Court Opinion

ID: 9785774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:20:11.450836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:32.937502
License: Public Domain

Justice KIDWELL,
dissenting.
This case presents very important public policy issues affecting Idaho families. How courts decide where a custodial parent may live or which parent should have custody of a child demands extremely careful scrutiny. The magistrate abused his discretion in two significant respects. First, he improperly applied the best interest of the child test in § 32-717 (BIOC test) to Ms. Roberts’s request to relocate to Boise with her children. Applying the test as he did was not “necessary or proper in the best interest of the children” as required by § 32-717. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the magistrate erred by ordering that, if Ms. Roberts did relocate at any time in the indefinite future, she would lose physical custody of the children. This clause of the magistrate’s order was arbitrary and punitive, and failed to account for the best interests of the children at the time when a change in custody might occur. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the analysis of the majority opinion and would vacate the magistrate’s order and remand this case for further proceedings.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
The parties asked the magistrate court to consider two modifications to the Custody Sehedule/Parenting Plan (parenting plan): (1) whether Mr. Roberts should have more time with his children; and (2) whether Ms. Roberts should be able to relocate from the Mini-Cassia area to Boise. In the opinion on appeal, the magistrate stated:
The primary issue of these proceedings is the request of [Ms. Roberts] to be allowed to permanently remove the children from Cassia and Minidoka Counties. If the Court denies consent to remove the children, [Ms. Roberts] will then have to determine if she wants to stay in the Mini-Cassia area with custody of the children, or move and allow the defendant to have custody.
The magistrate found that the test for determining whether the parenting plan should be modified to allow Ms. Roberts to relocate “remains that of what is in the best interest of the children.” Factors the magistrate considered in applying the test included:
each parents reason for seeking or opposing the move, quality of relationship between child and ... parents, impact of the move on ... future contact with the noncustodial parent, degree to which custodial parent’s and childs’ life may be enhanced economically, emotionally, and educationally by the move, and feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through . suitable visitation arrangements.
The magistrate ordered that “the request of [Ms. Roberts] to move the children outside Cassia or Minidoka counties is denied____” Additionally, the magistrate ordered that if Ms. Roberts “moves from Minidoka or Cassia, custody of the children will be changed to Mr. Roberts, and the children will reside *407with him.” The court failed to explain why it would be in the children’s best interest for custody to revert from Ms. Roberts to Mr. Roberts if Ms. Roberts moved from the Mini-Cassia area at any time in the indefinite future.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When reviewing an exercise of discretion the Court inquires: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Brownson v. Allen, 134 Idaho 60, 63, 995 P.2d 830, 833 (citing Osteraas v. Osteraas, 124 Idaho 350, 353, 859 P.2d 948, 951 (1993)).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. The Court Improperly Applied The Best Interest Of The Child Test To The Issue Of Whether Ms. Roberts Could Relocate.
The magistrate found that I.C. § 32-717(1) governed Ms. Roberts’s request to modify the parenting plan so that she could relocate. This section states in pertinent part:
In an action for divorce the court may, before and after judgment, give such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the children. The court shall consider all relevant factors____
I.C. § 32-717(1).
Courts may “give such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper in the best interest of the children.” I.C. § 32-717 (emphasis added). Determining where a custodial parent will live based solely upon the BIOC test is neither “necessary [n]or proper, in the best interest of the children” for purposes of I.C. § 32-717 (emphasis added). The best interest of the child, including the child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent, does constitute an important factor in determining whether a court should grant permission for a custodial parent to relocate. However, basing a decision about a custodial parent’s right to relocate solely on the BIOC test overshadows and essentially eliminates consideration of the custodial parent’s protected liberty interests in choosing where to live, work, and raise children. Thus, determining where a custodial parent may five, work, and parent solely based on the BIOC test constitutes an unnecessary and improper interference with the interests of custodial parents, not a “necessary and proper” direction “in the best interest of the children.” I.C. § 32-717. Therefore, I would find I.C. § 32-717 inapplicable in this case.
In light of the shortcomings of the BIOC test as applied to relocation of a custodial parent, a better rule is that a custodial parent’s liberty interest in choosing where to live, work and rear children, gives rise to a presumptive right to relocate. The presumption, however, is not absolute. The noncustodial parent may rebut the presumption by showing that the purpose of the relocation is interference with the non-custodial parent’s rights. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgess, 13 Cal.4th 25, 31, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 449, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (1996); In re Marriage of Postma, 2002 WL 31235833 at *3-4 (Cal.App.2002) (unpublished opinion). The presumption could also give way if the court found, sua sponte, or at the non-custodial parent’s urging, the custodial parent’s relocation would substantially derogate the best interest of the child. Unlike application of the BIOC test, the presumption of a right to relocate provides balance among the interests of the child, the rights of the non-custodial parent, and the liberty interests of the custodial parent.
I would find that the magistrate abused his discretion by improperly applying the BIOC test found in I.C.' § 32-717 when determining whether to allow Ms. Roberts to relocate. Consequently, I would vacate and remand the magistrate’s decision for reevaluation in *408accord with Ms. Roberts’s presumptive right to relocate.
B. The Magistrate Erred By Ordering A Custodial Reversion Clause.
A “custodial reversion clause” is a clause of a custody order which states that custody will change, or revert, from one parent to the other, automatically, upon the happening of an event or the occurrence of a condition. I would find that the magistrate erred by ordering custodial reversion if Ms. Roberts moved from the Mini-Cassia area. The magistrate’s custodial reversion clause was never subjected to the BIOC test; rather, it was an arbitrary and punitive threat intended as a mechanism through which to enforce the other provisions of the magistrate’s order. Contempt proceedings, not custodial reversion clauses, are the proper method through which to enforce custody orders. See, e.g., Blakely v. Blakely, 100 Idaho 107, 594 P.2d 145 (1979).
Even if it is argued that the magistrate relied on the BIOC test to justify the custodial reversion clause at the time he issued his opinion, custodial reversion clauses should be found invalid. “The custody status of a child should not change automatically with the removal of a parent from his or her present location.” In re Marriage of Seitzinger, 333 Ill.App.3d 103, 111, 266 Ill.Dec. 720, 727, 775 N.E.2d 282, 289 (2002). See also Carter v. Kratzenberg, 209 A.D.2d 990, 991, 619 N.Y.S.2d 456, 456 (1994); Wilson v. Wilson, 12 Va.App. 1251, 1255-56, 408 S.E.2d 576, 579 (1991); Emerick v. Emerick, 5 Conn. App. 649, 659, 502 A.2d 933, 938 (1985); Hovater v. Hovater, 577 So.2d 461, 463 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (holding a custodial reversion clause invalid even when agreed upon by the parties in the parenting agreement). This is the case because custody reversion clauses are clearly speculative and amount to no more than conjecture concerning what might be in the best interest of the child in the indefinite future. Korn v. Korn, — So.2d -, -, 2003 WL 164234 at *6 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). Instead, courts should consider whether changing custody meets the BIOC test only upon a showing of an actual, permanent and substantial change in circumstances that may warrant a change in custody. See, e.g., Brownson, 134 Idaho at 63, 995 P.2d at 830 (stating the long-standing rule that the burden is on the party seeking a custody modification to show a permanent and substantial change in circumstances before the court will address the request on its merits).
Enforcing custody reversion clauses allows potentially antiquated court orders to eclipse present reality. Therefore, we should hold the custodial reversion clause invalid. Thus, I would vacate and remand this case in order for the magistrate to consider whether a significant change in circumstances warrants considering a change in custodial parent and, if so, whether such a change would satisfy the BIOC test.
Sadly, this case exemplifies the justification for finding custodial reversion clauses invalid. Though not part of the record on appeal, at oral argument the parties informed this Court that Ms. Roberts and her two children moved from the Mini-Cassia area to Boise two years ago. The children are in school in the Boise area and both parties agree that the children are well adjusted. Because of this appeal, the magistrate has not enforced the custodial reversion clause. Now, by upholding the custody reversion clause, this Court jeopardizes the children’s living arrangements. The children may be forced to again relocate and live with their father. If this happens, it will result solely from an arbitrary and punitive clause of the magistrate’s opinion stating that Ms. Roberts would have to decide “if she wants to stay in the Mini-Cassia area with custody of the children, or move and allow the defendant to have custody.” This said nothing about the children’s best interest when the magistrate issued his order and says no more about it today.
IV.
CONCLUSION
I would find that the magistrate applied the wrong standard in determining whether Ms. Roberts could relocate, and I would find the custody reversion clause in this case invalid. Therefore, I would remand this case *409for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.