Court Opinion

ID: 9488102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:36:32.029165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:41.851904
License: Public Domain

DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
If I thought we had jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal, I would agree with the conclusion that the challenged charter provision is constitutional. I am not persuaded, however, that jurisdiction exists.
This question turns, as the court’s opinion recognizes, on the applicability of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine. The doctrine requires more than a theoretical possibility that there will be a repetition of the complaining party’s grievance; the plaintiff must show a “reasonable expectation” that he or she (or members of the class he or she represents) will be subjected to the challenged action again. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348-49, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975); Dean v. Austin, 602 F.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045, 100 S.Ct. 733, 62 L.Ed.2d 731 (1980); and Speer v. City of Oregon, 847 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir.1988), all of which refer to the “reasonable expectation” requirement. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 400, 95 S.Ct. 553, 558, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), where the Court stressed that “it is clear that [Iowa] will enforce [its durational residency requirement for plaintiffs in divorce actions] against those persons in the class that appellant sought to represent and that the District Court certified.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As far as the two candidates in the case at bar are concerned, the record does not show that either of them is likely to be unwilling or unable to pay his taxes while running for office in the future. We cannot simply assume that having defaulted once, they are likely to default again. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320, 108 S.Ct. 592, 602, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), pointing out that the Supreme Court has generally “been unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of [a governmentally inflicted] injury.”
As far as the plaintiff voters are concerned, the record does not suggest that the charter provision is likely in future to deprive them of the chance to vote for anyone else they might be inclined to support. The charter provision was in effect for a quarter of a century before it was invoked to keep Messrs. Cook and Bumstead from running for office. It does not appear that anyone who was delinquent in paying his taxes had ever been tempted to enter an electoral race in the City of Newaygo prior to the year in which Cook and Bumstead did so, and I know of nothing in the record to indicate that there is a reasonable expectation that anyone in this situation will be so tempted again. In most places, at least, a candidate’s nonpayment of taxes, if made public, is something that could cost him or her votes — and candidates generally find it prudent to avoid alienating potential voters unnecessarily.
Durational residency requirements are different. Ours is a highly mobile society, and there was clearly a reasonable probability that the durational residency requirement involved in Sosna v. Iowa would actually keep some people from getting divorced in future years, just as it was clear that the durational residency requirement involved in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), would actually keep some people from voting in future years. The chances are far more remote that future candidates will wish to run for office in Newaygo while in default to the city.1 It is neither necessary nor appropriate *1219for us to rule on the Newaygo ordinance if the ordinance is not reasonably likely to trip up candidates in the future — and, as far as I can see, the ordinance is not in fact likely to do so. I would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

. Notwithstanding that Newaygo has fewer than 1500 inhabitants, I agree with my colleagues on the panel that there could again come a time when some Newaygoan might wish to run for office while in default on his taxes. But the fact that something of the same sort happened 14 years ago in a resort town in Delaware (see the case cited in footnote 2 of the court's opinion) does not persuade me that Newaygo is at all *1219likely to experience a recurrence of this particular problem.
Although it is true that there would have been no reason for the voters of Newaygo to adopt the ballot access provision in the first place if they had not recognized the possibility that tax delinquents might wish to run for office, I do not think it necessarily follows that the voters had a "reasonable expectation” that this situation would actually arise. There are plenty of small towns with election ordinances that have never had to be enforced at all, much less enforced in more than one election season, because no one has ever felt inclined to violate them.