Court Opinion

ID: 9946077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 00:03:03.528451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.866660
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24
                 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION FIVE

    W. BRADLEY ELECTRIC, INC.,
    et al.,
         Cross-defendants and                 A167137
    Respondents,
                                              (City & County of San
    v.                                        Francisco Super. Ct.
    MITCHELL ENGINEERING,                     Nos. CGC19575663,
                                              CGC20583018)
         Cross-complainant and
    Appellant.

         Defendant and cross-complainant (and appellant) Mitchell Engineering
(Mitchell) appeals from an order denying its motion under Code of Civil
Procedure section 4731 to set aside a judgment dismissing its cross-complaint
against cross-defendants (and respondents) W. Bradley Electric, Inc.
(Bradley) and DeHaro Ramirez Group (DeHaro). Mitchell contends the
dismissal should have been vacated under section 473, subdivision (d),
because its attorney entered into a settlement agreement and dismissed the
cross-complaint without Mitchell’s express authorization. Mitchell also
contends in its reply brief that the court should have granted relief under
section 473, subdivision (b), on the grounds of surprise or excusable neglect.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II A.

1        All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                          1
      We will affirm the order. In the published portion of this opinion, we
conclude that, even if the dismissal could be deemed void rather than
voidable for purposes of section 473, subdivision (d), substantial evidence
supports the conclusion that Mitchell ratified the unauthorized actions of its
attorney, and Mitchell fails to establish that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to set the dismissal aside. In the
unpublished portion of the opinion, we conclude that Mitchell’s argument
under section 473, subdivision (b), is forfeited and meritless.
               I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      In May 2019, plaintiffs Mary Wong (individually and as the personal
representative of the Estate of Lai Lee Wong), Thomas Wong, Felix Wong,
and Jerry Wong (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Mebrhatu Behre Brhane and
Doe defendants (Case No. CGC-19-575663). Plaintiffs alleged that, on March
16, 2018, Lai Lee Wong was crossing the street near Broadway and Stockton
Streets in San Francisco, when a vehicle driven by Brhane, while working as
a rideshare driver for Uber Technologies Inc. (Uber), struck her in the
crosswalk and caused injuries that led to her death. Uber was later
substituted for Doe 1 and added as a defendant.
      In February 2020, Plaintiffs filed a separate complaint against Mitchell
(Case No. CGC-20-583018). Plaintiffs alleged that the condition of the
sidewalk and crosswalk entrance near the intersection of the accident, which
was under construction as part of a project involving Mitchell, was a
contributing cause of the fatal accident. According to the complaint, Mitchell
“negligently controlled, designed, constructed, maintained, operated, and
inspected the accident intersection so as to create a dangerous condition . . .
that created a substantial risk of injury to the members of the general
public.”

                                        2
      Mitchell initially tendered its defense and indemnification to its
insurer, The Hartford. After The Hartford appointed John Hauser as
Mitchell’s lawyer, Mitchell answered the complaint and filed a cross-
complaint against Brhane.
      Mitchell later tendered the matter to Bradley’s insurer, The Travelers
Indemnity Company of Connecticut (Travelers), as an additional insured
under Bradley’s policy. Travelers agreed to defend Mitchell subject to a
reservation of rights and retained the law firm of Thomas | Lucas to
represent Mitchell.
      After the Thomas | Lucas firm joined Mitchell’s defense, Mitchell filed
an amended cross-complaint against Brhane for indemnity, partial
indemnification, and declaratory relief in August 2020. That same month,
the trial court consolidated Plaintiffs’ two cases under Case No.
CGC19575663.
      In May 2021, Mitchell filed a second amended cross-complaint against
Brhane, Uber, DeHaro, and Bradley (hereafter, cross-complaint). The cross-
complaint asserted causes of action for equitable indemnity and contribution
against all cross-defendants, express indemnity against DeHaro and Bradley
based on indemnity provisions in their subcontracts, breach of contract
against DeHaro, and declaratory relief.
      DeHaro then filed a cross-complaint against Mitchell, Bradley, Brhane,
and Uber, seeking equitable indemnity, equitable contribution, and
declaratory relief.
      In November 2021, Bradley moved for summary judgment against
Mitchell, setting the hearing for January 19, 2022.

                                       3
      A. Settlements
      Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement with Brhane and Uber.
The trial court granted their motion for a determination that the settlement
was in good faith in December 2021.
      Around the same time, Plaintiffs agreed to settle with DeHaro and
Bradley for $10,000 each, provided that the remaining parties—including
Mitchell—stipulated that the settlement was in good faith or the trial court
issued a good faith settlement determination.
      Lawyers for Mitchell and DeHaro began to negotiate a potential
resolution of the Mitchell and DeHaro cross-actions. Mitchell was
represented by Vanessa Whirl of Thomas | Lucas. The lawyers reached a
proposed stipulation by which (1) Mitchell would concede the good faith of
DeHaro’s settlement with Plaintiffs and (2) Mitchell and DeHaro would
dismiss their cross-complaints against each other in exchange for a waiver of
fees and costs.
      In a December 14, 2021 email to Mitchell’s president (Curtis Mitchell)
and other Mitchell personnel (Kathy Streblow and Andy Noll), Whirl
apprised Mitchell that DeHaro and Bradley had settled with Plaintiffs, the
trial court had approved Uber’s and Brhane’s settlement with Plaintiffs, and
Mitchell still had express indemnity claims against Bradley and DeHaro.
Whirl then explained the strategic benefit of the proposed settlement with
DeHaro (and Bradley): “Now the question being posed is: do we dismiss
against Bradley and DeHaro, leaving just us against Plaintiffs? My
recommendation is yes, and here is why. [¶] 1. I have always said it does not
make sense for us three defendants to be throwing mud at each other. It only
strengthens Plaintiffs’ case for them. [¶] 2. Bradley has an MSJ pending
before the Court. If we oppose it and lose, we could be on the hook for

                                       4
attorney fees to Bradley. Not good. [¶] 3. Bradley and DeHaro’s settlements
of $10,000 a piece set an anchor. Mitchell is no more culpable than they are.
So I want to get authority for a $10k offer to them. If they don’t take it, we
move forward with the MSJ I’ve been telling you about and see how it goes.”
(Italics added.) Whirl’s email concluded: “Travelers is already on board with
my recommendation but I wanted to discuss with you guys before I bless the
settlements and dismiss our Cross-Complaints. Please let me know as soon as
you can what your position is. I am available for a call if needed, although
my phone rings all day and I may be unavailable when you call.” (Italics
added.)
      The next day (December 15, 2021), without receiving any response from
Mitchell, Whirl sent an email to Bradley’s attorney, stating that “[t]his will
confirm our conversation wherein I agreed that my client will stipulate to
your client’s settlement with Plaintiff in the amount of $10,000. We will
further dismiss our express indemnity cause of action against your client in
exchange for a waiver of fees and costs.” (Bolding in original.) Whirl
sent essentially the same email to DeHaro’s attorney, confirming that
Mitchell would dismiss its indemnity cause of action against DeHaro for a
waiver of fees and costs.
      On December 21, 2021, Whirl sent a status report to the claims
adjuster for Travelers, with a copy to Streblow, a Mitchell employee. On page
12 of the 15-page report, Whirl advised that Bradley had moved for summary
judgment on Mitchell’s cross-complaint. She also reported that Bradley and
DeHaro had settled with Plaintiffs for $10,000 each and recounted the
following: “We were requested by their respective attorneys to stipulate to
the good faith nature of the settlements and drop our claims of express
indemnity. After discussion with you [Travelers], we determined it was best

                                        5
to concede to the settlements and drop the express [indemnity] claims . . . .
[¶] Because we are stipulating to these settlements, we obtained a waiver of
fees and costs from each of them and stopped work on the Opposition to the
W. Bradley MSJ.”
      On January 4, 2022, on Mitchell’s behalf but without Mitchell’s express
authorization, Whirl signed a Stipulation Regarding Good Faith of
Settlement Between Plaintiffs and DeHaro-Ramirez Corporation
(Stipulation). The Stipulation states in relevant part: “The undersigned
parties hereby stipulate and agree that the settlement between DeHaro and
Plaintiffs is in good faith pursuant to the provisions of [] section 877.6, as
well as the factors set forth in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs.
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 488. . . . Rather than incur the burden, expense, and delay
in seeking a judicial determination of good faith settlement pursuant to []
sections 877(b) and 877.6, and with the agreement to dismiss all cross-
complaints pending between the parties hereto with prejudice, in
return for an agreement for each party to bear its own attorney’s
fees and costs of suit herein, the undersigned parties agree, and stipulate,
that the settlement between Plaintiffs and DeHaro would properly be
determined to be in good faith under these code sections as well as pursuant
to the factors set forth in TechBilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs. (1985)
38 Cal.3d 488, if an application or motion were to be filed with the Court, and
thus no such filing is required given this stipulation.” (Bolding in original.)
The Stipulation further provided: “This Stipulation eliminates any further
indemnification or contribution claim arising out of the Plaintiffs’ claimed
injuries and damages, this lawsuit, or any settlements among the
undersigned defendants. Likewise, this Stipulation eliminates any claims
which were or could have been presented in the pending cross-complaints of

                                        6
DeHaro and Mitchell Engineering, and any claims which could have been
presented by way of a cross-complaint of W. Bradley Electric, Inc. against
DeHaro in this matter.” (Italics added.) Counsel for DeHaro, Bradley, and
Plaintiffs also signed the Stipulation. In short, the Stipulation precluded
Mitchell from pursuing its cross-complaint, including any claims against
DeHaro or Bradley.
      Consistent with the Stipulation, Whirl signed, on Mitchell’s behalf, a
voluntary Request for Dismissal with prejudice of Mitchell’s cross-complaint
on January 5, 2022. The trial court entered the dismissal the same day.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs dismissed their complaint as to Brhane and Uber, and
DeHaro dismissed its cross-complaint as to all cross-defendants including
Mitchell, leaving only Plaintiffs’ claim against Mitchell.
      What occurred after January 5, 2022 is largely disputed (as discussed
later), but it is certain that on June 2, 2022—nearly five months after
Mitchell’s cross-complaint was dismissed—Curtis Mitchell emailed Whirl and
an insurance claims person and asked, “Could one of you let me know if we
settled Mitchell[’]s cross complaint against Bradley in the Wong case?” The
next day, Whirl replied: “I’m unclear what you are asking. We’ve discussed
at length, several times, the dismissal of Bradley by Mitchell. That dismissal
terminated Mitchell’s claims against Bradley. There is no settlement
remaining to be made because that Cross-Complaint is done.” Curtis
Mitchell responded that he “was aware that Bradley settled with the
plaintiff” but he “never gave anyone authority to dismiss Mitchell’s cross
complaint against Bradley.” He asked, “If the Mitchell-Bradley cross-
complaint was dismissed[,] who gave authority to do that?”
      Whirl replied: “It’s concerning to me how many times we’ve discussed
this and you still ask the same question. Attached is my email to your team

                                        7
on December 14, 2021 letting you know what was going on. I had a timeline
to make a call before the opposition to the GFS apps [(good faith settlement
applications)] and MSJ [(motion for summary judgment)] were due. No one
from your office responded to my email. I signed and filed the dismissal on
January 4, 2022, three full weeks later. [¶] The insurance carriers do have
the right to make calls like this when providing a defense to insureds.
Insurance carriers and attorneys such as myself do this day in and day out.
When we have to make tough calls, the clients don’t always understand.
That is why they are giving the authority to make those calls without you if
necessary. Notwithstanding the same, you didn’t give me any input when I
ran it by you. My adjuster at Travelers gave me authority for the dismissal
as she was authorized to do. [¶] Keeping Bradley in the case so you can tell
the jury that Bradley screwed up when not a single professional in this
investigation believes lighting to be an issue is a horrible mistake. We would
not have the strength we currently have in our defense if I opposed Bradley’s
MSJ and built a case for Plaintiff[s] against it. Plaintiffs did not even sue
Bradley; even that attorney knows he doesn’t have a case for insufficient
lighting. It’s an argument he’s throwing at the wall after the fact to see if it
sticks. [¶] Let me know if you need me to forward my prior responses to this
inquiry as well.”
      In a return email, Curtis Mitchell wrote: “Thanks Vanessa [¶] I just
wanted to confirm you dismissed Bradley from the cross complaint without
Mitchell’s approval while being paid by Travelers. [¶] Thanks.”
      On June 13, 2022, Mitchell added Sellar Hazard & Lucia as its counsel.
Within days, Mitchell settled with Plaintiffs.

                                        8
      B. Mitchell’s Attempt to Reinstate Its Cross-Complaint
      On July 1, 2022—after it had settled with Plaintiffs and nearly six
months after the dismissal of Mitchell’s cross-complaint against DeHaro and
Bradley—Mitchell filed a motion to set aside the dismissal of its cross-
complaint pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b), arguing that the dismissal
was caused by a party or legal representative’s “mistake, surprise, and/or
excusable neglect.” Mitchell’s notice of motion also apprised that Mitchell
sought relief under the trial court’s equitable powers.2 It did not, however,
mention section 473, subdivision (d).
      Mitchell’s motion was supported in part by a declaration from Curtis
Mitchell, who averred that “the entry of the dismissal was a complete
surprise and shock to [him] and hence Mitchell Engineering, and was action
taken unilaterally by Thomas | Lucas by mistake or excusable neglect or
some other reason disconnected from [Mitchell’s] interests, or all or any
combination.” He claimed he was unaware of either dismissal until June 3,
2022, when trial preparations were underway.
      Bradley and DeHaro opposed Mitchell’s motion, contending the
requirements of section 473, subdivision (b) were not met and the motion was
untimely. Mitchell filed a reply brief, along with another declaration from
Curtis Mitchell, who claimed he did not know about the settlements with
DeHaro and Bradley until July 2022, after they filed their oppositions to
Mitchell’s motion.
      A hearing on Mitchell’s motion was held on August 8, 2022. At the
request of Bradley and DeHaro, the trial court continued the hearing for 60
days “to allow discovery on the points that the parties have raised and

2
     Mitchell had filed an ex parte application for relief on the same grounds
on June 29, 2022—which the trial court did not grant.

                                        9
basically any point that’s raised by these papers or the tentative [ruling],
period, full stop.” The court also allowed the parties to file supplemental
briefs.
      DeHaro and Bradley deposed Curtis Mitchell on September 9, 2022.
He maintained that he had not understood that the cross-complaint was
dismissed before June 3, 2022.
      DeHaro noticed Whirl’s deposition, but Whirl advised that Mitchell had
instructed her not to give testimony or produce documents reflecting
privileged communications. Mitchell also served an objection to the
deposition, asserting it would not allow Whirl to testify as to communications
with Mitchell regarding the settlement and dismissal and refusing to produce
documents.
      Bradley moved to compel Whirl’s deposition and to order Mitchell to
produce documents. Mitchell opposed the motion. The trial court granted it,
finding that Mitchell waived the attorney-client privilege as to
communications with Whirl about the settlement and dismissal of Mitchell’s
cross-complaint.
      Bradley and DeHaro deposed Whirl. She testified that she repeatedly
notified Mitchell, and specifically Curtis Mitchell, of the dismissal of the
cross-complaint. In particular, she referenced her December 14, 2021 email
to Curtis Mitchell, Streblow, and Noll, recommending the dismissal of the
cross-complaint, asking their position, and inviting a call if they wanted to
discuss her recommendation. Whirl did not receive a response, and “[t]he
lack of response from the client, considering that they would immediately
respond to me if they had input on an issue, indicated to me that there was
no issue.” In addition, Whirl testified she received no communication from
Mitchell regarding her December 21, 2021 status report to Travelers, which

                                       10
confirmed the stipulation to Plaintiffs’ settlements with Bradley and DeHaro.
According to Whirl, Curtis Mitchell never told her not to dismiss the cross-
complaint, and no one from Mitchell told her she lacked authority to dismiss
it. When signing Mitchell’s settlement agreements with DeHaro and Bradley
and dismissing the cross-complaint, she believed she had the right and
authority to do so and it was in Mitchell’s best interest.
      Whirl also testified about discussions with Curtis Mitchell concerning
the cross-complaint after it was dismissed. At least twice between March 30
and May 6, 2022, she explained the reasons for the dismissal, including in a
telephone call (or two) and a video conference preparing him for a deposition
in Plaintiffs’ case. Immediately after Curtis Mitchell’s deposition in May
2022, he and Whirl again discussed the dismissal of the cross-complaint. On
May 6, 2022, Whirl sent a pre-trial report to a claims consultant at The
Hartford, with a copy to Curtis Mitchell, Noll, and Streblow, confirming the
agreements to dismiss Bradley and DeHaro. On May 25, 2022, Whirl and
Curtis Mitchell exchanged emails regarding her discussion with an insurance
broker, who confirmed that the dismissal “made perfect sense to her.”
Between June 3 and 7, 2022, Whirl and Curtis Mitchell had an email
exchange (described above), in which Whirl asserted they had discussed the
dismissal of the cross-complaint many times. Whirl testified that Curtis
Mitchell claimed “surprise” only after Travelers withdrew its defense of
Mitchell.
      Mitchell filed a supplemental brief on December 5, 2022, claiming its
motion was based on Mitchell not authorizing the dismissal of the cross-
complaint. The brief did not mention section 473, subdivision (d) or contend
that the judgment was “void.”

                                       11
      DeHaro and Bradley filed supplemental briefs opposing Mitchell’s
motion. Bradley also sought judicial notice of a May 2020 report of the
California Senate Judiciary Committee regarding Assembly Bill 2723, which
amended section 664.6 to provide that a writing agreeing to a settlement may
be enforced under that section if the writing is signed by the attorney, even if
it is not signed by the client. Bradley and DeHaro contended that section
664.6 provided an independent reason to deny Mitchell’s motion.
      Mitchell’s motion to vacate was heard on December 12, 2022. The trial
court stated that Mitchell’s “stretch[ing] the [motion] out this long,” despite
knowing “what was going to happen in the deposition of Ms. Whirl,” was
“close to sanctionable.”
      By written order, the trial court denied Mitchell’s motion to vacate.
The court explained: “The motion is based on the claim that Mitchell
president Curtis Mitchell was ‘surprised by the dismissal.’ [Citations.]
However, the deposition of Mitchell’s lawyer has now been taken and it
establishes that she addressed the cross-complaint’s dismissal with Mr.
Mitchell and his company on several occasions, so no surprise was warranted.
[Citations.] In its December 5, 2022, supplemental brief, Mitchell
Engineering shifts focus to a notion that its lawyer was not authorized to
dismiss the cross-complaint. This argument would have more force had Mr.
Mitchell not sat silent while knowing the cross-complaint would be (and then
was) dismissed. [Citations.] Moreover, the dismissal is enforceable under
CCP 664.6.”
      Mitchell filed a timely notice of appeal.

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                               II. DISCUSSION
      A. Section 473, Subdivision (b)
      In the trial court, Mitchell’s briefs relied on section 473, subdivision (b),
and the court ruled that Mitchell was not entitled to relief under that
subdivision. Mitchell’s opening brief in this appeal, however, does not
challenge the court’s ruling as to subdivision (b). Although Mitchell’s reply
brief discusses subdivision (b), Mitchell waived its challenge to the court’s
ruling by not raising the issue in the opening brief. (Tisher v. California
Horse Racing Board (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 349, 361.)
      Even if we were to consider Mitchell’s arguments under section 473,
subdivision (b), Mitchell has not established error. As relevant here, the
subdivision states: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Although Mitchell claims the
dismissal was taken by surprise and excusable neglect, it fails to show that
the trial court’s rejection of its claims was an abuse of discretion. (Sprague v.
County of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 119, 127 [abuse of discretion
review for rulings under section 473, subdivision (b)].)
            1. Surprise
      Mitchell claimed below that the dismissal of its cross-complaint was a
surprise that it did not learn about until July 2022. In this context, surprise
means a “condition or situation in which a party . . . is unexpectedly placed to
his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.” (Credit Managers Assn. v.
National Independent Business Alliance (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173;
see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 611–

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612.) As explained below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting Mitchell’s claim of surprise.
      Despite Curtis Mitchell’s claim, ample evidence supported the trial
court’s conclusion that Whirl “addressed the cross-complaint’s dismissal with
Mr. Mitchell and his company on several occasions, so no surprise was
warranted.” As shown by documentary evidence and Whirl’s deposition
testimony, Mitchell was informed of Whirl’s proposal to dismiss the cross-
complaint against Bradley and DeHaro in her December 14, 2021 email, and
her December 21, 2021 status report indicated that she was stipulating to the
settlement and “drop[ping]” Mitchell’s cross-claims. The dismissal, two
weeks later, was therefore not due to a circumstance in which Mitchell was
unexpectedly placed, and which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
      Mitchell argues in its reply brief that Curtis Mitchell was surprised in
the sense that he did not think a dismissal would be entered without his
express consent. However, Whirl’s report on December 21 gave notice to
Mitchell that Whirl was, in fact, dismissing the cross-complaint without its
express consent. Mitchell fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
            2. Excusable Neglect
      Mitchell claimed in the trial court that Whirl’s dismissal of the cross-
complaint without its express consent was excusable neglect. “Excusable
neglect” exists if “ ‘ “a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar
circumstances” might have made the same error.’ ” (Solv-All v. Superior
Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007.) Mitchell fails to show that a
reasonably prudent attorney would have dismissed the cross-complaint
without Mitchell’s express consent.

                                          14
      As Mitchell points out elsewhere in its briefs, an attorney’s act that
impairs a client’s substantial rights—such as dismissing a client’s cross-
complaint—is generally “valid only with [the] client’s express authorization.”
(Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1582, italics
added; see Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 407; Cal. Rules
Prof. Conduct, rule 1.2(a).) In obtaining this authorization, the lawyer must
adequately apprise the client of the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed settlement and dismissal of the claims. (Bice v. Stevens (1958) 160
Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [“[w]ithout his client’s free and intelligent consent, after
full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, an attorney may not
surrender any substantial right of his client; nor may he impair, compromise,
or destroy his client’s cause of action”]; Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rules
1.01(e), 1.4(b), 1.4.1(a)(2).) Here, it is undisputed that Whirl did not obtain
Mitchell’s express authorization to sign the Stipulation or file the request for
dismissal, and Mitchell’s mere silence in the face of Whirl’s December 14 and
December 21 communications did not constitute express authorization.3

3       In her emails, declaration, and deposition, Whirl stated that a
Travelers claims adjuster agreed to the dismissal of Mitchell’s cross-
complaint, suggesting that Mitchell’s consent was thus unneeded. A client’s
consent to a settlement may not be required where the client’s insurance
policy gives the insurer the right to settle within policy limits without such
consent. (See, e.g., Fiege v. Cooke (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1353
[settlement enforceable under section 664.6 even though clients did not agree
to it in writing or orally before the trial court, where “insurers fully cover the
settlement under a policy that gives them the right to settle without the
insureds’ consent”]; Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2003) 109
Cal.App.4th 918, 920 [where policy grants the insurer the duty to defend and
the right to settle any claim within policy limits, the insurer need not obtain
the insured’s consent before settling].) The parties here, however, do not
argue that the Travelers policy gave Travelers that right, let alone that
Travelers had the right to authorize the dismissal of Mitchell’s affirmative
claims in its cross-complaint.

                                        15
      In its reply brief, Mitchell contends Whirl’s neglect was excusable
because her “pattern of interactions with her client falsely but reasonably
gave her the impression that she had authority to sign the Dismissal.”
According to Mitchell, it would regularly respond to Whirl’s emails but gave
no response to her email about the proposed dismissal. In stark contrast to
its argument elsewhere that a lawyer must obtain express authorization from
the client to compromise the client’s substantial rights, Mitchell urges that,
as a result, “Whirl reasonably believed that Mr. Mitchell’s silence represented
his approval of her dismissal of the cross-complaint.” Mitchell provides no
authority that a lawyer’s failure to obtain express authorization to dismiss a
claim is excusable as long as the lawyer thought authorization-by-silence was
sufficient. In any event, he fails to establish error. (See Huh v. Wang (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419 [“The inexcusable neglect of an attorney is
usually not a proper basis for granting the client's motion under section
473.”]; Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258
(Zamora) [“the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief
from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could
have made,’ ” and “ ‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care,
such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not
therefore excusable”].)
            3. Untimeliness
      Even if there was surprise or excusable neglect, application for relief
under section 473, subdivision (b) must be “made within a reasonable time, in
no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or
proceeding was taken.” (§ 473, subd. (b); italics added.) Although the trial
court did not rule whether the motion was timely, DeHaro and Bradley
argued untimeliness in their opposition, and we may uphold the court’s

                                       16
ruling on any correct ground supported by the record. (ASP Properties
Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1268.) Thus, we
independently uphold the denial of Mitchell’s motion under subdivision (b) for
untimeliness.
      Here, the dismissal was entered on January 5, 2022. Mitchell did not
apply for relief until nearly six months later, by ex parte application on June
29, 2022, and by noticed motion on July 1, 2022. Even though Mitchell filed
its motion within the six month limit established by section 473, subdivision
(b), it still must show reasonable diligence. (Arega v. Bay Area Rapid Transit
Dist. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 308, 316 [“What constitutes a ‘reasonable time’
depends on the circumstances of each case ‘but definitely requires a showing
of diligence in making the motion after the discovery of the default’ ”];
Younessi v. Woolf (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145 [diligence requirement
not satisfied without evidence explaining seven week delay in moving to set
aside dismissal].) Mitchell does not show that it filed its motion to vacate
within a reasonable time.
      In its reply brief, Mitchell argues that its motion was timely because it
was “not fully informed that the Dismissal was executed and filed until June
3, 2022.” Substantial evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Mitchell’s
counsel knew of the judgment of dismissal on the day it was filed, since she
filed the request for dismissal. Even if this knowledge is not imputed to
Mitchell, the evidence indicated that Whirl informed Curtis Mitchell that she
was going to dismiss the cross-complaint several weeks before she did so and
informed him of the dismissal multiple times thereafter, including in at least
two conversations she had with him when preparing for his deposition. In
April 2022, for example, Mitchell questioned why Bradley was no longer in

                                       17
the case, and Whirl explained the reasons for the dismissal. Mitchell does
not explain why it took until July 2022 to file a noticed motion.
      Nor does Mitchell address the fact that, by the time it got around to
claiming the dismissal was entered without its authorization, Plaintiffs’
litigation was over: Mitchell had already settled with Plaintiffs, and DeHaro
and Bradley—who were given no clue that Mitchell might later protest the
dismissal—had long believed their participation in the case was over. A
reasonable inference is that Mitchell was not sufficiently diligent in seeking
relief. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to vacate the
dismissal under section 473, subdivision (b).
      B. Section 473, Subdivision (d)
      Mitchell contends the trial court erred by denying relief under section
473, subdivision (d), because Whirl was not authorized to dismiss the cross-
complaint. The argument is unavailing.
            1. Forfeiture
      Issues not raised in the trial court generally cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, although we may consider “ ‘a pure question of law
which is presented on undisputed facts.’ ” (In re Marriage of Hinds (1988)
205 Cal.App.3d 1398, 1403.)
      Here, Mitchell’s notice of motion and memorandum of points and
authorities in the trial court did not refer to subdivision (d) of section 473.
Mitchell’s second amended notice of the motion, filed over two months later,
did add subdivision (d) as a ground for the motion, noting relief under that
subdivision may be granted to set aside a void judgment or order. The second
amended notice, however, was served after DeHaro and Bradley filed their
initial oppositions to the motion and was ostensibly providing notice of a new
hearing date. Moreover, Mitchell’s supplemental brief, filed after the second

                                        18
amended notice, did not mention section 473, subdivision (d) or include any
argument that subdivision (d) applied or that the dismissal was “void.”
      In most cases, an appellant cannot contend that the trial court erred by
rejecting an argument the appellant had not raised in its briefing to that
court. We will proceed to the merits here, however, because a party may
raise a new legal theory on appeal based on facts considered by the trial court
(Ward v. Taggert (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742), Mitchell’s attorney made a
passing reference to subdivision (d) at the hearing, and (as shown below) the
case law on vacating an order or judgment for lack of client authorization is
not always clear on the statutory basis or theory justifying relief.
             2. Merits
      Section 473, subdivision (d), states: “The court may, upon motion of the
injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or
orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and
may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any
void judgment or order.” (Italics added.) When reviewing an order denying
relief under section 473, subdivision (d), we consider de novo whether the
judgment is void and, if it is, determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in deciding not to set it aside. (Nixon Peabody LLP v. Superior
Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 818, 822 (Nixon Peabody); Cruz v. Fagor
America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495–496 (Cruz); Pittman v. Beck
Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020–1021 (Pittman); but
cf. Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 1013, 1021–1024 [questioning whether discretion exists where a
default judgment was entered in violation of the trial court’s fundamental
jurisdiction].)

                                       19
      Mitchell contends he is entitled to relief under section 473, subdivision
(d) because the dismissal of its cross-claims by its attorney without its
express consent was void. But the dismissal appears to be voidable, rather
than void. As a result, it is not clear that Mitchell may obtain relief under
subdivision (d). It is, however, clear that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to set aside the dismissal. We therefore reject
Mitchell’s contention regardless of whether the dismissal was void for
purposes of section 473, subdivision (d).
                   a. Voidable, Not Void
      A judgment is void if the trial court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental
sense, as where it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, or granted relief the court had no power to
grant. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653,
660 (American Contractors); Estate of Buck (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1846, 1854;
Neumann v. Melgar (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 152, 164.) If the court has
fundamental jurisdiction but exceeds its jurisdiction by acting contrary to its
statutory duties, the judgment is merely voidable, not void. (American
Contractors, at p. 660; In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56.)
And a judgment that is merely voidable is not subject to section 473,
subdivision (d). (Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 495; Johnson v. E-Z Ins.
Brokerage, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 86, 99 (Johnson) [section 473,
subdivision (d) did not apply because the judgment, entered due to the court
erroneously awarding terminating sanctions ex parte, was voidable, rather
than void]; Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 565 (Lee) [no relief under
section 473, subdivision (d), because a default and default judgment were
voidable rather than void].)

                                        20
      Here, Mitchell does not contend the trial court lacked fundamental
jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. Nor does it dispute that
the court had the power to enter a dismissal pursuant to a request for
dismissal that appeared valid on its face. As such, Mitchell has not
demonstrated that the dismissal is void rather than voidable. To the
contrary, while at times urging that the dismissal is void, Mitchell also states
in its opening brief that “dismissals based upon unauthorized settlements are
voidable and subject to being vacated.” (Italics added.)
      In our view, a judgment entered pursuant to a settlement and request
for dismissal that were not authorized by the client would be voidable, not
void. This is consistent with the well-established distinction between matters
that are “void” as opposed to “voidable,” which limits the term “void” to
decrees for which the court lacked fundamental jurisdiction. (E.g., American
Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 660; In re Marriage of Goddard, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 56; Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 495; Johnson, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 99; Lee, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 565.) It also comports
with common sense and the public policies favoring settlement and the
finality of judgments. If an unauthorized judgment is voidable, the judgment
can be set aside at the client’s option, leaving it to the client to decide
whether to seek relief or to ratify the unauthorized settlement agreement and
accept the judgment. If an authorized judgment were void, then it would be a
nullity, subject to being set aside by any party—including an opposing party
with buyer’s remorse regardless of the client’s wishes and interests. (Cf.
Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 929–930 [void
contract is without legal effect, is a nullity, binds no one, and can neither be
validated nor ratified; a voidable contract is one where a party may elect to
avoid the legal relations created by the contract or ratify it].)

                                        21
      That said, relevant caselaw has not clearly delineated whether a
judgment entered pursuant to an unauthorized settlement is void or voidable,
or whether it is section 473, subdivision (d) or some other source of authority
that may provide the client relief.
      For example, consistent with our view is the oft-cited Whittier Union
High School Dist. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 504 (Whittier
Union). There, an attorney settled his clients’ case for $30,000 without their
consent, forging their signatures, dismissing their claims, and pocketing the
money. The trial court set aside the dismissal of their claims under section
473. (Id. at p. 506.) The defendant filed a writ petition seeking to vacate that
order, arguing that the application for relief was not made within six months
from the judgment. The court of appeal denied the petition, explaining: “If
[the attorney] wholly lacked power to dismiss the cause and acted beyond the
scope of his authority in dismissing his clients’ complaint, his action
remained voidable for an indeterminate period, and his clients could vacate
the unauthorized dismissal within a reasonable time after learning of it,
regardless of the time limitations in section 473.” (Id. at pp. 507–508; italics
added.)
      Whittier Union did not rely on section 473, subdivision (d), but it did
suggest that Mitchell is not entitled to relief under that provision. Even if
Whirl lacked the power to dismiss the cross-complaint, the judgment would
be merely voidable pursuant to Whittier Union. As a result, section 473,
subdivision (d), by its terms, would not apply.4 (Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th

4
      Furthermore, under Whittier Union, Mitchell had to seek to vacate the
dismissal “within a reasonable time after learning of it.” (Whittier Union,
supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 508.) As we have noted, it was within the trial
court’s discretion to conclude that Mitchell’s motion was not timely.

                                       22
at p. 495; Johnson, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 99; Lee, supra, 168
Cal.App.4th at pp. 565–566.)
      Other cases cited by Mitchell granted clients relief from dismissals
entered without their consent, but they too did not construe the dismissals as
“void” or rely on section 473, subdivision (d). (E.g., Bowden v. Green (1982)
128 Cal.App.3d 65, 70, 73–74; Bice v. Stevens, supra, 160 Cal.App.2d at pp.
225, 233–234.)
      The exception is Romadka v. Hoge (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1231
(Romadka). There, an attorney had mistakenly dismissed the clients’ case
with prejudice, rather than without prejudice as the clients had instructed.
The clients moved to vacate the dismissal under section 473. The attorney
admitted the mistake, but the trial court denied the motion. (Id. at p. 1234.)
The court of appeal reversed, ordering that the dismissal be entered without
prejudice. Noting the language in section 473, subdivision (d), the court of
appeal ruled that “[a]n attorney’s unauthorized disposition of clients’
substantive rights is invalid and a judgment based thereon is therefore void.”
(Id. at p. 1236.)5

5     Courts have viewed the factual scenario in Romadka as presenting an
issue of attorney mistake. (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 259 [citing
Romadka as a case in which a judgment was vacated due to an attorney
mistake]; Brown v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 182, 187 [“The plaintiff in
Romadka was able to obtain relief under section 473 because the voluntary
dismissal was entered by mistake]; see Robinson v. Hiles (1953) 119
Cal.App.2d 666, 668–673 [misunderstanding between attorney and client,
resulting in dismissal of the client’s claims, provided a basis for setting aside
the dismissal under section 473, where the client acted with due diligence
after discovering the attorney’s mistake].) Mistake is a ground for relief
under subdivision (b) of section 473. That ground would not have been
available here because Mitchell did not act with due diligence.

                                       23
      In the end, we need not and do not decide whether an unauthorized
judgment in these circumstances is void (Romadka) or voidable (Whittier), for
two reasons: (1) substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Mitchell
ratified the settlement and dismissal, and thus the dismissal cannot be set
aside; and (2) even if the dismissal is deemed void, the court did not abuse its
discretion under section 473, subdivision (d) in declining to vacate it.
                   b. Ratification
      In response to Mitchell’s argument that Whirl was not authorized to
dismiss the cross-complaint, the trial court concluded: “This argument would
have more force had Mr. Mitchell not sat silent while knowing the cross-
complaint would be (and then was) dismissed.” (Italics added.) The court’s
finding was supported by substantial evidence, including Whirl’s testimony
and documents indicating her many communications with Mitchell before
and after the dismissal was filed.
      The trial court’s finding supports a conclusion that, although Whirl did
not obtain the requisite express authority for the settlement and dismissal,
Mitchell’s failure to lodge an objection and promptly take steps to rectify the
matter constitutes a ratification that precludes relief. “It is well settled that
a client may ratify the unauthorized actions of his attorney.” (Navrides v.
Zurich Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 698, 703; see Blanton v. Womancare, Inc.,
supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 408 [recognizing possibility of ratification]; Rivera v.
Shivers (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 82, 92 [“even an unauthorized act by an
attorney concerning substantial rights can be later ratified by the client and
thus bind him or her”]; Moving Picture etc. Union v. Glasgow Theaters, Inc.
(1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 395, 403 [although an attorney has no power to bind its
client to settlement without specific authorization, the attorney’s act is
binding on the client if the client “ratifies it or accepts the benefits of the

                                         24
attorney’s acts”].) Ratification may occur where the client fails to lodge
prompt disagreement with his or her attorney’s action. (NORCAL Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Newton (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 79 [client’s failure to take
“immediate action to express dissatisfaction with [her attorney’s] arbitration
demand on her behalf . . . constitute[s] a ratification”].) And where the client
has ratified a previously unauthorized act of his or her attorney, there is no
basis for concluding that the resulting dismissal is void or voidable due to the
lack of authorization. (See Rakestraw v. Rodrigues (1972) 8 Cal.3d 67, 73
[effect of ratification, as to some or all persons, “is to treat the act as if
originally authorized”].)6 For this reason alone, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by declining to set aside the dismissal of Mitchell’s cross-claims.
                    c. Even if Void, No Abuse of Discretion
      Even if the dismissal was not authorized or ratified, and even if it was
void under section 473, subdivision (d), the statute gives the trial court
discretion to decide whether the judgment should be set aside. (Romadka,
supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1237; see Nixon Peabody, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th
at p. 822; Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 495–496; Pittman, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1020–1021.) Mitchell fails to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion.
      Romadka ultimately shows why Mitchell is not entitled to relief under
section 473, subdivision (d). In Romadka, after concluding the judgment was

6     Mitchell contends that “[c]ase law involving a client’s acquiescence is
only persuasive when the client is present at the time the attorney makes the
unauthorized act,” citing People v. Jordan (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 597. Mitchell
does not cite a specific page in Jordan that supports this proposition, and we
could find nothing in Jordan to support it. Jordan concluded that a client
had acquiesced to his counsel’s act while standing in his presence, but did not
suggest that ratification is impossible if the client was not in the attorney’s
presence. (Id. at p. 599.)

                                          25
void, the court of appeal considered whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying relief. Because the client’s counsel had submitted a
declaration admitting that she acted without authority and by mistake, and
there was no basis for the trial court to disbelieve this evidence, the court of
appeal found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the clients’
motion to vacate the dismissal with prejudice. (Romadka, supra, 232
Cal.App.3d at p. 1237.)
      Here, by contrast, Whirl did not admit that Mitchell lacked knowledge
or that Whirl made a mistake checking a box on a dismissal form. Instead,
her position—supported by substantial evidence—was that Mitchell knew or
should have known that the dismissal was going to be entered, and that
Mitchell knew about the entry of the dismissal well before Mitchell sought to
vacate it. The trial court found her position to be true. This case is therefore
distinguishable from Romadka, as well as other cases in which an attorney
acted unilaterally on the client’s behalf without notifying the client at all.
(See Whittier Union, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 509 [lack of authority must
be shown by “strong and convincing proof, and the longer the delay in the
application for relief the stronger and more convincing the factual proof
should be;” “[w]hen nothing more than client misunderstanding or client
change of heart is involved, the propriety of such relief is doubtful”].)
      Other circumstances also supported the trial court’s refusal to grant
relief. As we have discussed, Mitchell did not file a motion until nearly six
months after the entry of the dismissal even though there is substantial
evidence that Curtis Mitchell found out about the dismissal months earlier.
Even accepting Mitchell’s claim that it lacked full knowledge of the dismissal
until June 3, 2022, Mitchell did not bring the matter to the attention of the
trial court (or Bradley or DeHaro) for weeks, after it had settled with

                                        26
Plaintiffs and the case was essentially over. Indeed, on June 13, 2022,
Mitchell (through new counsel) asked the court to continue the trial, without
mentioning any concerns about the validity of its settlements with Bradley
and DeHaro.
       In sum, whether or not the judgment of dismissal may be deemed void
due to Whirl’s failure to obtain Mitchell’s express consent to its entry,
Mitchell fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
relief.7
                                III. DISPOSITION
       The order is affirmed.

7
      According to respondents, Mitchell’s argument that Whirl lacked
authority to dismiss the cross-complaint is unavailing due to Assembly Bill
2723 (AB 2723), which became effective on January 1, 2021, before the
Stipulation in this case. AB 2723 amended section 664.6, such that a
settlement agreement may be enforced under that section even if the
agreement is signed only by a party’s attorney and not by the party itself.
The amendment explicitly overturned Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10
Cal.4th 578, 586, which had interpreted section 664.6 to require the
signature of the litigants themselves because attorneys must obtain
settlement authorization from their clients. As respondents point out, a
Senate Judiciary Committee Report states that the amendment was intended
to “explicitly grant[] the authority to stipulate to settlements to attorneys, on
behalf of the parties they represent,” to “streamline this process in order to
meet the goals of efficiency and economy.” The enforcement of the
Stipulation under the streamlined process of section 664.6, however, is not at
issue here, and we question the relevance of AB 2723 to this appeal. But we
need not and do not reach the issue, because we affirm the trial court’s order
on other grounds.

                                       27
                                          CHOU, J.
We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J.

W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering / A167137

                                     28
A167137 / W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering

Trial Court:City & County of San Francisco Superior Court

Trial Judge:     Richard B. Ulmer Jr.

Counsel:   Sellar Hazard & Lucia; Christian Lucia, Ganette Mary-Marie
Genetti, Justin Michael Graham, and Peter Keith Pritchard for Appellants.

Rankin, Shuey, Mintz, Lampasona & Harper; Kevin R. Mintz, Nima B.
Aminian, The Aguilera Law Group; Raymond E. Brown for Respondents.

                                     29