Court Opinion

ID: 9430123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:01.245614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:23.137588
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens join,
dissenting.
The issue presented is whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may lawfully seize a joint bank account for payment of a single codepositor’s delinquent taxes when it does not know how much, if any, of the account belongs to the delinquent. As it seems to me that the Court today misreads the relevant statutory language, in effect overrules prior decisions of this Court, and substantially ignores the property rights of nondelinquent taxpayers, I dissent.
I — I
The parties have stipulated the following facts. On June 13, 1980, respondent bank held $321.66 in a checking account and $1,241.60 in a savings account, each in the names of “Roy Reeves or Ruby Reeves or Neva R. Reeves.” App. 11-12. Under state law and by contract with the bank, each of these individuals could withdraw any amount from either account. Also on June 13, the IRS served a notice of levy on the bank demanding that it pay over all sums owed to Roy J. Reeves *734up to $1,302.56, the balance of a tax assessment against him. It later issued a partial release of levy for moneys in excess of $856.61 and served a final demand for payment on the bank. The bank, however, refused to pay over this amount because it did not know how much of the money in the accounts belonged to Roy Reeves as opposed to Ruby and Neva. The Government, to enforce its levy, then sued the bank for $856.61. Before the District Court the parties agreed to submit “[n]o further evidence as to the ownership of the monies in the subject bank accounts . . . .” App. 17. As a result, neither the Government nor the Court knows how much of the funds in each account was owned by each codepositor.
The District Court dismissed the complaint as “premature.” 554 F. Supp. 110, 117 (ED Ark. 1982). It held that “the interest of [a] co-depositor in not having his ownership interest in the account erroneously taken by the government . . . [required] some notice procedure at the levy stage . . . .” Id., at 114. Due process, it found, required the IRS to give codepositors notice of the levy action before seizing the accounts. Id., at 114-115. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed without expressing any opinion on the District Court’s due process analysis. 726 F. 2d 1292 (1984). Instead, it reached a similar result as a matter of statutory construction. In particular, it held that the Government had not shown the bank to be in possession of property or rights to property belonging to the tax delinquent, as the levy statute requires.
II
Because “taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need,” Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 259 (1935), Congress has created a “formidable arsenal of collection tools . . . ,” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677, 683 (1983). Central to this “arsenal” are administrative levy, 26 U. S. C. §6331, and judicial foreclosure, §7403, two procedures by which the Government can seize and sell property in which the delinquent taxpayer has an interest. Each procedure is designed *735to apply to specific kinds of situations to ensure that taxes owed are paid while respecting the rights of nondelinquents who may have an interest in the property.
The Court today, however, ignores the property rights of nondelinquents. It holds that a delinquent’s right to compel payment from a bank of balances in a joint account entitles the Government to levy on all of those funds — even when it is stipulated, as in this case, that the Government does not know that any of the money in the account actually belongs to the delinquent. By so holding, the Court disregards both the plain language and structure of the statute, ignores this Court’s century-long interpretation of the Code (effectively overruling Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U. S. 326 (1890), and part of United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51 (1958)), and disregards the fact that under Arkansas law a codepositor may have no property interest in funds that he may withdraw from the joint account.
h — I HH
Administrative levy under .26 U. S. C. § 6331 is the more drastic of the Government’s two primary collection procedures.1 See Bull v. United States, supra, at 259-260. By allowing the Government summarily to seize and sell “all property and rights to property . . . belonging to [the delinquent],” 26 U. S. C. § 6331(a), administrative levy permits the IRS to collect unpaid taxes without judicial intervention. *736It is a “summary, non-judicial process, a method of self-help authorized by statute which provides the Commissioner with a prompt and convenient method for satisfying delinquent tax claims.” United States v. Sullivan, 333 F. 2d 100, 116 (CA3 1964). It provides no notice to third parties that property in which they may have an interest has been seized. If an individual discovers a levy and believes that it was wrongful, his or “her only recourse is to seek administrative review under 26 U. S. C. §6343(b) within nine months2 or file suit in federal district court under 26 U. S. C. § 7426(a)(1) within the same amount of time.3
Section 7403 provides a quite different method for collecting delinquent taxes.4 Under § 7403, the Attorney General, *737at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, institutes a civil action in federal district court “to subject any property ... in which [the delinquent] has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax.” 26 U. S. C. § 7403(a). All persons “claiming any interest in the property” must be joined as parties, § 7403(b), and “duly notified of the action,” § 7403(c). Unlike a § 6331 levy, a § 7403 suit is a plenary action in which the court “adjudicate^] all matters involved” and “finally determine^] the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property.” § 7403(c). The district court may decree the sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds “according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States.” Ibid.
The language of these two provisions reveals the central difference between them. -While § 6331 applies to “property and rights to property . . . belonging to [the delinquent],” § 6331(a), § 7403 applies to “property ... in which [the delinquent] has any right, title, or interest . . . ,” § 7403(a). In other words, § 6331 permits seizure and sale of property or property rights belonging to the delinquent, while § 7403 allows the Government to seize and sell any property right in which the delinquent has an interest — even a partial interest. In many cases, of course, this difference is unimportant. Both procedures, for example, apply to any property *738interest that belongs completely to the delinquent, for it is necessarily true that any right to property “belonging to” the delinquent is also property in which he “has a[n] . . . interest.” In general, however, the opposite is not always true. A property right in which the delinquent has only a partial interest does not “belon[g] to” the delinquent and hence is not susceptible to levy.
Until today, this Court has followed this interpretation of the levy and foreclosure provisions for the past century. In Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U. S. 326 (1890), the Court held that the Government could not levy on property rights in which a delinquent had less than a complete interest. In that case, the Government had levied on the fee interest in property that the delinquent had leased for a term of years. One issue presented was whether the Government’s subsequent sale of the property conveyed the freehold or only the leasehold interest. The first Justice Harlan analyzed the issue as follows:
“The government neglected to pursue the only mode by which the fee could be sold; namely, a suit in equity, in which all persons interested in the property could have been made parties. When the [delinquent] was in default in respect to taxes, it was for the proper officers of the government to elect whether they would seek satisfaction of its demands by means of a seizure and sale by the collector of the [delinquent’s] interest only, or by a suit to which all persons having claims upon the premises on which the government had a lien should be made parties. They chose to adopt the former method, under which only the interest of the delinquent . . . could be seized and sold.” Id., at 341.
In other words, the Government could have either levied administratively only on the leasehold or proceeded in equity (the forerunner of §7403) to condemn the entire freehold interest. Under the former approach, it could take only the interest that completely “belonged] to” the delinquent, while *739under the latter, it could take property interests of which the delinquent owned only a part.5 Accord, Blacklock v. United States, 208 U. S. 75 (1908).
In United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677 (1983), we recently reaffirmed this understanding of the statutory scheme. After noting that § 7403 exhibits “grea[t] solicitude for third parties,” id., at 695, we discussed how §§6331 and 7403 differ:
“Under ... § 6331(a), the Government may sell for the collection of unpaid taxes all nonexempt ‘property and rights to property . . . belonging to [the delinquent taxpayer] . . . Section 6331, unlike §7403, does not require notice and hearing for third parties, because no rights of third parties are intended to be implicated by §6331. Indeed, third parties whose property or interests in property have been seized inadvertently are entitled to claim that the property has been ‘wrongfully levied upon,’ and may apply for its return either through administrative channels ... or through a civil action filed in a federal district court. ... In the absence of such ‘wrongful levy,’ the entire proceeds of a sale conducted pursuant to administrative levy may be applied, without any prior distribution of the sort required by *740§ 7403, to the expenses of the levy and sale, the specific tax liability on the seized property, and the general tax liability of the delinquent taxpayer.” Id., at 696 (first emphasis in original, second added).
The Court later described the various advantages of each method of tax collection as follows:
“Among the advantages of administrative levy is that it is quick and relatively inexpensive. Among the advantages of a § 7403 proceeding is that it gives the Federal Government the opportunity to seek the highest return possible on the forced sale of property interests liable for the payment of federal taxes. The provisions of § 7403 are broad and profound. Nevertheless, § 7J/.03 is punctilious in protecting the vested rights of third parties caught in the Government’s collection effort, and in ensuring that the Government not receive out of the proceeds of the sale any more than that to which it is properly entitled.” Id., at 699 (emphasis added).6
*741As Mansfield, and Rodgers make clear, this Court long has interpreted “property and rights to property belonging to the delinquent” to mean exactly that. Section 6331’s reach extends only to property rights completely belonging to the delinquent.
IV
The narrow question presented, then, is whether the Government levied upon property or rights to property belonging only to Roy Reeves. The Court holds that the Government did so because it levied on Roy Reeves’ right under state law to require the bank to pay over to him the outstanding balances in the accounts. This right unquestionably belonged tó Roy Reeves, as it did to each of the other codepositors. They all had the same right to withdraw. But the right to withdraw funds was no more than that. It was a right accorded parties to joint accounts as a matter of mutual convenience, and it was independent of any right to or in the property. It encompassed no right of possession, use, or ownership over the funds when withdrawn. See Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 617,135 S. W. 2d 837, 841 (1940); Hayse v. Hayse, 4 Ark. App. 160-B, 160-F, 630 S. W. 2d 48, 49-50 (1982). These property rights, which the levy provides no way of determining, are defined by independent principles of Arkansas law that are not now at issue.7
*742The Government, however, is not levying on the mere right to withdraw, which is of little value without any right of ownership. The levy at issue reaches the underlying funds in the accounts — no matter whom they belong to. Roy Reeves could, as the Court argues, have withdrawn all the joint funds, but, if under state law he had no independent right in the property itself, he could not legally possess the funds of the others, let alone use them to pay his taxes. That the delinquent might unlawfully convert the money of others to pay his taxes does not give the Government the right to do so. The Government cannot “‘“ste[p] into the taxpayer’s shoes,””’ ante, at 725, quoting United States v. *743Rodgers, 461 U. S., at 691, n. 16, in this sense. It hardly comports with the “[cjommon sense” the Court relies on, ante, at 725, to hold that the Government may seize and sell property belonging only to third parties to pay taxes owed by the delinquent.8
The Court nevertheless holds that the right to withdraw all of a joint account is determinative because “‘it is inconceiv*744able that Congress . . . intended to prohibit the Government from levying on that which is plainly accessible to the delinquent taxpayer-depositor.’”9 Ante, at 726, quoting United *745States v. First National Bank of Arizona, 348 F. Supp. 388, 389 (Ariz. 1970) (emphasis added), aff’d, 458 F. 2d 513 (CA9 1972) (per curiam). By holding that mere accessibility controls, the Court simply ignores the plain language of §6331. It also effectively overrides state law that “ ‘controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer ha[s] in the property.’”10 Aquilino v. United States, *746363 U. S. 509, 513 (1960), quoting Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 82 (1940); United States v. Bess, 357 U. S., at 55. Under the Court’s reasoning, for example, a codepos-itor’s right to withdraw would allow the Government to levy on a joint account even if the Government knew that under state law none of the funds in the joint account “belonged to” the delinquent codepositor, i. e., the delinquent had no property interest in the funds themselves.11 Cf. Aquilino v. United States, supra, at 513, n. 3 (“It would indeed be anomalous to say that the taxpayer’s ‘property and rights to property’ included property in which, under the relevant state law, he had no property interest at all”). Such a position exceeds even the IRS’s own interpretation of its *747levy powers. Rev. Ruling 55-187, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 197 (“A joint checking account is subject to levy only to the extent of a taxpayer’s interest therein, which will be determined from the facts in each case”). This position, moreover, effectively overrules not only Mansfield but also part of United States v. Bess, swpra, a case in which this Court held that a delinquent could have no “property or right to property” in funds over which he had no right of possession. 357 U. S., at 55-56.
The Court also disregards the statutory language and its prior cases when it argues that the levy authorized by § 6331 is only a “provisional” remedy. Ante, at 715, 720, 726, and 728. Third parties who have their property taken may pursue — if they know about the taking — either administrative or judicial relief. But one would hardly characterize as “provisional” the Government’s taking of an innocent party’s property without notice, especially when, even if the taking is discovered, the burden is then on the innocent party to institute recovery proceedings.12 Furthermore, absent notice of any kind, the nine months that the administrative, 26 U. S. C. § 6343(b), and judicial, 26 U. S. C. § 6532(c)(1), remedies ordinarily give third parties to contest a levy is a short time indeed. There is no certainty that within this time they will discover that their property has been used to pay someone else’s taxes. This may be particularly true as *748to the owners of joint savings accounts, owners in common of unimproved real estate, and owners in other situations where there may be little occasion to know that one’s property has been seized by an IRS levy. In short, the Court’s decision often will place the property rights of third parties in serious jeopardy.13
V
On the stipulated facts, the IRS did not know what portion, if any, of the joint accounts levied upon “belong[ed] to” Roy Reeves. It knew only that he had a right to withdraw that under state law encompassed no right to the possession, use, or ownership of the funds when withdrawn. In allowing the levy under these circumstances, the Court today not only decides this case contrary to all of the relevant decisions of the Courts of Appeals but also effectively overrules sub silentio its own prior decisions. Moreover, the Court relies on remedies that, because no notice is provided, may in many cases prove ineffective in protecting the rights of third parties.14
I accordingly dissent, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

 Section 6331 provides in pertinent part:
“(a) Authority of Secretary
“If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property and rights to property. .. belonging to such person ....
“(b) Seizure and sale of property
“The term ‘levy’. . . includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means. ... In any case in which the Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible).”

 Section 6343(b) states in pertinent part:
“If the Secretary determines that property has been wrongfully levied upon, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to return—
“(1) the specific property levied upon,
“(2) an amount of money equal to the amount of money levied upon, or
“(3) an amount of money equal to the amount of money received by the United States from a sale of such property.
“Property may be returned at any time. An amount equal to the amount of money levied upon or received from such sale may be returned at any time before the expiration of 9 months from the date of such levy.”

 Section 7426(a)(1) provides as follows:
“If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant to a levy, and any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United States. Such action may be brought without regard to whether such property has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary.”
Section 6532(c)(1) requires third parties who are not seeking administrative review to file suit within nine months of the levy.

 Section 7403 provides in pertinent part as follows:
“(a) Filing
“In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy has been made, the Attorney General or his delegate, at the request of the Secretary, may direct a civil action to be filed in a district court of the United States to enforce the lien of the United States under this title with respect *737to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability. . . .
“(b) Parties
“All persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property involved in such action shall be made parties thereto.
“(c) Adjudication and decree
“The court shall, after the parties have been duly notified of the action, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved therein and finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property, and, in all cases where a claim or interest of the United States therein is established, may decree a sale of such property . . . and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States. . . .” 26 U. S. C. § 7403.

 The Court argues that Mansfield is irrelevant to today’s decision because it stands for the unremarkable proposition that “the Government may not levy upon a leasehold interest and then turn around and sell a fee interest — an entirely different kind of interest.” Ante, at 732, n. 15. It bases this reading of Mansfield on the presence of a waiver from the feeholder, which was in fact tangential to the Court’s holding in that case. The Court in Mansfield discussed the feeholder’s waiver only in order to determine whether it gave the Government an interest in the fee. 135 U. S., at 338-339. If it did, it was clear that the Government could sell the fee. The Court, however, concluded that the waiver gave the Government no such interest. Id., at 339. Thus, the Court had to consider whether the levy on the property could by itself effectively transfer more than the delinquent’s leasehold interest. Justice Harlan, writing for the Mansfield Court, found that the levy could not, and it is in this respect that Mansfield is a highly pertinent — if not a controlling — authority.

 The Court attempts to minimize the conflict between its holding today and the holding in Rodgers by mischaracterizing that case. The Court states that “[t]he [Rodgers] Court noted that §6331, unlike §7403, does not ‘implicate the rights of third parties,’ because an administrative levy, unlike a judicial lien-foreclosure action, does not determine the ownership rights to the property.” Ante, at 731. Nothing in Rodgers, however, suggests that § 6331 is not intended to implicate third-party rights for this reason. As the first quotation from Rodgers in the text above clearly indicates, § 6331 is not meant to implicate such rights because its explicit language limits levies for “unpaid taxes [to] all nonexempt ‘property and rights to property . . . belonging to [the delinquent taxpayer] . . .’” (emphasis in Rodgers).
The Court also argues that comparing § 6331 and § 7403 is like comparing “apples and oranges.” Ante, at 732, n. 15. It suffices to say that this Court always has relied on comparison of these two provisions. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S., at 695-697; Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U. S., at 341. Furthermore, the “more telling” comparison that the Court believes Rodgers made between §7403 and a wrongful-levy action, see ante, at 731-732, n. 15, actually works against today’s *741result. By stating that wrongful-levy actions can be pursued when “property ha[s] been seized inadvertently,” 461 U. S., at 696, the Rodgers Court makes clear its assumption that the Government cannot levy on property it knows may belong to third parties. The reasoning of the Court today, however, would allow exactly this result.

 The Arkansas Supreme Court has described the statute granting co-depositors the right to withdraw in the following terms:
“[The statute was] passed for the protection of the bank in which the deposit was made. It permits the bank to pay out the deposit . . . and protects the bank in doing so. . . . The statute[, however,] effects no investiture of title as between the depositors themselves, but only relieves the bank of the responsibility and duty of making inquiry as to the respec*742tive interests of the depositors in the deposit . . . .” Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 617, 135 S. W. 2d 837, 841 (1940).
The Court of Appeals accepted this characterization of Arkansas law and described the interrelationship between the right to withdraw and the underlying property rights as follows:
“Roy [Reeves] could have withdrawn any amount he wished from the account and used it to pay his debts, including federal income taxes, and his co-owners would have had no lawful complaint against the bank. But they might have had a claim against Roy for conversion. The rights of the co-owners inter sese are not determined by the . . . Arkansas statutes [granting a right of withdrawal]. Those rights depend on the intention of whoever deposited the money, or on whatever agreement, if any, might have been made among the co-owners, or on some other applicable rule of state law. If, for example, a spouse makes a deposit in a bank account that bears both spouses’ names, a tenancy by the entirety is created, defea-sible by either spouse at will simply by making a withdrawal. But here we do not know whether Roy is married to Ruby or Neva. In fact, both the government and the bank have studiously avoided finding out. ... In short, we know, or presume, that each co-owner could withdraw all of both accounts, but that is all we know.” 726 F. 2d 1292, 1295 (CA8 1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court accepts, as it must, the state court’s determination of Arkansas law. It simply holds that federal law overrides it, despite what this Court has held in Aquilino v. United States, 363 U. S. 509, 513 (1960), quoting Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 82 (1940); United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 55 (1958); see ante, at 726-729.

 The Courts of Appeals that have considered whether the IRS can levy on jointly held property to pay a co-owner’s taxes have held that it cannot when it does not know how much of the property actually belongs to the delinquent. In United States v. Stock Yards Bank of Louisville, 231 F. 2d 628 (CA6 1956), Justice (then Judge) Stewart, writing for the court, held that a joint bondholder’s right to present a bond for redemption, receive payment in full, and thereby eliminate completely the other co-owner’s interest as far as the issuer was concerned did not give the IRS the right to levy on the entire bond to pay one co-owner’s taxes. “Proof of the actual value of the taxpayer’s interest was an essential element of the government’s case under the statute, and for lack of such proof the case falls.” Id., at 631. The Court attempts to distinguish this case on the ground that “[sjavings bonds . . . are different from joint bank accounts . . . .” Ante, at 728, n. 11. In Stock Yards Bank, however, the Court of Appeals expressly analogized savings bonds to joint bank accounts, 231 F. 2d, at 631, and the Court today points to no relevant distinguishing feature. It merely creates a distinction without a difference.
Likewise, in Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F. 2d 620 (CA3 1952), the Court of Appeals rejected the IRS’s view that it could levy on joint bank accounts held as tenancies by the entirety when “either spouse may draw upon them.” Id., at 622. The court found that the “power of each spouse to withdraw funds,” which the IRS argued was determinative, ibid., was actually irrelevant because under state law “the ownership of both [spouses] attaches to funds withdrawn by either,” ibid. “The United States,” it held, “has no power to take property from one person, the innocent spouse, to satisfy the obligation of another.” Id., at 623. The Court attempts to distinguish this case on the ground that it “did not concern the propriety of a provisional remedy, but the final ownership of the property in question.” Ante, at 728, n. 11. This is misleading. In Raffaele, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s quashing of a warrant of distraint. It thus held that the IRS had no right to seize the property as an initial matter. It did not hold that the IRS had properly seized the property but had to return it.

 The Court today states that “[t]he overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that a delinquent taxpayer’s unrestricted right to withdraw constitutes ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ subject to provisional IRS levy, regardless of the facts that other claims to the funds may exist and that the question of ultimate ownership may be unresolved at the time.” Ante, at 724-725. Insofar as the Court states that the IRS can levy on the right to withdraw, one can assume, without deciding, that it is correct, because the statement is irrelevant. In the present case, the IRS is not levying on the right to withdraw, but on the underlying right in the property, which may well belong to innocent third parties. See supra, at 741-743. On the other hand, insofar as the Court states that “these cases all stand for the proposition that a delinquent’s state-law right to withdraw funds from [a] joint bank account is a property interest sufficient for purposes of federal law for the Government to levy the account. . . ,” ante, at 725, n. 9, it is simply mistaken. Not one, let alone “all,” of these cases stand for this proposition. The cases the Court cites from the Courts of Appeals, the District Courts, and the Tax Court either decide a different question or actually support the position taken by the Third and Sixth Circuits, see n. 5, supra. Four of the Court of Appeals cases and one of the District Court cases concern the amount of “property” in an individual’s account when the bank has either an unexercised right of setoff or checks still to be drawn against the account at the time of the levy. Citizens & Peoples National Bank v. United States, 570 F. 2d 1279 (CA5 1978) (unpaid checks); United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 538 F. 2d 1101 (CA5 1976) (unexercised right of setoff), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 945 (1977); United States v. Sterling National Bank & Trust Co., 494 F. 2d 919 (CA2 1974) (same); Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F. 2d 820 (CA9 1957) (same), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 938 (1958); United States v. First National Bank of Arizona, 348 F. Supp. 388 (Ariz. 1970) (same), aff’d, 458 F. 2d 513 (CA9 1972). The fifth Court of Appeals case, the other District Court case, and all the Tax Court cases support a holding opposite to the Court’s today. In Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F. 2d 957 (CA9 1974), for example, the court allowed the levy against community property only because state law “ha[d] . . . given the [delinquent] rights in that property . . . .” Id., at 960. And in the other District Court case and all the Tax- Court cases the court found that state law gave the delinquent not only a right of withdrawal but also a right of use or possession in the underlying funds themselves. United States v. Third National Bank & Trust Co., 111 F. Supp. 152, 155 (MD Pa. 1953) (delinquent was either sole owner of *745funds or joint tenant); United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 49 AFTR 2d ¶ 82-428, at 82-725 (Md. 1982) (“[P]rior to the federal tax levy, both [co-depositors] owned the accounts as joint tenants, each having the absolute right to use or withdraw the entire fund. . . . Consequently, [the delinquent codepositor] had property rights in the checking account. . . .”); Sebel v. Lytton Savings & Loan Assn., 65-1 USTC ¶9343 (SD Cal. 1965) (joint tenancy); Tyson v. United States, 63-1 USTC ¶ 9300 (Mass. 1962) (holding in the alternative that assessment was jointly against both co-depositors or that state law granted any creditor the right to possession of either codepositor’s funds).
These cases should also dispel the Court’s fear that the IRS will be forced to “bring a lien-foreclosure suit each time it wishe[s] to execute a tax lien on funds in a joint bank account. . . .” Ante, at 733. Nothing in my opinion suggests that under existing federal law the IRS can never levy on a joint bank account. As the cited cases make clear, many, if not most, States give codepositors property rights in all the funds in a joint account. As long as state law grants such a right — which Arkansas law does not, see n. 7, supra—levy on all the funds to pay a single codepositor’s taxes is proper. It is only when state law does not grant such a right that the IRS should not be allowed to levy under § 6331 without first determining that the funds “belong to” the delinquent. The Court’s position, however, would permit levies even when the IRS knows that none of the fluids in the account belongs to the delinquent taxpayer.

 At several points, the Court mischaracterizes my reliance on state law. I do not suggest that because state law “puts certain limits on the rights of creditors, and attaches certain consequences to [the right to withdraw] as regards the delinquent himself. . . the Government is limited by these same state-law constraints.” Ante, at 724, n. 8. Nor do I suggest that “state law dictates the extent of the Government’s power to levy.” Ante, at 725, n. 9. These are strawmen that the Court long ago rejected. United States v. Bess, 357 U. S., at 56-57. Like the Court, I would follow the statement in Bess that § 6331 “creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law . . . .” Id., at 55 (emphasis added). As the Court today states, “under Bess, state law controls only in determining the nature of the legal *746interest which the taxpayer has in the property.” Ante, at 724, n. 8. Here, however, the delinquent taxpayer may have no legal interest in the property. All that is known is that he has a right of withdrawal that is completely independent of the funds themselves. See n. 7, supra. Nevertheless, the Court attaches “federal consequences” sufficient to levy on the accounts. In effect, what the Court holds today is that the delinquent’s right against the bank creates “federal consequences” that attach to the completely different right to the funds themselves. By so construing the “federal consequences” of Bess, the Court does nothing less than rewrite § 6331, a provision that authorizes levy only on “property and rights to property belonging to” the delinquent.

 Moreover, if taken seriously, the Court’s reasoning would make any action for wrongful levy fruitless. If the mere right to withdraw payment is indeed the determinative interest, then a levy on a joint account for payment of a codepositor’s taxes can never be wrongful. It will always be true that a right to withdraw belonged to the delinquent codepositor. The Court, of course, does not actually take this extreme position. It would apparently allow a third party subsequently to contest a levy on the ground that “the money in fact belongs to him or her.” Ante, at 726 (emphasis added). This, however, amounts to recognition that it is the right of ownership, rather than the right to withdraw, that controls. To avoid taking a transparently unreasonable position, the Court switches the basis of its analysis. The relevant property interest, it appears, depends upon whether the Government is trying to seize property or a third party is trying to recoup it. The Court offers no reason for applying this double standard, and the statute itself yields none.

 The Court also argues that a levy on third-party property may be justified because “[the levy] merely protects the Government’s interests so that rights to the property may be determined in a postseizure proceeding.” Ante, at 731, n. 15. This statement incorrectly states the law. Under the levy statute, the IRS has the power not only to seize but also to sell property. 26 U. S. C. § 6331(b). A co-owner of a house seized and sold to pay a delinquent’s taxes would indeed be surprised to discover that the IRS’s levy “merely protects the Government’s interests . . . .” Assuming that the co-owner discovered within nine months that the IRS had levied on the property (for no notice to him is required), he could recover in a wrongful-levy action at most some of the proceeds from the sale. This “remedy” hardly “punctiliously protects]” the rights of third parties, as the Court claims. Ante, at 731-732, n. 15.

 The Court also emphasizes that administrative levy is justified because, like the delinquent’s right to withdraw, it is “subject to a later claim by a codepositor that the money in fact belongs to him or her.” Ante, at 726. This statement proves too much. Under the Court’s reasoning, the IRS could levy on anyone’s property to pay anyone else’s taxes because such wrongful seizures are nearly always “subject to a later claim by [the owner] that the [property] in fact belongs to him or her.” The fact that every wrongful taking is subject to a subsequent claim for conversion does not justify the taking.

 The IRS may reach funds like these by following the procedure prescribed by § 7403. And, of course, Congress, if it wishes, may authorize collection of funds under a levy-type procedure, provided it observes constitutional requirements, particularly that of notice. As I would find the statutory language dispositive (as did the Court of Appeals), I do not address the due process claim relied on by the District Court.