Court Opinion

ID: 9529417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:38.159756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:46.331526
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL, dissenting: I agree with the majority that summary judgment is generally inappropriate in scope of employment cases and that criminal acts of an employee may fall within the scope of employment. I disagree that this case is an exception to these rules. The majority opinion relies on cases holding that an employer could not be vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of an employee. Deloney v. Board of Education, 281 Ill. App. 3d 775, 666 N.E.2d 792 (1996) (truant officer allegedly committed aggravated criminal sexual assault); Randi F. v. High Ridge YMCA, 170 Ill. App. 3d 962, 524 N.E.2d 966 (1988) (day care worker beat and fondled child); Webb v. Jewel Cos., 137 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 485 N.E.2d 409 (1985) (security guard searched and fondled girl customer); Hoover v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 51 Ill. App. 3d 263, 366 N.E.2d 925 (1977) (doctor had carnal knowledge of patient against her will). However, sexual activity is totally outside the job duties of a truant officer, day care worker or security guard. While there may be cases where a doctor will touch the genitals or breasts of a patient, Hoover involved alleged forced sexual intercourse based on a pretext of treatment. Hoover, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 264, 366 N.E.2d at 927.2 Webb rejected a distinction between fondling and intercourse, but Webb involved a security guard, not a masseur. Plaintiffs cite Metzler v. Layton, 373 Ill. 88, 25 N.E.2d 60 (1939), in which an office manager chased and shot a co-employee who had robbed the office. The supreme court held that Layton’s private, personal motive for the chase did not exclude the interest of his employer, as “[t]he pursuit was the continuation of one transaction.” Metzler, 373 Ill. at 92, 25 N.E.2d at 62. The Metzler court approvingly stated: “In the case of Gulf, Colorado [&] Sante Fe Railway Co. v. Cobb, [Tex. Civ. App.,] 45 S.W.2d 323, [326,] the court said: ‘The master is liable for any such act of the servant which, if isolated, would not be imputable to the master, but which is so connected with and immediately grows out of another act of the servant imputable to the master, that both acts are treated as one indivisible tort, which, for the purposes of the master’s liability, takes its color and quality from the earlier act.’ ” Metzler, 373 Ill. at 92-93, 25 N.E.2d at 62. The supreme court stated that it could not “presume to separate the acts of Layton as a servant from the acts of Layton as an individual where the entire occurrence was within such a very short space of time.” Metzler, 373 Ill. at 93, 25 N.E.2d at 62. The court concluded that vicarious liability “was a question for the jury to decide.” Metzler, 373 Ill. at 93, 25 N.E.2d at 62. Similarly, in this case, the improper massage is connected with and immediately grows out of the massage authorized by the hotel and raises a question of fact. A jury should be allowed to decide whether the acts are divisible. The Ritz Carlton claims that the misconduct here was not in furtherance of its business. However, in Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989), a case involving an allegedly intoxicated driver, the supreme court did not use the term “furtherance” as a touchstone of analysis; instead, it appears in the dissent. Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 372, 543 N.E.2d at 1314 (Ryan, J., dissenting, joined by Miller, J.) (citing Hoover and Webb). Moreover, the Ritz Carlton benefits from the provision of massage services to its guests. The provision of these services created the opportunity for the misconduct alleged here. In addition, the defendant in this case is a hotel. Plaintiffs note that a hotel owes its guests a duty of care for their safety. There is a duty to protect others from attack by a third person where the attack was reasonably foreseeable and the parties had a special relationship such as carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, business inviter-invitee, or voluntary custodian-protectee. Morgan v. 253 East Delaware Condominium Ass’n, 231 Ill. App. 3d 208, 211, 595 N.E.2d 36, 38 (1992). In Eversole v. Wasson, 80 Ill. App. 3d 94, 398 N.E.2d 1246 (1980), which plaintiffs cited in opposition to summary judgment, a student sued a teacher and school district after the teacher assaulted him in school based on a grievance arising outside of school. This court reversed a judgment in bar of action against the school district, based on the in loco parentis relationship of the master to the victim. Eversole, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 96-97, 398 N.E.2d at 1247-48, citing W Prosser, Torts § 70 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser, upon which the Eversole court relied, wrote that vicarious liability is imposed “even for such entirely personal torts as *** rape” and applies to innkeepers. W. Prosser, Torts § 70, at 465 (4th ed. 1971). The Restatement (Second) of Agency contains a similar example: “The chambermaid at a hotel steals the clothes of a traveler stopping at the hotel. The hotel keeper is subject to liability although he reasonably believed the chambermaid to be honest.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214, Illustration 5, at 466 (1958). Moreover, in such a case, the fact that the agent “acts for his own purposes and with no intent to benefit the principal is immaterial.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214, Comment e, at 466 (1958). In this case, the hotel’s contracts with masseurs require adherence to the code of ethics of the American Massage Therapy Association, which forbids the misconduct alleged here. This requirement may be construed as evidence that the alleged misconduct was reasonably foreseeable, which may result in vicarious liability. See Wright, 174 Ill. 2d at 405, 675 N.E.2d at 118; Eversole, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 96-97, 398 N.E.2d at 1247-48; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 245 (1958) (use of force). Although the majority opinion concludes that the masseurs cannot be compared to psychiatrists, hotel masseurs can be compared to hotel chambermaids. Given the relationship between the hotel and the plaintiffs, and the fact that the alleged misconduct here arises from the employees’ job duties, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to vicariously liability. Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should only be allowed when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1986). In this case, the summary judgment is not free from doubt. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   The majority opinion also dismisses plaintiffs’ reliance on St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Downs, 247 Ill. App. 3d 382, 617 N.E.2d 338 (1993), as a misplaced citation of dicta. The majority also states that Deloney contains an exhaustive review of “scope of employment” cases. However, the cases cited in Deloney as rejecting liability in cases involving teachers and day care workers are from jurisdictions such as California and Minnesota, both of which impose vicarious liability on hospitals for sexual misconduct of psychiatrists and doctors. See Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1988); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1982). See also Inderbitzden v. Lane Hospital, 124 Cal. App. 462, 12 P.2d 744 (1932) (implying vicarious liability for medical students). In Doe v. Samaritan Counselling Center, 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990), the court reversed a summary judgment on a respondeat superior claim involving sexual conduct by a counsellor. In Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 594 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), the court held there could be vicarious liability for a sexual assault committed by a nursing assistant. Of course, not all jurisdictions agree on this point. However, the difference in opinion demonstrates that the issue is far from clear-cut.