Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:00:34.90793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:33.799622
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USCA11 Case: 23-10280    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 04/30/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10280
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        SANCHEZ MARQUITTE HICKS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00074-TWT-LTW-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10280

        Before NEWSOM, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
               After pleading guilty, Sanchez Hicks appeals his sentence of
        96 months’ imprisonment for two counts of possession of a
        ﬁrearm by a felon. On appeal, Hicks argues that his two prior
        Georgia convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
        do not qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2),
        which references the crime-of-violence deﬁnition in U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.2(a), and thus the district court erred in calculating his base
        oﬀense level.
               In United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311, 1313-20 (11th
        Cir. 2018), this Court held that a Georgia conviction for aggravated
        assault with a deadly weapon qualiﬁes as a “crime of violence”
        under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which uses a crime-of-violence deﬁnition
        contained in its commentary. The Morales-Alonso Court held that
        Georgia’s aggravated assault with a deadly weapon crime contains
        substantially the same elements as generic aggravated assault. Id.
        at 1317, 1320.
               Both § 4B1.2(a) and § 2L1.2’s commentary contain
        enumerated oﬀenses clauses that use materially identical language
        to deﬁne a “crime of violence” as a list of oﬀenses, and “aggravated
        assault” appears in both lists. For the reasons explained herein, we
        conclude that Hicks’s challenge to his base oﬀense level fails.
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        23-10280               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                I. BACKGROUND
               A grand jury indicted Hicks on two counts of possession of
        a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
        and 924(a)(2). Count One charged that Hicks possessed a ﬁrearm
        on May 26, 2017, and Count Two charged that he possessed a
        ﬁrearm on January 25, 2019. Hicks entered a non-negotiated plea
        of guilty to both counts.
              At sentencing, Hicks did not dispute that he had two
        Georgia aggravated assault convictions from 2009 and 2015. The
        2009 conviction was for assaulting two persons “with a deadly
        weapon, to wit: a handgun” by shooting them. The 2015
        conviction was for “an assault upon [a] person . . . with a handgun”
        during an attempted armed robbery.
               Given these two Georgia aggravated assault convictions, the
        presentence investigation report (“PSI”) recommended a base
        oﬀense level of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Under
        § 2K2.1(a)(2), a base oﬀense level of 24 applies when the defendant
        committed his ﬁrearm oﬀense after two felony convictions for a
        “crime of violence” as deﬁned in § 4B1.2(a), which includes
        “aggravated assault.” See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) & cmt. n.1,
        4B1.2(a)(2). Hicks objected to the PSI’s base oﬀense level of 24,
        arguing that his two Georgia convictions were not “crimes of
        violence.” Hicks maintained that Morales-Alonso did not foreclose
        his particular challenge.
              The district court overruled Hicks’s objection to
        § 2K2.1(a)(2)’s base oﬀense level, ﬁnding it was bound by our
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-10280

        Morales-Alonso holding that a Georgia conviction for aggravated
        assault with a deadly weapon qualiﬁes as a crime of violence. After
        making adjustments not relevant to this appeal, the district court
        calculated a total oﬀense level of 23, which with Hicks’s criminal
        history category of VI, yielded an advisory guidelines range of 92
        to 115 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a 96-
        month sentence on each felon-ﬁrearm conviction, to be served
        concurrently.
                                 II. DISCUSSION
        A.    Standard of Review
               We review de novo the interpretation and application of the
        Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272
        (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). We also review de novo whether an
        oﬀense is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the
        Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Harrison, 56 F.4th 1325, 1330
        (11th Cir. 2023).
        B.    Crime of Violence Under § 2K2.1(a)(2)
               The Sentencing Guidelines assign a base oﬀense level of 24
        for an oﬀense involving the possession of a ﬁrearm and/or
        ammunition by a convicted felon if the defendant committed the
        instant oﬀense after sustaining at least two felony convictions for a
        “crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Section 2K2.1 cross
        references U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) for the deﬁnition of a “crime of
        violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.1.
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        23-10280                Opinion of the Court                        5

               In turn, § 4B1.2(a) deﬁnes “crime of violence” as follows:
               (a) CRIME OF VIOLENCE.—The term “crime of
               violence” means any oﬀense under federal or state
               law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
               exceeding one year, that—
                     (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
                     threatened use of physical force against the
                     person of another; or
                     (2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter,
                     kidnapping, aravated assault, a forcible sex
                     oﬀense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or
                     unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm described in
                     26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as
                     deﬁned in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).
        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). The second clause, referred
        to as an enumerated oﬀenses clause, includes “aggravated assault”
        in the list of oﬀenses that are crimes of violence. Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
        C.     Morales-Alonso
               In Morales-Alonso, this Court squarely addressed a Georgia
        conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under
        O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). 878 F.3d at 1313-20. Morales-Alonso
        involved the deﬁnition of crime of violence applicable to U.S.S.G.
        § 2L1.2 (2015). Id. at 1313 & n.2.
              Like § 4B1.2(a)(2), § 2L1.2’s deﬁnition of “crime of
        violence,” found in its commentary, contained an enumerated
        oﬀenses clause, stating as follows:
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                23-10280

              “Crime of violence” means any of the following
              oﬀenses under federal, state, or local law: murder,
              manslaughter, kidnapping, aravated assault, forcible
              sex oﬀenses (including where consent to the conduct
              is not given or is not legally valid, such as where
              consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent,
              or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
              robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of
              credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any other oﬀense
              under federal, state, or local law that has as an
              element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
              physical force against the person of another.
        U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2015) (emphasis added); see
        Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d at 1314. While Morales-Alonso addressed
        the enumerated oﬀenses clause applicable to § 2L1.2, not the one
        found in § 4B1.2(a)(2), both clauses use materially identical
        language to deﬁne “crime of violence” as a list of oﬀenses, and
        both lists include the oﬀense of “aggravated assault.” Compare
        U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2015), with id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
               In Morales-Alonso, this Court held that a Georgia conviction
        for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-
        5-21(a)(2) qualiﬁed as a crime of violence under the enumerated
        oﬀenses clause in § 2L1.2’s deﬁnition of “crime of violence.” 878
        F.3d at 1313-20. Applying our prior decision in United States v.
        Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010), the Morales-Alonso
        Court explained that generic aggravated assault has two essential
        elements: (1) a criminal assault (2) that is accompanied by either
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        23-10280               Opinion of the Court                         7

        the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the victim or the use of
        a deadly weapon. Id. at 1315.
               The Morales-Alonso Court then looked to Georgia’s
        aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and concluded
        that (1) it was divisible as to its aggravator component, and (2) the
        defendant was convicted of the version of aggravated assault that
        involved the use of a deadly weapon. Id. at 1316-17. Next, the
        Court determined that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was not further
        divisible, so its essential elements were “(1) an assault, (2) that is
        committed ‘[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or
        instrument which, when used oﬀensively against a person, is likely
        to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.’” Id. at 1317.
                Comparing those elements to the elements of generic
        aggravated assault, the Morales-Alonso Court “conclude[d] that
        Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or other
        qualifying ‘object, device, or instrument’ in violation of O.C.G.A.
        § 16-5-21(a)(2) contains substantially the same elements as generic
        aggravated assault.” Id. The Court rejected the defendant’s
        argument that the Georgia statute was categorically broader than
        the generic oﬀense because it also encompassed assault “with an
        ‘object, device, or instrument’ that is ‘likely to or actually does
        result in serious bodily injury.’” Id. at 1317-20. The Court held that
        Georgia aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2)
        “satisﬁes the enumerated oﬀenses clause” of § 2L1.2. See generally
        id. at 1313-20.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10280

        D.    Hicks’s Claim
                Hicks argues that a Georgia conviction for aggravated
        assault with a deadly weapon does not qualify as a “crime of
        violence” under the enumerated oﬀenses clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2).
        Speciﬁcally, Hicks contends that the Georgia oﬀense requires a
        mens rea of only recklessness, whereas generic aggravated assault
        requires a mens rea of “extreme indiﬀerence to human life,” which
        Hicks terms “extreme indiﬀerence recklessness.” Hicks’s challenge
        is that the Georgia oﬀense is categorically broader than the generic
        oﬀense. Hicks’s claim fails for several reasons.
               First, our Court’s holding in Morales-Alonso forecloses
        Hicks’s claim. The Morales-Alonso Court held that Georgia
        aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualiﬁes as a crime of
        violence under the enumerated oﬀenses clause because it has
        “substantially the same” elements as generic aggravated assault. Id.
        at 1320. As already noted, the enumerated oﬀenses clauses for
        U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and § 4B1.2(a)(2) use nearly identical language to
        deﬁne “crime of violence” as a list of oﬀenses and “aggravated
        assault” appears in both lists. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt.
        n.1(B)(iii), with id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
               Absent indications to the contrary in the commentary, we
        interpret the same language used in two provisions of the
        Sentencing Guidelines consistently. United States v. Martinez, 964
        F.3d 1329, 1333-36, 1334 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (interpreting the
        phrase “another felony oﬀense” of drug traﬃcking in
        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) as consistent with the phrase “drug traﬃcking
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        23-10280               Opinion of the Court                          9

        oﬀense” deﬁned in the commentary to § 2L1.2). Nothing in the
        two guideline provisions or their commentary suggest that the two
        enumerated oﬀenses clauses—both listing aggravated assault—
        should be read diﬀerently here. Accordingly, we are bound by
        Morales-Alonso’s holding. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347,
        1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that under this Court’s prior panel
        precedent rule, a prior panel’s holding binds subsequent panels
        “unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of
        abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc”).
               Second, we recognize that Hicks contends that our prior
        panel precedent rule “has no role to play here” because the Morales-
        Alonso Court did not address his speciﬁc argument about the
        diﬀerent mens rea elements for Georgia and generic aggravated
        assault. Morales-Alonso’s conclusion that Georgia aggravated
        assault with a deadly weapon is not categorically broader than
        generic aggravated assault was necessary to our Court’s decision,
        and therefore constitutes a holding that binds future panels. See
        United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019); see also
        United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009)
        (explaining that the holding is what “was necessary to the result
        reached” and could not be “discarded without impairing the
        foundations of the holding”).
               Hicks’s challenge, essentially, is that Georgia aggravated
        assault with a deadly weapon is categorically broader than generic
        aggravated assault for a reason or argument that the Morales-Alonso
        panel failed to consider. But “there is no exception to the [prior
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10280

        panel precedent] rule where the prior panel failed to consider
        arguments raised before a later panel.” Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1198.
        Indeed, this Court has “categorically rejected an overlooked reason
        or argument exception to the prior-panel-precedent rule.” In re
        Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015). Nor is there an
        exception to the rule based on “a perceived defect in the prior
        panel’s reasoning or analysis as it relates to the law in existence at
        that time.” Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Smith v. GTE Corp., 236
        F.3d 1292, 1301-03 (11th Cir. 2001)).
               Third, Hicks relies on United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846
        (11th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 2457 (U.S. May 15, 2023), 1
        not for what it holds but for the fact that it declined to apply our
        prior panel precedent rule. We explain why Jackson is materially
        diﬀerent and does not apply here.
               In Jackson, this Court addressed whether the defendant’s
        Florida cocaine-related convictions were “serious drug oﬀenses”
        under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). 55 F.4th at 850-
        51. The ACCA deﬁnes a “serious drug oﬀense,” in part, as “an
        oﬀense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or
        possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled
        substance (as deﬁned in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21

        1 The grant of certiorari in Jackson is not about our prior panel precedent rule.

        The question in Jackson is whether the “serious drug offense” definition in the
        ACCA “incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time
        of the federal firearm offense . . . or . . . at the time of the prior state drug
        offense (as the Eleventh Circuit held below).” Jackson v. United States, No. 22-
        6640 (Question Presented Report).
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        23-10280               Opinion of the Court                         11

        U.S.C. [§] 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten
        years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)
        (emphasis added). Prior to Jackson, our Court held that this
        statutory “serious drug oﬀense” deﬁnition requires only that the
        state oﬀense “involve” the conduct of “manufacturing,
        distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or
        distribute” and does not require a generic-oﬀense matching
        exercise. See United States v. Xavier Smith, 983 F.3d 1213, 1222-23
        (11th Cir. 2020). Our Court also held that a “serious drug oﬀense”
        has no mens rea requirement as to the illicit nature of the drug. See
        United States v. Travis Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2014).
               In contrast, the wholly separate question in Jackson involved
        the meaning of the statutory language “as deﬁned in section 102 of
        the Controlled Substances Act.” 55 F.4th at 853. Speciﬁcally, the
        question was whether this statutory part of the “serious drug
        oﬀense” deﬁnition “incorporates the version of the controlled-
        substances schedules in eﬀect when the defendant was convicted
        of his prior state drug oﬀenses or the version in eﬀect when he
        committed his present ﬁrearm oﬀense.” Id.
               In answering that question, the Jackson Court rejected the
        government’s argument that our prior ACCA precedent in Xavier
        Smith and Travis Smith foreclosed the defendant’s challenge. Id. at
        852-54. The Court explained that those precedents construed a
        diﬀerent part of the ACCA’s “serious drug oﬀense” deﬁnition—
        whether the oﬀense was one “involving manufacturing,
        distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10280

        distribute”—and thus did not express a binding holding as to the
        other part of the “serious drug oﬀense” deﬁnition that required the
        state oﬀense to involve “a controlled substance (as deﬁned in
        section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 802).”
        Id. at 853-54.
                The Jackson Court observed that “[a]t best” those prior
        decisions “assumed that this part of the [ACCA’s] ‘serious drug
        oﬀense’ deﬁnition and [the Florida drug statute] encompass the
        same universe of substances,” but that “assumptions are not
        holdings.” Id. at 853-54 (quotation marks omitted). Jackson
        acknowledged that this Court has “categorically rejected an
        overlooked reason or argument exception to the prior-panel-
        precedent rule.” Id. at 853 (quotation marks omitted). But the
        Jackson Court pointed out that the question now was about what
        version of the federal controlled substances schedules the ACCA’s
        “serious drug oﬀense” deﬁnition incorporates. Id. Thus, the
        Jackson Court concluded it was not bound by our earlier decisions
        because they “did not address the question this appeal presents.”
        Id. at 854; see also United States v. Penn, 63 F.4th 1305, 1310-11 (11th
        Cir. 2023) (citing Jackson and reiterating that those same ACCA
        precedents did not foreclose the defendant’s speciﬁc challenge to
        whether a particular Florida drug conviction qualiﬁed as a “serious
        drug oﬀense” because it was not “presented and decided” in those
        precedents).
               Notably too, both Jackson and Penn involved the deﬁnition of
        “serious drug oﬀense.” What’s more, neither Jackson nor Penn
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        23-10280               Opinion of the Court                         13

        involved an enumerated oﬀenses clause that deﬁned a “crime of
        violence” and listed aggravated assault as a crime of violence.
        Simply put, Jackson is materially diﬀerent from this case.
                Unlike in Jackson, the prior panel precedent rule applies here.
        In Morales-Alonso, the defendant claimed the Georgia statute was
        categorically broader than the generic oﬀense and focused on the
        types of weapons that could be used to commit a Georgia
        aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-
        21(a)(2). 878 F.3d at 1317-20. But in rejecting the defendant’s
        overbreadth argument, the Morales-Alonso Court did not limit its
        holding to that element or assume that the other elements of the
        generic and Georgia oﬀenses were the same. Instead, the Morales-
        Alonso Court explicitly concluded that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2)
        “contains substantially the same elements as generic aggravated
        assault” and qualiﬁed as a “crime of violence.” Id. at 1317, 1320.
        Thus, Hicks’s argument about the mens rea element, if accepted,
        would necessarily mean that the panel in Morales-Alonso was wrong
        in concluding that Georgia aggravated assault “contains
        substantially the same elements as generic aggravated assault” and
        thus is not categorically overbroad for purposes of the enumerated
        oﬀenses clause. Therefore, Hicks’s overbreadth argument is
        foreclosed by Morales-Alonso. See Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1198.
              For these reasons, the district court correctly concluded it
        was bound by Morales-Alonso and properly applied U.S.S.G.
        § 2K2.1(a)(2)’s increased base oﬀense level of 24 in calculating
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        14                 Opinion of the Court              23-10280

        Hicks’s advisory guidelines range. We aﬃrm Hicks’s 96-month
        total sentence.
              AFFIRMED.