Court Opinion

ID: 9896223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 20:00:52.755304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:25.533735
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        NOV 9 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN, an individual,             No.   22-35816

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:21-cv-01036-MO

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KRISTOFER ASLA; NICOLE KEIDEL;
ALLISON BROWN; CITY OF
SHERWOOD, a political subdivision of the
State of Oregon,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Oregon
                  Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted September 13, 2023
                              Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER, R. NELSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher Griffin was charged with sexual abuse and

other related offenses but subsequently acquitted of all charges. Griffin sued

Detective Kristofer Asla, Officer Nicole Keidel, Prosecutor Allison Brown, and the

City of Sherwood (collectively, the “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
malicious prosecution, due process violations, judicial deception, and municipal

liability under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district

court granted summary judgment for the Defendants. Griffin v. Asla, No. 3:21-cv-

01036-MO, 2022 WL 4237275, at *12 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2022). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Caldwell v. City & County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th

Cir. 2018). For the reasons below, we affirm.

      1.     The district court concluded that Prosecutor Brown was protected

against Griffin’s claims by absolute immunity because she acted within her

prosecutorial role. See Griffin, 2022 WL 4237275, at *4–6. Griffin asserts that some

of Brown’s conduct occurred outside that role and without probable cause. Griffin

alleges that Brown provided false and misleading statements to the court and defense

counsel, withheld exculpatory material, willfully ignored exculpatory evidence, and

failed to correct the record when Griffin was re-arrested for violating his release

agreement.

      We, too, conclude that Griffin’s claims against Brown are barred by absolute

immunity. A prosecutor receives absolute immunity for functions “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” including “actions apart

from the courtroom.” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012)

(en banc) (citations omitted). Brown’s alleged misconduct involved prosecutorial

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functions, so absolute immunity applies. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029–

30 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that prosecutors are absolutely immune “for failure to

investigate the accusations against a defendant before filing charges,” “the knowing

use of false testimony at trial,” and failing “to preserve or turn over exculpatory

material”). And Griffin identifies no evidence to support his allegation that Brown

failed to correct the record after Griffin was re-arrested. Brown merely continued

“overseeing trial preparations,” after “probable cause had been established,” so

absolute immunity applies. See KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1112–13 (9th Cir.

2004).

      2.     The district court next concluded that Griffin’s malicious prosecution

claim failed because the Defendants had probable cause. See Griffin, 2022 WL

4237275, at *7–10. Griffin acknowledges that probable cause existed to initiate

prosecution but maintains that the Defendants continued to prosecute and detain him

after probable cause had dissipated.

      “[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to malicious prosecution.” Lassiter

v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Thompson

v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022). Officers may not disregard facts that

dissipate probable cause, United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th

Cir. 2005) (per curiam), but they have no duty to investigate further or look for

additional exculpatory evidence after probable cause is established, Cameron v.

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Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). Griffin identifies evidence that he

believes dissipated probable cause, but that evidence does not undermine the district

court’s conclusion that probable cause continued to exist in light of the fact that the

victim’s story remained consistent “as to material issues” and that there was at least

some corroborating evidence. See Griffin, 2022 WL 4237275, at *3, 9; see also

Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (statements of a minor

victim corroborated by other evidence can create probable cause).

      The Defendants also had probable cause to re-arrest Griffin for violating his

release agreement by sending a billing email. The Defendants attempted to contact

Griffin’s mother several times to determine whether the billing email was automated

but received no response. Contrary to Griffin’s characterization of the record, the

evidence he identifies does not establish that the email was automated. An email

sent from Griffin’s email address to the victim’s mother plus the lack of response

after the Defendants’ repeated attempts to make contact created probable cause to

re-arrest Griffin. His malicious prosecution claim fails.1

      3.     The district court also concluded that the Defendants did not violate

Griffin’s due process rights. See Griffin, 2022 WL 4237275, at *7–10. Griffin’s

due process and judicial deception claims stem from the Defendants’ alleged failure

1
 Griffin’s Oregon state-law malicious prosecution fails for the same reason. See
Merrill v. A.R.G., 398 P.3d 954, 959 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).

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to provide Griffin with exculpatory evidence and the inclusion of false statements in

the search warrant affidavit. But Griffin has not identified any material exculpatory

evidence the Defendants withheld or material false statements the Defendants made

in the search warrant affidavit. He claims that the Defendants withheld “the CARES

video,” but the Defendants turned over the video. Id. at *3. He claims that the search

warrant affidavit falsely stated certain specific details concerning the victim’s

statements about an alleged bottle of lotion, but even if the victim’s asserted

inconsistencies on that score had been included, probable cause would still exist

based on the remainder of the affidavit. And to the extent that Griffin alleges that

the Defendants omitted information that would have extinguished probable cause,

we disagree. Even if the affidavit included the omitted evidence, there still would

have been “a substantial basis for finding probable cause” based on the existing

evidence. See Chism v. Washington State, 661 F.3d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 2011); see

also Nieves Martinez v. United States, 997 F.3d 867, 880 (9th Cir. 2021).

      4.     Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Sherwood was not

liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). See Griffin,

2022 WL 4237275, at *10–11.             We affirm that holding because Griffin’s

constitutional rights were not violated, so his municipal liability claim fails. See City

of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).

      AFFIRMED.

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