Court Opinion

ID: 9451295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:12:53.971289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:39.236674
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting).
I dissent. My concurrence in the court’s original opinion1 was based upon contentment with result supported by a convenient subjective application of the generality that the doctrine of equivalents has no broad scope to premise infringement when the grant of patent has required the applicant to be satisfied with specific and strict limitation of claims. The basis of inventiveness is thus clearly defined and the range of equivalency becomes, as this court has stated, “minimal.” Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Tex-on, 1 Cir., 268 F.2d 839, 843. But I do not disagree with the court’s views on infringement were they projected against a background of a valid patent issued for inventiveness in principle, part or combination. I do not consider the case at bar to present such a background. To me, the prior art discloses both the operative principle and parts of the Seavey patent. And, indeed, appellee’s expert witnesses so conceded, asserting the inventiveness lay in the detailed design of the parts to obtain maximum cooperation. These particulars of design consist of an even number of bolt holes in the pump housing, equi-spaced, and symmetrical 180° parts in the transmission cover plate. Neither of these particulars is present in the accused device (except, as broad equivalents) and, again, to me, are obvious and disclosed in the prior art including the Packard marine transmission and appellant’s own automotive transmission.

. The court’s original opinion, filed but withdrawn, held the patent uninfringed and indicated possible disagreement upon, but did not reach, the issue of validity.