Court Opinion

ID: 9729933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:53:07.111552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:02.456338
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: I joined fully in this court’s decision in People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43 (2005), because I believed at the time that the analysis contained in it would ease the confusion that arises when courts seek to classify statutes as mandatory or directory. However, in the time since we filed our decision in Robinson, the confusion appears to be unabated. See People v. Garstecki, 234 Ill. 2d 430, 435-36 (2009) (explaining split in appellate court over the classification of Supreme Court Rule 431); People v. Ousley, 235 Ill. 2d 299, 311 (2009) (noting that “confusion persists” post-Robinson). Because of this, I am convinced that the analysis used in Robinson is no longer helpful. So, while I agree with the result reached in today’s opinion, I write separately to express my views on the mandatory/directory question. The issue in this case can be stated simply as: What are the consequences when the trial court fails to give an admonishment to a defendant in open court that the General Assembly indicated “shall” be given in section 113 — 8? Generally, the legislature does not intend its statutory provisions to be disregarded, but “not all directives and requirements declared in statute law should be understood to have equal force.” 3 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §57:1, at 6 (6th rev. ed. 2001). I am no longer confident that the resolution of the mandatory/directory issue requires a discussion of two “distinct” questions that are “easily confused” because they both contain the term “mandatory.” 235 Ill. 2d at 514. I think the use of the two questions, as set forth in today’s opinion, further confuses the issue because “[a]s a matter of terminology, mandatory statutes are usually said to be imperative and directory statutes permissive.” 3 N. Singer §57:1, at 4. Yet, under this court’s analysis a statute found to be permissive under the first question may, under the second question, still be mandatory. That is confusing since permissive statutes are, by their nature, directory. The question of whether a statutory provision has a mandatory or directory character is one of statutory construction. Pullen v. Mulligan, 138 Ill. 2d 21, 46 (1990). The ordinary meaning of the language should always be favored, and the form of the verb used in a statute, such as “shall” or “may,” is “the single most important textual consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory.” 3 N. Singer §57:3, at 13-14. However, even that is “still not the sole determinant, and what it naturally connotes can be overcome by other considerations.” 3 N. Singer §57:3, at 14. In this way, “[a] 11 pertinent intrinsic and extrinsic aids to construction are applicable when determining whether statutory provisions are mandatory or directory.” 3 N. Singer §57:3, at 11. For this reason, “shall” can be construed as directory (see, e.g., United Illuminating Co. v. City of New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 692 A.2d 742 (1997)), while “may” can be construed as mandatory (see, e.g., T.W. Morton Builders, Inc. v. von Buedingen, 316 S.C. 388, 450 S.E.2d 87 (1994)). Whether language in a statute is mandatory or directory must be determined “on a case by case basis” with “the criterion whether such requirement is mandatory or directory is whether such requirement is essential to preserve the rights of the parties.” 3 N. Singer §57:3, at 21-22. Here, although the General Assembly used “shall” in section 113 — 8, it did not set forth any specific consequences for the failure to follow the directive. Generally, “[w]hen a statute specifies what result will ensue if its terms are not complied with, the statute is deemed mandatory ***; [hjowever, if it merely requires certain things to be done and nowhere prescribes results that follow, such a statute is merely directory.” 3 N. Singer §57:3, at 23-24. This same rule finds support in our case law: “The general rule in determining whether a statute is mandatory or advisory is as follows: ‘Where the terms of a statute are preemptory and exclusive, where no discretion is reposed or where penalties are provided for its violation, the provisions of the act must be regarded as mandatory.’ ” Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321, 350 (1944), quoting Clark v. Quick, 377 Ill. 424, 430 (1941). A corollary of this rule is that the lack of consequences for noncompliance “leads to a directory construction.” 3 N. Singer §57:8, at 35. Indeed, this court has held that the lack of specific consequences for noncompliance following a statutory command results in a directory construction. See Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233-34 (1960). This is so as long as the rights sought to be protected are not affected by the failure to act. Carrigan, 19 Ill. 2d at 233. In this case, the failure to act does not render defendant unable to challenge the validity of his guilty plea. Defendant, like any other defendant, has the ability to seek to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of the imperfect admonishment. As Justice Kilbride points out, defendant has failed to establish in his motion that the trial court’s failure to admonish him under section 113 — 8 injured the right the General Assembly sought to protect. 235 Ill. 2d at 530 (Kilbride, J., specially concurring). I believe the mandatory/directory analysis set forth above is more clear than that employed in today’s opinion. The majority notes that the dispositive issue in this case is not whether the statute is “mandatory or permissive,” but whether the statute is “mandatory or directory.” 235 Ill. 2d at 516. I am not sure what that means because if a statute is permissive, it is directory. People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997). To discern whether the statute is “mandatory or directory,” the court then states that the statutory language is the most reliable evidence of the legislature’s intent, and that “we presume that language issuing a procedural command to a government official indicates an intent that the statute is directory.” 235 Ill. 2d at 517. This presumption is overcome under either of two conditions: (1) when negative language prohibiting further action in the case of noncompliance or (2) when the right the provision is designed to protect would generally be injured under a directory reading. 235 Ill. 2d at 517. I find the use of a presumption unnecessary. Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose the statute at issue had contained the following sentence after the “command”: Failure to so advise a defendant invalidates a plea of guilty. According to the analysis set forth in the majority opinion, rather than give immediate effect to that language (invalidate the plea), a court of review must first “presume” that there are no mandated consequences except if negative language appears. I fail to see why the court’s presumption would arise if the statute expressly states the consequences. In all other respects, I join in the majority’s opinion. JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also specially concurring: While I agree with both the judgment and the majority of this court’s analysis, I disagree with its definition of the right section 113 — 8 was intended to protect, and consequently, with a portion of the subsequent analysis. Therefore, I specially concur in the opinion. The majority relies heavily on the analysis in People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43 (2005). In Robinson, this court examined a statute requiring orders dismissing petitions for postconviction relief to be served on the petitioners within 10 days. 235 Ill. 2d at 515; Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 50. We determined that the right the legislature intended to protect could be broadly defined as the right to appeal. 235 Ill. 2d at 518; Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 57. We reasoned that the right to appeal was not generally injured by service at a later date because sufficient time would, nonetheless, often remain for defendants to file a timely notice of appeal. We then concluded that the statute was directory, despite the potential harm statutory violations could cause to the appeal rights of all postconviction petitioners. 235 Ill. 2d at 518; Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 57. In contrast, a violation of section 113 — 8 is not potentially harmful to all defendants. Indeed, noncompliance with section 113 — 8 is not potentially harmful to the rights of the vast majority of Illinois defendants because “[ijmmigration consequences — in particular, deportation — are not applicable to United States citizens.” 235 Ill. 2d at 518. As the majority recognizes, our legislature “clearly thought” that information “informing defendants that there could be potential immigration consequences to entering a guilty plea” was “important to a defendant when making his decision to plead guilty.” 235 Ill. 2d at 518. Implicit in this recognition is the fact that only defendants who are not United States citizens would find this information important in their decision-making. Unlike the statute in Robinson, the legislature did not intend section 113 — 8 to protect a broadly applicable right. Rather, the legislature intentionally targeted the statute to protect the rights of a select group of defendants, namely those whose immigration status could be affected by entering a guilty plea. Thus, the right the legislature intended section 113 — 8 to protect is not properly defined as the broad right of all defendants “to intelligently waive a jury trial and enter a guilty plea” (235 Ill. 2d at 518), but rather as the right of noncitizen defendants to be informed that a guilty plea could result in negative immigration consequences. Applying that definition of the protected right, we would next consider “whether the right that the statute intends to protect would be generally injured by a directory reading of the statute.” 235 Ill. 2d at 518. Instead of concluding that the protected right would not generally be injured because most defendants are citizens who are not subject to potential immigration consequences (235 Ill. 2d at 518), however, this court should review defendant’s conduct at the guilty plea hearing and the allegations in his motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate his conviction. Based on those factors, we would then decide whether defendant has adequately established that he “is not a United States citizen” and that “the crime for which [he] is entering a plea is one that could trigger immigration consequences.” 235 Ill. 2d at 519. Here, defendant’s motion alleged that “[a]t the time of his plea, defense counsel was unaware of defendant’s immigration status. Defendant is not a United States Citizen but is a resident alien” and that “[n]either defense counsel nor the State made the court aware of the above facts concerning defendant’s immigration status.” During the trial court’s questioning at defendant’s plea hearing, however, defendant’s response indicated that he was a United States citizen, creating a conflict with the allegations in the motion. No documents were attached to the motion to establish defendant’s immigration status definitively. Nor did defendant’s motion contain any allegation that a guilty plea to the charged offense could trigger negative immigration consequences. Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the trial court’s failure to admonish him under section 113 — 8 generally injured the right our legislature intended to protect. Consequently, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant has not overcome the presumption that the legislature intended a directory reading of section 113 — 8. 235 Ill. 2d at 519. Because I respectfully disagree with the majority’s definition of the right the legislature intended to protect by enacting section 113 — 8 and a portion of the following analysis, however, I specially concur in the opinion.