Court Opinion

ID: 9382548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 00:00:44.827532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.121009
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10171         Document: 00516690726            Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/27/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                          March 27, 2023
                                        No. 22-10171                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk

   Ladarius Johnson; Irma Lopez; Pedro Lopez; Terry
   Bracey; Roshawn Polite; Brandi West; Brittny Arrieta,

                                                                  Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                             versus

   Tyson Foods, Incorporated,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellee.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 2:21-CV-156

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Haynes, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          In this appeal, seven individuals (“Plaintiffs”) who allegedly
   contracted COVID-19 while working at Tyson Foods’s (“Tyson”)
   meatpacking plant in Amarillo, Texas, challenge the district court’s dismissal
   of their common-law negligence claims. Because Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to
   satisfy the requirements of Texas’s Pandemic Liability Protection Act

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10171     Document: 00516690726           Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/27/2023

                                    No. 22-10171

   (“PLPA”), and Plaintiffs have provided no basis to amend their complaint,
   we AFFIRM.
                               I.     Background
          Plaintiffs worked at Tyson’s meatpacking plant during the onset of the
   COVID-19 pandemic and allegedly contracted the virus “because of the
   unsafe working conditions at the Amarillo, Texas facility.” Three weeks
   after Texas adopted the PLPA, Plaintiffs filed suit in Texas state court,
   asserting negligence claims against Tyson for its failure to implement
   appropriate safety measures during the height of the pandemic.
          In   their   complaint,    Plaintiffs    aver   that     Tyson    flouted
   recommendations and protocols intended to mitigate the spread of COVID-
   19. They allege, inter alia, that Tyson (1) required its employees to continue
   in-person work after Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s April 2, 2020, “stay-at-
   home order”; (2) declined to implement COVID-19 guidelines set forth by
   the World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control and
   Prevention; (3) failed to provide personal protective equipment, implement
   social distancing, and provide adequate medical treatment to workers at the
   plant; and (4) required individuals infected with COVID-19 to continue
   working. These decisions allegedly caused over 7000 employees nationwide
   to contract the virus and resulted in twenty-four deaths.
          Tyson removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss
   under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In its motion, Tyson
   contended that Plaintiffs’ claims were proscribed by the PLPA and that their
   allegations of causation were otherwise conclusory. Tyson further asserted
   that Plaintiffs’ claims were expressly preempted by the Federal Meat
   Inspection Act (“FMIA”), conflict-preempted by the Defense Production

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                                          No. 22-10171

   Act (“DPA”), and barred by the DPA’s immunity provision.1 The district
   court agreed. It dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims and declined their request for
   leave to amend, explaining that Plaintiffs had not offered a proposed
   amendment and that, regardless, the recent enactment of the PLPA was an
   inadequate basis for amendment since Plaintiffs filed suit weeks after it was
   adopted. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                     II.     Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
          The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and this
   court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s
   grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506
   (5th Cir. 2012), and denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, Smith v.
   EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004).
                                   III.      Discussion
          Although Plaintiffs filed their complaint in Texas state court, which
   applies a more “lenient” pleading standard, federal pleading standards
   control upon removal. Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 617 (5th
   Cir. 2018). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
   complaint’s allegations must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
   true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
   556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
   The facts pled must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that
   the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While we “constru[e]
   all reasonable inferences” in the “light most favorable to the plaintiff,” we
   do “not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual

          1
            Because we conclude Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the PLPA, we need
   not reach the issues of FMIA and DPA preemption or immunity.

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                                           No. 22-10171

   inferences, or legal conclusions.” White v. U.S. Corr., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302,
   306–07 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
   A.      Motion to Dismiss
           In Texas, the PLPA governs pandemic-related negligence claims.2
   The PLPA, enacted on June 14, 2021, shields corporations3 from liability for
   “exposing an individual to a pandemic disease during a pandemic emergency
   unless” claimants satisfy two requirements. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
   § 148.003(a).4 First, the statute requires claimants to demonstrate that the
   defendant “knowingly failed” to do one of two things: (1) warn of or
   remediate a condition that it knew was likely to result in exposure to the
   disease, or (2) “comply with government-promulgated standards, guidance,
   or protocols intended to lower the likelihood of exposure.”                          Id.
   § 148.003(a)(1)(A)–(B).            Second, claimants must establish “reliable
   scientific evidence,” which “shows the failure . . . was the cause in fact of the
   individual contracting the disease.” Id. § 148.003(a)(1)–(2).
           1.        Knowing Failure to Warn, Remediate, or Implement
           To determine what the pleading should have included, we analyze the
   necessary facts as described in the statute.                The PLPA provides two
   approaches for establishing the first prong, each of which show that the
   claimant would need to plead the date or timeframe of exposure. Under the
   knowing failure to warn or remediate approach, the claimant must

           2
               The parties do not dispute that the PLPA applies here.
           3
             The term “person” used in the statute includes corporations. See Coming
   Attractions Bridal & Formal, Inc. v. Tex. Health Res., 595 S.W.3d 659, 662–63 (Tex. 2020)
   (explaining Texas’s definition of the term “person” in statutes).
           4
             The statute applies “to an action commenced on or after March 13, 2020, for
   which a judgment has not become final before the effective date of” the Act. Act of June
   14, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 528, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws, S.B. 6, § 5(a).

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   demonstrate that the defendant “(i) had control over the condition; (ii) knew
   that the individual was more likely than not to come into contact with [it];
   and (iii) had a reasonable opportunity and ability to remediate” or warn of
   the condition “before the individual came into contact with” it.                           Id.
   § 148.003(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Similarly, to establish a “knowing
   failure to implement,” the claimant must show that (i) the company had a
   “reasonable opportunity and ability to implement or comply with the
   standards,” (ii) the company refused or flagrantly disregarded the standards,
   and (iii) the government-promulgated standards “did not, on the date that the
   individual was exposed to the disease, conflict with” then-existing or other
   “government-promulgated standards, guidance, or protocols that the
   [corporation] implemented.”              Id. § 148.003(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
   Therefore, to plausibly allege that Tyson had an opportunity to warn,
   remediate, or implement government-promulgated standards “before” or
   “on the date” of exposure, we conclude that the Plaintiffs’ pleading must
   provide the date of contact with the virus.
           Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege any dates of exposure. It merely
   asserts that Plaintiffs were “required to continue working at the Tyson
   meatpacking plant in Amarillo, Texas” after the April 2, 2020, “stay-at-
   home order”5 and that each plaintiff contracted COVID-19 as a result of the

           5
             In any event, the purported “stay-at-home order” exempted meatpacking plants.
   Governor Abbott’s Executive Order GA-14, effective April 2, 2020, mandated that “every
   person in Texas shall, except where necessary to provide or obtain essential services, minimize
   social gatherings and minimize in-person contact with people who are not in the same
   household.” Tex. Gov. Greg Abbott, Executive Order GA-14 2 (Mar. 31, 2020),
   https://bit.ly/3e5pTLt (emphasis added). The Order defines “essential services” as
   “everything listed” by DHS in its “Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure
   Workforce, Version 2.0.” Id. at 3. This guidance deemed “[f]ood manufacturer employees
   and their supplier employees,” including “those employed in . . . livestock, poultry, [and]
   seafood slaughter facilities processing facilities” essential. CISA, Advisory Memorandum
   on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response

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                                           No. 22-10171

   unsafe conditions.         Although these allegations suggest that Plaintiffs
   contracted the virus at some point in the spring, they do not fix a date from
   which a court could determine whether Tyson had an opportunity to
   remediate the conditions or warn Plaintiffs before they encountered the
   virus, as well as what orders were in place at the time they suffered the
   disease. Plaintiffs’ indeterminate date of exposure is particularly problematic
   under the “knowing failure to implement” approach, which requires an exact
   date so that the court may evaluate the defendant’s compliance with ever-
   shifting government-promulgated protocols.                  Without dates or specific
   timeframes of exposure, Plaintiffs’ allegations falter under the first prong of
   the PLPA.
           2.       Causation
           The PLPA further requires a claimant to submit “reliable scientific
   evidence” showing that the defendant’s failure “was the cause in fact of the
   individual contracting the disease.” § 148.003(a)(2). Under Texas law,
   “cause in fact is essentially but-for causation.” Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.
   v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Tex. 2015). Thus, “a tortious act is
   a cause in fact” only if it was “a substantial factor in causing the
   injury . . . without which the injury would not have occurred.” Id. (citation
   omitted); see also Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 265 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (interpreting Texas’s causation requirement). While it is indisputable that a
   claimant need not offer proof of any element at the pleading stage,6 Plaintiffs

   (Mar.   28,     2020),    https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_
   Guidance_on_the_Essential_Critical_Infrastructure_Workforce_Version_2.0_1.pdf.
   The executive order terminated on April 28, 2020.
           6
             We agree with the Plaintiffs that actual expert evidence is not required at the time
   the pleading is filed, but that does not alter the fact that relevant allegations need to be
   asserted therein.

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                                     No. 22-10171

   must, at a minimum, plead facts that could support the conclusion that
   Tyson’s actions or inactions were a substantial factor in their contraction of
   the virus. See Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir.
   2016) (explaining that dismissal is proper “if the complaint lacks an allegation
   regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief.” (quotation
   omitted)). Moreover, since “COVID–19 can and does spread at home, in
   schools, during sporting events, and everywhere else that people gather,”
   NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 665 (2022) (per curiam), Plaintiffs’ pleading
   must proffer facts which plausibly suggest that each plaintiff contracted
   COVID-19 at the Tyson facility as a result of Tyson’s failures to warn,
   remediate, or implement government-promulgated protocols.
          Plaintiffs do allege that Tyson required COVID-positive individuals
   to continue working such that they could infect others at the plant. But this
   troubling allegation does nothing to connect Tyson’s conduct to Plaintiffs’
   contraction of the virus, much less suggest facts that could be supported by
   “reliable scientific evidence,” establishing causation. Plaintiffs do not, for
   example, allege that Tyson placed each plaintiff next to unmasked workers
   who demonstrated symptoms such as sneezing or coughing or, more
   importantly, that they were near a person known by Tyson to have COVID
   (regardless of whether they were symptomatic). Nor do they assert that they
   avoided exposure to the virus outside of work by mask-wearing, social
   distancing, or avoiding large gatherings. In other words, Plaintiffs have
   provided no facts to plausibly suggest that of the myriad places and ways in
   which they could have been exposed to COVID-19, they contracted the virus
   at the Tyson plant as a result of Tyson’s negligence. Without allegations
   connecting Plaintiffs’ individual contraction of COVID-19 to both Tyson’s
   facility and failures, Plaintiffs’ allegations of causation fail to “allow[] the
   court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
   misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As such, Plaintiffs’ allegations

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   fail to satisfy the PLPA at the pleading stage, and therefore the district court
   properly dismissed the complaint.
   B.      Leave to Amend
           Plaintiffs contend, however, that they should have received an
   opportunity to replead. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides
   that courts should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”
   We have recognized that removal from a notice-pleading jurisdiction may be
   a “natural time” for amendment, Peña, 879 F.3d at 617, but the plaintiff must
   still provide “some notice of what his or her amendments would be and how
   those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects.” Scott v. U.S.
   Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
   Otherwise, the “absence of any proposed amendments, compounded by the
   lack of grounds for such an amendment justifies” a district court’s denial of
   leave to amend. United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co., 343 F.3d 325, 331
   (5th Cir. 2003).
           Plaintiffs’ request—a single paragraph included in their response to
   Tyson’s motion to dismiss (not even a motion to amend)—does not attach
   or list the contents of a proposed amendment. Instead, Plaintiffs simply
   requested leave to amend in the event their claims needed “additional
   clarification,” noting that other courts had granted leave in light of the recent
   enactment of the PLPA. Such a bare request, however, “fail[s] to offer any
   grounds as to why [Plaintiffs’] leave should be granted or how deficiencies in
   [their] complaint could be corrected.” Scott, 16 F.4th at 1209. Particularly
   fatal, though, is Plaintiffs’ failure to provide any additional, curative facts.7

           7
             Even at oral argument before this court, Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted not having
   details on the dates on which each individual plaintiff contracted the virus or the precise
   government-promulgated protocols which governed the facility at that time or times.
   Thereafter, Plaintiffs submitted a letter, allegedly pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

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                                            No. 22-10171

   Because Plaintiffs failed to identify in their request how they would correct
   the deficiencies in their pleading, the district court did not abuse its
   discretion in denying leave to amend. See McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist.,
   309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002).
                                      VI.      Conclusion
           In sum, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim under the PLPA, and
   Plaintiffs failed to properly seek an amendment containing additional facts
   which might cure the deficiencies therein. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

   Procedure 28(j), explaining that “counsel lacked definitive personal knowledge” at oral
   argument of the dates on which each plaintiff contracted COVID-19 and confirming that
   these dates “are not in the record.” The letter then admitted that the dates varied from
   March 29 to June 5, 2020, still without stating the precise date for each plaintiff. Even that
   letter, however, fails to state what the amendment would add to the complaint which, of
   course, would be untimely for that purpose. Regardless, because Rule 28(j) letters are
   reserved for “pertinent and significant authorities,” not amendments or supplemental
   briefing, this “was not an appropriate use of a Rule 28(j) letter,” such that the facts and
   arguments alleged therein are not relevant. Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 545 n.4 (5th
   Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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