Court Opinion

ID: 9491761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:23:06.169875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:55.915388
License: Public Domain

CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
At oral argument, we tested the outer limits of the waiver of sovereign immunity that the court endorses today for suits on contracts that further the purposes of the Reclamation Reform Act. There are none. Every contract the government enters into concerning activity that promotes the interests of all federal reclamation law — whether for office supplies at WAPA, or to have a WAPA building painted, virtually any contract that WAPA signs — carries a waiver of sovereign immunity.
For this reason — the boundless waiver that moots the Contract Disputes Act of 1978— the government seeks a narrower and more reasonable waiver. I agree with the government.
It is of course true that section 390uu describes a waiver for “any” contract suit, but, as the court candidly notes, the authors of the Reclamation Reform Act took care to provide a specific definition of the term “contract”:
As used in this subehapter [including in section 390uu, the home of the broad waiver adopted by the court]:
(1) The term “contract” means any repayment or water service contract between the United States and a district providing for the payment of construction charges to the United States including normal operation, maintenance, and replacement costs pursuant to Federal reclamation law.
43 U.S.C. § 390bb(1) (1994).
Whether this suit can go forward in the United States District Court depends upon whether the broad waiver in section 390uu is, or is not, limited by the express definition of contract written in section 390bb(l). Jurisdiction in the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act cannot lie when an adequate remedy is available elsewhere, as it is in this case, in the United States Court of Federal Claims.
We are instructed'that “[w]aivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be ‘unequivocally expressed.’ ” United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S, 30, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (further citations omitted)). A waiver is to be “strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (citation omitted).- Further, when a waiver provision can be interpreted reasonably in more than one way, we cannot say that the waiver has been unequivocally expressed. See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011.
*1342I could stop here, because, to my mind, when it takes several pages to explain why the court prefers the broad waiver in section 390uu to the narrower waiver commanded by section 390bb(l), the broad waiver fails the “unequivocal” test. But there is more.
In the broad waiver provision, the Congress also provided that “[a]ny suit pursuant to this section may be brought in any United States district court in the State in which the land involved is situated.” 43 U.S.C. § 390uu (1994). As the Government demonstrates in its brief, this provision makes no sense when one is concerned with the WAPA contract for office supplies. There is no “land involved” in such a suit, nor is there any land involved in this power supply suit. Land, however, is necessarily involved in suits between irrigation contractors and the United States.
Finally, I think it makes sense that Congress would restrict the waiver of sovereign immunity to the contracts identified in section 390bb(l). As I understand the relevant federal reclamation law, the Government pays for a massive public works project that will supply water where needed. The Government then enters into contracts with the beneficiaries of the public works project that are designed to reimburse the Government through repayment or water service terms. For such matters, the Government is a provider of services to the public, and the Government waives its sovereign immunity to suit in case of disagreements between the Government and the contracting parties, for otherwise, the public would be without recourse.
Other matters, such as the contract in this case, involve the supply of services by the public to the Government as purchaser. I see a principled distinction between the two kinds of contracts, and perceive no need for a boundless waiver of sovereign immunity with regal'd to the latter. I think that contracts for the supply of services or products to the United States should be adjudicated under the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Contact Disputes Act, unless the Congress has expressly conferred a waiver elsewhere. When I apply the required canons of construction for waivers of sovereign immunity, I am driven to the conclusion that the court is wrong in this case. The motion to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims should have been granted.
I respectfully dissent.