Court Opinion

ID: 9482219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:43:45.201668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:50.628178
License: Public Domain

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I do not agree that presentence drug rehabilitation efforts may be considered under the rubric of “Acceptance of Responsibility,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, so to justify a two-level offense reduction, nor that “ ‘extraordinary’ ” rehabilitation, Maj.Op. at 962 (quoting United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir.1990)), may support further reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. I also disagree that Application Note 2 to section 3E1.1 permits acceptance of responsibility reductions for defendants such as Harrington.
I would follow the Third and Ninth Circuits in concluding that U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4— which states that “[djrug dependence ... is not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines” — clearly indicates that the Sentencing Commission considered and rejected drug rehabilitation as a basis for downward departure. See United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 162, 163 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 132-33 (3d Cir.1990). I cannot imagine that the Commission explicitly rejected the notion of drug dependence as a reason for downward departure without implicitly rejecting the companion concept of drug rehabilitation. After all, rehabilitation is not relevant unless one is dependent. See Martin, at 163; Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133. And the Commission’s recommendation that addicted defendants be sentenced to supervised release with participation in drug treatment programs after incarceration, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, is a further indication that the Commission considered and rejected rehabilitation as a sentencing factor. See Martin, at 163.
The majority fails to confront section 5H1.4, merely stating without explanation that “the Commission ha[s] not squarely addressed the issue we face.” Maj.Op. at 962. The district judge thought that the Commission’s “rejection of addiction as a sentencing factor is no indication of its consideration of susceptibility to successful treatment for drug addiction,” United States v. Harrington, 741 F.Supp. 968, 976 (D.D.C.1990), which, as I indicate above, I think is fallacious. It is not clear to me whether the majority agrees or disagrees with the district judge on this point.
To be sure, the Third and Ninth Circuits have not decided that acceptance of responsibility reductions for drug rehabilitation are unavailable to defendants whose crimes are drug-related (the Third Circuit explicitly reserved the issue). But that the Commission rejected drug dependence — and therefore rehabilitation — as a sentencing factor under section 5H1.4, I think, forecloses this result. Moreover, even if the Commission had not rejected rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, I do not think drug rehabilitation fits within section 8E1.1. A defendant’s participation in a drug treatment program does not evince his acceptance of responsibility for the crime he committed, even where — as here — that crime was distributing illegal drugs. Rather, it demonstrates only the defendant’s desire to improve himself, see Pharr, 916 F.2d at *971132, and perhaps to obtain a lighter sentence.
The majority’s holding permits, even encourages, the very “battle[s] of experts” the majority wishes to avoid. Maj.Op. at 960. Leaving open the possibility for unlimited downward departure for “ ‘extraordinary’ ” rehabilitation invites expert testimony as to whether the defendant’s rehabilitation efforts are in fact exceptional— particularly since the majority does not define extraordinary rehabilitation.
Finally, the majority’s reading of Application Note 2 as not precluding acceptance of responsibility reductions for defendants who, like Harrington, maintain their innocence and proceed to trial is dubious. The note makes clear that defendants who put the government to its burden of proof will qualify for a reduction only “[i]n rare situations.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 Application Note 2.Presentence drug rehabilitation efforts are anything but rare, as the district court below recognized. See Transcript of Sentencing, June 27, 1990, at 11 (“The Court: [speaking to defendant Harrington] ... If I do this ..., and you don’t keep on doing what you’re doing now, you are going to ruin the chance not only for yourself but for thousands and thousands of people who might have a chance [like yours].... ” (emphasis added)).