Court Opinion

ID: 9726322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:43:51.663149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.030932
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
While there are problems with the search and seizure issues here, the problems in the area of proof of possession of liquor by a minor are more glaring.
Critical additional facts need to be set out. The automobile which the defendant was presumptively driving was not owned by him, nor was there any evidence as to the circumstances under which he was driving it. The evidence shows that “Donald R. Rys was the notarized owner of the vehicle.” There is no evidence of the relationship of Donald R. Rys to the defendant, Dennis Rys. The six other occupants of the vehicle were never identified in the evidence either by name or description, nor were their positions in the automobile shown. “.Five of the other parties in the vehicle were found to be less than 20 years old. One party was 21 years old or older.” The bottle of whiskey on the right-hand side of the floor in the front seat was “partially covered with a jacket or coat.” The village marshal went around to the fight side of the vehicle after the passengers were all out of the car “and opened this door and pulled the jacket away from the- bottle to be certain it was a whiskey bottle ***.”.
The majority opinion makes the. statement that the bottle was “in plain sight of the defendant while he was driving.” There is no evidence to support that statement'. It was at night. The village marshal used a flashlight to see the bottle. There were seven people in the car. ‘.
The marshal 'at no time smelled alcohol on any person in the car, nor in the car itself, nor in the soft drink bottles which were also in the car. There is simply nó evidence of "knowledge or consciousness of possession by defendant except whatever inference might “arise *348from the fact that he was apparently driving the vehicle at the time it was stopped. There is no evidence that the owner of the car was not a passenger in the car. There is not even any evidence that the owner was not the individual over 21 years old.
Under these factual circumstances, the majority opinion holds: “Ordinarily, when liquor, narcotics, or contraband materials are found on a defendant’s premises or in an automobile possessed and operated by him, the evidence of unlawful possession is deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of any other reasonable explanation for its presence.” None of our cases have ever gone that far and the cases cited in support of the proposition do not support it. Most of the cases cited by the majority opinion involve premises, not vehicles. In the three cited cases which involve vehicles, the crucial words are “ownership, domination, and control.”
State v. Salte, 54 S. D. 536, 223 N. W. 733, comes closest to supporting the majority opinion. It states: “The finding of the liquor in a vehicle owned, dominated, and controlled by the accused is sufficient prima facie to establish a conscious and substantial possession.”
In State v. Nelson (Mo. App.), 21 S. W. 2d 190, the court stated: “The car belonged to another who was present and in control thereof, and the presumption would prevail that possession of the liquor went with ownership and possession of the car.”
In Horne v. State, 93 Ga. App. 345, 91 S. E. 2d 824, the last of the vehicle trio cited, and the only vehicle case of recent vintage, the court said: “Presumptively the whiskey found in the automobile belonged to the owner of the automobile who was driving the car.”
If the majority opinion here be correct, a minor may be convicted of unlawful possession of liquor by the mere fact that he was driving an automobile, which he did not own, in which liquor was found, without any additional proof of conscious and substantial possession. This would *349be so whether or not the owner of the automobile was present in the car and whether or not there were other minor passengers also. While the court may wish to overrule State v. Eberhardt, 176 Neb. 18, 125 N. W. 2d 1, by ignoring it, this is not the case in which to do it. In fact, the rule that knowledge and consciousness of possession of alcoholic liquor are essential elements of proof was reaffirmed in State v. Reeder, 183 Neb. 425, 160 N. W. 2d 753. In any event, this court has not yet disagreed with the rule quoted in Eberhardt, from Reyes v. State, 151 Neb. 636, 38 N. W. 2d 539: “Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, the circumstances proven must relate directly to the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt in such a way as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion.”
The evidence here was clearly insufficient and the conviction should be reversed.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.