Court Opinion

ID: 9767404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:18:52.625888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.031838
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus,
dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, Judge Cavanaugh, which is based upon the validity of the *145collateral criminal consequences doctrine as espoused in his well-reasoned dissent in Commonwealth v. Hayes, 408 Pa.Super. 68, 596 A.2d 195 (1991). I write separately, however, to state an additional reason for the impropriety of the majority’s decision today.
In Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 533 Pa. 294, 621 A.2d 990 (1993), our supreme court reiterated a long-standing theory behind habitual criminal legislation. Specifically, the Dickerson court stated
[t]he point of sentence enhancement is to punish more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal activity despite the theoretically beneficial effects of penal discipline. Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 349 Pa.Super. 415, 419, 503 A.2d 435, 437 (1986), allocatur granted, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1986), appeal dismissed, 517 Pa. 406, 537 A.2d 1370 (1988).
Id. at 299-300, 621 A.2d at 992. Pennsylvania’s criminal and sentencing statutes, which have detailed guidelines for sentencing a defendant, include a section relating to the computation of a defendant’s prior record score before determining the appropriate sentence for a defendant on a subsequent conviction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701, et seq; 204 Pa.Code § 303.4-7. A defendant’s prior record will result in an enhanced sentence on a subsequent crime when a prior offense has resulted in a conviction before the later offense is committed. See Dickerson, 533 Pa. at 300, 621 A.2d at 993.
Our own court, recognizing the necessity of applying these recidivist provisions strictly and consistently, has expressed that
[i]t was not intended that the heavier penalty prescribed for the commission of a second offense should descend upon anyone except the incorrigible one, who after being reproved, “still hardenth his neck.” If the heavier penalty prescribed for the second violation ... is visited upon the one who has not had the benefit of the reproof of a first conviction, then the purpose of the statute is lost.
Commonwealth v. Kane, 430 Pa.Super. 203, 206, 633 A.2d 1210, 1211 (1993) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sut*146ton, 125 Pa.Super. 407, 413, 189 A. 556, 558 (1937). In addition, this court has repeatedly expressed its views on the validity, application and effect of the enhancing statutes. See Kane, supra (enhancement provision of Crimes Code not applied to a defendant who was sentenced and convicted of second drug offense prior to his sentencing or conviction of first drug offense); Commonwealth v. Beatty, 411 Pa.Super. 450, 601 A.2d 1253 (1992) (en banc) (when determining penalty enhancement under Motor Vehicle Code section, only those convictions prior to the offense date and within look-back period shall be utilized to determine the applicable penalty enhancement; defendant who had only pled guilty on first offenses, where pleas had not been entered until after his conviction on a second crime, was not subject to enhancement provision); Commonwealth v. Tobin, 411 Pa.Super. 460, 601 A.2d 1258 (1992) (en banc) (defendant who pled guilty to two driving under the influence offenses was not subject to enhanced sentence unless he had previous conviction at the time of his second offense); Commonwealth v. Eck, 411 Pa.Super. 465, 601 A.2d 1261 (1992) (en banc) (determines proper procedure for employing recidivist statute in light of a conviction of a prior offense under the Motor Vehicle Code); Commonwealth v. T. Williams, 431 Pa.Super. 167, 636 A.2d 183 (1993) (en banc) (court must remain consistent in applying recidivist provisions to ensure continuity, efficiency, and stability in our judicial decision-making) (Cirillo, J., concurring and dissenting).
In this case, both McGuire and Ahlborn were convicted of crimes. Unlike the majority, I cannot regard their PCRA petitions as “moot;” the potential for harm under the enhancing statutes and the sentencing guidelines still exists. To cause these defendants to potentially suffer the heightened consequences on a subsequent conviction, based upon the present convictions which may have been reversed due to meritorious claims presented in their unreviewed PCRA petitions, is against basic principles of justice and the rights conferred under our state and federal constitutions.
Accordingly, I would reverse.