Court Opinion

ID: 9381225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 15:00:57.223487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.831234
License: Public Domain

21-2553
Black v. Wrigley

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

       At a stated term of The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 22nd day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:
               JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
               ROBERT D. SACK,
               BETH ROBINSON,
                          Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________

SAMUEL H. BLACK, BERNARD BLACK,

               Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                      v.                                           No. 21-2553

CHERIE WRIGLEY, ESAUN G. PINTO, SR., CPI INVESTIGATIONS,

            Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________

FOR APPELLANT:                                  BERNARD BLACK, pro se, Evanston, IL.
FOR APPELLEE:                                       ROBERT M. FANTONE, JR., Andrew L.
                                                    Mancilla (on the brief), Mancilla &
                                                    Fantone, LLP, New York, NY.

       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Amon, Judge).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment appealed from entered on

September 22, 2021 is hereby AFFIRMED.

       Plaintiffs-appellants, Bernard Black, appearing pro se, 1 and Samuel H. Black

appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants-

appellees Cherie Wrigley, Esaun G. Pinto, Sr., and CPI Investigations. Samuel

Black serves as a trustee of a Supplemental Needs Trust (SNT) established for the

benefit of Joanne Black because of her mental health. 2 Bernard Black is Joanne

Black’s brother. Samuel H. Black is Bernard’s son and Joanne’s nephew. Cherie

1  Although Bernard Black is a nominal party in this case, we note that he is a lawyer and is
admitted pro hac vice to appear in this case.
 2 Bernard Black was suspended from his role as co-trustee of the SNT by the Denver Probate

Court in January 2018. See Black v. Black, 482 P.3d 460, 471, 482–84 (Colo. App. 2020) (affirming
decision). He asserted in his oral argument in this appeal that that the Denver Probate Court
order suspending him as co-trustee has lapsed by operation of law, but he does not contend that
the Colorado court, or any other court, has ended the suspension or reinstated him as trustee. We
do not purport to resolve questions surrounding his status because there is no dispute that
Samuel Black continues to serve as trustee of the SNT and is authorized to pursue this action in
that capacity. Any generic reference in this Order to “Black” refers to Samuel Black as trustee of
the SNT.

                                                2
Wrigley is Joanne’s cousin.        And Esaun Pinto is vice president of CPI

Investigations and has known Joanne for approximately twenty years.

      Black sued defendants for allegedly defrauding the SNT of monies they

purportedly used for Joanne’s care and supervision. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on

appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

      We review a grant of summary judgment without deference to the district

court, resolving all ambiguities and “drawing all reasonable inferences” against

the moving party. Bey v. City of New York, 999 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2021).

“Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Doninger v. Niehoff,

642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). When the burden

of persuasion at trial is on the non-moving party, the party moving for summary

judgment may satisfy their burden of production “by demonstrating that the non-

moving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-

moving party’s claim.” Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107,

                                          3
114 (2d Cir. 2017). 3 The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party

must cite “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Beard v.

Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006).

       On appeal, Black’s arguments focus on several sets of related allegations: (1)

Pinto and his two associates traveled to Colorado in April of 2013 to locate and

bring Joanne to the East Coast, but they did not work the hours reflected in

invoices Pinto submitted to Black; (2) Pinto invoiced Black for expenses he did not

in fact incur; (3) Pinto withdrew money from Joanne’s Chase and Wells Fargo bank

accounts and improperly used these funds for his own purposes; (4) Pinto

improperly arranged to serve as Joanne’s Representative Payee for purposes of

receiving her Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments and improperly

used these for his own purposes; and (5) Pinto invoiced Black for visiting Joanne

three times per week after she returned to the East Coast when he did not in fact

do so. On the basis of these alleged facts, Black contends that Pinto, and Wrigley

as an aider and abettor, are liable for (i) fraud, (ii) fraud by omission, (iii)

3 In quotations from caselaw and the parties’ briefing, this summary order omits all internal
quotation marks, alterations, footnotes, and citations, unless otherwise noted.

                                             4
fraudulent     misrepresentation,        (iv)       constructive   fraud,    (v)    negligent

misrepresentation, (vi) unjust enrichment, (vii) money had and received, and/or

(viii) conversion. 4 For the following reasons, we agree with the district court that

summary judgment in favor of defendants is proper.

       I.    Colorado Services

       The district court properly awarded defendants summary judgment on all

claims relating to the Colorado-related services because Black has not cited any

evidence supporting his contention that the hours reported on the invoices for the

Colorado-related services were overstated or contradicting Pinto’s affidavit

testimony that they were not. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)

(explaining that, although the moving party has the burden of proving no genuine

dispute of material fact, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by

showing—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case”); Sioson v. Knights of

Columbus, 303 F.3d 458, 460 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (explaining that this Court

will generally decline to “scour the record” for evidence to support a party’s

arguments where the party fails to cite record evidence).

4 Black did not make a breach of contract claim, and he did not assert each of the above causes
of action with respect to each particular set of factual allegations.

                                                5
      Instead, Black argues that a jury could infer that the hours Pinto billed (and

Black paid) were necessarily inflated from the face of the invoice Pinto submitted.

The invoice, in relevant part, reflects charges for: “Pinto: Protection Hours from

4/12, 4pm to 4/19, 1am (153 hrs @ $150 per hour)” and “Driver: 4/17, 4pm to 4/19,

1am (33 hrs @ $50 per hour).” See Attachment 4 to Declaration re Motion for

Summary Judgment at 1, Black v. Wrigley, No. 16-cv-430 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021),

ECF No. 88-4. Black argues that this invoice is self-evidently overbilling because

it is “physically impossible” to work 33 hours in a 33-hour timeframe or 153 hours

in a 153-hour timeframe. See Appellants’ Br. at 55-56.

      But in the context of traveling from the East Coast to Colorado to retrieve

Joanne, including potentially caring for her around the clock, the invoice on its

face, without more, is not enough to support a non-speculative inference that Pinto

improperly inflated the bill for his and his associate’s time. Black has not proffered

any evidence that Pinto or his associate were not with and caring for Joanne

throughout their time in Colorado. Black likewise cites no evidence to support his

implicit claims that (1) Pinto was not entitled to compensation for hours when

Joanne was in his care but he was sleeping, and he was not entitled to

compensation for his driver during hours when his driver was not actually

operating a vehicle, and (2) Pinto knew that he was not entitled to compensation

                                          6
for such hours but knowingly claimed compensation for those hours anyway. On

this record, even affording Black the benefit of all reasonable inferences, Pinto’s

invoice on its face is insufficient to raise a material issue of fact to support any of

Black’s legal claims. 5

       II.    Overbilling for Expenses

       For similar reasons, we reject Black’s argument that the bills Pinto

submitted, and Black paid, for out-of-pocket expenses were self-evidently false.

Black relies on the facts that Pinto reported the expenses in round numbers and

that Pinto has not proffered specific documentation to support the claimed

expenses. But he has offered no evidence to counter Pinto’s sworn testimony that

he incurred every expense listed in his invoices; no evidence that, to the extent that

he used round numbers, Pinto rounded “up” in accounting for his expenses; and

no evidence to support his view that Pinto’s failure to provide receipts to support

5  Black argues that we should not consider Joanne’s uncontradicted affidavit testimony in
support of defendants on this and other points because much of her testimony does not rest on
her firsthand knowledge and some relates to events that took place at a time when her mental
health was unstable. We need not reach this issue. Even without considering Joanne’s
uncontradicted testimony, we conclude that Black has failed to present sufficient evidence to
enable a reasonable jury to find in his favor as to his claims arising from the Colorado services,
the expenses for which Pinto sought and received reimbursements, and Pinto’s bank account
withdrawals. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.

                                                7
the expenses that he claimed, and Black paid, reasonably supports an inference

that he falsified his invoices.

       We do not suggest that a party’s inability or failure to provide information

in response to reasonable inquiries can never support an inference that creates a

dispute of fact. But here, Black does not, for example, proffer discovery responses

in which Pinto gives evasive or deceptive answers to questions about the expenses

for which he billed Black 6 or even an agreement requiring Pinto to document the

expenses he invoices. Instead, Black essentially argues that because Pinto has not

provided receipts to support his invoices, a genuine dispute exists as to whether

the invoices were accurate—an argument that essentially seeks to assign Black’s

burden of production and persuasion to defendants.

       As the defendant in this case, it is not Pinto’s burden to disprove Black’s

allegations. See D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The

non-moving party may not rely on mere conclusory allegations nor speculation,

but instead must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events

is not wholly fanciful.”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986)

6 The only discovery response Black cites to show that Pinto’s responses were deceptive relates
to Joanne’s SSDI benefits. The only discovery request in the record relating to the expenses Pinto
billed was met with an objection, which does not constitute evidence and cannot without more
create a dispute of fact.

                                                8
(“[T]he plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly

supported motion for summary judgment.”).

       III.   Withdrawals from Joanne’s Bank Accounts

       For the same reasons, defendants are entitled to summary judgment with

respect to Black’s claims relating to Pinto’s withdrawals from Joanne’s Chase and

Wells Fargo bank accounts. Black identifies numerous withdrawals Pinto made

from Joanne’s bank accounts that Black alleges Pinto diverted to his own use. 7 As

the district court explained, the evidence Black cites in support of his argument

demonstrates only that money was withdrawn from Joanne’s bank accounts but

does not show that Pinto used those funds for anything other than Joanne’s

expenses. Instead, Black states in his declaration that Pinto did “not provide any

specific evidence on how, if at all, these funds were used for Joanne’s benefit or

returned to Joanne.” Jt. App’x 234 ¶ 7.

       Again, as the defendant, Pinto was not required to prove he did not misuse

Joanne’s funds. See D'Amico, 132 F.3d at 149; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57. Black

7 Black does not suggest that Pinto was not authorized to use Joanne’s debit card to access her
accounts, but Black does allege that Pinto appropriated the funds he withdrew to his own use,
rather than using them for Joanne’s benefit. Because we conclude that Black has not provided
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact, we do not decide whether Black
has standing to pursue the various claims alleged solely on the basis that the SNT contributed
funds to the bank accounts from which Pinto allegedly withdrew funds for his own use.

                                               9
identifies Pinto’s withdrawals from Joanne’s bank accounts, but that alone is

insufficient to establish that he misused the funds and that he is liable for fraud by

omission; negligent misrepresentation; fraudulent misrepresentation; money had

and received; and unjust enrichment. See Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. v. Allegheny

Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that fraud by omission

under New York law requires material misrepresentation and reasonable

reliance); see also Hydro Invs., Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 20 (2d Cir. 2000)

(explaining that negligent misrepresentation under New York law also requires,

among other things, material misrepresentation and reasonable reliance); Eternity

Glob. Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 186 (2d Cir.

2004) (explaining that fraudulent misrepresentation under New York law also

requires material misrepresentation and reasonable reliance); Middle E. Banking Co.

v. State St. Bank Int’l, 821 F.2d 897, 906 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that money had

and received under New York law requires that defendant have received and

benefitted from money from plaintiff and, under principles of equity, defendant

should not be permitted to keep the money); Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures,

Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that unjust enrichment under New

York law requires a similar showing).

                                            10
       In short, Black has not cited sufficient evidence in the record to support an

inference that Pinto used funds from Joanne’s bank accounts for his own purposes

or to establish the essential elements of his various claims. 8

       IV.     Visits with Joanne

       Summary judgment is also proper as it relates to all causes of action resting

on the allegation that Pinto billed for more visits than he actually conducted with

Joanne when she was housed in two different facilities. Black contends that by

invoicing the SNT, Pinto represented that he visited Joanne three times per week,

but he actually visited her less often. Black points to evidence that from May 22 to

October 23, 2014, the visitor log where Joanne was living showed an average of

only 1.2 visits per week from Pinto. 9

       Like the district court, we conclude that Black has not presented evidence

creating a genuine dispute of fact as to the time period from June through

December 2013, when Pinto billed for his services on an hourly basis. Black does

8  Insofar as Bernard Black was removed as Joanne’s financial conservator in 2015, and the SNT
did not fund or receive Joanne’s SSDI benefits, Black is not a proper plaintiff to pursue claims
based on Pinto’s alleged misuse of or failure to account for Joanne’s SSDI funds. Even if Black
could properly pursue claims based on Pinto’s alleged misuse of the SSDI monies, his claims
would fail for the same reasons as noted above.
 9 The frequency of Pinto’s visits throughout this period is disputed. Pinto testified that for

various reasons he did not always sign in. He also testified that the frequency of his in-person
visits decreased in 2014 relative to 2013, and that he did not agree to visit three times per week
once he began working for a monthly flat rate.

                                               11
not identify any evidence that Pinto did not, in fact, visit Joanne thrice weekly

during this period. Given the dynamic nature of the facts, the visitor logs from

May through October 2014 are insufficient to support a reasonable inference as to

Pinto’s number of visits in the latter half of 2013.

      Although Black has raised a dispute of fact as to Pinto’s number of visits in

2014, even viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Black, he has

not stated a claim with respect to any of his causes of action.

         a. Fraud-based Claims—January to September 2014

      Black cannot make a claim for fraud relating to the period from January

through September 2014, when Pinto billed a monthly flat rate of $8,000 at the

beginning of each month for his services for Joanne. “New York distinguishes

between a promissory statement of what will be done in the future that gives rise

only to a breach of contract cause of action and a misrepresentation of a present

fact that gives rise to a separate cause of action for fraudulent inducement.” Merrill

Lynch & Co. Inc., 500 F.3d at 184. Viewing the disputed facts in the light most

favorable to Black, because Pinto’s 2014 invoices represented charges for promised

future conduct, any successful claim that he made a commitment to visit three

times per week and failed to fulfill that commitment would rest on breach of

contract—not fraud.

                                          12
          b. Unjust Enrichment and Money Had and Received

       We also agree with the district court that summary judgment for defendants

on Black’s unjust enrichment and money had and received claims was proper, but

for different reasons. 10

       The parties do not dispute the district court’s characterization of their

relationship as contractual. 11 The New York Court of Appeals has explained that

a claim of unjust enrichment is a “quasi-contract” claim, meaning “an obligation

the law creates in the absence of any agreement.” Goldman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,

841 N.E.2d 742, 746 (N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added). Where a matter is controlled

by an enforceable contract between parties, a claim of unjust enrichment does not

lie. Id.; see also Gargano v. Morey, 86 N.Y.S.3d 595, 599 (2d Dep’t 2018) (“A cause of

action for money had and received is similar to a cause of action to recover

damages for unjust enrichment, the essence of which is that one party has received

money or a benefit at the expense of another.”); Parsa v. State of New York, 474

N.E.2d 235, 237 (N.Y. 1984) (“[Money had and received] is not an action founded

on contract at all; it is an obligation which the law creates in the absence of

10  See Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[This Court] may affirm . . . on any basis
for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds upon which
the district court did not rely.”).
 11 The parties dispute the terms of the contract, not the existence of a contract.

                                                 13
agreement when one party possesses money that in equity and good conscience

[that party] ought not to retain and that belongs to another.”).

       Because Black’s claims for unjust enrichment and money had and received

are based on Pinto’s alleged failure to perform services he had contracted to

perform, Black is foreclosed from recovering on a theory of unjust enrichment or

money had and received absent an exception to the general principle cited above.

Even if an agreement secured through fraudulent misrepresentation constitutes an

exception to this general rule, for the reasons set forth above, Black has failed to

create a genuine dispute of fact with respect to his fraud claims. 12

                                                  * * *

12On appeal, Black does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that his conversion claim
relating to Pinto’s alleged overbilling for visiting Joanne fails because he presented no evidence
of demanding repayment. For that reason, we need not address this claim on appeal. Loeffler v.
Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 279 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining that issues inadequately
raised in briefs are deemed waived on appeal). Even if Black’s general challenges to the district
court’s order regarding his charges for visiting Joanne sufficiently preserve a challenge on the
conversion claim, we see no error in the district court’s reasoning. See Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 360 F. App’x 179, 180 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Where the original possession is lawful, a
conversion does not occur until the defendant refuses to return the property after demand or until
he sooner disposes of the property.”).

                                                14
      We have considered Black’s remaining arguments and conclude that they

are without merit. For the reasons stated above, the district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.

                                     FOR THE COURT:
                                     Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                       15