Court Opinion

ID: 9428223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:11.379757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:12.343574
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
concurring in the result.
I agree with most of the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, and do not agree with the Court’s reading of Rule 68. It is anomalous indeed that, under the Court’s view, a defendant may obtain costs under Rule 68 against a plaintiff who prevails in part but not against a plaintiff who loses entirely.
I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the Court because I do not think that the terms of the offer made in this case constituted a proper offer of judgment within the scope of Rule 68.
I
Rule 68 provides, in pertinent part:
“At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued” (emphasis added).
*363In Title YII eases, the scope of “costs” is defined in the statute itself. Except in unusual circumstances, Title VII requires that a prevailing plaintiff receive “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k) ; see Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 416-417 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 401-402 (1968). We held last Term in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980), that a claim to an attorney’s fee is not weakened if the plaintiff prevails by “settlement rather than through litigation.”
A Rule 68 offer of judgment is a proposal of settlement that, by definition, stipulates that the plaintiff shall be treated as the prevailing party. It follows, therefore, that the “costs” component of a Rule 68 offer of judgment in a Title VII case must include reasonable attorney’s fees accrued to the date of the offer. Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (Colo. 1978) (offer of $2,200 together with costs, not including attorney’s fees, was “fatally defective because it excludes attorney’s fees then accrued”).
The purposes of Title VII and Rule 68 each would be served by this plain-language construction of the relationship between the statute and the Rule. To be sure, Title VIFs fee provision was designed to enable plaintiffs to vindicate their rights through litigation. Piggie Park, supra, at 401-402. On the other hand, parties to litigation and the public as a whole have an interest — often an overriding one — in settlement rather than exhaustion of protracted court proceedings. Rule 68 makes available to defendants a mechanism to encourage plaintiffs to settle burdensome lawsuits. The Rule particularly facilitates the early resolution of marginal suits in which the defendant perceives the claim to be without merit, and the plaintiff recognizes its speculative nature.1
*364An offer to allow judgment that does not cover accrued costs and attorney’s fees is unlikely to lead to settlement. Many plaintiffs simply could not afford to accept such an offer. It may be, also, that the plaintiff’s lawyer instituted the suit with no hope of compensation beyond recovery of a fee from the defendant. Such a lawyer might have a conflict of interest that would inhibit encouraging his client to accept an otherwise fair offer. It therefore seems clear that the relevant interests — of both parties and the public — will be served by construing Title VII and Rule 68 in accordance with their plain language.2
II
Delta’s offer in this case did not comply with the terms of Rule 68.
When a plaintiff prevails in a litigated Title VII suit, the court awards a reasonable attorney’s fee. The primary factors relevant to setting the fee usually are the time expended and *365a reasonable hourly rate for that time.3 Thus, a court is not bound by the prevailing attorney’s proposed hourly rate or by the bill submitted. The fee itself must be reasonable.
The same practice should be followed in Title VII cases in which the prevailing party is established by a Rule 68 offer of judgment. Cf. Maher v. Gagne, supra. In such a case, the offer of judgment consists of two components: (i) the substantive relief proposed, which may be a sum of money or specific relief such as reinstatement or promotion, and (ii) costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. The offer should specify the first component with exactitude. But the amount of the fee is within the discretion of the court if the offer is accepted.4
Assessed by these standards, Delta’s putative offer of judgment simply did not comply with the terms of Rule 68. In pertinent part, the offer provided:
“Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant hereby offers to allow judgment to be taken against it in this action, in the amount of $450, which shall include attorney’s fees, together with costs accrued to date ” (emphasis added).
*366Delta’s offer would have complied with Rule 68 — and the company now would be entitled to the costs it seeks5 — if the offer had specified some amount of substantive relief, plus costs and attorney’s fees to be awarded by the trial court. But the offer did not so specify.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.

 Unfortunately, the cost of litigation in this country — furthered by discovery procedures susceptible to gross abuse — has reached the point where many persons and entities simply cannot afford to litigate even the most *364meritorious claim or defense. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U. S. 995, 999-1001 (1980) (Powell, J., with whom Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, dissenting); ACE Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U. S. 1081, 1086-1088 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Janofsky, A. B. A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A. B. A. J. 1323, 1323-1324 (1979). Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 177 (1979).

 In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752 (1980), we held that the term “costs,” as it is used in 28 U. S. C. § 1927, does not incorporate by reference the definition of costs used in Title VII. Nothing in that case is inconsistent with my reasoning here. In Roadway Express, a party sought costs, including an attorney’s fee, under § 1927 from opposing counsel who had unreasonably and vexatiously delayed an employment discrimination lawsuit. We concluded that the attorney’s fee could not be recovered under § 1927, because Congress intended that section to include only those costs specified in a corresponding section, 28 U. S. C. § 1920. In this case, by contrast, the entitlement to “costs,” including an attorney’s fee, arises under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In approving the Federal Rules, Congress appears to have incorporated the definition of costs found in the substantive statute at issue in the litigation. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (d).

 In Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F. 2d 102 (1976) (en banc), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the primary determinant of a court-awarded fee— the “lodestar” — should be the amount of time reasonably expended on the matter multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The “lodestar” is subject to adjustment based on, inter alia, the quality of the work and the results obtained. Id., at 117-118; accord, Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F. 2d 915, 922-924 (CA1 1980); Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U. S. App. D. C. 390, 401-404, 641 F. 2d 880, 891-894 (1980) (en banc). Cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (CA5 1974).

 It may be, of course, that the parties will settle the issue of costs and attorney’s fees after the acceptance of the offer, without the need to involve the trial judge. Nothing in this opinion should be read to discourage that practice. But the terms of the offer of judgment must permit the prevailing plaintiff to request the trial judge to award a reasonable fee.

 Contrary to the suggestion in Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, post, at 378-379, nothing herein requires prevailing defendants to receive attorney’s fees as part of their costs under Rule 68 when a plaintiff rejects an offer of judgment and then ultimately loses on the merits. As I have stated, it is the province of the trial judge to determine the entitlement to, and amount of, an attorney’s fee. See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text. Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees except in unusual circumstances. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 401-402 (1968). A prevailing defendant, on the other hand, is entitled to attorney’s fees as part of the costs only when the lawsuit is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 421 (1978).