Court Opinion

ID: 9761993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:05:52.417625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:28.973135
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Manderino :
Although I concur that the judgment of sentence should be affirmed, I disagree with the majority’s position that the trial court should be controlled in the matter of charging the jury on voluntary manslaughter, by the wishes of defense counsel for trial strategy purposes or any other purposes. Defense counsel has no right to decide that the jury will not consider voluntary manslaughter.
The Commonwealth, as well as the defendant, has an interest in a proper verdict by the jury. We have consistently held that a jury verdict of voluntary manslaughter in a homicide case is proper even though the jury was not charged on voluntary manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209, 216 A. 2d 337 (1966). It would be illogical and unjust to allow the defendant to eliminate voluntary manslaughter from jury consideration just as we have held it would be illogical and unjust to allow the trial court or the Commonwealth to eliminate such a charge or take the issue of voluntary manslaughter from the jury. See Frazier, supra.
If we say that the trial court properly can take away from the jury the question of voluntary manslaughter in some cases because defense counsel so desires, as a matter of trial strategy, we could not prop*598erly allow a jury verdict of voluntary manslaughter to stand. Yet, the law is clear that even if the jury is not charged on voluntary manslaughter, such a verdict is proper. We cannot give the defendant a right with one hand and take it away with the other and consider the manual dexterity the product of sound jurisprudence.
I very seriously doubt that we would allow a trial judge to withdraw second degree murder from the jury simply because the defendant so requested. The Commonwealth would have a most serious objection that such a limitation on the jury’s options would be unjust to the Commonwealth’s interest, yet the rationale of the majority would of necessity lead to such a result.
That which distinguishes murder from voluntary manslaughter is the element of malice. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 275 Pa. 338, 119 A. 403 (1923); Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 47 A. 2d 445 (1946). The finding of malice means murder Commonwealth v. Simpson, 436 Pa. 459, 260 A. 2d 751 (1970)—the absence of malice and an entry into the area of passion and provocation means voluntary manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Conner, 445 Pa. 36, 282 A. 2d 23 (1971). The thin line of demarcation is, more often than not, invisible. It should always be the scrutinizing vision of twelve jurors that determines the line’s visibility— not the trial court, defense counsel, or prosecutor. Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Myers, 402 Pa. 451, 167 A. 2d 295 (1961); Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A. 2d 661 (1970); Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 441 Pa. 57, 270 A. 2d 195 (1970).
We have also held, and correctly so, that voluntary manslaughter is a proper verdict even in the absence of passion and provocation because a jury may not find malice because of other circumstances in a given case. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 266 A. 2d 726
*599(1970); Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 122 A. 166 (1923); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. & R. 423 (1821). If there is any area of human justice that requires the deliberation and the voice of a jury, it must be the area of decision concerned with the taking of one human life by another. Are the total circumstances surrounding any homicide so simple and neat that a jury should not be given for consideration at least three categories of human culpability—first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter? I think not. Only the jury, not the court, should decide the delicate question of the degree of human culpability in the killing of another human.
In this case, however, the error was not called to the trial court’s attention and no objection was raised to the charge. Unless under the total circumstances of a given case, counsel’s failure to object amounts to the ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant is not entitled to relief. In this case there is no allegation or evidence from which it can be concluded that counsel was ineffective. The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.