Court Opinion

ID: 9401408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 00:01:13.178557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:52.543576
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10087        Document: 00516783107             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/12/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-10087
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                                  June 12, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Michael Tremaine Schexnayder,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 3:19-CR-623-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Michael Tremaine Schexnayder appeals his convictions for Hobbs
   Act robbery, carrying and brandishing a firearm during a violent crime,
   possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and carjacking. Schexnayder
   represented himself with standby counsel at a suppression hearing and at
   trial, where he cross-examined witnesses and made arguments before the

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10087      Document: 00516783107          Page: 2     Date Filed: 06/12/2023

                                    No. 22-10087

   court and jury.     Throughout the proceedings Schexnayder frequently
   invoked sovereign citizen arguments and disputed the court’s jurisdiction
   over him. Schexnayder argues that he did not receive a fair trial because of
   the district court’s failure to hold a competency hearing. He also argues that
   he did not validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel.
          We consider the following factors relevant to decide whether a
   competency hearing is necessary: “(1) any history of irrational behavior,
   (2) the defendant’s demeanor at [the proceeding], and (3) any prior medical
   opinion on competency.” United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th
   Cir. 2002). All three factors are relevant in determining the need for further
   inquiry, but one factor, standing alone, may be sufficient. See United States
   v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699, 707 (5th Cir. 2012). The district court’s sua
   sponte failure to conduct a competency hearing is reviewed for abuse of
   discretion. United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 303 (5th Cir. 1995). “Whether
   reasonable cause exists to put the court on notice that the defendant might
   be mentally incompetent is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id.
   at 304 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          All three factors support the district court’s decision not to hold a
   competency hearing or order a psychological examination. See Messervey, 317
   F.3d at 463. First, the district court had before it no evidence of a history of
   irrational   behavior   demonstrating     reasonable      cause   to   question
   Schexnayder’s competency; no participant in the proceedings alerted the
   district court to any evidence showing that Schexnayder had a history of
   disturbed behavior reflecting an inability to understand the criminal
   proceedings or assist in his defense. Cf. United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892,
   895, 902, 904 (5th Cir. 2009). As for Schexnayder’s demeanor in pre-trial
   proceedings, the district court personally observed and interacted with
   Schexnayder during the hearing on Schexnayder’s request to represent
   himself, and it emphasized that he remained engaged and attentive

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Case: 22-10087      Document: 00516783107           Page: 3   Date Filed: 06/12/2023

                                     No. 22-10087

   throughout the hearing and demonstrated his understanding of the
   proceeding by voicing his objections and opinions regarding the factual and
   legal matters discussed. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
   Finally, there was no prior medical opinion establishing reasonable cause to
   believe that Schexnayder suffered from a mental illness or defect that
   rendered him unable to understand the nature or consequences of the
   proceedings or assist in his defense, and his testimony suggested he was
   competent. See Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d at 707. Therefore, the district
   court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a competency hearing or
   ordering a psychological examination. See id. at 706.
          We review de novo whether a defendant validly waived his Sixth
   Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial. United States v. Mesquiti, 854
   F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2017). Before permitting a defendant to represent
   himself, a district court is required to determine whether he has “knowingly
   and intelligently” decided to forgo counsel and whether his request was clear
   and unequivocal. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
          Here, it is undisputed that Schexnayder clearly and unequivocally
   informed the district court of his desire to represent himself, and the district
   court accordingly held a Faretta hearing to determine whether his waiver of
   counsel and decision to proceed pro se was knowingly and intelligently made.
   The record demonstrates that the district court’s warnings were consistent
   with those approved by this court. See Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 274. Further,
   nothing in the record indicates that Schexnayder did not understand the
   difficulties of proceeding pro se. See id. at 274-75. Thus, Schexnayder’s
   decision to waive his Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel was knowing
   and intelligent. See id.; Davis, 269 F.3d at 518.
          The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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