Court Opinion

ID: 9761825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:55:59.820987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:26.727495
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice, concurring.
I join in the reversal of Superior Court. I write separately, however, to express my strenuous objection to the majority’s creation of different standards of proving due diligence, under Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 1100(c)(3), on the basis of the number of common pleas judges sitting on the bench in any given county and on whether the court or the prosecution schedules criminal trials. There is no support provided by the language of this rule for such distinctions and the creation of these distinctions is not necessary for the disposition of any case. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “although the record before the court, as well as the arguments, were insufficient under the statute, the petitions passed constitutional muster.” Maj. op. at 180. This case does not present a constitutional issue.
*182The judgment of the Court herein is consistent with the law of Commonwealth v. Hollingsworth, 346 Pa.Super. 199, 499 A.2d 381 (1985), allocatur denied, Pa., 527 A.2d 536 (Table — 1987), wherein Superior Court held that a criminal defendant’s general denial of due diligence admits all well-pleaded facts which the defendant does not specifically deny and the court accepts as true, and preserves only the issue whether the uncontroverted facts are sufficient to show due diligence as a matter of law.
My review of the record reveals that appellee, Roy Gray Bond, did not object during any of the three extension hearings to appellant’s assertion that a crowded docket prevented the case from going to trial within 180 days or the granted extension periods. As no facts were in issue, therefore, it is only necessary for this Court to determine whether . 1) the trial court accepted appellant’s well-pleaded facts as true, and 2) the uncontested facts were sufficient to show due diligence as a matter of law.
Although the trial court did not state at the time of hearing that it accepted appellant’s well-pleaded facts as true, it is clear that the trial court ruled in appellant’s favor in granting the petitions for extension on the basis of those facts. In its opinion, the trial court states:
During the time period involved in this case, there existed a sizeable criminal trial list of which the [appellee’s] case was but one— This Court was, and is, fully satisfied that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in attempting to bring [appellee’s] case to trial. In fact, there was nothing the Commonwealth could have done to accelerate the disposition of the case and avoid the need for extensions.
Memorandum of the Court at 4 (March 19, 1985) (emphasis added).
Appellant scheduled this case for trial both before the Rule 1100 run date and at the earliest dates consistent with its extension requests and the court’s business. Rule 1100 *183requires no more of the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Morales, 508 Pa. 51, 494 A.2d 367 (1985). Due diligence was shown as a matter of law, therefore Superior Court erred when it determined that the record did not support the extensions granted by the trial court.