Court Opinion

ID: 9840069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 05:07:46.238457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:23.493410
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

MARCIE GLOWACKI,                                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      September 14, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                     No. 361775
                                                                      Oakland Circuit Court
MARTIN GLOWACKI,                                                      LC No. 2017-856477-DO

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and MURRAY and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying her motion for postjudgment
attorney fees in this divorce case. We affirm.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This is the third time this case has been before this Court. In 2019, plaintiff appealed the
trial court’s judgment of divorce, challenging the trial court’s division of the marital estate,
particularly with regard to defendant’s medical practice and the court’s decision to equally
apportion a significant joint and several tax liability. Plaintiff also challenged the trial court’s
decision to forever bar spousal support after four years. This Court’s prior opinion provides the
following relevant background summary:

               The parties married in April 2004. Although the parties did not have any
       children of the marriage, plaintiff had two sons from a previous marriage.
       Defendant was in medical school when the parties met. Before and during the early
       years of the parties’ marriage, plaintiff worked in the aviation industry, selling seats
       on private planes for both her own business and another company. In 2007, after
       defendant had obtained his medical degree, he established a medical practice
       known as the Sunrise Institute of Pain Management (“Sunrise”). Plaintiff
       contributed funds to assist in establishing this practice and she was involved in
       managing the practice until approximately 2011 or 2012, when she decided to
       remain at home to care for her two sons and the marital home.

                                                 -1-
               Despite the fact that Sunrise generated revenues in excess of $1.5 million
       annually, the parties fell behind in their tax obligations to the state of Michigan and
       the United States government. At the time of trial in 2018, the parties owed
       approximately $2.7 million in outstanding taxes to the state of Michigan and the
       Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Although the IRS initially granted plaintiff
       innocent-spouse relief with regard to a portion of the tax liability, it later denied
       plaintiff innocent-spouse relief with respect to tax years 2011-2014 and 2016.

              At trial, the parties attributed the tax debt to lavish spending, with each party
       blaming the other for the spending and financial decisions. Similarly, both parties
       took credit for the launch of defendant’s medical practice. At the time of trial,
       defendant’s income from his medical practice was approximately $1 million
       annually. Meanwhile, plaintiff claimed that she had to sell personal belongings and
       jewelry, and accept money from her children, to make ends meet after filing for
       divorce.

                The primary issues at the bench trial involved the division of the marital
       estate, including apportionment of the tax liabilities, and determination of spousal
       support for plaintiff. The trial court awarded the parties’ marital home in Michigan
       to defendant, and awarded the parties’ vacation home in Colorado to plaintiff. The
       trial court found that both parties were responsible for the excessive spending that
       led to the tax liabilities, and held both parties equally responsible for repayment of
       the tax debt. [Glowacki v Glowacki, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
       of Appeals, issued June 10, 2021 (Docket No. 350691) (“Glowacki I”), pp 1-2.]

In determining an appropriate award of spousal support, the trial court found that defendant earned
$1 million annually, and even though plaintiff had not worked outside the home for several years,
the court concluded that she was capable of doing so and imputed $30,000 in annual income to
her. Id. at 2. The trial court awarded plaintiff spousal support for four years, in the amount of
$30,000 a month for the first year, and $20,000 a month for each year thereafter. Id. Defendant
was permitted to deduct from these monthly amounts certain expenses and debts for which plaintiff
was held responsible, including plaintiff’s 50% share of the monthly tax payments to the IRS and
the state of Michigan. Id. at 2-3.

       In Glowacki I, this Court vacated in part the judgment of divorce “to the extent that it
requires plaintiff to pay 50% of the outstanding tax liability after the final spousal-support
payment[.]” Id. at 10. This Court also vacated the portion of a uniform spousal support order that
provided spousal support was forever barred after 48 months. Id. This Court reasoned that because
spousal support was decided by the trial court after a contested trial, it remained subject to
modification under MCL 552.28. Glowacki I, unpub op at 4-5. This Court denied plaintiff’s
request to have the case reassigned to another judge and remanded “to the trial court for
reconsideration of the tax-apportionment issue.” Id. at 10.

        On remand, the trial court again apportioned the outstanding tax debt equally between the
parties. Plaintiff again appealed that decision to this Court in Docket No. 359084. Plaintiff also
filed a postjudgment motion seeking relief from a provision in the divorce judgment that required
her to sell or refinance the parties’ Colorado home within one year of entry of the judgment.

                                                 -2-
Plaintiff sought relief from the refinance-or-sell provision, pointing out that she was unable to
refinance the Colorado home because the IRS had filed tax liens against the property and the
amount of the liens, combined with an outstanding mortgage debt and a line-of-credit debt,
exceeded the equity value of the home, and thereby prevented her from refinancing it. The trial
court denied plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff appealed that decision to this Court in Docket
No. 361084.

        The appeals in Docket Nos. 359084 and 361084 were consolidated in this Court.1 With
regard to the tax-apportionment issue, this Court held that “the trial court’s decision to again
apportion the $2.7 million tax debt equally between the parties is inequitable” and it again
remanded the “matter to the trial court with a directive that it more equitably apportion this joint
obligation of the parties, while recognizing their actual earning capacities.” Glowacki v Glowacki,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 11, 2023 (Docket
Nos. 359084 & 361040) (“Glowacki II”), p 6. This Court explained:

       We recognize, as did the trial court, that the tax liability at issue is a joint obligation
       of the parties. Generally, marital debts are treated as negative assets and typically
       are allocated according to the same equitable principles that govern division of
       marital assets. See, e.g., Butler v Simmons-Butler, 308 Mich App 195, 209; 863
       NW2d 677 (2014).

                In its opinion on remand, the trial court in this case noted that plaintiff wife
       was 48 years old, that she did not testify regarding any physical health issues that
       affected her ability to work, that she at one point earned an annual income of
       $225,000 during the marriage, and that she had the ability to find employment in
       the private jet rental industry in which she had formerly worked. The trial court,
       citing its prior opinion, also observed that plaintiff had earned an 18% commission
       on amounts ranging from $35,000 in 2008 to $1,192,477.03 in 2005 while working
       to secure private jet rentals and transportation. The trial court found, on the basis
       of plaintiff’s and another witness’s testimony, and plaintiff’s employment history,
       that plaintiff is “a savvy businessperson” and possessed “the capacity to earn a
       substantial living.” The court reached this conclusion even though plaintiff had
       testified that her previous work dried up during the economic downturn in 2008 and
       2009, and no one was flying on private jets at that time. Further, plaintiff testified
       that larger corporations had taken over the work that plaintiff used to do, and if
       plaintiff were to work for one of those companies, she would make substantially
       less money.

              Accordingly, while the trial court indeed considered plaintiff’s prior income
       in formulating its opinion that plaintiff had a substantial earning capacity, it did not
       comply with one of this Court’s key directives, which was to compare plaintiff’s
       earning capacity to the earning capacity of defendant, who was earning $1 million
       annually from his successful medical practice. [Glowacki I], unpub op at 7. Even

1
 Glowacki v Glowacki, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 28, 2022 (Docket
No. 361040).

                                                  -3-
         accepting as accurate the trial court’s findings that plaintiff at one point earned
         $225,000 annually during the marriage, and that she earned 18% commissions on
         income amounts as high as $1,192,477.03 while working in the private jet rental
         business, which would yield a before-tax income of $214,645.00, plaintiff’s earning
         capacity still falls far short of defendant’s earning capacity. Therefore, the trial
         court erred by not complying with this Court’s clear directive to consider and
         contrast the earning capacity of each party. See Sparks, 440 Mich at 160.[2]
         Moreover, considering plaintiff’s age of 48 years and that she has not been
         employed since 2010, it is unlikely she would be able to earn even half of what
         defendant earns. This consideration weighs strongly against a conclusion that equal
         apportionment of the tax liability after the four-year period of spousal support
         payments ends is fair and equitable.

                  The trial court also was required on remand to consider “plaintiff’s current
         life status, her necessities, or her personal circumstances.” [Glowacki I], unpub op
         at p 7. In particular, defense counsel questioned plaintiff regarding deposits and
         withdrawals to and from her bank account in 2017, and she stated that she had
         borrowed money from her friends after defendant “walked out the door in
         January 2017.” In October 2017, after plaintiff filed for divorce, she asked a friend
         if she could borrow $10,000 because defendant was refusing to provide her with
         money to pay her bills, and she had to sell her personal belongings to pay bills.
         Plaintiff further testified that she did not have any savings or investments left
         because she had invested them all in Sunrise. On redirect examination, plaintiff
         testified that she made deposits into her personal JP Morgan Chase bank account
         for $5,000 in June 2017 after selling her jewelry, and for $12,000 after selling her
         Rolex, and said she sold these items so she could pay her bills. Plaintiff’s teenage
         son testified that since the summer of 2017, things had been very difficult for the
         family financially, and he sold a Rolex watch that defendant had gifted him for
         $8,000 to help plaintiff pay bills for the family. Plaintiff’s son acknowledged that
         he regularly gave plaintiff money from his job as a lifeguard because she has
         “[l]imited money.”

                 We acknowledge that conflicting evidence on many of these matters was
         presented at trial and there is evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
         plaintiff’s excessive spending habits contributed to the enormous tax debt. For
         example, while plaintiff blamed defendant’s mismanagement of Sunrise, both
         defendant and Jeffrey Freeman, a tax professional and attorney who assisted the
         couple with outstanding tax issues, provided testimony indicating that plaintiff’s
         lavish spending contributed to the tax debt.

                  We also observe that plaintiff appears to have made little effort to secure
         employment consistent with her previously demonstrated abilities during the long
         life of this case. Despite that she had previously earned an income well into the

2
    Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).

                                                 -4-
       six-figure range, the record reflects that she only recently obtained employment
       paying her at the rate of $25 per hour. While plaintiff appears to have struggled
       financially at the outset of this divorce proceeding, the very substantial spousal
       support she has received ($360,000 annually in the first year following the divorce
       decree, and $240,000 annually for the three years thereafter, subject to offsets)
       appears to have allowed her to subsist without working for a substantial period of
       time, only recently securing gainful employment but at a level well below her
       previous earnings. Plaintiff’s current life status and personal circumstances
       strongly suggest that she is underemployed, after having remained unemployed for
       a substantial period of time.

               We nonetheless conclude that under these circumstances, in which the trial
       court has imputed income to plaintiff of $30,000 and there is no evidentiary basis
       to conclude that plaintiff will be able to earn an income close to defendant’s income,
       the trial court’s decision to again apportion the $2.7 million tax debt equally
       between the parties is inequitable. Accordingly, we again remand this matter to the
       trial court with a directive that it more equitably apportion this joint obligation of
       the parties, while recognizing their actual earning capacities. Plaintiff retains
       substantial earning capacity that she has thus far failed to exercise, which the trial
       court may once again take into consideration when fashioning a more equitable
       division of the joint tax obligation. [Glowacki II, unpub op at 4-6.]

However, this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment
relative to the refinance-or-sell provision in the divorce judgment, citing several reasons in support
of that decision. Glowacki II, unpub op at 7-9.

         As relevant to the instant appeal, in February 2022, while Glowacki II was still pending in
this Court, plaintiff filed a motion for postjudgment attorney fees. In particular, plaintiff noted
that there were several pending motions related to the sale of the Colorado home, and she asserted
that “[t]he preservation of this asset is paramount,” that she was seeking a stay of enforcement of
the provision for its sale, and that she was pursuing her legal remedies in this Court. Plaintiff
requested that defendant be required to pay her postjudgment attorney fees in the amount of
$25,000 under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) because she was “unable to bear the expense of this litigation
without a contribution towards her attorney fees.” Plaintiff emphasized that she secured
employment earning $25 an hour just a week earlier, whereas defendant earned approximately
$1 million or more a year. Therefore, defendant had the ability to pay plaintiff’s attorney fees.
Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion.

      During the hearing on plaintiff’s motion, her counsel did not request $25,000, but
“somewhere in the range of $100,000,” in attorney fees, adding that a bill of particulars would
show that plaintiff “spent approximately $150,000.00 on her attorney fees post-judgment.”
Counsel further informed the court that although plaintiff had “made a preliminary agreement” to
work at a local gallery, she now had “some medical issues” and could not maintain that
employment.

      The court determined that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was unable to bear the
expense of this action and denied her motion for postjudgment attorney fees. Plaintiff appeals.

                                                 -5-
                                            II. ANALYSIS

        This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether to award attorney fees in a divorce
action for an abuse of discretion. Loutts v Loutts (After Remand), 309 Mich App 203, 215-216;
871 NW2d 298 (2015). A court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes. Barrow v Wayne Co Bd of Canvassers, 341 Mich App 473,
484; 991 NW2d 610 (2022). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and its
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Loutts (Aft Rem), 309 Mich App at 216.

        Michigan follows the “American Rule,” which provides that “ ‘attorney fees are not
recoverable as an element of costs or damages unless expressly allowed by statute, court rule,’ ” a
common-law exception, or a contractual provision. Skaates v Kayser, 333 Mich App 61, 84; 959
NW2d 33 (2020), quoting Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). Plaintiff
argues that she is entitled to attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a),3 which applies to an award
of attorney fees in a divorce action, and, in pertinent part, states:

                (D) Attorney Fees and Expenses.

                (1) A party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to
        pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific
        proceeding, including a post-judgment proceeding.

                (2) A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts
        sufficient to show that:

                 (a) the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, including the
        expense of engaging in discovery appropriate for the matter, and that the other party
        is able to pay[.]

         MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) allows attorney fees only as necessary to prosecute or defend a
lawsuit. Skaates, 333 Mich App at 85. This Court has also stated that a “party may not be required
to invade her assets to satisfy attorney fees when she is relying on the same assets for her support.”
Id. (citation omitted). In considering a request for attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), a trial
court must “give ‘special consideration to the specific financial situations of the parties and the
equities involved.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).

         Plaintiff’s initial two arguments are intertwined. First, she asserts that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying her motion because she is not in a financial position to pay her attorney
fees, unlike defendant who earns approximately $1 million annually. Second, she argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by basing its decision on its determination that her spousal support
payments were sufficient to enable her to pay her postjudgment attorney fees. As plaintiff
observes, in Myland v Myland, 290 Mich App 691, 702; 804 NW2d 124 (2010), this Court held

3
  MCL 552.13(1) provides that in a divorce action, a court may require either party “to pay any
sums necessary to enable the adverse party to carry on or defend the action, during its pendency.”

                                                   -6-
that “a party sufficiently demonstrates an inability to pay attorney fees when that party’s yearly
income is less than the amount owed in attorney fees.”4 Plaintiff claims that at the time she filed
her motion for postjudgment attorney fees, she was earning $25 an hour, but, by the time the
motion was actually heard in May 2022, she was not working. Plaintiff also asserts that she has
unspecified medical issues and owed more than $150,000 in attorney fees, whereas defendant
earned $1 million or more annually and maintains a lavish lifestyle.

         Plaintiff, as the party requesting attorney fees, had the burden of proving her entitlement
to attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), and thus had the burden of demonstrating that she was
unable to bear the cost of the litigation. Loutts (Aft Rem), 309 Mich App at 218. In ruling on
plaintiff’s motion, the trial court observed that its predecessor, following a trial, found that plaintiff
had the ability to earn income herself. In the opinion and order entered after the divorce trial, the
trial court stated that it had “no doubt” that plaintiff was capable of working, and imputed income
of $30,000 a year to her, noting that she had testified at trial that “she is a savvy business person”
and was the “driving force” behind the development of defendant’s pain clinic. At the motion
hearing, the trial court observed that plaintiff apparently was not exercising her earning capacity,
but stated that it did not know why. Plaintiff’s counsel raised the issue of plaintiff’s health for the
first time at the motion hearing, but failed to identify any specific health issues or fully explain
how they interfered with plaintiff’s ability to work. Plaintiff did not otherwise present evidence
supporting her claim that she had health issues that prevented her from earning an income. After
reviewing plaintiff’s past credibility issues and the court’s prior determination that plaintiff was
capable of earning money, the trial court voiced that it was simply not going to “take your word
on that today.”

         We are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that plaintiff
failed to establish facts sufficient to demonstrate that she was unable to bear the expense of the
action. MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a). The court observed that it had previously been determined that
plaintiff had the capacity to earn an income and that there was evidence that she was employed
and earning approximately $52,000 annually.5 To the extent that plaintiff claimed that health
issues prevented her from continuing to work and earn an income, that allegation was not supported
by any factual or documentary evidence, but only by counsel’s unsupported allegation at the
motion hearing. For example, plaintiff did not submit an affidavit or other evidence to establish
or explain the nature of her alleged health condition, or explain how any health issue impacted her
ability to maintain employment. Moreover, plaintiff did not submit any invoices to substantiate

4
 This Court subsequently explained that this “is not dispositive of the party’s ability to pay in all
cases.” Loutts (Aft Rem), 309 Mich App at 216-217. Instead, the trial court must consider the
parties’ financial situations and the equities involved. Id. at 218 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
5
 If, as alleged in plaintiff’s motion, plaintiff earned $25 per hour and worked a typical 40-hour
week, she would gross $1,000 each week.

                                                   -7-
the amount of her claimed attorney fees.6 Although the parties did not dispute that defendant had
the financial ability to pay for plaintiff’s postjudgment attorney fees, that alone was not sufficient
to entitle plaintiff to attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a). It was also necessary for plaintiff
to demonstrate that she was unable to bear the expense of the action. The trial court did not err by
finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she could not bear the expenses of the litigation.7

        Although plaintiff correctly observes that “[w]ith respect to a party’s ability to prosecute
or defend a divorce action, a party ‘may not be required to invade her assets to satisfy attorney fees
when she is relying on the same assets for her support,’ ” Myland, 290 Mich App at 702 (citation
omitted), the record does not support plaintiff’s argument that the trial court violated this principle.
At the motion hearing, the trial court focused on plaintiff’s ability to earn an income and found
that she was earning an hourly wage of $25 and received $1,000 weekly before taxes “in addition
to the spousal support that she’s paid.” In ultimately denying plaintiff’s motion, rather than
considering plaintiff’s spousal support and requiring her to invade that support, the trial court
instead focused on plaintiff’s earning capacity and ability to earn an income. There was no
suggestion by the court that it expected plaintiff to invade her spousal support to pay her attorney
fees or that spousal support was a factor in the court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion for
attorney fees.

       The record also does not support plaintiff’s claim that the trial court denied her motion for
postjudgment attorney fees by relying in part on a provision in the parties’ divorce judgment that
required her to pay defendant’s attorney fees related to the sale of the Colorado home. The
pertinent provision provides:

               Should Plaintiff-wife fail to timely sell or refinance the Colorado home,
       Defendant-Husband shall list and sell the home within twelve (12) months from the
       date of entry of this Judgment of Divorce, Defendant shall be reimbursed from the
       proceeds of the sale of the real property or by deducting from his spousal support

6
  We recognize that counsel offered to produce evidence of attorney’s fees of $100,000 or more
after plaintiff asked for $25,000 in attorney’s fees in her written motion.
7
  During the hearing on plaintiff’s motion, defense counsel asserted that plaintiff could not “ask
for appellate fees in the trial court level,” without citation to any authority. The trial court opined
that defense counsel was correct because “[t]here is a separate statute or a separate court rule with
respect to attorney fees in an appellate matter, both in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme
Court. It’s in those applicable sections of the court rule. I looked it up previously.” Although the
trial court also did not cite a specific statute or court rule, we presume that its’ references were to
MCR 7.216(A)(7) and (C) and MCR 7.316(A)(7) and (C), pertaining to our appellate courts’
powers, including the explicit authority to award attorney fees against a vexatious litigant.
Neverthelss, this Court has also previously held that MCR 3.206(C), the similarly-worded
predecessor to MCR 3.206(D), “allows a trial court to award appellate attorney fees.” McIntosh v
McIntosh, 282 Mich App 471, 483; 768 NW2d 325 (2009), citing Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App
420, 439; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). Regardless, the trial court reached the right result, and we find
that reversal on this basis is unwarranted. Varela v Spanski, 329 Mich App 58, 81; 941 NW2d 60
(2019).

                                                  -8-
       obligation to Plaintiff all reasonable costs (including all reasonably incurred
       attorney fees), expenses, and interest related to any action that Defendant and/or his
       counsel must take to address any failure on [the] part of Plaintiff with regard to this
       provision, including, but not limited to, either her failure to refinance the home to
       remove Defendant’s name from the mortgage and line of credit or her failure to
       timely sell the real property as required pursuant to this provision. After all
       obligations, including but not limited to, all liens, tax liens (applied equally to each
       party’s IRS and/or State of Michigan tax liability), mortgage, and line of credit, are
       paid on the property, any remaining net-sale proceeds are awarded to Plaintiff.
       [Emphasis added.]

         Also before the court at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees was her separate
motion to modify the listing price for the Colorado home. Previously, because plaintiff failed to
sell or refinance the Colorado home within one year after entry of the divorce judgment, the court
entered an order, dated December 10, 2021, authorizing defendant to list the property for sale. The
court’s order also provided that defendant’s request for attorney fees related to the sale of the
Colorado property was “reserved.” Later, after plaintiff filed a motion to stay proceedings and
defendant filed a motion to enforce the December 10, 2021 order, the trial court entered an order,
dated February 16, 2022, stating that the December 10, 2021 order “is in effect and subject to
immediate enforcement.” In defendant’s response to plaintiff’s motion to modify the listing price
for the Colorado home, defendant expressly requested that the court order plaintiff to pay his
attorney fees and costs associated with defending that motion. Thus, the issue whether plaintiff
should be required to pay defendant’s attorney fees associated with plaintiff’s pending motion to
modify the listing price for the Colorado home was also before the court at the hearing on
plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees.8

        Contrary to what plaintiff argues, there is no indication in the record that the trial court
relied on the attorney-fee provision relative to the Colorado home as a basis for denying plaintiff’s
motion for attorney fees. Although the trial court did briefly mention this provision during the
motion hearing, the issue was before the court in the context of plaintiff’s separate motion to
modify the listing price for the Colorado home and defendant’s request for attorney fees associated
with the Colorado home. Significantly, plaintiff’s counsel explained that plaintiff’s request for
attorney fees was a distinct issue from defendant’s request for attorney fees under the provision
related to the sale of the Colorado home, which counsel stated would be the subject of separate
proceedings, and the trial court stated, “I understand that.” As explained earlier, the trial court’s
ruling denying plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees focused on plaintiff’s ability to earn an income

8
 At the hearing, defendant’s counsel advised the court that the Colorado home had been appraised
for purposes of the divorce at $750,000, and that just days earlier, he had received “an incredible
offer” to purchase the Colorado home for $1.225 million, which was accepted. Although
plaintiff’s motion requested that the property be listed for no less than $1.25 million, the court
noted that the difference was approximately $30,000 and asked plaintiff’s counsel “are we gonna
argue about this?” Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “No, Judge.” The trial court ultimately denied
plaintiff’s motion to modify the listing price of the home on the basis that “the issue is now moot.”
The trial court’s order denying the motion did not award defendant any attorney fees.

                                                 -9-
and her failure to demonstrate that she was unable to bear the expense of the action. The court did
not mention or address the provision in the parties’ divorce judgment regarding defendant’s ability
to recover attorney fees related to the sale of the Colorado home as a basis for denying plaintiff’s
motion for postjudgment attorney fees. Therefore, we reject this claim of error.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Anica Letica
                                                             /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                             /s/ Sima G. Patel

                                               -10-