Court Opinion

ID: 9533671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:33:49.083363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:07.188134
License: Public Domain

Opinion Concurring in Result
DeBruler, J.
The cases discussed by the majority in concluding that it will not treat the merits of appellant’s claim that his statements given to fellow prisoners were the product of coercion and that consequently the trial court erred in admitting them against him, establish three propositions. First, no statement given to a person who is not a government agent is inadmissible in court because of the absence of the advisement of rights and waiver required by Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Leaver v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 523, 237 N.E.2d 368; McFarland v. State, (1957) 263 Ind. 657, 336 N.E.2d 824; Luckett v. State, (1973) 158 Ind. App. 571, 303 N.E.2d 670. Second, quite apart from the requirements of the Miranda case a separate and non-constitutional common law rule exists in Indiana which prohibits the use by the State of statements of the accused or any witness if those statements are the product of coercion, no matter what the source of that coercion might be. Trinkle v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 114, 121, 284 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Opinion of DeBruler, J., concurring in result and authorities cited therein.) Third, a private person may procure statements through the use of threat or force from one unlawfully intruding upon his home or property and such statements are admissible under an exception to the common law rule prohibiting the use of involuntary statements. This *610anomalous exception was first stated in Trinkle v. State, supra, and has no application here, as the coercion was allegedly applied here by fellow prisoners during incarceration and riot by a private person engaged in protecting property. Appellant is therefore entitled to review of his claims on its merits under the second proposition of law stated above.
Turning then to the merits, I find that the two questioned statements were written by appellant two months after his arrest for this homicide while he was confined in a one-man isolation cell for some form of infraction and were slipped to adjoining cells by appellant. While so confined one is deprived of visitors, cigarettes, trips to the commissary and use of the phone. Evidence was presented that one of the statements was given in return for a promise of some cigarettes. Other evidence was presented that the other statement was given without promise of any sort of compensation, and that appellant was being slipped cigarettes throughout his stay in the isolation area by fellow prisoners. Appellant was not threatened or harassed. He was not deprived of food, clothing or sleep. Under the circumstances shown, the trial court was correct in determining that the statements were voluntary and not the product of the undue influence of fellow prisoners.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 372 N.E.2d 461.