Court Opinion

ID: 9775249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:51:44.702584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:24.014053
License: Public Domain

AKIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the burden was upon the plaintiff in the trial court to assert contractual consent to jurisdiction in Texas, but rather under rule 120a the burden of proof was upon the nonresident defendant to establish lack of amenability of service of process issued by a Texas court. Neither can I agree that plaintiff waived contractual consent to jurisdiction in Texas because of its failure to plead this ground because Tex.R.Civ.P. 120a places the burden upon the defendant to establish lack of amenability to process rather than the validity of the process issued and served. Additionally, the consent to jurisdiction was before the court by way of defendant’s evidence, which was specifically read to the court by counsel. Accordingly, I must dissent.
The real question is whether a nonresident defendant may prove the invalidity of the process issued and served as distinguished from lack of amenability to Texas process. In my view, insufficiency of plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations in his petition affects the validity of process rather than amenability to process under rule 120a. Consequently, I do agree with the majority’s analysis approving the position of Professor Thode with respect to rule 120a and their comment that if the question was one of first impression, they would adhere to Professor Thode’s analysis of rule 120a, which view was cited with approval by the supreme court in McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex.1965), although that case concerned defective process rather than amenability. Furthermore, the supreme court in McKanna reversed the default judgment but remanded so that the nonresident defendant could answer and defend on the merits under rule 122.
I disagree with the majority, however, in following cases incorrectly decided by several courts of civil appeals. Those courts misread McKanna and held that under rule 120a the plaintiff had the burden of pleading facts which would sustain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, rather than addressing the language of rule 120a, which establishes that the nonresident defendant must show lack of amenability to process, not merely defective process, at the hearing on his 120a plea.
The most often cited of these erroneously decided cases is Gathers v. Walpace Company, Inc., 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.— Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Gathers, the court recognized rule 120a, but held that the nonresident defendant was not amenable to process in Texas because plaintiff failed to plead facts authorizing issuance of process under the long-arm statute. Thus, that court focused on whether the plaintiff’s petition pleaded facts to invoke the long-arm statute rather than on rule 120a, which requires the nonresident defendant to plead and to prove lack of jurisdiction by a Texas court over his person. The result of that decision was to transfer the burden of proof on a rule 120a motion from the defendant to show that a Texas court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant to the plaintiff to plead and prove jurisdictional facts under the long-arm statute.
In my view, this holding is contrary to the language of rule 120a, which in pertinent part states:
*435Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 121, 122 and 123, a special appearance may be made by any party either in person or by attorney for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such party or property is not amenable to process issued by the court of this State. [Emphasis added]
The Gathers’ court, as well as several others, fails to give effect to the literal language of rule 120a, which requires the nonresident defendant to show lack of amenability to process. Where defective process exists, the proper procedure is for the defendant to move to quash. According to rule 122, should the service of process be quashed, “defendant shall be deemed to have entered his appearance at ten o’clock a. m. on the Monday next after the expiration of twenty days after the day on which the citation or service is quashed.” Thus, under the rules, defective process may be cured but lack of amenability to process cannot.
All of these opinions misread McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex.1965), which concerned defective process rather than amenability. McKanna did not arise on a special appearance but rather as a direct attack by writ of error from a default judgment against a nonresident. The supreme court held that the record must affirmatively show jurisdiction, and because the jurisdictional allegations were insufficient, no jurisdiction was shown. That court noted with approval Professor Thode’s article and, consistent with Professor Thode’s article, remanded the case for trial under rule 123, which provides that when a judgment is reversed “because of defective service of process, no new citation shall be issued or served, but the defendant shall be presumed to have entered his appearance to the term of court at which mandate was filed.” Id. at 930.
Unfortunately, the erroneously decided courts of civil appeals cases cited in the majority’s opinion, such as Gathers, have misapplied McKanna to lack of amenability under rule 120a rather than confining that holding to defective process situations. By misapplying McKanna to special appearances under rule 120a, those courts have authorized dismissal if the nonresident defendant challenges plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdiction at the special appearance hearing, contrary to McKanna. At least, to be consistent with McKanna, those courts should have remanded so that the plaintiff could amend his pleadings to cure any irregularity, thus placing upon the nonresident defendant his proper burden of showing lack of amenability under rule 120a.
Although I agree that the law should be certain where possible, I cannot intellectually agree to follow decisions of courts of civil appeals, which have misread a supreme court decision, as well as the clear language of rule 120a. Instead, I would adhere to Professor Thode’s analysis of rule 120a, overrule this court’s opinion in Castle v. Berg, 415 S.W.2d 523, 526 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas 1967, no writ), and expressly decline to follow the other decisions set forth in the majority opinion which misread McKanna and rule 120a. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in Henslee v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600, 69 S.Ct. 290, 293, 93 L.Ed. 259, 264 (1948): “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”