Court Opinion

ID: 9390595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 21:00:35.42933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.591530
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1183

        KERRY A. FARLEY, as the Mother and Natural Guardian of M.A.F. and N.J.F.;
        M.T.F.; M.A.F.; N.J.F.,

                            Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                     v.

        THE FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cv-01249-CMH-IDD)

        Submitted: March 30, 2023                                         Decided: April 26, 2023

        Before KING, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Caner Demirayak, LAW OFFICE OF CANER DEMIRAYAK, ESQ., P.C.,
        Brooklyn, New York, for Appellants. William B. Porter, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH,
        PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Plaintiffs Kerry A. Farley and her three children, M.T.F., M.A.F., and N.J.F., appeal

        the district court’s order dismissing their pro se complaint without prejudice for failure to

        exhaust their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

        (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. Because the district court did not have the benefit of the

        Supreme Court’s decision in Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023), when

        it dismissed the complaint, we vacate the dismissal order and remand.

               Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

        29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

        §§ 12132, 12133, and sought both injunctive relief and compensatory damages. Relying

        on 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) 1 and our unpublished decision in Z.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Pamlico Cnty.

        Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 744 F. App’x 769 (4th Cir. 2018), abrogated in part by Luna

        Perez, 143 S. Ct. at 863-65, the district court determined that Plaintiffs were required to

        exhaust the administrative processes under the IDEA before pursuing their Rehabilitation

        Act and ADA claims. Because they had not done so, the district court ruled that it lacked

               1
                   Section 1415(l) of Title 20 of the United States Code provides:

               Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
               procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans
               with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or
               other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except
               that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is
               also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures]
               shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action
               been brought under [the IDEA].

                                                       2
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        subject matter jurisdiction over their complaint and dismissed it. But see K.I. v. Durham

        Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 54 F.4th 779, 792 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he IDEA’s exhaustion

        requirement is not a jurisdictional requirement but a claims-processing rule.”).

               On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not

        apply to their Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims insofar as they seek compensatory

        damages because such relief is not available under the IDEA. 2 In Luna Perez, which issued

        after the parties completed briefing in this appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with an

        identical argument and held that § 1415(l) does not require exhaustion of the administrative

        processes under the IDEA “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for

        compensatory damages—a form of relief [the] IDEA does not provide.” 143 S. Ct. at 864;

        see id. at 865 (“[A] suit admittedly premised on the past denial of a free and appropriate

        education may nonetheless proceed without exhausting [the] IDEA’s administrative

        processes if the remedy a plaintiff seeks is not one [the] IDEA provides.”). The district

        court’s application of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement to Plaintiffs’ claims seeking

        compensatory damages thus conflicts with Luna Perez and cannot be sustained.

               Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal order and remand for further

        proceedings on Plaintiffs’ complaint. We deny Plaintiffs’ motion asking us to direct the

        district court to appoint a guardian ad litem and counsel. The district court will have an

               2
                 While Plaintiffs did not make this argument below, we regularly consider new
        arguments on appeal related to intervening precedent, like Luna Perez. See, e.g., United
        States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 191-92 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Chittenden, 896
        F.3d 633, 639-40 (4th Cir. 2018).

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        opportunity to reconsider Plaintiffs’ request for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and

        counsel after reviewing the record again in light of our opinion. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 3

                                                                    VACATED AND REMANDED

               We thus deny as moot Plaintiffs’ motion for reasonable accommodations at oral
               3

        argument.

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