Court Opinion

ID: 9518618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:57:31.852627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:13.835507
License: Public Domain

¶ 49. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
(dissenting). Today's majority opinion reduces the number of recognized exceptions to public officer immunity, thereby expanding immunity. It accomplishes this change in the law by collapsing the known danger exception into the ministerial duty exception, and then adding a heretofore unknown "specific act" requirement. Because the majority opinion's new approach is contrary to precedent and without authority, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 50. Numerous public officer immunity cases of both this court and the court of appeals discuss the known danger exception as distinct from the ministerial duty exception. See, e.g., Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 91, 95, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999); Sheridan v. City of Janesville, 164 Wis. 2d 420, 426, 474 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1991). Most recently, this *348court confirmed the known danger exception as distinct in Willow Creek Ranch, LLC v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693. The court explained: "immunity does not apply to the performance of: (1) ministerial duties; (2) duties to address a 'known danger;' (3) actions involving medical discretion (the Scarpaci rule); and (4) actions that are 'malicious, willful, and intentional.'" Id. at ¶ 26.
¶ 51. Yet the majority appears unwilling to be bound by this precedent. Instead, without withdrawing language or overruling cases, the majority transforms established precedent and adds a new standard that requires a "particularized" "specific act." Majority op. at ¶ 40.
¶ 52. To be sure, there is ample language in the case law that relates the known danger exception to the ministerial duty exception. However, the majority goes too far, not just relating the two exceptions but ultimately equating them. The two exceptions are not the same.
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT
¶ 53. Any analysis of the known danger exception must begin with Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977). Although the court in Cords discussed a "ministerial duty" and did not use phrases such as "known and compelling danger" or "known danger," over time Cords became the cornerstone for the known danger exception. The majority agrees that "[t]he [known danger] exception was first announced in Cords." Majority op. at ¶ 32.
¶ 54. The plaintiffs in Cords fell into a deep gorge at a state park, sustaining severe injuries. One of them fell while on a hiking trail only one foot from a steep *349drop-off into the gorge. Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 532. The park manager, Anderson, had neither marked the trail with warning signs nor informed his superiors of the danger, even though it was his job to make sure the trails were in a safe condition and to give reports to his superiors as to any steps to be taken to reduce safety hazards. Id. at 536-37.
¶ 55. This court in Cords set up its analysis using the standards that describe the ministerial duty exception to immunity. 80 Wis. 2d at 541. However, the court's application of the these standards and its holding marked the beginning of the known danger exception as a distinct exception to immunity. The court explained as follows:
Anderson knew the terrain at the glen was dangerous particularly at night; he was in a position as park manager to do something about it; he failed to do anything about it. He is liable for the breach of this duty.
Id. The court then concluded:
We hold that the duty to either place warning signs or advise superiors of the conditions is, on the facts here, a duty so clear and so absolute that it falls within the definition of a ministerial duty.
Id. at 542.
¶ 56. Thus, in Cords, it was not that the park manager failed to perform a "specific act" for which "the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion." Rather, it was that the park manager failed to act in the face of a dangerous situation that clearly required him to take action.
*350¶ 57. After Cords, subsequent decisions solidified the known danger exception as an exception separate from the ministerial duty exception with overlapping but different contours. For example, in C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988), this court acknowledged the relationship of the two exceptions:
a public officer's duty is ministerial where a danger is known and of such quality that the public officer's duty to act becomes "absolute, certain and imperative."
It then indicated the difference:
[W]here a public officer's duty is not generally prescribed and defined by law in time, mode, and occasion, such that "nothing remains for judgment or discretion," circumstances may give rise to such a certain duty where, as in Cords, the nature of the danger is compelling and known to the officer and is of such force that the public officer has no discretion not to act.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
¶ 58. Similarly, in Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996), the court related the two exceptions, but characterized the known danger exception as involving the failure to act: "a public officer's duty becomes ministerial only 'where, as in Cords, the nature of the danger is compelling and known to the officer and is of such force that the public officer has no discretion not to act.'" Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The Kimps court also noted that the facts in Cords "warranted a special exception be made to the general rule of public employee immunity." Id.
¶ 59. In short, the duty to act in a known danger case need not be "prescribed and defined by law in time, mode, and occasion such that 'nothing remains for judgment or discretion.'" C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715. *351Rather, liability attaches because the danger is of such a quality that the public officer "has no discretion not to act." Id.
¶ 60. To put it simply, the distinction between the two exceptions is this: the foundation for liability in the ministerial duty exception is that the defendant failed in performing (or failed to perform) a highly particularized and prescribed task whereas the foundation for liability in the known danger exception is that the defendant failed to act in the face of a danger clearly requiring action.
FROM ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT TO THE NEW STANDARD
¶ 61. The majority rejects the distinction between the two exceptions and collapses the known danger exception into the ministerial duty exception. It does so by departing from the "has no discretion not to act" standard associated with the known danger exception and replacing that standard with its own new standard. The majority makes three leaps in the law of public officer immunity to accomplish this transformation. These leaps are contrary to precedent and without authority.
¶ 62. As a first leap, the majority begins the process of collapsing one exception into the other by questioning whether the ministerial duty exception is itself a distinct exception to immunity. The majority makes this announcement: "The ministerial duty exception is not so much an exception as a recognition that immunity law distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts, immunizing the performance of the former but not the latter. See Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 91. Majority op. at ¶ 25.
*352¶ 63. Although the majority is correct that Kier-styn states that "the law has drawn a distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts," 228 Wis. 2d at 91, the majority is incorrect in citing Kierstyn (or any authority) for the proposition that the performance of ministerial acts is not actually an exception to immunity. Our precedent, including Kierstyn, clearly states the contrary. Willow Creek, 2000 WI 56, ¶ 26 ("[t]his court has recognized four exceptions ... (1) ministerial duties . . ."); Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 90 ("this court has recognized four exceptions to public officer immunity"); Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10 ("doctrine of immunity is not without exception, however, the most common of which is ... ministerial duty").
¶ 64. The second leap the majority makes is to graft the time, mode and occasion test of the ministerial duty exception onto the known danger exception. Citing C.L., the majority explains that the known danger must be of such force that "the time, mode and occasion for performance is evident with such certainty that nothing remains for the exercise of judgment and discretion." Majority op. at ¶ 38. However, when C.L. cited Cords for this proposition, it did so incorrectly. Cords, which left it to the park manager's discretion to either post signs indicating the danger or inform his superiors, cannot be read for this proposition that C.L. attributes to it. Indeed, elsewhere in C.L., the court correctly recognized that the time, mode and occasion test of the ministerial duty exception does not apply to the known danger exception. 143 Wis. 2d at 715.
¶ 65. Finally, in the third leap, the majority magnifies C.L.'s erroneous citation to Cords by concluding, without citation to authority, that for the known danger exception to apply, the danger must be such that a "self-evident, particularized, and non-discretionary" ac*353tion is required and that "[t]he focus is on the specific act the public officer or official is alleged to have negligently performed or omitted." Majority op. at ¶ 40 (emphasis added). Thus, the majority requires a level of particularity heretofore unknown and accomplishes the collapse of the known danger exception into the ministerial duty exception.
¶ 66. The crux of the majority's rationale for transforming the "has no discretion not to act" standard into a new standard appears in a footnote, again, without citation to authority:
We acknowledge that there is language in some of the cases referring generally to a "duty to act" instead of a duty to perform a particular act.... Despite the sometimes generalized language, the cases finding a known danger sufficient to pierce immunity are premised on conclusions that particularized government responses were required by the dangerous circumstances in question.
Majority op. at ¶ 44 n. 7.
¶ 67. The final effect of the majority's analysis is to eliminate the known danger exception as envisioned by Cords and subsequent precedent. The majority opinion renders essentially meaningless the case law's distinction between the known danger exception and the ministerial duty exception.
¶ 68. That the majority is eliminating one of the recognized exceptions to immunity is underscored by an application of its new standard to the facts of Cords. Was the park manager's duty to either post signs or inform his superiors sufficiently "particularized" for the majority test? It seems that the answer may be no. Was the manager's duty one whose "time, mode and occasion for performance is evident with such certainty that *354nothing remains for the exercise of judgment and discretion"? Again, the answer seems to be no. What was the "specific act" in Cords that the manager negligently performed or omitted? Was it the failure to inform his superiors or the failure to post signs?
¶ 69. Cords shows that the degree of particularity the majority requires before the known danger exception will apply is too particular. It seems that under the majority analysis here, the result in Cords would have come out differently.
¶ 70. In addition, the majority's new conception of the known danger exception requiring a "particularized" "specific act" has uncertain consequences. Most importantly, by eliminating one of four exceptions to immunity, it expands immunity. However, there may be other consequences as well, and the majority's approach leaves fundamental questions unanswered in the pleading and practice of cases involving public officer immunity.
¶ 71. For example, how must plaintiffs plead and assert the known danger exception in order to survive motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment? At what stage must a plaintiff first identify the "particularized" "specific act" required of the defendant? What if the plaintiff identifies one specific act (for example, manual traffic control), but it turns out that it was a different specific act that was required in the face of the known danger? Does the plaintiff have the burden to show which specific act was required, or does the defendant have the burden to show that no specific act was required?
¶ 72. Unlike the majority, I apply the known danger exception as it exists in our precedent, and in doing so, I reach the same conclusion as the court of appeals. The situation here — a failed traffic light that left a *355high-speed intersection uncontrolled during a nighttime storm — is a known danger. I also agree with the court of appeals that this danger is not unlike the danger presented by a path open for night-time hiking that runs within inches of a precipitous drop into a gorge. Finally, as the court of appeals determined, summary judgment was granted improperly because the question of whether Officer Fredericks took action when confronted with a known danger hinges upon the resolution of genuinely disputed questions of fact.
¶ 73. In sum, I cannot join the majority opinion because it eliminates the known danger exception as a distinct exception to immunity. Rejecting precedent, the majority equates the two exceptions, then adds a new "specific act" requirement. Like the court of appeals, I would apply the known danger exception as it existed in our precedent until today. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 74.
I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissent.