Court Opinion

ID: 9760059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:39:40.54612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:07.981341
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
In suspending respondent for two years, the majority treats the matter too lightly. In recommending disbarment, however, the Board on Professional Responsibility “would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct.” D.C.App.R. XI, § 7(3).1 For the reasons that follow, I would suspend respondent from the practice of law for at least three years.
I.
I begin with the proposition that our standard of review in Rule XI, § 7(3), ante at 1361, calls for substantial deference to the Board:
[T]he rule endorses the Board’s exercise of broad discretion in handing out discipline that is subject only to a general review for abuse in that discretion’s exercise. The rule requires that we enforce a general sense of equality in the sanctions handed out, but it otherwise commands that we should respect the Board’s sense of equity in these matters unless that exercise of judgment proves to be unreasonable. [In re Haupt, D.C.App., 422 A.2d 768, 771 (1980) (per curiam) (Haupt I)-]
Thus, while dispositions must not be inconsistent, we have adopted a rough approximation standard, giving due weight to the Board’s expertise and, of considerable significance, to the Board’s opportunity to ob*1367serve demeanor. Such deference is especially important for cases in which the Board confronts an attorney with a prior disciplinary record and thus is likely to have a special sense of the most appropriate sanction the second or third time around.
I stress our deferential standard of review because, in In re Fogel, D.C.App., 422 A.2d 966 (1980) (per curiam), which the majority emphasizes, we deferred to the Board’s recommendation of a year-and-a-day suspension even though, when compared with other cases, we might well have imposed a greater discipline. Our standard of review, therefore, likewise implies that when we receive such a strong recommendation as we have here — disbarment—we have a substantial burden to justify our own imposition of a lesser sanction, especially one as low as two years. See In re Whitlock, D.C.App., 441 A.2d 989, 991-92 (1982) (per curiam) (in two cases, Board’s aggregate recommendation of one-year suspension reduced to six months).
Consistent with the required deference, I agree with my colleagues in the majority that disbarment is unwarranted here. Aside from two unreported disbarment orders — one in 19752 when our disciplinary system was relatively new and the other in 19803 based on reciprocal discipline — we have not ordered disbarment for the level of noncriminal misconduct found in this case. Precedent indicates that to avoid inconsistency with the pattern of previous dispositions, even roughly defined, the Board should have recommended a sanction less than disbarment. By imposing a suspension of only two years, however, the majority of this court overreacts. The court is too lenient.
II.
In re Fogel, supra, the year-and-a-day suspension case that the majority calls “most closely on point,” ante at 1361, is a single-incident, neglect-of-appeal case in which the respondent attorney made certain misrepresentations to his client, the court, and the Hearing Committee. The respondent, moreover, had received a previous reprimand, as well as unexplained discipline in Virginia. Id. 422 A.2d at 967. The present case also is a single-incident neglect case; it arises out of a plaintiff’s personal injury action in which respondent misrepresented the situation to his client and to Bar Counsel. Like Fogel, respondent Sheehy has been subject to previous discipline: a reprimand (for neglect and misrepresentation) and an informal admonition (for neglect).
The similarity stops there, however, for the present case is more egregious than Fogel in three significant respects: First, respondent Sheehy’s neglect resulted in the loss of his client’s opportunity to litigate, for he permitted the statute of limitations to expire. In contrast, Fogel was replaced by other court-appointed counsel, without prejudice to the client’s opportunity to pursue his appeal (which he ultimately lost). Id. at 967 n. 1. Second, while Fogel fabricated excuses for failures to appear in court, respondent Sheehy fabricated a complete coverup directed at his client and Bar Counsel, replete with purported negotiations, settlement, and use of respondent’s own funds as supposed payment from the opposing party. Finally, unlike Fogel, respondent harassed an innocent third person, initially suing his client’s doctor (in a last minute effort to toll the running of the statute of limitations) when respondent “was fully aware” that the doctor was not the driver of the automobile. Ante at 1363. In sum, the severity of the deception, the prejudice to the client, and the exploitation of an innocent third person comprise substantially greater misconduct here than that found in Fogel, supra.
Another case, reflecting a disposition closer to the one ordered by the majority, is In re Smith, D.C.App., 403 A.2d 296 (1979), in which we adopted the Board’s recommendation of an 18-month suspension coupled with an order to make restitution of $280. *1368There, the respondent neglected a case in which he had agreed to investigate whether the client’s deceased father had left any assets. He accepted a retainer, knowing after preliminary investigation that the father’s assets were insufficient to warrant proceeding further. The respondent also abandoned a landlord-tenant case, resulting in a default judgment against his client and her eventual eviction. Although Smith concerned two cases of misrepresentation/neglect and abandonment, respectively, respondent Sheehy’s conduct here is altogether more egregious, given his misrepresentations both to his client and to Bar Counsel, the severe prejudice to this client, his harassment of an innocent doctor, and his record of previous discipline.
As I see it, the most useful case for our purposes here is Haupt I, supra, where this court adopted the Board’s recommendation of a three-year suspension for two counts of misconduct. First, counsel intentionally failed to pursue a divorce for his client while twice obtaining the fee for publication, deceiving his client by saying he “would have her divorce by Christmas,” id. 422 A.2d at 770, and falsely representing to Bar Counsel that “he had not received money for publication and that the divorce complaint had been reinstated.” Id. Second, counsel misrepresented to a Maryland sheriff that the fianceé of an incarcerated juvenile client was actually counsel’s assistant, as a ruse to obtain permission for her entry to the cellblock. Id. This pattern of misconduct was compounded by 30- and 90-day suspensions in Maryland and a 30-day suspension and informal admonition in the District of Columbia. Id. at 771 n. 2.
Respondent Sheehy not only is responsible for misrepresentations at least as serious as those in Haupt I, supra, but also more seriously has prejudiced his client (through the running of the statute of limitations) as well as an innocent third party (the client’s doctor whom respondent knowingly sued without a legitimate basis). These latter factors, coupled with the Board’s clear sense that the heaviest possible sanction is called for here, combine to offset the fact that respondent’s prior disciplinary record does not appear to be as serious as Haupt’s three previous suspensions.
Were it not for this court’s (and the Board’s) more recent cases, our decision in In re Duesterdick, D.C.App., (No. D-9-75, Aug. 15, 1975) (unreported disbarment) probably would be controlling; for, as the Board noted, Duesterdick — in a case very similar to this one — was disbarred for permitting the statute of limitations to run on his client’s personal injury claim and for falsely stating both to his client and to an Inquiry Committee of the Board that the claim had been settled. However, the newer disciplinary perspective supplied by the dispositions summarized above and in the majority opinion, ante at 1361-1362, when compared with our latest disbarments for noncriminal conduct, reveals that the most severe sanction typically has been reserved for a more extreme pattern of ethical violations than we have here. See, e.g., In re Haupt, D.C.App., 444 A.2d 317 (1982) (en banc) (per curiam) (Haupt II) (disbarment for “pattern of neglect and wilfull disregard of ethical and legal duties” concerning twelve clients); In re Burka, D.C.App., 423 A.2d 181 (1980) (en banc) (disbarment for two-year pattern of conservator’s dishonest and deceitful use of ward’s assets); cf. In re Willcher, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 185 (1979) (five-year suspension for neglect of ten matters, excessive fees, and failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel, mitigated by a debilitated mental condition).4 Respondent’s major misconduct here, coupled with his similar, though perhaps lesser lapses in the past, does not rise to the pattern of noncriminal misconduct typically required for disbarment.
Accordingly, with a view to consistency rather than a tilt toward a general lowering *1369of disciplinary standards, I believe this court should order no less than a three-year suspension of respondent Sheehy.
III.
In focusing on the policy of consistency with previous dispositions, I recognize that consistency will be ill-advised if applied too rigidly, in a way that forever precludes our raising or lowering the disciplinary floor. If the experience of the Board and this court were to indicate that the progression of disciplinary sanctions, as applied, has been too light or too heavy, we must be able to reset that progression at a higher or lower level. But the Board should recommend it, and we should do it, in a straightforward manner, not incrementally under the guise of purported consistency. I would be open to disbarment on a record such as this if done openly as part of an upward realignment of disciplinary standards.
What I fear is that the majority disposition here will be read as a signal for a general lowering of disciplinary standards, just as the Board’s proposed disbarment, if adopted, could be read as an indirect effort to raise standards. Neither reading would be correct, for I understand both the majority of this court and Board to be premising their respective dispositions on consistency with the past. Given Duesterdick, supra, the Board and my dissenting colleagues at least have solid authority for what they propose. I perceive in the majority’s approach a reliance on cases such as Fogel, supra, and Smith, supra, to drop the sanction too low. In Haupt I, supra, I find strong support for a three-year suspension. Respectfully, therefore, I dissent.

. I cannot agree with my other colleagues in dissent who would treat this matter, in effect, as a disbarment by consent. The fact is, respondent did not consent, see D.C.App.R. XI, § 17; he put the Board to its proof. There are many reasons why an attorney may choose not to appear to defend in this court. Failure to appear, therefore, should not be deemed, automatically, to imply indifference let alone consent to whatever happens.

. In re Duesterdick, D.C.App. (No. D-9-75, Aug. 15, 1975).

. In re Spencer, D.C.App., (No. M-30-78/D-36-80, Feb. 13, 1980).

. A five-year suspension is virtually equivalent to disbarment, for unless convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, In re Kerr, D.C.App., 424 A.2d 94 (1980) (en banc), a disbarred lawyer may petition for reinstatement after the “expiration of at least five years from the effective date of the disbarment." D.C.App.R. XI, § 21(2).