Court Opinion

ID: 9701890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:42:29.200637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.462240
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
I believe that the lower court correctly decided that the exculpatory clause in appellant’s contract with Gray did not satisfy the requirements of subsection (a), § 413 of the Restatement, and therefore that the subsection was properly not given to the jury.
*109Subsection (a) states that an employer may be relieved of liability for harm in a § 413 case if he provides in the contract with an independent contractor that the contractor shall take “such precautions.” “Such precautions” refers to “special precautions” required to prevent physical harm due to “a peculiar unreasonable risk.”
Here, the exculpatory clause read:
16. The safety of all persons employed by Contractor and his subcontractors on Owner’s premises, or any other person who enters upon Owner’s premises for reasons relating to this contract, shall be the sole responsibility of Contractor. Contractor shall at all times maintain good order among his employees and shall not employ on the work any unfit person or anyone not skilled in the work assigned to him. Contractor shall confine his employees and all other persons who come onto Owner’s premises at Contractor’s request or for reasons relating to this contract and his equipment to that portion of Owner’s premises where the work under this contract is to be performed or to roads leading to and from such work sites, and to any other area which Owner may permit Contractor to use.
Contractor shall take all reasonable measures and precautions at all times to prevent injuries to or the death of any of his employees or any other person who enters upon Owner’s premises. Such measures and precautions shall include, but shall not be limited to, all safeguards and warnings necessary to protect workmen and others against any conditions on Owner’s premises which could be dangerous and to prevent accidents of any kind whenever work is being performed in proximity to any moving or operating machinery, equipment or facilities, whether such machinery, equipment or facilities are the property of or are being operated by, the Contractor, his subcontractors, the Owner or other persons.
It is understood that if employees of Owner shall perform any acts for the purpose of discharging the responsibility undertaken by the Contractor in this Article 16, *110whether requested to perform such acts by the Contractor or not, such employees of the Owner while performing such acts shall be considered the agents and servants of the Contractor subject to the exclusive control of the Contractor.
This clause does not provide for special precautions in the situation in this case — the change in the usual tear-out procedure and the use of the chute — for two reasons. First (as the majority notes), the peculiar risk arose after the contract was drawn and signed. § 413 requires that in such a circumstance the employer take further action; * if he wishes to rely on subsection (a), that further action would be an amendment of the contract. Second, the clause does not specifically refer to special precautions against specific peculiar risks. I believe subsection (a) contemplates such specifics and cannot be satisfied by the language, “[contractor shall take all reasonable measures and precautions at all times to prevent injuries to or the death of any of his employees . . ..” The correctness of this belief, I suggest, is confirmed by the illustrations under § 416 (which treats the same kind of “peculiar risk” as § 413; see § 416, Comment b); these illustrations describe clauses that state the special precautions that are to be taken.
To give a charge on subsection (a) and to give the jury the exculpatory clause would have been to ask the jury to interpret the clause. In my view, this would have been clear error, for
[wjhere the meaning of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and construction are for the court, not the jury. Cerceo v. DeMarco, 391 Pa. 157, 137 A.2d 296 (1958); Filler Products, Inc. v. Corriere, 381 Pa. 394, 113 A.2d 219 (1955). It is our conclusion that the court below did not err in construing the contract. Sub*111mitting it to the jury for their interpretation, as appellants requested, would have been error.
Hewes v. McWilliams, 412 Pa. 270, 275, 194 A.2d 339, 342 (1963).
I would affirm.

 See Comment d:
Although the employer at the time he lets the contract has no reason to anticipate that conditions will arise which require special precautions to be taken, if in fact such conditions do arise and he knows or should know of them, he is then required to act in the manner required by the rule stated in this Section.