Court Opinion

ID: 9555332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 18:00:34.53078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:28.940629
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _____________

                                      No. 22-2425
                                     _____________

                              CANDIDO LOPEZ-GALENO,
                                              Petitioner
                                        v.

              ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                            _____________

                        On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                             (Agency No. A098-494-492)
                          Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal
                                     _____________

                   Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                    June 20, 2023
                                   _____________

                Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

                                 (Filed August 11, 2023)
                                     _____________

                                       OPINION*
                                     _____________

       *
       This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
MATEY, Circuit Judge.

       Petitioner Candido Lopez-Galeno is subject to removal but claims Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”) protection, citing the threat of violence from police and rival

gangs in Mexico. But the Board of Immigration Appeals denied his claim based on

substantial evidence after a fair hearing, so we must deny the petition.

                                             I.

       Lopez-Galeno joined La Gran Familia Mexicana (“LGFM”), a gang in his

hometown of San Miguel. After arriving in the United States without admission or

parole, he continued his membership and memorialized his affiliation with tattoos

including the letters “F” and “M” on his chest—standing for “Familia Mexicana”—and

“PMS” on his stomach for “Primos” (his branch of LGFM). After rising in the ranks to

sublieutenant, Lopez-Galeno added a tattoo to his left hand depicting a rosary and three

dots signifying his new rank.

       Lopez-Galeno eventually had a change of heart and decided to leave the gang. He

spoke with Eladio “Cholo” Diaz, the “absolute leader” of LGFM in both the U.S. and

Mexico, who “respected” Lopez-Galeno’s decision. A.R. 220, 221, 169. But a few

months later, Lopez-Galeno stabbed a member of a rival gang to death. He pleaded guilty

to aggravated manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty-two years’ imprisonment.

       In 2021, Lopez-Galeno was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Lopez-Galeno admitted the allegations, but

                                             2
sought deferral of removal under the CAT, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–.18. With relief denied

by the IJ and the BIA, Lopez-Galeno now petitions for review.1

                                             II.

       We consider each of Lopez-Galeno’s arguments and find no errors of law. First,

Lopez-Galeno argues he was deprived of due process when the IJ cut short a line of

questioning about the appearance of LGFM’s leader, Cholo. An important issue, Lopez-

Galeno argues, because Cholo and another gang member were killed in Mexico when

rivals identified them as LGFM members by their tattoos.

       We see no error. The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process to noncitizens at

removal hearings, including the fundamental requirement of an “opportunity to be heard

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239

(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted). This includes “key protections,” like receipt

of “a full and fair hearing that allows . . . a reasonable opportunity to present evidence.”2

Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). But

outside of a few “structural error[s] that necessarily make[] proceedings fundamentally

unfair”—such as deprivation of a right to counsel or an unbiased judge—due process

       1
         The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have
limited jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), see
Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–92 (2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(e). “[W]e review
the BIA’s legal determinations de novo,” Zhi Fei Liao v. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 714, 718
(3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), and its findings of fact in denying CAT protection for
substantial evidence. Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1692.
       2
         Similarly, noncitizens have a statutory right under the Immigration and
Nationality Act to a “reasonable opportunity” to “present evidence on [their] own
behalf.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
                                              3
violations require a finding of prejudice. Aquino v. Att’y Gen., 53 F.4th 761, 766 (3d Cir.

2022).

         Lopez-Galeno suffered no prejudice. He has not identified what additional

testimony he would have given, suggesting only that it would have bolstered the

resemblance between his and Cholo’s tattoos. But the IJ agreed the two men had similar

tattoos, so Lopez-Galeno has not shown the additional evidence “would have made a

difference.”3 Id. at 767.

         Second, Lopez-Galeno argues the Agency failed to aggregate the risks of his

return and erroneously viewed his claim of danger as a “series of suppositions” based on

“an unlikely hypothetical chain of events.” A.R. 6, 54–55, 90–91. But the Agency’s

“chain of events” language referred to the events necessary for any of the groups Lopez-

Galeno identifies to spot his tattoos, recognize their nature,4 and then torture Lopez-

Galeno as a result. That is too attenuated a tale to find a greater-than-not likelihood of

future torture. Cf. In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917–18 & n.4 (A.G. 2006). And, in

any event, the IJ specifically concluded Lopez-Galeno “has not demonstrated the

         3
          Serrano-Alberto highlights the kinds of prejudice needed for a due process
violation. In that case, the IJ engaged in inappropriate conduct with a “pervasiveness and
egregiousness,” interrupting and cabining “critical” testimony, focusing on “irrelevant
details, making findings contradicted by the record, and maintaining a condescending and
belligerent tone.” 859 F.3d at 224. Here, the IJ cut short a single descriptive discussion
because she accepted Lopez-Galeno’s point. That fell within her “broad discretion to
conduct and control immigration proceedings.” Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 97, 102
(BIA 2020).
        4
          The IJ reasonably found Lopez-Galeno’s tattoos unlikely to be recognized. They
include no gang colors; the visible tattoos are not particular to LGFM; and the tattoos
more specific to the Gran Familia are covered by ordinary clothing.
                                              4
cumulative risk from gangs, cartels and the police in Mexico makes it more likely than

not that he will be tortured upon return.” A.R. 55, 91. Similarly, the BIA noted that “[t]he

Immigration Judge considered the aggregate risk of harm from rival gangs, cartels, and

the police, and found, without clear error, that [Lopez-Galeno] does not face a ‘more

likely than not’ risk” of torturous harm. A.R. 8. Both showing Lopez-Galeno’s risks were

considered in their aggregate.

       Lopez-Galeno counters that the IJ ignored that he could also be targeted as a rival

criminal deportee or recruited because of his experience and knowledge as a high-ranking

member of LGFM. But either would still require being recognized as an LGFM member

or mistaken as a member of another gang or cartel. And, as the IJ noted, such events are

unlikely because Lopez-Galeno has no visible tattoos that would identify his past

association.

       Third, Lopez-Galeno argues the Agency misunderstood the scope of cartel

activity. He says the IJ improperly reduced the weight of Dr. Kirkland’s expert report

because that report focused on cartel conditions in Tierra Caliente instead of San Miguel.

But the IJ’s decision was reasonable: both Dr. Kirkland’s testimony and the cartel map in

the record support the conclusion that San Miguel is close to but outside Tierra Caliente.

Similarly, Lopez-Galeno points out the IJ incorrectly stated the Jalisco Cartel does not

currently operate in Puebla. The BIA reasonably concluded that this was only a slight

                                             5
misstatement by the IJ, as the Jalisco Cartel operates in Puebla only by “proxy,”

predominately engaging in fuel theft, and does not pose a major threat.5 A.R. 8 n.8.

       Finally, Lopez-Galeno argues the Agency made an “implied determination

regarding Mr. Lopez-Galeno’s ability to relocate,” Opening Br. 28, by stating that he will

“live with family in San Miguel Tilapa and scrupulously avoid gang involvement,” A.R.

55, 91. Not so. “Ability to relocate” refers to one of the relevant considerations in

assessing the likelihood of torture: whether “the applicant could relocate to a part of the

country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). But San Miguel is Lopez-Galeno’s hometown and where his family

resides, so returning there would not be “relocating” within Mexico.6

                                             III.

       For these reasons, we will deny Lopez-Galeno’s petition for review.

       5
          Since there is no likelihood of torture, we need not consider whether public
officials would acquiesce. See Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017).
        6
          Lopez-Galeno also challenges the finding that he will “scrupulously avoid gang
involvement,” A.R. 55, but that is merely acceptance of his statement that he does not
“want to have anything else to do with gangs,” A.R. 182.
                                              6