Court Opinion

ID: 9570270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:21:52.229181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:26.611849
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
In recent years, the rulings of this Court (in some of which I joined) have required taxing authorities to grant tax-free status for the following:
(1) A house used by a coven of witches for the worship of a deity called Wicca. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 249 Ga. 348 (292 SE2d 657) (1982).
(2) A major hotel in downtown Atlanta, acquired through foreclosure by a retirement system, which now can compete — tax-free — with all the other hotels. Teachers’ Retirement System of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 249 Ga. 196 (288 SE2d 200) (1982).
(3) Wooded tracts of land owned by churches, used on occasion for woodland strolls and sylvan devotionals. Tax Assessors v. Outreach for Christ, Inc., 241 Ga 2 (243 SE2d 42) (1978); Roberts v. Atlanta Baptist Assn., 240 Ga. 503 (241 SE2d 224) (1978).
(4) Long-term leasehold interests of private, for-profit corporations whose businesses are located on lands purchased with *549public funds. McMillan v. Jacobs, 249 Ga. 117 (288 SE2d 211) (1982); Allright Parking of Ga. v. Tax Assessors, 244 Ga. 378 (260 SE2d 315) (1979).
(5) Business income derived from sale of products physically delivered to purchasers within this state, upon the premise of ultimate out-of-state destinations. Strickland v. Patcraft Mills, 251 Ga. 43 (302 SE2d 544) (1983).
Now, the majority has seen fit to extend the gift of tax freedom to privately-owned buildings which are nothing more than social clubs for college students, whose functions and frolics are to be subsidized by the merchants and farmers and freeholders of Bulloch County, Georgia.
(See Anno. 66 ALR2d 904: “With few exceptions the courts have held that college fraternities and sororities are not exempt from taxation, because they exist primarily for the convenience of their members, and are mainly concerned with providing them with board, lodging, and recreation, while any educational, charitable, and benevolent purposes are of secondary importance.”)
What is to prevent any entrepreneur (who can easily arrange to be grossly overpaid by the “non-profit” entity which he controls) from claiming exemption for any enterprise which runs roughly parallel to the broad aims of “a college?” Bookstores, laundries, fast-food places, clothing stores, rooming houses, theaters, car repair shops, and video arcades — all of these can help meet the concerns of educational institutions that students be literate, clean, well-fed, decently housed, wholesomely entertained, and assured of needed transportation and good hand-and-eye coordination.
“It is a cardinal rule in the construction of grants by the public that nothing passes by implication; that statutes under which special privileges, amongst which is exemption from taxation, are claimed by a corporation, will be strictly construed in favor of the public, and the exemption will not be held to be conferred unless the terms of the grant clearly and distinctly show that such was the intention of the Legislature.” City of Macon v. Central R. &c. Co., 50 Ga. 620, 621 (1874).
The exemption of “places of religious worship,” OCGA § 48-5-41 (a)(2) (Code Ann. § 91A-1102), illustrates the boundless range of absurdities spawned by a departure from this “cardinal rule.” Small wonder that courts have encountered a profusion of new religions, e.g., Theriault v. Carlson, 339 FSupp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), where every dwelling house is a sanctuary, and every householder a minister — hence tax-free.
Who can define “religious worship?” History preserves from antiquity a plethora of sacred rites, which include prostration before *550the solar deity, anointing the body with oils, immersion in consecrated waters, burnt offering and libation, sacral music and dance. Are these things “religious worship?”
Or are they but poolside cook-outs?
I cannot deny that ownership by a non-profit private corporation is but one step removed from ownership by a privately-endowed university, as in Alford v. Emory University, 216 Ga. 391 (116 SE2d 596) (1960). In my opinion the taking of today’s step, while regrettable, is not so grave as is the adherence to the rule announced in Alford, which is bad policy and bad law. “The rule of stare decisis is a wholesome one, but should not be used to sanctify and perpetuate error in so short a term [of] years, without very weighty reasons in behalf of public policy.” City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 732 (13 SE 252) (1890).
Putting aside all cavil over school control, motive, exclusionary practices, and meager residential use, it is wrong that ordinary citizens must be forced to subsidize private clubs.
And no amount of precedential recitation or logical extension can obscure so plain a truth.
It is wrong.
I am authorized to state that Justice Smith joins in this dissent.