Court Opinion

ID: 9530061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:57:02.476952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:59.551574
License: Public Domain

PETERS, P. J.
I dissent.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the defendants admitted that defendant Roy Kent Mauser was negligent, and that such negligence proximately contributed to the accident. The sole issue was whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. On that issue the plaintiff concedes the evidence was conflicting, and concedes that there is evidence to support the implied finding of the jury that he was guilty of contributory negligence. But the issue was a close one. A contrary finding likewise would have been supported. Moreover, it must be remembered that, as a result of the accident, plaintiff’s companion was killed, and plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury and had no memory of the collision. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident capable of testifying except defendant Roy Kent Mauser and his companion and close friend Hampton. Under such circumstances, any substantial error in the admission of the evidence of either of these witnesses could not help but be prejudicial.
In my opinion, it was error of a most serious and prejudicial nature to have admitted the hearsay, self-serving statement made by Hampton to the investigator of defendants, under the guise of rehabilitation. Hampton, called as a witness for defendants, testified that he saw the accident, and testified to facts which, if believed, showed plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. On cross-examination an attempt was made to impeach him by asking him if, at the scene of the accident and at the police station, he had not told the investigating police officers that he had not seen the accident. He denied making such statements. Officers Badagliacco and Murray were then called, and they testified that Hampton had told them at the scene of the accident and at the police *690station that at the time of the collison (about 2 a.m.) he was resting and did not see the accident. There was no charge made of recent fabrication, or that Hampton had been induced to change his testimony because of any improper inducement of defendants. All that plaintiff attempted to and did do, was to impeach the witness by the usual method of showing prior inconsistent statements. It was simply a situation that develops in every case where a witness has made prior inconsistent statements. The charge that the testimony given by Hampton on the trial was “false” cannot be distorted into a charge of recent fabrication within the meaning of that limited exception to the general rule. That charge is expressly or impliedly made in every case of impeachment.
It must not be forgotten that the usual and general rule is that a witness cannot be rehabilitated by the introduction of prior consistent statements. It is well settled, in this and other states, that, when a witness has been impeached, the opposing party cannot rehabilitate that witness by showing that at other and different times the witness made statements out of court and out of the presence of the other party in harmony with his present testimony. (See cases collected 27 Cal. Jur., p. 178, § 153.) To that rule there is limited exception. That exception is that where the witness is charged with testifying under the influence of some motive prompting him to make a false statement, or that his evidence is a fabrication of recent date, such rehabilitating evidence is admissible. The exception is well illustrated by the two eases relied upon in the majority opinion. In Davis v. Tanner, 88 Cal. App. 67 [262 Pac. 1106], a witness was impeached by the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement. Prior consistent statements were allowed to be introduced to rehabilitate her. The theory upon which this was held proper is clearly stated at p. 75 as follows : “It is apparent from the record that appellants offered the former statement of the witness Hogg to impeach her on the theory that she had fabricated or colored her testimony given at the trial through the urgent inducement of respondent’s attorneys, with whom a recent conference was developed by appellants, with the manifest inference that this interview was the cause of whatever conflict exists between her testimony at the trial and her former statement made to appellants.” (Italics added.) In People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. (2d) 731 [104 P. (2d) 794], rehabilitating evidence was admitted because an attempt had been made to show that the district *691attorney’s office had brought improper influences to bear upon the witness. In the instant case there was no express or implied charge that defendants or their counsel had brought improper pressure to bear on Hampton. They simply charged that he had told the police officers he did not see the accident, and that he was friendly with one of the defendants. Certainly, it cannot be contended, because a witness is impeached by showing friendship with one of the parties, that the door is thrown open to the introduction of hearsay, self-serving prior consistent declarations in violation of the general rule above discussed. If the credibility of a witness can be propped up in this fashion the limited exception to the general rule would soon abolish that rule.
For these reasons I believe the judgment should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 24, 1942. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a hearing.