Court Opinion

ID: 9755095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:24:31.533466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:02.465214
License: Public Domain

VEASEY, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of the majority, but I write separately to emphasize that, in my view, the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court is compelled by the narrow scope of the standard of review. The determination of whether the taking of the Cannons’ land for wetlands mitigation was necessary is controlled by the standard of review at two levels: (i) that exercised by the Superior Court when DelDOT’s decision to condemn a particular wetland was challenged by the Cannons and (ii) when this Court reviews the Superior Court. In each case, the standard is the same.
We all agree that the ultimate issue in this case is the “necessity” determination of DelDOT to take the Cannons’ land for wetlands mitigation. The Superior Court heard live testimony on that point and made findings of fact, based on the evidence presented at trial. Based on those findings the trial court concluded that Del-DOT had not abused its discretion in making the determination of necessity for taking the Cannon property.
The issue before the Superior Court was not whether the trial judge should substitute his judgment for that of DelDOT, the agency charged by the General Assembly with the statutory responsibility to make that judgment. Rather, the issue before the trial judge was whether the DelDOT determination was based on supportable facts and reason, whether or not the trial judge would have reached the same judgment in the first instance. Stated differently, the issue before the trial judge was whether DelDOT’s exercise of its “judgment,” as called for in the statute, was the product of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion.2 The trial judge applied that *563analysis to the facts adduced at trial3 and concluded that DelDOT’s judgment was not an abuse of discretion.
The next and final level of review is that to be applied by this Court. Although our scope of review on statutory construction and constitutionality is de novo, our scope of review is deferential on the trial judge’s factual findings on DelDOT’s “judgment” of the “necessity” of the taking of the Cannons’ property. Specifically, the issue is not whether we would agree in the first instance with DelDOT’s determination of necessity or even whether, in the second instance, we would have come to the same conclusion as did the trial judge on this record. Rather, our task is as follows:
In exercising our power of review, we have the duty to review the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings below. We do not, however, ignore the findings made by the trial judge. If they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, in the exercise of judicial restraint we accept them, even though independently we might have reached opposite conclusions. It is only when the findings below are clearly wrong and the doing of justice requires their overturn that we are free to make contradictory findings of fact.4
In my view, the findings of the trial court on the exercise of DelDOT’s discretion meets this test of our judicial review. The Cannons’ land was favorably located as “on-site and in-kind.” DelDOT did, ultimately, consider other alternatives, and, upon examining those alternatives, it found that none achieved the same level of acceptability as the Cannon property.
DelDOT’s judgment of necessity permits it to consider a rank order of preferences within the universe of acceptable sites. A relevant and permissible factor in that analysis is what DelDOT believes the Corps would likely accept. DelDOT is not relegated to a choice of only minimally acceptable sites in the face of an objection by the landowner of the preferred site. Therefore, whether or not we are comfortable with the result or whether we would have preferred a different outcome, in my view our affirmance of the trial court is compelled by our narrow scope of review.

. State ex rel. Sharp v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, 112 A.2d 857, 859 (Del.1955) ("In the absence of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, tire determination of the Legislature or of the state agency to whom the power has been delegated will not be disturbed.”).

. See, e.g., facts set forth in the Majority Opinion at 12, n. 1.

. Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del.1972) (emphasis added); cf. Hudak v. Procek, 806 A.2d 140 at 144 (Del.Supr.) (stating that, when this Court’s "scope of review is narrow and accords considerable deference to the trial judge’s factual findings,” those findings will not be disturbed, "whether or not we would independently have reached the same conclusions”); Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1235 (Del.1997) (stating, in the context of a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for additur or a new trial, that this Court will "not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial judge, who presided at trial and heard the evidence,” unless her "determination is beyond the range of reasonableness or constitutes an abuse of discretion”). Cf. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.1994) ("If a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.”).