Court Opinion

ID: 9721437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:59:18.358296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.833151
License: Public Domain

JEFFERSON (Bernard), J.*
I am writing this separate concurring opinion because I believe there is a need for a critical analysis of the *538question of appropriate instructions on the element of “intent”— whether the crimes involved are so-called general-intent crimes or specific-intent crimes—both of which types are present in the offenses of prostitution and pandering, the crimes before us in the instant case.
In the instant case, the instruction which the trial court gave on “intent” was CALJIC No. 3.30 (1975 revision), which is labelled “Concurrence of Act and General Criminal Intent.” This instruction provided as follows: “In the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2 of the information, namely, pimping and pandering, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent. To constitute general criminal intent it is not necessary that there should exist an intent to violate the law. Where a person intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with general criminal intent, even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.”
The general-intent instruction is derived from the requirement of Penal Code section 20 which provides that “[i]n every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.” (Italics added.)
But Penal Code section 20 does not tell us what is the “intent”—the state of mind—which must exist in the perpetrator for particular offenses. As observed by People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 532 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092], “the casebooks are filled to overflowing with the courts’ struggles to determine just what state of mind should be considered relevant in particular contexts.” It is the decisional law that has divided the mental element for crimes into the two concepts—general intent and specific intent. The general-intent crime has been designated as the crime in which the mental element involved is simply the intentional doing of an act declared to be a crime irrespective of whether the perpetrator knows or does not know that such act, intentionally done, constitutes the commission of a criminal offense.
Contrasted with the general-intent crime is the specific-intent crime —a crime in which the mental state of a specific intent is an essential element of the crime—a mental state which involves more than simply the intentional doing of that which the law declares to be a crime.
*539If a specific-intent crime is charged against a defendant, it is generally considered error to instruct on general intent (such as giving CALJIC No. 3.30) since the jury might well convict a defendant on a finding that he simply intentionally did the act components of the offense—thus possessing the requisite general intent—but without finding that he possessed the specific intent necessary for the crime charged. (See People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222 [223 P.2d 223].)
In the case at bench, the offense of “pandering” (Pen. Code, § 266i), charged against defendant in count II of the information, is a specific-intent crime. The crime of “pandering” requires that a defendant (1) commit the act of procuring another person, and (2) do so with the specific intent in mind—“for the purpose of prostitution.”
The instruction generally given when a specific-intent crime is charged is CALJIC No. 3.31. This instruction provides that, in the case of a specific-intent crime charged in the information, “there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator and unless such specific intent exists the crime to which it relates is not committed. [1Í] The specific intent required is included in the definition of the crime charged.”
Whenever a felony involving a specific intent is charged in an information, a specific-intent instruction should be given by the court, sua sponte. This sua sponte requirement with respect to a specific intent crime is set forth in People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]. (See also People v. Turner (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 174 [99 Cal.Rptr. 186].)
In my view CALJIC No. 3.31—as a specific intent instruction—is plainly inadequate and should be revised. The beginning reference of the instruction that the instruction applies to a particular offense charged in the information and the concluding sentence that “[t]he specific intent required is included in the definition of the crime charged” (meaning other separate instructions defining the offense charged) leave to speculation and conjecture that the jury will understand the specific intent involved in the definition of the crime charged.
The last sentence of CALJIC No. 3.31 should be tailored in each case so that the specific intent required is inserted as a part of the instruction. The desirability of tailoring CALJIC No. 3.31 to set forth in *540the instruction itself the exact specific intent required for the particular crime involved is well illustrated here where the trial court gave the following instructions defining terms in connection with the pandering offense: the meaning of such terms as “procures,” “prostitution,” “oral copulation,” and “sodomy.”1
Since Penal Code section 266i—the pandering offense—does not contain the word “intent” at all, and, since many other Penal Code sections that define specific-intent crimes do not use the word “intent,”2 it is essential that the jury be told in no uncertain language exactly what constitutes the specific intent as an essential element of the particular offense charged against defendant. This can best be accomplished by including and describing the specific-intent element as a part of CALJIC No. 3.31.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 14, 1980. Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

The instructions given defining various terms were as follows: “Every person who procures another person for the purpose of prostitution or who receives or gives, or agrees to receive or give, any money or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to procure another person for the purpose of prostitution is guilty of pandering. [H] As used in this instruction, the term ‘procures’ means to obtain for another. [I] In the crime of pandering, it is immaterial whether the person procured consented to or requested the procurement. Nor must a sexual act be completed. The crime is complete once the procurement is effected. [If] As used in these instructions, the term ‘prostitution’ includes sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation or other lewd or dissolute acts between persons in return for money or other consideration. [If] Oral copulation is the act of copulating the mouth of one person with the sexual organ of another person. Copulating means to join or connect. [H] Sodomy is sexual conduct consisting of contact between the penis of one person and the anus of another person.”

See, e.g., Penal Code sections 211 (robbery); 118 (perjury); 182 (conspiracy).