Court Opinion

ID: 9459179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:12:27.050891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:03.053749
License: Public Domain

KILKENNY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
We should not speak in this proceeding on former jeopardy, an issue which was not raised in the district court, and which is vehemently disclaimed by the defendants, the real parties in interest. Since I differ with the majority on the nature of the issues presented by the petition and the responses thereto, I restate them as follows:
(1) did the government have a right of appeal from the district court judgment to either the Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court? and,
(2) did the respondent have power to hold a pre-trial hearing, over the objection of the government, on the issue of obscenity, and thus deprive the latter of a trial on the merits ?
RIGHT OF APPEAL
(1) At the outset, we are faced with respondent’s argument that petitioner had an adequate remedy by appealing to this court or to the United States Supreme Court and, having failed to do so, is not entitled to seek a writ of mandamus. We withheld decision in this litigation pending the outcome in United States v. Weller, 466 F.2d 1279 (CA9 1972). Although the decision here is not absolutely controlled by the court’s conclusions in Weller, for apparent distinctions are manifest.1 I would hold that the overall rationalization in Weller is applicable and that the petitioner could not appeal the decision of the lower court to this court or the Supreme Court. Weller was remanded to the Circuit Court for decision after the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal was not properly before it. United States v. Weller, 401 U.S. 254, 91 S.Ct. 602, 28 L.Ed.2d 26 (1971). In United States v. Pinkus, 466 F.2d' 1405 (CA9 1972), on a factual background strikingly similar to that before us, a panel of this court Recently invoked Weller 2 and held that an appeal did not lie to the Circuit Court.
Accordingly, respondent’s argument that mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal is here of no avail.
ON THE MERITS
(2) I commence with the premise that the petitioner had a constitutional right to a jury trial.3 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36-37, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965); United States v. *765Gray, 448 F.2d 164, 168 (9 Cir. 1971); United States v. Ferguson, 448 F.2d 169 (9 Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 941, 30 L.Ed.2d 809 (1972). For that matter, the right, if not waived, is implicit in Rule 23(a), FRCrimP.4 Here, the petitioner, rather than consenting, consistently objected to the pre-trial proceedings on the issue of obscenity and participated in the proceedings only on the insistence of the respondent. Indeed, it would seem that respondent was of the belief that he was trying an issue of law, rather than one of fact. I quote from one of the final paragraphs of his decision.
“Alright. That brings us to the holding in the ca’se. My precise holding is that the motion to dismiss will be granted as to each count of each case before me. I find each piece of these advertisements in issue not obscene as a matter of law." [Emphasis added.]
The respondent’s conclusions on the subject were probably influenced by decisions such as United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (CA2 1968). Our intervening decision in United States v. Miller, 455 F.2d 899, 902 (CA9 1972), declines to follow the majority in A Motion Picture Film and holds that obscenity is a question of fact, rather than one of law. Clearly, the respondent was in error in proceeding over the express opposition of the petitioner.
True enough, a number of district courts have followed the procedure invoked by the lower court. These are not controlling.
United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 89 S.Ct. 1559, 23 L.Ed.2d 94 (1969), upon which respondent relies, had nothing whatsoever to do with obscenity. It was a tax case. In United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L. Ed.2d 793 (1964), the Supreme Court was speaking of the powers and duties of an appellate court in treating constitutional problems. I quote from Roth, page 497, 77 S.Ct. page 1315:
“ . . . Every communication has an individuality and ‘value’ of its own. The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressable within constitutional standards. . . .” [Emphasis added.]
Manifestly, the Supreme Court was speaking of the particularized judgment which appellate courts must make for themselves on constitutional issues. Nowhere is it suggested that a trial court may take over, pre-try and decide this type of constitutional issue in a pre-trial hearing. In Childs v. Oregon, 431 F.2d 272 (CA9 1970), rev’d. 401 U.S. 1006, 91 S.Ct. 1248, 28 L.Ed.2d 542 (1971), the Court is speaking of the duty of an appellate court to examine the evidence and determine if it is of such a nature to be properly submitted to the jury. The language of the opinion does not touch the problem here presented.
Respondent quotes extensively from United States v. Head, 317 F.Supp. 1138 (E.D.La.1970). There, the indictment identified with great specificity the matter alleged to be obscene, and could be distinguished on that ground alone. Beyond that, the element of pandering was there disclaimed by the government. The bald statement, unsupported by authority, that a trial court is required to rule on the constitutional question of obscenity vel non when that issue is properly presented in advance of trial, does *766not impress me and I would decline to follow it.
I have examined the other authorities pressed upon us by the respondent and in the answers and brief of the defendants. I find that most of them do not deal with obscenity, or do not treat obscenity at the trial level as one of fact. Of course, we are bound in that respect by the Miller decision.
The majority concede that “the trial judge’s procedure might well be unauthorized and improper.” It is intimated that if the government had applied to us for relief that it might have been granted under the “All Writs Act”. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. I assume this means an application for a Writ of Prohibition. On this point, we should keep in mind that the matter was pending on the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12, FRCrimP. The rule requires the court to determine the motion before a trial unless deferred. The same rule states that an issue of fact shall be tried by a jury if a jury trial is required under the constitution or an Act of Congress. Until the hearing the government could not have known that the judge might decide the motion on what he believed to be an issue of law. The government could not have known of the judge’s position until the judge made his decision.
Where, as here, a district judge exceeds his powers under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in granting a final order, the government is entitled to either a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition or both to require the district judge to vacate the invalid order. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 1330, 91 L.Ed. 1610 (1947). The judgment of dismissal in this case is a final order of the type mentioned in Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 97-98, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967), as justifying the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Double jeopardy is a defense which may toe waived. Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313 (CA9 1966), cert. dismissed 385 U.S. 802, 87 S.Ct. 10, 17 L.Ed.2d 49; Haddad v. United States, 349 F.2d 511 (CA9 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 896, 86 S.Ct. 193, 15 L.Ed.2d 153; Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (CA9 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 860, 70 S.Ct. 103, 94 L.Ed. 527. It is a defense which must be pleaded. United States v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346 (CA7 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 845, 80 S. Ct. 98, 4 L.Ed.2d 83, rehearing denied 361 U.S. 904, 80 S.Ct. 212, 4 L.Ed.2d 159. We should not act as counsel for the defendants and here assert in their behalf the defense of former jeopardy. That is not our function. This is particularly true where the complete record of what occurred is not before us, where the trial judge was certain that former jeopardy did not attach,5 and where at least some of the defendants were resolute in their position that double jeopardy was not involved. Could it be that the defendants, by their actions both here and in the district court, have waived their alleged defense of double jeopardy? The issue is not before us and should be resolved in the lower court.
This is not a case such as United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 90 S.Ct. 2117, 26 L.Ed.2d 608 (1970), where a jury was empaneled, the case tried and a verdict of guilty returned and then set aside.
*767CONCLUSION
I would follow the procedures outlined in United States v. Gray, sUpra, p. 168 and United States v. Ferguson, supra, and direct the issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring respondent to vacate and set aside the orders dismissing the indictment. Further, I would direct that respondent reinstate the indictment and proceed to trial in accordance with established practice and procedure.

. Weller was indicted for failure to submit for induction. [50 U.S.C. App. § 462],

. Circuit Court decision.

. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides, among other things, that: “ . . . The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury . . . . ”

. Rule 23, FRCrimP.
“(a) Trial by Jury. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the government.” [Emphasis added.]

. “The Court: Well, all right. The record I think is clear enough on this.
“The technique here employed of determining under a pretrial motion to dismiss whether the material which is the basis of the indictment is colorably obscene or whether it is not obscene as a matter of law is a proper one, though it has not as yet been approved by any Court of Appeals so far as I can determine.”
*?• «!•
“This procedure preserves the Government’s right to appeal since jeopardy has not attached; and this procedure, if the decision is to dismiss, may save the litigants from going to trial unnecessarily.” (Emphasis supplied.)