Court Opinion

ID: 9943061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:02:31.378956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:00.732565
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10966   Document: 31-1    Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10966
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       CRYSTAL CAMPBELL,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       MAYO CLINIC INC.,

                                                          Defendant,

       MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES LLC.,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10966      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 02/21/2024     Page: 2 of 8

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10966

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00053-TCB
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, JORDAN, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Crystal Campbell appeals the district court’s grant of sum-
       mary judgment for Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC (Mayo) re-
       garding her race and gender discrimination claims, brought under
       Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.
       §§ 2000e-2(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After careful review, we af-
       firm.
              We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
       novo. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir.
       2010). Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine
       issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to
       judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining
       whether the movant has met this burden, courts must view the ev-
       idence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Alvarez, 610
       F.3d at 1263–64.
              Among other things, Title VII prohibits employers from dis-
       criminating against an employee “because of ” her race or sex. 42
       U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 1981 prohibits employers from inten-
       tionally discriminating against employees based on their race dur-
       ing the making of contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Title VII and § 1981
USCA11 Case: 23-10966         Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 02/21/2024          Page: 3 of 8

       23-10966                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

       discrimination claims are evaluated using the same analytical
       framework. See Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836,
       843 & n.11 (11th Cir. 2000). There are two theories of discrimina-
       tion: single motive and mixed-motive. See Qui v. Thomas Cnty. Sch.
       Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016).
               Campbell brought both theories of discrimination and ap-
       peals the district court’s determination on both theories. Regard-
       less of the theory, Campbell must present facts suﬃcient to permit
       a jury to ﬁnd there was intentional discrimination. See Lewis v. City
       of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Lewis
       I). We will start with Campbell’s single motive theory and then
       proceed to her mixed-motive theory.
                                        Single Motive
               To prevail under a single motive claim based on circumstan-
       tial evidence, 1 a plaintiﬀ must either satisfy the three-step burden-
       shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
       411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), or by presenting “convincing mosaic” of
       circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional
       discrimination by the decisionmaker as described in Smith v. Lock-
       heed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Campbell
       argues that she can satisfy either. We disagree and address each in
       turn.

       1 A plaintiff can also present direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Lewis

       I, 918 F.3d at 1220 n.6. But Campbell has not presented any direct evidence,
       so we do not discuss this avenue.
USCA11 Case: 23-10966      Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2024     Page: 4 of 8

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10966

              First, under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiﬀ bears the initial
       burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 411
       U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
       plaintiﬀ must present evidence showing that: (1) she is a member
       of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employ-
       ment action; (3) the plaintiﬀ was qualiﬁed for the job or beneﬁt at
       issue and (4) the employer treated similarly situated employees
       who were not members of the plaintiﬀ’s class more favorably.
       Lewis I, 918 F.3d at 1220–21.
               For the last element, the plaintiﬀ must show that her em-
       ployer treated similarly situated employees outside of her pro-
       tected class more favorably. Id. at 1221. To meet that prong, a sim-
       ilarly situated comparator will ordinarily have engaged in the same
       basic conduct as the plaintiﬀ, will have had the same supervisor,
       and will share the plaintiﬀ’s employment or disciplinary history. Id.
       at 1227–28.
              If the plaintiﬀ can establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
       tion, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate a legitimate,
       nondiscriminatory reason” for its action. Id. at 1221. If the em-
       ployer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
       tion, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiﬀ employee to show
       that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.
       Id.
               Campbell cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
       tion because she could not identify comparators who were simi-
       larly situated in all material respects. Lewis I, 918 F.3d at 1218. To
USCA11 Case: 23-10966       Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 02/21/2024       Page: 5 of 8

       23-10966                 Opinion of the Court                             5

       begin, Campbell was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan
       (PIP), and none of Campbell’s comparators—fellow Clinical Spe-
       cialty Representatives (CSR) with Mayo in the Southern Region of
       the Gastroenterology/Infection Disease Division—had been
       placed on a PIP. This quickly defeats Campbell’s comparator argu-
       ment because no other comparators share the same disciplinary
       history. See id. at 1228.
               Looking deeper into Campbell’s employment history, she
       was consistently ranked lower than her proposed comparators in
       the CSR sales rankings for her region and her actual sales numbers
       fell far below theirs. Campbell asserts that her numbers and rank-
       ing would have been better had she had access to the Direct-to-Phy-
       sician (DTP) program, which allowed physicians to send tests di-
       rectly to Mayo rather than going through the hospital where the
       tests were performed. But none of the evidence suggests that use
       of the DTP would have helped her numbers; to the contrary, there
       is testimony in the record that the program was neither utilized
       often nor successful when utilized. Her ﬂoundering sales numbers
       and rankings, combined with her placement on a PIP, are examples
       of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in work history from the comparators she
       identiﬁed. Thus, the district court did not err in ﬁnding that Camp-
       bell could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
       the McDonnell Douglas standard. 2

       2 Even if Campbell could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she

       cannot show that Mayo’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminat-
       ing her—her continued poor job performance—was pretextual. Campbell did
USCA11 Case: 23-10966        Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 02/21/2024        Page: 6 of 8

       6                         Opinion of the Court                      23-10966

               Second, a plaintiff may alternatively survive summary judg-
       ment if she presents a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evi-
       dence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by
       the decisionmaker.” Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (quotations omitted).
       “A convincing mosaic may be shown by evidence that demon-
       strates, among other things, (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous state-
       ments [], and other bits and pieces from which an inference of dis-
       criminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systematically better treat-
       ment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the employer’s
       justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169,
       1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (Lewis II) (internal quotations omitted).
              Campbell has not presented “a convincing mosaic of cir-
       cumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional
       discrimination by” William Robinson, the person who hired and
       ﬁred Campbell. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (quotations omitted). The
       crux of Campbell’s argument is that Robinson was engaged in a
       suspicious, discriminatory campaign to ﬁnd fault in her perfor-
       mance. But the circumstantial evidence to which Campbell alludes
       simply does not show that any of Robinson’s actions were moti-
       vated by discrimination. Although not dispositive, Robinson inter-
       viewed with and hired her, noting that his ﬁrst impression of her
       was that she was amicable and smart with an impressive

       not perform at the level of her colleagues and has presented no circumstantial
       evidence that rebuts this fact or supports any reasonable inference that her
       race or sex was the real reason for her termination. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265–
       66.
USCA11 Case: 23-10966      Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2024     Page: 7 of 8

       23-10966               Opinion of the Court                         7

       educational background. What is more dispositive is the evidence
       that Robinson worked with Campbell to improve her job perfor-
       mance by organizing meetings in which she could participate, indi-
       vidually coaching her on her annual presentation, and setting goals
       for her to strive for both in her annual performance evaluation and
       her PIP. Only after months of assistance in which Campbell did not
       show improvement and continued poor performance did Robinson
       move forward with terminating Campbell’s employment. The dis-
       trict court did not err in ﬁnding that Campbell could not support
       her discrimination claims under the convincing mosaic standard.
                                   Mixed-Motive
              To survive summary judgment under a mixed-motive the-
       ory, the plaintiff must show that illegal bias was a motivating factor
       for an adverse employment action, even though other factors also
       motivated the action. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235. Courts must ask
       whether the plaintiff has identified “evidence sufficient to convince
       a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action
       against the plaintiff; and (2) a protected characteristic was a moti-
       vating factor for the defendant’s adverse employment action.” Id.
       at 1239 (cleaned up).
              Here, for the same reasons that Campbell cannot piece to-
       gether a convincing mosaic of intentional discrimination, she also
       cannot show that discrimination played any role in Robinson’s de-
       cision to terminate her employment. See id. at 1235. The district
       court did not err in finding that Campbell could not support her
       discrimination claims under the mixed-motive theory.
USCA11 Case: 23-10966    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 8 of 8

       8                    Opinion of the Court               23-10966

             Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judg-
       ment for Mayo.
             AFFIRMED.