Court Opinion

ID: 9857848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:03:22.800515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:44.433764
License: Public Domain

ROBERT W. HANSEN, J.
(dissenting). As to the issues raised on this appeal, the writer would find four state statutes as controlling:
(1) OTHER-CRIMES STATUTE.
In this state, by statute, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible “to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith,” but is not excluded “when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”1 [Emphasis supplied.] The state here had the burden of proving intent to deliver and knowledge as to the presence of the contraband heroin on defendant’s premises. This is particularly true in this case since the defendant claimed to have no knowledge of heroin sales originating in her own home and flatly denied knowledge or possession of any drugs whatsoever.
The trial court held that evidence as to the presence of stolen property, marijuana and illegal weapons on the *105premises at the time of the heroin sale had probative value to show criminal intent.2 The writer agrees. The mental element of intent (or knowledge) may be established with the aid of circumstantial and inferential evidence.3 A trier of fact may reasonably infer from the presence of stolen property, other contraband drugs and illegal weapons on the premises, that one charged with aiding and abetting in the delivery of a controlled substance had knowledge and intent to aid delivery of another illegal controlled substance, heroin, from her premises.4
We deal here not with evidence of a prior crime, but with evidence of contemporaneous acts and crimes. Our court has held that the probative value of a prior incident “ ‘depends in part upon its nearness in time, place, and circumstances to the alleged crime or element sought to be proved.’ ”5 As to time, place and circumstances, the evidence here found to have probative value was as near as near can be. It was properly found to have probative value.
(2) BALANCING OF FACTORS STATUTE.
In Wisconsin, by' statute, probative evidence may be excluded “on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste *106of time,” the rule being: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”6 [Emphasis supplied.] Trial courts are thus required to consider and determine “ ‘whether the prejudice of other-crimes evidence is so great as compared with its relevancy and the necessity for its admission in the particular case as to require its exclusion.’ ”7
The record in the instant case amply demonstrates that the trial court did in fact engage in the required balancing of factors. Taking the issue of admissibility under advisement when first raised, the trial court inspected the record, balanced probative value versus prejudice to defendant, and held the challenged evidence as to marijuana, stolen property and illegal weapons to be admissible.
The test on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.8 The key issue at trial was knowledge of the presence of contraband on the premises and the existence of intent to aid and abet its delivery. Accordingly, the writer would find no abuse of discretion. As was said in a recent case, as *107to prior acts ranging from inappropriate comments to a girl to enticing a minor for immoral purposes: “ ‘While the admission of this evidence was prejudicial, it was extremely relevant and was appropriately admitted.’ ”9
(3) LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY RULE.
By Supreme Court rule, now included in the statutes, it is clearly provided that: “When evidence which is admissible . . . for one purpose but not admissible . . . for another purpose is admitted, the judge, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”10 [Emphasis supplied.] The limited purpose of evidence is determined upon timely objection and motion to restrict its use,11 or when its limited purpose later becomes apparent upon timely motion.12
A request for a jury instruction limiting the purpose of evidence is required. The' rule, above set forth, so requires, and the Judicial Council Committee’s Note to the rule so states.13 The requirement of a request by the defendant preserves the option of defendant, as a matter of trial tactics, not to seek and secure a limiting instruction where, as in the case before us, the other-crimes evidence is probative as to the burden of proof upon the state to establish intent and knowledge, but is peripheral *108to the alibi defense upon which the defendant here primarily relied.
In the case before us, while objection was made to the introduction of the evidence of stolen property, contraband substances and illegal weapons, no request was made by defendant’s trial counsel for the submission of a limiting instruction. Since no request for such instruction was made, as required, there is here no error in the absence of a limiting instruction in the trial court’s instructions to the jury.
Thus, by any test or standard, the writer would affirm, finding: No trial court error in the ruling on probativeness, no error in the probativity versus prejudice balancing, and no error in failing to give a limiting instruction since this was not requested by defendant. However, even with the majority determination of error in the balancing process and in the failure to give the limiting instruction, it is difficult to see how these alleged errors affected the substantial rights of the parties, the required test for reversal.
(4) REVERSIBLE ERROR STATUTE.
The following is the test for reversal on appeal as to misdirection of the jury: “No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted in an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which the application is made, after an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure the new trial.”14 [Emphasis supplied.]
*109Our court has stated the test of harmless error to he “not whether some harm has resulted,” but “whether the appellate court in its independent determination can conclude there is sufficient evidence, other than and uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence, which would convict the defendant beyond reasonable doubt.”15
An independent examination of this record compels the conclusion that there is ample evidence, other than and uninfluenced by the testimony as to other-crimes, to convict this defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, of aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance. Narcotics Agent Wells testified he had a telephone conversation with a woman identifying herself as Martha who arranged for the sale to him of a specified quantity of heroin for $8,000. Defendant did not deny participating in such conversation, but testified that the conversation was a “hoax” on the agent.
However the sale to the agent was made in the quantity specified and at the $8,000 price agreed to. Agent Wells drove one Johnny Hayes Anderson to a spot near defendant’s home. Anderson got out of the car and walked in the direction of defendant’s home, returning therefrom with the $8,000 worth of heroin. Shortly thereafter the defendant was found in the garage of her home with a loaded pistol on the floor by her side. (As to the alibi claim, the alibi witness testified he had seen her in a grocery store in the early morning hours of September 5, 1974, the date of the sale. This testimony was eroded, if not erased, by his subsequent insistence that he observed the defendant in November, not September.) Since defendant admitted participating in the telephone conversation with the agent, however such conversation was labeled, and considering the consequent sale of heroin from defendant’s home in the amount specified and price agreed in the telephone conversation, ample *110evidence is present, other than and uninfluenced by the other-crimes evidence, to sustain the conviction.
The writer would affirm finding (1) no error in the trial court ruling that the challenged testimony had probative value as to intent and knowledge; (2) no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s balancing of probativeness and prejudice; and (3) no error in failing to give limiting instructions where no request was made by defendant for such limiting instruction. Additionally, the writer submits that the trial court errors found by the majority are not sufficient cause for reversal under the Wold test or the sec. 274.37, Stats., requirements for reversal.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Han-ley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.

 Sec. 904.04(2), Stats.

 Consent search of defendant’s home yielded a stolen TV set, two illegally sawed-off shotguns and two bags allegedly containing marijuana, a controlled substance.

 State v. Spraggin, 71 Wis.2d 604, 618, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1976), a case involving this same defendant’s conviction on a charge of receiving stolen property, contrary to sec. 943.34(2), Stats. (Conviction reversed in interest of justice because defendant erroneously received a felony sentence for two misdemeanor offenses.)

 Id. at 618, holding: “A trier of fact may infer from the presence of many similar articles that the recipient of property is engaged in the practice of selling stolen goods.”

 Sanford v. State, 76 Wis.2d 72, 81, 250 N.W.2d 348 (1976), quoting Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 294, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).

 Sec. 904.03, Stats. — Rule 303, ALI Model Code of Evidence, originally adopted in Whitty v. State, supra, n. 5, at 294.

 Sanford v. State, supra, n. 5, at 82, quoting Whitty v. State, supra, n. 5 at 295.

 See: Price v. State, 37 Wis.2d 117, 154 N.W.2d 222 (1967), this court holding at 133: “He [defendant] contends that under that rule [Rule 303] the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probativeness; hence, it should be excluded.
“However the rule (303) leaves that decision to the trial judge, and ... we cannot say that the evidence of the occurrence herein was of so little probative value as contrasted to its possible prejudicial effect that the trial judge abused his discretion in letting it in.”

 State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis.2d 647, 656, 247 N.W.2d 696, 703 (1976). See also: Sanford v. State, supra, n. 5, at 82, 83.

 Sec. 901.06, Stats., Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 901.06, Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis.2d R21 (1973).

 Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, supra, at R21, citing Seraphine v. Hardiman, 44 Wis.2d 60, 170 N.W.2d 739 (1969).

 Id. at R21, citing Huse v. Milwaukee County Expressway Comm., 16 Wis.2d 225, 114 N.W.2d 429 (1961).

 Id. at R21, the note reading: “A request for a jury charge instruction limiting the purpose of evidence is required. Illinois Steel v. Paczocha, 139 Wis. 23, 119 N.W. 550 (1909); Domasek v. Kluck, 113 Wis. 336, 89 N.W. 139 (1902), but see Baraboo v. Excelsior Creamery, 171 Wis. 242, 177 N.W. 36 (1920).”

 See. 274.37, Stats., adopted in 1909, replacing the earlier standard for reversal in Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 17, 38 N.W. 177 (1888). This section is presently sec. 817.37, Stats., by Supreme Court Order, 67 Wis.2d 761.

 Wold v. State, 57 Wis.2d 344, 356, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).