Court Opinion

ID: 9417484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:18:55.060564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:43.657377
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
with whom concurred The Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Gray, dissenting.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Gray, and myself are unable to assent to the opinion and judgment of the court.
The effect of the statutes of Iowa is to forbid the introduction of intoxicating liquors from other States- for sale, except for medicinal, mechanical,' culinary, or sacramental purposes. • They may be brought in for such purposes, by any person, or carrier, for- another person or corporation,. if consigned to some one authorized by the laws of Iowa to buy and sell intoxicating liquors. And these statutes permit the sale of foreign intoxicating liquors, imported under the laws' of the United States, provided such sale is- by the importer, in the original casks or packages, and in quantities not less than those in -which they are required to be imported.
It appears upon the face of the declaration that the plaintiffs— one of whom is a citizen of Iowa — made application to the board of supervisors of Marshall County, in that State, for permission, under the statute, to buy and sell in that county intoxicating liquors for medicinal, culinary, mechanical, and sacramental purposes, and that their application was rejected. They then resorted to the expedient of buying five thousand barrels of beer in Chicago, and tendering them to the railroad company for transportation to the same county, without furnishing the certificate required by the laws of Iowa. The refusal of the company to transport this beer into Iowa, in -violation of her laws, is the basis of the present suit. The plaintiffs claim damages upon the ground that they could' have sold this beer in that State at a price in advance of what *510it cost them. As they do not allege that the beer was to be delivered, in Iowa to a person authorized by her laws to sell it there, no wrong was done, of which the plaintiffs can complain, unless it be their right, not only to have their beer carried into the State, but to sell it there, in defiance of her laVs.
The fundamental question, therefore, is, whether Iowa may lawfully restrict the bringing of intoxicating liquors from other States into her limits, by any person or carrier, for another person or corporation, except such as are ■'consigned to persons authorized by her laws to buy and sell them for the special purposes indicated. In considering this question, we are not left to conjecture ■ as to the motives prompting the enactment of these statutes ; for, it is conceded, that the prohibition upon common carriers bringing intoxicating liquors from other States, except under the foregoing conditions, was adopted as subservient to the general design of protecting the health and morals and the peace and good order of the people of Iowa against the physical and moral -.evils resulting from the'’unrestricted manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors.
In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, it was adjudged that state legislation prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, to be sold or bartered for general use as a beverage, did not necessarily infringe any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States; and that the former decisions to that effect License Cases, 5 How. 504 Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 33; and Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201, 206 — “rest, upon the acknowledged right of the States of the Union to control their purely internal affairs, and, in so doing, to protect the health, morals, and safety of their people by regulations that do not interfere with the execution of the powers of the general government, or violate rights secured by the Constitution. The power to establish such regulations, as was said in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, reaches everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the national government.” 123 U. S. 659. Referring to the suggestion that no government could lawfully prohibit a citizen from *511manufacturing for hi's own use, or for export or storage, any article of food or drink, not endangering or affecting the rights of others, the court said: “ But by whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined whether the manufacture of particular articles of drink, either for general use or for the personal use of the maker, will injuriously affect-the public? Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere; else society will be at the merey of the few, who, regarding only their own appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and security of the many, provided only they are permitted to do as they please. Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or; needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety.” 123 U. S. 660, 661.
But it is contended that a statute forbidding the introdnction of intoxicating liquors from other States, does infringe rights secured by the Constitution of the United States; and that view is sustained by the opinion and judgment in this case. The' decision is placed upon the broad ground that intoxicating liquors are merchantable commodities, or known articles of commerce, and that, consequently, the Constitution, by the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce operates, in. the absence of legislation, to establish unrestricted trade, among the States of the ‘Union, in such commodities or articles. To this view we cannot assent. In Mugler’s case the court said that it could not “shut out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the public morals, and the public safety may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks ; nor the fact, established by statistics accessible to every one, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and crime existing in the country are, in some degree at least, traceable to this evil.” The court also said, that “ if, in the judgment of the legislature [of a State] the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for the maker’s own use, as a beverage, would tend to cripple, if not *512•defeat, the effort tot guard the community against the evils attending the excessive use- of such liquors, it is not for the courts, upon their view as to what is best and safest for the community, to disregard the legislative determination of that question. . . . Nor can it be said that government interferes with or impairs- any one’s constitutional rights of liberty or of property, when it determines that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks for general or individual úse, as a beverage, are or may become hurtful to society, and constitute, therefore, a business in which no one may lawfully engage.” 123 U. S. 662, 663.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, 205, Chief Justice Marshall said that “ inspection laws, - quarahtine laws, and health laws of- every description” were component parts of that mass.of legislation, “not surrendered to the general government,” which “can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves ; ” that such laws “ are.. considered as flowing from the acknowledged power of a State to provide for the health of its citizens.” To this doctrine the court has steadily adhered. In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 730, after observing that a state law, requiring an importer to pay for and take out a license before he should be permitted to sell a bale of goods imported from a foreign country, is void, (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,) and that a state law which requires the master of a vessel, engaged in foreign commerce, tó pay a certain sum to a state officer on account of each passenger brought from a foreign country, is also void, (Passenger Cases, 7 How. 273,) the court said: “ But a State, in the exercise of its police power, may forbid spirituous liquor, imported from abroad or from another State, to be sold by retail or to be sold at all without a license; and it may visit the violation of the prohibition with such punishment as it may deem proper. Under quarantine laws, a vessel registered; or enrolled and licensed, may be stopped before entering her port of destination, or be afterwards removed and detained elsewhere for an indefinite period; and a bale of goods, upon which the duties have or have not been paid, laden with infection, may b¿ seized under ‘ health laws,’ *513and, if it cannot be purged of its poison, may be' committed to the flames.” In Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99, 103, it was said that “ in conferring upon Congress the regulation of-commerce, it was never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, arid safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country.” In Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 165, 171, the court adjudged that a statute of Missouri, prohibiting' .the introduction into that State of all Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle between May 1 and November 1 of each year, whether diseased or not, and which imposed burdensome conditions upon their transportation through the State, was void because a regulation of interstate commerce. But it was distinctly declared that the delegation to Congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States “ was not a surrender of that which may properly be denominated police power,” which included, the court said, the power, in each State, to adopt “ precautionary measures against social evils” ; to “ prevent the spread of crime or pauperism, or disturbance of the peace ” ; to “ exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as Avell as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases”'; and to exclude “ property dangerous to the property of citizens of the State; for example, animals having contagious or infectious diseases.” “ All these,” it was said, “ are in immediate connection with the protection of persons and property against noxious acts of other persons, or such use of property as is injurious to the property of others; they are self-defensive.” It Avas only because the Missouri statute embraced cattle that were free from disease, that it was declared unconstitutional. In Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 505, the principle was .affirmed that the police power of the States was not surrendered, when authority was conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States.
It seems to us that the decision just réndered does not conform to the doctrines of the foregoing cases, and may impair, *514if it does not destroy, the power of a State to protect her people against the injurious consequences that are admitted to flow from the general use of intoxicating liquors. It was said in Brown v. State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 439, 441: “ There is no difference, in effect, between a power to prohibit the Sale of an article and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. . . . When the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, if has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has ¡become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the 'original form or package in which it was imported, a tax •upon it is too plainly a duty on .imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution.” Considering the question in that case, under the power of Congress to regulate commerce, the court said: “ Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient in that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce.” p. 447. ,- Although there was no question in that case as to commerce among the States, the Court further said: “We suppose the principles laid down in this case to apply equally to importations from a sister State.” p. 449. If, therefore, as. the court how decides, the Constitution gives the right to transport intoxicating liquors into Iowa from another State, and if that right carries with it, as one of its essential ingredients,, authority, in the consignee, to sell or exchange such articles, after they are so brought in, and while in his possession, in the original packages, it is -manifest that the regulation forbidding sales of intoxicating liquors,- within the State, for other than medicinal, mechanical, culinary, or sacramental purposes, and then only under a permit from a board of supervisors, will be of little practical value. In this view, any one — even a citizen of Iowa — desiring to sell intoxicating liquors in that State, need only arrange to have them delivered to him from some point in another State, in *515packages of varying sizes, as may suit customers. Or, he may erect - his manufacturing establishment, or warehouse, just across the Iowa line, in some State having a different public policy, and thence, with wagons, transport liquors into Iowa, in original packages. If the State arraigns him for a violation of her laws, he may claim — and, under the principles of the present decision, it may become difficult to dispute the claim —that, although such laws were enacted solely to protect the health and morals of the people, and to promote peace and good order among them, and although they are fairly adapted to accomplish those objects, yet the Constitution' of the United States, without any action upon the part of Congress, secures to him the right to bring or receive from other States intoxicating liquors in original packages, and to sell them, while held by him in such packages, to all choosing to buy them. • Thus, the mere silence of Congress upon the subject of trade among the States in intoxicating liquors is made to-operate as a license to persons doing business in one State to jeopard the health, morals, and good order of another State, by flooding the latter with intoxicating liquors, against the express will of. her people.
It is admitted that a State may prevent the. introduction within- her limits of rags or other goods infected with disease, or of cattle or meat, or other provisions which, from their condition, are unfit for human use or consumption; because, it is said, such articles are not merchantable or legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. But suppose the people of a State believe, upon reasonable grounds, that the general use of intoxicating liquors is dangerous to the public peace, the public health, and the public morals, what authority has Congress or the judiciary to review their .judgment upon that subject, and compel them to submit to a condition of things which they regard as destructive of their happiness and the peace and good order of society ? .If, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, a State can protect her sound cattle by prohibiting altogether the introduction within her limits of diseased cattle, she ought not to be deemed disloyal to that Constitution when she seeks by similar legislation to protect *516her people and their'homes against the introduction of articles which are, in good faith,- and not unreasonably, regarded by her citizens as “laden with infection” more dangerous to the public than diseased cattle, or than rags containing the gérms of disease.
It is not a satisfactory answer to these suggestions, to say that if the State may thus outlaw the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, as a beverage, and exclude them from her limits, she may adopt the same policy with -reference to articles that confessedly have no necessary or immediate connection with the health, the morals, or the safety of the community, but are proper subjects of trade-the world-over. This possible abuse of legislative power was earnestly dwelt upon by the counsel in Mugler’s Case. The same argument can be, as it often is, made in reference to powers that all concede to be vital to the public safety. But it does not disprove their existence. This court said that the judicial tribunals were not to be misled by mere pretences, and were under a solemn duty to look at the substance of things whenever it became necessary to inquire whether the legislature had transcended the limits of its authority ; and that, “ if, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.” 123 U. S. 661. In view of these principles, the court said it was difficult, to perceive any ground for the judiciary to declare that the prohibition by a State of the manufacture or sale, within her limits; of intoxicating liquors for general use there as a beverage, is not fairly adapted to the end of protecting 'the community against the evils which confessedly result from the excessive use of ardent spirits. ' Id. 662. In the same case the court sustained, without .qualification, the authority of Kansas to declare, not only that places where such.liquors were manufactured, sold, bartered, or given away, or were kept for sale, barter, or delivery, in violation of her statutes, should be deemed common nuisances, but to provide *517for. the forfeiture, without compensation, of the intoxicating liquors found in such places and the property used in maintaining said nuisances.-
■ Now, can it .be possible that the framers of the Constitution intended — whether Congress chose or not to act upon the subject — to withhold from a State authority to prevent the introduction into her midst of articles or commodities, the manufacture of which, within' her limits, she could prohibit, Without impairing the constitutional rights of her own people ? If a State may declare a place where intoxicating liquors are sold for use as a beverage to be a common nuisance,-subjecting the person' maintaining the same to fine and imprisonment, can her people be compelled to submit to the sale of such liquors, when brought there from another State for that purpose ? This court has often declared that the most important function of government was -to preserve the public health,' morals, and safety; that it could not divest itself of that power, nor, by contract, limit its exercise; and that even the constitutional prohibition upon laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not restrict the power of the State to protect the health, the morals, or the safety of the community, as the one or the other may be involved in the execution of such contracts. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 816; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 751; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 664. Does the mere grant of the power to regulate commerce among the States invest individuals of onp State with the right, even without the express sanction of Congressional legislation, to introduce among the people of another State. articles which, by statute, they have declared to be deleterious to their health and dangerous to their safety? In our opinion, these questions should be-answered in the negative. It is inconceivable that the well-being of any State is at the mercy of the liquor manufacturers of other States.
These views are sustained by Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446. It was there held that a statute of Michigan which imposed a tax upon persons who, not residing or having their *518•principal place of business in that State, engaged there in the business' of selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors to be shipped into Michigan from other States, but which did not impose a similar tax upon persons selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors' manufactured in that State, was a discrimination against the products of other States, and void as a regulation-in restraint of commerce. In reference, to the suggestion by the state court that the statute was an exercise by the legislature of the police, power for the discouragement of the use of intoxicating liquors, and the preservation of the health and morals of the people, this court said: “ This would be a perfect justification of the act if it did not discriminate against the citizens and products of other States in a matter of commerce- between the States, and thus usurp one of the prerogatives of the national legislature.” p. 460. The clear implication from this language is that the state law would have -been sustained if it • had' applied the same rule to the products.of Michigan which it attempted to apply to the products of other. States-
At the argument it was insisted that the contention of the plaintiffs was supported by Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 436, where the question was whether the legislature of a State could ’ constitutionally require an importer of foreign articles or commodities to take out a license from the State before he should be permitted to sell a bale or package so imported. The indictment in that case charged Brown with having sold one' package of foreign “ dry goods ” without having such a licetise. The court held the state regulation to be repugnando that clause' of the' Constitution declaring that no State shall,, without the consent, of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, -except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspebtion laws,-as well as to that clause which clothes Congress with power to regulate commerce with foreign- nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. Among other things, it said that the right to sell articles imported from foreign countries is connected with the law permitting importation, as an inseparable incident; observing, at the close of.the *519opinion- that it supposed the principle laid down to apply equally to importations from a sister State. It is, however, clear from the whole opinion that the court in .that observation had reference to commerce in articles having no connection whatever with the health, morals, or safety of the people, and that if had no purpose to withdraw or qualify the explicit declaration, in Gibbons v. Ogden, that the health laws of the States were a component part of that mass. of. legislation, the power to enact which remained with the States, because never surrendered to the general government. In behalf of Maryland it was insisted that thé constitutional prohibition of state imposts or duties upon imports ceased the instant the goods entered the country; otherwise, it Avas argued, the importer “ may introduce articles, as gunpowder,' AvHich endanger a city, into the midst of its population; he may introduce articles Avhich endanger the public Health, and the power of self-preservation is denied.” To this - argument Chief Justice Marshall replied : “ The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch Of the police poAver, Avhich unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, Avith the States. If the possessor stores it himself out of town, the removal cannot be a duty on imports, because it contributes nothing to the revenue. If he prefers placing it in a public magazine, it is because he stores it there, in his own opinion, more advantageously than elseAvhere. We are not sure that this may not be classed among inspection laws. The removal or destruction of infectious or unsound articles is undoubtedly ah exercise of that power, and forms an express exception to the prohibition Ave are considering. Indeed, the laws of the United States expressly recognize the health laws of a State.” This, Ave understand to'have been a distinct readjudication that the police power, so far as it involves the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, remains with the States, and is not overridden by the National Constitution.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, it was said by counsel that the Constitution does not confer the right of intercourse between State and State, and that such', right' has its source in those laAvs Avhose authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout *520the world. Chief Justice Marshall said: “ This is true. The. Constitution found it an existing right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate it.” 9 Wheat. 211. ' In the same case hé said that this power is “ the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be "governed.” p. 196. It may be said, generally, that free commercial intercourse exists among the several States by íoróe of the Constitution. But as, by the express terms of that instrument, the powers hot delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people, and as, by'the repeated adjudications of this court, the States have not surrendered, but have reserved, the power, to protect, by police regulations, the health, morals, and safety of their people, Congress may not prescribe any rule to govern commerce among the States which prevents the propér and reasonable exercise of this reserved power. Even if Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, had authority to declare what shall or what shall not be subjects of commerce' among the States, that power would not fairly imply authority to compel a State to admit within her limits that which, in fact .is, or which, upon reasonable .grounds, she may' declare to be destructive of the health, morals, and peace of her people.. The purpose of committing to Congress the regulation of commerce was to insure equality of. commercial'facilities, by preventing one State from building up her own trade at the expense of sister States. . But that' purpose is not defeated when a State employs appropriate means to prevent the introduction into her limits of what she lawfully forbids her own people from making. It certainly was not meant to give citizens of other States greater rights in Iowa than Iowa’s own people have.
But if this be-not. a sound interpretation of the Constitution; if intoxicating liquors are entitled to the same - protection by the National Government as ordinary merchandise entering into commerce among, the States; if Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, may, in its discretion,. permit or prohibit commerce among the States in intoxicating liquors; and, if, therefore, state .police power, as the health, *521morals, and safety of the people may be involved.in its proper exercise, can be overborne by national regulations of com-, merce, the former decisions of this court would seem to show that such laws of the States are valid, even where they affect commercial intercourse among the States, until displaced by Federal legislation, or. until they come in direct conflict with some act of Congress. Such was the doctrine announced in Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245. That case involved the validity of an act of the legislature of Delaware, authorizing a dam to be built across a navigable stream, in which the tide ebbed and flowed, and in which there was a common and public way in the natui’e of a highway. The.court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, said: “The act of assembly, by which the plaintiffs were authorized to construct their dam, .shows plainly that this is one of those many creeks, passing through a'deep level marsh adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance. The value of the property on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come into. collision with the powers of' the General Government, are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the States. But the measure authorized .by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been, accustomed to use it.” p. 251. • The counsel having insisted that the statute came in conflict with the power of Congress to'regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, the • court said: “If Congress had passed any act which bore on this case, any act in execution of the poAver to regulate commerce, the object of Avhieh was to control state legislation over small navigable creeks into Avhieh the tide flows, and Avhieh abound throughout the lower country of the middle and southern States, we should not' feel much difficulty in saying that a state law coming in conflict Avith such act would be void. But Congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of ■ Delaware to the Constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with *522foreign nations and among the several States; a power which has not been so exercised- as to affect the question.” The same principle is announced in many other cases. Gilmam. v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678; Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205; Hamilton v. Vicksburg &c. Railroad, 119 U. S. 280; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 546. These were all cases of the erection of bridges and other structures within, the limits of States, and under their authority, across public navigable waters of the United States. They, were held not to be forbidden by the Constitution, although such structures actually interfered with interstate commerce. In Gilman v. Philadelphia and Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., the bridges were without draws, entirely preventing the passage of boats to points, in one case, where the tide ebbed and flowed,, and,-in both cases, to points where commerce had been previously carried on. In Hamilton v. Vicksburg &c. Railroad, the court said: “ What the form and character of the bridges should be, that is to say, of what height they should be erected,'and of what materials constructed, and whether with or without draws, were matters for the regulation of the State, subject only to the paramount Authority of Congress to prevent any unnecessary obstruction to the free navigation of the streams. Until Congress intervenes in such cases, and exercises its authority, the power of the State is plenary. When the State provides for the form and character of the structure its directions will control, except as against the action of Congress, whether the bridge be with or without draws, and irrespective of its effect upon navigation.” p. 281.
But, perhaps, the language of this court — all the judges concurring — which most directly bears upon the question before us, is found in County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 701, reaffirming Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company. It was there said: “In The License Cases, (5 How. 04,) -which were before the court in! 1847, there Was great diversity of views in the opinions of the different judges upon the operation of. the grant of the commercial power of Congress in the absence of Congressional legislation. Extreme *523doctrines upon both sides of the question were asserted by some of the judges, but the decision reached, so far as it can be viewed hs determining any question of construction, was confirmatory of the doctrine that legislation of Congress is essential to prohibit the action of the States upon the subject thus considered.” This language is peculiarly significant in view of the fact that in one of the License Cases — Pierce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. 504, 557, 578 — the question was as to the validity of an act of that State, under which Pierce was indicted, convicted, and fined, for having, sold, without a local town license, a barrel of gin, which he purchased in Boston, transported to Dover, New Hampshire, and there sold in the identical cask in -which it was carried to that State from Massachusetts.
In harmony with these principles the court affirmed at the present term, in Smith v. State of Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, the validity of a statute of that. State, making it unlawful for a locomotive engineer, even when his train is employed in interstate commerce, to drive or operate any train of cars' upon a railroad in that State, used for the transportation of persons, passengers, or freight, without first undergoing an examination by, and obtaining a license from, a board of engineers appointed by the governor of Alabama. If a train of cars passed through that State to New Orleans, the engineer, however well qualified for his station, if not licensed by that local board, was subject to be fined not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, and sentenced tó hard-labor for the county, for not more than six months. The court held that this statute “ is not, considered in its own nature, a regulation of interstate commerce ”; that “ it is properly an act of legislation within the scope of the admitted power reserved to the States to regulate the relative rights and duties of persons, being and acting Avithin its territorial jurisdiction, intended to operate so as to secure for ‘ the public safety of person and property ” ; and that “ so far as it affects transactions of commerce among the States, it does so only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely, and not so as to burden or impede them, and in the particulars on which it touches those transactions at all it *524is not in conflict with any express enactment of Congress on the subject, nor contrary to any intention of Congress to be presumed from its silence.” Until Congress, by legislation, prescribed the qualification of locomotive engineers employed by railroad companies engaged in the transportation of passengers and goods among the States, Alabama, it was adjudged, could fix the qualifications of such engineers, even when running in that State trains employed in interstate commerce.
•It would seem that if.the Constitution of the United States does not, by its own force,'displace or annul a state law, authorizing the construction of bridges or dams across public navigable waters of the United States, thereby wholly preventing the passage of vessels engaged in interstate commerce upon such waters, the same Constitution ought not to be held to annul- or displace a law of one. of the States which, by its operation, forbids the bringing within her limits, from other States, articles which that State, in the most solemn manner, has declared to be injurious to the health, morals, and safety of her people. The-silence .of Congress upon the subjeet of interstate commerce, as affected by the police laws of the States, enacted in.good faith- to promote the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, and to that end prohibiting the manufacture and sale, within'their limits, of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage,-ought to have, at least, as much effect as the silence of Congress in reference to physical obstructions placed, under the authority of a State, in a navigable water of the United States. The reserved power of the States to guard the health,'morals, and safety'of their people is more vital to the existence of society, than their power in respect to trade and commerce having no possible connection with those subjects.
For these reasons, we feel constrained to' dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court.
Mr. Justice Lamar was not present, at the argument of this ease, and took no part in its decision.