Court Opinion

ID: 9514291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:48:29.689455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:15.878742
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶22] The Department should have been affirmed because there is substantial record evidence to support its decision. Although the majority opinion correctly states the standard of review for a question of law, it ignores the fact that the circuit court specifically overruled findings of fact made by the agency and substituted its own for those of the agency.
This court’s standard of review of administrative appeals is clearly defined. We will overrule an agency’s findings of fact only when they are clearly erroneous. The question is not whether there is substantial evidence contrary to the agency finding, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency finding. In other words, even if there is evidence in the record which tends to contradict the Department’s factual determination, so long as there is some “substantial evidence” in the record which supports the Department’s determination, this court will affirm. Great weight is given to the findings made and inferences drawn by an agency on questions of fact. Conclusions of law are given no deference and are fully reviewable. When reviewing evidence presented by deposition, we do not apply the clearly erroneous standard but review that testimony as though presented here for the first time.
Hendrix v. Graham Tire Co., 520 N.W.2d 876, 878-79 (S.D.1994) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The record is primarily made up of depositions and affidavits:
[w]hen discussing evidence submitted by deposition, this court said: “Since [the deponent] did not appear before the court when testifying we have reviewed his testimony as though presented here in the first instance. Consequently, the clearly erroneous rule ... does not apply. In other words, it is not burdened with a presumption in favor of the trial court’s determination.”
‘With the testimony presented to the trial court [by deposition] there is no presumption in favor of the trial court’s determinations. Accordingly, it is our duty to review the evidence and determine the issues involved as though presented here in the first instance.” In an administrative appeal, the trial court’s decision below is based entirely on the written record from the agency. We are folly as capable of reading the agency record as was the trial court. We therefore review the agency record in the same light as does the trial court to determine whether or not the agency’s decision was clearly erroneous in light of all the evidence in the record.
Application of Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 382 N.W.2d 413, 415-16 (S.D.1986) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Accord First Nat’l Bank of Biwabik, Mn. v. Bank of Lemmon, 535 N.W.2d 866, 871 (S.D.1995) (holding documentary evidence is reviewed de novo).
[¶ 23] The majority adopts the circuit court’s findings of fact, calling them “well reasoned, substantially supported by the evidence and ... persuasive.” ¶ 15. The majority’s approach is wrong — it is not in accordance with our well-settled standard of *198review. Hendrix, supra. The scope of our inquiry should be whether there is “substantial evidence” to support the determination of the Department, not the decision of the circuit court.
[¶ 24] All three physicians who examined Paulson agreed there was no discernible physiological change to his back condition. In Dr. Wayne Anderson’s affidavit, he expressed his opinion that Paulson’s impairment stemmed from his 1989 injury at BHP; furthermore, he pointed out that “[Paulson’s] objective testing before and after his injury in January 27, 1992, was essentially the same. So, I believe that was a transient injury which resolved to his pre-existing condition.” Dr. Alvin Wessel, Jr. also testified by affidavit that “[he did] not feel that the second event involved with lifting the liquor at the Liquor Store exacerbated the back condition beyond what the first injury had already caused him problems with [sic] ... the overall outcome was [not] any worse as a result of the second injury.”
[¶ 25] Finally, Dr. Steven Goff testified by deposition to the following:
1) That there was no evidence of new injury and no evidence of structural change;
2) that the risk of recurrence for Paulson’s initial injury was “quite high;”
3) Paulson showed symptomatic, not mechanical, improvement since the 1989 injury and prior to the 1992 incident;
4) Paulson’s back problem, which resulted from the 1989 BHP injury was never going to go away; it was not curable;
5) “the chances of [Paulson] doing something to increase his symptom level again is high;”
Goff conceded the following:
1) An increase in pain symptoms for the victim of a back injury is possible without a specific triggering event;
2) The lifting incident “obviously was not [the] most important factor in the natural history development of [Paulson’s back] problem;” and that “the natural history of the back problem [could have] led to [the] same ending point;” and finally that
3)he would not have been surprised to see Paulson’s change of symptoms in the absence of any lifting incident.
[¶ 26] The testimony of these three doctors constitutes “substantial evidence” to support the Department’s finding of a recurrence.
[¶27] The circuit court seems to view Goffs hesitation to defer to Wessel’s opinion as pivotal; however, Goff did agree Wessel was in a better position to evaluate, or render an opinion upon, Paulson’s condition. Goffs stated reason for his reluctance to completely defer to Wessel was because- “we might not be comparing the same thing.” Almost in the same breath, Goff testifies the only source either doctor had available from which to draw a conclusion was Paulson’s self-reported symptoms:
Well, what I’m trying to say here is that the — all we have to go on here to decide whether there’s been a worsening of his condition is his symptoms because we don’t have another documentation of it. In other words, we don’t have the documentation that [structural change occurred]. [We have] to base it on what he tells us[.]
[¶ 28] As indicated, the testimony of these three physicians constitutes the requisite “substantial evidence” to affirm the Department’s decision. Therefore, I dissent.