Court Opinion

ID: 9845288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:18:28.366449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:59.874286
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I concur as to dismissal, but for a different reason, and I respectfully dissent as to payment of costs.
On July 26, 1984, appellant and seventeen other inmates of the Dodge Correctional Institution filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, complaining about food preparation and the health conditions under which it was being prepared and served. They sought to have their complaint certified as a class action. They also “On oath” stated that they were unable to pay “filing fees for the Court and Attorney, And we ask this Court to grant us the right to proceed with- money’s (sic).” Whitehead was the person designated to receive service on behalf of all plaintiffs.
Service was perfected on defendants and they filed answers near the end of December; their certificates show service on Whitehead at Dodge, although the State’s shows the wrong zip code. The case was set on the calendar for January 29, 1985, and the court calendar was sent by the clerk to Whitehead at Dodge. From there it was forwarded to Rutledge Correctional Institution in Columbus but returned to Dodge Superior Court, “addressee unknown.” The clerk then remailed it to Whitehead at Lowndes Correctional Institution, where he was incarcerated, on January 25. (Whitehead later stated under oath in the record that he did not receive it until January 28.) The court dismissed the suit on the ground that the case was moot; the court did not dismiss it only as to Whitehead. Further, the court assessed the costs of $59 against Whitehead and ordered his inmate account to be seized by the Department of Offender Rehabilitation and the costs paid therefrom. Upon learning of this, Whitehead wrote to the clerk of the Dodge Superior Court for help; there is no response in the record. Shortly thereafter, Whitehead filed in the superior court a timely notice of appeal and “Brief of Appellant,” both nota*668rized, and an affidavit of poverty and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The record was sent here and an enumeration of errors containing in effect another brief, was filed.
On appeal Whitehead claims as error the seizure of the inmate account and the dismissal of the suit for lack of prosecution.
1. The suit was dismissed because Whitehead did not appear, had not advised the court of his change of address, and because the issues were deemed moot since Whitehead no longer was at the institution he complained about. The latter would not render the suit moot because there were seventeen other plaintiffs, but they have not appealed and so that issue is not before us. Whitehead not being an attorney, he cannot represent them on appeal. Whitehead obviously did not appear at trial because he was incarcerated in. Lowndes and did not have sufficient time to obtain a judicial writ. OCGA § 24-10-62. The lack of time occurred because he had not advised the court that his address had changed. He says he did not notify the court because he had never been notified that the suit was docketed. While he may with some justification have been waiting for such word, since the suit had been sent for filing with no prepaid costs and only an “oath” of inability of any of the plaintiffs to pay the filing fee, he still would have been obligated to advise the court of his change of address so as to receive that notification to begin with. Thus the fault that he did not receive notice of the court date must be laid at his doorstep. Furthermore, he should have taken notice of its docketing by the defendants’ answers which contained the court number and demonstrated that the suit had been served. He does not disclaim receiving these answers, even though they were sent to Dodge in late December. Apparently they were forwarded to him and eventually reached him, albeit probably at or via Rutledge C. I. since Dodge C. I. sent his January mail first to Rutledge.
2. The court erred in assessing costs, however. The suit was accepted for filing and was processed without the deposit required by OCGA § 15-6-77 (b) (1). The deposit is to be paid or an affidavit of indigence is to be filed. OCGA § 9-15-4 (a). Although no jurat was affixed to the “oath” signed by all of the plaintiffs, the obvious claim of indigency was nevertheless acted upon and the suit was filed and processed. It was not returned for nonpayment of the deposit nor were plaintiffs notified that their suit could not proceed free of costs because of the absence of a jurat. No issue was ever made of it and now it is too late to cure it. Consequently, the court should not be authorized to assess all costs against plaintiff Whitehead. This is especially so because Whitehead was only one of eighteen plaintiffs. I would therefore reverse this portion of the court’s order.
*669Decided October 3, 1985
Rehearing denied October 31, 1985
Frank W. Whitehead, pro se.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, for appellee.