Court Opinion

ID: 9791899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:20:15.265123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.287298
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent to the Court’s decision in this case. The State not only complied with the notice requirements of Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774 (Okl.Cr.1979), but the evidence also met the guidelines for admissibility set forth in Burks. Id. at 772. I further disagree with the Court’s attempt to distinguish our prior approval of this same type of evidence and the circumstances in Little v. State, 725 P.2d 606 (Okl.Cr.1986), and Huddleston v. State, 695 P.2d 8 (Okl.Cr.1985). Rather than being distinguishable these cases support the admissibility of the evidence. I do not find support in the law as to the amount of time between offenses being a factor as to whether the exceptions set forth in 12 O.S.1981, § 2404(B), are applicable. The provisions of this section do not contain the time limitations on convictions which are addressed in 12 O.S.1981, § 2609(B), for purposes of impeachment. We have previously set forth the factors to be considered for admissibility in Burks, and these requirements did not include a time restriction or a requirement that each offense be against the same victim. The determining factor to be addressed here is whether there was a “visible connection” between the offense charged and the offense sought to be proved. The similarities in Appellant’s approach to each of the victims, the young ages of the girls, the subsequent silence of the girls, and the actual sexual nature of the offenses are appropriate to show motive and common scheme or plan in this case. The court disregards the reality of the fact that sex offenders of this type, who victimize young family members, more often than not go undetected for extended periods of time. This is due to the embarrassment and fear on the part of the young victims to disclose the acts that have been committed against them. The Legislature has not restricted the admissibility of this type of evidence by including a time limitation on the prior acts or a requirement that each offense was committed against the same victim, and I do not find an independent basis in the law to establish a bright line in this case. The guidelines established in Burks, 594 P.2d at 772, are sufficient to restrict “other crime” evidence without further limitations. I therefore DISSENT.