Court Opinion

ID: 9665205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:42:37.645321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.965905
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in *209part). While I agree with Justice Brickley that in a defamation suit involving a media defendant and a private plaintiff, absent the application of any common-law privilege, a negligence standard is appropriate, I do not agree, without further factual findings, that the official- and public-proceedings privilege provided by MCL 600.2911(3); MSA 27A.2911(3) is inapplicable in this case. Further, I wish to clarify that all of the common-law privileges traditionally available to all defendants, both media and otherwise, have not been "subsumed” by the constitutional mandates of New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964), and Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974), and are still a vital part of the jurisprudence of this state.
Justice Brickley, in his analysis of this case, presumes that the "public-interest privilege” utilized by the Court of Appeals in such cases as Weeren v Evening News Ass'n, 2 Mich App 74; 138 NW2d 526 (1965), and Dienes v Associated Newspapers, Inc, 137 Mich App 272; 358 NW2d 562 (1984), has been subsumed by the constitutional requirement of New York Times, supra, which requires a finding of constitutional1 malice before a public official or public figure may succeed in a defamation suit against a media defendant. The privilege utilized by the Court of Appeals to conditionally immunize news reports which are in the "public interest” appears to be a hybrid of two common-law2 qualified privileges: communication to one who may act in the public interest, which *210requires a narrow audience and which applies normally only to nonmedia defendants, see Nuyen v Slater, 372 Mich 654; 127 NW2d 369 (1964); and the privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern, which usually involves editorials or opinions on public officials and matters of public concern, see Lawrence v Fox, 357 Mich 134; 97 NW2d 719 (1959).
The broader "public-interest privilege” applied by the Court of Appeals has, as Justice Brickley suggests, been utilized exclusively to deal with media reports on matters of public interest. The rationale behind this "privilege” is identical to that espoused by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times, supra, and its progeny,3 and I can only conclude that this "hybrid privilege” was utilized by the Court of Appeals to address the same constitutional concerns. As New York Times and Gertz have now set the standards required in this area, I agree that the use of a broad "public-interest privilege” to conditionally immunize reports of matters in the public interest, which it appears may have been unique to this state, is no longer necessary or appropriate.
However, it must be noted that the two traditional common-law privileges, from which this broad privilege appears to have grown, are still available to defendants in a defamation action in *211this state. This is important to note because nonmedia defendants may not be afforded the same constitutional protection as media defendants4
5and because the protection afforded by the privileges may be greater than that required by the constitutional standard of Gertz.6
*212A proper determination of this case, therefore, requires first that we decide whether such a privilege applies to the statements published by the defendant regarding Mr. Rouch’s arrest. In the event that no such privilege exists, or if the privilege has been abused, or if it does not afford the constitutionally required standard of fault,6 then it is appropriate to consider the proper standard of liability which should be applied under the dictates of New York Times and Gertz.
The rationale behind the common-law privileges in defamation cases, according to Prosser, is analogous to that behind the privileges available to defendants in assault and battery cases.
It rests upon the same idea, that conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiffs reputation. [Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 114, p 815.]
The privileges are divided into two types: those which are absolute, immunizing defendants from liability without regard to their purpose or motive or the reasonableness of their conduct, and those which are qualified, requiring a showing of malice before there can be any recovery.
Absolute immunity is granted in those situations in which "there is an obvious policy in favor of permitting complete freedom of expression, without any inquiry as to the defendant’s motives.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 114, p 816. Prosser & Keeton list six absolute privileges which are available to both media and nonmedia defendants._
*213The most commonly encountered of the absolute privileges is the privilege surrounding judicial proceedings.7 This privilege immunizes statements made by judges in their judicial capacity and has been extended to cover, among others, grand and petit jurors, witnesses, counsel in the conduct of a case, parties in private litigation, defendants and instigators of prosecution. See 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, §§ 585-589, pp 244-252. Absolute privileges also cover: members of legislative bodies for acts in the performance of their duties, which has been extended to cover legislative witnesses, see Restatement, supra, § 590A; communications between certain governmental executive officers; instances where the plaintiff has consented to the publication; communications between husbands and wives; and political broadcasts required under § 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (47 USC 315[a]). Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Div v WDAY, Inc, 360 US 525; 79 S Ct 1302; 3 L Ed 2d 1407 (1959). The Restatement is of the view that any publication required by law is also absolutely privileged. Restatement, supra, § 592A, p 257.
The qualified privileges traditionally available to defendants, both media and otherwise, are intended to shield publishers from liability in a defamation suit, absent a showing of malice.8 Perhaps the one most commonly used is the privilege to communicate to one who may act in the public interest. This privilege, commonly called the "pub-*214lie interest” privilege, allowed publication to a restricted audience of matters in the public interest. As Prosser & Keeton note, this
involves communications made to those who maybe expected to take official action of some kind for the protection of some interest of the public. . . . The privilege includes false statements of fact concerning the plaintiff made in good faith; but, although it is not impossible that communications to other non-official interested persons will be protected, publication to the world at large in a newspaper is not. [Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, pp 830-831.]
This "public interest” privilege has been found to cover communications by private citizens to proper authorities for the prevention or detection of crime, complaints about public officials’ conduct, and complaints to school boards questioning teachers’ competence. See Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, pp 830-831; Nuyen v Slater, supra.
Other qualified privileges, as noted by Prosser & Keeton, include: communications in the interest of the publisher and in the interest of others or in which the publisher and the recipient have a common interest; and the privilege to make fair comment on matters of public interest.9 See Law*215rence v Fox, supra. The Restatement also includes a privilege for statements made by inferior administrative officers not covered by the absolute privilege and for communications, under certain circumstances, which serve to protect the well-being of a member of the family.
Qualified or conditional privileges only protect those who do not abuse them. Traditionally, a qualified privilege is abused when the publication is made with malice, when the publisher does not act for the purpose of protecting the interest intended to be protected by the privilege, where there is excessive publication, where the publisher does not reasonably believe the publishing is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the privilege, or when one publishes unprivileged defamatory matter in addition to privileged publications. See Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, pp 832-835, and Restatement, supra, §§ 599, 600, 602, 605A, pp 286-297.
None of the foregoing absolute or conditional privileges is applicable in the case at bar. However, both Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, pp 836-838, and the Restatement, supra, § 611, pp 297-302, detail what is described in both treatises as a special type of privilege to report on official or public proceedings. At common law, this privilege was conditional, yet some commentators argue that it is now constitutionally required to be an absolute privilege.10_
*216According to the Restatement this privilege applies to all activities of government.
Report of Official Proceeding or Public Meeting
The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported. [Restatement, supra, § 611, p 297.]
This privilege existed according to Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, p 836, "upon the idea that any member of the public, if he were present, might see and hear for himself, so that the reporter is merely a substitute for the public eye— this, together with the obvious public interest in having public affairs made known to all.”
Traditionally, a publication was privileged if it was a fair and accurate report of the official proceedings, although courts have allowed some leeway, most often finding that minor inaccuracies would not defeat the privilege. Embellishments of *217the facts in the official proceedings, however, would be an abuse and the publisher would lose the protection of the privilege. See, e.g., McAllister v Detroit Free Press Co, 76 Mich 338; 43 NW 431 (1889).
Most courts which have considered the question have applied the privilege to reports of official criminal police proceedings. See, e.g., Turnbull v Herald Co, 459 SW2d 516, 520 (Mo App, 1970) (privilege extends to "actions and activities of police officers, including the details and reasons for an arrest”); Phillips v Evening Star Newspaper Co, 424 A2d 78 (DC App, 1980) (information in arrest records and report of the fact of arrest privileged); François v Capitol City Press, 166 So 2d 84, 89 (La App, 1964) (privilege to publish "fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which he is being held”); Piracci v Hearst Corp, 263 F Supp 511 (D Md, 1966); Commercial Publishing Co v Smith, 149 F 704, 706 (CA 6, 1907) ("[t]he publication of the fact that one has been arrested, and upon what accusation” privileged).
The Restatement and Prosser & Keeton also view reports of arrests as privileged under the official-proceedings privilege. The Restatement, often quoted by courts in this regard, notes:
An arrest by an officer is an official action, and a report of the fact of the arrest or of the charge of crime made by the officer in making or returning the arrest is therefore within the conditional privilege covered by this Section. On the other hand statements made by the police or by the complainant or other witnesses or by the prosecuting attorney as to the facts of the case or the evidence expected to be given are not yet part of the judicial proceeding or of the arrest itself and are not privileged under this Section. [Restatement, supra, § 611, comment h, p 301.]
*218The scope of the official-proceedings privilege has been extended beyond reports of the official proceedings, themselves. Courts have also uniformly applied it to reports of any matter contained in official records which are part of the official proceedings, such as public court files. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, p 836; Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469; 95 S Ct 1029; 43 L Ed 2d 328 (1975); Lotrich v Life Printing & Publishing Co,11 117 Ill App 2d 89; 253 NE2d 899 (1969); McAllister, supra.
The privilege does not extend, however, to "unofficial talk of such officials as policemen, as distinct from their official utterances or acts, such as an arrest.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, pp 836-837. We noted this in McAllister, supra, 356:
And the reporter of a newspaper has no more right to collect the stories on the street, or even to gather information from policemen or magistrates out of court, about a citizen, and to his detriment, and publish such stories and information as facts in a newspaper, than has a person not connected with a newspaper to whisper from ear to ear the gossip and scandal of the street.
Because the privilege covered fair and accurate reports of public records which are part of an official proceeding, there is also a requirement in most jurisdictions that some official action12 has *219been taken before the publisher can escape liability. Consequently, a "pleading or a deposition filed in a case but not yet acted upon may not be reported under the claim of privilege.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, p 837.13 Logically, this would also require that more than mere investigative work have been undertaken by a government agency in a criminal case.
There appears to be a split of authority on the question whether a publisher must have actually relied on the public records which are part of an official proceeding, or whether it is adequate that the information published is actually contained in such a record. See, e.g., Medico v Times, Inc, 643 F2d 134 (CA 3, 1981), and Bufalino v Associated Press, 692 F2d 266 (CA 2, 1982).
The best reasoned approach14 and the one which appears to have been followed most often in Michigan courts, is that actual reliance is not necessary, but that publishers act at their own peril if they rely on anything other than official documents. As Judge Gillis of the Court of Appeals aptly stated *220in McCracken v Evening News Ass’n, 3 Mich App 32, 38-39; 141 NW2d 694 (1966):
The fact that the reporter herein relied on the word of another as to the nature of the complaint and warrant is immaterial. The statute does not command the reporter to obtain his information from the official court records. At his risk, and at the risk of his publisher, he may rely upon the word of another as to the contents of the complaint and warrant, and that it will be so issued if it has not already been. . . . Obviously, if a warrant is never issued, there are no official proceedings that can be reported and this statute is not applicable.[15]
The statute referred to by Judge Gillis is MCL 600.2911; MSA 27A.2911 which, I believe, contrary to what Justice Brickley appears to find,16 is the codification of the common-law official-proceedings privilege in this state.17_
*221Section 2911(3), in pertinent part, provides:
No damages shall be awarded in any libel action brought against a reporter, editor, publisher, or proprietor of a newspaper for the publication in it of a fair and true report of any public and official proceeding, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the article published.
A parallel statute in New York has been held by the courts of that state to afford more protection than the common-law privilege, rather than less. In discussing the history of the New York official-proceedings law, the New York Court of Appeals noted in Murray v Brancato, 290 NY 52, 58; 48 NE2d 257 (1943):
The Legislature of the State of New York by chapter 130 of the Laws of 1854 provided that "no reporter, editor or proprietor of any newspaper shall be liable to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, for a fair and true report in such newspaper of any judicial, legislative, or other public official proceedings . . . except upon actual proof of malice in making such report, which shall in no case be implied from the fact of publication.” This statute, it has been said, was "simply declaratory of the common-law.” (Ackerman v Jones, 37 NY Super Ct 42, 54 [1874].) . . . Then in 1930 by chapter 619 of the Laws of 1930 the words "without proving actual malice in making the report” were omitted and no express qualification of the privilege remained in the statute. [Emphasis in original.]
It was further noted in Farrell v New York Evening Post, 167 Misc 412, 415; 3 NYS2d 1018 (1938), that "[b]y the amendment of 1930 [chapter 619] all publications falling within the purview of the statute are absolutely privileged.” See also *222Keogh v New York Herald Tribune, Inc, 51 Misc 2d 888; 274 NYS2d 302 (1966).18
I would find, from the language of § 2911, that the intent of the Legislature in codifying this privilege in 1931, as in New York, was not to change the protection offered at common law, but, rather, to extend it by making this an absolute privilege. This privilege would thus cover a report of an official and public proceeding and any public records which are part of that proceeding.
This construction parallels the suggestion that Cox requires absolute immunity for fair and accurate reports of official records and proceedings. See n 10. The Restatement was amended in 1977, after Cox was decided, to reflect this view:
If the report of a public official proceeding is accurate or a fair abridgment, an action cannot constitutionally be maintained, either for defamation or for invasion of privacy. [Restatement, supra, § 611, comment b, p 298.]
It is undisputed that Mr. Rouch was arrested by the Emmett Township Police Department, and it appears to be true that he was later released on bond. Therefore, because libel requires a false statement, there is no cause of action for a report of the arrest, itself, of the charge for which he was arrested or, if true, of the fact that bail was set.
The privilege provided by the statute would only be necessary for false statements made in the story. As summary judgment was granted in this case and no factual findings were made on this issue, I am unable to determine on the record *223before us whether any of the alleged false statements were part of any public-official proceeding or were contained in any official report which was part of such proceeding.19 If they were, I would find that the defendants are privileged under § 2911, provided that the reporting was a fair and true account of statements made in such proceedings or reports.
As to any statements which are not so privileged, I am in agreement with Justice Brickley that, balancing the plaintiff’s privacy interests with the requirements of the constitution,20 a negligence standard is appropriate. Further, I agree that in this case the plaintiff is constitutionally required to prove falsity. Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps, 475 US —; 106 S Ct 1558; 89 L Ed 2d 783 (1986).
I would remand this case to the trial court for further findings consistent with this opinion.
Riley, J,, concurred with Boyle, J._

 Constitutional malice has been defined as knowledge that the defamatory statements are false or are made with reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. New York Times, supra, 280.

 It must be noted that neither party nor amici curiae in this case argue that the broad public-interest privilege applied in such cases as Weeren, supra, and Dienes, supra, is not actually a privilege recognized at common law.

 Interestingly, in Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, supra, 346, the United States Supreme Court noted that the public-interest rationale behind New York Times would be difficult to extend to private plaintiffs.
[I]t would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of "general or public interest” and which do not — to determine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, "what information is relevant to self-government.” . . . We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges.

 Although traditionally the New York Times standard has been viewed as protecting media defendants, the rationale of that decision applies equally to nonmedia defendants. See Smolla, Let the author beware: The rejuvenation of the American law of libel, 132 U Pa L R 1 (1983). However, it is probably true that the standards set forth in Gertz, supra, 347-348, are not applicable to nonmedia defendants.
This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation.
However, former Chief Justice Burger in his opinion in Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111, 133, n 16; 99 S Ct 2675; 61 L Ed 2d 411 (1979), noted that this issue had not been decided by the United States Supreme Court.
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 113, p 808, suggest this confusion could be cleared up by requiring some degree of fault in all cases. "Much could be accomplished by way of simplifying the law and adequately protecting speech in the private area by way of requiring fault with respect to truth or falsity of the matter published in all situations. Most qualified privileges could then be abolished.”

 I do not address the question whether, after New York Times, and Gertz, qualified privileges require a showing of common-law malice (ill will or bad motive) or constitutional malice (knowing that statements are false or reckless disregard for whether or not they are false). The Restatement takes the view that a showing of constitutional malice is now appropriate in the case of all qualified privileges:
A substantial minority of the cases at common law took this position. With the current familiarity with the constitutional standard of reckless disregard, arising from the case of New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254, and the more frequent use of it in the abuse-of-privilege cases as a result, this standard seems to offer a felicitous solution. It is anticipated that as other courts realize the situation they will agree with it. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 592A, p 260.]
See also Smolla, n 4 supra, pp 79-80 ("The law of defamation will evolve much more coherently if ill-will malice is discarded altogether, and the knowing or reckless disregard of the truth standard is used *212for all conditional privileges, whether their pedigree is common law, constitutional, or both.”).

 See n 5.

 It appears that the majority may have confused this privilege with the separate and distinct privilege to report on official and public proceedings. Although some courts have extended the judicial-proceedings privilege to cover official publication of judicial opinions, it has not been viewed normally as exempting reports of judicial proceedings, but rather as foreclosing liability for statements made in the proceedings themselves. Reports of such statements were traditionally covered by the latter privilege.

 See n 4.

 The Restatement takes the view that the privilege to make fair comment on matters of public interest may have been rendered obsolete by United States Supreme Court decisions and that opinions, in general, may no longer be considered defamation. Quoting Gertz, supra, 339, the Restatement surmises,
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. . . .” This categoric statement was not necessary to the decision in the case in which it is found, and the Supreme Court’s indications that an expression of opinion cannot be the basis of a defamation action have involved public communications on matters of *215public concern. Although it is thus possible that private communications on private matters will be treated differently, the logic of the constitutional principle would appear to apply to all expressions of opinion of the first, or pure, type. [Restatement, supra, § 566, comment c, pp 172-173.]

 In a recent article in the University of Illinois Law Review, it is suggested that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469; 95 S Ct 1029; 43 L Ed 2d 328 *216(1975), and New York Times, require that states modify their application of the official-proceedings privilege.
New York Times and Cox have transformed the privilege to report on public proceedings. At common law, courts granted the publisher of defamatory matter in a report of an official act or proceeding a privilege only if the report was fair, accurate, and made without express malice. Constitutional privilege, however, absolutely protects such reports so long as the reports accurately depict the proceedings observed. . . .
A few states have enacted statutes that grant absolute immunity to accurate reports of public proceedings and documents. These statutes, like the Second Restatement, properly observe the first and fourteenth amendments’ demand that dissemination of accurate information regarding the activities of governmental institutions be free from sanction. [Workman, Reports upon public proceedings and documents: Absolutely protected by constitutional privilege, 1985 U Ill L R 1059, 1074-1075.]

 Justice Brickley finds that Lotrich, supra, and several cases from other states, see ante, p 171, are construing a broader privilege than that provided in Michigan. However, all of the cases involve the application of the same special common-law privilege reported in both Prosser & Keeton and the Restatement which has traditionally been available to all defendants in a defamation action in this and other states.

 In his opinion, Justice Brickley draws a distinction between an official-proceedings privilege and the Restatement privilege in § 611 which he believes is an "official action” privilege. At common law, some official action was required before a statement could be said to *219be privileged under the official-proceedings privilege. I do not read the Restatement as describing a different privilege, but, rather, as explaining the common-law prerequisite.

 Some states have repudiated the "official act” requirement. See, e.g., Phillips v Evening Star, supra.

 A commentator in a recent Villanova Law Review article finds an actual reliance requirement will have a "chilling” effect on the media’s constitutional rights. In responding to the case of Bufalino, supra, which had required that the actual source of information be revealed, even if the information was in public records, the article notes:
The result will either be that the protection of the fair and accurate report privilege will be sacrificed, or the willingness of would-be informants to supply publishers with information will be lost. [O’Brien, Torts — defamation—actual reliance on official records is needed for application of fair and accurate report privilege — identification of plaintiff as a public official is needed for application of New York Times actual malice standard, 28 Vill L R 1028, 1048 (1982-1983).]

 A warrant is not an absolute requirement for the privilege to apply. An arrest by police will also satisfy the official-action requirement.

 Justice Brickley states in his opinion:
Broader privileges have included arrests and information given to a law enforcement official.
We think a fair reading of the "public and official proceedings” language of the instant legislation would dictate that it is intended to cover at least the more limited common-law privilege to report judicial proceedings, but is not by its very language intended to be a "government action,” "arrest record,” or "public records” privilege. [Ante, p 171.]
All of the cases cited by Justice Brickley as inapposite to the statute involve the application of the common-law "official proceedings” privilege.

 Even if Justice Brickley were correct that § 2911 does not afford the same protection as the common-law "official proceedings” privilege, a determination would have to be made as to whether the Legislature intended to preempt the previously available privilege. As I believe the codification parallels the common law, I do not reach this question.

 New York has since expanded the reach of its statute by extending the protection to "any person, firm or corporation” and by removing the term "public” from its provisions. See New York Civil Rights Law, § 74 (McKinney).

 As the Restatement, supra, § 611, comment h, p 301, notes, an official proceeding in the criminal law context would often begin with an arrest. Any actions or reports made by the police before that time are merely investigative in nature and thus not privileged as part of an official proceeding. As was previously stated, official action is a requirement of the common-law privilege. See Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 115, p 836.

 For an interesting discussion of this balancing, see Miller, The William O. Douglas lecture: Press versus privacy, 16 Gonzaga L R 843 (1981).