Court Opinion

ID: 9383589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 19:00:47.822316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:46.485160
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
              ________________

                    No. 21-1674
                 ________________

                     BIN WANG,

                               Appellant

                          v.

         SUPERINTENDENT FOREST SCI;
        THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE
               ________________

      Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
         (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-00357)
     District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
                   ________________

      Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                 On March 29, 2022

Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

            (Opinion filed: March 30, 2023)
                                    ________________

                                        OPINION*
                                    ________________

ROTH, Circuit Judge

       Bin Wang appeals the order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We granted a

certificate of appealability on his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in failing to conduct a reasonable forensic investigation to counter the

prosecution’s homicide narrative. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                                              I.

       In May 2007, Bin Wang shot and killed his wife, Xiangzhen Lin, in their

Philadelphia home. Wang told police that Lin died by suicide when she shot herself in

the back of the head. To support his suicide narrative, Wang’s trial counsel hired Dr.

Paul Hoyer, a forensic pathologist, as an expert witness. After reviewing Lin’s autopsy

report, the photographs, the discovery, and digital images of the gun, Dr. Hoyer prepared

an expert report. Wang’s trial counsel lamented to Wang that Dr. Hoyer’s “findings are

not as strong as I had hoped. In fact, the conclusion will make the suicide argument a

very difficult one for a jury to understand.” 1 Trial counsel later wrote to Wang and said

that Dr. Hoyer “is not saying that [Lin’s] death was absolutely, positively a suicide,” and

that it would be Wang’s own testimony “that will persuade the jury that this was a

*
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
  Appx. 831.
                                              2
suicide.”2 Both Dr. Hoyer and Wang testified at trial, a jury convicted Wang of First-

Degree Murder and Possession of an Instrument of Crime, and the trial court sentenced

him to life imprisonment.

       Wang then began Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) proceedings.

He contended that “trial counsel was ineffective for not expanding the scope of his

forensic investigation by consulting with and retaining a crime scene expert or

reconstructionist to conduct a holistic examination of all the physical evidence at the

scene.”3 The PCRA court determined that trial counsel’s strategy “had a reasonable basis

designed to effectuate [Wang’s] interests, namely that . . . Lin’s death was a suicide.” 4

Accordingly, the PCRA court denied Wang relief on his ineffective-assistance claim.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PCRA court, and Wang did not seek

review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

       Wang next petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Wang

again claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to

execute a reasonable forensic investigation to counter the Commonwealth’s homicide

narrative. A magistrate judge reviewed Wang’s petition and issued a Report &

Recommendation, recommending that the petition be denied. Wang lodged twenty-two

objections. The District Court overruled all but one of Wang’s objections, adopted the

Report & Recommendation with some supplements, and dismissed Wang’s petition.

2
  Appx. 833.
3
  Appx. 639.
4
  Appx. 640.
                                              3
                                             II.

       The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and

2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We exercise plenary

review because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. 5

       Although our review of the District Court’s decision is plenary, the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires us to defer considerably to

the state court’s determination. 6 Under AEDPA, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief

only if the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.”7 A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent “if the state court applies

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the [Supreme Court’s] cases.”8 A

state court’s application of clearly established law is “unreasonable” if the court identifies

the correct governing rule but applies it to the facts of the case in a manner that is not

merely erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” 9 Put another way, “a state prisoner

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 10

5
  See Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 280 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
6
  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2010).
7
  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
8
  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).
9
  Id. at 409–10; Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003).
10
   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
                                              4
       Further, our review of the state court’s “scrutiny of counsel’s performance must”

itself “be highly deferential.” 11 Courts “should recognize that counsel is strongly

presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 12 In light of the deference given to trial

counsel’s decisions under Strickland v. Washington,13 and our deference to the state

court’s determinations, our review is “doubly deferential.”14

       Under Strickland, a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must first

show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 15 “This requires showing that counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 16

       Second, a petitioner must show that the deficient performance caused prejudice.17

“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 18 To establish prejudice, a petitioner “must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 19

                                             III.

11
   Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
12
   Id. at 690.
13
   Id. at 691.
14
   Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6.
15
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
16
   Id.
17
   Id.
18
   Id.
19
   Id. at 694.
                                                5
       Wang claims that “[t]rial counsel . . . should’ve expanded his forensic

investigation after receiving Dr. Hoyer’s equally plausible opinion because Dr. Hoyer’s

opinion didn’t move the reasonable doubt needle in [Wang’s] favor.” 20 His failure to do

so, Wang says, violated Strickland and constituted ineffective assistance.

       The Pennsylvania courts did not unreasonably apply federal law when they

rejected Wang’s argument. Wang’s trial counsel hired an experienced forensic

pathologist, and that expert reviewed the evidence, wrote a report, and testified on

Wang’s behalf at trial. That the report was not as helpful to Wang’s defense as Wang

may have wished does not mean that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally

ineffective. Under Strickland, counsel’s “duty to investigate does ‘not force defense

lawyers to scour the globe,’ and limited investigation is reasonable where counsel has

good reason to think further investigation would be wasteful.” 21

       Even if his trial counsel erred in not seeking out a second forensic expert, there is

a reasonable argument that Wang’s trial counsel satisfied Strickland.22 That is all the law

permits us to consider.

                                           IV.

20
   Appellant’s Br. at 42. In other words, Dr. Hoyer’s expert opinion did not conclusively
say Lin took her own life.
21
   Siehl v. Grace, 561 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.
374, 383 (2005)).
22
   See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.
                                              6
       The decision by Wang’s trial counsel not to hire a second expert, viewed through

the doubly deferential lenses of Strickland and AEDPA, was reasonable. We will affirm

the District Court’s order, denying Wang’s petition for habeas relief.

                                             7