Court Opinion

ID: 9833414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:41:34.959132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:01.241564
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The defendant in error’s motion for rehearing presents the contention, in substance, that by virtue of the acts of Summit Place Company, in making and filing for record the map, accompanied by the deed of dedication, the space designated for private parking and sidewalk became portions of the street, and that the right of the purchaser of lot 6 to use such sidewalk space and private parking space would be only such right as he has in common with the public. Defendant in error does not appear to be entirely clear as to whether the parcel is a public park or part of the street. While the contention is urged, and frequently repeated, that it is a part of the street, he relies on the cases wherein it has been held that to lay out a town and designate a plat as “Park” will be held to constitute a dedication of such space as a public park, in the absence of anytMng to show a contrary intention. If tMs parcel was dedicated to the public as a park, the owner of every lot in Summit Place addition will be confronted with problems relating to ingress and egress and the control of what is to be planted in front of his residence. “In order to constitute a dedication of private property to public use, it must clearly appear that the owner intended- to absolutely and irrevocably set apart the land for public use.” Atlanta v. Railway, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 120 S. W. 923.
[8] The deed of dedication expressly states that all streets and alleys are thereby dedicated to the public generally, and especially to the city of San Antonio, subject to certain conditions therein named, one of which relates to poles, wires, sewers, water and gas mains, all of wMch are to be placed in the alleys. After the express dedication of the streets and alleys, appears the statement: “The red lines on map indicate public sidewalks, four feet wide, and the green shadings indicate private parking between the public sidewalk and the curbing along the streets.” This statement does not constitute any express dedication, such as was made with respect to the streets and alleys, but the mere designation of the sidewalk space as intended for public sidewalks, would doubtless be sufficient, and it has so been considered -by *149us, to constitute a dedication to the public pf an easement in such space for sidewalk. The designation of a strip as “private parking” cannot be considered on the same footing as to lay out a town and mark a square or other parcel as “Park,” in which case the intention would ordinarily be disclosed to make it a public park. We know of no clearer way to negative the idea that parting is to be public parking than to designate it as private parking.
Wle. have heretofore pointed out that the maker of the map, in indicating the width of lot 6 at 114 feet, took as parts of said lot the sidewalk space and the private parking space. This is proved conclusively by the fact that, unless we attribute such intention to the maker of the map, we must attribute to him the making of a map upon which the corner lots are laid out upon a different scale from the inside lots.
[9] Of course, if the intention of the maker of the map was to include the sidewalk space and the private parking space as portions of the corner lots, such intention was adopted by Summit Place Company when it had the map recorded.
The cases cited by appellee in the motion do not aid in determining the question at issue. The instrument indorsed on the map does not state that the sidewalk space and the private parking space constitute parts of the street. On the contrary, the statement is made that the private parking lies between the sidewalk and the curbing along the streets. Of course lot 6 could have been made to extend only to the sidewalk, in which case, doubtless, a black line would have been draiwn so as to clearly show its boundary, and the front line would have been marked “98” instead of “114.” It is also clear that the company could make the lot include the sidewalk space and private parking space, subject to an easement in favor of the public for sidewalk, and restrictions as to the use of the space designated as private parking. When the map and its accompanying deed of dedication are considered together, it clearly appears that Summit Place Company stipulated that lot 6 was 114 feet wide; that such distance was obtained by treating the lot as extending to the street indicated on the map; that the lot was burdened with an easement in favor of the public for sidewalks; and restrictions concerning the use of that part between the sidewalk and curb, imposed for the purpose of enhancing the beauty and symmetry of the addition.
If it could be held that there is such ambiguity as rendered it necessary to resort to circumstances attending the making of the map and its accompanying instrument, the uncontradicted testimony of Walker and Roos as to the plan on which the addition was laid out would resolve the ambiguity against defendant in error’s contention. This testimony was not contradicted except in so far as it contained statements to the effect that defendant in error participated in conferences resulting in the formation of the plan for laying out and selling the property. The extent of defendant in error’s connection with the company is covered by the trial court’s sixth finding of fact, copied in the original opinion. While it is true that Summit Place Company could not convey something it had already parted with, and if the map and deed of dedication showed clearly that lot 6 only had a front of 98 feet, the deed to defendant in error could not change that fact, under the testimony of Walker it appears that a general form of deed was prepared as a part of the plan for laying out and selling the addition, which form was to be used in all conveyances. This being true, the provisions of the deed in evidence cast light on the intent of the company with respect to the map and its accompanying instrument, and, as before pointed out, the deed treats the private parking as part of the lot, for it expressly provides that “no fence or coping shall be erected on any lot outside of the proposed sidewalk.”
As defendant in error has failed to prove the falsity of the representation that lot 6 contained 114 feet front on Queensborough Court, he cannot recover, for that is the only representation relied on in his pleading.
Defendant in error’s motion for rehearing is overruled.