Court Opinion

ID: 9473196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:22:27.172742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:22.856263
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I accept the basic analytic framework developed by the court. Like the court, I conclude that I.B.P.’s actions constitute legitimate petitioning activities that are entitled to some degree of first amendment protection. I also agree with the court that the first amendment does not absolutely insulate I.B.P.’s actions from liability for defamation, but rather provides these actions with a qualified privilege that may be lost under some circumstances. Further, to determine the scope of this qualified privilege, the court must focus on the status of the person defamed; and if the person defamed is a limited purpose public figure, that person must prove “actual malice” in order to overcome the qualified privilege and recover.
Despite basic agreement with the court’s approach, I disagree with its conclusions. Unlike the court, I conclude that Bagley’s actions have not stripped him of his status as a private individual. Further, even if Bagley has become a limited purpose public figure and as a result is required to prove “actual malice,” the district court in fact instructed the jury on the issue of actual malice and the jury specifically found that I.B.P. acted with actual malice. This finding was separate and distinct from any other issue decided by the jury, and after an independent review of the evidence, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285, 84 S.Ct. 710, 728, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), I conclude that Bagley presented clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1967, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Finally, I disagree with the court’s reversal of the jury’s award of damages on Bagley’s interference with future employment claim. While such an award will be duplicative if Bagley ultimately succeeds on his libel claim, Bagley has yet to do so. Consequently, any decision on the propriety of this award is premature. Because of these basic disagreements, I respectfully dissent.
The court’s conclusion that Bagley is a limited purpose public figure flows largely *1321from its determination that Bagley played an “active” and “influential” role in the legislative process. Ante at 1316. This conclusion, particularly in light of the significant burden such a decision imposes on Bagley, is misplaced. Bagley’s only involvement in the legislative process was as a witness before the Smith subcommittee. He had no role in the subcommittee’s policy determinations and did not, outside his specific testimony, attempt to lobby or persuade the subcommittee to take any particular action or position. Instead, Bagley made a single appearance before the subcommittee, under subpoena, and provided information relevant to that subcommittee’s activity. Outside of this single appearance, Bagley had neither “proven access” to the legislative forum nor a “realistic opportunity” to counteract false statements made by I.B.P. Ante at 1316.
Given these facts, I cannot conclude that Bagley played either an “active” or “influential” role in the legislative process. If he did, then virtually every witness appearing before a congressional committee will constitute an “active” and “influential” participant and like Bagley will lose his or her status as a private citizen. A mere witness can hardly be said to play “an influential role” in “resolving” a particular controversy, especially in the context of losing the mantle and protection of private person status. The court’s conclusion that such individuals have “accepted the risk” and are “less deserving of recovery” is remarkably harsh and ignores the valuable role these individuals play in our legislative process. This result will discourage citizens with relevant information from coming forward and, as a consequence, Congress will likely be deprived of a valuable source of information. Simply because an individual becomes “involved in or associated with a matter that attract[s legislative] attention” should not mean that this individual is “automatically transformed into a public figure.” Wolston v. Readers Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 167, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979).
I reach a similar result when I examine Bagley’s overall involvement in the I.B.P. controversy. Throughout this controversy, Bagley sought no public audience. His meetings with other individuals were private and nonpublicized and, in fact, were not initiated by Bagley. Even his congressional testimony was not objectively voluntary since, as the court notes, it was given under subpoena. Further, after his testimony, Bagley conscientiously avoided the media and made no public comment. Finally, any media attention that Bagley may have received following the publication of the Peterson letter cannot transform an otherwise private individual into a limited purpose public figure. Under any analysis, I simply cannot conclude that Bagley has so “thrust [himself] to the forefront of [this] particular public controversy * * * [that] [h]e has relinquished * * * his interest in the protection of his own good name.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Consequently, unlike the court, I believe Bagley retains his status as a private citizen.
Although it is my contention that Bagley retains the status of a private citizen, the first amendment values implicated by I.B. P.’s petitioning activities are still entitled to constitutional protection. The necessary constitutional protections were enumerated by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court outlined the constitutional limitations on a private citizen’s right to recover for defamation in the context of media comment. While the present case involves the first amendment right to petition, I believe the constitutional limitations found in the area of media comment are equally applicable to the area of first amendment petitioning.
The constitutional limitations outlined by the Supreme Court in Gertz are essentially three-fold. First, although a state may define the appropriate standard of liability for defamation, it may not impose liability without fault. Id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. Second, unless actual malice has been proven, the private citizen may recover only *1322actual damages. Id. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. Third, punitive damages cannot be recovered without proof of actual malice. Id. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. In this case, the district court’s instructions comply with the Gertz limitations and consequently provide I.B.P.’s first amendment interests with “the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need * * to survive.’ ” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)).
On the issue of liability, the district court required Bagley to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that I.B.P. “published the [Peterson] letter with knowledge that it was false.” This instruction meets the Gertz fault requirement. The fact that the district court also instructed the jury that words such as “stole” and “perjury” are libelous per se and create a “presumption of * * * falsity” did not relieve Bagley of the burden of proving fault. Despite this presumption, Bagley was still required to prove that I.B.P. published these statements with knowledge that they were false. Falsity and fault are separate and distinct concepts and the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that falsity is necessarily an indication of fault. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. at 3010 n. 10. Cf. Bose Corp., 104 S.Ct. at 1965.
The district court’s instructions are also consistent with the second Gertz limitation. On the issue of compensatory damages, the district court, while at one point speaking of a “presumption of injury,” specifically limited Bagley’s recovery of compensatory damages to those “which were directly and proximately caused by the alleged libel.” This instruction clearly limited Bagley’s compensatory damages to those which he could actually establish.
Finally, with respect to the third Gertz limitation, the jury was instructed that Bagley could recover punitive damages only if he could prove “on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice.” The district court defined the term actual malice as “[a] publication * * * made with knowledge that it is false, or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” These instructions are consistent with the Gertz limitation on the recovery of punitive damages and properly define both the term actual malice, New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280, 84 S.Ct. at 726, and the necessary burden of proof, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 30, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1813, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Further, the court’s gratuitous finding that “the punitive damage instruction contained error in that it failed clearly to place the burden of proving actual malice by clear and convincing evidence on Bagley,” ante at 1317, is inappropriate. I.B.P. concedes in its brief that the district court’s instruction placed the burden of proving this issue on Bagley. In addition, I.B.P. has not even raised this issue on appeal.
Even if Bagley is a limited purpose public figure and is required to prove actual malice, I conclude that the jury’s verdict should stand. The jury awarded Bagley punitive damages. This award was separate from the award of compensatory damages and was specifically based on the jury’s determination that I.B.P.’s actions were motivated by actual malice. This independent determination in and of itself is sufficient to support both the compensatory and punitive damage awards in this case. As was stated by Chief Justice Warren in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967): “Although the ‘actual malice’ instructions were not also given in connection with the compensatory damage issue, it is difficult to conceive how petitioner could have been prejudiced by that failure in view of the fact that the jury, guided by ‘actual malice’ instructions awarded * * * punitive damages.” Id. at 166, 87 S.Ct. at 1997 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Further, in so far as the district court’s presumption of falsity is concerned, this presumption was limited to the issue of *1323liability for purposes of compensatory damages. The instructions on their face show that this presumption did not carry over to the issue of liability for punitive damages, the determination of which is independent from a determination of liability for compensatory damages. Consequently, any error the district court may have committed is nonprejudicial and may not be used by this court as a basis for disturbing the jury’s verdict. Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 724 F.2d 653, 656 (8th Cir.1983) (citing Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Weston, 610 F.2d 501, 503 (8th Cir.1979)). The court has forgotten that “[w]e have ... come a long way from the time when all trial error was presumed prejudicial and reviewing courts were considered ‘citadels of technicality.’ ” McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 848, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (quoting Kottea-kos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1245, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). I.B.P. received the fair trial to which it was entitled and this court should not, in light of the clear jury finding of actual malice, reverse the jury’s determination.
As a final comment, I disagree with the court’s reversal of the damages awarded Bagley on his tortious interference with future employment claim. While an award on this claim would be duplicative of a libel recovery, Bagley very simply has yet to recover on his libel claim. Until that recovery occurs, it is difficult to see how the award of damages for tortious interference with future employment can be duplicative. Rather than reversing this award, the court should remand this portion of the action back to the district court subject to the ultimate determination of the libel issue.
I also conclude that there is sufficient evidence, independent of any evidence that might constitute protected petitioning activity, to support this claim. Prior to I.B.P.’s actions, Bagley was highly regarded in the meat industry, had a good reputation for honesty, ability, and integrity, and received numerous offers of employment. Following his congressional testimony, however, Bagley was fired from Dubuque Packing at I.B.P.’s instigation. Additionally, Bagley was effectively “blacklisted” from the industry as a whole by I.B.P. and it was made clear to him that he should look for employment in another industry because he would never work in the meat industry again. The offers of employment stopped and Bagley was unable to obtain further employment in the meat industry. I believe that this evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the tortious interference with future employment claim.
In conclusion, contrary to the court, I would affirm the awards for libel and tor-tious interference with future employment.