Court Opinion

ID: 9659061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:30:58.611198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:03.676304
License: Public Domain

Otis, Justice
(dissenting),
I cannot agree that under this record it was proper for the court to set aside the settlement and dismissal of this matter under Rule 60.02(6). All of our prior decisions make it clear that the application of clause (6) is reserved for exceptional situations where the equities weigh heavily in favor of the petitioner and clearly require that relief be granted to avoid an unconscionable result. This is not such a case.
The law favors good-faith settlements.1 They are presumed to be valid. Litigants who seek to avoid them have a heavy burden of persuasion.2 To permit them to be vacated except for the most compelling reason creates “uncertainty, chaos, and confusion” with respect to future dispositions,3 and is a disservice to other litigants whose matters are thereby delayed.4
Most of the cases which have granted relief after the year prescribed in Rule 60.02(1) has elapsed resulted from settlements involving minors.5 *140Characteristically they have appealed “strongly to the conscience of the court” because they were handled without the assistance of counsel,6 or, as sometimes happens, prolonged disability and economic compulsion have led to a hasty and improvident settlement. Even then we have stressed the need for caution in vacating such judgments. But where children are involved the court has frankly acknowledged the adoption of a more liberal rule which recognizes that they are “not possessed of unlimited contractual competence” in their own right.7
With these principles in mind, I respectfully submit that the plaintiff, who is an adult, has at best made out a case of mutual mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60.02 (1). There is nothing harsh or unusual in his circumstances which requires the court to grant the extraordinary relief contemplated by Rule 60.02(6). The equities are, in my opinion, the other way. This plaintiff’s fall occurred in December 1958, nearly 8 years ago, a fact which now burdens defendant with the difficult problem of determining exactly what injury plaintiff originally suffered and its progress and causal relation to his present condition. He received prompt medical attention for numerous injuries, among others being extensive bruises on his entire left side. Although they were obvious in the area of his hip, no X rays were taken in that region. I respectfully suggest there is no evidence, to support a finding that it was impossible to discover plaintiff’s necrotic condition within a year of the time the settlement was made in April 1962. Although plaintiff shortly thereafter experienced pain in his left hip, he did not again consult a doctor until May 9, 1963, nor had he done so after November 1959, a period of 3 Vi years. He settled without a medical examination; he failed to inquire into his condition for more than a year after recognizing unusual symptoms; and allowed over a year more to elapse before moving to vacate. It is clear that part of the delay was due to plaintiff’s failure to advise his own lawyer of the prior settlement, and to his difficulty in finding medical evidence to relate the ac*141cident to his necrotic condition, a fact mentioned both by his doctor and the trial court. It is also noteworthy that the Mayo Clinic who performed extensive surgery on plaintiff is significantly silent on the subject of causal relation.
In my opinion, therefore, the case is governed squarely by our recent decisions in Schoenfeld v. Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N. W. (2d) 560,8 and Newman v. Fjelstad, 271 Minn. 514, 137 N. W. (2d) 181. In Newman the plaintiff sought to set aside a release because of the development of osteomyelitis some years thereafter, claiming this to be a separate and distinct injury not known or considered by the court and the parties at the time of settlement. In reversing an order which vacated the release we reiterated the rule that a release cannot be set aside on the ground that known injuries resulted in consequences not known and not expected when it was made and that the parties are presumed to have intended to settle all claims growing out of the injuries whether the aftereffects proved to be more or less serious than anticipated. We then quoted with approval the following (271 Minn. 519, 137 N. W. [2d] 184):
“This was not an unknown injury, but an unknown and unexpected consequence of the injury, and does not bring the case within the rule. To avoid such a release, the rule requires clear and convincing proof that a substantial injury, which was not discovered until after the settlement, had in fact been sustained in the accident and existed at the time of the settlement. That unknown and unexpected consequences resulted from known injuries is not sufficient.”
As I view the instant case the issue of whether or not the necrotic condition could be diagnosed within a year of settlement is not decisive. If it existed and could be detected during that period (and there is no showing it could not), plaintiff is barred for not having acted within the time pre*142scribed by Rule 60.02(1). On the other hand if it was an unknown and unexpected consequence of a known injury, as in the case of osteomyelitis, then there is no evidence, let alone “clear and convincing proof,” that plaintiff initially suffered a substantial injury unrelated to that for which he settled. In either case under our decisions, I submit that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
Mr. Chief Justice Knutson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 Jallen v. Agre, 264 Minn. 369, 373, 119 N. W. (2d) 739, 742.

 Schoenfeld v. Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 133, 114 N. W. (2d) 560, 568; Eggleston v. Keller Drug Co. 265 Minn. 78, 81, 120 N. W. (2d) 305, 307.

 Rogalla v. Rubbelke, 261 Minn. 381, 384, 112 N. W. (2d) 581, 583.

 Eggleston v. Keller Drug Co. 265 Minn. 78, 82, 120 N. W. (2d) 305, 308.

 Wilson v. Davidson, 219 Minn. 42, 17 N. W. (2d) 31; Clark v. Gronland, 221 Minn. 505, 23 N. W. (2d) 169; Doud v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 259 Minn. 341, 107 N. W. (2d) 521; Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N. W. (2d) 704.

 Elsen v. State Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. 219 Minn. 315, 17 N. W. (2d) 652.

 Larson v. Stowe, 228 Minn. 216, 220, 36 N. W. (2d) 601, 603, 8 A. L. R. (2d) 455; McGovern v. Lutz, 242 Minn. 397, 402, 65 N. W. (2d) 637, 640.

 In Schoenfeld we said (262 Minn. 132, 114 N. W. [2d] 567): “Consequences which will follow in the future from known injuries depend upon so many unknown conditions and contingencies and will vary to such an extent in different individuals that they cannot be known with any degree of certainty. Mistakes which might occur in forecasting such consequences are mistakes of opinion, not of fact, and therefore furnish no sufficient ground for annulling the release.”