Court Opinion

ID: 9706933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:55:52.363436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.040676
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell:
It is conceded by everyone that under the well established existing law the plaintiff in this case cannot recover for breach of an implied warranty (1) unless he was a purchaser, or (2) the defective or damaging article was food or like goods for human consumption, or (3) he came within the provisions of §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It is crystal clear that plaintiff was not a purchaser nor was the article food or like goods for human consumption.
The law was recently accurately and pertinently stated in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation, 409 Pa. 610, 187 A. 2d 575.
Paragraph 1 of the syllabus well summarizes the facts and the decision in that case: “1. In this action of assumpsit for alleged breach of an implied warranty of fitness for the purposes intended, in which it appeared that the defendant sold a bottle of carbonated soda water to the plaintiffs employer and that while the plaintiff was on duty as a bartender in the employer’s club house he was injured by flying glass fragments when the bottle exploded, it was 3eld that the seller’s implied warranty to the purchaser that the contents of the bottle were fit for the purposes intended did not extend to the plaintiff as an employe of the purchaser.”
The Court in its Opinion said (pages 613-616) : “It is clear from the language used [in §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code] that in order to qualify as a person (not a buyer), who is within the protection of the warranty, one must be a.member of the buyer’s family, his household or a guest in his home. An employee is definitely in none of these categories. For *395the meaning of the words, ‘family’ and ‘household’ see, Way Estate, 379 Pa. 421, 109 A. 2d 164 (1954) and Shank Estate, 399 Pa. 656, 161 A. 2d 47 (1960).
“. . . a study of pertinent Pennsylvania authorities [prior to the Code] is also necessary for the purposes of this decision.
“The general rule in the United States is that the mere resale of a warranted article does not give a sub-purchaser the right to sue the manufacturer in assumpsit, on the. basis of breach of warranty} for damages incurred by him due to a defect in the quality of the goods. Pennsylvania decisions are in accord with this general proposition. The warranty is personal to the immediate or original buyer, and he alone may avail himself of the benefit thereof. This limitation is based on the rule of privity of contract. See, 1 Williston, Sales, §244, and 77 C.J.S., Sales, §305.
“However, nearly a third of the American jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have broken away from the rule of ‘privity of contract’ in cases involving food, beverages and like goods for human consumption, and have for various stated reasons permitted a subpurchaser to sue the manufacturer directly in assumpsit for breach of an implied warranty that the food was wholesome and fit to eat.
“. . . Regardless of the rationale employed in these decisions, it is now established beyond argument in Pennsylvania that a subpurchaser may sue the manufacturer directly in food cases for breach of an implied warranty of fitness regardless of the lack of privity. Since the enactment of the Code, this right is extended to members of the subpurchaser’s family, his household and guests in his home. . . .
“. . . He is a complete stranger to any contractual transaction involved. His cause of action is basically *396one. of tort * and should stand or fall thereon. To grant such an extension of the warranty, as urged herein, would in effect render the manufacturer a guarantor of his product and impose liability in. all such accident cases even if the utmost degree of care were exercised. This would lead to harsh and unjust results.”
The language of §2-318 of the Code specifically extends a seller’s warranty to any natural person (1) who is in the family of the buyer, or (2) in the household of the buyer, or (3) is a guest in the buyer’s home. Situations will frequently arise where a person may be in two or in all three of the aforesaid classes and consequently sometimes there will be overlap. Moreover a very important proviso or condition is attached to each of said classes. This key condition prohibits recovery by any of these persons, unless it is reasonable to expect that the member of the family or a person in the buyer’s household or a guest of the buyer may use such goods and be injured thereby.
It is indisputable that plaintiff was not a guest in the buyer’s home and he was not a member of the buyer’s household. It is also clear that the Vord “household” of the buyer undoubtedly refers to and includes persons who live, and servants who work,** in the buyer’s home. A guest of the buyer means, as its name implies, a visitor who comes for a meal or a drink or a chat, or for a short visit. That brings us to the critical question: Was plaintiff’s decedent “in the family of the buyer” and, if so, was it reasonable to expect that he “may” use, consume or be affected by the goodsf
The word “family” is not defined in the Code and its interpretation must depend on the language and *397context in which it appears in a particular statute or in a particular case. In many cases or situations the word “family” is flexible and difficult to define. Considering the language of this Code which extends a seller’s warranty to any natural person who is in the family of the buyer and who, it is reasonable to expect, may use and be injured by the damaging and allegedly defective goods, we believe that in the context in which it is used this means not distant relatives, but the close family, including in-laws,* of the buyer.
In the instant case plaintiff’s decedent, the 7 weeks old nephew who lived next door with his mother — who was the sister of the buyer of the allegedly defective article, viz., a vaporizer-humidifier — was not only a close relative of the buyer, but because he lived next door, it was reasonable to expect that he might use such article, and hence was included in the protection of the warranty. On the other hand, if the buyer lives and buys the goods in Philadelphia, and the son or nephew of the buyer lives in Chicago or Miami or San Francisco, he would not be covered by the Code if the explosion and injury occurred in one of those remote cities or in any other remote place.
With respect to the Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, it ignores the language of the Code, i.e., family, household, guest. Moreover, in cases based upon a warranty (express or implied) it would (1) abolish privity of contract, (2) overrule our prior decisions in this field, and (3) ex*398tend, without proof of fault or negligence, and without any limitation, the right of any and every person to recover who is injured by any goods which are manufactured or sold by any and every seller. If such a radical change of the law is to be made, it should be made by the Legislature and not by the Courts.
I would affirm the judgment entered by the lower court for defendant Resalí Drug Company and for defendant Northern Electric Company but concur in the reversal by the majority of the judgment entered in favor of Preitz, trading as Hartsville Pharmacy, with a procedendo.

 Italics throughout, ours.

 of, however, Shank Estate, 399 Pa. 656, 161 A. 2d 47, with which we are familiar.

 We believe it is impossible to construe tbe word “family” as meaning all those who come under and are entitled to inherit under the Intestate Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, since this would include the Commonwealth and all remote heirs even if they lived a great distance away. The language of the Code must have, we repeat, and must be given a reasonable and practical interpretation. Cf. Way Estate, 379 Pa. 421, 109 A. 2d 164; and Beilstein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. 152, 45 A. 73.