Court Opinion

ID: 9480554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:51:18.856799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:45.510304
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM:
In our opinion dated August 29, 1989, this court affirmed a district court judgment in favor of plaintiff Robert Guidry (Guidry) as to the liability of the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 406 and former and current Union leaders (the defendants) for violations of the Labor *1494Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), (2), (5), and 529. Guidry v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 406, 882 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.1989), vacated, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1465, 108 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). We remanded, however, for a reassessment of damages. Id. at 941-45. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated our judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of its decision in Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local Union No. 6, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 424, 107 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), a case that addressed the issue of whether hiring hall discrimination constituted “discipline” within the meaning of sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529. We, in turn, remanded to the district court for further proceedings in light of Breininger, to the extent that Breininger affected our panel’s prior opinion. Guidry, 902 F.2d 335 (1990). Of course, for the reasons explained in our prior opinion, a remand to the district court was necessary, in any event, to reassess Guidry’s damages. See Guidry, 882 F.2d at 941-45 (holding that actual and punitive damages based on Guidry’s LMRDA claims should be reassessed under a one-year limitations period)'.
Guidry now petitions this court for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. Gui-dry argues that a remand on the liability issue is required only as to those claims potentially affected by the Breininger decision — i.e., those claims based on sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA2 — and that our mandate erroneously instructs the district court to make new determinations of liability on all of his claims. He contends that Breininger in no way impacts the district court’s finding of liability based on the defendants’ breach of the duty of fair representation under the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). He also argues that the district court’s finding of liability under the LMRDA may be affirmed on the alternative grounds of Guidry’s LMRDA equal rights and free speech claims, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), (2) — theories of recovery that were not addressed by the Supreme Court in Breininger, and that are not affected by the Court’s decision in that case.
Having considered Guidry’s motion for rehearing, we conclude that his complaint is well taken. Although it was not our intention to require the district court to reevaluate the defendants’ liability for breach of the duty of fair representation, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), or for violation of Gui-dry’s rights to equal union member rights and free speech, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529, we admit that our mandate is not completely clear on this point. We therefore modify our prior order, by deleting the last full paragraph and substituting in its place the following four paragraphs.**

. Guidry correctly notes that the Supreme Court's holding regarding a plaintiffs burden of pleading and proof under the LMRDA looks only to sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529, and is based on its construction of the term "discipline” contained in those sections.

 Editor's Note: These paragraphs have been incorporated at the end of the opinion at 1493.