Court Opinion

ID: 9784625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:49:51.157002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:57.063170
License: Public Domain

HANNAH, CJ., dissents. li>i>I respectfully dissent. The appeal should be dismissed because the State is not entitled to an appeal, pursuant to Ark. R App. P.-Criminal 3(c). Appellee complied in good faith with the terms of the agreement to forbear prosecution and is entitled to enforce the agreement on its terms.1 Detrimental reliance was not a term of the contract and is irrelevant to the analysis. Under Hammers, 261 Ark. 585, 600, 550 S.W.2d 432, 439 (1977), a criminal defendant is “equitably entitled to have his or her agreement with the prosecutor enforced if he or she has complied with its terms in good faith.” Hammers controls and as settled law deprives the State of its opportunity to appeal under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure-Criminal 3 because the correct and uniform administration of the law is not at issue. See Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 3(c). Detrimental reliance applies only in the absence of a binding agreement with the prosecutor. It may permit a criminal defendant to enforce a promise, for example, in plea negotiations. In that case, although the prosecutor may make an offer, and the criminal defendant may express a willingness to accept the offer, no binding agreement can be created between the prosecutor and the criminal defendant because the plea must be approved by the circuit court. See Caldwell v. State, 295 Ark. 149, 152, 747 S.W.2d 99, 101 (1988) (“The parties have no power to bind the court, and thus it is illusory to say the state is bound by |gjsuch an agreement before it is consummated by the acceptance of a guilty plea by the court.”). In such a case, the criminal defendant must show detrimental reliance to enforce the plea. Id., 747 S.W.2d at 101 (“[A]bsent a showing of acceptance of a plea of guilty based upon agreement and absent a showing of other detrimental reliance upon the agreement, Caldwell was not entitled to enforcement of it.”). In the present case, the prosecutor made an offer to forbear prosecution, a right held by the prosecutor that in no way involved the court. See, e.g., Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 595, 918 S.W.2d 114, 119 (1996); see also, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (noting that there is no judicial review of the decision to prosecute). Once the prosecution’s offer was accepted, and appellee performed, he was equitably entitled to enforce the agreement on its terms. Hammers, 261 Ark. at 600, 550 S.W.2d at 439. Again, the terms of the agreement did not require him to show detrimental reliance. I agree that the circuit court was correct in enforcing the terms of the contract; however, the issue on appeal was settled in Hammers. I would hold that the State’s appeal be dismissed because it was not entitled to an appeal under Rule 3.  . I note that the prosecutor attempted to "revoke” the offer; however, the offer had been accepted, and it was too late to revoke it. The offer was made before the prosecutor reviewed the material on the computer and determined its seriousness. I find it troubling that such an offer was made without a careful review of the evidence; however, the prosecutor is now bound by his agreement.