Court Opinion

ID: 9685374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:35:10.487417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:05.251832
License: Public Domain

VARNER, District Judge
(dissenting) :
I am generally in accord with my brothers as to the applicable laws involved in this case and differ only in the conclusion with the excellently written majority opinion. My problem arises in considering that delicate balance, under the circumstances here involved, between the rights of the press and the interests of the State when considering the various provisions of the statute.
Conceivably, a part of § 14 is constitutionally valid and a part thereof is unconstitutional. If the parts are wholly independent of, or separable from, each other, the part which is valid or constitutional may stand while that which is invalid or unconstitutional will be rejected, Lynch v. United States, (Ga.) 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434; Wislar v. United States, 97 F.2d 152, 26 C.C.P.A. 138, cert. den. 305 U.S. 629, 59 S.Ct. 93, 83 L.Ed. 403; Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala. 209, 36 So.2d 487. This rule has been held to apply even though the valid and invalid parts are in the same paragraph, sentence or section of the Act, Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, supra; Harder v. Denton, 9 Cal.App.2d 607, 51 P.2d 199. Whether the valid and invalid parts of a statute are separable is a question of legislative intent, Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 58 S.Ct. 678, 82 L.Ed. 936, 115 A.L.R. 105; Carter v. Cart*781er Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160; and the fact that a severability clause appears in the Act tends to indicate the legislative intent that the part of the statute which is valid should prevail, and a severability clause in the statute provides a basis for a rule of construction that the legislative intent was that the valid part should survive. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 52 S.Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038. A severability clause may create a presumption of the severability of the valid and invalid parts of the Act and a further presumption that the Legislature would have enacted the valid part alone, Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, supra; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 758, 79 L.Ed. 1468. It is the considered conclusion of this writer that a part of this statute may be, and should be, saved.
The public is admitted to the galleries over the Legislature, and, to the extent that a press pass is required by the statute for admission of a news gatherer to the galleries, the requirement places a burden on the press, exclusively of all others, and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. The State has no special interest therein.
I do not believe that the Legislature has the authority to require a declaration by any member of the press that he is not employed in any legislative or executive department of the government, that he is not employed by any person or corporation having legislation before the State Legislature, and that he will not become engaged in any such activities while covering news from the State Legislature. One may not be excluded from gathering news because of his employment or his beliefs. Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents’ Assn., supra.
It must be remembered, however, that the business of gathering and distributing news to newspapers throughout the United States and foreign countries is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press, and a publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from application of general laws. Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, (NY 1937) 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953. The rights of freedom of the press from restraint, license or censorship are not absolute but are relative, and publishers are subject to the general law as is any other industry conducted for profit. Four Star Publications, Inc. v. Erbe, (D.C. Iowa 1960) 181 F.Supp. 483, appeal dis. 304 F.Supp. 872. Where the government demonstrates compelling interest in regulation of persons with constitutional rights which overrides the interest of those persons in their regulated activities, the constitutional right, even a First Amendment right, of the individual must yield to the public interest. United States v. Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 562, (CA Mo.1970) 434 F.2d 1116, adhered to 434 F.2d 1127, cert. granted 402 U.S. 994, 91 S.Ct. 2168, 29 L.Ed.2d 160.
I agree that no State interest is involved in excluding the press from those areas available to the public generally. However, as to persons who, because they are affiliated with the press, have access to those places particularly set aside for the press itself by the Legislature, I disagree with my brothers. I am of the opinion that the requirement that all news gatherers who have special privileges, not accorded the general public, whereby they may have contacts with legislators or other governmental officers whom they may influence, may be required to furnish a statement of economic interest as provided in § 14 to the extent of giving the names of all newspapers and publications, radio stations, television stations or news gathering organizations by which they are employed and such other occupations, employments or financial interests as they may have. It is my opinion that the State of Alabama has a controlling interest in knowing the true motive of persons given special privileges to associate with governmental officers and *782having an opportunity to influence them in accordance with the privileges now accorded news reporters who regularly attend State governmental functions, such as sessions of the Legislature. These persons, whether or not lobbying, are, by virtue of their daily contacts and the influence of their publications, in an advantageous position to influence government. This is especially true at the legislative level where subtle changes in language of bills' may be extremely valuable to various private interests.
It is my opinion that that provision of the statute requiring approval by the State Ethics Committee of each special press pass may be construed to give unlimited discretion to the Ethics Committee in granting or denying press passes on such basis as they see fit, or it may be construed to require the State Ethics Committee to grant special press passes to those news gatherers who conform with the legal provisions (the disclosure clause) of § 14. I conceive that, if such provision is construed to give unbridled discretion to grant or deny special press passes, the same is unconstitutional as depriving news gatherers of their rights without due process of law, denying equal protection and infringing the freedom of the press. However, to the extent that said statute may be construed as requiring the State Ethics Committee to grant special press passes to those conforming with the legal requirements of said § 14, I conceive that said requirement is constitutional1 as the State has a logical and controlling interest in identifying the financial interests of those enjoying special opportunities to influence State government.
As to that part of § 14 as follows:
“Members of the press who cover the State Legislature or state government in any way, either as a member of an editorial staff or through direct reporting, prior to being admitted to * * * press rooms, committee rooms, committee meetings, any space set aside for use of the press, the floor of the legislature, or press conferences by a member of the legislature or a government official, shall file a statement of economic interest, in accordance with the provisions of this Act at the office of the State Ethics Commission and shall have been approved by the State Ethics Commission for a special press pass and shall be subject to the provisions of the Act. The statement of economic interest filed by the members of the press shall further include the names of all newspapers or publications, radio stations, of news-gathering organizations by which they are employed, and what other occupations or employment they may have, if any
I would find as follows: (1) that said part is separable from, and enforceable independent of, the other parts of said § 14; (2) that the Legislature intended that such part should survive and become law in the event the other parts of the said section should be declared unconstitutional; and (3) that the State of Alabama has a controlling interest over the interests of the press in so regulating those enumerated news gatherers sufficient to validate said provisions.
I would further agree with my brothers that the other provisions of § 14 are unconstitutional and void.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent in part and concur in part with the opinion of my brothers.

. Where the choice of constructions of an ambiguous statute allows a constitutional meaning or an unconstitutional meaning, the court will adopt such construction as will validate the statute. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 30, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893; Tilton v. Richardson, Secy., 403 U.S. 672, 674, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790.