Court Opinion

ID: 9943223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 21:03:56.770085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:32.975650
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Serrano CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B325319

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                         Super. Ct. No. NA115520)
           v.

 ONOFRE SERRANO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
         James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven
D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                              INTRODUCTION
      Defendant entered a bar after it had closed to the public and threw a
bar stool and tables at a security guard. When the security guard tried to
subdue him, the defendant stabbed the guard four times before fleeing. Prior
to the preliminary hearing, the defendant waived his right to counsel. Later,
due to defendant’s disruptive behavior at a pretrial hearing, the court
appointed trial counsel. The jury convicted defendant of two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant contends he did not knowingly
waive his right to counsel prior to the preliminary hearing. He also claims
the trial court erred in excluding medical records of his neck and spine
injuries. We affirm.

            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On September 26, 2020, defendant and appellant Onofre Tommy
Serrano (Serrano) went to the R Bar in Long Beach, California. An unarmed
security guard employed by R Bar, D’Angelo Darby (Darby), told Serrano to
leave the bar because he had harassed a female employee. Serrano became
angry and pulled out a knife before leaving.
      Serrano returned to R Bar on October 5, 2020. Darby recognized
Serrano and told him to leave. Serrano became angry and challenged Darby
to a fight. Serrano left the bar after other patrons intervened.
      Hours later, shortly before 3:00 a.m. on October 6, Serrano returned to
the bar. At that time, the bar was closed and the employees were cleaning
up. Upon seeing Darby, Serrano became angry and threw a barstool. When
Darby approached Serrano to subdue him, Serrano threw two bar tables at
him. Darby eventually reached Serrano and punched him in the face. A fight
ensued, and in the melee Serrano pulled a knife from his pocket, stabbing

                                       2
Darby four times. Darby suffered wounds to his forearm, bicep, and the back
of his head. Serrano then fled the bar. Darby was transported by
paramedics to the hospital, where he received treatment for his wounds.
      Serrano was initially charged with attempted murder (Pen. Code,
§§ 664/187, subd. (a), count 1)1 and assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a
barstool and table (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2).

A.    Arraignment on Complaint
      On February 24, 2021, the trial court called the case for arraignment.
The court appointed counsel to represent Serrano. Serrano waived
arraignment and the reading of the complaint. The court entered pleas of not
guilty on both charges.

B.    Waiver of Counsel
      On March 16, 2021, Serrano appeared in court and requested the
court’s approval to waive his right to counsel and appear in propria persona.
Serrano submitted a form waiving his right to counsel under Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). The trial court conducted an
extended inquiry of Serrano before accepting his waiver. As part of that
discussion, Serrano indicated he was 50 years old and held a college degree in
the administration of justice. He also indicated he previously represented
himself in a criminal case and had obtained a dismissal.
      The trial court proceeded to advise Serrano of his rights and the
dangers of self-representation. Specifically, the court warned Serrano that if
he represented himself, he would be without the assistance of an attorney
and would be opposed by an experienced district attorney. The trial court

1     All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                        3
warned Serrano he would not receive special consideration or assistance as a
self-represented party. Serrano was also told he would conduct his own trial,
make his own motions, and be solely responsible for all work at all stages of
the proceedings. The court additionally informed Serrano that he could
change his mind and request a lawyer at any time, and an attorney would be
appointed to represent him.
      As part of this colloquy, Serrano told the court he understood “what the
crime and the charge is, any possible legal defenses, the intents that needs
[sic] to be proved, both general and specific intent, what defenses [he] may
have, what facts need to be proven for [him] to be found guilty, and what are
the sentencing options and pre- and post-trial motions.” The trial court also
cautioned Serrano that his pro per status would be revoked if he was
disrespectful toward the judge or committed misconduct in court.
      The trial court made one final effort to convince Serrano to accept
counsel: “One last pitch. And I do this to every pro per case. It is really hard
to represent yourself as pro per. . . . So I am going to make a pitch to ask you
not to go pro per, but if you want to do that, I will respect that decision and
let you go pro per. [¶] Would you like to have a lawyer or would you like to
go pro per, sir?” Serrano responded, “I would like to exercise my Faretta
rights, Your Honor.”
      The trial court accepted Serrano’s waiver and ruled he could proceed in
propria persona. The court then discussed the preliminary hearing, stating
“You just want to fight this case, right? It is a life case, right? You have a
prelim date on April 6. Would you like to exercise that right to have your
preliminary hearing on April 6th?” In response, Serrano stated he needed
more time to file a motion and prepare his case and agreed to waive his right
to a preliminary hearing on that date.

                                         4
      At subsequent hearings, the trial court repeatedly advised Serrano of
the dangers of self-representation and implored him to accept counsel. For
example, at an October 26, 2021, hearing, the trial court cautioned Serrano
that “[t]his is the last legal advice I’m going to give you. [¶] If you want to
represent yourself and go to prison that’s fine with me, but you have
fundamental misunderstandings about the law.” The court also stated
“again, I want to urge you to get counsel.”
      On November 8, 2021, the court again encouraged Serrano to accept
counsel, stating “every time we come to court I urge you to get counsel.” The
court stated that Serrano was not an effective advocate, warning “you created
these problems that are going to come back and haunt you at trial. And I’m
trying to warn you again you may want to have counsel in this case.” The
court also noted “I have offered you counsel on innumerable occasions and
you turned it down.”
      At a November 30, 2021, hearing the court again reminded Serrano of
the difficulties of self-representation and reminded him that he had “stand-by
counsel who I’m happy to appoint at any time.” Similarly, on June 7, 2022,
the trial court cautioned Serrano “I’ve told you 100 times that in this case in
particular being in pro per is not wise.” The court pleaded with Serrano to
accept counsel, saying, “And, Mr. Serrano, again, I don’t know how to say this
exactly. If I felt that there was nothing for you to gain by having an attorney
represent you in this case I wouldn’t urge you as much as I do to be
represented by counsel, but this is a case that could go a number of different
ways. And having the guiding hand of an experienced defense lawyer would
help you enormously in this case. [¶] The stakes for you are high. They
don’t have to be as high as they are. And, like I said, an experienced attorney
could well assist you and make this case a lot better than the way I see it

                                        5
going right now. [¶] Like I said, I’m interested in seeing a just result in this
case happen and I don’t want to see that sacrificed.” In response, Serrano
affirmed that he was sure he wanted to continue to represent himself.

C.    Preliminary Hearing
      Serrano’s preliminary hearing was held on July 12, July 21, and
August 9, 2021. At the preliminary hearing, Serrano testified he was
employed as a legal document assistant. He stated he had certificates in the
administration of justice from Long Beach City College and in paralegal
studies from Los Angeles Trade Tech College.
      He testified that on October 5, 2020, he went to a friend’s house to have
a drink and “had many drinks throughout the night.” That was all he could
remember of October 5. He said he woke up on October 6 experiencing pain
in his arms, back, and neck but did not have any memory of returning to the
R Bar on October 5. He could not recall his fight with Darby because he was
intoxicated and unconscious. He also testified about medical issues
concerning his neck and back, including surgeries he underwent in the month
after his altercation with Darby. Serrano contended his neck was fractured
by Darby. He also submitted his medical records from USC Medical Center.
      After resting his case, Serrano stated he was asserting the “affirmative
defenses of unconsciousness, self-defense, third-party culpability, outrageous
government conduct, and selective enforcement.” The court found his
defenses lacked “any scintilla of credulity whatsoever” and stated that
Serrano had “wasted this court’s time” and “made a mockery of the justice
system.” The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to hold Serrano to
answer on the charges against him.

                                        6
D.    Arraignment on Information
      Following the preliminary hearing, an information was filed on August
23, 2021, charging Serrano with one count of attempted murder (§§ 664/187,
subd. (a), count 1) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1), count 2). The information also alleged Serrano had one prior
serious felony conviction, which constituted a “strike” within the meaning of
sections 667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b). Circumstances in
aggravation were also alleged under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421.
The trial court subsequently dismissed count 1 under section 1118.1, and the
information was amended to add count 3 for assault with a deadly weapon, a
knife, which included a great bodily injury enhancement (§§ 245, subd. (a),
12022.7, subd. (a)).
      On September 10, 2021, the trial court arraigned Serrano on the
information. Serrano pled not guilty to the charges against him.

E.    Court’s Revocation of Self-Representation
      At a June 30, 2022 hearing, Serrano sought to replace his investigator
for alleged failures to do the work Serrano required to prepare his defense.
Serrano became angry during the hearing and hurled expletives at his
investigator. Serrano, who claimed to be confined to a wheelchair, also got up
from his wheelchair and approached the investigator. In response, the trial
court revoked Serrano’s pro per status and appointed stand-by counsel to
represent him.

F.    Pretrial Motions
      Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion to exclude “any reference to
irrelevant evidence pertaining to the defendant’s alleged neck and spine

                                       7
injury and hospital treatment.” The prosecution argued Serrano’s medical
treatment occurred after his altercation with Darby and was not relevant to
any of his defenses. At the hearing on the prosecution’s motion, Serrano’s
counsel did not oppose the prosecution’s request to exclude the evidence and
stated he was not going to ask Serrano any questions about his medical
condition. The trial court granted the motion, stating “He testified at length
[at the preliminary hearing] about his physical injuries. My inclination
would be to exclude all that as being irrelevant since they seem to have an
independent source, but having read the preliminary hearing transcript I
doubt very seriously, even if I order Mr. Serrano not to mention that, he’s
going to. It’s going to be a blurt-out. [¶] And if that happens I would allow
him to be impeached with the medical records showing that his injuries are a
result of a degenerative disease and a bullet wound which he has to explain I
assume.”

G.    Trial
      Serrano was represented at trial by his appointed counsel. In his
opening statement, Serrano’s counsel laid the groundwork to claim self-
defense. Counsel argued Darby had escalated a minor disturbance to a
physical fight by throwing the first punch. Counsel also highlighted the
significant size difference between Serrano, who weighed approximately 170
pounds, and Darby, who weighed nearly 400 pounds. He claimed the
surveillance video would show Serrano flailing wildly under Darby with
Darby’s hands around his neck.

                                       8
      1.    Serrano’s Testimony
      Serrano testified at trial against the advice of counsel. Serrano went to
R Bar on October 5 to meet with friends. He admitted he got into a verbal
dispute with Darby before leaving the bar. He returned to the bar a few
hours later, at around 3:00 a.m., again trying to see his friends. When he
looked into the bar, he saw Darby and assumed Darby was blocking him from
seeing his friends. He was angry at Darby for kicking him out of the bar on
September 26 and October 5. On seeing Darby, he became enraged and
threw a barstool. He was not trying to hit anyone with the stool.
      At that point Darby approached him and Serrano threw bar tables at
Darby to ward him off. The tables did not stop Darby, who reached Serrano
and threw the first punch. Darby’s initial punch rendered Serrano
unconscious. He had no recollection of his fight with Darby aside from what
he saw on the surveillance video. He was eventually able to break free and
leave the bar.
      On cross-examination, the prosecution impeached Serrano with his
preliminary hearing testimony where he claimed to have no recollection of
returning to R Bar on October 5. When asked at trial if he admitted to
stabbing Darby, Serrano responded, “Darby put my head in a headlock and
fractured my neck.” The court struck the answer as nonresponsive. When
the prosecution asked if he stabbed Darby, Serrano stated, “I stabbed him
regarding—after he fractured my neck.” The court struck the second half of
the answer as non-responsive.
      On redirect, counsel asked Serrano why he stabbed Darby. Serrano
answered, “Because he put my head in a headlock and fractured my neck.”
The court intervened, telling counsel, “you were warned about that. He was
warned about that. That opens the door. [¶] . . . You asked the question

                                       9
and he gave an answer he wanted to. And I’m going to tell the jury it’s not
true.” The court addressed the jury, stating, “Ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, the law allows the court to take judicial notice of certain facts. [¶] I’m
going to take judicial notice of the fact right now that Mr. Serrano’s neck
injuries were the result of, A, a congenital issue and, B, he has a bullet lodged
there. It has nothing to do with D’Angelo Darby.”

      2.    Defense Closing Argument
      At closing argument, Serrano’s counsel again argued that Serrano had
acted in self-defense: “This was a case of self-defense. It’s unfortunate that
Mr. Darby suffered those injuries, but he chose to go after Tommy Serrano.
Up until that point all Mr. Serrano had done was break some bottles for
which he would have been liable. Vandalism. [¶] They could have sued
him.” He again painted Darby as the aggressor who wanted to “shut
[Serrano’s] big mouth up. So he hit him. Mr. Serrano defended himself.”

      3.    The Verdicts
      The jury found Serrano guilty on both counts of assault with a deadly
weapon. It also found true the allegations that he had personally inflicted
great bodily injury on both counts.2
      The court proceeded to trial on the prior conviction allegation and
aggravating circumstances. The jury returned a verdict finding Serrano had
been previously convicted of a serious felony (carjacking) and found true the
alleged circumstances in aggravation.

2     The court later dismissed the great bodily injury enhancement with
respect to count 2, finding “[t]he attack of the barstools and tables did not
result in great bodily injury to the victim.”
                                       10
F.    Sentencing and Post-Trial Motions
      After the jury returned its verdicts, Serrano moved for a new trial
based, in part, on a claim that the jury failed to adequately deliberate the
case. The court noted the jury deliberated for “about 48 minutes.” However,
the court denied the motion, finding the brief deliberation was not
noteworthy as “The case against Mr. Serrano here was overwhelmingly
strong.” The court noted the video evidence alone “demonstrated Mr.
Serrano’s guilt beyond any reasonable doubt.” The court also noted that
Serrano’s trial testimony “was obviously inconsistent with other statements
that he had made and inconsistent with the physical and video evidence.”
The court pointed out Serrano seriously damaged his credibility with the jury
by walking off the witness stand and back to his seat without assistance,
despite claiming to be confined to a wheelchair.
      The court then proceeded to sentencing. The court began by noting
Serrano’s history of self-representation and the court’s subsequent revocation
of that right. The court also stated, “On June 30th the court was advised by
custody staff that Mr. Serrano had intended to, quote, ‘break,’ end quote, the
appointed investigator apparently in the hopes of forcing a withdrawal of
that investigator and further delay of this trial. [¶] I was also advised, again
by custody staff, that the defendant intended to waste as much of the court’s
time as humanly possible to intentionally irritate the court. [¶] Additionally,
the defendant had a history of refusing to come to court. And allowing him to
remain self-represented, knowing that he intended to disrupt the proceedings
of the court, was, in essence, giving him total control over the proceedings.”
      The trial court then selected count 3, the assault with a knife, as the
principal term and sentenced Serrano to the high term of four years, doubled

                                       11
to eight due to the true finding of the prior strike. The court added three
years to this sentence pursuant to the great bodily injury allegation. On
count 2, the court sentenced Serrano to a consecutive term of two years,
calculated as one-third of the mid-term of three years, then doubled to two
years because of the prior strike. Serrano’s aggregate sentence is 13 years in
state prison.

G.    Appeal
      Serrano filed a timely appeal of the judgment against him.

                                DISCUSSION
A.    Faretta Waiver
      Serrano contends the trial court erred in permitting him to represent
himself under Faretta without first orally advising him of the maximum
potential prison sentence he faced if convicted. He argues that the absence of
this specific admonition invalidates the waiver of his right to the assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

      1.    Legal Standards
      A defendant seeking to represent himself “should be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open.’ [Citation.]” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) “No particular form
of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel
and elect self-representation.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041,
1070.) Rather, “the test is whether the record as a whole demonstrates that
the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including

                                      12
the risks and complexities of the particular case.” (Ibid.; accord, People v.
Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1,
24.)
       A valid Faretta waiver requires “‘a finding that the waiver is knowing
and voluntary, i.e., the accused understands the significance and
consequences of the decision and makes it without coercion.’” (People v.
Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1002 (Frederickson.) To support such a
finding, a trial court must “inform the defendant in general terms of the most
common disadvantages” of self-representation. (Id. at p. 1003.) “‘The
defendant “should at least be advised that: self-representation is almost
always unwise and that the defense he conducts might be to his detriment; he
will have to follow the same rules that govern attorneys; the prosecution will
be represented by experienced, professional counsel who will have a
significant advantage over him in terms of skill, training, education,
experience, and ability; the court may terminate his right to represent
himself if he engages in disruptive conduct; and he will lose the right to
appeal his case on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.]
In addition, he should also be told he will receive no help or special treatment
from the court and that he does not have a right to standby, advisory, or
cocounsel.”’” (People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 544 (Ruffin).)
Before granting a defendant’s request for self-representation, courts
frequently require defendants to sign written forms, including such
admonitions. (See, e.g., id. at p. 541; Frederickson, supra, at p. 1004.)

       In Ruffin, this court previously noted “there is a split of authority in
California as to whether the court must also specifically advise the defendant
of the maximum penal consequences of conviction” before accepting a

                                        13
defendant’s Faretta waiver. (Ruffin, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) In
People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, our colleagues in the First District
held advisement of penal consequences was not essential to a valid Faretta
waiver. However, in People v. Jackio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 445 (Jackio),
our colleagues in the Third District came to the opposite conclusion and
determined the court must advise the defendant of the maximum potential
punishment when taking a Faretta waiver. The Ruffin court declined to
decide the issue as it found that merely giving a defendant a Faretta form
and stating generally that it was unwise to represent himself was insufficient
to constitute a valid waiver. (Ruffin, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 545–547.)
      Where a defendant proceeds in propria persona at a preliminary
hearing but is represented by counsel at trial, any alleged error in denying
defendant counsel at the preliminary hearing is reviewed under the standard
of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). (People v. Boulware
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1753, 1757.) Under this standard, “the error is
reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid; accord People
v. Wilder (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 489, 500–502 (Wilder) [applying Chapman
analysis to invalid Faretta waiver].) Our California Supreme Court has
similarly assumed, without deciding, that a deficient Faretta waiver may be
harmless under Chapman if the People show beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) the defendant would have waived counsel even if he received adequate
warnings; or (2) the outcome would have been no more favorable to the
defendant even had he elected to be represented by counsel. (People v.
Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 244–245 (Burgener).)

      2.    Serrano’s Faretta Waiver was Knowing and Voluntary

                                      14
      It is uncontested that at the time Serrano offered his Faretta waiver, he
was facing a maximum potential prison sentence of 29 years. It is also
undisputed that the court did not advise Serrano of this fact when engaging
in a colloquy with Serrano before accepting his waiver. However, in
questioning Serrano, the trial court specifically asked if he was aware of the
potential sentencing options he faced, and Serrano confirmed that he was.
The court also informed Serrano in general terms of the most common
disadvantages of self-representation, including that an experienced attorney
would represent the prosecution and that Serrano would not be entitled to
any special treatment by virtue of his pro per status. The record indicates
Serrano had training and experience as a paralegal and legal document
assistant and obtained a degree in the administration of justice. He
previously represented himself in a criminal action, which had been
dismissed. Before accepting his Faretta waiver, the trial court also pleaded
with Serrano to accept counsel, which Serrano refused.
      In addition, shortly after accepting his waiver, the court advised
Serrano he was facing a “life case.” Courts have recognized that subsequent
advisements of potential sentencing can cure any defect in the original
Faretta colloquy. (See e.g. People v. Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443,
447–449, 455 [Faretta waiver valid where defendant was not advised of his
maximum exposure until two weeks after the court granted his Faretta
motion].) Serrano argues that because the trial court inaccurately
characterized the case as a “life case,” this warning was insufficient. We
disagree.
      In referring to the case as a “life case,” the trial court stressed the
severity of Serrano’s potential punishment. We note Serrano was 50 years
old at the time he gave his Faretta waiver. A 29-year prison sentence would

                                        15
mean he might spend the remainder of his life in prison. While the trial
court’s characterization of the case as a “life case” was not technically
accurate, it did serve to advise Serrano that, if convicted, he could spend a
significant portion of his remaining years in prison.
      The court’s holding in Jackio was premised on the notion that a
defendant must appreciate the potential consequences of waiving counsel.
The Jackio court concluded the trial court must “advise a defendant desiring
to represent himself at trial of the maximum punishment that could be
imposed” if the defendant is found guilty. (Jackio, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 454–455.) “By so advising, the trial court puts the defendant on notice
that, by representing himself, he is risking imposition of that maximum
possible punishment. The defendant who decides to represent himself after
this advisement proceeds with his ‘“eyes open”’ and understands the dangers
of self-representation, at least with respect to the possible punishment.
[Citations.] Neither the Constitution nor interpretive case law requires
more.” (Ibid.)
      On the record before us, we find Serrano was on notice of the severity
and magnitude of the potential punishment he faced if found guilty and
proceeded to waive counsel with his eyes open. We, therefore, find that the
trial court did not err in accepting Serrano’s Faretta waiver and allowing him
to proceed—temporarily—in propria persona.

      2.    Any Error in the Court’s Faretta Colloquy was Harmless
      Even if we were to assume the trial court erred in not advising Serrano
that he faced a potential sentence of 29 years in prison, we find the error to

                                       16
be harmless under either test put forth by our California Supreme Court in
Burgener.

            a.    Serrano Would Have Waived Counsel Even if Specifically
                  Advised of his Maximum Potential Sentence

      Before granting Serrano’s Faretta waiver, the trial court pleaded with
Serrano to utilize appointed counsel. Even after accepting the waiver, the
court repeatedly reiterated Serrano was making a mistake by representing
himself and encouraged him to accept attorney representation. The trial
court went so far as to warn Serrano that the defenses he asserted at his
preliminary hearing “lack[ed] any scintilla of credulity whatsoever” and that
“The stakes for you are high. They don’t have to be as high as they are. And,
like I said, an experienced attorney could well assist you and make this case
a lot better than the way I see it going right now.”   Yet Serrano remained
steadfast in his refusal to accept counsel and insisted on representing
himself. We are convinced Serrano would have waived counsel even if
specifically informed that his maximum potential sentence was 29 years in
prison.
      There is also ample evidence in the record to suggest Serrano’s Faretta
waiver was motivated by a desire to abuse and delay the judicial process. In
Wilder, the court applied the Chapman harmless error standard and found
“Nothing would have changed had defendant been advised of the dangers of
self-representation” because the defendant had abused his right to self-
representation in the hopes of creating reversible error on appeal. (Wilder,
supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.) The Wilder court noted Faretta “‘held
generally that a defendant may represent himself. It did not establish a
game in which defendant can engage in a series of machinations, with one

                                       17
misstep by the court resulting in reversal of an otherwise fair trial.’” (Id. at
p. 503, quoting People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 115.)
      There is substantial evidence in the record that Serrano abused his
right to self-representation. At Serrano’s sentencing hearing, the trial court
noted “custody staff” had advised the court that Serrano engineered disputes
with his investigator in the hope of forcing the investigator to withdraw and
delay the trial. The court also noted it was advised Serrano had a history of
refusing to come to court and “intended to waste as much of the court’s time
as humanly possible to intentionally irritate the court.” This is consistent
with the trial court’s observation that Serrano “wasted this court’s time” and
“made a mockery of the justice system” at the preliminary hearing.
      We find beyond a reasonable doubt that Serrano would have waived his
right to counsel even if he had been specifically advised at the time of his
original Faretta waiver that he was facing a potential sentence of 29 years in
prison.

            b.     Serrano Would Not Have Obtained a More Favorable Result
                   with Counsel

      We also find Serrano would not have obtained a more favorable result
at trial even if represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing.
      Serrano argues he would have raised a different theory of defense at
the preliminary hearing. Serrano now asserts Darby escalated the fight to
lethal force by placing him in a headlock. Serrano claims he stabbed Darby
in an effort to protect his compromised neck. He contends that the trial
court’s acceptance of his Faretta waiver effectively denied him the
opportunity to present this defense at the preliminary hearing. This
argument defies reason as Serrano testified at the preliminary hearing and

                                       18
trial that he was unconscious at the time he stabbed Darby and had no
memory of the fight. If Serrano had no recollection of the encounter, then
regardless of whether he was represented by counsel, he would not have been
able to truthfully attest that he stabbed Darby because he was worried about
further injury to his neck.
      At trial, Serrano testified against the advice of his counsel,
simultaneously changing certain testimony from his preliminary hearing and
claiming the testimony he gave at the preliminary hearing was true.
Notably, at both the preliminary hearing and trial, Serrano testified that he
was unconscious when he stabbed Darby. If Serrano offered this testimony at
trial while represented by counsel, we can find no basis to conclude that he
would have offered contrary testimony if he had been represented by counsel
at his preliminary hearing.
      Serrano appears to be arguing—though he does not say so directly—
that he would have changed his story and committed perjury at the
preliminary hearing and trial if he had been represented by counsel earlier.
This argument lacks merit.
      We also note this theory of self-defense, offered for the first time on
appeal, would have required Serrano to admit that he had a preexisting neck
injury before his altercation with Darby. Yet Serrano steadfastly refused to
acknowledge a preexisting injury and repeatedly claimed that Darby was the
sole cause of his neck injury. At the preliminary hearing and trial, Serrano
insisted on asserting that Darby fractured his neck despite his own medical
records indicating he suffered from pre-existing conditions.
      Even when represented by counsel, Serrano refused to acknowledge his
neck injury was caused by the combination of a preexisting congenital
condition and a bullet lodged in his neck. At trial, his counsel asked him why

                                       19
he stabbed Darby. Rather than assert that he feared for his compromised
neck and spine, Serrano instead claimed that Darby fractured his neck. We
find no reasonable basis to conclude a different result would have followed if
counsel had asked that question of Serrano at the preliminary hearing.
      Furthermore, as the trial court noted, the evidence of Serrano’s guilt
was overwhelming. The fight was captured on security video, which was
shown to the jury. The trial court also noted that Serrano’s conduct at trial
seriously damaged his credibility by giving inconsistent statements and
walking in front of the jury with no assistance while purporting to be
confined to a wheelchair. We also note the jury returned its verdict in
approximately 45 minutes, a fact which the trial court attributed solely to the
overwhelming evidence of Serrano’s guilt.
      For these reasons, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that Serrano
would not have obtained a more favorable result if he had been represented
by counsel at the preliminary hearing.

      3.    Arraignment
      Serrano argues the trial court also erred in failing to readvise him of
his right to counsel at the time he was arraigned on the information following
the preliminary hearing. It is undisputed that the court was required to
readvise Serrano of his right to counsel at the time of his arraignment,
regardless of whether he previously waived that right. “[T]he superior court
is required to advise a defendant of his or her right to counsel in superior
court whenever the defendant appears without counsel at the arraignment,
even when the defendant previously has been advised of the right to counsel
and has expressed an intention to waive counsel throughout the proceedings.”
(People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 361 (Crayton).) A trial court’s

                                       20
failure to do so is analyzed under the harmless error standard outlined in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). (Crayton, at p. 350, fn. 1.)
Where a defendant was repeatedly advised “of the risks of self-
representation” and demonstrated an “unwavering” desire to represent
himself, the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right to counsel
at his arraignment is harmless error. (Id. at p. 366.)
      As set forth above, Serrano was steadfast in his desire to represent
himself despite extensive warnings from the court that he was putting
himself in jeopardy by doing so. Accordingly, any error in failing to readvise
Serrano of his right to counsel at the time of his arraignment on the
information was harmless under Watson and Crayton.

B.    Evidentiary Ruling
      Before trial, the prosecutor moved to exclude “any reference to
irrelevant evidence pertaining to the defendant’s alleged neck and spine
injury and hospital treatment.” The court granted the motion, stating if
Serrano attempted to testify that Darby broke his neck during the fight, he
would allow Serrano to be impeached with his medical records showing the
injury was the result of a congenital issue and a bullet lodged in his neck. At
the time of this ruling, Serrano was represented by counsel who made no
objection. On appeal, Serrano also contends the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of his neck injury. We find Serrano has forfeited this issue.

      1.    Serrano Has Forfeited this Issue on Appeal
      Counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s ruling forfeited this issue
on appeal. “As a general rule, a defendant’s failure to object to an alleged

                                        21
trial error relieves an appellate court of the obligation to consider the claim
on review.” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 710 (Arredondo).)
“The reason for this rule is to allow the trial court to correct its errors and ‘to
prevent gamesmanship by the defense.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Moreover, “a
judgment may not be reversed for the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless
‘the substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made
known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other
means.’” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 580, quoting Evid. Code,
§ 354, subd. (a).) However, a claim of error in the exclusion of evidence will
not be deemed forfeited on appeal if the appellant makes a showing that it
would have been futile to object or make an offer of proof. (People v. Wilson
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 793 [“A litigant need not object, however, if doing so
would be futile”]; Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (b).)
      It is undisputed here that no objection was made to the trial court’s
exclusion of this evidence, nor was any offer of proof made as to the
substance, purpose, or relevance of the evidence. Serrano has thus forfeited
any claim of error in the exclusion of this evidence. Serrano argues the issue
was not forfeited because it would have been futile for counsel to object to the
court’s ruling. Serrano’s argument relies exclusively on the assertion that
the court gave “forceful admonitions” in making its rulings, which he now
claims justified a reasonable belief that “any objection to the court’s ruling or
even further discussion would have been futile.” We find this
characterization unsupported by the record.
      In making its ruling before trial, the court stated that if Serrano
claimed Darby fractured his neck, the court would allow the prosecution to
impeach Serrano with his medical records to establish Serrano’s injuries
stemmed from conditions that predated the altercation with Darby. This in

                                        22
no way suggests that it would have been futile for counsel to object or clarify
the court’s ruling to allow Serrano himself to introduce evidence regarding
his pre-existing medical condition. If anything, it indicates that the trial
court was willing to allow the jury to hear such evidence. We, therefore, find
Serrano has not established it would have been futile to object, and thus he
has forfeited any claim of error concerning the trial court’s ruling.

      2.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
      Serrano also claims that to the extent this issue is deemed forfeited, his
counsel’s failure to object at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
This alternative argument does not fare any better.
      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Serrano must
establish that his “counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) In determining
whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we “defer[] to counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions” and presume that “counsel acted within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Ibid.) Serrano faces a
heavy burden on appeal as “deciding whether to object is inherently tactical,
and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.” (People
v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502.) To succeed, Serrano “‘must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”’” (People v. Fairbank
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1243, quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 689.) His ability to make this showing is particularly difficult in
these circumstances as “this is a direct appeal and the record does not

                                        23
disclose the reason for counsel’s failure to object.” (Arredondo, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 711.)3
      To carry his burden, Serrano must show either “(1) the record
affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to
provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009; accord People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.)
On appeal, the record does not affirmatively disclose that counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for choosing not to object to the trial court’s ruling.
Serrano has made no argument to the contrary. Serrano also does not claim
his counsel was ever asked why he did not object, and the record does not
show otherwise. This leaves only the question of whether Serrano has shown
there was no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s choice. We find he has not
made this showing.
      Rather than address counsel’s potential reasons for not objecting,
Serrano’s argument focuses exclusively on the reasons why counsel should
have objected. In particular, Serrano takes great pains to discuss how his
history of neck injury could have been relevant to his claim of self-defense.
But the question for us is not whether there was a potentially viable
alternative theory of self-defense that counsel could have presented; instead,
we must determine whether Serrano has established there is no satisfactory
explanation for counsel’s tactical decision not to object. The record here

3     For this reason, courts have recognized that “except in those rare
instances where there is no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s actions,
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas corpus,
not on direct appeal. [Citation.] This is particularly true where, as here, the
alleged incompetence stems from counsel’s failure to object.” (People v. Lopez
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 972.)
                                        24
shows Serrano’s counsel had legitimate tactical reasons for not objecting to
the trial court’s ruling.
      At trial, counsel’s theory of self-defense was based on uncontested facts
in the record, primarily the significant height and weight difference between
Serrano and Darby. Counsel also argued that Darby himself unnecessarily
escalated a minor disturbance into a physical fight by going out of his way to
approach and strike Serrano rather than simply calling the police to have
Serrano removed from the premises. By contrast, if counsel had instead
argued that Serrano feared for his life because of pre-existing medical
conditions, the prosecution would have impeached Serrano with his prior
testimony that he was unconscious at the time of the stabbing. In other
words, counsel could not have proceeded with this new theory of self-defense
at trial without damaging Serrano’s credibility with the jury. Counsel could
have reasonably determined this risk to be too great and made the strategic
decision to proceed with a theory of self-defense that did not contradict his
client’s own testimony. As the court noted in denying Serrano’s motion for a
new trial, Serrano already faced significant problems with his credibility.
Counsel could have made the reasonable choice not to add to them.
      As there was a rational tactical reason for counsel’s failure to object,
Serrano’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks merit.
                                        //
                                        //
                                        //

                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                       25
                     ZUKIN, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

                26