Court Opinion

ID: 9838519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 17:04:51.663203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.125930
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/6/23 In re C.O. CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re C.O. et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
 CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES,                                             E081064

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.Nos. J290300, J290301
                                                                         & J290302)
 v.
                                                                         OPINION
 M.C.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

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                                   I. INTRODUCTION

       M.C. (Mother) is the biological mother and A.O. (Father) is the presumed father of

I.A., G.O., C.C., and B.G.C. Plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children

and Family Services (CFS) filed dependency petitions pursuant to Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 300 et. seq. on behalf of all four children. Mother appeals from

an order terminating her parental rights as to I.A., G.O., and C.C.2

       On appeal, the only claim asserted by Mother is that the order terminating her

parental rights must be conditionally reversed because CFS failed to comply with its duty

of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)

and related California statutes. Specifically, Mother claims that CFS failed to interview

all known extended family members regarding the children’s potential Indian ancestry as

required by section 224.2, subdivision (b). We conclude that section 224.2, subdivision

(b) does not apply to the facts of this case and affirm the order terminating Mother’s

parental rights.

                      II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Mother is the biological mother and Father is the presumed father of I.A., G.O.,

C.C., and B.G.C. On August 20, 2021, CFS obtained a detention warrant pursuant to

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

       2 While the dependency proceedings for all four children were conducted together
for a period of time, B.G.C. was eventually placed separately from her older siblings and
is not included in the order challenged in this appeal.

                                             2
section 340 for all three children in response to an ongoing history of referrals3 and took

the children into protective custody that same date. During the process of taking the

children into protective custody, social workers asked Mother, Father, and the maternal

grandmother whether they had knowledge of the children’s potential Native American

ancestry, and all three denied any such knowledge.

       On August 24, 2021, CFS filed dependency petitions on behalf of I.A., G.O. and

C.C. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), alleging Mother’s and Father’s

inability to protect, inability to provide, and abuse of siblings as bases for jurisdiction. At

the detention hearing, Mother and Father both denied Native American ancestry when

questioned by the juvenile court. Both parents also completed ICWA-020 forms by

indicating they had no knowledge of potential Native American ancestry. Finally, both

parents completed “Family Find and ICWA Inquiry” forms, which identified maternal

grandmother and an uncle as relatives.

       On October 14, 2021, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional and

dispositional hearing on the petitions. At the time, CFS reported that social workers

made a follow-up ICWA inquiry with both Mother and Father, but both denied

knowledge of any potential Native American ancestry. The juvenile court sustained the

allegations of each petition and ordered the children removed from Mother and Father.

       3 The family was already known to CFS because Mother’s parental rights had
already been terminated as to two other children. Additionally, Father had already been
given sole custody of I.A., G.O., and C.C. as the result of a prior dependency proceeding
in which Mother was unable to reunify with the children.

                                              3
       While these dependency proceedings were pending, Mother gave birth to a fourth

child, B.G.C. CFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of B.G.C., alleging

abuse of B.G.C.’s siblings as one of several bases for jurisdiction. CFS again interviewed

Mother and Father, and both, again, initially denied any knowledge of potential Native

American ancestry. However, when asked by the juvenile court whether they had

potential Native American ancestry at the detention hearing for B.G.C., Father responded,

“Yes.” Parents also completed new ICWA inquiry forms. This time, both parents

provided new information by identifying a grandfather and providing contact information

for the children’s grandfather. Despite this new information, the juvenile court made a

finding that ICWA did not apply.

       The juvenile dependency proceedings for the three children subject of this appeal

and B.G.C. proceeded together for a period of time. The juvenile court scheduled and

held a contested six-month review hearing for the three children at the same time as a

contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing for B.G.C. The juvenile court also

scheduled and held a placement hearing pursuant to section 361.3 for the three children at

the same time as a continued contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing for B.G.C.

In its jurisdictional and dispositional report for B.G.C., CFS reported that it made another

inquiry with Father regarding potential Native American ancestry following the detention

hearing for B.G.C. and that, this time, Father denied any such ancestry. Ultimately,

B.G.C. was placed separately from her older siblings and is not included as part of this

appeal.

                                             4
       On April 6, 2023, the juvenile court held a contested permanency planning hearing

pursuant to section 366.26. With respect to ICWA compliance, the section 366.26 report

submitted by CFS simply stated that “the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply,” and

it did not detail that any further efforts had been taken by CFS to make any inquiries

regarding the children’s potential status as Indian children. The juvenile court terminated

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and selected a permanent plan of adoption for the

children. Mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights as to I.A., G.O.,

and C.C.

                                    III. DISCUSSION

       On appeal, the only claim of error raised by Mother is that CFS failed to comply

with its initial duty of inquiry under ICWA and the related California statutes.

Specifically, Mother argues that CFS failed to comply with a mandatory duty imposed by

section 224.2, subdivision (b), which purportedly required CFS to contact all identified

extended family members in order to obtain information regarding the children’s

potential status as Indian children. We disagree.

A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

       “Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address concerns regarding the separation of

Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in

non-Indian homes. [Citation.] ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to

follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster

care or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.) “To determine

whether ICWA applies to a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court and [the relevant

                                             5
social services agency] have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a

child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an

Indian child.’ ” (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 566.)

       “This duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty of initial inquiry and the

duty of further inquiry.” (In re Dominick D., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) “ ‘The

duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding’ ” and, at a minimum,

requires asking every participant in the proceeding “ ‘ “whether the participant knows or

has reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” ’ ” (In re K.H. (2022)

84 Cal.App.5th 566, 597.) “[I]f that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child

is an Indian child, then the [relevant social services agency] ‘shall make further inquiry

regarding the possible Indian status of the child” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1052), which may include interviewing extended family members, contacting the

Bureau of Indian Affairs, contacting the State Department of Social Services, contacting

pertinent tribal entities, or contacting other persons who may be reasonably expected to

have relevant information (In re K.H., at pp. 597-598). “[The relevant social services

agency] is required to document its ICWA inquiry efforts throughout the proceedings,

beginning with the petition . . . . All filings thereafter must include ‘a detailed description

of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received

pertaining to the child’s Indian status.’ ” (In re Dominick D., at p. 566; In re D.S., at

p. 1049.)

       Following the inquiry stages, the juvenile court may make a finding that ICWA

does not apply because the relevant social service agency’s inquiry and due diligence was

                                              6
“ ‘proper and adequate’ but no ‘reason to know’ whether the child is an Indian child was

discovered.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050; In re Dominick D., supra,

82 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply includes

an implicit finding that social workers fulfilled their duty of inquiry. (In re Austin J.

(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885.) “[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings

under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if reasonable, credible

evidence of solid value supports the court’s order.” (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th

303, 314; In re Austin J., at p. 885 [implicit finding that social workers fulfilled their duty

of inquiry is reviewed for substantial evidence].)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s ICWA Finding

       On appeal, Mother claims that the record does not show CFS fulfilled its initial

duty of inquiry under section 224.2. Mother contends that under section 224.2,

subdivision (b), CFS had a mandatory duty to contact every known extended family

member as part of its initial inquiry, and the failure to do so requires reversal. As

relevant here, section 224.2, subdivision (b), provides: “If a child is placed into the

temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to Section 306 . . . , the

county welfare department . . . has a duty to inquire whether that child is an Indian child.

Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking . . . extended family members . . . whether

the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) We disagree with

Mother’s contentions.

       It is undisputed that the children in this case were taken into protective custody

pursuant to a warrant issued under section 340. This court has repeatedly concluded that

                                               7
section 224.2, subdivision (b) “requires a county welfare department to ask extended

family members about a child’s Indian status only if the department has taken the child

into temporary custody under section 306.” (In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492,

504 (Robert F.), review granted July 26, 2023, S279743; In re Ja.O. (2023)

91 Cal.App.5th 672, 677-681, review granted July 26, 2023, S280572; In re Andres R.

(2023)___Cal.App.5th___(Aug. 23, 2023, E079972) [2023 Cal.App.Lexis 638]; but see

In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953 [declining to follow Robert F.].) As we

explained in Robert F., our interpretation of section 224.2, subdivision (b), is supported

by the plain meaning of the statutory text; consideration of the statutory provision in

context with the entire statutory scheme; the practical and reasonable application of the

statute; and the statute’s legislative history. (Robert F., at pp. 500-504.)

       Further, even assuming section 224.2, subdivision (b) might apply, multiple recent

decisions by the Court of Appeal have rejected the interpretation of the statute advanced

by Mother, concluding that courts should not interpret statutes literally if it would lead to

“absurd” results and endorsing the view that “making an initial and further ICWA

inquiry of every member of a child’s extended family . . . , plus every other person who

has an interest in the child—is absurd at best and impossible at worst.” (In re Ezequiel

G.(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004-1006; In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 603

[interpreting section 224.2, subdivision (b) as requiring contacting all family members in

all cases as being “absurd”]; In re E.W. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 314, 321-322 [endorsing

view that compliance with the literal language of section 224.2, subdivision (b) is

“ ‘absurd at best and impossible at worst’ ”].) Thus, we are unpersuaded by Mother’s

                                              8
argument that section 224.2, subdivision (b) required CFS to interview every known

family member in this case in order to comply with its initial duty of inquiry.

       It is true that CFS is not absolved of its obligation to make an initial inquiry

simply because section 224.2, subdivision (b) does not apply. As we explained in

Robert F., “[c]ase-specific circumstances may require the department to interview

extended family members” because section 224.2, subdivision (a) still imposes a general

“ ‘affirmative and continuing’ ” duty of inquiry in all cases. (Robert F. supra,

90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.) Thus, a parent’s affirmative claim of Native American

ancestry may suggest the need to conduct additional investigation as part of CFS’s initial

inquiry. (See In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 322 [The mother’s statement of

possible Indian ancestry and identification of the grandfather “was sufficient to require

further inquiry,” which “should have, at minimum, included interviews with [the

mother’s] extended family members.”].)

       However, Father subsequently denied Native American ancestry when CFS

followed up shortly after his initial claim. This is substantial evidence upon which the

juvenile court could rely to conclude that CFS adequately fulfilled its duty of inquiry.

(See In re E.W., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 322 [The juvenile court’s finding of ICWA

compliance was supported by substantial evidence despite the mother’s initial claim of

possible Native American ancestry, where mother “made repeated subsequent

representations that she lacked any Native American ancestry.”].) Thus, we conclude

that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implied finding that CFS fulfilled

its initial duty of inquiry. Absent error, we need not consider the issue of prejudice.

                                              9
                              IV. DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                FIELDS
                                                         J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
          Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
                        J.

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