Court Opinion

ID: 9453269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:08:43.340932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:35.574002
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Being firmly of the opinion both that Daugherty did not have the effective assistance of counsel for his defense against the two robbery charges and that his constitutional rights were abridged by his failure to receive an adequate hearing on his competence to stand trial, I respectfully dissent.
The two robberies were committed on December 23, 1956. Daugherty was arrested on December 26 and on the same day signed a written confession as to the commission of both robberies. On January 5, 1960, indictments were returned, and on January 8, counsel was appointed to represent Daugherty. Upon conviction, as the majority notes (footnote 4 to majority opinion), “he certainly would have received life imprisonment, possibly death.” In the light of his confession, the most likely, if not the only possible, defense was insanity. Yet it is without dispute that his appointed counsel spent no more than fifteen or twenty minutes in conferring with Daugherty. That conference took place on January 8, 1960, in a room at the courthouse just prior to Daugherty’s arraignment. Daugherty’s *815testimony as to the substance of that conference was:
“I went in a little room with Mr. Ratliff and he asked me had I signed a statement, and I told him yes, sir, they had a statement. I told him that I wanted — there’s a little tiny county around there and I told him I would like to be tried somewhere else and also be given a sanity hearing, and he told me if he was appointed my attorney that he wouldn’t ask for these changes.
“I said, ‘Well, sir, you’re not going to be my attorney.’
“Q. Did you tell him you had been previously committed to the mental institution in Big Springs?
“A. Yes, sir. He talked to me about that.
“Q. Approximately how long did you talk with Mr. Ratliff on that date ?
“A. Approximately 15, 20 minutes.
“Q. And that is main contents of your conversation with him?
“A. Yes, sir. That was it.
“Q. When was the next time that you saw Mr. Ratliff?
“A. The evening when I got the 75 years.
“Q. All right. Did you ever see him in jail at any time?
“A. No, sir. He never came to jail.
“Q. The next time you saw him is the time you were again taken before the court, is that correct?
“A. That’s right.”
Mr. Ratliff’s affidavit introduced in evidence deposed as follows:
“I discussed the cases with Mr. Daugherty on January 8, 1960. He told me at that time that he was trying to deal with the District Attorney and that he had signed a confession and was going to make the best deal that he could with the District Attorney. Mr. Daugherty was brought from the jail and I conferred with him in a private room, at which time he told me that he had signed a confession and that he was negotiating with the District Attorney for a lesser sentence. I advised Mr. Daugherty that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was entitled to a jury trial if he so desired, but he informed me that he had signed the confession and that it did not appear that he could beat the cases.”
On January 8, following this fifteen or twenty minute conference, Daugherty entered a plea of not guilty to each of the two indictments (R. pp. 84, 107). Mr. Ratliff then left solely to Daugherty the making of a “deal” to plead guilty. By January 19 it was made known to the court that Daugherty was ready to plead guilty. According to the affidavit of Judge Chapman, the State trial judge,
“As I remember it, the attorney for the state and the attorney for the defendant had discussed among themselves and with the court the mental condition of the defendant and the court was assured that in the opinion of each of said attorneys the defendant was sane and knew the difference between right and wrong and knew what he was doing at that time. The defendant was brought into open court and his case was called for trial. Both the state and the defendant announced ready for trial, a jury was waived by the defendant, and at that time the defendant was questioned as to his mental condition; and the attorney for the state, the attorney for the defendant and the court were of the opinion that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong and that he was then a person of sound mind; and after this matter had been explored the defendant was then tried for said offenses.”
Mr. Ratliff was, of course, present when the pleas of guilty were entered, but took no part other than to announce that the defendant was ready. Before accepting the plea in each case, Judge Chapman questioned Daugherty as to his sanity. In the case first called, the questions and answers were as follows:
“THE COURT: Are you a person of sound mind?
“THE DEFENDANT: I guess I am.
*816“THE COURT: Well, do you know whether you are or not?
“THE DEFENDANT: Well, I know right from wrong I guess.
“THE COURT: Have you ever been charged with insanity or confined in an institution for the insane ?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I have.
“THE COURT: When was that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Two different occasions.
“THE COURT: You have been released from those, however?
“THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know; I ran off the last time I was over there.
“THE COURT: Where was that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Big Springs.
“THE COURT: I see.
“MR. ADKINS [District Attorney]: He was discharged in December prior to the commission of the offense by the Big Spring Hospital.
“THE COURT: Did you know that ?
“THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn’t know it.
“THE COURT: All right. Well, in other words you think you are a person of sound mind; you understand the difference between right and wrong?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: You knew what you were doing when you did this ?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: All right, it appearing to the Court you are sane, your plea of guilty is received. Have a seat.”
In the other case the inquiry as to sanity was as follows:
“THE COURT: Have you ever been charged with insanity? I want to ask you this again. I believe you stated a few minutes ago you had been in a mental institution at one time?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: I believe Mr. Adkins’ records show you have been discharged from that; do you know that?
“THE DEFENDANT: I’ve got his word for it.
“THE COURT: In other words you think you are a person of sound mind and know what you are doing in this trial?
“THE DEFENDANT: I know the difference between right and wrong.
“THE COURT: It appearing to the Court you are sane, your plea of guilty is received.”
Formal judgments of conviction were then entered and Daugherty was sentenced in each case to “Seventy-five (75) years in the State Penitentiary.”
If Daugherty had not been an indigent, can anyone imagine that employed counsel in a capital case would have done no more than confer with his client for fifteen or twenty minutes? Yet every defendant, rich and poor alike, should stand equal before the law. Griffin v. Illinois, 1956, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891; Coppedge v. United States, 1962, 369 U.S. 438, 447, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21, n. 13 and cases there cited. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, it was said that, “This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.” It may be added that this noble ideal cannot be realized if the standard of effectiveness of the poor man’s appointed counsel is lower than the standard required of counsel employed by defendants able to pay fees. The standard relied on by the majority is quoted from Williams v. Beto, 1965, 354 F.2d 698, 704:
“It is the general rule that relief from a final conviction on the ground of incompetent or ineffective counsel will be granted only when the trial was a farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation.”
It must be noted that even that standard requires “adequate opportunity for *817conference and preparation.” I submit, however, that the quoted statement of that standard so misplaces the emphasis that it can be construed to require only an inferior type of service. This Court’s ruling should require the State to provide for every defendant the equal protection of the laws. It seems to me that my oath of office to “administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich,” 1 compels me to do all in my power to require really effective service from appointed counsel. I much prefer the statement of the standard contained in the latest expression on the subject from this Court:
“An indigent defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Any experienced trial lawyer knows that a purported trial without adequate preparation amounts to no trial at all. That much was indicated in Powell v. State of Alabama, 1932, 287 U.S. 45, 57 [53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158] :
“ ‘ * * * during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.’
“This Circuit has been strict in its requirement of the effective assistance of counsel. The test was well stated in MacKenna v. Ellis, 1960, 280 F.2d 592, 599.
“ ‘We interpret the right to counsel as the right to effective counsel.
We interpret counsel to mean not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.’
“See also Mosley v. Dutton, 5 Cir. 1966, 367 F.2d 913, 916.
“Again in Roberts v. Dutton, 1966, 368 F.2d 465, we held that there had been no adequate preparation of the defense, and adopted the rule as well stated by Judge Murrah for the Tenth Circuit in Willis v. Hunter, 1948, 166 F.2d 721, 723:
“ ‘We think that the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplates the guiding hand of an able and responsible lawyer, devoted solely to the interest of his client; who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the law and facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity to present them to a court or jury in their most favorable light.’ ”
Brooks v. State of Texas, 5 Cir. 1967, 381 F.2d 619.
Judged by that standard, Daugherty did not have the effective assistance of counsel. The majority suggests that “counsel’s failure to assert mental incompetence as a defense appears to have been a strategical move * * Any experienced trial lawyer knows that sound strategy cannot be formulated without “consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation.” 2 Daugherty’s appointed counsel made no investigation whatever as to his client’s sanity. Even today we are in the dark as to the advisability of a defense on the ground of insanity. Indeed, the fifteen or twenty minutes allowed for conference was scarcely sufficient to permit Daugherty to relate to his counsel the long history of his troubles which might indicate mental illness.
That history included leaving grammar school while in the fifth grade, being sent to reform school when he was fifteen, thereafter serving a year in the penitentiary for stealing gasoline and then five years for stealing a car; cutting off his finger, cutting his heel tendons seven times, slashing his wrists on two different occasions, breaking his arm; receiving some 25 or 30 shock treatments; being examined by two psychiatrists in October 1959, only about two months be*818fore the robberies were committed, each of whom diagnosed his condition as “maniacal, depressive psychosis,” upon those certificates being “adjudged mentally ill and requires observation and/or treatment in a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others,” and his escape from the hospital to which he was committed. The prosecuting attorney informed the State trial judge that, “He was discharged in December prior to the commission of the offense by the Big Spring Hospital.” He neglected to say that Daugherty’s discharge was not as a cured patient but because he escaped.
If the facts and circumstances which came to the trial judge’s attention were not sufficient to indicate the necessity of a sanity hearing, the only reason must be the inadequate preparation of the case by Daugherty’s appointed counsel. The trial judge relied on assurances from the attorneys and on his own questioning of Daugherty, which has been quoted, all of which I submit are totally inadequate. Probing the depths of a human mind is a well-nigh impossible task even for a trained psychiatrist. It is not safe to rely on the opinions of attorneys or even judges as to the sanity of defendant.3
My brothers say that Daugherty was able “to bargain effectively”; they seem to think that he made a good deal. Frankly, I don’t think so. Seventy-five years seems a long time, virtually the same as a life sentence, for a defendant twenty-five years old. Whether the deal was good or bad, however, is not for us to judge. On this record it seems clear to me that Daugherty should have received an adequate hearing on his competence before he was put to trial, and also that he did not have the effective assistance of counsel. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, TUT-TLE, WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON and CLAYTON, Circuit Judges.

. 28 U.S.C.A. § 453.

. Powell v. State of Alabama, 1932, 287 U.S. 45, 47, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158.

. Van De Bogart v. United States, 5 Cir. 1962, 305 F.2d 583, 588.