Court Opinion

ID: 9744857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:19:57.15426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.550399
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: The City argues that the trial court erred by equating “catastrophic” injury under section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) with a line-of-duty disability under section 40 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/4 — 110 (West 2000)). Because I agree, I respectfully dissent. In my judgment, the majority opinion is wrong because (1) it gives inappropriate weight to the remarks of a single legislator, (2) it fails to properly analyze the term “catastrophic injury,” and (3) it fails to consider how other jurisdictions have defined that term in similar contexts. I will discuss each of these failings in turn. I. THE ILLEGITIMACY OF “LEGISLATIVE HISTORY” The majority writes that because the term “catastrophic injury” is not defined in the Act, it “must look elsewhere to determine the intent of the legislature.” 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1136. The problem, however, is that the majority — like the trial court — begins and ends its inquiry by focusing solely on the remarks of Senator Donahue. To the extent that such remarks can ever properly be deemed “legislative history,” I reject the notion that this court can rely on them in construing section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)). As Justice Scalia has written, “[t]he greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.” Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519, 123 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). In support of its use of this “legislative history,” the majority cites People v. Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d 174, 178, 643 N.E.2d 865, 868 (1994), for the proposition that courts may consider relevant statements by legislators concerning the nature and effect of a proposed law. However, the majority ignores Town of the City of Bloomington, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 599 N.E.2d at 70, in which this court wrote the following: “□□legislators do not make laws by making speeches on the floor of the legislative chamber or by writing memos for committee meetings. They make laws by majority vote on a specifically worded bill that has been read three times before each house and distributed to each legislator. (111. Const. 1970, art. iy §§ 8(c), (d).) Neither the disclosed nor undisclosed intent of a legislator or lobbyist becomes law, only the bill as it reads when passed becomes law.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, by considering comments made during legislative debates, the trial court considered as dispositive a factor this court in City of Bloomington held should not be considered at all in construing statutes. Now the majority repeats the error. If the majority is correct in relying upon the comments of an individual legislator, in this case Senator Donahue, as an appropriate source for determining legislative intent, then the majority should address the following questions that its reliance raises: (1) How many senators were present in the Senate when Senator Donahue spoke? (2) How many senators were aware that Senator Donahue placed the definition of “catastrophic injury” in her statements discussing the bill rather than in the bill’s express language? (3) Assuming a given senator was aware, how does anyone know whether that senator agreed with Senator Donahue’s remarks? (4) If a given senator heard Senator Donahue’s remarks and did not agree with them, does not the majority opinion place a burden on that senator to step forward and say so, or forever let the remarks of Senator Donahue be cited by the judiciary as “the will of the Senate?” (5) If this is to be the rule of statutory construction, then how many Illinois legislators are aware that they remain silent at their peril if they disagree with the views of those legislators motivated to speak about the legislation pending before the chamber? The majority’s approach seriously misconstrues the piirpose of legislative debate. That purpose ought not to be to provide language either intentionally or inadvertently left out of the bill being considered. Instead, that purpose should be to persuade legislators who might have doubts about a bill to vote for it. And even then, legislative debates should always be conducted with the understanding that courts will have the last word, in determining what the bill means, based upon the written language contained within the hill. This case illustrates the wisdom of the tenet that courts should not consider legislative debates in construing statutes. See City of Bloomington, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 599 N.E.2d at 70 (“[n]either the disclosed nor undisclosed intent of a legislator or lobbyist becomes law, only the bill as it reads when passed becomes law” (emphasis in original)). The oral remarks of Senator Donahue show just how easy it would have been for the legislature to have defined “catastrophic injury” within the text of section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) — assuming, of course, that her fellow legislators would have agreed with Senator Donahue if that language actually appeared in House Bill 1347. For example, that bill could have contained the following language: “For purposes of this section, ‘catastrophically injured’ means a police officer or firefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line-of-duty disability.” However, the bill the legislature passed did not include that language, and even though that language might constitute desirable policy, this court is limited to interpreting the statute as it is written. See City of Springfield v. Judith Jones Dietsch Trust, 321 Ill. App. 3d 239, 245, 746 N.E.2d 1272, 1277 (2001) (a court must not rewrite a statute to make it consistent with the court’s idea of orderliness and public policy). II. PROPER ANALYSIS OF THE TERM “CATASTROPHIC INJURY” Although section 10 of the Act refers to “catastrophic injury,” it does not define that term. However, the reference to “catastrophic injury” manifests the legislature’s belief that injury can be measured by degrees. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “catastrophic” as “[o]f the nature of, or belonging to, a catastrophe.” 2 Oxford English Dictionary 972 (2d ed. 1989). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “catastrophe” as “a momentous tragic event ranging from extreme misfortune to utter overthrow or ruin.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 179 (10th ed. 1998). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “catastrophe” as “[a] sudden disaster, wide-spread, very fatal, or signal.” 2 Oxford English Dictionary 972 (2d ed. 1989). The American Heritage Dictionary provides that the term “catastrophe” “especially stresses the sense of tragic outcome with irreparable loss.” American Heritage Dictionary 374 (1975). Viewing injuries on a continuum from minor to fatal, a “catastrophic injury” under section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) would have to fall somewhere toward the end of the continuum — that is, it would have to be some type of extreme, irreparable injury short of death. Although I cannot definitively say what “catastrophic injury” means in all cases, I am confident that whatever it means, it means something more than a duty-related injury which qualifies a firefighter for a line-of-duty disability pension. A firefighter is eligible for such a pension if, “as the result of *** injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty,” he is found to be “physically or mentally permanently disabled for service in the fire department.” 40 ILCS 5/4 — 110 (West 2000). Thus, section 40 of the Code encompasses any injury that prevents a firefighter from serving as a firefighter. Although an “injury” under section 40 may constitute a “catastrophic” injury, an injury under that section does not have to be “catastrophic” to qualify a firefighter for a line-of-duty disability. In other words, a firefighter may sustain a duty-related injury that prevents him from serving as a firefighter without sustaining a “catastrophic” injury. This interpretation of section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) is supported by section 4 — 112 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/4 — 112 (West 2000)), which provides that a firefighter under the age of 50 who is receiving a line-of-duty disability pension must undergo yearly medical examinations to verify that his disability is a continuing one. If the Board is presented with satisfactory proof that a firefighter has recovered from his disability, the Board will terminate his line-of-duty disability pension, and the firefighter will be reinstated into active service. 40 ILCS 5/4 — 112 (West 2000). It would make no sense to interpret a “catastrophic” injury under section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) as meaning any injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability, when such a disability may be temporary. See American Heritage Dictionary 374 (1975) (“Catastrophe especially stresses the sense of tragic outcome with irreparable loss” (emphasis added)). Such an interpretation would render the word “catastrophic” superfluous. See People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225, 228, 751 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (2001) (“a statute should be construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless”). III. HOW OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE DEFINED “CATASTROPHIC INJURY” In Villarreal v. Village of Schaumburg, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 1163-64, 759 N.E.2d 76, 82 (2001), the First District Appellate Court held that the plaintiff, who was employed as a police officer by the defendant village, did not suffer a “catastrophic injury” under section 10 of the Act where he was found to be fully disabled from serving on a police department and thus qualified for retirement from service. In so concluding, the First District analyzed the term “catastrophic injury” much as did Part II of this dissent and concluded that the plaintiffs injury had “not rendered him incapable of engaging in any gainful employment.” (Emphasis in original.) Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1163, 759 N.E.2d at 81. The First District noted that its decision required no resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction for interpretative guidance because, in its judgment, the language of the Act was clear and unambiguous. The court noted, however, that because the case before it was one of “first impression in Illinois, we believe it is beneficial to briefly look at the term ‘catastrophic injury’ as it has been defined by other jurisdictions.” Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1164, 759 N.E.2d at 82. The court then cited the language of the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 3796(b) (1994)), as providing that “ ‘catastrophic injury’ means consequences of an injury that permanently prevent an individual from performing any gainful work.” Villareal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1164, 759 N.E.2d at 82. The Villarreal court deemed that definition “consistent with the plain and commonly understood meaning of ‘catastrophic injury’ we have discussed.” Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1164, 759 N.E.2d at 82. The First District then looked to similar state statutes from Florida, Georgia, and North Dakota (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.02(37) (West Supp. 2002); Ga. Code Ann. § 3^9 — 200.1(g) (1998); N.D. Cent. Code § 65 — 05.1—06.1(2)(c) (1995)) and found all of these statutes to support the interpretation it applied to section 10 of the Act. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1164-65, 759 N.E.2d at 82-83. I find the First District’s analysis in Villarreal is quite sound, and in addition to the other reasons I have already discussed in this dissent, I deem that analysis another basis for reversing the trial court’s judgment. IV THE LIMITED ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT It should be emphasized that — despite Krohe’s suggestion to the contrary — the issue before this court is not whether Krohe’s specific duty-related injuries constituted “catastrophic injuries.” Krohe’s complaint did not allege the factual details of his injury, other than to state that the Board had determined that he “was permanently disabled from performing his duties as a firefighter by reason of injuries sustained in the cause of performing acts of duty.” Further, the trial court made no findings of fact regarding the extent or impact of Krohe’s injuries or whether his injuries in fact constituted “catastrophic injuries.” Instead, the court determined only that “those individuals (a firefighter in this case) who are disabled in the fine of duty are entitled to have their health insurance premiums paid by the employer (in this case the City of Bloomington).” This court is thus limited to the precise issue before us — namely, whether the trial court erred by interpreting “catastrophic injury” under section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) as meaning any injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 40 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/4— 110 (West 2000)). V EPILOGUE The recent tragic death of hundreds of New York firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical technicians served as a jolting reminder of the bravery and dedication of these men and women. When duty called, they ran to the burning World Trade Center towers, and many died as a result. This court joins our fellow Americans in saluting these dedicated public servants — here in central Illinois as well as in New York City — and we might well wish to see section 10 amended to reflect the intention of Senator Donahue so that injured firefighters and their families would have the additional financial protection such an amendment would provide. Nonetheless, we are duty-bound to interpret section 10 as it is written, not as we would prefer it to read, however much we might prefer a different result.