Court Opinion

ID: 9625309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:35:57.036818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:05.943983
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(concurring and dissenting) .
I concur except as to that portion of the main opinion that affirms the trial court’s conclusion that respondent have title to the property as well as judgment for the price, and that such title be retained until the judgment is paid in full. There is respectable authority for such conclusion, as evidenced by the A.L.R. citations which give the authorities on both sides of this problem, but where, by and large, the cases representing the view expressed by the majority opinion, are from the south and east, and not from the Pacific Reporter states. These latter seem to be quite in accord in espousing the opposite view, as readily can be discovered by examining the cases, in the Pacific Digests, under Sales ^479. Such opposite view also seems to be the majority view,1 which holds that if one elects to pursue the price, he cannot retain title, and if he elects to retake the property, he cannot claim the price.2
As a practical matter, it would seem that the western view is desirable since it would allow the buyer to use the self-same property to pledge as security in obtaining funds with which to pay the judgment, a result that might be impossible if the property were frozen. Furthermore, it would seem that the seller would not be unduly prejudiced if title were in the buyer, since having a money judgment, he could levy execution against the property, only a small part of which might be necessary to satisfy the judgment. It seems to the writer that to allow the Seller to retain title until the judgment is paid is to allow him to have his cake and eat it. In taking this view I am not unaware of the fact that the view adopted by the majority opinion is incorporated in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (Sec. 24), and is therefore the rule in those states which, unlike Utah, have adopted that Act.

. Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Bowers Edition, Vol. 3, Sec. 1309.

. Commercial Credit Co. v. Phoenix Hudson-Essex, Inc., 33 Ariz. 56, 262 P. 1; Yost v. May, 110 Cal.App.2d 41, 242 P.2d 73; Utah Implement Vehicle Co. v. Kesler, 36 Idaho 476, 211 P. 1079; First Nat. Bank v. Marlowe, 71 Mont. 461, 230 P. 374; Doughty v. Laubach, 172 Okl. 42, 44 P.2d 105; C. I. T. Corp. v. Fisher, 187 Okl. 314, 102 P.2d 848; Geroy v. Upper, 182 Or. 535, 187 P.2d 662, 174 A.L.R. 1355; Washington Cöoperative Chick Ass’n v. Jacobs, 42 Wash.2d 460, 256 P.2d 294; Mathews Piano Co. v. Markle, 86 Neb. 123, 124 N.W. 1129; Jensen v. Kissick, 204 Iowa 756, 215 N. W. 962.