Court Opinion

ID: 9740193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:29:45.872008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.750552
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The majority, refusing to accept the reasoning of the circuit court and court of appeals, correctly holds that the grievance in this case was arbitrable and that the parties have bargained for the arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement and for the arbitrator’s decision on the merits of the dispute.
The arbitrator found that the grievant, Lund, was employed by the city of Milwaukee as a patrolman from 1960 until February, 1970, at which time he was transferred to the Vice Squad as an acting detective. In April, 1974, Lund was transferred from the Vice Squad to the Detective Bureau, continuing as an acting detective. From April, 1974, until March, 1975, Lund was under the direct supervision of Lt. Partipilo; in March, 1975, Lund came under the direct supervision of Lt. Nueman.
On several occasions Lt. Partipilo was critical of Lund’s performance. This criticism culminated on October 5, 1975, with Lt. Partipilo submitting a written re*33port to the Inspector of Detectives recommending that Lund be removed from acting detective status. On October 6, Captain Will submitted a report to the Inspector of Detectives in which he also recommended that Lund be returned to the uniform division.
On October 7,1975, the Deputy Inspector of Detectives filed a report with the Chief of Police, recommending that Lund be transferred out of the Detective Bureau. On October 10, 1975, Lund learned that a department order had been issued on that day transferring him to patrol duty. On October 15,1975, Lund filed a grievance, alleging that his transfer to patrol duty was a disciplinary measure in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and requesting that he be reinstated to his former position or that he be given the rank of detective. On October 16, 1976, Lt. Partipilo denied the grievance, asserting that the transfer was due to Lund’s inadequate performance of duties over the past year to year and one-half.
After a careful review of Lt. Partipilo’s complaints of Lund’s performance, of Lund’s explanations and of the full record, the arbitrator concluded (1) that Lund had been transferred from acting detective to patrol duty; (2) that Lund’s transfer constituted discipline within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement; (3) that the discipline was without cause and was therefore in violation of the agreement; (4) that the transfer was unfair; and (5) that Lund’s transfer was in violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator directed that Lund be restored to his former status as Acting Detective.
As I understand the majority opinion, which is not unambiguous, the majority has no quarrel with the arbitrator’s five conclusions, which are summarized above, relating to the merits of the grievance. The majority apparently concedes that it would not upset the arbitrator’s findings. The arbitrator’s findings are consistent with the generally accepted concepts of transfer and *34discipline. Elkouri & Elkouri, in their text How Arbitration Works (3d ed. 1973), describe the relationship of “transfer” and “discipline,” noting that even if an agreement explicitly recognizes broad management rights to transfer, management’s right to transfer is limited if transfer is a form of discipline. The pertinent part of these commentators’ discussion of the issue is as follows:
“Some agreements explicitly recognize management’s rights to transfer. While such agreements sometimes make the transfer right subject to other terms of the agreement, it appears that arbitrators generally require any restriction upon the right to be clearly stated. . . .
“A transfer may be effected when the employer requires employees to rotate among jobs within their classification, or to move from one shift to another, or to move from one job to another in a different classification in the same job class, or when the employee is moved to a new machine on the same job, or to a new location for the same job.
“In the absence of a contract provision to the contrary, it has been held that the employer’s right to transfer workers is not conditioned upon the willingness of the workers to be transferred, and that the employer has the right to determine whether a transfer is temporary or permanent. Moreover, management has been held to have the right and duty to transfer an employee if his presence in a given occupation creates some undue hazard for himself or others. Various other justifications have similarly been accepted by arbitrators in upholding transfers required by management. However, the right to transfer as a form of discipline appears to be definitely limited.” Id. at 530, 531. (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority's criticism of the arbitrator’s award apparently goes to the remedy. The majority says “The dispositive question then, is whether the award directing that the grievant be transferred back to acting detective status was within the authority of the arbitrator.” {Supra, p. 24) The majority answers the question it poses concluding that the arbitrator “exceeded his contract authority in ordering that the grievant be *35transferred back to acting detective status.” (Supra, p. 32).
The majority reaches the wrong result because (1) it errs in characterizing the arbitrator’s remedy as an order that Lund be transferred and (2) it relies on this court’s decision in Milwaukee Police Association v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis.2d 145, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979), which is inapposite.
Characterizing the remedy as a transfer is erroneous. The arbitrator has not directed that Lund be transferred to a particular job or to a particular division. The arbitrator has merely directed that Lund be reinstated to his former position from which he was illegally removed; the arbitrator has merely directed that Lund be restored to the status quo which existed prior to an illegal discipline proceeding. Applying the majority’s reasoning to an illegal discharge of an employee, the arbitrator could not order the employee reinstated because the arbitrator would be interfering with management’s right to hire.
The Milwaukee Police Association case is not applicable to the instant case. In the Milwaukee Police Association case the officer complained that a transfer that he requested but which was denied was a grievable matter and that the arbitrator should order that the requested transfer be granted. This court noted that “[t]he arbitrator acknowledged that the chief’s right to transfer employees in a manner most advantageous to the city would seem to place the subject of transfers in a non-grievable category.” 92 Wis.2d at 157. Although the arbitrator himself recognized that he was going outside the agreement in handling the issue of a requested transfer, he proceeded to arbitrate the dispute about the requested transfer and to grant relief. The arbitrator ordered the officer transferred even though he recognized that the chief retains the power to transfer employees in a manner most advantageous to the city. As might be predicted, this court held in the Milwaukee Po*36lice Association case that the arbitrator’s order that the officer be transferred at the first opportunity exceeded his power and contract authority because “both the statutes and the collective bargaining agreement vest authority in the chief of police to make decisions concerning transfers.” 92 Wis.2d at 158.
In this case, unlike in the Milwaukee Police Association case, Lund is not requesting a transfer; he is objecting to an adverse transfer. In this case, unlike in the Milwaukee Police Association case, the arbitrator decided that there is a legitimate arbitrable grievance under the contract, that discipline was administered via a transfer, and that the employee had not been disciplined for cause. In the instant case, unlike in the Milwaukee Police Association case, the arbitrator relies on the collective bargaining agreement and concludes he has power to arbitrate the dispute. In this case, unlike in the Milwaukee Police Association case, the arbitrator does not order a requested transfer. The Milwaukee Police Association case is inapposite.
With the focus of the majority opinion apparently on the impact of explicit contractual restrictions on the arbitrator’s remedial authority, I have attempted to find a contractual restriction on the arbitrator’s remedial authority to reinstate Lund. I can find none. Although the collective bargaining agreement specifically states that “the arbitrator shall have no authority to grant wage increases or wage decreases,” there is no express limitation in the agreement on the arbitrator’s power to reinstate an employee to his former position if discipline was wrongfully imposed.
I concede that the agreement does not provide that if the chief illegally disciplines an employee by removing him from his position, an arbitrator may order the employee reinstated. However, the power of the arbitrator to order an employee reinstated is generally accepted as a remedy available to the arbitrator. The majority (su*37pra, p. 25) looks to United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960), for support of its position that the reinstatement is beyond the arbitrator’s authority. However, the majority fails to quote key language from Enterprise Wheel. The United States Supreme Court said: “When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formw-lating remedies. There is a need for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Minute Maid Co. v. Citrus Workers, Local 444, 331 F.2d 280, 281 (5th Cir. 1964), an arbitrator, finding that an employee had been wrongfully discharged, ordered that he be reinstated with back pay. The company argued that because the collective bargaining agreement did not provide for a back pay remedy, the award should not be enforced. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the “contract did not exclude from arbitration either the subject matter or the remedy adopted by the arbiter,” and held that the essence of the award was adequately grounded in the contract. See also, United Steelworkers of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 730 (5th Cir. 1974).
Applying the Enterprise Wheel test (supra, p. 25), I conclude that there is a sufficient nexus between the chief’s breach of the agreement by wrongfully disciplining Lund and the arbitrator’s remedy of reinstatement so that the arbitrator’s “award is legitimate [and] it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.” The remedy of reinstatement is grounded in the agreement and flows logically and reasonably from the breach of agreement. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the award should not be vacated. I dissent.