Court Opinion

ID: 9741720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:01:02.78926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.654789
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I must dissent from the majority’s opinion.
The controversy at bar focuses on the adequacy of the trial court’s instruction concerning the intent element of the crime of aiding and abetting felony murder. In regard to the aiding and abetting theory, the jury was told that if they found that defendant helped plan the robbery with intent to assist in the robbery, then they could find aiding and abetting. The trial court then went on to list the elements of the crime of aiding and abetting felony murder as: (1) defendant intended to commit robbery when he aided the principal, (2) defendant did in fact aid or abet or assist in the robbery, (3) murder occurred as a result of the robbery, (4) the murder was "fairly within the scope of [the] criminal enterprise and it might have been expected to happen in the course of committing this robbery with a pistol”. The trial court then explained that the jury was to distinguish between first- and second-degree murder and defined first-degree murder as "the killing occurred as a result of the crime of robbery and that *662the defendant was at the time engaged in aiding or abetting another, * * * in the commission of that crime”.
The majority holds that the instruction constitutes reversible error in that it eliminated the element of malice from the jury’s consideration.
The instruction when read as a whole indicates that if it is found that the killing occurred within the scope of the criminal enterprise of robbery with a pistol, and if the defendant aided or abetted in that criminal enterprise, then the defendant could be found guilty of felony murder. Although I agree that the existence of malice is a jury question, the element of malice sufficient to elevate the killing to felony murder is established by finding that the killing occurred in the perpetration of one of the enumerated felonies. People v Till, 80 Mich App 16, 28-29; 263 NW2d 586 (1977). In this regard I would hold the instructions in the present case not to be erroneous.
I believe that my position comports with the legislative policy underlying the felony murder rule which is "to discourage those who would commit, or attempt to commit, felonies inherently dangerous to human life by imposing a greater penalty than would otherwise obtain for deaths attributable to their acts in furtherance of the felonious purpose”. People v Till, supra, 36.
I would affirm the defendant’s conviction.