Court Opinion

ID: 9388654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 09:08:59.741416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.711754
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                                 TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                         No. 10-22-00353-CV

          IN THE INTEREST OF R.W.S., J.R.S., AND M.S., CHILDREN

                                  From the 13th District Court
                                    Navarro County, Texas
                                 Trial Court No. D21-29633-CV

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

          The mother and father of R.W.S., J.R.S., and M.S. appeal from a judgment that

terminated their parental rights to their children after a jury trial. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§161.001. The mother and father complain that the definition of “endanger” in the jury

charge was erroneous, although they each acknowledge that there was no objection to

the instruction given made to the trial court. 1 Because we find that this complaint was

not properly preserved, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

PRESERVATION OF JURY CHARGE ERROR

          The mother and father each complain that the definition of “endanger” submitted

to the jury in the jury charge constituted an improper comment on the weight of the

1
    The mother and father filed separate briefs in this proceeding but raised the same issue and arguments.
evidence. Both the mother and father acknowledge that no objection was ever made to

the trial court to any part of the jury charge.2

        In civil proceedings, Rule 272 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that

“[a]ll objections [to the jury charge] not so presented [in writing or dictated into the

record] shall be considered as waived.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 272. The Texas Supreme Court

has long held that a complaint about the jury charge is waived unless the trial court is

made aware of the complaint through a timely objection and a ruling is obtained, even in

termination proceedings. See In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003); In re A.V., 113

S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex. 2003). Because neither the mother nor the father objected to the jury

charge on this basis, this complaint was waived. See also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). We

overrule the mother and father’s sole issues.

CONCLUSION

        Having found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                          TOM GRAY
                                                          Chief Justice

2The mother and father both argue that, in termination of parental rights proceedings, the current rules for
preservation of jury charge error pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure should be set aside and the
criminal standard set forth in Almanza v. State should be adopted. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985). If the Almanza standard was adopted, jury charge error would not have to be preserved
in the trial court in order to complain on appeal; rather, unobjected-to error would be reviewed for
egregious harm as in criminal appeals. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We
decline the parents’ invitation to alter preservation rules in termination of parental rights proceedings.

In the Interest of R.W.S., J.R.S., and M.S., Children                                                 Page 2
Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed April 19, 2023
[CV06]

In the Interest of R.W.S., J.R.S., and M.S., Children   Page 3