Court Opinion

ID: 9809525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:16:50.220322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:24.038853
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.
(dissenting) : The learning as to judgments by default and inquiry is not applicable in this case, for,, though such judgment was taken by mutual consent, it was in effect set aside, the plaintiff at the trial term being permitted to amend his complaint and the defendant to-file his answer, and the issues arising thereon were duly submitted to the jury. The plaintiff testified that he made the contract with one Swan as agent of the defendant. The defendant objected that there was no evidence of agency. The court overruled the objection and the defendant, excepted. Whether there was jprima facie evidence of agency was for the court. The material fact that Swan was the agent of the defendant authorized to-contract was for the jury. The judge overruled the exception, thus passing on the fact himself. The exception being made, it was incumbent on,' the judge to set out the pertinent evidence. The Code, Sec. 412 (2) expressly so-*939requires, but there is no evidence in the record tending to show the ageucy. It may have been stated on the argument here that the defendant had theretofore paid for timber bought for it by Swan, but nothing of the kind appears in the case on appeal. The record states : “ The defendant objected to the paper as evidence. The court admitted the same with the remark, made in a very pointed manner, that he would allow the paper to be read and risk it; that when people contracted debts, they must pay the same. Defendant excepted.” This was an expression of opinion that the defendant had contracted a debt to the plaintiff which was still due and ought to be paid, and was a violation of the act of 1796, now The Oode, Sec. 413. State v. Dick, 60 N. C., 45; Reiger v. Davis, 67 N. C., 185; State v. Dancy, 78 N. C., 437. “The court made calculation and statement of amount claimed by plaintiff, as per alleged contract price and as testified to by plaintiff and handed same to the jury, and told them that the same was what the court had calculated to' be due the plaintiff by the defendant, by the contract.” This was .an expression of opinion by the court that the testimony of the plaintiff was correct, and this could not he corrected.by the judge adding thereto “ but for the jury to make their own calculations, that they were not bound by his.” State v. Dick, supra, is exactly “ on all fours,” but indeed no precedent is needed to .show that, if this is admissible, the statute designed to present the weight of the judge’s views of the evidence going to the jury is henceforth a nullity. It is a violation of Section 413 of The Code for the judge at any time during the trial — and not in the charge only— to express an opinion before the jury on the weight of the evidence. State v. Browning, 78 N. C., 555; March v. Verble, 79 N. C., 19; Sever v. McLaughlin, 79. N. C., 153 Fickey v. Merrimon, Id., 585. The plaintiff testified that *940he sold to the defendant all his poplar and hard wood trees on 100 acres of land at $4.25 per M. for poplar, and $4 perM. for hard wood “when cut, peeled, sawed in logs and delivered to defendant on the banks of Cheoah river.” He further testified that he delivered only 7 M. feet of poplar, and that he cut, peeled and sawed 41 M. feet of pop' Jar but did not deliver it, and that he cut and peeled 100 M. feet of hard wood, about 5 M. of this being also sawed into logs of the contract length, but none of this timber was delivered at the Cbeo'ah river except the 7 M. feet of poplar.
Upon this state of facts the court charged, as a measure of damages, that “ the plaintiff was entitled to the contract price, less the sum it would cost to put the timber to the river, ” and the defendant excepted. Upon this the plaintiff recovered (the jury doubtless taking the calculation made for them by the judge) $313.25, when only 7,000 feet of lumber at $4.25 was shown to have been delivered. There is no evidence in the record showing any state of facts which could have authorized a verdict against the defendant for timber not delivered at the stipulated point, and this instruction being excepted to, in justice to the defendant it was incumbent upon the court to set out the evidence pertinent to that charge, and which would justify it. On the evidence, as it appears in the record, this instruction is erroneous.
But in any aspect of the evidence, even if.it liad been ■shown (as it was not) that the logs had been delivered at the river, the instruction was wrong. When the vendor delivers the goods at the place agreed, if the vendee fails or refuses without cause to accept them, the universally recognized rule of damages (save in very exceptional cases) is the difference between the contract price and the market price. This is indeed elementary law, and is to be *941found easily accessible in all of the authorities. 2 South-erland Damages, Sec. 647, and numerous cases there cited Clifton v. Newsom, 46 N. C., 108; 2 Benjamin Sales, Sec. 1117, and cases cited in note; Barron v. Arnaud, 8 C. B., 804; 3 Parson Contracts, 209 (marginal page) and cases cited. The instinotion of the court in this ease gave the plaintiff more damages than he could have had if it had been shown that all the timber had actually been delivered at the stipulated place ; but in fact his own .evidence, fai-from sustaining the allegations made in the complaint, showed only 7,000 feet delivered and no excuse for failure to deliver the balance. Even if this had been a judgment by default and inquiry, (instead of answer filed and a trial upon issues framed, as it was,) still, it would have been a default and inquiry and not a judgment by default final. Hence, even in that case, it would have been incumbent on the plaintiff to prove his case, the default and inquiry admitting only a cause of action and judgment for costs till something more was approved. Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C., 291. Oldham v. Kerchner, 81 N. C., 430, was an action by a vendee for failure to deliver, and not, as in this case, an action by a vendor for failure to receive and pay ; besides, in the Oldham case the vendee was allowed to recover profits of grinding, because the vendor contracted well knowing the purpose of the vendee in buying..
The court further instructed the jury upon the second issue as to damages : “ That the plaintiff was entitled to damages ; that as to the amount of damages, it was for the jury to find from the evidence what sum the plaintiff is-entitled to.” Defendant excepted. On this issue the-plaintiff recovered $86.75-. The record proper (in the-judgment signed by the court) states that “ by consent, the plaintiff having been allowed to so amend his complaint as to set up such claim as he may have- against the *942defendant for damages sustained by him by reason oí defendant’s breach of its contract, and the defendant being allowed to answer, denying the damage alleged, and both amendment and answer being treated as in, without objection certain issues were submitted to the jury as follows.” It is on the second of t]ie issues thus framed on the pleadings, there being an allegation and a denial of damage, that the Judge tells the jury that “ the plaintiff is entitled to damages — rhow much is for the jury to say.” This charge is erroneous certainly on the face of the record, and, if the state of the evidence was such as to justify this instruction, the exception put the court and the appellee on notice to send up the pertinent evidence that would sustain it, and, it not being sent up, and taking the record as it is to be full and true, this charge was properly excepted to, it being supported by no evidence, and likewise an expression of opinion. It certainly could have been no guide to the jury, beyond the instruction by the court to allow the plaintiff something on the second issue. It may be that the case was imperfectly made out, but we must take the record as we find it. The appellee not having excepted to the appellant’s case, it is as conclusive as if settled by the judge. Resides, it appears that the judge expressed his opinion three times in the charge that the plaintiff ought to recover. Possibly he ought. We do not know how that may be, but his Honor should not have intimated his opinion to the jury to that effect.