Court Opinion

ID: 9656488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:49:12.912638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.701614
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice
(dissenting).
If prescription1 can run against a minor whose parents are deceased and for whom a tutor has been appointed, why should not prescription also run- against a minor whose parents are living and whose father occupies the place of and has the power of a tutor?
Is the orphan to be less favored by the-law than other children?
The majority rests its holding upon a. Court of Appeal decision which reasons, that if the parents are living and decline to invoke the act on behalf of the minor it is the same as if the minor had no par'ent and to hold otherwise would be to-make the minor’s rights depend entirely upon the will of the parent. See Gospel v. Southern Carbon Co., 4 La.App. 272 (1926). If we adopt that idea, must we not say that in the case where the parents are dead and a tutor is appointed for the minor and the tutor declines to invoke the act on behalf of the minor it is the-same as if the minor has no tutor and to. hold otherwise would be to make the minor’s rights depend entirely upon the will, of the tutor.
*45If the minor’s rights are to depend upon the will of someone, it seems that the natural and logical conclusion to draw is that it is best that they should depend upon, the will of the parent, for the parent is more concerned with the child’s interest than anyone else. All of our law is based upon the wisdom of that natural law.
Thus, if the court is repelled at the idea that the rights of the minor should depend entirely upon the will of the parent, when both are living, it should more readily be repelled by the idea that the rights of the minor should depend entirely upon the will of a tutor, who is often a remote relative or possibly a stranger.
Acceptance of these propositions, and I submit that we cannot accept one without accepting the other, would result in the inevitable conclusion that if either the parent or the tutor fails to file suit timely, no prescription can be invoked against the minor — a result which is clearly repugnant to the legislative declaration that prescription does apply to claims for compensation on behalf of minors when they are properly represented. R.S. 23:1209, 23:1234.
The foregoing emphasizes the error of the majority opinion on basic principles. These propositions illustrate that there is neither justice, logic nor reason supporting the majority view.
I am unwilling to perpetuate the error ■committed by the Courts of Appeal of this State in 'the cases cited in the majority opinion. 24 Tul.L.Revl 197 (1949).
This whole case revolves around the intent of the legislature when it enacted R.S. 23 :1234 dealing with prescription to be applied-to claims of minors under the Workmen’s Compensation Act: That enactment provides:
“In case an injured employee is mentally incompetent or a minor or, where death results from the injury, in case any dependent 'as herein defined is mentally incompetent or a minor at the time when any right, privilege or election accrues to him under this Chapter, his duly qualified curator or tutor, as the case may be, may, in his behalf, claim and exercise such right, privilege or election, and no limitation of time, in this Chapter provided for, shall run, so long as such incompetent or minor has no curator or tutor, as the case may be.” (Emphasis added.)
In my view the father of the minor here is a tutor within the meaning of the quoted section. We havé always held that during the marriage the father is clothed, in regard to the property and interest of the minor child, with all the powers of a tutor. Dauterive v. Shaw, 47 La.Ann. 882, 17 So. 345 (1895). Article 4501 of the Code of Civil Procedure so declares in these words:
“When both parents are alive and not -divorced, or judicially separated, prop*47erty belonging to a minor may be sold or mortgaged, a claim of a minor may be compromised, and any other step may be taken affecting his interest, in the same manner and by pursuing the same forms as in case of a minor represented by a tutor, the father occupying the place of and having the powers of a tutor * * (Emphasis added.)
This article had its counterpart in Article 222 of the Civil Code, which it repealed. See also La.Civil Code arts. 216, 221.
A minor is as thoroughly and properly represented by a parent, when both are living as he is by a tutor; and that is the key to the meaning of “tutor” in R.S. 23 :- 1234 — it means that prescription should not run against a minor who has no qualified representative in the law to assert his rights.
Any other conclusion leads to an absurd result, as no tutorship can exist during marriage when parents are not legally separated from bed and board. Blades v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 237 La. 1, 110 So.2d 116 (1959); Acosta v. Robin, 7 Mart.,N.S., 387 (La. 1829); State v. Judge of Parish of Orleans, 6 La. 363 (1834).
Thus, if we accept the word “tutor” to mean what the majority says it means, no suit could be filed on behalf of this minor while his parents are alive and not judicially separated, because the father does not fall within the definition of “tutor” as the majority defines that word and the rights of a minor under the act must be asserted by a “tutor”.
Still the father here is permitted to institute suit to enforce the minor’s rights just as a tutor could do (and I think properly so); whereas, when it comes to the meaning of the word “tutor” when prescription against the minor is an issue the majority (I think erroneously) holds that prescription may not be invoked because the father is not a tutor.
This makes it clear to me that where this section refers to “tutor” when it speaks of asserting the rights of minors it necessarily must have the same meaning as the word “tutor” when the section speaks of the prescription applicable to minors.
Furthermore, the strained interpretation that the court has placed on this section brings the case squarely in conflict with the public policy of this State regarding the limitation of time for filing compensation claims. That policy has been expressed as follows:
“ * * * the purpose of the requirement that a suit be brought by the claimant within one year is, (1) to enable the employer to determine when his potential liability for an accident would cease, (2) to prevent, as a matter of public policy, suits based on stale claims where the evidence might *49be destroyed or difficult to produce, and (3) to fix a statute of repose giving rise to a conclusive presumption of a waiver of the claim.” Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, Inc., 208 La. 538, 23 So. 2d 209 (1945); Harris v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 200 La. 445, 8 So.2d 289 (1942).
Under the court’s decision an employer can be confronted with a stale compensation claim,.say twenty years after the accident, when he would obviously, in most cases, be unable to defend himself because the evidence would probably then be destroyed or difficult to produce.
I respectfully dissent.

. Prescription as used herein has the same meaning as limitation of time and the pre-emption period, all of which are sometimes used to refer to the time within which rights may be asserted under the-Workmen’s Compensation Act.