Court Opinion

ID: 9787253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:13:52.712539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:53.939743
License: Public Domain

BREWER, J.,
concurring.
A critical tension point between the majority and dissenting opinions is the importance, if any, to an exploitation analysis of a causal link between a defendant’s consent to a search and his knowledge that the police had discovered *62information that would not have been obtained “but for” unlawful police conduct. The majority gives little, if any, weight to such knowledge. 183 Or App at 58 n 8. The dissent, on the other hand, appears to believe that exploitation can occur only if the facts “demonstrate that a substantial factor in defendant’s decision to consent was his knowledge that [the police] had discovered information during the unlawful stop.” Id. at 74 (Deits, C. J., dissenting).
I agree with the dissent that, although the issue is not one of voluntariness, a defendant’s reasons for giving consent to a search may be relevant to an exploitation analysis. It is not uncommon for a defendant’s knowledge that the police had obtained information to affect the decision to give consent. The existence of such knowledge logically can contribute to a determination that the police took advantage of unlawful conduct. However, its absence is not dispositive. In some instances, the causal link between unlawful police conduct and giving consent may be so strong that the conclusion that the police took advantage of the unlawful conduct is inescapable, irrespective of whether the defendant knew, in giving consent, that the police had acquired any information that led to the request for consent. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 319 Or 212, 224, 874 P2d 1322 (1994) (Gillette, J., concurring). As explained by the majority, that is the case here. 183 Or App at 61. Accordingly, I join in the majority opinion and concur.