Court Opinion

ID: 9403625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:07:38.47218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.392450
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0708
                              Filed June 21, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TYSHAUN DAMIRAEY McKINNEY,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J.

Shubatt, Judge.

      Tyshaun McKinney appeals his sentences for theft in the first degree and

going armed with intent. AFFIRMED.

      Chris Raker, East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
                                          2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

       Tyshaun McKinney appeals his sentences for theft in the first degree and

going armed with intent, asserting the district court improperly relied on the

contents of a sealed examination prepared for a transfer-of-jurisdiction hearing.

We find McKinney did not preserve error on his claims and affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

       On August 1, 2021, McKinney robbed a convenience store while wielding a

firearm. McKinney was sixteen years old at the time. McKinney was charged as

an adult with robbery in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.2

(2021), and assault while participating in a felony, in violation of section 708.3. The

trial information further indicated he would be subject to a sentencing

enhancement for using a handgun during the robbery as provided under Iowa

Code section 902.7.

       McKinney filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction of his case to the juvenile

court for adjudication and disposition. Juvenile court services prepared a waiver

investigation report recommending McKinney remain in adult court. McKinney had

a psychological evaluation prepared and submitted to the court ahead of the

hearing on his motion to transfer jurisdiction, requesting the evaluation be sealed

as confidential information. The court admitted the evaluation and sealed it at a

Level 3 security level.1 The court ultimately denied McKinney’s motion, finding the

1A document sealed at Level 3 security in adult cases in the court’s electronic filing
and case management system is accessible to participating attorneys, internal
court personnel, and clerks of court and judges. Iowa Judicial Branch, EDMS
Security Levels 4 (Feb. 3, 2023), https://www.iowacourts.gov/static/media/cms/E
DMSSecurityLevels_F52E0C9950721.pdf.
                                         3

juvenile system did not offer a viable placement option which would both serve the

child and protect society.

       After the court denied the motion to transfer, McKinney and the State

reached a plea agreement. McKinney pleaded guilty to amended charges of theft

in the first degree, in violation of section 714.2, and going armed with intent, in

violation of section 708.8.

       The plea agreement noted the State would argue for consecutive

sentences, and McKinney would be free to argue for a deferred or suspended

sentence. The presentence investigation report (PSI) recommended consecutive

sentences. The PSI investigator reviewed the psychological report and referenced

it in the final report. McKinney did not object to the use of the psychological

evaluation in the PSI.

       In its sentencing argument, the State referenced findings from the sealed

psychological evaluation submitted as part of McKinney’s motion to transfer to

juvenile court.2 The references were also included in the State’s resistance to the

motion to transfer filed several months earlier. McKinney did not object to the

references at the sentencing hearing, and his counsel used the references to

support mitigating factors of youth. During his own allocution, McKinney explained

some of his troubled history and then told the court

             And as the district attorney stated, that I woke up that day and
       thought it was going to be fun to go rob a convenience store, and
       note as I had stated to the judge beforehand, that—it’s in my PSI.
       That—it’s in my PSI that I told him that I woke up on different
       substances. I popped pills, smoked weed, and I woke up with a

2Considering the confidentiality concerns expressed in McKinney’s appeal, we do
not share here the exact language objected to.
                                        4

      cloudy mind, wasn’t thinking straight, and I walked in the store and I
      robbed the place.

      The court imposed the statutory sentence for each charge and ordered

them to run concurrently. McKinney appeals his sentences.3

II. Standard of Review.

      We will not reverse a district court’s sentencing decision “absent an abuse

of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Formaro, 638

N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion may occur

      if a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should
      have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an
      improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors
      but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a
      sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the
      facts of the case.

State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 138 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). If a court uses

an improper consideration in sentencing, “resentencing of the defendant is

required . . . even if it was merely a ‘secondary consideration.’” Damme, 944

N.W.2d at 106 (citation omitted).

III. Error Preservation.

      McKinney asserts at sentencing the district court erroneously relied on the

psychological evaluation filed as part of his motion to transfer. He argues the

information in the evaluation was confidential and the statements in the evaluation

were specific to the transfer hearing and not admissible under Iowa Code section

3“[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the
defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).
                                         5

232.45(11)(b).4 He claims the court’s use of the evaluation at sentencing violated

his due process rights and his right against self-incrimination.

       Generally speaking, “a defendant need not first challenge a district court’s

abuse of discretion at the time of sentencing to have the matter directly reviewed

on appeal.” State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Iowa 2018). As a matter of

fairness, we do not require a defendant at sentencing to “question the court’s

exercise of discretion or forever waive the right to assign the error on appeal.” Id.

(citation omitted). However, there are distinctions between claiming the sentence

is intrinsically unconstitutional and claiming errors in the proceedings prior to

imposition of sentence. Id. at 23.

       In Gordon, the defendant “claim[ed] the use of the risk assessment tools

violates his due process rights.” Id. at 23. The court noted the use of the risk

assessment tools was incorporated into Gordon’s PSI before sentencing, and,

after reviewing the report, Gordon did not object to the use of the tools. Id. The

claimed error “occurred in the proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence.” Id.

The court found, “Because Gordon’s claim does not involve the inherent power of

the court to sentence him for his crime, the normal rules of error preservation

apply.” Id.

       Here, McKinney is not claiming his sentence is intrinsically unconstitutional;

he claims use of his voluntarily-submitted psychological evaluation violates his due

process rights and right against self-incrimination. McKinney asserts error was

4Section 232.45(11)(b) provides, “Statements made by the child during intake or
at a waiver hearing held [to determine whether to proceed in juvenile or adult court]
are not admissible as evidence in chief against the child in subsequent criminal
proceedings over the child’s objection in any event.”
                                          6

preserved when the district court granted his motion to file the evaluation under

seal with a heightened security level. The State simply noted errors in sentencing

may be challenged on direct appeal even without an objection below. We do not

find either party’s error preservation statement applicable.

       As in Gordon, the error McKinney asserts was apparent at the time of the

PSI report and could have been raised with the court at the time of sentencing. “A

court has a right to rely on the information in the PSI when the defendant fails to

object to the information contained in the PSI.” Id. at 24.

       McKinney failed to object to the use of the evaluation in the PSI and its use

at sentencing.   Therefore, the court had a right to rely on the PSI and the

evaluation.   We find McKinney failed to preserve his due process and self-

incrimination claims for direct appeal.

       AFFIRMED.