Court Opinion

ID: 9717179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:59:45.770637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.891700
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s holdings that the trial court failed to make a deadly weapon finding and used judicial reasoning by inserting the word “NONE” in the judgment.
The indictment states that appellant did “then and there, with the specific intent to commit the offense of capital murder ... intentionally shoot Kendrick Green and Alonzo Primus with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.” Based on the language in the indictment, appellant had notice that the State would seek an affirmative finding. See Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Further, when appellant signed the admonishment form and pled guilty to the offense, he confessed that (1) he was the same person named in the indictment and (2) that he committed the offense charged in the indictment, which clearly stated that he did “intentionally shoot [the two victims] with a deadly weapon.” See id. Again, the indictment specifically alleged the use of a “deadly weapon,” a firearm. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon 2006); Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d at 820.
By asking appellant at the August 6, 2001 plea hearing if he had signed page three of the plea admonishment form— which referred back to the indictment — by accepting appellant’s verbal guilty plea, and by stating, “On your plea of guilty in each case, I’m going to find you guilty in each case,” the trial court necessarily determined that appellant used a deadly weapon “by shooting” in the commission of the attempted capital murder offense. Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d at 820; cf. Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (holding that an affirmative finding is de facto made when the defendant is found guilty as charged in the indictment). Further, the trial court never indicated any reason not to find that a deadly weapon was used. Contra Fanniel v. State, 73 S.W.3d 557, 559 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (where the trial court purposely omitted the deadly weapon finding so that defendant would be eligible for deferred adjudication).
*430I also disagree with the majority that the trial court used judicial reasoning to insert the word “NONE” as its deadly weapon finding. No judicial reasoning was necessary to see that appellant had notice of and pled guilty to attempted capital murder by shooting two people with a deadly weapon; this had already taken place in the 2001 plea proceeding. See id. If the trial court had not believed that the “shooting” with a deadly weapon allegation was true, it would not have accepted appellant’s guilty plea.
Here, the trial court made two deadly weapon findings — an affirmative finding by accepting appellant’s guilty plea and a negative finding in the judgment. The trial court used judicial reasoning in making the affirmative finding, as appellant pled guilty to the offense as alleged in the indictment. See Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d at 820. However, unlike the court in Fanniel, the trial court here did not use judicial reasoning when making the negative deadly weapon finding in the judgment. See Fanniel, 73 S.W.3d at 559. Accordingly, the trial court’s error was clerical, and it justifiably entered a judgment nunc pro tunc which reflected a deadly weapon finding. See Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d at 820. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion and would affirm the trial court’s order.