Court Opinion

ID: 9712681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:58:27.178775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.747251
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Spaeth, J.,
This is an appeal from the refusal of the court below to approve an agreement for a permanent allowance, stipulated to by both parties to a divorce action. Since the court should have approved the agreement, we remand with instructions to enter an order granting an allowance in accordance with the agreement.
On October 27, 1972, appellee George Lyall instituted an action in divorce a.v.m. on the ground of indignities against appellant Mary Lyall. On March 2, 1973, appellant’s attorney filed a petition for appointment of a guardian ad litem for appellant because of her recent psychiatric hospitalizations and her inability to communicate with her attorney and participate in her own defense. Following a court-ordered neuropsychiatric examination, a guardian was appointed.
Two master’s hearings were held in July, 1974. At the second, the parties entered into the record a stipulated agreement providing for a permanent allowance for appellant regardless of the outcome of the proceedings. The master subsequently filed a report recommending that a divorce be granted. On September *65226, 1974, the court entered a final decree in divorce, but it did not enter an order for permanent allowance.
On October 22, 1974, appellant’s attorney petitioned the court for an order providing permanent alimony under Section 45 of the Divorce Law, Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237, §45, 23 P.S. §45. Attached to the petition was a proposed order incorporating the terms of the stipulation. The court did not issue the stipulated order but entered a rule upon appellee to show cause why he should not be ordered to pay permanent alimony. The rule was made returnable on November 15, 1974, but in the interim appellant filed this appeal.1
In its opinion, the lower court points out that appellant does not qualify for alimony under Section 45 of the Divorce Law since that section permits the award only when the spouse is insane. Both appellant in her petition and the lower court, however, overlooked Section 48 of the Divorce Law.2 Section 48 provides:
“In case of the application of a spouse for divorce from a spouse who is insane or suffering from serious mental disorder, the court, or a judge thereof to whom the application is made, shall have the power before granting the divorce to decree an allowance for the support of the defendant spouse in such amount as it may direct. The allowance herein provided may be subsequently adjusted to conform to changed conditions.” (Emphasis supplied). Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237, §48, added Sept. 22, 1972, P.L. 880, No. 202, §2, 23 P.S. §48.
Thus, for an allowance for support to be granted, a defendant spouse’s psychiatric difficulties need no longer rise to the level of legal insanity; a serious mental disorder will suffice.
*653Here the record clearly shows that appellant was suffering from a serious mental disorder at the time of the proceedings. A guardian ad litem was needed to properly prepare appellant’s defense. The court neuro-psychiatrist found appellant to be “seriously ill” and diagnosed her as paranoid schizophrenic. The first master’s hearing was terminated abruptly due to appellant’s uncontrolled outbursts. Appellee’s testimony at the second hearing established that appellant had been institutionalized several times for emotional problems. Appellant’s testimony at that hearing was often bizarre and incoherent.3
Testimony at that hearing also established appellant’s need for a support allowance. She testified that she was not then employed, nor had she been for several years. Her behavior at the hearing also indicated that she would probably have difficulty finding and holding employment.
. This is precisely the kind of difficult situation that Section 48 was designed to alleviate. Since, therefore, the court had the power to order an allowance for support, it should have done so in accordance with the parties’ stipulation. Where parties to a divorce stipulate as to the amount of alimony to be paid, the court should accept the stipulation in the absence of fraud or overreaching by either party and enter an order accordingly. Strickler v. Strickler, 138 Pa. Superior Ct. 34, 10 A.2d 69 (1939); Hall v. Hall, 97 Pa. Superior Ct. 429 (1929); Freedman & Freedman, Law of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsylvania §482 (2d ed. 1957). Cf., Foley Bros., Inc. v. *654Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 584, 163 A.2d 80 (1960). Such an order does not affect “the dignity or prerogatives of the Court, but relate[s] to a matter which concern[s] only the parties themselves.” Strickler v. Strickler, supra at 36, 10 A.2d at 69, quoted in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth, supra at 590, 163 A.2d at 84.
Here there is no evidence of fraud or overreaching. To the contrary, appellant’s guardian ad litem stipulated on the record that the agreement was acceptable. Moreover, the agreement itself seems fair and comprehensive. It provides for, inter alia, a fifty dollar a week allowance for appellant, a life estate for her in the marital home, payment for major repairs to the property, life and health insurance policies for her benefit, a limited amount charge account at Gimbel’s Department Store, and, upon a showing of insurability of appellant, a monthly ten dollar bank deposit in the name of the guardian towards the purchase of an automobile. It would continue during the lifetime of the parties4 or until appellant’s remarriage.
For these reasons, the case is remanded to the court below with instructions to enter an order for an allowance to appellant in accordance with the agreement stipulated to by the parties.
Hoffman, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

. An appeal may properly be taken as soon as the divorce decree is entered since the decree terminates all property rights and duties of either party. Section 55 of the Divorce Law, supra, 23 P.S. §55.

. Appellant’s brief in this court discusses Section 48.

. The issue of whether the divorce was properly granted under these circumstances, although raised in appellant’s brief, is not before us since no exceptions were filed to the master’s report and the issue was not presented to the lower court. Wiggins v. Wiggins, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 298, 90 A.2d 275 (1952); Epstein v. Epstein, 93 Pa. Superior Ct. 398 (1928). Cf., Diiliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).

. If appellee predeceases appellant, only the promise to pay the premium on the life insurance policy would act as a claim against appellee’s estate, but appellant’s life estate in the home would continue until her death.