Court Opinion

ID: 9573675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:57:39.716753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:42:19.438600
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
1. Fabe’s motion for rehearing asserts we erred in holding his failure to follow the discretionary appeals procedure deprived this court of jurisdiction to consider the issues in Division 1 above. He argues these issues were preserved as the trial court denied his motions to the same effect earlier in the proceedings and because he did not invoke OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) in his post-trial motion.
While Fabe asserted these issues earlier in the proceedings, he also unquestionably asserted these points in his post-trial motion, which was entitled, “Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Verdict and Judgment, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New Trial.” Further, Fabe relied on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, one of the grounds for a motion to set aside the judgment. OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (1). Thus, neither Fabe’s misstating the record by asserting that his post-trial motion was only to reconsider earlier rulings, nor his failure to cite OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), is of any consequence. See Holloway v. Frey, 130 Ga. App. 224, 227 (202 SE2d 845). The motion denied was to set aside the judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), and the discretionary appeals procedure is applicable. See State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Yancey, 188 Ga. App. 8, 9 (371 SE2d 883). Further, “[a] careful reading of OCGA § 5-6-35 leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the legislature never intended the application process to be circumvented.” State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Yancey, 258 Ga. 802 (375 SE2d 39).
Moreover, compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional. State of Ga. v. Baldwin, 187 Ga. App. 611, 612 (371 SE2d 135). Therefore, Fabe’s failure deprives this court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, dismissal of this portion of Fabe’s appeal is required. State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Yancey, supra.
While Fabe argues that he can assert these arguments at any time, he must do so in a court having appellate jurisdiction. His failure to comply with the discretionary appeals procedure deprives this court of jurisdiction just as if he failed to file a timely notice of appeal. OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (1).
*3332. Fabe argues that he was entitled to rely on Floyd’s forged signature. The thrust of this argument is that Fabe could file suit knowingly relying on a forged signature. No presumption in our law authorizes such conduct. See OCGA § 24-1-1 (6).
Fabe cites OCGA § 14-2-151 (a), concerning corporate seals, as such a presumption. He does not cite, however, OCGA § 14-2-151 (b), which provides: “[A] third party without knowledge or reason to know to the contrary may rely on such document as being what it purports to be.” Since Fabe had knowledge to the contrary, he could not rely on any presumption under OCGA § 14-2-151 (a). In any event, this Code section concerns the corporation, and it would not entitle Fabe to a presumption that Floyd’s forged individual signature was valid. Thus, this authority and other precedent, authorizing an action against a corporation because of the corporate seal, are not persuasive in this action brought against Floyd individually.
Further, Fabe’s primary argument has been that he could rely on Floyd’s forged notarized signature to bring this action against Floyd individually. The copies of the agreement in the record, however, show that Floyd’s only notarized signature was his forged signature in the “firm acknowledgement,” and that there is no acknowledgement for Floyd’s forged signature as an individual indemnitor.
This “firm acknowledgement” differs significantly from the individual acknowledgement. .The “firm acknowledgement” in relevant part provides: “[Floyd] thereupon acknowledged to me that he executed the same as and for the act and deed of said firm” (Emphasis supplied.) The individual acknowledgements in the record do not contain the emphasized language.
As this action was against Floyd individually, the presumptions Fabe offers, even if valid, would not support filing this lawsuit against Floyd. Further, although asserting that he could bring this lawsuit relying on actions of Floyd’s attorney, Fabe provides no theory for how such conduct could prove that Floyd signed the document which Fabe knew was forged prior to filing suit. While Fabe cites Shiver & Barnett v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 57, 58 (2 SE2d 760), this case is not authority for the proposition he asserts. Shiver concerns the rebuttable presumption that arises from a party’s failure to produce evidence in his possession at trial, not the circumstances here. In any event, even a Shiver presumption does not arise if the party has no burden of producing evidence. Southern Express Co. v. B. R. Elec. Co., 126 Ga. 472, 477-478 (55 SE 254). Moreover, this argument is contrary to trial testimony from one of Fabe’s attorneys that they could only rely on the information they had and not what Floyd’s attorney said. We note that the information Fabe had that Jones had Floyd’s signature forged was the result of Fabe’s own investigation and was not information received from Floyd or Floyd’s attorney.
*334As there were no presumptions for Fabe to rely on, his arguments on when presumptions may be rebutted are meaningless.
3. Fabe argues that we “egregiously” overlooked the decision of our Supreme Court in Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Swindle, 260 Ga. 685 (398 SE2d 365), and accuses us of “abdicating [our] responsibility to consider the entire record when reviewing damage awards.”
Swindle, an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), stated: “Damages recoverable in an FELA action are compensatory only.” 260 Ga. at 686. Therefore, the jury was limited in its considerations in reaching its verdict, and a different standard of review could be employed in measuring whether the verdict was excessive.
Here, while punitive damages were not authorized separately, the jury was authorized to award damages for Floyd’s mental distress (Yost v. Torok, supra at 95, n. 3), and the damages are awarded according to the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors, a much broader standard. See Westview Cemetery v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 544-546 (216 SE2d 776). Swindle is not precedent here.
Fabe also complains that we did not refer to certain testimony he believes favors his case. This argument disregards the basic rule that on appeal we must construe the evidence most strongly in support of the verdict. See J. C. Penney &c. Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 190 Ga. App. 727 (380 SE2d 282). Therefore, our failure to refer to evidence which might have supported Fabe’s case, if the jury had chosen to credit it, does not mean that we did not consider it. In the same manner, our failure to refer to Fabe’s attorney asking Floyd’s attorney on cross-examination in open court, “[D]id you go to law school?,” did not mean that we did not consider it, as we assume the jury also did in assessing the damages to be awarded. Moreover, the evidence suggests that Fabe’s real feelings were reflected in the testimony from his witnesses suggesting that a $185,000 loss could not be written off without someone being sued.
Fabe also complains that the amount Fabe was sued for should not be considered in measuring whether the damages awarded Floyd were excessive. This argument fails to consider rather basic human nature: One facing a lawsuit for one or 100 dollars reasonably could be expected to suffer less mental distress than one facing a suit for over $185,000. Further, Floyd’s testimony alone was sufficient to prove his mental suffering. See OCGA § 24-4-8.
4. Fabe’s other arguments on issues he waived are also not persuasive. He made no motion to restrict Floyd’s argument and made no objection to any part of the argument. Also, the record shows that when the trial judge offered Fabe’s attorney the opportunity to present additional argument on the divided argument issue, Fabe refused by stating, “I think I could just tell him [co-counsel] what I wanted *335to.” These issues were waived. In any event, it is not apparent that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to permit the divided argument. Goforth v. Wigley, 178 Ga. App. 558, 561 (343 SE2d 788).
Decided March 12, 1991
Rehearing denied March 27, 1991
Andrew J. Hill, Jr., Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, Terrence B. Adamson, for appellant.
Cornwell, Church & Healy, James E. Cornwell, Jr., Cathey & Strain, Edward E. Strain III, for appellee.

Motion for rehearing denied.