Court Opinion

ID: 9732251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:13:07.043165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:25.447312
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ZAPPALA, Justice.
On the evening of August 19, 1982, while a guest and in attendance at a party, at a residence located on the South Side of the City of Pittsburgh, the Appellant was arrested *526and charged with criminal homicide and aggravated assault. Donald Kennelly, David Martelli and their friends appeared to have been uninvited guests at the party. A fight ensued during which the Appellant was struck in the face. He responded by securing a kitchen knife. What happened after the acquisition of the knife is in dispute. The Appellant claims that he was confronted by Martelli holding a crowbar and, in self-defense, fatally stabbed him. He then saw a friend being beaten by Kennelly, resulting in the Appellant stabbing Kennelly once and then throwing the knife over a fence. The Commonwealth argues that the Appellant first stabbed Kennelly and then Martelli. The order of the stabbings is critical in refuting the perceived justification defense.
The evening after the party, the Appellant turned himself in to the police and gave a statement admitting to stabbing Martelli in self-defense and then stabbing Kennelly. The knife was later recovered and found to have blood type “B” on it. Martelli had type “B” blood, while Kennelly has blood type “0”.
As indicated, the Commonwealth filed two criminal informations charging the Appellant with aggravated assault upon Kennelly and homicide in the death of Martelli. On November 10, 1982, the Commonwealth filed a motion to consolidate the two informations. For some unexplained reason, the motion was never considered until October 19, 1983, the same time the trial court was conducting a hearing on the Appellant’s motions to sever and to suppress certain statements of the Appellant. After taking testimony, the trial court granted the motion to sever, denied the motions to suppress and consolidate, and, after extensive oral argument, restricted the Commonwealth’s use of to the facts of the aggravated assault charge in the voir dire process. The Commonwealth then appealed the trial court ruling to the Superior Court, believing that the trial court ordered the Commonwealth not to offer any evidence regarding the aggravated assault charge in the homicide trial. The Superior Court reversed the trial court, 350 Pa.Super. *527635, 503 A.2d 458, concluding that it had erred in reversing the charges and in disallowing the introduction of the aggravated assault evidence during the homicide trial. We granted allocatur to review the appealability of the orders involved. For the reasons hereinafter, we now reverse.
There is no question that if the order the Commonwealth is appealing from is a suppression order, such review, although interlocutory, is permissible. Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). Furthermore, it is unnecessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the suppression order caused a substantial handicap, its good faith certification being sufficient. Commonwealth v. Dugger, supra. In Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra, we affirmed an interlocutory appeal of a suppression order because "... the Commonwealth should possess the right of an appellate review of the validity of a pre-trial order of suppression where the effect of such order is to terminate the prosecution.’’ (Emphasis in original). 411 Pa. at 62, 190 A.2d at 308. In Commonwealth v. Dugger, supra, the appellee was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. The evidence suppressed was in fact the drugs discovered on the appellee’s person. As in Bosurgi, the suppressed evidence was directly related to the charges, without which the Commonwealth could not realistically proceed. Our reason for permitting these interlocutory appeals was the finality aspect of a suppression order and the unfair position in which the Commonwealth was placed if it were required to establish its burden of proof without all of the evidence it deemed necessary. However, in this appeal, the Commonwealth is not appealing a suppression order. Therefore, the Dugger and Bosurgi rationale is not controlling.
The order here appealed from granted the severance of two criminal informations. In Commonwealth v. Saunders, 483 Pa. 29, 394 A.2d 522 (1978), we addressed the appealability of such an order and had no problem in concluding that such an order is interlocutory and thus not *528appealable. The reasoning for our decision was that the Commonwealth was free to seek conviction on both counts in two separate trials. Thus, the finality aspect and the ensuing prejudice inherent in granting a suppression motion is not present when faced with a severance order.1
The appeal being interlocutory and no specific authority having been cited demonstrating that jurisdiction has been conferred upon this Court, there exists no jurisdiction for us to consider the Commonwealth appeal. The order of the Superior Court is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County for trial.2
PAPADAKOS, J., concurred in the result.
LARSEN and McDERMOTT, JJ., filed dissenting opinions.

. In Commonwealth v. Barkley, 335 Pa.Super. 389, 484 A.2d 189 (1984), the Superior Court accepted an appeal from the Commonwealth based in part upon the entry of an order severing charges of robbery and criminal homicide. To the extent that the decision in Barkley conflicts with the disposition of this appeal, Barkley is overruled.

. After the conclusion of the suppression hearing at which time the learned trial judge denied the suppression motion but granted the severance motion, the parties commenced jury voir dire. A dispute arose during voir dire for the homicide trial as to whether questions with regard to the aggravated assault charges were relevant. The parties then sought clarification from the trial judge as to whether the evidence regarding the aggravated assault would be permitted to be used at the homicide trial. After lengthy oral arguments, the trial judge ruled that based upon the evidence presented during the suppression hearing and the Commonwealth’s offer of proof, the Commonwealth lacked any evidence to substantiate its position that Kennelly was stabbed by the same knife as Martelli. As such, the trial judge concluded that the resulting prejudice to the appellant of the introduction of any evidence of the aggravated assault in the homicide trial would outweigh its probative value.
From a complete review of the record it is clear that the trial judge’s ruling did not preclude the Commonwealth from introducing additional evidence at the time of the actual trial to bolster the probative value of its use of the aggravated assault evidence during the homicide trial. The trial judge only intended to restrict the use of the aggravated assault evidence in the context of the voir dire procedure. On remand, the Commonwealth may still attempt to demonstrate relevancy by the introduction of additional evidence to the trial court, subject, however, to any motion in limine the appellant may file.