Court Opinion

ID: 9575749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:16:40.528746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:57.425298
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(concurring). The record does not disclose that Recorder’s Court Judge George Murphy committed error in denying defendant’s motion to suppress or that the trial judge, Recorder’s Court judge John P. O’Hara, erred in finding, in his opinion on motion for new trial, that:
“In view of the permission given by the defendant with his attorney’s approval, the entry could not have been illegal or unreasonable. In searching as they did the police were performing their duty at the scene of the crime. * * * The consent and advice of defendant removed any objections, if any is valid, to the return of the police later in the day to continue their investigation.”
Justice' Kavanagh’s conclusion is based on a purported statement of the prosecuting attorney in his brief opposing defendant’s motion to suppress, before Judge Murphy, that Detective-Sergeant Harris informed defendant his home would he searched even though he did not grant them permission and give them the key. It is admitted that the record does not disclose that such a statement was made at the hearing before Judge Murphy, or was even considered by him. ;
Defendant’s attorney cross-examined Sergeant Harris at the trial and at no time, intimated that defendant gave permission because of coercion, op *301referred (then or at any time in defendant’s brief) to the statement contained in the prosecuting attorney’s brief, namely that the police “were going to continue the investigation of the crime whether or not they had keys.”
Defendant in his testimony makes no reference to this point and admits giving Sergeant Harris permission to enter his home, as is shown by the following:
“Q. Reverend Kaigler, I direct your attention to the morning of January 14,1959, when yon were under arrest and on the 9th floor of police headquarters and to a conversation which you had with Detective-Sergeant David Harris concerning going out to your house. Would you repeat that conversation the best you can? * * *
“A. He said they wanted to go out and make some pictures, wanted to know how to get into the house. I told them I didn’t have a key, but I thought the kitchen- — the window on the south side of the house was unlocked, perhaps they could get in that way.”
Not only the lack of reference by defendant to the prosecuting attorney’s statement, but the testimony of Sergeant Harris at the trial also refutes a conclusion that we should declare an illegal search because the prosecutor in his brief indicated defendant’s home was going to be searched even if defendant did not give the keys to the police, as is evidenced by the following excerpts from Detective Harris’ testimony at the trial:
“We were met at the homicide bureau 4th floor room 432 by Attorney Early and Attorney Massey, and several members of the church. I talked to Early, Attorney Early, and told him that Detective Backman and myself would like to go out to the house, and we would like to gain entrance through the house but we did not have the keys. Would he ask his client, Mr. Kaigler, if it was possible that he *302might still have the keys on his person. He agreed to do that. * * *
“I went with Attorney Early to the 9th floor of police headquarters, to the rear portion of the cells, and were met by Mr. Kaigler, Reverend Kaigler and talked to Reverend Kaigler, that is, Early and myself, and we were informed by the reverend that the keys were probably still in the house at the time of his arrest. He did not have them with him, and he was sure the officers locked the door on the way out.
“We then asked if it was anyway possible to get into the house. We were informed by the reverend that it was possible that if we went around to the side it was the side where the driveway was, through the rear of the house was a sunroom which was used as an office and there is a side door there. He said it is possible if you use a skeleton key or possibly a knife you could pull back the door, the lock, and get in that way. We asked him if it was possible if we couldn’t get in that way, could we break a little portion of glass out to gain admission. He said it was quite all right with him. Then he said, Well, wait a minute. I have an alternative method. Maybe,’ he said, ‘on the side, in the dining room, I usually leave the center window open.’ He said, ‘It is possible if that is open you can go in through that way.’ * * *
“We tried the back door but I guess we weren’t very good burglars, we couldn’t get into there, so we went around to the side, and Dokendorf being the smaller of Backman and I, we would probably get stuck in the window — went up on the car which was parked alongside the window, dining room window, and Dokendorf, Patrolman Dokendorf climbed to the porch, the top of the car, opened the window, which was open, which was unlocked.
“Q. The same window ?
“A. Same window described by the reverend.
“Q. The defendant had indicated?
“A. That is right, and got into the house.”
*303Appellant’s first question under “Statement of Questions Involved” is as follows:
“Did the lower court commit reversible error in failing to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress, evidence, namely the tape recording, for the reason that such was the product of an unlawful search and seizure?”
"VVe answer that question “No.”
We grant, however, appellant’s prayer of relief “that this case be reversed and remanded for a new trial” under 2 other questions presented, namely questions 6 and 9:
“Question 6: Did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the introduction of the tape recording, exhibit 21, for the reason that such was a denial of appellant’s constitutional privileges of due process guaranteed to appellant by the Constitution of the State of Michigan and by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that the exhibit was surreptitiously acquired and was so highly inflammatory and prejudicial?”
“Question 9: Did the trial court commit reversible error in permitting the prosecutor upon cross-examination of the defendant to extensively interrogate defendant concerning his premarital sex relations with the deceased, adultery, legitimacy of defendant’s adopted children, and the financial relationships between the defendant and his deceased wife and between the defendant and his former wife?”
Referring to question 6, appellant in his brief states:
“That the contents of the recording were so highly inflammatory and prejudicial in the eyes of the jury as to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. Of course, any evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory is damaging to the defendant. But there are limits to what the prosecution may intro*304duce. And even admitting, per arguendo, that the recording was properly authenticated and was part of the res gestae, and that selected portions of the tape could have been played to the jury (or transcribed on paper and read to the jury, see United States v. McKeever [CCA 2], 271 F2d 669), nevertheless we contend error was committed by playing the entire tape. The tape must be heard to appreciate our position, but it contains detailed, explicit and uneuphemistic discussion and argument concerning financial, domestic, marital, sexual, and religious matters, problems of unfaithfulness, and obscene and self-serving remarks of a nature which could not otherwise be gotten into evidence.”
As to question 9, appellant says:
“The tape resulted in introducing into the trial a scattershot of issues having nothing whatsoever to do with the guilt or innocence of the accused, and very little to do with anything else of relevance. The effect of permitting that tape to be introduced, along with permitting the prosecutor to roam unfettered upon so many irrelevant issues during cross-examination, could have as its exclusive purpose and result the prejudicing of the minds of the jurors against the defendant. The matters were irrelevant and inflammatory and of hindrance rather than of assistance in the search for truth.”
Defendant was cross-examined in regard to his sexual relations with his wife previous to their marriage; whether he was the father of his wife’s children which he adopted after marriage; the facts relating to his having been married 3 times; whether his second wife accused him of infidelity; how much property he acquired while being pastor of his first church; how many pieces of property he bought while he was a minister; his annual income; the facts regarding his transfers from different churches and the reasons for his leaving; whether it was not a fact *305lie had been asked to resign by his superiors, and how he got his severance pay.
The following questions and answers are but a sample of the improper cross-examination of defendant:
“Q. At that time, before you left the Madison church, weren’t you making around $10,000 a year?
“A. No.
“Q. How much were you making?
“A. Wasn’t making that.
“Mr. Early: I object, going into his finances again. I don’t see any relevancy.
“The Court: Well, the question has arisen here about why he left one church. I don’t know what Mr. Ziskie is going to develop from it but it has a bearing upon the integrity of the witness. I think it is proper.
“Mr. Ziskie: Thank you, your Honor.
“Q. (By Mr. Ziskie, continuing): If you weren’t making $10,000 a year, Kaigler, how much were you making before you left the Madison church ?
“A. One hundred dollars a week is all I ever made, sir.
“Q. Are you sure?
“A. That’s right.
“Q. Well, didn’t you and your — in your own answer to your wife’s bill of complaint for divorce say you made more than that ?
“A. She said it; I didn’t.
“Q. didn’t you say it?
“A. No.
“Q. Didn’t you get $25 a month for your car ?
“A. No.
“Q. You didn’t?
“A. No.
“Q. How much did you get for your car?
“A. None at all.
“Q. You got no car allowance whatsoever?
“A. Tha-t is right, none at all.
“Q. You sure about that?
“A. That is right.
*306“Q. Without contradiction?
“A. That is right, without true contradiction.
“Q. Pardon me?
“A. Without true contradiction.
“Q. Now, making $100 a week at that time, how many pieces of property did you have at the same time?
“Mr. Early: I am going to object to that. I really don’t see the relevancy, going through the property, back and forth.
“The Court: Well, this has a bearing upon his disputes with the deceased.
“Mr. Early: That is while he is married to his second wife.
“Mr. Zishie: I said while he was on Madison.
“Mr. Early: Well, he was married.
“Mr. Zishie: He had already known Clara at that time.
“Mr. Early: He is married to the second wife then. I don’t see where it is proper.
“The Court: I think he may go into it.
“Mr. Zishie: All right.
“The Witness: Do I have to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’?
“Q. (By Mr. Ziskie, continuing): No. I asked you how many pieces of property did you own at the time that you were making $100 a week and didn’t get any car allowance?”
We agree with the appellant that: “The effect of permitting that tape to be introduced, along with permitting the prosecutor to roam unfettered upon so many irrelevant issues during cross-examination, could have as its exclusive purpose and result the prejudicing of the minds of the jurors against the defendant. The matters were irrelevant and inflammatory and of hindrance rather than of assistance in the search for truth.”
The following from our decision in People v. Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 718, 719, is applicable to this type of cross-examination:
*307“The prosecutor contends that the aforementioned cross-examination was for the purpose of testing the memory and credibility of the defendant. We think, however, that the interrogation went far beyond the boundaries of permissible cross-examination. Such an examination could have been for no other purpose than to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors. The tactics pursued have been previously condemned in People v. Gotshall, 123 Mich 474; People v. Dowell, 136 Mich 306; and People v. Wright, 294 Mich 20.”
The playing of the tape before the jury required 70 minutes and because it was too difficult for the reporter to separate the background television programs that could be heard from the words of defendant and wife, the reporter made no effort to take down and report the tape.
In a written opinion denying defendant’s motion for a new trial the trial court stated:
“The tape does reveal that as the evening lengthened, the tempo of the discussions between defendant and his wife became more violent. Among the passages were accusations of infidelity, recriminations of personal conduct of both parties, frank remarks of intimate relations between the 2 individuals, as well as discussions of property owned by them. There were statements about shooting, among them being a statement by defendant ‘I’ll blow your G-od dam brains out.’ Also when reminded by deceased he would go to Jackson if he shot her, he said he did not care as he was an old man who didn’t have many more years to live and he didn’t mind spending the rest of them in Jackson.”
Upon retrial this statement of the trial court, or one similar, would bring before the jury the salient facts, and if defendant so desires this be done instead of playing the tape, such a procedure should be adopted. Such a course would establish that there was a violent quarrel preceding the shooting, in-*308eluding accusations of infidelity, disputes in regard to property, et cetera, but it would prevent confusing-the jury by introducing testimony endeavoring to-prove the truth or falsity of the numerous irrelevant accusations.
Defendant-appellant’s prayer that this case be reversed and remanded for new trial is granted.
Otis M. Smith, J., concurred with Kelly, J.