Court Opinion

ID: 9710677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:15:12.839268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:58.938472
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
I cannot agree that the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA)1 preempted the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over Stockard’s tort claim for slander. The CMPA does not preempt all common law tort claims that an employee has against the District, but provides the exclusive remedy for only those “arising out of employer conduct in handling personnel ratings, employee grievances, and adverse actions.” District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 635 cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 380, 116 L.Ed.2d 331 (1991) (Thompson II); King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 663 (D.C.1993). Stock-ard’s claim for slander does not appear to fall within that category.
Stockard, a tenured professor, had a separate contract for coaching services which the University of the District of Columbia (UDC) refused to renew. Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1014 (D.C.1990). Stockard claimed that after UDC refused to renew her coaching contract, its athletic director, Orby Moss, falsely told basketball team members and other university employees that the reason for the non-renewal was her misappropriation of funds. Id. at 1016-17, 1022. The CMPA preempts common law action only if the alleged wrongful treatment is cognizable as a “personnel issue.” Id. Stockard is not claiming an injury or damages cognizable as a personnel issue under the CMPA. See King, supra, 640 A.2d at 663. Rather, Stock-ard claims injury to her reputation due to the tortious conduct of a university employee for which the CMPA does not afford relief. Thus, her slander action is more like an assault and battery claim which has been recognized as falling outside the coverage of the CMPA, even though the tortious conduct occurred in the workplace, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 663 (citing Thompson II, supra, 593 A.2d at 624 n. 2, 635).
Contrary to the majority, in my view, there is a meaningful distinction between Moss’ slanderous remarks in this case and the defamatory remarks found to preclude an action in the Superior Court against the District in Thompson II, supra. In Thompson II, the plaintiff sued her employer, the District, and her supervisor for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims were based on statements the supervisor made in twenty-two memoranda which “repeatedly advised and warned [Thompson] to follow the correct leave request procedures and notified her of problems in the performance of her duties_” Thompson II, supra, 593 A.2d at 625 (quoting District of Columbia v. Thompson, 570 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C.1990) (Thompson I)). Thompson claimed that the statements in the memoranda were false. Id. This court characterized the memoranda as “letters of warning,” “written reprimands,” or “corrective actions” within the meaning of the union collective bargaining agreement or within the CMPA. Id. at 627. This court also found that some of the memo-randa appeared to be directed toward discipline under the CMPA. Id. Thus, all of the alleged statements were found to be tied to provisions of documents governing the employees rights and responsibilities under the CMPA or a CMPA-sanetioned union contract.2 Id. In contrast, Moss’ allegedly false post-contract statements were made to persons with no claimed connection to any disciplinary process and unconnected with any contemplated or pending adverse action. The slanderous remarks cannot be said to fall clearly within the scope of CMPA so as to preempt the Superior Court’s jurisdiction to entertain Stockard’s slander claim. Moss’ statements cannot be fairly said to have been made for the purpose of warning, reprimand*569ing, or taking adverse action against Stock-ard. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.

. D.C.Code §§ 1-601.1 — 1-637.2 (1992).

. In Thompson II, the District conceded that Thompson's assault and battery claims were not actions covered by the CMPA, and therefore brought properly as an independent tort claim. 593 A.2d at 24 n. 2.