Court Opinion

ID: 9819351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:23:23.571845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:57.380668
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SLATER, dissenting: The majority acknowledges that subsections 607(b)(1) and (b)(3) of the Marriage Act, which authorize grandparent visitation, were intended to supercede the common law pertaining to grandparent visitation. The majority also recognizes that those statutory provisions were held unconstitutional in Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d 309, 769 N.E.2d 1, as interfering with a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions about his child. The majority even admits that “the constitutional principles outlined in Wickham apply to grandparent visitation in general.” 344 Ill. App. 3d at 348. Yet the majority nevertheless concludes that grandparent visitation is authorized under the common law. Surely, the majority is not suggesting that the courts may, under the guise of common law, do what has been explicitly disallowed by Wickham? The visitation agreement in this case was entered into based on a void statute and is therefore also void. It infringes on Johnson’s fundamental right to raise his child and cannot be retroactively legitimized by reliance on resurrected common law principles. I dissent.