Court Opinion

ID: 9421870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:00:16.428293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:32.413275
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The constitutional validity of the. occupational tax provisions on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers has been established by United States v. Kahriger, 346 U. S. 22. In construing those provisions, however, we have held that no. weight can be given to the suggestion that they must be interpreted on the premise that their-enactment was “‘in part motivated by a congressional desire to suppress wagering.’ ” United States v. Calamaro, 354 U. S. 351. In that case we held that only “writers,” “bankers,” or those who have “a proprietary interest” in a lottery operation are subject to the taxing statutes, and that therefore only those persons can be held for violation of their substantive provisions.
In this case the Government has in effect sought to by-pass Calamaro by the simple expedient of indicting persons connected with a lottery operation not. for the substantive offenses proscribed by the Internal Revenue Code, but instead for conspiring with those members of the lottery operation who are personally subject to the relevant excise taxes to evade payment of those taxes. Two essential elements of the crime, first, knowledge that the taxes are due, and, second, a “willful and positive *682attempt to evade tax in any manner or to defeat it by any means,” Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 499, are sought to be established here by the naked fact that the lottery operation was carefully concealed by all who participated in it. Since lotteries are unlawful in virtually every State, more particularly in Georgia where this enterprise was carried on, and therefore require concealment if they are to continue to operate, to permit a conviction on such evidence alone would relegate Calamaro to the status of an unmeaningful relic. The opinion of the Court convincingly demonstrates why the evidence in the case does not support a finding by the jury that petitioners Smith and Law knew that a tax was owing by petitioners Ingram and Jenkins, and that they undertook acts of concealment for the purpose, in whole or in part, of aiding an evasion of that tax.
But I think that the very considerations which lead the Court to reverse the conviction of Smith and Law equally require a reversal as to Ingram and Jenkins. An indispensable element of the crime of tax evasion is knowledge that a tax is imposed. This knowledge may be proved directly or circumstantially. Here there is no direct proof, and the sole circumstantial evidence relied on by the Government is the fact of concealment of the lottery operation. But if, as the Court holds, “certainly the secrecy of the operation did not go to show . . . knowledge” by Smith and Law that their superiors were liable for a federal tax, I am at a loss to understand how this factor can at the same time suffice to show knowledge on the part of petitioners Ingram and Jenkins that they themselves were liable for a federal tax. The latter no less than the former must be shown to have actual knowledge that a tax is owing before they can be convicted of a conspiracy to evade that tax, and the Court’s reasoning plainly demonstrates to me that the Government has made no such showing in this case.
*683I think that sight has been lost of the fact that this is a prosecution for conspiracy to violate a federal taxing statute, not for violation of local gambling laws. An overwhelming showing has been made that petitioners were participants in a large lottery enterprise, but that does not suffice to support conviction of the crime with which they are here charged.