Court Opinion

ID: 9909842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 15:06:11.871405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:58.403787
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2068-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KURT V. SMITH,
a/k/a WILFREDO PEREZ,
KURT U. SMITH, and
KURT J. SMITH,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Argued December 4, 2023 – Decided December 14, 2023

                   Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 19-01-
                   0059.

                   Austin J. Howard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
                   Public Defender, attorney; Austin J. Howard, of
                   counsel and on the briefs).

                   Nicole Handy, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for respondent (LaChia L. Bradshaw, Burlington
            County Prosecutor, attorney; Nicole Handy, of counsel
            and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      A jury found defendant Kurt V. Smith guilty of two counts of reckless

manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1), for starting a fire, which resulted in the

death of his elderly mother and her companion. Defendant appeals from his

convictions on grounds the State failed to preserve exculpatory evidence,

challenges the admission of the State's fire expert's testimony, and contests his

sentence. We affirm in part and remand in part, for the reasons expressed herein.

      Defendant resided with his mother and her companion at her home in

Pemberton Township. The State adduced testimony from defendant's friend,

Jerome Bland. He explained that on October 16, 2018, defendant and two

acquaintances were in the garage attached to the home "messing with

[defendant's] motorcycle." When Bland arrived at the home, he let himself in

the front door and called for defendant but did not get a response.       While

searching for defendant, Bland saw defendant's mother and her companion

sleeping in bed. Bland eventually heard defendant's voice emanating from the

garage and went there.

      Seconds after entering the garage, Bland smelled strong gasoline fumes.

He told defendant he could smell gasoline and asked, "What are you trying to

                                                                           A-2068-21
                                       2
do, start a fire?" Defendant responded, "Do you want to see a fire? I'll show

you a fire" and took a lighter out of his pocket, lit it, and dropped it to the ground.

A fire started and immediately spread to both side walls, running down to the

motorcycle, which also caught fire.

      Defendant immediately asked one of his friends to hand him a fire

extinguisher and he attempted to put the fire out. Bland left the garage and tried

to awaken defendant's mother and her companion without success. He returned

to the garage and observed defendant open the garage door to drag the

motorcycle out, which caused "the whole house [to light] up like a Christmas

tree out of hell." Bland again tried, but failed, to awaken defendant's mother

and her companion. He then exited the home and tried to put out the fire with

the garden hose. Once he realized his efforts were futile, he tried again to rouse

defendant's mother and her companion. Bland emphasized, "the whole time,

[defendant] was still trying to put the fire out . . . ."

      Bland called 9-1-1 but did not wait for police because he was afraid his

prior criminal record would lead police to believe he started the fire. Firefighters

removed the bodies of defendant's mother and her companion from the home.

The Burlington County Chief Medical Examiner testified both victims died of

smoke and soot inhalation, and thermal burns.

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                                           3
      The following day, Detective Brian Lloyd of the Burlington County

Prosecutor's Office and Captain Stephen Letts of the New Jersey State Fire

Marshal's Office investigated and documented the scene. Inside the garage, they

found a fire extinguisher and observed water on the garage floor with a "sheen"

or "rainbow color," which they each testified was "indicative" of an ignitable

liquid accelerant. They found the motorcycle inside the garage near the door

with debris on top of it and its rubber melted off. Melissa Balogh, a forensic

scientist employed by the New Jersey State Police Office of Forensics, testified

she examined defendant's right work boot, which he wore the night of the fire,

and testing revealed gasoline on the bottom of the boot.

      A grand jury indicted defendant with two counts of first-degree

aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) (counts one and two); and one

count of third-degree arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b)(1) (count three). Prior to trial,

defendant moved to suppress Captain Letts's expert report and testimony

regarding the origin and cause of the fire. The motion judge granted the motion

in part, ruling the portion of the opinion concluding the fire was deliberately set

by defendant would be inadmissible. Defendant also moved to dismiss the

indictment or, alternatively, for an adverse-inference jury instruction based on

the State's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence after the

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                                        4
Township demolished the property where the fire occurred without notice to the

defense. The judge denied the motion.

      The jury trial and sentencing were handled by a different judge. The jury

acquitted defendant of the aggravated manslaughter charges but found him

guilty of the lesser-included offenses of reckless manslaughter. It deadlocked

on the arson charge.

      The trial judge denied defendant's motion for a new trial, which claimed

Captain Letts improperly opined about the cause of the fire. The judge granted

the State's motion to sentence defendant to an extended term of imprisonment

as a persistent offender.

      On February 10, 2022, the judge sentenced defendant on the reckless

manslaughter convictions to two concurrent eleven-year prison terms, with an

eighty-five percent parole bar pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA),

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The judge found aggravating factors three, six, and nine

and mitigating factor two—concluding the aggravating factors substantially

outweighed the mitigating factors. The State dismissed the arson count.

      Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:

            POINT I THE STATE DENIED DEFENDANT HIS
            RIGHTS    TO    DUE    PROCESS    AND
            CONFRONTATION       BY     DESTROYING
            POTENTIALLY   EXCULPATORY    EVIDENCE

                                                                          A-2068-21
                                        5
WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE DEFENSE AND IN
DEFIANCE OF REPEATED PRESERVATION
REQUESTS. (Partially Raised Below).

    A.    The Untested Motorcycle Was Highly
    Material Evidence Because the State's Expert
    Admitted that It Remained a "Possible" Cause of
    the Fire that He Never Ruled Out.

    B.    The State's Destruction of a "Possible"
    Cause of the Fire Manifestly Prejudiced the
    Defense Because It Prevented Defendant from
    Investigating His Theory of the Fire's Cause and
    from Adequately Confronting the State's Expert.

    C.   The Destruction of the Crime Scene
    Without Notice to the Defense — Despite
    Repeated Preservation Requests — Constitutes
    Bad Faith.

          1.    Communications Show that the State
          Had Actual Notice of the Defense's
          Preservation Requests, but It Destroyed the
          Evidence Anyway Without Notice to the
          Defense.

          2.    The     State's    Destruction   of
          Potentially Exculpatory Evidence Was in
          Bad Faith Because It Disregarded
          Repeated       Preservation      Requests,
          Selectively Preserved Other Evidence, and
          Refused to Provide Notice of the
          Demolition Date.

    D.     The Proper Relief Is Dismissal of the
    Indictment with Prejudice. Alternatively, a New
    Trial Is Required.

                                                        A-2068-21
                        6
POINT II THE ADMISSION OF THE STATE'S
FIRE     EXPERT'S OPINIONS   VIOLATED
NUMEROUS EVIDENTIARY PROHIBITIONS AND
DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. (Partially
Raised Below).

    A.    The State's Fire Expert Should Have Been
    Barred from Offering Any Expert Opinion
    Because He Was Also the Lead Fact Investigator.
    (Raised Below).

    B.    The State's Fire Expert's Causation
    Opinion Violated N.J.R.E. 702 Because It Merely
    Parroted the Claim of a Testifying Eyewitness,
    Which Was Not Beyond the Ken of the Jury.

    C.    The State's Fire Expert's Causation
    Opinion Violated N.J.R.E. 703 Because He
    Relied on Double Hearsay Without Evaluating Its
    Reliability in Violation of Professional Fire
    Investigation Standards. (Not Raised Below).

    D.    The State's Fire Expert's Opinion that a
    Visible "Sheen" Was "Indicative" of a Liquid
    Accelerant — Without Any Testing — Was Not
    a Generally Accepted Scientific Option. (Not
    Raised Below).

    E.   Admitting the Opinions Was Not Harmless
    and Was Plain Error Because They Bolstered the
    Credibility of the State's Sole Eyewitness.

POINT III REVERSAL  IS  REQUIRED   ON
FUNDAMENTAL-FAIRNESS AND CUMULATIVE-
ERROR GROUNDS. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT IV ALTERNATIVELY,            DEFENDANT'S
SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE.

                                                      A-2068-21
                        7
                                        I.

      Defendant argues he was deprived of due process and the right of

confrontation because the State destroyed exculpatory evidence when it

demolished his mother's home and the motorcycle, despite repeated preservation

requests.     He claims he should have been able to have an expert test the

motorcycle's electrical system and petcock valve 1 because the defense theory

was an electrical short ignited the fuel leaking from the valve. Defendant argues

access to this evidence was vital to rebut the State's case—which was predicated

on Bland's testimony that defendant ignited the fire—because Bland lacked

credibility. Defendant asserts Bland was an unruly witness, left the scene on the

day of the incident, and has a criminal record of his own, including an arson

conviction.

      The evidence was also important because Captain Letts admitted the fire

could have been caused by an electrical short. Another investigator testified the

petcock valve was "barely attached to the threads of the gas tank," which he

believed would cause gas to leak out quickly. Additionally, Detective Lloyd

admitted the motorcycle's gas tank did not have a gas cap and the petcock valve

1
  A petcock is "a small shut-off valve used to control the flow of liquid or gas."
Wikipedia,         the       Free        Encyclopedia,         Petcock,         at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petcock (last visited Dec. 6, 2023).
                                                                            A-2068-21
                                        8
was loose. Defendant argues, taken together, this evidence supports his theory

the fire was accidental.

      Defendant argues the court should have granted his motion to dismiss the

indictment. Alternatively, we should remand for a new trial and suppress the

portions of Captain Letts's opinion that cannot be challenged due to the lost

evidence. Notwithstanding the spoliation, defendant contends the court should

have charged the jury that it could draw an adverse inference against the State,

given its destruction of the evidence.

      To determine if a due process violation has occurred in the instance of

loss, destruction, or suppression of physical evidence in a criminal trial, courts

consider: (1) "whether there was bad faith . . . on the part of the government";

(2) "whether the evidence . . . was sufficiently material to the defense"; and (3)

"whether [the] defendant was prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the

evidence."   State v. M.B., 471 N.J. Super. 376, 382-83 (App. Div. 2022)

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. 453, 479

(App. Div. 1985)). Generally, if a defendant does not prove "bad faith on the

part of the State, 'failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not

constitute a denial of due process of law.'" Id. at 382 (quoting George v. City

of Newark, 384 N.J. Super. 232, 243 (App. Div. 2006)).

                                                                            A-2068-21
                                         9
      Bad faith has been found when destruction of evidence was "a conscious

effort to suppress exculpatory evidence." State v. Serret, 198 N.J. Super. 21, 26

(App. Div. 1984). Bad faith can also be the result of "egregious carelessness,"

which we have defined as "[conspicuously] bad, flagrant" conduct. State v.

Carter, 185 N.J. Super. 576, 580-81 (App. Div. 1982). Our Supreme Court

recently held bad faith does not require intentional misconduct.        State v.

Zadroga, ____ N.J. ___ (2023) (slip op. at 19-33).

      On December 3, 2018, the Pemberton Township construction official

emailed the director of the township's department of community development,

advising the property was "in danger of imminent collapse and failure" and a

mandatory demolition date was required by November 2018. However, no

demolition was set yet. On December 19, 2018, defense counsel left a voice

mail with the township asking officials to return his call and advise "what the

demolition plans are if any."

      On December 22, 2018, defendant wrote to the township code

enforcement officer from jail and copied the prosecutor. His letter advised that

the township did not have his permission "to tamper with, destroy or trespass on

the . . . property" and warned against destroying evidence. On December 28,

2018, the township chief of police sent an email to the prosecutor attaching

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                                      10
defendant's letter advising the township wished to demolish the home because

the "construction official . . . deemed it a public safety hazard." The chief asked

the prosecutor to advise what his office's position was on the demolition. On

January 2, 2019, the prosecutor responded he would contact defense counsel "to

tell him . . . the scene is extremely dangerous and needs to be demolished as

soon as possible and then give [the defense] a very brief timeline to get done

what he needs to do." The prosecutor, in turn, emailed defense counsel and

advised as follows: "The home is in horrible shape and is a public danger . If

you are retaining an expert[,] could you let me know so I can advise Pemberton

[Township] on how to proceed with regard to demolition." On January 4, 2019,

the prosecutor emailed the chief advising he had spoken with defense counsel

who

            advised that he wants to retain an expert to look at the
            property prior to it being demolished but he needs
            approval from his supervisor who is currently out of the
            office. (That being said he advised . . . that he does not
            believe that he will be granted permission to retain an
            expert). His supervisor will be in next week and he
            should have a final answer at that time.

      On January 10, 2019, the prosecutor emailed defense counsel and asked:

"Any word yet on whether you will be retaining an expert and the demolition of

the home?" On February 9, 2019, defense counsel wrote to the township's

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                                       11
construction official inquiring whether the demolition had "occurred and, if not,

if [a] date has been set . . . ." Counsel requested "the house not be destroyed

until [the defense] . . . had an opportunity to have an arson expert examine the

property before any planned demolition."

      On February 13, 2019, the prosecutor advised the chief defendant "has a

new attorney who is now renewing the request that the property not be

demolished until he has an expert look at the premises." The chief responded

"[t]he property has not been touched as per the request of [defense counsel]."

The prosecutor then emailed defense counsel inquiring if he had a time frame to

inspect the property. The prosecutor explained the reason for his question was

the township "is concerned with the hazard that the property poses given its

current condition and the potential liability that it poses." He explained he told

prior defense counsel the same thing and prior counsel "didn't feel as though the

[public defender's o]ffice would retain an expert." The prosecutor asked defense

counsel to let him know as soon as possible about the time frame to inspect the

property.

      On April 18, 2019, the State provided the fire marshal's report to defense

counsel.    Internal emails between township officials dated May 14, 2019,

showed a growing concern with the property because it had become a dumping

                                                                            A-2068-21
                                       12
ground for trash.     The emails reflect the township had refrained from

demolishing the property at the defense's request. The home was ultimately

demolished on June 26, 2019.

      Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds the State failed to

preserve the evidence by allowing the home to be demolished. The motion judge

issued a detailed written opinion, and concluded the State had not acted in bad

faith because it gave defendant "ample opportunity to retain an expert an d

investigate the scene prior to the home's destruction . . . ." The home was not

demolished until seven months after the fire. Moreover, the State was in regular

contact with the defense regarding the fact township officials wanted to

demolish the property because it was unsafe and had become a dumping ground.

The judge found "[e]ven if the State did act in bad faith, [d]efendant failed to

meet the remaining burden by showing the evidence had material exculpatory

value prior to its destruction, or that destruction of the home unduly prejudiced

[d]efendant." The judge noted defendant was not "denied the opportunity to do

independent research and investigation [and] . . . there was no way to know

whether the home had some exculpatory value prior to its destruction."

Defendant did not make "a showing that the evidence destroyed would have

played a significant role in his defense." Regardless, defendant could still retain

                                                                             A-2068-21
                                       13
an expert to examine the evidence and refute the State's expert report, including

cross-examination of the State's witnesses.     However, the judge concluded

"[w]hether the home had fire detectors, whether building materials may have

accelerated the fire, or whether the petcock valve on the motorcycle was leaking

gas do not negate any of the elements of the crime and are thus not exculpatory."

      Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude the motion judge's

findings were sound and the State did not deprive defendant of due process

warranting either dismissal of the indictment or a new trial. The facts do not

support the conclusion the State either acted in bad faith or that its conduct was

egregious and flagrant. There were legitimate public safety concerns about the

home, and the record shows the State was in constant contact with defense

counsel inquiring about plans to inspect the property and kept the defense

apprised of the deteriorating nature of the home and delaying its demolition so

a defense expert could inspect it.

      Defendant argues Detective Lloyd's testimony established the petcock

valve was loose and potentially leaking gas.         He asserts Captain Letts's

conclusions on the source of the ignition were based solely on Bland's report

and inadmissible. Therefore, the motorcycle was critical evidence because its

electrical system had potential exculpatory value. We are unpersuaded.

                                                                            A-2068-21
                                       14
      "Evidence is material 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.'" State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. Super. 47, 67 (App. Div. 2014)

(quoting State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 246 (1996)). The record does not support

defendant's speculative theory of causation.

      Captain Letts testified he did not rule out an electrical short as the cause

of the fire. However, he also stated "[he] had no evidence of the motorcycle

causing the fire."   Although Captain Letts acknowledged a lab could have

analyzed the motorcycle's electrical system, the record does not demonstrate a

reasonable probability the electrical system was intact following the fire to

permit such an analysis.

      Defendant has not convinced us the destruction of evidence manifestly

prejudiced his case. The destruction of the alleged exculpatory evidence ignores

Bland's unrebutted eyewitness testimony that defendant caused the fire by

tossing a lighter on the ground.

      Nor are we persuaded defendant's confrontation rights were violated. As

the motion judge aptly noted, the destruction of evidence did not prevent

defendant from performing "independent research and investigation based upon

the State's [expert] report." Defendant's expert could have reviewed the State's

                                                                            A-2068-21
                                      15
evidence and refuted the State's theory of the case. The defense could also cross-

examine the State's witnesses regarding the cause of the fire. The trial transcript

reflects defense counsel did so by cross-examining Captain Letts about the fact

he inferred the source of ignition by relying on Bland's statement that he saw

defendant throw a lighter. Moreover, the defense also cross-examined Bland.

However, the jury clearly credited the State's evidence. Defendant received a

fair trial.

                                        II.

       Defendant contends the admission of Captain Letts's expert's opinion that

the cause of the fire was incendiary was prejudicial because he was both the

expert and the lead investigator, and the dual role improperly bolstered his

credibility. Defendant also argues Captain Letts's causation opinion violated

N.J.R.E. 702 because it was not beyond the ken of the jury. Defendant further

contends Captain Letts's opinion violated N.J.R.E. 703 because it relied on

double hearsay since he did not interview Bland or review his sworn testimony,

and instead derived what Bland saw from a detective's report. He claims Captain

Letts improperly bolstered Bland's testimony. Further, Captain Letts's opinion

that the sheen on the water in the property was evidence of an accelerant was

                                                                             A-2068-21
                                       16
improper under N.J.R.E. 703 because it did not rely upon facts or data

reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.

      We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings under a deferential standard

and will "uphold [the trial court's] determinations 'absent a showing of an abuse

of discretion.'" State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (quoting State v. Perry,

225 N.J. 222, 233 (2016)). Under that standard, "[a] reviewing court must not

'substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court' unless there was a 'clear

error in judgment'—a ruling 'so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice

resulted.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)). We

disregard harmless errors, but errors capable of causing an unjust result the jury

"otherwise might not have reached" require reversal. State v. Prall, 231 N.J.

567, 581 (2018) (quoting State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004)). "When a

defendant fails to object to an error or raise an issue before the trial court, we

review for plain error." State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 407 (2017) (citing R. 2:10-

2).

      "The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the

sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015).

"N.J.R.E. 703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony." Id. at 53. Expert

testimony is admissible if it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the

                                                                             A-2068-21
                                       17
evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . ." N.J.R.E. 702. Expert testimony

must be based on "(1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence

admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily

admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by

experts." Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53 (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J.

569, 583 (2008)).

      In State v. Torres, our Supreme Court cautioned that even when a witness

may be qualified to give an expert opinion, "the court should carefully weigh

whether the prejudicial effect of that evidence outweighs its probative value."

183 N.J. 554, 580 (2005) (citing State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 184 (1997)).

"[W]hen the expert witness is an investigating officer, the expert opinion may

present significant danger of undue prejudice because the qualification of the

officer as an expert may lend credibility to the officer's fact testimony regardin g

the investigation." Ibid. As a result, Torres requires trial courts exercise their

discretion to limit the scope of such testimony by giving a limiting instruction

to the jury "that conveys to the jury its absolute prerogative to reject both the

expert's opinion and the version of the facts consistent with that opinion." Ibid.

(quoting State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 304 (1995)).

                                                                               A-2068-21
                                        18
      After Captain Letts testified the fire "was intentionally set, [and was] an

incendiary fire[,]" defense counsel timely objected. Following a sidebar, the

trial judge gave the following limiting instruction:

            I am going to instruct that you disregard and put no
            weight to the last portion of the testimony of Captain
            Letts with regard to the determination that the fire was
            intentionally set. That will be within your purview as
            the finders of fact in this matter.

                   At the end of case, I will provide additional
            instructions touching on this exact issue, but I am
            ordering you to disregard the testimony with regard to
            that statement, the last statement by Captain Letts, the
            witness indicating that it was his opinion based on his
            analysis that the fire was intentionally set.

      The trial judge's limiting instruction was timely, correct, and adequately

instructed the jury to ignore the prejudicial aspect of Captain Letts's testimony.

"[W]e trust juries to follow instructions." State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 65 (1993).

The record does not convince us the jury failed to follow the judge's instructions.

      Captain Letts primarily testified on other matters beyond the ken of the

jury. He explained he ruled out other household items as potential causes of the

fire, his assessment of the fire's movement and intensity throughout the house,

and his assessment of the fire's origin. The State did not ask Captain Letts about

the lighter as the source of ignition during direct examination. This information

was adduced during the defense's cross-examination, which repeatedly asked

                                                                             A-2068-21
                                       19
whether the cause of the fire was a lighter, if he searched for a lighter on the

scene, and the likelihood of a lighter surviving a fire.

      We reject the assertion Captain Letts's expert opinion did not meet the

standards of N.J.R.E. 703 regarding his reliance on Bland's statement. At trial,

Captain Letts was examined by the defense regarding the National Fire

Protection Association Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (NFPA 921)

standard, which are guidelines used in fire investigations. NFPA 921 states:

            [A] fire explosion investigation may include all or some
            of the following tasks: scene inspection or review of
            previous scene documentation done by others; scene
            documentation through photography and diagramming;
            evidence recognition, documentation, and preservation;
            witness interviews; review and analysis of the
            investigation of others; and identification and
            collection of data from other appropriate sources.

            [NFPA 921 § 4.4.3.2]

      NFPA 921 § 19.2.1 states that in some investigations, "a single item, such

as an irrefutable article of physical evidence or a credible eyewitness to the

ignition . . . may be the basis for a determination of cause." However, this

section also provides "no single item is sufficient in itself to allow determination

of the fire cause. The investigator should use all available resources to develop

fire cause hypotheses and to determine which hypotheses fit all of the credible

data available." Ibid.

                                                                              A-2068-21
                                        20
      Having considered the record in light of these standards, we are convinced

Captain Letts's testimony met the requirements of N.J.R.E. 703. He did not rely

solely on Bland's statement, and instead testified that the eyewitness statements

were corroborated by the physical evidence, including his inspection of the

scene and the gasoline on defendant's boot. These elements, taken together, led

him to rule out other causes of the fire.

      Captain Letts's and Detective Lloyd's testimony about the "sheen" only

stated it was indicative of an accelerant. This testimony was corroborated by

the fact defendant's shoe had gasoline on it and Bland's testimony pointing to

gasoline fumes in the garage. Regardless, the defense was able to cross-examine

the witnesses regarding the probity of the sheen. This testimony did not unduly

prejudice the jury's ability to draw its own conclusions.

                                        III.

      When multiple errors are alleged, "the predicate for relief for cumulative

error must be that the probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the

underlying trial unfair." State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007). Even

where a defendant alleges multiple errors, "the theory of cumulative error will

still not apply where no error was prejudicial and the trial was fair." State v.

                                                                           A-2068-21
                                       21
Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014). The errors alleged by defendant, individually

and taken together, do not convince us he received an unfair trial.

                                      IV.

      Defendant challenges his sentence, arguing the judge failed to adequately

explain his basis for finding the aggravating factors, and should have found

mitigating factor eight. He claims the judge failed to provide any explanation

for finding aggravating factors six and nine and found factor three solely based

on defendant's criminal history. Further, the judge did not "explain the weight

[he] assigned to the factors [he] found." Defendant notes factor three should

have been accorded little weight because his criminal history primarily

comprised municipal violations and third- and fourth-degree convictions. He

claims the judge enhanced his sentence based on his prior contacts with law

enforcement, which had resulted in dismissed or unindicted charges.

      Defendant argues the court violated N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(f)(1) and Rule 3:21-

4(k) because it did not explain on the record the real-time period of parole

ineligibility when it imposed the sentence pursuant to NERA. He asserts we

have previously ordered a resentencing when the court did not refer to the NERA

ineligibility term. State v. Ramsey, 415 N.J. Super. 257, 271-72 (App. Div.

2010).

                                                                          A-2068-21
                                      22
      Sentencing decisions are discretionary in nature. State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.

321, 347 (2019). We review a sentence for an abuse of discretion, deferring to

the sentencing court's factual findings, and should not second-guess them. State

v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018); State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). We

"must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines

were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not

'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application

of the guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'"

State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State

v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).       "To facilitate meaningful appellate

review, trial judges must explain how they arrived at a particular sentence."

Case, 220 N.J. at 65.

      Defendant was sentenced to an extended term as a persistent offender.

The judge imposed concurrent eleven-year prison terms on both counts of

second-degree reckless-manslaughter, with an eighty-five percent parole bar

pursuant to NERA. He found aggravating factors three (risk of re-offense),

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six (extent of prior criminal history), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(6); and nine (need for deterrence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). He also found

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mitigating factor two (defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would

cause serious harm), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2).

     The judge qualitatively analyzed the aggravating and mitigating factors as

follows:

           [I]n reviewing the presentence report and the
           submissions of counsel [the court] does find clearly that
           aggravating factor [three] exists, the risk that
           [defendant] will commit another offense. There are
           contacts with the court going back to 1977 and as
           outlined in the presentence report the contacts with law
           enforcement have been consistent, frequent, and
           basically . . . since 1977.

                  The [c]ourt finds aggravating factor [six] could
           be applicable here. And of course that is the extent of
           . . . defendant's prior criminal record, and the
           seriousness of the offenses for which he has been
           convicted. And the [c]ourt also finds aggravating
           factor [nine], the need to deter the defendant and others
           from violating the law.

                  In this matter the [c]ourt could only find one lone
           mitigating factor, and that is mitigating factor [two].
           That [defendant] did not contemplate that his conduct
           would cause, or threaten serious harm. And the [c]ourt
           finds that here based upon the lengthy criminal history
           and the application of the aggravating and mitigating
           factors that the aggravating factors preponderate over
           the lone mitigating factor. They substantially outweigh
           the mitigating factors.

     The judge declined to impose consecutive sentences and reasoned as

follows:

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            [W]hile [defendant] has been convicted of these two
            counts . . . the [c]ourt recognizes that [defendant] also
            attempted to, at least from the [c]ourt's perspective,
            attempted to put out the fire and attempt[ed] to rescue
            the individuals who ultimately succumbed to the fire.
            And so[,] the [c]ourt does weigh that and it does not
            impose a significantly more severe sentence in
            consideration of that. But [defendant's] criminal
            history is abhorrent, but ultimately the [c]ourt's
            determination for the extended term and the term of
            imprisonment reflects the facts and circumstances as
            the [c]ourt finds them to be.

      We are satisfied the judge made adequate findings regarding the

aggravating and mitigating factors. The record supports the factors the judge

found, and he explained the weight given to them. Defendant's argument that

the court should have considered mitigating factor eight (defendant's conduct

was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur) is unsupported by the record.

      N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(f) states:

            The court shall explain the parole laws as they apply to
            the sentence and shall state:

                  (1) the approximate period of time in years and
                  months the defendant will serve in custody before
                  parole eligibility;

                  (2) the jail credits or the amount of time the
                  defendant has already served;

                  (3) that the defendant may be entitled to good
                  time and work credits; and

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                                      25
                  (4) that the defendant may be eligible for
                  participation in the Intensive Supervision
                  Program.

      The record lacks an explanation of the real-time parole consequences of

defendant's sentence.    They are not mentioned in defendant's sentencing

memorandum. And the only mention of NERA at sentencing was the following

statement from the judge: "The [c]ourt will grant the application for an extended

term and sentence [defendant] to a term of imprisonment to the custody of the

Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for a term of [eleven] years to

which [NERA] shall be applicable." For these reasons, we remand the sentence

and direct the judge to explain the real time consequences of defendant's

sentence, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(f).

      Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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