Court Opinion

ID: 9766126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:33:25.407384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.540390
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
FANNING, Justice.
We think our holding in this case to the effect that the admission in evidence by the trial court of the testimony of the witness Self, as complained of by appellant’s Points 1, 2, 3 and 4, did not constitute reversible error under the record in this case, is a correct holding and is supported by the following additional authorities which were not cited in our original opinion, to wit: Philadelphia Underwriters Agency of Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W. 899, wr. dis.; Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. IV, Sec. 1191; McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 1954, p. 413 and Sec. 209 p. (424-425).
The case of Philadelphia Underwriters Agency of Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia v. Brown, supra, 151 S.W. 899, 902, involved a suit on a fire insurance policy with the insurance company defending on the ground that plaintiff had other insurance on the same property in violation of the policy contract. Defendant offered proof by a witness that he heard plaintiff say on the night of the fire that he had other insurance coverage, and also on cross-examination plaintiff was asked if he had additional insurance. The evidence in question was excluded by the trial court on the ground that the other policy would be the best evidence. The appellate court held this to be error, stating:
“The existence of other insurance was only collaterally involved, and might have been proved by parol. This was not an effort to show the contents of other written policies, but merely to establish that such policies had been issued and were in existence.”
In Wigmore on Evidence, supra, (3rd Ed. Vol. IV, Sec. 1191) it is stated:
“Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.”
In McCormick, supra, (p. 413) it is stated:
“It is manifest, however, that the test of ‘collateralness’ is an exceedingly vague one, not dependent upon a technical analysis of the formal issues made on the pleadings, but rather upon the probability of substantial room for controversy as to the very terms of the writing. If no such dispute seems probable, then the trial judge should have the power to relax the rule requiring the document to be produced and allow its net effect to be summarily stated. Here as elsewhere in the application of this purely administrative rule, *575the trial judge’s discretion should he reviewed only for grave abuse.”
In McCormick, supra, (Sec. 209, p. 424-42S) it is stated:
“209. Review of Rulings Admitting Secondary Evidence,
“It will be seen from the earlier sections of this chapter that the requirement of the production of original writings, with the several excused for non-production and the exceptions to the requirement itself, make up a fairly complex set of regulations for administration by the trial judge. Mistakes in the application of these rules are, understandably, not infrequent. The purpose of this system of rules, on the other hand, is simple and practical. That purpose is to secure the most reliable information as to the contents of documents, when those terms are disputed. A mystical ideal of seeking “the best evidence” or the “original document,” as an end in itself is no longer the goal. Consequently when an attack is made, on motion for new trial or on appeal, upon the judge’s admission of secondary evidence, it seems that the reviewing tribunal, should ordinarily make inquiry of the complaining counsel, ‘Does the party whom you represent actually dispute the accuracy of the evidence received as to the material terms of the writing? ’ If the counsel cannot assure the court that such a good faith dispute exists, it seems clear that any departure from the regulations in respect to secondary evidence must be classed as harmless error.”
Since the testimony of the witness Self did not form the foundation of the cause or a defense thereto, but was collateral thereto, for this reason the same was clearly admissible. Furthermore, as hereinbefore pointed out, the truth of the testimony in question was not disputed and there was no substantial controversy about the correctness of the rates and testimony in question, and the admission in evidence of the testimony in question by the trial court clearly under this record would not constitute reversible error in any event for the reasons stated in McCormick, Sec. 209, supra.
We have carefully considered all of appellant’s contentions in his motion for rehearing and are of the opinion that same should be overruled. We adhere to our af-firmance of this cause and respectfully overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing.
CHADICK, C. J., concurs.
DAVIS, J., dissents.