Court Opinion

ID: 9762264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:18:11.641587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:32.501234
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because the search of appellant’s person was illegal and violative of his Fourth Amendment rights. The evidence in question was obtained from him as a result of a “stop and frisk.” The officers contend that they patted down appellant’s outer clothing and then searched him as a safety precaution before admitting him into their car.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Kruczaj testified that he and his partner received a radio dispatch that there was a man in the women’s dormitory at Widener College who *178appeared to be intoxicated. They found him in what the officer termed “a dazed state.” They questioned him, found nothing- to arouse their suspicion and asked him if he had a vehicle in which to return home. He replied that he owned no vehicle and requested a ride home. Before appellant was permitted into the police car and without his consent, he was frisked. A small plastic vial containing pills and a hypodermic syringe were removed from his clothing.
There are only two justifications that may be offered to sustain-a search in a case of this type: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; that is, the officers had probable cause to believe that appellant had committed or was about to commit a crime,* and (2) the existence of specific facts leading to the belief that appellant was armed and dangerous. There was testimony at the suppression hearing that appellant was searched because the officers were concerned for their own safety, and that the search represented standard police practice before giving any civilian a ride. There was no testimony, however, articulating facts supporting a belief that appellant was armed and dangerous.
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 158-159, 253 A.2d 276, 279 (1969), the seminal Pennsylvania case, is instructive on permissible search:
First, a seizure and search ... is reasonable and legitimate if the police officer has probable cause to arrest, i.e., if at the inception of the seizure he has knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances, gained through trustworthy information, to warrant a prudent man in the belief that the person seized has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. Second, even if probable cause to arrest is absent, the police officer may still legitimately seize a person . . . and conduct' a limited search of the individual’s outer clothing in an attempt to discover the presence of weapons which might be used to endanger the safety of the police officers and others, if *179the police officer observes unusual and suspicious conduct on the part of the individual seized which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous.
(Emphasis in original.) (Footnote omitted.) See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
In addressing the suppression issue, the trial court relied on Commonwealth v. Stratton, 231 Pa.Super. 91, 331 A.2d 741 (1974). That reliance was misplaced. Under the Stratton rationale, a search to discover weapons is justified only if the officer reasonably concludes that criminal activity may be afoot and that the suspect is armed and dangerous:
[T]he police officers must be able to articulate facts which aroused their suspicion and a mere allegation that a suspect engaged in “suspicious” conduct is not sufficient to justify a “stop and frisk.”
Id, 231 Pa.Superior Ct. at 94-95, 331 A.2d at 742. See Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 263 A.2d 342 (1970); Commonwealth v. King, 247 Pa.Super. 443, 372 A.2d 908 (1977); Commonwealth v. Purnell, 241 Pa.Super. 230, 360 A.2d 737 (1976); Harvey Appeal, 222 Pa.Super. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972).
Police officers find themselves in perilous situations every working day of their lives. In the instant case, the court recognizes the dilemma facing the officers: whether to transport an apparently intoxicated civilian and face a personal safety risk or whether to leave him in the area possibly to commit mischief. The officers could have resolved that dilemma by asking appellant to consent to a limited frisk before giving him a ride. They failed to ascertain such a consent. Under the clear mandate of the law they were not justified in frisking him without it.
I would reverse judgment of sentence.

 Although the officers may have had probable cause to arrest the appellant for criminal trespass, the record indicates that they did not intend to do so and that the search was not in any way connected with the appellant’s trespass onto the Widener College campus.