Court Opinion

ID: 9657005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:10:36.130049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:29.635913
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). This case is one of many cases in the circúit and appellate courts involving the circuit court's pretrial dismissal of an action because of the attorney's dereliction of duty.1 Punishment of litigants for the sins of counsel is thus not an unusual or isolated event.
*288In civil cases the principles of agency law as applied to the attorney-client relationship ordinarily require that a litigant is bound by the acts of counsel.2 I conclude, however, that strict application of the rule that a litigant is bound by the acts of counsel is usually too harsh in a case of pretrial involuntary dismissal of an action with prejudice because of counsel's, not litigant's, neglect and disobedience of court orders.
The majority opinion makes no distinction between the conduct of the Johnsons and the conduct of their attorney. The majority opinion refers to the Johnsons and their attorney interchangeably and gives little weight to the Johnsons' argument that a circuit court should consider the personal fault of the litigants in a pretrial dismissal for the attorney's disobedience of court orders.
The majority relies on Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), a 4-3 United States Supreme Court decision which has been criticized by commentators for *289its harshness to blameless litigants.3 The majority holds that "[although Wisconsin courts may exercise their discretion in appropriate cases by not punishing litigants for their counsel's error or misconduct, our cases establish that the litigant has no right to avoid the consequences of his attorney’s conduct by disavowing the actions of counsel." Majority op. at 284. Under the majority opinion, the circuit court may, in its discretion, but need not, consider that a litigant bears no personal fault for the delay in prosecuting the action.4 I conclude that it is an abuse of discretion for a circuit court to impute counsel's conduct to the litigant without considering the personal fault of the litigant.5
*290In my opinion, several reasons justify the relaxation of the general rule that counsel binds a litigant in the context of a pretrial involuntary dismissal for counsel's disobedience of court orders.
One, as' a practical matter, a layperson ordinarily cannot be expected to supervise his or her attorney through every pretrial phase of litigation. A litigant may make appropriate inquiry and be victimized by counsel. A layperson may have no reason to suspect problems with counsel simply because a lengthy period of time has passed since an action was filed. A long period often passes before cases reach trial. Justice Black said it well in his dissent in Link v. Wabash R.R.: "to impose the punishment for the lawyer's failure to prosecute on the plaintiff who . . . was simply trusting his lawyer to take care of his case as clients generally do" is to ignore "the practicalities and realities of the lawyer-client relationship." Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634, 646 (1962).
Two, the consequence for the blameless litigant whose case is dismissed is extraordinarily severe. The litigant never gets the opportunity for a trial on the merits. A malpractice suit against counsel is an unsatisfactory solution for both the litigant and the judicial system.
Three, the harm to the opposing party is ordinarily limited, and the opposing party can be compensated.
Four, the circuit court has other sanctions available to it short of dismissal of the litigant's case with *291prejudice, the most severe sanction possible. Sanctions could be imposed on the lawyer personally.6
Five, while a circuit court's efforts to move the docket expeditiously are important, dismissing actions for counsel's failure to comply with court orders does not necessarily foster sound, speedy administration of justice.7
*292The federal third circuit court of appeals has adopted a procedure to protect litigants from attorneys' default, to protect opposing parties, and to prevent unnecessary delay. The third circuit court of appeals invoked its supervisory power to require federal trial courts to mail notice directly to the litigant of the time and place of a hearing on a motion to dismiss. This procedure, said the court, puts the litigant on notice of possible jeopardy to his or her legal interest while the litigant still has the opportunity to take appropriate action. The third circuit court of appeals has directed the federal trial courts to consider whether the litigant is personally at fault when ruling on a motion to dismiss.8 The federal trial courts are encouraged to make findings supported by the record that the litigant personally bore some responsibility for the attorney's actions before dismissing for failure to prosecute.9
*293Judge Seitz wrote for a unanimous third circuit panel as follows:
Defaults in professional obligations are a blight on the legal system and a betrayal of the privilege accorded the legal profession. We have therefore concluded that the growing scope of the problem and the responsibility of the courts to the general public require us to invoke our supervisory power in this area with respect to the district courts within this circuit.
We conclude that any motion, whether by court or counsel, seeking an effective dismissal or default judgment based on an apparent default on the part of a litigant's counsel be pleaded with particularity and with supporting material and that where the papers demonstrate reasonable grounds for dismissal on that basis the court shall direct the clerk of the court to mail notice directly to the litigant of the time and place of a hearing on any such motion, reasonably in advance of the hearing date. We are confident that the district judges have the necessary remedies to prevent any abuse of this procedure.
We think such a procedure will put the client on notice of possible jeopardy to his or her legal interests by counsel's conduct at a time when the client can take appropriate action . . ..
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987).
I favor adopting a similar procedure under this court's superintending power. Article VII, sec. 3, Wis. Const. A circuit court should notify the litigant of the time and place for a hearing on any motion to dismiss *294before trial for counsel's disobedience of court orders.10 In determining whether to dismiss the action the circuit court should not assume that a litigant is aware of and bound by the acts of counsel in the pretrial phase of litigation. The circuit court should consider the litigant's personal responsibility for and attempts to remedy the counsel's noncompliance in determining the appropriate sanctions and make appropriate findings on this issue on the record.
I join the mandate because I conclude that in this case the litigants, although blameless for the attorney's misconduct, themselves failed to act promptly when they became aware of the attorney's misconduct. While the circuit court was considering the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Johnsons learned of the motion to dismiss and of their attorney's failure to proceed with the case. For about four months the Johnsons failed to take any action to correct the matter. They failed, for example, to advise the circuit court of their position and of their disavowal of their attorney's conduct.11 The circuit court's dismissal of the action with prejudice is an exercise of discretion. I affirm the dismissal in this case, as it is possible to hold the litigants in this case accountable for their own conduct.
*295For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate but do not join the opinion.

Two cases in addition to this case have been decided today. See Daniel Schneller v. St. Mary's Hospital Medical Center, 162 Wis. 2d 296, 470 N.W.2d 873 (1991) (sanction precluding naming witness constitutes effective motion to dismiss); Monson v. Madison Family Institute, 162 Wis. 2d 212, 470 N.W.2d 853 (1991). A petition for review before this court raises the same issue. Barenz v. Stewart, No. 90-2065-FT (decision of the court *288of appeals filed February 20, 1991, affirming judgment of circuit court dismissing action).
Judge Sundby of the court of appeals calculated that since the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure the court of appeals has decided 24 cases involving failure to prosecute or to comply timely with a pretrial order, 20 of which resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint. Monson v. Madison Family Institute, No. 89-0314, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 15,1990) (Sundby, J., dissenting op. pp. 23-24).

This case falls within the broader subject of the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking between lawyer and client and the lawyer's obligation to keep the client informed. See, Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1120 (1968); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Deci-sionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. P&. L. Rev. 41 (1979).

See Note, Involuntary Dismissal for Disobedience or Delay: The Plaintiffs Plight, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 922 (1967); Note, Dismissal for Failure to Attend a Pretrial Conference and the Use of Sanctions at Preparatory Stages of Litigation, 72 Yale L. J. 819 (1963); Note, The Demise (Hopefully) of an Abuse: The Sanction of Dismissal, 67 Cal. W.L. Rev. 438 (1971).

In Schneller v. St. Mary's Hospital Medical Center, 162 Wis. 2d 296, 470 N.W.2d 873 (1991) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting.), the circuit court failed to consider the plaintiffs' lack of personal fault. The circuit court also refused to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard personally to explain, according to their affidavits, that they had selected counsel carefully, had relied upon him, and had made frequent inquiry about discovery during the progress of the case.

The court might impose monetary sanctions on the attorney. See Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 907 (1991) (advocates fines in discipline cases).

Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren in Link v. Wabash R.R., emphasized the conflict between clearing the court dockets and giving justice to the parties:
The Court seems to find some reason for holding that this plaintiff can be penalized without notice because of a program certain courts have adopted to end congestion .... It is of course desirable that the congestion on the court dockets be reduced in every way possible consistent with the fair administration of justice. But that laudable objective should not be sought in a way which undercuts the very purposes for which courts were created — that is, to try cases on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the parties . . .. When we allow the desire to reduce court congestion to justify the sacrifice of substantial rights of the litigants in cases like this, we attempt to promote speed in administration, which is desirable, at the expense of justice, which is indispensable to any court system worthy of its name.
Moreover it seems plain to me that. . . dismissing meritorious lawsuits is doomed to fail even in its misguided purpose of promoting speed in judicial administration. Litigants with meritorious lawsuits are not likely to accept unfair rulings of that kind without exhausting all available appellate remedies. Consequently, any reduction of trial court dockets accomplished by such dismissals will be more than offset by the increased burden on appellate courts . . ..
It is true that by its ruling today the Court finally puts an end to this case and thus clears it from all federal dockets. But in view of the fact that the merits of the case have never been reached, I cannot believe that there should be much rejoicing at this fact. The end result of the procedures here has been that much time has been wasted and yet no justice has been done. I feel it highly regrettable *292that the Court feels compelled to place its stamp of approval upon such procedures. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 648-49 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
See also, Statement of Justice Black and Justice Douglas on the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Proposed Amendments, 31 F.R.D. 617,619 (1962), advocating that before dismissing a plaintiffs action for failure of the lawyer to prosecute, the trial court should be required to serve notice on the plaintiff personally.

Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987); Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1147-1149 (3d Cir. 1990); Curtis T. Bidwell and Sons, Inc. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693, n.19 (3d Cir. 1988); Andrews v. Government of Virgin Islands, 132 F.R.D. 405, 411 (D. Virgin Islands 1990); Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1986).

The court in Dunbar remanded the case for a hearing and determination on the dismissal, " [g]iven the absence of a finding with record support that Ms. Dunbar bore some responsibility for the flagrant actions of her counsel . . Dunbar v. Triangle *293Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987). See also, Curtis T. Bidwell and Sons, Inc. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693, n.19 (3d Cir. 1988).

The circuit court already mails out notices in other pretrial matters. See Sec. 802.10(3)(a), Stats. 1989-90, which provides:
Calendar practice ... (3) (a) Scheduling conference. The court may on its own motion. . . call a scheduling conference upon at least 10 days written notice by mail to all attorneys of record and to all parties who have appeared of record and are not represented by counsel.

Compare Schneller v. St. Mary's Hospital Medical Center, 162 Wis. 2d 296, 470 N.W.2d 873 (1991) (Abrahamson, J. dissenting).