Court Opinion

ID: 9849756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:45:39.099377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.722692
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.—I respectfully dissent.
This case asks the age-old question: does judicial commitment to principle matter? The majority gives the modern answer. Not if it gets in the way of expediency.1
The “Three Strikes” law reflects the public’s long-simmering frustration with perceived laxity in a criminal justice system that allowed repeatedly convicted felons to be released after serving modest sentences with time off for good behavior. All too often, this revolving door led to more crimes, new victims, and greater tragedies. The public saw “soft on crime” judges who were more solicitous of criminal defendants than public safety as the problem; they viewed Three Strikes as the solution.
The Three Strikes sentencing scheme requires full consecutive terms when a defendant with qualifying priors is convicted of multiple current felonies which constitute separate criminal episodes. It provides a comprehensive sentencing framework under which a qualifying strike affects all felony counts and governs sentencing on each count. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (c)(6), (7) [providing mandatory sentencing on all current offenses in specified circumstances]; id., § 667, subd. (c)(8) [providing mandatory sentencing even on counts not tried in current proceeding].)
This integrated sentencing scheme, designed to be applied to all cases coming within its terms, does not admit of half measures. Once made operative by pleading and proof of one or more prior serious or violent felony convictions, neither the initiative nor the legislative version of Three Strikes contains any mechanism for avoiding its full consequences. The law did not contemplate—and was in fact designed to prevent—the judge being the ultimate arbiter of the “just” sentence.
Under our precedents, the trial court retains discretion under Penal Code section 1385 or Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), to remove a case from the reach of the law. (See People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 *505Cal.4th 968 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 928 P.2d 1171]; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628] (Romero).) But, until today, in choosing to rely upon these latter statutes, a trial court had to make a principled determination that the defendant did not come within the spirit of the Three Strikes law and therefore should not be subject to its letter.
Thus, I disagree that a court can dismiss prior convictions on a count-by-count basis. Moreover, even if, in rare cases, a court has that power, the principles we articulated in our recent precedents bar the trial court from doing so here.
In Romero, we held that a trial court may strike prior felony conviction allegations in cases arising under the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) The power to do so arises under Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a) (section 1385(a)), which authorizes a trial court to dismiss a criminal action “in furtherance of justice” on its own motion. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) But, unless carefully circumscribed, the power to strike prior felony conviction allegations “in furtherance of justice,” which Romero itself described as an “amorphous concept” (id. at p. 530), carries with it the real potential for undermining the intent of the Three Strikes law itself—namely, “to restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders” (id. at p. 528).
In People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 160 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429] (Williams), we again acknowledged that “what is ‘just’ is formless. [Citation.]” Nonetheless, in order to effectuate the obvious intent of the Three Strikes law to restrict judicial discretion, “we undertook] to render Penal Code section 1385(a)’s concept of ‘furtherance of justice’ somewhat more determinate.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 160.) We concluded that “in ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. If it is striking or vacating an allegation or finding, it must set forth its reasons in an order entered on the minutes, and if it is reviewing the striking or vacating of such allegation or finding, it must pass on the reasons so set forth.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) We emphasized *506that “no weight whatsoever may be given to factors extrinsic to the [Three Strikes] scheme, such as the mere desire to ease court congestion or, a fortiori, bare antipathy to the consequences for any given defendant. [Citation.]” (Ibid.\ see also People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 980.)
While professing to follow Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, in reality, the majority tosses aside its carefully crafted limits on judicial discretion. The majority rejects what it deems “the false assumption that striking prior conviction allegations with respect to some, but not all, counts is proper only if the current offenses differ in some way from one another, or if they differ in their relationship to the prior convictions.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 500.) Instead, notwithstanding Williams’s unequivocal holding that “bare antipathy to the consequences for any given defendant” should be given “no weight whatsoever” (17 Cal.4th at p. 161), the majority now concludes that the “overarching consideration” in determining whether to strike prior felony conviction allegations with respect to some, but not all, counts is the total length of a defendant’s sentence “because the underlying purpose of striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences. [Citation.]” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 500.) In other words, the “overarching consideration” in determining whether to strike prior felony conviction allegations “in furtherance of justice” under section 1385(a) is the trial court’s antipathy to the sentence the law would otherwise require. The court may achieve the result it deems “just” by any means necessary.
One need only compare the facts of this case to the facts of Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, to see how standardless things have become. In Williams, in concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in striking one of Williams’s prior felony convictions, we pointed to his failure to “follow through in efforts to bring his substance abuse problem under control.” (17 Cal.4th at p. 163.) Here, in upholding the trial court’s decision to strike, the majority points to the fact defendant’s crimes “were related to drug addiction.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 503.) In Williams, in concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in striking one of Williams’s prior felony convictions, we noted that “[a]s to his present felony: It is a conviction of driving under the influence that followed three other convictions of driving under the influence; ‘the existence of such convictions reveals that [he] had been taught, through the application of formal sanction, that [such] criminal conduct was unacceptable—but had failed or refused to learn his lesson’ [citation].” (17 Cal.4th at p. 163.) Here, in upholding the trial court’s decision to strike, the majority glosses over the fact defendant’s two present convictions for burglary followed quickly on the heels of five previous convictions for exactly the same offense. In Williams, in concluding that the *507trial court had abused its discretion in striking one of Williams’s prior felony convictions, we observed that the only time he had not been engaged in criminal activity was when he was in prison or jail. (Ibid.) Here, in upholding the trial court’s decision to strike, the majority ignores the fact defendant admitted to having committed six burglaries shortly after his release from prison and while still on parole for the five prior burglaries.
In Romero, we said a court “abuses its discretion by dismissing a case, or a sentencing allegation, simply because a defendant pleads guilty.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531.) Here, we find defendant’s cooperation with police helps to place him outside the spirit of Three Strikes. And what cooperation it was. As to the crimes of which defendant is convicted, there was no doubt of his participation. In the first, he helpfully left his wallet and his driver’s license in the rubble. The victim of the second burglary arrived home in time to observe defendant fleeing with her property. Apprehended moments later with the loot, he confessed to additional burglaries, hoping to make a deal to avoid Three Strikes punishment.
The real effect of today’s decision is to make the defendant’s eligibility for punishment under Three Strikes a factor in mitigation. When a defendant receives a lengthy Three Strikes term on the first of multiple counts, the trial court may disregard the law as to all other counts. Of course, because a single Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life is severe, judges will be inclined to impose only 1 such sentence regardless of the circumstances. Thus, the majority has in effect taken Romero out of its box. Romero is no longer reserved for the rare case involving a particularly harsh sentence for a relatively minor offense. Courts may now routinely apply Romero to the benefit of recidivists for whom such solicitude is not appropriate. That is not what I heard the voters demand when they enacted the Three Strikes law. Three Strikes was not about judicial discretion; it was about accountability. It was not about “just” sentences; it was about swift, certain, and harsh retribution. Moreover, by encouraging courts to impose only a single Three Strikes sentence regardless of the circumstances, the majority’s decision rewards the industrious career criminal—after the first count, the rest are virtually free.
Exercise of this purported “discretion” does not conform to the concept of “furtherance of justice” delineated in Williams. It is nothing less than a return to the subjective sentencing practices the electorate and the Legislature intended to circumscribe. Compounding the situation, the majority’s analysis affords no principled standard by which appellate courts can meaningfully review the trial court’s action. (Cf. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
*508Nevertheless, the majority claims the “reasoning of Romero and the standards we enunciated in Williams logically support the trial court’s action in this case.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 499.) This is true only if Romero sought to enshrine an “amorphous concept” {Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530) designed to undermine Three Strikes’ clear intent to “restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders” {id. at p. 528). If that was Romero's purpose, its promise has been quickly fulfilled.
The sentence imposed here was lengthy. But that is beside the point. It was still less than the law required. When the Legislature enacted, and the voters passed, the Three Strikes law, they intended to restrict trial courts’ discretion in sentencing. The trial court here had it right when it initially observed that striking defendant’s prior felony convictions “would be for the sole purpose of avoiding the sentence I’m required to hand down by law” and that “if the Three Strikes law was meant for anyone it was meant for Mr. Garcia.” Today’s holding eviscerates the intent of the Three Strikes law. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 21, 1999, and on July 21, 1999, and August 11, 1999, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

The majority complains “the statutory language is not so crystal clear.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 503, fn. 3.) The intent, however, is. What part of “no” do they not understand?