Court Opinion

ID: 9927195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:07:08.624513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:08.805676
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3677-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TENNEYSON D.
FAIRCLOUGH,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided January 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 17-07-
                   0938.

                   Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
                   for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
                   attorney; Steven E. Braun, on the brief).

                   Leslie-Ann Marshall Justus, Deputy Attorney General,
                   argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
                   Attorney General, attorney; Leslie-Ann Marshall
                   Justus, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Tenneyson Fairclough appeals from the June 29, 2022, Law

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

                                          I.

      We glean these facts from the record. On July 10, 2017, defendant was

charged in a seven-count indictment with two counts of first-degree attempted

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (counts one and two); two counts

of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (counts three and

four); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count five); second-degree unlawful possession of a

weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (count six); and second-

degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (count

seven). The charges stemmed from defendant firing a gun into a car occupied

by two of his acquaintances outside a bar in Aberdeen on December 22, 2016.

One of the victims sustained a gunshot wound and both victims identified

defendant as the shooter.

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       After losing a Wade1 hearing challenging the out-of-court identifications,

on September 17, 2018, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to counts one

(attempted murder) and six (unlawful possession of a weapon). In exchange,

the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and

recommend an aggregate sentence of twelve years imprisonment, subject to an

eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early

Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.2

       Despite defendant indicating on the plea form that he was a United States

citizen, prior to sentencing, his attorney confirmed that he was not a United

States citizen. As a result, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and

submitted a supporting certification by his attorney averring that defendant's

mother had been advised by an immigration attorney that "a plea of guilty will

almost definitely result in [defendant's] deportation." On March 29, 2019, the

plea judge granted defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea with the

State's consent.

1
    United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2
  Defendant was also extended term eligible as a result of which he faced a
maximum sentencing exposure of life imprisonment if convicted of attempted
murder at trial. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6, -7.
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                                        3
      Thereafter, on May 22, 2019, defendant entered a renegotiated guilty plea

to counts three (aggravated assault) and six (unlawful possession of a weapon).

In exchange, the State agreed to recommend an aggregate term of ten years'

imprisonment, subject to NERA, but defense counsel would request an

aggregate eight-year NERA term over the State's objection. During the plea

hearing, the judge thoroughly reviewed the nature of the charges and the terms

of the plea agreement with defendant, and ensured that defendant had a full

understanding of the consequences of his plea. Defendant confirmed that he had

consulted with an immigration attorney, that he was entering the guilty plea with

the "assum[ption]" that he would be deported, and that he was satisfied with his

attorney's representation.

      Critically, during the plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred

between the judge and defendant:

            [COURT]: Okay. I ask you all these questions, and it
            may feel like I'm asking you the same question over and
            over again . . . but I need you to understand that if I
            accept your plea today, I'm not going to give you your
            plea back just because you changed your mind later
            today. Okay? So now is the time to speak. Do you
            understand?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            [COURT]: Okay. And knowing all of that, you still
            wish to plead guilty?

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            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

      In providing a factual basis for the plea, defendant responded to his

attorney's and the court's questions as follows:

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . on December 22, 2016 at
            about 9:53 in the evening, were you in Aberdeen, New
            Jersey?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And were you in the area of
            the Masonic Lodge . . . .?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And while you were there, at
            some point did you have a gun on your person?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you knew that the gun
            that you had was a gun, right?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you have any kind of
            permit to carry a gun?

            [DEFENDANT]: No.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And so you knew that it was
            not lawful for you to have a gun on your person, is that
            correct?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

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                                        5
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And at some point on
December 22, 2016, did you take that gun and shoot
into the car where you knew that a man by the initials
of J.G. was sitting?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And when you shot in the car
where J.G. was sitting, did you do that because you
were trying to cause him serious bodily harm?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

....

[COURT]: All right. And you knew who J.G. was?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[COURT]: Okay. And who was he? Can you tell me?

....

[DEFENDANT]: Somebody that was at the bar.

[COURT]: Okay. And . . . so you fired the gun and
you shot him, yes?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[COURT]: And you knew that you actually hit him?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[COURT]: Okay. And you understand that you caused
him serious bodily injury?

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                          6
            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            [COURT]: And you intended to do that at the time that
            you shot him?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

After ensuring compliance with Rule 3:9-2, governing the entry of guilty pleas,

the judge accepted defendant's plea.

      At the sentencing hearing conducted on July 10, 2019, defense counsel

argued for leniency, asserting that "probably the most serious repercussion to

[defendant] from this conviction is that he will be deported." Defense counsel

continued that an immigration attorney had said "it [was] almost 100 percent

certain that [defendant would] be deported." In acceding to defense counsel's

request for leniency, the judge weighed heavily "the fact that there [was] certain

deportation in this case." Accordingly, the judge sentenced defendant to eight

years' imprisonment, subject to NERA, on the aggravated assault charge, and a

concurrent five years' imprisonment, with forty-two months of parole

ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), on the weapons

offense.

      Defendant did not file a direct appeal. However, on August 20, 2021,

defendant filed a timely PCR petition, which was later supplemented by

assigned counsel. In his petition, defendant asserted, among other things, that

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his attorney was ineffective by failing to pursue a speedy trial motion and failing

to object to defendant's inadequate factual basis. Defendant also asserted that

defense counsel's "cumulative errors" amounted to ineffective assistance of

counsel (IAC). Additionally, defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea for a

second time.

      Following oral argument conducted on June 27, 2022, the PCR judge

entered an order on June 29, 2022, denying defendant's petition without a n

evidentiary hearing. In an accompanying written decision, the judge reviewed

the factual background and procedural history of the case, applied the governing

legal principles, and concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim

of IAC.

      Specifically, the judge determined defendant failed to show that his

attorney's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our

Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58 (1987). According to the

judge, "[t]o the contrary, plea counsel did an extraordinary job in ultimately

negotiating a second plea agreement that permitted defendant to plead to a less

serious crime and resulted in a sentence that was four years lower than the one

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defendant initially agreed to." The judge also concluded that defendant was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

       In rejecting defendant's contention that his attorney was ineffective by

failing to pursue a speedy trial motion, the judge acknowledged that there was a

thirty-one-month delay between defendant's arrest on December 26, 2016, and

sentencing on July 10, 2019. However, after applying the factors identified in

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to evaluate a speedy trial claim, 3 the

judge concluded "[d]efendant provide[d] no facts to support his argument that

had plea counsel filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds it would have

been successful." See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007) ("It is not

ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless

motion . . . .").

       In support, the judge pointed out that defendant "was responsible for most

of th[e] delay first, by filing pre-trial motions which required a hearing, then

entering a guilty plea . . . falsely indicating he was a United States citizen, and

3
   The four factors identified in Barker "to determine when a delay infringes
upon a defendant's due process rights" are "the '[l]ength of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.'"
State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2009) (alteration in original)
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). Our Supreme Court adopted the Barker test
in State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976).
                                                                              A-3677-21
                                         9
then moving to withdraw the plea in order to seek advice from an immigration

attorney." See State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989) ("Any delay that

defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial

violation." (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986))).

Further, the judge noted "there [was] no indication in the record that defendant

ever asserted a desire for a trial." Additionally, the judge stressed that defendant

"actually benefitted from the delay" because defendant was ultimately

"sentenced to eight years, four years less than the original offer defendant

accepted."

      Turning to defendant's claim that his attorney was ineffective by failing

to object to an inadequate factual basis, the judge determined the claim lacked

merit on procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the judge explained

the claim was "barred as it could have been raised on direct appeal." See State

v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 245, 254-55 (App. Div. 2016) ("'[A] petitioner may

be barred from relief if the petitioner could have raised the issue on direct appeal

but failed to do so, Rule 3:22-4 . . . .'" (alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 (2009))).

                                                                              A-3677-21
                                        10
      Substantively, the judge rejected defendant's claim that his factual basis

was inadequate "because he answered questions from his counsel and the court

with 'yes' and 'no' responses," reasoning:

            [T]he use of leading questions is permitted when a
            factual basis for a plea is elicited. State v. Smullen, 118
            N.J. 408 (1990). It is inconsequential that defendant
            did not provide an adequate factual basis in narrative
            form. His answers to questions from his counsel and
            the court were sufficient to establish that he committed
            the charged offense[s].

      In this ensuing appeal, defendant raises the following points for our

consideration:

            POINT I – THE PLEA BARGAIN IS INVALID
            BECAUSE IT INCLUDED A PLEA OF GUILTY TO
            N.J.S.A.    2C:39-5[(B)]  WHICH       IS
            UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD[.] (NOT
            RAISED BELOW).

            POINT II – ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT N.J.S.A.
            2C:39-5[(B)] IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS
            FACE, DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY
            NONETHELESS MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE
            FACTUAL BASIS OMITTED ANY QUESTIONS AS
            TO WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD CARRIED THE
            HANDGUN IN QUESTION FOR PURPOSES NOT
            RELATED TO SELF-DEFENSE[.] (NOT RAISED
            BELOW).

            POINT   III –    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5[(B)] IS
            UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED
            TO DEFENDANT[.] (NOT RAISED BELOW).

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                                       11
            POINT IV – DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN
            EVIDENTIARY    HEARING   BECAUSE    OF
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
            REGARDING HER FAILURE TO REQUEST A
            SPEEDY TRIAL.

            POINT V – AS RAISED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
            PRIOR TO THE PCR HEARING, THE FACTUAL
            BASIS WAS INADEQUATE.

            POINT VI – CUMULATIVE ERRORS BY COUNSEL
            CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
            COUNSEL (ARGUED BY PCR DEFENSE COUNSEL
            BUT NOT RULED ON BY THE COURT).

            POINT VII – DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
            ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.

                                            II.

      In Points I, II, and III, defendant argues for the first time on appeal that

"his plea bargain is invalid" because N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) is "facially

unconstitutional," and is "unconstitutionally vague as applied to [him] because

it required [him] to obtain a carrying permit notwithstanding his right to carry a

gun for self-defense."4 In support, defendant relies on N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol

Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), arguing that inasmuch as

4
  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) provides that "[a]ny person who knowingly has in his
possession any handgun . . . without first having obtained a permit to carry the
same as provided in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:58-4, is guilty of a crime of the second
degree."
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                                       12
"the United States Supreme Court has in effect held N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5[(b)] to be

unconstitutional because it requires citizens to obtain a carrying permit, a

requirement not justified by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments,

defendant's plea bargain cannot stand." Defendant continues that assuming

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) is constitutional, his "factual basis nonetheless should have

included, at a minimum, [self-defense related] questions." 5

      We decline to consider defendant's constitutional challenge because it was

not presented to the PCR judge. "Generally, an appellate court will not consider

issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised below." State v. Galicia,

210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012). As our Supreme Court explained:

                   Appellate review is not limitless.             The
            jurisdiction of appellate courts rightly is bounded by the
            proofs and objections critically explored on the record
            before the trial court by the parties themselves. . . . In
            short, the points of divergence developed in

5
   The State counters that although Bruen "struck down" the "'justifiable need'"
to carry a handgun requirement contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d), "it did not
disturb any other parts of the states' handgun-permitting laws." Thus, according
to the State, notwithstanding Bruen's holding, disqualifying criteria for certain
applicants seeking to obtain a handgun carry permit remain in effect and
defendant was otherwise disqualified from obtaining a permit due to his lengthy
prior criminal history. Further, the State continues, Bruen did not invalidate
"the requirement[] . . . that individuals must first obtain a permit before carrying
firearms in public," a requirement defendant failed to satisfy. (Emphasis added).
After Bruen was decided, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 in
December 2022, see L. 2022, c. 131, § 3, but has not amended or supplemented
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).
                                                                              A-3677-21
                                        13
proceedings before a trial court define the metes and
bounds of appellate review.

      The reason for that limitation undergirds the very
structure of our legal traditions.      As eloquently
explained by an experienced and revered appellate
judge:

      . . . . [O]ur appellate courts step into the
      shoes of the trial judge and view the facts
      and issues as they were presented to him[
      or her].

             But there is more than history and
      tradition supporting our adherence to the
      record made below. There is an instinct of
      fairness due both the trial judge . . . and a
      litigant's adversary, a sense that one's
      opponent should have a chance to defend,
      explain, or rebut some challenged ruling
      and that the trial judge should have a clear
      first chance to address the issue. Indeed, if
      appellate courts were to consider some
      unpreserved issues but not others,
      depending on gradations of sympathy, the
      result would be an extremely uneven
      playing field.

             There is also the canny recognition
      that if late-blooming issues were allowed
      to be raised for the first time on appeal, this
      would be an incentive for game-playing by
      counsel, for acquiescing through silence
      when risky rulings are made, and, when
      they can no longer be corrected at the trial
      level, unveiling them as new weapons on
      appeal. Finally, there is an element of
      institutional self-preservation in closing

                                                           A-3677-21
                           14
                   the door to what could be a flood of open-
                   ended appellate opportunities.

            [State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009) (quoting
            Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and
            Judging 84–85 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1994)).]

      Following oral argument, the PCR judge issued his written decision on

June 29, 2022. Bruen was decided on June 23, 2022. Therefore, defendant had

an opportunity to present his constitutional challenge to the PCR judge prior to

the issuance of the judge's decision. See Robinson, 200 N.J. at 20 ("'[O]ur

appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly

presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is

available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the

trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" (quoting Nieder v. Royal

Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973))).

      In Points IV, V, and VI, defendant challenges the judge's rejection of his

contentions that his attorney was ineffective by failing to pursue a speedy trial

motion and object to a purportedly inadequate factual basis. Defendant also

challenges the judge's denial of his petition without an evidentiary hearing.

      "[W]e review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's

determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster,

429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013). "If the court perceives that holding

                                                                             A-3677-21
                                       15
an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the d efendant

is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted).

      An evidentiary hearing is only required when a defendant establishes "a

prima facie case in support of [PCR]," the court determines that there are

"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the

existing record," and the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).       "[W]here . . . no

evidentiary hearing was conducted," as here, "we may review the factual

inferences the [trial] court has drawn from the documentary record de novo,"

and "[w]e also review de novo the court's conclusions of law." State v. Blake,

444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016).

      "To establish a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b). To establish a prima facie IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate "by

a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357

(2009), that his or her attorneys' performance fell below the objective standard

                                                                             A-3677-21
                                       16
of reasonableness set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and adopted in Fritz,

105 N.J. at 49-58, and that the outcome would have been different without the

purported deficient performance. Stated differently, a defendant must show

that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

      To establish the prejudice prong to set aside a guilty plea based on IAC, a

defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration

in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). To that end, "'a

[defendant] must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain'"

and "insist on going to trial" would have been "'rational under the

circumstances.'" State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011)

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). That determination

should be "based on evidence, not speculation." Ibid.

      Failure to meet either prong of the two-pronged Strickland/Fritz test

results in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280

(2012) (citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway

to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not,

                                                                              A-3677-21
                                        17
to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation

omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

      Applying these principles, we discern no abuse of discretion in the PCR

judge's denial of defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing, and

we affirm the denial substantially for the reasons stated in the judge's cogent

written opinion. Because there were no errors committed by defense counsel,

defendant's cumulative error claim must fail as well.

      Finally, in Point VII, defendant argues that he should be allowed to

withdraw his guilty plea for a second time primarily "because he will be

deported to Jamaica as a result of his plea." Defendant claims "that he was never

advised that he faced mandatory deportation if he were to plead guilty" and

asserts that "permitting the withdrawal . . . will remedy the matter."

      Although a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a petition for PCR based

on IAC may be filed together, "[t]hey must be considered separately." State v.

O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 368 (App. Div. 2014) (citing State v.

McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 15-26, 29-30 (2012)). That is because a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea is governed by Rule 3:21-1 while a petition for PCR is

governed by Rule 3:22-1 to -13. "[P]ost-sentence [withdrawal] motions are

                                                                           A-3677-21
                                       18
subject to the 'manifest injustice' standard in Rule 3:21-1," which places "'a more

stringent standard'" on the movant to obtain relief. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super.

at 370 (quoting State v. Norman, 405 N.J. Super. 149, 160 (App. Div. 2009)).

Under that standard, "'the burden rests on defendant, in the first instance, to

present some plausible basis for his request, and his good faith in asserting a

defense on the merits.'" Smullen, 118 N.J. at 416 (quoting State v. Huntley, 129

N.J. Super. 13, 17 (App. Div. 1974)).

      A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by the four-factor test

established in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). In evaluating the motion, a

court must consider and balance: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a

colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons

for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal

would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused."

Id. at 157-58.    "No factor is mandatory; if one is missing, that does not

automatically disqualify or dictate relief." Id. at 162. However, "the longer a

defendant delays in seeking to withdraw a plea, the greater burden he or she will

bear in establishing 'manifest injustice,' because the prejudice to the State under

prong four will generally increase. Moreover, a defendant's reasons for delay

                                                                             A-3677-21
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may also weigh against relief under factor two." O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. at

370.

       Here, as defendant points out, the PCR judge failed to address the

withdrawal motion. Ordinarily, we would remand the matter to the trial court

to remedy the omission. However, under the unique circumstances of this case,

we reject defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea for various reasons.

First, the claim is procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-4 because defendant could

have raised the issue on direct appeal. In the alternative, we also reject the claim

on the merits.    Without substantiation, defendant invokes his innocence to

support the first Slater factor and asserts that the case "would not involve much

preparation on the part of the State" to support the fourth Slater factor. However,

the crux of defendant's claim is the second Slater factor, his reason for

withdrawal, which is to avoid deportation.

       Defendant was previously allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he

had misrepresented his citizenship status on the plea form. After obtaining

advice from an immigration attorney and assuring the plea judge that he was

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleading guilty under the assumption

that he would be deported, he now seeks to withdraw his plea a second time for

                                                                              A-3677-21
                                        20
the very same reason—to avoid deportation.             We cannot abide such

gamesmanship.

      "Generally, representations made by a defendant at plea hearings

concerning the voluntariness of the decision to plead, as well as any findings

made by the trial court when accepting the plea, constitute a 'formidable barrier'

which defendant must overcome before he will be allowed to withdraw his plea."

State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). "That is so because '[s]olemn declarations in open court

carry a strong presumption of verity.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74). Defendant has failed to vault this formidable

barrier.

      Affirmed.

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