Court Opinion

ID: 9910564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 21:00:50.465092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:10.997248
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2472
CARLOS A. WILLIAMS,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General,
                                                 Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
             No. 1:17-cv-08613 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.
                     ____________________

 ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2023 — DECIDED DECEMBER 15, 2023
              ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
    ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Carlos Williams alleges his former
employer, the United States Postal Service, ﬁred him for dis-
criminatory reasons. Of his several theories, he focuses on re-
taliation: he worked there for seventeen years, and through-
out that time he ﬁled complaints over his and other postal
workers’ treatment. His bosses were unhappy. Even so, the
Postal Service did not ﬁre him until 2014, when he failed to
appear at work for months. This appeal asks us to overturn a
2                                                  No. 22-2472

jury verdict that rejected Williams’s discrimination claims. We
aﬃrm.
                        I. Background
A. Factual History
    Plaintiff Carlos Williams worked for the United States
Postal Service (“USPS”) from 1997 to 2014. At all relevant
times, he occupied a letter carrier post in the Glen Ellyn Post
Office. Two managers, Connie Principe and John Walsh, su-
pervised him there. Williams’s protected characteristics are
also relevant to this employment discrimination suit: he is a
Black man who identifies as a Choctaw and a Moor, and he
was born in 1972—placing him in his early forties when the
alleged discrimination took place.
    During his tenure with USPS, Williams showed a keen in-
terest in labor and employment law. This often manifested in
legal actions against USPS management. Williams filed claims
on his own behalf, variously alleging employment discrimi-
nation, retaliation, and violations of holiday pay policies. And
through an organization called the “No Harassment Founda-
tion,” he aided others with their claims. Altogether, he has
filed at least fifteen complaints with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) about his managers’
conduct.
   This appeal touches on just two of Williams’s quarrels
with USPS. Each pertains to a firing: one in 2013, and one in
2014.
   The 2013 Firing: On May 24, 2013, Williams filled in for an-
other letter carrier. Along his route, a young woman ap-
proached his truck to pick up her mail. She was eighteen years
old. Instead of her usual postwoman, she encountered
No. 22-2472                                                  3

Williams, who started asking her questions about her age and
her plans for after high school. The interaction soon crossed a
line. When she mentioned her interest in the fashion industry,
Williams offered to let her model for his clothing line. He
called it “Clexsy,” informing her it was a mashup of the words
“classy” and “sexy.” He then went two steps further by offer-
ing to take her for a ride in his new Volvo and adding omi-
nously that she would not “have to do anything with him.”
Williams also handed her a slip of paper with his name and
phone number. Her response was to retreat inside her family
home and close and lock the door. Williams came back later,
too. Apparently distracted, he had forgotten to deliver a pack-
age to the family. Her father accepted the delivery; the young
woman told her parents what happened.
   The next day, her mother called the post office. Williams’s
manager, Connie Principe, advised her to call the police if the
daughter had felt threatened or harassed. So she did. Wil-
liams felt consequences soon after, when USPS put him on
emergency placement—off-duty status without pay—five
days after the incident. He remained in that placement for al-
most a month. Then USPS brought him back.
    But on Williams’s second day back on the job, a report
from USPS’s Office of the Inspector General concluded that
Williams’s conduct reflected poorly on his employer. That
finding led to a notice of removal from employment on July
11, which in turn kicked off the process to fire Williams. Wil-
liams responded by filing union grievances. After almost a
year, these grievances led to an arbitration on June 4, 2014.
There, Williams settled the grievances on successful terms:
Williams would return to work on June 6, and USPS would
4                                                  No. 22-2472

give him half of the backpay for his eleven months off the job.
Williams, however, did not return on June 6.
    The 2014 Firing: Williams did not personally sign the set-
tlement immediately: a union representative did so for him. It
is for that reason, he says, that he did not come to work on
June 6—he did not know about the start date. USPS sent Wil-
liams letters saying his start date was either June 6 or June 9—
the parties disagree on that date—and urging him to return to
work. Williams never showed up on June 9, or any date there-
after. Instead, he called into an automated system to request
two weeks of sick leave; these calls repeated every two weeks.
Williams never contacted his supervisor, and no medical doc-
uments ever accompanied the requests. And so USPS did not
authorize any leave.
   On July 5, USPS designated Williams absent without
leave, or AWOL. Nine days later, they sent him a notice of
removal charging him as AWOL—the parties call this the
“charging document.” A month later, on August 18, USPS
separated Williams from his employment. A letter dated Au-
gust 29 informed Williams of that fact.
B. Procedural History
   Williams filed a complaint with the EEOC, which the
agency dismissed on USPS’s motion for summary judgment.
Williams tried again with another complaint—he met the
same fate. Then he retained a lawyer and brought this suit
against USPS, asserting Title VII claims rooted in both the
2013 and 2014 firings. In particular, he alleged that USPS dis-
criminated against him on the bases of race, color, sex, age,
national origin, and association with a disabled person (his
wife suffered from and ultimately succumbed to cancer
No. 22-2472                                                    5

during these events). He also alleged that USPS had retaliated
against him for his No Harassment Foundation activities.
    The district court narrowed the suit’s scope after USPS
moved for summary judgment. Partially granting USPS’s mo-
tion, the district court cut things down to only the 2014 firing
and only the claims alleging retaliation and discrimination on
the bases of race, gender, and national origin.
   Williams’s retained counsel thereafter moved to with-
draw. Williams asked the district court to recruit him a new
lawyer, and it did. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). When that law-
yer explained that he was unqualified to litigate employment
discrimination claims, the court recruited an experienced em-
ployment lawyer, who agreed to take up the case. She too
withdrew after Williams pressed her to amend the complaint
and add certain far-fetched legal theories of his own design.
The court declined to recruit a third lawyer.
    And so Williams carried on with the case pro se. In the
leadup to trial, plaintiff Williams filed a self-styled Motion to
Dismiss, apparently trying to dismiss the “case” against him
that had led to his firing six years earlier. The district court
construed this as a motion for reinstatement to duty and de-
nied it. Next Williams moved to reopen discovery so he could
re-depose certain witnesses and develop a record for his new
legal theories. The court also denied this motion. With trial
looming, the parties then moved in limine to admit or exclude
certain evidence. The district court granted these motions in
part and denied them in part. The rulings (under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403) aimed to keep the core evidence in the case
while excising prejudicial, confusing, and dilatory evidence.
With that goal in mind, the district court forbade the govern-
ment from raising the 2013 incident and limited Williams’s
6                                                    No. 22-2472

retaliation evidence to the bare procedural history of each
complaint he had filed.
    Williams then proceeded to trial pro se. Though he was
able to make an opening statement and examine witnesses, he
did need occasional help from the court. Trial lasted five days,
and the jury rendered a swift verdict for USPS. This appeal
followed.
                         II. Discussion
   Williams raises a surfeit of issues on appeal. The first batch
concerns his own legal ideas—strange double jeopardy and
due process theories, plus the peculiar motion to dismiss.
Next we turn to the district court’s choice not to recruit a third
lawyer, and then to the motions in limine. We then address
Williams’s grievances with the district court’s trial manage-
ment.
A. Substantive Issues
    Williams first advances a “double jeopardy” argument,
whose novelty stems from its lack of merit. Recall that USPS
had suspended him initially, then brought him back. Only af-
ter the Office of the Inspector General issued its damning re-
port did the Glen Ellyn branch initiate his removal. Citing old
administrative decisions from the Merit Systems Protection
Board, Williams urges us to hold that the removal proceed-
ings illegally punished him a second time for his 2013 con-
duct: first the suspension, then the firing. We are not bound
by those administrative precedents. Nor are they relevant to
this employment discrimination claim—Williams never ties
the disciplinary two-step to any protected characteristic. It
does not even seem to be unusual for USPS to discipline a
postal worker this way. See, e.g., Matthews v. Milwaukee Area
No. 22-2472                                                      7

Local Postal Workers Union, 495 F.3d 438, 439–40 (7th Cir. 2007)
(postal worker suspended, then fired for the same conduct).
    Next, he suggests that his ultimate firing deprived him of
due process, since he had a property right in his employment.
Williams, however, never pleaded a due process claim. “The
district court was not required to address a claim or theory
that plaintiff did not assert.” Gates v. Board of Educ. of the City
of Chicago, 916 F.3d 631, 641 (7th Cir. 2019). Nor are we.
    Williams’s third challenge is that the district court con-
strued his self-styled “motion to dismiss” as a motion for re-
instatement to duty status (which it denied). But district
courts can “recharacterize the motion in order to place it
within a different legal category” to “create a better corre-
spondence between the substance of a pro se motion's claim
and its underlying legal basis.” Castro v. United States, 540 U.S.
375, 381–82 (2003). Just so here. Williams also contends that
the district court had to wait for a response from USPS before
ruling on his motion. District courts, however, have “inherent
authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a
view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases,”
including by denying meritless motions without awaiting a
response. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) Further, the
District Court’s Local Rules belie Williams’s argument: “Fail-
ure to file a supporting or answering memorandum shall not
be deemed to be a waiver of the motion or a withdrawal of
opposition thereto, but the court on its own motion or that of
a party may strike the motion or grant the same without fur-
ther hearing.” N.D. Ill. LR 78.3. The district court handled the
“motion to dismiss” appropriately and did not err.
8                                                    No. 22-2472

B. Recruitment of Counsel
    We turn now to the district court’s choice not to recruit a
third lawyer for Williams. The first time Williams asked for
recruited counsel, the district court granted his request. But
that counsel withdrew, citing inexperience with employment
discrimination cases. Then the district court recruited an ex-
perienced employment lawyer, who accepted the assignment.
But she too ultimately withdrew after representing Williams
for six months. This time, the district court denied Williams’s
request to recruit counsel. Williams maintains it was a mis-
take not to recruit someone new, given his claims’ complexity
and novelty and his proximity to trial. He also argues he was
prejudiced, suggesting an attorney’s help would have short-
ened the odds of a winning verdict.
     Williams, like other litigants, enjoys no right to counsel in
civil cases. McCaa v. Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir.
2018). Still, he and others “may ask the district court to request
an attorney to represent the litigant.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1)). In many cases, a pro se litigant can expect that a
court’s decision whether to recruit counsel will follow a set
process, which comprises two questions: “(1) has the indigent
plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been
effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the
difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to
litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir.
2007) (en banc). Here, the district court eschewed this analysis
in declining to appoint Williams a third attorney.
    Williams’s arguments roughly map onto the Pruitt ques-
tions. As to the first question, he argues that he tried to secure
counsel by asking law school clinics and law firms for help.
On the second, he contends that his case was particularly
No. 22-2472                                                   9

complex, especially if the court embraced his homegrown
double jeopardy and due process arguments. That complex-
ity, he argues, called for professional help.
    Williams misses that this is no ordinary case. His argu-
ments might go a long way to persuade a district court that it
should appoint one lawyer. Now, though, he is asking for a
third after making unreasonable demands on the second. We
have been clear: “The valuable help of volunteer lawyers is a
limited resource.” Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hosp., 962 F.3d
933, 937 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dupree v. Hardy, 859 F.3d 458,
462–63 (7th Cir. 2017)). “The courts must be careful stewards
of this limited resource.” Id. at 934. When pro bono counsel
has “invested many hours of valuable time in the case before
moving to withdraw because the client would not cooperate,”
a wise court will economize with its scarce pool of pro bono
volunteers. Id.
    Here, the district court heeded our warning in Cartwright
and deployed its resources judiciously. Williams did not co-
operate with his pro bono attorney, who boasted not just ex-
perience but expertise in employment discrimination. That at-
torney did not disclose her specific reasons for moving to
withdraw—rather, minding her professional obligations, she
adverted only to “a substantial and fundamental disagree-
ment on how to proceed with the litigation.” Williams fleshed
out the details. In resisting her motion to withdraw, Williams
explained that he had asked the lawyer to amend the plead-
ings to include his meritless due process and double jeopardy
claims. The district court rightly chose not to expose another
lawyer to the reputational risks Williams’s requests would, if
granted, have posed.
10                                                 No. 22-2472

    Besides, the decision not to recruit counsel for Williams
worked no prejudice. Even in those cases where Pruitt does
apply, and a court skips the two-step inquiry, “we only re-
verse based on that error if the plaintiff shows prejudice.”
McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1031. Williams cannot. The relevant ques-
tion is whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the pres-
ence of counsel would have altered the outcome.” Pruitt, 503
F.3d at 660. On these facts, even a skilled lawyer would strug-
gle to make a case. The USPS’s defense was that it fired Wil-
liams for not showing up to work for months—and the undis-
puted evidence proved that he had not showed up to work
for months. Williams fails to show prejudice: these flaws
would sink his case no matter who steered the ship.
    When a district court has already recruited a capable at-
torney, and a pro se litigant undermines their professional ef-
forts, the district court need not undertake another Pruitt in-
quiry. Far from erring, the district court showed Williams pa-
tience and solicitude, recruiting one lawyer and then another.
C. Evidentiary Rulings
    Next, Williams contends that the district court mishandled
various pretrial evidentiary rulings. He appeals three of the
district court’s rulings on motions in limine. We review for
abuse of discretion. Downing v. Abbott Lab’ys, 48 F.4th 793, 804
(7th Cir. 2022).
    First, Williams moved to admit the substance of his past
EEOC activity into evidence. Williams, remember, had filed
several complaints on behalf of other postal workers through
the No Harassment Foundation. He moved similarly to admit
the complaints from prior proceedings where he represented
himself. The district court granted these motions in part and
No. 22-2472                                                     11

denied them in part, concluding that Williams could tell the
jury only that he had filed each complaint, when he had filed
it, and how it had turned out. The court reasoned that those
facts alone were relevant to Williams’s retaliation claims. An-
ything else would be substantially more confusing for the jury
or more prejudicial than probative, so Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403 barred its use.
    Now on appeal, Williams urges us to reverse, insisting
that he needed to admit the substance of other employees’
complaints to tie his firing to his involvement with the No
Harassment Foundation. Put another way, he thought the
substance would help demonstrate USPS’s motive to retaliate.
Our caselaw demands more. “[E]vidence of discrimination
and retaliation against other employees” comes with a “high
likelihood of juror confusion and inherent delay” that “out-
weigh[s] what little value could be gleaned from it.” Lewis v.
City of Chicago Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 443–44 (7th Cir. 2009).
That goes double in a situation like this one, with numerous
claims over several years. The district court acted well within
its discretion in excluding this evidence.
   Williams’s own past filings fare no better. His claim al-
leged that higher-ups retaliated for his filing complaints—
asking jurors to assess the merits of those complaints would
cause confusion and distract from that core issue. Once again,
the district court acted well within its discretion.
    Second, Williams moved to admit paperwork showing that
USPS agreed to 50% backpay for the time he had been away
from work following the 2013 firing. The district court re-
jected the motion, holding that this paperwork was irrelevant:
it went to his 2013 firing, and the only claims at trial focused
on the 2014 firing.
12                                                 No. 22-2472

    Williams now argues that the documents are relevant to
any issue involving the arbitration proceedings. But those
proceedings bear little relationship to the 2014 firing and
therefore to his claims at trial. They are relevant only in that
they led to his assignment to return to work on June 6 (or June
9). The backpay agreement is another matter entirely. What-
ever monies USPS owed could not have changed Williams’s
scheduled start date.
    Third, Williams moved to exclude the USPS charging doc-
ument establishing he had gone AWOL as of June 6, 2014. The
district court denied his request, holding that the evidence
was central to USPS’s defense and Williams remained free to
argue finer points about the precise date he was due back to
work.
   To exclude relevant evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence
403 requires that its probative value be substantially out-
weighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay.
The charging document is highly relevant here. Standing
alone, it proved (1) that Williams was due to return to work,
and (2) that Williams was on notice of that fact. Given that the
probative value was so great, it is hard to imagine exclusion
under Rule 403. Still worse for Williams, the prejudicial effect
was minimal. Even if the jury credited the document’s June 6
date rather than Williams’s arguments for June 9, Williams
never returned to work. That three-day difference hardly
matters.
   Williams tacks on an argument that the district court
should have reopened discovery and let him re-depose wit-
nesses, since his initial (retained) lawyer had refused to de-
velop a record on Williams’s due process and double jeop-
ardy arguments. Here, too, we review for abuse of discretion.
No. 22-2472                                                     13

Sullivan v. Flora, Inc., 63 F.4th 1130, 1139 (7th Cir. 2023). There
was none. Williams is bound by his counsel’s decisions be-
cause lawyers’ “actions are imputed to their clients.” Wade v.
Soo Line R.R. Corp., 500 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2007). He cannot
be heard to complain that counsel declined to pursue his pet
legal theories.
D. Trial-Management Decisions
    Last, Williams lodges a string of thirteen complaints over
the district court’s trial management. None exceeds thirty
words. All these, as “perfunctory and undeveloped argu-
ments … are waived.” Rock Hemp Corp. v. Dunn, 51 F.4th 693,
704 (7th Cir. 2022). Even if they were not waived, they misin-
terpret the record to try and twist the district court’s efforts to
help Williams into inklings of bias. Not one has merit.
                        III. Conclusion
   The judgment of the district court is
                                                       AFFIRMED.