Court Opinion

ID: 9633207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:38:14.516629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:30.843000
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
I would reverse and remand with instructions to review the case in accordance with the standards for judicial review specified in ORS 242.804 (3).①
As the majority opinion points out, all the parties, as well as the court, ‘got off on the wrong foot’ in this ease by erroneously assuming that the review was to *297be accomplished pursuant to chapter X, § 68, of the Milwaukie City Charter, rather than OES 242.804.
Under OES 242.804 (3), the circuit court, in reviewing the matter, is limited to conducting a summary hearing to determine “whether the order of * * * discharge * * * made by the commission was made in good faith for cause.” An examination of the record, however, indicates that the proceeding in the circuit court was in fact tried as a de novo review of the matter under chapter X, § 68, of the City Charter. This was error.
The case at bar is similar in several respects to Phillips v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 7 Or App 588, 490 P2d 1005 (1971), Sup Ct review denied (1972), where the petitioner, a cafeteria worker at the Tongue Point Job Corps Center, was dismissed for using abusive language toward fellow employes. She appealed to the Public Employe Eelations Board (PEEB). PEEB, erroneously assuming that it had the power of de novo review, ordered her reinstatement after a de novo hearing. The Board of Higher Education appealed to the circuit court which reversed PEEB. This court affirmed the circuit court holding, inter alia: (1) PEEB does not act in a de novo capacity and is not entitled to make a determination independent of the decision of the appointing authority; (2) the term “good faith for cause” as used in the statute (substantially identical with OES 242.804) means sufficient cause proven on hearing after reasonable notice; (3) in order for PEEB to reinstate a discharged employe it must find that the employer was not acting in good faith; (4) among other things that a court will examine in review of administrative agency action are whether the administrative board exercised its discretion judi-*298eionsly and not capriciously, and whether it arrived at any conclusion which was not clearly wrong.
It seems to me that the majority opinion now compounds the error below by reviewing the matter by the same erroneous standard in this court and concluding that the evidence supports the decision of the circuit court. This court would have no more authority than did the circuit court to review this matter contrary to OES 242.804 (3). This is not only contrary to OES 242.804 but contrary to what I have understood to be settled law in this state and elsewhere applicable to the judicial review of administrative actions. See, for example, Ward v. Ore. State Bd. of Nursing, 266 Or 128, 510 P2d 554 (1973); Bay v. State Board of Education, 233 Or 601, 378 P2d 558, 96 ALR2d 529 (1963); Beistel v. Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., 6 Or App 115, 486 P2d 1305 (1971).
As I understand the majority opinion, it affirms the trial court here by applying the doctrine of invited error, holding that the defendants invited the basic error, namely, that judicial review was to be accomplished under the appeal provisions of the city charter rather than OES 242.804.
But plaintiff rather than defendants committed the initial ‘error’ by bringing the suit under the appeal provisions of the city charter. Defendants appeared and defended the proceeding on the same erroneous basis. However, defendants’ counsel in his closing argument to the court stated:
“* * * Now, I think there is no dispute as to the fact that we are limited to cause and this is held in a case in which happens to be in Arizona, Smith vs. Lassen, 424 Pac. 2d, 856, where the Court has said that a Court is still limited to statutory, rules *299applying to Civil Service Commissions and that the Court cannot substitute its thinking or judgment for that of the Commission, if there is grounds for the cause that they [sic] should uphold that cause.”
Defendants’ counsel makes substantially this same contention in his brief in this court, notwithstanding a statement to the contrary in the majority opinion.
I do not believe therefore that the doctrine of invited error should be applied under the above circumstances.
Finally, although this point is not clear from my reading of the court’s oral remarks at the conclusion of the case, if the trial judge intended to hold as a matter of law that defendants could not under chapter X, § 61, of the City Charter, also rely on the infractions involved in two prior disciplinary actions taken against plaintiff, as part of the grounds for dismissal, then I would hold this to be error also. Phillips v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., supra; West New York v. Bock, 38 NJ 500, 186 A2d 97 (1962); Rushin v. Bd. of Child Welfare, 65 NJ Super 504, 168 A2d 238 (1961).

 ORS 242.804 (3) provides:
“The circuit court shall hear and determine such appeal in a summary manner. The hearing shall be confined to the determination of whether the order of removal, discharge, demotion or suspension made by the commission was made in good faith for cause. No appeal to such court shall be heard except upon such grounds.”