Court Opinion

ID: 9648633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:31:01.505451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:03.665061
License: Public Domain

PEEPLES, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the denial of the motion for rehearing, but I respectfully disagree with the majority’s criticism of Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1978), in which *357the supreme court interpreted Tex.Educ. Code Ann. § 21.912 (Vernon 1987).1 Frankly, I give the edge to the Barr majority, but even if the Barr dissent had the better argument, the fact remains that the legislature has declined to “correct” any misreading of its statute for 14 years. Recently the court revalidated Barr in Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.1987). The court pointed out that the legislature, far from disagreeing with school immunity for negligence as interpreted in Barr, had broadened its reach. Id. at 618-19. In the years since Hopkins the legislature has again adopted the immunity provisions of § 21.912 by reference. See, e.g., Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 21.935(a), 105.95(e)(1) (Vernon 1991 & Supp.1992).
Justice Biery recommends that the legislature allow suits against individual school teachers and administrators for ordinary negligence. I do not join in that recommendation. I will concede that in our vast education system, which involves millions of students, there will be scattered instances in which the negligence of teachers and administrators causes a student real injury. The case before us may be one of them. But if the immunity for ordinary negligence is abolished, how will courts weed out, short of trial, suits brought for less appropriate reasons? Negligence is an expansive concept that can touch all aspects of human relations.2 Courts seldom grant or affirm summary judgments in negligence cases.
A statute making it easier for students to sue teachers and administrators would pit them against each other, diverting money, time, and mental effort from education to litigation. Schools would pay a high price when those involved in litigation (and perhaps their colleagues) gave depositions instead of lectures; produced documents instead of learning; attended trials instead of classes; listened to legal advice instead of student reports. While the lawsuit inched its way toward trial, the matter would occupy the minds of everyone, diverting attention and mental energy from the education task at hand. To buy peace and settle a lawsuit might be viewed as a concession of fault. Either way — settlement or trial — the student body would gossip about the lawsuit. The authority of all educators would be undermined. We would read more articles asking why Johnny can’t read, and whether our students have fallen farther behind the Japanese. Teachers might wonder why they took up teaching instead of law; volunteers — who presumably would also have become liable when § 21.935(a) was amended — would regret their decision to give something back to the community.
The last thing our schools need is damage suits based on ordinary negligence when our state is having trouble funding public education in the first place. See, e.g., Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.1989). True, the number of such suits per capita might be small, and perhaps they would seldom succeed. Nevertheless, even though the teacher or administrator might ultimately be vindicated in court, our schools can ill afford the dollar costs of defending the modern-day lawsuit.
Counsel for plaintiffs admitted at oral argument that under his interpretation of the statute — which is recommended to the legislature — a student could sue a physical education teacher who made the class do too many pushups and caused him to throw up. That admission demonstrates the legislature’s wisdom in leaving the supreme *358court s interpretation of the statute in Barr untouched.

. The statute has been held constitutional. See Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907, 108 S.Ct. 1082, 99 L.Ed.2d 241 (1988).

. For example, it is not clear to me how far Texas has gone in adopting the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but the language in some cases is broad. See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.1987) (broad language approving cause of action for negligent infliction of mental anguish; theory applied to parents' claim for negligent handling of corpse).