Court Opinion

ID: 9918550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-15 11:09:16.42316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.929239
License: Public Domain

In the
             Court of Appeals
     Second Appellate District of Texas
              at Fort Worth
           ___________________________
                No. 02-23-00309-CV
           ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF P.P.-S., AND G.P.-S., CHILDREN

       On Appeal from the 322nd District Court
               Tarrant County, Texas
           Trial Court No. 322-720044-22

       Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant G.S.-E. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her

parental rights to her children, P.P.-S. and G.P.-S. Mother argues that the evidence

was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under Family Code

Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O); that the trial court’s finding under Section

161.001(d)1 “was in error”; and that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. Because we hold that the evidence is

legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangering conduct

findings and the best-interest findings, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating

Mother’s parental rights.

                                    I. Background

      On May 12, 2022, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

(TDFPS) received a report alleging neglectful supervision of the children by Mother.

There were concerns that Mother and the children’s father (Father)2 had been

physically fighting in front of the children and that Father had moved into the home

after being released from prison.

      1
        The trial court found that Mother did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that she was unable to comply with specific provisions of a court order or
that she made a good-faith effort to comply but that her failure to do so was not her
fault. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(d); see also id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
      2
        Father’s parental rights to the children were terminated in 2019. He is not a
party to this appeal.

                                           2
A. TDFPS’s Investigation

      TDFPS Investigator Mikaila Horton followed up on the neglectful supervision

allegations against Mother. On May 13, 2022, Horton spoke with the property

manager at the apartment complex where Mother resided; she told Horton that she

had received several complaints of nonstop fighting and that Mother was on the verge

of eviction. When Horton spoke with Mother, Mother denied that Father had been

staying in the home with the children. Horton then spoke to the children, and they

relayed that their “daddy” had been staying with them. The property manager later

confirmed that she had seen Father and that he had been staying with Mother. While

Mother continued to deny that Father had been living with her, Horton advised

Mother to contact law enforcement and request a protective order if Father came to

the residence again.

      Horton also spoke with an employee at the children’s school who stated that

the children had been frequently absent. She told Horton that an unknown man had

been dropping the children off and that she felt that Mother had not been “keeping

up with” the children.

      On June 22, 2022, TDFPS Investigator Nicole Rosier spoke with staff at the

leasing office of Mother’s residence. A staff member relayed that there had been

another incident of fighting between Mother and the man living with her and that

Mother had received an eviction notice because of the continued fighting. Mother’s

neighbor told Rosier that he could hear fights between Mother and the same man and

                                         3
that he could hear the children crying during the fighting. When Rosier met with

Mother, Mother told her that she had tried to get a protective order against Father but

that, anytime she called the police, Father would be gone by the time the police

arrived at her home. Rosier advised Mother that she should not open the door of her

home for Father or otherwise engage with him, and Mother agreed.

      Rosier met with the children and tried to ask about Father, but the children

were not responsive to her questions. G.P.-S. told Rosier that she had been instructed

by someone not to “say things” to Rosier. She did not provide the person’s name.

      1. History of Family Violence in the Home

      Father has a history of domestic violence. When P.P.-S. was approximately six

months old, Father committed family-violence assault against Mother. He was

convicted for that offense in May 2016. On February 10, 2019, and June 11, 2019,

Father committed family-violence assaults against Mother. In 2020, he received two

felony convictions for family-violence assault with a previous conviction for those

offenses.

      Mother initially claimed that she had not seen or heard from Father since he

was released from prison in April 2022. However, TDFPS’s investigation revealed

that Mother had allowed Father to stay in her home with the children after he was

released from prison. At trial, the property manager testified that when she

confronted Mother about the complaints regarding the fighting heard from Mother’s

home, Mother stated that her “ex” had been staying with her and that they had been

                                          4
fighting in the home. The fighting became so excessive that Mother was threatened

with eviction unless she could provide proof of a protective order against Father.

Mother agreed but never provided any proof. The property manager observed that

while Mother appeared to be concerned about the fighting that had been happening

in front of the children, she was “not concerned enough to make [Father] leave” the

home. The property manager ultimately decided to let Mother stay, but only because

Father had gone back to jail.

      Linda Frederickson, the children’s counselor, testified that the children’s

behavior had “[d]eteriorated” by August 2022. The children disclosed to Frederickson

that they had witnessed domestic violence in the home. They explained that Mother

and Father would “scream and yell at each other” and make each other bleed. The

children were afraid in their own home. G.P.-S. explained that she did not feel safe in

Mother’s home and preferred to live with her foster family. Frederickson observed

that P.P.-S.’s behavior began “mimicking” the characteristics of domestic violence.

She opined that the children would likely develop “more anxieties and problems” if

they were to return to Mother’s care.

      On June 23, 2022, TDFPS received another intake report alleging neglectful

supervision after law enforcement responded to another family-violence incident

between Mother and Father that had occurred in front of the children.

                                          5
      2. Mother’s Drug Use

      When Rosier met with Mother on June 23, 2022, Mother denied any recent

drug use. Mother’s oral swab drug test was negative, but the result from her hair

strand test was positive for methamphetamines. Rosier confronted Mother with the

drug test results, and Mother admitted that she had been using methamphetamines on

the weekends but that she had not used since April 2022. She claimed that she had

been “stressed” about Father getting out of prison and finding her. Mother denied

that she had ever used methamphetamines while the children were present. To

Mother’s credit, she did not test positive for illegal drugs after the children were

removed from her care.

      3. Mother’s History with TDFPS

      In June 2018, TDFPS found “Reason to Believe” on allegations of neglectful

supervision of the children by Mother and Father following concerns of domestic

violence between Mother and Father and of the family’s homelessness. Both Mother

and Father tested positive for methamphetamines. At that time, Mother was the

children’s primary caregiver. Mother and Father were uncooperative and evaded

TDFPS throughout the case. The children were removed and placed in foster care. In

August 2020, the children were returned to Mother’s care after Father’s parental rights

had been terminated.

                                          6
B. Removal

      TDFPS sought removal of the children because of Mother’s allowing Father to

reside in her home and to have continued contact with the children, the history of

domestic violence between Mother and Father, Father’s criminal history, Mother’s

being evicted due to several complaints of fighting, Mother’s history of drug use, and

Mother’s TDFPS history resulting in a previous removal of the children. The children

were removed from Mother’s care in July 2022.

C. After Removal

       As part of Mother’s services, Mother was required to stay away from Father.

Mother understood that she was not to have any contact with him, though she

expressed that she did not understand why Father had anything to do with her family

case, as his parental rights had been terminated.

       In October 2022, there was another incident of domestic violence between

Mother and Father in Mother’s home. The police report noted that Father had been

paroled to Mother’s home. Mother did not disclose the assault to her therapist or to

her caseworker. Instead, Mother lied and said that she had not been in contact with

Father since the children were removed. Following Father’s arrest for the October

2022 assault, Mother told her caseworker that she had heard from her mother-in-law

that Father was in jail, but she did not disclose that he had been arrested for the

assault. She also lied to her therapist about Father’s incarceration, claiming that she

had learned of Father’s arrest in court and that he was in jail due to a parole violation.

                                            7
      During a January 20, 2023 permanency hearing, the trial court emphasized the

requirements of Mother’s service plan and cautioned Mother not to have contact with

Father. Despite the warning, Mother visited Father in jail that same day. Mother

visited Father in jail approximately fifteen times while he was incarcerated for

assaulting her, in violation of her service plan. She was dishonest about that contact

with Father as well, and when confronted by her caseworker and by her therapist,

Mother claimed that she had visited Father only “a couple of times” to discuss their

divorce, though she continued to visit him even after the divorce was final.

      Mother told her caseworker that, despite Father’s parental rights having been

terminated, he was still the children’s father and had a right to know about his kids.

This statement led the caseworker to believe that Mother would not protect the

children from Father. She testified that Mother’s continuing to see Father was a safety

concern indicating that domestic violence was likely to continue.

      As part of her service plan, Mother was also required to successfully complete a

Family Recovery Court program and individual counseling. Mother was

unsuccessfully discharged from the Family Recovery Court program. Mother’s

therapist reported that Mother had been making progress in individual counseling and

that she had wanted to continue working with Mother. However, Mother chose not to

continue individual counseling as she felt there was no need for it. Mother’s therapist

could not “mark” that Mother had been successfully discharged from her individual

counseling because she continued to lie to her therapist. While Mother did

                                           8
successfully complete some of her services, such as a parenting support program, her

caseworker testified that Mother could not demonstrate or “put into practice” what

she had learned. The caseworker opined that Mother therefore had not successfully

accomplished the intended goal of those services.

D. Foster Placement

      When the children were removed from Mother’s care, they were placed with

the same foster mother with whom they had been placed during the 2018 removal

and with whom they had a continued relationship and support from even after having

been returned to Mother’s care in 2020. For example, the foster mother provided the

children, and even Mother, with basic needs—such as groceries, gas, and clothing—

and continued to maintain contact with the children between both TDFPS cases.

Mother’s caseworker testified that the foster mother had sought out additional

services for the children and that she had “advocated for them to ensure that they got

every possible service” necessary for their progression. Indeed, the foster mother’s

efforts helped the children advance their educational level despite having been behind

when they went into her care the second time.

      G.P.-S. told Frederickson that her foster mother had been taking “good” care

of them. Frederickson opined that the children’s foster mother, who is adoption

motivated, had been working diligently on their behalf and that she appeared to have

the ability to help the children develop. Frederickson also described the foster

placement as “emotionally and psychologically stable.” The CASA (Court-Appointed

                                          9
Special Advocate) opined that removing the children from their foster placement

would be detrimental to the children’s mental, emotional, and physical health.

      The children began to consider their foster placement “home,” and they told

the CASA that they felt safe with their foster mother and wanted to stay with her.

According to the caseworker, the children even began referring to their foster mother

as “mommy.” Conversely, the children expressed to Frederickson that they did not

want to live with Mother and that they did not feel safe in Mother’s home.

                                    II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

      For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking

termination—here, TDFPS—must prove two elements by clear and convincing

evidence: (1) that the parent’s actions satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section

161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b);

In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). Evidence is clear and convincing if it

“will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth

of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; Z.N.,

602 S.W.3d at 545.

      To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination

cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding

to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction

that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder may draw inferences,

                                           10
but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the factfinder settled any

evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done

so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved,

and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id.; In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). That is, we consider evidence favorable to the

finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a

reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). The

factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

      We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the

factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child

relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due

deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant them with our own. In re

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). Here, we review the whole record to decide

whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that TDFPS

proved the specific grounds for termination under Family Code Subsections

161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that the termination of the parent–child relationship is in

the children’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,

28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief,

then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.

                                            11
B. Termination Under Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)

      Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support

termination of her parental rights under Family Code Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D)

and (E). We disagree.

      1. Applicable Law

      Under Subsections (D) and (E), the trial court may terminate a parent’s rights if

it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has

      (D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in
          conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
          emotional well-being of the child; [or]

      (E)   engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
            who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
            emotional well-being of the child[.]

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

      “‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or injury” or “to jeopardize.” In re

J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd,

727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). Under Subsection (D), it is necessary to examine

the evidence related to the environment of the child to determine if the environment

was the source of the endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The conduct

of a parent in the home can create an environment that endangers the child’s physical

and emotional well-being. Id. For example, “abusive or violent conduct by a parent or

other resident of a child’s home” may produce an endangering environment. Id. A

                                          12
parent’s choice to continue a romantic relationship with a partner who exposes the

child to domestic violence can constitute endangerment under Subsection (D) because

such exposure may cause traumatic harm to a child. In re B.U., 02-23-00150-CV, 2023

WL 5967604, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re

O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 906 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.). Illegal drug use by

the parent “likewise supports the conclusion that the child[]’s surroundings endanger

[his or her] physical or emotional well-being.” J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125.

       Under Subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the

endangerment of the child’s physical and emotional well-being was the direct result of

the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. See id.; see also Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Termination under Subsection (E) must be based

on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of

conduct by the parent is required. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. The endangering conduct

need not be directed at the child, nor must the child actually suffer injury. J.F.-G., 627

S.W.3d at 312. The specific danger to a child’s well-being may be inferred from

parental misconduct standing alone. See In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (“As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a

life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a

child.”). Illegal drug use and its effect on the parent’s life and her ability to parent may

establish an endangering course of conduct. Id. Evidence that a parent “exposed her

children to domestic violence” may also support a finding of endangerment under

                                            13
Subsection (E). In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no

pet.).

         Because the evidence pertaining to Subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, we

conduct a consolidated review of those subsections. See In re S.H., No. 02-17-00188-

CV, 2017 WL 4542859, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem.

op.); In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).

         2. Analysis

         The record reflects that Mother deliberately exposed the children to domestic

violence in the home and that she failed to protect the children from Father’s

violence. Father has a history of domestic violence. Despite that history, and despite

Father’s parental rights having previously been terminated, Mother allowed Father to

move into her home with the children after he was released from prison. In the home,

Mother and Father argued and physically fought “nonstop.” The fighting was so

excessive that Mother’s neighbors made several complaints, and Mother was

threatened with eviction if the fighting did not stop. The children witnessed the abuse

and had seen their parents bleeding. They told their counselor that they were afraid in

their own home.

         Mother asserts that she was the victim of Father’s violence. While this may be

true, Mother took deliberate actions to maintain contact with Father even after the

children had been removed from her care and in direct violation of her service plan.

Cf. In re R.F., 115 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (concluding a

                                           14
court may consider a parent’s noncompliance with a service plan as part of the

endangerment analysis).

      According to Mother, Father—who no longer has any parental rights to the

children—had a “right to know about his kids.” This led the caseworker to believe

that Mother would not protect the children from Father, and the evidence suggests

that the domestic violence was likely to continue upon Father’s release from his most

recent incarceration. For example, the children were removed from Mother’s care in

June 2018 due, in part, to concerns of domestic violence between Mother and Father.

During that case, Father continued to collect felony convictions for committing

family-violence assault against Mother, and his parental rights were terminated. The

children were subsequently returned to Mother’s care. During this case, Father

committed another family-violence assault against Mother. Yet Mother could not

comprehend why Father “had anything to do with” this case, and she was dishonest

with her caseworker and her therapist about her contact with Father. Cf. In re T.J., No.

05-22-00954-CV, 2023 WL 1988838, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 14, 2023, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (upholding endangerment finding when mother “failed to cooperate with

[TDFPS] and failed to participate in the services she needed to complete in order to

preserve her relationship with the children”).

      Mother was so stressed about Father getting out of prison and finding her that

she relapsed and began using methamphetamines again. She claimed that she tried to

get a protective order against Father, but she never produced the protective order.

                                           15
And while she ultimately sought a divorce from Father, she continued to contact him

after the divorce was final. Despite knowing that Father was an abusive, violent

person, and despite likely being a victim herself, Mother deliberately kept him

involved in the children’s lives, and she lied about his involvement throughout the

case. She apparently was “not concerned enough” about the domestic violence to

remove Father from the children’s lives.

      Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

judgment and giving due deference to the factfinder’s endangerment findings, we hold

that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that Mother had

knowingly placed or had knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or

surroundings that endangered their emotional or physical well-being and that Mother

had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with others whose conduct

endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s issues regarding

termination under Subsections (D) and (E). See id.

      Because a finding of only one predicate ground alleged under Family Code

Section 161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support termination, In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355,

362 (Tex. 2003), we need not reach Mother’s issues regarding termination under

Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(O).

                                           16
C. Best Interest of the Children

       Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best

interest. For the reasons set out below, we overrule this issue.

       1. Best-Interest Factors

       Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the

child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest

analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development,

In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether evidence is

sufficient to support a best-interest finding, we review the entire record. In re E.C.R.,

402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). Evidence probative of a child’s best interest may be

the same evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. Id. at 249; C.H., 89

S.W.3d at 28; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). We also consider the

evidence in light of nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining

the child’s best interest:

       (A)    the [child’s] desires . . . ;
       (B)    the [child’s] emotional and physical needs[,] . . . now and in the
              future;
       (C)    the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
              future;
       (D)    the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
       (E)    the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the
              [child’s] best interest . . . ;

                                              17
       (F)    the plans for the child by these individuals or[, if applicable,] by
              the agency seeking custody;
       (G)    the stability of the home or proposed placement;
       (H)    the [parent’s] acts or omissions . . . indicat[ing] that the existing
              parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and
       (I)    any excuse for the [parent’s] acts or omissions.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R.,

402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider,

among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); In re E.N.C., 384

S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012). These factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors

may not apply to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed

evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is

in the child’s best interest. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence

relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id.

       2. Analysis

       The following evidence, in context, supports the trial court’s finding that

termination of the parent–child relationship between Mother and the children was in

the children’s best interests:

   • (First Holley factor) The children expressed that they wanted to stay in their
   foster “home.” They felt safe with their foster mother and referred to her as
   “mommy.” Conversely, the children expressed that they did not feel safe in
   Mother’s home and that they did not want to live with Mother.

   • (Second and Third Holley Factors) The children needed a safe and stable home
   and a mother who did not allow a violent person into the home. The children also
   needed a mother that prioritizes “keeping up with” them and ensuring that their

                                           18
needs are met. Mother exposed the children to a pattern of domestic violence; the
children were afraid in their own home. The domestic violence in Mother’s home
created both emotional and physical risks for the children. While in Mother’s care,
the children missed school, and their behavior “deteriorated.” If they were
returned to Mother’s care, the children would likely develop “more anxieties and
problems.” Removal from the foster mother’s care would risk causing the children
more trauma and upsetting their stability.

• (Fourth Holley Factor) Mother demonstrated an inability to parent. She
prioritized her own desires over the children’s safety and stability by remaining
involved with her violent, abusive husband and allowing him to live with them.
While Mother appeared to be concerned about the domestic violence happening in
front of the children, she was “not concerned enough to make [Father] leave.” She
also felt that Father still had a right to be in the children’s lives despite a
termination order to the contrary. The children’s foster mother, on the other hand,
had been working diligently on their behalf. The evidence showed that she, unlike
Mother, appeared to have the ability and desire to help the children develop, and
she ensured that the children were provided for and felt safe.

• (Fifth Holley Factor) Mother failed to take advantage of the programs available
to assist her. She was unsuccessfully discharged from the Family Recovery Court
program, and her dishonesty with her therapist prevented her from successfully
completing individual counseling. She also failed to stay away from Father despite
being ordered to do so. While Mother completed some of her services, she did not
accomplish the intended goal of those services.

• (Sixth Holley Factor) Mother did not suggest any plans for the children. She
testified that she intended to continue going to Narcotics Anonymous meetings.
Regarding how she planned to protect the children, Mother testified that “[o]nly
time could prove that.” Other than Mother’s commendable plan to keep herself
clean from drug use, she wholly failed to identify her legitimate plans for the
children. See In re A.B., No. 02-23-00124-CV, 2023 WL 5615870, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re K.A., No. 02-19-
00099-CV, 2019 WL 4309168, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 12, 2019, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).

• (Seventh Holley Factor) Mother did not demonstrate that she could provide the
children with permanency and stability. Cf. In re G.V., III, 543 S.W.3d 342, 350
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied) (“[C]hildren need permanency and
stability.”). She asserted that she worked as an Uber driver and that she rented a
car to perform her job. But she provided no proof of employment or any car

                                      19
   rental arrangement. On appeal, she offers the conclusory assertion that she “had a
   home[] and had a job.” Conversely, the children’s foster mother was able to
   provide the children with a safe, stable home in which the children were thriving.
   She also helped Mother provide for the children when they were in Mother’s care.
   The children had a “good” relationship with their foster mother, who expressed
   that she was adoption motivated. TDFPS had no concerns about whether the
   foster mother could meet the needs of the children.

   • (Eighth and Ninth Holley Factors) Mother’s acts—maintaining contact with
   Father and exposing the children to domestic violence—and omissions—failing to
   shield the children from domestic violence, lying about contacting Father, and
   noncompliance with her service plan—indicated that her parent–child relationship
   with the children was not a proper one. The only excuse Mother provided for her
   acts and omissions was that she was a domestic-violence victim and that the police
   would not help her because she was married to Father. While Mother may have
   been a victim, she did not file for divorce until after the children were removed
   from her care—for the second time—and she continued to visit Father in jail after
   the divorce was final. She also claimed to have obtained a protective order against
   Father, but that is not supported by any evidence in the record. The trial court did
   not have to believe Mother’s excuses.
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best-

interest finding, and giving due deference to that finding, we hold that a reasonable

factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that termination

of the parent–child relationship between Mother and the children was in the

children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at

573. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. We

overrule Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s best-interest finding.

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                                    III. Conclusion

      Having overruled Mother’s dispositive issues, we affirm the trial court’s order

terminating her parental rights to the children.

                                                      /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                      Wade Birdwell
                                                      Justice

Delivered: January 11, 2024

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