Court Opinion

ID: 9545756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:19:15.155745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:31.278688
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
with whom MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s holding that the superior court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Michael Propst relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5).
Michael Propst moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or, in the alternative, for modification of the child support award pursuant to AS 25.24.-170. Master Andrew Brown subsequently issued a report in which he recommended that Michael Propst’s motion be denied. In part the master concluded that:
Mr. Propst’s Motion was filed in September 1986, almost 2½ years after the Dowling decision. While Civil Rule 60(b)(5) does not have the one year limitation of (b)(l)-(3), Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2863, at 202 (1973), says concerning a(b)(5) motion that “[a]ll that is required is that the motion be made in a ‘reasonable time.’ ” Submitting this issue to the court 29V2 months after Dowling, during which time Ms. Libby and the boys heavily relied on his ongoing payments and in *785such dependence have carved out their future actions, was not within a “reasonable time.”
In his report the master also addressed the merits of Michael Propst’s motion and concluded that it should be denied. The master reasoned in part as follows:
The main ground for his seeking court relief is the Civil Rule 60(b)(5) aspect. While Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984), did overrule Hinchey v. Hinchey, 625 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1981), holding that AS 25.24.160 authorized support only for minor children, the case of Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1986), provides the rationale to deny his motion....
... The key issue here is whether it is equitable to terminate Mr. Propst’s post-majority support obligation under the April 1981 O.A.J.
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... Here just the opposite would be true — to permit Mr. Propst’s post-majority obligation to terminate based on the Dowling decision would be a gross “wrong” to the three children and Ms. Libby.
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Mr. Propst’s Motion to end his support obligation should be denied both as lacking foundation under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) and also lacking any evidence of a material and substantial change of circumstance under Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1979).
The superior court approved the master’s report and entered an order denying Michael Propst’s motion.
In Hinchey v. Hinchey, 625 P.2d 297, 300 (Alaska 1981), this court held that AS 25.-24.160(2)1 authorized the superior court to enter post-majority educational support awards. Hinchey was subsequently overruled in Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480, 483 (Alaska 1984). In Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142, 144 (Alaska 1986), the non-custodial parent filed a motion to modify the post-majority educational child support provisions of the decree. The motion was filed seven months after the entry of the decree and four months after the Dowl-ing decision. Id. In Lawrence we recognized two avenues by which such an order could be modified or vacated. One such avenue is that the non-custodial parent may move to modify the child support obligation pursuant to AS 25.24.170, Id. at 144-45. In regard to the motion we said that the movant has the burden of demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances to support the modification of any existing award. Id. We expressly rejected the father’s argument that the change in law brought about by the Dowling decision constituted changed circumstances sufficient to support modification of the award. Id. at 145. Absent evidence of any other change in circumstances, we concluded that the non-custodial spouse was not entitled to a modification of the support award under AS 25.24.170. Id.
In the case at bar, Michael Propst offered no evidence of changed circumstances other than the change mandated by the Dowling decision. I would therefore hold that the superior court did not err in refusing to modify the post-majority educational support award under AS 25.24.170.
We also observed in Lawrence that a non-custodial parent who is subject to a decree which requires post-majority educational support payments might be entitled to relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). 718 P.2d at 146. More specifically, we recognized that the non-custodial parent might be entitled to relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) if it was no longer equitable to give the judgment for post-majority support prospective application. Id. As indicated earlier the superi- or court agreed with the master’s conclusion that Michael Propst was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b)(5) both because he did not bring the motion within a reasonable period of time, and because it would be inequitable to relieve him from judgment.
I would conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Propst’s Civil Rule 60(b)(5) motion since the *786motion was not made within a reasonable time. Of particular significance is the fact that this court’s decision in Dowling was issued in March of 1984. Propst did not bring his Rule 60(b)(5) motion until September 1986, approximately two and one-half years after our decision in Dowling. Given this fact the Rule 60(b)(5) motion was not filed within a reasonable period of time.
Additionally, my review of the record persuades me that there are no circumstances which indicate that Propst’s failure to file a timely Rule 60(b)(5) motion should be excused. Nothing in the record alters the controlling fact that under the provisions of the 1981 judgment Michael Propst was subject to a valid, continuing obligation to provide post-majority educational support for his three children. The parties’ stipulation, which led to the dismissal of Michael Propst’s appeal of the 1981 judgment, was based on the fact that their children were too young for educational plans to be considered. However, by the time Michael’s Rule 60(b) motion was filed, Christopher and Andrew had already entered college. Therefore, any uncertainty concerning their children’s educational plans does not provide an adequate explanation for Michael’s two and one-half year delay in seeking relief from the superior court’s order.
In my view, neither the parties’ stipulation nor the subsequent actions of the Child Support Enforcement Division diminished Michael Propst’s post-majority educational support obligations. Nor do they furnish any basis for extending the time within which Michael Propst should have sought relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5).
I would therefore affirm the decision of the superior court.

. See maj. op. at note 4.