Court Opinion

ID: 9624775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:17:15.69747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:22.873553
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
specially concurring.
I agree with Judge Swanstrom that the search warrant was improperly issued. Judge Swanstrom’s opinion is devoted in part to distinguishing this case from State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 771 P.2d 546 (Ct.App.1989), a case on which I did not sit. Accordingly, I write separately to articulate our underlying concerns about “anticipatory warrants.”
Such warrants are not unconstitutional per se. Most jurisdictions allow them, but the courts in those jurisdictions appear to place two restrictions on their issuance and execution. First, they require a particularized showing, in the probable cause affidavit or testimony, that the items sought in the search will be in a specified place at a specified future date or time. The courts often speak in terms of “inevitability” or “imminence” when referring to this requirement. See, e.g., People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, 282 N.E.2d 614, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct. 58, 34 L.Ed.2d 91 (1972) (upholding an anticipatory warrant to search the person of an individual whose possession of certain evidence was “imminent and all but inevitable”). Second, the courts have declared that the issuing magistrate should specify what particular event(s) will trigger the execution of the warrant. Anticipatory warrants that can be executed at any time have met with disapproval, although they are rarely held invalid on this ground alone. See, e.g., State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166 (Alaska Ct.App.1983).
These restrictions serve to minimize three risks inherent in anticipatory warrants. First, there is a risk of premature issuance. Warrants issued upon mere speculation of future criminal activity are plainly invalid. By requiring a particularized showing of probable cause, the courts have endeavored to prevent the search of a *1052suspect’s person or property when the evidence presented to the magi 'trate indicates only that the suspect is expected to commit a crime in the future. The second risk is the possibility that magistrates will abdicate to police officers an important judicial function — the determination that probable cause exists to believe that the objects to be seized are in the place to be searched. By requiring a particularized showing before the warrant is issued, the magistrate can ensure that he or she — not the officers in the field — will determine when, and whether, there should be a search. Moreover, by specifying an event to trigger the search, the magistrate can prevent the police from weighing evidence obtained after the warrant’s issuance, in determining for themselves when the search should occur. The third risk, closely related to the other two, is that the warrant will be executed prematurely — that is, when the evidence sought is not yet at the place, or in the possession of the person, to be searched. This risk can be minimized if the magistrate identifies a specific event to trigger the warrant’s execution.
The restrictions on anticipatory warrants are illustrated in a sampling of decisions in other jurisdictions. Many involve interception, and subsequent delivery, of packaged contraband by the postal service. For example, in United States v. Outland, 476 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.1973), the court upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a suspect’s home upon delivery of a package of drugs by the postal service. The court noted Uiat the evidence was known to be in the “hands of the postal inspector” and was to be delivered at the suspect’s residence on the following day. Other postal service cases include United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir.1969); United States v. Feldman, 366 F.Supp. 356 (D.Hawaii 1973); People v. Shapiro, 37 Cal.App.3d 1038, 113 Cal.Rptr. 54 (1974); and State v. Mier, 147 N.J.Super. 17, 370 A.2d 515 (1977). In each of these cases, the proper place and timing of the search were clear because the evidence was in the process of being delivered by postal employees.
Similarly, in Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980), a case noted by Judge Swanstrom, police officers in Alaska had reliable information that a suspect was receiving weekly shipments of drugs from his wife in Seattle. They asked Seattle police to notify them when the next shipment occurred. The Seattle police informed the Alaska officers when the suspect’s wife went to an airline ticket counter and presented a package for shipment to Alaska. Based upon this information, the Alaska officers obtained a warrant and executed it after they saw the package being delivered to the suspect’s home. The Alaska Supreme Court criticized the issuing magistrate for not specifying the event which would trigger the search. The court nevertheless declared the warrant to be valid, presumably because the likelihood of premature execution was unlikely where the police tracked the package and knew when it had arrived at the suspect’s residence. In this respect, Johnson is akin to State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct.App.1982), where the police knew the suspect would be carrying drugs on an airline flight, and they obtained a warrant to search him upon arrival at the airport.
Other illustrative fact patterns are presented in State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166 (Alaska Ct.App.1983) (magistrate specified event triggering execution of warrant), and Mehrens v. State, 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718 (Ct.App.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870, 105 S.Ct. 219, 83 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984) (triggering event not specified but warrant issued upon information explicitly tying the search to a particular time, place and person). Compare, e.g., State v. Vitale, 23 Ariz.App. 37, 530 P.2d 394, 398 (1975) (anticipatory warrant struck down because future event was “a matter of pure speculation”); United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006, 105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 L.Ed.2d 382 (1985) (anticipatory warrant to search for package at suspect’s home held invalid because delivery at home was uncertain).
In my view, the present case is unlike those in which anticipatory warrants have been upheld. The probable cause affidavit *1053and accompanying testimony were long on quantity of information depicting Wright’s association with a drug dealer, Burnside, but short on quality of information showing that the evidence sought would be at the place (Wright’s house) to be searched. Neither did the magistrate specify an event, time, or set of circumstances that would trigger the future execution of the warrant. These deficiencies are further discussed in Judge Swanstrom’s opinion, and need not be elaborated here. It suffices to say that the warrant was invalid.
Nevertheless, as Judge Swanstrom has observed, application of the exclusionary rule appears to be barred by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 693 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1984), we expressed misgivings about Leon but held that the so-called “good faith” exception would be applied pursuant to a policy, enunciated by the Idaho Supreme Court, that the search-and-seizure provision of the Idaho Constitution, art. 1, § 17, should be interpreted in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. As recently explained in State v. Prestwich, 115 Idaho 317, 766 P.2d 787 (Ct.App.1988), we still feel constrained to follow Leon. We will do so unless and until our Supreme Court decides otherwise on independent state constitutional grounds. Accordingly, the district judge’s decision in this case, refusing to suppress the evidence seized under the invalid warrant, must be upheld.
SWANSTROM, J., concurs.