Court Opinion

ID: 7819684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:49:32.312983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:42.340576
License: Public Domain

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice, dissenting. I very much disagree with the majority opinion for two reasons. For one (recognized by the majority), the law looks with disfavor upon the ademption of a specific legacy, and secondly, I cannot agree that the fact situation herein denotes an intent upon the part of Ms. Merritt to revoke the legacy to the two nephews, in the case of In Re Estate of Brown, 252 N.E. 2d 142 (Ind. 1969), cited in the majority opinion 1 there is a thorough discussion of the subject under consideration and the court sets out the law on ademption clearly and definitely as follows: “The courts look with disfavor upon the ademption of a specific legacy and will not approve of such an ademption unless the facts and circumstances of the particular case unmistakenly demand such a result. “It is only when the subject matter of the specific legacy has been completely destroyed, alienated or extinguished, or so changed in character that it cannot be recognized or identified, that the legacy will be adeem-ed. But where the subject matter of the specific legacy has not been completely destroyed, alienated or extinguished, but merely changed in form, shape or location, by accident, operation of law, or some act of the testator, and such subject matter in its changed or altered form can be traced into the possession of the testator,, and is a part of his estate as the time of his death, and the attitude of the testator toward such altered property has been such as to indicate no change in his testamentary intent, there is no ademption and the legatee will take such property in its altered form.” [My In Mee v. Cusineau, Executrix, 213 Ark. 61, 209 S.W. 2d 445, we pointed out the circumstances under which an ademption will occur, and as will be subsequently shown, these circumstances are not present in the instant case. In Mee this court said: “At § 341, 28 R.C.L. 345, appears statements of the law to the following effect. The distinctive characteristic of a specific legacy is its liability to ademption. If the identical thing bequeathed is not in existence, or has been disposed of so that it does not form a part of the testator’s estate, at the time of his death, the legacy is extinguished or adeemed, and the legatee’s rights are gone. [My emphasis]. The rule is universal that in order to make a specific legacy effective the property bequeathed must be in existence and owned by the testator at the time of his death, and the nonexistence of property at the time of the death of a testator which has been specifically bequeathed by will is the familiar and almost typical form of ademption. [Citing cases]. *** “The reason for this rule as stated in the numerous cases cited in the note to § 543, 68 C.J. 844, is that as the testator no longer owns the property specifically devised, there is no property for the devisee to take, and also that subsequent conveyance of the property by the testator after having made a specific devise of it indicates conclusively a change of testamentary intent as to that property.” The majority also mention the case of Prendergast v. Walsh, 42 A. 1049 (N.J), cited by the appellees, but, in my opinion, do not satisfactorily distinguish that case from the one at hand. In Prendergast, the testatrix left a bequest of money to her three sisters, or their survivors, “whatever of my money now on deposit in four banks in New York City (naming them) which may be on hand, and not otherwise disposed of, share and share alike.” During her lifetime, the testatrix withdrew the money from the four New York banks and deposited same in another bank, where it remained until her death. The court, holding there was no ademption, inter alia, “The thing she bequeathed, she drew from the bank. It remained the identical thing bequeathed, until disposed of in some way by her. She could have disposed of it by consuming it in living, or turning it into other property, or devoting it to a purpose inconsistent with the bequest. She did neither of these things, but, on the contrary, took'the specific thing which she got from the bank, and kept it until April 1st following, and then, with a slight addition, placed it in the Hoboken Bank. While by this deposit in this last-named bank she lost the right to have the same money again in specie, she retained the right to “llave it as money or cash. If thereafter it was properly designated as money or cash, it must be regarded as a part of the same cash which she had taken from the four banks. If the money remained practically the same money, then the removal of it from the place of its deposit did not amount to an ademption. The place of deposit was merely used as descriptive of the thing bequeathed. It was used to identify the particular money given, and it is entirely settled that, where the place is merely descriptive, the removal of the things to another place is immaterial.” Numerous other cases are to the same effect. It is apparent that the law strongly looks with disfavor upon an ademption, and if the legacy can be traced and clearly identified and the attitude of the testator toward such altered property has been such as to indicate no change in the testamentary intent, there is no ademption. Accordingly, the question in this litigation, to which the majority agree, is whether Mary Ann Merritt indicated an intention to revoke the legacy of the two nephews. I contend that there is absolutely nothing in this record — not a single fact — to indicate in any way that Ms. Merritt had any intention to revoke such legacy. In withdrawing the money from the savings and loan association, and depositing it into her checking account, Ms. Merritt specifically and clearly gave her reason for doing so, “the purpose of taking care of medical expenses for myself.” In'other words, it is obvious that the testatrix, whose checking account only consisted of $518.78, contemplated that she would need to expend additional funds for medical expenses, and withdrew the money from the savings and loan account and placed it in her checking account solely for that purpose. This is not unusual, and is done every day by those who are required to live on their savings. She was withdrawing this money for her own use and not for the purpose of leaving it to some different legatee. Of course, if the money was not placed in a checking account, but instead retained at her home, her future expenses could only have been paid in cash and this could hardly be considered practical. The majority indicate that there is significance in the fact that Ms. Merritt deposited the money withdrawn from the savings account in the checking account that she already maintained, rather than setting it up in a separate account.2 I cannot attach any importance to this fact. Why should Ms. Merritt, whose only purpose in withdrawing the money from the savings account was to place such money in a location where she could write checks for her medical expenses, open a separate checking account when she already had one? To me, this would be ridiculous. Succinctly stated, the facts reflect that this withdrawal of funds from the savings and loan association was not occasioned by any change in testamentary intent — but rather (according to her own written statement) was occasioned by her expectation that she would need the money withdrawn for her own personal use. There is another fact which I consider quite pertinent, and that is that Ms. Merritt’s Will was executed on February 12, 1972, and her death occurred on May 21, 1972, only slightly more than three months after execution of the Will. To summarize, the depository was changed because Ms. Merritt could not write checks on the money in its original depository. As in Brown, the money can easily be traced into the possession of the testator and was a part of her estate at the time of her death; as in Prendergast, it was not disposed of by her, was not even used for the purpose of turning it into other property, and was not, in my view, set apart for a purpose inconsistent with the bequest. I, therefore, respectfully dissent to the holding of the majority. Holt, J., joins in this dissent.  The majority cite this case and correctly state its holding, which is entirely contrary to the majority view taken in the instant litigation; no effort, however, is made by the majority to distinguish Brown from the case now before us, and it is noticeable that the holding there went beyond the holding of the chancellor in the case before us, in that in Brown the money at issue had been converted to bank certificates.   From the majority opinion: “In Willis, money on deposit in a named bank was bequeathed. The money thereafter was transferred to another bank; however, it was placed in a separate savings account rather than commingled with another savings deposit in the same bank. ‘Significant is the fact that the identical fund was put in a separate savings deposit rather than being commingled with a like savings deposit then in the same bank.’ ”