Court Opinion

ID: 9707013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:58:41.010835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.933458
License: Public Domain

Draper, J.
— The executor of the estate of William H. Coleman, deceased, brought this action to obtain a construction of the following bequest under item III of the will, viz: “To the Home for the Aged located at 2007 N. Capitol Avenue, Indianapolis, Indiana . . . $10,000.00.”
The appellant Indianapolis Home for the Aged, Inc., and the appellee Altenheim of Indianapolis each filed answer asserting it was the legatee designated in the will. The court resolved the contest in favor of Altenheim of Indianapolis, and Indianapolis Home for the Aged, Inc. appeals.
Item III reads as follows:
“I give and devise to the following the amounts set out herein:
“To the William H. Coleman Hospital for Women, in Indianapolis, Indiana — $15,000.00
*597“To the Suemma Coleman Home located at 2044 N. Illinois Street, Indianapolis, Indiana______________________$10,000.00
“To the Home for the Aged located at 2007 N. Capitol Avenue, Indianapolis,
Indiana____________________________$10,000.00
“To the Second Presbyterian Church of Indianapolis, Indiana_____________$5,000.00”
For a better understanding of the problem presented, it should be stated that, according to the undisputed evidence, the appellee has continuously owned and operated a home for the aged at 2007 North Capitol Avenue, in Indianapolis, since 1910, when it was incorporated. It assumed the name “The Altenheim of Indianapolis” in 1920, and it has ever since borne that name.
The appellant was organized in 1876. Its name since 1935 has been “The Indianapolis Home for the Aged, Inc.” For more than sixty years it has owned and operated a home for the aged at 1731 North Capitol Avenue, in Indianapolis. Both are non-profit corporations.
By stipulation of the parties the trial court heard certain evidence with the understanding that if it were later deemed to be inadmissible, the objections thereto would be sustained and such evidence would not be considered. That evidence tended to prove that:
(a) the decedent was acquainted with, and expressed interest in the activities of, the Appellant and its officers;
(b) The decedent was a life member of the Appellant;
(c) the decedent had made at least one gift of $500.00 to the Appellant;
(d) the decedent expressed an intention of doing something more for the Appellant;
*598(e) the decedent had talked with the scrivener of his will concerning making this provision for the Appellant and that the scrivener was . <■ unaware that any home for the aged, other than Appellant, was located in the vicinity.
At the conclusion of the .trial the court found there was no ambiguity in the will, and so rejected,that evidence. The question presented is whether that evidence was admissiblé. We think it was admissible if the trial court erred in its conclusion that the will was unambiguous.
If, from an examination of the will, it could be said with certainty that the testator meant to designate the beneficiary under the third bequest by ideritifying the activities of the institution to be benefited and giving the address thereof, we woiild agree that there is no ambiguity in the will, and the appellee would unquestionably be entitled to take.
But an examination of the whole item leaves a doubt in that respect. It raises an uncertainty. Looking at the whole item, it might seem that the testator meant to designate the legatees therein named by the name of the institution to be benefited, rather than by a description of its activities. That conclusion might be reached, we think, by giving due consideration to the use of capital letters, and to the fact that the second bequest under the item is in no way descriptive of ’the activities of. the beneficiary.
An ambiguity would, not necessarily arise out of that situation, however, for there might be but one institution which could fit the language of the bequest whether the language be read and understood the one way or the other.
When the language of the will is attempted to be applied, however, the existence of the two claimants is discovered, at the addresses above mentioned. Further *599undisputed facts develop further confusion. They reveal that the testator failed to exactly name either claimant in the third bequest. And it is further learned that he also failed to name with exactness the beneficiaries under the first two bequests under the item. The names used in each of the three bequests do, however, closely resemble the true name of an existing institution, and if he intended to designate the appellant in the third bequest, the name he used is approximately as accurate as the names used to designate the beneficiaries under the first two items.
If the testator was dealing in names, and not descriptions, a consideration of the names themselves might favor the appellant. It is known that the word “Altenheim” means “home for the aged” or “home for old people,” yet “The Altenheim of Indianapolis” is a distinctive name, and it might well be supposed that if the testator meant to designate the beneficiary by name, he would have used the word “Altenheim” for that purpose, even though other words of the name were omitted. If, therefore, the testator meant to designate the beneficiary by name, it might seem likely that when he said “To the Home for the Aged,” he meant “The Indianapolis Home for the Aged, Inc.” and not “The Altenheim of Indianapolis.”
But even though, in the light of the foregoing, it might be considered that the testator did mean to designate the beneficiary by name, and that he was thereby intending to benefit the appellant, uncertainty still remains because he further said “located at 2007 N. Capitol Avenue, Indianapolis, Indiana” at which place the appellee, and not the appellant, conducts a home for the aged.
Obviously, the words of the will are intended to designate only one beneficiary. Both claimants were not intended to take. Does the situation raise a latent *600ambiguity? And if so, is evidence of the type rejected admissible to resolve it? The whole subject is exhaustively treated in an annotation in 94 A. L. R. at p. 26. Many cases there collected would seem to furnish an affirmative answer to both questions. See also In re Canterbury’s Estate (1939), 226 Ia. 586, 284 N. W. 807, which presents a somewhat similar factual situation.
But we need not seek guidance from other jurisdictions. Applicable principles have been announced by our own Supreme Court. A latent ambiguity is one which first arises out of the language of the will when the words thereof are attempted to be applied to the object or subject which those words describe. As said in Daugherty, Administrator v. Rogers (1889), 119 Ind. 254, 20 N. E. 779:
“ ‘... It may often happen that persons or things, or the intention of the testator respecting them, may seem to be sufficiently defined by the terms of the will, and yet when the language employed, and the facts to which it refers, are brought in contact with each other, the language and the facts are so inharmonious as to leave the intention of the testator obscure. Thus an ambiguity arises, not upon the face of the will itself, but from facts therein referred to which are extrinsic to the instrument. This, according to the maxim of Lord Bacon, constitutes the every essence of a latent ambiguity, which he defines to be ‘that which seemeth certain and without ambiguity for anything that appeareth on the deed or instrument; but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the ambiguity.’ Hawkins v. Garland, 76 Va. 149 (44 Am. Rep. 158).
“ ‘An ambiguity which arises not upon the words of the will, deed, or other instrument, as looked at in themselves, but upon those words when applied to the object or to the subject which they describe,’ is a latent ambiguity. 1 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 530, and note.”
*601And so in this case, when an attempt is made to fit the language of the will to either of these institutions, it seems that neither exactly fits that language, but each might be considered to fit it in part. So if the court can go no further, it would be impossible to determine which of these claimants was entitled to take, and the intention of the testator would be defeated.
But Judge Mitchell further said in the case from which we just quoted:
“Whenever, therefore, in applying a will to the objects or subjects therein referred to, extrinsic facts appear which produce or develop a latent ambiguity, not apparent upon the face of the will itself, since the ambiguity is disclosed by the introduction of extrinsic facts, the court may inquire into every other material extrinsic fact or circumstance to which the will certainly refers, as well as to the relation occupied by the testator to those facts, to the. end that a correct interpretation of the language actually employed by the testator in his will may be arrived at.”
If, in fact, the address given in the will was merely descriptive of the legatee, and it was erroneous, it may be disregarded if, after rejecting the errors or false words, enough remains to show with reasonable certainty who was intended. Hertford v. Harned (1916), 185 Ind. 213, 113 N. E. 727; Pate v. Bushong (1903), 161 Ind. 533, 69 N. E. 291.
It is, of course, true that “the construction must come from the will and not the will from the construction.” The circumstances under which evidence of the kind under consideration is admissible, and the reasons for admitting it under those circumstances are so well stated in Daugherty, Administrator v. Rogers, and Hertford v. Harned, supra, that *602it would serve no good purpose to dwell upon that subject.
We think that evidence of the type rejected, and other like evidence, if any there is, offered by either party, should be admitted for the purpose of correctly interpreting the language actually employed by the testator in his will.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to sustain appellant’s motion for new trial.
Royse, C. J., and Crumpacker, J., not participating.
Wiltrout, J., dissenting.