Court Opinion

ID: 9446296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:51:39.442492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:36.339877
License: Public Domain

CALEB M. WRIGHT, District Judge
(dissenting).
The precise question presented on this appeal is whether the Referee’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Section 205(g) of the Act provides:
“Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, * * * may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action * * *. Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides * * *. As part of its answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, * * (Emphasis supplied.) 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).
The Referee’s determination which was affirmed by the Agency held that the claimant was not entitled to mother’s insurance benefits nor lump-sum payments because the “living with” requirement of the Act was not met.1 “Living with” as enunciated in the statute pertinent to these specific claims has a peculiar meaning spelled out in the applicable statutory sections. It is only complied with if,
(1) claimant and decedent were both members of the same household on the date of death, or
(2) she was receiving regular contributions from him toward her support on such date, or
(3) he had been ordered by any court to contribute to her support.2
The Referee found that the claimant and the wage earner were not members of the same household on the date of death. This finding was based upon the evidence which demonstrated:
The wage earner resided at 4 Brixner Alley; whereas claimant at the time of *787wage earner’s death resided at 327 Lee Place. At all times wage earner’s clothes and personal belongings were at the Brixner Alley residence. The wage earner’s intentions at date of death were that these arrangements would be permanent and there was no intention on his part that he and the claimant would become members of the same household.3
Secondly, the Referee held that at the time of death the claimant was not receiving regular contributions from decedent toward her support. On this point the Referee concluded that the eleven payments of $30 each, ceasing over one year prior to death could in no way be considered substantial, notwithstanding wage earner during this period was not gainfully employed because of his severe cardiac condition. Receipt by the wage earner of pensions totaling $126 per month was sufficient evidence to the Examiner to indicate that he was in a position to make some type of regular contribution.
Finally, the Referee held that wage earner had not been compelled by court order to provide support for claimant. The record is uncontradicted that this was the case.
Against this background, I feel that the Referee’s findings were supported by substantial evidence,4 and therefore the District Court on review erred in substituting its determination and inferences for those of the Referee.5 Thus evaluated, I concur with this Circuit’s recent pronouncement in Fcrenz v. Folsum,6 wherein the permissive bounds of review were clearly enunciated, and in Judge Hastie’s dissent in Goldman v. Folsom, particularly with respect to the concluding observation set forth below:7
“I am not concerned that the estate of Mrs. Goldman will get a modest sum in a doubtful case. I am concerned, however, that with so many controversies like this continually requiring administrative decision, this court embarks upon a course of substituting judicial for administrative judgment in doubtful situations.”
Accordingly I dissent.

. This action does not involve claims for the wage earner’s natural children pursuant' to 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) since the Secretary readily concedes the three children born of this marriage are entitled to Child’s insurance benefits. Thus, at the present time claimant receives monthly benefits in the sum of $162 applicable to Charleton, Carleton and Betsy Boyd.

. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h) (2).

. “I don’t believe we ever would have made a full-time homo together. Ho liked to have a good time too well to settle down, lie divided his time between 4 Brixner Alloy, Johnstown, Pa. and 327 Lee Place, Johnstown, Pn. a distance of about 7 blocks. I was willing to make a full-time home with him if he had wanted to. I did Ms laundry (except shirts which lie always sent to a commercial laundry) and cooked his meals when he was with me.” (Statement of claimant, Ann M. Boyd, Jan. 5, 1955).

. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).

. Forenz v. Folsom, 3 Cir., 1956, 237 F.2d 48, certiorari domed 1957, 352 U.S. 1006, 77 S.Ct. 569, 1 L.Ed.2d 551.

. Note 5, supra.

. 3 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 776, 781.