Court Opinion

ID: 9877474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:05:23.922364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:11.989497
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                 No. 22-1415
                              September 27, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOHNATHON THOMAS WINGFIELD,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,

Judge.

      Johnathon Wingfield appeals his sentence following his Alford pleas.

AFFIRMED.

      Jessica Donels of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gribble Gentry Brown

Bergmann & Messamer L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Scott, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

      Johnathon Wingfield reached a plea agreement with the State to resolve

multiple child-sex-abuse charges. Pursuant to the agreement, Wingfield entered

Alford pleas1 to two counts of an amended charge of assault with intent to commit

sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11(3) (2021). Under the

agreement, both parties agreed to recommend the maximum sentence of two

years for each charge with the sentences to be run consecutively. The agreement

allowed the State to argue for imposition of the term of incarceration and Wingfield

to argue for suspension of the sentence.

      After accepting Wingfield’s pleas, the district court ordered a presentence

investigation report (PSI) to be prepared. Wingfield failed to cooperate in the

preparation of the PSI. Nevertheless, a PSI was prepared in time for Wingfield’s

initial sentencing hearing. The PSI was not favorable to Wingfield. At the initial

hearing, Wingfield’s counsel asked for a continuance to allow Wingfield a second

chance to cooperate with the PSI process. His counsel argued that Wingfield

misunderstood his obligation to cooperate in the process.        The district court

granted the request, Wingfield cooperated in the process, and a supplemental PSI

was prepared and filed with the court before Wingfield’s rescheduled sentencing

hearing.

      At the rescheduled hearing, the district court followed the joint

recommendation of imposing two, two-year sentences to be served consecutively.

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37‒38 (1970) (permitting a criminal

defendant to enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt by acknowledging strong
evidence of guilt and voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly agreeing to allow
the court to consider such strong evidence of guilt in accepting the plea).
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The court resolved the competing arguments over suspension or imposition of the

sentence in favor of the State, requiring Wingfield to serve the indeterminate four-

year prison sentence. Wingfield appeals. He argues the district court abused its

discretion by failing to consider the supplemental PSI and to properly weigh the

information in that supplemental report.

       Because Wingfield challenges his sentence rather than the Alford plea itself,

he has good cause to appeal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa

2020) (finding good cause to appeal following a guilty plea when the defendant

challenges the sentence rather than the plea); State v. Phillips, __ N.W.2d __, __,

2023 WL 2672058, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023) (finding good cause to appeal

following an Alford plea when only the sentence is challenged). There is no dispute

that Wingfield’s sentence is within the statutory limits, so we review for an abuse

of discretion. See State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385 (Iowa 2020) (“If the

sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, as it is here, we review for an abuse

of discretion.”). A sentencing decision that falls within statutory limits is “cloaked

with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of

discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Wilbourn, 974

N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105–06).                    A

sentencing court abuses its discretion only when the discretion is exercised for

reasons that are clearly untenable or clearly unreasonable. Id.

       Wingfield argues the court disregarded its obligation to consider the

supplemental PSI. See Iowa Code § 901.5 (listing the PSI as one of the items of

pertinent information the court is to consider in choosing a sentencing option). The

defendant bears the burden of proving the court abused its discretion. State v.
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LeGrand, 501 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). Wingfield failed to meet his

burden.

       The crux of Wingfield’s argument is that the court did not acknowledge the

supplemental PSI’s recommendations that he complete sex-offender treatment in

the community rather than in prison; made clear it was disregarding the

supplement when it stated it did not believe the supplement represented

Wingfield’s true self; and ignored Wingfield’s expression of remorse at the

sentencing hearing. We are not persuaded by Wingfield’s arguments.

       Wingfield’s claim that the district court did not consider the supplemental

PSI is directly rebutted by the district court’s statement that it considered the

supplemental report. As to the weight to give the supplemental PSI, the court is

not required to follow the PSI recommendations—it is only one factor the court is

permitted to consider. State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2019). The

fact the court imposed a prison sentence while the PSI author recommended a

suspended sentence does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

       As to Wingfield’s contention that the court ignored his expression of

remorse, the court was not required to take his statements, either at sentencing or

to the PSI interviewer, at face value. We give district court judges significant

latitude in sentencing, Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106, and this includes their

judgment about a defendant’s sincerity. See State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d

344, 355 (Iowa 2022) (noting that whether a defendant shows sincere remorse or

lack of remorse is a proper consideration in sentencing); State v. Watkins, No. 02-

0075, 2002 WL 31018187, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2002) (finding no abuse

of discretion when the district court’s recital of factors included the “defendant’s
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lack of sincere remorse”). Just because the district court did not believe what

Wingfield told the PSI interviewer that ended up in the supplemental report does

not mean the court ignored it. We also note that the district court’s conclusion that

Wingfield lacked remorse is supported by the record. For example, the initial PSI

noted Wingfield resisted participation in treatment. With this fact in mind, it is

justifiable that the court doubted the sincerity of the about-face Wingfield exhibited

in the second interview and in the resulting supplemental PSI. Even at the final

sentencing hearing, while Wingfield stated remorse for the difficulty of the events

of the case on “everyone,” he expressed no remorse for the actions leading to his

convictions. This detail further supports the court’s determination that Wingfield

lacked remorse.

       Wingfield failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court

abused its discretion. He has not shown that the decision to impose a prison

sentence was clearly untenable or clearly unreasonable. As a result, we affirm the

decision of the district court.

       AFFIRMED.