Court Opinion

ID: 9503278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:39:59.588091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:21.740585
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority but not with its reasoning. As I explain below, the majority opinion contains an elaborate dictum that plays no role in deciding the issue before this court. I write separately to point out that dictum.
The trial court entered its original judgment in this proceeding on August 25, 2005. Mother filed no appeal from that judgment. On September 28, 2005, mother filed a motion for appointment of appellate counsel, which was granted on September 30, 2005. On October 12, 2005, mother filed a motion for entry of an amended judgment due to the clerk’s mistake in failing to mail the original judgment to mother’s lawyer in this contempt proceeding. The trial court, with the state’s acquiescence, entered an amended judgment on October 13, 2005.
Mother appealed from the amended judgment on November 4, 2005. However, the state moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the August 25, 2005, judgment was the only legally cognizable judgment, that mother had appealed from that judgment beyond the statutory 30-day deadline, and that the trial court had had no authority to enter a second, identical judgment on October 13, 2005, simply to restart the time limit for filing an appeal.
The Court of Appeals agreed that the entry of an amended judgment might restart the 30-day deadline for an appeal, but “only if the amended judgment materially altered the rights or obligations of the party under the original judgment or created a new right of appeal.” The Court of Appeals explained that, because the original judgment and the amended judgment were “identical in content,” the amended judgment did not restart the deadline for filing an appeal. For that proposition, the court relied on a single authority: Far West Landscaping v. Modern Merchandising, 287 Or 653, *543601 P2d 1237 (1979). The court granted dismissal of mother’s appeal by order.
This case poses one issue on review: Did the trial court have authority to enter an amended judgment? This court stated the dispositive rule of law regarding that question in the following passage of Stevenson v. U. S. National Bank, 296 Or 495, 498, 677 P2d 696 (1984), in which this court distinguished Far West and held that a trial court had authority to set aside a judgment entered prematurely and without notice to counsel, and later enter an identical amended judgment to cure the court’s error:
“In Far West, the trial court had reached a final decision on all issues and the judgment had been entered before any mistake occurred. In the present case, the judgment was entered before the trial court determined the motion to reconsider and while the matter was still under advisement. This is not a case in which the trial court came to a final decision and later set aside a judgment merely to accommodate a party who missed the time for appeal. There is nothing in the order or any part of the record available to us to indicate that the sole purpose for setting aside the judgment was to extend the time for appeal, even though this was a result. We hold that the trial court’s grant of the motion to set aside the judgment and issue another was authorized by ORCP 71A. and 71C. and was not an abuse of discretion.”1
(Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.)
In applying that rule to the facts in this case, our inquiry, simply stated, is whether the trial judge set aside the *544original judgment for the sole purpose of extending the time for an appeal, as discussed in Far West, or instead set aside the original judgment to correct an absence of notice to counsel regarding the entry of judgment, as discussed in Stevenson. The majority decides — correctly, in my view — that the trial court did have authority, under the Stevenson decision, to enter an amended judgment. The majority points to the state’s violation of its duty under UTCR 5.100(1) to serve mother’s counsel with a copy of the proposed judgment and states:
“That additional ground for the trial court’s ruling distinguishes this case from Far West and brings it, instead, within this court’s holding in Stevenson * *
346 Or at 539. The majority also expressly approves the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in Amvesco, Inc. v. Key Title Co., 69 Or App 740, 687 P2d 1121 (1984), that Far West has no application when a trial court reenters a judgment to correct an earlier premature award of attorney fees. The majority states, “[t]he same distinction applies here.” 346 Or at 541.
I concur that Stevenson controls the outcome here and that, as the majority acknowledges, Far West is distinguishable from this case on review. A reader might assume that, having identified the controlling authority in this case as well as the distinguishable authority on which the Court of Appeals erroneously relied, the majority simply would stop.
But the majority does not stop. Instead of citing Far West and explaining why its holding does not control the distinguishable facts here, the majority embarks on a lengthy discussion of why, in its view, certain alterations to ORCP 71 in 1981 did not modify the rule that Far West adopted (i.e., trial courts may not set aside and reenter a judgment for the sole purpose of extending the time for appeal). The majority attempts to justify that exercise by asserting that the parties have invited this court to decide “whether this court’s holding in Far West remains correct in light of subsequent changes to the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCPs).” 346 Or at 526. That simply ignores the issue that this case poses. As noted above, the question on review concerns the trial court’s authority to enter an amended judgment under the facts shown in the record. Stevenson supplies the complete answer *545to that question. There is no need in this circumstance to decide whether later-enacted rules have altered the holding in Far West, when that holding has no conceivable impact on the decision of this case.
I am cognizant of the fact that each of the parties cites Far West and that the state in particular urges the court to announce that Far West remains good law despite later amendments to the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it is not at all unusual for parties to cite cases and other authorities, or to present alternative arguments, to this court that, after examination, turn out to have no effect on the disposition of the case. This court’s usual response to that circumstance is either to distinguish the irrelevant authorities and arguments, or to ignore them altogether, and move on. That is what should happen here. That one party strongly desires this court to confirm the continued vitality of a 30-year-old distinguishable case is no justification for this court to do so.
“Dictum,” an abbreviation for “obiter dictum,” refers to statements in a judicial decision that, even though relevant, are not necessary or essential to the decision of the court and have neither adjudicatory force nor precedential effect. Black’s Law Dictionary 1102 (8th ed 2004) (explaining “obiter dictum,” which in Latin means “something said in passing”). Occasionally, it can be difficult to identify dictum in a court’s opinion, because nonessential legal analysis and the assertions of immaterial legal propositions can he shrouded by the certitude of the court’s views. As Justice Cardozo once said, “[D]icta are not always ticketed as such, and one does not recognize them always at a glance.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 30 (Yale Univ Press, 1921). It is, however, essential to identify dicta, when they arise, so that courts and litigants in future disputes will not be misled about the precedential weight of nonessential comments in a court’s decisions.
My purpose in raising the problem of dictum in the majority opinion is not necessarily to disagree with the majority’s statement of the specific holding in Far West, i.e., a trial court cannot set aside a judgment for the sole purpose of extending a party’s time for filing an appeal. As noted, I also *546agree that Far West does not affect our disposition in this case. Rather, I point out that neither the majority’s citation of that distinguishable authority nor the parties’ conflicting (but ultimately immaterial) arguments about the vitality of Far West after certain 1981 amendments to ORCP 71 has any impact on the disposition in this case. Courts commonly identify dicta as statements and comments in an opinion that concern some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved in or essential to the determination of the case at hand. See, e.g., In re Tuttle, 291 F3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir 2002) (so stating). The majority’s comments about the meaning and effect of ORCP 71 on the holding in Far West fail that familiar test: The majority opinion could state the same holding and disposition that it now states without any citation to or discussion of the impact of ORCP 71 on Far West2
The majority misses that point. For example, the majority asserts that the continuing vitality of the Far West holding was “squarely in play” in the lower courts and was the “only issue” raised on appeal by the parties and resolved by the Court of Appeals. 346 Or at 539 n 18. That demonstrates only that the parties and the Court of Appeals have discussed at length the continuing vitality of a case that does not influence our disposition of this dispute. As the majority’s separate discussion of Stevenson demonstrates, a lengthy *547review of the continuing vitality of Far West is not essential to the court’s decision.
At the heart of the courts’ resistance to dictum is the concern that legal error may attend nonessential legal conclusions in an opinion. I would postpone, for that reason, any comment on the meaning and effect of the 1981 amendments to ORCP 71 until those issues arise in a case that necessitates their resolution. To explain that concern, I briefly address the facts from Far West and the substance of the 1981 amendments to ORCP 71.
In Far West, mistakes by both the court clerk and the trial judge misled the lawyer for the defendant to think that the court had not signed or entered a judgment. The lawyer relied on the judge’s assurance that he would not sign a judgment until after a certain date so that the lawyer could attend to a matter out of town and file an appeal upon her return. In fact, the judge already had signed and filed the judgment, the clerk had failed to mail a copy to counsel as a statute required, and the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired. The trial judge learned of the mistakes that had occurred and entered a new judgment, and the lawyer appealed from the new judgment.
The question on appeal in Far West was whether the trial court had authority to enter the second judgment. The majority referred to two possible sources of that authority. The first was former ORS 18.160 (1979), repealed by Or Laws 1981, ch 898, § 53, which provided at that time:
“The court may, in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
The court decided that the statute did not apply. Because the judgment had been taken several days before the court’s mistaken misrepresentations to counsel, it was not taken through a mistake. Id. at 657.
It is worth noting that the majority opinion in Far West misquoted former ORS 18.160 (1979); the majority omitted the words “against him through his” in the statute, *548which is set out above in full. Those words were significant, because they limited the court’s statutory authority to set aside a judgment to circumstances in which a mistake, even of a party, had caused entry of a judgment against the party. Clearly, the mistake in Far West was attributable to the trial judge and the clerk, not to the lawyer or a party. For that separate reason as well, former ORS 18.160 (1979) afforded no relief to the lawyer and her client.
The court in Far West also examined the inherent authority of trial courts to vacate or amend their judgments, and cited numerous cases that confirm that authority. The majority nonetheless held that trial courts had no inherent authority to vacate or amend a judgment if the sole purpose for doing so is to extend the time for appeal. Id. at 658-59.3
Effective in 1981, the legislature repealed former ORS 18.160 (1979) and enacted ORCP 71. See Or Laws 1981, ch 898, § 53. ORCP 71 B(1) provides, in part:
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or such party’s legal representative from a judgment for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect!.]”
As the majority correctly acknowledges, that wording introduced a substantive change to what had been the wording under former ORS 18.160 (1979). By deleting the words “against him through his” from the former statute, the legislature expanded trial court authority to address mistakes by persons other than a party. Read logically, that rule at least arguably would permit a trial judge to rectify mistakes by the court staff or the trial court itself. Indeed, that wording of the new rule appears to have been a direct response to the narrow view of trial court authority that led to the result in Far West.
The majority chooses to reject the contention that the modified wording of the new rule changed the analysis *549that this court applied in Far West. The majority claims that lawyers, for decades, have not been able to establish “excusable neglect” by relying on advice from court personnel about whether the court has entered judgment; it counsels lawyers to check the record themselves. But this issue concerns the new description of the court’s authority to relieve a party from a judgment entered due to someone’s mistake (including the court’s mistake), not excusable neglect. When read according to its terms, the new rule appears to establish that the trial court has the power to alleviate the effects of its own mistakes, not only those of a party. If the rule were so read, then, when the court carries out that judicial function pursuant to ORCP 71 B(1) and determines, for good cause, that a mistake occurred in the entry of a judgment and requires the vacation of that judgment to rectify the proven mistake, it may be said that the decision to set aside the judgment is “for the sole purpose” of extending the time for appeal. In short, the legislature’s amendment to the terms of ORCP 71 B(1) arguably authorizes a court to act for a legitimate purpose— correction of an erroneous entry of a judgment due to a mistake by the court or staff — that was not sanctioned when this court decided Far West. But, whether the foregoing reading (or some other) is correct, the majority errs in purporting to give a contrary answer to that question now.4
The majority states that the holding in Far West remains in effect despite the legislature’s enactment in 1981 of ORCP 71 C (“This rule does not limit the inherent power of a court to modify a judgment within a reasonable time * * *.”). According to the majority, ORCP 71 C
“is a reservation of inherent trial court authority, not a source of inherent authority. That provision thus preserves whatever inherent authority a trial court had before the *550enactment of ORCP 71 C, but it does not add to that authority.”
346 Or at 532-33 (emphasis in original).
That statement about the meaning of ORCP 71 C may (or may not) be correct; but it clearly does not resolve any issue about the trial court’s authority under Stevenson to enter a second judgment, although this court in Stevenson expressly cited ORCP 71 C as a source of trial court authority to set aside an existing judgment and to issue a second identical judgment. Stevenson, 296 Or at 498. Thus, whatever else might be said about it, the majoritys statement in dictum that ORCP 71 C is not a “source” of trial court authority appears to conflict with this court’s analysis in Stevenson.
The specific difference that separates the majority opinion and this concurrence can be stated succinctly. On the one hand, the majority determines that, notwithstanding the 1981 amendments to ORCP 71 B(l), if a trial court inadvertently enters a judgment on a date that contradicts a promise or representation to counsel by the trial court concerning entry of the judgment and, as a result of counsel’s reliance, the appeal deadline expires, the trial court has no authority under ORCP 71 B(l), and no inherent authority, to treat that circumstance as a mistake and resolve the problem by entering a second judgment. That is the effect of the majoritys statement that it “adhere[s] to the holding in Far West, 287 Or 653.” 346 Or at 536.1, on the other hand, am of the view that the trial court may have that authority under ORCP 71 B(l). I would reserve that question for a case that raises it. This is not that case.
For the reasons expressed above, I concur in the result reached by the majority, but not in the majoritys reasoning.
De Muniz, C. J., and Gillette, J., join in this specially concurring opinion.

 ORCP 71A provides:
“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own motion or on the motion of any party and after such notice to all parties who have appeared, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, a judgment may be corrected as provided in subsection (2) of section B of this rule.”
ORCP 71C provides:
“This rule does not limit the inherent power of a court to modify a judgment within a reasonable time, or the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, or the power of a court to grant relief to a defendant under Rule 7 D(6)(f), or the power of a court to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.”

 A recital of the majority’s proffered legal conclusions in their logical order demonstrates the nonessential nature of the majority’s statements about the effect of the 1981 amendments to ORCP 71 on Far West Landscaping v. Modern Merchandising, 287 Or 653, 601 P2d 1237 (1979).
The majority determines, first, that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court had no authority to enter a second judgment. This court’s analysis in Stevenson confirms that the trial court’s action was within that court’s legal authority. That conclusion requires reversal of the Court of Appeals decision.
Second, the majority concludes that this case is distinguishable from Far West. The state’s argument, that, under Far West, the trial court lacked authority to enter a second judgment, is beside the point; this court’s decision in Stevenson v. U. S. National Bank, 296 Or 495, 677 P2d 696 (1984), as noted, contradicts the state’s position and confirms that the trial court’s entry of a second judgment is legally authorized.
Third, notwithstanding the two conclusions noted above, the majority goes on to discuss at length the 1981 changes to ORCP 71 B and concludes that those changes did not affect Far West. The majority fails to explain how that determination has, or could have, any legal consequence once the majority concludes that the trial judge had authority under Stevenson to enter a second judgment.

 Chief Justice Denecke, joined by Justice Peterson, dissented. The dissenters concluded that the majority had produced an outcome that was “manifestly unfair” and an “inequitable result.” Id. at 660, 661 (Denecke, C. J., dissenting).

 The scope of a trial court’s authority under ORCP 71 B to relieve a person from a judgment for any cause, including mistake, ultimately is a matter of legislative policy, as reflected in the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure. In view of the majority’s dicta regarding the scope of that authority, the Council for Court Procedures may wish to inquire whether it should amend any rule of civil procedure to reflect accurately the intended legislative policy. See ORS 1.735 (describing authority of Council on Court Procedures to adopt amendments to, or to repeal, the rules of civil procedure).