Court Opinion

ID: 9691215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:16:55.884326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:13.136358
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Chief Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I am sure that it is the depth of concern over the perpetual struggle to provide appropriate public schools that has obscured the majority’s understanding and resulted in this usurpation by seizing power to act where there is no power to act. The majority is clearly con&sed, as is demonstrated by the following statement in the majority opinion: We further made it radiandy clear in our supplemental opinion handed down on June 18, 2004, that although we were releasing jurisdiction of the case, we reserved the right to exercise our power at any time to assure that a constitutional system of education would be attained. . . . It is a misperception that the issue of the constitutionality of the public schools in Arkansas has been pending for twenty-two years. No case on the constitutionality of the public schools has been pending before this court for twenty-two years. While I understand and share the desire to assure that a constitutional system of public education is attained, the desire to see that the legislature does so is hardly a basis of jurisdiction. Neither does a fair warning that the court may act give rise to jurisdiction. Yet the majority asserts that it has jurisdiction, giving a meaning to the word jurisdiction heretofore unknown. I am confused, although I am reminded of Alice and Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass. In conversation with Alice, Humpty Dumpty stated, “There’s glory for you.” Alice was confused by the use of the word “glory.” “I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t — till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock down argument for you!’ ” “But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock down argument for you,’ ” Alice objected. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make the words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master— that’s all” Lewis Carroll, The Complete Illustrated Lewis Carroll 196 (New York: Gallery Books, 1991). It appears that this court is assumingjurisdiction just because we choose to say we can. “Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties.” Pedersen v. Stracener, 354 Ark. 716, 719, 128 S.W.3d 818 (2003). According to Rogers School District No. 30, the controversy in this case is apparently a failure by the State to “follow this court’s directives and their failure to honor their commitment previously given this Court” to provide a constitutional public school system. It is clear that this court has no authority to issue orders to the legislature. So what is this case now, an original action in this court for breach of promise? It certainly appears that the school districts and the State are arguing over whether the school system enacted in the last legislative session meets constitutional requirements, but there is no justiciable controversy on that issue before this court. Our jurisdiction arises from Lake View Sch. District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W. 3d 472 (2002) (Lake View III), where the majority-stated that the case was “an appeal from a final order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court entered May 25, 2001, which concluded that the current school-funding system is unconstitutional . . . .” Lake View III, 351 Ark. at 42. This court further stated, “We affirm the trial court’s order regarding the unconstitutionality of the public school-funding system but reverse its finding relative to excess debt service. . . .” Id. Thus, the issue of a future school system enacted by the General Assembly in the last legislative session was not the subject of the case in Lake View III and further has never been the subject of litigation in the circuit court. A mandate may not be recalled to examine an issue that was not the subject of the prior litigation. In re Kunkel, 398 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2005). In short, there is no jurisdiction in this case. With the exception of the contempt power and certain listed writs, this court has appellate jurisdiction only. Bynum v. Savage, 312 Ark. 137, 847 S.W.2d 705 (1993). There is no appellate jurisdiction in this case because there is no order from a lower court to review in this case, which is what appellate courts do. Ward Sch. Bus Mfg., Inc. v. Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 547 S.W.2d 394 (1977). Original jurisdiction is jurisdiction to decide a matter in the first instance. Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005). The majority is appointing special masters to decide in the first instance whether the legislature has “attained” a “constitutional system of education.” This court lacks original jurisdiction to undertake such a determination. Yet here we are discussing recalling the mandate to allow this court to review whether the legislature did what this court never ordered it to do and what this court never had the authority to order it to do. Besides, just based on simple logic, how does recall of a mandate affirming a decision by the circuit court that the then-existing school system is unconstitutional allow this court to examine the question of the constitutionality of a subsequently enacted school system? Focusing too long on the majority’s analysis of its authority to act in this case may result in cramping of the cerebral cortex. In any event, there is no reason to recall the mandate regarding the constitutionality of the legislative enactments from the last legislative session regarding schools because they are presumed constitutional. In Bush v. Martineau, 174 Ark. 214, 295 S.W. 9 (1927), this court cited cases dating to 1836 showing that an act of the legislature is presumed constitutional. The law remains the same today. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005). Until someone challenges the new school system in circuit court and obtains a ruling of the circuit court that the system is unconstitutional, then the system is constitutional. Justice Glaze’s concurring opinion states that “[i]f it were ‘not this court’s role’ to interject itself into this particular fray, then we should not have done so in the first place.” The concurring opinion argues that to retreat from the “fray” is to engage in the “height of hypocrisy.” From my first involvement in this case, I have opposed this court’s attempts to direct the General Assembly and stated in my concurrence to Lake View Sch. Dist No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W. 3d 472 (2002) (Lake View III), that the role of this court is to determine whether acts of the General Assembly concerning the public school system are constitutional and not to direct the General Assembly as to what legislation to enact. I restated my concerns about encroaching upon the constitutional duties of the General Assembly in my concurring opinion in Lake View Sch. Dist No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 189 S.W.3d 1 (2004). If we interjected ourselves into this “fray” in error, then any position other than dissent to this court’s actions in this opinion would only be to perpetuate error. What brings us to the brink of abandoning the doctrine of separation of powers is not hard to understand. When we begin our analysis correctly, it is not difficult to continue down the right path. However, once we err, it can be very difficult to get back on the right path. It is beyond dispute in Arkansas that the responsibility for the creation, organization and regulation of the public schools system is within the exclusive province of the legislature. Loyd v. Knight, 288 Ark. 474, 706 S.W.2d 393 (1986); Heber Springs Sch. Dist. v. West Side Sch. Dist., 269 Ark. 148, 599 S.W. 2d 371 (1980); Wallace Sch. Dist. v. County Bd. of Educ., 214 Ark. 436, 439, 216 S.W.2d 790 (1949). The Arkansas Constitution vests in the General Assembly the duty and authority to establish, maintain, and support a public school system. Barker v. Frank, 327 Ark. 589, 939 S.W.2d 837 (1997); East Poinsett County Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Massey, 315 Ark. 163, 866 S.W.2d 369 (1993); Saline County Educ. Bd. v. Hot Springs Educ. Bd., 270 Ark. 136, 603 S.W.2d 413 (1980). See also, Lemaire v. Henderson, 174 Ark. 936, 298 S.W. 327 (1927). In 1934, this court stated: It has been too often held, as now to be a matter of debate, that the Legislature is clothed by the Constitution with plenary power over the management and operation of the public schools. It is for the Legislature to declare policy with reference to the schools, and, however much this court might doubt the wisdom of the policy declared, it has no power to alter it. Wheelis v. Franks, 189 Ark. 373, 377, 72 S.W.2d 231 (1934). That the legislature has plenary power over the public schools means that it has full power. Beard v. Albritton, 182 Ark. 538, 31 S.W.2d 959 (1930). “We do not even imply that we have the authority to dictate to the General Assembly....” Wells v. Riviere, 269 Ark. 156, 169, 599 S.W. 2d 375 (1980). Yet off we go now asserting that we ordered studies and very specific actions by the legislature. I must also note another argued basis for jurisdiction. The majority in Lake View III stated that “[t]he people of this State unquestionably wanted all departments of state government to be responsible for providing a general, suitable and efficient system of public education to the children of this state.” Lake View III, 351 Ark. at 53. It is not clear what this means. This assertion provides no basis for jurisdiction. Perhaps the statement was only intended to announce a noble sentiment; however, it resulted in the petitioners arguing at the last oral argument that there was a distinct form of jurisdiction in school cases allowing this court to direct the General Assembly with respect to establishment of the public schools. There is no such jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction is appellate with the noted very limited exceptions. Further, this constitutes a blending of the powers of the legislative and judicial branches of government, and this court has specifically rejected the notion of a “blending” of powers in favor of a strict separation of powers. We have stated “Our system, providing as it does for distinct separation of departments, did not in its inception contemplate a blending of authority; and overlapping must not be permitted now at the command of expediency or in response to the nod of convenience.” Spradlin v. Arkansas Ethics Comm’n, 314 Ark. 108, 115, 858 S.W.2d 684 (1993)(quoting Oates v. Rogers, 201 Ark. 335, 346, 144 S.W. 2d 457 (1940)). In Lake View III, a stay of one year was mistakenly granted to avoid a nonexistent problem oflitigation arising from continued operation of a public school system declared unconstitutional by this court. Somehow, in a metamorphosis that would make even Franz Kafka’s head spin, the stay miraculously transformed itself from a stay to prohibit litigation regarding the unconstitutional school system to a stay and order that the legislature enact a constitutional school system by January 4, 2004. How could such a stay and order ever be squared with the law that the legislature has plenary power over the creation, organization and regulation of the public schools? See Loyd, supra. There is no jurisdiction to recall the mandate. There is no jurisdiction on any basis for this court to consider the school system enacted by the General Assembly in the last legislative session, and, further, the recall is in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. The action of the majority in recalling the mandate is nothing more than a usurpation of the legislative function in utter disregard for the separation-of-powers doctrine that has protected our representative form of government over many generations. This court has now set precedent that it stands as the ever vigilant monitor of the public schools, and as this case proves, every two years we will again be asked to review the school system. Such a review is an exercise of original jurisdiction that this court is not granted by our constitution. Section 6 of Amendment 80 provides, “Circuit Courts are established as the trial courts of original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned pursuant to this Constitution.” I wonder why we have trial courts if this court has now decided to try cases. I dissent because we have no jurisdiction to recall the mandate and no jurisdiction to review the school system enacted in the last legislative session. Neither cries of frustration, nor cries that efficiency demands our action, nor even unfounded cries that the General Assembly will “cut and run” should tempt us to abandon our form of government and make this court a superlegislature. Gunter, J., and Special Justice Carol Dalby join this dissent.