Court Opinion

ID: 9396130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 16:10:05.129315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:14.188373
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211386
                                     No. 1-21-1386
                               Opinion filed May 19, 2023
                                                                        FIFTH DIVISION

                                        IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                               FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

YOVANY I. LOPEZ COLUNGA, Individually and            )
as Father and Next of Friend of Joshua Jair Lopez,   )      Appeal from the
and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of    )      Circuit Court of
Yovanny Jadiel Lopez, Deceased,                      )      Cook County.
                                                     )
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                           )      No. 20-L-6550
                                                     )
      v.                                             )      Honorable
                                                     )      Kathy M. Flanagan,
ADVOCATE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS                        )      Judge presiding.
CORPORATION, d/b/a/ Advocate Christ Medical          )
Center; ADVOCATE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS                )
CORPORATION, d/b/a Advocate Medical Group;           )
APRIL D. JONES, D.O.; RENAISSANCE                    )
MEDICAL GROUP, S.C.; RUKMINI VELAMATI,               )
M.D.; THOMAS MURRAY, D.O.; STACEE                    )
LEWIS, M.D.; ALEXANDRIA VAN OYEN, D.O.;              )
PATRICK LLOYD, D.O.; MICHELLE JOHNSON;               )
HUMERA ASEM, M.D.; JOANNA IZEWSKI,                   )
M.D.; THERESE KIRSCH, M.D.; DENISE                   )
TAITANO-RITTER, M.D.; VALERIE                        )
SWIATKOWSKI, M.D.; CLARISA FIGUEROA;                 )
DESIREE FIGUEROA; and PIOTR BOBAK,                   )
                                                     )
      Defendants                                     )
                                                     )
      (Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation,    )
      d/b/a Advocate Christ Medical Center;          )
      Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation,     )
      d/b/a Advocate Medical Group; April D.         )
      Jones, D.O.; Renaissance Medical Group,        )
      S.C.; Rukmini Velamati, M.D.; Stacee Lewis,    )
      M.D.; Patrick Lloyd, D.O.; Alexandria Van      )
      Oyen, D.O., and Thomas Murray, D.O.,           )
      Defendants-Appellees).                         )
No. 1-21-1386

       JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Justices Lyle and Navarro concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1     This is an interlocutory appeal in a tort action in which plaintiff Yovany I. Lopez Colunga

alleged 30 counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendants Advocate

Health and Hospitals Corporation and various physicians. In ruling on defendants’ motion to

dismiss, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)),

the circuit court concluded that plaintiff’s claims were legally insufficient but, on its own motion,

certified the following two questions for our review:

                (1) Can a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress be stated

       against a defendant, allegedly engaging in the outrageous conduct toward a plaintiff who

       is unknown to the defendant and who is not present at the time of the purportedly

       outrageous conduct; and

                (2) Can a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress be stated

       based on purported failures to perform certain acts (i.e., non-feasance) versus intentional,

       active performance of certain acts (i.e. malfeasance)?

We allowed leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). We review certified

questions of law de novo. Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 57-58 (2007). For

the reasons explained below, we answer the first certified question, “No,” and deem the second

certified question moot.

¶2     Our review under Rule 308 is limited to answering the legal questions certified. Apollo

Real Estate Investment Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 398 Ill. App. 3d 773, 778 (2009). We are not

reviewing the circuit court’s dismissal order, and our jurisdiction under Rule 308 is limited to

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No. 1-21-1386

answering the questions as drafted. Id. (“Our review is strictly limited to the certified questions

presented; we do not render any opinion on the propriety of any underlying rulings of the trial

court.”); see also In re Estate of Luccio, 2012 IL App (1st) 121153, ¶ 17 (“[T]he rule was not

intended to be a mechanism for expedited review of an order that merely applies the law to the

facts of a particular case.”). Nevertheless, in analyzing the questions presented, it is helpful to have

some understanding of the procedural background.

¶3     The crime underlying this case is of unspeakable horror: Clarisa Figueroa lured a young

expectant mother to her home on the pretense of selling her baby clothes and, instead, murdered

the mother, cut her unborn son from her womb, and claimed the baby as her own.

¶4     Figueroa called for emergency medical assistance, reporting that she had given birth

unexpectedly at home. When the baby arrived at Advocate Christ Medical Center, he was not

breathing. Doctors resuscitated him and admitted him into the neonatal intensive care unit. The

hospital discharged Figueroa from the labor and delivery unit after three days. She continued to

make medical decisions on the baby’s behalf for two weeks, until Chicago Police detectives

questioned the medical staff, prompting the baby’s neonatologist to take protective custody.

Genetic testing confirmed that Figueroa was not the baby’s biological mother. Police subsequently

arrested Figueroa for the murder of the baby’s mother.

¶5     Upon learning of his newborn son’s whereabouts, the baby’s father, Yovany Lopez

Colunga, assumed responsibility for decisions pertaining to the baby’s medical care. The same

doctors continued to care for the baby until his death one month later.

¶6     The baby’s father is our plaintiff, and his complaint seeks damages based on intentional

infliction of emotional distress against the medical providers who administered care to Figueroa

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No. 1-21-1386

and the baby at Advocate Christ Medical Center. According to plaintiff, the medical providers

consciously disregarded the substantial risk of causing him to suffer severe emotional distress

when they permitted Figueroa to make medical decisions on the baby’s behalf despite the

information in Figueroa’s medical records—including her age, lack of verifiable prenatal history,

and prior tubal ligation—which should have indicated to the medical providers that she was

physically unable to be the baby’s biological mother.

¶7     The circuit court concluded that plaintiff had not stated viable claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, reasoning that the baby’s biological father was “unknown to

Defendants at the time *** and that he was not present, either in a two-person or a three-person

setting when the alleged outrageous conduct occurred.” The circuit court further noted that

defendants’ alleged conduct involved “taking no action,” which does not “constitute the type of

intentional, overt, active conduct *** required to satisfy the elements of this tort.”

¶8                                   A. First Certified Question

¶9     Can a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress be stated against a

defendant who allegedly engaged in outrageous conduct toward a plaintiff who is unknown to the

defendant and who is not present at the time of the purportedly outrageous conduct? To state a

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege facts

establishing that (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the defendant either

intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that his

conduct would cause emotional distress, and (3) the defendant’s conduct in fact caused severe

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No. 1-21-1386

emotional distress. Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 392 (1994); accord Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 46(1) (1965).

¶ 10   To the extent that Illinois courts have analyzed issues related to the tort, Illinois law

corresponds with section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement divides the

tort into “direct” claims and “third-party” claims. A direct claim is one where the plaintiff is the

victim of the defendant’s extreme and outrageous acts and the defendant directs those acts at the

plaintiff. E.g., Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 275 (2003). A third-party claim is one

brought by a bystander, who witnesses the defendant’s extreme and outrageous acts directed at

another person. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. l (1965).

                “(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or

       recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such

       emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily

       harm.

                (2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to

       liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress

                       (a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present

                at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or

                       (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress

                results in bodily harm.” (Emphases added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts

                § 46 (1965).

¶ 11   Almost from its inception, courts and commentators alike have recognized the need to

impose strict limiting principles on this tort. See Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 88-

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No. 1-21-1386

90 (1976). These limiting principles differ in direct claims versus third-party claims. Third-party

claims may only be brought by a plaintiff who is present and who is either a family member or a

non-family member who suffers bodily harm as a result of the tort. See, e.g., Green v. Chicago

Tribune Co., 286 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13-14 (1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(2)

(1965)) (the plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim failed where she “did not

allege *** that she was present” when the defendant photographed her son undergoing medical

treatment); Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 12, at 65 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.

1984) (“Ordinarily recovery in such cases is limited to plaintiffs who are not only present at the

time, but are known by the defendant to be present ***.”).

¶ 12    The “presence” requirement reflected in our cases and the Restatement functions as one of

those limiting principles, denying recovery on questionable claims lacking the indicia of intent and

genuine emotional harm that a plaintiff’s contemporaneous observance of the outrageous conduct

guarantees. See, e.g., Green, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 14; see also Prosser and Keeton on the Law of

Torts § 12, at 65-66 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). As the Restatement’s drafters noted,

“The limitation may be justified by the practical necessity of drawing the line somewhere, since

the number of persons who may suffer emotional distress at the news of an assassination of the

President is virtually unlimited ***.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. l (1965). 1

        1
         Courts outside of Illinois have occasionally relaxed the presence requirement for third-party claims
brought against terrorists. See, e.g., Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2005).
The rationale underpinning these cases is that the defendants specifically intended to inflict fear and
emotional distress on indirect victims through their outrageous acts. Id. at 115. Despite terrorists’ broader
aims, courts nonetheless limit the scope of potential plaintiffs to those expected to suffer most—namely,
the victim’s immediate family. See Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
No case has considered the viability of the terrorism exception under Illinois law, and it has no application
to our certified questions.

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No. 1-21-1386

¶ 13   Direct claims, in contrast, do not require “presence” under Illinois law. E.g., Kolegas v.

Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1992) (the plaintiff stated claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress against radio hosts who “broadcast their derogatory remarks on the

radio throughout the Chicago metropolitan area and outlying counties”); Prakash v. Parulekar,

2020 IL App (1st) 191819, ¶¶ 48-51 (allegations were sufficient to state direct claim against a

professor who “intensely attacked” a colleague’s professional integrity and career for a duration

of five years in their shared academic and professional networks). To sufficiently plead a direct

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, however, a plaintiff must allege specific facts

showing that the defendant acted with intent. See Tobolt v. Allstate Insurance Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d

57, 63 (1979) (“A mere statement that an act was done with a certain purpose or intent, without a

statement of facts showing purpose or intent, is a conclusion of law.”); see also Schroeder v. RGIS,

Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 122483, ¶ 27 (“A complaint alleging *** intentional infliction of emotional

distress ‘must be specific, and detailed beyond what is normally considered permissible in pleading

a tort action.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (quoting Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,

306 Ill. App. 3d 148, 155 (1999))); Gerald W. Boston et al., Emotional Injuries: Law and Practice

§ 1:11, at 1-22 to 1-23 (1998) (“Because intent or recklessness is an essential element of the tort,

recovery is denied where the plaintiff fails to offer sufficient evidence from which defendants [sic]

culpable state of mind can be inferred.”).

¶ 14   Recklessness can support a claim where a defendant knew that severe emotional distress is

certain or substantially certain to result and acted in conscious disregard of that risk. Kolegas, 154

Ill. 2d at 24; Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46

cmt. i (1965)). In Rekosh v. Parks, for example, a funeral home disregarded a substantial risk that

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No. 1-21-1386

cremating a father’s remains would cause extreme emotional distress to his children. 316 Ill. App.

3d 58, 65-67 (2000), abrogated on other grounds by Cochran v. Securitas Security Services USA,

Inc., 2017 IL 121200. The funeral home’s director knew that the father’s ex-wife could not legally

authorize the cremation and had also witnessed the ex-wife forge his son’s signature. Id. at 65. The

plaintiffs’ allegations supported an inference that the funeral home was “aware that there was

someone *** who therefore had a right and a duty with respect to the disposition of the body.” Id.

That the funeral home proceeded to cremate the body anyway was sufficiently extreme and

outrageous conduct as against the funeral home, which was aware of the “high probability” that

its conduct would cause severe emotional distress. Id. at 66-67.

¶ 15   In Koeller v. Cook County, 180 Ill. App. 3d 425, 436 (1989), in contrast, the plaintiff failed

to allege that the defendant “knew there was a high probability that emotional distress would

occur.” (Emphasis added.) There, the plaintiff’s brother was 1 of 20 people who perished in an

apartment fire. Id. at 427. Based on dental X-rays and conflicting identification evidence, the

medical examiner’s office misidentified the body and informed the plaintiff’s family that it did not

belong to her brother. Id. at 427-28. The medical examiner’s office discovered its mistake one year

later, after finding that a name, closely resembling that of her brother, appeared on a prescription

bottle found inside the decedent’s pocket. Id. at 428. Although the plaintiff alleged several

deficiencies in the identification process, the plaintiff’s allegations provided no support for a

finding that the medical examiner’s office “proceeded in conscious disregard” of the probability

that she would suffer emotional distress “as a result of the acts and omissions of its employees.”

Id. at 435-36.

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No. 1-21-1386

¶ 16    As Rekosh and Koeller demonstrate, intentional infliction of emotional distress requires

conduct undertaken with either purpose or recklessness, because it is the defendant’s culpable state

of mind from which a fact finder might infer that the conduct was “extreme and outrageous” as

opposed to merely negligent. See, e.g., Giraldi v. Lamson, 205 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1029-30 (1990)

(citing Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 60 Ill. App. 3d 679, 685 (1978))

(allegations that the defendants “carelessly and negligently failed to investigate *** do not allege

that [the defendants’] acts were intentional or that the [defendants] knew that severe emotional

distress was certain or substantially certain to result” (emphasis in original)); Bruce L. Ottley et al.,

Illinois Tort Law § 3.02, at 3-5 (3d ed. 2010) (“If the defendant’s state of mind is such that he or

she only reasonably foresees or should foresee a risk of severe emotional distress, it falls below

the minimum necessary for this tort.”). Pleading recklessness requires facts showing that the

defendant was aware of the high probability of causing emotional distress. See Koeller, 180 Ill.

App. 3d at 436. It is the defendant’s decision to engage in a course of conduct, despite the “high

degree of probability” of causing the plaintiff’s severe mental anguish, which renders it so

outrageous in character, and to such an extreme degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency. Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d

(1965)). Inherent to the requisite state of mind to commit intentional infliction of emotional distress

is the defendant’s knowledge of at least the person who is substantially certain to suffer emotional

distress.

¶ 17    Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative. A defendant can have

no liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress to a plaintiff who is unknown and not

present.

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No. 1-21-1386

¶ 18                           B. Second Certified Question

¶ 19    Can a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress be stated based on

purported failures to perform certain acts (i.e., non-feasance) versus intentional, active

performance of certain acts (i.e., malfeasance)? In light of our answer to the first certified question,

an answer to the second certified question is unnecessary and is rendered moot. See Grundy v.

Lincoln Park Zoo, 2011 IL App (1st) 102686, ¶ 17 (Hoffman, J.) (answer to one certified question

rendered another certified question moot); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019)

(interlocutory review of a certified question pursuant to Rule 308 is proper if it “may materially

advance the termination of the litigation”).

¶ 20    In summary, we answer the first certified question in the negative, and we deem the second

certified question moot.

¶ 21    Certified question answered; cause remanded.

                                                 - 10 -
No. 1-21-1386

      Lopez Colunga v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 2023 IL App (1st) 211386

Decision Under Review:       Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 20-L-6550;
                             the Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                    Sean P. Driscoll, of Driscoll Law Group LLC, and Yvette
for                          Loizon, of Clifford Law Offices, P.C., both of Chicago, for
Appellant:                   appellant.

Attorneys                    Krista R. Frick, of Cunningham, Meyer & Vedrine, P.C., of
for                          Chicago, for appellees Advocate Health and Hospitals
Appellee:                    Corporation, Rukmini Velamati, Stacee Lewis, Patrick Lloyd,
                             Alexandria Van Oyen, and Thomas Murray.

                             Aimee K. Lipkis and Melissa H. Dakich, of Cray Huber
                             Horstman Heil & VanAusdal LLC, of Chicago, for other
                             appellees.

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