Court Opinion

ID: 9617001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:51:21.828424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:04.526171
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that it is possible to distinguish Sherbert v. Verner from the case at bar. However, I do not think Sherbert ought to be so distinguished.
First, it begs the question to suggest that the petitioner’s religious conversion was untimely. The choice of a religious faith is rarely capricious, and here, the petitioner’s sincerity has not been questioned.
Second, in my view, the ability of CF&I to accommodate petitioner’s beliefs is not legally significant. I cannot weigh the interest of CF&I against the petitioner’s constitutional right to the free exercise of his religious beliefs. Third, I perceive no reason for requiring a converse statute which discriminates favorably to those with contrary religious views.
*742And finally, the issue of petitioner’s availability for other employment was not litigated in this case, nor was it decided by the administrative body. Accordingly, I cannot afford this factor any constitutional importance.
I would rule that the petitioner’s “personal reason” for quitting his employment is protected by the First Amendment. Cf. Everitt Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 39 Colo.App. 336, 565 P.2d 967 (1977). In my view, it demeans the free exercise clause to declare a person’s fundamental right to religious belief, while attaching a penalty to its exercise.