Court Opinion

ID: 9782177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:04:34.731516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:50.961474
License: Public Domain

BREWER, C. J.,
concurring.
The majority has done a faithful job in this case of applying the template for property division imposed by the Supreme Court in Kunze and Kunze, 337 Or 122, 92 P3d 100 (2004). I write separately to express my views regarding two issues: (1) whether wife’s transfer of her separately held stock proceeds and other funds into the parties’jointly owned Paine Webber accounts resulted in the acquisition of property during the marriage to which the rebuttable presumption of equal contribution set out in ORS 107.105(l)(f) applies, and (2) if so, whether wife rebutted the presumption that husband contributed equally to those acquisitions.
In Kunze, the Supreme Court properly reminded bench and bar that “the legislative intent underlying ORS 107.105(l)(f) is the formulation of a property division at dissolution that is just and proper in all the circumstances.” 337 Or at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained that, to achieve its directive, “the statute empowers the court to distribute any real or personal property that either or both of the parties hold at the time of dissolution [.]” Id. at 133. Under ORS 107.105(l)(f), if a party establishes that the asset at issue is a marital asset — that the asset was acquired during the marriage — “then the court must apply the rebuttable presumption of equal contribution * * *.” Kunze, 337 Or at 134. The legislative intent behind the statutory presumption recognizes that, “[in the absence of] evidence to the contrary, each spouse’s efforts during a marriage equally contribute to, and are made for the benefit of, the marital estate, regardless of the nature of those efforts or how the property is held.” Id. at 134. The initial focus of my concern is the court’s implicit assumption that the concept of commingling is unrelated to — and, indeed, only comes into play after — the determination whether the asset in question was acquired during the marriage and, therefore, is subject to the rebuttable presumption of equal contribution. Id. at 137-43 (holding that commingling is pertinent to the determinations whether the statutory presumption has been *590rebutted and what is a just and proper division of property). As explained below, that assumption drives the division of the parties’joint brokerage accounts in this case.
The rebuttable presumption of equal contribution is a creature of statute. ORS 107.105(l)(f) (2001) provides that “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that both spouses have contributed equally to the acquisition of property during the marriage, whether such property is jointly or separately held.” In this case, as in Kunze, the beginning point should be the task of identifying the pertinent acquisition of property during the marriage. In making that determination, we must begin with the text of the statute in context. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). We are admonished to give words of common usage their “plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 611. “As a part of context, [a] court considers, among other things, other provisions of the same statute, other related statutes, prior versions of the statute, and [the Supreme Court’s] decisions interpreting the statute.” Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 411, 939 P2d 608 (1997).
The rebuttable presumption of equal contribution was added to the statute, then numbered ORS 107.105(l)(e), in 1977. Or Laws 1977, ch 847. The Supreme Court first considered the meaning of the phrase “acquisition of property during the marriage” in Engle and Engle, 293 Or 207, 214-15, 646 P2d 20 (1982). The court noted that the term “marital assets” was not defined in ORS 107.105(l)(e) (1977) and that the statute referred to property received during a marriage in two ways, namely, as “the acquisition of marital assets” and as “the acquisition of property during the marriage.” The court explained:
“Although there may be some question whether property received during the marriage by a spouse by way of gift or inheritance is intended to be included with either phrase (a question which we need not and do not decide in this case), there is no doubt that both phrases intended to include most other property acquired by one or both spouses during the marriage. The amendment recognized the fact that nonearning spouses who maintain the home, do the cooking and cleaning and raise the children, also contribute to the acquisition of property in a tangible, substantial way. The *591result was the creation of the rebuttable presumption of an equal contribution. Thus, when property is acquired with monies earned by a working spouse, whether title is taken in the husband’s name, the wife’s name, or in both names, the acquisition of the property would be treated, at least presumptively, as having resulted from the equal efforts of the spouses.”
Engle, 293 Or at 214 (footnote omitted).
The court next considered the meaning of the phrase “acquisition of property during the marriage” in Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117, 121, 653 P2d 1258 (1982). In that case, the wife received an inheritance after the parties separated but before an action to dissolve their marriage was filed. The husband argued that the inheritance should be considered a marital asset subject to the statutory presumption. The court agreed, reasoning that “the reference to ‘acquisition of property during the marriage’ indicates that it includes neither assets brought into the marriage by either spouse nor assets acquired by them after dissolution.” Id.
The court most recently considered the meaning of the phrase “acquisition of property during the marriage” in Massee and Massee, 328 Or 195, 206-07, 970 P2d 1203 (1999). Following the PGE template, the court observed that the dictionary definition of “ ‘acquisition’ ” is “ ‘the act or action of acquiring.’ ” Id. at 206 (quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 19 (unabridged ed 1993)). Relying on that definition, the court concluded that the appreciation during the marriage of assets brought to the marriage and separately held by the husband constituted property “acquired” during the marriage and, thus, was a marital asset to which the presumption applied. Massee, 328 Or at 206.
Neither the legislative history of the 1977 amendment nor anything that the court said in Engle or Pierson speaks meaningfully to the problem at hand. However, Massee may be instructive. By concluding that the mere passive appreciation in value of property brought into the marriage and separately held by one spouse constitutes property acquired during the marriage, the court indicated that the phrase “acquisition of property during the marriage” is of broad applicability. It therefore is difficult to conceive how a *592deliberate transfer of an interest in property from one spouse to another, or from one spouse to both, would not also be regarded as property acquired during the marriage.1 Nevertheless, despite the expansiveness of the holding in Massee, the Supreme Court in Kunze implicitly concluded that an interspousal transfer of property does not result in an acquisition of property during the marriage for purposes of ORS 107.105(l)(f) (2001).
The statute, however, is not so limited. By its terms, the statutory presumption applies to the act of acquiring property during the marriage, regardless of whether the asset is jointly or separately held. Thus, the scope of the presumption is unrestricted in two salient ways: (1) it can apply to successive acquisitions of the same property during the marriage, and (2) it is of no consequence whether the form of acquisition is joint or separate.
The majority correctly applies the presumption to wife’s initial acquisitions of stock and cash by gift from her parents and concludes, as I would, that wife rebutted the presumption that husband equally contributed to those acquisitions. However, because it is constrained by Kunze, the majority does not address the second phase of acquisitions that occurred when wife deposited the stock proceeds and other funds into the parties’joint accounts during the marriage. That omission, although compelled by precedent that binds this court, is inconsistent with the statutory text. It also unnecessarily complicates the role that commingling plays in the division of marital property.
*593In. Kunze, the Supreme Court treated certain commingled property as a distinct form of property. See Kunze, 337 Or at 139 (“[A]cts of commingling may operate to convert a separately acquired asset into a joint asset of the marital partnership.” (Emphasis added.)). In recognizing that distinct form, the court subscribed to a complex calculus for determining the extent to which an asset is to be traced to its former ownership and, thus, provisionally included in or excluded from the property division. Id. at 142. That calculus could be useful in two other contexts: (1) as discussed below, in determining from a communal vantage point whether the presumption of equal contribution has been rebutted, and (2) in determining, at the final stage of analysis, whether equitable considerations compel the division of property that otherwise would be excluded from consideration. In fact, that calculus may provide the sole practical means for addressing the effect of commingling with respect to property, such as furnishings, artwork and the like, whose acquisition frequently is undocumented.
However, there is a congruence between commingling and the formal interspousal transfer of property during a marriage that the court overlooked in Kunze. The conveyance of an interest in real property has a well-defined legal effect. See, e.g., ORS 93.850(2)(a) (a warranty deed “shall convey the entire interest in the described property at the date of the deed which the deed purports to convey”). Likewise, the joint ownership of other types of property, such as bank and investment accounts, as well as vehicles, is routinely established by written agreement and title, respectively. See, e.g., ORS 708A.485 (“Any multiple-party account may be paid, on request, to any one or more of the parties. A financial institution shall not be required to inquire as to the source of funds received for deposit to a multiple-party account, or to inquire as to the proposed application of any sum withdrawn from an account, for purposes of establishing net contributions.”); ORS 803.010 (describing “prima facie” ownership effect of certificate of title to motor vehicle).
There is an important reason for this state of affairs. In the everyday world, including married life, people understand that the formal transfer of an ownership interest in property is a legally significant event. That is why it makes *594perfect sense that the legislature would treat as legally significant the formal interspousal transfer and acquisition of property during the marriage by attaching a rebuttable presumption of equal contribution to it. Because the statutory text clearly evinces that legislative intent, there is no reason to regard formally commingled property as a distinct form of joint property necessitating separate treatment in determining whether the property is a marital asset and its divisibility. The business of property division is complicated enough without artificially restricting the scope of property to which a simplifying presumption applies. And simplification is a function that the statutory presumption ordinarily serves quite well. It helps avoid the ad hoc resolution of dissolution disputes by bringing a measure of consistency and predictability to the application of the law in an area where fact-matching is inherently treacherous.
In short, because the stock proceeds and other funds deposited into the Paine Webber joint accounts were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are marital assets to which the statutory presumption applies.
With the foregoing in mind, I would separately consider whether wife rebutted the presumption that husband contributed equally to the acquisitions that occurred when the stock proceeds and other funds given to wife by her parents were deposited into the Paine Webber joint accounts in 1995 and thereafter. With little enthusiasm, I conclude that wife rebutted the presumption. The evidence showed that wife placed those funds in the Paine Webber accounts for “cultural reasons” and because of her commitment to the parties’ shared future. There was no evidence that husband made any particular contributions to the deposit of the stock proceeds and to her funds into the joint accounts.
Based on longstanding principles of property division, that evidentiary vacuum would not be conclusive where, as here (1) the parties’ marriage was one of lengthy duration, (2) there was no agreement or common understanding between the parties that the joint accounts were to be wife’s separate property, (3) the parties both valued hard work and saved for a shared future, and (4) as a consequence, the parties thoroughly commingled their assets and financial affairs. *595See Stice and Stice, 308 Or 316, 328-29, 779 P2d 1020 (1989) (discussing similar factors in determining whether presumption was rebutted). Under such circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that wife did not rebut the presumption that husband equally contributed to the questioned acquisitions. However, in Massee, the Supreme Court said:
“In deciding whether the presumption of equal contribution is rebutted, the court first must determine the magnitude of each spouse’s overall contribution to the acquisition of marital assets from evidence in the record. If one spouse is a homemaker, that determination necessarily will include an assessment of the homemaker spouse’s contribution to the enterprise of homemaking. A homemaker spouse’s overall contribution may consist of a combination of domestic contributions and economic or other nondomestic contributions.
“Once the court has determined each spouse’s overall contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, the court compares the respective contributions of the spouses. The ultimate question is whether the spouse seeking to rebut the presumption of equal contribution has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the other spouse did not contribute equally to the acquisition of marital assets. If the court determines that the presumption of equal contribution is rebutted, the presumption drops from the case and the court divides the property according to the magnitude of each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition of marital assets. In other words, the court distributes the marital assets without regard to any presumption, but in a manner that is just and proper in all the circumstances, including the proven contributions of the parties to the acquisition of marital assets.”
Massee, 328 Or at 205 (footnotes omitted).
The quoted passage can be understood to suggest that the trial court should admit evidence about the details of each party’s activities throughout the marriage, should attempt to assign values to those activities, and then should attempt to correlate those values to the parties’ marital assets. At first blush, that approach appears to be difficult to reconcile with the court’s earlier decision in Stice. In that case, the wife argued that she should be able to rebut the *596statutory presumption by showing that throughout the marriage she had been the “saver and purchaser,” that the acquisition of the disputed asset had been the result of her “industry and frugality,” and that her husband had been a self-indulgent “spender” who “used most of his income above that needed for the monthly expenses for his enjoyment and hobbies.” Id. at 324. The court rejected her argument, stating, “In a long-term marriage in which the parties’ properties were acquired during the marriage, the parties should separate on as equal a basis as possible.” Id at 327.
In Kunze, however, the court appeared to limit the reach of Stice:
“We note that, in Stice, 308 Or 316, this court considered commingling for a different reason under the statutory presumption of equal contribution. In concluding that the wife had failed to rebut the statutory presumption in that case, the court found it persuasive that the parties had commingled their financial affairs and that the wife had not shown that the husband considered the disputed assets to be the wife’s separate property. Id. at 328-29. Specifically, the court observed that that evidence strengthened the presumption that the husband had made an equal contribution by showing that the husband had enabled the wife to devote her income to the purchase of the disputed assets. Id. The reasoning in Stice, however, is inapposite to this case, because husband here does not contend that his efforts during the marriage contributed either directly or indirectly to the disputed marital property; rather, as discussed below, he argues only that he is entitled to a part of those assets because the wife’s acts of commingling converted those assets into joint assets of the marital partnership.”
Kunze, 337 Or at 139 n 10. The court’s apparent retrenchment in Kunze is not free from controversy. As Professor Leslie Harris has observed:
“Avoiding an examination of whether one spouse’s efforts were more valuable than the other’s, except in extreme cases, furthers several policies that are inherent in the property division and other statutes. First, such an inquiry clashes with the abolition of fault as a consideration in economic decisions at divorce; the line between marital fault and less-than-wholehearted contributions would be difficult to draw, at best. Second, inquiring in detail about *597who made greater contributions to the family’s well-being during the marriage may undermine the parties’ willingness to set aside their own self-interest during the marriage in favor of the common good of the family. Third, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, [ORS] 107.105(l)(f) must always be construed to recognize the financial importance of both spouses’ work and to ensure that homemakers and other spouses who forgo career development to care for the parties’ home and children share in the economic fruits of the marriage. Requiring trial courts to evaluate the relative worth of the spouses’ labors during the marriage could significantly undermine this policy.”
Leslie Joan Harris, Tracing, Spousal Gifts, and Rebuttable Presumptions: Puzzles of Oregon Property Distribution Law, 83 Or L Rev_,_(forthcoming 2005) (footnotes omitted). Professor Harris’s views notwithstanding, Kunze suggests that, except in cases involving a homemaker spouse, the Supreme Court probably will require a particularized assessment of a spouse’s contribution to the acquisition of a disputed asset — even a commingled asset — in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted. Here, the record is bereft of evidence that husband contributed, directly or indirectly, to the joint acquisition of an interest in the disputed funds. Accordingly, wife rebutted the presumption that husband equally contributed to that acquisition.
Although it is tempting to follow the majority’s analysis as it proceeds through the additional steps prescribed by Kunze, the exercise would not contribute to a better understanding of the principles at play. Suffice it to say that the majority appears to come to a conclusion that Kunze countenances. Because binding precedent so demands, I respectfully concur.

 Admittedly, an abstract way to reconcile Massee with Kunze would hold that the statutory presumption applies only to the initial acquisition of property, not to a successive transfer between spouses. In fact, that is the necessary, but unstated, implication of the court’s holding in Kunze. See Kunze, 337 Or at 144 (stating that the statutory presumption was inapplicable to “premarital equity” in property that wife had conveyed to husband as a co-owner during the marriage). Viewed accordingly, once the appreciation of a premarital asset during the marriage is understood to constitute discrete property, its initial “acquisition” could be distinguished from the successive acquisition by one spouse of an interest in the other spouse’s “premarital equity’ in property. As explained below, though, that distinction lacks support in the text and context of the statute; it ignores the fact that the transfer of an undivided joint ownership interest in property results in the acquisition of an interest in the entire property, including the premarital equity of the transferor spouse.