Court Opinion

ID: 9571996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:37:09.946895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:18.394943
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice
(dissenting) :
I would hold that summary judgment on the counterclaim was inappropriate as the pleadings and depositions raise factual issues which must be determined at trial. Hook, as Admrx. v. Rothstein, S. C., 268 S. E. (2d) 288 (1980); South Carolina Farm Bureau v. Scott, S. C., 262 S. E. (2d) 739 (1980).
The majority correctly notes “both parties had their then mutual attorney draw up the agreement in controversy” whereby appellant Murphy agreed to sell respondent his shares in their corporation, Quality Home Builders, Inc. That attorney represented each party individually and served as corporate counsel for the business. The majority opinion does not report the fact that this same law firm *340now represents respondent in this action repudiating the very agreement it drew for respondent and appellant on the grounds it is an invalid, usurious instrument. The extent and nature of respondent’s participation in initiating this transaction may, in my view, ultimately bar his assertion of the counterclaim for double the amount of interest paid in. That question is for the trier of fact.
The rule has long been accepted that a borrower’s conduct may estop his assertion of the defense of usury in an action on the debt. 45 Am. Jur. (2d), Interest and Usury §§ 257, 259; annotation, 16 A. L. R. (3d) 510; see, e. g., Gudgel v. Kaelin, Ky. App., 551 S. W. (2d) 803 (1977) and Massie v. Rubin, 270 F. (2d) 60 (10th Cir. 1959) ; see also 91 C. J. S. Usury § 91. The roots of this doctrine were grown in the soil of the equitable maxim that no man should profit from his own wrong, and the rule is particularly applicable where the borrower is an attorney and the lender a layman, Heubusch v. Boone, 213 Va. 414, 192 S. E. (2d) 783 (1972); Perry v. Shelby, 196 Ark. 541, 118 S. W. (2d) 849 (1938), or where the borrower initiates or promotes the transaction. 16 A. L. R. (3d) 510; Schylander v. Tsaruchas, 96 Misc. (2d) 934, 409 N. Y. S. (2d) 932 (1978); 45 Am. Jur. (2d), supra at § 259'.
While here respondent is not an attorney, the note and agreement were prepared by his attorney with terms dictated by respondent in the presence of appellant. At that time the attorney left appellant with the impression the instruments were valid and binding. Now that same law firm carries respondent’s banner in not only defending against appellant’s action to collect on the ground the agreement is usurious, but also in seeking penalty damages against a past client under an instrument it drew for that client. Cf. Holt v. Rickett, 143 Ga. App. 337, 238 S. E. (2d) 706 (1977) [debtor estopped from asserting the defense of usury to an action on a promissory note which the debtor’s attorney prepared].
*341In my view an inquiry into the facts is necessary and desirable to clarify the application of the law. I would reverse the order granting summary judgment on the counterclaim and remand for trial with the other issues joined by the pleadings. Accordingly, I dissent.
Lewis, C. J., concurs.