Court Opinion

ID: 9602519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:56:25.557611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:54:06.498620
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that any prejudicial error occurred below.
Specifically in regard to the trial court’s refusal to allow in evidence respondent Hemingway’s extra-judicial statement to the effect that “she felt like she was the cause of an accident,” such was within its prerogative as recognized by Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence, which reads in part as follows:
. the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing issues or of misleading the jury, .
The very purpose of said Rule 45 is to place the trial judge in control over the *705admission of evidence, and where, in his opinion, the danger of prejudicial influence upon the jury outweighs its probative value, it is entirely proper for him to exclude it. Such was the case in this instance and the trial judge did not exceed his authority, nor did he abuse his discretion. Consequently, this Court should not substitute its judgment for his.
The subjective nature of the excluded statement (“I felt ”) was alone sufficient to warrant its exclusion. In a ease such as this, the fact-finding function does not concern itself with the subjective mind processes of a witness and his “feelings” are not the proper subject of exploration. To the contrary, the fact-finder concerns itself with the objective evidence which in this case was extensive as to Hemingway’s driving pattern and from which the jury in fact found that it constituted negligence. On the other hand, there was also adequate evidence presented to support the jury’s conclusion that such negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident.
Turning now to the propriety of the “proximate cause” instruction, the main opinion is somewhat equivocal in its comments thereon since it concedes it to be a true statement of the law but thereafter deems it not appropriate in this case since “it would seem to exculpate Hemingway . whether or not Querry’s conduct was foreseeable.” I am unable to adopt that reasoning for the following reasons.
First, when the instruction is read in its entirety, I am of the opinion that it properly states the law that applies to this case. The entire instruction reads as follows:
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause — the one that necessarily sets into operation the factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate directly or through intermediate agencies or through conditions created by such agencies.
If the continuous sequence is broken by an efficient intervening cause, then all acts occurring before the break of the continuous sequence cannot be the proximate cause. If a driver creates a dangerous condition with a motor vehicle, but this condition is such that another driver, exercising reasonable care, should have observed and avoided the dangerous condition, then the negligence of the later driver is an independent intervening cause, and, therefore, the first driver cannot be a proximate cause of the collision. [Emphasis added.]
The foregoing instruction finds support in instruction number 15.6, J.I.F.U.1 and often-cited Utah cases,2 and I am of the opinion that it properly sets forth the applicable law.
I am unable to read the said instruction as depriving the jury of its charge to determine the reasonableness of the actions of all of the parties, within the recognized bounds of foreseeability.
Secondly, the main opinion holds that it was error not to instruct the jury that Hemingway was charged with the duty of foreseeing that a “momentarily inattentive” driver such as Querry would not be able to react quickly enough to avoid a collision. The facts of this case do not support any such “momentary inattentiveness” as is evident from the following testimony elicited from appellant and which supports the jury’s apportionment of 85 percent negligence on the part of Querry and 15 percent on her part:
Q. How much distance separated you from Miss Hemingway when you first saw her?
A. Probably about 150 meters.
******
Q. So it would be more like 160 yards away?
*706A. Yeah.
* * * * * *
Q. And do you have an estimate as to how fast she was traveling?
“A. She was going awfully slow into my lane. I called it creeping, so that is pretty slow.
* * * * * *
Q. Were you able to see the taillights on her car?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. You never had any trouble observing her that night?
A. Oh, no. I saw her.
Q. The visibility was clear, wasn’t it? A. Yes, it was.
Q. It was a nice clear night?
A. Yes.
* ⅝: * * ⅝: *
Q. And you were overtaking her, isn’t that right?
A. I was catching up to her, yes.
Q. And she was in your lane?
A. Yes.
* * * * * *
Q. And then she put on her brakes and started to slow down again?
A. Right.
* * * * * *
Q. . Could you see beyond the right rear corner of your car?
A. No.
Q. So you didn’t know if there were any cars behind you, behind the right rear corner of your car coming up?
A. There was one right next to me, so I didn’t have to look any further.
Q. How fast was that car traveling? A. Faster than I was.
⅜ Hi ⅜ * * *
Q. And so you were coming up behind her and saw her brake lights go on, and that was about at a point where you were 110 yards behind her. Is that right?
A. Yes. That is right.
Q. And at that time you put on your brakes?
A. A little bit.
* * * * * *
Q. From that point on did she at any time accelerate?
A. No. I don’t think so.
Q. Was her speed decreasing?
A. I couldn’t notice that.
Q. Were you overtaking her?
A. I was coming closer.
* * % ⅝: \ ⅝: $
Q. Okay. Did you have any difficulty in stopping?
A. Well, I braked so hard that it pulled my car a bit to the right. I did have power brakes. Yeah, I would say it is [sic] difficulty in stopping.
Q. When was it that you first saw Mr. Querry?
A. When I slammed on my brakes, at the very same time I glanced in my rear-view mirror, I saw the lights coming toward me. And I knew I was in for it.
It is evident from the foregoing that appellant negligently failed to reduce her speed as was dictated by the conditions existing. She was then forced to come to an abrupt stop in order to avoid a collision which in turn, combined with the negligence of Querry, was the proximate cause of the collision.
The record adequately supports the jury’s conclusion that Hemingway’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the collision and that instead, the combined negligence of appellant and Querry was such cause.
I would affirm.
ELLETT, C. J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of HALL, J.

. Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 1957.

. Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953); Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).