Court Opinion

ID: 9487996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:33:18.41411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:37.535358
License: Public Domain

GUY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court that this case should be remanded in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in . United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993).
I respectfully dissent from the excessive fines analysis, however.
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[ejxcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” - U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In Austin v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993),- the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture actions. It left for the lower courts to determine, however, the appropriate test for determining whether a forfeiture is excessive in certain circumstances. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2812. The court noted in a footnote that, in his concurrence, Justice Sealia suggested that “the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture’s excessiveness is the relationship between the forfeited property and the offense.” Id. at - n. 15, 113 S.Ct. at 2812 n. 15 (citing id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2814-15). The Court did not adopt the Sca-lia view, however, and held instead: “We do not rule out the possibility that the connection between the property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of Austin’s property was excessive.” Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2812.
*1423This circuit has not addressed what factors are relevant in determining whether a forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment. Other circuits, however, have considered the issue. For example, the Fourth Circuit adopted an “instrumentality test” in United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1792, 131 L.Ed.2d 721 (1995). Under that test, the court must consider (1) the nexus between the offense and the property, (2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating the offending property from the remainder. In considering the first factor, the nexus between the offense and the property, the court should consider (a) the use of the property in the execution of the crime, whether it was deliberate and planned or incidental and fortuitous, (b) the importance of the property to the success of the illegal activity, (e) the time during which the property was used illegally and the spacial extent of the use, (d) whether the use was isolated or repeated, and (e) whether the property had a specific use for drug related activity or whether it was used for general purposes. Id. at 365.
Applying the Chandler test to the facts of this case, I would conclude the forfeiture was excessive. First, there is an insufficient nexus between the offense and the property. The facts shown in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party show two sales of marijuana in an amount not exceeding $75 being sold in Swallow’s home. A third sale of $20 worth of marijuana took place in the alley behind Swallow’s home ten days prior to these two sales, but the affidavit does not make clear whether the alley is part of Swallow’s property. In terms of drug quantities, no more than 3 to 4 ounces were involved. See Chandler, 36 F.3d at 361 (marijuana valued at $500-$600 per pound). Three to four ounces is easily carried on one’s person. Contrary to the government’s repeated assertions in its briefs, there is no evidence in the affidavit or elsewhere indicating that any marijuana was stored at Swallow’s home.
The use of the property by the claimant under these facts appears to be incidental. The police initiated the purchases. The two times that the confidential informant purchased marijuana in Swallow’s home, the confidential informant approached Swallow to purchase marijuana while Swallow was at his home. When Swallow was not in his home, the sale was consummated in the alley behind his house.
The property was the situs of illegal activity for only a very brief time. The home was implicated in two purchases taking place on two consecutive days. The drugs might well have been on Swallow’s person the entire time. No search warrant was issued in this case. This ease is distinguishable from eases where property is used for storage. See, e.g., Chandler, 36 F.3d at 361 (one to two pounds of marijuana in basement, bales of marijuana in garage).
The property was used for normal residential purposes as Swallow’s home. No drugs were found stored in the home. Swallow had no role in selecting the place of the drug purchases. The police, in coordination with the confidential informant, arranged for the purchases to take place at Swallow’s home. Under the Chandler test, the forfeiture of Swallow’s home would be excessive given these facts.
In United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir.1994), the Eighth Circuit refused to decide whether the seizure of claimant Long’s property violated the Excessive Fines Clause, since it dismissed the action on due process grounds. The court noted, however, that it disagreed with the district court’s adoption of Justice Scalia’s relationship test: “the test applied by the district court is inadequate because it conflates the Eight Amendment excessive fine analysis with the section 881(a)(7) nexus requirement.” 27 F.3d at 330. The court indicated that the Eighth Amendment requires a broader analysis. Relevant factors the court suggested might include “the monetary value of the property, the extent of criminal activity associated with the property, the fact that the property was a residence, [and] the effect of forfeiture on innocent occupants” among others. Id. at 330-31.
The Eighth Circuit’s consideration of monetary value of the property suggests a pro*1424portionality analysis, an approach criticized by the Fourth Circuit in Chandler, see 36 F.3d at 365,1 but adopted by some courts. E.g., United States v. R.R. No. 1 Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 874-75 (3rd Cir.1994); United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F.Supp. 725, 732-33 (C.D. Cal.1994).
In the case at bar, the district court applied in part a proportionality analysis. The court compared the value of the property forfeited, estimated by the government to be $83,700, with the nature of the offense. In addressing the offense, the court referred to the possible punishment that Swallow could have received, given his prior convictions, were he prosecuted under federal law: imprisonment of up to ten years and a potential fine of $500,000 on each count. (App. at 54.) The court then added together Swallow’s actual fine of $6,000 and the value of his house, $83,700, and concluded that the forfeiture penalty was “not disproportionate to the severity of the offenses when viewed in light of the penalty [Swallow] could have received under federal law for those offenses.” (App. at 54-55.)
The district court’s comparison to the potential fine of $500,000 is unrealistic. Swallow has not been prosecuted under any federal law. Even if he were prosecuted successfully, the likelihood, under these facts, that he would receive such a fine is, for all practical purposes, non-existent.
The parties ask this court to adopt a multi-factor test similar to the one developed in Zumirez Drive. That test includes the following factors: “(i) the inherent gravity of the offense compared with the harshness of the penalty; (ii) whether the property was an integral part of the commission of the crime; and (iii) whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or' spatial use.” 845 F.Supp. at 732.
I agree with the majority that this is not the case in which we should attempt to adopt a test for this circuit. For myself, I would prefer to see the district courts continue to use a case-by-case approach applying what they deem to be the relevant factors under the facts presented. Given the large volume of forfeitures nationwide, the likelihood is great that we will be receiving further guidance from the Supreme Court.

. The Chandler court pointed out that there is no history of a proportionality principle under the Excessive Fines Clause. 36F.3dat365. Rather, that principle has traditionally been associated with the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Id. The proportionality test prohibits sentences that are "disproportionate to the crime committed.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006, 77 L.Ed,2d 637 (1983) (life imprisonment without parole for offender who committed seventh non-violent felony by uttering a 'no account' check in the amount of $100 constituted cruel and unusual punishment). The Solem Court devised a three-part test that has been widely used in constitutional proportionality analysis, considering: “1) the inherent gravity of the offense, 2) the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction, and 3) sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 36 F.3d at 365 (citing 463 U.S. at 290-91, 103 S.Ct. at 3010).
Recent cases question the applicability of a proportionality principle to the Eighth Amendment at all. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the proportionality principle did not exist in the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 962-94, 111 S.Ct. at 2684-86. In a separate opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, limited the scope of Solem, stating that the Eighth Amendment only forbids "extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. at 2705. Given there is no history of a proportionality principle under the Excessive Fines Clause, and § 881(a)(7) does not limit the value of property subject to forfeiture, the Chandler court rejected the application of the principle to forfeiture analysis.