Court Opinion

ID: 9402748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 18:04:09.390548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.454131
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/16/23 In re K.C. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re K.C., a Person Coming                                  B322944
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                             (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No.
                                                             18CCJP04274A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

KENYATA C.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge.
Conditionally affirmed, remanded with directions.
     Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                      ______________________
      On August 18, 2022 the juvenile court terminated
Kenyata C.’s parental rights to her four-year-old daughter, K.C.,
and transferred the child’s care, custody and control to the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
for adoptive planning and placement. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 366.26.)1 On appeal Kenyata contends the Department
breached its affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether
K.C. may have Indian ancestry as defined by the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California law. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subs. (a), (b) & (e).)
We agree and remand the matter for full compliance by the
Department and the juvenile court with the inquiry and notice
provisions of ICWA and California law.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. The Dependency Petition and Termination of Parental
         Rights
       On September 13, 2018 the juvenile court sustained a
petition, as amended by interlineation, pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), finding true the allegations that K.C. had been
born with a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine and
Kenyata had a history of substance abuse, had a positive
toxicology screen for amphetamine at the time of K.C.’s birth and
was a “recent user of ecstasy and marijuana,” all of which
rendered her “periodically incapable” of providing regular care of

1     Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.

                                 2
infant K.C. At the October 25, 2018 disposition hearing the court
declared K.C. a dependent child of the court, removed her from
Kenyata’s custody and ordered family reunification services and
unmonitored visits for Kenyata. The whereabouts of K.C.’s
alleged father were unknown, and the court declined to order
reunification services or visitation for him.
      At the December 10, 2019 12-month review hearing
(§ 366.21, subd. (f)) the juvenile court found Kenyata’s compliance
with her case plan had not been substantial. The court
terminated reunification services and set the case for a selection
and implementation hearing under section 366.26.
      The section 366.26 hearing was held on August 18, 2022.2
The juvenile court found returning K.C. to Kenyata would be
detrimental and K.C. was adoptable. The court terminated
Kenyata’s parental rights and identified K.C.’s current foster
parents, with whom K.C. had been living since December 2019,
as the prospective adoptive parents.
      2. The Department’s ICWA Investigation and the Juvenile
         Court’s ICWA Findings
       The Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (ICWA-010(A)) form
filed with the dependency petition on July 10, 2018 reported that
K.C. had no known Indian ancestry. The form did not identify
anyone whom the social worker had questioned about Indian
ancestry. The detention report stated Kenyata had denied

2     The hearing had been continued several times, in part due
to K.C.’s counsel’s request for a hearing pursuant to section 361.3
to assess Kenyata’s sister, Shineka C., for placement. The
contested section 361.3 hearing was held over five days in April,
May and June, 2022, at the conclusion of which the juvenile court
denied the request to remove K.C. from her current placement.

                                 3
having any Indian ancestry. The report also explained K.C. had
been placed with Kenyata’s cousin, Joelisha F., but the report did
not indicate that Joelisha had been asked whether the family had
any Indian ancestry. The social worker had additionally
interviewed four other members of Kenyata’s family with whom
Kenyata had been living—an aunt, two cousins and a minor-
cousin—but there is no record of an inquiry regarding Indian
ancestry during these interviews.
      On the day of the detention hearing Kenyata filed her
Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) form on which
she checked the box for the option, “I may have Indian ancestry”
and listed “Blackfoot” as the tribe. During the hearing the
juvenile court asked Kenyata whether there was a family
member who could provide additional information regarding any
Indian ancestry. Kenyata named her cousin Tawana R. and
stated Tawana was “my cousin that took me there.” Kenyata
stated Tawana’s phone number on the record, and it was
handwritten on the ICWA-020 form. The court ordered the
Department to investigate the claim of Indian ancestry.
      On August 15, 2018 the Department sent Notice of Child
Custody Proceeding for Indian Child (ICWA-030) forms to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Secretary of the Interior and
the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana. The forms listed Kenyata’s
name, current and former addresses and birthplace. It did not
include her birthdate. The form also included the name,
birthdate and birthplace of Kenyata’s mother; the name of
Kenyata’s father; the name, address, birthdate and birthplace of
Kenyata’s maternal grandmother and the name of Kenyata’s
deceased maternal grandfather. There is no record of the

                                4
Department attempting to directly contact any of these family
members.
       The jurisdiction/disposition report filed August 20, 2018
included a summary of an interview with Kenyata in which she
stated “she was unsure about her Indian Ancestry as she stated
she had heard from a cousin in the family that there may be some
Indian ancestry” on her mother’s side of the family. The
Department social worker also interviewed Kenyata’s aunt
Loria C. regarding possible Indian ancestry. Loria explained she
was the half sister of Kenyata’s mother: They had the same
mother but different fathers. The Indian ancestry, Loria stated,
was on her father’s side of the family and not on her mother’s
(and Kenyata’s) side of the family.
       In a last minute information report filed October 19, 2018
the Department stated it had not yet received responses to the
ICWA-030 forms it had sent two months earlier. In addition, on
October 15, 2018 a Department social worker called the number
for Tawana that Kenyata had provided during the detention
hearing. However, the social worker “was unable to make contact
as the number provided is not a valid number.” There is no
record of the Department attempting to obtain additional contact
information for Tawana. Further, despite the fact that K.C. was
still placed with Joelisha and the Department had frequent
contact with her, there is no record of the Department asking
Joelisha about possible Indian ancestry.
       At the disposition hearing on October 25, 2018 the juvenile
court found that, given no response had been received to the

                                5
ICWA-030 notices, it did not have reason to know that K.C. was
an Indian child.3
       In July 2019 K.C. was removed from Joelisha’s care and
placed with a non-related extended family member, Myeshia A.
Myeshia had a child with Kenyata’s brother, Deshawn S. There
is no indication the Department inquired about possible Indian
ancestry during its contacts with Myeshia. Nor did the
Department attempt to contact Deshawn.
       Around the time K.C. was removed from Joelisha’s care,
the Department assigned a permanency program social worker to
K.C.’s case. As described by the social worker during the
section 361.3 hearing, the permanency program social worker’s
role is to “search through a family, both records and speaking
with individuals, around finding family connections for children
in our foster care system.” This was important, she explained, so
that the child would know “their story and their own history.”
During the course of her investigation the social worker identified
13 relatives of Kenyata, many of whom were previously known to
the Department. No effort was made to interview these relatives
regarding K.C.’s possible Indian ancestry.
       In February 2021 Shineka contacted the Department and
stated she wanted to obtain custody of K.C. There is no
indication the Department inquired about possible Indian
ancestry during that conversation or any subsequent
conversation while assessing Shineka for placement.

3   There is no indication in the record that responses to the
ICWA-030 notices were ever received.

                                 6
                          DISCUSSION
      1. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice
       ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq. (2023)) set minimal procedural protections for
state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) The statute authorizes states to
provide “‘a higher standard of protection’” to Indian children,
their families and their tribes than the rights provided under
ICWA. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287-288; see
25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting state court
actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian children
(see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits an Indian child’s
tribe to intervene in—or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction
over—a child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); In re
Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8).
       To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in
dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related
state law, investigation of a family member’s belief a child may
have Indian ancestry must be undertaken and notice provided to
the appropriate tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court
and child protective services agencies “an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an
Indian child”]; see In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735,
741-742.) The duty to inquire “begins with initial contact
(§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child
protective agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals
whether the child may be an Indian child.” (In re T.G., supra,

                                 7
58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290; accord, In re Antonio R. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429; see § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).)4

4      The Department’s duty of inquiry, beginning at initial
contact, as now defined in section 224.2, subdivision (b), was
added to the Welfare and Institutions Code by Assembly Bill
No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 833, § 5),
effective January 1, 2019. Assembly Bill No. 3176 substantially
revised the provisions of California’s ICWA-related statutes to
conform their language to language in then-recently adopted
federal regulations and, recognizing California’s higher standard
for investigating whether a child may be an Indian child, to
specify more clearly the steps a social worker, probation officer
and court are required to take in making an inquiry into a child’s
possible status as an Indian child. (In re T.G., supra,
58 Cal.App.5th at p. 296.)
        Although that legislation was not in effect when the initial
dependency petition concerning K.C. was filed in 2018, a hearing
that culminates in termination of parental rights or an adoptive
placement—that is, a section 366.26 selection and
implementation hearing—is considered a separate “child custody
proceeding” as to which ICWA and related state law
requirements, including the duty of inquiry, apply. (See
25 U.S.C. § 1903(1); 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2023); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(2); see also In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
768, 785, fn. 11.) Because Kenyata challenges the implied
finding of ICWA inapplicability underlying the order made at the
section 366.26 hearing terminating her parental rights,
California’s ICWA-related statutes and rules of court in effect in
2022, when that hearing was held, apply in this appeal. (See
In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 289, fn. 13 [“[t]he parties
agree the [state’s ICWA-related statutes] in effect in
January 2020 when the section 366.26 hearings were held appl[y]
to these appeals”]; In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 321
[“‘[s]ince Mother is appealing from the findings made at the

                                 8
        In addition, section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of
further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child
“[i]f the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to
believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does
not have sufficient information to determine there is reason to
know that the child is an Indian child.” (See also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) [further inquiry must be conducted if the
social worker “knows or has reason to know or believe that an
Indian child is or may be involved”].)5 Further inquiry includes,
“but is not limited to,” interviewing, as soon as practicable,
extended family members to gather the biographical information
required by section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5), to be included in
ICWA notices, contacting the BIA and contacting “the tribe or
tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to
have information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship
status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C); see In re Rylei S.
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316-317.)
        If those inquiries result in reason to know the child is an
Indian child,6 notice to the relevant tribes is required. (25 U.S.C.

September 6, 2019 section 366.26 hearing and not those in 2017
or 2018, the current ICWA statutes apply’”].)
5     References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
6      “For purposes of ICWA, an ‘Indian child’ is an unmarried
individual under age 18 who is either a member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in a
federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member
of a federally recognized tribe.” (In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th
at p. 287, fn. 10; see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) [definition of “‘Indian
child’”] & (8) [definition of “‘Indian tribe’”]; see also Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definitions].)

                                   9
§ 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3; see In re J.S. (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 678, 686; In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
p. 290.) The governing federal regulations require ICWA notices
to include, if known, the names, birthdates, birthplaces and tribal
enrollment information of all direct lineal ancestors of the child.
(25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d)(3) (2023).) State law mandates inclusion of
“[a]ll names known of the Indian child’s biological parents,
grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian custodians,
including maiden, married, and former names or aliases, as well
as their current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth
and death, tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal
ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if
known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C); see In re A.M. (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 303, 317 [“‘If the notice duty is triggered under
ICWA, the notice to a tribe must include a wide range of
information about relatives, including grandparents and great-
grandparents, to enable the tribe to properly identify the
children’s Indian ancestry. [Citation.] Any violation of this
policy requires the appellate court to vacate the offending order
and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with
ICWA requirements’”].)
       “The duty to develop information concerning whether a
child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department,
not the parents or members of the parents’ families.” (In re
Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 430; accord, In re
Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742 [“the agency has a
duty to gather information by conducting an initial inquiry,
where the other party—here a parent . . . —has no similar
obligation”]; see also In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706
[“[t]he court and the agency must act upon information received

                                10
from any source, not just the parent [citations], and the parent’s
failure to object in the juvenile court to deficiencies in the
investigation or noticing does not preclude the parent from
raising the issue for the first time on appeal”].)
      2. The Department Failed To Adequately Investigate K.C.’s
         Possible Indian Ancestry
      The ICWA-020 form filed by Kenyata at the time of the
detention hearing indicated Kenyata’s belief she had Blackfoot
ancestry. That belief was confirmed by Kenyata during the
detention hearing; and she told the court her cousin Tawana may
have additional information. These preliminary responses from
Kenyata unquestionably provided reason to believe an Indian
child might be involved in the proceeding and triggered the
Department’s duty to make further inquiry pursuant to
section 224.2, subdivision (e), and rule 5.481(a)(4). (See In re
T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 292 [mother’s statement she
believed she had Indian ancestry and identification of her
grandfather as having possible Indian ancestry were sufficient to
require further inquiry]; In re A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 322 [mother’s statement she had been told she may have
Blackfeet or Cherokee ancestry and identifying her grandfather
as having possible Indian ancestry sufficient to require further
inquiry].) However, with one exception, there is no indication in
the record the Department interviewed any of the family
members with whom it had contact regarding K.C.’s possible
Indian ancestry. The Department did not attempt to contact
Tawana until three months after it obtained her phone number;
and, when the number turned out to be invalid, the Department
never asked Kenyata, or any other relatives with whom it had

                                11
regular contact, whether they knew of alternative methods to
reach Tawana.
       The Department argues it was relieved of its statutory duty
to investigate K.C.’s possible Indian ancestry because, when it
interviewed Loria, she stated the Indian ancestry was on her
father’s side and not on Kenyata’s side of the family. As the
Department puts it, Loria “would presumably have more
information regarding Indian ancestry in the family than would
the mother’s cousin.” However, the record does not establish
Tawana’s place in the family tree, that is, whether she was
related to Loria’s father and thus, likely shared Loria’s ancestry,
or whether Tawana was related to Kenyata in another way such
that her potential Indian ancestry would be shared by Kenyata—
and perhaps be unknown to Loria. The Department’s
presumption that Loria’s explanation was dispositive of K.C.’s
ancestry reflects a troubling indifference to the importance of
ICWA and the Department’s responsibilities for its good faith
implementation.7
       Once the duty to investigate has been triggered, as it was
here, “a social services agency has the obligation to make a
meaningful effort to locate and interview extended family
members to obtain whatever information they may have as to the
child’s possible Indian status.” (In re K.R., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th

7      As we have previously cautioned the Department, an
assumption about what a family member should know regarding
his or her family history “overlooks recent findings on the impact
this country’s decades-long efforts to destroy Indian families and
eradicate Indian history and culture, including through abuses of
the child welfare system, may have on a family’s awareness of its
Indian ancestry.” (In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 321-322.)

                                12
at p. 709.) One relative’s denial of Indian ancestry on the part of
the child does not relieve the Department of its statutory
responsibilities. Once the Department had contact information
for K.C.’s extended family members, it was required to make a
meaningful effort to obtain information from them. There is no
excuse for its failure to do so.
       In addition, although the Department sent formal
ICWA-030 notices to the Blackfoot Tribe of Montana,
section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(C), requires the Department to
have informal contact and to share information with a tribe in
which a dependent child may be a member in order to develop the
pertinent information—not simply to send a formal ICWA-030
notice. (See In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290 [“[t]his
informal contact with the tribe must include ‘sharing information
identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a
membership or eligibility determination’”]; see also In re D.S.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1049 [“[t]he sharing of information
with tribes at this inquiry stage is distinct from formal ICWA
notice”].) There is no record of the Department complying with
this obligation.
       The Department’s breach of its duty of inquiry was
compounded in this case by the juvenile court’s failure to ensure
compliance with ICWA’s requirements before finding ICWA did
not apply to the proceedings. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2) [court may
make a finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings if
the court makes a finding, supported by sufficient evidence, “that
proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as
required in this section have been conducted”]; see In re Rylei S.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 320.)

                                13
       Finally, we are not persuaded by the Department’s
argument that any failure to conduct a further inquiry regarding
K.C.’s possible Indian ancestry was harmless. The Department
argues its interviews with Kenyata and Loria and its ICWA-030
notices were sufficient and “any additional inquiries were not
likely to bear meaningfully as to whether [K.C.] was an Indian
child.” As we have stated in the context of the Department’s
failure to conduct an inquiry pursuant to section 224.2,
subdivision (b), “Speculation as to whether extended family
members might have information likely to bear meaningfully on
whether the child is an Indian child has no place in the analysis
of prejudicial error . . . .” (In re Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th
at p. 435.) The same is true when the failure to investigate
occurs after the Department has reason to believe a child
possesses Indian ancestry. The “missing information was, at the
very least, likely to be meaningful in determining whether the
children involved were Indian children—whether the information
ultimately showed they were or established they were not.
Because we do not know what we do not know, nothing more in
the way of prejudice need be shown.” (In re Rylei S., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 324, 325 [“the failure to fully comply with a
mandatory duty may be harmless error, so long as the record
affirmatively reflects that the protections intended to be afforded
through the exercise of that duty have been provided”].)
       A remand for further inquiry is required in this case.
      3. Omissions in the ICWA-030 Notices Must Be Addressed
         on Remand
       The Department concedes Kenyata’s middle name and date
of birth were known by the Department but were not included in
the notices sent to the BIA, the Secretary of the Interior and the

                                  14
Blackfoot Tribe of Montana as required by ICWA. (See 25 C.F.R.
§§ 23.11(a) & 23.111(d)(1)-(3) (2023); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3,
subd. (a)(5)(C).) However, the Department argues the errors
were harmless because Kenyata was not the individual claiming
to be a member of or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.8
This argument ignores the fact that ICWA notice requirements
are strictly construed. (See In re Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 557; In re J.S., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.) Furthermore,
because the record does not contain the responses received to the
notices, if any, there is no way to determine whether the
omissions were material to any eligibility determination.
      Nevertheless, given our remand for further investigation,
the error is harmless. If further inquiry establishes a reason to
know K.C. is an Indian child, then the Department will be
required to send complete notices pursuant to section 224.3,
subdivisions (a) and (b). If it is determined there is no reason to
know K.C. is an Indian child, then no notice will be required; and
any error in the prior notices will not have adversely affected the
outcome of the proceedings or the rights of any Indian tribes.
(See In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 [failure to provide
notice harmless where further inquiry to be done on remand].)

8     “‘“[O]rdinarily failure in the juvenile court to secure
compliance with [ICWA’s] notice provisions is prejudicial error.”
[Citations.] Any failure to comply with a higher state standard,
however, “must be held harmless unless the appellant can show a
reasonable probability that he or she would have enjoyed a more
favorable result in the absence of the error.’’’” (In re Y.W., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 558; accord, In re E.H. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1072.)

                                 15
                         DISPOSITION
      The August 18, 2022 order terminating Kenyata’s parental
rights is conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded to the
juvenile court for full compliance with the inquiry and notice
provisions of ICWA and related California law and for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                                        PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

             SEGAL, J.

             FEUER, J.

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