Court Opinion

ID: 9681183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:45:26.962298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.561231
License: Public Domain

ON appellant’s motion for rehearing
McDONALD, Judge.
In the recent decision of this court in Stoker v. State, 331 S.W. 2d 310, consideration was given to a motion to quash, raising a like question under a like record.
The court has decided that this appellant’s contention should be properly reviewed because of the constitutional question he poses.
Able court-appointed counsel for the appellant predicates his appeal, in his brief and his motion for rehearing, upon the premise that the very able trial judge committed error in including some Negroes on the grand jury that returned the indictment under which appellant was tried and convicted. Counsel for appellant relies on Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, as authority for his contention, and also upon the recent case of Stoker v. State, supra.
In essence, the Cassell cases holds that the constitutional prohibition against discrimination because of color may not be satisfied by Negro representation arbitrarily limited to one. This case further holds that there may be neither inclusion nor exclusion *561because of race and, further, that token representation of a race on a grand jury is not a constitutional requisite — with which premise this court is in full accord.
The Cassell case is not authority for setting aside the indictment herein upon the ground that Negroes were intentionally included.
The appellant here complains that the appointment of a Negro on the jury commission and the inclusion of two Negroes on the grand jury constitute discrimination by the trial court against him as a member of the Negro race.
Appellant makes no contention that the two Negroes on the grand jury that returned the indictment were coerced into returning a true bill or that the grand jury considered and achieved a result different from what might have been had the grand jury contained only white persons.
The only contention made by appellant was that the trial judge admonished the jury commission that they could not ex-elude persons because of race or color; that they could not put on or keep off on account of race; but that, in view of the mandate of this court as expressed in Stoker v. State, supra, the district court of Van Zandt County could no longer operate with Negroes excluded from juries.
The appellant states in his brief that the first bill of indictment was rendered in August 81, 1959, in the district court, charging him with the offense of rape, and that the indictment was returned by a grand jury which had been empaneled under a system that no Negroes were ever called for grand jury duty within the county (the county being Van Zandt).
Subsequent to the decision of this court in the Stoker case, another jury commission containing a Negro selected a grand jury containing two Negroes on the panel. At the January term, 1960, another indictment against the defendant was returned, charging him with the same offense.
It is obvious from the action of the two different grand juries that the appellant fared no better or no worse by virtue of the inclusion of the members of his race on the grand jury.
While the question here presented by appellant for consideration is a novel contention and is no doubt a question or case of *562first impression so far as this court is concerned, and no case is apparently in point, nor has the exact question been heretofore posed, in the case of Winfield v. State, 163 Tex. Cr. R. 445, 293 S.W. 2d 765, the defendant, a man, contended that he had been discriminated against in the selection of the jury that tried him, on account of the failure of the jury commissioners to select women on the panel. The appellant there conceded that he was not a member of the class discriminated against, but he urged the court to hold that any discrimination, if shown, would vitiate the panel.
This court held in the Winfield case that an accused may not urge discrimination against a class of which he is not a member.
This court cited with approval the Alexander case, 160 Tex. Cr. R. 460, 274 S.W. 2d 81. In that case the appellant was a white man. He attacked the indictment, alleging that race discrimination was practiced against one of the Negro race in the organization of the grand jury returning the indictment in his case. He asserted the proposition that the union of which a large portion were Negroes was involved. The defendant was indicted for burglary by discharge of firearms with intent to murder a person who was a member of the company employing union members, whereas the court held that the appellant, not being a member of that race, could not urge discrimination against members of the Negro race.
Since it is definitely established that one not a member of a race or class cannot urge discrimination by the exclusion of members of the race of which he is not a member, the converse of the proposition would certainly be true — that a woman could not be heard to complain that she had been discriminated against because members of her sex were included in the grand jury panel returning the indictment against her, nor could a Negro complain that he had been discriminated against by a grand jury that included members of his race.
After careful consideration of appellant’s contention, the court feels that his position is not tenable.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.