Court Opinion

ID: 9833285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:35:11.192429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:59.938898
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
I. Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee urges, on motion for rehearing, that articles 769, 770, 771, and 772, Rev. Oiv. Statutes, do not apply to charters adopt- ' ed under the Ho.me Rule Bill, of the General Laws, as contained in article 1096a et seq.; that nothing in said general laws authorizes a city chartered thereunder to sell its water or other products of its public utilities to persons or corporations residing outside of the limits of the city; that in order to have such power, a city must perforce go to the act of the Thirty-First Legislature, 1909, given in the original opinion.
We see no reason why the act of 1909 does not apply io the charter of the city of Sweet-water. By the terms of said act, as shown' in our original opinion, it is provided that the act is applicable to “all towns or cities of the state of Texas, which may have been or may hereafter be chartered or organized under the General Laws of Texas or by special act or charter,” etc.
Certainly, no broader terms of application could be used. The charter of the city of Sweetwater was adopted December 18, 1913, after the act of 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 147 [Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Giv. St. 1914, arts. 1096a -1096i]) took effect, and, of course, long aft-' er the act of 1909 took effect. The charter of Sweetwater provides, in article I, that the municipality shall have “such powers, rights, privileges and duties ms are allowed by Géneral Laws, and such as are hereinafter provided.” Certainly, the acts of 1909 and 1913, aforementioned, were part of the “General Laws,” and it was the intention and purpose so expressed that the municipality should have all the pbwers conferred by each of those acts, if not inconsistent. We believe that the act of 1909, as well as the act of 1913, applies. Quinlan v. H. & T. C. Ry. Co., 89 Tex. 356, 34 S. W. 738; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Weatherby, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 409, 92 S. W. 58. Therefore we overrule appel-lee’s motion for rehearing.
II. Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants urge, with much vigor and evidence of considerable research, that inasmuch as a municipality has a dual capacity, • i. e., a governmental capacity and a proprietary capacity, and inasmuch as it is conceded that it has the right to sell the surplus water to persons residing outside the city limits,t that in its proprietary capacity it has the right and authority to extend its mains beyond such limits for the purpose of furnishing water to its nonresident custom- ■ ers; ,that the right to sell the water carries with it the right to furnish the means, oí conveyance to the purchasers. A number of authorities are cited, among which are City *197of Galveston v. Loonie, 54 Tex. 517; Brennan v. Weatherford, 53 Tex. 330, 37 Am. Rep. 758; Tone v. Tillamook City, 58 Or. 382, 114 Pac. 938; Esberg Cigar Co. v. Portland, 34 Or. 282, 55 Pac. 961, 43 L. R. A. 435, 75 Am. St. Rep. 651; Canavan v. Mechanicsville, 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882, 13 A. L. R. 1123; Vilas v. Manila, 220 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 416, 55 L. Ed. 491; Omaha Water Co. v. City of Omaha; 147 Fed. 1, 77 C. C. A. 267, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614; Andrews v. South Haven, 187 Mich. 294, 153 N. W. 827, L. R. A. 1916A, 908, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 100; 28 Cyc. 263, 265, 266.
We will briefly discuss some of these decisions. We do not find any expressions in the two cases by our Supreme Court, cited by appellee, contrary to our holding in the instant case. In the case of Brennan v. City of Weatherford et al., supra, the court did hold that a more liberal rule of construction is allowed in favor of public charters granted for the general good than in private charters granted for individual gain, and with this doctrine we agree. But we do not think in our original opinion we applied a rule contrary to this. In City of Galveston v. Loonie, it is said that the express power being granted the city to construct sidewalks, for which the lot was ultimately responsible, the city had the implied authority to contract such obligations as were necessary to execute the power. With this announcement we concur. But we do not believe that the deduction made by appellants follows. The appellants urge that since the Home Rule Bill expressly grants to cities and towns the authority to sell its surplus water to person residing outside their limits that there is an implied power granted the city to convey such water to the residences or plants of such.nonresident users. We think a reasonable construction of the Home Rule Bill shows that it was not the intention of thd Legislature to empower cities chartered under the provisions of this act to construct and maintain water mains to nonresident users, but that it is evident from such act that it intended that the nonresident users should pay for the construction and maintenance of the means of conveyance outside of the city, with the power of supervision reserved to the city, to see that' such mains were constructed and maintained in a way to preserve the rights of the city.
Tone v. Tillamook City, 58 Or. 382, 114 Pac. 938, involved the question of whether the covenant of the city, given in consideration of an easement across the land of plaintiffs’ assignors or grantors for the laying of the city’s water mains (evidently the mains to the city from the source of supply), was enforceable. There was no question involved as to the power of the city to extend its mains to furnish water to nonresident users. Johnson City v. Weeks et al., 133 Tenn. 277, 180 S. W. 327, 3 A. L. R. 1431, involved the question of taxation by the county of a pipe line constructed by the city from its limits to the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. The home was situated partly within and partly ..without the city. The Legislature of Tennessee had granted the right to Johnson City to “own and operate a system of waterwprks for said city and adjacent territory.” The court held that the home and its lands were “adjacent territory,” and upheld the claims of the city that the pipe line was exempt from taxation.
We shall not extend this opinion by a further consideration of the eases cited by appellants, but believe our disposition of the issues involved in our original opinion was correct. Therefore appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled.