Court Opinion

ID: 9898599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 20:06:08.583017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:23.749488
License: Public Domain

No. 125,117

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          JOHNNY KING,
                                     Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                                   v.

                                 UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 501,
                                   Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

                                  SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
        In a retaliatory discharge case, the employee need not prove that they expressly
advised the employer of the legal basis for the claim that their actions were protected.
The employer is charged with knowledge of the laws that apply to them as an employer.
The employee is only required to outline the facts that give rise to the application of any
legal protections claimed.

2.
        Neither the Freedom from Unsafe Restraint and Seclusion Act (FURSA)—K.S.A.
2022 Supp. 72-6151 et seq.—and the attendant Kansas regulations that mirror it—K.A.R.
91-42-1 et seq.—nor the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001 (Coverdell
Act)—20 U.S.C. § 7941 et seq., create a public policy that would warrant an exception to
Kansas' at-will employment doctrine.

        Appeal from Shawnee District Court; THOMAS G. LUEDKE, judge. Oral argument held August 15,
2023. Opinion filed November 9, 2023. Case dismissed.

        Theodore J. Lickteig, of Lickteig Law Firm, LLC, of Lenexa, and Terence E. Leibold and Alex B.
Atchison, of Petefish, Immel, Hird, Johnson & Leibold, L.L.P., of Lawrence, for appellant/cross-appellee.

                                                    1
        J. Phillip Gragson, of Henson, Hutton, Mudrick, Gragson & Vogelsberg, L.L.P., of Topeka, for
appellee/cross-appellant.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., HILL and BRUNS, JJ.

        ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J.: Johnny King, a paraprofessional for Unified School
District 501 (the District), was called to help with a disruptive student. Based on his
response, the District terminated King for failing to follow emergency safety intervention
policies and training. King sued the District for wrongful termination.

        Prior to trial, the district court found that there is a public policy exception to
Kansas' employment-at-will doctrine which protected King's continued employment for
the District. Accordingly, the case was allowed to proceed to trial. After the close of
King's evidence, the district court granted the District's motion for judgment as a matter
of law. The district court found that King failed to establish that he took a protected
action and that his termination was not pretextual.

        King appeals the granting of the motion for judgment as a matter of law. The
District cross-appeals the district court's finding that a public policy exception existed to
override Kansas' employment at will doctrine. Although we find that the district court
was correct in holding that King failed to establish his termination was pretextual, we
also find that the district court erred in not dismissing the case based on King's failure to
establish a public policy exception to the Kansas employee-at-will doctrine. Accordingly,
King was not entitled to bring a wrongful discharge action in the first place and his case
must be dismissed.

                                                  2
                           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Johnny King was hired as a paraprofessional for the District, and in 2017 was
assigned to Hope Street Elementary School (Hope Street). One of the job duties assigned
to King was to assist with behavior control as needed. According to King, that ended up
being a fairly significant portion of what he did in his day-to-day employment. Hope
Street was considered a school for at-risk children—children who had little control of
their behavior at times and were often disruptive.

       The District's policy for emergency safety interventions, such as seclusion and
restraint, called for limited safety interventions. Employees were encouraged "to utilize
other behavioral management tools, including prevention techniques, de-escalation
techniques, and positive behavioral intervention strategies." To that end, emergency
safety interventions were "not [to] be used unless a student's conduct presents an
immediate danger to self or others." The emergency safety interventions policy stated that
all staff members were prohibited, in part, from using faceup or supine physical
restraints.

       As part of his employment, the District required King to be trained in the Mandt
system. The Mandt System "is a relationally based program that uses a continuous
learning and development approach to prevent, de-escalate, and if necessary, intervene in
behavioral interactions that could become aggressive." The Mandt system prohibits using
pain compliance, trigger points, or pressure points. It also prohibits hyperextension of any
part of the student's body. The Mandt system also prohibits doing anything that
potentially risks the hyperextension of any part of the student's body. In addition, any
technique that involves substantial risk of injury, forces the student to the floor, chair, or
wall is prohibited. As is any manual restraint that maintains the student on the floor in
any position or any technique which puts or keeps the student off balance. In general, the
least restrictive interaction needed to protect the student or others should be used.

                                               3
       When discussing the Mandt system and the training he received in it, King said
that it never covered what to do in a situation where a student was hitting another person.

       A few months after King started at Hope Street, student J.C., began acting out by
"verbalizing and otherwise being disruptive." Ashley West, J.C.'s paraprofessional, told
J.C. to take a break with her so they could discuss his behavior in a timeout room. West
sat in a chair outside the timeout room while J.C. walked down the hallway toward her.
As J.C. got close to West, he yelled at her and struck her with his fist. King attempted to
get J.C. into the timeout room and J.C. resisted. J.C. tried to escape the timeout room
while King attempted to close the door.

       King said that he was not applying pressure to J.C. or trying to take his breath
away when he attempted to put him in the timeout room. He did acknowledge pulling on
J.C.'s foot to keep him into the timeout room. He also acknowledged that he might have
tried pulling on J.C.'s shirt to keep him in the room. J.C. escaped the timeout room, and a
social worker took him away and got him settled down.

       A short video of the situation was recorded and is included in the record. The
video shows J.C. attempting to get out of the timeout room while King shuts the door on
him. J.C. ends up lying on his back, or supine, as he exits the room, although it is unclear
if he was put on his back as a result of King grabbing him or if he stumbles as he leaves
the room. The video ends with J.C. on his back with King pulling on J.C.'s shirt.

       After the incident, Paula Swartzman-Waters, the Hope Street Coordinator and a
Mandt trainer between 2012 and 2014, recommended that King be terminated for not
following proper Mandt de-escalation techniques. In June 2017, Carla Nolan, the General
Director of Human Resources for the District, sent King a letter notifying him of his
proposed termination. The Board of Education approved the recommendation, and King's
employment was terminated. King unsuccessfully appealed his termination.

                                             4
       King sued the District alleging one count of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy. The District moved for summary judgment arguing, in part, that King
could not establish that he exercised a statutory or constitutional right that was
recognized as a basis for a retaliatory discharge claim.

       The district court denied the motion, recognizing a public policy exception to
Kansas' at-will employment doctrine exists when a school employee takes reasonable
actions to provide a safe environment for students and educators.

       A jury trial was held in January 2022. At the close of King's evidence, the District
filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. In its motion, the District argued, in large
part, that King failed to show that the District had knowledge of King's exercise of a
right—which, according to the District's motion, is a necessary element of a claim for
wrongful discharge.

       The district court granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law.

       King timely appealed arguing that the district court erred by finding that he failed
to establish select elements of a retaliatory discharge claim. The District filed a timely
notice of cross-appeal seeking review of the district court's finding that a public policy
exception existed to override Kansas' employment at will doctrine.

                                         ANALYSIS

I.     OUR STANDARD OF REVIEW ON BOTH THE APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL IS
       DE NOVO

       A trial court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de
novo determining "whether evidence existed from which a reasonable jury 'could

                                              5
properly find a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Siruta v. Siruta, 301 Kan. 757, 766,
348 P.3d 549 (2015).

       When ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court must
resolve all facts and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor
of the party against whom the ruling is sought. The district court must deny the motion if
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions based on the evidence. The appellate
court must apply a similar analysis when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Dawson v. BNSF Railway Co., 309 Kan. 446, 454, 437 P.3d
929 (2019).

       In addition, to the extent we are required to interpret statutes, we also have
unlimited review. Nauheim v. City of Topeka, 309 Kan. 145, 149, 432 P.3d 647 (2019).

II.    WE EXAMINE KING'S CLAIMS AS THEY RELATE TO THE ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL
       DISCHARGE

       To establish a prima facie case for wrongful discharge King was required to show:
(1) he took a protected action; (2) the District knew about the protected action; (3) the
District took an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the
protected action and the adverse employment action. See Hill v. State, 310 Kan. 490, 495,
514, 448 P.3d 457 (2019) (listing elements for a retaliatory transfer).

       Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to
provide evidence of a legitimate reason for terminating the plaintiff. Once the defendant
has done so, the plaintiff is then required to prove that the reasons offered were merely
pretextual. 310 Kan. at 513.

                                              6
       The first question before this court is whether, when all facts and reasonable
inferences are made in favor of King, the district court erred when it found that King
(1) failed to establish that the District knew King took a protected action and (2) that
King failed to establish a causal connection between the protected action and King's
termination.

       A. King claims his action was protected by both state and federal statutes.

       King claims that his action was protected by the Freedom from Unsafe Restraint
and Seclusion Act (FURSA)—K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6151 et seq.—and the Paul D.
Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001 (Coverdell Act)—20 U.S.C. § 7941 et seq.

       FURSA set out rules on emergency safety interventions. For example, under
FURSA "[e]mergency safety interventions shall be used only when a student presents a
reasonable and immediate danger of physical harm to such student or others with the
present ability to effect such physical harm." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6153(a). Local
school boards were required to "develop and implement written policies to govern the use
of emergency safety interventions in schools." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6153(g). FURSA
set the floor for the local school boards, as any policy implemented by the board "shall
conform to the standards, definitions and requirements of [FURSA]." K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
72-6153(g).

       FURSA expired on June 30, 2020. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6158. However, the
Kansas Department of Education adopted regulations that largely mirrored the substance
of FURSA. K.A.R. 91-42-1 et seq.

       The Coverdell Act is meant "to provide teachers, principals, and other school
professionals the tools they need to undertake reasonable actions to maintain order,
discipline, and an appropriate educational environment." 20 U.S.C. § 7942. The

                                              7
Coverdell Act preempts state laws to the extent that state laws are inconsistent with the
Coverdell Act, but it does not preempt any state law that provides additional protection
from liability. 20 U.S.C. § 7945(a).

       In substantive part, the Coverdell Act limits liability "for harm caused" by teachers
in school if:

       "(1) the teacher was acting within the scope of the teacher's employment or
       responsibilities to a school or governmental entity;
       "(2) the actions of the teacher were carried out in conformity with Federal, State, and
       local laws (including rules and regulations) in furtherance of efforts to control, discipline,
       expel, or suspend a student or maintain order or control in the classroom or school;
       "(3) if appropriate or required, the teacher was properly licensed, certified, or authorized
       by the appropriate authorities for the activities or practice involved in the State in which
       the harm occurred, where the activities were or practice was undertaken within the scope
       of the teacher's responsibilities;
       "(4) the harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence,
       reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the
       individual harmed by the teacher; and
       "(5) the harm was not caused by the teacher operating a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or
       other vehicle for which the State requires the operator or the owner of the vehicle, craft,
       or vessel to–
                (A) possess an operator's license; or
                (B) maintain insurance." 20 U.S.C. §7946(a).

       B. King was able to establish that his legal justification for appealing his
termination was based on the FURSA or the Coverdell Act.

       Both parties, and the district court, acknowledge that the District was aware of
King's actions. However, the district court noted that "there was no evidence introduced
that the [District] was aware [King's] action was taken pursuant to [FURSA or the

                                                        8
Coverdell Act] or under the protection of said law." The district court went on to note that
there was no evidence that information was provided to the District that King was
purporting to act under the protection of the law or that he raised the issue of legal
justification during the investigation or any proceedings prior to his current suit.

       The district court went on to find that knowledge of the action taken by King
"does not equate to knowledge of the exercise of a right" and that in a retaliatory
discharge case, the employee must prove that the employer had knowledge of the right
exercised prior to the termination. On appeal, King disagrees, arguing that the employee
need only show that the employer must only know about the protected activity of the
employee.

       The district court based its finding on the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in
Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 752 P.2d 685 (1988), where the court addressed a
wrongful discharge claim in a whistleblower case. The only knowledge element set out
by the Kansas Supreme Court in Palmer is that "the employer had knowledge of the
employee's reporting of such violation prior to discharge of the employee." 242 Kan. at
900.

       The district court's decision that King was required to show that the District had
knowledge of the right exercised reads too much into Palmer. See 242 Kan. at 900.
Requiring a plaintiff to prove that that a defendant in a retaliatory discharge case had
knowledge of the right exercised provides a perverse incentive to defendants to remain
ignorant of the law.

       The Tenth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Bausman v. Interstate Brands
Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2001), a retaliatory discharge case involving
workers compensation, where the circuit court found that Kansas' "'knew or should have

                                              9
known' standard charges an employer with knowledge of those facts concerning an
employee's workplace injury reasonably available to the employer at the time."

       As the court in Bausman put it, "an employer cannot adopt a workplace policy by
which the employer abdicates its duty to see, to hear, and to think." 252 F.3d at 1121. The
same standard should apply here. King was not required to prove that the District was
aware of the rights that King purported to act under. And even if the District did need to
know about the claimed rights, the District should have known about them given its
position as an employer of teachers and paraprofessionals.

       The district court erred when it determined that King did not meet his evidentiary
burden. In a retaliatory discharge case, the employee need not prove that they expressly
advised the employer of the legal basis for the claim that their actions were protected.
The employer is charged with knowledge of the laws that apply to them as an employer.
The employee is only required to outline the facts that give rise to the application of any
legal protections claimed. Accordingly, King was not required to prove that the District
knew he had exercised a right. Instead, he was only required to show that the District
knew about the action that he took. There is no question that the District knew about
King's actions in this case.

       C. King established a causal connection between the protected activity and his
termination.

       The district court also found that King failed to prove there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and his termination. In the district court's
decision, the court equated the causal connection element with King's duty to prove that
any justification for his termination offered by the District was pretextual.

                                             10
       On its face, there was a causal connection between King's actions and his
termination. King was terminated because of the actions he took to secure J.C.

       Once King has established a prima facie case, which we find he has here, the
burden shifts to the District to provide evidence of a legitimate reason for terminating
King. If the District is able to meet its burden, King is then required to prove that the
reasons offered were merely pretextual. Hill, 310 Kan. at 513.

       D. The District established that King was terminated solely for his failure to
follow the MANDT system, and King failed to establish that the reason given was
pretextual.

       "To raise a triable issue of whether the employer's reason is mere pretext, the
employee's evidence may include that the employee was treated differently than others
similarly situated; the employer's treatment of the employee before the protected action;
and the employer's response to the protected action." Hill, 310 Kan. at 518.

       King argues that he showed the reason for his termination was pretextual because
he was treated differently than other similarly situated employees. The evidence does not
support disparate treatment.

       King was not similarly situated to any other employee involved in the incident
with J.C. King was the only employee to physically engage with J.C. He was the only
employee to grab J.C. by the leg and drag him into the timeout room. And he was the
only employee who attempted to close the timeout room door on J.C. To say that the
reason for termination was pretextual because similarly situated employees were treated
differently is a step too far when there were no similarly situated employees. The
situation would be different if King, like the other employees, had not physically
intervened and then been terminated. But that is not what happened here. King was the

                                             11
only employee to physically intervene with J.C., and King was the only employee
terminated.

       Nor does King raise any other factors to establish that the termination was
pretextual in his brief. He notes that other factors exist, such as the temporal proximity
between the act and the termination, evidence that the stated reason for termination was
false, or evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy. But he
does not point to any evidence or argument on his part that the other factors support a
finding that his termination was pretextual. Instead, he hangs his hat on the similarly
situated employee factor which, as discussed above, has limited weight here.

       E. Kansas does not require that an employee establish the employer's decision was
made in bad faith to prove it was pretextual.

       The district court in this case also found that there was no evidence to show that
the District's decision to terminate King was not done with a good-faith belief that King
violated the Mandt guidelines.

       In Rivera v. City and County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004),
the Tenth Circuit discussed the role of whether the employer acted in good faith in
terminating an employee's employment in the context of whether the termination was
pretextual. There, the court stated that the "'relevant inquiry is not whether [the
employer's] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [it] honestly
believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.'" 365 F.3d at 924-25
(quoting Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 [10th Cir. 1999],
overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 [2002]).

                                              12
       Kansas appellate courts have not yet adopted the honest belief doctrine, and we are
not prepared to do so here.

       F. The district court was not bound by its earlier summary judgment decision.

       Prior to trial the district court denied the District's motion for summary judgment
finding there was evidence that King's termination was pretextual.

       The court noted that other employees were present at the incident and were not
terminated. As the court put it in its order, had the other employees "followed the
appropriate Mandt de-escalation procedures at the early stages given its alleged
invariable success, it is possible that the Plaintiff's emergency intervention would have
been rendered unnecessary." The court went on to say "the [District] places the sole onus
on [King] for application of these guidelines. The evidence could suggest that [King]
inherited a situation where Mandt was no longer applicable and J.C. was not susceptible
to its effect." The court acknowledged that King was "the only person who physically
intervened in response to the physically aggressive conduct of J.C., but it is equally true
that the others who were present apparently also failed to appropriately apply de-
escalation procedures, assuming their inevitable success." Ultimately, in its order denying
the motion for summary judgment, the district court believed that King "provided
evidence sufficient to create a legitimate question as to whether the [District's] stated
reason for [King's] termination was pretextual."

       On appeal, King argues the district court should have been bound by its earlier
decision in its order denying the motion for summary judgment and, as a result, should
have found that there was sufficient evidence to deny the motion for judgment as a matter
of law, at least on this particular issue. Alternatively, he argues that he presented
sufficient evidence at trial to establish that his termination was pretextual, even if the
district court was not required to follow its prior decision.

                                              13
       The law of the case doctrine is a discretionary policy which generally means that a
court will refuse to reopen a matter that has already been decided in the case, without
limiting the court's power to do so. The law of the case is used, in part, to avoid indefinite
relitigation of the same issue. State v. Collier, 263 Kan. 629, 631, 952 P.2d 1326 (1998).

       King's argument regarding the law of the case doctrine, and its application in the
current case, is extremely limited. He gives a brief overview of the doctrine and then
states, without specific citations backing up his assertion, that the doctrine should have
barred the district court from determining that King failed to establish a causal
connection between his action and his termination because he failed to show that the
termination was pretextual. But as stated above, the law of the case doctrine is
discretionary and does not prevent a court from readdressing an issue it has already
decided. In this case, the court decided the issue at the summary judgment stage and then
revisited its decision after hearing evidence at trial.

       And after looking at the evidence as outlined above, we do not believe that the
district court was wrong to reconsider its earlier decision.

       In sum, King fails to establish that the reason for his termination was pretextual.
He only argues that he was similarly situated to other employees who were not
terminated. But King alone engaged in a physical altercation with J.C., which the District
believed violated Mandt guidelines under the circumstances. The other employees
involved were not accused of violating Mandt guidelines and were not terminated.

       Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting the District's motion for
judgment as a matter of law on King's wrongful discharge claim.

                                               14
       Even though we affirm the district court's ultimate decision as it relates to King's
failure to meet his burden of proof, it all becomes irrelevant when we examine the
District's cross-appeal.

III.   KING WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE WHO COULD BE TERMINATED FOR ANY
       REASON

       The District claims the district court erred in recognizing a public policy exception
to Kansas' at-will employment doctrine when a school employee takes reasonable actions
to provide a safe environment for students and educators. We agree.

       "Kansas employment law is grounded in the doctrine of employment-at-will. In
the absence of an express or implied contract of duration or where recognized public
policy concerns are raised, employment is terminable at the will of either party." Riddle v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 27 Kan. App. 2d 79, 86, 998 P.2d 114 (2000). The public policy
exceptions are limited. In Hill, 310 Kan. at 501, the Kansas Supreme Court listed the six
exceptions recognized at the time: (1) filing a claim under the Kansas Workers
Compensation Act; (2) filing a claim under the Federal Employers Liability Act;
(3) whistleblowing; (4) exercising a public employee's First Amendment right to free
speech on an issue of public concern; (5) filing a claim under the Kansas Wage Payment
Act; and (6) invoking rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act or the Kansas Minimum
Wage and Maximum Hours Law.

       When determining whether a public policy exception to Kansas' at-will
employment exists, three scenarios exist:

       "(1) The legislature has clearly declared the state's public policy; (2) the legislature
       enacted statutory provisions from which public policy may reasonably be implied, even
       though it is not directly declared; and (3) the legislature has neither made a clear

                                                     15
       statement of public policy nor can it be reasonably implied." Campbell v. Husky Hogs,
       292 Kan. 225, 230, 255 P.3d 1 (2011).

       The recognition of a public policy exception

       "has rested on a principle of deterrence against employer reprisal for an employee's
       exercise of a legal right. And in those instances in which an employee is exercising a
       statutory right created by the legislature, we have noted that such deterrence serves not
       only the employee's interests but also those of the state and its people. This is because
       statutory rights exist only because of the legislature's determination that such a right is in
       the public interest." Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation, 297 Kan. 547, 556, 304 P.3d
       1226 (2013).

       FURSA, and the similar Kansas regulations, do not create a public policy that
would warrant an exception to Kansas' at-will employment doctrine. First, it does not
clearly state that it is the public policy of the State, let alone clearly state that it is the
public policy of the State to protect the continued employment of teachers and other
school professionals who restrain a student. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6151 et seq. Nor
can a public policy protecting the continued employment of teachers or other
professionals who restrain students be reasonably implied.

       FURSA limits emergency safety interventions to "only when a student presents a
reasonable and immediate danger" to self or others, but it does not focus on protecting the
teacher or other professional restraining the student. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6153(a).
Instead, it requires protection for the students who might potentially be restrained. And if
an emergency restraint occurs, it provides a procedure for parents "to file a complaint
with the local board" if the parent believes "that an emergency safety intervention has
been used on the parent's child in violation of the act, rules and regulations or the local
board's emergency safety intervention policy." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6153(g)(2)(A); see
K.A.R. 91-42-4(f).

                                                    16
       FURSA does not operate like the recognized public policy exceptions set out in
Hill. It does not provide protections for a teacher who restrains a student, nor does it offer
some sort of appeal process for a teacher disciplined for restraining a student. This is not
a situation like a classic workers compensation retaliation case where an employee is
injured, files a claim, and is retaliated against because he or she took the statutorily
authorized action of filing a claim. Instead, FURSA and the similar regulations provide
protections for students.

       Similarly, the Coverdell Act does not protect King in this situation. The Coverdell
Act protects a teacher from liability "for harm caused by an act or omission of the teacher
on behalf of the school" if certain conditions are met. 20 U.S.C. § 7946(a). Those
conditions require the teacher to act in a manner consistent with federal, state, and local
laws, rules, and regulations. 20 U.S.C. § 7946(a)(2). But the Coverdell Act does not limit
an employer's ability to terminate a teacher for restraining a student in a manner
inconsistent with school policy. Instead, the Coverdell Act's main protection for teachers
is that it prohibits punitive damages to be awarded against the teacher unless the teacher's
actions constituted "willful or criminal misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference
to the rights or safety of the individual harmed." 20 U.S.C. § 7946(c)(1). In addition, the
Coverdell Act limits a teacher's liability to "only for the amount of noneconomic loss
allocated to that [teacher] in direct proportion to the percentage of responsibility of that
[teacher]" for the harm claimed. 20 U.S.C. § 7947(b)(1)(A).

       The Coverdell Act, like FURSA and the similar regulations, does not operate like
the recognized public policy exceptions. It limits a teacher's liability in certain
circumstances, but it does not provide a teacher carte blanche in restraining a student.
King was still required to act within the confines of the law and regulations, both of
which required the local board to create and implement written policies to govern the use
of emergency safety interventions in schools. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6153(g); K.A.R.
91-42-3(a). The Coverdell Act, FURSA, and the Kansas regulations do not protect a

                                              17
teacher from termination after the teacher has violated district policy and statutory
requirements.

       FURSA, the similar regulations, and the Coverdell Act do not operate to create a
public policy exception to Kansas' employment-at-will doctrine. Neither the laws nor the
regulations clearly state that it is a public policy for Kansas. Nor can a public policy
protecting teachers from termination be reasonably implied.

       This is especially true when considering that King did not appear to act within the
confines of the law and the regulations when he was restraining J.C. K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
72-6153(f)(1) prohibits "supine, or face-up physical restraint." K.A.R. 91-42-2(e)(2) also
prohibits supine restraints. And the Coverdell Act requires teachers' actions to conform
with State and local laws and regulations. 20 U.S.C. § 7946(a)(2). In the district court's
order denying the motion for summary judgment, King admitted that J.C. was supine in
the video of their altercation. There is not a public policy protecting teachers or
paraprofessionals from termination after using a prohibited restraint on a student.

       The district court makes much of the "[e]mergency safety interventions shall be
used only when a student presents a reasonable and immediate danger of physical harm"
in its order denying the District's motion for summary judgment. (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6153(a); see K.A.R. 91-42-2(a). The district court read that
language as essentially imposing a duty on King to restrain J.C. But the language in
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 72-6153(a) and K.A.R. 91-42-2(a) does not impose a duty to act on
teachers and paraprofessionals. Instead, when read in the context of the rest of the law
and regulations, the "shall" operates to stop teachers and paraprofessionals from acting
unless absolutely necessary and, if necessary, in a safe manner. To read otherwise ignores
the clear protections that FURSA and the similar regulations afford students.

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       The district court erred when it determined that FURSA, the similar regulations,
and the Coverdell Act established a public policy which created an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine of Kansas. Because there is not a public policy exception,
King cannot show that his continued employment was protected under Kansas law. As an
employee in Kansas, without a demonstrable contract stating otherwise, King's
employment was at-will, and he could not sue for wrongful termination. See Riddle, 27
Kan. App. 2d at 86.

       In sum, although we find that the district court was correct in holding that King
failed to establish his termination was pretextual, we also find that the district court erred
in not dismissing the case based on King's failure to establish a public policy exception to
the Kansas employee-at-will doctrine. Accordingly, King was not entitled to bring a
wrongful discharge action in the first place and his case must be dismissed.

       Case dismissed.

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