Court Opinion

ID: 9897972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:28.931366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:05.246548
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                                                                                                        Filed
                                                                                                  Washington State
                                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                                   Division Two

                                                                                                     June 13, 2023

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                 DIVISION II
        STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                  No. 56984-1-II

                                       Respondent,

               v.                                                        PUBLISHED OPINION

        JAMES LARON ELLIS,

                                       Appellant.

              MAXA, J. – James Ellis appeals his sentence following a resentencing pursuant to State v.

       Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). Ellis’s sentence related to his conviction in 2009

       following a guilty plea to second degree murder with a firearm sentencing enhancement. The

       conviction arose from an incident in which Ellis shot and killed a person in the course of an

       attempted robbery. Ellis was 18 years old at the time of the offense.

              At the resentencing hearing, the trial court declined Ellis’s request to consider the

       mitigating qualities of his youth at the time of the offense. But the court imposed the sentence

       Ellis’s defense counsel recommended. The trial court did not alter the provisions in the original

       judgment and sentence imposing several legal financial obligations (LFOs), restitution, and

       interest on the restitution amount.

              Ellis argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider the mitigating qualities of

       youth when imposing his sentence; that imposition of restitution, interest on restitution, and the
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       No. 56984-1-II

       crime victim penalty assessment (VPA) violated the excessive fines clause in the United States

       and Washington constitutions; and the trial court improperly imposed certain LFOs.

              We hold that (1) the trial court was not required to consider Ellis’s youth at resentencing,

       and any error relating to the trial court’s suggestion that it did not have discretion to consider

       Ellis’s youth was harmless because the court imposed the sentence that Ellis requested; (2)

       imposition of restitution does not violate the excessive fines clause; (3) a recently enacted

       statutory provision gives the trial court discretion to waive interest on restitution, so on remand

       the court must consider whether to waive interest based on the statutory factors; (4) a newly

       enacted statutory provision precludes imposing the VPA on an indigent offender, so on remand

       the trial court must determine whether Ellis is indigent and reconsider imposition of the VPA

       based on that determination; and (5) on remand the trial court must strike the DNA collection fee

       and community custody supervision fees based on newly enacted statutory provisions and

       reconsider whether to impose the criminal filing fee and attorney fees.

              Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s sentence, and remand

       for the trial court to strike the DNA collection fee and community custody supervision fees from

       the judgment and sentence and to reconsider the imposition of interest on restitution, the VPA,

       the criminal filing fee, and attorney fees.

                                                      FACTS

              In March 2008, Ellis shot and killed a person in the course of an attempted robbery. Ellis

       was 18 years old at the time of his offense. The State charged Ellis with first degree murder,

       second degree murder, second degree assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm.

              Ellis pled guilty to second degree murder. In January 2009, the trial court sentenced him

       to 240 months in confinement and an additional 60 months for a firearm sentencing

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       No. 56984-1-II

       enhancement. The sentence was based on an offender score of 4, which included a prior

       conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The trial court ordered Ellis to pay

       the $500 VPA, a $200 criminal filing fee, $1,500 in attorney fees, a $100 DNA collection fee,

       and community custody supervision fees. The judgment and sentence stated that interest would

       accrue on unpaid amounts. The trial court also ordered Ellis to pay restitution in the amount of

       $7,097.32. The restitution order stated, “CVC1 $7,097.32.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 36.

                In July 2021, Ellis was resentenced after one point was removed from his offender score

       based on Blake, which lowered the standard range sentence. At the resentencing hearing, Ellis

       stated, “I would like to just bring awareness of my youthfulness. . . . And hopefully you can take

       into consideration that.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 5. The court noted, “That certainly is an

       issue that the courts have acknowledged is something that should be taken into account in certain

       circumstances.” RP at 6. But the court stated that youthfulness is “a different issue than the one

       we’re talking about today.” RP at 6.

                The State recommended that Ellis’s sentence remain at 300 months because that sentence

       was within the standard range with his lower offender score. Ellis did not advocate for an

       exceptional sentence below the standard range. Instead, he asked the trial court to lower his

       sentence to 289 months, proportional to the new sentencing range.

                Before the trial court imposed a sentence, Ellis again asked the trial court to consider his

       youth. The court responded that this issue “is something that you have the ability to address in a

       different format than what we are doing today.” RP at 9.

                The trial court entered an order correcting the 2009 judgment and sentence, changing

       Ellis’s total confinement from 300 months to 289 months, the adjustment Ellis recommended.

       1
           “CVC” refers to the crime victim compensation fund.

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       No. 56984-1-II

       The order stated that all other terms and conditions of the 2009 judgment and sentence would

       remain in full force. Ellis appeals his sentence.

                                                   ANALYSIS

       A.     SCOPE OF RESENTENCING

              Ellis argues that he is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court declined to

       consider his youth when imposing his sentence. We disagree.2

              In general, a defendant cannot appeal a standard range sentence. RCW 9.94A.585(1); In

       re Pers. Restraint of Marshall, 10 Wn. App. 2d 626, 635, 455 P.3d 1163 (2019). But this rule

       does not prohibit defendants from appealing the process by which the trial court imposed its

       sentence. Id.

              The trial court was not required to consider Ellis’s youth when sentencing him. In State

       v. Houston-Sconiers, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to

       consider the mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing juvenile offenders. 188 Wn.2d 1, 18,

       391 P.3d 409 (2017). But Ellis was 18 at the time of his offense, so Houston-Sconiers is

       inapplicable. See State v. Nevarez, 24 Wn. App. 2d 56, 61-62, 519 P.3d 252 (2022), rev. denied,

       1 Wn.3d 1005 (2023).

              Ellis suggests the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 482

       P.3d 276 (2021), extended the holding in Houston-Sconiers to young adult offenders. In

       Monschke, the Supreme Court in a split decision held that the mandatory imposition of life

       without parole sentences was unconstitutional for offenders who were 18 to 20 years old as well

       as for juvenile offenders. 197 Wn.2d at 326, 329. But this court rejected the argument that the

       2
         Initially, Ellis argues at length that he was entitled to a full resentencing. However, the record
       reflects that Ellis received a full resentencing hearing.

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       No. 56984-1-II

       lead opinion in Monschke supports extending the holding in Houston-Sconiers to the sentencing

       of an 18-year-old, Nevarez, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 60-62, and the Supreme Court has denied review

       of that case. 1 Wn.3d 1005 (2023).

              Ellis also argues that the trial court failed to recognize that it had the discretion to

       consider his youth under State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). In O’Dell, the

       Supreme Court held that trial courts are allowed, but not obligated, to consider youth as a

       mitigating factor in favor of an exceptional sentence below the standard range when sentencing

       adult defendants. Id. at 696. Here, Ellis does not argue that the sentencing court failed to

       recognize its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence. At the sentencing hearing, Ellis

       argued for a sentence within the standard range, which the trial court granted. Therefore, the

       court was not required to consider the mitigating qualities of youth under O’Dell. See Nevarez,

       24 Wn. App. 2d at 61-62.

              The trial court certainly had the discretion to consider Ellis’s youth when considering his

       sentence within the standard range. But even if the court erred in failing to recognize that it had

       such discretion, any error was harmless because Ellis received the sentence his defense counsel

       requested. And Ellis does not assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

              We hold that Ellis is not entitled to be resentenced even though the trial court declined to

       consider Ellis’s youth at resentencing.

       B.     EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE CHALLENGES

              Ellis argues that imposition of $7,097.32 in restitution, interest on restitution, and the

       VPA violates the excessive fines clause. We disagree with regard to restitution, but we remand

       for the trial court to address restitution interest and the VPA based on newly enacted statutory

       provisions.

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       No. 56984-1-II

               1.    Legal Principles

               The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the

       Washington Constitution prohibit excessive fines. City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wn.2d 136, 158,

       493 P.3d 94 (2021). The excessive fines clause limits the state’s ability to impose monetary

       sanctions as punishment for an offense. Id. at 159. A monetary sanction violates the excessive

       fines clause if (1) the sanction is punishment, and (2) the sanction is constitutionally excessive.

       Id. at 163.

               A sanction is punishment under the excessive fines clause if it is at least “partially

       punitive.” Id. A sanction is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportional to the

       gravity of the defendant’s offense. Id. at 166. To determine whether a sanction is

       disproportional, we consider (1) the nature and extent of the crime, (2) whether the violation was

       related to other illegal activities, (3) the other penalties that may be imposed for the violation,

       and (4) the extent of the harm caused. Id. at 173. In addition, we also must consider a fifth

       factor: an offender’s ability to pay the fine. Id. at 168-73. We review excessive fines challenges

       de novo. Id. at 163.

               2.    Failure to Raise Claims in Trial Court

               Initially, the State argues that we should decline to consider Ellis’ excessive fines claims

       because they were raised for the first time on appeal. We disagree.

               RAP 2.5(a)(3) states that a party is allowed to raise a “manifest error affecting a

       constitutional right” for the first time on appeal. To determine the applicability of RAP

       2.5(a)(3), we inquire whether (1) the error is truly of a constitutional magnitude, and (2) the error

       is manifest. State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 267, 458 P.3d 750 (2020).

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       No. 56984-1-II

              Here, Ellis’s excessive fines claims are of constitutional magnitude. And if we were to

       accept Ellis’s arguments, the error would be manifest. Therefore, we will exercise our discretion

       and address Ellis’s excessive fine claims.

              3.        Restitution

              Ellis argues that the trial court violated the excessive fines clause when it imposed

       $7,097.32 in restitution. We disagree.

                   a.     Restitution Statute

              RCW 9.94A.753(5) states, “Restitution shall be ordered whenever the offender is

       convicted of an offense which results in injury to any person or damage to or loss of property”

       absent extraordinary circumstances. Under RCW 9.94A.753(3)(a), restitution “shall be based on

       easily ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for

       treatment for injury to persons, and lost wages resulting from injury.” In addition, “[t]he amount

       of restitution shall not exceed double the amount of the offender’s gain or the victim’s loss from

       the commission of the crime.” RCW 9.94A.753(3)(a). The legislature has found “a compelling

       state interest[ ] in compensating the victims of crime.” RCW 7.68.300.

              Former RCW 9.94A.750(4) (2018) states that “the court may not reduce the total amount

       of restitution ordered because the offender may lack the ability to pay the total amount.” And

       former RCW 9.94A.750(1) states that “[t]he court should take into consideration . . . the

       offender’s present, past, and future ability to pay” only when setting the offender’s minimum

       monthly payment toward restitution.

              In 2022, the legislature added a subsection to RCW 9.94A.753(3), effective January 1,

       2023. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 3. The new subsection provides that the trial court “may

       determine that the offender is not required to pay, or may relieve the offender of the requirement

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       No. 56984-1-II

       to pay, full or partial restitution and accrued interest on restitution where the entity to whom

       restitution is owed is an insurer or state agency, except for restitution owed to the department of

       labor and industries under chapter 7.68 RCW, if the court finds that the offender does not have

       the current or likely future ability to pay.” RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) (emphasis added).

              The restitution order here related to amounts incurred by “CVC,” CP at 36, which refers

       to the crime victim compensation program established in chapter 7.68 RCW. The CVC is a self-

       insurance program operated by the Department of Labor and Industries, so the trial court here

       would not be allowed to rescind the restitution order under RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b). However,

       RCW 7.68.120(5) states, “Any requirement for payment due and owing the department by a

       convicted person under this chapter may be waived, modified downward or otherwise adjusted

       by the department in the interest of justice, the well-being of the victim, and the rehabilitation of

       the individual.”

                    b.    Punishment

              The first question is whether the restitution imposed here constitutes “punishment.”

       Long, 198 Wn.2d at 163. We conclude that because the specific restitution ordered here was

       solely compensatory, it was not punishment for purposes of the excessive fines clause.

              The Supreme Court has stated in a different context that restitution is both compensatory

       and punitive. State v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 279-80, 119 P.3d 350 (2005). Restitution is

       compensatory because it is connected to a victim’s losses. Id. at 280. But the court stated that

       restitution also is punitive because RCW 9.94A.753(3) allows the trial court to order restitution

       in an amount that is double a victim’s loss, which necessarily exceeds what is necessary to

       compensate a victim. Id.

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              Division One of this court in State v. Ramos relied on Kinneman to conclude that

       restitution is partially punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes. 24 Wn. App. 2d 204, 226, 520

       P.3d 65 (2022), rev. denied, 200 Wn.2d 1033 (2023). And the court cited Harris v. Charles, 151

       Wn. App. 929, 940, 214 P.3d 962 (2009), aff’d, 171 Wn.2d 455, 256 P.3d 328 (2011), for the

       proposition that a court must look to the legislature’s intent in determining whether restitution is

       punishment, not to the restitution ordered in a particular case. Ramos, 24 Wn. App. at 226.

              However, Kinneman did not address whether restitution was punitive for purposes of the

       excessive fines clause. That case involved whether the defendant was entitled to a jury

       determination of the facts essential to restitution. 155 Wn.2d at 277. And Harris involved the

       definition of “punishment” for purposes of double jeopardy, not for purposes of the excessive

       fines clause. 151 Wn. App. at 940. Therefore, those cases are not directly controlling. And no

       case other than Ramos has held that a restitution order that involves only compensation of a

       crime victim constitutes punishment.

              We conclude that, unlike Division One stated in Ramos, the proper inquiry is whether the

       restitution ordered in a particular case is punitive. Here, the restitution the trial court ordered

       was solely compensatory, reimbursing the CVC for amounts paid to the victim of Ellis’s crime.

       The court in Kinneman stated that restitution could be punitive because the trial court has

       statutory authority to order restitution in an amount that is double a victim’s loss. 155 Wn.2d at

       280. But the trial court here did not double the amount needed to compensate CVC. Therefore,

       under the facts of this case, the restitution the court ordered was not punitive.

              We hold that because the restitution imposed on Ellis was not punitive, the excessive

       fines clause does not apply.

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       No. 56984-1-II

                    c.   Constitutionally Excessive

              Even if the restitution the trial court ordered was punitive, the second question is whether

       the restitution imposed here was constitutionally excessive. Long, 198 Wn.2d at 163. We

       conclude that the restitution imposed here was not excessive.

              In Ramos, the court concluded that restitution orders based on the victim’s actual losses

       necessarily are not excessive, even if the offender is unable to pay. 24 Wn. App. 2d at 230. The

       court relied on a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Dubose, which held that proportionality is

       built into the restitution order when the amount of restitution is tied to the victim’s loss, and the

       offender’s ability to pay does not change the outcome. 146 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998).

       The court in Ramos stated,

              We agree with the reasoning of Dubose and hold that a restitution award based on
              a victim’s actual losses is inherently proportional to the crime that caused the losses
              because the amount is linked to the culpability of the defendant and the extent of
              harm the defendant caused. A defendant’s inability to compensate the victim for
              the losses he caused will not render the restitution amount grossly disproportional.

       24 Wn. App. 2d at 230.

              We agree with Ramos regarding this issue. Here, the amount of restitution was the

       amount paid by the crime victim compensation fund, which necessarily related to victim losses.

              Further, application of the five-factor test articulated in Long supports the conclusion that

       the restitution imposed was not constitutionally excessive. First, the nature and extent of the

       crime was second degree murder, a significant crime. Second, the murder was related to other

       illegal activities – Ellis committed the murder during the course of an attempted burglary with an

       illegally possessed firearm. Third, second degree murder carries a maximum sentencing term of

       life and a maximum fine of $50,000. Fourth, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount that

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       the crime victim compensation program paid to compensate the victim’s family, which

       represented only a portion of the actual financial harm that resulted from Ellis’s offense.

              Regarding the fifth factor, Ellis claims that he is indigent and that he is unable to pay the

       restitution amount. However, that amount is not so high that it would be inconceivable that Ellis

       would be able to pay that amount at some point after being released from prison. And RCW

       7.68.120(5) allows the Department of Labor and Industries to waive, modify downward, or

       otherwise adjust the amount of restitution “in the interest of justice, the well-being of the victim,

       and the rehabilitation of the individual.” This means that there is a statutory mechanism through

       which Ellis’s restitution amount may be reduced or eliminated.

              We hold based on our de novo review of the specific facts of this case, the restitution

       imposed on Ellis was not constitutionally excessive. Therefore, the excessive fines clause does

       not apply.

              4.    Restitution Interest

              Ellis argues that the statutory imposition of interest on the restitution amount violates the

       excessive fines clause. However, this issue has been resolved by the recent enactment of a new

       statutory provision regarding restitution interest.

              In 2022, the legislature added a subsection to RCW 10.82.090 effective January 1, 2023.

       LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 12. The new subsection states,

              The court may elect not to impose interest on any restitution the court orders.
              Before determining not to impose interest on restitution, the court shall inquire into
              and consider the following factors: (a) Whether the offender is indigent as defined
              in RCW 10.101.010(3) or general rule 34; (b) the offender’s available funds, as
              defined in RCW 10.101.010(2), and other liabilities including child support and
              other legal financial obligations; (c) whether the offender is homeless; and (d)
              whether the offender is mentally ill, as defined in RCW 71.24.025. The court shall
              also consider the victim's input, if any, as it relates to any financial hardship caused
              to the victim if interest is not imposed. The court may also consider any other
              information that the court believes, in the interest of justice, relates to not imposing

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       No. 56984-1-II

              interest on restitution. After consideration of these factors, the court may waive the
              imposition of restitution interest.

       RCW 10.82.090(2) (emphasis added).3

              Although this amendment did not take effect until after Ellis’s resentencing, it applies to

       Ellis because this case is on direct appeal. See State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426

       P.3d 714 (2018). Therefore, we remand for the trial court to address whether to impose interest

       on the restitution amount under the factors identified in RCW 10.82.090(2).

              5.   Imposition of the VPA

              Ellis argues that imposition of the VPA violates the excessive fines clause. However, this

       issue has been resolved by enactment of a new statutory provision regarding the VPA.

              In the 2023 session, the legislature passed Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1169. LAWS

       OF 2023, ch. 449. ESHB 1169 added a subsection to RCW 7.68.035 that prohibits courts from

       imposing the VPA on indigent defendants as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3). LAWS OF 2023, ch.

       449, §1; RCW 7.68.035(4). The amended statute also requires trial courts to waive any VPA

       imposed prior to the effective date of the amendment if the offender is indigent, on the offender’s

       motion. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1; RCW 7.68.035(5)(b). This amendment will take effect on

       July 1, 2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449.

              Although this amendment will take effect after Ellis’s resentencing, it applies to Ellis

       because this case is on direct appeal. See Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d at 748-49. However, there has

       been no finding that Ellis is indigent and the State refuses to concede this issue. Therefore, we

       3
        The reference to RCW 10.101.010(3) will be changed to RCW 10.01.160(3) effective July 1,
       2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 13.

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       No. 56984-1-II

       remand for the trial court to determine whether Ellis is indigent under RCW 10.01.160(3) and to

       reconsider the imposition of the VPA based on that determination.4

       C.     IMPOSITION OF LFOS

              Ellis argues that the trial court erred at resentencing by not removing the following LFOs:

       the DNA collection fee, community custody supervision fees, the criminal filing fee, $1,500 in

       attorney fees.

              RCW 43.43.7541 currently provides that the DNA collection fee is mandatory unless the

       offender’s DNA previously had been collected as the result of a prior conviction. However, the

       legislature has eliminated this provision, effective July 1, 2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 4. On

       remand, the trial court should strike the DNA collection fee.5

              Effective July 2022, RCW 9.94A.703(2) no longer authorizes the imposition of

       community custody supervision fees. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 29, § 7. Although this amendment

       took effect after Ellis’s resentencing, it applies to cases pending on appeal. State v. Wemhoff, 24

       Wn. App. 2d 198, 200-02, 519 P.3d 297 (2022). Therefore, the community custody supervision

       fees must be stricken. Id. at 202.

              RCW 36.18.020(2)(h) now prohibits imposition of the criminal filing fee on a defendant

       who is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3). However, there has been no finding that Ellis

       is indigent and the State refuses to concede this issue. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to

       determine whether Ellis is indigent and to reconsider the imposition of the criminal filing fee

       based on that determination.

       4
         Although the amendment to RCW 7.68.035 has not yet taken effect, it will be in force by the
       time this appeal is mandated.
       5
         Although the amendment to RCW 43.43.7541 has not yet taken effect, it will be in force by the
       time this appeal is mandated.

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              Under former RCW 10.01.160(1) (2018), a trial court may require a defendant to pay

       “costs.” Court-appointed attorney fees constitute costs under former RCW 10.01.160(1). In re

       Pers. Restraint of Dove, 196 Wn. App. 148, 155, 381 P.3d 1280 (2016). However, costs cannot

       be imposed on an indigent defendant. Former RCW 10.01.160(3). Again, there has been no

       finding that Ellis is indigent, and the State refuses to concede this issue. Therefore, we remand

       for the trial court to determine whether Ellis is indigent and to reconsider the imposition of

       attorney fees based on that determination.

              Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to strike the imposition of the DNA collection

       fee and community custody supervision fees. We also remand for the court to reconsider

       imposition of the criminal filing fee and attorney fees.

                                                 CONCLUSION

              We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s sentence, and remand for the trial

       court to strike the DNA collection fee and community custody supervision fees from the

       judgment and sentence and to reconsider imposition of interest on restitution, the VPA, the

       criminal filing fee, and attorney fees.

                                                             MAXA, J.

        We concur:

        GLASGOW, C.J.

        VELJACIC, J.

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