Court Opinion

ID: 9655730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:20:12.572011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:21.421695
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
Third-party defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted in the St. Clair County Circuit Court for third-party plaintiffs failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant third-party plaintiff now appeals as of right. For purposes of this opinion, defendant third-party plaintiff will hereinafter be referred to as "St. Clair Rubber” and third-party defendant will be referred to as "Hoover”.
On August 3, 1976, an explosion occurred at Hoover’s chemical and adhesive factory in Port Huron. Plaintiff and several others, employees of Hoover, were performing their jobs at the time and were injured as a result of that explosion. Apparently, St. Clair Rubber had delivered four 54-gallon drums of flammable petroleum-based adhesive material to Hoover for packaging in 2-ounce tubes. Once packaging was completed, the tubes were to be returned to St. Clair and eventually sold. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint against both the Southeastern Michigan Gas Company and St. Clair Rubber. Plaintiff set forth three theories of recovery against St. Clair Rubber: (1) failure to provide adequate warnings regarding the extremely flammable adhesive product; (2) negligent entrustment, as St. Clair knew or should have known that Hoover was not competent to handle such a dangerous product in a safe and reasonable manner; and (3) defective manufacture or design resulting in breaches of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Subsequently, St. Clair Rubber filed a third-party complaint against *5Hoover seeking "both contractual indemnity and common law indemnity”. The trial court found that an indemnity contract did not exist and that, since plaintiffs complaint only pled theories of active negligence on the part of St. Clair Rubber, common-law indemnity was not available. Thus, Hoover’s motion for summary judgment was granted.
St. Clair Rubber first asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on its claim of an express contract of indemnification pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because it was necessary to look beyond the pleadings to resolve the motion. A motion brought pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1) challenges the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs claim only. In Partrich v Muscat, 84 Mich App 724, 729-730; 270 NW2d 506 (1978), this Court detailed the applicable rules for passing on a motion seeking summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1):
"The standard governing this Court’s review of a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment based on GCR 1963, 117.2(1) is well settled. The motion is to be tested by the pleadings alone. Todd v Biglow, 51 Mich App 346; 214 NW2d 733 (1974), lv den 391 Mich 816 (1974). The motion tests the legal basis of the complaint, not whether it can be factually supported. Borman’s, Inc v Lake State Development Co, 60 Mich App 175; 230 NW2d 363 (1975). The factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, along with any inferences or conclusions which may fairly be drawn from the facts alleged. Unless the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recover, the motion under this subrule should be denied. Crowther v Ross Chemical & Manufacturing Co, 42 Mich App 426; 202 NW2d 577 (1972).”
*6Applying this standard, it is clear that the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted as to the allegation of an express contract of indemnity. Hoover’s motion diu not test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings but instead claimed that there was no genuine issue of material fact, i.e., that the language relied upon by St. Clair Rubber, which appeared at the bottom of a shipping invoice covering the four drums of adhesive product sent to Hoover for packaging, did not create an indemnity contract. That language was examined by the trial court and is as follows:
"Express Warranty Clauses
"This Warranty Is Made in Lieu op All Others, Express or Implied, Including Merchantability. Seller’s Only Obligation Shall Be to Replace Such Quantity of the Product Proved to Be Defective. Seller shall not be liable for any loss, damage or injury whether ordinary, direct, incidental or consequential, arising from the purchase, possession, handling, use or inability to use this material. Before using, user shall determine the suitability of the product for his intended use, and user assumes all risk and liability whatsoever in connection therewith. Neither the scope of the warranty nor liability thereunder may be modified or extended except in writing executed by a duly elected officer of the St. Clair Rubber Company.
"Adhesive Express Warranty. Because we have no control over methods of application or conditions of use, adhesives are warranted only to be made of our standard commercial grade materials to meet our standards. Users should test for suitability for their specific purposes and user assumes all risk and liability. This Warranty Is Made in Lieu of All Others, Express or Implied, Including Merchantability.
"Liability Under This Warranty Is Limited to Replacement of Adhesives Failing to Meet Our *7Standards and we shall not be liable for any loss, damage or injury, whether ordinary, direct, incidental or consequential, arising from the purchase, possession, handling, use or inability to use this material.
"Neither the scope of the warranty nor liability thereunder may be extended except in writing executed by a duly elected officer of the St. Clair Rubber Company.
"No Claims Honored Unless Reported Within 10 Days From Date of Invoice.”
A motion grounded on GCR 1963, 117.2(3) requires the filing of supporting affidavits. GCR 1963, 117.3. Although Hoover’s attorney filed an affidavit with the motion, claiming that "the contents of same are true and accurate to the best of his present information and knowledge”, such has been equated with an affidavit made on "information and belief’. Brooks v Reed, 93 Mich App 166, 173-174; 286 NW2d 81 (1979), lv den 411 Mich 862 (1981). The latter is insufficient to support a motion pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3). Nonetheless, we need not reverse on this basis. Hoover failed to raise the affidavit issue at the trial level. Consequently, appellate review of this procedural error is precluded. Hayes v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 97 Mich App 758, 773; 295 NW2d 858 (1980).
As to the merits of St. Clair Rubber’s claim that an express contract of indemnification existed with Hoover, the following is applicable. The express warranty clauses in issue seek to disclaim and limit any liability St. Clair Rubber might have visá-vis subsequent purchasers, possessors, or users of the adhesive product. The clauses totally fail to set forth contractual indemnity provisions. St. Clair Rubber is merely referred to as the seller. It is clear, however, that St. Clair Rubber did not sell Hoover anything. Rather, Hoover was to be paid *8four cents for each tube that it filled with the material supplied by St. Clair Rubber. Although Hoover was a "possessor” of the material, it clearly did not possess the material in the sense contemplated by the warranty language, i.e., as one in the retail distribution chain or as an ultimate consumer. Even if Hoover were to be deemed a "possessor” of the material, Hoover is not attempting to hold St. Clair Rubber liable. Rather, St. Clair Rubber is attempting to use warranty clauses obviously designed as a shield for the company as a sword to impose liability on Hoover.
Indemnity contracts are construed strictly against the party who drafts them and the indemnitee. Gartside v Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 87 Mich App 335, 339; 274 NW2d 58 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 915 (1979). In order for an indemnity contract to be given effect, its terms must be unequivocal. Pritts v J I Case Co, 108 Mich App 22, 29; 310 NW2d 261 (1981). In our opinion, the warranty clauses simply created no indemnity contract, let alone an unequivocal indemnity agreement. The trial court did not err in finding that there was no express contract of indemnity.
We also reject St. Clair Rubber’s claim that it is entitled to common-law indemnity. Where the primary complaint alleges active negligence, as opposed to derivative liability, the defendant is not entitled to common-law indemnity. Peeples v Detroit, 99 Mich App 285, 292-293; 297 NW2d 839 (1980); Brown v Unit Products Corp, 105 Mich App 141, 145-147; 306 NW2d 425 (1981); Swindlehurst v Resistance Welder Corp, 110 Mich App 693, 698; 313 NW2d 191 (1981).
Here, only one of the primary plaintiffs claims could conceivably be construed as alleging derivative liability, namely: plaintiffs assertion that St. *9Clair Rubber negligently entrusted Hoover with performing an inherently dangerous activity with the adhesive product. Whether a complaint pleading the inherently dangerous activity doctrine can be considered as alleging a species of vicarious liability currently splits this Court. See Duhame v Kaiser Engineering of Michigan, Inc, 102 Mich App 68, 72-75; 300 NW2d 737 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 955 (1981), for citations. We believe, as did the Court in Duhame, that a claim of negligently entrusting the performance of an inherently dangerous task to another constitutes an allegation of active negligence. The fundamental element of such a claim is the defendant’s active negligence in not taking proper precautions to ensure that the inherently dangerous activity will be properly performed. The principal is negligent and liable because it allowed the other to negligently perform the dangerous job. See, also, Brown, supra, 147-148.
Although St. Clair Rubber sought "contractual indemnity” and briefly argued the theory of implied contractual indemnity to the trial court, the trial court did not specifically address the issue in its opinion. However, a subsequent order of clarification indicates that the trial court did consider that theory.
In Hill v Sullivan Equipment Co, 86 Mich App 693, 697; 273 NW2d 527 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 880 (1979), this Court stated as follows in respect to a claimed implied contract of indemnity:
"To determine whether a third-party plaintiff has stated a cause of action for indemnity based on an implied contract, the court must look to the third-party complaint as well as the original complaint. * * * As this case arises on summary judgment for failure to state a cause of action, we accept as true third-party *10plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts and inquire whether these claims are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery.” (Citation omitted.)
However, even under an implied contractual theory, the indemnitee must be completely without fault. Dale v Whiteman, 388 Mich 698, 705; 202 NW2d 797 (1972). This case is unlike Hill, supra, relied upon by St. Clair Rubber. There, the third-party complaint set forth specific allegations which, if proven, would establish that the sole cause of plaintiff’s injury was the third-party defendant’s negligence. Here, however, St. Clair Rubber has merely averred that Hoover was negligent while it was not. However, St. Clair Rubber fails to plead any facts in its third-party complaint from which a jury could conclude that, on any one of the theories pled by plaintiff, St. Clair Rubber was wholly without negligence and that complete fault for plaintiff’s injuries lay with Hoover. As such, the trial court correctly granted Hoover’s motion for summary judgment on this theory.
On appeal, St. Clair Rubber argues that several allegations of the third-party complaint properly pled either breach of an implied warranty or breach of contract. However, a careful reading of the third-party complaint makes it clear that St. Clair was not seeking relief upon either of those theories and did not present them to the trial court. Thus, they are not properly before this Court. Hayes v Booth Newspapers, Inc, supra. Hoover’s conduct was alleged to constitute negligence, not a breach of an implied warranty. Specifically pleading the latter, in conjunction with a claim for contract damages, has been found to constitute a separate theory of recovery by one panel of this Court. Pontious v E W Bliss Co, 102 *11Mich App 718, 722; 302 NW2d 293 (1981), lv den 411 Mich 1062 (1981). However, St. Clair Rubber’s allegations make it unclear whether it is 'seeking indemnification or contract damages. If the former, its claim must fail because plaintiff’s complaint alleges only active negligence on its part and St. Clair Rubber’s third-party complaint pleads nothing which can overcome this problem. If the latter, the claim is insufficiently pled.
"GCR 1963, 111.1(3) requires a complaint to set forth 'a demand for judgment for the relief that the pleader seeks’. Darin & Armstrong’s complaint did not ask for breach of contract damages; it was framed solely on issues of indemnification. Moreover, Darin & Armstrong failed to mention breach of warranties in its briefs to the trial court, and the trial court did not address this theory of recovery in its opinion. As stated in Three Lakes Ass’n v Whiting, 75 Mich App 564, 581; 255 NW2d 686 (1977):
" 'This, however, was not the argument presented to the trial court. Plaintiff may not shift ground on appeal and come up with new theories here after being unsuccessful on the one presented in the trial court. Thompson v Ecorse, 7 Mich App 492; 152 NW2d 51 (1967), Rinaldi v Livonia, 69 Mich App 58, 64; 244 NW2d 609 (1976).’ ” Darin & Armstrong v Ben Agree Co, 88 Mich App 128, 137; 276 NW2d 869 (1979), lv den 406 Mich 1007 (1979).
Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.
Affirmed. Third-party defendant-appellee may tax costs.