Court Opinion

ID: 9644255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:51:30.062557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:10.583278
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(concurring).
I agree that the trial court should not have accepted appellant’s plea of guilty to murder generally after the *232district attorney represented to appellant that voluntary manslaughter was the only crime of which appellant could be convicted. I am also of opinion that the Court properly reaches the merits of appellant’s challenge to his guilty plea, despite the fact that no petition to withdraw the plea was filed in the trial court. See my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 465 Pa. 379, 350 A.2d 815 (1976). Accordingly, I join in the reversal of the judgment of sentence and the remanding of the case for a new trial.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this concurring opinion.
PER CURIAM.
ORDER
On Petition for Reargument
AND NOW, this 30th day of March, 1976, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the Petition for Reargument in the above-captioned matter is denied.
The heart of this petition for reargument is the allegation by the District Attorney that there is a typographical error in the official transcript, upon which this Court relied in reaching its decision that William Jasper’s guilty plea to murder generally was constitutionally infirm. The disputed question by the Assistant District Attorney, as it appears in the certified transcript, was:
“Q. Voluntary manslaughter, which is the only crime that his Honor could adjudicate you guilty of, is an unlawful killing that is somehow provoked, legally provoked; do you understand that?” [Emphasis added]
It is said that the word “only” should have been the word “other” and since the District Attorney’s office has stated that, the reargument petition should be granted.'
Initially, it should be noted that the answer to this petition contains a specific denial that the transcript con*233tained an error. Faced with this denial, the petitioner would then have had to produce some positive evidence that an error was, in fact, made. Here, no affidavit from the stenographer or replication of the record was produced in either the petition or the reply by the Commonwealth. The only indication that the record contained an error is the bald assertion as to what the former Assistant District Attorney said when he contacted the petitioner’s office. We therefore see no reason for reaching the question of whether or not the statutorily imposed prima facie validity attendant a certified transcript * should be dispelled.
This disposition is consistent with the statutorily created procedure for making alterations to a record as well as with a number of cases decided by this Court on this point. See Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 317 A.2d 258 (1974); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 451 Pa. 500, 304 A.2d 146 (1973); Commonwealth v. Kulik, 420 Pa. 111, 26 A.2d 73 (1966).
In Commonwealth v. Young, supra, when faced with a trial judge’s attempt in a memorandum opinion to cure a defect in the record concerning the charge to the jury on the reasonable doubt standard, we stated:
“However, this Court is statutorily bound to regard the transcribed record as ‘prima facie accurate’ . Section 1199 establishes the sole procedure for correcting errors in the transcribed record of trial. Objections must be made within fifteen days of notice that the record is transcribed and will be filed
Here, no objections were made to the record by either party, no hearing held, and no order made. In short, no attempt was made to comply with section 1199. . In view of the explicit statutory procedure, this Court may not accept as correctly reflecting what *234occurred at trial, anything other than the original record or record as corrected in accordance with section 1199.” [Emphasis added].
456 Pa. at 113, 317 A.2d at 263 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. McDonald, 459 Pa. 17, 326 A.2d 324 (1974); Commonwealth v. Walker, 459 Pa. 12, 326 A.2d 311 (1974). The attempt to correct the record in the Young case occurred before the case was argued in this Court and before any decision was reached on the appeal and still this Court would not accept the suggested correction. Here, no attempt was made to correct the alleged error prior to a final decision on the merits by this Court. We perceive no reason for treating this petition any differently than this issue was treated in the Young case.
, The Commonwealth nowhere contends that it did not have the full fifteen days to review the notes of testimony prior to certification, nor does it offer an explanation for its failure to comply with Section 1199. In view of the strict compliance with this rule required by our case law, we must at this stage disregard the alleged transcription error.
As an alternative this petitioner contends that since the appellant, in claiming his guilty plea was involuntary, did not point specifically to the word “only” in the colloquy, this Court should not have taken notice of it. This argument forgets that Pa.R.Crim.P. 319(a) requires that a judge “shall not accept it [guilty plea] unless he determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered. Such inquiry shall appear on the record.” [Emphasis added]. Here, Jasper in his appeal challenged the voluntariness of his guilty plea alleging a violation of his right to due process. Once the issue is raised our rules required that the constitutional validity of the plea be demonstrated on the record. Our review of the record indicated a serious *235misrepresentation during the colloquy which when considered with the other factors apparent in the case rendered the guilty plea invalid. Failing to see any merit in this contention or in the contention concerning the alleged transcription error, the petition for reargument is hereby denied.

 Act of May 11, 1911, Public Law 279, Section 4, 12 P.S. Section 1199.