Court Opinion

ID: 9931242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 18:02:46.054837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:36.625832
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                                DAVID SEGAL,
                                  Appellant,

                                        v.

  ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, an Agency,
                      Appellee.

                             No. 1 CA-UB 22-0358
                               FILED 2-8-2024

               Special Action - Industrial Commission
                        No. U-1790328-001-B
       The Honorable Marjorie Nanian, Administrative Law Judge

                            APPEAL DISMISSED

                                   COUNSEL

Yuzhuo Li, Attorney at Law, Mesa
By Yuzhuo Li
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee
                             SEGAL v. ADES
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1             Appellant David Segal challenges a determination made by
the Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) Appeals Board
(“Board”) that he was ineligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
(“PUA”) and would thus be required to repay the amounts he had received.
Because ADES later waived his repayment obligation, he is no longer
aggrieved by the Board’s decision. We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.

¶2            Between March 2020 and May 2021, Segal applied for and
received PUA benefits. However, in notices provided to Segal between July
2021 and November 2021, ADES determined he was not eligible for PUA
benefits and classified them as overpayments, requiring him “to refund the
money” to ADES. Segal appealed these determinations, and as pertinent
here, they were affirmed by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in January
2022. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Segal filed his timely
application for appeal to this court in September 2022.

¶3             In June 2023, ADES sent four notices to Segal stating that he
would “not need to repay these benefits because these payments were
issued incorrectly through no fault of your own, and repayment would be
contrary to equity and good conscience. . . . The remaining overpayment
balance and your repayment obligation have been waived in full.” Two
months later, Segal filed four applications for appeal, acknowledging the
waiver notices and asking the Board to apply them but arguably still
challenging his PUA eligibility. In October 2023, this court issued orders
denying each of those applications for appeal. Meanwhile, in January 2023,
this court granted Segal’s application for appeal in this case challenging the
eligibility determination, appointed pro bono counsel to represent him, and
ordered briefing, which was completed by September 2023.

¶4             We have an independent duty to determine our appellate
jurisdiction, Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464, 465 (App.
1997), which is “defined, and limited, by the Legislature,” Brumett v. MGA

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                              SEGAL v. ADES
                            Decision of the Court

Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 426, ¶ 4 (App. 2016). See also Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 9 (“The jurisdiction, powers, duties and composition of any
intermediate appellate court shall be as provided by law.”).

¶5            As Segal notes in his opening brief, this court’s jurisdiction to
review the Board’s rulings arises from A.R.S. § 41-1993(B), which states that
a “party aggrieved by a decision of the appeals board may file an application
for appeal to the court of appeals.” (Emphasis added.) And as
demonstrated by the unique procedural circumstances of this case, whether
a party is aggrieved may be affected by events that occur after filing of the
application for appeal.

¶6            “To qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate
to deny the party some personal or property right or to impose a substantial
burden on the party.” Jewel C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 347, 349, ¶ 3
(App. 2018) (quoting Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. B-9385, 138 Ariz. 291, 293
(1983)). Originally, Segal was aggrieved by the Board’s decision because it
found him ineligible for PUA and determined he needed to repay those
funds. However, given ADES’s subsequent decision to waive the
overpayments, Segal has been relieved of that obligation and no longer
faces imposition of a substantial burden or denial of a property right. Nor
does he argue that the administrative decision regarding eligibility would
impose collateral consequences. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 618, ¶ 9
(App. 2012) (discussing the “collateral consequences exception” to
mootness). Thus, whether the Board erred in finding him ineligible for
those funds is moot, which also means dismissal of the appeal is
appropriate. Id. at 617, ¶ 5 (noting that an appeal will be dismissed as moot
“when our action as a reviewing court will have no effect on the parties”).

¶7            Although the record is not clear as to the precise amount of
PUA funds Segal received, he has not been harmed given that ADES
waived his repayment obligations “in full.” Because Segal is no longer
aggrieved by the Board’s determination that he was not eligible for PUA
benefits, we dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Chambers v.
United Farm Workers Org. Comm., AFL-CIO, 25 Ariz. App. 104, 107 (1975)
(“Dismissal is required for lack of an aggrieved party.”).

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA
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