Court Opinion

ID: 9544441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:55:39.434058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:00.428661
License: Public Domain

THOENTON, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the main conclusion of the majority opinion, namely, that the right to obtain a petition for a writ of review expressly granted by OES 342.905 (8) was by implication taken away by OES 183.480. The majority reaches this result by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal.
The reasons for my disagreement may be summarized as follows:
(1) An examination of the legislative history of the Teacher Tenure Law indicates to me a legislative intention to retain the writ of review provision (OES 342.905 (8)) as a part of the law, rather than to eliminate it; and
*45(2) Writ of review and appeal are two different remedies. The two provisions involved here are not repugnant to each other. Hence this is not a proper case for the application of the rule of implied repeal.
Taking up the first point, an examination of the legislative history of ORS 342.905 (8)① shows that this subsection was originally enacted as part of former ORS 342.945. That section provided as follows:
“(1) Any permanent teacher who has been dismissed by action of the board after a hearing pursuant to ORS 342.935 shall have the right to appeal from the decision of the board to the circuit court for the county in which the permanent teacher is employed. The appeal shall be filed within a period of 30 days after notification of the decision of the board. The procedure shall be as nearly as possible the same as an appeal from a circuit court to the Supreme Court in equity suits but no undertaking on appeal shall be required. The cost of preparing the transcript on appeal shall be borne by the board,
“(2) Nothing in ORS 342.805 to 342.955 precludes a permanent teacher from obtaining a writ of review as provided in ORS 34.010 to 34.100 after a hearing pursuant to either ORS 342.925 or 342.935 for the purpose of reviewing the findings and order, if any, authorized by ORS 342.925 or 342.935.”
It will be noted that the above statute granted the right to obtain a writ of review only to the employe, i.e., the discharged teacher.
*46The 1971 legislature in overhauling the entire Teacher Tenure Law'made two significant changes in former OHS 342.945. First, it eliminated the appeal provision (OKS 342.945 (1)) but retained the writ of review provision. Second, it expanded the scope of OKS 342.945 (2) by giving the employer, namely, the district school board also, the right to obtain a writ of review. The effect of the. elimination of the appeal provision was to make such appeals subject to the general provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Thus it would appear that appeal and writ of review were treated as concurrent remedies both before and after the 1971 amendment.
Further, it is significant that the instant writ of review provision was not repealed in the 1971 comprehensive revision of the Administrative Procedures Act, in which the statutes dealing with the built-in review procedures of a large number of other administrative bodies were expressly repealed. The omission of the Teacher Tenure Law provision from this wholesale repeal is strong evidence that the legislature intended to retain the writ of review here.
Second, the above construction- is further supported by the intrinsic nature of the writ of review in this state.
A writ of review and an appeal provide two distinctly different remedies. A writ of review cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. Garnsey v. County Court, 33 Or 201, 54 P 539, 54 P 1089 (1898); Asher v. Pitchford, 167 Or 70, 115 P2d 337 (1941). The object of a writ of review is to keep inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction, and compel them to proceed regularly in the disposition of matters brought before *47them fox determination. Garnsey v. County Court, supra.
The writ of review is not interchangeable with the right of appeal, but lies only to correct errors in jurisdiction and irregularity in procedure, and not every error of law. Bechtold et al. v. Wilson et al., 182 Or 360, 186 P2d 525, 187 P2d 675 (1947). It is allowed only if the inferior tribunal exercised its judicial functions erroneously or exceeded his or its statutory jurisdiction to the injury of some substantial right of plaintiff. Miller v. Schrunk et al, 232 Or 383, 375 P2d 823 (1962); Vollmer v. Schrunk, 242 Or 196, 409 P2d 177 (1965) (specially concurring opinion of Oenecke, J;); Hochfeld v. Portland, 97 Or 572, 190 P 725, 192 P 911 (1920).
In my view the effect of the. 1971 amendment (ORS 342.905 (8)) was to preserve the.writ independent of the. existence of the right of appeal. This is the same conclusion our Supreme Court reached in Bechtold et al. v. Wilson et al., supra, in considering an earlier amendment of the writ of review statute.
It has been held that writ of review and appeal may not be availed of at the same time, notwithstanding the fact that the two remedies are concurrent. Kamm v. City of Portland, 132 Or 311, 285 P 240 (1930).
In interpreting a statute the court cannot insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted, and when there are several provisions such construction is to be adopted as will give effect to all. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bean, 167 Or 535, 119 P2d 575 (1941).
Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored by the law. Wampler v. Dept. of State Police, *48224 Or 439, 355 P2d 238 (1960). TMs is not a proper case to apply this rule of statutory interpretation. It is only where two Acts are so plainly inconsistent that they cannot stand together that the latter will repeal the former by implication. Rorick v. Dalles City, 140 Or 342, 12 P2d 762 (1932); Pacific Elevator Co. v. Portland, 65 Or 349, 133 P 72 (1913); Cunningham v. Klamath Lake R. Co., 54 Or 13, 101 P 213, 101 P 1099 (1909).
The majority opinion makes reference to testimony by the Attorney General and one of his assistants before a committee of the 1971 legislature as to what that office was intending to bring about— elimination of the multiplicity of judicial review provisions. But this type of evidence cannot override express legislation which is directly to the contrary.
A court is not authorized to rewrite a statute or ignore the plain meaning of unambiguous words. Fullerton v. Lamm, 177 Or 655, 163 P2d 941, 165 P2d 63 (1946). It should declare what the legislature has done, not what it should have done. Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson et al., 183 Or 305, 193 P2d 543 (1948).

 ORS 342.905 (8) provides:
“Nothing in ORS 342.200 and 342.805 to. 342.955 precludes a permanent teacher or a district school board from obtaining a writ of review as provided in ORS 34.010 to 34.100 after a hearing pursuant to this section for the purpose of reviewing the findings and order, if any, of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board.”