Court Opinion

ID: 9866167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 00:32:19.269359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:13:20.233943
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
HAMITER, Justice.
After further study of this case, following the granting of a rehearing limited to plaintiff’s alternative demand for recovery on quantum meruit, we are of the opinion that additional proceedings in the trial court should be conducted.
It will be remembered that the suit was dismissed solely upon the theory that it was prematurely instituted. Plaintiff, on its main demand, had alleged that it was entitled to be paid under a contract for services rendered in the consummation of a sale of the Carter property to the Midland Oil Corporation of New York; and it prayed for judgment accordingly. Thereafter, defendants pleaded and proved that no sale had been effected, that the Midland Corporation had acquired only an option to purchase the property, thus disclosing the prematurity of the main demand.
However, in the alternative, plaintiff also prayed for a judgment based on quantum meruit. And it attached to and made a part of its petition numerous documents, principally correspondence had between it and the defendants, which must be considered in determining its cause of action. These documents (not emphasized by plaintiff’s counsel during presentation of the case on the original hearing), when read along with the specific allegations made, show that plaintiff is seeking to obtain payment under the alternative demand for services rendered in the confection of any transaction whatever, whether a sale or otherwise, by and between Carter and the Midland Corporation, and it is asserting that its efforts were entirely responsible for the parties’ negotiating and closing some deal beneficial to defendants.
As before shown, in urging the prematurity of plaintiff’s suit, defendants offered in evidence the option agreement, entered into by Carter and the Midland Corporation and approved by Frank L. Hereford, the trustee or representative of Carter’s creditors. For that option to purchase Carter’s property, as the provisions of the instrument recite, the Midland Corporation had paid over to Hereford the sum of $65,-000 cash; and the parties had agreed that such sum, as well as all amounts given for any extension of the option, would be applied on the agreed total purchase price of $258,034.48 if and when the option be exercised. In the event of failure to exercise the option, the consideration paid therefor, as is usually the case in transactions of that kind and as shown by one of Hereford’s letters attached to the petition, would be retained by such trustee for the benefit of creditors, and Midland Corporation would take nothing.
If it be true, as defendants contend, that the only deal consummated was the option agreement, in our opinion plaintiff should *463recover herein on quantum meruit a fee commensurate with the value of the services it has rendered, provided, of course, it can and does prove the alleged contract with defendants and that it was responsible for the option’s confection. Assuming the existence of the contract and that the option was sold as a result of plaintiff’s efforts, clearly it would be inequitable to deny to plaintiff the right to participate in the proceeds thereof, especially since the consideration obtained is a sum additional to Carter’s assets from which the creditors, represented by Hereford, are seeking satisfaction of their claim. A denial of that kind would offend the moral maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another. C.C. Article 1965.
Therefore, we think that plaintiff’s action, at least to the extent of the alternative demand, is not premature; and we also conclude that the petition, along with the annexed documents, is sufficient to allow recovery on quantum meruit and to permit the introduction of proof of that alternative demand.
Furthermore, it is our opinion that plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief, preventing disbursement of funds in the hands of the trustee to the extent of $25,000 during the pendency of this action. Should this relief not be granted, the trustee could distribute such funds among the various creditors whom he represents, all to the irreparable injury of plaintiff and its rights. Code of Practice Article 303.
For the reasons assigned the judgments of the district court which denied plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the suit are now reversed and set aside; defendants’ exceptions of no cause and no right of action, of want of interest, and of prematurity, are overruled; and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistent with the views herein expressed. Further, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the district court cause the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction, on plaintiff’s furnishing bond according to law, requiring defendant Frank L. Hereford, trustee, to retain, during the pendency of this action, $25,000 of the funds now held by him in his capacity of trustee or representative of such creditors. Costs of this appeal shall be paid by defendants and all ether costs shall await the final determination of the suit. The right to apply for a rehearing is reserved to defendants.
O’NIELL, C. J., is recused.