Court Opinion

ID: 9939787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 19:09:11.128803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:57.324156
License: Public Domain

J-A23031-23

                                   2024 PA Super 23

    DAVID J. KISH II                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TAUNA KISH AND MICHAEL KNECHT              :   No. 636 MDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
                                 202300729

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         FILED: FEBRUARY 12, 2024

       Appellant, David J. Kish II (“Appellant”), the presumptive father of

C.M.S.K. (“Child”), born in March 2018, appeals from the April 20, 2023 order

directing genetic testing.1 After review, we affirm.

       The certified record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural

history. Appellant and Tauna Kish (“Mother”) were married in July of 2015.

They remained husband and wife at all relevant times thereafter, including at

the time of Child’s birth and at the time of the subject proceeding.2 See N.T.,

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 An order requiring blood tests to determine paternity is interlocutory but
immediately appealable. Jones v. Trojak, 535 Pa. 95, 101, 634 A.2d 201,
204 (1993).

2 Appellant and Mother shared two older children, A.D. and B.D., ages 11 and

10 at the time of the subject proceeding, both of whom are not subjects of
the instant appeal.
J-A23031-23

4/12/23, at 5-6, 10-11; Plaintiff’s Exhibit A (marriage license). Nevertheless,

according to Appellant, their marriage was “on and off” during unspecified

periods, and Mother did not consistently live with him. See N.T., 1/12/23, at

57-58, 63. In 2015 or 2016, Mother began a relationship with Michael Knecht

(“Knecht”) (collectively, “Appellees”), and they eventually cohabited.      See

N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 3-4, 8, 10. Appellant was aware of Mother’s

relationship with Knecht and that they cohabited. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 63-

65.

      The testimony of Appellant and Knecht conflicted in that they each

testified that they lived with Mother throughout her pregnancy and

accompanied her to prenatal medical appointments. See N.T., 4/12/23, at

10-11, 14, 22; N.T., 1/12/23, at 49, 51, 58; N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 8-

10. Knecht further testified that he was present for Child’s birth and signed

paternity paperwork. See N.T., 4/12/23, at 22; N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at

5-6. Significantly, no father is indicated on Child’s birth certificate; however,

his surname is designated as Knecht.          See Plaintiff’s Exhibit C (birth

certificate); see also N.T., 4/12/23, at 10; N.T., 1/12/23, at 26, 63, 81.

Knecht stated that he drove Mother and Child home from the hospital, and

that they resided with him after birth. See N.T., 4/12/23, at 22; N.T., 1/12/23

(Volume 2), at 7-8, 13.

      Appellant admitted that he was not present for Child’s birth and did not

sign any paternity paperwork. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 58-59. However, he

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testified that he drove Mother and Child home from the hospital.       Despite

stating that Mother and Child resided with him after Child’s birth, he

acknowledged that Mother had not resided with him for several months at the

time and, upon discharge from the hospital, he dropped them off at an

apartment where Mother and Knecht had resided. See N.T., 4/12/23, at 11-

12; N.T., 1/12/23, at 52, 63, 65.

      Approximately two or three months later, Appellees, along with Child,

were evicted from their apartment.        See N.T., 1/12/23 at 17-18; N.T.,

1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 8. While there is a discrepancy in the record where

Mother and Child resided immediately thereafter, it is undisputed that, since

approximately May 2019, Child has resided in the home of Appellant’s mother,

D.K. (“D.K.”), along with Appellant and his two older children.     See N.T.,

1/12/23, at 16, 50, 86; N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 11. Although Mother

was initially present at D.K.’s home at that time as well, she is a drug addict

and did not consistently stay in the home. See N.T., 4/12/23, at 8; N.T.,

1/12/23, at 17, 20, 24, 34-35, 50 (“[Mother] would come and go and maybe

show up a month or two later and then come back to see the kids and then

leave. . . .”). In September 2019, Mother prepared and executed a document

outside of court giving the maternal grandmother temporary custody of Child

but noting that he would continue to reside with D.K. See N.T., 1/12/23, at

20 (“And this . . . gives temporary custody of [Child] to [the maternal

grandmother]. [Child] will remain . . . with [D.K.]. . . .”).              .”).

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       It is important to note that Appellant was a registered Megan’s Law

offender and was prohibited from being alone with Child.3 See id. at 46, 53,

66-67.    According to D.K., she was “always with the child with my son

present.”4 Id. at 46. As a result, D.K. and the maternal grandmother have

essentially been working together to raise Child and his siblings. See id. at

21, 75.

       In January 2020, Knecht’s mother, C.K. (“C.K.”), acting pro se, initiated

a custody action against Appellees, wherein she requested shared physical

custody of Child.5, 6       See N.T., 1/12/23, at 99; Complaint for Custody,

____________________________________________

3 In 2013, Appellant pled guilty to 15 charges of child pornography.   See N.T.,
1/12/23, at 12-13, 43-44, 66-67.

4 At the time of the subject proceeding, Appellant was no longer a registered

offender prohibited from being alone with Child. See id. at 14, 43, 46, 55.
Notwithstanding, D.K. testified that they still abided this restriction. See id.
at 46 (“He still leaves his bedroom door open like he was told. [C]hild is never
. . . left alone with him.”).

5 The Honorable Stefanie Salavantis presided over both the custody and
paternity proceedings, which she found to be “inseparable.” Trial Court
Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 6/8/23, at 1 n.3.

6 In issuing the subject order, the trial court relied upon the record of the
underlying interrelated custody matter. As such, on November 17, 2023, this
Court directed the provision of the custody record as a supplemental record.
See Per Curiam Order, 11/17/23; see also Gulentz v. Schanno Transp.,
Inc., 513 A.2d 440, 443 (Pa.Super. 1986) (concluding that Pa.R.A.P. 1926
“provides a basis for the inclusion by the trial court of the judgments in the
record. It would also provide a basis for action on the part of this Court to
include the relevant documents. In this instance, since the existence and
validity of the judgments is undisputed, in the interests of judicial economy
such action would be warranted.”). The trial court complied.

                                           -4-
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1/23/20, at ¶ 3. C.K. did not name Appellant as a party to this action and

omitted any reference to him in her pleading. Pursuant to agreed-upon order

of March 2, 2020, the court awarded Mother primary physical custody and

Knecht partial physical custody as agreed upon by Appellees.       See Order,

3/2/20, at ¶ 5. The court awarded C.K. partial physical custody the second

weekend of each month. See id. at ¶ 6.        In addition, the court awarded

Appellees shared legal custody of Child. See id. at ¶ 4. Notably, the custody

order named Knecht as Child’s father. See id. at ¶ 2.

      In December of 2021, C.K. filed pro se a petition to modify the custody

order, wherein she requested additional partial physical custody, as well as

weekly telephone calls and vacation time. Petition for Modification of Custody,

12/9/21, at ¶ 4.    By agreed-upon order of January 26, 2022, the court

maintained C.K.’s physical custody award, but also awarded her weekly

telephone and/or video communication. See Order, 1/26/22, at ¶¶ 8, 12.

The court maintained Appellees’ legal and physical custody awards, but

specifically awarded Knecht custody on the fourth weekend of each month.

See id. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 7. Like with C.K., the court permitted Appellees to have

reasonable telephone and/or video communication with Child.        In addition,

the court awarded Appellees one separate week of vacation with Child. See

id. at ¶¶ 11, 15. Again, the order identified Knecht as Child’s father. See id.

at ¶ 2.

                                     -5-
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       Then, on January 5, 2023, D.K. and the maternal grandmother, pro se,

filed a petition seeking to, inter alia, intervene in the custody action and join

Appellant as an additional defendant.7 At a hearing on January 12, 2023, the

trial court heard testimony from witnesses including D.K., Appellant, the

maternal grandmother, C.K., and Knecht.

       D.K. and the maternal grandmother testified that they did not know that

Child was the subject of a custody action involving Knecht and C.K.                Both

however admitted that they were aware that Mother had attended court on

multiple occasions related to Child. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 37-41, 76-79. In

fact, D.K. drove Mother twice and attempted to participate on one occasion.

See id. at 37-40. Appellant likewise acknowledged that he was aware that

Mother attended court related to Child and was aware of an order affording

C.K. custodial time. See id. at 67-69.

       As   further    recognized     by       Appellant,   D.K.,   and   the   maternal

grandmother, C.K. has regularly exercised her custodial time in conjunction

with D.K. and the maternal grandmother. See id. at 41-42, 69-73, 78-79,

88-89. C.K. further revealed that Knecht saw Child during her custodial time.

See id. at 90-91.

____________________________________________

7 C.K. additionally filed, pro se, a petition for special relief as a result of
Appellant’s Megan’s Law status on this date.

                                           -6-
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      On January 17, 2023, the court issued an order holding all requests in

abeyance pending a determination of paternity.       See Order, 1/17/23. In so

doing, the court stated:

      At present, the court is unable to issue a ruling on the pending
      petitions due to the fact that no legal determination has been
      made regarding paternity. Either potential father may file the
      appropriate petition with the court regarding the issue of
      paternity. Once that determination has been made, the court shall
      issue a ruling with regard to the pending petitions for special relief.

Id. at 2 n.1 (cleaned up).

      In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court explained

the genesis of the subject proceeding, as follows.

      On January 17, 2023, [Appellant] filed the instant complaint in
      paternity seeking an order establishing him as the father of [Child]
      under the theories of presumption of paternity and paternity by
      estoppel. In his complaint, Appellant names [Knecht] as an
      individual who has made claims of paternity. A hearing was held
      before [the] court on April 12, 2023, wherein [Appellant] and
      [Knecht] both offered testimony. [Mother] failed to appear at the
      April 12, 2023 hearing, despite proper service.

T.C.O. at 1 (cleaned up) (footnotes omitted). In fact, according to Appellant,

Mother’s whereabouts were unknown at the time, and he further alleged that

she is a heroin addict. See N.T., 4/12/23, at 8.

      Appellant testified that Child was conceived and born during his

marriage to Mother, and that he had access and is not sterile.          See N.T.,

4/12/23, at 5-6, 10-12, 14-15. He stated that he has fulfilled all parental

duties to Child throughout his life, and that Child refers to him as “Dad.” See

id. at 12, 15; see also id. at 14-15 (financial support); id. at 13-14 (joint tax

returns); id. at 17 (health insurance); id. at 18 (baptism). Appellant further

                                       -7-
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testified that he was not made a party to and not aware of the nature of the

underlying custody proceeding until recently. See id. at 19.

      In support of his belief that he is Child’s father and request for genetic

testing, Knecht attested, “I know I'm the father because he looks just like me,

and I was at all the doctor visits. I was there when he was born. I took the

picture of his weight. I drove them home because him and her lived with me.”

Id. at 22.

      By order dated and entered April 20, 2023, the trial court ordered

Appellant and Knecht to undergo genetic testing in order to establish Child’s

paternity.   The court further directed such testing be private with Knecht

responsible for the costs thereof. As set forth in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the

court concluded as follows:

      Therefore, based upon the court’s review of the totality of the
      circumstances in this case, it is in Child’s best interest that a
      genetic test be done to determine paternity, and for the
      accompanying custody case to proceed forward once that
      determination has been made. This court additionally stresses
      that it is not in any way making any decisions regarding the
      custody and visitation of any party with the minor child at this
      time.

T.C.O. at 15.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 25, 2023. Pursuant to

order of April 28, 2023, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for stay

pending appeal. Thereafter, by order of May 1, 2023, the trial court directed

Appellant to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied. See In re K.T.E.L, 983

                                     -8-
J-A23031-23

A.2d 745, 747 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding that the failure to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal with the notice of appeal will

result in a defective notice of appeal, to be disposed of on a case-by-case

basis); Cf. J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904 (Pa.Super. 2010) (appellant waived all

issues by failing to timely comply with the trial court’s direct order to file a

concise statement). The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 8,

2023.

        On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        A. Did the trial court err by ordering genetic testing to determine
        paternity when Appellant put forth evidence at trial to establish
        that he is the father, and where “Paternity by Estoppel” is
        operative, rendering blood tests irrelevant?

        B. Did the trial court err [by] failing to determine that Appellant is
        the father of the subject child, considering the overwhelming
        evidence at trial and the best interests of the child?

Appellant’s Brief at 9 (suggested answers omitted) (footnotes omitted).8

        We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s orders granting

genetic paternity testing. Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 462 (Pa.Super.

2007).

        An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden or
        misapplied the law, or if there is insufficient evidence to sustain
        the order. Moreover, resolution of factual issues is for the trial
        court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's
        findings if they are supported by competent evidence. It is not
____________________________________________

8 Knecht failed to file a brief in support of his position with this Court.
                                                                         Mother
submitted a letter to this Court dated July 31, 2023, indicating her agreement
with and incorporating Appellant’s brief. See Letter in Support of Brief,
7/31/23.

                                           -9-
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      enough [for reversal] that we, if sitting as a trial court, may have
      made a different finding.

Id. (citing Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2003) (internal

citations omitted)).   “The finder of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence

presented and assess its credibility.” In so doing, the finder of fact “is free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence and [we as an appellate court] will

not disturb the credibility determinations of the court below.” Vargo, 940

A.2d at 462 (citation omitted).

      With his issues on appeal, which we address together as they are

interrelated, Appellant challenges the trial court’s order of genetic testing. He

essentially argues that the evidence established his paternity based upon the

doctrines of presumption of paternity and/or paternity by estoppel, and that

genetic testing is, therefore, irrelevant.    See Appellant’s Brief at 15-21.

Examining both doctrines, Appellant then proceeds to argue that the trial court

erred by failing to determine that he is Child’s father, “considering the

overwhelming evidence at trial and the best interests of the child.” Id. at 22.

      The legal determination of the paternity of a child conceived or born

during a marriage derives from the common law.

      [F]irst, one considers whether the presumption of paternity
      applies to [the] particular case. If it does, one then considers
      whether the presumption has been rebutted. Second, if the
      presumption has been rebutted or is inapplicable, one then
      questions whether estoppel applies. Estoppel may bar either a
      plaintiff from making the claim or a defendant from denying
      paternity.

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N.C. v. M.H., 923 A.2d 499, 502–503 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting Brinkley v.

King, 549 Pa. 241, 250, 701 A.2d 176, 180 (1997) (plurality opinion)).

      Under the law of presumptive paternity, “[G]enerally, a child conceived

or born during the marriage is presumed to be the child of the marriage; this

presumption is one of the strongest presumptions of the law of Pennsylvania;

and the presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. . .

.” Brinkley, 549 Pa. at 248; 701 A.2d at 179. This presumption however

applies only where the underlying policy of the presumption, i.e., to preserve

marriages, would be advanced by its application. Id. at 250-51, 701 A.2d at

181. It is well-settled that the presumption of paternity is inapplicable when

there is no longer an intact marriage to preserve. Fish v. Behers, 559 Pa.

523, 528, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999).

      Instantly, Appellant suggests an intact marriage existed at the time of

Child’s birth as well as at the time of the subject proceeding. He highlights

that he and Mother were married; he was not sterile; and he had access to

Mother. See Appellant’s Brief at 23. Notwithstanding, the record supports

the trial court’s finding that Appellant’s and Mother’s marriage was “clearly

not an intact marriage presently.” T.C.O. at 8. While Appellant and Mother

remained married, Appellant stated that, at the time of the subject hearing,

he was not residing with Mother. See N.T., 4/12/23, at 4-5. He acknowledged

that he was unaware of where she currently resided due to her ongoing drug

addiction.   See id. at 8.   Further, at the January 2023 hearing in the

                                    - 11 -
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underlying custody matter, Appellant recognized the unstable nature of his

relationship with Mother, admitting that they were on and off and had indeed

separated for an unspecified period. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 57-58 (“For a time

we did[,] I guess, stop seeing each other. . . .[I]t’s kind of been an on and off

thing since it first happened.”).

      Moreover, Appellant concedes that the presumption of paternity is

without merit inasmuch as his marriage is not intact.     See Appellant’s Brief

at 23. In the alternative, Appellant focuses his argument with respect to the

doctrine of paternity by estoppel.

      In Fish, the Court explained:

      Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal determination that
      because of a person’s conduct (e.g., holding out the child as his
      own, or supporting the child) that person, regardless of his true
      biological status, will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor will
      the child’s mother who has participated in this conduct be
      permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the third
      party is the true father. [T]he doctrine of estoppel in paternity
      actions is aimed at “achieving fairness as between the parents by
      holding them, both mother and father, to their prior conduct
      regarding the paternity of the child.”

Fish, 559 Pa. at 528, 741 A.2d at 723 (quoting Freedman v. McCandless,

539 Pa. 584, 591–92, 654 A.2d 529, 532–33 (1995)).

      The doctrine of paternity by estoppel

      is based on the public policy that children should be secure in
      knowing who their parents are. If a certain person has acted as
      the parent and bonded with the child, the child should not be
      required to suffer the potentially damaging trauma that may come
      from being told that the father he has known all his life is not in
      fact his father.

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Fish, 559 Pa. at 530, 741 A.2d at 724 (quoting Brinkley, 549 Pa. at 249-50,

701 A.2d at 180). In K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 614 Pa. 508, 529, 38 A.3d 798, 810

(2012), the Court held, “paternity by estoppel continues to pertain in

Pennsylvania, but it will apply only where it can be shown, on a developed

record, that it is in the best interests of the involved child.”

      It is well-settled that, “before an order for a blood test is appropriate to

determine paternity the actual relationship of the presumptive father and

natural mother must be determined.” Jones, 535 Pa. 95 at 105, 634 A.2d at

206 (citation omitted). As the Court stated in Fish, “where the [estoppel]

principle is operative, blood tests may be irrelevant, for the law will not permit

a person in these situations to challenge the status which he or she has

previously accepted.”     Fish, 559 Pa. at 529, 741 A.2d at 723 (citation

omitted).

      Appellant asserts that, in the case sub judice, the evidence established

paternity by estoppel. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-35. He maintains that Child

has resided with him and his two older children since birth. See id. at 29-30.

He asserts that he is Child’s sole father-figure and has provided for Child and

held Child out as his son.      Id. at 30-31.     For example, Child celebrates

birthdays and holidays with Appellant; Appellant is noted as Child’s father with

Child’s medical providers; Appellant has claimed Child as a dependent on his

joint taxes with Mother; and Appellant was recognized as Child’s father at

Child’s baptism. See id. at 31-32. Conversely, Appellant argues that Knecht

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“has not been a part of [C]hild’s life, never exercised any visitation, sent

birthday cards or anything.” Id. at 30-31. Appellant contends that Knecht

indicated that he was sterile9 and has not been involved with Child. See id.

at 33. As such, Appellant states:

       Clearly the best interests of this child would be to remain in the
       home with his closely bonded siblings, and with Appellant as the
       only father all of the children have ever known, the only father
       who financially supports them, who takes a real role in their lives,
       living with them, participating in family functions, taking them to
       events that are fun – basically being a dad on a day-to-day basis.
       ...

Id. at 34-35.

       In finding paternity by estoppel inapplicable and against Child’s best

interests, the trial court determined that Appellant was not credible.        See

T.C.O. at 14 (“This [c]ourt does not find the testimony of Appellant at the April

12, 2023 hearing to be fully credible.”). The court recognized discrepancies

as to the actual parental duties performed by Appellant, given the involvement

of D.K. and the maternal grandmother. Id. at 9-10. Further, Knecht was

identified as Child’s father in the above-described custody orders and he and

C.K. were awarded custody in the underlying custody action initiated in

____________________________________________

9 Knecht testified that he thought he was unable have children due to an injury

as a teenager. N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 10. However, as addressed by
the trial court, “at neither hearing was any medical testimony, nor medical
documentation, regarding [Knecht’s] alleged condition presented to this
[c]ourt. Furthermore, there have been many instances of individuals believed
to be sterile where pregnancy ultimately does occur. This belief by [Knecht]
is not dispositive.” T.C.O. at 14.

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January 2020.    The court therefore concluded that it is unbelievable that

Appellant and Mother and their respective families were unaware of this

custody litigation but failed to intervene until the maternal grandmother and

D.K. filed a petition in January of 2023.     The court concluded that it is in

Child’s best interest to maintain a relationship with Knecht and his family. See

id. at 11-14. The court reasoned:

            It is completely unbelievable to this [c]ourt that Appellant,
      Appellant’s family, and [Mother’s] family had “no idea” about the
      ongoing custody case and about the fact that [Knecht] has been
      claiming paternity of [C]hild for several years. The testimony is
      clear that the family was aware that [Mother] was going to
      custody court on several occasions, the Knecht family was
      involved in the case, and the subject of that case was [Child].

             Appellant continues to ignore the fact that [C]hild has an
      established relationship with [Knecht’s] family, specifically
      [Knecht] and [C.K.], who has been having [c]ourt[-]ordered
      partial physical custody periods with [C]hild one (1) weekend a
      month for the past three (3) years. [C.K.] testified during the
      January 12, 2023 hearing that she has had custody of [C]hild one
      weekend a month beginning in 2020, and that [Knecht] was
      “supposed to have one weekend a month; he was supposed to
      have one week vacation in that year; and he’s supposed to have
      phone calls every day.” [C.K.] further testified that [Knecht] has
      seen [C]hild a few times at her home during her custodial periods,
      and he also celebrates holidays at [her] home with [Child]. [C.K.]
      testified that her family schedules holidays around the times that
      [C]hild is in her custody. [C.K.] likewise testified that [C]hild has
      her husband’s middle name, son’s middle name, and the Knecht
      family name. . . .

             [C]hild, presently age five (5), has had “Knecht” as his last
      name since his birth, and the same is reflected on his birth
      certificate. It is certainly in [C]hild’s best interest to maintain a
      relationship with the Knecht family that he has had consistent
      phone communication with and monthly weekend custody and
      holiday visits for the majority of [C]hild’s life. The “harm” that
      Appellant seeks to prevent from occurring to [C]hild has, in fact,

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      already occurred. [C]hild already has a relationship, albeit a
      sparse one, with Knecht, and a more developed, regular
      relationship with [his] family, specifically [C.K.].

Id. at 12-14 (citations to record omitted).

      Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s findings and

conclusion that the doctrine of paternity by estoppel is not applicable based

on the facts in this case. The evidence reveals a long-standing, established

relationship between Knecht and his family and Child, as assented to and

supported by Mother and Appellant, as well as their families.

      Knecht testified that he and Mother were in a relationship and living

together when Mother learned she was pregnant and during her pregnancy.

See N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 3-5, 9-10 (“I was at work, and she sent me

a picture of a pregnancy test.”). C.K. corroborated same. See N.T., 1/12/23,

at 93-94, 96. Indeed, she recalled throwing Mother’s baby shower. See id.

at 94. Knecht stated that he went to all prenatal doctor appointments. See

N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 13. Further, he was present for Child’s birth and

signed paternity paperwork. See id. at 5-6.

      Notably, Child was given, and his birth certificate denotes, Knecht’s last

name. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit C (birth certificate); see also N.T., 4/12/23, at

10; N.T., 1/12/23, at 26, 63, 81. Knecht testified to Child having his last

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name and middle names associated with him and his family.10 N.T., 1/12/23

(Volume 2), at 5. Knecht explained that, following a prenatal ultrasound, he

and Mother had “very extensive conversations about what [Child’s] name

would be.” Id. at 5. As to its significance, Knecht continued, “His first middle

name is my father’s first name, and his second middle name is my first name

and of course my last name.” Id. at 6. C.K. elaborated that Child’s names

were revealed as a Christmas present to Knecht’s father. See N.T., 1/12/23,

at 95.

         Thereafter, upon discharge after birth, Knecht indicated that he drove

Mother and Child to their shared apartment, where they resided for two to

three more months before getting evicted:

              Q. Okay. When [Child] left the hospital were you there?

              A. Yeah.     I drove them home.

              Q. [Appellant] did not drive them?

              A. Absolutely not.

              Q. Are you positive?

              A. I am 100 percent positive.

              Q. Okay. Whose car?

____________________________________________

10 Interestingly, while conceding that Child has Knecht’s last name, the
maternal grandmother expressed that Mother wanted Child’s last name to be
her maiden name. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 80-81 (“[S]he wanted [Child] to
[have her maiden name] so all three children would have . . . the same last
name.”).

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J-A23031-23

              A. It was my car.

              Q. Okay. Who got the car seat?

              A. I did.

              Q. Okay. So from the hospital, literally from the room?

            A. Yeah. I carried him from the room to the car in the snow
       and everything. Yeah.

              Q. There was snow on the ground?

              A. Yep.

             Q. You remember that. Okay. Where did you go from the
       hospital?

              A. We went right home, which was our apartment. . . .

            Q.    How long had you been living together in that
       apartment?

            A. I want to say five months before he was born and then
       another two or three months after he was born.

            Q. Okay. So you lived together there for three more
       months and then what happened?

              A. We got evicted. . . .

N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 7-8 (bold omitted). D.K., C.K. and the maternal

grandmother all similarly recounted Appellees residing together following

Child’s birth.11 See N.T., 1/12/23, at 29-30, 82-83, 95-96.

____________________________________________

11 The record reveals that Mother’s cousin resided at this apartment as well.

See N.T., 1/12/23, at 63, 82, 95.

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J-A23031-23

      Furthermore, Knecht was identified as Child’s father in two agreed-upon

custody orders resulting from the underlying custody action initiated in

January 2020. See Orders, 3/2/20 & 1/26/22. Throughout, Mother never

challenged this classification of Knecht as father. Knecht testified as follows:

            Q. Okay. You were in court in 2020 and 2021 over custody
      of [Child]?

            A. Yeah.

            Q. At any point did [Mother] raise the issue of him not being
      your child?

            A. No.

            Q. And those two court orders were entered by agreement
      giving you shared legal custody?

            A. Yeah.

            Q. Of [Child]?

            A. Me and her agreed to everything.

N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2), at 9 (bold omitted).

      Similarly, C.K. stated:

            Q. [O]n January 23, 2020, do you remember filing for
      custody?

            A. Oh, yes.

            Q. And you filed for custody against who?

            A. Against [Appellees].

            Q. Okay. You showed up for custody in this building?

            A.   That’s correct.

                                      - 19 -
J-A23031-23

             Q. When you showed up, did [Mother] make any argument
     at all that you did not have the right to ask for custody of [Child]?

           A. No, none.

           Q. Did she raise the issue that potentially [Knecht] was not
     [Child’s] father?

           A. No.

          Q. The [o]rder that was generated, was that generated by
     agreement?

           A. Yes.

           Q. So that agreement was between who?

           A. [Appellees].

           Q. And you?

           A. Yes.

           Q. Okay. And you have been to court more than once?

           A. Yes.

           Q. How many more times did you come back?

           A. The year after.

           ...

           Q. That was the second time you were court?

           A. That’s correct.

           Q. Did she raise any issues about your son not being the
     father at that point?

           A. No.

N.T., 1/12/23, at 99-100 (bold omitted).

                                    - 20 -
J-A23031-23

      Despite testifying during the custody hearing that they did not know

that Child was the subject of a custody action involving Knecht and C.K, both

D.K. and the maternal grandmother admitted knowledge that Mother attended

court multiple times related to Child. See id. at 37-41, 76-79. Indeed, D.K.

drove Mother twice and actually attempted to participate on one occasion.

She testified, “We tried -- we tried going into -- tr[ied] to tell him that we

have the paperwork for [Child] with all the facts, the marriage license, and

everything else. We were not allowed in the courtroom. We were not called

in to testify. They told us we would be called in as witnesses and we never

were.” Id. at 37-40

      Additionally, contrary to claims at the subject proceeding of only recent

knowledge of the extent of the underlying custody proceeding, see N.T.,

4/12/23, at 19, at the January 2023 custody hearing Appellant conceded that

he was aware that Mother attended court related to Child and was aware of

an order affording custodial time to C.K., see N.T., 1/12/23, at 67-69. Thus,

this belies any assertions of ignorance.

      Moreover, and as noted supra, pursuant to these agreed-upon orders,

C.K. was awarded and entitled to partial physical custody the second weekend

of every month as well as phone calls, which she exercised in cooperation with

D.K. and the maternal grandmother. See Orders, 3/2/20 & 1/26/22; N.T.,

1/12/23, at 41-42, 78-79, 88. Appellant, D.K., and the maternal grandmother

all conceded that C.K. engaged in regular custodial time with Child, with C.K.

                                    - 21 -
J-A23031-23

retrieving Child from the maternal grandmother. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 41-

42, 69-73, 78-79. D.K. testified:

     Q. Okay. You are aware, are you not, that [C.K.] has been taking
     [Child]?

     A. Yes. I drop him off.

     Q. You drop him off?

     A. I drop him off to [the maternal grandmother]. I do after school
     and when she’s supposed to have him.

     Q. Okay. How often has she been seeing him?

     A. She gets him at least one weekend out of the month and she
     gets phone calls. If we need to change, it we let her know.
     Sometimes she changes with us and we change with her. . . .

Id. at 41-42; see also id. at 78-79.

     C.K. testified that Knecht saw Child during her custodial time and

holidays. She explained, “Well, [Knecht] saw [Child] a few times at my house

on my visitation. [Knecht] has come to Christmases, Thanksgivings. [Knecht]

does see -- like, [Knecht] was seeing [Child] at my house on my visitation.”

Id. at 90. She continued, “Like, we schedule our holidays around [Child], so

when we -- okay. For Thanksgiving, everybody comes to my house because

that’s when we have [Child] and that’s when we celebrate Thanksgiving, the

second weekend of the month unless we switch it around and work with each

                                    - 22 -
J-A23031-23

other doing that.”12 Id. at 90-91. In fact, Knecht stated, “Every chance I get

to, I see [Child].” N.T., 1/12/23 (Volume 2) at 12.

       To the extent Appellant argues that Knecht failed to present any

evidence or rebut Appellant’s claims of paternity, see Appellant’s Brief at 34,

this argument is without merit. As aptly stated by the trial court,

       At the outset, the court notes that the various iterations
       throughout Appellant’s concise statement claiming that [Knecht]
       “presented no evidence, filed no counterclaim or complaint for
       paternity, and did not dispute any of [Appellant’s] evidence” and
       that [Appellant] provided “unrebutted testimony” that he is the
       father are patently false. While it is correct that [Knecht] did not
       file a counterclaim or complaint in paternity, he provided
       testimony at both the January 12, 2023 and the April 12, 2023
       hearings that he believes that he is the father of the subject child
       for various reasons, testified that there is a current custody action
       in Luzerne County regarding this child where he is named father,
       and made an oral request that the court order genetic testing.
       Additionally, [Knecht] has been named as the father of [Child] in
       [the underlying custody action] since [January] of 2020, an action
       to which Appellant was only recently named as an additional
       defendant, and only because [D.K.] and [the maternal
       grandmother] sought to intervene in said action. There have been
       clear paternity claims by both Appellant and [Knecht] since at
       least January 12, 2023, where both individuals introduced himself
       on the record as “father” to [Child].

T.C.O. at 9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court

concluding that the doctrine of paternity by estoppel does not apply in this

case. Clearly, Child had a relationship with Knecht and his family throughout

____________________________________________

12 C.K. testified that D.K. and the maternal grandmother did not permit Knecht

to exercise his custodial time as set forth in the order. See N.T., 1/12/23, at
88-89.

                                          - 23 -
J-A23031-23

his life to which Appellant, through his action and inaction, acquiesced. We

agree with the trial court that “[Child] is entitled to be a part of his biological

[f]ather’s family, and to explore his heritage if he chooses to do so. It is in

[Child]’s best interest to know, for certain, which of these families that he has

relationships with, is his biological family.”   T.C.O. at 14.   Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s order directing genetic testing in order to determine

Child’s paternity.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/12/2024

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