Court Opinion

ID: 9589505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:45:26.981194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:38.798733
License: Public Domain

Oxner, Justice
(dissenting).
It seems to be conceded, as stated in the majority opinion, that the parties to this action are bound by the construction given to the complaint by the District Judge in passing on the motion to remand. He held that the complaint did not state “a separate and independent claim or cause of action against the defendant insurance company”; that “the complaint does not allege a cause of action for damages for breach of the insurance contract because there is no allegation in the complaint that the contract between plaintiff’s husband and the' insurance company had been breached by the defendant insurance company”; and that the cause of action alleged was “a joint cause of action against all the *11defendants for fraud and deceit in which all defendants participated throughout and for which all defendants are equally responsible.” Babb v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, D. C., 102 F. Supp. 247.
The insured could have brought an action for breach of the contract. He could have sued in equity to have the policy declared in force. He could have proceeded in tort for fraud and deceit. He died without making an election. However, the plaintiff, as administratrix of his estate, has elected to bring an action for fraud and deceit. Such a cause of action did not survive. Cline v. Southern Railway Co., 113 S. C. 440, 102 S. E. 641; Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co., 197 S. C. 256, 15 S. E. (2d) 117. It is perhaps for this reason, as stated in the majority opinion, that the plaintiff has abandoned any claim “for recovery upon any cause of action which may have accrued to her husband, the insured, under the policy or its cancellation”.
My disagreement with the majority of the Court is in holding that the plaintiff individually has a cause of action for fraud and deceit. It seems to be conceded that as beneficiary she had no cause of action during the lifetime of the insured because she then had a mere expectancy. But it is said that after the death of the insured, such right became vested, giving the plaintiff as beneficiary a cause of action. But how could the plaintiff have any rights as beneficiary under a policy no longer in existence? It is stated in respondent’s brief that she makes no contention “that the contract issued to her husband was in effect at the time of his death.” When the policy ceased to be of force and effect, plaintiff’s rights therein ceased. She no longer had an expectancy or any other interest. Any right she may have had was predicated on the existence of the contract.
The result of the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court is that a cause of action which accrued to the insured during his lifetime but which did not survive can now be brought by the plaintiff individually who admittedly had no right in such cause of action at the time it arose.
*12I think the demurrer should be sustained. Myers v. Industrial Life & Health Insurance Company, 170 S. C. 80, 169 S. E. 676, which is so strongly relied upon in the majority opinion, calls for no different conclusion. That action was one for fraudulent breach of a contract, which is regarded under our decisions as an action ex contractu. The plaintiff here could have brought a suit for fraudulent breach of the contract, but she has elected not to do so. We have consistently recognized a distinction between an action for fraudulent breach of contract and an action for fraud and deceit. Broome v. Travelers Insurance Co., 183 S. C. 413, 191 S. E. 220. It was there held that in an action for fraudulent breach of contract, there may be a recovery for actual damages although there was no proof of fraud entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.
Fishburne, J., concurs. '