Court Opinion

ID: 9638883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:57:27.154621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:07.224959
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The principal opinion misinterprets and fails to fully set forth pertinent portions of the voir dire and of the record made on defendant’s motion to strike for cause and misreads defense counsel’s motion to strike. In so doing the majority fails to consider certain exchanges between venire-woman Martin and defense counsel and erroneously concludes the trial court had confused the two separate times Martin was questioned individually.
In addition to the instances of individual questioning of Martin set forth in the principal opinion, the following occurred during defense counsel’s voir dire of the panel following a question by Martin:
MR. O’BRIEN [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [T]his goes on to some of my questions, and if you still have — after I’m finished still have that question, I’ll see how I can best respond to it. The Court will instruct you that the burden of proof is on the State of Missouri to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Is there anybody here who could not follow that instruction? All right, by placing the burden of proof on the State, that means that in this case it is up to the State of Missouri to prove Mr. Draper guilty, and he is under no obligation at any time to produce evidence to satisfy you that he is innocent. Is there anybody who could not follow that instruction of law? (Emphasis added.)
All right, Mr. Draper and any defendant has the option of allowing the State to put on its case and having the twelve persons who serve on the jury determine from that evidence whether or not the State has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Is there anybody here who would not be able to determine or think that you would have to believe the State’s case, even were Mr. Draper to offer no evidence at all? Could you all independently weigh the State’s case in your own mind is the question. (Emphasis added.)
Miss Martin, have I answered your question sufficiently?
VENIREMAN MARTIN: Yes, thank you.
MR. O’BRIEN: Okay. Would you, knowing that you’ll be instructed in those points of law, be inclined to expect Mr. Draper to testify before you could consider his guilt or innocence?
VENIREMAN MARTIN: Not after you explained it to me.
MR. O’BRIEN: Okay, so you could follow the instructions of the Court in that regard? (Emphasis added.)
VENIREMAN MARTIN: Yes.
*867The following colloquy occurred on defendant’s motion to strike Martin for cause:
MR. O’BRIEN [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Juror No. 7, Carol D. Martin, I would move to strike her for cause. She indicated that she didn’t believe that absent defense testimony or witnesses that she could independently evaluate the credibility of a police officer. (Emphasis added.)
THE COURT: I don’t think that’s what she said.
MR. KOMOROSKI [PROSECUTOR]: I think she just had a question, Your Honor, as to—
THE COURT: And I think one of your last questions you asked her if she could render a fair and impartial verdict.
MR. O’BRIEN: Well, I think—
THE COURT: It started off that way, but after you talked with her, I think she said that she could be fair, and she could be a fair and impartial juror.
MR. O’BRIEN: Okay, Well, that may very well be what she said, Your Honor, but I think her initial response indicated that she would have difficulty making that evaluation.
MR. KOMOROSKI: I—
THE COURT: That’s not what I got out of it.
MR. KOMOROSKI: I thought the question was asked and she responded after Mr. O’Brien’s explanation she could be fair and impartial. She was satisfied with the—
THE COURT: She may have been a little confused at first, but I think after you talked with her I think she understood. I don’t think she was — there was any question in her mind that she could be fair and impartial. All right, what about Juror Number 25, Mr. O’Brien?
Defendant’s challenge for cause was not based solely on Martin’s response to the individual questioning cited by the principal opinion. The record shows clearly that the challenge was based primarily on the later individual questioning of Martin regarding her ability to weigh the State’s case in her own mind absent defense testimony. The principal opinion recognizes, as did the trial court and even defense counsel, that this inquiry resulted in her demonstrating she could follow the court’s instructions and independently weigh the State’s case in her own mind. Defense counsel sought to disqualify Martin by combining the two matters on which she was individually questioned, and as the trial court correctly concluded, Martin did not say she could not evaluate an officer’s credibility absent defense evidence. The trial court accurately evaluated the challenge presented by defense counsel.
In reversing the conviction the principal opinion focuses on Martin's statements that she would be inclined to believe the testimony of a police officer. These statements were made in response to defense counsel’s hypothetical question which was posed in general terms regarding the testimony of any police officer. This Court has held that such statements will not operate to disqualify when consideration of the entire voir dire shows that the venirewoman would be fair and impartial if chosen as a juror. State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. banc 1983).
There is ample support in this record for the trial court’s finding that Martin could be a fair and impartial juror. Defense counsel inquired whether any venireman could not follow the burden of proof instruction and require the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin did not respond. Defense counsel posed this additional question to the array:
Is there anybody here who would not be able to determine or think that you would have to believe the State’s case, even were Mr. Draper to offer no evidence at all? Could you all independently weigh the State’s case in your own mind is the question.
Again, Martin remained mute and by so doing affirmed that she could independently evaluate the State’s case even if the defendant offered no evidence. Defense counsel continued with a direct question to venirewoman Martin: “Okay, so you could follow the instructions of the court in that *868regard?” She replied, “Yes.” Finally, defense counsel made these closing remarks in his address to the panel, and again, Martin did not indicate that she had any reservations about her qualifications to serve on the jury:
Okay, thank you. Anybody else have any response to the last question or to what Miss Martin and I were talking about? Okay. Now, that we have to cover every single thing that might be in anybody’s mind, so the question I have now is, is there anybody who for any reason thinks that he or she should or should not serve on this jury for any particular reason?
All right, and it’s impossible for me in my questions to anticipate everything that might possibly affect you when you reach your decisions. Is there anybody here who feels that there’s something that Mr. Komoroski [PROSECUTOR] and I should know about before we select the twelve of you who will serve as jurors that you haven’t already been asked? (Emphasis added.)
A determination by the trial judge of the qualifications of a prospective juror necessarily involves a judgment based on observation of the venireman’s demeanor and an evaluation and interpretation of the answers as they relate to whether the venireman would be fair and impartial if chosen as a juror. State v. Cuckovich, 485 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. banc 1972). A significant amount of time elapsed between Martin’s initial statement regarding police testimony and her affirmation of her ability to follow the court’s instructions. She heard and by her silence affirmed her qualifications in response to defense counsel’s final remarks to the panel. Giving due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to view the witness and hear her testimony, it is reasonable to conclude the trial court found that the second individual questioning and final general questions had cured any doubts raised in the first episode and that defendant’s challenge inaccurately interpreted Martin’s responses.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, the testimony as a whole indicated that Martin demonstrated an ability to evaluate all testimony by the same standard. There is no clear abuse of discretion shown on this record nor any real probability of injury to defendant. Even if defendant's challenge had been based exclusively on the initial questioning, it is not clear Martin would need to have been disqualified for cause. The essential elements of the State’s case were proved by the testimony of the victim. Police testimony was of relatively minor importance. See State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417, 423-24 (Mo. banc 1983).
The judgment should be affirmed.