Court Opinion

ID: 9637030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:54:07.266165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:52.333640
License: Public Domain

RAKER, J., concurring in part and dissenting, in which BELL, C.J., joins in part:
I respectfully concur and dissent. Appellees assert that Maryland excludes them and their children from the protections unique to marriage solely because the person whom they love is a person of the same sex. Appellees seek the right to marry, understanding that a civil marriage license entitles married couples to a vast array of economic and social benefits and privileges—the rights of marriage—as well as other intangible benefits. Because in my view entitlement to the rights of marriage and the right to marry are distinct issues, I analyze them separately.
I would adopt the same analysis that the Supreme Court of New Jersey embraced in Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 908 A.2d 196 (2006), in which same-sex couples sued state officials, seeking both a declaration that New Jersey’s laws banning same-sex marriage violated the equal protection guarantees of the New Jersey Constitution as well as injunctive relief compelling the State to grant them marriage licenses. The New Jersey Court noted that the legal battle in the case had been waged over one overarching issue—the right to marry. The court rejected this “all-or-nothing” approach. Id. at 206. Instead, the court distinguished between the right to marry, on the one hand, and the rights of marriage on the other hand. Id. Specifically, the court considered appellees’ equal protection claim to consist of two components: whether committed same-sex couples have a constitutional right to the benefits and privileges afforded to married heterosexual couples, and, if so, whether they have a constitutional right to have their relationship recognized by the name marriage. I view the instant case before this Court in the same way, i.e., the issue presented as having two components.1 I would hold that *327denying rights and benefits to committed same-sex couples that are given to married heterosexual couples violates the equal protection guarantee of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.2 As did the State of New Jersey, I would find that “to comply with this constitutional mandate, the Legislature must either amend the marriage statutes to include same-sex couples or create a parallel statutory structure, which will provide for, on equal terms, the rights and benefits enjoyed and burdens and obligations borne by married couples.” Harris, 908 A.2d at 200.
The Vermont Supreme Court reached the same conclusion and adopted a similar approach. Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999). Like the New Jersey plaintiffs, (and the Maryland plaintiffs), the Vermont plaintiffs “sought injunctive and declaratory relief designed to secure a marriage license, *328their claims and arguments here have focused primarily upon the consequences of official exclusion from the statutory benefits, protections, and security incident to marriage under Vermont law.” Id. at 886. Although the Vermont decision is based upon the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, the court-ordered remedy for the deprivation of rights protected by the State Constitution makes eminent sense. The court held as follows:
“We hold that the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature. Whatever system is chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of the law.”
Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.3
I.
Under Maryland’s traditional equal protection jurisprudence, a legislative classification which does not discriminate *329on the basis of sex, burden significantly a fundamental right, or otherwise draw a classification based on suspect or quasi-suspect criteria may be sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Broadwater v. State, 306 Md. 597, 603, 510 A.2d 583, 585-86 (1986) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)); Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 716-17, 908 A.2d 1220, 1235 (2006). In consideration of the majority’s analysis, I agree that rational basis is the proper standard for reviewing Family Law § 2-201.
As the majority notes, a statute subject to rational basis review will be upheld generally unless the classification is “wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 707, 426 A.2d 929, 942 (1981) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) and McDonald v. Bd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969)). Furthermore, a classification subject to rational basis review may result in some inequality so long as the state can produce any conceivable “state of facts” to justify the *330distinction. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 352, 499 A.2d 178, 185 (1985); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976).
It is incorrect, however, to presume that rational basis review is effectively no review at all, particularly where vital personal interests are affected by a statutory classification.4 In Frankel, the Court noted its willingness to strike down, under rational basis review, laws that lack any reasonable justification.5 Frankel, 361 Md. 298, 315, 761 A.2d 324, 333 (2000). We stated as follows:
‘We have not hesitated to carefully examine a statute and declare it invalid if we .cannot discern a rational basis for its enactment. ‘The vitality of this State’s equal protection doctrine is demonstrated by our decisions which, although applying the deferential standard embodied in the rational basis test, have nevertheless invalidated many legislative classifications which impinged on privileges cherished by *331our citizens.’ ”6
Id., at 315, 761 A.2d at 333 (quoting Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 419, 635 A.2d 967, 971 (1994)). In practice, we have reviewed closely a legislative classification when important personal interests of distinct groups of Maryland residents are at stake or when legislation distributes benefits and burdens unequally between residents of the State.7 With this equal protection jurisprudence in mind, I turn to whether appellees are entitled to the same benefits, rights and privileges afforded to married heterosexual couples.
II.
Maryland’s marriage law, Family Law § 2-201, entitles only opposite-sex couples to the rights of marriage. Md.Code (1984, 2006 RepLVol.), § 2-201 of the Family Law Article. As *332a result of the classification in § 2-201, two similarly situated classes of people are established: committed same-sex couples and married opposite-sex couples. The State asserts that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in encouraging marriage between two members of the opposite sex as a means of fostering a stable environment for procreation.8 Appellees, on the other hand, assert that the distinction between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples does not rationally further the State’s interest in child welfare.
A. Current Laws—Rights and Limits
In order to determine whether Maryland’s marriage law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, it is first necessary to review how the Maryland statutory, regulatory, and case law has evolved to expand rights to gays and lesbians. It is highly significant that throughout this State, based on statutes and ordinances, discrimination against gays and lesbians is not tolerated or acceptable. As I will outline, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is against the law in this State. This context is important for analyzing whether the State’s proffered interest is legitimate, and whether the State’s means fit sufficiently the ends sought by the statute.
1. Rights
Over the past decade, Maryland has sought to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation and to reduce the disparate treatment of people based on sexual orientation, particularly in the areas of family law, criminal law, and anti-discrimination legislation.
Starting in the mid-1990’s, Maryland appellate courts rejected the notion that homosexual individuals should be treat*333ed differently than heterosexual individuals when determining parental rights. Specifically, Maryland courts have rejected the notion that a person is unfit for visitation rights because of his or her sexual orientation. Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 237-238, 721 A.2d 662, 678 (1998); North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 15-17, 648 A.2d 1025, 1032-33 (1994). In North, the Court of Special Appeals, en banc, held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a homosexual father overnight visitation rights by focusing on the perceived harms of exposing his children to his homosexual lifestyle instead of focusing on the proper question of whether visitation was in the best interests of his children. North, 102 Md.App. at 15-17, 648 A.2d at 1032-33. This Court has held subsequently that the sexual preference of the non-custodial parent whose visitation is being challenged is not relevant, and that restrictions on visitation should be reviewed under the best interests of the child standard. Boswell, 352 Md. at 236-238, 721 A.2d at 678. Indeed, we noted in Boswell that the “only relevance that a parent’s sexual conduct or lifestyle has in the context of a visitation proceeding of this type is where that conduct or lifestyle is clearly shown to be detrimental to the children’s emotional and/or physical well-being.” Id. at 237-38, 721 A.2d at 678.
Maryland appellate courts have not considered sexual orientation as a factor when determining third party custody rights. In a custody dispute between two homosexual women, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court was required to exercise jurisdiction over a child visitation lawsuit brought by the biological mother’s former same-sex partner under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, even if Tennessee was the more convenient forum. Gestl v. Frederick, 133 Md.App. 216, 244-45, 754 A.2d 1087, 1102-03 (2000). The court noted that the former partner, who was not a biological parent, would lack standing to bring an action in Tennessee absent a finding that parental custody would result in substantial harm to the child, whereas Maryland law entitled the third party an opportunity to show that exceptional circumstances existed that would make it in the child’s best interests to grant *334her custody.9 Id. The sexual orientation of the individuals raising the custody claim was not a relevant factor in the court’s holding—the former same-sex partner was viewed as any other third party who had a role in the child’s life and could show exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543 (2003) (affirming grant of custody to grandparents); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116, 43 A.2d 186 (1945) (denying father’s petition for custody when child had been living with foster parents for five years); Pastore v. Sharp, 81 Md.App. 314, 322, 567 A.2d 509, 513 (1989), cert. denied, 319 Md. 304, 572 A.2d 182 (1990) (finding exceptional circumstances when child had been in custody of third party for two of his five years, child had become attached to third party, and his future would lack stability and certainty if placed with the natural mother); Newkirk v. Newkirk, 73 Md.App. 588, 595, 535 A.2d 947, 950-51 (1988) (finding exceptional circumstances in awarding custody of teenage children to half-brother, rather than natural father).
Although the issue of same-sex adoption has not been addressed by this Court, Maryland law does not appear to *335preclude same-sex couple adoptions. The plain language of Family Law § 5-3A-29 permits any adult to adopt.10 Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-3A-29 of the Family Law Article. Thus, the statute does not appear to distinguish between the adoption of children by homosexuals or same-sex couples.11 Individuals in a same-sex relationship may adopt, even though currently they are not allowed to marry under Maryland law, because there is no requirement that an adult seeking to adopt a child be married. Md.Code (1984, 2006 ReplVol.), § 5-349(b) (stating that a petition for adoption may not be denied “solely because the petitioner is single or unmarried.”). In traditional adoptions and single-person adoptions, a child is adopted by one or two new parents and all legal relationships with prior parents are terminated. Maryland also recognizes “second-parent adoptions,” where a child with one parent is adopted by a second parent without severing the prior-existing parental relationship.12 Id. § 5-*336331(b)(2) (adoption without prior termination of parental rights). Maryland’s trial courts have granted same-sex couples “second-parent adoptions” and have noted that such adoptions are in the best interests of the child. See In re Petition of D.L.G. & M.A.H., No. 95-179001/CAD, 2 MFLM Supp. 21 (1997) (Cir. Ct. Balt. City, June 27, 1996); Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of the Att’y Gen., Sharon Grosfeld, Delegate, Maryland Gen. Assemb. (June 9, 2000). Thus, sexual orientation is not a factor in adoption proceedings in Maryland, and the children adopted by same-sex couples are treated under Maryland law in the same way as children adopted by a heterosexual or married couple.
Maryland has acted to protect gays and lesbians in the area of criminal law. The General Assembly has amended Maryland’s hate crime statutes to prohibit committing a crime upon a persons or property because of sexual orientation. See Md.Code (2002, 2006 Cum.Supp.), §§ 10-301 to 10-306 of the Criminal Law Article.
Maryland has addressed the decriminalization of sexual acts for both heterosexual and homosexual couples. In Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990), this Court held that Maryland’s statute criminalizing “unnatural or perverted sexual practices” did not encompass private, consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults.13 See Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 554. In 1998, a Maryland circuit court extended the Schochet ruling to hold that the *337“unnatural or perverted sexual practices” statute, § 554, did not encompass consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual or homosexual activity. See Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL-1059, 1998 WL 965992 (Md.Cir.Ct. Oct. 15, 1998). It is worth noting that the defendant State of Maryland specifically argued that § 554 should be construed so as not to apply to private, consensual, non-commercial homosexual activity because any other interpretation “gives rise to an equal protection question.” Id. at *6. The Circuit Court held that “[i]t cannot be doubted ... that there would be an equal protection violation if acts, considered not criminal when committed by a heterosexual couple, could be prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple. There is simply no basis for the distinction.” 14 Id. at *7. Thus, four years prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), which invalidated Texas’ homosexual sodomy law, Maryland’s courts and executive branch had already determined that private, consensual, non-commercial sex is non-criminal.15
Maryland public policy prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in public accommodation, housing, and employment. See Anti-discrimination Act, 2001 Md. Laws Chap. 340. The Anti-discrimination Act of 2001 bans discrimination based on sexual orientation, defined as “the identifica*338tion of an individual as to male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.”16 Id. The Act states that it, “may not be construed to authorize or validate a marriage between two individuals of the same-sex” and it “may not be construed to require or prohibit an employer to offer health insurance benefits to unmarried domestic partners,” but the Act as a whole firmly establishes that Maryland’s public policy prohibits adverse treatment based on sexual orientation. Id.
There are a multitude of other state-wide laws and regulations that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in a variety of categories. It is unlawful for social workers, judges, and the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, for example, to discriminate based on sexual orientation. Md. Code (1981, 2005 Repl. Vol, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 19-311 of the Health and Occupations Article; Md. Rule 16-813 Canon 3A (“A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office ... impartially, and without having or manifesting bias or prejudice, including bias or prejudice based on ... sexual orientation. ...”); Md.Code (1957, 2002 Repl. Vol), Art. 29, § 1-107. Maryland has regulated several other areas to further the goal of sexual orientation equality.17
*340Many Marylanders are similarly and further protected by county or municipal laws. Howard County, Prince George’s County, Baltimore City, Montgomery County, and Anne Arundel County have ordinances that, in some form, prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Howard County Code § 12.200 (2007) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation generally); Id. § 12.207 (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. § 12.208 (prohibiting employment discrimination); Id. § 12.209 (prohibiting discrimination by law enforcement personnel); Id. § 12.210 (prohibiting public accommodation discrimination); Id. § 12.211 (prohibiting financing discrimination); Id. § 19.513 (prohibiting discrimination in use of “open space areas”); Prince George’s County Code § 2-210 (2003) (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. § 2-231.01 (prohibiting commercial real estate discrimination); Id. § 5A-117 (prohibiting cable service discrimination); Id. § 10A-122 (prohibiting discrimination in award of contracts); Id. § 16-101 (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in the personnel system of the County); Baltimore City Code art. 4, § 3-1 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination); Id. § 3-2 (prohibiting public accommodations discrimination); Id. § 3-3 (prohibiting education discrimination); Id. § 3-4 (prohibiting health and welfare agency discrimination); Id. § 3-5 (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. art. 5, § 31-3 (providing for an annual review of licensed medical service providers to certify that they do not deny service on the basis of sexual orientation); Id. art. 19, § 23-2 (providing for the tracking of hate crimes motivated by the victim’s sexual orientation); *341Montgomery County Code § 27-1 (2004); Id. § 8A-15 (prohibiting cable service discrimination); Id. § 27-11 (prohibiting public accommodations discrimination); Id. § 27-12 (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. § 27-16 (prohibiting commercial real estate discrimination); Id. § 27-19 (prohibiting employment discrimination); Id. § 27-22 (prohibiting discrimination through intimidation); Id. app. D, § 6.19 (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by licensees granted licenses by the Board of Licensing Commission); Code of Montgomery County Regulations § 21.02.18.04 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination by fire rescue personnel); Id. § 27.26.01.01 (including crimes committed against a person because of their sexual orientation as “hate crimes”); Id. § 33.07.01.05 (prohibiting employment discrimination in county operations); Anne Arundel County Code § 10-8-111 (2005) (prohibiting cable service discrimination).
Amongst these counties, Montgomery County is unique because it has extended certain employment benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of County employees—rights previously only enjoyed by heterosexual couples through the civil contract of marriage.18 See Employee Benefits Equity Act of *3421999 (the “Act”), Montgomery County Code § 38-22 (2004) (providing certain insurance and financial benefits to same-sex domestic partnerships); Id. § 52-24 (extending tax exemption for property transfers to same-sex couples). The Act, generally, extends benefits, such as health, leave, and survivor benefits comparable to those afforded the spouses of County employees, to the domestic partners of County employees, including those benefits available “under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, and other federal laws that apply to County employment benefits.” Id. at § 33-22(b).
This Court upheld the constitutionality of the Montgomery County Act. See Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 801 A.2d 148 (2002) (holding that a home rule county does not exceed its local lawmaking authority or otherwise undermine State and federal law by providing benefits to the domestic partners of its employees). We held that the Act did not implicate Maryland’s marriage laws. Id. at 514-15, 801 A.2d at 158. Instead, we determined that the County had demonstrated a valid public purpose for extending employment benefits, namely “recruiting] and retaining] qualified employees and ... promoting] employee loyalty.” Id. at 512, 801 A.2d at 157. Thus, under this State’s home rule authority, Montgomery County was within its right to provide for the health and welfare of the County not already provided for by the public general law. Md.Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.), Art. 25A, § 5(S).
*343B. Limitations
Despite Maryland’s recent statutory, regulatory, and case law that has evolved to equalize some legal protections of heterosexuals and homosexuals, same-sex couples are denied the protection of hundreds of laws simply because they are not yet entitled to the rights and benefits flowing from marriage. Appellees have directed us to over 425 statutory protections that are afforded to married couples and, as a result, to their children under state law, protections that appellees are denied.19 See Equality Maryland., Marriage Inequality in the State of Maryland (2006), http://www.equalitymaryland.org marriage/marriage_inequality_in_maryland.pdf. I briefly examine the extent to which these laws continue to restrict committed same-sex couples from enjoying the full benefits and privileges available through marriage, unlike similarly situated heterosexual couples.20
Health related benefits are among the rights afforded to married couples but denied to committed same-sex couples. A spouse is automatically entitled to act as a surrogate regarding health care decisions necessary for an incapacitated spouse absent the existence of an appointed guardian. Md.Code (1982, 2005 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 5-605 of the *344Health-General Article. A spouse may share a room in health care facility. Id. § 19-344(h). A spouse is also permitted to secure health insurance for the other spouse. Md.Code (1997, 2003 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 12-202 of the Insurance Article. Same-sex couples do not enjoy these automatic protections.
Married individuals benefit also from certain default provisions associated with the death of a spouse. A surviving spouse automatically has the right to arrange for the final disposition of the body of a decedent spouse in absence of written instructions. Md.Code (1982, 2005 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 5-509 of the Health-General Article. A spouse is exempt from inheritance tax on benefits plans or real property passed on by the decedent. Md.Code (1988, 2004 ReplVol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 7-203 of the Tax General Article. A spouse is entitled to a family allowance of $5,000, which is exempt from and has priority over all claims against the estate. Md.Code (1974, 2001 ReplVol, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 3-201 of the Estates and Trusts Article. A spouse may bring a cause of action for the wrongful death of a spouse. Md.Code (1974, 2006 ReplVol.), § 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Furthermore, health insurance providers are required to continue coverage for surviving spouses. Md.Code (1997, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 15-407 of the Insurance Article. Same-sex couples must incur the expense of attempting to gain and to protect these rights through wills and other legal instruments.
Beyond the realm of health and death benefits, married couples enjoy the right to freely transfer joint ownership in property to a spouse without having to pay transfer or recordation tax. Md.Code (1986, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), §§ 12-108, 13-403 of the Tax-Property Article. Married couples may own property as tenants by the entirety, Md.Code (1974, 2003 ReplVol, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 4-204 of the Real Property Article, which can, for example, protect the property from forfeiture in certain circumstances. Md.Code (2001, 2001 ReplVol, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 12-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article. In judicial proceedings, married individuals may *345not be compelled to testify against their spouse or to disclose confidential communications. Md.Code (1974, 2006 RepLVol.), § 9-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. One spouse cannot be compelled to testify against a defendant spouse as an adverse witness unless the charge involves child abuse or assault in which the spouse is a victim. Id. § 9-106. In the area of education, dependent children and spouses of armed forces members further benefit under Maryland law because they are exempt from paying non-resident tuition at a public institution of higher education. Md.Code (1978, 2006 RepLVol.), § 15-106.4 of the Education Article.
The statutes determining relationships between child and parent are particularly relevant. Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 1-206 of the Trusts and Estates Article states as follows:
“(a) A child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses. Except as provided in § 1-207,[21] a child born at any time after his parents have participated in a marriage ceremony with each other, even if the marriage is invalid, is presumed to be the legitimate child of both parents.
“(b) A child conceived by artificial insemination of a married woman with the consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both of them for all purposes. Consent of the husband is presumed.”
Although a child conceived by artificial insemination of a married woman can automatically be the legitimate child of both individuals in the marriage, a same-sex couple must go through the process of second-parent adoption, which necessarily involves a period of some delay.
It cannot be argued that same-sex couples are not denied significant benefits accorded to heterosexual couples. It is clear that there are significant differences in the benefits provided to married couples and same-sex couples in the areas *346of taxation, business regulation, secured commercial transactions, spousal privilege and other procedural matters, education, estates and trusts, family law, decision-making regarding spousal health care, insurance, labor and employment, child care and child rearing, pensions, and the responsibilities attendant to spousal funeral arrangements. Significantly, the inequities directed to individuals in same-sex couples have an impact on their children. Children in same-sex couple households are treated differently—because their care providers are denied certain benefits and rights—despite comparable needs to children of married couples. Thus, under Maryland’s current laws, committed same-sex couples and their children are not afforded the benefits and protections available to heterosexual households.
2. Analysis of State’s Interests
As the majority notes, the State asserts two rationales in support of the statute governing marriage, Family Law § 2-201. First, the State argues that, “Maryland law preserving the historic definition of marriage to include a man and a woman is eminently reasonable and unquestionably bears a fair and substantial relation to the State’s legitimate interest in maintaining and promoting the traditional institution of marriage.” This rationale addresses solely the definition of marriage, as opposed to the rights and benefits that flow from marriage. Because I write separately to address the rights and benefits, I do not address this proffered State interest.
The State asserts also that, encouraging “the definition of marriage to include a man and woman is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in providing for the offspring that may result from heterosexual intimacy.” Again, my focus is on whether the State may rationally deny same-sex couples the full rights and benefits of marriage in order to foster its asserted interest in a stable environment for procreation and child rearing.22
*347Under our equal projection jurisprudence, a law will survive rational basis scrutiny, generally, if the distinction it makes rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose. As the majority acknowledges, the classification established in Family Law § 2-201 is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. The statute is over-inclusive because children may be born into same-sex relationships through alternative methods of conception, including surrogacy, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and adoption. Conversely, the statute is under-inclusive because not all opposite-sex couples choose to procreate, not all opposite-sex couples are able to have children, and many opposite-sex couples utilize the same alternative methods of conception as same-sex couples.23 We have recognized, however, that a classification subject to rational basis review having “some reasonable basis need not be made with mathematical nicety and may result in some inequality.” Whiting-Turner, 304 Md. at 352, 499 A.2d at 185 (emphasis added); but see Waldron, 289 Md. at 713-14, 426 A.2d at 946 (“A loose fit between the legislative ends and the means chosen to accomplish those goals, which leaves a significant measure of similarly situated persons unaffected by the enactment, or conversely, which includes individuals within the statute’s purview who are not afflicted with the evil the statute seeks to remedy, is intolerable.”). The question, in this case, is whether the State has a reasonable basis for its classification in Family Law § 2-201, particularly in light of the extensive inequality that results from the classification and its impacts on vital interests. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 704, 426 A.2d at 940 (noting that where a legislative enactment “invades protected rights to life, liberty, property or other interests secured by the fundamental doctrines of our jurisprudence, there is rea*348son to be especially vigilant” in the exercise of rational basis review.)
Maryland public policy supports procreation that occurs in both opposite-sex and same-sex couple environments. Maryland appears to grant adoptions to both homosexual and heterosexual couples, and adoption agencies “may not deny an individual’s application to be an adoptive parent because ... [o]f the applicant’s ... sexual orientation.” COMAE 7.05.03.09(A); see also COMAE 7.05.03.15(C)(2). Maryland courts alfio grant second-parent adoptions to same-sex partners and the Department of Health & Mental Hygiene issues birth certificates recognizing same-sex partners as co-parents. Furthermore, \ Maryland courts must disregard the sexual orientation of each parent in child custody and visitation disputes. See Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 721 A.2d 662. These laws do not demonstrate that Maryland has an interest in favoring heterosexual parents over homosexual couples with regard to procreation and child rearing. Indeed, the State specifically treats homosexual couples and heterosexual couples similarly in this context.
Despite the fact that Maryland provides some rights and benefits in the area of procreation to same-sex couples, the State asserts it has a rational basis for excluding same-sex couples from the full benefits of marriage. This is not a rational assertion. There is no doubt that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting procreation and child rearing, but it cannot rationally further this interest by only granting the full rights of marriage to opposite-sex couples when it already provides some legal protections regarding procreation and child rearing to same-sex couples.24 Maryland’s equal protection jurisprudence requires that a legislative distinction *349reasonably relate to the achievement of a legitimate State interest. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 355, 601 A.2d 102, 108 (1992) (noting that “a court will not overturn the classification unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irrational.”) (quotations omitted; internal citations omitted). Here, where Maryland has granted some rights regarding procreation and child-rearing to same-sex couples, it cannot rationally claim that its interest in providing a stable environment for procreation and child rearing is then actually furthered by the exclusion of same-sex couples from the equal rights and benefits of marriage.25
What is striking, in fact, is that the State’s proffered interest—providing a stable environment for procreation and child rearing—is actually compromised by denying same-sex families the benefits and rights that flow from marriage. That is, there is not a sufficient link between the State’s proffered legitimate interest and the means utilized by the State to further that interest.
The State has determined arbitrarily which benefits may be extended to same-sex couples and the inequality that results is more than merely “some inequality.” For example, there is no rational basis why a surviving spouse of a state employee *350killed in the performance of his or her duties should be denied payment of a death benefit if the individual is part of a same-sex couple. Md.Code (1994, 2004 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 10-404 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article. A surviving spouse, regardless of sexual orientation, and his or her child or children would benefit from the additional financial security provided from a death benefit. It is rational to presume that such a financial benefit would contribute to a stable environment for procreation and child rearing, regardless of the couples’ sexual orientation. Similarly, there is no rational basis for requiring a group life insurance policy to cover a spouse and dependent children in a heterosexual family, when children of same-sex couples would benefit just as much from life insurance. Md.Code (1997, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 17-209 of the Insurance Article. This disparate treatment of committed same-sex couples, exhibited in a multitude of Maryland laws discussed supra, directly disadvantages the children of same-sex couples, and there is no rational basis to allow such disadvantages when the State’s proffered interest is to promote a stable environment for procreation and child rearing. Each child raised in a household headed by a same-sex couple in Maryland needs and is entitled to the same legal protections as a child of married parents.
I agree with the Supreme Court of Vermont, which recognized both the multitude and significance of the benefits and protections incident to a marriage. The Vermont Supreme Court stated as follows:
“While other statutes could be added to this list, the point is clear. The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license are of such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned. Considered in light of the extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the stated purposes of the law—protecting children and ‘furthering the link between procreation and child rearing’—the exclusion falls substantially short of this *351standard. The laudable governmental goal of promoting a commitment between married couples to promote the security of their children and the community as a whole provides no reasonable basis for denying the legal benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples, who are no differently situated with respect to this goal than their opposite-sex counterparts. Promoting a link between procreation and childrearing similarly fails to support the exclusion.”
Baker, 744 A.2d at 884.
The classification in Family Law § 2-201 is significantly over—and under-inclusive, and creates more than merely an imperfect fit between means and ends with regard to the disbursement of the rights and benefits of marriage. Denying same-sex couples the rights and benefits appurtenant to marriage is not a means to legitimately meet the State’s interest in furthering procreation and child-rearing. Moreover, the classification creates more than merely “some inequality”—it creates a grossly unequal distribution of benefits and privileges to two similarly situated classes of people. The State has failed to provide a legitimate State interest in denying the protections and responsibilities of marriage that is rationally furthered by the classification in Family Law § 2-201. As discussed, supra, this State has demonstrated that it is on a path to providing full equality regardless of sexual orientation, and it is unreasonable and irrational for the State to arbitrarily grant to same-sex couples certain rights and benefits incident to marriage considering the full range of protections and responsibilities that come with marriage. In short, while there may be a legitimate basis for retaining the definition of marriage as one between a man and a woman, there is no legitimate basis for denying committed same-sex couples the benefits and privileges of marriage.
The reality of Maryland today is that heterosexual couples are not the only people that participate in procreation and child rearing. Maryland’s laws recognize and promote this reality, and each child raised in a household headed by a committed same-sex couple in Maryland needs and is entitled *352to the same legal protections as a child of heterosexual married parents. Thus, in order for the State to rationally further procreation and child rearing, the benefits and rights incident to marriage must be equally available to both committed same-sex and committed opposite-sex couples.
C. Remedy
The State has not demonstrated a rational relationship between denying committed same-sex couples the benefits and privileges given to their married heterosexual counterparts and the legitimate government purpose of promoting procreation and child-rearing. Under the equal protection guarantee of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the State must provide committed same-sex couples, on equal terms, the same rights, benefits, and responsibilities enjoyed by married heterosexual couples.
It is up to the General Assembly to meet the equal protection guarantee of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. It is not this Court’s role to craft a constitutional statutory scheme, but the General Assembly could satisfy the constitutional mandate by creating a separate statutory structure similar to the civil union or domestic partnership laws present in our sister jurisdictions.26
Each state’s statutory scheme differs in the rights and benefits granted to same-sex couples,27 but the schemes are *353similar in that they afford rights to committed same-sex couples on equal terms with their heterosexual counterparts. The New Jersey experience is important and instructive. On October 25, 2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 908 A.2d 196. The Court held that there is not a fundamental right to marriage under the New Jersey Constitution, but that “under the equal protection guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, committed same-sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 220-21. The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that the legislature had 180 days to either amend the existing marriage statutes to include same-sex couples, or it could create a separate and parallel statutory structure, such as a civil union, affording same-sex couples all of the same rights and responsibilities as heterosexual married couples. Id.
New Jersey’s legislature acted and chose to establish civil unions by amending the State’s current marriage statute to include same-sex couples. See 2006 N.J. Laws 975. In doing so, the legislature stated that it was “continuing its longstanding history of insuring equality under the laws for all New Jersey citizens by providing same-sex couples with the same rights and benefits as heterosexual couples who choose to marry.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:1-28® (West 2007).
The New Jersey Legislature set forth three requirements that two persons seeking to establish a civil union must meet: (1) not be a party to another civil union, domestic partnership or marriage in New Jersey; (2) be of the same sex; and (3) be at least 18 years of age, with certain exceptions.28 Id. § 37:1-30. Regarding benefits and rights, the New Jersey legislature *354stated that “[cjivil union couples shall have all of the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.” Id. § 37:l-31(a). The statute specifically notes, for example, that, “[t]he rights of civil union couples with respect to a child of whom either becomes the parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple with respect to a child of whom either spouse or partner in a civil union couple becomes the parent during the marriage.” Id. § 37:l-31(e). Moreover, the statute enumerates a list of “legal benefits, protections and responsibilities of spouses [that] shall apply in like manner to civil union couples, but shall not be construed to be an exclusive list of such benefits, protections and responsibilities.”29 Id. § 37:1-32. Finally, the legislature estab*355lished a Civil Union Review Commission, which it charged with, amongst other things, studying the implementation of the law, evaluating the effect on same-sex couples, their children and other family members of being provided civil unions rather than marriage, and reporting its findings to the Legislature and Governor on a semi-annual basis. Id. § 37:1-36.
Under Md. Rule 8-606, the disposition of an appeal is evidenced by the issuance of a mandate by the Clerk of Court in conformance with the opinion, not by the opinion itself. Generally, the mandate—the judgment of the Court—is issued 30 days after the filing of the opinion, but Rule 8—606(b) permits the Court to advance or delay the issuance of the *356mandate and we have, on occasion, exercised this discretion. See Massey v. Secretary, Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 389 Md. 496, 886 A.2d 585 (2005) (Clerk of Court directed to withhold mandate for 120 days in order to give the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services time to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act).
Similar to the situation in New Jersey prior to passage of that State’s civil union law, there is an unconstitutional disparity of rights, benefits, and responsibilities between committed same-sex couples and heterosexual couples in Maryland. The constitutional relief to which appellants are entitled would necessarily require the cooperation of the General Assembly. As a result, such relief could not be immediate. The General Assembly should, however, work to create a scheme that safeguards the individual liberties protected by the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In this case, I would retain jurisdiction in this Court and instruct the Clerk to withhold the mandate for 180 days to give the General Assembly time to consider and enact legislation consistent with the views expressed in this dissenting opinion. In my view, the General Assembly should either amend the marriage statutes or enact an appropriate statutory scheme to provide appellees with their full rights under Maryland’s equal protection guarantee in a timely manner.
Chief Judge Bell authorizes me to state that he agrees with, and joins this dissenting opinion to the extent that it endorses and advocates that committed same-sex couples are entitled to the myriad statutory benefits that are associated with and flow from marriage. He does not join the part of this opinion that accepts the majority’s analysis and determination that rational basis review is the appropriate standard to be applied in this case. See Bell, C.J., dissenting opinion.

. The majority analyzes whether appellees have a constitutional right to have their relationships recognized by the name marriage, but fails to *327consider whether appellees are entitled to the same benefits, rights and privileges afforded to married heterosexual couples. I write separately to address only this latter issue.

. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states "[t]hat no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Although Article 24 does not contain an express equal protection clause, this Court has held that the same concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. Frankel v. Board of Regents, 361 Md. 298, 312-13, 761 A.2d 324, 332 (2000) (quoting Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 482, 697 A.2d 468, 477 (1997)). United States Supreme Court cases applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are binding on this Court when applying that clause and are persuasive when we undertake to interpret and apply Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. Id. at 313, 761 A.2d at 332. We reiterate that each provision is independent, however, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other. See, e.g., Dua v. Comcast, 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002). It is well accepted that this Court may apply a more stringent standard of review as a matter of state law under Maryland's equivalent to the Equal Protection Clause. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company, 449 U.S. 456, 461-63 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 715, 722-23 n. 6, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981).

. The Vermont court made clear that the Legislature could and should fashion the appropriate remedy, stating as follows:
"We hold only that plaintiffs are entitled under Chapter I, Article 7, of the Vermont Constitution to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples. We do not purport to infringe upon the prerogatives of the Legislature to craft an appropriate means of addressing this constitutional mandate, other than to note that the record here refers to a number of potentially constitutional statutory schemes from other jurisdictions. These include what are typically referred to as 'domestic partnership’ or ‘registered partnership’ acts, which generally establish an alternative legal status to marriage for same-sex couples, impose similar formal requirements and limitations, create a parallel licensing or registration scheme, and extend all or most of the same rights and obligations provided by the law to married partners. See Report, Hawaii Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law (Appendix D-1B) (1995) (recommending enactment of 'Universal Comprehensive Domestic Partnership Act’ to establish equivalent licensing and *329eligibility scheme and confer upon domestic partners 'the same rights and obligations under the law that are conferred on spouses in a marriage relationship') (emphasis added); C. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a 'Simulacrum of Marriage’, 66 Fordham L.Rev. 1699, 1734-45 (1998) (discussing various domestic and foreign domestic partnership acts); A. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural, Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 How. L.J. 173, 217-20 n. 237 (1992) (reprinting Denmark’s 'Registered Partnership Act’); see generally, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 Colum. L.Rev. 1164 (1992) (discussing local domestic partnership laws); M. Pedersen, Denmark: Homosexual Marriage and New Rules Regarding Separation and Divorce, 30 J. Fam. L. 289 (1992) (discussing amendments to Denmark’s Registered Partnership Act); M. Roth, The Norwegian Act on Registered Partnership for Homosexual Couples, 35 J. Fam. L. 467 (1997) (discussing Norway’s Act on Registered Partnership for Homosexual Couples). We do not intend specifically to endorse any one or all of the referenced acts, particularly in view of the significant benefits omitted from several of the laws.” Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864, 886-87 (1999).

. Professor Cass Sunstein has documented that the United States Supreme Court has departed from the deferential rational basis standard without defining a new level of scrutiny. See Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L.Rev. 4, 59-61 (1996). These cases include Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1628-29, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (holding Colorado statute that banned state or local laws forbidding sexual-orientation discrimination was not rationally related to legitimate governmental objective), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3259-60, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (applying rational basis review, Court invalidated zoning discrimination against mentally retarded as based on "irrational prejudice”), and United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 2825-26, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973) (invalidating regulation that excluded nonfamily members of household from food stamp program). In each of these decisions, the Court employed a highly contextual, fact-based analysis balancing private rights and public interests even while ostensibly applying minimal rational basis review.

. We noted that, "such invalid regulations have often imposed economic burdens, in a manner tending to favor some Maryland residents over other Maryland residents." Frankel, 361 Md. at 315, 761 A.2d 324 (quotations omitted) (citing Maryland Aggregates v. State, 337 Md. 658, 672 n. 9, 655 A.2d 886, 893 n. 9 (1995)).

. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2485, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) ("We have been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.”).

. See, e.g., Frankel, 361 Md. 298, 761 A.2d 324 (striking down, on rational basis review, tuition policy discriminating against certain instate residents); Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 635 A.2d 967 (1994) (striking down, on rational basis review, ordinance discriminating against tow operators without a place of business in the county); Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981) (striking down, on rational basis review, statute discriminating against retired judge practitioners); Kirsch v. Prince George’s County, 331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372 (1993) (striking down, on rational basis review, zoning ordinance discriminating against university student tenants); Md. St. Bd. of Barber Ex. v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973) (striking down, on rational basis review, statute discriminating against cosmetologists); Bruce v. Dir., Chesapeake Bay Aff., 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971) (striking down, on rational basis review, statute discriminating against out-of-county crabbers and oystermen); City of Balto. v. Charles Ctr. Parking, 259 Md. 595, 271 A.2d 144 (1970) (striking down, on rational basis review, ordinance discriminating against painted signs); Md. Coal Etc. Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949) (striking down, on rational basis review, mining statute discriminating against non-exempt counties); Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936) (striking down, on rational basis review, statute discriminating against paper-hangers); Havre de Grace v. Johnson, 143 Md. 601, 123 A. 65 (1923) (striking down, on rational basis review, an ordinance discriminating against out-of-city automobiles for hire).

. To reiterate, I do not address whether same-sex partners have the right to define their relationship by the name of marriage or whether the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the traditional institution of marriage by name. In this dissent, I analyze solely whether same-sex couples are entitled to the same rights of marriage that are provided in Maryland to heterosexual partners.

. This Court stated recently that "where private third parties are attempting to gain custody of children from their natural parents, the trial court must first find that both natural parents are unfit to have custody of their children or that extraordinary circumstances exist which are significantly detrimental to the child remaining in the custody of the parent or parents, before a trial court should consider the " ‘best interests of the child’ standard as a means of deciding the dispúte.” McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 325, 869 A.2d 751, 754 (2005); see also Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 662, 814 A.2d 543, 557 (2003) ("[W]hen the dispute is between a parent and a third party, it is presumed that the child's best interest lies with parental custody. If there is a sufficient showing that the parent is unfit, however, or that exceptional circumstances exist which would make parental custody detrimental to the child's best interest, the presumption is rebutted and custody should not be given to the parent, for, in either situation, parental custody could not possibly be in the child's best interest. So long as the best interest of the child remains the definitive standard and there is any reasonable alternative, it defies both logic and common sense to place a child in the custody of anyone, including a parent, when either that person is unfit to have custody or such action, because of exceptional circumstances, would be detrimental to the child's best interest.”)

. The statutory requirements for adoption do not specifically address sexual orientation. Section 5-3A-29 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code sets forth the requirements as follows:
(a) Age—Any adult may petition a court for an adoption under this subtitle.
(b) Minimum period of placement—A petitioner may petition for adoption of a child 180 days or more after a child placement agency places the child with the petitioner.
(c) Marital status—(1) If a petitioner under this section is married, the petitioner’s spouse shall join in the petition unless the spouse:
(1) is separated from the petitioner under a circumstance that gives the petitioner a ground for annulment or divorce; or
(ii) is not competent to join in the petition.
(2) If the marital status of a petitioner changes before entry of a final order, the petitioner shall amend the petition accordingly.
Md.Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-3A-29 of the Family Law Article.

. Other states expressly prohibit adoptions by gays and lesbians. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 63.042(3) (West 2005) ("No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(5) (2004 & Supp.2006) ("Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”); Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9(3)(a) (2002) ("The Legislature specifically finds that it is not in a child’s best interest to be adopted by a person or persons who are cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.”).

. See In re Petition of D.L.G. & M.A.H., No. 95-179001/CAD, 2 MFLM Supp.21 (1997) (Cir. Ct. Balt. City, June 27, 1996). According to www. *336thetaskforce.org, Maryland is one of 15 states where trial courts have granted "second-parent adoptions.” Second-Parent Adoption in the U.S. (2007), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_naaps/ 2nd_parent_adoption_5_07_color.pdf. Only three states provide for second-parent adoptions by statute. See Conn. Gen.Stat. 45a-724(3) (2005); Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002); 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 837.

. A jury had convicted Schochet of participating in the unnatural or perverted sexual practice of fellatio under the Md.Code (1957, 1987 Rep. Vol.), Art. 27 § 554. Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 718, 580 A.2d 176, 178 (1990). Schochet did not directly address homosexual acts. See id.

. Interestingly, although this Court has not opined on Williams, the Maryland Office of the Attorney General issued an Advice Letter to Delegate Sue Hecht on October 29, 1999 stating that, “although Williams is a circuit court decision, the Court of Appeals would likely reach the same conclusion.” See Advice Letters, Advice and Legislation Quarterly News, Office of the Attorney General, October-December 1999, at 2-3, available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/news/994.htm.

. The American Civil Liberties Union reports that The Office of the Attorney General, in a consent decree signed on January 19, 1999, agreed to both not appeal Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL-1059, 1998 WL 965992 (Md.Cir.Ct. Oct. 15, 1998) and not enforce Maryland’s sodomy statute. See In Historic Settlement with ACLU, Maryland Clears Last of its Sodomy Laws From the Books, (1991), http://aclu.org/lgbt/discrim/11991prs19990119.html; see also Scott Calvert, Ruling on Gays Stirs Up Emotions, Balt. Sun, June 28, 2003, at 1A.

. Maryland is one of twenty-one jurisdictions that have passed sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws. See Thetaskforce.org, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S. (2007), http://www.thetaskforce.or^ downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_07_07_color.pdf. The other jurisdictions are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, Vermont.

. See Gregory Care, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Long Overdue: The Evolution of a "Sexual Orientation-Blind” Legal System in Maryland and the Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 35 U. Balt. L.Rev. 73 at n. Ill (2006) ("Md.Code Regs. 01.01.1995.19(I)(A)(11) (2004) (executive order to establish an equal employment opportunity program for state government to ensure personnel actions taken "without regard to ... [sjexual orientation”); id. 01.04.04.04(B)(7) (2004) (requiring the board of directors of Residential Child Care Programs to ensure that such programs do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 05.04.11.18(A) (2005) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by sponsors or contractors in the Special Housing Opportunities Program); id. 05.05.02.14(A) (2005) *339(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the Multi-Family Flousing Revenue Bond Financing Program); id, 05.17.01.10(A) (2005) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by sponsors in the Community Legacy Program); id. 07.03.03.07(I)(9)(b) (2004) (deeming quitting a job because of sexual orientation discrimination as good cause for purposes of the Family Investment Program); id. 07.03.08.02(B)(1)(h) (2004) (same in Emergency Assistance to Families with Children program); id. 07.03.16.08(D)(2) (2004) (same in Refugee Cash Assistance program); id. 07.05.03.09(A)(2) (2004) (prohibiting private child placement agencies from denying an application because of the applicant’s or the adoptive child’s sexual orientation); id. 07.05.03.15(C)(2) (2004) (prohibiting the delay or denial of the placement of an adoptive child because of the adoptive parent or child's sexual orientation); id. 10.18.06.03(A)(6) (2004) (requiring Maryland AIDS Drug Assistance Program providers to provide services without regard to sexual orientation); id. 10.26.03.03(D)(5) (2004) (prohibiting licensees of the Board of Acupuncture from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.34.10.06(A)(1) (2004) (prohibiting pharmacists from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.41.02.04(E) (2005) (prohibiting licensees of the Board of Examiners for Audiologists, Hearing Aid Dispensers, and Speech-Language Pathologists from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.42.03.03(B)(5) (2005) (prohibiting licensed social workers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.43.14.03(D)(5) (2005) (prohibiting licensed chiropractors and registered chiropractic assistants of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.43.18.03(D)(5) (2005) (prohibiting licensed massage therapists of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.46.02.01(A)(1) (2005) (prohibiting licensees of the Board of Occupational Therapy Practice from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.47.01.07(C) (2005) (prohibiting a program administered under the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.51.04.01(C)(2)(x) (2005) (prohibiting providers of Maryland Primary Care from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.53.01.01(D)(5) (2005) (prohibiting an electrologist from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.58.03.05(A)(2)(b) (2005) (prohibiting a counselor or therapist certified or licensed by the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 11.02.04.02(A) (2005) (mandating that departmental actions of the Department of Transportation not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 11.07.06.13 (2005) (mandating that proposals ©submitted to the Transportation Public-Private Partnership Program may not be subjected to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 11.15.29.02(E)(6) (2005) (permitting the rejection of motor vehicle registration plates which "[cjommunicates a message of any kind about” sexual orientation); id. 13A.01.04.03 (2005) (guaranteeing a safe, adequate, and harassment-free educational environment for students without regard to sexual orientation in Maryland’s public *340schools); id. 14.27.02.03(B) (2004) (calling for the implementation of an equal employment opportunity program in the Maryland Environmental Service to administer the human resources policies and provisions without discriminating on the basis of sexual .orientation); id. 14.29.04.09(C)(1) (2004) (prohibiting borrowers from the Maryland Heritage Areas Loan Program from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 14.30.04.04(B)(3)(e)(i) (2004) (requiring election petitions of employee organizations for the State Higher Education Labor Relations Board to certify that they accept members without *341regard to sexual orientation); 27:23 Md. Reg. 2130 (Nov. 17, 2000) (executive order for commission to study sexual orientation discrimination in Maryland).”)

. Certain requirements must be met for a couple to qualify as a domestic partnership. Section 33-22(c)(l) of the County Code provides:
"(c) Requirements for domestic partnership. To establish a domestic partnership, the employee and the employee’s partner must ... "(1) satisfy all of the following requirements:
"(A) be the same sex ...;
“(B) share a close personal relationship and be responsible for each other’s welfare;
"(C) have shared the same legal residence for at least 12 months;
"(D) be at least 18 years old;
"(E) have voluntarily consented to the relationship, without fraud or duress;
"(F) not be married to, or in a domestic partnership with, any other person;
"(G) not be related by blood or affinity in a way that would disqualify them from marriage under State law if the employee and partner were ... opposite sexes;
“(H) be legally competent to contract; and
*342"(I) share sufficient financial and legal obligations to satisfy subsection (d)(2).”
Section (d) addresses the acceptable evidence of domestic partnership. Pursuant to subsection (d)(1), such evidence consists of either "an affidavit signed by both the employee and the employee's partner under penalty of perjury” or an official copy of the domestic partner registration, and under subsection (d)(2), evidence that the employee and partner share certain of several enumerated items, such as a joint lease, see § 33-22(d)(2)(A), or checking account, see § 33-22(d)(2)(C), that may document a domestic partnership.

. As the majority notes, there are literally over a thousand federal rights, responsibilities, and privileges granted to married couples, but denied to same-sex couples. See A.B.A. Sec. of Fam. L., A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 Fam. L.Q. 339, 366 n. 98 (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GA O Rep. No. 04-4353R, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior Report (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. items/d04353r.pdf). The majority notes correctly, in footnote 6 of their opinion, that "[ajlthough disposition of the present case would have no effect on Appellees’ eligibility for those federal benefits under the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, it illustrates the current regulatory landscape regarding same-sex marriage and the marital benefits from which Appellees are excluded.”

. It is not practical to fully discuss here the privileges that are provided to married individuals and denied to committed same-sex couples. For a full description see Equality Maryland., Marriage Inequality in the State of Maryland (2006), http://www.equalitymaryland. org /marriage/marriage_mequality_in_maryland.pdf.

. Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 1-207 of the Estates and Trusts Article states that an "adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of his adopting parent or parents.”

. There is no doubt that the State has a legitimate interest in the welfare of children. The question is whether Family Law § 2-201 rationally furthers this interest.

. As noted in Baker, 744 A.2d at 881, “it is undisputed that most of those who utilize nontraditional means of conception are infertile married couples, and that many assisted-reproductive techniques involve only one of the married partner’s genetic material, the other being supplied by a third party through sperm, egg, or embryo donation.” (citations omitted).

. Whether a child was conceived through "accidental” heterosexual sex or entered a family after planning by a different or a same-sex couple does not alter the State’s interest in encouraging that every child be raised in the most stable setting possible. There is no rational basis for concluding that excluding same-sex couples from the rights of marriage will influence heterosexual couples to have procreative sexual relations only within marriage or to pursue marriage after procreation. *353registration of domestic partnerships. Cal. Family Code, §§ 297 -299.6 (West 2004); D.C. Code § 32-701 et seq. (2001); Haw.Rev.Stat. 572C-1 et seq. (2006 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2710 (2003); 2007 Or. Laws 168; 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 616-37.

. Maryland’s equal protection jurisprudence requires that the legislative distinction further a legitimate state interest. Chief Judge Judith Kaye, writing for the dissent in Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 391, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (2006), explained as follows:
"Properly analyzed, equal protection requires that it be the legislated distinction that furthers a legitimate state interest, not the discriminatory law itself. Were it otherwise, an irrational or invidious exclusion of a particular group would be permitted so long as there was an identifiable group that benefitted from the challenged legislation. In other words, it is not enough that the State have a legitimate interest in recognizing or supporting opposite-sex marriages. The relevant question here is whether there exists a rational basis for excluding same-sex couples from marriage, and, in fact, whether the State’s interests in recognizing or supporting opposite-sex marriages are rationally furthered by the exclusion.” (citation omitted).

. The focus of this dissent is not on the definition of marriage, but it should be noted that the General Assembly could also act to remedy the current equal protection violations by modifying the definition of marriage in Family Law § 2-201 to include committed same-sex couples. Alternatively, the Legislature could elect to title all partnerships between two people, whether heterosexual or homosexual, as civil unions, domestic partnerships, etc.

. Connecticut, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Vermont, for example, have passed legislation that allows or authorizes civil unions for same-sex couples. See Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 46b-38aa to -38pp (2006 Supp.); 2007-2 N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 54 (LexisNexis); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:8A-1 to A-12 (West 2007); Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002). California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, and Washington enacted legislation providing for the

. Certain marriages or civil unions are prohibited outright, such as those between relatives. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:1-1 (West 2007).

. The non-exclusive list of legal benefits, protections and responsibilities stated in the New Jersey Civil Union statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:1-32 (West 2007), includes the following:
"a. laws relating to title, tenure, descent and distribution, intestate succession, survivorship, or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership or transfer, inter vivos or at death, of real or personal property, including but not limited to eligibility to hold real and personal property as tenants by the entirety;
"b. causes of action related to or dependent upon spousal status, including an action for wrongful death, emotional distress, loss of consortium, or other torts or actions under contracts reciting, related to, or dependent upon spousal status;
"c. probate law and procedure, including nonprobate transfer;
"d. adoption law and procedures;
“e. laws relating to insurance, health and pension benefits;
"f. domestic violence protections pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991,” P.L.1991, c. 261 (2C:25-17 et seq.) and domestic violence programs;
"g. prohibitions against discrimination based upon marital status;
"h. victim’s compensation benefits, including but not limited to compensation to spouse, children and relatives of homicide victims;
"i. workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to chapter 15 of Title 34 of the Revised Statutes, including but not limited to survivors’ benefits and payment of back wages;
"j. laws relating to emergency and nonemergency medical care and treatment, hospital visitation and notification, and any rights guaranteed to a hospital patient pursuant to P.L.1989, c. 170 (C.26:2H-12.7 *355et seq.) or a nursing home resident pursuant to P.L.1976, c. 120 (C.30:13-l etseq.);
“k. advance directives for health care and designation as a health care representative pursuant to P.L.1991, c. 201 (C.26:2H-53 et seq.);
"1. family leave benefits pursuant to P.L.1989, c. 261 (C.34:11B-1 et seq.);
"m. public assistance benefits under State law, including, but not limited to: Work First New Jersey benefits pursuant to P.L.1997, c. 38 (C.44:10-55 et seq.); medical assistance pursuant to P.L.1968, c. 413 (C.30:4D-1 et seq.); Supplemental Security Income pursuant to P.L.1973, c. 256 (0.44:7-85 et seq.); pharmaceutical assistance pursuant to P.L.1975, c. 194 (C.30:4D-20 et seq.) and P.L.2001, c. 96 (C.30:4D-43 et seq.); hearing aid assistance pursuant to P.L.1987, c. 298 (C.30:4D-36 et seq.); and utility benefits pursuant to P.L.1979, c. 197 (0.48:2-29.15 et seq.) and P.L.1981, c. 210 (0.48:2-29.30 et seq.); “n. laws relating to taxes imposed by the State or a municipality including but not limited to homestead rebate tax allowances, tax deductions based on marital status or exemptions from realty transfer tax based on marital status;
"o. laws relating to immunity from compelled testimony and the marital communication privilege;
"p. the home ownership rights of a surviving spouse;
"q. the right of a spouse to a surname change without petitioning the court;
"r. laws relating to the making of, revoking and objecting to anatomical gifts pursuant to P.L.1969, c. 161 (C.26:6-57 et seq.);
"s. State pay for military service;
"t. application for absentee ballots;
"u. legal requirements for assignment of wages; and
"v. laws related to tuition assistance for higher education for surviving spouses or children.”