Court Opinion

ID: 9673536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:14:14.910043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.560738
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I concur in the conclusion of the lead opinion that the scope of the risks encompassed by the fireman’s rule does not extend to Gibbons’ claims. The fireman’s rule can fairly be limited to afford a cause of action for injuries sustained as a result of the alleged subsequent gross negligence of an independent third party unconnected to the situation that brought the officer to the scene. Although I recognize this approach limits the rationale of Woods v City of Warren, 439 Mich 186; 482 NW2d 696 (1992), the limitation is appropriate because it affords a remedy for independent and intervening acts that injure an officer while preserving the core rationale of the rule. The logical consequence of defining the rule to extend to “the normal risks of the safety officer’s profession” would mean that even injuries like those allegedly sustained by plaintiff Mariin would be noncompensable although there is no direct relationship between the act that caused the injury and the act that occasioned the officer’s presence. Id. at 196. I write separately to state my belief that, under the particular facts of this case, the fireman’s rule does not *330bar a claim for damages for injuries caused by the subsequent wrongdoing of a third party uninvolved with the original act, where the wrongdoing resulted from wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent behavior. In regard to carelessness or ordinary negligence, however, the fireman’s rule bars the claim.
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When a police officer steps into the roadway to direct oncoming traffic around an accident scene, the officer runs the risk of being struck by a vehicle. This is a normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk of the profession just as it was foreseeable that a disgruntled person would attack Officer Mariin. However, unless we conclude that by virtue of his profession an officer assumes the risk of injury from every irresponsible act, a line must be drawn. Officer Gibbons did not assume the risk of being injured by a subsequent wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent act of a third party by virtue of the fact that he was dispatched to the scene of an automobile accident anymore than he assumed the risk of being intentionally run down by a vindictive driver with a score to settle who happened to pass by as the officer was directing traffic. Therefore, I agree that injury from the alleged wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent behavior of defendant Caraway, where Caraway was uninvolved with the original act of negligence and where her alleged misconduct occurred after the officer arrived at the scene, was not a “normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk[] of the chosen profession.” Kreski v Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co, 429 Mich 347, 372; 415 NW2d 178 (1987).
*331limiting this exception to acts of wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent misconduct also appropriately balances the policy concerns underlying the rule. Emergency situations and conditions such as those Officer Gibbons encountered are replete with distractions. At this particular accident site, during evening rush hour traffic, one police cruiser and two tow trucks were at the scene with emergency lights flashing, two vehicles involved in the original accident were disabled, debris was being swept from the roadway, and Officer Gibbons was standing with a flashlight in the intersection directing traffic in conjunction with an operating traffic light.1 Faced with these circumstances, it is not unusual for traffic to come to a sudden stop or for cars to swerve to avoid obstructions in the roadway. Although arguably negligent, such activity is a foreseeable risk of an officer’s profession and, indeed, is often the very reason for which officers are dispatched to the scene of an accident. Officers are trained at taxpayer expense to handle these very situations. Under the circumstances of this case, public policy considerations support shielding citizens from a damage claim for injuries suffered by an officer as a result of the carelessness or ordinary negligence of an individual. They do not support shielding citizens from damage claims for injuries arising from their reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct.
This result also addresses the contention that the fireman’s rule places officers at a disadvantage when *332compared to the ordinary citizen. It is true that the ordinary citizen has a remedy for injuries inflicted through ordinary negligence as well as gross negligence. The average citizen may also be sued for injuries caused through simple or gross negligence. In contrast, police officers are immunized from liability by state statute unless their conduct is grossly negligent, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), and are not liable under federal law for injuries caused by ordinary or gross negligence that does not involve a violation of a statute or a clearly established constitutional right.2 Moreover, it has not been disputed here that even where liability is individually imposed, the governmental employer actually pays the judgment. Thus, while the nature of the police officer’s employment exposes him to risks for which compensation in damages is not available, the Legislature has determined that the nature of the employment justifies shielding the employee against exposure to liability for negligently inflicted injury. Arguments regarding adjustments to the rights and responsibilities of police and safety officers should be directed to the Legislature.
*333To summarize, although I believe Officer Gibbons is barred from seeking damages for the carelessness or ordinary negligence of defendant Caraway, I also believe that the same public policy considerations that supported the adoption of the fireman’s rule do not support insulating Caraway from liability for her alleged wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent behavior. Since the rule is not “a license to act with impunity,”3 it should not shield individuals from the consequences of their reckless acts. Rather, the rule was designed, in part, to protect citizens from incurring multiple costs for those acts that themselves created the need for public protection services.4
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Michigan’s fireman’s rule bars tort claims by safety officers against persons whose negligence created the reason for the officer’s presence and for injuries stemming from the normal risks of the officer’s profession. Kreski, supra at 372; Woods, supra at 196. While the alleged reckless, wanton, and grossly negligent conduct of defendant Caraway is not shielded from liability under the rule, mere negligence or carelessness on the part of a third party, which takes place after the safety officer arrives at the scene of the original incident and which is unconnected to the original incident, does not, in my opinion, under the particular facts of this case, create an exception to the fireman’s rule. Consistent with this opinion, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision in regard to the fireman’s rule in Gibbons. In all other respects, I concur with the lead opinion.
*334Brickley, j., concurred with Boyle, J.

 For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the facts as alleged in plaintiff’s complaint and in deposition testimony are true. Any disputes regarding factual issues should be resolved by the trial court on remand.

 See Michigan’s governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107) (liability against government employees will be barred unless their conduct is grossly negligent); Nemeckay v Rule, 894 F Supp 310 (ED Mich, 1995) (government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from civil liability where their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights); Lewellen v Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co, Tenn, 34 F3d 345 (CA 6, 1994) (injury caused by negligence does not constitute deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest for purposes of 42 USC 1983); Hickey v Zezulka (On Resubmission), 439 Mich 408, 428; 487 NW2d 106 (1992) (negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference for purposes of 42 USC 1983); Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540; 410 NW2d 749 (1987), aff’d Will v Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 US 58; 109 S Ct 2304; 105 L Ed 2d 45 (1989) (a state official sued in his official capacity for retroactive relief is not a “person” for purposes of a damage suit under §.1983).

 Kreski, supra at 372.

 Id. at 366.