Court Opinion

ID: 9709794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:54:54.857694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:51.525242
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause for trial. The dismissed counts contained factual allegations of potentially life-threatening structural defects and actions on the part of defendants which constitute wilful and wanton misconduct. If, as a result of one of the alleged defects, one of the plaintiffs had suffered personal injuries, or his property had been damaged or destroyed, the majority would agree that he had a cause of action. If the facts alleged, except for the absence of personal injuries or property damage, state a cause of action, the fortuitous circumstances that no such injury or damage was suffered should not bar it. This case is distinguishable from Moorman and Redarowicz, upon which the majority relies, in that in those cases the complaints contained no factual allegations that the defects were dangerous or life-threatening or which would support a finding of wilful and wanton misconduct. The majority opinion acknowledges that punitive damages may be recovered “when the conduct causing the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.” (112 Ill. 2d at 95.) I agree with the appellate court that the dismissed counts alleged a tort under this standard. Assuming, however, that they did not adequately allege a separate tort, I would adopt plaintiffs’ alternative argument that punitive damages should be awarded for wilful and wanton breach of contract even though there was no independent tort. The majority quotes from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: “ ‘Willful’ breaches have not been distinguished from other breaches, punitive damages have not been awarded for breach of contract, and specific performance has not been granted where compensation in damages is an adequate substitute for the injured party.” The foregoing quotation demonstrates precisely the defect in the position taken by the majority. Absent the assessment of punitive damages, a wilful violator of a contract incurs no sanction and bears only the costs of performance under the terms and conditions of his agreement. In many instances, the sum awarded is not subject to prejudgment interest, and absent a specific provision, the wronged party cannot recover his attorney fees. No rational basis presents itself for holding that wilful misconduct arising out of a breach of contract should not be discouraged in the same manner as wilful misconduct resulting in a tort. In this jurisdiction both legislative enactments and the decisions of this court have recognized the function and efficacy of punitive damages. In Mattyasovzky v. West Towns Bus Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 31, the court stated: “[P]unitive damages are awarded primarily to punish the offender and to discourage other offenses. Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973); Prosser, Law of Torts 9 (4th ed. 1971). The underlying strength of these objectives of punishment and deterrence varies substantially from case to case. Where, for example, the defendant has benefited by his misconduct, a judgment which only compensates the plaintiff for what he has lost would permit the defendant to keep his wrongful gain.” 61 Ill. 2d 31, 35. It is time that we acknowledge and excise from the body of law of this State the artificial distinction perpetuated by the majority opinion. As the result of the reversal of the judgment, plaintiffs will be the inadequately compensated victims of defendants’ misconduct, and defendants will be permitted to keep their wrongful gains. I respectfully dissent.