Court Opinion

ID: 9647356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:33:58.903115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:48.433710
License: Public Domain

CHAPA, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion.
In this termination of parental rights case, only appellant, Diana Neal, the natural mother of the child, appeals the court’s judgment terminating her parental rights.
“The natural right which exists between parents and their children is one of constitutional dimensions”, and “grounded on good policy considerations.” Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976). There exists “the strong presumption that the best interest of a minor is usually served by keeping custody in the natural parents.” Id. Any action “which permanently sunders those [parent and child] ties”, requires “the proceedings [to] be strictly scrutinized.” Id. Such actions “can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.” State v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243, 54 S.W. 901, 903 (1900). Consequently, the Texas Supreme Court has established the requirement that because “[germination is a drastic remedy”, “[h]ereafter, the ‘clear and convincing evidence' standard of proof will be required in all proceedings for involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship.” In the Interest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980). The clear and convincing standard was defined as “‘that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” Id., citing State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.1979). In view of the fact that termination of parental rights involves the termination of rights bestowed upon parents by a power far above us all, the standard required can hardly be considered drastic.
*223According to the pleading, this case was filed as an involuntary termination case. Since appellee’s case was based entirely on an affidavit by appellant purporting to be a “voluntary relinquishment of parental rights” under TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 15.03(a) (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1991), and as the affidavit was objected to as being involuntary by appellant’s counsel, the case continued being an involuntary termination case until the voluntary nature of the affidavit was established. The court correctly withheld ruling on appellant’s objection to the affidavit until the court heard evidenced on the issue. Since the case, at this point, continued to be an involuntary termination case, and was entirely dependant on the challenged affidavit by appellant, clear and convincing evidence by the appellee was required to establish that the affidavit was in fact voluntary. However, appellee failed in its burden, and the court erred both in terminating the parental rights of the appellant and in failing to grant a new trial.
In an effort to sustain its burden of establishing that the affidavit was voluntary, appellee merely presented the testimony of Tina Jackson, a caseworker for the appellee, and Dr. Belvis. Jackson testified, among other things, that appellant suffered from mental illness; that although appellant had an attorney representing her in the proceeding, Jackson and a secretary had gone to the home of the appellant and her husband to obtain the affidavits without appellant’s attorney being present; that appellant did not want to sign the affidavit at the time of its execution and was very emotionally upset; that appellant did not want to sign the affidavit, but wanted to go to court with her husband; that appellant’s husband did not want to go to court and had exercised enough control and pressure over appellant to induce her to sign that day when, in fact, appellant did not want to sign; that Jackson was not sure whether the appellant would have signed the affidavit even on the day of trial had the appellant appeared for trial; and, that Jackson was not sure whether the affidavit was voluntary.
Dr. Belvis, appellant’s treating psychiatrist, testified that the appellant could have the intelligence and mental capacity to understand the affidavit if she had been taking her medication at the time. However, the record did not reflect whether the appellant was or was not under the medication at the time the affidavit was signed.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, only the appellant testified, stating, among other things, that she had a history of mental illness; that she did not sign the affidavit voluntarily; that the affidavit was presented for her signature, at appellant’s home and in the absence of her attorney, by Miss Jackson, an employee of the appel-lee; that at the time the affidavit was presented to her, the appellant had requested that her attorney be present and was told by Miss Jackson that an attorney was not necessary and that there was no sense in her even having a lawyer; that appellant asked Miss Jackson to leave her home, but that Miss Jackson left only after obtaining the signed affidavit; that appellant’s husband physically harmed appellant because she wanted to keep the child; that at the time she signed the affidavit, she felt that her husband might cause her further harm if she refused to sign the affidavit; that she did not attend two prior hearing because her husband’s mother, Mrs. Goodwin Brown, after promising to take her to court, had, at the last moment, called to tell her she could not take her, leaving her without transportation; and, that Mrs. Brown was the one who was trying to arrange for the adoption of appellant’s child, the subject of this proceeding, by Mrs. Brown’s other son who resides in California.
Strictly scrutinizing this evidence, as we must, it cannot be said that the evidence reaches the level of a “clear and convincing” standard, or that the evidence establishes “the most solid and substantial reasons” to justify termination of appellant’s parental rights. In Interest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847; State v. Deaton, 54 S.W. at 903.
I would also reverse and remand.