Court Opinion

ID: 9918947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 22:14:21.537983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:50.064426
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        No. 84382-6-I

                          Respondent,        DIVISION ONE
               v.

 NICETO AMOR CANETE,                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                          Appellant.

       SMITH, C.J. — In August 2017, S.W. informed her mother that Niceto

Canete, her stepfather, had repeatedly molested her. Canete was later charged

with one count of child molestation in the first degree and one count of child rape

in the second degree. Although charged in 2017, Canete’s trial did not begin

until March 2022. Despite this delay, Canete did not interview N.C., S.W.’s

younger sister, before trial began. N.C. did not testify and Canete was convicted

on both counts. On appeal, Canete raises a variety of issues. He contends that

the trial court erred by (1) excluding N.C.’s testimony in violation of his right to

compel witnesses and (2) improperly commenting on the evidence by providing a

no-corroboration jury instruction. He also asserts that the State interfered with

his ability to interview N.C. in violation of his right to counsel and that his counsel

was ineffective in failing to interview N.C. before trial. In addition, Canete argues

that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly speculating as to

Canete’s first-person thought process and misstating the burden of proof in
No. 84382-6-I/2

closing arguments. Finally, he asserts cumulative error. Finding his arguments

without merit, we affirm.

                                      FACTS

        Niceto Canete was married to Katherine Romero, S.W.’s mother, from

June 2006 to August 2017. Romero had two children prior to the marriage, S.W.

and D.R., and Canete and Romero had two children together. Canete, Romero,

S.W., and her two younger sisters, N.C. and B.C., lived together in Whatcom

County.

        Canete was a strict stepfather, who punished S.W. by grounding her,

pinching her or hitting her with a yardstick. S.W. did not like having him in the

home.

        While living together, Canete sometimes woke S.W. up by sitting beside

her on her bed. S.W. recalled on one occasion, when she was 11 or 12 years

old, that Canete woke her up by putting his hands in her pants, touching her

bottom and digitally penetrating her vagina. He stopped when she moved.

        Another time, after N.C. told Canete that S.W. had an iPod1 she was not

supposed to have, Canete sent S.W. to her room as punishment. Later that

evening, Canete entered her room while she was sleeping and digitally

penetrated her. When S.W. flinched, Canete stopped, rubbed her face to put her

back to sleep and left the room. S.W. eventually moved to the living room,

waiting for her mother to come home.

        1 An iPod is a pocket-sized device used to play music files.

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No. 84382-6-I/3

       When Romero arrived, S.W. waited until Canete left the room and told her

mother what he had done. Romero sent S.W. to her bedroom, asking her to lock

the door, before confronting Canete. Romero ended the relationship and ordered

Canete out of the house. A month later, S.W. disclosed the assault to a school

counselor who, as a mandatory reporter, informed law enforcement.

       In August 2017, the State charged Niceto Canete with one count of child

molestation in the first degree and one count of child rape in the second degree.

                                 Pre-Trial Motions

       Although Canete was charged in 2017, his trial did not begin until five

years later, in March 2022. The same attorney represented Canete from filing

through trial. In the five years prior to trial, Canete’s attorney completed some

defense interviews in 2018, some more before the omnibus hearing in 2022, and

some the week prior to trial. Canete’s attorney did not indicate the need for any

additional discovery. Both parties confirmed the case was ready for trial.

       The week before trial, Canete’s attorney interviewed E.H., a friend of S.W.

to whom S.W. had disclosed the abuse. In this interview, E.H. recounted her

own experience with Canete, which was similar to S.W.’s. The morning of the

trial, the State moved to admit E.H.’s testimony under ER 404(b). Canete

objected, arguing that the introduction of evidence was untimely. The court

noted that it was a close call but agreed that the request was untimely and

denied the ER 404(b) motion.

       Following denial of the motion, Canete sought an order allowing him to

amend his witness list and depose N.C. Defense counsel sought an interview

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No. 84382-6-I/4

with N.C. because she was present in the home the day of the second incident

and could potentially provide relevant information. Neither the State nor defense

counsel had N.C. on their witness list. Law enforcement never interviewed her.

         In the several months leading up to trial, defense counsel sent five e-mails

to the State concerning N.C.’s testimony. The first four e-mails discussed

defense counsel’s need to interview S.W.’s siblings. They did not specify N.C. in

particular and did not explicitly request the State’s help in facilitating the

interviews. The fifth e-mail, sent a week before trial, specifically listed N.C. and

stated that defense counsel had been seeking to interview the siblings for three

years.

         As N.C. was a minor, defense counsel asserted that all of the e-mails

were requests for the State to help facilitate the interview. The State argued that

they did not understand that Canete was seeking assistance to interview N.C.

until the last e-mail, sent six days before trial began. Two days after the last

e-mail, the State informed Canete that N.C.’s mother would not agree to an

interview.

         The court denied defense counsel’s motion to amend the witness list and

depose N.C., stating that the request to call N.C. as a witness was untimely,

rendering compelling a deposition unnecessary.

                                          Trial

         Following S.W.’s testimony at trial, the State moved to amend the

information to charge Canete with child molestation in the second degree instead

of in the first degree. Defense counsel did not object.

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No. 84382-6-I/5

       Prior to closing, the court heard arguments on the parties’ proposed jury

instructions. The State proposed a no-corroboration instruction, reasoning that it

was not necessary for the alleged victim’s testimony to be corroborated in order

for the jury to convict Canete. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the

no-corroboration instruction constituted improper judicial comment on the

evidence. The court proceeded with the instruction over the objection, noting

that the instruction was a correct statement of the law.

       During closing, the State made a few generalized statements about child

sex abuse survivors and stated that its burden was to prove the case beyond a

reasonable doubt as to the “material elements.” The prosecutor also argued, in

the first-person, what he suggested to be Canete’s possible thought process

while allegedly committing the crimes. Defense counsel did not object to any of

these statements in closing.

       Following jury deliberations, Canete was convicted of child molestation in

the second degree and rape of a child in the second degree. The court imposed

a standard range of 36 months for child molestation in the second degree and a

minimum of 119 months for rape of a child in the second degree. Canete

appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

       Right to Present a Defense, to Compel Witnesses, and to Counsel

       Canete asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional right to

present a defense and compel witnesses when it denied his motion to amend his

witness list and depose N.C. Canete also argues that the State violated his right

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No. 84382-6-I/6

to counsel by denying him the opportunity to interview N.C. We conclude that

Canete’s rights were not violated both because he failed to establish that N.C.’s

testimony would be material and favorable to the defense and because he had

ample time to interview N.C. and failed to do so.

      Whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right has been violated presents

a legal question that we review de novo. State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797,

453 P.3d 696 (2019). And we review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an

abuse of discretion. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 797. The trial court abuses its

discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable

grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Hampton, 184 Wn.2d 656, 670, 361

P.3d 734 (2015).

      The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 22 of the Washington State Constitution provide a criminal defendant

with the right to present a defense. State v. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 63, 502

P.3d 1255 (2022). This includes the right to compel witnesses at trial. State v.

Maupin, 128 Wn.2d 918, 924, 913 P.2d 808 (1996). “This right is a fundamental

element of due process.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 109 S. Ct. 646, 98

L. Ed. 2d 798, (1988). But this right is not absolute. State v. McCabe, 161 Wn.

App. 781, 787, 251 P.3d 264 (2011). For example, defendants can only compel

witnesses who are material to the defense and who offer relevant testimony.

State v. Smith, 101 Wn.2d 36, 41, 677 P.2d 100 (1984). The defendant has the

burden of showing materiality, Smith, 101 Wn. 2d at 41, and relevant evidence is

evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

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No. 84382-6-I/7

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” ER 401.

       More than the mere lack of testimony is necessary to establish a violation

of the right. State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn. App. 530, 552, 364 P.3d 810 (2015). To

create such a violation, state conduct must impermissibly interfere with a

defendant’s ability to present a defense and that interference must cause the loss

of material evidence, favorable to the defendant. McCabe, 161 Wn. App. at 787.

       Canete asserts that the court’s denial of his motion to depose N.C. and

amend his witness list violated his right to compel witnesses. Because Canete

fails to establish that N.C.’s testimony is material, relevant or favorable, the trial

court did not violate his right in denying his motion to amend his witness list. The

court’s denial of Canete’s motion to depose N.C. then flowed from the fact that

she would not be allowed to testify. As the ability to depose a witness is simply a

discovery issue, denying the request to depose a witness cannot by itself violate

Canete’s right to present a defense. See, e.g. State v. Mankin, 158 Wn. App.

111, 121, 241 P.3d 421 (2010) (noting that a criminal defendant is not, as a

matter of right, entitled to depose prospective witnesses); CR 26 (depositions are

governed by the rules of discovery).

       Canete concedes that “it is difficult to determine the precise impact of

N.C.’s testimony on the evidence at trial because she was never interviewed.”2

Such an interview, he continues, “may have produced evidence critical to the

       2N.C. did take part in a forensic interview with Gail Tierney, a Child
Forensic Interviewer from the Brigid Collins House in Whatcom County. She did
not speak with the State or Defense Counsel.

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No. 84382-6-I/8

defense.” (Emphasis added.) Even in his briefing, Canete admits that it is only

“possible that N.C.’s testimony would have had a tremendous impact on the

defense’s case.” (Emphasis added.) Canete cannot speak to what N.C.’s

testimony might be because N.C. was never interviewed by counsel or law

enforcement. The only information Canete presents is his supposition as to what

she saw and might say. He could not even provide hearsay statements about

the likely testimony. And because he cannot speak to what N.C.’s testimony

might be, Canete fails to establish materiality, relevance, or favorability. The

court did not violate Canete’s right to compel witnesses.

       Canete also asserts that his right to counsel was violated because he was

unable to interview N.C. This violation, he argues, arose from the State’s refusal

to facilitate an interview, which then prevented him from interviewing N.C. before

trial. But Canete mischaracterizes his efforts to interview N.C.

       Defense counsel’s purported reason for not interviewing N.C. on his own

was that it was common practice for the State to help facilitate interviews with

children. Over the course of the six months leading up to trial, defense counsel

sent five e-mails to the State. Each e-mail noted that defense counsel had yet to

interview S.W.’s siblings. But contrary to Canete’s assertions, none of the

e-mails actually ask the State for help in facilitating the interviews. In fact, it is

not until the fifth e-mail that defense counsel even mentions N.C. by name. Even

then, the e-mail only states, “I have been seeking to interview [S.W.’s] siblings for

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No. 84382-6-I/9

about 3 years.”3 And when Canete made clear that he wanted help facilitating

the interviews, the State responded within two days. The record does not

demonstrate that the State interfered with Canete’s ability to interview N.C.

Without state interference, Canete fails to establish a violation of his right to

counsel.

       Neither the court nor the State violated Canete’s right to present a

defense, right to compel witnesses, or right to counsel.

                         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Canete next argues that defense counsel’s failure to interview N.C. in the

five years prior to trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Because

Canete does not establish that the outcome of the trial would have been different,

we conclude that defense counsel’s actions do not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel.

       Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “mixed questions of law and

fact” that we review de novo. In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wn.2d 853,

865, 16 P.3d 610 (2001).

       To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced

by that deficient performance. In re Pers. Restraint of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835,

840, 280 P.3d 1102 (2012). To establish deficient performance, the defendant

must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

       3The record before us does not show any further evidence that defense
counsel had actually sought these interviews for three years.

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No. 84382-6-I/10

reasonableness. State v. Goldberg, 123 Wn. App. 848, 852, 99 P.3d 924 (2004).

This includes failing to interview witnesses and giving no reason for doing so.

State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 352 P.3d 776 (2015). “ ‘To establish prejudice, a

defendant must show that but for counsel’s performance, the result would have

been different.’ ” Goldberg, 123 Wn. App. At 852 (quoting State v. McNeal, 145

Wn.2d 352, 362, 37 P.3d 280 (2002)).

       It is the defendant’s burden to overcome the “ ‘strong presumption’ ” that

counsel’s representation was effective. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 337,

899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (quoting State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226, 743 P.2d

816 (1987)). “ ‘If trial counsel’s conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial

strategy or tactics, it cannot serve as a basis for a claim that the defendant

received ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” Goldberg, 123 Wn. App. At 852

(quoting McNeal, 145 Wn.2d at 362).

       Canete contends that counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to

interview N.C. in the five years preceding trial. We agree.

       In arguing that the State violated his right to present a defense, both

Canete and the State point to five e-mails that indicate defense counsel’s intent

to interview N.C. While defense counsel’s assertion that it is common practice

for the State to arrange interviews with minors may be true, his e-mails to the

State span only the six months leading up to trial and do not specifically ask for

the State’s help. Defense counsel had four and a half years before that to

interview N.C. The State concedes that defense counsel “willfully failed to take

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No. 84382-6-I/11

timely steps to interview N.C.” Defense counsel had five years in which to

interview N.C. and confirmed the case for trial, not having done so.

       Jones is instructive here. Failing to interview a witness without real

reason, rather than out of strategy, constitutes deficient performance. Jones,

183 Wn.2d at 340. Canete asserts that, as N.C. was in the home the evening of

the second incident, she could have been able to testify as to whether Canete

ever entered S.W.’s room. Defense counsel knew from the beginning of the case

that N.C. was in the home, and given that the police did not interview her, the

only way to find out what she knew would be to interview her himself. Defense

counsel failed to do so. Defense counsel’s conduct is analogous to Jones: in

failing to interview N.C., rather than making the strategic decision not to, defense

counsel’s performance was deficient.

       Although we agree that counsel’s performance was deficient, we conclude

that Canete fails to demonstrate that deficiency caused prejudice. Canete

concedes that “it is difficult to determine the precise impact of N.C.’s testimony

on the evidence at trial because she was never interviewed.” Such an interview,

Canete continues, “may have produced evidence critical to the defense.”

(Emphasis added.) As N.C. was never interviewed by the State, defense

counsel or law enforcement, we do not know what she may or may not have

testified to. And the possibility of unknown testimony, along with Canete’s

supposition as to what she might say, is not enough to establish that, but for

counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been

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No. 84382-6-I/12

different. Without providing any evidence establishing that the outcome of the

trial would have been different, Canete cannot establish prejudice.

       Defense counsel’s actions did not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel.

                                   Jury Instruction

       Canete contends that the court made an improper judicial comment on the

evidence by giving a no-corroboration instruction. We disagree.

       “Whether a jury instruction is legally correct is reviewed de novo.” State v.

Chenoweth, 188 Wn. App. 521, 535, 354 P.3d 13 (2015). A challenge to jury

instructions is reviewed in the context of all instructions given. State v. Pirtle, 127

Wn.2d 628, 656, 904 P.2d 245 (1995).

       Article IV, section 16 of the Washington State Constitution provides,

“Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment

thereon, but shall declare the law.” A trial judge improperly comments on the

evidence if it gives a jury instruction that conveys to the jury their personal

attitudes toward the merits of the case. State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709, 721, 132

P.3d 1076 (2006). On the other hand, a jury instruction that does no more than

accurately state the applicable law does not constitute an impermissible

comment on the evidence. State v. Brush, 183 Wn.2d 550, 557, 353 P.3d 213

(2015).

                                          12
No. 84382-6-I/13

       RCW 9A.44.020(1)4 provides “[i]n order to convict a person of any crime

defined in this chapter it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged

victim be corroborated.” Washington courts have consistently upheld no-

corroboration instructions as correct statements of law under RCW 9A.44.020(1)

when the instruction is given in reference to an alleged victim’s testimony in sex

offense cases. See, e.g., Chenoweth, 188 Wn. App. At 537 (holding that

corroboration is not required in sex offenses); State v. Zimmerman, 130 Wn. App.

170, 182-83, 121 P.3d 1216 (2005) (holding that a no-corroboration instruction is

not reversible error).

       While instructing the jury, the court stated that “in order to convict a person

of child molestation in the second degree or rape of a child in the second degree,

it is not necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated.”

(Capitalization omitted.) This is an accurate statement of the law and therefore

the instruction does not constitute an impermissible comment on the evidence.5

                             Prosecutorial Misconduct

       Canete raises three instances of prosecutorial misconduct, arguing that

the prosecutor (1) improperly appealed to the passions and the prejudices of the

jury by arguing generalizations about all child sex cases, (2) argued Canete’s

first-person thought process based purely on speculation and not on facts in

       4 The chapter includes both rape of a child in the second degree and child
molestation in the second degree, the charges at issue. RCW 9A.44.076, .086.
       5 Canete’s counsel acknowledged the accuracy of this jury instruction

during closing arguments (“[T]he State is correct and it’s a correct statement of
the law that testimony is evidence, and corroboration is not required.”).

                                         13
No. 84382-6-I/14

evidence, and (3) misstated the burden of proof. As Canete does not

demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor’s statements prejudicially

affected the jury’s verdict or that any potential prejudice could not have been

fixed by a curative instruction below, we conclude that the prosecutor’s actions

did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

       To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must

establish that the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial. State

v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 756, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). To establish prejudice, the

defendant must show a substantial likelihood that the error affected the jury

verdict. State v. Molina, 16 Wn. App. 2d 908, 918, 485 P.3d 963 (2021). Where

a defendant does not object at trial, he is deemed to have waived any error

unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an

instruction could not have cured any resulting prejudice. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at

760. Under this heightened standard, the defendant must show that (1) no

curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury, and

(2) the misconduct resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of

affecting the jury. State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43 (2011).

Counsel’s decision not to object or to request a curative instruction “strongly

suggests to a court that the argument or event in question did not appear

critically prejudicial to an appellant in the context of trial.” State v. Swan, 114

Wn.2d 613, 661, 790 P.2d 610 (1990).

       We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion,

viewing the allegedly improper statements within the context of the entire case.

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No. 84382-6-I/15

Molina, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 918. Here, Canete did not object to any of the three

instances of alleged misconduct and therefore his claims are subject to a

heightened standard of proof.

       Canete first asserts that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the

passions and prejudices of the jury by arguing generalizations about all child sex

cases. But Canete fails to establish misconduct or prejudice. The prosecutor

made two statements referencing child sex abuse survivors broadly. He stated

first, “[S.W.] is a survivor of child sex abuse, and survivors of child sex abuse

have no witnesses.” A few minutes later he continued, “[c]hild sex abuse

survivors have to find their voices.” These statements, Canete argues, asked the

jury to convict Canete “on behalf of all ‘survivors’ in ‘child sex abuse cases’ ”

rather than the facts of the case.

       However, allegedly improper statements should be considered in the

context of the prosecutor’s entire argument. Molina, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 918. The

prosecutor made these two comments, in passing, in the context of discussing

details specific to this case. When viewed in the context of the prosecutor’s

entire closing argument, these statements were unlikely to result in substantial

prejudice and any resulting prejudice could have been fixed by a curative

instruction.

       Canete next asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing

Canete’s first-person thought process based purely on speculation and not on

facts in evidence. The State concedes that this reference to Canete’s first-

person thought process was improper. We agree. However, the prosecutor’s

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No. 84382-6-I/16

statements here were limited in scope and tied closely to S.W.’s testimony and to

Canete’s behavior. While the prosecutor’s statements of “[h]ow far can I go? . . .

[h]ow far can I get with this? . . . [c]an I go a little further?” were improper, they

were not the focus of the State’s argument. Furthermore, those three statements

were a small part of the entire closing argument. Simply pointing them out is not

enough to establish that the misconduct had a substantial likelihood of affecting

the jury.

       Lastly, Canete argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

misstating the burden of proof. Again, allegedly improper statements should be

considered in the context of the prosecutor’s entire argument. Molina, 16 Wn.

App. 2d at 918. The prosecutor did misstate the burden of proof once, stating

“[w]hat’s important about that is that we have to prove our case beyond a

reasonable doubt as to material elements of the charge okay? . . . [B]ut we don’t

have to prove everything about the case beyond a reasonable doubt.” But he

later stated the correct burden of proof, noting that “[n]ow, to convict the

defendant of child molestation in the second degree, the following elements must

be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, this is what I’m referring to.”

(Capitalization omitted.) He then listed each element as it connected to the facts

of the case. He did the same for the charge of rape of a child in the second

degree. Additionally, both the court and defense counsel stated the correct

burden of proof. Viewed within the context of the entire closing argument, the

misstatement was unlikely to result in substantial prejudice and any resulting

prejudice could have been easily remedied by a curative instruction.

                                           16
No. 84382-6-I/17

       The prosecutor’s actions did not result in prosecutorial misconduct.

                                  Cumulative Error

       Canete argues that if we are not satisfied that any of the previously

discussed errors alone are enough to warrant reversal, the combined effects

denied Canete a fair trial under the cumulative error doctrine. As there is little

error, the combined effect is not enough to warrant a reversal.

       The cumulative error doctrine applies when “several trial errors standing

. . . alone may not be sufficient to justify reversal but when combined may deny a

defendant a fair trial.” State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390 (2000).

“The test to determine whether cumulative errors require reversal of a

defendant’s conviction is whether the totality of circumstances substantially

prejudiced the defendant and denied [them] a fair trial.” In re Pers. Restraint of

Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 690, 327 P.3d 660 (2014) (abrogated on other grounds

by State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018)). The defendant bears

the burden of proving cumulative error. In re Pers Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d

296, 332, 868 P.2d 835 (1994).

       Here, there are only two established trial errors. The first is defense

counsel’s failure to interview N.C. The second is the prosecutor’s improper

speculation into Canete’s first-person thought process. In both instances,

however, Canete has failed to prove any prejudice. Because reversal under the

cumulative error doctrine requires circumstances that substantially prejudiced the

defendant and Canete has failed to show prejudice, reversal is not warranted.

                                         17
No. 84382-6-I/18

       The combined effects do not warrant a reversal under the cumulative error

doctrine.

       We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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