Court Opinion

ID: 9956887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 13:07:49.513632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.751472
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hawkins, 2024-Ohio-1253.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                               :    APPEAL NO. C-230489
                                                   TRIAL NO. 23CRB-1468
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :

    vs.                                       :       O P I N I O N.

 KAELIN HAWKINS,                              :

       Defendant-Appellant.                   :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 3, 2024

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Monica Windholtz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Jon R. Sinclair, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

       {¶1}    In response to the Ohio General Assembly shifting the burden of proof

in self-defense cases from the defendant to the prosecution, Ohio added Crim.R. 12.2,

which requires the defendant to file a written notice, prior to trial, providing their

intent to raise a self-defense argument. Here, defendant-appellant Kaelin Hawkins

claims that the trial court erred by declaring his self-defense arguments “waived”

because he failed to file the requisite notice. He also faults his defense counsel as

ineffective for failing to follow Crim.R. 12.2. But even if an error arose by virtue of the

missing notice, he still must show prejudice flowing from that flaw in the trial process.

Because the trial court allowed evidence of Mr. Hawkins’s self-defense arguments

notwithstanding the lack of notice and weighed it prior to announcing its guilty

verdict, we ultimately find no prejudice on this record. We accordingly affirm the

judgment of the trial court convicting him of misdemeanor assault.

                                            I.

       {¶2}    In January 2023, Ariel Bahuguna, Jeremy Hill, and about five other

friends were drinking and dancing at The Drinkery, a bar in Cincinnati’s Over-the-

Rhine neighborhood. Eventually, they wound up in a physical tangle outside the bar

during which another patron, Mr. Hawkins, bit Ms. Bahuguna on the thigh. Although

all witnesses testified that they drank that night and some admitted to having hazy

recollections of the evening’s events, a general picture emerged at Mr. Hawkins’s trial

about how the confrontation and bite transpired.

       {¶3}    Shortly after arriving, Ms. Bahuguna and some other women in the

group went to the restroom. There, they encountered Molly Beddinghaus, who Ms.

Bahuguna described as “hysterical,” and asked her if she needed help. Mr. Hawkins,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Ms. Beddinghaus’s boyfriend, waited outside the restroom, as apparently he was prone

to doing. At some point, after hearing a commotion, Mr. Hawkins peered into the

restroom to check on Ms. Beddinghaus and, seeing the group of women attempting to

console her, sought to extract her. But he claimed that the women pulled Ms.

Beddinghaus back into her restroom stall, “by the neck,” despite her crying out for

him. Soon after, the women left the restroom with Ms. Beddinghaus and told Mr. Hill

and their other friends that they needed to call her a car to get her home.

       {¶4}   Mr. Hill testified that, around this time, Mr. Hawkins approached his

group, acting like a “hostile individual,” and threw a drink at them. Whereupon,

security tossed Mr. Hawkins out of the front entrance of the bar, and the friend group

(with Ms. Beddinghaus) migrated outside through a back door.

       {¶5}   Across the street from the bar, the group waited with Ms. Beddinghaus

for her car to arrive for five to ten minutes, during which time Mr. Hill described her

as “hysterically crying” and “visually shaken, visibly upset.” Suddenly, Mr. Hawkins

rushed forward and “collided” with the group with enough force to knock Mr. Hill, Ms.

Bahuguna, and others to the ground, apparently attempting to rescue Ms.

Beddinghaus. As the altercation unfolded, Mr. Hill saw Mr. Hawkins on top of Ms.

Bahuguna with his teeth latched to her thigh, biting her through her jeans in a zombie-

like manner. He pulled Mr. Hawkins off her, and he and Mr. Hawkins fell to the

ground again as they fought. Mr. Hawkins then sank his teeth into Mr. Hill’s torso,

before Mr. Hill shoved him off. Police eventually arrived, and Mr. Hawkins was

charged with assaulting Ms. Bahuguna, in violation of R.C. 2903.13. The arresting

officer testified that Ms. Beddinghaus was “extremely distraught, crying nonstop,”

refused medical attention, and would not tell the officer anything that happened.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶6}   At trial, Mr. Hawkins did not deny biting Ms. Bahuguna, and the state

introduced photographs of her bite injury into evidence, showing deep top- and

bottom-teeth marks, redness, and bruising on her thigh. Instead, he asserted self-

defense and defense of another, insisting that Ms. Bahuguna’s group sought to

“kidnap” Ms. Beddinghaus. His theory focused especially on the restroom incident

and his observation that the group was holding coats over Ms. Beddinghaus’s head

(perhaps to shield or hide her) outside the bar. He further testified that when he

approached the group outside, he tripped on a curb, and someone grabbed him by the

neck as he was trying to pull Ms. Beddinghaus away, precipitating the physical

entanglement and biting, which he maintains occurred in self-defense.

       {¶7}   Ms. Beddinghaus’s account of the evening left much to the imagination.

She testified that when she entered the restroom, a group of women came into her

stall, and she “blanked out” based on stress and fright before calling out for Mr.

Hawkins. She recalled that she “kind of blurred out again” after Mr. Hawkins was

escorted out of the bar and remembered later being outside with the group. On cross-

examination, she admitted that she did not know whether she asked the women for

help when she was “blacked out.”

       {¶8}   The trial court ultimately found Mr. Hawkins guilty of misdemeanor

assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13, and sentenced him to 180 days in jail, 180

suspended, and two years of probation. It denied Mr. Hawkins’s Crim.R. 29 motion

for an acquittal after the state’s case and again after the conclusion of evidence. Prior

to the second ruling, the court noted that the record contained no notice regarding a

self-defense argument, as required by Crim.R. 12.2, determining that those arguments

were “waived.” Mr. Hawkins asked the court to consider the self-defense evidence he

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

presented anyway. Prior to announcing the verdict, the court favorably described how

Mr. Hill and Ms. Bahuguna’s “story matched” and found that the defense’s kidnapping

theory “does not make logical sense.” It found persuasive the facts that security did

not try to intervene, the group patiently waited outside of the bar with Ms.

Beddinghaus, Ms. Beddinghaus did not testify about women forcing her to do

anything, and Ms. Beddinghaus lacked memories about the night. It considered the

testimony of both Mr. Hawkins and Ms. Beddinghaus and assessed their stories for

consistency and credibility prior to finding him guilty.

       {¶9}    Mr. Hawkins moved for a new trial, which the court denied. He now

appeals his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to consider his self-

defense arguments and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel

because his trial counsel failed to file a notice of self-defense.

                                            II.

       {¶10} In March of 2019, an amended Ohio statute shifted the burden of proof

to the prosecution in use of force cases where “there is evidence presented that tends

to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense” or defense of

another. R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) (In such cases, “the prosecution must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force” in that defensive way.).

We have previously held that the procedural burden “ ‘of going forward with the

evidence’ ” of an affirmative defense, which is a burden of production, remains with

the accused. State v. Parrish, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190379, 2020-Ohio-4807, ¶

13-14, quoting R.C. 2901.05(A).

       {¶11} In this case, however, the parties do not contest whether Mr. Hawkins

met his burden of production or whether the state met its burden of proof. Instead,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

their primary concern is how the trial court handled Mr. Hawkins’s admitted failure

to file the requisite notice under Crim.R. 12.2. Under that rule, a defendant must give

written notice of his intent to argue self-defense or defense of another no less than 14

days before trial in a misdemeanor case, like this one. Crim.R. 12.2. Further, “[i]f the

defendant fails to file such written notice, the court may exclude evidence offered by

the defendant related to the defense, unless the court determines that in the interest

of justice such evidence should be admitted.” Id. Thus, under Crim.R. 12.2, a trial

court has discretion whether to exclude a defendant’s evidence of self-defense after the

defendant fails to file the requisite notice, and an appellate court reviews the trial

court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when

“a court exercise[s] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over

which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-

Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

       {¶12} Notwithstanding the absence of notice, Mr. Hawkins asserts that the

trial court erred in failing to consider his self-defense evidence and that it should have

done so “in the interest of justice.” See Crim.R. 12.2. However, after reviewing the

record, we conclude the trial court effectively did what he now requests. Despite

deeming his self-defense arguments “waived” because of the lack of Crim.R. 12.2

notice, the trial court recited its factual conclusions at length prior to announcing the

verdict, including assessments of Mr. Hawkins’s self-defense and defense of another

arguments. It found that Ms. Beddinghaus’s story “just does not make sense” and that

the kidnapping allegation likewise “does not make logical sense,” emphasizing how

neither she nor Mr. Hawkins alleged any type of kidnapping plot on the night of the

assault. And the court recalled the officer’s testimony that despite Mr. Hawkins

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

claiming to have injuries from the brawl, she observed none on him that night.

Contrasted with the trial court’s findings that the stories of the prosecution’s witnesses

“matched,” the court impliedly found the defense’s theories not to be credible. So

while the trial court may have acted inconsistently in announcing its “waiver”

determination before weighing the self-defense arguments anyway, the waiver

statement seemingly did not prevent the defense from advancing its self-defense

arguments for the trial court, and it weighed them in the end.

       {¶13} Under our harmless error standard, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or

variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Crim.R. 52(A).

At a minimum, to affect the defendant’s substantial rights, the error must be

prejudicial. See State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-3257, 141 N.E.3d 590, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.).

Because Mr. Hawkins fails to show how the trial court’s statement that his self-defense

arguments were “waived” prejudiced his defense, we conclude the trial court’s actions

were at a minimum harmless, and we overrule his first assignment of error.

       {¶14} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Hawkins understandably faults

his trial counsel for failing to file the requisite notice of self-defense under Crim.R.

12.2. But his claim that this failure deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel

in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Constitution fails by the same logic

his first assignment of error fell short: he does not show that he suffered prejudice by

the lack of notice.

       {¶15} To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

demonstrate both that “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and that “the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To show prejudice, a defendant “must prove

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the

result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143,

538 N.E.2d 373 (1989).

       {¶16} Here, the trial court admitted and weighed evidence of Mr. Hawkins’s

self-defense and defense of another arguments despite its waiver conclusion. Mr.

Hawkins presents no argument that additional evidence would have been admitted or

considered had the notice been appropriately filed (for instance, he never proffered

additional evidence). Therefore, he has not met his burden to show a reasonable

probability that the result of the trial would have differed if his trial counsel had

complied with the notice requirement of Crim.R. 12.2, and we overrule his second

assignment of error. See id. at 143; see also State v. Watson, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2022CA00145, 2023-Ohio-3137, ¶ 45-47 (holding defense counsel’s failure to file

Crim.R. 12.2 notice of self-defense was not prejudicial where trial court permitted

evidence of self-defense and instructed the jury on self-defense).

                                    *      *       *

       {¶17} Because Mr. Hawkins fails to show prejudice from the trial court’s

statement that his self-defense arguments were “waived” or from his trial counsel’s

failure to file the requisite notice under Crim.R. 12.2, we overrule his two assignments

of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court convicting him of misdemeanor

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13.

                                                                     Judgment affirmed.

BOCK, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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