Court Opinion

ID: 9650081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:23:44.363309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:18.073053
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
First, I must dissent from the determination of the Majority that the asbestos-caused pleural thickening of appellees Murray and Simmons is not compensable as a matter of law. I do so because I am unable to conclude that appellant Fibreboard Corporation has preserved this issue for appellate review.
The Majority holds that the trial court erred in failing to grant the judgment notwithstanding the verdict requested by Fibreboard in that “Fibreboard argued at trial, in post-trial motions and in this appeal, that their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted, as appellees suffered no damages as a result of their asymptomatic pleural thickening and hence had no compensable injuries.” Majority Opinion at 212. In reviewing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict:
[T]he evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, and he must be given the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact arising therefrom, and any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in his favor---- Further, “a judge’s appraisement of evidence is *216not to be based on how he would have voted had he been a member of the jury, but on the facts as they come through the sieve of the jury’s deliberations.”
There are two bases upon which a judgment n.o.v. can be entered: one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first[,] a court reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor, whereas with the second[,] the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.
Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 402, 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1992) (quotations and citations omitted). In the present case, the majority concludes that judgment notwithstanding the verdict is compelled as a matter of law based on Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corp., 429 Pa.Super. 327, 632 A.2d 880 (1993); see Majority Opinion at 212. Yet, the conclusion of the Majority is stated in a manner indicating that the evidence compels a factual conclusion different from that arrived at by the jury. See Majority Opinion at 212-213. Absent an analysis of the evidence which would impel the conclusion that the evidence fails to support the verdict of the jury, this Court is unable to make such a determination. Moure, supra, 529 Pa. at 402, 604 A.2d at 1007. Here the Majority not only fails to apply the appropriate standard, but neglects to supply the accompanying analysis.
Even if the Majority had applied the appropriate standard, accompanied by the necessary analysis, I would conclude that this determination of the Majority fails. Giffear holds as a matter of law, that asymptomatic pleural thickening is a noncompensable injury. 429 Pa.Super. at 335, 632 A.2d at 884. During the discussion of jury instructions, counsel for Fibreboard conceded that the issue of whether pleural thickening is compensable is “for the jury to decide.” N.T. June 10, 1991, *217at 1.264; Murray, R.R. 617a; Simmons, R.R. 596a. Once Fibreboard has conceded that the compensability of pleural thickening is a question for the trier of fact, Giffear cannot apply. Therefore, I conclude that this issue has not been preserved for appellate review.
In its brief to this Court, Fibreboard maintains that it has preserved the issues raised in this appeal, having taken “exceptions to various trial court rulings (R. 609a-[6]lla), and filed Post-Trial Motions on June 28, 1991 (R. 12a[-22a]).” Murray Brief at 5; Simmons Brief at 5. The first pages referenced by Fibreboard encompass exceptions to the jury charge. See N.T. June 11, 1991, Afternoon Session at 1.256-1.258; Murray R.R. at 609a-611a; Simmons R.R. at 588a-590a.
In reviewing a claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, the proper test is whether the charge in its entirety, against the background of the evidence in the particular case, demonstrated that error was committed which was prejudicial to the complaining party; this Court will not consider portions of the charge out of context or reverse solely on the basis of isolated inaccuracies. Butler v. Kiwi, S.A., 412 Pa.Super. 591, 604 A.2d 270 (1992), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 650, 613 A.2d 556 (1992). An erroneous jury instruction may only provide a basis for a new trial if it can be shown that the instruction was fundamentally in error and may have been responsible for the verdict, or if the charge has a tendency to mislead or confuse the issue presented. Soda v. Baird, 411 Pa.Super. 80, 600 A.2d 1274 (1991), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665, 616 A.2d 986 (1992). A trial court may properly refuse a requested point for charge when the substance of that request has already been given via a general or specific instruction. Butler v. Kiwi, S.A., supra. Moreover, the trial court is not required to use the exact language of a requested point for charge; it need only choose a form of expression which adequately and clearly covers the subject. Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 364 Pa.Super. 26, 527 A.2d 134 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 613, 539 A.2d 810 (1988).
*218Fibreboard argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must find “compensable” pleural thickening in order to award damages to Murray and Simmons. This claim is meritless. The trial court instructed the jury that it must find “compensable asbestos-related disease or injury” in order to award damages to Murray and Simmons. N.T., supra at 1.292-1.293, 1.296; Murray R.R. at 645a,-646a, 649a; Simmons R.R. at 624a-625a, 628a. In addition, the trial court accurately defined the term “physical injury” for the jury to enable the jury to understand what constituted a “compensable asbestos-related disease or injury.” Here, the trial court gave the jury the substance of the instruction Fibreboard claims was omitted. Id. at 1.292-1.293, 1.296; Murray R.R. at 645a; Simmons R.R. at 633a.
Fibreboard also argues that the trial court failed to utilize the language of the jury instructions proposed by Fibreboard. Fibreboard, however, disregards that the trial court has broad discretion in charging the jury and may use any particular language so long as the applicable law is fully and accurately conveyed. Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., 408 Pa.Super. 83, 596 A.2d 203 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 644, 607 A.2d 254 (1992). I do not find error in the jury charge.
Fibreboard also contends that the issues have been preserved in its Post-Trial Motions filed on June 28, 1991. R.R. 12a-22a. In these motions, Fibreboard, in essence, asserted that the medical evidence was insufficient to support a claim for damages, raised various complaints with respect to the jury charge, and requested remittitur. Murray at R.R. 12a-22a; Simmons at R.R. 12a-22a. Nowhere do I find an assertion by Fibreboard that “appellees suffered no compensable damages as a result of their asymptomatic pleural thickening and hence had no compensable injuries.” In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant must make a timely, specific objection at trial and must specifically raise the issue in post-trial motions; issues not preserved for appellate review cannot be considered by an appellate court even though the alleged error involves a basic or fundamental error. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 507 *219Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985). I would find that these issues have not been preserved for appellate review.
Second, I am unable to agree with the determination of the Majority that “Keene [Corporation and Owens-Illinois Glass Company] have also preserved the issue of the application of the holding of Giffear” by their assertion “that the trial court erred in denying their motion for remittitur.” Majority Opinion at 218-214. In support of the claim that the trial court erred in denying the motion for remittitur, the Majority holds that the following quote from Keene and Owens-Illinois’ Brief presents the same question answered in Giffear:
[T]he awards to both Mr. Simmons and Mr. Murray were grossly excessive. Plaintiffs’ own medical expert, Dr. Altschuler, testified that neither plaintiff suffered from any physical symptom, including shortness of breath, as a result of any asbestos-related disease or condition. Likewise, there was no claim of any wage loss, medical expenses or other out-of-pocket expenses. Moreover, there was no testimony, or evidence, which demonstrated that either plaintiff was prevented from working in any way as a result of any asbestos-related condition.... Their present injuries, which cause no real or substantial impairment, are not a proper basis for the award of such a huge sum.
Brief of Keene and Owens-Illinois, at 25-26, quoted in the Majority Opinion at 213-214. Giffear would be applicable only if this were asymptomatic pleural thickening. However, medical testimony established that both Murray and Simmons had symptomatic pleural thickening in that they had shortness of breath upon exertion. N.T. June 6, 1991, at 50-51, 72, 110; Murray R.R. at 337a-338a, 359a, 396a; Simmons R.R. at 316a-317a, 338a, 375a. In view of this, at the threshold, I would find Giffear inapposite.
Moreover, I find it to be unsettling that the Majority would apply this Court’s decision in Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corp., supra, to these consolidated cases retroactively. The Giffear decision itself fails to specify whether the holding is to be applied prospectively only or whether the holding is to be *220given retroactive application. The Majority would apply Giffear retroactively on the basis that:
Where an appellate decision overrules prior law and announces a new principle, unless the decision specifically declares the ruling to be prospective only, the new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal.
Blackwell v. Commonwealth State Ethics Comm’n, 527 Pa. 172, 188, 589 A.2d 1094, 1102 (1991) quoting Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 508 Pa. 228, 233, 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983). Thus, the Majority would hold that this new rule is to be applied retroactively to all pending cases if the issue has been properly preserved at all stages of the adjudication.
While Blackwell states that “although retroactivity is the general rule, a sweeping rule of retroactive application is not justified. Retroactive application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis.” 527 Pa. at 182, 589 A.2d at 1099. As Blackwell sets forth:
The U.S. Supreme Court has viewed the decision of whether to apply a new rule retroactively or prospectively as a function of three considerations: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of the reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice by the retroactive application of the new rule. We have adopted this three-factor standard and apply it when a question of the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision is before us.
Id. at 183, 589 A.2d at 1099 (citations omitted).
Blackwell recounts three separate factors that are to be . considered in arriving at this determination:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed____ Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each *221case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’____ Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.[”]
Id. at 184, 589 A.2d at 1100, citing Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 306 (1971).
This Court has not yet expressly considered whether Giffear should apply retroactively or prospectively. There has been an assumption that Gijfear is to be applied retroactively notwithstanding that the issue has not been directly raised before our Court; and, notwithstanding that we have not had the benefit of reasoned argument by the parties on whom the burden of these decisions would fall.
I am unable to deem a request for remittitur sufficient to preserve the question of whether it is proper to award damages for even an asymptomatic condition pursuant to Gijfear. I fail to see that a request for remittitur has the particularity or precision to adequately preserve this issue. A request for remittitur alone is not sufficient to preserve this issue.
Moreover, I cannot agree that our Court should allow Giffear to be applied retroactively, absent considered and reasoned reflection. I would find this adoption of retroactivity particularly disturbing given the volume of these cases throughout the Commonwealth.
Accordingly, I dissent.