Court Opinion

ID: 9716541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:43:19.637307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.714589
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion upon the merits (October 29, 1987) I dissent from the majority's decision to deny Gregory Gollnick's Petition for Rehearing.
*1260Furthermore, I do not agree with the majority's interpretation of the effect to be given Hubbard Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Greeson (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 1071. In Greeson, the place of the tort was virtually irrelevant to the lawsuit, The lawsuit there involved an act of negligence or acts giving rise to products liability which took place solely in another state and the parties all had contacts solely with that other state. The only contact with the "place of the tort" was the injury itself.
In the case before us, all relevant incidents and acts took place in Indiana, including the injury. The only significant contact with California is that the parties reside there. The place of the tort is not only significant but is the dominant factor with respect to this litigation. The second step of the Greeson test, therefore, is not applicable in this case.
The Petition for Rehearing filed by Karen and Verna as to the Gollnicks, alleges a misstatement of record in the majority opinion of October 29, 1987. In that opinion it was stated that on the night preceding the accident, "[the adults present stationed themselves as lookouts at the bottom of the driveway." (Slip opinion at 2). In the context of the majority opinion concerning the Gollnicks' duty, the statement implied that Gregory had been present the night before and was aware of the risky circumstances involving the sledding site. Accordingly, the opinion implied that in light of Gregory's knowledge the Gollnicks assumed no independent duty toward Kar-
en. See Campbell v. Northern Signal Co. (1981), 103 Ill.App.3d 154, 58 Ill.Dec. 638, 430 N.E.2d 670; Kay v. Ludwick (1967), 87 Ill.App.2d 114, 230 N.E.2d 494; Freeze v. Congleton (1970), 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424, as cited and relied upon in majority opinion (514 N.E.2d at 650).
An examination of the record prompted by Karen and Verna's Petition for Rehearing discloses that Gregory was not present at the sledding site on the night preceding the accident. Such fact might well be determined to have an effect upon the conduct required of the Gollnicks in order to measure up to their duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.
The circumstances, as I now know them to be, compel me to retract my earlier conclusion that the Gollnicks' Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted. Under the facts as now known, I am unable to agree that "as a matter of law, no breach of Golinicks' duty to exercise reasonable care occurred ..." (Sullivan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, 514 N.E.2d at 652).1
For the foregoing reasons I would grant both Petitions for Rehearing and would remand for further proceedings.

. My conclusion that, as a matter of law, Golin-icks incurred no premises liability remains unchanged.