Court Opinion

ID: 9682073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:05:07.519938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.353410
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissent on motion for rehearing in Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins., 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.1988), I dissent from the court’s opinion today. I cannot and will not agree to join an opinion which, in effect, despite its claims to the contrary, adheres to the position that a select group of individuals, namely appellate judges, are better able to determine the credibility of witnesses and the facts of any given case than are a group of community citizens sitting as jurors. But, more specifically, I write this dissenting opinion to highlight several points which the majority opinion brings to my attention.
A brief detour through the history of the Texas court system is helpful in understanding the matters at hand. Before the 1891 amendments to the Texas Constitution, this court exercised what the majority opinion terms general “appellate jurisdiction.” Undoubtedly, as case law reveals, this court exercised jurisdiction over factual and legal issues. I do not take issue with the majority opinion on this matter. When the Texas Constitution was amended in 1891, jurisdiction over fact questions was conferred upon the newly-created civil appellate courts. TEX. CONST. Art. Y, § 6. In Choate v. San Antonio & A & P Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 406, 44 S.W. 69 (1898), this court stated that the purpose of the amendment of art. V, § 6 was not to enlarge the power of the courts of appeals over questions of fact, but rather to restrict in express terms the jurisdiction of the supreme court and confine the supreme court to questions of law. Therefore, in determining the extent to which courts of appeals may now review a jury verdict for factual sufficiency, the critical question is whether this court exercised review of jury verdicts for factual sufficiency prior to 1891. It is my analysis of this issue which separates my opinion from that of the majority.
Prior to the 1891 amendment to the Texas Constitution, it is apparent, and the majority opinion so agrees, that this court exercised its factual review power with great deference toward jury verdicts. See Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326 (1846) (where question is one of fact to be ascertained by jury, from weighing evidence and degree of probability, appellate court will not interpose for purpose of granting new trial unless it be in order to remedy some manifest error); Carter v. Carter, 5 Tex. 93 (1849) (court, and especially appellate court, will not set aside jury verdict, merely because evidence might not be deemed, by judge, sufficient proof of the disputed fact); Long v. Steiger, 1 Tex. 460 (1852) (jury verdict must clearly appear to be wrong to induce appellate court to set it aside); Love v. Barber, 17 Tex. 312 (1856) (evidence must palpably and entirely fail to support in the verdict before the court may set aside jury verdict). While the terms used at that time to describe this court’s review of evidence are quite different from the terms used now, it is clear from a reading of the cases that this court indulged in factual review of a kind far more analogous to what we now call a “no evidence”. standard. There are very few au*654thoritative cases which would allow this court, at that time, to review the evidence on a standard similar to our “sufficiency of the evidence” or “great weight and preponderance” standard. The sheer number and overall impact of all the cases this court decided prior to 1891 suggest that this court did not visualize itself as vested with the power to review a jury verdict on anything suggestively close to “insufficiency of the evidence.” The 1891 amendments conferred upon the courts of civil appeals only such powers over facts as this court had previously exercised. This court did not reweigh the evidence in a case or review it for what we term mere “insufficiency purposes.” Accordingly, the courts of appeals should not now be entitled to exercise authority beyond what this court possessed before 1891.
I take exception to the majority’s reliance upon Carlton v. Baldwin, 22 Tex. 724 (1859), appeal after remand, 27 Tex. 572 (1864); McQueen v. Fulgham, 27 Tex. 464 (1864); Willis v. Lewis, 28 Tex. 185 (1866); and Weisiger v. Chisolm, 28 Tex. 780 (1866). All of these cases were decided during the general period when Texas was one of the confederate states or while it was controlled by a “reconstruction court.” Reliance upon authority from this era should be discouraged. Official matters of the State of Texas were in discord and decisions of this court are generally thought to be less authoritative from that time period. See M. BONER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 29-32 (1976); NORVELL, ORAN M. ROBERTS & THE SEMICOLON COURT, 37 TEX.L.REV. 279 (1959). Moreover, I find equally unauthoritative the majority’s reliance upon Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Somers, 78 Tex. 439, 14 S.W. 779 (1890), to describe the nature and extent of authority that a court of appeals has over fact questions. Somers states that this court could set aside a jury verdict when it was against the preponderance of the evidence. 78 Tex. at 441, 14 S.W. at 779. What authority does Somers cite for such a proposition? Somers cites Willis v. Lewis, which, as mentioned earlier, is of questionable authority in itself. Somers also cites Dimmitt v. Robbins, 74 Tex. 441, 12 S.W. 94 (1889). Not only does Dimmitt fail to cite the origin of authority for this proposition, a careful reading will show that although the court used the phrase “sufficiency of the evidence,” it was really asking whether there was “any evidence” to support the jury’s finding as to the amount of a debt. Dimmitt, 74 Tex. 440-41, 12 S.W. 98-99.
The court’s opinion lends one half of one page to the true issue in this case. According to the majority opinion, Somers stands for the proposition that a court of appeals may review a jury verdict on a standard of preponderance of the evidence. Then, based upon the questionable authority the majority opinion maintains that the court of appeals in this case could conclude that “the jury’s finding that Cropper was not negligent in his operation of the water wagon was so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.” 720 S.W.2d at 826. Not only does the majority opinion miss the mark as to the issue in this case, it relies upon questionable authority to establish the answer to the crucial issue of whether this court prior to 1891 exercised factual review over jury verdicts in the nature of “against the preponderance” of the evidence or “against the great weight” of the evidence. My review of the pre-1891 cases reveals that this court did not exercise any type of factual review over jury verdicts that was even akin to the type of power now being exercised by the courts of appeals. Somewhere along the path of law, the courts of appeals have strayed beyond their legitimate power.
The majority opinion also contends that the original grant of general “appellate jurisdiction” to this court, and then in 1891 to the court of appeals, authorized not only review over questions of law, according to the common law tradition, but review over facts, according to the civil law tradition. Assuming this to be true, it still does not explain how the courts of appeals enlarged their power over facts to the point that they act as a limiting factor on the right of trial by jury. At civil law in civil cases *655there was no tradition of a right to trial by jury; cases were tried solely to a judge. See J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, 112-21 (2d ed. 1985). Consequently, on appeal, in accordance with the civil trial tradition, only facts found by a judge were subject to review by an appellate court. Therefore, in the civil law system, appellate review of facts would never offend any right of trial by jury, as there was none. Thus, even if one accepts the majority opinion’s reasoning that the Texas appellate system merged civil and common law concepts, the same reasoning should extend so to allow appellate courts to review facts only in those cases tried to a judge. Certainly, this proposition is perfectly consistent with the majority’s notion of appellate review by a civil law-common law merger; yet this proposition has the advantage of maintaining an individual’s right of trial by jury.
Additionally, Bailey v. Haddy, Dallam 376 (1841), a case which the majority relies upon as authority for the proposition that courts vested with general “appellate jurisdiction” are empowered to review facts, cannot be characterized as authorizing the type of factual review in which the court of appeals now engages. At that time, there was no statement of facts nor any court reporter. The appellate court reviewed merely a statement certified by the trial judge as containing the substance of the testimony, but not detailing the evidence in any manner. Therefore, in Bailey, the appellate court could not be engaging in any process of weighing or reweighing the evidence because the evidence was not before them. It is a quantum leap from the type of factual review indulged in in Bailey to the factual review indulged in by the court of appeals in this case. Indeed, it is a leap supported by very little authority. This case reminds me somewhat of Musser v. Smith Protection Services, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.1987). Musser was a libel case in which the “trial judge, twelve jurors, one court of appeals justice, and three supreme court justices” did not represent the “ordinary reader.” Id. at 656 (Robertson, J., dissenting). I find a similar fallacy at work here. A trial judge, twelve jurors, and three supreme court justices perceive the facts a certain way; whereas, the court of appeals and six supreme court justices view it in another. The readily apparent factor that separates the perceptions of the two groups of individuals is that one group includes twelve citizens who come to a courtroom with inquiry and vigor for the proceedings and the other group contains solely professional judges who come jaded by past judicial experiences. For this reason, I do not necessarily believe appellate judges are superior judges of character or facts. The people of Texas felt that way too when they adopted their constitution. Although the jury system is an imperfect system, it is clearly the best system in the world for deriving the truth of facts. I recognize that sometimes a jury may return what we perceive as a less than reasonable verdict; however, procedures are in place by which a trial or appellate judge may stifle those jury verdicts which are clearly wrong. Otherwise, the jury system remains the best alternative.
Finally, I find it particularly distressing that the majority opinion attributes to me certain thoughts and statements that simply do not exist. The majority opinion states that the “difference between findings and nonfindings had previously been described as a ‘distinction which exists in semantics and theory only but which does not exist in reality.’ Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex.1985) (Robertson, J. concurring).” Supra at 649. This is clearly not the thought I expressed in Dyson. Even a cursory reading of my concurrence in Dyson would reveal that the “distinction which exists in semantics and theory only but which does not exist in reality” was the difference between a court of appeals reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and a court of appeals substituting its thought processes for that of the jury. Nowhere in my concurrence do I differentiate between findings and nonfindings. I find it patently offensive that the majority opinion would attribute to me thoughts and statements which simply do not exist. When one sees such blatant error, one can*656not help but question whether the entirety is plagued by haphazard work.
In conclusion, albeit all the concerns I’ve expressed here, I remain most concerned about the courts of appeals exercising factual review of a jury verdict on the standards of “insufficiency of the evidence” or “great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” While the majority states that the right of trial by jury is not violated by these standards, and that the right should remain inviolate, the practical effect of its decision in this case is to permit the courts of appeals to overturn a jury verdict on such subjective standards. This is paying lip service to the right of trial by jury; it is not a meaningful preservation of the right. Although the majority opinion has a superficially appealing appearance, it lacks insight into the real effect upon the right of trial by jury when a court of appeals reviews a jury verdict upon such lax standards.
I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
RAY and MAUZY, JJ., join in this dissent.