Court Opinion

ID: 9764603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:32:24.962657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:58.661171
License: Public Domain

GALLAGHER, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
In the splendid isolation of the appellate court, search and seizure cases sometimes get over-refined and take on a different appearance than in the real world of criminal law enforcement. This is often because some of the evidence is magnified to the detriment of a totality review of all the earthy circumstances presented. Here, once the crucial facts are examined realistically and in their totality, it would appear the majority opinion is in conflict with *1025our precedents, and with a prudent interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
The case arises from a citizen’s complaint of street corner narcotics trafficking. The facts are typical and undoubtedly are similarly repeated in hundreds of cases a year in this jurisdiction. A citizen calls the police to complain of drug trafficking at a neighborhood street corner and provides a description of the suspected trafficker; a police officer in a patrol car responds and proceeds to the street corner and begins an investigation of a person the officer suspects from the information provided him; the individual retreats from the scene and the officer calls out to the retreating suspect; and when he comes abreast of him, he starts addressing questions to the suspect. After further investigation, Terry seizures often take place, and frequently they result in a search and later an arrest. This court and the trial court see that scenario in countless cases each year.
The importance of this particular typical case is the court now is holding that an unconstitutional arrest took place when the arresting officer performed a reasonable investigation of the complaint prior to the arrest when the narcotics were discovered.
I believe this decision creates an important precedent in this jurisdiction because (a) the facts are so typical of innumerable street drug arrest cases, and (b) it may discourage police investigative initiative in typical drug cases. It would really be no final answer to say that, nevertheless, the decision is necessary in order to preserve Fourth Amendment requirements. I believe we can square constitutional requirements with sensible investigation of complaints regarding moving street scenes involving narcotic trafficking. And I believe we can square constitutional requirements without discouraging reasonable police investigative initiative in these street trafficking cases.
This case began with a call at midnight from a citizen, not here identified, reporting that a man was selling narcotics at 17th and Euclid Streets, N.W.1 The height and dress of the man were given. Phone information by an unidentified citizen, standing by itself, constitutes neither probable cause to arrest nor a sufficient basis to conduct a Terry2 seizure, under established law. Alabama v. White, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). There is no difference with the majority opinion on this score. The difference we have is that, in my view, this is not really the basic issue in this case. Rather, the issue is whether on the totality of the facts, as the police investigation progressed step-by-step from the initial information, the officer, as the circumstances gradually unfolded at the end, had probable cause to arrest.
To put it another way, from the time the officer received the radio call to the time of the discovery of the narcotics on the defendant, did the officer take any unreasonable steps in the Fourth Amendment sense during the course of his investigation? If he did not, then this is an indication the arrest was valid, if the totality of circumstances added up finally to probable cause. I think that is the sensible way to approach this case. As the Supreme Court has instructed, when considering probable cause or investigative stop issues “the totality of the *1026circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). In this review, we are of course bound by the factfinding of the trial court, unless we conclude it is clearly erroneous, and there is no such finding by this court.3
We start out with a phone call to the police at midnight describing a man who, it was said, was selling narcotics at the corner of 17th and Euclid Streets, N.W. The description was a black male, about five feet, six inches, wearing a white shirt, with dark writing on the front of the shirt and blue jeans. This information was relayed to an officer in a patrol car whose “beat” included that location. It so happened the officer was then approaching 17th and Euclid Streets in the patrol car. He testified he was familiar with that corner, as he had patrolled it for two years, and knew it to be a corner where drugs are sold.4 When he arrived there, he started his on-the-scene investigation.
He observed that there was a group of women and men on the corner. He saw two persons who might fit the description. He thereupon “challenged the dispatcher to confirm the lookout.” After the dispatcher repeated the identification as the officer surveyed the scene, he noticed some in the group dressed in sweatsuits, some in shorts, etc. He narrowed the description down to the defendant.
Continuing his investigation of the information from the citizen, he walked toward the defendant. As he approached him, the officer said “sir” and, as he continued the approach, the defendant turned around, disregarded him and kept walking. The officer said “sir” again, “come here,” but he kept walking away. He said he had made “eye contact” and he had to “double time” to keep up. The officer caught up with the defendant and told him he wanted to talk to him because he “fit the description of a complaint” on drug selling. The officer asked if he had identification and the defendant said “no." He then observed an object which bulged in his right pocket. He twice asked the defendant what it was, and the defendant would not answer. The officer was, of course, aware that drug dealers often carry weapons. The officer thereupon did a protective “pat-down, holding on to that object.” He asked a third time what it was and got no response, so he “went inside his pocket, took it out.” The reason he did so was based on his “experience with people in that area, me being by myself, it’s a precaution that the department has taught me to use, so far as protecting myself.”
The hard object was a film canister, and the officer had during fifty or sixty previous arrests seen film containers used to transport drugs. Because of this, he then opened the container and there were four tin foil packets, which proved to be the narcotics. The arrest followed.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it seems to me that at the point to which his investigation of the citizen complaint had progressed when he saw the bulge, he had by then reasonable grounds to suspect (not believe) that the defendant was engaged in selling drugs as reported to him and he had a right to protect himself by a frisk for a weapon because of the bulge. When he felt the hard object, and then extracted it and the object proved to be a film canister, and, based upon his extensive experience in drug arrests, knew they are frequently used as drug containers, I believe that adding all the circumstances together thus far, there was probable cause to search the canister. Upon discovering the contents of the canister, he had probable cause to arrest. It seems to me that each step the officer took in his investigation was reasonable in the constitutional sense, and these various measures *1027ultimately added up to probable cause for the arrest.
While it is established under Alabama v. White, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2416, that the telephone call from the citizen did not in itself constitute justification for a Terry5 seizure, let alone probable cause to arrest, this is not to say it should not be given investigative weight. The police would be open to justifiable criticism if such information was not taken seriously.6
The critical difference between the majority and dissent is the point at which the Terry seizure occurred. The majority claims in the crucially important part of its opinion, (see footnote 24, maj. op.), that no reasonable suspicion existed when the defendant stopped as the officer drew abreast. That, says the majority, was the “stop” because the officer testified he “stopped Brown after he started to walk away.”
This is the specific issue that divides the majority and the dissent. I have a problem with the majority opinion at this juncture in its crucial footnote 24.7 The court sets forth only a portion of the police officer’s testimony in relation to what transpired after he arrived at the scene and began investigating. Consequently, one may get an erroneous impression of the evidence. I will therefore set forth the remainder of this pertinent testimony by the officer so there will be no misunderstanding on what actually transpired in this case. As it commences, the trial judge is seeking to learn what actually transpired leading up to the seizure.8
The trial judge stated:
I would like you to cover one other thing, Ms. Rosenthal, before you yield this witness. This witness testified he called the defendant twice, and the defendant didn’t stop. Can you get into that a little bit.
The prosecutor proceeded to do that at some length:
BY MS. ROSENTHAL:
Q. Officer, could you say exactly what you did when you were calling to this defendant?
A. First time when I confirmed the look-out, he, the defendant, he was on the — it was on the west — he was on the northwest corner, and when I started approaching him, I called him and said, sir, and, like I said, he turned around, he acted like he didn’t acknowledge what I was saying to him, and he kept walking.
I said, sir, again. Come here. He turned around, he kept walking. He hadn’t stopped.
Q. How are you sure, officer, that the defendant knew it was him you were addressing, and not somebody else?
A. Well, at one point, at one point he made eye contact. It was — it was pretty brief, but, like I say, at one point, yeah, you know — .
He was — he was — he acknowledged me, I am pretty sure that he did because the second time I called him, he started walking away, totally. And I had to — not jog, but double-time up to him to get him to stop, initially.
Q. Officer, specifically, at the moment that you began to approach the defendant, did the defendant start walking away from you at that point, *1028or was it not until you talked to him that he started walking away?
MR. KROLLMAN: Objection, Your Honor. It’s a little leading, a little compound—
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MS. ROSENTHAL:
Q. At what time did the defendant start walking away from you?
A. First time I called him.
Q. So, the defendant did not start walking away until you had called him?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, at the time that you called to him, was there eye contact at that point?
A. First time, yes.
Q. And again, would you repeat what it was, exactly, what you said while you had this eye contact with him.
A. First — first time I said, sir. Second time, I said, sir. Third time, I said, sir, and advanced towards him.
Q. Let me pull that back, each time.
The first time you said, sir, and you had eye contact with the defendant, what, if anything, did the defendant do?
A. What did he do? Like I say, we made eye contact briefly, I’d say, for about a second. He turned around, and kept walking.
Q. Now, was the defendant sitting, or standing at the time?
A. Standing.
Q. And you said, sir, he saw your eyes, and then he turned around, and started walking; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Did he turn around so that his back was facing to you?
A. Yeah.
Q. Now at that point, did you follow him?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you say, then?
A. Second time, I said, sir. He kept walking.
Q. And, at that point, did he turn around to look at you at all?
A. No.
Q. Did you say it in a voice that was loud enough that he could hear you?
MR. KROLLMAN: Objection, Your Honor; speculative.
THE COURT: Did you say it loudly, or did you say it like you’re talking now?
THE WITNESS: Not like I’m talking — I would say I’ve a — pretty good voice, pretty good tone of voice.
THE COURT: Was it a commanding voice? Do you know what I mean when I say that: Was it a commanding voice?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Were there other people very close to him, in proximity, standing on that same northwest corner?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Did they all turn and walk way?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Well, when they saw you walk up, police officer in uniform, everybody just started walking away?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MS. ROSENTHAL:
Q. Did anybody at all stay in that place?
A. I’d say, I believe about three people.
Q. Three people stayed? And approximately how many walked away?
A. From where defendant was located, about 20.
Q. About 20 people started walking away?
A. Yeah.
Q. How loud would you say your voice was?
A. How loud? I’d say, loud enough to be heard.
Q. And was it clear to whom you were directing the comment, sir?
MR. KROLLMAN: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MS. ROSENTHAL:
Q. When you said, sir, did you direct it specifically towards the defendant?
A. No.
*1029Q. Who did you direct it, specifically towards?
A. I directed it towards the defendant. Is that what you are asking me? Yes, like I said the first time, there was eye contact. That’s when I knew he acknowledged me, the first time I called him.
MS. ROSENTHAL: Court’s indulgence.
BY MS. ROSENTHAL:
Q. Officer, when you talked, first, one-on-one with the defendant, did he still try to keep walking?
A. At one point, yes, he took a couple steps, and he stopped.
Q. And what, if anything, did you do that caused him to stop?
A. I let him know why I was stopping him, and my basis for being up there and picking him out.
Q. And, specifically, what did you do that caused him finally to stop?
A. I told him I wanted to talk to him. He stayed for what I told him. I said, I’m up here because you fit the description of a complaint, somebody selling drugs.
Q. And what, if anything, did the defendant say at that point?
A. Nothing; at that point, he didn’t say anything else.
Q. Okay.
The crucial evidence is, therefore, that when the stop took place, the officer had told him he wanted to talk to him and the defendant “stayed for what I told him.” That was the stop and the reason the stop occurred. There was then no laying on of hands, no police obstruction, and there was no command to stop. That is established.
The crucial difference between the majority and dissent in this case is whether the seizure took place when the defendant stopped to answer questions, or when the officer later laid his hands on him.9
It has been acknowledged that police do not seize persons within the Fourth Amendment meaning by merely approaching them in public and asking questions. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), the Supreme Court laid down some guidelines in this area of law.
[C]haracterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a “seizure,” while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. The Court has on other occasions referred to the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws. Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would be unsolved. In short, the security of all would be diminished.
Id. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877 (citations omitted).
In construing relevant Supreme Court decisions, this court stated in United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040 (D.C.1985), that the Supreme Court
has virtually deemed a police approach for questioning on the street to trigger a “consensual encounter,” [I.N.S. v.] Delgado [466 U.S. 210], 104 S.Ct. [1758] at 1762 [80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)], absent “intimidating” circumstances beyond the natural sense of obligation almost anyone would feel when a police officer begins asking questions.
Id. at 1044.
In Kelly v. United States, 580 A.2d 1282 (D.C.1990), this court once again stated that “[a] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs ‘[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen ... ’” and “[i]t is not enough ... to assert that police officers are inherently figures of authority, and that their presence results in non-consensual encounters.” Id. at *10301285. “There must be more than mere questioning before a court will find that a seizure has occurred.” Id. at 1286.
Here, there was no police command to stop, no police obstruction and no touching of the defendant prior to the point at which the seizure occurred, i.e., when the officer laid his hands on him in feeling the bulge in his pants pocket while questioning him. Yet, the court is nevertheless holding that a seizure occurred before the officer saw the pocket bulge and had no success in finding out from the defendant, by questions, what caused the bulge.
It is unwise to over-refine these on-the-street investigative issues as to do so causes “unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment,” as the Supreme Court has observed. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1582, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Otherwise, it may cause the prosecutor, the police and the public to be in considerable confusion on what is a permissible Terry seizure — a constantly recurring practical problem in contemporary criminal law enforcement, certainly in this jurisdiction.
The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). As the Supreme Court reminded us in Alabama v. White, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2416, “reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Under Alabama v. White, supra, as we know, a phone call to the police from a citizen not identified requires additional corroboration from investigation in order to support a Terry seizure.
The initial complaint of drug trafficking plus the subsequent investigation which revealed the particular street corner, the repeating of the police report when the officer arrived at the street corner, the belief of the officer that the defendant met the description given in the complaint, the conduct of the defendant during the street investigation — these things lent reasonable corroboration to the initial information and justified articulable suspicion sufficient to support a Terry seizure when the officer saw the pocket bulge when he first stood beside the defendant. Furthermore, when a person is leaving a scene upon seeing the police arrive and an officer directs a request to the individual for the opportunity to ask the person questions, and the person continues to depart and thereby rejects the officer’s request, the individual at that point has the legal right to do so. But that is not to say that this conduct may not be factored by the officer into the reasonable suspicion equation. It would be legitimate to do so under those particular circumstances. This court’s decision in Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312 (D.C.1989), for example, is not to the contrary, as I understand it.
There is a certain internal inconsistency in the majority opinion. The main thrust of the opinion is that the case presents an Alabama v. White, supra, issue, i.e., whether an anonymous tip justifies a Terry stop, which the Supreme Court answered negatively. Yet, as the majority comes to acknowledge in its crucial footnote 24, this case actually presents the issue of whether on the totality of the circumstances (not just the initial tip) there was a premature seizure of the defendant by the police.
If, as I believe, a seizure occurred when the officer subsequently saw the pocket bulge, the investigation had by then progressed to a point where he had articulable suspicion. The subsequent search of the canister (the hard object) came at a stage when he then had probable cause to search and then later arrest, for the reasons explained earlier.
Under these circumstances this is hardly a case to be turned on the holding in Alabama v. White, supra, relating to anonymous tips standing alone. The initial complaint from the unidentified citizen surely *1031did not stand alone and uncorroborated in this record. There was adequate corroboration to take this case out of that holding in Alabama v. White, supra, and into reasonable grounds for suspicion at the time seizure occurred; and there was reasonable ground for belief he was committing a crime when the subsequent arrest occurred.
I would affirm the trial court.

. It is a matter of common knowledge in this locality that in drug cases the initial information giving rise to police investigations frequently comes from a neighborhood resident who telephones information to the police. It is also commonly known that the police department encourages such phone calls and has made it known publicly that the police will protect the identity of such callers. The reason for this protection is to avoid injury that might well come to the callers from the drug merchants if their identities were made known.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). It will be recalled that Terry was decided in 1968, not long after the sharp ascendancy in urban crime which began in the middle 1960’s. The net effect of Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Terry was a recognition that application of the Fourth Amendment should take into consideration the reality of the societal change. Subsequently, we have been visited with such unusual measures as airport security checks, and in fact, even security checks to enter our courthouse, along with other public buildings. These procedures reflect societal conditions as we now find them and, naturally, the courts have taken these conditions into consideration in construing the Fourth Amendment.

. There was some conflicting testimony about the description of his dress, for example, the color of his pants as seen under street lights in the dark of night. The trial judge resolved the color of the pants issue in the government’s favor in his factfinding.

. In dealing with reality, one should naturally expect that a police officer does not disregard a specific factor such as this, for what it is worth.

. Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2.

. As related earlier, we are well aware that concerned neighbors are fearful of being identified by the narcotics dealers as being the informant, for reasons of safety. This is not to say that such information is, or should be, considered as adequate to warrant a Terry stop, to say nothing of an arrest. It is to say, however, that neither should it be factored down to zero investigative weight. I believe it should be recognized for what it is worth, with due regard for the Fourth Amendment. First of all, it obviously carries weight sufficient to cause a police investigation. As an investigation progresses, it may be supported and carry more weight.

. To digress, the last paragraph of the court’s footnote 19 has rather interesting implications. The court there seems to be grasping for support from the straw of statements made by the defense counsel at the defendant’s sentencing hearing, a rather improbable source for support in relation to an evidentiary issue.

. Lest one be misled, the majority’s quoted musings of the trial judge during the hearing were not part of his findings.

. As I have stated, there is hardly a conflict between us as to whether the law is as stated in Alabama v. White, supra.