Court Opinion

ID: 9771696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:51:27.579363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:35.628316
License: Public Domain

MAUZY, Justice,
dissenting.
If George Upshaw had bought two separate auto insurance policies, paying for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage on each, his beneficiaries would be allowed to stack the coverages under the two policies. Unfortunately, like many policyholders, George Upshaw chose to cover his entire family under one comprehensive policy; and although he paid three separate premiums for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, the majority holds that his beneficiaries cannot stack the coverages within the policy. This holding exalts form over substance, and deprives George Up-shaw’s beneficiaries of the coverage to *636which they are entitled under the Texas Insurance Code. I dissent.
The objective of the uninsured/underin-sured motorist coverage statute, Tex.Ins. Code art. 5.06-1, is “the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles.” Tex.Ins.Code art. 5.06-1(1). The statute is remedial in nature, and is to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment. Stracener v. United, Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex. 1989). In Stracener, this court unanimously concluded that article 5.06-1 requires interpolicy stacking of uninsured or under-insured motorist coverages. In doing so, we emphasized that “[tjhose clauses in insurance policies which are not consistent with and do not further the purpose of article 5.06-1 are invalid.” 777 S.W.2d at 384.
Retreating from the court’s commitment in Stracener, the majority today approves a policy clause of the type that the court formerly condemned. The limitation in Part C of Upshaw’s insurance policy establishes a fixed limit of liability for one person’s bodily injuries, regardless of the number of separate premiums paid. I would hold that this limitation is inconsistent with the purpose of article 5.06-1, and is therefore invalid under Stracener.
The majority defends the policy limitation on the basis of article 5.06-l(2)(d) of the Texas Insurance Code, which was enacted in 1977. Act of May 6, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 182,1977 Tex.Gen.Laws 370. This provision, the majority holds, “manifests the legislature’s intention” to permit anti-stacking clauses in insurance policies. 842 S.W.2d at 635. The legislative history of article 5.06 — l(2)(d), however, indicates no such intention. The main purpose of the 1977 amendment was to add property damage to those damages from which an insured is entitled to protection. See House Comm, on InsuRance, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1256, 65th Leg., R.S. (1977); Debate on Tex.S.B. 1256 on the Floor of the Senate, 65th Leg., R.S. (May 2, 1977). Article 5.06-l(2)(d) was adopted as one part of the package expanding the required coverages to include property damage. Neither the Bill Analysis nor the floor debates suggest any legislative intent to allow insurers to limit coverage in the manner the majority now endorses.
If the legislature had intended to adopt anti-stacking language, it certainly could have done so. By 1977, this court had already interpreted article 5.06-1 to require the interpolicy stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 514 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex.1974); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.1972). To counter either interpolicy or intrapolicy stacking, the legislature need only have adopted language directly addressing the issue, as other states have done. See, e.g., 18 Del.Code § 3902(c).1 Article 5.06-l(2)(d) includes no such language; it was aimed at a different problem, and its terms should not be stretched to reach the issue confronted here. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.-023 (Statute Construction Aids).
The majority’s expansive reading of article 5.06-l(2)(d) cannot be reconciled with the approach this court took three years ago in Stracener. If article 5.06-l(2)(d) is an anti-stacking provision, why does it apply only to intra policy stacking, and not to inter policy stacking? The statute itself makes no distinction between single-policy and multiple-policy situations.
The majority strives to distinguish Stra-cener on public policy grounds, offering a rationale for the decision that was never actually articulated by the Stracener court. With multiple insurers, the majority reasons, an insurer may seek to avoid liability completely, whereas a single insurer must always assume some liability. 842 S.W.2d *637at 635. The implicit suggestion is that one who is insured under a single policy should be content with the minimum coverage the insurer chooses to afford, even if the insured could have recovered more by paying the same premiums on separate policies.
The availability of stacking should depend solely on whether a premium was charged and paid for additional protection. See Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d at 798. An insurer should not be able to collect a premium for statutorily-required protection and then avoid payment with carefully-crafted language of limitation. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gatlin, 470 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1971, no writ).
The Declarations Page of George Up-shaw’s policy contains a bold statement: “INSURANCE IS PROVIDED WHERE A PREMIUM IS SHOWN FOR THE COVERAGE.” It then shows that a premium of $18.00 was paid for uninsured/underin-sured motorist coverage on one of Up-shaw’s vehicles, and premiums of $17.00 each were paid for coverages on Upshaw’s other two vehicles.
I would hold that Upshaw’s beneficiaries are entitled to full coverage on each of the policies for which Upshaw paid premiums. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment for the Upshaws. Because the majority effectively deprives the beneficiaries of their rightful recovery, I dissent.
GAMMAGE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. "The affording of insurance under this section to more than 1 person or to more than 1 vehicle shall not operate to increase the limits of the insurer’s liability. When 2 or more vehicles are insured under 1 policy, the limits of liability shall apply separately to each vehicle as stated in the declaration sheet, but shall not exceed the highest limit of liability applicable to any 1 vehicle.”