Court Opinion

ID: 9668784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:26:12.365009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:48.230166
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice (concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I think the reason on which that result rests is wrong, or at least very misleading. At the beginning of the next to the last paragraph in the opinion this language is found: “Whén all the competent testimony in this record is considered, we hold that appellee has failed to meet the burden of proof required, in the circumstances, in the present case, which is between the mother and son, . . .” I am at a loss to understand (for the opinion does not explain) just at what point in the trial of the case the burden shifted to appellee. Does the majority mean to say or imply that the burden shifted from the plaintiff (appellant) to the defendant (appellee) when the relationship of mother and son was shown? Frankly, I can think of no other testimony that could remotely tend to shift the burden. If it is meant that the showing of the mother and son relationship cast the burden of proof on appellee, then I submit that there is a grave possibility that thousands of similar transactions in this state are in jeopardy. It is common knowledge that quite frequently a parent will deed property to a child, or vice versa. It has never been my understanding that such a transaction cast a cloud of suspicion on the grantee which he might some day he called upon to explain away. And how can the burden of explaining away the cloud he met? The majority opinion sheds some interesting light on that point, for it says: “The duty rested on appellee, Richard, to show that these instruments were freely and voluntarily executed.” This poses a novel situation, for how can a grantee he expected to make positive proof that his grantor acted “freely and voluntarily.” I feel that those making the majority opinion have misapplied the rule they rely on. In this case there is no showing of any special confidential relationship existing between the parties other than parental, and it is not shown that any positive duty rested on the son to advise his mother. To the contrary, the mother actively sought and obtained the advice of a law firm of her own choosing. The time honored rule is that the burden rests on the one seeking to set aside a deed, and I think it would be much safer to apply it here, especially where it can be done and reach the same result. Harris, C. J., joins in this concurrence.