Court Opinion

ID: 9849932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:49:48.315935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.310894
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion requiring that law enforcement officers obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause as a condition precedent to the obtaining of telephone toll call records for use as evidence. In my view, a telephone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in toll records.
In this case the toll records were obtained pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. Even if the majority is sound in its constitutional analysis of the requirements necessary for admission of the toll records at the time of trial, it would not extend to the use of the records before the grand jury. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). I believe the evidence in issue should be admitted not only before the grand jury, but also as substantive evidence in trial of the issues framed in the indictment.
In determining whether a particular form of governmental electronic surveillance is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we are guided by the United States Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In Katz, government agents intercepted the contents of a telephone conversation by attaching an electronic listening device to the outside of a public phone booth. The United States Supreme Court, in overruling Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), rejected the assertion that a “search” can only occur when there has been a physical intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area.” Katz held that, since the government's monitoring of the conversation “violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth,” it “constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 389 U.S. at 351-353, 88 S.Ct. at 511-512.
This inquiry normally embraces a two-prong analysis:
“The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,’ ... whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve [something] as private.’ ... The second question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize’ as “reasonable,” ’ .... ”
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979).
In Smith v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court, applying the analysis articulated in Katz, held that a pen register does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the view of the Court, individuals do not have a legitimate expec*32tation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial. The Court found further that, even if there was a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was not reasonable.
Four years later, this court held in People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 144 (Colo.1983), under virtually identical factual circumstances:
“[T]hat Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution provides a telephone subscriber with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the records of telephone numbers dialed, that such material is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, that the installation of a pen register to record the numbers dialed constitutes a search, that the acquisition by means of the pen register of the record of the numbers dialed constitutes a seizure, and that in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent law enforcement officers may not procure the installation of a pen register without first obtaining a search warrant supported by probable cause.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
My dissent in this case is for substantially the same reasons that I set out in my dissent in Sporleder. Although I remain convinced that the Colorado Constitution must ultimately be interpreted by the Supreme Court of this state, I am uneasy with decisions of this court which reach a result different from the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of nearly identical language in the United States Constitution, particularly where, as in Sporleder, this court’s rationale for departing from the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment in favor of an interpretation of Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is never plainly demonstrated.
An individual has an expectation of privacy in the content of a telephone conversation, but no expectation of privacy attaches to the specific number which has been dialed. “It is the content of a conversation which the Constitution protects and not the information necessary to make the telephone connection.” Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 146 (Erickson, C.J., dissenting). The analysis applies with even greater force to toll records which document only those calls individually billed to the telephone subscriber.
When a person uses a telephone to make a toll call he knows that there will be a toll or charge incurred for the use of the phone. The calling number is billed on a monthly basis for toll calls reflected in the business records of the telephone company. Every person who uses a telephone expects to be billed for long distance calls and cannot reasonably invoke a claim that he has a right of privacy in the telephone records which reflect the toll calls he has made in a particular month.
In my view, the exclusionary rule should not be applied in this case because the law enforcement officers were acting with the reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. See section 16-3-308(2)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8 & 1983 Cum.Supp.). I believe that the Strike Force officers were acting in conformity with, and in reliance upon, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, when they obtained the toll records and that their conduct constituted a “technical violation” under section 16-3-308(2)(b).
The majority opinion states that, since Sporleder “was explicitly based on and foreshadowed by Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980)” (decided prior to the complained of conduct in this case), appellant’s good faith reliance on Smith v. Maryland was misplaced. In Chames, we held that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his bank records. There, we emphasized that the substance of the requested bank records was a protected interest. We did not find, however, that the fact that there may or may not have been a financial transaction was a protected interest.
The majority’s finding in this case necessarily requires of police officers a presci*33ence that eluded even the trial court judge.1 The concept of privacy can be traced to the United States Supreme Court’s development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Compare Goldman with Katz. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). In my view, law enforcement officers are entitled to rely upon the decisions of our highest court, and should not have to anticipate that a federally guaranteed constitutional right will be given a broader interpretation under an all but identical provision in a state constitution. Address by Professor William Greenhalgh, Georgetown University Law Center, National Conference on Developments in State Constitutional Law (March 9, 1984). “I cannot think of a sounder basis for law enforcement officers to act upon than a decision of the United States Supreme Court.” Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 152 (Rovira, J., dissenting). See section 16-3-308(2)(b), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8 & 1983 Cum.Supp.); Michigan v. Long, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (adopting a presumption against the existence of adequate and independent state grounds).
In my view, telephone subscribers have no legitimate expectation of privacy in toll records of the telephone company. I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice RO-VIRA joins me in this dissent.

. The record reveals that the trial court found initially that the toll records were legally obtained. Appellee then filed a motion to reconsider which was granted. The trial court, in reversing its earlier ruling, found:
"However, the Court finds that People v. Spor-leder is controlling in this case. That is certainly a very restrictive case, particularly when we consider that it is, in effect, far broader than the United States Supreme Court decision.

With that case decided, however, I feel that I must reverse my previous ruling, and will order that the evidence be suppressed."

(Emphasis supplied.)