Court Opinion

ID: 9731469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:46:39.126212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.407105
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Chief Judge,
with whom MACK, Senior Judge, joins, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
In my view the majority correctly concludes that the court has jurisdiction to decide whether or not the Department of Human Rights has unlawfully withheld from Ms. Timus her right to a hearing before the Human Rights Commission under D.C.Code § 1-2560 (Repl.1992).1 See D.C.Code § 1-1510(a)(2) (Repl.1992). Specifically, I join Part III of the majority’s opinion (except for the last sentence), see supra 756-758 concluding that the court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction and to determine whether Regulation 716.9 (38 D.C. Reg. 6917 (1986)) is valid.2
With regal'd to Regulation 716.9, the Department of Human Rights acted, in my view, beyond its authority in promulgating it. As supplemented herein, Judge Mack’s opin*772ion for the division sets forth the reasoning for the conclusion that the make-whole regulation is invalid. See infra opinion of Senior Judge Mack. To conclude that the regulation is valid, see supra Part IV of the majority opinion, is to grant to the Department powers beyond the limited rule-making authority delegated to it by the legislature.3 To' require the Department to develop objective standards for application of Regulation 716.9, as Judge Ferren proposes, would accomplish nothing since it could not give validity to the rule promulgated without authority. See supra opinion of Judge Ferren at 763. Moreover, the rule is drafted in contravention to the legislative scheme to encourage (but not compel) efforts to conciliate by protecting the confidentiality of such efforts.4 Rather, in my view, because the words used in the D.C. Human Rights Act evince the intent to authorize voluntary conciliation, the Department of Human Rights was without authority to promulgate a regulation that would deny an administrative remedy to a complainant who declines to accept a make-whole offer by the respondent during conciliation efforts under D.C.Code § 1-2546 after the Department has found probable cause to believe that the complaint states a claim of unlawful discrimination in violation of the statute.
The court must apply the plain meaning of the language used in the statute, applying to the words “their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.” See Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (“The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he [or she] has used”) (citations omitted). The language of the provision on conciliation in the Human Rights Act authorizes the Department “at any time after the filing of the complaint, [to] endeavor to eliminate such unlawful discriminatory practice by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.” D.C.Code § l-2546(a). An endeavor entails effort but not necessarily success; it is an attempt, no more and no less. See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985 ed.) at 410. By use of the word “endeavor,” the legislature directed the Department to make attempts to bring about the informal resolution of complaints of discrimination. It also specified the means — by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. These are words of reconciliation. By using these terms, the Council indicated that the resolution process should be conducted on terms that are agreeable to the parties. See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, supra, at 272 (“conciliate” means “to gain (as goodwill) by pleasing acts”; “to make compatible: reconcile”; “appease”; from the Latin word meaning “to assemble, unite, win over”).
There is nothing to indicate that the legislature vested power in the Department to force a complainant, upon penalty of loss of an administrative remedy, to conciliate a discrimination complaint for which the Department has found probable cause. The statutory provision on conciliation refers only to such requirements as may be placed on the respondent. See D.C.Code § 1-2546(b). The same statutory provision expressly provides, moreover, that only “[u]pon agreement of all the parties to a complaint ... [shall] a conciliation agreement ... be deemed an order of the Commission, and shall be enforced as such.” Id. § 1-2546(c). Furthermore, in giving rule-making authority to the Office and the Commission the legislature expressly limited that authority in order to ensure that rules and policies did not conflict with the statute. Id. § 1-2541(c), supra note 2. Forced conciliation is a concept that is foreign to the statutory language.
In addition, the legislative history makes clear that the legislature contemplated voluntary, not forced, conciliation. See Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, supra, *773470 A.2d at 753. The legislative report stated that:
The benefits of administrative handling of civil law are to provide an opportunity for settlement of complaints voluntarily before the hearing and to bring about more rapid compliance with the law by offering an alternative to lengthy court proceedings. We believe the establishment of administrative hearings to be vital to the success of enforcing Title 34 [codified as D.C. Code §§ 1-2501 through 2557 (Repl.1992 & Supp.1993) ].
District of Columbia City Council Committee on Education and Youth Affairs, Legislative Report on Title 34, the Human Rights Law, at 2 (October 15, 1973). See also infra note 13. The majority ignores this statement of legislative intent.
Had the legislature intended to deny an administrative remedy to a complainant who refused to accept what the Department determined was a make-whole offer after it had made a favorable probable cause determination, the legislature could easily have said so. Yet, the legislature said nothing about a “make-whole” offer.5 Instead, it only authorized the Department to “endeavor” to conciliate complaints of discrimination; it provided specifically that conciliation occurs only when there is agreement of the parties and that when there is no agreement between the parties, an administrative hearing should be afforded to the alleged victim of discrimination. By so defining conciliation, the legislature indicated that the determination of whether their differences could be successfully settled through conciliation lies in the control of the parties and not the Department of Human Rights.
Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, the “failure of conciliation efforts,” as that phrase is used in § 1-2550, cannot mean more than that the parties were unable to agree to settle them dispute without further governmental involvement. See Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, supra, 470 A.2d at 754 (construe statute in context of legislative scheme) (citation omitted). The option that the statute leaves to the Department — to decide whether to issue a notice of public hearing before any conciliation efforts are attempted or only after conciliation efforts have been attempted and failed — does not transform the voluntary nature of the conciliation process itself. There is no ambiguity here. Significantly, the legislature chose language that refers to a failure of “efforts” and not to a failure of conciliation, a distinction suggesting, as in § l-2546(a), that the legislature recognized both the desirability of voluntary settlement and also the likelihood that such efforts would not always succeed, thereby giving rise, where probable cause has been found, to the need for a hearing before the Commission. See supra note 1.
The dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Regulation 716.9 for failure to accept a make-whole offer should not be confused with dismissals for administrative convenience pursuant to § l-2556(a). The legislature gave the Department express authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause for a complaint of unlawful discrimination and when to dismiss a complaint for administrative convenience. D.C.Code §§ l-2545(b), - 2556(a). In its attempt to justify its dismissal of the instant complaint, the Department’s concerns about weeding out frivolous complaints and controlling its workload have a hollow ring.6 Indeed, the Department, in *774following the legislative directive of § 1-2545, has defined what it has determined to be a dismissal for administrative convenience.7 Such dismissals do not, according to the Department’s regulation, include dismissals for failure to accept make-whole offers under Regulation 716.9. See Dankman v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, 443 A.2d 507, 513 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (agency is obligated to follow its own regulations).8
Although the Department has authority to dismiss a complaint for administrative convenience under § l-2556(a), that is not what it purported to do in dismissing Ms. Timus’ complaint. The Department repeatedly informed Ms. Timus that the dismissal of her complaint was based on her failure to accept the respondent’s offer, which, notwithstanding her contrary view, the Department deemed would make her whole. This is clear from the Department’s correspondence with Ms. Timus.9 It is also clear from the Department’s own regulation and its Notice of Conciliation.10 An internal departmental memorandum further indicates that the Department also did not treat a failure of conciliation as the conclusion of the administrative process.11 The court is bound by the reasons that the Department gave for dismissing Ms. Timus’ complaint and cannot deem an agency dismissal for one purpose to be a dismissal for another. See Jones v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 519 A.2d 704, 709 (D.C.1987); opinion of the majority, supra, at 760 n. 12. Under the circumstances, since the Department did not pur*775port to dismiss Ms. Timus’ complaint for administrative convenience and it had no authority to penalize conciliation, there is no occasion for deference by the court to the administrative interpretation of the statute as reflected in Regulation 716.9. See James Parreco & Son v. Rental Housing Comm’n, 567 A.2d 43, 48 (D.C.1989) (citing Totz v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm’n, 412 A.2d 44, 46 (D.C.1980)); infra note 15; supra note 8.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the en banc court is construing the civil rights statute of the District of Columbia. The elected representatives of the District of Columbia expressly determined that the elimination of unlawful discrimination is of “the highest priority.” D.C.Code § 1-2501 (Repl. 1992).12 Indeed, so important did the legislature view the human rights provisions that it enacted the law twice.13 Consequently, the court must take great care in construing the words of the statute in order to assure that Ms. Timus’ statutory right to relief (and, consequently, the rights of others who hereafter seek administrative relief from unlawful discrimination) is protected in accordance with the statute enacted by the Council. Cf. JBG Prop., Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 364 A.2d 1183, 1185 (D.C.1976) (“The Human Rights Law in the District of Columbia was enacted to aid not only an individual complainant, but also the public at large”); Motorola Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir.1973) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (employment discrimination viewed in terms of “systems” and “effects” rather than intentional wrongs by individuals)). The majority’s creation of ambiguity, based on an assumed willingness of the complainant to conciliate, see majority opinion at 15, ignores both statutory language and purpose. See D.C.Code § 1-2501 (statutory purpose), -2544(a) (who may file a complaint), -2553(a) (scope of relief that the Commission may order).
As her appeal is decided by a majority of the en banc court, however, Ms. Timus is denied an administrative remedy before the Commission unless she successfully pursues timely and costly litigation in which she faces the burden of persuading a trial court judge that the Department erred in applying Regulation 716.9 in her ease. That is a formidable burden in light of the views expressed by at least a majority of the court.14 Alternatively, according to a majority of the court, she can file suit de novo in the trial court.15 Preter*776mitting the prejudice that has accrued to both parties as a result of years of delay in the resolution of the complaint,16 the majority does not clarify whether such a lawsuit would be barred by the statute of limitations and, hence, Ms. Timus would be confronted with our decision in Anderson v. U.S. Safe Deposit Co., 552 A.2d 859, 862-63 (D.C.1989) (statute of limitations); see D.C. Code § 1-2556(a). The parties, therefore, face the prospect of still further delay and litigation to settle that issue in court before, perhaps, reaching the merits of her complaint. One judge would also allow Ms. Timus to seek further relief before the agency by further challenging the Department’s application of its make-whole regulation to her case, thereafter returning again to this court with the subsequent possibility of obtaining a hearing before the Commission. See infra opinion of Judge Ferren at Part II.
Future litigants seeking relief from unlawful discrimination may face similarly daunting prospects of delay and costly litigation, all because Regulation 716.9 has recast the voluntary conciliation provided by the statute into a means of denying administrative relief. The administrative delay experienced by Ms. Timus and the respondent and the procedural road ahead in the courts are far removed from the statutory scheme contemplated by the Council. See indented quotation, supra at 772-773. The rationality of a human rights statutory scheme based on voluntary conciliation in the administrative process is abundantly clear where the intent of the legislature is to promote the elimination of unlawful discrimination, and not more court litigation, in the Nation’s capital. In my view, this is another reason why the Council’s intent is clear and Regulation 716.9 is invalid.
Accordingly, I concur in holding that the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of Regulation 716.9, I respectfully dissent from the holding that Regulation 716.9 is valid, and I would remand the case to the Department with instructions to issue the notice of hearing pursuant to § 1-2550.
APPENDIX
Opinion of Senior Judge Mack of March 20, 1992, before the Division.
MACK, Senior Judge:
Petitioner challenges the dismissal on March 21, 1990, by the Department of Human Rights,1 formerly the Office of Human Rights (OHR), of her complaint of discrimination filed on December 5, 1986, against Davis, Inc., a local real estate management company. The complaint, which triggered an investigation and finding by OHR of “probable cause” (to believe that Davis, Inc. had committed an act of discrimination by refusing rental accommodations to petitioner), see *777D.C.Code § l~2545(a), (b) (1987 Repl.), was subsequently dismissed on the ground that petitioner had refused to accept a “make-whole” offer2 of conciliation advanced by Davis, Inc. In this court, petitioner specifically contends that the dismissal by OHR was contrary to law. The government counters that we are without jurisdiction to review this petition and, that in any event, the dismissal by OHR must be affirmed as an act of prosecutorial discretion. We find that the challenged order of dismissal is both reviewable and reversible.
I
Any discussion of the jurisdictional and substantive issues presented here must be' cast in the light of the statutory scheme and, of course, the facts.
Among the discriminatory acts prohibited by the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-2501, -2557 (1987 Repl. & 1991 Supp.), is that of rejecting a prospective tenant in a rental transaction because a child resides with such prospective tenant. See D.C.Code §§ 1-2515, -2502 (30) (1987 Repl. & 1991 Supp.). An aggrieved individual may elect to file a complaint with OHR or in any court of competent jurisdiction. See D.C.Code §§ 1-2554(a), -2556 (1987 Repl. & 1991 Supp.). See also Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392 (D.C.1991). The filing of a complaint with the OHR constitutes an election of remedies, Brown v. Capitol Hill Club, 425 A.2d 1309, 1311 (D.C.1981), and may be voluntarily withdrawn by the complainant at any time prior to the investigation and findings by OHR with respect to jurisdiction and probable cause. D.C.Code §§ 1-2544(b), -2545 (1987 Repl.). If OHR finds it lacks jurisdiction, or that there is no probable cause to believe that the respondent has engaged in unlawful discrimination, the Director must issue an order dismissing the complaint. D.C.Code § 1-2545(c) (1987 Repl.). When, however, the OHR finds the existence of probable cause, either in advance of conciliation attempts or upon the failure of such attempts (a discretionary approach with OHR), it “shall” issue and serve in the name of the Human Rights Commission3 a notice of hearing. Id. at §§ 1-2546, -2550.
Thus, under the statutory scheme, once an aggrieved person elects to cast his or her lot with the administrative route, the processing of the complaint remains in the pipeline to the hearing stage (1) unless the OHR dismisses after a finding of no probable cause, or (2) unless the aggrieved has voluntarily and timely withdrawn the complaint, or (3) unless the agency dismisses for “administrative convenience” (in which case as to numbered events (2) and (3), the right to bring suit in a court of competent jurisdiction is restored). See id. § 1-2556. In the instant case, not one of these events has occurred. Petitioner has not voluntarily withdrawn her complaint; the dismissal by OHR was not for administrative convenience nor was it one mandated by statute after a finding of no probable cause. Rather, OHR dismissed the complaint after a finding of probable cause on the ground that this complainant refused to accept a proposal offered by the alleged discriminator as a remedy.4
II
It is this action that underlies the basis for our judicial review. As we have pointed out, *778the language of the Human Rights Act mandates that once OHR finds probable cause to exist and after conciliation, if initiated, has failed, the Office must proceed to lay the ground-work for a trial-type hearing in the name of the Commission. Instead, here OHR dismissed the complaint. This it could not legally do. This dismissal was the “legal wrong” conferring jurisdiction for review purposes to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals within the meaning of the Human Rights Act and the District of Columbia Administrative Procedures Act.5 See Donnelly Associates v. District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board, 620 A.2d 270, 276 (D.C.1987).
To hold otherwise would leave complainants without protection against “absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action [of an administration agency] whose action is unauthorized by any law and is in violation of the rights of the individual.” We rejected such an approach in Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, supra, 597 A.2d at 398 (citing American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110, 23 S.Ct. 33, 39, 47 L.Ed. 90 (1902)). In Simpson, in reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to an administrative record showing a finding of “no probable cause,” we stated, “We find implausible the notion that the Council of the District of Columbia intended to empower an administrative officer to doom to perpetual oblivion a complaint of unlawful discrimination, without his or her order being subject to any judicial review whatever.” Simpson, supra, 597 A.2d at 390. The implausibility is even more apparent in the instant case where the administrative agency has made a finding that probable cause exists to believe that an individual has been the subject of discrimination. The net result of such a policy would deny the individual not only judicial review but the due process right to a trial-like hearing which the statute provides.6
Respondent, therefore, can gain no mileage from the argument that the Human Rights Act is modelled on the National Labor Relations Act, and that therefore the courts will not review a decision in which OHR merely exercises its “prosecutorial discretion.” See id. (citing Hourihan v. NLRB, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 316, 201 F.2d 187 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930, 73 S.Ct. 792, 97 L.Ed. 1359 (1953)). To the extent that OHR found probable cause, it has exercised its discretion. It does not have discretion thereafter to dismiss the complaint unless it had purported to act (which it did not) on the ground of administrative convenience. See Brown v. Capitol Hill Club, supra, 425 A.2d at 1312. Moreover, the broad argument that OHR (and its successor) have total control of the “prosecution” of cases administratively filed is antithetical to the enforcement of a civil rights act. In this regard, we need only look to the language, the history, and the case law of our federal civil rights statute (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103), undeniably a model for purposes of administration and enforcement of the local statute. See Education and Youth Affairs Committee, District of Columbia Council, Legislative Report on Title 34, The Human Rights Law at 1 (October 15, 1973). Indeed, under the original statutory scheme of the federal statute (the 1964 Act), the Equal Employment Opportuni*779ty Commission (EEOC) had no power to prosecute the charges filed with it but only the option of investigating and attempting conciliation with the party it found cause to believe was engaging in a discriminatory practice.7 See generally Equal Employment Opportunity — Responsibilities. Rights, Remedies (John Pemberton, Jr., ed.) (Practising Law Institute 1975). Once the respondent failed to reach an agreement with EEOC, EEOC issued to the aggrieved a “right to sue notice,” which quickly led to the characterization of aggrieved persons as “private attorney generals.” See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). Thus, the federal statute from the beginning put ultimate control in the hands of the complainants and the courts and this policy continued after the statute was amended to give EEOC the right to sue in its own name. See Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 365-66, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) (under this title, the provisions allow the aggrieved person to select a remedy in the courts where there is inaction, dalliance or dismissal of the charge by the agency, or unsatisfactory resolution); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912, 91 S.Ct. 2219, 29 L.Ed.2d 689 (1971) (in order for the complainant to have his or her day in court, the Commission need not actually engage in conciliation); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F.Supp. 891, 893 (D.Me.1970) (complainants are not to be denied their day in court due to administrative delay or inability to accomplish conciliation); and 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 48.80 at 9A-97 (1982) (“conciliation proceedings can be by-passed by an individual”).
The act of “conciliation” by its very terms implies pacifying — not enforcing. Conciliation is an integral part of both our federal and local statutes but it is not an indispensable part. Our Human Rights Act, like its federal counterpart, encourages conciliation, but if conciliation fails, a complainant must have a right to pursue his charge in an appropriate adjudicatory forum.
Ill
In this case, the error on the part of OHR stems from its adoption of regulations which do not comport with the statutory scheme on the Human Rights Act. Thus, the statutory provision places with the OHR “[i]f ... the circumstances so warrant” the option of endeavoring to eliminate a discriminatory practice “by conference, conciliation or persuasion.” D.C.Code § 1-2546(a) (1987 Repl.). The terms of any conciliation agreement may require a “respondent” to refrain from committing such practices or to take affirmative action, and may include consent by the “respondent” to the entry in a court of a consent decree. See id. § 1-2546. These conciliation provisions make no reference to the complainant.
The statute also provides that in the event of failure of conciliation, or in advance of conciliation efforts, and after a finding of probable cause, the OHR shall issue “a written notice, together with a copy of the complaint,” requiring the respondent to answer the charges at a public hearing before the Commission sitting as an adjudicatory body. Id. at § 1-2550.
By contrast, OHR’s regulations speak of notice to the parties “of an opportunity to settle” and “inviting the parties to conciliate the complaint.” See 33 D.C.Reg. 6916, 6917 (1986) (to be codified at 4 DCMR §§ 716.1, 716.10 respectively). With respect to the failure of conciliation, the regulations describe such failure as occurring when respondent refuses to participate or offers a remedy that will not make the complainant whole “and complainant refuses to accept such an offer.” 33 D.C.Reg. 6917 (1986) (to be codified at 4 DCMR § 716.11). The basic prob*780lem arises, however, with the promulgation of 33 D.C.Reg. 6917 (1986) (to be codified at 4 DCMR § 716.9) which goes one step further to provide that
If during conciliation efforts, respondent offers a remedy that would place complainant in the same position that complainant would have been in had the alleged discriminatory practice not occurred, and complainant refuses to accept such offer, and if the Director determines that such offered remedy would make complainant whole, the Director may order the complaint dismissed.
(Emphasis added.)
In so doing, OHR has conferred upon itself the authority to dismiss a complaint after finding that probable cause exists and after conciliation efforts have begun. There exists no statutory authority for this regulation. The Act authorizes OHR to dismiss a complaint only either upon finding no probable cause, 33 D.C.Reg. 6918 (1986) (to be codified at 4 DCMR § 718.1), or “on the grounds of administrative convenience.” 33 D.C. Reg. 6912 (1986) (to be codified as 4 DCMR § 708.1). Where conciliation efforts have failed, OHR must proceed with the issuance of a notice of a hearing. 33 D.C. Reg. 6918 (1986) (to be codified as 4 DCMR § 717.2). To do otherwise would deny a petitioner the right to develop proof under protective procedures which the statute affords.
The statute authorizes OHR to endeavor to resolve disputes through conciliation. The statute does not authorize OHR to force settlements on complainants by threatening to dismiss their complaints. While OHR may have intended by its regulation to further encourage settlements, good intentions are no substitute for statutory authority. The statute is geared to first ferreting out discrimination and, second, to fashioning remedies for that discrimination. OHR, having determined that probable cause existed to believe unlawful discrimination had occurred, had no authority to dismiss petitioner’s complaint without a hearing on the merits.

Reversed and remanded.

. The hearing before the Commission may be a hearing before a hearing examiner, who, in turn, will file a report of findings with the Commission. See Stevens Chevrolet v. Commission on Human Rights, 498 A.2d 546, 548 (D.C.1985); D.C.Code § 1-2551(a). At the time Ms. Timus filed her complaint, the Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development was called the Office of Human Rights. See Mayor's Order 89-247, November 1, 1989 (renaming Office). In this opinion, all references are to the Department of Human Rights or the Department.

. Because, in my view. Regulation 716.9 is invalid, I need not reach the issue posed by the last sentence of the majority’s opinion nor address the jurisdictional issue raised in Part 111(b) Judge Ferren’s opinion regarding jurisdiction to consider the regulation as applied. However, I agree with Judge Ferren’s critique of Judge Steadman’s opinion. See supra opinion of Judge Ferren at 770 n. 8.

. See D.C.Code § l-2541(c) (Department of Human Rights and Commission "may ... promulgate ... such rules and procedures as they deem necessary to effectuate and which are not in conflict with, the provisions of this chapter”).

. See D.C.Code § l-2546(c) (the Department "shall not make public, without the written consent of the respondent, information concerning conciliation efforts”); § 1 — 2552(d) ("[e]fforts at conciliation by the [Department], or the parties, shall not be received in evidence” before the Commission or hearing examiner).

. The legislature could simply have provided that the Department may dismiss a complaint upon the complainant’s refusal to accept a make-whole offer, even after a finding of probable cause. This would make the District's statute more like the federal civil rights statute. In 1992, on the federal scheme, regulations were issued addressed to the failure of an aggrieved party to accept a "make-while” offer. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.18 (1992). The regulations make it crystal clear, however, that when a charge was dismissed for such a reason, the federal commission must issues a right-to-sue notice to the party claiming to be aggrieved. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.-28(b)(2). However, the D.C. Human Rights Act may tie a complainant (as it has in the instant case) to an administrative remedy. The conciliation provision in the District’s statute clearly shows that the legislature did not intend to foreclose relief to a party engaged in administrative conciliation who did not accept an offer. See D.C.Code § 1 — 2546(b). When conciliation fails, a hearing is required.

. See petition of the Department of Human Rights for rehearing en banc at 2, 8, & 9 ("The panel majority allows a claimant alleging discrimination to force the [Department] of Human *774Rights and the Commission of Human Rights to commit scarce resources to litigation even though the claimant can get all the relief she could reasonably hope for in litigation through conciliation”; "[t]he costs in unnecessarily expending the resources of the [Department] ... and the Commission clearly outweigh the benefits of permitting litigation to continue in these circumstances"; the panel majority “will require the government to waste very scarce resources because of the mere whim of a complainant, thus burdening the process for all claimants”).

. Regulation 708.1 (33 D.C.Reg. 6912 (1986)), provides that “[a] case shall be terminated without prejudice if the complainant submits a written request to withdraw the complaint, or for the following administrative reasons”: (1) the complainant is absent or cannot be contacted by the [Department], (2) the complainant fails to proceed, (3) the complainant fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or (4) the [Department] lacks jurisdiction. See Honig v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 388 A.2d 887, 888 (D.C.1978) (Department has prosecutorial discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction over a complaint).

. See also Carroll v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 487 A.2d 622, 623 (D.C.1985) (party before administrative agency has due process right to notice of rules and procedures that bind the agency); Ammerman v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm’n, 375 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C.1977) (same).

. In a letter of March 22, 1990, the Director of the Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development informed Ms. Timus that her case "has been administratively closed ... pursuant to § 716.9 ... 33 [D.C.Reg.] 6909.” This letter referred to the Department's March 7, 1990, letter, which likewise stated that "pursuant to Section 716.9 ... 33 [D.C.Reg.] 6909 (1981), the [Department] has the authority to dismiss the Complaint after Respondent offers a make-whole remedy and the Complainant rejects the same.” Likewise by letter of July 12, 1988, the Department had advised Ms. Timus that her complaint would be subject to dismissal under Section 716.9 if she rejected the respondent's make-whole offer.

. Regulation 708.1 does not provide that a dismissal for administrative convenience includes a dismissal for refusal to accept a make-whole offer under Regulation 716.9. See supra note 7. The "Notice of Conciliation Process,” dated February 11, 1988, stating that probable cause has been found, "invites the parties to join in a collective effort toward a just resolution of this matter,” and provides that the respondent’s “failure to respond ... will result in this [Department] processing the case for a public hearing in the District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, as provided in ... D.C.Code, Section 1-2546(a) (1981).” The Notice further states that "if conciliation is not accomplished within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of this letter, the subject case will be scheduled for public hearing.” See Regulation 716.10, (33 D.C.Reg. 6917 (1986)) (from receipt of notice, 30 days for conciliation).

. The internal memorandum indicates that the Department acknowledged Ms. Timus' right to a hearing upon the failure of conciliation under Regulation 716.11. By memorandum of February 8, 1990, a staff member advised the Associate Director of the Department of Human Rights that conciliation efforts had failed because the respondent failed to make “the original offer of an apartment” and the complainant still wanted an apartment, and therefore "recommend[ed] that the above case be certified to the Commission for hearing.” (emphasis added)

. See Council of the District of Columbia Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs, Report ofBill2-179, "The Human Rights Act of 1977," at 3 (July 5, 1977) ("Enactment of Title 34’s provisions as the 'Human Rights Act' would underscore the Council’s intent that the elimination of discrimination within the District of Columbia should have 'the highest priority’....”).

. See Report of the Council of the District of Columbia Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs, supra, at 1:
"Bill 2-179 [The Human Rights Act of 1977] makes no substantive changes in the text of present Title 34 of the D.C. Rules and Regulations, the 'Human Rights Law.’ Its sole effect is to enact that law as a statute and thus make it a permanent part of the District of Columbia Code. Enactment would serve three basic purposes: ... (2) reenforcement of the Council’s view that the Human Rights Act is among our most important laws and is to be vigorously enforced by all agencies and officials of the District Government.’’
The Committee noted that "in several court cases serious questions have been arised concerning the power of the pre-Home Rule District Government to authorize some of the remedies contained in Title 34.” Id. at 2. Recommitting itself to the statutory scheme in Title 34 by "putting] our human rights law on a firm legal footing,” the Committee explained that such questions “severely weaken the effectiveness of our Human Rights Law, particularly as regards its 'private attorney general’ enforcement by victims of discrimination. If those questions are not effectively answered, the District of Columbia might thus find itself in the ironic position of having a law which is widely hailed as the most comprehensive of its kind in the nation yet is lacking in enforcement mechanisms.” Id.

. See supra Parts IV and V of the majority opinion. See also supra opinion of Judge Ferren at Part II.

. This alternative became clear only before the en banc court when the Department advised the court, for the first time, that it interpreted its dismissal of Ms. Timus’ complaint for failure to accept a make-whole offer under Regulation 716.9 to be a dismissal for administrative convenience under D.C.Code § 1-2556(a). See petition for rehearing en banc by the Department of Human Rights at 6. See infra opinion of Senior Judge Mack for the division majority at 778 ("the dismissal by OHR was not for administrative *776convenience”). Before the division, Ms. Timus advised that she was of the view that her complaint was not subject to a de novo hearing in any court. See majority opinion at 755 ("Director informed petitioner ... that the case was being 'administratively closed’ pursuant to § 716.9 ... because of her failure to ... accept! ] the settlement offer"). This recently disclosed interpretation should give the en banc court pause. See Keating v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 354-55, 927 F.2d 616, 625-26 (1991) ("argument [that section of statute found to be controlling has no application because permit issued is not a “permit” within meaning of the statute] comes too late, for it presents an entirely new theory of this case which cannot be appropriately raised on a petition for rehearing"; throughout the proceedings the state never disputed that the permit was within statute; hence, "the argument is waived and we decline to reopen the matter now”). The majority’s effort to ignore the problem and rationalize the Department's new theory, see majority opinion at 760 n. 12, is unpersuasive in light of the Department’s previous position before the court and the regulations promulgated by the Department.

. The court has acknowledged that delay in administrative proceedings may be cause for dismissal. See, e.g., Wisconsin Ave. Nursing Home v. District of Columbia Comm’n on Human Rights, 527 A.2d 282, 285-86 (D.C.1987); JBG Prop., Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, supra, 364 A.2d at 1186. See also Regulation 716.10, supra note 10 (period for conciliation is 30 days from receipt of notice of invitation to conciliate).

. The District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development was created by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1989. See 36 D.C. Reg. 6305 (1989); Mayor’s Order No. 89-247, 36 D.C. Reg. 7847 (1989). The Reorganization Plan abolished OHR and transferred all of its functions to the new department. For the purpose of convenience, the term "OHR” is used throughout this opinion.

. See p. Ill & n. 4 infra.

. Three Commission members, or designated Hearing Examiners sit as a hearing tribunal to perform an adjudicatory service in conformance with procedures promulgated pursuant to the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act. See D.C.Code § 1-2551 (1987 Repl.).

. After determining that probable cause existed to believe petitioner had been discriminated against, OHR notified the parties that if conciliation was not achieved, the matter would be resolved by a trial-type hearing. An offer of conciliation, which OHR considered an adequate remedy or a "make-whole” offer, was forwarded to petitioner. Petitioner made a series of inquiries regarding the terms of the offer and declined to accept it until her questions were answered. The answers provided by OHR to petitioner’s questions were unsatisfactory to her. Subsequently, OHR presented petitioner with an ultimatum: if petitioner refused to accept the "make-whole” offer, OHR would dismiss the complaint. Petitioner made more inquiries, but did not accept the offer. Subsequently, OHR dismissed the complaint. Petitioner then filed this petition for judicial review.

. D.C.Code § 1-2554 of the Human Rights Act provides that:
[a]ny person suffering a legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved by, an order or decision of the Commission in a matter, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter is entitled to judicial review thereof, in accordance with § 1-1510 [i.e., the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act], upon filing in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, a written petition for such review.
D.C.Code § 1-1510 of the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act states in relevant part that:
[a]ny person suffering a legal wrong ... by an order or decision of ... an agency in a contested case, is entitled to judicial review ... [by] the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

. It is for this reason — the credible claim that a government agency has exceeded its statutory authority — that alternatively, this court could treat this as a petition for mandamus, i.e., to compel compliance with the dictates of the statute. See D.C.App.R. 21; see also Dillard v. Yeldell, 334 A.2d 578 (D.C.1975).

. Under the 1964 Act, the Justice Department and persons aggrieved were authorized to bring suit in the federal court. In 1972, the statute was amended to permit EEOC to sue in its own right. Prior and subsequent to this time, EEOC entered private suits as amicus curiae. Under the 1972 amendments, the private right of action was expressly preserved; when EEOC brought suit, moreover, the aggrieved had an absolute right to intervene.