Court Opinion

ID: 2964982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:45.788394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:02.552254
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 97-1245
                                 THOMAS R. BOOTHBY,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                    SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER,
                                Defendant, Appellee.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                ____________________
            Francis M. Jackson on brief for appellant.
            Jay  P.  McCloskey, United  States  Attorney,  David R.  Collins,
       Assistant  United  States Attorney,  and Thomas  D. Ramsey,  Assistant
       Regional 
               Counsel, 
                        Office 
                              of the Chief Counsel, Region I, Social Security
       Administration, on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                  November 18, 1997
                                ____________________

                 Per Curiam.  In  February 1992, claimant Thomas  Boothby
            filed  a  pro  se  application  for  SSI  benefits,  alleging
            disability on account of alcoholism and depression.  When his
            application was denied at the administrative level,  claimant
            failed  to seek  further review.   In  September 1993,  after
            suffering a heart attack, he filed a second such  application
            and, with the assistance  of counsel, was eventually  awarded
            benefits pursuant thereto.   The ALJ rejected his request  to
            reopen  the first  application,  however,  finding  that  new
            evidence 
                    documenting 
                               his 
                                   mental impairments failed to establish
            "good cause" for doing so.  See 20 C.F.R. S 416.1488.   After
            the 
               Appeals 
                      Council 
                              declined review, claimant filed this action
            in district  court challenging  the denial  of his  reopening
            request.   From a  judgment dismissing the  suit for lack  of
            jurisdiction, he now appeals.  
                 The denial  of a request  to reopen  an application  for
            disability benefits is  ordinarily not reviewable in  federal
            court.  See, e.g.,  Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,  107-09
            (1977); Colon v. Secretary of HHS, 877 F.2d 148, 152-53  (1st
            Cir. 1989)  (per curiam).  An  exception to this rule  exists
            where a colorable  constitutional claim  has been  presented.
            See
              , 
                e.g.
                    , 
                      Sa
                        nders, 430 U.S. at 109; Dvareckas v. Secretary of
            HHS
              , 
                804 
                    F.2d 770, 772 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam).  Claimant
            has attempted  to advance  such a  claim here--arguing  that,
            because 
                   his 
                      mental 
                             impairments prevented him from understanding
                                         -2-

            and 
               pursuing 
                       his 
                           administrative remedies, and because he lacked
            legal                                                       o
            reopen 
                  the 
                      first application contravened due process.  Such an
            argument, when factually  supported, has  gained a  favorable
            judicial 
                    reception. 
                               
                               See
                                  ,
                                    e.g., Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480,
            1482-83 (9th Cir. 1997) (listing cases); Parker v.  Califano,
            644                                   Torres
                  or  other representation at  the time,  the refusal  t
                F.2d 1199, 1203  (6th Cir. 1981);        v. Secretary  of
            HEW, 475  F.2d 466, 468-69 (1st  Cir. 1973); see also  Social
            Security Ruling (SSR) 91-5p; Acquiescence Ruling 90-3(4).  As
            one 
               court 
                     has 
                        observed, 
                                  "It offends fundamental fairness ... to
            bind 
                a 
                  claimant to an adverse ruling who lacks both the mental
            competency and the legal assistance necessary to contest  the
            initial 
                   determination." 
                                   
                                   Young v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 951, 955 (4th
            Cir. 1988).1
               1  Inexplicably, claimant made no mention of the due
            process issue in his complaint or in his "itemized statement"
            (although he did there refer to the analogous SSR 91-5p). 
            The first written reference thereto appears in his objections
            to the magistrate-judge's report; it is unclear whether the
            issue was earlier raised at oral argument.  Any claim not
            presented to the magistrate-judge would be waived.  See,
            e.g., Borden v. Secretary of HHS, 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.
            1987).  Yet because the Commissioner has not argued that any
            such waiver occurred, we need not pursue the matter. 
            Similarly, because the Commissioner has not contended that
            the constitutional claim was subject to the administrative
            exhaustion requirement, we need not address the issue.  See,
            e.g., Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1980)
            (excusing failure to present due process issue to Secretary).
                                         -3-

                 On appeal, the Commissioner does not take serious  issu
                        opositions.   Instead, he argues that the medical
                      falls  short  of  "definitively  establishing  tha
                                                                        e
            with 
                these 
                      pr           2
            evidence                                                    t
            plaintiff was unfit  to pursue  the remaining  administrative
            remedies."  Brief  at 12.  Yet  the relevant inquiry here  is
            whether  a  "colorable"   due  process  violation  has   been
            demonstrated.  This is  not an onerous standard.  See,  e.g.,
            Evans
                , 
                  110 
                      F.3d 
                          at 
                             1483 
                                  (noting that "plaintiff whose challenge
            was 
               not 
                  'wholly 
                          insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous' stated
            a colorable  constitutional  claim")  (quoting  Boettcher  v.
            Secretary 
                     of 
                        HHS, 759 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1995)); Boock v.
            Shalala
                  , 
                    48 
                      F.3d 
                           348, 
                                353 (8th Cir. 1995) (indicating that only
            those claims  that were "patently  frivolous" would "fail  to
            confer jurisdiction upon the district court") (Campbell,  J.,
            sitting by designation).
                 Upon review of the evidence here, we find that  claimant
            has presented  a colorable due  process claim.   Dr.  Doiron,
            although 
                    reporting well after the events in question, spoke of
            an organic  disorder  with significantly  compromised  mental
            functions, variable  attention span,  impaired  concentration
               2  The Commissioner does assert at one point, without
            elaboration, that "the alleged constitutional deprivation
            must concern the proceeding at which the determination not to
            reopen was made."  Brief at 10 (citing Cherry v. Heckler, 760
            F.2d 1186, 1190 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985)).  Yet other courts have
            taken a broader view of the Sanders exception, see, e.g.,
            Evans, 110 F.3d at 1482-83, which we regard as the preferable
            approach.
                                         -4-

            levels,  depressive  symptomology  and  substandard   reading
                  y.3   And  even Dr.  Luongo, on  whom the  Commissioner
            relies, spoke of an emotionally unstable personality disorder
            with strong sociopathic and alcoholic features, a borderline-
            defective intellect, a chronic difficulty in maintaining  any
            leve
            abilit
                l of  responsibility, and an  inability to handle  funds.
            Factfinding 
                       is 
                          of 
                            course 
                                   the function of the agency rather than
            a court.  See, e.g., Torres, 475 F.2d at 469.  We hold simply
            that the evidence of mental incapacity in 1992, when claimant
            failed 
                  to 
                     pursue his administrative remedies, is sufficient to
            warrant further inquiry by the Commissioner.
                 Because the due process inquiry involves a fact-specific
            judgment 
                    in 
                       evaluating medical evidence, we remand the case so
            the Commissioner can make this judgment as an initial  matter
            and--if satisfied that  there was a  denial of due  process--
            address the merits.   This procedure is consistent with  past
            practice 
                    in 
                       earlier cases.  We think it worth emphasizing that
            this remand turns on whether claimant has made a  "colorable"
            due process  claim.  Nothing in  this opinion is designed  to
            suggest that the Commissioner should necessarily find that  a
            violation occurred.
               3  The Commissioner has not objected to consideration of
            the second Doiron report, which was first presented to the
            Appeals Council.  See, e.g., Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 44-
            45 (2d Cir. 1996) (following majority view that new evidence
            submitted to Appeals Council is properly deemed part of
            administrative record, even when Council has denied review).
                                         -5-

                 We add that,  given claimant's failure to raise the  due
            process 
                   issue before the Commissioner, and given his tardiness
            in presenting that issue squarely to the district court,  see
            note 1 supra, any  request for attorney's fees in this  court
            would be looked upon with disfavor. 
                 The judgment  is vacated and  the case  remanded to  the
            district court, with directions to remand to the Commissioner
            for further action consistent herewith.  No costs.
                                         -6-