Court Opinion

ID: 9615509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:37:45.253788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:48.355030
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest in jointly representing the two defendants charged in this case and the conflict adversely affected the representation of Woods.
1. An important issue for trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel, which the majority ignores, is the validity of a waiver of conflict of interest. In non-death penalty cases, a defendant may consent to joint representation by waiving the conflict of interest.10 To be constitutionally valid, however, the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.* 11 There is no record in this case of the trial court questioning Woods about his written, pro forma waiver to ensure that it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Nor did trial counsel ever discuss the dangers or conflicts that might arise from joint representation.
I recognize that a trial court is not constitutionally required to conduct a hearing on the validity of a waiver whenever defendants are jointly represented.12 However, the judicial process would be well-served if trial courts conducted an inquiry as soon as possible whenever faced with jointly represented criminal defendants. An inquiry would permit the trial court to determine well before trial whether separate counsel is required. Additionally, if the inquiry appears on the record and the trial court concludes the waiver is valid, the appellate courts would be better equipped to address the issue on appeal. This suggested procedure is also consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 (c), which requires federal courts to make an inquiry on the record whenever co-defendants are jointly represented.
A complete inquiry would show on the record that a defendant insisting upon joint representation is aware that a potential conflict exists and may result in counsel foregoing favorable defenses, arguments, and plea negotiations on his behalf.13 The record should also show that the defendant is aware of his right to separate counsel and *852that separate counsel will be appointed if he is indigent.14 Finally, the trial court should inform the defendant that his waiver of conflict-free counsel will preclude an appellate court from examining any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s conflict of interest.15 Although establishing a constitutionally sufficient waiver through a colloquy between the trial court and defendant may be an imperfect procedure,161 nonetheless conclude that such a procedure will aid the administration of justice by appropriately balancing the defendant’s right to counsel of his own choosing and the State’s interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted fairly.17
2. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on joint or dual representation where the defendant raised no objection at trial, the defendant must show that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”18 A defendant need not make the additional showing required under Strickland v. Washington,19 that, but for the deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different.20
3. The record demonstrates that counsel was handicapped in his plea negotiations. His only plea offer of time-served for Woods was unreasonable in light of the State’s evidence showing that Woods was the shooter, but was reasonable in light of the evidence suggesting a mere presence defense for Brown. Counsel operating without a conflict would have sought a more reasonable plea agreement on behalf of Woods.21 Additionally, witnesses testified that, after the crime took place, they saw Brown with a gun that he was trying to hide and that Brown made inculpatory statements. Due to the joint representation, trial counsel failed to cross-examine these witnesses regarding this testimony and had to forego using this evidence to challenge the State’s theory that Woods was the shooter, lest counsel implicate his other client, Brown. Because counsel’s actual conflict adversely affected his representation of Woods, I would reverse.
*853Decided November 26, 2002
Reconsideration denied December 13, 2002.
Patrick D. Deering, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Elizabeth A. Baker, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Tammie J. Philbrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears joins in this dissent.

 Dean v. State, 247 Ga. 724 (279 SE2d 217) (1981); compare Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 91 (270 SE2d 185) (1980) (in death penalty cases, defendants cannot waive right to conflict-free counsel and separate counsel must be appointed).

 Fleming, 246 Ga. at 91.

 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 346 (100 SC 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980).

 United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Dean v. State, 247 Ga. at 725 n. 1 (“trial judges should point out to the defendants that joint representation may create a conflict of interest and determine whether all such defendants agree to joint representation”).

 Garcia, 517 F.2d at 278.

 Id.

 See Fleming, 246 Ga. at 92.

 Wheat v. United States, 486 U. S. 153, 160 (108 SC 1692, 100 LE2d 140) (1988).

 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. at 348; Ellis v. State, 272 Ga. 763, 765 (534 SE2d 414) (2000).

 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162 (122 SC 1237, 152 LE2d 291) (2002).

 See Tarwater v. State, 259 Ga. 516 (383 SE2d 883) (1989) (actual conflict existed when counsel negotiated plea conditioned on all three clients pleading guilty); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 489 (98 SC 1173, 55 LE2d 426) (1978) (“[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process”).