Court Opinion

ID: 9570217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:21:09.878437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:07.219438
License: Public Domain

*160Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
Hasty rejected his court-appointed trial counsel just before the commencement of his trial. The trial court made it clear that if Hasty refused to accept the court-appointed counsel, he would be forced to represent himself at the trial. Hasty then informed the trial court that he did not want court-appointed counsel but wanted to hire his own attorney. In order to give Hasty an opportunity to hire a lawyer, the trial court continued the trial from the May calendar to the July calendar. The trial court informed Hasty that he would be tried with hired counsel or “if you don’t have [hired counsel] by July, you will have to represent yourself then.” When the case was called in July, Hasty showed up without counsel, informed the court that he had been unable to hire counsel, and stated that he wanted court-appointed counsel to represent him. The trial court refused to give Hasty new appointed counsel and required Hasty to proceed to trial without the assistance of counsel.
We remanded this case to the trial court in Hasty v. State, 210 Ga. App. 722, 725 (437 SE2d 638) (1993), for a hearing to determine whether Hasty’s lack of representation at trial was attributable to his own lack of diligence. See Shaw v. State, 251 Ga. 109, 111 (303 SE2d 448) (1983); Callaway v. State, 197 Ga. App. 606, 607-608 (398 SE2d 856) (1990). After a hearing on remand, the trial court concluded that Hasty’s lack of representation was due to his own lack of diligence and that no new trial was required.
On appeal, Hasty claims he acted diligently in attempting to hire counsel and that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him a new trial since he did not waive his right to appointed counsel. In reversing the trial court and ordering a new trial, the majority concludes that Hasty is entitled to a new trial because the record does not reflect that he knowingly waived the right to be represented by appointed counsel.
Assuming that Hasty diligently attempted but was unable to hire counsel, his asserted right to a new trial is based on the claim that he was indigent and the trial court erroneously denied his request for court-appointed counsel after he was unable to hire one. Accordingly, the determinative issue in this case is whether Hasty validly waived the right to be represented at trial by appointed counsel.
Although Hasty qualified as an indigent and was given appointed counsel, he rejected his court-appointed counsel when the case was first called for trial. “[A]n indigent criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to discharge one court-appointed attorney and have another substituted in his place. A request of this sort addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 35 (257 SE2d 543) (1979); Turner v. State, 199 Ga. App. 836 (406 SE2d 512) (1991). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by *161informing Hasty that by rejecting his court-appointed counsel, he would be required to represent himself. When informed of this fact, Hasty told the trial court he wanted to hire his own lawyer, and asked for a continuance of the trial to do so. The trial court accommodated Hasty’s request for an opportunity to hire counsel but made clear that by rejecting his court-appointed counsel, Hasty would be required to represent himself in the event he did not obtain hired counsel.
Decided November 9, 1994.
Steven M. Reilly, for appellant.
Britt R. Priddy, District Attorney, Johnnie M. Graham, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The record is adequate to show the trial court found that Hasty’s rejection of court-appointed counsel, along with his request for a continuance to hire counsel, was “the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.” Mercier v. State, 203 Ga. App. 494, 495 (417 SE2d 430) (1992). As to any claim that Hasty was not adequately warned of the dangers of proceeding pro se, the record reflects that the trial court warned Hasty of the difficulty of proceeding pro se and recommended against it. Moreover, “[b]y his very invocation of the right to [hired] counsel at trial, appellant clearly understood and wished to avoid the danger of self-representation.” Burnett v. State, 182 Ga. App. 539, 541 (356 SE2d 231) (1987); compare Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197 (275 SE2d 49) (1981). The trial court properly denied a new trial.