Court Opinion

ID: 9838441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 15:00:49.5932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:28.074492
License: Public Domain

20-3681
    Mohamed v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                              Straus, IJ
                                                                           A205 901 397

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of September, two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
               JON O. NEWMAN,
               WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
               STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    MOHAMED SALAH NASR MOHAMED,
           Petitioner,

                   v.                                            20-3681
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                   Genet Getachew, Esq., Law Office of Genet
                                      Getachew, Brooklyn, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                    General; Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant
                                    Director; Dawn S. Conrad, Senior Litigation
                                    Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                    United States Department of Justice,
                                    Washington, DC.

         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

         Petitioner Mohamed Salah Nasr Mohamed, a native of Saudi Arabia and

citizen of Sudan, seeks review of a September 28, 2020, decision of the BIA

affirming a March 23, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mohamed Salah Nasr Mohamed, No. A 205 901 397

(B.I.A. Sep. 28, 2020), aff’g No. A 205 901 397 (Immig. Ct. Hartford, CT Mar. 23,

2018).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

procedural history.

         Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s

decisions. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).

The applicable standards of review are well established. “[T]he administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
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compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Accordingly,

we review the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and must defer to the

factfinder’s findings based on such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113

(2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). An IJ may “base a credibility

determination” on, among other things, the “inherent plausibility” of the

applicant’s account and the consistency between the account and other evidence

of record, “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). We will

defer to the IJ’s credibility determination unless “no reasonable fact-finder could

make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

      Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination in this

case, which was based on two aspects of Mohamed’s testimony that the IJ

determined were inherently implausible. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d

63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A]n IJ is entitled to consider whether the

applicant’s story is inherently implausible.”); see also Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

                                          3
F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination for

“substantial evidence”).

      First, Mohamed testified that he was a member of the Democratic Unionist

Party and was arrested and detained on August 30, 2006, while demonstrating

against the construction of a dam in a historically Nubian area of Sudan. While

record evidence confirmed that a Democratic Unionist Party protest was held that

day in the same city Mohamed had identified, the protest was about commodities

prices, not the construction of a dam. When asked to explain this discrepancy,

Mohamed stated he had no knowledge of the other protest.              The agency

reasonably found Mohamed’s lack of knowledge to be implausible because the

protest, which received media coverage, took place in the same city and was

organized by a political party in which both he and his father were purportedly

active. The agency’s finding of implausibility was “tethered to record evidence,

and there is nothing else in the record from which a firm conviction of error could

properly be derived.” Wensheng Yan, 509 F.3d at 67.

      Mohamed argues that his lack of knowledge of the other protest could be

explained by Sudan’s lack of free press, but this explanation is contrary to

Mohamed’s testimony that newspapers write about all the demonstrations.

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Moreover, Mohamed failed to rehabilitate his implausible testimony by not

providing sufficient corroborating evidence that the dam protest ever occurred.

See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure

to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that

has already been called into question.”). Accordingly, Mohamed’s reading of

events is not compelled by the record and, on our deferential review, does not

warrant disturbing the agency’s conclusion to the contrary.               8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

      The adverse credibility determination is further supported by the

inconsistency between Mohamed’s testimony and a letter from a Democratic

Unionist Party official in the United States about the extent of his involvement

with the party. Mohamed testified that he never attended any party meetings in

the United States and was not involved with the Democratic Unionist Party in the

United States. The letter, however, stated that Mohamed was an active member

of the party, responsible for posting and distributing the party’s memos and

calling members to attend the party’s meeting. Mohamed failed to provide an

explanation for this inconsistency when confronted with it at the hearing.

                                         5
      Mohamed now argues that the agency should have interpreted the letter as

detailing Mohamed’s political activities in Sudan as well.        But as with the

inconsistency above, Mohamed’s alternative reading is not compelled by this

record.   Accordingly, the agency reasonably relied on this inconsistency in

making its adverse credibility finding and determining, as a result, that Mohamed

failed to show that he had experienced past persecution based on a relevant

ground. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must

do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure

relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to

credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

      Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that

Mohamed failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. “[T]o

establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past

persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities . . . are either aware

of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng v.

Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).         The IJ here found

insufficient evidence that authorities in Sudan would be interested in Mohamed

because he had not been involved in Sudanese politics since 2006, had not

                                         6
provided evidence that the government otherwise knows of his activities or would

seek to persecute him upon return, and had not shown that Nubians like himself

are targeted for persecution. This finding, which the BIA upheld, is supported by

substantial evidence. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)

(per curiam) (holding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable

if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”).

      The agency’s unfavorable asylum determinations were dispositive across

Mohamed’s applications because asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

relief 1 were all based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d

148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

1We decline to consider Mohamed’s argument that he warrants CAT protection
due to his status as a failed asylum-seeker because the argument is both
unexhausted and raised in a conclusory manner with no record evidence
supporting it. Although exhaustion is not jurisdictional, see Santos-Zacaria v.
Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1120 (2023), it is “mandatory” when, as here, the
Government has raised it as a defense, see Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d
104, 107 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7
(2d Cir. 2005) (deeming applicant’s “claim abandoned” where he raised an issue
in “only a single conclusory sentence”).
                                           7
     For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                   FOR THE COURT:
                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                   Clerk of Court

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