Court Opinion

ID: 9908037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 17:08:31.175152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:53.948173
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hertzfeld v. Hertzfeld, 2023-Ohio-4411.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ZSUZSANNA HERTZFELD,                                :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                            No. 111726
                 v.                                 :

ROBERT HERTZFELD, JR.,                              :

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
                           AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 7, 2023

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Domestic Relations Division
                                 Case No. DR-20-381506

                                             Appearances:

                 Paul M. Friedman, for appellee.

                 McCarthy Lebit Crystal & Liffman Co., LPA, Richard A.
                 Rabb, and Rebekah A. Cline, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Defendant-appellant, Robert Hertzfeld, Jr. (“Husband”), appeals from

the judgment entry of divorce issued by the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court,
Division of Domestic Relations. He raises the following assignments of error for

review:

      1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to award
      husband his one-half share of the marital residence and thereby
      dividing marital property unequally without reference to the factors in
      R.C. 3105.171.

      2. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in its allocation of
      wife’s student loans.

      3. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to make a
      finding as to either party’s income for support purposes.

      4. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by imputing income
      to Husband.

      5. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in its calculation of
      Wife’s income.

      6. The trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of
      spousal support and making it non-modifiable.

      7. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in its determination
      of child support.

            After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                     I. Factual and Procedural History

            Husband and plaintiff-appellee, Zsuzsanna Hertzfeld (“Wife”), were

married on August 27, 2002. Two children were born of the marriage, I.H. (d.o.b.

03/02/2010) and Z.H. (d.o.b. 04/04/2013).         On May 28, 2020, the parties

separated. On June 15, 2020, Wife filed for divorce. On July 1, 2020, Husband

answered and counterclaimed.
             The matter proceeded to trial in March 2022, where the following facts

were adduced.

             When the parties were married in 2002, Wife was employed as a

waitress. Subsequently, Wife began attending Cuyahoga Community College, and

earned an associate degree in nursing in 2008. Upon obtaining her associate degree,

Wife began working as a registered nurse at the Cleveland Clinic. Wife continued

her education and obtained a bachelor’s degree in nursing. In the summer of 2016,

Wife left her nursing position to pursue a master’s degree in nursing on a full-time

basis.   Wife remained unemployed while she attended the master’s program

pursuant to the requirements of the program. Following her graduation in 2019,

Wife obtained a nurse anesthetist position with the Cleveland Clinic in March 2020.

Wife took out student loans while working on her associate and master’s degrees

that she subsequently consolidated. At the time of trial, the outstanding balance of

the student loans was $159,802.18. (Joint exhibit No. 2.) The parties stipulated that

a portion of the student loans, or $98,448, was used to pay for various marital

expenses while Wife was enrolled in graduate school. (Tr. vol. II at 28-29; plaintiff’s

exhibit No. 10.)

             Wife confirmed that her starting salary with the Cleveland Clinic in

2020 was $157,000 annually. (Tr. vol. II at 135.) Because Wife started her position

in the middle of the year, her tax documents reflect that she earned $108,682.33 in

2020, and $153,057.81 in 2021. (Plaintiff’s exhibit No. 16.) Husband, however,

introduced Wife’s final paystub from 2021, which reflected that her year-to-date
“gross pay” was $158,964.69. (Defendant’s exhibit Y.) Wife’s latest pay stub, dated

February 28, 2022, indicated that her year-to-date earnings was $28,068.32. (Tr.

vol. IV at 31; Defendant’s exhibit AA.)

            Prior to the parties’ marriage, Husband attended John Carroll

University for approximately three years, but did not complete his degree. He later

continued his education while married to Wife, and earned his bachelor’s degree in

communications from Cleveland State University in 2007.

             In 2000, Husband gained employment at Swagelok Corporation,

where he worked for approximately 20 years. In his most recent role with the

corporation, Husband served as a “business-process analyst” and was responsible

for monitoring the distribution of inventory. The record reflects that in 2017,

Husband earned $66,739.16; in 2018 he earned $74,519.96; in 2019 he earned

$69,780.04; and in the “first six months of 202o” he earned $39,736.80. (Tr. vol. II

at 19-21.; plaintiff’s exhibit Nos. 4-5.) Husband clarified, however, that his listed

salary for the year 2020 was $72,779.16. (Tr. vol. IV at 73.; defendant’s exhibit E.)

             In May 2020, Wife discovered pornography on Husband’s computer

and reported it to the police. Husband was arrested and indicted for pandering

sexually oriented material involving a minor and possession of criminal tools.

During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, Husband borrowed money from

his father in the amount of $107,737.00 to cover the costs of living and attorney fees.

(Tr. vol IV at 71; defendant’s exhibit FF.) In June 2021, Husband was convicted of
two counts of pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor in violation of

R.C. 2907.322. In addition, Husband was classified as a Tier II sex offender.

             The parties separated on May 28, 2020, the day of Husband’s arrest.

Husband was placed on unpaid administrative leave by his employer in June 2020,

the same month that Wife filed for divorce. In June 2021, Husband was terminated

by Swagelok due to his criminal convictions. Husband is currently employed by

AML RightSource and earns approximately $52,000 annually. (Tr. vol. II at 21.)

             Mark Anderson, a professional licensed counsellor and board-certified

vocational expert, testified on behalf of Wife. In relevant part, Anderson was asked

to determine Husband’s earning capacity based upon his age, education, and work

experience. (Tr. vol. I at 86.) He researched comparable jobs available in Northeast

Ohio and determined that someone who held Husband’s position with Swagelok at

the time he was fired should earn an annual salary of $81,444.00 locally, and

$93,030.00 nationally. (Tr. vol. I at 93.) Anderson confirmed that Husband’s

current salary is $52,000.00. (Tr. vol. I at 98.) He estimated, however, that had

Husband remained employed at Swagelok, he would be earning $79,472.00. (Tr.

vol. I at 113.) Thus, Anderson opined to a reasonable degree of vocational certainty

that Husband is “absolutely” underemployed. (Tr. vol. I at 98.)

             Approximately three years into their marriage, the parties purchased

a home located in University Heights, Ohio. The marital property is encumbered by

a mortgage that had an outstanding balance of $113,450.26 as of February 16, 2022.
(Joint exhibit No. 2.) The total appraised value of the marital property is $137,600.

(Tr. vol. II at 156.)

               At the time of trial, both children were attending school. In June 2021,

Wife hired an au pair to serve as a nanny for the children while she was at work.

Wife conceded that the annual cost to employ the au pair is approximately $20,000.

(Tr. vol II at 191.)

               On June 14, 2022, the trial court issued a written judgment, granting

the parties a divorce. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court (1) determined that the

“equitable de facto termination date of the marriage” is May 28, 2020, (2) awarded

Wife exclusive ownership and possession of the parties’ marital home, (3) ordered

Wife to pay Husband $12,223.46 for marital debts associated with the parties’ 2020

tax returns and Wife’s transfer of money from a joint bank account, (4) determined

that $98,484 of Wife’s student loan balance is marital debt, (5) determined that

Husband is exclusively responsible for the seven promissory notes issued to his

father after the de facto termination date, (6) divided the parties’ retirement assets

equally, (7) denied Husband’s request for attorney fees and litigation expenses, (8)

determined that “spousal support is neither appropriate nor reasonable,” (9)

designated Wife as the residential parent for the children, and (10) ordered Husband

to pay “$965.74 per month ($482.87 per month per child) as child support plus

$20.35 per month ($10.17 per month per child) as cash medical support, for a total

of $986.07 per month.”

               Husband now appeals from the trial court’s judgment.
                               II. Law and Analysis

                                Standard of review

               The Ohio Supreme Court has long recognized that a trial court must

have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each

divorce case. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989). For

that reason, when reviewing a trial court’s determination in a domestic-relations

case, an appellate court generally applies an abuse of discretion standard.

Holcomb v. Holcomb, 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 130, 541 N.E.2d 597 (1989).

               “A court abuses its discretion when a legal rule entrusts a decision to a

judge’s discretion and the judge’s exercise of that discretion is outside of the legally

permissible range of choices.” State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-

6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 19. See also Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-

Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 39 (“[C]ourts lack the discretion to make errors of

law, particularly when the trial court’s decision goes against the plain language of a

statute or rule.”).

               There is no abuse of discretion where the record contains competent,

credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Trolli v. Trolli, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 101980, 2015-Ohio-4487, ¶ 29, citing Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 94456, 2011-Ohio-2255, ¶ 24. Under this deferential standard, we

may not freely substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Feldman v.

Feldman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92015, 2009-Ohio-4202, ¶ 12, citing Soulsby v.

Soulsby, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 07CA1, 2008-Ohio-1019.
                                A. Marital Home

              In the first assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court erred

and abused its discretion by failing to award him a one-half share of the equity in

the parties’ marital home. He contends that the trial court’s decision to award Wife

exclusive ownership of the marital home constitutes “an unjustified punishment

* * * as it is grossly inequitable and not supported by the facts and circumstances of

the case.” In contrast, Wife asserts that the trial court’s division of the parties’

marital assets, including the allocation of the marital home, was equitable.

              In divorce proceedings, the trial court is required to determine what

constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property.             R.C.

3105.171(B). Property acquired during a marriage is generally presumed to be

marital property, unless it can be shown to be separate. Victor v. Kaplan, 2020-

Ohio-3116, 155 N.E.3d 110, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.), citing Johnson v. Mills, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 102241, 2015-Ohio-4273, ¶ 18. The party seeking to have certain

property classified as “separate property” has the burden of proof, by a

preponderance of the evidence, in tracing the separate property. Strauss v. Strauss,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 2011-Ohio-3831, ¶ 49, citing Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio

App.3d 731, 734, 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist.1994).

              Marital property includes, in relevant part:

      (i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by either or
      both of the spouses, including, but not limited to, the retirement
      benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by either or both of the
      spouses during the marriage;
      (ii) All interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in any
      real or personal property, including, but not limited to, the retirement
      benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by either or both of the
      spouses during the marriage;

      (iii) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all income and
      appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-
      kind contribution of either or both of the spouses that occurred during
      the marriage * * *.

R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i)-(iii). Marital property does not, however, include separate

property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b).

              Relevant to this appeal, it is well established that the increased equity

in a marital home during a marriage is appropriately treated as marital property.

See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 2019-Ohio-2035, 136 N.E.3d 966, ¶ 63 (2d Dist.);

Wright v. Cramer, 2018-Ohio-764, 107 N.E.3d 836, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.); Spicer v. Spicer,

12th Dist. Butler No. CA95-06-115, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1733, *2 (Apr. 29, 1996);

Goebel v. Werling, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19385, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3443, *1

(July 28, 1999) (“reduction in a mortgage during a marriage is equivalent to a

marital investment and is considered part of the marital equity”); Scott v. Scott, 11th

Dist. Trumbull No. 2007-T-0059, 2008-Ohio-530, ¶ 21.

              Once the characterization of property is made, the trial court must

divide the marital and separate property equitably between the spouses, in

accordance with R.C. 3105.171(B). Generally, marital property shall be divided

equally, unless an equal division would be inequitable, in which case the property

shall be divided in the manner the trial court determines equitable.              R.C.
3105.171(C)(1). When dividing marital property, the court shall consider various

factors, including:

      (1) The duration of the marriage;

      (2) The assets and liabilities of the spouses;

      (3) The desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to reside
      in the family home for reasonable periods of time, to the spouse with
      custody of the children of the marriage;

      (4) The liquidity of the property to be distributed;

      (5) The economic desirability of retaining intact an asset or an interest
      in an asset;

      (6) The tax consequences of the property division upon the respective
      awards to be made to each spouse;

      (7) The costs of sale, if it is necessary that an asset be sold to effectuate
      an equitable distribution of property;

      (8) Any division or disbursement of property made in a separation
      agreement that was voluntarily entered into by the spouses;

      (9) Any retirement benefits of the spouses, excluding the social security
      benefits of a spouse except as may be relevant for purposes of dividing
      a public pension;

      (10) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and
      equitable.

R.C. 3105.171(F).

              The determination of whether property is marital or separate is a

mixed question of law and fact that will not be reversed unless it is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Kobal v. Kobal, 2018-Ohio-1755, 111 N.E.3d 804,

¶ 27 (8th Dist.). Once the characterization of the property is made, the reviewing

court will not disturb the trial court’s distribution of the property absent an abuse of
discretion. Id.; Williams v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95346, 2011-Ohio-

939, ¶ 8.

               In this case, there is no dispute that the equity in the marital home

constitutes marital property as contemplated under R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a). The

parties purchased the marital home during their marriage and jointly owned the

property, which was encumbered by a mortgage with a balance of $113,450.26 as of

February 16, 2022. (Joint exhibit No. 1.) Based on the certified copy of the county

property information report from the Cuyahoga County Auditor’s Office introduced

into evidence during Wife’s testimony, the listed residential value is $137,600. (Tr.

vol. II at 156.) Thus, as set forth in the parties’ joint exhibit No. 2, the equity in the

marital home was approximately $24,149.74, as of February 16, 2022. Divided

equally, Husband’s alleged interest in the home’s equity would amount to

$12,074.87.

               Regarding the division of property, the record reflects that the trial

court attempted to effectuate an equal division of all marital property. Specifically,

the trial court expressed at the conclusion of the “Division of Property” section of

the divorce decree that “the above discussion constitutes an equal division of the

property.” (Emphasis added.) There is no indication that the court believed that an

equal division of marital property would be inequitable under the circumstances

presented in this case. Rather, it is clear the court believed that awarding Wife

exclusive ownership of the property constituted an equal division of the property.
In reaching this conclusion, the court briefly noted that Wife had been allocated the

“majority of the marital debt in regard to her assumption of the mortgage.”

              After careful consideration, we find the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to award Husband an equal share of the equity in the parties’

marital home. Upon consideration of the factors listed under R.C. 3105.171(F), we

find the record is devoid of credible evidence to conclude that it would be inequitable

to apply the presumption of an equal division of the marital home. There was, for

instance, no testimony or documentary evidence to suggest that awarding Husband

a share of the equity in the marital home would result in unfavorable costs or tax

consequences. Furthermore, Wife’s decision to remain in the home and, therefore,

assume the remaining balance of the mortgage was premised on her own desires to

retain possession of the home for the sake of her children. Wife’s resistance to

Husband’s repeated requests for the court to order the sale of the home is

understandable. However, it was improper for the trial court to characterize Wife’s

assumption of the mortgage as an allocation of a marital debt for the purposes of

awarding her the entire equity in the home.

              Here, an equal division of marital property would entitle Husband to

one-half of the equity in the marital home as of February 16, 2022, minus the value

of the mortgage payments made by Wife since the de facto termination date of May

28, 2020. Because the terms of the divorce decree required Wife to individually

“assume the mortgage of the real property,” Husband is not entitled to any equity

created by Wife’s mortgage payments following the termination of the parties’
marriage because such payments related to what is now considered Wife’s personal

debt.

               Because nearly 21 months passed between the de facto termination

date and the date used to establish the outstanding balance of the mortgage at trial,

it is probable that Husband’s interest in the home’s equity is substantially less than

the amount he asserts on appeal. In this regard, we recognize that consideration of

Wife’s mortgage payments since May 28, 2020, may have contributed to the trial

court’s determination that awarding Wife the full equity in the marital home

constituted an equal division of marital property. However, in the absence of clear

and convincing evidence establishing the amount of equity Wife’s individual

mortgage payments have created in the marital residence since the termination of

the marriage, we find it necessary to remand this matter for the trial court to (1)

declare the market value of the home as of June 14, 2022,1 (2) determine the value

of the equity in the property as of May 28, 2020, and (3) to award Husband an equal

share of this equity, if such equity exists.

               The first assignment of error is sustained.

                           B. Wife’s Student Loan Debt

              In the second assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court

erred and abused its discretion in its allocation of Wife’s student loans.

        As a practical matter, the trial court must place a value on each contested item
        1

of property in order to divide the property equitably. Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 83 Ohio
App.3d 794, 799, 615 N.E.2d 1071 (10th Dist.1992).
              As with the division of marital property, this court reviews the trial

court’s division of marital debt under an abuse of discretion standard. Trolli, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101980, 2015-Ohio-4487, at ¶ 31, citing Banjoko v. Banjoko, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 25406, 2013-Ohio-2566, ¶ 18. “‘Marital debt has been

defined as any debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties

or for a valid marital purpose.’” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting Lucas v. Lucas, 7th Dist. Noble

No. 11No382, 2011-Ohio-6411, ¶ 33. As such, debts incurred during the marriage

are generally presumed to be marital unless it can be proved they are separate.

Vergitz v. Vergitz, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 05 JE 52, 2007-Ohio-1395, ¶ 12. The party

seeking to establish that the debt is separate rather than marital must establish, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that such debt was the separate obligation of the

other spouse. Walpole v. Walpole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99231, 2013-Ohio-3529,

¶ 110.

              With respect to student loan obligations, “[t]he determinative factor

is whether the loan was incurred during the marriage.” Kehoe v. Kehoe, 2012-Ohio-

3357, 974 N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Nemeth v. Nemeth, 11th Dist. Geauga

No. 2007-G-2791, 2008-Ohio-3263. See also Shoenfelt v. Shoenfelt, 3d Dist. Shelby

No. 17-14-13, 2015-Ohio-225, ¶ 55 (“Student loans obtained by one spouse during

the marriage may be categorized as marital debt subject to equal distribution.”),

citing Harris v. Harris, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2006-CA-00003, 2007-Ohio-1232,

¶ 34; Webb v. Webb, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA97-09-167, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS

5615, *4 (Nov. 30, 1998).
              Nevertheless, even if student loans are deemed marital debt, the debt

may properly be allocated to the party who incurs the debt. Webb at *4. Courts have

considered different factors when determining the allocation of student loan debt.

Such factors include when the income generated by the degree was realized; whether

the spouse undertaking the degree was not working while obtaining the degree, thus,

depriving the family of additional income; and whether the student loans were used

to pay for family expenses. Id. at *4-5.

              In this case, Wife was questioned at length about the student loans she

used to finance her continued education during the marriage. Wife estimated that

she took out approximately $180,000 in student loans while obtaining her associate

and master’s degrees. Of that total amount, approximately $98,484 was deposited

into the parties’ joint checking account and used for household expenses from the

summer of 2017 through 2019. Wife explained that the parties were forced to use a

substantial portion of the loans to pay for household expenses because the master’s

program did not permit students to gain employment while completing the

program. The parties stipulated that the student loan balance was $159,802.18 as

of January 27, 2022.

              Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court concluded that the

loans deposited into the parties’ joint bank account during the marriage constituted

marital debt. The remaining balance was declared Wife’s separate debt. The court

summarized its judgment as follows:
      The court finds that $98,484 of the student loan was deposited into the
      parties’ joint checking account. That portion of the loan is marital. The
      outstanding balance minus ($61,318.18) is [Wife’s] separate debt
      because the income generated by Plaintiffs degree was realized after the
      de facto termination date.

      ***

      It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that [Husband] shall pay
      and hold [Wife] harmless on the following marital debts: * * *one half
      of the marital portion ($49,242) of the Earnest Student loan debt used
      to pay for household expenses.

              On appeal, Husband argues the trial court committed reversible error

by failing to conclude that Wife is solely responsible for her student loan debt. He

contends that the courts judgment created an inequitable windfall to Wife where (1)

the benefit of Wife’s degree was not realized until after the divorce, (2) Wife did not

work while obtaining her degree “thereby depriving the family of additional

income,” and (3) approximately $20,000 of marital funds were paid towards the

outstanding balance of the loans during the marriage. Alternatively, Husband

argues the trial court’s decision to demand that Husband make a lump sum

distributive payment of the student loan amount though Wife made monthly

payments was arbitrary, punitive, and inequitable.

              Viewing the trial court’s allocation of marital property and debts

collectively, we are unable to conclude that the trial court arbitrarily required

Husband to share in the marital debt associated with the loans used to pay for

household expenses during the marriage. Contrary to Husband’s assertion on

appeal, “[t]he notion that the degree-earning spouse is the sole beneficiary of the

earned degree, and hence should shoulder all of the student-loan debt” is “inherently
flawed.” See Polacheck v. Polacheck, 2013-Ohio-5788, 5 N.E.3d 1088, ¶ 28 (9th

Dist.). In this case, extensive evidence was introduced at trial relating to the student

loan debt, including Wife’s period of unemployment during the completion of the

master’s program, Wife’s substantially increased income since the de facto

termination date, the outstanding balance of the loan, and the parties’ stipulation to

the amount of the loan used for marital expenses. In this regard, there can be no

dispute that the portion of the student loans used to pay for household costs during

the marriage served a valid marital purpose that benefited both parties equally.

Balancing the foregoing factors in totality, we find competent, credible evidence

supports the trial court’s decision to divide the marital debt equally. Accordingly,

we find no abuse of discretion in this instance. Trolli, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

101980, 2015-Ohio-4487, at ¶ 29, citing Kapadia, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94456,

2011-Ohio-2255, at ¶ 24. See also Polacheck at ¶ 30 (Noting that “it is inequitable

to require the spouse earning a degree toward the end of the marriage to shoulder

the entire burden of the debt simply because debt was incurred toward the end of

the marriage.”).

              We agree, however, that the divorce decree is silent on the time frame

in which Husband must pay half of the $98,484 marital debt to Wife. This is in stark

contrast to the specific time parameters used to dictate payment schedules in other

portions of the divorce decree. Although trial courts have broad discretion in

dividing marital property in a manner the court determines equitable, we decline to

speculate that the court intended to effectuate a lump-sum payment to Wife in the
amount of $42,242. We, therefore, remand this matter for the trial court to set forth

the time parameters for payment in sufficient detail so as to enable a reviewing court

to determine whether the award is equitable and fair according to law. See Johnson

v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2018-CA-36, 2019-Ohio-1024, ¶ 31 (“[T]he trial

court must provide sufficient detail about its property division.”).

                 The second assignment of error is overruled in part, sustained in part.

                    C. Designation and Calculation of Income

                 In the third assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court erred

and abused its discretion “by failing to make a finding as to either party’s income for

support purposes.” Husband contends that because the trial court failed to explain

how it arrived at an income that exceeds the amount he is currently earning, it is

clear the court “made certain assumptions which are neither in the record nor

contained in the judgment entry.”

                 In the fifth assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court erred

and abused its discretion in its calculation of Wife’s income. Husband contends that

the trial court’s calculation of Wife’s income as $158,964.69 “is an understatement

of [her] income which is against the manifest weight of the evidence and is not

contained anywhere in the record.” Because the third and fifth assignments of error

concern related issues of procedure and fact, we address them together for the ease

of discussion.

                 Husband correctly states that when calculating child support, the trial

court must first determine the annual income of each parent, including the gross
and potential income of a parent the court determines to be voluntarily unemployed

or underemployed. See R.C. 3119.01(C)(10)(a)-(b). The spousal support statute

similarly requires the trial court to “consider” the parties’ actual income and their

respective earning abilities. R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(b).

              Firstly, we find no merit to Husband’s suggestion that the divorce

decree failed to designate the parties’ income for the purposes of calculating the

applicable support obligations.      In this case, the divorce decree expressly

incorporated the income computations contained in the attached child-support

worksheet by reference. (Divorce decree at pg. 13.) (“The worksheet used to

compute child support and cash medical support under Ohio Revised Code 3119.022

or 3119.023 is attached hereto as Exhibit B.”) The attached worksheet, marked as

exhibit B, designates Husband’s “Annual Gross Income” as $72,779.19. This income

figure directly correlates to the documentary evidence introduced at trial, including

a copy of an internal document from Swagelok, titled “Associate Performance and

Rewards,” which demonstrated that, but for Husband’s termination following his

criminal conviction, his gross salary for the year 2020 was set to be $72,779.16.

(Defendant’s exhibit E.)    The court did not guess or otherwise make certain

assumptions in calculating Husband’s gross income. Rather, it relied exclusively on

the documentary evidence introduced by Husband at trial.

              Similarly, the child-support worksheet incorporated into the divorce

decree expressly designated Wife’s “Annual Gross Income” as $158,964.69. Again,

this is not the case where the child support orders and calculations are based on the
lack of documentary evidence. See In re K.R.B., 2017-Ohio-7071, 95 N.E.3d 799,

¶ 26 (8th Dist.) (finding an abuse of discretion because “[t]he child support

worksheet * * * [does] not indicate upon what information the figures listed in the

worksheet were based”).       Rather, the income reflected in the child support

worksheet for Wife specifically derived from documentary evidence introduced at

trial, namely a copy of Wife’s final paystub for the year 2021. See R.C. 3119.05(A)

(“The parents’ current and past income and personal earnings shall be verified by

electronic means or with suitable documents, including, but not limited to, paystubs

* * *[.]”). This document, marked Defendant’s exhibit Y, reflects that Wife’s year-

to-date “gross pay” for 2021 totaled $158,964.69.

              Next, to the extent Husband challenges the court’s calculation of

Wife’s income, this court has explained that while “‘“the standard of review for a trial

court’s support determination is abuse of discretion, challenges to factual

determinations upon which the support order is based are reviewed using the ‘some

competent credible evidence’ standard.”’” Jajola v. Jajola, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

83141, 2004-Ohio-370, ¶ 8, quoting Bender v. Bender, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20157,

2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3212, *9 (July 18, 2001). Thus, “because a determination of

gross income for support purposes is a factual finding, we must review the trial

court’s decision to determine whether it is supported by competent, credible

evidence.” Trolli, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101980, 2015-Ohio-4487, ¶ 45, citing

Jajola at ¶ 8, and Fallang v. Fallang, 109 Ohio App.3d 543, 548, 672 N.E.2d 730

(12th Dist.1996). In performing this review, we note that “[a]s trier of fact, the trial
court [is] in the best position to weigh the evidence and assign appropriate

credibility.” Onyshko v. Onyshko, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0035, 2010-Ohio-

969, ¶ 88.

              The calculation of the parties’ gross incomes in this case presented

unique obstacles given the implications of Husband’s felony conviction and Wife’s

substantial increase in annual income upon obtaining employment as a nurse

anesthetist just months before the de facto date of termination of the marriage.

Throughout the trial, Wife maintained that “in light of her contractual salary of

$157,000, and her 2021 W-2 for the year 2021 ($153,057.81), there is no reason to

believe and certainly no preponderance of evidence to show that her income for the

year 2022 will exceed $157,000.” (Plaintiff’s closing brief, pg. 13-14.) In contrast,

Husband argued that Wife’s paystubs more accurately reflected that her current

income is $168,409.92 based on the amount she earned during the first two months

of 2022. (Defendant’s exhibit AA.)

              After careful consideration, we find the trial court’s use of Wife’s gross

income from 2021 in the amount of $158,964.69 was reasonable and supported by

competent and credible evidence. Here, it is undisputed that Wife began her

employment in the middle of 2020. Thus, 2021 was the only year Wife earned a full,

annual income before the trial commenced in March 2022. While the documentary

evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Wife earned bonuses and overtime

pay in excess of her stated base salary of $157,000, it is evident that these amounts

are inconsistent from paycheck to paycheck. It was, therefore, reasonable for the
court to rely exclusively on Wife’s “gross pay” for the year 2021, which included her

total overtime and bonus earnings for that year, rather than to speculate about

Wife’s potential gross income for the year 2022 based on the amount she earned

during the first two months of that stated year.

              Whether the trial court erred in imputing Husband’s preconviction

income for the purposes of support is a separate issue that will be addressed in

further detail below.    However, viewing the divorce decree and the evidence

introduced at trial collectively, we are unable to conclude that the trial court failed

to make findings as to the parties’ incomes. We further find the trial court’s

calculation of Wife’s gross income is supported by competent, credible evidence.

              The third and fifth assignments of error are overruled.

                      D. Husband’s Income Calculation

              In this fourth assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court

erred and abused its discretion by imputing income to him in the amount of

$72,779.16. Husband contends that the documentary evidence introduced at trial

established that he currently earns an annual salary of $52,000, and “the reality is

that the opportunity to earn what he was once making before simply does not exist,

and to impute such income to [him] for support purposes is an abuse of discretion.”

              Child support orders are governed by R.C. Chapter 3119.            “‘The

underlying purpose of Ohio’s child support legislation is to meet the current needs

of the minor child.’” Habib v. Shikur, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-735, 2018-Ohio-

2955, ¶ 13, quoting Harbour v. Ridgeway, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-350, 2005-
Ohio-2643, ¶ 34. See also Bates v. Bates, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-137, 2005-

Ohio-3374, ¶ 21 (“We are mindful that the overriding concern in calculating child

support is the best interest of the child for whom support is being awarded.”). To

achieve this purpose, “‘Ohio has adopted what is known as the “income shares”

model for child support — a model that presumes that a child should receive the

same proportion of parental income as he or she would have received if the parents

lived together.’” N.W. v. M.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107503, 2019-Ohio-1775,

¶ 17, quoting Phelps v. Saffian, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103549, 2016-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7.

Thus, “[t]he starting point for determining the proper amount of child support to be

paid is parental income.” Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-

1042, 2014-Ohio-1252, ¶ 7, citing Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-

4542, 3 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 11.

              As previously mentioned, the trial court is required to determine the

parents’ annual income for the purposes of calculating child support. Sweeney v.

Sweeney, 2019-Ohio-1750, 135 N.E.3d 1189, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.). R.C. 3119.01 defines

“income” as either (1) the gross income of a parent employed to full capacity, or

(2) the sum of the gross income of the parent and any potential income of an

unemployed or underemployed parent. R.C. 3119.01(C)(10)(a)-(b). See Yenni v.

Yenni, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111058, 2022-Ohio-2867, ¶ 26, citing N.W., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga    No.   107503,   2019-Ohio-1775,     at   ¶   29.   (“Pursuant   to   R.C.

3119.01(C)([10])(b) and 3119.01(C)([18]), the trial court is permitted to impute

potential income to a parent who is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily
underemployed for the purpose of determining the parent’s child support

obligation.”).

                 To determine the potential income for a parent who the court finds is

voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed, the trial court must consider

the following criteria:

      (i) The parent’s prior employment experience;

      (ii) The parent’s education;

      (iii) The parent’s physical and mental disabilities, if any;

      (iv) The availability of employment in the geographic area in which the
      parent resides;

      (v) The prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic area in
      which the parent resides;

      (vi) The parent’s special skills and training;

      (vii) Whether there is evidence that the parent has the ability to earn
      the imputed income;

      (viii) The age and special needs of the child for whom child support is
      being calculated under this section;

      (ix) The parent’s increased earning capacity because of experience;

      (x) The parent’s decreased earning capacity because of a felony
      conviction;

      (xi) Any other relevant factor.

R.C. 3119.01(C)(18)(a).

                 Thus, the imputation of income involves a two-step process. Lord v.

Lord, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89395, 2008-Ohio-230, ¶ 37. First, the trial court

must determine whether the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
In re M.C.M., 2018-Ohio-1307, 110 N.E.3d 694, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). Once the court

makes such a finding, the court must then determine the amount of income to

impute, based upon the factors in R.C. 3119.01(C)(18). Id. at ¶ 23. See also Misra

v. Mishra, 2018-Ohio-5139, 126 N.E.3d 367, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).

              “Whether a parent is voluntarily underemployed and the amount of

potential income to be imputed to the parent for the calculation of child support are

matters the trial court determines on the particular facts and circumstances of each

case.” N.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107503, 2019-Ohio-1775, at ¶ 29, citing Rock

v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 616 N.E.2d 218 (1993), syllabus. Thus, a trial court’s

decision to impute income will be overturned only upon a showing of an abuse of

discretion. Rock at 112.

              Preliminarily, we find no merit to Husband’s assertion that the court

erred by failing to make express “references to the factors set forth in

R.C. 3119.01(C)([18]).”    In this case, the trial court found that Husband was

voluntarily underemployed for support purposes. Viewed in its entirety, the divorce

decree reflects that the court’s judgment relied on various factors contemplated

under R.C. 3119.01(C)(18), including Husband’s employment history, his education

and training level, his lack of physical, mental, or emotional condition, and his

decreased earning potential due to his criminal conviction. Given these relevant

considerations, we can discern from the record that the court complied with the

procedural requirements of R.C. 3119.01(C)(18). See A.L.D. v. L.N.S., 2d Dist. Clark
No. 2021-CA-49, 2022-Ohio-959, ¶ 19 (“[A]n express determination as to every

factor under R.C. 3119.01(C)([18]) is not required[.]”).

              Turning to the first step of the process for imputing income, we find

the trial court properly determined that Husband is voluntarily underemployed as

contemplated under R.C. 3119.01. In this case, the evidence introduced at trial

established that Husband was terminated from his position at Swagelok based on

his criminal conviction for pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor.

(Tr. vol. I at 50.) Although Husband’s annual income was substantially diminished

following his termination, courts have routinely recognized that “misbehavior that

results in the termination of employment is a voluntary act that allows a trial court

to find a party voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.” Todd v. Todd, 12th Dist.

Butler Nos. CA2022-12-115 and CA2023-03-02, 2023-Ohio-3677, ¶ 12. See also

Hurley v. Austin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99992, 2013-Ohio-5592, ¶ 16, citing

Drucker v. Drucker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76139, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2471

(June 8, 2000); Groves v. Groves, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-06-059, 2009-

Ohio-931 (recognizing that a criminal conviction is a voluntary act that should not

relieve individuals of their child-support obligations). Under these circumstances,

we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision finding Husband was

voluntarily underemployed.

              Turning to the second step of the analysis, however, we find the record

lacks competent and credible evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to

impute $72,779.16 in potential income to Husband, the same amount he was set to
make while working as a business-process analyst for Swagelok in 2020. Although

the record indicates that Husband is well educated and trained in the area of

inventory distribution, his convictions and status as a Tier II sex offender have

rendered his ability to earn the imputed income highly unlikely. See Courtney v.

Courtney, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2013-09-087 and CA2013-10-096, 2014-Ohio-

4281, ¶ 15 (finding the court erred by imputing the husband’s former income where

his “earning capacity is greatly reduced due to his felony conviction for aggravated

theft”). Although Wife presented expert testimony at trial indicating that a person

with Husband’s education and employment history should be earning $81,444

locally, the evidence failed to demonstrate that the prevailing wages and availability

of employment for a person with Husband’s qualifications would equally apply to a

person with a criminal conviction for pandering sexually oriented material involving

a minor. Under the narrow and specific circumstances of this case, imputing the

same amount of income to Husband that he earned in 2020 is not reasonable and

amounts to an abuse of discretion. In the interests of equity, we remand this matter

for the trial court to impute an income that more accurately reflects Husband’s full

earning potential as a convicted felon. Our judgment is not intended to diminish

Husband’s criminal conduct but is necessary to avoid future conflicts between the

parties, thereby protecting the best interests of the children.

              The fourth assignment of error is sustained in part, overruled in part.
                         E. Spousal-Support Calculation

                 In the sixth assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his request for spousal support. Husband contends

that the trial court’s judgment failed to appropriately consider several factors of

R.C. 3105.18(C), including the parties’ relative earning potential, the length of the

marriage, his contributions to Wife’s education, and his lost income production

resulting from his marital responsibilities.

                 The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether an award

of spousal support is proper based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Smith v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110214, 110245 and 110274, 2022-Ohio-

299, ¶ 33, citing Wojanowski v. Wojanowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99751, 2014-

Ohio-697, ¶ 43, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990).

Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s spousal support order absent an abuse

of discretion.

                 When determining whether spousal support is appropriate and

reasonable, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).

Kaletta v. Kaletta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98821, 2013-Ohio-1667, ¶ 22. These

factors include, but are not limited to

      (1) the relative earning abilities of the parties; (2) the ages and physical,
      mental, and emotional conditions of the parties; (3) the retirement
      benefits of the parties; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the
      standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; (6) the
      relative education of the parties; (7) the relative assets and debts of the
      parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the
      parties; (8) the time and expense necessary of the spouse seeking
      support to acquire education, training, or job experience; (9) the tax
      consequences for each party of an award of spousal support; and (10)
      any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and
      equitable.

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).

              The goal of spousal support is to reach an equitable result. Hloska v.

Hloska, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101690, 2015-Ohio-2153, ¶ 10. And while there is

no set mathematical formula to reach this goal, the Ohio Supreme Court requires

the trial court to consider each factor set forth under R.C. 3105.18(C) and “not base

its determination upon any one of those factors taken in isolation.” Id. at ¶ 11.

              In this case, the divorce decree reflects that the trial court carefully

considered the applicable factors set forth under R.C. 3105.18(C), including those

factors Husband suggests support his request for spousal support. The court

summarized its application of the spousal-support statute as follows:

      Presently, [Wife] earns significantly more than [Husband] as a Nurse
      Anesthetist. However, the court finds that [Husband] is under-
      employed in his current position and able to earn more than he is
      currently earning. In addition, [Husband] is solely responsible for his
      termination and the reduction to his income over the last two years.
      Both parties in this matter are in their forties and have not
      demonstrated any physical, mental, or emotional condition that would
      necessitate support. Parties’ retirement assets are largely marginal.

      Parties were married for approximately eighteen years before they
      separated in May 2020. It would be inappropriate to consider [Wife’s]
      salary as a nurse anesthetist in examining the standard of living of the
      parties during the marriage as she was only employed in this capacity
      for two months before the parties’ separation. Prior to their separation,
      the parties’ joint income was less than what [Wife] is now earning. The
      court finds that it is inappropriate and inequitable to consider [Wife’s]
      current salary in determining the standard of living of the parties
      during the marriage.
      While [Husband] asserts that he should receive spousal support due to
      his contribution to [Wife’s] education, the court finds that both parties
      contributed to the other’s education. In fact, [Husband] credited
      [Wife] with his return to school to complete his bachelor’s degree in
      communication. Defendant’s Exhibit F. [Wife] holds the following
      degrees: associate’s degree in nursing, bachelor’s degree in nursing,
      and a master’s degree in nursing. There is no evidence before the court
      to suggest that [Husband] needs more education, training, or further
      job experience to obtain appropriate employment.

      [Husband] argues that as the primary caregiver during eighteen years
      of marriage, [Husband] was unable to pursue higher education during
      this time, therefore, [Husband] lost income production capacity
      resulting from his marital responsibilities. [Husband’s] argument fails
      to consider that [Husband] could have sought additional education
      during the other fifteen years of the parties’ marriage and before their
      separation. [Husband] did not demonstrate that his caretaking lost
      income production capacity aside from his inability to pursue further
      education. [Husband] did not demonstrate that he was an engaged
      caretaker, as evidenced by the criminal conduct he engaged in while the
      children were in his care. The court finds this argument lacks merit.

      The court finds, upon consideration of the factors set forth in Ohio
      Revised Code 3105.18(C)(1), that spousal support is neither
      appropriate nor reasonable.

              Viewing the trial court’s discussion in its entirety, we find the trial

court sufficiently considered the statutory factors outlined in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-

(n). Moreover, by commenting on each factor that was relevant to the parties with

a thoughtful and lengthy analysis, we find the divorce decree contained sufficient

details for this court to determine whether the denial of spousal support was fair and

equitable.

              We further find competent and credible evidence supports the trial

court’s balancing of the relevant factors and its conclusion that an award of spousal

support in favor of Husband would not be equitable or reasonable. Here, the trial
court carefully considered the circumstances of the parties’ marriage and relied

exclusively on the testimony and documentary evidence introduced at trial in

applying R.C. 3105.18(C). Mindful of the principle that “[w]hen applying the abuse

of discretion standard, a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court,” we find no basis in the record to conclude that trial court’s

spousal-support order was unreasonable or arbitrary. In re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio

St.3d 135, 138, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991); see also Allan v. Allan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 107142, 2019-Ohio-2111, ¶ 95.

               Briefly, we note that our resolution of the fourth assignment of error

does not alter our assessment of the evidence supporting the trial court’s denial of

spousal support.     While Husband’s potential income is less than the amount

imputed to him in the divorce decree, we find the trial court’s spousal-support order

appropriately focused on the parties’ earnings and standard of living during the

duration of the marriage. In this regard, the court astutely recognized that spousal

support was not reasonable where the disparity between the parties’ current

incomes is premised on circumstances occurring near or after the de facto

termination date of marriage. Thus, our conclusion that Husband is entitled to a

reduction in the imputation of income for child support purposes does not require

the trial court to revisit his entitlement to spousal support under the circumstances

presented in this case.

               Similarly, we are unable to conclude that the court abused its

discretion by declining to retain jurisdiction to modify the spousal-support order
where the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that future circumstances

will not alter Husband’s ability to seek support given the timing of the de facto date

of termination and Wife’s subsequent increase in annual income. Moreover, given

the nature of the court’s spousal-support judgment, Husband has not established

that the circumstances warranting a reservation of jurisdiction under R.C.

3105.18(E) is applicable to this case. See Ware v. Ware, 5th Dist. Licking No.

12CA91, 2014-Ohio-2606, ¶ 38 (“A trial court errs in reserving jurisdiction over the

issue of spousal support after finding that spousal support was not appropriate or

reasonable.”).

                 The sixth assignment of error is overruled.

                           G. Child-Support Calculation

               In this seventh assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court

erred and abused its discretion in its determination of child support. Because the

trial court’s calculation of child support relied on the court’s determination of each

parent’s annual income, we find our resolution of the fourth assignment of error

renders Husband’s challenges to the trial court’s calculation of child support to be

moot.     Husband’s child-support obligation will be redetermined on remand.

Accordingly, the seventh assignment of error is moot.

               Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings.

        It is ordered that the parties share equally the costs herein taxed.

        The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURS;
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., CONCURS IN PART, CONCURS IN JUDGMENT
ONLY IN PART, AND DISSENTS IN PART (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., CONCURRING IN PART, CONCURRING IN
JUDGMENT ONLY IN PART, AND DISSENTING IN PART:

              Respectively, I concur in part, concur in judgment only in part, and

dissent in part. I concur with the majority’s resolution of the first, second, sixth, and

seventh assignments of error regarding the marital home, student loan, spousal

support, and child respectively.

              I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding on the third

assignment of error regarding the trial court’s failure to state its findings for income

attributed to Husband and Wife for child support and the fifth assignment of error

contending that the income calculation for Wife was incorrect. I would sustain the

assigned errors and remand to the trial court to specify the grounds for the child

support income findings.
              In this case, both Husband and Wife contended that their income was

stated incorrectly though Wife did not assign the issue as error. The trial court

provided the requisite child support worksheet pursuant to R.C. 3119.02. A child

support worksheet must be provided to assure the appellate court that the applicable

statutes have been followed and to ensure “‘meaningful appellate review.’” In re J-

L.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100469, 2014-Ohio-1245, ¶ 14, quoting Marker v.

Grimm, 65 Ohio St.3d 139, 142, 601 N.E.2d 496 (1992).

              It is true that a trial court’s explanation of its child support

determination is not required to “be so specific or detailed as to support, dollar-by-

dollar, the particular child support obligation imposed by the court.” In re K.R.B.,

2017-Ohio-7071, 95 N.E.3d 799, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Lopez-Ruiz v. Botta, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-577, 2012-Ohio-718, ¶ 7.

              Nevertheless “there must be sufficient information in the trial court’s

supporting ‘journal entry’ (or otherwise in the record) to allow a reviewing court to

discern why the juvenile court did what it did and why it determined its decision was

in the best interest of the child.” Id. “Without such information, we are unable to

properly assess whether” the trial court’s “decision was the product of a sound

reasoning process or was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Id., citing

Mahlerwein v. Mahlerwein, 160 Ohio App.3d 564, 2005-Ohio-1835, 828 N.E.2d

153, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); see also Green v. Tarkington, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-10-02,

2010-Ohio-2165, ¶ 22 (where the record did “not reflect the trial court’s reasoning

and findings as to how [its] decisions [regarding child support] relate to the best
interest of the child,” appellate court was “unable to determine” whether or not the

trial court’s determinations regarding child support were an abuse of discretion).

              I suggest that the phrase “or otherwise in the record” has been too

broadly construed where the result is to require an appellate court to comb through

the sometimes voluminous record to support the trial court’s decision and defeats

the purpose of having the trial court support the findings by statute. I respectfully

advocate that the goal of meaningful appellate review as well as judicial economy

would be best served by specificity by the trial court in the journal entry as required

by law. Thus the reason for my dissent.

              I concur in judgment only with the majority’s resolution of the fourth

assignment of error challenging Husband’s imputed income finding for child

support. I would also find that the factors cited under R.C. 3105.18(C) for spousal

support should not be deemed sufficient to satisfy the statements required for child

support under R.C. Chapter 3119.