Court Opinion

ID: 9660017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:01:15.126261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:13.960110
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Culver
joined by Justice Garwood dissenting.
If this case is to be reversed as to the plaintiffs, Gossett, for another trial, to which I agree, though I would base the reversal on additional grounds to those advanced by the majority, I think it should also be reversed as to the third party defendant, Mrs. Sample.
It is not disputed that Olive Street was marked and designated as a one-way street for northbound traffic. The plaintiff, Mrs. Gossett, testified that Olive Street was a one-way street for traffic going north; the police officer testified that there were signs on Olive Street designating it as a one-way street for traffic moving north. Mrs. Sample was placed upon the stand by plaintiffs and in response to interrogation by plaintiffs’ counsel answered that she did not see any one-way signs, but in the next breath, in answer to further questions, said that it had been recently made a one-way street. She further testified that the policeman came up on the one-way street. On cross examination she admitted that the policeman gave her a ticket for attempting* to go the wrong way and that while she did not ap*261pear in the corporation court and plead guilty, yet she paid a fine which was shown to be in the amount of $25.00, the charge being that of negligent collision, illegal right turn. The above was substantially all of the evidence on the point.
Under this proof I think it was not necessary for the defendant to offer a formal city ordinance. No objection was made by plaintiff or the defendant, Mrs. Sample, to any of this testimony nor did they raise the point that a copy of the ordinance had not been offered in evidence.
This testimony is in the nature of an admission and ought to-be binding upon Mrs. Sample. This was not the situation in Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Texas 50, 132 S.W. 2d 97, relied on by the majority. Plaintiffs’ counsel at one point in his summation to the jury argued as follows:
“* * * She (Mrs. Sample) has her own attorney, but I say at that point a person could have had a proper lookout at that corner and have failed to see a sign. We leave that question to be resolved in your own mind. It seems the street had been made a one-way street there just two or three days before. Mrs. Sample herself was the only one that testified in that respect and she admitted it was a one-way street. There is no evidence controverting the fact it had been a working one-way street for at least two or three days. * *
Signs are posted for the direction of traffic and should be respected and obeyed and are to be relied upon without theretofore ascertaining whether they have been established by valid ordinance. It would be difficult for traffic to be controlled if this were not true. This proposition is supported by Mathias v. Eichelberger, 182 Wash. 185, 45 Pac. 2d 619, 621, where the court said:
“* * * Whether or not Legion Way was, by ordinance, made a one-way street, it was such in fact and the signs posted and maintained challenged the public’s attention to the fact. The way had been so marked for a considerable period of time before the collision, a fact known to the respondent driver of the truck.
“ ‘Travelers upon public highways are not expected to first ascertain and determine whether such signs are established in strict compliance with law before respecting them.’ ” See also Lawe v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash. 362, 1 Pac. 2d 237; Comfort v. Penner, 166 Wash. 177, 6 Pac. 2d 604, 606.
*262In my opinion the issue should have been worded substantially as requested by the defendant as follows:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question defendant, Mrs. Mary Sample’s proceeding south on a street which was designated as a one-way street for northbound traffic only was negligence?”
Under the issues submitted the jury did not reach or answer the question as to whether Mrs. Sample’s proceeding south on Olive Street was negligence, a proximate cause or the sole proximate cause of Mrs. Gossett’s injuries. It appears to me that the error affects the whole of the matter in controversy and the entire case should be retried.
Opinion delivered October 10, 1956.
Rehearing overruled November 7, 1956.