Court Opinion

ID: 9953200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 16:14:32.37213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:45.209775
License: Public Domain

J-S08026-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARIO RAMON TORO COTTE                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 705 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 10, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-CR-0000934-2022

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                              FILED: MARCH 21, 2024

       Mario Ramon Toro Cotte (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after his non-jury convictions of one count each of

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, possession of a small

amount of marijuana, unauthorized use of an automobile, general lighting

requirements, and driving while operating privileges suspended – DUI

related.1 We affirm.

       On December 7, 2021, Pennsylvania State Troopers conducted a traffic

stop of a minivan operated by Appellant. During the stop, the troopers seized

fentanyl and marijuana. The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(31)(ii); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928(a); 75

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4303(b), 1543(b)(1)(iii).
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with the above-described offenses. On April 7, 2022, Appellant filed a pretrial

motion to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop. On May 16,

2022, and July 8, 2022, the suppression court held hearings on the motion.

      The suppression court thereafter rendered the following findings:

      [The charges] resulted from a traffic stop conducted by
      Pennsylvania State Troopers Dylan Adams and Ryan Wildermuth
      on December 7, 2021, at approximately 11:46 p.m. in Craley,
      York County, Pennsylvania.

            Trooper Adams observed [Appellant] driving a green Chevy
      Uplander with an inoperable registration plate lamp. Trooper
      Adams testified that he followed [Appellant] and turned off his
      own headlights to verify that [Appellant’s] registration plate light
      was not working. Trooper Adams initiated his lights and siren and
      conducted a traffic stop. Upon approaching [Appellant], Trooper
      Adams smelled the odor of marijuana and alcohol emanating from
      the vehicle. [Appellant] was unable to produce a valid driver’s
      license and admitted to the Trooper that his license was
      suspended – DUI related. Trooper Adams later confirmed this fact
      by reviewing [Appellant’s] certified driving record from his patrol
      vehicle.

             [Appellant] requested to exit the vehicle and check the
      registration plate light. Trooper Adams agreed but inquired
      whether [Appellant] had any weapons on his person. [Appellant]
      pulled up his shirt and Trooper [Adams] immediately noticed a
      bulge in [Appellant’s] coat pocket. Upon inquiry to [Appellant],
      [Appellant] responded that it was a bag of candy. [Appellant]
      removed the bag from his pocket and turned to place it in
      [Appellant’s] vehicle. For safety purposes, Trooper Adams asked
      to see the bag and [Appellant] handed the bag to Trooper Adams.
      Trooper Adams testified that[,] based on his training and
      experience[,] he immediately felt bundled glassine bags in the
      plastic bag and suspected that the bag contained heroin. Trooper
      Adams opened the black bag and indeed found multiple bags of
      the suspected contraband.

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             Trooper Adams then placed [Appellant] under arrest and
       provided Miranda2 warnings to [Appellant]. Trooper Adams then
       applied for a search warrant for [Appellant’s] vehicle, which was
       authorized. Upon execution of the search warrant[, five vials
       containing marijuana were] discovered in the vehicle.

Suppression Court Opinion, 7/26/22, at 2-4 (citation and footnotes omitted;

footnote added).

       On July 26, 2022, the suppression court denied Appellant’s suppression

motion. The suppression court determined that Appellant’s evasiveness, in

response to Trooper Adams’s initial inquiry about the bag, provided reasonable

suspicion to support the trooper’s investigatory detention. Id. at 6, 8. The

suppression court also deemed discovery of the contraband inevitable because

Appellant admitted his license was suspended and thus could not have been

permitted to drive away from the scene. Id. at 6.

       Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of

the above offenses. On April 10, 2023, the trial court imposed an aggregate

sentence of 7 to 14 years in prison.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant and the trial court

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

       Did the lower court err in denying [Appellant’s] suppression
       motion where, without a warrant, the trooper seized and searched
       a bag [Appellant] was carrying because: 1) the trooper lacked
       reasonable and articulable suspicion that the bag contained a
       weapon or that [Appellant] was armed and dangerous; 2)

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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      [Appellant] merely submitted to a show of authority in handing
      the trooper the bag as opposed to consenting; and 3) the
      Commonwealth failed to prove the bag would have been inevitably
      discovered?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Appellant asserts Trooper Adams lacked reasonable suspicion to inquire

about the bag. See id. at 16-21. He argues that the ostensible purpose of

the inquiry was to ensure officer safety, but Trooper Adams lacked any

articulable safety-related grounds to inspect the bag. Id. Appellant argues

his allegedly “evasive” behavior did not escalate the encounter, but rather

deescalated it. Id. at 20. He asserts that any safety concern regarding the

bag’s contents “evaporated when [Appellant] sought to place the bag in the

minivan” and “thus remove it from the situation.”         Id.   Appellant also

maintains his action of handing the bag to the trooper was not consensual,

but rather was coerced. Id. at 21-25. He further argues the Commonwealth

failed to establish that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered.

Id. at 25-31.

      Our standard of review

      in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is
      limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual
      findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
      conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
      Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may
      consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
      the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
      in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression
      court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate
      court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the
      court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the

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      determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
      legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
      binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
      suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the
      conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary
      review.

Commonwealth v. Kuhlman, 300 A.3d 460, 464 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

      “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, incorporated

to states by and through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, protect

citizens from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’”       Commonwealth v.

Barnes, 296 A.3d 52, 56 (Pa. Super. 2023). This Court has explained:

            The law recognizes three distinct levels of interactions
      between police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an
      investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see
      Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and (3) a custodial detention.

             A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
      between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
      by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
      it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond and therefore
      need not be justified by any level of police suspicion.

           In contrast, an investigative detention carries an official
      compulsion to stop and respond. Since this interaction has
      elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of
      unlawful activity.

            Finally, a custodial detention occurs when the nature,
      duration and conditions of an investigative detention become so
      coercive as to be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent
      of an arrest. This level of interaction requires that the police have
      probable cause to believe that the person so detained has
      committed or is committing a crime.

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Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).

      Regarding a Terry stop:

             [T]he question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at
      the time of an investigatory detention must be answered by
      examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
      there was a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
      individual stopped of criminal activity. These circumstances are
      to be viewed through the eyes of a trained officer.

             In making this determination, we must give due weight ...
      to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled
      to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality
      of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
      examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
      conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when
      taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
      officer.

Barnes, 296 A.3d at 57 (citations omitted).

      This Court has explained that

      an officer may pat-down an individual whose suspicious behavior
      he is investigating on the basis of a reasonable belief that the
      individual is presently armed and dangerous to the officer or
      others. To validate a Terry frisk, the police officer must be able
      to articulate specific facts from which he reasonably inferred that
      the individual was armed and dangerous. In determining whether
      a Terry frisk was supported by a sufficient articulable basis, we
      examine the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

      “The purpose of a Terry frisk is to allow an officer to continue an

investigation without fearing for the safety of the officer or others nearby.”

Id. at 11. To justify a Terry frisk, “[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain

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that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man

in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or the

safety of others was in danger.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“Review of an officer’s decision to frisk for weapons requires balancing two

legitimate interests: that of the citizen to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures; and that of the officer to be secure in his personal safety and to

prevent harm to others.” Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153, 1158

(Pa. 2000) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)).

      This Court has observed that “roadside encounters between police and

suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the

possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect.” In re O.J.,

958 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)).

      We have recognized that when an officer detains a vehicle for
      violation of a traffic law, it is inherently reasonable that he
      or she be concerned with safety and, as a result, may order
      the occupants of the vehicle to alight from the car. Allowing
      police officers to control all movement in a traffic
      encounter is a reasonable and justifiable step towards
      protecting their safety.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(emphasis added; citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).

      “Evasive behavior” is relevant in determining whether there is

reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory detention. Commonwealth

v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow,

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528 U.S. 119 (2000)); accord In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001)

(“nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable

suspicion”). A defendant’s furtive or evasive movements may “escalate[ an]

encounter   into     one    of    reasonable    suspicion.”      Commonwealth      v.

Scarborough,       89      A.3d    679,   684    (Pa.   Super.    2014);   see   also

Commonwealth v. Hall, 713 A.2d 650, 653 (Pa. Super. 1998), rev’d on

other grounds, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001) (Terry frisk justified where

defendant’s refusal to comply with officer’s request to remove his hand from

his pocket “escalated [a mere encounter] into a situation where the totality of

circumstances involved a reasonable suspicion and justified a detention to

stop and frisk.”);      Commonwealth v. Thomas, 179 A.3d 77, 83-84 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (defendant’s “refusal to comply with [officer’s] request to

remove his hands from his pockets justified the frisk of his person for the

protection of the officers,” and “[i]t was reasonable for [the officer] to infer

that [the defendant] may have been armed and dangerous, given his refusal

to show his hands and his evasive movements”).

      Here, the suppression court found that Trooper Adams inquired whether

Appellant had any weapons in response to Appellant’s own request to exit the

vehicle. Suppression Court Opinion, 7/26/22, 5-6. Appellant responded that

he had no weapons and lifted his shirt to show his waistband. N.T., 5/16/22,

at 27. At that point, Trooper Adams saw a bulge in Appellant’s jacket pocket.

Id. Trooper Adams testified that Appellant “gripped [the bulge] when it was

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in his pocket and when he lifted his shirt up he gripped it to lift it up.” Id. at

13. Trooper Adams testified, “I just wanted to know for my safety what that

[bulge] is, whether it be a gun or a weapon or something that could hurt me.”

Id. at 14. The suppression court found that when Trooper Adams saw the

bulge in Appellant’s jacket pocket, he was alerted to a legitimate safety

concern. Suppression Court Opinion, 7/26/22, at 6. Trooper Adams asked

Appellant what the bulge was, and Appellant said it was candy. N.T., 5/16/22,

at 27-28. Trooper Adams asked if he could see it and, ignoring the request,

Appellant removed the bag from his pocket and attempted to put it in the

vehicle.   Id. at 28.      Trooper Adams asked again if he could see it, and

Appellant handed him the bag. Id.

       The suppression court found that Appellant’s actions after Trooper

Adams first asked about the bulge were “evasive” and provided Trooper

Adams with justification to insist on inspecting the bag. Suppression Court

Opinion, 7/26/22, at 6, 8.        The suppression court implicitly treats Trooper

Adams’s second request to see the bag, which resulted in Appellant handing

it over, as the functional equivalent of a Terry frisk of the bag. Id. at 8.3

Appellant argues his attempt to put the bag in the vehicle and “thus remove

____________________________________________

3 Appellant concedes the encounter did not become coercive until the second

time Trooper Adams asked to see the bag. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5.
Trooper Adams’s second request to see the bag immediately followed
Appellant’s “evasive” actions. See N.T., 5/16/22, at 27-28; Suppression
Court Opinion, 7/26/24, at 6.

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it from the situation” dispelled any safety concern. Appellant’s Brief at 20.

However, the suppression court’s contrary interpretation of Appellant’s actions

(as heightening rather than dispelling concern) is supported by the record,

and we are bound by its factual findings.4

       Our review discloses that the suppression court’s factual findings are

supported by the record, and its application of the law to the facts was proper.

See Commonwealth v. Morris, 619 A.2d 709, 712 (Pa. Super. 1992)

(defendant’s “furtive movements in stuffing a brown bag under the front

passenger seat of the vehicle” justified Terry frisk of defendant and search of

vehicle’s passenger compartment); Commonwealth v. Mathis, 173 A.3d

699, 713-14 (Pa. 2017) (Terry frisk justified in part by officer’s observation

of defendant angling himself to conceal a jacket containing a prominent

bulge). We discern no error in the suppression court’s conclusion that, under

____________________________________________

4 Appellant fails to explain how, if he were able to place the bag in the vehicle,

it would not still be accessible by him. See Commonwealth v. Tuggles, 58
A.3d 840, 842 (Pa. Super. 2012) (under Terry, “a weapons search may be
performed where an officer has reasonable suspicion that a firearm may be
secreted in [a vehicle] and … the search may encompass any area where a
weapon could be hidden and accessible to the defendant in the vehicle.”).

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the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Adams reasonable suspicion to

inspect the bag.5, 6 Appellant’s issue merits no relief.

       In light of our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s remaining

arguments regarding whether his action of handing over the bag was

consensual or whether the contraband would have been inevitably discovered.

____________________________________________

5 The suppression court also found the fact that the “traffic stop occurred near

midnight in a rural area of York County” to be a factor heightening the officer’s
concern for safety. Suppression Court Opinion, 7/26/22, at 7. This factor has
long been recognized as contributing to the totality of the circumstances
justifying a protective search. See In re O.J., 958 A.2d at 566 (protective
search justified in part because “[t]he vehicular stop occurred at night, which
creates a heightened danger that an officer will not be able to view a suspect
reaching for a weapon.”); Commonwealth v. Rosa, 734 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa.
Super. 1999) (protective search justified in part because defendant “was
stopped at night in a rural area”); Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (protective search
justified in part because “[t]he hour was late and the area rural.”).

6 Trooper Adams testified that as soon as he had the bag in his hand, he “felt

what felt like glassine packets, bundles of heroin,” and he “immediately knew
what it was.” N.T., 5/16/22 at 14. The suppression court found this testimony
credible. Suppression Court Opinion, 7/26/22, at 8. Appellant does not
dispute that, once Trooper Adams had the bag in his hand, he could seize it
under the plain feel doctrine. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1; see Int. of T.W.,
261 A.3d 409, 425 (Pa. 2021) (during a Terry frisk, if an officer determines
an object “is not a weapon, the officer may only remove the object if it is
immediately apparent by touch the object is illegal contraband.”).

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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2024

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