Court Opinion

ID: 9942634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:10:49.009957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:22.420570
License: Public Domain

J-A25003-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  DEDICATED NURSING ASSOCIATES,                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  INC.                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MINOCQUA HEALTH AND REHAB LLC                :
  D/B/A MINOCQUA HEALTH; AND                   :   No. 320 WDA 2023
  REHAB SYMMETRY HEALTHCARE                    :
  MANAGEMENT LLC; LOUIS LLOYD                  :
  KASS; JOHN THOMAS ONSON AND                  :
  LEVI YITZCHOK RUDD                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at
                         No(s): No. 22-CI-02170

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED: February 21, 2024

       Rehab Symmetry Healthcare Management LLC (“Symmetry”), John

Thomas Onson, and Levi Yitzchok Rudd (collectively “Appellants”) appeal the

order denying their petition to open or, in the alternative, strike the default

judgment entered against them and in favor of Dedicated Nursing Associates,

Inc. (“DNA”). We affirm.

       This case involves a dispute arising from a written contract between

DNA, a Pennsylvania corporation, and Minocqua Health and Rehab LLC d/b/a

Minocqua Health (“Minocqua”), a Wisconsin limited liability company.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Thereunder, Minocqua agreed to compensate DNA in exchange for DNA

providing staff to Minocqua’s skilled nursing facility located in Wisconsin. The

agreement contained a choice of law and venue provision, stating that all

disputes arising therefrom shall be litigated pursuant to Pennsylvania law in

Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania.             Appellants were not parties to the

contract, though Rudd executed it on behalf of Minocqua in his capacity as its

chief executive officer.

       On June 27, 2022, DNA filed a complaint naming Minocqua, Appellants,

and Louis Lloyd Kass as defendants.1 In the complaint, DNA asserted one

count each of breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Minocqua,

averring that it failed to pay DNA for the staffing services provided.       The

complaint also included one count of unjust enrichment against Appellants and

Kass, alleging that, as part owners of Minocqua, they wrongly profited from

DNA’s performance and Minocqua’s non-payment. As pled in the complaint,

Symmetry was a limited liability company organized in Florida, Onson was a

resident of North Carolina, and Rudd was a resident of Florida. The affidavits

of service indicated that none of the Appellants was served within

Pennsylvania, though there is no dispute that they were all served in

accordance with our procedural rules.

       Neither Appellants nor Minocqua filed a responsive pleading to the

complaint. DNA subsequently secured two separate default judgments, one
____________________________________________

1 Louis Lloyd Kass is not a party to this appeal, as he was never served with

the complaint and no judgment was entered against him.

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against Minocqua in the amount of $76,492.21 and the other against

Appellants in the amount of $67,806.14. Approximately four months later,

Appellants filed a motion to open or strike the default judgment, asserting that

there was a fatal defect on the face of the record because the trial court lacked

personal jurisdiction over them.     More particularly, they highlighted that

nothing in the record demonstrated that they were domiciled or physically

present in Pennsylvania at the time of service, or that they conducted business

within the Commonwealth. The trial court denied the petition after argument

and the consideration of briefs. Specifically, it found that as to the request to

strike the judgment, Appellants failed to show a fatal defect on the face of the

record. Regarding the request to open, the court held that the petition was

not timely filed, and that Appellants offered no reasonable excuse for the delay

in responding to the complaint.

      This timely appeal followed. The trial court entered an opinion pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), and Appellants complied with the court’s order to file a

concise statement of errors. Appellants present the following issues for our

review:

      I. Whether there is a defect on the face of the record, such that
         the default judgment should have been stricken, when there is
         no jurisdiction over the persons of the Appellants, who do not
         reside in, were not served in, and do not have statutory
         minimum contacts with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

      II. Whether there is a defect on the face of the record, such that
          the default judgment should have been stricken, when two
          different judgments based on contradictory theories of
          recovery are entered on the same alleged damages.

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Appellants’ brief at 4.

       Notably, Appellants have limited their arguments on appeal to whether

the judgment should have been stricken, as opposed to opened. 2 We begin

with the pertinent standard of review. “An appeal regarding a petition to strike

a default judgment implicates the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issues regarding the operation of procedural rules of court present us with

questions of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary.” Green Acres Rehabilitation and Nursing Center v.

Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2015) (cleaned up).

       As to petitions to strike a judgment, this Court has stated as follows:

       A petition to strike . . . operates as a demurrer to the record. A
       petition to strike a judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect
       or irregularity appearing on the face of the record. A petition to
       strike is not a chance to review the merits of the allegations of a
       complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects
       that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the
       petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief. A fatal defect on the
       face of the record denies the prothonotary the authority to enter
       judgment.       When a prothonotary enters judgment without
       authority, that judgment is void ab initio. When deciding if there
       are fatal defects on the face of the record for the purposes of a
       petition to strike a default judgment, a court may only look at
       what was in the record when the judgment was entered.

____________________________________________

2 At oral argument before this Court, counsel for Appellants conceded that the

petition was untimely to the extent it requested that the default judgment in
question be opened. Additionally, Appellants do not assert in their brief that
the trial court erred in concluding that the petition to open was not timely.
Therefore, we do not address the court’s denial of this portion of Appellants’
petition.

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Bank of New York Mellon v. Johnson, 121 A.3d 1056, 1060 (Pa.Super.

2015) (emphasis added, citation omitted).          Further, when reviewing the

merits of a petition to strike, “the court is limited to a review of only the record

as filed by the party in whose favor the warrant is given. Matters dehors the

record will not be considered. If the record is self-sustaining, the judgment

will not be stricken.” Digital Communications Warehouse, Inc. v. Allen

Investments, LLC, 223 A.3d 278, 287 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      In their first argument on appeal, Appellants challenge the trial court’s

denial of their petition to strike on the basis that the court lacked personal

jurisdiction over them. See Appellants’ brief at 14-17. We note:

      A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three jurisdictional
      elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the parties; subject
      matter jurisdiction; or the power or authority to render the
      particular judgment.     The term “jurisdiction” relates to the
      competency of the individual court, administrative body, or other
      tribunal to determine controversies of the general class to which
      a particular case belongs. Moreover, it is never too late to attack
      a judgment or decree for want of jurisdiction, as any such
      judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction
      of the subject matter or the person is null and void, and can be
      attacked by the parties at any time. A petition to strike a
      judgment founded on a jurisdictional deficiency is therefore not
      subject to the same “timeliness” considerations as a petition to
      open the judgment.

Digital Communications Warehouse, Inc., supra at 288 (citation

omitted).

      General personal jurisdiction over individuals, such as Onson and Rudd,

and limited liability companies, like Symmetry, is governed by 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5301, which specifies in pertinent part:

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     (a) General rule.--The existence of any of the following
     relationships between a person and this Commonwealth shall
     constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals
     of this Commonwealth to exercise general personal jurisdiction
     over such person, or his personal representative in the case of an
     individual, and to enable such tribunals to render personal orders
     against such person or representative:

           (1)   Individuals.--

                 (i) Presence in this Commonwealth at the time when
                 process is served.

                 (ii) Domicile in this Commonwealth at the time when
                 process is served.

                 (iii) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent.

                        ....

           (3)   Partnerships,   limited    partnerships, partnership
           associations professional associations, unincorporated
           associations and similar entities.--

                 (i) Formation under or qualification as a foreign
                 entity under the laws on this Commonwealth.

                 (ii) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent.

                 (iii) The carrying on of a continuous and systematic
                 part if its general business within this Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5301(a).

     Pennsylvania courts may also exercise specific personal jurisdiction over

non-resident defendants under the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. See 42

Pa.C.S. § 5233. As relevant here, that statute sets forth thusly:

     (a) General rule.--A tribunal of this Commonwealth may
     exercise personal jurisdiction over a person . . . who acts directly,
     or by an agent, as to a cause of action or another matter arising
     from such person:

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           (1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth.
           Without excluding other acts which may constitute
           transacting business in this Commonwealth, any of the
           following shall constitute transacting business for purpose
           of this paragraph:

                 (i) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth
                 of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby
                 realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing
                 an object.

                 (ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth
                 for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit
                 or otherwise accomplishing an object with the
                 intention of initiating a series of such acts.

                 (iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly
                 into or through this Commonwealth.

                 (iv) The engaging in any business or profession within
                 this Commonwealth, whether or not such business
                 requires license or approval by any government unit
                 of this Commonwealth.

                 (v) The ownership, use or possession of any real
                 property situate within this Commonwealth.

           (2) Contracting to supply services or things in this
           Commonwealth.

           (3) Causing harm or tortious injury by an act or omission
           in this Commonwealth.

           (4) Causing harm or tortious injury in this Commonwealth
           by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(a).

     The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to

exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant had “certain

minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the

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suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal

quotation marks omitted). A defendant establishes minimum contacts where

the “contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant could

reasonably anticipate being called to defend itself in the forum.” Schiavone

v. Aveta, 41 A.3d 861, 869 (Pa.Super. 2012) (cleaned up).

      With this background in mind, we turn to Appellants’ arguments. They

first assert that it is clear from the record that the trial court had no personal

jurisdiction over any of them.    See Appellants’ brief at 14-16.      Appellants

contend that even accepting the averments in the complaint and affidavits of

service as true, DNA did not establish that the court had general jurisdiction

over Onson or Rudd pursuant to § 5301(a)(1) because neither of them was

present in Pennsylvania when served with the complaint, domiciled in

Pennsylvania at that time, or consented to jurisdiction by any agreement,

since they were not parties to the contract at issue. Id. at 14-15. Appellants

argue that the same applies to Symmetry, which was not organized in

Pennsylvania, did not consent to jurisdiction, and did not carry on any general

business within Pennsylvania. Id. at 15.

      Further, Appellants aver that the trial court did not have specific

jurisdiction over them since the allegations in the complaint “d[id] not satisfy

the minimum contacts requirements of Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute.” Id.

at 16. They note that none of them was a named party to the contract. Id.

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at 15. Minocqua, not Appellants, was the only participant with an obligation

to pay DNA for its services. Id. at 15-16. Appellants iterate that they had no

minimum contacts with this Commonwealth, stating that “Appellants did not

enter into a contract; supply services; commit a tort; cause tortious harm;

hold an interest in property; issue insurance; accept an appointment; execute

a bond; apply for a permit; or commit; or violate a law within” Pennsylvania.

Id. at 16.   Since this lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the

record, Appellants assert that the court erred in denying their motion to strike

the default judgment.

      DNA argues that there was no fatal defect on the face of the record and

accuses Appellants of attempting to “shoe-horn a defense” into the petition to

strike. DNA’s brief at 8. It also addresses the merits of Appellants’ arguments

as to the lack of in personam jurisdiction by pointing to paragraphs in the

complaint that purport to establish such jurisdiction.        Id. at 9 (citing

Complaint, 6/27/22, at ¶ 9).     DNA contends that Appellants “should have

reasonably anticipated being ha[i]led into court in Pennsylvania” based on the

fact that Onson and Rudd are officers of Minocqua. Id. at 13. DNA maintains

that because Minocqua consented to Pennsylvania jurisdiction in the contract,

that consent extended to Appellants based on their relationships to and control

over Minocqua.

      Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying

Appellants’ motion to strike the default judgment. While Appellants undergo

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significant pains to argue exactly why the complaint, as stated, does not

establish the existence of personal jurisdiction over them, this argument

misses the mark. As our case law makes clear, the proper question here is

whether there was a defect on the face of the record that establishes that the

trial court necessarily lacked jurisdiction over them as a matter of law.

Accord Bank of New York Mellon, supra at 1060.

      Initially, we note that a petition to strike a judgment on the basis that

the court lacked jurisdiction over the person typically occurs when there is a

defect relating to service of process or the notice requirements for securing a

default judgment. See, e.g., Oswald v. WB Public Square Associates,

LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 798 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that appellee’s

failure to utilize the proper language in her ten–day notice constitutes a ‘fatal

defect on the face of the record’ pursuant to Rule 237.1.” (cleaned up)). In

those instances, where a plaintiff fails to comply with a rule and that omission

can be determined on the face of the record, a petition to strike may be

granted.

      On the other hand, if the court is required to consider any fact outside

of the record, or if an averment of fact is disputed, it is improper to strike a

judgment.   See Roy by and through Roy v. Rue, 273 A.3d 1174, 1187

(Pa.Super. 2022) (“[I]f a party seeks to challenge the truth of factual

averments in the record at the time judgment was entered, then the party

should pursue a petition to open a judgment, not a petition to strike the

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judgment.”    (citation   omitted));   see      also   Digital   Communications

Warehouse, Inc., supra at 288 (finding that the trial court properly denied

a petition to strike because it could not consider the defendant’s argument

that service was not made upon an authorized agent of the entity without

reviewing evidence outside the record).

      Here, Appellants request that we take the omission of certain facts from

the complaint, such as whether Appellants had sufficient minimum contacts

with this Commonwealth, as proof that the trial court lacked personal

jurisdiction as a matter of law.       Appellants’ arguments in this vein are

premised upon the notion that all facts supporting personal jurisdiction must

be apparent from the face of the complaint and return of service. Yet they

cite no legal support for such a requirement, and we have discovered none.

      Rather, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that personal

jurisdiction is an issue of fact that cannot be discerned from the existing record

when all that has been filed is the complaint.           When a party wishes to

challenge a lack of jurisdiction over the person, it may do so by filing a

preliminary objection. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1). Critically, the official note

to that rule states that objections raising lack of personal jurisdiction “cannot

be determined from facts of record.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028, Official Note. Rather,

“[i]f an issue of fact is raised, the court shall consider evidence by depositions

or otherwise.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2).

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      It is clear then that, when presented with an attack on a court’s personal

jurisdiction over a defendant, for instance because the criteria establishing

neither general nor specific jurisdiction are met, the reviewing court must look

to evidence beyond the allegations asserted in the pleadings. It necessarily

follows that in these situations, the party does not contest the sufficiency of

the complaint or record itself. Instead, an objection filed pursuant to this rule

raises a new question that a trial court must dispose of through development

of a record and additional evidence.

      Since Appellants never filed preliminary objections or any other

documents until after the default judgments were entered, no additional

testimony or evidence was admitted or received.

      Accordingly, on the record before us, it is unclear whether the trial court

lacked personal jurisdiction over Appellants. We do not know whether any of

the Appellants was domiciled in Pennsylvania or carried on a continuous and

systematic part of its business within the Commonwealth. Similarly, we have

no idea of the extent of Appellants’ contacts with this jurisdiction, let alone

whether they were sufficient to subject them to specific jurisdiction under

Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute. In short, the record does not affirmatively

evince a lack of jurisdiction, but rather an open question as to jurisdiction. As

such, there is no fatal defect on the face of the record that established as a

matter of law that the judgment was invalid.

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      Moreover, we note that Appellants do not assert that the complaint is

otherwise defective insofar as it violated any other relevant rule of civil

procedure. For example, they do not contend that the complaint lacked a

notice to defend (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1018.1); the necessary contents of pleadings

(Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019); a request for the specific relief sought (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1021);

or a verification (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024). Since the complaint complied with the

our procedural rules, we cannot agree with Appellants that it is deficient as a

matter of law. See Bank of New York Mellon, supra at 1063 (finding no

fatal defect on the face of a record when a complaint for mortgage foreclosure

complied with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1147). We likewise see no flaws within the affidavits

of service, and Appellants do not assert that any aspect of service in this case

was faulty.   See Mountney v. Everclear Roof & Restoration, 266 A.3d

655, 2021 WL 4958784, *4 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision)

(holding that a petition to strike must be denied when the reviewing court is

“unable to uncover any applicable rule of civil procedure or existing authority

that conflicts with the affidavit of service as filed”); see also Sharpe v.

McQuiller, 206 A.3d 1179, 1184 (Pa.Super. 2019) (stating that “[g]enerally,

courts acquire personal jurisdiction by service of process that satisfies” the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure).

      If we were to grant relief to Appellants, we would be placing an improper

burden upon DNA to include averments in its complaint that are not required

by law and would reward Appellants for failing to timely file preliminary

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objections or a petition to open the judgment. Such a holding would further

obliterate the distinction between striking and opening judgments, which are

separate remedies reviewed under different standards. See Oswald, supra

at 794 n.3 (“It is well-settled that a petition to strike a default judgment and

a petition to open a default judgment are two distinct remedies, which are

generally not interchangeable.” (citation omitted)). If they had followed the

proper procedures, such as filing preliminary objections or a timely petition to

open the judgment, Appellants very well may be correct that they could

eventually demonstrate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over them.

However, Appellants, on full notice that they had been sued here, sat on their

rights and thereby limited this Court’s review to a record that is simply

insufficient to make this determination as a matter of law.

       Since any lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be ascertained from the

record at the time the default judgments were entered, Appellants are not

entitled to relief on this basis.3

____________________________________________

3 Appellants cite Stepnowski v. Avery, 340 A.2d 465 (Pa.Super. 1975), as

analogous to the matter sub judice. There, like here, the defendants filed no
responsive pleading to the complaint, instead challenging the court’s
jurisdiction over them for the first time in a petition to strike or open filed after
entry of a default judgment, which the trial court granted. This Court affirmed,
and in so doing reviewed the averments in the complaint to ascertain whether
jurisdiction was established, concluding that the individual defendants lacked
sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania so as to satisfy the then-
current version of the long-arm statute. Id. at 496. We find this case
distinguishable since it does not indicate whether the defendants’ petition to
open was timely filed and considered by the trial court before it ultimately
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       In their second issue on appeal, Appellants assert that the petition to

strike should have been granted because the trial court lacked authority or

power to enter judgment against Appellants after it entered a separate

judgment against Minocqua, and that this error constitutes a defect on the

face of the record. See Appellants’ brief at 18-21. Appellants argue that it is

improper to have two judgments herein, as doing so entitles DNA to double

recovery without requiring it to elect a remedy. Id. at 18. They cite case law

stating that a plaintiff “cannot recover on a claim for unjust enrichment if such

claim is based on the breach of a written contract.” Id. at 19. Appellants also

believe that they were improperly held liable for Minocqua’s debts simply

because they were owners of Minocqua, and that the assertions in the

complaint “failed to justify a reason to pierce the corporate veil and hold

Appellants liable for the express contractual obligation of Minocqua.” Id. at

20-21.

       As to this issue, the trial court stated thusly:

       [Appellants] did not cite any case law or authority that directly
       supports a finding that [DNA] was barred from obtaining a default
       judgment against both . . . Minocqua and [Appellants] when
       neither responded in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of
       Civil Procedure and requirements of Pa.R.C[iv].P. 1037 were
____________________________________________

struck the judgment. As indicated above, had Appellants filed a prompt
petition to open the default judgments here, it is possible they would have
been entitled to relief. Further, to the extent this Court in Stepnowski
determined that there was a fatal defect on the face of the record by
examining the adequacy of averments in the complaint, we believe that
procedure has been implicitly abrogated by the many binding decisions filed
since then, as cited and discussed in the body of this memorandum.

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      satisfied at to both.     The argument actually goes to the
      excessiveness of the award, which is an insufficient ground to
      strike a judgment. Johnson v. Earl Scheib, Inc., 507 A.2d 1228
      (Pa.Super. 1986). Further, the mere fact that there are two
      judgments does not mean that [DNA] would execute on both to
      obtain a double recovery.       [DNA] could execute on either
      judgment until there is a full satisfaction of the unpaid invoices.
      Therefore, the fact that [DNA] obtained a default judgment
      against both sets of defendants does not qualify as a defect on the
      face of the record and did not serve as a basis for this court to
      strike the default judgment.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/23, at 5.

      For its part, DNA distinguishes the case law cited by Appellants

discussing the rule against double recoveries, arguing that DNA has not yet

recovered on either judgment, and hence there is no violation of this principle.

See DNA’s brief at 15-16. Additionally, DNA asserts that the contention from

Appellants that they were improperly held liable for the debts of Minocqua

goes to the merits of DNA’s claim, which is an inappropriate consideration

when reviewing a petition to strike. Id. at 17 (citing Green Acres, supra at

1267).

      We conclude that Appellants again have not demonstrated an error on

the face of the record entitling them to relief as a matter of law, and thus the

trial court correctly denied the petition to strike. There can be no violation of

the doctrines of either double recovery or elections of remedies here since, as

both the court and DNA emphasize, DNA has not recovered on the judgments.

See Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 892 (Pa. 2007) (stating that the

primary application of the doctrine of election of remedies is “to prevent

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double recovery from a single injury” (emphasis added)).         To the extent

Appellants assert error based upon their belief that DNA’s claims could not

succeed on the merits, such contentions are improper to consider as to a

petition to strike a default judgment. See Bank of New York Mellon, supra

at 1060 (“A petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the

allegations of a complaint.”).

      In sum, Appellants have failed to convince us that there is a fatal defect

on the face of the record.       Therefore, the court did not err in denying

Appellants’ motion to strike the default judgment entered against them.

      Order affirmed.

 DATE: 02/21/2024

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