Court Opinion

ID: 9712859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:01:42.047416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.906829
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the suppression court erred in suppressing the physical evidence obtained pursuant to the second search warrant. I believe, however, that the suppression court properly suppressed Ryles’ inculpatory statement because it was obtained in violation of the Davenport rule.1
Our Supreme Court adopted the following rule in Davenport: “If the accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statement obtained after arrest but before arraignment shall not be admissible at trial.” 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306. In a footnote immediately following that statement, our Supreme Court stated: “We recognize that it is difficult to fix any particular time limit. Nevertheless, we conclude that it is desirable to set such a standard, and that six hours provides a workable rule which can be readily complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances.” Id., 471 Pa. at 286 n.7, 370 A.2d at 306 n.7 (emphasis added). The majority, without discussion, construes this language as establishing an exception to the six hour per se rule. I disagree. I believe that the quoted language in the footnote was intended to explain the reason for choosing the six hour rule. If the Supreme Court intended an exception to the *557rule, it would have explicitly said so. Moreover, in subsequent cases stating the Davenport rule, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has mentioned “exigent circumstances.” See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 476 Pa. 344, 347 n.2, 382 A.2d 1202, 1204 n.2 (1978); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 476 Pa. 83, 89, 381 A.2d 877, 881 (1977); Commonwealth v. Morton, 475 Pa. 374, 379 n.3, 380 A.2d 769, 771 n.3 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 274 Pa.Super. 140, 148 n.4, 418 A.2d 335, 339 n.4, (1979) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa.Super. 159, 166 n.7, 401 A.2d 1148, 1152 n.7 (1979) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Hadden, 265 Pa.Super. 112, 114, n.1, 401 A.2d 826, 827 n.1 (1979); Commonwealth v. Washington, 259 Pa.Super. 407, 411 n.9, 393 A.2d 891, 893 n.9 (1978) (per curiam).
Construing the Davenport decision as adopting a rule which applies “in the absence of exigent circumstances” is contrary to the Court’s purpose in adopting a six hour rule. The Davenport Court adopted this rule to eliminate the problems encountered in applying the Futch test. Davenport, 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306. The Court stated the intended impact of the Davenport rule as follows:
This rule will assure more certain and even-handed application of the prompt arraignment requirement, and will provide greater guidance to trial courts, the bar and law enforcement authorities. Such a rule will simplify the. task of determining the admissibility of statements taken before arraignment and thereby further judicial economy. It will also lessen the burden on prosecution and defense resources. In many cases this rule should eliminate the need for pre-trial litigation of the admissibility of statements by the defendant and thus help reduce pre-trial delay. Moreover, a rule based on the length of delay between arrest and arraignment will better serve to deter violations of the prompt arraignment requirement and to ensure that the protections afforded at preliminary arraignment are made available without unnecessary delay.
Id., 471 Pa. at 287-88, 370 A.2d at 306. The majority’s construction of Davenport will invite litigation and require the *558courts to engage in a case-by-case determination of whether the Commonwealth has shown exigent circumstances, contrary to the Supreme Court’s intention in adopting the rule. Our Supreme Court may decide that “exigent circumstances” should be an exception to the Davenport rule; this Court, however, should not extend that rule under the pretext of following it.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Ryles was not arraigned until six hours and twenty-five minutes after arrest. Because Ryles was arraigned after the six hour period mandated by Davenport, the suppression court correctly concluded that Ryles’ inculpatory statement should not be admissible at trial. Having concluded that Ryles’ statement is inadmissible under Davenport, it is necessary to address ah issue not reached by the majority-whether the suppression court erred in suppressing physical evidence obtained as a result of Ryles’ statement.
In his statement, Ryles told the police the location of the sneakers and trousers he had been wearing at the time of the incident. Based on this information, the police obtained a search warrant and seized sneakers, trousers, and boxer shorts at the address supplied by Ryles. The suppression court concluded that the physical evidence had to be suppressed because its admission would violate the doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1965).
In its well-known decision in Wong Sun v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States restated the principle that the exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of evidence obtained from an accused in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments prohibits also the indirect use of such evidence. On the question of what evidence must be considered as obtained as a direct result of an unlawful invasion, and so excluded, the Court said, in a frequently quoted passage: “We need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal *559actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting the establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417, . . . quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959).
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 461 Pa. 407, 412-13, 336 A.2d 603, 606 (1975).
The Commonwealth contends that the suppression court should not have applied the Wong Sun test in this case. The Davenport rule is not constitutionally mandated; rather, it was adopted pursuant to our Supreme Court’s supervisory power. Davenport, 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306. Therefore, neither the United States nor the Pennsylvania Constitution requires the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of a statement which is inadmissible because the preliminary arraignment was held more than six hours after arrest. There does not appear to be any Pennsylvania appellate court decision applying the Wong Sun doctrine where the initial illegality arises from the violation of a nonconstitutional procedural rule. I believe that our Supreme Court would not apply the exclusionary rule in this case. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274, 368 A.2d 626 (1977), our Supreme Court stated:
The exclusionary rule originated to deter unlawful police practices by depriving law enforcement officials of the benefits derived from using unlawfully obtained information. [Citations omitted.]
Where, however, the admission of the proffered evidence does not represent an exploitation of the unlawful police practices the exclusion of relevant testimony would serve only to frustrate the objectives of the adjudicative process without providing any enhancement of that process . .
Id., 470 Pa. at 282, 368 A.2d at 630. As noted by the majority, “Instantly, the reason the arraignment did not *560occur within six hours was the unavailability of the judge; hence, there is no illegal activity to deter.” At 544. Because there was no police misconduct in this case, suppressing the physical evidence obtained as a result of Ryles’ statement “would serve only to frustrate the objectives of the adjudicative process without providing any enhancement of that process . . . ” Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 70 Pa. at 282, 368 A.2d at 630. Therefore, I would hold that the physical evidence is admissible at trial.2
Accordingly, I would affirm the lower court’s order suppressing Ryles’ statement and reverse the lower court’s order suppressing the physical evidence.

. Because this is an appeal by the Commonwealth from the suppression court’s order suppressing Ryles’ statement and physical evidence, I do not reach the issue of whether the suppression court erred in finding that the police had probable cause to arrest Ryles.

. The Commonwealth also contends that the suppression court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether the physical evidence would have been discovered independent of Ryles’ statement. Because I conclude that the physical evidence should not be suppressed, I do not reach this issue.