Court Opinion

ID: 9627746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:52:56.202227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:46:56.356739
License: Public Domain

SULT, P.J.,
dissenting.
¶ 16 Because I believe that Fiveash is wrongly decided, and because the majority perpetuates the error, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 17 Fiveash construed Rule 17.4(g) as not being a challenge for cause, a proposition with which I agree. Having decided what the Rule 17.4(g) challenge was not, Fiveash then sought a category in which to place such a challenge. In rather summary fashion, Fiveash equated the Rule 17.4(g) right to change of judge to the peremptory right to change of judge granted in Rule 10.2.
¶ 18 Fiveash offered no analysis of these respective rights to explain why the framers of the Rules of Criminal Procedure would grant the identical right in two separate Rules, intending that the use of one preclude the use of the other, all without so much as even a passing mention by the framers that this was the intended result. Ignoring the conspicuous absence of any express or implied directive that the change of judge rules be so construed, Fiveash justified its result on the basis that “any provision relating to disqualification of judges must be given strict construction to safeguard the judiciary from frivolous attacks upon its dignity and integrity and to ensure the orderly function of the judicial system.” 156 Ariz. at 425, 752 P.2d at 514 (quoting State v. Perkins, 141 Ariz. 278, 286, 686 P.2d 1248, 1256 (1984)).
¶ 19 As an exercise in statutory construction, Fiveash fails on many counts. See State v. Baca, 187 Ariz. 61, 63, 926 P.2d 528, 530 (App.1996) (we construe rules of court applying the tools of statutory construction). We are told that in attempting to ascertain legislative intent, we should consider the statute’s context, language used, subject matter, historical background, and the statute’s spirit and purpose. State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 493, 799 P.2d 831, 834 (1990). Fiveash considered only the subject matter of the two rules, namely challenges to judges, and apparently based on the distasteful (to judges) nature of this subject matter, proceeded to limit the rights granted by the framers of the rules.
¶20 Rule 10.2 and Rule 17.4(g) are not identical and should not be treated as interchangeable. Rule 10.2 has its origins in Arizona’s Territorial Code and no doubt was a product of the populist philosophy of the time that espoused a mistrust of, and sought limitations upon, government. See Stephens v. Stephens, 17 Ariz. 306, 308-11, 152 P. 164, 165-67 (1915) (construing Paragraph 500(4), Civil Code 1913, dealing with an affidavit of bias and prejudice against a judge, and finding it to grant a peremptory challenge which needed no proof). Rule 17, including 17.4(g), was drawn from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and did not enter Arizona’s jurisprudence until 1973. See Vol. 16A, Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated, at 1, and Comment to Ariz. R.Crim. P. 17 (1998).
¶ 21 While the two rules may share the same purpose, to effect reassignment of a case to another judge, they do not share the same spirit. From the outset, the peremptory challenge has been exercisable for any reason or even for no reason. Stephens, supra. The Rule 17.4(g) change of judge, however, is much more limited in its availability and use than the peremptory challenge and was enacted to meet a specific concern regarding true bias. That concern is the possibility of prejudice infecting a trial *260judge from having read a presentence report concerning a defendant who has elected to go to trial after withdrawing from a plea agreement or having it rejected by the judge. See Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492, 89 S.Ct. 1134, 22 L.Ed.2d 442 (1969).
¶ 22 The effects of the two rules are also entirely different. Rule 10.2 is available to all defendants as well as the state, and can be exercised for any reason, including vindictiveness against a particular judge. Because of this, its exercise is far more likely to subject the judiciary to “frivolous attacks upon its dignity and integrity,” and far more likely to disrupt “the orderly function of the judicial system.” See Perkins, supra. Rule 17.4(g), on the other hand, will be used only rarely and then for a very good reason, one which even judges agree implicates the impartiality of the judge to be changed. See Chavez v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 93, 95, 887 P.2d 623, 625 (App.1994) (“[w]e believe that such prejudice [from reading the presentence report] may arise when a defendant withdraws from a plea prior to its acceptance or when a defendant withdraws from a plea following its rejection”). Clearly, Rule 17.4(g) does not have the capacity to inflict on the judicial system the damage that Rule 10.2 does, and it should not be lumped in with Rule 10.2 and thereby subjected to a “strict construction” which eviscerates it.
¶23 Nevertheless, under this guise of “strict” construction, Fiveash succeeded in inappropriately withdrawing the protection of Rule 17.4(g) from those whom the framers anticipated would need it. The majority opinion here completes the job of reading Rule 17.4(g) out of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because I believe that Rule 17.4(g) serves a valuable function in assuring both the impartiality and appearance of impartiality of the judiciary, and because I believe the framers of the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly intended that Rule 17.4(g) be considered and interpreted separately from Rule 10.2,1 dissent.