Court Opinion

ID: 9855586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:27:42.575329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:13.531100
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting).
I agree with the rulings of the Wayne Circuit Court1 and the Court of Appeals2 holding that MCL 600.2946(5) represents an unconstitutional delegation of the Legislature’s power. The majority reverses these rulings by adopting, with little discussion, the “independently significant standard” doctrine, while restricting the limitation that our lower courts and our precedent have placed on legislative delegations. In keeping with the wisdom of our lower courts’ rulings and our precedent, I would affirm the decisions by holding MCL 600.2946(5) unconstitutional.
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The majority focuses on the independence of the Food and Drug Administration (fda). In so doing, it loses sight of the significant fact that the standards used by the fda change from time to time.
When the Legislature adopts the determinations of a foreign body, it implicitly determines that the body’s choice is sufficiently reliable to be conclusive. When the foreign body alters the standards by which it makes its determinations, it undermines the stability of the Legislature’s choice. The foreign body becomes the only authority that approves the changed standards as well as the one that applies them. At that point, it steps into the shoes of the Legislature, making a policy choice for the people of Michigan. Its decision no longer represents the Legislature’s intent. A statute that enables a foreign body to make a policy determination not embraced by the Legislature perpetrates an unconstitutional delegation of the Legislature’s power.
The analysis I have set forth is the basis for the Court of Appeals holding: an unconstitutional delegation occurs when a statute references fact-finding that is based on standards that are not “established and essentially unchanging.” 248 Mich App 472, 485; 639 NW2d 45 (2001). Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the Court of Appeals did not invent this limitation. Rather, it drew it directly from this Court’s holding in Dearborn Independent, Inc v Dearborn, 331 Mich 447; 49 NW2d 370 (1951).
In Dearborn, we examined a statute that prescribed qualifications a newspaper must satisfy in order to publish legal notices. One qualification was that the *21newspaper “shall have been admitted by the United States post-office department for transmission as mail matter of the second class . ...” Id. at 454. The Court held that this reference to post office determinations depended on “future as well as present regulations . . . .” Id. Because the postal authority could and might at any time revise the standards for second-class mail, the statute allowed the authority to step into the shoes of the Legislature. Thus, it constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power.3
Conversely, if the qualifications for second-class mail had been unchanging, the law would have been constitutional. The standard would have had independent significance and its content would have been known to the legislators who adopted it. The Court of Appeals properly interpreted the Dearborn holding as requiring both “established and essentially unchanging” standards. 248 Mich 485.
The present situation closely parallels that in Dear-born. Here, the statute refers to the findings of the FDA, which are based on changing standards. As a consequence, MCL 600.2946(5) must be held unconstitutional under the logic employed by the Dearborn Court. Because it is empowered to change the standards by which it approves drugs, the fda, not the Legislature, determines whether an action for the injuries drugs cause may be sustained in Michigan. *22That constitutes an exercise of the Legislature’s power to act as the lawmaker in Michigan.
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No previous Michigan case has adopted the “independently significant standard” doctrine. In embracing it, the majority eradicates the precedent that would limit it, overruling Dearborn as “incorrectly decided in light of the law’s subsequent development in this area . . . .”4 Ante at 16.
I disagree with this approach and prefer to square the “independently significant standard” doctrine with our precedent by limiting the doctrine as Dearborn would have limited it. That is, we should hold it constitutionally acceptable to adopt by reference independent decisions of a foreign body as long as the foreign body’s standards are “established and essentially unchanging.”
The present statute fails the test. The natures of both science and the drug approval process are of the sort that the fda’s standards must evolve over time. Accordingly, fda determinations are not “essentially unchanging” and a statute that incorporates them perpetrates an unlawful delegation.
The majority rejects this analysis, saying that the determination of a statute’s constitutionality “cannot rationally depend on a court’s perception of the rela*23tive permanence of the actions adopted.” Ante at 15. To the contrary, I believe that courts are able to make that assessment with great accuracy. Courts can distinguish between static standards and evolving standards. For example, the standard by which the Naval Observatory calculates the passage of time reasonably can be expected not to change. Contrast that with the manner in which the FDA determines the safety and efficacy of a drug, an evolving standard.
Distrust of the judiciary’s ability to distinguish standards is an inappropriate basis for upholding an unconstitutional statute and discarding the precedents of this Court.
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Some characterize MCL 600.2946(5) as a tort-reform statute that adopts a foreign body’s standards while maintaining the consumer’s ability to bring suit in the event of fraud or bribery. It is of interest that, after MCL 600.2946(5) was enacted, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Buckman Co v Plaintiff’s Legal Comm, 531 US 341; 121 S Ct 1012; 148 L Ed 2d 854 (2001). Under Buckman and its progeny, a plaintiff’s allegations of fraud or bribery are preempted by federal law. Only the FDA may determine whether it was defrauded or bribed when it approved a drug.
MCL 600.2946(5) precludes a person who claims to have been injured by an FDA-approved drug from suing the manufacturer in a Michigan court. When read in conjunction with the Buckman decision, this simple tort-reform statute becomes elevated to a “tort-elimination” statute.
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In sum, I would affirm the judgments of the Wayne Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals holding MCL 600.2946(5) unconstitutional. The majority misconstrues my position. The conclusiveness of the FDA’s decisions does not undermine the statutes’s constitutionality. What undermines it is the fact that the FDA’s decisions are founded on shifting standards. It is only when the standards are “established and essentially unchanging” that a statutory reference to the products of the standards should be ruled a constitutional delegation of the legislative power. The holding I advocate would accord with logic and this Court’s precedent, while adopting with appropriate restriction the “independently significant standard” doctrine.

 Judge Marianne O. Battani.

 Judges William B. Murphy and Kathleen Jansen, Judge Jeffrey G. Collins not participating, 248 Mich App 472; 639 NW2d 45 (2001).

 In the analogous context of reference statutes, the Court of Appeals has held that “when a Michigan statute adopts by reference a federal law that is subsequently amended, but the Michigan statute remains unchanged, the courts are constitutionally required to construe the statute as continuing to refer to the original federal enactment before amendment.” Radecki v Director of Bureau of Worker’s Disability Compensation, 208 Mich App 19, 23; 526 NW2d 611 (1994).

 The majority also holds that any change in fda standards is irrelevant because the Legislature restricted the statute’s application to the time the drug leaves the manufacturer’s hands. The date the drug was manufactured is not relevant to whether the statute is unconstitutional. The pertinent question is, when the fda evaluates a drug in the future, does it use the standards that the Legislature knew of and relied on when the act was passed?