Court Opinion

ID: 9786057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:46:13.067641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:40.853193
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting.
Because I agree with the court of appeals that the decision to request a lesser non-included offense instruction in this jurisdiction implicates a fundamental right, and therefore must remain with the defendant himself rather than his counsel, I respectfully dissent. More to the point, I believe the majority opinion simply fails to address the unique situation created by this jurisdiction's liberal (and highly unusual) procedure allowing criminal defendants to present juries with offenses neither charged by, nor even included within charges filed by, the prosecution. Although they may use the similar term "lesser offense," none of the majority's authorities-including both federal and state case law and ABA Standards-remotely contemplate an instruction on a "lesser non-included offense," and therefore none offer the slightest support for its conclusion.
More than thirty-five years ago, this court chose to condition a defendant's right to present a jury with the option to convict him of an offense less serious than the one actually charged solely upon the evidence presented at trial,. People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24, 28-29, 525 P.2d 431, 434 (1974). Whether the elements of an offense requested by the defendant are included in the charged offense or not, he must be entitled to have the jury consider that offense, as long as the evidence at trial offers a rational basis upon which to acquit of the greater offense and still convict of the lesser. People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715, 720 n. 5 (Colo.1982). Although permitting criminal defendants to opt for lesser non-included offense instructions has been criticized by the United States Supreme Court, see Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 99, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 (1998) (permitting jury to convict of offense prosecution did not even try to prove "can hardly be said to be a reliable result"), and roundly rejected by other state courts, see, eg., People v. Birks, 19 Cal.4th 108, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073, 1090 (1998) (overruling prior allowance of lesser non-included offense instructions requested by defense), we have never retreated from the position we took in Rivera.
*562Unlike the case of a lesser included offense, which merges with the greater, see Meads v. People, 78 P.3d 290, 293 (Colo.2003), and therefore can, at most, result in a conviction for a less serious form of the charged offense, the effect of injecting a lesser non-included offense into the jury's considerations is to subject the defendant to an additional conviction and harsher punishment than would otherwise be the case. See id. at 294; see also People v. Skinner, 825 P.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Colo.App.1991); People v. Will, 730 P.2d 898, 900 (Colo.App.1986). As far back as Rivera itself, we recognized that a request for a lesser non-included offense instruction "is tantamount to the defendant's consent to an added count being charged against him." 186 Colo. at 29, 525 P.2d at 434. In fact, granting such a request amounts not merely to a defendant's consent to an added count but actually to adding another charge against him, without even the acquiescence, much less the aim, of the prosecuting authority.
The majority initially appears to acknowledge the distinction between lesser included and lesser non-included offenses; however, after recounting the arguments of the parties and the holding of the court of appeals, it completely ignores the distinction and thereafter simply directs its attention generically to "lesser offenses." Rather than attempting to discredit the distinction between lesser included and lesser non-included offenses as illusory, or at least meaningless for purposes of a defendant's personal rights, the majority relies on outside authorities exclusively addressing lesser included offenses. Every case relied on by the majority, both federal and state, as well as the applicable ABA Standard commenting on tactical choices to be reserved for defense counsel, expressly addresses only the question of lesser included offenses, and none hints at a rule governing, nor even contemplates, the additional risk to a defendant involved in adding a lesser non-included offense instruction to the equation.
The Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct represent the only authority from this jurisdiction even peripherally relied on by the majority. Besides the fact that these rules purport to govern only attorney ethics, as distinguished from constitutional rights; and that Rule 1.2(a) represents a verbatim adoption of the model rule, whose drafters clearly never contemplated Colorado's broad allowance of defense requested non-included offense instructions; it seems particularly ironic for the majority to look to a body of rules prescribing an attorney's obligations to his client as support for counsel's authority to tactically subject his client to greater criminal liability than that sought by the state, without even the client's agreement.
Apart from its argument from authority (inapposite as its offered authorities may be), the majority seems merely to argue that a request by counsel for additional charges, unlike a guilty plea, does not actually admit additional crimes or deprive the defendant of his right to advocate for outright acquittal. While this may be an accurate statement, it is difficult to understand why the decision to subject a criminal defendant to harsher punishment should not also be personal to him, or why he should be forced even to risk, at the hands of his own counsel, greater erimi-nal liability. It remains unclear to me that defense counsel should be permitted to deprive his client of the option to go for broke, rather than seeking a compromise verdiet on even an included lesser offense; but I can see absolutely no justification for subjecting a criminal defendant, without his agreement, to greater criminal liability than that charged by the state.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice EID joins in this dissent.