Court Opinion

ID: 9851716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:18:30.690665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.905651
License: Public Domain

*679Hill, Justice,
concurring specially.
As stated by Justice Hall, instructions to the jury are not to be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (94 SC 396, 38 LE2d 368).
At the expense of prolonging this decision, let us view the overall charge in its pertinent parts.
The trial court charged the jury, inter alia, as follows:
'The defendant’s plea of not guilty challenges and denies every material allegation in this indictment and I charge you that before the state is entitled to a verdict of conviction of the defendant at your hands, the burden is upon the state of proving the defendant’s guilt as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The defendant enters upon his trial with the presumption of innocence in his favor and that presumption remains with him throughout the trial unless and until it is overcome by evidence sufficiently strong to satisfy you of his guilt to a reasonable and moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless you find such evidence in this case, you would acquit the defendant.”
After defining the meaning of "reasonable doubt” and the meaning of direct and circumstantial evidence, the court continued:
"I charge you, however, that whether dependent upon direct or circumstantial evidence the true test in all criminal cases is not whether the conclusion at which the evidence points may be false but whether or not the evidence is sufficiently strong to satisfy your minds and consciences to a reasonable and moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. If the evidence is not thus strong, it would be your duty to acquit.
"Now, gentlemen, I charge you that a crime under our law is a violation of a statute of this state in which there shall be a union of joint operation of act, or omission to act, and intention, or criminal negligence.”
Next the court charged the jury that a person will not be presumed to act with criminal intent, and instructed them as to the definition of murder with malice aforethought, and as to the definition of express malice.
*680Then the court charged as follows:
"Malice is an essential ingredient in murder, as charged in the indictment, and it must exist before the alleged homicide can be murder. Malice, in its legal sense, is not necessarily ill-will or hatred. It is the unlawful, deliberate intention to kill a human being, without justification, or mitigation, or excuse, which intention must exist at the time of the killing. . .
"Now, as to this indictment, gentlemen, I charge you that if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in this county, at any time prior to the return of this indictment, with a weapon or instrumentality named in this indictment, and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, did unlawfully and intentionally shoot Winnie Mae Watson and kill Winnie Mae Watson, as charged in the indictment, and you believe the weapon or instrumentality used, in the manner used, if one was used, was one likely to produce death, then you would be authorized and it would be your duty to convict the defendant of the offense of murder as charged in the indictment. And in that event, the form of your verdict would be, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Hamp Grace, guilty.’
"Now, gentlemen, the defendant contends that he’s not guilty of the offense charged, and further contends that the state has not shown his guilt of the offense as charged to a reasonable and moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt. If from a consideration of the evidence, or from a lack of evidence, you believe these contentions of the defendant to be the truth of the case, or if you believe either of these contentions of the defendant to be the truth of the case, it would be your duty to acquit him, and the form of that verdict would be, We, the Jury, find the defendant not guilty.’
'The defendant also sets up as a defense the plea that he was of unsound mind and irresponsible at the time of the alleged crime. I charge you that under the law of this state every person is presumed to be of sound mind and discretion but the presumption may be rebutted. I charge you further that the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of that person’s will, but this presumption may be rebutted. And when in *681a criminal trial the defendant sets up as a defense that he was insane or of unsound mind at the time of the alleged crime, the burden is upon him to establish this defense, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury [by a preponderance of the evidence]. If he carries this burden, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.”
["By a preponderance of evidence is meant that superior weight of evidence upon the issues involved, which, while not enough to wholly free the mind from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other.”]
"I charge you that although the burden of establishing his insanity or unsoundness of mind at the time of the alleged offense be not successfully carried by the defendant, so as to authorize his acquittal on this ground, it is nevertheless the duty of the jury to consider the evidence touching the alleged insanity in connection with the other evidence in the case; and if, in view of all the evidence, the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, he should be given the benefit of that doubt and should be acquitted . . .
"The question of insanity is a question of fact, as I have said, to be determined by you. If you believe that the defendant committed the act charged against him in this bill of indictment, but that at the time of its commission, he was mentally incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to that act, then you should acquit him. Likewise, if you have a reasonable doubt as to this, you should give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and acquit him.”
On recharge, the trial judge expressly struck from the charge those portions quoted above which appear in brackets, and instructed the jury not to consider those portions as part of the charge.
In my view, the charge, plus recharge, placed the burden upon the state to prove the defendant’s guilt, including intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. In my view, the jury was instructed that if they entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, including sanity, he was entitled to the benefit of that doubt and should be *682acquitted. In my view, the charge, plus recharge, when taken as a whole, did not violate the requirement of In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (90 SC 1068, 25 LE2d 368), that due process "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . ,” including sanity.