Court Opinion

ID: 9707292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:07:51.760179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:30.597682
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I readily concur in virtually every aspect of this Court’s opinion in this difficult and very important case,17 except with respect to the Court’s affirmance of the Superior Court’s finding of disqualifying bias on the part of Michael Tikoian.18 I do not lightly dissent (even if only in part) in a case of such obvious importance. Nevertheless, after careful consideration of the facts and the law, I have no choice in good conscience but to dissent; I do so respectfully, but nonetheless quite vigorously.
I am fully persuaded of the correctness of most of the holdings that are so well articulated in the Court’s opinion, and I am pleased to concur in those holdings— most especially (1) the holding concerning the necessity of a remand to the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC); (2) the holding that the Superior Court committed clear error when it found disqualifying bias on the part of Paul Lemont; and (3) the holding relative to the principle of quasi-judicial immunity. (I am greatly concerned about preserving intact the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, and I readily and wholeheartedly concur in the scholarly and sensible paragraphs of the Court’s opinion that address that very significant issue.)19
*451While the foregoing words of laudatory endorsement are written in all sincerity, I must with equal sincerity express my disagreement with the majority’s decision to uphold the Superior Court’s finding of disqualifying bias20 on the part of Michael Tikoian. I acknowledge the thoughtful nature of the majority’s approach to the troubling question of bias (vel non) on the part of Mr. Tikoian, but I nonetheless remain convinced that .the Superior Court clearly erred when it found disqualifying bias on the part of that senior governmental official.21
I acknowledge the long-standing requirement that a finding of fact by a nisi prius court should be overturned only if said finding is clearly erroneous. That is a demanding requirement, but it is certainly not an insuperable one. See, e.g., Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 353 (R.I.2003) (holding that, in the context of a claim for adverse possession, a “trial justice misconceived and overlooked material evidence”); see also Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830, 836 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that a trial court clearly erred when it had “fundamentally misconstrued the testimony upon which it explicitly and exclusively relied”); Allen v. Johnson, 79 Conn.App. 740, 831 A.2d 282, 288 (2003) (holding that the trial court’s finding concerning a title issue was “clearly erroneous”).22 With respect to the issue of disqualifying bias on the part of Mr. Tikoian, I have no hesitancy in stating (respectfully) that the Superior Court clearly erred.
In all candor, I consider the finding by the Superior Court (and this Court’s affir-mance of same) as to the existence of disqualifying bias on the part of Mr. Tik-oian to be an unwarranted negative reflection23 on a man who, based upon my reading of the record, appears to be a conscientious public official — some of whose actions merit criticism in hindsight but who, under settled principles of administrative law, should not be deemed so *452biased as to be disqualified from further participation in this case. In my mind, disqualifying a judicial or quasi-judicial officer for bias should be a most uncommon occurrence. It should take place only after a careful balancing process. See, e.g., Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185 (R.I.2008) (“It is a well-recognized principle that judicial officers are duty-bound to recuse themselves if they are unable to render a fair or an impartial decision in a particular case. * * * At the same time, however, justices have an equally great obligation not to disqualify themselves when there is no sound reason to do so.”) (quotation marks omitted). In my judgment, by upholding the Superior Court’s finding of disqualifying bias on the part of Mr. Tik-oian, the majority has wandered off the path outlined by precedent; and I regretfully predict that the result will be that those involved in administrative adjudication in this jurisdiction in the future will “reap the whirlwind.”24
In my view, the trial justice in the Superior Court and the majority of this Court have erred because they have not given sufficient weight to the long-recognized presumption of regularity that attaches to the acts of public officials. A cogent description of that vitally important presumption may be found in the United States Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in the case of United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926). In that case, the Supreme Court wrote as follows:
“The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.” Id. at 14-15, 47 S.Ct. I.25
As this Court has similarly stated, “[a]ny administrator is presumed to be neutral unless proven to be otherwise.” In re Cross, 617 A.2d 97, 100 (R.I.1992); see also Nelson v. Dodge, 76 R.I. 1, 11-12, 68 A.2d 51, 56-57 (1949); Kelley v. City Council of Cranston, 61 R.I. 472, 482-83, 1 A.2d 185, 189 (1938).
In a similar vein, Justice Byron White, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in the frequently cited case of Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), expressly alluded to the principle that a contention of bias in an administrative adjudication “must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456 (emphasis added); see also Larue v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 568 A.2d 755, 758-59 (R.I.1990); Davis v. Wood, 444 A.2d 190, 192 (R.I.1982).
In Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.1988), a significant due process case involving the University of Rhode Island’s University Board on Student Conduct, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit wrote as follows:
“It would seem clear that the role of the board before whom the student appears is quasi-judicial, which presupposes the indispensable prerequisites of integrity and objectivity. * * * Generally, in examining administrative proceedings, the *453presumption favors the administrators, and the burden is upon the party challenging the action to produce evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption.” Id. at 15.
After examining the record in the case at bar, it is my conclusion that the party that sought to disqualify Mr. Tikoian failed to produce “evidence sufficient to rebut” the vitally important presumption of “integrity and objectivity” to which the First Circuit made such unequivocal reference in Gor-man. See id.
Considering the effect of the presumption of integrity on the case at bar, it should be emphasized ab initio that there is not the slightest hint in the record of any self-dealing or similar improper motivation on Mr. Tikoian’s part;26 in my judgment, this is a consideration of great importance.27 Instead, the more I scrutinize the record, the clearer it becomes to me that Mr. Tikoian’s motivation in the midst of the administrative proceedings was simply to attempt to bring about a compromise solution with respect to a highly controversial application.28 Mr. Tikoian’s alleged bias was rather a temporary “tilt” of an intellectual and pragmatic sort29 (as contrasted with a bias stemming from self-interest or from a “fixed judgment”); and there is no evidence in the record that convinces me that, if he were allowed to participate in the further proceedings that will take place at some future date, his views would not further evolve in one direction or the other, as they had in the past.30
*454It is apparently undisputed that Mr. Tikoian was not challenged as being biased when the administrative proceedings began. If, during the course of those proceedings, he formed certain tentative intellectual conclusions as to how the issues presented might best be resolved, my view would be that having such tentative viewpoints is entirely appropriate in the decision-making process. What he did is what any responsible decision-maker does: he or she listens to the evidence and formulates or reformulates tentative conclusions — without excluding the possibility that subsequent evidence or argument might sway him or her in another direction. I believe that the following particularly eloquent and perceptive passage from a well-known book written by a very distinguished (and recently deceased) federal judge accurately and succinctly describes the decision-making process:
“I see decision-making as neither a process that results in an early conviction based on instant exposure to competing briefs nor one in which the judge keeps an open mind through briefs, discussion in chambers, argument, and conference, and then summons up the will to decide. I see the process, rather, as a series of shifting biases. * * *
“One reads a good brief from the appellant; the position seems reasonable. But a good brief from appellee, bolstered perhaps by a trial judge’s opinion, seems incontrovertible. Discussion with the law clerks in chambers casts doubt on any tentative position. Any such doubt may be demolished by oral argument, only to give rise to a new bias, which in turn may be shaken by the postargument conference among the judges. * * * The guarantee of a judge’s impartiality lies not in suspending judgment throughout the process but in recognizing that each successive judgment is tentative, fragile, and likely to be modified or set aside as a consequence of deepened insight.” Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the Federal Appellate Bench 63 (1980) (emphasis added).
In my judgment, that passage from Judge Coffin’s fine little book deserves multiple re-readings and careful reflection. I am not aware of any more insightful explanation of the manner in which the decision-making process operates; the quoted passage is a profound reflection upon the manner in which the human intellect proceeds (viz., in a halting and tentative way) before it reaches a conclusion with respect to a complex matter. In my view, the above-quoted words of Judge Coffin are fully applicable to Mr. Tikoian’s decision-making process in the case at bar.
I believe that it is a regrettable error for this Court to uphold the disqualification of Mr. Tikoian with respect to future proceedings31 on the basis of any past in*455discretions in connection with this case. After long and careful consideration, I have been unable to locate in the record sufficient evidence of abiding bias to justify the disqualification of a man whom my reading of the record discloses to be an energetic, innovative, and conscientious public servant. See generally Del Vecchio v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir. en banc 1994) (“The question is not whether some possible temptation to be biased exists; instead, the question is, when does a biasing influence require disqualification?”). In my judgment, one can rightly apply to Mr. Tikoian, mutatis mutandis, the following colorful and cogent words written by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court with respect to cabinet officers in the often cited case of United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941):
“Cabinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to be flabby creatures any more than judges are. Both may have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case. But both are assumed to be [persons] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. Nothing in this record disturbs such an assumption.” Id. at 421, 61 S.Ct. 999.
I am well aware that it is a basic tenet of due process that every case should be tried before an impartial and independent adjudicator. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”); see also Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-47, 95 S.Ct. 1456; Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15; see generally Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1267, 1269 n. 10 (1975). This principle is applicable “to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). Yet, as several distinguished jurists have noted, that basic tenet must coexist with the fact that every sentient person has inherent predispositions. For example, Judge Jerome Frank, writing for the Second Circuit in his eloquent and frequently cited opinion in the case of In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.1943), stated:
“Democracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases fairly, and there can be no fair trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and disinterestedness. If, however, ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions; and the process of education, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations, attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition, are pre-judices. Without acquired ‘slants,’ pre-concep-tions, life could not go on.” Id. at 651 (emphasis added).32
It is self-evident that no judge or administrator should be expected to enter a proceeding with his or her mind being a complete tabula rasa.. Such a requirement would be at loggerheads with human nature. It is rather the duty of the decision-maker to be aware of his or her “preconceptions” and “predispositions”33 and not *456be controlled by them, but rather be controlled solely by the evidence in the record.34
For certain, courts have on occasion disqualified adjudicators for bias relating to self-interest. It is the presence of this type of bias, where an adjudicator has some personal stake in the outcome (unlike the above-described “series of shifting biases” 35 of an intellectual and not self-interested sort), that may well constitute a due process violation and require disqualification. See generally 2 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 6.10 (2d ed.1997). For example, in the case of Tumey v. Ohio, 278 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 487, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), the United States Supreme Court noted that the adjudicator in question in that case had had “a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial * * Id. at 523, 47 S.Ct. 437. In view of that fact, the Supreme Court held that “it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.” Id.; see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., — U.S. -,-, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2265, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (holding that “the probability of actual bias [rose] to an unconstitutional level” where a judge refused to recuse himself in a case involving a major donor to the judge’s election campaign). Likewise, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972), the Supreme Court held that, where the revenue derived from judgments rendered in a mayor’s court provided a substantial portion of the municipality’s funds, that mayor could not act in a disinterested fashion when serving in a judicial capacity. Id. at 59, 93 S.Ct. 80. I repeat that there is absolutely no indication in the record of such a pecuniary motivation or other form of self-dealing on Mr. Tikoian’s part.
By contrast, it is a well established principle that it is not improper for administrators “to form views about law and policy on the basis of their prior adjudications of similar issues which may influence them in deciding later cases.” Rombough v. Federal Aviation Administration, 594 F.2d 893, 900 (2d Cir.1979); see also Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702-03, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948) (holding that the Commission’s public statements regarding its views on a particular pricing system did not merit disqualification); 2 Koch, at § 6.10. Additionally, an adjudicator should not be “disqualified simply because [he or she] has taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing that he is not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association, 426 U.S. 482, 493, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Morgan, 313 U.S. at 421, 61 S.Ct. 999; see generally 48A C.J.S. Judges § 265 (2004). Nothing in the record of this case indicates that Mr. *457Tikoian’s views would not have evolved further if he was unsuccessful in his attempt at arriving at a compromise through the Goulet plan.
With the sole exception of the trial justice’s finding that Mr. Tikoian threatened a subcommittee member that he would not be reappointed if he did not vote for the Goulet plan, nothing in the record convinces me that there was any disqualifying bias on Mr. Tikoian’s part. I readily concede that, in making such a threat, Mr. Tikoian acted unwisely and improperly; and, while I neither excuse nor minimize the seriousness of that particular activity, common experience educates us to the fact that a certain amount of “arm wrestling” frequently takes place when a decision-making body (including judicial and quasi-judicial bodies) seeks to arrive at a decision. Indeed, I believe that some degree of vigorous interaction36 within a group charged with rendering a fair decision is often salutary. Mr. Tikoian should undoubtedly be chastised for having acted in such a manner, and he should be admonished not to act similarly in the future. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the threat articulated by Mr. Tikoian, while inappropriate, was indicative of a permanent or abiding bias on his part. My overall impression, after perusing the entire record and considering the presumption of integrity, is that Mr. Tikoian is a sincere and well-meaning public official who, at a particular point in time, endeavored to bring about a “half-a-loaf ’ compromise outcome. Search as I may, I am unable to perceive sufficient evidence in the record to justify the Superior Court’s finding of disqualifying bias on the part of Mr. Tikoian.
As for Mr. Tikoian’s contacts with Governor Carcieri and his staff, they are to me much ado about nothing in terms of a disqualifying bias analysis.37 I concede that it would have been preferable for Mr. Tikoian to have delegated a subordinate to maintain contact with the Governor’s office. But what is significant is the lack of any finding by the trial justice that the Governor or his staff sought to “lobby” or “pressure” Mr. Tikoian in one direction or another. To the contrary, the trial justice explicitly found that the Governor did not attempt to lobby Mr. Tikoian; such a factual finding is, in my judgment, highly significant.38 Similarly, I consider Mr. Tikoian’s statements to various news reporters to be of no real import. See generally Cement Institute, 333 U.S. at 702-03, 68 S.Ct. 793. Therefore, it is my conviction that any reliance upon these (con-cededly ex parte) communications should not be dispositive in the disqualifying bias analysis.
Mr. Tikoian may not have acted in all respects exactly as this Court, in recent times, has come to expect quasi-judicial adjudicating officials to act. See, e.g., Arnold, v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 820-22 (R.I. 2007) (clarifying the norms concerning the duty of administrative adjudicators to avoid ex parte contacts in administrative proceedings). That being said, however, I believe that Mr. Tikoian’s actions must be judged in light of the substantially more opaque standards that prevailed in the *458pre-A-rooM era; and I further respectfully maintain that Mr. Tikoian’s various ex parte contacts that are reflected in the record do not overcome the presumption of integrity or demonstrate the presence of disqualifying bias.
I take no issue with the more exigent considerations relative to ex parte contacts which are the result of the clarifications that were spelled out in the quite recent39 Arnold case.40 However, I think that it is fundamentally unfair to apply those more exigent considerations to the pre-Arnold actions of Mr. Tikoian, with the result being that he is held to be disqualified from participating in future administrative proceedings with respect to this case. Now that there has been authoritative clarification of the “ground rules” that should govern administrative proceedings conducted by quasi-judicial officers, I know of no reason not to believe that Mr. Tikoi-an will henceforth act assiduously in accordance therewith. We as a society expect a great deal of our public officials — including integrity and an acute sensitivity to ethical standards. However, I consider it unwarranted to expect that such officials be clairvoyant as to not yet clearly promulgated expectations and norms. There is something fundamentally unfair in viewing yesterday’s activities through today’s ethical spectacles (viz., the clarifications articulated in Arnold). In my judgment, while remand to the CRMC is an entirely appropriate remedial measure, Mr. Tikoian should not be disqualified from partieipat-ing in the further proceedings that are to take place.
In further support of the view just expressed, I would note that I am of the same mind as was the circuit court in the leading case of Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547 (D.C.Cir.1982) (PATCO). In the PATCO case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that ex parte contacts do not inevitably lead to disqualifying bias. Id. at 572-78. In that case, a union leader invited a member of the Federal Labor Relations Authority to dinner. Id. at 559. During their dinner conversation, which lasted approximately an hour and a half, the two gentlemen engaged in a fifteen minute discussion regarding a case that was pending before the Labor Relations Authority. Id. at 559, 571. The Court of Appeals ruled that, while it did not condone that behavior of the two gentlemen, it did not believe that the ex parte dinner conversation “irrevocably tainted the Authority’s decision-making process or resulted in a decision unfair either to the parties or to the public interest.” Id. at 573.41 While Mr. Tikoian’s actions in the instant case were concededly not fully consistent with the administrative law standards recently clarified by this Court in Arnold,42 I am entirely unable to conclude that his ability to perform as an *459impartial decision-maker was irrevocably tainted by what he did.
As I view it, there is, with respect to the Tikoian bias issue, an absolutist tone to the Superior Court’s reasoning and to this Court’s affirmance thereof; there is a failure to take into account the manner in which decision-making groups operate in the real world.43 While I certainly do not countenance any departure from high ethical standards by those acting in quasi-judicial capacities, the sometimes rough- and-tumble character of group decision-making is a reality; I believe that beneficial light in the end often emerges from such rough-and-tumble proceedings. I often recall the pithy and sagacious admonition of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: “We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.” Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501, 51 S.Ct. 228, 75 L.Ed. 482 (1931) (quoted with approval by this Court in Plantation Legal Defense Services, Inc. v. O’Brien, 121 R.I. 595, 597, 401 A.2d 1277, 1278 (1979)); see also In re Request for Advisory Opinion from the House of Representatives (Coastal Resources Management Council), 961 A.2d 930, 933 n. 3 (R.I.2008) (quoting with approval the same admonition of Justice Holmes).
Mistakes were made in this case — undoubtedly.44 But I find nothing in the record that indicates to me that Mr. Tikoi-an should be disqualified with respect to future proceedings in this case or that such mistakes cannot be resolved by disclosure of the ex parte contacts upon remand to the CRMC. I repeat that I am convinced, after a careful perusal of the record, that Mr. Tikoian was not acting out of some sort of self-interest or personal animus or fixed judgment; I see no evidence that his actions were the product of any improper purpose. Instead, it is clear to me that Mr. Tikoian eventually became convinced, as the proceedings progressed,45 that a compromise solution might be the best, considering the interests and goals of all concerned.46 Thereafter, he became familiar with the compromise plan that was cobbled together at the direction of Mr. Lemont (“the Goulet plan”), and he then did his best to convince other CRMC members of the desirability of such a compromise solution. Except for his regrettable use of overly heavy-handed tactics vis-á-vis a fellow member of the CRMC, I do not perceive his actions as being different in kind from those that can be perceived within any decision-making body on any given day.
An intellectually arrived at conviction at one moment in time that a compromise solution might be best does not add up to disqualifying bias; this Court made precisely that point in its unanimous recent *460decision in Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174 (R.I.2008). In that case, this Court lauded the desirability of settlement and compromise, and it ruled that the trial justice’s earnest efforts to bring about same were entirely proper. Id. at 186-87. I consider the following language from the Ryan opinion to be applicable (mutatis mutandis) to Mr. Tik-oian’s efforts to have the CRMC arrive at a compromise decision:
“In view of the venerable judicial policy of encouraging settlement and endorsing the mediation alternative, it borders on the offensive for a party to claim that a justice should be recused for adhering to this policy. We see no reason why the efforts of a trial justice to encourage settlement is in any way indicative of personal bias or prejudice; by encouraging settlement, a trial justice is not expressing a preconceived view of the case before him or her, but rather is simply promoting this state’s sound policy of favoring settlement and/or mediation of disputes.” Id. at 187.
I am deeply concerned that the majority’s opinion with respect to Mr. Tikoian will discourage future compromise and settlement discussions in matters pending before this state’s several adjudicative bodies — and I consider that to be a very regrettable result.
When all is said and done, it is my definite view that the presumption of regularity and of integrity has not been overcome with respect to Mr. Tikoian — far from it! I am convinced that the trial justice’s finding of disqualifying bias as to him is clearly erroneous. It is further my very respectful conviction that the majority is doing a disservice to a senior public official and to the citizens of this state by upholding the ruling that Mr. Tikoian is so irrevocably biased that he should be disqualified with respect to future proceedings in this case. In my judgment, Mr. Tikoian should be permitted to sit with the other current members of the Coastal Resources Management Council as it considers the additional material that this Court has held it should consider upon remand.
For all of these reasons I very respectfully, but most vigorously, dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the Superior Court’s finding of disqualifying bias on the part of Michael Tikoian. I express no view as to the Gerald Zarrella issue. With those two exceptions, I am very pleased to concur in all the rest of the Court’s opinion.

. This case is of great importance to those concerned with environmental preservation, to those who seek to engage in construction projects in the coastal areas, and to those interested in the intricacies of administrative law.

. I express no view whatsoever concerning the Superior Court's finding of disqualifying bias on the part of Gerald Zarrella, who is no longer a member of the Coastal Resources Management Council. I would prefer not to pass upon such an issue unless it were absolutely necessary to do so. See generally PDK Laboratories Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (then-Circuit Judge John Roberts, concurring in part) (stating that “the cardinal principle of judicial restraint” is that "if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more”).

.With respect to the quasi-judicial immunity issue, I feel obliged to record in the most emphatic terms my view that any probing of the thought processes of judicial or quasi-judicial officials with respect to their thinking while engaged in decision-malting should take place, if ever, only in the most extraordinary of circumstances (which certainly were not present in tins case). The probing of the thought processes of such decision-makers is alien to the Anglo-American legal tradition, and I for one could not readily be a party to any liberalization of the law in this domain. If such liberalization were to occur, I think that it is inevitable that the courts would immediately begin to see non-prevailing party after non-prevailing party seek to analyze the thought processes of those decision-makers who reached a result contrary to the wishes of the non-prevailing party. The result would be chaos of the sort that Charles Dickens loved to satirize.

. A frequently cited legal reference work defines the word "bias” as meaning “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will on the one hand or undue friendship or favoritism on the other toward one of the litigants or his or her attorney, with a formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of a judge as distinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.” 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 128 (2009) (emphasis added). I believe that the words “fixed anticipatory judgment” in this definition are especially important.

. Even if one considers the Superior Court’s ruling concerning the disqualifying bias on the part of Mr. Tikoian to be a close call (and I do not), it is my view that the "presumption of integrity” (see discussion of said principle, infra) should militate against a finding of disqualifying bias. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). It is my opinion that that is precisely what the presumption of integrity is meant to do. Employing a “tie goes to the runner” approach in close call situations serves (inter alia) the goal of discouraging the filing of minimally supported motions seeking recusal or disqualification. See footnote 26, infra.

. Appellate determinations that a nisi prius court has clearly erred are by no means in the "once in a blue moon” category. Indeed, in this very case the Court holds (and I readily concur in that holding) that the trial justice clearly erred in finding disqualifying bias on the part of Paul Lemont.

. I wish to emphasize that I very definitively do not read the majority opinion as suggesting that there was any sort of ignoble motivation on Mr. Tikoian’s part. It is my understanding that my colleagues in the majority as to the Tikoian issue simply share the trial justice’s conviction that, at some point during the administrative proceedings relative to this case, Mr. Tikoian's thought processes became fixed to such an extent that he could no longer render an unbiased decision. It is my view, by contrast, that the record does not support a finding that his thought processes had become fixed to such an extent. See footnote 20, supra.

. Hosea 8:7 (King James).

. See also United Stales v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941); Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir.1972) (noting "the well recognized presumption as to the regularity of the acts of public officials”); Chequinn Corp. v. Mullen, 159 Me. 375, 193 A.2d 432, 435 (1963) ("The good faith of a public official is not lightly to be denied. Proof of prejudice and bias sufficient to overcome the sense of responsibility to office and to community must be heavy.”); see generally 67 C.J.S. Officers § 240 (2002).

. I think it important to repeat that I do not infer from the majority opinion any suggestion that the majority deems Mr. Tikoian’s conduct to have been unethical or the product of moral turpitude. My understanding of the majority's viewpoint is that it was inclined to find as not clearly erroneous the trial justice’s position that, in a close case, one should understand die maxim “the tie goes to the runner” as meaning that, when faced with an apparent "tie” or fifty-fifty call as to disqualifying bias vel non, the "tie” should be resolved in favor of recusal — whereas I believe that it should be resolved in favor of non-recusal.

. I recognize that bias does not necessarily stem from extrajudicial sources. See Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185-86 n. 21 (R.I.2008); see generally Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994); State v. Nordstrom, 122 R.I. 412, 414, 408 A.2d 601, 602 (1979). With respect to the case at bar, however, I am unable to conclude from the record that there was sufficient evidence of disqualifying bias on the part of Mr. Tikoian— regardless of whether one takes into account extrajudicial sources or occurrences within the administrative proceedings.

. In my judgment, it is significant that the record discloses that Mr. Tikoian’s interest in what came to be called "the Goulet plan” was not present at the outset of the CRMC proceedings; it came about only after the administrative proceedings were underway. I can find absolutely no evidence in the record that Mr. Tikoian had a "fixed anticipatory judgment” (see footnote 20, supra) when those proceedings commenced. Moreover, I can perceive no sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that he had a fixed judgment at any later time as those proceedings went forward.

. As I discuss further in the next paragraph of the text, it is a basic feature of the human reasoning process that numerous temporary intellectual "conclusions” are reached in the course of an administrative or judicial proceeding before the final conclusion is reached at the end of the proceeding.

. It is clear from the record that Mr. Tikoian showed an ability to modify his thinking about the proposed project as time went by. Significantly, it appears from the record before us that Mr. Tikoian wished to subject the petition of Champlin's to an immediate vote of the full. CRMC when the petition was initially proposed. Moreover, it was Mr. Tikoian who appointed Mr. Zarrella (who the record reveals to be at all times favorably inclined towards the proposed project) to the subcommittee. In my view, these facts constitute *454meaningful evidence that Mr. Tikoian’s initial thinking was far from what it later became. In plain English, Mr. Tikoian's thinking evolved over time.

. It is clear that the trial justice did not foresee the need for any future proceedings when she carried out her virtually unprecedented arithmetical readjustment of the votes cast by certain members of the CRMC (viz., Mr. Tikoian, Mr. Lemont, and Mr. Zarrella) with respect to the application at issue. (It will be recalled that the trial justice carried out her arithmetical readjustment after she had ruled that Mr. Tikoian and the other two just-mentioned members of the CRMC should be disqualified, resulting in their votes not being counted.)
However, as a result of today’s holding of the Court as to remedy (in which holding I unequivocally concur), there will now be further administrative proceedings with respect to this case. It is my definite conviction that the majority errs in holding that Mr. Tikoian should be disqualified from participating in those future proceedings.

. See also Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 167 (1921).

. See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943) (Jerome Frank, J.).

. Undoubtedly, there will be occasions where a decision-maker has so strong an intellectual predisposition as to a particular issue that due process would require recusal or disqualification. See footnote 20, supra. However, I see nothing in the record that in any meaningful way suggests that Mr. Tikoian had such a strong intellectual predisposition as to any material issue in this case.

. Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the Federal Appellate Bench 63 (1980).

.Let me be clear: permissible "vigorous interaction” within a decision-making body may often include heated rational debate and even a substantial degree of emotional rhetoric, but not an activity such as an actual threat to a fellow member regarding his future on the adjudicative body.

. Governor Carcieri is not a party to this case, nor is any member of his staff.

. The Superior Court did note that Governor Carcieri expressed a tentative preference for a plan involving less expansion than that originally proposed by Champlin's.

. The opinion in Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813 (R.I.2007), was issued on December 24, 2007.

. The trial justice apparently considered the Arnold opinion to be of moment because, when it came to her attention, she specifically requested that the parlies submit legal memo-randa addressing the ramifications of that opinion for the case at bar.

. To my mind, the expression “irrevocably tainted” in the PATCO decision quoted in the text is of capital importance. Disqualifying bias and the duty to recuse are present when a decision-maker has been irrevocably tainted by considerations other than the evidence of record. I do not perceive any basis in the record for concluding that Mr. Tikoian was irrevocably tainted.

. Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813 (R.I.2007).

. I make this observation without implying any lack of respect for those with whom I disagree concerning the disqualification of Mr. Tikoian. The several bias issues in this case are very difficult, and the opinions of the trial justice and of my colleagues deserve (and have) my genuine respect as being the work product of conscientious adjudicators.

. In Joseph Conrad's novel An Outcast of the Islands 154 (1920), one of the characters memorably comments: "It’s only those who do nothing that make no mistakes, I suppose.”

. See Coffin, footnote 35, supra, at 63 ("[Ejach successive judgment is tentative, fragile, and likely to be modified or set aside as a consequence of deepened insight.”).

. It should at all times be borne in mind that this Court looks with favor on attempts to compromise or settle disputes. See, e.g., Ryan, 941 A.2d at 186; Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 294 n. 19 (R.I.2007).