Court Opinion

ID: 9956396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 23:13:20.537954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:58.997872
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MICHELLE MERCERI,
                                               No. 85865-3-I (linked with
             Appellant,
                                               DIVISION ONE
             v.
                                               UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

             Respondent,

DEUTSCHE BANK AG a/k/a
DEUTSCHE BANK, doing business in
the United States as DEUTSCHE
BANK USA, and as DEUTSCHE BANK
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, a
national banking association, as
trustee for holders of the BCAP LLC
Trust 2007-AA2; and SHAWN CASEY
JONES,

             Defendants.

MICHELLE MERCERI,                        No. 85690-1-I)

             Appellant,

             v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, DEUTSCHE
BANK AG a/k/a DEUTSCHE BANK,
doing business in the United States as
DEUTSCHE BANK USA, and as
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY, a national banking
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/2

 association, as trustee for holders of
 the BCAP LLC Trust 2007-AA2,

               Respondents,

 SHAWN CASEY JONES,

               Defendant.

       BIRK, J. — In this inverse condemnation action, landowner Michelle Merceri

filed an action against the State of Washington, in which she joined as defendants

a fellow putative owner and a lender holding a deed of trust, seeking compensation

for a state highway expansion’s taking of restrictive covenant rights benefiting her

property. The superior court bifurcated trial, entered judgment determining the

amount of compensation and interest due because of the taking, and denied

Merceri an award of attorney fees, but has not yet determined the allocation of the

recovery among Merceri, the putative other owner, and the lender. Merceri filed a

notice of appeal from the judgment challenging the award of interest and denial of

attorney fees. While the first notice of appeal was pending, Merceri unsuccessfully

sought to enforce an attorney lien against the compensation recovery and

separately filed a notice of appeal from the denial of that motion. We affirm the

superior court’s rulings denying Merceri’s motions for attorney fees and compound

interest, we conclude the denial of Merceri’s motion to enforce an attorney lien is

not appealable and so we do not review it, and we remand.

                                          I

       In a complaint filed August 6, 2021, Merceri alleged ownership of a lot in the

Fairweather Basin subdivision in Hunts Point, Washington, which was subject to

                                          2
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/3

protective restrictions and covenants. She alleged the State effected a taking by

condemning two neighboring lots for a highway project and putting them to use in

violation of the covenants. Merceri joined as parties Shawn Jones, who is on the

title to Merceri’s property but according to her has disclaimed any interest in the

claim for just compensation, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, which

purports to be the beneficiary of a 2006 deed of trust encumbering the property.

As memorialized in a partial summary judgment order dated April 15, 2022, the

State agreed its construction on the two lots violated one of the covenants, the

superior court granted Merceri summary judgment on that issue, and the court

reserved the amount of damages for trial. By summary judgment order dated

September 6, 2022, the court limited certain of Merceri’s damages claims, but

otherwise ruled there was evidence requiring a jury determination of the diminution

in value of Merceri’s property. On September 9, 2022, the court entered an order

directing that trial proceed in three phases: “(1) determination on the amount of

compensation on Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim as against [the State], (2)

determination of interest on any award to Plaintiff and attorneys’ fees, and (3)

Deutsche Bank’s entitlement to and recovery from any such award to Plaintiff.”

       On October 4, 2022, Merceri filed a notice of settlement between herself

and the State, reflecting that Merceri had accepted the State’s pretrial offer under

RCW 8.25.070. The State presented a proposed judgment for the agreed amount

of just compensation plus statutory interest of 12 percent from the date of taking

on May 11, 2011. Merceri filed an objection to the proposed judgment. Merceri

sought compound interest, citing Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 131 Wn.2d 640, 935

                                         3
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/4

P.2d 555 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d

682, 451 P.2d 694 (2019). Following a presentation of judgment hearing, on

November 4, 2022, the court entered its judgment and decree of appropriation for

the agreed amount of just compensation and statutory interest of 12 percent.

Statutory 12 percent simple interest on $205,000.00 from 2011 to 2022 amounted

to $282,664.11. Merceri filed motions to amend the judgment and for an award of

litigation costs including attorney fees incurred to obtain just compensation. By

orders dated November 29, 2022, the court denied both motions. On December

1, 2022, Merceri filed a notice of appeal directed to the Supreme Court designating

the judgment and these orders.

       Separately, on May 16, 2023, Merceri filed in the superior court a “Motion

to Enforce Attorney Lien Claim on Judgment.” In that motion, Merceri sought

disbursal of funds from the court registry to satisfy a claim of lien for attorney fees

asserted by her counsel. The superior court denied this motion, and on July 14,

2023, denied reconsideration. On July 31, 2023, Merceri filed a notice of appeal

directed to this court designating these orders.

       This court’s clerk’s office docketed Merceri’s July 31, 2023 notice of appeal

under matter number 85690-1-I. By order dated October 3, 2023, the Supreme

Court transferred Merceri’s December 1, 2022 appeal to this court. The clerk’s

office docketed this appeal under matter number 85865-3-I. By letter, the court

advised the parties that the matters would be linked for purposes of argument and

disposition.

                                          4
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/5

                                           II

       In advance of oral argument, the court advised the parties of its notation

ruling stating, “[T]he parties are directed to be prepared at oral argument to

address whether there is an appealable final judgment before the court within the

meaning of RAP 2.2.” The November 4, 2022 judgment states, “There is no just

reason to delay entry of this Judgment and Decree of Appropriation as to the just

compensation arising from the State’s condemnation of the Covenant, this is a final

judgment at the express direction of the Court.” However, the judgment does not

include findings supporting that statement, as required by RAP 2.2(d). In the

absence of such findings, such a judgment is generally not appealable. Pepper v.

King County, 61 Wn. App. 339, 349, 810 P.2d 527 (1991).

       RAP 2.2(a) provides that “[u]nless otherwise prohibited or provided by

statute or court rule,” a party may appeal from only designated superior court

decisions. A judgment adjudicating less than all the claims or counts, or the rights

and liabilities of less than all the parties, is generally subject only to discretionary

review until the entry of a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, counts, rights,

and liabilities of all the parties. RAP 2.2(d). Generally, when a judgment is not

appealable because RAP 2.2(d) is not satisfied, the appellate court must dismiss

an appeal. Schiffman v. Hanson Excavating Co., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 681, 687-88, 513

P.2d 29 (1973); Pepper, 61 Wn. App. at 346 & n.4. Despite the court’s direction in

advance of argument, no party identified a statute or court rule making the

                                           5
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/6

November 4, 2022 judgment appealable as a matter of right.1            The court’s

additional research has identified RCW 8.04.150, which states,

       Either party may seek appellate review of the judgment for damages
       entered in the superior court within thirty days after the entry of
       judgment as aforesaid, and such review shall bring before the
       supreme court or the court of appeals the propriety and justness of
       the amount of damages in respect to the parties to the review:
       PROVIDED HOWEVER, That upon such review no bond shall be
       required: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, That if the owner of land, the
       real estate or premises accepts the sum awarded by the jury, the
       court or the judge thereof, he or she shall be deemed thereby to have
       waived conclusively appellate review, and final judgment by default
       may be rendered in the superior court as in other cases: PROVIDED
       FURTHER, That no review shall operate so as to prevent the said
       state of Washington from taking possession of such property
       pending review after the amount of said award shall have been paid
       into court.

       State v. Scheel held that when determining the allocation of a condemnation

award, the trial court had no authority to alter the judgment for just compensation

because it had not been appealed. 74 Wn.2d 137, 137, 140, 443 P.2d 658 (1968).

The court said, “Having failed to give notice of appeal within 30 days according to

law and rule, [the appellants] cannot now reopen the matter in a subsequent trial

for equitable distribution.” Id. at 140. In State v. Wachsmith, the court held the

portion of a condemnation judgment awarding attorney and expert witness fees is

appealable under RCW 8.04.150. 4 Wn. App. 91, 96, 479 P.2d 943 (1971). In a

       1
         Merceri sought to rely on the superior court’s CR 54(b) direction, despite
its lack of the required findings, or alternatively discretionary review under RAP
2.3(b). Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, Merceri v. Dep’t of Transp., No.
85865-3-I (Feb. 28, 2024), at 1 min., 49 sec. to 2 min., 02 sec. and 2 min., 52 sec.
to 3 min., 36 sec, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2024021466/.
The State sought to rely on RCW 8.04.110 and .130, but those statutes do not
address appealability. Id. at 11 min., 38 sec. to 12 min., 12 sec. and 19 min., 04
sec. to 19 min., 31 sec.

                                         6
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/7

motion to dismiss the appeal, Wachsmith argued the portion of the judgment

awarding such fees was not appealable because they did not qualify as “the

propriety and justness of the amount of damage.” Id. at 92, 96. We disagreed,

noting the enactment of RCW 8.25.070 permitted a trial court to award attorney

fees in the judgment for damages in an eminent domain proceeding, the trial court

made such an award and included it in the judgment for damages, and this award

merged in the total judgment for damages. Id. at 96. Accordingly, the “remedy of

review by appeal is proper.” Id. (citing RCW 8.04.150). These decisions satisfy

us that the November 4, 2022 judgment is appealable under RCW 8.04.150.

       The same is not true of the superior court’s later orders denying Merceri’s

motion to enforce an attorney lien. RCW 8.25.070 speaks to the condemnor’s

liability for attorney fees as part of the gross award of just compensation, and RCW

8.04.150 contemplates appeal of the amount of just compensation separate from

subsequent proceedings to determine the allocation among claimants. The July

2023 superior court orders lack any CR 54(b) certification, as well as the

supporting findings required under RAP 2.2(d). The parties have identified, and

the court has located, no statute or court rule making the July 2023 orders denying

enforcement of an attorney lien appealable as a matter of right.

       In the absence of an appealable final judgment, a party seeking review is

limited to discretionary review. RAP 5.1(c) states that “[a] notice of appeal of a

decision which is not appealable will be given the same effect as a notice for

discretionary review.” Thus, when CR 54(b) and RAP 2.2(d) are not met, an

appellate court may still accept review if the criteria for discretionary review under

                                          7
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/8

RAP 2.3(b) are met. Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban

Lines Ass’n, 156 Wn.2d 253, 257, 261 n.4, 126 P.3d 16 (2006); Glass v. Stahl

Specialty Co., 97 Wn.2d 880, 883, 652 P.2d 948 (1982). Here, they are not.

Regardless of whether the superior court’s rulings denying current enforcement of

an attorney lien are error, which we do not decide, they are not “obvious” or

“probable” error, and even more plainly they do not “render further proceedings

useless” or “substantially alter[] the status quo or substantially limit[] the freedom

of a party to act.” RAP 2.3(b)(1)-(2). To the contrary, they expressly contemplate

that further proceedings must occur.

       As to Merceri’s July 31, 2023 notice of appeal, matter number 85690-1-I,

review is dismissed. Because neither Merceri nor Deustche Bank has prevailed

on review, we direct that no party is awarded attorney fees or costs at this time,

but this direction is without prejudice to any party’s establishing an entitlement to

attorney fees or costs in subsequent proceedings.

                                          III

       Merceri argues the superior court erred by failing to award compound

interest.2 We disagree.

       The state constitution requires that “just compensation” be paid in case of

a governmental taking of private property. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16. An inverse

condemnation claim seeks to recover the value of property that the government

       2
          The State argues Merceri’s alleged error concerning interest cannot be
reviewed, because she did not supply a report of proceedings from a November 3,
2022 presentation hearing. The parties presented their arguments to the superior
court in the form of proposed judgments and their respective written objections to
each other’s proposed judgments. The record affords a basis for review.

                                          8
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/9

appropriated without a formal exercise of its eminent domain powers. Jackass Mt.

Ranch, Inc. v. S. Columbia Basin Irrig. Dist., 175 Wn. App. 374, 388, 305 P.3d

1108 (2013). “Just compensation requires that the property owner be put in the

same position monetarily as he or she would have occupied had the property not

been taken. It consists of the full equivalent of the value of the property paid

contemporaneously with the taking.” Sintra, 131 Wn.2d at 655-56. In an inverse

condemnation action, interest is necessary to compensate the property owner for

the loss of the use of the monetary value of the taking or damage from the time of

the taking until just compensation is paid. Id. at 656. Interest in this context is a

measure of the rate of return on the property owner’s money had there been no

delay in payment. Id.

       RCW 8.28.040 requires a court in an eminent domain proceeding tried to

verdict by the jury or the court to impose postverdict interest as part of the

compensation for the taken or damaged property. The interest must be set at the

maximum interest rate permitted at that time under RCW 19.52.020 from the date

of entry of the verdict to the date of the payment. RCW 8.28.040. The maximum

interest rate allowable under that statute is 12 percent. RCW 19.52.020(1)(a).

       In Sintra, the court held that awarding compound prejudgment interest

instead of simple interest constituted error. 131 Wn.2d at 660. The trial court

awarded 12 percent interest on the compensation award compounded annually.

Id. at 651. The Supreme Court reversed, noting RCW 8.28.040 guides the trial

court’s determination of a prejudgment interest award as part of the award of just

compensation. Sintra, 131 Wn.2d at 660. Because RCW 19.52.020 “does not

                                         9
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/10

specifically provide for the compounding of interest, only simply interest is

allowed.” Sintra, 131 Wn.2d at 660. However, if a party proves by presenting

evidence that statutory simple interest does not afford just compensation, the trial

court has discretion to award compound interest. Id. Absent such proof, “a

property owner in a temporary regulatory takings case is entitled only to simple

interest under RCW 8.28.040 as part of just compensation.” Sintra, 131 Wn.2d at

660-61. We review the superior court’s decision to allow simple interest and not

compound interest for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 660. A trial court abuses

its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable

grounds, or based on untenable reasons. Gildon v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 158

Wn.2d 483, 494, 145 P.3d 1196 (2006).

       Merceri submitted several declarations in support of her request for daily

compound interest instead of simple interest to fully compensate her. University

of Washington Accounting Associate Professor Ed deHaan stated compound

interest is “fundamental in modern finance . . . for standard financial products such

as savings accounts or loans,” “is what the financial world earns and pays in

everyday transactions,” and “daily compounded interest is relatively easy to

calculate on[e]self.” Vickie Reynolds, a businesswoman and investor residing in

King County, stated she expected financial institutions would pay daily compound

interest and she would “never accept simple interest because simple interest is not

the standard for the payment of interest on savings accounts in Washington.”

Merceri filed her own declaration stating, “Paying me less than interest

compounded daily would not provide just compensation and would not make me

                                         10
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/11

whole.” She claims, “No reasonably prudent investor or involuntary creditor, which

I am, would accept less than interest compounded daily” and repeats that she is

entitled to full just compensation, which means interest compounded daily.

       Merceri does not show based on this evidence that it was an abuse of

discretion by the superior court to award statutory 12 percent simple interest on

$205,000 from 2011 to 2022, amounting to $282,664.11.          Merceri relies on

primarily federal case law supporting compound interest. But her argument, and

the above evidence, ignores the rates at which federal authorities have allowed

compound interest.     Merceri’s authorities, discussed below, use commercial

interest rates, in contrast to Washington’s statutory rate.

       The rule allowing compound interest in takings cases is based on the

constitutional intent to provide just compensation. See Sintra, 131 Wn.2d at 660.

The purpose of allowing interest in cases where the property owner is not paid at

the time of the taking is to ensure the owner “is placed in as good a position

pecuniarily as [the owner] would have occupied if the payment had coincided with

the appropriation.” Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10-11,

104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194, 81 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984). In Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United

States, the court held just compensation required awarding compound interest in

that case because of the government’s delay in payment, the taken property’s

characterization as commercial and income-producing, consistency where the

discount rate used at trial for future earnings adopted a compound interest rate,

and consistency where Congress’s recent amendment to the Declaration of Taking

Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258e-1 (1988), provided that compound interest would be

                                         11
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/12

awarded where the government exercised its eminent domain authority. 30 Fed.

Cl. 411, 414-16 (1994). While there was delay in this case, for reasons the parties

dispute, the other factors relied on in Whitney Benefits are absent.

       In Brunswick Corp. v. United States, a patent infringement case, the court

imposed interest rates compounded annually “since no prudent commercially

reasonable investor would invest at simple interest.        Compounding interest

annually, therefore, is more likely to place the patentee in the same financial

position it otherwise would have held had royalties been timely paid.” 36 Fed. Cl.

204, 219 (1996). The court ordered compound interest “commensurate with the

prime rate.” Id. at 207. Noting that determining the appropriate rate of interest in

Court of Claims takings cases is a question of fact, the court rejected the

condemnee’s own after-tax weighted average cost of capital as the measure of

just compensation, which the condemnee asserted ranged from 8.76 percent to

12.5 percent. Id. at 219. Another case allowed compound interest at a federal

statutory rate requiring use of “ ‘the weekly average one-year constant maturity

Treasury yield.’ ” Vaizburd v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 499, 504 (2005) (quoting

40 U.S.C. § 3116). Another used “the seven-year Treasury STRIPS [Separate

Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities] rate” as the measure of

just compensation. Nat’l Food & Beverage Co., Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl.

679, 704 (2012) (footnote omitted). These cases look to what “ ‘a reasonably

prudent person investing funds so as to produce a reasonable return while

maintaining safety of principal’ ” would receive. Schneider v. Cnty. of San Diego,

285 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 50.50 Acres of Land,

                                        12
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/13

931 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991)). Merceri cites United States v. N. Pac. Ry.

Co., 51 F. Supp. 749, 749-50 (E.D. Wash. 1943), in which the court allowed

compound interest at 6 percent, but the court did not explain the reason for its

selection of that rate, and it is no longer consistent with Court of Claims decisions.

       The combination of Merceri’s evidence not addressing rates and these

decisions using commercial rates does not support that statutory 12 percent simple

interest for the delay from 2011 to 2022 was inadequate to place Merceri “in as

good a position pecuniarily as [she] would have occupied,” Kirby Forest, 467 U.S.

at 10, based on a reasonable return while maintaining safety of principal, if

payment had been made in 2011. The superior court was within its discretion to

decline to compound interest.

       Merceri argues the Washington legislature has changed eminent domain

law to conform with federal law, but the changes made do not include amending

RCW 19.52.020 to mandate interest be compounded. Merceri points to provisions

of Washington law enacted to match the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real

Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655, and its

corresponding regulations under 49 C.F.R. §§ 24.1-24.306. Chapter 8.26 RCW

and its corresponding regulations in chapter 468-100 WAC contain substantially

the same provisions. Both these federal and state statutes indicate that their

primary purpose is to minimize the hardship of displacement for individuals and

businesses affected by public projects by providing uniform procedures for

providing relocation assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 4621(b); RCW 8.26.010(1)(a). They

do not address interest on takings.

                                         13
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/14

                                          IV

       Merceri argues she was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 8.25.075. We

disagree.

       Reasonable attorney fees incurred in an inverse condemnation action are

not available unless provided in contract, statute, or recognized equitable

principles. State v. Costich, 152 Wn.2d 463, 469-70, 98 P.3d 795 (2004). RCW

8.25.075(2) authorizes an acquiring government agency’s attorney to include in

the settlement amount reasonable attorney fees, when appropriate, where a claim

is settled in an inverse condemnation action. Daviscourt v. Peistrup, 40 Wn. App.

433, 442 n.9, 698 P.2d 1093 (1985). RCW 8.25.075(3) provides that in an inverse

condemnation action, a plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees “but only if the judgment

awarded to the plaintiff as a result of trial exceeds by ten percent or more the

highest written offer of settlement submitted by the acquiring agency to the plaintiff

at least thirty days prior to trial.”

       Merceri does not dispute that the amount of just compensation in her case

was established by settlement after the jury was selected but before it was sworn.

She relies on Petersen v. Port of Seattle, where the court reversed the trial court’s

denial of an award for attorney and expert witness fees in an inverse condemnation

case. 94 Wn.2d 479, 481-82, 489, 618 P.2d 67 (1980). The plaintiffs sought

recovery of the diminished value of their property resulting from the Port of

Seattle’s operation of Sea-Tac Airport. Id. at 481. A proceeding began in superior

court to test the validity of defenses asserted by the Port. Id. Several days of

hearings followed where several witnesses were called and subjected to direct and

                                          14
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/15

cross-examination and closing arguments were made to the court. Id. at 481, 488.

The court rejected the defenses. Id. at 481. The trial to determine the amount of

compensation due to the plaintiffs was never held because the superior court

entered a judgment on agreed facts. Id. at 481-82. The Petersen court viewed

the series of hearings to test the Port’s defenses as the first portion of a bifurcated

trial. Id. at 488. The Port was held liable for attorney and expert witness fees

under RCW 8.25.075 because its written settlement offer was not made 30 days

before the start of those series of hearings. Id. “This is in keeping with the

legislative encouragement to avoid trials.” Id. “In light of the legislative objective

of settling rather than trying matters such as this, it seems anomalous to contend

that the evaluation of defenses requiring the taking of testimony for several days

is not at least a portion of a trial.” Id. at 488-89.

       Petersen is distinguishable. In Petersen, while there was not a full trial, the

obligation to pay just compensation was established through a contested

adjudication of the Port’s defenses. Here, the amount of just compensation and

the State’s undisputed payment of statutory interest followed as a result of

settlement. The statute makes an award of attorney fees available in cases where

the amount of compensation was determined as a result of trial. In this case, the

amount was determined by settlement in advance of trial.

       Merceri also cites City of Snohomish v. Joslin, 9 Wn. App. 495, 500, 513

P.2d 293 (1973). There, we remanded for an award of attorney fees, explaining

that RCW 8.25.075 was not limited to condemnation actions. Id. at 498-99, 500.

We said RCW 8.25.075 “clearly manifests a legislative intent that if a condemnor

                                            15
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/16

chooses to take property without instituting condemnation proceedings, the owner

shall be reimbursed for his costs of litigation in obtaining his constitutionally

guaranteed just compensation.” Id. at 500. But Joslin is not applicable, because

it was decided before the 1977 amendment to RCW 8.25.075 limiting the

availability of attorney fees to only cases determined “as a result of trial.” See

LAWS OF 1977, Ex. Sess., ch. 72, § 1, at 296.         Because the amount of just

compensation and the admitted statutory 12 percent interest were not determined

to be owed “as a result of trial,” the superior court did not err by denying Merceri’s

motion for attorney fees.

       Pointing to the language of RCW 8.25.075(2) making it discretionary for the

agency whether to include an attorney fee award in a settlement offer, Merceri

argues the legislature set no standards guiding the agency’s discretion. Merceri

does not cite authority that a legislative grant of discretionary authority to an

executive branch official fails simply because of the possibility of arbitrary

implementation, she does not point to circumstances indicating that the attorney

general’s decision not to offer compensation for attorney fees in her case was

arbitrary, and she does not suggest to the court any construction of the statute to

provide the guidance she says is required. Cf. People’s Org. for Wash. Energy

Res. v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, 104 Wn.2d 798, 808, 711 P.2d 319 (1985)

(deference accorded to regulatory agency where the statute “in very broad terms,

basically just direct[ed] them to set [utility rates] which the agencies determine to

be just and reasonable.”).

                                         16
No. 85865-3-I (linked with No. 85690-1-I)/17

      Merceri seeks attorney fees on appeal, but because she does not prevail

we decline to award them.

                                        V

      In matter number 85690-1-I, review is dismissed and no party is awarded

attorney fees or costs at this time, without prejudice to any party subsequently

establishing such an entitlement in future proceedings. In matter number 85865-

3-I, we affirm the superior court’s November 4, 2022 judgment, and its rulings

denying compound interest and denying attorney fees under RCW 8.25.075. We

direct that this opinion shall be filed in both matter number 85690-1-I and matter

number 85865-3-I. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

                                       17