Court Opinion

ID: 9663875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:54:09.390152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:58.559377
License: Public Domain

Murphy, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s resolution of the first two issues raised by plaintiff in this appeal. However, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority regarding the effect of the notice provision set forth in MCL 436.22(5); MSA 18.993(5).
Our Supreme Court has held that such statutory notice provisions are not unconstitutional per se. Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96, 99-100; 211 NW2d 24 (1973). Nevertheless, the Court has also clearly expressed its disapproval of this type of requirement:
*213At the outset, we acknowledge frankly that statutes which limit access to the courts by people seeking redress for wrongs are not looked upon with favor by us. We acquiesce in the enforcement of statutes of limitation when we are not persuaded that they unduly restrict such access, but we look askance at devices such as notice requirements which have the effect of shortening the period of time set forth in such statutes. Id., 99.
The Court held that statutory notice provisions are enforceable as long as they are reasonable in length. Id., 100. However, the Court also held that failure to give statutorily required notice is not a basis for dismissal of an action unless the party entitled to the notice shows that actual prejudice resulted from lack of notice. Id. See also Hobbs v State Hwy Dep’t, 398 Mich 90, 96; 247 NW2d 754 (1976), May v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 140 Mich App 730; 365 NW2d 192 (1985), Hanger v State Hwy Dep’t, 64 Mich App 572; 236 NW2d 148 (1975), and Hussey v Muskegon Heights, 36 Mich App 264; 193 NW2d 421 (1971).
Presumably, the primary purpose of such notice requirements is to prevent stale claims and to give the defendant an opportunity to investigate the claim "while the evidentiary trail is still fresh.” Hussey, supra, 267-268. However, toward this same end, the dramshop act already provides for a shorter limitation period of two years, as opposed to the general three-year period during which an action may be commenced for injury to a person or property. MCL 436.22(5); MSA 18.993(5); MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805. See Henderson v Biron, 138 Mich App 503, 506; 360 NW2d 230 (1984). In my opinion, strict construction and enforcement of the notice provision of MCL 436.22(5); MSA 18.993(5) gives an unfair advantage to a defendant bar by further reducing the period during which *214the plaintiff must take action in order to pursue a dramshop claim. I would hold that in order to use a plaintiffs failure to give the statutorily required notice as a basis for dismissal of a complaint seeking redress for wrongs, a dramshop defendant must show that actual prejudice resulted from the lack of notice.