Court Opinion

ID: 9941613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:01:00.868508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:48.575710
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-7027     Document: 010111001735       Date Filed: 02/16/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        February 16, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  MELISSA PHILLIPS,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 23-7027
                                                  (D.C. No. 6:21-CV-00256-JFH-GLJ)
  JESSE JAMES; JESSICA BROWN;                                 (E.D. Okla.)
  DAVID DOBSON; JESSE PETTY,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Plaintiff Melissa Phillips, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s

 dismissal without prejudice of her amended complaint against four individual

 members of the Choctaw Nation’s tribal police department. Exercising jurisdiction

 under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm for substantially the same reasons given by the

 district court, as summarized below.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-7027    Document: 010111001735         Date Filed: 02/16/2024     Page: 2

                                    BACKGROUND

       I.     Plaintiff’s Allegations

       Ms. Phillips filed her original complaint in August 2021 against tribal police

 officers Jesse James, Jessica Brown, and David Dobson. On September 9, 2021, she

 filed an amended complaint adding Chief of Police Jesse Petty. Liberally construed,1

 the Amended Complaint asserted numerous state-law tort claims against the

 defendants, including intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,

 slander, and defamation; violations of various Oklahoma statutes and the federal

 Violence Against Women’s Act (VAWA); and violations of the Fourth and

 Fourteenth Amendments. All claims stem from the defendants’ alleged mishandling

 of a prolonged dispute between Ms. Phillips and her neighbor.

       The underlying facts are set forth in extensive, at times impenetrable fashion

 in the Amended Complaint as well as a later complaint filed in the Choctaw Nation

 District Court.2 The dispute began in July 2021 when Ms. Phillips’s neighbor

       1
          As a pro se litigant, Ms. Phillips is entitled to a liberal construction of her
 filings. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir.
 2005). But she must still comply with the same rules as other litigants, and we do not
 act as her “attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id.
       2
          “In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all well-pleaded
 facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true, and the
 court must liberally construe the pleadings and make all reasonable inferences in
 favor of the non-moving party.” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal,
 Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017) (brackets and internal quotation marks
 omitted). The defendants submitted Ms. Phillips’s tribal complaint to the district
 court to support their tribal court exhaustion argument, and it is included in the
 record on appeal. Although we have not relied on its allegations in determining
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 initiated a campaign of stalking and dangerously harassing behavior towards her.

 The neighbor’s conduct, which encompassed multiple instances of trespassing on

 Ms. Phillips’s property, spying on her, and menacing her with a gun, prompted

 Ms. Phillips in August 2021 to obtain an ex parte protective order against the

 neighbor from the tribal court. This lawsuit arises out of the defendants’ actions or

 inaction in connection with this protective order. Ms. Phillips alleges the defendants

 failed to enforce the order and thus allowed her neighbor’s abusive behavior to

 continue, failed to provide the documentation that she needed for the final protective

 order hearing on November 5, 2021, and failed to refer violations of the order to the

 office of the tribal prosecutor. Sprinkled throughout Ms. Phillips’s pleadings are

 allegations that defendants discriminated against her because she is a Cherokee

 woman and disabled. She also contends the defendants wrongly believed the tribal

 court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the protective order against her neighbor because

 he is a not a tribal member. And she alleges the defendants retaliated against her

 after she filed this lawsuit and defamed her by calling her a liar.

       In the “Relief Needed and Requested” section of her Amended Complaint,

 Ms. Phillips requested numerous declarations, which can be loosely categorized as

 follows: (1) an order declaring that tribal court jurisdiction extends to protective

 order matters between tribal and non-tribal members; (2) an order declaring that

 defendants’ handling of the protective order matter violated her civil rights; and

 whether her federal-court complaint states a claim, we have considered them to the
 extent they help us understand the factual background of her claims.
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 (3) an order instructing the tribal police to follow federal statutes governing tribal

 court jurisdiction.3 Ms. Phillips also asked the district court to order the defendants

 to produce various incident reports and to refer her neighbor’s alleged criminal

 conduct to the tribal prosecutor. In addition, the Amended Complaint sought

 emergency orders directing an FBI investigation into her allegations and referring

 violations of the protective order to a federal prosecutor. Finally, Ms. Phillips sought

 money damages against the defendants jointly and severally in the amount of

 $250,000 plus punitive damages.

       II.    Dismissal of the Amended Complaint

       On January 1, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended

 Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), asserting lack of jurisdiction

 based on sovereign immunity, arguing the real party in interest here is the Choctaw

 Nation. Defendants also raised defenses of qualified immunity, failure to state a

 claim, and omission of a necessary party (the Choctaw Nation). On February 6,

 2023, the district court, adopting a January 18, 2023, report and recommendation of

 the magistrate judge, granted defendants’ motion and dismissed the Amended

 Complaint without prejudice.4 As discussed below, the district court’s decision was

       3
         In her appeal brief, Ms. Phillips contends, “[t]he main reason for [the]
 declarative order was to declare that tribes DO have criminal jurisdiction over
 non-Indians under VAWA . . . .” Aplt. Opening Br. at handwritten p. 4.

       4
          The district court subsequently reopened the case to consider Ms. Phillips’s
 untimely objection to the report and recommendation and several other motions that
 she filed challenging the dismissal of the action. In an order dated March 24, 2023,
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 based on sovereign immunity, Ms. Philipps’s failure to state a claim under the

 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and comity concerns underpinning the tribal

 exhaustion rule.

       a. Sovereign Immunity

       As the district court explained, “Native American tribes, such as the Choctaw

 Nation, enjoy the same immunity from suit enjoyed by other sovereign powers and

 are ‘subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has

 waived its immunity.’” R. at 178 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs, Inc.,

 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998)). “[A] tribe’s immunity generally immunizes tribal

 officials from claims made against them in their official capacities.” Native Am.

 Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1296 (10th Cir. 2008). This

 means “that tribal officials are immunized from suits brought against them because of

 their official capacities—that is, because the powers they possess in those capacities

 enable them to grant the plaintiffs relief on behalf of the tribe.” Id.

       The district court recognized this doctrine does not immunize individual

 members of the tribe. “[I]ndividual defendants may be sued in their individual

 capacities even where a suit arises out of actions the individuals took in their official

 capacities.” R. at 179. “Where a suit is brought against the agent or official of a

 sovereign, to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the suit, we ask whether

 the court overruled Ms. Phillips’s objection and denied her other motions, which it
 construed together as a motion to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

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 the sovereign is the real, substantial party in interest.” Native Am. Distrib., 546 F.3d

 at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This turns on the relief sought by the

 plaintiffs.” Id. at 1297 (quotation marks omitted). As the district court explained,

 “[i]f the relief sought is only nominally against the official and is in fact against the

 official’s office, then the real party in interest is the sovereign and the suit will be

 barred on the basis of sovereign immunity.” R. at 179 (citing Lewis v. Clarke,

 581 U.S. 155, 161-62 (2017)). If, however, a plaintiff sues an individual for

 monetary damages arising out of that person’s unconstitutional or wrongful conduct,

 “sovereign immunity does not bar the suit so long as the relief is sought not from the

 sovereign’s treasure but from the officer personally.” Native Am. Distrib., 546 F.3d

 at 1297 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

        The district court characterized plaintiff’s various requests for equitable relief

 as essentially seeking a collection of orders instructing the Choctaw Nation how to

 enforce a protective order issued by its own court. The district court explained that

 such orders—for example, one compelling the defendants to refer protective order

 violations to the tribal prosecutor—would necessarily be directed to the defendants in

 their official capacities as tribal police officers, not as individuals. The court thus

 concluded “the real party in interest for all claims related to [plaintiff’s] equitable

 prayers for relief is the Choctaw Nation and these claims are barred by sovereign

 immunity.” R. at 181.

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        b. Failure to State a Claim

        The district court was careful to distinguish Ms. Phillips’s claims for money

 damages from her equitable claims barred by sovereign immunity: “[h]ere, the

 prayer for monetary damages is asserted . . . in a way that does not implicate the

 Choctaw Nation or its treasury, thus tribal sovereignty will not operate to bar any

 claims related to that prayer for relief.” R. at 181. The court concluded, however,

 that Ms. Phillips failed to tie her damages request to the “unadorned listing of causes

 of action” in her Amended Complaint. Id. at 182. The court acknowledged

 Ms. Philipps’s attempt to allege constitutional violations but explained that a

 cognizable claim offers more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation

 of the elements of a cause of action . . .’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Ultimately, the Amended Complaint failed to connect

 Ms. Philipps’s federal claims to her request for monetary damages, and the court

 concluded that doing so on her behalf would impermissibly cast it in “the role of

 advocate for the pro se litigant.” R. at 182.

        c. The Tribal Exhaustion Rule

        The district court properly raised the tribal exhaustion rule sua sponte. United

 States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th Cir. 1996). It “provides that as a matter of

 comity, a federal court should not exercise jurisdiction over cases arising under its

 federal question or diversity jurisdiction, if those cases are also subject to tribal

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 jurisdiction, until the parties have exhausted their tribal remedies.” Id.5 The rule

 reflects “Congress’s strong interest in promoting tribal sovereignty” and the

 presumption that jurisdiction “lies in tribal court unless Congress has expressly

 limited that jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). We

 have held that when it comes to jurisdictional questions in particular, federal courts

 should not intervene until the tribal court has had a full opportunity to examine the

 issue. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1997).

       As the district court noted, this circuit takes a “strict view” of the tribal

 exhaustion rule. R. at 183; see Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507. We have held that

 “federal courts should abstain when a suit sufficiently implicates Indian sovereignty

 or other important interests.” Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507 (internal quotation

 marks omitted). The district court explained, when a dispute is “a ‘reservation

 affair,’ comity concerns almost always dictate that the parties exhaust their tribal

 remedies before resorting to the federal forums.” R. at 183 (internal quotation marks

 omitted); see also Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507 (observing, “when the dispute is a

 ‘reservation affair’ there is no discretion not to defer” (internal quotation marks

 omitted)). When a dispute is not a reservation affair, the comity analysis requires

       5
         The tribal exhaustion rule does not require a pending action in tribal court,
 Tsosie, 92 F.3d at 1041, and it does not appear that a tribal court action was pending
 when the court dismissed the Amended Complaint in this case. We note, however,
 that Ms. Phillips has since filed an action in Choctaw District Court seeking much the
 same equitable relief sought here. In the certificate of service attached to that
 complaint, she states: “copies of this complaint shall be given to the federal court to
 show attempt to resolve matters at tribal level as the court wants any tribal remedy
 exhausted first.” R. at 279 (capitalization omitted).
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 examination of the policy concerns set forth in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v.

 Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985). Those concerns are “(1) furthering

 congressional policy of supporting tribal self-government; (2) promoting the orderly

 administration of justice by allowing a full record to be developed in the tribal court;

 and (3) obtaining the benefit of tribal expertise if further review becomes necessary.”

 Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507.

        The district court first asked whether this case presents a “reservation affair.”

 In doing so, the court considered “whether the claims at issue implicate tribal

 interests;” whether the case “implicates tribal law or policy;” “whether a tribal-court

 proceeding involving the same parties is pending;” and “whether resolution of the

 dispute involves interpretations of tribal law.” R. at 184. The court found a strong

 tribal nexus in this case, noting the tribe’s considerable interest in protecting the

 rights of its members and employees. This, in addition to the tribal law and policy

 concerns implicated by plaintiff’s allegations convinced the court this case is a

 reservation affair that should be decided by the tribal court.

        The district court’s thorough analysis did not stop there. Despite concluding

 this case is a reservation affair, the court dutifully went on to assess its abstention

 obligation under National Farmers. It reasoned, “[a]s this case concerns in large part

 the Choctaw Nation’s internal policies and laws, the orderly administration of justice

 in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the

 Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is

 addressed.” R. at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further reasoned

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  that exercising its jurisdiction “would only serve to contravene the federal policy of

  supporting tribal self-government.” Id. at 186. Finding no applicable exceptions to

  the tribal exhaustion rule,6 the district court ultimately concluded that none of the

  National Farmers policy objectives “would be advanced by the exercise of federal

  jurisdiction over a matter concerning a protective order originating in the Choctaw

  Nation Tribal Courts and enforced by Choctaw Nation employees.” Id. at 185. It

  therefore dismissed Ms. Phillips’s federal claims as a matter of comity.7

                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I.

        Because the dismissal in this case was without prejudice, we examine our

  jurisdiction. In general, this court has jurisdiction only over “final decisions of the

  district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A case dismissed without prejudice may or may

  not be a final appealable order, depending upon the circumstances.” Coffey v.

  Whirlpool Corp., 591 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1979). “A dismissal of the complaint

  is ordinarily a non-final, nonappealable order (since amendment would generally be

  available), while a dismissal of the entire action is ordinarily final.” Moya v.

        6
           “As a prudential rule based on comity, the tribal exhaustion requirement is
  subject to several exceptions.” Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
  Rsrv., 862 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2017). Given this court’s strict view of the
  tribal exhaustion doctrine, the exceptions, which are detailed in Norton, are applied
  narrowly. Id.
        7
          Having dismissed all the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise
  supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Phillips’s state law claims. See Lancaster v.
  Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 1998).
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  Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

  omitted). But “an order is not necessarily devoid of finality simply because it speaks

  in terms of dismissal of the complaint.” Id. “In evaluating finality, . . . we look to

  the substance and objective intent of the district court’s order, not just its

  terminology.” Id. Here the district court denied any further amendment to the

  complaint as futile and entered judgment against Ms. Phillips in favor of the

  defendants. Under these circumstances, it is clear the district court intended to

  dismiss the entire action. We thus have jurisdiction under § 1291 to hear this appeal.

         To the extent the district court dismissed Ms. Philipps’s claims for lack of

  subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, our review is de novo. See Blue

  Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Azar, 919 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (stating standard of

  review applicable to subject matter jurisdiction dismissal) and Brokers’ Choice,

  861 F.3d at 1104 (failure to state a claim). “We review a dismissal on exhaustion

  grounds for an abuse of discretion.” Tsosie, 92 F.3d at 1041 (internal quotation

  marks omitted). A “district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct

  law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact. The

  proper scope of the tribal exhaustion rule, however, is a matter of law which we

  review de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                              II.

         Although she frames the argument in several different ways, Ms. Phillips’s

  chief contention on appeal is that the district court erred in requiring exhaustion of

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  her claims in tribal court.8 She does not challenge the court’s sovereign immunity

  ruling but argues Choctaw law forecloses her claims against the individual

  defendants and, therefore, the court’s dismissal of this action amounted to denial of

  access to the courts. Ms. Philipps does not cite to any such tribal law, however, or

  point to any unsuccessful effort she has made to seek monetary damages against the

  individual defendants in tribal court. Moreover, Ms. Phillips fails to address the

  district court’s conclusion that her claims against the individual defendants failed to

  satisfy the pleading requirements of the federal rules of civil procedure under

  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

        Having thoroughly reviewed the briefs and the record, along with the

  well-reasoned magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and the district court’s

  decision adopting it, we find no reversible error or abuse of discretion. We conclude

  the district court correctly characterized plaintiff’s requested equitable remedies as

  seeking relief against the Choctaw Nation rather than the defendants in their

  individual capacities. Accordingly, those claims were properly dismissed for lack of

  jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign immunity. To the extent the Amended

  Complaint sought to allege claims against defendants in their individual capacities,

        8
           We do not address Ms. Phillips’s vague assertions of wrongdoing against
  defense counsel, which are neither particularized nor supported by any record
  citations. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring “appellant’s contentions and the
  reasons for them” be supported by “citations to the authorities and parts of the record
  on which the appellant relies”).

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  we agree with the district court’s Twombly analysis. Finally, we agree that abstention

  is warranted here based on the comity concerns underlying the tribal exhaustion rule.

                                      CONCLUSION

        We affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s

  report and recommendation, dated January 18, 2023, which was adopted by the

  district court in its order of February 6, 2023.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Bobby R. Baldock
                                               Circuit Judge

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