Court Opinion

ID: 9473750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:38:33.208715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:42.760470
License: Public Domain

SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge
(with whom KASHIWA and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, and NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, join), dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This is a very important case in which the MSPB has intervened, and one that should not be lightly considered. The case is important because the majority opinion deprives government employees in the competitive service of certain rights granted to them by Congress in 1978 when it amended Title 5 § 4303 (Chapter 43) governing removal proceedings by an agency against employees for unacceptable performance. These rights include, among others, entitlement to 30 days’ advance written notice of the proposed action which identifies specific instances of unacceptable performance on which the action is based and the critical elements of the employee’s position involved in each instance of unacceptable performance, representation by an attorney or other representative, a reasonable time to answer orally and in writing, a decision within 30 days after the expiration of the notice period specifying the instances of unacceptable performance on which the removal is based, freedom from removal proceedings for unacceptable performances occurring more than one year prior to the date of the 30-day notice, an opportunity to improve the employee’s performance, (see § 4302(b)(6)), and if improvement that is acceptable continues for one year from the date of the notice, all entries or notations of the removal proceedings shall be removed from his record, and, finally, freedom from removal on ad hoc rules and decisions of agencies, a practice Congress sought to eliminate by its amendment of § 4303 (Chapter 43).
These rights have been taken away from employees by the majority opinion in its holding that an agency may use Title 5 § 7512 (Chapter 75) proceedings to remove an employee for unacceptable performance instead of Chapter 43. Chapter 75 does not grant employees the above rights present in Chapter 43. As will be shown more fully below, this holding is contrary to, and violates, both Chapter 43 and Chapter 75. The decision also imposes an additional burden on agencies because in removal proceedings under Chapter 75 the agencies must prove the charges by the higher standard of preponderance of the evidence instead of the lesser standard of substantial evidence allowable under Chapter 43. See Title 5 § 7701(c)(1)(A) and (B). Accordingly, the majority opinion adversely affects both employees and agencies.
The majority opinion is in error when it holds that Chapter 75 (Title 5 § 7512) proceedings may be used in a performance-based action to remove an employee who is subject to removal under the provisions of Chapter 43 (Title 5 § 4303). This error is readily apparent to anyone who reads this statute, which provides as follows:
Title 5 § 4303 (Chapter 43):
*847§ 4303. Actions based on unacceptable performance
(a) Subject to the provisions of this section, an agency may reduce in grade or remove an employee for unacceptable performance.
(b) (1) An employee whose reduction in grade or removal is proposed under this section is entitled to—
(A) 30 days’ advance written notice of the proposed action which identifies—
(i) specific instances of unacceptable performance by the employee on which the proposed action is based; and
(ii) the critical elements of the employee’s position involved in each instance of unacceptable performance.
(B) be represented by an attorney or other representative;
(C) a reasonable time to answer orally and in writing; and
(D) a written decision which—
(i) in the case of a reduction in grade or removal under this section, specifies the instances of unacceptable performance by the employee on which the reduction in grade or removal is based, and
(ii) unless proposed by the head of the agency, has been concurred in by an employee who is in a higher position than the employee who proposed the action.
(2) An agency may, under regulations prescribed by the head of such agency, extend the notice period under subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section for not more than 30 days. An agency may extend the notice period for more than 30 days only in accordance with regulations issued by the Office of Personnel Management.
(c) The decision to retain, reduce in grade, or remove an employee—
(1) shall be made within 30 days after the date of expiration of the notice period, and
(2) in the case of a reduction in grade or removal, may be based only on those instances of unacceptable performance by the employee—
(A) which occurred during the 1-year period ending on the date of the notice under subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section in connection with the decision; and
(B) for which the notice and other requirements of this section are complied with.
(d) If, because of performance improvement by the employee during the notice period, the employee is not reduced in grade or removed, and the employee’s performance continues to be acceptable for 1 year from the date of the advance written notice provided under subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section, any entry or other notation of the unacceptable performance for which the action was proposed under this section shall be removed from any agency record relating to the employee.
(e) Any employee who is a preference eligible or is in the competitive service and who has been reduced in grade or removed under this section is entitled to appeal the action to the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 7701 of this title.
(f) This section does not apply to—
(1) the reduction to the grade previously held of a supervisor or manager who has not completed the probationary period under section 3321(a)(2) of this title.
(2) the reduction in grade or removal of an employee in the competitive service who is serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment or who has not completed 1 year of current continuous employment under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less, or
(3) the reduction in grade or removal of an employee in the excepted service who has not completed 1 year of current continuous employment in the same or similar positions.
(As amended Pub.L. 95-454, Title II, § 203(a), Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1133.) Title 5, § 7512 (Chapter 75):
§ 7512. Actions covered
*848This subchapter applies to—
(1) a removal;
(2) a suspension for more than 14 days;
(3) a reduction in grade;
(4) a reduction in pay; and
(5) a furlough of 30 days or less; but does not apply to—
(A) a suspension or removal under section 7532 of this title,
(B) a reduction-in-force action under section 3502 of this title,
(C) the reduction in grade of a supervisor or manager who has not completed the probationary period under section 3321(a)(2) of this title if such reduction is to the grade held immediately before becoming such a supervisor or manager,
(D) a reduction in grade or removal under section 4303 of this title, or
(E) an action initiated under section 1206 or 7521 of this title.
Added Pub.L. 95-454, Title II, § 204(a), Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1136. (Emph. Sup.)
Thus, it is clear that § 7512 (Chapter 75) states in plain, unambiguous, and unequivocal terms that it does not apply to a removal under § 4303 (Chapter 43). In fact, in the first part of the majority opinion it is stated that “subsection D of § 7512 makes Chapter 75 not applicable to Chapter 43.” This is, of course, correct. The opinion also quotes correctly the legislative history of the two chapters as follows:
The legislative history advises simply that Chapter 75 governs any action against an employee ‘where the basis for the agency action is misconduct or any other cause besides unacceptable performance. Actions based on unacceptable performance are governed by chapter 43.' (Emphasis added.) Senate Report at 46, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 2768.
The majority opinion also states that:
“The statute should be applied as written.”
This is of course correct, but the majority opinion holds exactly opposite and contrary to the statute as written.
In view of the clear and specific mandates of the statute, as well as the above admissions and approvals of the majority as to their meaning, it is indeed astonishing that the majority concludes that, notwithstanding the prohibition in § 7512(D) (Chapter 75), proceedings under Chapter 75 may be used in Chapter 43 removal proceedings against an employee based on unacceptable performance. This conclusion is directly contrary to the statute, and no amount of circuitous reasoning, philosophical interpretation, discussion of previous and other legislation, nor the citation of prior cases that are no longer applicable, can change its unambiguous provisions.
Chapter 43 (§ 4303) governs actions to remove an employee for unacceptable performance, and Chapter 75 (§ 7512) provides specifically that it does not apply to a removal under § 4303. Yet, in the face of these provisions of the statute, and contrary to them, the majority holds:
“Chapter 75 remains available for performance-based actions.”
It is obvious that this holding violates both sections of the statute.
In view of the foregoing and the discussion which follows, it must be said that the majority opinion cannot be sustained on any theory because it is contrary to the statute and, therefore, erroneous as a matter of law.
In the instant case Petitioner, Albert J. Lovshin, appeals from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), Docket No. SF07528311046, approving the action of the Department of the Navy in separating him from his position at the Naval Ship Weapons Systems Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, California, for inefficiency and poor workmanship.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was an Electronics Engineer, GS-855-12, at the above Naval Station, *849when on October 23, 1981, the Navy submitted to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) an agency-initiated application for his disability retirement. Thereafter, on October 29, 1981, the Navy sent Petitioner a Notice of Proposed termination stating that the Navy intended to discharge him, effective November 30, 1981, for unsatisfactory performance of his assigned duties. Following this notice, Petitioner was separated from the service on November 30, 1981, before OPM acted on the disability application. Petitioner appealed the discharge to the Board on December 10, 1981. Thereafter, on January 6, 1982, OPM notified the Navy that it had approved the disability retirement. The Navy then placed Petitioner on disability retirement status, retroactive to November 30, 1981. The Navy then filed a motion with the Board to dismiss Petitioner’s separation appeal, which was granted by the Board on February 23, 1982.
The Petitioner filed a motion with OPM for reconsideration of the agency-initiated application for disability retirement, and on July 23, 1982, OPM granted Petitioner’s motion and reversed its previous decision by denying the disability retirement application. This denial was upheld by OPM on July 1, 1983, after the Navy asked for a further reconsideration. Whereupon, the Navy retroactively reinstated its original discharge of Petitioner for inefficiency, effective November 30, 1981.
The Petitioner then pursued his discharge appeal. A hearing was held and the presiding official of the Board held that the charges were proven by the Navy by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reinstatement of the November 30, 1981, separation-inefficiency action by the Navy was proper, and that Petitioner’s separation was for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. The decision of the presiding official was approved by the Board. The Petitioner has appealed from that decision to this court.
The Petitioner was removed and separated from his position by proceedings conducted under the provisions of Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1121, 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (the Act). Petitioner contends that if he was to be removed for poor performance, the proceedings had to be conducted by the Navy under and in accordance with ' Chapter 43 (5 U.S.C. § 4303) of the Act instead of Chapter 75. The Navy argues that it had an option to file the action on the performance-based charge under either Chapter 75 or Chapter 43. This is the main issue in the case.
As a preliminary matter, it should be pointed out that when Congress passed the Act it provided in § 43021 that each agency should develop one or more performance appraisal systems to be approved by OPM by October 1, 1981. As events transpired many agencies failed to have such performance appraisal systems approved by OPM by said date. As a consequence, OPM issued interim regulations for the discharge of employees on performance-based charges under Chapter 43 of the Act. However, the Board held these regulations invalid in Wells v. Harris, 1 MSPB 199, 1 M.S.P.R. 208 (1979). The Board held further in that case that agencies could nevertheless maintain performance-based actions against employees under Chapter 75. A number of courts followed the Wells opinion in this regard and upheld the discharge of employees in such actions under Chapter 75 during the interim period before the agencies had an OPM-approved performance appraisal system in place. Some of these cases are Kochanny v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 694 F.2d 698 (Fed.Cir.1982); Turnage v. U.S., 230 Ct.Cl. 799 (1982); Hatcher v. Department of the Air Force, 705 F.2d 1309, rehearing denied, 712 F.2d 1419 (11th Cir.1983); Debose v. Department of Agriculture, 700 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.1983); Darby v. Internal Revenue Service, 672 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir.1982); Drew v. Department of the Navy, 672 F.2d 197 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072, 103 S.Ct. 493, 74 L.Ed.2d 634 (1983).
*850In Wells, the Board, at pages 235-236, reasoned:
However, if a determination of inadequate performance is not made under a performance appraisal system provided for in Chapter 43, then it may be processed as a Chapter 75 action.
Whichever action an agency chooses to pursue, it will have to comply with the procedural requirements of that Chapter. If an agency sees some advantage in pursuing [a] performance-based action under Chapter 75, it is not inconsistent with the Act so long as the agency meets the higher burden of proof — and the more difficult standard of demonstrating that the action will promote “efficiency of the service.”
The following cases are in accord: Kochanny, 694 F.2d at 701, Hatcher, 705 F.2d at 1312; Debose, 700 F.2d at 1266; Darby, 692 F.2d at 196; Drew, 672 F.2d at 201.
In Turnage, the Court of Claims, at page 800, stated:
For present purposes, it is sufficient to state that the act established two different, mutually exclusive procedural routes for disciplining employees on the basis of unsatisfactory job performance. 5 U.S.C. § 752(d) (Supp. IV 1980)
----Chapter 43 gives employees slightly more procedural protections, 5 U.S.C. § 4303, than does Chapter 75, 5 U.S.C. § 7513, but Chapter 43 actions are reviewed by the Board on a “substantial evidence” standard, while Chapter 75 actions must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1). As a result, Chapter 43 removals are more easily sustained, as Congress intended.
The basis for the decisions in the above cases was the holding of the Board in the Wells case that an agency could proceed under either Chapter 75 or Chapter 43 in a performance-based action to remove an employee. However, on October 22, 1984, the Board in a well-reasoned and comprehensive opinion held in Gende v. Department of Justice, 23 M.S.P.R. 604 (1984), that after October 1, 1981, the exclusive procedure for bringing performance-based actions for the removal of an employee was Chapter 43 (§ 4303) and that after that date such an action could not be brought under Chapter 75 (§ 7513), subject to certain exceptions.2 I agree with this decision of the Board for reasons that follow. The cases discussed above are not applicable to the case before us for at least three reasons. In the first place, the charges filed in those cases were agency actions initiated or begun before October 1, 1981, the required OPM approval date for agency performance appraisal systems, whereas, in Gende and in our case the actions were begun after October 1,1981. In the second place, those cases followed the decision of the Board in Wells and, for all practical purposes, were limited to performance-based actions filed during the interim period before October 1, 1981. Finally, the Board modified Wells and held for the first time in Gende that such actions filed after October 1, 1981, must be filed under Chapter 43 and could not be filed under Chapter 75 unless they involved one of the exceptions mentioned by the Board in that case. This in banc court should hold that Kochanny, Turnage and similar cases cited above are no longer applicable to performance-based actions against employees filed after October 1, 1981.
A study of the legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that Congress intended that performance-based removal and demotion actions be effected exclusively under Chapter 43 procedures. One of the main purposes of the Act was to simplify and expedite procedures against employees whose work and performance was substandard. See S.Rep. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in House Comm, on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Civil Service Reform Act of *8511978, at 1466 (Comm. Print No. 96-2, 1979) (herein referred to as Legislative History). In amending Chapter 43, Congress conferred certain benefits on both employees and agencies. Employees could no longer be removed or demoted under ad hoc rules of agencies. Any removal against them had to be based on the results of § 4302 appraisal systems. Furthermore, that Section and § 4303 provide that any employee whose reduction or removal is proposed must be given 30 days’ notice which identifies the instances of unacceptable performance complained of, a reasonable time to reply, and an opportunity for improvement. These provisions indicate that Chapter 43 was intended by Congress to be the exclusive remedy to remove an employee for unacceptable performance. This conclusion is strengthened by the following statement on page 39 of the Senate Report, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 2761:
The purpose of section 203 is to provide for new systems of appraising employee work performance. The principal changes it makes in Chapter 43 of title 5, United States Code are the following:
-Abolishment of present requirements of summary adjective ratings and appeals for performance ratings;
-Establishment of revised performance appraisal system to be used as a basis for developing, rewarding, reassigning, demoting, promoting, retaining, and removing employees; and
-Establishment of new procedures for taking action based on unacceptable performance.
The benefit conferred on agencies by the Act was the provision that they would be required to prove their charges against employees by the lesser standard of substantial evidence instead of the more exacting standard of preponderance of the evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1) provides that “in the case of an action based on unacceptable performance described in section 4303 of this title” the agency action shall be sustained only if "supported by substantial evidence” and shall be sustained “in any other case” if supported by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
Also, as stated above, § 7512(D), which is a part of Chapter 75, provides that it does not apply to “a reduction in grade or removal under Section 4303 [Chapter 43] of this title.” See Schwartz v. Dept. of Transportation, 714 F.2d 1581, 1583 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1983), which holds:
[T]he provisions of Chapter 75 are inapplicable to reductions in grade or removals for unacceptable performance under 5 U.S.C. § 4303. See 5 U.S.C. § 7512(D) (1982).
This holding of our court is squarely on the issue involved in the instant case. The decision in that case is a precedent that is binding on us with respect to any decision we make on the same issue. However, the majority opinion does not follow it, does not even mention it, and holds directly contrary to it. This failure of the majority opinion to follow a prior decision of this court is unprecedented and contrary to the procedures and practices of this court. The majority opinion makes no attempt to overrule the Schwartz decision, and it could hardly do so, because Schwartz holds exactly what the statute says.
The above provisions of the statute, plus the legislative history of the Act, are convincing proof of the intention of Congress to make Chapter 43 the exclusive procedure in performance-based cases.
The MSPB has intervened in this case and urges us to uphold its decision in Gende and to hold that Chapter 43 is the exclusive procedure for performance-based actions filed after October 1, 1981. The Board also requests that the instant case be remanded to it for further consideration. The majority opinion acknowledges the fact that the Board has intervened and notes its requests, but fails to give them any favorable consideration. The MSPB is an important part of our government and has considerable expertise in this area. It is trying to conscientiously administer Chapters 75 and 43 as written and as intended by Congress and is to be commended for these efforts. This court should give deference *852to its opinion and its application of the statute and allow it to reconsider the instant case in light of its decision in Gende. This is especially true in view of the fact that there are a number of other cases pending before the Board that involve the same Chapter 43 and Chapter 75 issue that is involved here.
I would hold that Chapter 43 is the exclusive procedure for agency performance-based actions against employees filed after October 1, 1981, and that Chapter 75 cannot be used in such cases. Also, I would vacate the decision below and grant the request of the Board and remand the case to it for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.3

. The Sections of the Act referred to herein are those found in Title 5, U.S.C.

. We do not need to consider the exceptions discussed by the Board in Gende, as they are not involved in the case before us. Such exceptions will have to be decided on a case by case basis as they arise.

. I do not reach the merits, because no decision thereon can be made until the issue of the proper application of Chapter 43 and Chapter 75 has been resolved.