Court Opinion

ID: 9832947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:19:30.7802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.343396
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
In a motion for rehearing appellant insists that he has established that appellee’s manner of operating his dairy barn and surrounding grounds constituted a nuisance and that as a result of such nuisance he had suffered material damage. He further insists that only the court by proper order can abate such a nuisance and that he is “entitled to his injunction as his right existed when he filed the suit, or accrued thereafter.”
Appellant likewise complains that the trial court heard and considered improper evidence. There is no showing that the trial court considered any improper evidence or that such evidence was harmful if considered. On the contrary, it is presumed that the trial court did not consider any improper evidence, if such was heard.
*674Appellant is correct in his claim that the record reveals that the river in question crosses a part of appellant’s premises but, under the -record, we do not consider it material whether the river crosses his premises or borders his premises.
Appellant has made no claim on appeal for compensation as damages. He has confined his proof in the trial court and his brief on appeal in this Court to the issue of injunctive relief to prohibit the refuse from running down on his premises from the premises of the appellee. Other complaints and questions raised but not briefed as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure are waived. San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Malcher, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 197; Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Ladin, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W.2d 991; and Broussard v. L. Cartwright Realty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d 777.
The following general rule of law is announced in the case of Herman v Forrest, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W. 624, 625: “The granting of a writ of injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and his action in refusing to grant such a writ will be revised only where a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. Davidson v. Wells, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W. 518; Pavey v. McFarland, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W. 591; Fry v. Jackson, Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 612.” Such rule is likewise supported by the following cases: Beall v. Barsch, Tex.Civ.App., 37 S.W.2d 761; Miller v. Dickinson, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W. 1014; Simon v. Nance, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W. 661; and 31 Tex.Jur. 445, sec. 32.
In the instant case the trial court did not file a finding of fact concerning the controlling issue in the case and was not requested by appellant to file additional findings. But the record discloses that the trial court recognized the controlling issue and correctly stated it, as is shown in our opinion.
The rule is well settled that an applicant for an injunction must proceed with diligence. 24 Tex.Jur. 133, sec. 93, and authorities there cited. But, for some reason, not disclosed by the record, the first hearing was had by the trial court on the merits of this case on July 10, 1944 and a final hearing was had at a subsequent term of the court four and one-half months later and the judgment was entered at the close of the final hearing. It is admitted by appellant that appellee testified at the 'final hearing, in effect, that he had made such changes in his premises subsequent to the previous hearing as caused the nuisance, if any, to be abated but that appellant testified that notwithstanding the changes made by appellee the nuisance had not been abated. The trial court heard the controverted issue and found in favor of appel-lee.
The rule is likewise well settled that in a case such as this it will be presumed that the trial court found facts, when such are not reflected by the record, that supported its judgment. If there be evidence of probative force to support the facts in such a case, it is the duty of the reviewing court to affirm the judgment of the trial court if such can be done on any reasonable theory supported by the evidence and authorized by law. Strickland et al. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. et al., Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 901, and authorities there cited.
We have again carefully reviewed the record in this case and have thoroughly considered appellant’s motion for rehearing. Under the record and authorities cited, it is our opinion that although much of the evidence is controverted, there is evidence of probative force to support the judgment of the trial court and that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the relief prayed for by appellant. The motion is therefore overruled.