Court Opinion

ID: 9845793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:28:22.833911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:22.112290
License: Public Domain

Guy, J.
(dissenting)—I believe the majority incorrectly denied the award of attorney fees to Ms. Hill. Analysis of statutes such as the one pertaining to attorney fees in worker compensation cases traditionally begins by looking to the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the *190statute and applying the intention of the Legislature to the interpretation of the statute.
As the majority notes, the attorney fee statute literally authorizes an award of fees only when the Board's decision is reversed or modified. However, this reading of the statute fails to account for the legislative purpose of the workers' compensation act which is to compensate injured workers for the harm they suffer.
RCW 51.52.130 has been read to permit a worker who prevails at the Board level and again at trial after appeal by the employer to receive attorney fees. Deaconess Hosp. v. Hoye, 30 Wn. App. 536, 635 P.2d 1095 (1981). This leads to a logical and just interpretation of the meaning of the attorney fee statute as opposed to a strictly literal reading. Deaconess relied on the decision in Johnson v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 95 Wn.2d 739, 630 P.2d 441 (1981) to determine that the self-insured employer should be responsible for the claimant's attorney fees when the employer does not prevail on an appeal of a workers' compensation claim.
I thus reject the majority's argument that the statute should be interpreted narrowly to preclude the award of attorney fees to a claimant who successfully defends the award of workers' compensation on appeal. Both the majority and the Court of Appeals below rely on Trapp v. Department of Labor & Indus., 48 Wn.2d 560, 295 P.2d 315 (1956) and Spring v. Department of Labor & Indus., 39 Wn. App. 751, 695 P.2d 612 (1985) which held that RCW 51.52.130 authorizes the award of attorney fees only where the Board is found to have erred. See also Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 48 Wn.2d 553, 559-60, 295 P.2d 310 (1956). The Trapp decision acknowledged that:
[Tjhere seems much merit in the argument . . . that, when a workman or beneficiary has to have legal representation at the appeal board, superior court, or supreme court level in order to obtain the relief to which he is ultimately determined to be entitled, the award so secured should not be diminished by the payment of attorney's fees.
*191Trapp, at 562. Ultimately, however, the court held that the statute was clear and did not provide for the award of attorney fees. This holding has since been limited by this court's decision in Johnson v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., supra. As noted in Johnson, adherence to the express language of the statute leads to absurd and unjust results because all claimants who prevail at trial should be awarded attorney fees. The majority does not adequately address the legislative intent behind the award of attorney fees to successful claimants and therefore reaches an absurd and unjust result.
A liberal construction of the workers' compensation statute is mandated by RCW 51.12.010. The statute provides that " [t]his title shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment." RCW 51.12.010. This court has elaborated on this purpose in stating:
[T]he guiding principle in construing provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act is that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.
Dennis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987).
In keeping with the purpose of the Industrial Insurance Act, this court previously has analyzed the attorney fee statute weighing both the intent of the act to compensate and the judicial goal to avoid unjust and absurd results. For example, in Johnson this court held that despite the express statutory language distinguishing between employees of self-insured and state-insured companies, both should be awarded attorney fees. Johnson, at 745.
The majority attempts to distinguish Johnson from the case at bench by asserting that Johnson addressed the improper distinction between employees of self-insured and state-insured employers. The majority reasons that the current statute makes no such improper distinction. This is *192not so. The attorney fee statute distinguishes between employees who prevail at the Board level and those who do not but then prevail on appeal. This scenario was precisely the type of absurd and unjust distinction this court remedied in Johnson.
This court determined that the benefits awarded under the Industrial Insurance Act include all amounts of money received. The Johnson decision stated:
For any worker who qualifies to receive attorney and witness fees under RCW 51.52.130, the actual benefits obtained in the appeal will be increased pro tanto by the amount of attorney and witness fees the worker does not have to pay.
Johnson, at 742. Thus, this court determined that receiving attorney fees if the employer is state-insured and not receiving attorney fees if the employer is self-insured effectively provides less compensation to one category of employees. Applying this reasoning to Hill's case, an award reduced by the attorney fees incurred in the appeal is not equivalent to the benefits that she would have received had she lost at the Board level and then prevailed at trial. See also Kenworthy v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 113 Wn.2d 309, 779 P.2d 257 (1989) (affirmed on reconsideration). This court has long maintained that:
"The very purpose of allowing an attorney's fee in industrial accident cases primarily was designed to guarantee the injured workman adequate legal representation in presenting his claim on appeal without the incurring of legal expense or the diminution of his award, if ultimately granted, for the purpose of paying his counsel. ..."
Harbor Plywood, 48 Wn.2d at 559 (quoting Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 26 Wn.2d 51, 173 P.2d 164 (1946)).
In analyzing RCW 51.52.130, the conclusion that attorney fees should be awarded to all prevailing claimants would carry out both the intent of the act by fully compensating the claimant, as well as providing a reasonable interpretation of the statute. This interpretation would comport with the long line of Washington cases which decided that:
*193Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effect the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid unjust or absurd consequences. A thing which is within the object, purpose and spirit of an enactment is as much within the act as if it were within the letter.
(Citations omitted.) Johnson, at 743 (quoting Whitehead v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 92 Wn.2d 265, 269, 595 P.2d 926 (1979)). In Johnson, this court held that it was not within the "object, purpose and spirit" to deny attorney fees to workers "whose only deficiency is the chance that their employers choose to be self-insured." Johnson, at 743.
Under similar reasoning, in this case it would not be within the spirit of the Industrial Insurance Act to provide less compensation to a worker whose only "deficiency" is that she prevailed too soon. To uphold this distinction and provide for the award of attorney fees to parties who prevail for the first time at trial and deny the award of attorney fees to parties who successfully defend a challenge to their receipt of industrial insurance benefits is an absurd and unjust result. In view of this fact, it is unreasonable to assume that the Legislature would intend to allow attorney fees on appeal if the claimant lost at the Board level but not if she prevailed at the Board level. See, e.g., Whitehead, at 269.
The object of construction is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the Legislature, and when that intention is discovered it is controlling, although it may be contrary to the strict letter of the statute. In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wn.2d 430, 437, 502 P.2d 1163, 60 A.L.R.3d 620 (1972). Thus, where it is apparent the intent of the Legislature is to protect the interests of the injured worker and provide fair compensation for the worker's injuries including attorney fees on appeal, this court should interpret RCW 51.52-.130 to provide attorney fees to all workers who prevail in an employer appeal even though the statute's "strict letter" provides otherwise.
*194Ultimately, the compensatory purpose of the Industrial Insurance Act is best effectuated by liberally interpreting the statute awarding attorney fees. A liberal interpretation is necessary to avoid the harsh result of diminishing a claimant's disability benefits for each successful appeal. Awarding attorney fees to all claimants who prevail at trial benefits the system of just compensation for injuries and is consistent with the object and spirit of the act.
Utter and Dore, JJ., concur with Guy, J.