Court Opinion

ID: 9517864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:35:22.598968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:09.262993
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In appealing a pretrial order, the State must show clearly and unequivocally that the order will have a critical impact upon the prosecution. State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.2005). Critical impact is a threshold issue, and “ ‘[i]n the absence of critical impact we will not review a pretrial order.’ ” Id. (quoting In re L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn.1999)); see also State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.1998) (explaining that the critical impact of the pretrial order must be first determined before deciding whether the order was error); State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Minn.1987) (explaining that critical impact had been a threshold requirement to review before the establishment of the court of appeals).
Historically, appeals by the government “in criminal cases are something unusual, exceptional, not favored.” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245, 101 S.Ct. 1657, 68 L.Ed.2d 58 (1981) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The common law rule is that the government has no authority to appeal in a criminal case absent express legislative authorization. Id. “Both prudential and constitutional interests contributed to this tradition. The need to restrict appeals by the prosecutor reflected a prudential concern that individuals should be free from the harassment and vexation of unbounded litigation by the sovereign.” Id. at 246, 101 S.Ct. 1657.
“In Minnesota, the legislature first departed from this longstanding rule in 1967 when it enacted Minn.Stat. § 632.11 (1967) authorizing state appeal of certain pretrial orders.” Kim, 398 N.W.2d at 549. The critical-impact rule “originated in [Minn. Stat. § 632.12 (1967) (requiring state to file critical impact statement with notice of appeal)] and was retained with some modifications by this court after adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.” State v. Barrett, 694 N.W.2d 783, 787 n. 3 (Minn.2005). “There are good reasons for strictly construing the rule granting the prosecution the right to appeal a pretrial order. The appeal occurs while the defendant is awaiting trial, presumed innocent, and possibly confined. The defendant’s right to a speedy trial is also implicated by the prosecution taking a pretrial appeal.” Id. at 787.
The criminal rules require that the prosecutor’s oral notice of intent to appeal a pretrial order include a statement for the record as to how the pretrial order will have a critical impact on the prosecution. Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2(1). The rules also require that the statement of the case filed with the notice of appeal include a summary statement as to how the pretrial order will have a critical impact on the prosecution. Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2(2). In other words, a prosecution appeal is authorized if the pretrial order will have a critical impact upon the prosecution. As a corollary, authority for a prosecution appeal of a disclosure order is lacking unless the State makes the requi*95site threshold showing of harm, which was not done in Rambahal’s case.
Most jurisdictions allow the prosecution to appeal orders suppressing evidence, often by means of statutes that “speak generally of orders ‘suppressing or excluding’ evidence, and have been held applicable to a broad range of pretrial orders limiting the government’s proof at trial.” 7 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orín S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure, § 27.3(c) at 39-40 (3d ed. 2007). Several jurisdictions limit these appeals to cases in which the suppressed evidence will have a critical or substantial impact on the outcome of the government’s case. Id. at 42. Hawaii has specifically authorized the immediate appeal of an order denying a prosecution request for a protective order allowing nondisclosure of a witness for personal safety reasons. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 641-13(8) (Supp.2007). But “[m]any jurisdictions allowing prosecution appeals from pretrial interlocutory orders do not extend that authority beyond orders suppressing evidence.” LaFave, supra, at 42-43.
We have read our rules as encompassing prosecution appeals of orders suppressing or excluding evidence. E.g., McLeod, 705 N.W.2d at 787 (holding that exclusion of Spreigl evidence would have a critical impact on pending trial); Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 420 (holding that suppression of confession would significantly reduce the likelihood of a successful prosecution). Our rules limit these appeals to cases in which the suppression or exclusion orders will have a critical impact on the prosecution. Unlike Hawaii, there is no express authorization in our rules for immediate appeal of a disclosure order in the absence of critical impact. We do have “inherent authority to [accept] an appeal in the interests of justice even when the filing or service requirements set forth in a rule or statute have not been met.” Barrett, 694 N.W.2d at 788 n. 4 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Whether this pretrial appeal does or does not merit departure from the threshold requirement to review in the interests of justice, I still do not believe we can reach the disclosure issue without first determining the threshold issue. Therefore, at a minimum, I would have the parties brief the threshold issue.