Court Opinion

ID: 9541693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:27:53.568752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:29.269563
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER, dissenting: The majority holds that the remark made by Dean West, the jailer for Williamson County, was error, but it was not reversible error. His testimony was introduced after being called as a rebuttal witness. They also stated that the trial court properly instructed the jury to d'sregard the objectionable testimony. Tire trial court took the position that the State’s witness, West, had not mentioned anything about a prior record but had merely testified to the effect that the defendant had been incarcerated previously.' The trial court decided that mere incarceration does not mean conviction, and that, therefore, while error was committed, it was harmless error. The majority agrees with this ruling of the tidal court. Where, as in this case, the defendant chooses not to testify, tire introduction of evidence of prior offenses is even more restricted since it can no longer be justified as impeachment of the defendant’s credibility. The historical objection is that evidence of prior offenses prejudices the jury by conveying to them the impression that the defendant has criminal tendencies and is likely to commit a crime such as the one for which he is being tried. People v. Polenik, 407 Ill. 337, 95 N.E.2d 414. I fail to see much difference between testimony concerning defendant’s previous incarcerations, and testimony which would focus upon a conviction for such incarceration. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, Mr. West’s testimony suggests that the appellant had a history of being incarcerated for some purpose which was in connection with violations of law. I doubt that the jury would make a fine distinction between an incarceration for an arrest without conviction, and an incarceration upon conviction, and the introduction of either would have been in error. It must be remembered that the defendant did not testify at the trial. Having determined that Mr. West’s remarks were error, the real question that confronts me is whether such remarks were prejudicial, requiring a mistrial. When the jury reconvened, following the trial court’s overruling the appellant’s motion for mistrial, the trial court stated: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are instructed to disregard the last response to the last question given and if you cannot remember it, don’t try to remember it * * While I am cognizant of the several cases upholding the curative effect of a trial court’s admonition to a jury to disregard objectionable evidence, such an admonition in this case strikes me as being totally inadequate, and this is especially true in light of the jury instruction, offered by the State, which was given by the trial court at the close of the tidal. In People’s Instruction No. 13 (IPI No. 24.01), the trial court instructed the jury: While the admonition to disregard Mr. West’s response regarding appellant’s previous incarceration might, in itself, have been curative, such admonition was disregarded by the trial judge in giving People’s Instruction No. 13, quoted above. By giving the second paragraph of People’s Instruction No. 13, the trial court instructed the jury that repeated criminal, or otherwise antisocial conduct, was not to be considered a mental disease or mental defect within the meaning of the first paragraph of People’s Instruction No. 13. In other words, the trial court had previously admonished the jury to disregard Mr. West’s testimony regarding the appellant’s previous incarcerations, and yet in the key instruction regarding the defense of insanity, the trial judge instructs the jury that repeated criminal conduct is not mental disease or mental defect. The only reference to repeated criminal conduct in this case was Mr. West’s unfortunate response. I do not believe that the appellant’s discussing his previous criminal conduct on closing argument constituted his waiver of the prejudice emanating from Mr. West’s response. The Committee Note to Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal No. 24.01, states specifically: “A person is insane and not criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time of the conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law. Abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal, or otherwise anti-social conduct, is not mental disease or mental defect.” (Emphasis added.) “This instruction (Criminal No. 24.01) should be given only when the trial court has determined that there is some evidence tending to prove insanity as defined in Section 6 — 2 of the Criminal Code. Second paragraph should be given only when the evidence shows repeated criminal or other anti-social conduct.” The admonition to disregard entirely Mr. West’s testimony regarding previous incarcerations, but to consider repeated criminal conduct as not coming within the meaning of a “mental disease or mental defect” constituted prejudicial error for which the judgment of conviction should be reversed, and a new trial ordered. I therefore dissent.