Court Opinion

ID: 9643189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:21:28.09113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.025613
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
concurring.
I fully concur in the majority’s opinion and disposition of points two and three. However, I specially concur in its disposition of point one.
In addressing the retaliatory discharge claim recognized under article 8307c of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes,1 Gifford Hill American, Inc. invoked comparison with the McDonnell Douglas shifting burden test. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In doing so, it admitted that Paul Whittington’s evidence “raised the inference that there ... [was] a casual link” between his discharge and his workers compensation claim. The admission satisfied the causative nexus required under article 8307c. See Parham v. Carrier Corp., 9 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that the worker’s compensation *767claim need not be the sole cause but simply a determining factor); Acme Boot Co. v. Montenegro, 862 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ) (holding proof that the worker’s compensation claim “contributed” to the adverse employment decision sufficient causation). But for it, I would have respectfully concluded that the evidence was both legally and factually insufficient to establish anything other than Gifford Hill’s desire to enhance employee safety and dislike for employee injuries. Moreover, from neither of those stimuli alone could one reasonably infer retaliation as contemplated by article 8307c. Parham v. Carrier Corp., 9 F.3d at 387-88.

. The provision was repealed and replaced in 1993 by § 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code.