Court Opinion

ID: 9845681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:26:14.612722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.245201
License: Public Domain

RETIRED JUSTICE HARRISON, with whom JUSTICE COMPTON
joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
*450I concur that the evidence was sufficient to support the instruction given on a driver’s duty to operate a vehicle at a “reasonable speed under the existing conditions.”
I disagree that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to introduce the testimony of her minister that her reputation for truth and veracity was good. There was nothing extraordinary in either the examination or cross-examination of the witnesses in this routine automobile accident case, except in their being tedious. They were searching, intense, and persistent, but in no sense vicious, abusive, overbearing, or overreaching.
This action by the plaintiff alleging a leg injury in an automobile accident which occurred in 1987 was brought at the same time she had pending another personal injury action against a 7-Eleven store for an accident that occurred in 1985 and which involved the same limb. She allegedly still suffered from, and was being treated for, her first injury some eighteen months after the second accident. For obvious reasons counsel for the defendant sought to establish these facts, to point out certain inconsistencies in her testimony and previous statements made by her, and otherwise to support his theory that her damages were in fact attributable to the 1985 accident and not the one with Miller. This was a perfectly legitimate exercise by counsel and should not be construed as an attack on her character. On the contrary, an incisive cross-examination is the most effective tool available in our judicial system to ferret out the truth in any case, and should not be chilled or unduly restrained.
In a great majority of automobile accident cases involving testimony of the drivers and their medical experts, the testimony offered by plaintiff and defendant is diametrically opposed. If character evidence is held permissible in this case, it will be construed as modifying or abrogating the long-standing rule in Virginia that evidence of a witness’ character or reputation for truth and veracity is not admissible in civil cases, unless impeached or is a central issue of the case.
Further, here it clearly was not because of any vicious or improper cross-examination of the plaintiff or her doctor that her counsel sought to introduce evidence of her character. Before either Mrs. Luck or her medical expert testified and were cross-examined, he announced to the trial court that “Mrs. Luck would be our only witness other than Dr. Adelaar and a character witness.”
*451Later in the trial, counsel for the plaintiff made his argument for the introduction of a character witness as follows:
“. . . whenever a witness, a party’s testimony has been attempted to be contradicted, that puts the character into issue, and the Supreme Court has held and it is done universally in my practice.” [Emphasis added.]
The trial judge aptly responded:
“Then that would mean that a character witness would testify in every case for both the defendant and the plaintiff. I don’t believe that is what the Supreme Court has said. If you are going to call a witness only to say that her reputation for truth and veracity is good, I’m not going to allow it.”
The majority cites selective remarks made by counsel for the defendant in closing argument as evidencing his intent to impeach plaintiffs character and honesty. Evidently counsel for plaintiff did not then agree, for at no time during the argument did he voice any objection or make any exception to the cited remarks.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, plaintiffs only motion was for summary judgment on the question of liability, and for the issue of damages to be submitted to the jury. Pertinent also, the trial court’s final order reflects only that “the plaintiff moved the court to set aside the verdict as being contrary to the law and evidence and on grounds that several instructions proffered by plaintiff were rejected by the court.”
Adams v. Adams, 233 Va. 422, 357 S.E.2d 491 (1987), relied upon by the majority, involves an entirely different factual situation. There, the person whose integrity was involved was a decedent who had allegedly failed to comply with an oral agreement made by him prior to his death. Both the trial court and this Court held that the decedent’s reputation was “right squarely put in issue in the case.” 233 Va. at 426, 357 S.E.2d at 493. Further, Adams also involved Virginia’s so-called “dead man’s statute,” Code § 8.01-397. We specifically adhered there to the general rule regarding the admissibility of character evidence and to the exception applied in George v. Pilcher, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 299 (1877); Adams, 233 Va. at 427-28, 357 S.E.2d at 494.
I find no abuse of discretion by the lower court and therefore would affirm its judgment.