Court Opinion

ID: 9541932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:29:48.51756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:22.372696
License: Public Domain

Concurring in Result
Hunter, J.
Probable cause for arrest is not the central issue before us. Rather, we are confronted with an examination of the reasonableness of an investigative detention of a motor vehicle. Judge Buchanan delineated the proper analysis under the facts of the case at bar. Williams v. State (1973), 299 N. E. 2d 882, 888 (Buchanan, P.J., dissenting). Therefore, I adopt his opinion as my own and reproduce it here as a correct interpretation of Luckett v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 174, 284 N. E. 2d 738:
“In order to determine whether there was a justifiable investigative detention a more complete statement of the facts is necessary:

“RESTATEMENT OF ESSENTIAL FACTS

“On the night in question, Indiana State Police Sergeant Cox and Trooper Fox were on routine patrol duty when they received a radio dispatch at 10:02 P.M., informing them that an armed robbery had been committed at the King’s Crown Motel in West Lafayette, Indiana, seven minutes prior to the broadcast. This report described the suspects as two Negroes, both about six feet tall. Shortly thereafter, a second report was received indicating that the suspects’ car (which remained undescribed) may have traveled northwest.
*555“At the time of these dispatches, the officers were located on State Road 18, four miles east of U.S. Highway 231, and fifteen miles northwest of the scene of the crime. Knowing Highway 231 to be a major link-up between Highway 52 and Interstate 65 (the most direct route to Chicago), the officers proceeded directly to the intersection of Highways 18 and 231 in order to observe northbound traffic on Highway 231.
“Upon arrival at the intersection, approximately three minutes later, the officers parked their patrol car and observed traffic which, according to Trooper Fox’s testimony, was unusually light for that time of day. Two to four minutes elapsed, during which time the officer observed two automobiles traveling north. When a third car came by, driven by Appellant Williams, the officers suspected the driver was a Negro.
“At this time, the officers had been able to calculate from their knowledge of speed limits, road conditions, elapsed time and distances, that if the fleeing suspects were traveling northwest in the most direct route to Chicago, they could be observed at just this point.
“Sergeant Cox testified to this fact as follows:
“ ‘We knew that a crime had been committed. We knew from the time element that the individual we were looking for had time to be about this location at about this time.’
“Acting upon this information the officers decided to follow the automobile driven by Appellant Williams, and while doing so clocked its speed at approximately seventy miles per hour which was violative of the sixty-five mile per hour limit in that zone.
“After receiving a third radio dispatch stating that one subject had used a sawed-off shotgun or pistol in the robbery, the officers overtook and passed the vehicle in an effort to get a better look at the occupant, which efforts were unsuccessful due to the darkness. The officers then proceeded a short distance to a second intersection located on the south edge of Wolcott, Indiana, where they parked in a service station drive. When the automobile came to a stop at this intersection, the officers took advantage of the improved lighting conditions to observe the occupant and one officer became certain that he was a Negro, although the other entertained some doubt.
“They then stopped the automobile at the side of the road. While asking Appellant Williams for his driver’s license, *556Trooper Fox looked into the car with his flashlight and saw Appellant Rogers lying in the back seat. Sergeant Cox discovered a sawed-off shotgun located on the front floor of the car in open view. These observations led the police officers to place the Appellants under arrest for armed robbery and to seize the incriminating evidence used at trial. (The appellants were later positively identified as the robbers by employees of the Motel.)
“The Indiana statute which gives ‘stop and frisk’ powers to law enforcement officers reads:
“ ‘9-1048. Officer’s duty to interrogate persons in public place — Limitations — Exemption from civil liability.— When a law enforcement officer in a distinctive uniform, or in plain clothes after having identified himself as a law enforcement officer reasonably infers, from the observation of unusual conduct under the circumstances and in light of his experience, that criminal activity has been, is being, or is about to be committed by any person, observed in a public place said officer may stop such person for a reasonable period of time and may make reasonable inquiries concerning the name and address of such person and an explanation of his action. Said stopping and inquiry shall be limited to those matters under the enforcement jurisdiction of the particular officer and when conducted within the limits specified herein shall not constitute official custody or arrest and shall not constitute grounds for civil liability for false arrest or false imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied.)
“ ‘9-1049. Search of outer clothing — Disposition of weapons found. — When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to the preceding section and he further reasonably concludes in light of his experience that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, he shall be entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. If the officer discovers a weapon he may seize it and if it is unlawfully possessed, said weapon shall be held for evidence in the prosecution of the appropriate criminal charge. If such person is not arrested and charged, said weapon shall be returned to him.
“‘9-1050. Act supplemental. — This act [§§S-10A? — 9-10501 shall be construed as supplemental to and not in *557limitation of any power or authority granted to law enforcement officers by other statutes or by the common law.’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“I.C. 1971, §§ 35-3-1-1 to 35-3-1-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 9-1048 to 9-1050 (Burns 1972 Suppl.)
“(These sections are hereafter collectively referred to as the Statute and individually by section number.)
“The Statute was enacted in 1969 apparently in responce to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. State of Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, which definitively enunciated the constitutional validity of non-arrest police detentions. The detention in Terry resulted solely from the one-the-spot observation of a police officer of the suspicious conduct of the defendants.
“The Statute adopts the same concept. A stop is authorized as a result of a police officer’s ‘observation of unusual conduct’ under the circumstances. It is not intended to apply if the officer has prior knowledge of criminal activity. Thus the majority misinterpret and misapply the Statute by measuring the officer’s conduct solely in terms of observation of unusual conduct.
“Section 1050 expressly recognizes the limited application of §§ 1048 and 1049 by stating the Statute is supplemental to and not in limitation of other statutes or the common law. “The same limitation was implicitly recognized by our Supreme Court in Luckett v. State, supra, which involved similar facts and significantly omitted any reference to the Statute. Furthermore, the Court found a stop, or investigative detention, was justified if reasonable under the circumstances and did not utilize the probable cause test as was mistakenly done by the majority in the case before us.
“Luckett merits closer scrutiny. A police officer received a radio dispatch alerting him to a recent burglary. The broadcast described the vehicle as a Chevrolet and gave its license plate prefix and described some of the stolen property. The officer subsequently observed an automobile which fit the description except for the make (Oldsmobile). The driver was stopped and requested by the officer to produce his operator’s license. At this time the officer, using a flashlight, observed some of the stolen goods in plain view in the back seat, whereupon the vehicle’s occupants were placed under arrest.
“The court found the officer’s conduct a justifiable detention even though he did not have probable cause to ‘formally arrest’ the automobile’s occupants:
*558“ ‘However, this case involves the flight of suspected felons, and Officer Jackson was placed in a position where he had to choose between immediate action on one hand and restraint on the other. Efficient and effective law enforcement, in which there is a strong governmental interest, can best be accomplished by immediate action such as that taken by Officer Jackson in the instant case. It appears to be well settled that there is nothing automatically unconstitutional in subjecting citizens to a brief detention under circumstances where probable cause for a formal arrest is lacking.’ (Original emphasis as to the word ‘automatically’ only.) Luckett, supra, at 741.
“In Luckett, the court clearly distinguished between ‘detention’ and ‘arrest’ in an automobile-stop transaction recognizing that a reasonable detention may ripen into an arrest:
“ ‘Upon reaching the car, Jackson, who was rightfully positioned, shined his flashlight inside where he observed the case of wristwatches which had been placed on the back seat. At this time, the suspects were placed under formal arrest, thus ending the period of brief detention. The reasonableness of an investigation condiwted during a period of brief detention where probable cause for a formal arrest is lacking is a matter which will have to be determined on a case by case basis. Under the facts of the case at bar, we hold that the investigation was reasonably conducted and that no constitutional violation occurred. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that when Jackson observed the wristwatches he then had probable cause to arest [sic] the appellant.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Luckett, supra, at 743.
“In formulating the standard of ‘reasonableness,’ Justice Hunter speaking for a unanimous court did not refer to the Statute, or its requirement of ‘unusual conduct.’
“It would seem, then, logically enough, that two standards exist by which the legality of non-arrest detentions may be measured. The standard of ‘unusual conduct’ which should be employed per the Statute in cases where the intrusion is founded upon on-the-scene observations and the Luckett test, applicable to situations, as here, where police conduct is based .upon independent knowledge and circumstances apart from such observations. This is consistent with § 1050 of the Statute, Terry v. State of Ohio, supra, and recent enlargements of the Terry rule by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Adams, Warden v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612.
*559“Were it not so police officers, with prior knowledge of criminal activity could only detain moving vehicles if probable cause was present or for observation of unusual conduct. “Other Indiana cases relied upon by the majority in support of its position that an arrest occurs whenever a vehicle is stopped dealt with situations in which probable cause was found to exist in the first instance. Lynch v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 284, 280 N. E. 2d 821; Paxton v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 264, 263 N. E. 2d 636; Patterson v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 499, 255 N. E. 2d 520.
“They are not pertinent to the inquiry of justifiable investigative detention.
“As many foreign jurisdictions recognize, compelling reasons exist for permitting a police officer to stop and briefly detain a motor vehicle absent probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Miller (10th Cir. 1971), 452 F. 2d 731, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926; United States v. Catalano (7th Cir. 1971), 450 F. 2d 985, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 928; Carpenter v. Sigler (8th Cir. 1969), 419 F. 2d 169; United States v. Gazaway (N. D. Ga. 1969), 297 F. Supp. 67; Bramlette v. Superior Court of Merced County (1969), 273 Cal. App. 2d 799, 78 Cal. Rptr. 532; Palmore v. United States (D. C. Ct. of App. 1972), 290 A. 2d 573, footnote 24 at 583 (U.S. appeal pending).
“Ours is a nation on wheels and the frequent use of the automobile in the commission of crime often places police officers in emergency situations requiring immediate action. Luckett V. State. They have a limited range of responses. Do nothing, allow escape, and risk violence visited upon the public by fleeing criminals. Continued surveillance may also be possible, but is unacceptable if suspects are thought to be armed. Resort to ‘arrest’ is also an alternative, but only if the officers do indeed possess enough information to constitute probable cause in a technical sense.
“The only effective alternative in many instances involving suspects in moving vehicles is direct action half way between inaction and arrest, i.e., investigative detention reasonable [sic] conducted under the circumstances. The recognized governmental interest in apprehension of criminals demands such investigative stops: Ballou v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1st Cir. 1968), 403 F. 2d 982, cert. denied. 394 U.S. 909, 89 S. Ct. 1024; See also: United States v. Edwards (5th Cir. 1972), 469 F. 2d 1362; United States v. Catalano, supra; Cox v. United Stores (D. C. Ct. of App. 1969), 256 A. 2d 917; W. LaFave, ‘Street Encounters’ and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 *560MICH. L. REV. 40 (1968); Note, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1967).
“According to Luckett an investigative detention of a moving vehicle is justifiable if ‘the facts known ... at the time he [the police officer] stopped the car were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an investigation was appropriate.’
“Various factors determine reasonableness of the stop. “Location of the vehicle within the range of possible flight is one. If the vehicle is observed within the span of time reasonably required to travel from the scene of the crime to the point of observation a stop may be justified even if the officers received a description of the car which was at variance with the vehicle observed. Luckett v. State, supra; Cox v. United States, supra; Bailey v. United States (D. C. Cir. 1967), 389 F. 2d 305.
“Likewise flight of a vehicle from the scene of the crime along a logical escape route may be another factor in determining reasonableness. Coleman v. United States (D. C. Cir. 1969), 420 F. 2d 616.
“The necessity of rapid response in an emergency to avoid escape by the suspects should be considered. See, e.g., Luckett v. State, supra; United States v. Edwards, supra; United States v. Catalano, supra; Coleman v. United States, supra; Carpenter v. Sigler, supra; Ballou v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra.
“Lack of visibility due to darkness may tend to justify temporary detention: Carpenter v. Sigler, supra; Bramlette v. Superior Court of Merced County, supra; People v. Henze (1967), 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545.
“Lack of or inaccurate description does not destroy reasonableness of the stop: Luckett v. State, supra (different model); United States v. Edwards, supra; Cox v. United States, supra (different color).
“In the fact situation under consideration the combination of these factors adds up to a reasonable stop. The location of the stopped vehicle was within the range of possible flight. In fact the juxtaposition of time and distance between the patrol car and the appellant’s auto as calculated by the officers, pinpointed the exact meeting place of the two vehicles on Road 231, the most logical escape route northwest of West Lafayette — and the most direct route in a northwesterly direction to Chicago. It was dark. The suspects were known to be two Negroes — one was observed *561in a vehicle traveling in excess of the legal speed limit. Even though immediate action was necessary, the auto was trailed and the occupant observed for more accurate identification.
“Unlike Luckett in which the officers had the color of the automobile, three digits of the license plate prefix, and three suspects appearing in the car, there nevertheless was a coalescence of circumstances sufficient to reasonably justify investigative detention of appellant’s vehicle. The actions of these police officers was proper and reasonable police action — witnessed by the ripening of their temporary detention into arrest for probable cause when they observed the second suspect and a sawed-off shotgun out of sight in the rear of appellant’s automobile.
“Two random samples are illustrative of investigative detentions held to be reasonable under less persuasive circumstances.
“In Carpenter v. Sigler (8th Cir. 1969), 419 F. 2d 169, the court upheld an investigative detention based upon Terry, looking at these meager facts:
“ ‘It was an early morning hour in a small town where unidentified cars do not routinely travel at that time. The car had out of county license plates. There had been a series of burglaries in the town. During the period of surveillance by the officers the car moved very slowly past closed business establishments and pursued a rather erratic course through the streets of the town. These facts taken together all point to sufficient justification for stopping the Carpenter auto and requiring the occupants to identify themselves.’
“In United States v. Jackson (9th Cir. 1971), 448 F. 2d 963, police detention was upheld on facts bearing marked resemblance to those before us. City police officers were on routine patrol duty at 11:20 P.M. when they received a radio report that a store had been robbed. The report described the suspects as two Negro males and stated that they fled in an easterly direction. Being familiar with the area, the officers proceeded to an intersection which they calculated to be in the line of a possible escape route. Moments after reaching the intersection, the officers saw an automobile traveling south with three Negro males inside. After a short period of surveillance, the car was stopped by use of a flashing red light.
“Finding that the officers were faced with an emergency situation, that the third occupant in the vehicle could have *562been a ‘lookout’ or driver during the commission of the crime and that the automobile in which the subjects were riding was headed in the direction of a Negro area of the city, the court held that the officers’ actions were justifiable:
“ ‘Under these facts the officers acted reasonably in stopping the Cadillac and questioning the occupants concerning their identity and residences. This was intelligent, effective police work. If police officers may not do what was done here, law enforcement would be seriously crippled. The Fourth Amendment was not intended to handcuff the police in their reasonable effort to handcuff criminals. [Citations omitted.]’ 448 F. 2d, at 970. (Emphasis supplied.)
“Whether the stopping of a moving vehicle for investigative purposes under appropriate circumstances is denominated an ‘arrest’, a ‘preliminary arrest’, or whatever, the urgent need for investigative detention exists. Furthermore, such stops are legally justifiable by Indiana, federal, and sister state cases. To draw fine lines as to what constitutes an ‘arrest’ in these circumstances is to engage in stultifying semantics.
“The decision of the learned trial judge should be affirmed.”
(Footnotes omitted)