Court Opinion

ID: 9373518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:36.306575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.012776
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     STEPHEN M. DAMBRA,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DA-3330-21-0393-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND                        DATE: August 1, 2022
       HUMAN SERVICES,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lawrence George Widem, Esquire, West Hartford, Connecticut, for the
             appellant.

           Tonya Savage, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) appeal
     for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                               2

          following circumstances:     the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
          material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
          or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
          administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
          decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
          discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
          material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
          diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
          Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
          considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
          established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
          Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
          which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                           BACKGROUND
     ¶2         The appellant is a preference-eligible employee with the agency’s Indian
          Health Service (IHS). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. In August 2021, the
          appellant filed three separate applications for three different, higher -graded
          positions in the IHS. Id. at 7. The appellant was not selected for any of these
          positions.   The agency’s explanation in each case was that “[b]y law, Indian
          Preference candidates are entitled to consideration for Federal employment
          before other applicants. There were sufficient Indian Preference candidates for
          this vacancy; therefore, your application was not considered.” Id.
¶3              On August 31, 2021, the appellant filed a Board appeal, arguing that the
          agency violated his veterans’ preference rights in connection with these
          nonselections. Id. at 3, 5. He indicated on his appeal form that he had not filed a
          complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL) concerning this matter. Id. at 4.
          The administrative judge issued an order, notifying the appellant of the standard
          for establishing jurisdiction over a VEOA appeal, including the requirement that
                                                                                           3

     the appellant first exhaust his administrative remed y with DOL.           IAF, Tab 3
     at 2-6. She ordered the parties to file evidence and argument on the issue. Id.
     at 6-7.
¶4          On September 16, 2021, the appellant responded by filing a copy of a claim
     receipt from DOL, which indicated he had filed a veterans’ preference complaint
     earlier that same day. 2 IAF, Tab 4 at 4. The administrative judge then issued an
     order stating that “[t]he appellant has not submitted any evidence s howing that he
     has filed a DOL complaint regarding the non-selections at issue in this appeal
     and, if he has, that DOL has closed his complaint or that 61 days have passed
     since he filed his DOL complaint.” IAF, Tab 5 at 1. She ordered the appellant to
     show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at
     1-2.   The appellant did not respond to the administrative judge’s order.          The
     agency responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to satisfy the exhaustion
     requirement.     IAF, Tab 7.       After the record on jurisdiction closed, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction on that basis. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID).
¶5          The appellant has filed a petition for review, contesting the administrative
     judge’s jurisdictional analysis.    Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2.         The
     agency has responded to the petition for review, and the appellant has filed a
     reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 4-5.

     2
       The appellant also filed a copy of the last page of an undated Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC) complaint, the contents of which are not contained in the record. IAF,
     Tab 4 at 5. The administrative judge informed the appellant that, if he wished to raise
     an additional claim in connection with his OSC complaint, he needed to specify the
     nature of that claim. IAF, Tab 5 at 2. The appellant has not done so; none of his
     subsequent pleadings address this OSC complaint, either as to its contents or his reason
     for submitting evidence of it for the record. We therefore decline to address the matter
     any further.
                                                                                        4

                                        ANALYSIS
¶6        As applicable here, to establish Board jurisdiction over a VEOA appeal, an
     appellant must (1) prove by preponderant evidence that he exhausted his remedy
     with DOL, and (2) make nonfrivolous allegations that:        (i) he is a preference
     eligible within the meaning of VEOA, (ii) the action at issue took place on or
     after the date that VEOA was enacted, and (iii) the agency violated his rights
     under a statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference.            5 U.S.C.
     § 3330a(a), (d); Lazaro v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316, 1319
     (Fed. Cir. 2012); Gingery v. Office of Personnel Management, 119 M.S.P.R. 43,
     ¶ 13 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(2), (b)-(c).
¶7        In this case, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove
     that he exhausted his administrative remedy. We agree. 3 The first step of the
     exhaustion process is to file a complaint with DOL containing a summary of the
     allegations that form the basis of the complaint. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(2)(B);
     Wible v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 333, ¶ 10 (2013). After filing
     that complaint, an appellant may fulfill his exhaustion obligation by one of two
     means. The first occurs when DOL’s investigation into the complaint does not
     result in the resolution of the complaint, and DOL notifies the complainant, in
     writing, of the results of its investigation. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(c)(2); Styslinger v.
     Department of the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶ 15 (2007).          The second occurs
     when DOL is unable to resolve a complaint within 60 days after the date on which
     it was filed. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d)(1); Styslinger, 105 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶ 15. After
     60 days have passed without a resolution of the complaint, the complainan t may
     elect to appeal the alleged violation to the Board, but he must first notify DOL of
     his intention to file a Board appeal.         5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d); Styslinger,
     105 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶¶ 15-19; 5 C.F.R. § 1208.21(a).

     3
       The administrative judge did not address the remaining elements of the appellant’s
     jurisdictional burden, and we need not do so here.
                                                                                         5

¶8         Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to satisfy the
      exhaustion requirement because fewer than 61 days had passed since he filed his
      complaint, and he provided no evidence that DOL had closed his complaint. ID
      at 3. On petition for review, the appellant argues, through his attorney, that the
      exhaustion process is now complete and the appeal is ripe for adjudication
      because DOL has provided him written notice that it was unable to resolve his
      complaint and has closed its investigation. PFR File, Tab 2 at 7-10, Tab 5 at 4.
¶9         The Board will adjudicate a VEOA appeal that was not ripe when filed but
      becomes ripe during the pendency of the appeal. See Bent v. Department of State,
      123 M.S.P.R. 304, ¶ 6 (2016); Wooten v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      96 M.S.P.R. 671, ¶ 9 (2004). However, the record in this case still lacks evidence
      upon which the Board could base a finding that the process before DOL has been
      exhausted. The appellant has filed neither a copy of the alleged DOL notification
      nor a sworn statement that he received such notification. The statements of a
      party’s representative in a pleading do not constitute evidence.      Pupis v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 105 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 5 (2007).
¶10        Acknowledging that the record does not contain a copy of a DOL closeout
      notification, the appellant argues variously that the Board should take official
      notice of the notification, the administrative judge should have obtained a copy of
      the notification from DOL, and the agency should have obtained a copy of the
      notification from DOL.      PFR File, Tab 2 at 7, 10-11, Tab 5 at 6-7.       Under
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.64, the Board may take official notice of matters of common
      knowledge or matters that can be verified. However, DOL’s investigation of the
      appellant’s complaint is not a matter of common knowledge, and the Board does
      not have ready access to DOL’s investigatory records such that it can veri fy the
      disposition of the appellant’s complaint.     Furthermore, the burden of proof on
      jurisdiction belongs to the appellant.   5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(b)-(c).   It is not the
      responsibility of the administrative judge or the respondent agency to provide
      evidence of jurisdiction on the appellant’s behalf, particularly in cases like this
                                                                                        6

      one in which the appellant is in a better position than the agency to provide the
      relevant evidence. Cf. Ellis v. Department of the Navy, 76 M.S.P.R. 102, 107
      (1994) (considering the fact that pertinent evidence regarding the jurisdictional
      issue was likely to be in possession and control of the agency as favoring a
      finding of Board jurisdiction).       For these reasons, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant has not submitted any evidence to show
      that the exhaustion process is complete under the first method described in
      Styslinger, 105 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶ 15.
¶11        Nor has the appellant submitted any evidence to show that he exhausted his
      administrative remedy with respect to the second method described in Styslinger,
      105 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶ 15. Although more than 60 days have now passed since the
      appellant filed his complaint with DOL, he has not provided evidence or even
      alleged that he notified DOL of his intention to file a Board appeal. See Becker v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 29, ¶¶ 7-8 (2010).
¶12        The administrative judge further found that, even if the appellant had
      completed the exhaustion process, he still failed to establish jurisdiction because
      he submitted no evidence to show that he completed it with respect to the specific
      nonselections at issue in this appeal. ID at 3. The appellant does not contest this
      finding on review, and we agree with the administrative judge’s assessment.
      Proof of exhaustion requires, at a minimum, a showing that the DOL complaint
      concerns the same agency action or decision at issue in the Board appeal. See
      White v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 M.S.P.R. 574, ¶¶ 7-9 (2010).
¶13        The appellant argues for the first time on review that the agency violated
      his rights under the Fifth Amendment when it applied Indian preference to the
      position at issue.    PFR File, Tab 2 at 6-7.   However, an alleged violation of
      constitutional rights, standing alone, does not confer Board jurisdiction. Moore v.
      Department of State, 15 M.S.P.R. 488, 489-90 (1983), aff’d, 765 F.2d 159 (Fed.
      Cir. 1985) (Table).
                                                                                            7

¶14         The appellant also argues that the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C.
      § 3330a(d) is a prudential rule that does not limit the Board’s subject matter
      jurisdiction. PFR File, Tab 2 at 8-9, Tab 5 at 5. The Board, however, has already
      addressed this issue in adopting its current regulations at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57, and
      we decline to revisit it in the context of the instant appeal.        See Practices &
      Procedures, 80 Fed. Reg. 4489, 4492 (Jan. 28, 2015) (disagreeing with a
      commenter’s suggestion that the Board treat the exhaustion requirement as
      nonjurisdictional in VEOA and individual right of action appeal s).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit . The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                  9

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     10

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice describe d in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expir ed on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of App eals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              11

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.