Court Opinion

ID: 9778198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:55:15.015996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:33.158243
License: Public Domain

DICE, Commissioner.
Appellant was tried and convicted in the corporation court of the city of San Antonio upon a complaint charging the offense of speeding. From the conviction he appealed to County Court at Law No. One of Bexar County, where, upon a trial de novo he was again convicted, and assessed punishment at a fine of $100.
Following his arrest by the sheriff of Bexar County under a capias pro fine, appellant applied to the judge of the county court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was being illegally restrained of his liberty because his conviction was under a void ordinance. The writ was granted and, after a hearing, the judge remanded appellant to custody, from which order he brings this appeal.
Appellant’s sole contention is that the city ordinance is void because it prescribes *673a different penalty for speeding than that prescribed by state law for the same offense. Art. 6701d, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. This contention is based upon the fact that the ordinance provides as punishment for speeding “A fine not to exceed two hundred dollars,” and the penalty prescribed for violation of Art. 6701d, Sec. 143, is “a fine of not less than One ($1.00) Dollar nor more than Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars.”
Art. 6701d, V.A.C.S., provides, in Sec. 166(a), that no person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing and that any speed in excess of the limits specified in said section “or established as hereinbefore authorized” shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.
Sec. 166(a), subd. 5, par. c, provides that the limits set forth in Sec. 166 (one of which is thirty (30) miles per hour in an urban district) may be altered as authorized in Secs. 167, 168, and 169.
Sec. 167 grants authority to the State Highway Commission, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, to alter maximum speed limits at certain places.
Sec. 169(b) confers like authority upon the governing bodies of incorporated cities in respect to highways or streets within the corporate limits of such cities. The authority to alter the maximum speed limits set forth in Art. 166(a) is subject to the qualification: “provided that under no circumstances shall any such governing body have the authority to modify or alter the basic rule established in paragraph (a) of Section 166 * *
The ordinance before us is silent as to the rule referred to which makes it unlawful to drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing, any speed in excess of the limits specified in Sec. 166 or established as authorized in Secs. 167, 168, or 169 being prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.
We conclude that, as a penal ordinance defining the offense of speeding and providing a fine “not to exceed two hundred dollars” as punishment, the ordinance is invalid. Insofar as the ordinance alters the prima facie speed limits set out in Sec. 166(a) of Article 6701d, under authority of Secs. 166(a), 167, and 169, and implements said statute without altering or modifying the basic rule established in paragraph (a) of Sec. 166, it is valid and a conviction for violation of the state statute, implemented by the ordinance, with punishment authorized by Sec. 143 of said Article 6701d, is not subject to attack as a conviction for violation of a void ordinance.
The complaint is sufficient to charge such violation, and appellant’s conviction appears to be proper and can be sustained under the state law, Art. 6701d, V.A.C.S., as implemented by the ordinance.
The judgment remanding appellant to custody is affirmed.
Opinion approved by the court.