Court Opinion

ID: 9928824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:11:02.630959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:46.085086
License: Public Domain

J-S27040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SHANNON ROBERT WATTS                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1723 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 22, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001071-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                          FILED: JANUARY 24, 2024

       Shannon Robert Watts (“Watts”) appeals from the dismissal, following

a hearing, of his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       In a prior decision, we detailed the underlying facts:

       On October 24, 2016, Alllen Chapman [(“the victim”)] invited his
       friend, Forrest Miller [(“Miller”)], and Miller’s family over to his
       apartment, where he lived with his wife and daughter. While
       there, [the victim] drank alcohol and Miller smoked marijuana.

              Later, [the victim] and Miller went to Watts’[s] house to buy
       prescription narcotics. After each bought 4 pills from Watts, Miller
       crushed 2 and snorted them. [The victim] did the same with all 4
       pills he purchased from Watts. After leaving Watts’[s] house, [the
       victim] and Miller briefly stopped at a bar and then a store to buy
       beer and cigarettes.

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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           [The victim] and Miller later returned to the apartment.
     [The victim] was irritated, acted a bit crazy, and argued with his
     wife. He appeared high and spacey, had trouble talking, stumbled
     around, and needed help with eating. Shortly after Miller and his
     family left, [the victim] fell asleep on the sofa.

           The next morning, [the victim’s] wife found him still asleep
     on the sofa, snoring. She shook his shoulder to try to wake him,
     and his head [slipped] off the arm of the sofa. [The victim] then
     went silent and stopped breathing.

           When the paramedics arrived, [the victim] was not
     breathing and had no pulse. The paramedics used a defibrillator
     and started CPR on [the victim]. On the way to the hospital, the
     paramedics continued to try to resuscitate [the victim] but could
     not keep his heart beating. The paramedics pronounced [the
     victim] dead.

           The next day, the police interviewed Miller about what
     occurred the night before. Miller and his girlfriend had consumed
     the other 2 pills he got from Watts. The police set up a controlled
     buy using Miller as a confidential informant to buy drugs from
     Watts.

           Miller met Watts and bought 3 oxymorphone pills from him.
     As a result, the police arrested Watts and interviewed him about
     [the victim]. Watts admitted that he sold pills to Miller . . . and
     watched Miller and [the victim] snort them. Watts was charged
     with [the victim’s] death.

            Following trial, a jury convicted Watts of [drug delivery
     resulting in death “DDRD”] and other related offenses [filed under
     a separate docket number but consolidated for trial]. The trial
     court sentenced Watts to 78 months to 240 months of
     incarceration. Watts filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial
     court denied. No appeal was filed.

           After an amended PCRA petition, the court reinstated Watts’
     direct appellate rights. Watts filed [a] timely appeal.

Commonwealth v. Watts, 1468 MDA 2020 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished

memorandum at 1-3).

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        This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See id. at 1. Watts did

not seek leave to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

        Watts, through retained counsel, filed the instant, timely PCRA petition,

which included a request for discovery.           See PCRA Petition, 4/28/22, at 4

(unnumbered).       The PCRA petition included the dockets numbers in both

cases.    See id. at 1 (unnumbered).             Subsequently, Watts filed, without

seeking leave of court, two “addendums” to his PCRA petition. The first, filed

prior    to   the   evidentiary    hearing     the   PCRA   court   granted,   sought

reconsideration of the PCRA court’s decision denying discovery.                  See

Addendum to PCRA Petition, 9/7/22, at 1-2 (unnumbered). The second, filed

after the evidentiary hearing, sought to supplement the PCRA petition by

adding a new claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.          See Second

Addendum to PCRA Petition, 10/14/22, at 1-3 (unnumbered).

        The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing at which Watts, Attorney

Eric J. Weisbrod (“trial counsel”), and Dr. Michael Baden (“Dr. Baden”), an

expert in forensic pathology, testified. The PCRA court denied the petition.

See Order, 11/22/22 at 1 (unnumbered). The instant, timely appeal followed.

Watts and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2 See Notice of Appeal,

12/22/22, at 1 (unnumbered). Watts raises four issues on appeal.

____________________________________________

2 Watts filed a single notice of appeal with only one docket number, thereby

failing to conform with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018),
which requires separate notices of appeal for each case. Id. at 976-77.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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              1. Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Watts’s PCRA
       petition] . . . where [Watts’s] trial counsel was ineffective for
       failing to consult with and procure an expert in pathology to aid
       the defense and, as a result, rendered himself unable to convey
       expert information to the jury — of crucial importance to the
       defense in relation to causation . . . [?]

              2. Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Watts’s PCRA
       petition], in conjunction with its denial of [Watts’s] request to
       engage in discovery, as set forth in [the PCRA petition]?

              3. Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Watts’s PCRA
       petition], in conjunction with its refusal to consider [Watts’s]
       second request to engage in discovery as set forth in [Watts’s]
       addendum to [PCRA petition] in which [Watts] request[ed] that
       the [PCRA c]ourt reconsider its denial of his request to engage in
       discovery?

              4. Did the [PCRA] court err by refusing to consider [Watts’s]
       alternative claim for [PCRA] relief set forth in [Watts’s] Second
       Addendum to [PCRA petition], where it became evident based
       upon testimony provided at the hearing held on September 30,
       2022, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
       in failing to object to damaging statements contained in the
       prosecutor’s closing arguments that were utterly unsupported by
       evidence submitted at trial[?]

Watts’s Brief at 9-10 (some dates and transcript cites omitted).

____________________________________________

However, Walker has been overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Young,
265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021), and, further, in May 2023, Pa.R.A.P. 311, 313,
314, 341, 512, 902, and 904 were amended with immediate effect in response
to Walker, Young, and their progeny. Regardless of the effect of the Walker
violation here, we decline to quash Watts’s appeal because the PCRA court
order dismissing Watts’s petition informed Watts he had the right to appeal
the judgment within 30 days of the order, but not that he needed to file a
separate appeal for each docket number. See Order, 11/22/22. We view this
as a breakdown in court operations pursuant to Commonwealth v. Larkin,
235 A.3d 350, 354 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc), and Commonwealth v.
Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 159 (Pa. Super. 2019), precluding waiver.

                                           -4-
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      In his first claim, Watts asserts he received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. See Watts’s Brief at 19-35. We review ineffectiveness claims under

the following standard:

      Appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is
      limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court’s
      determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.
      The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
      support for the findings in the certified record. This Court grants
      great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not
      disturb those findings merely because the record could support a
      contrary holding. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal
      conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, a “PCRA court’s

credibility findings are to be accorded great deference, and where supported

by the record, such determinations are binding on a reviewing court.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 452 (Pa. 2016) (internal

citations omitted).

      With respect to claims in ineffective assistance of counsel,

      counsel is presumed to have been effective and [] the petitioner
      bears the burden of proving counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. To
      overcome this presumption, a petitioner must establish that: (1)
      the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel
      did not have a reasonable basis for his or her act or omission; and
      (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
      deficient performance, that is, a reasonable probability that but
      for counsel’s act or omission, the outcome of the proceeding would
      have been different. A PCRA petitioner must address each of
      these prongs on appeal. A petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong
      of this test is fatal to the claim.

                                      -5-
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Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (internal

citations omitted). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue

a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035,

1042 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to present

an expert witness, [an] appellant must present facts establishing that counsel

knew or should have known of the particular witness.” Commonwealth v.

Millward, 830 A.2d 991, 994 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Further,

“the [appellant] must articulate what evidence was available and identify the

witness who was willing to offer such evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bryant,

855 A.2d 726, 745 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).

      Watts claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert

pathologist to counter the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert

pathologist concerning the victim’s cause of death. See Watts’s Brief at 19-

35. As noted above, Watts did present the testimony of Dr. Baden, an expert

pathologist, at the evidentiary hearing.     See Watts’s Brief at 21.      Watts

highlights various parts of Dr. Baden’s testimony which he believes either

supported    testimony    from    fact   witnesses    and   contradicted     the

Commonwealth’s medical evidence, demonstrated a lack of thoroughness in

the Commonwealth’s expert pathologist’s investigation, or cast doubt on that

expert’s scientific findings. Lastly, Watts argues trial counsel, who consulted

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with an expert toxicologist prior to trial,3 had no reasonable basis for failing

to consult an expert pathologist. See id. at 27-31.

       The PCRA court disagreed with Watts, finding trial counsel articulated a

reasonable basis for not retaining an expert pathologist, and Watts had not

shown prejudice. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/22/22, at 8-10. The PCRA court

stated:

       Trial   counsel   testified   that    when   he     examined    the
       Commonwealth’s expert report, he noted the expert identified the
       obvious, serious, and unrelated to drug-use, medical problems of
       the victim. He further noted the Commonwealth’s expert could
       not “parse out” the drugs from causation, i.e., the
       Commonwealth’s expert could not say the drugs alone caused the
       victim’s death; trial counsel further knew the Commonwealth’s
       cooperating witness/informant had been purchasing similar drugs
       from [Watts].      In short, trial counsel identified significant
       weaknesses in the Commonwealth’s own expert evidence that he
       could exploit during trial. His strategy, which is tried and true in
       criminal defense and eminently reasonable, was to form the
       defense from within the Commonwealth’s own evidence. Such
       strategy under these circumstances [was] reasonable and
       designed to effectuate [Watts’s] interests.

              It is without import that trial counsel acknowledged having
       his own forensic pathologist to consult with and/or testify would
       have been helpful. It is not the focus of the [c]ourt to examine
       whether that would have been “better” than the path chosen. We
       must determine whether trial counsel chose a reasonable path; it
       is irrelevant whether there was a “better” path unless it was
       substantially better. We find it is not.

Id. (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted).

____________________________________________

3 See N.T., 9/30/22, at 51.

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      Regarding the proof of prejudice, the PCRA court provided the

following discussion:

      [Watts’s] proposed expert, Dr. Baden, did not testify that he held
      an opinion favorable to Watts that he could have rendered for the
      jury. . . . In fact, he testified the Commonwealth’s expert’s
      finding of the cause of death was extremely accurate. He quibbled
      more with whether the Commonwealth’s expert had fully
      investigated everything he could, i.e., obtained a complete
      medical history for the victim, spoken with next of kin, etc. This
      is woefully short of proving the “path not taken” offered a
      substantial probability of success.

                                         ***

              Not only did [Watts’s] expert witness, Dr. Baden, not offer
      an opinion in [Watts’s] favor, he did not testify to any opinion as
      to the victim’s cause of death (other than to agree with the
      Commonwealth’s expert, based upon what he had reviewed). The
      bulk of his testimony was focused on what evidence he would want
      to examine yet and lines of questioning that could have been put
      to the Commonwealth’s expert during trial. None of this testimony
      establishes a reasonable probability that, but for the trial counsel’s
      failure to retain an expert pathologist, the outcome of the trial
      would have been different. In fact, on the testimony presented,
      it is every bit as probable [Watts’s] expert would continue to agree
      with the Commonwealth’s expert as it is he would render a
      differing opinion (even presuming he was able to review all the
      evidence/reports/records/interview next of kin that he wants).

Id. (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted).

      Our independent review of the relevant law and the certified record

confirms the PCRA court’s analysis. Dr. Baden’s testimony, during which he

continually equivocated and “walked back” his disagreements with the

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Commonwealth’s expert, was arguably more harmful to Watts than helpful.4

See N.T., 9/30/22, at 5-44. Critically, Dr. Baden testified he could not rule

out opioid overdose as being “a direct and substantial factor” in causing the

victim’s death. Id. at 45.

       On direct appeal, this Court rejected Watt’s sufficiency challenge to his

DDRD conviction. See Watts, supra, at 4-8. We concluded Watts sold the

drug that was present in [the victim’s] blood and watched him snort it. The

Commonwealth’s expert pathologist opined that crushing and snorting the pills

he got from Watts, was in part the cause of [the victim’s] death. See id. at

8.   Watts has not presented any expert testimony which contradicted the

____________________________________________

4 Watts views Dr. Baden’s testimony in the light most favorable to him and

ignores that Dr. Baden qualified most of the testimony Watts emphasizes.
Watts notes Dr. Baden discussed the testimony of witnesses that the victim
seemed drunk rather than high in the hours immediately prior to his death.
However, the toxicology report did not show alcohol in the victim’s blood. See
Watts’s Brief, at 21-22; N.T., 9/30/22, at 31. Additionally, Watts ignores Dr.
Baden’s own testimony that family and spouses of drug addicts are often not
reliable witnesses. See N.T., 9/30/22, at 30. Watts also strongly relies on
Dr. Baden’s theory regarding post-mortem “redistribution,” which would result
in blood taken from the victim’s heart having artificially high levels of opioids,
and Dr. Baden’s criticism of the Commonwealth’s expert for not using blood
taken from other parts of the body. See Watts’s Brief at 23-24; N.T., 9/30/22,
at 16-17. Dr. Baden admitted his testimony was speculative because he did
not know if the tested blood came from the victim’s heart. See N.T., 9/30/22,
at 18. Watts also contends Dr. Baden would have testified the levels of opioids
in the victim’s blood were non-lethal at the time of his death. See Watts’s
Brief at 24-25. However, this misstates Dr. Baden’s testimony. Dr. Baden
testified that different people have different tolerances for opioids and the
levels of opioids found in the victim’s blood have been found to be non-lethal
in some people and lethal in other people, and Dr. Baden could not know if
the levels were lethal for the victim. See N.T., 9/30/22, at 20-21, 31-37.

                                           -9-
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Commonwealth’s expert testimony. See N.T., 9/30/22, at 5-44. As noted

above, Dr. Baden agreed with the Commonwealth’s expert’s conclusion on

cause of death. See id. at 45. Thus, Watts has not shown that, had trial

counsel hired an expert pathologist, the result would have been different. See

Wholaver, 177 A.3d at 144.          For the above reasons, Watts’s claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel does not merit relief.

      In his second and third issues, Watts avers the PCRA court erred in

denying his request for discovery. See Watts’s Brief, at 35-38. In his first

request, Watts sought:

      a. The ambulance report(s):
      b. The Emergency Room/Hospital Report(s):
      c. The microscopic slides associated with the autopsy;
      d. The full toxicology lab report(s); and
      e. Any other documents/materials that Dr. Baden deems relevant
         to his review.

PCRA Petition, 4/28/22, at 5 (unnumbered). In his second request, Watts

asked for the same items, but elaborated his “requests are made under

exceptional circumstances” and “[i]t is highly likely that the requested items

will support [Watts’s] pending claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Addendum to [PCRA petition], 9/7/22, at 1-2 (unnumbered).            He further

averred, “[i]t is highly likely that the requested items will result in [Watts’s]

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receipt of exculpatory evidence that was not available to [Watts] at the time

of trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”5 Id.

       The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure proscribe discovery during

collateral proceedings “except upon leave of court after a showing of

exceptional circumstances.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1). Neither the PCRA nor

the   Pennsylvania       Rules    of   Criminal    Procedure   define   “exceptional

circumstances,” but this Court has held it is within the PCRA court’s discretion

to determine “whether a case is exceptional and warrants discovery.”

Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).     This Court “will not disturb the PCRA court’s determination

regarding the existence of exceptional circumstances unless the court abused

its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). We have stated, “[m]ere speculation

that exculpatory evidence might exist does not constitute an exceptional

circumstance warranting discovery.” Commonwealth v. Frey, 41 A.3d 605,

612 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426,

452 (Pa. 2011) (holding showing of good cause under Rule 902(E) “requires

more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence.”).

       Watts has not demonstrated the PCRA court abused its discretion. In

its decision denying Watts’s PCRA petition, the PCRA court noted Watts “did

____________________________________________

5 Watts does not claim trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain
discovery.

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not set forth in the [PCRA petition] the reason he desired discovery of these

items.” PCRA Court Opinion, 11/22/22 at 6. The court further explained:

      During his testimony at the PCRA hearing, Dr. Baden advised that
      he desired to review these materials. However[,] his testimony
      was less than clear as to why he desired to review them.

                                     ***

      [Watts] has yet to explain to the [c]ourt his need for this evidence.
      Dr. Baden’s testimony on this point, at best, is that his ability to
      review the evidence may result in exculpatory evidence or an
      exculpatory opinion on behalf of [Watts]. Clearly, the medical
      records related to the victim’s death have been available, and
      were available, to [Watts] for several years prior to trial.

Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original, record citations omitted).

      Having reviewed the record, in particular the relevant portion of Dr.

Baden’s testimony, see N.T., 9/30/22, at 41-45, we discern no abuse of

discretion in the PCRA court’s ruling. See Frey, 41 A.3d at 611. Moreover,

on appeal, Watts does not allege these materials were exculpatory but merely

they would “assist [Dr. Baden in] his investigation.” Watts’s Brief at 37. Watts

has presented a “generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence” and is

therefore not entitled to relief. Hanible, 30 A.3d at 452. Watts’s second and

third issues fail.

      In his fourth and final issue, Watts contends the PCRA court erred in

failing to grant relief on his alternate claim trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the Commonwealth’s closing argument. See Watts’s Brief

at 38-41. Watts acknowledges he did not raise this claim in his initial PCRA

petition.   See id. at 40.   Rather, Watts raised the claim for the first time

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following the evidentiary hearing in his second addendum to the PCRA petition,

which was filed without leave of court.       See Second Addendum to [PCRA

petition], 10/14/22, at 1-3 (unnumbered); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A)

(“The judge may grant leave to amend or withdraw a petition for post-

conviction collateral relief at any time.”). The PCRA court declined to consider

this issue because Watts did not seek leave of court to file an amended PCRA

petition. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/22/22, at 6.

      A PCRA petitioner must seek leave of court to amend a PCRA petition;

claims raised in an unauthorized amended petition are waived.              See

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 627 (Pa. 2015) (emphasis added);

see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A). Our Supreme Court has instructed that PCRA

amendments are not “self-authorizing, i.e., [] a petitioner may [not] simply

‘amend’ a pending petition with a supplemental pleading.” Commonwealth

v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84

A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“Where the petitioner does not seek leave

to amend his petition . . . the PCRA court is under no obligation to address

new issues.”).

      Here, Watts did not seek leave to amend his PCRA petition. Instead, he

filed an “addendum” which raised, for the first time, a separate and distinct

claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Thus, we conclude Watts waived this

claim, and, like the PCRA court, decline to further address it.

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     For the above reasons, Watts’s claims are waived and/or meritless.

Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Watts’s PCRA petition.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/2024

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