Court Opinion

ID: 9781049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:06:02.081349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:02.056519
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 22-1633
                               Filed August 30, 2023

STEPHEN CRAIG LEONARD,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Don E. Courtney,

Judge.

      Stephen Craig Leonard appeals the denial of his application for

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

      Elizabeth K. Elsten, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Ahlers and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                          2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

       Stephen Leonard appeals the district court’s denial of his application for

postconviction relief (PCR), contending his trial counsel was ineffective in advising

him to waive trial by a jury, in failing to secure an expert witness, and in failing to

depose one of the State’s witnesses. Upon review, we affirm.

   I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

       On August 22, 2018, Clay County Deputy Sheriff Heck served a civil

summons on Leonard at his home. During this encounter, Heck stated he detected

the smell of “raw marijuana” emanating from the residence and immediately

applied for a search warrant. Upon grant of the warrant, authorities executed the

search later that same night. An emptied pill bottle containing marijuana, a second

bottle with marijuana residue, and marijuana seeds were found as a result.

Leonard was later charged with possession of a controlled substance, marijuana,

third or subsequent offense.

       During the proceedings, Leonard filed two pro se pretrial motions: (1) to

suppress the evidence obtained from the search and (2) for appointment of an

expert witness to testify at a suppression hearing. He alleged evidence was

obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; more specifically, he asserted the

search warrant application and Deputy Heck’s accompanying affidavit did not

satisfy probable cause. The trial court denied both motions, determining that

appointing an expert would deviate from the four corners of the warrant application

and was not a necessity, and further determining that Deputy Heck’s affidavit,

combined with his qualifications and experience, were a sufficient basis for
                                          3

probable cause.    Following these pretrial motions, Leonard applied for court-

appointed counsel, and trial counsel entered his appearance.

       Leonard waived his right to a jury trial, and a trial on the minutes occurred

on July 1, 2019. Leonard was ultimately convicted, and the conviction affirmed

upon appeal. See State v. Leonard, No. 19-1863, 2020 WL 4201807, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Jul. 22, 2020). He promptly filed a PCR application, contending his trial

counsel was ineffective in advising him to waive trial by a jury, in failing to secure

an expert witness, and in failing to depose one of the State’s witnesses. This

application was denied and now comes before us on appeal.

   II. Review.

       “We ordinarily review . . . PCR applications for corrections of errors at law.”

Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019) (citations omitted). But because

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims raise constitutional issues, we review the

denial of PCR applications raising such claims de novo. Id.

   III. Discussion.

       On appeal, Leonard contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he

breached three essential duties: (1) counsel allowed a jury trial waiver that was not

voluntary and intelligent, (2) counsel failed to reasonably investigate available

defenses by not requesting an expert witness, and (3) counsel failed to depose a

key witness, Deputy Heck. “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the claimant must satisfy the two-prong test by proving that his trial counsel

failed to perform an essential duty and prejudice resulted.” State v. Majors, 940

N.W.2d 372, 391 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted) (describing the two-prong test for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466
                                           4

U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).       Both elements must be proven for the claim to be

successful. Id. For the first prong, we presume counsel performed competently

unless proven otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence, measured

objectively against the prevailing professional norms.          Id.   To establish the

prejudice required for the second prong, “the claimant must prove by a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s failure to perform an essential duty, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted). All issues were

properly preserved and we address each in turn.

   A. Waiver of Jury Trial.

       First, Leonard argues trial counsel failed to fully advise him of his right to a

jury trial, resulting in a waiver that was not voluntary or intelligent. Additionally, he

contends trial counsel used coercion to obtain a jury trial waiver. The right to a

jury trial must be strictly observed absent a voluntary and intelligent waiver. See

State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Iowa 2008); see also Iowa R. Crim.

P. 2.17(1). This requires both a written waiver and a court-conducted colloquy

advising a defendant of their rights. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d at 705-06 (citing State

v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 2003)).

       Leonard underwent questioning on the record before the written waiver was

accepted. The district court found Leonard fully understood his rights and was

motivated to waive them for strategic purposes. Leonard’s decision to waive was

motivated by the ability to appeal the validity of the search warrant. We agree with

the district court that Leonard’s waiver was voluntary and intelligent. Trial counsel

has no affirmative duty beyond the constitutional and statutory requirements to
                                            5

ensure that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Therefore, a breach

of duty has not been established on this basis.

        We also find no evidence of coercive tactics used to obtain a waiver.

Leonard’s reasoning for this claim is a statement made by trial counsel on the

record: “I’m not going to show up here for a three-day jury trial when I know all that

evidence is coming in, and for the most part know what the verdict is going to be.”

In contrast, the State counterargues that the statement was taken out of context.

Instead, it was trial counsel’s response when asked to explain his strategy for

recommending a trial on the minutes. Absent additional evidence of coercion,

Leonard similarly fails to satisfy his burden of establishing breach of an essential

duty.

        Even if Leonard had established breach, we find he has failed to establish

prejudice. Despite later testimony at the PCR hearing that Leonard regretted the

decision to waive a trial by jury, this is insufficient to establish actual prejudice, and

his burden is similarly left unmet. We reject his ineffective-assistance challenge

on this theory.

   B. Investigation and Expert Witness Testimony.

        Next, Leonard contends trial counsel failed to reasonably investigate and

re-assert the suppression issue at trial. The test we use is based on “reasonable

professional judgments” with “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. The entirety of the circumstances is

considered to make this determination.           Id.   Leonard asserts an expert was

necessary to determine the human’s ability to smell raw marijuana kept in a closed

container in the rear of a residence.           But State-expensed experts are only
                                          6

appointed upon a showing of necessity, see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.20(4), and we

agree with the district court that no expert was necessary here.            Leonard’s

arguments focus on the prior suppression ruling, not on trial counsel’s alleged

failures once appointed. There is no duty to raise issues without legal merit. See

State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Iowa 2009). As the suppression issue had

been decided and preserved for later appeal, no other meritorious claims were left

to be made.    Moreover, because the decision to not request an expert was

strategic, weight is given to trial counsel’s reasonable professional judgment.

State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 206 (Iowa 2019) (citing Carroll, 767 N.W.2d

at 645.). Leonard has not adequately established that his trial counsel breached

an essential duty.

      There is also no prejudicial impact. Leonard argues the suppression ruling

determined the admissibility of the marijuana itself; its exclusion would then have

an immediate effect on the case outcome and result in prejudice. But this issue

was already preserved for appeal and introduction of an expert would likely not

change the outcome. Therefore, Leonard’s ineffective-assistance claim fails in this

regard.

   C. Deposition of Deputy Heck.

      Leonard’s final claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to depose

Deputy Heck, a key witness.        He implies refusal to depose requires some

affirmatively stated strategic purpose. Using the same Strickland analysis, we

disagree. Whether to take a deposition is a strategy-grounded decision, primarily

based on its utility at trial. Kellogg v. State, 288 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1980).

Leonard again fails to satisfy his burden. There is no pervasive duty by trial
                                          7

counsel to defend their choice of strategy not to take a deposition. Rather, the

exercise of judgment is given a “strong presumption” in our review. Harrison, 914

N.W.2d at 206 (citation omitted).      Here, trial counsel employed professional

reasoning in his decision to not take the deposition, and we give such a decision

deferential weight. Accordingly, we find no breach of essential duty has been

established. Further, actual prejudice cannot be found solely based on the lack of

opposition at the suppression hearing, as determined previously. We therefore

reject Leonard’s third and final ineffective-assistance claim.

   IV. Disposition

       Because Leonard failed to prove either breach of an essential duty by his

trial counsel or prejudice, we find he did not establish ineffective assistance of

counsel in connection with any of the three grounds asserted in this appeal.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Leonard’s PCR application.

       AFFIRMED.