Court Opinion

ID: 9630110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:00:35.632776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:15.847399
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Manderino :
I dissent. The appellant was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 87 S. Ct. 1920 (1967).
The majority introduces a novel and dangerous rule into a defendant’s right to compulsory process. The majority, in effect, holds that a trial judge is to consider the value of a witness to the defendant before the witness can be subpoenaed for trial. There has never been such an unfair restriction on the right to call witnesses. On many occasions, the prosecution, without question, subpoenas witnesses who come to court and never testify. Under the test established by the majority, a trial court may conduct a minitrial as to each *247and every subpoena requested by the defense (or the prosecution). During that minitrial, the trial court may analyze all of the considerations concerning the possible value of a witness to the defense and then decide that the witness is not needed.
“The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 1023, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967).
Prior to trial, the appellant requested subpoenas for two persons whom the appellant wanted to call as witnesses during his trial. The request was denied and that denial is one of the assignments of error. The appellant’s request for the subpoenas should have been granted.
When the subpoenas were requested, the trial court properly inquired about the reasonableness of the appellant’s request in order to prevent the arbitrary use of the trial court’s subpoena power. The appellant informed the trial court that the proposed witnesses were competent to testify about the appellant’s condition at the time the appellant allegedly waived his constitutional rights and gave a statement to the police. The appellant, at that time, was being detained in the state correctional institution in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, on an unrelated charge for which he was later acquitted. The proposed witnesses were incarcerated with the appellant. The appellant informed the trial court that while he was incarcerated he was on medication and *248was constantly taking pills. He said that once he passed out in his cell. One of the proposed witnesses, according to the appellant, was giving the appellant medication under doctor’s orders and was in the appellant’s cell at all times. The other proposed witness, according to the appellant, was also aware of the appellant’s condition.
There was no proper basis for the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s request. The prosecution argues that the subpoenas were properly denied because the proposed testimony was immaterial and the proposed witnesses were incompetent. I cannot agree. The proposed testimony was obviously material since the appellant claimed that his condition prevented a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, and also affected the voluntariness of his statement. The witnesses were incompetent, it is argued, because they were lay witnesses and had no training and experience as medical experts. The record, first of all, is silent concerning the training and experience of the witnesses, but even if we assume the proposed witnesses were not medical experts, they would have been competent as witnesses on relevant and material matters. The witnesses were certainly competent to testify about their observations of the appellant and their conduct, if any, in administering medication under a doctor’s order. See G. M. Henry, Pennsylvania Evidence §537 (1953). An inquiry concerning the reasonableness of a request for a subpoena is not the trial of the case. All that the appellant was required to establish was that his request was reasonable and not arbitrary. Under the circumstances, the subpoenas should have been granted.
Article I, section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in addition to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantees an accused the right “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in *249his favor. . . .” The appellant, in this case, was improperly deprived of that constitutional right. See Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 109 A. 878 (1920); Commonwealth v. Harbaugh, 201 Pa. Superior Ct. 360, 191 A.2d 844 (1963).
The error was not harmless. The statement which the appellant gave to the police admitted the stabbing of the victim. During the trial, the appellant denied the stabbing and presented a witness who corroborated the appellant’s testimony that the victim, who was a friend of the appellant, was dead when the appellant entered the victim’s home. The appellant vigorously contested the truthfulness of the statement he gave to the police, claiming that it was false and coerced by threats to his wife and child. Credibility is for the trier of facts, but we cannot say that the jury might not have resolved the conflicting testimony in the appellant’s favor had the proposed witnesses testified. The judgment of sentence should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Roberts joins in this dissenting opinion.