Court Opinion

ID: 9737107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:16:20.979461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.570645
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's determination that Anna King, William H. Stuckey, and Crystal Stuckey (Homeowners) do not have standing to enforce the restrictive covenants contained in the Plat against the Ebrens. In my view, Corner v. Mills makes it clear that a general scheme or plan of a development exists when "the circumstances and facts of the case, including the language of the deeds and the grantors' actions, reveal an intent by them to create such a plan or scheme." 650 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). It is apparent to me that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Homeowners, reveals such an intent on the part of Donald Smith.
The majority cites Corner for the proposition that a common plan will exist where a subdivision is recorded in a single plat. Op. p. 829. The Corner court's decision, however, is based on the idea that the facts of the case can indicate that a grant- or had a common scheme of development in mind when he or she sold off plots of a larger tract of land. Corner, 650 N.E.2d at 715. Specifically, I would note that in Corner, the Shuperts purchased a tract of land in 1942 that was subsequently sold off piece by piece. The first four lots sold had no restrictions. Lot Number 11 was sold off with a list of restrictions, including one that prevented the land from being used for any purpose except for residential use. Two lots were sold after Lot Number 11, but only one of them had the residential use restriction. In 1946, the Shuperts recorded a plat of the tract and named the area Christiana Acres. Thirteen lots were sold after the recording, some included restrictions in their deeds while others did not. Id. at 714.
In 19983, Marie Corner-who owned one of the plots that originally was purchased by the Shuperts-decided to use her plot for commercial purposes. She petitioned the trial court to strike the residential restrictions. The trial court upheld the residential restrictions, finding a common scheme or plan of residential development. Id.
On appeal, Corner argued that the trial court's finding was erroneous because "some of the covenants are ambiguous and ... many of the deeds are not identical in their restrictions." Id. at 715. Corner also argued that "some propérties do not have restrictions on them at all, and ... several lots were conveyed without restrictions before the plat was recorded." Id. We affirmed the trial court, however, noting that "the pertinent focus is on whether the cireumstances and facts of the case, including the language of the deeds and the grantors' actions, reveal an intent by them to create such a plan or scheme." Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, we noted that:
[Where a common grantor opens up a tract of land to be sold in lots and blocks, and before any lots are sold, inaugurates a general scheme of improvement for such entire tract intended to enhance the value of each lot, and each lot subsequently sold by such grantor, is made subject to such scheme of improvement, there is created and annexed to the entire tract what is termed a negative equitable easement, in which the several purchasers of lots have an interest, and between whom there exists mutuality of covenant and consideration.
Id. at 715-16 (quoting Elliot v. Keely, 121 Ind.App. 529, 539-40, 98 N.E.2d 374, 379 (1951)). The Corner court acknowledged *833that some plots' deeds did not contain the restrictions but also held that this did not "conclusively show the nonexistence of" a common scheme or plan. Id. at 715.
If the Corner court found sufficient evidence to demonstrate a common scheme or plan, then here the Homeowners have at least successfully raised a genuine issue of material fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment. All parties had a common grantor, Donald R. Smith. Additionally, Smith's affidavit stated that he:
[Hlad a common and general plan in selling off pieces of the parent parcel for construction thereon of single family residences to provide that each and every tract so conveyed would be subject to the same mutually enforceable restrictive covenants so as to assure that each tract conveyed would have constructed thereon no more than one single family dwelling with an attached garage.
Appellant's App. p. 48. Even more telling, the King and Stuckey tracts had the same restriction with respect to structures as did the subdivision lots. Appellant's App. p. 19, 20, 23. Finally,; the reason the platted subdivision came into existence was external. The Franklin County Area Planning Commission's executive director stated that "[The Unified Zoning Ordinance of Franklin County, Indianal,] would not have allowed [the Smiths] to convey the [lots later included in the subdivision] as separate building lots which would each be entitled to receive an improvement location permit to allow construction of a residence thereon unless those tracts had been platted into a Subdivision." Appellant's App. p. 52.
I also note that the Ebrens were not without notice. All the parcels at issue here were part of Smith's original tract. The deeds from the lots that made up the original tract could have been inspected to determine which lots were within Smith's original common plan. I would also note that the Eibrensg's answer alleged that they advised William H. Stuckey that the pole barn was going to be erected before construction began. Appellant's App. p. 88. Stuckey did not object to the proposed project. Appellant's App. p. 38. If such an allegation is true, the Homeowners' claim for equitable relief may have been compromised under the doctrine of laches. Black's Low Dictionary 875 (6th ed. 1990) ("Equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights").
In short, summary judgment was not warranted here inasmuch as a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Smith had a common scheme or plan in mind when he began selling parts of his original tract for homesteads. However, because the Homeowners are seeking equitable relief, I would permit the Ebrens to more fully develop their affirmative defense of laches.