Court Opinion

ID: 9380822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 15:00:35.145544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.820649
License: Public Domain

22-419-cv
    Ogbolu v. The Trustees of Columbia University

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

               At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
    Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of March two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
               REENA RAGGI,
               RICHARD C. WESLEY,
               STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    Brandon E. Ogbolu,
                                Plaintiff-Appellant,
    John Doe,                                            22-419
                                Plaintiff,
                      v.
    The Trustees of Columbia University in the City
    of New York, Lee C. Bollinger, Jane E. Booth,
    Patricia S. Catapano, Andrew W. Schilling,
                     Defendants-Appellees.
    _____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                   Brandon E. Ogbolu, pro
                                                           se, Fort Lauderdale, FL.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                  Daniel R. Alonso and
                                                           Brian J. Wegrzyn,
                                                           Buckley LLP, New York,
                                                           NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Oetken, J).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,           IT   IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court of January
31, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

      Appellant Brandon E. Ogbolu, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against
certain employees and trustees of Columbia University (collectively, “Columbia”).
While attending Columbia University, Ogbolu accumulated tuition debt that was
converted into two private student loans after he graduated, a practice Ogbolu
believes was illegal.

      In 2019, he entered into a settlement agreement with Columbia for a refund
of $35,799.80 and an undisclosed payment. The agreement contained a release of
claims: “In consideration of the Settlement Payment and Refund, Mr. Ogbolu
releases and discharges Columbia, its affiliates, subsidiaries, successors and
assigns and its and their present and former trustees, officers, employees, and
counsel (Released Parties) from any and all claims and/or liabilities of any kind
whatsoever, whether known or unknown, that he has or may have arising out of
or relating in any way to the Covered Claims.” App’x 13. The “Covered Claims”
included “claims for compensatory and punitive damages, and including
specifically claims for the return of funds, late fees, interest, emotional distress,

                                         2
lost earnings, medical expenses, and attorney’s fees, among other things,” with
respect to “certain repayment agreements” and “certain improper servicing,
collection and credit reporting activity” from January 1, 2002, to October 29, 2019.
Id. at 12.

       In February 2021, Ogbolu—believing that the settlement agreement was
unenforceable and that Columbia had discriminated against him on the basis of
his Asperger’s syndrome—brought thirty-three federal and state claims against
the defendants. The district court determined that the settlement agreement was
enforceable and that any non-precluded claims failed on the merits. It dismissed
Ogbolu’s third amended complaint with prejudice and denied a parallel motion
for an injunction. Ogbolu appealed and now moves in this court for an injunction
pending appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

       We review the judgment granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
and Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting all of the factual allegations of the complaint
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Ogbolu’s favor. Fund Liquidation
Holdings LLC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 991 F.3d 370, 379-80 (2d Cir. 2021). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 16 F.4th 1070,
1076-77 (2d Cir. 2021). Because Ogbolu has proceeded pro se, we liberally construe
his filings both in the district court and on appeal to raise the strongest arguments
those filings suggest. Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2022).

                                           I

       As an initial matter, Ogbolu argues that the district court failed to “define”
and “conceptualize” his Asperger’s syndrome, which he claims was integral to his
lawsuit. Appellant’s Br. 20-30. Ogbolu alleged that Columbia took advantage of
him throughout the settlement negotiation process and then continued
intentionally to exploit him following the settlement. However, the district court

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did not ignore Ogbolu’s Asperger’s syndrome. For example, the district court
considered whether during the lengthy settlement negotiations Columbia
deliberately triggered his condition by using stall tactics. The district court also
noted that Ogbolu notified the defendants of his self-diagnosis during settlement
discussions in October 2019 and that he was officially diagnosed in January 2021.
While the district court may not have included detailed descriptions of Ogbolu’s
medical information in its public decision, the record indicates that the district
court examined Ogbolu’s arguments and claims with his diagnosis in mind.

                                               II

       In dismissing Ogbolu’s complaint, the district court concluded that a
majority of the claims were precluded by the valid settlement agreement between
Ogbolu and Columbia.

       We “review a district court’s factual conclusions related to a settlement
agreement, such as whether an agreement exists or whether a party assented to
the agreement, under the clearly erroneous standard of review” and review “legal
conclusions with respect to its interpretation of the terms of a settlement
agreement” de novo. Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir.
2005). “A settlement agreement is a contract that is interpreted according to
general principles of contract law.” Id. “Under New York law, a release that is clear
and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into
will be enforced.” Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998).

       The district court did not clearly err in determining that the settlement
agreement was enforceable. 1 A court may vacate a settlement agreement only

1
  The settlement agreement was “integral” to the complaint and thus properly
considered by the district court as part of the motion to dismiss. Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); see Interpharm, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 655
F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2011) (reviewing an agreement containing releases as “integral to
the complaint”).

                                               4
when there has been a showing of fraud, collusion, mistake, or duress or when the
agreement is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, or ambiguous. McCoy v.
Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 302 (2002). Ogbolu’s duress and fraud arguments are
without merit. Repudiation of an agreement based on duress requires a showing
of (1) a wrongful threat that (2) had the effect of precluding the exercise of free
will. United States v. Twenty Miljam-350 IED Jammers, 669 F.3d 78, 88 (2d Cir. 2011)
(applying New York law). Ogbolu alleged that Columbia manipulated him during
settlement negotiations and took advantage of his Asperger’s syndrome by
engaging in stall tactics, such as ignoring Ogbolu’s emails and sending delayed
responses. Even accepting as true Ogbolu’s allegations that Columbia ignored or
failed to respond promptly to his emails, he does not plead that Columbia
prevented him from exercising his free will. As to Ogbolu’s claims of fraud, the
claims all refer to Columbia’s student loan practices. Ogbolu does not identify any
fraudulent acts separate from the “subject of the release.” Centro Empresarial
Cempresa S.A. v. Am. Movil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276 (2011). 2 Thus, the
district court correctly determined that the settlement agreement and its release of
claims were valid.

      Many of Ogbolu’s claims are premised on Columbia’s allegedly illegal
conversion of outstanding tuition debt into student loans. As the district court
correctly determined, however, Ogbolu released Columbia from these claims
through the valid settlement agreement, see App’x 12-13, and otherwise lacks
standing to bring a criminal action, see Schlosser v. Kwak, 16 F.4th 1078, 1083 (2d
Cir. 2021). For these reasons, the district court correctly dismissed Counts 1-15 and
28-32 of the third amended complaint as precluded by the settlement agreement
and Counts 16-22, insofar as the claims relate to conduct covered by the agreement.

2
 Although Ogbolu argues on appeal that the agreement should be voided for public
policy concerns, he has not specified any public interest, which generally favors
settlement agreements, harmed by the agreement.

                                         5
                                           III

      With respect to Ogbolu’s remaining tort and discrimination claims that arise
from Columbia’s alleged actions during and after the settlement process, Ogbolu
has not pleaded any facially plausible claims. Ogbolu does not plead facts
suggesting that Columbia discriminated against him “on the basis of disability,”
Krist v. Kolombos Rest., Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a)), or acted with a “discriminatory motive,” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole
Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013). Ogbolu has not plausibly
alleged that any of Columbia’s reported actions occurred on the basis of his
Asperger’s syndrome.

      Ogbolu also alleges that Columbia is liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The conduct
underlying both of these claims is the incorrect tax form that Columbia sent
Ogbolu, which was corrected after he notified them about the mistake. Ogbolu has
not plausibly alleged the elements of either of these claims. The conduct at issue
was not “extreme and outrageous,” Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121
(1993), and Ogbolu’s claimed injury does not possess “some guarantee of
genuineness,” Taggart v. Costabile, 131 A.D.3d 243, 256 (2d Dep’t 2015) (quoting
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21 (1958)). 3

      Finally, we detect no “abuse of discretion” in the district court’s denial of
preliminary injunctive relief. Green Haven Prison Preparative Meeting of the Religious
Soc’y of Friends v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 16 F.4th 67, 78 (2d
Cir. 2021). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
(1) irreparable harm; (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or
(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make them fair
ground for litigation, plus a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the

3
 Because Ogbolu did not establish that Columbia committed a tort, his negligent
supervision or retention claims were also correctly dismissed.

                                            6
moving party; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Id. As
discussed above, the district court correctly concluded that Ogbolu would not
succeed on the merits of his claims and that there were no sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits of this case. The motion filed in this court for a
“Preliminary Injunction Pending the Determination of This Appeal,” is denied for
the same reasons.

      We have considered Ogbolu’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are
without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                         7