Court Opinion

ID: 9625973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:57:25.606599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:18.478795
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
dissenting.
I concede that the trial court’s first-degree murder jury instruction in this case was erroneous and that the error is one of constitutional dimension. However, contrary to the majority, I believe that the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A violation committed at trial that infringes upon a defendant’s constitutional rights is presumed to be prejudicial and entitles defendant to a new trial unless the error committed is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(b) (1988); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1982). The overwhelming evidence of guilt may render error of constitutional dimension harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969); State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 400, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988).
In Chapman, the United States Supreme Court held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11. The Court said that, although “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless, . . . [not] all trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal.” Id. at 23, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 710. An error involving the denial of a federal constitutional right can be deemed harmless in a state criminal proceeding if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 705.
Applying the foregoing standard to the facts in this case, I have no doubt that the evidence against defendant, even in view of the erroneous instruction given, is so overwhelming that the *61error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The impact of the tainted instruction on the mind of an average juror in the face of the overwhelming evidence of guilt was “so unimportant and insignificant” that it must be deemed harmless. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 709.
First-degree murder is the intentional and unlawful killing of another human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation. N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (1989); State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 77, 405 S.E.2d 145, 154 (1991). Premeditation means that the defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim some period of time, however short, before the actual killing. State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 238, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). Deliberation means an intent to kill executed by the defendant in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful purpose, and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation. Bonney, 329 N.C. at 77, 405 S.E.2d at 154. A specific intent to kill is subsumed within the elements of premeditation and deliberation, and therefore, proof of premeditation and deliberation is also proof of intent to kill. “A specific intent to kill is a necessary constituent of the elements of premeditation and deliberation, and therefore, proof of premeditation and deliberation is also proof of intent to kill.” State v. Thomas, 332 N.C. 544, 560, 423 S.E.2d 75, 84.
Because premeditation and deliberation relate to processes of the mind, they are rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence. State v. Olsen, 330 N.C. 557, 565, 411 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1992). Some of the circumstances from which an inference of premeditation and deliberation can be drawn are:
(1) absence of provocation on the part of the deceased, (2) the statements and conduct of the defendant before and after the killing, (3) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased, (4) ill will or previous difficulties between the parties, (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless, (6) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner, and (7) the nature and number of the victim’s wounds.

Id.

*62The evidence presented at defendant’s trial clearly showed that he committed a murder that was premeditated and deliberated.
First, the victim in no way provoked defendant to commit the crime in question. The victim was asleep in his bed when defendant called the victim’s house and asked the victim for a ride to Shell Bank Farm, where defendant worked. After giving defendant a ride to the farm, the victim remained outside in his truck while the defendant went into the office. While sitting in the truck, the victim was shot through the left side of the head by defendant, who was inside the office. The victim managed to get out of the truck and walk into the office. Defendant alleges that the victim then picked up a knife in the kitchen and began to go after the defendant, but no knife was ever found at the scene. Jennifer Simmons, the victim’s wife, testified that her husband was not carrying a knife on the night in question and that he never carried a knife. While the victim was in the office, defendant, not content with the fact that the victim already had one bullet in the left side of his head, shot the victim again in the right side of the head in the cheek area. There is no evidence of provocation on the part of the victim in this case.
Second, the evidence presented at defendant’s trial showed a ruthless killing committed by a man who had devised an elaborate plan to kill his father-in-law. Ceclia Edmondson testified that on 9 July 1990, she was on the porch of her house, which was next door to the victim’s house. Defendant was sitting on the hood of a car in her driveway. Edmondson heard the victim accuse defendant of being a wife beater and ask defendant what kind of drugs he was taking. After the victim went inside his house, defendant stated, “I’m going to kill that bald headed, mother-f — ing-son-ofa-b— if he doesn’t leave me alone.”
During work on 10 July 1990, defendant asked Kerney Harrison, a fellow employee, for a ride to work the next day. Defendant had never before asked Harrison for. a ride to work because either his mother-in-law or his father-in-law drove him to work in the morning. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on 10 July, defendant called Gary Stambaugh, the manager who lived at the farm, and asked if he could borrow the farm truck to go fishing that night. Defendant then called the victim’s house at approximately 9:00 p.m. and asked the victim if he would give him a ride to the farm. Defendant told the victim that the lights had gone out at the farm and that *63Hanns-Deerter Alhusen, the owner of the hog farm, had called defendant and asked him to check on the farm. As Alhusen later testified, neither he nor anyone else at the farm had called defendant to check on the lights at the farm. Defendant went to the victim’s house, and they drove out to the hog farm, which was approximately three-fourths of a mile off of Highway 97. Upon arriving at the farm, defendant had the victim stop at Stambaugh’s house so that defendant could pick up the farm truck. It was common knowledge at the farm that a .22-caliber rifle was kept in the farm truck. The victim then followed the defendant, who was in the farm truck, to the farm office. After going into the office, defendant went into the room where the .22-caliber bullets were kept, loaded the rifle, aimed out the window, and shot the victim in the head while the victim was waiting in the truck for the defendant. Defendant’s plan to kill his father-in-law was almost successful at that point, but his father-in-law survived the bullet wound to his head and managed to get out of his truck and walk into the office. At this point, defendant again shot his father-in-law in the head. This time he was successful in his plan to kill his father-in-law.
Defendant, in his confession, claimed that he then went to get help for the victim. Defendant claimed that he first drove the farm truck, with the victim following him with two bullets in his head, four-tenths of a mile from the farm office and then left the farm truck there. Defendant then proceeded to take the victim, in the victim’s truck, seven to eight miles to the house of defendant’s brother, who lives in Baker’s Trailer Park. All of defendant’s actions were taken under the pretense of wanting to “help” the victim. Yet, defendant knew that Stambaugh lived at the farm house; in fact, defendant talked to Stambaugh that night before taking the farm truck. Defendant made no attempt to get Stambaugh to call for help nor did he himself call for help. Instead, defendant drove to Baker’s Trailer Park, and when his brother would not answer the door, he went to Albry Thurman’s mobile home and told Thurman that his father-in-law had been the victim of a “drive-by” shooting and had been shot twice. Not only did defendant not seek available help for his father-in-law, he made up a false story as to what had happened on the night in question in order to cover up his crime.
Third, defendant’s confession erases any possible doubt as to the lack of premeditation and deliberation on the part of defendant. *64On 13 July 1990 at 5:40 p.m., defendant made the following signed confession to Detective Donnie A. Lynn with the Edgecombe County Sheriff’s Department:
My name is Tim Keel.
I shot my father-in-law at the hog farm July 10, 1990.
I made a phone call to 442-7970. I think John answered.
I told him I had to go to work.
Me and Amy [defendant’s wife] were at O’Deh’s store on Church Street.
We got back to the house.
My father-in-law and I talked to each other.
We arrived at the hog farm.
I got the farm truck; went ahead of him to unit five hundred.
He parked his truck beside the building.
I went inside the unit and fired a shot into the cab.
The rifle was in the farm truck.
I shot through the window in Johnny’s office.
John Simmons [victim] got out of his truck and he was bleeding. He kept saying he was hit.
As he entered the door, I told him [to] sit down in the kitchen area.
I shot again because he had a knife and was coming after me.
He fell down and got up and I helped him into the truck to get him some help.
He got into his truck. He was conscious and kept saying, “Help me. Help me.”
I carried him to Baker’s Trailer Park and tried to get him some help.
I passed a red car on the way to Baker’s Trailer Park.
They were yelling and drinking and riding around.
*65This is where I got the red car descriptions from.
John Simmons [victim] carried me back to the edge of the path where I left the farm truck.
We went back to the hog house on his truck.
I don’t know why I did it. I didn’t have any reason for shooting him.
I threw the gun in one of the fields in the hog pen.
In addition, on 11 July 1990, SBI Agent Dennis Honeycutt examined the farm office and the area outside the office. He not only observed blood all over the office, but he also performed luminol and phenolphthalein tests to determine the presence of blood not detectable by the human eye. A large bloodstained area was discovered on the ground outside the front door of the office. Honeycutt also observed a .22-caliber shell casing near the bloodstain. Just outside the front door, blood was also observed on a small cement pad. Upon entering the front door of the office, Honeycutt discovered on the floor three cloth strands from a cloth mop; each strand had bloodstains on it. In the dressing room where the employees change for work, there were a series of blood spatters on the wall. Honeycutt testified that “[a] blood spatter is an area of blood that has been acted on by force. The area of blood would be basically in flight. The blood would be moving through the air striking some object and causing a spatter.” Bloodstains were also noted in the shower. Honeycutt further found bloodstains on the washing machine in the laundry room, one on top of the washer and another under the lid. Also in the laundry room was a pair of coveralls that had a large bloodstain on the bottom of the pants leg. On the floor near the shower area was a shoe pattern in blood. The door leading from the laundry room into the kitchen also had four blood spatters on it. Blood spatters were also noted on the bottom portion of the refrigerator in the kitchen, as well as on the walls. On the back porch, Honeycutt also observed a cloth mop with bloodstains on it. Further cloth strands with bloodstains on them were also found in the trash can in the kitchen. James Stevey, an employee at Shell Bank Farm, testified that when he left work on 10 July 1990 he did not see any blood in the office.
Furthermore, Dr. Louis Levy, pathologist and medical examiner for Nash and Edgecombe Counties, testified that he conducted an *66autopsy of the victim’s body on 11 July 1990. Upon external examination, Dr. Levy found bruises, contusions, abrasions, and lacerations on the left side of the body. In addition, there were two gunshot wounds to the head. One gunshot wound was in the right cheek at ear level and was identified as an entrance wound. There was a second entrance wound behind the left ear. The two bullet paths came from opposite sides of the head. Dr. Levy testified that, in his opinion, both bullets that struck the victim were fired from a distant range.
Finally, defendant clearly tried to cover up the fact that he had committed a murder. After shooting his father-in-law, defendant went to Albry Thurman’s mobile home and told Thurman that the victim had been shot during a drive-by shooting. Shelby Thurman corroborated her husband Albry’s testimony, adding that defendant stated that the drive-by shooting had occurred from a red station wagon at the Gay Road dumpsters.
Deputy Robert Davis with the Edgecombe County Sheriff’s Department testified that he went to the Thurmans’ mobile home and talked to defendant on the night in question. Defendant told Davis that earlier in the evening he had received a phone call to go to Shell Bank Farm. Defendant’s father-in-law, the victim, drove defendant out to the farm; on the way back, with the victim driving, defendant stated that someone in a red station wagon had shot the victim twice near the intersection of Leggett Road and Gay Road.
Sergeant Donnie Lynn also interviewed defendant at the mobile home. Defendant told Lynn a similar story but added that when he and the victim passed the red station wagon, defendant heard two pops, after which the victim slumped over and defendant managed to stop the truck. Defendant stated that he managed to pull the victim over to the passenger side of the truck and that he then drove the truck to Baker’s Trailer Park. Lynn testified that defendant showed him where all of these events occurred but that they did not go inside the farm office because defendant said it was locked and he did not have a key.
James Stevey, an employee at Shell Bank Farm, testified that on 11 July 1990, the day after the murder, he noticed a puddle of blood in the sandy gravel in front of the office door. He stated that when defendant stepped outside the front door of the office, *67defendant went straight to the puddle of blood and kicked soil over it. Defendant said nothing while he did this.
Ceclia Edmondson testified that she went to the hospital the night that the victim was shot. While at the hospital, Edmondson saw defendant, who stuck his bloodied shirt in her pocketbook. She took the shirt home and washed it for him.
In conclusion, although I concede that the trial court erred in its first-degree murder instruction to the jury, I strongly believe that the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented at trial could leave no doubt in any reasonable juror’s mind that defendant committed a murder with premeditation and deliberation; therefore, defendant had the necessary specific intent to commit first-degree murder. It is for this reason that I dissent from the majority’s opinion.
Justice Lake joins in this dissenting opinion.