Court Opinion

ID: 9886455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 16:10:51.111784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:02.895970
License: Public Domain

J-A17016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  R.S.K.                                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  D.L.K.                                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 375 EDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 10, 2023
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 2012-61169

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED OCTOBER 6, 2023

       D.L.K. (“Mother”) appeals from the order which: (1) directed a

pharmacy to fill a prescription for a puberty-blocking drug to be administered

to her minor child, K.K. (born in July 2009); (2) directed K.K.’s pediatric

endocrinologist to administer the drug to K.K.; and (3) deferred any ruling on

Mother’s petitions to modify custody until Mother undergoes the psychological

evaluation which the trial court ordered her to complete in 2020. We affirm.

       Mother and R.S.K. (“Father”) were married in 2000 and have been

divorced since 2013. They have four children, two of whom are minors subject

to a custody order. One of the minor children, K.K., was born as a female but

identifies as a male. As K.K. does not wish to identify as a female, he has

been working with physicians and therapists for several years to obtain

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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treatment for gender dysphoria and to prevent the development of female

physical attributes during puberty. In this regard, K.K. received a puberty-

blocking Supprelin implant in 2020, and since April 2022 has been receiving

bi-annual puberty-blocking Triptodur injections.

       Since the parties separated in 2011, they have collectively filed dozens

of competing petitions to modify custody, find each other in contempt of court,

and for contempt hearings. Numerous custody orders have been entered in

this contentious action, some of which have temporarily given Father sole legal

and sole physical custody. Presently, Father and Mother have shared legal

custody of the minor children, and Father has primary physical custody of

them. See Trial Court Orders, 8/31/21 and 5/16/22.1

       In August 2020, the trial court ordered both Mother and Father to

undergo a psychological evaluation by a designated evaluator, Donald

Seraydarian, Ph.D., as part of the custody evaluation process through Court

Conciliation and Evaluation Service (“CCES”).        Father complied with that

directive.   Mother has not.        Mother attempted to circumvent the court’s

directive by claiming that she was assessed by Family Services; however, the

trial court deemed that assessment incomplete and non-compliant, and on

several occasions has ordered her to comply with its August 2020 directive.

____________________________________________

1 In its opinion, the trial court incorrectly stated that Father presently has sole

legal custody of the minor children. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/23, at 3.

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       In March 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding K.K.’s

gender transition care.       The court heard testimony from, inter alia: K.K.’s

pediatric endocrinologist, Laurissa Kashmer, M.D.; K.K.’s primary physician,

Scott Blore, M.D.; and K.K.’s therapist, Marjorie Morgan, LPC. See Domestic

Court Sheet, 3/1/22, at 1.          The trial court also conducted an in camera

interview of K.K., with counsel and a court reporter present.           See id.

Unfortunately, the proceedings were not transcribed. As such, there is no

record of the evidence and testimony provided to the trial court.        At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered its ruling that K.K. may

continue to receive injectable puberty blockers, “but not the medical

procedure.”2 Id. K.K. thereafter received a Triptodur injection in April 2022.

See N.T., 1/27/23, at 43.

       In May 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing. Following the hearing,

the court entered a custody order which specified that, inter alia, the custody

order entered on August 31, 2021 (granting Mother and Father shared legal

custody over the minor children, and granting Father primary physical custody

over them) would remain in effect, and that only Mother and Father could

attend medical and other appointments for the minor children.      See Custody

Order, 5/16/22, at unnumbered 1.

____________________________________________

2  We understand this ruling to mean that, in lieu of surgically
removing/receiving another Supprelin implant, K.K. would instead start
receiving injections of a puberty blocking drug.

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      In June 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing. At the hearing, the

court heard testimony from, inter alia, Dr. Kashmer, Dr. Blore, and Jeremy

Gunn, Esquire, as counsel for, inter alia, Pantherx Rare Pharmacy (“Panther

Pharmacy”). See Domestic Court Sheet, 6/14/22. The evidentiary portion of

the hearing was not transcribed. Thus, there is no record of the evidence and

testimony provided to the trial court. However, the trial court’s “Decision” at

the end of the proceedings was transcribed. Therein, the court directed that,

prior to obtaining a second medical opinion regarding K.K., Mother must first

consult with Dr. Kashmer and Dr. Blore. See N.T., 6/14/22, at 3-4; see also

Domestic   Court   Sheet,   6/14/22   at    1    (providing   that   “[n]o   second

opinion/appt. on Gender Dysphoria can be made by [M]other, until Mother

consults with Dr. Kashmer and Dr. Blore”).          The court also ordered that

Father’s fiancé be removed as a contact for the minor children with respect to

all medical providers.   See N.T., 6/14/22, at 4; see also Domestic Court

Sheet, 6/14/22 at 1 (providing that “[fiancé] is to be removed as a contact for

[the minor children] in the medical offices”).

      On October 3, 2022, the trial court entered an order directing Dr.

Kashmer to execute a prescription for K.K.’s bi-annual Triptodur injection and

to administer the injection to K.K. as soon as possible, in October 2022.

However, when Dr. Kashmer attempted to execute the prescription through

Panther Pharmacy, she was unable to do so because Mother had contacted

the pharmacy and stated that she had shared legal custody of K.K., she did

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not consent to the Triptodur injection, and K.K. still had a Supprelin implant

which had not been removed. Based on Mother’s representations, Panther

Pharmacy declined to fill the prescription due to its legal concerns regarding

Mother’s communication.

      In November 2022, Father filed an emergency petition to find Mother in

contempt of the October 3, 2022 order directing that K.K. receive a Triptodur

injection, and sought recovery of his attorneys’ fees as a sanction against

Mother. Father also sought sole legal custody related to K.K.’s medical and

psychological care.

      In response, Mother filed an amended petition for modification of

custody.   Therein, Mother alleged that Father was not acting in the minor

child’s bests interests and that Father did not keep her updated regarding

K.K.’s gender transition care. Mother also claimed that Dr. Kashmer was lying

under oath and was non-credible and suspicious. Mother further averred that

Father’s legal counsel, Susan Smith, Esquire, was having sexual relations with

Father, thereby making counsel incredible and causing Mother mental

anguish. Mother additionally claimed that there are no records showing that

she and Father are divorced or that their marriage has been annulled. Mother

also sought sole legal and physical custody of the minor children, as well as

an order that both parties attend CCES for an expedited custody evaluation,

at Father’s cost.

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      On that same date, Mother filed an amended petition for modification of

custody and contempt wherein she claimed that Father did not complete his

application for CCES. Mother requested sole legal and physical custody of the

minor children. Mother also requested that Father’s custodial visits be limited

to Wednesday evenings from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. until the CCES process

is completed, and that Father’s fiancé be forbidden from Father’s custodial

visits. Mother further requested an order directing Father to pay $2,500 for

their oldest child’s MCAT review course.

      Mother thereafter filed an ex-parte emergency petition for contempt and

ex-parte emergency modification of a custody order wherein she claimed that,

in violation of a court order, Father’s fiancé is listed as a secondary contact at

a medical facility, the fiancé pretended to be the children’s mother or

stepmother, the fiancé lied to the court and medical professionals, and the

fiancé called Mother’s place of work on three occasions and tried to get Mother

fired. Mother requested a restraining order against Father’s fiancé, as well as

a finding that Father was in contempt of the custody order for failing to remove

the fiancé from the minor children’s medical records. Mother also sought an

emergency temporary order granting her sole legal and physical custody of

the two minor children.

      On January 27, 2023, the matter proceeded to a hearing on the pending

petitions. Mother, who had previously been represented by counsel, appeared

pro se. The trial court permitted Mother to read into the record a letter from

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Panther Pharmacy to Dr. Kashmer explaining that, although a Supprelin

implant has an indicated twelve-month duration, studies have shown that it

can suppress puberty and hormones for up to two years and, as such, should

not be used in conjunction with Triptodur due to the risk of adverse physical

reactions.   Mother conceded that K.K. received the Supprelin implant in

December 2020, more than two years prior. Mother also complained that she

had attempted to obtain a second opinion for K.K. from a doctor at Childrens

Hospital of Philadelphia (“CHOP”); however, Father had cancelled the

appointment.    The trial court then reminded Mother that, in making the

appointment, she had not complied with the conditions imposed by the court

before any such second opinion appointment could be scheduled. The trial

court then heard testimony via telephone from a representative from Panther

Pharmacy, who indicated that the pharmacy would need an order from the

court directing it to honor one or the other parent’s decision for the Triptodur

prescription, since Father provided consent and Mother did not. The court

inquired if the pharmacy would honor an order from the court indicating that

Father was the sole legal custodian for purposes of parental consent for the

Triptodur injections, and the pharmacy representative responded in the

affirmative. See N.T., 1/27/23, at 53. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

court indicated that it would not rule on the various motions for contempt of

court and would hold them in abeyance. See id. at 65. The court directed

Mother to complete her psychological evaluation by Dr. Seraydarian as quickly

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as possible, so that the court could address the various petitions for

modification of custody that she had filed.      Id. at 66, 67.   The trial court

embodied its various rulings in a “Domestic Court Sheet” which was filed

following the conclusion of the hearing. See Domestic Court Sheet, 1/27/23,

at 1.

        On February 6, 2023, Mother filed a notice of appeal. Later that same

day, the trial court entered two orders which collectively directed that: (1) Dr.

Kashmer immediately execute a prescription to Panther Pharmacy for a

Triptodur injection for K.K.; (2) Panther Pharmacy immediately dispense a

Triptodur injection on K.K.’s behalf; (3) Dr. Kashmer or her staff facilitate the

prompt administration of the Triptodur injection to K.K.; and (4) Father has

sole legal custody as it pertains to the continued Triptodur injections for K.K.

The trial court also issued an order directing Mother to file a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        Meanwhile, this Court issued an order directing the trial court to enter a

final order in the matter, as the Domestic Court Sheet from which Mother

appealed was neither a final order nor appealable. On March 10, 2023, the

trial court complied with this Court’s directive by entering an order which: (1)

affirmed the two orders entered on February 6, 2023; and (2) indicated that

Mother’s petitions for modification of custody would not be addressed until she

complied with the August 2020 order to undergo a psychological evaluation

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by Dr. Seraydarian. See Order, 3/10/23, at unnumbered 1.3 The trial court

thereafter authored an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).

       Mother raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by not holding a
          properly structured hearing?

       2. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by authorizing the
          injection of . . . K.K.?

       3. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by placing conditions
          on [Mother] getting a second opinion at [CHOP]?

       4. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by imposing conditions
          on the psychiatric evaluation of [Mother] in order for there to
          be a custody evaluation by CCES?

Mother’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       Our standard of review

              In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest
       type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept
       findings of the trial court that are supported by competent
       evidence of record, as our role does not include making
       independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to
       issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to
       the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses
       first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s
       deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the
       test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as
____________________________________________

3 A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before

the entry of an appealable order is treated as having been filed after such
entry and on the day thereof. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5). Accordingly, Mother’s
premature notice of appeal was deemed as having been filed upon the entry
of a final appealable order. See id.; see also Johnston the Florist, Inc. v.
TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d 511 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (holding
that this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is perfected where appellant
prematurely appealed from an order denying post-trial relief and judgment
was later entered).

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      shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions
      of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are
      unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

C.R.F., III v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

      Further, we have stated the following:

            [T]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody
      matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special
      nature of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will
      have on the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge
      gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody
      proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court
      by a printed record.

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

      With respect to Mother’s first issue, concerning the structure of the

January 27, 2023 hearing, we must determine whether she preserved it for

our review. When a trial court directs an appellant to file a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b), any issues not

raised in that statement are waived. See Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d

306, 308 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(vii) (providing that

“issues not included in the Statement . . . are waived”). Thus, any issue that

was not raised and preserved properly before the lower court in the concise

statement is waived. See Korman Commercial Props. v. Furniture.com,

LLC, 81 A.3d 97, 102 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing

that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for

the first time on appeal). Conversely, issues which are raised in the concise

statement but not developed or discussed in an appellate brief are deemed

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abandoned. See In Interest of T.Q.B., 286 A.3d 270, 273 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(holding that issues raised in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement that are not

developed in appellate brief are abandoned).

      Here, in her court-ordered concise statement, Mother limited her first

issue to a claim that “[t]he [trial] court abused its discretion by not holding a

properly structured hearing.       Susan Smith, Esquire dominated the

hearing and made medical conclusions without having an expert

witness testify.”      See Concise Statement at ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

However, in her brief, Mother made no mention of Attorney Smith, let alone

her conduct or statements at the January 27, 2023 hearing.            Instead, in

relation to her first issue, Mother discusses entirely different issues concerning

custody and contempt matters. See Mother’s Brief at 17-21. However, as

explained above, the trial court held in abeyance any ruling on the competing

petitions for contempt, and expressly deferred ruling on the pending custody

petitions until Mother completes her psychological evaluation.         See N.T.,

1/27/23, at 65-66; see also Order, 3/10/23, at 1. Thus, as Mother failed to

discuss the specific issue raised in her concise statement—concerning how the

conduct and statements of Attorney Smith impacted the structure of the

January 27, 2023 hearing, we deem Mother’s first issue abandoned.

      In her second issue, Mother contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in authorizing the Triptodur injections for K.K. without receiving

expert testimony at the January 27, 2023 hearing, or considering FDA

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warnings about puberty blockers.4 Mother maintains that there was no expert

testimony regarding: the efficacy of puberty blocking medications or hormone

treatments; the appropriate standard of informed consent for mental health

professionals or endocrinologists; or available non-surgical treatments for K.K.

Mother claims that she testified at the hearing regarding FDA warnings for

puberty blockers, studies concerning cognitive psychosocial functioning of

children with puberty blockers and asserted that a second opinion was needed

on hormone disorder.

       The trial court considered Mother’s second issue and determined that it

lacked merit. The court reasoned:

              This court did not abuse its discretion when [it] entered . . .
       orders regarding [K.K.]’s [Triptodur] injection.          This court
       previously entered an order on October 3, 2022, supporting
       [K.K.]’s [Triptodur] injection based on [K.K.]’s best interest as a
       child, but Mother intervened[,] which caused [the court] to have
       to enter new orders to ensure that the prescription and
       administration are authorized. Furthermore, [the court] allowed
       Mother to read to this court a letter from Panther Pharmacy to Dr.
       Kashmer about “clinical concerns” regarding the [Triptodur]
       injection and the [Supprelin] implant and possible risks of
       “adverse effects” of administrating the [Triptodur] injection before
       removing the [Supprelin] implant. N.T., 1/27/[]23, [at] 40-42.
       Furthermore, the letter indicates that the [Supprelin] implant’s
       duration is twelve months with some possible, continued
       dispersion. Id.[ at] 40. Mother confirmed on the record that the
       [Supprelin] implant was implanted on December 28, 2020, which
       is past two years. Id.[ at] 42. We carefully considered this
____________________________________________

4 In the discussion of her second issue, Mother again attempts to discuss
various additional claims which were not raised in her concise statement. See
Mother’s Brief at 21-23. Because these additional claims were not raised in
the concise statement, we need not address them, as they are waived. See
Korman, 81 A.3d at 102; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

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       information and the record, and we called Panther Pharmacy on
       the record before reasonably deciding to enter the new orders
       related to [K.K.]’s [Triptodur] injection.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/23, at 12-13 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in authorizing

continued Triptodur injections for K.K. Although Mother argues that there was

no factual basis for the trial court’s orders authorizing Triptodur injections for

K.K., the record belies Mother’s claim. The trial court conducted numerous

hearings    on   the    issue,   and    heard      testimony   from   several   medical

professionals, on more than one occasion, including Dr. Kashmer and Dr.

Blore.5    The court also conducted an in camera interview with K.K.,

presumably to determine whether K.K. wanted to receive Triptodur injections.

Mother explicitly told the trial court that she did not have any objection to K.K.

receiving Tritodur injections. See N.T., 1/27/23, at 38-39. Instead, Mother’s

concerns stemmed from a letter from Panther Pharmacy to Dr. Kashmer

____________________________________________

5 To the extent that Mother seeks to challenge the testimony provided by such

medical professionals, she failed to ensure that the transcripts for the hearings
at which they testified were included in the certified record. The Rules of
Appellate Procedure contemplate that the parties who are in the best position
to know what they actually need for appeal are responsible to take affirmative
actions to secure transcripts and other parts of the record. See Pa.R.A.P.
1911 (providing that “[t]he appellant shall request any transcript required
under this chapter in the manner and make any necessary payment or deposit
therefor . . ..”). Moreover, the failure to request a transcript for a hearing
generally results in waiver of any claims that cannot be resolved in the
absence of the necessary transcript. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904
A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a)). Here,
however, the record is sufficient based on other evidence to permit our review.
Accordingly, we do not find waiver.

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explaining that, although a Supprelin implant has an indicated twelve-month

duration, studies have shown that it can suppress puberty and hormones for

up to two years and, as such, should not be used in conjunction with Triptodur

due to the risk of adverse physical reactions. See N.T., 1/27/23, at 40-42

(wherein the court permitted Mother to read the letter into the record). After

carefully considering all of the information provided to it, including the possible

risks of adverse effects as raised by Mother, the trial court determined that

continued Triptodur injections were in K.K.’s best interest, particularly since it

had been over two years since K.K. received the Supprelin implant in

December 2020. See id. at 42. As an appellate court, we must accept the

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record,

as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. See

C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443.          As the trial court’s rulings are reasonable and

supported by the record, we discern no abuse of discretion.          Accordingly,

Mother’s second issue merits no relief.6

       In her third issue, Mother contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by placing conditions on her getting a second medical opinion for

____________________________________________

6 Notably, Mother did not appeal the trial court’s ruling in March 2022,
permitting K.K. to receive Triptodur injections, which must be administered
every six months. Nor did Mother appeal the trial court’s October 3, 2022
order directing that K.K. receive another Triptodur injection as soon as
possible, as six months had elapsed since K.K.’s April 2022 injection. Instead,
Mother simply attempted to obstruct compliance with the October 3, 2022
order by directly contacting Panther Pharmacy.

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K.K. Mother asserts that “[n]othing demonstrates a hormone disorder . . .

[and t]here is no medical reason for the Triptodur injections.” Mother’s Brief

at 24. According to Mother, “[a] qualified professional for mental health never

saw [K.K.]” Id. Mother argues that she “sent the endocrinologist at CHOP

what the doctor required.” Id. Mother indicates that she “told [the court]

that there were no published reports of adolescents withdrawing from

puberty-suppressing drugs from resuming normal puberty development

typical for their sex.” Id. Mother maintains that Father “stopped” her from

getting a second opinion at CHOP, and the trial court supported Father’s

decision. Id.

      The trial court considered Mother’s third issue and determined that it

lacked merit. The court reasoned:

            This court did not abuse its discretion by placing
      prerequisites for Mother before seeking second opinion at [CHOP]
      regarding [K.K.]’s gender transition care. This court held a
      conference on September 20, 2022, with both parties through
      their counsel where the prerequisites were established. [See]
      N.T., 1/27/[]23, [at] 24. While Mother claims that her counsel at
      the time did not share this information with her and that she did
      not receive any e[-]mails about this, Father’s counsel proved on
      the record that an e[-]mail on the day of the conference included
      Mother[,] and that Father’s counsel reminded Mother of the
      instruction through e[-]mail on December 12, 2022. Id.[ at] 25-
      26. Therefore, we did not arbitrarily set the prerequisites for
      seeking a second opinion at [CHOP].

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/23, at 13-14 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in imposing

prerequisites for Mother to obtain a second medical opinion for K.K.’s gender

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transition care. At a hearing in June 2022, the trial court directed that, prior

to obtaining a second medical opinion regarding K.K., Mother must first

consult with Dr. Kashmer and Dr. Blore. See N.T., 6/14/22, at 3-4; see also

Domestic     Court   Sheet,   6/14/22    at   1   (providing   that   “[n]o   second

opinion/appt. on Gender Dysphoria can be made by [M]other, until Mother

consults with Dr. Kashmer and Dr. Blore”). While there is no transcript in the

record for the September 2022 conference referenced by the trial court, the

court referenced additional conditions that had been imposed before any

second medical opinion could be obtained for K.K., including that the second

opinion doctor must first speak with Dr. Kashmer and be provided with certain

records prior to scheduling an appointment with K.K. See N.T., 1/27/23, at

23-24. Mother did not comply with these directives, causing Father to cancel

the appointment that Mother had scheduled. Id. at 23.

      In this Court’s view, the trial court’s conditions were reasonable and

necessary to ensure that: (1) Mother was appropriately informed by K.K.’s

treating physicians regarding K.K.’s medical needs and course of treatment;

and (2) K.K. was not subjected to a medical appointment with a new physician

who had not spoken with K.K.’s pediatric endocrinologist or provided with the

information and documentation needed to make an accurate diagnosis. As we

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, Mother’s third issue merits

no relief.

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         In her final issue, Mother contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by ordering her to complete a psychological evaluation with Dr.

Seraydarian before the matter can proceed to a CCES custody evaluation and

her various pending custody petitions may be addressed.

         The polestar of child custody law is to serve the best interests of the

child.     C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 909 (Pa. 2018).          To aid in this

determination, a custody court “may order the child(ren) and/or any party to

submit to and fully participate in an evaluation by an appropriate expert or

experts.” Pa.R.C.P. 1915.8(a). Whether to order a custody evaluation is a

matter within the purview of the custody court. See Jordan v. Jackson, 876

A.2d 443, 455 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding “[i]t is clearly within the court’s

discretion whether to order an evaluation”).

         However, where a custody court has ordered an appellant to undergo a

psychological evaluation and deferred consideration of a custody petition until

such evaluation is completed, this Court may not consider the custody court’s

exercise of its discretion in ordering the psychological evaluation where no

final custody order has been entered in the action. See Miller v. Steinbach,

681 A.2d 775, 778 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that this Court was without

jurisdiction to address an appeal of an order deferring any ruling on custody

until father underwent and paid for psychological evaluations). This is because

“the issue concerning the psychological evaluations is intertwined with the

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issue of whether [a parent] should be granted partial custody of his minor

child.” Id.

      Here, the trial court ordered Mother to undergo a psychological

evaluation with Dr. Seraydarian in August 2020. To date, Mother has not

complied with that directive, despite repeated instructions by the trial court

that she do so. The record reveals that Mother’s mental health is very much

in question, and that a psychological evaluation will be critical to the trial

court’s assessment of what custody arrangement will be in her children’s best

interest. Thus, as the question of the psychological evaluation is intertwined

with the issue of whether Mother’s custodial rights should be modified, we

may not address it at this juncture. Id. Any challenge that Mother may wish

to raise regarding the psychological evaluation can be presented on appeal

once the trial court has issued a final custody order in the matter. Id.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 10/6/2023

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