Court Opinion

ID: 9480187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:40:58.239043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:32.442534
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority today holds that both the district courts and the Court of Appeals *617have jurisdiction under § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185) to review non-final awards of arbitrators. (Maj. Op. at 611-12) It does so notwithstanding the clear statement by authorities, including a prior panel of this court,1 which have expressly addressed this issue and held otherwise. This court has previously held:
We must determine whether the [arbitration] panel determination was final and binding within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 185. If it was not, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to vacate it.
Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. Systems Council U-2, 703 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir.1983). (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion seeks to distinguish Systems Council U-2 by characterizing the jurisdictional rule found in it, and in Millmen Local 550 v. Wells Exterior Trim, 828 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987), as “prudential” and not “jurisdictional” (Maj. Op. at 613-14) and then going on to hold that prudence dictates that we take jurisdiction despite the fact that the arbitrator’s award here is not final. (Maj. Op. at 614).
I therefore dissent from the majority’s judgment, which holds, contrary to Systems Council U-2, that we have jurisdiction to review Arbitrator Das’s arbitration award — an award which decided only the company’s liability but has yet to decide the remedy. Rather, I would dismiss the union’s appeal and remand to the district court with the direction that it do so as well. Neither court, district or appellate, has jurisdiction to enforce or vacate the awards of an arbitrator that are not final, as is the case here.
I.
The majority’s approach to this case is seriously flawed. First and foremost, this court has stated expressly and unequivocally that an arbitrator’s award which resolves only the issue of liability, and as a consequence does not resolve the issue of remedy, is not final and binding and no jurisdiction is available in federal courts under § 301 to confirm or vacate such a determination. See Systems Council U-2, 703 F.2d at 70.
In so holding, this court specifically addressed the issue of jurisdiction, and found it wanting, stating:
We hold that under the present circumstances the [arbitration] panel’s determination of liability was not a final award within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 185. As such, the district court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the determination.
Systems Council U-2, 703 F.2d at 70.
We went on to amplify our holding — a holding and not merely dicta, as the majority opinion characterizes it (Maj. Op. at 614), that:
The present arbitration decision partakes of all the attributes of an interim order. Review of the decision at this stage would disrupt and delay the arbitration process and could result in piecemeal litigation. If this court should reverse the district court’s determination and uphold the [arbitration] panel’s liability determination and the parties did not thereafter agree upon a remedy, the [arbitration] panel would be required to impose one. The company could then repetition the district court to review that remedy. We *618see no legitimate reason for allowing such piecemeal litigation.

Id.

It must be obvious that if the district court in Systems Council U-2 had no jurisdiction, jurisdiction in our Court was similarly lacking. Accordingly, in this case, where the district court was admittedly without jurisdiction under the doctrine of Systems Council U-2 (Maj. Op. at 611), when it entertained the union’s action seeking to enforce the arbitrator’s liability decision, our jurisdiction is lacking as well.
Nor is the majority’s attempt to bolster its analysis by reliance on Hart v. Overseas National Airways, Inc., 541 F.2d 386 (3d Cir.1976) a convincing exercise (Maj. Op. at 613 n. 4). Hart at no time addressed the jurisdictional issue that is at the heart of Systems Council U-2’s holding. Hart did not address jurisdiction as an issue. Indeed, no such issue was ever briefed by the parties or heard by the court. The fact that a court decides a case, and resolves a dispute, does not necessarily provide authority for the proposition that jurisdiction was properly invoked; unless the court specifically addresses the issue of jurisdiction — which Hart did not. See, e.g., Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 2775, 49 L.Ed.2d 672 (1976) (“Making the assumption, then, without deciding, that our jurisdiction in this cause is established, we affirm ... ’’); Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 94 S.Ct. 3039, 41 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1974) (same); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969) (same). Thus, the suggestion by the majority that Systems Council U-2 is not binding on a subsequent panel of this court because it is at tension with Hart, is clearly wrong.
Secondly, the majority opinion, relying wholly on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Maj. Op. at 612-13), argues that because that statute confers jurisdiction only with respect to final judgments while § 301 is not similarly limited, “we may establish only prudential doctrines restricting the exercise of jurisdiction.” The essence of this argument is that any jurisdictional grant not encompassed or found in the text of § 1291 must necessarily be prudential in nature. However this argument ignores the entire body of jurisprudence establishing jurisdiction in federal courts under the “collateral order” doctrine, a judicially crafted doctrine not found in § 1291, but certainly not prudential in nature; See Cohen v. Beneficial Industries Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) (and progeny); Wright & Miller, 15 Federal Practice & Procedure § 3911; 9 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 110.10, 13[9]. To the extent that the collateral order doctrine is, as the majority classifies it, a judicial interpretation of the final order doctrine of § 1291 (Maj. Op. at 612-14), so too is § 301. See Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir.1988). (“The leading case in this circuit analyzing arbitration orders under section 1291 is Rogers v. Sobering Comp. [262 F.2d 180 (3rd Cir.1959) ] where Judge Maris, writing for the in banc court, set forth the rule that an order requiring arbitration is appealable as final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ... ”); Gavlik Construction Co. v. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1975) (same).
Thirdly, in addition to having offended this court’s Internal Operating Procedures by having ignored the express holding of Systems Council U-2, the majority opinion has also disregarded a cardinal principle of jurisdictional jurisprudence: that is, both the bench and the bar must know without qualification when an order may be appealed.
Nor is it an answer to this dilemma to state that review of incomplete arbitration awards will be sought infrequently. We need only refer to the very cases cited throughout the majority opinion to belie that proposition; e.g. Systems Council U-2 (Maj. Op. at 610-12), Millmen Local 550 (Maj. Op. at 611-12), and Hart (Maj. Op. at 611-12, 613-14). Where jurisdiction is uncertain, an “obscure-line” rule, a rule which creates only uncertainty, cannot serve the purposes of a “bright-line” rule.
Justice Scalia stated this principle well in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202-03, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988) when he wrote:
*619The time of appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear_ Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line rule, which accords with traditional understanding, that a decision on the merits is a “final decision” for purposes of § 1291 whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for attorney’s fees attributable to the case.
(Emphasis added.)
The problem inherent in failing to delineate the precise event giving rise to jurisdiction to review was previously encountered by this court in an analogous situation when we held that there were two different, mutually contradictory times to appeal a decision properly. In Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.1977), we held that an order requiring payment of monies was not final and could not be appealed until quantified to a specific amount. In Delong v. Raymond Int’l, Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1138 n. 3 (3rd Cir.1980) we reached a contrary result and held that the time to file an appeal commenced after a decision on the merits, even if damages had not yet been awarded. These conflicting opinions, much as Systems Council U-2 conflicts with the majority holding here, left the bench and bar in the untenable position of not knowing when an appeal had to be noticed. That dispute was not resolved until our in banc decision in Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division), 662 F.2d 975 (3rd Cir.1981) (in banc) which adopted the Richerson rule. True, the Supreme Court sometime later in White v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982) opted for a different rule, to which of course we now subscribe. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 628, 635 (3rd Cir.1982). The point that I make, however, is that no responsible court should permit or encourage uncertainty as to when review is available. Yet, that is precisely what the majority has chosen to do here in the face of binding prior precedent.
Just as the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Company, 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) and Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988), has adopted a bright line rule as to the time when jurisdiction vests (because of the need for clear and unambiguous jurisprudence where jurisdiction is involved), so too we should seek consistency in this circuit’s jurisprudence. That consistency with respect to jurisdiction can now only be achieved by an in banc decision of the Court.
The holding of the majority, even if it were not in direct conflict with Systems Council U-2, embarks down a path which does not provide the needed instruction to the bench and the bar. Rather, it allows for “jurisdiction” to be granted in some cases and denied in others, based upon whatever prudential factors a particular panel, hearing a particular case, may find attractive. If the majority’s prudential rule controls, will every bifurcated arbitration award be immediately appealable? If so, how is the rule of Systems Council U-2 to be squared with the rule in this case? Will litigants be compelled to comply with both rules thereby leading in some cases to fragmented and piecemeal appeals, a result disapproved by this court in Systems Council U-2, 703 F.2d at 69-70, and the Supreme Court in United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 3082, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 (1982)? Or will it lead, as I suggest it will, to multiple appeals in all cases similar to the instant proceeding, a result that can only impose onerous burdens onto reviewing courts? This is particularly so given that the majority has not specified the prudential factors it will consider in deciding if jurisdiction should be asserted before a final decision is rendered by the arbitrator.2
*620II.
I have dissented from the majority opinion and judgment because I would dismiss the union’s appeal rather than entertain it and reach the merits as the majority has done. I would also remand to the district court with directions that the district court vacate its order of May 23, 1988 and all subsequent orders in that the district court had no jurisdiction to act on a non-final order of arbitrator Das.3
My dissent is based on three grounds. First, the majority decision involves the very power of the federal courts — its jurisdiction — to enforce and then review arbitration decisions. Without doubt, this issue involves a question of exceptional importance. See IOP 8B(2). Second, the majority’s decision has violated our longstanding policy to honor, and not conflict with, published precedent of the Court. See IOP 8B(1). (See n. 1) Third, the majority decision cannot help but engender confusion and uncertainty as to if, and when, enforcement and review of a bifurcated arbitrator’s award is available. These transgressions by the majority call out for resolution by this court in banc.
ON REHEARING AND REHEARING IN BANC
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, Chief Judge, and SLOVITER, BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge.
The petition for rehearing filed by appel-lee in the above-entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.
Judge Hutchinson would have granted rehearing.
Judge Cowen dissents from the denial of in banc rehearing for the reasons noted in Judge Garth’s dissent to the panel opinion.

. As this circuit’s Internal Operating Procedure 8C ("Policy of Avoiding Intra-Circuit Conflict of Precedent”) states:
It is the tradition of this court that reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to overrule a published opinion of this court.
To the extent that the majority deems the holding in Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. Systems Council U-2, 703 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir.1983) to be incorrect, the proper, and indeed the only, method to change that holding is by an in banc rehearing. Internal Operating Procedure 8B states that rehearing will not be ordered except:
(1) Where consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or
(2) where the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
Both criteria are met here.

. In departing from the teaching of Systems Council U-2, the majority relies on only one prudential fact. The factor that it identifies is that this appeal arises from a post-judgment motion entitled "Union’s Motion to Remand to Arbitrator Shyam Das”, and which the majority characterizes as a “motion to enforce." The motion to enforce was brought more than a year after the district court’s order of May 23, 1988 granting summary judgment in the union’s favor.
*620I am at a loss to understand why the majority believes prudence indicates that it should decide such a case when it concedes that it would have declined to review the original order, as the district court itself should have declined jurisdiction. If anything, such an approach allows a jurisdictionally “imprudent" decision — the initial hearing of the case by the district court — to stand.

. The majority opinion has misread my dissent (see Maj. Op. at n. 1). I do not, as the majority claims, characterize the majority's refusal to vacate the district court's original order as based upon "prudential” considerations (see supra, p. 609-10). What I have stated as the majority’s holding, and what the majority itself has held, is that this court’s jurisdiction on appeal is based upon prudential considerations — a vastly different matter, and one with which I disagree.
Under my analysis, the district court’s order of May 23, 1988 was entered without the court's power to do so, and thus without jurisdiction in the traditional and classical sense. The majority opinion concedes (Maj. Op. at 610-11) that fact by stating that had there been an appeal from the original order, the district court’s judgment would not have been upheld, and in “entertaining the original action, the district court acted contrary to the consistent teachings of this court and, so far as we are aware, every other Court of Appeals that has considered a similar issue.” Thus, the premise of footnote 1 of the majority’s opinion is without foundation.