Court Opinion

ID: 9965040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 15:13:34.643529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.190825
License: Public Domain

05/01/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                           Assigned on Briefs March 13, 2024

       LANORRIS O’BRIEN CHAMBERS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County
                         No. 83413 Barry R. Tidwell, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. M2023-00929-CCA-R3-PC
                        ___________________________________

The Petitioner, LaNorris O’Brien Chambers, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his
convictions for two counts of robbery, two counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, and
one count of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Petitioner argues trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance in failing to challenge Count 5, in failing to request dismissal of
Count 2 of the superseding indictment, in failing to explain Rule 404(b) and the effect of
his prior convictions, in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the State’s notice of sentence
enhancement, and in failing to review all discovery with him. We affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES
CURWOOD WITT, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Matthew J. Crigger (on appeal), Brentwood, Tennessee, and Halle Mann (appellate brief),
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, LaNorris O’Brien Chambers.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Christian N. Clase, Assistant Attorney
General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and John Zimmerman, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                          OPINION

       On October 2, 2019, the Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted the Petitioner in
case number 82166 for two counts of robbery (Counts 1 and 2), two counts of fraudulent
use of a credit card (Counts 3 and 4), and one count of aggravated assault (Count 5).
       On November 4, 2019, the State filed a Notice of Sentence Enhancement, listing the
thirteen prior felony convictions the Petitioner had received in Florida and Alabama.

       On June 9, 2020, the Rutherford County Grand Jury returned a superseding
indictment, charging the Petitioner in case number 83413 with one count of robbery (Count
1), one count of aggravated robbery (Count 2), two counts of fraudulent use of a credit card
(Counts 3 and 4), and one count of aggravated assault (Count 5).

       On September 9, 2020, the Petitioner entered guilty pleas in case number 83413, the
superseding indictment, to two counts of robbery (Counts 1 and 2), two counts of
fraudulent use of a credit card (Counts 3 and 4), and one count of aggravated assault (Count
5) and agreed to be sentenced for the felony offenses as a Range III offender, with the trial
court to determine the length of his sentences. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial
court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years, entering judgments on December 8,
2020.1

        Thereafter, on December 6, 2021, the Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for
post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel,
in part, by failing to challenge Count 5 and by inducing him to plead guilty rather than
proceed to trial because of his criminal history. Following the trial court’s appointment of
counsel, the Petitioner filed an amended petition, which additionally alleged, in pertinent
part, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to “discuss Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) and prior
convictions’ impact on trial” and in failing to “provide and review all discovery.” After
his first appointed counsel withdrew and new counsel was appointed, the Petitioner filed a
second amended petition, alleging in part that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
challenge Count 2 and in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the State’s Notice of
Sentence Enhancement.

       At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he represented the
Petitioner in 2019 and that although he was currently retired, he had practiced law for
approximately thirty years. Trial counsel stated that he was very familiar with the
requirements for a proper indictment, including Tennessee Code Annotated (“Code”)
section 40-13-202. He asserted that the language in Count 5 in both the original and
superseding indictments was sufficient to properly apprise the Petitioner of the charged
offense of aggravated assault because all the essential elements of the offense were present
in Count 5 for both indictments. When asked if he thought there was anything wrong with
Count 5 on either indictment, trial counsel replied that “[Count 5] could have been a little
more detailed as to the place” where the crime occurred; however, he asserted that

       1
          The post-conviction court entered corrected judgments in Counts 1 and 2 on June 1, 2023, nunc
pro tunc to December 8, 2020.
                                                 -2-
information identifying “the deadly weapon, the motor vehicle, date, [and] individual
[victim]” were present in Count 5 in both the original indictment and the superseding
indictment.

        Trial counsel said he knew the State elevated Count 2 from robbery in the original
indictment to aggravated robbery in the superseding indictment. When asked why the State
decided to do this, trial counsel said he “assume[d]” that after the State spoke with the
victim in Count 2 about her injuries, it “determined that it was appropriate to go back and
supersede the indictment[.]” However, trial counsel admitted that he did not “know” that
was what happened. He added that initially the State provided limited discovery and that
later, the State provided more complete discovery, but he was unsure whether he received
this additional discovery before the State obtained the superseding indictment. Trial
counsel said he was not aware of any new evidence that prompted the State to obtain the
superseding indictment elevating Count 2 to aggravated robbery.

        Trial counsel acknowledged that because of “a typo,” the statute included in Count
2 of the superseding indictment referenced the crime of robbery; however, he said that “the
facts [in Count 2 of the superseding indictment] charged aggravated robbery, not robbery.”
Trial counsel asserted that this typographical error was “[n]ot sufficient to nullify [Count
2 of the superseding indictment].” He also asserted that it would have been “a simple
process” for the State to amend Code section 39-13-401 to Code section 39-13-402, which
the trial court would have allowed because similar issues happened “all of the time.”

       Trial counsel stated that he reviewed the State’s Notice of Sentence Enhancement
that had been filed under the original indictment’s case number and asserted that he was
familiar with the requirements for such notices. He said that the notice of sentence
enhancement’s reference to “TCA 40-25-202” rather than “TCA 40-35-202” was a
“typographical error” that would not have prevented the Petitioner from being put on notice
that the State intended to enhance his sentence. In addition, trial counsel stated his belief
that the incorrect statute did not make the notice misleading. He asserted that the
prosecutor initially intended to try the Petitioner’s case and “get the maximum” sentence
he could and that the prosecutor believed the Petitioner was “a career criminal in regard to
this case.” Trial counsel asserted that the notice’s failure to identify the actual range in
which the State intended to sentence the Petitioner was not misleading because he had
discussed the Petitioner’s sentence range, if convicted at trial, with him “repeatedly.” He
did not recall the State’s filing a new notice of sentence enhancement after the superseding
indictment amended the charge in Count 2 from robbery to aggravated robbery; however,
he believed that the State’s previously filed notice was sufficient to place the Petitioner on
notice about sentence enhancement for the superseding indictment as well. Trial counsel
added that in his early years of practice, a different judge in an unrelated case informed
him that the State had provided sufficient notice by filing a notice of sentence enhancement
                                            -3-
after the original indictment but not after the superseding indictment. He said his
discussions with the Petitioner included considerations regarding whether the Petitioner
was convicted of aggravated robbery or robbery and how the Petitioner’s prior convictions
could affect his sentence.

        Trial counsel asserted that he never told the Petitioner that he should plead guilty
because he would be convicted at trial because of his prior convictions. Instead, trial
counsel said he and the Petitioner “had conversations about his prior criminal record” and
about how the Petitioner’s criminal record might apply if he was convicted at trial. Trial
counsel said he also talked to the Petitioner about the dangers of testifying at trial, given
his criminal record. He also advised the Petitioner not to mention his criminal record and
not to make statements that could “open the door” for the State to discuss his criminal
record. Trial counsel said he recalled talking to the Petitioner about his prior convictions
“at least” once, but “probably two” times, before the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas. He
did not recall whether he reviewed Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) with the Petitioner.
Trial counsel acknowledged that he did not file a motion in limine to preclude entry of the
Petitioner’s former convictions at trial; however, he stated that if the Petitioner had
proceeded to trial, he would have raised that issue.

      Trial counsel agreed that it was his responsibility to explain to the Petitioner the
elements of the charged offenses. He said he informed the Petitioner of the differences
between aggravated robbery and robbery and the differences between aggravated assault
and misdemeanor assault.

        Trial counsel recalled his and the Petitioner’s reviewing the “discovery on different
occasions,” but he could not remember if they discussed “all of the discovery.” He could
not remember if the Petitioner viewed the entire video of his police interview. Although
trial counsel said the Petitioner initially asked to watch the entire video of his police
interview, on a later occasion he believed the Petitioner “wasn’t interested in watching
it[,]” but he was not certain. Trial counsel said the reason he did not discuss the entire
video with the Petitioner was that they were “talking more in contemplation of settlement
negotiations.”

        On cross-examination, trial counsel stated that he spent most of his career working
in the public defender’s office where he had handled “[t]housands” of felony cases,
including many that went to trial. He agreed that although the Petitioner’s case was set for
trial on October 12, 2020, the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas on September 9, 2020,
which was over thirty days prior to his scheduled trial date. He added that although the
Petitioner made an issue about the State’s failure to file a notice of sentence enhancement
after the superseding indictment, he believed this notice did not need to be filed until thirty
days prior to trial, which would have been after the Petitioner’s guilty pleas in this case.
                                             -4-
Trial counsel also stated that motions in limine and Rule 404(b) motions were typically
handled closer to the actual trial date.

        Trial counsel stated that if the Petitioner had proceeded to trial and intended to
testify, he would have encouraged the Petitioner to review the video of his post-arrest
statement to police. He said that although he did not foresee the Petitioner testifying at
trial, he and the Petitioner would have reviewed the video of his police interview to help
guide him on how to cross-examine the State’s witnesses when the State attempted to
introduce the video of his interview.

        Trial counsel asserted that the Petitioner “never” proposed an affirmative defense
or a legal justification for the charged conduct. He said the Petitioner never indicated that
he had an alibi witness or that he was not present at the crime scenes. He also said that the
Petitioner never disputed any of the prior convictions listed in the State’s notice of sentence
enhancement.

        Trial counsel stated that whenever he and the Petitioner spoke, it was “more along
the lines of . . . finding a resolution to the cases.” Consequently, trial counsel pursued a
plea agreement for the Petitioner on “[m]ultiple occasions.” He believed that the evidence
against the Petitioner was “overwhelming” and that the Petitioner would be convicted of
at least robbery on both cases, but probably aggravated robbery in Count 2. He noted that
the two victims in this case were a professional educator and an elderly lady who was
robbed as she was going to a doctor’s office. He said the husband of the elderly victim
testified at the Petitioner’s sentencing hearing and went into detail about how the robbery
had impacted her, which seemed to “move[] the [c]ourt quite a bit.” Trial counsel stated
that if he had not obtained a plea agreement, the Petitioner would not have had a defense
at trial, so the best strategy was “trying to mitigate from aggravated robbery down to a
robbery.” He noted that the Petitioner had used the Petitioner’s rewards card and the
victim’s stolen credit card at a sporting goods store, which was how the police were able
to connect that robbery back to him.

       In addition, the Petitioner’s girlfriend used her employee card, along with the
victim’s stolen credit card, and the Petitioner was driving around in a vehicle that had stolen
items in it, which also connected the robberies back to the Petitioner. Trial counsel stressed
that the Petitioner “needed to find a settlement resolution and not go to trial” in this case
because “[t]he evidence against him was too strong.” He noted that the Petitioner
ultimately pled guilty “to two robberies,” rather than a robbery and an aggravated robbery,
and that the Petitioner received a Range III sentence with a release eligibility of forty-five
percent, rather than being sentenced as a career criminal, which had a release eligibility of
eighty-five percent. Trial counsel said that although he believed the trial court would
sentence the Petitioner to something in the twenty-year range, the court ultimately
                                             -5-
sentenced him to the maximum sentence of fifteen years for each of the robbery convictions
and ordered these sentences served consecutively, for an effective thirty-year sentence.

       The Petitioner also testified at the post-conviction hearing. He asserted that the
language in Count 5 of the superseding indictment was insufficient to charge him with
aggravated assault because it failed to track the language of Code section 39-13-102.
Specifically, he claimed that the words “threaten to cause bodily injury” when used alone
did not “import violence” and therefore did not charge the offense of aggravated assault.
The Petitioner asserted that although Count 2 alleged that the victim had suffered serious
bodily injury, there was no evidence disclosed in discovery and there was no new evidence
indicating that this victim had suffered serious bodily injury.

       The Petitioner also argued that the State’s notice of sentence enhancement was
insufficient because it did not inform him whether the State intended to sentence him as a
standard, multiple, persistent, or career offender. He also asserted that the State never filed
a new notice of sentence enhancement after it obtained the superseding indictment. The
Petitioner said that trial counsel never talked to him about not opening the door to the
State’s introducing his prior convictions. He claimed that after the State obtained the
superseding indictment, “it was all about the plea” He said trial counsel never discussed
the elements of the offenses with which he was charged.

       The Petitioner stated that the “only video” he saw was “the video of the victim,
Hylania Thom[]son, in the hospital bed.” He later said he asked trial counsel to review his
“post[-]arrest video interview” and that trial counsel “showed [him] the video,” but the
Petitioner could not recall if he saw the “whole, full video.” The Petitioner claimed trial
counsel withheld “[a]ll discovery dealing with the facts and the law” related to his charges
but “[n]ot so much the video.”

        During the State’s cross-examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that trial counsel
showed him the video of the victim in the hospital bed from the news report. He claimed
trial counsel never told him that the reason the police charged him was that he had used his
rewards card and the victim’s stolen credit card at Dick’s Sporting Goods. When he was
asked if the police, just by luck, came to his apartment the day he was leaving with some
of the stolen items in his car, the Petitioner said, “It wasn’t hard to put two and two together,
sir.” The Petitioner also denied ever seeing his post-arrest interview video and claimed
that trial counsel never explained anything to him about his case. Significantly, the
Petitioner never testified at the post-conviction hearing that but for trial counsel’s errors,
he would have not have entered his guilty pleas and would have proceeded to trial.

       Following this hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order denying the
Petitioner post-conviction relief. In this order, the post-conviction court made the
                                              -6-
following findings of fact regarding the Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to
challenge Count 5:

       The [c]ourt credits the testimony of [trial counsel], and not [the Petitioner],
       that [trial counsel] did not find Count 5 of the indictments to be deficient and
       that he explained the nature of this charge to the Petitioner. The Petitioner
       did not present any evidence to rebut this testimony.

       The post-conviction court also made the following findings regarding the
Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to move to dismiss Count 2:

       Trial counsel has no control over whether a superseding indictment will be
       obtained for any count. Irrespective of that fact, the [c]ourt credits [trial
       counsel]’s testimony that he did not find issue with the indictment as to Count
       2 and moved forward with plea negotiations. The Petitioner has not shown
       any evidence that [trial counsel] was in fact unprepared for his case and
       unable to properly advise him[,] other than merely alleging it by implication.

       Regarding the Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel misled or induced the Petitioner
to plead guilty and failed to explain Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) and the use of his prior
convictions at trial, the post-conviction court made the following findings and conclusions:

       The [c]ourt credits [trial counsel]’s testimony that he told the Petitioner a
       plea bargain would be in his best interest given the strength of the evidence
       in discovery and not, as the Petitioner alleges, because he would be convicted
       again for having many prior convictions. The [c]ourt does not find the
       testimony of the Petitioner credible that [trial counsel] misstated the law to
       him to induce his plea. The Petitioner has not overcome the presumption that
       trial counsel “provided adequate assistance and used reasonable professional
       judgment.” See Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 458.

       As to the Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of
the State’s Notice of Sentence Enhancement, the post-conviction court made the following
finding:

       The [c]ourt credits the testimony of [trial counsel] that he did not believe the
       language of the State’s Notice of [Sentence] Enhancement and any
       typographical errors made the document misleading or constitutionally
       deficient for notice purposes such that he could not negotiate a plea and
       proceed with the case.

                                            -7-
        The post-conviction court then made the following additional findings regarding
this issue:

       The Petitioner testified [at the post-conviction hearing] that the Notice of
       [Sentence] Enhancement did not sufficiently apprise him of the State’s
       intention to give him an enhanced sentence. The [c]ourt does not find this
       credible.

       The [c]ourt credits the testimony of [trial counsel] that he “repeatedly”
       discussed with the Petitioner his possible sentence range and that he was on
       notice from the State’s original Notice of [Sentence] Enhancement that the
       Petitioner was a Career Offender based on his prior convictions. . . . The
       Petitioner did not present any evidence to rebut this testimony. In the
       Negotiated Plea Agreement, the Petitioner affirmed via signature that he
       understood “the range of punishment for the offense(s) for which [he was
       charged].” At the plea colloquy, the [trial] court also asked the Petitioner
       whether he understood the range of punishment possible in his case and the
       Petitioner affirmed that he did. Therefore, the [c]ourt does not find the
       testimony of the Petitioner credible that [trial counsel] never explained the
       differences between the ranges for offenders of what “persistent” versus
       “career” offender meant.

      Regarding the Petitioner’s claim that that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
review all discovery with him, including the video of his police interview, the post-
conviction court made the following findings and conclusions:

       At the [post-conviction] hearing, the Petitioner conceded that he may have
       seen some of [his] interview [with police] but that his main concern was not
       having a discussion about discovery related to his charges.

       The [c]ourt credits [trial counsel]’s testimony that he went over some
       discovery with the Petitioner but that he did not recall if he reviewed with
       the Petitioner the video of the police interview. The Petitioner did not present
       any evidence to rebut this testimony. The Petitioner has not shown what
       specific evidence [trial counsel] neglected to show him before he pled guilty.

       Finally, as to all of these claims, the post-conviction court concluded that the
Petitioner had not met his burden of showing that trial counsel’s performance fell below
an “objective standard of reasonableness” or was “outside the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” In addition, the post-conviction court concluded

                                            -8-
that the Petitioner had failed to show that “but for th[ese] alleged error[s], he would not
have pleaded guilty in this case.”

       Following entry of this order, the Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                        ANALYSIS

        The Petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically,
he claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge Count 5 of the indictment, in
failing to challenge Count 2 of the indictment, in failing to explain Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 404(b) and the use of his prior convictions at trial, in failing to challenge the
State’s notice of sentence enhancement, and in failing to review all discovery with him.
The State asserts that the Petitioner has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient as to
any of these issues or that but for these alleged errors, the Petitioner would have proceeded
to trial or would have received a more favorable sentence. We agree with the State.

       Post-conviction relief is only warranted when a petitioner establishes that his or her
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of an abridgment of a constitutional
right. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of
proving the factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f); see
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 8(D)(1); Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 786 (Tenn. 2014).
Evidence is considered clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt
about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from it. Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562
(Tenn. 2010); Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009); Hicks v. State, 983
S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

        This court reviews “a post-conviction court’s conclusions of law, decisions
involving mixed questions of law and fact, and its application of law to its factual findings
de novo without a presumption of correctness.” Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 621
(Tenn. 2013) (citing Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tenn. 2011); Calvert v. State,
342 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tenn. 2011)). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are treated
as mixed questions of law and fact. Grindstaff, 297 S.W.3d at 216. A post-conviction
court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence in the record
preponderates against them. Calvert, 342 S.W.3d at 485 (citing Grindstaff, 297 S.W.3d at
216; State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)). “Accordingly, we generally defer
to a post-conviction court’s findings with respect to witness credibility, the weight and
value of witness testimony, and the resolution of factual issues presented by the evidence.”
Mobley v. State, 397 S.W.3d 70, 80 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152,
156 (Tenn. 1999)). However, we review a post-conviction court’s application of the law
to its factual findings de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id.

                                             -9-
        The right to effective assistance of counsel is protected by both the United States
Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I,
§ 9. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must
establish that (1) his lawyer’s performance was deficient and (2) this deficiency prejudiced
the defense. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A petitioner successfully demonstrates deficient performance
when the petitioner establishes that his attorney’s conduct fell “below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). Prejudice
arising therefrom is demonstrated once the petitioner establishes “‘a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.’” Id. at 370 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). However, to establish
prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the petitioner would not have entered his guilty
plea and would have proceeded to trial. Serrano v. State, 133 S.W.3d 599, 605 (Tenn.
2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). “Because a petitioner must
establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides
a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at
370.

        In assessing an attorney’s performance, we “must be highly deferential and should
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689). In addition, we must avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight” and must “judge
the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “No particular
set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent a criminal defendant.” Id. at 688-89. However, “‘deference to matters of
strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon
adequate preparation.’” House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Goad,
938 S.W.2d at 369).

        A. Count 5. First, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to challenge Count 5 in the original and superseding indictments. He asserts that
the language in Count 5 was insufficient to inform him that he was being charged with
aggravated assault because it “fail[ed] to sufficiently track” Code section 39-13-102. In
particular, he claims the words “threaten” or “threatening” do not appear in Code section
39-13-102 or Code section 39-13-101. He also claims the phrase “threaten to cause bodily
injury” used in Count 5 does “not import violence and when used alone in an indictment
                                           - 10 -
does not charge aggravated assault.” Ultimately, the Petitioner argues that if trial counsel
had challenged Count 5, there “is a likelihood” he would not have entered his guilty pleas.

        Count 5 in both the original and superseding indictments states that the Petitioner
“did unlawfully and knowingly threaten to cause bodily injury to Hylania Thompson, by
use or display of a deadly weapon, to wit: motor vehicle, in violation of T.C.A. [§] 39-13-
102 . . . .”

       To sustain a conviction for aggravated assault as charged in this case, the State had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Petitioner intentionally or knowingly caused
the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the use or display of a deadly
weapon. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2018), -101(a)(2) (Supp.
2018).

        The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that an indictment is valid if it contains
sufficient information (1) to enable the defendant to know the accusation to which answer
is required, (2) to furnish the court adequate basis for the entry of a proper judgment, and
(3) to protect the defendant against double jeopardy. State v. Hammonds, 30 S.W.3d 294,
299 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997)). Moreover,
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-13-202, the indictment must

       state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language,
       without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner so as to enable a person of
       common understanding to know what is intended, and with that degree of
       certainty which will enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper
       judgment.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202; see Hammonds, 30 S.W.3d at 300 (stating that “indictments
which achieve the overriding purpose of notice to the accused will be considered sufficient
to satisfy both constitutional and statutory requirements”). An indictment must contain all
the essential elements of the charged offense. VanArsdall v. State, 919 S.W.2d 626, 630
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Morgan, 598 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1979)).

        At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he believed Count 5
sufficiently charged the offense of aggravated assault. Although trial counsel noted that
Count 5 “could have been a little more detailed as to the place” where the crime occurred,
he nevertheless asserted that Count 5 correctly identified “the deadly weapon,” which was
“the motor vehicle,” as well as the “date, [and] individual” victim. Trial counsel also stated
that he reviewed Count 5 and its elements with the Petitioner. On the other hand, the
Petitioner testified that Count 5 was insufficient because it failed to track Code section 39-
                                            - 11 -
13-102 and because the words “threaten to cause bodily injury” when used alone did not
“import violence” sufficient to charge the offense of aggravated assault. In its order
denying relief, the post-conviction court specifically credited trial counsel’s testimony over
the Petitioner’s testimony regarding the sufficiency of Count 5.

       We conclude that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge Count 5.
That count clearly identified that the Petitioner intentionally or knowingly caused the
victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury and that the act involved the use or display
of a deadly weapon, which are the essential elements of the offense of aggravated assault.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), -101(a)(2); see also 7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern
Jury Instr. T.P.I.—Crim. 6.02.

        Here, the Petitioner seems to argue that Count 5, which stated that the Petitioner
“threaten[ed] to cause bodily injury,” was insufficient to charge that the Petitioner
“[i]ntentionally or knowingly cause[d] another to reasonable fear imminent bodily injury.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), -101(a)(2). Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“threat” as “[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on another’s
property . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). We conclude that the language
in Count 5 was adequate “to enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202; see VanArsdall, 919 S.W.2d at 630 (reiterating
that the indictment must define the offense “so as to afford persons of ordinary intelligence
fair notice of what conduct is prohibited”). In addition, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
held, “[S]pecific reference to a statute within the indictment may be sufficient to place the
accused on notice of the charged offense.” State v. Sledge, 15 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tenn. 2000)
(citing State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tenn. 1999); Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95
(Tenn. 1998)). Count 5 clearly referenced the relevant statute for aggravated assault, Code
section 39-13-102. Because Count 5 sufficiently placed the Petitioner on notice that he
was charged with aggravated assault, we conclude trial counsel was not deficient in failing
to challenge this count.

       We also conclude that the Petitioner has failed to show he was prejudiced by trial
counsel’s alleged error. The Petitioner offered no proof at the post-conviction hearing
explaining why he would not have entered his guilty plea if the trial counsel challenged
Count 5. Trial counsel testified that the evidence against the Petitioner was
“overwhelming” and that the Petitioner never proposed a defense for the charged conduct
and never indicated he had an alibi witness. Trial counsel also stated that the Petitioner
wanted to resolve his cases, which was why trial counsel sought a plea agreement for the
Petitioner on “multiple occasions.” Because the Petitioner cannot show a reasonable
probability that, but for trial counsel’s failure to challenge Count 5, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial, he has failed to establish prejudice.
Accordingly, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.
                                            - 12 -
       B. Count 2. Next, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to move to dismiss Count 2 of the superseding indictment. He claims Count 2 is
“insufficient to charge aggravated robbery” because it references Code section 39-13-401,
the robbery statute, rather than Code section 39-13-402, the aggravated robbery statute.
The Petitioner also asserts that Count 2 “was superseded from robbery to aggravated
robbery with no probable cause, no additional discovery, no new medical evidence to
support the victim suffered a serious bodily injury, and seemingly no new additional
statements from the witness or victim.” He claims that if trial counsel had challenged
Count 2 for these reasons, he would not have entered his guilty plea.

       Count 2 of the superseding indictment states that the Petitioner “did unlawfully and
knowingly[] take property, to wit: a purse and contents, from Hylania Thompson by
violence or putting said Hylania Thomson in fear, and did thereby cause her to suffer
serious bodily injury in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-401 . . . .”

       We conclude that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge Count 2 for
insufficiency. Trial counsel testified that although a “typo” in Count 2 referenced Code
section 39-13-401, the robbery statute, rather than Code section 39-13-402, the aggravated
robbery statute, the allegations in Count 2 clearly charged aggravated robbery. Trial
counsel also asserted that the typographical error in Count 2 was not sufficient to nullify
Count 2 and that the State could simply have amended Code section 39-13-401 to 39-13-
402, which the trial court would have allowed because similar issues happened “all of the
time.” The Petitioner’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing was limited to his claim
that there was no discovery and no new evidence showing that the victim had suffered
serious bodily injury. In denying relief, the post-conviction court accredited trial counsel’s
testimony that Count 2 was sufficient to charge aggravated robbery and then held that trial
counsel had no control over whether the State would obtain a superseding indictment.

        Here, Count 2 charges the Petitioner with knowingly taking property from the victim
by violence or by putting the victim in fear where the victim suffered serious bodily injury.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402, -401; see also 7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern Jury Instr. T.P.I.—
Crim. 9.02. Because Count 2 tracks the language of the aggravated robbery statute, it
“adequately” charges the offense. See VanArsdall, 919 S.W.2d at 630 (citing Patty v.
State, 556 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977)). Moreover, it is well-established
that where there is a clerical error regarding the statute referenced in the indictment, the
trial court may treat the incorrect statute as surplusage and can try the defendant under the
proper statute. See McCracken v. State, 489 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972);
Lewis v. Taylor, No. E2013-02492-CCA-R3-HC, 2014 WL 1920619, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. May 13, 2014) (“[A]n indictment’s reference to an incorrect statute is mere
surplusage and does not render the indictment fatally defective.”).
                                            - 13 -
       We also conclude that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge the fact
that Count 2 elevated the offense of robbery to aggravated robbery. We recognize that the
State has broad discretion to pursue a superseding indictment. State v. Harris, 33 S.W.3d
767, 771 (Tenn. 2000). “Although the State may not bring a superseding indictment to
harass or intimidate the accused, a legitimate decision to bring a superseding indictment is
uniquely within the State’s authority.” Id. (footnote omitted). At the post-conviction
hearing, trial counsel testified that he “assum[ed]” that the State obtained the superseding
indictment after speaking with the victim about her injuries. He noted that Hylania
Thompson, the victim in Count 2, was an elderly woman who was robbed by the Petitioner
as she was going to a doctor’s appointment. He also recognized that Ms. Thompson’s
husband testified at the Petitioner’s sentencing hearing about how the robbery had
impacted her, which seemed to move the court. While the Petitioner claimed there was no
evidence that Hylania Thompson suffered serious bodily injury, he failed to present any
proof to substantiate this claim. In denying relief, the post-conviction court found that trial
counsel did not have any control over whether the State would obtain a superseding
indictment; the court then credited trial counsel’s testimony that he believed Count 2 was
sufficient, which was why trial counsel moved forward with plea negotiations. For these
reasons, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that trial counsel performed
deficiently as to Count 2.

        Moreover, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to show he was prejudiced by
any alleged error regarding Count 2. Although the Petitioner claims that he would not have
entered his guilty plea if trial counsel had challenged Count 2, he failed to offer any proof
on this point at the post-conviction hearing. The record shows that even if trial counsel
had somehow successfully challenged Count 2 in the superseding indictment and then
proceeded under Count 2 charging robbery in the original indictment, the record shows that
the Petitioner still would have entered his guilty plea. Trial counsel testified that there was
“overwhelming” evidence of the Petitioner’s guilt, that the Petitioner had offered no
defense for these charges, and that the Petitioner had repeatedly expressed his desire to
resolve his cases. Because the Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that, but
for trial counsel’s failure to challenge Count 2 in the superseding indictment, he would not
have entered his guilty plea and would have proceeded to trial, he has failed to establish
prejudice. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

       C. Rule 404(b). Next, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel erred in failing to
explain Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the use of his prior convictions at trial. He
claims that if trial counsel had not told him he would be convicted at trial based on his prior
convictions, he would not have entered his guilty pleas.

                                            - 14 -
        Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of a defendant’s prior convictions “to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait.” Tenn.
R. Evid. 404(b). At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he never
informed the Petitioner that he should plead guilty because the jury would convict him at
trial because of his prior convictions. Instead, trial counsel stated that he talked to the
Petitioner about his prior record and how his record might affect his sentence, if the
Petitioner was convicted at trial. Trial counsel also said he talked to the Petitioner about
“the dangers” of testifying at trial, given his criminal record, and emphasized that the
Petitioner should not bring up his record or make statements that could open the door for
the State to discuss his criminal record. While trial counsel did not recall talking to the
Petitioner about Rule 404(b) and acknowledged that he did not file a motion in limine to
preclude admission of the Petitioner’s prior convictions at trial, he asserted that the
Petitioner entered his guilty pleas more than thirty days prior to the trial date and that he
typically handled motions in limine and Rule 404(b) motions closer to a defendant’s actual
trial date. Although the Petitioner testified that trial counsel never talked to him about not
opening the door to the State’s introduction of his prior convictions, trial counsel asserted
that he talked to the Petitioner about this issue at length. Ultimately, the post-conviction
court accredited trial counsel’s testimony on this point and found that the Petitioner’s
testimony that trial counsel had misstated the law to induce his plea was not credible. We
are bound by the post-conviction court’s credibility findings. Mobley, 397 S.W.3d at 80
(citing Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 156). Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel was not
deficient as to this issue.

         We also conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice regarding this
issue. Other than his own discredited testimony, the Petitioner failed to present any proof
at the post-conviction hearing showing that but for trial counsel’s advice regarding his
criminal record, he would not have entered his guilty plea. The record shows that the proof
of the Petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming, that the Petitioner had no defenses, that the
Petitioner sought to resolve his charges, and that the Petitioner’s best strategy was to plead
guilty to robbery, rather than face the risk of being convicted of aggravated robbery at trial.
Because the Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable probability that but for trial
counsel’s alleged errors in failing to explain Rule 404(b) and the use of his prior
convictions at trial, he would not have entered his guilty plea and would have proceeded
to trial. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.

       D. Notice of Sentence Enhancement. In addition, the Petitioner contends that trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the State’s Notice of
Sentence Enhancement. He asserts that the State’s notice incorrectly referenced Code
section 40-25-202, rather than Code section 40-35-202; that the notice failed to identify
whether the State was seeking enhanced punishment for him as a multiple, persistent, or
career offender; that the notice provided incorrect dates for offenses; and that the State
                                            - 15 -
failed to refile the notice of sentence enhancement after obtaining the superseding
indictment. The Petitioner claims that there is a reasonable probability that but for trial
counsel’s failure to challenge the Notice of Sentence Enhancement for one of the above
reasons, he would have been sentenced as a Range I offender at sentencing.

       The district attorney has the discretion to seek enhanced sentencing of a defendant.
State v. Adams, 788 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tenn. 1990). The notice requirement for sentencing
enhancement provides:

       If the district attorney general believes that a defendant should be sentenced
       as a multiple, persistent or career offender, the district attorney general shall
       file a statement thereof with the court and defense counsel not less than ten
       (10) days before trial or acceptance of a guilty plea; provided, that notice may
       be waived by the defendant in writing with the consent of the district attorney
       general and the court accepting the plea. Such statement, which shall not be
       made known to the jury determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant
       on the primary offense, must set forth the nature of the prior felony
       convictions, the dates of the convictions and the identity of the courts of the
       convictions. . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-202(a). If the State fails to comply with this pretrial filing
deadline, then the defendant may request a reasonable continuance of trial. Tenn. R. Crim.
P. 12.3(a) (“[T]he district attorney general shall file notice of this intention [to seek an
enhanced punishment] not less than ten (10) days before trial” and “[i]f the notice is
untimely, the trial judge shall grant the defendant, on motion, a reasonable continuance of
the trial.”).

        The purpose of this notice requirement is to “(a) provide fair notice to an accused
that he/she is exposed to other than standard sentencing, (b) to facilitate plea bargaining,
(c) to enable the accused to make an informed decision before entering a guilty plea, and
(d) to a certain extent, to aid in trial strategy.” State v. Livingston, 197 S.W.3d 710, 712
(Tenn. 2006) (citing Adams, 788 S.W.2d at 559; State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400, 412
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)). Significantly, an accused is entitled to “fair” notice, not
“perfect” notice, of sentence enhancement. Id. at 712-13. If the State substantially
complies with the notice requirement, then the burden shifts to the defendant to inquire
about any ambiguities in the notice and to show that any issues with the notice prejudiced
the defendant. State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tenn. 2018). However, if the
notice is so defective that it amounts to no notice at all, then the State has not met its burden,
and the defendant does not have to establish prejudice. Id. (citing Adams, 788 S.W.2d at
559).

                                              - 16 -
       In this case, the State filed a Notice of Sentence Enhancement on November 4, 2019.
It provided that the State was giving “notice to the [Petitioner] pursuant to the provisions
of TCA § 40-25-202 of its intent to enhance to an additional Range of any sentence[]
imposed in this cause based upon the following convictions.” The notice then listed the
Petitioner’s convictions and the convicting courts.

        First, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to challenge
the notice of sentence enhancement on the basis that the notice cited the wrong statute. At
the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that the notice of sentence
enhancement’s reference to Code section 40-25-202 rather than 40-35-202 was a
“typographical error” that would not have prevented the Petitioner from being put on notice
that the State intended to enhance his sentence. He also stated his belief that the incorrect
statute did not make the notice misleading. In denying relief, the post-conviction court
credited trial counsel’s testimony that any typographical errors in the notice did not make
it misleading or constitutionally deficient, such that he could not negotiate a plea deal for
the Petitioner and proceed with the case. It is well established that clerical errors do not
typically invalidate a notice of sentence enhancement. See Livingston, 197 S.W.3d at 712-
13 (requiring “fair,” not “perfect[,]” notice of sentencing enhancement); see also
McCracken, 489 S.W.2d at 51; Lewis, 2014 WL 1920619, at *3; State v. Wright, No.
M2010-02096-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 601332, at *17-18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23,
2012) (concluding that several clerical errors, including the failure to distinguish between
misdemeanors and felonies, the inclusion of an incorrect conviction date, the failure to
identify the correct court for two convictions, and the omission of a conviction, did not
render notice in the notice of sentence enhancement “materially misleading”).

        Second, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to specify
whether the State intended to sentence him as a multiple, persistent, or career offender.
Trial counsel testified that he knew the State intended to sentence the Petitioner as “a career
criminal” and that the notice’s failure to identify the actual sentencing range was not
misleading because he had “repeatedly” talked to the Petitioner about his sentence range if
convicted of any of the charged offenses at trial. In denying relief, the post-conviction
court credited trial counsel’s testimony that he discussed with the Petitioner his possible
sentencing range and that he believed the original notice of sentence enhancement was
sufficient to inform the Petitioner that he was a career offender based on his previous
convictions. The post-conviction court also found that the Petitioner’s testimony on this
point was not credible and that the Petitioner failed to present any evidence to support his
claim, given that both the Petitioner’s guilty plea colloquy and plea agreement showed that
the Petitioner understood his possible range of punishment in this case. A notice of
sentencing enhancement does not have to specify the particular sentencing range that the
State intends to pursue. See Livingston, 197 S.W.3d at 713-14 (reiterating that Code
section 40-35-202(a) “requires, at a minimum, that the State file: (1) written notice, (2)
                                            - 17 -
clearly expressing the State’s intention to seek sentencing outside of the standard offender
range, (3) setting forth the nature of the prior felony conviction, the dates of the convictions,
and the identity of the courts of the convictions” (footnote omitted)); see also Taylor, 63
S.W.3d at 413 (holding that a notice of sentence enhancement is not required to specify
which range—career, persistent, or multiple—applies to the defendant); Adams, 788
S.W.2d at 559 (stating that the purpose of Code section 40-35-202(a) is to provide
reasonable notice to the accused “that he is exposed to other than standard sentencing”).

       Third, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was deficient in failing to challenge
the notice on the basis that the offense dates were listed incorrectly in the notice. However,
Code section 40-35-202(a) only requires that the notice state the nature of the prior felony
convictions, the dates of the convictions, and the courts in which these convictions
occurred. In any case, because the Petitioner failed to offer any proof showing how his
offense dates on the notice were incorrect, he has failed to show that trial counsel was
deficient on this basis.

        Fourth, the Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was deficient in not challenging
the State’s failure to file a second notice of sentence enhancement after obtaining the
superseding indictment that charged the Petitioner with the more severe charge of
aggravated robbery. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he believed
the Petitioner was on notice of the sentencing enhancement for his aggravated robbery
charge in the superseding indictment based on the State’s first notice of sentence
enhancement following the original indictment. Trial counsel said that, early in his career,
another judge in an unrelated case had informed him that the State’s notice under similar
circumstances was sufficient. Moreover, trial counsel testified that the Petitioner entered
his guilty plea on September 9, 2020, which was over thirty days prior to his scheduled
trial date, and that although the Petitioner had made an issue of the State’s failure to file a
second notice after the superseding indictment, this second notice was not required to be
filed prior to the date the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas in this case. In denying relief,
the post-conviction court concluded that trial counsel was not deficient in determining that
the State’s notice of sentence enhancement was sufficient to place the Petitioner on notice
that he would be subjected to enhanced sentencing. The law supports the post-conviction
court’s conclusion. See Livingston, 197 S.W.3d at 715-16 (concluding that “[a]lthough
the language in count two of the second indictment elevated the statutory penalty into a
higher class by the additional element that the defendant created a risk of death or injury
to innocent bystanders or other third parties, we do not find this fact fatal to the finding of
notice” because “the defendant had fair warning that the State intended to seek enhanced
punishment for this crime, accomplishing the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-202(a)”); cf. State v. Carter, 121 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tenn. 2003) (concluding
that the defendant was not given sufficient notice of the State’s intent to seek an enhanced
sentence on the charge of conspiracy to sell cocaine where the original indictment, which
                                             - 18 -
had a notice of enhanced punishment but did not include the conspiracy charge, was
dismissed, and the second indictment, which included the conspiracy charge, was not
accompanied by a notice of enhanced punishment and the second indictment was not a re-
indictment for the same offense). For all these reasons, the Petitioner has failed to show
that trial counsel’s failure to challenge the notice of sentencing enhancement was deficient.

        We likewise conclude that the Petitioner has failed to show that any alleged error
regarding the notice of sentence enhancement caused him prejudice. He claims that but
for trial counsel’s failure to challenge the notice of sentence enhancement, he would have
received a lesser sentence as a Range I offender. We reiterate that even if trial counsel had
challenged the notice of sentence enhancement for any of the above reasons, the Petitioner
would not have received relief and, therefore, would not have been sentenced as a Range I
offender. Because the Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for
trial counsel’s performance regarding the notice, he would not have entered his guilty plea,
he has failed to establish prejudice. Accordingly, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on
this issue.

        E. Discovery. Lastly, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to review all discovery with him. He asserts that because his case took place during
the COVID-19 pandemic, he and trial counsel were not able to have enough time to review
all of the discovery in his case. The Petitioner claims that if trial counsel had reviewed the
discovery with him, there “is a likelihood” that he would not have entered his guilty pleas.

        The Petitioner has failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient with
regard to this issue. Trial counsel testified that he and the Petitioner reviewed the discovery
in this case several times. He said that while the Petitioner initially asked to watch the
entire video of his police interview, he recalled that the Petitioner later said he “wasn’t
interested in watching it.” Trial counsel said he did not discuss the entire interview video
with the Petitioner because they focused more on “settlement negotiations” in light of the
“overwhelming” evidence against the Petitioner. Although the Petitioner initially testified
that the “only video” he saw was “the video of the victim, Hylania Thompson, in the
hospital bed,” the Petitioner later admitted that trial counsel showed him the video of his
police interview, although he could not recall if he saw the “whole, full video.” In denying
relief, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to identify the specific
discovery trial counsel failed to show him prior to the Petitioner’s entering his guilty pleas.
Because the Petitioner has not identified the specific discovery trial counsel failed to show
him or the significance of this non-disclosed discovery, the Petitioner has failed to show
how trial counsel’s performance on this issue was deficient.

      The Petitioner has also failed to show how trial counsel’s alleged errors regarding
discovery prejudiced him. He claims that if trial counsel had reviewed all discovery with
                                            - 19 -
him, there “is a likelihood” that he would not have entered his guilty pleas. However, at
the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner never explained why he would not have entered
his guilty pleas if he had been shown all the discovery in his case. Again, the record shows
that the proof of the Petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming, that he had no defenses, that he
wanted to resolve his charges with a plea agreement, and that his best strategy was to plead
guilty to robbery, rather than face the risk of being convicted of aggravated robbery at trial.
The Petitioner has failed to show there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial
counsel’s failure to review all discovery with him, he would not have entered his guilty
pleas and would have proceeded to trial. Because the Petitioner has failed to show that
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

                                      CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

                                      ___________________________________________
                                        CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

                                            - 20 -