Court Opinion

ID: 9655057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:59:04.235377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:15.816292
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. MoPaddin, Associate Justice, dissenting.. These two cases were consolidated in this Court. The first is from Baxter Chancery Court, and the second is from Marion Chancery Court. My dissent goes only to the case from the Marion Chancery Court, styled Burnes v. King, No. 2461. I am of the opinion that a permanent injunction should be granted against the issuance of the bonds by the Marion County Court because the industry is not to be ‘ ‘ within the county. ” • ' It was conceded by appellee in the oral argument that Amendment No. 49 is the only authority for Act No. 2; and that Act No. 2 is the only authority under which Marion County is issuing the challenged bonds. I concede that Act No. 2 is broad enough to cover what was attempted here; but I maintain that Amendment No. 49 is not broad enough to cover Act No. 2. Here is the germane language of Amendment No. 49: “. . . any county may issue, by and with the consent of the majority of the qualified electors of said . . . county voting on the question . . . bonds . . . for the purpose of securing and developing industry . . . within-the county holding the election.” (Emphasis supplied.) Two points stand out: the bonds are for the purpose of (1) securing and developing industry (2) within the county. I am firmly of the opinion that obtaining and developing a manufacturing plant in Baxter County is not an industry within Marion County. All Marion County can hope to gain is an increase in population to result from people coming to Marion County to work in Baxter County. That is fine; but it is not within the provisions of the Constitutional Amendment No. 49. The majority opinion defines industry as “ . . . systematic labor or habitual employment; esp. human exertion employed for the creation of value.” Even accepting the definition, still the Amendment 49 says that such systematic labor or habitual employment must be within the county. In the case at bar, the labor and employment is to be in Baxter County and not in Marion County: so the Constitutional requirement is not met. That the framers of Amendment No. 49 recognized the force of the words, “within the county,” is clear: because, in regard to municipalities the amendment says, “within or near said municipality,” whereas, in speaking of counties the amendment says, “within the county.” Yet the Majority is in effect saying, as regards a county, that ‘ ‘ within ’ ’ means ‘ ‘ within or near. ” If this holding of the Majority in this case should be extended to our venue statutes, where would be the end to the confusion? The words, “within the county, ’ ’ mean what they say; and I refuse to torture the words to achieve a different meaning, even to help two well meaning Counties obtain an increase in population in one and a plant in the other. As I see it, the Chancery decree should be affirmed in the Baxter County case, but reversed in the Marion County case.