Court Opinion

ID: 9722339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:26:16.979391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:34.319467
License: Public Domain

STRANKMAN, J.
I dissent. While I share my colleagues’ concern with the analysis in In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522 [159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549], I do not share their willingness to extend it. No legal authority requires a lower court to accept as binding comments made by a higher court that are beyond the factual controversy presented to it. Simply put, Eric J. decided a case involving a felony and a misdemeanor, not a succession of misdemeanors. Justice Clark’s opinion does not reach the question presented to us.
Whatever is accomplished by the incorporation of the Penal Code adult felony sentencing scheme into the juvenile area through Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, I cannot see how that incorporation prohibits consecutive full misdemeanor terms. As the majority points out, the sen*766tence was permissible had Claude J. been an adult. There is no legal or logical reason for the rule to change when it is applied to a juvenile. Eric J. does not mandate a reduction in term because Claude J. is a juvenile. There is no valid reason for this court to draw a distinction that the Legislature did not make and the Supreme Court did not find.
I would reverse the order granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus and affirm the initial sentence pronounced by the trial court.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 17, 1990.