Court Opinion

ID: 9691296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:23:40.603585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:16.063340
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.,
dissenting.
I dissent.
In Blixt v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 717, 18 N. W. 2d 78, we considered the following provision found in section 60-105, R. S. Supp., 1949: “No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle, hereafter sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate duly issued, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” We held: “The provision goes far beyond a mere regulation under the police power. It amounts to an invasion of the right of contract, the impairment of rights of property and a restriction upon the right of the courts to weigh and consider evidence and to make determinations with *648regard to title and ownership of property and contractual rights and obligations.”
Section 60-105, R. S. Supp., 1949, also includes the following: “* * * nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such person against a person having possession of such certificate of title or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate for such motor vehicle * * * for a valuable consideration.”
The court now holds that all of Chapter 60, article 1, R. S. Supp., 1949 (which includes section 60-105, R. S. Supp., 1949), does not violate any provision of our state or the federal Constitution “especially with reference to the right df contract, the delegation or restriction of judicial powers, and due process of law.” The court overrules directly the above holding in the Blixt case.
Article V, section 9, of the Constitution provides: “The district courts shall have both chancery and common law jurisdiction, and such other jurisdiction as the legislature may provide * * *.”
In Lacey v. Zeigler, 98 Neb. 380, 152 N. W. 792, we held with reference to this provision: “The equitable jurisdiction of the district court is therefore beyond the power of the legislature to limit or control.”
We have followed this principle repeatedly down as late as the case of In re Trust Estate of Myers, 151 Neb. 255, 37 N. W. 2d 228.
In Burnham v. Bennison, 121 Neb. 291, 236 N. W. 745, we stated: “It may be said that, by the terms of the Constitution, district courts in Nebraska are vested with ‘chancery jurisdiction.’ Const, art. V, sec. 9. This we have construed as vesting district courts with equity jurisdiction which they may exercise without legislative enactment. Matteson v. Creighton University, 105 Neb. 219. Indeed, this court is committed to the view that, not only is equity jurisdiction conferred by the terms of the Constitution, but as thus conferred it is beyond the power of the legislature to limit or control. That, while the legislature may grant such other jurisdiction as it *649may deem proper, it cannot limit or take from such courts their broad and general jurisdiction which the Constitution has conferred upon them.” This was followed in State ex rel. Sorensen v. Farmers State Bank, 121 Neb. 532, 237 N. W. 857, 82 A. L. R. 7; In Hall v. Hall, 123 Neb. 280, 242 N. W. 607; in State v. Odd Fellows Hall Assn., 123 Neb. 440, 243 N. W. 616; in State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nebraska State Bank, 124 Neb. 449, 247 N. W. 31; and in John A. Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 299 N. W. 261.
In State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N. W. 676, we held: “It is obvious that the exclusive and preeminent nature of the equity jurisdiction conferred on the district courts by these constitutional provisions is equally true of the common-law jurisdiction likewise vested in the same tribunals.”
In Clark v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 139 Neb. 65, 296 N. W. 449, we held: “The district court is a creation of the Constitution as is also its common-law and equity power and jurisdiction. This power and jurisdiction are not limited by terminology and, further, the terminology does not admit of legislative limitation, but only of legislative extension.”
I do not undertake to discuss the various specific applications we have made of this principle save to point out that in Tombrink v. Sarpy County, 120 Neb. 160, 231 N. W. 783, we applied laches as an equitable doctrine enforceable under constitutional powers independently of any statute of limitations.
The court now puts its approval upon a statute that limits the application of the doctrine of waiver and estoppel- and that limits the jurisdiction of courts at both law and equity, and this is done although we have repeatedly declared that “It is an imperative duty of the judicial department of government to protect its jurisdiction at the boundaries of power fixed by the Constitution.” State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of Minatare, *650123 Neb. 109, 242 N. W. 278. See, also, State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, supra.
The court holds: “A purchaser who receives possession of an automobile without obtaining the certificate of title thereto, as required by our statute, acquires no title or ownership therein.” That is a positive statement and, as made, without exceptions. The issues of this case require no such determination.
Suppose A, who is an owner and has the requisite certificate of title, agrees to sell a specific car to B. B pays the full purchase price to A and is given possession of the car. All that remains is for A to get and deliver the certificate of title to B. A then refuses to do that one thing. We have held that “Courts of equity may grant specific performance of an oral agreement to transfer title to personal property as well as to real estate.” Hackbarth v. Hackbarth, 146 Neb. 919, 22 N. W. 2d 184. A brings an action for specific performance. Would he not then, under this opinion, be met with a well based contention that “No court * * * shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest” of B because B does not have the requisite certificate of title; that under this holding B has acquired no title or ownership in the car; and that the act denies him the equitable rights of specific performance? Such I think is a reasonable construction of the court’s opinion.
But the court does not stop there. The court holds: “A subsequent purchaser for value of the automobile, who obtains the certificate of title by complying with the statutory requirements relating thereto, obtains the title and ownership thereof. His title and ownership are superior to any rights which the first purchaser may have.”
Now, suppose that C purchases for value from A subsequent to the sale to B, and C obtains a certificate of title by. complying with the statutory requirements. This rule holds that C obtains rights of title and ownership superior to those of B and by that impliedly holds that *651B has some rights of title and ownership. This is in conflict with the preceding rule which is that B has acquired no title or ownership, otherwise the holding announces the obvious that a purchaser from one who has a title acquires a title and ownership superior to one. who has no title and ownership.
Now, suppose that subsequently C purchased for value and got the certificate of title from A with full knowledge of every part of the transaction between A and B. Under this rule C’s title and ownership are superior to any rights of B and B has only an undetermined right of a personal action of some kind against A. Would not C in equity be subject to the same rule that we have repeatedly followed and last restated in Beard v. Morgan, 143 Neb. 503, 10 N. W. 2d 253, that “ ‘A party who purchases real estate with knowledge that another has a contract of purchase for the same is not a bona fide purchaser; and if he acquires such knowledge at any time before the payment of the consideration, he will not be protected as a purchaser in good faith. * * *
“ ‘A purchaser with notice is liable to. the same equity, stands in his place, and is bound to do that which the person he represents would be bound to do by the decree. He takes the estate subject to the charge, and stands in the place of his vendor.’ ” We there affirmed a decree of specific performance. But here, under the court’s opinion, C would not be subject to an action of specific performance and more, under the statute here approved, an equity court would not be permitted to recognize any right, claim, or interest of B, a bona fide purchaser, against C, a purchaser with notice.
If this opinion is sound and the Legislature has the power to deny equitable rights and remedies as to one: kind of personal property, then I see no barrier to its: doing it as to all kinds of personal property and to real property.
I cannot believe that the Legislature ever intended' such results to flow from this act, nor do I believe, even *652if it had that intent, that the Legislature has the constitutional power to so provide.