Court Opinion

ID: 9369988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 16:00:32.650567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.457521
License: Public Domain

21-2673
   United States v. Hill

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
   City of New York, on the 10th day of February, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:
                    BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
                    RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
                    SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                         Circuit Judges.
   __________________________________________
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                              Appellee,

                   v.                                              No. 21-2673

   MARVIN HILL,

                         Defendant-Appellant.
   __________________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant:              Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender,
                                      Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal Public
                                      Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office,
                                      Syracuse, NY.

For Appellee:                         Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States
                                      Attorney, for Carla B. Freedman, United
                                      States Attorney for the Northern District of
                                      New York, Syracuse, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS    HEREBY     ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED.

      Marvin Hill appeals from the district court’s judgment imposing a

twenty-one-month term of imprisonment with no term of supervised release,

following his guilty plea to one count of escape from the custody of the Bureau of

Prisons (the “BOP”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

      On appeal, Hill challenges only the substantive reasonableness of the

twenty-one-month term of imprisonment imposed by the district court – a

sentence that he completed on December 30, 2022.          See BOP Inmate Locator,

http://www. bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2023); App’x at 33 (providing

Hill’s BOP register number).

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      “Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the federal

judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” United States v. Blackburn, 461 F.3d

259, 261 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2). “So, as a general rule, if

an event occurs during the course of the proceedings or on appeal that makes it

impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief . . . , we must dismiss the

case.” United States v. Chestnut, 989 F.3d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Therefore, in a criminal proceeding, if “the only relief” that a

defendant seeks is to reduce or vacate his sentence – and the defendant “has now

completed that . . . sentence” – we must conclude that “the appeal is moot,” since

“neither we nor the district court can grant him the relief he is seeking.” Id.

      To be sure, “[i]n certain circumstances, an appeal challenging a criminal

sentence will not be rendered moot when the defendant is released from prison so

long as the defendant is still subject to a term of supervision.” Chestnut, 989 F.3d

at 224.   More specifically, “[f]or a term of supervised release to preserve the

presence of a live case or controversy, there must be more than a remote and

speculative possibility that the district court could or would impose a reduced

term of supervised release were we to remand the matter.” Id. at 225 (internal

quotation marks omitted). But here, there is no “possibility that the district court

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could . . . impose a reduced term of supervised release,” since the district court did

not impose any term of supervised release in the first instance. Id. (emphasis

added). Therefore, because it would be “impossible for [us] to grant any effectual

relief . . . to [Hill], we must dismiss the case.” Id. at 224; see also United States v.

Key, 602 F.3d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 2010) (“An appellate challenge to a criminal sentence

is rendered moot when the defendant has been released from prison and when

there is either no possibility or only a remote and speculative possibility that the

district court . . . would impose a reduced term of supervised release.” (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

      We have considered Hill’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal as moot.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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