Court Opinion

ID: 9777487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:13:05.365766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:20.608225
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
On direct appeal, appellant contended his plea was involuntary because the trial judge failed to give the Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a) admonishment which requires the defendant be informed “orally or in writing of the possible consequences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of community supervision.” The Court of Appeals stated:
In the present felony case, the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirement. The record shows that, although the trial court did admonish *128appellant with regard to the requirements of Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 26.13 (Vernon 1989 & Supp.1994), the court failed to inform appellant of the consequences of violating probation in accordance with Article 42.12, section 5. .
Ray v. State, 877 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994). The Court of Appeals then held the error was not subject to a harm analysis under Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) and reversed the judgment of the trial court.
We granted review to determine: first, if the Court of Appeals correctly found the admonishment was not given; second, if the Court of Appeals correctly determined that failure to give the mandatory admonishment was error;1 and, third, whether failure to give the admonishment is subject to a harm analysis.
The majority opinion addresses only the second ground for review and holds failure to comply with art. 42.12, § 5(a) does not render an open plea of guilty or nolo contendere involuntary. Ante at 127. Therefore, according to the majority, failure to comply with art. 42.12, § 5(a) is not error and, consequently, the issue of harm is moot. Ibid. This holding has the effect of judicially repealing the admonishment requirement of art. 42.12, § 5(a). This is contrary to our normal approach to statutory interpretation. See e.g., Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (We ordinarily give effect to the statutory text.). Accordingly, I cannot join the majority opinion.2
Relying on the rationale of Sodipo v. State, 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), and Graham v. State, 873 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, no pet’n), the Court of Appeals held art. 42.12, § 5(a) is a mandatory statute that is not subject to a harm analysis under Rule 81(b)(2) because there is no concrete data to determine whether the error contributed to the conviction or punishment. Ray, 877 S.W.2d at 427-428. I respectfully disagree.
Appellant pled guilty on July 15, 1991. The proceedings were recessed until September 10, 1991, when appellant was placed on deferred adjudication probation. The Hon. Tom Price presided over both of these proceedings. Almost two years later, on July 2, 1993, a hearing was held on the State’s Motion To Proceed With an Adjudication of Guilt. Within the motion was an allegation that appellant committed a subsequent offense by unlawfully possessing cocaine. At the hearing, presided over by the Hon. Gary R. Stephens, the State proved and Judge Stephens found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the subsequent offense, granted the State’s motion and entered a finding of guilt. Judge Stephens then proceeded with a hearing on the issue of punishment. Based upon appellant’s pleas of true, Judge Stephens found both enhancement allegations true.3 In summation, the State asked that punishment be assessed at confinement for life. At the conclusion of the arguments of counsel, Judge Stephens assessed that punishment.
In light of the foregoing, I would find beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure of Judge Price to give the art. 42.12, § 5(a) admonishment made no contribution, approximately two years later, when Judge Stephens determined appellant’s guilt and assessed his punishment. Accordingly, I would sustain the State’s third ground for review and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I join only the judgment of the Court.

. The second ground for review contends the Court of Appeals erred in holding appellant's plea was involuntary. This contention is based upon a misperception of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. The Court did not find the plea was involuntary; the Court merely found the trial judge faded to give the required admonishment. Ray, 877 S.W.2d at 428. Perhaps the State mis-perceives the opinion because the appellant couched his point of error in terms of voluntariness.

. Additionally, I cannot agree that the instant felony case is controlled by Price v. State, 866 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), where we specifically stated that "our conclusions and holdings are applicable only to deferred adjudication proceedings in misdemeanor cases.” [Emphasis in original.] The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that Price was not controlling. Ray, 877 S.W.2d at 426, n. 3.

.The record reflects that on three separate occasions (July 15, 1991, September 10, 1991 and July 2, 1993) appellant pled true to the enhancement allegations.