Court Opinion

ID: 9863276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:19:54.118253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:26.621871
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
We deal here with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on account of alleged conflicting interests, thereby implicating a certain basic duty inherent in representing a criminally accused client, viz:
“Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interests.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
For years the Supreme Court of the United States has insisted that inherent in “the ‘Assistance of Counsel for his defense’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment” to a criminally accused is “his right to ‘conflict-free’ counsel.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Furthermore, it has suggested some “suspect” situations conducive to denying that right, viz:
“... Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. For example, [it may preclude exploring a plea bargain agreement]. Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent and attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another. Examples can be readily multiplied. The mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate’s conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters."
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, at 489-490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, at 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, at 438 (1978).1
*783In Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, the Supreme Court declined to resolve divergent approaches taken by lower courts to two issues commonly raised in challenges to joint representation, towit: first, how certain and strong a conflict must be to constitute deprivation of effective assistance of counsel; second, the scope and nature of an affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure there is no such deprivation. Id,., at 483-484, 98 S.Ct., at 1178. Our immediate concern here is with the first issue.
From a constitutional standpoint the Supreme Court now differentiates two situations: one, where an objecting accused (or counsel) demonstrates that “potential conflicts” in multiple representation “imper-missibly imperil his right to a fair trial,” thus creating the presumption that “the possibility of conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel;” the other, where a nonobjecting accused demonstrates that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Compare, as it did, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72-75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 465-467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), with Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 256, 92 S.Ct. 1551, 1554, 32 L.Ed.2d 45 (1972). Id., 446 U.S., at 348-349, 100 S.Ct., at 1718-1719.
Three times in Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, the Supreme Court stated in similar terms that a nonobjecting accused must demonstrate that “an actual conflict of interest” adversely affected performance of his attorney: id., at 348, 349 and 350, 100 S.Ct., at 1718 and 1719; accord: Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S., at 692, 104 S.Ct., at 2067. Contrary to what the majority opinion indicates at page 782, the Cuyler Court never mentioned “ ‘actual, significant ’ conflicts.” 2 Clearly the proper legal test requires finding no more than an actual conflict of interest.3
In the opinions discussed ante the Supreme Court provides examples aplenty of conflicts of interests, but there is a dearth of instances found to constitute an “actual conflict.”4 Some decisions regard Glasser v. United States as a reliable benchmark. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, viz:
“... The record showed that defense counsel failed to cross-examine a prosecution witness whose testimony linked Glasser with the crime and failed to resist the presentation of arguably inadmissible evidence. [Glasser, 315 U.S. at 72-75, 62 S.Ct. at 465-467]. The Court found that both omissions resulted from *784counsel’s desire to diminish the jury's perception of a codefendant’s guilt.”
Id., 446 U.S., at 348-349, 100 S.Ct., at 1718.5
In contrast is Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 92 S.Ct. 1551, 32 L.Ed.2d 45 (1972), the facts of which the Cuyler Court briefly summarized, viz:
"... Dukes pleaded guilty on the advice of two lawyers [separately but from the same firm], one of whom also represented Dukes’ codefendants on an unrelated charge. Dukes later learned that this lawyer had sought leniency for the code-fendants by arguing that their cooperation with the police induced Dukes to pled guilty [and also that they “came under the influence of Dukes and got involved”].”
Id., 446 U.S., at 349, 100 S.Ct., at 1718-1719. Rejecting a contention that “his lawyer’s conflict of interest infected his plea,” the Supreme Court agreed with an essential finding by the Connecticut Supreme Court, viz:
“There is nothing in the record before us which would indicate that the alleged conflict resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel and did in fact render the plea in question involuntary and unintelligent.”
Therefore, “Dukes did not identify an actual lapse in representation.” Id., at 349, 100 S.Ct., at 1719.6
Thus the recurring theme throughout germane Supreme Court decisions is that a possible conflict of interest becomes an “actual conflict of interest” in representation when manifested by identifiable active or passive behavior on the part of counsel that is unfavorable to interests of his client. We should so hold.
As thus understood, I agree the Houston (1st) Court of Appeals did not find an “actual conflict of interest,” but in resolving the issue the majority opinion of this Court is often gratuitously presumptuous and terribly ambiguous.7
*785Accordingly, while I do not join the opinion of the Court, I concur in its judgment.

. All emphasis throughout this opinion is mine unless otherwise noted.

.The insertion of "significant" by this Court probably first appears in Ex parte Alaniz, 583 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Cr.App.1979)—delivered something more than a year before Cuyler v. Sullivan. In a footnote to a textual recitation that petitioner complained of "a conflict of interest on the part of his retained attorney,” the late Judge W.T. Phillips wrote:
"An actual and significant conflict of interest exists when ‘one defendant stands to gain significantly by counsel adducing probative evidence or advancing plausible arguments that are damaging to the cause of a codefend-ant whom counsel is also representing.’ Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 at 1076 (5th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.1976).”
Id., n. 3, at 381. The internally quoted language is from the Foxworth opinion; having qualified "gain” with "significantly," in note 7, at 1077, the Foxworth Court converted that notion into "an actual, significant conflict” to contrast a conflict that is "irrelevant or merely hypothetical." U.S. v. Huntley, supra, at 1406, faithfully follows Foxworth.
Again, both opinions preceded Cuyler v. Sullivan, which requires just that a conflict be "actual.”

. Indeed, the Supreme Court did not undertake to determine whether the asserted conflict was "actual." Because there were competing eviden-tiary contentions by the parties which the Court of Appeals did not weigh "under the proper legal standard," it vacated the judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id., 446 U.S., at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719.

. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, at 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, at 1104, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (because record demonstrates “the possibility of a conflict of interest,” cause remanded for further hearing [emphasis in original]); cf. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, at 3120-3121, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (actual conflict not identified where one lawyer represented a coindictee and his partner represented the other in separate trials).

. More specifically, the Glasser Court analyzed the first failing as follows:
“Brantman [witness who implicated code-fendant Kretske in accepting a bribe on behalf of one Abosketes, and testified he did not know Glasser, but was not then crossexam-ined by counsel] was re-called three days later. Stewart [counsel for both Glasser and Kretske] declined cross-examination. That this decision was influenced by a desire to protect Kretske can be reasonably inferred from the colloquy between the court and Stewart before sentence was imposed. At that time Stewart told the court that, lest his failure to cross-examine Brantman reflect on Kretske, the reason for his forbearance was that he feared that Brantman would tell worse lies. But, especially after the intervening testimony of Abosketes [to the effect that he paid money because Glasser and Brantman were linked together in the deal], a thorough cross-examination was indicated in Glasser’s interest to fully develop Brantman’s lack of reference to, or knowledge of, Glasser. Stewart’s failure to undertake such a cross-examination luminates the cross-purposes under which he was laboring.”
315 U.S., at 73, 62 S.Ct., at 466.

. In explication the Connecticut Supreme Court pointed out, inter alia:
"... [It does not appear that either attorney] induced [Dukes] to plead guilty in furtherance of a plan to obtain more favorable consideration from the court for other clients.” Dukes v. Warden, supra, 406 U.S., at 257, 92 S.Ct., at 1554.

.Apart from curious notions that potential conflicts may be avoided by one accused foregoing his defense or each being "willing to accuse the other of nefarious conduct” (At 780), the core of the majority view is at page 782, viz:
"... ‘Potential’ conflicts may indeed become ‘actual’ conflicts of interest during the course of a criminal proceeding, but the transformation must be firmly based on changes in the particular case without regard to speculative, hindsight analysis of an attorney’s strategy.”
No Supreme Court decision coming to my attention indicates that "trial strategy” of counsel is an irrelevant consideration in determining existence of an actual conflict of interest. “Since a possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation," Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra [446 U.S.] at 348, [100] S.Ct., at 1718,” by its very nature potential conflict is preexisting condition to selection of strategies and defenses, and the risk is that the former may unduly influence choosing or manifestly impair executing the latter. See Foxworth v. Wainwright, supra, at 1079-1080. That an accused acquiesced in joint representation will not justify “an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] his lawyer’s performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra 466 U.S., at 348, 100 S.Ct., at 1718.