Court Opinion

ID: 9885802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 14:07:31.284952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:21.040958
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-312

                           MARTHA OMORODION-MOGAJI

                                       vs.

                     A-LOWELL SELF STORAGE & others.1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment for

 the defendants on the plaintiff's eleven-count amended complaint

 concerning her access to items in a storage unit owned and

 operated by the defendants.2        We affirm the judgment.

       The underlying facts and claims need not be described in

 detail.    It suffices to say that after a motion judge dismissed

 most of the claims for failure to state a claim on which relief

 could be granted, the remaining claims went to trial before a

 jury.   After the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, the

 trial judge directed a verdict for the remaining two defendants

 1 A-Tucard LLC, Frank Pollack, and Joseph Dicarlo.
 2 The final judgment itself indicates only that the defendants'
 motion for a directed verdict was allowed. In light of the
 allowance of that motion as to certain claims, and the earlier
 allowance of a motion to dismiss all other claims, we construe
 the judgment as resolving all claims in the defendants' favor.
on the plaintiff's assault claim and for all four defendants on

the plaintiff's claims of trespass to chattels and negligence.

The plaintiff appealed.

      The plaintiff's appellate brief does not rise to the level

of appellate argument.    See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as

appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).      See also Maroney v.

Planning Bd. of Haverhill, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 678, 683 n.8

(2020).    Her brief also fails to include accurate and

appropriate record citations as required by rule 16 (a) (9) (A),

making her claims of error difficult to decipher.      We

nevertheless briefly address the points in her brief, insofar as

we are able to discern them.

      1.   Statute of limitations.    The plaintiff first asserts

that it was error to dismiss any of her claims on statute of

limitations grounds.     We have reviewed the record and find no

indication that any of her claims were dismissed on such a

ground, either at the motion to dismiss or directed verdict

stages or at any other point in the case.

      2.   Contract.   The plaintiff asserts that the defendants

failed to acknowledge their contractual obligations until

damages had resulted.     The motion judge dismissed the contract

claim on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert

it.   The plaintiff does not identify any error in that ruling.

                                  2
     3.   Negligence.   The plaintiff argues the merits of her

negligence claim.   She does not address or identify any error in

the trial judge's ruling ordering a directed verdict for the

defendants on claim preclusion and issue preclusion grounds,

based on a prior District Court judgment.3

     4.   Negligence per se.     Under the heading of "negligence

per se," the plaintiff argues that the defendants' conduct

violated G. L. c. 184, § 18, and the Attorney General's consumer

protection regulations.     The amended complaint, however, does

not appear to contain any such claims.

     5.   Trespass to chattel.   As with her negligence claim, the

plaintiff argues the merits of her trespass to chattel claim,

but does not address the trial judge's ruling ordering a

directed verdict for the defendants on claim preclusion and

issue preclusion grounds.

     6.   Conversion.   The plaintiff argues the merits of her

conversion claim.   The motion judge dismissed that claim on the

ground, among others, that the plaintiff lacked standing to

assert it.   The plaintiff does not identify any error in that

ruling.

3 The plaintiff's reply brief alludes to res judicata and
collateral estoppel but presents no discernible argument as to
why either doctrine was inapplicable here.

                                  3
       7.   Tortious interference with contract rights.     As with

her conversion claim, the plaintiff argues the merits of her

tortious interference with contract rights claim, but fails to

identify any error in the motion judge's dismissal of that claim

on the ground, among others, that the plaintiff lacked standing

to assert it.

       8.   Damages.   The plaintiff argues generally that she was

entitled to damages, but she identifies no specific error in the

judge's rulings resolving her claims in the defendants' favor.

She also discusses the constitutional guarantee of equal

protection of the laws, but nowhere did the amended complaint

assert an equal protection claim.

                                       Judgment affirmed.

                                       By the Court (Milkey, Blake &
                                         Sacks, JJ.4),

                                       Clerk

Entered: October 6, 2023.

4   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                   4