Court Opinion

ID: 9765801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:20:05.840617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:15.863918
License: Public Domain

McDONALD, Presiding Judge
(concurring).
I concur with Judge Woodley as to the disposition of this cause, in affirming the judgment of the trial court. However, I am not in accord with his reasoning in reaching the result.
I think this case should be affirmed under the provisions of Art. 212, V.A.C.C.P., wherein a peace officer is authorized to arrest without a warrant an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony, or as an “offense against the public peace.” Haller v. State, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 294, 162 S.W. 872; Hackett v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 414, 357 S.W.2d 391.
I further feel that the provisions of the Ordinance of the City of Austin, derived from Art. 214, V.A.C.C.P., are adequate to justify an affirmance of this conviction.
The only real distinction between the two foregoing provisions that is, Art. 212, supra, and the Austin Ordinance, is that the statute says, “against the public peace”, and the Ordinance says “breach of the peace”.
Judge Woodley in effect says “disorderly conduct” is the reason for the arrest without a warrant. I cannot agree with the New Jersey decision cited in his opinion wherein the conclusion is reached that “all disorderly conduct is not necessarily a breach of the peace.”
While I adhere to the early decision of this Court and the pronouncement therein in the case of Ex parte Strittmatter, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 156, 124 S.W. 906, holding the vagrancy statute constitutional, I am not unmindful of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas as recently as February 28, 1966, in the case of Hicks, Petitioner v. District of Columbia, 86 S.Ct. 798, wherein Mr. Justice Douglas expressed his view that a statute defining “vagrant” was unconstitutional. I am content to follow the precedents announced by this Court until such time as the Supreme Court of the United States hands down an opinion to the contrary. I do not feel that the case of Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888, is in point to the extent of successfully supporting an attack upon the constitutionality of our “vagrancy statute”, and declaring it unconstitutional.
I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.