Court Opinion

ID: 9669059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:38:33.935829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.863420
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Appellant sought new counsel after pleading guilty and before the date set for sentencing. A capias was issued for appellant on the day the first sentencing hearing was scheduled and his bond was increased at that time. The question presented is whether the trial court was required to permit substitution of new counsel on the second scheduled *309date for sentencing. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
Nothing we have said today casts any doubt or places any qualification upon our previous holdings that limit the right to counsel of choice.... We have recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, ... and against the demands of its calendar[J ... This is not a case about a court’s power to enforce rules or adhere to practices that determine which attorneys may appear before it, or to make scheduling and other decisions that effectively exclude a defendant’s first choice of counsel.
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, — U.S. -,-, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565-66, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (internal citations omitted). I believe the trial court’s “wide latitude” included the authority in this case to deny the motion to substitute and to proceed with the rescheduled sentencing hearing.