Court Opinion

ID: 9551034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:46:51.342912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:55.694420
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.,
concurring:
The basis for a new trial, as expressed in NRCP 59(a) (7) perplexes me. If the words used, “insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law,” means the absence of substantial evidence to support the verdict, then the verdict should be set aside and judgment entered for the opposing party as a matter of law. Another *382trial would be nonsense. On the other hand, if the words acknowledge that there may be substantial evidence to support the verdict, then it seems to me that the verdict should stand even though the trial judge may not like it. The present case places the problem in focus. The trial judge (correctly in my view) denied the motion of the City of Reno for a directed verdict based on the proposition that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The judge believed that reasonable minds could differ regarding the city’s alleged liability to plaintiff, and therefore ruled that the jury should decide the case. Yet, after the jury made its decision, the court set it aside (not because of a legal error, new evidence, misconduct, etc., which may have affected a fair trial, but rather because of his view of the evidence) and ordered the parties to do it all over again. The foolishness of it all is immediately apparent.
Presented with this problem in years past, this court on review of an order granting a new trial on this ground, NRCP 59(a) (7), formerly 9385.52(7) 1929 NCL, 1941 Supp., has attempted to evaluate the trial judge’s action in terms of whether he “abused the discretion” granted him. The guiding principles are tabulated in Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. Grich, 59 Nev. 345, 93 P.2d 513, and succeeding cases. Briefly it may be said that his discretion is properly exercised if he grants a new trial when the evidence preponderates against the verdict, but that an abuse occurs when the evidence preponderates in favor of the verdict. We are ill equipped to make such an evaluation. We can, with reasonable accuracy, search a record to ascertain if there is some substantial evidence to support a result. However, I seriously doubt our capacity on review to assert what evidence preponderates or is to be given the greater weight. Nor should the trial judge have that prerogative once having determined that the case is properly one for jury decision.
Precedent advises that when a case comes to us on appeal from an order on motion for new trial in a jury case, we must look to the decision of the judge — not *383the jury verdict. Arrowhead Freight Lines v. White, 71 Nev. 257, 287 P.2d 718.1 Yet we are in no position to decide whether an abuse of discretion has occurred until we first re-examine the facts presented to the jury to see if there is a preponderance for one side or the other. We cannot do this on a direct appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict. Being remote from the arena, we do' not profess to have the capacity to weigh, sift and evaluate the evidence when the case comes to us in that manner. Why should the rule on review be different when the appeal is taken from the judge’s order on a motion for a new trial? It seems to me that the same standards should apply in either instance. If the verdict rests on substantial evidence, it should stand; if it does not it should be set aside. Admittedly, the process of determining the existence of substantial evidence requires some evaluation on our part. However, it is a reasonably workable standard in most cases. On the other hand, I find it quite impossible from our vantage point to review a record and decide on which side the evidence preponderates. Yet such is our task under Nevada case law as it now exists. I believe that NRCP 59(a) (7), as a basis for granting a new trial, should be abolished as a hindrance to the efficient administration of justice. The other grounds for new *384trial set forth in NRCP 59 (a) are sufficiently broad to permit the correction of an occurrence affecting the fairness of the trial.
Turning to the present case, I, too, believe that the trial court’s order granting a new trial should be reversed. There is a mass of evidence from which the jury could rightfully conclude that the City of Reno was not liable to the plaintiff.

 Unearned Hand expressed his disapproval when, on review of an order denying a new trial motion, he stated: “Moreover, while it might he well to give us the unconditional power to review such orders, we could not as things are exercise it freely. The most that has been said is that we may do so when there has been ‘an abuse of discretion.’ That is an impracticable rule, unless confined as it has aways been confined save for Cobb v. Lepisto. The trial judge decides what verdict is within the bounds of reasonable inference from the evidence. That is a question which we can consider as well as he, and which we do upon his direction of a verdict. But by hypothesis we are not to be allowed to do that; we must come at the matter at one remove, and apply the same test to the judge’s decision that he applies to the jury’s. We must in effect decide whether it was within the bounds of tolerable conclusion to say that the jury’s verdict was within the bounds of tolerable conclusion. To decide cases by such tenuous unrealities seems to us thoroughly undesirable; parties ought not to be bound by gossamer strands; judges ought not to engage in scholastic refinements.” Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463.