Court Opinion

ID: 9706127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:32:13.384695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:54.570152
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY
GRACI, J.:
¶ 1 I join the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of the majority. I write *910separately only to note my view that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Killen, 545 Pa. 127, 680 A.2d 851 (1996), is not to the contrary. I am also compelled to take issue with Judge Bender’s suggestion that our Commonwealth’s prosecutors are being “intellectually dishonest” in invoking the standard for interlocutory appeals. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, at 914.
¶ 2 In Killen, the court said:
The proffered testimony in the case sub judice does not reference in any way the complainant’s past sexual conduct as proscribed by [18 Pa.C.S.A.] § 3104(a); rather, the statements evidence the complainant’s state of mind shortly after (and by implication during) her alleged sexual assault and are therefore relevant and admissible to impeach her credibility.
Id. at 854. I do not believe that the court’s emphasis of the word “after” in juxtaposition with the word “past” may be taken as the court’s signal that the Rape Shield Statute only applies to evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct which precedes the time of the alleged sexual assault. This view is borne out by the statement that next follows the above quote: “The Rape Shield Law was not designed to exclude evidence of a victim’s statements to persons which are part of and relevant to the ongoing episode in which the alleged criminal activity takes place.” Id. Thus, it is clear that the court in Killen was not suggesting that evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct after the event giving rise to the charges was outside of the protection afforded by the Rape Shield Statute.
¶ 8 The Rape Shield Statute, by its title, governs “evidence of [a] victim’s sexual conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104. It refers four times to the “victim’s past sexual conduct.” Id. As the statute is concerned with the admissibility of evidence at the trial of the offense being prosecuted, I understand the word “past” to refer to anything that occurs before the trial. The date of the offense is irrelevant to the operation of the statute. That is my understanding of the majority opinion. Opinion, at 914.
¶ 4 Turning to Judge Bender’s comments, I do not believe that the Commonwealth has been granted “essentially unchecked authority to certify an adverse pretrial order.” Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, at 914.4 The Commonwealth’s certification must be made in good faith. Evidence to the contrary could result in the quashing of an appeal brought by way of Rule 311(d). I recognize that some *911might say that this is little protection because there would rarely be evidence of lack of good faith or bad faith by the certifying prosecutor. This may be so, but it is because the Commonwealth’s prosecutors, with rare exception, take their responsibilities to the courts and to the public seriously and in conformity with the rules of professional conduct.
¶ 5 While the Commonwealth’s prosecutors may be zealous in their representation and may certify some appeals as to which there may be a difference of opinion as to whether a prosecution is substantially handicapped by an adverse pretrial order, I am aware of no evidence that they are being intellectually dishonest in doing so. Instead, they are following the pronouncements of this Court and the Supreme Court as the prosecutors understand and interpret them. For that they should not be chastised.
¶ 6 With these thoughts, I fully join the opinion of the majority.
¶ 7 STEVENS, J. joins in this Concurring Statement by GRACI, J.

. I recognize that Judge Bender is not the first member of this Court to criticize the Commonwealth’s attorneys in certifying appeals under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 2003 PA Super 94, ¶ 25 n. 14, 822 A.2d 716 (filed 3/10/03). Lest the reader be misled, however, it should be pointed out that, in Santiago, the trial court issued a multi-part pretrial order from which the Commonwealth took its appeal. Id. at ¶ 4. The Commonwealth raised four separate claims resulting from the trial court’s order which, inter alia, suppressed the defendant's statements, prohibited the introduction of some of the Commonwealth’s evidence, allowed the defendant to introduce certain hearsay evidence, and refused to address an issue until the time set for.trial. Id. at ¶ 5. It was only as to the last claim to which the panel annexed the footnote cited by Judge Bender. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, at 912 n. 6. The Santiago panel reversed the trial court on two of the other claims raised by the Commonwealth. Had immediate pretrial appeal not been available, the prosecution would have been without substantial evidence in a murder prosecution, including inculpatory statements made by the defendant. One can hardly suggest from an examination of the complete opinion and the ultimate result in Santiago that the Commonwealth’s'certification was wholly inappropriate or lacking in good faith.