Court Opinion

ID: 9744064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:43.699148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.468982
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
At the time of the initial establishment of the plea of guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, the legislature also enacted the statute, 1.C. 85-86-2-5, to govern the sentencing and treatment of those persons found guilty but mentally ill. That statute provides in full as follows:
35-86-2-5. Sentencing of defendant found guilty but mentally ill
(a) Whenever a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, or enters a plea to that effect that is accepted by the court, the court shall sentence him in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense.
(b) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime is committed to the department of correction, he shall be further evaluated and then treated in such a manner as is psy-chiatrically indicated for his mental illness. Treatment may be provided by:
(1) The department of correction; or.
(2) The department of mental health after transfer under IC 11-10-4.
(c) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime is placed on probation, the court may, in accordance with IC 85-88-2-2, require that he undergo treatment. [IC 835-86-2-5, as added by Acts 1981, P.L. 298, § 5; P.L. 820-1988, § 21}.
The above quoted statute contains several important and related legislative decisions and judgments among which are the following:
1. Judges and juries of the state are selected to make the determination of mentally ill, rather than psychiatrists, psychologists, or corrections officials.
2. The solemn occasion of the determination of guilt or innocence is selected as the time for the determination of mental illness to be made rather than at the time of sentencing or commitment.
3. The time of the crime is selected as the point at which mental illness to to be determined to have existed or not, and *732not the time of sentencing or commitment.
4. The legislature selected itself as the determiner of the class of individual offenders who should be placed on the psychiatric evaluation and treatment track.
The statute as a whole makes a very basic assessment of human nature. It is that when the process of determining mental illness is made by reliable decision makers like judges and juries, at the time of the solemn act of determining guilt or innocence, based upon the most trustworthy evidence available of criminal conduct and its accompanying state of mind, and such process results in the finding of guilty but mentally ill, the individual offender so identified is rehabilitatable and reformable within a prison system which is under a legislative mandate to evaluate and treat.
In the first paragraph, the court is required to sentence all persons falling in the mentally ill class "in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense." Standing alone, this command would appear to answer the question of whether persons found guilty but mentally ill remain subject to the penalty of death clearly in the affirmative as the majority opinion concludes. It does not stand alone however, but is followed by the further command that persons found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime be ".. further evaluated and then treated in such a manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness." Thus, this statute as an answer to the death possibility question, loses it clarity of direction. When considered as a whole, it represents a legislative vision that all persons found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense have an illness of the mind which has a nexus with criminal behavior which when properly diagnosed and treated will lead to better conduct. This view is at odds with the vision of human worthlessness which is basic in the death sentence statute. Given the conflict within I.C. 35-86-2-5, and the manner in which its vision differs from the death statute, leads to the conclusion that the statute governing the sentencing which follows a finding of guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense is ambiguous with regard to whether it represents a legislative decision that those persons convict ed of murder upon a finding or verdict of guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime shall remain subject to the death penalty.
Due process and due course of law, in this area of absolutes, cannot be satisfied by ambiguities of this sort. If the legislature is persuaded that persons guilty but mentally ill at the time of their crimes fall within that class subject to the death penalty, it should clearly express that decision. Since it has not done so, I would remand this case to the trial court to resentence appellant to a term of years appropriate for his crimes, thus facilitating and placing the burden upon the department of corrections to further evaluate him and then treat him in such a manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness.