Court Opinion

ID: 9704513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:37:50.962719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.610323
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
In People v White, 390 Mich 245, 255; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), this Court, following the lead of other jurisdictions,1 adopted the "same transaction” test as the proper standard to be applied in examining a claim of double jeopardy.2 We adopted this test because it "provides the only meaningful approach to the constitutional protection against being placed twice in jeopardy”, supra, 257-258.
The cases now before this Court require us to examine the parameters of the same transaction *497test. This is by no means an easy task.3 As Justice Brennan admitted in calling for the adoption of the same transaction test, "the phrase 'same transaction’ is not self-defining”. Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 454, fn 8; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). However, the task can be accomplished in such a way that the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant will be protected without reaching anomalous or absurd results.
In this opinion we will explore the purposes behind the adoption of the same transaction test, examine how other jurisdictions have developed the concept of the same transaction, set forth criteria for determining whether crimes arise out of the same transaction and apply that standard to the facts of the four cases before us.
I — Purpose Behind Adoption of Same Transaction Test
In seeking to establish the proper parameters of the same transaction test we must be mindful of the purposes behind adopting the rule. We expressed the view in White that the use of the same transaction test would promote both "the best interests of justice arid sound judicial administration”. 390 Mich 258. Indeed, economical and expeditious administration of justice will result from use of this test, but as we emphasized in White, "our primary objective in adopting the same transaction test is to ensure that a criminal defendant *498receives meaningful protection under the double jeopardy clause”. 390 Mich 258, fn 6.4 We observed:
"A far more basic reason for adopting the same transaction test is to prevent harassment of a defendant. The joining of all charges arising out of the same criminal episode at one trial ' * * * will enable a defendant to consider the matter closed and save the costs of redundant litigation.’ It will also help ' * * * to equalize the adversary capabilities of grossly unequal litigants’ and prevent prosecutorial sentence shopping. 'In doing so, it recognizes that the prohibition of double jeopardy is for the defendant’s protection.’ 41 Mich App 370, 378; 200 NW2d 326, 330 (1972).” 390 Mich 258-259.
It is the protection of the defendant from the possibility of prosecutorial harassment which was foremost in our minds when we adopted the same transaction test5 and this is the principle which must be kept in mind as we give substance to the phrase, the same transaction.
*499II — Same Transaction — Intent Crimes— White Applies
White dealt with a series of offenses all of which involved crimes where criminal intent was an element of the crime. In White, this Court said:
"[T]here can be no doubt that the three crimes committed by defendant were all part of a single criminal transaction. The crimes were committed in a continuous time sequence and display a single intent and goal —sexual intercourse with complainant.” (Emphasis added.) 390 Mich 245, 259.6
This was the criterion that case established:
"a continuous time sequence and display [of] a single intent and goal.”
This criterion provides a generally workable test to apply in most instances to determine whether a single transaction exists vis-á-vis double jeopardy if all the activities involve crimes where criminal intent is an element. We accept that as the criterion which must be applied in all cases where only intent crimes are in question.
Ill — Same Transaction — No-Intent Crimes
Where a series of offenses involve either no intent crimes or intent and no-intent crimes, the criterion in White does not provide a wholly workable test. The cases with which this opinion deals involve such fact situations. Our task therefore is to formulate an appropriate criterion to test them in the spirit of White.
*500The American Law Institute Model Penal Code seeks to prevent successive prosecutions where offenses are part of the same criminal episode. Section 1.07(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) provides in pertinent part:
"A defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.”
In Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233, 253; 304 A2d 432 (1973), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing the Model Penal Code with approval, held that:
"The Double Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a 'single criminal episode.’ ” (Footnote omitted.)
The White quotation used above in part I makes use of the term "criminal episode” as follows:
"The joining of all charges arising out of the same criminal episode ' * * * will enable a defendant to consider the matter closed and save the cost of redundant litigation.’ ” 290 Mich 259.
Utilization of this term therefore will comport with language already employed in White.
Both Hawaii and New York have an approach to the problem at hand that suggests another useful criterion. In State v Ahuna, 52 Hawaii 321, 326; 474 P2d 704, 707 (1970), the Supreme Court of Hawaii held:
*501"We think that a satisfactory approach to the problem is set forth in § 111 of the proposed Hawaii Penal Code 1970. Under the approach a former prosecution, although it has been for a violation of a different statutory provision, will bar a subsequent prosecution if the subsequent prosecution is for an offense based on the same conduct, unless the offense 'requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil.’ ”
A New York criminal statute likewise provides that subsequent prosecutions will not be barred where "the offenses * * * [contain] an element which is not an element of the other, and the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil”. NY Crim Pro L § 40.20(2)(b) (McKinney 1971).7
A common criterion in both these jurisdictions is that the same transaction rule applied where the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, not "a substantially different harm or evil” (Hawaii), or "very different kinds of harm or evil” (New York).
Drawing upon these sources certain criteria for determining whether crimes arise out of the same transaction can be set forth.
1) Where criminal intent is required in the offenses involved, the criterion set forth in White *502applies: "continuous time sequence and display [of] a single intent and goal.”8
2) Where one or more of the offenses does not involve criminal intent, the criterion is whether the offenses are part of the same criminal episode, and whether the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, not a substantially different, or a very different kind of, harm or evil.9
The above criteria do not purport to be all-inclusive. Criteria could no doubt be fashioned to encompass a greater number of fact situations and perhaps offer more guidance and thereby promote to a greater degree the efficient administration of justice. However, we believe that the criteria set forth today are as broad as appropriate until we are called upon to consider further illustrative cases.
IV — Application of the Standard
The task remains to determine whether the individual offenses involved in each of the four cases before us arise out of the same transaction. Each of the four cases include either traffic or liquor law violations. Such offenses do not require *503criminal intent as an element and consequently, part (1) of the standard dealing with the singleness of the criminal intent or goal is inapplicable. The relevant portion of the standard for the cases before us is part (2).
A. Crampton
On May 13, 1972, Clyde Crampton was arrested in Lansing and charged with driving under the influence of liquor, MCLA 257.625; MSA 9.2325. The complaint alleging that charge was filed in 54-A District Court on May 16, 1972. Subsequently, on June 28, a separate complaint charging Cramp-ton with failure to display a valid registration on demand, MCLA 257.223; MSA 9.1923, was also filed in the district court. It is clear that this second complaint was also based on the May 13 arrest.
Faced with the two complaints, Mr. Crampton entered a guilty plea to the failure to display registration charge on October 25, 1972. On November 6, Crampton moved to quash the driving under the influence of liquor charge by arguing that the same transaction rationale barred any further prosecution. The district court held that the same transaction rule did not apply and the circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied leave and we granted leave on September 4, 1974, 392 Mich 793 (1974).
So Crampton poses the question whether the offenses of DUIL and inability to display a valid registration are part of the same transaction. Since they are not intent offenses we employ the second criterion "whether the offenses are part of the same criminal episode, and whether the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same *504or similar harm or evil, not a substantially different, or a very different kind of, harm or evil”.
Were DUIL and inability to display a valid registration part of the same criminal episode? Nothing indicates these two offenses were part of the same criminal episode. DUIL appears merely to have been the occasion of exposing the inability to display a valid registration.
Furthermore, the harm or evil intended to be prevented by the DUIL law and the law requiring ability to display a valid registration are substantially different. The former is to protect the travelling public against danger from drivers not in full control of themselves. The latter is to protect against the theft of automobiles.
In short, the two offenses in Crampton are not part of the same transaction under our second criterion. The guilty plea to the failure to display a registration charge therefore was not a bar to suit on DUIL. The circuit court and the district court holdings were therefore correct.
B. Hudgins
Royce Daniel Hudgins was arrested on October 5, 1973, and charged with three offenses all detected at one point in time: making an improper U-turn (Detroit ordinances, § 38-5-7); driving an automobile emitting excessive smoke (Detroit ordinances, § 38-10-11); and carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle without a license (MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424). On April 25, 1974, before the scheduled date of his trial on the two ordinance charges, Mr. Hudgins entered a guilty plea in the Traffic and Ordinance Division of Recorder’s Court to the improper U-turn and excessive exhaust smoke charges. He was convicted and fined by the court. *505The same day, he moved in recorder’s court to dismiss the gun charge, arguing that the same transaction rule barred any further prosecution. The trial judge agreed and dismissed the charge. The people appeal on bypass granted by this Court, 393 Mich 774 (1974).
Hudgins poses the question whether making an improper U-turn or operating a vehicle which emits excessive smoke and carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle are part of the same transaction. Since making an improper U-turn and operating a vehicle which emits excessive smoke are non-intent offenses, we again employ the second criterion of our test, supra.
First, we find that the only connection between the offenses of making an improper U-turn or excessive smoke emission and carrying a weapon was that the arrest resulting from the traffic violations was the occasion for discovering that Hudgins was carrying a pistol in the vehicle. As with Crampton, such a connection is not sufficient to establish that these offenses were part of the same criminal episode.
Secondly, the harm or evil intended to be prevented by the improper U-turn law, the excessive smoke emission law and the law prohibiting the carrying of weapons are substantially different. The law which prohibits improper U-turns is designed to promote the flow of traffic and safety conditions on certain designated roadways. The law prohibiting excessive smoke emission is designed to prevent polluting the air. Neither of these offenses involves laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or, evil sought to be prevented by the law prohibiting carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle, namely, to promote public peace and safety.
*506Therefore, the traffic offenses and the crime of carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle were not part of the same transaction under our second criterion. The trial court was in error in its ruling that the prosecution on the gun charge was barred by the same transaction rule.
C. Jones
On February 17, 1974, Jones was arrested in a raid of an alleged "blind pig” in the City of Detroit. Three separate charges were filed against him: disorderly conduct (Detroit ordinances, § 39-1-10); possession of heroin (MCLA 335.341[4] [a]; MSA 18.1070[41] [4] [a]); and possession of marijuana (MCLA 335.341[4] [d]; MSA 18.1070 [41] [4] [d]). Approximately one month later, on March 15, 1974, Mr. Jones was found guilty by a referee in the Traffic and Ordinance Division of Recorder’s Court on the disorderly conduct charge. A fine of $100 was imposed. Subsequently, on July 8, 1974, Mr. Jones moved to dismiss the two remaining charges by arguing that the same transaction test applied to this case. The trial judge granted the motion and the people appealed on bypass granted by this Court, 393 Mich 794 (1975).
Since disorderly conduct is a non-intent offense, we employ the second criterion of our test. First, as in the case of Crampton and Hudgins, the only connection between the disorderly conduct offense and the offenses of possession of heroin and marijuana was that the arrest for disorderly conduct was the occasion for the discovery of the additional possession of heroin and marijuana offenses. Such a connection is insufficient to establish that these offenses were part of the same criminal episode.
Secondly, the purpose of the disorderly conduct ordinance is to prevent unlawful civil disturbance *507while the purpose of the laws prohibiting the possession of marijuana and heroin is to ultimately prohibit the use of physically harmful substances. Clearly, the ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct was intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil from the laws prohibiting possession of marijuana or heroin.
Therefore, the disorderly conduct offense and the crime of possession of marijuana and heroin were not part of the same transaction.
The trial court was in error in its ruling that prosecution of the possession of marijuana and heroin offenses was barred because of the same transaction rule.
D. Allen
On September 29, 1973, James Allen, Jr., was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of liquor (MCLA 257.625; MSA 9.2325); felonious assault (MCLA 750.82; MSA 28.277), and carrying a concealed weapon (MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424). All offenses are alleged to have occurred at the scene of an automobile accident in which Allen was involved. On November 26, 1973, Allen stood trial in the Trafile and Ordinance Division of Recorder’s Court on the DUIL charge. He was convicted and sentenced by the court to 45 days at the Detroit House of Correction. On February 6, 1974, he moved in recorder’s court for the dismissal of the two remaining charges. The trial judge found that the same transaction test applied and accordingly dismissed the charges. The people appeal on bypass granted by this Court, 393 Mich 775 (1974).
Since DUIL is a non-intent offense, we once again employ the second criterion of our test. In *508this particular case we must apply the second criterion to (1) whether DUIL and carrying a concealed weapon are part of the same transaction and (2) whether DUIL and felonious assault are part of the same transaction.
As for DUIL and carrying a concealed weapon, we find that these two offenses are not part of the same transaction. First, we find that these offenses are not part of the same criminal episode. The only connection between DUIL and carrying a concealed weapon in this case is that arrest for the DUIL violation was the occasion for the discovery of the concealed weapon. As we have seen in Crampton, Hudgins, and Jones, this is not a sufficient link to establish that these offenses were part of the same criminal episode. Secondly, we find that the harm or evil intended to be prevented by the DUIL law and the law prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon are substantially different. The purpose of the DUIL law, as we noted in our discussion of Crampton, is to protect the travelling public against danger from drivers not in full control of themselves. The purpose of the law prohibiting carrying a concealed weapon is to promote public peace and safety. So, clearly, these offenses involve laws intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil. Therefore, the trial court was in error in ruling that DUIL and carrying a concealed weapon were part of the same transaction, thus barring prosecution on the concealed weapon offense.
As for DUIL and felonious assault, we find that these two offenses are also not part of the same transaction. It is a close question whether the DUIL offense and the felonious assault offense in this case were part of the same criminal episode. However, we need not make this determination *509because, applying the other part of the test, we find that the DUIL and felonious assault laws were intended to prevent substantially different kinds of harm or evil. We have already reiterated the purpose of the DUIL law: to protect the travelling public against danger from drivers not in full control of themselves. The purpose of the felonious assault law is to protect the public from physical violence and harm. Therefore, the trial court was also in error when it concluded DUIL and felonious assault were part of the same transaction. Prosecution on the felonious assault charge was not barred under the same transaction rule.
IV — Conclusion
Under the standard adopted today for determining whether offenses arose out of the same transaction, we conclude that in none of the four cases should subsequent prosecutions be barred. In Crampton the district court is affirmed. In Hudgins, Allen and Jones, recorder’s court is reversed and those cases are remanded for trial.
Coleman and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Lindemer and Ryan, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973).
Jurisdictions achieving same result via statute include: Minnesota, see State v Corning, 289 Minn 382; 184 NW2d 603 (1971); California, see In re Henry, 65 Cal 2d 330; 54 Cal Rptr 633; 420 P2d 97 (1966); New York, NY Crim Pro L § 40.10(2) (McKinney 1971).

 The Michigan Double Jeopardy Clause, which is substantially identical to the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.” Const 1963, art 1, § 15.

 As the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted in State v Johnson 273 Minn 394; 141 NW2d 517, 524-525 (1966):
"While the objectives are clear enough, the difficulty lies in formulating a test for determining whether each violation charged resulted from a single behavioral incident. * * * [A]ny test must give consideration to the vast number of conceivable situations which are likely to arise.”

 "The Double Jeopardy Clause is a guarantee 'that the State with all its resources and power [shall] not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity * * * .’ Green v United States, 355 US 184, 187 [78 S Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199; 61 ALR2d 1119] (1957).” Concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 450; 90 S Ct 1189, 1197-1198; 25 L Ed 2d 469, 479 (1970).

 In White we did recognize an exception to the same transaction test " 'where a crime is not completed or not discovered despite the due diligence on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction * * * ’. Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 453 n 7; 90 S Ct 1189, 1199; 25 L Ed 2d 469, 481 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).”
Whether an exception to the same transaction test should be recognized in those cases in which the prosecutor does not know or through due diligence could not discover that other charges against the defendant exist is a question that deserves our careful consideration. However, since we have ruled in this opinion that none of the instant appeals fall within the same transaction test (see part IV of this opinion), it is a question we need not answer today.

 Defendant White had been charged with kidnapping, felonious assault and rape. 390 Mich 250-251.

 See also In re Martinis v Supreme Court of New York, 15 NY2d 240, 247; 206 NE2d 165, 167; 258 NYS2d 65, 68 (1965).
"It has long been recognized that crimes separate in nature, although arising out of the same transaction, may be defined and convictions thereon sustained without exposing defendant to double jeopardy (People v Snyder, 214 App Div 742; 209 NYS 898 [1925], affd 241 NY 81; 148 NE 796 [1925]; People v Skarczewski, 287 NY 826; 41 NE2d 99 [1942]; People v Di Lapo, 14 NY2d 170; 250 NYS2d 261; 199 NE2d 361 [1964]).”

 We agree with the Court of Appeals application of the White rationale in the following cases: People v Rolston, 51 Mich App 146; 214 NW2d 894 (1974); People v Joines (On Remand), 55 Mich App 334; 222 NW2d 230 (1974); People v Davenport (On Remand), 51 Mich App 484; 215 NW2d 702 (1974); People v West, 54 Mich App 527; 221 NW2d 179 (1974); People v Martinez, 58 Mich App 693; 228 NW2d 523 (1975); People v Goans, 59 Mich App 294; 229 NW2d 422 (1975); People v Williams, 61 Mich App 642; 233 NW2d 122 (1975); People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974); People v Charles Johnson, 62 Mich App 240; 233 NW2d 246 (1975).

 Defendants Hudgins, Jones, and Allen argue that the same transaction test is applicable where crimes are connected by a continuous time sequence or a common intent or goal. Such a standard is far too broad and would not best serve the purposes for which the same transaction test was adopted.