Court Opinion

ID: 9951071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 16:00:56.235977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:05.680295
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11065    Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 03/15/2024    Page: 1 of 11

                                                                [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                           Nos. 22-11065 & 22-12599
                           ____________________

        JESUS GABRIEL NAVARRO GUADARRAMA,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                             Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petitions for Review of a Decision of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                   Agency Nos. A209-879-709 & A209-879-709
                            ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11065

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
               Jesus Gabriel Navarro Guadarrama, a native and citizen of
        Mexico, petitions for our review of the Board of Immigration
        Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal of his application for adjustment of
        status and the Board’s subsequent denial of his motion to
        reconsider. Navarro Guadarrama contends that the Board erred by
        applying the incorrect legal standard—as articulated in its own
        precedent—to the discretionary consideration of his adjustment-of-
        status application. After careful consideration of the parties’
        arguments and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that we
        have jurisdiction to consider Navarro Guadarrama’s petitions for
        review but that the Board did not apply the wrong legal standard.
        Accordingly, we deny the petitions.
                                         I
                                         A
               Navarro Guadarrama entered the United States in 1995 and
        was thereafter convicted of several crimes. As relevant here, he
        was convicted of violating Florida state law by (1) possessing 20
        grams or less of marijuana in 2005, (2) possessing 20 grams or less
        of marijuana and drug paraphernalia in 2010, and (3) contributing
        to the delinquency of a child in 2018.
              The government initiated removal proceedings against
        Navarro Guadarrama on various grounds, including that he had
        been convicted of a controlled-substance offense under 8 U.S.C.
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        22-11065               Opinion of the Court                        3

        § 1182(a). Navarro Guadarrama applied for adjustment of status
        pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), which permits an alien who is
        unlawfully in the United States to obtain relief from removal if he
        meets specified requirements. In conjunction with his adjustment
        application, Navarro Guadarrama sought a waiver of
        inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), which allows the Attorney
        General to waive inadmissibility in certain circumstances. Navarro
        Guadarrama’s marijuana-possession convictions required him to
        obtain the waiver.
               An immigration judge found that because Navarro
        Guadarrama had two marijuana-possession convictions, he was
        statutorily ineligible for a § 1182(h) waiver, which is available, as
        relevant here, only when an alien has a single offense for possession
        of 30 grams or less of marijuana. Navarro Guadarrama sought
        review of the IJ’s decision before the Board, which dismissed his
        appeal and held that his two marijuana-possession convictions
        rendered him ineligible for a waiver.
                                         B
              After a Florida state court vacated his 2005 marijuana-
        possession conviction, Navarro Guadarrama moved to reopen his
        removal proceedings. The Board granted the motion and
        remanded the case to the IJ. Following a hearing, the IJ issued a
        written decision denying Navarro Guadarrama’s application for a
        § 1182(h) waiver and for adjustment of status under § 1255(i).
               Although the IJ found that Navarro Guadarrama was
        statutorily eligible for a § 1182(h) waiver and that he had satisfied
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11065

        the threshold requirements for adjustment of status, she concluded
        that he hadn’t established extreme hardship as required to obtain
        the waiver. The IJ further found that even if Navarro Guadarrama
        had established hardship, he wasn’t entitled to discretionary relief.
        The IJ afforded “favorable weight” to Navarro Guadarrama’s
        “strong family ties within the United States,” the significant length
        of time he had lived in the country, and his work history. The IJ
        explained, though, that Navarro Guadarrama had a number of
        adverse factors, including his criminal record and evidence of his
        bad character. The IJ emphasized his arrest for sexual battery, his
        conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a child, his
        multiple convictions for possession of marijuana and drug
        paraphernalia, the five years he spent as a fugitive in Georgia, and
        his failure to file tax returns. After “considering the totality of the
        circumstances,” the IJ determined that Navarro Guadarrama’s
        adverse factors “greatly outweigh[ed]” his positive equities and,
        accordingly, that he had failed to demonstrate that he warranted a
        favorable exercise of discretion necessary to obtain a waiver. The
        IJ incorporated her discretion analysis into Navarro Guadarrama’s
        adjustment-of-status evaluation and thus also denied the
        adjustment.
               Navarro Guadarrama sought review of the IJ’s decision
        before the Board, which dismissed his appeal. The Board found
        that Navarro Guadarrama’s positive equities were “substantial,”
        including “his lengthy residence in the United States beginning at a
        young age; his close family ties . . . ; his employment history; and
        his community ties . . . .” Ultimately, however, the Board agreed
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        22-11065               Opinion of the Court                        5

        with the IJ’s determination that Navarro Guadarrama didn’t
        warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. Summarizing Navarro
        Guadarrama’s adverse factors, including his criminal history, tax
        evasion, and living as a fugitive, the Board concluded:
              We agree with the Immigration Judge that the
              negative factors in this case outweigh the
              respondent’s positive equities. Even considering the
              positive factors and the potential hardships of the
              respondent’s removal on himself and his family, we
              conclude that the respondent failed to carry his
              burden of proving that he merits adjustment of status
              in the exercise of discretion. We conclude the
              respondent is undesirable as a permanent resident
              and a grant of relief is not in the best interest of the
              United States. See Matter of Mendez-Morale[z], 21 I&N
              Dec. 296, 299-300 (BIA 1996).

        Because the Board determined that Navarro Guadarrama didn’t
        merit discretionary relief, it didn’t reach the questions whether he
        needed a waiver or whether he met his burden regarding hardship.
        Navarro Guadarrama timely petitioned this Court to review the
        Board’s dismissal of his appeal.
                                         C
               Not long thereafter, we held in Said v. U.S. Attorney General,
        28 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2022), that Florida’s deﬁnition of marijuana
        is broader than (and thus not a categorical match for) the federal
        deﬁnition. In light of Said, Navarro Guadarrama moved the Board
        to reconsider its decision in his removal proceedings. He argued
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11065

        that he no longer needed a § 1182(h) waiver because, under Said,
        his 2010 state-law marijuana-possession conviction didn’t count as
        a controlled-substance oﬀense under § 1182 that would render him
        inadmissible. In his motion, Navarro Guadarrama argued that the
        Board erred by applying the standard articulated in Matter of
        Mendez-Moralez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996), which applies to
        aliens who require waivers, rather than the standard from Matter
        of Arai, 31 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1970), which applies to those who
        don’t. Navarro Guadarrama contended that the Board conﬂated
        the standards from those two decisions and that the outcome of
        his proceedings would have been diﬀerent had the proper standard
        been applied—because, he argued, Arai calls for a presumption that
        the favorable exercise of discretion is appropriate for adjustment of
        status, whereas Mendez-Moralez requires no such presumption.
                The Board denied Navarro Guadarrama’s motion to
        reconsider. It reaﬃrmed its conclusion that Navarro Guadarrama
        didn’t warrant discretionary relief. The Board further explained
        that it didn’t err by citing Mendez-Moralez:
              In citing to Matter of Mendez, the Board did not
              subject the respondent to a higher discretionary
              standard, as [Navarro Guadarrama] argues in his
              motion. Rather, the Board cited this case for the
              overarching proposition that in evaluating whether a
              respondent warrants a favorable exercise of
              discretion, an adjudicator must ‘balance the adverse
              factors evidencing [a noncitizen’s] undesirability as a
              permanent resident with the social and humane
              considerations presented on his behalf to determine
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        22-11065               Opinion of the Court                          7

               whether a grant of relief in the exercise of discretion
               appears to be in the best interest of this country.’

              Navarro Guadarrama timely petitioned this Court for
        review of the Board’s denial of his motion to reconsider. We
        consolidated that petition with his pending petition for review of
        the Board’s dismissal of his appeal.
                                          II
                 As a threshold matter, the government asserts that we lack
        jurisdiction over Navarro Guadarrama’s petition under 8 U.S.C.
        § 1252(a)(2).      That statute includes a jurisdiction-stripping
        provision that states, in relevant part, that “[n]otwithstanding any
        other provision of law . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to review
        . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . .
        1255 . . . of this title.” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Another provision of
        the same statute, though, expressly preserves our jurisdiction over
        “questions of law”: “Nothing in subparagraph (B) . . . which limits
        or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding
        review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a
        petition for review . . . .” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). But to be clear, the
        latter provision preserves our jurisdiction only over genuine
        questions of law and colorable constitutional claims—a petitioner
        may not “dress up a claim . . . to invoke our jurisdiction.” Patel v.
        U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), aﬀ’d
        sub nom. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022).
               The government concedes, as it must, that “[a]n argument
        that the agency applied the wrong legal standard in making a
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11065

        determination constitutes a legal question” over which we have
        jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D). Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d
        792, 799 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 73 F.4th
        852, 856 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding that “‘questions of law’ in
        § 1252(a)(2)(D) should be read to ‘include[ ] the application of a
        legal standard to undisputed or established facts’” (quoting
        Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1067 (2020))); Farah v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]hether the
        Board applied the correct legal standard is a question of law.”). It
        contends, though, that to confer jurisdiction the petitioner’s
        argument “must have some possible validity,” Arias v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 482 F.3d 1281, 1284 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007), and it insists that
        Navarro Guadarrama’s argument doesn’t pass muster because he’s
        really just challenging the IJ’s and Board’s discretionary weighing
        of evidence. That sort of contention, the government says, is a
        “garden-variety abuse of discretion argument” over which we lack
        jurisdiction. Farah, 12 F.4th at 1326.
              We disagree. Navarro Guadarrama isn’t challenging the
        Board’s granular, case-by-case balancing of the positive and
        negative equities in his particular case. Rather, he contends that
        the Board applied the wrong framework altogether—Mendez-
        Moralez rather than Arai. Navarro Guadarrama asks us to hold that
        the Board applied the wrong legal standard in deciding his case.
        That is precisely the sort of question of law over which we have
        repeatedly held we have jurisdiction.
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        22-11065               Opinion of the Court                         9

                                         III
               On, then, to the merits. The question, again, is whether the
        Board applied the wrong legal standard in rejecting Navarro
        Guadarrama’s claim. And Navarro Guadarrama’s contention,
        again, is that the Board invoked its decision in Mendez-Moralez,
        which applies to aliens who need waivers of inadmissibility, rather
        than Arai, which applies to those who don’t.
               Let’s review, beginning with Arai. There, the Board
        reviewed an alien’s application for adjustment of status under
        § 1255. See 13 I&N Dec. at 494. The applicant didn’t require a
        § 1182(h) waiver and had no adverse factors. Id. at 495. The Board
        held that “[w]here adverse factors are present in a given application,
        it may be necessary for the applicant to oﬀset these by a showing
        of unusual or even outstanding equities.” Id. at 496. “[F]avorable
        factors such as family ties, hardship, length of residence in the
        United States, etc.,” the Board said, “will be considered as
        countervailing factors meriting favorable exercise of administrative
        discretion.” Id. The Board further explained that “[i]n the absence
        of adverse factors, adjustment will ordinarily be granted, still as a
        matter of discretion.” Id.
               In Mendez-Moralez, an alien applying for adjustment of status
        needed a waiver of inadmissibility due to his conviction for a crime
        involving moral turpitude. See 21 I&N Dec. at 297. There, the
        Board explained that for cases involving waivers, “the Immigration
        Judge must balance the adverse factors evidencing an alien’s
        undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11065

        considerations presented on his behalf to determine whether the
        grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best
        interests of this country.” Id. at 300. Notably for present purposes,
        the Board explained that the approach outlined in Arai “has no
        application to relief under section [1182(h)] of the Act,” where a
        “waiver of inadmissibility . . . necessarily involves at least one
        adverse consideration, speciﬁcally the criminal conviction or
        activity constituting the ground of exclusion sought to be waived.”
        Id. The Board thus held that in situations requiring a waiver, “there
        can be no presumption that relief is warranted in the exercise of
        discretion.” Id.
                Navarro Guadarrama is quite right that Mendez-Moralez and
        Arai indicate that different legal standards apply in different
        circumstances. In a case like his, however—where all agree that
        significant adverse factors are present—the Mendez-Moralez and
        Arai analyses effectively merge. In Arai, the Board held that “[i]n
        the absence of adverse factors, adjustment will ordinarily be granted,
        still as a matter of discretion.” 13 I&N Dec. at 496 (emphasis
        added). That’s not Navarro Guadarrama’s case. Navarro
        Guadarrama was arrested for sexual battery, was convicted of
        contributing to the delinquency of a child and possessing
        marijuana, lived for five years as a fugitive in Georgia, and failed to
        file tax returns. Therefore, although under Arai adjustment of
        status will “ordinarily” be granted “[i]n the absence of adverse
        factors,” that presumption is inapplicable to Navarro
        Guadarrama’s case.
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        22-11065               Opinion of the Court                       11

               To be clear, the mere fact that in dismissing Navarro
        Guadarrama’s appeal the Board cited Mendez-Moralez rather than
        Arai does not conclusively demonstrate that it applied the wrong
        standard. In its decision on Navarro Guadarrama’s motion to
        reconsider, the Board explained that it cited Mendez-Moralez “for
        the overarching proposition” that the IJ must balance adverse
        factors with “the social and humane considerations presented on [a
        noncitizen’s] behalf” when evaluating whether he warrants a
        favorable exercise of discretion.           And that “overarching
        proposition” is comparable to Arai’s suggestion that adverse factors
        may offset “favorable factors such as family ties, hardship, length
        of residence in the United States, etc.” 13 I&N Dec. at 496.
        Accordingly, even if the Board cited the “wrong” case, there’s no
        indication that, in substance, it applied the wrong standard. Indeed,
        at oral argument Navarro Guadarrama’s lawyer candidly
        acknowledged that he would have a “big problem” if the Board had
        cited Arai rather than Mendez-Moralez—even if its substantive
        analysis had been substantially the same. See Oral Arg. at 9:34–9:42.
        That seems to us exactly right—absent the citation to Mendez-
        Moralez, there’s nothing to suggest that the Board applied the
        wrong standard.
                                       * * *
              Nothing in the Board’s analysis indicates that it applied a
        substantially incorrect standard in determining whether Navarro
        Guadarrama warranted discretionary relief. Accordingly, we
        DENY the petitions for review.