Court Opinion

ID: 9459835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:32:52.112149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:21.339324
License: Public Domain

MATTHES, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I have no difficulty with that part of the majority opinion holding that a defendant can be convicted for making a false statement regarding his status as a felon on an application to purchase a firearm, despite the subsequent reversal of his sole felony conviction. However, I -disagree with the determination that reversal of appellant’s conviction is necessary because the appellant was not allowed to introduce evidence of the reversal of his state felony conviction on the issue of credibility.
There are basic principles of law which must be considered and should be applied in this case in resolving the evi-dentiary matter. We should refrain from reviewing an issue not raised by objection during the trial, but which is presented for the first time at oral argument on appeal. This principle has been recognized by this and other courts in many cases. Thus, in McNeely v. United States, 353 F.2d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1965), Judge Gibson, in speaking for the court, stated:
“It is an axiom of trial procedure that counsel must take the initiative in protecting the rights of his clients. The cases are too numerous to cite which hold that to preserve for review any acts or omissions of a trial court the party must make ‘known to the court the action he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefor; . . .’ Rule 51, Fed.R.Crim.P. A party may not stand idly by, watching the proceedings and allowing the Court to commit error of which he subsequently complains. Thomas v. United States, 287 F.2d 527 (5 Cir. 1961).”
In United States v. Mitchell, 463, F.2d 187, 192 (8th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 969, 93 S.Ct. 1449, 35 L.Ed.2d 705 (1973), we stated: “It should be noted first that Mitchell did not properly raise this particular point in his brief, and we are not disposed to have theories raised for the first time during oral argument.” See also Thomas v. United States, 287 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1961). The rationale for the rule is obvious. The trial judge should not be faulted for commission of prejudicial error where a party does not afford the judge an opportunity to correct the situation of which he subsequently complains.
This ease is a typical one for adhering to the rule above stated. During the colloquy between the judge, the Assistant United States Attorney, and the attorney representing appellant, the court, after denying appellant’s oral motion for dismissal, requested counsel for appellant to state his position on the eviden-tiary aspect of the reversal of the felony conviction. Counsel’s response in no way indicated that he deemed the evidence admissible on the issue of credibility.
Furthermore, appellant’s brief did not submit the credibility issue. Only one point was submitted in the brief, which was to the effect that the court erred in permitting the government to allege and prove a prior felony conviction when the conviction had been reversed, and in denying appellant the right to prove his acquittal on the state charge “all in violation of due process of law.” The credibility question made its appearance for the first time at oral argument. As I understand Rule 51, Fed.R.Crim.P., and the cases interpreting that rule, appellant’s claim of error came too late.
The majority opinion recognizes that appellant’s counsel did not raise the credibility issue directly, but then pro*434ceeds to consider the issue as “plain error” under Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., which, of course, requires no initial objection in the trial court. But, in so holding, the majority runs counter to what this court has consistently held, that is, that the “plain error” rule is to be invoked cautiously and sparingly, only in exceptional cases, to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice. United States v. Reed, 446 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cable, 446 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1971); McNeely v. United States, 353 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1965); Black v. United States, 309 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1962); Bell v. United States, 251 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1958). Also see, e. g., United States v. Sheley, 447 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U. S. 1022, 92 S.Ct. 698, 30 L.Ed.2d 672 (1972); United States v. Flanagan, 445 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1060, 92 S.Ct. 741, 30 L.Ed.2d 748 (1972).
Moreover, having failed to object below to the action of the trial court excluding the evidence, the burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate that the exclusion was so “palpably flagrant” as to affect his substantial rights and constitute “plain error” under Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. United States v. Flanagan, supra at 265. See also McNeely v. United States, supra at 917 of 353 F.2d. Viewed objectively, this record does not convince me that exceptional circumstances exist which require the application of the “plain error” rule.
There is nothing to indicate that the government attempted to exploit before the jury the exclusion of the reversal in order to destroy the appellant’s credibility. Additionally, the court did not instruct the jury that the prior conviction of the appellant could be considered in determining his credibility. Rather, the appellant’s credibility was substantially weakened by his own conflicting testimony at the two trials concerning what he had said to the gun salesman.
This record convinces me that the evidence of guilt was strong. The appellant’s credibility was weak, even with the awareness that the state felony conviction had been overturned. Moreover, the majority overlooks the practically uneontroverted showing by the government that the appellant had made yet a second false statement to the gun salesman, concerning his current address. An adequate showing of this second false statement alone would warrant a conviction under the federal statute.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, at 202, 63 S.Ct. 549, at 555, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943), stated:
“In reviewing criminal cases, it is particularly important for appellate courts to re-live the whole trial imaginatively and not to extract from episodes in isolation abstract questions of evidence and procedure. To turn a criminal appeal into a quest for error no more promotes the ends of justice than to acquiesce in low standards of criminal prosecution.”
In conclusion, I am not persuaded to believe that the error, if any, was prejudicial, and I am opposed to sending the case back to the trial court for yet another trial.