Court Opinion

ID: 9444005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:37:43.625144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:40.586887
License: Public Domain

FINNEGAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
While I concur in the result reached by my brothers there appears to be an additional ground worthy of mention, in support of the opinion announced today.
Delaware’s statutory mandate is a conduit through which corporate life blood is transfused even after a certificate of dissolution issues. I view this enactment as demonstrative of a legislative intent to avoid truncation of corporate existence by prolonging it for enumerated purposes after dissolution has been signaled. The statutory proviso implements this stay of execution.
We are not here confronted with an extinct corporation, rather one which is enjoying continued, though restricted existence. This corporation was not put to death. Facing up to the broader issue imbedded in this appeal requires recognition of the grave possibility that a statute, such as this one, enacted at the state level could frustrate the administration and enforcement of criminal law in the federal area. Of course we accord the most serious deference to legislative intention evidenced by- the statutory phraseology. But I think the *941question travels beyond a bare question of statutory interpretation. This problem could be restructured and treated as a question involving state power to immunize a corporation against federal criminal prosecutions during a prolonged and restricted existence. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S.Ct. 436, 48 L.Ed. 679.
Certain notions concerning the incapacity of corporations to commit various crimes have long since been dispelled.1 Responsibility of corporations has evolved from the total incapacity theory espoused by Chief Justice Holt to finding a corporate employer guilty of manslaughter.2
Accordingly if some quantum of corporate existence is acknowledged under the Delaware provision, then there emerges the broader question as to whether that State could insulate its corporate creation against such criminal responsibility by omitting from this statutory reprieve unequivocal phraseology pertaining to prosecutions for criminal violations.
It must he remembered that the instant case involved violations allegedly committed during the normal life of the corporate defendant; prosecution for which was commenced subsequent to dissolution, but within the statutory period of extended life. Certainly no question of existence arose at time of the alleged violations.
I find it difficult to perceive how this corporate defendant can exist during the statutory period to wind up its affairs and enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution for alleged violations occurring during its normal life.

. E. g., United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 2 Cir., 1946, 154 F.2d 798; People v. Canadian Fur Trappers Corporation, 1928, 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455, 59 A.L.R. 372; Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 1899, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445, 44 L.R,A.,N.S., .159.
See generally: Marcus, Liability of Dissolved Corporations, 58 Harv.L.Rev. 675 (1945); Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 Col.L.Rev. 1, 181. (1928); Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 Yale F.J. 827 (1927); Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 Ill.L.Rev. 305 (1924); Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 Harv. L.Rev. 404 (1916); Welsh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations, 62 L.Q. Rev. 345.

. State v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 1917, 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685; contra People v. Rochester Railway & Light Co., 1909, 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22, 21 L.R.A..N.S., 998.