Court Opinion

ID: 9572300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:40:37.712686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:22.713331
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring and dissenting). I must acknowledge that the plaintiffs claims in the present case give me pause. The plaintiff has brought an action for damages against her 80-year-old father (with whom she has had good relations over the years) for incest that allegedly occurred about fifty years ago. One wonders about the purpose or wisdom of litigating these allegations of injuries inflicted so long ago.
Nevertheless, under sec. 893.587, Stats. 1991-92, the passage of time alone does not justify the dismissal of a complaint.1 By enacting this statute, the legislature declared the policy of providing a legal remedy to adult survivors of incest.
*1059I write separately to emphasize that summary judgment is not appropriate in this case because a factfinder must determine the date the plaintiff discovered the fact and cause of injury and in doing so will have to evaluate testimony about an adult's mental processes in discovering the cause of his or her injury in a claim for incest. On summary judgment courts should not weigh evidence or determine the truth of asserted matters; courts simply determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. I would therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals reversing the summary judgment.
From the affidavits and depositions in this record on summary judgment it is apparent, as the court of appeals explained, that the parties dispute the material facts of when the plaintiff discovered (or should have discovered) the fact of the injury and that the probable cause of her injury was incest.2
The majority opinion states repeatedly, ipse dixit, that the plaintiff knew by 1986 that she had been abused by her father and that this abuse was the cause of her injury. Repetition, however, does not establish the fact. The date at which the plaintiff made (or should have made) the discovery is the central factual dispute in this case and should be determined by the factfinder.
The test under the discovery rule, "in the exercise of reasonable diligence," is an objective test. Thus, under the discovery rule, the plaintiffs cause of action accrued when she discovered or when a reasonable person under *1060the same or similar circumstances as the plaintiff should have discovered the injury, its cause, its nature and the defendant's identity. Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 638, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989); Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 160, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991).3
The discovery rule requires a particularized inquiry into whether a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances would have discovered the fact and cause of her injury earlier than two years before the action was commenced. In a case such as this one, expert psychological testimony would be presented. The factfinder's determination of when the plaintiff made or should have made the discovery is dependent upon the factfinder's appraisal of the psychological evidence presented, the scientific credentials of the expert witnesses, and the victim's credibility. The lapse of 50 years in this case might very well affect a factfinder's view of the facts alleged and the witnesses' credibility. Jury instructions should be tailored to assure that the credibility of the witnesses and the validity of the psychological evidence are given appropriate scrutiny.
I would therefore remand the cause to the circuit court for the factfinder — in this case a jury — to determine when "discovery" occurred, and hence, when the statute of limitations began to run.
*1061I would also direct the circuit court to instruct the jury that such finding of fact be made in accordance with the legislative directive of sec. 893.587, Stats. 1991-92, which adopted the discovery rule set forth in our cases. I agree with the majority's conclusion that Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1987), merely applies to incest cases the discovery rule established in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983),4 and Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 388 N.W.2d 140, 146 (1986).5
The plaintiff urges this court to read Hammer as stating that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has "shifted the blame" for her injury, independent of her discovery of its fact and its cause. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs position is erroneous. Section 893.587, Stats. 1991-92, does not incorporate as a separate element the victim's psychological capability to commence a lawsuit at a time subsequent to discovering the fact and the probable cause of the injury. Nevertheless I conclude that the process of "shifting the blame," while not a separate step in the accrual of an action, may be an aspect of the *1062discovery of the cause of the injury. A victim must be aware (or a reasonable person in the victim's position should be aware) that some person other than herself is responsible for producing her injury before she can be said to have discovered the cause. It is only when she discovers the injury and its cause that the cause of action accrues.
Because the elements necessary to the discovery process (the discovery of the injury and its cause) are fact dependent and must be resolved by the factfinder before a period of limitations can be calculated, I conclude the court of appeals correctly remanded resolution of the fact questions to the circuit court.

 Section 893.587, Stats. 1991-92, establishes that a plaintiff may commence an action to recover damages for injury caused by incest within two yearn after the time the plaintiff "discovers the fact [of the injury] and the probable cause [of the injury], or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fact and the probable cause, of the injury, whichever occurs first."

 In determining whether the cause of action is time-barred, only those facts relating to when the plaintiff discovered the fact and the cause of her injury are relevant.
If the plaintiff can overcome the statute of limitations hurdle, the record is clear that the parties dispute whether the sexual abuse ever took place. Therefore summary judgment is not appropriate on the merits of the case.

 "The issue of reasonable diligence is ordinarily one of fact." Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 638, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989) (citing Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 404). When the facts and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts are not in dispute, whether a claimant has exercised reasonable diligence is a question of law. See Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 161, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991); see also Hennekens, 160 Wis. 2d at 171-74 (Abrahamson, J. dissenting) (discussion of summary judgment and discovery rule).
In this case the facts and inferences are disputed.

 Hansen held that the cause of action accrued on the date the injury was discovered, not on the date of the act that resulted in injury.

 Borello went a step further than Hansen and held that, although an injury was known at an earlier date, the cause of action did not accrue or the statute of limitations did not commence to run until, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injured party discovered the cause of the injury. In Borello the injury was a respiratory ailment that was apparent to the injured party. Not until two years after the injury became apparent to the injured party did she acquire factual information to a reasonable probability that a defective furnace was the cause of the injury. We held that her cause of action accrued on the date she acquired that information.