Court Opinion

ID: 89093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:57+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:31.880814
License: Public Domain

89 U.S. 641 (____)
22 Wall. 641
UNITED STATES
v.
O'GRADY.
Supreme Court of United States.

*644 Mr. C.H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States, appellant.
*645 Messrs. P. Phillips and T.J. Fuller, contra.
*646 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Judgment was recovered by the claimants for the whole amount of the net proceeds of the cotton in the original suit, and it is not even suggested that the United States filed any set-off or counterclaim in that case, nor would it now make any difference if the claim of set-off or counterclaim had been filed in that case, for if filed and rejected the appropriate remedy of the United States was by appeal to the Supreme Court. Appeal to this court in such a case undoubtedly would lie; nor was that the only remedy left to the United States, as the Court of Claims, on motion, might grant a new trial in such a case, if it appeared that any fraud, wrong, or injustice had been done to the United States.[*]
But the United States did not appeal from the judgment of the Court of Claims, nor does it appear that any application in their behalf was made to that court for a new trial, as expressly authorized by an act of Congress. On the contrary, it appears that the United States acquiesced in the *647 judgment and claimed to deduct from it the amount now in controversy as due to the government for the internal revenue tax. Such a power is not vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, nor in any other executive officer of the government, even if it could be; and it is clear that the judgments of this court, rendered on appeal from the Court of Claims, if no such power is conferred by an act of Congress, are beyond all doubt the final determination of the matter in controversy; and it is equally certain that the judgments of the Court of Claims, where no appeal is taken to this court, are, under existing laws, absolutely conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless a new trial is granted by that court as provided in the beforementioned act of Congress.[*]
By the act of the 3d of March, 1863, it was provided that no money shall be paid out of the treasury for any claim passed upon by the Court of Claims till after an appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury, which provision was of course as applicable to the judgments on appeal, rendered by this court, as to the original judgments rendered by the Court of Claims, as the subject-matter of the suit in either case is one "passed upon by the Court of Claims."[]
Either party by virtue of that act was allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court declined to take jurisdiction of such appeals, chiefly for the reason that the act practically subjected the judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in such cases to the re-examination and revision of the Secretary of the Treasury.[]
Subsequently Congress repealed the provision conferring that authority upon the Secretary of the Treasury, and since that time no doubt has been entertained that it is proper that the Supreme Court should exercise jurisdiction of appeals in such cases.[§]
Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a cause, and inasmuch as the Constitution does not *648 contemplate that there shall be more than one Supreme Court, it is quite clear that Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the re-examination and revision of any other tribunal or any other department of the government.
Opposed to that is the suggestion that the internal revenue tax is a lien upon the property taxed, and that the lien, when the property is sold, is transferred to the proceeds of the sale, as in the case of a maritime lien when the res is sold and the proceeds of the sale have been paid into the registry of the court. Whether that is so or not is not a question in this case; but suppose the question is presented, it is a sufficient answer to the suggestion, that the United States, if they desire to enforce such a right, must seek some other remedy than the one pursued in the case before the court, as it is clear that when such a claim as that preferred by the claimants in the original petition passes into judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction it ceases to be open, under any existing act of Congress, to revision by any one of the executive departments or of all such departments combined. Remedies, such as have been suggested, if seasonable, may be pursued in a proper case, but it will be time enough to decide the question whether any remedy now remains when the question is properly presented.
Should it be suggested that the judgment in question was rendered in the Court of Claims, the answer to the suggestion is that the judgment of the Court of Claims, from which no appeal is taken, is just as conclusive under existing laws as the judgment of the Supreme Court, until it is set aside on a motion for new trial.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  15 Stat. at Large, 75.
[*]  Ex parte Russell, 13 Wallace, 664.
[]  12 Stat. at Large, 768.
[]  Gordon v. United States, 2 Wallace, 561.
[§]  14 Stat. at Large, 9.