Court Opinion

ID: 9447323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:31:56.448824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:59.407429
License: Public Domain

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge, with whom BAZELON, Circuit Judge, joins
(dissenting).
Petitioner sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis from his conviction for second-degree murder. A panel of the court denied leave, one judge dissenting. Petitioner asked reconsideration en banc, and this has been denied — erroneously, I think.
There is at least one question presented here for our review which is not plainly frivolous — namely, whether the trial court erred in refusing a requested instruction on the defense of insanity. “[S]o long as there was some evidence relevant to the issue of [insanity], the credibility and force of such evidence must be for the jury, and cannot be matter of law for the decision of the court.” Kinard v. United States, 1938, 68 App.D.C. 250, 254, 96 F.2d 522, 526, as quoted in Tatum v. United States, 1951, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 386, 390, 190 F.2d 612, 616.
A psychologist testifying for the defense stated that petitioner had an I.Q. of 69, and that this placed him “in a range of mental defectiveness”; that his I.Q. had also been rated as 69 when he attended school and again when he was a member of the armed forces; and that “for practical purposes, you may regard him as a moron.” In rejecting the request for an instruction, the trial judge said: “There is no insanity in this case. * * * No insanity. There is no mental defect in the eyes of the law. His. [the psychologist’s] definition of a mental defect was altogether different from what we consider as a defense of insanity.” The trial court’s evaluation of the Rorschach test is reflected in his statement to the jury that he “was not impressed with the ink blots introduced in evidence by the psychologist.”
The professional witness did testify that in his opinion petitioner was “not mentally ill.” But this appears to have rested solely on his belief that petitioner was not psychotic, and that as a matter of law only psychosis constitutes “mental illness.” It is apparent that the trial court shared this view. Of course, this view is erroneous. Carter v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608.
It is true that in Stewart v. United States, 1960, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 275 F.2d 617, 624, this court rejected “the argument that it was error for the trial court to decline to give the requested instruction that evidence of diminished intellect would permit-the jury to return a verdict of a lesser degree of homicide than first degree murder.” But here the requested instruction was of a different sort: it was asked in relation to a possible verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, and not in relation to a possible verdict of guilty of a lesser offense than second degree murder. The question involved in this case is thus quite distinct from the one involved in Stewart. It Is a question not without difficulty.1 While it is not necessary at this stage to express a view as to how the question raised should be decided, we should give petitioner his day in this court.
I therefore vote for en banc consideration — not of the merits of the case, but. of the petition for allowance of the appeal in forma pauperis. If allowed, the appeal would come on in normal course for hearing by a panel.
*687EDGERTON and FAHY, Circuit Judges: Though we agree with Judge Washington’s basic position, the case does not seem to us appropriate for reconsideration en banc.

. Apparently at least one judge of the District Court has granted an instruction similar to the one requested — and de*687nied — here. See Smith v. United States, 1959, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 169 at 180, 270 F.2d 921, at page 932 (fn. 2 of dissenting opinion).