Court Opinion

ID: 9896177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 17:10:17.607453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:10.856395
License: Public Domain

J-S35031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.R.S., A                :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: Q.L.W., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :    No. 827 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered May 9, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
                                2023-0058

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                          FILED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023

       Q.L.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the May 9, 2023 decree of the orphans’

court terminating her parental rights to M.R.S., born in June 2021 (“Child”).

After careful review, we affirm the decree.

       Child first came to the attention of the York County Office of Children,

Youth, and Families (“the Agency”) on September 6, 2022 when the Agency

received a referral regarding concerning behavior by Mother that placed Child

at risk. As explained by an Agency caseworker at the May 9, 2023 hearing,

       Specifically, there were allegations that the police had responded
       to a store where it was reported that [Mother] had been
       shoplifting. Mother had [Child] in her custody at that time and
       had been observed out walking in the rain with [Child]. Police
       attempted to secure shelter for Mother and [C]hild. However,
       there were not available shelters. The [A]gency later learned that
       Mother had been staying at the Days Inn and was advised to
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S35031-23

       return there. Mother did not return to the Days Inn[,] and [she]
       was later located walking the streets with [C]hild. They were
       taken by ambulance to York Hospital. Mother was involuntarily
       committed . . . [and Child] was examined and determined to be
       in good health and not need[ing] hospitalization. While at the
       hospital, Mother told hospital personnel that she believed her
       daughter was dead.

N.T., 5/9/23, at 22.

       An application for emergency protective custody of Child was filed by

the Agency on September 7, 2022. At the time that the application was filed,

Child’s father, S.S.S. (“Father”), could not be located, although the Agency

later discovered that he was residing at York County Prison.1 Child was placed

in kinship care as of the date of the September 7 hearing. On September 9,

2022, the orphans’ court issued a shelter care order finding that return of

Child to Mother or Father was not in her best interest. A dependency petition

was filed by the Agency, and Child was adjudicated dependent on September

15, 2022. While it is not entirely clear from the record whether Child was

immediately placed in the care of her maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”),

Child has resided with Grandmother for the majority, if not all, of the time

since her removal from Mother’s care.            Grandmother is a pre-adoptive

resource for Child.

       Status review hearings were held on December 21, 2022, and February

17, 2023.     On March 21, 2023, the Agency filed a petition for involuntary

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court noted in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that Father
remained in detention on charges of, inter alia, rape by forcible compulsion.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 7 n.2.

                                           -2-
J-S35031-23

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. On May 9, 2023, the

orphans’ court conducted a status review hearing and then proceeded to a

hearing on the termination petition. Agency caseworker and intake manager

Patricia Neiderer, Grandmother, and Mother testified at the hearing.         Child

was represented by legal interests counsel, as well as a separate guardian ad

litem (“GAL”), in the termination proceedings.        See In re Adoption of

K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (holding that appellate courts should

engage in sua sponte review to determine if orphans’ court appointed legal

interest counsel to represent children in contested termination proceedings).

Additionally at the hearing, Father consented to Child’s adoption and the

voluntarily relinquishment of his parental rights.2    Orphans’ Court Opinion,

7/10/23, at 7; N.T., 5/9/23, at 7, 16-18; Consent by Parent of Adoptee,

6/12/23.

       The   orphans’     court   comprehensively   summarized   the   testimony

presented at the May 9, 2023 hearing in its opinion:

       At [the] status review hearing on May 9, 2023, Patricia Neiderer,
       [] testified that Mother was re-hospitalized, again via involuntary
       commitment, at Massachusetts General Hospital, due to mental
       health concerns, from February 11[,] 2023 to March 17[,] 2023;
       however, as of the termination hearing, Mother was living in the
       home of her [great-]aunt[]. [N.T., 5/9/23,] at 4. Mother reported
       that she was receiving medication management through Philhaven
       [], which had not been responsive to releases to obtain records.

____________________________________________

2 Father has not withdrawn his consent, nor has he filed an appeal.    Orphans’
Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 7 n.3.

                                           -3-
J-S35031-23

     Id. Mother was employed at [a hotel] but was hoping to move to
     [a packaging company] to obtain more regular hours. Id. . . .

     In spite of Mother’s hospital stay at Massachusetts General being
     involuntary, Mother [has] refused mental health case
     management. Id. at 5. Ms. Neiderer had been unable to confirm
     Mother’s claim that she was continuing her medicine management
     through Philhaven. Id. Questioned by the [orphans’ c]ourt, Ms.
     Neiderer testified that[] Mother came out of involuntary
     commitment, took her medicine, and refused mental health
     treatment, which is a pattern that Mother has followed throughout
     this case. Id. at 12.

     Mother was not visiting with [C]hild [through the Agency], as
     visits were discontinued prior to Mother’s second involuntary
     hospitalization. Id. at 5. [On] May 1, 2023, Mother requested
     visits; however, [] despite no contact with Ms. Neiderer from
     Mother’s hospital discharge on March 17, 2023, until May 1, 2023,
     Mother had no contact with Ms. Neiderer and did not request visits
     in the interim. Id. at 5-6. Mother’s last visit with [C]hild was
     December 8, 2022. Id. at 11.

     . . . Ms. Neiderer was unaware if Mother had contacted the prior
     caseworker regarding visits at any prior time. Id. at 10. Despite
     there being a process for Mother to see [C]hild, in which Mother
     only needed to contact a caseworker to request visitation, there
     were no records [of such a request], which . . . the caseworker
     [would have been] responsible to log, [if] such a request [was
     made]. Id. at 35-36. During cross-examination by Mother’s
     counsel, it was established that, during a period of Mother’s
     incarceration, Mother had requested visitation; however, Mother
     was not undergoing mental health treatment in the prison and the
     caseworker reported Mother was not in a position to visit. Id. at
     43.

     Ms. Neiderer testified that she was informed by Hugh Smith and
     Associates, who were performing Mother’s parenting capacity
     assessment, that, as of the hearing, there were yet to be any
     verbal recommendations. Id. at 10-11. The assessment had
     been performed the week prior on May 4, 2023. Id. at 11.

     [According to Ms. Neiderer, Child] was doing well in the kinship
     home of her [Grandmother, who is a pre-adoptive resource for
     Child]. Id. at 7. . . . The [A]gency recommended that [Child]
     remain in the custody and care of Grandmother [] and that
     [Child’s] parents’ rights be terminated. Id. . . .

                                   -4-
J-S35031-23

     Following a recess, the [orphans’ c]ourt convened a termination
     of parental rights hearing on May 9, 2023. Id. at 13. The
     testimony of the status review hearing was incorporated into the
     dependency matter and termination of parental rights hearing.
     Id. at 15. Ms. Neiderer was called and [testified that, although]
     she was not assigned the case until April 21, 2023, [she] managed
     the previously assigned caseworker and had been supervising the
     case since September 6, 2022. Id. at [20-]21.

     [Ms. Neiderer stated that, after Mother’s involuntary commitment
     on September 6, 2022, no] protective services were offered to
     Mother due to the need for emergency mental health placement.
     Id. at 22-23.      Likewise, the [A]gency did not attempt to
     [implement a] safety plan with Mother prior to placing [C]hild, . .
     . due to Mother’s mental state at the time. Id. at 23. At the time,
     the [A]gency was unsure where Father was; Father was later
     located at York County Prison. Id. On September 6, 2022, the
     [A]gency sought and was granted emergency protective custody
     and [Child] remained in placement from September 6, 2022,
     which, as of the hearing, amounted to some eight months. Id.
     [Child] was adjudicated dependent and remained so and, by the
     time of the hearing, [Child] had been dependent approximately
     eight months. Id. at 23-24.

     Family service plans were created[,] and Mother’s goals were to
     address mental health, cooperate with the [A]gency, and to
     cooperate with an in-home team. Id. at 24. Mother did not
     cooperate with an in-home team. Id. The only treatment that
     Ms. Neiderer was aware of Mother being in, as of the termination
     hearing, was Mother’s self-reported medication management
     through Philhaven and Ms. Neiderer was unaware of any [other]
     mental health treatment being received by Mother. Id. at 25. As
     for her goals, Mother completed a psychiatric [examination]
     during her second involuntary commitment and completed her
     parenting capacity evaluation on May 4, 2023 . . . Id. Mother
     had not made any progress in addressing her mental health as
     she simply kept repeating a pattern of getting back on medication
     after a period of inpatient hospitalization, doing well for a brief
     period of time, going off her medication, and needing to be re-
     hospitalized. Id.

     Evidencing a long history of mental health concerns, during a
     scheduled visit on November 1, 2022, Mother forced herself into
     a[n Agency] van during transport, was dropped off at maternal
     [G]randmother’s house, and then walked back to the daycare and

                                    -5-
J-S35031-23

     picked up [Child]. Id. at 26[, 40]. Mother then proceeded to York
     Hospital[, Grandmother’s place of employment,] and proclaimed
     that she was there to pick up Grandmother[]’s body, because she
     was dead, and that this was why Mother picked up [C]hild from
     daycare. Id. at 40.

     By way of further example, on December 7, 2022, Mother sent
     Grandmother [] nonsensical text messages claiming that
     Grandmother was being watched by the F.B.I., that Grandmother
     was torturing [Child], and stating Grandmother was the devil. Id.
     at 26. Police responded and found [Child] to be safe and
     unharmed. Id. Mother’s behavior seems only to have grown
     more erratic from this point on.

     On February 3, 2023, id. at 41, Mother began sending voice and
     text messages to the caseworker alleging Grandmother was
     withholding [C]hild from Mother, which[ led to] the caseworker
     and [GAL], fearing for [Child’s] safety, cancel[ing] upcoming
     visitations. Id. at 26-27. [On February 7,] Mother [] showed up
     at Grandmother’s home and let herself in and, eventually, heeded
     Grandmother[]’s demands that Mother leave.           Id. at 27.
     Thereafter, Grandmother locked up the house, realized her car
     keys were gone, and suspected Mother of taking her car keys. Id.
     at 27. Mother then showed up at day care and attempted to take
     [C]hild while alleging Grandmother had no custodial rights[;
     Mother then] kidnapped [Child from the daycare].              Id.
     Grandmother [] reported the theft of her car keys to police and
     discovered that she was also missing a set of knives and a credit
     card. Id. Grandmother discovered unauthorized transactions
     demonstrating that Mother had used the credit card to buy plane
     tickets from Towson, Maryland to Boston, Massachusetts and for
     further travel to Germany. Id. It was believed that Mother
     intended to take [Child] to Germany; however, Mother was picked
     up in Boston and was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric
     facility. Id. . . .

     Mother never had safe, stable, and appropriate housing for herself
     and [Child]. Id. at 29. During the pendency of proceedings,
     Mother claimed; to reside at a home from which there was an
     eviction notice; to reside between Mother’s grandmother’s home
     and Mother’s aunt’s home, id. at 28; to reside in Grandmother’s
     [] home, which, Grandmother [], reportedly vacated; and to
     reside with [Grandmother’s aunt]. Id. at 29. As will be addressed
     chronologically, below, Grandmother [], credibly, clarified some of
     the details of Mother’s various living situations that were initially

                                     -6-
J-S35031-23

     described by [Ms.] Neiderer—most glaringly, that Grandmother
     never vacated her home for Mother.

     Since adjudication, Mother never maintained a lawful source of
     income. Id. at 29. Despite a support order entered against her
     for $213.00 per month, Mother had made no support payments.
     Id. at 29-30. Mother provided no direct financial support to the
     [A]gency or kinship family. Id. at 30. . . .

     Mother’s last visitation was December 8, 2022. Id. This was the
     result of Mother being incarcerated [from December 16, 2022 to
     January 27, 2023] and due to Mother being involuntarily
     committed a second time for mental health hospitalization [from
     February 11, 2023 to March 17, 2023]. Id. [at 4, 30, 44.] At the
     time of the termination hearing, there was a court directive that
     Mother was not to have contact with [C]hild due to her continued
     mental health issues. Id. at 30-31. Mother never progressed
     beyond fully supervised visitation with [Child]. Id. at 31.

     On October 12, 2022, a referral was made for Mother to have
     parenting education through Pressley Ridge. Id. at 31. On
     December 12, 2022, Pressley Ridge closed the referral due to
     being unable to contact Mother who made no response to several
     texts and calls. Id.

     Mother also refused contact with [a mental health program] after
     a referral was made in October of 2022. Id.

     Ms. Neiderer opined that Mother had not been successful with
     services and that there were no other services that the [A]gency
     could have offered to Mother. Id. at 32. Mother made no requests
     for services outside of the alleged pre-termination hearing
     visitation request. Id.

     Mother did not attend any of the medical appointments for [C]hild.
     Id. In the six months prior to the termination hearing, Mother
     had not performed any parental duties beyond attending
     visitations. Id. Mother was in no position to receive physical
     custody of [C]hild due to Ms. Neiderer’s inability to confirm
     Mother’s mental health treatment following recommendations
     made      when Mother      was involuntarily hospitalized in
     Massachusetts. Id. at 32-33. [Ms. Neiderer opined that, d]espite
     having been afforded a reasonable period of time, Mother had not
     remedied the conditions that caused [Child] to be removed from
     Mother’s care. Id. at 33. Mother had not made diligent effort
     towards resuming her parental responsibilities. Id. Ms. Neiderer

                                   -7-
J-S35031-23

     testified that, in the opinion of the [A]gency, termination of
     Mother’s parental rights was in [Child’s] best interests due to
     [Child] deserving permanency[. Id.] at 33-34. Moreover, “[g]iven
     Mother’s mental health, the likelihood that she’ll reasonably be
     able to achieve the goals and maintain the progress necessary to
     have [Child] returned and maintained safely in the home is low.[”]
     Id. at 34.

     An [A]gency representative, Christine Brown, had met with [C]hild
     at Grandmother[]’s home and made notes regarding the visit. Id.
     at 36. Ms. Neiderer testified that those notes indicated that
     [C]hild was safe and happy in Grandmother’s home. Id. Ms.
     Neiderer had no information whether there were any requests by
     [C]hild to see Mother. Id. at 37. It was reported to Ms. Neiderer
     that there was a great bond between [Child] and Grandmother [].
     Id. . . .

     [With respect to the Agency’s assessment of Mother’s bond with
     Child,] Ms. Neiderer[ stated that] Mother’s first [supervised] visit
     [with Child on October 5, 2022 went] well, with Mother interacting
     appropriately with [C]hild, but Mother end[ed] the visit early due
     to another appointment. Id. at 38[, 40]. [During the second of
     three visits Mother had with Child on November 1, 2022,] Mother
     attempted to force her way into the [Agency] van[ as described
     above. Id. at 38, 40. At the] last visit on December 8, 2022, . .
     . Mother was not interactive with [C]hild, never took off Mother’s
     or [C]hild’s jacket, Mother sat in a chair with her head propped up
     and staring at [Child] while speaking very little and in a low voice
     and not making any sense. Id. at 39. The caseworker provided
     Mother with coloring books and crayons and Mother then hugged
     [Child] and sat on the floor while [Child] walked around the room.
     Id. Mother mumbled again but made little sense. Id. Given a
     ten[-]minute warning prior to the end of visitation, Mother did not
     begin cleaning up and, instead, when time was up, attempted to
     leave, became argumentative about cleaning up, acted as though
     she was going to clean up, and, finally, Mother stormed out of the
     visitation area while holding [Child] and proclaiming that she had
     to work and would be unable to clean up. Id. at 39-40.

     Grandmother [] was called and she testified that [Child] was doing
     well in her home and was getting along well with the other children
     in the home, with the youngest being five years older. Id. at 45-
     46. Grandmother testified that Mother did not attempt in-person
     contact with [C]hild, but that Mother would attempt,
     approximately twice a day, to FaceTime with [C]hild. Id. at 46.

                                    -8-
J-S35031-23

     Mother provided de minimis financial support to Grandmother for
     [C]hild [in amounts in the range of $5, $10, and $20]. Id. at 47[,
     51-52, 64].

     Asked what she would prefer in terms of contact with either parent
     post adoption, Grandmother credibly responded that she was
     unsure, but offered that she felt it was important for [Child] to
     know her parents. Id. at 47. Grandmother had made attempts
     to facilitate custody periods for paternal grandmother but had not
     succeeded as of the hearing due to paternal grandmother’s
     husband’s health concerns. Id.

     Grandmother [] felt that, due to her familiarity with Mother’s
     mental states, she would be able to protect [Child] when Mother
     is not mentally well. Id. at 47-48. Grandmother, describing how
     FaceTimes between Mother and [C]hild would go, felt that [Child]
     has grown accustomed to being with Grandmother and that she’s
     excited when Mother calls. Id. at 48-49. [However, Grandmother
     stated that Child] does not exhibit signs of yearning for her by,
     say, grabbing the phone and saying “mom.” Id. at 49.

     On cross-examination, Grandmother [] indicated that she felt as
     though Mother’s mental state has been better since she left
     hospitalization. Id. at 50. Grandmother related how Mother
     desired to raise her own daughter, even to the exclusion of
     Grandmother’s involvement, but that Mother would prefer
     Grandmother [] to anyone else to raise [Child] if Mother could not.
     Id. at 51. . . .

     Grandmother testified that during a period when Mother was out
     on bail, Mother had no place to live and Grandmother set [M]other
     up in hotels. Id. at 54-55. Grandmother [] indicated Mother could
     not live with Mother’s grandmother or Grandmother[]’s aunt and
     stated that Mother never lived with Grandmother [] in this period,
     nor did Grandmother [] vacate her residence to make way for
     Mother. Id. at 55. Mother lived with Grandmother[]’s aunt upon
     her return from [her involuntary commitment in] Boston. Id. at
     56.    Grandmother testified that she feels Mother is at an
     appropriate point right now to have visits with [Child] and testified
     that she would call the police the moment her daughter was not
     fine to be with [C]hild. Id. at 57. . . .

     Th[e orphans’ c]ourt questioned Grandmother [] and
     Grandmother clarified that she would not agree to anything less
     than fully supervised visitation for Mother with supervision every
     minute of that visitation. Id. at 58. Grandmother, queried about

                                     -9-
J-S35031-23

     her battles with Mother’s psychosis, testified that she would be
     more at ease if Mother would acknowledge and go to the doctors
     and therapy, but Grandmother stated that she could not make
     Mother do those things. Id. at 58-59. Grandmother detailed the
     [] history of arguments [between Mother and Grandmother,]
     Mother’s hopes of returning to school and cleaning her life up[,]
     and the cycle of breakdowns that is preventing Mother’s recovery.
     Id. at 59-60. This led Grandmother to acknowledge the following
     [] regarding Mother’s limitations:

        [M]y grace with my daughter is limited at this point. I mean,
        I love her, like I’m always going to try to help her, but I
        want her to understand how serious - - like, certain things
        you just can’t do. You can’t do what everybody else is doing,
        and so much of your life has been like kind of taken away
        and kind of robbed, unfortunately. But, you know, from this
        point, like, you have the support, you have people here, so
        make the right choices.

     Id. at 60.

     Grandmother [] acknowledged that in the month prior to the
     termination hearing, Grandmother and Mother had a difference of
     opinion, during a doctor’s appointment, about Mother’s mental
     health treatment. Id. at 60-61. [At that appointment], Mother
     was refusing ongoing mental health treatment, as she has in the
     past. Id. at 61. The most treatment Mother was willing to engage
     in was taking medications. Id. Mother was FaceTiming with
     Grandmother [] to make sure that Mother took her medications;
     though, this [practice] had lapsed in the weeks leading up to the
     termination hearing. Id.

     When Mother returned from Boston, it was Grandmother who
     orchestrated Mother living with Grandmother’s aunt. Id. at 62.
     Mother did not make that arrangement. Id. Mother’s residences
     during the dependency action were hotels paid for by
     Grandmother, hospitals for involuntary commitment, jail, and
     other residences at times when Mother was not under
     Grandmother[]’s care. Id. at 62-63. [] Grandmother agreed that
     she provided transportation for Mother, via Grandmother driving
     her or providing Uber, Grandmother paid for Mother’s hotels,
     Grandmother provided Mother money, and Grandmother simply
     met Mother’s monetary needs. Id. at 63. When [M]other
     provided money to Grandmother, it was small increments [that
     were] vastly outweighed by what Grandmother provided to

                                   - 10 -
J-S35031-23

     Mother. Id. at 64. [] Grandmother admitted that, though Mother
     was doing better at the time of the hearing, she had been in a
     similarly improved state on multiple occasions in the past before
     relapsing into psychosis.      Id. at 64-65.      Grandmother []
     reaffirmed her commitment to [Child] knowing her parents, id. at
     65, and Grandmother[]’s ability to maintain at least a minimal
     relationship with each parent, that would ensure [Child’s] safe
     contact with each parent, to facilitate continued interaction
     between [C]hild and her biological parents. Id. at 65-66. With
     the caveat that Grandmother [] seeks to maintain the actual
     identities and relationships of the various parties, in the opinion
     of [Child’s] legal counsel [], [Child] looks to Grandmother as a
     mother-figure who she would go to for care and support. Id. at
     68-69.

     Mother, implying there was but one period of mental health
     concern, testified that, prior to her “psychosis outbreak,” she was
     a great mother. Id. at 70. Asked what treatment, in the relevant
     time period, Mother had sought for her psychosis issues, Mother
     responded that psychosis does not require counseling and only
     requires medication. Id. at 71. Mother testified to how her
     postpartum depression had been medicated with an anxiety
     medication, but she still ended up involuntarily committed for
     approximately three weeks. Id. at 72. Mother testified to not
     trusting being medicated during a stint in jail and how she decided
     that she would seek treatment upon her release. Id. at 73.
     Mother testified that she and [Grandmother] had actually argued
     over the form of Mother’s medication—Mother claimed to have
     suffered paralysis of the left side of her body and a stiff neck from
     injections and, so, Mother preferred to ingest her medication. Id.
     at 73-74.

     Mother asserted that she was fully capable of taking care of her
     daughter and that[, if Child was returned to Mother, the two]
     would be staying with [Mother’s great-]aunt until the end of
     summer, which was her aunt’s stipulated point for Mother to move
     out of [the] home. Id. at 75. . . .

     Mother testified to desiring to resume visits with [Child]. Id. at
     76. Mother stated that she did not like going through the [A]gency
     for supervised visits and that she would rather do visits through
     Grandmother []. Id. at 76-77. . . .

                                    - 11 -
J-S35031-23

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 5-18 (record citation reformatted; some

emphasis omitted).

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court announced its

decision to grant the Agency’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights

to Child and stated its findings and reasoning on the record. N.T., 5/9/23, at

80-87.   The orphans’ court issued a decree on the same day terminating

Mother’s parental rights. Final Decree, 5/9/23. Mother filed a timely notice

of appeal and concurrently filed a concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).     On July 10, 2023, the

orphans’ court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), addressing

Mother’s appellate claims.

      Mother presents the following issues for our review:

      I. Whether the orphan[s’] court erred as a matter of law and/or
      abused its discretion in terminating the parental rights of Mother
      pursuant to 23 [Pa].C.S. [§] 2511(a)(1) as the evidence did not
      support by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had
      evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to []
      Child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties?

      II. [Whether] the orphan[s’] court erred as a matter of law and/or
      abused its discretion in terminating the parental rights of Mother
      pursuant to 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511(a)(2) when the evidence did not
      support by clear and convincing evidence that Child was without
      parental care or control or that the conditions which led to the
      initial placement would not or could not be remedied by Mother?

      III. Whether the orphan[s’] court erred as a matter of law and/or
      abused its discretion in terminating the parental rights of Mother
      pursuant to 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511(a)(5) in finding that (1) condition
      which led to removal or placement of the Child continued to exist;
      (2) and termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the
      Child there was not clear and convincing evidence that Mother

                                    - 12 -
J-S35031-23

      could not or would not remedy the conditions which led to the
      initial removal?

      [IV]. Whether the orphan[s’] court should have given Mother
      additional time to address her significant mental health issues and
      Mother believes that she was making progress towards alleviating
      the concerns regarding her mental health issues?

      [V]. Whether the orphan[s’] court erred as a matter of law and/or
      abused its discretion in terminating the parental rights of Mother
      pursuant to 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511(b) when the best interest of the
      Child would not be served by termination?

Mother’s Brief at 6-7 (trial court disposition, suggested answers, and

unnecessary capitalization omitted; reordered for ease of disposition).

      In addressing Mother’s challenge to the termination of her parental

rights, we apply the following precepts:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)).

      The burden is on the petitioner in the lower court to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of

parental rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa.

Super. 2021).    The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as

                                     - 13 -
J-S35031-23

“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act.      “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary

termination[.]” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11).      If the trial court determines the petitioner

established grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and

convincing evidence, the court then must proceed to assess the petition under

subsection (b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 267.

      Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5), and subsection (b). However, this Court

may affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its determination

concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus

our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         *        *            *

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for

                                     - 14 -
J-S35031-23

         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

         *        *             *

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the moving party must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 600 (Pa.

2021). The grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited

to affirmative misconduct but also include refusal and parental incapacity that

cannot be remedied. In re K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(en banc).    “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re Adoption of

A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021); see also In re Adoption of

K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc), affirmed, 240 A.3d

1218 (Pa. 2020) (noting that a parent has an “affirmative duty” to work

towards the return of his children, which requires, at a minimum, that he

                                    - 15 -
J-S35031-23

“cooperate with the [local agency] and complete the rehabilitative services

necessary so that the parent can perform his parental duties and

responsibilities”). “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a continued inability

to conduct his life . . . in a fashion that would provide a safe environment for

a child, whether that child is living with the parent or not, and the behavior of

the parent is irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the

termination of parental rights is justified.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118

(Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

       Mother challenges the orphans’ court’s finding as to the third element

under Section 2511(a)(2) that the causes of Mother’s repeated and continued

incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal—specifically, her mental health issues—

could not or would not be remedied.3 See L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600. Mother

contends that, “[w]hile there was a significant period of time [when she] was

not receiving treatment,” she “began the road to recovery with her inpatient

treatment in Boston and [has] continued to maintain her mental health upon

her discharge” and return to Pennsylvania. Mother’s Brief at 25. She cites as

support for her positive mental state the testimony that Grandmother

permitted Mother daily or twice daily FaceTime contact with Child. Mother
____________________________________________

3 Mother’s first three appellate issues relate to the orphans’ court’s finding that

termination was appropriate under Section 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). As we
may affirm the orphans’ court determination under any one subsection of
Section 2511(a) and we conduct our analysis only as to subsection (a)(2), we
address Mother’s corresponding second appellate issue related to this basis
for termination, and we do not address Mother’s first and third issues
pertaining to subsections (a)(1) and (5).

                                          - 16 -
J-S35031-23

additionally stresses that there was “no indication in the testimony at the time

of the [termination] hearing that [her] mental health was decompensating.”

Id.

      Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the orphans’

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mother cannot or will not

remedy the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal that led to

Child’s removal. The orphans’ court persuasively explained the rationale for

its decision that termination was appropriate under Section 2511(a)(2) of the

Adoption Act at the conclusion of the May 9, 2023 hearing and in its July 10,

2023 Rule 1925(a) opinion. At the May 9, 2023 hearing, the orphans’ court

noted Mother’s “history of psychosis that predates the dependency action,”

which follows the “pattern of periods of lucidity and doing well, combined with

a refusal to engage in mental health treatment, during which time Mother

takes her medications for [a] period of time until she determines, in her own

mind, the medications are no longer needed.” N.T., 5/9/23, at 82. Mother

then stops taking the medication and plunges into “various depths of

psychosis” in a cycle that “repeats and repeats and repeats.” Id. at 82-83.

The lower court observed that Mother “still has not learned” that “the

medication alone has never been enough” and that she requires “ongoing

mental health treatment so that she can continue to understand the need to

take the medication and so that she can also talk about the various problems

and travails and triggers that she encounters in life.” Id. at 82.

                                     - 17 -
J-S35031-23

      The orphans’ court then discussed Mother’s inability to remedy the

conditions that led to Child’s removal.       Notwithstanding Mother’s current

“period of lucidity,” the court explained that Mother has “refuse[d] to fully

address her mental health conditions,” citing the “multiple relapses” over the

course of the case with the most glaring example being the abduction of Child

and attempt to flee the country to Germany. Id. at 83-84. The court further

found that Mother “clearly has not met any of her initial goals” established by

the Agency as she had not demonstrated “stability in housing” where her

current living situation was temporary and entirely arranged by Grandmother

and Mother has no “stability in employment” when she has made no payments

towards   her    monthly   support   obligation   and   remains   dependent   on

Grandmother for rides and financial support.        Id.   The court added that

Mother’s visitation with Child—which totaled only three visits—over the course

of eight months was “woefully inadequate.” Id. at 84. The orphans’ court

concluded at the hearing by stating that “[i]n summary, it’s just an

overwhelming case in support of termination of parental rights as to

[M]other.” Id.

      In its opinion, the orphans’ court provided additional support for its

finding that Mother has refused to remedy the conditions that led to Child’s

removal and placement. The court noted that, during the eight-month period

of dependency prior to the termination hearing, Mother “demonstrated a

continuation of her pattern of mental health cycling between shaky stability

and psychosis.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 28. Mother evidenced

                                     - 18 -
J-S35031-23

“an intransigent belief that her psychosis can be managed with medicine

alone,” which position she professed at the termination hearing and which was

further confirmed by Grandmother’s testimony about recent arguments that

she had with her daughter about getting additional help. Id. at 20, 25-28.

The court discussed various instances that demonstrated Mother’s medicine-

only treatment was not working: the kidnapping of Child and attempt to

abscond to Germany via Boston leading to an involuntary commitment, text

messages Mother sent to Grandmother that required police intervention to

determine that Child was safe, Mother’s incarceration, Mother’s attempt to

enter a van and abduct Child at one scheduled visit, and her “strange

behavior” at another of her three visits. Id. at 23-26.

      Moreover, the orphans’ court discussed in detail Mother’s failure to fulfill

any of the other goals that were established by the Agency. Mother attended

only three supervised visits following Child’s removal; while the first of the

three visits reportedly went well, Mother still left early for “another

appointment” with no explanation for what that appointment was. Id. at 22,

24. The remaining two visits did not proceed well, the visits were paused at

the urging of the GAL due to safety concerns, and, notwithstanding her

purportedly improved mental state, Mother did not request visits after her

return from the Massachusetts involuntary commitment until one week before

the termination hearing. Id. at 23-24. Mother also did not cooperate with

the Agency in-home team, and she failed to engage in the mandated parenting

education program, with the provider ultimately closing out Mother’s

                                     - 19 -
J-S35031-23

enrollment based upon her lack of participation. Id. at 21-22. Furthermore,

Mother did not attend any of Child’s medical appointments, and she did not

provide meaningful financial contribution for Child’s care despite being under

a court order to pay support. Id. at 21-22, 24, 28.

      The orphans’ court’s findings and conclusions with respect to Section

2511(a)(2) find ample support in the testimony presented by the Agency at

the termination hearing, as described supra. We note that the orphans’ court

found Grandmother to be a credible witness, relying on her testimony as to

such issues as Mother’s cyclical mental health history, Grandmother’s urgings

to Mother to seek additional mental health treatment aside from medication,

Grandmother’s discussion of the various forms of assistance she continues to

provide her daughter, and Grandmother’s insistence that she would not allow

Mother to have a moment of unsupervised time with Child even in her current

sound mental state. Id. at 10-11, 14-17, 22, 25, 28. Based on the orphans’

court’s well-supported findings, we see no error in the court’s conclusion that

Mother “has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct [her] life . . . in a

fashion that would provide a safe environment for” Child and, as shown by the

fact that Mother has made no progress to achieving the Agency’s goals for

reunification, the conditions that led to Child’s removal are “irremediable.”

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118 (citation omitted). Therefore, we discern no basis to

disturb the orphans’ court’s determination that termination was appropriate

under Section 2511(a)(2).

                                    - 20 -
J-S35031-23

      In her next issue, Mother argues that the orphans’ court “should have

permitted her additional time to deal with her mental health issues and to be

able to properly parent” Child beyond the eight-month period between Child’s

adjudication of dependency in September 2022 and the termination decree in

May 2023. Mother’s Brief at 32. While Mother recognizes that the Adoption

Act permits termination of parental rights in shorter time frames, she draws

our attention to the Juvenile Act which requires a court to consider at a

permanency review hearing whether the agency has filed a termination

petition when a “child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 22

months.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9). Mother asserts that termination would

only be appropriate in the comparatively short period at issue here if the

parent “was making little to no progress towards reunification.” Mother’s Brief

at 31. Mother maintains that, in her case, termination was improper because

she has shown “progress” in maintaining her mental health since her last

involuntary commitment and Grandmother appeared at the hearing to be

“supportive of [M]other’s efforts [] to deal with her mental health issues and

be a parent for” Child. Id. at 31-32.

      Initially, we find Mother’s citation to the Juvenile Act to be inapt. Our

Supreme Court has explained that the Act’s required inquiry at a permanency

review hearing as to whether a termination petition has been filed when a

child has been dependent for 15 out of the prior 22 months was put in place

to combat the phenomenon of “foster care drift” when children linger in the

foster system for years and ensure that a dependent child achieves

                                    - 21 -
J-S35031-23

permanency within two years. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9); In the Interest

of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1108 & n.19 (Pa. 2023) (discussion of enactment of

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) in accordance with federal Adoption and Safe Families

Act of 1997); T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269 (same). Thus, the required inquiry under

the Juvenile Act was intended to establish an upper limit on when

permanency for a dependent child should be attained rather than a minimum

period before a termination petition may be filed or considered. Mother cites

to no provision that would bar termination of parental rights when only eight

months have lapsed from the time the Child is adjudicated dependent to when

the termination decree is issued. To the contrary, as Mother recognizes, the

Adoption Act specifically envisions that termination may be based upon as

little as six months of a parent’s conduct. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (5)

(providing for termination based upon parental conduct of “at least six

months”). Moreover, our caselaw makes clear that time is of the essence for

a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her child:

     [A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts
     to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
     responsibilities.    The court cannot and will not subordinate
     indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
     parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.

In the Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted); see also K.M.G., 219 A.3d at 672-73 (the Adoption Act “does not

provide a parent with an unlimited period time to overcome the incapacity

                                    - 22 -
J-S35031-23

that led to the adjudication of the child” and “a parent must make a diligent

effort towards overcoming [her] incapacity”).

      The orphans’ court addressed as follows Mother’s argument that

termination was improper only eight months after Child’s removal:

      Additional time would not have been sufficient for Mother to
      ameliorate the [c]ourt’s concerns.       Mother’s extraordinarily
      supportive and credible mother, Grandmother [], testified that
      Mother had achieved similar states of improvement on multiple
      occasions in the past, only to, repeatedly, relapse into psychosis.
      Even with Grandmother[’s] immense love and provision of
      bottomless support for Mother, coupled with the full resources of
      York County, which testimony established had been exhausted
      vis-à-vis Mother, over an, approximately, eight-month span,
      Mother demonstrated repetition of her cycle between greatly
      supported functioning/wellness and psychosis. . .

      . . . Considering Mother’s pattern of mental health relapses and
      Mother’s testimonial demonstration of intransigence towards
      treatment, additional time would not have alleviated [the c]ourt’s
      concerns and would only have deprived [Child] of the stability,
      love, comfort, and security that she will receive from Grandmother
      [] who will be unfettered from the capricious whims of Mother’s
      lamentable mental instability.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 31-32 (emphasis in original).

      We find no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s analysis. While

Mother claims she made substantial “progress” towards her goal of

reunification with Child, Mother’s Brief at 32, the orphans’ court found that

Mother made virtually no progress towards the goal of reunification by the

date of the termination hearing.   As discussed supra, Mother did not avail

herself of any of the services offered by the Agency, she did not provide

financial support for Child, she did not obtain suitable housing, and she only

                                    - 23 -
J-S35031-23

attended three supervised visits with Child, with further visitation halted due

to Mother’s concerning behavior.     Moreover, the improvement in Mother’s

mental condition at the time of the termination hearing was, in the orphans’

court’s estimation, illusory as Mother steadfastly refused to engage in any

mental health treatment beyond medication and thus, she remained subject

to the same cycle of wellness and psychosis that had continuously plagued

her.   The orphans’ court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing

evidence. This issue therefore merits no relief.

       We next turn to the orphans’ court’s determination under Section

2511(b) of the Adoption Act, which focuses on “the developmental, physical

and emotional needs and welfare of the child” as opposed to the conduct of

the parent under subsection (a). 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); In re C.B., 230 A.3d

341, 349 (Pa. Super. 2020). Mother argues that termination of her parental

rights does not serve the best interests of Child where there continues to exist

a bond between the two. Mother maintains that severing that bond would

deprive Child of an existing beneficial relationship. Mother highlights before

this Court Grandmother’s testimony that Child knows who Mother is, gets

excited when Mother FaceTimes with her, and will hug and kiss the phone

while speaking to Mother. N.T., 5/9/23, at 48-49.

       Under Section 2511(b), a child’s particular developmental, physical, and

emotional needs must be assessed on a case-by-case basis with a

consideration of each child’s specific needs. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105-06; see

also L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 593. “The emotional needs and welfare of the child

                                     - 24 -
J-S35031-23

have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort,

security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks

omitted); see also K.T., 296 A.3d at 1106.          Accordingly, there is no

“exhaustive list” of factors that must be considered in this context. K.T., 296

A.3d at 1113 n.28.

      The Section 2511(b) analysis requires consideration of “the emotional

bonds between the parent and child,” with the threshold for the bond inquiry

being whether termination will sever a “necessary and beneficial relationship,”

such that the child could suffer “extreme emotional consequences” or

“significant, irreparable harm.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10 (citation omitted);

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. However, consideration of “the parental bond is but

one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113; see

also In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). A court must also

consider, as appropriate, the child’s need for permanency and length of time

in foster care; the child’s placement in a pre-adoptive home and whether there

is a bond with the foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the

child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113.

      The orphans’ court addressed Section 2511(b) at the conclusion of the

May 9, 2023 hearing:

      What’s clear to the [c]ourt is [Child]’s bond with Mother has
      actually improved through the stability, love, care, and nurturing
      provided by [] Grandmother. I think it’s clear that [] Grandmother
      provides all of the daily supports, including but not limited to
      financial, love, emotional, all of the supports that a parent would
      provide are one thousand percent provided solely through []
      Grandmother.

                                    - 25 -
J-S35031-23

     I do also find that [Child] is fully bonded with [] Grandmother.
     She’s an integral part of [] Grandmother’s family, with the
     youngest child [living in Grandmother’s home] being a mere five
     years older than [Child]. So [Child] has . . . excellent role models
     in the older children, and a child that is very close in age, so I
     can’t think of a better adoptive resource than [] Grandmother.

     Also, to her credit, [] Grandmother has from day one indicated a
     desire to identify Mother and Father as Mother and Father and a
     willingness to supervise and maintain those maternal and paternal
     bonds, provided it is safe for [C]hild physically, mentally, and
     emotionally in [] Grandmother’s sole discretion. To her credit, []
     Grandmother has continued to do that despite the waves of
     repetitive failure of Mother during the dependency action. It’s like
     crashing wave after crashing wave after crashing wave of Mother’s
     failures, and yet, through it all, the one rock that the waves cannot
     break is [] Grandmother. [] Grandmother’s desire reaches even
     to Father’s mother. So, once again, the [c]ourt cannot think of a
     better adoptive resource, a more excellent adoptive resource,
     than [] Grandmother.

     Now the bond as to Mother has been nurtured by [] Grandmother.
     So Mother’s bond with her own [C]hild has been nurtured and
     furthered by [] Grandmother to the point that through []
     Grandmother there are successful FaceTime phone calls.
     However, calling your daughter and caring for your daughter are
     two totally different things. They are worlds apart. So to the
     extent that there is a bond between Mother and [Child], it was,
     number one, created and nurtured by [] Grandmother, the
     adoptive resource; and, number two, it’s toxic as between Mother
     and [Child], because [Child] simply has no idea when Mother is
     going to next go off the rails.

N.T., 5/9/23, at 84-86. In its later opinion, the orphans’ court noted that,

although Child was excited when Mother FaceTimes with her, it does not

appear that Child “yearns for [] Mother by grabbing for the phone or saying

‘mom’” and that the testimony revealed that Mother was at times “stilted and

strange” during supervised visits with Child. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/10/23,

at 30.   The court further expressed that it was “greatly concerned” with

                                    - 26 -
J-S35031-23

Mother’s “macabre ideations” during her psychotic breaks—for example,

Mother going to Grandmother’s place of work, a hospital, and telling everyone

that she was there to pick up Grandmother’s dead body and Mother’s

attempted flight to Germany with Child—and how that affected Child’s needs

and welfare. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted).

     The orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare would be best

served through termination of Mother’s parental rights. The orphans’ court

recognized that Mother has an emotional bond with Child and that Child

benefits from the FaceTime calls with Mother, yet the court determined that

the Mother-Child bond was not a “necessary and beneficial relationship” and

that “the trauma caused by breaking [the] bond is outweighed by the benefit

of moving [C]hild toward a permanent home” with Grandmother. K.T., 296

A.3d at 1109; T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 253. Furthermore, the court appropriately

considered Child’s strong bond with Grandmother, the fact that Grandmother

was a pre-adoptive resource for Child, the suitability of Grandmother’s home,

and the stability, love, and support provided by Grandmother, which met

Child’s development, physical, and emotional needs. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113.

As with the orphans’ court’s other findings discussed above, the conclusion

that termination is proper under Section 2511(b) is supported by clear and

convincing evidence.

                                   - 27 -
J-S35031-23

      Accordingly, as we find that Mother is not entitled to relief on any of her

challenges to the orphans’ court’s May 9, 2023 decree terminating her

parental rights to Child, we affirm that decision.

      Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/09/2023

                                     - 28 -