Court Opinion

ID: 9712398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:04.507233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.904615
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I concur only in the result reached by the majority, but I disagree entirely with what is implied in the Court’s per curiam opinion and explicit in the concurring opinion—that we need not allow appellant counsel at his sanity hearing as a constitutional matter. Certainly I am pleased that this Court has reached the right result. But I do not believe that it is enough to grant appellant the right of counsel on a “policy” or “good idea” basis. On that theory, perhaps others similarly situated will not fare as well, if the majority concludes that its grace should not be continued. That is a decision which I do not believe this Court would be entitled to make. In my view, the long overdue relief granted today is not revocable as a matter of judicial policy, grace or discretion, but rather is predicated on a fundamental and absolute constitutional right. I therefore find it necessary to express my views as to why appellant is entitled, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to the assistance of counsel in this case.
Appellant was arrested in 1963 by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and charged with writing threatening letters to the President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. 871. Pending disposition of this charge and while appellant was confined in the Lackawanna County prison, the United States Marshal for the Middle District of Pennsylvania petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions of Lackawanna County for the appointment of a sanity commission pursuant to The Mental Health Act of 1951, *481Act of June 12, 1951, P. L. 533, §101 et seq., 50 P.S. §1071 et seq. On September 30, 1963, a commission was appointed.
The commission found that appellant was mentally ill with criminal tendencies, and the court ordered him committed to Faryiew State Hospital. The Federal District Court, on motion of the United States Attorney, dismissed the complaint against appellant because the federal authorities had determined appellant to be mentally incompetent. At no time during these commitment proceedings was appellant represented by counsel.
Subsequently, while confined at Faryiew, appellant filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County papers which were treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was dismissed, and the Superior Court affirmed per curiam, Judge Hoffman dissenting in an opinion which Judge Montgomery joined. We granted allocatur to determine whether appellant was constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel at his sanity hearing.
At the outset, it is necessary to consider whether counsel is essential at the sanity commission hearing even though the order committing appellant technically was issued by the court, not by the sanity commission. While we have held that under the criminal commitment procedures of the Act of 1951, 50 P.S. §§1224, 1225, the commission’s findings are merely “advisory,” (although they may not be arbitrarily rejected by the court), Commonwealth v. Ballem, 391 Pa. 626, 636, 139 A. 2d 534, 539 (1958), and although the civil commitment provision, 50 P.S. §1203, under which appellant was committed also leaves the ultimate determination to the court, this is not conclusive. There Is no doubt at all that the commission’s findings will be given great weight by the committing judge. The sanity hearing is where most data is collected and where ex*482pert opinion is given; the court proceeding under these circumstances is likely to be little more than a formality. In effect the commission hearing is a critical stage, cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1931 (1967), and it is there that appellant’s liberty and future are actually at stake. Thus whatever constitutional protections to which appellant may be entitled attached at the sanity commission hearing.
The Commonwealth, like the defense, believing this case to involve solely a constitutional issue essentially argues only that appellant is not entitled to counsel at a sanity commission hearing because the hearing is a “civil,” not “criminal,” proceeding. This argument was made and rejected in the juvenile court area by the Supreme Court of the United States in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). Prior to Gault, Pennsylvania had adopted the parens patriae doctrine to hold juvenile proceedings to be non-criminal in Holmes Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A. 2d 523 (1954). The Supreme Court of the United States refused to folloAV this reasoning, quoting instead the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Mtjsmanno in Holmes that the juvenile is placed in “a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours. . . .” 387 U.S. at 27, 87 S. Ct. at 1443, quoting 379 Pa. at 616, 109 A. 2d at 530. The same conditions—“bars, guards, and routine”—form a substantial part of the atmosphere at Farview, the institution to which appellant Avas sent, and staff members even have claimed that these factors are part of the rehabilitative process there. 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 78, 86 (1961).1 In *483the face of this, Gault shows that it simply is not enough to maintain that a proceeding is not “criminal” in order to deprive an individual of constitutionally guaranteed protections where Ms liberty is at stake.
The decision that constitutional due process protections could attach at a commitment proceeding “whether denominated civil or criminal” was made before Gault in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608, 87 S. Ct. 1209, 1211 (1967), and had been foreshadowed much earlier in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 275-76, 60 S. Ct. 523, 526 (1940) (by implication).2 To institutionalize appellant for a time that may be the equivalent of a life sentence without giving him so fundamental a right as the assistance of counsel cannot be permitted.
The role which counsel can play at a sanity com*484mission hearing should not be underestimated. The argument rejected in Gault that the child could be adequately represented by the probation officer and by the court itself, 387 U.S. at 35-36, 87 S. Ct. at 1448, is equally specious here. Members of the sanity commission and the judge who evaluates the commission’s report have functions that are separate and distinct from those of an individual’s own counsel, and cannot give an individual the full assistance and protection which his own attorney could provide. See Note, “The Right to Counsel at Civil Competency Proceedings,” 40 Temp. L. Q. 381, 387-90 (1967).
Initially counsel is necessary in a sanity investigation situation to explain the proceedings to the individual and to help the individual make initial communications with the authorities.3 From the very beginning, counsel can also insure that the applicable state procedures, which may on their face provide an individual with a fair hearing, are being followed.4
*485At a sanity hearing, just as at a criminal trial, one of counsel’s most essential functions is as a fact-finder and developer. This is particularly important where his client is inarticulate, frightened, or both. Even absent this difficulty, counsel is still necessary to present a coherent picture of the legally relevant facts in the case. Closely related to this is the potential need for counsel to cross-examine witnesses so as to present a complete picture of his client’s condition. Sanity hearings and determinations present legal as well as medical problems, Kutner, “The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings,” 57 N.W.L. Rev. 383, 386-89 (1962), and legal questions rarely can be decided by one sure answer. An individual needs the assistance of counsel in order to insure that all the evidence in his best interest is presented, and to guarantee that all the evidence will be used toward a determination that is relevant to the proper legal standards for commitment.5 The ultimate determination will *486technically not be whether the individual is “insane” but whether he is able “to adapt to the society of which he is a part. . . . The social controls, including the individual’s ability to work within a complex human relationship, are usually the first to suffer deterioration. This failure may result in the inability of the individual to care for himself, or it may be expressed in anti-social conduct directed at others. In either case, the problems are no longer medical, but have social and legal consequences.” Ross, “Commitment of the Mentally Ill,” 57 Mich. L. Rev. 945, 954 (1959).
Ultimately it must be remembered that while in a criminal trial, counsel’s primary function is to secure the release of his client, this is not necessarily true in a sanity hearing. Representation is essential, even if an individual’s commitment is a foregone conclusion, in order to insure that the individual will receive the proper treatment for his case, and to work for the improvement of improper conditions. See 40 Temp. L. Q., supra, at 389.
The importance of counsel at a sanity hearing is confirmed by the fact that statutory provisions for representation exist in most states.6 The Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 also envisions the presence of counsel at sanity commission proceedings. Act of October 20, 1966, Special Sess. No. 3, P. L. 6, §408, 50 P.S. §4408 (Supp. 1967).7 *487Even were we to conclude that the Commonwealth is not obligated to allow counsel at a sanity hearing, once that privilege is allowed to some, it cannot be denied to others because of their indigency or lack of knowledge. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956). And since I believe that the Commonwealth is constitutionally compelled to allow counsel at a sanity hearing, in my view it must also provide attorneys for those who cannot afford them. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963).
In summary, I believe that the result reached today is constitutionally compelled, and I would not diminish appellant’s constitutional rights by basing them on the supervisory powers of this Court.
Mr. Justice O’Brien joins in this opinion.

 An individual’s criminal record will likely effect his treatment in the institution, and if the crime is sufficiently severe, will greatly decrease his chance for release. Further, the time spent in Farview will be considered part of the individual’s punishment *483in determining whether he should he tried if released. 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 78, 94, 104 (1961).

 Specht involved a Colorado procedure under which petitioner was convicted of indecent liberties under one statute and was then given an indeterminate one-day-to-life term under the Sex Offenders Act. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§39-1 to 10 (1963). The Sex Offenders Act covered persons convicted of sex offenses who in the opinion of the trial court constituted a “threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill.” §19-1. The statute utilized a procedure by which petitioner was examined and a report was prepared to be used by the trial judge prior to sentencing. However there was no hearing, no right of confrontation, etc.
The Court held this procedure to be constitutionally impermissible. The earlier Pearson ease was distinguished because there a person adjudged to have a “psychopathic personality” received a “hearing where he was represented by counsel and could compel the production of witnesses on his behalf.” 386 U.S. at 610, 87 S. Ct. at 1213. Although the Minnesota procedure in Pearson was' neither criminal in nature nor tied to a criminal conviction, neither the Court in Pearson nor in BpecM considered this to be controlling.

 Commentators are able to cite an extreme case to emphasize the need for counsel from the very outset of proceedings. See Note, 40 Temp. L. Q. 381 (1967) ; Kutner, “The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings,” 57 N.W.L. Rev. 383 (1962). The ease involved the Duzynskis, Polish emigrants who suspected the janitor of their Chicago apartment building of stealing money from their apartment. The janitor, upon being confronted by Mrs. Duzynski, called the police and on their arrival told them that both Mr. and Mrs. Duzynski were insane. The Duzynskis were then seized, handcuffed and taken to the mental health clinic where, unable to answer questions in English, they were pronounced insane and committed. Six weeks later, still not comprehending why he was incarcerated, Mr. Duzynski committed suicide and only then was an investigation held that led to Mrs. Duzynski’s release.

 Although Illinois has a series of safeguards to protect against improper institutionalization, a study there has disclosed that certificates of insanity frequently are issued after-the-fact and without proper examination; individuals in effect must prove themselves sane; patients are frequently so heavily sedated at the court *485hearing that they are unable to defend themselves; and not only are persons not generally informed of their legal rights, but workers who do so inform them are generally reprimanded or dismissed. Kutner, supra at 384-85. While these findings are directly relevant only to Chicago, similar abuses have been found in numerous other states, id. at 386, and in any event the potential for abuse is a danger that exists everywhere.

 In United States v. Driscoll, 399 F. 2d 135, 138, (2d Cir. 1968), the Court held defendant to be entitled to the assistance of counsel during a psychiatric examination that was used at trial to prove that defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the offenses. The Court emphasized that appellant was entitled to confer with counsel so that he could “fully and intelligently respond to the doctor’s questions.” Id. at 138. The Court rejected the government’s argument that defendant was merely seeking a “constitutional right to slant his answers,” noting that although defendant might give different answers if given notice that they could be used against him and if permitted to consult with his attorney, this does not necessarily indicate dishonesty. Bather, the Court believed that with the help of a lawyer, defendant’s answers “might well have *486been fuller, had defendant himself focused on his state of mind five years before.” Id.

 In its excellent amicus brief, the American Civil Liberties Union points out that forty-two jurisdictions make some provision for assistance of counsel. Appointment is mandatory in twenty-two jurisdictions; in six others it is mandatory upon request.

 Section 4408(b) makes appointment of counsel in a criminal commitment proceeding optional with the court. Section 4408(d) obviously anticipates counsel’s presence, since one of the factors *487which the court is to consider in drafting its order is the individual’s ability “to confer with his counsel with reference to such proceedings.”