Court Opinion

ID: 9763567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:49:46.204829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:46.320818
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Justice,
concurring.
In addition to the point discussed in the majority opinion, I would add that there is no evidence in this case of any type of delivery. *230A gift requires more than a promise; it requires both intent to make a gift and execution by delivery or other transfer of the property. Thornton v. Rains, 157 Tex. 65, 299 S.W.2d 287, 288 (1957).
The delivery of a gift may be either actual or constructive. Bishop v. Bishop, 359 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.1962). However, a review of numerous Texas cases on this subject reveals that both types of delivery require some positive act on the part of the giver.2
Arnold takes the position that Ridgeway was of sound mind and capable of forming a donative intent. Yet, there is no evidence that he did anything to transfer the funds to her, such as making a telephone call to the bank to instruct the transfer, signing a document instructing the bank to make the transfer, going to the bank and asking it to make the transfer, or any other type of delivery. There is simply no evidence of delivery in this case.
Furthermore, as a designated payee, Arnold had a fiduciary relationship to Harmon Ridgeway and was bound by the general duties of a trustee when dealing with Ridge-way’s property. See, e.g., Slay v. Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W.2d 377, 387 (1945). Under Section 113.053(a)(1) of the Texas Trust Code, “a trustee shall not directly or indirectly buy or sell trust property from or to” herself, unless an enumerated exception applies. Tex. PROp.Code Ann. § 113.053(a)(1) (Vernon 1995). None of the enumerated exceptions apply in this case. See Tex PROp.Code Ann. § 113.053(b)-(f) (Vernon 1995). If a sale from a trustee to herself is prohibited as self-dealing, then a gift of trust property from a trustee to herself would be an even more flagrant type of prohibited self-dealing.
I concur in the majority opinion for the reasons stated therein, as well as the reasons set forth in this concurring opinion.

. See, e.g., Williams v. Krueger, 351 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1961), rev’d on other grounds, 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962); Pruett v. First Nat’l Bank of Temple, 175 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1943, no writ); O’Donnell v. Halladay, 152 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Benavides v. Laredo Nat'l Bank, 91 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1936, no writ).