Court Opinion

ID: 9390312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:05:33.509994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.615358
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023
                                                            TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                    2021-SC-0479-MR

DONNIE CAMPBELL                                                         APPELLANT

                     ON APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
V.                  HONORABLE JUDY VANCE MURPHY, JUDGE
                               NO. 20-CR-00090

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                  OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CONLEY

                    AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART

      An Adair Circuit Court jury found Donnie Campbell guilty of first-degree

assault, first-degree robbery, and violating a domestic violence order (DVO).

The jury also found Campbell to be a persistent felony offender in the first

degree and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment, which the trial court

then imposed. Campbell appeals to this Court as a matter of right.1 He claims

the trial court erred because it: Allowed testimony via Zoom; permitted the

Commonwealth’s witness to testify despite a purported discovery violation;

failed to strike a juror for cause; refused to grant a mistrial; and failed to grant

a directed verdict on first-degree assault and first-degree robbery. Campbell

further contends the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
during closing argument. Finally, Campbell urges this Court to overturn his

conviction based on cumulative error. We find the trial court committed error

when it permitted a witness to testify via Zoom and hold that error requires

reversal of the conviction of assault in the first-degree but affirm the Adair

Circuit Court on the remaining convictions and the resultant life sentence.

                   I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Felicia Woolridge had an intimate relationship with Campbell for

approximately three years, and eventually, Campbell came to reside with her at

her home on Pinetree Street in Columbia. In December of 2019, Felicia

obtained a domestic violence order (DVO) against Campbell. Campbell then

moved out of her residence and left Columbia entirely.

      After Campbell left, Felicia began a friendship with Michael Smith. Felicia

denied that she and Smith were involved romantically but when Campbell

returned in May of 2020, he did not want them talking anymore. Felicia

acquiesced because she wanted to work things out with Campbell. Both men

became jealous of one another, and after several serious physical

confrontations transpired between Campbell and Smith, it escalated to the

matter currently before this Court.

      On May 22, 2020, Smith came home from work and was relaxing at his

home. He had recently gotten paid and had approximately $170 on his person.

He was sitting in a chair and listening to music when he noticed someone walk

by his window. At first, he thought it was his brother. He was suddenly struck

on his shoulder and fell to the floor. He saw it was Campbell holding a steel

                                         2
pipe standing over him. Smith played dead while Campbell beat him several

times with the weapon and took his wallet and left.

      When he was sure that Campbell had fled, he ran to his landlord Billy

Wheat’s house for help. Billy called for an ambulance and when Chad Wheat,

(no relation) the emergency medical technician (EMT) arrived, he saw that

Smith was covered in blood and had lost consciousness for approximately

forty-five seconds. EMT Wheat also observed that Smith had numerous

lacerations and a one square inch chunk of flesh missing from his head where

he could see Smith’s skull.2 Smith also had a large swelling on the back of his

neck. He was transported to the local hospital where a computerized

topography (CT) scan of his head and neck was administered. The CT scan

discovered his cervical spine was fractured. Melissa Snead, a registered nurse

(RN), sutured the lacerations but was unable to do so for the avulsion on the

back of his head. Smith had to be transported to the University of Kentucky’s

Medical Center because it was determined he required further treatment at the

trauma center there.

      EMT Wheat drove the ambulance that transported Smith to Lexington.

While enroute, Smith experienced a severe drop in blood pressure. When it

registered at 66/40, Wheat pulled the ambulance over to administer fluids in

order to stabilize Smith. When they arrived at the University of Kentucky

      2  Dr. Tucker, mentioned below, diagnosed this as an avulsion and described it
as if part of Smith’s scalp was scooped out.

                                          3
Medical Center the swelling on the back of Smith’s neck was the size of a

softball.

      While at UK, Smith was treated by Dr. Brian Tucker. Dr. Tucker

diagnosed Smith as having a fractured skull located at the back of his head, a

concussion, a hematoma and swelling on the back of his head and neck, a

cervical spine fracture, broken nose, and an avulsion on the back of his head.

      Campbell was arrested at Felicia’s house shortly after the 911 call was

made. On June 25, 2020, an Adair County grand jury indicted Campbell for

assault in the first-degree, robbery in the first-degree, violation of a domestic

violence order and being a persistent felony offender in the first-degree. After a

two-day trial the jury convicted Campbell on all counts and recommended a

sentence of life imprisonment. The circuit court accepted the recommendation

of the jury and sentenced Campbell accordingly. Further facts will be adduced

as necessary. We now discuss the merits of the appeal.

                                     II.   ANALYSIS

      First, Campbell argues the trial court erred by permitting a witness to

testify via Zoom which violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the

6th Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 Secondly, he claims the

trial court erred by not excluding expert testimony because of the

Commonwealth’s purported discovery violation. Next Campbell claims that

during voir dire the trial court erred by failing to grant the defense motion to

      3  Campbell did not argue at trial, nor does he here claim any violation of his
right of confrontation under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.

                                            4
strike a juror for cause. Campbell also argues the trial court ought to have

granted a mistrial upon motion of the defense when Smith claimed he was at

risk of being paralyzed. Campbell further argues that the trial court erred by

not granting a directed verdict on both the assault in the first-degree and

robbery in the first-degree. Campbell also contends the Commonwealth

committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and finally,

Campbell argues that the errors in this case require reversal under the

cumulative error doctrine.

   A. The trial court erred by allowing Dr. Tucker to testify via Zoom
      which requires reversal of the assault in the first degree conviction.

      Campbell argues that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Tucker to

testify via Zoom in violation of his right of confrontation afforded by the 6th

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Dr. Tucker’s testimony about the extent

of Smith’s injuries was relevant to prove Smith sustained a serious physical

injury,4 an essential element of assault in the first degree.5 Campbell preserved

this issue by making contemporaneous objections.

      On the morning of trial, the Commonwealth informed the court and

Campbell’s attorney that it would have Dr. Tucker testify remotely via Zoom. As

justification the Commonwealth stated Dr. Tucker was scheduled to work that

      4  KRS 500.080 (17): “‘Serious physical injury’ means physical injury which
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged
disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ.”
       5 KRS 508.010: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (a) He

intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument[.]”

                                          5
day at the hospital and would be unable to travel to Adair County, a distance of

approximately one hundred miles. Although neither party addresses it, we note

Dr. Tucker’s subpoena is dated August 11, 2021, and he was served on the

18th of August, only one day prior to his scheduled testimony.6

      Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). The

test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary,

unfair, unreasonable or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth

v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the

accused in all criminal prosecutions the right to be “confronted with the

witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right of confrontation is

also enshrined in Kentucky’s Constitution that guarantees “in all criminal

prosecutions the accused has the right . . . . to meet the witnesses face to face.”

Ky. Const. §11. Courts have long recognized that the right of confrontation is

one of the “fundamental guaranties of life and liberty[.]” Kirby v. United States,

174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899). And the primary purpose of which is to compel the

witness “to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,

and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives

his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.

237, 242–43 (1895).

      6   The trial began on August 18, 2021.

                                           6
      At times courts have grappled with issues on the application of the Sixth

Amendment right of confrontation. Courts have had to decide, for instance,

whether certain rules admitting hearsay evidence conflicted with the right of

defendant to confront witnesses against them. The United States Supreme

Court in Ohio v. Roberts was faced with the issue of whether testimony given

during a preliminary hearing was admissible at trial. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). They

held the Sixth Amendment merely expressed a preference for face-to-face

confrontation. Id. at 65. The Court in Roberts reasoned that defendants’

confrontation rights must occasionally give way to competing interests of

“public policy and the necessities of the case.” Id. at 64 (citing Mattox v. United

States, 156 U.S. at 243). Thus, hearsay was permitted as long as it was firmly

rooted in a hearsay exception or bore a “sufficient indicia of reliability.” Id. at

66.

      The idea that confrontation rights, as guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment, required “balancing” with competing interests of public policy led

courts to weigh the rights of the accused against the state’s interest in

protecting child sex abuse victims from re-traumatization by their purported

abuser. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing the Iowa Supreme Court, held that

a screen placed between the two thirteen-year-old victims and the defendant

violated his right of confrontation. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). As part

of its reasoning the Court commented that:

         [F]ace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful
      rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may
      confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached

                                          7
      by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections
      have costs.

Id. at 1020. However, two years later the Court upheld a different method that

sought to avoid re-traumatization of a minor sex-abuse victim. In a Maryland

case, a state statute allowed a minor to testify via a one-way closed-circuit

monitor. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990). Under this procedure the

child, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel retired to a different room, while

the judge, jury, and the defendant remained in the courtroom. Id. at 841. In a

5-4 ruling the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right of

confrontation is not absolute and a “[s]tate's interest in the physical and

psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to

outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers

in court.” Id. at 853. The Court explained that there must be an adequate

showing of necessity on a case specific basis. Id. at 855. The Court even went

so far as to opine that face-to-face confrontation, while a core constitutional

value is not the “sine qua non7 of the confrontation right.” Craig, 497 U.S. 836

at 847.

       Central to the Court’s holding in Craig is that it was based upon its

understanding of the confrontation clause as articulated by Ohio v. Roberts,

497 U.S. 836 (1990). This approach allowed courts to balance competing

interests of “public policy and the necessities of the case.” Id. at 64 (citing

      7 “Sine qua non” is defined as Latin for “without which not. A thing that is
absolutely indispensable or essential.” Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd ed. 1910).

                                           8
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243). This conception of the Confrontation Clause was

lambasted by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Craig. He argued that:

             The Court supports its antitextual conclusion by cobbling
      together scraps of dicta from various cases that have no bearing
      here. It will suffice to discuss one of them, since they are all of a
      kind: Quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531,
      2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Court says that “[i]n sum, our
      precedents establish that ‘the Confrontation Clause reflects
      a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ ” ante, at 3165.
      (emphasis added by the Court). But Roberts, and all the other
      “precedents” the Court enlists to prove the implausible, dealt with
      the implications of the Confrontation Clause, and not its literal,
      unavoidable text.

Craig, 497 U.S. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He roundly condemned the

balancing test promulgated under Roberts and Craig, stating “[f]or good or bad,

the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, and we are not at liberty to

ignore it.” Id. at 870. His dissent foreshadowed the latter majority opinion he

authored in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).

      Roberts is now overruled by Crawford v. Washington. Id. In Crawford, the

Court reversed itself by holding that the Sixth Amendment does not merely

express a preference for face-to-face confrontation, rather, “[i]t commands, not

that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular

manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. Crawford rejected

the replacement of “categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended

balancing tests . . .” Id. at 67-68. And “[w]here testimonial statements are

at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional

demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Id. at

68-69.

                                          9
      And yet, almost twenty years after Crawford, Maryland v. Craig, remains

“good law.” 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990). The U.S. Supreme Court has not dealt

with the inherent contradiction between Crawford and Craig. But a Sixth

Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals decision upheld a conviction that utilized the

procedure as authorized by Craig in United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479 (6th

Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 754 (Mem) (2018). Judge Sutton in a

separate concurrence wondered how Craig can “survive in the absence of the

Roberts balancing test?” Id. at 494 (Sutton, J., concurring). Because, he

opined, “Craig relied heavily, indeed almost entirely, on Roberts to justify its

decision.” Id. at 492.

      The courts in this Commonwealth have also been reluctant to address

the contradiction between Craig and Crawford. In a case decided four years

after Crawford, this Court in Sparkman v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 667 (Ky.

2008), ruled it was error to allow the Commonwealth to utilize the procedures

under KRS 421.3508 where the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate a

compelling need. Id. at 670. Nonetheless, we held it was harmless and

ultimately upheld the conviction. Id. at 671. Nowhere in this Court’s analysis in

Sparkman do we address the latent incongruity of relying on Craig in the wake

of the decision in Crawford.

      There are some recent unpublished cases where the Court of Appeals

and this Court weighed in on the issue of using two-way video conferencing,

      8  KRS 421.350 is entitled “Testimony of child allegedly victim of illegal sexual
activity.”

                                           10
i.e., Zoom, during the pandemic. As such, the facts are similar to the issues

presented in this case but have yielded somewhat inconsistent results. The

Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s decision9 which overruled the

Commonwealth’s motion to use Zoom technology to permit a witness to testify

for trial because he was located at a federal correctional facility in Manchester,

Kentucky. Gardner v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-1383-MR, 2021 WL

3573304 (Ky. App. Aug.13, 2021). The Court of Appeals panel analyzed the

case under Craig and reasoned that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate a

compelling need. Id. at *4.

      This Court was faced with a similar issue when a defendant objected to

the use of Zoom teleconferencing during his sentencing hearing. Gibson v.

Commonwealth, No. 2020-SC-0250-MR, 2021 WL 3828558 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2021).

Gibson was initially charged with murder after stabbing three people and

killing one of them. He had entered a plea agreement to second-degree

manslaughter and two counts of second-degree assault. The recommended

sentence was twenty years. Id. at *1. At the sentencing hearing, held on May 4,

2020, the trial court utilized Zoom and sentenced him according to the terms of

the plea agreement. Id. We upheld the decision of the lower court under Craig’s

rationale. Id. at *4. This Court also pointed to our own administrative orders

allowing testimony via Zoom. Id. Our decision in Gibson and our decision here

can be reconciled by pointing out the present case involved a jury trial in

August of 2021 after the worst of the pandemic had receded and courts were

      9   The hearing was held on October 7, 2020.

                                          11
functioning more or less normally; conversely Gibson’s sentencing hearing took

place right at the beginning of the pandemic in May of 2020 when courts were

severely curtailed in their normal functioning. Also, at a sentencing hearing,

the trial court is the finder of fact and the court did not depart from the

sentence voluntarily agreed upon by both the defendant and the

Commonwealth. Id. at *1.

      This Court does not have the authority to overrule the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Craig. And because Campbell failed to argue that

his Section 11 rights of confrontation under the Kentucky Constitution were

violated, we will not use this opportunity to depart from federal precedent.

Therefore, as Judge Sutton explained in his concurring opinion in United

States v. Cox, “Craig governs us here, as junior courts may not overrule the

handiwork of their superiors.” 871 F.3d at 492.

      In the present case, Dr. Tucker testified remotely via Zoom for Campbell’s

trial. We are unable to determine the audio-visual quality of the Zoom

testimony the jury enjoyed, but upon review of the record Dr. Tucker appears

in the lower right quadrant of the screen and the visual is blurry and

fragmented. The other three quadrants are filled by the judge, the prosecutor,

and the defense attorney. It does not appear Dr. Tucker could view either the

appellant or the members of the jury when he testified to the extent of Smith’s

injuries and course of treatment at the University of Kentucky’s Medical

Center. The Commonwealth argued that Dr. Tucker needed to testify via Zoom

because he was needed at the hospital and could not travel to Adair County to

                                        12
be present at the trial. Again, we note this trial took place at the tail end of the

pandemic in August of 2021. The Commonwealth urges this Court to accept

that this supports a finding of necessity as contemplated by Craig.

      But the Commonwealth’s reliance on Craig is misplaced. The witnesses

in Craig were victims of sexual abuse and were minors at the time of their

testimony. Those procedures were put in place to protect them from the

potential of traumatization by confronting, and being confronted by, the

perpetrator of said crimes. This was found necessary because there was no

other way for the children to testify without the attendant psychological impact

of being in the physical presence of the defendant. Here, we have what

amounts to a scheduling difficulty between the Commonwealth and Dr. Tucker,

which was likely caused by the belated issuance of the subpoena. While this

could have been remedied with a continuance, it was certainly not a matter of

necessity.

       Appellees also point to the administrative orders from this Court

encouraging the use of zoom for remote testimony. In the relevant order we

state that “[c]ourts are encouraged to continue hearing civil and criminal

matters using available telephonic and video technology to conduct

proceedings remotely.” Supreme Court of Kentucky Amended Administrative

Order 2021-27 (B)(1). The administrative orders from this Court were intended

to encourage the use of remote technology within the context of the parties’

constitutional rights. The orders from this Court never purported to replace the

U.S. Constitution or the Kentucky Constitution but rather must be interpreted

                                         13
within those frameworks. There are many proceedings which could be

contemplated under this order. For instance: criminal motion hour, routine

hearings, a trial in which a defendant waives a confrontation issue because his

right to a speedy trial is more important to him. However, in this instance, we

are dealing with a jury trial where the defendant was facing a considerable

amount of jail time and the Commonwealths’ expert witness testimony was

crucial in proving a key element of the assault charge. The defendant,

understandably, objected to the Zoom testimony of the doctor and insisted on a

face-to-face confrontation which was countered by the Commonwealth with the

argument the doctor was too busy to comply with the subpoena.10 Clearly this

situation does not comply with Crawford, but neither does it comply with

Craig. There was no showing of necessity, other than convenience to the doctor,

or balancing of a victim’s interests that justified the surrender of the

Defendant’s constitutional rights of confrontation. Thus, by allowing Dr.

Tucker to testify via Zoom as a convenience to him, the trial court erred.

      Since we have determined that there is a confrontation clause error we

must decide “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence

complained of might have contributed to the conviction . . . or put

otherwise, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Talbott v.

Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 24 (1967)). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that:

      An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of
      whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or

      10   The record indicates that Dr. Tucker testified from home and not the hospital.

                                            14
      the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation;
      such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and
      harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the
      remaining evidence.

Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021–22. Dr. Tucker’s testimony was relevant to whether

Campbell was guilty of assault in the first-degree. The Commonwealth, in order

to obtain a conviction, was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Smith had sustained a serious physical injury. Serious physical injury is

defined by KRS 500.080 (17), the relevant portion of which states:

      "Serious physical injury" means physical injury which creates a
      substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged
      disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss
      or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

Dr. Tucker’s testimony conveyed to the jury the extent of the injuries suffered

by the victim. During his testimony he frequently referred to Smith’s medical

records, which were also admitted as evidence. He noted that Smith suffered a

fracture of the third vertebrae of his cervical spine (C3) and multiple fractures

of the C6. Dr. Tucker also stated that there was a fracture to the base of his

skull, a concussion, a swelling on the base of his skull, and the aforementioned

avulsion. On cross-examination, Campbell was able to elicit that Smith did not

require a blood-transfusion nor was he intubated. Dr. Tucker conceded that

Smith did not require surgical intervention and he appeared alert and oriented.

      The Commonwealth had other witnesses that testified to the extent of

Smith’s injuries. EMT Wheat testified Smith lost consciousness for almost a

minute, his extensive bleeding, and the large hole located in the rear of his

head that exposed a portion of Smith’s skull. When EMT Wheat transported

                                        15
Smith to Lexington, he had to stop the ambulance and administer fluids

because his blood pressure became dangerously low. The Commonwealth

introduced photographs of the crime scene which showed a substantial

amount of blood on the floor and the portion of the exposed skull. Melissa

Snead, a registered nurse, testified that the results of the CT scan showed

fractures of the C3 and C5 vertebrae of the cervical spine. The Commonwealth

also introduced the certified medical records from the University of Kentucky

and T.J. Sampson Hospital in Columbia, where Smith was initially taken.

      These records, and records from Smith’s follow-up appointment were

reviewed by Dr. William Ralston, the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s Chief

Medical Examiner who testified on behalf of the appellant. Dr. Ralston testified

that upon review of Smith’s medical records he concluded that Smith was not

likely to die from the wounds he received. He based his conclusion primarily

on the lack of intra-cranial bleeding which is more commonly associated with

risk of death. He did note that Smith sustained multiple fractures of the neck,

nose and a fracture at the base of the skull. This is consistent with the

testimony of Dr. Tucker. Campbell also called Dr. Kiteck who saw Smith for a

follow up appointment on July 20, 2020, approximately five weeks after the

assault, to remove the staples from his head. He noted no other complications

from the attack. At trial, Smith testified that he still suffered from stiffness of

his neck and hears a popping sound when he turns his head.

      Considering all the testimony given by all the witnesses, this Court

cannot be confident that the trial court’s decision to allow a doctor to testify

                                         16
remotely, on an essential element of the Commonwealth’s case, is harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. And because there is a reasonable possibility his

testimony contributed to the guilty verdict on the charge of assault in the first-

degree, we reverse the judgment of the Adair Circuit Court on that charge.

   B. The trial court did not err by refusing to grant a directed verdict on
      robbery in the first-degree.

      Campbell argues the trial court erred by not granting his motion for a

directed verdict on robbery in the first degree. Campbell claims that Smith’s

testimony was the only evidence at trial to support a conviction for robbery and

his testimony was too unreliable to defeat a motion for a directed verdict on

that charge. This Court has previously stated that:

             On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
      fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
      Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
      juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
      ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
      for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions
      as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). The standard of

review for an appellate court on reviewing a lower court’s decision regarding a

directed verdict is, “if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly

unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is a defendant entitled to a

directed verdict of acquittal.” Id.

      The jury convicted Campbell of robbery in the first-degree. Robbery in

the first-degree is defined by KRS 515.020(1) which states as follows:

      A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course
      of committing theft, he or she uses or threatens the immediate use
                                        17
      of physical force upon another person with intent to accomplish
      the theft and when he or she: (a) Causes physical injury to any
      person who is not a participant in the crime; or (b) Is armed with a
      deadly weapon; or (c) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a
      dangerous instrument upon any person who is not a participant in
      the crime.

Smith testified that Campbell used a steel rod to strike him repeatedly and

thus caused at the very minimum, physical injury. Smith also testified it was

Campbell who rolled him over and stole his wallet. Smith’s testimony was

uncontroverted at trial. Since Smith admitted to using alcohol and marijuana

that evening, Campbell argues, his testimony should be disregarded as

unreliable. Campbell also claims Smith’s credibility was tarnished because he

was less than forthright about his cocaine usage. At trial, Smith did not admit

to using cocaine that evening or the previous week even though cocaine

metabolites were found in his system at the hospital. Additionally, Campbell

argues the Commonwealth ought to have tested the wallet for fingerprints or

the presence of Campbell’s DNA to corroborate Smith’s testimony.

      Campbell urges this Court to apply Collinsworth v. Commonwealth, 476

S.W.2d 201, 202 (Ky. 1972), a case regarding circumstantial evidence and

directed verdicts. But the application of Collinsworth here is unwarranted

despite Campbell’s mischaracterization of Smith’s testimony as circumstantial

evidence. It is not. Additionally, Smith’s testimony was corroborated by the

numerous injuries he sustained as a result of the attack. Ultimately it is the

jury that makes determinations as to a witness’s credibility. McDaniel v.

Commonwealth, 415 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Ky. 2013). The jury here heard the

evidence, and it was not clearly unreasonable that they determined Campbell
                                       18
committed the offense of robbery in the first-degree. The trial court did not

commit error by failing to grant a directed verdict.

   C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to strike juror
      353 for cause.

      Campbell argues that, by failing to strike juror 353, the trial court

violated his right to an impartial jury. At trial, Campbell moved to strike juror

353 because of statements she made to the court as detailed below. Defendants

are entitled an impartial jury as guaranteed by Section 11 of the Kentucky

Constitution and by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution. Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 604, 612 (Ky. 2008). The

Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “[w]hen there is reasonable

ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial

verdict on the evidence, that juror shall be excused as not qualified.” RCr

9.36(1). A trial court’s decision on whether to strike a juror for cause lies within

the sound discretion of the trial court. Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d

762, 780 (Ky. 2013). Upon review, an appellate court will not reverse the trial

court’s decision unless it is an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous. Id. The

trial court’s decision on whether to strike a juror should be made “on the

totality of the circumstances, not on a response to any one question.” Fugett v.

Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 604, 613 (Ky. 2008). Should a trial court abuse

its discretion in its failure to strike a juror for cause, the error cannot be said

to be harmless and requires reversal. Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336

(Ky. 2007). This issue is preserved by Campbell.

                                         19
      Campbell’s objection to juror 353 is based on her disclosure to the court

that her father had suffered a severe injury that exposed a portion of his bone

in his leg. The juror admitted she gets anxious when she sees blood. This,

Campbell claims, would cause her to evaluate any injury at issue on a purely

emotional basis rather than according to the evidence presented at trial.

Campbell also claims this juror’s squeamishness would cause her to be

reluctant to view any pictures of injuries in this case. This sensitivity to this

type of injury does not amount to a type of bias but rather is a normal human

reaction. Jurors are expected to evaluate evidence in all kinds of tragic and

highly emotionally charged cases and there is no requirement an impartial jury

be comprised of stonily impassive jurors.

       Campbell also claims juror 353 ought to have been stuck for cause

because she informed the court her mother-in-law and sister-in-law are

nurses. She stated to the court she found nurses to be credible on medical

issues and would likely believe a nurse over a lay witness on medical issues.

But she added, she would not believe a nurse over a lay witness over

something not medically related. Juror 353 merely stated she finds people with

medical experience and training better able to evaluate and diagnose medical

issues better than somebody without any medical experience or training. This

has little to do with members of her family being part of the nursing profession.

Campbell’s argument would be stronger if juror 353 declared a nurse had more

credibility over a doctor or other medical professional but she did not. Further,

Campbell’s claims of bias only relate to the issue of serious physical injury and

                                         20
since we have overturned the first-degree assault conviction, Campbell’s claims

of juror bias are without merit here. Hence, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by refusing to strike juror 353.

   D. Campbell’s remaining claims of error

      Campbell has six remaining claims of error. They are (1) that the trial

court erred when it failed to exclude Dr. Tucker from testifying because of a

purported discovery violation, and (2) failed to grant Campbell’s motion for

mistrial, (3) and the trial court’s failure to grant a directed verdict on the

charge of assault in the first degree, (4) and purported prosecutorial

misconduct during closing arguments.

      Campbell’s remaining convictions do not require reversal under the

cumulative error doctrine under Brown v. Commonwealth as we have found no

further errors. 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). As for the remainder of

Campbell’s claims, any alleged errors the trial court may have made relate

solely to Campbell’s conviction on assault in the first-degree. These are now

moot since we have reversed the judgment of the trial court on the conviction of

assault in the first-degree.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

   Based on the foregoing, we hereby reverse the judgment of conviction on the

charge of assault in the first-degree but affirm the Adair Circuit Court on the

conviction of robbery in the first-degree, violating a domestic violence order,

and being a persistent felon in the first-degree and his resultant sentence of life

                                         21
imprisonment. We now remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

   All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur.

Thompson, J., concurs by separate opinion. Lambert, J., concurs in result only

by separate opinion.

   THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING: I write separately to emphasize that as to

the issue regarding violation of the Confrontation Clause by having the doctor

testify remotely, it is the Commonwealth Attorney who is at fault for causing

this reversal. This emergency room doctor, located one-hundred miles away

from the trial venue, was served with a subpoena the day before the trial. This

is intolerable. It is unrealistic to expect such a witness to be able to arrange to

attend a trial in person with such short notice.

      Adequate preparation for a trial must include issuance of subpoenas to

doctors as soon as practical after the trial date is set. Doctors and other

professionals deserve the courtesy of the judicial branch of our government and

while other witnesses may not require quite as much notice, all witnesses may

have other commitments they will need to rearrange to attend court. The

majority opinion should serve as a warning that the defendant’s right to

confrontation will not be set aside where the failure of a witness to personally

appear is caused by the Commonwealth’s failure to act with all prudent

diligence.

                                         22
      LAMBERT, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: I fully agree with the

majority’s adoption of the two-part Maryland v. Craig11 test to determine

whether a criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights have been violated

when a witness testifies via two-way video conferencing. I further agree that

Craig’s requirements were not met in this case. However, I would hold that the

trial court’s error in permitting Dr. Tucker to testify via Zoom in this case was

harmless error. Notwithstanding, I concur in the result of Campbell’s first-

degree assault conviction being vacated because I believe the trial court

committed reversible error in failing to grant Campbell’s motion for directed

verdict for that offense. I therefore concur in result only.

      To begin, I agree that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Tucker to

testify via two-way video conferencing because doing so violated Campbell’s

confrontation clause rights. I further agree with the majority’s conclusion that

Craig is the proper test to apply when the Commonwealth seeks to have a

witness testify using two-way video conferencing. Despite the ongoing debate

concerning whether Craig can survive in a post-Crawford v. Washington12

world, the United States Supreme Court has yet to explicitly overrule Craig and

it therefore remains good law. And, although the United States Supreme Court

has yet to address the application of the Confrontation Clause within the

context of two-way video conferencing, nearly all of the federal circuit courts

apply Craig to determine whether a witness’ testimony via two-way video

      11   497 U.S. 836 (1990).
      12   541 U.S. 36 (2004).

                                        23
violated a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation.13 It is also worth noting

that Craig has been applied by the federal circuits in cases wherein the witness

to testify by two-way video was not an alleged victim of child sex abuse.14

      Under Craig, “a defendant’s right to confront accusatory witnesses may

be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where

denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy

and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”15 And,

“[t]he requisite finding of necessity must. . . be a case-specific one: The trial

court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the [two-way video

conferencing] is necessary to [serve the important public policy].”16

      In this case, during an in chambers discussion on the morning of the

first day of trial, the Commonwealth represented to the trial court that Dr.

Tucker could not be physically present because he was scheduled to work in

an emergency room in Lexington, and could not get his shift covered to make

the four to five hour round trip to Adair County. The Commonwealth made it

seem as though Dr. Tucker took care of COVID patients, noting this Court’s

      13   See U.S. v. Cotto-Flores, 970 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2020); U.S. v. Abu Ali, 528
F.3d 210, 242 (4th Cir. 2008); Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 2007);
U.S. v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 753 (6th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Protho, 41 F.4th 812, 827
(7th Cir.); U.S. v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 554 (8th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Carter, 907 F.3d
1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2018); U.S. v. Carrier, 9 F.3d 867, 869 (10th Cir. 1993); and U.S.
v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006). It appears the Third Circuit has yet to
opine on the issue, and the Second Circuit remains an outlier in its holding that Craig
does not apply to two-way video testimony based on its reasoning that two-way video
preserves the face-to-face confrontation absent in the one-way video system used in
Craig. See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999).
        14 See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 241; Horn, 508 F.3d at 313; and Yates, 438 F.3d at

1315.
        15 Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
        16 See id. at 855.

                                           24
approval of video conferencing in response to COVID. The trial court seemed to

take this representation on faith and ruled that Dr. Tucker was “a busy ER

doctor in the middle of a COVID pandemic who’s stepping away from patients

on respirators.” While accommodating a COVID physician could potentially be

an important public policy to be served, there is nothing concrete in the record

to support this assertion. According to Dr. Tucker’s own testimony, he is an

emergency room trauma surgeon who sees severely injured emergency room

patients. He testified that it was a busy time of the year for trauma until the

weather gets cold but said nothing of being overwhelmed with COVID patients.

He made no representations whatsoever that he was actively treating COVID

patients, or that his schedule could not be worked around because of his work

treating COVID patients. Dr. Tucker’s CV is not included in the record on

appeal and was not provided to the defense until the morning of the second day

of trial.

       Accordingly, as I understand the majority to hold that the

Commonwealth did not make an adequate showing of necessity under Craig, I

agree that allowing Dr. Tucker to testify via two-way video conferencing was

error. But I submit this error was harmless. “Confrontation clause errors are

subject to a harmless error standard of review. Before a federal constitutional

error can be held harmless, the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief

that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”17 An error is considered

       17 See, e.g., Quist v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Ky. App. 2010)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

                                         25
harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

contribute to the verdict obtained.18 While I ultimately assert that there was

insufficient evidence of serious physical injury, assuming arguendo that the

evidence was sufficient, Dr. Tucker’s testimony was cumulative when

considered alongside the other evidence as to Smith’s injuries. I would

therefore argue that its omission would not have changed the outcome beyond

a reasonable doubt, rendering it harmless. A recitation of the evidence of

Smith’s injuries is necessary.

      Smith testified that on the evening of Friday, May 22, 2020, he was

sitting in a chair in his home when Campbell gained entry and struck him on

the left shoulder. Smith fell to the floor and Campbell continued to beat him

with what Smith described as a “steel pipe” about his head and neck. Smith

said he “played dead” until Campbell stopped beating him and left. Smith was

then able to, according to his own words, jump up, go out his front door, jump

over the railing on his porch, run across the street and through a field until he

got to his landlord’s house who he told to call 911. Photographs of the two

large lacerations on the back and side of his head were admitted during his

testimony. He testified that the wounds required staples that were later

removed, and that apart from scarring he does not have any issues with those

injuries. Smith further testified that he was kept at UK Hospital for

approximately forty-eight hours and was given a neck brace to wear upon

discharge. He stated that he sometimes wears the neck brace when he sleeps,

      18   See, e.g., Stewart v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Ky. 2010).

                                           26
and when he does not his neck becomes stiff and “pops.” However, during

cross-examination he acknowledged that he has not sought any additional

medical care for his neck, that he did not have any follow up care after the

attack other than having his staples removed, and that he has continued to

work detailing cars.

      Chad Wheat, the paramedic that responded to Smith’s landlord’s house,

testified that when he arrived Smith’s head and shirt were covered in blood and

that he had multiple lacerations on his head. Of note was a “one inch by one

inch hole” on the back of Smith’s head that was deep enough that Wheat could

see his skull. As Wheat began to bandage Smith’s head, he became

unresponsive for forty-five seconds to a minute, and then woke up again. As

Wheat was transporting Smith to a local hospital, T.J. Samson Community

Hospital, Smith’s blood pressure began to gradually drop. When Smith’s blood

pressure reached 66/40, Wheat administered a saline IV and Smith’s blood

pressure stabilized within twenty minutes. On cross-examination, Wheat

testified that no other medical treatment was rendered: Smith did not require

resuscitation, a blood transfusion, intubation, etc.

      Melissa Snead, a registered nurse at T.J. Samson, treated Smith when he

arrived. His medical records from that hospital were admitted during her

testimony. His records noted lacerations above his left eyebrow, behind his left

ear, and on the back of his head. CT scans of Smith’s head and neck that were

conducted upon his arrival revealed he had factures in two of his cervical

vertebrae. She stated he was transferred to UK Hospital approximately two

                                       27
hours after his arrival at T.J. Samson because he required a higher level of care

than they could provide.

      Dr. Tucker testified that he was Smith’s treating physician when he

arrived at UK on Saturday, May 23 between midnight and 1:30 a.m., and

Smith’s medical records from UK were introduced through him. In addition to

the two cervical spine fractures already discussed by nurse Snead, Dr. Tucker

further testified that Smith’s CT scan revealed a skull fracture to his occipital

condyle, i.e., the back lower portion of his head. He also noted that the larger

laceration on Smith’s head was considered an avulsion, which he described as

the tissue being “scooped out.” But notably, no surgical intervention was

recommended or required for any of his injuries. There was no mention of him

being placed in the ICU or other elevated care unit. Instead, Smith was kept

for observation for about forty-eight hours and was then released and

instructed to wear the neck brace for three months. Again, he required no

surgeries, no blood transfusion, no intubation, nor any other medical

treatment apart from what has already been described.

      For its part the defense called Dr. William Ralston, the Chief Medical

Examiner for the Commonwealth who also provides private consultation on

forensic pathology and expert testimony. Dr. Ralston reviewed Smith’s

ambulance reports, his T.J. Samson records, and his UK medical records. He

discussed each of the injuries Smith sustained at length. In particular, the two

lacerations to his head, his occipital condyle fracture, and the two fractures in

his cervical spine. He discussed that it was possible that the avulsion could go

                                        28
back to its original form, but it was also possible that it would leave a

permanent indentation and scar. He opined that none of Smith’s injuries were

“immediately life threatening” based on the treatment he received: he reasoned

that no life-saving intervention occurred and that his records do not indicate

that he was at risk of dying at any point. He further opined that nothing in the

medical records indicated that Smith’s day to day life would have been affected

apart from wearing his neck brace.

      The defense also called Dr. Clinton Kiteck who removed Smith’s staples

on July 2, 2020, less than two months after the attack. Dr. Kiteck stated that

Smith reported no issues with his injuries other than wanting his staples

removed.

      Again, assuming arguendo that the evidence was in fact sufficient to

support a first-degree assault conviction, I submit that if Dr. Tucker had never

testified at trial the outcome would have been no different. Evidence of the

large lacerations that Smith sustained came in through Smith himself,

paramedic Wheat, nurse Snead, and Dr. Ralston. Evidence of Smith’s cervical

vertebrae fractures were discussed by Nurse Snead and Dr. Ralston. And

Smith’s occipital condyle fracture was discussed by Dr. Ralston. There’s

simply nothing Dr. Tucker testified to regarding Smith’s injuries that was not

also discussed by other witnesses. I would therefore hold that the trial court’s

error in allowing him to testify via zoom was harmless.

       Instead, I submit that the reversible error committed by the trial court

in relation to Campbell’s first-degree assault charge was its failure to grant a

                                        29
directed verdict based on the Commonwealth’s lack of proof that Smith

sustained a serious physical injury as that term is defined by statute.19 “On

appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a

whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the

defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.”20

       In order to convict Campbell of first-degree assault, the Commonwealth

had to prove that “[Campbell] intentionally [caused] serious physical injury to

[Smith] by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”21 Serious

physical injury is defined in relevant part as “physical injury which creates a

substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged

disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or

impairment of the function of any bodily organ.”22 Importantly, “[w]hen

determining whether a defendant caused a serious physical injury, the issue is

not whether there was proof of an act that could cause serious physical injury.

The issue is whether there was proof of an act that did, in fact, cause serious

physical injury.”23

      19  This error was properly preserved: the defense moved for a directed verdict at
the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. It
specifically argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove first-degree assault because
Smith’s injuries failed to meet the statutory definition of serious physical injury. See
Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250, 266 (Ky. 2020).
       20 Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
       21 KRS 508.010(1)(a).
       22 KRS 500.080(17).
       23 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Ky. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

                                          30
      To begin, there was no evidence that Smith’s injuries created “a

substantial risk of death.” The only medical treatment he received was the

administration of IV fluids, staples to close the two large lacerations on his

head, and a neck brace to be worn for three months. The evidence was

undisputed that neither his cervical spine fractures nor his occipital condyle

fracture required surgery or further treatment other than wearing his neck

brace. He was kept for observation over a weekend and was back to work six

days later.

      Although Smith sustained some blood loss, he only ever lost

consciousness for about a minute when paramedic Wheat arrived and began to

treat him. None of the medical professionals testified that his blood loss

amount was life threatening; indeed, no blood transfusion was required. In

addition, while his blood pressure dropped to 66/40 while being transported to

T.J. Samson, paramedic Wheat testified and the ambulance report reflects, that

it was a gradual and steady drop in blood pressure that was remedied quickly

with a saline IV. He required no other medical treatment, and the only follow

up medical treatment he received was removal of the staples from his head

wounds.

      Likewise, there was insufficient evidence that his injuries caused “serious

and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged

loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” The Commonwealth

points to the large scar left on Smith’s head from the laceration described as an

avulsion and Smith’s discussion of his neck issues as proof of this

                                        31
requirement. I disagree. In Anderson, the defendant cut the victim’s jawline

with a straight razor, leaving a scar.24 This Court held that “[w]hile the scar on

[the victim’s] jaw does constitute a disfigurement, it is not of sufficient severity

to support a finding of ‘serious physical injury’ under the second prong of KRS

500.080[(17)], which requires not merely disfigurement, but ‘serious and

prolonged’ disfigurement.”25 If a large scar left across a victim’s face does not

constitute serious and prolonged disfigurement, a presumably26 large scar left

on the back of a victim’s head cannot be said to constitute serious and

prolonged disfigurement either.27

      And, while substantial prolonged pain can constitute a serious physical

injury,28 there was no evidence that Smith suffered from such pain. Smith

stated that if he does not sleep in his neck brace, his neck gets stiff and will

“pop.” But he has never sought any additional medical treatment for his neck,

and he was able to return to work less than a week after the attack.

      While I am loath to in any way minimize the horrible nature of this

senseless attack on Smith or his resulting injuries, KRS 500.080(17) “sets a

      24   Id. at 580.
      25   Id. at 582.
        26 There is no evidence of record regarding what the scar looks like. Instead,

Smith showed the back of his head to the jury at the Commonwealth’s request.
        27 Cf. Jones v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. App. 1987) (holding

that loss of an eye constituted “serious and prolonged disfigurement ... or prolonged
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ” sufficient to prove serious
physical injury).
        28 Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 787 (Ky. 2004) (holding that “pain

is an ‘impairment of health.’ If the pain is substantial, but not prolonged, it
constitutes a ‘physical injury;’ but if it is prolonged, then it is a ‘serious physical
injury.’”).

                                          32
fairly strict level of proof which must be met by sufficient evidence of injury,”29

and it simply was not met in this case. I would therefore hold that the trial

court reversibly erred by overruling the defense’s motion for directed verdict on

the charge of first-degree assault. But, for the reasons stated herein, I would

hold that the trial court’s error in permitting Dr. Tucker to testify remotely was

harmless error.

   COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

   Molly Mattingly
   Assistant Public Advocate

   COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

   Daniel Cameron
   Attorney General of Kentucky

   Stephanie L. McKeehan
   Assistant Attorney General

      29   Anderson, 352 S.W.3d at 581 (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                           33