Court Opinion

ID: 9730880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:26:57.787153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:10.414544
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I believe the decision rewards plaintiff’s improvidence and punishes defendant’s foresight.
On October 29, 1976, at the conclusion of a contested trial, the circuit court entered a judgment of divorce prepared by plaintiff’s attorney and consented to by defendant’s attorney, which provided, with respect to insurance, that any interest either party had in policies on the life of the other was extinguished. It is reasonable to conclude that the intent was that if the husband paid premiums on life insurance policies, the wife was to receive no benefit from his demise. Now, under the guise of equating disability benefits with earned, taxable, or investment income, the majority approves the trial court’s finding of no change of circumstances, or, at least, no significant change of circumstances.
*305To me it is incredible to say that on these facts there was no change in circumstances warranting modification of the alimony award. At the time of the divorce in 1976, appellant husband was fifty years old, employed full time as a respected sportscaster with a major television station. Fourteen years later, after serious medical disability, the husband was retired, receiving a retirement pension, disability benefits, and social security benefits. I cannot imagine what would constitute a greater change in circumstances in the life of an active wage earner in a responsible position than going from full-time productive employment to complete retirement. Add to that advanced age (sufficient to qualify for social security benefits) and physical disability (severe enough to qualify for insurance disability benefits).
However, the real question here is whether that sizable portion of defendant’s yearly income of $60,000 that comes as proceeds from medical disability insurance that he purchased after the divorce should be his separate property interest, safe from invasion by the former spouse, the marital estate having been divided fourteen to sixteen years earlier. I would hold that the disability insurance proceeds that defendant now receives, purchased with premiums paid out of his own assets after the property division, is not the equivalent of income from pension, investment, or employment, but is, on the contrary, his separate and sole estate, and should not be computed in determining availability of income for purposes of alimony. I would liken it to an annuity purchased with sole and separate assets or a pension that becomes wholly accrued and vested after divorce. Cf. Vollmer v Vollmer, 187 Mich App 688; 468 NW2d 236 (1991).
*306MCL 552.602(c)(ii); MSA 25.164(2)(c)(ii) defines income as:
Any payment due or to be due in the future from a profit-sharing plan, pension plan, insurance contract, annuity, social security, unemployment compensation, supplemental unemployment benefits, and worker’s compensation.
I surmise the rationale behind the enactment of the Support and Visitation Enforcement Act, MCL 552.601 et seq.; MSA 25.164(1) et seq., as contemplating a present or ongoing relationship between the supporting spouse and the asset to be reached. Stated another way, I do not think the insurance contract referred to in § 2(c)(ii), MCL 552.602(c)(ii); MSA 25.164(2)(c)(ii), contemplates the reaching of disability benefits purchased by the husband from his sole and separate assets after property division. Furthermore, interpreting the judgment of divorce, entered October 17, 1976, I believe it was the intent of the parties and of the court that an equitable distribution of the assets would be final and that neither party would be entitled to distribution of the assets of an after-acquired insurance contract.
I would reverse and remand for reconsideration in which defendant’s disability insurance benefits would be excluded from the computation of his income.