Court Opinion

ID: 9675938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:10:22.477891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:41.489185
License: Public Domain

Bandstra, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority but for a different reason.
While I agree with the majority that the portion of Davidson v Secretary of State, 351 Mich 4; 87 NW2d 131 (1957), relied upon by plaintiff is dictum, I conclude that the Supreme Court in Davidson reached the correct result. The statutory definition of “special mobile equipment” is a limiting definition, carving out from the universe of vehicles those that qualify. See MCL 257.62; MSA 9.1862. Under the statutory language, the vehicles that qualify are determined by a two-step process, which first delineates vehicles that are “not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property . . . ,”1 From this cate*54gory of vehicles, a smaller subcategory is identified as constituting “special mobile equipment,” i.e., only those vehicles that are “incidentally operated or moved over the highways . . . Accordingly, if a vehicle is “designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property,” that vehicle is not included within the first category. If, however, a vehicle falls within this category, it still fails to be “special mobile equipment” if it is more than “incidentally operated or moved over the highways.” Under this analysis, the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[ejxistence of any 1 of these 3 factors . . . will defeat the claimed exemption” is correct. Davidson, supra at 9.2
The tanker-trailer at issue in this case is not “special mobile equipment” under the statute thus construed. The tanker-trailer was “designed . . . primarily for the transportation of . . . property” and does not fall within the category of vehicles delineated by the statute as potentially falling within the definition but only if they are “incidentally operated or moved over the highways.”
Nonetheless, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the tanker-trailer is “special mobile equipment” *55for a completely different statutory reason. In its cross appeal, defendant Stenberg Brothers, Inc., argues that the trial court erred in not ruling in its favor on the basis of MCL 257.216; MSA 9.1916, which provides that “[e]very motor vehicle, . . . when driven or moved upon a highway, is subject to the registration . . . provisions of this act. . . .” Defendant Stenberg Brothers argues that the tanker-trailer was not subject to registration under this provision because it was not ordinarily or regularly driven or moved upon a highway. Accordingly, under the insurance policy, defendant argues that the tanker-trailer is “mobile equipment” because it is “not subject to motor vehicle registration.” I agree.
Whether the tanker-trailer was “subject to registration” under the statute depends not on whether it was capable of being registered but rather whether it was required to be registered under statute. Reaver v Westwood, 148 Mich App 343, 348; 384 NW2d 156 (1986). Under the clear language of MCL 257.216; MSA 9.1916, the tanker-trailer was “subject to . . . registration” when it was leased by Mead Corporation and “moved upon a highway” to the location where it was used as a storage tank. However, the registration requirement resulting from that brief move could have been satisfied with a fourteen-day “temporary registration” because the tanker-trailer did not transport liquids during the move. MCL 257.226b; MSA 9.1926(2). Following the move, the tanker-trailer was clearly used as a stationary storage tank and was no longer “subject to registration” under the statute. Accordingly, at the time of the accident at issue in this case, the tanker-trailer was “mobile equipment” *56as defined by the insurance contract.3 I would affirm because the trial court reached the correct result albeit for the wrong reason. Welch v Dist Court, 215 Mich App 253, 256; 545 NW2d 15 (1996).

 I agree with the majority’s opinion that the word “or” is properly read as disjunctive rather than conjunctive. However, my analysis of the statute does not improperly read “or” as conjunctive. Instead, my analysis of the statute, compared to that of the majority, differs with respect to how the statute’s use of the word “not” is to be applied. The majority’s analysis applies “not” to each of the following verbs individually, meaning that a vehicle may be “special mobile equipment” if it is “not designed” or if it is “[not] used” primarily for the transportation of persons or property. My analysis rests on a determination that the legislative intent was that the verbs would be considered as a group and the “not” would be applicable *54to the verb group; thus, the “not designed or used” language of the statute means “neither designed nor used.”

 Both the above analysis and that of the majority is logically supportable. Thus, we are faced with two logically supportable analyses of the statute. I reject the majority’s analysis because it is inconsistent with the Davidson dictum that has been the basis of repeated opinions by the Attorney General on various issues. See, e.g., OAG, 1961-1962, No 4031, p 519 (September 5, 1962); OAG, 1960, No 3456, p 64 (April 4, 1960); OAG, 1959-1960, No 3275, p 13 (January 31, 1959). While, as the majority points out, these opinions are not precedentially binding on this Court, a longstanding construction by the Attorney General “should be given considerable weight.” Aller v Detroit Police Dep’t Trial Bd, 309 Mich 382, 386; 15 NW2d 676 (1944).

 The situation here is different than that found in Einerwold v Complete Auto Transit, Inc, 145 Mich App 521, 524; 377 NW2d 890 (1985), where a pickup truck was regularly used to transport employees on public highways from one lot to another.