Court Opinion

ID: 9480458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:48:34.682171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:42.149201
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In affirming the district court’s two-level upward adjustment of Foreman’s sentence, the majority enlarges the scope of section 3B1.3 far beyond anything the language of that provision can reasonably bear. I have expressed elsewhere my reservations about the restrictions which the Sentencing Guidelines place on the discretion of the sentencing judge. United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 544 (9th Cir.1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially). Nevertheless, since we must apply the Guidelines, we should apply them as they are written. Because I cannot acquiesce in the strained interpretation rendered by the majority, I dissent.
I begin with the language of the applicable guideline:
§ 3B1.3. Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels. This adjustment may not be employed in addition to that provided for in § 3B1.1, nor may it be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is included in the base of*1341fense level or specific offense characteristic.
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3B1.3 (Nov. 1989) (emphasis added). The majority concedes that Foreman’s offense was complete by the time she showed her badge, and that this section is applicable only if Foreman’s act of identifying herself as a police officer constituted an abuse of a position of public trust, which “significantly facilitated the ... concealment of the offense.” Id. (emphasis added).
The majority gives short shrift to Foreman’s argument that her conduct was not an “abuse” of her position as an officer. Foreman suggests that section 3B1.3 applies only when the offender abuses a “special privilege” enjoyed by virtue of her position of public trust, and I can agree with the majority that this interpretation is unsatisfactory. Still, it must be conceded that section 3B1.3 applies to offenders who abuse positions of public trust; not merely to those who occupy such positions or even to those who use such positions. To abuse is “[t]o use improperly, to misuse; to make a bad use of, to pervert, or misemploy; to take a bad advantage of.” Oxford English Dictionary 11 (Compact Ed.1971). This seems to me to require something more than merely responding to a request for identification in precisely the way in which police officers are expected to respond. In this case, the something more is intent: if we accept the district court’s finding that Foreman flashed her badge in a conscious attempt to deflect suspicion and conceal her offense, then we must conclude that this attempt was an abuse, rather than merely a use, of her position of public trust.1 However, I need not resolve the intent question because Foreman’s conduct, whether or not it was an “abuse” of her position, clearly did not satisfy the rest of section 3B1.3.
Section 3B1.3 does not permit or direct the sentencing judge to enhance the sentence of everyone who abuses a position of public trust. Instead, it provides for enhancement only if the defendant’s abuse “significantly facilitated the ... concealment of the offense” (emphasis added). The majority notes that facilitating a crime or concealment means making it easier, not necessarily making it successful; that is true enough, as far as it goes. However, the majority then proceeds to commit several serious errors. First, it virtually ignores the word “significantly,” which modifies “facilitated.” On its face, this term plainly requires the sentencing judge to assess the effect of the abuse, and to determine whether that effect was of sufficient magnitude: it must have furthered the crime or concealment “significantly.” Furthermore, the use of the past tense, i.e., “facilitated,” renders indisputable the proposition that the abuse must have actually had some effect. The abuse must have significantly facilitated (a matter of historical fact); it is not sufficient to say merely that the act in question constitutes the sort of act that, conceivably or in general, has a tendency to significantly facilitate.
The majority notes, as I do, that “significantly” modifies “facilitated” rather than “commission or concealment.” Based upon this observation, the majority asserts that “the inquiry is not the extent to which the abuse of trust furthered the crime or concealment, but whether the abuse made the crime significantly easier to commit or conceal.” Ante, at 1338 n. 2. I see no difference between these two inquiries, unless the majority believes that “furthered” connotes ultimate success in a way that “facili*1342tated” does not.2 In any event, even taking the majority’s preferred formulation as the authoritative version of the test, there is simply no conceivable argument that it was satisfied here. In this case Foreman’s showing of her badge did not serve to make her crime easier to commit, nor did it have any practical effect upon her effort to conceal the offense. In fact, Foreman’s actions had no practical effect whatsoever. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, not even the district court found that her actions had any effect on the criminal activity involved,3 and the majority provides no argument for adopting a different view of the facts on appeal.
Since the majority makes no argument whatsoever that Foreman’s use of her police badge altered, let alone “significantly” altered, her situation in any way, the plain meaning of section 3B1.3 should foreclose any further inquiry and preclude any enhancement based upon this section. Only thus can we honor the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language must ordinarily be given its plain meaning. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); id. at 452, 107 S.Ct. at 1223 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 18 L.Ed. 830 (1868); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 34, 15 S.Ct. 508, 515, 39 L.Ed. 601 (1895) (Harlan, J.); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492, 67 S.Ct. 789, 793, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947) (Jackson, J.); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693, 68 S.Ct. 331, 334, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (Black, J.); Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 64, 73 S.Ct. 580, 583, 97 L.Ed. 821 (1953) (Douglas, J.)).
Disregarding this rule, the majority looks past the unambiguous language of the statute in order to justify its rather odd “implication” that an unsuccessful effort to facilitate is the same as having “significantly facilitated,” or is somehow included within the latter phrase. Here, the majority repeats its first error, this time misconstruing the most pertinent aid to construction of the guideline: the official Commentary that was adopted along with it. This Commentary, properly read, is devastating to my colleagues’ construction. The degree of facilitation necessary for enhancement is virtually the only aspect of the “abuse of trust” portion of section 3B1.3 that receives any attention in the Application Notes that were adopted as part of the official Commentary — which should tell us something about the importance of this requirement. According to the Commentary, “[t]he position of trust must have contributed in some substantial way to facilitating the crime and not merely have provided an opportunity that could as easily have been afforded to other persons. This adjustment, for example, would not apply to an embezzlement by an ordinary bank teller.” Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3, Commentary (Application Note 1) (emphasis added). This Commentary, like the guideline it amplifies, clearly calls for an inquiry into the extent to which the abuse of trust contributed — actually contributed — to the concealment of the offense. The majority settles instead for enhancement based upon an alleged bare and unsuccessful attempt to conceal, without any evaluation of efficacy. Yet an intent to use one’s position to facilitate concealment is inherent in the very concept of “abuse”; the majority’s approach gives no effect to the further requirement that the abuse have significantly facilitated or substantially contributed to the concealment. The phrase “in connection with” could be substituted for “in a manner that significantly facilitated” and the result, as the majority reads *1343the statute, would be identical in every case.
Having freed itself from the constraints not only of the guideline but also of the Commentary explaining it, the majority errs a third time by turning to guideline provisions not applicable here. Even if one wishes to overlook the inappropriateness of this excursion, it is difficult to fathom why the majority believes the authority it cites supports its selective construction of the statute. As the majority concedes, the fact that attempts are expressly covered by other sections of the Guidelines raises a presumption that attempts are covered when they are explicitly mentioned and not covered when they are not explicitly mentioned. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Section 3C1.1, which appears on the very next page of the Guidelines Manual, provides for a two-level sentence enhancement “[i]f the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” Guidelines Manual, § 3C1.1 (emphasis added). Even if the language of section 3B1.3 were not as clear as it is, Russello’s rule of construction would oblige us to presume that Congress and the Sentencing Commission fully intended the omission from section 3B1.3 of any reference to “attempted facilitation,” and thus to give effect to that intentional omission.
However, the majority rejects such a presumption in this case, adverting to “the Commission’s overall Guidelines policy on attempts.” Ante, at 1339. By this grand phrase is apparently signified section 2X1.-1, which appears in Chapter Two (“Offense Conduct”), Part X (“Other Offenses ”), but the alleged generality of this section is open to serious question. Section 2X1.1, by its own terms, addresses only the determination of base offense levels, and says nothing about adjustments, which are the subject of Chapter Three.4 Moreover, the Commentary to this “overall Guidelines policy” cites no fewer than thirteen specific provisions which preempt it by specifically providing for attempts. Id., Commentary (Application Note 1). Each of the provisions mentioned is an “offense guideline”; the drafters apparently thought it unnecessary even to discuss “adjustment guidelines” on attempts because it is perfectly apparent from the face of section 2X1.1 that this so-called “overall Guidelines policy” has no application whatsoever to adjustments.5
In summary, the guideline applies only to an abuse of trust that significantly facilitated the concealment of a crime. No one could suggest that any such event occurred here.6 All that happened is that Foreman *1344showed her badge in response to a request for identification from federal and local law enforcement agents whose suspicion she had aroused. Her doing so had absolutely no effect on subsequent occurrences. The investigating authorities were completely unimpressed and proceeded to question Foreman regarding the unusual bulge around her waist. The incredulous officers ignored her answer and asked to feel the bulge; when Foreman consented to this search, the narcotics were discovered and she was arrested.
Although Foreman’s conduct clearly did not facilitate anything, the majority refuses to apply the plain meaning of the statute and instead creates a new and more expansive guideline, borrowing elements from other, inapplicable guidelines that the majority apparently feels should have been included here. The result is a guideline covering something called “attempted concealment,” which was not covered before, and which the majority apparently believes is not subject to the clearly expressed statutory command that the sentencing judge assess the efficacy of the conduct in question by determining whether it significantly facilitated the concealment. Honesty, uniformity, and proportionality — the justifications which the Sentencing Commission advances for the Guidelines, Guidelines Manual, Ch. 1, Pt. A (“Introduction”), n. 3 (“The Basic Approach”) — are not fostered by such an approach to the Commission’s language. Accordingly, I dissent.

. The district court reached this conclusion despite Foreman's uncontradicted representation at the sentencing hearing that she showed her badge only because it was on top of her driver’s license in her wallet — precisely where she had been trained to keep it. This was an eminently reasonable explanation for her conduct, and I strongly suspect that nearly all police officers are trained to keep their badges in a similar location. It is also likely Foreman was trained to identify herself as a police officer on all occasions involving public contact with government officials, as well as on any occasions where contact with private citizens might lead to controversy or official action. We should not lightly infer an improper motive when an officer of the law merely follows orders.

. Such a connotation is certainly unintended, and lacks objective support as well. To “further" is "[t]o help forward, assist (usually things, less frequently persons); to promote, favour (an action or movement).” Oxford English Dictionary 1099 (Compact Ed.1971).

. See note 6 infra.

. The base offense levels in Chapter Two are answers to the question, "What sort of crime did the defendant commit?" For this purpose, there is little difference in criminal culpability between one who commits crime A and one who commits all the acts necessary to the commission of a crime A but is unexpectedly foiled. In contrast stands Chapter Three, which deals with the harms caused by the means (usually not criminal by themselves) by which the crimes are actually committed. Enhancement is not generally specified for attempting to use means specified by Chapter Three because criminally culpable intent beyond that of the base offense can rarely (if ever) be inferred solely from a defendant’s choice of means; harm rather than intent is the key in Chapter Three.

. I note also that even if we could properly apply the "overall Guidelines policy on attempts” to adjustments, the results would be absurd. Consider, for instance, the effect upon § 3B1.1 ("Aggravating Role”), which provides for enhancement if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor. Would the majority enhance the sentence of someone who attempted to organize, lead, manage, and supervise, but who was roundly rejected as an organizer, leader, etc., by all of the other participants? Could such a person have his sentenced enhanced on this ground and simultaneously reduced under § 3B 1.2(a) on the ground that he actually turned out to be a “minimal participant" in the crime?
The majority evades these questions by declining to decide "whether the Commission’s policy on attempts applies to any other adjustment.” Ante, at 1339. But after the majority’s misapplication of section 2X1.1 in this case, why should it not apply to others as well? What will stop it? My only hope in this regard is that future courts will see that the majority has suspended the ordinary rules of statutory construction and will limit its approach accordingly.

.The majority, after creating, deleting, and rearranging various elements of the guideline, quotes from the district court's findings and *1344interprets the pertinent language "as a finding that Foreman's conduct significantly facilitated her attempt to conceal her offense.” Ante, at 1340. This strikes me as an odd way to interpret the language the majority quotes. All the district court said was that Foreman “attempt[ed] to dissuade the investigating officers from proceeding further with their investigation. This attempt was not successful.” Where in that statement, one might ask, could the majority possibly find anything to support the assertion that Foreman’s conduct had any significant effect of any kind?
The majority apparently thinks this factual issue can be settled by acknowledging that while "other inferences might be drawn from these same facts, the findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous.” Ante, at 1340. My contention, however, is not that the district court's finding of significant facilitation was clearly erroneous; it is rather that the district court made no such finding. The district judge plainly thought it was sufficient to find that Foreman intended to facilitate the concealment of her crime; he did not address the efficacy of Foreman's conduct at all.