Court Opinion

ID: 9673773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:18:23.765121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.085839
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority that People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445; 224 NW2d 840 (1975), is controlling; however, my analysis of that case convinces me that the prosecutor has more latitude in rebutting an alibi than my brothers now allow.
People v Bennett, and its predecessor,1 do not absolutely prohibit rebuttal evidence if the same evidence could have been offered in the case in chief. To the extent that my brothers suggest that all evidence must be classified as either "case in chief’ evidence or "rebuttal” evidence, I strongly disagree. Some evidence may be used at both points in the trial.
I believe that the Bennett and McGillen cases have a narrower prohibition: rebuttal evidence is inadmissible if it does not "bear on an issue raised by the people” or "bear on an issue raised by the defense”. 393 Mich 445, 449. In judging the propriety of the prosecutor’s evidence under the Bennett holding, we must therefore answer two questions: (1) Was an issue raised by the defense, and (2) Does the rebuttal evidence "bear on” that issue.
In both McGillen and Bennett the prosecution *598attempted to rebut answers given by the defendant or defendant’s witness on cross-examination. The evidence offered by the prosecution was more properly viewed as impeachment evidence, not rebuttal. In those cases, the evidence was not related to an issue that was directly raised by the defense. The distinction is worth emphasizing. As the Bennett court stated:
"Rebuttal is limited to the refutation of relevant and material evidence — hence evidence bearing on an issue properly raised in a case.
"Such issue of course could be one raised in the prosecutor’s case in chief or one raised by way of defense, and evidence on either would be subject to rebuttal.” 393 Mich 445, 449.
In the present case, the rebuttal evidence was directed to an issue raised directly by the defense —alibi. It was not directed to an issue planted by the prosecution on cross-examination. Rebuttal of an alibi was all that was attempted here.
Given this determination that there was an issue raised by the defense, the analysis must turn to the kind of evidence that is admissible for rebuttal on that issue. Again, Bennett provides the test: does the evidence "bear on an issue raised by the defense”?
I believe that the trial judge has considerable discretion in answering this question. The principle of People v Utter, 217 Mich 74, 83; 185 NW 830 (1921), allowing the trial judge discretion, was not abandoned by McGillen and Bennett. Those cases only narrowed the legal range in which the discretion may be exercised. In the present case, we must determine if it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to hold that evidence of a *599common pattern of conduct "bears on” an alibi. I conclude that this was not an abuse of discretion.
The defendant’s alibi in this case was the equivalent of arguing that the complainant erroneously recognized the defendant and that someone else committed the offense. The alibi thus directly challenges the complainant’s identification of the defendant. Because an alibi necessarily implies an erroneous identification, evidence that tends to corroborate the identification will tend to rebut the alibi. Identification evidence, including evidence offered by victims of similar offenses allegedly committed by the defendant, rebuts the implication of defendant’s alibi that the complainant erroneously identified the defendant. Simply put, common pattern identification evidence "bears on” the alibi.
In the present case, there was no error below. The defendant knew on the first day of trial that the witnesses might testify, yet did not ask for a continuance. The defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine these rebuttal witnesses. The judge instructed the jury that the evidence was for the limited purpose of identification. Moreover, the evidence from the case in chief was so convincing that I am convinced there was no miscarriage of justice.
I would affirm this conviction.

 People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251; 220 NW2d 677 (1974).