Court Opinion

ID: 9609676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:29:50.693654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:51.630813
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
In my view the trial court was clearly in error in refusing to submit to the jury the issue of whether appellant was guilty of simple possession of heroin as opposed to possession thereof with intent to distribute. Such lesser offense is punishable by imprisonment of not more than two years, or a fine of not more than $5,000, or both. Code section 32-1510.49(d) (1) (1974 Supp.).
It is well settled that where, under the evidence, the accused may be found guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included within the greater crime charged, the court should so instruct the jury, especially where such an instruction has been requested. See State v. Bealin, 201 S. C. 490, 23 S. E. (2d) 746 and State v. Shea, 226 S. C. 501, 85 S. E. (2d) 858. Moreover the defendant, under the circumstances of this case, would have been entitled, if requested, to a charge to the effect that the jury should resolve any reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was guilty of the lesser or the greater offense by finding the defendant guilty of only the lesser offense. State v. King, 158 S. C. 251, 155 S. E. 409; State v. McLaughlin, 208 S. C. 462, 38 S. E. (2d) 492.
The State’s case rested entirely upon circumstantial evidence. The box containing the substance, in which heroin was present, was found in the defendant’s bedroom, between the sheets of her bed, she being not the only occupant of the trailer where she lived. Proof of intent to distribute rested entirely upon inferences to be drawn from the amount of heroin in her constructive possession. The amount of heroin was approximately 2.37 grains, an amount barely sufficient to give rise to a prima facie showing, or a presumption, of intent to distribute. Mere or simple possession is, as a matter of fact, clearly included within the act or offense of possession with intent to distribute.
*318I respectfully submit that the cases of United States v. Johnson, 7 Cir., 506 F. (2d) 305 and Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343, 85 S. Ct. 1004, 13 L. Ed. (2d) 882, relied on in the majority opinion do not support the conclusion therein reached. If we adopt the Federal test, developed under Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for determining when an instruction on a lesser included offense should be given, such test applied to the facts of this case requires a reversal.
The offense of possession with intent to distribute is composed of two factual elements: (1) mere possession; (2) intent to distribute. Intent to distribute is a factual element essential to the greater offense but not to the lesser offense of possession. Such factual element, in the present case, was clearly disputed when the defendant took the stand and denied possession. Plainly, denial of possession is a denial of any intent to distribute since, it is utterly imposible to be guilty of possession with intent to distribute, in the absence of possession. The intent to distribute being clearly a disputed factual element, under the test applied in the Federal courts, the defendant here was clearly entitled to a charge Oh the lesser offense of simple possession.
Other quite serious questions are presented by appellant, but brushed aside as nonmeritorious without any discussion. Most of such questions could be resolved upon a new trial, should they arise, without prejudice to the appellant. Since 1 would order a new trial for the reasons hereinabove set forth, I will not deal, with these issues at length, but I respectfully suggest that they are sufficiently serious to warrant full consideration by those members who would affirm.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the heroin count.
Lewis, J., concurs.