Court Opinion

ID: 9775530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:01:46.883495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:27.995135
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I join Justice Corbin’s dissent and further observe that the majority this date applies a patchwork quilt approach to this cause of action. We have held that a claim amy be brought for injuries like we have in this case either as a wrongful death action or medical malpractice. Brown v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 558, 732 S.W.2d 130 (1987), (Brown I); see also Matthews v. Travelers Indemnity Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247, 432 S.W.2d 485 (1968). We have held that the two are alternative causes of action with different statutes of limitation. Id. The option is available even when a medical injury is involved such as we have in the present case. Id. Today, we are saying, “Not so.” The majority holds that the 60-day notice provision in the Medical Malpractice Act may be plucked from that act and applied to a wrongful death action to foreclose further litigation under that statute. There are several things wrong with this approach. First, the majority has endorsed a hybrid cause of action. Secondly, we decided this issue in Brown v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 308 Ark. 361, 823 S.W.2d 908 (1992) (Brown III), when we said: Because this is a wrongful death action, compliance with the medical malpractice statutes, including § 16-114-204 [the 60-day notice statute], is irrelevant. 308 Ark. at 363, 823 S.W.2d at 909. Finally, the fact that we subsequently decided that the injury in Brown I was not a medical injury does not negate the holding in Brown I that a medical injury claim could be brought either under the Medical Malpractice Act or as a wrongful death action. I would reverse the trial court’s orders of dismissal and remand for trial. Glaze and Corbin, JJ., join.