Court Opinion

ID: 9445425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:28:43.66793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:15.686877
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(with whom Circuit Judge PRETTYMAN concurs) .
We agree that the conviction must be reversed, but for reasons which will be developed in this opinion.
We do not share the view expressed by Judge BAZELON that McNabb v. United States1 compels exclusion of the appellant’s oral admissions. We believe that before admissions or confessions are to be excluded under the McNabb rule, the inculpatory statements must be shown to have been induced by an illegal detention, to have been elicited through illegality, and thus to constitute fruits of wrongdoing by the officers. The disclosures must have been the result of the unlawful detention. In Hines v. United States, we affirmed without opinion after the trial judge, expressly relying upon our opinions in Pierce v. United States, infra note 11, and Allen v. United States, infra note 12, had refused to exclude confessions not shown to be the product of illegal detention. Certiorari was denied.2
As we read it, McNabb is based upon the premise that when there has been inexcusable detention for the purpose of illegally extracting evidence from an accused, coupled with the successful extraction of inculpatory disclosures as a result of continuous questioning for many hours under psychological pressure, the statements of the accused so produced shall not be received.
The Supreme Court has had repeated opportunities to say that its rule of evidence for federal courts means less, but it has declined to do so. Rather than automatically exclude all self implicating statements by an accused while in cus tody, the Court has said:
“By United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71, [64 S.Ct. 896, 898, 88 *924L.Ed. 1140], this Court decided that the McNabb rule was not intended as a penalty or sanction for violation of R.S.D.C. § 397, a commitment statute. The same conclusion applies to Rule 5, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”3
It is true that at one time, as when the Mitchell case 4 was before us, some members of this court, like some members of other Courts of Appeals, thought the Mc-Nabb rule must be rigidly defined to bar confessions received during a period of unlawful detention, irrespective of whether or not the detention produced the disclosures. Chief Judge Groner noted the distinction thus in Boone v. United States 5:
“But on appeal to the Supreme Court our view was rejected and the Supreme Court itself interpreted its language in the McNabb case wholly contrary to the position now taken by counsel for appellant in this case. In the Mitchell case the Supreme Court said, as it had said in the Mc-Nabb case, that inexcusable detention for the purpose of extracting evidence from the accused is both wrong and unlawful, but pointed out that while this is true, detention, standing alone, does not affect the admissibility of the confession except in a case in which it appears that the disclosure is induced by it. In short, that unlawful detention, without more, does not require rejection of a confession otherwise-admissible.”
After the Boone opinion had been written, we were again faced with the problem in Garner v. United States.6 There,, we reverted to our first interpretation of the so-called McNabb rule, thinking we were required to do so because of the-opinion in Upshaw v. United States, infra note 17, which was subsequent to our Boone case. We considered in the Garner opinion the applicability of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-which had become effective as of March-21, 1946. We decided that Rule 5(a)’ does not command that an arrested person be taken before a magistrate “forthwith,” 7 and that the Rule contemplates-, circumstances out of which there well' may be the possibility of necessary delay. It was decided that the delay in arraigning Garner was not unreasonable andi that the confession had been properly-received.8
While there were yet other cases raising comparable questions, both here and’ in other circuits, many, perhaps most of' them, have been cited in Tillotson v. United States9 and Watson v. United; States.10 Without further elaboration^ we come to Pierce v. United States.11 Once again we considered whether or not an illegal detention which did not induce-the accused to disclose his guilt made his-confession inadmissible. The opinion by *925Judge WILBUR K. MILLER explained the gradual crystallization of the true rule to govern such situations. Judge BAZELON concurred in the result, having reached the conclusion that the confession was not made either during or because of unnecessary delay in presenting the accused before a committing magistrate.
The question was again presented in Allen v. United States.12 Judge WILBUR K. MILLER wrote:
“For the reasons stated in Pierce v. United States * * * we think the McNabb rule * * * is that illegal detention before presentment to a committing magistrate, standing alone and without more, does not invalidate a confession made during its contimiance, unless the detention produced the disclosure.”13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Again Judge BAZELON concurred in the result since he found there had been no unnecessary delay in arraignment.
The rule of the Pierce and Allen cases has since been followed by this court, and, in essence, by other circuits.14
Some of our colleagues would strike down the Pierce and Allen cases. They read the McNabb case as commanding that result, not because of express language in the McNabb opinion, but by virtue of what someone says it says. Perhaps any such proposed test can be countered in like vein. For example, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: “Inexcusable detention for the purpose of illegally extracting evidence from an accused, and the successful extraction of such incul-patory statements by continuous questioning for many hours under psychological pressure, were the decisive features in the McNabb case which led us to rule that a conviction on such evidence could not stand.” 15 He added, having explained the Court’s own rationale, “We adhere to that decision and to the views on which it was based.”16 Again, in Upshaw v. United States,17 Mr. Justice Black pointed out that the accused had not been arraigned because the officer thought there was not a sufficient case for the court to hold him, and had he been arraigned, the officer would no longer have been able to question him. Thus, the confessions were the fruits of wrongdoing by the police since the petitioner had been “illegally detained for at least thirty hours for the very purpose of securing these challenged confessions. He thereby refutes any possibility of an argument that after arrest he was carried before a magistrate ‘without unnecessary delay.’ ”18
It may prove of interest to note that in the McNabb opinion the Court had said of the accused, “They were not brought before a United States Commissioner or a judge” 19 and again, “He was not taken before a United States Commissioner, or a judge.” 20 When the case went back for a new trial, the facts as to the time of arraignment were brought out. The Court of Appeals concluded that the record sustained a finding that the accused had been arraigned so that
“this circumstance is now out of the case and there is no substantial *926evidence that the confessions were elicited by means of illegal procedure. As pointed out in the Me-Nabb case, supra, 318 U.S. [at] page 346, 63 S.Ct. [at] page 615, 87 L. Ed. 819, ‘The mere fact that a confession was made while in the custody of the police does not render it inadmissible.’ This quotation was repeated in United States v. Mitch■ell, 64 S.Ct. 896, 899. The Mitchell •opinion embodies a clarification of its MeNabb opinion.
“We think that the circumstances in the present setting do not compel the exclusion of confessions upon the ground that they were involuntary.”' 21
’Thus the McNabbs were convicted, and •certiorari was denied.22
Judge PRETTYMAN and I are satisfied that since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the application of Rule 5 is to be governed by the Pierce and Allen cases. By applying, ■not disparaging, the rule to be deduced from Pierce and Allen, we have concluded that the conviction in this case must be reversed.
The record shows that the defense •voiced timely objection and moved to ex-elude the appellant’s allegedly inculpatory admissions. The trial judge properly conducted an extensive hearing out •of the presence of the jury. But it was the duty of the trial judge thereupon to ■determine preliminarily whether the motion to exclude should be granted or •denied,23 his ruling to depend upon the facts and circumstances shown, within the Pierce and Allen rule. Assuming, •without deciding, that there was no unnecessary delay in arraigning the appellant, there still remained the question of •whether or not “the detention produced the disclosure.” *
We are of the view that upon the face of events, the motion to exclude the admissions should have been granted. The record develops the setting thus:
Appellant had worked as a waitress on a night shift. She came home from work at about two o’clock on a Sunday morning and, according to her testimony, did some household chores, going to bed between three-thirty and four o’clock in the morning. She was alone in the apartment with her husband. At about six o’clock she aroused a neighbor with word that her husband had been stabbed. From then on she was in the custody of the police. What sleep she had had between four o’clock and six o’clock is a guess (she said she had none), but it could not have been more than two hours. She was questioned at intervals all day Sunday. She was twice given polygraph tests, each test lasting about an hour or an hour and a half, both being “inconclusive,” due to her distraught condition. She had no food, having declined lunch. Finally at about eight o’clock: Sunday evening she was taken to a room at the Women’s Bureau and went to bed. Sometime after one o’clock Monday morning she was aroused and taken downstairs to a witness room or conference room in the Women’s Bureau, and the questioning by police officers began. This questioning lasted about three-quarters of an hour, or possibly an hour. At this interview she is said to have confessed orally.
At no time was she warned that anything she said would be used against her, and at no time was she advised of her right to counsel. She at no time saw any of her family or friends.
At all times after early Sunday morning she was obviously the prime suspect in the case, having been alone in the apartment with her husband, having given the alarm, and having made conflict*927ing statements to the police from time to time. By her own statement she was always a material witness.
If we assume this woman had worked eight hours on the Saturday night shift and had been awake an hour prior to going to work, she had had no more than two hours’ sleep in twenty-seven hours when she went to bed at the Women’s Bureau Sunday evening.
It counters our experience and the teaching of the cases, to believe that the police can question such a person, distraught from the circumstances, without food, without rest, off and on from seven o’clock in the morning to eight o’clock at night, and then wake her in the middle of the night, take her out of bed to a conference room, question her again, without warning and without advice as to counsel, and then obtain inculpatory admissions, free from taint. There was no reason for not warning her or advising her of her right to counsel. There was in this case no reason for not booking her, either on probable cause for suspicion of murder or as a material witness.24 There was no conceivable reason for waking her up at one o’clock in the morning for further questioning except to get a confession or admissions before the morning hour arrived when the officers knew they would have to charge her before a committing magistrate. That the admissions were the product of her detention under the circumstances narrated, seems to us to be perfectly plain, and the disclosures fail to survive the interdiction of the Pierce and Allen rule. The failure of the trier so to rule requires that the conviction be reversed.25

. 1943, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819.

. 1955, 350 U.S. 949, 76 S.Ct. 324.

. United States v. Carignan, 1951, 342 U.S. 36, 42, 72 S.Ct. 97, 100, 96 L.Ed. 48.

. Mitchell v. United States, 1944, 78 U.S. App.D.C. 171, 138 E.2d 426, reversed 1944, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896.

. 1947, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 359, 360, 164 F. 2d 102, 103, citing United States v. Mitchell, 1944, 322 U.S. 65, 70, 64 S.Ct. 896.

. 1949, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 361, 363-364, 174 F.2d 499, 501-502, certiorari denied 1949, 337 U.S. 945, 69 S.Ct. 1502, 93 L. Ed. 1748.

. The notes in the files of the Supreme Court will disclose that the committee explored the possibilities of a rule requiring that an arraignment be immediate or that the accused be presented “forthwith” to a committing magistrate. These views were rejected, however, and as promulgated by the Supreme Court itself as of December 26, 1944, Rule 5(a) provides that the accused is to be taken before the nearest committing magistrate-“without unnecessary delay.”

. Certiorari was denied 1949, 337 U.S. 945, 69 S.Ct. 1502, 93 L.Ed. 1748.

. 1956, 97 U.S .App.D.C. 402, 231 F.2d 736, certiorari denied 1956, 351 U.S. 989, 76-S.Ct. 1055.

. 1956, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 234 F.2d. 42.

. 1952, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 19, 22, 197 F.2d 189, 192, certiorari denied 1952,. 344 U.S. 846, 73 S.Ct. 62, 97 L.Ed. 058..

. 1952, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 197, 202 E.2d 329, 334, certiorari denied 1952, 344 U.S. 809, 73 S.Ct. 112, 97 L.Ed. 674.

. Id., 91 U.S.App.D.C. at page 202, 202 F.2d at page 334.

. See cases collected in Tillotson v. United States, ubi, supra note 9.

. United States v. Mitchell, 1944, 322 U.S. 65, 67, 64 S.Ct. 896, 897, 88 L.Ed. 1140.

. Id., 322 U.S. at page 68, 64 S.Ct. at page 897.

. 1948, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 D.Ed. 100.

. Id., 335 U.S. at page 414, 69 S.Ct. at page 172.

. 318 U.S. at page 334, 63 S.Ct. at page 610; and see the memorandum upon denial of petition for rehearing. 1943, 319 U.S. 784, 63 S.Ct. 1322, 87 L.Ed. 1727.

. Id., 318 U.S. at page 337, 63 S.Ct. at page 611.

. 6 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 904, 907.

. 1944, 323 U.S. 771, 65 S.Ct. 114, 89 L.Ed. 616.

. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at page 346, 63 S.Ct. at page 616.

 It will be noted from the dissenting opinion by Judge WILBUR K. MILLER that he and Judges BASTIAN and BURGER are in accord with our views as to the MeNabb rule and the Pierce and Allen cases.

. D.O.Oode § 4-144 (1951) provides that material witnesses who are to be detained shall have suitable accommodations in premises other than those employed for the confinement of persons charged with crime.

. Watson v. United States, supra note 10.