Court Opinion

ID: 9536956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:10:09.509133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:37.378821
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: On the record here presented the decision of the court seems to impose absolute liability where an express warranty is made by the manufacturer of an industrial product. That is, the manufacturer absolutely guarantees the performance of its goods against product-induced injury under any and all circumstances, regardless of unforeseen intervening occurrences.
It seems to me where an intervening cause gives rise to an injury resulting from a manufactured product covered by express warranty, the basic question should be one of reasonable foreseeability just as in negligence cases. The warranty’s existence and breach should be determined in the light of the contemplation of the parties at the time the product is sold and delivered. A plaintiff should be permitted to recover for injuries which the defendant manufacturer had reason to foresee as a probable result of a breach at the time the sale was made. (2 Fmmer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 16.01 [4] [1970].) An express warranty should not be interpreted to include conditions or intervening occurrences that neither party had reason to anticipate. (Tamburello v. Travelers Indemnity Company [E. D. La. 1962] 206 F. Supp. 920.) In other words, the plaintiff must prove the breach of the express warranty to be the proximate cause of his injury.
In Naaf v. Griffitts, 201 Kan. 64, 439 P. 2d 83, this court held that under an express warranty special damages could be recovered when they proximately result from the breach and may reasonably be regarded as having been within the contemplation of the parties.
For a case involving an express warranty concerning agricultural seed, see Anderson v. Thomas, 184 Kan. 240, 336 P. 2d 821.
A full discussion of the foreseeability of an intervening cause in *730a negligence case may be found in Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P. 2d 1053.
The uncontradicted evidence in this case discloses that the 600 amp QMQB switch was free from defects when it left the manufacturer and at the time of installation; that after the switch had been installed at the Kansas Cold Storage Company in the city of Wichita, a bolt of lightning struck the plant during an electrical storm which fused or welded together one of the three sets of moveable contact blades in the switch.
As the name implies, “600 amp QMQB switch,” the switch was protected by 600 amp fuses.
The evidence is uncontradicted that upon testing an identical switch of this design after the occurrence, 82,500 amperes were run through the closed contacts of the switch but this was insufficient to weld the contacts together. Thus, the surge of electricity which went through the switch here in question welding the contacts exceeded 82,500 amperes, but the 600 amp fuses designed by the manufacturer to protect the switch did not blow. The fuses failed to perform their function.
An expert engineering witness, Arthur Worth, testified:
“. . . The switch is designed to carry 600 amps but is actually tested at six times 600 amps. If a contact or blade welded shut it very likely took something in excess of 82,500 amps to accomplish. In my opinion, it had to be a very fast surge of current to have welded the blade or contact without blowing the fuses. Lightning could supply the type of surge that would cause this sort of thing.”
Even if it be assumed that the manufacturer in this case was obligated to foresee that lightning might strike the electrical system controlled by the 600 amp QMQB switch, the manufacturer should not be held to foresee that a tremendous surge of electricity in excess of 82,500 amps would go through a 600 amp fuse without blowing it and result in fusing or welding the contact blades of the switch.
It is respectfully submitted the trial court should have entered judgment for the defendant as a matter of law.