Court Opinion

ID: 9754579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:04:48.735944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.815497
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
I join in the opinion of the majority and find that it accurately applies the prior holdings of both our court and the Supreme Court to the facts in this case.
I have become increasingly disturbed, however, by the growing trend in our courts to consolidate separate and distinct bills of indictment and try a defendant on them at one trial. Thus, in the instant case, appellant was tried on no less than nine separate charges of burglary and either rape or assault with intent to ravish.
“The justification for a liberal rule on joinder of offenses appears to be the economy of a single trial.” Drew v. United States, 331 F. 2d 85, 88 (1964). This justification seems rather tenuous in the framework of *77our judicial system which strives so mightily for the rights of the accused. Nonetheless, we have been very hesitant in reversing the discretionary judgment of the lower courts, despite the potential dangers inherent in this practice.
Despite our liberality, however, I have long felt that the trial courts might themselves see fit to impose a greater self-restraint and, by so doing, guard against the intrusion of prejudice in trials.
In the instant case, for example, each of the nine victims of the terrible crimes testified one after the other. Each described succinctly and plainly what had happened to her. Our majority opinion correctly points out that each of the nine indictments Avas kept separate for the jury’s consideration. On its face, no prejudice appears. But can Ave be sure of the reaction of the jury to nine such consecutive stories? Was the testimony of each witness truly convincing and sufficient in itself to convict? Or, rather, did the ultimate verdicts represent an amalgam of all of the evidence insofar as it related to one defendant? May we not with reason doubt that this jury, composed of twelve individuals who were not learned in the laAV, considered separately each of the nine indictments?
Significantly, appellant complains that his attorney was inadequate, since he advised appellant not to testify on his own behalf. The majority opinion correctly points out that we will not attempt to guess at the reasons for counsel’s trial stratagems. It is not unreal to suppose, however, that counsel was forced into this position by the joinder of the many indictments. Perhaps counsel would have preferred that appellant testify on some of these charges, if they had been tried separately. It is certainly clear that this practice may often compel an attorney to select a defense which will best accommodate itself to all of the charges joined, rather than allow him to present the best case in defending against each individual charge.
*78The potentiality of such prejudice to the defendant, a prejudice which is virtually impossible to detect, should be considered fully and carefully by the courts. Without such careful consideration, much of the protection which we seek for the accused in our courts may be lost inadvertently and unknowingly. In making these determinations, judges might do well to bear in mind the statement of Hawkins, J., in Queen v. King, 1 Q.B. 214, 216 (1897) :
“. . . I pause here to express my decided opinion that it is a scandal that an accused person should be put to answer such an array of counts containing, as these do, several distinct charges. Though not illegal, it is hardly fair to put a man upon his trial on such an indictment, for it is almost impossible that he should not be grievously prejudiced as regards each one of the charges by the evidence which is being given upon the others.”