Court Opinion

ID: 9568774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:24.589136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:06:19.060682
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
During the State’s cross-examination of defendant’s sister, certi*9fied copies of the sister’s convictions of the offenses of armed robbery and voluntary manslaughter were tendered into evidence for the purpose of impeachment and admitted into evidence without objection. Thereafter, the State attempted to delve into the particular circumstances of the voluntary manslaughter offense and defense counsel objected, pointing out that the State had already established the witness’ conviction for this offense and asking that the State be restricted to the issues in the case sub judice. After the State responded that it was attempting to establish the credibility of the witness, defendant’s objection was overruled and the witness required to answer. Defendant enumerates as error the trial court’s permitting the State to impeach the witness by eliciting testimony as to the particular circumstances of the prior offense of voluntary manslaughter. In my view, the issue argued on appeal lies within the scope of the objection made at trial, is meritorious, and is not harmless error, therefore I respectfully dissent.
“[A] witness cannot be discredited even by his own testimony that he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. It is necessary that a copy of the record of conviction be introduced. Rewis v. State, 109 Ga. App. 83 (134 SE2d 875). Accordingly, the testimony of a witness that he has done some act that the law makes a crime is not a legal method of impeachment.” Durrett v. State, 135 Ga. App. 749, 751 (3), 752 (219 SE2d 9). “While a witness may be discredited by proof of general bad character or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, it is not competent to discredit him by showing that he has committed, been arrested for, confined for, or even indicted for such an offense. Davis v. State, 60 Ga. App. 772, 773 (2) (5 SE2d 89); Smallwood v. State, 95 Ga. App. 766 (3) (98 SE2d 602); Beach v. State, 138 Ga. 265 (1), [(75 SE 139)]. Neither may general bad character be proved by individual acts. Johnson v. State, 61 Ga. 305 (2); Davis v. State, 60 Ga. [App.] 772, 774, supra.” McCarty v. State, 139 Ga. App. 101 (1), 103 (227 SE2d 898). While Georgia is among those states which permit a witness impeached by a prior criminal conviction to attempt to rehabilitate their character by explaining the circumstances of the conviction (Belvin v. Houston Fertilizer &c. Co., 169 Ga. App. 100, 101 (2) (311 SE2d 526)), there is no authority granting the party impeaching a witness any comparable exclusion from the above rules.
“Although both parties are entitled to a ‘thorough and sifting’ cross examination (Code § 38-1705), this right is not unlimited. White v. State, 74 Ga. App. 634 (40 SE2d 782). The scope of cross examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge . . . and his ruling will not be disturbed unless such discretion be abused. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 639 (2) (146 SE2d 895). This right must be ‘tempered and restricted so as not to infringe on privilege areas or *10wander into the realm of irrelevant testimony.’ Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 737 (208 SE2d 791).” McCarty v. State, 139 Ga. App. 101 (1), 102-103, supra. In the case sub judice, the relevancy of the testimony elicited over defendant’s objection could only have gone to the impeachment of defendant’s key witness. Whether the testimony at issue is viewed as an improper method of impeachment or as irrelevant, admission of such evidence was beyond the discretion of the trial court. Due to the importance to the defense of the sister’s attempt to assume sole responsibility for the crimes at issue, I cannot agree that the admission of the improper testimony elicited from this witness was harmless. It follows that defendant’s conviction should be reversed. Polk v. State, 202 Ga. App. 738, 739 (2) (415 SE2d 506); Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881, 882 (3) (350 SE2d 801); Richards v. State, 157 Ga. App. 601, 602 (2) (278 SE2d 63); Grant v. State, 142 Ga. App. 606, 607 (236 SE2d 691); Cross v. State, 136 Ga. App. 400, 405 (6) (221 SE2d 615); Corley v. State, 64 Ga. App. 841, 842 (3) (14 SE2d 121).
Decided July 7, 1993
Reconsideration denied July 30, 1993
J. M. Raffauf, Alden W. Snead, for appellant.
David McDade, District Attorney, William H. McClain, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Cooper joins in this dissent.