Court Opinion

ID: 9539388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:03:35.112752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:47.620826
License: Public Domain

BERRY, Justice
(dissenting).
For reasons hereinafter stated, I am unable to agree with the majority opinion.
As I read and understand the uncontra-dicted evidence in this case, it is clear that at the time defendant initially executed the “Operating Agreement” in controversy it was agreed and understood that defendant reserved the right to revise the agreement at a later date; that he wished to consult with representatives of Public Service Company before reaching a final decision on the matter of revising the agreement.
Defendant testified that upon William B. Osborn, Sr.’s submitting the agreement to him, he “glanced at it and (he) could see it was — applied to oil operations more than gas operations, which it cost more money to run oil”; that he advised Mr. Osborn that he would “sign it on account of it being a matter of expediency and get the well started before they changed this— they were trying to change the spacing on us, and subject to revision”; that he “advised them that (he) would — would want to make — discuss the matter since Public. Service was the other non-operator along for a quarter interest, along with me as a quarter interest non-operator, which I did at a later date”.
The person who took defendant’s acknowledgment to the operating agreement testified that “Mr. Rogers, when he glanced at it, said it looked like it may be an oil agreement, but I’ll sign it with the understanding we can revise it later”; that at the time defendant signed the agreement “he made the verbal comment that he signed it with the understanding that he reserved the right to make revisions in it at a later date, and Mr. Osborn agreed to that.”
By letter, under date of July 27, 1956, Public Service Company advised Mr. Osborn that it had revised the agreement as to overhead; that the revised agreement was enclosed; that “We have discussed the suggestions set out in this letter with Mr. W. G. Rogers by telephone and he informs me that it meets with his approval. I am sure, however, that he did not intend to commit himself until he has had opportunity to consider the matter after reading this letter and getting your reaction regarding same. If you feel that the suggested method of handling the cost of the day to day operation and bookkeeping is equitable and satisfactory, letters from Mr. Osborn and Mr. Rogers stating their approval will be deemed by us to constitute an agreement with respect thereof.” In a subsequent letter under date of August 10, 1956, Public Service Company advised Mr. Osborn “After discussing the matter of the changes you desire made in the Operating Agreement, we find we are very much at a loss to understand why provision for overhead charges should be covered in the contract, if those charges are not intended to be made. Yesterday Mr. W. G. Rogers was in the office to discuss this situation and after he examined the Contract and the clauses deleted by us and I explained to *224him the changes you desire made, he expressed himself as favoring leaving of the ■contract in its present condition and said that as soon as he returned to his office, he would get in touch with you and explain his views to you directly.”; that “As a practical matter we think the simplest ■course is to let the contract remain in its present state, unless you and Mr. Rogers ■agree on changes. We try to be reasonable and are inclined to go along with any ■situation that we regard as being reasonable.”
It is settled law that where a person to •whom an offer is made accepts the offer; ■subject to material changes therein or subject to acceptance thereof by a third person, an agreement cannot be said to have heen reached because there was not a meeting of the minds of the parties. In or'der for an agreement to result in said instances, the suggested changes must be accepted by the person making the offer. See 15 O.S.1951, § 71; Kingfisher Mill & Elevator Co. v. Westbrook et al., 79 Old. 188, 192 P. 209; Lee v. National Refining Co. et al., 181 Okl. 556, 75 P.2d 406; 12 Am.Jur. “Contracts”, Sec. S3, p. 543, and 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 43, pp. 381, 384. The first paragraph of the syllabus to the case first above cited reads as follows:
“Where a person offers to do a definite thing, and the party to whom the ■offer is made accepts conditionally, or introduces a new and material term into the acceptance, his answer constitutes a counter proposal, and there is no agreement; but, when the party to whom the counter proposal is made accepts it, such counter proposal and acceptance constitute a binding contract.”
The substance of the trial court’s judgment is that the agreement as modified was the agreement that was binding upon all interested parties. In Davidor v. Smith, Okl., 309 P.2d 272, 273, we stated in the syllabus that “In an action of legal cognizance where jury is waived, if there is any competent evidence, or inferences to be drawn therefrom, reasonably tending to support the findings and judgment of the trial court, such judgment will be affirmed on appeal to this Court.” When the findings and judgment of the trial court are measured by the quoted rule, it is apparent to me that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.