Court Opinion

ID: 9864993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:19:49.047464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:40.232342
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
1. The bill in question was passed by the House and sent to the Senate, where it was passed on second read*122ing. The Senate resolution states that the hill probably ■will pass on third and final reading if the bill is deemed constitutional. The resolution contains the recital, customary on such occasions, that the Senate entertains doubts as to the constitutionality of the bill. The Senate wants to know whether or not, if the hill is enacted, the statute would be in conflict with certain specified pro-' visions of the Constitution; therefore, the test to be applied is the same as though the bill had become a statute. A statute cannot be declared unconstitutional unless, beyond a reasonable doubt, it conflicts with some provision of the Constitution. Four of the justices and four of the lawyers appearing in the case believe that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the bill provides for the creation of a debt in violation of section 3 of article 11 of the state Constitution. Three of the justices and five of the lawyers, including the Attorney Greneral, believe that no such conflict exists; and the House of Representatives also took this view, or it would not have passed the bill. Such was the situation when the following statement was inserted in the majority opinion: “It would seem that these quotations from the bill, set over against this constitutional prohibition, leave nothing to answer. We venture the assertion that no man, able to read and understand ordinary English, however otherwise educated or uneducated, wise or foolish, would question for a moment that this bill was a, plain violation of the constitutional prohibition, or find any reason to the contrary, save by a resort to profound legal learning and a doubtful application of judicial precedents.” That statement should not be permitted to pass without comment. It was well calculated to stifle opposition and to silence all who have the preposterous presumption to differ with the majority in opinion and the temerity to express their views. I concede that the majority possess intelligence and legal ability and are sincere ; but as I do not concede to them infallibility, I take the liberty, not*123withstanding the statement quoted above, of questioning the soundness of their conclusions.
2. In their arguments the lawyers reminded us that no emergency can justify a waiving or suspension of constitutional provisions, and our attention was called to the forceful language of Mr. Justice Hilliard in Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 408, 26 P. (2d) 1051, 1054. All of the justices are in accord with those sentiments. All of us have taken an oath to support the federal and state Constitutions, and it may be assumed that each of us understands the nature and binding force of that oath. The court is not, and never has been, divided on the question whether or not the Constitution is the supreme law and binding upon all. The question in the Walker case was not, as some suppose, whether or not constitutional provisions can be waived or ignored by the court, but whether the statute there in question came within the inhibition of certain provisions of the Constitution. A similar question is involved in the present proceeding.
3. Section 3 of article 11 of the state Constitution provides: ‘ ‘ The state shall not contract any debt by loan in any form, except to provide for casual deficiencies of revenue, erect public buildings for the use of the state, suppress insurrection, defend the state, or in time of war, assist in defending the United States.”
In the majority opinion it is said that the bill before us contemplates the contracting of a debt within the meaning of that provision and for that reason is unconstitutional. I am unable to concur in that view. To arrive at a correct decision of this question, it is necessary to consider the bill as a whole; taking a few detached expressions is likely to lead to a wrong result.
I fear that the majority opinion gives too much weight to certain words occurring in the bill, such as “borrow,” “loans,” “repay such loans,” etc., and does not sufficiently consider the act as a whole and the purpose thereof. “He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin-deep into its meaning.” Broom, Legal *124Maxims (7th Ed.) 685. The words of a statute, taken literally, are not always a safe guide to its true meaning. A Bolognian law provided “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity.” “After a long debate,” it was held that the law did not extend to a surgeon who opened the vein of a person who had fallen down iu the street in a fit. 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries, p. 60. Although it is improbable, it is not impossible that the prosecuting officer, pointing to the letter of the law, ventured the assertion that no man, able to read and understand, however otherwise educated or uneducated, wise or foolish, would question for a moment that the surgeon was guilty of a plain violation of the law, or find any reason to the contrary, save by a resort to profound legal learning and a doubtful application of judicial precedent. But, be that as it may, the court, in construing the law, did not stick to the letter, which “killeth,” but adhered to the spirit, which “giveth life.” A statute of Edward II enacted that a prisoner “who breaks jail shall be guilty of felony.” The statute was held not to extend to a prisoner who broke out when the prison was on fire, “for,” as Plowden explains, “he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burned.” Coudert, Certainty and Justice, p. 161. We repeatedly have construed statutes according* to their spirit, when their strict letter seemed to call for a different result. See, for example, Brown v. State, 5 Colo. 496; Aggers v. People, 20 Colo. 348, 38 Pac. 386; Armstrong v. Simonson, 84 Colo. 472, 271 Pac. 627.
Just what does the bill in question provide? At the regular 1933 session the General Assembly passed an act imposing an excise tax on motor fuel. S. L. 1933, c. 140. It provides, among* other things, that after 3 per cent of the proceeds derived from the tax have been used for purposes not important here, 70 per cent of the balance shall be placed to the credit of the state highway fund. §10 (a), (b). The title to the bill now before us, so far as pertinent here, is as follows: “An act to provide for *125emergency relief and to provide for employment quickly and to defend the state, by authorizing the issue of highway debentures and the sale thereof to the United States of America, for the purpose of raising money in anticipation of the collection of the excise tax on motor fuels; providing for the redemption of such debentures; * *
The act provides that to carry out its purpose and to enable the state to avail itself of the provisions of the congressional act of June 16, 1933, known as the National Industrial Eecovery Act, money not exceeding $10,-000,000 may be borrowed from the United States; that “highway debentures” for the amount of the money received shall be executed and delivered to the United States, and the money received shall be placed in the state highway fund; that from time to time there shall be transferred from the state highway fund to the state highway debenture fund sufficient money to pay the highway debentures, and that the money shall be used for that purpose only; that any grant to the state made under the National Industrial Eecovery Act or other acts of Congress shall be paid into the state highway debenture redemption fund to be used only for the purpose of paying the highway debentures; that all such debentures ‘ ‘ shall be paid solely from the state highway debenture redemption fund and not otherwise”; that “the issue of said debentures shall not constitute a general obligation of the State of Colorado, but shall be payable solely from the excise tax pledged for the payment thereof”; and that the state shall cause the excise tax to be promptly collected and applied to the payment of the debentures, and in the meantime shall not alter the existing* statute so as to impair the security. The money received from the sale of the debentures can be used only for the purpose of constructing, repairing and improving the public highways; and the bill provides that when the present emergency shall have ended no further agreement for the construction of highways or related projects under the act shall be entered into. ' In the title and repeatedly *126in the act the transaction between the state and the United States is referred to as a “sale” and a “purchase.” Thus, the governor is authorized “to order the sale to the United States” of the debentures, and to “enter into a contract with the United States * * * for the purchase of said debentures. ’ ’ There are provisions as to what shall be done “after the sale of said debentures” and “upon receipt of the full purchase price of said debentures,” and how the expenses of making’ the “sale” of the debentures shall be paid.
It is submitted that if the bill were enacted, the intent, meaning and effect of the statute would be as follows :
It would not add to the burden of the general taxpayers ; the general taxes would not be increased by the fraction of a cent; the taxpayer would pay exactly what he is now paying — no more and no less. Although it does not go to the validity of the act, it may be noted, in order to correct the mistaken notion that the taxpayers ’ burden would be made heavier, that it would not even add one cent to the burden of those paying the excise tax. That tax, both as to amount and time of payment, would remain exactly the same as it is under the statute now in force.
Instead of increasing the taxpayers’ burden, it would greatly lessen it by enabling the state to receive from the United States a grant of work relief funds, under the National Industrial Recovery Act, to the extent of several million dollars.
It would not divert to the payment of the debentures any part of the general tax fund of the state.
It would not change in any particular the use to which the excise tax on motor fuel is applicable, namely, road work. It would merely enable the state, by issuing debentures anticipating the collection of the excise tax, to do at once, while the emergency is great, identically the same road work that would be done in any event, but *127that in the absence of the bill would have to be spread, over a period of several years.
The credit of the state would not be pledged for the payment of either principal or interest. If the excise tax should prove insufficient to take care of the debentures, no other fund of the state could be resorted to to make good the deficiency. This would be as well known to the holder of the debentures as to the state.
The obligation assumed by the state would be, not to pay the debentures with the proceeds of general taxes, but to collect the excise tax promptly and apply it to the satisfaction of the debentures.
As the excise tax is collected, the state would hold the proceeds as trustee for the benefit of the assignee of the fund, i. e., the holder of the highway debentures.
Whether we view the contemplated transaction between the state and the United States as a loan or a purchase by the latter, the transaction, in substance, would be an assignment by the state, without recourse upon the state, of so much of the motor fuel tax as may be necessary to reimburse the United States for the money advanced.
The transaction would not constitute a contracting of a debt within the meaning of section 3 of article 11 of the Constitution.
What is meant by the word “debt” depends on the context, the general subject with reference to which it is used and the purpose sought to be accomplished. As we said in Shields v. City of Loveland, 74 Colo. 27, 218 Pac. 913, “The definitions of the word debt are many.” If the state borrowed money on the general credit of the state, and as collateral security for the loan pledged the proceeds of an excise tax, there would be created a general obligation of the state, and this would be a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provision in question. That, of course, is not this case. But if, as in the present case, the transaction does not constitute a general obligation of the state, it does not constitute a debt within the inhibition of the Constitution. For ex*128ample, if there is a valid tax levy and labor and supplies are obtained and are paid for by warrants, certificates, debentures or bonds which are made payable only out of the taxes when collected, there is no creation of a debt in the constitutional sense, because no general obligation of the state is created. If, instead of paying for the labor and supplies by delivery of such warrants, certificates, debentures or bonds, thereby making it necessary for the one receiving them to convert them into cash, the state itself obtains the money thereon and pays for the labor and supplies with the money so received, the result is the same; in each case the instruments, in effect are assignments of all or part of the taxes to be collected — an assignment without recourse on the state.
The meaning of such debt-limitation provisions in Constitutions has been clearly explained by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Alabama State Bridge Corporation v. Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695. Am act pledged the bridge tolls, the surplus from the gasoline tax and the receipts from the convict department to the payment of bonds issued to pay for bridge construction. It was held that this did not create a debt within a constitutional provision that “no new debt shall be created against or incurred by this state, ’ ’ with certain exceptions, etc. The court said: “Our judgment is that ‘debt,’ within the meaning, the purview, the whole content, of the constitutional provision, is that which the state in any event is bound to pay, an obligation secured by the general faith and credit of the state. Bonds that may be issued for the construction of bridges under this act will not evidence such an obligation — will not be so secured. * * * There is no promise on the part of the state to pay in any event; there is no pledge that there will be a surplus of any fund; there is no pledge of the general credit of the state; there will be no debt within the meaning* of section 213.”
The distinction suggested above has been recognized repeatedly by this court. In People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, *12910 Pac. 641, the court construed the constitutional provision (§6, art. 11) that “the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county,” etc., shall not exceed a certain amount, and held that in determining the amount of indebtedness county warrants are to be taken into account. That the court meant general, not anticipatory, warrants is clear, for the court observed: “Whether the doctrine recognizing the right to anticipate, by assignment, revenue levied but uncollected, by warrants drawn thereon and accepted absolutely in payment, is admissible under our statutes, we do not now determine. The case, as it stands, does not present this question.”
In People v. May, 9 Colo. 404, 12 Pac. 838, it was held that a warrant or other instrument having the effect of an assignment pro tanto, without 'recourse upon the county, of a fund to accrue from the current levy of taxes, accepted as full payment for labor or material does not create a debt within the meaning of the Constitution. The court said: “Since, in such case, the assignee takes all the risk if the taxes are not collected, relying simply upon his right to compel the proper officers to perform their duty in the premises, no liability, contingent or otherwise, attaches to the county. * # * The warrant now in controversy was issued after the constitutional limit of indebtedness had been reached by the county. It is general in form. It does not purport to be payable from any particular fund, or out of the revenue from the taxes of any specified year. Nor do counsel claim, in the pleadings or argument, that, when the instrument issued, it was the intention to restrict in any manner the county’s liability for the supposed indebtedness represented thereby. This warrant cannot be treated as an assignment under the views herein expressed.”
Such an assignment, of course, must be based upon a valid levy; hence if the county revenue beyond the current year were attempted to be assigned such assignment would be ineffective, not because it would create a debt, but because such levy would be invalid. The levy itself *130cannot be anticipated and drawn upon. Goodykoontz v. People, 20 Colo. 374, 38 Pac. 473. No such situation is presented where, as here, there is an assignment of anticipated receipts from the motor fuel excise tax, because the provision for that tax is valid and effective beyond the biennial period; that constitutes a valid levy that will support anticipatory warrants or debentures.
In In re Canal Certificates, 19 Colo. 63, 34 Pac. 274, a statute provided that the expenses of constructing a state canal were to be met in part by “certificates of indebtedness,” payable only out of funds received for carriage of water, or in payment for lands, and that they shall not in any event become a claim against the state, except as to said funds. It was held, notwithstanding the use of the word “indebtedness," that the act was not in conflict with the constitutional provision fixing a limitation upon state indebtedness.
In Shields v. City of Loveland, supra, money for the completion of an electric light plant was to be obtained by issuing municipal bonds, payable only out of the revenue derived from the plant. We held that the bonds, if issued, would not create a debt in the constitutional sense, saying: “Plaintiffs in error insist, however, that the revenue bonds constitute a debt, and so the lawful limit is exceeded. We do not think that they amount to a debt within the intent of the Constitution or statute. The definitions of the word debt are many, and depend on the context and the g'eneral subject with reference to which it is used. 17 C. J. 1371. Its meaning in the sections of the Constitution and statutes now before us must be determined by their purpose, which was to prevent the overburdening of the public, and bankruptcy of the municipality. Clearly the revenue bonds are not within that purpose. The public can never be overburdened by that which it is under no obligation to discharge, nor can the city become bankrupt by what it does not have to pay. Nor are these bonds a technical debt. Nothing is my *131debt unless a judgment for its amount can be recovered against me upon it.”
In Franklin Trust Co. v. City of Loveland, 3 F. (2d) 114, the court passed upon the same question, with the same result, saying (p. 116): “There is no ground for a claim that the bonds are to be a lien on the plant, or that the holders could look to the plant for their payment; nor can general taxation be resorted to for that purpose. The opinion of the State supreme court can mean nothing else.” (Italics are mine.)
In Searle v. Town of Haxtun, 84 Colo. 494, 271 Pac. 629, we followed the Shields case. Great reliance is placed by the opponents of the bill before us upon the following statement of Mr. Justice Denison in his opinion in the Searle case: “If a tax was required there was of course a debt.” That the tax referred to is a general property tax cannot be doubted. See 3 F. (2d) 114, 116, supra; and the plaintiff’s citations in the Searle case. Distinguishing the cases cited by the plaintiff, the court said in the Searle case: “Plaintiff’s cases on the other hand, with one exception, show that the bonds there in question required either a tax beside the income, to pay them, or that there was a mortgage or pledge of property for that purpose. If a tax was required there was of course a debt, and, while we do not concede that a mortgagor in a mortgage to secure the debt of another becomes thereby a debtor for that debt, yet there is a. substantial difference between a mortgage of property,, by which it may all be lost and the city thus compelled, in substance, to pay, and a pledge of its future income, by which the property cannot be lost, but the city only compelled to devote the income of the improved property thereto. See City of Bowling Green v. Kirby, supra.
“The one exception is Schnell v. Rock Island, 232 Ill. 89, 83 N. E. 462, 14 L. R. A. (N.S.) 874, but even in that case the ordinance provided that one source of revenue for the payment of the bonds was to be special taxes. However, bonds payable by special assessments are *132everywhere held not to be debts of the municipality, so, we must regard this case as an authority in favor of plaintiff in error; but we follow Shields v. Loveland, City of Bowling Green v. Kirby and Winston v. Spokane, supra, and hold that the proposed bonds are not debts of the town.”
The attorneys who attack the constitutionality of the act contend that the recent case of Reimer v. Town of Holyoke, 93 Colo. 571, 27 P. (2d) 1032, conclusively determines that the act before us contemplates the creation of a debt in violation of section 3 of article 11 of the Constitution. I submit that that case not only does not sustain that contention, but clearly supports the position taken in this opinion. The contract involved in that case was for the purchase of two Diesel engines and equipment to take the place of two engines and equipment already in use for the generation of electric current at the municipal plant. The contract provided that deferred installments of the purchase price should be evidenced by municipal pledge orders payable only from the net revenue of the light plant. But in addition to that, and this is what moved the court to decide as it did, the contract required the town to expend large sums of money that could come only out of the town’s general funds raised by taxation. Beyond question, this created a general obligation of the town. In addition to that, the contract required the town to divert to the special fund considerable sums of money from the funds raised by general obligation of the town. In addition to that, the con-details; they are set forth fully in the opinion in that case, and show the glaring difference between the situation in that case and that presented by the record in this proceeding.
The very point now being discussed has just been decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas. At a special session in 1933 the Kansas Legislature passed an act authorizing the state highway commission to borrow money from the United States to be used for the pur*133poses stated in the act, namely, the construction, reconstruction, improvement and maintenance of state highways and bridges, and providing for the pledging, as security for the loans, of warrants payable solely from funds derived from gasoline taxes and motor vehicle license taxes. In State v. Kansas State Highway Commission, (Kan.) 28 P. (2d) 770, it was held that that, act did not provide for the contracting of a debt within the inhibition of section 6 of article 11 of the Kansas Constitution. That section and section 5 provide:
“Sec. 5. For the purpose of defraying extraordinary expenses and making’ public improvements, the state may ■contract public debts; but such debts shall never, in the aggregate, exceed one million dollars, except as hereinafter provded. Every such debt shall be authorized by law for some purpose specified therein, and the vote of a majority of all the members elected to each house, to be taken by the yeas and nays, shall be necessary to the passage of such laws; * * *.
“Sec. 6. No debt shall be contracted by the state except as herein provided, unless the proposed law for creating such debt shall first be submitted to a direct vote •of the electors of the state at some general election; and if such proposed law shall be ratified by a majority of all the votes cast at such general election, then it shall be the duty of the legislature next after such election to enact such law and create such debt, subject to all the provisions and restrictions provided in the preceding section of this article.”
The court said: “The debts referred to in Article 11, sections 5 and 6, supra, are debts to be paid by a general property tax. This is clear from the reading of the sections. What the framers of our Constitution were guarding against was the incurring of debts in excess of a million dollars payable by a general property tax without the question having been submitted to and adopted by the people. They regarded property as the basis of taxation. # * They were not dealing with the question *134of obligations to be paid only by special tax, such as on motor vehicles or motor fuels, or from funds raised in some manner other than by general property tax.”
Another case dealing with the question under discussion here is State v. Moorer, 152 S. C. 455, 150 S. E. 269. The Constitution of South Carolina prohibits an increase of the state’s public debt, except for ordinary and current business, without a vote of the qualified electors authorizing it. A statute provides for the financing of the construction of state highways through the issuance by the governor and the state treasurer of state highway certificates of indebtedness and notes. The act further provides: “The full faith, credit and taxing power of the State are hereby pledged for the payment of the principal and interest of the State Highway certificates of indebtedness and notes authorized by this Act.” It provides, also, for the pledging of the proceeds of the gasoline and motor vehicle taxes for the payment of the certificates and notes. The court consisted of five Supreme Court justices and fourteen Circuit judges. Two> of the former and eleven of the latter joined in deciding* that the act did not violate the constitutional provision in question, since the pledged taxes probably would be suffiicient to pay the certificates and notes. The minority were of the opinion that the pledging of the‘taxes did not relieve the state from its primary obligation “any more than the assignment of collateral to a note would relieve the maker from his primary obligation upon it.” In the dissenting opinion it is said: “The point is simply this’: Where there is created no obligation on the part of the state, and the proposed improvements are to be paid for out of a designated special source of income, the state is but a trustee of an express trust, to apply such income to the stated purpose, incurring* no liability itself other than what mig'ht spring- from a discharge of that trust; but where, in addition to its trust relation, the state has expressly assumed the payment of the obligations, the *135existence of the trust relation will not relieve the express obligations from the character of debts.”
In other words, the nineteen members of the court agreed that if the South Carolina act were the same as the bill before ns, it would not provide for the contracting of a debt within the inhibition of the Constitution; a position that the majority of the justices of this court venture to assert would be taken by no man, “learned or unlearned, wise or foolish.”
In Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S. C. 288, 135 S. E. 153, the state agreed to repay to the counties and highway districts, from a special fund consisting of the proceeds derived from the gasoline tax and the automobile, license tax, and federal aid money, the moneys advanced by them for road construction. The court held that this did not constitute the incurring of a debt within the meaning of the Constitution, saying:
“The proposed reimbursement agreements will not constitute a general liability of the state. The reimbursements to be made thereunder can be made only from a special fund consisting of the gasoline tax, automobile license tax, and federal aid. No property tax can ever be levied to meet these obligations.
“Is such a limited liability a debt of the state in the constitutional sense? The underlying purpose of the constitutional provisions concerning the creation of state debt was that they should serve as a limit of taxation— as a protection to taxpayers, and especially those whose property might be subjected to taxation. This purpose will not be defeated if it should be held by this Court that a debt for the construction of a state highway system, payable exclusively from federal aid moneys and special license taxes to be borne by the persons who will derive the principal benefits from the state highway system, is not a debt of the kind required by the Constitution to be approved by the voters of the state before it is incurred. According to the weight of authority in other states, such *136a debt does not fall within the terms of snch a constitutional provision.”
That case was cited with approval in California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, (Cal.) 21 P. (2d) 425. And see In re Opinions of the Justices, 220 Ala. 539, 126 So. 161.
I submit that, in reason and upon authority, if the bill before us should be enacted, the statute would not provide for the contracting of a debt within the meaning of section 3 of article 11 of the Constitution.
4. If the majority were correct in assuming that the act contemplates the contracting of a debt in the constitutional sense, the bill, I submit, would come within the exception, for it would be a debt contracted to defend the state.
It is said that the people intended that the exception should apply to defense of the state against armed aggression only, but the history of the section, as well as its language as finally adopted, forbid such construction. There were able lawyers and statesmen in the constitutional convention. That they selected deliberately and only after careful consideration the language appearing in the section, and that they rejected words that would support the contention of counsel, amply appears from the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. In the resolution, as originally offered, the exception was worded thus (p. 71): “for the purpose of repelling- invasion, suppressing insurrection or defending the State in time .of war.” An offered amendment read (p. 158): “to * * * repel invasion, suppress insurrection, defend the State, or assist in def ending the United States in time of war, or provide for the defense of the State when threatened by hostilities.” The language of the original resolution and that of the proposed amendment were rejected, and the section, as adopted by the convention, reads as follows (Constitution, article 11, section 3): “to * * * suppress insurrection, defend the state, or, in time of war, assist in defending the United States.” Thus it *137appears that the very provisions that counsel ask us to read into the section by implication were deliberately rejected by the framers of the Constitution.
A similar situation was presented in People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, 10 Pac. 641. After tracing the history of a certain section from the time it was reported to the constitutional convention by its appropriate committee until its final passage, and noting that at one stage of the proceeding the word “such” was inserted before the word “indebtedness,” but later, and finally was stricken, we said:
“We are not to presume that the framers of the constitution did not understand the force of language. This action of the convention shows conclusively an intention, shows conclusively that they intended that the section should stand, and be read, understood, and adopted by the people, as expressing* a meaning’ different from the' meaning which the word ‘such,’ inserted as indicated, would give to the section. Thus we see that this word, which we are asked to interpolate into the section, ‘is a stone which the builders rejected.’ We are not at liberty to restore it to, and make it the ‘head-stone’ of, the section.
“While the ultimate inquiry is always the intent of the people who adopted the constitution, the intention of its framers is an associated inquiry.”
Even the debates in Congress concerning a proposed constitutional amendment to be submitted to the states,, have been said by the Supreme Court of the United States to be “valuable as contemporaneous opinions of jurists and statesmen upon the legal meaning of the words” used in the constitutional amendment. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 699, 18 Sup. Ct. 456.
It is submitted that the expression “defend the state”' was not intended to be limited to defense against armed aggression. That it must be given some effect is obvious. It is not necessary to speculate concerning the various situations in which indebtedness may be incurred for the *138defense of the state. The only question with which we are concerned at this time is whether such a situation existed when the Senate sought our advice.
In his proclamation of July 29, 1933, calling a special session of the General Assembly, the Governor declared that: “* * * the present nation-wide economic depression has created a serious emergency in this State due to widespread unemployment and consequent indigence and dependence of a large portion of the people of this State; * * * that the increasing* inadequacy of federal, state and local relief funds to relieve the situation has resulted in existing and ever threatening deprivation of thousands of families and individuals in this State of the necessities of life; * * * and that because of the conditions aforesaid, distress and hunger exist among our people in such a degree that the public peace, order, tranquillity and safety are seriously affected and endangered and the processes of orderly government itself imperiled.”
In his proclamation of December 2, 1933 calling the second special session, the Governor. declared, in substance, that the emergency declared in the former proclamation persists and has become even more serious and aggravated so that it is once more imperative that legislation be enacted immediately to provide for cooperation with the federal government in its relief and recovery program; to allay the present widespread public discontent and social unrest by the provision of direct relief or work relief, or both, for the unemployed, needy and destitute citizens of this state; to provide a program of necessary public works in connection therewith; to prevent disaster in this critical emergency; to defend the state; and to meet other emergencies and requirements which have arisen since the adjournment of the regular and special sessions of the General Assembly. Two statutes passed at the first special session (S. L. pp. 60, 94) and the bill before us contain similar declarations. Those findings and declarations are entitled to great respect; *139indeed, we have held that in some cases findings and declarations of fact by the governor, as well as by the General Assembly, are conclusive upon the courts.
Section 5 of article 4 of the Constitution empowers the governor to call out the militia to suppress insurrection, and section 218 of the Compiled Laws provides: “When * * * insurrection in the state is made or threatened the governor shall order the national guard to * * * suppress the same.” In In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190, it was contended that notwithstanding the governor’s declaration that San Miguel county was in a state of insurrection, as a matter of fact such condition did not exist. We held that contention to be without merit, saying (p 164): “It must, therefore, become his [the governor’s] duty to determine as a fact when conditions exist in a given locality which demand that in the discharge of his duties as chief executive of the state he shall employ the militia to suppress. This being true, the recitals in the proclamation to the effect that a state of insurrection existed in the county of San Miguel cannot be controverted. Otherwise the legality of the orders of the executive would not depend upon his judgment, but the judgment of another co-ordinate branch of the state government. ’ ’
We have made a similar ruling with reference to legislative declarations. Section 1 of article 5 of the Constitution vests in the General Assembly the legislative power of the state, but reserves to the people the right to reject at the polls all legislative acts, with one exception noted below. This reserved power is called the referendum, and the referendum may be ordered, except as to laws “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety * * We have held repeatedly that a legislative declaration in a statute that it is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety is conclusive upon all departments of government and all parties, so far as it abridges the right to invoke the referendum. In re Senate Reso*140lution, 54 Colo. 262, 130 Pac. 333; Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 156 Pac. 1108; In re Interrogatories of the Governor, 66 Colo. 319, 181 Pac. 197.
In the Van Kleeck case, supra, we said (p. 10):
“By article III of onr Constitution it is provided:
“ ‘The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, — the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.’
“During the process of the enactment of a law the legislature is required to pass upon all questions of necessity and expediency connected therewith. The existence of such necessity is a question of fact, which the general assembly in the exercise of its legislative functions must determine; and under the constitutional provision, above quoted, that fact cannot be reviewed, called in question, nor be determined by the courts. It is a question of which the legislature alone is the judge, and when it determines the fact to exist, its action is final. The courts cannot be advised what facts the general assembly acted upon when it determined that a statute was necessary for the purposes specified, and to undertake to review its action upon a question of fact, would be a collateral attack upon its judgment. The general assembly has full power to pass laws for the purposes with respect to which the referendum cannot be ordered, and when it decides by declaring in the body of an act that it is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, it exercises a constitutional power exclusively vested in it, and hence, such declaration is conclusive upon the courts in so far as it abridges the right to invoke the referendum. * # * To conclude the contrary would violate the constitutional provision to which we have referred, the plain object of which is to inhibit one department of government exercising any power that *141by the Constitution is vested in another. The Constitution defines the powers and duties of each department, and should the courts venture to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature 'in any case where the Constitution has vested the legislature with power over the subject, they would enter upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to their authority, and where their discretion alone, would measure the extent of their interference.” (Italics after the first are mine.)
Such is the law even where the result is to deprive the qualified electors of the very important right to express their views at the polls. Perhaps the more reasonable rule to apply in the present proceeding is that such declarations are entitled to great respect, and, while not conclusive on the courts, will be regarded as highly persuasive and to be rejected only in case they are palpably false. Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. District, 72 Colo. 268, 211 Pac. 649. In State v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 23 P. (2d) 1, it was held that the legislative declaration of facts constituting emergency for legislation is conclusive, unless, giving effect to every favorable presumption, the declaration, on its face, is obviously false; and that in determining the truth or the falsity of such legislative declaration, the court cannot inquire as to the facts, but must consider the question from what appears on the face of the act, aided by its judicial knowledge.
Prom what appears on the face of the bill before us, aided by our judicial knowledge, are we justified in saying, as the majority do in effect, that the declarations of the Governor and the General Assembly are palpably or obviously false? I respectfully submit that the question should be answered in the negative. It is a matter of common notoriety, and of such matters we take judicial notice, that unparalleled conditions have confronted, not only the state, but the entire country; that millions of persons were thrown out of employment; that those receiving direct relief from public and private funds have been variously estimated to be somewhat between twenty *142and thirty-five per cent of the entire population, that hunger, want, distress and destitution were widespread throughout the land: that in order to lessen the menace, the nation, the states, the various subdivisions of the states, and private charitable organizations have expended billions of dollars in direct relief, and have distributed vast quantities of food, clothing and fuel; and that in order to give employment, public improvement projects involving the expenditure of enormous sums of money were undertaken ; that states and their various subdivisions, and railroads, banks and other business concerns applied for and received millions of dollars from the federal government as outright contributions or as loans to enable them to function and to save a general collapse. The measures adopted to meet the emergency are comparable in magnitude to those resorted to-during the World War. The natural sequel to hunger and destitution is desperation, and those rendered desperate by such causes yield not infrequently to revolutionary propaganda. Government investigations show that those organizations and individuals who seek the overthrow of our government have been active throughout these distressing times. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. What would have happened if preventive measures in the way of relief on a vast scale had not been resorted to, and what would happen if such measures should be abandoned at this time, can only be conjectured. Becent tragic events abroad and the teachings of history warn us not to be too optimistic concerning the results likely to follow in such a case. There are-no greater menaces to the state than widespread hunger, destitution and desperation. However, the measures to-be adopted to meet such an emergency are legislative problems with which article 3 of the Constitution forbids us to meddle.
Conditions here were so desperate that the state was wholly unable to cope with them alone. At the request of the state officials, the federal government contributed *143millions of dollars to relieve distress in this state, bnt with the distinct understanding that the General Assembly should pass relief measures to help care for the destitute here, and that if it failed to do so federal relief would be withheld. Such was the situation when the General Assembly met twice in special session and attempted to discharge the obligation resting upon the state, and thus prevent a discontinuance of the indispensable federal aid. The bill now before us represents the second attempt. For the first attempt, see Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 26 P. (2d) 1051.
The reason why great respect should be accorded to legislative findings and declarations is not only that they are made by a co-ordinate branch of the government, but that they are made by those whose duty it is to investigate and know the facts. Legislators reside in all parts of the state, and are in far better position to know the actual conditions throughout the state than are Supreme Court justices, closeted as they are, in the quiet, sheltered seclusion of their chambers.
After a careful consideration of the bill and of the facts of which we must take judicial notice, I am unable to join the majority in saying, in effect, that the findings and declarations of the Governor and the General Assembly are palpably and obviously false. That being so, it seems to me that the bill before us is a bill to defend the state within the meaning of the Constitution. Surely, if defense of the state is not confined to defense against armed aggression, and we have seen that it is not, the conditions found and declared by the Governor and the General Assembly presented a situation as menacing to the state as armed aggression would be, and called as imperatively for defensive measures.
It is not quite clear what is meant by the following language in the majority opinion: “Certainly the emergency arising from the unemployment of the comparatively small number of men to whom this proposed act would give work on the highways of the state does not *144rise to the solemnity of such an attack or threat, and no facts are presented which lead to snch a conclusion. Were it otherwise we cannot close our eyes to the natural conditions involving such employment. It is now almost January 1, and the very nature of the proposed work forbids that it could be in full swing, employing anything like its full complement of men, before spring. Months must elapse before the alleged defense can become reasonably effective. Meanwhile the present emergency, in its most serious aspect, must probably pass.”
Of course, this bill is only one of the measures required to meet the emergency; others must follow. If the language quoted is intended to convey the idea that this bill is not a defensive measure because it cannot by itself afford all the relief that the occasion demands, it may be answered that although a war cannot be won with only one battleship, a bill authorizing the construction of a battleship would be none the less a defensive measure. If, however, the purpose is to question the wisdom, policy and expediency of the measure, the answer is that such matters are within the exclusive province of the legislative department, and that it is no less obligatory upon courts to observe the limitation set by the Constitution upon their powers than it is obligatory upon legislatures to observe the constitutional limitation upon legislative powers.
In conclusion, I respectfully submit :
1. That the bill does not contemplate the contracting of a debt within the meaning of section 3 of article 11 of the state Constitution.
2. That even on the "theory of the majority that the bill does contemplate the contracting of such a debt, the bill comes within the exception provided for in that section, because the contracting of the debt would be for the defense of the state.
Mr. Justice Holland concurs in this dissenting opinion.