Court Opinion

ID: 9907757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 21:02:36.336752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:56.990669
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/6/23 Vera v. Lucas Auto Center CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

FABIOLA VERA,                                                       B323619

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. 21STCV06832)
         v.

LUCAS AUTO CENTER, INC.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Affirmed.
     Primary Law Group, Joshua Kroot and Ahmed Jinnah for
Defendant and Appellant.
     Auto Fraud Legal Center, Christopher P. Barry and
Michelle A. Cook for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                ________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

       Fabiola Vera purchased a used car from Lucas Auto Center,
Inc. (Lucas Auto). After multiple mechanical problems, a repair,
and a dispute over warranty coverage, Lucas Auto repossessed
the car to recoup additional costs it said Vera owed. Vera filed
suit against Lucas Auto in February 2021, alleging fraud and
breach of warranty claims, as well as violation of several
consumer protection laws. Although its agent for service of
process was served, Lucas Auto filed no responsive pleadings, the
clerk entered a default, and the court entered a default judgment
in favor of Vera in October 2021.
       In May 2022 Lucas Auto moved to set aside the default and
default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.1
Lucas Auto argued it never received actual notice of Vera’s
lawsuit due to invalid substitute service on its registered agent
for service of process. The trial court denied Lucas Auto’s motion
because it determined the motion was untimely and Lucas Auto
did not demonstrate it lacked actual notice of the action. We
affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    Vera’s Lawsuit Against Lucas Auto
      Vera purchased a used BMW 750i from Lucas Auto in
August 2020 with a warranty of 30 days or 1,000 miles covering
the engine and transmission. After the car developed problems
with the transmission within 30 days of the purchase, Lucas Auto

1     Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                2
repaired the car and charged Vera $2,000 for half the cost of the
repairs, citing the terms of its warranty. Vera could not afford to
pay, so Lucas Auto repossessed the car. Vera, in turn, decided to
sue Lucas Auto. Vera mailed a notice and demand letter via
certified mail with a copy of the complaint to Lucas Auto at its
business address, and to its registered agent for service of process
on February 19, 2021. Vera then filed suit against Lucas Auto on
February 22, alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and the Unfair Competition Law.

B.     Service of the Summons and Complaint on Lucas Auto
       Vera’s summons for Lucas Auto was issued on February 22,
2021. The summons issued notice of the lawsuit to “Lucas Auto
Center, Inc.”2 The part of the summons labeled “Notice to the
Person Served” provided checkboxes to indicate the served
person’s relationship to the defendant, including a checkbox to
indicate the person was served on behalf of a corporation. On the
summons Vera later filed with the court, this checkbox was not
checked.
       On March 8 Vera served Lucas Auto. Through a registered
process server, Vera delivered the summons and complaint to the
office of Monica Paladines, Lucas Auto’s registered agent for
service of process, at her business address. The process server
left the summons and complaint with Angie Ortiz, an employee of
Paladines. The proof of service indicated Paladines was served

2      Vera also sued Hudson Insurance Company, but it was
later dismissed from the suit.

                                 3
through substitute service on Ortiz, a “person at least 18 years of
age apparently in charge at the office.” The process server also
indicated he informed Ortiz of “the general nature of the papers.”
      Subsequently, another process server sent a copy of the
summons and complaint by first-class mail to:

      LUCAS AUTO CENTER, INC
      ATTENTION: MONICA PALADINES – PERSON
      AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT
      16130 VENTURA BLVD., STE 210
      ENCINO, CA 91436

       On April 5 Vera amended her complaint. On April 15 a
process server served the first amended complaint at Paladines’s
office. Again, the server delivered the amended complaint to
Ortiz and indicated she was the person “apparently in charge.”
The next day, as before, a copy of the first amended complaint
was mailed to Paladines’s office.

C.    Entry of Default and Default Judgment Against Lucas Auto
      Lucas Auto filed no response to Vera’s complaint or
amended complaint. On June 22, 2021 Vera filed a request for
entry of default, which the clerk granted that same day. Vera
served this document by mail on Paladines at her business
address.
      Vera applied for a default judgment against Lucas Auto on
September 10 requesting damages and attorney fees totaling
$30,805.32, and served her application on Paladines. The court
entered the default judgment on October 13, 2021 and awarded
Vera the full amount requested. On December 1, Vera’s counsel

                                 4
contacted Lucas Auto to ask which banks counsel should use to
enforce the judgment, and he was informed by a Lucas Auto
manager where it had bank accounts, including those with the
largest available balances. A writ of execution of the judgment
followed on May 23, 2022.

D.    Lucas Auto’s Motion To Set Aside the Default and Default
      Judgment Under Section 473.5
      The same day, Lucas Auto moved to set aside the default
and default judgment under section 473.5.3 Lucas Auto argued
service was improperly made on Paladines’s employee Ortiz
because Ortiz had no relationship to Lucas Auto, was not in
charge of Paladines’s office, and was instructed to refuse service
of process. Because of improper service, Lucas Auto contended it
never received actual notice of the action against it.
      In support of its motion, Lucas Auto submitted one-page
declarations from Paladines and from Everardo Arreygue,
general manager of Lucas Auto. Neither explained when Lucas
Auto became aware of Vera’s lawsuit, or why it waited seven

3      In relevant part, section 473.5 provides: “(a) When service
of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time
to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been
entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and
file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment
and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be
served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event
exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default
judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him
or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has
been entered.”

                                 5
months after entry of the default judgment before it filed the
motion. Arreygue’s declaration instead attested that Lucas Auto
had no relationship with Ortiz. Arreygue’s declaration did not
state that Lucas Auto lacked actual notice of the lawsuit.
       Paladines’s declaration also did not state that she or Lucas
Auto lacked actual notice of the lawsuit, and instead stated as
follows:

      1.    I am the registered agent for service of process for
            defendant Lucas Auto Center, Inc. (“Lucas Auto”). . . .
      2.    I am informed that plaintiff Fabiola Vera (“Vera”)
            alleges that the Summons and Complaint in this
            action was served on me by serving Angie Ortiz
            (“Ortiz”) at my office.
      3.    That assertion is incorrect for multiple reasons.
      4.    First, Ms. Ortiz worked at my office for
            approximately three months. Ms. Ortiz was never in
            charge of the office.
      5.    More importantly, and like all my employees,
            Ms. Ortiz was specifically instructed that she was not
            to accept service of any type of process.
      6.    I did not ever receive the Summons and Complaint in
            this action from Ms. Ortiz.
      7.    I have no record of any emails to Lucas Auto in which
            I forwarded legal documents.

      Vera opposed Lucas Auto’s motion as untimely and
unmeritorious. She also submitted an attorney declaration
attesting to the communications her counsel had with Lucas Auto
on December 1, 2021 regarding what bank accounts should be

                                 6
used to enforce the judgment. Lucas Auto’s reply did not contest
these communications took place.

E.    The Trial Court Denied the Section 473.5 Motion
      The trial court held a hearing on Lucas Auto’s motion on
August 25, 2022. After hearing argument, the court denied the
motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The trial
court first ruled that Lucas Auto’s motion was untimely under
section 473.5. The court observed that, once a defendant is
served with the notice of default, section 473.5 imposes a 180-day
deadline for filing a motion to set aside the default. The court
reasoned that because Lucas Auto received the notice of default
on June 22, 2021, its motion was untimely because it was filed
more than 180 days later on May 23, 2022.4
      The court also denied Lucas Auto’s motion on the merits.
The court first noted that section 473.5 “is premised on lack of
‘actual notice’ not whether service of process was deficient.” The
court ruled that Vera properly effectuated substitute service on
Ortiz because she was apparently in charge of Paladines’s office,
even if she was not in fact in charge. It also found that, even if
Ortiz did not deliver the summons and complaint to Paladines,
Lucas Auto received actual notice of the action because “a copy of
the complaint[] was subsequently mailed to Ms. Paladines, which
Ms Paladines does not deny receiving.”
      Lucas Auto timely appealed.

4    As further explained below, on appeal the parties agree
Lucas Auto did not receive notice of the default.

                                7
                          DISCUSSION

       Lucas Auto advances several arguments on appeal. First,
it challenges the trial court’s ruling that its section 473.5 motion
was untimely filed and its finding that Lucas Auto received
actual notice of the lawsuit. It also contends service of process
was improper and that certain defects in the summons void the
default judgment. We address each in turn.

A.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying
       Lucas Auto’s Motion To Set Aside the Default Judgment
       1.    Standard of Review
       “Trial court rulings on motions for relief from default [and
default judgment] are subject to an abuse of discretion standard.”
(Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadelphia Television Network,
Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894, 907 (Luxury Asset Lending)
[reviewing denial of § 473.5 motion].) “The appropriate test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds
of reason.” (Anastos v. Lee (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1318-
1319.) In the context of a section 473.5 motion to set aside the
default or default judgment for lack of actual notice, we also
“review the court’s findings regarding actual notice of the action
for an abuse of discretion.” (Ellard v. Conway (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.) In this context, a court has abused its
discretion “if the court’s factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.” (Shapell Socal Rental Properties, LLC v.
Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198, 213.) “Under the
substantial evidence standard, ‘“[o]ur review is limited to a
determination whether there is any substantial evidence,

                                  8
contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the finding.”’” (In
re Marriage of Nakamoto & Hsu (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 470.)

       2.    The Timeliness of Lucas Auto’s Section 473.5 Motion
       Section 473.5 authorizes a party to bring a motion to set
aside a default or default judgment “within a reasonable time,
but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry
of a default judgment . . . ; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or
her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has
been entered.” (§ 473.5, subd. (a).) Even if a party files within
the applicable statutory deadline of 180 days or two years,
section 473.5 separately requires a movant to file “within a
reasonable time” after receiving actual notice of the default or
default judgment. (See Luxury Asset Lending, supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 908; Trackman v. Kenney (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 175, 180.)
       Here, the clerk entered the default on June 22, 2021 and
the trial court entered default judgment against Lucas Auto on
October 13, 2021. Lucas Auto moved to set aside the default and
default judgment on May 23, 2022, 335 days after entry of default
and 222 days after the default judgment. The trial court denied
Lucas Auto’s motion, in part, because it was filed more than
180 days after Lucas Auto received notice of default.
       On appeal, Lucas Auto asserts Vera never served notice of
the default or default judgment, only notice of Vera’s request for
default, and thus its section 473.5 motion was timely filed within
two years of the entry of the default judgment. The record
supports this assertion. In the respondent’s brief, Vera appears
to concede Lucas Auto did not receive written notice of the entry
of default or default judgment, and further concedes Lucas Auto’s

                                  9
motion was filed within two years after the default judgment was
entered.
       The parties dispute, however, whether Lucas Auto filed its
motion within a “reasonable time” under section 473.5. Vera
argues that Lucas Auto did not explain when it discovered the
default or default judgment, nor the delay in bringing its motion,
and thus made no showing the motion was filed within a
reasonable time. Lucas Auto asserts the statute does not require
any showing of filing within a reasonable time, as long as the
movant files within the statutory deadlines of 180 days or two
years. It does not cite any authority adopting this reading of the
statute.
       The case law does not support Lucas Auto’s argument.
Generally, a party’s failure to explain its delay in seeking relief is
fatal to a section 473.5 motion because, even if brought within the
statutory time periods, a “party must act with diligence upon
learning of the judgment.” (Trackman, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at
p. 180; Luxury Asset Lending, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 908
[where party explained reasons for delay, one year delay in
bringing motion was reasonable].) We need not resolve this
dispute, however, because the trial court made no finding on the
matter and Lucas Auto failed to meet its burden under
section 473.5 to show lack of actual notice.

      3.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
             Finding Lucas Auto Received Actual Notice of the
             Action
      Even if Lucas Auto had filed its motion within a reasonable
time, the trial court correctly denied relief. The trial court
determined Lucas Auto “failed to prove that Plaintiff’s alleged

                                 10
deficient service failed to provide Lucas [Auto] with actual
notice.” This finding that Lucas Auto had actual notice of the
complaint is amply supported by the evidence.
       To obtain relief from a default or default judgment under
section 473.5, the moving party must establish its “lack of actual
notice” of the action through an affidavit. (§ 473.5, subd. (b); see
Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 861.) The
movant must also demonstrate its lack of notice “was not caused
by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.”
(§ 473.5, subd. (b).) For purposes of section 473.5, “‘actual notice’”
means “genuine knowledge of the party litigant.” (Rosenthal v.
Garner (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 891, 895.) The “‘“actual
knowledge”’” requirement is “‘strictly construed.’” (Ellard v.
Conway, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
       In reaching its conclusion that Lucas Auto “failed to prove
it lacked actual notice of the action,” the trial court examined the
two declarations Lucas Auto submitted. Arreygue’s declaration
disclaimed any knowledge of Ortiz or relationship between Ortiz
and Lucas Auto, but failed to state that Lucas Auto did not
receive actual notice of the complaint (e.g., it did not disclaim
receipt of Vera’s pre-filing notice she was filing a lawsuit, or
receipt from Paladines). Paladines’s declaration attested that she
“did not ever receive the Summons and Complaint in this action
from Ms. Ortiz,” but did not disclaim receiving these documents
by mail. Her declaration further attested that: “I have no record
of any emails to Lucas Auto in which I forwarded legal
documents.” Reviewing the proofs of service in the record, the
trial court observed that, after substitute service was effectuated
on Ortiz, “a copy of the complaints was subsequently mailed to
Ms. Paladines, which Ms. Paladines does not deny receiving.”

                                 11
The court also determined that “Ms. Paladines received copies in
the mail” of “other documents such as the Request for Entry of
Default, Case Management Statement, Notice of Dismissal of
Hudson Insurance, and Memorandum of Costs.” On this basis,
the trial court found Lucas Auto had not established it lacked
actual notice of the action, as required by section 473.5.
       This finding was supported by substantial evidence. Vera’s
proofs of service showed the summons, the complaint, and the
first amended complaint were mailed first-class to Paladines.
While Paladines denied receiving these documents from her
employee Ortiz, she did not deny receiving them by mail. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Lucas Auto had
actual notice of the lawsuit.
       Lucas Auto insists “the record does not establish any proof
that those alleged mailings [to Paladines] were ever actually
received.” But Lucas Auto was the moving party with the burden
of proof in the trial court, and it did not produce any evidence
Paladines did not actually receive the mailings Vera sent to her
at Paladines’ business address. Paladines could have attested
she never received the summons, the complaint or the amended
complaint. But her declaration does not so declare, let alone
provide any supporting facts demonstrating she did not receive
the documents mailed to her at her business address. (See
Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 885 [affirming denial of
§ 473.5 motion because the defendant’s “declaration did not state
any supporting facts” showing his lack of actual notice]; accord,
Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 861
[upholding finding of actual notice because the defendant’s
declaration “does not declare that he lacked actual knowledge of
the action”]; Neadeau v. Foster (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 234, 237

                               12
[holding a defendant failed to refute evidence of proper service by
asserting “summons was not received” or “he was unaware of the
action pending against him”].)
       Lucas Auto further argues that, even if Paladines—its
agent for service of process—received the summons and
complaint by mail, “receipt of those papers did not put Lucas on
actual notice of the Summons and Complaint.” This argument
also fails. “[A] corporation can have actual notice only through
an agent who has the appropriate authority.” (Pulte Homes
Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 267,
274.) Thus, “notice to the person designated by the corporation
as its agent for service of process is actual notice,” because “the
corporation has expressly held that person out to the world as
authorized to receive notice of actions.” (Ibid.; accord, Ramos v.
Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444-
1445 [affirming relief under § 473.5 because the plaintiff did not
serve the corporate defendant’s agent for service of process and
thus did not convey “actual notice” to the defendant].)
       For these reasons, the trial court did not err by finding that
Lucas Auto received actual notice of the lawsuit, and thus was
not entitled to relief under section 473.5.

B.    Lucas Auto’s Arguments Regarding Purported Defects in the
      Summons and Service of Process Lack Merit
      Lucas Auto also challenges alleged defects in the summons
and the sufficiency of service. Lucas Auto’s argument appears to
be that these defects somehow deprived it of actual notice of
Vera’s lawsuit and/or deprived the court of jurisdiction over it.
These are not cognizable arguments under section 473.5, the only

                                 13
ground Lucas Auto raised in the trial court. In any event, these
arguments are unavailing.

       1.    The Summons Was Not Defective
       Lucas Auto contends defects in the summons rendered the
judgment void on its face for lack of personal jurisdiction. It
argues the summons should have been “addressed” to Paladines,
not Lucas Auto, and that the summons failed to indicate
Paladines was served on behalf of Lucas Auto. These arguments
miss the mark.
       Section 412.20 requires that “a summons shall be directed
to the defendant.” (§ 412.20, subd. (a).) Paladines was not the
defendant, so the summons was properly directed to Lucas Auto,
not to her. Further, section 416.10 authorizes service on a
corporation’s agent for service of process. (§ 416.10, subd. (a).)
Lucas Auto cites no authority supporting its position that a
defendant’s agent for service of process must be a named
defendant to effectuate service on the defendant.
       Lucas Auto’s argument that the summons omitted the
notice required by section 412.30 that Paladines was served on
Lucas Auto’s behalf also lacks merit. Section 412.30 mandates
certain notice to corporate defendants in the form of the
summons. The notice must state “in substance: ‘To the person
served: You are hereby served in the within action (or special
proceeding) on behalf of (here state the name of the corporation
or the unincorporated association) as a person upon whom a copy
of the summons and of the complaint may be delivered to effect
service on said party under the provisions of [the appropriate
Code of Civil Procedure].’” (§ 412.30.) Lucas Auto maintains

                                14
section 412.30 was violated because Vera’s summons did not
check the box indicating service on behalf of a corporation.
        Lucas Auto did not raise this objection in the trial court, so
the argument is forfeited.5 (See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle
Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548 [“‘“As a general rule,
theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the
first time on appeal.”’”].) In any event, “all that is required is
substantial compliance in order to render the service of summons
upon a corporation effective.” (See, e.g., Cory v. Crocker National
Bank (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 665, 669-672 (Cory) [party
substantially complied with § 412.30 although checkbox
indicating service on behalf of corporation was unchecked where
circumstances made clear corporate officer was served on behalf
of the defendant corporation, i.e., bank was named defendant,
corporate officer was not being served as an individual defendant,
and summons revealed on its face service was made under this
section].) Lucas Auto concedes that substantial compliance is
sufficient when a party has actual notice.
        Vera substantially complied with section 412.30. The
summons was directed at Lucas Auto, it was served on Paladines

5      Lucas Auto asserts this argument is not forfeited, because
the sufficiency of the summons implicates personal jurisdiction
which can be “challenged at any time.” Even if we agreed with
Lucas Auto’s theory that this failure to check the correct box
somehow deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, the rule of
forfeiture applies equally in the context of personal jurisdiction.
(See Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP v. California Coastal Com. (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 830, 844 [observing a defendant who does not
object to personal jurisdiction “forfeits any future challenge to the
court’s power over him or her”].)

                                 15
(its registered agent for service of process), and it was clear that
Paladines was not being sued as an individual defendant.
Although the box indicating service under section 416.10 was not
checked (as in Cory), under these circumstances as a registered
agent for service of process, Paladines “could not [be], and was
not, misled or confused as to the capacity in which [s]he was
served.” (Cory, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 670.) These
circumstances are thus distinguishable from those in Lucas
Auto’s contrary authorities. (See Mannesmann DeMag, Ltd. v.
Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1122-1124 [no
substantial compliance with § 412.30 because “the name of the
defendant Mannesmann did not appear on the face of the
summons”]; MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557-558 [no substantial compliance because
the person served on behalf of the corporation was also an
individual defendant in the action and the summons indicated
service on an individual defendant].)6

6      Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431,
435 and National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Superior
Court (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 326, 327-329 both pre-date the
California Supreme Court’s subsequent decision liberalizing
interpretation of service of process statutes. (See Pasadena Medi-
Center Associates v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778
[“Although some decisions under pre-1969 statutes required
strict and exact compliance with the statutory requirements
[citation] . . . the provisions of the new law . . . ‘are to be liberally
construed. . . . “to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of
the court if actual notice has been received by the defendant, and
in the last analysis the question of service should be resolved by
considering each situation from a practical standpoint.” The
liberal construction rule, it is anticipated, will eliminate

                                   16
      2.     Substitute Service on Ortiz Substantially Complied
             with the Statutes Governing Service
       Lucas Auto contends service on Ortiz was improper because
she was not a “person in charge” of Paladines’s office under
section 415.20, and she had no connection to Lucas Auto. To be
sure, if a defendant was not properly served with a summons “in
the manner prescribed by statute,” a default judgment entered
against that defendant is void. (Hearn v. Howard (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200.) But, as noted above, “‘[s]tatutes
governing substitute service shall be “liberally construed to
effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction if actual notice has
been received by the defendant.’” (Id. at p. 1201.) Because Lucas
Auto had actual notice, service of process that substantially
complies with the statute is all the law requires. (See Dill v.
Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1436-
1437.) “‘Substantial compliance . . . means actual compliance in
respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of
the statute.’” (Id. at p. 1439, fn. 12.)
       Under section 416.10, service on a corporation can be
achieved in several ways, including serving the individual
designated as its agent for service of process. (§ 416.10,
subd. (a).) Section 415.20, in turn, authorizes substitute service
on a corporation’s designated agent “by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint during usual office hours in his or her

unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly disputes over legal
technicalities, without prejudicing the right of defendants to
proper notice of court proceedings.’”].) Accordingly, neither case
contemplates the possibility of substantial compliance with
section 412.30 or its predecessor.

                                17
office . . . with the person who is apparently in charge thereof.”
(§ 415.20, subd. (a).) Once substitute service is made, the serving
party must “thereafter mail[] a copy of the summons and
complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be
served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint
were left.” (Ibid.)
       Contrary to Lucas Auto’s contention, Ortiz was properly
served as a “person who is apparently in charge” of Paladines’s
office. “‘The evident purpose of Code of Civil Procedure
section 415.20 is to permit service to be completed upon a good
faith attempt at physical service on a responsible person.’”
(Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1387,
1393.) “Service must be made upon a person whose ‘relationship
with the person to be served makes it more likely than not that
they will deliver process to the named party.’” (Id. at p. 1393.)
       Paladines’s declaration confirmed Ortiz was her employee
at the time the complaint and the amended complaint were
served. The proofs of service show Ortiz was present at
Paladines’s office on the two occasions the process server hand-
delivered documents, the process server explained to Ortiz the
nature of the documents, and Ortiz accepted these documents
both times when Paladines was apparently unavailable. Courts
have upheld substitute service under similar circumstances. (See
Khourie, Crew & Jaeger v. Sabek, Inc. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
1009, 1013 (Khourie) [service proper on “the only person who
responded” to the door at the defendant’s office, even if not the
office manager]; Ludka v. Memory Magnetics International (1972)
25 Cal.App.3d 316, 319-321 [service proper on a shared
receptionist in a common area outside the defendant’s office
suite].) Although Lucas Auto argues Paladines instructed Ortiz

                                18
not to accept service of process, “service cannot be avoided by
denying service.” (See Khourie, at pp. 1013-1014 [affirming
service on a person apparently in charge who stated she was not
accepting service]; cf. Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc., supra,
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 [“‘While the defendant may control the
acceptance of mail by his [or her] household, he [or she] may not
thereby negate the effectiveness of service otherwise effective
under the law.’”].)
      In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion to set aside the default and default judgment.

                         DISPOSITION

       The order denying the motion to set aside the default and
default judgment under section 473.5 is affirmed. Vera is
entitled to recover her costs on appeal.

                                      MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.                 EVENSON, J.*

*     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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