Court Opinion

ID: 9667507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:47:36.87149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:14.477803
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
(dissenting). The majority concludes that a reasonable juror might have misunderstood the allocation of the burden of persuasion with respect to the issue of the defendant’s intoxication, and thus “the jury instructions were tainted and this taint impaired the integrity of the jury determination.” Majority opinion at 431. Because I do not believe a reasonable juror could have understood the challenged instruction to place upon the defendant the burden of proof with respect to the element of intent, and for other reasons hereinafter discussed, I respectfully dissent.
As the first step in its analysis, the majority concludes that this case offers a clear-cut example of the problem dealt with in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1976). In that case the relevant Maine statutes recognized two kinds of felony homicide — murder and manslaughter. Although both kinds of homicide shared the common features of being unlawful and intentional, murder also included the element of “malice aforethought,” while manslaughter required that the killing have been done “in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.” The jury was instructed on two kinds of homicide and was specifically instructed “that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden *437provocation.” 421 U.S. at 686. Reasoning that heat of passion on sudden provocation was, in effect, the “negative” of malice aforethought, the court held that the instruction “affirmatively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.” Id. at 701.
Despite the fact that in this case we are dealing with “negative defense,” see, majority opinion at 429, I do not find the same affirmative shift in the burden of proof here as occurred in Mullaney. The jury in Mullaney was told that the state need prove two things — that the killing was unlawful and intentional. It is clear that those two elements were also a part of the crime of manslaughter. However, once those two elements were established by the state, the next step in the prosecution (and the one which determined whether the conviction would be for murder or manslaughter) fell squarely on the defendant. Unless the defendant proved that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, a third element of the crime of murder — malice aforethought — would be conclusively implied. In other words, once the state proved up a basic case of felony homicide, it was presumed to be murder unless the defendant proved it was not. Such a jury charge sounds too much like the accu-satorial rule by which a man is guilty until proven innocent, and it is no wonder the United States Supreme Court found it violative of the fundamental due process notions articulated in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
In contrast, in this case the state was not relieved of its burden of proving the presence of the element implicated by the intoxication defense — intent. The jury was instructed repeatedly that the state had to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and intent was defined as an element of the crime. Moreover, a review of the record of the state’s case indicates *438that a significant portion of it was directed toward establishing the presence of the element of intent. In my view this case is not a Mullaney situation at all. At no point during the prosecution was the defendant burdened with the task of proving the nonexistence of an element, the presence of which was automatically and conclusively implied if he failed. And even if the challenged instruction in this case were taken to mean that the defendant must prove something or make some sort of showing (an assumption I make for argument only), it surely does not come close to placing with the defendant the “risk of nonpersuasion,” to use the majority’s term, since his ultimate guilt did not depend directly upon his success or failure. It depended upon the state proving the existence of intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
To say the challenged instruction does not run afoul of Mullaney is not, however, to say it is necessarily constitutionally permissible. As the majority correctly points out, the test is how the instruction could be understood by a reasonable juror. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The majority concludes that the phrase “he must establish,” repeated three times1 in the space of one sentence, in close proximity to the words “utterly incapable of forming the intent,” “easily could have led a reasonable juror to conclude that before a verdict of not guilty of first-degree murder could be returned, the defendant had to convince him or her that a reasonable doubt existed regarding the defendant’s intent to kill. (Emphasis added.)” Majority Opinion at 433. I disagree.
The potential effect or impact of a jury instruction upon the deliberative process must be gauged by viewing the jury instructions in their entirety. Moes v. State, 91 *439Wis.2d 756, 768, 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979) ; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973). The majority, in apparent adherence to this principle, states at pages 434-435:
“We have reviewed the jury instructions and we note that this is not a case where a single sentence or phrase lent itself to an impermissible interpretation which was counterbalanced by a set of jury instructions which, when read as a whole, accurately stated the law.”
My review of the complete instructions given by the trial judge in this case leads me to believe otherwise.
The trial judge read twenty-four pattern instructions and two special instructions requested by counsel, both of which related to intoxication. Prior to giving the challenged instruction, the jury was instructed on the elements of first-degree murder in part as follows:
“Before the Defendant may be found guilty of murder in the first degree, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that there were present the following two elements of this offense. First, that the Defendant intended to kill Randall Quandt, and second, that the Defendant caused the death of Randall Quandt.”
Following that instruction and an extended instruction on what is meant by intent, the jury was instructed that:
“If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the Defendant did commit an act of shooting which caused the death of Randall Quandt at the time and place charged in the Information, and that at any time before doing such act the Defendant had formed in his mind the purpose to take the life of Randall Quandt and that the act of shooting was done by the Defendant in pursuance of such mental purpose, then you should find the Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in the Information.
“If, however, you are not so satisfied, then you must find the Defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree. . . .”
*440Following instruction on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, the jury was again instructed:
“If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the Defendant committed first degree murder, . . . you should find him guilty of that offense. ...”
After the trial judge read the challenged instruction on intoxication, the jury was instructed as follows:
“In determining the guilt or innocence of the Defendant you should scrutinize the evidence with the utmost care and caution. You should act with all the judgment, reason, prudence and discrimination you possess. If, after this scrutiny of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt of the Defendant’s guilt, you must find him not guilty.
“The law presumes every person charged with the commission of an offense to be innocent. This presumption attends the Defendant throughout the trial and prevails at its close unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not required to prove his innocence.
“The burden of proving the Defendant guilty of every element of the crime charged is upon the State. Before you can return a verdict of guilty, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
“If you can reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the Defendant’s innocence, you should do so and find him not guilty.”
After being so instructed, could a reasonable juror believe the defendant was required to prove anything? I think not. A recent survey confirms what some jurists have suspected for a long time — that jury instructions have a modest impact on juries because jurors do not comprehend the nuances and directions contained in the instructions. Jurors are citizens selected for temporary duty as fact finders in contested legal matters. I do not *441know any definition of the proverbial “reasonable jur- or,” but I accept the proposition that the reasonable juror is one who comes to jury duty knowing that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence. I believe it equally reasonable to assume that, when jurors have accepted the jurors’ oath after voir dire examination and when they are repeatedly instructed on the matter of burden of proof, they collectively comprehend from the maze of instruction the principal theme that the defendant does not have to prove his innocence, and the state does have to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence before the jury can convict the defendant of any crime.
I believe this case is distinguishable from Sandstrom. In Sandstrom the court rejected the argument that the general instructions on the burden of proof or the presumption of innocence neutralized an instruction that “ ‘[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.’ ” 442 U.S. at 513. The court concluded the erroneous instruction was not cured by the other instructions because a reasonable juror could have believed the normal presumption of innocence and burden of proof could be effectuated by operation of the challenged instruction, that is, a reasonable juror could have believed that the state could prove its case and overcome the presumption of innocence by the application of the challenged presumption. We are not dealing with a presumption that could be viewed as an aid or shortcut to proof, as was the case in Sandstrom. The totality of the instructions here clearly and unmistakably allocate the burden of proof, as well as the risk of nonpersuasion, upon the state, and for that reason I do not find the instruction constitutionally infirm, and I would affirm the court of appeals.
*442I am also troubled by the language of the majority opinion at page 430, stating that, once the defendant has come forward with some evidence of intoxication, “the burden will be upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s consumption of alcohol or drugs did not negate the existence of a state of mind necessary to fix criminal liability.” The majority then states: “In his discretion, the prosecutor may elect to provide additional evidence in rebuttal of the defense or the prosecutor may choose to stand on the basis of the proof he submitted in the case-in-chief.” This suggests that the majority recognizes the state does not assume some additional or greater burden when the defendant has raised the issue of intoxication. But this language does not go far enough.
The state’s burden to prove that a defendant’s state of mind was not negated by alcohol consumption inheres in its general burden to prove intent. I fear that now each time intoxication is an issue defense counsel will be clamoring to have a special instruction submitted to the effect that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not so intoxicated as to be incapable to forming the requisite intent. I hope trial judges resist these urgings, inasmuch as I do not feel that such an instruction is proper. It is elementary that to prove a thing exists one must in effect disprove its nonexistence. Thus when a jury is instructed that the state must prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt, it means there must be no reasonable doubt arising from the defendant’s intoxication or any other intent-negating factor.
This is not a case like Moes where we held the state was required to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the statutory defense of coercion. Lack of coercion is not an element of first-degree murder, and *443thus the basic instruction that the state is required to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt does not logically subsume or incorporate its burden relative to that statutory defense. But where the issue is merely the negative or nonexistence of an element of the crime, as it is with intoxication, to first instruct on the state’s burden with respect to the elements of the crime and then to instruct on the state’s burden as to the nonexistence of an alcohol or drug induced negation of these elements is not only redundant but also, I believe, imper-missibly intrusive into the discretion of the state to prosecute its case.
This ease leads me to question the need for or wisdom of granting a statutory defense to an element of the crime. Clearly, without the statute the defendant is entitled to offer any evidence that relates to his ability to form an intent. The state, in meeting its obligation to prove intent, must overcome any factor, including intoxication, which tends to negate its existence.
My disenchantment with the statutory defense extends to the text of Wis JI — Criminal 765. If a trial judge, using the test set forth at page 430 of the majority opinion, decides an intoxication instruction is warranted, the jury need only be advised that in considering whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime, although intoxication alone does not relieve one of criminal responsibility, the fact that the defendant may have been intoxicated should be taken into account. Instruction 765 is unnecessarily extensive, and in view of its susceptibility to challenge, I believe it should be changed. I urge the legislature to eliminate sec. 939.42(2), Stats., and the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee to revise Wis JI — Criminal 765.
Because I do not believe that the jury in this case, or any reasonable jury, could have believed that the burden *444of persuasion with respect to the element of intent had been shifted to the defendant, I would affirm the conviction and the decision of the court of appeals.

 The record reveals the judge stumbled in reading the instruction and, recognizing this, told the jury he would start over again. That the stumbling resulted in the comment being repeated three times does not convince me that the jury might perceive this as emphasis.