Court Opinion

ID: 9565777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:27:39.513324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:53.250738
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
The majority holds today that our due process clause guarantees indigent civil litigants the right to counsel at public expense *898whenever “[t]he interest at stake . is one of the most fundamental of all civil liberties, the right to direct the upbringing of one’s child.” While I agree that in this case the petitioner, because of the extreme disadvantage to which she is put, should have counsel appointed for her from some source, there are a number of reasons why I am unable to join my colleagues in holding that all indigent child custody litigants are constitutionally entitled to counsel at public expense.
I can find no authoritative precedent, state or federal, to firmly support such an extension of due process rights. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), the court merely struck down court fees and service of process fees that effectively denied access to the state courts to indigents seeking divorce. While the court did note the importance of the “basic position of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values,”1 the key factor in the decision appears to have been the state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving the marriage relationship.2 Since a legal divorce in Connecticut could only be obtained through the courts, filing fees which significantly impeded indigents’ access to those courts and which did not serve a “countervailing state interest of overriding significance” 3 were held to violate due process. In reaching this decision, the majority in Boddie carefully avoided any suggestion that the right to counsel was mandated in such cases. Here it is worth noting that, unlike the circumstances presented in Boddie, child custody litigants are not compelled to go to court to settle their claims.
Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974), which the majority relies upon in the case at bar, was concerned with child dependency proceedings in which the state of California was a party. The excerpted language from that case which appears in the majority opinion here was uttered only in regard to such dependency proceedings. Moreover, the court in Cleaver did not establish a firm constitutional rule requiring court-appointed counsel in every dependency proceeding; rather, it established general guidelines to be applied on a case by case basis.4
Similarly, our previous decisions in this area do not require that counsel be provided to indigent civil litigants in private child custody proceedings. In Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974), we held that an indigent in a contempt proceeding, for nonsupport of his child, had a constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney, stating:
We base this decision on the right to jury trial in a contempt proceeding for nonpayment of child support recognized in Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1971), and on the underlying rationale of that decision which focuses on the very real threat of incarceration, [footnote omitted].
Otton, supra at 538.
In explaining why the need for assistance of counsel was deemed greater when a jury trial was involved, we quoted the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 45-46, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2016-17, 32 L.Ed.2d 530, 543 (1972):
An unskilled layman may be able to [represent] himself in a nonjury trial before a judge experienced in piecing together unassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of the [litigant].
Otton, supra at 540.
In a later case, Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1977), we extended the right to counsel to an indigent defendant in a paternity suit brought by the state on behalf of the mother. In reaching that result, we relied heavily on the fact that in *899such proceedings defendants suffer serious exposure to criminal liability.5 We also noted that any resultant paternity and support decree would be likely to have a major impact on the defendant’s life and would be res judicata in later contempt proceedings that could result in incarceration.6 Furthermore, we reasoned that the need for counsel was heightened because the defendant was being prosecuted by the state with all of its resources and power.7 The Reynolds decision, therefore, was not simply based on the significance of the parent-child relationship, but was founded on other important factors as well.
Notwithstanding this absence of authoritative precedent, I am particularly troubled by the failure of the majority to give full consideration to those procedural aspects of private child custody proceedings which help to insure that even unrepresented litigants will have a full, fair opportunity to be heard.
First, as in any case, the court itself may call, question, and cross-examine witnesses in an effort to determine the best interests of the child. In this regard it is noteworthy that a Divorce Reform Task Force report of the National Council on Family Relations has recommended that child custody determinations should no longer be a product of adversarial proceedings. See, 1 Family Law Reporter 2026 (1974). Although the report does not specify any alternative procedures, its conclusion suggests that it may be preferable to leave the examination of witnesses in such proceedings solely to the province of the judge, thereby diminishing some of the adversarial aspects of these hearings.
Second, the Alaska legislature has, by statute, provided for the appointment of counsel to represent children who are the subject of private custody proceedings. AS 09.65.130. These attorneys, in fulfilling their obligations to their clients, must call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses for both sides and make appropriate evidentia-ry objections. This, too, helps to insure that the strength and weaknesses of each opposing side will be fully and properly aired even without the assistance of counsel.
Finally, unlike other types of civil litigation, there is no right to a jury trial in private child custody proceedings. The determination of the best interest of the child is made solely by the court. AS 25.20.060. Thus, as implied in Otton, supra, there is no special need for “the guiding hand of counsel . . to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole” for a jury; rather, the judge, experienced in piecing together unassembled facts, is capable of fully evaluating the evidence in favor of, and against, both sides.
In light of these considerations, I believe there is no sound basis for concluding that a private child custody litigant cannot be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard without the assistance of counsel. On the contrary, certain procedural aspects of child custody proceedings — the exclusive fact-finding role of the judge and independent counsel for the children — support the view that unrepresented child custody litigants may actually be afforded more due process “protection” than other private civil litigants, threatened with deprivation of other important rights, who do not have an attorney.
This brings me to a third troubling aspect of today’s holding, namely, the extent to which the majority’s reasoning, applied with basic notions of equal protection, logically requires counsel for other indigents in private litigation involving other rights. There, too, complex and emotional issues may be involved, along with important state interests in the outcome. These factors, the majority opinion suggests, enhance the need for assistance of counsel, and this would be especially true where the fact-finding role is delegated to a jury, as it often would be in other cases. See, Otton, supra at 540. Thus, I am unable to see *900how, logically, this court will be able to limit its holding today, consonant with equal protection, to deny appointed counsel to other indigent persons involved in such private civil litigation.8 This point was made by Chief Judge Breitel in a related case, In the Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1975), where the New York Court held that there was no constitutional right to counsel in divorce cases:
It merits added comment that among the many kinds of private litigation which may drastically affect indigent litigants, matrimonial litigation is but one. Eviction from homes, revocation of licenses affecting one’s livelihood, mortgage foreclosures, repossession of important assets purchased on credit, and any litigation which may result in the garnishment of income may be significant and ruinous for an otherwise indigent litigant. In short, the problem is not peculiar to matrimonial litigation. The horizon does not stop at matrimonial or any other species of private litigation.9 [footnote added]
Finally, there is another aspect of the court’s decision which requires comment, and that is the cost to the public. Whether we place responsibility on the private bar or the state treasury, the cost ultimately will be borne by the public. Even if the initial burden were cast upon the private bar, the expense of providing counsel for indigent civil litigants eventually would be paid for from some other source. So far as I know, we lack reliable data on the legal needs of the poor in civil cases in Alaska and the expense of meeting those needs. Without such information, it seems to me hazardous to create an inflexible constitutional right, the impact of which we can only vaguely discern. In this regard, I think it unfortunate that the state has not been heard before the court takes this major constitutional step, as the state has an obvious interest in the ramifications of this decision.
For these reasons, I would hold that the petitioner is not entitled to counsel as a matter of constitutional right, but rather is entitled to appointed counsel in the discretion of the court.10

. Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. at 374, 91 S.Ct. at 784, 28 L.Ed.2d at 116.

. Id.

. Id. 401 U.S. at 377, 91 S.Ct. at 785, 28 L.Ed.2d at 118.

. Cleaver v. Wilcox, supra, at 945.

. Reynolds v. Kimmons, supra, at 802.

. Id.

. Id. at 803.

.The majority opinion expresses the belief that a “public agency” supplied Mr. Flores with counsel in this case. I disagree. The Alaska Legal Services Corporation is a non-profit enterprise organized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2996b, which established the national Legal Services Corporation. It is clear that the national Legal Services Corporation is not an agency of the federal government, nor are its staff members federal employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2996c(c); 42 U.S.C. § 2996d(e)(l). Spokane County Legal Services, Inc. v. Legal Services Corporation, 433 F.Supp. 278, 280 (E.D.Wash.1977). In my view, the Alaska Legal Services Corporation is a private corporation and not an agency of the state or federal government. Therefore, I conclude that a “public agency,” in the sense of being an agency of the government, did not provide Mr. Flores with counsel in this case.

. See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Black, dissenting from a denial of a petition for certiorari in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 91 S.Ct. 1624, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971).

. It should be noted that AS 25.30.100(c) grants the superior court authority to order “another party” to pay “travel and other necessary expenses” of an out-of-state party if this would be “just and proper under the circumstances.”