Court Opinion

ID: 9740060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:27:09.9196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:15.821725
License: Public Domain

NETTESHIEM, J.
¶ 51. (concurring). I agree with the majority opinion. I write separately regarding the jury selection issues.
¶ 52. In State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999), the supreme court recently reaffirmed an often-stated principle that trial courts should err on the side of caution when considering a request to remove a prospective juror for cause. The court said:
[T]he circuit courts are ... advised to err on the side of striking prospective jurors who appear to be biased, even if the appellate court would not reverse *137their determinations of impartiality. Such action will avoid the appearance of bias, and may save judicial time and resources in the long run.
Id. at 864, 596 N.W.2d at 749 (alteration in original; quoting State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 503, 579 N.W.2d 654, 666(1998)).
¶ 53. At a minimum, the responses of the challenged jurors in this case established an appearance of bias. While that alone is not a basis for reversal, it is hardly a desirable state of affairs. The propriety of a trial court's ruling is not always measured by whether it is affirmed. It would be far better for all concerned — the victims, the State, the judicial institution, the public and Oswald — if it could be said that Oswald was convicted by a jury that reflected no appearance of bias.
¶ 54. More importantly, when the State decided to resist Oswald's challenges for cause and the trial court opted to reject those challenges, no one could confidently say that the appearances of juror bias might not translate into subjective or objective bias in the judgment of a reviewing court. In short, the State and the trial court took an unnecessary risk of reversal. Fortunately for the State and the trial court, that has not come to pass.