Court Opinion

ID: 9748314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:59:31.512929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:34.278394
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s opinion reversing and remanding this case to the trial court. My review of the record reveals that Appellants failed to timely seek reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying their motions to intervene and subsequently failed to timely file their notices of appeal. Thus, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The majority sidesteps our lack ofjurisdiction by concluding that Ark. Code Ann. §28-1-115 (1987) applies and somehow allows Appellants to seek reconsideration at any time following entry of the trial court’s order. This conclusion is in error for two reasons. First, section 28-1-115 is not applicable to the case at hand. Section 28-l-115(a) provides in relevant part: For good cause and at any time within the period allowed for appeal after the final termination of the administration of the estate of a decedent or ward, the court may vacate or modify an order or grant a rehearing. However, no such power shall exist as to any order from which an appeal has been taken or to set aside the probate of a will after the time allowed for contest thereof. In applying this section, this court has recognized that there is a need for greater flexibility in the probate court. See Price v. Price, 258 Ark. 363, 527 S.W.2d 322 (1975). In Price, however, this court recognized that such flexibility was needed regarding orders concerning the administration of the estate. In this case, however, we are dealing with motions to intervene brought by parties who have no rights to the proceeds of the estate. Such motions have no impact on the administration of an estate. Moreover, at no time has this court ever found section 28-1-115 to be applicable to an order denying a party’s motion to intervene in a probate case under Ark. R. Civ. P. 24. Rule 24, which is the rule that Appellants allege require their intervention in the probate case, is a rule of civil procedure. The majority ultimately concludes that the trial court in this case must analyze Appellants’ motions to intervene under Rule 24; yet, to reach this conclusion, the majority discards other applicable rules of civil procedure on the basis that probate statutes govern this case. I do not understand this contradictory position set forth by the majority opinion. Simply put, a motion to intervene is not a typical probate order. Appellants’ motions to intervene and the trial court’s subsequent order denying those motions have nothing at all to do with the administration of the Nolen estate. Rather, they were filed for the sole purpose of allowing Appellants to challenge the appointment of the adminstratrix in an attempt to thwart the civil suit filed against them by the estate. Thus, section 28-1-115(a) is inapplicable. Second, even if I were to assume that section 28-1-115 is somehow applicable, Appellants do not satisfy the good-cause requirement of this section. Section 28-1-115 specifically allows a trial court to vacate or modify a previous order if there is good cause to do so. In Brantley v. Davis, 305 Ark. 68, 805 S.W.2d 75 (1991), this court affirmed an order of the probate court denying a motion to vacate where the record was void of any evidence as to whether good cause existed to vacate the order. See also Brooks v. Baker, 242 Ark. 128, 412 S.W.2d 271 (1967) (holding that the trial court erred in denying a motion to vacate where good cause existed to set aside the order). Similarly, the court of appeals in Cobb v. Estate of Keown, 53 Ark. App. 171, 920 S.W.2d 501 (1996), affirmed an order of the trial court denying an appellant’s motion to set aside an order. In affirming, the court of appeals concluded that an allegation of newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement of good cause, because there was no explanation as to why the evidence could not have been discovered prior to entry of the trial court’s order. Here, the motion filed by Helena Regional Medical Center fails to allege that there is any good cause for the trial court to reconsider its previous order.1 In fact, the primary basis for the motion for reconsideration appears to be that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the law. Essentially, the motion for reconsideration is nothing more than reargument of Appellants’ original position regarding their right to intervene.21 am remiss to understand how arguments already made to the trial court constitute good cause under section 28-1-115. Obviously, the majority is also unable to ascertain what good cause exists in this case as evidenced by its failure to even address the issue. Finally, I must note my agreement with the majority that section 28-1-115 establishes an extended period during which a probate court has jurisdiction to modify or vacate a previous order. Yet, I reiterate that there must be good cause in order for a trial court to avail itself of this extended period of time. How the majority comes to the conclusion that the issue of good cause is irrelevant in the instant matter is beyond my comprehension. The first three words in section 28-1-115(a) are “[f]or good cause” followed by the connector “and.” Thus, according to the plain language of section 28-1-115, atrial court may vacate or modify an order if there is good cause and it is within the time allowed for appeal. In the absence of one of these statutory requirements being met, a party may not seek reconsideration of a trial court’s order pursuant to this section. Hence, in the present case where the parties did not even allege that there was good cause for the trial court to vacate its previous order, section 28-1-115 is simply not applicable. Nevertheless, Appellants and the majority rely on this section in order to cure the defect caused by Appellants’ failure to timely file their motion for reconsideration. This is a disingenuous tactic that is subverting both our rules of civil procedure and the Probate Code. Determining that section 28-1-115 is inapplicable leads to the question of what rule governs the motion for reconsideration and its timing. The majority concludes that Appellee’s argument that Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(b) governs is without merit. I agree with the majority that Rule 52(b) governs situations where a party requests that a court amend its findings or make further findings, and such is not the present case. The majority, in a footnote, also mentions Ark. R. Civ. P. 60 but does not address the issue of whether it is applicable to the case at bar or not. I do not believe that Rule 60 is applicable, as that rule allows a trial court to vacate or modify a judgment in order to correct an error or mistake or to prevent the miscarriage of justice. In this case, Appellants essentially asked the trial court to vacate its judgment, reconsider its interpretation of the law, and enter a new judgment in their favor, thereby allowing them to intervene in the probate case. Thus, it is apparent to me that the substance of Appellant’s motion is one for a new trial pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 59. In fact, Rule 59(a)(6) provides that one of the grounds for a new trial is a decision that is contrary to the law, which is what Appellants argued in the motion for reconsideration. In Slaton v. Slaton, 330 Ark. 287, 956 S.W.2d 150 (1997), this court recognized that a motion filed as a “motion for reconsideration” was actually a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 where the substance of the motion was an allegation that the divorce decree was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. There, this court reiterated the rule that motions should be liberally construed and that courts should not be blinded by titles but should look to the substance of the motions to ascertain what they seek. In support of its conclusion, the Slaton court cited to its previous decision in Jackson v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 309 Ark. 572, 832 S.W.2d 224 (1992), where this court held that a motion to vacate, which claimed that the judgment was void because it was contrary to the facts and the preponderance of the evidence, was really a motion for a new trial under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). I agree with the rationale of this court in Slaton and Jackson and believe it to be applicable to the motion for reconsideration filed in this case. Appellants in their motion for reconsideration argued that the trial court’s order was in error because the trial court failed to analyze their motions to intervene under Rule 24. Their request that the trial court vacate its previous order and enter a new order granting their motions to intervene is clearly tantamount to a motion for a new trial. Thus, pursuant to Rule 59(b), Appellants had ten days from entry of the judgment to file their motion for reconsideration. As judgment was entered in this case on July 25, 2003, Appellants had until August 8, 2003, to file their motion. Helena Regional filed its motion on August 22, followed by Dr. Guillermo’s motion to adopt on August 29. Clearly, both these filing dates were beyond the ten days allowed under Rule 59(b). Because the motions were not timely filed, the trial court had no authority to consider the merits of the motion. Moreover, even if Appellants’ motion had been timely filed, the trial court did not rule on the motion for reconsideration within thirty days of its filing, as required by Rule 59(b). In fact, the trial court did not rule on the motion until November 18, 2003. Pursuant to Rule 59(b), if a trial court neither grants nor denies the motion within thirty days of the date it was filed, the motion shall be deemed denied. Thus, in this case, Appellants’ motion was deemed denied on September 22, 2003, thirty days after Helena Regional filed the motion for reconsideration. Despite the fact that Appellant’s motion was deemed denied on September 22, they did not file their notice of appeal until December 11, 2003. The time for filing a notice of appeal is governed by Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 4, which provides in pertinent part: (b) Extension of time for filing notice of appeal (1) Upon timely filing in the circuit court of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to amend the court’s findings of fact or to make additional findings under Rule 52(b), a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a), or any other motion to vacate, alter, or amend the judgment made no later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be extended for all parties. The notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the entry of the order disposing of the last motion outstanding. However, if the circuit court neither grants nor denies the motion within thirty (30) days of its filing, the motion shall be deemed denied by operation of law as of the thirtieth day, and the notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days from that date. Therefore, under Rule 4(b)(1), Appellants were required to file their notice of appeal by October 22, 2003, thirty days after their motion was deemed denied. Because Appellants did not file their notice of appeal until December 11, 2003, their appeal was untimely. As this court has recognized, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. U.S. Bank v. Milburn, 352 Ark. 144, 100 S.W.3d 674 (2003); Rossi v. Rossi, 319 Ark. 373, 892 S.W.2d 246 (1995). Appellants’ failure to timely file a notice of appeal renders this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of their appeal; yet, despite our lack of jurisdiction, the majority addresses the merits of Appellants’ argument and remands this matter to the trial court. This is clearly in error. Again, however, the majority avoids the procedural defect with the notice of appeal by asserting that Appellants’ notice of appeal was timely filed under Ark. Code Ann. § 28-1-116 (1987). That section is inapplicable as we are dealing with matters of civil procedure. In any event, subsection (g) of section 28-1-116 establishes the applicability of general appellate rules. Simply because Appellants, who are defendants in a civil lawsuit filed on behalf of the estate, sought to intervene in the probate case does not mean that the rules of civil procedure should be ignored. As I previously pointed out, the purpose of the Probate Code, as recognized by this court on numerous occasions, is to allow probate judges greater flexibility in their orders regarding the administration of estates. This is so because of the unique nature of probate proceedings. There is simply nothing unique about a motion to intervene or a motion for reconsideration that would warrant the use of the more flexible standards of the Probate Code. Based on the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent. Brown and Gunter, JJ., join.   SeparateAppellee Dr. Guillermo did not file a motion for reconsideration; rather,he filed a motion to adopt Helena Regional’s motion for reconsideration.    Helena Regional also alleges that the trial court requested post-hearing briefs but then issued its order prior to receiving those briefs. Nevertheless, Helena makes no argument that the trial court’s failure to consider their subsequently submitted brief constitutes good cause for reconsideration.