Court Opinion

ID: 9910822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 17:08:36.025415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:33.929406
License: Public Domain

J-S33004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DERRICK DVORAY ELVERTON                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1183 WDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-25-CR-0001082-2020

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: December 18, 2023

       Appellant, Derrick Dvoray Elverton, appeals from the aggregate

judgment of sentence of 9 to 18 years’ incarceration, imposed after a jury

convicted him of conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit

burglary.1    On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his

pretrial motions to suppress evidence, and to sever his case from his

codefendants. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain

his conspiracy convictions. After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 After Appellant filed this appeal, his counsel, Tina M. Fryling, Esq.,filed a
petition to withdraw as his attorney based on “a conflict in that she was
already representing a co-defendant in the case in his appellate proceedings.”
Petition for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 3/29/23, at 1. The trial court
appointed William Hathaway, Esq., who entered his appearance on Appellant’s
behalf with this Court on March 22, 2023, and filed Appellant’s brief on June
14, 2023. Thus, we hereby grant Attorney Fryling’s petition to withdraw.
J-S33004-23

      Appellant was charged, alongside codefendants Damarjon Beason,

Anthony Blanks, and Marshawn Williams, with multiple offenses, including

criminal homicide and attempted burglary, in connection with the death of

Patric Phillips on December 7, 2019. Appellant filed several pretrial motions,

including a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to sever his case. At a

hearing conducted thereon, the following evidence was presented:

      Commonwealth witness Michael Toles testified that, in the waning
      days of October 2019, an individual with a tattoo depicting “wings
      on his neck,” later identified as [Appellant], informed Toles and
      his friend, Marshawn Williams, that he knew precisely where
      Phillips, who sold marijuana from the back door of his home, kept
      his drugs hidden within his residence.           Armed with this
      information, a plot was devised to gain entry into Phillips’ home
      and steal the drugs: one individual would lure Phillips to the back
      door under the pretense of buying marijuana, at which time the
      others would ambush Phillips at gun point, gain entry to the
      residence, and search for the drugs. According to Toles, he,
      Williams, and another individual attempted to execute the plan
      sometime in November, but the plot was thwarted after a third
      individual’s phone began to ring loudly as they approached the
      back door.

      Undeterred by this setback, they tried again weeks later on
      December 7th. On that day, Williams asked Toles if he would give
      him a ride along with [Appellant] and an individual Williams
      identified as “Little Marmar,” and who police later identified as
      Damarjon Beason, to go see about the “Patric situation.” Toles
      testified that Williams was carrying a Glock handgun on that day.
      Toles dropped the three off on 23rd Street, but eventually Williams
      called asking to be picked up near the intersection of 24th and
      Wayne Streets, where Toles found Williams, [Appellant], and
      Beason sitting on a porch. The three reentered Toles’ vehicle, at
      which time Beason informed him they were “waiting for somebody
      to bring something.”      At approximately 5:23 p.m., Beason
      grabbed the attention of an individual walking past the vehicle in
      a crowd of people. Police later identified this individual as Anthony
      Blanks. According to Toles, Beason asked Blanks for his gun,
      which Blanks hesitantly relinquished to Beason after a short

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     conversation. Once Beason was in possession of the gun, he,
     Williams, and [Appellant] exited the vehicle onto the sidewalk and
     began walking towards Phillips’ house at 750 East 24th Street. At
     roughly 5:37 p.m., they cut through to the backyard of Phillips’
     residence by way of the driveway of 758 East 24th Street and over
     a chicken wire fence separating the two properties.

     At approximately 5:43 p.m., another individual, Daniel Dugan,
     arrived at Phillips’ residence, parking his vehicle on 24th Street
     and making his way to the backyard.               Dugan later told
     investigators that it was not unusual to find other individuals in
     the backyard as the backdoor was used as the main entrance to
     the residence, so he was not at first alarmed by the three’s
     presence there. As he approached, however, an individual in a
     black coat revealed a handgun, pushing it into his side, forcing
     him to the back door, and demanding that he knock on the door.
     When Phillips answered the door, Dugan was pushed aside, and
     the individual with the gun took aim at Phillips’ head. Phillips
     reached out and grabbed the gun, at which point Dugan heard a
     muffled gunshot. Philips fell to the ground with a gunshot wound
     to the head while the three individuals fled in an easterly direction.
     Meanwhile, Toles, who had remained parked at 24th and Wayne
     Streets, drove off when he heard what sounded like a gunshot.

     Investigators later discovered spent 9mm shell casings in the
     backyard. They also found several items left behind in the path
     of flight from the scene, including a 9mm Ruger handgun, a space
     gray iPhone, a blue North Face jacket, and a pair of navy blue
     sweatpants. The gun was found lying on top of some leaves inside
     a cardboard box directly behind 758 East 24th Street. The jacket
     and sweatpants were found underneath a wooden wheelchair
     ramp at the front of 823 East 24th Street. The phone was found
     nearby, although not directly underneath the ramp.

     The initial Erie Police Department investigation included a forensic
     analysis of the items left behind at the scene and surveillance
     video from neighboring properties, eventually identifying Beason
     and [Appellant] as two of the individuals present in Phillips’
     backyard the evening of December 7th. Criminal complaints were
     subsequently filed against them and a Preliminary Hearing was
     held on June 12, 2020; formal charges were brought by the

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       Commonwealth in Informations filed in July [of 2020].[2]
       Specifically, … [Appellant] was charged with criminal
       homicide/murder; first degree aggravated assault; second degree
       aggravated assault; robbery; conspiracy to commit robbery;
       persons not possess, use, manufacture, control, sell, or transfer
       firearms; firearms not to be carried without a license; recklessly
       endangering another person; possessing instruments of crime; …
       terroristic threats[; burglary; and conspiracy to commit burglary].

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/12/21, at 2-4 (citations to the record omitted).

       Appellant filed his omnibus pretrial motion on November 10, 2020, and

an amendment thereto on January 29, 2021. Therein, Appellant challenged,

inter alia, the sufficiency of a December 9, 2019 warrant to search the gray

iPhone,3 as well as the validity of a December 16, 2019 warrant to seize “all

records” possessed by Uber Technologies, Inc., “related to the phone number

associated      with     the     iPhone        and   the   iCloud   account   [for]

derrickelverton@iCloud.com from December 1, 2019 through December 8,

2019….” Id. at 62. Appellant also moved to sever his trial from his three

codefendants. After conducting a hearing on June 3, 2021, the court denied

those aspects of Appellant’s pretrial motions by opinion and order entered on

November 12, 2021. His case proceeded to a jury trial and, on June 9, 2022,

the jury convicted Appellant of conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy

to commit burglary. It acquitted him of all other charges, including robbery,

____________________________________________

2 On May 27, 2021, the Commonwealth joined Anthony Blanks’ and Marshawn

Williams’ trials with Appellant’s and Beason’s.

3 A pink iPhone was also recovered during the investigation of this case, and

was at issue in Appellant’s pretrial suppression motions. Thus, for clarity, we
will refer to the phone at issue herein as the gray iPhone.

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burglary, and second-degree (felony) murder. On September 15, 2022, the

court sentenced Appellant to the aggregate term set forth supra.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he also complied with the

trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. The court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion

on February 6, 2023. Herein, Appellant states the following four issues for

our review:

      A. Whether the [trial] court erred in its pretrial suppression ruling
      by concluding that the [i]Phone at issue constituted abandoned
      property and thus … Appellant lacked any privacy right as to the
      … [i]Phone to challenge the legality of the police search of the
      phone?

      B. Whether the [trial] court erred in holding that two search
      warrants, relating to Uber Technologies, Inc[.,] and another
      seeking … Appellant’s [iCloud] identification, respectively, were
      not overbroad and consequently upholding the validity of said
      warrants and the fruits thereof?

      C. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying … Appellant’s
      severance motion from co-defendant, Damarjon Beason, since the
      joinder would be patently prejudicial, which was further
      exacerbated by the joinder of two additional [sic] co-defendants?

      D. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
      support … Appellant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit
      robbery and conspiracy to commit burglary?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Appellant’s first two issues challenge the court’s denial of his pretrial

motions to suppress evidence recovered from the gray iPhone, and the records

seized from Uber Technologies, Inc.

      An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
      to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining

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       whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
       the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
       facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
       the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
       Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
       remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
       a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
       supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
       findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
       erroneous.     Where the appeal of the determination of the
       suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
       suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
       appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
       court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
       of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned

up).

       We begin by addressing Appellant’s challenge to the legality of the

search of the gray iPhone. Initially, Appellant cursorily claims that “[t]he facts

as stated within the Affidavit of Probable Cause do not establish that evidence

of a crime would be found in the … [gray] iPhone[,]” and that the warrant to

search the phone was “overbroad, essentially allowing an unlimited search of

the device for evidence of illegal activity.”          Appellant’s Brief at 7.

Problematically, Appellant provides no meaningful discussion of either of these

claims.

       When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is
       an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently
       developed for our review. Commonwealth v. Gould, … 912 A.2d
       869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006). The brief must support the claims
       with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with
       citations to legal authorities. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c).
       Citations to authorities must articulate the principles for which
       they are cited. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b).

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      This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments
      on behalf of an appellant. Gould, 912 A.2d at 873. Moreover,
      when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful
      appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find
      certain issues to be waived. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010). Here, we

deem Appellant’s challenges to the warrant for the gray iPhone waived based

on his failure to develop these claims.

      In any event, even if not waived, we would agree with the trial court’s

conclusion that Appellant abandoned the iPhone and, therefore, he had no

standing to challenge the search thereof, even if the warrant was defective.

      Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires that law officers obtain
      a warrant before they intrude into a place of privacy; however, an
      exception to the warrant requirement exists when the property
      seized has been abandoned. Commonwealth v. Clark, 746 A.2d
      1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2000). “[T]o prevail on a suppression
      motion, a defendant must demonstrate a legitimate expectation
      of privacy in the area searched or effects seized, and such
      expectation cannot be established where a defendant has
      meaningfully abdicated his control, ownership or possessory
      interest.” Commonwealth v. Dowds, … 761 A.2d 1125, 1131
      ([Pa.] 2000). Simply put, “no one has standing to complain of a
      search or seizure of property that he has voluntarily abandoned.”
      Commonwealth v. Shoatz, … 366 A.2d 1216, 1220 ([Pa.]
      1976).

Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 330 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      Instantly, the trial court provided a detailed analysis to support its

decision that Appellant abandoned the iPhone. See TCO at 72-84. On appeal,

Appellant presents only bald and unsupported challenges to that decision, with

no developed discussion or legal analysis in support thereof. See Appellant’s

Brief at 8-9. For instance, although the trial court discusses specific evidence

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that, in its view, proved Appellant intended to abandon the iPhone, see TCO

at 79-81, Appellant only cursorily responds that “[t]here is no evidence that

… [A]ppellant sought or displayed any modicum of intention to abandon his

cellphone and forego any expectation of its contents.” Appellant’s Brief at 8.

Such undeveloped claims do not demonstrate any error in the court’s detailed

and well-reasoned analysis of the abandonment issue, which we adopt herein.

Accordingly, even had Appellant not waived his challenge to the validity of the

search warrant for the iPhone, we would agree with the court’s conclusion that

he lacked standing to challenge the search of the iPhone based on his

abandonment thereof for the reasons set forth by the court in its November

12, 2021 opinion. See TCO at 72-84.

      In Appellant’s second issue, he claims that “the [trial] court erred in

holding that the two search warrants regarding Uber Technologies and for

Appellant[’]s Apple ID were not overbroad and sustaining the legality of the

execution of the respective search warrants[.]”         Appellant’s Brief at 9

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).       Although Appellant mentions two

warrants in his statement of the issue, the body of his argument only

addresses the December 16, 2019 warrant “for all listed records under the

control of Uber Technologies, Inc.[,]” pertaining to Appellant’s phone number

and his iCloud account. Id. Thus, we address only that warrant herein.

      First, Appellant contends that the information gleaned from the allegedly

illegal search of the gray iPhone was included in the Affidavit of Probable Cause

for the at-issue warrant and cannot be considered in determining whether

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probable cause existed to seize the records from Uber Technologies. Id. at

10.   As set forth in our discussion of Appellant’s first issue, he has not

demonstrated that the search of the gray iPhone was unlawful and, thus, the

information recovered from the phone was properly assessed in determining

if the December 16, 2019 warrant was supported by probable cause.

      To the extent that Appellant claims that probable cause was still lacking,

even with the information recovered from the gray iPhone, we conclude that

his argument is undeveloped and, therefore, waived. Appellant only baldly

claims that “the affidavit sets forth general conclusions not supported by any

facts giving probable cause to believe that any evidence would be found” in

the seized records. Id. Appellant does not provide any further discussion or

legal authority to support this single sentence.    Thus, his challenge to the

probable cause to support the warrant is waived. See Kane, 10 A.3d at 331.

      Appellant additionally argues that the warrant was overbroad. The trial

court provided an in-depth discussion of the law pertaining to this claim, see

TCO at 32-44, as well as an analysis of the at-issue warrant in the present

case, id. at 62-63. Appellant’s brief argument challenging the court’s decision

on appeal is inadequate to demonstrate any error therein. See Appellant’s

Brief at 10-12. Accordingly, we adopt the court’s analysis of the overbreadth

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issue as our own, and find Appellant’s second issue meritless for the reasons

set forth by the court therein.4 See TCO at 32-44; 62-63.

       In Appellant’s third issue, he argues that the court erred by denying his

motion to sever his trial from co-defendant Beason’s because “there was a

likelihood of antagonistic defenses” between them. Appellant’s Brief at 13.

Appellant also claims he was prejudiced by his trial not being severed from

Marshawn Williams’ trial, as certain witnesses were permitted to testify about

inculpatory statements Williams made after the murder, which Appellant

claims could have caused the jury to convict him “based upon mere guilt by

association….” Id. at 15.

       No relief is due. Initially, Appellant offers no argument to support his

claim that he and Beason had antagonistic defenses and, thus, should have

been tried separately. Consequently, he has waived this argument for our

review. See Kane, 10 A.3d at 331. Likewise, Appellant has also waived his

claim that his and Williams’ trials should have been severed because he was
____________________________________________

4 We also observe that, in the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, it notes that,

       after it rendered its decision in November of 2021, our Supreme
       Court issued its opinion in Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d
       541 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021), which appears consistent with the
       approach taken by this [c]ourt in determining whether the
       searches of digital evidence in this case were proper. See id. at
       553-54 (“[W]e hold that the [Commonwealth v.] Grossman[,
       555 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1989),] standard for an overbreadth challenge
       applies equally to the search of a digital space as it does for a
       physical search.”).
Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion (Rule 1925(a) Opinion), 2/6/23, at 2. We agree
with the court that its analysis is consistent with Green.

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prejudiced by the admission of Williams’ inculpatory statements. Appellant

did not raise any claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement pertaining to the

severance of his trial from Williams’ case, nor any challenge to the admission

of Williams’ inculpatory statements. Therefore, these arguments are waived.

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or

not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are

waived.”); Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) Order, 10/11/22, at 1 (warning that “[a]ny issue

not properly included in said Statement, timely filed and served pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), shall be deemed waived for purposes of appeal”)

(unnumbered page); see also Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque

Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (“[I]n

determining whether an appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on

non-compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial court’s order that triggers an

appellant’s obligation[.   T]herefore, we look first to the language of that

order.”) (citations omitted; some brackets added).

      In any event, even if not waived, we would discern no error in the court’s

decision not to sever Appellant’s case from Beason’s, for the reasons set forth

by the court in its November 12, 2021 opinion. See TCO at 96-102.

      Finally, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain

his convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit

burglary. From what we can discern, Appellant seemingly believes that the

jury’s acquitting him of robbery and burglary demonstrates that the jury

believed he renounced his participation in those crimes and, thus, it follows

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that he renounced his participation in the conspiracy to commit those

offenses, as well. According to Appellant, there was evidence to support the

jury’s alleged finding that he renounced his participation in the conspiracies,

including testimony “that [he] did not leave the backyard area the entire time

and was positioned by the gate while the other two individuals actively

approached the door and then placed a gun to the head of Dugan while then

gaining entry into the residence whereupon Philips was shot by one of the

individuals.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant insists that “[t]his course of

conduct is fully consistent with a renunciation of any underlying conspiracy on

the part of [Appellant] and would support that this was the calculus employed

by the jury in applying the jury instruction as to renunciation[,]” which was

provided “as it pertained to the conspiracy charges under 18 Pa.C.S. §

903(f)….” Id. at 17, 18.

      We disagree. Initially, we note:

      A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presents a
      question of law. We must determine whether the evidence is
      sufficient to prove every element of the crime beyond a
      reasonable doubt. We must view evidence in the light most
      favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and accept
      as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon
      which, if believed, the fact finder properly could have based its
      verdict.

      Our Supreme Court has observed:

         The facts and circumstances established by the
         Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
         innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
         be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
         and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
         fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.

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        Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must
        be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
        considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
        credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
        produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

     Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, … 934 A.2d 1233, 1236 n. 2 ([Pa.]
     2007).

Commonwealth v. Thoeun Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 709–10 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(cleaned up; some internal citations omitted).

     Additionally,

     [a] criminal conspiracy conviction requires proof of:

        (1) an intent to commit or aid in an unlawful act, (2) an
        agreement with a co-conspirator and (3) an overt act in
        furtherance of the conspiracy. Because it is difficult to prove
        an explicit or formal agreement to commit an unlawful act,
        such an act may be proved inferentially by circumstantial
        evidence, i.e., the relations, conduct or circumstances of the
        parties or overt acts on the part of the co-conspirators.

     Circumstantial evidence can include, but is not limited to, the
     relationship between the parties, the knowledge of and
     participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of
     the parties surrounding the criminal episode. These factors may
     coalesce to establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a
     reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail.

Id. at 710.

     Here, we are unconvinced by Appellant’s argument that the jury must

have concluded that he renounced his participation in the conspiracy to

commit robbery and burglary because it acquitted him of those predicate

offenses. As the trial court observed:

     “It is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow the trial
     court’s instructions[.]” Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262,
     1280 (Pa. 2016).         Here, the jury was instructed on the
     renunciation defense to conspiracy twice, and no juror raised

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      concerns with the verdict when they were polled at the conclusion
      of the trial. If anything, we must assume the jury was fully aware
      of, but simply chose not to credit, [Appellant’s] renunciation
      defense. As such, the argument is without merit.

Rule 1925(a) Opinion at 5. The court also pointed out that,

      even if there were inconsistencies, “inconsistent verdicts, while
      often perplexing, are not considered mistakes and do not
      constitute a basis for reversal.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 234
      A.3d 824, 829 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v.
      Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 120 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc)). “When
      an acquittal on one count in an indictment is inconsistent with a
      conviction on a second count, the court looks upon the acquittal
      as no more than the jury’s assumption of a power which they had
      no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through
      lenity.” Id. That the jury may have exercised its prerogative to
      spare [Appellant] convictions for robbery and felony murder is not
      a basis to assume that it found he satisfied the elements of a
      complete and voluntary renunciation of the alleged conspiracies[,]
      too. At most, it is an indicator that the jury was willing to exercise
      its powers of leniency only so far.

      In the end, we cannot know for sure why the jury chose to convict
      [Appellant] on the conspiracy charges, while acquitting him of
      robbery and felony murder. However, “we refuse to inquire into
      or to speculate upon the nature of the jury’s deliberations or the
      rationale behind the jury’s decision. Whether the jury’s verdict
      was the result mistake, compromise, lenity, or any other factor is
      not a question [to be considered on] review.” Commonwealth
      v. Miller, 35 A.3d 1206, 1213 (Pa. 2012).

Id. at 4-5.

      We agree with the trial court’s rationale regarding Appellant’s

renunciation argument. We further add that, to the extent Appellant suggests

that his acquittal for the predicate offenses of robbery and burglary invalidates

his convictions for conspiring to commit those crimes, this argument is also

meritless.    See Appellant’s Brief at 16 (“If the jury concluded that …

[A]ppellant could not be criminal [sic] culpable for the predicate offenses of

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robbery and burglary[,] and logically that would also eliminate any criminal

culpability under the felony murder counts as a matter of course[,] then there

is no legal or factual foundation to then also render a verdict of guilty as to

conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit burglary lacking any

predicate offenses.”). Nothing in the above-quoted law indicates that a person

must complete the predicate offense in order to be convicted of conspiracy,

and Appellant provides no legal support for this claim.        Instead, to be

convicted of criminal conspiracy, an individual must only intend to commit an

unlawful act, agree with a co-conspirator to do so, and commit an overt act in

furtherance of that agreement. Appellant does not explain how the evidence

was insufficient to prove any of these elements. Therefore, his sufficiency

challenge does not warrant relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 12/18/2023

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