Court Opinion

ID: 9544096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:57.609947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:59.180056
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(dissenting, with whom Hennessey, C.J., and Wilkins, J., join). For the first time in the history of this Commonwealth, the court today gives retroactive effect to a criminal statute of limitations. The court does this, contrary to the intent of the Legislature; in so doing, the court aligns us with a small group of our sister States who have addressed the issue.
“As a general rule, statutes operate prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly shown. Yates v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 356 Mass. 529, 531 (1969). Welch v. Mayor of Taunton, 343 Mass. 485, 487 (1962).” Nantucket Conservation Found., Inc. v. Russell Management, Inc., 380 Mass. 212, 214 (1980). It is a fundamental precept that criminal statutes are strictly construed against the government and in favor of the accused. See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 374 Mass. 719, 721 (1978). Moreover, “criminal limitations statutes are ‘to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.’ ” United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968), quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932).1 In the absence of any *595legislative intent to make the amendment retroactive, I see no reason to override the presumptions stated above.
The court states: “ [I]t is not reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended to delay the application of the new ten-year statute of limitations [G. L. c. 277, § 63].” Ante at 593. No explanation is given for this conclusory statement. On the contrary, the only reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature intended prospective application. In the past thirty-five years, G. L. c. 277, § 63, has been amended only three times: once in 1987, an amendment not in issue; once in 1985, the amendment at issue in this case; and once in 1955. Statute 1955, c. 781, § 2, provided: “Section 1. Section 63 of chapter 277 of the General Laws, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edition, is hereby amended by inserting after the first sentence the following sentence: — An indictment for the crime or crimes set forth in sections seventeen, eighteen, nineteen and twenty-one of chapter two hundred and sixty-five, or for conspiracy to commit such crime or crimes, or as accessory thereto, or any one or more of them may be found and filed within ten years of the date of commission of said crime or crimes. Section 2. The second sentence of section sixty-three of chapter two hundred and seventy-seven of the General Laws, as appearing in section one of this act, shall apply to indictments for such crimes committed within the six years next prior to the effective date of this act as well as thereafter” (emphasis supplied). Thus, in 1985, when the Legislature amended this statute which, in its 1955 enactment specifically provided for retroactivity, it did not repeat the language providing for retroactive application of the amendment. The 1985 amendment, and the legislative history accompanying the amendment, are silent on the issue of retroactivity. This silence, in light of the statute’s pre*596vious explicit language of retroactivity, speaks volumes. It is far more “reasonable” to assume that, because they did not so provide, the Legislature did not want the 1985 amendment to operate retroactively.
Furthermore, it is clear, generally, that the Legislature knows how to make a statute retroactive when it wants it to operate in that way. In addition to the explicit langauge of retroactivity in the 1955 amendment to G. L. c. 277, § 63, the Legislature has provided explicitly for a retroactive application with regard to other criminal statutes.2 Indeed, when the Legislature *597amended G. L. c. 269, § 10, in 1981, and a prior amendment in 1976 contained a clause providing for retroactivity, the Legislature enacted a new provision also allowing for retroactivity. Compare G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended by St. 1976, c. 34, § 2, with St. 1981, c. 411, § 2. In this context, the omission of the retroactivity language in the 1985 amendment to G. L. c. 269, § 63 (as compared with the 1955 amendment), is a compelling indication that the Legislature did not intend the 1985 amendment to be retroactive.
The court also states, as justification for its views, that the Legislature was concerned with “one of the great scourges of our society — the sexual abuse of children.” Ante at 593. Obviously, the Legislature was so concerned, and properly so. But the court’s conclusion is a classic non sequitur. While I agree that child abuse is a terrible and tragic crime, the fact that the Legislature lengthened the statute of limitations for crimes of that nature has no bearing on the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of the statute. Normally, when the Legislature is keenly concerned with remedying a problem, it will invoke the emergency clause, thereby making the legislation effective immediately, rather than in ninety days. No emergency provision was attached to this amendment. Nor did the Legislature utilize its prior technique of making the statute explicitly retroactive.
To date, no case in this Commonwealth has given retroactive effect to a criminal statute of limitations. The case cited by the court, Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557 (1959), is off the mark; that case dealt with a statute governing the admissibility of evidence, clearly a procedural rule. The question whether a statute of limitations is procedural or substantive in this context has not been addressed in this Commonwealth, and there is a significant split of opinion among sister jurisdictions, as noted in the court’s opinion. Contrary to the court’s assertion that the split among jurisdictions is “hopeless,” my review of the cases of other jurisdictions reveals a decided preference for prospective application of a criminal statute of *598limitations.3 I find the logic and reasoning of the majority of the States to be persuasive. I dissent.4

 In Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970), Justice Black stated for the Court the reasons for such a principle: “In deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run in a given case several considerations guide our decision. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit *595exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.”

See the following examples: Section 13 of St. 1964, c. 308, dealing with delinquent children and crimes committed by delinquent children, approved April 22, 1964, provides: “This act shall take effect on July first, nineteen hundred and sixty-four; and its provisions shall apply to any person who, prior to his seventeenth birthday, shall have committed an offense against the law of the commonwealth or violated a city ordinance or town by-law, whether such offense or violation was committed prior to or subsequent to the effective date of this act” (emphasis supplied).
Section 6 of St. 1972, c. 293, dealing with indeterminate sentencing of prisoners, approved May 18, 1972, provides: “The provisions of this act shall apply to all sentences for misdemeanors imposed under sections seventeen, eighteen, thirty-two, and thirty-three of chapter two hundred and seventy-nine of the General Laws on or after January first, nineteen hundred and seventy” (emphasis supplied).
Section 2 of St. 1976, c. 34, dealing with the licensing of firearms, approved March 30,1976, provides: “This act shall take effect as of January first, nineteen hundred and seventy-six, and shall become inoperative on January first, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.”
Section 2 of St. 1981, c. 411, dealing with the licensing of firearms, approved September 29, 1981, provides: “This act shall take effect as of July first, nineteen hundred and eighty-one, and shall cease to be operative on January first, nineteen hundred and eighty-two.”

 The majority lists nine cases that give criminal statutes of limitation retroactive effect. Of those nine, three are Texas cases, two are Illinois cases, and one, People v. Whitesell, 729 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986), categorically does not infer retroactive effect to criminal statutes of limitation. Rather, Whitesell relies on two prior Colorado Supreme Court cases, People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1985), and People v. Midgley, 714 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1986), which held that there must be clear legislative intent to overcome the presumption against retroactivity. In Holland, supra at 121, the same amendment to the statute of limitations at issue in Whitesell was found to be retroactive only on a showing of specific and explicit legislative intent.
In addition to the jurisdictions mentioned by the court (see ante at 593 notes 2 & 3), which do not give statutes retroactive effect in the absence of clearly stated legislative intent, see United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105, 106 (3d Cir. 1975); Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853, 859-860, 861 (Fla. 1977); Commonwealth v. Baysore, 349 Pa. Super. 345, 349 (1986); and People v. Holland, supra. See also Mullenax v. Langston, 286 Ark. 470, 471 (1985) (statute of limitations in effect at time offense committed applies).
Thus, it appears that five jurisdictions give retroactive effect to criminal statutes of limitation: California, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas, and Washington. Eleven jurisdictions refuse to give retroactive effect in the absence of clear legislative intent or on the basis that a statute of limitations is substantive: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

 For the reasons stated here, I dissent also in the cases of Commonwealth v. Pellegrino, post 1003 (1988), and Tigges v. Commonwealth, post 1003 (1988).