Court Opinion

ID: 9729803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:49:16.734869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.273170
License: Public Domain

Weaver, C.J.
I write separately to concur in the holding and result of the lead opinion regarding the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto of §§ 45 and *13046 of the Administrative Procedures Act.1 The legislative veto violates the enactment and presentment provisions of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 4, §§ 1, 22, 26, 33, and, therefore, violates the separation of powers, Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Further, I agree with the lead opinion that the offending portions of §§ 45 and 46 creating the legislative veto are severable from the Administrative Procedures Act. I leave to another case the question of the constitutionality of the delegation of rulemaking authority to agencies.
Markman, J. Although I concur in the result reached by the lead opinion, I write separately because: (1) I do not agree with the lead opinion’s reliance on the rationale from Immigration & Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919; 103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 (1983),1 and (2) I do not agree that 1977 PA 108 violates the Enactment and Presentment Clauses of the Michigan Constitution. However, I agree with the lead opinion’s result because the challenged involvement by the Legislature in the implementation phase of agency rulemaking: (1) exceeds the limits of such involvement provided for by Const 1963, art 4, § 37, and (2) conflicts with the expressed will of the voters who rejected Proposal A in 1984.
*131I
This case arises from a dispute concerning whether the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) could legitimately promulgate new rules pursuant to an enabling act2 without first complying with certain steps under the Administrative Procedures Act (apa) that were added by 1977 PA 108. The challenged procedures require proposed rules to be submitted by the proposing agency to the Michigan Legislature’s Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR) and be approved either by the JCAR or, if JCAR approval is not forthcoming, by concurrent resolution of the Legislature, before becoming effective. See MCL 24.245-24.246; MSA 3.560(145)-3.560(146).
From its inception, the constitutionality of the Legislature’s involvement, pursuant to 1977 PA 108, at the implementation phase of agency rulemaking has been questioned, but this Court properly found it necessary to wait for the issue to arise in an actual case or controversy. See Request for Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1977 PA 108, 402 Mich 83; 260 NW2d 436 (1977). In 1984, the voters rejected Proposal A, which would have amended Const 1963, art 4, § 37 to expressly permit the Legislature, or a joint *132committee thereof, to approve or disapprove, in any manner provided by law, any rule proposed by an administrative agency.
In 1995, the mdoc formulated rules to implement a new standardized visitation policy, and commenced the procedures for promulgating new administrative rules under the apa. This included holding public hearings and submitting the proposed rules to the jcar. The jcar did not initially approve the proposed rules, but, before a second scheduled hearing could be conducted, the MDOC withdrew the rules from JCAR consideration and forwarded them to the Governor and the Office of Regulatory Reform. The rules were then promulgated without approval by the JCAR or the Legislature when they were transmitted by the Office of Regulatory Reform to the Secretary of State.
Separate actions for mandamus and an injunction, seeking to block application of the new rules by the mdoc, were unsuccessful in the trial courts, and were consolidated in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found that the requirement that proposed agency rules be approved by the JCAR or the Legislature before becoming effective “fails to satisfy the enactment and presentation provisions of the Michigan Constitution,” and “[i]n a broader sense, . . . violates the doctrine of separation of powers.” 222 Mich App 385, 389, 398; 564 NW2d 130 (1997).
n
The analysis of whether it is constitutional for a statute to require that the jcar or the Legislature approve new administrative rules before they can *133become effective, pursuant to 1977 PA 108, entails de novo review that starts from the presumption that the statute is constitutional, and recognizes a violation only if its unconstitutionality is clear. McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 24; 597 NW2d 148 (1999). We must look for the meaning of our constitution by a search for “what law the people have made” People v Reichenbach, 459 Mich 109, 119; 587 NW2d 1 (1998), indirectly quoting People v Harding, 53 Mich 481, 485; 19 NW 155 (1884). “The first rule a court should follow in ascertaining the meaning of words in a constitution is to give effect to the plain meaning of such words as understood by the people who adopted it.” Bond v Ann Arbor School Dist, 383 Mich 693, 699; 178 NW2d 484 (1970).
The lead opinion follows the reasoning of Chadha to determine that what the JCAR or the Legislature does when it blocks the promulgation of proposed agency rules is “legislative action,”3 concluding that this amounts to legislation without compliance with the enactment and presentment requirements.4 However, given that this Court is not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional construction when interpreting the Michigan Constitu*134tion,5 I would adopt what I perceive to be the better reasoned approach of Justice White’s Chadha dissent.6 Justice White made these observations:
Without the Legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson’s choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the executive branch and independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role. [Chadha, supra at 968 (White, J., dissenting).]
The history of the legislative veto also makes it clear that it has not been a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches— the concerns of Madison and Hamilton. Rather, the veto has been a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under Article I as the nation’s lawmaker. While the President has often objected to particular legislative vetoes, generally those left in the hands of congressional committees, the Executive has more often agreed to legislative review as the price for a broad delegation of authority. To be sure, the President may have preferred unrestricted power, but that could be precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check on the exercise of delegated authority. [Id. at 974.]
The Constitution does not directly authorize or prohibit the legislative veto. Thus, our task should be to determine *135whether the legislative veto is consistent with the purposes of [US Const] art. I and the principles of Separation of Powers which are reflected in that Article and throughout the Constitution. We should not find the lack of a specific constitutional authorization for the legislative veto surprising, and I would not infer disapproval of the mechanism from its absence. From the summer of 1787 to the present the government of the United States has become an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers. Only within the last half century has the complexity and size of the Federal Government’s responsibilities grown so greatly that the Congress must rely on the legislative veto as the most effective if not the only means to insure their role as the nation’s lawmakers. [Id. at 977-978.]
The power to exercise a legislative veto is not the power to write new law without bicameral approval or presidential consideration. The veto must be authorized by statute and may only negative what an Executive department or independent agency has proposed. On its face, the legislative veto no more allows one House of Congress to make law than does the presidential veto confer such power upon the President. [Id. at 980.]
[T]he Framers were concerned with limiting the methods for enacting new legislation. The Framers were aware of the experience of Pennsylvania where the legislature had evaded the requirements attached to the passing of legislation by the use of “resolves,” and the criticisms directed at this practice .... There is no record that the Convention contemplated, let alone intended, that these Article I requirements would someday be invoked to restrain the scope of Congressional authority pursuant to duly-enacted law. [Id. at 981-982.]
I fear it will now be more difficult [as a result of the majority’s decision] “to insure that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the people .. . .” [Id. at 1002-1003.]
*136Because I agree with this reasoning, I do not generally view a statutorily authorized legislative veto over proposed agency rulemaking as unconstitutional. Essentially, such a veto procedure represents an attempt by the legislative branch of government to counterbalance the problem within the modem administrative state of the delegation to the executive branch of government of what was once viewed as legislative power.7 Such delegations themselves permit executive agencies to pervasively regulate, i.e., legislate, without satisfying the enactment or presentment requirements of the state constitution. For this Court over the years to have countenanced such delegations of essentially legislative authority, yet now to insist that the Legislature cannot attempt to staunch this loss of authority through the enactment of a legislative veto, would be, in my judgment, to alter the balance of separation of powers, but for the existence of the Michigan-specific circumstances8 described in *137part m.9
The central difference between the lead opinion’s approach and my own is that, in my judgment, the lead opinion focuses only on the actual moment when the jcar or the Legislature attempts to participate in the promulgation of agency rules (i.e:, it examines only the legislative veto itself), rather than the validity of the authorization for such conduct by members of the legislative branch. Isolating this single moment in the process ignores the larger context. By contrast, I would examine the entire process to determine *138whether the statute mandating legislative approval of agency rules, which was introduced by bill and met the bicameral and presentation requirements, is constitutional.
Here, if the legislative veto had not been passed by both houses of the Legislature, or had not been presented to the Governor, I would have no difficulty agreeing that such a deficiency would be constitutionally fatal. Likewise, if the veto purported to bestow on the JCAR, or the Legislature as a whole, the power to enact new laws without approval of both houses and presentment to the Governor, I would not hesitate to strike it down on the basis of the enactment or presentment requirements of the constitution. However, I see no applicability of these requirements to statutorily authorized participation by the jcak or the Legislature in the implementation of previously enacted enabling statutes.10
m
A
Clearly, determining whether 1977 PA 108 is constitutional requires us to interpret the Michigan Constitution. This Court’s obligation in that regard is to find the law that the people have made, see Reichenbach, supra at 119. This, of course, is consistent with the view expressed by Justice White when he stated that the Court’s “task should be to determine whether *139the legislative veto is consistent with the purposes of [US Const] Art. I and the principles of Separation of Powers that are reflected in that Article and throughout the Constitution.” Chadha, supra at 977.
“Separation of powers” under the Michigan Constitution is no more, and no less, than the sum of the specific constitutional provisions assigning or limiting particular powers and functions among the three separate branches of state government.11 Consequently, it is meaningless to say that a particular statute violates the doctrine of separation of powers without first finding a specific constitutional violation grounded in the language or overall structure of the constitution.12 Questions that aid in identifying a violation of a specific provision assigning or limiting power include: (1) what are the limits of the particular power assigned by the constitution to a particular branch? and (2) *140what limitations upon the power of one branch are implied in those granted to another?13
Hence, the starting point for determining whether 1977 PA 108 is consistent with the sum of the specific constitutional provisions assigning or limiting specific powers and functions among the three branches of state government, is the language and overall structure of the Michigan Constitution. The Michigan Constitution vests: (1) the legislative power of the state of Michigan in the Senate and House of Representatives, Const 1963, art 4, § 1, (2) the executive power in the Governor, Const 1963, art 5, § 1, and (3) the judicial power exclusively in one court of justice, Const 1963, art 6, § 1. Against this background, we should turn to consideration of more specific constitutional provisions granting or limiting powers. Of central importance to the instant analysis is art 4, § 37.
B
As the lead opinion notes when addressing whether the nondelegation doctrine has been violated, the *141implementation of a law through a proper grant of authority to promulgate rules, once the necessary authority has been validly delegated, is considered a proper executive function. People v Turmon, 417 Mich 638, 644-645, 648-649; 340 NW2d 620 (1983). However, Const 1963, art 4, § 37, defines a limited role for the Legislature to thereafter involve itself in the agency rulemaking process, stating:
The legislature may by concurrent resolution empower a joint committee of the legislature, acting between sessions, to suspend any rule or regulation promulgated by an administrative agency subsequent to the adjournment of the last preceding regular legislative session. Such suspension shall continue no longer than the end of the next regular legislative session.
Like the lead opinion, I draw certain inferences from this limited grant of authority. Primarily, I infer that the people who adopted the 1963 Constitution, and chose to permit the Legislature to empower a legislative committee only to temporarily suspend rules, and only those promulgated between legislative sessions, did not intend to authorize their Legislature to unilaterally and permanently block the promulgation of agency rules by bestowing upon itself, through legislation, a significantly greater role in the implementation of agency rulemaking than the express limits contained in this provision.
Unlike the framers of the United States Constitution, the voters of Michigan who, in 1963, adopted our present state constitution were not constrained in their ability to envision the modem administrative state, yet the limited role for the Legislature described in Const 1963, art 4, § 37 is the one for which they expressly provided. Consequently, there is *142an unavoidable negative implication in this language that is couched in terms of an affirmative, but circumscribed, grant of legislative power.14 That is, that with respect to the authority of legislative committees to veto the rules and regulations of the executive branch, the Legislature may do what is specifically set forth in this provision and no more.
This conclusion is buttressed by the Court of Appeals observation, with which I agree, “that the framers of the constitution were operating under the assumption that the Legislature only had the constitutional authority to affect agency rules by bills . . . .” 222 Mich App 400. Specifically, in 1958, an opinion of the Attorney General concluded that, despite a statute permitting it, “the legislature by the adoption of a concurrent resolution may not constitutionally suspend, alter or abrogate a rule or regulation promulgated by a state agency .... Neither can a joint committee of the legislature . ...” 2 OAG, 1958, No 3352, pp 246, 254 (October 8, 1958).
The convention record reveals that, as originally proposed, art 4, § 37, would have expressly authorized delegations of authority to administrative agencies to establish rules or regulations of general applicability, reserving in the Legislature the power to sus*143pend or annul such rules by legislation, while permitting a legislative committee to suspend such rules until the next session of the Legislature. The delegates were informed by the Chairman of the Committee on Legislative Powers that the effect of this language would be to increase the power that could be exercised by a legislative committee, on the basis of then present law as interpreted by the Attorney General. 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2419. When the proposed provision was amended to reflect its present language, the Chairman of the Committee on Legislative Powers was asked to give examples of why art 4, § 37 was necessary. The chairman responded by describing two incidents when the revenue department had promulgated rules and the Legislature had to quickly “pass legislation to correct what we considered injustices in that field. . . . They corrected by legislative acts, which is the only way they could do it . . . .”2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2970.
Whether the Attorney General was correct in concluding that the Legislature was previously unable to affect agency-promulgated rules except by legislation is not critical here. What is critical is that, while working under that presumption, a carefully limited grant of authority to only temporarily suspend agency rules is what the framers drafted, and it is what the voters ratified. Clearly, neither the framers of this new constitution, nor the ratifying voters, were precluded from changing what they then believed to be the state of the law, inasmuch as whatever constitutional language they adopted would be this state’s highest law. Hence, this history strongly supports the negative implication that flows naturally from the lim*144iting language in the affirmative grant of power in art 4, § 37.
The dissent examines this same convention record, focusing exclusively on the fact that the purpose of art 4, § 37 was to provide the Legislature with some means of checking executive rulemaking that occurs between legislative sessions, instead of also considering the inference drawn from the framers’ conclusion that such a grant of express authority was necessary in the first place. The dissent then concludes that “[t]he record does not support the concurrence’s ‘limited grant’ analysis.” Post at 163. However, this reasoning ignores the scope of legislative power to affect agency rulemaking that the framers understood to exist absent art 4, § 37, and instead implies that the framers’ understanding was wrong. Although I agree with the dissent’s statement that, with regard to art 4, § 37, “a majority of delegates were concerned with ensuring legislative power, rather than limiting it,” that concern arose from the limits on legislative power that those same delegates understood to be imposed by the sum of the other provisions of the constitution. Post at 163. How can one turn to the convention record in order to consider intent, accept that art 4, § 37 was intended to grant additional power to the Legislature, but not accept the framers’ view on the scope of legislative power absent art 4, § 37?15
*145The dissent concedes that “[t]he prevailing view was that art 4, § 37 was needed to close a loophole previously exploited by executive agencies.” Post at 163 (emphasis added). Yet, according to the dissent’s interpretation, art 4, § 37 was wholly unnecessary because the framers inaccurately viewed the balance of the 1963 Constitution as limiting the power of the Legislature to simply pass a law like 1977 PA 108, thus eliminating any problem with rules being promulgated between legislative sessions. This is a novel method of divining constitutional meaning, i.e., inquiring not into what the framers actually intended and accomplished, but into what they would have intended and accomplished had they thought differently. Instead, this Court should avoid construing the constitution in a way that renders a provision effectively inoperative. House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 585; 506 NW2d 190 (1993). If art 4, § 37 is a limited, but necessary, grant of additional power, the obvious implication is that, absent this provision, the Legislature could not wield even this limited power, let alone a greater power, to affect agency rules that have been promulgated pursuant to previously enacted enabling statutes.
Consequently, I agree with the dissent’s recognition that art 4, § 37 serves only as a “stopgap” measure. However, I respectfully disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that this provision does not foreclose broader participation by the Legislature in rulemaking, or that Michigan’s presumption of statutory constitutionality requires that we interpret art 4, § 37 so as to reconcile it with the constitutionality of 1977 PA 108. Such a reconciliation would be contrary to the plain meaning of the words in art 4, § 37 as under*146stood by the people who adopted the 1963 Constitution. See Bond, supra at 699. As Justice Cooley’s admonishment reminds us:
Every constitution has a history of its own which is likely to be more or less peculiar; and unless interpreted in the light of this history, is liable to be made to express purposes which were never within the minds of the people in agreeing to it. . . . [This Court’s] duty is to enforce the law which the people have made, and not some other law which the words of the constitution may possibly be made to express. [Harding, supra at 485 (emphasis added).]
If 1977 PA 108 could be reasonably reconciled to comport with art 4, § 37 and its history, I would not oppose doing so, but the authority relied on by the dissent cannot justify changing art 4, § 37 to comport with 1977 PA 108. 16
*147After comparing Const 1963, art 4, § 37 with the role that 1977 PA 108 attempts to bestow on the JCAR (and the Legislature acting without compliance with the Presentment Clause), one cannot but conclude that 1977 PA 108 is an impermissible expansion of the explicitly limited role provided for the Legislature in the veto of agency rules by Const 1963, art 4, § 37 and, therefore, an encroachment upon the powers assigned to the Executive by the 1963 Constitution.
c
In assessing the constitutionality of 1977 PA 108, I am also guided by the fact that the ultimate source of political power in Michigan, the people—the same “we the people” who ratified the 1963 Constitution and whose constitutionally expressed intentions this Court is obligated to effectuate—were presented in 1984 with Proposal A, which would have amended art 4, § 37 to expressly permit the type of legislative approval of proposed agency rules at issue here. The voters rejected this proposed amendment, and I believe that significant weight must be accorded to that rejection.
I am cognizant of the often dubious exercise of attaching meaning to the inaction of a legislative body, particularly insofar as silence in the face of court decisions can be regarded as “legislative acquiescence.” See Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 258-261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999) (“sound principles of statutory construction require that Michigan courts determine the Legislature’s intent from its words, not from its silence”). However, a rejection of a proposed constitutional amendment by a popular vote of the people cannot be equated, in my judg*148merit, with legislative silence because, unlike the temporary nature of each passing Legislature, the people of this state, in a political sense, are an enduring and unchanging institution. “We the people” are the one political constant since the enactment of our constitution.17
To appreciate the distinction, one must appreciate why legislative acquiescence is such a weak indicator of legislative intent. A long line of cases, state and federal, has recognized with respect to congressional intent that “the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” United States v Price, 361 US 304, 313; 80 S Ct 326; 4 L Ed 2d 334 (1960).18 This Court’s recent disapproval of legislative acquiescence in Donajkowski, supra at 258-261, implicitly recognized that the only legislative intent that is relevant to interpreting a statute is the intent of the Legislature that enacted it. Consequently, subsequent inaction by a different Legislature, whether it be silence or the rejection of an alternative proposal, cannot properly serve as an indi*149cator of what a prior Legislature intended. Given, however, that the people are not a political institution akin to the Legislature, which is transformed every two years, a subsequent vote of the people, the same “we the people” who adopted the 1963 Constitution, does provide relevant insight into the intent of the appropriate enacting body.
Although it is possible to speculate regarding the subjective motivations of those voting against Proposal A, the only reasonable inference, in my judgment, that can be drawn from this rejection is that the people did not want the proposed provision to become part of the Michigan Constitution. The dissent suggests that the defeat of Proposal A is “irrelevant” because voters reject proposals for a variety of reasons and that such defeated proposals do not become law. This argument focuses only on the direct legal ramifications of a defeat to the proposal itself, and ignores the legislative insight that can be drawn from this defeat as to the intent of the enduring political body that previously adopted the 1963 Constitution.19
*150Indeed, I strongly disagree with the dissent’s assertion that this popular vote of the people, expressly provided for by the constitution, is “irrelevant” to the present analysis. To disagree about the exact meaning of such a vote is understandable. But there is no basis for derogating the significance of the electorate’s exercise of their constitutional authority as merely a “ballot-box rejection” that came twenty years too late. Indeed, there is no more constitutionally significant event than when the wielders of “[a]ll political power” under that document, Const 1963, art 1, § 1, choose to exercise their extraordinary authority to directly approve or disapprove of an amendment thereto. Const 1963, art 12, §§ 1 and 2. The proposed amendment here was widely debated by the people and their representatives, as well as within the media. Well over three million voters, presumably after reflecting upon the merits of the amendment, marked “yes” or “no” on ballots that described “a proposal TO ALLOW THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE administrative rules,” with approximately three-fifths of those voters marking “no.”
Apparently, in the eyes of the dissent, these voters were laboring under a misapprehension that the exercise of this authority was somehow relevant to the governance of this state. Little did they know, however, that only if they had approved the amendment would their decision have been deemed relevant later by some justices of this Court. Apparently because they made the “wrong” choice, their vote is now deemed by the dissent to be “irrelevant” in shedding *151light upon what meaning this same electorate accorded to the constitution when they ratified it in 1963.20
Further, contrary to the dissent’s characterization, I do not assert, or imply, that “we the people” directly rejected 1977 PA 108 because the language it added to the apa mirrors that of the defeated Proposal A. Rather, the vote on Proposal A obviously did not involve 1977 PA 108. The will of the electorate, as expressed by their rejection of the proposal, is relevant only inasmuch as it provides insight into what the people understood art 4, § 37 to mean when they ratified it. A rejected proposal does not “trump” legislation, but a constitutional provision does.21
*152Therefore, I believe that it is not “acquiescence” when “we the people” exercise the ultimate political power under our constitution and vote against expressly permitting one branch of the government to exercise a particular control over another. I view the rejection of Proposal A as a meaningful expression of will of the people, the same people whose intent is necessary to an understanding of the 1963 Constitution.
CONCLUSION
I find this to be a far closer case than do my colleagues with whom I concur, but nonetheless would also conclude that 1977 PA 108 is unconstitutional because: (1) it exceeds the express limitations on the Legislature’s involvement in agency rulemaking under Const 1963, art 4, § 37, and (2) it conflicts with the expressed will of the voters who rejected Proposal A in 1984.
Unlike the lead opinion, however, I would not focus strictly on the moment when the jcar or the Legislature attempts to veto rules in order to assess the constitutionality of such conduct. Rather, I would focus on the constitutionality of the larger process, which recognizes that the statutory authorization for such involvement fully complied with the enactment and presentation requirements. Further, I do not view a legislative veto, which serves only to preserve the constitutional role of the Legislature as the principal enactor of fundamental policy decisions, to be an invalid exercise in “legislating” without adherence to the enactment and presentation requirements of the Michigan Constitution. Rather, I believe that a system in which essentially legislative decisions are made by *153the executive branch of government poses a greater threat to the separation of powers mandate of Const 1963, art 3, § 2. If not for the specific language of art 4, § 37, and the people’s rejection of Proposal A, I would favor upholding 1977 PA 108.22
I agree with the analysis in parts n(B), n(c), and h(d) of the lead opinion concerning the severability of the offending portions of §§ 45 and 46 of the apa, the constitutionality of the instant enabling act pursuant to current nondelegation doctrine, and the validity of the challenged rules in view of the scope of rulemaking authority granted to the MDOC by MCL 791.206; MSA 28.2276.23 For these reasons, I concur in the overall conclusion articulated in part m of the lead opinion.

 Specifically, subsections 8, 9, 10, and 12 of § 45 and the first sentence of subsection 1 of § 46

 In Chadha, a majority of the United States Supreme Court invalidated a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that permitted either House of Congress, by passing a resolution, to veto an Attorney General’s decision to suspend the deportation of an alien. The articulated basis for this holding was that the veto power sought to be exercised under the challenged section was “legislative action” overriding the Attorney General’s exercise of statutorily authorized discretion and, therefore, in violation of the bicameral and presentment requirements of US Const, art I, §§ 1 and 7.

 The enabling act in question provides, inter alia, the director of the mdoc with the authority to promulgate rules for:
(a) The control, management, and operation of the general affairs of the department.
(d) The management and control of state penal institutions, correctional farms, probation recovery camps, and programs for the care and supervision of youthful trainees .... [MCL 791.206(1); MSA 28.2276(1).]

 The Chadha majority presumed that when one House of Congress acts it is acting within the powers properly assigned to it under the United States Constitution; then it held that a one-house legislative veto was within the category of legislative actions subject to bicameral and presentment requirements because it: (1) altered the rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch; (2) supplanted legislative action; (3) involved determinations of policy; and (4) was not among the situations enumerated in the United States Constitution where one House of Congress was authorized to act alone. Chadha, supra at 952-958.

 The Michigan Constitution provides that “[a]R legislation shaR be by biR,” art 4, § 22, and that “[ejvery biR passed by the legislature shaR be presented to the governor before it becomes law,” art 4, § 33.

 See City of Mesquite v Aladdin’s Castle, Inc, 455 US 283, 293; 102 S Ct 1070; 71 L Ed 2d 152 (1982); Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 758-759; 506 NW2d 209 (1993).

 Justice Rehnquist authored a separate dissent in which Justice White also joined.

 The current test to distinguish when agency rulemaking authority is an invalid delegation of legislative power and when it is a valid authorization to use discretion in the implementation of the law is whether the enabling act, together with any applicable administrative safeguards, provides sufficient standards “as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits,” so that the rulemaking authority can be construed as “conferring administrative not legislative power and as vesting discretionary, not arbitrary authority.” People v Turmon, 417 Mich 638, 644; 340 NW2d 620 (1983), quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 309; 240 NW2d 206 (1976), quoting Argo Oil Corp v Atwood, 274 Mich 47, 53; 264 NW 285 (1935) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Westervelt v Natural Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412, 436-437; 263 NW2d 564 (1978) (Williams, J.).

 Given that we are interpreting the Michigan Constitution, Michigan-specific circumstances are of overriding importance. The lead opinion notes that the high courts of eight sister states have found legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking to be unconstitutional under their respective state constitutions, while two states have upheld them. However, like Michigan, none of these states is obligated to follow federal analysis when *137interpreting their own constitutions. See City of Mesquite, n 5 supra at 293. Consequently, a tally of the respective outcomes of these decisions is not nearly so persuasive as consideration of the state-specific circumstances that supported the results under the respective state constitutions. In Martinez v Dep’t of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 165 Wis 2d 687; 478 NW2d 582 (1992), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the legislative veto provision at issue (which involved only temporary suspension by a legislative committee), that court noted Wisconsin’s historical view of its implied separation of powers doctrine and the important public policy of ensuring that “elected officials [are] accountable for rules governing the public welfare.” Id. at 701. The Idaho Supreme Court, which also upheld the constitutionality of a legislative veto over agency rulemaking, found that the view expressed by Justice White in his Chadha dissent comported with the separation of powers principles embodied in the Idaho Constitution. Mead v Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 667-669; 791 P2d 410 (1990). However, despite their sound reasoning, in my judgment, neither of these courts was faced with a constitutional provision comparable to Const 1963, art 4, § 37 or a popular rejection of a proposal to change this provision. As a contrasting example, in Alaska v ALIVE Voluntary, 606 P2d 769, 775 (Alas, 1980), a pre-Chadha case where a statutorily authorized legislative veto was struck down, the court found that the specificity that the Alaska Constitution used when dealing with express legislative veto powers “leads logically to the conclusion that no other veto power is implied.”

 That the legislative branch itself has been responsible for the delegation of what may be its own powers is no response to the instant proposition that this Court has not been equally vigilant in defending the prerogatives of the legislative branch as it is here in defending those of the executive branch. As Const 1963, art 4, § 1 states, “The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives.” The Legislature has no authority to delegate the “legislative power,” and the judiciary has no authority to countenance such a delegation.

 It may be trae that the only other way that the Legislature could block the promulgation of proposed rules would be to pass a bill and present it to the Governor. However, the current focus should be on what the Legislature actually did by enacting and attempting to use 1977 PA 108, and not on what the Legislature could or could not have done had it tried to accomplish the same objective by another method.

 When viewed in this manner, it becomes clear that the powers of the three branches of government do not overlap, but their exercise often does. The legislative branch does not share any of the executive branch’s power to implement the law, and the executive branch does not share any of the legislative branch’s power to make the law, but in the exercise of these respective powers, there may be some overlap and, consequently, some amount of tension.

 Const 1963, art 3, § 2, states:
The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.
However, this “separation of powers” statement appears neither to add to, nor detract from, separation of powers principles already expressed or inherent in the Michigan Constitution by virtue of the specific provisions allocating or limiting the power of the government to be wielded by the separate branches of government.. In this sense, Const 1963, art 3, § 2 is analogous to the statement of the federalism principle set forth in Amendment X of the United States Constitution, a principle already made clear by the other more specific provisions of that constitution.

 In answering these questions, it is important to bear in mind that the only separation of powers issue under consideration here is the constitutionality of legislative involvement in the promulgation of rules proposed by an administrative agency pursuant to authority bestowed by the Legislature under an enabling act. This is not a case where the MDOC contends that it wields inherent authority to promulgate internal rules regarding visitation policies at prisons that it administers. While it would seem self-evident that running a prison would necessarily require setting some internally enforceable “rules” with regard to visitation, which may not be on par with administrative rules as defined by the apa, see MCL 24.207; MSA 3.560(107), and that a legislative scheme permitting the Legislature to unilaterally involve itself in such day-to-day administrative decisions necessarily implicates the separation of powers doctrine, this is not our present concern. Nonetheless, when I consider 1977 PA 108 in view of MCL 24.207(k); MSA 3.560(107)(k), I understand that a reasonable argument might have been made in support of the proposition that some provisions of 1977 PA 108 encroach on the inherent assignment of executive power to the executive branch by Const 1963, art 5, § 1.

 There is nothing unusual about the principle that language couched in terms of an affirmative grant can also reasonably imply a restriction. As an illustration, most drivers in Michigan are aware that, absent some posting to the contrary, it is permissible to make a right turn at a red light. Suppose a sign was posted at a particular intersection that read: “Right turn on red permitted 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 A.M.” Would it not be a reasonable inference to conclude that turning right on a red light is prohibited at that intersection between the hours of 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m , even though the restriction is couched in terms of an affirmative grant of power and, without the sign, drivers would be able to turn right on red at any hour of the day?

 I have already noted that my own reading of the balance of the provisions of the 1963 Constitution would not require a finding that the Legislature would be limited to enacting new legislation in order to block the promulgation of agency rules. But, unlike the dissent, I do not view myself to be at liberty to reject the framers’ opinion on that subject that is implicit in art 4, § 37.

 Oddly, the dissent places reliance on the undisputed proposition that a statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, and that we are duty bound to construe statutes, if we can, so that they conform to constitutional requirements. See McDougall, supra at 24; People v Bricker, 389 Mich 524, 528; 208 NW2d 172 (1973). However, the dissent does not even purport to offer an interpretation of 1977 PA 108 that would accomplish such a reconciliation. Rather, the dissent simply announces this well-accepted rule of statutory construction as if, eo ipso, it supported the dissent’s interpretation of art 4, § 37 (“if the apa and art 4, § 37 can be reconciled, they must be”). Post at 158. It is no “reconciliation” to proclaim, as does the dissent, that this statute and constitutional provision address different circumstances and that nothing in art 4, § 37 prohibits the jcak review process. That is merely a conclusion drawn from the dissent’s own interpretation of art 4, § 37 and, hence, cannot logically be a premise for arriving at the conclusion from which it is drawn.
There is no rule of construction of which I am aware that requires the original meaning of a constitutional provision to yield in order to save a statute. Following the dissent’s logic, the Legislature could effectively rewrite the entire 1963 Constitution by enacting new statutes that would require this Court to accept only those constitutional interpretations that would preserve the new statutes. The meaning of art 4, § 37 cannot be affected by the enactment of new legislation.

 As a political institution, the people are unique. “All political power is inherent in the people.” Const 1963, art 1, § 1. “We the people” may recall elective officers without subjecting the reasons for doing so to judicial review. Const 1963, art 2, § 8. “We the people” have the right to propose laws, and enact or reject proposed laws, or to approve or reject laws enacted by the Legislature. Const 1963, art 2, § 9. “We the people” are not subject to being replaced in the next election or being recalled. “We the people” face no term limits or quorum requirements, and “we the people” do not derive our power from the consent of those we serve. “We the people” may propose constitutional amendments, a function that requires a two-thirds majority of both houses to otherwise accomplish, and regardless of how such amendments are proposed, it is “we the people” who ultimately decide whether such amendments become effective. Const 1963, art 12, §§ 1 and 2.

 See also, e.g., Jones v United States, 526 US 227, 236-240; 119 S Ct 1215; 143 L Ed 2d 311 (1999); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v LTV Corp, 496 US 633, 650; 110 S Ct 2668; 110 L Ed 2d 579 (1990).

 Construing the rejection of Proposal A in any manner other than its most obvious implication, i.e., that the people desired not to add a more far-reaching legislative veto provision to their constitution, would be to ignore the historical context of the vote. As noted, the constitutionality of 1977 PA 108 had been in considerable doubt from its inception. See, e.g., Request for Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1977 PA 108, supra. Subsequently, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Chadha. Given the relatively high incidence with which state courts tend to adopt the constitutional reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, even when not required to do so, it is a highly questionable proposition that anyone in Michigan in 1984 was truly certain that 1977 PA 108 could withstand a constitutional challenge. Hence, it is inconsistent with the historical reality to suggest that there may have been a more subtle reason for the people’s rejection of the proposal—namely, that even though the people truly desired this power in their Legislature, they were confident that the Michigan Constitution already permitted *150such legislative review of agency rules and therefore believed that Proposal A was redundant.

 The dissent disclaims any opinion on “whether the JCAR review process is prudent,” and suggests that it is my reasoning that is somehow concerned with “whether the voters’ rejection of Proposal A in 1984 was ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ ” Post at 159-160, n 4. However, I believe that the dissent deeply misapprehends my point. I have simply pointed out the incongruous approach of the dissent’s willingness to attach significance to the voters’ approval of a proposal while wholly discounting the voters’ rejection of the same proposal. Despite its disclaimer, it is the dissent’s approach that purports to pass judgment on the substantive decision making of the people, by finding significance only in their approval of a measure, and ignoring the significance in their disapproval.

 The dissent uses a metaphor about “Mary” and her favorite color to illustrate the proposition that, if the facts were different, no relevant inference could be drawn from the 1984 expression of will by “we the people.” However, substituting the actual facts, the same illustration would go something like this: On Monday, Mary gave some indication that her favorite color was blue. On Thursday, it becomes important to know what Mary’s favorite color was on Monday, and someone points out that on Wednesday, Mary unambiguously stated that her favorite color was blue. Because Mary is a constant, her expressed preference on Wednesday provides some relevant information regarding her likely expressed preference two days earlier. By comparison, if this was a metaphor about legislative acquiescence, an expression of a different person’s favorite color on Wednesday would provide no useful insight regarding Mary’s favorite color on Monday.

 In a tripartite republican form of government, a primary check on the power of any particular branch is the resistance of the other two branches to being displaced. Hence, one practical result of this Court’s decision today may be that the Legislature will more scrupulously guard the authority that it bestows upon agencies. Agencies themselves, which must ultimately rely on the Legislature for funding and are susceptible to having their rules superseded by statute, may also find themselves subject to other more subtle means of legislative influence. Recognizing the foresight of James Madison at the federal constitutional convention, it is possible “ ‘that in doubtful cases the policy [will] soon take place of limiting the duration of [enabling acts] as to require renewal instead of repeal.’ ” Chadha, supra at 954, n 18, quoting 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p 587.

 But see also n 13.