Court Opinion

ID: 9750115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:20:33.902108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:02.858341
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Robebts:
Defendant William Smith and two co-defendants were apprehended while fleeing from a robbery on March 21, 1968. The motor vehicle in which they were riding was searched, without a warrant, both at the *11scene of the arrest and again several hoars later while the automobile was in the custody of the police at the police station. Defendant argues that the second warrantless search of the automobile while it was immobilized at the police station was in violation of the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. I agree and would therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial.1
Any analysis of a Fourth Amendment challenge must begin with the unequivocal protective language of the Amendment itself: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment requires that “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure. . . .” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968). In similar terms the Court said in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967): “[S]carches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 357, 88 S. Ct. at 514.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971), the Court carefully articulated the *12exceptions to the otherwise inviolate principle that “whenever practicable” a warrant must be obtained. Enumerated there were the following well-recognized exceptions: a search made while in “hot pursuit”, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967); a seizure made when the object was in “plain view” and the police conduct was inadvertent, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623 (1963); a search made when exigent circumstances justify the absence of a warrant, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); or a search incident to an arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969).
This constitutionally mandated framework of the Fourth Amendment has been consistently followed by this Court, until today. In Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 431 Pa. 639, 246 A. 2d 381 (1968), we said: “Whenever practicable, the police must obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through warrant procedure, and the failure to comply with the warrant procedure ‘can only be excused by exigent circumstances.’ ” Id. at 643, 246 A. 2d at 383, (quoting from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)). Applying this constitutional imperative to the facts here it is clear that the police had ample opportunity to procure a search warrant. The defendant’s automobile had been immobilized for several hours and was safely in the custody of the police at the police station. There was “no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeing opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous chase.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra at 462, 91 S. Ct. at 2035-2036 (1971). Nor was there any fear that other confederates would move the automobile or remove physical evidence. 431 Pa. at 644, 246 A. 2d at 384. In short, at the time of the second search, there were no “exigent cireum*13stances” that permitted the police to dispense with the constitutional requirement of obtaining a search warrant.
The Commonwealth argues, and the majority’s holding implies, that because the search in question took place in an automobile, the Fourth Amendment standards for a reasonable search should somehow be relaxed. This Court heretofore has emphatically rejected the suggestion that cars are sui generis and thus not entitled to the aegis of the Fourth Amendment. As we noted in Commonwealth v. Cockfield, supra, “[C]ertainly an automobile is not per se unprotected by the warrant procedure of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 644, 246 A. 2d at 384. With similar forcefulness the Supreme Court said in Katz v. United States, supra: “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, a recent United States Supreme Court decision involving automobile searches, the Court cogently stated: “The word automobile is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.” 403 U.S. at 461-62, 91 S. Ct. at 2035.
Finally, I am unpersuaded that Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970), supports the result reached by the majority. The Supreme Court in Chambers stated: “For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981. With this statement I am in complete agreement. I recognize that it would seriously undermine police efforts if they were prohibited from immobilizing a vehicle used in a crime until they had an opportunity to *14secure a search warrant. In Chambers the Court sustained a search, without a warrant, of an automobile that was in the custody of the police. However, a crucial distinction exists between Chambers and this case. In Chambers no search was conducted contemporaneously with the initial arrest of the defendants. As the Court noted: “It was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the station house. All occupants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of the night. A careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers, and it would serve the owner’s convenience and the safety of Ms car to have the veMcle and the keys together at the station house.” Id. at 52, n.10, 90 S. Ct. at 1981, n.10 (emphasis added).
Chambers simply held that when, because of legitimate concerns over their own safety, the police are unable to conduct a search contemporaneously with an arrest, an exigent circumstance arises which allows the police to subsequently search without a warrant. Such a holding is of course consistent with the Fourth Amendment general requirement of a warrant, a principle wMch was expressly acknowledged in Chambers and reaffirmed thereafter in Coolidge, supra. The compelling circumstance in Chambers is not present in this case. Here the police had an opportunity to search the automobile when the defendant was arrested, and in fact did so. During the course of that search the police recovered a weapon used in the crime, the money taken in the robbery, and a bloodstained coat. Thus there existed no “exigent circumstance” justifying the officers from not obtaining a warrant before they searched the automobile a second time several hours later at the police station.
In sum, I think that given the longstanding principle of requiring a search warrant whenever practica*15ble, it would be improper to give Chambers a reading beyond its immediate and unique factual getting. This is justified both because Chmnbers itself expressly acknowledged this principle, and because in the subsequent case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire the Court again restated its adherence to the general requirement of a warrant.
Accordingly, I dissent.
Mr. Justice Nix joins in this dissenting opinion.

 There can be no doubt that the materials obtained from this second search were prejudicial to the defendant and its introduction into evidence could not be construed as harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). The materials seized included several articles of clothing which were instrumental in linking the defendant to the actual perpetration of the crime.