Court Opinion

ID: 9579594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:38.118833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:37.115306
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with part m of the lead opinion, but *148I would not reject the procedural/substantive inquiry in determining the effect of amendments of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq. Today, the lead opinion, virtually without comment or analysis, adopts an approach we have repeatedly rejected when addressing other amendments of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. See, generally, Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 678; 375 NW2d 715 (1985) (Levin, J., dissenting); Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 536; 337 NW2d 300 (1985) (Levin, J., dissenting); Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 15; 345 NW2d 184 (1984) (Levin, J., dissenting). Eliminating the procedural/substantive inquiry overrules a vast body of law that is well entrenched in our jurisprudence, an approach the Legislature has necessarily taken into account when amending statutory provisions. Without a compelling justification, which the lead opinion does not provide, I would not abandon this approach to statutory interpretation.
Rather, I agree with Justice Riley’s analysis of when a third-party caregiver’s cause of action accrues, continued reliance on a substantive/ procedural analysis to determine whether an amendment should be given retroactive effect, and decision that the fifty-six-hour limitation,1 at issue in Riza and Mullins, is procedural and therefore should apply retroactively.
The fifty-six-hour limitation is a procedural modification because the amendment limits only the family’s right to compensation. Section 315 merely codifies, with a fifty-six-hour limitation, the existing right of the family to receive compensation—a right created by the courts. See Kushay v Sexton Dairy Co, 394 Mich 69; 228 NW2d 205 (1975); *149Brown v Eller Outdoor Advertising Co, 111 Mich App 538; 314 NW2d 685 (1981). The limitation does not affect the essence of the right, but merely "the amount of compensation which [the caregiver] may eventually receive.” White v General Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387, 395; 429 NW2d 576 (1988). Thus, the amendment is procedural and can be applied retroactively.2
I disagree, however, with Justice Riley’s decision to reach the question whether the one-year-back limitation3 on recovery for attendant or nursing care, at issue in Sokolek, should be retroactively applied.
The defendant in Sokolek did not properly preserve the question whether the one-year-back rule should be given retroactive effect, and it is therefore waived. The defendant did not argue before the wcab or in its initial application to the Court of Appeals that the one-year-back limitation is procedural and that it should therefore apply retroactively. Instead, defendant relied solely on the contention that because the plaintiff filed for compensation after the effective date of the amendment, the amendment applied to the plaintiff’s claim. The final paragraph of the Court of Appeals opinion accurately notes:_
*150Because the issue whether §381(3) should be applied retroactively because it is remedial was not raised by defendant either before this Court or before the wcab, that issue has not been preserved for appellate consideration and must be considered waived. Achtenberg v East Lansing, 421 Mich 765, 773; 364 NW2d 277 (1985); Wiand v Wiand, 178 Mich App 137, 150; 443 NW2d 464 (1989). [206 Mich App 31, 36-37; 520 NW2d 668 (1994).]
I agree with the Court of Appeals that because defendant did not raise this argument below, it is not properly preserved. Because the date of filing has no relevance in determining whether a statutory amendment applies to a third-party caregiver’s cause of action, and defendant’s belated argument that the amendment should apply retroactively is not preserved for review, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision in Sokolek.

 MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315)(1).

 I wish to explicitly note that the question whether an insurer or employer can recoup payments already made to familial caregivers is not before us. It would appear that although the familial caregiver may not have been entitled to receive compensation for care rendered in excess of fifty-six hours, the insurer or the employer is not injured because payment for care, to the extent allowed in the injured worker’s award, would still have been paid by the insurer or the employer; although the payee would have been a nonfamilial caregiver. Regardless, the parties have not argued or briefed this issue and cognizant of the similar problems created by our opinion in Franks v White Pine Copper, supra, I expressly note that this case does not authorize employers or insurers to recoup payments made to familial caregivers in excess of fifty-six hours or to recover for payments made for care rendered more than one year back,

 MCL 418.381(3); MSA 17.237(381)(3).