Court Opinion

ID: 9480295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:43:57.260359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:35.823174
License: Public Domain

SNEED, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the court’s opinion with a reluctance grounded in dissatisfaction with both the law enacted by Congress and its application by this circuit.
As to the law, the standards “clear probability of persecution” and “well founded fear of persecution” have too little objective content to enable administrators and courts to apply them with confidence and consistency. It is impossible to exclude from the decisional process extra legal concerns derived from the experiences of the decision maker or his or her forbears. Also not excludable is the decision maker’s understanding of the history of, and conditions prevailing in, the country of the refugee’s origin. No doubt the argument that these influences should not be excluded can be made with some force. The difficulty the argument encounters, however, is that its strength suggests that administrators should be the decision makers rather than judges who in our legal system function best in applying Jaw to facts established by an adversarial process in which their role is essentially a subordinate one.
The response of Congress has been to create immigration judges and the Bureau of Immigration Appeals that are mainly administrative but somewhat judicial in nature, and review by Article III judges, who are, it turns out, also mainly administrative and somewhat judicial. Obviously the reviewing judges should be much less administrative and more judicial, but that is very difficult to achieve in the context of “asylum” and “withholding of deportation” cases. The difficulty springs in part from the absence of a meaningful adversarial process in the system. The illegal alien tells his story to an immigration judge who frequently has heard the same or a similar story many times previously. There is no one to contradict it and quite often no one to corroborate it. Some “likelihood of falsity” meter flutters in the mind of the immigration judge and if the needle of that meter reaches a near vertical position the alien is in peril of being deported. The same process occurs at the Article III level. Both sets of “judges” are being used as administrators confronted with grossly inadequate information untested by an adversarial process and equipped with an authority that literally can mean life or death in some instances. Decisions frequently are made on the basis of untethered intuition.
Obviously Article III judges need not function precisely as do immigration judges. Occupying a higher rung in the review ladder their role could be reduced to spotting aberrational decisions by the immigration judges and reversing them as not being supported by substantial evidence. So long as consistency appeared to characterize the results affirmances would be proper.
It is very likely that Congress did intend the Article III judges generally to perform in this fashion. While some circuits appear substantially to so function, the Ninth Circuit does not. In four specific respects, the Ninth departs from this model. These are:
1. It has heightened the quantity or quality of substantial evidence that an INS decision which denies relief to the alien must surmount to avoid reversal.
2. It has imparted to the testimony of the alien in question an increasing degree of credibility to the point that only an explicit finding by an immigration judge of incredibility will justify a denial of withholding of deportation or asylum in any case in which the alien’s story is not patently false.
3. It has eliminated any necessity that the alien’s testimony be corroborated by relevant external evidence.
*7654. It treats “political neutrality” as an “opinion” for which an alien may show a “probability” or “likelihood” of persecution.
In each instance we stand apart from our sister circuits. Perhaps the beat of the drummer to which we march is the correct one; in any event, it is quite different.
I. The Substantial Evidence Standard.
This circuit makes it easier than any other for an alien to argue successfully that a decision by an immigration judge is not supported by substantial evidence. The seed that yielded this fruit was Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 n. 8 (9th Cir.1984), in which this court began to review denials of withholding of deportation under a “heightened” substantial evidence standard. The reason offered for the departure was that where the issue is withholding deportation, a finding of a “probability” of persecution required granting the relief, whereas the granting of asylum was a matter within the discretion of the Attorney General. Id. and n. 9. Whatever may be the merits of this distinction, the “hydraulics” of the “withholding of deportation” and “asylum” provisions dictate that reducing the level of the first forces a lowering of the second.
Other circuits that have articulated explicitly the standard of review follow the abuse of discretion standard. The Fifth Circuit, for example, “aecord[s] deference to the Board’s interpretation of immigration statutes unless there are compelling indications that the Board’s interpretation is wrong.” Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826, 108 S.Ct. 92, 98 L.Ed.2d 53 (1987) (citing Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1250 n. 8 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987)). The same is true for other circuits. See Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 411 (6th Cir.1987) (applying abuse of discretion standard); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1523 (4th Cir.1986) (same); McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir.1986) (same).
II. The “Incredibility" Requirement.
Although the stricter standard of review employed in the Ninth Circuit may determine the outcome of some cases, the more troubling doctrinal development has been the creation of judicial fictions — all in the guise of statutory interpretation — that accord a steadily increasing presumption of verity to aliens’ contentions with respect to each evidentiary “requirement.” An illustration of this dynamic is the movement toward an “incredibility” requirement. An alien must provide specific evidence of persecution, and “ ‘mere assertions of possible fear’ are insufficient.” Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir.1985) (quoting Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir.1983)). Lest this burden be too great, our circuit has determined that an alien’s own testimony is controlling if “credible and supported by general documentary evidence that the threats should be considered serious.” Artiga-Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir.1987); see Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285.
Other circuits have been chary of according too much weight to an alien’s own statements, for the obvious reason that they tend to be self-serving. See, e.g., Gumbol, 815 F.2d at 412 (defining the permissible parameters under which an alien’s “own unsubstantiated testimony” will be accepted); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 577 (7th Cir.1984) (permitting alien’s statements only under certain circumstances).
By grafting on the statute a doctrinal rule that the INS must make a formal credibility determination, however, we have put in place a requirement that will frequently trip up even the most diligent INS adjudicator. If, as in the case before us, the immigration judge makes no determination that the alien’s testimony is not credible, this circuit “presume[s] that they have found the petitioner’s testimony credible.” Artiga-Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723.1 Thus, to *766proceed with deportation, an immigration judge must explicitly find the alien’s testimony “incredible.” The absence of an adversarial factfinding process2 makes such a showing extremely difficult.
III. The Erosion of External Corroboration.
A requirement that the immigration judge must find the alien’s testimony incredible signals the further erosion of external corroboration requirements. Although the alien must “produce some evidence to show that persecution, if carried out, would be directed toward the alien as an individual,” Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.1985), the alien may produce such evidence in our circuit by means of his own testimony. See, e.g., Artiga-Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723.
Such evidence is highly subjective, and being filtered through the lense of the alien’s experience, it may be distorted. Accordingly, every circuit but this one has required external corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 409, 412 (6th Cir.1987) (finding petitioner’s own testimony without more evidence insufficient to show clear probability of future persecution); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (4th Cir.1986) (following Seventh Circuit requirement that alien must offer specific facts that he “will more likely than not be singled out for persecution”) (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 573 (7th Cir.1984)); Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (finding petitioner’s own testimony insufficient without external evidence of political dissidence for showing of persecution); McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir.1986) (requiring aliens to “present some objective evidence establishing a realistic likelihood that he would be persecuted in his native land”); Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 573 (requiring specific, objective facts that this particular alien is being singled out for persecution).
The case before us illustrates our failure to require corroboration. The letter would perhaps have been such evidence, but Mendoza is unable to produce it. We do not require its production. It is thus unlikely that Mendoza would prevail in any circuit but this one.
An equally troubling dimension of this erosion of external evidentiary requirements is that it underscores our departure from the general rule of deference to administrative decisions. The extent to which the other circuit courts of appeal disagree with our court’s approach is well-illustrated by a recent decision of the Eleventh Circuit. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, that court deferentially reviews decisions of the executive branch in this field. In Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.1990), the court recently upheld an order denying a withholding of deportation because it found no linkage between the persecution and the alien’s “political opinion,” as required by the statute. In a revealing passage, made all the more so by the striking difference it exposes between the approaches of these two circuits, the court stated:
Where Congress has made either an explicit or an implicit delegation of authority to an agency to fill the gaps in a statute and to provide meaning to particular terms of a statute, we must give “considerable weight” to the executive department’s construction. See Chevron *767[v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)] at 843, 104 S.Ct. [2778] at 2781-82 [81 L.Ed.2d 694], We “may not substitute our own construction for a reasonable interpretation” made by the BIA. Id.; see also INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1222, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (“in the process of filling ‘any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,’ the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program.”); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir.1987) (“[W]e accord deference to the Board’s interpretation of immigration statutes unless there are compelling indications that the Board’s interpretation is wrong.”). We conclude that the BIA’s determination that neither the retribution Escobar fears from the guerillas for having deserted them nor the investigation that he fears the government will undertake and the punishment it might exact because of his association with the guerrillas constitutes “persecution ... on account of ... political opinion” is reasonable.
Id. at 1296-97 (footnote omitted).
We of the Ninth Circuit do not speak in those tones.
IV. Political “Neutrality” as “Political Opinion. ”
We also differ from other circuits on the crucial question of what constitutes “persecution ... on account of ... political opinion.” The Ninth Circuit has held that political neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h). See, e.g., Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.1989). This holding eviscerates the political opinion requirement of the statute. It means that a politically inactive alien, and perhaps most illegal aliens are, may now gain the protection of asylum. Other circuits have not been blind to this distortion of the historical purposes of asylum. In a footnote, the Perlera-Escobar court made clear that it perceived a difference in legal standard between these two circuits:
Although [the] Maldonado-Cruz [district court opinion] has been reversed by the Ninth Circuit in Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.1989), we still regard it as persuasive and as a statement of the BIA’s position. In reversing the BIA’s decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on its own decisions which hold that political neutrality is a political opinion within the meaning of the Act. This circuit has not adopted the Ninth Circuit’s belief that political neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of the Act.
894 F.2d at 1297 n. 4.
As a concept of international law, political asylum developed in response to the need to protect persons from persecution by their government because they had performed political acts or held political opinions in defiance of the state. Authorities interpreting the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 (“Refugee Convention”), 189 U.N.T.S. 137, for example, hold two different views regarding the nature of political opinion necessary to qualify for refugee status. Neither encompasses political neutrality. According to S. Prakash Sinha, an international authority on asylum:
Where the nature of the offense is mixed, one point of view maintains that the Convention applies only to those cases where the political opinion of the individual involved is decisive of the nature and severity of his punishment, while another viewpoint holds that it is sufficient that he has committed the offense because of his political opinion.
S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law 103 (1971).
This core idea of political activism underlies the concept of “refugee” status. As Sinha notes, the key element of political opinion involves the “rupturpng] of the refugee’s normal relationship between him and his state.” In turn, this rupture results from a political controversy, which “may arise from his non-submission to a new government for various political reasons, or from acts of political persecution by the government of his state, or from his own political offenses.” Id. at 97. We *768distort the meaning of an important requirement for refugee status when we permit political aloofness to serve as an active “political opinion,” that endangers its holder. It also demeans the true martyr for whom asylum was intended.
It is not likely this concurring opinion will alter either the statutory or case law with which it is concerned. Nonetheless, from time-to-time sightings should be taken to establish one’s position. Our ship appears to be at some distance from the main fleet but no reefs or shoals appear dead ahead. As a passenger, I shall go below and hope for the best.

. In a similar case, the Seventh Circuit properly refused to go so far. See Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.1984). In Carvajal-Munoz, the “immigration judge made no specif*766ic statement regarding petitioner’s credibility.” Id. at 577. The court permitted the alien’s own statements as evidence with certain caveats: "Thus, while recognizing the potential for self-serving statements in this context, we accept petitioner’s statements where they establish factual circumstances with specificity, are not speculative, and do not conflict with petitioner’s other evidence.” Id. As evidenced by the court's holding in favor of the INS, see id. at 580, the Seventh Circuit’s standard is significantly different from the holding in this case, which relies on a presumption of credibility. No other circuit appears to follow the Ninth Circuit’s rule.

. As already mentioned, the immigration system is not an adversary system. The job of the INS is not to deport every alien. Nor should it be. Rather, the INS should attempt faithfully to execute the will of Congress by withholding the deportation of, or granting asylum to, those who meet specific criteria.