Court Opinion

ID: 9519684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:22:37.529028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:36.542583
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Buchanan, J.
I concur in the result only in this case. Judge White interprets Luckett v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 174, 284 N.E.2d 738, and Williams v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 547, 307 N.E.2d 457, as permitting the use of the term “probable cause” in connection with an investigative stop. This is not so.
The use of a probable cause test in justification of an investigative stop was specifically prohibited by Williams v. State, supra, which reversed on transfer the majority opinion of this court (District Two) adopting a probable cause test. In so doing, then Chief Justice Arterburn adopted Justice Hunter’s language in Luckett v. State, supra, stating that
“in situations of this sort the question is ‘whether the facts known ... at the time he (a police officer) stopped the car were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an investigation was appropriate.’ ”
Justice Hunter concurring in the result points up the distinction between probable cause for arrest and reasonableness of an investigative detention of a motor vehicle. He said,
“Probable cause for arrest is not the central issue before us. Rather, we are confronted with an examination of the rearsonableness of an investigative detention of a motor vehicle.” (Emphasis supplied).
He further indicated that Luckett v. State did formulate a standard of reasonableness to be distinguished from probable cause for arrest.
*443This is not a matter of splitting semantic hairs, or of equivalents. An investigative detention of a moving vehicle is justifiable on the basis of whether the facts known at the time to the police officer stopping a moving vehicle are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an investigative stop was appropriate.1 The requirement of probable cause for an arrest is a more exacting standard than the “reasonableness” required for an investigative stop. Williams and Luckett, supra. The importance of the distinction is witnessed by the opposite result reached by the Supreme Court in applying the less stringent standard of reasonableness to the facts of the Williams case as opposed to the application of the probable cause standard by the majority of this court.
Therefore, I deem it inaccurate and misleading to utilize the term “probable cause” in connection with an investigative stop. Luckett and Williams did not do so. To meld probable cause for arrest and probable cause for an investigative stop is a dangerous intermingling of dissimilar principles. The distinction between them may easily get lost along the path of common usage.
Mote.—Reported at 329 N.E.2d 51.

. The basic ease in this field is Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, which was relied on by our Supreme Court in Williams. Also following Williams and Luckett is Elliott v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 413, 317 N.E.2d 173.