Court Opinion

ID: 9840270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 18:00:35.142816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:44.146849
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20517      Document: 00516896869         Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/15/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                          FILED
                                                               September 15, 2023
                                   No. 22-20517                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                          Clerk

   Elimelech Shmi Hebrew,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:21-CV-2929
                  ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:
          The Texas Department of Criminal Justice fired Elimelech Shmi
   Hebrew after he refused to cut his hair and beard in violation of his religious
   vow. Hebrew brought a Title VII suit, alleging religious discrimination and
   failure to accommodate his religious practice. The district court granted
   summary judgment in favor of defendants. In accordance with the Supreme
   Court’s recent decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023), we reverse.
Case: 22-20517      Document: 00516896869           Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/15/2023

                                     No. 22-20517

                                          I.
          Elimelech Shmi Hebrew is a devout follower of the Hebrew Nation
   religion. As part of his religion, he has taken a Nazarite vow to keep his hair
   and beard long—a vow he has kept for over two decades.
          In August 2019, Hebrew was hired by the Texas Department of Crim-
   inal Justice (“TDCJ”) as a Correctional Officer. On August 19, he reported
   for duty to the TDCJ training academy. TDCJ officers quickly singled out
   him among the forty trainees. The officers told Hebrew that he could not stay
   at the academy unless he cut his hair and shaved his beard in compliance with
   TDCJ’s grooming policy.
          At the time, TDCJ’s grooming policy forbade male officers from hav-
   ing beards unless they had a medical skin condition. The policy also prohib-
   ited male officers—but not female officers—from having long hair. TDCJ
   has since amended its policy to allow all male officers to grow quarter-inch
   beards.
          When approached at the training academy, Hebrew informed the of-
   ficers that he took a religious vow to keep his hair and beard long, and nothing
   could make him violate that vow. The officers then gave him an ultimatum:
   break his vow and cut his hair, or leave the academy without pay while his
   accommodation request was pending. Hebrew chose the latter option. The
   officers lined him up against a wall and photographed him from the front and
   side. ROA.502–03. They also gave him a religious accommodation request
   form. Hebrew completed the form and requested an accommodation to keep
   his hair and beard that same day. He was forced to leave the academy while
   his application was pending and was placed on leave without pay. A week
   later, Hebrew filed a second request for religious accommodation with the
   appropriate documentation and a recitation of his Nazarite vow.

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           Two months after that, Hebrew received a letter from TDCJ denying
   his requests. It said:
           The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e(j) requires em-
           ployers to reasonably accommodate employees by allowing
           them the opportunity to worship or observe their religious
           practices. Beards are prohibited for safety reasons as security
           staff must be able to properly wear a gas mask when chemical
           agents are being utilized throughout the unit. Long locks of hair
           could be used against you by an offender overpowering you es-
           pecially from behind. Also, with this amount of hair contraband
           items cannot be easily detected during search procedures of the
           unit. Additionally, beards and hair of this length are prohibited
           per PD-28 Dress and Grooming Standards, therefore, your re-
           quest to wear a long beard and long locks is DENIED with no
           further actions.
   ROA.518; see also 406 (internal email providing same reasoning).
           Hebrew received the letter. But he chose to keep his hair and beard in
   obedience to his religious vow. As a result, TDCJ terminated his employ-
   ment.
           Hebrew exhausted his administrative remedies. He then filed a pro se
   lawsuit against TDCJ and various officers, which alleged claims of religious
   discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights
   Act of 1964. The district court dismissed several officers from the suit. The
   remaining defendants, TDCJ and Executive Director of TDCJ Bryan Collier,
   moved for summary judgment. The district court found that Hebrew had es-
   tablished a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Nonetheless, it found
   that TDCJ had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Hebrew—
   to promote the safety of officers and security of prisons. The district court
   also recognized that TDCJ failed to accommodate his religious practice. But
   it rejected Hebrew’s failure to accommodate claim, reasoning that the ac-
   commodation would impose an undue hardship on TDCJ. The district court

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   emphasized that TDCJ would have to bear more than a de minimis cost be-
   cause coworkers would have to “perform extra work to accommodate” He-
   brew’s religious practice. ROA.884. The district court granted summary
   judgment in favor of the defendants. Hebrew timely appealed.
          We review the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. See
   Playa Vista Conroe v. Ins. Co. of the W., 989 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 2021). We
   must construe all facts in favor of Hebrew as the non-moving party.

                                             II.
          Title VII forbids religious discrimination in employment: “It shall be
   an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire
   or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
   individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
   of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
   § 2000e-2(a). The statute defines “religion” broadly to include “all aspects
   of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Id. § 2000e(j).
          Title VII also requires employers to accommodate the religious
   observances or practices of applicants and employees. See id. §§ 2000e-2(a),
   2000e(j). Such accommodations often go above and beyond the non-religious
   accommodations they might otherwise provide. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch
   Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 775 (2015) (“Title VII does not demand mere
   neutrality with regard to religious practices . . . . Rather, it gives them favored
   treatment . . . .”). In short, Title VII imposes on employers both a negative
   duty not to discriminate and a positive duty to accommodate.
          We hold TDCJ breached both duties. TDCJ (A) failed to
   accommodate Hebrew’s religious practice and (B) discriminated against him
   on the basis of his religious practice.

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                                          A.
          First, Hebrew’s failure to accommodate claim. Title VII requires
   employers to accommodate “all aspects of religious observance and
   practice” unless the employer demonstrates that he cannot accommodate
   the employee’s religious observance or practice “without undue hardship on
   the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see Antoine
   v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 2013).
          All agree that TDCJ failed to accommodate one of Hebrew’s
   fundamental religious practices by requiring him to cut his long hair and long
   beard in violation of his religious vow. The only question is whether TDCJ
   has met its burden to show that granting Hebrew’s requested
   accommodation—to keep his hair and beard—would place an undue
   hardship on TDCJ. We (1) hold TDCJ cannot meet the undue hardship
   standard, and (2) the Department’s counterarguments are unavailing.
                                          1.
          The Supreme Court recently clarified the undue hardship standard.
   See Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023). Many lower courts, including the
   district court in this case, had read a prior Supreme Court decision, Trans
   World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), to hold an “undue
   hardship” was “any effort or cost that is ‘more than . . . de minimis.’” Groff,
   143 S. Ct. at 2286 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84). In Groff, a unanimous
   Court forcefully rejected this reading. The Court held that a showing of
   “undue hardship” requires something far greater: an employer must prove
   that the burden of accommodation “is substantial in the overall context of an
   employer’s business.” Id. at 2294. The Court looked to various definitions
   of “hardship” and concluded:
          under any definition, a hardship is more severe than a mere
          burden. So even if Title VII said only that an employer need

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           not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not
           escape liability simply by showing that an accommodation
           would impose some sort of additional costs. Those costs would
           have to rise to the level of hardship, and adding the modifier
           “undue” means that the requisite burden, privation, or
           adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” level.
   Ibid. (citation omitted). This is a heavy burden and requires something far
   greater than de minimis—something more akin to “substantial additional
   costs or substantial expenditures.” Id. at 2295 (quotation omitted).

           The Court went on to offer a formulation for lower courts to apply:

           We think it is enough to say that an employer must show that
           the burden of granting an accommodation would result in
           substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its
           particular business.
           What matters more than a favored synonym for “undue
           hardship” (which is the actual text) is that courts must apply
           the test in a manner that takes into account all relevant factors
           in the case at hand, including the particular accommodations at
           issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size, and
           operating cost of an employer.
   Ibid. (citation and quotation omitted).*

           _____________________
           *
            The Groff Court’s reference to “all relevant factors in the case at hand” obliges
   the lower courts to tailor their analysis of Title VII to each individual case. Ibid.; cf. Fulton
   v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (“Rather than rely on broadly
   formulated interests, courts must scrutinize the asserted harm of granting specific
   exemptions to particular religious claimants.”) (citation and quotation omitted). The
   reference to the “size and operating cost” of the employer, Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295,
   suggests that, all other things being equal, larger businesses and institutions must bear a
   heavier burden in proving undue hardship.

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          The Court also specified what an undue hardship is not. Because the
   hardship must affect “the conduct of the employer’s business,” evidence of
   “impacts on coworkers is off the table for consideration” unless such impacts
   place a substantial strain on the employer’s business. Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2296
   (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). Even if an impact on coworkers places a
   substantial strain on the employer’s business, that impact “cannot be
   considered ‘undue’” if it is attributable to religious bias or animosity. Ibid.
          Finally, the Court noted that “Title VII requires that an employer
   reasonably accommodate an employee’s practice of religion, not merely that
   it assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or
   accommodations.” Ibid. If a requested accommodation poses an undue
   hardship, the employer must sua sponte consider other possible
   accommodations. See id. at 2297. Only after thorough consideration of other
   options may the employer deny the employee’s request for accommodation.
   Cf. Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 455 (7th Cir. 2013)
   (“On this issue, [the employer] bears the burden of proof, so it must show,
   as a matter of law, that any and all accommodations would have imposed an
   undue hardship.”) (cited in Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2296).
          TDCJ cannot meet the requirements of Title VII for at least four
   reasons. First, TDCJ merely argues that the burden it would face is more than
   de minimis. ROA.477. But as Groff held, a de minimis burden does not qualify
   as an undue hardship. Thus, TDCJ’s claim fails at the starting line. Second,
   TDCJ nowhere identifies any actual costs it will face—much less
   “substantial increased costs” affecting its entire business—if it grants this
   one accommodation to Hebrew. See Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295. TDCJ simply
   identifies its security and safety concerns without regard to costs. Likewise,
   TDCJ’s reference to possible additional work for Hebrew’s coworkers is
   insufficient to show an undue hardship. See id. at 2296. Finally, TDCJ did not
   present any evidence that it considered other possible accommodations. See

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   id. at 2297. It simply rejected Hebrew’s accommodation request without a
   thorough examination of “any and all” alternatives. See Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at
   455.
                                         2.
          TDCJ raises three counterarguments. None is persuasive.
          First, TDCJ argues that this accommodation would pose an undue
   hardship because Hebrew could hide contraband in his hair or beard. But the
   district court admitted that TDCJ could simply search Hebrew before he
   entered the prison facilities. See ROA.885. As its own expert attested, TDCJ
   already “conducts searches of everyone who enters a unit, including its own
   employees.” ROA.552. And TDCJ already searches officers’ hair and beards
   if it suspects hidden contraband. ROA.553; cf. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352,
   365 (2015) (holding beard searches address prison’s safety concerns in
   context of religious discrimination claim under the Religious Land Use and
   Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”)). TDCJ’s expert only
   feared that “if all officers were permitted to have long hair and long beards,
   the TDCJ may need to consider changing the way officers are searched.”
   ROA.553. But a hypothetical policy reevaluation if everyone received an
   accommodation cannot show that TDCJ faces an undue hardship if it grants
   one accommodation. See Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295 (instructing us to look to
   “the case at hand” and “the particular accommodations at issue” (emphasis
   added)). The fact that a search of Hebrew might take a few extra minutes
   would not pose a “substantial” or “undue hardship” “in the overall
   context” of TDCJ’s $2.4 billion FY2022 budget. Id. at 2294; Explore
   Expenditures, Texas Comptroller, https://perma.cc/5FVH-WHV9
   (last visited September 12, 2023) (select “Expenditures”; then select
   “FY2022”; then select “All Expenditures”; select “Texas Department of

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   Criminal Justice” from AGENCY dropdown; and finally select “General
   Revenue Fund” from APPROPRIATED FUND dropdown).
          Second, TDCJ points to the potential safety risks of wearing a gas
   mask with a beard. Officers sometimes use chemical agents in prisons. When
   they do, TDCJ encourages the use of gas masks “if time and if the situation
   permits.” ROA.556. Beards can inhibit masks from properly sealing and
   possibly expose officers to chemicals.
          Importantly, both the mask instruction manual and TDCJ’s expert
   stated that any length of beard can prevent proper sealing. ROA.557. In fact,
   TDCJ’s expert acknowledged that he has seen men with “even limited facial
   hair” unable to seal their masks. ROA.559. Nonetheless, when TDCJ denied
   Hebrew’s accommodation, it allowed officers with medical conditions to
   have quarter-inch beards. ROA.559. TDCJ now allows all male officers to
   have quarter-inch beards. ROA.581. TDCJ has offered no evidence
   whatsoever to show that there is a greater safety risk or hardship in allowing
   Hebrew to keep his beard. Cf. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12
   v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.) (holding that a no-
   beard policy with a medical exemption undermined the prison’s stated safety
   rationale).
          Third, TDCJ argues that inmates could grab Hebrew’s long beard or
   hair in an attack and thereby incapacitate him. But again, TDCJ’s exception
   for other individuals undermines its stated rationale. For example, TDCJ
   permits female officers to have long hair for any reason, religious or secular.
   And female officers with long hair face the same safety risk Hebrew allegedly
   would. For example, TDCJ’s expert testified that he has seen a woman
   attacked when an inmate grabbed her hair. ROA.559. Nonetheless, TDCJ
   continues to allow women to have long hair. This purely secular exception
   for some officers undercuts TDCJ’s proffered safety concerns in creating an

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   exception for Hebrew. Cf. Fraternal Order, 170 F.3d at 366; Fulton, 141 S. Ct.
   at 1882. Thus, the policy does not even provide “neutral” treatment toward
   religious observers, much less the “favored treatment” that Title VII
   demands. Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 775.
          With respect to Hebrew’s beard, TDCJ has presented no evidence
   that an officer with a long beard imposes an undue hardship. Cf. Garner v.
   Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237, 247 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that TDCJ’s no-beard
   policy for inmates failed under RLUIPA because TDCJ presented “no
   evidence of any specific incidents affecting prison safety in those systems due
   to beards”). TDCJ’s only evidence belabors the safety concerns of long hair
   but not long beards. ROA.556. Even if such safety concerns did exist, TDCJ
   would still bear the burden of demonstrating the “substantial increased
   costs” needed to address said concerns. Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295. Thus,
   TDCJ has not met its burden to show that it would face an undue hardship if
   it accommodated Hebrew’s religious faith.

                                         B.
          Next, Hebrew’s Title VII religious discrimination claim. As the
   Supreme Court has held, “the rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a
   failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer
   may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a
   factor in employment decisions.” Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 773. That means
   an “employer violates Title VII” if the employee “requires an
   accommodation of [a] religious practice, and the employer’s desire to avoid
   the prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision” to
   terminate the employee. Id. at 773–74. Notably, this “motivating factor”
   standard is “broader than the typical but-for causation standard” and
   encompasses many claims of religious discrimination. Nobach v. Woodland
   Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 799 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2015). An employer need

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   not even know about the employee’s religious practice; it violates Title VII so
   long as it takes the action “with the motive of avoiding the need for
   accommodating a religious practice.” Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 774 (emphasis
   in original). And motive is especially easy to infer where an employee has
   submitted a request for an accommodation or where the employer knows of
   the employee’s religious practice. See ibid.; Nobach, 799 F.3d at 378.
          Hebrew’s religious practice was more than a motivating factor in
   TDCJ’s termination decision. In fact, it was the only factor that led to his
   discharge. Upon his arrival at the training academy, Hebrew told TDCJ about
   his religious practice and requested an accommodation. TDCJ told him he
   would not be able to remain at the training academy so long as he continued
   to abide by his religious practice. TDCJ placed him on unpaid leave. And then
   TDCJ fired him for his religious observance of his Nazarite vow. Hebrew has
   sufficiently proved that TDCJ fired him “because of” his religious practice,
   so we must reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment. 42
   U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see also id. § 2000e(j); Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 773;
   Nobach, 799 F.3d at 379.
          TDCJ argues nonetheless that there is no Title VII violation because
   its proffered reason for discriminating against Hebrew was neutral and based
   on legitimate safety concerns. The employer in Abercrombie made the same
   argument, contending “that a neutral policy cannot constitute ‘intentional
   discrimination.’” 575 U.S. at 775. But the Supreme Court rebuffed this
   argument, holding:
          Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to
          religious practices—that they be treated no worse than other
          practices. Rather, it gives them favored treatment,
          affirmatively obligating employers not to fail or refuse to hire
          or discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s
          religious observance and practice. An employer is surely

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          entitled to have, for example, a no-headwear policy as an
          ordinary matter. But when an applicant requires an
          accommodation as an aspect of religious . . . practice, it is no
          response that the subsequent failure . . . to hire was due to an
          otherwise-neutral policy. Title VII requires otherwise-neutral
          policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.
   Ibid. (quotations omitted). Likewise, in this case, TDCJ cannot hide behind
   its “otherwise-neutral policy.” Ibid. This policy must “give way” to
   Hebrew’s requested accommodation. Ibid. Plain and simple, “religious
   practice is one of the protected characteristics that cannot be accorded
   disparate treatment and must be accommodated.” Ibid.
                                   *        *         *
          For decades, inferior federal courts read a single line from Hardison
   for more than it was worth. The de minimis test had no connection to the text
   of Title VII. See Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F.3d 821, 826–28
   (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J., concurring). And by blessing “the denial of even
   minor accommodation in many cases, “the de minimis test made it “harder
   for members of minority faiths to enter the job market.” Groff, 143 S. Ct. at
   2292 (citing amicus briefs from, inter alia, The Sikh Coalition, Union of
   Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, and Seventh-day Adventist
   Church). No more. The decision in Groff enables Americans of all faiths to
   earn a living without checking their religious beliefs and practices at the door.
          For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s entry of
   summary judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this
   opinion.

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