Court Opinion

ID: 9940493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 17:09:15.557223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:55.139819
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41052

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MANUEL MANQUERO,

       Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
Angie K. Schneider, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM
Mark A. Peralta-Silva, Assistant Appellate Defender
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1}    This matter was submitted to this Court on the brief in chief in the above-entitled
cause pursuant to Joint Miscellaneous Order No. 2022-002, effective November 1,
2022. Having considered the brief in chief, concluding the briefing submitted to this
Court provides no possibility for reversal, and determining that this case is appropriate
for resolution on Track 1 as defined in the Administrative Order in In re Pilot Project for
Criminal Appeals, No. 2022-002, we affirm for the following reasons.
BACKGROUND

{2}    Defendant’s conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol (fifth
offense) arises out of an incident on March 15, 2020, when his vehicle was stuck by
oncoming traffic as he attempted to execute a left-hand turn. [BIC 2-3; RP 177] Deputy
Hernandez responded to the scene of the accident. [BIC 2] He noticed that Defendant
was stumbling and holding onto his vehicle. [BIC 2] In the course of the investigation
Deputy Hernandez also observed that Defendant smelled of alcohol, he had bloodshot
watery eyes, his speech was slurred, and there was a wet spot near his groin, which
Deputy Hernandez associated with urine. [BIC 2-3] Defendant stated that he had
consumed several beers prior to the accident, [BIC 3, 5] and also appears to have
indicated that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage called “Twisted Tea.” [BIC 2-3]
Defendant subsequently refused to perform either standardized field sobriety tests or
breath-alcohol testing. [BIC 3]

{3}     At trial Defendant contended that the driver of the oncoming vehicle was at fault
for the accident. [BIC 4-5] He admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that
afternoon, and he acknowledged that he had told Deputy Hernandez that he had
consumed beer. [BIC 4-5] However, he testified that in fact he had only consumed
“Twisted Tea.” [BIC 4-5] Although Defendant further acknowledged that he was
impaired at the time of the DWI investigation, his head had struck the windshield, and
he ascribed his condition to the accident rather than his consumption of alcohol. [BIC 4-
5] He explained that he had refused to perform either field sobriety tests or breath-
alcohol testing “because he did not want to testify against himself.” [BIC 5]

{4}      In addition to Defendant’s testimony, the defense also presented the testimony of
a pharmacologist, Dr. French. [BIC 5-8] Although the district court indicated that it would
not qualify Dr. French as an expert with respect to the specific question of performing
calculations relative to blood alcohol content (BAC), he was nevertheless permitted to
render an opinion on Defendant’s BAC and to testify that Defendant would not have
been impaired if his alcohol consumption had been as limited as Defendant claimed at
trial. [BIC 8]

{5}    Ultimately, the jury returned a guilty verdict. [RP 182] The instant appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

I.     Plain Error

{6}    Defendant contends that the admission of Deputy Hernandez’s inaccurate
testimony about the specific alcoholic content of “Twisted Tea” constituted plain error.
[BIC 10-14]

{7}     “Plain error is an exception to the general rule that parties must raise timely
objection to improprieties at trial, and therefore it is to be used sparingly.” State v. Dylan
J., 2009-NMCA-027, ¶ 15, 145 N.M. 719, 204 P.3d 44 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Under the plain error rule, there must be (1) error, that is (2) plain, and
(3) that affects substantial rights.” State v. Hill, 2008-NMCA-117, ¶ 21, 144 N.M. 775,
192 P.3d 770 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We apply the rule only in
evidentiary matters and only if we have grave doubts about the validity of the verdict,
due to an error that infects the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding.” Dylan J.,
2009-NMCA-027, ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{8}    Defendant’s argument pertains to Deputy Hernandez’s testimony that Defendant
smelled of beer, together with his apparently inaccurate assertion that “Twisted Tea”
contains vodka. To the extent that this testimony suggested that Defendant’s
consumption of alcohol had not been as limited as Defendant claimed, he contends that
the admission of that testimony constituted plain error. We disagree, for several
reasons.

{9}    First, it is noteworthy that Deputy Hernandez was not the only witness to testify
that “Twisted Tea” contains vodka. The defense expert, Dr. French, similarly stated that
“Twisted Tea” contains vodka. [BIC 12] We question whether Defendant may advance
any claim of error under the circumstances. See generally State v. Campos, 1996-
NMSC-043, ¶ 47, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (“Acquiescence in the admission of
evidence, . . . constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal.”), abrogated on other grounds
as stated in State v. Groves, 2021-NMSC-003, 478 P.3d 915; State v. Jim, 2014-
NMCA-089, ¶ 22, 332 P.3d 870 (“It is well established that a party may not invite error
and then proceed to complain about it on appeal.”).

{10} Second, the record before us does not support Defendant’s position relative to
the significance of the claimed error. As the defense expert made clear in the course of
his testimony, [BIC 12] the specific nature of the alcoholic content of “Twisted Tea” is
not relevant in and of itself. And although the specific content of “Twisted Tea” could
have been relevant if the odor were actually similar to the odor of beer, the record
contains nothing to support that. See generally State v. Hunter, 2001-NMCA-078, ¶ 18,
131 N.M. 76, 33 P.3d 296 (stating that “[m]atters not of record present no issue for
review”). To the contrary, the only evidence of record on this subject is Deputy
Hernandez’s testimony that “Twisted Tea” smells different than beer. [BIC 2] We will not
presume otherwise.

{11} Third and finally, we note the compelling evidence of guilt that was presented in
this case: Defendant’s involvement in a traffic accident; his bloodshot, watery eyes, odor
of alcohol, and slurred speech; Defendant’s refusal to participate in field sobriety or BAC
testing; and Defendant’s admission to having consumed alcohol. In light of the strength
of the evidence supporting the conviction, we conclude that the admission of the
testimony at issue cannot be said to constitute plain error. See generally State v. Muller,
2022-NMCA-024, ¶ 43, 508 P.3d 960 (providing that “we apply the [plain error] rule
sparingly and only when we have grave doubts about the validity of the verdict, due to
an error that infects the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding” and that “[t]he
burden is on the defendant asserting plain error to establish prejudice” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. State v. Hernandez, 2017-NMCA-020, ¶ 20,
388 P.3d 1016 (explaining that when nonconstitutional evidentiary error occurs, the
harmless error standard of review mandates reversal only where there is a “reasonable
probability” the inadmissible evidence contributed to the defendant’s conviction).

II.   Expert Qualification

{12} Defendant contends that the district court erred in declining to qualify Dr. French
as an expert witness. [BIC 14-18]

{13} “Whether a witness possesses the necessary expertise or a sufficient foundation
has been established to permit a witness to testify as an expert witness is a matter
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Smith v. Smith, 1992-NMCA-080, ¶
19, 114 N.M. 276, 837 P.2d 869.

{14} At trial defense counsel appears to have demonstrated Dr. French’s expertise in
pharmacology, the metabolism of alcohol, and its effects on the human body; and, the
district court appears to have qualified him as an expert in those areas. [BIC 5-7]
However, on the narrow subject of calculating BAC, Dr. French explained that he does
not perform calculations or engage in independent analysis; he simply relies on a
standardized formula, and utilizes tables and charts that are commonly accepted and
readily available. [BIC 6, 8] In view of Dr. French’s reliance upon those materials, the
district court appears to have concluded that he did not demonstrate sufficient expertise
relative to BAC calculations to qualify as an expert in that narrow field. [BIC 8]
Nevertheless, Dr. French was permitted to offer “lay opinion” testimony about
Defendant’s BAC, assuming Defendant’s consumption of alcohol had been as limited as
Defendant claimed. [BIC 8] Dr. French was also permitted to testify that Defendant
would not have been impaired, in the sense that he would not have felt the effects of
alcohol, have had altered sensory perceptions, or have experienced diminished motor
coordination or physical abilities, under such circumstances. [BIC 8]

{15} In this context we review for abuse of discretion only. See State v. Castaneda,
2001-NMCA-052, ¶ 28, 130 N.M. 679, 30 P.3d 368. Although Dr. French’s reliance
upon charts and tables to estimate BAC does not necessarily reflect lack of expertise in
that specific area, the district court recognized Dr. French’s more general expertise
relative to the metabolism of alcohol and its effects upon the human body. And
ultimately, in view of the scope of the testimony that was admitted, Dr. French appears
to have been effectively treated as a qualified expert in all of the relevant fields. See
generally Rule 11-701(A), (C) NMRA (providing that lay testimony must be rationally
based on the witness’s perception, and cannot be based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge). We therefore perceive neither abuse of discretion, nor
prejudicial error. See, e.g., State v. Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 262, 75
P.3d 862 (holding that the exclusion of expert testimony concerning BAC was neither an
abuse of discretion nor prejudicial to the defense, where the court’s ruling did not
prevent the defense from presenting evidence or arguing to the jury about the
individual’s intoxication); Castaneda, 2001-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 28-31 (holding that the
district court acted within its discretion in declining to qualify a witness as an expert for
the narrow purpose of rendering an opinion about the defendant’s level of intoxication,
where the witness was nevertheless allowed to testify about how the body metabolizes
alcohol as well as the defendant’s possible BAC at the relevant time). See generally
State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 43, 343 P.3d 1245 (noting that the “[d]efendant
bears the initial burden of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by [asserted]
evidentiary error”).

III.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{16} Finally, Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
[BIC 18-27]

{17} “The standard for effective assistance of counsel is whether defense counsel
exercised the skill, judgment, and diligence of a reasonably competent defense
attorney.” State v. Herrera, 2001-NMCA-073, ¶ 36, 131 N.M. 22, 33 P.3d 22 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant must show that their attorney erred,
and that the error prejudiced the defendant in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 38, 278 P.3d 517.

{18} Defendant’s claim is premised on the assertions of error addressed in the
preceding subsections of this opinion. For the reasons stated, we have rejected both
claims of error. In view of our assessment of those matters, particularly the apparent
lack of prejudice, we conclude that Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing
of ineffective assistance of counsel. See generally State v. Martinez, 2007-NMCA-160,
¶ 24, 143 N.M. 96, 173 P.3d 18 (“When there is no showing of prejudice, [a] claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.”). We therefore decline to remand to the
district court. See State v. Swavola, 1992-NMCA-089, ¶ 3, 114 N.M. 472, 840 P.2d
1238 (restricting remand “to those cases in which the record on appeal establishes a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance”). See generally State v. Cordova, 2014-
NMCA-081, ¶ 7, 331 P.3d 980 (“Our Supreme Court has expressed a preference that
ineffective assistance of counsel claims be adjudicated in habeas corpus proceedings,
rather than on direct appeal.”).

CONCLUSION

{19}   In light of the foregoing, we affirm.

{20}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge