Court Opinion

ID: 9735876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:33:49.706478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:02.104656
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree that the information provided by Webb and the Hospital pursuant to the form submitted by Eitler with her request for an evaluation did not violate public policy. Therefore Hitler may not successfully claim that she was defamed by the information provided to Star Light. Neither may she recover upon a theory that the defendants blacklisted her.
I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the analysis of the majority with regard to the effect of the "authorization/release" provision of the form signed by Eitler. This portion of the form authorized Webb and the Hospital to forward the evaluation to Star Light and specifically released Star Light and Webb/Hospital "from any and all liability for damages in the furnishing and receiving of this information". Appellant's App. at 92. Notwithstanding I.C. § 22-5-3-1(b), the majority concludes that this release confers "absolute" immunity to Webb and the Hospital. I respectfully disagree.
The statute confers immunity upon a former employer providing information "unless ... the information disclosed was known to be false at the time the disclosure was made." Id. (emphasis supplied). If this provision is to have any meaning, it signifies a binding legislative policy determination that a former employer may not avoid civil liability for providing information known to be false. This is certainly contrary to the majority's "absolute" immunity analysis which, under the cireum-stances, would permit the employer to provide knowingly false information with total impunity.4
*504The majority goes further and holds that the absolute privilege conferred by the authorization/release is all-encompassing and includes the "right" of a former employer in providing information to a prospective employer, to attempt to prevent the former employee from obtaining employment elsewhere. I respectfully disagree because I.C. § 22-5-3-2 prohibits such conduct. See Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). I must agree, however, that given the current posture of the law as enunciated in Burk, an employee who voluntarily left the former employment, as did Eitler in this case, may not utilize the Blacklisting Statute to launch a law suit.
Although I disagree with the over-breadth with which the majority cloaks the authorization/release, I nevertheless agree that the information provided by Webb and the Hospital does not give rise to a viable defamation claim or a viable "blacklisting" claim.
Webb and the Hospital merely filled out the pre-printed form with checkmarks and an "X." The form was submitted by Eitler with the understanding that it would be filled out and with the further understanding that the various rating categories were not all positive evaluation ratings. The information was provided by Webb and the Hospital as requested. It was within the discretion of Star Light as to what weight, if any, would be given to the evaluation.
In this context, as to the defamation claim the information was clearly evaluative in nature and constituted the subjective opinion of the evaluator. It was not susceptible to a determination that the evaluative information was either true or false. It was not therefore within the possible seope of a defamation action.
Furthermore, as noted, the information was submitted to Star Light as requested by Eitler. Even were we to include employees who had voluntarily left their former employment within the purview of the Blacklisting Statute, neither Webb nor the Hospital attempted to prevent Star Light from hiring Kitler even though the nature of the evaluation could have reasonably been considered as negative and as a strongly unfavorable evaluation.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the affirmance of the summary judgment granted in favor of Webb and the Hospital.

. To the extent that the authorization/release confers duties, responsibilities, and benefits or privileges upon the respective parties to it, it is analogous to a contract if not a contract in fact. Accordingly, it is well settled that ce statutes and the law as otherwise existing become a part of every contract and must be read into it.' " Prof'l Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind.1982) (quoting Dollman v. Pauley, 202 Ind. 387, 394, 174 N.E. *504729, 731 (1931)). For this reason it would appear wholly inappropriate to construe contractual language in a manner violative of statutorily enunciated public policy. As stated in Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind.1997);
"Indiana courts have long recognized and respected the freedom to contract. We recognize a 'very strong presumption of enforceability of contracts that represent the freely bargained agreement of the parties.' However, in certain circumstances a court may declare an otherwise valid contract unenforceable if it contravenes the public policy of Indiana." (citations omitted).
In determining public policy we first look to the Constitution and to the statutory law of the State. Id.