Court Opinion

ID: 9458582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:56:22.438515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:49.195687
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM:
The original opinion is modified in the following respects:
We have reconsidered under a correct legal standard the evidence presented to the trial judge at the hearing on Brinks’ motion for a statutory mental competency examination. Our original opinion referred to the standard before the trial court as “whether there is 'reasonable ground’ to believe the defendant is insane presently, or that he was insane at the time the offense was committed,” which is that of Tit. 15, § 425, Code of Alabama (1958 Recomp.). This is more stringent than the standard correctly applicable, i. e., whether there was “reasonable ground to doubt [the accused’s] sanity.” This is the statutory standard of Tit. 15, § 426, Code of Ala. (1958 Re-comp.).
Alabama has three different statutory procedures for mental examinations to which reference should be made. Tit. 15, § 428, is unrelated to competency to stand trial and to criminal responsibility at the time of the offense. It is for the beneficient purpose that a person incarcerated (for any number of reasons, not limited to criminal charges) who is mentally ill may be transferred to a hospital for treatment. Ex parte Garrett, 262 Ala. 25, 76 So.2d 681 (1954); Lee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc). Tit. 15, § 425, prescribes a purely advisory procedure available to the trial judge after indictment in a capital case, if the judge thinks it will be helpful, triggered by the presentation to him of the written report of three expert practitioners or of the superintendent of the state hospitals, showing reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was insane at the time of the offense or presently. No hearing is provided for. The inquiry made under § 425 need not even include competency to stand trial. Lee v. Alabama, supra, 386 F.2d at 106.
Sec. 428, the treatment section, is not even arguably relevant in this-case. As to § 425, while Brinks was charged with robbery, a capital offense in Alabama, Tit. 15, § 415, Code of Alabama (1958 Recomp.), the procedure of this advisory section was not triggered nor was it required to be.
Thus as we concluded in our previous opinion, Brinks’ motion fell under Tit. 15, § 426, which provides that “if any person charged with any felony be held in confinement under indictment, and the trial court shall have reasonable *450ground to doubt his sanity, the trial of such person for such offense shall be suspended until the jury shall inquire into the fact of sanity.” If the jury finds the accused sane the trial in chief shall proceed. If found insane the accused must be committed to the state hospital where he must remain until restored. If restored he must be remanded to prison, and the criminal proceedings resumed. In no event may he be released so long as the prosecution remains pending or he continues to be insane.1 § 426, supra.
Throughout the case, there has been considerable confusion as to which procedure Brinks was seeking to invoke. The language of his motion closely tracked § 428.2 Brinks’ brief to the habeas court shed no light on the matter. In its brief the state assumed he was proceeding under § 425 or § 426. The order denying the writ referred to no statute but discussed in general terms the right to be examined by a psychiatrist at government expense. Brinks’ brief to this court on appeal refers to only § 425, and § 428, and the state’s brief only to § 426. We have been indiscriminately referred to cases under the three sections without regard to their fundamental differences in purpose, procedure and result.3
Before the trial judge suspends the normal course of criminal proceedings and conducts a jury inquiry into the “fact of sanity” there must come to his attention factual data, or allegations of factual data, tending to show “reasonable ground to doubt [the accused’s] sanity.” The court has discretion to determine if the underlying factual basis said to exist does in fact exist, and whether such factual basis constitutes “reasonable ground to doubt [the accused’s] sanity.” If that standard is attained, discretion drops out of the picture — that is, the judge has no discretion to disobey the mandate of the statute if the prerequisites for the mandate are present. In its brief to us the State of Alabama acknowledges that the trial courts of that state have begun to recede from their reluctance to grant sanity investigations and that the Alabama Supreme Court has tempered its former position that refusals were by and large unreviewable.
Having reexamined the evidentiary matter presented to the trial judge at the hearing on Brinks’ motion, we have no doubt that it met the standard of “reasonable ground to doubt [Brinks’] sanity” and that the court exceeded the allowable range of its discretion in denying the valuable right provided by § 426. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Alabama Court of Appeals reviewed the question under a test of whether the matter presented to the trial judge was sufficient to “establish [Brinks’] insanity.” 207 So.2d at 128. This is the very issue that one whose insanity is in doubt is entitled to have decided by a jury.
Turning to the remedy, the State must either retry Brinks or release him. If it elects to retry him, it must accord him the § 426 jury inquiry into the “fact of sanity.” A hearing at this time to determine nunc pro tunc, if possible, Brinks’ mental condition in 19664 is not feasible since the proceedings which Brinks sought required determination by a jury.
*451That part of our prior opinion concerning availability to an indigent of expert psychiatric assistance to show his entitlement to an investigation into his sanity, is withdrawn.
The District Court’s denial of the petition is reversed and the case is remanded with directions that the state be afforded a reasonable opportunity to retry petitioner, subject to his right to a § 426 jury inquiry, and should the state elect not to do so the writ must issue.
Reversed and remanded.
The Petition for Rehearing is denied and the Court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it, (Rule 35 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is also denied.

. The provisions of § 426 for a separate jury trial on the issue of insanity is a valuable right. Lee v. Alabama, supra, 386 F.2d at 107.

. For example, it refers to a jury “if [the judge] deems it necessary,” which is quoted from § 428. A jury is mandatory under § 426 and not provided for at all under § 425.

. The confusion between these sections is understandable, and shared. See Lee v. Alabama, supra, 386 F.2d at 101-107. See also the opinion of the Alabama Court of Appeals, in Brinks’ appeal on the merits, Brinks v. State, 44 Ala.App. 266, 207 So.2d 127, 128 (1967) cert. denied, 281 Ala. 716, 207 So.2d 129, citing Tit. 15, Chapter 21 Article 2, of the Alabama Code, which contains both § 426 and § 428 but not § 425.

. Lee v. Alabama, supra; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed. 2d 815 (1966).