Court Opinion

ID: 9848227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:15:00.767509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:08.477341
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from Division 1 of this court’s opinion and from the judgment affirming the trial *440court. The majority conclude that: "The habeas corpus court properly ruled that the appellant was not entitled to a commitment hearing.” Actually, the trial court made no factual determination as to whether the appellant was denied a commitment hearing. (Tr. p. 24). The ruling was that "even assuming (appellant) could substantiate his claim of denial of a commitment hearing,” this would not entitle him to relief.
In my judgment, this was error and I would reverse the trial court with direction to conduct an additional hearing to determine if in fact the appellant was denied a commitment hearing and, if he were, whether such denial prejudiced the defendant at his subsequent trial.
The theory of this court’s decision in Division 1 of its opinion is that since a commitment hearing is not "a requisite to a trial for the commission of a felony,” it was not error if the appellant failed to have such a hearing. I disagree with the reasoning used by the majority because, in my view, the denial of a commitment hearing to a defendant charged with a felony is a denial of a substantial right given him by law. In Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866 (2) (148 SE2d 305), this court, in a unanimous decision written by then Associate Justice Mobley, held, "The denial of a commitment hearing, under the circumstances of this case, was error requiring the grant of a new trial, . . .” In that case, it appeared that the defendant was without the benefit of counsel and that the defendant’s purported waiver of a commitment hearing was the result of duress consisting of cruel and inhumane treatment inflicted upon him by those in whose custody he was being held. It also appeared in that case that the defendant was in the custody of the officers without a warrant for his arrest. As observed by Justice Mobley in his opinion for the court (p. 869), "A person accused of crime may waive a commitment hearing,” but the waiver was held to be ineffectual there because of the duress practiced upon the defendant. That decision recognizes: "A commitment hearing is a valuable right which the law gives to one accused of crime. Ga. L. 1956, p. 796 (Code Ann. § 27-210); Code § 27-401 et seq. A lawyer recognizes this fact, for this affords him an opportunity to make the state show its hand by putting up the evidence it has against the accused, which enables him to know what he has to defend against, as well as to protect his client against commitment without sufficient evidence.” Id. p. 868. See, also, Chaffee, Memorandum on The Detention of Arrested Persons and Their Production Before a Committing Magistrate, as appended to Hearings, House *441Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 12, Pt. 1, at 257 (1958).
All of the reasons stated are vital and meaningful to every defendant in a criminal case. The commitment hearing is the only formal discovery tool available to the defense in a criminal case in Georgia. See Rautenstrauch v. State, 129 Ga. App. 381 (1) (199 SE2d 613), where Chief Judge Bell, speaking for the Court of Appeals, recently restated the holdings of both that court and this court that: "In Georgia there is no statute nor any rule of practice allowing pretrial discovery and inspection of evidence, and possession of evidence, by defendant or his counsel.” Against the backdrop of this rule, it is easy to see how important a commitment hearing can be to a defendant in a criminal case.
The appellant himself gave the reason he wanted a commitment hearing in the present case in compelling language. His reasons are found in a letter filed as a part of the record in Davis v. State, 229 Ga. 509 (192 SE2d 253). They are, in his words, as follows: "A commitment hearing was essentially necessary in this case because it would have given me an opportunity to get these witnesses’ testimony on record as an impeachment tool later at trial. Also, it would have been to my interest as well as serving the interest of justice to have this testimony on record at the earliest possible date after the alleged crime because recollections of witnesses are far more accurate shortly after a happening than it is two months later.”
I might add in conclusion that the reasoning used by this court in the Manor case, supra, is consonant with the view taken by the U. S. Supreme Court that a preliminary (commitment) hearing is a "critical” state in the state’s criminal process. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (90 SC 1999, 26 LE2d 387), and Adams v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 278 (92 SC 916, 31 LE2d 202). If we fail to make this valuable right to a commitment hearing secure by our decisions we will remove it from the statute books as a right and cast it into the unprotected area of indulgences. To argue that one who is denied a commitment hearing may secure his release from unlawful detention by habeas corpus misses the point. The right to a commitment hearing is a substantial and important statutory right possessed by an accused in a criminal case in Georgia. Its efficacy depends, however, on the willingness of this court to enforce it. We have not done so by affirming the trial court in this case.