Court Opinion

ID: 9776597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:39:50.889721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:40.090043
License: Public Domain

OYARD, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the record fails to establish the continuous and systematic activity required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as enunciated in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).
The United States Supreme Court made clear that a defendant is not subject to a state’s general jurisdiction absent continuous and systematic contacts between the defendant and the forum state. In Heli-cópteros, the Court found that no general jurisdiction existed in Texas, even though Helicópteros created several contacts with Texas. Helicópteros purchased more than $4 million worth of helicopters, parts, and accessories in Texas between 1970 and 1977. During the same years, it sent pilots for training to a Fort Worth plant, where the helicopters were manufactured. Heli-cópteros also sent management and maintenance personnel to Fort Worth for training and consultation. Helicópteros received payments drawn on a Houston bank. The Supreme Court was not satisfied. It ruled that without contacts more substantial than those present, Texas could not exercise general jurisdiction. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411, 104 S.Ct. at 1870. In our case, Chaparral maintained fewer contacts with Texas than had Helicópteros.
Helicópteros addressed additional factors which, if present, might support jurisdiction. Those factors include: authorization to do business in Texas, the appointment of an agent for service of process in Texas, solicitation of business in Texas, employees and records based in Texas, real or personal property located in Texas, or signing a contract in Texas. Id. We note that most of those factors are equally absent from our case with the following exceptions: Chaparral advertised in *834a publication reaching parts of Texas and it bought insurance policies that were countersigned by an insurer in Dallas. As in Helicópteros, Chaparral was not authorized to do business in Texas, did not have an agent in Texas for service of process, had no employees based in Texas, kept no records in Texas, and owned no real or personal property in Texas. The only continuous contact would be based on the insurance policies and the contract with Sun to perform work in Texas, under which no work had been performed. The insurance policies were purchased to protect Chaparral. In the event work were ever done in Texas, the policies would be considered continuous. However, the only transaction or act that occurred was the signing of those policies — a single, solitary event. One could consider the coverage to be continuous, but the policies only went into effect when an'employee was in Texas, which was sporadic. Therefore, the contacts, if any, were neither continuous nor systematic. In light of the substantial contacts in Heli-cópteros which were held insufficient to warrant jurisdiction, the contacts based on the insurance policy will not subject Chaparral to jurisdiction in Texas.
The contract with Sun could conceivably be considered' a sufficient minimum contact. However, a contract with an out-of-state party does not, by itself, establish sufficient minimum contacts with the instate forum to allow the exercise of jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2185, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Several other factors such as “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing” must be considered. Id.; see also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). In McGee, jurisdiction was upheld where a suit “was based on a contract which had substantial connection” with the forum state. Id. at 223, 78 S.Ct. at 201. Here, no work was ever done in Texas pursuant to this contract, although the contract left open the possibility that some work could be done in the future. The contract was signed and negotiated in Hobbs, New Mexico, and payment was made to Chaparral in New Mexico. Based on these facts, no continuous and systematic minimum contact occurred because of this contract.
One point that makes this case distinguishable from Helicópteros is that Chaparral solicited business in Texas through advertisements placed in a publication that was distributed in New Mexico and Texas. Chaparral testified that the advertisements were directed to customers outside the Permian Basin area, such as northern New Mexico. This solicitation of business, when coupled with the fact that Chaparral never received any business in Texas from this advertisement, is insufficient to support jurisdiction in Texas.
The only other contact with Texas was the work done during short trips to west Texas. As in Helicópteros, the trips were not systematic, but rather, they were disjointed and sporadic. In Helicópteros, the pilots, management and maintenance personnel made several trips to Fort Worth. The Court held that those trips were a part of the total package which constituted the purchase of the helicopters. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. at 1874. The trips made into Texas by Chaparral were on án “as needed” basis. The record reflects that several months or years would go by between some visits. Since the trips were not planned and a normal routine was not followed for the trips to Texas, the trips cannot be considered systematic contacts with the forum state. Since none of the various meager contacts with Texas were systematic and continuous, general jurisdiction cannot lie over Chaparral in Texas. The majority admits the lack of specific jurisdiction. The case should be dismissed.