Court Opinion

ID: 9698514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:52:30.412466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.516095
License: Public Domain

WEDEMEYER, EJ.
¶ 55. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I concur with the Majority's conclusion in part II B of this opinion — the Commission reasonably concluded that Ameritech's long-distance charges constituted a "substitute charge" for the carrier common line charge and, therefore, were unlawful under Wis. Stat. § 196.196(2)(b)3 (2001-02). I disagree, however, with the Majority's reversal of the circuit court's decision that refunds were not authorized. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from part III of the majority opinion.
¶ 56. I agree with the circuit court that the Commission does not have the authority to order Ameritech to refund approximately $18,000,000 gained from the unlawful charges. The circuit court based this decision on the language of Wis. Stat. § 196.37(1) (2001-02) which prohibits retroactive ratemaking. It provides:
If, after an investigation under this chapter or ch. 197, the commission finds rates, tolls, charges, schedules or joint rates to he unjust, unreasonable, insufficient or unjustly discriminatory or preferential or otherwise unreasonable or unlawful, the commission shall deter*439mine and order reasonable rates, tolls, charges, schedules or joint rates to be imposed, observed and followed in the future.
(Emphasis added.) Wisconsin Stat. § 196.37(2) (2001-02) offers similar prospective-only language:
If the commission finds that any measurement, regulation, practice, act or service is unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, preferential, unjustly discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable or unlawful, or that any service is inadequate, or that any service which reasonably can be demanded cannot be obtained, the commission shall determine and make any just and reasonable order relating to a measurement, regulation, practice, act or service to be furnished, imposed, observed and followed in the future.
(Emphasis added.)1 This language, in plain terms, sets forth the time sequence for corrective measures: the Commission is not authorized to engage in retroactive ratemaking, but may adjust rates prospectively only. The case law is consistent with this interpretation. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983) (the PSC has only those powers which are expressly conferred or necessarily implied by the statutes). "No provision in ch. 196, Stats., expressly authorizes the commission to order a utility to refund money to its customers when the utility may have acted imprudently." Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 181 Wis. 2d 385, 392, 511 N.W.2d 291 (1994). The rule against *440retroactive ratemaking is "firmly ensconced in Wisconsin law." Id. at 393. Moreover, if any doubt exists as to an implied power that may exist, that doubt "should be resolved against the exercise of such authority." Kimberly-Clark Corp., 110 Wis. 2d at 462.
¶ 57. There are certain exceptions to the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking, wherein refunds are allowed under very narrow circumstances. See Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 181 Wis. 2d at 393 (Commission may order a utility to set future rates high enough to recoup past "extraordinary losses."); GTE North, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 176 Wis. 2d 559, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993) (refunds may be ordered when the utility collected rates in violation of the filed tariffs, "filed-rate doctrine exception"); CenturyTel of the Midwest-Kendall, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2002 WI App 236, 257 Wis. 2d 837, 653 N.W.2d 130 (refunds may be ordered when utility increases rates without complying with tariff filing requirements).
¶ 58. None of these exceptions, however, apply to the instant case. Here, Ameritech followed the proper procedures for filing its tariffs. It did not charge more than what the filed tariffs permitted. The majority concludes that the CenturyTel case controls and allows the refund. I disagree.
¶ 59. In my opinion, CenturyTel is distinguishable from the instant case. In CenturyTel, the utility failed to comply with the procedural requirements regarding access rate increases. Id., ¶ 8. The PSC concluded that the utility had violated the filed rate statute by charging access rates that were not properly filed pursuant to statute. Id., ¶ 10. Hence, the filed-rate-doctrine exception to the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking applied in CenturyTel. This is not the factual scenario presented in the instant case. Rather, it is undisputed *441that Ameritech complied with the proper procedural requirements in filing its tariffs as required by the statutes. It was a later substantive challenge by the appellants that led to the conclusion that the approved rates actually constituted a substitute charge for the carrier common line charge. Therein lies the distinction between this case and CenturyTel. Accordingly, in my opinion, the instant case is governed by the general rule that the Commission does not have the authority to order retroactive refunds, and not by the specific exceptions to that rule allowed in particular cases.
¶ 60. Finally, the majority suggests that ordering a refund is the only way to remedy the wrong which occurred here. I disagree. There are other remedies available to the appellants to recoup the unlawful charges, without having to grant the Commission authority, which is prohibited by statute. Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 196.219(4m) (2001-02) provides the means for any person injured to recoup losses as a result of the unlawful charges through a civil action.
¶ 61. Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the decision of the trial court in toto.

 The parties present opposing views as to whether Wis. Stat. § 196.37(1) or (2) (2001-02) applies. The circuit court relied on § 196.37(1). The majority opinion refers to § 196.37(2). Nevertheless, both subsections contain the same prospective-only language.