Court Opinion

ID: 9399550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 16:12:47.365652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.648226
License: Public Domain

J-S08008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHAEL CARTER                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :     No. 1317 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 15, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-01-CR-0000403-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED: JUNE 5, 2023

        Appellant, Michael Carter, appeals from the August 15, 2022 judgment

of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County that

imposed an aggregate sentence of 13 years and 9 months to 34 years’

incarceration. Appellant pleaded guilty to homicide by vehicle while driving

under the influence (a second degree felony) (Count 2), accidents involving

death or personal injury (a second degree felony) (Count 5), accidents

involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed (a third degree

felony) (Count 8), driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled

substance (“DUI”) (an ungraded misdemeanor – first offense) (Count 13),

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked (Count 17), and

flight to avoid apprehension, trial, or punishment (Count 8).1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

       On March 18, 2021, [] Appellant was on state parole from
       sentences imposed by [the trial] court for two convictions for
       felony possession with intent to deliver cocaine. At 9:30 a.m.[,]
       on that day, while high on a cocktail of various drugs including
       eutylone, cocaine, [] methamphetamines, and alcohol, Appellant
       made the deadly decision to drive in Straban Township, Adams
       County[, Pennsylvania].

       Meanwhile, the victim[] and his wife[] were minding their own
       business, going about life as normal and were at [a gas station
       and convenience store] in Straban Township, Adams County.
       [The victim] was standing between his vehicle and the gas pump
       to begin filling his vehicle with gas. [The victim’s wife] was a
       seated passenger in the vehicle at the time. Appellant, who had
       no driver[’s] license, failed to stop [his vehicle] at a clearly marked
       stop sign[.       Appellant’s vehicle] traveled across several
       intersecting lanes of traffic into the [gas station] parking lot at an
       excessively high rate of speed before slamming into gas pumps
       [and] eventually driving through a gas pump striking the
       [victim’s] vehicle pushing it sideways into [the victim] and
       trapping [the victim] between his vehicle and the gas pump.

       While [the victim] was trapped for almost an hour, he remained
       partially conscious despite suffering severe injuries. [The victim’s
       wife] was trapped inside the vehicle, watching her husband suffer
       until emergency personnel could extricate her from the vehicle.
       Appellant, meanwhile, fled the scene on foot before [the] police
       could arrive. After an excruciating amount of time, emergency
       personnel were finally able to free [the victim] from his pinned
       position and transport[ed] him to [a hospital] for serious bodily
       injuries, including one of his feet being nearly amputated at the
       scene and attached only by skin.

____________________________________________

175 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3735(a), 3742(b)(3)(i), 3742.1(a)(1), 3802(d)(1(ii), and
1543(a), as well as 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a), respectively.

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       Police [officers] eventually located [] Appellant, based on
       eyewitness descriptions, a short time later near State Route 116
       in Adams County. During Appellant's interaction with police, he
       was clearly and highly intoxicated[,] and Appellant informed
       arresting [police] officers that he had been using drugs all night
       long prior to getting behind the wheel of a borrowed vehicle.

       [T]he injuries suffered by [the victim] included amputations,
       multiple surgeries, a punctured lung, a punctured spleen, and the
       need for life support. [The victim] succumbed to his injuries and
       died as a result of them on May 4, 2021, after suffering in a
       hospital bed for more than six weeks after the incident.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/19/22, at 2-4.

       Appellant was charged with the aforementioned criminal offenses, as

well as third-degree murder (Count 1), recklessly endangering another person

(2 counts) (Count 11 and Count 12), aggravated assault by vehicle while

driving under the influence (2 counts) (Count 3 and Count 4), homicide by

vehicle (Count 6), accidents involving death or personal injury (Count 7),

accidents involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed (Count

9), and driving under the influence of a controlled substance (3 counts) (Count

14, Count 15, and Count 16).2 On May 2, 2022, Appellant entered an open

guilty plea to Counts 2, 5, 8, 10, 13, and 17. On August 15, 2022, the trial

court sentenced Appellant as follows: Count 2 – 5 to 10 years’ incarceration

with the sentence set to run consecutively to any sentence imposed as a result

of Appellant’s parole violation; Count 5 - 5 to 10 years’ incarceration with the

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2705 (2 counts), as well as 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 3735.1 (2 counts), 3732, 3742, 3742.1(a)(1), 3802(d)(1)(i) (Count 14),
3802(d)(1)(iii) (Count 15), and 3802(d)(2) (Count 16), respectively.

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sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed for Count 2; Count

8 – 2 years and 3 months to 7 years’ incarceration with the sentence set to

run consecutively to the sentence imposed for Count 5; Count 10 – 1 year and

6 months to 7 years’ incarceration with the sentence set to run consecutively

to the sentence imposed for Count 8; and Count 17 – payment of a mandatory

fine of $200.00.3 As part of his sentence, Appellant was not eligible for the

recidivism risk reduction incentive (“RRRI”) program.

       On August 24, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, seeking a

reduction of sentence on the ground the trial court, in fashioning its sentence,

failed to consider that Appellant “availed himself of treatment during his

addiction.”    Post-Sentence Motion, 8/24/22, at ¶3.     The trial court denied

Appellant’s post-sentence motion on August 25, 2022. This appeal followed.4

       Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court

abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence?” Appellant’s Brief at

5.

____________________________________________

3For sentencing purposes, Appellant’s conviction at Count 13 merged with his
conviction at Count 2. As part of the sentence imposed at Count 5, Appellant
was ordered to pay a mandatory fine of $2,500.00. The trial court did not
impose a fine at Counts 2, 8, or 10. Appellant was also ordered to pay the
cost of prosecution ($670.00) and awarded credit for time served (515 days).

4 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.

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      Appellant’s issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,

arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed an excessive

punishment without first considering mitigating circumstances. Id. at 8.

      It is well-settled that “the right to appeal [the] discretionary
      aspect[s] of [a] sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v.
      Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where
      an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence,
      we should regard his[, or her,] appeal as a petition for allowance
      of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162
      (Pa. Super. 2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury,
      992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

         An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his[,
         or her,] sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by
         satisfying a four-part test:

         We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         [the] appellant [] filed a timely notice of appeal, see
         Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
         preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
         modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
         appellant's brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);
         and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the
         sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
         Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

      [Moury, 992 A.2d] at 170. We evaluate on a case-by-case basis
      whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about
      the appropriateness of sentence. Commonwealth v. Kenner,
      784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (original

brackets omitted). If an appellant fails to challenge the discretionary aspects

of a sentence either by presenting a claim to the trial court at the time of

sentencing or in a post-sentence motion, then the appellant’s challenge is

waived. Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012)

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(en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 75 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2013).          A

substantial question exists when an appellant presents a colorable argument

that the sentence imposed is either (1) inconsistent with a specific provision

of the Sentencing Code or (2) is “contrary to the fundamental norms which

underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d

581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011).

Allegations that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence paired with

assertions that the trial court failed to consider mitigating circumstances raise

a substantial question that the sentence was inapposite to the Sentencing

Code. Commonwealth v. Kurtz, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 3138750, at *17

(Pa. Super. Apr. 28, 2023) (slip copy), relying on Commonwealth v.

Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc), appeal denied,

126 A.3d 1282 (Pa. 2015).

        Here, the record reflects that Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal

and properly preserved a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence in a post-sentence motion requesting a reduction of sentence.

Appellant also included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Appellant’s Brief

at 8.    In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that the trial court

imposed an excessive sentence without considering certain mitigating

circumstances. Id. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to

consider that “this was the only DUI in Appellant’s [50] years of life, []

Appellant never received intensive treatment for what was clearly the disease

of addiction, and [] the injur[ies] he caused his victims, though grievous, were

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without any malice on Appellant’s part.”     Id., relying on Appellant’s Rule

1925(b) Statement, 10/4/22. In so arguing, we find that Appellant raises a

substantial question regarding the trial court’s alleged failure to consider

mitigating circumstances before imposing what Appellant asserts was an

excessive sentence. Kurtz, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 3138750, at *17; see

also Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770. Therefore, we proceed to consider the merits

of Appellant’s discretionary sentencing claim.

      Here, Appellant concedes that the trial court imposed individual

sentences that fell within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines but

asserts that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs in

fashioning Appellant’s over-all sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 9, 16. To support

this claim, Appellant notes that the trial court confined him to a state

correctional institution without ordering that he undergo treatment for drug

and alcohol addiction. Id. at 13. Appellant argues,

      What Appellant requested of the trial court and avers he did not
      receive is a consideration of his rehabilitative needs. The [trial]
      court patently took into account the gravity of the offense in
      relation to its impact on the victim and the community. The trial
      court never in its sentencing order or [Rule] 1925(a) opinion
      addressed Appellant's rehabilitative needs other than to say
      Appellant had been given opportunities to rehabilitate himself, to
      which he had been indifferent. Appellant avers that he was in fact
      a dying man, drowning in his own addiction, repeatedly in a
      criminal justice system that punished but did not treat - at least
      in any meaningful way. If he can be treated and made well,
      finally, for the addictions that have consumed him, he can atone
      for his grievous mistake but still be a contributing member of
      society.

Id. at 16-17 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

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       It is well-established that “[w]hen imposing a sentence, a [trial] court

must    consider   the   factors   set   forth   in   42   Pa.C.S.A.   § 9721(b).”

Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal

denied, 963 A.2d 467 (Pa. 2008). Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code,

in pertinent part, states,

       the [trial] court shall follow the general principle that the sentence
       imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with
       [S]ection 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection
       of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
       on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
       rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The [trial] court shall also
       consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted
       by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect
       under [S]ection 2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for
       sentencing, resentencing and parole, risk assessment instrument
       and recommitment ranges following revocation).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).      In determining the place of confinement, a state

correctional facility or a county prison facility, Section 9762 of the Sentencing

Code states that for sentences having a maximum term of five or more years,

the defendant shall be committed to a state correctional facility. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9762(b)(1).

       Appellate review of a trial court’s sentencing determination is governed

by Section 9781(c) of the Sentencing Code.

       Section 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which the
       appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the
       [trial] court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the sentence
       falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly unreasonable” based on
       the circumstances of the case; and (3) the sentence falls outside
       of the guidelines and is “unreasonable.”

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Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c). In reviewing sentencing matters, we are mindful of

our well-settled standard of review.

        Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the [trial
        court], and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
        manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of
        discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
        the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
        [trial] court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment
        for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill[-]will, or arrived
        at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009).

        The trial court, in the case sub judice, reviewed a pre-sentence

investigation (“PSI”) report before fashioning Appellant’s sentence.5             Trial

Court Order, 8/19/22, at 2 (unpaginated); see also Commonwealth v.

Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating, “[w]here the [trial

____________________________________________

5   In the sentencing order, the trial court stated,

           The [trial] court [] received and reviewed the [PSI] report
           and [] also entertained a number of victim impact
           statements. The [trial] court [] also reviewed letters in
           support of [Appellant] submitted by defense counsel, as well
           as statements on [Appellant’s] behalf.

           From the PSI [report], it is noted [Appellant] has 21 adult
           arrests with 11 convictions. As indicated by [the trial] court
           prior to entry of this order, multiple opportunities have been
           given to [Appellant] for local rehabilitation, none of which
           [were] effective [in] avoid[ing the] tragic circumstances in
           this case.

Trial Court Order, 8/19/22, at 2 (unpaginated).

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court] had the benefit of a [PSI] report, it will be presumed that [the trial

court] was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant's

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors” (original brackets, original quotation marks, and citation omitted)),

appeal denied, 159 A.3d 935 (Pa. 2016).        Additionally, at the sentencing

hearing, the trial court heard from, inter alia, Appellant who explained his

addiction and prior attempts at rehabilitation, in pertinent part, as follows:

      Since I first used heroin at age 15, my life has been largely about
      my addiction. I've been to jail probably 10 times[,] always drug
      related. I sold drugs to finance my habit. I never made money
      [from] selling drug[s] other than to supply my own habit.

      When I [went] to jail, I would get clean. I would come out of jail
      determined to stay clean. I'd get a job. But then I would start
      thinking about getting high again. I turned [to abusing] cocaine
      because it wouldn't make me sick when I couldn’t get it[, unlike
      heroin when I was un]able to get heroin.

      I always thought I was okay basically because even when I was
      using heavily, I would be able to work, usually at a restaurant, to
      keep a roof over my head. I never had a DUI[,] and I never had
      a car accident. I never had health insurance[,] and I never could
      afford to go to rehab[ilitation]. But even if I could, I don't know
      that I would have. I thought I was functioning okay in the world
      I knew.

      ...

      Once I stayed clean for a year and a half. But I always [went]
      back to [drug use.] I had some treatment at [a rehabilitation
      facility] when I was on work release from Adams County Prison[,]
      and it did work for a while. But then I would go back to my old
      ways.

N.T., 8/15/22, at 16-18.

      In fashioning Appellant’s sentence, the trial court explained,

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       [The trial court] also note[s] that [the Commonwealth’s] history
       of opportunities given to [Appellant] is indeed accurate.[6
       Appellant’s] history reveals one of significant drug addiction
____________________________________________

6The Commonwealth provided the following re-cap of Appellant’s history
with the trial court:

       Your Honor, [Appellant’s] prior record score is a five. The [trial]
       court is aware of that based on the [PSI report]. But the history
       of the opportunities this [Appellant] has had I think is worthy of
       noting.

       He first came before Adams County Court of Common Pleas back
       in 2014, where he was given [a maximum] county sentence for
       four deliveries of cocaine. At his first revocation hearing in 2015,
       [the] Commonwealth sought a state [prison] sentence[,] but his
       revocation was actually suspended to the [back] time and his
       supervision was reduced.            He was paroled over the
       Commonwealth’s objection in 2016.

       At his second parole violation or probation violation hearing, the
       Commonwealth, again, asked for a state prison sentence and
       [Appellant] was, again, given an opportunity to avail himself of
       rehabilitation over the Commonwealth’s objection and once again
       got a [county] sentence.

       Then, again, he was paroled over the Commonwealth’s objection
       in November [] 2017, [upon serving] his minimum [sentence]. At
       his third probation violation, he was finally sentenced to state
       prison for one to five years in November [] 2018. While on that
       supervision, he committed this offense. But also while on [county]
       supervision for that case, he committed a new felony [for] drug
       delivery and again was given a [county] sentence[ and] an
       opportunity to rehabilitate himself.

       Of note, I think at [the time of sentencing in November] 2018,
       [the trial court] basically [] outlined the court's efforts to give
       [Appellant] an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, he didn't avail
       himself of that. He made the same claims for leniency based upon
       addiction, that he had turned his life around, that he now had
       stable employment. But despite that, here we are.

N.T., 8/15/22, at 6-7 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

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      through the years and mostly drug offenses through the majority
      of his adult life. [The trial court] presided over sentencing and
      revocation in this case and recall[s] vividly some prominent
      business members and pastors and people in the community
      speaking on [Appellant’s] behalf at the original sentencing for the
      drug conviction that [Appellant] currently has [as] a state parole
      hit [] and then at the revocation [hearing], as well.

      And it's pretty evident that [Appellant has] been given multiple
      opportunities to address the addiction. And addiction is, of course,
      [] a horrible disease. But, again, those circumstances, those
      opportunities have repeatedly been given to [Appellant] through
      the years.

      [The trial court had] indeed made provisions for local
      rehabilitation prior to revocation, third revocation when sentenced
      to [a state correctional facility], all of which included drug and
      alcohol treatment. It's evident to note that the [trial] court and
      the [p]robation department cannot cure addiction. It requires an
      effort by a person to avail him[self] or herself of opportunities
      given to improve themselves.

      And while [Appellant] is [not, in the trial court’s opinion],
      inte[n]tionally violent, the danger posed to the community is
      obviously - is obvious and self-evident here. Circumstances that
      took - tragically took [the victim’s] life due to what [the trial court
      considers] to be [Appellant’s] selfish and callus actions could have
      occurred anywhere at any time to any victim in our community.

      [T]hat kind of conduct after multiple attempts at local
      rehabilitation [treatment services] evidences that [Appellant]
      poses a highest degree of random danger to the community at
      large.

Id. at 21-22 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

      A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court, in fashioning

Appellant’s overall sentence, specifically referred to, and considered,

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, as well as the protection of the public and the

gravity of the offense. As discussed supra, the trial court was apprised of all

necessary facts, through its review of the PSI report, a letter and impact

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statements provided by the victim’s family, the testimony of a character

witness, and Appellant’s own statement, as well as the trial court’s knowledge

of Appellant’s prior criminal history and long battle with drug and alcohol

addiction. We presume that the trial court applied those facts in fashioning

Appellant’s sentence.

      We reject Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed to consider his

rehabilitative needs, i.e., his need to participate in drug and alcohol treatment.

Appellant bases this claim exclusively upon the trial court’s failure to

specifically state in its sentencing order that such treatment programs shall

be provided to Appellant. This contention is unavailing. Section 93.12 of the

Pennsylvania    Code    governing   the   Department     of   Corrections – State

Correctional Institutions and Facilities provides that an inmate has a right of

access to, inter alia, health care professionals and prescribed treatment for

serious medical needs, and each state correctional institution is required to

establish procedures to permit such access by inmates.              37 Pa. Code

§ 93.12(a). As part of an inmate’s access to health care professionals and

treatment, an inmate may receive access, free of charge, to, inter alia, mental

health treatment and social service programs, including, but not limited to,

substance abuse groups and counseling. 37 Pa. Code § 93.12(d)(6) and (17).

Thus, despite the absence of a directive in the sentencing order that

rehabilitative treatment services, i.e., substance abuse groups and counseling

services, be provided to Appellant, such services are, nevertheless, provided

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to Appellant automatically. Therefore, we do not find the trial court abused

its discretion in sentencing Appellant.7

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/05/2023

____________________________________________

7 To the extent Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing consecutive sentences or ordering that Appellant serve his sentence
in a state correctional institution, we find these assertions to be without merit.
First, “[l]ong[-]standing precedent recognizes that the Sentencing Code
affords the [trial] court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or
consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to
sentences already imposed.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206,
1212 (Pa. Super. 2021) (original brackets and ellipsis omitted), citing,
Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612 (Pa. Super 2005); see also
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. Second, even if the trial court set Appellant’s individual
sentences to run concurrently with each other, Appellant’s maximum sentence
of 10 years would have required his incarceration to be in a state correctional
institution. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(b)(1) (stating that, all persons sentenced to
a maximum term of five or more years “shall be committed to the Department
of Corrections for confinement”).

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