Court Opinion

ID: 9829682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:31:56.255313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.169735
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
Notwithstanding it appeared from the un-contradieted testimony of its assistant superintendent and others who testified on its behalf that it was the porter’s duty to open vestibule doors at stations and assist passengers in alighting from appellant’s trains, appellant insists that we erred in holding that it appeared as a matter of law 'that the porter acted within the scope of his duty as such if he opened the door to the south side of the vestibule to enable appellee to alight from the train on that side.
The insistence is not based on a claim that there was any testimony showing it was not the porter’s duty to do that, but on testimony showing that the porter’s instructions were to open only doors to the sides of the vestibules next to stations, and to assist negro passengers in alighting from the train through those doors; and on testimony which appellant thinks shows that if the porter opened the door on the south side as claimed by appellee, and so violated his instructions, he acted in collusion with appellee, and should be held to have acted as appellee’s agent and not in his capacity as porter.
It is, we think, plain enough, without discussion or a. citation of authorities, that if the duty appellant devolved on the porter was to open vestibule doors at stations, it should not be heard to say, as against a passenger, that he acted outside .the scope of his authority as porter when he opened a particular one of such doors, notwithstanding in doing so he may have violated its instructions.
The testimony relied upon as supporting the contention made, that if the porter opened the door as claimed he acted in collusion with appellee, was that of appellee as follows:
“I told him (the porter) I wanted to get off on the opposite side and wanted him to assist me in getting off, and he said he would.”
Appellee further testified that at the time he made the request of the porter he thought a compliance with it would be against appellant’s rules, and for that reason did not make it until after another porter and the conductor, who were in the coach as it approached Winfield, had left it.
We do not think the testimony referred to made an issue as to whether appellant was responsible for the conduct of the porter or not. Appellee was a passenger.
That he may have induced the porter to violate appellant’s instructions in regard to opening vestibule doors did not relieve the porter of his duty as such to use care to avoid injuring him. Appellee was not injured because of the violation by the porter at his instance of appellant’s rules. He was injured because of the negligent, act of the porter in pushing the box against him; in other words, because of the failure .of the porter to discharge the duty he owed to exercise care for appellee’s safety while a passenger •on the train. We do not think the principle applied in Grahn v. Ry. Co., 100 Tex. 27, 99 S. W. 104, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025, 123 Am. St. Rep. 767, cited by appellant as supporting its contention, is applicable to the facts here. 'Grahn was not a passenger on the freight train. I-Ie was on it without authority from any one authorized to accept him as a passenger, in violation of the company’s rules, and in collusion with the conductor. He was a trespasser on the train, and the company owed him no duty it did not owe a trespasser.
The motion is overruled.