Court Opinion

ID: 9407343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 16:10:02.708393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.074818
License: Public Domain

J-S11019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 TYREE DOCKERY                           :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 2479 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 22, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004934-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                        FILED JULY 06, 2023

     Tyree Dockery appeals pro se from the order dismissing his second Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition for untimeliness. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-9546. We affirm.

     The facts of the case have been summarized as follows.

     On December 12, 2005, in Philadelphia, [Dockery’s] friend, Denzel
     Deverteuil, physically fought Juan Hayes on the street. Hayes and
     Deverteuil agreed that the fight, over an unpaid loan, would be
     fair and without weapons. The two fought for several minutes
     before Deverteuil refused to fight and walked away. Hayes told
     Deverteuil that the fight was not over and that he would return.

     Hayes later returned, without weapons, with his brother-in-law,
     the decedent, Cleo Flynn. As Hayes parked, Deverteuil walked
     away. As he walked away, Deverteuil saw a man—which appeared
     to be [Dockery], whom he identified as Buddha—running toward
     Hayes and Flynn. (On March 1, 2012, after [Dockery] was arrested
     in North Carolina, he told detectives that his nickname was
     “Buddha.”). Immediately after Hayes and Flynn exited their
     vehicle, [Dockery] appeared from behind another vehicle and fired
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        three to four shots at Hayes and Flynn. Flynn later died at Temple
        University Hospital.

        Following the shooting, [Dockery] fled to North Carolina. In the
        summer of 2011, [Dockery’s] aunt and a former Philadelphia
        Police Officer, called the Philadelphia Police and informed them
        that she had learned from her daughter, Sharlita Razor, that
        during [Dockery’s] recent stay with Sharlita and William Razor, he
        had confessed to a shooting in Philadelphia. Sharlita and William
        Razor each gave statements to the police describing [Dockery’s]
        confession.

        At trial, both Hayes and Deverteuil identified [Dockery] as the
        shooter.

PCRA Ct. Op., filed 4/12/17, at 2-3 (citations to trial transcript omitted).

        Dockery was charged with murder generally, firearms not to be carried

without a license, and possession an instrument of crime (“PIC”). 1 Prior to

trial, the Commonwealth filed notice that if convicted, Dockery would be

subject to a mandatory minimum sentence, based on his criminal history and

his use of a firearm. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9712(b),2 9714(d).

        The jury found Dockery guilty of third-degree murder3 and the two other

charges. At the sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged that Dockery’s

prior record score was zero. See N.T., 4/11/14, at 2, 29, 31. However, the

court stated it considered, among other things, that Dockery had previously

been arrested for resisting a public officer. Id. at 30-31. It sentenced Dockery

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1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 6106 and 907.

242 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9712(b) was rendered unconstitutional by Alleyne v.
United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), as recognized in Commonwealth v.
Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa.Super. 2014).

3   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).

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to 20 to 40 years’ incarceration for third-degree murder and a consecutive

two and one half to five years’ incarceration for carrying a firearm without a

license. The court imposed no further penalty for PIC. Despite the

Commonwealth’s earlier notice, the Commonwealth did not seek, and the

court did not impose, any mandatory minimum sentences.

      Dockery appealed. We affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our

Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 2015. See Commonwealth v.

Dockery, No. 1423 EDA 2014, 2014 WL 10786950 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(unpublished mem.), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 1038 (Pa. 2015).

      Dockery filed his first PCRA petition in 2016. Relevant here, Dockery

challenged the legality of his sentence under Alleyne, which “held that any

facts leading to an increase in a mandatory minimum sentence are elements

of the crime and must be presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Valentine, 101 A.3d at 809. The PCRA court dismissed the petition,

and we affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Dockery, No. 2063 EDA 2017,

2018 WL 1516349 (Pa.Super. 2018) (unpublished mem.). We found the

Alleyne claim baseless because Dockery had not been subject to a mandatory

minimum sentence. Id. at *4. We also observed that Alleyne does not apply

retroactively to cases on collateral review. Id.

      Dockery filed the instant PCRA petition, his second, pro se on January

13, 2021. He again alleged his sentence was illegal pursuant to Alleyne, but

this time, he argued his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object

when the Commonwealth gave notice that a mandatory minimum sentence

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would apply. Dockery also argued his counsel had been ineffective in failing

to object when the court had considered his arrest for resisting an officer as

an aggravating factor at sentencing. See PCRA Pet., 1/13/21, at 3-5; PCRA

Ct. Order and Op., filed 3/11/21, at 3.

       The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely, without holding a

hearing.4 See PCRA Ct. Order and Op. at 6. It also found Dockery’s

ineffectiveness claim based on Alleyne claim lacked merit, as the court had

not imposed a mandatory minimum sentence. It found that Dockery’s other

ineffectiveness claim failed because the sentencing court had acknowledged

on the record that Dockery’s prior record score was zero and that his arrest

for resisting an officer had not resulted in a conviction, and because the

sentence was primarily based on other aggravating factors. This timely appeal

followed.5
____________________________________________

4The court first issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a
hearing, in compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).

5 Dockery initially failed to file a timely appeal, instead erroneously filing a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. He thereafter sought reinstatement of his
appellate rights regarding the dismissal of his second petition, which the PCRA
court granted. Dockery then filed a timely notice of appeal from the dismissal
of his second PCRA petition.

On appeal, this Court observed that the lower court docket did not contain a
notation that it had served the final order dismissing Dockery’s second petition
on Dockery, or the date of service. We therefore quashed the appeal as
premature and directed the lower court to amend the docket. See
Commonwealth v. Dockery, No. 1229 EDA 2021, 2022 WL 1102150
(Pa.Super. filed April 13, 2022) (unpublished mem.); but see
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Dockery presents two issues:

       1. Was    [Dockery]   sentenced   under   the   mandatory
       minimum/enhancement act, in violation of the United States
       Supreme Court[’]s holding in Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99
       (2013)[?]

       2. Did the trial [j]udge use a[n] aggravating circumstance during
       her deliberations in sentencing [Dockery] to the ultimate sentence
       he received[?]

Dockery’s Br. at 2 (unpaginated) (suggested answers omitted).

       Dockery argues that he was subjected to an illegal mandatory minimum

sentence and attaches as proof a copy of the docket showing that the

Commonwealth filed a pre-trial “Notice of Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Case.” See id. at Ex. 1. Unlike his petition, Dockery does not frame this issue

____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Mowery, 290 A.3d 659 at *4 n.12 (Pa.Super. 2022)
(unpublished mem.).

The PCRA court, attempting to comply with our directive, entered another
order dismissing Dockery’s second PCRA petition and directing that the docket
reflect service of the order on Dockery. Dockery then filed another notice of
appeal. However, this Court observed that the PCRA court had issued the order
before we had remanded the record and returned jurisdiction to the PCRA
court. We accordingly issued a per curiam order finding the PCRA court’s order
to be a legal nullity and dismissing the appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Dockery, No. 1379 EDA 2022 (Pa.Super. July 15, 2022) (per curiam order).

We again remanded and relinquished jurisdiction. See Certificate of
Remittal/Remand of Record, 8/18/22, at 1. The PCRA court thereafter entered
an order dismissing Dockery’s second PCRA petition, providing that the docket
reflect the date of service on Dockery, and directing Dockery to file a new
notice of appeal. But see Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating premature notice of
appeal shall be treated as filed on the date of entry of the relevant appealable
order). The docket now reflects that the court served Dockery with notice of
the order on August 24, 2022, by certified mail. Dockery filed a new notice of
appeal on September 16, 2022. We find no jurisdictional impediments to our
review.

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as implicating counsel’s effectiveness. He further argues that the transcript of

his sentencing shows that the sentencing court improperly considered his

arrest for resisting an officer as an aggravating factor in imposing sentence.

He attaches a copy of his criminal history to show that he was not convicted

of that crime. See id. at Ex. 2. Dockery asserts that his claims are neither

untimely nor waived, because they go to the legality of his sentence.

        “Our standard of review is well settled.” Commonwealth v. Anderson,

234 A.3d 735, 737 (Pa.Super. 2020). “When reviewing the denial of a PCRA

petition, we must determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by

the record and free of legal error.” Id. (citation omitted).

        The PCRA court held that Dockery’s petition was untimely. Timeliness of

a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. To be timely, any PCRA

petition, whether a first petition or subsequent one, must be filed within one

year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless

the petitioner pleads and proves at least one of the three statutory exceptions

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Id.6 For purposes of the PCRA, a
____________________________________________

6   These exceptions are:

        (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
        interference by government officials with the presentation of the
        claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
        or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

        (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
        the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
        of due diligence; or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

       Dockery’s judgment of sentence became final in 2015. Dockery did not

file his petition within a year of his judgment of sentence becoming final. He

instead did not file it until 2021. Dockery did not plead, much less prove, that

any of the time-bar exceptions apply, and none of his claims appear to

implicate any of them. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Although Dockery

argues his claims are not subject to timeliness review because, in his view,

they go to the legality of his sentence, he is incorrect. An allegation of illegality

is not, on its own, an exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. Although the

PCRA provides an avenue for obtaining relief from an illegal sentence, such

claims may be entertained on collateral review only if presented in a timely

PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 179 A.3d 37, 43 (Pa.Super.

2017).7 Dockery has not shown that the PCRA court committed legal error.

____________________________________________

       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
       by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
       has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

7But see Commonwealth v. Moose, 245 A.3d 1121, 1129 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(en banc) (stating claims related to the constitutionality of sex offender
registration and reporting statutes are exempt from PCRA timeliness
requirements), appeal denied, 268 A.3d 1077 (Pa. 2021).

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2023

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