Court Opinion

ID: 9595094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:35:41.944768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:57:58.722342
License: Public Domain

Reid, J.
(dissenting in part). I agree with Chief Justice Dethmers that there can be no discovery in this type'óf case.
I do not agree that there should be no injunction forbidding the receiving and transmitting of money (in Michigan) to be placed on bets outside of the State. Such illegal acts described in the statute as are committed within the State, the equity court has jurisdiction to enjoin.
The section of the act in question (CL 1948, § 692.-251 [Stat Ann § 18.901]) is as follows:
“Any building, vehicle or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, or used for.the unlawful manufacture, storing, possessing, transporting, sale, keeping’ for sale, giving away, bartering, furnishing or otherwise disposing of any vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous or intoxicating liquors or any mixed liquors or beverages, any part of which is intoxicating, is hereby declared a nuisance and the furniture, fixtures and contents of any such building, vehicle or place, and all such intoxicating liquors therein are also declared a nuisance and all *96such nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as hereinafter provided. Any person, or his servant, agent or employee who shall own, lease, conduct or maintain any building, ■vehicle or place used for any of the purposes or by any of the persons above set forth or where any of the acts above enumerated are conducted, permitted or carried on, is guilty of a nuisance.” (Italics supplied.)*
We have heretofore properly and by necessary inference construed and applied this statute as to the meaning of the phrase, “used for the purpose of,” as including acts and uses of property before effectuation of the forbidden purpose.
In People, ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney, v. Tate, 306 Mich 667, we say (per syllabus):
. “Decree of -trial court in suit to abate a nuisance and confiscate car used in gambling operations, whereby car was impounded for 5 months and owner restrained from loaning it to party using it when it was seized, is affirmed.”
.. There is nothing in the Tate Case to show that the car was the place where the bet was completed. The contrary is implied.
.. In People, ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney, v. Sill, 310 Mich 570, a chancery proceeding brought under the act in question in this case, to abate a nuisance, we upheld a decree which adjudicated that an automobile used by its owner in transporting mutuel bet slips, was a nuisance, and that it be sold by the sheriff. There was no claim or showing that any bet was perfected in the automobile. While the owner of the car was transporting the mutuel bet slips, the bets very evidently were not yet accomplished. It is fair to deduce that the automobile was merely used for the purpose of bringing about a bet.
*97In the Sill Case, at page 575, we say:
“The method by which the ‘numbers racket’ operates appears in People, ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney, v. Bitonti, 306 Mich 115; and People, ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney, v. Tate, 306 Mich 667. The use of automobiles as essential tools in this type of gambling is generally recognized. The purpose of PA 1925, No 389, is to eliminate effectively, by statutory procedure, the use of property, real or personal, in connection with gambling, prostitution, and illicit sale of liquor, et cetera.”
In the instant case, it is likewise apparent that the telegraph office was used in connection with gambling, and such use' was an indispensable part in the consummation of this type of gambling transaction. The property was an “essential tool” used for the purpose of gambling, and clearly falls within the purview of the statute.
The remedies in the first part of the section are the remedies of injunction and confiscation and are aimed at prevention of illegal use of property. The construction of the section as contended for in this opinion is eminently appropriate as a basis for injunction, for the purpose of prevention. We have upheld the constitutionality of this act as far as concerns its provisions for injunction. People, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Donovan, 228 Mich 520; People, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Holschuh, 235 Mich 272 (syllabus 5).
The words in the first line of the section in question, “used for the purpose of,” clearly and unmistakably apply not only to “building” or “place” but also to the word “vehicle.” As to the offense of gambling, it is very apparent that the use of a vehicle in gambling is an accessory use and the vehicle is not the place where the completed offense occurs. It is necessary to conclude that the legislature in*98tended the words “used for the purpose of” to include both meanings, i.e., used to bring about an effectuated purpose and used in pursuance of a purpose not as yet, if ever, effectuated.
The inclusiveness of the meaning of the words “used for the purpose of” is illustrated in the 2 cases, People, ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney, v. Sill and People, ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney, v. Tate, supra. The meaning which the Chief Justice would exclude, has been recognized, used and applied by us in those 2 cases hereinbefore noted. The statute does not recite that the purpose must have become fulfilled or effectuated.
Not in the Tate Case nor in the Sill Case, did this Court by corollary or otherwise base its decision in whole or in part on CL 1948, § 750.306 (Stat Ann § 28.538), which declares the gambling paraphernalia such as was contained in the vehicles to be a common nuisance. Decision in each of those 2 cases was based upon our construction of the statute in question in this case.
The Chief Justice cites Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. City of Lansing, 291 Mich 589, in support of the theory that the interstate commerce duties of defendant as common carrier, required defendant to accept and deliver moneys and messages in gambling transactions ; but in that case, the slot machines had been shipped from Baltimore, Maryland, and were in course of interstate commerce when received by the Grand Trunk Railway and until delivered to the consignee. That situation was totally different from the instant case in which the money and messages relating thereto had not as yet been placed in interstate commerce when offered to defendant for transmission. There was no duty nor right on the part of defendant Western Union in the instant case, to repeine money nor message, to be transmitted for gambling purposes.
*99“The majority of the eases support the rule applied in the reported case (Wiggins v. Postal Telegraph Co., ante [44 ALR] 781 [130 SC 292, 125 SE 568]), that a telegraph company is not liable for negligence in connection with the transmission of telegrams which relate to gambling transactions.” 44 ALE 783, citing many cases, including Carland v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 118 Mich 369 (43 LRA 280, 74 Am St Rep 394).
In the Carlancl Case, we say, pages 377, 378:
“It is contended further that this telegram was sent in furtherance of a gambling contract, which would have been void under the statute, and that damages for a failure to deliver it cannot be recovered. How Stat § 9354f, prohibits the purchase and sale of grain, et cetera, on margins for future or optional delivery, without any intention of receiving or paying for the property so bought or sold. If this claim were conclusively proved, so that we could find the fact as alleged, we should have no doubt that the plaintiff’s action must fail.”
“Therefore, if Mo ES 1909, § 7227 makes it unlawful for a common carrier to keep, store, and deliver a consignment of pure alcohol to a licensed druggist and pharmacist in a local option community to be used in the preparation of tinctures and prescriptions, then the carrier may, no doubt, refuse to accept such consignment for shipment. State, ex rel. Gibson, v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Mo App), 191 SW 1051; State, ex rel. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., v. Woolfolk, 269 Mo 389 (190 SW 877).” Gum v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Mo App), 198 SW 494, 496.
“Where a brewing company proffers intoxicating liquors to a railroad for carriage into Indian Territory, where the introduction of such liquors is prohibited by the State Constitution, the road’s refusal to carry is justified.” Leisy Brewing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 141 CCA 3 (225 F 753) (per syllabus 2).
*100See,, also, Melchert v. American Union Telegraph Co., 11 F 193, where damages were claimed because of the claimed negligence of defendant relating to transmitting a telegram from Davenport, Iowa, to Chicago, Illinois, for a proposed transaction amounting in effect to gambling; the proposed contracts being void, judgment was given defendant.
In its answer defendant in the trial court raised the defense of its status under the interstate commerce clause, but made no mention of such matter in its reasons and grounds for appeal, nor in its statement in its brief of the questions involved in this Court, and may be said to have abandoned that defense.
In the instant case, the bill charges and the answer admits that defendant in its telegraph office received and transmitted by wire certain moneys for the purpose of completing specified bets in Illinois.
Defendant in its brief goes even further and states, “Offers to wager are freely sent and received every day, sometimes involving football games, sometimes baseball games, sometimes stock market transactions, sometimes horse races.” The 2 admitted specific instances charged in the bill are in practical effect admitted to be but particular instances of an habitual practice of defendant.
The necessity and basis for a temporary injunction in the instant case is shown and the temporary injunctive order against defendant’s permitting its 2 offices in Washtenaw county, mentioned in the bill of complaint, to be used in receiving or transmitting money or offers for use in gambling operations or to effectuate betting to be elsewhere completed should be to that extent only affirmed. The case should be remanded to the trial court for an immediate hearing as far as found necessary, after time for rehearing *101in this Court has elapsed. No costs, neither party having prevailed in full.
Boyles, J., concurred with Reid, J.
The late Justice North did not participate in this decision.

 For another statute concerning gambling and place and apparatus used in gambling, see CL 1948, § 750.302 (Stat Ann § 28.534).