Court Opinion

ID: 9527318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:29:35.826316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:42.708783
License: Public Domain

BARHAM, Justice
(dissenting).
I subscribe to the dissent of Mr. Justice McCaleb. The majority has treated the provision “* * * Such persons may disclose testimony given before the grand jury, at any tim,e zvhen permitted by the court, to show that a witness committed perjury in his testimony before the grand *407jury” as having application only to a criminal prosecution for the crime perjury. (Emphasis mine.) Of course, no court permission is necessary for the disclosure of perjured testimony at a criminal trial for perjury. Additionally, of what value are the words “at any time” if the article is to be restricted to a criminal prosecution for perjury ? The redactors and the Legislature obviously intended that in any court proceeding testimony before the grand jury may be used to show that one has testified falsely under oath — that is, has perjured himself. As pointed out by Mr. Justice McCaleb, R.S. 15:493 is specific statutory authority to use this testimony to impeach a witness by showing a contradictory statement under oath, and court permission is unnecessary.
I find it impossible to accept the restrictive application of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 434 as interpreted by the majority. The last sentence of that article, which provides that a witness may discuss his testimony with counsel or the district attorney even in the absence of court supervision, is certainly broad in scope. Why, then, should not the State and the defendant in a criminal prosecution in court be allowed to thwart the injustices which would occur in those proceedings if contradictory and false testimony of witnesses cannot be exposed? Punishment of one for perjury will not free another convicted on the perjured testimony, nor will it provide the State an opportunity for obtaining a just conviction under truth. Our Legislature obviously intended to codify and even expand the jurisprudence of this state which had previously removed some of the secrecy from the grand jury proceedings. It is our obligation to implement its obvious intent.
I readily acknowledge the error of the discussion to the contrary in State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484.
McCALEB and BARHAM, JJ., are of the opinion a rehearing should be granted.