Court Opinion

ID: 9917034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 15:06:22.03854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:59.529971
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Spencer, 2024-Ohio-59.]
                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       SCIOTO COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                 :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :    Case No.   22CA4000
                                                               22CA4001
         v.                                    :

OSHNAYA V. SPENCER,1                           :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                   :

________________________________________________________________

                                            APPEARANCES:

Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.2

Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew
F. Loesch, Scioto County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:1-3-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is a consolidated appeal from two Scioto County

Common Pleas Court judgments of conviction and sentence.                  In one

case, the trial court found Oshnaya V. Spencer, defendant below and

appellant herein, guilty of seven criminal offenses and sentenced

her to serve a combined three years and three months in prison.                    In

       The record contains multiple spellings of appellant’s
        1

first name. At the change of plea hearing, appellant stated
that her first name is spelled Oshonya. We, however, have used
the name that appears on the trial court’s judgment entry in
case number 21CR270(A).
     2
       Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
court proceedings.
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                            2

the other case, the trial court found (1) appellant guilty of six

criminal offenses, (2) sentenced her to serve a combined four years

and nine months in prison, with four years mandatory, and (3)

ordered appellant to pay a $5,000 fine, and costs of prosecution

and any other fees permitted.   The court further ordered the prison

sentences imposed in each case to be served consecutively to each

other for an aggregate prison term of eight years to an indefinite

prison term of up to ten years, with four years mandatory.

     {¶2}   Appellant assigns the following errors for review:

            FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED FINANCIAL
            SANCTIONS AGAINST MS. SPENCER.”

            SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “THE COURT IMPROPERLY SENTENCED MS. SPENCER TO
            SERVE CONSECUTIVE TERMS.”

     {¶3}   On June 9, 2021, a Scioto County Grand Jury returned an

indictment that charged appellant with seven criminal offenses: (1)

trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a

third-degree felony; (2) possession of cocaine, in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A), a third-degree felony; (3) possession of

marijuana, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony;

(4) trafficking in marijuana, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a

fourth-degree felony; (5) identity fraud, in violation of R.C.

2913.49(B)(2), a fifth-degree felony; (6) possessing criminal
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                             3

tools, in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-degree felony; and

(7) conspiracy, in violation of R.C. 2923.01(A)(2), a fourth-degree

felony.

     {¶4}   On November 2, 2021, a Scioto County Grand Jury returned

another indictment that charged appellant with: (1) aggravated

trafficking in drugs, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(1), (2) aggravated possession of drugs, a second-degree

felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (3) trafficking in

cocaine, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1),

(4) possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A), (5) possession of drugs, a first-degree

misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and (6) possession of

marijuana, a minor misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A).

     {¶5}   Appellant later agreed to plead guilty to all thirteen

counts of the two indictments and the trial court found appellant

guilty as charged.

     {¶6}   At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged several

offenses. In the first case, Case No. 21CR270(A), the court merged:

(1) counts one (cocaine trafficking), two (cocaine possession), and

seven (conspiracy), and (2) counts three (marijuana possession) and

four (marijuana trafficking).   The state elected to proceed to

sentencing on counts one and four.

     {¶7}   In the second case, Case No. 21CR780(A), the trial court

merged: (1) counts one (aggravated drug trafficking) and two
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                                4

(aggravated drug possession), and (2) counts three (drug

trafficking) and four (cocaine possession).   The state elected to

proceed to sentencing on counts one and three.

     {¶8}   The trial court asked the prosecutor if the state had a

“position on the mandatory drug fine in case number 21CR780.”       The

prosecutor responded that the state “stipulate[d] to [appellant’s]

indigence for the purpose of” the mandatory fine in Case No.

21CR780(A).   The court said it would “accept the stipulation of the

parties and not impose a fine in that matter – in that charge.”

     {¶9}   Later, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court

addressed appellant’s co-defendant, her daughter, Elisha Spencer.

The court stated that it would impose “a discretionary fine of

$5,000.00" on count one of Elisha’s indictment, then stated that it

would “impose no fines on Ms. Elisha Spencer.”   The court ordered

both appellant and Elisha to pay the costs of prosecution.

     {¶10} When imposing sentence, the trial court found that

     consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public
     from future crime or to punish the offender, and not
     disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenders [sic]
     conduct, and to the danger the offender poses to the
     public. The Courts [sic] going to find that one of these
     offenses was committed after [her] arrest on the earlier
     of the offenses, although before [she] was indicted. This
     Court is also going to find that two or more of the multiple
     offenses committed was part of one or more courses of
     conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple
     offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
     single prison term for any of the offenses committed as
     part of the course of conduct adequately reflects the
     seriousness of the offenders [sic] conduct.

On September 7, 2022, the trial court filed the judgment entries of
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                           5

sentence.   In Case No. 21CR270(A), the court sentenced appellant to

serve the following prison terms: (1) 18 months on count one; (2)

nine months on count four; (3) 12 months on count five; and (4) six

months on count six.   The court further ordered count six to be

served concurrently with count four, and ordered counts one, four,

and five to be served consecutively to one another, and

consecutively to the sentence in Case No. 21CR780(A), for an

aggregate prison term of eight years, with four years mandatory, to

an indefinite prison term of up to ten years.   The court found

     that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
     public from future crime or to punish the offender and are
     not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenders
     [sic] conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
     public, that one offense was committed after the Defendant
     was charged on an earlier offense, and further finds that
     at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as
     part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused
     by two or more multiple offenses so committed was so great
     or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
     offenses committed as part of any of the course of conduct
     adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s
     conduct.

The court also ordered appellant to pay the costs of prosecution.

     {¶11} In Case No. 21CR780 (A), the trial court sentenced

appellant as follows: (1) serve a mandatory minimum prison term of

four years to an indefinite maximum term of six years on count one;

(2) a nine-month prison term on count three; (3) a 30-day-jail

sentence on count five; and (4) a $100 fine on count six.   The

court further ordered that the sentences for count one and count

three be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                            6

the sentence in Case No. 21CR270 for an aggregate minimum prison

term of eight years (with four years mandatory) to an indefinite

term of ten years.    The court ordered the sentences for counts five

and six to be served concurrently.     The court also ordered

appellant pay a $5,000 fine, the costs of prosecution and any other

fees permitted.    This appeal followed.

     {¶12} Appellant’s two assignments of error challenge the

sentence that the trial court imposed.      In her first assignment

of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by

imposing financial sanctions.     In her second assignment of

error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by imposing

consecutive sentences.     Because the same standard of review

governs both assignments of error, for ease of discussion, we

first set forth that standard.

                                   A

     {¶13} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts

apply the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).       E.g., State

v. Nelson, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 22CA10, 2023-Ohio-3566, ¶ 63.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) provides that “[t]he appellate court’s

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused

its discretion.”     Instead, the statute authorizes appellate

courts to “increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence” “if

it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following”:

          (a) That the record does not support the sentencing
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                         7

    court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section
    2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section
    2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the
    Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
         (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

    {¶14} Practically speaking, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) means that

appellate courts ordinarily “‘defer to trial courts’ broad

discretion in making sentencing decisions.’”    State v. Gwynne,

___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2023-Ohio-3851, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 11 (Gwynne

II), quoting State v. Rahab, 150 Ohio St.3d 152, 2017-Ohio-1401,

80 N.E.3d 431, ¶ 10 (lead opinion), and citing State v. Marcum,

146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 23

(describing an appellate court’s review of whether a sentence is

clearly and convincingly contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)

as being deferential to the sentencing court); accord State v.

Creech, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3730, 2017-Ohio-6951, ¶ 11,

quoting State v. Venes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98682, 2013–Ohio–

1891, ¶ 21 (“[t]he language in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) establishes an

‘extremely deferential standard of review’ for ‘the restriction

is on the appellate court, not the trial judge’”).   In other

words, appellate courts “may increase, reduce, or otherwise

modify consecutive sentences only if the record does not

‘clearly and convincingly’ support the trial court’s R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-sentence findings.”   Gwynne II at ¶
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                          8

13.

            “[C]lear and convincing evidence” means “that
       measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere
       ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent
       of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable
       doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the
       mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction
       as to the facts sought to be established.”

Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120

N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

            Therefore, an appellate court is directed that it
       must have a firm belief or conviction that the record
       does not support the trial court’s findings before it
       may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify consecutive
       sentences. The statutory language does not require that
       the appellate court have a firm belief or conviction
       that the record supports the findings. This language is
       plain and unambiguous and expresses the General
       Assembly’s intent that appellate courts employ a
       deferential standard to the trial court’s consecutive-
       sentence findings. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) also ensures that
       an appellate court does not simply substitute its
       judgment for that of a trial court.

Id. at ¶ 15.

       {¶15} Thus, in the case sub judice, we may not disturb the

trial court’s decision to impose a $5,000 fine, to require

appellant to pay prosecution costs, and to sentence her to

consecutive sentences unless the record clearly and convincingly

shows that the sentence is contrary to law.    E.g., State v.

Lykins, 4th Dist. No. 17CA1040, 2017-Ohio-9390, 102 N.E.3d 503,

¶ 9.

                                  B
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                             9

    {¶16} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court erred by: (1) ordering her to pay a $5,000

fine, and (2) failing to waive or cancel the requirement that

she pay the prosecution costs.   Appellant points out that, at

the sentencing hearing, the state conceded appellant is indigent

and the court stated it would not impose a fine.   She further

asserts that the court did not consider her present or future

ability to pay.   Appellant thus contends that the trial court

plainly erred by including the $5,000 fine in its sentence.      For

similar reasons, appellant claims that the trial court erred by

failing to waive the requirement that she pay the prosecution

costs.

    {¶17} The state pointed out that appellant did not comply

with the R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) requirement to file an affidavit

before sentencing to attest that she is indigent and unable to

pay the mandatory fine.   The state “concedes” that appellant was

indigent for purposes of appointed counsel, but claims that

being indigent for purposes of appointed counsel is not the same

as being indigent and unable to pay a mandatory fine.   The state

additionally claims that appellant failed to object to the

mandatory fine and, therefore, waived the right to challenge the

fine on appeal.

    {¶18} Appellant counters that, at the sentencing hearing,
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                         10

the state specifically stipulated that appellant’s indigency for

purposes of the mandatory fine.     She also points out that, at

the sentencing hearing, the trial court mentioned a $5,000 fine

in relation to Elisha, but not in relation to appellant.

Appellant thus asserts that trial counsel, therefore, had no

reason to object during the sentencing hearing and could not

have objected to a statement that the court did not utter.

Appellant further challenges the state’s argument that her trial

counsel’s failure to file an indigency affidavit before

sentencing should result in the conclusion that the trial court

did not err by imposing the fine.    Appellant contends that, if

the trial court did not plainly err by imposing the fine, then

trial counsel’s failure to file the affidavit before sentencing

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

                       R.C. 2929.18(B)(1)

    {¶19} R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) requires a sentencing court to

impose a mandatory fine upon certain offenders.    The statute

provides:

         For a first, second, or third degree felony
    violation of any provision of Chapter 2925., 3719., or
    4729. of the Revised Code, the sentencing court shall
    impose upon the offender a mandatory fine of at least
    one-half of, but not more than, the maximum statutory
    fine amount authorized for the level of the offense
    pursuant to division (A)(3) of this section.

The statute further states, however, that a sentencing court
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                          11

“shall not impose the mandatory fine upon the offender” if the

following two conditions exist: (1) the offender files an

affidavit with the court before sentencing to allege “the

offender is indigent and unable to pay the mandatory fine”; and

(2) “the court determines the offender is an indigent person and

is unable to pay the mandatory fine.”    R.C. 2929.18(B)(1).   If

these conditions are not met, then imposing a mandatory fine

upon an offender is not contrary to law.    Importantly, failing

to file an affidavit before “sentencing is, standing alone, a

sufficient reason to find that the trial court committed no

error by imposing the statutory fine.”     State v. Gipson, 80 Ohio

St.3d 626, 633, 687 N.E.2d 750 (1998).

    {¶20} Equally important, however, is a criminal defendant’s

right to be physically present at all critical stages of the

proceeding, including when a trial court imposes a sentence.

Crim.R. 43(A)(1) (“defendant must be physically present at every

stage of the criminal proceeding and trial, including * * *

imposition of sentence”).    Thus, “‘[b]ecause the defendant’s

presence is required when the court imposes sentence, the trial

court errs when its judgment entry of sentence differs from the

sentence that it announced at the sentencing hearing in the

defendant’s presence.’”     State v. Patrick, 4th Dist. Lawrence

No. 12CA16, 2013–Ohio–3821, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Kovach, 7th
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                        12

Dist. Mahoning No. 08–MA–125, 2009–Ohio–2892, ¶ 28, citing State

v. Jordan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP–1330, 2006–Ohio–5208, ¶

48; e.g., State v. Vaughn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103330, 2016-

Ohio-3320, ¶ 18 (“[a] trial court cannot impose a sentence in

the sentencing entry that differs from that it imposed at the

sentencing hearing”); State v. Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

101640, 2015-Ohio-1824, ¶ 19 (“[a] defendant is entitled to know

his sentence at the sentencing hearing”); Katz and Giannelli,

Criminal Law, Section 120:3 (3d ed.) (“[i]t is error if the

judgment entry states a different sentence from that which was

announced at the hearing”).

    {¶21} Courts thus have concluded that a trial court’s

sentence is contrary to law when a sentence is imposed in a

sentencing entry that the court did not impose in open court and

in the defendant’s presence.   State v. Craig, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-230112, 2023-Ohio-3777, ¶ 43 (reversing trial court’s

imposition of mandatory fine when court did not impose mandatory

fine during sentencing hearing and in defendant’s presence);

State v. Kirksey, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 20 JE 0002, 2021-Ohio-

2893, ¶ 13 (“because Appellant’s sentencing entry does not

comport with the sentence pronounced by the trial court at the

sentencing hearing, we reverse and remand for the trial court to

include a waiver of the mandatory fine pursuant to R.C. 2929.18
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                        13

in a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry”); State v. Turner, 4th

Dist. Athens No. 13CA26, 2015-Ohio-3712, ¶ 21 (reversing trial

court’s sentence that imposed a mandatory fine when prosecutor

specifically stated at sentencing hearing that the state not

pursuing a fine due to the defendant’s indigency and when trial

court had not imposed fine during sentencing hearing and in

defendant’s presence); State v. Patrick, 4th Dist. Lawrence No.

12CA16, 2013-Ohio-3821, ¶ 11 (“sentence is contrary to law

because the sentence announced by the trial court at the hearing

differed from that in the sentencing entry”); State v. Robinson,

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1369, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 79 (“[b]ecause

a defendant is required to be present when sentence is imposed,

it constitutes reversible error for the trial court to impose a

different sentence in its judgment entry than was announced at

the sentencing hearing in defendant’s presence”).

    {¶22} Accordingly, “if there exists a variance between the

sentence pronounced in open court and the sentence imposed by a

court’s judgment entry, a remand for resentencing is required.”

State v. Quinones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89221, 2007-Ohio-6077,

¶ 5; accord State v. Jordan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1330,

2006-Ohio-5208, ¶ 48 (“a trial court errs when it issues a

judgment entry that imposes a sentence that differs from the

sentence the trial court announced at a sentencing hearing in
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                           14

the defendant’s presence”; remand for resentencing is the

appropriate remedy).

       {¶23} In the case sub judice, the sentencing hearing

transcript reflects that the state stipulated to appellant’s

indigency for purposes of the mandatory fine and the trial court

accepted this stipulation.    Moreover, during the sentencing

hearing the trial court did not inform appellant that, despite

the stipulation, it would impose a $5,000 mandatory fine.       Thus,

because the trial court did not pronounce this fine in open

court and in appellant’s presence, the court erred when it

imposed that fine in its sentencing entry.    As a result, the

trial court’s imposition of the mandatory fine is contrary to

law.

       {¶24} Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s decision to

impose a $5,000 mandatory fine and remand this matter for

resentencing.

                             R.C. 2947.23

       {¶25} Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred by

failing to waive the costs of prosecution under R.C. 2947.23(C),

or to cancel them under R.C. 2303.23.

       {¶26} Initially, we point out that appellant did not object

to the imposition of these costs during the trial court

proceedings.    Consequently, she forfeited the error.   State v.
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Johnson, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-16-41, 2017-Ohio-6930, ¶ 24

(defendant’s failure to object to costs during trial court

proceedings forfeited the error); see State v. Thomas, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 104567, 2017-Ohio-4436, ¶ 5 (failure to object at

sentencing to restitution order forfeits all but plain error on

appeal); State v. Perry, 4th Dist. Pike No. 16CA863, 2017-Ohio-

69, ¶ 14 (failure to object during trial court proceedings

forfeits sentencing issues absent plain error).   We may,

however, review the issue under a plain error analysis.

    {¶27} Generally, appellate courts recognize plain error

“‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and

only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”   State v.

Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 559 N.E.2d 710 (1990), quoting

State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978),

paragraph three of the syllabus.   For plain error to apply, a

trial court must have deviated from a legal rule, the error must

have been an obvious defect in the proceeding, and the error

must have affected a substantial right.   E.g., State v. Rogers,

143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22; State

v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).

However, even when a defendant demonstrates that a plain error

or defect affected the defendant’s substantial rights, the Ohio

Supreme Court has “‘admonish[ed] courts to notice plain error
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“with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and

only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’”        Rogers at

¶ 23, quoting Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, quoting Long at

paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶28} In the case at bar, we do not believe that the trial

court’s order for appellant to pay the costs of prosecution

constitutes an obvious error.

       R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) states:

            In all criminal cases, including violations of
       ordinances, the judge or magistrate shall include in the
       sentence the costs of prosecution, including any costs
       under section 2947.231 of the Revised Code, and render
       a judgment against the defendant for such costs.

“Thus, the imposition of court costs on all convicted defendants

is mandatory, whether ‘indigent or not.’”    State v. Rister, 4th

Dist. Lawrence No. 21CA17, 2023-Ohio-1284, ¶ 19, quoting State

v. Taylor, 161 Ohio St. 3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163 N.E.3d 486,

¶ 6.

       {¶29} R.C. 2947.23(C) provides that the trial court

“‘retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment

of the costs of prosecution * * * at the time of sentencing or

at any time thereafter.’”    State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497,

2018-Ohio-493, 108 N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 265, quoting R.C. 2947.23(C).

In light of this provision, appellate courts have held that

defendants do “not need [the appellate] court to remand th[e]
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case in order for [the defendant] to file a motion to waive

costs.”   Id.; accord State v. Garcia, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

107027, 2022-Ohio-3426, ¶ 106.

    {¶30} R.C. 2303.23 similarly states: “If at any time the

court finds that an amount owing to the court is due and

uncollectible, in whole or in part, the court may direct the

clerk of the court to cancel all or part of the claim. The clerk

shall then effect the cancellation.”     This statute is “merely

permissive” and does “not require consideration of ability to

pay.”   Taylor at ¶ 15.

    {¶31} Under R.C. 2947.23(C), a trial court retains

jurisdiction to waive the costs of prosecution, and appellant

may still seek a waiver.     Consequently, in the case before us

the trial court’s failure to waive the costs of prosecution

during sentencing did not constitute an obvious error that

resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.     State v.

Thompson, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-19-30, 2020-Ohio-723, ¶ 21 (no

manifest miscarriage of justice when appellant retained “the

ability to seek waiver, suspension, or modification of the

payment of the costs of prosecution in this case”).

    {¶32} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule, in part, and sustain, in part, appellant’s first
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                         18

assignment of error consistent with our opinion.

                                 C

    {¶33} In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts

the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences because

the court improperly relied upon an impermissible factor when it

determined that consecutive sentences are warranted.   Appellant

contends that the court stated that it imposed consecutive

sentences because “one of the offenses was committed after [her]

arrest on the earlier of the offenses, although before [she] was

indicted.”   Appellant argues that because R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

“does not allow [a] court to consider whether offenses were

committed before any other case was indicted,” the trial court

“improperly considered this extraneous factor outside the bounds

of [R.C.] 2929.14(C)(4).”

    {¶34} We first observe that appellant did not object at the

sentencing hearing to the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Our review, therefore, is limited to determining whether the

trial court plainly erred.   See Barnes, supra.

    {¶35} In the case at bar, after our review we do not believe

that the trial court plainly erred by imposing consecutive

sentences.   R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) outlines the requirements that

trial courts must follow when imposing consecutive sentences:

        If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender
    for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                        19

    require the offender to serve the prison terms
    consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive
    service is necessary to protect the public from future
    crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
    sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
    the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender
    poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of
    the following:
         (a) The offender committed one or more of the
    multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial
    or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to
    section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised
    Code, or was under post-release control for a prior
    offense.
         (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were
    committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and
    the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses
    so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of
    any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
    seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
         (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct
    demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to
    protect the public from future crime by the offender.

    {¶36} In the case before us, even if the trial court may

have improperly relied upon R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), the trial

court also recited the circumstance listed in R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(b).   At the sentencing hearing, and in each

judgment of conviction and sentence, the trial court found

    at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as
    part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused
    by two or more multiple offenses so committed was so great
    or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
    offenses committed as part of any of the course of conduct
    adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s
    conduct.

    {¶37} Therefore, we do not believe that the trial court
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                         20

plainly erred by imposing consecutive sentences.   Furthermore,

the record does not otherwise clearly and convincingly show that

consecutive sentences are contrary to law.

    {¶38} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s second assignment of error.

                                 D

    {¶39} In conclusion, we: (1) overrule appellant’s first

assignment of error as it pertains to the court’s order that she

pay the costs of prosecution, (2) sustain her first assignment

of error regarding the court’s imposition of the $5,000

mandatory fine, (3) reverse the trial court’s judgment that

imposed the $5,000 mandatory fine, and (4) remand this matter

for resentencing.   We also overrule appellant’s second

assignment of error and otherwise affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                     JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                     REVERSED IN PART AND THIS
                                     CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
                                     PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
                                     THIS OPINION.
SCIOTO 22CA4000 & 22CA4001                                        21

                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed in part,
reversed in part and this matter remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellee shall
recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry
this judgment into execution.
     If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail
has been previously granted, it is continued for a period of 60
days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay
is to allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate at the
expiration of the 60-day period.
     The stay will also terminate if appellant fails to file a
notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court in the 45-day
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court
dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration of said 60 days,
the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                    For the Court

    BY:__________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.