Court Opinion

ID: 9513698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:39:19.730898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:58.709666
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 32] I concur in the majority opinion with the exception of that part holding the trial court abused its discretion when it *851refused to allow the children of the parties to testify as to their preferences and other matters and that part holding the trial court did not err when it failed to award permanent spousal support.
[¶ 33] The majority opinion concludes the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the children to testify “without first assessing whether the children were of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference.” Competency of a person to be a witness is to be determined by the trial court. See State v. Oliver, 78 N.D. 398, 49 N.W.2d 564, 574 (1951). The majority recognizes the trial court has broad discretion in not only the admission of evidence, but the refusal to allow a witness to testify. See Fargo Women’s Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 391 N.W.2d 627, 630 (N.D.1986).
[¶ 34] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(i), “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preferenee[,]” must be one of the factors the court considers in a custody determination. Therefore, in the context of the statute, the trial court’s determination of whether the child is competent to be a witness entails an analysis of whether the child is of “sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience” to express a preference for one parent over the other parent.
[¶ 35] In the present case, an interim custody order was sought and Reineke offered, at that time, affidavits signed by the children to support his position. Judge Riskedahl ordered that the mother, Michels, receive interim custody and stated:
The record also establishes that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of intimidating and threatening behavior towards the plaintiff, especially since the initiation of the divorce process. At one point he had the locks on the house changed, and effectively “locked out” the plaintiff for several days.
The record of the case suggests that the defendant, although hard working and certainly financially supporting his family, has exercised a pattern of controlling behavior towards his wife and children. The “style of conduct” exhibited by the defendant indicates to the Court that it should not give considerable weight to the affidavits of the children, indicating they prefer that custody be placed with their father. It appears that the defendant’s method of dealing with people would be such that the children would be in an awkward and uncomfortable situation if they tended to disagree with their father. It is apparent that he has attempted to draw them into the circumstances of the marital discord and wishes to have them “take sides” in support of him. The Court also concludes that the way in which the defendant has exposed his children to this extra-marital affair does not reflect a concern on his part for their best interests.
Judge Romanick, who ultimately tried this case, noted in his order denying the appointment of a custody investigator that he had reviewed the documentation filed with the interim order and Judge Riskedahl’s interim order before arriving at his decision on the motion.
[¶ 36] At trial, the trial court delayed its ruling until it had heard a full day of testimony and then invited each party to make an offer of proof why the court should allow the children to testify. After considering the evidence that Reineke’s counsel said would be offered by the fourteen-year-old daughter, the court concluded that the daughter would basically testify, “I want to live with Dad.” No offer of proof was made as to the testimony of the *852minor son. See N.D.R.Ev. 103(a)(2); Wagner v. Peterson, 430 N.W.2d 331, 332 (N.D.1988) (holding without an offer of proof, die court cannot determine if the exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial). Further, Reineke never requested that the court interview the children in chambers.
[¶ 37] The trial court found Michels stipulated that the minor daughter preferred i:o live with Reineke. The preference of the minor child was, therefore, in evidence. Reineke never makes it clear on the record or in his brief what other testimony by the minor daughter was relevant to the court’s consideration of custody or visitation. Both on the record and in his brief, there are only general statements by Reineke’s counsel that the minor child’s testimony “would have collaborated their father’s testimony, counteracted the testimonies of the mother’s witnesses and would have provided imperative insight into the relationship between the children and their mother.”
[¶ 38] The trial court’s findings clearly indicate that it concluded the fourteen-year-old daughter was not of sufficient maturity, intellect, or experience to competently testify on any matters. The trial court found the minor daughter had been “acting out” since the divorce and “has had trouble following direction from her mother.... ” The trial testimony was that the minor daughter was acting unruly, yelling, throwing things, and breaking things, and that she was angry and full of emotion. Furthermore, the trial court found that Reineke had the children read all the allegations made by each party and had inappropriately drawn them into the divorce proceeding, including having the minor daughter take pictures of the home to further his position that the home was messy. The trial court clearly determined the will of the minor daughter was being controlled by Reineke and concluded she was not of sufficient maturity to make an intelligent choice and be a competent witness.
[¶ 39] Although I believe it is preferable for a trial court to interview the children in chambers on the record with counsel for the parties present when deciding whether a child is of sufficient “intelligence, understanding, and experience” to state a preference, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(i) does not require that procedure. Whether to interview a child to determine the child’s preference is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. See Tasker v. Tasker, 395 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn.Ct. App.1986); Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Palmer v. Palmer, 138 Vt. 412, 416 A.2d 143, 144 (1980). Here, the record indicates the trial court heard evidence that went directly to the maturity of the minor daughter to be able to intelligently and independently testify. A court may refuse to consider a child’s preference if the child is not mature. McDowell v. McDowell, 2001 ND 176, ¶ 20, 635 N.W.2d 139. I believe that when the welfare of a child is involved, a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it assesses the child’s competence through evidence such as was introduced in this case, rather than through an interview.
[¶ 40] Furthermore, in this case, the photographs of the mother’s home taken by the daughter came into evidence and Reineke testified to things his minor daughter told him. The minor daughter's testimony would have been subject to an objection that it was cumulative.
[¶ 41] The majority string cites numerous statutes and appears to take the position that a fourteen-year-old child should be permitted to testify because she is fourteen. Our Court has never held the age of a child is the determinative fact in concluding whether a child is mature and has the capacity to make an intelligent choice in a *853child custody case. See Barstad v. Barstad, 499 N.W.2d 584, 588 (N.D.1993). In Palmer, 416 A.2d at 144, the Supreme Court of Vermont declined to agree that because a fourteen-year-old child is allowed by statute to select their guardian, children fourteen and older must be allowed to voice their preference regarding custody and visitation. The trial court refused to hear the desires of the fourteen and fifteen-year-old children. The Vermont Supreme Court held the trial court had not abused its discretion when the evidence supported the award of custody. “The decision to allow a child to testify as to custody preference is in the trial court’s discretion, and, absent a showing that it clearly abused its discretion, will not be placed in error.” Id.
[¶ 42] I am concerned the majority opinion fails to recognize that in custody disputes, children can be “victimized by the animosities of their parents.” Jordana v. Corley, 220 N.W.2d 515, 524 (N.D.1974) (Vogel, J., concurring). Also, “a child’s preference ... may, in some instances, be motivated by goals and ambitions which undermine the significance of that preference and may, in fact, be detrimental to the child’s best interests.” Alvarez v. Carlson, 524 N.W.2d 584, 590 (N.D.1994). Custody disputes are traumatic situations for children and subjecting them to stating a preference for one parent adds more trauma, especially if it involves testimony in open court. Irreparable injury to the parent-child relationship may result from such confrontation. Therefore, every effort should be made by the trial court when a child states a preference, to determine if the child’s preference is the result of undue influence by a parent. See Bar-stad, 499 N.W.2d at 588. Children during their minority often change their preference from one parent to the other. See Judith S. Waflerstein et al., The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce 116 (2000) (stating “In following these alliances over the years, I find that the vast majority are short-lived and can even boomerang. Children are capricious allies. They soon become bored or ashamed of their mischief. Not one alliance lasted through adolescence and most crumbled within a year or two.”).
[¶ 43] Under the facts of this case and where the children’s preference was stipulated to on the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not holding an in-chamber interview of the children.
[¶44] I respectfully dissent also from that part of the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s award of rehabilitative spousal support in place of permanent spousal support. Our standard of review is clearly erroneous. Sommer v. Sommer, 2001 ND 191, ¶ 8, 636 N.W.2d 423. A trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support its findings, they are induced by an erroneous view of the law, or even if there is some evidence to support its findings, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Id. I am of the opinion that the trial court erred in applying our law on rehabilitative and permanent spousal support to the facts of this case, and I am left with a firm conviction a mistake has been made.
[¶ 45] The trial court distinguishes between permanent spousal support and rehabilitative spousal support in its findings. It states that permanent spousal support is appropriate when the economically disadvantaged spouse cannot be equitably rehabilitated. Further, rehabilitative spousal support is an attempt to provide education, training, or experience that will enable the recipient to achieve “adequate” or “appropriate” self-support while improving her employment skills. The trial court also notes that “[s]pousal support is aimed at *854balancing the burdens and disadvantages created by the divorce.” The trial court found that Michels has been disadvantaged by the marriage to Reineke. However, the trial court errs in awarding only rehabilitative spousal support and finding that Michels will need “a period of support to recover and be able to become self-supportive.” The evidence does not support that Michels can be rehabilitated, is able to “recover,” or able to become “self-supportive.”
[¶ 46] We have distinguished permanent and rehabilitative spousal support:
There are two types of spousal support. Permanent spousal support is appropriate to provide traditional maintenance for a spouse who is incapable of rehabilitation. Rehabilitative spousal support, on the other hand, is awarded to provide a disadvantaged spouse time and resources to acquire an educational, training, work skills, or experience that will enable the spouse to become self-supporting.
van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 100 (N.D.1994) (citations omitted).
[¶ 47] In van Oosting, the wife was 44 years of age, had no education beyond high school, had a limited work experience, suffered from Multiple Sclerosis, which was in remission, was depressed as a result of the divorce, and had to adjust to handling her own affairs. The trial court awarded the wife one year of spousal support to rehabilitate herself. Our Court held that the trial court’s award of rehabilitative support was clearly erroneous and we remanded directing the trial court to award permanent support subject to future modification. Id. at 100,101. We pointed out that under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, the court is :o consider the health and physical condition of the parties. See Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845, 852 (N.D.1966); Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1952). We highlighted the significance the health and physical condition of the parties has in determining support and stated:
Our sister-state, Minnesota, is in agreement with our holdings emphasizing the importance of the health of the parties when awarding support....
The Minnesota legislature has not only codified the factors to be taken into account when awarding spousal support, but has also created a “presumption” for permanent spousal support when there is uncertainty as to its necessity. (Citation omitted.) This approach is helpful.
van Oosting, at 101.
[¶ 48] Under the facts of this case, permanent spousal support is necessary for the parties to equitably share in the burdens of the divorce. The marriage is of long duration, the parties have been married for 19 years and together two years prior to marriage, for a total of 21 years together. Michels is 48 years old and has Multiple Sclerosis, which is a progressive disease. The trial court found her Multiple Sclerosis could cause difficulties in the future concerning her ability to remain employed. Michels earns about $19,000 per year as a records clerk in a medical clinic and has completed two years of college. Her salary is approximately 60 percent of what Reineke earns as a truck driver for Waste Management, which is about $32,000 per year. In addition, he receives overtime on a regular basis.
[¶49] The trial court found that Rei-neke desired out of the marriage because he had started a relationship with someone else, that he had been a controlling spouse, and that he had been demeaning to Mi-chels in public. The trial court found the parties lived a middle income life. Although Michels received the home in the divorce, the trial court found it was in need of $11,000 of repairs, ordered Michels to *855pay the first mortgage, one-half of the second mortgage, and the entire $8,100 remaining on the loan from her parents to purchase the home.
[¶ 50] In its findings of fact, the trial court found Michels was “not expecting any significant raises in the near future and appears to have topped out as to work levels.” Accordingly, there is nothing in the evidence that Michels situation will improve, change, or that she will be able to “recover.” The only thing that may change, and for the worse not the better, is Michels’ Multiple Sclerosis, which the trial court noted “is a concern.” In light of Michels’ age, the fact she has “topped out as to work levels,” and her significant health problem of Multiple Sclerosis, rehabilitation is unlikely. Permanent spousal support is the appropriate remedy to ensure the parties equitably share the reduction in their separate standards of living. Under the majority opinion, the issue of spousal support is reserved and Michels, in four years, would have the burden of showing a material change in circumstances justifying a modification. Yet the trial court’s findings make it clear that it does not expect anything will change with respect to the parties’ financial situation. The trial court also found Reineke “does not expect any significant raises in the near future.” In order to modify an award of spousal support, there must be a showing of a material change in circumstances, which “is something substantially affecting the financial abilities or needs of a party.” Sommer, 2001 ND 191, ¶ 18, 686 N.W.2d 428 (citation omitted). Michels will be unable to make this showing unless her Multiple Sclerosis affects her ability to work in four years. Otherwise, her spousal support will end even though the parties’ finances remain unchanged and there remains no expectation for her to rehabilitate or “recover.”
[¶ 51] I would reverse and remand, directing the trial court to enter an award of permanent spousal support in the amount of $300 per month.
[¶ 52] I, therefore, concur in part and dissent in part.
[¶ 53] Mary Muehlen Maring