told

Officer Scicutella that he would tell Appellee that Officer Scicutella went to get

his clothes and attempt to talk to Appellee. Id. at 06:57-07:03.

      Officer Anglemeyer returned to Appellee and began to discuss Appellee’s

prior derogatory comments, stating, “I know you told me about the cunt

thing,” when before the officer had said anything else, Appellee, unprompted,

blurted out that he had sex with an 18-year-old “girl” that night too.

Anglemeyer 2 at 09:15-09:30. He asked the officer, “Is that what you were

about to say?” Id. at 09:23-09:25. Officer Anglemeyer responded, “yes,”

and asked Appellee what led to that.       Id. at 09:25-09:51.     Appellee then

described the incident in detail. Id. at 9:30-12:05.

      Later, Appellee asked to sit in the back of the patrol car, because he was

cold. See Moser at 1:01:48. The officers left the car door cracked open and

complied with Appellee’s request to turn the lights off in the car.        Id. at

1:03:25-1:04:19. Appellee then grew impatient and shouted that he wanted

“to get the fuck out of here.” Id. at 1:05:30-1:05:45. The officers asked

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Appellee to stay calm and jokingly claimed they would put him in handcuffs.

Id. at 1:05:45-1:05:56.     Appellee began to pace around the patrol car,

eventually stating that he would leave after “one more lap.” Id. at 1:06:45-

1:07:20. The officers told Appellee to remain by the car and convinced him

not go into the facility to get his belongings. Id. at 1:07:20.

      Appellee voluntarily went back into the patrol car again while urging the

officers to take him away from the facility. See Moser at 1:07:30-1:07:50.

Officer Moser closed the self-locking door. Id. at 1:07:56. Appellee told the

police officers to hurry and questioned what Officer Scicutella was doing that

was preventing them from leaving. Id. at 1:10:10-1:12:00. Appellee then

asked to be let out of the car as he was tired of waiting. Id. at 1:12:27.

Officer Moser did not comply with Appellee’s request, and told him to wait

“one sec” because he had to talk to Officer Anglemeyer.           Id. at 1:12:27-

1:12:44. Appellee questioned whether what the officers were saying was true

and made a comment expressing disbelief that there were four police officers

present. Id. at 1:13:20-1:13:36.

      The officers eventually let Appellee out of the car to speak with Detective

Wagner. See Moser at 1:13:55. Detective Wagner told Appellee that the

Victim had reported that he had raped her. See Anglemeyer 4 at 00:12. The

detective questioned Appellee about the accusations, and Appellee recounted

the events from that day. See Moser at 1:15:30-1:28:18. Appellee continued

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to express impatience, stating that he would march into the facility “right now

and get [his] shit.” Id. at 1:18:05.

      Detective Wagner then directed Officer Moser to go with Appellee to

gather his belongings from the facility. Moser at 1:28:27. As Appellee led

Officer Moser toward Brookdale’s lobby, the officer advised Appellee to “keep

[his] mouth shut” and not “cause issues” for himself. Id. at 1:28:53-1:29:10.

Officer Moser warned Appellee that if he began to yell and cause a disturbance,

he would put him in handcuffs. Id. at 1:29:14-1:29:15. After obtaining his

belongings, Appellee threw a peace sign up with his hand and exited the lobby

carrying his suitcases. Id. at 1:30:28. Appellee placed his suitcases in the

patrol car and told the officers, “all right bros, let’s get the fuck out of here.”

Id. at 1:31:50-1:31:52.

      The officers did not leave and repeatedly told Appellee to “hang tight.”

Moser at 1:33:16-1:36:02. While sitting in the back of the patrol car, Appellee

questioned whether he would be permitted to leave the facility.             Id. at

1:41:05-1:41:25.     Officer Moser reassured Appellee that he would leave

because he was sitting in the back of the vehicle uncuffed. Id. at 1:41:25-

1:41:35. Officer Moser then let Appellee out of the car to have a cigarette.

Id. at 1:47:30. Within minutes, Detective Wagner returned, told Appellee to

put his cigarette out, and directed Appellee to go with him. Id. at 1:52:00.

Detective Wagner then frisked and handcuffed Appellee.           Id. at 1:52:10-

1:53:15.   The detective began to administer Miranda warnings, advising

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Appellee that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could

and would be used against him in a court of law. Id. at 1:53:16-1:53:23. He

did not inform Appellee of his right to an attorney. Id.

       Appellant was then taken to the police station and charged with rape,

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), sexual assault, indecent assault

(two counts), and indecent exposure.5 On January 10, 2021, Appellee filed

an omnibus pretrial motion, seeking, inter alia, suppression of his statements

made in violation of Miranda.          See Appellee’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motions,

1/10/22, at 5-8 (unpaginated).           The trial court conducted a suppression

hearing on March 18, 2022, at which time the Commonwealth submitted into

evidence a thumb drive containing the body cam footage from five different

officers and the preliminary hearing transcript. See N.T., 3/18/22, at 6-7.

The court ordered that Appellee’s motion to suppress evidence would be taken

under advisement and adjudicated based solely on the preliminary hearing

transcript and the body cam footage. See id. at 10.

       On May 26, 2022, the trial court held a limited video conference to

announce its rulings on Appellee’s pretrial motions. Relevant herein, the court

granted Appellee’s motion to suppress all of his statements to police absent

Miranda warnings. See N.T., 5/26/22, at 3-5. The court specifically found

____________________________________________

5 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 3124.1, 3126(a)(1)-(2), and
3127(a), respectively.

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the officers never intended to allow Appellee to leave, and that Appellee was

“never properly Mirandized.” See id. at 3-4. Although the trial court entered

the order on May 26th, the order was not mailed to the parties until July 1,

2021 due to a clerical error. See Criminal Docket at 7; see also Statement

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 9/9/21, at 2.

        On July 12, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal. On July

15, 2022, the trial court directed the Commonwealth to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Order,

9/15/22. The Commonwealth filed a Rule 1925(b) concise statement on July

25, 2022. On September 9th, the trial court issued a statement indicating

that it was unable to fully address the errors alleged by the Commonwealth

because the Commonwealth had not requested the transcript from the May

26, 2022, suppression proceeding.         See Statement Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)     at   2-3.   The   trial   court   requested   this   Court   waive   the

Commonwealth’s arguments due to its failure to request a transcript. See id.

at 3.

        The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review:

        Did the trial court err in suppressing [Appellee’s] statements?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

        We begin by addressing the trial court’s request that we waive the

Commonwealth’s argument for failure to request the May 26, 2022, hearing

transcript. The Commonwealth contends that “there was no waiver of the

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issue where the transcripts were obtained and are available for appellate

review.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. The Commonwealth argues that the

trial court’s reasoning, which relied on Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1911(d), was misplaced

because Rule 1911(d) “is a rule of appellate procedure dealing with appellate

review, not the [t]rial [c]ourt’s review of its own record or its own reasoning.”

Id. at 10.    Further, the Commonwealth argues that “a transcript was

unnecessary as the entire reasoning of the [t]rial [c]ourt for suppression was

the police made a knowing misrepresentation to a defendant.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

      Here, on September 12, 2022 — three days after the trial court issued

its Rule 1925(a) statement — the Commonwealth filed motions for

transcription regarding the March 18th and May 26th hearings.             Those

transcripts were then made part of the certified record.

      We find this delay in requesting a transcript does not preclude us from

addressing the alleged errors under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1922, an appellant “may file a request for

transcripts under Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 4007 prior to

or concurrent with the notice of appeal.”        Pa.R.A.P. 1922(a) (emphasis

added). Also, Pa.R.A.P. 1911 requires an appellant to request a transcript “in

the time prescribed by Rules 4001 et seq. of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial

Administration.” Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a). However, it should be noted that the

Rules of Judicial Administration do not set forth an explicit time frame in which

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an appellant must request a transcript.        See Pa.R.J.A. Nos. 4001-4016.

Instead, the Rules of Judicial Administration establish deadlines by which a

court reporter or transcriptionist must respond to requests for transcripts.

See Pa.R.J.A. 4011(A). When an appellant fails to take the necessary action

for “the preparation of the transcript,” an appellate court “may take such

action as it deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.”

Pa.R.A.P. 1911(d).

      Notwithstanding    the   Commonwealth’s       delay   in    requesting    the

transcripts, the certified record now includes the transcripts of the March 18th

and May 26th hearings. As mentioned above, the May 26th hearing includes

the trial court’s explanation for granting Appellee’s motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we conclude that the certified record is sufficient to allow

meaningful review of the Commonwealth’s claims, and we decline to find that

waiver is appropriate. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 178

(Pa. Super. 2005) (holding “the lack of a Rule 1925(a) opinion is not always

fatal to [this Court’s review] because we can look to record to ascertain” trial

court’s   reasoning).    Therefore,   we   will   address   the   merits   of   the

Commonwealth’s claims.

      Turning to the Commonwealth’s substantive claim, we note that our

standard of review in addressing a trial court’s grant of a suppression motion

is well-settled:

            When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order,
      we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only

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      the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
      evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
      entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s
      findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those
      findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
      not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
      the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

      Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the
      record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however,
      we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal
      conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Galloway, 265 A.3d 810, 813 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

and emphasis omitted), appeal denied, 284 A.3d 870 (Pa. 2022). Moreover,

even if we disagree with the court’s conclusions, we may affirm “on any valid

basis appearing of record.”    In Interest of N.B., 187 A.3d 941, 945 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred by focusing solely

on the police officer’s subjective intent to restrict Appellee’s movement and

failed to consider whether Appellee reasonably believed his “freedom of

action” was being restricted — that is, whether he “actually believed he was

in police custody” — or whether he was subject to interrogation.              See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 14-19.

      “Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual’s

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”          Commonwealth v.

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation & internal quotation

marks omitted). The courts of this Commonwealth have recognized “three

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levels of interaction between the police and citizens: (1) a mere encounter,

(2)   an    investigative   detention,   and   (3)   a   custodial   detention.”

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

      A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
      between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
      by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
      it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond.

      In contrast, an investigative detention, by implication, carries an
      official compulsion to stop and respond, but the detention is
      temporary, unless it results in the formation of probable cause for
      arrest, and does not possess the coercive conditions consistent
      with a formal arrest. Since this interaction has elements of official
      compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.
      In further contrast, a custodial detention occurs when the nature,
      duration and conditions of an investigative detention become so
      coercive as to be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent
      of an arrest.

Id. (citation omitted).

      Miranda warnings are required only for the third-level interaction — a

custodial detention or arrest. Spence, 290 A.3d at 314.

      The United States Supreme Court has held that, before law
      enforcement officers question an individual who has been taken
      into custody or has been deprived of his freedom in any significant
      way, the officers must first warn the individual that he has the
      right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
      him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
      attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
      appointed. However, these special procedural safeguards are
      required only where a suspect is both taken into custody and
      subjected to interrogation.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 519-20 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

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       In determining whether an encounter is investigatory or custodial, a trial

court should consider the totality of the circumstances. Spence, 290 A.3d at

314.

              An investigative detention may develop into a custodial
       detention. The key difference between an investigative and a
       custodial detention is that the latter involves such coercive
       conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest.
       The court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine
       if an encounter is investigatory or custodial.

               The numerous factors used to determine whether a
       detention has evolved into an arrest include the cause for the
       detention, the detention’s length, the detention’s location,
       whether the suspect was transported against his or her will,
       whether physical restraints were used, whether the police used or
       threatened force, and the character of the investigative methods
       used to confirm or dispel the suspicions of the police. [Moreover,
       we note] [c]ustodial interrogation has been defined as questioning
       initiated by the police after a person has been taken into custody
       or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of action in any
       significant way. Further, an interrogation occurs when the police
       should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to
       elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Id. at 314–15 (citations & quotations omitted).

       The standard for determining whether police have initiated a
       custodial interrogation or an arrest is an objective one, with due
       consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the
       person interrogated rather than the strictly subjective view of the
       troopers or the person being seized. An arrest exists when the
       police intended to take the defendant into custody and the
       defendant was subjected to the actual control and will of the
       police. A person is in custody when he is physically denied his
       freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation
       in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or
       movement is restricted by the interrogation.

Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at 517-18 (citations & quotation marks omitted). In

other words, “a person is considered to be in custody for the purposes of

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Miranda when the officer’s show of authority leads the person to believe that

[he] was not free to decline the officer’s request, or otherwise terminate the

encounter.” Commonwealth v. Harper, 230 A.3d 1231, 1237 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citation omitted).

      If an individual is not advised of his Miranda rights prior to
      custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials, evidence
      obtained through the interrogation cannot be used against him.
      [I]n order to trigger the safeguards of Miranda, there must be
      both custody and interrogation. Statements not made in response
      to custodial interrogation are classified as gratuitous and are not
      subject to suppression for lack of Miranda warnings.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 71 A.3d 998, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations

omitted).

      Here, the trial court found that Appellee was the subject of an improper

custodial detention and provided the following reasons for its ruling at the May

26, 2022, videoconference:

      Under the law, the issue before me is whether [Appellee]
      reasonably felt he was free to leave. I don’t think there are many
      disputes about what the evidence showed, and really I think what
      is, the primary reason why I’m going to grant the suppression
      motion . . . [is] whether [Appellee] reasonably believed he was
      free to leave.

      In this case, the police knowingly and intentionally stated
      mistruths to him. They said that [Officer Scicutella] was going
      and getting [Appellee’s] belongings, he was not. They said that
      they were going to give him a ride wherever he wanted to go
      . . . but this is not what was the truth. I think Officer Anglemeyer
      . . . decided to question him before he, quote, unquote, lawyered
      up . . . . So they never had the intention of taking him anywhere,
      the officer was never getting his belongings, they were
      investigating and they were just trying to keep [Appellee] with
      him. So that’s where I want to draw the line, when there is a
      knowing misrepresentation stated to [Appellee] to encourage

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      [him] to stay, I think that’s where the line has to be drawn. If
      they say nothing and he stays, and they’re just talking to him and
      it’s not something that is factually not true, I think that’s different.
      So I don’t think, even if [Appellee] had the reasonable belief that
      he was free to go, that it was made on the truthful surroundings
      of the circumstances at the time.

      Additionally, the second problem is that he was never properly
      Mirandized from what I saw on the video and the evidence that
      was presented to me for my consideration. I think only the first
      two prongs of Miranda were stated to him, never about his right
      to a lawyer or right to a free lawyer if he could not afford one.

N.T., 5/26/22, at 3-4 (paragraph breaks added).

      We disagree in part with the trial court’s initial determination for the

following reasons. First, the test for custodial interrogation does not depend

on the police officer’s subjective intent, but rather, focuses on “the reasonable

belief of the individual being interrogated.”       Harper, 230 A.3d at 1237

(citation omitted). Therefore, the court’s comments emphasizing the officers’

intent are misplaced. Moreover, our review of the record does not support a

conclusion    that   the   officers’   statements    amounted      to   intentional

misrepresentations. The body cam footage demonstrates the officers were

trying to monitor an ongoing investigation scene, in which they could have

taken Appellee to a hotel or another location if their investigation was

inconclusive or yielded no results. Furthermore, we note that the officers are

permitted to use certain tactics including trickery and other types of non-

coercive methods when questioning a suspect. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394

U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (“The fact that the police misrepresented the statements

that [the co-defendant] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view

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to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 863 (Pa. 2018) (finding

defendant’s claim, that his consent to search “was not voluntarily given based

on purported “stealth, deceit and misrepresentation” by police when they

extended the duration of a traffic stop to allow time for a K-9 unit to arrive,

to be meritless). Accordingly, we construe the court’s finding regarding the

officers’ “misstatements” during the investigation as erroneous.

      Based on the record before us, we conclude Appellee was in “custody”

for purposes of Miranda from the moment Officer Scicutella frisked him. See

Scicutella 1 at 00:00. From that point on, one or more officers escorted or

prevented Appellee from walking away from them on repeated occasions. See

id. at 00:44-00:50; Moser at 00:00-00:13; Anglemeyer 1 at 00:01-00:18;

Anglemeyer 1 at 02:28-02:43; Moser at 11:35-11:45.          Moreover, over an

hour into their interaction, the officers locked Appellee in a patrol car for

roughly six minutes, despite Appellee’s subsequent requests to be let out.

Moser at 1:07:56-1:13:55. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person

would not feel free to leave. See Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at 503. As such, we

agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellee was in custody based on

the officers’ actions because Appellee’s freedom of movement was entirely

restricted to an area within the officers’ immediate supervision, and he was

never told that he was free to leave, despite the officers’ assurances that they

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would help gather his belongings and take him out of the facility. See id. at

517-18.

       However, our inquiry does not end there. As noted above, Miranda

warnings are required only if a suspect is also subject to an interrogation. See

Harper, 230 A.3d at 1237 (noting that there must be both custody and

interrogation     to    trigger    Miranda         safeguards)   (citation   omitted).

“Interrogation has been held to encompass not only express questioning, but

also any words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have

known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement.”

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 639 A.2d 763, 771 (Pa. 1994) (emphasis

added).

       With respect to Officer Anglemeyer’s statements to Appellee, he

intended to interrogate Appellee following his conversation with Detective

Wagner, but ultimately did not do so. See Anglemeyer 2 at 03:00-09:30.

Instead, Appellee blurted out the fact that he had sex with a “girl” that night

before Officer Anglemeyer was able to question him about the allegations.

See id. at 09:15-09:30.6 An individual’s spontaneous utterances or “‘blurt

out’ incriminating statements made in course of small talk with authorities,

even in custodial setting, are not per se subject to suppression.” Interest of

____________________________________________

6 In response, Officer Anglemeyer then asked “what led to that,” and Appellee

described the incident in detail. See id. at 9:30-12:05.

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N.M., 222 A.3d at 770 (citations omitted). Moreover, “[i]t is well established

in Pennsylvania that volunteered or spontaneous utterances are admissible

even though the declarant was not Mirandized.” Commonwealth v. Baez,

720 A.2d 711, 720 (Pa. 1998) (quotation marks omitted). See also Hughes,

639 A.2d at 771 (finding that defendant’s statement in response to officer’s

statement was an “unsolicited, gratuitous statement” and, thus, not subject

to suppression).

       At that point in time, Officer Anglemeyer did not question Appellee about

the sexual assault allegations.          Rather, he brought up Appellee’s prior

comments7 about another patient at the facility who was not the Victim.

Anglemeyer 2 at 09:15-09:30. The officer’s statement was not a question nor

was it an explicit request referencing Appellee’s sexual acts with the Victim.

Appellee voluntarily divulged that he had sex with the Victim.       See id. at

09:15-09:30. Moreover, we observe that Officer Anglemeyer’s statement was

not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect,”

which is a requirement for an interrogation to occur. See Hughes, 639 A.2d

763, 771. Compare with Interest of N.M., 222 A.3d 759, 774 (Pa. Super.

2019) (finding that specific questions from detectives about burglary were

meant to produce an incriminating response and necessitated Miranda

____________________________________________

7 Appellee’s prior comments were in response to a question by Officer
Anglemeyer regarding whether Appellee knew why the police may have been
called that night. Anglemeyer 1 at 00:47-00:55.

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warnings). As such, we find the trial court erred in suppressing Appellant’s

unsolicited statement to Officer Anglemeyer about having sex with the Victim.

     Rather, we observe Appellee’s interrogation began when he was directly

confronted with the rape allegations by Detective Wagner. See Anglemeyer

4 at 00:12; Moser at 1:15:30-1:28:18. The detective specifically mentioned

the Victim had reported that Appellant had raped her and questioned Appellant

about the accusations. Id. Appellee responded that the sexual encounter had

been consensual and recounted the events from that day. Moser at 1:15:30-

1:28:18. When Detective Wager asked about the alleged rape, the detective

should have given Appellee his Miranda warnings, as he should have known

his question was likely to elicit an incriminating statement. See Hughes, 639

A.2d at 771. His failure to do so renders Appellee’s statements to Detective

Wagner inadmissible on Miranda grounds. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 at

492 (finding that statements made by suspect without Miranda warnings

were inadmissible).

     As such, we agree with the trial court that Appellee did not receive

proper Miranda warnings before he was interrogated. See N.T., 5/26/22, at

4. Detective Wagner did not provide Appellee with Miranda warnings until

he was frisked and handcuffed by Detective Wagner more than 30 minutes

after the interrogation began. See Moser at 1:52:10-1:53:23. Moreover, the

detective’s misstep did not end there. When Detective Wagner recited the

warnings to Appellee, they were incomplete.      The detective only advised

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Appellee of two out of the four Miranda warnings, namely, his right to remain

silent and that anything he said could and would be used against him. See

id. at 1:53:16-1:53:23. Detective Wagner did not inform Appellee of his right

to an attorney, nor his right to a free attorney. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at

444.    Accordingly, the trial court did not err in suppressing Appellee’s

statements to Detective Wagner because his Fifth Amendment rights as

delineated in Miranda were violated.

       In summary, we find the trial court properly concluded that Appellee

was in a custodial detention at the time of the investigation, albeit on other

grounds — because a reasonable person in Appellee’s place would not have

felt free to leave the officers’ supervision. See N.B., 187 A.3d at 945. We

disagree with the trial court that Appellee’s statement to Officer Anglemeyer

should be suppressed because at the time Appellee made the statement, the

officer was not expressly questioning him and his comments were not

“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement.” Hughes, 639 A.2d at

771. Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court in suppressing Appellee’s

statements to Detective Wagner because at that point, the detective subjected

Appellee to an interrogation and provided defective Miranda warnings.

       Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/22/2023

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