Court Opinion

ID: 9720684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:39:25.980865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.610564
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DUNN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority’s resolution of two issues. First of all, I believe that, by failing to make an offer of proof, defendant waived the issue of whether the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection when defense counsel asked Bianca Jones if she had ever known S.W. to exaggerate the truth to her. In general, an offer of proof must be made in order to preserve the issue of wrongful exclusion of evidence for review. (People v. Cobb (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 898, 905.) If the testimony to be elicited is obviously relevant and material, no offer of proof is required. (Cobb, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 905.) A detailed and specific offer of proof is required, however, if it is not clear what the testimony of the witness will be or what basis the witness will have for so testifying. 186 Ill. App. 3d at 905. In Cobb, this court held that, because the defendant failed to make a specific, detailed offer of proof, he waived the issue of whether the trial court erred by excluding a police officer’s testimony as to a certain matter. (186 Ill. App. 3d at 905-06.) In so holding, this court noted that it could not determine from the record exactly what the substance of the officer’s testimony would have been or the basis of that testimony. (186 Ill. App. 3d at 905.) We further stated that it was conceivable that the officer’s testimony could have been based on what others had told him and would have therefore been inadmissible hearsay. (186 Ill. App. 3d at 905-06.) It was thus impossible to determine from the record whether the exclusion of the testimony constituted reversible error. 186 Ill. App. 3d at 906. The same is true in the case at bar. This court has no way of knowing how Bianca Jones would have responded to the question at issue here. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. (See People v. Moreno (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6.) It is also possible, as it was in Cobb, that the basis for the testimony could have been a conversation with another person. Jones may have testified that S.W. told her something and she found out from someone else that it was not true. This would have constituted inadmissible hearsay. Because defendant’s failure to make an offer of proof makes it impossible to determine whether reversible error occurred, I would hold that he has waived the issue of whether the trial court erred by sustaining the objection to the question his attorney asked Bianca Jones. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a remand is necessary for the purpose of having the trial court articulate specific factors which led to its conclusion that S.W.’s hearsay statement to Officer Henriquez should be admitted into evidence under section 115 — 10 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 115 — 10). Under section 115 — 10(b)(l), such a statement is admissible if the trial court “finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 115— 10(b)(l).) The trial court did make such a finding in this case. The statute does not require trial judges to articulate specific reasons in support of such findings. The majority concludes that a remand is necessary to ensure that the trial court’s admission of S.W.’s hearsay statement was consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Idaho v. Wright (1990), 497 U.S. 805, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139, which was issued after the trial in this case. The standard in section 115 — 10, which requires “sufficient safeguards of reliability” based upon the “time, content, and circumstances of the statement,” is in my view effectively the same as the Wright standard of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” based solely upon the circumstances surrounding the statement (Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 656, 110 S. Ct. at 3149). Section 115 — 10, like the court’s opinion in Wright, requires trial courts to focus solely upon the circumstances surrounding the statement and to determine whether those circumstances make it particularly likely that the declarant was telling the truth when she made the statement. Because the Illinois standard applied here was essentially the same as the one set forth in Wright, I do not believe it is necessary to remand the case in order to ensure compliance with Wright. A trial court’s finding after a section 115 — 10(b)(l) hearing should only be overturned on appeal if it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (People v. Deavers (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1068.) In the case at bar, S.W. had no motive to fabricate, and she did not use terminology that would be unexpected of a child her age. (See Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 656, 110 S. Ct. at 3150.) Furthermore, although Officer Henriquez did question S.W., he testified that the questions were open-ended rather than leading. (See People v. Edwards (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029.) Finally, the statement was made only a few hours after the alleged incident. In light of these factors, the trial court’s decision to admit testimony about the statement was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and should have been affirmed. For the above reasons, I would affirm defendant’s conviction. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.