Court Opinion

ID: 8770338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 12:41:42.105552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:10.957584
License: Public Domain

SEAMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). I cannot concur in the af-firmance of this judgment, as I believe the operation of the Belt Company described in the record is not within the meaning of the safety appliance act. It clearly appears that this company was an independent railroad within the city, engaged only in transferring cars (loaded or unloaded) from the terminal of one trunk line in Chicago to that of another trunk line; that it had no part in the shipment of any commodities which were upon the cars, nor interest in shipping bills or rates charged, nor concern in their ultimate destination and delivery to consignee; that its only service involved herein was the transfer of cars over its own lines, from one terminal to the other in Chicago, when the cars were delivered to it by a trunk line to be so transferred, for which service the Belt Company was paid by the trunk line an arbitrary rate per car, on monthly collections. In such service the Belt Company is neither chargeable with notice whether the service of the trunk lines in respect of the cars is interstate commerce or otherwise, nor concerned in such inquiry, as I believe. It was not “engaged in interstate commerce,” as defined in the interstate commerce act, and I *546am of opinion that the two acts are in pari materia, so that the terms of the safety appliance act are inapplicable to the service thus performed by the Belt Company, and the judgment should be reversed.