Court Opinion

ID: 9388780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 17:02:59.590083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.629004
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/21/23 P. v. McFadden CA4/1
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080325

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD290150)

 TRAYVON MOORE MCFADDEN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Affirmed.
         Lizabeth Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeals, for
Defendant and Appellant
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
         A jury convicted Trayvon Moore McFadden of felony assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury and causing great bodily injury to
Nabeel Y. Before sentencing, McFadden made a Romero1 request that the
trial court strike four out of five of his prior serious felony convictions for
residential burglary. The trial court denied the Romero request and
ultimately imposed a sentence of 25 years to life for the assault and an
additional 3 years for the great bodily injury enhancement. On appeal,
McFadden argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering
improper factors in its ruling on the Romero motion, thereby violating his due
process rights.
      We conclude that the trial court did not rely on any information beyond
what is permissible in the context of sentencing. The trial court did not
consider improper factors or violate McFadden’s due process rights by
denying his Romero motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The current offense occurred after McFadden was arrested and booked
into custody in January 2020 for resisting arrest and possessing a firearm
and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of his probation for another
offense. In April 2021, McFadden was transferred to a cell with Nabeel Y.
and Brandon H. in San Diego County Central Jail. Both Nabeel and Brandon
had been occupying the cell for a few days before McFadden arrived. Before
sharing a cell on this occasion, McFadden and Brandon had encountered one
another as cellmates at George Bailey Detention Facility (“George Bailey”).
At George Bailey, McFadden had complained to deputies that he wanted
Brandon out of their cell. As a result of McFadden’s request, an altercation
between Brandon and custodial personnel ensued that led to Brandon being
placed in an administrative segregation unit for two or three weeks.

1     People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
                                     2
      As soon as McFadden moved in with Nabeel and Brandon at the
San Diego County Central Jail, he immediately cleaned the floor and toilet,
attempting to “set the tone” in terms of hygiene in the cell. Over the course of
three days, McFadden grew increasingly irritated by a perceived lack of
cleanliness in the cell, particularly with the body odor of Nabeel. The assault
in question occurred after McFadden woke up from a brief nap on the night of
his third day in the cell. When McFadden awoke from his nap, he accused
Nabeel of failing to clean himself properly and told him to take a shower,
leading to a heated argument.
      According to Brandon, McFadden threw the first punch, hitting Nabeel
in the face or ribs. McFadden continued to strike Nabeel in the face and
chest until Nabeel got hold of a shampoo bottle and managed to fling some
shampoo into one of McFadden’s eyes. At this point McFadden “hit [Nabeel]
a couple more times” until Deputy Breslow arrived at the cell to respond to
the commotion.
      Upon arriving at the cell, Deputy Breslow saw McFadden punch
Nabeel’s torso. Deputy Breslow ordered them to stop fighting and move to
opposite sides of the cell; both McFadden and Nabeel complied with his
commands. McFadden and Nabeel were removed from the cell and evaluated
by nurses at the jail. Nabeel’s medical condition was deemed critical by the
jail’s medical staff and he was sent via ambulance to the emergency room.
      At the emergency room, a CAT scan of Nabeel’s face “revealed he had
jaw fractures on each side of his jaw.” An attending physician determined
that Nabeel needed surgery to repair one of these fractures. Surgeons then
inserted a plate into Nabeel’s jaw in an operation that took “[a]pproximately
two and a half [or] three hours.” Nabeel’s recovery required him to

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temporarily switch to a liquid diet and he was prescribed opiates to manage
resulting pain.
      In May 2021, the District Attorney for the County of San Diego filed an
information charging McFadden with one count of assault likely to produce

great bodily injury (Pen. Code,2 § 245, subd. (a)(4)) with infliction of great
bodily injury upon another (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The information also
alleged that McFadden had previously been convicted of five counts of
residential burglary, which were alleged as both serious felony priors (§§ 667,
subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, 668).
      In a jury trial, the jury found McFadden guilty of assault likely to
produce great bodily injury and also found that, in the commission of the
assault, McFadden inflicted great bodily injury on Nabeel. Following the
verdict, a separate case relating to McFadden’s January 2020 arrest for
firearm/ammunition possession and resisting arrest was dismissed on the
basis of McFadden being found “guilty [of] other charges.”
      Before the sentencing hearing, McFadden filed a statement in
mitigation and the prosecution filed a statement in aggravation. McFadden’s
statement in mitigation included a Romero request that the trial court
exercise its discretion to strike all but one of his five prior serious felony
convictions for the purposes of sentencing under the Three Strikes law. In
his Romero request, McFadden offered numerous reasons why treating all his
felony convictions as strike priors would be inconsistent with the spirit of this
sentencing scheme. McFadden argued that each of his felony convictions
flowed from the same case, and he otherwise had a minor and non-violent
criminal history. With regard to murder charges then pending against him

2     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                       4
in another case in Los Angeles, he explained that the Los Angeles case was

“not the subject of a Harvey3 waiver and has not been found as an aggravant
by a jury or bound over for trial by a Judge.” He also argued that “[t]he
present offense was committed because of an unusual circumstance, such as
great provocation, which is unlikely to recur.” In light of these
circumstances, McFadden suggested that unmitigated application of the
Three Strikes law would yield an unduly severe sentence.
      The prosecution’s statement in aggravation contended that granting
McFadden’s Romero motion would be inappropriate. The prosecution
characterized McFadden’s assault on Nabeel as “excessive, avoidable, and
unwarranted.” In describing McFadden’s “violent propensities,” the
prosecution referred to the Los Angeles murder charges and argued that
McFadden “admitted to detectives he shot and killed another man out of
anger and jealousy.” The prosecution suggested that “[w]hen considering the
Defendant’s character and prospects the Court need not look much further
than the fact that he is now facing murder charges in LA County.”
Specifically, the statement in aggravation stated: “While on probation for the
previously discussed five strike priors, Defendant was arrested on
January 13, 2020 for possessing a gun as a convicted felon. It was later
determined that this gun was used in an LA [C]ounty murder that took place
on January 11, 2020. Defendant later admitted to homicide detectives that
he did in fact use that gun to shoot and kill someone out of rage and
jealousy.” The prosecution provided no evidence to support these statements.
      The probation department also filed a report in advance of sentencing.
Aside from recounting McFadden’s juvenile record, misdemeanor convictions,
and felony residential burglary convictions, the report provided details of his

3     People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey).
                                      5
January 2020 arrest for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted
felon. Specifically, the probation report stated that McFadden tried to flee on
foot from a vehicle that was pulled over for a tinted windows violation, and
officers later located a handgun near where he was apprehended and taken
into custody. The criminal history section of the report ended with a note
specifying that “[t]he Court should also be aware that a hold was placed on
the defendant on 06/01/20 by the Gardena Police Department for pending
charges of PC187(a), Murder and PC29800(a)(1), Felon in Possession of a
Firearm.” The report recommended that probation be denied and McFadden
be imprisoned “for the term of 8 years plus 25 years to life” under the Three
Strikes law.
      At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge first clarified that she had
“read and considered the probation officer’s report, as well as the
statement[s in] mitigation and aggravation presented by the parties.” The
court then heard arguments on McFadden’s Romero motion.
      McFadden emphasized that his prior convictions led to probation
because “the offense was not viewed so seriously that he needed to be sent to
state prison.” Ultimately, McFadden’s stated position was “that sentencing
him as a one-strike defendant and doubling up his principal term fits within
the spirit of the three-strikes law.”
      The prosecution responded by pointing out that “[t]here has to be some
reason for this Court to find this defendant outside of [the spirit of the Three
Strikes law],” and suggested there were insufficient grounds for such a
finding. Referring to the Los Angeles case, the prosecution asserted that
“this defendant has since [his burglary convictions] shot and killed
somebody.” Immediately after the prosecution made this remark, however,
the court interjected, “I can’t consider that. How can I consider that?” The

                                        6
prosecution answered by suggesting that it was proper to consider under
Romero because it related to the defendant’s “characteristics and prospects.”
In response to further questions from the trial court, the prosecution clarified
that its position was that it was proper to consider McFadden’s pending
charges in Los Angeles for murder and felon in possession of a firearm only
for the purpose of adjudicating the Romero motion.
      McFadden’s defense counsel disagreed with the prosecution and argued
that People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 (Williams), which discussed the
factors a court may consider with respect to a Romero motion, did not permit
consideration of charges that have yet to be adjudicated.
      The court denied McFadden’s Romero motion. Laying out its rationale,
the court first expressed that McFadden “earned those four burglary
convictions, he had a great opportunity there, and he did not take advantage
of those opportunities, specifically the grant to probation.” Next, the court
found McFadden’s “perspective that it was his right [or duty] . . . to get the
other inmate to clean things up” problematic. After the court stated that “I
just don’t think he fits the Romero type of exception,” the court added that
this determination was “reinforced by the idea that he then subsequently had
the firearm.” The court reasoned that because McFadden ended up in
custody as a direct result of the firearm possession, and the assault occurred
while he was in custody after being arrested for that offense, there was a
sufficient nexus to consider the firearm possession. Addressing the
prosecution’s invocation of McFadden’s pending murder charge in
Los Angeles, however, the trial judge expressed, “I am really uncomfortable
using the murder case, even in this analysis, because there is no Harvey
waiver to that.”

                                        7
      In the end, the court sentenced McFadden to 25 years to life for the
assault under the Three Strikes law, plus an additional three years for the
great bodily injury enhancement, and imposed a $2,000 restitution fine.
                                  DISCUSSION
      McFadden contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his Romero motion because its ruling was predicated on facts not in evidence.
Specifically, McFadden claims that the trial court’s ruling improperly relied
on “the prosecution’s allegations that McFadden possessed the gun that was
used in the uncharged murder, that his DNA was on the gun, or that he
admitted guilt in the uncharged murder.” Alternatively, McFadden argues
that the court improperly relied on McFadden’s dismissed firearm case.
McFadden asserts that the trial court’s abuse of discretion amounted to
prejudicial error and violated his due process rights. We disagree.
      Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), grants trial courts
discretionary authority to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the
Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious
and/or violent felony . . . ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 158.) In Williams, the Supreme Court articulated the
appropriate standard for ruling on a Romero motion: “[T]he court in question
must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the]
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of [the defendant’s] background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside [the spirit of the three strikes sentencing
scheme], in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had
not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.”
(Williams, at p. 161.)

                                         8
      When a trial court elects not to exercise this power, the “trial court’s
decision not to strike is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Carmony).) “[A] trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) Accordingly, “[a] trial
court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision
find no support in the evidence.” (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991,
998.) “ ‘The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show
that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’ ” (People v. Superior
Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 (Alvarez).)
      On review, we must presume that the trial court “considered all of the
relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.”
(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.409 [“Relevant factors enumerated in these rules must be considered
by the sentencing judge, and will be deemed to have been considered unless
the record affirmatively reflects otherwise.”].) Without a clear showing that
its ruling on a Romero motion was irrational or arbitrary, the trial court is
presumed “ ‘to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377; Myers, at
p. 310 [“Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the
relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit
of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled
differently in the first instance.”].) Moreover, “[t]he trial court is not required
to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under section 1385 [to
strike prior felony convictions.]” (People v. Gillispie (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th
429, 433 (Gillispie).)

                                         9
         Indeed, “a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a
prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances.” (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th. at p. 378.) McFadden correctly notes that one such
circumstance is “where the court considered impermissible factors in
declining to dismiss.” (Ibid.) “For example, the record may show that the
court was motivated by considerations that violate the guarantee of equal
protection under the law, such as bias related to the defendant’s race or
national origin . . . .” (Gillispie, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 434.)
         We reject McFadden’s argument that the trial court relied on improper
factors in denying his Romero motion. First, nothing in the record suggests
that the trial court relied on McFadden’s alleged involvement in the
Los Angeles murder or the fact that the gun he possessed was the one used in
the Los Angeles murder. On the contrary, at the sentencing hearing, as soon
as the prosecutor remarked, “this defendant has since shot and killed
somebody,” the trial judge immediately responded, “I can’t consider that.”
The trial judge proceeded to ask the prosecutor why he thought she was
permitted to take the uncharged murder into account, and he clarified that
he felt consideration was proper under Romero in reference to McFadden’s
“characteristics and prospects.” Later, when the trial judge denied the
Romero motion, she said, “I am really uncomfortable using the murder case,
even in this analysis, because there is no Harvey waiver to that.” The trial
judge made no other comments suggesting that she considered McFadden’s
alleged involvement in the Los Angeles murder in denying his Romero
motion, or that she was persuaded by the prosecutor’s arguments on the
issue.
         The trial judge made clear that she felt the uncharged murder was
subject to the proposition in Harvey that, absent an appropriate waiver of

                                           10
rights, a criminal defendant who accepts a plea agreement should “suffer no
adverse sentencing consequences by reason of the facts underlying, and solely
pertaining to, the dismissed [charges].” (Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 758.)
Although the record does not indicate that McFadden accepted any plea
agreement regarding the uncharged murder, and the Harvey limitation was
therefore inapplicable, the trial judge’s comments nevertheless affirmatively
demonstrate that she believed it would have been improper to consider the
uncharged murder.
      McFadden has failed to point to anything in the record showing that
the trial court relied on the Los Angeles murder in its denial of his Romero
motion. McFadden merely highlights language describing the circumstances
around the uncharged murder in the prosecution’s statement in aggravation
and the probation officer’s report and suggests “the court abused its
discretion as there was no support in the record to support these purported
facts underlying its sentencing decision.” But the mere fact that the
prosecutor and the probation officer referred to the Los Angeles murder does
not demonstrate that the trial court relied on it.
      Because sentencing decisions are presumptively valid, including those
that implement the sentencing scheme prescribed by the Three Strikes Law
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378), McFadden shoulders the burden to
show that the trial court did in fact rely on improper factors (see Alvarez,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977). As to the Los Angeles murder, he has failed to

meet his burden.4

4     Although McFadden has failed to demonstrate error, we caution that
potentially prejudicial facts should not be included in a statement in
aggravation without any supporting evidence. “Assertions of fact in a
statement in aggravation or mitigation must be disregarded unless they are
supported by the record in the case, the probation officer’s report or other
                                       11
      With regard to McFadden’s dismissed firearm case, however, the record
is clear that the trial court did rely on his unlawful possession of the firearm
(but not on the fact that it purportedly matched the firearm used in the Los
Angeles murder). As we have noted, the relevant facts surrounding the
recovery of the firearm were set forth in the probation officer’s report. We
conclude that the trial court committed no error by relying on these facts
from the probation report.
      “[C]ourts routinely rely upon hearsay statements contained in
probation reports to make factual findings concerning the details of the
crime.” (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 212; People v. Tran (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 877, 888, fn. 5 [“The court may also consider and rely upon
hearsay statements contained in a probation report, including the police
reports used to prepare the crime summaries contained in the report.”].) The
Penal Code and Rules of Court expressly contemplate that trial courts may
consider a probation officer’s report, including its discussion of aggravating
and mitigating factors. (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (b)(4); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.411.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437(d); see also People v. Evans
(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022 [“A sentencing court has wide discretion in
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors.”].)
      The Rules of Court do provide some relevant limitations on the trial
court’s consideration of facts stated in a probation report. Rule 4.411.5(a)(3)
provides: “Records of an arrest or charge not leading to a conviction or the
sustaining of a petition may not be included unless supported by facts

reports properly filed in the case, or other competent evidence.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.437(d).) In this case, even if true, the prosecution’s discussion of
the gun used in the Los Angeles murder and McFadden’s alleged confession
to the murder was not supported by anything in the record, including the
probation report.
                                       12
concerning the arrest or charge.” Rule 4.411.5(c) provides: “The source of all
information must be stated. Any person who has furnished information
included in the report must be identified by name or official capacity unless a
reason is given for not disclosing the person’s identity.”
      Here, in reference to the dismissed firearm case, the probation officer’s
report conformed to these requirements. In the criminal history section, the
report provided a relatively detailed account of the facts leading to
McFadden’s January 2020 arrest, describing a traffic stop which escalated
into a foot chase and ultimately the recovery of the handgun in the area
where McFadden fled. The probation report also listed the sources of
information for this criminal history section. Indeed, McFadden does not
argue any violation of rule 4.411.5. Therefore, we conclude that it was proper
for the trial court to consider the underlying facts pertaining to the dismissed
firearms charge as described in the probation report.
      Finally, even if it had been improper for the trial court to consider
McFadden’s 2020 firearm possession, there is no reasonable probability that
the trial court would have reached a different result on his Romero motion.
Even when a trial court takes improper factors into account in sentencing,
“[a] remand for resentencing is required only where it is reasonably probable
a different result would have occurred had the improper factor[s] not been
considered.” (People v. Kellett (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 949, 962–963; People v.
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 [“When a trial court has given both proper
and improper reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside
the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have
chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were
improper.”].)

                                       13
      The trial court’s comments at sentencing indicate that the firearm
possession was not determinative to its ruling on the Romero motion. The
trial court explained its ruling by stating, “when I look at his history and I

think that he earned those four[5] burglary convictions, he had a great
opportunity there, and he did not take advantage of those opportunities,
specifically the grant to probation.”
      The trial court was also troubled by McFadden’s behavior as an inmate
in jail. The court noted, “[t]he other thing is, when he testified, his
perspective that it was his right, his duty, I don’t know how we want to
characterize it, to get the other inmate to clean things up was problematic. I
think that does not bode well for him.” Immediately after these remarks, the
court concluded, “[s]o I just don’t think that [McFadden] fits the Romero type
of exception to the terms of striking any of the strikes.” Only after making
this determination did the court go on to say “[t]hat decision is reinforced by
the idea that he then subsequently had the firearm.” This language indicates
that the trial court’s ruling would have been the same even it had not
considered the facts of the dismissed firearm case, because those facts merely
reinforced the trial court’s ruling based on other factors. Thus, we conclude
that even assuming the trial court committed any error by considering
McFadden’s firearm possession, it would be harmless on this record.

5    The trial judge was referring to the four prior convictions which
McFadden was asking to be stricken in his Romero motion (i.e., he was
asking the court to be treated as a one-strike defendant).
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                             DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                           BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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