Court Opinion

ID: 9395184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 14:09:08.035561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.091626
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Catherine Nadolsky,                    :
                 Petitioner            :
                                       :
            v.                         :
                                       :
UPMC Altoona Regional Health           :
System (Workers’ Compensation          :
Appeal Board),                         :   No. 1366 C.D. 2021
                 Respondent            :   Submitted: February 3, 2023

BEFORE:     HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
            HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                    FILED: May 17, 2023

            Catherine Nadolsky (Claimant) petitions for review of the November
24, 2021 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the
decision of the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) to grant the requested
modification of Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits from total to partial
disability. Upon review, we affirm.

                                 I. Background
            In April 2017, Claimant sustained a work-related injury in the form of
a head contusion, which UPMC Altoona Regional Health System (Employer)
accepted by means of a notice compensation payable. Board Opinion, 11/24/21 at
1, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 144a. In September 2019, a physician conducted an
impairment rating evaluation (IRE) of Claimant pursuant to the Sixth Edition of the
American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment, Second Printing (Guides), which yielded a whole-body impairment
rating of 5%. Id. The following month, Employer filed a notice changing Claimant’s
disability status to partial disability, effective April 20, 2019.               Id.    Claimant
thereafter filed a review petition challenging her change in disability status. Id. In
April 2021, the WCJ denied Claimant’s petition on the basis that Claimant failed to
meet her burden of proving that her impairment rating was equal to or greater than
35%, further stating that he lacked the authority to address Claimant’s constitutional
challenge to the IRE provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WC Act).1 Id.
at 1-2, R.R. at 144a-45a.2
                Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed. Id. at 2 & 5, R.R. at
145a & 148a. The Board identified as Claimant’s “sole argument” on appeal her
assertion that the WCJ erred in denying her review petition because Section 306(a.3)
of the WC Act3 failed to remedy the unconstitutional aspects of the IRE process. Id.
at 2, R.R. at 145a. Noting that, like the WCJ, it lacked the authority to declare
unconstitutional any portion of the WC Act, the Board nevertheless observed that

       1
           Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.

       The WCJ also decided various other petitions. However, Claimant challenged only the
denial of the review petition contesting her change in disability status. See Board Opinion,
11/24/21 at 2, R.R. at 145a.
       2
         In May 2021, the WCJ issued an amended order directing Employer to reimburse
Claimant for reasonable litigation costs and determining an appropriate fee for Claimant’s counsel.
See WCJ Order, 5/17/21 at 1-3, R.R. at 133a-35a.
       3
        Section 306(a.3) was added to the WC Act by the Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, No.
111 (Act 111), 77 P.S. § 511.3.
                                                2
this Court previously rejected identical constitutional challenges to Act 111. Id. at
3-4, R.R. at 146a-47a (first citing Rose Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Espada), 238 A.3d 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020); then citing Pierson v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Consol. Pa. Coal Co.), 252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied,
261 A.3d 378 (Pa. 2021); and then citing Hutchinson v. Annville Twp. (Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd.), 260 A.3d 360 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), appeal denied, 279 A.3d
1180 (Pa. 2022)).
                 Claimant petitioned this Court for review.

                                              II. Issues
                 Before this Court,4 Claimant argues that Act 111’s designation of the
Sixth Edition of the Guides in assessing whole body impairment fails to remediate
the delegation of powers deemed unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School
District), 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) (Protz II), because the AMA is not required to
hold hearings, accept public comment or explain the grounds for its methodology in
a manner that would be subject to judicial review. Claimant’s Br. at 11. Further,
Claimant asserts that the physician authors of the Guides are not public employees
subject to discipline or removal. Id. Claimant also maintains that the enactment of
Section 306(a.3), 77 P.S. § 511.3, impermissibly “delegated authority to the AMA,
a private entity,” without “political accountability.”            Id.5 Claimant, therefore,

       4
         This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s necessary
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or
whether constitutional rights were violated. Russell v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Volkswagen
of America), 550 A.2d 1364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988).
       5
           Section 306(a.3) provides, in pertinent part:

                                                   3
requests that this Court “set aside” the Board’s November 24, 2021 order and declare
the IRE process unconstitutional. Id. at 12.

                                        III. Discussion
               In Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School
District), 124 A.3d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (Protz I), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
Protz II, a claimant challenged the modification of her benefits from total to partial

               (1) When an employe has received total disability compensation
               pursuant to clause (a)[, referring to Section 306(a) of the WC Act,
               77 P.S. § 511,] for a period of one hundred and four weeks, unless
               otherwise agreed to, the employe shall be required to submit to a
               medical examination which shall be requested by the insurer within
               sixty days upon the expiration of the one hundred and four weeks to
               determine the degree of impairment due to the compensable injury,
               if any. The degree of impairment shall be determined based upon
               an evaluation by a physician who is licensed in this Commonwealth,
               who is certified by an American Board of Medical Specialties-
               approved board or its osteopathic equivalent and who is active in
               clinical practice for at least twenty hours per week, chosen by
               agreement of the parties, or as designated by the department,
               pursuant to the [Guides] 6th edition (second printing April 2009).

               (2) If such determination results in an impairment rating that meets
               a threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater than thirty-
               five per centum impairment under the [Guides], 6th edition (second
               printing April 2009), the employe shall be presumed to be totally
               disabled and shall continue to receive total disability compensation
               benefits under clause (a). If such determination results in an
               impairment rating less than thirty-five per centum impairment under
               the [Guides,] 6th edition (second printing April 2009), the employe
               shall then receive partial disability benefits under clause (b)[,
               referring to Section 306(b) of the WC Act, 77 P.S. § 512,] provided,
               however, [t]hat no reduction shall be made until sixty days’ notice
               of modification is given.

77 P.S. § 511.3(1), (2).

                                                 4
disability under former Section 306(a.2) of the WC Act,6 on the basis that the
provision unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority in contravention of
article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.7 See Protz I, 124 A.3d at 408
& 410-11. We agreed, holding that the challenged statute’s provision for use of the
most recent edition of the Guides in evaluating the degree of impairment
impermissibly delegated legislative authority to the AMA to establish the criteria for
such evaluations. Id. at 410-15 (citing former Section 306(a.2)(1) of the WC Act,
77 P.S. § 511.2). Thus, we deemed former Section 306(a.2) unconstitutional
“insofar as it proactively approved versions of the Guides beyond the Fourth Edition
without review,” and we remanded the matter to the Board with instruction to
remand to the WCJ to apply that edition to the dispute. Id. at 416. Our Supreme
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that this Court erred in failing to
strike former Section 306(a.2) in its entirety on the basis that the valid portions were
inseparable from the constitutionally defective provisions. Protz II, 161 A.3d at 841.
                In response to Protz II, the General Assembly enacted Act 111 on
October 24, 2018 to replace the unconstitutional provision with Section 306(a.3).
Act 111 amended the WC Act by lowering the threshold impairment rating for
determining partial disability from less than 50% to less than 35%. Compare Section
306(a.3) of the WC Act, 77 P.S. § 511.3, with former Section 306(a.2) of the WC
Act, formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2. Act 111 also specified that IREs shall be performed
using, specifically, the Sixth Edition of the Guides, as opposed to generally

       6
           Added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, repealed by Act
111.
       7
        “The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” PA. CONST. art. II, § 1.

                                                5
prescribing the use of the most recent edition. See Section 306(a.3) of the WC Act,
77 P.S. § 511.3.
               Here, the gist of Claimant’s argument is that Act 111’s designation of
the Sixth Edition of the Guides for use in conducting IREs fails to remediate the
delegation of legislative authority deemed unconstitutional by the Protz II Court,
because the AMA and the individual authors of the Guides are private actors. See
Claimant’s Br. at 11.8 This contention is meritless. In Pennsylvania AFL-CIO v.
Commonwealth, 219 A.3d 306 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), we explained that

               if the General Assembly adopts an existing set of standards
               as its own, there is no delegation and no violation of article
               II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. As our
               Supreme Court in Protz II explained:

                      it is important to clarify that the non-delegation
                      doctrine does not prevent the General Assembly
                      from adopting as its own a particular set of
                      standards which already are in existence at the
                      time of adoption. However, for the reasons we

       8
         Claimant asserts, without citation to supporting legal authority or further elaboration, that
the provision of credit to employers for partial disability benefits paid prior to the effective date of
Act 111, as provided for in Section 314 of the WC Act, 77 P.S. § 651, effects an unconstitutional
deprivation of property rights and violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the
Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. See Claimant’s Br. at 8-9. We observe that
Claimant mistakenly cites Section 314 of the WC Act, 77 P.S. § 651, when Section 3(1) of Act
111 is relevant to her argument. See 3(1) of Act 111 (providing that for purposes of determining
whether an employee has received at least 104 weeks of total disability compensation for purposes
of submitting to an IRE, “an insurer shall be given credit for weeks of total disability compensation
paid prior to the effective date of [Act 111]”). Moreover, Claimant’s insufficiently developed
contentions are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (providing that the argument in an appellate brief
“shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued[,] . . . followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985
A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (holding that “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of
a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived”). Claimant’s bare assertion that a physician may
not lawfully conduct an IRE prior to the adoption of regulations accompanying Act 111 is likewise
waived. See id.

                                                   6
                    have explained, the non-delegation doctrine
                    prohibits the General Assembly from
                    incorporating, sight unseen, subsequent
                    modifications to such standards without also
                    providing adequate criteria to guide and restrain
                    the exercise of the delegated authority.

             [Protz II, 161 A.3d at 838-39.]

             ....

             The non-delegation doctrine does not prohibit the General
             Assembly from “adopting as its own a particular set of
             standards which already are in existence at the time of
             adoption.” Protz II, 161 A.3d at 838 . . . . That is what the
             General Assembly did here—it adopted the Sixth Edition,
             second printing, which . . . was in existence when Section
             306(a.3) was enacted, “as its own.” Id. When such an
             adoption occurs, the General Assembly is exercising its
             legislative and policy making authority by deciding that it
             is those particular standards that will become the law of
             this Commonwealth. It is not delegating its authority to
             legislate.

Pa. AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at 314-16 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the private status of
the AMA and any individual contributors to the Guides is immaterial to Claimant’s
constitutional claim, because no delegation of legislative discretion occurred when
the General Assembly adopted “an existing set of standards,” i.e., the Guides, as its
own. Pa. AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at 314 (citing Protz II, 161 A.3d at 838-39); see also
Hutchinson, 260 A.3d at 366 (citing Pa. AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at 314-15; Rose Corp.,
238 A.3d at 557) (deeming meritless a claimant’s assertion “that Act 111 [was]
unconstitutional because its provision for IREs pursuant to the Sixth Edition . . . of
the Guides improperly delegate[d] legislative authority to the AMA, a private
entity,” and pointing out that “[t]his Court ha[d] previously rejected this argument

                                           7
and ha[d] expressly held that Act 111 did not constitute an improper delegation of
legislative authority”).
               Regardless, we note that every delegation of legislative authority to a
private party is not automatically unconstitutional.      In critiquing Protz I, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that

             our precedents to date have not unequivocally supported
             the Commonwealth Court’s view that the General
             Assembly cannot, under any set of circumstances, delegate
             authority to a private person or entity. See Protz [I], 124
             A.3d at 416. Notably, this Court occasionally has
             suggested in non-delegation cases that the traditional
             constitutional requirements (i.e., “policy choices” and
             “adequate standards”) are necessary whenever the General
             Assembly delegates its authority “to any other branch of
             government or to any other body or authority.” Blackwell
             [v. State Ethics Comm’n], 567 A.2d [630,] 636 [(Pa.
             1989)] (emphasis added). For example, this Court has
             held unconstitutional a law that required all chiropractors
             seeking to renew their licenses to attend either a two-day
             conference held by the Pennsylvania Chiropractic Society
             (a private organization), or another “equivalent
             educational conference.” State Bd. of Chiropractic
             Exam’rs [v. Life Fellowship of Pa.], 272 A.2d [478,] 479
             [(Pa. 1971)]. In striking down that statute on non-
             delegation grounds, we recited the general rule that the
             General Assembly must provide adequate standards to
             guide and restrain the exercise of delegated administrative
             functions. Id. at 481. . . . Put another way, we held that
             the statute in State Board of Chiropractic Examiners was
             unconstitutional because it delegated unchecked and
             unrestrained authority over chiropractic continuing
             education, not because the Chiropractic Society was a
             private organization. Id. at 481.

Protz II, 161 A.3d at 837-38 (citation omitted); see also Pa. AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at
314 (citing Protz II, 161 A.3d at 837-38) (clarifying that “[a]lthough [the Protz II

                                          8
Court] cited precedent raising concerns about [] delegations [to private entities],
including the lack of political accountability of [such] . . . entit[ies], it also cited
other precedent that did not rule out the constitutional propriety of those
delegations”).
             We, therefore, conclude that Claimant’s constitutional challenge lacks
merit. See Protz II, 161 A.3d at 838-39; Hutchinson, 260 A.3d at 366; Rose Corp.,
238 A.3d at 557; Pa. AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at 314-16.

                                   IV. Conclusion
             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the November 24, 2021 order of
the Board.

                                        __________________________________
                                        CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                           9
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Catherine Nadolsky,                 :
                 Petitioner         :
                                    :
           v.                       :
                                    :
UPMC Altoona Regional Health        :
System (Workers’ Compensation       :
Appeal Board),                      :   No. 1366 C.D. 2021
                 Respondent         :

                                ORDER

           AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2023, the November 24, 2021 order
of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

                                  __________________________________
                                  CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge