Court Opinion

ID: 9700789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:49:20.496931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:14.597734
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, P.J.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against him on double jeopardy grounds. We reverse.
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). A bench trial was commenced before Detroit Recorder’s Court Judge Daphne Means Curtis on September 9, 1991. During the morning session, three prosecution witnesses testified and the matter recessed *199for lunch. Upon reconvening, Judge Curtis announced in open court that the trial prosecutor had just informed her that defendant was the brother of Gregory Hicks, the judge’s personal friend and campaign manager.
Judge Curtis then asked the parties for their respective positions on the matter. Counsel for defendant argued that because Gregory Hicks would not be called as a witness in the case, Judge Curtis should not recuse herself. Counsel further argued that should Judge Curtis recuse herself, the case should be dismissed. The assistant prosecutor stated that he had no comment on the matter. Judge Curtis then stated that although her relationship with defendant’s brother could potentially affect her objectivity in the case, she believed that such influence was unlikely. Judge Curtis noted, however, that her friendship with defendant’s brother created the appearance of impropriety. She then recused herself and referred the decisions regarding a mistrial and defendant’s request for dismissal to the chief judge of the court.
Acting Chief Judge Robert L. Evans reassigned the case to Judge Terrance K. Boyle, who entertained a defense motion to dismiss at a hearing held on December 4, 1991. At the hearing, Judge Boyle formally declared a mistrial, stating that Judge Curtis’ recusal constituted the functional equivalent of a mistrial. Judge Boyle then denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that Judge Curtis’ recusal constituted manifest necessity for a declaration of a mistrial, and thus, defendant’s retrial was not barred by double jeopardy.
Defendant now argues on appeal that Judge Boyle erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was no manifest necessity for a mis*200trial. We agree. A judge should not declare a mistrial sua sponte without first making explicit findings, after a hearing on the record, that no reasonable alternative exists. United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 483-485; 91 S Ct 547; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971); People v Benton, 402 Mich 47, 61; 260 NW2d 77 (1977). People v Wilcox, 183 Mich App 616, 619-620; 456 NW2d 421 (1990).
The United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit a defendant from being placed twice in jeopardy. People v Dawson, 431 Mich 234, 250; 427 NW2d 886 (1988); Wilcox, supra at 620. Jeopardy attaches in a bench trial once the first witness is sworn. People v Brower, 164 Mich App 242, 246; 416 NW2d 397 (1987). If the trial court declares a mistrial after jeopardy has attached, the state is precluded from bringing the defendant to trial a second time unless the defendant consented to the mistrial or the mistrial was of manifest necessity. Dawson, supra at 252; Wilcox, supra at 620; People v Little, 180 Mich App 19, 22; 446 NW2d 566 (1989). The trial court is afforded considerable deference with respect to its decision regarding the existence of manifest necessity. Benton, supra at 65. Cf. Little, supra at 23 (citing Downum v United States, 372 US 734, 738; 83 S Ct 1033; 10 L Ed 2d 100 [1963], for the proposition that any doubt regarding the existence of manifest necessity should be resolved in favor of the defendant).
"Manifest necessity” is not a precisely defined concept, but is usually determined case by case with reference to various factors, such as the failure of the jury to agree upon a verdict, misconduct on the part of a juror, or an incurable defect in an indictment or the proceedings. Benton, supra at 56-57; Wilcox, supra at 621. "An important consideration is whether the nature of the defect perceived by the judge was such that, if a guilty *201verdict had been rendered, the conviction would have had to have been reversed on appeal.” Wilcox, supra at 621.
Courts have generally recognized that where circumstances actually impair a trial judge’s ability to impartially preside over a trial, there is manifest necessity for the court to declare a mistrial. See, e.g., State v Pierce, 459 A2d 148 (Me, 1983), State v Workman, 60 Ohio App 2d 204; 396 NE2d 777 (1977), Lewis v Anderson, 94 Idaho 254; 486 P2d 265 (1971), and State v Puckett, 92 Ariz 407; 377 P2d 779 (1962). In the absence of any actual bias or partiality, however, the mere appearance of partiality is generally held insufficient to establish manifest necessity. See, e.g., Little, supra, Torres v State, 614 SW2d 436 (Tex Crim App, 1981), Douglas v State, 32 Md App 311; 360 A2d 474 (1976), and Ferlito v Judges of County Court, 39 AD2d 17; 331 NYS2d 229 (1972), aff'd 31 NY2d 416; 340 NYS2d 635; 292 NE2d 779 (1972).
In the instant case, when apprised of the familial relationship between defendant and her campaign manager, Judge Curtis conferred with counsel for the respective parties in open court. Counsel for defendant unequivocally opposed Judge Curtis’ suggestion that she should recuse herself. Nevertheless, in deciding to recuse herself, Judge Curtis stated, in pertinent part:
The problem with sitting as a judge, particularly in a waiver trial is that not only do I have to be concerned about whether I might be influenced in my rulings or in my findings by knowing someone in the defendant’s family but also whether or not it looks improper, the appearance of impropriety and the Cannons [sic] refer to both of those situations as it applies to judges. I might be influenced by knowing his brother now that I know that I know his brother. I don’t really think that I would *202be, but I think just as important is the fact that it would not look good, that the appearance of impropriety could certainly result from my continuing as the trier of fact in this case.
After the case was reassigned to Judge Boyle, he found that Judge Curtis’ recusal alone constituted manifest necessity warranting a mistrial. We disagree. Under the circumstances, it was not necessary for Judge Curtis to recuse herself from this case. Although the assistant prosecutor brought the potential conflict to the judge’s attention, he did not ask the judge to recuse herself, nor did he move for a mistrial. Furthermore, counsel for defendant adamantly opposed the judge’s recusal. Because Judge Curtis stated that it was unlikely that her objectivity would be affected, it appears that her decision to recuse herself was essentially based on the potential for bias and the appearance of impropriety. We find under these facts that such grounds did not constitute "manifest necessity” requiring a mistrial.1 As this Court in Little, supra, stated:
While we recognize the desirability of avoiding the appearance of judicial partiality whenever possible, this potential for the appearance of judicial partiality must be balanced against the deprivation of defendant’s "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” This valued right is more compelling where the defendant, as here, actively opposed the declaration of a mistrial. [Id. at 27, quoting Jorn, supra at 484.]_
*203In his decision, Judge Boyle stated that although he "would not have recused myself under these circumstances mid-trial absent a request by either party,” he felt that Judge Curtis’ decision could not be called error and was, "in constitutional terms,” manifest necessity. Judge Boyle appears to have distinguished this case from Little because a bench trial was involved and defendant would be minimally prejudiced by a retrial. We believe this is too tenuous a consideration. Even in bench trials, courts have declined to find manifest necessity for disqualification where the trial judge’s personal relationships, or those of the judge’s family, present a hypothetical possibility or an appearance of influence as opposed to actual bias or partiality. In Ferlito, supra, a very similar relationship between the affected parties existed and the court found no manifest necessity. The court stated:
In the appraisal of judicial conduct it is recognized, of course, that the appearance of impropriety may sometimes be as devastating as the reality; but the mistrial procedure is not designed to afford an escape hatch from the performance of an unpleasant duty. A mistrial such as this, declared as in the public interest, and against the defendant’s will, must have some basis of demonstrable substance— for, as the rule has it, the necessity must be 'manifest.’ Here, the remote possibility of unfair treatment and the clear showing of prejudice to the defendant conjoined to interject the mistrial which the court proposed and, over objection, granted. [31 NY2d 419-420.]
We fully agree with the New York court and can find no substantial or meaningful difference between Ferlito and this case. There was no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial over defendant’s objection, and the state is barred from *204placing defendant in jeopardy a second time on these charges. We do not disagree with Judge Boyle’s conclusion that Judge Curtis’ recusal was the functional equivalent of a mistrial, but we disagree with his conclusion that it cannot be called error. We find constitutional error requiring reversal.
The February 7, 1992, order of the Recorder’s Court denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is reversed and the case is dismissed.
Michael J. Kelly, J., concurred.

 In People v McCline, 442 Mich 127; 499 NW2d 341 (1993), a factually distinguishable case, the Court noted that it is preferable that a single judge preside over all aspects of a trial to insure that the judge who hears the testimony regarding the facts also applies the law. In Mediae, the Court held that substitution of a judge before opening argument or the admission of evidence is not an automatic ground for reversal, and that the defendant in that case failed to demonstrate prejudice.