Court Opinion

ID: 9797335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:28.383959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:27.727592
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, P. J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
The majority holds that, on de novo review, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that youth committed the crimes of riot, assault in the third degree, and disorderly conduct. I agree with the majority that the evidence establishes that youth aided and abetted the assault. But I strongly disagree with the majority that the evidence establishes that youth committed either riot or disorderly conduct. I therefore dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusions as to those crimes.
I begin with the sufficiency of the evidence as to the crime of riot. ORS 166.015(1) provides:
*238“A person commits the crime of riot if while participating with five or more other persons the person engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.”
(Emphasis added.) At issue in this case is whether youth engaged in “tumultuous and violent conduct” during his confrontation with Vinh. The majority holds:
“Youth, with his cousins, surrounded Vinh, blocking his escape. One of the cousins challenged Vinh to fight. Just before the physical attack began, youth and his cousins were talking to each other in a language Vinh- did not understand. Vinh was intimidated and expected violence from the cousins. After the cousins spoke and the attack began, youth and the other cousins were ‘moving everywhere,’ and Vinh’s attention was diverted to them when Nay [one of the cousins] kicked him to the ground.”
167 Or App at 234. Thus, the majority holds that youth engaged in three acts that constituted “tumultuous and violent conduct,” namely, (1) youth was a member of a group that “surrounded Vinh”; (2) youth spoke to other members of the group in a language that Vinh did not understand; and (3) youth and the group “moved everywhere” in a way that distracted Vinh. The majority, however, never explains why those three acts constitute “tumultuous and violent conduct.”
In my view, the proper method of analysis is first to define the relevant terms and then to examine the evidence in light of the relevant definitions. ORS 166.015 does not define the phrase “tumultuous and violent conduct.” But in State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 938 P2d 756 (1997), the Supreme Court did. In that case, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of ORS 166.015. He argued that, based on the Criminal Law Revision Commission’s commentary concerning ORS 166.015, the statute was intended to proscribe making “ominous threats” of personal injury and property damage. According to the defendant, a statute that targets the making of threats violates the guarantee of free expression of Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.
The court first determined whether ORS 166.015 proscribes the making of threats. Applying the familiar methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
*239Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), the court began with the text, to determine whether it contains an unambiguous answer. The court concluded that it does:
“The text of ORS 166.015 prohibits persons from engaging in ‘tumultuous and violent conduct.’ These are words of common usage, to which we typically ascribe their ordinary meaning. * * * ‘Tumultuous’ is defined as:
“ T: marked by tumult: full of commotion and uproar: riotous, stormy, boisterous * * * 2: tending or disposed to cause or incite a tumult * * * 3: marked by violent or overwhelming turbulence or upheaval.’
“Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 2462 (unabridged 1993). The definition of‘violent’ is:
“ 1: characterized by extreme force * * *: marked by abnormally sudden physical activity and intensity * * * 2: furious or vehement to the point of being improper, unjust, or illegal * * * 3: extremely or intensely vivid or loud * * *: unusually intense * * *: unnaturally strong * * * 4: produced or effected by force: unnatural * * * 5: tending to distort or misrepresent * * * 6: extremely excited: emotionally aroused[.]’
“Id. at 2554. Finally, ‘conduct’ is defined as ‘behavior in a particular situation or relation or on a specific occasion.’ Id. at 474.”
Chakerian, 325 Or at 377.
As for the commentary of the Criminal Law Commission, the court held that it constitutes legislative history. Because the statutory phrase “tumultuous and violent conduct” is unambiguous, the court held that it is not appropriate to consider the commentary as a basis for asserting that the term includes “ominous threats.” Id. at 377-78. Ultimately, the court concluded that, on the basis of the foregoing definitions of the statutory terms, “[t]he legislature did not intend to reach protected expression in prohibiting ‘tumul- • tuous and violent conduct.’ ” Id. at 380.
Thus, the question in this case is whether the three acts that the majority says youth committed constitute “tumultuous and violent conduct,” as the court defined the terms in Chakerian. In addressing that question, it bears *240emphasis that the statute is phrased in the conjunctive; both “tumultuous” and “violent” conduct is required.
The first act is that youth was a member of a group that “surrounded Vinh,” which had the effect of blocking his escape. I do not understand how simply being a member of a group that “surrounded” another individual constitutes a “tumultuous” and “violent” act. Nothing in the record suggests that, in “surrounding” Vinh, youth made any unusual noise or other commotion. Likewise, nothing in the record suggests that any force was involved, that any “sudden physical activity and intensity” was involved, that, in surrounding Vinh, youth or his cousins were “extremely or intensely vivid or loud” or that their actions in surrounding Vinh met any of the other definitional components of the relevant statutory terms.
The second act is that youth and his cousins conversed in Mien, which Vinh, who is Vietnamese, did not understand. I am at a loss to understand how conversing in a language that was unfamiliar to Vinh constituted “tumultuous and violent conduct.” Indeed, after Chakerian, I do not understand how the conversation even is relevant.
The third act is that youth made an undefined movement that distracted Vinh as he was attacked by the other members of the group. Once again, nothing in the record specifies what sort of “movement” youth engaged in, much less that it was “riotous, stormy, boisterous” or “marked by violent or overwhelming turbulence or upheaval.” Likewise, nothing in the record remotely suggests that what youth did involved “extreme force,” or that his movement was “furious or vehement,” “extremely or intensely vivid or loud,” or any of the other definitional components of the statutory terms. There is thus a complete absence of evidence that youth’s conduct was “tumultuous and violent.”
The majority responds first by arguing that Chaker-ian really does not stand for the proposition that the phrase “tumultuous and violent” means what the words ordinarily mean. According to the majority, the court in Chakerian backed away from the ordinary definition of the terms when it “distilled” them to merely “ ‘physical activity that [was] reasonably perceived by others as threatening an imminent *241breach of the peace.’ ” 167 Or App at 235 (quoting Chakerian, 325 Or at 378). The majority, however, takes the court’s statement out of context. The court made it in response to the defendant’s argument that the statute proscribed the making of threats. In that context, the court responded that, given the dictionary definitions of the relevant terms, the statute refers to physical activity. The court did not say, as the majority suggests, that any activity that threatens an imminent breach of the peace qualifies, whether or not it is “tumultuous and violent.” Even assuming that the majority’s reading of Chakerian is correct, however, its opinion still fails to explain how the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that youth threatened an imminent breach of the peace by engaging in the three acts that the majority finds he committed.
The majority next argues that, in any event, youth’s conduct was tumultuous, “because he engaged in concerted activity that was ‘lull of commotion and uproar.’ ” 167 Or App at 236 (quoting Chakerian, 325 Or at 377). That ipsedixitism is unsupported by any reference to the record. There is absolutely no testimony as to the character of youth’s conduct beyond the fact that he blocked Vinh’s exit, that he spoke to his cousins in Mien, and that he moved in an undescribed way that distracted Vinh. I challenge the majority to point to any portion of the record that reveals the nature of youth’s conduct to have been “full of commotion and uproar.”
Similarly, the majority declares that “it is also fair to say that youth’s conduct was violent, because it was characterized by ‘abnormally sudden physical activity and intensity.’ ” Once again, however, the majority makes no reference to the record of this case as it pertains to youth’s conduct. There is a complete absence of testimony about the nature of youth’s movements, much less testimony that they were “abnormally sudden” or “intense.”
The majority simply reasons that youth’s actions must be viewed “in the context of the group’s activity.” 167 Or App at 236. According to the majority, even if the record does not show the nature of youth’s actions, it may be inferred from the fact that he was part of a larger group whose other members did engage in riotous conduct. The problem with the majority’s approach to the evidence is that it is contraxy *242to the Supreme Court’s cautionary instruction in Chakerian, that there must be evidence that youth — and not merely other members of the group of which he was a part — actually engaged in “tumultuous and violent conduct.” In the court’s words:
“It is clear under the statute that a person does not commit the crime of riot if he or she merely is part of a group and five other members of that group engage in tumultuous and violent conduct that intentionally or recklessly creates a grave risk of causing public alarm. Under the statute, the state must prove that the person charged actually ‘engagefd] in violent and tumultuous conduct.’ ”
Chakerian, 325 Or at 375 n 8 (emphasis added). Thus, although certainly youth’s conduct must be seen in context, the fact remains that it is his conduct alone that is at issue, not his cousins’.
The majority insists that “violent and tumultuous conduct can consist of interference with a victim’s escape or obstruction of persons who might assist the victim.” 167 Or App at 236. Cited as authority for that proposition are two earlier decisions of this court, State v. Hicks, 120 Or App 345, 852 P2d 894, rev den 317 Or 584 (1993), and State v. Chavez, 65 Or App 534, 671 P2d 708 (1983), rev den 296 Or 253 (1984).
In Hicks, the defendant not only was a member of a group that surrounded the victim but also was an active participant in beating the victim. The opinion does say that, in “cheering on the attack” and “surrounding the victim,” the other members of the group also were guilty of riot. 120 Or App at 348. In reaching that conclusion, however, the court expressly relied on — indeed, emphasized — the portions of the Criminal Law Revision Commission commentary that referred to “ominous threats.” Id. at 347. Plainly, neither the court’s conclusion nor its reasoning can be squared with what the Supreme Court later said in Chakerian. Even the state recognizes in this case that Hicks conflicts with Chakerian.
Chavez similarly involved a defendant who did not merely stand at the scene with other members of a group, but actively participated in the beating of the victim. Again, the court said that several other members of the group who had *243merely stood at the scene to prevent anyone from assisting defendant also committed riot. But, as with Hicks, that portion of the decision cannot be reconciled with Chakerian.
In short, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that youth engaged in “tumultuous and violent conduct.” In consequence, there is no evidence that he committed the crime of riot, and the majority errs in reaching a contrary conclusion.
I turn then to the sufficiency of the evidence as to the crime of disorderly conduct. ORS 166.025 provides, in part:
“(1) A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person:
“(a) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior[.]”
The majority concludes that “[y]outh engaged in tumultuous behavior that recklessly created a risk of public alarm and, therefore, youth engaged in disorderly conduct.” 167 Or App at 237. Once again, the majority’s opinion neglects to consider the meaning of the term “tumultuous.” Nothing in the record of this case demonstrates, or even suggests, that youth engaged in tumultuous conduct, as that term is ordinarily used and as it has been defined by the Supreme Court. The majority therefore errs in concluding that the evidence demonstrates that youth committed the crime of disorderly conduct.