Court Opinion

ID: 9915790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 17:00:52.89367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:53.536005
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11743   Document: 34-1    Date Filed: 01/08/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                 In the

                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-11743

                         Non-Argument Calendar

                         ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,

       versus

       UNTARIUS DEMONT ALEXANDER,

                                                Defendant-Appellant.
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11743

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-20224-MGC-1
                            ____________________

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

       PER CURIAM:

              Untarius Demont Alexander appeals following his convic-
       tions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count 1), at-
       tempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count 2), and brandishing and dis-
       charging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (Count 3).
       The government has moved for summary reversal, arguing that
       we should vacate Alexander’s conviction and sentence as to Count
       3—the count associated with Alexander’s attempted Hobbs Act
       robbery. It also contends that we should vacate the district court’s
       sentences as to the other two counts and order a de novo resentenc-
       ing under the “sentencing-package” doctrine. We agree.
                                          I
              Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of
       one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can
       be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where,
       as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Zhang v.
       U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 21-14355, 2023 WL 3736046, at *1 (11th Cir.
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       22-11743               Opinion of the Court                         3

       May 31, 2023) (quoting Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d
       1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969)). We review de novo questions of statu-
       tory interpretation. United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274, 1277
       (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
             In United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 (2019), the Su-
       preme Court invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause,
       which had defined a “crime of violence” as any crime that “by its
       nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
       person or property of another may be used in the course of com-
       mitting the offense,” as unconstitutionally vague under the due-
       process and separation-of-powers principles. Id. at 2336.
              Significantly, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
       Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), in June 2022, while Alexander’s ap-
       peal was pending. In that case, Justice Gorsuch’s majority resolved
       a circuit split and held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery did not
       qualify as a predicate “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s “el-
       ements clause,” which “cover[ed] offenses that [had] as an element
       the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
       the person or property of another.” Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2019. At
       the outset, the Court noted that, under the applicable categorical
       approach, the facts of a particular defendant’s case were immaterial
       because the “only relevant question [was] whether the federal fel-
       ony at issue always require[d] the government to prove—beyond
       a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case—the use, attempted
       use, or threatened use of force.” Id. at 2020.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11743

              The Court then explained that, to prove attempted Hobbs
       Act robbery, the government must show that the defendant in-
       tended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of
       actual or threatened force and completed a “substantial step” to-
       ward that end. Id. Justice Gorsuch emphasized, however, that
       while the government would have to show that the defendant took
       an “unequivocal” and “significant” step towards committing rob-
       bery, it need not show that the defendant actually used, attempted
       to use, or even threatened to use force, as required by § 924(c). Id.
       at 2020–21. And he stressed that “an intention to take property by
       force or threat, along with a substantial step toward achieving that
       object, . . . is just that, no more.” Id. at 2020. For example, a de-
       fendant who was apprehended before reaching his robbery victim
       could be convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, even though
       he has not yet engaged in threatening conduct, so long as the gov-
       ernment had other evidence of his intent and a substantial step. Id.
       at 2020–21. Therefore, the Court concluded that attempted Hobbs
       Act robbery was not a “crime of violence” under the text of
       § 924(c)(3)(A). Id. at 2021.
              Taylor further emphasized that the “elements clause does
       not ask whether the defendant committed a crime of violence or
       attempted to commit one,” but rather “asks whether the defendant
       did commit a crime of violence.” Id. at 2022 (emphasis in original).
       The Court concluded that, had Congress intended the elements
       clause to encompass attempted crimes of violence, it could have
       explicitly included attempt in its definition. Id. Ultimately, the Su-
       preme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to reverse and
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       22-11743               Opinion of the Court                          5

       remand Taylor’s enhanced sentence. Id. at 2019–20, 2025–26. In
       so holding, Taylor rejected the government’s argument—which we
       had adopted in United States v. St. Hubert, that because a completed
       Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, an attempted
       Hobbs Act robbery must qualify as well. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2021–
       22 (citing United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 352–53 (11th Cir.
       2018)).
                                         II
              The “sentencing-package” doctrine is a judicial practice that
       permits a district court to resentence a defendant on all counts of
       conviction where one of the counts of conviction was vacated, ei-
       ther through direct appeal or a § 2255 proceeding. United States v.
       Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (11th Cir. 2014). “[W]hen a convic-
       tion on one or more of the component counts is vacated for good,
       the district court should be free to reconstruct the sentencing pack-
       age . . . to ensure that the overall sentence remains consistent with
       the guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, and the court’s view concern-
       ing the proper sentence in light of all the circumstances.” Id. At
       resentencing, “[t]he sentence package that has been unpackaged by
       a reversal is to be repackaged at resentencing using the guidelines
       and the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 1016.
              We have also recognized that it is “anomalous to reverse
       some convictions and not others when all defendants suffer from
       the same error.” See United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 497 (5th
       Cir. 1980).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11743

                                            III
               Here, for the reasons the Supreme Court noted in Taylor,
       the facts of Alexander’s individual case are immaterial, and the only
       relevant question is whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery was
       used as a predicate “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s ele-
       ments clause. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2020–21. In Count 2 of the in-
       dictment, Alexander was charged with attempted Hobbs Act rob-
       bery, and the § 924(c) offense in Count 3 referenced Count 2 as the
       associated predicate “crime of violence.” After Davis and Taylor,
       attempted Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a “crime of vi-
       olence,” either under the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) or the el-
       ements clause in § 924(c)(3)(A). See Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2020–21;
       Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2324, 2336. Moreover, the government has al-
       ready acknowledged that a conviction of Alexander’s codefendant,
       Hamilton, on that count was improper for the same reason, and
       the district court then dismissed that count before sentencing him,
       so it would be anomalous for us to not provide the district court an
       opportunity to do the same in Alexander’s case. See Gray, 626 F.2d
       at 497.
              Importantly, the government correctly concedes that, under
       Taylor, Alexander’s conviction and sentence for Count 3 is unlaw-
       ful. Because one of the component counts should be vacated for
       good, the district court should be free to reconstruct Alexander’s
       sentence using the guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors so that it re-
       mains proper in light of all the circumstances. Fowler, 749 F.3d at
       1015–16. Therefore, because the government’s position is clearly
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       22-11743             Opinion of the Court                    7

       correct as a matter of law, we vacate Alexander’s conviction on
       Count 3 and remand for resentencing on the remaining counts.
       Zhang, No. 21-14355 at *1.
             VACATED AND REMANDED.