Court Opinion

ID: 9560458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:49:22.702105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:55.971534
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I, respectfully, dissent as I cannot go along with the majority’s conclusion that the landlord did not, as a matter of law, breach its duty of care by keeping an unrailed hole in the middle of a recreational deck at its apartment complex.1 What is reasonably foreseen as being injurious to others is generally a jury question. Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 688 (3), 689 (178 SE2d 543). Further, I do not agree with the majority’s holding that Artlip failed, as a matter of law, to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. While it is a general rule that one who has knowledge of a defective condition in the premises which is equal to that of the owner cannot rely for recovery upon a failure of the owner or operator to correct the condition, there is an exception to this rule which holds that when one is in a moment of stress or excitement and her attention is diverted from the defect, she is not to be held to the same degree of care in discovering and apprehending the danger as in ordinary situations. Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 687 (2), 688, supra.
During the early evening on August 2, 1992, Margaret Artlip was attacked by a bee while she and a friend socialized on an outdoor deck in a recreational area at her landlord’s apartment complex. Swatting defensively and backing away from the darting insect, Artlip *779stepped into an unrailed hole that was cut into the deck to accommodate a tall Georgia pine tree. Seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained, Artlip brought an action against her landlord, Arthur N. Queler and Michael L. Asher, each individually and as general partners of MAQ/Ashley-River Associates, L.P., MAQ/Ashley-River Associates, L.P., a Georgia Limited Partnership, and NPI Property Management Corporation, a Florida Corporation.
The landlord denied the material allegations of the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Artlip’s equal knowledge of the static condition on its deck bars recovery, as a matter of law. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord.
“The decisive issues are: ‘(1) fault on the part of [the landlord], and (2) ignorance of the danger on the part of [Artlip] (Cit.)’ Pound v. Augusta Nat., 158 Ga. App. 166, 168 (279 SE2d 342) (1981).” Shackelford v. DeKalb Farmer’s Market, 180 Ga. App. 348, 349 (1) (349 SE2d 241). With regard to the first issue, I believe the controlling issues in the case sub judice are whether the landlord exercised due care in keeping an unrailed hole in the middle of a recreational deck and whether the landlord should have foreseen or anticipated that someone may step or stumble into the hole in question as Artlip allegedly did on the evening of August 2, 1992. See OCGA § 51-3-1; Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 688 (3), supra.
What is reasonably foreseen as being injurious to others is generally a jury question. “ ‘In order for a party to be liable as for negligence, it is not necessary that he should have been able to anticipate the particular consequences which ensued. It is sufficient, if in ordinary prudence he might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might result.’ Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 337 (26 SE2d 698). ‘The most common test of negligence is whether the consequences of the alleged wrongful act are reasonably to be foreseen as injurious to others coming within the range of such acts, and what is reasonably to be foreseen is generally a question for the jury. (Citations.) The question for the jury is whether danger should have been recognized by common experience, or by the special experience of the alleged wrongdoer, or by a person of ordinary prudence and foresight (citations).’ Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 326 (124 SE2d 409).” Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 688 (3), 689, supra. In the case sub judice, I find no evidence supporting the majority’s holding that an unrailed hole in a recreational deck (as a matter of law) poses no danger to others, or that it is unforeseeable that someone may be injured by inadvertently stepping or stumbling into such an unguarded structure. Indeed, I do not think this Court, without expert proof regarding relevant building and construction *780standards, can take judicial notice that such a design feature is safe under all circumstances, as a matter of law. I, therefore, believe that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the landlord breached its duty under OCGA § 51-3-1.
With regard to the second issue, the landlord argues that Artlip’s equal knowledge of the static condition on the deck bars recovery, as a matter of law. The same argument was asserted under strikingly similar circumstances in Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 687 (2), supra, where the plaintiff tripped over an unduly placed bedspread (that was clearly visible to the plaintiff) because of excitement brought on by a cockroach’s invasive attack. This Court then held as follows: “Ordinarily, ‘one who is familiar with the premises cannot rely for recovery upon the negligence of the defendant in failing to correct a patent defect where such party had equal means with the defendant of discovering it or equal knowledge of its existence.’ Barrow v. James, 107 Ga. App. 377, 378 (130 SE2d 352). See also Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 170, 173 (138 SE2d 77) quoting 20 RCL 56, § 52; Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768 (4) (172 SE2d 344). However, this rule does not hold where the circumstances are such as to excuse the plaintiff from exercising the degree of care otherwise required. This latter exception finds expression in the ‘distraction’ or ‘emergency’ cases. The principle applicable here is well stated in City of Rome v. Phillips, 37 Ga. App. 299 (2) (139 SE 828). And see Glover v. City Council of Augusta, 83 Ga. App. 314, 316 (63 SE2d 422); City Council of Augusta v. Hood, 95 Ga. App. 259, 261 (97 SE2d 639); City of Albany v. Humber, 101 Ga. App. 276, 282 (113 SE2d 635). If we should hold that the plaintiff’s experience when she felt the cockroach crawling up her thigh under her dress, with its claws or feet clinging to her skin, was, as a matter of law, not a ‘moment of stress or excitement’ amounting to a distraction of sufficient magnitude to authorize the jury to find that she is not barred from recovery because she may have exposed herself to a condition of the premises of which she had prior knowledge, we should, in effect, be ruling out the doctrine of distraction as a viable rule.” Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 687 (2), 688, supra. Applying the same logic in the case sub judice, I cannot go along with the majority’s holding that the bee’s attack upon Artlip did not (as a matter of law) create such a “moment of stress or excitement” so as to preclude a jury’s finding that Artlip is not barred from recovery because she may have exposed herself to a condition of the premises of which she had prior knowledge. Further, I believe the only distinguishing factor between the Stuckey’s case and the case sub judice is the type of insect that allegedly prompted the panic situation. The majority’s distinction of the cases simply goes to the issue of foreseeability, which (in my view) is a jury question in the case sub *781judice as it was found to be in Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 687 (2), supra.
Decided March 15, 1996
Steven K. Weiner, Diane E. Bessen, for appellant.
Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, J. Kenneth Moorman, Christopher J. Graddock, for appellees.

 Contrary to the majority’s narrow characterization of Artlip’s complaint, this case does not merely involve a claim for negligent maintenance of the deck. Giving Artlip the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from her complaint, it is easily seen that this case involves a claim for negligent layout and design of this recreational structure. To say otherwise ignores the basic rule that, under the Civil Practice Act, all pleadings must be construed most favorably toward the plaintiff. Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Suc., 118 Ga. App. 498, 499 (2) (164 SE2d 246).