Court Opinion

ID: 9675132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:42:53.167081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.685986
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin
dissenting.
The part of the majority opinion from which I particularly dissent is the following:
“It seems reasonable to say that if an established plan involving the use of employees having civil service status is to be modified and in part abolished, the burden of going forward with evidence to show that real economy or more efficient service will result from the change should rest upon the municipality desiring to effect the change. * *
As I understand it, the majority opinion thus puts the burden of proof on the city to justify an ordinance which has been passed in due form by the legislative body of the city. That is contrary to my concept of the law. It is my understanding that *51an ordinance is presumed to be valid and the burden is on the party seeking to set aside the ordinance to show invalidity. See Reed v. City of Waco, Texas Civ. App., 1949, 233 S.W. 2d 247, wr. ref., as follows:
“* * * It is equally well settled that ‘The presumption is always in favor of the validity of legislation; and if there could exist a state of facts justifying the classification or restriction complained of, the courts will assume that it existed.’ Nolen v. Riechman, D. C., 225 F. 812, 819. * * * The Supreme Court of the United States in Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S. Ct. 581, 76 L. Ed. 1167, wherein a Texas statute was the subject of litigation, held outright that the transportation of persons for hire need not be treated as falling within the same classification for the purpose of regulation. See also Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596; Auto Transit Co. v. City of Fort Worth, Texas Civ. App., 182 S.W. 685, writ ref.; Fletcher v. Bordelon, Texas Civ. App., 56 S.W. 2d 313; Dallas Taxicab Co. v. City of Dallas, Texas Civ. App., 68 S.W. 2d 359.”
Also see Beene v. Bryant, Texas Civ. App., 1947, 201 S.W. 2d 268 (6-12), no writ history; Fletcher v. Bordelon, Texas Civ. App., 1933, 56 S.W. 2d 313, wr. ref.; 30A Texas Jur. 291, section 300.
I think it is dangerous to promulgate a special rule contrary to general principles to fit special situations, and for that reason I respectfully dissent.
Opinion delivered July 13,1960.